Case Title: Goldade v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-32

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-12-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Goldade v. State1983 WY 128674 P.2d 721Case Number: 83-32Case Number: 83-32Decided: 12/12/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHRISTINE 
GOLDADE, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court, Campbell County, Paul T. Liamos, Jr., 
J.

 
 
Gerald 
M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Laramie, J. Michael 
Sharman, Student Intern, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Laramie, and Sylvia L. 
Hackl, Public Defender, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

 
 
A.G. 
McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., and John W. 
Renneisen, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before 
ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER,* THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

 
 

* 
Retired June 13, 1983, but continued to participate in the decision of the court 
in this case pursuant to order of the court entered June 13, 
1983.

 
 

THOMAS, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Are statements which 
identify an abuser made by a child victim to a nurse and a physician admissible 
in evidence under the exception to the hearsay rule articulated in Rule 803(4), 
W.R.E.? This is the essential question presented in this appeal, although an 
attack also is made upon the reliability of the statements. The district court, 
in a trial to the court, ruled that such statements could be received in 
evidence, and they were received. The appellant was found guilty by the court of 
child abuse in violation of § 14-3-101(a)(ii), W.S. 1977, and she was sentenced 
to a term of six months in the county jail and a fine of $500 in accordance with 
the provisions of § 14-3-103(a), W.S. 1977.1 The imposition of the sentence and 
fine were suspended, and the appellant was placed on probation for one year. 
This appeal is from that judgment and sentence. We shall affirm the trial 
court.

 
 

[¶2.]     In her brief the 
appellant states the issues as follows:

 
 
"I. 
MAY A HEARSAY STATEMENT MADE BY A FOUR YEAR OLD OUT OF COURT DECLARANT BE 
ADMITTED UNDER THE W.R.E. 803(4) `TREATMENT AND DIAGNOSIS' EXCEPTION WHEN THE 
STATEMENT ATTRIBUTES FAULT AND BLAME AND IS NOT PERTINENT TO THE TREATMENT OR 
DIAGNOSIS?

 
 
"II. 
MAY A HEARSAY STATEMENT BE ADMITTED FOR ANY PURPOSE, WHEN, UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE STATEMENT LACKS TRADITIONAL GUARANTEES OF 
RELIABILITY?"

 
 
The 
State of Wyoming has submitted a counter-statement of the issues in this case as 
follows:

 
 
"I. 
UNDER W.R.E. 803(4), DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF A 
DOCTOR AND A NURSE CONCERNING SEPARATE OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS MADE BY THE 
VICTIM, TABATHA GOLDADE, DURING HER PHYSICAL EXAMINATION WHERE THE STATEMENTS 
CONCERNED THE CAUSE OF HER BRUISES, AND WERE REASONABLY PERTINENT TO TREATMENT 
AND DIAGNOSIS? 

 
 
"II. 
IF THE STATEMENTS OF THE CHILD WERE OTHERWISE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF W.R.E. 803(4) 
AS EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE, DID THE UNAVAILABILITY OF THE CHILD AT TRIAL 
THROUGH INCOMPETENCY TO TESTIFY ALTER THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HER STATEMENTS TO THE 
DOCTOR AND NURSE?

 
 
"III. 
IF A STATEMENT IS PROPERLY ADMISSIBLE AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE HERSAY [sic] RULE, 
DO INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MAY INDICATE UNRELIABILITY GO TO THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE STATEMENT OR MERELY TO ITS WEIGHT AND 
CREDIBILITY?

 
 
"IV. 
IF IT WAS ERROR TO ADMIT THE VICTIM'S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS TO THE DOCTOR AND 
NURSE, WAS SUCH ERROR NONETHELESS HARMLESS?"

 
 

[¶3.]     On August 13, 1982, the 
Campbell County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (D-PASS) 
received a telephone call about possible child abuse involving Tabatha Goldade 
who then was four and one-half years old. A social worker in the D-PASS office 
went to the appellant's home accompanied by a deputy sheriff. Initially the 
social worker observed bruises on Tabatha's face which had been covered with 
makeup. Further visual examination disclosed bruises on other parts of Tabatha's 
body, and the social worker decided that the child should be examined by a 
physician. This was done, and the doctor in his testimony stated that there were 
"a lot of bruises on Tabatha." Photographs which were admitted into evidence 
showed bruises on Tabatha's back, chest, stomach, legs, arms and face. It was 
determined that these bruises were not serious injuries, although Tabatha was 
hospitalized for several days for observation. The doctor testified that in his 
opinion, which was based on the results of tests during hospitalization, Tabatha 
did not "tend to bruise more easily than the average, healthy child." The 
doctor, in his opinion, ruled out illness, childhood play and home accidents as 
causes of these bruises and stated that the bruises were the product of child 
abuse.

