Case Title: In re Caden C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S255839

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re CADEN C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court 
Law. 
 
 
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,  
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
CHRISTINE C. et al., 
Defendants and Respondents; 
CADEN C., a Minor, etc., 
Appellant. 
 
S255839 
 
First Appellate District, Division One 
A153925, A154042 
 
San Francisco City and County Superior Court 
JD15-3034 
 
 
May 27, 2021 
 
Justice Cuéllar authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. 
 
1 
In re CADEN C. 
S255839 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
All too often, children experience harm — and shoulder 
long-term consequences — because their physical and emotional 
needs are neglected by their parents.  In California, we rely on 
social services and statutory procedures to strike a delicate 
balance between protecting children from abuse or neglect and 
ensuring the continuity of children’s emotionally important 
relationships, especially with their parents.  The resulting 
balance sometimes gives a struggling parent enough time and 
support to overcome deficiencies and regain custody.  When such 
success is not achieved, the dependency statutes require the 
court to hold a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code 
section 366.26.1  At that hearing, the court determines whether 
to terminate parental rights, making way for adoption, or to 
maintain parental rights and select another permanent plan.   
When making that fraught determination, a court must 
sift through often complicated facts to weigh competing benefits 
and dangers for the child.  It must consider practical realities 
over which it has limited control and envision a child’s future 
under contingent conditions.  And it must navigate situations 
that can change as quickly as the children before the court do. 
 
1  
All statutory references are to the Welfare and 
Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.  
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
2 
To ease the court’s difficult task in making this important 
decision, the statute provides a carefully calibrated process.  
Even if a court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
child is likely to be adopted, the parent may avoid termination 
of parental rights by establishing at least one of a series of 
enumerated exceptions.  If the parent establishes that an 
exception applies, the statute sets out additional steps for 
selecting a permanent plan for the child that preserves parental 
rights.  Going step by step through the prescribed process, the 
court can somewhat more easily accomplish the statutory goals 
of protecting the parent and child from an overhasty 
termination of their relationship while ensuring that the child 
is expeditiously placed in a safe and stable home. 
In this case, the trial court found that the parent had 
established the first of the listed exceptions, the parental-
benefit exception.2  This exception applies where the parent has 
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, the 
child would benefit from continuing the relationship, and 
termination of that relationship would impose a detriment on 
the child.  The Court of Appeal reversed.  It held that because 
the parent continued to struggle with substance abuse and 
mental health issues and because of the risks of foster care and 
benefits of the potential adoptive home, no reasonable court 
could find the child’s relationship with his parent outweighed 
the benefits of adoption. 
 
2  
We 
use 
the 
phrases 
“parental-benefit 
exception,” 
“beneficial parental relationship exception,” and “beneficial 
relationship exception” as labels for the exception currently 
codified at section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).  The labels are 
merely for ease of reference and do not reflect any substantive 
determination about the requirements to prove the exception. 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
3 
The Court of Appeal did not explain how the parent’s 
struggles related to the specific elements of the statutory 
exception:  the importance of the child’s relationship with the 
parent or the detriment of losing that relationship.  Instead, the 
appellate court treated the lack of progress in addressing 
substance abuse and mental health issues as a categorical bar 
to establishing the exception.  That conclusion was mistaken, so 
we now reverse.  
I. 
 
Caden C. was born in 2009 and lived with his mother 
(Mother) until he was four years old.  In September 2013, the 
Marin County Health and Human Services Department 
removed Caden from Mother’s custody because Caden and his 
mother had been living in a car and Mother admitted to recent 
drug use and suicidal ideation.  The court subsequently took and 
then decided to retain jurisdiction of Caden.  It ordered that he 
remain in foster care and that Mother address her substance 
abuse and mental health issues and attend parenting classes.  
Caden was placed in foster care with a nonrelative extended 
family member, Ms. H.  At a review hearing in July 2014, the 
court adopted the Department’s recommendation to retain 
jurisdiction but place Caden with Mother; Mother and Caden 
subsequently moved to San Francisco. 
 
By June 2016, Mother had relapsed.  The San Francisco 
Human Services Agency (the Agency) then filed a supplemental 
dependency petition and removed Caden from her custody.  (See 
§ 387.)  The petition alleged that Mother had created an 
unhealthy 
relationship 
with 
Caden, 
exposing 
him 
to 
“conversations that cause fear and create behaviors that 
jeopardize his safety, emotional well-being, and education.”  The 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
4 
Agency placed Caden back with Ms. H., but over the next year 
he moved through three other foster placements before being 
returned to Ms. H.  The foster parents said they were exhausted 
by the multitude of services for Caden and expressed concern 
that visitation with Mother made it difficult for him to settle 
into their homes.  During the same period of time, Mother 
reentered residential treatment and filed a modification petition 
to regain custody; the court denied the petition, and Mother 
disengaged from drug treatment.  In May 2017, the court 
reduced Mother’s visits to once per month, limited her 
educational rights, and set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26.  
Mother appealed, filed additional modification petitions and 
appealed their denials, and sought extraordinary relief.   
 
