Case Title: State v. St. Martin

Citation: 2011 WI 44

Docket Number: 2009AP001209-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 WI 44 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1209-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Brian T. St. Martin, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 22, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 9, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Charles H. Constantine 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there were briefs and oral 
argument by Michael K. Gould, assistant state public defender. 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sarah 
K. Larson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 44
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP1209-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2006CF747) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Brian T. St. Martin,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
JUN 22, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Racine County, Charles H. Constantine, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This case comes before us by 
certification from the court of appeals and concerns the 
constitutionality of a warrantless search of an apartment attic.   
Police obtained consent from Brian St. Martin’s girlfriend, who 
was present in the apartment, to search the attic.  They then 
asked the same question of St. Martin, who was by that point in 
police custody in a police van parked nearby.  He refused.  The 
police proceeded to search the attic and found cocaine and 
currency.  A warrant was subsequently obtained, and a second 
search was then conducted, and police seized cell phones, 
currency, a scale, and documents.  St. Martin was later charged 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
2 
 
based on the evidence seized in the searches.  He pleaded guilty 
and was convicted after the circuit court denied his suppression 
motion, which argued that the warrantless search violated state 
and federal constitutional protections against unreasonable 
search and seizure because under the rule set forth in Georgia 
v. Randolph, his co-tenant’s consent could not trump his express 
refusal.1   
¶2 
This appeal and the certification followed.  The 
certified question is stated as follows:  "Whether the rule 
regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), which states that a warrantless 
search cannot be justified when a physically present resident 
expressly refuses consent, applies where the physically present 
resident is taken forcibly from his residence by law enforcement 
officers but remains in close physical proximity to the 
residence such that the refusal is made directly to law 
enforcement on the scene?"  The answer to the question is that 
the rule in Randolph does not apply in such a case although the 
language therein explaining the holding is very helpful and 
supports 
our 
analysis. 
 
Unlike 
the 
Randolph 
defendant's 
                                                 
1 St. Martin also argued that the search warrant was invalid 
because it was issued based in part on two kinds of tainted 
evidence——the evidence seized from the warrantless search and 
statements 
police 
inaccurately attributed to St. Martin’s 
girlfriend that overstated her knowledge of St. Martin’s drug 
involvement——and that because the warrant was defective the 
second search was illegal as well.  He therefore argued that the 
evidence seized in both searches must be suppressed under the 
exclusionary rule.   
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
3 
 
objection, St. Martin's objection to the search was not made 
when he was physically present at the residence.  Instead, the 
applicable rule is the one stated in another shared-dwelling 
consent search case, United States v. Matlock, which holds that 
a co-tenant's consent to search is valid "as against the absent, 
nonconsenting [co-tenant]."  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164, 170 (1974).     
¶3 
We consider this case in light of Matlock and 
Randolph, two United States Supreme Court cases examining the 
legality of warrantless searches based on consent in two 
slightly different shared-dwelling cases.  In the first case, 
Matlock, the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search where 
only one resident had given consent.  It held that "the consent 
of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects 
is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom 
that authority is shared."  Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.  William 
Earl Matlock had been "arrested in the yard in front of 
the . . . home" where he lived, and a woman who also lived there 
gave consent to police to search the house while the defendant 
was detained "in a squad car a distance from the home."  Id. at 
166, 179.  Police never asked Matlock for his consent for the 
search.  Id. 
¶4 
The second case, Randolph, established the rule that 
is the focus of the certified question.  In Randolph, a 
warrantless search was conducted pursuant to the consent of one 
resident even though the second resident was present on the 
threshold and objected.  There the United States Supreme Court 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
4 
 
held 
that 
the 
warrantless 
search 
violated 
constitutional 
protections, on the grounds that "the cooperative occupant's 
invitation adds nothing to the government's side to counter the 
force of an objecting individual's claim to security against the 
government's intrusion into his dwelling place."  Randolph, 547 
U.S. at 115.  The Randolph Court noted it was drawing a fine 
line between the Matlock and Randolph fact patterns such that 
"if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in 
fact at the door and objects, the co-tenant's permission does 
not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential 
objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold 
colloquy, loses out."  Id. at 121 (emphasis added).  The Court 
thus struck a pragmatic balance that gives a non-consenting 
tenant, but only one who is present for the "threshold 
colloquy," the power to negate a co-tenant’s consent for a 
shared-dwelling search.  The Court observed that "there is 
practical value in the simple clarity of complementary rules, 
one recognizing the co-tenant's permission when there is no 
fellow occupant on hand, the other according dispositive weight 
to the fellow occupant's contrary indication when he expresses 
it."  Id. at 121-22. 
¶5 
As other courts have recognized, the "simple clarity" 
of those rules is lost if the requirement that the resident is 
"physically present" is not actually applied.  While the Ninth 
Circuit 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
has 
endorsed 
a 
more 
flexible 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
5 
 
application of the Randolph rule,2 we are persuaded that the 
better approach is the one taken by the federal circuit courts 
that focus on the rule’s requirements for an express objection 
while the objecting co-tenant is physically present with the 
police at the dwelling’s threshold.  For example, the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "[W]e see the contemporaneous 
presence 
of 
the 
objecting 
and 
consenting 
cotenants 
as 
indispensible to the decision in Randolph." United States v. 
Henderson, 536 F.3d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 2008).  Considering these 
requirements, the court deemed a tenant "absent" where the 
tenant had expressly objected to a search while on the scene and 
had been arrested and jailed.  Id. at 777.  The Henderson court 
held that "[a tenant's] objection is not enough if he is absent 
from the later entry by authorities with the voluntary consent 
of his cotenant."  Id. at 784.  The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that "this ['social custom'] rationale for the 
narrow holding of Randolph, which repeatedly referenced the 
defendant's physical presence and immediate objection, [is] 
inapplicable" where the objecting co-tenant "was not present 
because he had been lawfully arrested."  United States v. 
Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 960 (8th Cir. 2007). 
¶6 
The question then is whether a resident seated in a 
nearby vehicle is "physically present" such that his express 
                                                 
2 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held a warrantless 
search unconstitutional under Randolph where a search was 
conducted 
after 
a 
defendant 
"refused 
consent 
and 
was 
subsequently arrested and removed from the scene."  United 
States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2008). 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
6 
 
refusal 
to 
consent 
would 
bar 
a 
warrantless 
search 
notwithstanding the consent given by a co-tenant.  We are 
persuaded that Randolph is to be construed narrowly.  Although 
the language therein explaining the holding is very helpful, the 
rule stated in Randolph does not apply in this case because we 
conclude that St. Martin was not physically present at what the 
United States Supreme Court called the "threshold colloquy."  
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.  This case closely resembles the 
facts presented in the Matlock case.  The consent given by St. 
Martin’s co-tenant was valid, and as in the Matlock case, that 
consent rendered the search constitutionally permissible because 
it cannot be trumped by an objection from an absent tenant.  The 
cocaine and currency seized in the initial search of the attic 
is 
therefore 
admissible 
evidence. 
 
Having 
resolved 
that 
question, we merely note that there is no reason to exclude that 
evidence from consideration by the Racine County Circuit Court, 
which subsequently issued a warrant for a second search.  As a 
different branch of the circuit court later found after hearing 
St. Martin's motion to suppress the evidence, portions of the 
search warrant affidavit had contained inaccurate statements, 
and the circuit court correctly proceeded to evaluate the 
affidavit to determine whether the untainted information alone 
would have established probable cause to issue a search warrant.3  
                                                 
3 State v. O'Brien, 70 Wis. 2d 414, 424, 234 N.W.2d 362 
(1975) (where a search warrant is issued based on both tainted 
and untainted evidence, a reviewing court "independently can 
determine that the [untainted evidence was] sufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause to issue the search 
warrant . . . ").  See also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
7 
 
With the addition of the fruits of the first search, the 
affidavit’s 
sufficiency 
cannot 
be 
questioned. 
 
There 
is 
therefore no basis on which to suppress the scale, currency, 
cell phones and documents seized in the second search.4 
¶7 
We therefore answer the certified question by holding 
that the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in 
Randolph does not apply in these circumstances to bar a 
warrantless search, given that there is no allegation or 
evidence that the removal of St. Martin from the apartment was 
pretextual. 
 
Our 
holding 
that 
the 
first 
search 
was 
constitutional has the effect of putting beyond question the 
sufficiency of the affidavit for the warrant and the resulting 
evidence gained in the second search. We affirm the judgment and 
the order of the circuit court denying St. Martin's post-
conviction motion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
                                                                                                                                                             
721 (1984) (where sufficient untainted evidence is presented in 
the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause, the warrant 
is valid) and Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978) 
(stating that a search warrant must be voided and seized 
evidence excluded where "with the affidavit's false material set 
to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient 
to establish probable cause . . . ."). 
4 The circuit court that reviewed the affidavit for the 
search warrant agreed with the state that the warrantless search 
had been improper; however, our answer to the certified question 
means that the warrantless search was constitutionally sound; 
therefore, the evidence seized in it was properly considered in 
the search warrant affidavit.  There is no dispute that if the 
cocaine evidence were properly included, the affidavit would 
establish probable cause for a search warrant to be issued.   
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
8 
 
¶8 
St. Martin’s girlfriend, Latoya M. (Latoya), arrived 
at the police department at 11:30 p.m. on June 8, 2006, and 
asked to speak to an officer.  She told the officer she had been 
battered by St. Martin, with whom she shared an apartment.  She 
described being hit in the face and head and having her head 
slammed down on the headboard of the bed, and said that when St. 
Martin allowed her to leave the apartment, she had come directly 
to the police.  While she was at the station, she also told 
police she suspected that St. Martin was selling cocaine.  
Specifically, she mentioned that about six days earlier, she had 
walked into the bathroom and had seen him with what looked like 
cocaine in a plastic sandwich bag.  She said that before that 
occurred, St. Martin had asked her if she had taken something of 
his, which she denied; she said he had eventually told her he 
had found the lost item and that it was a "kilo."  She also said 
she suspected he hid cocaine in their apartment’s attic because 
she had seen him go up there. 
¶9 
Latoya showed officers a driver's license that gave an 
address that matched the apartment address, and she agreed to go 
back to the apartment with the police.  When they arrived at the 
apartment, they knocked and got no answer. Latoya used her key 
to let police into St. Martin's residence.  St. Martin was 
standing near the door when police opened it, and he said 
nothing in objection to their entry.  Once police entered, they 
took St. Martin into custody based on the allegation of assault 
and took him out to a police van.  He was then placed under 
arrest.  After St. Martin was taken outside, the officers asked 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
9 
 
Latoya for her consent to search the attic where she had said 
that drugs might be hidden.  Latoya consented to the search of 
the attic.  Officers then went outside to the police vehicle and 
asked St. Martin for his consent to search the residence.  He 
refused.   
¶10 After 
obtaining 
Latoya's 
consent, 
the 
officers 
accompanied her to the attic and searched the attic.  One 
officer noticed money sticking out from under some clothes, 
moved the clothes, saw two bags with what looked like cocaine, 
and seized the bags and the money.  Chemical tests showed that 
the substance was cocaine. 
¶11 The officers who spoke with Latoya relayed what she 
had told them to a drug investigator who immediately drafted an 
affidavit in support of a search warrant for a second search.  
This warrant contained some inaccurate statements regarding what 
Latoya had told police. The statements attributed to her 
included some statements that indicated she had knowledge about 
St. 
Martin 
"regularly" 
and 
"often" 
having 
drugs 
at 
the 
apartment.  The circuit court later found that Latoya had not 
made those statements.  The affidavit also stated that police 
had seized a large amount of cocaine as a result of the initial 
search.   
¶12 In the initial, warrantless search, police had seized 
cash and bags of cocaine.  In the second search conducted after 
police obtained a warrant, police had seized cash, a scale, cell 
phones and documents.  St. Martin moved to suppress the evidence 
seized in both searches.   
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
10 
 
¶13 St. Martin argued that the evidence seized in the 
first search should be suppressed because police did not have 
valid consent to search his apartment without a warrant.  He 
argued that the evidence seized in the second search should be 
suppressed because the warrant was invalid because it was based 
on an affidavit that referenced the cocaine seized in the first 
search and that included the inaccurate statements.5   
¶14 The State conceded at the circuit court that the pre-
warrant search was improper6 but argued that the evidence 
gathered in the initial search was still admissible under the 
independent source doctrine because the subsequently issued 
warrant would have been an independent source of the evidence.7  
It argued that the warrant was valid notwithstanding the 
                                                 
5 "Evidence 
obtained 
as 
a 
direct 
result 
of 
an 
unconstitutional search or seizure is plainly subject to 
exclusion."  Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984). 
6 This court is of course "not bound by the parties' 
interpretation of the law or obligated to accept a party's 
concession of law."  State v. Carter, 2010 WI 77, ¶50, 327 Wis. 
2d 1, 21, 785 N.W.2d 516 (citing Bergmann v. McCaughtry, 211 
Wis. 2d 1, 7, 564 N.W.2d 712 (1997)). 
7 "In [Murray v. United States], the [United States] Supreme 
Court held that evidence initially discovered during an illegal 
search, but subsequently acquired through an independent and 
lawful source, is admissible."  State v. Lange, 158 Wis. 2d 609, 
624, 463 N.W.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990).  The State acknowledges in 
its brief to this court that "no direct testimony was taken on 
either prong of Murray’s two-part test for the independent 
source doctrine: whether Investigator Sorenson would have sought 
either warrant had the illegal entry not been made; or whether 
the information obtained in the attic search affected the 
magistrate’s decision to issue either warrant."  Resp. Br. at 
40.  The independent source doctrine does not come into play 
here, and we need not consider it further. 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
11 
 
reference to the evidence seized in the warrantless search and 
the inaccurate statements provided to obtain it.  It argued that 
there was a sufficient basis to establish probable cause for the 
warrant even if the inaccurate information was redacted.  In 
other words, it argued that all of the evidence seized in both 
searches was admissible because there were sufficient facts in 
evidence even omitting the tainted evidence for the warrant to 
have been validly issued. It argued that the warrant was valid 
and would have served as an independent source for the discovery 
of the evidence in the apartment attic. 
 
¶15 After a hearing, the circuit court concluded that the 
affidavit 
in 
support 
of 
the 
search 
warrant 
did 
contain 
inaccurate statements but that police did not intentionally 
falsify the affidavit.  The circuit court denied St. Martin's 
motion to suppress.  The circuit court held, with no opposition 
from the State, that the first search was illegal because St. 
Martin had "specifically not consented to the search."  However, 
the court held that a redacted version of the affidavit, 
including 
only 
the 
accurate 
representations 
of 
Latoya's 
statements made to the police, would have provided sufficient 
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant; and the motion 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
12 
 
to suppress was denied as to all evidence from both searches.8  
St. Martin pleaded guilty, was convicted, and appealed the 
court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence.9  The 
court of appeals certified the question above to this court and 
this court accepted the certification. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
¶16 The following principles govern our review of a 
constitutional challenge to a search and our review of the 
sufficiency of an affidavit for a search warrant, both of which 
are presented in this case.  "Whether police conduct has 
                                                 
8 The record does not state with specificity under which 
doctrine the circuit court would have found the first search’s 
evidence admissible; it can be inferred from the motion hearing 
transcript and the decision that the court considered that the 
evidence seized in the warrantless search would have come in 
under the inevitable discovery doctrine and the evidence from 
the second search would have come in because the warrant was 
deemed valid.  We note that under our analysis, the evidence 
seized in the warrantless search is admissible because it was 
seized in a valid consent search; the subsequently issued 
warrant is not the basis for its admissibility, and neither the 
inevitable 
discovery 
doctrine 
nor 
the 
independent 
source 
doctrine come into play.  See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 434 
(1984)(fruits of an illegal search nonetheless may be admitted 
if the evidence "ultimately or inevitably [would] have been 
discovered even if no violation of any constitutional or 
statutory provision had taken place") and State v. Schwegler, 
170 Wis. 2d 487, 499-500, 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992) ("The 
proponent of the doctrine must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the tainted fruits inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means."). 
9 Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10) states, "An order denying a motion 
to suppress evidence or a motion challenging the admissibility 
of a statement of a defendant may be reviewed upon appeal from a 
final judgment or order notwithstanding the fact that the 
judgment or order was entered upon a plea of guilty or no 
contest to the information or criminal complaint." 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
13 
 
violated the constitutional guarantees against unreasonable 
searches and seizures is a question of constitutional fact."  
State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶19, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 
367.  While deferring to the circuit court's findings of 
evidentiary and historical fact, "we independently apply those 
historical facts to the constitutional standard."  Id.   
In deciding whether probable cause exists for the 
issuance of a search warrant, the reviewing court 
examines the totality of the circumstances presented 
to 
the 
warrant-issuing 
commissioner 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
warrant-issuing 
commissioner 
had 
a 
substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair 
probability that a search of the specified premises 
would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.   
State v. Romero, 2009 WI 32, ¶3, 317 Wis. 2d 12, 765 N.W.2d 756.  
The standard of review for a challenge to the issuance of a 
search warrant has been stated by this court as follows:   
[T]his court must determine whether the magistrate was 
apprised of sufficient facts to excite an honest 
belief in a reasonable mind that the object sought is 
linked 
with 
the 
commission 
of 
a 
crime. 
The 
magistrate's finding must stand unless the proof is 
clearly 
insufficient. 
This 
review 
is 
necessarily 
limited to the facts before the magistrate.  The 
evidence necessary for a finding of probable cause is 
less than that required at a preliminary examination 
or for a conviction.  Although the finding cannot be 
based on the affiant's suspicions and conclusions, the 
magistrate may make the usual inferences reasonable 
persons would draw from the facts presented.   
Bast v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 689, 692-93, 275 N.W.2d 682 (1979) 
(internal citations omitted).   
¶17 In this case, we review an affidavit that the circuit 
court found to contain both tainted and untainted evidence.  
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
14 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that where 
there is sufficient untainted evidence presented in 
the warrant affidavit to establish probable cause, the 
warrant is valid. Similarly, in State v. O'Brien, 
where a search warrant was issued based on both 
tainted and untainted evidence, [the] supreme court 
held that it could independently ‘determine that the 
[untainted evidence was] sufficient to support a 
finding of probable cause to issue the search warrant 
for a search of the entire [premises].’  
State v. Herrmann, 2000 WI App 38, ¶21, 233 Wis. 2d 135, 608 
N.W.2d 406 (internal citations omitted). 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶18 The question certified to this court is whether the 
rule set forth in Randolph applies under the circumstances of 
this case.  St. Martin argues that the Randolph rule does apply 
and argues that all evidence and information obtained in both 
the first search and the second search must be suppressed 
because the first search was a warrantless search to which he 
expressly objected, and the second search was authorized by a 
warrant that was obtained based on false statements and 
illegally gained evidence.  The State asserts that Randolph does 
not apply because it is factually distinguishable; instead, the 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
15 
 
State argues, it is Matlock that sets forth the applicable 
rule.10  
¶19 As noted above, there are certain principles that 
govern an analysis of a claimed Fourth Amendment violation.  
First, search by consent is an established exception to the 
general requirement for a warrant, a requirement rooted in the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the 
corollary provision in the Wisconsin Constitution.11  Consent 
                                                 
10 The State advances a series of additional arguments in 
the alternative; because we answer the certified question by 
holding that Matlock applies and that Randolph is properly read 
narrowly, we need not address each of the State’s arguments in 
the alternative.  In addition, St. Martin raises, but does not 
really develop, an argument that Latoya's consent was not valid 
because she was not a co-occupant.  This argument lacks any 
merit.  Third-party consent is valid, assuming no present 
objection, if given by a co-occupant with "actual or apparent 
authority" over the residence, which may be shown by facts 
including: (1) "possession of a key"; (2) the third-party's 
admission that she lives there; and (3) "possession of a 
driver's license listing the residence as the driver's legal 
address."  United States v. Groves, 530 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 
2008).  All of these facts were present in this case, and thus 
Latoya was authorized to give consent to search.  St. Martin has 
cited no authority to the contrary. 
11 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states that people have the right "to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects" 
from 
"unreasonable 
searches and seizures" and that probable cause is required for a 
warrant to be issued.  Article I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution provides as follows: "Searches and seizures. 
SECTION 11. The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the persons or things to be seized." 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
16 
 
searches 
are 
"a 
constitutionally 
permissible 
and 
wholly 
legitimate aspect of effective police activity." Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).  Second, the State bears 
the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, "that a 
warrantless search was reasonable and in compliance with the 
Fourth Amendment."  State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 541-42, 
577 N.W.2d 352 (1998).  Third, within the so-called "shared 
dwelling" category of warrantless consent searches, the United 
States Supreme Court has spelled out how to proceed when there 
is not unanimous consent. It has said that "the consent of one 
who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid 
as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that 
authority is shared."  Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170.  It has further 
stated that a "physically present inhabitant's express refusal 
of consent to a police search is dispositive as to him, 
regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant."  Randolph, 547 
U.S. at 122.  As applied to cases, the interaction of these 
rules can appear formalistic, as the United States Supreme Court 
has acknowledged.  It has recognized the "fine line" drawn in 
shared-dwelling consent cases and has stated that "the formalism 
is justified." Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.  It is helpful that 
the Court has made that point clear because this is a case where 
it comes down to applying the rule set forth in Randolph with 
such justified formalism. 
¶20 We have already set forth the parties’ essential 
arguments.  St. Martin argues that the evidence seized in the 
first search must be suppressed because under Randolph, his 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
17 
 
objection to the search from nearby trumps the consent granted 
by a co-tenant and renders a warrantless search illegal.  The 
State argues that Randolph does not govern here because St. 
Martin was not physically present in the apartment when he 
objected to the search of the attic. 
¶21 When we are in territory where fine lines are drawn 
and the law is unapologetically formalistic, we must look at the 
facts as they have been found by the circuit court and accept 
that small differences often become dispositive.  The decision 
here turns on where this case falls in relation to the fine line 
drawn by the United States Supreme Court in Randolph.12  St. 
Martin 
was 
"a 
potential 
defendant 
with 
self-interest 
in 
objecting [to a search]." Randolph 547 U.S. at 121. If he was 
"in fact at the door and object[ing]," Latoya’s consent was not 
sufficient for a consent search of the apartment.  If he was 
"nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy," 
the United States Supreme Court has said, he "loses out."  Id. 
                                                 
12 Justice Bradley accuses the majority of "sidestep[ping] 
Randolph's 
holding" 
and 
"handpick[ing] 
the 
language 
from 
Randolph" that supports a narrow reading of the case.  Dissent, 
¶48.  Naturally, we focus on the language that seems to us most 
significant to the resolution of this particular case, and 
Justice Bradley does the same; we disagree about which language 
that is.  As to the implication that the majority "advance[s] a 
more restrictive interpretation of the federal constitution" 
than the United States Supreme Court's, Dissent, ¶54, we note 
that other courts likewise bound by United States Supreme Court 
precedent have also read Randolph narrowly, as we do.  See 
infra, ¶25.  
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
18 
 
¶22 The facts as found by the circuit court13 are that St. 
Martin was in the house when the police arrived.  He did not 
expressly object to their entry as he stood at the door.  He was 
taken into custody.  There was no evidence that taking St. 
Martin into custody was a pretext to remove him from the 
premises so that police could search for the cocaine.  He was 
detained and arrested validly in response to an alleged battery. 
(St. Martin does not dispute that the arrest was valid, nor does 
he allege that his removal from the apartment was pretextual.)  
Latoya had a driver’s license showing the apartment’s address 
and had possession of a key.  She was in the apartment when she 
consented to the search of the attic.  St. Martin had left the 
apartment in the custody of the police, and was inside a police 
vehicle when police asked him for consent.  He expressly refused 
to consent, and the police searched the attic anyway. 
¶23 St. 
Martin 
was 
clearly 
not 
"at 
the 
door 
and 
objecting."  In fact, when he was "at the door" and the police 
entered, he did not object.  As St. Martin noted in his motion 
to the circuit court, "One difference between Randolph and St. 
Martin’s case is that St. Martin was absent at the time of 
[Latoya’s] consent."  It is undisputed that St. Martin was 
"nearby." 
                                                 
13 Because we decide only the case before us and do not 
speculate about the application of this holding to the facts of 
other cases, the dissent's consideration of various hypothetical 
fact patterns, Dissent, ¶¶49-50, is not useful to the analysis. 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
19 
 
¶24 We next turn to whether he was "invited to take part 
in the threshold colloquy," a point disputed by the parties.  
St. Martin argues that he was invited to take part because the 
officer came to him and asked for his consent.  The State argues 
that the "threshold colloquy" referenced by the Court in 
Randolph cannot be rightly construed to include a colloquy that 
occurs outside the home.   
¶25 We have considered the decisions by other courts that 
have examined and applied Randolph.  We find persuasive the 
careful analysis conducted by the Seventh and Eighth Circuit 
courts of appeals.  Those courts have held that the Randolph 
Court made clear its intention that its holding be applied in 
narrow terms.  The Seventh Circuit so held in a case with 
significant similarity to the one before us.  In Henderson, the 
defendant had been at his home when the police arrived in 
response to a report of domestic violence.  Henderson, 536 F.3d 
at 777.  Henderson met the police at the threshold and, in 
"unequivocal terms," refused consent to their presence in his 
home. Id.  He was arrested for battery and taken to jail. Id.  
Immediately thereafter, the police searched his house, having 
obtained a signed consent-to-search form from his wife. Id.  In 
holding that "both presence and objection by the tenant are 
required to render a consent search unreasonable" as to a non-
consenting co-tenant, the court noted, 
In United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 
2008), an en banc majority of the Eighth Circuit 
determined that Randolph's holding is case specific 
and extends no further than its particular facts. 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
20 
 
 . . . Randolph 
itself, 
we 
observed 
in 
Groves, 
"expressly disinvites" any reading broader than its 
specific facts. 
Like the Eighth Circuit, we see the contemporaneous 
presence of the objecting and consenting cotenants as 
indispensable to the decision in Randolph.  
Henderson, 536 F.3d at 781-83. 
¶26 In Hudspeth, the situation was similar.  The defendant 
had told police that he had "downloaded the [child pornography] 
images from the internet" onto his computer at work, and police 
had found the images on that computer.  Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 
955.  Officers asked to search his home computer, and he refused 
to consent.  Id.  Hudspeth was arrested and taken to jail, and 
officers went to his home, where they spoke with his wife and 
ultimately obtained her consent for a search of the home 
computer without informing her of his earlier refusal.  Id.  The 
Eighth 
Circuit 
first 
noted 
that 
the 
Randolph 
majority 
"consistently repeated it was Randolph's physical presence and 
immediate 
objection 
to 
Mrs. 
Randolph's 
consent 
that 
distinguished Randolph from prior case law," which the Court 
"reinforced . . . in its conclusion" with a focus on "the 
express refusal of consent by a physically present resident."  
Id. at 959.  The Eighth Circuit then turned to application of 
the rule to the facts: 
[U]nlike Randolph, the officers in the present case 
were not confronted with a "social custom" dilemma, 
where 
two 
physically 
present 
co-tenants 
have 
contemporaneous competing interests and one consents 
to a search, while the other objects. Instead, when 
[the officer] asked for Mrs. Hudspeth's consent, 
Hudspeth was not present because he had been lawfully 
arrested and jailed based on evidence obtained wholly 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
21 
 
apart from the evidence sought on the home computer. 
Thus, this rationale for the narrow holding of 
Randolph, which repeatedly referenced the defendant's 
physical 
presence 
and 
immediate 
objection, 
is 
inapplicable here. 
Hudspeth, 518 F.3d at 960. 
¶27 We agree with those courts that the Randolph Court 
incorporated an express requirement of physical presence in its 
shared-dwelling consent rule.  An approach that reads the phrase 
"threshold colloquy" metaphorically would not be consistent with 
either the "physically present" requirement or the "fine line" 
framework set forth by the United States Supreme Court.  Such an 
approach cannot be reconciled with the clear statement of the 
Court that minor factual differences will be dispositive.  The 
Seventh Circuit's analysis in Henderson noted that the Randolph 
concurrence by Justice Breyer stressed the fact-intensive nature 
of the analysis in this type of case.  See Henderson, 536 F.3d 
at 
781 (citing Randolph, 547 U.S. at 127 (Breyer, J., 
concurring)).  In cases where the United States Supreme Court 
has drawn what it acknowledges are fine lines, the facts matter, 
and slight factual differences may take the analysis in far 
different directions.  The argument that a slight variation in 
the facts would require an opposite result is therefore not 
persuasive.  Slight differences in facts do actually often make 
a difference.  We therefore agree with the State that under the 
justified formalism of the rules set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court, St. Martin was "nearby" and "not invited to take 
part in the threshold colloquy," and that he therefore does not 
fall within the rule stated in Randolph such that the search 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
22 
 
should have been barred and the evidence gained from it 
suppressed. 
¶28 Having addressed the certified question, we briefly 
turn to the second category of evidence at issue in this case, 
the evidence seized in the second search.  As noted above, that 
search was conducted pursuant to a warrant.  If the warrant was 
defective, as St. Martin argues, the items seized in that search 
would have to be excluded.14   
¶29 There are two grounds on which St. Martin attacks the 
validity of the warrant.  The first basis for the challenge is 
that the affidavit used in support of the warrant application 
contained reference to the cocaine seized in the initial search, 
which St. Martin had challenged as illegal.  We have determined 
that there was no constitutional violation as to the initial 
search, so the consideration of that evidence constitutes no 
flaw.  As St. Martin's counsel acknowledged before the circuit 
court during his challenge to the validity of the warrant, if 
the initial search was constitutionally valid and there was no 
bar to the consideration of the cocaine seized in that search, 
                                                 
14 Because the validity of the warrant is relevant only to 
the admissibility of the evidence seized in the second search, 
and not to the evidence seized in the first one, we need not 
address the arguments concerning the inevitable discovery 
doctrine and the independent source doctrine; they do not come 
into play.  As noted previously, our holding that the initial 
search was a valid consent search makes it unnecessary to 
consider alternative theories on which the evidence seized in 
that search could be admitted. 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
23 
 
there would be no basis on which to challenge the warrant.  That 
analysis is correct.   
¶30 The second basis for the challenge is that the 
affidavit contained both tainted and untainted evidence.  As 
noted above, the inclusion of tainted evidence in an affidavit 
does not alone invalidate the warrant issued.  See O'Brien, 70 
Wis. 2d at 424 (where a search warrant is issued based on both 
tainted and untainted evidence, this court can independently 
"determine that the [untainted evidence was] sufficient to 
support a finding of probable cause to issue the search 
warrant . . . .").  See also Karo, 468 U.S. at 719 (where 
sufficient untainted evidence is presented in the warrant 
affidavit to establish probable cause, the warrant is valid) and 
Franks, 438 U.S. at 156 (stating that a search warrant must be 
voided and evidence seized excluded where "with the affidavit's 
false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining 
content is insufficient to establish probable cause . . . .").  
The circuit court heard testimony concerning the tainted 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
24 
 
evidence provided in the affidavit and made the following 
findings15: 
Paragraph 4 of the search warrant states as follows: 
["]That your affiant states that Officer A. Matsen was 
approached by [Latoya] after St. Martin was in 
custody. [Latoya] told A. Matsen that St. Martin 
regularly 
has 
large 
amounts 
of 
cocaine 
in 
the 
apartment and that he regularly brings kilograms of 
cocaine into the apartment, where he would divide it 
up into smaller pieces and rebags [sic] it into 
smaller bags for resale.  [Latoya] further stated that 
St. Martin often hides that cocaine in the attic.["] 
As noted at the close of the evidentiary portion of 
the hearing, those statements were not true.  
(Emphasis added.) 
The circuit court then redacted the inaccuracies (which 
mainly consisted of exaggerating the number of times Latoya 
had seen St. Martin with cocaine) from the fourth paragraph 
of the affidavit based on the testimony and findings of 
fact, arriving at the following version: 
                                                 
15 The affidavit also contains reference to the cocaine 
seized in the initial search.  In considering St. Martin's 
challenge to the warrant, the circuit court excised the 
reference to the cocaine, noting, "The statements [by the 
officers] were made after they had discovered a large amount of 
cocaine in the attic.  Unfortunately, as conceded by both the 
State and argued by the Defense, the search of the attic was 
illegal because Mr. St. Martin had specifically not consented to 
the search."  The circuit court therefore evaluated the 
sufficiency of the affidavit without consideration of that 
evidence, whereas we have held that the initial search was 
proper and that the cocaine found did not have to be excluded 
from consideration. 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
25 
 
"That your affiant states that Officer A. Matsen was 
approached by [Latoya] after St. Martin was in 
custody.  [Latoya] told A. Matsen that St. Martin may 
have cocaine in the apartment.  That she had seen St. 
Martin divide cocaine into smaller pieces and rebag it 
into smaller bags.  [Latoya] further stated that St. 
Martin may hide cocaine in the attic."  
Given that information, the circuit court held that the 
affidavit's untainted evidence still established probable 
cause for a search of the attic.  Restoring the discovered 
cocaine to that affidavit, as our holding would do, merely 
strengthens the circuit court's basis for the conclusion 
that the affidavit was sufficient, that the warrant was 
valid, and that the evidence from the second search should 
not be suppressed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶31 The question then is whether a resident seated in a 
nearby vehicle is "physically present" such that his express 
refusal 
to 
consent 
would 
bar 
a 
warrantless 
search 
notwithstanding the consent given by a co-tenant.  We are 
persuaded that Randolph is to be construed narrowly.  Although 
the language therein explaining the holding is very helpful, the 
rule stated in Randolph does not apply in this case because we 
conclude that St. Martin was not physically present at what the 
United States Supreme Court called the "threshold colloquy."  
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121.  This case closely resembles the 
facts presented in the Matlock case.  The consent given by St. 
Martin’s co-tenant was valid, and as in the Matlock case, that 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
26 
 
consent rendered the search constitutionally permissible because 
it cannot be trumped by an objection from an absent tenant.  The 
cocaine and currency seized in the initial search of the attic 
is 
therefore 
admissible 
evidence. 
 
Having 
resolved 
that 
question, we merely note that there is no reason to exclude that 
seizure from consideration by a different branch of the Racine 
County Circuit Court, which subsequently issued a warrant for a 
second search.  As the circuit court later found, portions of 
the 
search 
warrant 
affidavit 
had 
contained 
inaccurate 
statements, and the circuit court correctly proceeded to 
evaluate the affidavit to determine whether the untainted 
information alone would have established probable cause to issue 
a search warrant.   With the addition of the fruits of the first 
search, the affidavit’s sufficiency cannot be questioned.  There 
is therefore no basis on which to suppress the scale, currency, 
cell phones and documents seized in the second search.  
¶32 We therefore answer the certified question by holding 
that the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in 
Randolph does not apply in these circumstances to bar a 
warrantless search, given that there is no allegation or 
evidence that the removal of St. Martin from the apartment was 
pretextual. 
 
Our 
holding 
that 
the 
first 
search 
was 
constitutional has the effect of putting beyond question the 
sufficiency of the affidavit for the warrant, and the resulting 
evidence gained in the second search. We affirm the judgment and 
the order of the circuit court denying St. Martin's post-
conviction motion. 
No. 
2009AP1209-CR   
 
27 
 
By the Court.—Certified question from the court of appeals 
answered and judgment and order of the Circuit Court for Racine 
County affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2009AP1209-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶33 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  In Georgia v. 
Randolph,1 the United States Supreme Court set forth a rule 
governing circumstances in which one inhabitant consents to a 
search and another inhabitant objects.  The Court held that "a 
physically present inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a 
police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the 
consent of a fellow occupant."  547 U.S. 103, 122-23 (2006).  
¶34 The 
majority 
appears, 
at 
times, 
to 
construe 
"physically present" to mean that the objecting inhabitant must 
be standing squarely under the doorframe when he registers his 
objection to the search.  To the extent that the majority limits 
the holding from Randolph, it endorses a test that will yield 
arbitrary results and impermissibly affords citizens fewer 
Fourth Amendment protections than does the United States Supreme 
Court.   
¶35 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that this case 
falls squarely within the rule enunciated in Randolph.  Because 
I determine that St. Martin was physically present when he 
refused to consent to the search, I respectfully dissent.   
I 
¶36 In its certification memorandum, the court of appeals 
asked whether the rule from Randolph applies when "a physically 
present resident is taken forcibly from his residence by law 
enforcement officers but remains in close physical proximity to 
the residence[.]"  Majority op., ¶2.  The State argues that a 
defendant is not physically present when he is "outside the 
                                                 
1 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
No.  2009AP1209-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
home."  Id., ¶24.  At times, the majority embraces the dictates 
of Randolph and concludes that the dispositive question is 
whether the defendant was "physically present at the residence."  
Id., ¶2.   
¶37 When applying the rule, however, the majority appears 
to conclude that "physically present" means that the defendant 
must be standing under the doorframe of the residence when he 
lodges his objection.  It notes that St. Martin "did not 
expressly object to [the officers'] entry as he stood at the 
door," id., ¶22, and that when St. Martin refused to consent to 
the search, he was "not at the door and objecting," id., ¶23.  
Therefore, it concludes that "St. Martin was not physically 
present at what the United States Supreme Court called the 
'threshold colloquy.'"  Id., ¶6.  Even though St. Martin was on 
hand and registered an express, contemporaneous objection to the 
search, the majority determines that he was "absent" and that 
"the rule stated in Randolph does not apply in this case."  Id., 
¶6.      
II 
¶38 "The physical entry of the home is the chief evil 
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."  
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980).  Warrantless 
searches of homes are presumptively unreasonable.  Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984).     
¶39 There are several recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.  These "narrow and well-delineated" exceptions are 
to be "jealously and carefully drawn," and the State bears the 
No.  2009AP1209-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that any 
warrantless search was reasonable and in compliance with the 
Fourth Amendment.  Flippo v. W. Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 
(1999); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); State 
v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 541-42, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998).  The 
rationale for construing exceptions narrowly is that "the 
informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered 
to issue warrants as to what searches and seizures are 
permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the 
hurried action of officers."  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 117 (quoting 
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)). 
¶40 The voluntary consent of the occupant of a home is one 
exception to the warrant requirement.  In United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), the Supreme Court held that "the 
consent 
of 
one 
who 
possesses 
common 
authority 
over 
premises . . . is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting 
person with whom that authority is shared."  Id. at 170.  
¶41 This holding was recently reexamined by the Supreme 
Court in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103.  In that case, the 
defendant's wife consented to a search of their home.  The 
defendant, who later sought to suppress the evidence, met the 
officers at the door and expressly objected to the search.    
¶42 In keeping with the principle that exceptions to the 
warrant requirement are construed narrowly to protect the 
privacy of the home, the Court held that "a physically present 
inhabitant's express refusal of consent to a police search is 
dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow 
No.  2009AP1209-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
occupant."  547 U.S. at 122-23.  It explained that the 
cooperative occupant's "disputed invitation, without more, gives 
a police officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering 
than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at 
all."  Id. at 114.    
¶43 When applying its holding to the facts of the case 
before it, the Court noted that Randolph was "at the door" when 
he expressed his objection to the search.  It explained that "if 
a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact 
at the door and objects, the co-tenant's permission does not 
suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, 
nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, 
loses out."  Id. at 121.   
¶44 When setting forth the question presented and its 
holding, however, the Court's language clarifies that the 
defendant need not be at the door to be deemed physically 
present.  The Court explained that the question presented was 
whether a search was lawful when a resident "is present at the 
scene and expressly refuses to consent."  Id. at 106 (emphasis 
added).  Later, the Court differentiated between residents who 
are "on hand" and those who are "absent."  Id. at 121-22.    
¶45 The rule set forth in Randolph appears to be motivated 
by the concern that officers need not "take affirmative steps to 
find a potentially objecting co-tenant."  Id. at 122.  Retaining 
the Matlock rule regarding "absent" co-tenants, the Court 
concluded that "it would needlessly limit the capacity of the 
police . . . if we were to hold that reasonableness required the 
No.  2009AP1209-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
police to take affirmative steps to find a potentially objecting 
co-tenant before acting on the permission they had already 
received."  Id. at 122. 
¶46 A different situation is presented when the co-tenant 
is "present at the scene" and "expressly refuses consent."  Id. 
at 106.  In such a case, "[d]isputed permission is [] no match 
for [the] central value of the Fourth Amendment," and "the 
cooperative 
occupant's 
invitation 
adds 
nothing 
to 
the 
government's 
side 
to 
counter 
the 
force 
of 
an 
objecting 
individual's 
claim 
to 
security 
against 
the 
government's 
intrusion into his dwelling place."  Id. at 115. 
¶47 In so concluding, the Randolph Court emphasized that 
"there is practical value in the simple clarity of complementary 
rules[.]"  Id. at 121.  One rule "recogniz[es] the co-tenant's 
permission when there is no fellow occupant on hand, the other 
accord[s] dispositive weight to the fellow occupant's contrary 
indication when he expresses it."  Id. at 121-22.  
III 
¶48 In making the determination that St. Martin was not 
physically present, the majority sidesteps Randolph's holding.  
Instead, it handpicks the language from Randolph where the Court 
was applying its rule to the particular facts of the case.   
¶49 Under the majority's analysis, it is unclear how close 
a nonconsenting occupant must be to the front door to be 
considered "physically present."  The majority notes that St. 
Martin "did not expressly object to [the officers'] entry as he 
stood at the door," majority op., ¶22, and that when St. Martin 
No.  2009AP1209-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
did object, he was "not at the door and objecting."  Id., ¶23.  
Neither the court of appeals nor the State advances such a 
restrictive rule.  Both acknowledge that the test is whether the 
defendant is "physically present."  See supra, ¶36.    
¶50 A 
straightforward 
application 
of 
the 
majority's 
apparent holding would lead to arbitrary results.  What if the 
nonconsenting occupant is standing just beyond the doorframe 
when he objects to the search?  What if he is 10 feet away?  
What if he is at the bottom of the stairs leading up to the 
door?  Does it make any difference if he is standing on the 
second step beyond the entryway, or on the fifth?  To negate his 
co-occupant's consent, must the nonconsenting occupant stand 
squarely under the doorframe of his residence and block the 
officers' entry as he lodges his objection?   
¶51 If the majority's rule is applied literally, the 
reasonableness of officers' actions will not be judged by any 
common understanding of what is reasonable.  Rather, the 
officers' actions will instead be judged by metaphysical 
determinations about the precise contours of the boundary of the 
"threshold" of a home.  This cannot possibly be the "formalism" 
envisioned by the Randolph Court when it explained that "there 
is practical value in the simple clarity of complementary 
rules."  Much simpler is a rule that recognizes the objection of 
a resident who is "on hand" and "at the scene" when he refuses 
to consent to the search of his private residence. 
¶52 In drawing the "fine line" that a co-occupant's 
objection loses validity past the threshold, the majority 
No.  2009AP1209-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
expands the consent exception to the warrant requirement and 
undercuts the requirement that searches be reasonable.  It is 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, rather than exceptions to 
the exceptions to the warrant requirement, that must be 
construed narrowly.  See Flippo, 528 U.S. at 13.   
¶53 I recognize that lower courts have split on whether 
Randolph should be given a broad or a narrow interpretation.2  
However, if the majority opinion is construed to hold that a 
defendant must be standing squarely under the doorframe for his 
objection to have any weight, the majority interprets the 
Federal 
Constitution 
to 
provide 
fewer 
rights 
than 
the 
interpretation adopted by the United States Supreme Court.  
This, the majority may not do.   
¶54 State courts are bound by the United States Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution.  Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967); State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 
44, ¶18, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142.  A state court may 
interpret its own constitution to provide greater protection 
than the Federal Constitution.  Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 
58, 62 (1967).  However, a state court may not advance a more 
restrictive interpretation of the Federal Constitution than the 
interpretation adopted by the United States Supreme Court.  Id. 
IV 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Marc McAllister, What the High Court Giveth the 
Lower Courts Taketh Away, 56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 663 (2008); Note, 
Renee E. Williams, Third Party Consent Searches After Georgia v. 
Randolph: Dueling Approaches to the Dueling Roommates, 87 B.U. 
L. Rev. 937 (2007). 
No.  2009AP1209-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
¶55 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the facts of 
this case fit squarely within the rule enunciated in Randolph.  
St. Martin and Latoya shared an apartment.  According to an 
officer's testimony, Latoya consented to a search of the attic.3  
St. Martin, who was detained in a squad car that had not yet 
left the scene, expressly objected to the search.4  The officers 
                                                 
