Case Title: Whittaker v. Dixon

Citation: 411 Md. 580

Docket Number: 32/09

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 32
September Term, 2009
         
          LISA WHITTAKER   
   
          v.
          TERRANCE DIXON
 
    
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
     Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
 JJ.
            PER CURIAM ORDER
 Bell, C.J., Murphy and Adkins, JJ.,
               Dissent.
Filed: November 18, 2009
 
LISA WHITTAKER
*
IN THE
*
COURT OF APPEALS
*
OF MARYLAND
v.
*
No. 32
TERRANCE DIXON
          *    September Term, 2009
   PER CURIAM ORDER
  
                             
      
The petition for writ of certiorari in the above-entitled case
having been granted and argued, it is this 18th day of November, 2009,
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the writ of
certiorari be, and it is hereby, dismissed with costs, the petition
having been improvidently granted.
/s/ Glenn T. Harrell, Jr.
    Senior Judge
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 32
September Term, 2009
                                                                              
LISA WHITTAKER 
   
v.
TERRANCE DIXON
                                                                              
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera, 
JJ.
                                                                              
Dissenting Opinion by Murphy, J.,
which Adkins, J., joins 
and Bell, C.J., joins in part.
                                                                              
Filed:    November 18, 2009
1  According to Petitioner, the case at bar presents three questions:  
(1)
Whether the Courts below erred in upholding the Circuit
Court judgment [that] was issued without a jurisdictional
basis and in violation of Petitioner’s rights pursuant to
the federal Servicemember’s Civil Relief Act (SCRA),
50 App. U.S.C.A. §§ 501 et seq. (2003)[?]
(2)
Whether the Courts below erred in finding that the
Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
take further action to protect Petitioner’s rights in
restoring the status quo ante and not returning the minor
child to Petitioner?
(3)
Whether the Courts below erred in finding that Petitioner
was served with notice of collateral pleadings in the
Circuit Court proceeding?
4
The petition for writ of certiorari that was filed in the case at bar asserts that
“Petitioner is a Major in the United States Army and deployed overseas to Afghanistan in
February, 2008.  Prior to her deployment Petitioner entrusted the full time care and
physical custody of the parties’ minor child[, a daughter], born April 11, 2006, to her
parents residing in Chesapeake, Virginia.”  Petitioner argues that the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County did not have jurisdiction to enter an order granting her ex-husband,
Respondent, “temporary residential custody” of their child.1
Petitioner and Respondent were divorced by a JUDGMENT OF ABSOLUTE
DIVORCE entered on September 13, 2007.  In that judgment, the Circuit Court ordered
that (1) Petitioner “be granted sole legal custody of the minor child . . . so as to obtain a
2 That ex parte relief was granted on the basis of Respondent’s MOTION FOR
EMERGENCY RELIEF, which was accompanied by an affidavit asserting that
Respondent had been “refused visitation by [Petitioner’s parents].”  
3 This hearing was held in response to a SPECIAL APPEARANCE BY
[PETITIONER] IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND VACATE
TEMPORARY ORDER IN RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY FILING, filed by
Petitioner’s counsel.  
5
passport for the minor child and for unrestricted travel by the child,” (2) Petitioner and
Respondent shall have joint legal custody for major issues[,]” (3) “the child shall continue
to live primarily with [Petitioner] who will have residential custody and [Respondent]
will have visitation[,]” and (4) “the Court shall retain jurisdiction over the parties and
their minor child with respect to the issues [of] custody, visitation and support[.]”  
On May 19, 2008, the Circuit Court entered TEMPORARY ORDER IN
RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY FILING that granted “temporary residential custody” of
the child to Respondent.2  At the conclusion of a May 28, 2008 hearing during which both
