Case Title: In re Lackey

Citation: 

Docket Number: S48552

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  January 10, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In Re Complaint as to the Conduct of
DAVID N. LACKEY,
Accused.
(OSB 98-33; SC S48552)
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted November 2, 2001.
	David N. Lackey, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
briefs in propria persona.
	Martha M. Hicks, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause for the Oregon State Bar.  With her on
the brief was Wilson C. Muhlheim, Eugene.
	Before Gillette, Presiding Justice, and Durham, Leeson,
Riggs, De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year, commencing 60 days from the filing of this
decision.
	*Carson, C.J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
		PER CURIAM
		In this lawyer discipline proceeding, the Oregon State
Bar (Bar) charged the accused with twice revealing client
confidences and secrets in violation of Code of Professional
Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 4-101(B) and ORS 9.460(3)
(each set out below). (1)  The accused defended, in part, on the
theory that his disclosures revealed allegedly corrupt government
practices and, therefore, were exempt from the prohibitions in DR
4-101(B) on public policy grounds.  He further contended that one
of the disclosures had involved information that was neither a
client secret nor a confidence.  The trial panel rejected those
arguments, concluded that the accused had committed the
violations, and suspended him from the practice of law for 18
months.		
		Our review of the decision of the trial panel is
automatic, ORS 9.536(2); Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.1 (each
providing for automatic review of lawyer suspensions exceeding
six months), and de novo, ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6.  The Bar has the
burden of establishing the alleged misconduct by clear and
convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  For the reasons that follow, we
agree with the trial panel that the accused violated DR 4-101(B)(1) through (3) and ORS 9.460(3) on one occasion, but
conclude that the Bar has not met its burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that the accused disclosed information
that constituted client confidences or secrets on a second
occasion.  Accordingly, we dismiss that charge.  As noted, the
trial panel ordered that the accused be suspended for 18 months. 
Because we dismiss the Bar's charges related to one cause of
complaint, and for the reasons discussed below, we suspend the
accused for one year.
I.  FACTS
		We find the following facts by clear and convincing
evidence.  From April 1984 until January 1994, the accused was
employed as the full-time Judge Advocate for the Oregon National
Guard (ONG).  His duties included providing legal support to the
Adjutant General and his staff, the Oregon Army and Air National
Guard of the State, and the United States Property and Fiscal
Officer (USPFO) for the State of Oregon.  On January 31, 1994,
the accused resigned from active duty as Judge Advocate, and, on
two occasions shortly thereafter, he made disclosures to the
press regarding legal matters pertaining to the ONG (hereinafter
referred to as "the audit matter" and "the Brown discharge
matter").  Before turning to a discussion of those disclosures,
we address first the circumstances leading to the accused's
resignation.
A.  Circumstances Leading to Accused's Resignation
		Beginning in late 1991, the accused developed a
contentious relationship with the newly appointed State Judge
Advocate at the ONG, Colonel Noteboom.  Noteboom was a member of
the ONG reserves, whose regular duty consisted of one weekend of
service each month and a 15-day period of training each year.  As
the full-time Judge Advocate, the accused's job was to function
as Noteboom's day-to-day representative at the ONG.  The accused,
however, refused to acknowledge Noteboom's authority as his
supervisor.  Specifically, the accused believed that Noteboom had
been appointed unlawfully and that, as a reservist, Noteboom was
not authorized to give legal advice when he was not on active
duty.  Eventually, the ONG Chief of Staff intervened to direct
the accused to accept Noteboom as a superior officer. 
		Over the next two years, the conflict between the
accused and Noteboom escalated.  The accused continued to believe
that Noteboom was appointed unlawfully and also filed formal
complaints with his superior officers, accusing Noteboom of
negligence and incompetence.  When Noteboom counseled the accused
regarding the accused's performance and placed him on a work
improvement plan, the accused filed additional complaints with
the Air National Guard Commander and the State Inspector General,
accusing both Noteboom and the ONG Chief of Staff of retaliating
against his "whistle-blowing" activities.  The Adjutant General
of the ONG, Major General Katke, found those complaints to be
without merit and, in February 1993, issued a letter of reprimand
to the accused.
