Case Title: Jordan v. Walmart Associates, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49452

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2023-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 49452 
 
In Re:  Jeffery Jordan, Decedent. 
------------------------------------------- 
SUE JORDAN, 
 
     Claimant-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
WALMART ASSOCIATES, INC., Employer; 
NEW 
HAMPSHIRE 
INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Surety, 
 
     Defendants-Appellants. 
_______________________________________ 
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Boise, August 2023 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: November 29, 2023 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho. 
The decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission is affirmed. 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, Pocatello, for Appellant. Jetta Mathews argued. 
Sue Jordan, Rathdrum, Claimant-Respondent, pro se. Sue Jordan did not appear.   
_______________________ 
 
BRODY, Justice 
This appeal involves a worker’s compensation claim. Appellants Walmart and New 
Hampshire Insurance Company appeal the Idaho Industrial Commission’s determination that the 
employee’s widow, Sue Jordan, is entitled to medical and death benefits. More specifically, they 
challenge the Commission’s application of the presumption set forth in Idaho Code section 72-228 
where there was unrebutted prima facie evidence indicating that the employee’s death arose in the 
course of his employment. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the decision of the Idaho 
Industrial Commission. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Sue Jordan filed a complaint with the Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”) 
seeking medical and death benefits for the death of her husband, Jeffrey Jordan. Jeffrey was 
working overtime at his place of employment, a Walmart tire department, on October 31, 2018, 
when he collapsed and was taken by ambulance to the hospital. Two days later, Jeffrey died in the 
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hospital from a stroke. In the complaint seeking medical and death benefits, Jordan claimed the 
nature of the injury was due to job-related “stress.”  
 
The Commission received Jordan’s complaint on November 1, 2019. After filing their 
answer, Walmart and New Hampshire Insurance Company (collectively “Walmart”) submitted 
discovery requests and interrogatories on March 20, 2020. Jordan produced three written 
statements from Jeffrey’s co-workers in May 2020, but otherwise did not respond.  Jordan also 
emailed the Commission’s support staff, requesting extra time to gather the required documents 
because of the COVID-19 pandemic, which had resulted in the closure of the Walmart tire 
department. Nearly four months after the first discovery request, Walmart filed a motion to compel. 
The Commission granted the motion, warning Jordan that she was required to respond to the 
discovery requests and file a notice of service of responses to the discovery no later than fifteen 
days from the order or sanctions may be imposed, “including and up to DISMISSAL OF THE 
COMPLAINT.” (Emphasis in original). Jordan failed to comply.  
 
On August 17, 2020, Walmart moved to dismiss Jordan’s complaint based on her failure 
to respond to discovery requests as ordered. On September 14, 2020, the Commission issued an 
order to Jordan, requiring her to show cause within fourteen days why sanctions, including 
dismissal of her complaint, should not be ordered. The assigned referee received a voicemail from 
Jordan on September 30, 2020, requesting a call back: 
Yes, this is Jordan and I’m calling on behalf of my husband, Jefferey Jordan, and I 
got a letter of [unintelligible] and I got a letter saying it was dismissed because there 
was no response from me when there was. If you could give me a call back at [phone 
number] and the case is IC 2019-017748. If you could get back to me, I would 
appreciate it. Thank you and bye-bye.  
The referee then relayed this ex parte communication to all parties via letter and advised Jordan 
that the referee could not discuss the case unless all parties were present.  
 
On October 26, 2020, Walmart contacted the Commission and inquired about the status of 
the case. A supervisor with the Commission informed Walmart’s counsel that they were reluctant 
to dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint during the COVID-19 pandemic. Walmart subsequently 
filed a petition for declaratory relief under Judicial Rule of Practice of Procedure (“JRP”) 15, 
requesting a ruling that no lawful order prevented the dismissal of complaints brought by pro se 
claimants, and also requesting that the Commission dismiss the complaint because of Jordan’s 
failure to comply with the Commission’s Order to Show Cause.  
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The Commission denied the petition for declaratory relief on the grounds that sanctions, 
including dismissal, are discretionary with the Commission under JRP 7(C) and 16. The 
Commission stated that it did not agree with Walmart’s position that dismissal was mandatory in 
this instance. The Commission explained that there were several possible sanctions available to 
address Jordan’s failure to comply with its order, one of which was dismissal. The Commission 
further explained that it was exercising its discretion in retaining cases during the COVID-19 
pandemic, particularly cases with pro se claimants and that additional precautions would be taken 
to ensure that dismissal was the appropriate sanction: 
There is no doubt that the current pandemic has thrown lives into disarray. Many 
people are struggling to keep food on the table and a roof over their heads, and it is 
understandable that the prosecution of a worker’s compensation complaint may 
assume a lower priority than it did in less turbulent times. We are reluctant to take 
action which will result in dismissal of the complaint of a pro se claimant during 
the current emergency, and this forbearance is not inconsistent with the many 
actions of state and federal governments .… 
 
. . . . 
. . . [I]t is our direction that before entertaining dismissal of a complaint of a pro se 
claimant, particularly where a dismissal without prejudice is the equivalent of a 
dismissal with prejudice [in a case where the statute of limitations has lapsed], the 
Commission must take additional precautions to be assured that dismissal is the 
appropriate sanction during the current emergency. 
The Commission referred Walmart’s request back to the referee to determine what sanctions would 
be appropriate and provided guidance on how the referee could hold a telephone conference with 
the parties to better understand Jordan’s failure to prosecute her case and whether it had anything 
to do with the pandemic.  
The referee held that telephone conference on February 8, 2021. That same day, Walmart 
requested a hearing date to determine whether Jeffrey’s death had been caused by an accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment, as defined by Idaho Code section 72-108(18), 
or was unrelated to the October 31, 2018, accident. A video hearing (over Zoom) was set for June 
4, 2021, and a briefing schedule was ordered. Near the deadline for the filing of her reply brief, 
Jordan sought an extension of time to file her brief, which the referee granted. Despite this 
extension, Jordan did not file a brief in support of her claim.   
At the hearing, Jordan attempted to admit the affidavits of three of Jeffrey’s co-workers. 
The referee excluded this evidence because Jordan had not previously disclosed to Walmart that 
she would offer those affidavits as exhibits. Walmart then moved for an order excluding any 
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testimony offered by or on behalf of Jordan because of her failure to comply with the order 
compelling her to respond to Walmart’s discovery requests: 
We received an order compelling discovery from the Commission in this case. No 
discovery was ever produced. We had filed a petition for declaratory ruling asking 
the Commission to dismiss the case for failure to comply with the order. The 
Commission felt like dismissal was not the appropriate remedy, but from the 
decision the Commission indicated that other remedies could be considered by – by 
you, Referee Robinson, in terms of the case. So, we would ask – and since that 
order has been entered I would just indicate no additional discovery has been 
produced. We have received no medical records. We have received no statements 
from any physicians establishing a causal link to any industrial incident and – and 
Mr. Jordan’s death and – and we have not received any information about these 
claims and because we have not received any discovery we would now move that 
any testimony be excluded. It would be unfair for us to be expected to cross-
examine and consider their testimony when the discovery was never provided in 
this case and I would note – we have not received any notice of any post-hearing 
depositions of any physicians. We do not have any medical records and where this 
case will likely turn on a medical opinion regarding causation, we just don’t see 
how that testimony would be appropriately provided to this court. So, we would 
move to exclude any testimony and ask that – that order be entered. 
This was the only sanction motion made by Walmart after the Commission issued its declaratory 
ruling.  Jordan responded that she had attempted to send medical records from the hospital to the 
Commission. She also explained that she had signed a release of medical information form, 
providing Walmart authorization to get Jeffrey’s medical records, from October 31, 2019, through 
November 2, 2019, (the date of Jeffrey’s death) directly from the hospital. Jordan also explained 
that there were no medical records prior to that “because he never – he was never even sick to even 
go to the doctor.”  
The referee granted Walmart’s motion to exclude testimony in part and denied it in part. 
Jordan was allowed to testify to anything within her personal knowledge but was prohibited from 
producing any testimony that veered into medical evidence. No other testimony was allowed. 
Jordan then testified about the events surrounding Jeffrey’s stroke on October 31, 2018, and 
Jordan’s awareness of his high blood pressure.  
Following the hearing, the referee issued her proposed findings of facts and conclusions of 
law. The referee noted that it was uncontested that Jeffrey had collapsed while working at Walmart, 
thereby determining as a matter of law that it was also uncontested that Jeffrey’s injury (the stroke) 
arose in the course of employment. Because of this, and because Jeffrey had died, the referee 
determined that Idaho Code section 72-228 applied, and Jordan was entitled to the presumption 
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that the “injury arose out of the course of employment.” The referee explained that, to rebut the 
presumption, Walmart was required to produce “substantial evidence that they did not have notice 
of the accident” or “substantial evidence to the contrary [that the injury arose out of the 
employment].” Finding that Walmart had notice that Jeffrey had collapsed while working and that 
this fact was uncontested, the referee concluded that Walmart had notice of the accident. The 
referee also found that Walmart offered no substantial, affirmative, medical evidence to rebut the 
presumption but instead presented argument regarding Jordan’s untimely filing (these arguments 
were rejected by the referee and are not raised on appeal) and lack of notice generally. Thus, having 
failed to provide substantial evidence necessary to overcome the statutory presumption set forth in 
Idaho Code section 72-228, the referee concluded that Jeffrey’s death arose out of and in the course 
of employment, and Jordan was entitled to death and medical benefits. The referee filed the 
proposed decision with the Commission for review.  
The Commission agreed with the referee’s ultimate conclusion but declined to adopt her 
decision, instead issuing its own findings and conclusions. The Commission determined that it was 
uncontested that Jeffrey had “suffered a massive hemorrhagic stroke and collapsed at work” in the 
course of his employment at Walmart and that Jeffrey had died. The Commission concluded that 
Jordan was “entitled to the presumption that the accident was also one arising out of his 
employment.” The Commission explained that Walmart “misapprehend[ed] the burden of 
adducing substantial affirmative medical evidence tending to prove that Decedent’s death is related 
to a non-industrial cause.”  
The Commission also explained that Walmart sought the hearing to determine the cause of 
Jeffrey’s injury without first obtaining any substantial evidence necessary to rebut the presumption 
that the accident which arose in the course of employment also arose out of that employment. 
Recognizing that the application of Idaho Code section 72-228 was not addressed by any party in 
this case, the Commission explained that Walmart’s request for a determination on the issue of 
causation could not be sufficiently answered without a consideration of the statutory rules that 
address the burdens of production and persuasion in cases such as this. The Commission held that, 
because consideration of section 72-228 is not a new theory of recovery or an affirmative defense 
but rather is a rule of law applicable to Jordan’s claim, the application of the statute was necessary 
to the determination of the issues raised by Walmart in its request for a hearing.  
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The Commission chided Walmart’s decision to take this case to a hearing before gathering 
evidence and without properly considering the impact of Idaho Code section 72-228 on the case: 
The application of the provision of Idaho Code § 72-228 to the facts of this 
case does not appear to have been anticipated by Defendants, but it should have 
been, inasmuch as consideration of Idaho Code § 72-228 is requisite to the first 
issue raised by Defendants in their request for calendaring: “whether Claimant’s 
[sic] death was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment as defined by Idaho Code 72-102(18) [sic].” Even so, Defendants 
failed to consider the impact of the circumstances of Decedent’s death on the 
question of who bears the burden of proving the “course” and “arising” components 
of the case. The Dissent has argued that to burden Defendants with this outcome is 
unfair in view of the considerable leniency shown by the Commission to Claimant 
in almost every other aspect of this case. However, it is Defendants who requested 
that this matter be set for hearing. Between the February 8, 2021 status conference 
and the June 4, 2021 hearing, Defendants took no further action to obtain discovery 
responses or, failing that, some sanction (including dismissal) for Claimant’s failure 
to respond. . . . Defendants made the tactical judgment to request that this matter be 
set for hearing, and they also declined to initiate any further pursuit of discovery 
responses from Claimant prior to hearing. At hearing, they obtained a favorable 
ruling preventing Claimant from putting on any medical evidence in support of her 
claim. Defendants having chosen this path forward, the Commission is not inclined 
to remand this matter to the Referee for further treatment of outstanding discovery 
requests, or dismissal of the Complaint, as has been suggested by the Dissent. 
(Internal citation omitted). The Commission concluded that Jeffrey’s death arose from, and 
occurred in the course of, his employment and therefore Jordan was entitled to death benefits and 
any medical benefits related to Jeffrey’s death. Walmart timely appealed.  
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
 
“When this Court reviews a decision from the Industrial Commission, it exercises free 
review over questions of law but reviews questions of fact only to determine whether substantial 
and competent evidence supports the Commission’s findings.” Deon v. H & J, Inc., 157 Idaho 665, 
667, 339 P.3d 550, 552 (2014). The correctness of the Commission’s application of Idaho Code 
section 72-228 is a question of law. Politte v. Dep’t of Transp., 126 Idaho 270, 272, 882 P.2d 437, 
439 (1994); Evans v. Hara’s, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 475, 849 P.2d 934, 936 (1993). Generally, when 
reviewing cases under section 72-228, this Court’s task is to determine whether there is substantial 
evidence contrary to the presumption that the injury arose out of the employee’s employment,” 
which is an evidentiary burden borne by the employer. Politte, 126 Idaho at 272, 882 P.2d at 439. 
. 
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Whether the employee suffered an industrial accident is a factual determination for the 
Commission, which this Court will uphold if it is supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Id. “[I]f there is doubt surrounding whether the accident in question arose out of and in the course 
of employment, the matter will be resolved in favor of the employee.” Id. (quoting Spivey v. 
Novartis Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 33, 43 P.3d 788, 792 (2002)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Industrial Commission did not err in concluding that Jordan was entitled to 
death and medical benefits. 
Walmart contends that the Commission erred in concluding Jordan was entitled to death 
and medical benefits because Jordan did not meet her burden in establishing all elements for a 
workers’ compensation claim. Walmart raises two arguments in support of this contention: (1) 
Jordan failed to prove that Jeffrey suffered an industrial accident resulting in a compensable injury, 
and (2) the Commission raised a new theory of recovery on Jordan’s behalf by sua sponte applying 
the statutory presumptions contained in Idaho Code section 72-228.  For the reasons explained 
below, we reject each of these arguments. 
1. Jordan met her burden of proving an industrial accident resulting in a compensable 
injury. 
 
