Case Title: In re Noah B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 201

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 201 
Docket: 
Cum-17-150 
Submitted 
On Briefs: September 27, 2017 
Decided: 
October 5, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE NOAH B. 
 
 
PER CURIAM  
 
[¶1]  The mother of Noah B. appeals from a judgment of the District 
Court (Portland, Eggert, J.) terminating her parental rights to Noah pursuant 
to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2016).1  She 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment and the 
court’s discretionary determination of the child’s best interest.  Because the 
evidence supports the court’s findings and discretionary determination, we 
affirm the judgment. 
 
[¶2]  Based on competent evidence in the record, the court found, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that the mother is unwilling or unable to 
protect the child from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to 
change within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet his needs and that 
                                         
1  The child’s father consented to the termination of his parental rights on March 6, 2017, and is 
not a party to this appeal.   
 
2 
she is unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time 
reasonably 
calculated 
to 
meet 
his 
needs. 
 
See 
22 
M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); In re Cameron B., 2017 ME 18, ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 1199.  
The court also found that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the 
child’s best interest.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055 (1)(B)(2)(a); In re Cameron B., 2017 
ME 18, ¶ 10, 154 A.3d 1199.  The court based its findings of parental unfitness 
and its determination of the child’s best interest on the following findings of 
fact: 
[The mother] has previously had her parental rights to four 
children terminated . . . .  
 
In this case, on February 3, 2016, [the child] was . . . found to 
have petechial bruising on the right side of his face . . . . 
 
When asked about the injuries, [the mother] first blamed 
the father for inflicting them.  Once confronted with evidence that 
the father was not available to inflict the injuries at the time they 
were inflicted, she admitted that she had been the one who 
inflicted them.  As a result of the injuries, a Preliminary Protection 
Order was entered, and subsequently a Jeopardy Order was 
entered.  A Rehabilitation and Reunification plan was put in place, 
and [the mother] began to make good progress with that plan.  
Because of the progress [the mother] was allowed weekly 
unsupervised visits with [the child] . . . . After the third such visit 
[the child] returned to his foster home with bruises on his arm. . . .  
 
Again [the mother] was asked about the bruises and denied 
that she had inflicted them. . . . [The child] was in her care at a 
time when the injuries were most likely to have occurred.  [The 
child] told his foster mother that his mother had done it . . . . The 
 
3 
Court finds that [the mother] again struck [the child] even when 
she was progressing on her rehabilitation and reunification plan.  
 
. . . .  
 
. . . This is the second time that [the child] has been removed 
from [the mother’s] care and placed with foster parents.  He 
should not have to go through this process again and needs to 
have permanency at this time.   
 
. . . He is well bonded to the members of his foster family 
and needs to move on in that safe and stable family setting. . . .   
 
 
[¶3]  The court further found that the child’s “physical conditions” and 
“cognitive challenges” make him incapable of “protecting himself from harm.”  
The court found that the mother’s “personality disorder with narcissistic and 
borderline traits and a history of antisocial features,” characterized by “rigid” 
thinking, “low tolerance for stress,” and a “lower ability to adapt to and react 
to novel situations,” is “difficult to treat and may require extensive time to 
allow treatment to be effective.”  Due to the mother’s condition, history of 
abuse, and the child’s high needs, the court found that it could not “allow 
placement with [the mother], or even to move again to unsupervised visits 
given the risk that [the child] would again have an injury inflicted upon him.”  
The court stated that it “does not know when [the mother] might . . . be 
considered a safe placement” and “there is no guarantee that . . . therapy will 
remediate [the mother’s] problem, and it may take a long time, measured in 
 
4 
years, to find out if [therapy] has worked.”  Noting that “[t]ime is measured 
from [the child’s] perspective,” the court found that the mother—despite her 
effort and progress—remains incapable of providing adequate care for the 
child in a time reasonably calculated to meet his needs.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); In re Alexander D., 1998 ME 207, ¶ 18, 716 A.2d 
222.  
 
[¶4]  Given these findings and the court’s other specific findings of fact, 
all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record, the court did 
not err in its determination of unfitness nor did it err or abuse its discretion in 
determining that termination of the mother’s parental rights, with a 
permanency plan of adoption, is in the child’s best interest.2  See In re 
Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶¶ 16-17, 889 A.2d 297. 
                                         
2  The mother also argues that the court erred because it considered the time the child spent in 
foster care in a previous child protection proceeding when making its best interest determination.  
The mother appears to argue that the court could only consider the child’s time in foster care from 
the current proceeding when determining the child’s best interest.  In fact, far from constituting 
error, the applicable statute requires the court to consider such periods of separation when 
determining if terminating parental rights is in the child’s best interest.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(2) 
(2016) (“In deciding to terminate parental rights, the court shall consider the best interest of the 
child . . . including . . . periods of attachment and separation . . . .”); see also In re Jacob B., 2008 ME 
168, ¶ 14, 959 A.2d 734 (“In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s 
best interest, a court must consider many factors, including . . . periods of attachment and 
separation . . . .”).  The court, therefore, did not err by considering the child’s time in foster care 
from the previous proceeding—a period of separation from his mother brought about by her past 
physical abuse—when it determined that terminating the mother’s parental rights, with a 
permanency plan of adoption, was in the child’s best interest.  See In re Jacob B., 2008 ME 168, ¶¶ 
12-14, 959 A.2d 734. 
 
5 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zack M. Paakkonen, Esq., Portland Legal LLC, Portland, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Portland District Court docket number PC-2016-17 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY