Case Title: Merritt v. State

Citation: 367 Md. 17

Docket Number: 29/00

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 29, September Term, 2000
Christopher Merritt v. State of Maryland
[Involves The Appropriate Standards For Appellate Review Of The Denials Of Motions For
New Trials]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 29
September Term, 2000
___________________________________________
CHRISTOPHER MERRITT
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
__________________________________________
        
Bell, C.J.,
Eldridge
        * Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell, 
                                
         JJ.
___________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
__________________________________________
     
Filed:    December 5, 2001
* Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member of
this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
The defendant in this criminal case, Christopher Merritt, was convicted by a jury in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony
murder, attempted armed robbery, and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.
Approximately two days after the trial, the State learned that the search warrant for the
defendant’s home and other documents, not admitted into evidence, were mistakenly sent to
the jury room during deliberations.  Defense counsel’s motion for a new trial, based upon the
erroneous submission of the documents, was denied.  We issued a writ of certiorari to decide
whether Merritt is entitled to a new trial.
I.
The instant case arises from the murder of Brian Owens.  The principal witness against
the defendant Merritt was Artinus Shands, who claimed that he participated in the crime with
Merritt.  Shands testified for the State pursuant to a plea agreement.  Under the agreement, in
exchange for his truthful testimony and his guilty plea, Shands would receive a life sentence
for murder, with all but fifty years suspended, and a concurrent sentence of twenty years for
use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.     
Shands’s testimony was as follows.  Ronald Laboard, Owens, Merritt, Shands, and
several others gathered for a dice game in the outside stairwell of the apartment building at
2404 Winchester Street in Baltimore City.  At some point during the game, Owens had won
more than a hundred dollars from each of the other players.  As a result, according to Shands,
Merritt became upset and decided to regain his money.  Merritt showed Shands a gesture with
his hand suggesting a gun.  Merritt and Shands then left the game and walked to the parking lot
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adjacent to the building.  There, Merritt retrieved two handguns from his car.  Shands said that
Merritt gave Shands a nine millimeter handgun and Merritt took a .380 caliber handgun.  As
they returned to the game, Merritt approached Owens, who was seated on the steps, and ordered
him and the other players to lie down.  Merritt pointed his gun at Owens and demanded the
return of his money.  Shands stated that Owens did not hand over the money, that Merritt’s gun
“went off,” and that Shands and Merritt continued to shoot Owens.  Owens fell to the bottom
of the stairs, and Merritt, Shands, and Laboard fled in Merritt’s car without taking Owens’s
money. 
The police obtained arrest warrants for Merritt, Shands, and Laboard, charging each with
the victim’s murder.  In a taped statement, Merritt stated that he, Shands, Laboard and several
others were rolling dice and drinking when two men approached and ordered them to get down.
One of the men held a gun to Merritt’s head and took the money that was in his hand.  When
the men demanded money from Owens, he moved and was shot several times.  Following the
shooting, everyone got up and ran from the scene.  Merritt stated that he, Shands, and Laboard
left together in Merritt’s car.  
Shands initially denied any knowledge of the incident.  The police played him the
portion of Merritt’s taped statement in which Merritt said that Shands was present during the
shooting.  Believing that Merritt had told the police that only Shands shot the victim, Shands
told the police that both he and Merritt had been the shooters.   At trial, Shands corroborated
his taped statement.  The State also introduced into evidence letters exchanged between Shands
and Merritt after both of them were incarcerated awaiting trial.  In those letters, each asked the
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other to tell his attorney that they had given false taped statements to the police because their
families had been threatened. 
Ronald Laboard, who is Merritt’s cousin, initially told the police that Merritt and
Shands shot the victim.  Laboard identified Merritt and Shands as the shooters from separate
photographic arrays.  The State eventually dropped the murder charges against Laboard.  At the
trial, however, Laboard testified that his initial statement to the police was false.  Laboard
stated that he was with the others at the dice game but that he left the game after he lost his
money.  He testified that he was not present when the shooting took place.
The State presented several police witnesses.  Officer Eric Isom was the patrol officer
who responded to the call that shots had been fired.  At the scene, Isom observed dice, a
Bacardi rum bottle, and two baggies containing a white, rock-like substance.  Kimberly Fowler
was the crime lab technician on the scene.  She recovered 19 cartridge casings as well as
bullets and fragments.  She also recovered two liquor bottles and some dice.  James Wagster,
an expert on firearms, testified that the cartridge casings recovered from the scene were fired
from a .380 caliber handgun and a .40 caliber Smith and Wesson handgun.  As an explanation
for Shands’s testimony that a .380 handgun and a nine millimeter handgun were used in the
shooting, Wagner testified that a nine millimeter handgun and a .40 caliber handgun look alike.
Two days after Merritt was convicted, the State learned from a juror that defense exhibit
6, which included the application for the search and seizure warrant for Merritt’s home, the
warrant, the affidavit in support of the warrant, the inventory return, and a copy of Merritt’s
taped statement to police, were present in the jury room during deliberations.  Exhibit 6 had
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been marked for identification only and had not been admitted into evidence.  The courtroom
clerk, however, marked “Evid” on the exhibits list next to the line referring to exhibit 6,
reflecting her erroneous belief that the exhibit had been admitted into evidence. 
Exhibit 6 contained an affidavit setting forth the credentials of Detective Carol Opher.
Specifically, the affidavit stated that Opher had been a member of the Baltimore City Police
Department for more than seventeen years and that, by executing search and seizure warrants
in the past, she had obtained evidence that resulted in the convictions of over one hundred
defendants.  The affidavit also contained a statement from Detective Opher that, during
interviews of witnesses, it was revealed that “one of the persons responsible for the murder of
Brian Owens is Chris Merritt.”  The affidavit disclosed that, while being interviewed, Merritt
admitted to owning a .38 caliber handgun which he said could be found in his home.  According
to the affidavit, Merritt also admitted owning a .380 caliber handgun.
Furthermore, a transcript of Merritt’s taped statement to the police was included in
exhibit 6.  A redacted copy of that statement had been admitted into evidence at trial.  In the
portions of the statement which had been redacted before being admitted into evidence, but
were not redacted in the statement included in exhibit 6, Merritt admitted to selling drugs
before the murder and to owning a .38 caliber handgun.  Finally, the inventory return contained
a listing of the property actually seized from Merritt’s residence.  The list included a shoe box
containing a green leafy substance, plastic baggies, and rolling papers.  These items had not
been admitted into evidence.  
In the motion for a new trial, defense counsel argued that the presence of exhibit 6 in
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the jury room during deliberations resulted in probable prejudice to Merritt.  The trial court
denied the defense’s motion, stating:  “After considering the quantity and quality of the other
evidence produced at trial, it cannot be said that the” presence of exhibit 6 “in the jury room
probably resulted in prejudice to the defense.”  The court continued that “the information is
harmless in light of the overpowering evidence in this case.”  The Circuit Court concluded that
Merritt “received a fair trial despite the unintentional submission by the courtroom clerk of
extraneous material into the jury room during deliberations.”
The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed.   Merritt filed in this
Court a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted.  Merritt v. State, 359 Md. 28, 753
A.2d 1 (2000).  
II.
The certiorari petition presented two questions, one relating to the appropriate standard
for appellate review in this case and the other relating to the merits of the trial court’s denial
of the motion for new trial.  Merritt argues (petitioner’s brief at 11, 16):
“I. Under the circumstances [of this case], the proper standard of
appellate review of the denial of a motion for a new trial is error, not
abuse of discretion.
* * *
II. The court either erred, or in the alternative, abused its discretion in
denying the motion for a new trial, when the motion was based on the
fact that prejudicial documentary evidence which was never entered
into evidence was erroneously submitted to the jury at the start of its
deliberations.”
-6-
The State, relying on a lengthy Court of Special Appeals’ opinion concerning the subject (Isley
v. State, 129 Md. App. 611, 743 A.2d 772 (2000)), and on language in older Court of Appeals’
opinions, first argues that trial judges’ rulings on motions for new trials are always
discretionary matters, that a trial judge’s exercise of discretion in refusing to grant a new trial
is “absolut[ely]” unreviewable on appeal, and that, in fact, “‘no appeal lies from the  action of
the court in overruling a motion for new trial’” (respondent’s brief at 7).  According  to the
State, a trial judge’s denial of a motion for a new trial is subject to appellate review “only . . .
where no discretion was exercised by the judge in rendering his decision.”  (Id. at 8).
Alternatively, the State argues that, if the denial of the motion for a new trial were reviewable
on appeal, the appropriate standard under the circumstances of this case is “the abuse of
discretion standard of review” and that the trial judge’s “discretion to deny Merritt’s motion
for a new trial . . . was a proper exercise of his discretion.”  (Id. at 10, 18).
A.
Initially, we flatly reject the State’s argument and the thesis of Isley v. State, supra, 129
Md. App. at 639-674, 743 A.2d at 784-806, that the denial of a motion for new trial is
absolutely unreviewable on appeal except for the situation where the trial judge has failed to
exercise any discretion.  As explained in detail by Judge McAuliffe for the Court in Buck v.
Cam’s Rugs, 328 Md. 51, 54-59, 612 A.2d 1294, 1296-1298 (1992), the Maryland case law
governing appellate review of rulings on motions for new trials has changed and evolved over
the years.  Moreover, language from older cases has sometimes been carelessly repeated in
more recent cases without taking into consideration the changes in the law.  The State’s
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argument in the case at bar, however, represents an effort to change the present law, to adopt
a rule from the past, and to require that our most recent cases on the subject be overruled.  This
we decline to do.
The early opinions of this Court clearly took the position that a trial court’s ruling on
a motion for a new trial was not subject to appellate review under any circumstances.  The
ruling would not have been subject to appellate review even when the trial judge refused to
exercise any discretion.  This principle of non-reviewability, set forth in the early cases, seems
to have been based, at least in part,  on the limited scope of, and requirements of, writs of error
and bills of exceptions.  See Anderson v. State, 5 H. & J. 174, 175 (1821).  See also, e. g.,
Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 6 Cranch 206, 218, 3 L.Ed. 200, 203-204 (1810); Balto. Paint
Works v. Parts Co., 173 Md. 210, 215, 195 A. 558, 561 (1937) (referring to “the common-
law rule that exceptions must be settled and signed before verdict”); Davis v. Carroll, 71 Md.
568, 569, 18 A. 965 (1889); Bond v. Citizens National Bank, 65 Md. 498, 501-502, 4 A. 893,
895-896 (1886); Donohue v. Shedrick, 46 Md. 226, 229-231 (1877); Archer v. State, 45 Md.
457, 460 (1876) (“The facts which were relied upon . . . for a reversal of the ruling . . . on the
motion for a new trial, are contained in a bill of exceptions, and all of them were offered . . .
upon the motion for a new trial.  It is very clear that no such bill of exceptions is authorized
by law”); Baltimore v. Reynolds, 18 Md. 270, 272-273 (1862); Wall v. Wall, 2 H. & G. 79,
81 (1827).
Furthermore, the principle that rulings on motions for new trials were unreviewable on
appeal appears to have been simply an application of the more general rule, adhered to by
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appellate courts at an earlier time, that any trial court ruling on a discretionary matter was
insulated from appellate review.  As this Court stated in Wall v. Wall, supra, 2 H. & G. at 81,
“where the subject decided by the inferior Court is left by law to their discretion, . . . it has
been adjudged that a writ of error will not lie.”  See, e.g., Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, supra,
6 Cranch at 217-218, 3 L.Ed. at 203-204; Wash., B. & A. Railroad Co. v. Kimmey, 141 Md.
243, 251, 118 A. 648, 651 (1922) (referring to the “‘rule that a discretionary ruling is not
reviewable on appeal’”).  
An exception to the principle that rulings on motions for new trials were not reviewable
on appeal was first discussed by this Court in Browne v. Browne, 22 Md. 103, 112-113
(1864).  In Browne, after a jury verdict, counsel for the losing party filed a motion for a new
trial accompanied by affidavits of four jurors who stated that another juror was sick during the
trial and the jury deliberations, that the sick juror was opposed to the verdict arrived at by the
other jurors, and that the sick juror “assented to it in order to obtain his release from the
confinement of the jury room.”  Id. at 113.  The trial court held that the statements by the four
jurors were inadmissible and denied the motion for a new trial. 
On appeal, in setting forth the general rule of non-reviewability, this Court in Browne
for the first time qualified what had previously been stated as an absolute rule.  The Court said
(id. at 112, emphasis added):
“[E]very motion for a new trial, is addressed to the sound legal discretion
of the court; and therefore no error can be ordinarily assigned with
regard to the decision of the court below upon such motion . . . .”
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The Browne opinion went on to explain the exception argued for by the appellant (ibid.):
“[B]ut it is argued that the refusal to admit the evidence offered in
support of the motion, was error in law, from which appeal lies; because
thereby the appellant was deprived of the exercise of the judgment and
discretion of the court upon the case as presented by the proof, to which
he had a legal right.  This is certainly a very nice distinction, but we are
not prepared to say it may not be a sound one . . . .”
The Court then assumed arguendo that the exception should be recognized and held that the
trial judge did not err (id. at 113):
“Without 
meaning 
to 
express 
any 
opinion 
upon 
the 
general
proposition involved in the appellant’s argument, it is very clear, that
even conceding the right of appeal on this branch of the case, the
decision of the Superior Court ought not to be reversed, if this Court
should be of opinion, either that the testimony was properly excluded, or
that it was immaterial and insufficient if admitted, to affect the validity
of the verdict.”
The Court upheld the trial judge’s ruling on the ground “that ‘the testimony of jurors cannot be
heard to impeach their verdict . . . .’” Ibid.
The “exception”  discussed in the Browne opinion was applied by this Court in Wash.,
B. & A. Railroad Co. v. Kimmey, supra, 141 Md. 243, 118 A. 648, which involved a motion
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.  In Kimmey, as in Browne, the motion for
a new trial was accompanied by affidavits setting forth testimony, and the trial judge excluded
the evidence.  This Court, holding that the exclusion of the evidence constituted error, and
relying on the language from Browne, reversed the denial of the motion for a new trial.  The
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Court explained (141 Md. at 250, 118 A. at 650-651, emphasis added):
“The general rule is that the disposition of a motion for a new trial is
within the sound discretion of the trial court and is not a subject of
appeal. . . .  The exception now under consideration, however, is not
directed to the action of the court in overruling the motion for a new
trial, but to its exclusion of evidence by which its judgment and
discretion in regard to the motion should properly have been
influenced.  The defendant was entitled to the exercise of a sound
discretion in the disposition of its motion.  A discretion could not be
characterized as sound which wholly disregarded evidence by which its
exercise should have been aided.”
It has been suggested that the language in Browne and the holding in Kimmey simply
stand for the principle that, in ruling on a new trial motion, a trial judge’s failure to exercise
any discretion is reviewable on appeal, but that the judge’s actual exercise of discretion
remains absolutely unreviewable.  Isley v. State, supra, 129 Md. App. at 645-650, 743 A.2d
at 790-793.  See also Carlile v. Two Guys, 264 Md. 475, 478, 287 A.2d 31, 33-34 (1972).
This suggestion is not accurate.  In both Browne and Kimmey the trial judges exercised
discretion.  The reversal in Kimmey was because the trial judge committed error in excluding
evidence and, therefore, did not “properly” exercise discretion and did not “exercise . . . a
sound discretion in the disposition of [the] motion.”  141 Md. at 250, 118 A. at 651.  The
appellate reversal in Kimmey was clearly based on findings of both error and abuse of
discretion, and some later cases in this Court have so construed it.  See, e.g., B. J. Linthicum’s
Sons v. Stack, 213 Md. 344, 347, 131 A.2d 721, 723 (1957) (“The only exception to the rule
[of non-reviewability] . . . was dealt with as an abuse of discretion.  See Wash., B. & A. R. Co.
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v. Kimmey, 141 Md. 243").
For the next twenty-five years after the B. J. Linthicum’s Sons case, some of this
Court’s opinions would state without qualification that discretionary rulings on new trial
motions were not reviewable, whereas other opinions seemed to recognize that such rulings
were reviewable for abuse of discretion or for the failure to exercise discretion.  See the
review of cases in Buck v. Cam’s Rugs, supra, 328 Md. at 54-57, 612 A.2d 1294, 1296-1298
(1992).  Compare, e.g., Carlile v. Two Guys, supra, 264 Md. at 477-478, 287 A.2d at 33-34,
and Kirkpatrick v. Zimmerman, 257 Md. 215, 218, 262 A.2d 531, 532 (1970), with Grabner
v. Battle, 256 Md. 514, 519, 260 A.2d 634, 636 (1970) (holding “that there was a
knowledgeable exercise by the trial judge of his discretionary powers and that he did not abuse
his sound discretion in denying the appellant’s motion for a new trial”); Perlin Packing Co.