To recover workers’ compensation benefits, the claimant carries the burden of establishing 
that he suffered both (1) an industrial accident and (2) a compensable injury resulting from that 
accident. See Serrano v. Four Seasons Framing, 157 Idaho 309, 317, 336 P.3d 242, 250 (2014).. 
An accident is “an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, 
connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to time 
when and place where it occurred, causing an injury.” I.C. § 72-102(17)(b).  
A compensable injury is “a personal injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the 
course of any employment covered by the worker’s compensation law.” I.C. § 72-102(17)(a) 
(emphasis added). An injury is deemed to arise out of the employment when “a causal connection 
is found to exist between the circumstances under which the work must be performed and the 
injury of which the claimant complains.” Hamilton v. Alpha Services, LLC, 158 Idaho 683, 689, 
351 P.3d 611, 617 (2015) (quoting Dinius v. Loving Care & More, Inc, 133 Idaho 572, 575, 990 
P.2d 738, 741 (1999)). An injury is deemed to be in the course of employment when it occurs 
while the worker is engaged in employment duties. Dinius., 133 Idaho at 575, 990 P.2d at 741. 
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Thus, a compensable injury includes an injury caused by an accident (as defined above), “which 
results in violence to the physical structure of the body.” I.C. § 72-102(17)(c). 
Walmart argues that Jordan failed to prove that the stroke resulted from an industrial 
accident because there was no evidence that the stroke is “connected with the industry in which it 
occur[red].” I.C.§ 72-102(17)(b). Walmart contends Jordan failed to present evidence—and the 
Commission made no finding—that there was an industrial accident that resulted in “violence to 
the physical structure of the body.”  I.C.§ 72-102(17)(c).  We disagree. 
This Court has previously held that a stroke occurring while the employee was engaged in 
employment duties is an industrial accident resulting in a compensable injury. See Lewis v. Dep’t 
of L. Enf’t, 79 Idaho 40, 45, 311 P.2d 976, 978-79 (1957) (explaining that a compensable injury 
does not require “violence” but is determined by whether the workplace labor aggravated or 
accelerated a pre-existing condition, or caused or contributed to the injury); see also Politte, 126 
Idaho at  271, 273, 882 P.2d at 438, 440 (upholding the Commission’s award of worker’s 
compensation benefits for an employee who suffered a stroke). Although this Court’s decision in 
Lewis predates the 1971 modification of Idaho’s worker’s compensation law, the definitions of 
“accident” and “injury” have remained unchanged since the terms were first added as part of “The 
Occupational Disease Compensation Law,” Idaho Code section 43-1001, added in 1939,  ch. 161, 
sec. 1, p. 286. Here, the Commission was presented uncontested evidence that Jeffrey collapsed 
from a stroke while working overtime at a Walmart tire center  performing employment duties. 
Thus, per our holdings in Lewis and Politte, the record establishes that Jeffrey suffered an industrial 
accident resulting in a compensable injury. 
2. The Industrial Commission did not raise a new theory of recovery on Jordan’s behalf 
because the application of Idaho Code section 72-228 is inherent to Jordan’s claim 
and the issue of causation. 
 
