Case Title: State v. Senna

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
                                No. 88-128
 
 
State of Vermont                             Supreme Court
 
      v.                                     On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont
Michael Senna                                Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
 
                                             March Term, 1989
 
 
Edward J. Cashman, J.
 
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Susan R. Harritt, Assistant Attorney
  General, and Craig Cwick and Margaret Cook, Law Clerks (On the Brief),
  Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee
 
Walter M. Morris, Jr., Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Defender, Montpelier, for defendant-appellant
 
 
PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Dooley and Morse, JJ.
 
 
     MORSE, J.  Defendant was charged with kidnapping three women in May of
1986.  The three women, employees at a store in Shelburne, testified that
defendant had taken them out of the store at knifepoint and forced them to
drive with him to an area off the public roadway.  Carrying camping gear,
they had then walked to a campsite in the woods, with their hands and feet
partially bound.  After several hours, according to their testimony,
defendant released them.  The women eventually made it to a police station.
The police found defendant at the campsite the following morning.
     After a trial by jury, defendant was convicted of three counts of
kidnapping and sentenced to three consecutive terms of fifteen to twenty-
five years imprisonment.  On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in
finding him competent to stand trial at a pretrial competency hearing; that
his behavior at trial and at sentencing should have caused the trial judge
to inquire again into the question of competency; that at most the evidence
warranted only one conviction and sentence; that the trial judge erred by
failing to determine whether defendant had discussed the contents of the
presentence investigation report with his attorney; and, finally, that the
court erred when it failed to disclose to defense counsel an ex parte letter
from a Department of Corrections official.  We affirm.
     Following defendant's arrest and arraignment, the court ordered a
psychiatric evaluation to determine his competency.  At defense counsel's
request, a hearing was held on May 8, 1987 before the Honorable Ronald F.
Kilburn, who determined, in findings and conclusions issued on June 16,
1987, that defendant was competent to stand trial.
     Defense counsel moved for a second competency hearing on October 2,
1987 based on the "tentative" nature of Judge Kilburn's ruling and on the
five-month passage of time since the earlier hearing.  Another hearing was
then held on November 30, 1987 before the Honorable Edward J. Cashman.  The
same two defense psychiatrists who had testified at the first hearing also
testifed at the second.  The judge orally declared that defendant was
competent, based on the evidence, but neglected to make specific findings to
support his determination.
     Defendant argues that the competency ruling should be vacated on three
grounds:  the record fails to support the finding of competency; the judge
used the wrong legal standard to measure competency; and the judge omitted
necessary findings.  All of these complaints, however, pertain only to the
second competency hearing.  Defendant assigns no error to the first hearing
and does not claim or show that factors and circumstances relevant to
defendant's mental state had changed during the six-month period between the
two hearings.  While defendant's second competency motion stated "the trial
judge must be free to correct obvious errors made or able to consider
additional factors since the previous determination," nowhere on appeal does
defendant indicate what these may be.  Absent a showing of changed
circumstances, we will assume that the decision to try defendant was
properly based on the unchallenged competency ruling from the first
hearing.  See United States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (4th Cir. 1985)
(reliance on three-month old psychiatric report upheld).  Any errors in the
second hearing accordingly would be harmless.
     Defendant next argues that the trial court's failure to inquire further
into the question of his competency at several points during the trial and
sentencing hearing violated his right to due process.  See Drope v.
Missouri,