 
 

[¶4.]     The record further 
discloses that Tabatha Goldade, together with a younger brother and a younger 
sister, had been residing with the appellant and her husband for the nine months 
preceding August 13, 1982. These three children were the natural children of Mr. 
Goldade's brother and his former wife. When the natural parents were divorced 
the mother had been found to be unfit to have custody of the children. Appellant 
and her husband then had accepted the children into their home at the request of 
the husband's brother. The appellant and her husband had talked with the same 
social worker for Campbell County D-PASS about adopting Tabatha and the other 
two children. Some paper work relating to the proposed adoption already had been 
accomplished. The social worker testified that he had heard Tabatha allude to 
the appellant as "Mommy," and there is no dispute with respect to the 
proposition that when Tabatha referred to "Mommy" or "Mother" she was referring 
to the appellant.

 
 

[¶5.]     Tabatha Goldade was 
called as a witness by the State. She could not respond to questions, however, 
presumably because of shyness and awe. The district judge ruled that she was not 
a competent witness. Her testimony, therefore, was not available to the 
State.

 
 

[¶6.]     The critical testimony 
which is in issue in this case came from the nurse who was on duty in the 
emergency room at Campbell County Hospital when Tabatha Goldade was brought 
there by the deputy sheriff and the social worker, and from a physician who 
specialized in pediatrics and who was called to the emergency room at the 
Campbell County Hospital to examine Tabatha. The testimony of the nurse is as 
follows:

 
 
"Q. 
Okay. During that time did you ask Tabatha any questions?

 
 
"A. 
Yes.

 
 
"Q. 
What was that?

 
 
"A. 
I did ask her how she had gotten these injuries. 

 
 
"Q. 
And did you get a reply?

 
 
"A. 
Yes."

 
 

[¶7.]     Following an 
appropriate objection by counsel for the appellant and argument, the transcript 
continues:

 
 
"THE 
COURT: Well, the court will overrule the objection. She may answer this 
question.

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"Q. 
Mrs. Ullrich, did you ask the little girl in question some 
questions?

 
 
"A. 
Yes. I did ask her how she incurred these injuries.

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"Q. 
* * * Did you get a reply to that question?

 
 
"A. 
Yes, I did.

 
 
"Q. 
What was that?

 
 
"A. 
That her mother had done it.

 
 
"THE 
COURT: Now, ma'am, would you tell us as closely as possible the exact words 
used. That's what counsel means when he asks you to answer, not a conclusion 
that you made from what was said, but you state what you asked this child as 
closely as possible and what her reply was as closely as 
possible.

 
 
"A. 
(By Mrs. Ullrich) I did ask her how she received these - I can't remember if I 
used the term bruises or what I said to her because of her age, and she did 
reply, `my mommy did it.'"

 
 

[¶8.]     The critical testimony 
of the physician with respect to the same subject is as 
follows:

 
 
"Q. 
In your examination of this child did you have occasion to ask her any 
questions?

 
 
"A. 
Yes, I did.

 
 
"Q. 
What were those questions?

 
 
"A. 
I asked her how the bruises that were seen on her, how they had 
occurred.

 
 
"Q. 
Did you get a response?

 
 
"A. 
Yes."

 
 
Following 
a consistent objection and ruling by the district court, the testimony 
continued:

 
 
"Q. 
* * * Could you tell us what that response was, Doctor?

 
 
"A. 
As I recall, She told me that her - she said, `my mother beat 
me.'"

 
 

[¶9.]     During 
cross-examination of the physician, the following testimony was 
elicited:

 
 
"Q. 
Okay. And when you went in to see Tabatha Goldade then you asked her where she 
got the bruises?

 
 
"A. 
During the course of the examination I asked her that 
question.

 
 
"Q. 
And she told you that, `my mommy beat me'?

 
 
"A. 
I think she used the word `mother.'

 
 
"Q. 
Okay. Mother?

 
 
"A. 
Uh-huh.

 
 
"Q. 
Are you aware of who the natural mother of this child is?

