Case Title: BRYAN KEITH GLOVER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0074

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
BRYAN KEITH GLOVER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 169169 P.3d 553Case Number: S-07-0074Decided: 10/25/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
BRYAN 
KEITH GLOVER,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMINGAppellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSubletteCounty

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Bryan Keith Glover was convicted by a 
jury of misdemeanor battery.  In 
addition to sentencing him to a period of incarceration, the district court 
ordered Mr. Glover to pay restitution to the victim and reimburse the State of 
Wyoming for 
his court-appointed counsel fees.  
In his appeal to this Court, Mr. Glover claims the district court erred 
in ordering him to make those payments.  
We find no error and affirm. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2] 
 The parties are in agreement that 
the issues for this Court's determination are whether the district court erred 
in ordering Mr. Glover to pay restitution to the victim and to reimburse the 
State for his public defender fees.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On April 9, 2006, Mr. Glover went to the 
Wheel-In Bar in Big Piney, Wyoming and took the car that his estranged 
wife had driven to the bar.  Upon 
discovering the car was gone from the parking lot, Mr. Glover's wife and Deena 
Longoria went to Mr. Glover's home to retrieve the car.  Mrs. Glover gave the keys to Ms. 
Longoria and asked her to drive.  As 
Ms. Longoria got into the car, Mr. Glover punched her in the face, fracturing 
her nose and both eye sockets.  Ms. 
Longoria was required to undergo reconstructive surgery to repair the damage to 
her face and left eye.

 
 
[¶4]  The State charged Mr. Glover with 
aggravated assault and battery.  A 
jury convicted him of misdemeanor battery, a lesser included offense.  The district court sentenced him to 180 
days in jail with credit for 180 days served prior to imposition of the sentence 
and Mr. Glover was released from jail.  
The district court also ordered Mr. Glover to pay $101,213.71 in 
restitution to Ms. Longoria, which included $11,840 in future medical costs for 
reconstructive eye surgery.  
Additionally, the district court ordered Mr. Glover to pay $12,500 in 
public defender fees.     

          

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]  We review factual challenges to district 
court orders awarding restitution for abuse of discretion.  An order awarding restitution should be 
supported by sufficient evidence to afford a reasonable basis for estimating the 
loss.  A victim impact statement is 
credible evidence to support an order of restitution.  Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, ¶ 14, 151 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶6]  Mr. Glover did not object to the 
district court's order requiring him to reimburse the State for the public 
defender fees. We review claims of error where no objection was made in district 
court for plain error.  This 
standard requires Mr. Glover to prove:  
the incident alleged as error clearly appears in the record, the alleged 
error violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and the error denied him a 
substantial right resulting in material prejudice.   Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 31, 149 P.3d 707, 714 (Wyo. 2007).

  

DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Restitution

 
 
[¶7]  Mr. Glover claims the evidence presented 
was not sufficient to establish that his conduct proximately caused Ms. 
Longoria's pecuniary damages.  He 
asserts the State provided no direct, credible evidence at the sentencing 
hearing concerning Ms. Longoria's damages or Mr. Glover's involvement in 
inflicting them.  He argues the only 
evidence presented, which consisted of the hearsay testimony of Robin Clover, 
the director of the domestic violence sexual assault program, about statements 
Ms. Longoria and her doctor made to her concerning future medical care and past 
and future medical bills, was insufficient to support the district court's 
order. 

 
 
[¶8]  The State responds that the district 
court was required to order Mr. Glover to pay restitution unless it specifically 
found he had neither the present nor future ability to pay. The State further 
asserts that the evidence presented at trial clearly showed that Mr. Glover 
battered Ms. Longoria, resulting in severe facial injuries requiring extensive 
medical care and a jury verdict finding him guilty of battery.  The State also points out that Mr. 
Glover admitted at sentencing that he caused Ms. Longoria's injuries.  Finally the State asserts that the 
amount of Ms. Longoria's pecuniary damages was properly established at the 
sentencing hearing through the testimony of the victim's advocate.       

 
 
[¶9]  Wyoming's restitution statutes provide in 
relevant part:

 
 
§ 
7-9-101.  
Definitions.

 
 
            
* * * *

 
 
            
(iii) "Pecuniary damage" means all damages which a victim could recover 
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the same facts or event, 
including damages for wrongful death.  
It does not include punitive damages and damages for pain, suffering, 
mental anguish and loss of consortium.  

 
 
            
(iv) "Restitution" means full or partial payment of pecuniary damage to a 
victim.  

 
 
            
(v) "Victim" means a person who has suffered pecuniary damage as a result 
of a defendant's criminal activities.  
An insurer which paid any part of a victim's pecuniary damages shall be 
regarded as the victim only if the insurer has no right of subrogation and the 
insured has no duty to pay the proceeds of restitution to the 
insurer.

 
 
 § 
7-9-102.  Order to pay upon 
conviction.

 
 
            
In addition to any other punishment prescribed by law the court shall, 
upon conviction for any misdemeanor or felony, order a defendant to pay 
restitution to each victim as determined under W.S. 7-9-103 and 7-9-114 unless 
the court specifically finds that the defendant has no ability to pay and that 
no reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to 
pay.

 
 
§ 
7-9-103.  Determination of amount 
owed; execution.

 
 
            
(a) As part of the sentencing process including deferred prosecutions 
under W.S. 7-13-301, in any misdemeanor or felony case, the prosecuting attorney 
shall present to the court any claim for restitution submitted by any 
victim.  

 
 
            
(b) In every case in which a claim for restitution is submitted, the 
court shall fix a reasonable amount as restitution owed to each victim for 
actual pecuniary damage resulting from the defendant's criminal activity, and 
shall include its determination of the pecuniary damage as a special finding in 
the judgment of conviction or in the order placing the defendant on probation 
under W.S. 7-13-301.  In determining 
the amount of restitution, the court shall consider and include as a special 
finding, each victim's reasonably foreseeable actual pecuniary damage that will 
result in the future as a result of the defendant's criminal activity. . . 
.

            
(c) The court shall order the defendant to pay all or part of the 
restitution claimed or shall state on the record specific reasons why an order 
for restitution was not entered.  If 
the court determines that the defendant has no ability to pay and that no 
reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to pay in 
the future, the court shall enter specific findings in the record supporting its 
determination.  

            

[¶10]  Pursuant to these provisions, the 
district court was required to order Mr. Glover to pay all or part of the 
damages Ms. Longoria could recover against him in a civil action for battery, 
including reasonably foreseeable future damages, unless the court found that Mr. 
Glover had no ability to pay at the time of his conviction and no reasonable 
probability of being able to pay in the future.  Substantial evidence was presented at 
trial showing that Mr. Glover inflicted the injuries sustained by Ms. 
Longoria.  Based upon the evidence 
presented, the jury found Mr. Glover guilty of battery.  At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Glover 
admitted that he struck Ms. Longoria and caused her injuries.  There is no question Ms. Longoria could 
have recovered damages in the amount of her medical bills in a civil action 
arising out of the battery, including reasonably foreseeable future bills.  

 

[¶11]  Testimony presented at trial showed that 
Ms. Longoria suffered severe injuries as a result of Mr. Glover striking her, 
including a Le Forte fracture,1 a nasal ethmoid complex fracture,2 a comminuted fracture of the left 
eye orbit,3 a fractured zygoma and fractures of 
both maxilla.  Testimony presented 
at the sentencing showed that Ms. Longoria's medical bills totaled $101,213.71, 
including $11,840.00 for future reconstructive eye surgery which her doctor 
indicated was necessary.  Although 
the testimony as to the amount of the medical bills came from the victim's 
advocate, rather than Ms. Longoria herself, we have held in previous cases that 
the evidence necessary to support a restitution award is that which affords a 
reasonable basis for estimating the loss.  
Brock v. State, 967 P.2d 26, 
27 (Wyo. 
1998).  Thus, we held a victim 
impact statement contained in a pre-sentence report in which the victim's mother 
requested $500 to cover the cost of counseling for her daughter constituted 
credible evidence for ordering restitution.  Id.  Similarly, in a larceny by bailee case, 
we held a victim's statement contained in a pre-sentence report requesting 
restitution for unpaid car rental charges and costs associated with physical 
damage to the vehicle afforded a reasonable basis for ordering restitution.  Stowe v. State, 10 P.3d 551 (Wyo. 
2000).  Like the victim impact 
statements, the victim's advocate testimony reciting Ms. Longoria's medical 
bills afforded a reasonable basis for the district court's restitution 
order.  We hold the evidence was 
sufficient to support the order.      

 
 
[¶12]  Mr. Glover also contends that the 
district court did not make the required finding that he had the present or 
future ability to pay the restitution, the evidence suggested he did not and 
will not have that ability and the district court's restitution order must be 
reversed.  The plain language of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-102 (LexisNexis 2007) does not require the district court 
to specifically find that the defendant has or will have the ability to pay. 
Rather, the provision requires the court to make a specific finding only when it 
determines the defendant does not have the ability to pay.  Apparently, the district court concluded 
a reasonable probability existed that Mr. Glover had or would have an ability to 
pay.  From the record before us, we 
hold the district court could reasonably have reached that conclusion.  Evidence was presented at trial showing 
that Mr. Glover worked on a gas rig at the time of the offense.  He told the judge at the sentencing 
hearing that he wanted to serve his time and get back to his family who needed 
his support.  The district court did 
not abuse its discretion in failing to specifically find that Mr. Glover did not 
and probably would not in the future have an ability to pay 
restitution.

 
 

2.            
Reimbursement 
of Public Defender Fees  

 
 
[¶13]  Mr. Glover also contends the district 
court committed error when it ordered him to reimburse the State for his public 
defender's fees in the amount of $12,500.  
Mr. Glover did not object to the order in district court.  Therefore, we apply the plain error 
standard which requires Mr. Glover to show that the incident alleged as error 
clearly appears in the record, the alleged error violated a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law, and the error denied him a substantial right resulting 
in material prejudice.  Martin, ¶ 31, 149 P.3d  at 714.

 
 
[¶14]  Mr. Glover's claim fails because he 
cannot show that the district court's order requiring him to reimburse the State 
for his public defender's fees violated a clear and unequivocal law.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-106(c) (LexisNexis 
2007) provides:

 
 
            
(c)  In every case in which a 
person has received services under W.S. 7-6-104, the presiding judge shall 
determine whether the person . . . is able to provide any funds toward payment 
of part or all of the cost associated with such services.  If the person . . . is not able to 
provide any funds towards payment of costs, the court shall enter a specific 
finding on the record.  If the court 
determines the person . . . is able to provide any amount as reimbursement, the 
court shall order the person . . . to reimburse the state for all or part of the 
costs of the services provided or shall state on the record the reasons why an 
order for reimbursement was not entered. 

 
 
[¶15]  In James v. State, 998 P.2d 389, 397 (Wyo. 
2000), this Court concluded that this provision directs the district court to 
either order reimbursement in some amount or explain why the defendant could not 
pay something.  The court concluded 
the statutory language requires the inference "that the legislature intended for 
a presiding court to presume that all defendants had either a present or future 
ability to pay unless proved otherwise."  Id.  On that basis, we held that it was 
reasonable for the district court to order the defendant to reimburse the State 
the amount of the public defender fees.   

 
 
[¶16]  Given the legislative intent that 
sentencing courts are to presume a present or future ability to pay unless a 
defendant proves otherwise, Mr. Glover cannot show that the district court 
violated a clear rule of law in ordering him to reimburse the State for his 
public defender fees.  The evidence 
at trial showed Mr. Glover was employed at the time of the offense, he told the 
court at the sentencing hearing that he wanted to get this incident behind him 
and return to supporting his family and no evidence was presented to suggest 
that he did not or would not have the ability to pay.  Under these circumstances, we find no 
error in the district court's order.

 
 
[¶17]  Affirmed.

    

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Dr. Terry 
Baker, Ms. Longoria's treating physician testified that a Le Forte fracture is 
one in which the mid-face between the mandible and the forehead is completely 
disassociated from the skull.

 
 

2Dr. Baker 
testified that a nasal ethmoid complex fracture is a "telescoping" fracture, 
meaning the nose is pushed in, involving the nose and the ethmoid 
sinuses.

 
 

3According to 
Dr. Baker, the left eye was displaced downward and in, the bones of the orbit 
were remarkably fractured, causing the orbit to rupture and it contents to go 
down into the sinus, and the eye was fixed in one position because the muscles 
had been impinged with bone.