Case Title: Dept. of Health & Welfare v. John Doe (2017-32)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 45435

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2018-04-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 45435 
 
 
In the Interest of the: DOE CHILDREN, 
Children Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
WELFARE, 
  
           Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN DOE (2017-32), 
  
           Respondent-Appellant. 
_______________________________________ 
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Boise, February 2018 Term 
 
2018 Opinion No. 34 
 
Filed: April 13, 2018 
 
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Twin Falls County. Hon. Roger Harris, Magistrate Judge. 
 
The magistrate court’s judgment is vacated. 
 
Williams Law Office, Chtd., Twin Falls, for appellant. 
 
Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. 
 
Jamie LaMure, Kimberly, for respondent Guardian Ad Litem. 
_____________________ 
 
SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS 
BRODY, Justice. 
This is an expedited appeal from a magistrate court’s judgment terminating John Doe’s 
parental rights as to his minor children KB and AB. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
John Doe is the father of minor children KB and AB (the “Children”). The Children 
entered the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s (“IDHW”) custody in December 2014 
after the Twin Falls Police declared them to be in imminent danger. The Children were in their 
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mother’s (“Mother”) care when the police arrested her for possession of a controlled substance. 
Law enforcement described the condition of Mother’s home at this time as “filthy, cluttered, and 
containing numerous safety hazards, including raw sewage being present in the basement.” Doe 
and Mother’s contacts with IDHW date back to as early as 2002. 
 
IDHW met with Doe and Mother to develop a case plan. The plan was filed on January 
21, 2015, and included a number of enumerated tasks for both Doe and Mother to complete in 
order for them to reunite with the Children. The case plan sought to provide Doe and Mother a 
framework to address “stable housing, sanitary living conditions, the need to obtain controlled 
substance abuse treatment, to remain clean/sober, and [to] stay out of jail.” The magistrate court 
issued an order regarding the case plan on January 26, 2015, in which the court stated, “It is 
contrary to the welfare of the children to remain in their parent’s custody.” The court also stated 
that reunification of the Children with their parents is the permanency plan, “which shall be 
finalized within twelve (12) months.” 
 
The magistrate court held review hearings throughout 2015. On December 21, 2015, 
IDHW petitioned the court for termination, as Doe and Mother had not completed their case 
plans nor reunited with the Children. The magistrate court held a trial on that petition on October 
5, 2016, at which thirteen witnesses testified, including Doe and Mother. The magistrate court 
issued an order on December 9, 2016, concluding that the parents had showed enough progress 
“that it would not be in the children’s best interest to terminate their parental rights at this time,” 
yet holding its decision in abeyance for three to six months rather than entering judgment. The 
court stated, “This additional time will allow the parents the opportunity to continue to work 
their case plans and try to demonstrate that they have the ability to safely and successfully 
reunite with their children.” 
 
Mother relapsed within weeks of the December 2016 order and was arrested for felony 
possession, kicked out of Drug Court, and went to prison.  IDHW again sought to terminate 
Doe and Mother’s parental rights, requesting a date for trial during a subsequent permanency 
hearing on March 9, 2017. The second trial took place on August 23, 2017. Five witnesses 
testified, again including Doe and Mother. Though Doe had not completed his required drug 
treatment regimen by the first trial, he became more actively involved in his treatment plan by 
the time of the second trial. Doe showed other encouraging signs between the first and second 
trial as well, including significant progress on his case plan. However, the magistrate court noted 
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that, despite progress between the first and second trials, Doe still had not completed his case 
plan nor reunified with his children in the intervening period between the first and second trial. 
The court issued a Memorandum Decision granting termination of Doe and Mother’s parental 
rights on October 2, 2017, and entered a corresponding judgment ten days later on October 12, 
2017. Mother did not appeal, but Doe timely filed his notice of appeal on October 17, 2017. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Courts must find clear and convincing evidence of grounds for terminating parental 
rights. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe (2015–01), 158 Idaho 764, 767, 351 P.3d 1222, 
1225 (2015). “Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating 
that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.” Id. This Court will not 
disturb a lower court’s decision to terminate parental rights if substantial, competent evidence in 
the record supports the decision. Id. “Substantial, competent evidence is such evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. This Court must 
independently review the magistrate court record, but is required to draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the magistrate court’s judgments since “the magistrate court has the 
opportunity to observe witnesses’ demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or 
motive, and to judge the character of the parties.” Id.  
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The magistrate court’s procedural error violated Doe’s due process rights. 
 
Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in family autonomy and in maintaining a 
relationship with their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Doe (2015–01), 
158 Idaho at 767, 351 P.3d at 1225. Though this Court generally will not consider on appeal 
issues not raised by the parties, we have “made exceptions for certain issues in certain types of 
cases.” State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, 535, 164 P.3d 814, 815 (2007). In State v. Doe, this Court 
outlined one of these narrow carve-outs in addressing the parallel between due process violations 
in the criminal context and those in child termination cases: 
Fundamental error, as defined in criminal cases, is error which “so profoundly 
distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his 
constitutional right to due process.” While this is not a criminal case, the 
magistrate court’s error in applying the incorrect standard affects Doe’s 
fundamental right to raise his own child and violates the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003)). 
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We must ensure that the judiciary functions “in a manner consistent with the individual 
constitutional rights, both state and federal, of all who appear before the bar of justice.” State v. 
LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 391, 630 P.2d 674, 678 (1981). The magistrate court committed 
procedural error that affected Doe’s fundamental rights in this case. In its December 2016 order, 
the magistrate court stated that “the parents have made enough progress that it would not be in 
the children’s best interest to terminate their parental rights at this time.” Thus, IDHW failed to 
meet its burden at the first trial to provide clear and convincing evidence that Doe’s parental 
rights should be terminated. Idaho Code section 16-2010 mandates that “[w]here the court does 
not order termination of the parent and child relationship, it shall dismiss the petition.” Given the 
statute’s requirement, the magistrate court should have issued a judgment for Doe in accordance 
with his finding that termination did not serve the Children’s best interest. Instead, the magistrate 
court held its ruling in abeyance rather than entering judgment, and did not dismiss IDHW’s 
petition. 
 
This timeline illustrates the problem with the magistrate court’s failure to follow the 
statutorily-mandated procedure: 
September 14, 2016: The court issued an order approving adoption as the 
permanent plan for the Children. 
October 5, 2016: The court held a termination hearing (the first trial). 
December 9, 2016: The court issued an order finding that termination is not in 
the Children’s best interest, but did not dismiss the petition nor issue a judgment. 
March 2, 2017: In its first progress report after the permanency hearing—and the 
very next docket entry of any kind—IDHW changed to a concurrent permanency 
goal, but listed “Adoption Relative” as the primary goal and “Reunification” as 
the secondary goal. In the “Recommendations” section of this report, IDHW 
requested that the “pending petition to terminate parental rights be once again 
considered by the court as the Department feels Termination remains in the 
children’s best interest.” 
 
The magistrate court’s December 2016 order stating that termination is not in the 
Children’s best interest is irreconcilable with IDHW’s first official recommendation following 
that order that termination “remains” in the Children’s best interest. This dichotomy is especially 
noteworthy given Doe’s claims regarding IDHW’s lack of cooperation in assisting him with 
reunification efforts with the Children. The magistrate court’s October 2017 decision following 
the second trial highlighted Doe’s failure to reunify with the Children as a substantial factor in 
his ultimate decision to terminate. The magistrate court’s procedural error in not entering 
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judgment for Doe and dismissing the petition upon finding that termination was not in the 
Children’s best interest affected Doe’s fundamental rights in this case. Indeed, one of the 
potential effects of a lack of judgment and dismissal—IDHW continuing with termination as the 
primary goal—may have led directly to Doe’s failed reunification efforts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court vacates the judgment terminating Doe’s parental 
rights and remands the case with instruction to enter a judgment for Doe, nunc pro tunc to 
December 9, 2016, consistent with the order finding that IDHW had not met its burden to show 
that termination was in the Children’s best interest. 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justice BEVAN CONCUR.