Case Title: State ex rel. Greene County Board of Commissioners v. O'Diam

Citation: 2019-Ohio-1676

Docket Number: 2018-0399

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. O’Diam, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-1676.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-1676 
THE STATE EX REL. GREENE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ET AL. v. 
O’DIAM, JUDGE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. O’Diam, Slip 
Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-1676.] 
Prohibition—Writ sought to prevent probate-court judge from enforcing orders 
concerning control of courtroom currently under the control of general 
division of common pleas court—Judge does not have inherent authority to 
issue order allowing him to take control of courthouse space that is already 
under the control of another judge—Writ granted with qualification. 
(No. 2018-0399—Submitted February 19, 2019—Decided May 7, 2019.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this original action, relators, the Greene County Board of 
Commissioners (“the board”) and Greene County, seek a writ prohibiting a 
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common-pleas-court judge from enforcing his orders concerning the control of 
Courtroom 3 in the Greene County Courthouse.  Courtroom 3 is currently under the 
control of the General Division of the Greene County Court of Common Pleas.  But 
Judge Thomas O’Diam of the probate division of the Greene County Court of 
Common Pleas has ordered the board to designate the room as the probate 
division’s courtroom and to provide the probate division exclusive use of the room 
three days a week.  In a related case currently pending before us, case No. 2018-
0447, Judge O’Diam seeks a writ of mandamus to enforce his orders. 
{¶ 2} Judge O’Diam has filed a motion to dismiss this case.  Also, the Ohio 
Association of Probate Judges has filed a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae 
memorandum in support of Judge O’Diam’s motion to dismiss, and the two judges 
of the general division of the Greene County Court of Common Pleas have filed a 
motion to intervene as relators. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 3} Judge O’Diam engaged in a year-long effort to persuade the board and 
the general-division judges that the probate division needs a full-sized courtroom 
dedicated to its proceedings.  That effort was not successful, and on March 5, 2018, 
Judge O’Diam issued an order setting forth the following mandates: 
 
1. The Greene County Board of Commissioners shall 
immediately, by appropriate resolution, designate Courtroom 3 as 
the permanent Probate Court courtroom on the terms described on 
Exhibit A attached to this Judgment Entry and Order [the principal 
term being exclusive probate-court control three days a week], 
without any modification, conditions or stipulations of any kind. 
2. The Greene County Board of Commissioners shall pass 
the resolution making this designation in full compliance with this 
January Term, 2019 
 
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Judgment Entry and Order at the Board’s next regularly scheduled 
meeting on March 8, 2018. 
3. The Greene County Board of Commissioners shall further 
pay directly from the County’s General Fund pursuant to statute, or 
reimburse this Court for, its reasonable and necessary legal fees and 
expenses arising out of, occasioned by, or directly or indirectly 
relating to this Judgment Entry and Order, and any subsequent 
mandamus action or similar proceeding this Court may institute 
against the Board because of the Board’s failure or refusal to comply 
with this Judgment Entry and Order. 
 
{¶ 4} In response, on March 6, 2018, the general-division judges entered an 
order that expressed their intent “to maintain sole and exclusive management of the 
lower area of the Greene County Courthouse [which is where Courtroom 3 is 
located] for use by the General Division and benefit of other agencies.” 
{¶ 5} The board met on March 8 and considered the two conflicting orders.  
After an executive session, they passed Resolution No. 18-3-8-26, which directed 
the county administrator to construct office space and a courtroom for the probate 
division, paid for from the county’s general fund, in the lower level of the Juvenile 
Justice Center building. 
{¶ 6} On March 13, 2018, Judge O’Diam issued an order declaring the 
board’s March 8 resolution void, ordering that the resolution be rescinded, and 
enjoining the board from taking any action in furtherance of it. 
{¶ 7} The board and the county then filed the instant action, seeking a writ 
of prohibition preventing Judge O’Diam from enforcing his March 5 and 13 orders 
and prohibiting him from issuing further orders in the matter.  As mentioned 
previously herein, Judge O’Diam has filed a motion to dismiss. 
 
 
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ANALYSIS 
The motion for leave to file an amicus curiae memorandum 
{¶ 8} The Ohio Association of Probate Judges seeks leave to file an amicus 
curiae memorandum in support of Judge O’Diam’s motion to dismiss and has filed 
a proposed memorandum.  Although S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.06 authorizes the filing of 
amicus briefs without leave of court, that authorization does not extend to 
“memoranda before an alternative writ is granted.”  State ex rel. Duke Energy Ohio, 
Inc. v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 41, 2010-Ohio-2450, 
930 N.E.2d 299, ¶ 11.  Thus, it was proper for the probate-judges’ association to 
seek leave.  The motion is unopposed, and we hereby grant it. 
The motion to intervene 
{¶ 9} The general-division judges filed a motion to intervene as relators in 
this case, along with a proposed complaint.  Judge O’Diam filed a memorandum 
opposing intervention, asserting that the general-division judges’ motion was 
untimely and that the board adequately represents the interest of the general-
division judges as relators in this prohibition case. 
{¶ 10} Civ.R. 24(A)(2) provides that upon “timely application,” anyone 
shall be permitted to intervene in a cause of action, “when the applicant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and 
the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest, unless the 
applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.”  And Civ.R. 
24(B)(2) allows a court to permit an applicant’s intervention based on a showing 
that the applicant’s claim or defense has a question of law or fact in common with 
the “main action.”  In exercising its discretion, the court “shall consider whether 
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the 
original parties.” 
January Term, 2019 
 
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{¶ 11} Although the general-division judges incontestably possess an 
interest in preventing the enforcement of Judge O’Diam’s orders, and although 
obtaining a writ of prohibition would help them retain control of Courtroom 3, 
Judge O’Diam’s mandamus case (Supreme Court case No. 2018-0447, in which the 
general-division judges also seek to intervene) provides the opportunity for them to 
assert both jurisdictional and substantive defenses against the enforcement of Judge 
O’Diam’s orders.  Moreover, for purposes of asserting that Judge O’Diam lacked 
jurisdiction to issue his orders, relators adequately represent the general-division 
judges’ interest. 
{¶ 12} The complaint and exhibits show that the board, whose resolution 
directs the renovation of space for the probate division in the Juvenile Justice Center 
building, has taken the same position as the general-division judges and is seeking 
to keep Judge O’Diam from enforcing his orders.  Thus, relators seek the same 
ultimate goal as the general-division judges.  See Clarke v. Warren Cty. Commrs., 
12th Dist. Warren No. CA2000-01-009, 2000 WL 1336684 (Sept. 18, 2000), *3, 
quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clow, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-910511, 1992 
Ohio App. LEXIS 4957 (Sept. 30, 1992), *6 (“ ‘Where the party seeking to 
intervene has the same ultimate goal as a party already in the suit, courts have 
applied a presumption of adequate representation, and to overcome that 
presumption, applicants ordinarily must demonstrate adversity of interest, collusion 
or nonfeasance’ ”). 
{¶ 13} Additionally, in this case, it is the board, not the general division, 
that could be held in contempt of Judge O’Diam’s order, and the board has both the 
full incentive and no less capability to advance the strictly legal arguments in 
support of prohibition.  Because relators adequately represent the interest of the 
general-division judges, we deny intervention of right under Civ.R. 24(A). 
{¶ 14} We exercise our discretion to also deny permissive intervention 
under Civ.R. 24(B).  The issues in Judge O’Diam’s motion to dismiss the complaint 
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have been fully briefed, and granting intervention at this juncture would impose 
further delay because Judge O’Diam would need to be given the opportunity to 
respond to the intervenors’ complaint.  We hold that granting intervention under 
these circumstances would unduly delay our adjudication of this matter. 
The motion to dismiss 
{¶ 15} Judge O’Diam has moved to dismiss the complaint for a writ of 
prohibition.  “Dismissal of the prohibition complaint for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted is appropriate if, after presuming the truth of all 
factual allegations of the complaint and making all reasonable inferences in [the 
relator’s] favor, it appears beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts entitling 
him to the requested extraordinary writ of prohibition.”  State ex rel. Hemsley v. 
Unruh, 128 Ohio St.3d 307, 2011-Ohio-226, 943 N.E.2d 1014, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 16} To demonstrate entitlement to a writ of prohibition, relators must 
show (1) that Judge O’Diam has exercised judicial power, (2) that his exercise of 
judicial power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ would result in 
injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  See 
State ex rel. Richland Cty. Children Servs. v. Richland Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas, 152 Ohio St.3d 421, 2017-Ohio-9160, 97 N.E.3d 429, ¶ 8.  Because the first 
element is undisputedly met, we turn to the question whether Judge O’Diam’s 
exercise of judicial power was unauthorized by law. 
{¶ 17} Judge O’Diam relies on case law establishing that “[c]ommon pleas 
courts and their divisions possess inherent authority to order funding that is 
reasonable and necessary to the court’s administration of its business.”  State ex rel. 
Wilke v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 90 Ohio St.3d 55, 60, 734 N.E.2d 811 
(2000).  In evaluating appropriations made by boards of county commissioners in 
those cases, the court focused on “the separation of powers among the various 
branches of government.”  State ex rel. Johnston v. Taulbee, 66 Ohio St.2d 417, 
420, 423 N.E.2d 80 (1981). 
January Term, 2019 
 