 
 
"A. 
I'm aware that Mrs. Goldade is not the natural mother, but I don't where - I 
don't know the natural mother.

 
 
"Q. 
All right. Did you question the child any further than that concerning those 
injuries?

 
 
"A. 
I don't think I did, no."

 
 

[¶10.]  The district judge, following the trial, 
entered Findings and Order of Court in which the court specifically 
found:

 
 
"4. 
That the testimony of the doctor and the nurse as to the four year olds [sic] 
statement was admitted as a proper exception to Rule 803(4) of the Wyoming Rules 
of Evidence as an exception to hearsay."

 
 
The 
appellant, relying upon authority from other jurisdictions, argues most 
strenuously that this ruling by the district court was erroneous, and that her 
conviction should be reversed.

 
 

[¶11.]  Rule 803, W.R.E., provides in pertinent 
part as follows:

 
 
"The 
following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness:

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"(4) 
Statements for purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment. - Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis 
or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, 
or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external 
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment."

 
 

[¶12.]  We have no quarrel with the general rule 
that statements attributing fault usually are not admissible under rules 
identical to Rule 803(4), W.R.E. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 
55 A.L.R.Fed. 664 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 1001, 101 S. Ct. 1709, 
68 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1981); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979); 
United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D.Mich. 1977); and 4 Louisell and 
Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 444, p. 603 (1980). If the goal of our court were 
simply to pursue the common-law tradition of stare decisis, then the cited 
authorities must be recognized as supporting the position of the appellant. In 
this instance, however, the function of the court must be to pursue the 
transcendent goal of addressing the most pernicious social ailment which 
afflicts our society, family abuse, and more specifically, child abuse. We 
conclude in that context that the ruling of the district court was proper, and 
the conviction of the appellant should be affirmed.

 
 

[¶13.]  In an instance such as this the court is 
confronted with a unique and special problem, and we must be concerned with an 
additional responsibility which is imposed upon a physician. Child abuse is 
recognized as encompassing more than mere physical injury. The State of Wyoming 
has adopted a policy which expresses concern with respect to emotional and 
psychological damage to the child as well. Section 14-3-205, W.S. 1977, provides 
in pertinent part as follows:

 
 
"(a) 
Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe or suspect that a child 
has been abused or neglected or who observes any child being subjected to 
conditions or circumstances that would reasonably result in abuse or neglect, 
shall immediately report it to the child protective agency or local law 
enforcement agency or cause a report to be made.

 
 
"(b) 
If a person reporting child abuse or neglect is a member of the staff of a 
medical or other public or private institution, school, facility or agency, he 
shall notify the person in charge or his designated agent as soon as possible, 
who is thereupon also responsible to make the report or cause the report to be 
made. Nothing in this subsection is intended to relieve individuals of their 
obligation to report on their own behalf unless a report has already been made 
or will be made."

 
 
In 
the definitional section of this statutory provision, § 14-3-201(a)(ii), W.S. 
1977, we find the following:

 
 
"(ii) 
`Abuse' means inflicting or causing physical or mental injury, harm or imminent 
danger to the physical or mental health or welfare of a child other than by 
accidental means, including abandonment, excessive or unreasonable corporal 
punishment, malnutrition or substantial risk thereof by reason of intentional or 
unintentional neglect, and the commission or allowing the commission of a sexual 
offense against a child as defined by law:

 
 
"(A) 
`Mental injury' means an injury to the psychological capacity or emotional 
stability of a child as evidenced by an observable or substantial impairment in 
his ability to function within a normal range of performance and behavior with 
due regard to his culture;

 
 
"(B) 
`Physical injury' means death or any harm to a child including but not limited 
to disfigurement, impairment of any bodily organ, bruising, bleeding, burns, 
fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma or substantial 
malnutrition;

 
 
"(C) 
`Substantial risk' means a strong possibility as contrasted with a remote or 
insignificant possibility;

 
 
"(D) 
`Imminent danger' includes threatened harm and means a statement, overt act, 
condition or status which represents an immediate and substantial risk of sexual 
abuse or physical or mental injury."

 
 
The 
definitional provisions ascribe importance in ascertaining whether a child has 
been a victim of abuse to discovering whether the injuries sustained by the 
child were accidental or deliberate.