Walmart argues that the Commission’s decision to apply the statutory presumption set forth 
in Idaho Code section 72-228 violated this Court’s holding in Deon v. H & J., Inc., which bars the 
Commission from raising new theories of recovery sua sponte. 157 Idaho 665, 671, 339 P.3d 550, 
556 (2014). Because this statutory presumption was never raised or addressed by the parties but 
first arose in the referee’s decision, Walmart argues it had no notice that Jordan would “raise the 
statute as part of her prima facie burden of proof” or that the Commission would “advocat[e] in 
[Jordan’s] stead.” Walmart contends that, as a result of the Commission’s application of this 
statute, it was denied its right to a neutral decision maker. Walmart misconstrues our holding in 
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Deon,  and we reject the contention that Walmart was denied a neutral decision maker where the 
Commission’s application of the statute was correct as a matter of law. 
Section 72-228 of the Idaho Code provides a statutory presumption in favor of a workers’ 
compensation claimant when the injured worker has been killed and his injury is shown to have 
arisen in the course of employment: 
In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically 
or mentally unable to testify, and where there is unrebutted prima facie evidence 
that indicates that the injury arose in the course of employment, it shall be 
presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the injury 
arose out of the employment and that sufficient notice of the accident causing the 
injury has been given. 
 
I.C. § 72-228.  If the claimant submits prima facie evidence to satisfy the first prong of the test—
that the injury arose in the course of employment, that gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that 
satisfies the second prong of the test—that the claimant’s injury arose out of his employment. The 
burden then shifts to the employer to present substantial evidence to the contrary. Id.; Seamans v. 
Maaco Auto Painting & Bodyworks, 128 Idaho 747, 753, 918 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1996); Evans, 123 
Idaho at 478, 849 P.2d at 939. To overcome the rebuttable presumption that an injury arose out of 
the worker’s employment, the employer must submit affirmative medical proof. Nelson v. 
Pocatello, 170 Idaho 160, 173, 508 P.3d 1234, 1247 (2022); Politte, 126 Idaho at 273, 882 P.2d at 
440. 
In this case, the Commission correctly recognized that the undisputed fact that Jeffrey 
collapsed while working in the Walmart tire department and later died from that stroke triggered 
the application of the rebuttable presumption set forth in Idaho Code section 72-228. Contrary to 
Walmart’s assertion, section 72-228 is not a theory of recovery or an affirmative defense. Instead, 
it is the law that applies to Jordan’s claim. It establishes which party has the burden of production 
and the burden of persuasion under the circumstances referenced within the statute.  
 
