Case Title: State Ex Rel. Land v. KNOX SUPERIOR CT. GELB, JUDGE

Citation: 233 N.E.2d 233, 249 Ind. 471

Docket Number: 1067S112

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1968-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
249 Ind. 471 (1968)
233 N.E.2d 233
STATE EX REL LAND, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
v.
KNOX SUPERIOR CT. GELB, JUDGE.
No. 1067S112.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed January 26, 1968.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Douglas B. McFadden, Assistant Attorney General, for relator.
Ramsey & Ramsey and Joe D. Black, of Vincennes, for respondent.
*472 PER CURIAM.
A petition for a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, for a writ of mandate, was filed by the relator, the State of Indiana ex rel. Murphy C. Land, prosecuting attorney for Knox County. The events leading to the filing of the petition are as follows:
The petition to reduce the bond was denied.
*473 It is the contention of the relator that the Superior Court of Knox County over-extended its judicial power by permitting defendant to take the oral deposition of the state's witnesses where the witnesses would be available for trial, and the taking of the depositions is to discover evidence in preparation of defendant's case, and not for the purpose of perpetuating testimony. The relator further contends that if the Knox Superior Court had judicial authority to permit the defendant to take oral depositions of state witnesses, similarly, permission must be extended to the State to take oral deposition of the defendant.
The respondent first raised the argument that Rule 2-35 of the Indiana Supreme Court Rules had not been complied with by the relator since a written motion to the lower court must first be made attacking the excess of jurisdiction. This would not go to the merits of this matter since both the relator and respondents agree that the central issue is whether Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 9-1610 grants the trial judge power to commission pretrial depositions in a criminal case.
Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 9-1610 reads as follows:
We believe the language of the said statute is clear. This court in Tullis v. Stafford (1893) 134 Ind. 258, 33 N.E. 1023, 1024, construed a prior statute (Rev. St. 1881, § 1805) which was basically the same statute as the one before the court now.
The provisions of that statute (Rev. St. 1881, § 1805) are as follows:
There appears to be only one substantial difference between the statute and Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 9-1610. The court interpreted "conditional" in the Tullis case as follows:
This court, therefore, at that time felt the word "conditional" referred to the use of the deposition and not to the question of its taking. This court, at page 261 in the Tullis case, continued:
The court went on to resolve the question of the taking of depositions at page 262 in which it stated:
Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 9-1610 differs from the prior statute, Rev. St. 1881 § 1805, in the elimination of the word *475 "conditional," but clearly gives the basic statutory right to take depositions as outlined.
Lander v. State (1958), 238 Ind. 680, 154 N.E.2d 507 cites the state statute and on page 687 the court states:
The legislature intended to confer reciprocal rights on the defendant and the prosecution when the defendant set the deposition machinery in motion. See Butler v. State (1884), 97 Ind. 378, 381, 382; Lander v. State, supra. Nevertheless, the defendant would not waive his right to remain silent under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article One, § 14 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana. The only right waived, that of confrontation of witnesses, is clearly set forth within the statute.
In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 461, the court at length, pages 458 through 465, discusses the privilege against self-incrimination. On page 460 the court summarizes: "The privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right `to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.' Malloy v. Hogan (1964), 378 U.S. 1, 8."
Both the relator and respondents cite the leading case of Brown v. United States (1958), 356 U.S. 148. In this case Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the majority of the court, affirmed a judgment of conviction by the lower court of contempt when the defendant has taken the stand and testified in her own behalf and the court has cautioned her that "she had waived the right to claim any privilege under the Fifth Amendment by reason of having testified as a witness in her own behalf." Exercising the rights under Burns' § 9-1610, supra does not constitute a waiver against self-incrimination, *476 and as the Brown v. U.S., supra case holds at page 155:
It is to be noted in Brown v. U.S., supra, a government civil suit in the Federal District Court for petitioner's denaturalization on the ground that she had fraudulently procured citizenship by swearing falsely that she was not, and had not been, a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party, she voluntarily took the stand and testified at length in her own defense.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby dismissed and the temporary writ heretofore granted is dissolved.
Arterburn, J. not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 233 N.E.2d 233.