Case Title: DOWNTOWN AUTO PARTS, INC. v. TONER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
DOWNTOWN AUTO PARTS, INC. v. TONER2004 WY 6791 P.3d 917Case Number: 03-176Decided: 06/15/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

DOWNTOWN 
AUTO PARTS, INC.; and

MARIE 
K. NELSON, a/k/a/ KATIE NELSON,

 

Appellants(Defendants),

 

v.

 

RACHEL 
N. TONER,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Peter 
K. Michael, Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Jay 
A. Gilbertz of Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

 

[¶1]           
The 
sole issue presented is whether the trial court properly relied on ordinary 
negligence principles to determine the existence of duty in this vehicle and 
pedestrian collision case.  The 
employee driver, Marie K. Nelson (Nelson), for Appellant Downtown Auto Parts, 
Inc., (Downtown) struck and injured Rachel N. Toner (Toner) as she attempted to 
cross a street.  Following a bench 
trial, the trial court applied comparative fault principles, determined that 
both parties were negligent, but Downtown's greater fault entitled Toner to 
money damages.  In this appeal, 
Downtown contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that 
Nelson owed a duty to Toner under the "sudden appearance" rule of law.  

 

[¶2]           
We 
hold that the trial court's ruling that Nelson owed a duty to Toner which she 
had breached, causing damages, was not clearly erroneous.  We affirm.

 

ISSUE

 

[¶3]           
Downtown 
presents this issue for our review:

 

1.                  
Whether 
an automobile driver can be at fault for a collision with a pedestrian when the 
driver was complying with all traffic statutes and ordinances immediately before 
the collision and the pedestrian appeared suddenly from a hidden location behind 
an obstruction.

 

Toner 
contends that the issue properly before us is:

 

Was 
there sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that the defendant was 
negligent?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]           
On 
the morning of September 28, 1998, Toner, a graduate student at the University 
of Wyoming, was given a ride to class by a friend.  No curbside parking was available, and 
the friend double-parked his van in the westbound lane of Lewis Street, which is 
adjacent to the University.  Toner 
had to walk in front of the friend's van and across Lewis Street without using a 
crosswalk in order to reach her destination at the Geology Building.  An oncoming vehicle stopped and gave 
Toner the right-of-way.  The 
Downtown Auto Parts delivery vehicle driven by Nelson approached the van from 
the rear, drove around the double-parked van, accelerating as it passed, and 
struck Toner just as she stepped out into the street.  Toner sustained serious damage to her 
left knee which required surgery and extensive treatment afterwards.  The parties did not dispute that Nelson 
was acting within the scope of her employment and, after a bench trial, the 
trial court issued a decision letter stating its general findings and 
apportioning sixty percent of fault to Downtown and forty percent of fault to 
Toner.  Under Wyoming's comparative 
fault laws, Downtown was responsible for sixty percent of the damages, and 
judgment was entered accordingly.  
This appeal followed.

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶5]           
Our 
standard of review when a trial is held before the bench, rather than a jury, 
is: 

 

The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict. Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 
(Wyo. 1993).  While the findings are 
presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Id. Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to 
assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail weighing 
disputed evidence.  Id. 
Findings of fact will not be set aside unless the findings are clearly 
erroneous.  Id. A finding is 
clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed.  
Id. We review a district court's conclusions of law de novo 
on appeal.  
Id.

 

Saulcy 
Land Co. v. Jones, 
983 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 1999).  

 

 

Duty 
to Pedestrian

 

[¶6]           
After 
carefully examining the evidence, the trial court as fact finder concluded that 
Nelson had breached a duty owed to pedestrians by failing to determine if 
pedestrians were present as she passed a parked van despite her knowledge that 
the Lewis Street area had a great deal of pedestrian traffic.  The trial court also concluded that 
Toner negligently failed to look to her left before crossing the street.  Because Nelson had the capability of 
causing great harm in her automobile and could have avoided the hazard with only 
minimal caution, the trial court found that Nelson's fault was greater than 
Toner's.  In its decision letter, 
the trial court quoted the following passage from Feltner v. Bishop, 348 P.2d 548 (Wyo. 1960):