		The accused subsequently filed complaints against
Noteboom with the Oregon State Bar, the Bureau of Labor and
Industries (BOLI), and the Oregon Attorney General.  The thrust
of those complaints, as with his prior complaints, was that the
ONG improperly had appointed Noteboom as the State Judge Advocate
and, therefore, that Noteboom was usurping the duties and
responsibilities of the accused.  The accused also maintained
that all negative personnel actions that the ONG had taken
against him, including Major General Katke's letter of reprimand,
were in retaliation for his "blowing the whistle" on Noteboom's
unlawful appointment.
		As a result of the accused's complaints against him,
Noteboom requested that the ONG remove him from the accused's
chain of command, pending a formal military investigation into
the various charges.  The ONG granted that request and, in May
1993, appointed an independent military investigator, Colonel
Mansfield, to conduct a comprehensive investigation of the
accused's allegations.  In his final report, Mansfield concluded
that, although it was true that Noteboom's appointment was
technically deficient, (2) the accused's persistent questioning of
Noteboom's judgment, authority, and competence was not justified. 
Moreover, Mansfield concluded that the accused's allegations that
adverse personnel actions taken against him were in retaliation
for his "whistle blowing" were groundless.  Mansfield recommended
that the ONG terminate the accused as the full-time Judge
Advocate.
		In October 1993, the ONG and the accused reached an
agreement whereby the accused would resign his full-time position
and dismiss all pending actions against the ONG in exchange for
being permitted to keep his military position in the reserves
until he was eligible for retirement.  However, one week before
resigning, the accused filed a final "whistle blower" complaint
with the Pentagon's Defense Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Hotline,
insisting that the personnel actions that the ONG had taken
against him were in retaliation for his prior complaints about
Noteboom's appointment and performance.  There is no evidence in
the record that the Pentagon responded to that complaint.
B.  The Audit Matter
		In 1992, an internal audit of the ONG revealed that
many senior employees erroneously had received overpayments
during the previous year relating to calculation of leave and
training duty pay, totaling over $38,000.  At the request of the
Adjutant General of the ONG, the accused reviewed the audit
results and submitted a memorandum that rendered legal advice and
made recommendations to the ONG staff.  In that memorandum, the
accused noted that there were indications of gross negligence or
fraud on the part of some ONG employees.  He recommended that the
USPFO conduct quarterly inspections of payment practices for the
next two years, initiate action to recoup overpayments, conduct
payroll audits of other years, and screen certain cases of
overpayment for potential disciplinary action.  The USPFO
supervising auditor submitted a memorandum to the Adjutant
General that also recommended recoupment of overpayments from
future wages, but suggested only limited informal investigations
and no further audits.  The Adjutant General ultimately approved
the auditor's recommendations and not those of the accused.
		In March 1994, after the accused had resigned as Judge
Advocate for the ONG, he telephoned and wrote a letter to Santos,
legal counsel to the Governor of Oregon.  In those
communications, the accused once again renewed his complaints of
retaliatory treatment at the hands of Noteboom and others. 
However, the accused, for the first time, also suggested that the
retaliatory acts were in response to his 1992 audit memorandum. 
According to the accused, his superiors "may have" viewed that
memorandum as an act of insubordination, because it exposed
senior ONG staff officers as "being involved in pay
irregularities or in mismanaging pay."  Santos responded that the
Inspector General's Office had taken the accused's allegations
under advisement.  One week later, however, the accused disclosed
his letter to Santos, along with the 1992 audit memorandum, to
local television and newspaper reporters.  At that time, the
accused did not have permission from the ONG to make those
disclosures to the press.
C.  The Brown Discharge Matter
		In 1992, an ONG nurse, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, was
caught stealing prescription drugs from the Oregon Military
Academy.  The accused reviewed the report of the Brown
investigation and advised the Adjutant General to refer the
matter to the Clatsop County District Attorney.  In subsequent
discussions with the district attorney on behalf of the ONG, the
accused proposed, with the approval of the Adjutant General, that
any plea agreement include a promise by Brown to accept a less
than honorable discharge from the ONG.  The accused also
disclosed his conversations with the district attorney's office
to others within the ONG, including nurses who worked with Brown. 
Those disclosures were authorized.  The district attorney allowed
Brown to enter a diversion program, and, after she successfully
completed the program, the district attorney dismissed the
charges against her.
