Case Title: State v. Green

Citation: 2000-Ohio-182

Docket Number: 19980913

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 2000-Ohio-182.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. GREEN, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Green (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 352.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty vacated and cause 
remanded to trial court for further proceedings when trial court fails to 
comply with Crim.R. 32(A)(1) — When imposing sentence, trial court must 
address defendant personally and ask whether he or she wishes to make a 
statement in his or her own behalf or present any information in mitigation 
of punishment. 
(No. 98-913 — Submitted June 6, 2000 — Decided December 20, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County, No. CR97-1450. 
 
On January 3, 1997, Samar El-Okdi was shot and left to die in an alley in 
Toledo. 
 
Around 1:40 a.m., on January 7, 1997, Toledo police stopped a Pontiac 
sedan, owned by El-Okdi, which was being driven by appellant, Joseph Green.  
Green and Douglas Coley, a passenger in the car, were separately convicted of the 
aggravated murder of El-Okdi and sentenced to death.  In order to establish Green’s 
identity as one of El-Okdi’s killers, the state introduced evidence that Green and 
Coley had carjacked, kidnapped, robbed, and then attempted to murder David 
Moore in Toledo on December 23, 1996. 
 
 
2 
 
On December 23, 1996, around 7:30 p.m., David Moore parked his 1990 
blue Ford Taurus at his apartment complex at 2152 Scottwood in Toledo.  While 
Moore was unloading his car trunk, Green walked up and asked for directions.  
Then Coley appeared, and both he and Green displayed guns held next to their 
chest.  Coley told Moore, “Give me the keys,” which Moore did.  Then Coley told 
Moore, “Get in the car,” and both Green and Coley forced Moore into the car.  
Green also said, “Don’t look at our faces.  We don’t want you to be able to identify 
us.” 
 
Coley drove, Moore sat in front, and Green sat behind Moore.  Green told 
Moore, “Don’t try an escape or I’ll kill you.  I’m already wanted for murder and it 
won’t matter, won’t make any difference.”  Moore pled for his life, but neither 
Green nor Coley responded.  Green did tell Moore, “Cough up the cash,” and 
Moore gave Coley $112.  Eventually, Coley stopped near a deserted field and told 
Moore to get out.  As Moore did so, Coley shot him in the stomach. 
 
Moore ran, but stumbled and fell.  Someone ran after him and shot him in 
the head.  As his assailant walked away, Moore was able to discern that the shooter 
(Green) was the taller and heavier of the two men that had abducted him. 
 
As the Taurus drove away, Moore got up and struggled to a nearby house 
where he collapsed.  Police were summoned.  Moore had been shot once in the 
stomach, head, and arm, and twice in the hand, and spent thirty-nine days in the 
 
 
3 
hospital.  Police later found two .25 caliber shell casings near where Moore had 
been shot.  On December 27, 1996, police recovered Moore’s blue Taurus, which 
had stolen plates.  At Green’s trial, Moore positively identified Green as one of his 
assailants. 
 
On January 3, 1997, sometime after 5:00 p.m., Samar El-Okdi drove her 
Pontiac 6000, Ohio license number RYH 862, to her apartment at 2104 Parkwood, 
which is a block from where Moore lived.  Raymond Sunderman, El-Okdi’s 
landlord, recalls that she arrived home that day sometime between 5:00 and 5:30 
p.m.  El-Okdi’s brother Shaheer remembers El-Okdi visiting his family-owned 
convenience store for around forty-five minutes beginning between 5:00 and 6:00 
p.m.  At approximately 8:00 p.m., El-Okdi dropped off film at the Blue Ribbon 
Photo store at Westgate Shopping Center.  No one else that testified ever saw El-
Okdi alive again. 
 
Around 8:30 p.m. that evening, Rosie Frusher left a friend’s house at 814 
West Grove Place in Toledo to use a pay telephone.  As Frusher walked toward the 
back yard, she heard something that sounded like firecrackers.  Frusher looked 
toward the noise and saw a gray car with long taillights, which were lit, sitting in 
the alley.  Frusher testified that a photograph of El-Okdi’s car looked like the car 
she had seen, and that the car’s license number had a zero in it.  Frusher saw a black 
man wearing a stocking cap sitting in the driver’s seat.  Another black man, who 
 
 
4 
had bushy hair and resembled Green, was standing outside and leaning into the car.  
(Frusher could not definitively state whether Green was that man.)  Frusher 
continued walking and called her friend from a nearby pay phone; Ameritech 
records confirm that the call was placed at 8:41 p.m. 
 
On January 4, Christopher Neal, El-Okdi’s boyfriend, returned from a trip 
and discovered that El-Okdi was missing.  Later that day, Neal notified police of El-
Okdi’s continued absence.  El-Okdi’s friends and relatives distributed missing-
person flyers, which described El-Okdi, her car, its bumper stickers, and her last 
known whereabouts. 
 
On January 6, Megan Mattimoe, a friend of El-Okdi’s, was parked on 
Scottwood waiting for a friend.  Just before 11:00 p.m., Mattimoe saw a gray 
Pontiac 6000 that was identical to El-Okdi’s car except that the license plate was 
different.  The Pontiac had a dent on the left side, like El-Okdi’s car, and bore a 
distinctive bumper sticker identical to one on El Okdi’s car. 
 
Mattimoe followed in her own car until the Pontiac parked at an apartment 
complex and two men got out.  She backed out of the parking lot, called 911, and 
drove away.  An older Cadillac chased her for several blocks at high speed. 
 
After Mattimoe talked with police later that night, she and a Toledo 
detective returned to where the gray Pontiac was parked.  Police verified that the 
Pontiac 6000 bore an Ohio license plate, YRT 022, that had been stolen in 
 
 
5 
November 1996.  Police staked out the gray Pontiac using five undercover police 
vehicles. 
 
After 1:00 a.m., Green, Coley, and a woman with a baby got into the gray 
Pontiac, and drove away.  Undercover police vehicles followed and, after being 
joined by marked police vehicles, forced the Pontiac to stop.  Green rammed one 
police car and spun his wheels in an effort to escape being boxed in.  After 
removing Coley and Green from the car, police found a loaded, brown-handled, .25 
caliber semiautomatic pistol on the floor in the back seat near where Coley had 
been sitting.  Green had a loaded, pearl-handled, .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol in 
his coat. 
 
After arresting Green, police officers advised him of his Miranda rights and 
questioned him.  Green first claimed that he had rented the car for several days from 
a “dope fiend.”  Later he told police that he had heard that Coley had obtained the 
car.  Finally, Green stated that Coley had told him that he had shot a woman.  Green 
also admitted that he had stolen license plates and placed them on the Pontiac, and 
that Coley had been driving the Pontiac for several days. 
 
Based on Green’s interview, police found El-Okdi’s body around 2:30 p.m. 
in an alley near where Frusher had heard shots and had seen a gray car some four 
days earlier.  At the scene, police found a shell casing about five feet from El-
Okdi’s body.  The coroner determined that El-Okdi had died from a .25 caliber 
 
 
6 
bullet that struck her between the eyes and which had been fired from a distance of 
less than one foot.  The coroner concluded that El-Okdi did not die immediately but 
may have drifted in and out of consciousness. 
 
On January 8, 1997, Coley and Green were arraigned on charges relating to 
El-Okdi’s stolen Pontiac, the stolen plates, and carrying concealed weapons.  That 
arraignment was televised.  Moore, who was watching local news on television, 
immediately recognized Green and Coley as the men who had kidnapped, robbed, 
and shot him. 
 
At trial, Tyrone Armstrong, a cousin to both Coley and Green, testified that 
Green and Coley usually carried .25 caliber semiautomatics.  Armstrong identified 
the guns:  Green’s was pearl-handled, and Coley’s had a brown stock.  Armstrong 
also testified that on December 24, 1996, Coley and Green, who spent a lot of time 
together, were driving around in a blue Taurus sedan.  That day, Green made up a 
rap song with the words “I shot him five times, and he dropped, he tried to run, so I 
shot him.”  On January 4 and January 6, 1997, Armstrong saw both Coley and 
Green driving around in a gray Pontiac 6000 sedan. 
 
David Cogan, a firearms expert, examined two bullets, one removed from 
El-Okdi’s brain and the other from Moore’s wrist, together with three shell casings 
recovered from the two crime scenes.  Cogan concluded that the Raven .25 caliber 
 
 
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pistol recovered from the Pontiac’s back floor had fired both bullets and had ejected 
all three shell casings. 
 
George Cass, an ammunitions expert, concluded that the ammunition that 
was found in both guns was consistent with the projectiles recovered from Moore 
and El-Okdi and with shell casings from the crime scenes.  The casings were made 
of the “same case material” and had “identical head stamps.”  The “live rounds had 
the identical bullets.”  These items were also consistent with ammunition originally 
packed in an empty .25 caliber ammunition box found at Green’s home. 
 
