Case Title: Eddy v. First Wyoming Bank N.A.-Lander

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-21

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Eddy v. First Wyoming Bank N.A.-Lander1986 WY 20713 P.2d 228Case Number: 85-21, 85-22Decided: 01/27/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
BRUCE N. EDDY, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

 
 
v. 

 
 
FIRST WYOMING BANK, 
N.A.-LANDER, LANDER, WYOMING, A UNITED STATES BANKING CORPORATION, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). E.C. CATES, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), v. FIRST WYOMING BANK, 
N.A.-LANDER, LANDER, WYOMING, A UNITED STATES BANKING CORPORATION, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Dallas J. Laird, 
Casper, for 
appellant Eddy.

 
 
Sue Davidson, of 
Urbigkit, Whitehead, Zunker and Davidson, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant 
Cates.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Richard D. Gist, 
Lander.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE,* ROONEY,** BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

 
 
** Retired November 30, 
1985.

 
 

ROSE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In this case, 
appellants Cates and Eddy attack a judgment nunc pro tunc which decrees that 
they are jointly and severally liable to appellee bank for $207,110.55 as of May 
23, 1983. The judgment nunc pro tunc was entered after a motion by the bank 
seeking to "amend, clarify and correct" nunc pro tunc a prior judgment, which 
motion was made well over one year after the original judgment had been rendered 
by the court. Appellants contend that the judgment nunc pro tunc was improper, 
and we agree that it must be set aside.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellee bank filed a 
complaint on January 28, 1982, seeking to recover from appellants, as guarantors 
or co-makers of a number of promissory notes. The bank and both appellants 
agreed to settle this suit by stipulation and confession of judgment. The 
stipulation and the judgment, prepared by the bank, provided that the appellants 
would be jointly and severally liable for $193,929.86 plus $13,180.69 in 
attorney's fees, a total of $207,110.55.

 
 

[¶3.]     The bank and appellants 
signed the stipulation and confession of judgment on May 17, 1983, whereupon the 
judgment was signed by the district court on May 23, 1983, and entered upon the 
records of that court in March of 1984. In July, 1984, a conflict arose 
concerning the judgment when appellant Cates sought to settle what he thought 
was a balance of some $64,000 owing on the judgment, while the bank claimed that 
the balance due was approximately $184,000. The difference springs from whether 
payments made by appellants to the bank in the period from January 28, 1982, to 
May 23, 1983, had already been credited in the stipulation and judgment or 
whether those payments instead reduced the judgment from the original 
$207,110.55.

 
 

[¶4.]     The conflict is 
attributable to the parties' interpretations of the judgment and the stipulation 
upon which the judgment was based. Appellants rely on the following language in 
the stipulation:

 
 
"That Plaintiff shall 
have judgment against the Defendants * * * jointly and severally, as of 28 January, 1982 * * * in the 
amount of $207,110.55 together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per 
annum from and after 28 January, 1982 * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
This language supports 
their claim that they owed the bank $207,110.55 as of January 28, 1982, and thus 
any payments the bank received after that date should have reduced the balance 
owed.

 
 

[¶5.]     The bank, on the other 
hand, claims that the judgment proclaimed that the appellants owed $207,110.55 
as of May 23, 1983, the date of judgment. The bank supports this position by 
relying upon the language in the judgment, which was dated May 23, 1983, 
ordering that the bank have a judgment against Cates and Eddy in the sum of 
$207,110.55.

 
 

[¶6.]     Because the bank wished 
to enforce the judgment and foreclose upon appellants' property, and yet avoid 
selling more of the property than was necessary to satisfy the debt owed, it 
moved to "amend, clarify and correct judgment nunc pro tunc." The trial court 
found that it had inherent and equitable power to consider the bank's motion, 
and that there was no clerical error in the original judgment. The court then 
granted the bank's motion and subsequently entered a judgment nunc pro 
tunc.

 
 
The original judgment 
provided in part "* * * that pursuant to the Stipulation and Confession of 
Judgment filed herein, Judgment should be entered against the Defendants and 
each of them, jointly and severally, for the sum of $207,110.55 together with 
interest thereon at the rate of 10% from and after 28 January, 1982 * * 
*."

