Case Title: Schott v. Miller

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1997-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Schott v. Miller1997 WY 100943 P.2d 1174Case Number: 96-296Decided: 08/07/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

ANN PAULA SCHOTT,  

Appellant (Plaintiff), 

 

v. 

 

CHARLES W. MILLER and SUSAN D. 
MILLER,  

Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Natrona County 

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

J. Patrick 
Hand of Hand & Campbell, P.C., Douglas.

Representing 
Appellees: 

Charles S. 
Chapin of Crowell & Chapin, P.C., Casper.

 

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

MACY, Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellant Ann 
Schott appeals from the summary judgment which was entered in favor of Appellees 
Charles Miller and Susan Miller.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Schott presents 
three issues on appeal:

 

A. Did the District Court err in granting summary 
judgment to Appellees?

B. Having received and heard arguments upon all of 
the matters contained in the file and depositions of the parties, without 
objection from the Court nor from Appellee[s], did the District Court err in 
refusing to allow the filing of said materials and depositions as part of the 
record?

C. Does the Order granting Summary Judgment go beyond 
the decision letter and rulings or findings of the District 
Court?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Schott acquired 
certain rural property in 1976 which was located in Natrona County. Prior to 
obtaining title to the property, she entered into a right-of-way agreement with 
Natrona County wherein Natrona County allowed her to place a water well and 
pipelines on land which was designated as a county road. The agreement provided 
in relevant part:

THIRD: The Board [of County Commissioners] reserves 
the right to use, occupy and enjoy its right-of-way, in such manner and at such 
times as it shall desire. If any such use shall at any time reasonab[ly] 
necessitate any change in location or manner of [use] of said improvements, or 
any part thereof, such change or alteration shall be made by . . . Schott, at 
the sole expense of . . . Schott, or upon the demand of the Board through the 
County Highway Superintendent, and neither the Board nor the County of Natrona 
shall be liable to . . . Schott on account thereof, or on account of any damage 
growing out of any use which the County of Natrona or the Board, or either of 
them, may make of its county road right-of-way.

FOURTH: The County of Natrona and the Board, for the 
purpose of this right-of-way, hereby disclaim any representation or implication 
that it retains any title in any county road right-of-way other than a perpetual 
easement for road purposes for so much land as described by the instrument 
conveying such easement and f[u]rther disclaims any interest in and to the well 
located pursuant hereto except as herein specifically set 
forth.

. . . Schott accepts notice and agrees that any 
expenses or damages incurred by . . . Schott t[hr]ough the abandonment, removal, 
reconstruction or alteration of any county road incurred by . . . Schott at no 
expense whatsoever to the Board or to the County of 
Natrona.

. 
. . .

SIXTH: That this right-of-way shall be revocable by 
the Board in its discretion and after six month[s'] written notice to . . . 
Schott.

SEVENTH: The term of this right-of-way shall be for 
ninety-nine years from and after this date and shall be thereafter renewable by 
. . . Schott or her heirs, assigns or personal representatives upon such terms 
and conditions as may be then negotiated between the 
parties.

 

Schott constructed the well 
and put the water to beneficial use.

 

[¶5]      In 1990, the 
Millers acquired title to property that adjoined Schott's property and that was 
traversed by the county road on which Schott's well and pipelines were located. 
In 1992, Natrona County vacated the portion of the county road where the well 
and a portion of the pipelines were located and quitclaimed its interest in that 
land to Susan Miller. It did not reserve Schott's right-of-way in the resolution 
vacating the road or in the quitclaim deed.

 

[¶6]      On May 24, 1995, 
the Millers notified Schott that they were exercising their right under the 
terms of the right-of-way agreement to revoke her right-of-way. In response to 
the notice, Schott filed an action in the district court, asserting that she had 
an interest in the property over which the vacated road passed for the purposes 
of maintaining and operating her well and pipelines. She claimed that she had an 
interest in the property by virtue of adverse possession and under the terms of 
the agreement with Natrona County.