Deborah Angel, a friend of Frusher’s, testified that Frusher had problems 
with drugs and alcohol and exhibited multiple personalities at times.  Twelve-year-
old Albert Quinn, who was with Frusher on the evening of the El-Okdi shooting, 
claimed that Frusher had been inside when the shots were fired.  Quinn also saw the 
car in the alley when he and Frusher went outside, and Quinn agreed that the car 
looked like a photo of El-Okdi’s car. Quinn did not see anyone outside the car. 
 
Dr. Jolie Brams, a clinical psychologist and expert in eyewitness 
identification, described Frusher as a woman who “experiences a range of rather 
debilitating psychiatric and psychological disorders.”  Frusher is “severely mentally 
disabled” and her mental condition makes her “very vulnerable to suggestions.”  
Her mental condition and past abuse of drugs and alcohol “negatively impact[ed] 
her ability to acquire information * * * in an accurate manner.” 
 
 
8 
 
The offenses against Moore and El-Okdi were joined.  Prior to trial, Green 
pled guilty to carrying a concealed weapon and to the offenses against Moore.  
After the trial, a three-judge panel convicted Green of the aggravated murder of 
Samar El-Okdi, as well as other offenses, and sentenced Green to death.  The chart 
that follows lists all charges, pleas, and the resulting sentences.  On the death 
specifications in Counts IV, V, and VI (later merged), the panel found that prior 
calculation and design had been proved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Charge 
Plea 
Finding 
Sentence 
I. Kidnapping of David Moore, R.C. 
2905.01(A)(2)  
Guilty 
Guilty 
Ten years  
II. Aggravated robbery of Moore, 
R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Ten years  
III. Attempted murder of Moore, 
R.C. 2923.02 
Guilty 
Guilty  
Ten 
years 
plus 
three years actual 
 
 
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IV. Aggravated murder of Samar El-
Okdi, R.C. 2903.01(A), with R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) death specification 
Not Guilty 
Guilty 
Death 
V. Aggravated felony murder of El-
Okdi, R.C. 2903.01(B), with R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) death specification  
Not guilty 
Guilty 
Merged with IV 
VI. Aggravated felony murder of El-
Okdi, R.C. 2903.01(B), with R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) death specification  
Not guilty 
Guilty 
Merged with IV 
VII. Kidnapping of El-Okdi, R.C. 
2905.01(A)(2) 
Not guilty 
Guilty 
Ten years  
VIII. Aggravated robbery of El- 
Okdi, R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) 
Not guilty 
Guilty 
Ten 
years 
plus 
three years actual 
IX. Carrying concealed weapon, 
R.C. 2923.12(A) and (D) 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Eighteen months 
X. Receiving stolen auto, R.C. 
2913.51 
Not guilty 
Guilty 
Eighteen months 
XI. Receiving stolen license plate, 
R.C. 2913.51 and 2913.71(c) 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Twelve months 
 
 
10 
Gun specifications in I, II, and III, 
R.C. 2941.145 
Guilty 
Guilty 
Merged into one 
three-year 
actual 
term in III, above 
Gun specifications in IV through 
VIII 
Not guilty 
Guilty 
Merged into one 
three-year 
actual 
term in VIII, above 
 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, John J. Weglian and 
Brenda J. Majdalani, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
 
Spiros P. Cocoves; David H. Bodiker, State Public Defender, and 
Pamela Prude-Smithers, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  In this appeal, Green advances twenty propositions of law.  
We reject each of the propositions relating to his convictions and therefore 
affirm his convictions. 
 
We vacate the death penalty, however, and remand the cause to the trial 
court for further proceedings, primarily because the trial court failed to comply 
with Crim.R. 32(A)(1), which requires the trial court in every criminal case to 
 
 
11 
personally address the defendant “and ask if he or she wishes to make a 
statement on his or her own behalf or present any information in mitigation of 
punishment.”  Additionally, we conclude that the trial court’s sentencing 
opinion contains numerous deficiencies.  Accordingly, the trial court must 
reconsider and revise that opinion prior to resentencing Green for the 
aggravated murder of Samar El-Okdi. 
I 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
In his first proposition of law, Green challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support prior calculation and design, which was charged in Count IV 
and in the death-penalty specifications in Counts IV, V, and VI. 
 
We have held that “[t]he relevant inquiry [on appeal] is whether, after 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, 
paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 
99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  “[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the 
credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.”  State v. DeHass 
(1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
 
 
12 
 
To qualify for the death penalty under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), the defendant 
must be the principal offender (“the actual killer,” State v. Penix [1987], 32 Ohio 
St.3d 369, 371, 513 N.E.2d 744, 746) or, if not, the trier of fact must find that the 
murder was committed with prior calculation and design.  Id.  Here, the trial panel 
declared that having found prior calculation and design, it need not  determine 
whether Green was the principal offender in the aggravated murder. 
 
Because the trial panel did not find that Green was the principal offender, 
i.e., “the actual killer,” the sufficiency of the evidence on prior calculation and 
design will determine whether the death penalty can be imposed in this case.  See 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(7); State v. Taylor (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 306-308, 612 
N.E.2d 316, 324-325; State v. Penix, supra. 
 
In 1974, the term “prior calculation and design” replaced the term 
“deliberate and premeditated malice” in defining aggravated murder in Ohio.  134 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1900.  No bright-line test exists that “emphatically 
distinguishes between the presence or absence of ‘prior calculation and design.’ ”  
State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 20, 676 N.E.2d 82, 89.  However, prior 
calculation and design is a more stringent element than premeditation.  State v. 
Cotton (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 10 O.O.3d 4, 381 N.E.2d 190, paragraph one of 
the syllabus. 
 
 
13 
 
In this case, the evidence directly establishes how and where El-Okdi was 
killed, although facts relating to where she was kidnapped and robbed are missing.  
The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Green was guilty of complicity 
in her death and thus was one of her killers.  When he was arrested, he was driving 
her car.  His constant companion, Coley, possessed the gun that killed her.  Green 
knew where her body could be found.  Moreover, just twelve days earlier and a 
block from where El-Okdi lived, Green and Coley, acting together, had carjacked 
and robbed David Moore, driven him to a deserted area, shot him several times, 
and left him for dead. 
 
Green argues that the state’s proof of prior calculation and design rests 
solely on the supposition that the facts of El-Okdi’s kidnapping, robbery, and 
murder were similar to what we know about the crimes against Moore.  He admits 
that “other acts” evidence is admissible to establish identity or intent under Evid.R. 
404(B).  However, he argues that it is impermissible to use other-acts evidence to 
prove prior calculation and design in a later crime. 
 
We reject Green’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.  First, 
Evid.R. 404(B) recognizes that “other acts” evidence can be admitted to prove, 
inter alia, “intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.” (Emphasis added.)  Additionally, prior calculation and design can be 
found even when the plan to kill was quickly conceived and executed.  See  State 
 
 
14 
v. Goodwin (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 343-345, 703 N.E.2d 1251, 1263 (store 
robbery in which one clerk was shot); State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 20-23, 676 
N.E.2d at 89-91 (two- to three-minute encounter in bar between rivals for another’s 
affections). 
 
In any event, the known facts of El-Okdi’s kidnapping, robbery, and murder 
by themselves, apart from the Moore crimes, support finding prior calculation and 
design.  For example, El-Okdi was killed in an isolated area and was kidnapped for 
no apparent reason other than to kill her.  El-Okdi was considerably smaller than 
her two armed killers, and she could not have posed any threat or put up any 
credible resistance.  Nothing in the record suggests that she went to the location 
where she was killed voluntarily.  In fact, El-Okdi had told a friend that she wanted 
to spend the evening at home alone.  Also, El-Okdi was shot at close range, 
between the eyes, which suggests an execution-style slaying.  Frusher testified that 
the Pontiac’s license plate had a zero in it, which means that Green and Coley 
placed stolen plates on El-Okdi’s Pontiac where they killed her.  Finally, Green 
and Coley drove her Pontiac 6000 around town, which suggests a plan both to use 
her property and deprive her of any way to complain about its use.  We reject 
Green’s first proposition of law. 
II 
Allocution Rights 
 
 
15 
 
In his second proposition of law, Green argues that he was denied due 
process and his rights under Ohio law because he was “not given an opportunity to 
speak before the death penalty [was] imposed.”  Ohio Crim.R. 32(A)(1) confers an 
absolute right of allocution: 
 
“At the time of imposing sentence, the court shall * * *: 
 
“Afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and  
address the defendant personally and ask if he or she wishes to make a statement in 
his or her own behalf or present any information in mitigation of punishment.”  See 
State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 738 N.E.2d 1178, paragraph one of 
the syllabus; State v. Reynolds (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 684, 687 N.E.2d 1358, 
1372. 
 
The state argues that the court asked Green whether he wished to make a 
statement before imposing sentence.  Around 9:25 p.m. on March 11, after hearing 
the penalty-phase evidence and deliberating for several hours, the panel announced 
that it was ready to proceed.  After noting its previous findings, the court asked 
whether the defense had any objection to sentencing on the noncapital offenses as 
well as the capital offenses that evening.  The defense had no objection.  The 
following exchange then took place: 
 
 
16 
 
“The Court:  Is there anything with regard to those offenses, Counsel or Mr. 
Green, prior to the Court passing sentence on both those counts as well as on 
Counts 7, 8 and 10? 
 
“Mr. Cameron [defense counsel]:  Anything we wish to say? 
 
“The Court:  Yes.” 
 
Counsel then commented about sentencing on the firearm specifications, and 
the court agreed.  Counsel said nothing further, and Green said nothing.  After 
Moore, Moore’s wife, and Moore’s brother made victim impact statements, the 
court imposed sentences for each offense to which Green pled guilty or was found 
guilty, including aggravated murder. 
 
The trial court clearly erred in not explicitly asking Green, in an inquiry 
directed only to him, whether he had anything to say before he was sentenced.  The 
United States Supreme Court has specifically cautioned federal judges under the 
comparable Federal Rules: “Trial judges before sentencing should * * * 
unambiguously address themselves to the defendant.  * * * [J]udges should leave 
no room for doubt that the defendant has been issued a personal invitation to speak 
prior to sentencing.” Green v. United States (1961), 365 U.S. 301, 305, 81 S.Ct. 
653, 655, 5 L.Ed.2d 670, 674. 
 
The trial court’s reference to “both those counts” is ambiguous.  The context 
suggests that the court may have solicited comment only on the noncapital 
 
 
17 
offenses.  Instead, the trial court should have specifically asked Green if he had 
anything to say about the capital counts as well as the other offenses.  The record 
demonstrates a violation of Crim.R. 32 that was neither invited nor harmless. 
 
Trial courts must painstakingly adhere to Crim.R. 32, guaranteeing the right 
of allocution.  A Crim.R. 32 inquiry is much more than an empty ritual:  it 
represents a defendant’s last opportunity to plead his case or express remorse.  
“[I]ts legal provenance was the common-law right of allocution.”  Green, 365 U.S. 
at 304, 81 S.Ct. at 655, 5 L.Ed.2d at 673.  See, also, United States v. Myers (C.A.5, 
1998), 150 F.3d 459, 461-462; United States v. Riascos-Suarez (C.A.6, 1996), 73 
F.3d 616, 627; Annotation (1964), 96 A.L.R.2d 1292, Section 4. 
 
Green’s right of allocution was violated, thereby undercutting the 
constitutional reliability of this death sentence.  Accordingly, we sustain his second 
proposition of law and remand for resentencing.  Campbell, 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 
738 N.E.2d 1178, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
III 
Residual Doubt 
 
In his third proposition of law, Green urges that this court to overrule State 
v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, syllabus (“Residual 
doubt is not an acceptable mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04[B]”).  In support, 
Green argues that McGuire unconstitutionally limits mitigation evidence under the 
 
 
18 
reliability component of the Eighth Amendment and that an accused has a due 
process right to argue against evidence of guilt that supports the death penalty. 
 
However, the precedents are clear and contrary to Green’s arguments.  We 
decline to overrule State v. McGuire.  Neither the United States Constitution nor 
the Constitution of Ohio requires that residual doubt be considered as a mitigating 
factor.  Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988), 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 
155; State v. McGuire, supra, at 402-404, 686 N.E.2d at 1122-1123.  We reject 
Green’s third proposition of law. 
IV 
Weighing and Determination of the Death Penalty 
 
In his fourth and fifth propositions of law, Green argues that the trial court’s 
sentencing opinion was constitutionally deficient because the court improperly 
weighed the aggravating circumstances that were alleged and proved, improperly 
considered nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, and failed to consider relevant 
mitigating evidence.  We agree and sustain his fourth and fifth propositions of law. 
 
R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) specifies that the death penalty shall be imposed “if the 
panel of three judges unanimously finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing 
outweigh the mitigating factors.”  “[T]he ‘aggravating circumstances’ against 
which the mitigating evidence is to be weighed are limited to the specifications of 
 
 
19 
aggravating circumstances set forth in R.C. 2929.04(A)(1) through (8) that have 
been alleged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. 
Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N.E.2d 311, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  Accord State v. Johnson (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 87, 24 OBR 282, 494 
N.E.2d 1061, syllabus; State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895, 
paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
When the trial panel imposed the death penalty on Green it violated these 
principles.  For example, the single death-penalty specification in Count IV, 
aggravated murder with prior calculation and design, as well as the single death 
specification in Counts V and VI, alleged that Green committed the murder while  
committing or attempting to commit “kidnapping or aggravated robbery.”1  
(Emphasis added.)  Despite the indictment’s clear language, the trial verdict stated 
that Green committed the murder while committing “both a kidnaping and an 
aggravated robbery.” (Emphasis added.)  The panel’s death penalty opinion also 
altered the aggravating circumstance from that specifically alleged in the 
indictment, by considering as two separate and distinct aggravating circumstances 
Green’s involvement in committing “both an aggravated robbery and a 
kidnapping.”  Moreover, the panel gave weight to both kidnapping and aggravated 
robbery as separate and distinct aggravating circumstances despite the fact that 
they were not alleged as such.  By doing so, the panel wrongfully multiplied a 
 
 
20 
single circumstance into two.  See State v. Spivey (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 405, 420, 
692 N.E.2d 151, 163, fn. 2; State v. Davis (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 361, 367-373, 528 
N.E.2d 925, 931-935. 
 
The panel made another egregious error by declaring that “the State has 
proved aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt under both R.C. 
2929.04(A)(3) and (A)(7):  that is, that the killing of Samar El-Okdi was for the 
purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial or punishment for another 
offense committed by Mr. Green.”  The panel, relying upon the (A)(3) factor in 
deciding to impose the death penalty, stated: “The killing of Samar El-Okdi was 
planned, calculated and carried out as an execution of a potential witness.”  In 
discussing the aggravating circumstances, the panel referred to “the gratuitous, 
cold, calculating and seemingly remorseless execution of Ms. El-Okdi.” 
 
However, the indictment did not allege a violation of R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), 
and the parties did not argue the issue.  The panel’s first reference to this 
aggravating circumstance was in the penalty opinion, not the guilt-phase verdict.  
The panel thus violated R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) and Wogenstahl by imposing death on 
the basis of an aggravating circumstance with which Green was never charged.  
State v. Baston (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 426, 709 N.E.2d 128, 136; State v. 
Raglin (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 257, 699 N.E.2d 482, 487. 
 
 
21 
 
Third, the trial panel relied on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in 
imposing the death penalty.  The trial court’s sentencing opinion compared and 
contrasted the Moore offenses with the El-Okdi killing.  However, Green was 
separately sentenced for the offenses against Moore, and no “course of conduct” 
specification, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), was charged in this case.  While the offenses 
against Moore helped prove that Green was involved in El-Okdi’s murder (see 
discussion on Green’s eleventh proposition of law), they were not relevant to the 
specified aggravating circumstance or to the decision to impose the death penalty 
upon Green.  For example, the trial court’s penalty opinion states: 
 
“The Moore incidents are hauntingly evocative of the facts surrounding the  
[offenses against El-Okdi].  Both were [carjacked]; both were forced back into 
their cars at gunpoint; both were then driven to remote alleys, ordered out of their 
cars, and then shot at point blank range. * * * Green and Coley kept both cars for 
several days afterwards.”  * * *  Perhaps they had some doubts that they had 
succeeded in killing Mr. Moore; but there could have been no such doubt as to Ms. 
El-Okdi.  She was shot directly between the eyes at very close range. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“[I]t is difficult to imagine a colder or more calculating murder than that of 
Ms. El-Okdi, or the attempted murder of Mr. Moore.  * * *  The only purpose of 
the subsequent kidnapping and ensuing events in each case was to eliminate any 
 
 
22 
possibility of later identification.  Each of these offenses taken as a sequence was 
chilling in the extreme.” 
 
Further, the trial court also improperly used facts about the offenses against 
El-Okdi as nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.  See Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d 
at 352-355, 662 N.E.2d at 319-321, and at paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. 
Davis, 38 Ohio St.3d at 367-369, 528 N.E.2d at 931-933.  Also, the panel’s 
speculation in the sentencing opinion that “it is certainly possible from the evidence 
that Mr. Green was the shooter” was improper, since the panel did not determine 
that he was the principal offender.  See discussion of Green’s first proposition of 
law. 
 
