Case Title: Mikell v. Henderson

Citation: 63 So. 2d 508

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1953-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
63 So. 2d 508 (1953)
MIKELL et al.
v.
HENDERSON, Sheriff.

Supreme Court of Florida, Division A.
February 27, 1953.
Leonard P. Cardone, Miami, for appellants.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen, William A. O'Bryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and DeCostas, Maer & Floyd, Miami, for appellee.
MATHEWS, Justice.
This case involves plain rooster fighting and cock fighting.
It is contended by the appellee that such fighting is cruelty to animals and is condemned by Sections 828.12 and 828.02, F.S.A.
The bill of complaint alleged that the appellants were engaged in the business of raising and training game cocks for sale and in improving the breed of such game cocks. It is further alleged in the bill of complaint that in order to properly raise and train game cocks and to improve the breed, it is necessary to eliminate the weaker cocks and that such elimination is accomplished by fighting game cocks against one another to determine the stronger bird, and which bird will be selected to propagate the species.
The appellants allege that their business of raising, training, fighting and selling highly bred game cocks does not fall within the confines of Chapter 828, F.S.A., the same being the Cruelty to Children and Animals Statute, and if it does, that the same violates the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Section 1 of the Declaration of Rights of the State of Florida, F.S.A.
In the bill of complaint the appellants alleged that the Sheriff of Dade County had made an arrest of another breeder of cocks for violating the same law, and said person was tried and convicted under the Statute. They further alleged that the defendant (appellee) sheriff threatens to arrest appellants under the authority of the above mentioned statute unless appellants discontinue their business of breeding and training game cocks and of selecting the best birds through the process of combat.
The learned Chancellor entered a final decree to the effect that the bill of complaint was without equity and failed to state a cause of action. In said decree, among other things, the Chancellor said:
In this case there is no question presented about artificial spurs or gambling on the result of the cock fights. Whatever fighting was done was without artificial *509 spurs and was not done in connection with any gambling activities.
The section of the statute involved is Section 828.12, F.S.A. which reads as follows:
Necessarily involved in connection with Section 828.12, F.S.A. is Section 828.02, F.S.A., which is as follows:
Section 828.15, F.S.A. is as follows:
Everyone familiar with roosters, and particularly game roosters, knows that they need no encouragement to fight. It is not necessary that their tail feathers be pulled, or that any other inducement be offered, or stimulant applied, in order to produce a fight.
Under these sections of the statute a person engaged in breeding and training game cocks may spend considerable sums of money, as it is alleged was done in this case, for pens and runs for his chickens, but if he permits them to get together in the back yard, or in a pen, or a run, where a fight results, he is guilty of cruelty to animals and is subject to a fine or imprisonment. On the other hand, he may be able to rent or buy a steamboat, or other floating craft, on which to ship his roosters anywhere on the waters of Dade County and not be guilty of cruelty to animals because of any fight which might take place on the steamboat or other craft. There is no difference between the fighting of roosters on a steamboat, or other craft, and the fighting of roosters on land, in the back yard or in the chicken runs. The fighting is the same and the cruelty is the same. Under the statute one is a violation of the law and the other is not.
There is no reasonable basis for the classification of cock fighting on a steamboat, or other craft, and cock fighting on land or in the back yard. The discrimination is unreasonable and arbitrary and denies to the appellant equal protection of the law.
Reversed, with directions to set aside the declaratory decree heretofore entered, and for further proceedings by entering a decree in accordance with this opinion.
HOBSON, C.J., and TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.