Case Title: THOMAS MERCHANT V. STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and STATE OF WYOMING, BOARD OF PAROLE, and their responsible employees, in their official capacities

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
THOMAS MERCHANT V. STATE OF WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and STATE OF WYOMING, BOARD OF PAROLE, and their responsible employees, in their official capacities2007 WY 159168 P.3d 856Case Number: 06-278Decided: 10/10/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
THOMAS 
MERCHANT,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.STATE OF 
WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and STATE 
OF WYOMING, 
BOARD OF PAROLE, and their responsible employees, in their official 
capacities,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Robert 
T. Moxley of Robert T. Moxley, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; David L. 
Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Daniel M. Fetsco, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.           

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Thomas Merchant 
contends the district court erred when it denied his request for credit for the 
time he was incarcerated in Colorado against 
each of his Wyoming sentences.  He also argues the district court erred 
by rejecting his claim that his constitutional right to equal protection of the 
law was violated when the State of Wyoming, Department of Corrections and the 
Wyoming Board of Parole (collectively referred to as "the State") denied him the 
opportunity to earn "special good time" credit off his minimum Wyoming sentences 
for the time he served in Colorado and, thereby, possibly qualify for parole at 
an earlier date.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Merchant 
presents three issues on appeal:

 
 

I.                    
After 
a criminal trial is completed under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 
("IAD"), does that statutory compact prohibit Wyoming  the receiving state  
from taking the time to "process" the inmate into its own correctional system, 
before returning the inmate "as soon as practicable" back to the sending 
state?

 
 

II.                  
Does 
a regulatory scheme deny equal protection of law when it excludes "IAD" inmates 
from the legal opportunities  i.e., 
the parole system and "special" good time  afforded to all other Wyoming inmates who serve Wyoming sentences in out-of-state 
institutions?

 
 

III.                
When 
an "IAD" defendant is convicted of crimes in Wyoming, what is the legal meaning of a 
"concurrent" sentence for time to be served thereafter in the prison system of 
the "sending state," where the Wyoming State Penitentiary sentence structure is 
for "consecutive" sentences?

 
 
The 
State phrases the issues as: 

 
 

I.                    
Did 
the district court and the Wyoming Department of Corrections properly interpret 
Appellant's sentences?

 
 

II.                  
Did 
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers require that Appellant be returned to 
Colorado 
without processing into the Wyoming Department of 
Corrections?

 
 

III.                
Was 
Appellant denied equal protection of law because he was not processed into the 
Wyoming Department of Corrections before return to Colorado? 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The criminal 
matter forming the basis for this case was considered by this Court in Merchant v. State, 4 P.3d 184 (Wyo. 
2000).  In October 1996, Mr. 
Merchant, who was serving a prison sentence in Colorado, was temporarily 
transferred to Wyoming pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§7-15-101 et. seq. 
(LexisNexis 2007), to stand trial on several outstanding Wyoming criminal charges 
related to his business activities as a used automobile dealer.  Merchant, 4 P.3d  at 186-87.  After a jury returned a guilty verdict 
on eleven counts, the district court sentenced Mr. Merchant as follows: Count I, 
four to five years; Count II, six to nine years; Count III, six to nine years; 
Count IV, six to nine years; Count V, four to five years; Count VI, six to nine 
years; Count VII, six to nine years; Count IX, six to nine years; Count X, six 
to nine years; and Count XI, six to nine years.1  The court then consolidated the sentences 
by making the sentences on Counts I, II and III concurrent, the sentences on 
Counts IV, V and VI concurrent, and the sentences on Counts VII, IX, X and XI 
concurrent.  The court specified the 
three consolidated Wyoming sentences would run consecutively, and provided, 
"[a]ll these counts --- counts one through eleven, excluding count eight  will 
run concurrent with respect to the Colorado counts."    

 
 
[¶4]      The written 
judgment and sentence mirrored the oral pronouncement:

 
 
            
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the terms of the confinement imposed above 
shall be served concurrent as to Counts I, II and III.  Concurrent as to Counts IV, V and 
VI.  Concurrent as to Counts VII, 
IX, X, and XI.  Counts IV, V and VI 
are to be served Consecutive to Counts I, II and III.  Counts VII, IX, X and XI to be served 
consecutive to all the counts and all counts to be served concurrent with the 
sentence imposed by the State of Colorado. 

