Case Title: Commonwealth v. Fernandes

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11668

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11668 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSE FERNANDES. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     January 9, 2023. - July 21, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Armed Assault with Intent to Murder.  Assault by 
Means of a Dangerous Weapon.  Firearms.  Electronic 
Surveillance.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Self-incrimination, Assistance of counsel.  Evidence, 
Wiretap, Opinion, Prior misconduct, Photograph, Third-party 
culprit, Business record.  Cellular Telephone.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Discovery, Public trial, Argument 
by prosecutor, Assistance of counsel, Duplicative 
convictions. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 6, 2011. 
 
The cases were tried before D. Lloyd Macdonald, J., and 
motions for postconviction relief, filed on March 6, 2020, were 
heard by Raffi N. Yessayan, J. 
 
 
James W. Rosseel for the defendant. 
Mary Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  The defendant, Jose Fernandes, was tried 
before a Bristol County jury and convicted of murder in the 
 
2 
first degree for the May 17, 2009, shooting death of Troy Pina 
(victim).1  The Commonwealth proceeded against the defendant on 
theories of deliberate premeditation and joint venture 
liability.  Among other evidence, the jury heard testimony from 
the defendant's associate, Alexis Cruz, that the defendant 
confessed to participation in the shooting.2  Cruz's testimony 
was supported by secret recordings of the defendant discussing 
his involvement.3 
 
1 In connection with the same shooting, the jury also 
convicted the defendant of three counts of armed assault with 
intent to murder, three counts of assault by means of a 
dangerous weapon, and one count of carrying a firearm without a 
license.  The jury acquitted the defendant of conspiracy to 
murder witness Kathleen Soule. 
 
2 This case arises from the same shooting described in this 
court's decision in Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 468 Mass. 417, 
418-419 (2014).  In that case, the Commonwealth was granted 
leave from a single justice of this court to file an 
interlocutory appeal from a judge's allowance of Marcus 
Mitchell's motion to suppress secret recordings for reasons not 
relevant in this case.  The appeal was reported to the full 
court.  See id. at 421.  The court held in relevant part that 
the recording at issue was not an "interception" forbidden by 
the Massachusetts wiretap statute, G. L. c. 272, § 99, because 
it met the requirements of the statute's "one-party consent 
exception."  See G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4; Mitchell, supra at 428.  
Specifically, the court observed that murder was "one of the 
designated offenses listed in [G. L. c. 272,] § 99 B 7," and it 
concluded that the facts before it regarding the May 17, 2009, 
shooting evinced a sufficient nexus to organized crime such that 
the judge did not err in finding that the murder was committed 
in connection with organized crime.  See Mitchell, supra at 423, 
425-428.  This latter issue is argued by the defendant here. 
 
3 These recordings were made pursuant to a warrant issued to 
satisfy the requirements of art. 14 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  See Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61, 
 
3 
On appeal from the verdicts and from the denials of his 
motions for a new trial, for an evidentiary hearing, and for 
further discovery, the defendant claims a number of errors, 
including that the secret recordings were not authorized by law 
and should not have been admitted in evidence, that Cruz should 
not have been permitted to testify to his understanding of 
certain slang used by the defendant, and that the defendant was 
prejudiced by the failure of the Commonwealth to turn over 
certain discovery. 
We address these contentions and others infra, and for the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of the motion for a 
new trial, the denial of the motion for an evidentiary hearing, 
and the denial of the motion for further discovery; we affirm 
the defendant's convictions on the charge of murder in the first 
degree, the three charges of armed assault with intent to 
murder, and the charge of carrying a firearm without a license; 
we vacate as duplicative the defendant's convictions on the 
three charges of assault by means of a dangerous weapon; and 
 
77 (1987).  Nevertheless, as explained in note 8, infra, this 
Blood warrant was unnecessary because the conversations did not 
take place in a private home.  See Commonwealth v. Burgos, 470 
Mass. 133, 134 n.1 (2014); Commonwealth v. Eason, 427 Mass. 595, 
599-600 (1998).  Therefore, while part of the background of this 
case, the Blood warrant does not affect the lawfulness of the 
recordings at issue.  See Mitchell, 468 Mass. at 419 n.1. 
 
4 
after a thorough review of the entire trial record, we decline 
to allow relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Background.  Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, we recite the essential facts 
that the jury could have found, reserving certain details for 
our discussion of the issues.  The defendant and Brian Lacombe 
were drug dealers, and both were part of "Supreme Team,"4 an 
association that also included Thomas Jeffreys, Marcus Mitchell, 
Joey Gomes, and Cruz. 
In May 2008, a feud began between Supreme Team and an 
individual named Francisco Monteiro.5  As one way of obtaining 
money, Mitchell and other members of Supreme Team managed or 
promoted dancers at strip clubs.  Monteiro did the same.  At 
that time, Mitchell and Monteiro both were in South Carolina 
with dancers they promoted, during an event known as "Bike 
Week."  A dancer associated with Mitchell tried to convince 
certain dancers associated with Monteiro to work with Mitchell 
instead, and Monteiro became upset (South Carolina dispute).  
 
4 The record includes references to this same association 
variously as "Supreme Team" and "Team Supreme."  We refer to it 
by the former designation except when quoting other sources, 
although the difference is of no moment. 
 
5 Evidence in the record, although not before the jury, 
suggested that Monteiro was affiliated with other gangs. 
 
5 
The victim, a friend of Monteiro, was involved in this dispute 
as well. 
By early 2009, the feud escalated into violence when 
Mitchell grabbed the victim and pushed him against a vending 
machine.  After a verbal confrontation with Monteiro around the 
same time, Mitchell asked Jeffreys for a gun, and he obtained a 
.40 caliber gun from Jeffreys's girlfriend.  The jury could have 
inferred that the defendant was the source of the gun given to 
Mitchell, as the defendant was acquiring guns from drug 
customers and supplying them to the team. 
One or two months later, Monteiro "sucker punched" 
Jeffreys.  Jeffreys was angry and vowed to shoot Monteiro.  
After that, Jeffreys, Mitchell, Cruz, Lacombe, and the defendant 
met at a pizza parlor.  Jeffreys told everyone that "it was on" 
between Supreme Team, on the one hand, and Monteiro and the 
victim, on the other.  From that point onward, the members of 
Supreme Team traveled together and carried guns.  The defendant 
typically traveled with Lacombe.  About one week after Monteiro 
punched Jeffreys, Monteiro shot Cruz outside a bar in Taunton.  
The other members of Supreme Team were angry and vowed revenge. 
On May 16 and into the early morning hours of May 17, 2009, 
the defendant was traveling with Lacombe in one vehicle, and 
Jeffreys was traveling with Mitchell in another.  The defendant 
carried a .45 caliber gun, and the three others carried .40 
 
6 
caliber guns.  The defendant later told Cruz that they were 
"patrolling, hunting."  Supreme Team encountered Monteiro at 
around midnight in the Whittenton area of Taunton, and Jeffreys 
fired three shots at him.  The defendant and Lacombe were nearby 
but drove away after encountering a police vehicle. 
Later that night, Jeffreys and the defendant positioned 
their vehicles to intercept Monteiro's vehicle on the highway.  
At about 1:40 A.M., Jeffreys and Mitchell shot at Monteiro's 
vehicle with .40 caliber guns from Jeffreys's black Infiniti.  
The defendant shot at Monteiro's vehicle with a .45 caliber gun 
from the vehicle that he was driving.  At least three guns were 
used in the shooting, two .40 caliber guns and a .45 caliber 
gun.  The victim, who was riding in the front passenger's seat 
of the vehicle driven by Monteiro, was killed. 
In the hours leading up to and following the shooting, the 
defendant maintained cell phone contact with Jeffreys.  After 
the shooting, Jeffreys parked the Infiniti where it was not 
visible from the street, and later that morning, the defendant 
went to the same location to pick up the Infiniti.  At that 
time, a witness heard the defendant talking about something 
happening on the highway.  Later examination of the Infiniti 
revealed a hasty repair to cover up what the jury could have 
inferred was a hole from a bullet that passed from inside to 
outside the vehicle.  The same day, the defendant and Lacombe 
 