parties were represented by counsel,3 the Circuit Court (1) granted Petitioner’s request to
rescind the May 19, 2008 order, but (2) denied Petitioner’s request that her parents, who
live in Chesapeake, Virginia,  be granted temporary custody of the child.  
Petitioner noted an appeal from the Circuit Court’s refusal to order that the child
be returned to the custody of Petitioner’s parents.  While affirming the judgment of the
Circuit Court in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in leaving [the child] in [Respondent’s] care, pending
further proceedings.  The court did not, as [Petitioner] alleges,
6
modify custody of [the child].  Rather, after vacating the
temporary custody order, and in the absence of a motion to
modify the divorce decree, the court merely declined to issue
another emergency custody order.
As the court noted, after it vacated the temporary custody
order, the custody order in the 2007 divorce degree was the
effective order.  Under that decree, [Respondent], who the court
noted had “never been adjudged unfit,” had joint legal custody
of [the child] and physical custody rights in the nature of
visitation.  
* * *
Thus, in response to [Petitioner’s] request “to restore the
status quo ante” and return the child to the grandparents, the
lower court properly pointed out that the status quo “was an
order which said [Petitioner] has legal custody, but
[Respondent] has visitation every other weekend,” and “the
grandparents [have] no legal standing in this case.”  Given that
[Respondent] had joint legal custody of his daughter, as well as
temporary custody in the form of visitation rights, it was proper
for the trial court to decline to order that the child be returned to
the third party grandparents.  
Whittaker v. Dixon, No. 832, September Term, 2008, slip opinion pp. 10-11, filed January
9, 2009.  (Footnotes omitted).
I.
With thousands of troops on active duty in Iraq and
Afghanistan, military custody issues arise frequently.  In an
all too common scenario, a servicemember who learns she
will soon be deployed entrusts her child to the care of a
grandparent or stepparent, rather than the child’s other legal
parent.  While the servicemember is away on active duty, the
other parent seeks custody of the child.  If the custody
arrangement is altered, the servicemember often faces a
complicated legal battle to regain custody upon her return, in
spite of her previous role as primary caregiver. 
7
Though the servicemember can request a stay of the
proceeding under the Servicemember Civil Relief Act
(SCRA), a lack of familiarity with the law often creates
confusion among both the lawyers and judges involved,
resulting in a denial or misapplication of the stay.  Even if it is
granted, a judge must balance the parents’ rights with those of
the child and may decide that the child’s best interests trump
the federal mandate and issue a new custody order in spite of
the federal law.
Lauren S. Douglass, Avoiding Conflict at Home When There is Conflict Abroad: Military
Child Custody and Visitation, Family Law Quarterly, Volume 43, Number 2, Summer
2009, p. 349.  (Footnotes omitted).
In the case at bar, the record shows that the Circuit Court asked Petitioner’s
counsel the following question:
[Is it] your position that [the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act,
50 App. U.S.C.A. §§ 501 et seq.] provides that a service
member in defiance of a custody order can place the children
with third parties and utterly defeat the custodial claims of a
second parent who has not been adjudged unfit for the duration
of deployment to some assignment out of state or out of the
country?
Because there are many military installations in this State and in close proximity to
this State, I am certain that other Circuit Courts will also be asking this question, and I am
persuaded that this Court should endeavor to provide the answer.  I therefore dissent from
the decision to dismiss, as improvidently granted, the writ of certiorari that was
previously issued in this case. Chief Judge Bell and Judge Adkins have authorized me to
state that they also dissent from the decision to dismiss.
4  Effective October 1, 2009, that statute provides:
§ 9-108. Custody or visitation order based on deployment of a parent
   
  (a) "Deployment" defined. -- In this section:
   (1) "deployment" means compliance with military orders received by a
member of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast
Guard, National Guard, or any other Reserve component to report for
combat operations or other active service for which the member is required
to report unaccompanied by any family member or that is classified by the
member's branch as remote; and
   (2) "deployment" does not include National Guard or Reserve annual
training, inactive duty days, or drill weekends.
(b) Specific reference of deployment in order. -- Any order or modification
of an existing child custody or visitation order issued by a court during a
term of a deployment of a parent shall specifically reference the deployment
of the parent.
(c) Specific reference to end of deployment in petition; hearing. --
   (1) A parent who petitions the court for an order or modification of an
existing child custody or visitation order after returning from a deployment
shall specifically reference the date of the end of the deployment in the
petition.
8
II.
“The parens patriae jurisdiction of circuit courts in this State is well established.” 
Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 293 Md. 685, 702, 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 (1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1147, 103 S. Ct. 790 (1983).  I would hold that, pursuant to their
inherent parens patriae authority, our Circuit Courts have jurisdiction to afford whatever
relief is necessary to protect the best interests of a child whose custodial parent has been
deployed.  I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, but
order that the case be remanded to the Circuit Court for entry of an order that conforms to
the requirements of § 9-108 of the Family Law Article.4  
   (2) (i) If the petition under paragraph (1) of this subsection is filed within
30 days after the end of the deployment of the parent, the court shall set a
hearing on the petition on an expedited basis.
      (ii) If the court finds that extenuating circumstances prohibited the filing
of the petition within 30 days after the end of the deployment of the parent,
the court may set a hearing on the petition on an expedited basis whenever
the petition is filed.
(d) Other requirements of order. -- Any custody or visitation order issued
based on the deployment of a parent shall require that:
   (1) the other parent reasonably accommodate the leave schedule of the
parent who is subject to the deployment;
   (2) the other parent facilitate opportunities for telephone and electronic
mail contact between the parent who is subject to the deployment and the
child during the period of deployment; and
   (3) the parent who is subject to the deployment provide timely
information regarding the parent's leave schedule to the other parent.
9
In Lenser v. McGowan, 191 S.W.3d 506 (Ark. 2004), while denying a petition for
writ of prohibition filed by a servicemember who asserted that the Circuit Court of
Pulaski County was without jurisdiction to enter a temporary custody order transferring
custody of his child (from the servicemember petitioner’s mother to his ex-wife, the
child’s mother), the Supreme Court of Arkansas stated:
Various acts have been passed by Congress over the years to
protect servicemembers who suffer adverse effects in defending
or prosecuting cases. However, that relief afforded against
adverse effects may not be used to gain an advantage, or in other
words, may not be used as a sword. See, e.g., Louis, J. [v.
Superior Court, 127 Cal.Rptr. 2d 26 (Cal. App. 4th (2002)],
supra. The idea is to relieve servicemembers from disadvantages
arising from military service, not to provide advantages by
10
reason of military service. [The child’s father] seeks an
advantage over [the child’s mother] in arguing that the circuit
court and [the child’s mother] are precluded from even raising
the issue of temporary custody because [the child] happened to
be with [the father’s] mother when the stay was entered. Had
[the child] perchance been with [the child’s mother] when the
stay was entered, it is doubtful [the child’s father] would be
arguing as he does presently. To accept [the] argument [of the
child’s father] would create an environment in which a
servicemember could always gain custody by simply making
sure the child is staying with the servicemember when the stay
is requested. That would provide servicemembers an advantage
rather than protect against adverse affects. The circuit court
stayed the domestic relations case until [the] return [of the
child’s father], but that does not put [the child] in suspended
animation. His life goes on, and the circuit court properly
entertained the issue of who should receive temporary custody.
Even if the stay had been in place when the temporary custody
was considered, it would not have prevented the circuit court
from issuing the order.  The circuit court has jurisdiction to
consider matters such as support, custody, and other similar
matters that arise during the course of the stay.  
Id. at 511.  Because I agree with that analysis, I would affirm the holding of the Court of
Special Appeals that “it was proper for the trial court to decline to order that the child be
returned to the third party grandparents.”
Judge Adkins has authorized me to state that she would also affirm the judgment of
the Court of Special Appeals.
11