Case Title: McKee Family I, LLC v. City of Fitchburg

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP001914

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 34 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1914 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
McKee Family I, LLC and JD McCormick Company, 
LLC, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross- 
          Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
City of Fitchburg, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 366 Wis. 2d 329, 873 N.W.2d 99 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 12, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 3, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
John C. Albert 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: Shirley S. Abrahamson and Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, JJ.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent-petitioners, 
there were briefs by Matthew Fleming and Murphy Desmond, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by Matthew J. Fleming 
 
For the defendants-respondent-cross-appellant, there was a 
brief by Lisa M. Lawless, Ross A. Anderson, Husch Blackwell, 
LLP, Milwaukee and Mark R. Sewell, Fitchburg City Attorney, and 
oral argument by Lisa M. Lawless 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Thomas Larson, Madison 
for Wisconsin Realtors Association, NAIOP Wisconsin and the 
Wisconsin Builders Association. 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Ryan J. Walsh, Chief 
Deputy Solicitor General with whom on the brief was Brad D. 
Schimel, Attorney General and Misha Tseytlin, Solicitor General 
for Wisconsin Attorney General and Department of Justice. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel M. Olson, 
Madison for League of Wisconsin Municipalities.  
 
 
 
2017 WI 34
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2014AP1914   
(L.C. No. 
2010CV3808) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
McKee Family I, LLC and JD McCormick Company, 
LLC, 
 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-
Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Fitchburg, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 12, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   Petitioner, McKee Family I, 
LLC ("McKee") appeals an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals affirming a circuit court grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the City of Fitchburg.1  The court of appeals determined 
that McKee did not have a vested right under a planned 
                                                 
1 McKee Family I, LLC v. City of Fitchburg, No. 2014AP1914, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2015) (affirming 
judgment and ordered entered by the circuit court for Dane 
County, John C. Albert, J., presiding). 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
2 
 
development 
district 
zoning 
classification 
and 
that 
its 
constitutional claim failed as a result. 
¶2 
McKee contends that the court of appeals erred and 
that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor.  
Acknowledging the fact that it did not submit an application for 
a building permit, it nevertheless argues that it had a vested 
right in developing land under the zoning classification. 
¶3 
According to McKee, vested rights accrue when a 
developer 
has 
made 
substantial 
expenditures 
or 
incurred 
substantial 
liability 
based 
upon 
reasonable 
expectations 
established by government action.  It contends that to the 
extent that the zoning classification is contractual in nature 
it also creates expectations upon which developers may rely.  
Contingent on its vested rights arguments, McKee further asserts 
that it has a claim for damages under the Takings Clause of the 
United States Constitution.2 
¶4 
We conclude that McKee did not have a vested right in 
developing the property under the planned development district 
zoning classification because it did not apply for a building 
permit.  Wisconsin follows the bright-line building permit rule 
that a property owner's rights do not vest until the developer 
has submitted an application for a building permit that conforms 
                                                 
2 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, provides that private property shall not 
"be taken for public use, without just compensation."  U.S. 
Const. amend V. 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
3 
 
to the zoning or building code requirements in effect at the 
time of application.  Lake Bluff Hous. Partners v. City of S. 
Milwaukee, 197 Wis. 2d 157, 172, 540 N.W.2d 189 (1995). 
¶5 
Additionally, we determine that a planned development 
district zoning classification does not create contractual 
expectations upon which developers may rely.  There is a very 
strong presumption that legislative enactments do not create 
contractual or vested rights.  Dunn v. Milwaukee Cty., 2005 WI 
App 27, ¶8, 279 Wis. 2d 370, 693 N.W.2d 82 (citation omitted).  
Further, there must be a clear indication that a legislative 
body intends to bind itself contractually in order to overcome 
the presumption.  Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, 
Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985).  McKee 
failed to overcome the presumption that Fitchburg did not intend 
to enter into a binding contract when it enacted an ordinance 
approving the zoning classification. 
¶6 
Finally, 
we 
do 
not 
need 
to 
reach 
McKee's 
constitutional takings claim because McKee conditioned its 
takings claim on its claim for vested rights.  Because McKee has 
no vested right in a planned development district zoning 
classification, it cannot succeed on its asserted contingent 
takings claim. 
¶7 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the City of Fitchburg. 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
4 
 