 

[¶7]      The Millers filed 
an answer and a counterclaim. They asked the district court to confirm their 
title to the property and to order Schott to remove her well and pipelines from 
their property or to sell the equipment to them. The Millers subsequently filed 
a motion for a summary judgment.

 

[¶8]      The district 
court held a hearing on the Millers' summary judgment motion. During that 
hearing, Schott apparently relied on excerpts from the parties' depositions in 
making her arguments. She requested that the deposition transcripts be included 
in the record; however, the district court denied her 
request.

 

[¶9]      After the hearing 
had concluded, the district court issued a decision letter in which it found 
that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that the Millers were 
entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. The district court, therefore, 
granted the Millers' motion for a summary judgment. Schott appealed to this 
Court.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶10]   A summary judgment is appropriate 
when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the prevailing 
party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164, 1166 
(Wyo. 1996); see also W.R.C.P. 56(c). 
We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who 
opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. JCI v. TL By TL (Paternity of TS), 917 P.2d 183, 185 (Wyo. 1996). We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by 
employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were employed 
and used by the lower court. Scott v. Scott, 918 P.2d 198, 199 (Wyo. 1996). We 
do not accord any deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. 
Koopman By and Through Koopman v. Fremont 
County School District, 911 P.2d 1049, 1051 (Wyo. 
1996).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶11]   Schott contends that the district 
court erred by granting the Millers' motion for a summary judgment.1 She argues that Natrona County 
improperly vacated the road. The district court concluded that Schott could not 
assert this claim because Natrona County was not joined as a party in the 
lawsuit.

 

[¶12]   This Court has stated that, after a 
county has established a public road, the public has a vested right to use the 
road and that the county cannot vacate or abandon the road unless it follows the 
appropriate statutory procedures. Sare v. 
Sheridan County Board of County Commissioners, 784 P.2d 593, 595 (Wyo. 
1989); Board of County Commissioners, 
Carbon County v. White, 547 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Wyo. 1976). When a party 
attempts to collaterally attack the validity of the proceedings which 
established or vacated a road or highway, however, the board of county 
commissioners is entitled to be given the presumption that the proceedings were 
valid. See Sheridan County v. Spiro, 
697 P.2d 290, 295 (Wyo. 1985). Accordingly, the county is a necessary party in 
an action in which the propriety of the county's proceedings is at issue. See id.; White, 547 P.2d  at 1198. The 
district court was, therefore, correct when it concluded that the issue of 
whether Natrona County had followed the procedures for vacating the road was not 
properly before it because Natrona County had not been joined as a party to the 
lawsuit.

 

[¶13]   We consider next what effect the 
vacation of the county road had upon Schott's right-of-way.2 Schott argues that her right-of-way 
continued to exist after the road was vacated.

 

[¶14]   W.S. 24-3-126(c)(i) provides that, 
upon proper vacation of a public road, "all title and interest . . . to the 
highway right-of-way shall pass to and vest in the present adjacent landowner." 
Although this statutory section specifically refers to only state highways, the 
rule embodied in the language is generally accepted. If the public has an 
easement on the land occupied by a highway, the title reverts to the fee owners 
upon vacation of the highway, and exclusive possession of the land is restored 
to the owners. 39 AM.JUR.2D Highways, 
Streets, and Bridges § 184 (1968). The rule, therefore, applies to county 
roads as well.

 

[¶15]   The legislature has, however, 
statutorily mandated that an abandonment or vacation of a road will not affect 
certain rights. Corporations may continue to operate and maintain facilities 
associated with public utilities on vacated or abandoned roads. See W.S. 24-3-126(c), 1-26-813.3 Counties also have the right to 
reserve access rights for landowners when they change the designation of a road 
from public to private. W.S. 24-3-101(c).4 Since the legislature provided that 
all title and interest to the vacated portion of a county road reverts to the 
adjacent landowner subject to only a few designated exceptions, it follows that 
any other special rights-of-way, licenses, or privileges which a county has 
granted to individuals would be extinguished upon vacation of the road and 
relinquishment of the public's interest in the road. W.S. 24-3-126(c), 
-101(c).

