Case Title: Garden v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 252, 2003, 292, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
SADIKI GARDEN,
§
§
Nos. 252 & 292, 2003
Defendant Below,
§
     (Consolidated)
Appellant,
§
§
v.
§
Court Below: Superior Court
§
of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
in and for New Castle County
§
Cr. I.D. No. 9912015068
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: November 4, 2003
Decided: February 13, 2004
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, STEELE and JACOBS,
Justices, constituting the Court en Banc.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire (argued), Brian J. Bartley, Esquire, Timothy J. Weiler,
Esquire, and Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington,
Delaware, for Appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire (argued), Thomas E. Brown, Esquire, and Elizabeth
R. McFarlan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee.
For the Majority, Per curiam:
1Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327 (Del. 2003).
2 Indeed, the trial court had instructed the jury in the penalty phase that its
recommendation would be given “great weight.”  State v. Garden, 792 A.2d 1025, 1030 (Del.
Super. 2001).  
3 Id. at 343.
2
In this appeal, we review the trial court’s decision to sentence Sadiki Garden
to death.  In an earlier opinion, this Court affirmed Garden’s convictions, but held that
the trial court did not give the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence appropriate
weight.1  This Court instructed the trial court, on remand, to give the jury’s
recommendation “great weight,”2 and to override that recommendation “only if the
facts suggesting a sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no
reasonable person could differ.”3  On remand, the trial court carefully reviewed the
record, and again concluded that the aggravating factors far outweighed the mitigating
factors.  This Court agrees that the record supports the trial court’s analysis.  The
standard, however, is not whether the trial court’s decision is supportable; it is
whether the jury’s opposite conclusion is supportable.  Since the record is not so clear
and convincing that no reasonable person could have voted for a life sentence, we
must reverse.
4815 A.2d 327.
3
Factual and Procedural Background
The facts surrounding the attempted robberies and murder of Denise Rhudy are
detailed in Garden v. State,4 and will only be summarized here.  In December 1999,
Garden and his two codefendants, Christopher Johnson and James Hollis, were
driving around looking for someone to rob.  Garden and Johnson had robbed a couple
the night before in a parking lot near Garden’s apartment, so the three men returned
to the same area.  Hollis waited in the car, while Johnson and Garden looked for
victims.  They spotted three people who had just parked their car -- Rhudy, Stephanie
Krueck and John Weilbacher.  Krueck and Weilbacher had gotten out of their car
when Garden approached, pointed a gun at them, and demanded money.  Both
responded that they did not have any money.  Garden then confronted Rhudy, who
was still sitting in the car.  After she, too, said she had no money, Garden shot her
twice.  He also fired one shot at Krueck before fleeing.  Rhudy died at the scene.
Krueck was not injured. The three men went to a party after their crime spree.  They
were apprehended three days later.
Hollis and Johnson testified against Garden as part of their plea bargains.
Garden was convicted of one count of intentional murder, one count of felony murder,
and various robbery and weapons charges.  In the penalty phase, the jury voted 10-2
5322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
6  73 Del. Laws Ch. 423 (2001).
4
in favor of life imprisonment for the intentional murder count, and 9-3 in favor of life
for the felony murder count.  Nonetheless, the trial court imposed the death penalty,
both after trial and after remand.
Discussion
a.  The Florida Connection
In our earlier opinion, this Court noted that Delaware’s 1991 death penalty
statute was modeled after Florida’s law, which had been upheld by the United States
Supreme Court.  Given this “legislative linkage,” the Court determined that Florida’s
death penalty jurisprudence should be followed in deciding when a judge may
override the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence.  Specifically, this Court applied
the standard announced by the Florida Supreme Court in Tedder v. State,5 holding that
a jury override is permissible only if the facts supporting a death sentence are “so clear
and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.” 
The trial court took exception to this ruling, noting that the 2002 amendment
to Delaware’s death penalty statute6 clearly demonstrates the General Assembly’s
intention to vest primary sentencing responsibility with the judge, not the jury.  The
trial court also protested our reliance on Florida law, arguing that the Tedder standard
7 State v. Garden, 831 A.2d 352, 356-357 (Del Super. 2003).
8 House Bill No. 287, 74 Del. Laws Ch.174.
9 68 Del. Laws Ch. 181.
10 604 A.2d 846 (Del. 1992).
11604 A.2d at 851.
12 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
13 The United States Supreme Court relied on the “crucial protection” afforded by the
Tedder standard again in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 295 (1977), in deciding whether the
5
is inconsistent with Delaware’s public policy, as expressed by our legislature.7  We
respect the trial court’s views, and the General Assembly’s power to set public policy.
But Garden’s sentence is controlled by the 1991 statute, not the 2002 amendment, or
a 2003 amendment directed specifically at the weight to be given to the jury’s
recommended sentence.8  
The Synopsis to the 1991 statute expressly states that Delaware’s law was
modeled after the Florida death penalty statute, as approved by the United States
Supreme Court.9  In State v. Cohen,10 in response to certified questions regarding the
constitutionality of the 1991 statute, this Court noted that the 1991 statute was
patterned after Florida law.  Moreover, this Court, in upholding the Delaware statute,
relied on the fact that the United States Supreme Court had found Florida’s statute
constitutional.11  The United States Supreme Court decision, Proffitt v. Florida,12 in
turn, noted the Tedder standard in upholding the Florida statute13.  Thus, Florida death
Florida death penalty statute was an ex post facto law.
14Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336, 1346 (Del. 1994).
6
penalty jurisprudence, in general, and the Tedder standard, in particular, have been
recognized as the underpinning for the 1991 statute from the time the law was enacted.
The majority and the dissent are in complete agreement that the 1991 Delaware
death penalty statute implicates the Tedder standard imported from the Florida law
upon which the Delaware statute was then based.  The issue that we review, and on
which the majority and the dissent part company, is how that standard should be
applied to the facts of this case.  
b.  The Jury Override Standard.
Both the jury and the judge participate in a capital sentencing decision.  Each
is instructed to review the aggravating and mitigating factors, to evaluate their relative
importance, and to decide whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
factors.  The judge must give the jury’s determination “great weight,” but the judge
may override the jury’s recommendation in appropriate cases.  Where the jury
recommends death, the trial judge may reject that recommendation and impose a life
sentence.14  Where the jury recommends a life sentence, however, the override
threshold is extremely high.  Under the Tedder standard, as interpreted numerous
times by the Florida Supreme Court:
15Ferry v. State,  507 So. 2d 1373, 1376 (Fla.1987).
16   In one such case, for example, defendant and his accomplice spotted a teen-aged
couple parked in a car near the beach.  After being forced at gunpoint to a secluded area, the
accomplice guarded the boy while the defendant raped the girl.  The boy attempted to help his
girlfriend, but was shot four times in the head.  The accomplice then took his turn raping the girl
vaginally and anally.  When the accomplice was done, he shot her twice in the head.  Then
defendant raped her anally, rolled her over, and shot her in the forehead.  The only mitigating
factors were that defendant was 22 years old and had no significant criminal history. Hoy v.
State, 353 So.2d 826 (Fla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 920 (1978); See, also: Douglas v. State, 328
So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976).
17See, e.g., Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 656 n. 417 (Del. 2001).
18See, e.g., State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846, 856 (Del. 1992).
7
[W]hen there is a reasonable basis in the record to support a jury’s
recommendation of life, an override is improper.... When there are valid
mitigating factors discernible from the record upon which the jury could
have based its recommendation an override may not be warranted.15 
Florida cases in which overrides were upheld involved especially cruel and heinous
murders by defendants who presented no mitigating circumstances or only very
marginal ones.16
Thus, we start with the unarguable proposition that the trial judge may override
the jury’s recommendation of life without parole only if the facts supporting the death
sentence are so clear and convincing that no reasonable person could differ.  The
Delaware death penalty procedure requires a record of the exact vote of the jury and
that the advice will be given “great weight”17 because it is the “conscience of the
community.”18  
19The 2003 statute (House Bill No. 287) provides:
The jury’s recommendation concerning whether the aggravating circumstances found
to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist shall be given such
consideration as deemed appropriate by the Court in light of the particular
circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and
propensities of the offender as found to exist by the Court.  The jury’s
recommendation shall not be binding upon the Court.
20Interestingly, however, the statute purports to apply not only prospectively but also to
“all defendants tried, re-tried, sentenced or resentenced after its effective date.”  In the Opinion
of the Justices, furnished to Governor Minner on July 11, 2003, in response to her inquiry as to
the constitutionality of House Bill No. 287, we said:
    First, in our opinion, none of the provisions of House Bill No. 287 is
unconstitutional on its face, at least to the extent that they operate prospectively to
defendants whose crimes are committed after the statute is enacted.  Second, whether
or not any of the provisions set forth in Sections 1, 2 or 4 may be deemed to have
been unconstitutionally applied retrospectively or sought to be applied to a particular
defendant in a particular case may be determined only on a case-by-case basis.
(Footnote omitted).
21See Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1992).
8
If the jury verdict is to be cast aside simply because the trial judge disagrees
with it, one wonders about the purpose and value of  the jury’s advisory verdict.
Nevertheless, the Delaware General Assembly, in its 2003 amendment to the death
penalty statute, elected to vest discretion in the trial judge to give the jury’s
recommendation “such consideration as deemed appropriate.”19  The State does not
contend on this appeal, however, that the 2003 statute applies to Garden.20
Here, we are required to apply not the 2003 statute, but the 1991 statute, which
we have construed as incorporating the Tedder standard.21  If reasonable minds can
differ in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, it necessarily follows that
22Ferry v. State, 507 So.2d at 1377.
9
the trial judge may not override the jury’s verdict because, by definition, it cannot be
said that no reasonable juror could have determined to recommend a sentence of life
without parole, rather than death.
In its decision after remand, the trial court reevaluated the reasonableness of its
own decision and concluded, with justification, that there is record support for the
imposition of a death sentence.  But the Tedder standard is not directed at the trial
court’s reasoning.  Rather, it requires that the court evaluate the jury’s decision and
determine whether there is any evidence to sustain the jury’s conclusion.22  When the
facts are analyzed from this perspective, the jury’s recommendation to spare Garden’s
life must be upheld.
c.  The Tedder Standard Applied to Garden.