I 
¶8 
This case involves a dispute about a change in the 
municipal zoning classification of property that McKee owns in 
Fitchburg.  Specifically, McKee objects to Fitchburg's rezoning 
of two lots (53 and 54) from a planned development district 
("PDD") zoning classification to a residential-medium ("R-M") 
zoning classification.  To provide the necessary context, we 
begin by explaining Fitchburg's process for adopting a zoning 
classification. 
¶9 
Pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 62.23 
(2013-14), 
municipalities may use a PDD zoning classification to establish 
planned mixed-use developments that have a higher density than 
is allowed under an R-M classification.3  The R-M zoning 
                                                 
3 Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(b) provides in relevant part: 
[T]he council may divide the city into districts of 
such number, shape, and area as may be deemed best 
suited to carry out the purposes of this section; and 
within such districts it may regulate and restrict the 
erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration or 
use of buildings, structures or land . . . The counsel 
may establish mixed-use districts that contain any 
combination of uses, such as industrial, commercial, 
public, or residential uses, in a compact urban form.  
The council may with the consent of the owners 
establish special districts, to be called planned 
development 
districts, 
with 
regulations 
in 
each, 
which . . . will over a period of time tend to promote 
the 
maximum 
benefit 
form 
coordinated 
area 
site 
planning, diversified location of structures and mixed 
compatible uses. . . .  
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
5 
 
classification allows development of only single-family or 
duplex structures. 
¶10 Before a property owner can develop land that is zoned 
under the PDD classification, Fitchburg's General Ordinances 
require the property owner to submit a general implementation 
plan ("GIP") to Fitchburg's Plan Commission.  Fitchburg, Wis., 
Gen. Ordinances §§ 22-593, 22-594 (2015).4  The Plan Commission 
then makes a determination and recommendation whether to advise 
the Fitchburg Common Council to approve the rezoning and GIP, to 
approve it with modifications, or to deny it.  Id. § 22-594(b). 
¶11 If Fitchburg approves a general plan, a property owner 
is then required to submit a specific implementation plan 
("SIP").  Id. § 22-599.  A property owner is allowed to apply 
for a building permit if Fitchburg approves the SIP.  Id. § 22-
597. 
¶12 The relevant zoning history of this case extends back 
to 1989, when McKee Brothers Partnership agreed to dedicate 
approximately 60 acres of farmland to the City of Fitchburg.  
This farmland, which became McKee Farms Park, was donated to 
fulfill Fitchburg's park land dedication requirements for a 
variety of McKee Brothers' projects, including the property at 
issue in this case.  Credit for the parkland allocation was 
determined by a settlement agreement, which gave McKee Brothers 
                                                 
4 The references to the Fitchburg General Ordinances in 
paragraph 11 are also to the 2015 version of the ordinances. 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
6 
 
the right to build 600 dwelling units on a variety of lands it 
owned. 
¶13 Over the years, the property at issue has been 
transferred between various McKee entities.  After the parkland 
dedication, McKee Brothers transferred the property to MAF 
Development, Inc., to create the Plat of Chapel Valley.5  The 
plat included four lots, the two undeveloped lots at issue (53 
and 54), as well as two additional lots that have already been 
developed (10 and 11). 
¶14 In conjunction with the creation of the Plat of Chapel 
Valley, MAF Development entered into an agreement with Fitchburg 
that it would make improvements in preparation for developing 
its land.  The required improvements included:  standard street 
improvements, installation of sidewalks, walkways and driveways, 
sanitary sewers, water mains laterals and easements, drainage 
facilities, grading and landscaping, erosion control, and 
electric, communications and gas facilities. 
¶15 At the time the plat was created, it had an R-M zoning 
classification, but MAF Development applied for and received 
approval for rezoning to a PDD classification.  When Fitchburg 
enacted Ordinance No. 94-O-11 rezoning Lots 10, 11, 53, and 54 
from R-M to PDD zoning, it also approved MAF Development's 
general implementation plan for developing the property. 
                                                 
5 William F. McKee was the president of MAF Development. 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
7 
 
¶16 As 
the 
general 
plan 
explained, 
the 
proposed 
development would provide "high quality multi-family housing 
that is in strong demand" for "mature adults."  Citing the "lack 
of housing options for mature adults in the Fitchburg area," the 
proposed development was intended to complement the "Independent 
Living" and "Elder Care" developments nearby.  The GIP explained 
that the "formation of such a 'senior community' will serve the 
community by making the most efficient use of public and private 
services these people will require." 
¶17 Lots 10 and 11, which are not at issue in this case, 
were developed between 1995 and 2002 under the PDD-GIP zoning 
plan with assisted living facilities, senior housing and senior 
condominiums.  Lots 53 and 54 were not developed and were 
eventually deeded from MAF Development to McKee in 2007. 
¶18 In 2008, more than a decade after Fitchburg approved 
the planned development district zoning and MAF Development's 
general implementation plan, McKee and JD McCormick Company, LLC 
("McCormick"), entered into negotiations for McCormick to 
purchase the undeveloped lots 53 and 54 from McKee.  The 
purchase agreement was contingent on McCormick's ability to 
obtain approval from Fitchburg to build 128 apartment units on 
the lots.6 
                                                 
6 McCormick was a plaintiff in this action before the 
circuit court granted Fitchburg's motion to dismiss McCormick 
from the case for lack of standing.  McCormick did not appeal 
the order dismissing it from the case and McKee did not raise 
the issue on appeal. 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
8 
 
¶19 McCormick presented a plan for a 128-unit apartment 
complex on Lots 53 and 54 at a Fitchburg neighborhood meeting.  
Fitchburg residents expressed concern about the effect of the 
proposed development on traffic, crime and housing values.  The 
neighborhood's objections were set forth in a petition signed by 
600 Fitchburg residents detailing concerns about the scale and 
density of the proposed development: 
If a rental development of this scale and density were 
built . . . it would result in significant increases 
in and unacceptable levels of traffic, noise, litter, 
vandalism, 
storm 
water 
run-off, 
and 
would 
significantly impact the quality of life and the 
property values of those already residing in our 
neighborhoods. 
In particular, Fitchburg residents were concerned that the 
proposed development did not comport with the original PDD-GIP 
plan to develop senior housing. 
¶20 Despite these objections, McCormick prepared a PDD-SIP 
application for the 128-unit apartment complex on lots 53 and 
54.  The proposed development consisted of four three-story 32-
unit apartment buildings, with a clubhouse and a pool.  It hired 
an architect, engineer, and landscape architect, but there is no 
evidence in the record regarding the costs McCormick incurred. 
¶21 After McCormick submitted the specific plan, two 
Fitchburg 
Common 
Council 
members 
submitted 
a 
rezoning 
application and draft ordinance to rezone lots 53 and 54 from 
PDD-GIP to R-M.  McKee and McCormick then filed a revised 
application for PDD-SIP approval.  Following a public hearing, 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
9 
 
Fitchburg 
adopted 
Ordinance 
2009-O-03, 
which 
rezoned 
the 
property from PDD-GIP to R-M. 
¶22 Under the R-M zoning classification, McCormick was 
limited to developing 28 dwelling units, compared to a maximum 
of 132 dwelling units under the PDD zoning classification.  
McKee 
and 
McCormick 
filed 
a 
lawsuit 
seeking 
declaratory 
judgment, damages and injunctive relief on the grounds that the 
rezoning of the lots was unlawful. 
¶23 The amended complaint asserted two claims.  First, it 
alleged that Ordinance 2009-O-03 is void as a matter of law 
because it was adopted by Fitchburg without the consent of the 
owner of the property, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(b).  
Second, it alleged that if Fitchburg "wrongfully adopted 
Ordinance 2009-O-03, and wrongfully refused to process and 
approve the PDD-SIP application," then McKee was deprived of the 
full economic use of the property and from earning a reasonable 
return on its respective investment.  McKee further alleged that 
it was deprived of substantive and procedural due process 
guarantees in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 13 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶24 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  
At issue here is the circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Fitchburg.  On summary judgment, the circuit court 
dismissed McKee's first claim, determining that Lots 53 and 54 
were rezoned in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(b) and the 
relevant local ordinances.  The circuit court did not reach 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
10 
 
