Case Title: STATE v GALLAGHER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12341 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1973 T H E STATE OE M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - JERRY GALLAGHER, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Hon. Robert He Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Sandall, Moses and Cavan, B i l l i n g s , Montana D. Frank Kampfe argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Jonathan B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: March 28, 1973 Decided : MAY - 1 1 9 7 3 F i l e d : MAY - 1 1973 Clerk M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal from a judgment of conviction of murder i n the f i r s t degree entered on a jury verdict in the thirteenth judicial d i s t r i c t , county of Yellowstone, After denial of h i s motion for a new t r i a l , defendant appealed. Defendant Jerry Gallagher raises four issues on appeal : 1, Defendant i s entitled t o a new t r i a l insofar as h i s defense counsel had previously prosecuted him, 2, The t r i a l court erred i n f a i l i n g t o grant defendant's motion f a r new t r i a l based upon newly discovered evidence. 3 , The t r i a l court erred i n f a i l i n g t o grant defendant's motion t o suppress certain evidence obtained in violation of h i s Fourth Amendment rights. 4 . The t r i a l court erred i n admitting certain evidence obtained i n a search incident t o defendant's a r r e s t where the a r r e s t warrant was predicated upon an insufficient showing of probable cause. O n September 7, 1971, a body was discovered on " ~ a r d i n H i l l " on U.S. Highway 87 near Billings, Montana, The body was identified a s that of one Eldon Egan. The body was observed by tourists, who had stopped a t a v i s t a point t o observe the Yellaw- stone Valley, some 75 t o 100 feet below the vista point on a steep incline beyond a barbed w i r e fence, which ran parallel t o the highway. It was l a t e r observed the fence had been cut a t a point not f a r from the body. The tourists stopped a Montana Highway Patrolman, Leo Burnett, and showed him the body, H e immediately notified the sheriff who took a team of deputies and detectives t o the scene, arriving a t about 1:20 p.m. A careful combing of the area revealed a fingernail clipper, - 7 0 s h e l l casings and one spent bullet, A t the v i s t a pulloff, above the body, there was a trash can i n which was found a paper bag containing a blood stained pillowcase, a block of woad, and a comb, A second bag contained a broken Vodka bottle, D r , Gordon L. Cox, a Billings pathologist, examined the body. H i s examination revealed Egan had been severely beaten and shot twice i n the head. One of the shots had been fired through the roof of the mouth. Either of the bullet wounds would have produced instant death. A "32 caliber slug was found i n the skull and the expended slug found near the body was a .32 caliber. Deputies of the sheriff's office and Billings police officers immediately began investigations t o ascertain Egan's a c t i v i t i e s i n the community. Much of the investigation concerned Billings southside bars and t h e i r clientele. Testimony a t t r i a l revealed that defendant and one John Curry, who was also charged and l a t e r acquitted of the murder, were together i n the Montana Bar i n the early hours of September 7, 1971. Egan had also been i n the bar and testimony indicated that he was carrying a .32 caliber revolver, There was testimony that Curry made the statement t o someone a t the bar when Egan came into the bar "not t o move, you might get into the cross fire". This person, James Lee Marvidikis, was not available for t r i a l but l a t e r i n a deposition taken i n Billings, March 16, 1972,and introduced a t the time of the motion for a new t r i a l , t e s t i f i e d Curry had a gun, a t one time had it a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y out from under h i s b e l t and that Curry told Marvidikis, "There i s going t o be a beef. * * * Hold s t i l l , don't move, you might get cross-fired." Investigation revealed and testimony was l a t e r given, that defendant and Egan had a few nights before been involved i n a "beef" a t the Empire Bar and that Egan, who came out the loser, had threatened t o "get" defendant. Testimony revealed both men had lived with a woman named Ida M a y France Egan, also known a s Smoky Walker, and that the altercation had developed because Egan a t the time out out of favor and defendant was being favored. The investigation narrowed down t o focus upon the where- abouts and a c t i v i t i e s of Curry and defendant. A t about 9:00 p.m. on