Case Title: Fulmer v. State

Citation: 230 N.E.2d 307, 249 Ind. 261

Docket Number: 30,684

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1967-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
249 Ind. 261 (1967)
230 N.E.2d 307
FULMER
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,684.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed October 19, 1967.
Rehearing denied December 21, 1967.
*262 Palmer K. Ward, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Raymond I. Klagiss, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
LEWIS, J.
A jury in Marion County Criminal Court, Division Two, convicted Kenneth Clayton Fulmer of Murder in the Second Degree on an indictment charging him with Murder in the First Degree. The issues formed at the trial were on the indictment with a plea of not guilty and a second affirmative plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Fulmer complains here of the following errors allegedly committed during his trial:
The fourth assignment of error will be treated later in this opinion.
On September 21, 1964, Fulmer and an accomplice planned to rob a taxicab driver. In pursuing such plans, they went to *263 Woodruff Place in the City of Indianapolis, memorized a street address, and returned to the center of Indianapolis; in particular, to the Bus Terminal Building. The appellant then hailed a taxicab and directed the driver to take him to the address in Woodruff Place. At the time he arrived at the address the appellant drew a .25 caliber automatic weapon and instructed the victim driver that it was a holdup and demanded the cash. The driver turned and faced the appellant and as he turned caused the lights in the interior of the cab to be turned on. A struggle ensued with the gun being discharged. The driver was mortally wounded. The appellant Fulmer fled the scene, but his flight was observed by several witnesses. The accomplice assisted the appellant by picking him up after the ill-fated robbery and appellant went to the home of a friend. The friend later testified that Fulmer made inconsistent statements as to whether or not he had participated in the robbery of the cab driver.
There was other evidence that appellant had made admission against interest to the effect that he had "shot a guy." Appellant himself testified to facts substantially as above set out. Extrajudicial statements should not be admitted into evidence until there is proof of the corpus delicti of the offense charged. Generally speaking, a trial judge in his discretion controls the order of proof. Hart v. State (1942), 220 Ind. 469, 44 N.E.2d 346. However, this general rule is limited by a line of respectable authority to the effect that the corpus delicti must be proven before the extrajudicial confessions and statements are received. Dennis v. State (1951), 230 Ind. 210, 102 N.E.2d 650, quoting with authority from Gaines v. State (1921), 191 Ind. 262, 132 N.E. 580, Hunt v. State (1939), 216 Ind. 171, 23 N.E.2d 681.
Prior to the time any extrajudicial statements were admitted here, we found evidence to be substantially as follows: A taxicab was left standing in Woodruff Place with the motor running and two doors open; the victim was lying beside it; the victim's blood was splashed upon the cab; a spent .25 caliber *264 casing was found in the vehicle; several witnesses testified they saw a person flee from the cab after having heard a noise similar to a gun discharging; a deputy coroner testified that the victim died as the result of a bullet lodged in the right lung. It is our opinion that the foregoing posture of the evidence was sufficient showing of the corpus delicti of the offense charged for the Court to admit out-of-court statements.
Appellant's next contention concerns the admission of certain evidence over objection, which evidence concerned other offenses separate and independent from the offense charged. We include here a part of the record so as to have a thorough understanding of appellant's contention on this point:
Generally speaking we reaffirm the law in a criminal prosecution; that if there is evidence of the defendant committing another crime, separate and independent from the offense charged, even though it is similar, it is irrelevant and inadmissible. State v. Robbins (1943), 221 Ind. 125, 46 N.E.2d 691
Layton v. State (1966), 248 Ind. 52, 221 N.E.2d 881, concerned one exception to the above rule; that being, where the other crime tends to establish the identity of the person who committed the crime at issue. During the trial evidence of the defendant's other crimes were introduced; however, the other crimes didn't, in reality, tend to prove the identity of the perpetrator. In reversing the Trial Court, this Court said:
"This court has previously held:
*268 The opinion concludes by stating that since these other crimes only show that the appellant previously committed armed robbery and are void of peculiar characteristics connected with the crime at issue, they do not fit into any one of the exceptions to the general rule. It was held reversible error to admit them into evidence.
