Case Title: State v. Mihill

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 1973-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Mihill  299 A.2d 557 (1973) STATE of Maine v. Terrance L. MIHILL. Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. January 31, 1973. *558 Donald Grey Lowry, Asst. County Atty., Portland, for plaintiff. Carl R. Trynor, Portland, for defendant. Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEBBER, WEATHERBEE, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ. ARCHIBALD, Justice. On appeal. The appellant was indicted,[1] tried before a jury and convicted of a violation of 17 M.R.S.A. § 754.[2] Appellant assigns five points on which his appeal rests, none of which have merit. Point One Appellant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the unlawful entry occurred "in the nighttime," as alleged in the indictment. Whether an illegal entry in violation of Section 754 takes place "in the nighttime" is pertinent only when the structure entered is a "dwelling house," and even then it is significant only because it obviates the necessity of proving a "breaking." In the case before us, the object of the illegal entry was "a building in which valuable things are kept" and not a "dwelling house" (see State v. Smith, 268 A.2d 625 (Me.1970); therefore, that portion of the indictment charging "in the nighttime" is not an essential allegation. "[U]nder the general rule . . . whenever an allegation may be struck out of the indictment without injury to the charge, it may be treated as surplusage." State v. Vermette, 130 Me. 387, 388-389, 156 A. 807, 808 (1931). See Martin v. State, 249 A.2d 871 (Me.1969). Furthermore, the appellant has demonstrated no prejudice resulting from this superfluous allegation.[3] State v. McFarland, 232 A.2d 804 (Me. 1967). Point Two Appellant argues that the indictment is insufficient in that it does not allege an "intent to permanently deprive" the owner of his property. This Court has recently held that an allegation of "`intent to permanently deprive' the owner of his property, is surplusage in a breaking, entering *559 and larceny indictment [17 M.R.S.A. § 2103]. . . ." Martin v. State, 249 A.2d 871 , 873 (Me.1969). A fortiori, such an allegation is unnecessary in an indictment for breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny. The indictment, by alleging "with intent . . . to steal, take and carry away" adequately charged larcenous intent, and is sufficient under the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure.[4] Points Three, Four and Five Appellant contends that the presiding Justice committed three errors in his instructions to the jury: (1) The instruction regarding evidence of proof of the date of the actual criminal act was erroneous. (2) The instructions failed to define properly the elements of larceny. (3) The instruction relating the element of intent to the acts of breaking and entering was incomplete and confusing to the jury. The record indicates that no objection to any of these instructions was seasonably entered as mandated by M.R. Crim.P., Rule 30(b). Thus, appellant's belated challenge will not be considered by this Court absent "[o]bvious errors or defects affecting substantial rights." M.R. Crim.P., Rule 52(b). The gratuitous instruction regarding the State's duty to prove an actual date was technically incorrect in that it did not restrict the permissible period of proof to six years prior to the date of the indictment. See 15 M.R.S.A. § 452; State v. Morin, 149 Me. 279, 284, 100 A.2d 657 , 659 (1953). However, the precise date of the illegal entry was not a material issue at trial since there was no variance between the date proved by the State and the date alleged in the indictment, namely, August 10, 1971. Under the circumstances appellant's rights were in no way affected and this technical inaccuracy may be disregarded as harmless error. M.R.Crim.P., Rule 52(a). Because our examination of the instructions discloses no error or defect, we do not consider the final two points as having been properly preserved for appellate review. M.R.Crim.P., Rule 52(b). See State v. Boisvert, 236 A.2d 419 , 422 (Me. 1967); State v. Simpson, 276 A.2d 292 , 294 (Me.1971); State v. Girard, 283 A.2d 462 , 463-464 (Me.1971). The entry is: Appeal denied.[5] POMEROY, J., did not sit. All Justices concurring.