Case Title: Timberlake v. Illini Hospital

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80700

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after 
the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions 
are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime 
prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. 
Therefore, because the following slip opinion is being made 
available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, it 
cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The 
official copy of the following opinion will be published by the 
Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports 
advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
               Docket No. 80700--Agenda 14--November 1996. 
     BARBARA TIMBERLAKE, Appellant, v. ILLINI HOSPITAL, an Illinois 
                  Not-For-Profit Corporation, Appellee. 
                     Opinion filed January 30, 1997. 
 
     JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court: 
     The issue before this court is whether section 13--217 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13--217 (West 1994)) permits 
plaintiff to refile her state law claims in state court within the 
applicable limitations period after she has already taken a 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice pursuant to section 2--1009 
of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--1009 (West 1994)) and 
made an unsuccessful attempt to pursue her claims in federal 
district court, which declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction. The circuit court held that section 13--217 did not 
permit plaintiff to refile under these circumstances, and the 
appellate court affirmed (277 Ill. App. 3d 1041). We granted 
plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 315. For 
the reasons which follow, we affirm. 
     On October 20, 1992, plaintiff, Barbara Timberlake, filed a 
four-count complaint against her former employer, defendant, Illini 
Hospital, in the circuit court of Rock Island County. Count I 
alleged breach of contract, count II asserted a claim based on a 
theory of promissory estoppel, count III alleged retaliatory 
discharge in violation of Illinois law, and count IV asserted a 
separate retaliatory discharge claim for violation of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. 
(Supp. 1990)). On January 6, 1993, defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss this complaint asserting that state court jurisdiction was 
preempted by ERISA. On March 5, 1993, Timberlake voluntarily 
dismissed her complaint without prejudice pursuant to section 2-- 
1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--1009 (West 
1994)). 
     Plaintiff subsequently refiled her complaint in federal 
district court on March 31, 1993, asserting claims for retaliatory 
discharge in violation of ERISA, breach of contract, and promissory 
estoppel. The claims contained in this complaint arose out of the 
same set of facts and pleaded the same causes of action as 
plaintiff's first complaint filed in state court. Plaintiff's 
complaint invoked federal subject matter jurisdiction as to the 
ERISA claim, and federal supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. 1367 
(Supp. 1990)) as to the state common law claims. 
     Defendant filed a motion in the district court for summary 
judgment, contending that under the undisputed facts of this case, 
defendant committed no violation of ERISA. On August 18, 1994, the 
district court granted defendant's motion, reasoning that plaintiff 
did not qualify for protection under ERISA because she was not a 
participant in defendant's ERISA plan at the time defendant 
allegedly discriminated against her. The district court further 
held that because plaintiff's ERISA claim failed, it could not 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state common 
law claims concerning breach of contract and promissory estoppel. 
The district court concluded that it must remand these common law 
claims to state court for further action. Timberlake did not appeal 
the district court's order. 
     On December 29, 1994, Timberlake filed a notice of remand and 
motion to reinstate her original cause of action in the circuit 
court of Rock Island County. That motion was denied on January 3, 
1995. The circuit court found that it was without authority to 
vacate the earlier order of voluntary dismissal that plaintiff had 
asked the court to enter. Timberlake then refiled her cause of 
action in the circuit court on January 11, 1995, within the 
applicable statute of limitations. Timberlake also asked the 
circuit court to reconsider its order of January 3, 1995, denying 
her motion to reinstate he original cause of action. 
     On March 5, 1995, the circuit court denied Timberlake's motion 
for reconsideration. The court also dismissed Timberlake's current 
cause of action pending before the circuit court on the grounds 
that section 13--217 did not authorize her to renew her action in 
state court under the circumstances present here. The appellate 
court subsequently affirmed that judgment, holding that section 13- 
-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure entitles a plaintiff to only 
one refiling after taking a voluntarily dismissal without prejudice 
even if the statute of limitations has not expired, and plaintiff 
here exhausted her one-time right to refile when she filed her 
complaint in federal district court. 277 Ill. App. 3d 1041. Because 
Timberlake's federal suit amounted to the single allowable 
refiling, the appellate court held that Timberlake was not 
permitted a second refiling in state court under section 13--217. 
We granted leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm. 
     As both parties to this litigation acknowledge, the question 
of when a plaintiff can refile an action after taking a voluntary 
dismissal is controlled by section 13--217 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. That statute is a saving provision which allows 
plaintiffs to refile a cause of action if its prior disposition was 
