Case Title: In re T.K.

Citation: 2006-Ohio-3056

Docket Number: 20051215

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re T.K., 109 Ohio St.3d 512, 2006-Ohio-3056.] 
 
 
IN RE T.K. 
[Cite as In re T.K., 109 Ohio St.3d 512, 2006-Ohio-3056.] 
Criminal law — Complicity — Aiding and abetting — Identity of principal need 
not be proven — Transferred intent. 
(No. 2005-1215 — Submitted March 14, 2006 — Decided July 5, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 84934, 2005-Ohio-2321. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1. 
The identity of the principal is not an element that the state must prove to 
establish the offense of complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 
2923.03(A)(2). 
2. 
The doctrine of transferred intent applies in complicity cases. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶ 1} In the early evening of July 30, 2003, Carolyn Pinson and members 
of her family gathered at her home for a birthday celebration.  Several members of 
a local gang, Seven All, walked down Pinson’s street, stopping in front of her 
home.  The members of Seven All had come to the house in search of one of 
Carolyn Pinson’s nephews, who had been previously involved in an altercation 
with a member of the gang.  Witnesses testified to seeing a handgun passed 
between members of the gang and to hearing the appellee, T.K., a minor, shout 
out “Shoot” and “Shoot the [expletive].”  Shots were fired, and Carolyn Pinson, 
her minor nephew, D.W., and a neighbor, Julio Hines, were wounded. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 2} Appellee, T.K., was charged with three counts of delinquency by 
having committed a violation of law that, if committed by an adult, would be 
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and one count of a violation 
that, if committed by an adult, would be aggravated riot in violation of R.C. 
2917.02(A)(2).  All charges against the appellee contained a one-year and a three-
year firearm specification and a gang specification. 
{¶ 3} After a trial, the juvenile court found the appellee to be delinquent 
on two counts of felonious assault for the shootings of Pinson and her nephew, 
D.W., and delinquent on one count of aggravated riot with a one-year firearm 
specification and a gang specification.  In reaching its decision, the court reasoned 
that the appellee knew that a gun was present at the scene and that he specifically 
intended his words to be put into action.  Further, although the court expressed 
some uncertainty as to which victim the appellee’s words were intended to target, 
the court found that the state sufficiently showed transferred intent to support the 
court’s finding of complicity to commit felonious assault.  The juvenile court 
committed the appellee to the institutional care of the Ohio Department of Youth 
Services for a minimum of 30 months, not to exceed his attainment of 21 years of 
age. 
{¶ 4} The appellee appealed his convictions to the Eighth District Court 
of Appeals.  The appellate court unanimously upheld the appellee’s conviction for 
aggravated riot, but a majority reversed his convictions on the two counts of 
felonious assault.  In re T.K., 8th Dist. No. 84934, 2005-Ohio-2321, ¶16.  The 
majority determined that the evidence presented was “so riddled with conflicting 
testimony” that the juvenile court could not identify the principal or determine the 
intended target.  Id. at ¶10.  Consequently, a majority of the appellate court held 
that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the appellee’s convictions 
of felonious assault.  Id. at ¶11. 
January Term, 2006 
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{¶ 5} The dissenting judge asserted that the juvenile court’s findings of 
delinquency on the charges of felonious assault were proper under the principle of 
complicity by aiding and abetting, given evidence that the appellee had actively 
encouraged a member of his gang to shoot at someone associated with Carolyn 
Pinson at her home.  Id. at ¶ 20, 22.  The dissenter argued that the juvenile court’s 
uncertainty over the identity of the specific target of the shooter was not fatal to 
the court’s finding of delinquency, because the juvenile court had determined that 
the appellee knew that members of his gang had a gun at the scene and that he 
acted with the specific intent to harm someone.  Id. at ¶19. 
{¶ 6} The cause is now before our court pursuant to our acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 7} Ohio’s complicity statute, R.C. 2923.03, reads:  
{¶ 8} “(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the 
commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:  
{¶ 9} “ * * * 
{¶ 10} “(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense[.] 
{¶ 11} “ * * * 
{¶ 12} “(F) Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the 
commission of an offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a 
principal offender.  A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, 
or in terms of the principal offense.” 
{¶ 13} This court has held that the state need not establish the identity of 
the principal in order to convict an offender of complicity.  State v. Perryman 
(1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 14, 3 O.O.3d 8, 358 N.E.2d 1040, paragraph four of the 
syllabus.  Rather, “[to] support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting 
pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the defendant 
supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal 
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in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent 
of the principal.”  State v. Johnson (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 754 N.E.2d 796, 
syllabus.  Such criminal intent can be inferred from the presence, companionship, 
and conduct of the defendant before and after the offense is committed.  Id. at 
245, 754 N.E.2d 796. 
{¶ 14} As these precedents indicate, the identity of the principal is not an 
element that the state must prove to establish the offense of complicity by aiding 
and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2).  Therefore, the juvenile court’s 
inability to identify the principal did not prevent it from finding the appellee 
delinquent on the two counts of felonious assault.  The juvenile court evaluated 
the evidence and determined that the appellee was more than a mere bystander at 
the scene of the shootings.  Specifically, the court found that the appellee was 
guilty of the two counts of felonious assault because he knew that a member of his 
gang possessed a gun at the scene, and with that knowledge and the specific intent 
to cause harm, he actively encouraged the shooter to shoot at someone at Pinson’s 
home. 
{¶ 15} Further, under the doctrine of transferred intent, an offender who 
intentionally acts to harm someone but ends up accidentally harming another is 
criminally liable as if the offender had intended to harm the actual victim.  See 
State v. Solomon (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 214, 217, 20 O.O.3d 213, 421 N.E.2d 139; 
State v. Sowell (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 322, 332, 530 N.E.2d 1294.  We hold that 
the doctrine of transferred intent applies in complicity cases. 
{¶ 16} The juvenile court’s uncertainty over the identity of the intended 
targets in this case is essentially immaterial.  If the victims were the intended 
targets, the appellee, as an aider and abettor, can be prosecuted and punished as if 
he were the shooter.  R.C. 2923.03(F).  Moreover, even if the victims were not the 
intended targets, under the doctrine of transferred intent, the appellee is as 
January Term, 2006 
5 
criminally culpable for the harm caused to the actual victims as he would be if 
they had been the intended targets. 
{¶ 17} Overall, we must emphasize that the weight of the evidence and the 
credibility of the witnesses are matters primarily for the trier of fact.  State v. 
DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph 
one of the syllabus.  In this case, the juvenile court evaluated the evidence, 
determined that the appellee had actively encouraged a member of his gang to 
shoot at someone at the Pinson home with the specific intent to cause harm, and 
found that the state had sufficiently showed transferred intent to support the 
court’s finding of complicity in two counts of felonious assault.  The juvenile 
court’s inability to identify the principal or determine the intended targets did not 
weaken the court’s findings so as to prevent the court’s adjudication of the 
appellee as delinquent on the charges of felonious assault. 
{¶ 18} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristen 
L. Lusnia, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant, state of Ohio. 
 
Jodi M. Wallace, for appellee, T.K. 
______________________