 
 

[¶14.]  Physicians and other medical service 
personnel are called to perform a vital role in this state's statutory framework 
for the protection of children. In particular they are empowered to document 
suspected child abuse by photographs and X rays at state expense. Section 
14-3-206(c), W.S. 1977. Furthermore, § 14-3-208(a), W.S. 1977, manifests a 
significant reliance upon medical personnel in dealing with child abuse in the 
following provision:

 
 
"When 
a physician treating a child or a medical staff member of a hospital in which a 
child is being treated has reasonable cause to believe there exists an imminent 
danger to the child's life or safety unless the child is taken into protective 
custody and there is not time to apply for a court order, the child may be taken 
into temporary protective custody without a warrant or court order and without 
the consent of the parents, guardians or others exercising temporary or 
permanent control over the child. Any person taking a child into temporary 
protective custody shall as soon as possible notify the appropriate local child 
protective agency. Upon notification, the local child protective agency shall 
initiate an investigation of the notification and make every reasonable effort 
to inform the parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare that 
the child has been taken into temporary protective 
custody."

 
 

[¶15.]  The justification for the exception to 
the hearsay rule contained in Rule 803(4), W.R.E., is that the statements which 
are furnished are considered to be reliable and trustworthy. 4 Louisell and 
Mueller, supra, § 444, p. 603 (1980). As stated 4 Weinstein's Evidence, § 
803(4)[01], p. 803-129 (1981):

 
 
"* 
* * [A]s a matter of policy, a fact reliable enough to serve as a basis for a 
diagnosis is also reliable enough to escape hearsay proscription. * * 
*

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"* 
* * Even in the case of a statement made for treatment the test is not only 
whether the declarant thought it relevant (thereby establishing reliability), but also whether a doctor would have 
reasonably relied upon such a statement in deciding upon a course of 
treatment." (Footnotes omitted. Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶16.]  In reaching a conclusion as to pertinency 
for purposes of applying Rule 803(4), W.R.E., the courts must rely upon the view 
of the treating physician or the views of other medical service personnel with 
respect to what facts are pertinent to diagnosis and treatment. While those 
views may not necessarily be controlling they do suffice to support the exercise 
of the sound discretion of the trial court in admitting such evidence. See 
Louisell and Mueller, supra, p. 598 (1980). It is apparent from the testimony of 
the physician quoted above that he was involved in attempting to diagnose and, 
if diagnosed, to then treat child abuse, not simply bruises on the little girl's 
face. The identity of the person causing those injuries is a pertinent fact in 
these circumstances.

 
 

[¶17.]  The policy of this state as it is found 
incorporated in the child protection statutes, makes vital the determination by 
physicians and others who are treating suspected child abuse cases of whether 
the injuries were inflicted deliberately. They also must decide whether the 
child may be in imminent danger, which determination is necessary in determining 
the propriety of temporary protective custody. In the absence of information as 
to the identity of any assailant of the child this latter decision cannot be 
made in a rational way. Given the circumstances confronting the trial court in 
this case, the admission of the evidence was within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and there has been no showing of an abuse of discretion which would 
permit that ruling to be disturbed on appeal. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 
(1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982); Sanville v. State, Wyo., 593 P.2d 1340 
(1979); and Daellenbach v. State, 
Wyo., 562 P.2d 679 (1977).

 
 

[¶18.]  The advisory committee notes to Rule 
803(4), F.R.E., which is identical to Rule 803(4), W.R.E., state in part, 
"Statements as to fault would not ordinarily qualify [as an admissible exception 
to the hearsay rule]." This rule, however, as the advisory committee note 
contemplates, is not without exception. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
affirmed the admission by a trial court of evidence, pursuant to Rule 803(4), 
F.R.E., of statements attributing fault given to an emergency room nurse for 
purposes of diagnosis. United States v. 
Rhodes, 11 Fed.Rules of Evidence Service (1982). The factual background was 
a child abuse case involving facts that are strikingly similar to those before 
this court. We hold, in a similar vein to that of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that the record in the present case is developed 
sufficiently with respect to the importance for purposes of diagnosis and 
treatment of the child's explanation of the manner in which her injuries were 
inflicted.

 
 

[¶19.]  This court has pursued a policy in child 
homicide cases of developing rules which ultimately will assist in protecting 
the innocent victims of child abuse. In a series of cases this court has 
recognized that opportunity, together with injuries consistent with child abuse, 
is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for homicide. See Marshall v. State, Wyo., 646 P.2d 795 
(1982); Rinehart v. State, Wyo., 641 P.2d 192 (1982); Grabill v. State, 
Wyo., 621 P.2d 802 (1980); Seyle v. 
State, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1081 (1978); and Jones v. State, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1150 
(1978). While this standard of proof well may be a minimal one, no apology is 
necessary for this policy. Because of the manifest need to protect the most 
helpless members of our society from violence on the part of others, the policy 
is both necessary and proper. Affording the exception to the hearsay rule 
contained in Rule 803(4), W.R.E., a liberal interpretation, insofar as it 
applies in child abuse cases, is only a logical extension of this court's policy 
in the child death cases. See Comment, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child 
Abuse Prosecutions, 63 Geo.L.J. 257, 269 (1974).

 
 

[¶20.]  The use of the terminology "battered 
child syndrome" to describe a diagnosis by a physician has been accepted in a 
number of courts. See, e.g., People v. 
Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971); People v. Ewing, 72 Cal. App. 3d 714, 140 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1977); State v. Loss, 
295 Minn. 271, 204 N.W.2d 404 (1973); People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657, 304 N.E.2d 358 (1973); State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905, 98 A.L.R.3d 285 (1978); State 
v. Mapp, 45 N.C. App. 574, 264 S.E.2d 348 (1980). A discussion of the 
developments in the medical profession relating to the recognition of the 
battered child syndrome is found in McCoid, The Battered Child and Other 
Assaults Upon the Family: Part One, 50 Minn.L.Rev. 1 (1965). An outline of the 
history of the law in adopting this diagnosis can be found in case note, 
Evidence - Child Abuse - Expert Medical Testimony Concerning "Battered Child 
Syndrome" Held Admissible, 42 Fordham L.Rev. 935 (1974). The Wyoming cases cited 
above fit well within the pattern described by the other authorities and 
commentators.

 
 

[¶21.]  The record here contains testimony by the 
physician that he asked the question concerning how Tabatha Goldade was injured 
in order to assist him with respect to a diagnosis of a child abuse syndrome. 
Given his duty and his professional responsibility as a physician to determine 
whether the child abuse "syndrome or a condition that requires treatment" was 
present, the statements elicited in fact were pertinent to his diagnosis and 
treatment. Admitting those statements into evidence pursuant to the exception 
contained in Rule 803(4), W.R.E., is consistent with the prior policy of this 
court in child abuse cases. We hold that there was no error committed by the 
trial court in admitting the statements into evidence.

 
 

[¶22.]  The appellant complains that there was no 
guarantee of reliability with respect to these statements. The concise and 
correct answer to that argument is that the exception to the hearsay rule 
contained in Rule 803(4), W.R.E., is premised upon an assumption of reliability. 
The rule does not demand any further showing, and appellant has cited to us no 
cases which would support her position in this regard. Under the circumstances 
we find no error in the failure to demonstrate reliability of the statements of 
Tabatha Goldade. We agree with the position of the State that at most this 
constitutes matter which would go to the weight, not the admissibility, of this 
testimony.

 
 

[¶23.]  The record in this case also discloses 
that when the social worker and the deputy sheriff arrived at the Goldade 
residence to investigate a report of possible child abuse, the appellant was the 
only adult present with the victim. While this circumstance may not be 
sufficient to establish exclusive opportunity to inflict the injuries so far as 
this case is concerned, the evidence also discloses that when the child victim 
was examined her facial bruises were found to be covered with makeup in an 
apparent attempt to conceal the existence of such bruises. Such evidence might 
not have the same impact for all people, but it certainly is susceptible to the 
inference that this was an attempt on the part of the appellant to conceal 
criminal conduct, tantamount to an admission. The evidence is consistent with 
the statements given by Tabatha Goldade to the examining physician and the 
nurse, and essentially reports the reliability of those 
statements.

 
 

[¶24.]  Finding no error in the admission of the 
hearsay statements contained in the testimony of the examining nurse and 
physician, we conclude that the judgment of the district court should be 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 
Section 14-3-101(a)(ii), W.S. 1977, provides as follows:

 
 
"(a) 
No parent, guardian or custodian of any child shall:

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"(ii) 
Abuse, torture, expose or cruelly punish the child."

 
 
Section 
14-3-103(a), W.S. 1977, provides as follows:

 
 
"(a) 
Any person violating any provision within W.S. 14-3-101 and 14-3-102 is guilty 
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred 
dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) plus court costs 
or imprisoned in the county jail not more than one (1) year, or 
both."

