Case Title: Commonwealth v. Pon

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11542

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11542 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PETER PON.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 7, 2014. - August 15, 2014. 
 
Present:  Ireland, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Gants, Duffly, 
& Lenk, JJ.2 
 
Criminal Records.  Criminal Offender Record Information. 
Practice, Criminal, Record.  Constitutional Law, Access to 
criminal records, Privacy.  Privacy. 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division 
of the Boston Municipal Court Department on October 22, 2007.  
 
 
After dismissal, a petition to seal the record, filed on 
November 14, 2012, was heard by Robert E. Baylor, J., and a 
motion for reconsideration was considered by him.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Pauline Quirion (Susan Malouin with her) for the defendant. 
 
Donna Jalbert Patalano, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Rahsaan D. Hall, for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights 
and Economic Justice & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
                     
 
1 A pseudonym.   
 
 
2 Chief Justice Ireland participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  Under G. L. c. 276, § 100C, second par., 
inserted by St. 1973, c. 322, § 1, a former criminal defendant 
whose case resulted in the entry of a nolle prosequi or a 
dismissal may obtain discretionary sealing of his or her 
criminal record where a judge determines that "substantial 
justice would best be served" by sealing.  This provision, which 
is part of the over-all criminal offender record information 
(CORI) statutory scheme, is intended to enable such individuals 
to overcome the inherent collateral consequences of a criminal 
record and achieve meaningful employment opportunities.  See 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. District Attorney for the Middle Dist., 
439 Mass. 374, 384 (2003).  In 2010, the Legislature enacted 
extensive reforms to the CORI scheme, extending access to 
official CORI records to more employers, housing providers, and 
other organizations, for limited use, and simultaneously 
broadening the scope of the sealing provisions to enable more 
individuals to shield their records from public view.  See 
generally St. 2010, c. 256.  Given the demonstrable legislative 
concern in these reforms about the negative impact of criminal 
records on the ability of former criminal defendants to 
reintegrate into society and obtain gainful employment, 
particularly in an age of rapid informational access through the 
3 
 
Internet and other new technologies, it is apparent that the 
stringent standard for discretionary sealing we articulated 
nearly twenty years ago, in Commonwealth v. Doe, 420 Mass. 142, 
149-152 (1995), no longer achieves the proper balance of 
interests.  We granted the defendant's application for direct 
appellate review following the denial of his request for 
discretionary sealing of his criminal record under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100C, and now set forth a new standard for determining when 
substantial justice would best be served by the sealing of 
certain criminal records under G. L. c. 276, § 100C, second par.3 
 
Background.  The defendant was charged in October, 2007, 
with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol (OUI) and leaving the scene of property damage following 
a motor vehicle accident.  He admitted to facts sufficient for a 
finding of guilty.  In September, 2008, a judge of the Boston 
Municipal Court Department ordered a continuance without a 
finding for one year with a rehabilitation program, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 90, § 24D, involving probation and a recommended forty-
five day suspension of his driver's license.  On October 22, 
2009, a judge dismissed the case on the recommendation of the 
probation department. 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the briefs of amici curiae the Lawyers' 
Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Justice, and the Union 
of Minority Neighborhoods; and the Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, and the Boston Workers Alliance.   
4 
 
 
Three years later, in November, 2012, the defendant filed a 
petition to seal his criminal record, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100C, due to its impact on his employment opportunities.4  At a 
hearing on the petition, the Commonwealth objected to the 
sealing of the case because, it contended, the employment 
consequences articulated by the defendant were attributable to 
earlier, more serious charges and not to the OUI charge at 
issue.  See note 34, infra.  The judge denied the petition and 
further denied the defendant's motion for reconsideration.   We 
granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review.   
 
After oral argument before this court, the Commissioner of 
Probation sealed the defendant's criminal record pursuant to the 
administrative process set forth in G. L. c. 276, § 100A.5  
                     
 
 
4 In support of his petition, the defendant submitted an 
affidavit discussing his difficulties obtaining employment and 
his contributions to his community through extensive volunteer 
work, a memorandum of law, a proposed order, and letters of 
support and certificates of achievement.  In particular, he 
emphasized his sobriety and clean criminal record since the 
incident.  Because he lost his commercial driver's license due 
to the incident, he has been unable to resume his career as a 
driver.  Despite applying for hundreds of jobs since 2007, he 
asserts that employers have declined to hire him due to his 
criminal offender record information (CORI). 
  
 
5 General Laws c. 276, § 100A, provides for mandatory 
sealing of "a record of criminal court appearances and 
dispositions" on petition to the Commissioner of Probation after 
a designated period of time if certain criteria are met.  A 
request for sealing under § 100A must be granted if "the 
person's court appearance and court disposition records, 
including any period of incarceration or custody for any . . . 
5 
 
Accordingly, the question of whether the judge abused his 
discretion by denying the defendant's petition to seal his 
criminal record is moot because the defendant has attained his 
                                                                  
record to be sealed occurred not less than five years before the 
request," in the case of a misdemeanor; not less than ten years 
before the request, in the case of a felony; or not less than 
fifteen years before the request, in the case of certain sex 
crimes.  Id.  The person must not have "been found guilty of any 
criminal offense" in Massachusetts, in any other State, or in a 
Federal court, within the preceding five years.  Id.  In 
addition, the person's record must "not include convictions of 
offenses" that are not eligible for sealing.  Id.  Convictions 
that are ineligible for sealing under § 100A include certain 
firearms offenses, see G. L. c. 140, §§ 121-131H; crimes against 
public justice, see G. L. c. 268; and crimes based on the 
conduct of public officials and employees, see G. L. c. 268A. 
See G. L. c. 276, § 100A.  In addition, persons who have been 
classified as a level two or level three sex offender may not 
have such offenses sealed.  G. L. c. 276, § 100A.  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 178K.   
 
 
Most offenses that are eligible for sealing under G. L. 
c. 276, § 100A, after the requisite period of time has passed, 
will not appear in the CORI reports provided to most employers 
and housing providers, even if the individual has not yet filed 
a petition to seal them.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05(4)(a) 
(2012).  However, if the individual has been convicted of a 
subsequent offense, offenses that have not been sealed by an 
affirmative request of the individual will be visible to such 
employers.  Id.  In addition, convictions of murder, 
manslaughter, and certain sex offenses are visible to employers, 
even if they are eligible for sealing under § 100A, unless the 
individual has affirmatively requested sealing.  See id.   
 
 
The defendant apparently met the criteria for § 100A 
sealing with regard to his OUI and accompanying property damage 
charges from 2007.  Although the Commonwealth contends on appeal 
that G. L. c. 276, § 100A, is unconstitutional, we decline to 
address this issue, as it is not properly before us.   
 
6 
 
desired relief through another process.6  See Ott v. Boston 
Edison Co., 413 Mass. 680, 680 (1992); Blake v. Massachusetts 
Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 703 (1976).   
 
Nonetheless, we exercise our discretion to revisit the 
standard for discretionary sealing under G. L. c. 276, § 100C.  
We may answer a question that is no longer important to the 
parties "where the issue [is] one of public importance, where it 
was fully argued on both sides, where the question [is] certain, 
or at least very likely, to arise again in similar factual 
circumstances, and especially where appellate review could not 
be obtained before the recurring question would again be moot."  
Lockhart v. Attorney Gen., 390 Mass. 780, 783 (1984).  The 
sealing of criminal records is of public importance, and the 
parties have addressed the merits of the current standard and 
the need for clearer guidance.  Moreover, this issue undoubtedly 
will arise again for offenders who seek to seal their criminal 
records prior to the eventual sealing provided for in G. L. 
c. 276, § 100A, and will again be rendered moot by the passage 
of time inherent in the due course of litigation and appellate 
review.  See Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 574 
(2013), quoting Lockhart, supra.  Further, the issue has 
"general application to the work of the trial court" and merits 
                     
 
6 As far as we can discern from the record before us, all of 
the defendant's past charges on his CORI record have now been 
sealed.   
7 
 
discussion by this court "in order to promote the proper 
administration of justice."  Doe, 420 Mass. at 143.7,8 
 
Discussion.  This case concerns the balance between the 
public's right of access to criminal court records and the 
State's compelling interest in providing privacy protections for 
former criminal defendants to enable them to participate fully 
in society.  In particular, we must consider that balance in 
relation to the substantive and procedural standards that govern 
review of a petition for discretionary sealing under G. L. 
c. 276, § 100C, second par.  The defendant asserts that our 
existing substantive standard does not adequately recognize the 
compelling interests in support of sealing, and asks that we 
                     
 
7 Although we typically decline to decide constitutional 
questions unnecessarily, see Blake v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 
369 Mass. 701, 707 (1976), this case involves a question of 
interpretation of a Massachusetts statute, G. L. c. 276, § 100C, 
as it relates to a right under the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and therefore does not signal a departure 
from our practice of judicial restraint in the realm of 
constitutional matters.   
 
 
8 Ensuring that the proper test is in place for review of a 
petition for discretionary sealing under G. L. c. 276, § 100C, 
is of particular importance where sealing is the only remedy for 
limiting access to certain classes of criminal records.  
"[W]here a sealing statute is applicable to a particular 
individual's circumstances, judges generally have no equitable 
authority to expunge court or probation records, because the 
Legislature has provided sealing as the exclusive remedy to 
protect the confidentiality of the records."  Commonwealth v. 
Moe, 463 Mass. 370, 373 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1606 
(2013), and cases cited (discussing G. L. c. 276, § 100C, second 
par.).  See Commonwealth v. Boe, 456 Mass. 337, 342-344 (2010). 
 
8 
 
adopt a more flexible standard that advances the legislative 
intent behind the 2010 CORI reforms.9  The Commonwealth contends 
that our existing jurisprudence properly captures the balance of 
interests at stake and merits only minor clarification.  It 
further asks this court to affirm the two-step hearing procedure 
articulated in Doe, 420 Mass. at 149-150, in order to ensure 
that adequate constitutional safeguards are afforded to the 
public.  We conclude that a new substantive standard is 
necessary to achieve the legislative purpose of discretionary 
sealing and modify the procedure currently in place for 
reviewing petitions for sealing. 
 
1.  Substantive standard for sealing under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100C.  a.  Statutory framework and legislative history.  Under 
G. L. c. 276, § 100C, second par., an individual may petition 
the court for sealing of a criminal case ending in a dismissal 
or entry of a nolle prosequi, as early as the time of the 
disposition or at any point thereafter.10  Id.  If "it appears to 
the court that substantial justice would best be served, the 
                     
 
9 Specifically, the defendant contends that the standard set 
forth in Commonwealth v. Doe, 420 Mass. 142, 149-152 (1995), is 
unworkable, because it provides minimal guidance to judges and 
renders it nearly impossible for defendants to succeed on 
sealing petitions.   
 
10 The second paragraph of G. L. c. 276, § 100C, provides in 
full:  "In any criminal case wherein a nolle prosequi has been 
entered, or a dismissal has been entered by the court, and it 
appears to the court that substantial justice would best be 
served, the court shall direct the clerk to seal the records of 
the proceedings in his files."   
9 
 
court shall direct the clerk to seal the records of the 
proceedings in his files."  Id.   
 
This provision was introduced in the 1970s shortly after 
the passage of the initial CORI Act (act), which authorized the 
creation of a comprehensive criminal justice information system 
that would afford limited access to court-based criminal 
records.  See G. L. c. 6, §§ 167-178B; St. 1972, c. 805.  See 
also St. 1973, c. 322, § 1, inserting G. L. c. 276, § 100C.  The 
act and its subsequent amendments attempted "to balance the 
public interest in having access to certain types of criminal 
justice information against the interest of personal privacy,"  
Brant, Barron, Jaffe, Graceffa, & Wallis, Public Records, FIPA 
and CORI:  How Massachusetts Balances Privacy and the Right to 
Know, 15 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 23, 59-60 (1981), "recognizing that 
ready access to a defendant's prior criminal record might 
frustrate a defendant's access to employment, housing, and 
social contacts necessary to . . . rehabilitation."  Globe 
Newspaper Co., 439 Mass. at 384.   
 