Our conclusion that section 72-228 is a rule of law rather than a theory of recovery is borne 
out by our decision in Evans v. Hara’s, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 478, 849 P.2d 934, 939 (1993). In that 
case Evans sustained a serious head injury as a result of a fall that occurred while he was working 
at Hara’s, Inc. Id. at 475, 849 P.2d at 936. The fall resulted in a skull fracture and brain hemorrhage, 
requiring surgery. Id. at 475–76, 849 P.2d at 936–37. Following surgery, Evans was left 
permanently disabled and unable to communicate. Id. at 476, 849 P.2d at 937. At a subsequent 
workers’ compensation hearing, the Commission’s referee applied Idaho Code section 72-228, 
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finding that it was undisputed that Evans was physically unable to testify, and that Evans’ injury 
arose out of his employment. Id. at 477, 849. P.2d at 938. However, Hara’s presented substantial, 
affirmative, medical evidence that: (1) Evans was an alcoholic who had a history of alcohol 
withdrawal seizures; (2) that such seizures resulted in Evans falling and striking his head on the 
ground and/or nearby furnishings, (3) that Evans had suddenly reduced his alcohol intake prior to 
the fall, and (4) that Evans’ head injuries caused by the fall were consistent with injuries that would 
be suffered during an alcohol withdrawal seizure. Id. at 476–79, 849 P.2d at 937–40. Likewise, 
Hara’s presented evidence that Evans had not fallen from any height and that there was nothing 
unusual about his work environment that day such as to create a risk of fall or a head injury. Id. 
Based on this evidence, the Commission found that Hara’s had presented substantial evidence 
sufficient to rebut the presumption that Evans’ injury arose out of his employment and thereby 
denied Evans’s claim. Id. at 478–79, 849 P.2d at 939–40.  
On appeal, Evans argued that the Commission had erred by assigning him the burden of 
persuasion in challenging Hara’s evidence. Id. at 478, 849 P.2d at 939. We affirmed the 
Commission’s decision, distinguishing the burden of production from the burden of persuasion, 
concluding that “once the employer has come forward with substantial affirmative evidence to 
indicate that the accident did not arise out of the employment, the burden shifts back to the 
employee to persuade the Commission that it did indeed arise out of the employment.”  Id. at 478, 
849 P.2d at 939.  
Most relevant to this case, this Court also stated in Evans that, where it was undisputed that 
(1) Evans was physically unable to testify and (2) his injury arose in his employment, the 
Commission was required to apply the statutory presumption contained in Idaho Code section 72-
228 that the injury also arose out of the employment. Id. When the presumption applies, the 
employer bears the burden of producing substantial, affirmative, medical evidence that the 
accident did not arise out of  the course of employment. If the employer fails to meet its burden of 
production, then the claimant prevails. I.C. § 72-228. But if the employer meets its burden of 
production, as in Evans, the burden of persuasion that the injury arose out of the employment shifts 
back to the claimant.  
Walmart argues that Evans is not applicable to this case because in that case Evans raised 
the statutory presumption of Idaho Code section 72-228 himself whereas it was the Commission 
who raised the statute’s application here. But Evans is applicable. Evans discusses the purpose of 
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the statutory presumption—namely, that Idaho Code section 72-228 is a mandatory rule of law 
assigning the burdens of production and persuasion for establishing causation in workers’ 
compensation claims when the undisputed facts show that claimant has died (like Jeffrey here) or 
is physically or mentally unable to testify (like Evans). Thus, in applying the rule of law articulated 
in Evans, we hold that it is irrelevant who first raises Idaho Code section 72-228 in a workers’ 
compensation claim.  
Walmart’s actions in requesting the hearing to determine whether Jeffrey’s death had been 
caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and  agreeing that 
Jeffrey’s collapse occurred while he was engaged in his employment duties, left the Commission 
no choice but to apply section 72-228. In fact, the Commission was required to do so to resolve 
the issues raised. While Jordan always bore the burden of persuasion in demonstrating that 
Jeffrey’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment, Jordan met this burden by 
presenting the undisputed facts that Jeffrey had collapsed while working and subsequently died. 
The burden of production then shifted to Walmart to overcome the rebuttable presumption by 
producing substantial, affirmative, medical evidence that the injury had not arisen in the course of 
employment. Walmart failed to meet its burden. 
Contrary to Walmart’s assertion, our holdings in Deon v. H & J., Inc. 157 Idaho 665, 671, 
339 P.3d 550, 556 (2014), and Heitz v. Carroll, 117 Idaho 373, 788 P.2d 188 (1990), are not 
applicable to this case.  Deon is not applicable because the Commission did not sua sponte raise 
an affirmative defense (like collateral estoppel) to a claimant’s allegation of the employer’s total 
liability. 157 Idaho at 669-71, 339 P.3d at 554-56. Likewise, Heitz is not applicable because the 
Commission did not sua sponte raise a new theory of recovery to enable Jordan to retry her case 
with an additional claim or a new cause of action. 117 Idaho at 378, 788 P.2d at 193.   
To be clear, Idaho Code section 72-228 does not present an alternative theory of recovery 
for claimants in workers’ compensation cases. Rather, it is a rule of law establishing the burdens 
of production and persuasion in workers’ compensation cases, as explained above. The application 
of section 72-228’s presumption—namely, that Jeffrey’s death arose out of his employment—was 
inherent in Jordan’s claim for medical and death benefits, given the undisputed facts that Jeffrey’s 
collapse occurred at work and that he subsequently died. 
Walmart further argues that affirming the Commission’s application of Idaho Code section 
72-228 would result in “almost no limit to the role the Commission could play in advocating on 
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behalf of one party or the other,” suggesting that the Commission would be allowed to 
spontaneously apply the statute of limitations even if not raised. We reject this argument. 
Invocation of the statute of limitations is different because it is an affirmative defense that must be 
raised by a party or else is waived. See Rivera v. Johnston, 71 Idaho 70, 75, 225 P.2d 858, 860-61 
(1950). 
 Likewise, we also reject Walmart’s argument that Idaho Code section 72-228 is similar to 
Idaho Code section 12-120(3), in which attorney fees shall be granted to a prevailing party but 
only when the party has specifically requested them. Recovery of attorney fees is an additional 
theory of monetary recovery above and beyond the damages sought for the claims pleaded in the 
complaint. See generally Indep. Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 20, 137 P.3d 
409, 416 (2006); Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., 150 Idaho 521, 530, 248 P.3d 1256, 1265 
(2011). In this case, the Commission’s application of section 72-228 did not result in an award of 
any additional medical or death benefits not noticed to Walmart by Jordan’s original claim and did 
not raise a new theory of monetary recovery. Rather, Idaho Code section 72-228 is more like Idaho 
Code section 12-102, in conjunction with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)(A) and (C), 
which provides costs to a prevailing party as a matter of right. “Because costs are awarded as a 
matter of right a party need not raise the issue in their opening brief on appeal or provide the Court 
with citation and authority authorizing costs in order to be awarded costs on appeal.”  Mulford v. 
Union Pac. R.R., 156 Idaho 134, 142, 321 P.3d 684, 692 (2014). Just as a party need not 
specifically request costs on appeal to recover those costs as a prevailing party, neither must a 
workers’ compensation claimant specifically raise Idaho Code section 72-228 to be entitled to its 
presumption when the undisputed facts presented give rise to its application as a matter of law. 
As explained above, Idaho Code section 72-228 is neither an affirmative defense nor a new 
theory of recovery but is instead a mandatory rule of law inherent to the noticed issues—issues 
raised by Walmart in its request for a hearing. By agreeing that Jeffrey had collapsed while 
working, combined with the inescapable fact that Jeffrey had died, Walmart was or should have 
been on notice of Idaho Code section 72-228’s applicability to this case. More specifically, once 
Walmart requested the hearing to resolve whether the injury arose out of Jeffery’s employment, it 
was bound by the presumption in section 72-228. We therefore hold that the Commission did not 
err in applying Idaho Code section 72-228 to Jordan’s case.  
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B. Jordan is not estopped from relying on section 72-228 because any prejudice to 
Walmart  was the result of its own conduct and misunderstanding of the applicable 
law.  
Walmart argues that “[e]ven if the Commission were allowed to apply section 72-228 sua 
sponte, it is unjust and inequitable to do so here because Claimant’s own actions prevented 
Defendants from rebutting it.” Walmart argues that it was prevented from rebutting the statutory 
presumption of section 72-228 because Jordan’s failure to respond to discovery requests left it 
with no access to pertinent medical records. Thus, Walmart argues the laws of equity and justice 
should prevent Jordan from relying on section 72-228 to win her claim. 
Walmart cites a variety of authorities to argue for justice and equity. It first references 
Idaho Code section 15-2-803(n), otherwise known as “Idaho’s slayer statute,” which bars a 
murderer from profiting from the death of his victim. It appears that Walmart is attempting to 
analogize Jordan’s failure to respond to discovery requests with a murderer retaining property or 
benefits as a result of the death of his victim, or Walmart may be equating a person who spoils 
evidence to a murderer. But such analogies fail here. No one alleges that medical records were 
destroyed, much less that Jordan destroyed them. Failure to respond to discovery requests is not 
on par with the intentional destruction of medical records or murder. 
Walmart next cites Idaho Rules of Evidence 804(a)(5) and (b)(5), which provide an 
exception to the hearsay rule when a proponent wrongfully causes the unavailability of a witness. 
Again, this rule of evidence is irrelevant here. This case does not involve a hearsay question, and 
no one alleges Jordan wrongfully made a witness unavailable. While Jordan’s failure to respond 
to discovery requests was improper, her actions did not prevent Walmart from obtaining Jeffrey’s 
medical information by other means. Walmart could have obtained Jeffrey’s medical records from 
the hospital by using the signed medical release form Jordan had provided, it could have requested 
the referee issue subpoenas to medical providers for the records, or it could have obtained the 
medical records through additional motion practice before the referee. Walmart never exercised 
these options. 
As a final argument on the issue of equity, Walmart invokes the clean hands doctrine, 
which provides that “‘a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his 
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the 
controversy in issue.’” Kirkman v. Stoker, 134 Idaho 541, 544, 6 P.3d 397, 400 (2000) (quoting 
Gilbert v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho 137, 145, 657 P.2d 1, 9 (1983)). The clean hands 
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doctrine is a principle of equity invoked to promote public policy and protect the integrity of the 
courts. See Gilbert, 104 Idaho at 145, 657 P.2d at 9. It is not “a judicial strait jacket . . . to repel all 
sinners from a court of equity, nor does it apply to every unconscientious act of a party[].” Id. at 
145–46, 657 P.2d at 9–10 (quoting 30 C.J.S. Equity § 98 (1965)). “[E]quity will consider the 
conduct of the adversary, the requirements of public policy, and the relation of the misconduct to 
the subject matter of the suit and to [the] defendant.” Id. at 146, 657 P.2d at 10 (alterations omitted) 
(quoting 30 C.J.S. Equity § 98 (1965)). 
Here, Jordan’s failure to respond to discovery requests and the Order to Show Cause does 
not amount to fraudulent, deceitful, or dishonest conduct. This Court did not apply the clean hands 
doctrine in Kirkman, or in Gilbert, and we decline to do so here. While failure to respond fully to 
discovery requests and an order to show cause is likely dilatory, application of the clean hands 
doctrine is not an appropriate remedy absent a showing of intentional misconduct in a court of 
equity. Instead, the proper remedy may be a motion for sanctions. 
Although Walmart initially moved for sanctions in August 2020 and moved for a 
declaratory judgment in October 2020, it dropped the issue once the Commission decided against 
mandatory dismissal and referred the issue back to the referee to determine whether the pandemic 
had anything to do with Jordan’s failure to prosecute her case and to determine precisely what 
sanctions, if any, were appropriate. Instead of pursuing the matter further with the referee, Walmart 
requested a hearing to resolve the issue of causation. Walmart was not required to request this 
hearing. Walmart had several alternative methods to defend against Jordan’s workers’ 
compensation claim: (1) do nothing and wait to see what Jordan (who, as Walmart readily admits, 
was failing to prosecute her case) would do; (2) establish with the referee that Jordan’s failure to 
answer discovery had nothing to do with the pandemic and renew its motion for sanctions in light 
of this showing; (3) depose Jordan to ask about Jeffrey’s medical history and providers; (4) request 
the referee issue subpoenas so Walmart could obtain Jeffrey’s medical records from medical 
providers; (5) use the signed release that Jordan provided to obtain Jeffrey’s medical records from 
the hospital; or (6) notice the claim for hearing. Walmart chose the last option, despite having no 
evidence to rebut the presumption provided by Idaho Code section 72-228.  
At the hearing, the only sanction Walmart requested was the exclusion of any offered 
testimony, which the referee largely granted by excluding the three affidavits of Jeffrey’s co-
workers and limiting Jordan’s testimony to information within her own personal knowledge. 
15 
 