One cannot overlook the overwhelming vote of the jury.  Ten of the twelve
jurors recommended life without parole.  Those ten jurors could have based their
decision on the following facts: 1) the shooting was not planned; 2) Garden suffered
a life-threatening childhood illness that negatively affected his development and
resulted in a personality disorder; 3) Garden had a decent work history; 4) Garden had
a positive relationship with his girlfriend and her children; and 5) Garden’s
accomplice was given a plea bargain and received a life sentence.  The issue is not
23 See: Ferguson v. State, 642 A.2d 772, 787 (Del. 1994).
10
whether the trial court or this Court would independently have been persuaded that
these factors outweigh the aggravating factors.  Rather, the trial court should have
reviewed the record to determine whether there is support for these mitigating factors
and, if so, whether they could reasonably form the basis for a recommendation of life.
1) Lack of Planning. 
Both of Garden’s original co-defendants, who testified against Garden, testified
that there was no prior plan to shoot or kill anyone.  The absence of premeditated
intent is a relevant mitigating factor.23
2) Garden’s Psychological Deficiencies.  
Dr. Charles Bean, a neurologist, testified that Garden was diagnosed with a
potentially fatal disease as a child and was treated for that disease from age 2-8.
Because of the prolonged treatment and the seriousness of the illness, Bean opined
that Garden was never taught appropriate boundaries and behavioral expectations.
Bean concluded that the disease and the lack of parental control added significantly
to Garden’s inability to accept responsibility for his acts.
Dr.  Alvin L. Turner, a clinical psychologist, also testified about Garden’s
personality.  Turner explained that, although Garden exhibits anti-social behaviors,
he is not a sociopath or predator.  Turner testified that Garden functions out of fear;
11
that he behaves much like a child, who acts impulsively without thinking; that he is
capable of empathy and remorse; and that Garden would be able to acclimate himself
to prison life.
3) Garden’s Employment.
Garden had been employed for 1½ years prior to his arrest.  He started working
through a temporary agency.  The manager of that agency described Garden as a
“dependable worker” who showed up when scheduled.   One of Garden’s jobs was at
a warehouse company.   The manager of that company  thought Garden was a good
employee – so good, in fact, that he hired Garden for a permanent job.  The manager
acknowledged that Garden had been insubordinate on one occasion, but testified that
the incident was minor and that, after talking to Garden about it, there were no further
problems.
4) Garden’s Relationship With His Girlfriend.
Garden’s girlfriend testified that he provided emotional and financial support
to her and her children during their two-year relationship.  She said that her three-
year-old child was especially attached to Garden and that they continue to visit him
regularly in prison.  She explained that Garden used to take care of her children while
she worked and took them to activities, in addition to providing financial support.
5) Disparate Treatment of Garden’s Accomplice.
24State v. Garden, 792 A.2d 1025, 1035 (Del. Super. 2001).
25See, e.g. State v. Ferguson, 642 A.2d 1267, 1269 (Del. Super. 1992); State v. Cabrera,
1999 WL 41630 (Del. Super. Jan. 21, 1999); Brookings v. State, 495 So.2d 135, 144 (Fla. 1986).
26It appears that his most serious infraction was that a razor was found in his cell.  But
nothing in his prison records indicated that he was considered a risk to institutional safety.
12
Johnson, who admitted that he recklessly caused Rhudy’s death, was a
“principal player” in the crime, which “probably would not have occurred without his
participation.”24  Yet he received a life sentence under a plea agreement.  The State
argued that Garden is more culpable because he pulled the trigger, but our courts (and
Florida’s) have long recognized a co-defendant’s life sentence as a mitigating factor.25
The aggravating circumstances in this case are, without question, significant.
Garden killed Rhudy during an attempted robbery; he has a history of committing
violent crimes; he expressed no remorse; and he took the life of an innocent mother
of four children.  The trial court also considered Garden’s prison record an
aggravating factor, although the jury may not have agreed, given the fact that most of
Garden’s infractions involved disobeying orders by, for example, asking for an extra
piece of chicken.26
The trial court and the jury reached different conclusions in their evaluation of
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  When that happens, the trial judge
must accept the jury’s recommendation if it has a reasonable basis in the evidence:
Where a jury and a trial judge reach contrary conclusions because  the
facts derive from conflicting evidence, or where they have struck a
27Chambers v. State, 339 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla. 1976).
28775 So.2d 263, 284-285 (Fla. 2000).
13
different balance between aggravating and mitigating circumstances
which both have been given an opportunity to evaluate, the jury
recommendation should be followed because that body has been
assigned by history and statute the responsibility to discern truth and
mete out justice. Given that the imposition of a death penalty "is not a
mere counting process of X number of aggravating circumstances and Y
number of mitigating circumstances, but rather a reasoned judgment . .
.", both our Anglo-American jurisprudence and Florida's death penalty
statute favor the judgment of jurors over that of jurists.27 
 
Here, as in Keen v. State,28
the focus of the [trial judge’s] analysis was not upon finding support for
the jury’s recommendation, i.e., determining if a reasonable basis existed
for the jury’s decision, but rather toward proving that the jury got it
wrong and lacked any reasonable basis to recommend life.  In other
words, the trial judge disagreed with their recommendation based on his
view of the mix of aggravators and mitigators, rather than through the
prism of a Tedder analysis.
 
To be sure, one can parse the issues where each of the aggravating and
mitigating factors is weighed and make a cogent assessment that the former outweigh
the latter.  That is precisely the argument that is artfully made in the very thoughtful
dissent.  But in the end, it is just that—an excellent argument, skillfully maximizing
the horrific nature of this murder and denigrating the defendant’s character, while
trivializing the mitigating factors in the record that would support the jury’s verdict.
