Case Title: CLARK v HENSEL PHELPS CONSTRUCTION

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Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-02-16T00:00:00Z

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No. 13399 I N T H E SUPREPlE COURT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1977 JOHN CLARK, Claimant and Appellant, HENSEL PHELPS CONSTRUCTION CO., Employer and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY C O . , I n s u r e r and Respondent. Appeal from: Workers' Comp. Court Judge William E. Hunt, p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Hoyt and Bottomly, Great F a l l s , Montana John C. Hoyt argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Thomas Lewis appeared, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent : J a r d i n e , Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, Great F a l l s , Montana James Aiken argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted: January 27, 1977 Decided: FEB 1 6 1 9 a Filed: :E @ g/I Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This appeal concerns written notice to claimant and approval of the Division of Workers' Compensation prior to the termination of workers' compensation benefits to an injured workman. Claimant John Clark was injured in an industrial acci- dent on August 16, 1973. He was employed by Hensel Phelps Construction Co. insured under Plan I1 of the Workers' Compensa- tion Act. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., "carrier", was the con- struction company's insurer. Clark was paid temporary total disability benefits from the date of the accident through October 2, 1973. The carrier stopped payment of benefits without notice to claimant or approval of the Division of Workers' Compensation. In June 1975, claimant requested a hearing before the Workers' Compensation Court. That court found claimant entitled to temporary total disability benefits from the date of the accident through October 2, 1973 and again from October 28, 1975 until further order of the court or until the claimant was able to return to work. No benefits were awarded for the period of October 3, 1973 through Octo- ber 28, 1975, and it is from this omission claimant appeals. The record reveals the injury suffered by claimant was an extremely painful and disabling back injury. Since the accident claimant has experienced recurcihg- burning pains in his lower back and left leg. The injury has created a weakness in his left leg causing a limp which is becoming progressively more pronounced. Immediately after the accident claimant was examined by Dr. Schroeder in Eureka, Montana. Dr. Schroeder diagnosed claimant's 1 I injury as a muscle spasm, left lumbar" and referred him to a specialist. Later D r . Schroeder informed the carrier claimant could return t o work on October 3, 1973. This bpinion was used by the c a r r i e r as the basis for termination of workers' compensa- tion benefits t o claimant. The record i s clear, claimant was unable t o do any kind of physical labor for the period i n question. From the date of the accident through October 1975, claimant was examined by a t l e a s t eight different doctors for treatment for h i s injured back. O n October 28, 1975 claimant was examined for the f i r s t time by D r . Richard A. Nelson. O n that date D r . Nelson determined claimant was disabled and unable t o engage i n h i s normal kind of work a s a result of the existing back injury. Apparently D r . Nelson's report was used by the Workers' Compensation Court i n fixing the date for the resumption of benefit payments t o claimant. There was no reason given by the court for the failure to require the carrier t o comply with the notice and approval provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act prior t o the termination of compensation benefit payments. A t issue i s the necessity of giving claimant written notice and acquiring approval of the Division of Workers' Compensa- tion, prior t o the termination of benefits. The controlling section of the Workers' Compensation Act i s section 92-615, R.C.M. 1947, amended i n 1974, but provided i n 1973: "* * * If the insurer determines t o i n i t i a l l y deny a claim, or a f t e r a claim has been accepted, terminates biweekly compensation benefits, it may do so only a f t e r fifteen (15) days written notice t o the claimant and the division, and a f t e r written approval of the division." The effect of this statute upon a fact situation as in the instant case, is a matter of first impression. However, the statute clearly and unambiguously states that notice to claimant and the division, and written approval of the division are prerequisites to the termination of compensation benefits. Where the language of a statute is plain, unambiguous, direct and certain, the statute speaks for itself and there is nothing left for the court con- strue. Hammill v. Young, Mont . , 540 P.2d 971, 32 St. Rep. 935; Dunphy v. Anaconda Co., 151Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660. The Rhode Island Workmens' Compensation Act contains a provision similar to section 92-615, R.C.M. 1947. Rhode Island General Laws 1956, section 28-35-46 states in pertinent part: "Before an employer may discontinue, suspend or reduce compensation payments whether they are being received under an agreement, award, order, finding or decree, the employer shall notify the commission and the employee of his intention to discontinue, suspend or reduce pay- ments and the reason therefor.* * &'' An interpretation of the effect this statute fact situation similar to the instant case is found in Carpenter v . Globe Indemnity Co., 65 R.I. 194, 14 A.2d 235, 240. There the carrier terminated compensation payments to an injured workman on the basis of a doctor's report which stated claimant was able to return to work. Claimant denied receiving notice of the termina- tion of benefits and it was clear the Workers' Compensation Commis- sion had received no such notice. The court found the unilateral termination ineffective noting: "9; * * In our opinion, a finding that such disability has ended or diminished can be reached only by a supple- mental agreement, also approved by the director of labor * Jc * * ' I A more recent case Raymond v. B.I.F. Industries, Inc., 112 R.I. 192, 308 A.2d 820 is in accord. It is clear Rhode Island courts interpret their statute as meaning the employer or his insurer may not unilaterally ter- minate workers' compensation benefits. Further, if the employer does attempt to unilaterally terminate the payment of benefits such attempted termination is ineffective. The employer remains liable for the payment of benefits until the termination is accomplished by following the statutory notice provision. The cause is remanded to the Workers'. Compensation Court with instructions to direct payments to claimant for the period October 3, 1973 to October 28, 1975. With that exception,the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court is affirmed. We Concur: Chief Justice ll