Case Title: Apple Group Ltd. v. Medina County Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2014-Ohio-2381

Docket Number: 2013-0149

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Apple Group Ltd. v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2381.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-2381 
APPLE GROUP LTD., APPELLANT, v. MEDINA COUNTY BOARD OF  
REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Apple Group Ltd. v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Revision,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2381.] 
Real property taxation—Evidence before Board of Tax Appeals negating 
auditor’s valuation—Independent valuation by Board of Tax Appeals—
Carryover value. 
(No. 2013-0149—Submitted February 25, 2014—Decided June 10, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2009-K-2101. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This real-property-valuation case concerns the proper valuation of 
unbuilt lots in a residential subdivision for tax year 2008.  The Board of Tax 
Appeals (“BTA”) rejected the comparable-sales appraisal submitted by the 
taxpayer, Apple Group Ltd., and because it concluded that the taxpayer had failed 
to discharge its burden of showing a different value, the BTA reverted to the 
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county’s valuation of the parcels.  Contrary to the BTA’s analysis, we conclude 
that Apple Group presented evidence that negated the auditor’s determination of 
value and that triggered the BTA’s duty to perform an independent valuation of 
the property for tax year 2008.  The BTA then had the duty to determine whether 
to carry a new valuation for 2008 forward to tax year 2009.  As for tax year 2010, 
the BTA properly decided that that tax year lay beyond the scope of inquiry in 
this case.  We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further 
proceedings. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} At issue are 13 residential lots improved for building (road access, 
city water, natural gas, electric, and telephone service available to each lot), but 
without any houses built on them as of the lien dates at issue.  The lots are part of 
a subdivision, called Trophy Club in Medina County, which includes lots not at 
issue. 
{¶ 3} In Medina County, 2007 was a reappraisal year, but on the lien 
date for tax year 2007 (January 1, 2007), the lots at issue were part of a larger 
tract.  According to the property record cards, that larger tract was subdivided into 
the current lots in June 2007.  That created the need for the auditor to assign 
individual values to the 13 individual lots for the first time in the 2008 tax year.  
Based on comparable sales from the Trophy Club subdivision, the auditor set the 
value of each lot at $105,000. (Because the lots were unbuilt, there was of course 
no building value to assign.) 
1.  The BOR retained the auditor’s valuation 
{¶ 4} Apple Group filed a single complaint on March 31, 2009, 
challenging the valuation and proposing a reduced value of $65,000 for each of 
the 13 lots.  As justification for the reduction, Apple cited “[m]arket data,” 
“[d]ecline in values,” and “[o]ther factors to be presented at the BOR hearing.”  
At the BOR hearing, Apple’s witness, Sandy Simich, testified that the Trophy 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
Club development involved three phases, of which the first two phases included 
the more desirable wooded lots, while the properties at issue were less desirable 
grassland parcels constituting phase three.  Also at the BOR hearing, the auditor’s 
witness, Chris Szelag, presented the comparables that the auditor had relied on in 
determining the $105,000 valuation for the lots.  Those comparables were 
primarily 2005 and 2006 sales that had occurred when the market was stronger. 
{¶ 5} On August 6, 2009, the BOR voted to retain the auditor’s valuation 
on the grounds that Apple failed to prove a different value.  Apple appealed to the 
BTA. 
2.  The BTA rejected the appraisal evidence for a reduced valuation 
{¶ 6} At the BTA hearing, Apple presented the appraisal report and 
testimony of Richard Racek, an expert appraiser.  The appraisal relies exclusively 
on the sales-comparison approach.  The comparable sales are 15 in number—
eight from the Trophy Club subdivision and seven from other subdivisions in a 
neighboring township.  Based on the comparables, Racek concluded that the lots 
were worth $85,000 for tax year 2008 and $75,000 for tax years 2009 and 2010. 
{¶ 7} On December 28, 2012, the BTA issued its decision.  The BTA 
observed that “[s]ince the lots in issue have not recently transferred, 
appellant * * * offered into evidence the testimony and written appraisal prepared 
by Racek” for 2008, 2009, and 2010.  BTA No. 2009-K-2101, 2012 WL 6846167, 
*1 (Dec. 28, 2012).  Noting that Apple as appellant bore the burden of showing its 
right to a reduced valuation, the BTA proceeded to consider the probative 
character of  the appraisal. 