 
 
The stipulation provided 
in part that "* * * Plaintiff shall have judgment against the Defendants * * * 
jointly and severally, as of 28 January, 1982, * * * in the amount of 
$207,110.55 together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from and 
after 28 January, 1982 * * *." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶7.]     In its judgment nunc 
pro tunc the court found:

"That the Court has 
inherent jurisdiction and equitable power to consider and rule upon Plaintiff's 
Motion to Amend, Clarify and Correct Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc without reference to 
statute or rule in order, upon proper evidence, to grant relief from a clerical 
error.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"The Judgment as rendered 
on May 23, 1983, does not contain any clerical error. "That by the language, 
meaning and effect of the Judgment as rendered herein on May 23, 1983, the 
Defendants, * * * jointly and severally, owed to Plaintiff * * * on May 23, 1983, the principal sum of 
$207,110.55 together with interest on said principal sum at the rate of 10% per 
annum calculated from and after January 28, 1982 * * *." (Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
The judgment nunc pro 
tunc completely failed to refer to the stipulation and confession of judgment, 
which was indisputably the basis for the original judgment and was referred to 
six times by that judgment. The judgment nunc pro tunc also consisted of only 
six double-spaced pages while the original judgment was six single-spaced pages, 
which indicates the considerable changes made.

 
 

[¶8.]     The entry of the 
judgment nunc pro tunc was made after a conference telephone call and without an 
evidentiary hearing dealing with the parties' intent when they entered into the 
stipulation. The bank claims that the court merely clarified its original 
judgment to avoid uncertainty and vagueness in its interpretation and 
enforcement, and that the court has inherent power as well as power under Rule 
60(a), W.R.C.P., to so act.1 Appellants contend that the motion 
by the bank sought to change material parts of the judgment, 17 months after the 
judgment and stipulation had been signed, and that the trial court did not have 
any power to change the judgment as it did.

 
 

[¶9.]     Preliminarily, we must 
deal with appellants' contention that the bank's motion to clarify the judgment 
should have been dismissed for the reason that the bank failed to comply with 
Rule 5(d), W.R.C.P., since the motion was forwarded to the trial judge and the 
judge did not send it to the clerk for filing. Rule 5(e), W.R.C.P., which is 
identical to the federal rule, provides in part:

 
 
"The filing of pleadings 
and other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made by 
filing them with the clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit the 
papers to be filed with him, in which event he shall * * * forthwith transmit 
them to the office of the clerk."

 
 

[¶10.]  Here it is undisputed that the bank's 
motion was forwarded to the trial judge well before the hearing on the motion 
and that the appellants were informed of and prepared to contest the motion. 4 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 1153 (1969), 
discusses Rule 5(e), F.R.C.P., and states: 

 
 
"Accordingly, the decided 
cases seem to indicate that whether `filing' has taken place may depend on the 
context in which the question arises and the good faith of the party who is 
obliged to file.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
"It also should be noted 
that filing in this context is complete when the judge has custody of the 
papers; his failure to forward them forthwith will not prejudice the party 
attempting to comply with the filing requirement."

 
 

[¶11.]  In the present case, appellants do not 
claim that the bank's actions harmed them. Appellants and their counsel were 
served with the bank's motion and notice of the hearing on the same. In this 
context, we hold that the required "filing" had taken 
place.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellant Cates claims the issues to 
be:

 
 
"A. Did the District 
Court err in sustaining the Motion of Appellee to Amend, Clarify and Correct 
Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc by entering a Judgment Nunc Pro 
Tunc:

 
 
"1. By granting relief to 
appellee, herein designated `Bank', from clerical error whether jurisdictionally 
premised on Rule 60, Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure or by invoking a contended 
power of the Court as to inherent jurisdiction and equitable power to grant 
relief from clerical error, at a date more than one year after execution of the 
original Judgment;

 
 
"2. By entering the 
Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc although the Court specifically held in the amendatory 
judgment that the original judgment did not contain clerical 
error;

 
 
"3. By determining that 
the debt balance and payment credits accrued for May 23, 2983 [sic] and not 
January 28, 1982 as provided by the Stipulation;

 
 
"4. By refusing to grant 
the parties an opportunity to present evidence before 
entry."

Appellant Eddy states the 
issue as:

 
 
"A. Whether or not the 
Trial Court had authority to enter the Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc filed December 24, 
1984?"

 
 

[¶13.]  Appellee bank agreed with Eddy's 
statement of the issue but restated the issue in its case against Cates 
as:

 
 
"A. Did the District 
Court err in sustaining the Motion of Appellee to amend, clarify and correct 
Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc by entering a Judgment Nunc Pro 
Tunc:

 
 
"1. Pursuant to the 
Court's inherent and equitable powers as supplemented by Rule 60(a), Wyoming 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which clarified and affirmed the meaning and intent of 
the Court's original Judgment to avoid a claimed uncertainty, vagueness or 
ambiguity in calculating the amount of the Judgment 
indebtedness?

 
 
"2. That affirmed that 
the amount of the indebtedness stated in the Court's original Judgment was 
calculated and determined owed as of May 23, 1983, the date of the original 
Judgment?"

 
 
CLERICAL 
ERROR

 
 
 
 

[¶14.]  The bank contends that the court had both 
inherent power and power under Rule 60(a), W.R.C.P., to act as it did. Rule 
60(a) provides in part that "clerical mistakes in judgments * * * may be 
corrected by the court at any time." Therefore, it is necessary to determine 
whether the court below corrected a clerical mistake so that its action can be 
said to be within Rule 60(a).

 
 

[¶15.]  The "error" in the original judgment in 
this case is that the judgment is ambiguous. Dated May 23, 1983, the judgment 
decreed that the bank have and recover a judgment in the sum of $207,110.55; yet 
the judgment also decreed that the matter had come before the court upon 
stipulation and confession of judgment and that judgment should be entered 
pursuant to the stipulation. The stipulation clearly stated that the bank "shall 
have judgment * * * as of 28 January, 1982, * * * in the amount of $207,110.55." 
Therefore, it is uncertain what the judgment intended. 

 
 

[¶16.]  In Spomer v. Spomer, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1146 
(1978), this court held that Rule 60(a) is designed to clarify as well as 
correct, and that it can be used when it is uncertain what an earlier order 
intended. However, even though Rule 60(a) can be used to clarify an earlier 
order, it still is not intended to correct judicial, as opposed to clerical, 
error. Therefore, in order to clarify this judgment under Rule 60(a), the error 
which made the judgment unclear must have been clerical.

 
 

[¶17.]  In Spomer this court set its primary focus 
on the scope of Rule 60(a) and stated:

 
 
"We think it clear that 
this rule was not designed as a substitute for appeal, nor to affect substantive portions of a 
judgment or decree. [Citation.] It is not intended to correct judicial, as 
opposed to clerical, error." (Emphasis added.) 580 P.2d  at 
1148-1149.

 
 
We went on to note that 
in distinguishing between clerical and judicial error, "[t]he key factor is 
whether or not the court reached a decision in the intentional or purposeful 
exercise of its judicial function." Id. at 1149.

 
 

[¶18.]  We dealt with the distinction between 
judicial and clerical error again in In 
re Estate Kimball, Wyo., 583 P.2d 1274 (1978). The threshold 
question in Kimball was whether the 
trial court was correct in its holding that there "was a clerical error which 
could be the subject of correction by virtue of an order nunc pro tunc since, if 
it was a judicial error, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the court to 
correct." Id. 
at 1277. We stated:

 
 
"`[A]ll errors, mistakes, 
or omissions which are not the result of the exercise of the judicial function' 
may be called clerical errors while a judicial error is one which is `the 
deliberate result of judicial reasoning and determination,' * * *." Id. at 1277-1278, quoting Holmes v. Holmes, 66 Wyo. 317, 211 P.2d 946, 
953 (1949).

 
 

[¶19.]  We have also said that the distinction 
does not depend so much upon the person making the error as upon whether it was 
the deliberate result of reasoning and determination. Holmes v. Holmes, supra. In Kane v. Kane, Wyo., 
616 P.2d 780 (1980), this court held that a clerical error occurred when counsel 
for the successful party prepared a judgment which failed to include a complete 
description of the property which was to be awarded his client. In the case at 
bar, counsel for the bank prepared a judgment which fails to unambiguously state 
the date from which the bank would have 
judgment.

 
 

[¶20.]  The original judgment signed by the judge 
of the trial court was not the result of a judicial determination made after a 
trial. It was the result of an agreement of the two parties and, as stated by 
appellant Cates:

 
 
"The Court * * * had no 
opportunity to apply judicial reasoning or make a judicial determination * * *. 
The Court was asked to and did approve and sign * * * the Stipulation and 
Confession of Judgment and Judgment * * *."

 
 
We repeat 
that:

 
 
"`[A]ll errors, mistakes, 
or omissions which are not the result of the exercise of the judicial function' 
may be called clerical errors while a judicial error is one which is `the 
deliberate result of judicial reasoning and determination,' * * *." In re Estate of Kimball, supra, 583 P.2d  
at 1277-1278.

 
 

[¶21.]  The judge himself stated that he had only 
signed the original judgment based on the stipulation and confession of judgment 
which was presented to him by the parties. The mistake was made by counsel in 
drafting the judgment so that appellants were liable on the judgment from both 
January 28, 1982, and from May 23, 1983. Such a mistake was not the deliberate 
result of judicial reasoning and determination. It was, instead, a clerical 
error.

 
 

[¶22.]  Although the trial court found that there 
was no "clerical error," such a finding is not conclusive. We have before 
reviewed the actions of courts in amending judgments which were asserted to 
contain clerical error, to determine whether there was a clerical error or 
whether the claimed error was instead judicial error. See In re Estate of Kimball, supra, 583 P.2d 1274; Spomer v. Spomer, supra, 
580 P.2d 1146. Applying the test developed in those cases, we believe that there 
was clerical error in the drafting of the original 
judgment.

 
 
JUDGMENT NUNC PRO 
TUNC

 
 

[¶23.]  We hold that the court could have 
clarified the judgment. We do not believe, however, that the action taken by the 
court clarified the original judgment; instead the judgment nunc pro tunc 
altered the original judgment so that it no longer was based upon the 
stipulation of the parties.

 
 

[¶24.]  In many cases "clerical error" is easily 
remedied. The trial court in In re Estate 
of Kimball, supra, 583 P.2d 1274, had corrected a decree, rendered some 28 
years previous, when it was clear that the decree was based upon a will but 
failed to include a pertinent provision of the will. We held such action valid. 
Likewise, in Midwest Refining Co. v. 
George, 44 Wyo. 25, 7 P.2d 213 (1932), we held that the court could correct 
an earlier judgment, which was rendered pursuant to a stipulation of the 
parties, when the judgment was not in accordance with the stipulation. In these 
cases the clerical error was easily remedied because the judgments clearly 
deviated from the instruments upon which they were intended to be 
based.

 
 

[¶25.]  In the case at bar, the judgment does not 
so clearly deviate from the stipulation. Appellants Cates and Eddy, by 
affidavit, stated that they agreed to have judgment entered against them for 
$207,110.55 as of January 28, 1982, and that they believed the stipulation so 
stated. The bank, on the other hand, contends that appellants' interpretation 
gives them a double recovery since the payments received by the bank after 
January 28, 1982, were already credited and that the bank agreed to accept a 
judgment of $207,110.55 from May 23, 1983. Because of this dispute, the trial 
judge could not easily clarify the judgment so that it conformed to the 
underlying stipulation. Unlike Kimball and Midwest, this was not a situation in which 
there was an unambiguous document upon which the judgment was intended to be 
based, but from which the judgment clearly deviated. In fact the court, in its 
judgment nunc pro tunc, completely ignores the stipulation upon which the 
original judgment was based, thus changing, as opposed to clarifying, the 
original judgment.

 
 

[¶26.]  The bank contends that the motion "did 
not involve the meaning and effect of the language of the Stipulation and 
Confession of Judgment nor the intent of either of the Appellants or their 
counsel." We cannot agree. The original judgment could only be clarified if its 
meaning was understood, and because it was clearly based upon the stipulation, 
it was absolutely necessary to examine the agreement contained in the 
stipulation in order to determine what was intended by the original judgment. 
The bank's successful position is further indication that the judgment nunc pro 
tunc completely changed the original judgment.

 
 

[¶27.]  The nunc pro tunc is limited to cases 
where it is necessary to make the judgment speak the truth, and cannot be used 
to change the judgment. Arnold v. State, 76 Wyo. 445, 306 P.2d 368, 
374 (1957). In its judgment nunc pro tunc the court, in this case, under the 
guise of clarification, altered the judgment when it failed to enter a judgment 
based upon the stipulation of the parties.

 
 

[¶28.]  The actions taken in the case of Vigil v. Vigil, 118 Mich. App. 194, 324 N.W.2d 571 (1982), are instructive here. In that case, the trial court refused 
to allow defendant to present evidence of the parties' intent as to the meaning 
of an ambiguous term in a judgment which was based upon a settlement reached by 
the parties. The court recognized that in interpreting a judgment, the trial 
court will often need only look to its own findings of fact and conclusions of 
law to resolve an ambiguity. The court then stated that this familiarity rule 
only extends, however, to judgments resulting from the trial court's own 
decisions, and when the judgment is drafted by the plaintiff's counsel and not 
the trial court, resolution of the ambiguity in the judgment can only be had by 
reference to additional proofs. The case was remanded to allow the parties to 
present evidence as to the ambiguous term. The present case is very similar to 
Vigil in that a judgment which was ambiguous was entered pursuant to an 
agreement of the parties. In order to clarify the judgment, without altering the 
original intent that it conform to the agreement of the parties, it was 
necessary for the court to receive additional evidence of the parties' intent 
when they entered into the stipulation. The court failed to take such additional 
evidence in entering its judgment nunc pro tunc and this failure resulted in the 
complete change of the original judgment rather than a clarification of the 
same.

 
 

[¶29.]  The original judgment failed to reflect 
the exact date from which Cates and Eddy were liable to the bank for 
$207,110.55. This mistake was a clerical error, as opposed to the deliberate 
result of judicial reasoning and determination, and was therefore subject to 
clarification under Rule 60(a). The actions of the court in rendering the 
judgment nunc pro tunc, however, did not clarify the original judgment which was 
entered pursuant to the stipulation, but rather altered the original judgment 
from what was intended. In order for the original judgment to be clarified, 
evidence of the parties' intent when they entered into the stipulation must be 
taken.

 
 

[¶30.]  The judgment nunc pro tunc is set aside 
and the case remanded for further action which is not inconsistent with this 
opinion.

 
 

1 Rule 60, W.R.C.P., 
provides in part:

 
 
"(a) Clerical mistakes. - 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, 
if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may 
be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the Supreme Court, and 
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the 
Supreme Court.

 
 
"(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. - On motion, and upon such terms as 
are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within one (1) year after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. * * *"

 
 
The motion to amend, 
clarify and correct was made well over one year after the judgment had been 
rendered, and there is no claim that the court could have acted under Rule 
60(b), W.R.C.P.

 
 

ROONEY, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, with whom BROWN, Justice, 
joins.

 
 

[¶31.]  I agree that there was a clerical error 
in the original judgment. I do not agree that there was any ambiguity in it. If 
there is ambiguity with the resulting necessity to determine intent, the error 
would not be clerical. To this extent, the majority opinion is inconsistent. I 
would reverse and correct the clerical error in the original judgment by 
inserting the words "as of January 28, 1982" after the figures "$207,110.55" - 
all without the need for remand.

 
 

[¶32.]  There is no ambiguity in the original 
judgment. It was rendered upon a stipulation and confession of judgment. There 
was no hearing. Evidence was not presented. To go backward, have a hearing, and 
receive evidence concerning the plain and unambiguous language of the 
stipulation and confession of the judgment upon which the original judgment was 
predicated would be improper.

 
 

[¶33.]  Our concern here should not be with any 
possible ambiguity in the original judgment. It was based entirely on the 
stipulation and confession of judgment. We need only to look to the stipulation 
and confession of judgment to analyze and understand the original judgment. 
Evidence might be necessary to determine intent if there were ambiguity in the stipulation and confession of 
judgment. The original judgment itself was not ambiguous. It simply 
contained a clerical mistake. The majority opinion acknowledges that the 
language of the stipulation "supports their [appellants'] claim that they owed 
the bank $207,110.55 as of January 28, 1982." Then, later, the opinion considers 
affidavits filed by the bank reflecting an intent contrary to the plain language 
of the stipulation. Still later, the opinion switches to a consideration of 
ambiguity in the original judgment and concludes that "[i]n order for the 
original judgment to be clarified, evidence of the parties' intent when they entered into the stipulation 
must be taken." (Emphasis added.) And the stipulation is recognized as not being 
ambiguous.

 
 

[¶34.]  The original judgment plainly says that 
it is entered against the defendants "pursuant to the Stipulation and Confession 
of Judgment filed herein." It then sets forth the amount of the judgment, but mistakenly omits the stipulated language 
"as of 28 January, 1982."

 
 

[¶35.]  This is a simple matter of a clerical 
mistake in the original judgment "arising from oversight or omission" which "may 
be corrected by the court at any time" pursuant to Rule 60(a), W.R.C.P., which 
provides in pertinent part:

 
 
"Clerical mistakes in 
judgments * * * arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court 
at any time * * *."

 
 

[¶36.]  I would reverse and direct that if the 
original judgment was not sufficiently clear through its recitation that it was 
pursuant to the stipulation and confession of judgment in setting the stipulated 
obligation to be $207,110.55 as of January 28, 1982, the omission of that date 
was a clerical error and the judgment be corrected 
accordingly.