Case Title: In re L.S. and K.S., Juveniles

Citation: 172 Vt. 549, 772 A.2d 1077

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re L.S. and K.S., Juveniles (2000-433); 172 Vt. 549; 772 A.2d 1077

[Filed 01-Mar-2001]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 19-Mar-2001]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2000-433

                             FEBRUARY TERM, 2001

In re L.S. and K.S., Juveniles	       }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
                                       }	Rutland Family Court
                                       }	
                                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 16/17-1-98 Rdjv

                                                Trial Judge: Patricia Zimmerman  

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       In this CHINS case, mother appeals a disposition order from the family
  court  order, modifying  the court's previous order, which approved a case
  plan goal of reunification of the children with  mother.  The new order
  sets a goal of long-term foster care.  Mother contends that the court erred
  (1)  by placing the burden of proof upon her to show changed circumstances,
  under 33 V.S.A. § 5532, a  necessary prerequisite to modification of the
  disposition order; and (2) by relying on mother's  poverty, and the foster
  parents' relative affluence, in making its order.  We agree with the first
  point  and therefore reverse.

       In January 1998, L.S. and K.S., then ages eleven and nine, came into
  SRS custody.  In  February 1998, the court found both children were in need
  of care and supervision based upon  mother's admission to the petition,
  which alleged that she had failed to protect them from her male  companion. 
  In June 1999, the parties stipulated to a case plan with a goal of
  reunification with  mother.  In July 1999, in its initial disposition
  order, the court "accepted and adopted" the case plan  and granted custody
  to the Commissioner of SRS.  

       In April 2000, SRS requested a twelve-month disposition review under
  33 V.S.A. § 5531, as,  early in the month, it had changed its case plan
  goal to long-term foster care.  Evidentiary hearings  were held July 24 and
  26, and August 4, 2000.  On August 29, 2000, the court issued findings and
  a  disposition order, denying mother's request for custody, continuing
  custody with SRS and approving  the new case plan goal of long-term foster
  care.  In reaching its decision, the court imposed on  mother the burden to
  show changed circumstances in contesting both (1) continued SRS custody,
  and  (2) the new case plan goal of long-term foster care.  Mother appeals.

       On appeal, mother claims the court erred in imposing upon her the
  burden to show changed  circumstances in contesting the new case plan goal
  of long-term foster care.  She contends that SRS  was the party seeking
  modification of the previous disposition order, and thus, SRS had the
  burden 

 

  of proof.  We agree.  

       Under 33 V.S.A. § 5531, a disposition order transferring custody to
  SRS "shall be reviewed at  a permanency hearing that shall be held every
  twelve months."  33 V.S.A. § 5531(a).  The  permanency hearing "shall
  determine the permanency plan for the child," deciding if and when the 
  child will be (1) returned to the parents, (2) released for adoption, (3)
  referred for legal guardianship,  or (4) placed in another planned
  permanent living arrangement.  Id. § 5531(d).  In making a  permanency-plan
  determination under § 5531, the court must consider the best interests of
  the child  under the factors enumerated under § 5540.

       Neither § 5531, nor § 5540, states generally which party bears the
  burden of proof at the  permanency hearing.  We addressed this issue,
  however, in In re J.H., 156 Vt. 66, 69, 587 A.2d 1009,  1011 (1991),
  wherein we held that "pursuant to § 5531, disposition orders are reviewed
  periodically  but, pursuant to § 5532, the orders will be modified only if
  the proponent of modification can show  that it is warranted by changed
  circumstances."  See 33 V.S.A. § 5532(a) (modification or vacation  of
  orders).  Section 5532 covers modification of orders and states that an
  order of the court may be  modified by the court upon petition by a party
  "on the ground that changed circumstances so require  in the best interests
  of the child."  We held in J.H. that the two provisions [§§ 5531 and 5532]
  can  and should be read together." 156 Vt. at 69,587 A.2d  at 1011.  Thus,
  at a § 5531 permanency  hearing, the party seeking to modify the previous
  disposition order has the burden of showing  changed circumstances.  

       In this case, SRS sought to modify the previous disposition order,
  which transferred custody to  SRS and accepted and approved a case plan
  with a goal of reunification with mother.  Following  J.H., SRS had the
  burden of showing changed circumstances and showing that a modification of
  the  order is in the best interests of the children.  Thus, the court erred
  by placing the burden of showing  changed circumstances upon mother when
  SRS sought to change the case plan goal to long-term  foster care.  

       There is an additional reason why the burden of proof is on SRS in
  this case.  Section 5531(d)  indicates that long-term foster care is the
  least favorable placement.  See In re A.S., 11 Vt. L.W. 312,  313 (2000). 
  In approving a permanency plan wherein the child remains or is placed in a
  planned  permanent living arrangement, such as long-term foster care, the
  Commissioner must demonstrate to  the court "a compelling reason that it is
  not in the child's best interests to return home, to have  residual
  parental rights terminated and be released for adoption or [to be] placed
  with a fit and  willing relative or legal guardian."  33 V.S.A.  §
  5531(d)(4).  Thus, here SRS has the burden first of  showing changed
  circumstances and then of showing a compelling reason why it is not in the
  best  interest of these children to return to their mother or to have
  residual parental rights terminated.  Of  course, the same evidence may be
  relevant to both showings.  

       Because the court placed the burden of proof upon mother and thus
  failed to determine  whether SRS met its burden under both §§ 5532 and
  5531(d)(4), we must reverse its decision  modifying the disposition goal. 
  We do not reach the second issue raised by mother because we 

  reverse on the first issue.  In any event, the second issue may not arise
  again upon remand.

       Reversed and remanded.

                                       BY THE COURT:

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       James L. Morse, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice