Case Title: ROBERT G. McLAUGHLIN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT G. McLAUGHLIN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 179780 P.2d 964Case Number: 87-282Decided: 09/27/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROBERT G. McLAUGHLIN, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender and Tom Sedar, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Hugh Kenny, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
GRANT, District Judge.

GRANT, District 
Judge.

[¶1.]     Just before 11:00 p.m., 
December 19, 1986, on Interstate Highway 25 near the McKinley Street 
exit, Casper, Wyoming, Robbyn Malone was killed when the 
speeding car from which she was ejected rolled over her head inflicting a 
massive crushing trauma. The car's driver was Robbyn's boyfriend, the father of 
her child, and appellant, Robert McLaughlin. Appellant was 
drunk.

[¶2.]     McLaughlin was charged 
with violating W.S. 6-2-106(b)(ii), aggravated homicide by vehicle, which 
required the State to prove that he operated or drove a vehicle in a reckless 
manner and his conduct was the proximate cause of the death of another person. 
The jury that convicted McLaughlin did so on evidence that established the facts 
to be related below, after a statement of the issues on appeal, which issues we 
decide against appellant in affirming the conviction.

[¶3.]     The trial centered 
around appellant's intoxication, speed (as indicated by eye-witness testimony 
and expert analysis of the physical facts), and cause of the roll-over - all 
going to the issue of whether appellant's conduct amounted to recklessness which 
caused the accident that indisputably took Robbyn Malone's life. Appellant says 
the conviction must be reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct in 
cross-examination and argument so egregious and which the trial court's failure 
to control was so erroneous that it cumulatively amounts to deprivation of 
appellant's right to fair trial; and, therefore, to plain error. The specifics 
of appellant's assertions and the issues raised, as well as this court's ruling 
on the latter, can be explained only in terms of the specific facts as developed 
from the trial evidence.

[¶4.]     Appellant was home in 
Casper from Laramie where he had been attending a trade 
school. His friend, Dave Chilberg, who was visiting from California, was a 
passenger on the night of the accident and a witness at the trial. Chilberg had 
brought a large quantity of liquor as a gift to appellant but wanted to go out 
and hit the bars as a "warm up" before starting on the liquor. Appellant and 
Chilberg picked up Robbyn Malone in appellant's 1974 Datsun. The three of them, 
between 7:00 and 11:00 p.m., went to Bronco's where they each had a beer, a 
whiskey sour and a "blue blazer" (a drink made of one-half Southern Comfort and 
one-half Cream deMenthe), to Fran's where they each had a beer, and to 
Remington's where they again each consumed a beer, a whiskey sour and a blue 
blazer. They departed Remington's for the Avalon Club, and it was on the way 
there, on I-25 heading toward Douglas just beyond the McKinley Street off ramp, 
that the car skidded with locked wheels to the right side of the outside 
eastbound lane, veered left across both lanes, crashed into the "jersey 
barrier," skidded along the barrier, rolled once and landed on its 
wheels.

[¶5.]     The section of 
interstate highway where the accident occurred was straight, flat, dry, well 
lit, and free of any obstruction or debris. The highway patrol responded and 
investigated. Officer Dye found appellant at the scene, apparently intoxicated. 
About 40 minutes after the accident a blood sample was drawn for a blood-alcohol 
test, which later produced a reading of .13 to .14. About 12:45 a.m., appellant 
was arrested and charged. At his trial, almost everything was 
contested.

[¶6.]     There are several areas 
of evidence and conflict therein significant to the issues. They arise chiefly 
out of the respective parties' expert testimony interpreting the physical facts, 
the qualification, credentials and motives of the defense expert, the amount of 
alcohol consumed by appellant and the witness Chilberg, the relationship between 
blood-alcohol level and degree of alcohol-induced impairment, speed of the 
vehicle at the time of the accident and how these things relate to the issue of 
appellant's recklessness.

Discussion

[¶7.]     Appellant was charged 
under W.S. 6-2-106(b)(ii) and convicted of aggravated homicide by vehicle. 
Appellant seeks to overturn that conviction based on alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct denying his right to a fair trial. Three aspects of misconduct are 
alleged:

I. The cumulative effect 
of the prosecutor's misconduct during cross-examination and closing 
argument,

II. Repeated misconduct 
coupled with the judge's failure to control it, and

III. Repeated intentional 
misconduct requiring a mistrial as a punitive measure.

[¶8.]     Appellant's first 
argument is that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's misconduct was 
sufficient to deny a fair trial. Although appellant argues several individual 
instances of misconduct, his primary concerns are (1) a question asked of his 
witness, Chilberg, during recross-examination, and (2) the substance of the 
prosecution's closing argument.

[¶9.]     We first examine the 
prosecutor's question to David Chilberg, the only other witness to the accident. 
In recross-examination, the prosecutor asked Chilberg:

Sir, you don't feel you 
were intoxicated even though your blood alcohol level was .13 at the 
Hospital?

In fact, 
although he had been drinking, Chilberg was not tested for blood-alcohol 
content. Only appellant had been so tested, and that result was .13. Defense 
counsel objected. The court sustained the objection, striking the question and 
instructing the jury to disregard the answer. Appellant characterizes this 
incident as an intentional statement of fact not in the record and asserts that 
this violated his right to a fair trial. He bases this on a "cat out of the bag 
syndrome," apparently meaning that instruction to disregard the answer is not 
enough. 

[¶10.]  Although the question was also stricken, 
appellant claims the question leaves the impression contrary to fact - that 
Chilberg's blood-alcohol level was established in evidence. The State argues the 
testimony was overwhelming that Mr. Chilberg had been drinking at least as much 
as appellant, and so any reference to Chilberg's blood alcohol should be 
considered harmless error.

[¶11.]  This court considered an improper 
question asked in a murder trial many years ago in State v. Sorrentino, 31 
Wyo. 129, 224 P. 420 (1924). There the prosecuting attorney asked the defendant about a prior 
crime. An objection was made and sustained, and a claim of misconduct was 
presented. The court said there was no doubt that the question assumed an 
affirmative fact that defendant was guilty of a different crime not connected 
with the immediate crime.

The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, in Wagner v. Hazle Twp., 215 Pa. 219, 225, 64 A. 405, 407 [1906] 
speaking of a similar situation says:

"When an attorney in the 
trial of a cause willfully and intentionally makes an offer of wholly irrelevant 
and incompetent evidence, * * * it is the plain duty of the trial judge, of his 
own motion, to act promptly and effectively by reprimanding counsel * * 
*."

* * * Such misconduct 
cannot, however, be considered sufficient to require the granting of a new trial 
in all cases. It is said in 8 Cal.Jur. § 604:

"Misconduct of the 
district attorney in asking improper questions is ground for reversal when it 
results in miscarriage of justice, but not otherwise."

Sorrentino, 224 P.  at 425. Although the question insinuated defendant's connection with the 
activity leading to the murder, other testimony had been properly introduced on 
that point. The question under consideration was, at most, cumulative in its 
effect. The court concluded that, in view of all the evidence, the question 
could not have had sufficient influence on the jury to materially affect their 
conclusion in reaching a verdict of manslaughter.

[¶12.]  A more recent case involved a 
cross-examination question about settlement efforts. No objection was made until 
the subject again came up in redirect. The court properly exercised its 
discretion and correctly instructed the jury to disregard that 
evidence.

We must assume that the 
jury followed the court's corrective instruction that the evidence * * * was 
irrelevant. The court's corrective instruction cured whatever error occurred by 
the improper questioning and answer that slipped into the 
record.

Hursh Agency, 
Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., 664 P.2d 27, 36 (Wyo. 1983) (citations 
omitted).

[¶13.]  In the instant case, the trial judge 
ordered the question to Chilberg stricken and instructed the jury. We must 
assume the jury followed the instruction. In view of all the evidence, this one 
incident is unlikely to have affected the conviction.

"[A] criminal conviction 
is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing 
alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by doing so 
can it be determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of 
the trial."

Story v. State, 
721 P.2d 1020, 1044 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 1044, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985)).

Closing 
Argument

[¶14.]  The remainder of appellant's first 
argument focuses on the added cumulative effect of misconduct in the 
prosecutor's closing argument. Specifically, appellant refers to 
"unsubstantiated testimony by the prosecutor," the prosecutor's "attack" on 
defendant's expert witness, and the use of social comment to "inflame" the jury. 
Appellant offers a number of examples (discussed below) which he insists are 
misconduct.

[¶15.]  To begin, we state unequivocally that 
there was no misconduct in this case. A prosecutor cannot urge upon the jury his 
personal belief or opinion. Barnes v. State, 642 P.2d 1263 (Wyo. 1982). However, he 
is not precluded from commenting on evidence and presenting inferences that 
logically follow from the evidence. Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599 (Wyo. 1984). We review the 
entire context of the closing argument, as well as the trial testimony and 
evidence, to determine whether the prosecutor's review of the evidence and 
comments about it were unsubstantiated by the record.

[¶16.]  The prosecutor began his argument 
declaring:

It is only fair to say 
that what I say and what Mr. Raymond says is not evidence. You are the ones that 
have to remember what you have heard.

* * * You have to resolve 
the testimony on your own.

He went on to 
say:

[T]he number one 
contributing human cause of this accident in this wreck, this crash, this 
collision, basically this killing, is alcohol.

[¶17.]  Appellant asserts there is no evidence whatsoever presented during 
the trial or in the record to support that statement. However, appellant (here, 
as in other instances) takes out of context and ignores the remainder of the 
prosecutor's statement:

We have had diagrams and 
disagreements and all sorts of things, and hours and hours of testimony, but 
since day one, since the day that Officer Dye filled out that report - and you 
heard his testimony - the number one contributing human cause of this accident 
in this wreck, this crash, this collision, basically this killing, is 
alcohol.

(It was 
undisputed that Mr. McLaughlin had been drinking and had consumed a substantial 
amount of alcohol.)

[¶18.]  The appellant also assails another 
statement as unsupported opinion:

Mr. McLaughlin * * * that 
night was not safe to be operating at any speed.

* * * [He] engaged in a 
totally unexplainable disastrous reaction to an object, real or imagined, he 
does not know, and that even after he perceived and reacted to that, he 
continued to be unable to make accurate judgments about driving a motor 
vehicle.

This is not an 
unreasonable inference from the testimony and, again, including the rest of this 
statement, the prosecutor adds:

It fits in * * * because 
it is obvious from any testimony, whether you believe one side or the other 
[that Mr. McLaughlin's reaction to an object was not fully 
explainable].

A last example, 
prosecutor:

[W]e know that Robert 
McLaughlin was thinking rationally as soon as he talked to Officer 
Lauderdale.

Again, appellant 
ignores the remainder of the summarized testimony.

Remember the context of 
the statement. "I can tell you what happened." (Quoting appellant's 
testimony.)

[¶19.]  Appellant further characterizes the 
prosecutor's use of social comment as inflammatory, believing that reference to 
media exposure about problems of drinking and driving is objectionable. 
Prosecutor:

We have a problem in our 
country with the drinking driver and we must consider this case on its own 
facts. But the fact remains that you cannot ignore the constant media 
publications that the average person is exposed to concerning the dangers of 
drinking and driving as relates to whether they know that is 
dangerous.

[¶20.]  The court recognizes the validity of 
appellant's proposition that an argument may not inflame passion and prejudice 
of the jury. Jeschke v. State, 642 P.2d 1298 (Wyo. 1982). But, appellant ignores the 
sentence following the statement, which states:

And in your reasonable 
backgrounds and your own reasonable experiences, do you believe that a 
reasonable person would not know that eight drinks was a dangerous amount to get 
out there behind the [wheel] and go down the highway? And go down the highway at 
what speed?

Reviewed in 
context, this is not inflammatory. It is permissible to refer to well-known 
facts from the public press or argue matters of common knowledge, 75 Am. Jur.2d, 
Trial, § 252 (1974). It is not unreasonable to infer from the testimony that 
drinking and driving do not mix well.

[¶21.]  As to remarks about appellant's expert 
witness, appellant predictably describes this also as inflammatory, inconsistent 
with the testimony, and an expression of the prosecutor's opinion that the 
expert witness is, in fact, a "professional witness." Among other things, 
appellant claims the prosecutor misstated testimony and maligned the witness' 
reputation. For example, appellant says the prosecutor's statement about the 
expert witness (Crawford) having been in more courtrooms than both lawyers put 
together has no factual basis, was unsupported by the record, and was expressed 
with the sole purpose of painting Mr. Crawford in an unfavorable light. 
Apparently Mr. Crawford's testimony that he has been qualified as an expert in 
court cases before and his answer, "I think I have probably testified 300 
times," has no significance for appellant.

[¶22.]  Appellant also attacks the prosecutor's 
statements, paraphrasing Crawford's testimony about Officer Dye's measurements 
at the scene of the accident. Crawford testified there were a number of mistakes 
in Dye's measurements. Although he argues that the prosecutor's remarks went 
beyond acceptable characterization about this complicated testimony, appellant 
did not object at the time. The testimony was clear that Mr. Crawford's expert 
opinion was based on analysis of photographs and diagrams. He had not been to 
the site of the accident. Officer Dye's measurements and calculations were based 
on information obtained at the site of the accident.

[¶23.]  It is clear the above remarks do not 
constitute misconduct. We further compare the argument to that in Freeze v. 
State, 662 P.2d 415 (Wyo. 1983). There, defendant/appellant 
challenged the prosecutor's closing argument claiming the prosecutor was 
attesting to the credibility of a witness, giving his personal belief as to the 
weight of the evidence, and expressing personal belief as to defendant's guilt. 
The court called appellant's contentions misleading and considered them within 
the total context of the prosecutor's argument when reviewing defendant's 
testimony. For example:

[T]he prosecutor went 
into other inconsistencies not included as offensive by appellant but worth 
repeating as illustrative of how misleading are appellant's 
contentions:

* * * * * 
*

"* * * the defendant in 
his testimony stated that he chased these 3 boys and then turned around. 
Remember direct by Miss Botham, and he said, well, no, no, I really didn't chase 
the boys, I only followed them. You make up your mind what he did. He doesn't 
know what he did, at least he wants you to think either that or so confused by 
it that he is not sure."

* * * * * 
*

"One thing he [appellant] 
said to me [on cross-examination], you know, sorry for what he did and sorry for 
any trouble he may have caused this girl. Part of this testimony here. Would a 
man be sorry for something that he didn't do, sorry for the trouble that he was 
in, if he didn't do any trouble? * * *

"All of the things he 
said that he does not know at this time, what is actually the truth? He has 
built this up, told so many different stories, he can't keep them 
straight."

[¶24.]  As the prosecutor was closing his 
argument in chief, we point out he again explained to the 
jury:

"* * * We want you to 
base your decision on the evidence that you have heard here, not on speculation 
or conjecture but on the evidence you in fact have heard from that witness 
stand, not what I have said, but what the witnesses said, and want you to look 
at all the evidence, * * *."

Freeze, 662 P.2d  
at 417-18 (citations omitted). The court's review of the transcript of that 
closing argument convinced it that the prosecutor was honest and straightforward 
with the jury, performing the function of closing argument, commenting on the 
evidence which he has every right to do. He carefully left the credibility of 
the witness and the state of the evidence to the jury.

[¶25.]  We also considered alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct in Jeschke, 642 P.2d  at 1301. The prosecutor said, "I think he beat 
him unmercifully. I think that's what those bruises are," referring to injuries 
during prosecution for involuntary manslaughter of a small child. There was no 
objection at the time of the comments, and further examination of the record 
revealed the prosecutor prefaced his comments with an admonishment that he was 
submitting the State's theory of the case. A prosecutor may comment on the 
evidence and draw reasonable inferences, it being the purpose of closing 
argument to explain the significance of evidence and how it should be viewed. 
The comments were well within the latitude given prosecutors in presenting the 
State's case.

[¶26.]  This court recognizes that a prosecuting 
attorney may draw all legitimate inferences from the 
evidence:

"Closing arguments are 
meant to be just that, arguments premised upon the evidence already submitted to 
the jury. Prosecutors are no more limited in their closing than defense counsel. 
They may review the evidence and suggest 
to the jury inferences based thereon. The purpose of closing arguments is to 
allow counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence. 
However, there are limits, not only on prosecutors, but on all 
attorneys."

Schmunk v. 
State, 714 P.2d 724, 742 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting 
Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 893 (Wyo. 1982) (emphasis in 
original)).

[¶27.]  Generally an expression of knowledge, 
opinion, or belief not based upon or shown by the evidence at trial, either 
expressly or inferentially, is improper and prejudicial error. Schmunk, 714 P.2d 724.

[¶28.]  If there was misconduct shown, serious 
and appropriate measures are required. In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S. Ct. 629, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935), a prosecuting attorney clearly overstepped the 
bounds of propriety and fairness which should characterize the conduct of such 
an officer in the prosecution of a criminal offense. He was guilty of misstating 
facts in his cross-examination of witnesses, assuming prejudicial facts not in 
evidence, and many other instances of reprehensible conduct. Although objections 
were sustained and the jury instructed to disregard these misstatements and 
questions, sterner measures were called for. The case against defendant Berger 
was weak, and in the circumstances, prejudice to his cause was so highly 
probable that its nonexistence could not be assumed. If the case against Berger 
had been strong or evidence of his guilt overwhelming, a different conclusion 
might be reached. Moreover, the misconduct of the prosecuting attorney was not 
slight but pronounced and persistent with a probable cumulative effect on the 
jury which cannot be disregarded as inconsequential. A new trial was 
awarded.

[¶29.]  Appellant in the case at bar repeatedly 
insists statements made by the prosecutor are unsupported by the evidence. He 
further claims there is no evidence in the trial record to support any statement 
about a connection between alcohol and the crash. He apparently sees no 
connection between extensive testimony about the amount of alcohol consumed and 
the cause of the accident. The prosecutor is not prohibited from arguing 
inferences which follow from the evidence. The testimony about the amount of 
alcohol consumed by appellant, the condition of his car, his claim of having 
swerved to avoid a possible unknown object in the road and the differing 
opinions about the speed of the car, all contribute to a reasonable inference 
that alcohol was a substantial contributing factor to the cause of this 
accident. Proper argument cannot be transformed into misconduct by hysterical 
and repeated assertions that it is improper argument.

[¶30.]  Appellant searches for and isolates 
individual sentences in the transcript of the argument, pouncing on each as 
evidence of misconduct. We have reviewed the complete closing in the context of 
all the evidence. In so doing, we cannot escape the observation that, were 
appellant's charges of misconduct by trial counsel valid, he might be subject to 
the same criticisms.

[¶31.]  In appellant's argument, he urges the 
jury to discount or disregard the testimony of the witness who observed and gave 
testimony describing appellant's driving just prior to the accident and to 
consider the defense evidence concerning speed, rather than "relying on [the 
State witness'] mumbo jumbo of skids." He characterized the patrolman's opinion 
as a "house of cards." His argument referred to his testimony as having been 
that "something ran across the road," whereas his actual testimony was, "I 
remember driving down the highway and seeing something."

[¶32.]  Appellant might well consider these 
observations about his own argument de minimis, and so they are. The point is 
that for the most part they are of the same caliber as those he makes of the 
prosecutor's argument and upon which he bases his plea for reversal. But even if 
one assumes that some of the State's argument was outside acceptable standards, 
it would leave appellant some distance from meeting the requirements necessary 
for reversal.

[¶33.]  The Wyoming Supreme Court has said that 
misconduct alone does not justify reversal. A party alleging prosecutorial 
misconduct has the burden of proving that he was substantially prejudiced by any 
misconduct that might have taken place. Story, 721 P.2d  at 
1020.

[¶34.]  Appellant carries a heavy burden when no 
objection is made at trial to comments in closing argument. This court has 
repeatedly said, "objection should be made at the time of the allegedly 
prejudicial comment in order that the trial court will have the opportunity to 
take corrective measures." Wheeler, 691 P.2d  at 604. Except for the objection to 
the question in cross-examination, "[a]pparently the first time it dawned on 
appellant that he had been prejudiced was when he wrote his appellate brief." 
Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 899 (Wyo. 1982) (Brown, J., 
dissenting).

[¶35.]  When no objection is timely lodged, the 
plain error standard must be applied. Plain error or defects affecting 
substantial rights may be noticed although not brought to the attention of the 
court through objection. W.R.A.P. 7.05. To invoke the plain error doctrine, 
several elements must be established:

First, the record must 
clearly show what occurred at the trial without resort to speculation. Second, 
the existence of a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been violated in 
an obvious way. And, finally, this violation must have adversely affected some 
substantial right of the accused.

Browder, 639 P.2d  at 895.

[¶36.]  The facts of the case must be viewed in 
light of the trial record as a whole and not as to whether any one single 
incident standing alone would be reversible. This cumulative effect approach has 
been applied in numerous cases. See Browder, 639 P.2d 889; Berger, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S. Ct. 629; and Wheeler, 
691 P.2d 599.

[¶37.]  The right at stake is the fundamental 
right to a fair trial, free from tainted argument. Reviewed as a whole, the 
argument in appellant's trial did not affect that right. Prosecutors must always 
keep in mind that their duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict, which is 
most certainly a difficult duty to be carried out carefully and cautiously. 
Jeschke, 642 P.2d  at 1303. Viewing the entire circumstances of the argument and 
trial testimony in appellant's case, it is clear there is no prejudice and no 
error.

Remedy

[¶38.]  Appellant further requests that we 
overrule Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150 (Wyo. 1978). That case was about murder and 
prosecutorial misconduct. One improper statement made in closing was immediately 
remedied by the court. There was no objection to another questionable statement 
which misstated the law. Appellant then asked for reversal under the plain-error 
doctrine. The court said:

A reversal and remand for 
a new trial - because of prosecutorial misconduct - will not be ordered as punishment for a prosecutor's misdeeds, 
but only because such misdeeds denied the accused a fair 
trial.

Id. at 1154 (emphasis 
added).

[¶39.]  Where there is no prejudice to a 
defendant, clearly there is no plain error warranting a new trial. Appellant has 
no grounds to request reversal as a punitive measure when no prejudice to 
appellant's rights was shown.

[¶40.]  Affirmed.