v. Price, 247 Md. 475, 491, 231 A.2d 702, 712 (1967) (“There was no manifest error or abuse
of discretion which would warrant this Court in disturbing the” denial of a new trial motion);
State, Use of Shipley v. Walker, 230 Md. 133, 137, 186 A.2d 472, 474 (1962) (“We find no
abuse of discretion in the instant case”); Martin v. Rossignol, 226 Md. 363, 366-367, 174
A.2d 149, 151 (1961) (“the denial of a motion for a new trial is not appealable, at least where
the trial court fairly exercises its discretion”); Brinand v. Denzik, 226 Md. 287, 293, 173
A.2d 203, 206 (1961) (“we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court”); Colter v. State, 219
Md. 190, 191-192, 148 A.2d 561 (1959) (“an appeal will not lie from an order denying a new
trial, at least where it is not claimed that there was an abuse of discretion”).
Commencing with this Court’s opinion in Wernsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 Md.
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406, 470 A.2d 802 (1984), however, we have consistently taken the position that denials of
motions for new trials are reviewable on appeal and that discretionary rulings on such motions
are subject to reversal where there is an abuse of discretion.  Wernsing was a personal injury
action based on alleged negligence and an allegedly defective product, and one of the chief
issues was whether certain actions were the proximate cause of the accident.  Evidence, other
than juror affidavits, disclosed that the jurors during deliberations had obtained a dictionary and
consulted it in arriving at a decision on the proximate cause issue.  This evidence was presented
to the trial court during the hearing on the motion for a new trial, and the court thereafter
denied the motion.  This Court, in an opinion by Judge Rodowsky, held that the denial of the
new trial motion was reviewable “for an abuse of discretion,” and the Court further held that
the “degree of probable prejudice [was] so great that it was an abuse of discretion to deny a new
trial.”  Wernsing, 298 Md. at 420, 470 A.2d at 809.
A few months after our decision in Wernsing, we reiterated that, “[o]rdinarily, a trial
court’s order denying a motion for a new trial will be reviewed on appeal if it is claimed that
the trial court abused its discretion.”  Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 600, 479 A.2d 1344, 1352
(1984).  In Mack, however, we held that the trial court’s denial of the motion, on the merits,
was fully “consonant with this Court’s consistent holdings” and that, therefore, “we shall not
disturb the exercise of the trial court’s discretion.”  300 Md. at 601, 479 A.2d at 1353.
As earlier indicated, in Buck v. Cam’s Rugs, supra, 328 Md. 51, 612 A.2d 1294, we
reviewed the Maryland cases concerning appellate review of rulings on motions for new trials,
recognized that there were conflicting lines of opinions, and reaffirmed the holdings in
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Wernsing and Mack “that an appeal will lie from the . . . denial of a motion for a new trial” and
that a discretionary ruling on a motion for new trial was subject to “review under an abuse of
discretion standard.”  Buck v. Cam’s Rugs, supra, 328 Md. at 56-57, 612 A.2d at 1297.  The
Court in Buck also pointed out that under some circumstances a trial judge’s discretion to deny
a motion for a new trial is much more limited than under other circumstances.  In fact, we
continued, there are situations in which there is virtually no discretion to deny a new trial.  The
Buck opinion thus explained (328 Md. at 58-59, 612 A.2d at 1298):
“On the other hand, a trial judge has virtually no ‘discretion’ to refuse
to consider newly discovered evidence that bears directly on the question
of whether a new trial should be granted.  See Wash., B. & A. R. Co. v.
Kimmey, supra, 141 Md. at 250, 118 A. 648 (‘discretion could not be
characterized as sound which wholly disregarded evidence by which its
exercise should have been aided’).  See also Browne v. Browne, 22 Md.
103, 112 (1864).  And, if newly discovered evidence clearly indicates
that the jury has been misled, a new trial should be granted.
* * *
“Similarly, where competent extrinsic evidence discloses that a jury’s
consideration of the case was seriously distorted by information that
should not have been before the jury, a trial judge may have little or no
‘discretion’ to deny a new trial.  See Wernsing v. General Motors Corp.,
supra, 298 Md. at 420, 470 A.2d 802 . . . .
“Accordingly, it may be said that the breadth of a trial judge’s
discretion to grant or deny a new trial is not fixed and immutable; rather,
it will expand or contract depending upon the nature of the factors being
considered, and the extent to which the exercise of that discretion
depends upon the opportunity the trial judge had to feel the pulse of the
trial and to rely on his own impressions in determining questions of
fairness and justice.”
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See also, e.g., Argyrou v. State, 349 Md. 587, 600, 709 A.2d 1194, 1200 (1998) (reiterating
“that the breadth of a trial judge’s discretion to grant or deny a new trial . . . will expand or
contract depending upon the nature of the factors being considered”); Yorke v. State, 315 Md.
578, 590, 556 A.2d 230, 235-236 (1989) (denial of a new trial motion is reviewable under an
abuse of discretion standard); Stevenson v. State, 299 Md. 297, 304, 473 A.2d 450, 453
(1984) (same).
Consistent with the recognition in Buck that sometimes a trial court has virtually no
discretion to deny a new trial motion, we have taken the position that some denials of new trial
motions are reviewable under a standard of whether the court erred rather than under an abuse
of discretion standard.  Accordingly, when an alleged error is committed during the trial, when
the losing party or that party’s counsel, without fault, does not discover the alleged error during
the trial, and when the issue is then raised by a motion for a new trial, we have reviewed the
denial of the new trial motion under a standard of whether the denial was erroneous.  See
Taylor v. State, 352 Md. 338, 344, 354, 722 A.2d 65, 68, 72-73 (1998); State v. Stanley, 351
Md. 733, 749, 720 A.2d 323, 330-331 (1998); Pinkney v. State, 350 Md. 201, 217-218, 711
A.2d 205, 213-214 (1998); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 34-35, 54-55, 702 A.2d 699, 706-
707, 716 (1997).  Also, in these criminal cases where we concluded that error did occur, the
matter of prejudice was reviewed under the harmless error standard of Dorsey v. State, 276
Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976).  See Taylor v. State, supra, 352 Md. at 354, 722 A.2d at 72;
Ware v. State, supra, 348 Md. at 48, 702 A.2d at 713.
The standard for determining whether error is prejudicial, set forth in Dorsey v. State,
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is as follows (276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d at 678):
“[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a
reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able
to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way
influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed ‘harmless’ and a
reversal is mandated.”
And when the error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, the Dorsey opinion
continued (ibid.):
“Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of – whether erroneously
admitted or excluded – may have contributed to the rendition of the
guilty verdict.”
B.
In the case at bar, the result would be the same whether the denial of the motion for a
new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard or under an error standard.
Nevertheless, under our cases, the denial of Merritt’s motion for a new trial should be
reviewed under the standard of whether error was committed and, if error was committed,
whether it was harmless under Dorsey.  
Merritt’s argument is that error was committed when the courtroom clerk marked the
exhibit list as if exhibit 6 had been admitted into evidence, and when exhibit 6 was submitted
to the jury.  The alleged error was not discovered until after the trial, and thus it could only
have been raised by a motion for a new trial.  Finally, according to Merritt, the error was
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clearly prejudicial under the Dorsey standard.  This scenario is similar to that involved in
Taylor v. State, supra; Pinkney v. State, supra; and Ware v. State, supra. As in those cases,
the question is whether error was committed and whether it was harmless under the Dorsey
test.
  
There is no doubt that error was committed during Merritt’s trial when the courtroom
clerk mistakenly marked “Evid” on the exhibit list next to exhibit 6 and when, consequently,
exhibit 6 was submitted to the jury as if it had been admitted into evidence.  The substance and
result of the clerk’s action was essentially the same as the action of a trial judge in erroneously
admitting an exhibit into evidence.  The only real difference would be that, in the latter
situation, defense counsel would have been aware of the action and would have had an
opportunity to object.
Moreover, Maryland Rule 4-326(a) specifies what may be taken to the jury room.  The
rule provides (emphasis added):
“(a) Items Taken to Jury Room.  Jurors may take notes regarding
the evidence and they may keep the notes with them when they retire for
their deliberations.  Unless the court for good cause orders otherwise,
the jury may also take the charging document and exhibits which have
been admitted into evidence, except that a deposition may not be taken
into the jury room without the agreement of all parties and the consent
of the court.  Electronically recorded instructions or oral instructions
reduced to writing may be taken into the jury room only with the
permission of the court.  On request of a party or on the court’s own
initiative, the charging documents shall reflect only those charges on
which the jury is to deliberate.  The court may impose safeguards for the
preservation of the exhibits and the safety of the jurors.”
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1
Although Sherman v. State was a 5-2 decision by this Court, all seven of the judges took the position
that when there is a violation of what is now Rule 4-326(a), and documents are improperly submitted to
the jury in a criminal case, the standard for determining prejudice is that set forth in Dorsey v. State.  The
two dissenting judges in Sherman were of the view that “the rule violation was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt under the standard adopted in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 350 A.2d 665 (1976).”
Sherman, 288 Md. at 642-643, 421 A.2d at 83 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
Under the rule, exhibits which have not been admitted into evidence obviously should not be
submitted to the jury.  
It is true that prejudice is not presumed when unadmitted exhibits are submitted to the
jury, just like prejudice is not presumed “when the jury considers evidence admitted by the trial
court which is later determined to have been erroneously admitted.”  State Deposit v. Billman,
321 Md. 3, 16, 580 A.2d 1044, 1050 (1990), and cases there cited.  Nonetheless, in a criminal
case, when items are improperly given to the jury in violation of Rule 4-326(a), the
determination of prejudice is based upon the harmless error standard of Dorsey v. State,
supra.  See Sherman v. State, 288 Md. 636, 640-642, 421 A.2d 80, 82-83 (1980).1  See also
Judge Cathell’s discussion for the court in Aron v. Brock, 118 Md. App. 475, 524-525, 703
A.2d 208, 232 (1997).
In the case at bar, we are not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the submission
of exhibit 6 to the jury “in no way influenced the verdict,” Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659, 350 A.2d
at 678.  The application for the search and seizure warrant contained a statement by the
detective that she was experienced, having made arrests that led to 100 convictions, and that
she determined that Merritt was responsible for the murder.  We specifically warned about this
type of evidence in Dorsey, as tending to portray a detective as “‘a super-investigator’” and
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improperly bolstering the detective’s testimony against that of other witnesses. 276 Md. at
644-645, 350 A.2d at 669-670.  The investigations which contributed to the detective’s
conviction rate were wholly irrelevant and prejudicial.  Moreover, the detective’s statement
pronouncing “one of the persons responsible for the murder of Brian Owens is Chris Merritt”
was clearly improper and prejudicial opinion evidence on the ultimate issue at the trial. See the
discussion in Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 277-279, 539 A.2d 657, 662-663 (1998). 
The detective also stated in the affidavit that Merritt admitted to owning a .38 caliber
handgun and a .380 caliber handgun, the same caliber used in commission of the murder.
Merritt’s statement to police that he owned a .38 caliber gun was successfully redacted from
the taped statement admitted at trial.  There was no evidence admitted at the trial that Merritt
told police that he owned the same caliber gun, .380, as one of the murder weapons.  The only
evidence that Merritt owned guns came from the testimony of Shands, the accomplice.  These
statements contained in the affidavit, as to Merritt’s ownership of weapons, improperly
corroborated Shands’s testimony and thus were extremely prejudicial.     
Exhibit 6 contained Merritt’s statement that he was “selling weed” before the crime and
included the inventory list of items seized from Merritt’s home evidencing drug dealing.  Such
evidence of other crimes would not be admissible under the circumstances of this case, and
it was highly prejudicial in showing the “criminal propensity” and “criminal character of the
defendant,” Snyder v. State, 361 Md. 580, 602-603, 762 A.2d 125, 137-138 (2000), and cases
there cited.  See also, e.g., Skrivanek v. State, 356 Md. 270, 291, 739 A.2d 12, 23-24 (1999);
Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 496-497, 597 A.2d 956, 959-960 (1991); State v. Werner, 302
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Md. 550, 556-557, 489 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1985).  
The trial judge was of the view that the “overpowering evidence” of Merritt’s guilt
rendered harmless the submission of exhibit 6 to the jury.  The principal witness for the State
providing the direct evidence of Merritt’s guilt, however, was the accomplice and admitted
murderer, Shands.  The witness Laboard repudiated his earlier statement implicating Merritt.
In light of the prejudicial nature of exhibit 6, we cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the submission of exhibit 6 to the jury in no way influenced the verdict.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
BALTIMORE CITY AND REMAND THE CASE TO
THAT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL.  COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE MAYOR AND
CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.