Case Title: Harris v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 321, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LYNN HARRIS,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 321, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0305005293 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  August 15, 2006 
Decided:  September 22, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 22nd day of September 2006, upon consideration of the 
appellant’s opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Lynn Harris, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s June 13, 2006 order summarily dismissing his motion for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The 
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment 
of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of the 
opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and AFFIRM.   
 
2
 
(2) 
In February 2004, Harris was found guilty, in a Superior Court 
bench trial, of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree, Conspiracy and 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.  He was 
sentenced to a total of 13 years of Level V incarceration, to be suspended 
after 10 years for probation.  This Court affirmed Harris’ convictions and 
sentences on direct appeal.1 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Harris claims that: a) the State failed to prove its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt; b) the police lacked reasonable suspicion to 
stop him; c) the police failed to give him the proper Miranda warnings 
before conducting a pat down search; and d) his attorney provided 
ineffective assistance in the direct appeal. 
 
(4) 
Because Harris’ first three claims were already presented in his 
direct appeal, he is foreclosed from presenting them again in this proceeding 
unless he can demonstrate that reconsideration of the claims is warranted in 
the interest of justice.2   In the absence of any such evidence, Harris’ first 
three claims are unavailing.   
 
(5) 
Harris next claims that his counsel provided ineffective 
assistance, specifically, by failing to file a timely notice of appeal, by filing a 
motion to withdraw along with his opening brief, and by failing to argue that 
                                                 
1 Harris v. State, Del. Supr., No. 193, 2004, Jacobs, J. (Apr. 11, 2005). 
2 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).  
 
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the State failed to prove its case, that the police lacked reasonable suspicion 
to stop him and that the police failed to give him the proper Miranda 
warnings.     
 
(6) 
In order to prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Harris must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of 
the proceedings would have been different.3  Although not insurmountable, 
the Strickland standard is highly demanding and leads to a “strong 
presumption that the representation was professionally reasonable.”4 
 
(7) 
As to Harris’ first claim of ineffective assistance, the record 
reflects that, after Harris himself filed a notice of appeal in this Court, the 
Clerk instructed Harris’ attorney to file a formal notice of appeal by a date 
certain.  Because Harris’ attorney did as the Clerk instructed, Harris’ first 
contention is without merit.  As to Harris’ two remaining claims of 
ineffective assistance, the record reflects that a no-merit brief was filed on 
Harris’ behalf under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), including the points that 
Harris wished this Court to consider.  Ultimately, however, this Court 
determined that Harris’ direct appeal was without merit.  Harris has, thus, 
                                                 
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
4 Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990). 
 
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failed to demonstrate any error on the part of his counsel that prejudiced his 
case.     
 
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of Harris’ opening brief that the appeal 
is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
clearly there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice