Case Title: State v. Parrish

Citation: 205 Kan. 178, 468 P.2d 143

Docket Number: 45,618

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1970-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
205 Kan. 178 (1970)
468 P.2d 143
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
C.C. (MONTE) PARRISH, Appellant.
No. 45,618

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 11, 1970.
Robert Martin, of Martin, Porter, Pringle, Schell and Fair, of Wichita, argued the cause, and William V. Crank, of Wichita, was with him on the brief for the appellant.
Donald H. Humphreys, County Attorney, argued the cause, and Kent Frizzell, Attorney General, and Larry E. Keenan, Special Assistant County Attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HATCHER, C.:
The defendant, C.C. Parrish, was charged with, and convicted of, burning insured property, the Parrish Hotel, Great Bend, Kansas, and the burning of the personal property of another.
On Sunday, October 8, 1967, a fire destroyed the Parrish Hotel. *179 The hotel was owned by the defendant who was in Washington, D.C. on business the night the hotel burned.
The evidence connecting Parrish with the burning consisted largely of hearsay testimony of four principal witnesses. As the appeal challenges the propriety of this testimony it must be reviewed at some length.
The testimony of Sharyn Patterson was summarized in the record. We present it here in part:
..............
..............
..............
..............
The testimony of Thomas Ahlf was also summarized in the record and we present it here in part:
..............
Sharon Cole's testimony was placed in the record in question and answer form. We summarize:
Sharon and Kenneth Christendon were married in July, 1960. They separated in April or May, 1967, and were divorced August 11, 1967. In the spring of 1967, she had a conversation with Mr. Christendon concerning the destruction of the Parrish Hotel. On request to state to the jury what was said in the conversation, she stated:
Christendon further stated to Sharon in the conversation that there would be a profit coming to him from Parrish.
Sharon further testified that she had another conversation with Christendon about destroying the Parrish Hotel in September, 1967. She met him in Pratt, Kansas where he was working for Parrish at Christendon's suggestion that they talk about a reconciliation. The best that Sharon could recall he said:
"A. He said, $10,000.00." (Emphasis supplied.)
After the conversation with Christendon at Pratt, Kansas, she went home to her mother and told her about the conversation. Her mother told her to "stay out of it, to stay away from it, and she did."
Sharon Cole testified that in March, 1968, she was drinking at a private club in Great Bend, the DAV. At this time she was very unhappy with her former husband, Kenneth Christendon, and she recounted her conversations with Christendon concerning the burning of the Parrish Hotel to Wilbur Root, a Great Bend fireman, who was also at the DAV Club.
The cross-examination of Sharon will be presented when we discuss the issue in which it is involved.
The defendant lodged objections to the hearsay testimony of the witnesses Sharyn Patterson and Sharon Cole, and continues his objections on appeal. The trial court admitted the testimony under the authority of K.S.A. 60-460 (j) which provides:
The appellant does not challenge the validity or effect of the above provision but contends 
The appellant does not challenge the admissibility of the testimony of Thomas Ahlf. We must conclude that the objection made to the testimony of Sharyn Patterson and Sharon Cole is not valid. *183 We cannot agree with appellant's suggestion that they did not testify that Chritsendon said he was going to burn the hotel. We find quite the contrary. We have set out the testimony of these two witnesses at some length and underscored that part where Christendon made the derogatory statements against his interest. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat them at this point. We must conclude that the statements made to the two witnesses by Christendon subjected him to criminal liability if the hotel burned and created a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule and social disapproval in the community.
We find nothing objectionable in the admission of testimony of the preliminaries and circumstances leading up to and surrounding the making of the assertion against the declarant's interest.
There was no error in the reception of the hearsay testimony.
The appellant next suggests 
Mrs. Shelby Johnson testified, on rebuttal for the appellant, that when her daughter, Sharon Cole, returned home from Pratt where she had talked with Christendon, it was about one o'clock at night. She further testified:
"Q. Were you asleep or awake?
"A. No, I was still up.
It is conceded by the appellee that the sole purpose of the testimony of Mrs. Johnson was to bolster the testimony of Sharon Cole.
Both parties rely on State v. Fouts, 169 Kan. 686, 221 P.2d 841, where we held:
We must look to the record to determine the issue. Was Sharon Cole impeached or her credibility as a witness attacked?
On cross-examination Sharon's chastity was questioned for the purpose of attacking her credibility. The following was elicited on cross-examination:
Appellant's counsel also cross-examined Sharon at some length as to her testimony on the witness stand and what she had told the fireman when she reported the cause of the fire. It appears that she had told the fireman Christendon was to receive $5,000.00 and in her testimony at the trial she mentioned $10,000.00.
Sharon further testified on cross-examination:
"A. Yes sir.
"Q. You were mad at your husband?
"A. Yes, sir.
..............
"A. No.
"A. No, sir."
We are forced to conclude that the facts established on cross-examination did tend to impeach the credibility of Sharon and attack her credibility. The corroborating testimony of Mrs. Shelby Johnson was therefore admissible to rehabilitate or support the witness.
The appellant objects to the testimony of the appellee's expert witness, one of the firemen present when the hotel burned. The *185 fireman based his opinion that the fire was of an incendiary nature solely upon his observations while he was on duty at the fire.
The appellant contends that observation of the fire itself, without more, is insufficient to enable an expert to express an opinion as to the cause of the fire. This argument may be proper in considering the weight of the testimony but not admissibility. In State v. Gore, 152 Kan. 551, 106 P.2d 704, we stated at page 555 of the opinion:
The appellant complains because the trial court denied his motion for a change of venue.
The appellant submitted but seven affidavits in support of his motion. Of the 75 jurors sworn and empaneled only 32 were dismissed for having formed an opinion. It appears there was no difficulty in obtaining a jury from the other 43 empaneled. It also appears that counsel for appellant spent 12 days interviewing people in Barton County to obtain the seven affidavits mentioned. Counsel for appellee in less than five hours obtained twenty-three affidavits stating that the appellant could receive a fair trial in Barton County.
A motion for change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (Krehbiel v. Goering, 179 Kan. 55, 293 P.2d 255; Ferrellgas Corporation v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 187 Kan. 530, 358 P.2d 786.) We find nothing which would support the claim of prejudice in not granting a change of venue.
The appellant complains of the trial court's failure to give the following instruction:
The trial court refused to give the instruction, stating:
The credibility of witness instruction given by the trial court was as follows:
This question was discussed at considerable length in State v. Wood, 196 Kan 599, 413 P 2d 90, where we held:
The necessity for many of these tautological instructions is losing force when a case is being considered by our present enlightened jurors. In State v. Miller, 83 Kan. 410, 111 Pac. 437, we said:
A careful examination of the record discloses no trial errors which would justify the granting of a new trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.