7 
went to a remote area with a box and a shovel.  When they 
returned, they did not have the box.  Asked what they were 
doing, Lacombe joked that they were burying a goldfish or a cat, 
and the defendant and Lacombe both laughed.  About two weeks 
later, the defendant also traveled with Jeffreys and his 
brother, John Jeffreys,6 when they went to intimidate a grand 
jury witness into providing false testimony regarding the 
shooting. 
On August 23, 2010, the defendant was arrested for 
conspiracy to violate the drug laws.  While the defendant was 
held on bail, in November 2010, the Commonwealth applied for and 
obtained a warrant authorizing the secret recording of the 
defendant.  The recording was effected that same month by Cruz, 
a member of Supreme Team who cooperated with the Commonwealth 
after his arrest on gun charges.  In the recordings and in other 
conversations with Cruz, the defendant admitted that he 
participated in the shooting along with Jeffreys and Mitchell; 
that he supplied the guns used in the shooting, which came from 
his customer; that he was carrying a .45 caliber gun that 
evening; and that he killed the victim.  In fact, the victim was 
killed by a .40 caliber bullet, but a .45 caliber bullet was 
 
6 This opinion generally refers to Thomas Jeffreys simply as 
Jeffreys.  To distinguish his brother, John Jeffreys, we use the 
latter's full name. 
 
8 
found on the floor near the front passenger's seat where the 
victim had been sitting.  The defendant confessed to "doing one" 
person and not being afraid of "doing another."  He also 
expressed his anger at how Mitchell had disposed of one of the 
guns. 
In March 2013, a Bristol County jury found the defendant 
guilty of one count of murder in the first degree, three counts 
of armed assault with intent to murder, three counts of assault 
by means of a dangerous weapon, and one count of unlawful 
possession of a firearm.7  In May 2019, after a series of 
extensions and stays of appeal, the defendant filed a motion for 
postconviction discovery in this court, which motion was 
remanded to the Superior Court.  A Superior Court judge allowed 
the motion and ordered production of the Commonwealth's file 
related to the grand jury investigation, but the judge 
subsequently revised the order to exclude materials subject to 
work product protections. 
In March 2020, the defendant filed with this court his 
motions for a new trial, for an evidentiary hearing, and for 
further discovery, which were also remanded to the Superior 
Court.  A Superior Court judge (motion judge) denied all three 
 
7 As noted supra, the jury acquitted the defendant of the 
remaining charge of conspiracy to murder a witness. 
 
9 
motions, and the appeal from these denials was consolidated with 
the appeal from the defendant's convictions. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We review the 
defendant's consolidated appeal pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
assessing preserved issues according to the appropriate 
constitutional or common-law standard and unpreserved issues for 
a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 159-160 (2020).  In 
analyzing the defendant's motion for a new trial where the 
motion judge neither presided at trial nor held an evidentiary 
hearing, we "examine [his] conclusion only to determine whether 
there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of 
discretion," although as he did not assess the credibility of 
any witnesses, we "regard ourselves in as good a position as the 
motion judge to assess the trial record."  Commonwealth v. 
Jackson, 468 Mass. 1009, 1010 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986). 
2.  Admissibility of secret recordings.  The defendant's 
primary argument on appeal is that the jury should not have 
heard the secret recordings of the defendant's confessions to 
Cruz.  The question then is whether the trial judge properly 
denied the defendant's motion in limine to exclude these 
recordings.  We review the instant issue de novo because the 
defendant disputes only points of law, see Commonwealth v. 
 
10 
Mitchell, 468 Mass. 417, 421 (2014), specifically, (a) whether 
the evidence before the trial judge established a nexus to 
organized crime for purposes of the Massachusetts wiretap 
statute's "one-party consent exception," G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4; 
and (b) whether the secret recordings violated certain of the 
defendant's constitutional rights. 
a.  Compliance with G. L. c. 272, § 99.  General Laws 
c. 272, § 99 B 4, permits warrantless secret recording under the 
following conditions, collectively known as the wiretap 
statute's one-party consent exception: 
"[A] secret recording of a conversation is not an 
'interception' and is therefore lawfully recorded without a 
warrant where (1) at least one party to the conversation 
gives prior consent to the recording of the conversation; 
(2) the party giving consent is a law enforcement officer 
or a person who has authorized a law enforcement officer to 
record the conversation; (3) the recording is made 'in the 
course of an investigation' of at least one of the 
designated offenses listed in § 99 B 7; and (4) the 
designated offense is 'in connection with organized 
crime[,' which] 'consists of a continuing conspiracy among 
highly organized and disciplined groups to engage in 
supplying illegal goods and services.'" 
 
Mitchell, 468 Mass. at 422, 425, quoting G. L. c. 272, § 99 A, 
B 4, B 7.8 
 
8 Even if this exception applies, art. 14 may yet require a 
warrant if the recording occurs in a private home.  See Blood, 
400 Mass. at 77.  See also Eason, 427 Mass. at 599-600.  As 
defense counsel correctly acknowledged during oral argument, 
Blood does not apply here where the defendant secretly was 
recorded while he was incarcerated.  See Burgos, 470 Mass. at 
134 n.1.  Even so, "the better . . . course, and the most secure 
course constitutionally, is for law enforcement officials to 
 
11 
 
The defendant contends that the Commonwealth did not 
sufficiently establish a nexus "with organized crime," Mitchell, 
468 Mass. at 422, so he concludes that the trial judge erred in 
applying the above exception to the facts of this case.  This 
court already once has held that a sufficient nexus existed 
between organized crime and the murder at issue.  See id. at 
423, 426-428.  In Mitchell, where it was sufficiently 
established that the defendant belonged to "Team Supreme," an 
organized and highly coordinated "drug distribution enterprise" 
engaged in "a bitter and violent feud" with Monteiro, where "at 
least four members of Team Supreme actively participated in the 
killing," and where "several more helped cover it up, including 
by hiding a gun that was used in the shooting and by conspiring 
to kill a potential witness," we held it "reasonable to infer 
that the shooting at issue here was undertaken at least in part 
in order to further Team Supreme's territorial or reputational 
interests," giving rise to "reasonable suspicion that the murder 
of [the victim] was [committed] in connection with organized 
crime."  Id. at 418, 426-428.  See Commonwealth v. Burgos, 470 
Mass. 133, 142 (2014). 
 
procure warrants . . . even in cases where it does not appear 
that the statutes require a warrant."  Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 
384 Mass. 271, 286 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982).  
In this case, the Commonwealth successfully applied for a Blood 
warrant, although it was not necessary. 
 
12 
The record in this case, in particular, the November 17, 
2010, affidavit of State police Trooper Daniel M. Giossi (Giossi 
affidavit), supports the same findings as to these material 
facts.9  On the basis of a witness statement and certain recent 
arrests, the Giossi affidavit averred the existence of "a drug 
enterprise operating in the city of Taunton . . . known as Team 
Supreme," with members including "Thomas Jeffreys, Jose 
Fernandes, Marcus Mitchell and Brian Lacombe."  The affidavit 
detailed the escalating rivalry between Supreme Team and 
Monteiro and the victim, and it described certain members of the 
Supreme Team drug enterprise -- specifically including the 
defendant -- forming and executing a plan to shoot Monteiro, 
which plan ended in the shooting death of the victim.  The 
 
9 The Giossi affidavit had been submitted in November 2010 
as part of the Commonwealth's effort to obtain a Blood warrant.  
As described in note 8, supra, a Blood warrant was unnecessary.  
Consequently, we do not analyze the sufficiency of the Giossi 
affidavit for purposes of obtaining a Blood warrant.  Rather, we 
analyze it as evidence before the court in the February 2013 
motion hearing.  The question before the court at that hearing 
was whether in November 2010, at the time of the relevant 
recordings, the Commonwealth needed to apply for a warrant 
pursuant to the more stringent requirements of G. L. c. 272, 
§ 99 E-F, or whether the recordings were exempt from those 
requirements pursuant to § 99 B 4.  See Mitchell, 468 Mass. at 
419 n.1, 421-422 (conducting similar analysis).  There is no 
argument that a warrant was obtained pursuant to G. L. c. 272, 
§ 99 E-F, for Cruz's secret recordings of the defendant, and in 
any event, an organized crime connection still would be required 
for the issuance of such a warrant.  See Commonwealth v. Long, 
454 Mass. 542, 555 (2009), S.C., 476 Mass. 526 (2017). 
 
 
13 
Giossi affidavit also described the efforts of Supreme Team to 
cover up the killing, including a conspiracy to murder a 
witness.10  In sum, the affidavit sufficed to establish the same 
conditions considered by this court in Mitchell, and so it 
sufficiently established a nexus to organized crime.  See 
Commonwealth v. Long, 454 Mass. 542, 557 (2009), S.C., 476 Mass. 
526 (2017) ("there must, at the very least, be an organized plan 
from which one reasonably may infer the existence of an ongoing 
criminal operation"). 
The defendant argues that Mitchell is inapposite because 
there, the court had "no evidence . . . regarding the origins of 
the dispute between Monteiro's group and Team Supreme."  
Mitchell, 468 Mass. at 427.  Here, by contrast, the defendant 
contends that additional information shows the origin of the 
conflict to be the South Carolina dispute, which he argues is 
unconnected to organized crime.  See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 406 
Mass. 135, 142 n.10 (1989), citing Commonwealth v. Jarabek, 384 
Mass. 293, 296 (1981).  But the defendant can only disconnect 
the dispute from organized crime by isolating its original 
source from its later development, that is, from the important 
 
10 After trial, however, the jury did not convict the 
defendant for conspiring to kill the witness. 
 
 
14 
context laid out in the Giossi affidavit.11  In Mitchell, 468 
Mass. at 427, this court cautioned against such a limited view 
as unrealistic: 
"[I]t can be inferred that Monteiro and his associates 
posed at least a physical, and possibly economic, threat to 
Team Supreme's members and interests, and that the feud 
between the groups was more than personal.  Even if the 
feud were purely personal, an illegal drug distribution 
business may see the perception of weakness as potentially 
fatal to an enterprise that wishes to protect its turf 
against competitors.  In the perverse world of a street 
drug organization, violence in response to perceived 
threats is often viewed as necessary to maintain its 
customer base, to intimidate or weaken rivals, to protect 
its reputation, and to deter future threats from 
emerging. . . .  Given the history of violence between 
Monteiro and members of Team Supreme, it is reasonable to 
infer that the shooting at issue here was undertaken at 
 
11 We additionally note that during the pretrial hearing on 
the omnibus motion that included the relevant motion to exclude 
Cruz's recordings of the defendant, the defendant's counsel 
provided the trial judge two affidavits from State police 
Trooper Paul F. Baker dated July 19, 2010, and July 27, 2010.  
These affidavits had supported the Commonwealth's applications 
to record secretly the telephone calls of Jeffreys.  On appeal, 
the defendant argues that the judge could consider only the 
Giossi affidavit because that was the only affidavit 
specifically relied on by the Commonwealth for the motion at 
issue.  But the case he cites does not stand for this 
proposition, see Burgos, 470 Mass. at 137 (noting as background 
in that case that "the Commonwealth did not offer any evidence 
other than [a trooper's] affidavit"), and we discern no reason 
that the trial judge could not have relied on these affidavits 
as well, which predated the Giossi affidavit and which contained 
facts sufficient to connect the murder of the victim to 
organized crime.  The July 19, 2010, affidavit specifically 
alleged that Supreme Team was an ongoing drug distribution 
enterprise, described the feud between Supreme Team and 
Monteiro, and concluded that the purpose of the shooting at 
issue was "to protect [the] narcotics distribution operation" 
described in the affidavit.  Counsel conceded during oral 
argument that, based on Trooper Baker's investigation, there 
were indicia of organized crime from June to August 2010. 
 
15 
least in part in order to further Team Supreme's 
territorial or reputational interests." 
 
This dispute did not run straight from an argument over 
dancers to the victim's murder but rather encompassed two other 
attacks by Monteiro on members of Supreme Team, including 
Monteiro's punching Jeffreys and shooting Cruz.  Both episodes 
were described in the Giossi affidavit. 
In sum, regardless of its origin, this was an ongoing 
dispute between Monteiro and members of a highly organized drug 
enterprise, and when the dispute escalated into violence, that 
enterprise organized its associates to commit and cover up a 
murder.  Contrary to the defendant's claim, the fact that the 
dispute arose over one gang member's business and influence 
promoting dancers supports rather than undermines the nexus to 
organized crime.  See Long, 454 Mass. at 556.  Because there was 
a nexus between the murder and organized crime at the time of 
the recordings, the recordings did not violate G. L. c. 272, 
§ 99, and we do not discern any error in the trial judge's 
denial of the defendant's motion to exclude them.12 
 
12 The defendant argues that the Commonwealth intentionally 
misled the Superior Court insofar as the Giossi affidavit did 
not reveal that the dispute between Monteiro and Supreme Team 
originated in a dispute over dancers and not drugs.  But this 
argument ignores the more important scope and development of the 
dispute, which were recounted in the Giossi affidavit and placed 
before the trial judge prior to his ruling on the defendant's 
motion.  Therefore, as described supra, the absence of 
information from the Giossi affidavit specifically describing 
 
16 
b.  Constitutionality of secret recordings.  More broadly, 
the defendant contends that by arresting him and allowing him to 
be questioned secretly by a government informant, the 
Commonwealth violated his right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures, his right against self-incrimination, and 
his right to counsel.  We review constitutional claims de novo, 
see Commonwealth v. Martinez, 487 Mass. 265, 267 (2021), and 
conclude that there is no merit to these arguments. 
As discussed supra, a warrant was not required by art. 14 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights or G. L. c. 272, 
§ 99, to authorize the secret recordings at issue.  See Burgos, 
470 Mass. at 134 n.1; Mitchell, 468 Mass. at 426-428.  Moreover, 
the defendant was not entitled to Miranda warnings where his 
confessions were made without coercion to an undercover 
informant, see Burgos, supra at 146, nor was the defendant's 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution implicated because, at the time of the recordings, 
 
the South Carolina dispute did not affect the legality of the 
secret recordings.  Furthermore, we accept the motion judge's 
finding that there was no effort to mislead, where the 
Commonwealth had expressly informed the trial judge that the 
feud originated in a dispute over dancers.  Indeed, it did so 
during an earlier argument regarding the same omnibus motion in 
limine that included the motion at issue. 
 
17 
"he had not been indicted or charged in connection with the 
victim's murder."13  See id. at 146 n.12. 
The defendant urges us to hold that the scope of the right 
to counsel under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights is broader and applies where separate charges are 
nevertheless "inextricably intertwined."  See Commonwealth v. 
Rainwater, 425 Mass. 540, 547-548 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
1095 (1998), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168 & n.1 
(2001).  This court previously recognized this doctrine as an 
"extremely limited" exception to the otherwise offense-specific 
nature of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but the doctrine 
no longer exists under the Sixth Amendment.  See Rainwater, 
supra at 547 & n.5.  See also Cobb, supra.  We need not 
determine whether this doctrine continues in effect under art. 
12 because the two sets of charges here are not inextricably 
intertwined, so the defendant's argument would fail regardless.  
See Commonwealth v. St. Peter, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 517, 522-523 
(2000).  According to the defendant, the two sets of charges at 
issue are inextricably intertwined because they arose from a 
single police investigation aimed at the murder.  But even if 
 
13 Because the right to counsel had not yet attached on the 
murder charge, it is immaterial whether, as the defendant 
argues, Cruz acted as a government agent for purposes of 
eliciting testimony about the murder.  See Burgos, 470 Mass. at 
146 n.12, citing Commonwealth v. Murphy, 448 Mass. 452, 453 
(2007). 
 
