Case Title: Adams Outdoor Advertising v. Board of Zoning Appeals

Citation: 

Docket Number: 061272

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
ADAMS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 
L.P., ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 061272  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 8, 2007 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF 
THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
William R. O’Brien, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, the dispositive issue is whether the 
installation of an electronic message board “enlarged” a 
lawful, nonconforming billboard in violation of a city’s 
zoning ordinance.  Because we conclude that the message 
board did enlarge the billboard, we will affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court upholding the decision of a 
board of zoning appeals. 
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
In 1988, the City of Virginia Beach (the City) adopted 
an ordinance prohibiting the erection of billboards within 
the City limits.  In relevant part, the ordinance provides: 
No new billboards shall be erected within the city 
limits, effective immediately.  All existing 
billboards shall be governed by the provisions of 
section 215 of this ordinance.  No billboard 
heretofore erected shall be located, in whole or in 
part, upon improved property. 
 
City of Virginia Beach Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance (CZO) 
§ 216(a).  With respect to existing billboards, CZO 
§ 215(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
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Notwithstanding the provisions of section 105(f) 
of this ordinance, no nonconforming sign shall be 
structurally altered, enlarged, moved or 
replaced, whether voluntarily or by reason of 
involuntary damage to or destruction of such 
sign, unless such sign is brought into compliance 
with the provisions of this ordinance. 
 
 
Adams Outdoor Advertising, L.P. (Adams), owns a 
billboard erected in the City on real estate owned by F. 
Wayne McLeskey, Jr.  Since the billboard was in existence 
when CZO § 216(a) became effective, it was a lawful, 
nonconforming billboard.  See Code § 15.2-2307; CZO § 105.  
In March 2004, the City zoning administrator informed Adams 
that it had “structurally altered and enlarged” the subject 
billboard in violation of CZO § 215(a) by installing a 
large, black, electronic message board on the billboard.  
The zoning administrator directed Adams to remove the 
billboard within 30 days. 
 
In accordance with Code § 15.1-2311, Adams appealed 
the zoning administrator’s determination to the City board 
of zoning appeals (BZA).  At the BZA hearing, the zoning 
administrator testified that she concluded Adams had 
“structurally altered” and “enlarged” the billboard because 
Adams cut holes in its face and added bracing in order to 
install the message board, and because the message board 
increased both the weight and mass of the billboard.  Adams 
acknowledged that it had obtained a permit to upgrade the 
 
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electrical service to the billboard to accommodate the 
message board.  It also admitted that the message board 
weighed 3,500 pounds.  Adams argued, however, that the 
installation of the message board was not a structural 
alteration or an enlargement of the subject billboard. 
To support its position, Adams introduced a letter 
from a structural engineer, opining that the addition of 
the electronic message board did “not increase the force in 
any structural element by more than [five percent]” and was 
not, therefore, “‘structural’ as defined by the 
International Building Code, [IBC §] 3403.2, which [was] 
incorporated into the Virginia Uniform Statewide Building 
Code.” 1  He also opined that the message board was “smaller 
in sign area [than] the original sign and its weight is 
negligible.” 
 
The BZA voted to uphold the zoning administrator’s 
determination.  One BZA member commented, “[T]o 
alter or modify a sign to support thirty-five hundred 
pounds . . . requires a significant amount of structural 
change.  In this case, it’s [a] violation of Section 215.” 
 
Adams and McLeskey (collectively, the petitioners), 
subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in 
 
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the circuit court, asserting that the installation of the 
electronic message board to one side of the billboard was 
not a structural alteration or an enlargement, and that, 
because Adams had subsequently taken the message board off 
the billboard, the City had no right to demand removal of 
the entire billboard without paying it “just compensation” 
under Code § 33.1-379(E).  The petitioners requested the 
circuit court to reverse the BZA’s decision and enter a 
final order directing that Adams did not have to remove the 
billboard. 
 
At the hearing before the circuit court, the 
petitioners introduced testimony from a structural 
engineer, who testified that the force load of the 
electronic message board was less than five percent.  The 
engineer therefore opined that the message board was not a 
structural alteration within the meaning of IBC § 3402.2.  
He further explained that, based on his visual inspection 
of the message board, it was sitting on protruding 
“horizontal angles” and the board was “strapped back with 
nylon cinch straps.”  According to the engineer, “[t]he 
straps were strapped to the steel angles and channels and 
support beams.” 
_____________________ 
1  Apparently, the engineer’s citation to IBC § 3403.2 
was a clerical error.  He should have referenced IBC 
 
5
 
The zoning administrator testified on behalf of the 
BZA with regard to her determination that the addition of 
the electronic message board had both “structurally 
altered” and “enlarged” the billboard.  The zoning 
administrator explained that the message board had 
“enlarged” the billboard because it “added to the size, the 
depth, [and] the volume of the structure.”  Continuing, the 
zoning administrator testified that the installation of the 
message board “structurally altered” the billboard due to 
the steel beams that had been bolted in place.  Finally, 
relying on the provisions of CZO §§ 215(a) and 216(a), the 
zoning administrator stated that Adams must bring the 
billboard into compliance with the CZO, meaning that Adams 
must remove it since billboards are no longer allowed in 
the City. 
 
In a letter opinion, which the circuit court 
incorporated into its final order, the court interpreted 
the terms “structurally altered” and “enlarged” according 
to their plain meanings since the CZO does not define 
either term.  The court also considered the CZO’s 
definition of the terms “structure” and “[s]igns, surface 
_____________________ 
§ 3402.2. 
 
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area.”2  The circuit court concluded that the installation 
of the electronic message board “structurally altered” the 
billboard.  The court further concluded that, although the 
message board “did not add to the height or length of the 
billboard’s surface, it increased the width on one side.” 
 
The circuit court next addressed the argument that 
removal of the billboard was not required since Adams had 
remedied any structural alteration or enlargement by 
returning the billboard to its original condition.  Relying 
on this Court’s decision in Adams Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 
v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 261 Va. 407, 544 S.E.2d 315 
(2001), the court concluded that “[t]he ordinance only 
appears to suggest removal of a billboard as a remedy for 
                     
2  The CZO defines the term “[s]tructure” as 
“[a]nything constructed or erected with a fixed location on 
the ground, or requiring a fixed location on the ground, or 
attached to something having or requiring a fixed location 
on the ground.”  CZO § 111. 
 
In defining the term “[s]igns, surface area,” the CZO 
states: 
The surface area of a sign shall be computed as 
including the entire area within a parallelogram, 
triangle, circle, semicircle or other regular 
geometric figure, including all of the elements 
of the matter displayed, but not including blank 
masking, frames or structural elements outside 
the sign surface and bearing no advertising 
matter.  The surface area of each face of a 
double-faced sign shall count to[ward the] total 
sign area permitted. 
 
Id. 
 
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abandoned nonconforming billboards.”  Thus, the circuit 
court concluded “that the BZA did not err” by requiring 
Adams to remove the billboard. 
In its final order, the circuit court held that the 
BZA did not apply erroneous principles of law and that the 
BZA’s interpretation of the relevant zoning ordinance 
provisions was not plainly wrong or in violation of the 
purpose and intent of the CZO.  The court therefore upheld 
the BZA’s determination and directed Adams to remove the 
billboard.  This appeal ensued. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal to the circuit court, the BZA’s decision was 
entitled to a presumption of correctness.  Code § 15.2-2314 
(2003) (amended by 2006 Acts ch. 446).3  Although Code 
§ 15.2-2314 provides that the appealing party may rebut the 
presumption “by proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
. . . that the [BZA] erred in its decision,” that 
evidentiary standard “pertains only to questions about the 
                     
3 As of July 1, 2006, the provisions of Code § 15.2-
2314 state that on appeal to a circuit court, “the findings 
and conclusions of the board of zoning appeals on questions 
of fact shall be presumed to be correct” and that “[t]he 
court shall hear any arguments on questions of law de 
novo.”  2006 Acts ch. 446.  In this opinion, all references 
to Code § 15.2-2314 pertain to the version in effect at the 
time the petitioners filed their petition for a writ of 
certiorari in the circuit court, which occurred before the 
 
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sufficiency of the record to prove a particular fact.”  
Board of Supervisors v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 271 Va. 
336, 348, 626 S.E.2d 374, 381 (2006).  When, as in the 
present case, the issue before the circuit court was a 
question of law, i.e. the meaning of certain terms used in 
the CZO, the petitioners had the burden of proving that the 
BZA “either applied ‘erroneous principles of law’ or that 
its decision was ‘plainly wrong and in violation of the 
purpose and intent of the zoning ordinance.’”  Trustees of 
the Christ & St. Luke’s Episcopal Church v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals, 273 Va. 375, 380, 641 S.E.2d 104, 107 (2007) 
(quoting Board of Supervisors, 271 Va. at 348, 626 S.E.2d 
at 382) (internal quotation marks omitted).  On appeal to 
this Court, we apply the same presumption of correctness to 
the circuit court’s determination affirming the BZA’s 
decision.  Id. at 381, 641 S.E.2d at 107 (citing Patton v. 
City of Galax, 269 Va. 219, 229, 609 S.E.2d 41, 46 (2005)). 
The petitioners assign error to the circuit court’s 
judgment upholding the BZA’s determination that the 
installation of the electronic message board both 
“structurally altered” and “enlarged” the billboard in 
violation of CZO § 215(a).  They also assign error to the 
_____________________ 
2006 amendments enacted by the General Assembly became 
effective. 
 