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{¶ 18} Judge O’Diam is correct that our case law holds that courts may issue 
orders to secure both adequate funding and adequate facilities in the courthouse.  
We have held that a court’s “funding orders are presumed reasonable and [a board 
of county commissioners] bears the burden to rebut the presumption” when a court 
seeks a writ of mandamus to enforce such orders.  Wilke at 60, 65.  Similarly, we 
have held that a court has inherent judicial power to take control of space in a 
courthouse by judicial order when the space is reasonably necessary for the court’s 
operation.  See State ex rel. Bittikofer v. Babst, 97 Ohio St. 64, 119 N.E. 136 (1917); 
Zangerle v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 141 Ohio St. 70, 46 N.E.2d 
865 (1943); State ex rel. Finley v. Pfeiffer, 163 Ohio St. 149, 126 N.E.2d 57 (1955). 
{¶ 19} The complaint contends that Judge O’Diam lacked jurisdiction to 
issue orders requiring the board to designate Courtroom 3 as the probate-division’s 
courtroom.  But contrary to the overall theory of the complaint, courts do possess 
inherent powers related to funding and courtroom space.  Moreover, those inherent 
powers are enjoyed by all constitutionally recognized courts, including the probate 
courts.  In Finley, we specifically held that “the Probate Court is a court of general 
jurisdiction” for purposes of exercising inherent judicial authority.  Id. at 153.  And 
although the provisions of the Ohio Constitution related to the judicial system have 
been amended since Finley was decided, those changes do not affect our rationale 
in Finley.  It remains true that the probate division is “established by the 
Constitution”1 and that, like any other court, it “has full authority and power to deal 
with all the subjects entrusted to it.”  Finley at 153.  All such courts possess similar 
inherent powers related to funding and courtroom space. 
{¶ 20} That said, and as the motion to dismiss acknowledges, “the dispute 
over Courtroom 3 presents for the first time competing demands of two courts.”  
We therefore turn to relators’ assertion that the case law regarding the power of a 
                                                 
1 See Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(C). 
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judge to take control of space in a courthouse is inapposite in this case because 
Judge O’Diam “is not seeking to take Courtroom 3 from another officer of the 
County” but rather “from the General Division of the Common Pleas Court.”  As 
relators point out, “the General Division’s need to exercise its judicial functions is 
not inferior, or secondary, to the Probate Court’s similar need” and unlike the 
circumstances presented in the case law, the board in this case is being ordered by 
one judge to “disregard a simultaneous order by [other judges].” 
{¶ 21} Relators are correct that the case law on this issue involves judicial 
orders taking control of courthouse space occupied by administrative offices, not 
by other courts.  Bittikofer, 97 Ohio St. 64, 119 N.E. 136 (court order ousts the 
county school superintendent); Zangerle, 141 Ohio St. 70, 46 N.E.2d 865 (court 
order ousts the county auditor); Finley, 163 Ohio St. 149, 126 N.E.2d 57 (court 
order ousts the county recorder).  Each case involves the exercise of power by a 
court over space within a courthouse, and in each case, we endorsed the exercise of 
judicial power on the grounds that the executive branch may not usurp judicial 
authority in determining the use of courthouse space.  See Bittikofer at 66 (because 
the “judicial power is a separate and independent department of the government,” 
a courthouse “naturally and necessarily comes within the control of that 
department; otherwise a conflict of authority might seriously impede the 
administration of justice”); Zangerle at paragraphs one, two, and three of the 
syllabus (because the “purpose of a courthouse * * * is to furnish the rooms and 
facilities essential for the proper and efficient performance of the functions of the 
court” and because a court “possess[es] all powers necessary to secure and 
safeguard the * * * exercise of [its] judicial functions and cannot be * * * impeded 
therein by other branches of the government,” the court “may exercise control over 
the courthouse”); Finley at 154-155 (acknowledging a court’s inherent power to 
acquire facilities for its operation but limiting the power to “the acquisition of 
necessary as distinguished from desirable quarters and space”). 
January Term, 2019 
 
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{¶ 22} By contrast, the relators in this case are not relying on the board’s 
executive authority but on the order of the general-division judges.  That fact 
distinguishes this case from prior inherent-power cases, inasmuch as Judge O’Diam 
cannot claim authority that supersedes that of the court’s general division—any 
more than the general-division judges can issue orders that supersede Judge 
O’Diam’s authority as probate judge. 
{¶ 23} In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that in Finley we 
hypothesized a conflict that involved the space demands of two different courts.  
Moreover, we used that hypothetical to develop the doctrine of the case: the 
inherent power of a court to take control of courthouse space is confined to “the 
acquisition of the space and facilities essential for its proper and efficient 
operation,” as opposed to the acquisition of merely “desirable quarters and space.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Finley at 155-156.  From this reasoning, Judge O’Diam 
concludes that Finley makes clear that “the proper path” for resolving the present 
dispute is a mandamus action in which the court can review the conflicting court 
orders and determine which court has a greater need for the space it claims. 
{¶ 24} We disagree with Judge O’Diam’s conclusion.  The conflict of court 
orders was merely hypothetical in Finley; the actual holding of the case applied the 
standard of reasonable necessity to a court order that claimed space from the county 
recorder.  Although we imagined conflicting court orders in Finley, we did not 
specify as part of the hypothetical the situation that we confront here: one of the 
two courts currently possesses and controls the courthouse space at issue. 
{¶ 25} We hold that a judge does not have inherent authority—and thereby 
lacks jurisdiction—to issue an order allowing him to take control of courthouse 
space when the space is already under the control of another court, or a different 
division of the common-pleas court.  It follows that Judge O’Diam was without 
power to issue the March 5 and March 13, 2018 orders insofar as they require the 
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board to designate Courtroom 3 as the probate-division’s courtroom.  We therefore 
deny the motion to dismiss. 
Merits of the prohibition action 
{¶ 26} Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.04(C), we now proceed to determine the 
merits of the case.  Two undisputed facts—the general division’s current control of 
Courtroom 3 and the existence of conflicting court orders—establish that as a 
matter of law, Judge O’Diam acted beyond his authority in issuing his orders 
requiring the board to designate Courtroom 3 as the probate-division’s courtroom.  
Judge O’Diam’s lack of jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous.  And “[i]n cases 
of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, the requirement of a lack of an 
adequate remedy of law need not be proven because the availability of alternate 
remedies like appeal would be immaterial.”  State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 99 Ohio 
St.3d 97, 2003-Ohio-2476, 789 N.E.2d 195, ¶ 18.  For this reason, relators are 
entitled to a writ prohibiting the enforcement of Judge O’Diam’s orders requiring 
designation of Courtroom 3 as the probate division’s courtroom. 
{¶ 27} But Judge O’Diam’s orders not only attempt to take control of 
Courtroom 3, they also mandate payment of the legal fees and expenses connected 
with defending and enforcing his orders.  Relators do not specifically contend that 
the judge lacked jurisdiction to make this demand.  And the case law treats such an 
order as a funding order that is presumptively valid.  See Wilke, 90 Ohio St.3d at 
65, 734 N.E.2d 811 (“A judge has the inherent authority to order a legislative body 
to provide funding necessary for the efficient administration of the court, including 
funding private counsel to represent the court”).  Of course, funding orders 
regarding appointed counsel for county officials need to be evaluated in conjunction 
with the statutes relating to the role of the county prosecuting attorney and the 
appointment of outside counsel.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Gains v. Maloney, 102 Ohio 
St.3d 254, 2004-Ohio-2658, 809 N.E.2d 24; State ex rel. Hillyer v. Tuscarawas Cty. 
Bd. of Commrs., 70 Ohio St.3d 94, 637 N.E.2d 311 (1994). 
January Term, 2019 
 
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{¶ 28} Because Judge O’Diam’s jurisdiction to order payment of legal fees 
and expenses has not been specifically contested in this case and because the 
appointment of the judge’s counsel is a subject of dispute in his mandamus case 
(Supreme Court case No. 2018-0447), we exempt from the writ of prohibition the 
portion of Judge O’Diam’s orders requiring the board to pay his fees and expenses 
relating to enforcement of the orders.  We will consider the validity of Judge 
O’Diam’s demand for payment of his private counsel and other litigation expenses 
when we consider the mandamus case. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 29} For the foregoing reasons, we grant the motion for leave to file an 
amicus memorandum, deny the general-division judges’ motion to intervene, and 
deny Judge O’Diam’s motion to dismiss.  We also grant a peremptory writ 
prohibiting Judge O’Diam from enforcing his orders entered on March 5 and March 
13, 2018, in the Greene County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division, case No. 
11587 MISC, captioned “In the Matter of the Designation of Courtroom 3 for Use 
by Greene County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division,” and additionally 
prohibiting Judge O’Diam from entering additional orders relating to the dispute 
over the control of Courtroom 3.  But we grant the writ of prohibition with the 
qualification that its issuance is without prejudice to Judge O’Diam’s claim that he 
is entitled to have the county pay his attorney fees and litigation expenses related 
to defending and attempting to enforce his orders.  That issue will be addressed in 
the mandamus case that is pending before this court in case No. 2018-0447. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
KENNEDY and DONNELLY, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part and would 
grant an alternative writ. 
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Surdyk, Dowd & Turner Co., L.P.A., and Dawn M. Frick, for relators. 
 
Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, L.L.P., Kathleen M. Trafford, and 
Caroline Gentry, for respondent. 
 
John D. Smith Co., L.P.A., John D. Smith, and Andrew P. Meier, for 
proposed intervenors, Judge Michael A. Buckwalter and Judge Stephen A. 
Wolaver. 
 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., Paul W. Flowers, and Louis E. Grube, for 
amicus curiae, Ohio Association of Probate Judges. 
_________________