 

Mr. 
Merchant was returned to Colorado after the 
sentencing hearing and was not processed into the Wyoming correctional 
system.    

 
 
[¶5]      In 2003, the 
State of Colorado paroled Mr. Merchant and he was 
transferred to the Wyoming State Penitentiary.  The Wyoming Department of Corrections 
(WDOC) determined he was entitled to credit for the time he served in Colorado against his Wyoming sentences in successive order.  WDOC also determined that he was not 
entitled to "special good time" credit for the time he served in Colorado.  "Special good time" is a reduction of 
the minimum sentence and is granted, in accordance with rules adopted by the 
governor under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-423 (LexisNexis 2007) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7-14-420 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1984), at the warden's discretion to reward 
exemplary behavior in prison.  
Because special good time credit has the effect of reducing the minimum 
sentence, an inmate who earns such credit may qualify for parole at an earlier 
date.    

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Merchant 
filed an action in the district court, challenging the WDOC's determination that 
his Colorado time should be credited against only one of his Wyoming sentences 
at a time and refusing to give him special good time credit or calendar him for 
parole while he was incarcerated in Colorado.  He also claimed that the State's failure 
to track him for purposes of special good time credit and parole while he was 
incarcerated in Colorado violated his 
constitutional right to equal protection of the law because other Wyoming inmates who are 
housed out of state are given the opportunity to earn such credit.2  Although the course of proceedings in 
this case was quite extensive, we need not detail it here.  It is enough to note that the district 
court entered a Stipulated Judgment under W.R.C.P. 54(b), incorporating a prior 
summary judgment ruling in favor of the State on Mr. Merchant's claim that he 
was entitled to credit for the time he served in Colorado against each of his three Wyoming sentences.3      

 
 
[¶7]      Although Mr. 
Merchant had already been paroled in Wyoming, 
the district court held a bench trial on his claim that his equal protection 
rights were violated because he was not tracked for special good time credit or 
calendared for parole while incarcerated in Colorado.  At the trial, an employee from the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary testified that, while many prisoners are housed out 
of state, only prisoners processed through the Wyoming correctional system are considered Wyoming inmates and, 
therefore, tracked for the purposes of "special good time" credit and calendared 
for parole.  She also testified 
that, because Mr. Merchant came to Wyoming to 
stand trial pursuant to the IAD and was returned to prison in Colorado after his sentencing, he was not processed into 
the Wyoming 
correctional system.    

 
 
[¶8]      After the trial, 
the district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Mr. 
Merchant's equal protection claim.  
The district court concluded that, under the IAD, Wyoming officials were required to return Mr. Merchant to 
Colorado without transferring him to the WDOC 
for processing into the Wyoming correctional system.  Addressing Mr. Merchant's equal 
protection claim, the court ruled:  

 
 
            
[Mr. Merchant] is not similarly situated to inmates who are processed 
into the WDOC system and later transferred to out-of-state prisons . . . .  Unlike [Mr. Merchant], those inmates 
were not serving sentences in other states before being temporarily transferred 
to Wyoming for the limited purpose of disposing 
of their pending charges in Wyoming.  
Plaintiff was a Colorado inmate when he 
came to Wyoming under the IAD, and he did not 
become a Wyoming inmate until he [was] paroled 
from his Colorado sentence and was transferred and 
processed into the WDOC system.  

 
 
In 
addition, the court held that, even if he was similarly situated, the State's 
action was rationally related to a legitimate state interest.    

 
 
[¶9]      Mr. Merchant 
appealed from the stipulated judgment and the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law.  

        

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   We review the district court's 
decision to grant a summary judgment de 
novo.  Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, 
¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 2006).  
Under W.R.C.P. 56(c), summary judgment is warranted "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law."   

 
 
[¶11]   After a bench trial, we review the 
trial court's conclusions of law de 
novo.   The trial court's 
findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard:

 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.  

 
 
Also, 
in reviewing a trial court's findings of fact,

 
 
we 
assume that the evidence of the prevailing party below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it.  We do not substitute ourselves 
for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to those findings 
unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of law.  

 
 
We 
affirm the trial court's findings if there is any evidence to support them.  

 
 

Carlson 
v. Flocchini Invs., 2005 
WY 19, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 847, 852 (Wyo. 2005), quoting Life Care Centers of America, Inc. v. 
Dexter, 2003 WY 38, ¶ 7, 65 P.3d 385, 389 (Wyo. 2003) (citations 
omitted).    

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 

1.                  
Consecutive 
or Concurrent Sentences

 
 
[¶12]   The Judgment and Sentence stated 
that Mr. Merchant's three consolidated Wyoming 
sentences were to be served consecutively and "all [Wyoming] counts to be served concurrent with the sentence 
imposed by the State of Colorado."  The WDOC interpreted the Judgment and 
Sentence as requiring it to apply his Colorado 
time to his Wyoming sentences in successive order, and the 
district court approved that interpretation.  Mr. Merchant argues the time he 
served in Colorado should have been applied to 
all of his Wyoming sentences simultaneously and the 
district court erred by ruling otherwise.  

 
 
[¶13]   We conclude that the district court correctly 
interpreted Mr. Merchant's sentences.  
A sentencing court "has discretion in determining whether the sentences 
will be served consecutively or concurrently."  Gould v. State, 2006 WY 157, ¶ 24, 151 P.3d 261, 267-68 (Wyo. 
2006).  See also, Doles v. State, 2002 WY 146, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 29, 33 (Wyo. 2002); Eaton v. 
State, 660 P.2d 803, 806 (Wyo. 1983).  The clear intent of the sentencing court 
was that Mr. Merchant's Wyoming sentences would run consecutively as 
to one another.  See generally, Kidd v. State, 937 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Wyo. 
1997), overruled on other grounds by Daugherty v. State, 2002 WY 52, 44 P.3d 28 (Wyo. 2002), and Hamill v. State, 
948 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Wyo. 1997) (considering the intent of the sentencing 
court in interpreting sentences).  
If we were to accept Mr. Merchant's argument that the time he was 
incarcerated in Colorado applied to all of his 
Wyoming sentences simultaneously, the 
consecutive nature of his Wyoming sentences 
would essentially be nullified, at least as to the time he served in Colorado.  Applying the Colorado time concurrently with one Wyoming sentence at a time gives effect to both the 
concurrent and consecutive nature of Mr. Merchant's Wyoming sentences.  

 
 
[¶14]   Moreover, even if we were to 
determine that Mr. Merchant's Wyoming sentences were unclear or ambiguous, 
our precedent would require us to construe them as consecutive.   In Pearson v. State, 866 P.2d 1297, 1299 
(Wyo. 1994), 
we stated:

 
 
We 
hold that, if no specification is made as to whether multiple sentences are 
concurrent or whether they are consecutive, the sentences will be deemed to be 
consecutive whether they are imposed in the same case, in different cases, or by 
different courts.   

 
 
The 
district court, therefore, properly ruled that the State had correctly 
interpreted Mr. Merchant's sentences.

  

2.                  
IAD 
Interpretation and Equal Protection Issues

 
 
[¶15]   Mr. Merchant argues the State 
treated him differently than other similarly situated inmates, in violation of 
his constitutional right to equal protection of the law,4 by denying him the opportunity to 
earn special good time credit and, therefore, possibly qualify for an earlier 
parole while he was incarcerated in Colorado.  Before addressing the merits of Mr. 
Merchant's claim, we need to determine whether it is moot given the fact he has 
been paroled. "A court should not hear a case where there has been a change in 
circumstances occurring either before or after a case has been filed that 
eliminates the controversy.'"  KO v. LDH (In re Guardianship of MEO), 
2006 WY 87, ¶ 27, 138 P.3d 1145, 1153 (Wyo. 2006), quoting Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Thunder Basin 
Coal Co., 978 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Wyo. 1999).

 
 
The 
doctrine of mootness encompasses those circumstances which destroy a previously 
justiciable controversy.  This 
doctrine represents the time element of standing by requiring that the interests 
of the parties which were originally sufficient to confer standing persist 
throughout the duration of the suit.  
Thus, the central question in a mootness case is "whether decision of a 
once living dispute continues to be justified by a sufficient prospect that the 
decision will have an impact on the parties."  