The juvenile court eventually held a section 366.26 
hearing from January to February 2018.  Over four days the 
court heard testimony from numerous witnesses for both Mother 
and the Agency.  It also received reports from the Agency; a 
bonding study from Mother’s expert, Dr. Molesworth; a clinical 
consultation report from the Agency’s expert, Dr. Lieberman; 
and a letter from Caden.  Caden indicated that he did not want 
to come to the hearing.  In light of his wishes and to avoid 
further traumatizing him, the court relied on his letter and 
statements in the course of the bonding study to understand his 
feelings.  (See § 366.26, subd. (h)(1).) 
The Agency argued that Caden was likely to be adopted, 
that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated, and the 
court should order a permanent plan of adoption.  The social 
worker indicated Mother sometimes discussed the case and her 
drug treatment in front of Caden, and described reports from 
caregivers and service providers that Caden talked about 
alcohol and drug use in detail.  She testified that Caden was 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
5 
doing well in his current foster placement with Ms. H., had not 
been harmed by having fewer visits with Mother, and would be 
able to form a bond with Ms. H. that would mitigate the loss of 
his relationship with Mother.  And the social worker testified 
that Caden reacted positively to living with Ms. H. but grew 
distressed at the prospect of not living with his mother.  Dr. 
Lieberman participated in administrative reviews of Caden’s 
case starting in 2016.  Dr. Lieberman testified for the Agency as 
an expert in parent-child bonding and attachment, with a 
specific focus in childhood trauma and its impact on children.  
She agreed that Caden “has a very strong emotional bond with 
his mother” but emphasized that “the narrowness of the bond 
poses a risk to [Caden’s] ability to devote his attention, energy, 
investment to developmentally appropriate tasks now of 
learning [and] socialization.”  Dr. Lieberman also explained her 
opinion that Caden would need ongoing support to address the 
trauma from his early years as well as from separating from his 
mother, but that Ms. H. could provide him the necessary comfort 
and security such that termination of his relationship with 
Mother would not be harmful for him. 
What Mother argued is that the court should not 
terminate her parental rights, because terminating her 
relationship with Caden would harm him.  Numerous witnesses 
described how they’d observed the relationship.  Mother herself 
testified that “I don’t want my son to ever, ever blame himself 
and think that he did something wrong or feel abandoned 
because I grew up, I grew up abandoned and feeling those things 
and I saw to it that my child has known he was loved and that 
he was a good kid and he had a heart of gold and that his heart 
resembled god.  Like why would you want to take that from him?  
Because that’s exactly what it would do if you were to, if you 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
6 
were to take me out of his life.”  On cross-examination of Mother, 
the Agency elicited testimony about Mother’s ongoing 
methamphetamine addiction.  Dr. Molesworth testified for 
Mother as an expert in child psychology, bonding studies, and 
the parent-child attachment.  Based on his review of visit 
reports and visits he observed, Dr. Molesworth characterized 
Mother’s interactions with Caden as generally positive.  He 
explained that Caden had an intense bond with Mother of the 
kind that might tend to impede Caden in forming relationships 
with others but did not seem to have done so in his case.  Dr. 
Molesworth suggested that, given the intense bond, losing 
contact with Mother would compound Caden’s other traumas 
leading to significant emotional fluctuation, confusion, and 
acting out in the near term and in adolescence.  On cross-
examination, 
Dr. 
Molesworth 
opined 
that 
despite 
the 
descriptions of Caden’s relationship with Ms. H., terminating 
contact with Mother would have detrimental effects of the kind 
he had described. 
The court found that Caden was likely to be adopted but 
that Mother had established the parental-benefit exception, 
precluding termination of parental rights.  The court explained 
Mother “has been a constant and that is the relationship that 
the Court does need to focus on.”  She “has maintained 
consistent and regular visitation and contact”; she “does stand 
in a parental role to her son”; and “the visits themselves have 
continued the significant emotional attachment that Caden and 
his Mother did create prior to his removals.”  Mother 
“substantially complied with her case plan and although 
unsuccessful at times . . . has continued her efforts to maintain 
her sobriety and address her mental health issues.”  As the court 
summed up its reasoning:  “Caden loves his Mother.  And he 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
7 
does derive benefits from his visits with her.  The record does 
show that while he has a strong developing relationship with 
Ms. H[.] that relationship in and of itself does not negate the 
harm that Caden would experience from the loss of his most 
significant emotional relationship.”  The court noted that “Dr. 
Lieberman did not interview or meet Caden” and emphasized 
that its review of both expert reports confirmed that “[Mother] 
and Caden have a consistent and positive relationship.”  On that 
basis, the court found that “severing Caden’s relationship with 
his Mother would deprive Caden of a positive emotional 
attachment and greatly harm Caden.”  It therefore declined to 
terminate parental rights and ordered the Agency to determine 
if Ms. H. would agree to serve as a legal guardian. 
In an addendum report, the Agency explained that Ms. H. 
did not feel comfortable with legal guardianship.  She had 
concerns about Mother’s demands for visitation and use of court 
process to disturb the placement.  She expressed fear for her own 
safety and that of her family based on Mother’s erratic behavior 
over the course of July 2014 to August 2016.  Ms. H. instead 
expressed a preference to further consider legal guardianship 
but keep Caden in her care for the time being as a foster 
placement.  The court then ordered that Caden remain in foster 
care subject to periodic review, and the Agency appealed the 
decision. 
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court — but its 
rationale encompassed a conclusion we now find to be mistaken.  
(See In re Caden C. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 87, 116 (Caden C.).)  
The Court of Appeal took particular issue with the trial court’s 
suggestion that Mother had “ ‘substantially complied with her 
case plan’ and ‘continues her efforts to maintain her sobriety 
and address her mental health issues.’ ”  (Id. at p. 110.)  In so 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
8 
doing, it followed a recent trend in the Courts of Appeal to place 
great emphasis on a parent’s failure to make progress in 
addressing the problems that led to the child’s dependency.  (See 
In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 648; In re Noah G. 
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1302, 1304; In re Marcelo B. (2012) 
209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643–645.)  The Court of Appeal also 
reasoned that the trial court “gave short shrift to uncontroverted 
evidence that long-term foster care posed substantial risk of 
further destabilizing a vulnerable child, fostered unhealthy and 
sometimes ‘toxic’ interactions between mother and child, and 
robbed Caden of a stable and permanent home with an 
exceptional caregiver.”  (Caden C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 
110.)  
We granted review to clarify the applicability of the 
parental-benefit exception — in particular, whether a parent 
must show progress in addressing issues such as drug abuse 
that led to the child’s dependency in order to establish the 
exception — and to resolve the standard of review for decisions 
regarding the parental-benefit exception.3 
 
3  
Around the time we heard oral argument in this matter, 
the trial court held a new section 366.26 hearing and terminated 
Mother’s parental rights.  Even though that decision renders 
this case moot, we have discretion to retain the case and decide 
it as one presenting issues of public importance, capable of 
repetition, yet tending to evade review.  (See, e.g., 
Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 524, fn. 1; 
In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 74, fn. 5.)  The parental-
benefit exception is of great importance and one of the most 
litigated issues in dependency proceedings.  Moreover, 
dependency matters should proceed as expeditiously as possible, 
which may heighten the difficulty of providing review in our 
 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
9 
II. 
Even when a court proceeds to select a permanent 
placement for a child who cannot be returned to a parent’s care, 
the parent may avoid termination of parental rights in certain 
circumstances defined by statute.  One of these is the parental-
benefit exception.  What it requires a parent to establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, is that the parent has regularly 
visited with the child, that the child would benefit from 
continuing the relationship, and that terminating the 
relationship would be detrimental to the child.  (See Welf. & 
Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Evid. Code, § 115.)  The 
language of this exception, along with its history and place in 
the larger dependency scheme, show that the exception applies 
in situations where a child cannot be in a parent’s custody but 
where severing the child’s relationship with the parent, even 
when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home, 
would be harmful for the child.  While application of the 
beneficial parental relationship exception rests on a variety of 
factual determinations properly reviewed for substantial 
evidence, the ultimate decision that termination would be 
harmful is subject to review for abuse of discretion.   
A. 
 
If the court cannot safely return a dependent child to a 
parent’s custody within statutory time limits, the court must set 
 
court.  (See Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 
1011, fn. 5.)  We therefore retain and decide the issues in this 
case. 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
10 
a hearing under section 366.26.  (See Cynthia D. v. Superior 
Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248–249 (Cynthia D.).)   
At the section 366.26 hearing, the question before the 
court is decidedly not whether the parent may resume custody 
of the child.  (See In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 
690 (Amber M.); cf. § 388, subd. (a)(1) [parent must show 
changed circumstances to get back custody of child during 
dependency proceedings].)  In fact, it is not permissible to order 
reunification at the section 366.26 hearing.  (See In re Zeth S. 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 411 (Zeth S.); In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 295, 304–306 (Marilyn H.).)  Indeed, when the court 
orders the section 366.26 hearing, reunification services have 
been terminated, and the assumption is that the problems that 
led to the court taking jurisdiction have not been resolved.  (See, 
e.g., In re Edward R. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 116, 126.)   
Instead, the goal at the section 366.26 hearing is 
“specifically . . . to select and implement a permanent plan for 
the child.”  (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 304; see also 
Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 250 [“ ‘This hearing 
determines only the type of permanent home’ ”].)  To guide the 
court in selecting the most suitable permanent arrangement, 
the statute lists plans in order of preference and provides a 
detailed procedure for choosing among them.  (See § 366.26, 
subd. (b) [“In choosing among the alternatives in this 
subdivision, the court shall proceed pursuant to subdivision 
(c)”].)  According to that procedure, the court must first 
determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the child is 
likely to be adopted.  (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)  If so, and if the 
court finds that there has been a previous determination that 
reunification services be terminated, then the court shall 
terminate parental rights to allow for adoption.  (See Cynthia 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
11 
D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 249–250.)  But if the parent shows 
that termination would be detrimental to the child for at least 
one specifically enumerated reason, the court should decline to 
terminate parental rights and select another permanent plan.  
(See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi), (4)(A).)  As we have 
previously explained, “[t]he statutory exceptions merely permit 
the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an 
option other than the norm, which remains adoption.”  (In re 
Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53, italics omitted (Celine R.).) 
 
In interpreting the exceptions, we are guided by the 
relevant statutory provisions, read in context.  (See, e.g., Ryan 
v. Rosenfeld (2017) 3 Cal.5th 124, 128.)  In particular, we take 
account of the connection the statute establishes — when an 
exception applies — between the “best interest” of the child and 
the continuation of parental rights.  Parallel to the provision 
detailing the exceptions (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi)), the 
statute provides that “[i]f the court finds that adoption of the 
child or termination of parental rights is not in the best interest 
of the child, because one of [those exceptions] . . . applies, the 
court shall” follow a process to select among permanent plans 
other than adoption.  (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(A), italics added.)  In 
other words, when a parent establishes that one of the 
exceptions applies, adoption or termination is not “in the best 
interest of the child.”  (Ibid.; see Stats. 1997, ch. 510, § 1; Sen. 
Judiciary Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 329 (1997–1998 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended June 23, 1997, pars. 14–15 [“This section 
provides that termination would be detrimental to the child and 
should not occur when one of the following circumstances exists. 
[¶] . . . [¶] [T]he proposed language would provide that 
termination would not be in the interests of the child when one 
of the four exceptions applies . . .”].) 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
12 
The exception at issue in this case is limited in scope.  It 
applies where “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for 
determining that termination would be detrimental to the child 
due to one or more of the following circumstances:  [¶]  (i) The 
parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the 
child and the child would benefit from continuing the 
relationship.”  (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)  From the statute, we 
readily discern three elements the parent must prove to 
establish the exception:  (1) regular visitation and contact, and 
(2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the 
child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be 
detrimental to the child.  In understanding these elements, we 
are guided by what has become the seminal decision 
interpreting the exception, the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s 
opinion in In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567 (Autumn 
H.).  The court there articulated the meaning of the exception in 
an opinion that has guided the thousands of Court of Appeal 
decisions on the exception since.  (See id. at pp. 575–576; see 
also, e.g., Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and 
Procedure (2020) § 2.171[5][b][ii][A]–[B].)  What the appellate 
court emphasized in Autumn H. is a crucial aspect of the trial 
court’s responsibility in these cases:  in assessing whether 
termination would be detrimental, the trial court must decide 
whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with 
the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a 
new adoptive home.  (See Autumn H., supra, at p. 575.)  By 
making this decision, the trial court determines whether 
terminating parental rights serves the child’s best interests. 
The first element — regular visitation and contact — is 
straightforward.  The question is just whether “parents visit 
consistently,” taking into account “the extent permitted by court 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
13 
orders.”  (In re I.R. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 201, 212.)  Visits and 
contact “continue[] or develop[] a significant, positive, emotional 
attachment from child to parent.”  (Autumn H., supra, 27 
Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)  Courts should consider in that light 
whether parents “maintained regular visitation and contact 
with the child” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) but certainly not to 
punish parents or reward them for good behavior in visiting or 
maintaining contact — here as throughout, the focus is on the 
best interests of the child.  (See Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at 
p. 254.) 
As to the second element, courts assess whether “the child 
would benefit from continuing the relationship.”  (§ 366.26, 
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)  Again here, the focus is the child.  And the 
relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as “[t]he 
age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the 
parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction 
between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.”  
(Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)  As the trial court 
and Court of Appeal did here, courts often consider how children 
feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.  
(See, e.g., Caden C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 109 [“The record 
is replete with comments from various care providers attesting 
to the significance of the bond between mother and son”]; In re 
Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 466–467, 471 (Scott B.); In 
re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1536–1537 (Brandon 
C.).)  Doing so properly focuses the inquiry on the child, even as 
courts must remain mindful that rarely do “[p]arent-child 
relationships” conform to an entirely consistent pattern.  (In re 
Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 (Jasmine D.); see 
also In re Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 614–615 
[“parenting styles and relationships differ greatly between 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
14 
families”]; In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 299 [“Autumn 
H. does not narrowly define or specifically identify the type of 
relationship necessary to establish the exception”].)  Certainly, 
it is not necessary — even if it were possible — to calibrate a 
precise “quantitative measurement of the specific amount of 
‘comfort, nourishment or physical care’ [the parent] provided 
during [his or] her weekly visits.”  (Brandon C., supra, at p. 
1538.)  As in this case, often expert psychologists who have 
observed the child and parent and can synthesize others’ 
observations will be an important source of information about 
the psychological importance of the relationship for the child.4   
Concerning the third element — whether “termination 
would be detrimental to the child due to” the relationship — the 
court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to 
sever the relationship and choose adoption.  (§ 366.26, subd. 
(c)(1)(B); see also § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(D).)  Because terminating 
parental rights eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child 
to maintain the relationship, courts must assume that 
terminating parental rights terminates the relationship.  (See 
In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 128; In re Noreen G. 
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1391; see also Troxel v. Granville 
(2000) 530 U.S. 57, 66–67.)  What courts need to determine, 
therefore, is how the child would be affected by losing the 
parental relationship — in effect, what life would be like for the 
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.  
(Cf. In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 55 [explaining, in 
 
4  
Both the trial and the appellate courts found the bonding 
study informative.  Trial courts should seriously consider, where 
requested and appropriate, allowing for a bonding study or other 
relevant expert testimony. 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
15 
discussing the “sibling relationship exception” (§ 366.26, subd. 
(c)(1)(B)(v)), “the court should carefully consider all evidence 
regarding the sibling relationship as it relates to possible 
detriment to the adoptive child”].)  As the expert who performed 
the bonding study in this case suggested, the effects might 
include emotional instability and preoccupation leading to 
acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or 
depression.  Yet as the experts in this case discussed, a new, 
stable home may alleviate the emotional instability and 
preoccupation leading to such problems, providing a new source 
of stability that could make the loss of a parent not, at least on 
balance, detrimental.   
In each case, then, the court acts in the child’s best interest 
in a specific way:  it decides whether the harm of severing the 
relationship outweighs “the security and the sense of belonging 
a new family would confer.”  (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 
at p. 575.)  “If severing the natural parent/child relationship 
would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional 
attachment such that,” even considering the benefits of a new 
adoptive home, termination would “harm[]” the child, the court 
should not terminate parental rights.  (Ibid.)  That subtle, case-
specific inquiry is what the statute asks courts to perform:  does 
the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh “the 
harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a] 
significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]”  
(In re S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 300.)  When the 
relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the 
security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, 
termination would be “detrimental to the child due to” the child’s 
beneficial relationship with a parent.  (§ 366.26, subd. 
(c)(1)(B)(i), italics added.)  We don’t address here what it means 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
16 
for termination to be detrimental due to any of the other listed 
exceptions.  That inquiry may well differ depending on the 
particular exception at issue.  (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii)–
(vi).) 
 
When 
it 
weighs 
whether 
termination 
would 
be 
detrimental, the court is not comparing the parent’s attributes 
as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive 
parent(s).  Nothing that happens at the section 366.26 hearing 
allows the child to return to live with the parent.  (See Zeth S., 
supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 411.)  Accordingly, courts should not look 
to whether the parent can provide a home for the child; the 
question is just whether losing the relationship with the parent 
would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, 
by the security of a new, adoptive home.  (See Amber M., supra, 
103 Cal.App.4th at p. 690 [finding error in not applying 
exception based on social worker’s testimony that “focus[ed] on 
[parent’s] inability to provide a home for [the children] and on 
the suitability of the current placements”].)  Even where it may 
never make sense to permit the child to live with the parent, 
termination may be detrimental.  (See Scott B., supra, 188 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 471–472.)  And the section 366.26 hearing is 
decidedly not a contest of who would be the better custodial 
caregiver.  (See Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1537–
1538.) 
 
What’s more, understanding the harm associated with 
severing the relationship is a subtle enterprise — sometimes 
depending on more than just how beneficial the relationship is.  
In many cases, “the strength and quality of the natural 
parent/child relationship” will substantially determine how 
detrimental it would be to lose that relationship, which must be 
weighed against the benefits of a new adoptive home.  (Autumn 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
17 
H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)  A child would benefit from 
continuing a strong, positive, and affirming relationship, and it 
would be destabilizing to lose that relationship.  Sometimes, 
though, a relationship involves tangled benefits and burdens.  In 
those cases, the court faces the complex task of disentangling 
the consequences of removing those burdens along with the 
benefits of the relationship. 
This is a case in point.  The experts agreed that Caden’s 
relationship with Mother had potentially negative features.  Dr. 
Molesworth indicated that Caden’s bond to Mother might be 
“narrow”:  Caden was preoccupied with Mother in a way that 
could impede forming other relationships.  And Dr. Lieberman 
highlighted this aspect of the relationship.  They disagreed, 
though, about how negative this feature actually was.  Dr. 
Molesworth thought the “narrow” bond had not in fact impeded 
Caden from forming other relationships.  Dr. Lieberman opined 
that it had.  And most relevantly for whether termination would 
be detrimental, the experts disagreed about the effects of 
severing the relationship given Caden’s preoccupation with 
Mother.  Dr. Molesworth opined that termination could be more 
detrimental on account of Caden’s preoccupation than if Caden 
were less preoccupied with Mother.  Dr. Lieberman, on the other 
hand, opined that termination could, in this respect, even be 
beneficial because it would allow Caden to focus on other 
relationships or activities.  The trial court seems to have 
credited Dr. Molesworth on the ground that Dr. Lieberman 
hadn’t interviewed or met with Caden.  A different court in a 
different case could find as the trial court did here that a 
potentially or actually negative aspect of a relationship might 
make termination even more detrimental.  It could also find that 
terminating a relationship with negative aspects would have 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
18 
some positive effects that weigh in the balance — and may tip it 
in favor of severing the parental relationship to make way for 
adoption.  
To gauge and balance these weights can be a daunting 
prospect for trial courts.  But it’s what the statute requires — 
and the legislative history confirms it.  In interpreting the 
dependency scheme in general and section 366.26 in particular, 
we have regularly looked to the report of the “Task Force,” which 
the Legislature created in 1987 to redesign the dependency 
system and whose recommendations the Legislature adopted.  
(See Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 247; Sen. Select Com. on 
Children & Youth, Rep. on Child Abuse Reporting Laws, 
Juvenile Court Dependency Statutes, and Child Welfare 
Services (Jan. 1988) p. i (hereafter Task Force Report).)  The 
Task Force explained why the parental-benefit exception existed 
and when it should be applied:  “Termination would not be 
permissible, however, in the following situation[]: [¶] a) 
Termination would be detrimental to the child due to the 
strength of the parent-child relationship.  There is substantial 
clinical evidence that some children in foster care retain very 
strong ties to their biological parents.  Since termination in such 
situations is likely to be harmful to the child, courts should 
retain parental ties if desired by both the parents and the child.”  
(Task Force Report, supra, at p. 11, underscoring omitted.)   
The history of the statute also underscores that these 
three elements — visitation, a beneficial relationship, and 
detriment from losing it — are what the parent has to prove.  
Subsequent to Autumn H., the Legislature amended the statute 
to require a parent to show a “compelling reason for determining 
that termination would be detrimental to the child . . . .”  (Welf. 
& Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added; see Stats. 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
19 
1998, ch. 1056, § 17.1.)  Based on this amendment, some courts 
suggested that parents must prove something more than 
Autumn H. required, some heightened level of harm or an 
additional “compelling reason.”  (See Caden C., supra, 34 
Cal.App.5th at pp. 113–114; In re Logan B. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 
1000, 1012; Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349; In re 
Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51.)  But closer examination 
of the legislative history of this amendment reveals the change 
does not impose an additional or heightened showing.  The 
Legislature added the “compelling reason” language in section 
366.26 and throughout the Welfare and Institutions Code to 
comply with the new Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 
(ASFA).  (Pub.L. No. 105-89 (Nov. 19, 1997) 111 Stat. 2115; see 
Stats. 1998, ch. 1056, § 27; Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor 
Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2773 (1997–
1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 24, 1998, p. 1 [“This bill 
conforms state law to the recently enacted Public Law 105-89, 
the Adoptions [sic] and Safe Families Act”].)  That federal 
statute required a “compelling reason” in particular situations 
when an agency didn’t move to terminate parental rights, or a 
court declined to terminate parental rights within specified 
timeframes.  (See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C), (E)(ii).)   
But ASFA didn’t specify what would count as a 
“compelling reason.”  The Legislature accordingly specified that 
existing reasons in the statute to delay setting a Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing or not to terminate 
parental rights were in fact compelling reasons as required by 
ASFA.  (See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(C)(i), 
(5), 366.22, subd. (a)(3), 366.3, subd. (h)(1).)  The addition of 
“compelling” in Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, 
subdivision (c)(1)(B) is another such example and just clarifies 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
20 
that, for example, the parental-benefit exception is a compelling 
reason not to terminate parental rights as possibly required by 
ASFA.  In other words, where terminating a child’s substantial, 
positive attachment to the parent would, on balance, be 
detrimental to the child, that simply is a compelling reason not 
to terminate parental rights.5   
What this means is that the parent asserting the parental 
benefit exception must show, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, three things.  The parent must show regular visitation 
and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of 
visitation permitted.  Moreover, the parent must show that the 
child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the 
parent — the kind of attachment implying that the child would 
benefit from continuing the relationship.  And the parent must 
show that terminating that attachment would be detrimental to 
the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit 
of a new, adoptive home.  When the parent has met that burden, 
the parental-benefit exception applies such that it would not be 
in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights, and 
the court should select a permanent plan other than adoption.  
 