the evening of September 8, the day a f t e r the discovery of Egan's body, the sheriff received a c a l l from a Mrs, Ruth Parker, complaining that a prowler was i n or had been in her home, Knowing that defendant had been living there, the sheriff and two deputies went t o her home and upon arriving there were re- quested by Mrs. Parker t o search the house, including the basement, While i n the basement, accompanied by Mrs. Parker, the sheriff observed what appeared t o be a blood stained s h i r t and with M r s . Parker's permission took the s h i r t , which had a t e a r on the right side of the rear of the s h i r t , H e also took a pair of trousers and a pair of stockings that appeared t o be blood stained. A t t r i a l , only the s h i r t had identificable blood stains and the blood was type A. Both defendant and Egan had type A blood. Concerning the blood stained pillowcase found i n the trash can near where the body was found, an extensive investigation traced it t o the home of one Lamona Northey i n Butte, Montana, Miss Northey, aged 16, i s the daughter of one Neddie St. Arnant of Butte, a friend of John Curry. Miss Northey t e s t i f i e d that John Curry came t o her home on the ev&ning of August 29, 1971; that he slept on the couch; that she gave him a pillow covered by the pillowcase found i n the trash can; that the next day Curry took the pillow out t o h i s car; and, that she had not seen it again u n t i l it was shown t o her by investigating officers a t Butte on November 30, 1971. She identified the pillowcase by the embroidery on it and indicated a particular interest i n it because it had been made by her grandmother and that she had intended t o em- broidery over it due t o the fact some of the colors had faded. Defendant and Curry were arrested one week a f t e r Egan's death i n a remote cow camp i n Wyoming. The car they were driving, which belonged t o curry's son, was impounded and searched under a warrant issued by a Wyoming magistrate. Testimony of witnesses a t t r i a l established that Curry and defendant had washed the car, inside and out, while a t the cow camp. They were observed washing the mats i n a horse tank and hanging them t o dry on a fence. Blood s t a i n s were found on the floor mats, and on a piece of cardboard taken from the trunk of the c a r , but t h e stai.ns were not i n s u f f i c i e n t amounts t o e s t a b l i s h whether they were human blood s t a i n s o r t o be typed. During the search by Sheriff Hladky of Wyoming the following items were taken from the c a r , processed and sent t o the FBI and l a t e r introduced i n t o evidence: a p a i r of gloves, a small suitcase containing clothes, a motel key, front f l o o r mats, and a piece of cardboard from the trunk of the car. Defendant and Curry were charged with the death of Egan. Bail was s e t a t $25,000 but l a t e r revoked on motion by the county attorney. Private counsel appeared f o r both defendants and re- presented them u n t i l December 20, 1971, when an a f f i d a v i t was f i l e d by defense counsel s e t t i n g forth t h a t he could not represent e i t h e r defendant t o the possible prejudice of the other. The withdrawal was authorized and defendant requested appointment of counsel alleging he was without funds t o h i r e counsel. It i s noted t h a t a f t e r being ably defended by the public defender he found funds on appeal t o h i r e private counsel. Defendant did not t e s t i f y a t t r i a l . ~ e f e n d a n t ' s f i r s t issue on appeal alleges e r r o r i n t h a t defense counsel John Adams had previously prosecuted defendant. Defendant r e l i e s on In r e Petition of Lucero, M o n t . 9 504 P.2d 992, 30 St.Rep. 161. W e hold Lucero not applicable t o t h e f a c t s of the i n s t a n t case. This Court recently considered t h i s question i n I n r e Petition of Romero, Mont , y P.2d , 30 St,Rep, 440, quoting from I n r e Petition of Gary Lynn Allen, M o n t . I I A s t o the f i r s t two sentences t h e i r period of time had long since expired and * * * defense counsel would be f r e e t o accept appointment since he was no longer involved i n the prosecution. 11 W e further noted i n Romero: his Court takes j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of the f a c t t h a t several of our most eminent and successful criminal defense lawyers a r e former prosecutors; and t h a t i n no case has our a t t e n t i o n ever been c a l l e d t o any lack of intewest,effort o r com- petency because of t h i s factor. I1 Section 94-3509, R,C,M. 1947, the s t a t u t e prohibiting counsel from appearing a s defense counsel f o r a person he pre- viously had prosecuted, r e f e r s t o the same case; i t has no appli- cation t o counsel appearing t o defend a t a l a t e r time and i n a d i f f e r e n t case, In addition, here t h e t r i a l court recognized the problem of the appointment of defense counsel and held a special hearing a t which the following colloquy occurred: " T H E COURT: Very well, t h a t order authorizing endorsanent of the witness i s signed, I might ask M r . Gallagher a t t h i s time --- I h o w when I appointed M r , Adams t o represent you I asked you i f you had a preference between M r . Adams and M r . Whalen and you s t a t e d t h a t you did prefer M r . Adams, and I am presuming from t h a t selection t h a t you hold no grudges against M r . Adams apparently f o r h i s previous work a s Co~nnty Attorney and you do f e e l t h a t he i s a good attorney and t h a t he i s doing and w i l l do a s good as he can f o r you i n your behalf. Am I correct i n t h a t assumption? " D E F E N D A N T G A L L A G H E R : Yes, Your Honor, "THE C O U R T : And you a r e s a t i s f i e d with him a s your attorney and the work he has done f o r you up t o now and so on? "DEFENDANT G A L L A G H E R : Yes, Your Honor. " T H E COURT: You do t r u s t and depend on him? " D E F E N D A N T G A L L A G H E R : Yes . "THE COURT: Very well. Okay, 11 Here defendant had a choice, he could have picked M r , Whalen, an experienced counsel, but chose M r . Adams. I n so doing, he waived any r i g h t t o demand a new t r i a l on t h i s issue. Defendant's second issue concerns whether the t r i a l court erred i n not granting a new t r i a l based on newly discovered evi- dence, In State v. Greeno, 135 Mont. 580, 586, 342 P.2d 1052, t h i s Court established c r i t e r i a t o be met before a new t r i a l w i l l be ~ r a r i t e d on the h s i s of newly discovered evidence. There it said: "(1) That t h e evidence must have come t o the knowledge of the applicant since the t r i a l ; (2) t h a t it was not through want of diligence that it was not discovered e a r l i e r ; (3) t h a t it i s so material t h a t it would probably produce a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t upon m o t h e r t r i a l ; (4) t h a t it i s not cumulative merely ---that is, does not speak a s t o f a c t s i n r e l a t i o n r o which there was evidence a t the t r i a l ; (5) t h a t the application must be supported by the a f f i d a v i t of the witness whose evidence i s alleged t o have been newly discovered, o r i t s absence accounted f o r ; and (6) t h a t the evidence must not be such a s w i l l only tend t o impeach the character or c r e d i t of a witness, To some of these there may be, and doubtless a r e , exceptions. For i l l u s t r a t i o n : the cumulative evi- dence may be so overwhelmingly convincing a s t o compel the conclusion t h a t t o sustain the verdict would be a gross i n j u s t i c e , o r the impeaching evidence may demonstrate perjury i n the witnesses upon whose evi- dence the verdict i s founded. " See also: State v. Best, M o n t . , 503 P. 2d 997, 29 St. Rep. 1045. Defendant r e l i e s heavily on several issues which he c l a s s i - f i e s a s newly discovered evidence i n h i s p e t i t i o n f o r a new t r i a l : (1) The f a c t t h a t h i s counsel on appeal, who had represented John Curry a t h i s t r i a l , had on examination of Lamora Northey raised some doubt a s t o her positive i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the pillow- case a t defendant's t r i a l . (2) The testimony of Forence Imsande who t e s t i f i e d a t curry's t r i a l , but did not t e s t i f y a t defendant's t r i a l . ( 3 ) The testimony of M r . and Mrs. Newt Kirkland, a l i b i witnesses f o r Curry, t h a t Curry was a t t h e i r home from the e a r l y hours of the morning of September 7, 1971, u n t i l about 10 a,m. the next morning. W e find the t r i a l court did not e r r i n denying a new t r i a l due t o the f a c t defendant f a i l e d t o produce s u f f i c i e n t new evidence t o support h i s p e t i t i o n f o r a new t r i a l . F i r s t , defendant's allegation t h a t Miss Northey materially varied her testimony a t the Curry t r i a l from t h a t given a t de- fendant's t r i a l i s subject t o question. A s previously noted, Miss Northey was sixteen years old, her mother was a friend of Curry, and she was not what could be termed a friendly witness f o r the s t a t e ; she gave a statement i n November 1971 t o the deputies identifying the pillowcase and l a t e r t e s t i f i e d in accordance with that statement a t defendant's t r i a l , and it was not u n t i l the night before she t e s t i f i e d a t Curry's t r i a l that she had any change of mind. Last, but not least, upon cross-examination a t Curry's t r i a l when asked t o review her previous statements a s t o truth, she admitted they were true. The t r i a l court noted, and we concur, one can only speculate a s t o what she might say on a third t r i a l . Obviously, the t r i a l judge was not impressed that t h i s was newly discovered evidence e n t i t l i n g defendant t o a new t r i a l , Second, Florence Imsande t e s t i f i e d a t Curry's t r i a l but did not a t defendant's t r i a l . Her testimony was that she saw defendant between 11:30 p.m. and 12:00 midnight on the night of Egan's death; that defendant was wearing a s h i r t freshly stained with blood; and, that when she q u e s t ~ h i m about it defendant said it came from injuries received in a fight. M r s . Imsande was a clerk a t the Frontier Club i n Billings. On cross-examination she stated she had sold defendant a b o t t l e of Vodka, she thought it was ord don's, but admitted they sold Smirnoffs--the type bottle found i n the trash can, A t defendant's t r i a l no testimony was produced indicating that anyone had seen defendant a f t e r midnight September 7 with blood on h i s s h i r t . Mrs. Imsande t e s t i f i e d a t Curry's t r i a l that she had known defendant since he was a boy a t Lewistawn. Both she and defendant must have been aware of t h i s so-called new evidence before h i s t r i a l , most certainly it i s not evidence that came t o defendant's attention a f t e r t r i a l and obviously with any diligence it could have been produced a t h i s t r i a l , Third, the testimony of M r . and M r s . Newt Kirkland, two a l i b i witnesses a t the Curry t r i a l . M r . Kirkland i s an admitted exconvict and on oral argument was described by the county attorney as a man "out on a bond of $75,000 from a recent bank robbery i n the midwest where he had l o s t an arm i n a gun fight." The Kirklands t e s t i f i e d a t Curry's t r i a l t h a t they saw Curry shortly a f t e r 1:00 a.m. on t h e 7th on the southside of Billings, t h a t he was a friend, t h a t he had been drinking, and t h a t they took him home with them and he spent the night a t t h e i r ranch. They t e s t i f i e d they brought him t o town about 10:00 a.m. the next morning. H o w t h i s qualified as t o defendant a s newly discovered evidence, escapes us. Curry and defendant were j a i l e d i n ad- joining c e l l s where they could t a l k t o each other; Kirklands v i s i t e d Curry a t l e a s t once and probably several times while he was i n j a i l , and t h e Kirklands knew defendant, I f t h i s evidence had been e i t h e r relevant o r t r u t h f u l it could have e a s i l y been secured by defendant before t r i a l , had he exercised due diligence, This Court i n S t a t e v , Jones, 32 Mont. 442, 454, 80 P, 1095, stated: "* * * a motion f o r a new t r i a l i s addressed t o the sound l e g a l discretion of the t r i a l court." Here, there was no abuse of t h a t sound discretion by the t r i a l judge i n denying defendant's motion f o r a new t r i a l , The require- ments of Greeno simply had not been met. Defendant's t h i r d i s s u e concerns the search of defendant's room and seizure of clothing found there. Fourth Amendment t o t h e United States Constitution; A r t . 1 1 1 , Sec, 7, Montana Consti- tution. Sections 95-701 and 95-718, R,C.M. 1947, s e t f o r t h the standards f o r search and seizure. Section 95-701, R.C.M, 1947, s t a t e s : "A search of a person, object o r place may be made and instruments, a r t i c l e s o r things may be seized i n accordance with the provisions of t h i s chapter when the search i s made: "(a) A s an incident t o a lawful a r r e s t , "(b) With the consent of the accused or of any other person who i s lawfully i n possession of the object o r place t o be searched, o r who i s believed upon reasonable cause t o be i n such lawful posses- sion by the person making the search. "(c) By the authority of a v a l i d search warrant, "(d) Under the authority andwithin the scope of a r i g h t of lawful inspection grantkd by the law, I I Section 95-718, R.C.M, 1947, s t a t e s : I I Instruments, a r t i c l e s or things lawfully seized a r e admissible a s evidence upon any prosecution o r proceeding whether or not the prosecution o r proceeding i s f o r the offense i n connection with which the search was o r i g i n a l l y made." Section 95-701 (d), R.C.M, 1947, is controlling, f o r the s h e r i f f had p r i o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n f a r h i s presence i n defendant's room, While engaged i n