Fourth, the court used an improper weighing standard, i.e., the panel found 
“the cumulative weight of the mitigating factors * * * do not offset the aggravating 
circumstances * * * proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the State.”  Before the 
death penalty can be imposed, R.C. 2929.03(D)(3) specifies that the panel must 
find, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances  
“outweigh the mitigating factors.”  Thus, the panel’s language obscured the state’s 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed mitigating factors.  Moreover, the panel’s wording, which referred to 
mitigation “offset[ting]” aggravation, improperly suggested that the defense had the 
 
 
23 
burden of persuasion.  See State v. Hill (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 433, 438-439, 653 
N.E.2d 271, 278. 
 
Finally, in his fifth proposition of law, Green asserts that the court did not 
give appropriate weight to mitigating factors.  Admittedly, “the assessment and 
weight to be given mitigating evidence are matters for the trial court’s 
determination.”  State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 171, 555 N.E.2d 293, 305.  
Accord State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
In this case, however, the trial court misinterpreted our decision in State v. 
McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, which held that residual doubt was 
not acceptable as a mitigating factor under R.C. 2929.04(B) in capital cases.  Here, 
the trial court declared that, but for the McGuire decision, “the resulting penalty for 
the capital murder count and specification would have been life without the 
possibility of parole, instead of death.”  The trial court then asserted, “Residual 
doubt as to identity, and to a lesser extent as to the role played by  [Green] in the 
demise of Ms. El-Okdi, would have played a pivotal role in this case, based upon the 
evidence. * * * Unequivocally, for what it is worth, it would have resulted in a 
different sentence.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
However, the McGuire decision does not and was never intended to preclude 
the appropriate weighing of the evidence and the independent weighing of 
 
 
24 
aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors.  Accordingly, the trial panel 
was able to give whatever weight it thought appropriate to the fact that it did not find 
that Green was the principal offender in the aggravated murder.  Indeed, the fact that 
a defendant was not the principal offender is a specific statutory mitigating factor.  
See R.C. 2929.04(B)(6).  Normally, it would be a powerful mitigating factor.  Very 
few death sentences have been approved against persons who were not the principal 
offender.  Cf. State v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 723 N.E.2d 1019.  Yet, in 
evaluating the evidence, the trial court gave virtually no weight to the fact that Green 
was not found to be the principal offender in the aggravated murder.  Moreover, the 
court’s erroneous reading of our decision in McGuire appears to have contributed to 
this failure. 
 
Deficiencies in a sentencing opinion can normally be corrected by appellate 
reweighing.  See State v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 190-191, 631 N.E.2d 124, 
131; State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d at 170, 555 N.E.2d at 304.  We deem the 
deficiencies in this case too severe to correct by simply reevaluating the evidence.  
In this case, the collective deficiencies in the trial court’s decision to impose the 
death penalty, as reflected in the sentencing opinion, undermine our confidence in 
that decision.  The panel overlooked many of this court’s prior decisions and the 
mandated statutory framework.  These cumulative errors reflect grievous violations 
of the statutory deliberative process.  Accordingly, we vacate the death penalty 
 
 
25 
imposed in this case and remand to the trial court for further deliberations.  See  
State v. Davis, 38 Ohio St.3d at 372, 528 N.E.2d at 936. 
 
While revising the sentencing opinion to address the deficiencies noted, the 
trial court judges on remand must consider whatever Green discusses should he 
choose to exercise  his right to allocution.  See discussion on Green’s second 
proposition of law. 
V 
Victim-Impact Evidence 
 
In his seventh proposition of law, Green argues that his constitutional rights 
were violated when Moore’s family members asserted that Green should be 
sentenced to death. 
 
Following the penalty deliberations, the court asked if it could accelerate 
sentencing for the Moore offenses, which had been scheduled for the next day.  The 
defense agreed.  Then, before the court announced the sentencing decisions for the 
Moore and El-Okdi offenses, David Moore described the events of his “terrifying” 
night, as well as the thoughts and emotions engendered by it.  He wanted to ensure 
that “these predators are never allowed to inflict this terror again on anyone else” 
and expressed his desire that they receive a maximum sentence. 
 
Moore’s wife described her anger, her fear, David Moore’s suffering, and 
the impact of the offenses.  She also contrasted the lives of Green and her husband, 
 
 
26 
and commented on the impact that El-Okdi’s death had on El-Okdi’s family.  Mrs. 
Moore thought that Green lacked remorse and asked, “How dare this coward 
[Green] think that he deserves to live when he has taken the life of another[?]”  Paul 
Moore, David’s brother, also spoke about his brother, the impact of the offenses, 
and the impact that El-Okdi’s murder had on El-Okdi’s family.  Paul Moore asked 
the court to “consider the gravity and the cruelty of these crimes and protect us by 
issuing the harshest penalty available by law.”  Defense counsel did not object to 
these statements. 
 
The United States Constitution does not prohibit victim-impact evidence in 
capital cases.  Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 
L.Ed.2d 720; State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d at 343, 703 N.E.2d at 1262.  
However, neither Ohio’s Constitution nor its statutes authorized Moore or his 
family to speculate about the impact of El-Okdi’s murder on El-Okdi’s family.  See, 
e.g., R.C. 2930.14; R.C. 2930.02; cf. State v. White (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 433, 446-
447, 709 N.E.2d 140, 154-155. 
 
The trial court should not have permitted Moore or his family members to 
express opinions about how Green should be punished for the offenses against El-
Okdi.  State v. Huertas (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 22, 553 N.E.2d 1058, syllabus 
(“Expressions of opinion by a witness as to the appropriateness of a particular 
sentence in a capital case violate the defendant’s constitutional right to have the 
 
 
27 
sentencing decision made by the jury and judge”). Accord State v. Goodwin, 84 
Ohio St.3d at 343, 703 N.E.2d at 1262; State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 
435, 439, 650 N.E.2d 878, 882. 
 
Because Green did not object, the issue must be considered on a plain-error 
basis.  Moreover, judges can normally be presumed not to have relied upon such 
improper expressions of opinion.  See State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d at 343, 703 
N.E.2d at 1262; State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384, 513 N.E.2d 754, 759.  
However, since the trial court’s death opinion in this case dwelt at length on the 
Moore offenses, which were not relevant, that presumption cannot reasonably apply 
in this case.  In revising their sentencing opinion in this case, the judges constituting 
the trial panel should clarify whether or not they considered expressions of opinion 
from others as to what the sentence should be in this case.  We sustain Green’s 
seventh proposition of law. 
VI 
Pretrial Issues 
 
Procedures on arrest.  In his eighth proposition of law, Green argues that 
he was arrested without a warrant on January 7, 1997, that he was not promptly 
taken before a magistrate for a probable cause determination, and therefore that “all 
fruits of the warrantless arrest must be suppressed.”  We find that Green’s 
arguments lack merit. 
 
 
28 
 
Green’s claim that he first appeared in court on January 15, eight days after 
his arrest, is wrong.  On January 8, Green appeared in Toledo Municipal Court for a 
preliminary hearing, which is a probable cause determination.  R.C. 2937.09.  He 
was charged with carrying a concealed weapon and receiving stolen property. A 
video of that court appearance is in the record. 
 
As Green did not complain at trial about the failure to conduct a prompt 
preliminary hearing, he waived the issue.  See State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 38, 44, 630 N.E.2d 339, 347; State v. F.O.E. Aerie 2295 (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 
53, 526 N.E.2d 66, paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Wade (1978), 53 Ohio 
St.2d 182, 7 O.O.3d 362, 373 N.E.2d 1244, paragraph three of the syllabus.  We 
reject Green’s eighth proposition of law. 
 
Suppression of pretrial statements.  In his ninth proposition of law, Green 
argues that his Miranda waiver and pretrial statements to police were coerced.  
Green argues that sleep deprivation overcame his will because he was questioned 
for over twelve hours without rest. 
 
In determining whether a confession is involuntary, a court “should consider 
the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal 
experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the 
existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or 
inducement.”  State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 3 O.O.3d 18, 358 N.E.2d 
 
 
29 
1051, paragraph two of the syllabus.  See State v. Brewer (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 50, 
58, 549 N.E.2d 491, 499; State v. Barker (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 135, 7 O.O.3d 213, 
372 N.E.2d 1324.  The same considerations apply to whether Green voluntarily 
waived his rights. 
 
The evidence supports a finding that Green voluntarily waived his Miranda 
rights both verbally and in writing and voluntarily talked with police.  Green 
acknowledged that he understood his rights and he in fact waived them on at least 
three separate occasions.  Green was arrested around 1:45 a.m. on January 7, 1997.  
He was first questioned at 5:04 a.m. when he was advised of and waived his 
Miranda rights.  He told police that a “dope fiend” rented him the car, so detectives 
drove him around town looking for this person.  Around 10:30 a.m., Green again 
signed a waiver of Miranda rights.  Around 2:30 p.m., police again advised Green 
of his Miranda rights and Green signed another waiver.  Around 4:30 p.m., Green 
claimed in a taped statement that Coley told him that he had shot a woman and 
stolen her car.  Green denied that he was involved in this crime. 
 