18 
this were true, the question is not whether the investigations 
were intertwined but whether "the pending charge is so 
inextricably intertwined with the charge under investigation 
that it cannot constitutionally be isolated from the uncharged 
offense" (alterations and citation omitted).  Rainwater, supra 
at 547.  See id. at 557 ("it is the criminal charge which calls 
[the] right into being and marks its extent").  Put another way, 
it is "whether the same acts and factual predicates underlie 
both the pending and the new charges" (citation omitted).  Id. 
at 556. 
Here, the two sets of charges lacked this identity.  The 
defendant was held pursuant to fourteen charges of conspiracy to 
violate the drug laws, G. L. c. 94C, § 40.  The allegations 
underlying these charges did not encompass the May 17, 2009, 
shooting.  Rather, the charges arose from a series of drug deals 
allegedly orchestrated by the defendant over one year later in 
August 2010.  What is more, in this case, the trial judge 
specifically instructed the jury at the defendant's request that 
they could not consider testimony about drugs as substantive 
evidence for the charges being tried.  Indeed, the defendant's 
appellate counsel characterized these drug charges as 
"unrelated" in an affidavit supporting the defendant's motion 
for a new trial.  For these reasons, the two sets of charges are 
not inextricably intertwined. 
 
19 
As part of his argument that the Commonwealth impermissibly 
used the drug charges to obtain information about the murder, 
the defendant also suggests that the Commonwealth misused the 
grand jury for discovery purposes.  But the disputed recordings 
were not obtained pursuant to the authority of the grand jury, 
and so the cases cited by the defendant are inapposite.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hall, 485 Mass. 145, 166 (2020) ("The defendant 
does not illustrate how this case is similar to Cote . . ."); 
Commonwealth v. Cote, 407 Mass. 827, 832 (1990); Commonwealth v. 
Liebman, 379 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1980), S.C., 388 Mass. 483 
(1983). 
3.  Testimony regarding meanings of slang terms.  The 
defendant further argues that it was error to permit testimony 
from Cruz as to the meanings of certain slang terms used during 
his conversations with the defendant.  Determinations of 
evidentiary "admissibility, probative value, and unfair 
prejudice are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge[] 
and will not be overturned absent clear error" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Melendez, 490 Mass. 648, 662 (2022). 
Where language is "ambiguous or consists of expressions not 
in common use" but has "a known meaning among certain persons," 
that meaning "may be explained by those who know."  Commonwealth 
v. Morgan, 107 Mass. 199, 201-202 (1871).  And this rule applies 
to slang.  See id. at 200, 201-202.  See also Commonwealth v. 
 
20 
Douglas, 354 Mass. 212, 218 n.2 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 
960 (1969).  Recent case law emphasizes the usefulness of expert 
testimony to interpret slang, jargon, or other coded language, 
but it acknowledges that context might be provided by other 
testimony as well.  See Commonwealth v. Henley, 488 Mass. 95, 
128 (2021); Commonwealth v. Rosa, 468 Mass. 231, 240 & n.14 
(2014).  Morgan, supra, implies that the relevance of such 
testimony is conditional on establishing that the witness has a 
basis for knowing the meaning.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 104(b) 
(2023). 
A witness's interpretation of evidence based on personal 
knowledge may also be considered lay opinion testimony "when the 
witness possesses sufficiently relevant familiarity . . . that 
the jury cannot also possess" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Vacher, 469 Mass. 425, 441 (2014).  Lay opinion testimony is 
admissible where it is "(a) rationally based on the witness's 
perception; (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the 
witness's testimony or in determining a fact in issue; and (c) 
not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge within the scope of [§] 702."  Mass. G. Evid. § 701.  
See Commonwealth v. Grier, 490 Mass. 455, 476 (2022); 
Commonwealth v. Mason, 485 Mass. 520, 538 (2020).  Where a 
witness is giving an opinion on the meaning of slang terms, in 
order for his testimony to be "rationally based" and "helpful" 
 
21 
to the jury, it must be established that the witness has 
sufficient familiarity with the slang terminology.  And where 
the witness testifies to "his own personal understanding of what 
[the defendant] meant, developed in the context of face-to-face 
conversation," it is "not based on scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge within the scope of [Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 702]."  United States v. Prange, 771 F.3d 17, 27, 29 (1st Cir. 
2014), quoting Fed. R. Evid. 701(c). 
Interpreting the nearly identical language of Fed. R. Evid. 
701, Federal courts in the First Circuit have decided 
consistently that a coconspirator who worked as an undercover 
agent may provide lay opinion testimony explaining slang, 
jargon, or other coded language.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 701 note; 
United States v. Santiago, 62 F.4th 639, 649-650 (1st Cir. 
2023); United States v. Obiora, 910 F.3d 555, 561-562 (1st Cir. 
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1586 (2019); United States v. 
Valbrun, 877 F.3d 440, 443-444 (1st Cir. 2017).  If properly 
supported, such testimony need not be limited to the typical 
meaning of particular words but may extend more broadly to 
interpreting statements made by the defendant.  See Santiago, 
supra at 649, quoting Obiora, supra at 562 ("no reason to 
require [a cooperating witness] to parse his interpretative 
testimony word by word as if he were a foreign language 
dictionary rather than an interpreter of a conversation"). 
 
22 
 
Here, the testimony at issue is Cruz's interpretations of 
statements made by the defendant.  The evidence at trial 
established that Cruz had been a drug dealer; that this was his 
"world"; that he had prior convictions of distribution of a 
class B substance; that he was twenty-seven years old at the 
time of trial and had known and become friendly with the 
defendant since Cruz was twelve or thirteen years old; that he 
had known Jeffreys, Mitchell, and Lacombe since at least 2008 
and had been friendly with them; and most importantly, that Cruz 
had been part of Supreme Team.  Not only had Cruz been a part of 
this team, but he also had been involved directly in the 
escalating feud between Supreme Team and Monteiro.  In sum, the 
testimony sufficed to establish that Cruz would have knowledge 
of the slang terms used by this specific criminal enterprise. 
 
The conversations between the defendant and Cruz were 
permeated with slang and code words.  Such coded language was 
used to evade prosecution, as the defendant criticized Cruz more 
than once for "dropping bombs," that is, for using real names 
during conversations.  The slang interpreted by Cruz ranged from 
highly specific to more general terms.  A few examples will 
suffice.  Cruz informed the jury that the members of Supreme 
Team referred to guns in code as "jackets," that "wrapped" meant 
to have a gun, and that "pop" meant to shoot.  He testified 
about drug terminology, stating that "custies" were drug 
 
23 
customers and that "the works" referred to drugs.  Most 
importantly, Cruz testified that the defendant's reference to 
"doing one" person was admitting his belief that he had killed 
the victim. 
Because the evidence showed that Cruz would have knowledge 
of such terms, his testimony explaining the slang terms used by 
the defendant was admissible.  Moreover, the risk of prejudice 
was minimized.  The vigorous cross-examination of Cruz, 
described infra, placed the jury well on notice that they might 
question the credibility of Cruz's testimony, including his 
interpretations of the defendant's statements.  Cf. Mason, 485 
Mass. at 539.  Indeed, the jury did not convict the defendant of 
conspiracy to murder Kathleen Soule, a charge that depended in 
no small part upon Cruz's explanations of conversations with the 
defendant.  The trial judge also gave multiple contemporaneous 
instructions that except for inquiry about slang terms, the 
evidence at issue was the recorded statements themselves and 
only insofar as they were made or adopted by the defendant.  And 
defense counsel used the slang testimony to support the 
defendant's theory of the case.  Cross-examining Cruz, defense 
counsel specifically elicited testimony about the slang terms 
used by the defendant.  In closing argument, he argued that the 
defendant's use of slang showed that he was merely a "wannabe" 
who liked to talk big.  In sum, Cruz's testimony explaining the 
 
24 
defendant's slang was admissible because the foundation for his 
knowledge was sufficiently established in the record, the 
statements he interpreted were ambiguous, and the risk of 
prejudice was minimized. 
4.  Bad act evidence.  The defendant further challenges 
evidence of a series of bad acts that he contends should not 
have been heard by the jury.  Again, determinations of 
evidentiary "admissibility, probative value, and unfair 
prejudice are left to the sound discretion of the trial judge[] 
and will not be overturned absent clear error" (citation 
omitted).  Melendez, 490 Mass. at 662. 
"Evidence of a defendant's . . . bad acts is not admissible 
to demonstrate the defendant's bad character or propensity to 
commit the crime charged."  Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 
805 (2021).  See Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224 
(1986); Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1).  "Such evidence may be 
admissible, however, if relevant for another purpose, such as to 
prove 'motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.'"  
Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 486 Mass. 617, 626 (2021), quoting 
Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(2).  See Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 
Mass. 228, 249 (2014).  "It also may be used where evidence of 
. . . bad acts is inextricably intertwined with the description 
of events . . . of the killing."  Commonwealth v. Bryant, 482 
 
25 
Mass. 731, 734 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Marrero, 427 
Mass. 65, 67 (1998).  Put another way, "the prosecution is 
entitled to present as full a picture as possible of the events 
surrounding the incident itself" (quotation, citation, and 
alteration omitted).  Commonwealth v. Morgan, 460 Mass. 277, 289 
(2011). 
But "[e]ven where relevant for a permissible purpose, the 
evidence is admissible only if its probative value is not 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect."  West, 487 Mass. at 805.  
See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 249 n.27.14  To be sufficiently 
probative, there must be a logical connection between the bad 
act and the facts of the case, and the bad act must not be too 
remote in time when viewed in light of that logical connection.  
See Teixeira, 486 Mass. at 627; West, supra; Commonwealth v. 
Facella, 478 Mass. 393, 405 (2017). 
 
First, the defendant challenges testimony regarding a gun 
recovered on January 5, 2010.  Evidence that the defendant 
possessed a gun is admissible to show that he had the "means of 
 
14 The defendant's trial took place before our decision in 
Crayton, 470 Mass. at 249 n.27, which clarified that evidence of 
other bad acts is inadmissible where its probative value is 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant, 
even if not substantially outweighed by that risk.  The trial 
judge here did not abuse his discretion under either standard, 
so we "need not decide whether the new standard we articulated 
in [Crayton] applies retroactively" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Da Lin Huang, 489 Mass. 162, 174 n.23 (2022), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Andre, 484 Mass. 403, 414 n.21 (2020). 
 
26 
committing the crime," including "access to or knowledge of 
firearms."  Commonwealth v. Holley, 478 Mass. 508, 532, 533 
(2017), quoting Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 156, 157 
(2014).  See Mason, 485 Mass. at 533; Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 
Mass. 742, 749-750 (2020).  To admit such evidence, it is not 
necessary to submit direct proof that the gun at issue was used 
in the commission of the charged offense.  See Holley, supra at 
533.  Rather, it is sufficient that the gun "was just one 
possible model of gun that 'could have been used in the course 
of a crime.'"  Id., quoting McGee, supra at 156.  For example, 
in Watt, supra at 749, we held that where a black .40 caliber 
firearm was used in a shooting, "testimony that the defendants 
previously had been seen with a 'Glock,' a '40,' and a black 
firearm was properly admitted to demonstrate that the defendants 
had access to the type of firearm that was used." 
Here, the evidence indicated that the loaded black .40 
caliber Glock handgun recovered on January 5, 2010, belonged to 
the defendant, and it had the same caliber and general type of 
rifling as one of the guns used in the earlier shooting of the 
victim.  Therefore, testimony about its recovery was admissible 
for the purpose of showing the defendant's access to such a 
firearm.15 
 
15 We additionally note testimony from Christine Davis that, 
in around 2007, she saw the defendant with a black gun on his 
 
27 
Second, the defendant takes issue with the admission of 
testimony regarding two other shootings:  a shooting at about 
midnight on May 17, 2009, on Whittenton Street; and a July 17, 
2009, shooting on Maple Street.  Testimony regarding these 
shootings was admissible for the permissible purpose of 
establishing motive.  See Teixeira, 486 Mass. at 628; Watt, 484 
Mass. at 748.  In Teixeira, supra, testimony about an earlier 
shooting established the defendant's motive because it revealed 
animus toward the target, whose brother was killed in the later 
shooting.  In Watt, supra, testimony about an earlier shooting 
was admissible to establish motive where the evidence indicated 
that the victim was murdered in retaliation for that earlier 
shooting.  And just as in this case, the motive at issue in 
Teixeira and Watt was animus based on a long-standing hostility 
between two groups.  See Teixeira, supra at 631; Watt, supra at 
746-748. 
Here, the Commonwealth's theory of the case was that the 
murder was motivated by the ongoing, violent dispute between 
 
lap, as well as testimony from Jessica Deshler that she saw the 
defendant twice after January 2010 with a gun.  Due to the lack 
of detail, this testimony comes much closer to impermissible 
evidence of a person's general acquaintance with weapons.  See 
Commonwealth v. Watt, 484 Mass. 742, 749-750 (2020); 
Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 478 Mass. 443, 448-449 (2017).  Even 
so, these guns could have been used in the shooting, and so we 
conclude that it was within the trial judge's discretion to 
admit this testimony, and there was no clear error in doing so.  
See Watt, supra; Vazquez, supra. 
 
28 
Supreme Team and Monteiro.  The defendant admitted to Cruz that 
the shooting on Whittenton Street was an earlier attempt by 
Supreme Team to shoot at Monteiro.  And testimony established 
another later gunfight between the defendant and Monteiro, which 
the jury could have concluded occurred on July 17, 2009, in the 
Maple Street area.  These other shootings illustrated Supreme 
Team's hostility toward Monteiro and established the motivation 
of its members for shooting at his vehicle. 
Testimony regarding these incidents also spoke to the 
defendant's state of mind and intent.  See Commonwealth v. 
Pagan, 440 Mass. 84, 87-88 (2003) ("Evidence that the defendant 
attempted to fire a deadly weapon at [the victim] just ten days 
prior to the actual killing is probative of the defendant's 
hostile attitude toward [the victim], his intent to kill [the 
victim], and the premeditated nature of the later killing").  
And ultimately, the question here was whether the defendant 
intended to participate in a murder.  The defendant's theory of 
the case was that he was not a full-fledged member of the 
Supreme Team criminal enterprise but simply a "wannabe."  His 
participation in attempts to kill Monteiro earlier on the very 
night in question and then again some months later provided a 
powerful and permissible rebuttal to this argument.16 
 
16 The defendant takes further issue with recordings of 
intercepted telephone calls between the defendant and Jeffreys 
 
29 
Third, the defendant challenges the admission of certain 
acts that broadly might be classed as evidence of gang 
involvement.  Specifically, the defendant contests the admission 
of testimony about his driving many different vehicles, his 
involvement in drug sales, his tattoos, and his display of gang 
signs.  But if gang affiliation is the motive for a murder, then 
"[e]vidence of gang affiliation [i]s relevant to the defendant's 
motive and state of mind."  Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 429 Mass. 
502, 504 (1999).  See Commonwealth v. Swafford, 441 Mass. 329, 
332-333 (2004).  Such evidence is particularly appropriate for 
establishing joint venture liability where, as here, the 
defendant denies that he participated in the murder with the 
requisite intent.  See Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 604 
(2018); Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 268 (2013) ("We 
have most often allowed gang evidence to be admitted for the 
purpose of establishing joint venture in cases where the 
evidence showed that the offense involved retaliation or 
conflict between rival gang members . . . and that the 
defendants therefore shared a common motive"). 
 
in July 2010 because they suggested a continuing conspiracy to 
kill Monteiro.  For the reasons described supra, establishing 
the existence of such a conspiracy was a permissible purpose for 
the admission of bad act evidence.  See Teixeira, 486 Mass. at 
628; Watt, 484 Mass. at 748; Pagan, 440 Mass. at 87-88. 
 
30 
Here, there was testimony that after the victim's death, 
the defendant and two other members of Supreme Team got tattoos 
stating "death before dishonor" and, further, that one of those 
other members had that same motto displayed in his vehicle.  
This message suggests a joint venture, and therefore the 
testimony was admitted for the appropriate purposes of showing 
motive, intention, and state of mind.  See Akara, 465 Mass. at 
268-269 (common symbols suggesting participants are "one for all 
and all for one" are relevant to joint venture).  See also 
Lopes, 478 Mass. at 604. 
The defendant also disputes the admission of photographs in 
which he "appear[ed] to flash gang signs."  But the trial judge 
did not discern any such signs, and a review of these exhibits 
does not show this conclusion to be erroneous.  Rather, the 
photographs at issue were offered for the permissible purpose of 
showing the defendant's association with Supreme Team, including 
the defendant and Jeffreys each wearing a medallion with the 
initials "S" and "T" on it.  As described supra, such common 
symbols are relevant to establishing a joint venture theory, so 
these materials were properly admitted.  See Lopes, 478 Mass. at 
604; Akara, 465 Mass. at 268-269.17 
 
17 Testimony that the defendant recruited a witness to work 
as an exotic dancer was properly admitted for the same purpose 
of showing joint venture, that is, motive, because members of 
 
31 
As to each of these acts, the prejudicial impact of any 
evidence suggesting gang involvement was ameliorated to some 
extent by the Commonwealth's agreement not to refer explicitly 
to Supreme Team as a gang during the course of the trial. 
Fourth, the defendant challenges evidence that he was a 
drug dealer18 and evidence of his acquisition and possession of 
guns, including guns obtained from a drug customer.  Again, 
where guns might have been used to commit the offense, their 
possession by the defendant is admissible.  See Holley, 478 
Mass. at 533.  And "evidence of the defendant's activity as a 
drug dealer" is admissible to establish motive.  See Bryant, 482 
Mass. at 735-736.  What is more, the prosecution is entitled to 
present a full picture of the alleged crime to the jury.  See 
Morgan, 460 Mass. at 289. 
 
Supreme Team were in the business of promoting such dancers.  
See Lopes, 478 Mass. at 604; Akara, 465 Mass. at 268-269. 
 
18 The defendant challenges testimony that he drove many 
different vehicles as improper bad act evidence.  It is not 
clear that driving different vehicles by itself speaks to a 
person's character, see Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b)(1), but we read 
the defendant's argument to mean that in combination with other 
evidence, this testimony suggested that he was a drug dealer.  
Here, however, there was eyewitness testimony that the defendant 
sold cocaine, and such testimony necessarily outweighed any 
potential inference from driving multiple vehicles.  
Consequently, we analyze the more important issue of drug 
dealing testimony.  See Watt, 484 Mass. at 747-748 (finding 
erroneously admitted testimony harmless where cumulative of 
admissible testimony). 
 
32 
 
The evidence at issue established that the defendant and 
Lacombe coordinated the illegal purchase of a .45 caliber 
semiautomatic handgun, three .40 caliber semiautomatic handguns, 
and a nine millimeter semiautomatic handgun by a drug customer, 
Leigh Baker, who then transported them across State lines.  The 
defendant and Lacombe then gave Baker money and cocaine in 
exchange for the illegally purchased firearms.  For his part, 
the defendant sought to make this an ongoing arrangement, 
telling Baker that "at any point . . . if [he] had extra 
firearms, or if [he] came across firearms, . . . [the defendant] 
would be willing to purchase them."  Consistent with that 
understanding, the defendant also paid Baker for a sixth 
illegally purchased .40 caliber semiautomatic handgun. 
 
Moreover, Cruz testified that the defendant was known to 
possess a .45 caliber firearm along with "all types" of other 
guns, including .45 caliber, .40 caliber, .380 caliber, and .38 
caliber firearms.  Cruz further recounted the defendant's 
statement that "we" had a number of guns from which to choose, 
including .40 caliber guns and other types of guns not used in 
the shooting at issue.  As to the .45 and .40 caliber guns, this 
testimony was permissible for the reasons described supra.  See 
Holley, 478 Mass. at 533; Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 478 Mass. 
443, 448-449 (2017).  As to the other guns, the testimony 
suggested that they were held collectively by Supreme Team, and 
 
33 
the jury could have concluded that some of those guns had been 
obtained by the defendant through drug customers. 
The defendant's acquisition of guns from Baker showed how 
he obtained the guns that might have been used in the shooting.  
The fact that the defendant was acquiring guns for collective 
use by Supreme Team showed his motivation and intentions with 
regard to the violence that Supreme Team employed in its feud 
with Monteiro, violence that culminated in the murder of the 
victim.  See Mitchell, 468 Mass. at 418-419, 427; Akara, 465 
Mass. at 268-269.  Relatedly, this evidence answered the 
defendant's argument that he was not a full participant in the 
criminal enterprise that was Supreme Team.  In closing, defense 
counsel argued that the defendant was "nothing but a big talker.  
He's on the team, but he's a bat boy.  He's not a clean-up 
hitter.  That's the difference. . . .  [T]his kid does nothing 
but talk smack, is nothing but a wannabe."  This evidence showed 
otherwise. 
For his part, the trial judge mitigated the prejudice of 
such evidence through individual voir dire and specific 
instructions to the jury.  He also screened each potential juror 
for bias that might arise from testimony about illegal firearms.  
See Maldonado, 429 Mass. at 505.  And the judge provided 
cautionary instructions against the misuse of bad act evidence.  
To remedy any prejudice caused by erroneously admitted bad act 
 
34 
evidence, "the judge ordinarily may rely on curative 
instructions."  Commonwealth v. Roe, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 801, 804 
(2016).  See Maldonado, supra.  Conversely, "failure to guide 
the jury" on the limited purposes for which they may consider 
such evidence can amount to prejudicial error.  See Roe, supra 
at 807. 
Here, the trial judge specifically instructed jurors not to 
infer any culpability from bad acts.  Quoting from Mass. G. 
Evid. § 404(b)(2), he provided a contemporaneous instruction not 
to consider the evidence of other shootings for any purpose 
other than "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, nature of relationship, or absence of 
mistake or accident."  At the close of the case, the judge again 
instructed the jury against using evidence of other shootings, 
drug dealing, or illegal firearm transactions for any 
impermissible purpose.  He forbade the jury to consider any of 
this as evidence of propensity or bad character and instructed 
the jury only to consider such evidence for the permissible 
purposes listed in the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence, which he 
again quoted, and he also added that the evidence might be 
considered for relevance to a common plan or scheme.  In sum, 
the judge took steps to minimize the prejudicial impact of the 
evidence, and we presume that the jury followed the judge's 
instructions.  See Bryant, 482 Mass. at 737. 
 
35 
The judge's quotation from the Massachusetts Guide to 
Evidence correctly summarized the law.  Even so, we note that 
instead of specifying the precise purposes for each piece of bad 
act evidence admitted, the judge's limiting instructions simply 
listed every permissible purpose written in § 404(b)(2).  We 
caution that bad act evidence is "inherently prejudicial," and 
where the jury are allowed to consider such evidence for 
purposes not in dispute, the risk of improper use can be 
"enormous."  Crayton, 470 Mass. at 249 n.27, 251.  Therefore, it 
generally is insufficient guidance for a trial judge simply to 
provide a collective list of bad act evidence and then instruct 
on every possible permissible purpose, as was done here.19  See 
Commonwealth v. Samia, 492 Mass. 135, 148 n.8 (2023).  In this 
instance, however, the risk sufficiently was mitigated by the 
instruction given because the bad act evidence was relevant for 
multiple permissible purposes, and further, the bad acts at 
 
19 We continue to stress that it is incumbent on counsel 
proffering bad act evidence to specify the precise nonpropensity 
purposes for which it is offered.  See Commonwealth v. Samia, 
492 Mass. 135, 148 n.8 (2023).  To the extent such evidence is 
admitted, it is the responsibility of a trial judge to 
"articulate the precise manner in which the [bad act evidence] 
is relevant" to the case, that is, to the specific nonpropensity 
purposes for which it is admitted.  Id., quoting Andre, 484 
Mass. at 415.  Further, a trial judge must "consider and 
articulate" on the record the risk that the jury will 
nevertheless use the evidence for an impermissible propensity 
purpose.  Samia, supra.  See Andre, supra. 
 
 
36 
issue spoke to some extent to the other factors listed in 
§ 404(b)(2). 
5.  Pretrial and postconviction discovery.  The sufficiency 
of pretrial and postconviction discovery also is disputed.  
Specifically, the defendant points to certain items produced in 
postconviction discovery, including late postconviction 
discovery that was produced in October 2022, during the pendency 
of these proceedings, and he argues that these materials20 should 
have been produced prior to trial.  Counsel for the defendant 
would have used these items for three purposes:  (1) to show 
that the secret recordings of the defendant were obtained in 
violation of G. L. c. 272, § 99; (2) to establish that the 2010 
 
20 As to pretrial materials, the defendant claims not to 
have received certain video recordings of witness interviews, 
although this is disputed, and he takes issue with evidence 
disclosed midtrial that Cruz was shot in 2011.  The discovery 
produced in response to the order allowing the motion for 
postconviction discovery purportedly amounted to over 600 pages 
of documents.  From these, the defendant's arguments focused on 
certain prosecutor's notes, a letter from Cruz demanding further 
benefits from the Commonwealth in exchange for his testimony, e-
mail messages describing benefits for Cruz, and a police report 
describing an arrest of Cruz.  The defendant also represented 
that the late postconviction materials amounted to more than 500 
pages, and he selected a portion that he requested be added to 
the record in this case.  But the defendant now has the benefit 
of all these materials, and as described infra, he does not use 
them to advance any argument that shows prejudice or requires a 
new trial.  See Commonwealth v. Barry, 481 Mass. 388, 399-400, 
cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 51 (2019); Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), 
(c) (3), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). 
 
37 
drug charges and instant murder charges were "inextricably 
intertwined"; and (3) to better impugn the credibility of Cruz. 
These first two arguments were made before this court with 
the benefit of the materials at issue, and for the reasons 
described supra, we disagree.  As to the third, trial counsel's 
"spirited" cross-examination of Cruz so thoroughly attacked his 
credibility that these additional materials only would have been 
cumulative.  The cross-examination established that Cruz was a 
drug dealer and career criminal who cooperated with the 
Commonwealth only for his own benefit and that, otherwise, he 
readily lied to law enforcement when it suited him, including 
about the feud between Supreme Team and Monteiro. 
The cross-examination also emphasized the benefits, valued 
at $16,139, that Cruz received from the Commonwealth, which 
benefits included the posting of bail, the removal of certain 
default warrants, and the provision of housing, food, and money, 
including payment for two classes that Cruz's girlfriend needed 
to take.  It was also clear that Cruz expected future benefits, 
including that a further warrant or charge would be resolved in 
his favor immediately after his trial testimony.  Given the 
thoroughness of the cross-examination on these topics, further 
testimony on these points merely would have been cumulative. 
Because the postconviction materials at issue only would 
have been used in support of unpersuasive arguments or else as 
 
38 
cumulative testimony, the failure to produce them prior to trial 
did not prejudice the defendant and does not warrant an 
evidentiary hearing or a new trial, and the motion judge did not 
abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's motions for a 
new trial and for an evidentiary hearing on this ground.  See 
Commonwealth v. Barry, 481 Mass. 388, 399-400, cert. denied, 140 
S. Ct. 51 (2019); Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), (c) (3), as 
appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). 
 
6.  Motion for further discovery.  The defendant also 
appeals from the denial of his motion for further discovery, 
which sought the production of materials subject to the work 
product protection or else an order requiring the Commonwealth 
to produce the equivalent of a privilege log.  The defendant 
seeks this discovery to argue that there was no organized crime 
connection sufficient to authorize Cruz's secret recordings of 
the defendant.  Because there is no requirement that the 
Commonwealth disclose such materials, see Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14 (a) (5), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004); Commonwealth 
v. Bing Sial Liang, 434 Mass. 131, 137-138 (2001), and because 
the defendant's argument consists only of speculation regarding 
a supposed effort to mislead the trial judge about the South 
Carolina dispute, an argument that we considered and addressed 
supra, the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in denying 
the defendant's motion for further discovery. 
 
39 
7.  CSLI evidence.  The defendant contests the 
admissibility of evidence regarding cell site location 
information (CSLI) from the cell phones of Jeffreys and the 
defendant.  Specifically, certain CSLI records were admitted in 
evidence in this case, and testimony from a radio frequency 
engineer was admitted explaining the import of those records.  
The trial in this case occurred prior to this court's decision 
in Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 232, 255 (2014), 
S.C., 470 Mass. 837 and 472 Mass. 448 (2015), in which we held 
that CSLI is subject to the warrant requirements of art. 14.  
Moreover, the defendant concedes that the relevant objection to 
this evidence was not made before or during trial.  
Consequently, to the extent that the evidence was admitted 
improperly, we review for a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Broom, 474 Mass. 
486, 492-493 (2016). 
Here, even if the evidence were admitted improperly, there 
was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice 
because the CSLI records "were both cumulative and corroborative 
of other evidence."  Vazquez, 478 Mass. at 446.  See 
Commonwealth v. Gumkowski, 487 Mass. 314, 322-323 (2021).  
Although the CSLI and related testimony were consistent with the 
Commonwealth's theory of the case, they were merely cumulative 
 
40 
and corroborative of Cruz's testimony, which placed the 
defendant at the scene. 
Specifically, the CSLI and related testimony placed the 
defendant in the general area of the shooting around the time it 
occurred.  And they showed that the defendant maintained cell 
phone contact with Jeffreys during the night of the shooting and 
traveled in the same direction, actions that suggest an 
intention to participate.  But the CSLI evidence was not precise 
enough to place the defendant at the scene of the shooting.  
Indeed, defense counsel emphasized the CSLI evidence in his 
closing argument, concluding that it was consistent with the 
defendant's being on the farther side of the Taunton River and 
choosing to remain at a distance.  Through cross-examination, 
defense counsel suggested that cell phone calls between the 
defendant and Jeffreys showed that they were not together. 
In sum, the CSLI was only cumulative and corroborative of 
Cruz's stronger testimony that placed the defendant at the scene 
of the shooting.  See Gumkowski, 487 Mass. at 322-323; Vazquez, 
478 Mass. at 446-447.  Given the force of the defendant's 
admissions to which Cruz testified, "we are substantially 
confident that the jury's verdict would not have been any 
 
41 
different had the CSLI records not been admitted."  Vazquez, 
supra at 447.21 
8.  Court room closure.  The Commonwealth sought to exclude 
Jeffreys's brother, John Jeffreys, from attending the trial on 
the basis of his alleged role in conspiring to kill a witness.  
It was represented to the trial judge that John Jeffreys had 
been indicted for his role in that conspiracy.  Even so, the 
judge initially denied the Commonwealth's motion without 
prejudice.  During trial, however, the Commonwealth renewed its 
motion, and the judge barred John Jeffreys from the court room.  
Shortly thereafter, the judge reconsidered, vacated his order, 
and permitted him to return.  John Jeffreys was excluded from 
the court room on the foregoing basis for approximately five 
minutes. 
The defendant contends that this exclusion violated his 
right to a public trial, as secured by the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.  See Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 
1), 456 Mass. 94, 106 (2010).  But a de minimis closure, that 
is, one which "is so limited in scope or duration that it is not 
constitutionally relevant," is reviewed only for abuse of 
 
21 As this conclusion applies to the challenged CSLI 
evidence from both the defendant's and Jeffreys's cell phones, 
we need not reach the Commonwealth's argument that the defendant 
lacked standing to challenge the CSLI evidence from Jeffreys's 
cell phone. 
 
42 
discretion.  See Vazquez Diaz v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 336, 
352 (2021); Cohen (No. 1), supra at 108-109.  Here, a single 
spectator, John Jeffreys, was barred from the court room for 
five minutes, during which time Christine Davis gave testimony 
that did not relate directly to the shooting at issue but to 
certain slang terms and prior bad acts.  Given the security 
concerns22 presented to the judge and the extremely limited 
nature of the exclusion, the judge did not abuse his discretion.  
See Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 478 Mass. 725, 733 (2018) 
("Deference is owed to a trial judge's perception of the dangers 
of threats and intimidation in the court room").23 
9.  Third-party culprit.  The defendant claims that the 
judge excluded certain third-party culprit evidence when he 
sustained an objection to the following question posed to a 
 
22 We note also that concerns were raised later in the trial 
regarding instances of possible witness intimidation in and out 
of the court room.  Moreover, later testimony indicated that 
John Jeffreys was present for and may have participated in 
Jeffreys's intimidation of a grand jury witness.  These later 
developments showed that court room security was a concern in 
this case. 
 
23 Similarly, during a pretrial motion session, the court 
room was closed for the brief duration of argument regarding the 
Commonwealth's initial motion to exclude John Jeffreys from the 
court room during trial.  For the same reasons described supra, 
including its extremely short duration and the security concerns 
raised, as well as the judge's finding that the conference would 
otherwise have been held at sidebar outside the hearing of 
spectators, the closure was de minimis and did not amount to an 
abuse of discretion.  See Vazquez Diaz, 487 Mass. at 352; 
Fernandes, 478 Mass. at 733. 
 
43 
witness:  "You also heard that . . . Cruz was possibly involved; 
isn't that true?"  "A defendant has a constitutional right to 
present evidence that another may have committed the crime," and 
so "we afford 'wide latitude' to such evidence" (citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Alcantara, 471 Mass. 550, 559 (2015).  
Even so, the evidence must not be "too remote or speculative" 
(citation omitted).  Id. at 559-560.  Although otherwise 
impermissible hearsay is admissible for establishing a third-
party culprit defense, it only is admissible "in the judge's 
discretion" if it is "otherwise relevant, [it] will not tend to 
prejudice or confuse the jury," and where there are "substantial 
connecting links" to the crime (citation omitted).  Id. at 559.  
Unsubstantiated rumor may be excluded properly without violating 
the defendant's constitutional right to present third-party 
culprit evidence.  See Martinez, 487 Mass. at 269-270; 
Alcantara, supra at 559-560. 
 
We review such constitutional questions de novo.  See 
Martinez, 487 Mass. at 267.  Here, the defendant sought to 
introduce a mere rumor.  In attempting to build foundation, 
defense counsel's prior question showed only that the witness 
had "heard a lot of things" about the victim's murder.  And when 
pressed at sidebar about the question at issue, defense counsel 
explained that he sought to know what the witness had heard 
about what Cruz was saying "around town."  The answer therefore 
 
44 
properly was excluded, and we note that the judge nevertheless 
permitted defense counsel to ask the witness less speculative 
questions on the same topic.  Moreover, defense counsel was 
otherwise permitted to explore this theory.  When cross-
examining Cruz, he elicited that Cruz wanted to kill Monteiro 
himself, and he suggested that Cruz lied about not being present 
for the shooting.  Further, counsel elicited from an 
investigating trooper that police received information that Cruz 
had a problem with Monteiro. 
10.  Admission of certain business records.  Records from 
two businesses, a gun shop and a moving vehicle rental company, 
were admitted in evidence without objection from trial counsel.  
On appeal, the defendant asserts that the admission of these 
records created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice because they were admitted improperly.  See Upton, 484 
Mass. at 159-160.  The defendant does not explain how their 
admission created such a likelihood. 
The rental company records were used to identify the 
defendant's telephone number, but they were cumulative of the 
CSLI records, which displayed the defendant's name along with 
his telephone number.  A witness who recognized the defendant's 
telephone number testified to it, and to the extent he did not 
remember the number but for the records, they could have been 
used to refresh his memory.  See Commonwealth v. Cheng Sun, 490 
 
45 
Mass. 196, 214 (2022).  The records were only cumulative or 
corroborative of other evidence.  See Vazquez, 478 Mass. at 446.  
Moreover, the defense did not dispute the defendant's telephone 
number but rather used the CSLI records to advance its own 
theory of the case that the defendant was a "wannabe" and only 
followed Jeffreys at a distance.  There was no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
The defendant takes issue with the records from the gun 
shop, which corroborated Baker's testimony about purchasing guns 
from that store.  But the defendant did not dispute directly 
that Baker purchased these guns.  Rather, he disputed that Baker 
sold the guns to the defendant.  There was no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because there was no 
indication that the records at issue were inconsistent with the 
defendant's theory of the case.  See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 455 
Mass. 372, 377-378 (2009). 
11.  Closing argument.  During closing argument, the 
prosecutor discussed testimony given by a witness from the 
Department of Transportation.  Specifically, the witness 
testified that a 2009 study revealed that on a Sunday morning 
from 1 A.M. to 2 A.M., 184 vehicles traveled in the southbound 
lanes of Route 24, where the shooting occurred.  In closing, the 
prosecutor argued that "180 cars go by during that hour," 
continuing, "You take that and divide it by sixty minutes, three 
 
46 
cars go by an hour.  And guess what three cars were there?  
Statistically speaking . . . ."  From the context, he intended 
to say "minute" instead of "hour."  This conclusion was offered 
in support of the prosecutor's argument that traffic was sparse 
on that stretch of highway at the time of the shooting. 
The defense argues that these representations created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Upton, 
484 Mass. at 159-160.  But the defendant did not dispute that a 
crime occurred on that road in the early morning hours.  Rather, 
he only disputed that he was present; the amount of traffic was 
not a point of contention.  Even if we assume that the 
prosecutor was suggesting that his math compelled the presence 
of a third vehicle -- a plainly impermissible inference from the 
testimony under discussion -- it did not follow that the vehicle 
needed to be the defendant's.  In the end, the prosecutor's 
argument on this point was inaccurate, but it did not reach the 
issue in dispute because it did not connect the defendant to the 
scene.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 460 Mass. 781, 788 
(2011) (incorrect statistical argument supported "the lone 
eyewitness identification on which the prosecutor's case wholly 
rested").  Moreover, the judge instructed the jury repeatedly 
that nothing in closing arguments constituted evidence.  See 
Commonwealth v. Cosme, 410 Mass. 746, 753 (1991).  For these 
 
47 
reasons, there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
12.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
argues that he received ineffective assistance from his trial 
counsel insofar as counsel (a) failed to review the contents of 
the video recordings described in the May 14, 2020, and October 
23, 2020, affidavits of trial counsel, (b) failed to object to 
CSLI evidence, and (c) failed to object to the admission of 
documents from the gun shop and rental company.  Where, as here, 
we conduct a plenary review of the defendant's conviction of 
murder in the first degree, we evaluate his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel under the more favorable standard of G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to determine whether there was a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Denson, 489 Mass. 138, 150-151 (2022).  Even if trial counsel 
did not review the video recordings in question, this error was 
not likely to have influenced the jury's conclusions for the 
reasons described supra in addressing these materials along with 
other pretrial and postconviction discovery.  And as 
demonstrated, there was no error in counsel's decisions not to 
object to the CSLI and the records from the gun shop and rental 
company, as this material only established points that were not 
disputed by the defendant.  In fact, the CSLI evidence was used 
by the defendant to promote his theory of the case. 
 
48 
13.  Comments regarding defense expert.  We also note that, 
during closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the 
defendant's handwriting expert as a "buffoon," and some of the 
cross-examination of this expert approached improper insinuation 
insofar as it seemed to suggest that the expert's testimony was 
bought by the defendant.  As the defendant did not object, we 
review the questions and argument for a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 
Mass. 639, 643-644 (2017).  We do not believe that the testimony 
of the defense expert had substantial weight except to suggest 
to the jury that they might question Cruz's assertions about the 
defendant's participation in a conspiracy to murder Soule.  
Ultimately, the jury found the defendant not guilty of this 
charge, and consequently, there was no substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice. 
14.  Duplicative convictions.  The parties agree that the 
defendant's three convictions of assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 15B (b), are duplicative of 
his three convictions of armed assault with intent to murder 
pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b), because the former crime is 
a lesser included offense of the latter.  See Commonwealth v. 
Parenti, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 696, 703 (1982).  "The appropriate 
remedy," therefore, "is to vacate both the conviction[s] and 
sentence[s] on the lesser included offense[s], and to affirm the 
 
49 
conviction[s] on the more serious offense[s]."  Commonwealth v. 
Mello, 420 Mass. 375, 398 (1995).  Consequently, we vacate the 
defendant's three convictions of assault by means of a dangerous 
weapon.  See Commonwealth v. Quiles, 488 Mass. 298, 318 (2021), 
cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1237 (2022). 
15.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed 
the record in accordance with G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and discern 
no basis to set aside or reduce the verdict of murder in the 
first degree or to order a new trial. 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions except for his three convictions of 
assault by means of a dangerous weapon pursuant to G. L. c. 265, 
§ 15B (b), which we vacate as duplicative, and we affirm the 
denial of the defendant's motions for a new trial, for an 
evidentiary hearing, and for further discovery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.