		In April 1994, a newspaper reporter contacted the
accused and told him that Brown had received an honorable
discharge from the ONG and had been appointed as a Lieutenant
Colonel in the Army Reserve.  The reporter also informed the
accused that the district attorney's office had said that it
would not have agreed to the plea bargain if it had known that
Brown would receive an honorable discharge.  The accused stated
to the reporter that Brown's honorable discharge was inconsistent
with his recommendations to the Adjutant General and with the
terms and conditions of the plea bargain that the accused had
discussed with the district attorney.  The accused did not have
permission from his client to make those disclosures.
II.  ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
A.  The Audit Matter
		We first address the Bar's allegation that, by
revealing the contents of his 1992 audit memorandum to the press,
the accused disclosed client confidences and secrets in violation
of 4-101(B)(1) through (3) and ORS 9.460(3).  DR 4-101 provides,
in part:
		"(A) 'Confidence' refers to information protected
by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law,
and 'secret' refers to other information gained in a
current or former professional relationship that the
client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be
likely to be detrimental to the client.
		"(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a
lawyer shall not knowingly:
		"(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of the
lawyer's client.
		"(2) Use a client confidence or secret of the
lawyer's client to the disadvantage of the client.
		"(3) Use a confidence or secret of the
lawyer's client for the advantage of the lawyer or
of a third person, unless the client consents
after full disclosure."ORS 9.460(3) provides that an attorney shall "[m]aintain the
confidences and secrets of the attorney's clients consistent with
the rules of professional conduct established pursuant to ORS
9.490."
		At the trial panel hearing, the accused conceded that
he had considered the advice and recommendations that he had
given to his clients regarding the 1992 audit to be confidential. 
Thus, the trial panel concluded that, when the accused released
his 1992 audit memorandum to the press, the accused improperly
had disclosed client confidences and secrets in violation of DR
4-101(B)(1) and ORS 9.460(3).  The panel further concluded that
the accused had violated DR 4-101(B)(2) and (3) because those
disclosures had been intended to satisfy the accused's desire to
embarrass and injure officers of the ONG with whom he had prior
work-related conflicts.
		On review, the accused does not dispute that the audit
recommendations contained in his 1992 memorandum were
confidential attorney-client communications.  Rather, he contends
that the failure of the ONG to follow the recommendations in his
1992 audit memorandum was evidence of an ongoing conspiracy at
the highest levels of the ONG to suppress the audit results and
defraud the public.  The accused further maintains that he had
attempted to resolve the situation internally, but had been
thwarted by his superiors.  He urges this court to recognize an
exception to DR 4-101 and ORS 9.460(3) that would permit lawyers
employed by government agencies, such as himself, to "blow the
whistle" on fraud and corruption when necessary to satisfy a
fiduciary duty to the public. (3)
		In support of such an exception, the accused relies on
a 1973 Federal Bar Association Ethics Opinion that states that a
lawyer for a public agency "assumes a public trust," which allows
the lawyer, under certain circumstances, to disclose to the
public confidences and secrets subject to the lawyer-client
privilege. (4)  Federal Bar Ass'n Professional Ethics Comm., Op 73-1
(1973) (The Government Client and Confidentiality, reprinted in
32 Fed BJ 71 (1973)).  According to that opinion, disclosure is
permitted:
	"when the lawyer, as a reasonable and prudent [person],
conscious of [the] professional obligation of care,
confidentiality and responsibility, concludes that
[government] authorities have without good cause failed
in the performance of their own obligation to take
remedial measures required in the public interest."
Id. at 75.
		DR 4-101(B) and ORS 9.460(3) contain no exception for
lawyers employed by a government agency.  Under similar
circumstances, this court declined to create an exception to the
Disciplinary Rules by interpretation.  See In re Gatti, 330 Or
517, 8 P3d 966 (2000) (declining to create exception to DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5), and ORS 9.527(4)).  We need not decide
the issue here, however, because the accused has failed to
establish a factual case for creating such an exception.  The
record discloses no facts to support the accused's claim that his
attempts to remedy government fraud in connection with the 1992
audit were "thwarted" by his superiors, thus justifying a public
disclosure of client confidences and secrets.  There is no
evidence in the record that the accused disclosed to anyone
outside the ONG that the failure of the ONG to follow the
recommendations in his audit memorandum was evidence of fraud
until after his forced resignation in 1994. (5)  Of the many
complaints that the accused filed with his superiors and with
government agencies from 1992 until 1994, none alleged any fraud
or cover-up in connection with the ONG's response to the 1992
audit.  Rather, the record discloses that all the accused's
complaints remained grounded in his persistent belief that the
ONG had appointed Noteboom unlawfully and that the accused was
the subject of retaliation for "blowing the whistle" on that
unlawful appointment.  It was only after his forced resignation
as Judge Advocate that the accused first voiced concern about
whether the ONG had followed the recommendations in his 1992
audit.  The timing of the accused's disclosure, together with the
lack of evidence supporting his allegations of a conspiracy to
defraud the public, leads us to conclude that the accused
revealed sensitive confidential communications relating to the
1992 audit out of a desire to embarrass or injure the officers of
the ONG.  The accused has failed to present evidence to support
his claim that his superiors thwarted his efforts to remedy
government fraud in connection with the 1992 audit and,
therefore, has not even established the predicate for his
proposed exception to the Disciplinary Rules.
		Having rejected the accused's proposed exception, we
reiterate that the accused does not dispute that his audit
memorandum contained client confidences and secrets.  We agree
with the trial panel that revealing that memorandum to the press
resulted in unauthorized disclosures of client confidences and
secrets, and that those disclosures were intended to satisfy the
accused's desire to embarrass or injure officers of the ONG with
whom he had prior work-related conflicts.  Accordingly, we find
that the accused violated DR 4-101(B)(1) through (3) and ORS
9.460(3).
B.  The Brown Discharge Matter
		We turn next to the Bar's allegation that, by
disclosing to the press his recommendation to the Adjutant
General that Brown receive an other than honorable discharge, the
accused revealed client confidences and secrets in violation of
DR 4-101(B)(1) through (3) and ORS 9.460(3).  The trial panel
found that the accused had disclosed to the district attorney his
recommendation regarding Brown's discharge, as well as the
Adjutant General's agreement with that recommendation, and that
those disclosures were authorized.  However, the trial panel also
found that the accused was not authorized to reveal publicly the
failure of his superiors to discharge Brown in accordance with
the representations made to the district attorney's office.  The
trial panel concluded that the accused's recommendations to the
ONG concerning the Brown discharge were confidences or secrets,
and that his disclosure of them to the press violated the
Disciplinary Rules.
		The accused argues that his recommendations to his
superiors and the ONG's agreement to give Brown an other than
honorable discharge were not client confidences or secrets
because they previously had been disclosed to a third party,
namely, the Clatsop County District Attorney.  The accused cites
this court's decision in Baum v. Denn, 187 Or 401, 406-07, 211
P2d 478 (1949), for the proposition that a "client cannot
authorize his lawyer to speak for him in dealing with third
persons, and then undertake to seal his lips as to what
transpired."
		The record evidence is murky, at best, regarding what
the accused told the district attorney about the accused's
recommendations to the Adjutant General, what the Adjutant
General authorized the accused to communicate to the district
attorney, and what the district attorney might have communicated
to the trial court in connection with the Brown plea bargain. 
The Adjutant General did not testify at the hearing.  No one from
the district attorney's office testified.  No transcript from any
court appearance by Brown or any court records regarding her
prosecution were introduced.  The accused's testimony about the
sequence and specific content of his conversations with the
Adjutant General and with the district attorney's office is
ambiguous regarding the extent to which he was authorized to and
did, in fact, disclose to the district attorney his
recommendation to his superiors regarding the discharge.  
		As noted, the trial panel made the factual findings
that the accused had disclosed to the district attorney's office
his recommendations to his superiors and that the disclosure was
authorized.  The trial panel, nevertheless, concluded that the
accused's later disclosure to the press of his recommendations
was a disclosure of client confidences or secrets.  We disagree.
		The disciplinary rules forbid the disclosure of client
"confidences" or "secrets" without client authorization.  DR 4-101(A) defines a "confidence" as "information protected by the
attorney-client privilege under applicable law * * *."  When the
holder of the privilege discloses, or consents to the disclosure
of, information subject to the privilege to a third person, then
the information is no longer privileged.  OEC 511.  Here, the
trial panel found that the accused had disclosed his
recommendations to his superiors to the district attorney and
that the disclosure was authorized.  If so, then the
recommendations were no longer "confidences."  We find the record
to be less clear on that issue than the trial panel did, but our
review leads us to conclude that the Bar has failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the accused's recommendations
to his superiors were "confidences" under DR 4-101(A), the
disclosure of which violated DR 4-101(B)(1) through (3) and ORS
9.460(3).
		We next consider whether the information the accused
disclosed to the press regarding Brown constituted client
"secrets," the disclosure of which was barred by the disciplinary
rules.  As noted, DR 4-101(A) defines a client "secret" as "other
information gained in a current or former professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or
the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would likely be
detrimental to the client."  (Emphasis added.)  It is undisputed
that the accused gained information about the Brown discharge
while acting as a lawyer for the ONG; even if the information was
no longer privileged because of its prior, authorized disclosure
to the district attorney, it still could be a "secret" if the
client had requested that it be held inviolate or if the
disclosure would be embarrassing or likely be detrimental to the
client.  Based on our review of the record, we find that the Bar
has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the ONG had
requested that the accused hold inviolate the information
regarding the Brown discharge that the accused previously had
provided to the district attorney.  The information, therefore,
was not a "secret" under the first prong of the definition
contained in DR 4-101(A).
		We also conclude that the Bar has not proved by clear
and convincing evidence that the accused "revealed" information
that "would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental
to the client."  DR 4-101(A).  It is true that it might have been
embarrassing or detrimental to the ONG for the press to report
that the ONG had informed the district attorney that Brown would
receive a less than honorable discharge and that Brown, in fact,
received an honorable discharge.  However, on this record, it
appears that the information -- and any embarrassment or
detrimental effect to the ONG -- was public information and was
provided to the press by others before the press contacted the
accused.
		Any embarrassment or detriment would have resulted from
the disclosure of two facts:  first, that the ONG had informed
the district attorney that it planned to give Brown a less than
honorable discharge if she pleaded guilty; and, second, that the
ONG later gave Brown an honorable discharge.  As discussed above,
the fact that the ONG had determined that Brown should receive a
less than honorable discharge properly was disclosed by the
accused to the district attorney and to others within the ONG. 
Under those circumstances, the district attorney would have been
entitled to make the ONG's position known in open court at the
time of the Brown plea bargain.  The record also shows that the
fact that Brown had received an honorable discharge was publicly
available information and, in any event, was disclosed by a
reporter to the accused, rather than by the accused to a
reporter.  Any embarrassment or detriment to the ONG was the
result of the initial communication to the press of the ONG's own
failure, for whatever reason, to give Brown an other than
honorable discharge when it previously had represented to the
district attorney that it would do so.  The record does not show
how the press initially obtained information regarding the Brown
discharge matter, and the accused denies that he initiated any
contact with the press.  The Bar has not proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused revealed information to the
press that was embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental. 
Accordingly, we hold that the accused did not violate DR 4-101(B)(1) through (3) or ORS 9.460(3) in connection with the
Brown discharge matter.  
III.  SANCTION
		Having determined that the Bar has proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused disclosed client confidences
and secrets on one occasion in violation of DR 4-101(1) through
(3) and ORS 9.460(3), we turn to the question of the appropriate
sanction.  The trial panel imposed an 18-month suspension based
on its finding that the accused's conduct on two occasions was
prejudicial to his clients, who were subjected to unwanted
adverse publicity.
		This court refers to the American Bar Association's
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992)
(ABA Standards) for guidance in determining the appropriate
sanction for lawyer misconduct.  See In re Schaffner, 323 Or 472,
478, 918 P2d 803 (1996) (so stating).  To determine the
appropriate sanction, "this court first considers the duty
violated, the accused's mental state, and the actual or potential
injury caused by the accused's misconduct.  Considering those
three factors leads to a suggested sanction, which this court may
choose to impose or may modify after examining aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and this court's case law."  In re
Gatti, 330 Or at 535 (citations omitted).
		The ABA Standards state that "the most important
ethical duties are those obligations which a lawyer owes to
clients."  ABA Standards at 5 (emphasis in original).  Included
in those obligations is the duty of loyalty, which encompasses
the duty to maintain client confidences.  ABA Standard 4.2.  In
this instance, the accused violated his duty of loyalty by
disclosing client confidences and secrets.  The accused acted
with "intent," because he made those disclosures with a
"conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  ABA Standards at 7.
		The ABA Standards describe disbarment as the "generally
appropriate" sanction when a lawyer knowingly discloses client
confidences "with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another"
and the disclosure causes injury or potential injury to the
client.  ABA Standard 4.21.  Suspension is generally appropriate
for such a disclosure "when the lawyer is not intentionally using
the professional relationship to benefit himself or another * *
*."  Commentary to ABA Standard 4.22.  With that guidance in
mind, we consider the aggravating and mitigating factors and our
case law.
		Two factors that the ABA Standards identify as
"aggravating" are present in this case.  The accused's conduct
was undertaken with a selfish motive, i.e., to exact revenge on
his superiors at the ONG, ABA Standard 9.22(b).  Further, the
accused has substantial experience in the practice of law, having
been a member of the Bar for more than 20 years.  ABA Standard
9.22(i).  A mitigating circumstance is that the accused has no
prior record of disciplinary offenses.  ABA Standard 9.32(a).
		We turn to this court's case law.  In In re Huffman,
328 Or 567, 592, 983 P2d 534 (1999), this court imposed a two-year suspension on a lawyer who disclosed client confidences and
threatened the client with criminal charges in violation of DR 4-101(B)(1) through (3) and DR 7-105(A).  As here, the lawyer in
Huffman acted intentionally and was motivated by self-interest. 
However, this court noted that the lawyer's lack of a prior
disciplinary record mitigated against disbarment.  Id. at 591-92.
		Here, the trial panel concluded that an 18-month
suspension, rather than disbarment, was an appropriate sanction. 
As noted, that decision rested on the trial panel's finding
against the accused on two causes of complaint, one of which we
have dismissed.  The trial panel's sanction was less than the
two-year suspension imposed in Huffman.  However, the accused
lawyer in Huffman was charged with threatening criminal
prosecution in addition to disclosing client confidences and
secrets.  Adjusting the trial panel's sanction based on our
review of the accused's conduct, we conclude that a one-year
suspension is an appropriate sanction in this proceeding.
		The accused is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year, commencing 60 days from the filing of this
decision. 
1. 	The Bar also charged the accused with three other
causes of complaint.  A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board
dismissed two of those causes of complaint at the request of the
Bar and concluded that the Bar had failed to prove the other
complaint.  The Bar has not challenged that conclusion.

2. 	ORS 398.012(1) provides that "the Governor, on the
recommendation of the Adjutant General, shall appoint" the State
Judge Advocate.  Mansfield's investigation revealed that,
historically, all the State Judge Advocates, including Noteboom,
had been appointed by the Adjutant General purporting to act "by
order of the Governor."

3. 	At the trial panel hearing, the accused presented the
additional argument that the Oregon "whistle blower" statute, ORS
659.505 et seq., protected his disclosures relating to the 1992
audit.  The trial panel disagreed, interpreting that statute to
prohibit the release of information subject to the attorney-client privilege.  The accused has abandoned that argument on
review.  

4. 	We note that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do
not incorporate the exception that the Federal Bar Association's
1973 ethics opinion sets out.  Rule 1.13(c) provides:
	"If, despite the lawyer's efforts * * *, the highest
authority that can act on behalf of an organization
insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is
clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may
resign * * *."
		In adopting Model Rule 1.13(c), the ABA House of
Delegates rejected a proposed exception that would have allowed a
lawyer for an organization to make limited disclosures outside
entity walls when confronted with entrenched corruption at the
highest echelons of the governing body.  Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
1 The Law of Lawyering § 17-12, at 17-41 (3d ed 2001).

5. 	The accused claims that, by late spring 1993, he had
reason to believe that the ONG administrators were engaged in a
conspiracy to thwart the disclosure of the 1992 audit results to
the appropriate authorities.  He claims that he disclosed the
results of the audit to his liaisons at the National Guard Bureau
and the Oregon Department of Justice (DOJ) who, assertedly, took
no action.  However, we could find no evidence of those
disclosures in the record.  For example, in a 1993 letter to
officials at DOJ, the accused did not mention fraud in connection
with the 1992 audit.