Case Title: Johnson v. Wilson

Citation: 276 Or. 69, 554 P.2d 157

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1976-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
554 P.2d 157 (1976)
276 Or. 69
Bertha T. JOHNSON, Appellant,
v.
Coston WILSON and Lois Wilson, Husband and Wife, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Oregon, Department 2.
Argued an Submitted May 5, 1976.
Decided September 3, 1976.
*158 Clayton H. Morrison, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Howard P. Arnest, Portland.
Gary Roberts, Legal Aid Service, Portland, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents.
Before O'CONNELL,[*] C.J., and HOLMAN, TONGUE and BRYSON, JJ.
BRYSON, Justice.
Plaintiff brought a forcible entry and detainer action against defendants to recover possession of residential property. The defendants filed a general denial and an affirmative equitable defense which alleged:
and prayed for a decree dismissing the complaint and "ordering the specific performance of Plaintiff's obligations under the oral agreement entered into with defendants."
Plaintiff's reply denied the allegations of defendants' affirmative equitable defense and asked for immediate restitution of the premises.
*159 The case proceeded to trial on the equitable defense and the court entered a decree as follows:
dismissed the action for forcible entry and detainer with prejudice.
The plaintiff appeals and contends the trial court erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish an oral contract for plaintiff to devise her residential property to defendants. We review de novo.
Defendants and plaintiff met in 1953 when the defendants rented plaintiff's home then situated at 1314 N.E. 6th Avenue in Portland, Oregon. In November 1956 plaintiff sold the 6th Avenue residence and purchased a house in northeast Portland, into which defendants moved.
In addition to their original landlord-tenant relationship, the parties' backgrounds caused them to develop a close personal relationship. Plaintiff Mrs. Johnson was an orphan and had no family. The Wilsons were childless and wanted to adopt children. There is evidence that the Wilson family addressed plaintiff as "mother" and "grandmother."
The plaintiff testified:
Plaintiff paid $7,800 for the second house, which is the one involved in this litigation. She made a down payment with monthly payments of $75 per month. She also paid the taxes on the real property, which amounted to $377.95 for the tax year 1974-75 at a taxable value of $13,600. Plaintiff completed payment on the contract and received a deed to the property on September 17, 1969.
During the early part of 1975 plaintiff decided to sell the house which defendants had been occupying since 1956. She testified (deposition read into record):
Defendant Coston Wilson testified regarding the alleged oral agreement as follows:
On December 15, 1955, approximately one year before plaintiff purchased the premises involved in this litigation, plaintiff executed her "Last Will and Testament" which first provided for funeral and burial services and the payment of her debts. It then provided, "I give and bequeath and devise the residue of my estate in equal shares to my friends LOIS WILSON and COSTON WILSON, presently residing at 1413 NE 6th Avenue, Portland, Oregon, or to the survivor between them."
Mr. Wilson testified that Mrs. Johnson gave him an envelope with the will in it "about '57 or '58, somewhere along those years." He further testified:
The exhibits received show that plaintiff's will was not in the envelope marked, *161 "To be opened after my death" but, rather, a letter stating:
The defendants did not call the defendant Lois Wilson as a witness. When called by the plaintiff, she testified:
On cross-examination she testified:
Plaintiff, 87 years old at the time of trial and retired, had previously been employed by Mr. Allen Green for some 20 years as a housekeeper. She "lived in" with the Green family. She testified quite clearly on all matters except the recall of dates. Plaintiff also testified that when she had "trouble" with the defendants in selling her house she changed her will and made "[t]he man I worked for, Allen Green," the beneficiary of her estate.
An oral contract to make a will devising real property must be proved by clear, concise and convincing evidence. Paulson v. Paulson, 241 Or. 88, 91, 404 P.2d 199 (1965); Gill v. Hewitt, 244 Or. 242, 244, 417 P.2d 399 (1966). "[P]roof by `clear and convincing evidence' means that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable." Cook v. Michael, 214 Or. 513, 527, 330 P.2d 1026, 1032 (1958); Sheets v. B & B Personnel Systems, 257 Or. 135, 145, 475 P.2d 968 (1970). The agreement must be just and mutual in its obligations and there must be a strict performance of the promisee of all terms and conditions of *162 the contract. Losey v. O'Hair, 160 Or. 63, 73, 83 P.2d 493 (1938).