No evidence suggests that police physically abused Green, threatened him, 
or made any promises during questioning.  Green was eighteen years old when 
questioned.  Interviews were sporadic, not continuous, and Green was given food 
and breaks.  Green never refused to answer questions, never asked for questioning 
 
 
30 
to stop, and never asked for medical attention or a lawyer.  Green did not complain 
that he was tired, nor does any evidence indicate that he was tired. 
 
The length and intensity of the questioning did not overcome his will.  See 
State v. Barker, 53 Ohio St.2d at 141, 7 O.O.3d at 217, 372 N.E.2d at 1329-1330.  
Instead, Green maintained his claim that he did not kidnap, rob, or kill El-Okdi but 
simply drove her car after she was killed.  The record supports the trial court’s 
decision to reject the suppression motion.  As State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 
19, 20, 1 OBR 57, 58, 437 N.E.2d 583, 584, held, “the weight of the evidence and 
credibility of witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.  * * * This principle is 
applicable to suppression hearings as well as trials.”  Accord State v. DeHass, 10 
Ohio St.2d 230, 39 O.O.2d 366, 227 N.E.2d 212, paragraph one of the syllabus; 
State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 277, 528 N.E.2d 542, 547.  We reject 
Green’s ninth proposition of law. 
 
Waiver of jury trial.  In his tenth proposition of law, Green argues that his 
jury trial waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court 
did not explain “all of the implications of that waiver including the limited right to 
appeal erroneous rulings by the three-judge panel.” 
 
However, a “trial court is not required to inform the defendant of all the 
possible implications of waiver [of trial by jury].”  State v. Bays (1999), 87 Ohio 
St.3d 15, 20, 716 N.E.2d 1126, 1135, citing State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 
 
 
31 
559 N.E.2d 464, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Accord State v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 
Ohio St.3d 230, 238, 714 N.E.2d 867, 875; State v. Baston, 85 Ohio St.3d at 421, 
709 N.E.2d at 132.  The trial court discussed with Green his right to a jury trial, 
including the role of fact-finding and the requirement of unanimity, and the court 
determined that Green had fully discussed with counsel his decision to waive a jury.  
The trial court did not mislead or misinform Green about his rights.  Green signed 
the waiver in open court and it was filed.  We reject Green’s tenth proposition of 
law.  State v. Jells, 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 559 N.E.2d 464, paragraph one of the 
syllabus; State v. Baston, 85 Ohio St.3d at 422, 709 N.E.2d at 133; State v. Filiaggi, 
86 Ohio St.3d at 238, 714 N.E.2d at 875. 
 
Disqualification of trial judge.  In his twelfth proposition of law, Green 
argues constitutional error because Judge J. Ronald Bowman, who sat on the three-
judge panel trying Green, conducted an ex parte pretrial certification hearing under 
Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(e), which restricted disclosure to the defense of the name of 
Tyrone Armstrong, a prosecution witness.  However, neither constitutional nor 
prejudicial error occurred. 
 
“The judge who disposes of such a motion [under Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(e)] may 
not be the same judge who will conduct the trial,”  State v. Gillard (1988), 40 Ohio 
St.3d 226, 533 N.E.2d 272, paragraph one of the syllabus, because “there is an 
unnecessary risk that the judge will harbor a bias against that defendant.”  Id. at 
 
 
32 
229, 533 N.E.2d at 276.  Although Judge Bowman did not “conduct the trial,” he 
did sit on the panel.  Such a mistake “is not per se prejudicial,” id., nor is  “violation 
of the Gillard rule [a] constitutional error.”  State v. Esparza (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
660, 662, 660 N.E.2d 1194, 1196. 
 
The fact that Judge Bowman had earlier ruled on the prosecutor’s Crim.R. 
16(B)(1)(e) certification and later sat on the panel was harmless error.  The hearing 
relating to Tyrone Armstrong was brief.  It dealt with Armstrong’s family 
relationship with Coley and Green, as cousins, the fact that all were incarcerated in 
the same facility, and the fact that family members had asked Armstrong not to 
cooperate with the prosecution.  Moreover, much of Armstrong’s testimony dealt 
with the Moore offenses, to which Green had pled guilty. 
 
With respect to the offenses against El-Okdi, Armstrong simply 
corroborated that Green was riding in El-Okdi’s car for two or three days before he 
was arrested.  Green readily admitted that fact to detectives.  The record does not 
suggest that the trial panel relied upon or considered the brief statements made at 
the pretrial Crim.R. 16 hearing.  See State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d at 384, 513 N.E.2d 
at 759.  We find any error to be harmless and reject Green’s twelfth proposition of 
law.  Cf. State v. Gillard, 40 Ohio St.3d at 229-230, 533 N.E.2d at 277. 
 
Denial of continuance.  In his fourteenth proposition of law, Green argues 
that he was denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel when the trial 
 
 
33 
court failed to grant a continuance because his counsel did not have adequate time 
to prepare for trial. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “[t]here are no mechanical 
tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due 
process.  The answer must be found in the circumstances * * *, particularly in the 
reasons presented [when] the request is denied.”  Ungar v. Sarafite (1964), 376 U.S. 
575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 850, 11 L.Ed.2d 921, 931.  In State v. Landrum (1990), 53 
Ohio St.3d 107, 115, 559 N.E.2d 710, 722, we recognized that “[s]everal factors 
can be considered: the length of delay requested, prior continuances, inconvenience, 
the reasons for the delay, whether the defendant contributed to the delay, and other 
relevant factors.” 
 
In fact, “[t]he grant or denial of a continuance is a matter that is entrusted to 
the broad, sound discretion of the trial judge.”  State v. Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 
65, 21 O.O.3d 41, 423 N.E.2d 1078, syllabus.  We have sustained trial judges in 
several capital cases who denied continuances despite defense claims that it needed 
more time to prepare.  See, e.g., State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 154-156, 
694 N.E.2d 932, 947; State v. Spirko (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 1, 17-18, 570 N.E.2d 
229, 249; State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d at 115-116, 559 N.E.2d at 721-722. 
 
The record supports finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  
Defense counsel Ronnie Wingate represented Green in January 1997 on the original 
 
 
34 
noncapital indictment.  On March 10, 1997, Green was indicted on capital charges.  
The next day, Wingate appeared at a hearing on Green’s behalf.  Thereafter, 
Wingate and Donald Cameron, who were the counsel at trial, represented Green at 
pretrial hearings or conferences in 1997 on March 12, July 17, August 5, August 12, 
September 16, September 18, October 9, October 15, and in 1998, on January 6, 
February 13, and February 23.  Trial began on February 24, 1998.  The trial date for 
September 8, 1997, had been reset for October 27, 1997, and trial was again 
continued until February 23, 1998. 
 
Thus, counsel had nearly one year to prepare for trial and sentencing.  
Although counsel claimed that they needed more time, their claims were not 
specific.  Another claim made by counsel, that they needed a continuance because 
of exculpatory evidence, could reasonably have been found not credible by the trial 
court in its discretion. 
 
Counsel presented a strong and specific defense based on the lack of 
physical and testimonial evidence tying Green to the offenses against El-Okdi.  In 
the penalty phase, counsel presented several witnesses including a defense 
psychologist.  The record shows “strong, vigorous, and competent” representation 
at all stages of the trial.  See State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 244, 256, 667 
N.E.2d 369, 381.  No basis exists to find ineffective representation or an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court in denying a continuance.  See State v. Mason, 82 Ohio 
 
 
35 
St.3d at 155, 694 N.E.2d at 947; State v. Spirko, 59 Ohio St.3d at 17, 570 N.E.2d at 
249.  We reject Green’s fourteenth proposition of law. 
VII 
Trial Issues 
 
“Other acts” evidence.  In his eleventh proposition of law, Green argues 
that improper evidence of other criminal acts, namely, evidence that he kidnapped, 
robbed, and shot Moore, denied Green due process, a fair trial, and a reliable 
sentencing determination.  Green also argues that this “other acts” evidence mostly 
concerned wrongdoing by Coley, not him. 
 
