Case Title: United America, LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018AP002383

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 44 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2018AP2383 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
United America, LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 392 Wis. 2d 335,944 N.W.2d 38 
PDC No:2020 WI App 24 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 18, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Lincoln   
 
JUDGE: 
Jay R. Tlusty   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, HAGEDORN, 
and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Joseph R. Cincotta, Milwaukee. There was an oral 
argument by Joseph R. Cincotta. 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Clayton P. Kawski, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Clayton P. Kawski. 
 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Eminent 
Domain Services, LLC by Erik S. Olsen and Andrew D. Weininger, 
Madison.  
 
2021 WI 44 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2018AP2383 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV78) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
United America, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
MAY 18, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
DALLET, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, HAGEDORN, 
and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   The 
Department 
of 
Transportation (DOT) changed the grade of a highway that abuts 
United America, LLC's property.  As a result, access to United 
America's property became less convenient and that property's 
value decreased.  The question here is whether such a diminution 
in property value qualifies as "damages to the lands" under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.18 (2017-18).1  The court of appeals held that it does 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
2 
 
not.2  We agree and therefore affirm the court of appeals' 
decision. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
United America operated a gas station and convenience 
store on its land that abuts the intersection of Highway 51 and 
Northstar Road.3  A paved driveway connected to Northstar Road 
provided the only access to United America's facilities.4  
Customers traveling on Highway 51 patronized United America's 
business by turning onto Northstar Road at what was once an 
at-grade intersection. 
¶3 
That convenient access from Highway 51 to United 
America's 
facilities 
disappeared, 
however, 
when 
the 
DOT 
initiated a project to change the grade at the intersection, 
making Northstar Road a bridge over Highway 51.  Despite United 
America's requests for on- and off-ramps to maintain convenient 
access between Highway 51 and United America's facilities, the 
DOT declined to include those ramps, resulting in a longer, 
indirect route to reach United America's business.  Because of 
that added inconvenience, Highway 51 traffic largely stopped 
                                                 
2 United Am., LLC v. DOT, 2020 WI App 24, 392 Wis. 2d 335, 
944 N.W.2d 38 (reversing the judgment of the Lincoln County 
Circuit Court, the Honorable Jay R. Tlusty presided). 
3 United America's parcel is located in the Southwest corner 
of where Highway 51 (running North-South) and Northstar Road 
(running East-West) intersect. 
4 United America cannot directly access Highway 51 from its 
property because the previous property owner sold the property's 
direct access rights to the DOT. 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
3 
 
patronizing United America's business.  United America's revenue 
subsequently suffered 
and its 
property's value decreased.  
United America sought compensation from the DOT for that 
diminished 
property 
value 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.18.  
Section 32.18 
requires 
the 
DOT, 
in 
the 
absence 
of 
a 
constitutional "taking,"5 to pay landowners whose lands abut a 
change-of-grade project the value of "any damages to said lands 
occasioned by such change of grade."  The DOT denied United 
America's claim. 
¶4 
United America timely commenced an action in the 
circuit court against DOT, alleging that Wis. Stat. § 32.18 
entitled it to "damages to [its] lands, property, and property 
value[]" occasioned by the change in Northstar Road's grade.  At 
the ensuing bench trial, United America and DOT introduced 
competing appraisals regarding United America's property value 
before and after the DOT's project.  The circuit court entered 
judgment in favor of United America in the amount calculated by 
United America's expert appraisal.  It concluded that the terms 
"any" and "occasioned" in § 32.18 indicate that the provision 
encompasses a broad range of compensable injuries, including "a 
diminution in the value of [United America]'s property due to a 
                                                 
5 A constitutional taking occurs when a private property 
interest is converted to public use.  Both the Wisconsin and 
federal constitutions require that the private owner be justly 
compensated for that conversion.  See Wis. Const. art. I, § 13; 
U.S. Const. amend. V.  United America does not argue that a 
taking occurred. 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
4 
 
loss of convenient access to the flow of traffic from US 
Highway 51." 
¶5 
The DOT appealed and the court of appeals reversed.  
United Am., LLC v. DOT, 2020 WI App 24, 392 Wis. 2d 335, 944 
N.W.2d 38.  The court of appeals concluded that, considering the 
context and this court's precedent predating enactment of Wis. 
Stat. § 32.18, the phrase "to said lands" plainly limits the 
scope of "any damages" to "structural or physical" injuries to 
the land itself.  Id., ¶¶14-25.  It reversed the circuit court's 
judgment because it determined that United America's diminished 
property value is not a structural or physical injury to its 
lands.  We granted United America's petition for review. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
¶6 
We review de novo the interpretation and application 
of Wis. Stat. § 32.18.  Moreschi v. Vill. of Williams Bay, 2020 
WI 95, ¶13, 395 Wis. 2d 55, 935 N.W.2d 318.  We interpret 
statutes so as to give the legislature's chosen language its 
"full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  We do this by reading the operative terms in a 
manner consistent with either their specially defined meaning 
or, if not specially defined, their common, ordinary, and 
accepted meaning.  Id., ¶45; Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).  Common 
meaning is derived in part from the statutory context in which 
the terms are used.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  That includes 
the terms' usage in relation to the language of closely related 
statutes, see id., and how the court had interpreted those terms 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
5 
 
prior to the legislature enacting the statute in question, see 
Strenke v. Hogner, 2005 WI 25, ¶28, 279 Wis. 2d 52, 694 
N.W.2d 296. 
¶7 
We 
begin 
by 
identifying 
the 
disputed 
language.  
Section 32.18 provides: 
Where a . . . highway improvement project undertaken 
by the department of transportation . . . causes a 
change of the grade of such . . . highway in cases 
where such grade was not previously fixed by city, 
village or town ordinance, but does not require a 
taking of any abutting lands, the owner of such lands 
at the date of such change of grade may file with the 
department of transportation . . . a claim for any 
damages to said lands occasioned by such change of 
grade. . . . [Upon denial of that claim,] such owner 
may . . . commence an action against the department of 
transportation . . . to recover any damages to the 
lands shown to have resulted from such change of 
grade. 
(Emphases added.)  The parties agree that United America is an 
abutting landowner to a DOT project that caused a change in 
grade, that Northstar Road's grade was not previously fixed by 
municipal ordinance, that no taking occurred, and that the 
change of grade occasioned United America's diminution in value.  
Thus, we face a single issue of statutory interpretation:  is a 
diminution in value a cognizable injury within the class of 
"damages to the lands"? 
¶8 
United America claims that it is and argues for a 
liberal reading of Wis. Stat. § 32.18.  It accuses the court of 
appeals of ignoring the legislature's choice of the broad phrase 
"any 
damages" 
by 
impermissibly 
limiting 
that 
phrase 
to 
"structural or physical" damages.  Similarly, United America 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
6 
 