a search f o r a prowler, the s h e r i f f came upon a blood stained s h i r t , and what appeared t o be blood stained pants and sox belonging t o defendant, upon whom focus had centered i n regard t o Egan's death. The s h e r i f f had no p r i o r knowledge t h a t he would find such evidence nor could he have anticipated such a find, Such evidence i s acceptable i n t o evidence and has been so held under the "plain view" doctrine discussed i n Coolidge v. M e w Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct, 2022, 29 L ed 2d 564, 582. There t h e court said: I I It i s well established t h a t under c e r t a i n circum- stances the police may seize evidence i n plain view without a warrant. * * * " A n example of the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the 'plain view' doctrine i s the s i t u a t i o n i n which the police have a warrant t o search a given area f o r specified objects, and i n the course of the search come across some other a r t i c l e of incriminating character, [Citing authority] Where the i n i t i a l intrusion t h a t brings the police within plain view of such an a r t i c l e i s supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions t o the warrant requirement, t h e seizure i s a l s o l e g i t i - mate, Thus the police may inadvertently come across evidence while i n 'hot pursuit' of a fleeing suspect, [Citing authority] And an object t h a t comes i n t o view during a search incident t o a r r e s t t h a t is appropriately limited i n scope under existing law may be seized with- out a warrant. [Citing authority] Finally, the 'plain view' doctrine has been applied where a police o f f i c e r i s not searching f o r evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminatin obiect, Harris v. United States. 390 U.S. 234. 19 L E$ 2d-1067, 88 Sect. 992; Frazier v l Cupp, 394 U.5. 731, 22 L Ed 2d 684, 89 S e c t , 1420; Ker v. California, 374 U.S., a t 43, 10 L . Ed 2d, a t 743, * * * "What the lain view' cases have i n common i s t h a t t h e police o f f i c e r i n each of them had a p r i o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r an intrusion i n the course of which he came inad- vertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves t o supplement the p r i o r justification---whether i t be a warrant f o r another object, hot pursuit, search incident t o lawful a r r e s t , o r some other legitimate reason f o r being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused--- and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the o r i g i n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent t o the police t h a t they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used t o extend a general exploratory search from one object t o another u n t i l something incriminating a t l a s t emerges .* * * "* * W e r e , once an otherwise lawful. search i s i n progress, the police inadvertently come upon a piece of evidence, it would often be a needless inconvenience, and sometimes dangerous--to the evidence o r t o the police themselves--to require them t o ignore it u n t i l they have obtained a warrant p r t i c u l a r l y describing it. 11 The l i m i t s on the doctrine a r e implicit i n the s t a t e - ment of i t s r a t i o n a l e , The f i r s t of these i s t h a t plain v i e w alone i s never enough t o j u s t i f y the warrantless s e i z u m evidence. * * * II The second limitation is t h a t t h e discovery of evidence i n plain view must be inadvertent. * *" (~mphasis added). The r u l e is: Where there i s p r i o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the palice t o search an area, and i n searching the area, they inad- v e r t e n t l y find incriminating evidence which they had no reason t o a n t i c i p a t e , they may lawfully s e i z e t h a t incriminating evidence, S t a t e v, Quigg, 155 Mont. 119, 467 P.2d 692; S t a t e v. Williams, Man t . - , 502 P.2d 50, 29 %,Rep. 802; State ex rel. Wilson and Hoffer v, D i s t r i c t Court, M o n t . 