Case Title: Ex parte John Cooper

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1200269

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2021-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: September 30, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2021
____________________
1200269
____________________
Ex parte John R. Cooper
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: William Jeff Hulsey and Traci Bullard
v.
John R. Cooper)
(Morgan Circuit Court, CV-20-900027)
PARKER, Chief Justice.
John R. Cooper, the director of the Alabama Department of
Transportation ("ALDOT"), seeks a writ of mandamus directing the
1200269
Morgan Circuit Court to dismiss an action commenced against him by
William Jeff Hulsey and Traci Bullard. Because Hulsey's and Bullard's
claims were based on Cooper's official duties as director, he was entitled
to a dismissal based on State immunity, and we grant his petition.
I. Facts
Hulsey was injured when he lost control of his vehicle during a
winter weather event. Hulsey and Bullard, his common-law wife, sued
Cooper, individually, for damages: Hulsey based on personal injury,
Bullard based on loss of consortium. Hulsey and Bullard alleged that
ALDOT employees made the road surface slick by applying an improper
mixture of anti-icing brine and diesel fuel to it, then aggravated the
slickness by flushing the road with water, then failed to warn drivers and
close the road. Hulsey and Bullard also alleged that Cooper failed to
supervise and train ALDOT employees and to ensure that they followed
ALDOT policies. Cooper moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
these claims were barred by State immunity and State-agent immunity.
The circuit court denied Cooper's motion, and he seeks mandamus review.
II. Standard of Review
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"A writ of mandamus will be issued only when (1) the petitioner has
a clear legal right to it, (2) a respondent has refused to perform a duty, (3)
there is no other adequate remedy, and (4) the petitioned court has
jurisdiction." Ex parte Boone Newspapers, Inc., [Ms. 1190995, Feb. 12,
2021] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2021). A trial court's denial of a motion to
dismiss grounded on immunity is reviewable by mandamus. Ex parte
Branch, 980 So. 2d 981, 984 (Ala. 2007). And we review such a denial de
novo; that is, we accept the complaint's allegations as true and determine
whether the plaintiff may possibly prevail. Ex parte Burkes Mech., Inc.,
306 So. 3d 1, 3 (Ala. 2019).
III. Analysis
Under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution, "the State of Alabama shall
never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." Art. I, § 14, Ala.
Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.). Section 14 is a jurisdictional bar to claims
against the State itself, State agencies, and State officers and employees
who are sued for damages in their official capacities. Ex parte Alabama
Dep't of Transp., 985 So. 2d 892, 894, 895 (Ala. 2007); Ex parte Moulton,
116 So. 3d 1119, 1130-31 (Ala. 2013). In particular, State officers and
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employees "are immune from suit when the action against them is, in
effect, one against the State." Barnhart v. Ingalls, 275 So. 3d 1112, 1122
(Ala. 2018).
In Barnhart, this Court held that a purported individual-capacity
claim is, in effect, one against the State when the duty allegedly breached
is owed solely because of the officer or employee's official position. Id. at
1125-27. In applying this test to the facts of Barnhart, this Court held that
the plaintiffs' backpay claims against State officers individually were
actually claims against the State because the officers' duty to apply wage
laws existed solely because of their official positions. Id. at 1126.
Similarly, in Anthony v. Datcher, 321 So. 3d 643, 653 (Ala. 2020), this
Court held that damages claims against a State educational official
individually for misclassifying positions of college instructors for salary
purposes were actually barred official-capacity claims because the official's
duty to properly classify the positions existed only because of her official
position. Most recently, in Meadows v. Shaver, [Ms. 1180134, Nov. 20,
2020] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2020), a plurality of this Court determined
that claims against a circuit clerk individually for failing to transmit a
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criminal sentence-status transcript were, in substance, official-capacity
claims because the clerk's alleged duties relating to the transcript existed
only because of her position.
Here, Cooper argues that the duties he allegedly breached existed
solely because of his official position as director of ALDOT. Hulsey and
Bullard's complaint alleged that Cooper owed the following duties:
- "to keep the roadway in repair and in a reasonably safe
condition" 
- "to not act wilfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith,
beyond [his] authority, and/or under a mistaken interpretation
of the law while engaging in [his] ALDOT employment duties"
- "to follow ALDOT policies, procedures, regulations, and
guidelines relating to the hiring, training, supervision, and
retention of employees"
- "to ensure that [ALDOT] policies were being followed by
ALDOT employees"
Cooper is correct that each of these alleged duties existed only
because he was the director of ALDOT. Apart from his official position,
Cooper owed no duty to keep the roadway in repair, to properly perform
ALDOT employment duties, to follow ALDOT policies, or to ensure that
ALDOT policies were being followed by ALDOT employees. Thus, Hulsey's
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and Bullard's  claims against Cooper were actually official-capacity claims;
they were, in effect, claims against the State that were barred by State
immunity.
Hulsey and Bullard argue that the claims were not barred by State
immunity because, they assert, Cooper sought State immunity "based
solely on the title of his office, rather than the nature of the suit."
However, as discussed above, Cooper's allegedly breached duties existed
solely because of his official position. Under Barnhart and its progeny,
that fact entitled Cooper to State immunity based on the "nature of [the]
claims," Barnhart, 275 So. 3d at 1126 (emphasis omitted); see Anthony,
321 So. 3d at 653; Meadows, ___ So. 3d at ___, not merely the " ' "character
of the office," ' " Barnhart, 275 So. 3d at 1122 (citations omitted).
Hulsey and Bullard also contend that the complaint's "allegations ...
allow[ed] [their] claims to circumvent [State] immunity." They appear to
be referring to the allegations that Cooper "acted willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond [his] authority, and/or under a mistaken
interpretation of the law." But those allegations related to State-agent
immunity under Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000) (plurality
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opinion),1 not State immunity under § 14. As clarified in Moulton,
allegations that a State officer or employee acted willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his authority, or under a mistaken
interpretation of the law do not circumvent State immunity under § 14
when the claim is, in effect, one against the State (i.e., actually an official-
capacity claim). 116 So. 3d at 1138-41. And as discussed above, the claims
here were in substance official-capacity claims. Thus, the complaint's
allegations did not circumvent State immunity.
Finally, Hulsey and Bullard argue that, under DeStafney v.
University of Alabama, 413 So. 2d 391, 395 (Ala. 1981), a personal-injury
claim based on negligence of a State officer or employee is not barred by
State immunity if the officer or employee was not exercising a
discretionary function. Hulsey and Bullard point out that Cooper made no
argument that he was exercising a discretionary function. Again, Hulsey
and Bullard conflate State immunity with State-agent immunity. In
1A majority of this Court adopted the Cranman plurality's
restatement of State-agent-immunity law in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d
173, 177-78 (Ala. 2000).
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DeStafney, which was decided before Cranman's restatement of State-
agent-immunity law, this Court applied a discretionary-function analysis,
derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D, to claims asserted
against a State agent individually. 413 So. 2d at 393-96. DeStafney's
discretionary-function analysis has now been superseded by the Cranman
restatement. See Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 402-04 (discussing DeStafney's
analysis within Cranman's summary of prior State-agent-immunity
jurisprudence before articulating Cranman's restatement). And as noted
above, that restatement applies only to State-agent immunity, not State
immunity. 
Because Hulsey's and Bullard's claims against Cooper were, in
effect, official-capacity claims against the State, they were not claims
against him individually. Thus, we need not address the parties'
arguments regarding whether Cooper was entitled to State-agent
immunity under Cranman.
IV. Conclusion
Hulsey's and Bullard's claims against Cooper were barred by State
immunity. Accordingly, we grant Cooper's petition and issue a writ of
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mandamus directing the circuit court to dismiss Hulsey's and Bullard's
claims.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ.,
concur.
Sellers, J., concurs in the result.
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