Case Title: LACEY v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-7

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
LACEY v. STATE2003 WY 14879 P.3d 493Case Number: 03-7Decided: 11/18/2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

KEVIN 
ROSS LACEY,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

                                                                                                

Appellee(Plaintiff).

            

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Kevin Ross Lacey, pro se, Olney Springs, Colorado. 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Dee Morgan,  Assistant Attorney General 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
KITE, Justice.

 

[¶1]      In 2002, more 
than ten years after being convicted and sentenced for kidnapping and two counts 
of aggravated assault, Kevin Lacey filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence 
in district court.  The district 
court denied his motion on the basis that no showing was made pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 35(a).  This Court must 
decide whether Mr. Lacey's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata 
given that he challenged his sentences previously in his direct appeal.  We affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The first issue 
as presented by the Appellee is dispositive:

 

Issue 
I:  Whether appellant's current 
challenge to his sentence is barred by the doctrine of res judicata?  

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Mr. Lacey's 
current appeal is his second appearance before this Court.  In 1990, we affirmed Mr. Lacey's 
conviction on one count of kidnapping and two counts of aggravated assault and 
battery.   The relevant facts 
which resulted in his conviction are set out in Lacey v. State, 803 P.2d 1364 (Wyo. 1990).

 

At the 
trial, Appellant's wife, Diane, testified to the occurrence of the following 
events. On September 10, 1988, Appellant finished working and returned to the 
apartment where he and Diane lived. Diane was approximately six months pregnant. 
Appellant had consumed some alcohol, and he continued to drink throughout the 
evening. Between nine and ten o'clock, the couple prepared to go to bed, and 
Diane asked Appellant if she could read a book. Appellant got angry because he 
did not approve of the book's subject matter and tore the book into pieces. 
Diane became frightened and went into the bathroom to change clothes so she 
could leave. Appellant went into a fury, kicked the bathroom door open, and 
began to strike Diane. Appellant pushed Diane into the bathtub, continued to 
beat her, pulled her hair, and told her that she and the baby she was carrying 
had to die. Although Diane did not believe she would survive  her husband's attack, 

the physical 
violence ceased after a period of thirty to forty-five minutes. At that point, 
Appellant became apologetic, and the couple cleaned up Diane's hair and blood. 
Despite the fact that Appellant's rage had subsided, he told Diane that she 
would have to die before the night was over. Diane asked if she could leave the 
apartment, but Appellant said, "No." After the bathroom was cleaned, Appellant 
retrieved several cans of beer and a knife, and the couple went to bed. 
Appellant lay beside Diane, holding the knife, and told her to go to 
sleep.

 

The 
next day, Appellant continued to exercise dominion over Diane by accompanying 
her everywhere she went and by carrying the knife or keeping it in close 
proximity. Appellant also poked at Diane with the knife, held it to her throat, 
and continued to verbally threaten her. The couple had several visitors during 
the day, but Diane was too afraid of Appellant to say or do anything which would 
alert anyone of her peril. Diane and Appellant left the apartment so Appellant 
could speak with a co-worker, but, once again, Diane was too scared to seek 
help. Finally, Diane's sister stopped by the apartment, and Diane told her that 
she wanted to get out. Diane's sister notified her father of Diane's 
plight, and he went to the apartment and liberated Diane without incident.

Lacey, 
803 P.2d  at 1366. 

[¶4]      On the basis of 
these facts, Mr. Lacey was charged with and convicted of the kidnapping and 
aggravated assault charges.  
Id.  The district 
court sentenced him to not less than twenty nor more than twenty-five years on 
the kidnapping conviction, not less than ten nor more than fifteen years on the 
first aggravated assault and battery conviction, and not less than ten nor more 
than twelve years on the second aggravated assault and battery conviction.  The kidnapping sentence and the first 
aggravated assault and battery sentence were to be served concurrently, with the 
final aggravated assault and battery sentence to be served consecutive to the 
first two sentences.  The jury found 
him to be a habitual criminal and the aggravated assault and battery sentences 
were enhanced under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 (LexisNexis 
2003).

 

[¶5]      On direct appeal 
to this Court, Mr. Lacey questioned the propriety of his sentence 
enhancement.  He contended his 
status as a habitual criminal should be used to enhance only one of his 
sentences.  This Court held that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced two sentences for 
two convictions arising out of a single occurrence.  Lacey, 803 P.2d  at 
1371.

 

[¶6]      In 2002, in his 
motion to correct an illegal sentence, Mr. Lacey argued the imposed penalties 
for the aggravated assault and battery convictions exceeded the maximum 
sentences prescribed by statute.  He 
also argued all three sentences should run concurrently with each other because 
of lack of evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and other irregularities at 
trial.  The district court denied 
Mr. Lacey's motion, holding that "no showing has been made pursuant to Rule 
35(a) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure to justify or require a 
modification of the Defendant's sentences."  This appeal 
followed.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      Mr. Lacey's 
current appeal is governed by W.R.Cr.P 35(a).  We recently 
stated:

 

W.R.Cr.P. 
35(a) governs motions to correct illegal sentences. "A motion to correct an 
illegal sentence under W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) is addressed to the sound discretion of 
the sentencing court." Mead v. State, 2 P.3d 564, 566 (Wyo. 2000). We, 
therefore, apply our abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing a denial of a 
motion to correct an illegal sentence. Cardenas v. State, 925 P.2d 239, 240 (Wyo. 1996). The abuse-of-discretion standard of review reaches the question 
of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice. Griswold v. State, 
2001 WY 14, P7, 17 P.3d 728, 731 (Wyo. 2001). Judicial discretion is a composite 
of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it 
means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the 
circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily and capriciously.  Id.

 

Martinez 
v. State, 2002 
WY 10, ¶ 7, 39 P.3d 394, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2002).  
W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) gives district courts the authority to correct illegal 
sentences at any time.  Id. 
at ¶ 9.  An illegal 
sentence is one that exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of 
imprisonment for the same offense, or otherwise violates the constitution or 
other law.  
Id.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶8]      In contending the 
district court erred in denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence under 
W.R.Cr.P. 35(a), Mr. Lacey argues the oral pronouncement of his sentences did 
not include a finding that he was a habitual criminal, and thus his aggravated 
assault sentences exceeded the maximum penalty allowed by law.  Further, Mr. Lacey contends the district 
court should have ordered his aggravated assault sentences to run concurrently 
because those charges were based on the same acts.  And finally, Mr. Lacey contends the 
district court should have imposed an enhanced sentence on only one of the 
aggravated assault charges, because it was the only "principal charge" capable 
of enhancement pursuant to the habitual criminal statute.

 

[¶9]      The State, on the 
other hand, contends Mr. Lacey's claims should be denied altogether because they 
are barred by res judicata.  Because 
Mr. Lacey challenged the legality of his sentence when he appealed from the 
district court's initial judgment and sentence, the State argues Mr. Lacey did 
raise or could have raised all of his current arguments in his direct 
appeal.

 

[¶10]   The district court denied Mr. 
Lacey's motion on the basis that no showing was made pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) 
to justify or require a modification of the sentences.  However, we need not reach that 
threshold because the doctrine of res judicata completely bars Mr. Lacey's 
motion. It is well settled we may affirm the district court's 
decision on any legal ground appearing in the record.   Daniels v. Carpenter, 2003 
WY 11, ¶ 30, 62 P.3d 555, ¶ 30 (Wyo. 2003).   

 

[¶11]   In determining whether the doctrine 
of res 
judicata applies, we examine four factors: (1) identity in 
parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate 
to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in 
reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them.  Markstein v. Countryside I, LLC, 
2003 WY 122, ¶ 15.  This court has 
repeatedly held that issues raised and considered in a prior criminal appeal are 
res 
judicata, and cannot be relitigated by a 
defendant in a subsequent collateral attack.  McCarty v. State, 929 P.2d 524, 525 (Wyo. 1996).   We have 
said:

 

It 
is a longstanding rule that issues which could have been raised in an earlier 
proceeding are foreclosed from subsequent consideration.  Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198, 
199 (Wyo. 1989); Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Wyo. 1988). 
Unless [the appellant] can show good cause why the issue was not raised at an 
earlier opportunity, the court may decline to consider the issue. Kallas, 
776 P.2d  at 199; Cutbirth, 751 P.2d  at 1261.

 

Hamill 
v. State, 
948 P.2d 1356, 1358 (Wyo. 1997).  

 

[¶12]   In Hamill, the defendant did 
not raise the issue of his consolidated sentence when he appealed his 1979 
conviction.  Eleven years later, Mr. 
Hamill filed his first motion to correct an illegal sentence.  Again, the motion contained no mention 
of his consolidated sentence.  That 
motion was denied.  Sixteen years 
after his conviction, he filed yet another motion to correct an illegal 
sentence, this time contending his sentence was illegally consolidated.  Finding res judicata applied, we 
said:

 

Hamill 
fails to articulate any reason why this issue was not raised in his earlier 
petitions regarding his sentencing        . . 
. .  Hamill makes no attempt to 
explain why he did not challenge his consolidated sentence in his petition filed 
in 1990 . . . . 

 

Neither 
do the interests of justice require consideration of Hamill's claim.  

 

 

Hamill, 
948 P.2d  at 1359. 

 

[¶13]   Similarly, in Mead v. State, 
2 P.3d 564, 566 (Wyo. 2000), we held Mr. Mead's appeal of his motion to correct 
an illegal sentence was barred by res judicata. "The issue   . . . could have been raised in 
that appeal, but it was not . . . .  
[W]e ground our decision in this case on the doctrine of res judicata, 
and we hold that this Court is foreclosed from considering Mead's appeal on its 
merits."  Id.  

 

[¶14]   Unlike the defendants in Hamill 
and Mead, Mr. Lacey did challenge his sentences in his direct 
appeal:

 

Appellant's 
final argument challenges the propriety of the district court's decision to 
increase both aggravated assault and battery sentences to greater amounts of 
time than provided for by statute as a result of the jury finding him to be a 
habitual criminal. Appellant does not contest the jury's finding that he is a 
habitual criminal. Instead, he contends his status as a habitual criminal 
should be used to enhance only one of his sentences.

 

Lacey, 
803 P.2d  at 1371.   Mr. Lacey's 
complaints in this appeal, likewise, focus on his sentences.  Here, he argues the district court erred 
"by not imposing one (1) sentence for the principal charge to be enhanced 
pursuant to the Wyoming Statute § 6-10-201, habitual criminal."   As in the prior appeal, Mr. 
Lacey's argument centered around his status as a habitual criminal and its 
effect on his sentences.  Although 
his argument differs slightly from that presented on direct appeal, the 
distinction is insufficient to avoid the application of res judicata.  Mr. Lacey offers no showing of why the 
issues raised in the current appeal could not have been raised in his direct 
appeal and absent such a showing his claims in the present appeal are barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata.  

 

[¶15]   Affirmed.