McKee's constitutional takings claim because it was conditioned 
on the dismissed first claim. 
¶25 McKee appealed the circuit court's summary judgment 
order.  On appeal, however, McKee did not argue that the 
rezoning ordinance was void under Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(b) for 
lack of consent.  Instead, McKee asserted that it had a vested 
right 
in 
the 
PDD 
zoning 
classification, 
that 
the 
PDD 
classification 
created 
a 
contract 
that 
gives 
rise 
to 
expectations on which developers may rely, and that the rezoning 
ordinance constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. 
¶26 The court of appeals determined that McKee did not 
have a vested right in the PDD zoning classification when 
Fitchburg rezoned the lots.  McKee Family I, LLC v. City of 
Fitchburg, No. 2014AP1914, unpublished slip op., ¶32 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 
Nov. 
5, 
2015). 
 
It 
declined 
to 
address 
McKee's 
constitutional taking argument, concluding that it was an 
undeveloped argument.  Id., ¶32 n.6. 
II 
 
¶27 In this case we are asked to review the court of 
appeals decision affirming the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the City of Fitchburg.  We review a 
decision 
granting 
summary 
judgment 
independently 
of 
the 
determinations rendered by the circuit court and the court of 
appeals.  Lambrecht v. Estate of Kaczmarczyk, 2001 WI 25, ¶21, 
241 
Wis. 2d 804, 
623 
N.W.2d 751. 
 
Summary 
judgment 
is 
appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
11 
 
fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
Id., ¶24. 
¶28 At issue is whether McKee has a vested right in the 
zoning classification and whether the classification creates 
contractual expectations upon which McKee may rely.  We 
additionally address whether a constitutional takings claim can 
be maintained.  These issues present questions of law that this 
court reviews independently of the determinations rendered by 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.  Zealy v. City of 
Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 372, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996). 
III 
¶29 We must address first whether McKee forfeited the 
arguments it raised for the first time on appeal.  Fitchburg 
contends that McKee did not appeal the claims dismissed by the 
circuit court on summary judgment.  According to Fitchburg, 
McKee forfeited the arguments it now advances because they were 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
¶30 Although the circuit court dismissed McKee's claim 
that Ordinance 2009-O-03 was void for lack of consent, it did 
not appeal that issue.  Instead, on appeal McKee asserts that it 
has a vested right in developing lots 53 and 54 under the PDD 
zoning classification due to expenditures incurred based upon 
reasonable expectations established by government action.  McKee 
further asserts that to the extent the zoning classification is 
contractual in nature, it also creates expectations upon which 
developers may rely. 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
12 
 
¶31 Contingent on its vested rights arguments, McKee 
contends that it has a claim for damages under the Takings 
Clause of the United States Constitution. 
¶32 Generally, issues not raised or considered by the 
circuit court will not be considered for the first time on 
appeal.  State v. Holland Plastics Co., 111 Wis. 2d 497, 504, 
311 N.W.2d 320 (1983).  However, it is within this court's 
discretion to "disregard alleged forfeiture or waiver and 
consider the merits of any issue because the rules of forfeiture 
and waiver are rules of 'administration and not of power.'"  
State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶49, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 
N.W.2d 681.  The arguments raised on appeal have been briefed 
and argued by both parties.  Accordingly, we choose to address 
McKee's arguments set forth above in order to clarify the 
important issues of law that are presented in this case. 
IV 
¶33 The primary issue before this court is whether McKee 
had a vested right in the PDD zoning classification before 
Fitchburg rezoned the land to the R-M zoning classification.  
Despite the fact that it was not eligible for, and did not apply 
for a building permit, McKee asserts that it had a vested right 
in the PDD zoning classification. 
¶34 McKee contends that this court should depart from 
Wisconsin's bright-line building permit rule and evaluate 
whether a developer has vested rights on a case-by-case basis.  
It argues that Fitchburg should not have had the discretion to 
change zoning regulations before a building permit was approved 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
13 
 
because McKee had already made substantial expenditures in 
preparation for development under the PDD-GIP zoning. 
¶35 We begin with the basic premise that municipalities 
have broad discretion to enact zoning ordinances and land use 
regulations for a variety of purposes: 
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or 
the general welfare of the community, the council may 
regulate and restrict by ordinance . . . the height, 
number of stories and size of buildings and other 
structures, 
the 
percentage 
of 
lot 
that 
may 
be 
occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open 
spaces . . . the 
density 
of 
population, 
and 
the 
location and use of buildings, structures and land for 
trade, industry, mining, residence or other purposes 
if there is no discrimination against temporary 
structures.   
Wis. Stat. § 62.23(7)(am).  Any ordinance adopted under this 
section "shall be liberally construed in favor of the city."  
Id. 
¶36 Additionally, 
"reliance 
on 
a 
particular 
zoning 
designation applicable to [a landowner's] property does not 
suffice 
to 
give 
the 
landowner 
a 
vested 
right 
to 
such 
designation."  Rainbow Springs Golf Co. v. Town of Mukwonago, 
2005 WI App. 163, ¶12, 284 Wis. 2d 519, 702 N.W.2d 40 (citing 
Zealy, 201 Wis. 2d at 381).  A "vested right" is a "right that 
so completely and definitely belongs to a person that it cannot 
be impaired or taken away without the person's consent."  Stoker 
v.  Milwaukee Cty., 2014 WI 130, ¶24, 359 Wis. 2d 347, 857 
N.W.2d 102 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1520 (10th ed. 
2014)). 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
14 
 
¶37 The exception to the rule that zoning does not create 
vested rights arises when a property owner has applied for a 
building 
permit 
conforming 
to 
the 
original 
zoning 
classification.  See Lake Bluff, 197 Wis. 2d at 182.  In Lake 
Bluff, this court concluded that the developer "obtained no 
vested rights, because it never submitted an application for a 
building permit conforming to the zoning and building code 
requirements in effect at the time of the application."  Id. 
¶38 Lake 
Bluff 
explained 
that 
"[o]ur 
cases 
have 
consistently held that no rights vest in such an instance" when 
a building permit has not been obtained.  Id.; see also State ex 
rel. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Wahner, 25 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 130 
N.W.2d 304 (1964); Vil. of Hobart v. Brown Cty., 2005 WI 78, 
¶28, 281 Wis. 2d 628, 698 N.W.2d 83.  Therefore, Lake Bluff 
reasoned that the developer "did not possess the 'clear, 
specific legal right which is free from substantial doubt' that 
is required in an action for mandamus."  Lake Bluff, 197 
Wis. 2d at 182 (quoting Collins v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 153 
Wis. 2d 477, 483, 451 N.W.2d 429 (1990)). 
¶39 McKee argues first that Lake Bluff's building permit 
rule should be limited to the facts of that case because the 
developer in Lake Bluff requested relief in the form of a writ 
of mandamus.  According to McKee, Lake Bluff declined to 
consider the developer's substantial expenditures in determining 
whether it had vested rights because a writ of mandamus requires 
"strict 
and 
complete 
compliance 
with 
all 
necessary 
and 
applicable provisions of the relevant ordinance . . ."  Id. at 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
15 
 
174 (quoting 4 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of 
Zoning and Planning, § 44.04[1], at 44-14 to 44-15 (4th ed. 1956 
& Supp. 1994) (footnotes omitted)).  Thus, McKee asserts that 
because it brought claims for declaratory judgment and damages 
arising from alleged constitutional violations, the permit rule 
should not be applied here given that the requested remedies are 
distinguishable from the relief requested in the writ of 
mandamus in Lake Bluff. 
¶40 We decline McKee's invitation to limit Lake Bluff to 
cases in which a developer seeks relief in the form of a writ of 
mandamus.  The Lake Bluff court did not base its decision on the 
developer's requested remedy.  Instead, it reasoned that "[f]rom 
the very beginning of zoning jurisprudence in this state [] a 
building permit has been a central factor in determining when a 
builder's rights have vested."  Id. at 172. 
¶41 Indeed, Lake Bluff considered prior Wisconsin case law 
on this issue in reaching its decision and explained that "a 
common factor . . . was the presence or absence of a building 
permit."  Id. at 172.  As Lake Bluff explained, Building Height 
Cases examined three separate cases and ruled on the nature of 
the vested rights, if any, in each case.  Id. at 171 (citing  
State ex rel. Klefisch v. Wisconsin Tel. Co. (Building Height 
Cases), 181 Wis. 519, 195 N.W. 544 (1923)).  In two of the cases 
it examined whether there were vested rights when the developer 
obtained a permit. However, in the third case where there was no 
application for a permit, there were no vested rights.  Id. at 
172. 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
16 
 
¶42 Underlying the vested rights doctrine is the theory 
that a developer is proceeding on the basis of a reasonable 
expectation.  Id. at 175 (citing State ex rel. Cities Serv. Oil 
Co. v. Bd. of Appeals, 21 Wis. 2d 516, 528-29, 124 N.W.2d 809 
(1963); 8 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 25:157 at 701 (3d ed. 1991).  
As Lake Bluff explained, "[r]equiring an application for a 
building permit which conforms to applicable zoning or building 
code requirements in order to show a clear legal right also 
serves the goals of the vested rights doctrine."  197 Wis. 2d at 
175. 
¶43 Wisconsin applies the bright-line building permit rule 
because it creates predictability for land owners, purchasers, 
developers, municipalities and the courts.  See, e.g., Guertin 
v. Harbour Assurance Co. of Bermuda, 141 Wis. 2d 622, 634-35, 
415 N.W.2d 813 (1987) (explaining that bright line rules provide 
predictability and protect all parties).  It balances a 
municipality's need to regulate land use with a land owner's 
interest in developing property under an existing zoning 
classification.  A municipality has the flexibility to regulate 
land use through zoning up until the point when a developer 
obtains a building permit.  Once a building permit has been 
obtained, a developer may make expenditures in reliance on a 
zoning classification. 
¶44 In contrast, the rule proposed by McKee, which would 
require a case-by-case analysis of expenditures, would create 
uncertainty at the various stages of the development process.  
Nevertheless, 
McKee 
urges 
this 
court 
to 
follow 
other 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
17 
 
jurisdictions, which it contends recognize expenditures made 
after a municipality approved the development of plats of land.  
See, e.g., Telimar Homes, Inc. v. Miller, 14 A.D.2d 586, 587 
(1976); Milcrest Corp. v. Clackamas Cty., 650 P.2d 963, 967 
(1982).  According to McKee, "the concept of fair play and 
protection of settled expectations demands a more flexible and 
searching inquiry than bright-line rules such as the building 
permit test can provide." 
¶45 For the reasons set forth above, we decline to adopt 
this approach.  Additionally, we observe that even if this court 
were to determine that a rule based on substantial expenditures 
should apply here, McKee's claim would fail because it has not 
introduced evidence supporting its claims. 
¶46 We previously addressed the two-fold impediments of 
failure to apply for a building permit along with the failure to 
present evidence in support of the claim.  In Zealy, the court 
determined that the developer did not have a vested right to the 
former residential zoning on his land.  201 Wis. 2d at 381-82.  
It reasoned that "Zealy has not shown that he made any 
expenditures in reliance on the zoning, nor has he ever 
submitted an application for a building permit proposing a 
residential use of the land."  Id.  McKee's claim suffers from 
the same lack of evidence of expenditures made in reliance on 
the PDD zoning as well as the failure to submit an application 
for a building permit. 
¶47 In sum, we decline to depart from Wisconsin's bright-
line building permit rule.  A property owner's rights do not 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
18 
 