 

[¶16]   In this case, Natrona County 
granted a right-of-way to Schott for the construction and maintenance of her 
water well. The right-of-way agreement clearly informed Schott that Natrona 
County held a mere easement in the property for public road purposes. Schott did 
not object to Natrona County vacating the road, and Natrona County did not, in 
its vacation resolution or in the quitclaim deed to the Millers, refer to 
Schott's right-of-way. Additionally, Schott does not operate a public utility. 
We conclude, therefore, that the exclusive title and interest to the property 
passed to the Millers and that Schott's right-of-way was extinguished when 
Natrona County vacated the road and relinquished its interest in the property 
without reserving the right-of-way.

 

[¶17]   Further, under the clear and 
unambiguous terms of the right-of-way agreement which Schott entered into with 
Natrona County, the right-of-way was revocable at Natrona County's discretion 
provided that Natrona County gave Schott six months' notice. The Millers, as 
successors to Natrona County's interest in the property, followed the revocation 
procedure given in the agreement. Any interest that Schott had in the property 
was, therefore, effectively terminated. Schott spends a great deal of space and 
effort in her brief in arguing that the Millers had notice that her well existed 
when they purchased their property. Whether or not the Millers had notice that 
the well and pipelines existed is irrelevant because the right-of-way was 
terminated upon vacation of the road and under the express terms of the 
right-of-way agreement.

 

[¶18]   Schott also takes issue with the 
district court's refusal to allow the deposition transcripts to be included in 
the record. She does not, however, explain the significance of the transcripts 
or how she was prejudiced by the district court's refusal to allow them to be 
included in the court file. No genuine issue of material fact existed in this 
case, and Schott has not convinced us that the inclusion of the deposition 
transcripts was necessary. Any error which may have been committed by the 
district court in failing to allow the deposition transcripts to be included in 
the record was, therefore, harmless. W.R.C.P. 61; W.R.A.P. 
9.04.

 

[¶19]   Affirmed.

 

Footnotes

1 Schott does not make a separate or 
distinct argument concerning her third issue in which she claimed that the 
summary judgment order went beyond the district court's decision letter and 
findings. We will not, therefore, address that issue 
individually.

2 Schott does not challenge the district 
court's decision that she was not entitled to have an easement on the basis of 
adverse possession. Schott has, therefore, conceded that issue, and the district 
court's ruling on the matter stands. Hermreck v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 
938 P.2d 863, 865 (Wyo. 1997).

3 W.S. 24-3-126(c) provides in pertinent 
part:

(c) . . . 
Abandonment or relinquishment shall not affect the rights of corporations or 
their successors in interest acquired under the provisions of W.S. 1-26-813 to 
continue the operation and maintenance of transmission and distribution lines 
constructed upon the right-of-way and shall not affect the rights of any 
corporation or successors in interest to continue to maintain any facility 
lawfully in the highway right-of-way at the time of any abandonment or 
relinquishment. Corporations shall have the right to go upon these lands for the 
purposes associated with maintenance or use of their 
facility.

W.S. 1-26-813 
provides in pertinent part:

Corporations 
authorized to do business in this state for the purpose of constructing, 
maintaining and operating a public utility may set their fixtures and facilities 
along, across or under any of the public roads, streets and waters of this state 
in such manner as not to inconvenience the public in their 
use.

4 W.S. 24-3-101(c) 
provides:

(c) In altering 
any county highway under this article or any other road dedicated by recorded 
plat as a public road, a board of county commissioners may change the 
designation of any road to a private road. If a board alters any road, it shall 
reserve the access rights of the area landowners and permit governmental 
agencies to retain access to that road for performing essential public services. 
It may also designate a nongovernmental entity to be responsible for the 
maintenance of any road altered pursuant to this 
section.