498 P. 2d 1217, 29 St,Rep. 523; United States v. Mitchell, 458 F,2d 960 (9th Cir.1972). Here a l l the requirements of t h e "plain view" doctrine enunciated i n Coplidge were met and the evidence was admissible, ~ e f e n d a n t ' s fourth and f i n a l issue concerns whether the search of John Curry's automobile and the seizure of a r t i c l e s therefrom was a v i o l a t i o n of defendant's constitutional r i g h t s under t h e Fourth Amendment t o the United States Constitution. A. Defendant made no timely motion t o suppress t h e evidence taken from John Curry's car. Section 95-1806, R.C.M, 1947, provides f o r the motion t o suppress evidence allegedly i l l e g a l l y seized, and reads: "(a) A defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the court t o suppress a s evidence anything so obtained, "(b) The motion s h a l l be made before t r i a l unless for good cause shown the court s h a l l otherwise direct, "(c) The defendant shall give a t l e a s t ten (10) days' notice of such motion to the -attorney prosecuting or such other time a s the court may direct, The defendant shall serve a copy of the notice and motion upon the attorney prosecuting. "(d) The motion shall be i n writing and s t a t e facts showing wherein the search and seizure were unlawful. "(e) If the allegations of the motion s t a t e facts which i f true show that the search and seizure were unlawful the court shall conduct a hearing into the merits of the motion, "(f) The burden of proving that the search and seizure were unlawful s h a l l be on the defendant, "(g) I f the motion is granted the evidence s h a l l not be admissible against the movant a t any t r i a l of the case. 1 t This Court has s e t forth the rule for suppressing evidence in State v. Callaghan, 144 Mont. 401, 406, 396 P,2d 821: "'One wishing t o preclude the use of evidence obtained through a violation of h i s constitutional rights must protect himself by timely action, I f he has had oppor- trxnity t o suppress the evidence before t r i a l , and has failed t o take advantage of h i s remedy, objection t o the evidence upon the t r i a l w i l l not avail him. I "* * * Of course, i f the f i r s t knowledge of the evi- dence comes a t the t r i a l stage then objection is proper a t that time, [Citing authority], I I See also: State v, Souhrada, 122 Mont. 377, 385, 204 P.2d 792, Here no motion was made for suppression of the floor mats or the cardboard taken from the Curry automobile, ~ e f e n d a n t ' s objection did not r a i s e any question a s t o the legality of the search, and the raising of the issue on appeal before t h i s Court i s not timely. B, Defendant has no standing t o object t o the introduction of evidence taken from the John Curry car, The r u l e as t o who can qualify as a person aggrieved by an unlawful search i s set forth in Jones v, United States, 362 U,S. 257, 261, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L ed 2d 697, 702, where the court said: "1n order t o qualify a s a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure one must have been a victim of a search and seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed a t someone else. * * * "Ordinarily, then, it i s e n t i r e l y proper t o require of one who seeks t o challenge the l e g a l i t y of a search a s the b a s i s f o r suppressing relevant evi- dence t h a t he a l l e g e , and i f the allegation be dis- puted t h a t he establish, t h a t he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy. t t This r u l e was reaffirmed i n Alderman v, United States, 394 U,S, 165, 89 S e c t . 961, 22 L ed 2d 176, It was a l s o applied by t h i s Court i n S t a t e v, Dess, 154 Mont. 231, 462 P,2d 186, C. Was there probably cause f o r t h e search warrant t o i s s u e i n Wyoming? Here, the record indicates defendant did not question the v a l i d i t y of the search warrant issued i n Wyoming, He alleges a subsequent search was made i n Billings, Montana without a warrant. W e find no merit t o t h i s allegation, Sheriff Hladky of Wyoming obtained a v a l i d search warrant from a Wyoming magistrate, seized c e r t a i n items, marked them, turned them over t o Sheriff Meeks of Yellowstone County and t e s t i f i e d a t the t r i a l , The search was l e g a l and the evidence taken from the c a r was proper, It i s recognized t h a t t h i s i s a jury verdict based e n t i r e l y on circumstantial evidence, but a s was said i n S t a t e v, Cor, 144 Mont, 323, 326, 396 P.2d 86: I t Circumstantial evidence i s not always i n f e r i o r i n quality nor i s it necessarily relegated t o a 1 second c l a s s s t a t u s ' i n the consideration t o be given it, The very f a c t it i s circumstantial i s n o t a s u f f i c i e n t allegation t o j u s t i f y a reversal of the judgment * * *, The t e s t i s whether the f a c t s and circumstances a r e of such a quality and quantity a s t o l e g a l l y j u s t i f y a jury i n deter- mining g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt, I f such be the case, then the court should n o t , indeed cannot, s e t aside the solemn findings of t h e t r i e r of the f a c t s . :I The judgment of t h e t r i a l court is affirmed, i Associate J u s t i c e We Concur: ' Hon. Edward T. Dussault, District Judge, sitting for Chief Justice James T, Harrison,