argues that the legislature's use of "occasioned" instead of the 
ostensibly narrower "caused" suggests that the legislature 
intended § 32.18 to cover a wider range of damages.  United 
America also contends that § 32.18 should be interpreted 
liberally because of its apparent "remedial" nature.  Lastly, 
United America urges that we read "damages" as a term of art 
that refers to monetary compensation and thus restricts § 32.18 
to a class of monetary losses. 
¶9 
The DOT counters that United America's arguments miss 
the forest for the trees by focusing on the language surrounding 
the critical limiting phrase——"damages to the lands"——rather 
than that phrase itself.  The DOT explains that the court of 
appeals did not add in the "structural or physical" limitation; 
that limitation is inherent in the plain meaning of "lands." 
¶10 We conclude that the diminution in property value 
occasioned by a change in an abutting highway's grade is not an 
injury compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.18 because such damages 
are not "damages to the lands."  That conclusion follows from 
the text of § 32.18, particularly in light of the closely 
related Wis. Stat. § 32.09(4) and (6)(f), and is confirmed by 
these provisions' legislative history.  We need not decide, as 
the court of appeals did, the full scope of "damages to the 
lands"; our conclusion that a property's diminution in value 
falls outside the scope of "damages to lands" suffices to 
resolve this case. 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
7 
 
A 
¶11 Under common law, a landowner cannot recover for 
consequential injuries, including a diminution in property 
value, resulting from the exercise of state police power, such 
as changing a highway's grade.6  See Nick v. State Highway 
Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 511, 514-15, 109 N.W.2d 71 (1961) (explaining 
that a diminution in value due to an exercise of state police 
power is not recoverable); Jantz v. DOT, 63 Wis. 2d 404, 409, 
217 N.W.2d 266 (1974) (affirming that a change in grade is an 
exercise of police power for which consequential injuries are 
not compensable).  The legislature, however, has enacted limited 
and specific exceptions to that rule, including Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.18. 
 
Section 32.18 
allows 
certain 
landowners 
(those 
abutting a highway change-of-grade project) to recover for 
certain consequential injuries (those "to the lands") occasioned 
by a change of grade. 
¶12 Although the legislature did not define "lands," its 
definition of "property" in Wis. Stat. § 32.01(2) indicates that 
"lands" constitutes some smaller subset of "property."  Per 
§ 32.01(2), "property" includes "estates in lands, fixtures[,] 
and personal property directly connected with lands."  That 
definition differentiates several elements of "property" by 
their relationship to "lands."  Estates in lands, for instance, 
                                                 
6 The "police power" is the government's authority to act 
"in the interest of public safety, convenience[,] and the 
general welfare."  Nick v. State Highway Comm'n, 13 Wis. 2d 511, 
513-14, 109 N.W.2d 71 (1961). 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
8 
 
comprise the intangible interests one can have in lands.  See 
Restatement 
(First) 
of 
Property 
§ 9 
(1936). 
 
Similarly, 
"personal property directly connected with lands" indicates that 
the legislature uses the term "lands" to denote a separate 
category than "personal property."  Thus, "lands" constitutes 
something narrower than "property," as the former does not cover 
the intangible estates in those lands or personal property.7 
¶13 It follows then that "damages to the lands" is a 
narrower category of injuries than "damages to property."  That 
conclusion is borne out by comparing how the legislature uses 
those phrases differently in two closely related statutes, Wis. 
Stat. §§ 32.18 and 32.09(6)(f).  See, e.g., Augsburger v. 
                                                 
7 Because the legislature specially defined "property" in 
Wis. Stat. ch. 32, we rely on that definition rather than the 
generic statutory definition in Wis. Stat. § 990.01.  See 
§ 990.01 (instructing that the generic definitions therein are 
inapplicable 
when 
applying 
them 
"would 
produce 
a 
result 
inconsistent with" the otherwise manifest statutory meaning).  
But even if the generic definition of "property" controlled, it 
reveals that, among the different categories of property 
interests identified in its definition, "lands" denotes the 
narrowest subset.  See § 990.01(31); see also Earl P. Hopkins, 
Handbook on the Law of Real Property § 1, at 3 (1896). 
Given the context of § 32.18, that same distinction 
differentiates "lands" from the generic statutory definition of 
"land."  See § 990.01(18).  While generally the plural includes 
the singular and vice versa, see Wis. Stat. § 990.001(1), here 
§ 990.01(18) defines "land" as "includ[ing] lands," among other, 
broader subsets of property.  We therefore cannot ignore the 
textual clues indicating that, at least in this context, "lands" 
means something different than "land"——especially when ignoring 
those clues results in a circular definition.  See Solie v. Emp. 
Tr. Funds Bd., 2005 WI 42, ¶31 n.17, 279 Wis. 2d 615, 695 
N.W.2d 463 (declining to adopt a circular interpretation of a 
statutory definition). 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
9 
 
Homestead Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 133, ¶17, 359 Wis. 2d 385, 856 
N.W.2d 874 ("When the legislature chooses to use two different 
words, we generally consider each separately and presume that 
different words have different meanings.").  Both provisions 
provide a landowner whose lands abut a change-of-grade project 
the right to compensation for resulting injuries.  But only 
§ 32.09(6)(f), which applies when there is an accompanying 
taking, uses the broader category "property" in allowing for the 
recovery of "[d]amages to property."  Section 32.18, on the 
other hand, applies only when there is no taking, and recovery 
is limited for "damages to the lands."  As "lands" is narrower 
than "property," we understand this distinction to mean that the 
class of injuries compensable under § 32.18 is narrower than 
that compensable under § 32.09(6)(f). 
¶14 That distinction is especially revealing here because, 
despite our precedent defining "damages to property" to include 
a property's diminution in value, the legislature opted for a 
different term in Wis. Stat. § 32.18.  Roughly 40 years before 
the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. §§ 32.18 and 32.09(6)(f), we 
held that the language "any damages . . . to [an abutting 
landowner's] property" encompassed the "diminution in market 
value of [her] property" caused by a "deflection of travel with 
consequent loss of existing prospective patronage."  Voigt v. 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
10 
 
Milwaukee Cnty., 158 Wis. 666, 668-70, 149 N.W. 392 (1914).8  No 
similar holding exists regarding "damages to the lands."  And we 
presume 
that 
when 
the 
legislature 
enacted 
both 
§§ 32.18 
and 32.09(6)(f), it did so with "full knowledge" of this 
difference in our case law.  See Strenke, 279 Wis. 2d 52, ¶28.  
Thus, 
when 
the 
legislature 
simultaneously 
enacted 
those 
provisions but used the phrase "damages to property" in 
§ 32.09(6)(f) and not § 32.18, one implication is that the 
legislature chose to compensate an owner's diminution in 
property value under the former but not the latter. 
¶15 That inference is confirmed by the text of another 
closely related provision, Wis. Stat. § 32.09(4).  Because the 
common law bars compensation for consequential injuries caused 
by an exercise of police power, a statute abrogating that rule 
must do so with "clear, unambiguous, and peremptory" language.  
E.g., Strenke, 279 Wis. 2d 52, ¶29.  And, as we have held for 
over 175 years, we "strictly construe[]" those statues to 
                                                 
8 We additionally recognize that the legislature did not 
opt for "damages to the owner," yet another phrase this court 
had held provides compensation for diminished property value.  
See Stamnes v. Milwaukee & S.L. Ry. Co., 131 Wis. 85, 88, 109 
N.W. 100 (1906), modified on reh'g on other grounds, 131 
Wis. 85, 111 N.W. 62 (1907). 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
11 
 
minimize 
their 
effect 
on 
the 
common 
law.9 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Augsburger, 359 Wis. 2d 385, ¶17; Schaefer v. City of Fond du 
Lac, 99 Wis. 333, 341, 74 N.W. 810 (1898); Baxter v. Payne, 1 
Pin. 501, 504 (Wis. Terr. 1845) (explaining that a law "being in 
derogation of the rules of the common law, has always been 
construed strictly").  The legislature did just that for 
takings, using clear, unambiguous, and peremptory language in 
§ 32.09(4) to expressly identify those provisions that change 
the common law rule as well as how they change it:  "If a 
depreciation in value of property results from an exercise of 
the police power, . . . no compensation may be paid for such 
depreciation 
except 
as 
expressly 
allowed 
in 
[Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09](5)(b) and (6) and [Wis. Stat. §] 32.19."  (Emphasis 
added.).  Predictably on that list, given our Voigt decision, is 
§ 32.09(6)(f), which compensates "[d]amages to property." 
¶16 Yet no similar provision exists for a diminution in 
value in non-taking scenarios; nowhere does any statute identify 
Wis. Stat. § 32.18 as abrogating the common law in that specific 
manner.  The legislature knows how to use clear, unambiguous, 
                                                 
9 The dissent ignores this nearly two centuries' worth of 
law and it cites no Wisconsin case to the contrary.  The dissent 
relies on one extrinsic source that is, ironically, consistent 
with our holding here and contrary to the dissent's position.  
See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 318 (2012) 
(arguing, consistent with our jurisprudence, that statutes 
should "not be interpreted as changing the common law unless 
they effect the change with clarity"); id. at 364-66 (arguing, 
contrary to the dissent, that remedial statutes should not be 
liberally construed because that approach "needlessly invites 
judicial lawmaking" and is "impossible" to apply). 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
12 
 
and peremptory language to change the common law rule regarding 
a diminution in value——it did so in the closely related Wis. 
Stat. § 32.09(4)——but it chose not to in § 32.18.  See 
Strenke, 279 Wis. 2d 52, ¶29; Piper v. Jones Dairy Farm, 2020 
WI 28, ¶28, 390 Wis. 2d 762, 940 N.W.2d 701.  Thus, we strictly 
construe § 32.18 to abrogate the common law only with respect to 
consequential "damages to the lands," while leaving intact the 
common law rule barring compensation for a diminution in 
property value.  See Nick, 13 Wis. 2d at 514-15; Strenke, 279 
Wis. 2d 52, ¶29. 
¶17 To 
summarize 
our 
plain-meaning 
analysis, 
the 
legislature indicated in two ways that Wis. Stat. § 32.18 
excludes from its specified class of compensable injuries a 
property's diminution in value.  First, instead of using 
"damages to property," which we have said includes a property's 
diminution in value, it used the narrower phrase "damages to the 
lands."  Second, the legislature made no clear, unambiguous, and 
peremptory statement that § 32.18 abrogates the common law with 
respect to compensation for a property's diminution in value.  
Therefore, we conclude that an abutting landowner is not 
entitled to compensation for its diminution in property value 
under § 32.18. 
B 
¶18 Although our plain-meaning interpretation of Wis. 
Stat. § 32.18 fully resolves our interpretive inquiry, we 
nevertheless note that legislative history confirms its plain 
meaning.  See, e.g., Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶51 ("[L]egislative 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
13 
 
history is sometimes consulted to confirm or verify a plain-
meaning interpretation."); Westmas v. Creekside Tree Serv., 
Inc., 2018 WI 12, ¶¶20, 49, 379 Wis. 2d 471, 907 N.W.2d 68.  
Indeed, the history behind the enacted language in Wis. Stat. 
§§ 32.09(4), 32.09(6)(f), and 32.18 confirms that § 32.18 
excludes from its ambit a property's diminution in value.  This 
statutory trio came about as part of a legislative proposal from 
an executive study committee that studied the "whole problem of 
land acquisition."10  The committee's proposal codified the 
common law rule that prohibited compensation for "a depreciation 
in value of property result[ing] from an exercise of the police 
power."  The legislature enacted that provision verbatim as 
§ 32.09(4).  See § 1, ch. 639, Laws of 1960.  The proposal also 
contained an exception to this general prohibition that would 
allow, among other things, abutting landowners to recover for 
"damage [of any kind] due to change of grade whether or not 
accompanied by a taking of land."  (Emphasis added.)  Thus, as 
proposed, a landowner in United America's situation could have 
recovered its diminished property value. 
¶19 The legislature, however, altered that result by 
deviating from the proposal in three significant ways.  See id.  
                                                 
10 The proposal came from Governor Vernon Thomson's Study 
Committee on the Problems of Land Acquisition, a group tasked 
with studying "the whole problem of land acquisition with 
particular attention to condemnation procedure, and methods of 
determining damages suffered by those called upon to surrender 
their 
property 
for 
the 
public 
good." 
 
