Case Title: Yuzefovsky v. St. John's Wood Apartments

Citation: 

Docket Number: 993015

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
ALEX YUZEFOVSKY 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 993015 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
January 12, 2001 
ST. JOHN’S WOOD APARTMENTS, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Melvin R. Hughes, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court 
properly sustained a demurrer to a second amended motion for 
judgment filed by a tenant against his landlord alleging fraud, 
negligent failure to warn, and negligent failure to protect 
concerning the danger of a criminal assault on the tenant by a 
third party which occurred on the landlord’s property. 
Because the procedural posture of this case controls our 
consideration of the factual allegations of the pleading at 
issue, we initially relate the proceedings in the trial court 
that preceded the trial court’s sustaining the demurrer to that 
pleading.  On April 26, 1998, Alex Yuzefovsky, a tenant of St. 
John’s Wood Apartments, filed a motion for judgment against St. 
John’s Wood Apartments and the alleged owner of that 
development, SJW, Limited Partnership.  Under various theories, 
Yuzefovsky alleged that these defendants were liable for 
injuries he sustained on the property of St. John’s Wood 
Apartments as a result of a criminal assault by a third party.  
Prior to serving the original motion for judgment on these 
defendants, Yuzefovsky filed an amended motion for judgment 
adding as additional defendants General Services Corporation and 
GSC Security.  This pleading alleged that the former had an 
ownership interest in St. John’s Wood Apartments and the latter 
provided security services to the other defendants on the 
premises of these apartments.  This pleading included additional 
theories of liability and increased ad damnum claims. 
After the first amended motion for judgment was served on 
the defendants, they filed a joint plea in bar of the statute of 
limitations with respect to a number of the claims asserted by 
Yuzefovsky and a demurrer to all of them.  Thereafter, the trial 
court sustained the plea in bar to one claim, sustained the 
demurrer to the remaining claims except for a claim of breach of 
contract, and granted Yuzefovsky leave to file a second amended 
motion for judgment.  On July 7, 1999, Yuzefovsky filed his 
second amended motion for judgment reasserting each of the 
claims to which the trial court had previously sustained the 
defendants’ demurrer without material change in the factual 
allegations.  This pleading, however, did not reassert the claim 
to which the plea in bar had been sustained or the contract 
claim to which the demurrer had been overruled.  The defendants 
filed another demurrer to all the claims in the second amended 
motion for judgment, the trial court sustained this demurrer, 
and dismissed the case with prejudice. 
 
2
Our consideration of the factual allegations in this case 
is governed by the well-settled principle that when a circuit 
court sustains a demurrer to an amended motion for judgment 
which does not incorporate or refer to any of the allegations 
that were set forth in a prior motion for judgment, we will 
consider only the allegations contained in the amended pleading 
to which the demurrer was sustained.  Bell Atlantic-Virginia, 
Inc. v. Arlington County, 254 Va. 60, 63 n.2, 486 S.E.2d 297, 
299 n.2 (1997); see also Breeding v. Hensley, 258 Va. 207, 212, 
519 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1999).  Our consideration of those 
allegations is further guided by well-settled principles of 
appellate review.  A demurrer admits the truth of the facts 
contained in the pleading to which it is addressed, as well as 
any facts that may be reasonably and fairly implied and inferred 
from those allegations.  Cox Cable Hampton Roads, Inc. v. City 
of Norfolk, 242 Va. 394, 397, 410 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1991).  A 
demurrer does not, however, admit the correctness of the 
pleader’s conclusions of law.  Ward’s Equip., Inc. v. New 
Holland North America, Inc., 254 Va. 379, 382, 493 S.E.2d 516, 
518 (1997).  Accordingly, we will consider the facts stated, and 
those reasonably and fairly implied and inferred, in the second 
amended motion for judgment in a light favorable to Yuzefovsky, 
but we will review the sufficiency of the legal conclusions 
ascribed to those facts de novo.  In relating these facts we 
 
3
will hereafter refer in context to all the defendants 
collectively as “St. John’s Wood” and the apartment complex as 
“the development.” 
In December 1994, Yuzefovsky moved to Richmond to begin new 
employment.  His employer initially provided him with temporary 
housing while he looked for permanent housing.  In conducting 
his housing search, Yuzefovsky was particularly concerned with 
the issue of his personal security, desiring to find housing in 
a safe and crime-free environment. 
In discussing his interest in leasing an apartment in the 
development with employees of St. John’s Wood, Yuzefovsky 
indicated that he was unfamiliar with the area where the 
development was located and expressed his concern for security.  
He specifically asked the employees if the development “was safe 
and whether there had been crime on and/or about the property.”  
The employees told Yuzefovsky “that there had been no crimes at 
[the property of] St. John’s Wood, and that it was safe.”  They 
further advised Yuzefovsky that “police officers lived in the 
development and that police vehicles patrolled the property.” 
Based upon these assurances, Yuzefovsky became a tenant of 
St. John’s Wood, leasing an apartment in the development and 
taking possession of it in February 1995.  On November 21, 1996, 
Yuzefovsky was confronted by an assailant armed with a sawed-off 
shotgun in a walkway on the property of St. John’s Wood and 
 
4
immediately adjacent to his apartment.  The assailant shot 
Yuzefovsky in the right shoulder, took his car keys, and fled in 
Yuzefovsky’s vehicle.  The assailant was subsequently arrested 
and convicted of crimes related to this incident. 
Yuzefovsky alleges that the employees of St. John’s Wood 
knew that their representations that there had been no crimes 
committed on or in the vicinity of the development, that the 
development was safe, that police officers lived there, and that 
police vehicles patrolled the development were false.  He 
further alleges that in 1994, 656 crimes, including 113 crimes 
against persons, were reported to the Richmond City Police as 
having occurred in the vicinity of the development and that 
criminal activity in that vicinity remained at that level for 
the next two calendar years.  Yuzefovsky further alleges that 
during the three-year period from November 21, 1993 to November 
21, 1996, there were 257 crimes reported to Richmond City Police 
that occurred on the development.1  These crimes included “5 
robberies . . ., 8 aggravated assaults, 13 simple assaults, 37 
residential burglaries, 34 larcenies, 97 larcenies from the 
                     
1Yuzefovsky does not allege with specificity how many of the 
crimes on the property of St. John’s Wood occurred prior to his 
decision to lease an apartment from St. John’s Wood.  It is a 
reasonable inference that at least some of these crimes occurred 
prior to December 1994.  Yuzefovsky also does not allege with 
specificity how many of these crimes occurred, if any, 
immediately prior to the November 21, 1996 assault upon him. 
 
5
auto[mobile], 2 abductions, 30 property crimes and 26 motor 
vehicles thefts.” 
The legal theories of liability asserted by Yuzefovsky in 
his second amended motion for judgment and for each of which he 
sought $15,000,000 for compensatory damages, in summary, are: 
(1) Fraud.  Yuzefovsky alleges that the misrepresentations 
by employees of St. John’s Wood that the development was safe 
and crime-free and that police lived in and patrolled the 
development “were negligent, reckless and/or intentional,” and 
that he relied on these misrepresentations in leasing an 
apartment at the development.  Yuzefovsky alleges that the 
injuries he sustained in the subsequent criminal assault were a 
direct and proximate result of these misrepresentations. 
(2) Duty to Warn.  Yuzefovsky alleges that under the 
circumstances of the previous criminal conduct that was known by 
St. John’s Wood, they owed a duty to warn him that “violent 
crime had taken place at [the development],” and that the 
negligent failure to exercise that duty was a proximate cause of 
the injuries he sustained in the subsequent criminal assault. 
(3) Duty to Protect.  Yuzefovsky alleges that St. John’s 
Wood, “and in particular GSC Security,” owed a duty to protect 
him against unsafe conditions or criminal activities of which 
they knew or should have known.  He alleges that St. John’s Wood 
had undertaken the duty to protect their tenants through the use 
 