5  
We now disapprove opinions to the extent they have held 
to the contrary:  In re Caden C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pages 
109–115; In re Logan B., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at pages 1010–
1013; In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at page 1349; and 
In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at page 51.  Many opinions 
have treated the “compelling reason” language as not adding 
any further or heightened requirement, and they just assess 
whether termination would be “detrimental,” i.e., whether the 
harm of losing the parental relationship would be offset by the 
security and stability of a new adoptive family.  (See, e.g., In re 
E.T., supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 77.)  We understand those 
opinions to be consistent with our decision today. 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
21 
(See § 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(A).)  We do not further discuss the 
steps for selecting such a permanent plan.  (See § 366.26, subd. 
(c)(4)(A)–(B).) 
B. 
We now turn to whether and how a parent’s continued 
struggles with the issues that led to dependency relate to 
application of the parental-benefit exception.   
A parent’s continued struggles with the issues leading to 
dependency are not a categorical bar to applying the exception.  
As the parties before us all agree, making a parent’s continued 
struggles with the issues leading to dependency, standing alone, 
a bar to the exception would effectively write the exception out 
of the statute.  In cases like this one, when the court sets a 
section 366.26 hearing, it terminates reunification services for 
the parent.  (See § 366.21, subd. (h).)  Thus, when the court holds 
a section 366.26 hearing, it all but presupposes that the parent 
has not been successful in maintaining the reunification plan 
meant to address the problems leading to dependency.  (See also 
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A) [court shall not terminate parental 
rights unless court has previously found that, to the extent 
required by statute, “reasonable services” were offered or 
provided].)  The parental-benefit exception can therefore only 
apply when the parent has presumptively not made sufficient 
progress in addressing the problems that led to dependency.  So, 
we reject the paradoxical proposition, without any basis in the 
statute or its history, that the exception can only apply when the 
parent has made sufficient progress in addressing the problems 
that led to dependency.  Parents need not show that they are 
“actively involved in maintaining their sobriety or complying 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
22 
substantially with their case plan” (Caden C., supra, 34 
Cal.App.5th at p. 112) to establish the exception.6   
But the parties likewise agree on something else:  issues 
such as those that led to dependency often prove relevant to the 
application of the exception.  We agree.  A parent’s struggles 
may mean that interaction between parent and child at least 
sometimes has a “ ‘negative’ effect” on the child.  (Autumn H., 
supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)  For example, there was some 
evidence in this case that, perhaps as a result of her mental 
health issues, Mother sought to undermine at least some of 
Caden’s foster placements, which could certainly have had a 
negative effect on him.  Conversely, a parent who gains greater 
understanding of herself and her children’s needs through 
treatment may be in a better position to ensure that her 
interactions with the children have a “ ‘positive’ . . . effect” on 
them.  (Ibid.; see In re E.T., supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 77 [“the 
insight [Mother] has into her own development and the love and 
care she has for her children was clear in her testimony.  Mother 
recognized that her behavior was traumatic for the children 
. . .”].)  In both scenarios, the parent’s struggles speak to the 
benefit (or lack thereof) of continuing the relationship and are 
relevant to that extent.  And issues such as those leading to 
dependency may also be relevant to the detriment from 
terminating parental rights.  There was some evidence in this 
case that Mother’s continuing substance abuse and mental 
health issues contributed to Caden forming what might have 
 
6  
To the extent these cases held to the contrary, we 
disapprove of them:  In re Caden C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th  at 
pages 110–112; In re Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at page 
648; In re Noah G., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at page 1304; and In 
re Marcelo B., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at pages 643–645. 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
23 
been a “narrow” bond with her.  And there was conflicting 
testimony about whether the nature of Caden’s bond to Mother, 
associated with Mother’s substance abuse and mental health 
issues, would make termination more or less detrimental for 
Caden.   
 
Nonetheless, the parent’s struggles with issues such as 
those that led to dependency are relevant only to the extent they 
inform the specific questions before the court:  would the child 
benefit from continuing the relationship and be harmed, on 
balance, by losing it?  The parent’s continuing difficulty with 
mental health or substance abuse may not be used as a basis for 
determining the fate of the parental relationship by assigning 
blame, making moral judgments about the fitness of the parent, 
or rewarding or punishing a parent.  (See Cynthia D., supra, 5 
Cal.4th at p. 254 [“It is not the purpose of the section 366.26 
hearing to show parental inadequacy . . . [or] that the parents 
are ‘at fault’ ”]; see also Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 305; 
Amber M., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 690; Goldstein et al., 
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1979) p. 79.)   
Nor could a parent’s struggles be relevant simply because 
they might conceivably affect the parent’s ability to regain 
custody of the child.  As we have previously explained, return to 
the parent’s custody is not an option at the section 366.26 
hearing.  (See Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 304–305.)  
Accordingly, whether the parent is or is not “ready for the 
children’s return to her custody” is not, by itself, relevant to the 
application of the parental-benefit exception.  (Amber M., supra, 
103 Cal.App.4th at p. 690.)  If termination of parental rights 
would, when weighed against the offsetting benefits of an 
adoptive home, be detrimental to the child, the court should not 
terminate parental rights, even if the parent has not 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
24 
demonstrated a likelihood that he or she will ever be able to 
regain custody.7  (See Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
471–472.) 
 
Mother argues that a parent’s struggles should only be 
relevant to whether the child would benefit from continuing the 
relationship.  They should not be considered “a second time” in 
deciding whether termination would be detrimental.  A parent’s 
struggles may be most directly relevant — as Mother suggests 
— to the “ ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between 
parent and child” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576) 
and then somewhat more indirectly to the harm of removing 
such interactions from the child’s life.  (See also Zeth S., supra, 
31 Cal.4th at p. 412, fn. 9.)  But how and how much the loss of a 
relationship with a parent may be harmful, how and how much 
that harm might be offset by a new family are complex questions 
not always answered just by determining how beneficial the 
child’s relationship with the parent is.  Though there is no 
reason for a court to consider “a second time” the same struggles 
in the same way, a parent’s struggles with substance abuse, 
mental health issues, or other problems could be directly 
relevant to a juvenile court’s analysis in deciding whether 
termination would be detrimental. 
 
7  
We also now disapprove those opinions that have held 
issues leading to dependency (1) were relevant in their own right 
apart from their relevance to the elements of the exception; (2) 
were relevant because they led to dependency; or (3) were 
relevant simply because they might keep the parent from 
regaining custody.  (See In re Caden C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th 
at pp. 110–112; In re Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 648; 
In re Noah G., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1304; In re Anthony 
B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 397; In re Marcelo B., supra, 209 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 643–644.) 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
25 
C. 
 
When courts make decisions about whether to apply the 
beneficial relationship exception, their decisions are subject to 
review.  What standard applies is another question we granted 
review to resolve. 
 
Courts of Appeal have come to use three different 
standards.  Many courts review all the trial court’s findings for 
substantial evidence.  (See, e.g., Autumn H., supra, 27 
Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)  Other courts have suggested that the 
appropriate standard is abuse of discretion because the “juvenile 
court is determining which kind of custody is appropriate for the 
child.”  (Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351 
[analogizing § 366.26 hearing to custody determinations at 
other stages of dependency proceedings].)  And yet others, 
including the Court of Appeal in this case, have adopted a 
“hybrid” standard.  They review whether there has been regular 
visitation and whether there is a beneficial relationship for 
substantial evidence but whether termination would be 
detrimental for abuse of discretion.  (See In re Bailey J. (2010) 
189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314–1315.) 
We agree with the general consensus:  a substantial 
evidence standard of review applies to the first two elements.  
The determination that the parent has visited and maintained 
contact with the child “consistently,” taking into account “the 
extent permitted by the court’s orders” (Brandon C., supra, 71 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1537) is essentially a factual determination.  
It’s likewise essentially a factual determination whether the 
relationship is such that the child would benefit from continuing 
it. 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
26 
 
The third element — whether termination of parental 
rights would be detrimental to the child — is somewhat 
different.  As in assessing visitation and the relationship 
between parent and child, the court must make a series of 
factual determinations.  These may range from the specific 
features of the child’s relationship with the parent and the harm 
that would come from losing those specific features to a higher-
level conclusion of how harmful in total that loss would be.  The 
court must also determine, for the particular child, how a 
prospective 
adoptive 
placement 
may 
offset 
and 
even 
counterbalance those harms.  In so doing, it may make explicit 
or implicit findings ranging from specific benefits related to the 
child’s specific characteristics up to a higher-level conclusion 
about the benefit of adoption all told.  All these factual 
determinations are properly reviewed for substantial evidence.  
(See In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 (Robert L.) 
[“evaluating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is 
similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the 
ruling”].)   
Yet the court must also engage in a delicate balancing of 
these determinations as part of assessing the likely course of a 
future situation that’s inherently uncertain.  The decision is not 
the same as a determination whether to transfer the child from 
the custody of one caregiver to another, but it does require 
assessing what the child’s life would be like in an adoptive home 
without the parent in his life.  (Cf. In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 
Cal.4th 295, 317–318 (Stephanie M.).)  The court makes the 
assessment by weighing the harm of losing the relationship 
against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home.  And 
so, the ultimate decision — whether termination of parental 
rights would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
27 
relationship with his parent — is discretionary and properly 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
 
In reviewing factual determinations for substantial 
evidence, a reviewing court should “not reweigh the evidence, 
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary 
conflicts.”  (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)  
The determinations should “be upheld if . . . supported by 
substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the 
contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a 
different result had it believed other evidence.”  (Ibid.; see also 
9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2020) Appeal, § 365.)  
Uncontradicted testimony rejected by the trial court “ ‘cannot be 
credited on appeal unless, in view of the whole record, it is clear, 
positive, and of such a nature that it cannot rationally be 
disbelieved.’ ”  (Adoption of Arthur M. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 
704, 717.) 
 
Review for abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused 
not primarily on the evidence but the application of a legal 
standard.  A court abuses its discretion only when “ ‘ “the trial 
court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an 
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.” ’ ”  
(Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.)  But “ ‘ “[w]hen two 
or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the 
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for 
that of the trial court.” ’ ”  (Id. at p. 319; see also Robert L., supra, 
21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067 [“The reviewing court should interfere 
only ‘ “if . . . under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in 
support of the trial court’s action, no judge could reasonably 
have made the order that he [or she] did” ’ ”].) 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
28 
 
While each standard here fits a distinct type of 
determination under review, the practical difference between 
the standards is not likely to be very pronounced.  Review for 
substantial evidence applies to factual determinations; abuse of 
discretion applies when a lower court must delicately balance 
factual 
determinations 
to 
assess 
an 
uncertain 
future 
situation.  But where, as with the parental-benefit exception, 
“the appellate court will be evaluating the factual basis for an 
exercise of discretion, there likely will be no practical difference 
in application of the two standards.”  (Eisenberg & Hepler, Cal. 
Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 
2020) ¶ 8:88; see also Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 
1351 [“The practical differences between the two standards of 
review are not significant”].)  At its core, the hybrid standard we 
now endorse simply embodies the principle that “[t]he statutory 
scheme does not authorize a reviewing court to substitute its 
own judgment as to what is in the child’s best interests for the 
trial court’s determination in that regard, reached pursuant to 
the 
statutory 
scheme’s 
comprehensive 
and 
controlling 
provisions.”  (Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 410.) 
III. 
Having explained the scope of the parental-benefit 
exception and the standard for reviewing an application of it, we 
turn to the Court of Appeal’s decision in this case.  The Court of 
Appeal found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s 
determinations that Mother had maintained regular visitation 
with Caden.  (Caden C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 108–109.)  
It also found that substantial evidence supported the trial 
court’s determination that Caden and Mother had a beneficial 
relationship.  (Id. at p. 109.)  It held, though, that the trial court 
abused its discretion in finding that the relationship was a 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
29 
compelling reason not to terminate parental rights.  (Id. at pp. 
110–115.)   
The Court of Appeal rested its decision to reverse on two 
considerations.  First, it concluded that mother had not 
“ ‘maintain[ed] her sobriety and address[ed] her mental health 
issues.’ ”  (Caden C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 110.)  It 
therefore held that “[n]o reasonable court would apply the 
beneficial relationship exception on this record of mother’s 
disengagement from treatment and case plan, inability or 
unwillingness to remain sober, and deficient insight regarding 
her parenting.”  (Id. at p. 112.)  Second, it reasoned that 
“although 
Caden 
enjoyed 
visiting 
with 
mother, 
their 
interactions were often detrimental to his well-being” (id. at p. 
114) by contrast with his relationship with Ms. H., “the only 
caregiver in Caden’s life who had enabled him ‘to feel that he is 
in the care of a consistent and predictable adult who keeps him 
safe and reliably looks out for his physical and emotional 
needs’ ” (id. at p. 115).  It therefore concluded that “when the 
strength and quality of mother’s relationship with Caden in a 
tenuous placement is properly balanced against the security and 
sense of belonging adoption by Ms. H. would confer, no 
reasonable court could have concluded that a compelling 
justification had been made for forgoing adoption.”  (Ibid., italics 
added.) 
The first consideration supporting reversal was improper.  
Even where a parent continues to struggle with addiction — and 
even if she believes that her addiction doesn’t make her an unfit 
parent — a reasonable court could conclude that termination of 
parental rights would, on balance, be detrimental to the child.  
(See Caden C., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 111.)  Mother was not 
required, in order to establish that the parental-benefit 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
30 
exception applied, to put evidence in at the section 366.26 
hearing that she had recently attempted to maintain her 
sobriety or seek treatment for her addiction or mental health 
issues.  (See Caden C., at p. 111.)  The Court of Appeal did not 
conclude, applying the appropriate standard of review, that the 
evidence showed Mother’s substance abuse or mental health 
issues affected whether her relationship with Caden was 
beneficial or whether its loss would, on balance, be detrimental 
to him.  The Court of Appeal did not, for example, connect 
Mother’s substance abuse or mental health to its emphasis on 
contested evidence about whether Caden’s visits with Mother 
“were often detrimental to his well-being.”  (Id. at p. 114.)  It 
also did not explain how its reliance on that contested evidence 
fit with its determination that “it cannot be seriously disputed 
that Caden had a beneficial relationship with mother — that is, 
a significant relationship the termination of which would cause 
him detriment.”  (Id. at p. 109.)  And so, the Court of Appeal’s 
holding that no reasonable court could apply the parental-
benefit exception given Mother’s substance abuse and mental 
health issues was error. 
Because we find that the Court of Appeal’s first 
consideration was erroneous, we reverse.  Accordingly, we do not 
address the court’s second consideration in detail.  In particular, 
we don’t decide whether the Court of Appeal failed to view “all 
the evidence, . . . most favorably in support of the trial court’s 
actions” (Robert L., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067) or 
improperly “substitute[d] its own judgment” (Zeth S., supra, 31 
Cal.4th at p. 410) for the trial court’s.  
The juvenile court declined to terminate parental rights 
nearly three years ago.  We now hold that the Court of Appeal, 
in reversing that decision, erred.  And so, we reverse the Court 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
31 
of Appeal.  More recently, the Agency filed a new petition to 
terminate parental rights, and the trial court held a new hearing 
and terminated Mother’s parental rights.  That subsequent 
decision renders moot the earlier decision not to terminate 
parental rights.  On remand, the Court of Appeal should 
therefore dismiss this appeal as moot.  (See People v. DeLeon 
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 660.) 
IV. 
 
The dependency statutes were enacted to prevent harm to 
children.  They prevent harm at the outset of the dependency 
process by removing children from situations where they are 
likely to suffer abuse or neglect.  But they also prevent harm in 
the process of selecting permanent placement through the 
parental-benefit exception, by allowing certain children to 
preserve emotionally important parental relationships.  This 
exception allows a child a legal basis for maintaining a 
relationship with the child’s parent if severing that relationship 
would, on balance, harm the child.  The exception preserves the 
child’s right to the relationship even when the child cannot 
safely live with that parent.  What it does not allow is a 
judgment about the parent’s problems to deprive a child of the 
chance to continue a substantial, positive relationship with the 
parent.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal and remand with directions to dismiss the appeal as 
moot. 
 
In re CADEN C.  
Opinion of the Court by Cuéllar, J. 
 
32 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re Caden C. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 34 Cal.App.5th 87 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S255839  
Date Filed:  May 27, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior    
County:  San Francisco    
Judge:  Monica F. Wiley    
__________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Kimiko Burton, Lead Attorney; 
Gordon-Creed, Kelley Holl and Sugerman, Jeremy Sugerman and 
Katie Curtis for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Jennifer Henning; Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel (San 
Diego), Caitlin E. Rae, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Tahra C. 
Broderson, Deputy County Counsel, for California State Association of 
Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Deborah Dentler, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Appellant. 
 
Janet G. Sherwood for Advokids, East Bay Children’s Law Offices and 
Legal Services for Children as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
 
Stacie Hendrix and Leslie Starr Heimov for Children’s Law Center of 
California, Legal Advocates for Children and Youth and Children’s 
Legal Services of San Diego as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
 
 
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Nicole 
Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 
and Respondent Christine C. 
 
Sharon Petrosino, Public Defender (Orange), and Brian Okamoto, 
Deputy Public Defender, for California Dependency Trial Counsel as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent Christine C. 
 
NYU School of Law Family Defense Clinic, Amy Mulzer; Jarvis Legal 
Services and Michelle L. Jarvis for Professors of Family and Clinical 
Law as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent 
Christine C. 
 
Michelle Danley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Respondent Brian C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Leslie A. Barry 
650 Park Rd. 
Mays Landing, NJ 08330 
(714) 206-3374 
 
Jeremy Sugerman 
Gordon-Creed, Kelley Holl and Sugerman 
1901 Harrison St., 13th floor 
Oakland, CA 94612 
(415) 969-6754 
 
Deborah Dentler 
510 S. Morengo Ave. 
Pasadena, CA 91101 
(805) 318-1146