Wisconsin 
Blue 
Book 791 (1958). 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
14 
 
First, instead of one provision that applied whether or not a 
taking occurred, the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 32.18 to 
address any change of grade unaccompanied by a taking of land 
and Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(f)11 for grade changes involving a 
taking.  Second, instead of allowing compensation for "damages" 
generally, the legislature identified two specific classes of 
compensable injuries and split those distinct classes between 
the new provisions:  "[d]amage to property" in § 32.09(6)(f) and 
the narrower "damages to . . . lands" in § 32.18.  See id.  The 
legislature's third deviation was its decision to "expressly 
allow[]" compensation for a diminution in property value only 
where there is a taking of land and only under the list of 
provisions 
set 
forth 
in 
§ 32.09(4). 
 
These 
deviations 
demonstrate that both the absence of a provision similar to 
§ 32.09(4) expressly identifying § 32.18 as abrogating the 
common law regarding compensation for a diminution in value and 
the distinction between "[d]amages to property" and "damages to 
the lands" were deliberate legislative choices.  And each choice 
confirms 
our 
plain-meaning 
conclusion 
that 
a 
property's 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6)(f) was originally enacted as 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(5)(g) 
(1959-60), 
but 
aside 
from 
a 
renumbering, the provision remains unchanged. 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
15 
 
diminution in value falls outside the class of consequential 
"damages to the lands" compensable under § 32.18.12 
C 
¶20 United America's textual argument to the contrary 
incorrectly focuses on the general term "any damages" while 
ignoring the limiting phrase "to the lands."  Although "any 
damages," without context, appears to express a general lack of 
"distinction or limitation" on the type of compensable injuries, 
the text of Wis. Stat. § 32.18 limits the class of compensable 
injuries to "any damages to the lands" (emphasis added).  See 
Any, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2016) (defining the 
adjective "any" as referring "to a member of a particular group 
or class without distinction or limitation" (emphasis added)).13  
Thus, under § 32.18, United America may recover any and all 
damages 
occasioned 
by 
the 
DOT's 
change-of-grade 
project, 
provided that those damages are to United America's lands.  And, 
                                                 
12 Neither 
Jantz 
v. 
DOT, 
63 
Wis. 2d 404, 
217 
N.W.2d 266 (1974), nor 118th Street Kenosha, LLC v. DOT, 2014 
WI 125, 359 Wis. 2d 30, 856 N.W.2d 486, alter this conclusion 
because neither case interpreted or applied Wis. Stat. § 32.18.  
In Jantz, we merely acknowledged that the plaintiff's claim for 
damages caused by a non-taking change of grade belonged under 
§ 32.18; we said nothing about whether such a claim would 
actually succeed under that statute.  63 Wis. 2d at 411.  In 
118th Street Kenosha, we speculated that a property's diminution 
in value "perhaps may" be compensable under § 32.18, but nowhere 
in that case did we actually interpret § 32.18 as definitively 
allowing such compensation.  359 Wis. 2d 30, ¶48 n.16.  Thus 
neither case controls here. 
13 "We rely on dictionary definitions when the legislature 
fails to provide a definition in the statute."  State v. 
A.L., 2019 WI 20, ¶16, 385 Wis. 2d 612, 923 N.W.2d 827. 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
16 
 
as discussed above, "damages to the lands" does not include 
diminished property value.  In other words, the presence of 
"any" does not allow us to read out of the statute the explicit 
limitation the legislature put into it.  See State v. A.L., 2019 
WI 20, ¶20, 385 Wis. 2d 612, 923 N.W.2d 827.  For similar 
reasons, 
we 
reject 
United 
America's 
arguments 
regarding 
"occasioned," "damages," and the statute's supposed remedial 
nature.  None of these arguments help us interpret the narrow 
issue of whether a diminution in property value falls within the 
class of "damages to the lands."14 
D 
¶21 Given the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 32.18, its 
application to 
United America's claim is 
straightforward.  
United America seeks compensation only under § 32.18 and only 
for the diminution in its property value.  A property's 
diminution in value, however, is not compensable under § 32.18.  
Therefore, United America's claim fails. 
                                                 
14 We also reject United America's "flow of traffic" and 
"indirect access" arguments.  United America's attempt to 
reframe its injury as a lost right to the flow of Highway 51's 
traffic fails because there is no such right.  See Schneider v. 
Div. of Highways, 51 Wis. 2d 458, 463, 187 N.W.2d 172 (1971) 
("[T]here is no property right to the flow of traffic [along a 
highway].").  United America also has no "indirect access" claim 
because its predecessor received compensation for the property's 
direct access rights to Highway 51.  Cf. id. (explaining that 
when a property's direct access to a highway is extinguished, 
reasonable indirect access must be provided unless the owner 
receives just compensation). 
No. 
2018AP2383 
 
17 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶22 We conclude that the plain meaning of "damages to the 
lands" in Wis. Stat. § 32.18 does not encompass United America's 
diminution in property value.  Accordingly, we affirm the court 
of appeals' decision. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶23 REBECCA 
GRASSL 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
"The 
fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require; that 
the rights of personal liberty and private property, should be 
held sacred."  Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 634 (1829) 
(Story, J.) (emphasis added).  Ignoring the plain text of Wis. 
Stat. § 32.18, the majority delivers a troubling blow to the 
statutory rights of Wisconsin's property owners.  According to 
the majority, if the Department of Transportation (DOT) causes a 
change of grade on the state's highways, abutting landowners are 
left without any recourse or compensation when DOT's actions 
eviscerate the value of their property.  The majority's 
interpretation misreads § 32.18 and erases the statutory rights 
of landowners in the process.  Properly interpreted, when DOT 
causes a change of grade that diminishes a landowner's property 
value on abutting land, § 32.18 allows landowners to collect 
compensatory damages.  Accordingly, United America was entitled 
to the circuit court's full award of damages.  I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
¶24 In 2004, Raj Bhandari, through his limited-liability 
company United America, entered into a land contract for the 
purchase of real estate abutting the intersection of Highway 51 
and Northstar Road in Lincoln County.  For a number of years, 
United America operated a gas station and convenience store on 
the property where the at-grade intersection allowed for direct 
vehicle access to and from Highway 51 and Northstar Road.  The 
at-grade 
roads 
facilitated 
convenient 
entrance 
to 
United 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
2 
 
America's business.  In 2006, before deciding whether to fully 
pay off the land contract and remain on the property, Bhandari 
contacted a representative at DOT to ask whether it had any 
plans to change the intersection.  The representative responded 
that a change in the intersection would not happen in Bhandari's 
lifetime or in the representative's lifetime.1 
¶25 Despite DOT's assurances to Bhandari, in 2013 DOT 
began a highway improvement project, which ultimately changed 
the grade at the Highway 51/Northstar Road intersection and 
converted Northstar Road to a bridge over Highway 51.  DOT 
refused to provide for on- and off-ramps that would preserve 
convenient 
access 
to 
United 
America's 
business 
at 
the 
intersection, despite Bhandari imploring DOT to do so.  As a 
result, individuals attempting to access United America's gas 
station and convenience store from Highway 51 were forced to 
take a circuitous route and drive miles out of the way to reach 
United America's property.  United America's business suffered a 
dramatic loss of revenue, and the value of its property 
plummeted. 
¶26 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.18, United America timely 
filed a claim with DOT requesting to be compensated for its 
                                                 
1 Both before and after Bhandari purchased the property, DOT 
wrote letters to Lincoln County commissioners and a Town of 
Merrill chairman stating that it had plans to change the 
intersection.  However, the circuit court concluded that "it was 
not convinced that any type of due diligence search by Mr. 
Bhandari regarding the subject intersection would have revealed 
[these prior letters]." 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
3 
 
damages.  Absent a taking of land,2 § 32.18 requires DOT to pay 
abutting landowners "for any damages" to their lands resulting 
from a DOT change-of-grade project.  DOT denied United America's 
claim, and United America later filed suit in the Lincoln County 
Circuit Court.  After a bench trial, the circuit court ruled in 
favor of United America.  The circuit court concluded that 
§ 32.18 allows United America to recover for the diminution in 
its property value resulting from DOT's change of grade at the 
Highway 51/Northstar Road intersection.  The circuit court 
determined: 
[T]he subject lands were damaged as a result of the 
change of grade to the highway abutting the property, 
and not by the DOT's use of police power to control 
the flow of traffic along its right of way. . . . The 
decisions of the DOT to change the grade of the 
highway abutting the Plaintiff's property, and not 
include exit and entrance ramps resulted in damages to 
the Plaintiff's property, through a diminution in the 
value of the Plaintiff's property due to a loss of 
convenient access to the flow of traffic from US 
Highway 51.  These were clearly foreseeable damages 
when the DOT made its decisions regarding the highway 
improvement project. 
The circuit court found that United America suffered $528,500 in 
damages due to DOT's change-of-grade project.  Specifically, 
United America's "before-value" was $600,000, but its "after-
value" following DOT's change-of-grade project sank to $71,500.  
The circuit court arrived at this determination with the benefit 
of a "substantial amount of . . . financial information provided 
                                                 
2 The parties agree there was no taking of land in this 
case. 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
4 
 
to the Court through appraisals," finding United America's 
appraiser to be the "most credible." 
¶27 DOT appealed the decision and the court of appeals 
reversed, concluding that Wis. Stat. § 32.18 allows landowners 
to recover only "structural damages" to their land resulting 
from a change-of-grade project.  According to the court of 
appeals, because United America's loss in property value from 
DOT's change of grade did not qualify as "physical" or 
"structural" loss, the circuit court's award must be vacated.  
Without endorsing its reasoning, the majority nevertheless 
affirms the court of appeals decision, concluding that "a 
property's diminution in value falls outside the scope of 
'damages to lands.'"  Majority op., ¶10.  The majority errs. 
II 
¶28 In relevant part, Wis. Stat. § 32.18 reads: 
Where 
a 
street 
or 
highway 
improvement 
project 
undertaken 
by 
the 
department 
of 
transportation . . . causes a change of the grade of 
[a] street or highway in cases where such grade was 
not 
previously 
fixed 
by 
city, 
village 
or 
town 
ordinance, but does not require a taking of any 
abutting lands, the owner of such lands at the date of 
such change of grade may file with the department of 
transportation . . . a claim for any damages to said 
lands occasioned by such change of grade. . . . [If 
DOT denies the claim], such owner may within 90 days 
following such denial commence an action against 
[DOT] . . . to recover any damages to the lands shown 
to have resulted from such change of grade. 
(Emphasis added.)  The majority reads the text of this statute 
in an insupportably strained and narrow manner.  According to 
the majority, United America's diminution in property value does 
not qualify as "damages to the lands" under § 32.18; therefore, 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
5 
 
United America cannot recover any losses occasioned by DOT's 
change-of-grade project.  See majority op., ¶1.  Contrary to the 
majority's holding, § 32.18 allows landowners to recover "any 
damages to the lands" resulting from a DOT change-of-grade 
project, 
and 
nothing 
in 
the 
statutory 
text 
restricts 
a 
landowner's recovery to "structural" or "physical" losses as the 
court of appeals concluded, nor does the text foreclose the 
recovery of damages for diminution in property value.  § 32.18 
(emphasis added).  Accordingly, the circuit court properly 
awarded damages to United America for DOT's change of grade at 
the Highway 51/Northstar Road intersection.3 
¶29 Resolution of this case rests upon the interpretation 
of two key statutory phrases:  (1) "any damages," and (2) "to 
the lands."  "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the 
language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
                                                 
3 For purposes of this case, there are two operative phrases 
in Wis. Stat. § 32.18:  the phrase "any damages to said lands 
occasioned by such change of grade," and the phrase "any damages 
to the lands shown to have resulted from such change of grade."  
Under § 32.18, the former phrase pertains to a landowner's 
statutory right to file a claim for damages with DOT after a 
change of grade, whereas the latter phrase pertains to a 
landowner's right to "commence an action" in circuit court when 
DOT denies a claim.  Both phrases similarly employ the operative 
language "any damages to lands."  Given that neither party 
disputes that DOT's change-of-grade project 
caused United 
America's diminution in property value, there is no reason to 
differentiate between the phrases "occasioned by" and "resulted 
from."  Both phrases clearly contemplate a causal connection 
between the landowner's damages and DOT's change-of-grade 
project——which is present in this case.  My analysis focuses 
upon the phrase "any damages to the lands," the meaning of which 
constitutes the crux of the statutory question before the court. 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
6 
 
Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  Under its most reasonable interpretation, the 
phrase "any damages" means precisely what it says:  "any 
damages," without exception.  Wis. Stat. § 32.18 (emphasis 
added).  "Damages" means any "[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to 
be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury."  
Damages, Black's Law Dictionary 488 (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis 
added); see Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶53 (instructing courts to 
turn to dictionary definitions to ascertain the plain meaning of 
a statute).   
¶30 As a general matter, "loss" is commonly understood as 
"the disappearance or diminution of value."  Loss, Black's Law 
Dictionary 1132 (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added).  "Damages" 
broadly includes compensation for a "loss," which includes the 
"diminution of value" of an individual's property, both real and 
personal.  The purpose of compensating an individual for loss is 
to "make whole the damage or injury suffered by the injured 
party."  See White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 290, 155 
N.W.2d 74 (1967).  As this court explained decades ago regarding 
land 
rights, 
"the 
measure 
of 
damages . . . will 
be 
the 
difference between the present value of the land and its value 
as affected by the execution of the proposed projects"——in this 
case, DOT's change-of-grade project.  State v. Adelmeyer, 221 
Wis. 246, 262-63, 265 N.W. 838 (1936).  
¶31 While the statutory meaning of "damages" is broad, it 
is not unlimited.  "Any" damages must be "to the lands" in order 
to be recoverable under Wis. Stat. § 32.18.  The meaning of 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
7 
 
"any" refers to "any one of the sort named."  Any, Oxford 
English Dictionary 94 (6th ed. 2007).  Under the plain meaning 
of the statutory language, any and all types of damages to the 
lands are recoverable.  Had the legislature wanted to limit the 
meaning of "damages" solely to "structural damages," as the 
court of appeals decided, or to exclude diminution-in-value 
damages as the majority holds, it certainly could have.  See 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, 
¶36, 341 Wis. 2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367.  But it did not; instead, 
it expressly stated that "any damages" are recoverable——nothing 
less. 
¶32 The majority improperly reads an exception into the 
text in order to narrow the meaning of "any damages."  Doing so 
violates the general-terms canon of statutory construction, 
under which "[g]eneral terms are to be given their general 
meaning."  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 101 (2012); Benson v. City of 
Madison, 2017 WI 65, ¶25, 376 Wis. 2d 35, 897 N.W.2d 16.  Under 
this canon, "general words (like all words, general or not) are 
to be accorded their full and fair scope.  They are not to be 
arbitrarily limited."  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 101.  "[T]he 
presumed point of using general words is to produce general 
coverage——not to leave room for courts to recognize ad hoc 
exceptions."  Id.  Unlike the court of appeals, the majority in 
this case deems it unnecessary to decide "the full scope of 
'damages to the lands.'"  Majority op., ¶10.  Nevertheless, it 
arbitrarily construes "any damages" to exclude "a property's 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
8 
 
diminution in value."  Id.  There is no textual basis to support 
this exclusion. 
¶33 The error of the majority's circumscription of the 
statutory text is illustrated by another case in which the 
federal courts interpreted a similarly broadly-worded statute 
"allowing the government to seize 'any property, including 
money,' that had been used for an illegal gambling business."  
Scalia & Garner, supra, at 103 (citing United States v. South 
Half of Lot 7 & Lot 8, Block 14, Kountze's 3rd Addition to the 
City of Omaha, 910 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1990)).  In that case, the 
government initiated forfeiture actions against real estate 
allegedly used for an illegal gambling business.  South Half, 
910 F.2d at 489.  The trial court construed "any property" to 
exclude real property but the appellate court disagreed, holding 
that "any property" means "any property."  Id.  Similar to the 
majority in this case, the dissent in South Half "would have 
held that the clear language meant something other than what it 
said, based in part on legislative history[.]"  Scalia & Garner, 
supra, at 103. 
¶34 While the scope of "any damages" recoverable under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.18 is textually unlimited, claimed damages must 
correspond "to the lands" affected by DOT's change-of-grade 
project.  "Land" has a specific meaning under the Wisconsin 
Statutes.  Although it is not defined in Chapter 32, under Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 990.01(18), 
"land" 
means 
"lands, 
tenements 
and 
hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein." 
(emphasis added).  Contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
9 
 
in this case, "lands" means more than just the physical, terra 
firma of the land; it includes the "rights thereto and interests 
therein" as well.  See Tenements, Black's Law Dictionary 1771 
(19th. 
ed. 
2019) 
("an 
estate 
or 
holding 
of 
land"); 
Hereditaments, Black's Law Dictionary 872 (19th ed. 2019) ("real 
property"); Land, Black's Law Dictionary 1048 (19th ed. 2019) 
("an estate or interest in real property.").  And contrary to 
the majority's holding, nothing in § 32.18 excludes diminution 
in value——an interest in the lands——from recoverable damages.  
Accordingly, the relevant question for this court is not simply 
whether DOT's change-of-grade project caused harm to the 
physical structure of United America's land itself, but whether 
the project caused "any damage" to the lands, including "rights 
thereto and interests therein." 
¶35 The majority brushes off Wis. Stat. § 990.01(18)'s 
definition of "land" in a footnote.  Rather than analyzing it, 
the majority dismisses the statutory command to construe "lands" 
as the legislature defined it as somehow "circular" and 
"inconsistent with the otherwise manifest statutory meaning."  
Majority op., ¶12 n.7 (internal quotations omitted).  The 
majority neglects to explain how the definition of "land" in 
§ 990.01(18) 
contravenes 
"the 
otherwise 
manifest 
statutory 
meaning."  The majority's rejection of the statutory definition 
of "land" as "circular" because it includes "lands" also spurns 
the legislative directive that "[i]n construing Wisconsin laws 
the following rules shall be observed . . . :  The singular 
includes the plural and the plural includes the singular."  Wis. 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
10 
 
Stat. § 990.001(1).  Regardless, the majority altogether ignores 
the operative language of the definition of "land" pertinent to 
this case:  "land" (which includes "lands") encompasses "rights 
thereto and interests therein" and the value of the land is 
indisputably one of the "interests therein" rendering its 
diminution a damage recoverable under Wis. Stat. § 32.18. 
¶36 In 
both 
instances, 
the 
majority 
violates 
the 
interpretive-direction canon, under which "[d]efinition sections 
and interpretation clauses are to be carefully followed."  
Scalia & Garner, supra, at 225; see Wisconsin Citizens Concerned 
for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶6, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 
N.W.2d 612 (modified by statute on other grounds) ("Words that 
are defined in the statute are given the definition that the 
legislature has provided.").  "It is very rare that a defined 
meaning can be replaced with another permissible meaning of the 
word on the basis of other textual indications; the definition 
is virtually conclusive."  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 228.  
While 
the 
legislature's 
definition 
of 
"lands" 
may 
be 
inconvenient for the majority's analysis, that does not give the 
majority license to ignore it. 
¶37 Applying the statutory definition of "lands," the 
dramatic loss in the value of United America's property 
constitutes 
"damage" 
to 
the 
"lands"——specifically, 
an 
"interest[] therein."  Wisconsin Stat. § 32.18 requires DOT to 
pay a landowner for "any damages" to "lands" as a result of a 
DOT change-of-grade project, and diminution in land value falls 
well within the meaning of "damages."  See Jantz v. DOT, 63 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
11 
 
Wis. 2d 404, 411, 217 N.W.2d 266 (1974) (noting that, under 
§ 32.18, compensable damages could include "loss of view, loss 
of direct access, loss of income, and change of grade").  As the 
circuit court determined, United America's property had been 
valued at $600,000 prior to DOT's change-of-grade project, but 
plummeted to a value of $71,500 upon project completion, 
resulting in a loss in value of $528,500.  Under the plain text 
of § 32.18, United America may recover the full value of the 
circuit court's award. 
¶38 Rather than applying the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.18, the majority adopts an interpretation crafted by 
comparisons to a "closely related provision" in Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.09(6)(f), 
which 
allows 
compensation 
for 
"damages 
to 
property" due to a change of grade resulting in a partial 
taking.  According to the majority, because the legislature used 
the phrase "damages to property" in § 32.09(6)(f) instead of 
"damages to lands" as found in § 32.18, the legislature must 
have afforded diminution-in-value damages only under the former.  
See majority op., ¶14.  The majority offers scant support for 
this conclusion, beyond its mere declaration that it is so.  
Section 
32.09(6)(f) 
concerns 
"all 
matters 
involving 
the 
determination 
of 
just 
compensation 
in 
eminent 
domain 
proceedings"——that is, when there is a taking.  (Emphasis 
added).  Matter of Condemnation by Redevelopment Auth. of City 
of Green Bay, 120 Wis. 2d 402, 409, 355 N.W.2d 240 (1984) 
(describing eminent domain as a process where an owner's 
property "is taken against his or her will").  By contrast, 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
12 
 
§ 32.18 compensates landowners for damages when there is not a 
taking.  See § 32.18 (stating that it applies only when DOT 
"does not require a taking of any abutting lands").  As we have 
plainly established, "Section 32.18 . . . merely provides a 
cause of action for damages; it does not bring the proceedings 
into the area of eminent domain.  The concept of 'just 
compensation' . . . applies to condemnation proceedings, and has 
no application to a statutory action for damages for change of 
grade commenced pursuant to the provisions of [section] 32.18."  
Klingseisen v. Wisconsin State Highway Comm'n, 22 Wis. 2d 364, 
368, 126 N.W.2d 40 (1964).  Accordingly, § 32.09 and its 
reference to "damages to property" in the context of a taking 
cannot inform the meaning of "damages to the lands" occasioned 
by government action other than a taking. 
¶39 The majority makes the same mistake in relying upon 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(4).  That statute states that "[i]f a 
depreciation in value of property results from an exercise of 
the police power, even though in conjunction with taking by 
eminent 
domain, 
no 
compensation 
may 
be 
paid 
for 
such 
depreciation except as expressly allowed in subs. (5)(b) and (6) 
and s. 32.19."  § 32.09(4).  Just like § 32.09(6)(f), § 32.09(4) 
applies only "[i]n all matters involving the determination of 
just compensation in eminent domain proceedings" and has no 
application whatsoever to a statute creating a right of action 
where no land is taken.  § 32.09 (emphasis added).  Because § 
32.09 provides the rules governing the determination of just 
compensation in eminent domain proceedings only, it simply has 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
13 
 
no bearing on the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 32.18, which 
governs claims for damages caused by changes of grade where no 
land is taken.  See Klingseisen, 22 Wis. 2d at 368.  The 
majority's resort to takings statutes as a mechanism for 
interpreting § 32.18 fails to buttress its analysis and only 
compounds the majority's error. 
¶40 The majority's statutory analysis takes a circuitous 
path, meandering into eminent domain statutes that have no 
application in the absence of a taking, in order to interpret 
"any damages to lands" to mean something other than what it 
plainly says.  This methodology violates the ordinary-meaning 
canon 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, 
"the 
most 
fundamental 
semantic rule of interpretation."   Scalia & Garner, supra, at 
69.  "Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday 
meanings——unless 
the 
context 
indicates 
that 
they 
bear 
a 
technical sense."  Id.; see Wisconsin Ass'n of State Prosecutors 
v. WERC, 2018 WI 17, ¶52, 380 Wis. 2d 1, 907 N.W.2d 425.  
Statutes, like "all other legal instruments" are "of a practical 
nature, founded on the common business of human life, adapted to 
common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common 
understandings."  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 69 (quoting Joseph 
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 
157-58 (1833)).  Judges "should not make" interpretation 
"gratuitously roundabout and complex."  Id. at 70.  To the 
detriment of property owners, the majority adopts a complicated 
and roundabout analysis that suffocates the ordinary meaning of 
the statutory words.  Much of the majority's analysis altogether 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
14 
 
avoids the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 32.18, which says "any 
damages to the lands," plainly encompassing diminution in 
property value as an interest in "the lands" as statutorily 
defined. 
¶41 This conclusion fully squares with our prior cases.  
In Jantz, a property owner brought suit when the state highway 
department took .38 acres of land to widen Highway 41-45 in 
Washington County and changed the grade of Maple Road in order 
to build an overpass across Highway 41-45.  Jantz, 63 Wis. 2d at 
407-08.  Jantz owned a bar and grill abutting Highway 41-45 and 
Maple Road, and the value of her property suffered as a result 
of DOT's project.  Importantly, Jantz did not bring suit under 
Wis. Stat. § 32.18 but instead under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6).  See 
id. at 409-11.  This court held that Jantz could not recover 
under § 32.09(6) in the absence of a "constructive taking"; 
therefore, Jantz could not collect damages related to "loss of 
view, 
loss 
of 
income, 
and 
circuity 
of 
access 
due 
to 
the . . . change of grade of Maple Road."  Id. at 411-12.  
Notably, however, the Jantz court identified § 32.18 as the 
proper basis for Jantz's claim for these damages.  In relevant 
part, the court explained: 
[Section] 32.18 applies as to any claim for damages 
due to change of grade of Maple Road. . . . Claims of 
compensable damages due to loss of view, loss of 
direct access, loss of income and change of grade were 
based on the before-taking and after-taking test under 
sec. 32.09(6).  That test does not apply because sec. 
32.09(6) does not apply. . . . If appellant qualified 
as an owner of abutting property to the relocated 
Maple Road, any claim for damages caused by the change 
of grade of Maple Road would lie under the provisions 
of sec. 32.18. 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
15 
 
Id. at 411 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  In other 
words, Jantz's claim should have been brought under § 32.18, 
which serves as the basis for "any claims for damages due to 
change of grade," including Jantz's claim for economic damages 
arising from the loss of direct access to her property.  Id.  
(emphasis added). 
¶42 This court reiterated this conclusion less than a 
decade ago.  In 118th Street Kenosha, we explained that the 
Jantz court "excluded evidence that the circuity of access or 
change in grade reduced the value of Jantz's property" only 
because "the relocation of Maple Road was separate from the 
partial taking of land" pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6).  
118th Street Kenosha, LLC v. DOT, 2014 WI 125, ¶¶47-48, 359 
Wis. 2d 30, 856 N.W.2d 486.  Although § 32.09(6) did not allow 
the recovery of damages for diminution in value, "Jantz perhaps 
may have been entitled to recover damages under Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.18 for harm to her property caused by Maple Road's change 
in grade."  Id., ¶48 n.16.  The majority in this case disavows 
these prior cases, which recognized a cognizable claim under § 
32.18 for the diminution in property value due to a change of 
grade resulting from a DOT project. 
¶43 Strangely, the majority insists that "nowhere does any 
statute identify Wis. Stat. § 32.18 as abrogating the common 
law" prohibition on "compensation for consequential injuries [a 
property's diminution in value] caused by an exercise of the 
police power."  Majority op., ¶¶15-16.  As the majority 
seemingly recognizes earlier in its opinion, § 32.18 does so 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
16 
 
itself.  Betraying the internal contradictions of its analysis, 
the majority notes that while "[u]nder common law, a landowner 
cannot 
recover 
for 
consequential 
injuries, 
including 
a 
diminution in property value resulting from the exercise of 
state police power" the legislature has in fact abrogated this 
common law rule——in § 32.18:  "The legislature, however, has 
enacted limited and specific exceptions to that rule, including 
Wis. Stat. § 32.18."  Majority op., ¶11 (emphasis added).  The 
statutory 
text, 
using 
"clear, 
unambiguous 
and 
peremptory 
language" as the majority demands, allows a property owner to 
"recover any damages to the lands shown to have resulted from 
such change of grade."  Majority op., ¶15.  "Any damages" 
clearly and unambiguously encompasses diminution in property 
value.  The majority absurdly believes the statute must say 
"this statute abrogates the common law," majority op., ¶16 
("nowhere does any statute identify Wis. Stat. § 32.18 as 
abrogating the common law"), but statutory changes to prior law 
"need not be express"——they need only be clear.  Scalia & 
Garner, supra, at 318.  With no explanation, the majority 
confidently 
declares 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09(4) 
clearly 
abrogates 
the 
common 
law 
but 
§ 32.18 
somehow 
fails 
the 
majority's amorphous test of clarity.  This is classic ipse 
dixit. 
¶44 In the past, this court characterized Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.18 as a remedial statute "that must be liberally construed 
to advance the remedy that the legislature intended to be 
afforded."  Stuart v. Weisflog's Showroom Gallery, Inc., 2008 WI 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
17 
 
22, ¶21, 308 Wis. 2d 103, 746 N.W.2d 762; Hughes v. Chrysler 
Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 979, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996).  The 
statute need not be construed "liberally" in order to discern 
its meaning; applying the fair reading approach outlined in 
Kalal, the court need only determine "how a reasonable reader, 
fully competent in the language, would have understood the text 
at the time it was issued."  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 33.  
Instead, the majority opts to "strictly construe § 32.18," 
majority op., ¶16, embracing "a relic of the courts' historical 
hostility to the emergence of statutory law" which displaced 
judge-made law.  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 318.  It is, 
however, 
a 
"false 
notion 
that 
words 
should 
be 
strictly 
construed."  Id. at 355.  "If by strict one simply meant that 
the interpreter holds tight to the fair meaning of the law, then 
the doctrine would be sound."  Id.  Applying a discredited 
doctrine, the majority eschews the fair meaning of "any damages" 
in favor of "a narrow, crabbed reading" of the words.  Id.  In 
doing so, the majority "strangle[s] [its] meaning."  Id. (citing 
Utah Junk Co. v. Porter, 328 U.S. 39, 44 (1946)). 
¶45 Applying the plain meaning of the statutory language, 
"any damages to the lands" means precisely what it says, but the 
majority's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.18 
wrongly 
circumvents what the legislature wrote.  "Property rights are 
necessary to preserve freedom, for property ownership empowers 
persons to shape and to plan their own destiny in a world where 
governments are always eager to do so for them."  Adams Outdoor 
Advert. Ltd. P'ship v. City of Madison, 2018 WI 70, ¶47, 382 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
18 
 
Wis. 2d 377, 
914 
N.W.2d 660 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting) (quoting Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 
(2017)).  Section 32.18 protects private property rights by 
compensating landowners when DOT causes their property values to 
plummet.  Because the majority's contrary interpretation impairs 
these rights in contravention of the plain meaning of § 32.18, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
No.  2018AP2383.rgb 
 
 
 
1