 
 

Id. at 1143 
(citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶16]   In his opening brief on appeal, Mr. 
Merchant states that he initially requested that the district court order the 
WDOC to "properly calculate" his sentence and "put Mr. Merchant onto the proper 
parole track."  Nevertheless, he 
acknowledges that he has already "served his time," and states that "[n]ow . . . 
the relief should be different."  
Mr. Merchant does not describe the "different" relief he should receive 
for the claimed violations of his equal protection rights.  Because he has been paroled, the relief 
he requested is no longer necessary.  
Thus, on the record before us, it is clear that Mr. Merchant's parole 
renders his constitutional issue moot. 

 
 
[¶17]   However, we have recognized 
exceptions to the general rule that we dismiss moot controversies when a case 
presents "a controversy capable of repetition yet evading review" or an issue of 
great public importance.  Board of Trustees of Fremont County School 
Dist. # 25 v. BM, 2006 WY 23, ¶ 3, 129 P.3d 317, 319 (Wyo. 2006).  The parties briefly addressed this 
matter in the district court.  A 
footnote in a joint stipulation filed prior to the bench trial stated: "The 
Plaintiff's claims are common to an undetermined number of present and future 
Wyoming 
inmates, and are reasonabl[y] certain to arise again.  The parties agree that the instant 
controversy is ripe for adjudication, even though Mr. Merchant has been 
paroled."  While a stipulation by 
the parties does not bind this Court to consider a matter that no longer 
presents a justiciable controversy, we agree there is a significant potential 
for this controversy to arise again and affect other Wyoming prisoners.  Thus, we will address Mr. Merchant's 
constitutional arguments.

 
 
[¶18]   The constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection "mandates that all persons similarly situated shall be treated 
alike, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.'"  Allhusen v. State ex rel. Wyo. Mental Health 
Prof'l Licensing Board, 898 P.2d 878, 884 (Wyo. 1995), quoting Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 423 
(Wyo. 1984).  Persons are "similarly situated" if they 
are subject to the same circumstances and conditions.  WW 
Ent., Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 
356 (Wyo. 
1998).   

 
 
[¶19]   Agreeing with the State's position, 
the district court ruled that the IAD required that Mr. Merchant be returned to 
Colorado after 
the pending charges were resolved without first transferring him to the WDOC for 
processing.  The court concluded, 
because he was not processed into the Wyoming 
correctional system, he was not similarly situated to other Wyoming inmates.  

 
 
[¶20]   Mr. Merchant challenges the State's 
and district court's interpretation of the IAD as requiring that he be returned 
to the sending state, Colorado, without being processed into the Wyoming 
correctional system.  Article V of 
the IAD addresses the nature of the receiving state's temporary custody of an 
inmate:  

 
 
            
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, 
the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary 
custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such 
indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order 
that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had.  If the request for final disposition is 
made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written 
notice provided for in Article III of this agreement.  In the case of a federal prisoner, the 
appropriate authority in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary 
custody as provided by this agreement or to the prisoner's presence in federal 
custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved 
by the custodian.

 
 
            
* * * * 

 
 
                        
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for 
the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one 
(1) or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis 
of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges 
arising out of the same transaction.  
Except for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from 
any place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in a 
suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting 
prosecution.

            

            
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purpose of this 
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending 
state.

 
 
            
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is 
otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time 
being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be earned 
by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of the 
jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.

 
 
            
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as 
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain 
in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and any 
escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an escape 
from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by 
law.

 
 
Section 
7-15-101, Art. V. 

 
 
[¶21]   We explained how the IAD is to be 
interpreted in Odhinn v. State, 2003 
WY 169, ¶¶ 14-15, 82 P.3d 715, 719-20 (Wyo. 2003):

 
 
In 
construing statutes, our aim is to effectuate legislative intent.  Director of Office of State Lands & 
Investments v. Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 73, 70 P.3d 241 (Wyo. 2003).  If the language is sufficiently clear, 
we do not resort to rules of construction.  
Id. We apply our 
general rule that we look to the ordinary and obvious meaning of a statute when 
the language is unambiguous.  
Id. We also 
construe a statute so as to give effect to all of its provisions.  Id.

 
 
            
With regard to the IAD specifically, it is a federal law subject to 
federal construction. Knox v. Wyoming 
Department of CorrectionsState Penitentiary Warden, 34 F.3d 964, 966 (10th Cir.1994).  United 
States Supreme Court interpretations of the IAD are thus binding on state 
courts.  State v. Reed, 266 Neb. 641, 668 N.W.2d 245, 2003 Neb. LEXIS 145.  The IAD is a remedial statute and should 
be liberally construed to achieve its purposes, including a speedy trial and the 
expeditious and orderly disposition of charges.  Corbin v. Superior Court of the State of 
Arizona, 155 Ariz. 365, 746 P.2d 937, 
939 (1987).  However, it also has 
strict procedural requirements that must be followed.  Id.

 
 

See 
also, State ex rel. Pharm v. Bartow, 2007 WI 
13, ¶¶ 15-16, 727 N.W.2d 1, ¶¶ 15-16 (Wis. 2007) (reciting, in a case 
interpreting the IAD, federal rules of statutory construction which are similar 
to Wyoming statutory construction rules).  

 
 
[¶22]   The basic policies behind the IAD 
are: 

 
 
The IAD 
is a compact among forty-eight states, the federal government and the District of Columbia 
creating uniform procedures for lodging and executing detainers.  . . . Wyoming's version of the IAD is promulgated in 
Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 7-15-101 
(LexisNexis 2003).  The Act provides 
a uniform procedure whereby persons who are serving prison sentences in one 
state, and who are also charged with crimes in another state, can be tried for 
the pending charges while they are serving their current sentences.  It is intended to provide for 
expeditious delivery of the prisoner to the receiving State for trial prior to 
the termination of his sentence in the sending State and seeks to minimize the 
consequent interruption of the prisoner's ongoing prison term.  

 
 

Odhinn, 
¶ 17, 82 P.3d  at 720 (some citations omitted).

 
 
[¶23]   At the trial, Julie Hopkins, the 
records manager of the Wyoming State Penitentiary, and Patrick Anderson, the 
executive director of the Wyoming Board of Parole, testified about how the State 
interpreted the IAD and handled both IAD and Wyoming inmates.  Ms. Hopkins indicated that inmates 
brought to Wyoming pursuant to the IAD are not under the 
province of the WDOC.  She stated 
that, because Mr. Merchant was an IAD inmate, the WDOC simply received a copy of 
the written Judgment and Sentence and information indicating that he had been 
transferred back to Colorado.  IAD inmates are not processed into the 
Wyoming 
correctional system to be tracked for purposes of "special good time" or 
calendared for parole prior to being returned to the sending state.  Instead, when a prisoner is finally 
transferred to the Wyoming State Penitentiary after being released by the 
sending state, the WDOC processes him into the Wyoming correctional system.  Mr. Anderson testified the State does 
not have any authority or control over the location or circumstances under which 
IAD prisoners are incarcerated in the sending state.     

 
 
[¶24]   Ms. Hopkins explained that true 
Wyoming 
inmates are handled differently than IAD inmates.  After being convicted in Wyoming, they are sent to one of the Wyoming penal 
institutions and processed into the system by the WDOC.  After processing, they are considered to 
be "Wyoming 
inmates" and, consequently, eligible to receive special good time credit and 
calendared for parole.  After 
remaining at the penitentiary for a certain period of time, a Wyoming inmate may 
be transferred out of state for housing pursuant to an interstate compact, such 
as the Western Interstate Corrections Compact, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-401 et. 
seq (LexisNexis 2007), a contract with another state, or an executive 
agreement.  Ms. Hopkins testified 
that, under the agreements with states housing Wyoming inmates, the WDOC has some degree of authority 
over, and responsibility for, the circumstances of Wyoming inmates' 
incarceration.    

 
 
[¶25]   The clear language of the relevant 
sections of Article V establishes that the scope of the receiving state's 
custody is carefully limited and designed to be "temporary" in nature.  The inmate remains under the 
jurisdiction of the sending state.   
Section 7-15-101, Art. V(g).  
The only reason the inmate is transferred from the sending state is to 
answer to the pending charges against him in the receiving state.  Section 7-15-101, Art. V(d).  While in the receiving state, he is to 
be housed in a suitable jail or facility regularly used to hold persons awaiting 
prosecution.  Id.   
Once the charges are resolved, he is to be returned to the sending 
state "[a]t the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of the 
agreement."  Section 7-15-101(V)(e). 