Under Evid.R. 404(B), “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove” a defendant’s character as to criminal propensity.  “It may, 
however, be admissible * * * [to show] motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”  Id.  “[T]he standard 
for determining admissibility of such evidence is strict.”  State v. Broom (1988), 40 
Ohio St.3d 277, 533 N.E.2d 682, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
“Other acts forming a unique, identifiable plan of criminal activity are 
admissible to establish identity under Evid.R. 404(B).”  State v. Jamison (1990), 49 
Ohio St.3d 182, 552 N.E.2d 180, syllabus.  In order “[t]o be admissible to prove 
identity through a certain modus operandi, other-acts evidence must be related to 
and share common features with the crime in question.”  State v. Lowe (1994), 69 
 
 
36 
Ohio St.3d 527, 634 N.E.2d 616, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Additionally, 
“[t]he admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound discretion 
of the trial court.”  State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 31 OBR 375, 510 
N.E.2d 343, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence 
of the crimes against Moore to help prove the offenses against El-Okdi.  First, no 
issue existed as to Green’s responsibility for the offenses against Moore.  Moore 
positively identified Green, and Green pled guilty to those offenses. 
 
Green is mistaken when he argues that he was only a minor participant in 
these offenses.  According to Moore, Green was the first person to approach him.  
Then Green and Coley displayed guns and both forced him in the car.  Green told 
Moore not to look at their faces and told Moore, “Don’t try an escape or I’ll kill 
you.”  Green also told Moore, “Cough up the cash.”  Finally, Green was the one 
who chased Moore and shot him several times. 
 
Second, the offenses against Moore showed a “unique, identifiable plan of 
criminal activity” helping to prove Green’s identity as one who kidnapped, robbed, 
and killed El-Okdi.  That evidence also relates to Green’s intent and his plans and 
preparation under Evid.R. 404(B).  In other cases, we have upheld similar “other 
acts” evidence.  See, e.g., State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 709 N.E.2d 484 
(both victims stabbed in chest, their trousers removed, and shoes placed next to 
 
 
37 
bodies); State v. Williams (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 652 N.E.2d 721 (same gun 
used to kill cab driver and assault truck driver); State v. Woodard (1993), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 70, 623 N.E.2d 75 (carjacking attempt admissible to prove identity as to later 
carjacking and murder); State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 552 N.E.2d 180 
(similar strong-arm robberies against small businesses). 
 
Here, the similarities between the offenses are remarkable.  Moore and El-
Okdi lived within a block of each other.  Within a twelve-day period, both were 
carjacked and kidnapped sometime between 7:30 and 8:30 p.m.  In both cases, the 
victims were robbed and taken in their older model cars to a remote area and shot.  
Based on the bullets from the victims, and the shells from the scene, both were shot 
by the same gun and the same type of bullets.  Both Coley and Green drove their 
victims’ cars after the carjackings using stolen license plates.  Thus, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion.  Cf. State v. Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 709 N.E.2d 484; 
State v. Williams, 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 652 N.E.2d 721.  We reject Green’s eleventh 
proposition of law. 
 
Off-the-record hearing.  In his thirteenth proposition of law, Green argues 
that the trial court erred by finding a witness competent to testify based on an off-
the-record hearing. 
 
Contrary to Green’s claims, the trial court did not conduct an off-the-record 
competency hearing.  In October 1997, the state took Frusher’s deposition.  On 
 
 
38 
February 25, 1998, during trial, Green moved to inspect Frusher’s psychiatric 
records and for a judicial determination of her competency.  The court declined to 
order a hearing on Frusher’s competency, noting that Frusher had seemed 
competent when the court had presided over her deposition.  The defense stressed 
that it needed access to Frusher’s medical records not to challenge her competency, 
but to explore “her state of mind at the time she allegedly made these observations” 
in the alley the night of El-Okdi’s murder. 
 
Later, the court noted that it had interviewed Frusher along with the 
prosecutor and defense counsel off the record to ascertain “where she [was] treated” 
and “whether or not she was willing to sign a Medical Information Release.”  The 
court noted that Frusher reluctantly signed a release.  The parties agreed that 
defense counsel could have access to the medical records before their cross-
examination.  Then, before Frusher testified, the court noted that based on its 
observations when Frusher was deposed and upon the court’s “off-the-record 
interview of Ms. Frusher a half an hour or so ago, the Medical Information Release 
and the course of the treatment * * * she is competent to testify.”  Green did not 
challenge that decision. 
 
Counsel consented to this informal procedure and apparently never asked for 
the accused or a court reporter to be present.  Defense counsel’s agreement to this 
procedure and failure to request that the interview be recorded waived all but plain 
 
 
39 
error.  See State v. Palmer, 80 Ohio St.3d at 554, 687 N.E.2d at 696-697; State v. 
Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364.  Moreover, a 
defendant’s absence from a witness competency hearing is not a fatal error.  
Kentucky v. Stincer (1987), 482 U.S. 730, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631.  We 
reject Green’s thirteenth proposition of law. 
 
Absence of accused during proceedings.  In his fifteenth proposition of 
law, Green argues that the trial court’s failure to secure Green’s presence at various 
in-chambers conferences violated his rights to confrontation and due process.  
Green was absent from a pretrial discussion regarding a continuance, a jury view, 
and stipulations about evidence, from the interview with Frusher about waiving her 
medical privilege, from a discussion over a continuance request and possible 
exculpatory evidence, from a discussion over a continuance request, police reports, 
hearsay, and defense efforts to locate witnesses, from a discussion over scheduling, 
possible witnesses, and Frusher’s psychiatric records, and from other discussions 
about Frusher’s medical records and scheduling. 
 
Green has a fundamental right to be present at all stages of his criminal trial.  
Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution; Crim.R. 43(A).  An accused’s absence, 
however, does not necessarily result in prejudicial or constitutional error. 
 
In Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), 291 U.S. 97, 107-108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 333, 
78 L.Ed. 674, 679, the court held that “the presence of a defendant is a condition of 
 
 
40 
due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his 
absence, and to that extent only.”  In United States v. Gagnon (1985), 470 U.S. 522, 
105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s absence 
from a hearing involving a juror, when counsel were present, did not offend due 
process.  See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 
(no Due Process or Confrontation Clause violation when an accused was excluded 
from a hearing on the competency of two child witnesses).  See, also, State v. 
Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 285-287, 6 OBR 345, 348-350, 452 N.E.2d 
1323, 1329-1331; State v. Roe (1989), 41 Ohio St.3d 18, 27, 535 N.E.2d 1351, 
1362.  See, also, Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(c)(3) (accused need not be present at “a 
conference or hearing upon a question of law”). 
 
Although the number of Green’s absences from in-chambers conferences is 
disturbing, the absences did not thwart a fair and just hearing.  Snyder, supra.  
Counsel were present and fully participated.  At the conferences, the panel never 
received testimony or evidence.  Cf. State v. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 24, 676 
N.E.2d at 92.  The discussions mostly involved legal issues within the professional 
competence of counsel, not issues that Green must personally decide.  Cf. United 
States v. Brown (C.A.6, 1978), 571 F.2d 980, 987 (accused must establish 
prejudice from absence at in-chambers conference); State v. White (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.3d 16, 26, 693 N.E.2d 772, 781 (accused’s absence during hearing on proposed 
 
 
41 
jury instructions did not deprive him of fair trial); State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d at 
285-287, 6 OBR at 348-350, 452 N.E.2d at 1329-1331. 
 
Moreover, Green’s counsel expressly waived Green’s presence at these 
discussions.  See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. at 1485, 84 
L.Ed.2d at 491 (trial court “need not get an express ‘on the record’ waiver from the 
defendant for every trial conference which a defendant may have a right to 
attend”); United States v. Gallego (C.A.2, 1999), 191 F.3d 156, 171-172 (waiver 
can be inferred from accused’s failure to object to exclusion); Polizzi v. United 
States (C.A.2, 1991), 926 F.2d 1311, 1322-1323 (counsel can waive accused’s 
right to be present); State v. Hill, 73 Ohio St.3d at 444, 653 N.E.2d at 281.  Thus, 
we reject the fifteenth proposition of law. 
 
Prosecutorial misconduct.  In his sixteenth proposition of law, Green 
argues that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence, advised witnesses not to 
talk to defense counsel, and improperly argued the case at both phases of the trial. 
 
Exculpatory evidence.  Despite Green’s claims, the state did not violate 
Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, by 
withholding exculpatory evidence.  The evidence in question was a police report 
on a prior domestic violence complaint by Penny Graves against Coley and certain 
pretrial statements by Tyrone Armstrong.  Since the reports were “presented 
during the trial [and not after the trial, as in Brady], there exists no Brady 
 
 
42 
violation.” (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Wickline (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 114, 116, 552 
N.E.2d 913, 917; State v. Brown (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 583, 595, 679 N.E.2d 
361, 369. 
 
Moreover, these reports were neither material nor exculpatory.  Green has 
not met the Brady materiality test that “had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  United States v. 
Bagley (1985), 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 494.  
See, e.g., State v. Lawson (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 343, 595 N.E.2d 902, 908; 
State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 433, 588 N.E.2d 819, 827.  The panel 
declined to find that Green was the principal offender, and whether Coley had 
previously misplaced a firearm or had admitted to shooting El-Okdi did not negate 
Green’s complicity.  Moreover, Armstrong’s testimony mostly related to offenses 
against Moore to which Green pled guilty. 
 
