Case Title: Herrera v. Union No. 39 School District

Citation: 2006 VT 83

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Herrera v. Union No. 39 School District (2005-204)

2006 VT 83

[Filed 04-Aug-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 83

                                No. 2005-204


  Dr. Ebaristo "Abe" Herrera                     Supreme Court
    
                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Windsor Superior Court


  Union No. 39 School District and               March Term, 2006
  James Van Hoof


  Theresa S. DiMauro, J.

  Michael Marks of Tarrant, Marks & Gillies, Montpelier, for
    Plaintiff-Appellant.

  Kaveh S. Shahi of Cleary Shahi & Aicher, P.C., Rutland, for
    Defendants-Appellees.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ., and 
            Martin, Supr. J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

        
       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.   This appeal arises out of an employment dispute
  between plaintiff Dr. Ebaristo Herrera, former principal of Black River
  Union High School, and defendants Union No. 39 School District and Dr.
  James Van Hoof, the District's superintendent.  Plaintiff appeals from the
  superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. 
  Plaintiff contends the court erred by concluding that the District's
  decision to place him on paid administrative leave for the remainder of his
  term of employment without a hearing did not breach plaintiff's employment
  contract or deprive him of a protected property or liberty interest without
  due process of law.  We reverse in part and remand.

       ¶  2.  The superior court determined that the following facts are
  undisputed.  See V.R.C.P. 56(c)(2) ("All material facts set forth in the
  statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be
  admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the
  opposing party.").  In 2000, plaintiff was hired by the District to serve
  as principal of Black River Union High School in Ludlow, Vermont. 
  Plaintiff's employment contract provided for a two-year term, beginning
  July 1, 2000, and continuing through June 30, 2002.  The contract also
  provided that plaintiff would be notified in writing whether his contract
  would be renewed for the next school year, and that "[s]hould the
  [District's school board] choose not to re-employ [plaintiff] for said
  year, or should the Board suspend or dismiss [plaintiff] during the term of
  this Agreement, [plaintiff] shall be entitled to appeal such action
  pursuant to [16 V.S.A. § 243]."

       ¶  3.  In February 2001, the relationship between plaintiff and Dr.
  Van Hoof began to deteriorate, based at least in part on accusations by Dr.
  Van Hoof regarding plaintiff's job performance.  In the spring of 2001, Dr.
  Van Hoof asked the District's school board to terminate plaintiff's
  employment, but the board decided not to do so after members of plaintiff's
  staff and the community showed support for plaintiff at a public meeting.
   
       ¶  4.  In the fall of 2001, Dr. Van Hoof again began accusing
  plaintiff of poor job performance, issuing several negative reports on his
  performance.  On November 9, 2001, Dr. Van Hoof compiled these reports into
  a single evaluation, which he provided to the board.  On November 28,
  plaintiff met with the board to discuss this evaluation.  At that meeting,
  the board invited plaintiff and Dr. Van Hoof into an executive session,
  where the board, plaintiff, and Dr. Van Hoof briefly discussed Dr. Van
  Hoof's evaluation of plaintiff.  The board then presented plaintiff with a
  document entitled "Settlement and Release Agreement," along with a copy of
  plaintiff's employment contract and a copy of 16 V.S.A. § 243, the statute
  governing the employment of school principals.  The board gave plaintiff
  the choice of resigning, pursuant to the agreement, with full pay and
  benefits, or facing immediate termination.  Plaintiff did not respond to
  the request for his resignation, and the board informed him that he would
  be placed on administrative leave until the board received his response. 
  The board ordered plaintiff not to talk to anyone but his immediate family,
  his attorney, and his financial advisor about the proposed agreement or the
  decision to place him on administrative leave.

       ¶  5.  On December 19, 2001, the board met again and voted to place
  plaintiff on paid administrative leave for the remainder of the 2001-02
  school year.  It also voted not to renew plaintiff's employment contract. 
  Neither issue was part of the board's agenda.  The board's decision
  appeared in an article in the December 20 edition of the Rutland Herald,
  under the headline, "BRHS principal is fired by the Board; Personnel
  evaluation is cited."  The article stated that the board had made its
  decision on the basis of Dr. Van Hoof's evaluation of plaintiff's
  performance, but also based on "potentially costly and damaging reasons"
  that were "not fit for public review."  The article quoted board member
  John Perry as saying that revealing the true reasons for the board's
  actions would be "doing a great disservice."  Perry said that by doing so,
  he "would be putting the taxpayers in jeopardy. . . .  It is incredibly
  frustrating not to be able to stand up and tell you why I [voted to fire
  [plaintiff]).  You all would pay for it."  Dr. Van Hoof was quoted in the
  article as saying, "For [plaintiff] to sit there and lead people to believe
  that he doesn't know why he's at this point, that's ridiculous."
   
       ¶  6.  On December 20, the board sent plaintiff two letters formally
  informing him of its actions.  The first letter stated that the board had
  voted to place him on "a paid leave of absence for the remainder of the
  2001/02 school year," during which he would be "relieved of all duties,
  responsibilities and authority."  The second letter stated that the board
  had voted not to renew plaintiff's contract for the 2002-03 school year,
  "based upon the performance deficiencies as set forth in the
  Superintendent's November 9, 2001 performance evaluation."  The letter
  continued,

    As provided by your Employment Contract and state statute, you
    have fifteen (15) calendar days from the delivery of this letter
    to request a meeting with the School Board concerning the
    non-renewal.  If you request such a meeting, you will be allowed
    to "present written information or oral information through
    statements of others and you may be represented by counsel."  If
    you request such a meeting, it will be held in executive session
    unless both you and the Board agree to hold the matter in public. 
    After such a meeting, the School Board shall decide whether or not
    to offer you an opportunity to renew your contract and any such
    decision by the Board shall be final.

  Plaintiff responded with a written request for a public hearing and meeting
  regarding both the decision to place him on administrative leave and the
  decision not to renew the contract.  The board agreed to schedule a hearing
  for January 11, 2002, on the nonrenewal of plaintiff's contract, but
  declined to engage in any further consideration of its decision to place
  plaintiff on leave, explaining that "[n]othing in your contract or 16
  V.S.A. § 243 provides for a challenge to such an action.  As such, we will
  not be dealing with this issue at the January 11 meeting."
   
       ¶  7.  On January 11, 2002, the board met with plaintiff to
  reconsider its nonrenewal of plaintiff's contract.  The meeting was not
  public.  At the meeting, plaintiff presented witnesses and submitted
  documents rebutting some of the allegations in Dr. Van Hoof's evaluation. 
  On January 16, the board notified plaintiff in writing that his contract
  still would not be renewed.  After receiving this letter, plaintiff sought
  employment with other school districts, including districts in other
  states, but was unsuccessful.  He alleges he lost one job opportunity when
  a local newspaper republished a report about the board's decision to place
  him on administrative leave.

       ¶  8.  In May 2003, plaintiff brought an action in the superior court. 
  His complaint alleged that defendants: (1) deprived him of due process
  under color of state law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violated his
  employment contract and his statutory rights as a principal; (3) committed
  defamation; and (4) discriminated against him on the basis of race in
  violation of the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act.  The complaint also
  contained a request for punitive damages and attorneys' fees.  Defendants
  moved for summary judgment on all counts.  The court granted defendants'
  motion in part, entering judgment in defendants' favor on the due process
  and contractual claims.  It concluded that the January 11, 2002 board
  meeting satisfied the demands of due process, and that the District was not
  contractually or statutorily required to provide plaintiff with a hearing
  specific to its decision to place plaintiff on administrative leave.  The
  court denied summary judgment on the defamation and discrimination claims. 
  These claims were tried before a jury; the jury found in favor of
  defendants on both counts.  This appeal followed.
   
       ¶  9.  On appeal, plaintiff does not challenge the jury's verdict. 
  Instead, he contends the superior court erred by granting summary judgment
  on the first two counts of his complaint.  We review a trial court's
  decision on summary judgment according to the same standard as the trial
  court.  In re Kurrelmeyer, 2006 VT 19, ¶ 7, 17 Vt. L. Wk. 66,