Indeed, the dissent demonstrates that the jury should have found that the
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.  Whether in our view they should
29Under the 1991statute, a jury empaneled to hear a capital case must be death qualified. 
State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846, 855-56 (Del. 1992).  That requirement means “no juror was
selected who was so conscientiously opposed to the death penalty as to preclude joining in a
recommendation of death.”  Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 344 (Del. 2003).
14
have or not, the dissent fails to persuade us that the conclusion of this death-qualified29
jury, which heard all the evidence, including live witnesses at the trial and the penalty
hearing, was so irrational that its verdict cannot be given great weight, but instead is
entitled to no respect whatsoever.  That may be the effect of the 2003 statute on new
cases to which it may be constitutionally applied after its effective date.  But that is
not the law under the 1991 statute, which applies to this case.
In sum, the trial court need not, and we need not, agree with the jury’s
conclusion in order to uphold it.  We may strongly disagree.  Under the governing
law, however, the jury’s recommendation must be respected if it is supported by the
record and is not irrational.  Proper application of the Tedder standard requires that
the trial court’s override be reversed and that Garden be sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of probation or parole.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Superior Court imposing a death
sentence is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED for imposition of a sentence
15
of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation and parole.  Jurisdiction is
not retained.  
Holland, Justice, dissenting:
30Ala. Code § 13A-5-47(c) (1997); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (2001); Fla. Stat. ch.
921.141 (2002); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
31 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
32 Cohen v. State, 604 A.2d 846 (Del. 1992).
33 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
34 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
35Proffitt v. Florida, 428, U.S. at 249 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.
1975).
16
Of the thirty-seven states that sanction capital punishment, Delaware and
Florida are two of only four states that provide for a jury override.30  The issue
presented in Garden’s case relates to the death penalty statute that Delaware enacted
in 1991, using the post-Furman31 Florida statute as a model.32  The operation of
Florida’s jury override was discussed by the United States Supreme Court briefly in
1976 in Proffitt v. Florida,33 and at length in 1984 in Spaziano v. Florida.34  When this
Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1991 Delaware statute, we relied upon those
holdings by the United States Supreme Court that had approved the Florida death
penalty system.
In Proffitt, the United States Supreme Court discussed the Florida jury override
and quoted from the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Tedder v. State.  Pursuant
to the holding in Tedder, the United States Supreme Court recognized that in order to
sustain a judge’s sentence of death by overriding a jury recommendation of life,
Florida required the facts suggesting a sentence of death to be “so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.”35  The United States
36Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. at 453.
37Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1992).
38Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 342 (Del. 2003).
39 Michael Mello, The Jurisdiction to Do Justice: Florida’s Jury Override and the State
Constitution, 18 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 924, 937 (1991).
17
Supreme Court examined and upheld the facial constitutionality of the Tedder jury
override standard in 1984 in Spaziano v. Florida.36  
The Tedder holding is now well established as the cornerstone of the Florida
jury override doctrine.  The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that the Tedder
standard is rigorous, and that it has become more so in the years since Spaziano v.
Florida was decided.  This Court cited Tedder in 1992 in the Pennell opinion that
resulted in the first Delaware execution following the enactment of the new statute.37
  Florida Override Experience
Delaware adopted a death penalty statute in 1991 that was modeled on the
Florida statute.38  Accordingly, the summary of the Florida jury override system in a
1991 law review article by Michael Mello is didactic.39  Table 1 that is attached to the
Mello article shows that in the fifteen year span of Florida’s post-Furman statute, jury
life recommendation overrides by trial judges were reversed in seventy-four percent
of the cases by the Florida Supreme Court.   
The same article then states that the figures in Table 1 become more significant
when they are divided into three time periods.  “From 1974 (when the first override
case reached the Florida Supreme Court) until the end of 1983 (just before certiorari
40Id. At 937.  See also Cochran v. State, 547 So.2d 928, 933 (Fla. 1989).
41 Ken Driggs, Regulating the Five Steps to Death: A Study of Death Penalty Direct
Appeals in the Florida Supreme Court 1991-2000, 14 St. Thomas L. Rev. 759, 770 (2002).
42 In 2003, the Delaware death penalty statute was amended and the Tedder standard for
appellate review of jury override death sentences was eliminated.  Therefore, Garden’s case may
be the only opinion in which the Delaware Supreme Court applies the Tedder standard to review
a jury override death sentence.  The Tedder standard for jury overrides is still the law in Florida. 
A similar proposal to remove the Tedder standard by amending the Florida statute was vetoed
several years ago.  See LaTeur Rey Lafferty, Florida’s Capital Sentencing Jury Override: Whom
Should We Trust to Make the Ultimate Ethical Judgment, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 463, 483-84
18
review was granted in Spaziano v. Florida), sixteen of sixty-two life overrides were
affirmed.  In 1984 and 1985 – during the pendency of Spaziano v. Florida in the
United States Supreme Court and the year after Spaziano was decided – affirmances
by the Florida court were significantly more frequent:  twelve of eighteen (66.7%).
But from 1986 through May 1990, only two of thirty-two (6.25%) were affirmed.”40
Therefore, in the four years that immediately preceded the enactment of the
Delaware statute in 1991, death sentences imposed by jury overrides were reversed
by the Florida Supreme Court in more than ninety-three percent of the relevant cases.
Conversely, death sentences imposed by overrides of jury life recommendations
survived appellate review in less than seven percent of the cases during that four-year
period.    According to a subsequent study, the Florida Supreme Court continues to
affirm jury override death sentences in only a few cases.41  
Garden is the first case, and may be the only case, in which this Court applies
the Tedder standard to review a trial judge’s decision to impose a death sentence by
overriding a jury recommendation of life.42  The Florida Supreme Court, however, has
(1995).
43 See Scott E. Erlich, Comment, The Jury Override: A Blend of Politics and Death, 45
Am. U. L. Rev. 1403, 1405 (1996).
19
applied the Tedder standard in reviewing more than 140 jury override cases.43  Since
very few death sentences imposed by jury overrides have been affirmed by the Florida
Supreme Court, it is logical for this Court to look at the facts in some of those Florida
cases where the Tedder standard was applied and the judge’s decision to impose death
by overriding the jury’s recommendation of life were affirmed.
Florida Mills Jury Override
The Mills case from Florida is significant for two reasons.  First, the facts of the
crime and the circumstances of the defendant are similar to the Garden case.  Second,
the trial judge’s jury override death sentence in Mills was not only affirmed on direct
appeal in 1985, during the Florida Supreme Court’s statistical zenith in affirming jury
overrides, but the jury override death sentence in Mills was also reaffirmed in 2001,
during the still extant nadir in the Florida Supreme Court’s override affirmance rate.
In 1979, Mills, then 22 years old, was convicted of felony murder, aggravated
battery, and burglary.  The facts set forth by the Florida Supreme Court in its 1985
opinion on direct appeal are as follows:
The evidence at the trial showed that Gregory Mills and his accomplice
Vincent Ashley broke into the home of James and Margaret Wright in
Sanford between two and three o’clock in the morning, intending to find
something to steal.  When James Wright woke up and left his bedroom
to investigate, Mills shot him with a shotgun.  Margaret Wright
44 Mills v. State, 476 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1985) (emphasis added).
45 Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975) (“a jury’s recommendation of life
should be given great weight and should be followed unless the facts suggesting a sentence of
death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.”).
46 Mills v. State, 476 So.2d at 179.
20
awakened in time to see one of the intruders run across her front yard to
a bicycle lying under a tree.  Mr. Wright died from loss of blood caused
by multiple shotgun pellet wounds.44
After finding Mills guilty of first degree murder, burglary, and aggravated battery, and
with the knowledge that the prosecution granted immunity to Mills’ co-defendant,
Ashley, who testified against Mills, the jury recommended a sentence of life
imprisonment.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge’s jury override and
specifically held that the jury override death sentence in Mills’ case met the
requirements of Tedder v. State.45
We hold that the trial judge’s findings in support of the sentence of death
even without the finding of especially heinous, atrocious and cruel, meet
the Tedder standard.  We find that the facts suggesting a sentence of
death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person
could differ.  There are three valid statutory aggravating circumstances,
and the trial judge has found there are no valid mitigating circumstances.
The purported mitigating circumstances claimed by Mills, but not found
by the trial judge, are not sufficient to outweigh the aggravating
circumstances nor do they establish a reasonable basis for the jury’s
recommendation.  We conclude that the imposition of a sentence of
death after a jury recommendation of life was proper in this case.46
In 2001, the Florida Supreme Court had the Mills jury override death sentence
before it once again.  According to Mills’ collateral attack on his jury override death
47 Keen v. State, 775 So.2d 263 (Fla. 2000).
48 Mills v. Moore, 786 So.2d 532, 539 (Fla. 2001).
49 Id. at 540
50 Id.
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
21
sentence, Keen’s47 application of Tedder by the Florida Supreme Court constituted a
new standard by which jury override cases are reviewed in Florida.  In responding to
Mills’ argument, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged:
In Keen, on the defendant’s direct appeal following his third trial, we
applied the Tedder analysis.  In applying Tedder, we emphasized the fact
that a trial court’s analysis in an override situation should focus on the
record evidence supporting the jury’s recommendation and should not
be the same weighing process that is used when the jury recommends
death.48
The Florida Supreme Court then made three emphatic points in its 2001 Mills
opinion.  First, Keen is not a major constitutional change or jurisprudential upheaval
of the law as it was espoused in Tedder.49  Second, Keen offers no new or different
standard for considering jury overrides on appeal.50  Third, “we disagree with Mills’
contention that Keen offers a new standard of law and we reject the contention that
Keen was anything more than an application of our long-standing Tedder analysis.”51
The final three statements in the 2001 Mills opinion, however, are most
significant in our review of Garden’s appeal.  First, Tedder is the seminal case in
Florida on jury overrides and remains so after Keen.52  Second, Tedder was properly
53 Id.
54 Id. 
55 State v. Garden, 792 A.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Del. Super. 2001).
56 Id. at 1028 & n.1 (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(j), (e)(2)).
57 Id. at 1028.
22
applied to the Mills case.53  Third, Keen provides no basis for a reconsideration of the
trial judge’s decision to sentence Mills to death by overriding the jury’s
recommendation for life.54  
Garden Jury Recommendation
Garden was convicted on three counts of Murder in the First Degree, Robbery
in the First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a
Felony and related charges.55  The jury’s unanimous finding, under a reasonable doubt
standard, that Garden committed felony murder established the statutory aggravating
circumstance rendering Garden eligible for the death sentence.56  The jury then
recommended a finding that the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the
mitigating circumstances by a ten to two vote on the intentional murder conviction and
by a vote of nine to three on the merged felony murder conviction.57  The Superior
Court was required to apply the Tedder standard by giving the jury’s advisory
recommendation of a life sentence “great weight” and the Superior Court could
override the jury’s majority recommendation only “if the facts suggesting a sentence
58 Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 343 (Del. 2003).