vest until the developer has submitted an application for a 
building permit that conforms to the zoning or building code 
requirements in effect at the time of application.  Lake Bluff, 
197 Wis. 2d at 182.  It is undisputed that McKee did not apply 
for a building permit.  Like the court of appeals, we conclude 
that McKee did not have a vested right in developing the 
property under the PDD zoning classification because it did not 
apply for a building permit. 
V 
¶48 We turn next to McKee's argument that to the extent 
the zoning classification is contractual in nature it also 
creates expectations upon which developers may rely. 
¶49 McKee bases this assertion on the City of Fitchburg 
Ordinances that set forth the procedures for the PDD zoning 
process that were in effect at the time the PDD-GIP was adopted.  
Specifically, McKee relies on language in the Ordinances that 
referred to a PDD zoning classification as "an agreement [that] 
is reached between the property owner and the City of 
Fitchburg." 
 
Fitchburg, 
Wis., 
Gen. 
Ordinances 
§ 
22.82.  
Additionally, McKee contends that section 22.91, which stated 
that "[t]he City Council shall approve a Specific Implementation 
Plan that is reasonably consistent with the previously approved 
General Implementation Plan," is an expression of intent to 
create expectations upon which developers are expected to rely.  
Fitchburg, Wis., Gen. Ordinances § 22.91. 
¶50 According to McKee, we should interpret the language 
of the Fitchburg Ordinances as expressing an intention to create 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
19 
 
expectations upon which developers are entitled to rely.  Thus, 
McKee asserts that we should decline to apply the building 
permit rule, because it contends that a planned development 
district is a form of negotiated zoning that a developer may 
rely upon once it is adopted by Fitchburg. 
¶51 McKee's 
argument 
here 
contravenes 
the 
strong 
presumption 
that 
legislative 
enactments 
do 
not 
create 
contractual rights.  Dunn, 279 Wis. 2d 370, ¶8 (citing Morrison 
v. Bd. of Educ. of City of W. Allis, 237 Wis. 483, 487-88, 297 
N.W. 383 (1941)).  Treating legislative acts as contracts would 
"enormously curtail the operation of democratic government."  
Id., ¶9 (quoting Pittman v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 64 F.3d 1098, 
1104 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
¶52 It 
is 
a 
well-established 
principle 
that 
"[o]ne 
legislature may not bind a future legislature's flexibility to 
address changing needs."  Flynn v. Dep't of Admin., 216 Wis. 2d 
521, 543, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998).  Accordingly, a current city 
government "may not enact a statute which has 'implications of 
control over the final deliberations or actions of future 
legislatures.'"  Id. 
¶53 The facts of this case demonstrate why a legislative 
body must have the flexibility to adopt and repeal legislation 
in response to its community's changing needs.  Lots 53 and 54 
were undeveloped for fifteen years after Fitchburg approved the 
PDD-GIP, yet McKee asserts that the current Fitchburg Common 
Council is contractually bound by a city ordinance adopted in 
1994. 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
20 
 
¶54 The original GIP proposed a development for "mature 
adults," citing the "lack of housing options for mature adults 
in the Fitchburg area."  It was intended to compliment the 
"Independent Living" and "Elder Care" developments nearby.  The 
GIP explained that the "formation of such a 'senior community' 
will serve the community well by making the most efficient use 
of public and private services these people will require." 
¶55 Lots 10 and 11, which are not at issue in this case, 
were developed between 1995 and 2002 under the PDD zoning plan 
with assisted living facilities, senior housing and senior 
condominiums.  In 2008, more than a decade after the PDD-GIP 
zoning was approved, McCormick presented a plan for a 128-unit 
apartment complex on lots 53 and 54 at a Fitchburg neighborhood 
meeting.  The development proposed in 2008 consisted of four 
three-story 32-unit apartment buildings, with a clubhouse and a 
pool. 
¶56 In a petition signed by 600 Fitchburg residents, the 
neighborhood detailed its concerns about the scale and density 
of the proposed development: 
If a rental development of this scale and density were 
built . . . it would result in significant increases 
in and unacceptable levels of traffic, noise, litter, 
vandalism, 
storm 
water 
run-off, 
and 
would 
significantly impact the quality of life and the 
property values of those already residing in our 
neighborhoods. 
The primary focus of concern was that the proposed development 
did not comport with the original PDD-GIP plan to develop senior 
housing. 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
21 
 
