Case Title: State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna

Citation: 1995-Ohio-98

Docket Number: 19950064

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1995-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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The State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski et al., v.                       
DeCessna, Judge.                                                                 
[Cite as State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v.                          
DeCessna (1995),    Ohio St.3d         .]                                        
Prohibition and procedendo restraining judge from exercising                     
     any jurisdiction to vary the mandate of the court of                        
     appeals and compelling judge to carry out the mandate by                    
     holding a trial on sole issue of damages -- Writs granted,                  
     when -- Appellate procedure -- Law-of-the-case doctrine                     
     applied.                                                                    
     (No. 95-64 -- Submitted June 6, 1995 -- Decided August 16,                  
1995.)                                                                           
     In Prohibition and Procedendo.                                              
     Relators, the law firm of Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski                     
and its individual members, provided legal representation for                    
David Palmer and Ok Sun Palmer in connection with an automobile                  
accident involving Ok Sun Palmer.  On January 27, 1988, relator                  
Dale R. Crandall, individually and on behalf of the law firm,                    
filed a complaint in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas to                   
collect attorney fees from the Palmers.  The Palmers filed a                     
complaint in Lucas County against Crandall and the firm                          
alleging legal malpractice.  On October 22, 1991, relators and                   
the Palmers entered into a release and settlement agreement in                   
which the Palmers released and forever discharged relators                       
"from any and all claims, demands, debts, damages, actions and                   
causes of action *** occurring at any time prior to or                           
contemporaneous with the execution" of the agreement.                            
     On November 6, 1991, the Palmers filed a complaint against                  
relators in the Wood County Court of Common Pleas claiming                       
defamation, breach of attorney-client privilege, and invasion                    
of privacy in connection with relators' legal representation of                  
the Palmers.  Relators filed an answer as well as a                              
counterclaim that alleged that the settlement agreement                          
obligated the Palmers to indemnify relators from their claims                    
and that the Palmers were therefore guilty of malicious                          
prosecution, causing damages in excess of $100,000.                              
     Respondent, Wood County Common Pleas Court Judge Donald A.                  
DeCessna, granted judgment in favor of relators on all of the                    
Palmers' claims and further entered judgment for relators on                     
their counterclaim in the amount of $1,000.  Judge DeCessna                      
determined that the Palmers' settlement agreement obligated                      
them to hold relators harmless for the allegations in the                        
Palmers' complaint.                                                              
     On February 5, 1993, the Court of Appeals for Wood County                   
affirmed Judge DeCessna's judgment concerning the Palmers'                       
complaint and also affirmed the finding that the Palmers were                    
liable on relators' counterclaim.  However, since relators had                   
only moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of                          
liability on their counterclaim, the court of appeals sustained                  
their cross-appeal and reversed the portion of Judge DeCessna's                  
judgment regarding damages.  The court of appeals remanded the                   
cause to the Wood County Court of Common Pleas "for further                      
proceedings concerning the issue of damages as to [relators']                    
counterclaim."  The court of appeals denied the Palmers'                         
application for reconsideration, and no further appeal was                       
taken by any party.                                                              
     Following remand, the Palmers filed various motions,                        
requesting relief from the judgment affirmed by the court of                     
appeals and a reinstatement of their complaint.   Judge                          
DeCessna did not rule on any of these motions.  On May 14,                       
1993, in a case involving the same parties, the Court of                         
Appeals for Lucas County determined that the October 21, 1991                    
settlement agreement was void because it was executed when Ok                    
Sun Palmer did not have either an attorney or an interpreter.                    
The court of appeals remanded the case to the Lucas County                       
Court of Common Pleas for a new trial.  Judge DeCessna then                      
continued the Wood County case and placed it on the court's                      
inactive docket pending a definitive decision by the court of                    
appeals.                                                                         
     On August 10, 1993, the court of appeals in the Lucas                       
County case granted relators' application for reconsideration                    
in part, but entered judgment in favor of David Palmer and                       
remanded the case to the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas as                   
to Ok Sun Palmer based on the invalidity of the settlement                       
agreement as to her.  Despite numerous requests by relators for                  
a trial on the sole remand issue of damages, Judge DeCessna                      
issued another order keeping the remanded case on the inactive                   
docket pending resolution of the Lucas County case.                              
     On January 12, 1995, relators instituted this action,                       
seeking writs of prohibition and procedendo restraining Judge                    
DeCessna from exercising any jurisdiction to vary the mandate                    
of the Court of Appeals for Wood County and compelling Judge                     
DeCessna to carry out the mandate by holding a trial on the                      
sole issue of damages.                                                           
                                                                                 
     Pheils & Wisniewski and David R. Pheils, Jr., for relators.                 
     Rayle & Matthews, Max E. Rayle and Mimi S. Yoon, for                        
respondent.                                                                      
                                                                                 
     Per Curiam.  Relators assert in their first and second                      
propositions of law that they are entitled to a writ of                          
prohibition.  To obtain a writ of prohibition, relators must                     
establish (1) that Judge DeCessna is about to exercise judicial                  
or quasi-judicial power, (2) that exercise of that power is                      
unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ would result                  
in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the                       
ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Fowler v. Smith (1994),                   
68 Ohio St.3d 357, 359, 626 N.E.2d 950, 952.                                     
     Relators contend that Judge DeCessna disregarded the                        
mandate of the court of appeals.  Under the doctrine of the law                  
of the case, "[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, such as an                   
intervening decision by the Supreme Court, an inferior court                     
has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior court                   
in a prior appeal in the same case."  Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11                  
Ohio St.3d 1, 11 OBR 1, 462 N.E.2d 410, syllabus.  The Ohio                      
Constitution does not give a court of common pleas jurisdiction                  
to review a prior mandate of a court of appeals.  State ex rel.                  
Potain v. Mathews (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 29, 32, 13 O.O.3d 17,                    
19, 391 N.E.2d 343, 345.  Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is                  
an appropriate remedy to prevent a lower court from proceeding                   
contrary to the mandate of a superior court.  State ex rel.                      
Smith v. O'Connor (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 660, 662, 646 N.E.2d                     
1115, 1117, citing State ex rel. TRW, Inc. v. Jaffe (1992), 78                   
Ohio App.3d 411, 604 N.E.2d 1376 (writ of prohibition issued to                  
prevent retrial on issue of fraud damages where mandate limited                  
retrial to emotional-distress damages).                                          
     The court of appeals' mandate in the prior appeal ordered                   
Judge DeCessna to conduct further proceedings limited to the                     
issue of damages on relators' counterclaim.  However, Judge                      
DeCessna instead inactivated the remanded case pending                           
resolution of a Lucas County Common Pleas Court case involving                   
the same parties.  The mandate did not condition the common                      
pleas court's duty to conduct further proceedings on any                         
pending case.  Therefore, Judge DeCessna has failed to comply                    
with the mandate of the court of appeals and has continued to                    
disregard that mandate by failing to set the case for and hold                   
a trial limited to the damages issue.                                            
     Judge DeCessna claims that no writ should issue because                     
the same court of appeals that issued the mandate subsequently                   
issued judgments in Lucas County cases involving relators and                    
the Palmers which invalidated the identical settlement                           
agreement that served as the basis for relators' counterclaim                    
in the Wood County case.  Judge DeCessna thus appears to                         
contend that an intervening decision by the same court of                        
appeals that issued the mandate constitutes an extraordinary                     
circumstance which gave him discretion to disregard the mandate.                 
     We have stated that an example of an extraordinary                          
circumstance which provides an exception to the law-of-the-case                  
doctrine  is an intervening Supreme Court case that states a                     
rule of law in conflict with the mandate.  Columbus Bd. of Edn.                  
v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1994), 70 Ohio St. 3d 344,                     
345, 639 N.E.2d 25, 26, citing Jones v. Harmon (1930), 122 Ohio                  
St. 420, 172 N.E. 151, syllabus; see, also, State ex rel. Davis                  
v. Cleary (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 494, 602 N.E.2d 1183.  Here,                    
there is no intervening Supreme Court case.  However, there are                  
intervening decisions of the same court of appeals.  Some                        
courts have held that an appellate court will, upon a                            
subsequent appeal, correct an error in its decision upon a                       
former appeal when such error is shown by a contrary decision                    
of the same court in another case, particularly where,                           
following the decision in the prior appeal, the same court set                   
forth a different rule in another case, thus either expressly                    
or by necessary implication overruling the previous decision.                    
Annotation, Erroneous Decision as Law of the Case on Subsequent                  
Appellate Review (1963), 87 A.L.R.2d 271, 344-345, Section                       
24[a].                                                                           
     However, in the two subsequent Lucas County appellate                       
cases relied on by Judge DeCessna, the court of appeals                          
expressly determined that its prior Wood County case was not                     
res judicata as to the Lucas County cases because "[a] review                    
of the previous decision from [the] court reveals that the                       
issue of whether settlement proceedings were improperly                          
conducted, rendering the settlement void, was not raised or                      
considered."  In the Wood County case, the Palmers did not                       
assert on appeal, as they did in the Lucas County cases, that                    
the settlement agreement was invalid as to Ok Sun Palmer                         
because the settlement proceedings were conducted when her                       
attorney was not present.  Therefore, the Lucas County                           
appellate cases did not set forth a contrary rule or overrule,                   
either expressly or by implication, the Wood County case.                        
     Since final judgment was entered in favor of relators on                    
the issue of liability of the Palmers on relators' Wood County                   
counterclaim, Judge DeCessna, relators, and the Palmers were                     
obliged to accept the issue as finally settled.  See Morton                      
Internl., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co. (Jan. 25, 1995),                          
Hamilton App. No. C-930613, unreported.  Application of the                      
law-of-the-case doctrine here furthers the doctrine's necessary                  
purposes of ensuring consistency of results, avoiding endless                    
litigation, and preserving the constitutional structure of                       
superior and inferior courts.  See Hawley v. Ritley (1988), 35                   
Ohio St.3d 157, 160, 519 N.E.2d 390, 393, quoting Nolan, supra,                  
11 Ohio St.3d at 3-4, 11 OBR at 2-3, 462 N.E.2d at 412-413.                      
     In addition, Judge DeCessna does not claim that he lacks                    
jurisdiction to hold the remand proceedings because of the                       
Lucas County proceedings.  See, generally, State ex rel.                         
Sellers v. Gerken (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 115, 117, 647 N.E.2d                     
807, 809, quoting State ex rel. Racing Guild of Ohio v. Morgan                   
(1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 17 OBR 45, 46, 476 N.E.2d 1060,                    
1062 ("'"As between [state] courts of concurrent jurisdiction,                   
the tribunal whose power is first invoked by the institution of                  
proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of                     
all other tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole issue and to                   
settle the rights of the parties."'").  There is also no                         
indication that the Lucas County case involves the same cause                    
of action as the Wood County case.  State ex rel. Judson v.                      
Spahr (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 111, 113,515 N.E.2d 911, 913.                        
     Therefore, because there are no extraordinary                               
circumstances justifying deviation from the court of appeals'                    
mandate, a writ of prohibition will issue to prevent Judge                       
DeCessna from improperly refusing to comply with the mandate by                  
staying the proceedings on remand.  See State ex rel. Heck v.                    
Kessler (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 98, 103-104, 647 N.E.2d 792,                       
797.  Relators' first and second propositions of law are                         
sustained.                                                                       
     Relators contend in their third proposition of law that a                   
writ of procedendo should also issue.  A writ of procedendo is                   
appropriate when a court has either refused to render a                          
judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment.                    
State ex rel. Doe v. Tracy (1988), 51 Ohio App.3d 198, 200, 555                  
N.E.2d 674, 677, citing State ex rel. Wallace v. Tyack (1984),                   
13 Ohio St.3d 4, 13 OBR 379, 469 N.E.2d 844.  A writ of                          
procedendo will issue requiring a judge to proceed to final                      
judgment where the judge erroneously stayed the proceeding                       
based on a pending case which has no effect on jurisdiction to                   
proceed.  See State ex rel. Davey v. Owen (1937), 133 Ohio St.                   
96, 105-106, 10 O.O. 102, 106, 12 N.E.2d 144, 149.  Judge                        
DeCessna asserts that any delay caused by his inactivation of                    
the case pending the Lucas County case was justified because of                  
the Lucas County appellate cases.  However, for the reasons set                  
forth in the discussion of relators' first and second                            
propositions of law, this assertion is meritless.                                
     The court of appeals issued its mandate in the previous                     
appeal on February 5, 1993.  By the time relators filed this                     
action, nearly two years had elapsed and the trial court had                     
still not complied with the court of appeals' mandate.  Judge                    
DeCessna's unjustified delay in proceeding to comply with the                    
mandate requires the issuance of a writ of procedendo directing                  
him to hold a trial on the sole issue of damages as to                           
relators' counterclaim.                                                          
     Accordingly, the requested writs of prohibition and                         
procedendo are granted.                                                          
                                 Writs granted.                                  
     Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney,                        
Pfeifer and Cook, JJ., concur.