3 From the record, it is not clear that Latoya actually 
consented to the search.  Initially, the State advanced no 
argument that the search was valid pursuant to her consent.  
Rather, the State conceded that the search was illegal: 
The Court: [Y]ou would agree that prior to [the 
application for a warrant] there was, in fact, a 
search of the attic? 
[District Attorney]: Yes. 
The Court: And you would also agree——you're conceding 
that search was improper? 
[District Attorney]: The search of the attic was 
improper.   
Latoya testified at the suppression hearing, but she was 
not asked whether she had consented.  The circuit court made no 
finding of fact regarding Latoya's purported consent.  Rather, 
it 
found: 
"What 
occurred 
here, 
unfortunately, 
is 
[the 
detectives] . . . went 
to 
the 
premises, 
they 
appropriately 
detained Mr. St. Martin.  He did not give consent to search.  In 
fact, he specifically said you can't search.  [Latoya] made some 
statements . . . and then at that time they probably should have 
called the metro drug unit, had them involved.  But instead they 
decided to conduct their own search."   
4 By determining that "[t]his case closely resembles the 
facts presented in the Matlock case," majority op., ¶6, the 
majority 
fails 
to 
account 
for 
an 
essential 
fact 
that 
distinguishes this case from Matlock.  In United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974), the defendant did not 
register any objection to the search.  By contrast, St. Martin, 
who was "on hand," expressly refused to consent to the search. 
No.  2009AP1209-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
knew that St. Martin objected.  Nevertheless, rather than 
attempting to secure a warrant, they ignored St. Martin's 
express objection and conducted a warrantless search of the 
attic.5 
¶56 Under these facts, I conclude that St. Martin was 
physically present when he expressly refused to consent to the 
search.6  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.    
¶57 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
I recognize that the application of the law to this case 
might differ if St. Martin, who was detained in a nearby squad 
car, had not objected to the search.  Under those circumstances, 
the facts would more closely mirror the facts presented in 
Matlock.  As the majority asserts, "the facts matter, and slight 
factual differences may take the analysis in far different 
directions."  Majority op., ¶27.       
5 There is no claim that any exigency justified the 
warrantless entry.  See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 116 n.6.  St. 
Martin had been lawfully arrested and secured in a squad car, 
and he would have had no opportunity to destroy any evidence 
that might be contained within the apartment.  Nothing but the 
"hurried action of [the] officers" prevented them from seeking 
"the informed and deliberate determination[] of [a] magistrate[] 
empowered to issue warrants."  Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 117 
(quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)). 
6 Additionally, I conclude that the untainted evidence, 
consisting primarily of Latoya's equivocal statements to the 
police, were insufficient on their own to establish probable 
cause for the second search of the attic.   
No.  2009AP1209-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1