¶57 The concerns of Fitchburg's citizens in this case 
demonstrate why the legislature must have flexibility to address 
the changing needs of the community.  See Flynn, 216 Wis. 2d at 
543.  Although Fitchburg adopted the PDD-GIP in 1994, it needed 
to be able to respond to the changing development needs of the 
community in 2008. 
¶58 Not only was the development far different than what 
was originally proposed, McCormick would have been the fourth 
owner of the property since McKee Brothers Partnership dedicated 
parkland to Fitchburg in 1989.  Subsequent to the parkland 
dedication, the property was transferred to MAF, which in 1994 
applied for and received approval for rezoning to a PDD 
classification.  Eventually, MAF deeded lots 53 and 54 to McKee, 
which now argues that the potential purchaser, McCormick, has 
the same zoning right granted to MAF in 1994 and reliance rights 
arising from the parkland dedication in 1989. 
¶59 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
there must be "some clear indication that the legislature 
intends to bind itself contractually" in order to overcome the 
presumption that a law is not intended to create private 
contractual rights.  Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 
465-66 (1985).  McKee points to no evidence other than the 
language of the ordinances in setting forth the development 
process as support for its argument that PDD zoning created a 
contract upon which it was entitled to rely.  Accordingly, McKee 
failed to overcome the presumption that Fitchburg did not intend 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
22 
 
to enter into a binding contract when it enacted the 1994 
Ordinance approving the PDD zoning classification. 
¶60 Finally, we observe that we need not consider McKee's 
argument that the rezoning of Lots 53 and 54 constituted a 
taking. 
¶61 McKee brought its takings claim as contingent on its 
claim for vested rights, contending it had a takings claim only 
if this court determined that it had a vested right in the PDD 
zoning classification.  In its amended complaint, McKee alleged 
that it suffered a taking in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments "in the event that the Court finds that 
the Defendant wrongfully adopted Ordinance 2009-O-03, and 
wrongfully 
refused 
to 
process 
and 
approve 
the 
PDD-SIP 
application . . ."  Likewise, in its opening brief McKee argues 
that "[f]inding vested rights will revive McKee's takings 
claim."  Finally, at oral argument, McKee reiterated "you cannot 
have a taking without a vested right." 
¶62 As asserted, McKee's takings claim is contingent on 
the success of his vested rights claim.  Having failed on his 
vested rights claim, his takings claim does not survive. 
VI 
¶63 We conclude that McKee did not have a vested right in 
developing the property under the planned development district 
zoning classification because it did not apply for a building 
permit.  Wisconsin follows the bright-line building permit rule 
that a property owner's rights do not vest until the developer 
has submitted an application for a building permit that conforms 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
23 
 
to the zoning or building code requirements in effect at the 
time of application.  Lake Bluff, 197 Wis. 2d at 182.  It is 
undisputed that McKee did not apply for a building permit. 
¶64 Additionally, we determine that a planned development 
district zoning classification does not create contractual 
expectations upon which developers may rely.  There is a very 
strong presumption that legislative enactments do not create 
contractual or vested rights.  Dunn, 279 Wis. 2d 370, ¶8 
(citation omitted).  Further, there must be a clear indication 
that a legislative body intends to bind itself contractually in 
order to overcome the presumption.  Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 
470 U.S. at 465-66.  McKee has not overcome the presumption that 
Fitchburg did not intend to enter into a binding contract when 
it enacted an ordinance approving the zoning classification. 
¶65 Finally, 
we 
do 
not 
need 
to 
reach 
McKee's 
constitutional takings claim because McKee conditioned its 
takings claim on its claim for vested rights.  Because McKee has 
no vested right in a PDD zoning classification, it cannot 
succeed on its asserted contingent takings claim. 
¶66 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the City of Fitchburg. 
¶67 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., 
did not participate. 
 
No.  2014AP1914 
 
 
 
1