Case Title: Garza v. Fernandez

Citation: 248 P.2d 869, 74 Ariz. 312

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1952-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
74 Ariz. 312 (1952) 248 P.2d 869 GARZA v. FERNANDEZ. No. 5554. Supreme Court of Arizona. October 9, 1952. *313 Garland & Sanders, Las Cruces, N.M., for appellant. Udall & Peterson, Safford, for appellee. STANFORD, Justice. Emma Garza, also known as Emma Zorrilla, plaintiff below and hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, brought this action for an accounting against Maria Z. Fernandez, administratrix of the estate of Gerardo Zorrilla, deceased, hereinafter called defendant. Plaintiff now appeals from the lower court's order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, a woman 59 years of age at the commencement of this action, is the mother of four children. Three children were the issue of her first marriage, and one, a daughter, the issue of the second. Plaintiff divorced her second husband in 1935 and in November of 1938, without any marriage ceremony, began living with Gerardo Zorrilla, as his wife. Plaintiff contends that subsequent to their mutual agreement to live together as man and wife they entered into an oral contract whereby plaintiff *314 was to manage Zorrilla's business affairs and they were to equally divide the joint accumulation. Zorrilla died intestate in 1949 and plaintiff now brings this action against the administratrix of the estate and for an accounting and a determination of her rights. The lower court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the following grounds: Section 58-101, supra, is Arizona's Statute of Frauds, and subdivisions three and eight thereof read as follows: We find that on September 25th of 1951, this court allowed and accepted amendments of the assignments of error submitted by the plaintiff, which contained some new matters. Originally but four assignments were submitted, the first being: The second assignment is quite similar. The third assignment has reference to vacating that judgment, and the fourth one assigns as error the failing and refusing of the trial court to rule on the tender of income tax returns. In the brief of plaintiff they did not touch on the third or fourth assignments. In the amended assignments which were filed on September 25, 1951, the plaintiff enlarged to considerable extent on the assignments but in the main the arguments pertain to the asserted oral agreement in question between the deceased and this appellant being illegal and void as being against public policy and good morals. *315 The court can determine the issues herein by the second assignment of error submitted by plaintiff's amendment, which reads: It appears from a careful reading of the plaintiff's complaint that, while the statement is made that the parties "began living together and cohabiting together" the gist of the complaint is that they mutually agreed to jointly work together to acquire property for their joint benefit. Witness the following in each of the three causes of action in the complaint: From the second clause of action we quote: From the third cause of action we quote: Supporting plaintiff's theory that such an agreement is valid, we quote from 55 C.J.S., Marriage, § 35(c), p. 878: In the California case of Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761, 763, it is stated: We now call attention to the rule in this jurisdiction as to when a motion for summary judgment should be granted. Our case of Sligh v. Watson, 69 Ariz. 373, 214 P.2d 123, 125, reads in part: Defendant, in support of her position that the agreement was an illegal one, quotes the following from the deposition of the plaintiff: Also, defendant quotes from 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, paragraph 175, page 673: From Fong v. Miller, 105 Cal. App. 2d 411, 233 P.2d 606, 608, defendant quotes: Having carefully considered the law cited by both parties, and in view of the allegations of plaintiff's complaint, we hold that the law set forth by the plaintiff is the better reasoned and is applicable to the purported facts of this case. One of the grounds on which the trial court based its granting of the motion for summary judgment was Section 23-105, A.C.A. 1939, which reads: Our case of Brought v. Howard, 30 Ariz. 522, 249 P. 76, 48 A.L.R. 1347, holds that the evidence of a transaction with decedent is admissible in the trial court's discretion. Also, in Wolff v. First National Bank, 47 Ariz. 97, 53 P.2d 1077, it states that permitting a witness to testify concerning conversations with deceased partner is within the discretion of the trial court, and overruling an objection to competency of a witness is similar or equivalent to requiring that witness to testify. We adhere to these prior rulings and hold that the admission or rejection of such testimony is discretionary with the trial court. We hold (1) that the statute of frauds was not available as a defense; (2) that there is a genuine controversy in this matter and that judgment should have been withheld by the trial court for the submission of proof. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for trial on the merits. UDALL, C.J., and PHELPS, DE CONCINI and LA PRADE, JJ., concur.