Interference with access.  Green argues that the state interfered with defense 
access to witnesses by advising twelve-year-old Albert Quinn not to talk with 
defense counsel before trial unless a prosecutor was present.  However, Quinn did 
not remember what was said or who said it.  The state claims to have told Quinn 
only that he did not have to talk with defense counsel if he did not want to do so.  
See State v. Zeh (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 99, 31 OBR 263, 509 N.E.2d 414, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Regardless of what was said, Green has not 
 
 
43 
established prejudice from any asserted constitutional violation.  Green called 
Quinn as a defense witness and had complete access to the witness at that time.  
Cf. State v. Scudder (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 263, 271-272, 643 N.E.2d 524, 531-
532. 
 
Trial-phase argument.  Green argues that the prosecutor improperly argued 
Green’s guilt.  However, “the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of 
the prosecutor.”  Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947, 
71 L.Ed.2d 78, 87.  The Constitution does not guarantee “an error-free, perfect 
trial.”  United States v. Hasting (1983), 461 U.S. 499, 508, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1980, 
76 L.Ed.2d 96, 106. 
 
At trial, Green failed to object to the remarks he now complains about.  
Thus, he waived all but plain error.  State v. Wade, 53 Ohio St.2d 182, 7 O.O.3d 
362, 373 N.E.2d 1244, paragraph one of the syllabus; Crim.R. 52(B).  Moreover, 
“[n]either alone nor in the aggregate did these [asserted] errors have an arguable 
effect on the outcome of the trial.”  State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 605, 
605 N.E.2d 916, 925. 
 
The prosecutor’s remarks about “senseless violence” or that Green’s crimes 
were “heinous” were inconsequential.  The prosecutor did not err by arguing that 
the facts of the Moore crime showed prior calculation and design for the El-Okdi 
 
 
44 
murder.  Evid.R. 404(B) permits proof of other acts to show “intent, preparation 
[or] plan.”  See discussion on Green’s eleventh proposition of law.  Nor did the 
prosecutor err by commenting on Green’s demeanor, body language, and lack of 
any concern during trial.  See, e.g., State v. Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d at 496-497, 709 
N.E.2d at 495 (state can comment on accused’s emotional outburst during 
argument); State v. Brown (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 317, 528 N.E.2d 523, 538 
(state “may comment on the accused’s appearance”). 
 
The prosecutor properly argued that Frusher was a reliable witness to the 
simple events she witnessed, that she lacked any motive to lie, and that her 
testimony was not contradictory.  The state did not improperly vouch for her as a 
witness.  Instead, the prosecutor argued facts to support Frusher’s credibility and 
responded to defense attacks on her credibility and mental abilities. See, e.g., State 
v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d at 339, 703 N.E.2d at 1260; State v. Woodard, 68 Ohio 
St.3d at 76, 623 N.E.2d at 80. 
 
The prosecutor’s comment that if Green “wanted to take your car from you 
he would not hesitate in killing you to take it,” was simple hyperbole that can be 
disregarded.  Likewise, the prosecutor’s brief comment about what El-Okdi was 
thinking as she lay dying was improper but not prejudicial.  Cf. State v. Combs 
(1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 282-283, 581 N.E.2d 1071, 1076-1077; State v. 
Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d at 357-360, 662 N.E.2d at 322-324.  Finally, “[j]udges 
 
 
45 
are trained and expected to disregard any extraneous influences in deliberations.”  
State v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 48, 584 N.E.2d 1192, 1196.  Accord State 
v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d at 384, 513 N.E.2d at 759. 
 
Penalty phase.  The prosecutor did not err by asking the defense 
psychologist, Dr. Jolie Brams, if the antisocial personality disorder classification 
also encompassed psychopaths and sociopaths.  The question and Dr. Brams’s 
affirmative answer merely provided a context for her opinions.  Green’s failure to 
object waived all but plain error.  State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 
98, 364 N.E.2d 1364. 
 
Further, Green argues that the prosecutor’s sentencing argument stressed the 
manner of killing, pointed to the lack of justification, and exaggerated the 
relatively minor role Green played in killing El-Okdi.  Green’s failure to object 
waived these issues.  State v. Wade, 53 Ohio St.2d 182, 7 O.O.3d 362, 373 N.E.2d 
1244, paragraph one of the syllabus; Crim.R. 52(B). 
 
Moreover, “[p]rosecutors can urge the merits of their cause and legitimately 
argue that defense mitigation evidence is worthy of little or no weight.”  State v. 
Wilson (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 381, 399, 659 N.E.2d 292, 309.  See, also, State v. 
Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph two of the 
syllabus.  As we noted in State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 200, 661 N.E.2d 
1068, 1075, “both the criminal and his crime are properly considered in 
 
 
46 
determining the propriety of imposing a death sentence.” (Emphasis sic.)  The facts 
are relevant in determining whether the nature and circumstances of the offense are 
mitigating.  State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 420, 613 N.E.2d 212, 
218.  See, also, State v. Stumpf (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 512 N.E.2d 598, 
paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
Finally, misconduct by the prosecutor did not permeate the trial.  
Considering all the circumstances, Green received a fair trial.  Cf. State v. Hill, 75 
Ohio St.3d at 201-202, 661 N.E.2d at 1076-1077; State v. Landrum, 53 Ohio St.3d 
at 110, 559 N.E.2d at 718.  We reject Green’s sixteenth proposition of law. 
 
Advice on right to testify.  In his seventeenth proposition of law, Green 
argues that the trial court violated Green’s constitutional rights by failing to ask 
Green whether he knew he had a right to testify and inquire whether “he 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives that right.”  However, “a trial court 
is not required to conduct an inquiry with the defendant concerning the decision 
whether to testify in his defense.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d at 
499, 709 N.E.2d at 497.  Accord State v. Madrigal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 398, 
721 N.E.2d 52, 71; State v. Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d at 240-241, 714 N.E.2d at 877.  
As in Bey, nothing in the record suggests that Green “wanted to testify and was 
denied the opportunity to do so.”  85 Ohio St.3d at 500, 709 N.E.2d at 497.  We 
reject Green’s seventeenth proposition of law. 
 
 
47 
 
Ineffective assistance of counsel.  In his eighteenth proposition of law, Green 
argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance both before and during the 
trial.  Reversal of convictions on ineffective assistance requires that the defendant 
show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.  
Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674, 683.  Accord  State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 
373. 
 
Green argues that his attorneys did not advise him about certain rights.  
Since the record does not reflect what Green’s counsel advised him, we are unable 
to determine whether Green’s attorneys failed to advise him about the differences 
between a jury and panel trial, his right to be present at in-chambers conferences, 
his right to testify, or his right to allocution.  The record also does not show that 
counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial.  We summarily reject these claims.  
See State v. Ishmail (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 8 O.O.3d 405, 377 N.E.2d 500, 
paragraph one of the syllabus (reviewing court cannot decide appeal based on 
matters not in the record); State v. Williams, 73 Ohio St.3d at 160, 652 N.E.2d at 
728 (same). 
 
Second, Green has not demonstrated that his counsel’s performance fell 
“below an objective standard of reasonable representation.”  State v. Bradley, 42 
 
 
48 
Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus. “[A] court must 
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 
2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. 
 
Counsel need not raise issues lacking merit.  State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d at 
211, 661 N.E.2d at 1083.  Since Green was brought promptly before a magistrate, 
counsel cannot be faulted for failing to claim otherwise.  Similarly, since there was 
no off-the-record competency evaluation of Frusher, counsel were not required to 
raise the nonexistent evaluation as an issue.  Counsel need not raise weak claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct.  Ohio’s statutory “reasonable doubt” definition is proper, 
as was the admission of trial-phase evidence into the penalty phase.  Counsel need 
not challenge such decisions.  See State v. DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 528 N.E.2d 
542, paragraph one of the syllabus, and discussion on Green’s other propositions of 
law. 
 
We cannot find counsel ineffective for failing to challenge Judge Bowman 
because he presided over the ex parte hearing regarding Tyrone Armstrong.  It is 
possible that counsel wanted Judge Bowman to sit even though he had participated 
in a pretrial hearing under Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(e).  Finally, counsel’s argument, in 
support of an acquittal on the “principal offender” element, that the state failed to 
prove intent to kill could have perhaps been clearer, but that does not constitute 
 
 
49 
deficient performance.  In sum, counsel acted within their reasonable professional 
judgment. 
 