Generally, in a suit on an oral contract for specific performance, a meeting of minds upon each and all essential elements is indispensable to creation of a contractual relationship. Friesen v. Fuiten, 257 Or. 221, 229, 478 P.2d 372 (1970); Kretz et ux. v. Howard et al., 220 Or. 73, 346 P.2d 93 (1960).
In most, if not all, of the numerous Oregon cases involving an oral contract to make a will devising realty, the alleged promisor is deceased at the time of the filing of the suit to enforce the contract.[1] In the case at bar, the promisor, plaintiff, is not deceased and any title or interest in her property created by will could not pass until her death.[2]
Defendants' affirmative answer alleged that plaintiff "agreed that she would devise and bequeath the above-described premises in fee simple absolute to the defendants at the time of plaintiff's death." Defendant Coston Wilson did not offer clear and convincing evidence to substantiate this allegation. His testimony is equivocal. He testified that the agreement was, "The house is to be yours, not after she died." (Emphasis added.) Defendant Lois Wilson testified that the property would be deeded to the defendants by plaintiff "when she [plaintiff] made the last payment." However, Lois Wilson also testified that defendants made rental payments to the plaintiff in 1973 and 1974. Further, when plaintiff, with her attorney, called on the defendants to advise them that she was going to sell the house, Lois Wilson raised no issue regarding an alleged oral contract to devise the property to defendants.
There is also evidence that the defendants did not perform their part of the alleged contract in that they failed to make some of the monthly rental payments and no home was provided for plaintiff upon her retirement. This is not a case wherein the defendants performed services for the plaintiff or paid consideration for the alleged contract to make a will devising plaintiff's realty to defendants. The evidence shows that the plaintiff purchased this property and made monthly payments of $75 on the contract until it was paid and also paid the real property taxes. In the meantime, she charged the defendants only $50 per month as rental. This is obviously less than a reasonable rental under any standard. When plaintiff was asked why she rented the house to defendants "for such a low price" she testified that "I thought I was doing them a good deed by letting them have it as cheaply as possible."
The testimony shows that this was a situation where plaintiff befriended defendants and decided to make defendants the beneficiaries in her will, leaving them the "residue" of her estate (not a specific devise of this particular real property). There was no consideration from defendants to plaintiff. The giving flowed from plaintiff to defendants. Subsequently, plaintiff, because of defendants' actions and lack of interest in her, changed her mind and decided to make her longtime employer the beneficiary of her estate. Also, it is apparent from the record that she needed funds from the sale of her *163 house to sustain her during old age. Plaintiff was in the hospital just prior to trial. Revocability is one of the essential characteristics of a will unless abrogated by law or a valid agreement to the contrary.
We conclude that defendants failed to meet their burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff would devise her premises "in fee simple absolute to the defendants at the time of plaintiff's death." Having concluded that defendants' equitable defense was not sustained by the evidence, the equitable defense is dismissed. Quine et ux. v. Sconce, 209 Or. 486, 490, 306 P.2d 420 (1957). The case must be remanded to proceed with the action at law as framed in the pleadings.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
[*]  Chief Justice when the case was argued.
[1]  Approximately 70 cases involving an oral contract to make a will have come before this court since 1898.
[2]  The 1973 Oregon Legislature, in adopting Oregon Laws 1973, Chapter 506, Section 13 (ORS 112.270), has acted to clarify the bringing of such suits. ORS 112.270 provides:

"(1) A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate, executed after January 1, 1974, shall be established only by:
"(a) Provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract;
"(b) An express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract; or
"(c) A writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract.
"(2) The execution of a joint will or mutual wills does not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills."