Case Title: Reid v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 194, 2007

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CARLTON REID,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 194, 2007 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Kent County   
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Def. ID No. 0209023220 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 27, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
October  19, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 19th day of October 2007, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Carlton Reid, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s March 22, 2007 denial of his motion for reconsideration of the 
Superior Court’s May 17, 2006 order that had granted Reid’s motion for 
modification of sentence.  The State of Delaware has moved to affirm the 
judgment of the Superior Court on the basis that it is manifest on the face of 
 
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Reid’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We find no merit to 
the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
 
(2) 
It appears from the record that Reid pleaded guilty on March 
14, 2003 to Possession of a Firearm during the Commission of a Felony 
(PFDCF) and Robbery in the First Degree.  At Reid’s sentencing, the 
Superior Court suspended thirty years of Level V imprisonment for the 
minimum mandatory required, i.e., a total of five years, and imposed two 
years each of Levels III and II probation. 
 
 
(3) 
On May 29, 2003, Reid filed a motion for reduction of sentence 
pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) (“Rule 35(b)”).  Reid asked 
the Superior Court to reduce his minimum mandatory term from five years 
to three years.  In exchange for the reduced sentence, and to demonstrate that 
he was committed to his rehabilitation, Reid offered to serve “[t]he other 2 
years [of minimum mandatory] . . . in an outpatient program and probation.”  
Reid also suggested that “[o]ne year of work release” would “help [him] 
take care of [his] son” and financial responsibilities.  By order dated June 16, 
2003, the Superior Court denied Reid’s motion on the basis that the five 
years of Level V was mandatory and could not be reduced or suspended. 
 
                                                 
1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
 
3
 
(4) 
In February 2006, Reid filed a motion for modification of 
sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b).  Reid requested that the Superior Court 
“modify half of [Levels III and II] probation to [Level IV] work release.”  
By order dated March 20, 2006, the Superior Court denied Reid’s 
modification motion in part on the basis that the motion was untimely. 
 
(5) 
In April 2006, Reid again filed a motion for modification of 
sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b).  Reid’s motion duplicated his unsuccessful 
motion filed in February 2006.  Nonetheless, after considering the motion, 
the Superior Court issued an order modifying Reid’s sentence.  By order 
dated May 17, 2006, the Superior Court replaced the two years of Level III 
probation imposed for PDWDCF with “Level IV work release for one year 
followed by Level III for one year.”  Reid did not appeal the May 17 order.  
 
(6) 
On March 14, 2007, Reid filed a document entitled 
“Reconsideration of Level IV and Probation” (“motion for reconsideration”).  
Reid asked the Superior Court to withdraw the May 17, 2006 order, which 
had converted one year of Level III probation to one year of Level IV work 
release, and reinstate the two years of Level III probation that was originally 
imposed.  In support of his motion, Reid reported that a shortage of bed 
space at Level IV was guaranteed to delay his upcoming transfer to work 
release, and that, as a result, he would remain incarcerated at a Level V 
 
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facility.  Moreover, Reid argued, the Superior Court erred when it converted 
one year of Level III probation to one year of Level IV work release.  
According to Reid, “after a person is sentenced the courts may not increase 
[the person’s] time.”   
 
(7) 
By order dated March 22, 2007, the Superior Court denied 
Reid’s motion for reconsideration as untimely and repetitive under Rule 
35(b).  This appeal followed. 
 
 (8) 
On appeal, Reid argues that the Superior Court’s May 17, 2006 
order illegally enhanced his sentence.  Having carefully considered the 
parties’ positions, the Court has concluded that Reid’s argument, particularly 
as it is articulated on appeal, is in the nature of a Rule 35(a) motion to 
correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner rather than a Rule 35(b) 
motion for modification of sentence.  
 
(9) 
Either way, whether considered as a Rule 35(b) modification 
motion or as a Rule 35(a) motion for correction of sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, Reid’s motion for reconsideration was untimely filed.2  The 
Court has further determined, as did the Superior Court, that Reid has not 
                                                 
2 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a), (b) (providing in pertinent part that a motion for 
correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal manner must be filed within ninety days of 
the sentencing order).  See also Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 
1390 (Del. 1995) (providing that “[the] Court may affirm on the basis of a different 
rationale than that which was articulated by the trial court.”).  
 
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demonstrated “extraordinary circumstances” that would justify consideration 
of his untimely motion.3 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Justice 
 
                                                 
3 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a), (b) (providing in pertinent part that “[t]he court will 
consider an application made more than 90 days after the imposition of sentence only in 
extraordinary circumstances”).