Walmart argues that this was not a sanction at all because the referee already excluded those 
affidavits due to Jordan’s failure to notify Walmart that she intended to use them at the hearing. 
However, Walmart’s argument here misses the point: Walmart did not ask for any other sanction; 
thus, the referee had no obligation to impose one on Jordan. 
 Moreover, Jordan did not testify to any additional prejudicial facts not already noticed to 
Walmart. The only facts testified to by Jordan and relied upon by the referee and Commission in 
their decisions were facts Walmart did not dispute: that Jeffrey collapsed from a stroke while 
working overtime at the Walmart tire department and that Jeffrey died two days later in the hospital 
from that stroke. These facts were enough for the Commission to apply Idaho Code section 72-
228’s presumption that Jeffrey’s death arose out of his employment, thereby entitling Jordan to 
death and medical benefits.  
We agree with the Commission that this case presents a clear example of misapprehending 
applicable law. Walmart requested the hearing on the mistaken belief that Jordan’s claim would 
be dismissed as untimely or for failure to prove causation of Jeffrey’s injury, without considering 
the presumptions in Idaho Code section 72-228. Any prejudice Walmart believes it suffered due 
to the Commission’s application of the statutory presumption in Jordan’s favor is thus primarily 
the result of its own decisions in handling this case. The Commission did not err in applying Idaho 
Code section 72-228. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Commission’s decision is affirmed. Although the prevailing party, Jordan is not 
entitled to costs because she did not make an appearance in this appeal.  
Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices STEGNER and ZAHN CONCUR. 
Justice Moeller sat for oral argument, but did not participate in the Opinion.