based on reasons outlined in the statute. Specifically, section 13- 
-217 provides: 
               "In the actions specified in Article XIII of this 
          Act or any other act or contract where the time for 
          commencing an action is limited, if judgment is entered 
          for the plaintiff but reversed on appeal, or if there is 
          a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and, upon a motion in 
          arrest of judgment, the judgment is entered against the 
          plaintiff, or the action is voluntarily dismissed by the 
          plaintiff, or the action is dismissed for want of 
          prosecution, or the action is dismissed by a United 
          States District Court for lack of jurisdiction, or the 
          action is dismissed by a United States District Court for 
          improper venue, then, whether or not the time limitation 
          for bringing such action expires during the pendency of 
          such action, the plaintiff, his or her heirs, executors 
          or administrators may commence a new action within one 
          year or within the remaining period of limitation, 
          whichever is greater, after such judgment is reversed or 
          entered against the plaintiff, or after the action is 
          voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff, or the action is 
          dismissed for want of prosecution, or the action is 
          dismissed by a United States District Court for lack of 
          jurisdiction, or the action is dismissed by the United 
          States District Court for improper venue." 735 ILCS 5/13- 
          -217 (West 1994). 
     Section 13--217 provides plaintiffs with the absolute right to 
refile their complaint within one year or within the remaining 
period of limitations, whichever is greater. Gendek v. Jehangir, 
 119 Ill. 2d 338 , 340 (1988). However, it was not intended to permit 
multiple refilings of the same action. This court has interpreted 
section 13--217 as permitting only one refiling even in a case 
where the applicable statute of limitations has not yet expired. 
Flesner v. Youngs Development Co.,  145 Ill. 2d 252 , 254 (1991). 
     In Flesner, plaintiffs initiated their lawsuit in United 
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois in May 
of 1981. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' cause of action 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in November of 1981. 
Plaintiffs refiled their action in state court in April of 1982 and 
later voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit. 
      Subsequently, plaintiffs refiled their suit for a second time 
in state court within the applicable limitations period. Their suit 
was dismissed, but the circuit court granted plaintiffs' motion to 
reconsider and reinstated the lawsuit. This court reversed the 
reinstatement of plaintiffs' suit, reasoning that "section 13--217 
expressly permits one, and only one, refiling of a claim even if 
the statute of limitations has not expired." Flesner, 145 Ill. 2d  
at 254. According to Flesner, after the United States district 
court dismissed plaintiff's suit for lack of jurisdiction, section 
13--217 permitted only a single refiling. 
     As in Flesner, the refiling provisions specified in section 
13--217 clearly apply in the case at bar. Section 13--217 
specifically provides that after taking a voluntary dismissal, a 
plaintiff may commence a new action within one year or within the 
remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater. Accordingly, 
Timberlake was entitled to a single refiling of her claim after 
taking a voluntary dismissal of her original cause of action filed 
in the circuit court of Rock Island County. Timberlake exercised 
her one opportunity to refile when she filed her complaint in 
federal district court. 
     In an effort to avoid this conclusion, Timberlake argues that 
the federal district court's subsequent refusal to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims here is 
distinguishable from the dismissal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction that was involved in Flesner. In support of her 
position, Timberlake cites Fanaro v. First National Bank, 160 Ill. 
App. 3d 1030 (1987), but that case predates our decision in Flesner 
and is based on the erroneous assumption that pendent jurisdiction, 
now part of what is known as supplemental jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. 
1367 (Supp. 1990)), is different from subject matter jurisdiction. 
In fact, supplemental jurisdiction is a form of subject matter 
jurisdiction. See Myers v. County of Lake, 30 F.3d 847, 850 (7th 
Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C.A. 1367, Practice Commentary, at 829 (West 
1993). Accordingly, a dismissal for lack of supplemental 
jurisdiction has no different effect on a plaintiff's right to 
refile under section 13--217 than does a dismissal for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction generally. Raper v. St. Mary's 
Hospital, 181 Ill. App. 3d 379, 382 (1989). 
     The reasoning of Fanaro is flawed for another reason as well. 
Fanaro assumes that where a plaintiff has taken a voluntary 
dismissal in state court and then had her case dismissed by the 
federal court, the reason for the federal court's decision is 
relevant in assessing whether she should be permitted to refile her 
cause of action yet again under section 13--217. This is incorrect. 
Under the statute, the reason a cause of action was originally 
dismissed is important in determining whether a plaintiff can 
subsequently refile, but after the case has been filed a second 
time, the reason for the second dismissal is of no consequence at 
all. No matter why the second dismissal took place, the statute 
does not give plaintiff the right to refile again. As this court 
expressly held in Flesner,  145 Ill. 2d 252 , section 13--217 permits 
one, and only one, refiling of a claim. 
     For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court 
is affirmed. 
 
                                                                  Affirmed.