 
 
[¶26]   In Wyoming, defendants awaiting prosecution are 
generally housed in the county jail where the charges are pending, not the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary.  The 
Wyoming 
correctional system is administered by the WDOC.  The WDOC does not become responsible for 
an inmate until after he is sentenced to serve a prison sentence and transferred 
to one of the penal institutions under its jurisdiction.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-1-104 (LexisNexis 
2007).   

 
 
[¶27]   Mr. Merchant argues that there is 
nothing in the IAD to prevent the WDOC from taking custody of him and processing 
him into the Wyoming correctional system before 
transferring him back to Colorado.  Such a procedure would, perhaps, benefit 
prisoners like Mr. Merchant, but it would not serve the stated and clear 
purposes of the IADto encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of 
pending charges.   Section 
7-15-101, Art. 1; Carchman v. Nash, 
473 U.S. 716, 720, 105 S. Ct. 3401, 87 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1985).  Thus, we conclude that the State 
properly interpreted and applied the provisions of the IAD when it returned Mr. 
Merchant to Colorado after he was sentenced 
without processing him into the Wyoming correctional system. 

 
 
[¶28]   Our conclusion that the State was 
not required to "process" Mr. Merchant into the Wyoming correctional system before returning 
him to the sending state is consistent with the Wisconsin Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the IAD in Pharm.  That court stated:  "Under the 
plain language of the statute, temporary custody does not include custody for 
the purpose of subsequent incarceration in a receiving state." Pharm, ¶ 23, 727 N.W.2d 1, ¶ 23, citing 
State of New York by Coughlin v. 
Poe, 835 F. Supp. 585, 590-91 (E.D. Okla. 
1993) (stating that temporary custody "does not expressly, or by 
implication, indicate custody for the purpose of service or execution of 
sentence in the receiving State").  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court further supported its position regarding the 
limited scope of "temporary custody" by referring to Article 1 of the IAD, which 
has also been adopted in Wyoming as § 7-15-101, Art. 1. 

 
 

The 
IAD applies to detainers lodged against prisoners that are based on 
untried indictments, informations or complaints.  As its purpose set out in Article I 
explains:  "this agreement [is] to 
encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and 
determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried 
indictments, informations or complaints."   Wis. 
Stat. §  976.05(1).   The reference to "untried" or 
"pending" charges is repeated in §  976.05(3)-(5).   There is nothing in the IAD that 
indicates that the rights accorded to prisoners under it attach when there are 
no untried charges outstanding.   
Therefore, we conclude that under the plain language of the statute, a 
prisoner has the following rights after he or she files a Request for 
Disposition under Article III (§  
976.05(3)):(1) transportation to a receiving state to answer pending 
charges;  (2) commencement of a 
trial within 180 days in the receiving state;  (3) return to the sending state to 
complete the prisoner's term of incarceration;  and (4) upon completion of the 
prisoner's term of incarceration in the sending state, return to the receiving 
state to serve any term of incarceration that has been imposed 
there.

  

Pharm, 
¶ 24, 
727 N.W.2d 1, ¶ 24.  

 
 
[¶29]   The State employees' undisputed 
trial testimony established that, because Mr. Merchant was not processed into 
the Wyoming correctional system, his situation 
was distinguishable from that of Wyoming inmates.  On this record, the district court 
properly ruled that Mr. Merchant was not similarly situated to Wyoming inmates who were 
processed by the WDOC and then housed out of state.  Mr. Merchant was not, therefore, 
entitled to be treated equally to Wyoming inmates for purposes of eligibility 
for special good time credit or parole calendaring.    

 
 
[¶30]   Moreover, even if we were to 
conclude that Mr. Merchant was similarly situated to the other Wyoming inmates, we still would not find his equal 
protection rights were violated when the State treated him differently than 
Wyoming 
inmates.  In conducting an equal 
protection analysis, we apply one of two tests to scrutinize the 
constitutionality of the disparate treatment.  When the equal protection claim involves 
a suspect class or a fundamental right, we apply the strict scrutiny test, which 
asks whether the state action is necessary to achieve a compelling state 
interest.  Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 940 
(Wyo. 2000).  If no suspect class or 
fundamental right is involved, "the analysis involves deciding whether the 
action bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest."  Id.  

