Case Title: Cohn v. Knowledge Connections Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 022592

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: ALL THE JUSTICES 
 
LAURA E. COHN 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 022592 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
SEPTEMBER 12, 2003 
KNOWLEDGE CONNECTIONS, INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Leslie M. Alden, Judge 
 
 
This case arises out of the circumstances surrounding an 
offer of employment to Laura E. Cohn ("Cohn") from Knowledge 
Connections, Incorporated ("KCI").  At trial in the Circuit 
Court of Fairfax County, Cohn alleged actual and constructive 
fraud on the part of KCI, through Marion Bonhomme ("Bonhomme")1, 
the president and owner of KCI. 
 
A jury awarded Cohn $125,000 in compensatory damages but 
the trial court granted a motion to strike made by KCI which 
previously had been taken under advisement.  The trial court 
then granted KCI's motion to set aside the verdict as to 
liability and damages.  For the reasons set forth below, we will 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 
From 1996 to 1999 Cohn worked as a manager with Omega World 
Travel ("Omega") in northern Virginia.  In addition to her 
salary of $38,000, Cohn received health insurance, vacation 
                     
 
1 During the pendency of the proceedings, Marion Bonhomme 
Knox changed her marital status.  In the record she is sometimes 
referred to as Ms. Bonhomme and sometimes as Mrs. Knox. 
time, and retirement benefits.  In June 1999 Bonhomme contacted 
Cohn and asked her to leave her job at Omega and become a 
manager with KCI.  Specifically, Bonhomme asked Cohn to work at 
KCI's Pentagon office.  Cohn expected to be assigned to the 
Pentagon office, although she knew that she could have been 
assigned to another KCI office.  The parties agreed that Cohn's 
employment with KCI was an "at-will" arrangement. 
 
Cohn was concerned about potential workplace conflicts with 
any employees at KCI who were qualified for the managerial 
position but were not promoted from within the company.  She 
believed her new position at KCI would be more secure, 
particularly during the probationary period, if she were the 
most experienced employee at the KCI office to which she was 
assigned.  Cohn stated at trial that Bonhomme told her no one on 
the existing KCI staff was qualified for the position offered to 
Cohn in the Pentagon office. 
 
Subsequently, Cohn learned from Bonhomme that Wayne Temple 
("Temple"), a KCI employee, had ten more years of experience 
than Cohn.  Cohn alleged at trial that, upon further inquiry, 
Bonhomme assured her that Temple did not have the supervisory 
experience necessary to manage the Pentagon office.  At trial, 
however, Bonhomme testified that she could not recall Cohn ever 
asking whether any current KCI employees were qualified for the 
                                                                  
 
 
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manager's position.  Nor did Bonhomme recall being asked why she 
was not hiring from within. 
 
On or around June 29, 1999, Bonhomme faxed a letter 
offering employment to Cohn as an administrative travel office 
manager at a salary of $48,000.  The offer of employment did not 
indicate a specific KCI office where Cohn would work.  KCI did 
not offer a retirement plan but did offer full medical benefits 
coverage and paid vacation.  Cohn accepted Bonhomme's offer of 
employment and tendered her resignation to Omega.  Cohn also 
began, with Bonhomme's assistance, applying for the security 
clearance necessary for work at the Pentagon. 
 
Cohn stated at trial that she was to begin work at KCI on 
August 2, 1999.  Bonhomme testified, however, that she told Cohn 
that if she wanted the Pentagon office position, she was 
required to start work on July 12, 1999, or, in the alternative, 
that she could accept the position in KCI's Crystal City office 
and begin work two weeks later.  On July 14, 1999, Bonhomme 
telephoned Cohn to notify her that Temple had been elevated to 
the managerial position at KCI's Pentagon office and that Cohn 
would be the administrative travel office manager at the 
company’s Crystal City office with the same salary and benefits.  
Bonhomme reiterated this statement in a letter dated the same 
day.  It was during this conversation, Cohn testified at trial, 
that Bonhomme expressed to her that the Department of Defense 
 
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chief travel officer in the Pentagon, Stanley Jefferson 
("Jefferson"), preferred working with men rather than women. 
Cohn asserted that because of this alleged gender bias, Bonhomme 
determined Temple should be in charge of KCI's Pentagon office. 
On July 16, 1999, Bonhomme notified Cohn that any employment 
offer from KCI was withdrawn because Cohn had not reported for 
work. 
 
Cohn subsequently filed an action against KCI in the 
Circuit Court of Fairfax County alleging actual and constructive 
fraud.  At the conclusion of Cohn's evidence, KCI made a motion 
to strike.  The trial court took the motion under advisement and 
allowed the jury to deliberate.  The jury returned a verdict for 
Cohn of $125,000 in compensatory damages.  However, in 
considering KCI's renewed motion to strike, the trial court 
found, with respect to Cohn's allegations of actual fraud, that 
she failed to present sufficient evidence that Bonhomme had 
intended to conceal Jefferson's alleged bias against women.  The 
court further found that Bonhomme had no duty to disclose 
whatever she knew or thought about Jefferson. 
 
With respect to Cohn's allegations of constructive fraud, 
the trial court found that Bonhomme's purported 
misrepresentations of Temple's qualifications were statements of 
opinion.  The trial court also stated that even if the 
statements were not statements of opinion, Cohn failed to 
 
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present clear and convincing evidence that the statements were 
false when made.  The trial court granted KCI's motion to strike 
as well as KCI's motion to set aside the verdict. 
 
We awarded Cohn this appeal. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Review of a trial court’s order striking the evidence 
requires the appellate court to accept as true all the evidence 
favorable to the plaintiff and any reasonable inferences from 
that evidence.  Lambert v. Downtown Garage, 262 Va. 707, 712, 
553 S.E.2d 714, 716 (2001).  Furthermore, when reviewing a trial 
court’s order setting aside a jury verdict, the trial court's 
decision will be sustained unless plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.  Henderson v. Gay, 245 Va. 478, 480, 429 
S.E.2d 14, 16 (1993); Lane v. Scott, 220 Va. 578, 260 S.E.2d 238 
(1979).  However, if there is a conflict in the testimony, and 
if reasonable people may differ in their conclusions or if a 
conclusion is based on the weight to be given to the testimony, 
the conclusion of the trial judge cannot be substituted for that 
of the jury.  Henderson, 245 Va. at 480-81, 429 S.E.2d at 16; 
Lane, 220 Va. at 581, 260 S.E.2d at 240.  Finally, this Court 
must give the recipient of the verdict the benefit of all 
substantial conflicts from the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence.  Henderson, 245 
 
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Va. at 481, 429 S.E.2d at 16; Graves v. National Cellulose 
Corp., 226 Va. 164, 169-70, 306 S.E.2d 898, 901 (1983). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Cohn brought separate causes of action, for actual and 
constructive fraud, based on two claimed misrepresentations.  
First, she alleged that her prospective employer, KCI, failed to 
inform her of Jefferson's alleged gender bias.  Second, she 
claimed that KCI misrepresented Temple's qualifications. 
In her amended motion for judgment, Cohn alleged that each 
of these misrepresentations was the basis for both fraud counts.  
However, during a hearing on post-trial motions, Cohn agreed 
with the trial court’s conclusion that the jury’s finding of 
actual fraud related to the alleged concealment of Jefferson’s 
gender bias and the finding of constructive fraud related to the 
alleged misrepresentation of Temple’s qualifications.  In her 
brief submitted to this Court, Cohn argues that the concealment 
of Jefferson’s alleged bias could be the basis for the claim of 
constructive fraud.  We do not consider Cohn's argument on this 
point because "[n]o litigant . . . will be permitted to 
approbate and reprobate — to invite error, as the [litigant] 
. . . did here, and then to take advantage of the situation 
created by his own wrong."  Fisher v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 
 
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417, 374 S.E.2d 46, 54 (1988); Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 
867, 878, 161 S.E. 297, 300 (1931).2
A.  Actual Fraud 
A cause of action for actual fraud requires the plaintiff 
to prove:  (1) a false representation, (2) of a material fact, 
(3) made intentionally and knowingly, (4) with intent to 
mislead, (5) reliance by the party misled, and (6) resulting 
damage to the party misled.  Evaluation Research Corp. v. 
Alequin, 247 Va. 143, 148, 439 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1994); Bryant v. 
Peckinpaugh, 241 Va. 172, 175, 400 S.E.2d 201, 203 (1991).  The 
trial court ruled that Cohn failed to prove her claim of actual 
fraud because she failed to establish there was an intent to 
conceal and that Bonhomme’s statement about Jefferson was 
opinion and not fact. 
Cohn claims that KCI failed to disclose Jefferson's alleged 
preference not to work with women.  Proof of fraud by 
nondisclosure “requires evidence of a knowing and deliberate 
                     
 
2 In any event, Cohn's argument misinterprets our decisions.  
This Court in Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hargraves, 242 Va. 
88, 405 S.E.2d 848 (1991), held that concealment can give rise 
to constructive fraud only in cases where there is a duty to 
disclose the concealed fact.  Id. at 92-93, 405 S.E.2d at 851.  
In that case, a duty to inform arose by virtue of the 
contractual obligation imposed by the insurance contract between 
the parties, a circumstance not present in this case.  Further, 
in Norris v. Mitchell, 255 Va. 235, 495 S.E.2d 809 (1998), we 
restated that concealment, in general, can only give rise to a 
claim of actual fraud. 
 
 
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decision not to disclose a material fact.” Lambert, 262 Va. at 
714, 553 S.E.2d at 718 (quoting Norris v. Mitchell, 255 Va. 235, 
241, 495 S.E.2d 809, 812 (1998)(internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  “A contracting party’s willful nondisclosure of a 
material fact that he knows is unknown to the other party may 
evince an intent to practice actual fraud.”  Spence v. Griffin, 
236 Va. 21, 28, 372 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1988). 
It is apparent from the record, as the trial court 
determined, that there was no proof of an intent to conceal.  
Assuming Cohn's claim concerning Jefferson's bias is correct, 
Cohn nonetheless produced no evidence that Bonhomme was aware of 
this bias, much less that she intentionally concealed it, at the 
time the employment offer was made.  In that circumstance, a 
claim for actual fraud based upon concealment cannot lie.  See 
Virginia Natural Gas Co. v. Hamilton, 249 Va. 449, 455, 457 
S.E.2d 17, 21 (1995) (a claim failed where there was no evidence 
that any employee of the party charged with actual fraud 
"intentionally and knowingly" made a false statement or 
concealed a material fact) (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, although “[i]t is not always an easy matter to 
determine whether a given statement is one of fact or opinion,” 
Mortarino v. Consultant Engineering Services, Inc., 251 Va. 289, 
293, 467 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1996), the evidence fails to show that 
Bonhomme’s statement was about a matter of "material fact" as 
 
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opposed to an opinion.  “It is well settled that a 
misrepresentation, the falsity of which will afford ground for 
an action for damages, must be of an existing fact, and not the 
mere expression of an opinion.”  Id.
Cohn’s own testimony during direct examination proves that 
Bonhomme expressed an opinion.  Cohn stated: “[Bonhomme] had 
advised me that in her opinion” Jefferson did not get along with 
the prior female office manager.  (Emphasis added).  In her 
cross-examination Cohn stated that Bonhomme’s statements 
regarding Jefferson were “only [Bonhomme’s] interpretation of 
the situation.” (Emphasis added).  The trial court correctly 
found that Bonhomme’s statements were opinions and, therefore, 
could not provide the basis for sustaining a claim of actual 
fraud. 
B.  Constructive Fraud 
"Constructive fraud differs from actual fraud in that the 
misrepresentation of material fact is not made with the intent 
to mislead, but is made innocently or negligently although 
resulting in damage to the one relying on it."  Evaluation 
Research, 247 Va. at 148, 439 S.E.2d at 390; Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Hargraves, 242 Va. 88, 92, 405 S.E.2d 848, 851 
(1991) (emphasis added).  A person asserting a claim of 
constructive fraud must prove that the misrepresentation forming 
the basis of the claim caused damage to the one relying on it.  
 
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Evaluation Research, 247 Va. at 148, 439 S.E.2d at 390.  To 
prevail in the case at bar, Cohn was required to prove that 
Bonhomme's misrepresentation of Temple’s qualifications was the 
cause of her failure to become the Pentagon office manager for 
KCI. 
"The proximate cause of an event is that act or omission 
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an 
efficient intervening cause, produces the event, and without 
which that event would not have occurred."  Beale v. Jones, 210 
Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1970).  Before the issue of 
proximate cause may be properly submitted to the jury, however, 
the evidence proving a causal connection must be "sufficient to 
take the question out of the realm of mere conjecture, or 
speculation, and into the realm of legitimate inference."  Id. 
(quoting Hawkins v. Beecham, 168 Va. 553, 561, 191 S.E. 640, 643 
(1937)). 
Assuming Cohn's evidence to be true, her constructive fraud 
claim fails because the misrepresentation of Temple’s 
qualifications is not the reason she failed to become the 
Pentagon office manager for KCI (the injury Cohn claims she 
incurred).  Under Cohn's theory of the case, the concealment of 
Jefferson’s attitude was the cause of the withdrawal of the job 
offer and Cohn's failure to get the KCI Pentagon office manager 
position.  Cohn's evidence was that Bonhomme changed the 
 
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position offered to Cohn as a result of Jefferson’s bias, not 
because she desired to promote Temple.  Therefore, any 
misrepresentation about Temple, even if made, could not have 
been the cause of Cohn's failure to receive the KCI Pentagon 
office position, which is the basis of her claimed injury.  
Therefore, her claim for constructive fraud must fail. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly granted KCI's motion to strike 
the evidence and motion to set aside the verdict.  As to the 
claim of actual fraud, Cohn failed to prove both Bonhomme's 
intent to conceal and that the statement at issue was about a 
matter of "material fact" and not opinion.  As to the claim of 
constructive fraud, Cohn could not show a causal connection 
between the alleged misrepresentation and the injury for which 
she claimed damages. 
We will, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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