Case Title: In re Estate of Peters

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Estate of Peters (99-154 & 99-258); 171 Vt. 381; 769 A.2d 630 

[Filed 20-Oct-2000]
[Motion for Reargument Denied 28-Nov-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            Nos. 99-154 & 99-258

In re Estate of Cheryl Peters	                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
    	                                         Lamoille Superior Court

                                                 June Term, 2000

Alan W. Cook, J. (99-154)
Ben W. Joseph, J. (99-258)

Kurt M. Hughes of Murdoch & Hughes, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Charles S. Martin of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Defendant Carroll Peters appeals from a Lamoille
  Superior Court jury  verdict for plaintiff in a civil action for a sexual
  battery he allegedly committed against Cheryl  Peters.  Defendant raises
  six arguments on appeal: (1) the action is barred by the statute of 
  limitations; (2) in a tort action for battery between spouses, a finding
  that consent to sexual  intercourse has been withdrawn is a prerequisite to
  liability; (3) the trial court erred by allowing out-of-court statements
  made by Mrs. Peters, the deceased victim, to be admitted; (4) the
  compensatory  damages are excessive; (5) the trial court erred in
  submitting the issue of punitive damages to the  jury without first
  allowing defendant to disclose his lack of wealth; and (6) the trial court
  erred in  awarding attorney's fees without any evidence to support the
  award.  We affirm.

 

       The following evidence was introduced at trial.  Defendant and Cheryl
  Peters were married  on July 13, 1990 and lived together in Hyde Park,
  Vermont.  Mrs. Peters had several children who  were not related to
  defendant.  The Peters began having marital problems, and in January 1993 
  separated.  Mrs. Peters moved in with her daughter, Raemarie Lamare, who
  lived in Morrisville.   Several months later, in the summer of 1993, Mrs.
  Peters rented a house in Morrisville with her  cousin, Richard Fitzgerald. 
  In July of that year, Mrs. Peters quit-claimed her rights to the Hyde Park 
  house.  Defendant filed for divorce on August 4, 1993, and Mrs. Peters
  accepted service of the  divorce papers. 

       On Sunday, August 8, 1993, defendant arrived at Mrs. Peters's
  residence in Morrisville at  approximately 9:00 p.m.  Mrs. Peters was not
  there.  Nicole Deuso, Ms. Peters' daughter, was there.   Ms. Deuso
  testified that she and her boyfriend, Bryant Pierce, asked defendant to
  leave several times,  but that he refused, and remained in the living room
  reading letters and poems he had written for  Mrs. Peters.  Eventually, Ms.
  Deuso turned out the lights in the living room to go to sleep, and 
  defendant went into Mrs. Peters' bedroom.  

       According to Ms. Deuso, Mrs. Peters arrived home that morning at about
  1:30 a.m.,  intoxicated.  Ms. Deuso told her that defendant was in her
  bedroom, so Mrs. Peters went into her  cousin's unoccupied bedroom. 
  Defendant followed Mrs. Peters into the bedroom and then  throughout the
  house as Mrs. Peters attempted to evade him, screaming "[i]t's my house!"  
  Eventually, Mrs. Peters went into her bedroom, and defendant followed. 
  According to Ms. Deuso,  she told him, "[i]f you're going to be here, then
  just shut up and let me get some sleep."  

       The next morning Ms. Deuso heard Mrs. Peters ask defendant what he was
  doing there.  She  saw Mrs. Peters come out of the bedroom in the same
  dress she had worn the night before and go 

 

  into the bathroom to get dressed for work.  Defendant then came out of the
  bedroom in his t-shirt and  underwear.  Mr. Fitzgerald arrived home that
  morning.  He testified that he was surprised to see  defendant there, and
  felt that something was wrong. 

       At approximately 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday morning, August 10th, defendant
  visited Mrs.  Peters' daughter, Ms. Lamare, at her apartment.  Ms. Lamare
  testified that defendant told her that he  "violated [her] mother" when he
  had gone to her house "the other night."  Ms. Lamare recounted that 
  defendant explained that when Mrs. Peters was passed out, he crawled into
  the bed and "made her  accessible to him," and that he "couldn't get it in
  very far, but it was good for him and that he  ejaculated."  Defendant then
  asked Ms. Lamare whether he should call Mrs. Peters at work before  she
  received a letter he had sent to her, confessing to what he had done.  Ms.
  Lamare suggested that  he call Mrs. Peters before she received his letter. 
  Ms. Lamare told defendant that she hoped her  mother "nailed his ass to the
  wall" for what he had done, to which defendant responded, "I'll do 
  anything I can to get away with it."

       Around 1:00 p.m. that same day, Mrs. Peters arrived at Ms. Lamare's
  apartment.  Ms. Lamare  testified that she could tell that something was
  wrong as soon as she saw her mother, and that Mrs.  Peters immediately
  informed her that defendant had called her at work and told her that he had 
  "violated" her.  She stated that Mrs. Peters was "devastated," and cried
  repeatedly, "I can't believe he  raped me" as she rocked back and forth on
  the couch.  Ms. Lamare encouraged her mother to call the  police, but Mrs.
  Peters responded that she "didn't dare" to report the incident.

       The next day, Mrs. Peters returned to Ms. Lamare's house with
  defendant's letter in which he  confessed to the assault.  The letter
  states, "I took advantage of you without your permission - sorry . . . ." 
  The letter, which was admitted into evidence and read into the record by
  Ms. Lamare, 

 

  graphically described the incident and defendant's explanation for his
  conduct.  In the weeks that  followed, defendant continually called and
  sent letters to Mrs. Peters.  Ms. Lamare testified that her  mother was
  frightened and hurt, and that her foremost concern "was to go where she
  couldn't be  found."

       Linda Briggs, Mrs. Peters' co-worker, testified that she had a
  conversation with Mrs. Peters  "on a day in August of 1993," but did not
  specify the date.  She noticed Mrs. Peters was upset and  acting
  differently, and that her emotional state interfered with her work.  When
  Ms. Briggs asked  Mrs. Peters what was wrong, she responded that defendant
  "broke into [her] house the other night  and raped [her]."

       Mrs. Peters's cousin and roommate, Mr. Fitzgerald, testified that he
  met Mrs. Peters at the  V.F.W. club to find out what had been bothering her
  when he saw her at their house on the morning  at issue.  She told Mr.
  Fitzgerald that defendant had raped her "the other morning."  She stated
  that  she did not want to get the police involved because she was scared,
  and that she was going to move  out of town.  Mr. Fitzgerald testified that
  Mrs. Peters was scared as she discussed this with him.   However, he could
  not recall whether this conversation occurred on the evening of the
  early-morning  assault or on the evening immediately after.

       A few weeks later, Mrs. Peters went to the home of another of her
  daughters, Tina Teale, to  borrow a truck for her move to Montpelier the
  following week.  Ms. Teale testified that her mother  was visibly upset and
  told Tina that defendant had raped her.  Mrs. Peters showed Ms. Teale 
  defendant's confession letter.

       Mrs. Peters died on September 2, 1993, as a result of an unsolved
  homicide in the Morrisville  home she shared with Mr. Fitzgerald.  On June
  10, 1996, Mrs. Peters' five children and her estate 

 

  filed a complaint against defendant alleging wrongful death, sexual assault
  and battery.  Defendant  filed an answer and affirmative defenses on July
  10, 1996.  On July 31, 1996, defendant filed a  motion to dismiss for
  failure to state a claim, arguing that the wrongful death claim was barred
  by the  statute of limitations, and that the sexual assault and battery
  claim did not allege a tort recognized by  Vermont common or statutory law. 
  The trial court dismissed the wrongful death claim because it  was
  time-barred, but denied defendant's motion to dismiss the assault and
  battery claim.  The estate  was the only remaining plaintiff. 

       A three-day jury trial began on November 23, 1998.  The
  above-mentioned witnesses  testified, and several letters written by
  defendant, including the confession letter, were entered into  evidence. 
  Defendant's sole witness was a urologist whose testimony was limited to
  defendant's  sexual capabilities.  At the close of plaintiff's case,
  defendant moved for a directed verdict.  In  denying defendant's motion,
  the court stated, "I think the evidence is overwhelming, and this jury, if 
  it believes the witnesses, would be well justified in finding that there
  was involuntary sexual  intercourse, and that that amounted to a battery. .
  . ."

       After the charge conference and at the close of both parties'
  evidence, the court gave the jury  instructions.  Defendant objected to the
  charge on punitive damages, arguing that the trial should  have been
  bifurcated on this issue because defendant had not been given an
  opportunity to present  his financial status.  The court denied the
  objection, noting that defendant had not raised this issue at  the charge
  conference, and that defendant was absent from a majority of the trial. 
  After  deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff of $125,000
  in compensatory damages and  $480,000 in punitive damages.  Defendant moved
  for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a  new trial.  The court
  denied the motion and entered judgment on the verdict.  This appeal
  followed.

 

                                     I.

       Defendant first argues that plaintiff's battery claim is barred
  because it was not brought  within the two-year statute of limitations for
  survival actions.  See 12 V.S.A. § 557(a).  Plaintiff  implicitly concedes
  the applicability of the limitation, but contends that the statute of
  limitations has  been waived in this case by defendant's failure to assert
  it.  We agree that defendant has not  preserved a statute of limitations
  defense to plaintiff's battery claim.

       Letters of administration memorializing Mrs. Peters' death were issued
  on September 10,  1993.  Plaintiff's complaint alleging that defendant
  "committed a sexual assault and battery" on  decedent (Count I), and did
  "willfully, deliberately and with premeditation kill . . . decedent" (Count 
  II), was filed on June 10, 1996.  Defendant filed a motion to dismiss,
  asserting that Count II should  be dismissed because of plaintiff's failure
  to bring an action for wrongful death within two years, as  required by 14
  V.S.A. § 1492(a).  Notably, defendant made no assertion that Count I was
  barred by  12 V.S.A. § 557(a) nor any other limitation, but argued instead
  that Count I "[did] not allege a tort  recognized by the common or
  statutory law of the State of Vermont."  Defendant's subsequent  memorandum
  of law in support of his motion to dismiss reiterated at length his
  argument that Count  II  was barred by § 1492(a), but again failed to
  assert any statute of limitations defense to Count I.  The trial court
  dismissed Count II, concluding that it was barred by § 1492(a). (FN1) 
  Defendant's  motion to dismiss Count I on the grounds that the facts
  alleged did not state a cause of action was  denied.

       "[I]n Vermont, a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that
  provides repose for a  prospective defendant, and its expiration does not
  affect a court's jurisdiction to hear the case."  

 

  Hixson v. Plump, 167 Vt. 202, 206,