Case Title: In re Gabriel W.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 133

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 133 
Docket: 
Yor-16-368 
Submitted 
On Briefs: June 14, 2017 
Decided: 
June 27, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE GABRIEL W. 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
 
[¶1]  The parents of Gabriel W. appeal from a judgment entered by the 
District Court (Biddeford, Janelle, J.) terminating their parental rights to the 
child pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2) (2016).  Each challenges the court’s 
findings by clear and convincing evidence that they are unfit, and its finding 
that termination of their parental rights is in the child’s best interest.  
Additionally, the mother asserts that her right to due process was violated 
when the court amended its termination order without holding a new hearing.  
Because the evidence supports the court’s factual findings and discretionary 
determination, and because we conclude that the mother received due process, 
we affirm the judgment. 
A. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
[¶2]  Applying the statute, the court found by clear and convincing 
evidence that “the parents are unwilling or unable to protect the child from 
 
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jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time which is 
reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs. . . . The court next finds that 
termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.”1  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i).  We review the factual findings supporting the 
unfitness determinations for clear error, see In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23, ¶ 3, 
155 A.3d 430, and apply the same standard to the factual findings supporting 
the best interest determination, although we review the court’s ultimate 
conclusion that termination was in the child’s best interest “for an abuse of 
discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through the trial 
court’s lens,” giving the court’s judgment “substantial deference.”  In re Caleb M., 
2017 ME 66, ¶ 33, --- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶3]  The court’s factual findings are supported by competent evidence in 
the record and are therefore not clearly erroneous.  See In re M.B., 2013 ME 46, 
¶ 40, 65 A.3d 1260.  Concerning the father, the court found that he had not 
complied with his reunification plan and consequently reunification had been 
unsuccessful; had been inconsistent in visiting the child and had “struggled to 
connect” with the child since the child was placed in DHHS custody at five days 
                                         
1  The court made findings in an order entered July 18, 2016, and made additional determinations 
in an amended order entered August 5, 2016.  We address the mother’s contention that the second 
order violated her right to due process infra, but otherwise treat the orders as a single judgment. 
 
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old; had repeatedly indicated that parenting an infant would be too difficult 
given that he cared for two other young children; had failed to engage in 
services recommended by the Department and by his psychologist; and had not 
taken responsibility for any of the conditions that the court had previously 
found placed the child in jeopardy. 
 
[¶4]  Concerning the mother, the court found that the child was born 
drug-affected.  It further found that the mother does not have a home of her 
own, having lived with her aunt for over a year, although she “will begin 
working two different jobs, which she believes will help her eventually secure 
stable housing”; “struggle[s] with drug and alcohol addiction, as well as mental 
health issues,” having been diagnosed with “Generalized Anxiety Disorder, 
Generalized Depression . . . Opioid Dependence . . . [and] Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder”; “continue[s] to receive mental health and substance abuse 
treatment . . . [and] has been prescribed several medications, including 
Suboxone”; “continues to have relapses with alcohol and marijuana, 
demonstrated by positive urine screens”; has not successfully reunified with 
the child because she has not complied with her reunification plan; “fails to take 
responsibility for behavior that has impacted the wellbeing of her children”; 
 
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and “has not been consistent with her visitation with [the child], and has not 
been cooperative with the Department.” 
 
[¶5]  Finally, the court, citing its unfitness findings and the parents’ failed 
reunification efforts, found that “termination is in the best interest of [the 
child].  [The child] has been in the care of [the foster mother] practically his 
whole life.  [He] is happy in [her] care and has a close bond with her.” 
 
[¶6]  The court’s findings, based on evidence in the record, explaining 
why the parents cannot or are unwilling to protect the child from jeopardy 
within the time required by statute and why the child’s best interest requires 
termination, are sufficient to support the judgment.  The mother’s contention 
that the court erred in making those determinations because “DHHS did not 
engage in reasonable reunification efforts” is not persuasive on this record, and 
in any event, as we recently reiterated, “because the Department’s compliance 
with its reunification duties prescribed in 22 M.R.S. § 4041(1-A) [2016] is not a 
discrete element of proof in a termination proceeding, any failure of the 
Department to comply with those duties does not preclude a finding of parental 
unfitness.”  In re Magdalena F., 2016 ME 125, ¶ 9 n.3, 146 A.3d 1103 (citing 
In re Doris G., 2006 ME 142, ¶ 17, 912 A.2d 572). 
 
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B. 
Due Process 
 
[¶7]  The mother contends that it was a violation of due process for the 
court to make an explicit finding concerning her parental unfitness in an 
amended order without first holding a new hearing.  “We review de novo 
whether an individual was afforded procedural due process.  The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner.”  Mitchell v. Krieckhaus, 2017 ME 70, 
¶ 16, --- A.3d --- (alteration and quotation marks omitted).  More specifically, 
“[d]ue process requires: notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the 
right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to 
claims and evidence, and an impartial fact-finder.”  In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, 
¶ 21, --- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶8]  The mother was afforded each of those elements at the two-day 
hearing held on June 3 and June 14, 2016.2  In its July 18, 2016, judgment, the 
court found explicitly that termination was in the child’s best interest and made 
the findings concerning parental fitness recited supra, although it did not 
explicitly find that the mother was an unfit parent.  In its August 9, 2016, order 
                                         
2  The mother did not attend the first day of the hearing, but she was represented by counsel who 
fully participated. 
 
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amending the original judgment, the court found no new facts concerning the 
mother’s fitness.  The order stated: 
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parents 
are unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and 
these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time which is 
reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs.  In making this 
finding, the court hereby incorporates its findings from the July 18, 
2016[,] Termination Order. 
 
The court next finds that termination of parental rights is in the 
best interest of the child.  In making this finding, the court 
incorporates the findings of the July 18, 2016[,] Termination Order. 
 
The Court has independently reached this conclusion and applied 
its own independent analysis in arriving at these legal findings.  
This Order simply clarifies the Order in which the court makes its 
findings and that the court has specifically made these findings. 
 
(Emphasis added and numerical headings omitted.) 
 
[¶9]  Because the mother fully participated in the hearing from which the 
facts underlying the court’s legal judgment were derived—that is, she was 
“heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” Mitchell, 2017 ME 70, 
¶ 16, --- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted)—she was afforded due process. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Jesse James Ian Archer, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant Mother 
 
Rubin Guedalie Segal, Esq., Portland, for appellant Father 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Biddeford District Court docket number PC-2015-18 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY