Case Title: State ex rel. Lowe v. Cincinnati, Inc.

Citation: 2009-Ohio-5864

Docket Number: 20081954

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Lowe v. Cincinnati, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5864.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5864 
THE STATE EX REL. LOWE, APPELLANT, v. CINCINNATI, INC. ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Lowe v. Cincinnati, Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5864.] 
Workers’ compensation — Exercise of continuing jurisdiction — Abuse-of-
discretion standard — New and changed circumstances — “Some 
evidence” supported the commission’s decision — Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2008-1954 — Submitted September 1, 2009 — Decided  
November 12, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 07AP-850,  
2008-Ohio-4891. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Robert Lowe, challenges the termination of his 
permanent total disability benefits by appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio.  
Lowe injured his left shoulder in 1998 while working for appellee Cincinnati, Inc.  
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In 2003, he was awarded permanent total disability compensation beginning in 
September 2002.  The order discussed Lowe’s testimony at length: 
{¶ 2} “The injured worker testified at hearing that he continues to suffer 
from pain despite four surgical procedures on his left shoulder.  The injured 
worker testified that the pain that he experiences is so severe that it interferes with 
his ability to ambulate as well as his ability to concentrate.  The injured worker 
further testified that he is unable to take care of his activities of daily living and 
needs help from his wife in dressing and feeding.” 
{¶ 3} In October 2005, Cincinnati, Inc. moved to terminate permanent 
total disability based on “new and changed circumstances that have occurred 
subsequent to the initial order that show [Lowe] is capable of sustained 
remunerative employment.”  The motion included a surveillance video that 
showed Lowe engaged in vigorous yard work.  It also included an October 5, 
2005 medical report by Dr. Bernard Bacevich, who had examined Lowe in 2003 
in connection with his initial request for permanent total disability.  In his 2005 
report, Dr. Bacevich made these observations from the surveillance tape: 
{¶ 4} “The [August 2004 section of the] tape then showed [Lowe] using 
a power mower which had to be pushed and pulled and he was using this with 
both arms; again without any visible signs of difficulty in using his arms.  He 
would push and pull this repetitively, move it around trees and not show any 
evidence of difficulty.  At times he would use a single arm and pull the mower 
backwards with his right arm, but he would be swinging his left arm, again, 
without any evidence of difficulty. * * * The next section of the video was from 
06/25/05 when it begins with him picking up a hedge clipper with his left arm and 
not showing any signs of difficulty.  The video, at times, would show him using 
the hedge cutter with his right arm and other times he would use it in both arms.  
He would then use a rake to clear the debris from the top of the bushes.  He would 
have his right arm at the proximal part of the handle and his left arm down lower 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
and would be pulling backwards quite forcefully and vigorously and, again, this 
showed no evidence of any difficulty or pain.  During these maneuvers his left 
arm would be raised forward to the 90-degree position.  At other times, he was 
seen holding the trimmer in his left arm[,] using the rake in his right arm to scrape 
off the cuttings and other times he would use both arms on the rake.  There were 
several episodes where he could easily pick up the hedge clippers with his left 
arm.  During all of these movements[,] [t]here is no evidence to indicate that he 
was experiencing pain.  This video demonstrated that he had full normal motion 
of the shoulder in various positions with the arm at or below shoulder level.” 
{¶ 5} The doctor concluded: 
{¶ 6} “Based upon reviewing this video, this man demonstrated physical 
capabilities that were much different than the findings on my examination on 
April 30, 2003.  On my examination he had exquisite pain in the shoulder on 
attempts at range of motion and had very severe guarding.  His pain was also 
aggravated by even bending the elbow whereas in the video he did not have any 
apparent difficulty with the shoulder even with bending activities at the elbow, 
lifting a hedge clipper, or using a hedge clipper or a rake.  Based upon review of 
this video, this man has either had a miraculous recovery between 04/30/03 and 
the first portion of the video dated 08/03/04, or that he was demonstrating marked 
symptom magnification during my examination.  Based upon the recent video of 
06/25/05, this man can certainly use his left arm for many activities which are 
fairly strenuous in that he could use it for pushing and pulling a lawn mower and 
also use it in cutting hedges and using a rake.  Based upon this video, it is 
certainly my opinion that this man is capable of gainful sustained remunerative 
employment and my opinions rendered in my [2003] report are no longer valid.  
The man is capable of using his left arm for repetitive activities certainly below 
the shoulder level.  He is capable of cutting grass, capable of using a hedge 
trimmer, and capable of raking.  This video does not support the fact that this man 
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has been granted permanent total disability benefits.  This man can perform light 
to medium work.” 
{¶ 7} The commission could not reopen the issue of Lowe’s permanent 
total disability eligibility unless it first determined that the exercise of continuing 
jurisdiction was appropriate.  The commission made that determination on 
January 18, 2006: 
{¶ 8} “[T]he employer has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
that there may have been a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant the 
stopping of the Permanent and Total Disability award.  Therefore the Staff 
Hearing Officer refers the file to the medical section for an examination on the 
issue of whether the injured worker is capable of performing sustained 
remunerative employment.  The examining physician is instructed to examine the 
injured worker and to review the video tape evidence submitted by the employer.” 
{¶ 9} Dr. Andrew Freeman performed this examination and made these 
observations from the videotape: 
{¶ 10} “This videotape shows [Mr. Lowe] walking around a yard using a 
hedge clipper.  During this approximately 10 minute segment of video[,] Mr. 
Lowe is seen to use both hands to operate a hedge clipper.  He is seen to move 
both arms in a rapid fashion.  There is no physical evidence of pain such as 
grimacing.  Mr. Lowe is seen to move the hedge clipper, use a rake in his yard, 
and reach to connect and disconnect his hose.  He also moves the hose during this 
period of time.  His range of motion in the left shoulder is observed to be at least 
30 degrees of extension, at least 20 degrees of adduction, at least 90 degrees of 
abduction, and at least 100 degrees of forward flexion.  He is observed at one 
point during the video to throw a hose with his left arm rapidly going from a point 
of 0 degrees of forward flexion to 100 degrees of forward flexion in the active 
tossing of the hose.” 
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5 
 
{¶ 11} Dr. Freeman then detailed his physical findings and reported that 
the left shoulder was still symptomatic.  He stated that Lowe’s conditions had 
reached maximum medical improvement and that Lowe had a 20 percent 
permanent impairment. Dr. Freeman concluded that Lowe was medically capable 
of sedentary work, with a prohibition against reaching or overhead work with the 
left arm. 
{¶ 12} On September 5, 2006, a staff hearing officer issued a detailed 
order that terminated Lowe’s permanent total disability.  The order first affirmed 
the presence of new and changed circumstances sufficient to reopen the issue of 
permanent total disability eligibility.  The staff hearing officer noted that the 
original grant of permanent total disability relied heavily on Lowe’s testimony 
concerning the physical limitations his injury imposed.  The staff hearing officer 
then discussed the videotape in depth and concluded that the “injured worker has 
greater functional capacities than he testified to at the original hearing.” 
{¶ 13} The staff hearing officer discussed the reports of Drs. Freeman and 
Bacevich and concluded that Lowe was medically capable of sedentary sustained 
remunerative employment.  Lowe’s nonmedical disability factors were reviewed 
and the staff hearing officer determined that they did not disqualify Lowe from 
sedentary work.  Accordingly, permanent total disability was stopped. 
{¶ 14} After further reconsideration was denied, Lowe turned to the Court 
of Appeals for Franklin County, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the 
commission to reinstate his permanent total disability compensation.  The court of 
appeals denied the requested writ of mandamus after determining that the 
commission’s order was supported by “some evidence.” State ex rel. Lowe v. 
Cincinnati, Inc., Franklin App. No. 07AP-850, 2008-Ohio-4891, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 15} Lowe has now appealed to this court as of right. 
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{¶ 16} Lowe challenges the commission’s continuing jurisdiction to 
reopen his permanent total disability eligibility, as well as the evidence underlying 
its decision to stop his compensation.  Neither challenge has merit. 
Continuing Jurisdiction 
{¶ 17} The 
commission’s 
continuing 
jurisdiction 
to 
reconsider 
compensation eligibility is not unlimited and can be invoked only where there is 
evidence of “(1) new and changed circumstances, (2) fraud, (3) clear mistake of 
fact, (4) clear mistake of law, or (5) error by an inferior tribunal.”  State ex rel. 
Nicholls v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 454, 459, 692 N.E.2d 188.  If the 
commission determines that it has continuing jurisdiction to revisit an issue, its 
order must state, in a clear and meaningful fashion, the basis upon which 
continuing jurisdiction is being invoked. Id.  The parties debate whether the 
January 3, 2006 staff hearing officer order satisfies this requirement. 
{¶ 18} Nicholls, 81 Ohio St.3d 454, 692 N.E.2d 188, was the first case to 
address this issue.  Nicholls arose from a commission order that granted 
reconsideration of a permanent total disability award “based on the possibility of 
error” in the original permanent total disability order. Id. at 456.  When the 
commission later vacated the award, the claimant filed an original action in this 
court, contesting the commission’s authority to reconsider his permanent total 
disability award.  We held that the order granting reconsideration was fatally 
defective: 
{¶ 19} “None of these [five continuing jurisdiction] prerequisites exists 
here. Again, there has been no allegation of new and changed circumstances or 
fraud.  There is also no clear error of any kind.  The reconsideration order cites 
only the possibility of error, and an unspecified error at that. 
{¶ 20} “Our approval of the staff hearing officer’s order on 
reconsideration would effectively give the commission unrestricted jurisdiction.  
Error is always possible, and its existence cannot be refuted when the commission 
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7 
 
is not made to reveal what the perceived error is.  We find, therefore, that the 
mere possibility of unspecified error cannot sustain the invocation of continuing 
jurisdiction.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 459, 692 N.E.2d 188. 
{¶ 21} We expanded on Nicholls in State ex rel. Foster v. Indus. Comm.  
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 320, 707 N.E.2d 1122.  There, an employer’s permanent 
total disability reconsideration motion was granted based on “probative evidence 
of a clear mistake of fact and of law in the order from which reconsideration is 
sought.”  We found this explanation, upon review, to be inadequate: 
{¶ 22} “In this case, the commission abandoned conjecture and found that 
there was error.  But, again, it does not identify the error.  Thus, despite any 
‘improvement’ in the order’s language, it still defies the spirit of Nicholls.  
Nicholls recognized that the propriety of continuing jurisdiction cannot be 
evaluated if the commission does not reveal, in a meaningful way, why it was 
exercised.  In this instance, as in Nicholls, claimant cannot refute the allegation of 
error without knowing what the alleged mistake is.  Saying that an error is ‘real’ 
as opposed to ‘possible’ is equally hollow if there is no way to test the legitimacy 
of the assertion.” Id. at 322, 707 N.E.2d 1122. 
{¶ 23} Three years later, State ex rel. Royal v. Indus. Comm. (2002), 95 
Ohio St.3d 97, 766 N.E.2d 135, was decided.  Reconsideration of Royal’s 
permanent total disability award was granted “based on the possibility of an error 
in the previous Industrial Commission order.” Id. at 98.  The commission 
followed that order with a bifurcated hearing on two issues – the propriety of 
reconsideration and the merits of the permanent total disability claim.  As to the 
former, the commission affirmed the grant of reconsideration, citing the existence 
of a mistake of law or fact.  This subsequent order identified the mistakes as the 
staff hearing officer’s (1) misrepresentation of a particular vocational report and 
(2) failure to consider nonmedical disability factors. Id. 
{¶ 24} We rejected this belated articulation of error: 
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{¶ 25} “Identification of error after reconsideration does allow a 
reviewing court to adjudicate the propriety of the commission’s invocation of 
continuing jurisdiction.  It does little to help the party opposing the motion, since 
it comes too late to allow a meaningful challenge to reconsideration at the 
administrative level.  Accordingly, appellants’ rehabilitation theory is rejected.”  
(Emphasis sic.) Id. at 100, 766 N.E.2d 135. 
{¶ 26} The commission in Lowe’s case used its continuing jurisdiction to 
revisit Lowe’s permanent total disability eligibility based on “sufficient evidence 
to demonstrate that there may have been a change in circumstances sufficient to 
warrant the stopping of the Permanent and Total Disability award.”  The order 
then stated that new evidence had been obtained that potentially demonstrated that 
Lowe was medically capable of sustained remunerative employment. 
{¶ 27} Lowe focuses on the words “may have been” and argues that the 
use of this phrase means the commission’s finding lacks the specificity demanded 
by Nicholls and progeny.  This proposition, however, elevates form over 
substance, while ignoring the larger purpose of Nicholls, Foster, and Royal.  The 
point of those cases was not to ensure that certain words were either used or 
avoided.  It was to ensure that litigants and reviewing courts would know why 
continuing jurisdiction/reconsideration had been exercised. 
{¶ 28} Lowe cannot credibly allege that the presence of the words “may 
have been” confused him as to why continuing jurisdiction was being exercised.  
The January 3, 2006 order clearly stated that allegations of new and changed 
circumstances related to Lowe’s ability to do sustained remunerative work.  
Moreover, the employer’s continuing jurisdiction/termination motion included Dr. 
Bacevich’s October 5, 2005 report as well as a memorandum that outlined the 
surveillance evidence and the employer’s legal argument.  Lowe knew in a timely 
manner exactly why continuing jurisdiction was being sought and invoked. 
January Term, 2009 
9 
 
{¶ 29} Accordingly, the commission’s decision to exercise continuing 
jurisdiction over Lowe’s permanent total disability eligibility was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
Permanent Total Disability 
{¶ 30} Permanent total disability cannot be paid when there is evidence of 
(1) actual sustained remunerative employment, (2) a physical ability to do 
sustained remunerative employment, or (3) activities so medically inconsistent 
with the claimed disability as to impeach the medical evidence underlying the 
award.  State ex rel. Lawson v. Mondie Forge, 104 Ohio St.3d 39, 2004-Ohio-
6086, 817 N.E.2d 880, ¶ 16.  At issue are the second and third elements. 