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circuit court’s ruling that Adams must remove the billboard 
in order to comply with the CZO.  In order to resolve this 
appeal, we need to decide only whether the message board 
“enlarged” the billboard. 
With regard to that issue, the petitioners argue that, 
since the CZO does not define the term “enlarged,” the 
definition of the term “[s]igns, surface area” set forth in 
CZO § 111, see supra text accompanying note 2, provides 
“the only objective and measurable standard” for 
determining whether the addition of the message board 
actually enlarged the billboard.  Thus, according to the 
petitioners, since the message board did not increase the 
square footage of the billboard’s advertising area under 
that definition, the installation of the message board did 
not enlarge the billboard in violation of CZO § 215(a). 
 
In response, the BZA argues that the zoning 
administrator and BZA properly applied the “plain and 
natural meaning” of the term “enlarged.”  See Capelle v. 
Orange County, 269 Va. 60, 65, 607 S.E.2d 103, 105 (2005) 
(applying “the plain and natural meaning” of words 
contained in a zoning ordinance).  The BZA further contends 
that whether the addition of the message board increased 
the square footage of the advertising surface area is not 
the controlling factor in deciding whether Adams enlarged 
 
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the billboard.  Instead, the BZA asserts that any increases 
in the billboard’s mass and volume must also be considered.  
Since the addition of the message board increased the 
weight and depth of the billboard, the BZA contends that 
Adams “enlarged” the billboard.  We agree with the BZA. 
When construing a zoning ordinance and its undefined 
terms, we give such terms their “plain and natural 
meaning.”  Capelle, 269 Va. at 65, 607 S.E.2d at 105 
(citing Donovan v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 251 Va. 271, 
274, 467 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1996); McClung v. County of 
Henrico, 200 Va. 870, 875, 108 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1959)).  
“Although we give consideration to the purpose and intent 
of the ordinance, we are not permitted to extend the 
ordinance provisions by interpretation or construction 
beyond such intent and purpose.”  Id. (citing Donovan, 251 
Va. at 274, 467 S.E.2d at 810; Gough v. Shaner, 197 Va. 
572, 575, 90 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1955)).  We also afford 
“great weight” to the interpretation given a zoning 
ordinance by the officials charged with its administration.  
Donovan, 251 Va. at 274, 467 S.E.2d at 810; accord Trustees, 
273 Va. at 381, 641 S.E.2d at 107. 
The term “enlarge” means “to make larger; increase in 
quantity or dimensions; . . . to increase the capacity of.”  
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 754 (1993).  
 
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The evidence in the record before us demonstrates that the 
electronic message board added between 3,000 and 3,500 
pounds to the weight of the billboard.  While the message 
board did not increase the billboard’s height, length, or 
the square footage of its advertising surface area, it did, 
however, increase the billboard’s depth.  Thus, we 
conclude, as did the zoning administrator, the BZA, and the 
circuit court, that the addition of the message board 
“enlarged” the billboard in both dimension and weight.  In 
this case, that determination was a “judgment call . . . 
best accomplished by those charged with enforcing” the CZO.   
Trustees, 273 Va. at 381, 641 S.E.2d at 107 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Lamar Co., LLC v. Board 
of Zoning Appeals, 270 Va. 540, 547, 620 S.E.2d 753, 757 
(2005).  Furthermore, contrary to the petitioners’ 
argument, nothing in the CZO’s definition of the term 
“[s]igns, surface area” suggests that a nonconforming 
billboard is “enlarged” only when the square footage of the 
advertising surface area is increased. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we conclude that the BZA, in 
finding that the addition of the message board “enlarged” 
the billboard, did not apply erroneous principles of law.  
Nor was its decision plainly wrong and in violation of the 
 
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intent and purpose of the CZO.  See Trustees, 273 Va. at 
380, 641 S.E.2d at 107.  Because the provisions of CZO 
§ 215(a) requiring that no nonconforming billboard “shall 
be structurally altered, enlarged, moved or replaced” are 
in the disjunctive, it is not necessary to address the 
petitioners’ assignment of error challenging the circuit 
court’s decision that the installation of the message board 
“structurally altered” the billboard. 
Furthermore, the petitioners’ remaining assignment of 
error challenging the circuit court’s holding that Adams 
must remove the billboard in order to comply with the CZO 
speaks only to the “determination that a structural 
alteration made to a nonconforming billboard cannot be 
cured by returning the billboard to the same condition in 
which it existed prior to the structural alteration.”  
(Emphasis added).  The petitioners do not challenge the 
circuit court’s separate, independent holding that Adams 
could not cure the enlargement of the billboard by 
returning the billboard to its preexisting condition.  
Thus, we will not consider that assignment of error.4  See 
Magco of Maryland, Inc. v. Barr, 262 Va. 1, 1, 545 S.E.2d 
                     
4  We likewise will not address the petitioners’ 
argument about “just compensation.”  That issue was not 
before the BZA.  See Adams Outdoor Advertising, 261 Va. at 
416, 544 S.E.2d at 320. 
 
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548, 548 (2001) (when there is an independent basis for the 
lower court’s judgment that is not challenged on appeal, 
this Court does not address the assigned error). 
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s 
judgment. 
Affirmed.