Case Title: Hollingshead v. Hollingshead

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hollingshead v. Hollingshead1997 WY 93942 P.2d 1104Case Number: 96-149Decided: 07/18/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

Juanita Joan HOLLINGSHEAD, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v. Joe William

HOLLINGSHEAD, Appellee 
(Defendant).

                            

  

 

Appeal from District Court, Carbon County, Ken 
Stebner, J.

  

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Rowena Heckert, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Cynthia L. Harnett, Assistant Attorney General; and 
Dan Wilde, Assistant Attorney General, argued, for Appellant. 

Thomas A. Thompson, of 
Williams, Kelly, Waldrip & Thompson, LC, Rawlins, for 
Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

   THOMAS, 
Justice. 

[¶1]         The question posed in this case is 
whether periodic payments ordered for child support are to be treated as 
judgments prior to the effective date of WYO. STAT. § 20-2-113(a) (Supp. 1989). 
The district court ruled that a periodic 
child support payment is a liability created by statute and applied the eight 
year statute of limitations found in WYO. STAT. § 1-3-105(a)(ii)(B) (1988).  The result was that payments that became 
due more than eight years prior to the filing of the motion to enforce the 
payments were barred. We hold that, in the absence of a statute, a decree for 
periodic payments of child support creates sequential judgments enforceable under the statutory procedure 
for enforcement of judgments, with the result that none were barred in this 
case. The Judgment on Arrears is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

 

[¶2]         In the Brief of State of Wyoming, 
filed on behalf of the Appellant Juanita Joan Hollingshead, the mother, this 
issue is stated:

 

            
Did the court properly apply WYO. STAT. § 1-3-105(a)(ii)(B) to limit 
recovery of past due child support?

 

 Joe William Hollingshead, the father, 
restates the issue in his Brief of Appellee in this way:

 

            
I. Whether the district court properly interpreted WYO. STAT. § 
1-3-105(a)(ii)(B) to limit Appellant's ability to recover past due child 
support?

 

[¶3]         Juanita Hollingshead (mother) and 
Joe Hollingshead (father) were divorced in Rawlins on July 30, 1976. They had 
one child, Joseph Hollingshead Jr., who was almost two years old at the time 
of the divorce. Pursuant to the divorce 
decree, the father was ordered to pay One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per month to 
the mother to assist in the support of the minor child. The child support was to 
commence on April 1, 1976, and continue each month until the child attained his 
majority, married, became self supporting, or otherwise was emancipated. 
Payments were to be made on the first day of each month.

 

[¶4]         The father paid very little of the 
child support over the years, and on February 8, 1996 the State, acting at the 
behest of the mother through its Child Support Services of Wyoming, filed a 
Motion for an Order to Show Cause asserting that the amount in arrears of child 
support was Twenty Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars and Eighty Cents ($20,329.80). The 
motion was filed by the State pursuant to the provisions of WYO. STAT. § 
20-6-106.  Following a hearing held 
on February 26, 1996, the district court entered a Judgment on Arrears in which the court found that the 
father had made one child support payment in the amount of Seven Hundred Seventy 
Dollars and Ten Cents ($770.10) through the office of the clerk of court. The father presented evidence of 
further payments in the amount of Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) for which the 
court gave him credit against his child support obligation of Twenty One 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($21,500), leaving an arrearage of Twenty Thousand 
Three Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars and 
Eighty Cents ($20,329.80). The court, however, invoked the provisions of WYO. 
STAT. § 1-3-105(a)(ii)(B), and ruled that any child support payment that had 
become payable more than eight years prior to the filing of the State's motion 
would be barred by the statute of limitations. The judgment awarded Six Thousand 
Nine Hundred Dollars ($6,900) in child 
support arrearage to the mother. The mother appeals the Judgment on 
Arrears.

 

[¶5]         For years after 1989 the same 
problem cannot occur because the legislature provided in Chapter 182, Session 
Laws 1989 that:

 

            
In any case in which child support has been ordered to be paid to the 
clerk of court, any periodic payment or installment under the provisions of the 
decree concerning maintenance is on the date it is due a judgment by operation of 
law.

 

 WYO. STAT. § 20-2-113(a) (Supp. 1989). 
Child support payments accruing after 1989, as judgments by operation of law, 
will be governed by the application of the statute of limitations that relates 
to judgments. If execution is not issued on a judgment within five years, the 
judgment becomes dormant. WYO. STAT. § 1-17-307 (1988). The party entitled to bring the 
action to revive a judgment then has twenty-one years from the date the judgment 
becomes dormant to bring such an action. WYO. STAT. § 1-16-503 (1988). A period 
of twenty-one years clearly would justify the recovery of the entire Twenty 
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars and Eighty Cents ($20,329.80) in this 
case.

 

[¶6]         Some of the periodic child support 
payments due from the father accrued after the effective date of the 1989 
statute. The State on behalf of the mother, however, also sought enforcement of 
payments that became due prior to 1989. The child support statutes are silent 
with respect to any statute of limitations that is applicable towards periodic 
payments or installments for the benefit of the child that accrue prior to 1989. 
The district court ruled that the periodic payments of child support due prior 
to 1989 were governed by the eight year statute of limitations found in WYO. 
STAT. § 1-3-105(a)(ii)(B), which provides:

 

            
(a) Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can only 
be brought within the following periods after the cause of action 
accrues:

 

         
   *      *      *      *      *      
*

 

                        
(ii) Within eight (8) years, an action:

 

         
   *      *      *      *      *      
*

 

                                    
(B) Upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or 
penalty;

 

 The premise of the district court's 
ruling was that child support is an obligation created by 
statute.

 

[¶7]         The district court is vested with 
continuing jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a child support obligation. 
Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 213 (Wyo. 1995); Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Wyo. 1988). The applicability of a statute of limitations is a 
question of law to be decided by the court.  Woodard v. Cook Ford Sales, Inc., 927 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Wyo. 1996); Hiltz v. Robert W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 570 
(Wyo. 1996). Such a decision is the 
subject of plenary review, and no deference is accorded to the decision of the 
trial court. Pete Lien & Sons, Inc. v. Ellsworth Peck Const. Co., 896 P.2d 761, 762 (Wyo. 1995); Harbel v. Wintermute, 883 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo. 
1994).

 

[¶8]         The plain language of WYO. STAT. § 
1-3-105(a)(ii)(B) provides that it is a general statute of limitations to bar an 
action based upon a liability created by statute. Union Pacific Resources Co. v. 
State, 839 P.2d 356, 372-73 (Wyo. 1992). We hold, however, that its application 
as a bar to the enforcement of periodic child support payments was erroneous. 
The district court pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 20-61 (1957), now WYO. STAT. § 
20-2-113 (1997), had the authority to issue a decree for periodic payments of 
child support. No liability on the part of any parent is created independently 
by the statute, however. Liability of the parent for child support is the 
product of the entry of a decree by the district court. Other courts have ruled 
that a money judgment does not come into 
existence until an action is brought for a determination of the amount of unpaid 
and delinquent installments. Kuhn v. Kuhn, 273 Ind. 67, 402 N.E.2d 989, 991 
(1980); Hough v. Hough, 206 Okla. 179, 242 P.2d 162, 163 (1952). We are 
satisfied that the liability for such payments is not created by statute, but 
simply results from a decree which the statute affords the district court the 
authority to enter.

 

[¶9]         Our consideration of the 
applicable authorities persuades us that the legislature, in adopting the 
statutory provision in 1989, simply codified the common law principle that 
periodic child support payments are judgments arising by operation of law.  Our research discloses that a majority 
of our sister jurisdictions have so held. See Hooks v. Hooks, 13 Kan. App. 2d 
105, 762 P.2d 846, 848 (1988); Seeley v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah 1975); Beesley v. Badger, 66 Utah 194, 240 P. 458, 460 (Utah 1925); Hough v. Hough, 242 P.2d  at 163; Huff v. Huff, 648 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tex. 1983); State of Mich., County of Shiawassee, on Behalf of Pruitt 
v. Pruitt, 94 N.C. App. 713, 380 S.E.2d 809, 810 (1989); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 54 Wn. App. 834, 776 P.2d 172, 173 (1989); Lynch v. Rohan, 116 Neb. 820, 219 N.W. 239 (1928); Schuster v. Merrill, 56 Ariz. 114, 106 P.2d 192 (1940); Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 
205 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1974); Hagemann v. Pinska, 225 Mo. App. 521, 37 S.W.2d 463, 
466 (1931); Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447, 156 N.E.2d 113, 116 (1959); Matson v. Matson, 333 N.W.2d 862, 865 
(Minn. 1983) (applying Wisconsin law); Walters v. Walters, 231 Iowa 1267, 3 N.W.2d 595, 596 (1942).

 

[¶10]      In some of the states, there is a 
specific statute of limitations for an action on a judgment. While recognizing 
that the decree requiring periodic payments for child support is a judgment, in 
those jurisdictions the statute of limitations for an action on a judgment will 
be invoked. In the absence of a specific statute of limitations, the statutory 
procedure for reviving dormant judgments is followed. It is apparent that 
the legislature in Wyoming 
preferred that approach for decrees from Wyoming courts since there is no 
specific statute of limitations for domestic judgments, but a specific statute 
of limitations has been enacted for foreign judgments. WYO. STAT. § 
1-3-105(a)(iii) (1988).

 

[¶11]      As the court stated in the early 
case of Beesley v. Badger, 66 Utah 194, 240 P. 458, 460 (Utah 1925) (emphasis 
added):

 

When a divorce is granted and the husband ordered to 
pay alimony or to support minor children or both, and the decree itself does not 
declare or impress a lien to secure such payments, then, by force of 
the             
statute relating to judgments in general, such decree or judgment from 
the filing and docketing thereof becomes and has all the force and effect of a lien to 
the same extent as an ordinary judgment for money, when the decree for alimony is in a gross sum, though 
payable partly or wholly in future installments, and when not in gross sum but, as here, in installments 
for an indefinite period, the decree is a lien securing payment of all due and unpaid installments, 
but not of installments to become due in the future.  By the weight of authority, and as we think the 
better reason, although there are cases to the contrary, a decree for alimony in a gross sum as well 
as to past-due and unpaid installments stands upon the same footing as 
ordinary money judgments and may be enforced by execution in the same manner as 
ordinary money judgments may be enforced.

 

[¶12]      Because the decree that awarded 
periodic child support payments prior to 1989 is cognizable as a judgment rather 
than a liability created by statute, it is appropriate to apply the statute of 
limitations relating to judgments to the pre-1989 situation exactly as it is 
applied to the post-1989 situation. Pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 1-17-307, since the mother did not 
execute on these judgments within five years, the judgments became dormant.  Although dormant, the judgments were 
subject to revival within twenty-one years, and revival occurred when the State 
filed its motion on behalf of the mother. WYO. STAT. § 1-16-503. The result is 
that none of the unpaid child support payments are time barred in this 
instance.

 

[¶13]      The Judgment on Arrears is 
reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings 
in accordance with this opinion.