The case at bar concerned a different exception to the general rule; that being, where a plea of insanity is entered as a defense to a homicide. Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. II, § 228, states the following rule concerning the admission of other acts when a plea of insanity is entered:
In interpreting this passage it would appear that anything is admissible into evidence when a plea of insanity is entered by the defense. The exclusionary rules, and the protection to the defendant afforded by them are relaxed. Highly prejudicial and/or inflammatory matter which, in reality, gives no aid to the jury in their task is admitted. Obviously this is a dangerous situation to say the least with the defense having to enter its plea and then take its chances as to what an overzealous prosecutor may present.
The Indiana law in this area may be stated thusly:
It will be noted that the Indiana law uses the words, relevant acts and conducts. (our emphasis) In looking to other sources on this subject, the following passages are helpful.
In these passages, as well, the language of "relevant" and "must throw some light on the question" is used.
In Coffey v. State (1943), 244 Ala. 514, 14 So. 2d 122, this question was specifically dealt with. While that Court stated wide latitude is allowed the Trial Court, they also concluded that the broad expressions had been modified in a previous case (Mitchell v. Parker (1932), 224 Ala. 149, 138 So. 832) by saying, "Of course, this expression must be understood to carry the necessary limitation that the acts inquired about must throw some light upon the inquiry." Also, the following statement from George v. State (1941), 240 Ala. 632, 200 So. 602, was set out in Coffey v. State, supra:
In the case at bar, after reviewing the evidence elicited by the prosecuting attorney from Mr. Dyer concerning other acts of the appellant while in the company of Dyer and Bob Pearson, we do conclude that this story of the anti-social and unconventional conduct of the appellant may have been relevant to show the mental condition of the appellant. We are unable to determine whether this evidence was offered by the State of Indiana in an effort to show that the appellant was not insane *270 at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the indictment, or that he was just an anti-social individual.
Under the doctrine of Kiefer v. State, supra, we are not in a position here to hold that the evidence elicited by the prosecuting attorney and covered by specification of error No. 4 was not relevant under the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
The trial judge had all of the evidence and was in a position to determine what evidence was relevant to the issue of insanity. In the examination of the record presented and the argument presented on appeal, we do not here make a finding contrary to that of the trial judge. We do, however, reiterate it is the law of Indiana that under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the general rule is that there is great latitude in admitting evidence of other conduct of the defendant, but it is limited to the extent that such conduct must be relevant to the issue of insanity. (our emphasis) Kiefer v. State, supra; Baker v. State, supra.
In Kiefer v. State, supra, at one point in the decision, this Court omitted the word "relevant"; but, we are confident this is a scrivener's error, and when we examine that opinion and realize that the Court relied on Baker v. State, supra, we do here re-affirm the law to be that the acts and conduct of the person involved, to be admissible, must be relevant under the issues formed. It is always difficult to determine relevancy and perhaps the explanation set out in 29 Am.Jur.2d, § 353, supra, is helpful, when the terminology of "throw a light on the mental condition of the defendant" is used.
The Trial Court did everything possible to confine the questioned evidence to a consideration and determination of the defendant's sanity or insanity. The Court gave the defendant's requested Instruction No. 23 among its final instructions, which reads as follows:
We do not find error in the ruling of the Trial Court on the admissibility of the evidence encompassed in appellant's specification No. 4.
The evidence presented by appellee was sufficient to prove each and every material allegation of the indictment. The verdict of the jury of Second Degree Murder is sustained by ample evidence and is not contrary to law. The appellant in this case was afforded a fair trial; the defense presented for him was professional and skillful.
The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.
Hunter, C.J., Arterburn and Mote, JJ., concur.
Jackson, J., Dissents without opinion.
NOTE.  Reported in 230 N.E.2d 307.