59 State v. Garden, 792 A.2d 1025, 1028 & n.1 (Del. Super. 2001) (citing Del. Code Ann.
tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(j), (e)(2)).
23
of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
differ.”58
Garden’s Aggravating Circumstances
The Superior Court determined that several aggravating circumstances were
associated with the murder of Denise Rhudy by Garden: 
1) Statutory Aggravator - Felony Murder – The fact that Denise Rhudy was
killed during the commission of an attempted robbery established the statutory
aggravating circumstance of felony murder that rendered Garden eligible for the death
sentence.59  This aggravating factor was established beyond a reasonable doubt by the
verdict of the jury.  The Superior Court judge described this felony murder as an
aggravating factor of the highest magnitude because “Denise Rhudy was not accosted
during the course of an unlawful transaction or for the purpose of taking contraband
from her. She was an innocent, law-abiding citizen who was out for a night of
amusement with friends when she was gunned down because she refused to give up
her property to an armed robber.  The judgment of the people of this State that a crime
of this nature justifies imposition of the ultimate penalty cannot reasonably be
disputed.”
60 See Del. Code Ann., tit. 11 § 4209(e)(1)(k), which specifies the killing of two or more
persons as a statutory aggravating circumstance.
61 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a).
24
2) Attempted Murder of Companion – After killing Denise Rhudy, Garden
fired a shot at one of her companions, Stephanie Krueck.  The bullet narrowly missed
its target, passing instead through the sleeve of Krueck’s jacket.  The Superior Court
judge found that Garden probably did intend to kill Krueck. But most importantly to
the Superior Court judge, “the shot fired at Krueck shows Garden’s willingness to take
a second life.”  Accordingly, the judge stated “this too is an aggravating factor of the
highest order.”60 
3) Lack of Remorse – The Superior Court judge found that Garden had shown
no remorse for killing Denise Rhudy.  The Court found this to be “evidence of a cold
and pitiless character.”  The judge determined that no reasonable person could
consider Garden’s lack of remorse as other than an aggravating factor. 
4) Criminal Record – Despite his relatively young age, Garden had amassed
a significant criminal record.  By age 24, Garden was eligible for a life sentence under
Delaware’s habitual criminal statute.61  The judge noted that the Delaware habitual
offender law reflects a strong public policy against releasing repeat offenders because
of the threat they pose to society. The Superior Court judge concluded that “Garden’s
status as an habitual offender is a non-statutory aggravating factor, which is firmly
rooted in the public policy and law of this State.  It is also a weighty aggravating
25
circumstance.”  The nature of Garden’s prior crimes was equally important to the
Superior Court judge.  All of Garden’s crimes involved some degree of premeditation,
and all but two involved serious elements of violence and danger to the public.  On
two separate occasions, Garden was caught driving vehicles which he had stolen using
burglary tools.  In each instance, Garden led police on a high-speed chase through
residential streets, exposing members of the public to injury.  Each chase ended in a
crash with Garden struggling against the police as they attempted to arrest him.
Accordingly, the Superior Court judge determined that “Garden’s criminal record and
habitual offender status are also aggravating factors of great magnitude.”  
5) Character and Propensities – The Delaware statute requires the judge and
jury to consider the character and propensities of the offender.  The judge determined
“the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from Garden’s criminal history
amassed by the age of 24 is that Garden had a serious propensity for violent criminal
conduct.”  The judge found no reasonable basis for deeming Garden’s criminal record
as other than a substantial aggravating factor.
An examination of the substance of the prior felony crimes committed by
Garden revealed serious elements of violence and premeditated lawlessness.   In fact,
if he had only committed the armed robbery of Denise Rhudy, Garden was eligible for
habitual criminal status.  The Superior Court judge characterized Garden’s criminal
history as an aggravating circumstance of “great magnitude.” 
26
6) Incorrigibility – The Superior Court judge found that “consistent with
Garden’s propensity for lawlessness, is his inability to conform to prison rules.”  The
judge determined that while most of Garden’s rule violations in prison were minor,
three were for fighting and one for carrying an open razor.  The Superior Court judge
concluded that “these facts show Garden’s unwillingness to obey authority, which can
only be taken as an aggravating factor.” 
7) Victim Impact – The Superior Court judge determined that another
aggravating factor was the impact of Denise Rhudy’s death on those around her,
including her parents, with whom she was close; her best friend, who witnessed her
murder; her ex-husband, who is now a single parent of four young children; and most
compelling, her four children, who were aged 16 months to 14 years at the time of her
murder.  The Superior Court judge noted that Denise Rhudy was a wholly innocent
victim selected at random. She was described as a good, decent and much-loved
person who is missed by her family and friends.  The judge saw “no reasonable basis
for finding that the loss of such a person is not an aggravating factor.” 
Garden’s Mitigating Circumstances
The Superior Court judge carefully considered the mitigating circumstances
presented by Garden and determined that each of those claims of mitigation by Garden
were entitled to little or no weight.  
27
1)
Planning – Both of Garden’s original co-defendants, who testified
against Garden, stated there was no prior plan to shoot or kill anyone. Garden
contends that the absence of premeditated intent to kill anyone is a mitigating factor.
