Case Title: MARY A. BERRY, and MERRY BERRY, INC., A Wyoming Corporation, d/b/a Fountain of Youth RV Park V. PAMELA TESSMAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0027

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARY A. BERRY, and MERRY BERRY, INC., A Wyoming Corporation, d/b/a Fountain of Youth RV Park V. PAMELA TESSMAN2007 WY 175170 P.3d 1243Case Number: S-07-0027Decided: 11/02/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

MARY 
A. BERRY, and MERRY BERRY, INC., A Wyoming Corporation, d/b/a Fountain of Youth 
RV Park,Appellants(Defendants),v.PAMELA 
TESSMAN,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofHot SpringsCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

Michael 
C. Steel and Jacob L. Brooks of Lonabaugh and Riggs, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Steel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

David 
B. Hooper of Hooper Law Offices, Riverton, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants, Mary 
A. Berry and Merry Berry, Inc., contest the district court's determination that 
they are liable for damages sustained when Appellee, Pamela Tessman, a guest in 
their RV park, injured herself by stepping into a marmot hole on the 
property.  Appellants also contest 
the amount of damages awarded by the district court.  We reverse.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Ms. Tessman 
presents several issues for our review.  
The following issue is dispositive:

 
 
            
Did the district court err in determining that a landowner had a legal 
duty to protect a visitor to her property from marmot holes on the 
premises?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On July 4, 2003, 
Ms. Tessman was staying at an RV park owned by Ms. Berry and leased to Merry 
Berry, Inc.  At check-in, Ms. 
Tessman asked Ms. Berry to direct her to a place where she could 
take her son fishing.  Ms. 
Berry directed 
Ms. Tessman to the river just off the property.  Ms. Tessman and her son walked across 
the property to the river.  In doing 
so they cut behind the bathhouse of the park, across several fields, over a 
"mashed down fence" and over a set of railroad tracks.  On the way back, Ms. Tessman testified, 
she saw several boys playing by a marmot hole in the field behind the 
bathhouse.  Ms. Tessman testified 
that she saw a number of adults and children using the "grassy area" behind the 
bathhouse to get to and from the river during the day.1

 
 
[¶4]      The gated pool 
area of the RV park normally closed to visitors at 9:30 p.m.  However, on the 4th of July, Ms. 
Berry kept the 
pool area open so that visitors could watch the municipal fireworks display from 
the pool.  Ms. Tessman was in the 
pool area observing the fireworks when she noticed that her son was up by the 
railroad tracks behind the property with a group of children who appeared to be 
setting off fireworks.  Concerned 
for her son's safety, Ms. Tessman left the lit pool area and went out into the 
grassy area behind the bathhouse to call her son back.  She stepped in the marmot hole she had 
observed earlier that day, twisted her ankle, and fell to the ground.  Ms. Tessman's relatives carried her back 
to her motor home and performed basic first aid on her injuries.  Ms. Tessman saw a doctor the next 
morning at Ms. Berry's insistence and has had continuing 
medical care since then.

 
 
[¶5]      Ms. Tessman sued 
to recover for injuries that she asserts stem from the fall she suffered when 
she stepped in the marmot hole on Ms. Berry's property.  The district court found in Ms. 
Tessman's favor and awarded $259, 205.00, which was reduced by 25% for 
contributory negligence.  This 
appeal followed.

            

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]                              
The elements a plaintiff must establish to maintain a negligence action 
are:  (1) The defendant owed the 
plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care, (2) the defendant 
breached the duty of care, (3) the defendant's breach of the duty of care 
proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the injury sustained by the 
plaintiff is compensable by money damages.

 
 

Valance 
v. VI-Doug, Inc., 
2002 WY 113, ¶ 8, 50 P.3d 697, 701 (Wyo. 2002).  We decline to address the issues related 
to breach and damages, as the issue of duty is 
dispositive.

 
 
[¶7]      The determination 
of the existence of a duty is a question of law, which we review de novo.  Id. 
at ¶ 8, 50 P.3d  at 701.  It may be 
necessary to consider some underlying facts in order properly to determine the 
existence of a duty.  Id.  We defer to a trial court's findings of 
facts unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Snelling v. Roman, 2007 WY 49, 
¶ 7, 154 P.3d 341, 345 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶8]      Some factors 
utilized in determining the existence of a duty are:

 
 
(1) 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to 
the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the 
extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the consequences to the community 
and the court system, and (8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance 
for the risk involved.  

 
 

Mostert 
v. CBL & Assocs., 
741 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 1987).

 
 
[¶9]      A landowner in 
Wyoming owes a 
general duty to "act as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a 
reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the 
likelihood of injury to another, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden 
of avoiding the risk."  Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293, 296 
(Wyo. 
1993).  In accordance with the above-mentioned principles of duty (see supra ¶ 8), Wyoming long ago 
recognized that landowners do not have a duty to protect from known and obvious 
dangers.  McKee v. Pacific Power 
& Light Co., 417 P.2d 426 (Wyo. 1966).  "It seems to be well settled that there 
is no liability for injuries from dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, 
or as well known to the person injured as they are to the owner of the 
facilities in question."  Id. at 
427.

 
 
[¶10]   In O'Donnell v. City of 
Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 
(Wyo. 1985), 
we rejected the application of this rule to man-made hazards.  In O'Donnell, we found that the known and 
obvious danger rule did not apply because the gravel on a municipal road, which 
caused a motorcyclist's injuries, had been laid by the city.  Id. 
at 1283.  We determined that the 
known and obvious danger rule had survived the statutory implementation of 
comparative negligence but found that the rule was limited to cases where the 
danger was naturally occurring.  
Id. at 
1282.  "The thrust of our known and obvious danger rule decisions has been 
that the danger presented by the accumulations of snow and ice does not 
generally create liability for a possessor of property because of their natural 
character."  Id. at 1283.  We restated this rule in Valance v. 
VI-Doug, Inc., 2002 WY 113, 
¶ 12, 50 P.3d  at 703, saying "[a] proprietor does not owe a duty of care to 
invitees to prevent the natural consequences of wind on his premises where he 
has not created or aggravated the naturally existing 
condition."

 
 
[¶11]   We have repeatedly affirmed that 
"[a]n owner of property still has no duty to his invitees to correct a known and 
obvious danger resulting from natural causes."  Radosevich v. Board of 
County Comm'rs of County of Sweetwater, 776 P.2d 747, 749 n.1 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 897 (Wyo. 1986)).  In Eiselein v. K-Mart, 
Inc., 868 P.2d 893, 895 (Wyo. 1994), we discussed our decision in O'Donnell and reiterated that "[w]e did 
not conclude, however, that the comparative negligence statute completely 
abrogated the rule, rather, we indicated it modified the known and obvious 
danger rule; restricting its application to known and obvious dangers resulting 
from natural causes."  We further 
stated in Eiselein v. K-Mart that "no 
justification exists for imposing on a property owner a duty to protect invitees 
from hazards which are naturally occurring and identical to those encountered 
off the premises." Id. at 898.  

 
 
[¶12]   While it is true that a landowner 
has no duty to protect others from "hazards which are naturally occurring and 
identical to those encountered off the premises", it is possible to remove a 
hazard from the ambit of this rule by aggravating the hazard, thereby 
significantly altering it from a naturally occurring condition that would be 
encountered off the premises.  Selby v. Conquistador Apts., Ltd., 990 P.2d 491, 494 (Wyo. 1999).  A plaintiff may show that an otherwise 
naturally occurring condition does not fall within this rule by showing "(1) 
that the defendant created or aggravated the hazard; (2) that the defendant knew 
or should have known of the hazard; and (3) that the hazardous condition was 
substantially more dangerous than it would have been in its natural state."  Id.

 
 
[¶13]   Even a naturally occurring, known 
and obvious hazard that the landowner has not aggravated could result in 
liability if that landowner were to create an expectation of heightened safety 
for people on the premises.  We have 
adopted the Restatement view2 of voluntary 
undertakings:

 
 

One 
who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another 
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person 
or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to 
perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the 
risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance 
upon the undertaking.

 
 

Restatement 
(Second) of Torts 
§ 323 (1965).  For example, a 
landowner could not reasonably allow a soccer field open to public use to become 
riddled with animal burrows, and still avoid responsibility.  The maintenance of land for such 
purposes would create an expectation of safety in visitors that would presumably 
cause them to act as they otherwise would not, that is, to run full tilt across 
an open field, as opposed to walking carefully.  The landowner, by undertaking to 
maintain his property for such use, would incur the duty to act reasonably with 
respect to that undertaking, and to maintain his property at a reasonable level 
of safety commensurate with the specific purposes for which it was made 
available.  

 
 
[¶14]   We see no reason the known and 
obvious danger rule should not apply to the ubiquitous hazard posed by the holes 
of burrowing animals.  Ms. Tessman 
has not shown that her circumstances warrant a finding that the marmot hole she 
stepped in was anything other than a naturally occurring, known and obvious 
danger, from which Ms. Berry had no duty to protect her.  She has also not shown that Ms. Berry 
owed her any other duty that would support a finding of negligence here.  The marmot hole was not a hazard created 
by Ms. Berry.  
The marmots were not domestic animals or pets but wild animals present in 
the surrounding area, as well as on the property itself.  There is no evidence that Ms. Berry or 
her staff aggravated the danger posed by the marmot hole.  To the contrary, the trial court found 
that Ms. Berry acted in a reasonable manner in attempting to minimize the danger 
from such holes on her property by filling them regularly and by having the 
animals trapped whenever they became a nuisance.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   A landowner does not have a duty to 
protect a guest on her property from a naturally occurring, known and obvious 
hazard she has not aggravated if she has not, through her own undertaking, 
created an expectation in her guests that they will be protected from such a 
hazard.  Ms. Berry and Merry Berry, Inc. did not create or aggravate 
the marmot hole that caused Ms. Tessman's injuries, nor did Ms. Berry  undertake any act that could have caused 
Ms. Tessman to rely reasonably on a heightened expectation of safety or special 
protection from marmot holes on her property.  We reverse and remand for entry of a 
judgment in favor of Appellants.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1This was 
not lawn grass, but naturally occurring vegetation.

 
 

2The 
adopted language reads:

 
 
One who 
undertakes, gratuitously * * * to render services to another which he should 
recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is 
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his 
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, * * 
*.

 
 

Ellsworth 
Bros., Inc. v. Crook, 406 P.2d 520, 524 (Wyo. 1965) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324(A) 
(1965) (renumbered § 323 in later editions)).  It is clear from the facts of Ellsworth that the court excised the 
portions of § 323 that were irrelevant to that particular case.  The omission does not appear to have 
been an explicit rejection of those portions of Restatement § 323, which we have 
included here.