 

We 
are fully aware of the soundness of the general rule that the operator of an 
automobile cannot assume that the road is clear and that under all circumstances 
and at all times an operator is bound to anticipate that persons may be met at 
any point in a public way, whether street, road or highway.  We also feel this duty becomes more 
strict when the presence of persons upon streets or highways actually exists or 
becomes more probable.  On the other 
hand, the limit of the operator's duty when lawfully driving is to exercise a 
diligence commensurate with hazards disclosed under surrounding circumstances, 
and the lookout which operators of vehicles must maintain is that most effective 
in the light of all present conditions and those reasonably to be 
anticipated.  

We 
also recognize that the existing circumstances surrounding an accident bear 
largely upon the question of an automobile operator's negligence . . . 
.

 

Id. 
at 
549-50 (citations omitted).

 

[¶7]           
Downtown 
contends that the trial court misapplied Feltner.  It argues that Feltner stands 
for the "sudden appearance rule" which posits that a driver, as a matter of law, 
has no duty to anticipate a pedestrian's sudden appearance from behind a parked 
automobile.  See Feltner, at 
550-51.  In this case, Downtown 
contends that because the trial court found that Nelson had obeyed all traffic 
laws as she attempted to pass the van and because Toner appeared suddenly from a 
hidden location, Nelson owed no duty to Toner.  Toner contends that this simple case 
requires application of ordinary negligence principles and apportionment of 
fault, both factual determinations.  

 

[¶8]           
There 
are four elements to a negligence cause of action:  (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty to conform to a specified standard of care; (2) the defendant breached the 
duty of care; (3) the defendant's breach of the duty of care proximately caused 
injury to the plaintiff; and (4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is 
compensable by money damages.  
Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc., 2002 WY 113, ¶8, 50 P.3d 697, ¶8 (Wyo. 
2002).  Whether a duty exists is a 
question of law for the court and may arise based upon common law, contract or 
statute.  Id.; Natrona 
County v. Blake, 2003 WY 170, ¶6, 81 P.3d 948, ¶6 (Wyo. 2003). However, when 
the question of duty depends upon the initial determination of certain basic 
facts, that initial determination is a question of fact for the 
fact-finder.  Valance, 
¶8. In vehicle and pedestrian collision cases, the common law duty on the 
basis of ordinary negligence principles states that a driver owes a duty to 
exercise the degree of care required of a reasonable person in light of all the 
circumstances.  Fegler v. Brodie, 
574 P.2d 751, 755 (Wyo. 1978).  

 

[¶9]           
In 
Feltner, the driver struck a toddler who darted in front of her from 
diagonally parked vehicles.  
Feltner, 348 P.2d  at 549.  
After trial to the court, judgment was in favor of the driver, and that 
decision was upheld on appeal. Id. at 553. Feltner noted that the 
"sudden appearance" of the child in front of the vehicle was a circumstance 
supported by evidence permitting the trier of fact to decide that the driver had 
not been negligent.  In other words, 
the "sudden appearance" of the child was a circumstance to be considered under 
ordinary negligence principles by the trier of fact.  Id. at 550.  Our review of the trial court's decision 
in this case indicates that the reason for Nelson's failure to see Toner was the 
primary issue in the case.  As a 
driver, Nelson owed a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.  Under the common law duty and our 
standard that all circumstances are to be considered, Nelson is not relieved of 
a duty to pedestrians because she has complied with traffic laws or because a 
pedestrian's sudden appearance left her only an instant to avoid an 
accident.  Nelson's duty of 
reasonable care required the trier of fact to consider that Nelson did not 
violate traffic laws, Toner's sudden appearance, as well as whether it was 
reasonable for Nelson to pass a double parked van at the speed she did when 
oncoming traffic had stopped in an area known to have a high volume of 
pedestrians.  The trial court's 
finding that Nelson should have foreseen the presence of pedestrians in this 
particular situation is not clearly erroneous, and we find no error and affirm 
the judgment of the trial court.