 
 
[¶31]   The rational basis test is 
appropriate for determining Mr. Merchant's equal protection claim because he 
does not allege he was a member of a suspect class or his claim involves a 
fundamental right.  He contends, 
however, the State's refusal to give him the opportunity to earn "special good 
time credit" and, thereby, possibly qualify for earlier parole when Wyoming inmates housed 
out of state are given that opportunity, was not rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.    

 
 
[¶32]   The district court ruled that there 
was a rational basis for treating him differently.   It concluded that the trial 
evidence established that special good time is a management tool "for use by 
Wyoming wardens, to reward good behavior on the 
part of Wyoming inmates."  The court opined that, because Mr. 
Merchant was not a Wyoming inmate while he was 
incarcerated in Colorado, "there existed no 
rationale to award [him] special good time for the time he served in Colorado toward his 
Wyoming Sentence."  It also ruled 
that tracking Mr. Merchant "while in Colorado for purposes of awarding warden's 
special good time would . . . work an undue burden on the WDOC and Board [of 
Parole]."    

 
 
[¶33]   The district court's ruling is 
supported by the trial evidence.  
Ms. Hopkins testified that "special good time" credit is used as a 
behavioral incentive for Wyoming inmates and indicated that, since Mr. Merchant 
was not a Wyoming inmate, the State had no tangible interest in encouraging his 
good behavior while he was incarcerated in Colorado.  Moreover, given the fact that the State 
has no part in determining where or under what circumstances another state's 
inmate is housed, Mr. Anderson indicated tracking non-Wyoming inmates for 
purposes of awarding special good time credit would be a difficult 
administrative burden.     

 
 
[¶34]   The district court ruled 
further:

 
 
            
Pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes §§ 17.22.5-301,302, and 405, 
Plaintiff, as a Colorado inmate, was eligible 
to receive the equivalent of Wyoming warden's 
special good time, which is a deduction of time from an inmate's Colorado sentence.  To allow Plaintiff to receive warden's 
special good time in Wyoming for the time he 
served in Colorado would allow Plaintiff to "double 
dip," simultaneously receiving time off his sentences in both states, while only 
serving time in one institution.

 
 
[¶35]   The trial transcript revealed 
additional reasons for treating IAD inmates differently from Wyoming inmates housed in 
other states.  Mr. Anderson 
testified that parole is used as a "relief valve for population pressures."  In other words, parole can be used to 
release prisoners who are not deemed to be a risk to society earlier in order to 
remedy prison overcrowding problems.  
Obviously, if, like Mr. Merchant, the prisoner is not a Wyoming inmate and is housed in another state as an inmate 
of that state, there is no reason to give him the opportunity to earn special 
good time credit and possibly an earlier parole because he is not contributing 
to the overcrowding of Wyoming prison 
facilities.

 
 
[¶36]   These reasons all support treating 
Mr. Merchant differently than Wyoming inmates.  Like the district court, we conclude the 
State's action was rationally related to several legitimate state 
objectives.    

 
 
[¶37]   Mr. Merchant directs us to two 
cases in support of his contention that the State violated his equal protection 
rights:  In re Salinas, 124 P.3d 665 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2005) and Van Winkle v. New Jersey Dep't of 
Corrections, 850 A.2d 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).  Mr. Salinas served concurrent Washington and South 
Dakota sentences in a South Dakota institution.  Salinas, 124 P.3d  at 666.  After Mr. Salinas was paroled in 
South Dakota, the Washington Department of 
Corrections credited his Washington sentence 
with his concurrent time, but refused to "credit him with any earned early 
release time for his South 
Dakota confinement."  Id. at 667.  The Washington agency took the position that he was not 
entitled to such credit because South 
Dakota did not have an earned early release program or a 
procedure for calculating such time.  
Id.

 
 
[¶38]   Without significant discussion, the 
court concluded that Mr. Salinas was similarly situated to other inmates who did 
receive earned early release credit.  
Id. at 667-68.   The Washington court's 
analysis, therefore, focused on whether there was a rational basis for treating 
Mr. Salinas differently.  Id. at 667.  The Washington Department of Corrections 
posited administrative inconvenience, based on the fact that South Dakota did not have 
an earned early release program, as a rational basis for discriminating against 
him.  Id. at 
668-69.  The court held that, under 
the facts of that case, administrative inconvenience was not a sufficient reason 
to deny Mr. Salinas the credit.  
Id.   

 
 
[¶39]   
Salinasis, obviously, distinguishable 
from the case at bar because the Washington court assumed that Mr. Salinas was 
similarly situated to other inmates who did receive credit for earned early 
release time.  Here, we have 
concluded that Mr. Merchant was not similarly situated to Wyoming inmates who are processed into the Wyoming correctional 
system prior to being sent out of state for housing.  Furthermore, as we explained above, 
unlike the Washington authorities, the WDOC offered 
reasons in addition to "administrative inconvenience" to justify treating Mr. 
Merchant differently.    

 
 
[¶40]   Mr. Van Winkle was transferred, 
pursuant to the IAD, from Pennsylvania to 
New Jersey to 
be tried on outstanding charges in that state.  Van Winkle, 850 A.2d  at 549.  After he was convicted, the New Jersey court sentenced him and ordered his sentences 
to run concurrently with his Pennsylvania sentence.  Id.  
Mr. Van Winkle was then returned to Pennsylvania, where he served his concurrent 
sentences.  Id.  
He was eventually paroled in Pennsylvania and returned to New Jersey.  Id.  
The New Jersey department of 
corrections refused to give him work credit against his New 
Jersey sentences for the time he served in Pennsylvania.  Id.

        

[¶41]   Among other arguments, Mr. Van 
Winkle contended his equal protection rights were violated "by the failure to 
grant him work credits for the time he served in Pennsylvania when he was, at the same time, 
serving a concurrent sentence out of this State."  Id. at 551.   A New 
Jersey superior court held that Mr. Van Winkle's equal protection 
rights were violated by the state statute which allowed work credits only when 
the inmate is incarcerated in an institution under New Jersey's 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 552. The court held that the 
department of corrections' justification for denying him work credits was not 
sufficient.  

 
 
The 
D.O.C. offers no explanation for why defendant should be denied work credits for 
the work he performed in Pennsylvania beyond 
its contention that petitioner was not under New Jersey's "control" during this time.  The D.O.C. does not dispute the same 
rehabilitative purpose is being furthered.  
Put another way, the D.O.C. does not provide a reasoned basis for 
distinguishing between petitioner serving a concurrent sentence out-of-state and 
a prisoner serving a sentence in State.  

 
 

Id.  The 
superior court also remarked that, although Mr. Van Winkle was paid by 
Pennsylvania for the work he performed in that 
state, he did not receive a reduction in his Pennsylvania sentence because that state did 
not award work credits.   Thus, 
there was no concern that if he were awarded work credits in New Jersey, he would be 
"double-dipping."  Id. at 553.     

 
 
[¶42]   Although Van Winkle's course of proceedings was 
similar to the case at bar, we do not believe the New Jersey ruling is 
applicable here.  The WDOC offered 
more thorough reasoning for treating Mr. Merchant differently from other 
Wyoming inmates than was presented in either Van Winkle or Salinas. Further, unlike the situation 
presented in Van Winkle, Mr. Merchant 
would have been "double dipping" if he had received Wyoming special good time credit while incarcerated in 
Colorado because he was eligible to receive 
similar credit under the Colorado system.  Thus, like the district court, we are 
satisfied that the State has met the rational basis test and did not, therefore, 
violate Mr. Merchant's equal protection rights.   

 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶43]   We affirm the district court's 
ruling that, as a matter of law, Mr. Merchant's Wyoming sentences were 
consecutive to one another and he was only entitled to credit for his Colorado 
incarceration against one Wyoming sentence at a time.  We also conclude that Mr. Merchant's 
equal protection rights were not violated when the State refused to give him the 
opportunity to earn "special good time" credit against the minimum terms of his 
Wyoming sentences or calendar him for parole 
while he was incarcerated in Colorado.  

 
 
[¶44]   Affirmed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The district 
court granted a defense motion for judgment of acquittal on Count 
VIII.

     

2Mr. 
Merchant's original complaint named the WDOC as the defendant and included 
requests for declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus.  He later amended his complaint to 
include a request for an injunction and a claim that his civil rights had been 
violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He 
also added the Wyoming Board of Parole as a defendant.     

  

3Mr. Merchant 
filed a Petition for Review of the stipulated judgment with this Court, but we 
denied that petition.

  

4The right to 
equal protection of the law is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and various provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, 
including Article I, §§ 2 and 34.