{¶ 8} The BTA questioned the appraiser’s conclusions.  Although the 
appraiser testified regarding a downturn both in the construction of new homes 
from 2005 through 2008 and a general decline in the market for residential real 
estate, the BTA found that the “sales data suggests that sales within the subject 
subdivision did not begin to reflect lesser transfer amounts until third quarter 
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2009.”  Id., *3.  The BTA felt free to disregard the lower prices garnered from 
sales out of other subdivisions on the grounds that those lower prices “may speak 
to the strength of that particular residential community” as opposed to the Trophy 
Club subdivision at issue.  Id. 
{¶ 9} Finally, the BTA noted that the two earlier sales out of the Trophy 
Club subdivision itself—the 2007 sale for $105,000 and the August 2008 resale 
for $110,000—“are consistent with and supportive of the auditor’s valuation of 
$105,000.”  Id., *3.  In a footnote, the BTA took note of Simich’s testimony that 
the 2008 sale for $110,000 was in a nicer portion of the subdivision, but pointed 
out that the appraiser “highlighted no such distinction.”  Id., fn. 2. 
{¶ 10} The BTA concluded that Apple Group “has failed to meet its 
affirmative burden on appeal.”  Id.  Citing case law, the BTA implicitly found that 
it did not have sufficient evidence before it to perform an independent valuation 
of the lots.  Id., quoting Simmons v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 81 Ohio St.3d 
47, 49, 689 N.E.2d 22 (1998) (“Where the BTA rejects the evidence presented to 
it as not being competent and probative, or not credible, and there is no evidence 
from which the BTA can independently determine value, it may approve the 
board of revision’s valuation, without the board of revision’s presenting any 
evidence”). 
{¶ 11} The BTA carried the 2008 valuation of the auditor over to tax year 
2009, but it declined Apple Group’s invitation to determine a value for tax year 
2010.  BTA No. 2009-K-2101, 2012 WL 6846167, *3, fn. 3. 
Analysis 
A.  Apple’s claim that the BTA should have valued three lots 
by using their sale prices is jurisdictionally barred 
{¶ 12} Apple’s first proposition of law states that the BTA decision is 
unreasonable and unlawful because the BTA “failed to recognize the recent, 
arm’s-length sales of three sublots.”  Under this heading, Apple argues that the 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
BTA ought to have adopted the sale prices of those three parcels as the values of 
those parcels.  Apple originally offered those sales not as direct evidence of the 
value of those parcels, but rather as comparable sales among other comparable 
sales.  Apple itself did not draw the BTA’s attention to the fact that the 
comparable sales included sales of three of the lots at issue, nor did Apple 
advance any argument before the BTA that those sale prices directly indicated the 
value of the parcels at issue. 
{¶ 13} Apple has failed to preserve this issue for appeal.  In its notice of 
appeal to this court, Apple sets forth no fewer than 16 assignments of error.  None 
of them come close to stating the issue that Apple raises through its first 
proposition of law.  Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction to grant relief to 
Apple Group on that ground.  See R.C. 5717.04 (fifth paragraph) (“A notice of 
appeal shall set forth the decision of the board [of tax appeals] appealed from and 
the errors therein complained of” [emphasis added]); Newman v. Levin, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 127, 2008-Ohio-5202, 896 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 28 (the court “lack[ed] jurisdiction 
to consider” a claim of error on appeal because “none of the errors raised in the 
notice of appeal to this court identif[ied]” that claim); see also Global Knowledge 
Training, L.L.C. v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 34, 2010-Ohio-4411, 936 N.E.2d 463, 
¶ 23-24; Fogg-Akron Assocs., L.P. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 
112, 2009-Ohio-6412, 919 N.E.2d 730, ¶ 12. 
B.  Racek’s comparable-sales study negated the auditor’s valuation and 
triggered the BTA’s duty to perform an independent valuation 
{¶ 14} Apple’s second, third, and fourth propositions of law fault the BTA 
for failing to acknowledge and rely upon the expertise of its appraiser and the 
probative force of his comparable-sales analysis.  But the BTA “is not required to 
adopt the valuation fixed by any expert or witness,” because the BTA possesses 
“wide discretion in determining the weight to be given the evidence and the 
credibility of witnesses.”  Cardinal Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
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Revision, 44 Ohio St.2d 13, 336 N.E.2d 433 (1975), paragraphs two and three of 
the syllabus.  Given that discretion, the court has held that “[a]bsent a showing of 
an abuse of discretion, the BTA’s determination as to the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight to be given to their testimony will not be reversed by this court.”  
EOP-BP Tower, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2005-Ohio-3096, 829 N.E.2d 686,  ¶ 14. 
{¶ 15} But Apple’s argument extends beyond the mere assertion that its 
appraisal ought to have been regarded as probative.  Apple argues alternatively 
that “[i]f the BTA did not find Mr. Racek’s sales comparison approach 
appropriate, the BTA should have utilized the market data provided by Mr. Racek 
to adjust his value conclusion or the BTA could have utilized the market data 
provided by the Property Owner at the BTA hearing.  Therefore, the BTA had a 
duty to undertake an independent valuation of the property.” 
{¶ 16} This alternative argument invokes legal principles that the court 
has enunciated and enforced in the past.  Those principles are summarized in 
Colonial Village, Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 123 Ohio St.3d 268, 
2009-Ohio-4975, 915 N.E.2d 1196, ¶ 23-25.  Specifically, the appellant at the 
BTA has an initial burden to show a different value from that found by the 
county.  Id. at ¶ 23.  But when the record contains evidence negating the auditor’s 
valuation, the BTA must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to allow 
an independent valuation of the property.  If there is sufficient evidence, the BTA 
must perform an independent valuation; if the evidence is not sufficient, the BTA 
may revert to the auditor’s valuation.  Id. at ¶ 24-25. 
{¶ 17} We agree with Apple’s contention that the BTA had the duty to 
perform an independent valuation in this case.  While the BTA was justified in 
questioning the precise values assigned by Racek for tax year 2008 and tax year 
2009, there is no question that the comparable sales documented a decrease in 
value within the Trophy Club subdivision over time.  Moreover, the sales that the 
January Term, 2014 
7 
 
BTA relied upon as support for the auditor’s higher valuation for tax year 2008 
are not directly probative, because the testimony before the BOR revealed that the 
August 2008 sale for $110,000 was a resale of a property in a better part of the 
subdivision. 
{¶ 18} Nor is there a dearth of evidence that market conditions generally 
were in decline.  The appraiser Racek testified that “the housing construction and 
the housing market, as a whole, started the decline far before the commercial and 
industrial market started to decline in late 2008, early 2009,” so that “by the time 
we got to 2008, the effective date of this analysis, the housing market was already 
in a—a large decline.”  Racek’s pronouncement corroborated the more anecdotal 
testimony of Apple’s fact witness before the BOR.  See AP Hotels of Illinois, Inc. 
v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 118 Ohio St.3d 343, 2008-Ohio-2565, 889 
N.E.2d 115, ¶ 17-18 (evidence that terrorist attacks had depressed market for 
hotel rooms supported BTA’s decision to perform an independent valuation of the 
property). 
{¶ 19} Under these circumstances, we hold that the evidence before the 
BTA both negated the auditor’s valuation of the unbuilt lots and furnished an 
evidentiary basis for the BTA to perform an independent valuation of the 
properties.  We therefore reverse the BTA’s decision to adopt the auditor’s 
valuation and remand for an independent valuation by the BTA itself for tax year 
2008. 
C.  On remand, the BTA shall determine whether the 2008 value should be 
carried over or whether a new value must be determined for 2009 
{¶ 20} On remand, the BTA will also confront the question whether to 
carry over its 2008 determination of value to 2009.  R.C. 5715.19(D) provides as 
follows: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Liability for taxes and recoupment charges for such year and each 
succeeding year until the complaint is finally determined and for 
any penalty and interest for nonpayment thereof within the time 
required by law shall be based on the determination, valuation, or 
assessment as finally determined. 
 
Our case law establishes that the carryover provision confers jurisdiction on the 
BTA to decide whether to carry over a value in a particular case.  Compare Wolf 
v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 11 Ohio St.3d 205, 207-208, 465 N.E.2d 50 
(1984), with Oberlin Manor, Ltd. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, 69 Ohio St.3d 1, 
2, 629 N.E.2d 1361 (1994). 
{¶ 21} In Wolf, the tax year at issue was 1979, an update year in that 
county.  The taxpayer argued that “the failure to render an opinion on valuation 
for the years 1980 and 1981 render[ed] the BTA decision unreasonable and 
unlawful.”  Id.  We stated that under R.C. 5715.19(D), “the original complaint 
becomes a carry-over complaint until it is finally determined,” with the result that 
the “tax years 1980 and 1981 were at issue before the BTA, along with tax year 
1979.”  Id.  But in response to the contention that the carryover provision required 
the BTA to address those years, we stated that the statute “merely provides, for 
purposes of this case, that tax liability for 1979 and each succeeding year until the 
BTA’s determination must be based upon that determination,” i.e., the 
determination of the board of revision as modified on appeal.  Id. at 208.  
Accordingly, “[t]he BTA is under no obligation to render separate determinations 
of fair market value for succeeding years.”  Id. 
{¶ 22} In Oberlin Manor, the tax year at issue was 1982, which was a 
triennial update year in Lorain County.  The case had already come before the 
court once and had been remanded for a new determination of value.  On remand, 
January Term, 2014 
9 
 
the BTA had determined a value for tax year 1982 but made no mention of 1983 
and 1984. 
{¶ 23} When the taxpayer had trouble obtaining refunds from the county 
for 1983 and 1984, the next two years of the triennium, it filed a motion for 
reconsideration at the BTA within the proper time period, seeking an order 
carrying over the value found for 1982 to 1983 and 1984.  The BTA declined on 
the grounds that the reconsideration standard was not satisfied.  The taxpayer 
appealed, and the court reversed the BTA’s failure to specify that the 1982 
valuation was applicable to 1983 and 1984 as well. 
{¶ 24} In Oberlin Manor, we relied on Wolf’s pronouncement that the 
remaining years of the triennium “ ‘were at issue before the BTA,’ ” observed that 
there was “no evidence of record that the property was changed in 1983 or 1984, 
or that it was in any way different from tax year 1982,” and ordered that the BTA 
carry over the 1982 value to those later years.  Our mandate was explicitly 
limited, however, to “the subsequent years in the same triennium.”  69 Ohio St.3d 
at 2, 692 N.E.2d 1361, quoting Wolf, 11 Ohio St.3d at 207, 465 N.E.2d 50. 
{¶ 25} Taken together, Oberlin Manor and Wolf establish that “once the 
board of revision’s disposition of the complaint for the original tax year is 
pending at the BTA, the BTA can (and in some cases must) exercise jurisdiction 
over subsequent years during which the BTA case itself is still pending.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  1495 Jaeger L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 132 Ohio 
St.3d 222, 2012-Ohio-2680, 970 N.E.2d 949, ¶ 19.  Moreover, the case law since 
Wolf and Oberlin Manor were has articulated the principles the BTA must follow 
in deciding valuation issues—including the duty to perform an independent 
valuation under particular circumstances, such as those here.  See Colonial 
Village, 123 Ohio St.3d 268, 2009-Ohio-4975, 915 N.E.2d 1196. 
{¶ 26} Consistent with this case law we reiterate that when a complaint 
for a particular tax year is pending before the board of revision or the BTA and 
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remains unresolved during one or more succeeding years, the carryover provision 
confers jurisdiction on the BTA to address the succeeding year or years that are 
within the same triennium as the tax year for which the complaint was originally 
filed.  We also modify Wolf by holding that the BTA’s carryover jurisdiction 
encompasses the decision whether to carry over the value determined for the 
earlier year at issue or whether to perform an independent valuation based on 
evidence that militates against a carryover.  On remand in this case, the BTA shall 
address tax year 2009 in accordance with these principles. 
D.  The BTA exercised sound discretion in declining 
to determine value for tax year 2010 
{¶ 27} Apple also asked the BTA to determine the value of the unbuilt 
lots for tax year 2010, but the BTA declined to do so.  The BTA observed that 
2008 and 2009 were “the latter portion of a sexennial reappraisal conducted in 
Medina County, while 2010 is the first year of the subsequent triennial update,” 
noted that “the transcript certified by the BOR does not contain information for 
that tax year [2010], the one in which the auditor would have established new 
values,” and concluded that “the better course is to direct [Apple Group] to first 
present its evidence of value to the BOR.”  BTA No. 2009-K-2101, 2012 WL 
6846167, *3, fn. 3. 
{¶ 28} Under its fifth proposition of law, Apple asserts that because the 
BTA had “continuing complaint” jurisdiction over tax year 2010, and because 
Apple had presented evidence of tax year 2010 valuation through the Racek 
appraisal, the BTA erred by its “failure * * * to comply with its statutory 
obligations to determine values for the sublots for the 2010 tax year.” 
{¶ 29} Although Apple is correct that continuing-complaint jurisdiction 
attached in this case and extended to tax year 2010, Apple is wrong to assert that 
the BTA thereby acquired the obligation to exercise jurisdiction over tax year 
2010.  The only authority Apple cites is AERC Saw Mill Village, Inc. v. Franklin 
January Term, 2014 
11 
 
Cty. Bd. of Revision, 127 Ohio St.3d 44, 2010-Ohio-4468, 936 N.E.2d 472, ¶ 35; 
but contrary to Apple’s suggestion, AERC directly determined that the board of 
revision had continuing-complaint jurisdiction for the ensuing tax year, not the 
BTA.  Id. at ¶ 10-14.  Indeed, our remand order in AERC consigned the question 
whether the continuing-complaint jurisdiction should be exercised before the 
BOR or before the BTA to the BTA’s discretion.  Id. at ¶ 38.  Moreover, 
recognizing that the BTA may exercise discretion under the continuing-complaint 
provision is consistent with the case law applying the carryover provision, which 
has acknowledged the BTA’s jurisdiction over the ensuing years within the same 
triennium, but which to date has not extended that jurisdiction beyond the 
triennium. 
{¶ 30} Finally, under the continuing-complaint provision the BTA must 
be vigilant, when requested to determine value for later years, that it does not 
exceed its jurisdiction by addressing a tax year for which a fresh complaint has 
been filed below.  See Fogg-Akron, 124 Ohio St.3d 112, 2009-Ohio-6412, 919 
N.E.2d 730, ¶ 10 (“we have held that the filing of a ‘fresh complaint’ * * * 
terminates the continuation of an earlier complaint, as long as the new complaint 
is procedurally valid”). 
{¶ 31} Accordingly, we reject Apple’s fifth proposition of law and affirm 
the BTA’s decision not to address tax year 2010. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 32} For all the foregoing reasons, we reverse the BTA’s decision to 
adopt the county’s valuation for tax year 2008, and we reverse the decision to 
carry that valuation over to tax year 2009.  We remand to the BTA with the 
instruction that the board perform an independent valuation for each of those two 
years.  We additionally affirm the BTA’s decision not to address tax year 2010. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and FRENCH, JJ., dissent. 
___________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 33} I agree with the portion of the majority opinion that holds that 
Apple Group failed to preserve the argument that sale prices ought to have been 
used to value three of the 13 unbuilt lots at issue.  But I dissent from the judgment 
setting aside the BTA’s determination of value and ordering a new valuation. 
{¶ 34} In our review of valuations, we are to defer to the BTA in its role 
as the finder of fact: 
 
The fair market value of property for tax purposes is a 
question of fact, the determination of which is primarily within the 
province of the taxing authorities, and this court will not disturb a 
decision of the Board of Tax Appeals with respect to such 
valuation unless it affirmatively appears from the record that such 
decision is unreasonable or unlawful. 
 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision v. Fodor, 15 Ohio St.2d 52, 239 N.E.2d 25 (1968), 
syllabus.  Weighing of the evidence and the assessment of credibility regarding 
appraisals are “the statutory job of the BTA.”  EOP-BP Tower, L.L.C. v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-3096, 829 N.E.2d 
686, ¶ 9, citing Fawn Lake Apts. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 75 Ohio St.3d 
601, 603, 665 N.E.2d 194 (1996).  Consequently, the BTA “is not required to 
adopt the valuation fixed by any expert or witness” but instead possesses “wide 
discretion in determining the weight to be given to evidence and the credibility of 
the witnesses.”  Cardinal Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 44 
Ohio St.2d 13, 336 N.E.2d 433 (1975), paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. 
January Term, 2014 
13 
 
{¶ 35} Given the BTA’s role as fact-finder, we have held that “[a]bsent a 
showing of an abuse of discretion, the BTA’s determination as to the credibility of 
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony will not be reversed by 
this court.”  EOP-BP Tower, ¶ 14.  To prove an abuse of discretion by the BTA, a 
party must show that “the BTA’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable.”  Id., see also Olmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 122 Ohio St.3d 134, 2009-Ohio-2461, 909 N.E.2d 597, ¶ 26.  And 
finally, “our case law establishes that we will reverse BTA findings only when 
there is a total absence of evidence to support a particular finding.”  HealthSouth 
Corp. v. Testa, 132 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-1871, 969 N.E.2d 232, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 36} Turning to the BTA’s decision and the record in this case, I 
conclude that there is no basis in our precedent for setting aside the BTA’s factual 
determinations either on total lack of evidence or for an abuse of discretion. 
{¶ 37} The BTA explained why it decided not to accord great weight to 
the comparable-sales appraisal that it was given.  First, although the appraisal 
showed a market decline over time for the properties under discussion, that 
decline was not documented until the third quarter of 2009 and did not prove the 
recommended lower valuation as of January 1, 2008.  Second, the appraisal did 
not consider comparability of the sales in other subdivisions or the need for 
adjustments.  Third, a pair of sales from the Trophy Club, one before and one 
after the 2008 lien date, indicated that the subdivision held its value in 2008. 
{¶ 38} In my view, these circumstances do not show either a total lack of 
evidence or an abuse of discretion.  I would thus defer to the BTA as the finder of 
fact and affirm its decision. 
{¶ 39} Nonetheless, the majority determines that the BTA’s valuation 
should be set aside and another valuation performed because the scant evidence 
presented negates the auditor’s valuation.  To do this, the majority relies on cases 
that have circumstances not present here.  Dayton–Montgomery Cty. Port Auth. v. 
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Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-Ohio-1948, 865 
N.E.2d 22, ¶ 22-30, as restated in Colonial Village Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 123 Ohio St.3d 268, 2009-Ohio-4975, 915 N.E.2d 1196, ¶ 24, 26. 
{¶ 40} In Dayton, evidence of actual cost corroborated the county’s cost 
schedules but simultaneously negated the grade-factor adjustment that the county 
had applied.  We could not affirm the BTA’s decision to revert to the auditor’s 
valuation, because it included the unsupported grade-factor adjustment.  I joined 
the majority opinion there because the case presented unusual circumstances. 
{¶ 41} Another unusual circumstance was presented in Colonial Village 
Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 2007-Ohio-4641, 
873 N.E.2d 298:  the property record card revealed an approach to valuing 
subsidized housing that was disapproved by case law.  Id., at ¶ 19-21.  In light of 
that legal error, id. at ¶ 19, the BTA had the “duty to undertake an independent 
valuation of the property.”  Id. at ¶ 24.  See also Sapina v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 136 Ohio St.3d 188, 2013-Ohio-3028, 992 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 27, 36 
(presumption favoring use of allocated sale price, together with plausible 
evidence of a proper allocation, justified finding a modified value of the 
property). 
{¶ 42} Here, however, the only evidence that would negate the county’s 
valuation is the very appraisal to which the BTA had decided to accord little 
weight.  The BTA rejected it for the reasons explained.  In reversing the BTA and 
ordering a new valuation, the majority has converted a modest exception to the 
rule of deference into a sweeping license for the court to substitute its own 
judgment regarding the evidence.  This approach does nothing other than second-
guess the BTA’s determination as a finder of fact and make us a super BTA, 
contrary to precedent.  See Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 112 Ohio St.3d 309, 2007-Ohio-6, 859 N.E.2d 540, ¶ 22, quoting DAK, 
PLL v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 105 Ohio St.3d 84, 2005-Ohio-573, 822 
January Term, 2014 
15 
 
N.E.2d 790, ¶ 16 (“We will defer to the BTA’s choice of appraisal” because “[i]n 
reviewing the BTA’s disposition of the factual issues in a property valuation case, 
‘[t]his court does not sit either as a super BTA or as a trier of fact de novo’ ”). 
{¶ 43} The majority’s refusal to defer to the BTA’s fact-finding also leads 
it to modify the longstanding holding of Wolf v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
11 Ohio St.3d 205, 208, 465 N.E.2d 50 (1984), that “[t]he BTA is under no 
obligation to render separate determinations of fair market value for succeeding 
years.”  Because the BTA now has been ordered to perform an independent 
determination of value for tax year 2008, and because the BTA’s decision carried 
the 2008 value over to 2009, the majority has ordered an independent valuation 
for 2009 as well.  In this respect, the correct approach would also have been the 
simpler one:   exercise proper deference to the BTA’s determination for 2008 and 
then defer to the BTA’s discretion to carry that value forward to tax year 2009. 
{¶ 44} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s 
decision to reverse and remand. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Karen H. Bauernschmidt Co., L.P.A., Karen H. Bauernschmidt, Charles J. 
Bauernschmidt, and Stephen M. Nowak, for appellant. 
 
Dean Holman, Medina County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nathan E. 
Carnes, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees, Medina County Auditor 
and Medina County Board of Revision. 
_________________________