Case Title: Lockridge v. Adrian

Citation: 638 So. 2d 766

Docket Number: 1921433

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1994-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
638 So. 2d 766 (1994)
Joe Watt LOCKRIDGE, Jr., et al.
v.
John L. ADRIAN, et al.
1921433.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
January 14, 1994.
Rehearing Denied March 4, 1994.
*767 Robert D. McWhorter, Jr. of Inzer, Stivender, Haney & Johnson, P.A., Gadsden, for appellants.
Albert L. Shumaker, Centre, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
In October 1981, Joe Watt Lockridge and his three sons (hereinafter "the Lockridges"), owners of a landlocked parcel of land, petitioned the probate court pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 18-3-1, for the condemnation of a right-of-way across the lands of John L. Adrian and his wife, Lucille Adrian, to the nearest and most convenient public road. The landlocked property in question, situated in Cherokee County and containing approximately five acres, is bounded on the north, east, and south by the waters of Weiss Lake and on the west by the Adrians' land. The probate court denied the relief requested; the Lockridges appealed to the circuit court for a trial de novo. Both the Lockridges and the Adrians moved for summary judgments. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the Adrians asserted that Art. I, § 23, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, and Ala.Code 1975, § 18-3-1, violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The trial court upheld Art. I, § 23, but, finding no "public use" in the proposed condemnation of a right-of-way over the Adrians' property, the trial court declared that § 18-3-1 was unconstitutional to the extent that it permitted a taking of the Adrians' private property without their consent for the Lockridges' private use.[1] The Lockridges appeal. We reverse.
Article I, § 23, Constitution of Alabama 1901, the provision authorizing the legislature to secure for persons a right-of-way over lands of other persons upon the payment of just compensation, reads as follows:
Pursuant to Art. I, § 23, the legislature, by general law, enacted § 18-3-1, which, at the time relevant to this case, read as follows:[2]
In Harvey v. Warren, 212 Ala. 415, 102 So. 899 (1925), this Court was faced with a constitutional challenge to General Act No. 679, Acts of Alabama 1919, p. 982, the predecessor to § 18-3-1. The Court upheld the act, stating:
212 Ala. at 416-17, 102 So.  at 900-01. (Emphasis added.)
Specifically, the interpretation from Steele v. County Commissioners, 83 Ala. at 305-08, 3 So.  at 762-63, relied on by the Court in Harvey v. Warren, supra, for upholding the act, reads as follows:
(Emphasis added.) See, also, Johnston v. Alabama Public Service Comm'n, 287 Ala. 417, 252 So. 2d 75 (1971) (holding that § 18-3-1 does not violate Art. I, § 23, or the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution).
The trial court in the present case correctly recognized that even a compensated taking of property when executed for no reason other than to confer a private benefit on a particular private party is unconstitutional under both the Alabama Constitution and the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Harvey v. Warren, supra; Steele v. County Commissioners, supra; Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 104 S. Ct. 2321, 81 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1984); and 2A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain §§ 7.01-7.73 (3d ed. 1990). In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Hawaii Legislature enacted the Land Reform Act of 1967 ("the Act"), which created a land condemnation procedure whereby title to real property was taken from lessors and transferred to lessees in order to reduce the concentration of land ownership on the islands. The Hawaii Legislature concluded that such drastic legislation was necessary, based on its finding that concentrated land ownership was skewing the state's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility and welfare. Rejecting a challenge to the Act based on the Fifth Amendment's Eminent Domain Clause and on Due Process provisions, the United States Supreme Court held:
467 U.S.  at 241-45, 104 S. Ct.  at 2329-2331. (Emphasis in original.)
However, the trial court in the present case erred in holding that § 18-3-1 was unconstitutional to the extent that it permits the taking of private property to establish a private easement by necessity. As this Court explained in Steele v. County Commissioners, and as the United States Supreme Court explained in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the taking of private property for a private use is constitutional provided that there exists a valid public purpose for the taking. There is no "literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general public," Midkiff, 467 U.S.  at 244, 104 S. Ct.  at 2331; it is only the purpose of the taking that must pass constitutional scrutiny, and a state's assessment as to what public purposes should be advanced by the exercise of the taking power is entitled to substantial deference by the courts. Midkiff. The public purpose advanced by § 23 of the Alabama Constitution, which § 18-3-1 was enacted to implement, was adequately stated in Steele v. County Commissioners:
83 Ala. at 307, 3 So.  at 763.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, KENNEDY, INGRAM and COOK, JJ., concur.
STEAGALL, J., concurs specially.
STEAGALL, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur specially to point out that while the taking referred to by the majority is constitutional, the actual use of the condemned right-of-way is, in my opinion, for the use of the condemnor and not for the use of the general public.
[1]  The trial court determined Alabama Power Company to be a necessary and indispensable party and ordered its joinder. However, Alabama Power is not a party to this appeal.
[2]  We quote here § 18-3-1 as it read before July 8, 1982; that version of the statute applies in this case. That pre-July 8, 1982, version refers to land "outside the corporate limits of a municipality." Section 18-3-1 was amended by Alabama Acts 1982, 2d Ex.Sess., Act No. 82-784, p. 288, to delete any reference to land "outside the corporate limits of a municipality"; that 1982 amendment added the language "provided written approval is obtained from the municipal government and the planning board of such municipality." The 1982 amendment thereby seems to restrict the application of the statute to land within the corporate limits of a municipality. After the 1982 amendment, the section reads:

"The owner of any tract or body of land, no part of which tract or body of land is adjacent or contiguous to any public road or highway, shall have and may acquire a convenient right-of-way, not exceeding in width 30 feet, over the lands intervening and lying between such tract or body of land and the public road nearest or most convenient thereto provided written approval is obtained from the municipal government and the planning board of such municipality."
The Court of Civil Appeals interpreted the amended provision in Hawkins v. Griffin, 512 So. 2d 109, 110-11 (Ala.Civ.App.1987):
"Although inartfully drafted, section 18-3-1, Code 1975, as amended, appears to be the result of an effort by the legislature to permit those landowners within the boundaries of municipalities who have no access to a public road or street to condemn private rights-of-way just as landlocked landowners outside municipalities are permitted to so condemn....
"After giving [§ 18-3-1, as amended in 1982,] a rational, sensible, and liberal construction, we conclude that the legislature intended to permit landlocked owners in municipalities to obtain private rights-of-way over the lands of others to the nearest public road or street and did not intend to deprive landlocked owners outside municipalities of the same right, which they had possessed for many years."
We think the Court of Civil Appeals correctly interpreted the 1982 Amendment.