 
 
These 
provisions were repealed by § 5 of Ch. 75, S.L. of Wyoming 1982, reiterated in § 
3 of Ch. 171, S.L. of Wyoming 1983. The offense here charged has been subsumed 
by § 6-2-503, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.), which treats child abuse as a 
felony.

 
 

BROWN, 
Justice, dissenting, joined by ROSE, 
Justice, with reservations.

 
 

[¶25.]  Although I disagree with the majority's 
reasoning in upholding appellant's conviction I take comfort in the fact that 
this court is not affirming the conviction of an innocent person. In my opinion 
the majority is approving appellant's conviction by the use of improper 
evidence.

 
 

[¶26.]  The record contains two confessions by 
appellant which were ruled inadmissible before trial. Courts at all levels find 
it difficult to ignore inadmissible evidence, which save for a technicality 
would be conclusive of a defendant's guilt. Knowing that a defendant has 
committed the acts complained of, courts succumb to the temptation to stretch, 
expand and distort the rules of evidence to rationalize a finding of 
guilt.

 
 

[¶27.]  A casual observer might reason that no 
great harm is done in this case by affirming the conviction. After all, 
appellant committed the acts charged. The offense is only a misdemeanor and 
appellant is not going to jail or paying any fine. Furthermore, she will be on 
unsupervised probation.

 
 

[¶28.]  My concern about the majority's reasoning 
and disposition is how it will be viewed as precedent.

 
 
"It 
is a maxim among these lawyers, that whatever has been done before may legally 
be done again; and therefore they take especial care to record all the decisions 
formerly made against common justice and the general reason of mankind. These, 
under the name of precedents, they produce as authorities to justify the most 
iniquitous opinions; and the judges never fail of directing accordingly." 
Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels: Houyhnhnms, ch. 5.

 
 
This 
case could logically be cited for the proposition that when a patient tells the 
physician the name of the person that caused the injury the physician can tell 
the trier of fact, even though the identity of the person inflicting injury is 
not necessary to the diagnosis or treatment of the injury.

 
 

[¶29.]  The trial court admitted the doctor's 
testimony under Rule 803(4), Wyoming Rules of Evidence, "Statements for Purposes 
of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment." I am not sure whether the majority approved 
the doctor's testimony under Rule 803(4), carved out a new exception to the 
hearsay rule or made an ad hoc determination because of expediency or policy. If 
the majority intended to approve the admission of the doctor's testimony under 
Rule 803(4), W.R.E., I think such holding is contrary to authority and results 
in expanding, stretching and distorting the rule.

 
 

[¶30.]  Rule 803(4), W.R.E. is the same as Rule 
803(4), Federal Rules of Evidence. Louisell & Mueller discuss that rule in 
Federal Evidence: 

 
 
"* 
* * The principal reason for admitting statements made for purposes of obtaining 
medical treatment is that they are considered trustworthy. Usually such 
statements are made by the patient to his physician, and usually they describe 
the patient's own past and present physical sensations, and things which 
happened to him personally. Thus, risks of misperception and of faulty memory 
are minimal. Moreover, the patient will understand that his description is 
important in determining the treatment he will receive, so he has every reason 
to speak not only truthfully, but carefully, so that risks of insincerity and 
ambiguity are likewise minimal.

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"The 
pertinency standard. To be within Rule 803(4), the statement must be `reasonably 
pertinent' to the treatment or diagnosis sought. * * *

 
 
"[T]he 
physician's belief as to what is pertinent should ordinarily control in applying 
the pertinency standard. * * *

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"The 
pertinency standard should be construed broadly enough to reach facts which 
would naturally be recited in a good-faith effort to provide needed information. 
* * *

 
 
* 
* * * * *

 
 
"But 
the pertinency standard does impose a true limit. Embellishments attributing 
fault are not reasonably pertinent. * * *" Louisell & Mueller, Federal 
Evidence, § 444, pp. 592-603 (1980).

 
 
"* 
* * However, a declarant's statement as to who caused an injury or illness is 
not pertinent to medical treatment or diagnosis and is therefore inadmissible." 
55 A.L.R.Fed. § 2(b), p. 694 (1981).

 
 

[¶31.]  In United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 
(8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001, 101 S. Ct. 1709, 68 L. Ed. 2d 203 
(1981), the trial court admitted the testimony of the doctor who examined a 
nine-year old victim concerning statements made by her following an assault. The 
court said:

 
 
"* 
* * It is important to note that the statements concern what happened rather 
than who assaulted her. The former in most cases is pertinent to diagnosis and 
treatment while the latter would seldom, if ever, be sufficiently related. * * 
*" Id., at 84.

 
 

[¶32.]  In United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 
(9th Cir. 1979), the examining physician was allowed under Rule 803(4), F.R.E., 
to repeat a three-year old child's description of the sexual assault, including 
the victim's statement concerning the cause of the injury. However, the court 
excluded any comment about the identity of the assailant.

 
 

[¶33.]  In another reference to Rule 803(4), 
F.R.E., it was said:

 
 
"The 
rule is limited to facts related which are `reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment;' it has never been held to apply to accusations of personal fault, 
either in a civil or criminal context." United States v. Narcisco, 446 F. Supp. 252, 289 (E.D.Mich.S.D. 1977).

 
 
See 
also State v. Fleming, 27 Wn. App. 952, 621 P.2d 779 (1980).

 
 

[¶34.]  The advisory committee notes on the 
rules, say:

 
 
"* 
* * Statements as to fault would not ordinarily qualify under this latter 
language. Thus a patient's statement that he was struck by an automobile would 
qualify but not his statement that the car was driven through a red light. Under 
the exception the statement need not have been made to a physician. Statements 
to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the family might 
be included." Rule 803, F.R.E., 28 U.S.C.A., p. 585 
(1975).

 
 

[¶35.]  Here, then, as in most cases, the crucial 
question is whether the statements made by the victim to the nurse and doctor 
were "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." Ms. Ullrich, the nurse, 
said she needed to know what type of injuries were sustained. This seems 
reasonable, because the answer immediately rules out other ways bruises or 
discoloration could have been caused. However, Ms. Ullrich did not need to know 
who caused the bruises or who was at fault.

 
 

[¶36.]  Dr. Merrill C. Horne, the treating 
physician, said the statement he heard from Tabatha, the victim, that her mother 
had beaten her did not help him to treat the bruises. However, he inferred that 
he was treating the victim for child abuse syndrome rather than bruises, and 
again he inferred but never said that the statement helped treat the child's 
case. The record does not tell us what the phenomenon "child abuse syndrome" is, 
whether it is a recognized medical phenomenon, or whether Dr. Horne is qualified 
to recognize and treat child abuse syndrome. Some of the deficiencies in 
foundation indicated above are supplied by the majority either as a result of 
independent research or knowledge. There is nothing in the record concerning the 
treatment of Tabatha that suggests that she was treated for "child abuse 
syndrome." Her tests, observation and treatment were for her physical 
injuries.

 
 

[¶37.]  I believe that it was error to permit the 
trier of fact to hear or consider evidence identifying the person who assaulted 
the victim. The statements identifying the person who assaulted the child were 
not reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Had the statements given to 
both Dr. Horne and Ms. Ullrich been limited to the fact that the child said she 
was beaten, spanked, hit or struck, they likely would have been properly 
admitted. This would be consistent with United States v. Nick, supra, where any 
comment about the identity of the assailant was excluded. The majority says "The 
identity of the person causing those injuries is a pertinent fact in these 
circumstances." Dr. Horne did not say that nor did any other 
witness.

 
 

[¶38.]  In support of its position the State 
relies a great deal on Moore v. 
State, 26 Md. App. 556, 338 A.2d 344, (1975). In Moore a physician testified that a three 
and one-half year old victim told him, "Daddy was mad, Daddy did it." The court 
upheld the conviction and held that the statement was admissible in evidence 
upon the exception to the hearsay rule as an "excited utterance." Wyoming 
recognizes the "excited utterance" exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(2), 
W.R.E. However, the record does not disclose that this exception is applicable. 
Deputy Sheriff Hamilton testified that Tabatha was not crying and did not appear 
to be in any pain when he and Mrs. O'Brien went to the house. The nurse 
testified that as far as she remembered, Tabatha was not crying. There was 
nothing in the record to indicate that Tabatha was in the excited state of mind 
which would lend reliability to the statement and qualify it as admissible under 
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Furthermore, the State does 
not contend that Rule 803(2), W.R.E., is applicable. The State's reliance on Moore v. State, supra, is 
misplaced.

 
 

[¶39.]  The State contends that the error, if 
any, in the admission of the victim's out-of-court statements to the doctor and 
nurse was harmless and that there was sufficient evidence to convict appellant 
even if the child's statements to the doctor and nurse were disregarded. I 
disagree. Without the objectional statements the State failed to prove the 
identity of the assailant beyond a reasonable doubt. The only evidence as to the 
identity of the assailant is the statements of the victim to the nurse and 
doctor.

 
 

[¶40.]  It is suggested by the majority that 
because of appellant's custodial relationship with Tabatha she had the 
opportunity to abuse the child and is the most logical person to be the 
assailant. However, the record is insufficient to show the necessary exclusive 
custody. We do not know when the bruises were inflicted; we do not know if other 
people were with Tabatha before she was taken to the hospital. We only know that 
the deputy sheriff and Mrs. O'Brien did not observe any other adults at 
appellant's home when they picked Tabatha up and took her to the hospital. We do 
not know if they looked for any other adults or made any investigation to see if 
others had had contact with Tabatha that day or in the recent past. This 
circumstantial evidence standing alone is not sufficient to indicate that 
appellant was the assailant. 

 
 

[¶41.]  In order to bolster a shakey rationale 
for its determination, the majority cites Marshall v. State, Wyo., 646 P.2d 795 
(1982) and earlier cases for the proposition that "opportunity, together with 
injuries consistent with child abuse, is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for homicide." In the Marshall case we 
said:

 
 
"Trauma, 
consistent with child abuse, coupled with an opportunity to inflict the injuries 
as in this case, satisfies us that the jury was justified in accepting the 
circumstantial evidence against appellant rather than his denial; and there was 
a basis for the jury to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Marshall v. State, supra, at 
799.

 
 
In 
Marshall and the other cases cited by 
the majority the defendants were alone with the victims at the time the injuries 
were inflicted. Here we do not know if appellant was alone with the victim when 
the injury occurred; we do not even know when the injuries occurred. The cases 
cited by the majority, therefore, have no application to the facts of this 
case.

 
 

[¶42.]  I conclude that the majority does not 
disagree with the authority that I have cited. The majority 
says:

 
 
"We 
have no quarrel with the general rule that statements attributing fault usually 
are not admissible under rules identical to Rule 803(4), W.R.E. * * * If the 
goal of our court were simply to pursue the common-law tradition of stare 
decisis, then the cited authorities must be recognized as supporting the 
position of the appellant. In this instance, however, the function of the court 
must be to pursue the transcendent goal of addressing the most pernicious social 
ailment which afflicts our society, family abuse, and more specifically, child 
abuse. * * *"

 
 
In 
the context of this statement by the majority I return to my original problem. 
Did the majority approve the admission of the doctor's testimony under Rule 
803(4), W.R.E., did they invent a new exception to the hearsay rule, or did they 
approve the evidence for this special case?

 
 

[¶43.]  There are twenty-four exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. I would prefer it if the majority would create a new exception to 
the hearsay rule or expand one of the existing exceptions to fit this set of 
circumstances. The "excited utterance" exception, Rule 803(2), W.R.E., or the 
"other exceptions" section, Rule 803(24), W.R.E., could be expressly expanded to 
cover this case. However, we have to stretch and distort the existing Rule 
803(4), W.R.E., too much to rationally admit the doctor's 
testimony.

 
 

[¶44.]  For these reasons I would remand for a 
new trial.

 
 

ROSE, 
Justice, joining in the dissent of BROWN, Justice, with the following 
reservations.

 
 

[¶45.]  I join in the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Brown because I believe that it properly analyzes the law with respect 
to the admissibility of out-of-court declarations pursuant to Rule 803(4), 
W.R.E. I disagree, however, with the suggestion that the "excited utterance" 
exception, Rule 803(2), W.R.E., could be expanded to cover this case. As Justice 
Brown points out, the record does not support a conclusion that the child was in 
a state of excitement at the time that she made the statements. Therefore, the 
application of Rule 803(2) would require unacceptable distortion of the rule's 
requirements.

 
 

[¶46.]  In addition, I see no reason to expand 
the existing exceptions to the hearsay rule. Rule 803(24), W.R.E., the catch-all 
exception, is sufficiently comprehensive to allow into evidence trustworthy, 
out-of-court statements, so long as all of the safeguards of that rule are 
met.