{¶ 31} The staff hearing officer’s September 5, 2006 order is 
painstakingly thorough.  It reaffirmed the existence of new and changed 
circumstances.  It stressed that permanent total disability was granted, in large 
part, on Lowe’s testimony at hearing.  At that time, Lowe stated that his shoulder 
pain was so severe that not only did it affect his ability to concentrate, but also 
affected his ability to walk.  He stated that he could not “take care of his activities 
of daily living” and needed “help from his wife in dressing and feeding.” 
{¶ 32} Against this background, a different staff hearing officer, three 
years later, stated: 
{¶ 33} “[T]he activities recorded on 06/25/2005 are the most compelling.  
The videotape * * * shows the injured worker using both arms and hands to trim 
bushes using hedge clippers.  The videotape on that date also shows the injured 
worker using both hands and arms to hold a rake which he is rapidly and 
forcefully moving back and forth to remove debris from the tops of bushes. 
{¶ 34} “ * * * 
{¶ 35} “The Staff Hearing Officer finds that the videotape evidence 
clearly demonstrates that the allowed conditions in this claim would not so 
severely restrict the injured worker’s functional capacity as to limit his abilities to 
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participate in the activities of daily living or to prevent the injured worker from 
performing the activities of dressing and feeding.  The Staff Hearing Officer finds 
that the [previous] Staff Hearing Officer relied upon the injured worker’s 
testimony that he was not able to perform the activities of daily living, including 
dressing and feeding and that he had a limited ability to walk due to pain[,] in 
finding that the injured worker was permanently and totally disabled.  Th[is] Staff 
Hearing Officer finds that the videotape demonstrates that the injured worker’s 
condition has changed since the original Permanent and Total Disability hearing 
and that the injured worker has greater functional capacities than he testified to at 
the original hearing.” 
{¶ 36} The staff hearing officer reviewed the new reports of Drs. 
Bacevich and Freeman.  Both doctors reached the same conclusion – Lowe was, 
at a minimum, physically capable of sustained sedentary work.  The staff hearing 
officer, however, properly recognized that a capacity for sedentary work is 
irrelevant if Lowe would be foreclosed from such employment by nonmedical 
disability factors such as age, education, work history, and skill level.  State ex 
rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm.  (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 170, 31 OBR 369, 
509 N.E.2d 946.  The staff hearing officer performed a detailed nonmedical 
analysis and concluded that Lowe’s nonmedical profile did not disqualify him 
from sedentary employment. 
{¶ 37} Lowe contends that the Freeman and Bacevich opinions are fatally 
flawed because they are based on only two days of surveillance.  Relying heavily 
on Lawson, 104 Ohio St.3d 89, 2004-Ohio-6086, 817 N.E.2d 880, he argues that 
even if the video had demonstrated that he had a capacity for remunerative 
employment on those days, it did not establish his  ability to work on a sustained 
basis and could not form the basis for either doctor’s opinion.  This argument 
fails. 
January Term, 2009 
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{¶ 38} Lowe’s argument ignores a critical distinction between the 
evidence in this case and in Lawson. In Lawson, the commission had terminated 
permanent total disability based on the medical report of Dr. Dunkin.  104 Ohio 
St.3d 39, 2004-Ohio-6086, 817 N.E.2d 880, ¶ 8.  Dr. Dunkin reviewed 
surveillance evidence of Lawson’s activities, but did not do a medical 
examination.  Id. at ¶ 28.  The doctor had determined that Lawson was not 
permanently and totally disabled based solely on his evidentiary review.  This 
conclusion, in and of itself, was not problematic.  It became problematic, 
however, when the commission concluded that the surveillance evidence revealed 
no activities that were medically inconsistent with the medical evidence that was 
relied on to support the initial award of permanent total disability.  This 
conclusion, in turn, effectively invalidated Dr. Dunkin’s report, because when the 
surveillance evidence was discredited, the report was left without foundation.  Id. 
at ¶ 28-29, 33.  This lack of foundation is why permanent total disability 
termination could not be sustained in Lawson. 
{¶ 39} The medical evidence in this case is different.  Dr. Freeman did not 
simply view the videotape.  He personally examined Lowe, and based upon that 
exam, determined that Lowe was capable of sustained sedentary employment.  
Thus, even if the surveillance evidence had been discredited — which in this case 
it was not — Dr. Freeman’s opinion was independently sustained by his own 
examination findings.  In other words, the surveillance evidence is irrelevant to 
the viability of Freeman’s report. 
{¶ 40} The medical reports in this case, combined with the video and the 
commission’s nonmedical analysis, are “some evidence” supporting the 
commission’s decision. 
{¶ 41} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Weisser & Wolf and Mark B. Weisser, for appellant. 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., and Gary E. Becker, for appellee Cincinnati, 
Inc. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Rema A. Ina, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
______________________