Green also complains that counsel should have objected to the panel’s 
finding on the R.C. 2929.03(A)(7) death specification and to the victim-impact 
statements.  Our disposition vacating the death penalty and remanding the cause 
renders those issues moot.  We reject Green’s eighteenth proposition of law. 
VIII 
Constitutional Issues 
 
In his nineteenth proposition of law, Green argues that his rights were 
violated because of Ohio’s statutory definition of reasonable doubt.  However, 
nothing in the record demonstrates that the three-judge panel relied upon a 
constitutionally deficient standard.  Moreover, Ohio’s statutory definition of 
reasonable doubt is constitutional.  See State v. Lundgren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
474, 493, 653 N.E.2d 304, 323; State v. Van Gundy (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 230, 594 
N.E.2d 604.  Accord Victor v. Nebraska (1994), 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 
L.Ed.2d 583.  We reject Green’s nineteenth proposition of law. 
 
We summarily reject Green’s twentieth proposition of law, which challenges 
the constitutionality of Ohio’s death penalty statute.  See State v. Poindexter 
(1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus; State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio 
 
 
50 
St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Goodwin, 84 
Ohio St.3d at 349-350, 703 N.E.2d at 1267. 
IX 
Sentence Appropriateness 
 
Green’s sixth proposition of law, which argues that the death penalty is not 
warranted in his case, is mooted by our disposition.  Our sentence evaluation and 
issues of proportionality are also mooted. 
X 
Disposition 
 
We affirm each of Green’s convictions and the sentences on the noncapital 
offenses.  We reverse the sentence of death and remand the cause for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  See State v. Davis, 38 Ohio St.3d 361, 
528 N.E.2d 925. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur separately. 
 
F.E. Sweeney, J., concurs in judgment. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
 
51 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
1. 
The panel correctly merged the aggravated murder charges for a 
single victim into a single offense for punishment purposes.  See State v. Lawson 
(1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 351, 595 N.E.2d 902, 913.  Counts V and VI were 
“merged into [Count IV] as allied offenses of similar import.” 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring.  I agree with the majority’s decision to vacate 
Green’s death sentence and to remand the cause to the trial court.  I write 
separately to (1) bolster the record support for the allocution decision in Part II of 
the majority opinion and (2) disagree with the language in Part V that suggests that 
trial courts must explicitly reject, in sentencing opinions, all inadmissible evidence. 
1 
 
In Part II, the majority cites a portion of the sentencing-phase transcript and 
determines that when the panel asked Green if there was anything he wished to say 
“with regard to those offenses,” the context of that question  “suggests that the 
court may have solicited comment only on the noncapital offenses.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  A review of the sentencing-phase transcript as a whole confirms, without a 
doubt, that the panel never invited Green to speak on his own behalf or present 
information in mitigation of punishment for the capital offenses in this case. 
 
 
52 
 
The transcript shows that the panel retired to consider the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances at 5:18 p.m.  Later that evening, the panel returned to 
announce its verdict and sentence Green.  First, the panel noted that it had 
previously found Green guilty of the aggravated murder charges and 
accompanying capital specifications in Counts 4, 5, and 6.  The panel then noted 
that it had previously found Green guilty of the noncapital offenses in Counts 1, 2, 
3, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11.  The panel’s next statement, not cited by the majority, was 
the following:  “Proceeding then with the non-capital sentencing first, then, this 
panel inquires whether the Defendant has any objection to accelerating sentencing 
as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 9 and 11 [noncapital offenses] from the regularly scheduled 
date, which was tomorrow, March 12, 1998 at 10 a.m.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
When counsel did not object, the panel asked Green whether there was 
anything he wished to say in regard to “those counts” (the noncapital counts it had 
just referred to—Counts 1, 2, 3, 9, and 11) “as well as on Counts 7, 8 and 10” (also 
noncapital counts).  The panel then heard over fifteen transcript pages of victim-
impact testimony and imposed sentence for all of the noncapital counts and 
specifications.  Immediately after imposing sentence for the noncapital offenses, 
the panel launched into sentencing on the capital counts—Counts 4, 5, and 6—
without ever asking Green whether there was anything he wished to say in regard 
to those offenses. 
 
 
53 
2 
 
In Part V, citing our Huertas, Goodwin, and Fautenberry cases, the majority 
correctly determines that the trial court erred when it permitted Moore and his 
family members to express their opinions about how Green should be punished for 
the offenses against El-Okdi.  Because Green did not object, I agree with the 
majority’s decision to apply a plain-error analysis.  I disagree, however, with the 
majority’s instruction to the trial court on remand to “clarify whether or not they 
considered such expressions of opinion from others as to what the sentence should 
be in this case.”  (Emphasis added.)  The imposition of such a requirement here 
could be miscontrued in future cases to be a statement by this court that plain error 
exists whenever a trial court fails to state expressly that it ignored improper 
testimony. 
 
As the majority notes, we may presume that trial judges do not rely on 
inadmissible expressions of opinion.  This presumption relieves trial courts of the 
duty to discount expressly every sort of improperly admitted testimony in their 
sentencing opinions.  By requiring the trial court to clarify whether it considered 
the improper testimony in this case, the majority undercuts the very presumption 
that it cites. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion. 
__________________ 
 
 
54 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I respectfully 
dissent from the second paragraph of the body of the majority opinion and Parts II, 
IV, V, IX and, in part, Part X of the opinion.  I do so because I believe that the 
pronouncements of the three-judge panel, while both wrong and intemperate in 
places,2 were substantially accurate overall and the judgments rendered by the 
panel should be affirmed. 
 
I respectfully concur in the remainder of the majority opinion.  Accordingly, 
I would affirm in all respects the judgments of the three-judge trial panel. 
 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
2. 
As examples, the panel’s opinion, in discussing State v. McGuire 
(1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, says that “[i]n the syllabus to that 
opinion, the 7-2 majority of the Supreme Court states * * *.” (Emphasis added.)  
There are, of course, a total of only seven justices on the Supreme Court of Ohio—
not nine.  Also, the two justices to which the opinion of the three-judge panel 
refers, did, in fact, concur with the judgment of the majority. 
 
Further, in continuing to discuss McGuire, the opinion of the three-judge 
panel says that “[t]his bright-line rule—overruling earlier decisions—in the view 
of this panel is wrongheaded to the point where one day its blind application will 
almost surely result in the execution of an innocent defendant.” (Emphasis added.)  
 
 
55 
At least five members of this court respectfully disagree with the three-judge panel.  
That is just how our system works.  Judges should be able to disagree, agreeably. 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I 
would affirm in toto the judgment of the trial court, including Green’s death 
sentence.  I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that Green’s right of 
allocution was violated. 
 
Although the majority opinion sets forth much of the exchange that took 
place between the trial court and Green’s attorneys prior to sentencing, that 
exchange is detailed more fully below to support my view that Crim.R. 32 was not 
violated: 
 
“The Court:  All right.  Is there anything with regard to those offenses, 
Counsel or Mr. Green, prior to the Court passing sentence on both those counts as 
well as on Counts 7, 8 and 10? 
 
“Mr. Cameron [defense counsel]:  Anything we wish to say? 
 
“The Court:  Yes. 
 
“Mr. Wingate [defense counsel]:  The only thing that we would add, Your 
Honor, is that it’s my understanding of the law that—that if the firearm 
specification which is attendant to those counts arose out of the same transaction 
and met that format, then there would be one firearm, which would mean there 
 
 
56 
would be one 3-year sentence that would be attendant to those charges, and we just 
ask the Court— 
 
“The Court:  I believe I already indicated that, but that’s our finding. 
 
“Mr. Wingate:  All right.  Then nothing further.”  (Emphases added.) 
 
I have little quarrel with the legal standards set forth in the majority opinion 
regarding the importance of the right of allocution and the need to adhere to the 
requirements of Crim.R. 32.  However, as the above discourse unmistakably 
illustrates, the record makes clear that this defendant was “issued a personal 
invitation to speak prior to sentencing,” and that this defendant chose not to take 
advantage of the unambiguous opportunity to make a statement.  See Green v. 
United States (1961), 365 U.S. 301, 305, 81 S.Ct. 653, 655, 5 L.Ed.2d 670, 674. 
 
The trial court explicitly addressed “Mr. Green,” as well as trial counsel, 
before sentence was passed.  As demonstrated by the trial court’s response to Mr. 
Cameron’s clarifying question, this was an invitation to “Mr. Green” to say 
anything he wished to say.  After Mr. Wingate made a comment and Green did not 
say anything, then Mr. Wingate explicitly stated “nothing further.”  From the 
context of the entire dialogue, there should be no question that the declaration 
“nothing further” should be fairly interpreted as a clear indication by counsel that 
Green had no desire to make his own statement. 
 
 
57 
 
Because I strongly disagree with the majority’s statement that “[t]he record 
demonstrates a clear violation of Crim.R. 32,” I respectfully dissent. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.