The jury convicted Garden of both Intentional Murder in the First Degree and Felony
Murder in the First Degree.  The record is undisputed that Garden armed himself with
a loaded weapon and planned to rob an innocent victim at gun point simply because
he wanted money that night.  When a plan to commit armed robbery at gun point
results in death, it becomes felony murder.  Rather than a mitigating circumstance, the
General Assembly has classified felony murder as the statutory circumstance that
made Garden eligible for the death sentence.  
(2)
Employment History – Garden asserts that his work history is a
mitigating factor.  The record provides facts on this subject only from June 1998 to
the date of his arrest in December 1999.  From June 1998 to July 1999, Garden was
employed by a temporary agency and worked on assignment to various employees.
Although the office manager described him as dependable, the agency’s records show
that Garden worked intermittently for only about four months during the thirteen-
month period.  In August of 1999, Garden began working for a warehouse company,
initially on assignment through a different temporary agency and then as a direct
employee.  A manager described him as a “good worker,” but company records show
that during his fourteen weeks of work, Garden was late 23 times and was
28
reprimanded for insubordination.  The Superior Court judge found no reasonable basis
for the jury to conclude that Garden’s work history was anything other than a minor
mitigating factor.  Moreover, Garden’s ability to work aggravates his decision to
support himself through a life of crime.
(3)
Relationship with Girlfriend - Garden contended that his relationship
with his girlfriend was a substantial mitigating factor.  Garden became involved with
Constance Webster in September 1997 and moved into her apartment in December.
He moved out in April 1999 at her suggestion, but the relationship continued.
Webster had four children when she began dating Garden and testified that he was a
father figure to them and took care of them while she was working.  She said he
provided substantial financial support.  The Superior Court judge determined that the
record casts some doubt on Webster’s testimony. For example, Garden’s work history
reflects that he could not have made any substantial financial contribution to the
household.  The record also demonstrates that Garden gave Webster items purchased
with the credit cards stolen in the robbery the night before Denise Rhudy’s murder.
Accordingly, the Superior Court judge concluded that there was no reasonable basis
for the jury to consider this relationship a mitigating circumstance of substantial
weight.
(4)
Age – Garden was 24 years old when he murdered Denise Rhudy.
Garden asserted that this age was a mitigating factor. The Superior Court judge
29
concluded that, even if a juror found some mitigating value in Garden’s age, it is not
reasonable for the jury to conclude that this factor could have been given substantial
weight.
(5)  Psychological Evidence – Garden’s psychological makeup is another
factor that the Superior Court was asked to consider in mitigation.  At the age of 23
months, Garden was afflicted with a serious and life-threatening illness, Histiocytosis-
X.  This illness required several months of hospitalization followed by a lengthy
period of chemotherapy.  It was resolved by the time Garden was age six or eight, but
periodic follow-up examinations were necessary as a precaution against recurrence.
This history was used as the basis for opinions offered by Dr. Charles Bean, a
neurologist with special competence in children, and Dr. Alvin Turner, a licensed
psychologist.  
Dr. Bean saw Garden on two occasions, at a medical examination when Garden
was eleven and in again August of 2000 while he was in prison awaiting trial.  Dr.
Bean testified that Garden was in good health and showed no after-effects of his
childhood disease.  He also testified that Garden had a performance IQ of 100, which
is average, and a verbal IQ of 91, which is only slightly below average.  Drawing on
Garden’s medical and social history, Dr. Bean concluded:  “Childhood experiences
have shaped a gentleman with a personality of significant weakness and vulnerability,
and he used significant denial to protect himself from self realization.”  
62 State v. Garden, 792 A.2d at 1033.
30
Dr. Turner saw Garden on two occasions, once shortly after his arrest and once
again shortly before trial.  Dr. Turner, who conducted various psychological tests in
addition to his clinical interviews, concluded that “Garden is best classified as a
person with a personality disorder not otherwise specified.”  He went on to say:  “It
is my belief that his childhood experiences are crucially involved in shaping a life-
long pattern of behavior which are responsible for the characteristics which I have
outlined above.  These include utter helplessness, a pervasive sense of guilt, and a
deep and pervasive sense of personal incompetence.”
Neither expert witness testified that Garden’s mental state impinged on his
ability to recognize the wrongfulness of murder or to resist the urge to commit the
crime.  Certain testimony of Dr. Turner suggests that Garden acted with a cruel and
brutal rationality.  In fact, after killing Denise Rhudy, Garden later callously told his
co-defendants that he had “shot the bitch because she wouldn’t give it up.”62  The
Superior Court judge found that the psychological evidence did not provide a rational
basis for concluding that Garden’s mental status was a mitigating factor, and a
contrary conclusion by a juror would have been unreasonable.
(6)
Disparate Treatment of Garden Accomplice – Garden argued that
another mitigating circumstance is the fact that his co-defendant, Johnson, was
63 Eutzy v. State, 458 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1045 (1985).
64 See McCampbell v. State, 421 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 1982).
65 Herzog v. State, 439 So.2d 1372 (Fla. 1983); McCampbell v. State, 421 So.2d 1072
(Fla. 1982).
66 Barfield v. State, 402 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1981); Slater v. State, 316 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1975).
67 Smith v. State, 403 So.2d 933 (Fla. 1981); Malloy v. State, 382 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 1979);
Halliwell v. State, 323 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1975).
68 Stokes v. State, 403 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1981); Neary v. State, 384 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1980).
31
allowed to plead guilty to non-capital murder.  Jury recommendations against the
death penalty, which may have been based on a desire to provide equality in
sentencing, were considered by the Florida Supreme Court in Eutzy v. State.63  In that
case, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that it has upheld the reasonableness
of jury recommendations of life which could have been based, to some degree, on the
treatment accorded one equally culpable of the murder.64  In summarizing its cases
that had reversed the judge’s decision to override the jury recommendation, the
Florida Supreme Court found:  the accomplice was a principal in the first degree;65 the
accomplice was the actual triggerman;66 the evidence was equivocal as to whether
defendant or the accomplice committed the actual murder;67 or the accomplice was the
controlling force instigating the murder.68  In each of those Florida cases, the jury had
before it, in either the guilt or the sentencing phase, direct evidence of the
accomplice’s equal culpability for the murder itself.  The Superior Court judge
concluded that the evidence in Garden’s case provided no basis upon which the jury
could have recommended life imprisonment in order to prevent disparity in
69 Mills v. State, 476 So.2d 172, 177 (Fla. 1985).
32
sentencing.  The record reflects that it was Garden, rather than his accomplices, who
inflicted the fatal shot.  In Mills, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the jury override
death sentence when the less culpable defendant was given immunity.
Garden Jury Override Death Sentence
The record in this case supports the Superior Court judge’s findings regarding
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  The judge concluded that the
aggravating factors were substantial and that the mitigating factors were ephemeral
in comparison.  The Superior Court judge in Garden’s case, like the judge in Mills,69
concluded that the purported mitigating circumstances claimed by Garden were not
sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances and did not establish a
reasonable basis for the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence.  Accordingly, the
Superior Court judge concluded the facts suggesting a sentence of death are so clear
and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.  That conclusion by
the Superior Court judge is supported by the record and is the product of a logical
deductive process.  The record reflects that Garden is a remorseless, incorrigible,
violent habitual offender who committed an unprovoked cold-blooded murder of an
innocent person who lacked the ability to defend herself, solely for pecuniary gain.
 Other Analogous Florida Override Cases
70 Echols v. State, 484 So.2d 568 (Fla. 1985).
71 Id. at 576.
72 Id. at 575.
73 Id.
74 Burr v. State, 466 So.2d 1051 (Fla. 1985).
75 Id. at 1052.
33
      The jury override death sentence imposed in Garden’s case is consistent with Mills
and is consistent with jury override death sentences affirmed by the Florida Supreme
Court in other similar cases.  In Echols v. State,70 the crime was felony murder.  It
occurred during the commission of a robbery and burglary in the home of the victim
by a person previously convicted of violent felonies.  Four aggravators were found.71
In addition to the other factors, the trial judge found that, like Garden, the defendant
failed to exhibit any remorse.  In upholding the jury override, the Florida Supreme
Court noted that lack of remorse could be used as evidence to negate mitigation.72  As
with Garden, the defendant’s age was also addressed.  The Florida Supreme Court
noted that if age is to be afforded weight as a mitigating factor, it must be “listed with
some other characteristics of the defendant or crime such as immaturity or senility.”73
In Burr v. State,74 the felony murder was committed during the course of a
robbery of a convenience store and was cold, calculated and premeditated. As in
Garden, the felony murder was committed “without any pretense of moral or legal
justification.”75  The sentencing judge also found that the murder was committed to
avoid a lawful arrest.  Because of the presence of aggravators and the absence of any
76 Id. at 1054.
77 Porter v. State, 429 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1983).
78 Id. at 296 (quoting Quince v. State, 414 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla. 1982)).  
34
mitigation, the Florida Supreme Court held that the trial judge’s death sentence was
the appropriate penalty, and the jury’s life recommendation was unreasonable.76  
In Porter v. State,77 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed an override of a
unanimous jury recommendation of life.  The defendant, age 22, murdered an elderly
man and his wife.  As with Garden, the felony murder occurred during the commission
of a robbery.  The sentencing judge found three aggravating factors, including that the
murders were especially heinous, atrocious and cruel, and that the defendant killed to
avoid arrest.  While some mitigating circumstances were found, the sentencing judge
determined that those circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating factors and
sentenced the defendant to death.  In affirming the override, the Florida Supreme
Court stated, “‘mere disagreement with the force to be given [mitigating evidence] is
an insufficient basis for challenging a sentence.’”78 
Conclusion
When this Court upheld the validity of the 1991 amendments to the Delaware
Death Penalty Statute, we recognized that “the new law changed the roles of the judge
79 State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846, 849 (Del. 1992).
80 Id.
81 Id. (emphasis added).
35
and the jury in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.”79  Pursuant to the 1991
amendments, the jury “functions only in an advisory capacity.”80  The 1991
amendments provide “the judge, after taking the jury’s recommendation into
consideration, has the ultimate responsibility for determining whether the defendant
will be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.”81
The Tedder standard requires a jury’s recommendation of life to be accorded
great weight and to be followed unless the facts suggesting a sentence of death are so
clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.  In Garden’s
case, the Superior Court judge’s findings in support of his decision to impose a
sentence of death, by overriding the jury recommendation of life, met the Tedder
standard.  In Garden’s case, the facts suggesting a sentence of death are so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.  Accordingly, I would
affirm the Superior Court judge’s decision to override the jury’s verdict and to impose
the death sentence.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.