6
of a security service, and that having done so, St. John’s Wood 
and this security service2 were negligent in exercising that duty 
by deploying inadequate numbers of security guards, using 
“[i]mproper patrol techniques,” providing “[i]nadequate security 
equipment,” and in failing to properly train, select, and 
compensate their security guards.  Yuzefovsky alleges that the 
breach of this duty was a proximate cause of the injuries he 
sustained in the subsequent criminal assault. 
(4) Special Relationship.  Yuzefovsky alleges that “[a]s a 
tenant of [St. John’s Wood, they] had a special relationship 
with [Yuzefovsky].  That [this] special relationship created a 
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect [Yuzefovsky] against 
criminal acts of third persons and to warn him of the danger of 
such attacks, since the danger of such attacks [was] known 
and/or reasonably foreseeable to [St. John’s Wood].”  Yuzefovsky 
alleges that the breach of the duties created by this special 
relationship was a proximate cause of the injuries he sustained 
in the subsequent criminal assault. 
In a memorandum in support of the defendants’ demurrer to 
the second amended motion for judgment, they contended that the 
                     
2The relationship between General Services Corporation and 
GSC Security is not clear from the record.  For purposes of this 
appeal, we draw the reasonable inference that General Services 
Corporation is a management company and GSC Security is either a 
unit of that company or a wholly owned subsidiary of it.  
 
7
allegations of fraud were based upon vague and indefinite 
statements of opinion and not fact, and that Yuzefovsky was not 
justified in relying on these statements.  They further 
contended that Yuzefovsky had a duty to undertake his own 
investigation of the area rather than relying on the statements 
made by employees of St. John’s Wood. 
As to the remaining claims of the second amended motion for 
judgment, the defendants contended that the liability asserted 
by each claim was founded upon the duty of St. John’s Wood to 
warn and/or protect tenants against criminal assaults by unknown 
third parties.  The defendants contended that there is no 
liability on a landlord in such circumstances because, as a 
matter of law, there is no special relationship between landlord 
and tenant that would give rise to such duties.  They further 
contended that even if there were a special relationship in this 
case, there was no duty to warn or to protect because the 
criminal act of the third party was not reasonably foreseeable. 
The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer to the 
fraud claim ruling that “[a]ny statement by [employees of St. 
John’s Wood] that the area would be safe from crime is opinion, 
not fact and not actionable.”  The trial court further ruled 
that even if such statements were actionable as fraud, the 
                                                                  
 
 
8
allegations of fact failed to establish a causal nexus between 
those statements and the criminal act that caused Yuzefovsky’s 
injuries. 
As to the various theories of negligence, the trial court 
ruled that Virginia does not recognize a special relationship 
between landlord and tenant giving rise to a duty to warn or to 
protect.  Thus, the trial court, relying primarily upon Wright 
v. Webb, 234 Va. 527, 533, 362 S.E.2d 919, 922 (1987), further 
ruled that a landlord is not liable for crimes committed by a 
third party against the tenant on the landlord’s property in the 
absence of knowledge that criminal assaults are occurring, or 
are about to occur, on the premises which indicate an imminent 
probability of harm to the tenant.  This appeal followed. 
DISCUSSION 
Yuzefovsky assigns three errors to the trial court’s 
judgment sustaining the demurrer.  In his first assignment of 
error, Yuzefovsky asserts that the trial court erred in ruling, 
as a matter of law, that a landlord’s knowledge of prior 
criminal assaults on or near the landlord’s property cannot give 
rise to a duty to take reasonable measures to warn and/or 
protect a tenant from reasonably foreseeable similar assaults.  
He asserts in his second assignment of error that the trial 
court erred in finding that the alleged false statements of St. 
John’s Wood were mere opinions and, therefore, not actionable.  
 
9
He asserts in his third assignment of error that the trial court 
erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that the misrepresentations 
by St. John’s Wood were not “a proximate cause” of Yuzefovsky’s 
injuries.  We will address each of these assignments of error 
seriatim. 
Negligence Issues
As we noted above, in ruling upon a demurrer the issue 
before the trial court in this case, and before this Court on 
appeal, is whether the facts alleged in Yuzefovsky’s second 
amended motion for judgment, along with the facts that may be 
reasonably and fairly implied by or inferred therefrom, are 
sufficient to support the causes of action under the theories of 
liability to which those facts relate.  With respect to claims 
of negligence, the factual allegations must establish the 
existence of a duty of care.  Whether such duty exists is “a 
pure question of law.”  Burns v. Johnson, 250 Va. 41, 45, 458 
S.E.2d 448, 451 (1995).  If the allegations are legally 
sufficient to establish a duty as a matter of law, then it 
becomes a matter for the jury, upon the evidence, to 
“determine[] whether the duty has been performed.”  Acme 
Markets, Inc. v. Remschel, 181 Va. 171, 178, 24 S.E.2d 430, 434 
(1943). 
The parties do not dispute the law applicable to the 
various legal assertions contained in Yuzefovsky’s second 
 
10
amended motion for judgment.  Rather, they dispute whether the 
factual allegations made therein sufficiently state the 
necessary elements of a cause of action against an owner or 
occupier of land, for injuries caused by the criminal act of a 
third party.  The question of when and under what circumstances 
an owner or occupier of land will be required either to warn his 
invitees or tenants of, or protect them against, harm from the 
criminal act of a third party is always fact specific and, thus, 
not amenable to a bright-line rule for resolution.  In that 
regard, while the general rule that no such duty is owed is 
unquestionably the law of this Commonwealth, Gupton v. Quicke, 
247 Va. 362, 363, 442 S.E.2d 658, 658 (1994), we have recognized 
that there are narrow exceptions to this rule. 
It is worthy of note, however, that while recognizing these 
exceptions, we have rarely found the circumstances of the cases 
under review to warrant the application of these exceptions.  
Compare, e.g., Burns, 250 Va. at 44-45, 458 S.E.2d at 450 
(business owner not liable for criminal assault on invitee), 
Wright, 234 Va. at 533, 362 S.E.2d at 922 (business owner not 
liable for criminal assault on invitee), and Gulf Reston, Inc. 
v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 159, 207 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1974)(landlord 
not liable for criminal assault on tenant) with Dudley v. 
Offender Aid and Restoration of Richmond, Inc., 241 Va. 270, 
279, 401 S.E.2d 878, 883 (1991)(private operator of “half-way 
 
11
house” for felons had special relationship with its clients and 
owed duty of care to the public to control clients’ actions).  
We have, however, set out in these and other cases the general 
analysis applicable for determining whether an exception to the 
general rule applies. 
First, the plaintiff must establish that there is a special 
relationship, either between the plaintiff and the defendant or 
between the third party criminal actor and the defendant.3  See, 
e.g., Holles v. Sunrise Terrance, Inc., 257 Va. 131, 136, 509 
S.E.2d 494, 497 (1999).  The necessary special relationship may 
be one that has been recognized as a matter of law, such as that 
between an innkeeper and guest, or it may arise from the factual 
circumstances of a particular case.  Second, the plaintiff must 
establish that the special relationship creates a duty of care, 
such as to warn and/or protect the plaintiff, as a result of the 
particular circumstances of that special relationship, including 
the known or reasonably foreseeable danger of harm to the 
plaintiff from the criminal act of the third party.  Whether the 
circumstances will warrant the imposition of those duties, as we 
                     
3Yuzefovsky does not contend that there was a special 
relationship between St. John’s Wood and the third party 
criminal actor in this case.  We note that the existence of such 
a relationship is almost always limited to a defendant’s 
exercise of a legal duty to control the actions of a person in 
custody or on parole.  See, e.g., Dudley, 241 Va. at 275-76, 401 
S.E.2d at 881. 
 
12
have stated, is a fact-specific determination.  Because the 
imposition of those duties “does not depend upon foreseeability 
[of harm to the plaintiff] alone,” consideration must be given 
to “the magnitude of the burden of guarding against [harm to the 
plaintiff] and the consequences of placing that burden on the 
defendant.”  Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 159, 207 S.E.2d at 845 
(citation omitted); see also Wright, 234 Va. at 531, 362 S.E.2d 
at 921.  Guided by these principles, we begin our analysis to 
determine whether there was a special relationship between St. 
John’s Wood and Yuzefovsky and, if so, whether any duty of care 
was owed by St. John’s Wood to Yuzefovsky under the factual 
allegations in the second amended motion for judgment. 
Initially, we observe that, with regard to Yuzefovsky’s 
negligence claims, the separate counts in the second amended 
motion for judgment incorporate by reference “all other 
allegations” in that pleading.  One such allegation is that 
Yuzefovsky “was a business invitee and tenant” of St. John’s 
Wood.  In a separate count entitled “Special Relationship,” 
Yuzefovsky further alleges that because he was their tenant that 
a special relationship existed between himself and St. John’s 
Wood.  On appeal, Yuzefovsky does not rely on the status of 
business invitee to advance his assertions that the trial court 
erred in sustaining the demurrer to his pleading.  Rather, his 
assertions are made in the context of the relationship between 
 
13
landlord and tenant and, accordingly, we will review the 
allegations in the second amended motion for judgment, including 
the count entitled “Special Relationship,” in that context. 
In prior cases, we have recognized that the necessary 
special relationships that may create a duty of care include 
those of common carrier and passenger, business proprietor and 
invitee, innkeeper and guest, and employer and employee.  A.H. 
v. Rockingham Publishing Co., 255 Va. 216, 220, 495 S.E.2d 482, 
485 (1998); see also Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 233 
Va. 445, 448, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1987).  Although we have 
observed that this list is not exclusive, we have consistently 
rejected the contention that the relationship of landlord and 
tenant, without more, constitutes a special relationship such 
that a duty of care may arise with regard to the conduct of a 
third party.  Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 159, 207 S.E.2d at 845; 
Klingbeil, 233 Va. at 448, 357 S.E.2d at 201 (holding that 
“there was no such common-law duty on this landlord” (emphasis 
added)). 
Rather, we have stressed that while a landlord owes a duty 
to his tenant to maintain in a reasonably safe condition those 
areas over which he has control, the landlord is not an insurer 
of his tenant’s safety.  Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 157, 207 S.E.2d 
at 844.  Thus, as a general rule, we have interpreted the 
landlord’s duty as being limited to maintaining in good repair 
 
14
and free of latent defects the areas over which the landlord has 
control, and not to require the landlord “to act as a policeman 
. . . ‘to protect his tenant from a criminal act by a third 
person.’ ”  Klingbeil, 233 Va. at 447, 357 S.E.2d at 201 
(citation omitted).  Nonetheless, in Gulf Reston and Klingbeil 
we made clear that our holdings were based upon the specific 
facts of those individual cases.  We did not preclude a 
determination under different circumstances that the necessary 
special relationship between a landlord and his tenant could be 
established such as to create a duty of care upon the landlord 
with regard to the criminal conduct of a third party that is an 
exception to the general rule applicable to the landlord-tenant 
relationship.  Gulf Reston, 215 Va. at 159, 207 S.E.2d at 845; 
see also A.H., 255 Va. at 221 n.4, 495 S.E.2d at 486 n.4. 
Assuming, without deciding, that the facts and 
circumstances as alleged in the second amended motion for 
judgment establish a special relationship between St. John’s 
Wood and Yuzefovsky, we must also consider whether those facts 
and circumstances are also sufficient to establish that St. 
John’s Wood had a duty of care to warn and/or protect Yuzefovsky 
against the danger of harm from the criminal conduct of a third 
party.  We are of opinion that neither duty is established on 
the facts and circumstances alleged in this case. 
 
15
Although in our prior landlord-tenant cases we found no 
special relationship and, thus, we did not reach the issue of 
what circumstances would give rise to a duty of care on the part 
of the landlord, in Wright, we observed that “[a] business 
invitor owes the same duty of reasonable care to his invitee 
that a landlord owes to his tenant.”  234 Va. at 530, 362 S.E.2d 
at 921.  With respect to whether a particular special 
relationship creates a duty to protect the invitee from the 
criminal acts of a third party, we went on to say that “[i]n 
ordinary circumstances, it would be difficult to anticipate 
when, where, and how a criminal might attack a business 
invitee.”  Id. at 531, 362 S.E.2d at 921.  Accordingly, we held 
that a business owner “does not have a duty to take measures to 
protect an invitee against criminal assault unless he knows that 
criminal assaults against persons are occurring, or are about to 
occur, on the premises which indicate an imminent probability of 
harm to an invitee.”  Id. at 533, 362 S.E.2d at 922.  We hold 
that this same standard applies to the determination whether a 
landlord owes a duty of care to protect a tenant with whom a 
landlord has a special relationship. 
There are no express allegations in Yuzefovsky’s second 
amended motion for judgment that St. John’s Wood knew that 
criminal assaults against persons were occurring, or were about 
to occur, on the premises that would indicate an imminent 
 
16
probability of harm to Yuzefovsky or another tenant, nor can 
such knowledge be reasonably implied or inferred from the 
allegations made.  Moreover, Yuzefovsky’s allegations, if 
proven, do not establish an imminent probability of injury to 
him from a criminal assault by a third party on the premises.  
There is no allegation that would support the conclusion that on 
or near the date when Yuzefovsky was injured such assaults or 
other crimes against persons were occurring, or about to occur, 
on the premises of St. John’s Wood.  Thus, we need not consider 
whether foreseeable harm at the heightened degree of probability 
established in Wright existed at some other time during this 
landlord-tenant relationship.  Cf. Thompson v. Skate America, 
261 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2001)(decided today, 
holding that imminent probability of harm is a heightened degree 
of foreseeable harm).  Accordingly, we hold that the allegations 
of the second amended motion for judgment are insufficient to 
establish that St. John’s Wood had a duty to protect Yuzefovsky 
under the facts of this case. 
Similarly, although we have not previously addressed the 
question whether a business owner, including a landlord, in a 
special relationship has a duty to warn an invitee or tenant of 
the danger of harm from criminal activity by a third party on 
the business owner’s premises, we find no reason in this case to 
invoke a standard different from that used to determine whether 
 
17
there is a duty to protect.  Cf. Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, 
261 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2001)(decided today, 
applying the same standard for both duties in a business owner-
invitee relationship).  Because Yuzefovsky had resided at the 
property of St. John’s Wood for approximately one year and nine 
months before he was injured, we hold that there is no basis to 
impose a continuing duty to warn against a danger that was not 
imminent. 
For these reasons, we hold that Yuzefovsky’s second amended 
motion for judgment does not establish a jury issue whether he 
was in imminent danger of harm from a criminal assault by a 
third party of which the defendants were aware and, thus, the 
trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to 
Yuzefovsky’s negligence claims. 
Fraud Issues 
Yuzefovsky’s second assignment of error asserts that the 
trial court erred in finding that the false statements he 
alleged were made to him by employees of St. John’s Wood 
concerning the safety of the development were mere opinions and, 
thus, could not form the basis of a claim for fraud.  St. John’s 
Wood contend that the employees’ statements concerning safety 
are clearly matters of opinion and that the claim that the 
development was crime-free “is so exaggerated that no reasonable 
person would be justified in relying upon it.”  Expanding on 
 
18
this latter contention during oral argument, counsel for St. 
John’s Wood asserted that these statements were “puffing,” that 
is “[t]he expression of an exaggerated opinion-as opposed to a 
factual representation-with the intent to sell a good or 
service.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1247 (7th ed. 1999).  We 
disagree with St. John’s Wood. 
“It is well settled that a misrepresentation, the falsity 
of which will afford ground for an action for damages, must be 
of an existing fact, and not the mere expression of an opinion.  
The mere expression of an opinion, however strong and positive 
the language may be, is no fraud.”  Saxby v. Southern Land Co., 
109 Va. 196, 198, 63 S.E. 423, 424 (1909).  “We have not, 
however, established a bright line test to ascertain whether 
false representations constitute matters of opinion or 
statements of fact.  Rather, ‘each case must in a large measure 
be adjudged upon its own facts, taking into consideration the 
nature of the representation and the meaning of the language 
used as applied to the subject matter and as interpreted by the 
surrounding circumstances.’ "  Mortarino v. Consulting 
Engineering Services, Inc., 251 Va. 289, 293, 467 S.E.2d 778, 
781 (1996)(quoting Packard Norfolk, Inc. v. Miller, 198 Va. 557, 
562, 95 S.E.2d 207, 211 (1956)). 
Here, the statements alleged to have been made by the 
employees of St. John’s Wood were not volunteered as part of a 
 
19
“sales pitch” to every potential tenant, but were specifically 
made in response to the Yuzefovsky’s expressed concern for his 
personal security.  Moreover, the specific statements that the 
development was crime-free, that police officers lived there, 
and that police vehicles patrolled the development are not 
matters of opinion or puffing, especially when, as is alleged, 
the employees knew these statements to be objectively false.  
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in finding that 
these false statements were not fraudulent misrepresentations of 
fact. 
Yuzefovsky’s third assignment of error raises the issue 
whether the trial court erred in finding that, even if these 
statements were fraudulent, there was no causal nexus between 
the fraud and the subsequent injuries resulting from the assault 
by a third party unknown to St. John’s Wood.  St. John’s Wood 
contend that at best the allegations constitute a claim for 
fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract and that the 
damages resulting from the criminal assault more than a year and 
half after the alleged act of fraud are too remote to give rise 
to liability.  We agree with St. John’s Wood. 
To sustain a claim of actual fraud, the plaintiff must 
prove a false representation, of a material fact, made 
intentionally and knowingly, with intent to mislead, reliance by 
the party misled, and resulting damage.  Evaluation Research 
 
20
Corp. v. Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 148, 439 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1994).  
Moreover, the “fraud must relate to a present or pre-existing 
fact, and cannot ordinarily be predicated on unfulfilled 
promises or statements as to future events.”  Soble v. Herman, 
175 Va. 489, 500, 9 S.E.2d 459, 464 (1940); see also Lumbermen’s 
Underwriting Alliance v. Dave’s Cabinet, Inc., 258 Va. 377, 382, 
520 S.E.2d 362, 365 (1999); Patrick v. Summers, 235 Va. 452, 
454, 369 S.E.2d 162, 164 (1988). 
In determining whether a cause of action for fraud sounds 
in contract or tort, and the damages that will arise therefrom, 
the source of the duty to abstain from making the fraudulent 
representation must be ascertained.  Richmond Metropolitan 
Authority v. McDevitt Street Bovis, Inc., 256 Va. 553, 558, 507 
S.E.2d 344, 347 (1998).  “[A] party can, in certain 
circumstances, show both a breach of contract and a tortious 
breach of duty.  However, ‘the duty tortiously or negligently 
breached must be a common law duty, not one existing between the 
parties solely by virtue of the contract.’ ”  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
It is clear that the duty to refrain from making these 
statements relates to the contract Yuzefovsky was induced to 
sign, and not from a common law duty.  In addition, the assault 
by the third party was remote in time from the execution of the 
contract and, thus, the damages for which Yuzefovsky sought 
 
21
recovery under the theory of fraud did not directly result from 
the fraudulent inducement to enter into that contract.  
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
sustaining the demurrer to the claim for fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial 
court sustaining the demurrer to Yuzefovsky’s second amended 
motion for judgment. 
Affirmed. 
 
22