Case Title: NOLAN CHARLES MUNIZ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-27

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOLAN CHARLES MUNIZ v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 206783 P.2d 141Case Number: 89-27Decided: 11/27/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
NOLAN CHARLES MUNIZ, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Jere Ryckman, 
J.

Robert J. 
Pickett of Pickett & McKinney, Rock 
Springs, Harley McKinney (argued), for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., (argued), for 
appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Nolan Charles 
Muniz was convicted of attempted first degree sexual assault. He raises the 
following issues:

"1. Whether the trial 
court erred in its refusal to offer instruction as to a lesser included 
offense.

"2. Whether the trial 
court erred in denying defendant's motion for acquittal for lack of sufficient 
evidence; and whether there was insufficient evidence to go to the jury, or to 
sustain the guilty verdict."

We 
affirm.

FACTS

[¶2.]     Nolan Muniz was sitting 
in the Astro Bar in Rock 
Springs, Wyoming on 
November 19, 1987, when an acquaintance, Darryl Kumpula, entered the bar with 
his girlfriend Lisa Sheets. They sat down at the bar next to Muniz, ordered 
beer, and Darryl began talking to Muniz. Lisa did not join in the conversation, 
but when Darryl left to go to the restroom, Muniz asked her if she "wanted to 
get lucky." She indicated she was not interested, and when Darryl returned, he 
and Muniz continued their conversation. After a while, Darryl told Lisa they 
were going to go driving around in Muniz's pickup. They purchased a few 
six-packs of beer, and the three of them left the Astro Bar in Muniz's truck. In 
their travels, Muniz stopped at a friend's trailer, then drove to the OK Lounge 
where they drank beer and shot some pool, finally returning to the Astro Bar. 
Darryl went inside, leaving Lisa and Muniz in his pickup.

[¶3.]     While Darryl was inside 
the Astro Bar, Muniz asked Lisa if he should pull around the block to see if 
Darryl was coming out. She said that would not be a good idea because Darryl 
would be angry if he came out and the truck was gone. A moment later, he made 
the same suggestion, Lisa said no, but Muniz drove out of the parking lot 
anyway. Lisa asked where they were going, and Muniz said, "just for a ride." 
When Lisa realized they were driving away from the bar, she asked Muniz what he 
was doing. He told her to shut up and backhanded her across the 
mouth.

[¶4.]     Lisa started screaming. 
Muniz grabbed her by the hair and tried to force her head into his crotch while 
telling her in slang terms to perform oral sex. She fought and struggled to get 
free, but Muniz hit her and told her that Darryl would never find out. Lisa then 
grabbed the steering wheel in an attempt to wreck the truck. Muniz slammed on 
the brakes, and as the truck skidded to a stop, Lisa jumped out of the truck and 
ran back down the road. She came to a truck that had stopped behind them and 
banged on the window, crying and screaming. The driver of the truck, a high 
school girl, let her into the truck and later testified that Lisa was hysterical 
and was screaming "get out of here, that guy tried to rape me." They drove to 
the Astro Bar, picked up Darryl, and then travelled to the police station where 
Lisa related what had happened. Rock 
Springs police officers located and arrested Muniz later 
that evening. At his trial, Muniz was convicted of attempted first degree sexual 
assault and acquitted on a charge of kidnapping. Muniz was sentenced to serve a 
term of not less than ten nor more than fifteen years in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.

DISCUSSION

[¶5.]     Appellant's first 
argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction on 
simple battery as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree sexual 
assault. Appellant orally proposed the instruction during the instruction 
conference, and it was rejected by the trial court. Appellant did not object, 
however, to the refusal of the instruction.

[¶6.]     Rule 31, W.R.Cr.P. 
provides in pertinent part:

"Instructions to the jury 
shall be given and objections thereto made at the time and in the manner 
provided for the giving of instructions and the making of objections thereto in 
the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure."

Rule 51, 
W.R.C.P. provides in pertinent part:

"No party may assign as 
error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto 
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter 
to which he objects and the grounds of his objection."

The reason for 
the requirement of stating the distinct grounds of objection is to give the 
trial court an opportunity to correct possible error in instructions before the 
jury retires. Morris v. State, 644 P.2d 170, 171 (Wyo. 1982). When refusal 
of an instruction is claimed to be in error, the record must contain a clear 
statement sufficient to inform the trial court of the basis of the asserted 
error. Evans v. State, 655 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Wyo. 1982). Failure to object precludes review 
by this court unless plain error is present. Morris, 644 P.2d  at 171. Appellant 
does not argue the existence of plain error, and we do not perceive such in our 
review of the record.

[¶7.]     Appellant's second 
contention is that there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction. 
He argues that there is nothing corroborating the victim's testimony and that 
inconsistencies in her testimony render it insufficient. First, he identifies 
evidence which could have been produced to corroborate the victim's story but 
was not. As examples, appellant points out that the police failed to search the 
interior of his truck for physical evidence corroborating the victim's statement 
and that investigating officers failed to tape record all of the conversation 
when interviewing a possible witness. The failure to produce this type of 
evidence, he concludes, shows that the evidence that was actually produced must 
be insufficient. We disagree. Our review of the sufficiency of evidence is not a 
quantitative comparison of what the evidence was against what the evidence might 
have been. We review questions of sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 
guilty verdict by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution to determine if sufficient evidence existed to allow a reasonable 
jury to draw inferences supporting the verdict. Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 880 
(Wyo. 1987). 
We have long recognized that uncorroborated testimony of a victim may sustain a 
conviction for sexual assault. Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 65 A.L.R.4th 1011 
(Wyo. 1986); Tway v. State, 7 Wyo. 74, 50 P. 188 
(1897); see also W.S. 6-2-311 (stating that corroboration of victim's testimony 
is not required).

[¶8.]     The victim was the only 
witness with knowledge of what happened in the cab of the truck apart from 
Muniz, who did not testify. Her testimony, if believed, was sufficient to allow 
the jury to the draw the inferences needed to support the 
verdict.

[¶9.]     In the second part of 
his argument, appellant contends that inconsistencies in her testimony render it 
not worthy of belief. This contention is primarily based on differences between 
the victim's statement to the police immediately after the incident and her 
testimony at trial. We were presented with a similar argument concerning 
inconsistencies in testimony in Brown v. State, 581 P.2d 189, 191 (Wyo. 1978), 
where we said that "[w]e view this as a most splendid argument to be directed to 
the fact finder inasmuch as it is entirely an attack upon the credibility of the 
complaining witness." On appeal we do not weigh the evidence or evaluate the 
credibility of the witnesses, as these are duties of the jury. Stewart v. State, 
724 P.2d 439, 443 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶10.]  Affirmed.

URBIGKIT, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶11.]  I concur in the decision to affirm this 
conviction, but differ in not finding that an uncorroborated sexual assault case 
is presented. My historical concern with one witness uncorroborated testimony 
for sexual assault convictions justifies recognition of significant and 
persuasive evidence of guilt supporting the essentially uncontested testimony of 
this victim. Consequently, I discern this case to be a general sufficiency of 
the evidence case and not a character of proof requiring resort to any 
uncorroborated testimony rule. Cf. Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo. 1986); W.S. 6-2-311. 
See also Brown v. State, 581 P.2d 189 (Wyo. 1978).

[¶12.]  I would consider the combined weight of 
evidence presented for proof of guilt by not only the testimony of the victim, 
but also the circumstantial and conjunctive testimony of other witnesses, 
Fitzgerald v. State, 599 P.2d 572 (Wyo. 1979), which is factually reinforced. 
Varvaro v. State, 772 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. App. 1988). Corroboration included the 
victim's physical condition immediately after occurrence, the observation of her 
escape from the perpetrator's vehicle by the young driver who provided immediate 
assistance, the supporting testimony of her fiancé as to the incidents of the 
evening, the evidence of immediate report to the police which permitted 
confirmation from that officer of believability and her mental and physical 
condition immediately following the assault.

[¶13.]  I concur generally in affirmation on a 
sufficiency basis that substantial evidence existed to sustain the jury's 
decision by a review of a totality of the proof. My aversion to any rigid 
application of an uncorroborated victim's testimony rule need not be considered 
for this well-proven case. After reviewing the evidence and appropriate 
inference in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact would have found the essential elements of the crime to have been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. That evidence was positive, convincing and provided 
the In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1075, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 377-78 (1970) due process requirement of certainty. Munson v. 
State, 770 P.2d 1093 (Wyo. 1989).