Section 100C, and related sealing provisions in G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 100A and 100B, facilitated this balance by requiring 
or permitting the sealing of records of certain convictions, 
juvenile records, and nonconvictions, whose availability did not 
serve criminal justice purposes.  See G. L. c. 276, § 100A, 
inserted by St. 1971, c. 686; G. L. c. 276, § 100B, inserted by 
10 
 
St. 1972, c. 404; G. L. c. 276, § 100C, inserted by St. 1973, 
c. 322.11  See also Rzeznik v. Chief of Police of Southampton, 
374 Mass. 475, 479 (1978); Brant, supra at 65 & n.292.  Once an 
individual's record is sealed, he or she may answer "no record" 
to any question regarding criminal history, and courts and the 
probation department must report that "no record" exists to 
anyone who inquires.  See What Is Sealing of a Record?, 
Massachusetts Criminal Offender Record Information Law § 5.2 
(Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 1st ed. 2012).  Sealing therefore 
removes some of the social and economic barriers created by a 
criminal record.  See Globe Newspaper Co., 439 Mass. at 384. 
 
The substantive standard for discretionary sealing under 
§ 100C, second par., where "substantial justice would best be 
served," is not defined in the statute, nor does the phrase lend 
itself to a clear definition.  See Wheatley v. Massachusetts 
Insurers Insolvency Fund, 456 Mass. 594, 601 (2010), S.C., 465 
Mass. 297 (2013).  Where the words of the statute are ambiguous, 
we strive "to make it an effectual piece of legislation in 
harmony with common sense and sound reason" and consistent with 
legislative intent.  Wolfe v. Gormally, 440 Mass. 699, 704 
                     
 
11 Other statutory provisions also provide for the sealing 
of certain charges or convictions of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance or marijuana.  See G. L. c. 94C, §§ 34, 44; 
St. 1973, c. 1102.  
11 
 
(2004), quoting Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 371 Mass. 186, 190 (1976). 
 
Nearly twenty years ago, this court adopted an 
interpretation of "substantial justice" based on the 
determination of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit that G. L. c. 276, § 100C, implicates concerns 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
therefore requires a heightened burden of proof on the part of 
the defendant in order to overcome a constitutional presumption 
of public access.  See Doe, 420 Mass. at 147-150, discussing 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989).  
In Pokaski, supra at 502-507, 510, the First Circuit concluded 
that because the right of public access guaranteed by the First 
Amendment was implicated by G. L. c. 276, § 100C, sealing under 
§ 100C must survive a "traditional compelling interest/least 
restrictive means test."  Id. at 505.  To justify sealing, a 
defendant must make a specific showing "that sealing [is] 
necessary to effectuate a compelling governmental interest."  
Id. at 511.  Given this heightened standard, the Pokaski court 
stated that sealing under § 100C could occur only in exceptional 
circumstances.  See id. at 506 n.17, 507 n.18.   
 
In Doe, 420 Mass. at 151, this court adopted the reasoning 
of Pokaski and required that, in order to obtain discretionary 
sealing under § 100C, the defendant must show "that the value of 
12 
 
sealing . . . clearly outweighs the constitutionally-based value 
of the record remaining open to society."  As part of this 
burden of proof, the defendant must establish that "he or she 
risks suffering specific harm if the record is not sealed."  Id. 
at 152.  See Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 507 n.18.  In conducting this 
balancing, the judge may consider "all relevant information," 
including "the reason for the nolle prosequi or dismissal," Doe, 
supra at 151, and whether "it is substantially probable that 
future opportunities are likely to be affected adversely by the 
existence of an arrest record," id. at 152.  The court also 
observed that the pool of defendants able to meet this burden 
would be small.  Id. at 149 n.7, citing Pokaski, supra at 507-
508. 
 
b.  Recent CORI reform.  Since our Doe decision in 1995, 
there have been significant changes in the availability of CORI 
records.  These changes indicate a strong legislative policy of 
providing the public, and particularly employers and housing 
providers, with access to certain criminal records in order to 
make sound decisions while also enabling the sealing of criminal 
records where so doing would not present public safety concerns. 
 
The 2010 CORI reforms consisted of three major components 
relevant to the analysis here.  See Massing, CORI Reform --
Providing Ex-Offenders with Increased Opportunities Without 
Compromising Employers' Needs, 55 Boston B.J. 21, 22, 24 (2011).   
13 
 
First, the Legislature extended access to official CORI records 
to a broader group, creating several tiers of access.  See G. L. 
c. 6, § 172; St. 2010, c. 256, § 21; 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05 
(2012).  Any employer, housing provider, professional licensing 
authority, or volunteer organization can generally access the 
following CORI information for authorized purposes:  pending 
criminal charges, including cases that have been continued 
without a finding, until they are dismissed; any convictions 
that are not yet eligible for automatic sealing under G. L. 
c. 276, § 100A; and any murder, manslaughter, and certain sex 
offense convictions, unless they have been sealed affirmatively 
under G. L. c. 276, § 100A, regardless of their eligibility for 
such sealing.12  See G. L. c. 6, § 172 (a) (3), (b); 803 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 2.05(4)(a).  Other employers, volunteer 
organizations, and local government agencies that work with 
vulnerable populations such as children, the elderly, or 
individuals with disabilities may access "all available criminal 
                     
 
12 CORI reports available online to employers who do not 
work with vulnerable populations do not include any convictions 
eligible for sealing under G. L. c. 276, § 100A, or 
nonconvictions that would be eligible for discretionary sealing 
under G. L. c. 276, § 100C.  See 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05(4) 
(2012); Massing, CORI Reform -- Providing Ex-Offenders with 
Increased Opportunities Without Compromising Employers' Needs, 
55 Boston B.J. 21, 23 (2011).  If, however, an individual is 
convicted of a new crime, convictions eligible for sealing under 
§ 100A will be visible unless the individual has officially 
requested sealing.  G. L. c. 6, § 172 (a) (3); 803 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 2.05(4).  See Massing, supra. 
 
14 
 
offender record information," which includes nonconvictions but 
implicitly excludes any sealed records.  See G. L. c. 6, 
§§ 172 (a) (8), (10)-(16), (18), (23), 172C, 172E, 172G, 172H, 
172I; G. L. c. 71, § 38R; 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05(1), 
(3)(b).  Members of the public may request conviction 
information on specific individuals within certain time 
limitations.  See G. L. c. 6, § 172 (a) (4); St. 2010, c. 256, 
§ 21; 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.05(5).  Finally, criminal justice 
agencies,13 firearms licensing authorities, and some government 
agencies that work with children are authorized to obtain all 
criminal offender record information, including sealed records.  
See G. L. c. 6, §§ 172 (a) (1) (criminal justice agencies and 
firearms licensing authorities), 172 (a) (9), (13) (children's 
agencies), 172B, 172F. 
 
This expansion of access to official CORI records reflects 
a recognition of two important policy needs:  that employers, 
housing providers, and licensing authorities have "legitimate 
business reason[s]" for wanting to know prospective employees' 
or recipients' criminal histories, and that making official CORI 
                     
 
13 "Criminal justice agencies" are defined as "agencies at 
all levels of government which perform as their principal 
function, activities relating to (a) crime prevention . . ; (b) 
the apprehension, prosecution, adjudication, incarceration, or 
rehabilitation of criminal offenders; or (c) the collection, 
storage, dissemination or usage of criminal offender record 
information."  G. L. c. 6, § 167. 
 
15 
 
records available more broadly would help steer employers and 
others away from reliance on potentially inaccurate sources of 
criminal history information made possible by technological 
advances since the initial passage of the CORI act (and since 
our decision in Doe).  See Massing, supra at 21-22.  Where 
criminal records are increasingly available on the Internet and 
through third-party background service providers, criminal 
history information that is available only briefly to the public 
through official means can remain available indefinitely, 
despite subsequent sealing or impoundment.  See Jacobs & Crepet, 
The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 
11 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 177, 186-187, 203-208 (2008) 
(hereinafter Jacobs & Crepet); Massing, supra at 22, 24.  By 
providing an official avenue for criminal history information 
and offering incentives for use of official CORI,14 the 
Legislature sought to balance a recognized need for broader 
access to criminal history information with a desire to minimize 
reliance on inaccurate or unauthorized criminal history 
information sources.  See Governor Patrick Signs Strong Anti-
Crime Package to Protect Public Safety, Expand Job 
                     
 
14 The reforms offer protection from negligent hiring claims 
based on failure to check other sources of criminal history, and 
from claims stemming from adverse employment decisions based on 
erroneous CORI.  See St. 2010, c. 256, § 21.  In contrast, if an 
employer relies on information from a private company, it does 
not receive protection from negligent hiring claims. 
16 
 
Opportunities, State House News Service, Aug. 6, 2010 
(legislation "ensures law enforcement agencies, employers and 
housing providers have access to accurate and complete records 
in appropriate circumstances"); State House News Service, July 
30, 2010 (statement of Sen. Cynthia S. Creem on Senate Doc. No. 
2583) ("There is no accountability or reliability.  This bill 
would allow for a web-based program to give potential employers 
access to information that is accurate and consistent"); State 
House News Service, Nov. 18, 2009 (statement of Sen. Creem on 
Senate Doc. No. 2210) ("The bill encourages users to conduct 
their background checks through this system and not any other").  
See also Cheney, Record Access Debate Juxtaposes Needs of Ex-
Prisoners, Employers, State House News Service, July 27, 2009. 
 
Second, the Legislature implemented procedural protections 
for defendants seeking employment by limiting when employers may 
ask about criminal history and requiring employers to share 
criminal history information with applicants.15,16  See G. L. 
                     
 
15 The reforms also improved the processes for correcting 
inaccurate information on a CORI record and filing a complaint 
for violations of the CORI statute, and created a self-auditing 
mechanism for individuals to receive reports on access to their 
records.  See G. L. c. 6, §§ 168, 175; St. 2010, c. 256, §§ 12, 
21, 35. 
 
 
16 Employers may not ask about criminal history until after 
the initial written job application, unless such information is 
required by law for the particular job (the so-called "ban the 
box" provision).  See G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (9 1/2); St. 2010, 
c. 256, § 101; Massing, supra at 23.   
17 
 
c. 6, § 171A; St. 2010, c. 256, § 19.  These protections were 
intended to minimize the discriminatory use of CORI information 
by employers and, again, promote accuracy of information where 
criminal history is considered.  See Massing, supra at 23 (so-
called "ban-the-box" provision "forces employers to consider ex-
offenders' job qualifications on the merits, rather than 
automatically reject applicants who honestly answer the 
[criminal history] question in the affirmative").   
 
Third, the Legislature made changes to the sealing 
provisions by enabling earlier automatic sealing under G. L. 
c. 276, § 100A, and expanding discretionary sealing to a broader 
class of nonconvictions.  The shortened waiting periods for 
automatic sealing17 reflect the consensus of recidivism research 
that "past convictions followed by a lengthy period of law-
abiding conduct simply are not relevant in predicting future 
criminal activity or assessing credibility."  Massing, supra at 
23.  See State House News Service, Nov. 18, 2009 (statement of 
Sen. Creem on Senate Doc. No. 2210) ("Research tells us that ex-
offenders who don't commit crimes in these timeframes are just 
as likely to reoffend as anyone else").  Further, where 
                                                                  
 
 
17 The reforms shortened the waiting periods for eligibility 
for automatic sealing under G. L. c. 276, § 100A, from 15 years 
to 10 years for eligible felonies, and from 10 years to 5 years 
for eligible misdemeanors, and count time served on probation or 
parole toward the waiting period.  See St. 2010, c. 256, § 128.   
18 
 
continuances without a finding previously had been excluded as a 
category of dismissed cases eligible for sealing under § 100C, 
their addition through the 2010 reform suggests that the 
Legislature specifically intended to make earlier sealing more 
widely available.  See G. L. c. 276, § 100C, as amended by 
St. 2010, c. 256, § 131.  These reforms, coupled with the 
procedural protections aimed at minimizing discrimination in the 
hiring process, strongly indicate that the Legislature was 
concerned with the collateral consequences of criminal records 
and sought to make sealing broadly available to individuals 
whose criminal histories or records no longer presented concerns 
of recidivism.  See State House News Service, July 31, 2010 
(statement of Rep. Christine Canavan on Senate Doc. No. 2583) 
("This is a bill that's all about [a] second chance at what all 
of us want, a good job, a good wage, and the ability to raise a 
family").  Cf. In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557, 568 (2012).  In 
light of these expanded opportunities for sealing, the 
Legislature also granted criminal justice agencies immediate and 
automatic access to sealed and nonsealed CORI information, 
further indicating that the Legislature anticipated that more 
criminal records might be sealed following the reforms.18  See 
                     
 
18 Prior to the 2010 reforms, criminal justice agencies 
could see that a sealed record existed, but they needed to 
petition a court in order to view its contents.  See Quirion & 
19 
 
G. L. c. 6, § 172 (a) (1); G. L. c. 276, § 100D; St. 2010, 
c. 256, §§ 21, 133.19    
 
Together, these reforms reflect what has been articulated 
widely in criminal justice research:  that gainful employment is 
crucial to preventing recidivism, and that criminal records have 
a deleterious effect on access to employment.  See Massing, 
supra at 24.  See generally Pager, The Mark of a Criminal 
Record, 108 Amer. J. of Soc. 937 (2003).  Sealing is a central 
means by which to alleviate the potential adverse consequences 
in employment, volunteering, or other activities that can result 
from the existence of such records.  See G. L. c. 276, § 100A, 
fifth par.; G. L. c. 276, § 100C, fourth par. 
 
Overall, the legislative history unmistakably suggests that 
the Legislature's intent in enacting the 2010 reforms was to 
                                                                  
Russo, Sealing Criminal Records 8 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 
2009). 
 
 
19 Another justification for changes to the sealing 
provisions was the concern among legislators that allowing 
criminal records to be available without limit would impose 
further punishment than the underlying crimes merited.  See 
State House News Service, July 31, 2010 (statement of Rep. 
Eugene O'Flaherty on Senate Doc. No. 2583) ("The idea is to keep 
the time frame briefer and stop the further punishment of what 
you've already paid for"); State House News Service, July 30, 
2010 (statement of Sen. Harriette L. Chandler on Senate Doc. No. 
2583) ("These people have served their time but the stigma of 
jail time remains, and this bill will help them become full-
fledged members of society again"); Office of Governor Deval 
Patrick, Patrick Administration Announces CORI Reforms, State 
House News Service, Jan. 11, 2008 (statement by Gov. Patrick) 
("CORI was never intended to turn every offense into a life 
sentence").   
20 
 
recalibrate the balance between protecting public safety and 
facilitating the reintegration of criminal defendants by 
removing barriers to housing and employment.20  See House Speaker 
Robert A. DeLeo, House Passes Criminal Offender Record 
Information Reform, State House News Service, May 26, 2010; 
State House News Service, Nov. 18, 2009 (statement of Sen. Creem 
on Senate Doc. No. 2210) ("This bill strikes a great balance 
. . . between providing information that the public has a right 
to know and protecting people's privacy").    
                     
 
20 Legislators emphasized the positive impact that the 
gainful employment of former criminal defendants can have on 
both preventing recidivism and benefiting the community at 
large.  See State House News Service, Nov. 18, 2009 (statement 
of Sen. Sonia R. Chang-Diaz on Senate Doc. No. 2210) ("No work 
makes a lot of people return to crime, drugs, prison"); State 
House News Service, May 26, 2010 (statement of Rep. O'Flaherty 
on House Doc. No. 4703) ("This proposal is grounded in facts, is 
smart on crime, and is protective of the population. . . . It is 
hard for individuals to assimilate back into neighborhoods when 
they are unable to get work").  This was also the governor's 
message in his advocacy on the issue.  See Governor Patrick 
Signs Strong Anti-Crime Package to Protect Public Safety, Expand 
Job Opportunities, State House News Service, Aug. 6, 2010 ("The 
best way to break the cycle of recidivism is to make it possible 
for people to get a job . . . . This legislation . . . helps 
people get back to work so they can support their families"); 
Massachusetts Exec. Order 495 (Jan. 11, 2008) ("[T]he 
Commonwealth has compelling interests in . . . empowering 
individuals to obtain gainful employment and housing").  In 
furtherance of this message, CORI reform was at times framed as 
an economic bill, stimulating employment and full economic 
participation by reducing barriers.  See Governor Patrick Signs 
Strong Anti-Crime Package to Protect Public Safety, supra; State 
House News Service, July 30, 2010 (statement of Sen. Cynthia S. 
Creem on Senate Doc. No. 2583); CORI Reform Supporters Push for 
Record Overhaul, State Capitol Briefs, State House News Service, 
June 3, 2009. 
21 
 
 
Given these clearly expressed legislative concerns 
regarding the deleterious effects of criminal records on 
employment opportunities for former criminal defendants, and the 
explicit expansion of opportunities for sealing to minimize the 
adverse impact of criminal records, it is apparent that the test 
articulated in Doe, 420 Mass. at 151, serves to frustrate rather 
than further the Legislature's purpose by imposing too high a 
burden of proof on the defendant and articulating unhelpful 
factors for the defendant to determine how to meet his or her 
burden.  Consequently, it is proper for us to revisit the 
meaning of "substantial justice" to ensure that we are 
interpreting the statute so as to give effect to present 
legislative intent.  See Wolfe, 440 Mass. at 704. 
 
c.  New standard.  Given the extent to which Doe frustrates 
the legislative intent behind the recent reforms to the sealing 
provisions, it is necessary to begin our analysis at the same 
point at which the Pokaski court did:  asking whether the First 
Amendment is indeed implicated by G. L. c. 276, § 100C, second 
par. 
 
"[A]lthough we give respectful consideration to such lower 
Federal court decisions as seem persuasive," Commonwealth v. 
Hill, 377 Mass. 59, 61 (1979), quoting Commonwealth v. Masskow, 
362 Mass. 662, 667 (1972), "we are not bound by decisions of 
Federal courts except the decisions of the United States Supreme 
22 
 
Court on questions of Federal law."  Commonwealth v. Montanez, 
388 Mass. 603, 604 (1983).  Because the United States Supreme 
Court has yet to address whether the records of criminal cases 
that have been dismissed or subject to nolle prosequi are 
entitled to a First Amendment presumption of access, we are not 
bound by any particular conclusion.21   
 
We turn now to the two-step analysis set forth by the 
Supreme Court to determine whether a First Amendment presumption 
of access applies.  See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 
478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II).   
 
First, we "consider[ ] whether the place and process have 
historically been open to the press and general public."  Press-
Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8.  At the core of the First 
Amendment right of access is the criminal trial proceeding, 
whose openness has been an "indispensable attribute of an Anglo-
                     
 
21 It is worth observing that neither the First Circuit nor 
the District of Massachusetts has revisited the question of 
access to the records of closed criminal cases for more than 
twenty years.  See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F. Supp. 
89, 100-101 (D. Mass. 1993) (denial of "public access to court-
maintained alphabetical indices of defendants in closed criminal 
cases without an individual judicial determination . . . that a 
particular defendant's name must be sealed or impounded to serve 
a compelling state interest" violates First Amendment).  It is 
indisputable that our society has changed drastically since 
either we or the Federal courts have given great thought to the 
consequences of sealing.  Clearly, the issue is ripe for 
revisiting, and we are not concerned that in so doing we are 
disturbing well-settled jurisprudence that remains readily 
applicable.  
 
23 
 
American trial" since time immemorial, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (plurality opinion), and 
whose value is ensuring the accountability of the judiciary to 
the public.  See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 
596, 604-606 (1982).  Court records also historically have been 
accessible to citizens of the Commonwealth, for the same reason.  
Republican Co. v. Appeals Court, 442 Mass. 218, 222 (2004).  See 
Boston Herald, Inc. v. Sharpe, 432 Mass. 593, 604 (2000); 
Ottaway Newspapers, Inc. v. Appeals Court, 372 Mass. 539, 546 
(1977).  See also Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 435 
(2001), citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F. Supp. 89, 
91, 100-101 (D. Mass. 1993).  But see Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 
Mass. 392, 395-396 (1884) (certain papers filed in court not 
open to public inspection).  However, we have long recognized 
that some classes of court records should not be available for 
public review, such as records relating to cases brought in 
juvenile court, see Commonwealth v. Gavin G., 437 Mass. 470, 
473-475 (2002), citing G. L. c. 119, §§ 60, 60A, and 65, G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 100 and 100B, and Police Comm'r of Boston v. 
Municipal Court of the Dorchester Dist., 374 Mass. 640, 652, 667 
(1978), and that court records properly can be impounded and 
made unavailable for public inspection upon a showing of good 
cause, see Republican Co., supra at 223, and cases cited.  
Further, by statute, the records of certain completed criminal 
24 
 
cases may not be presumptively open for public view in the same 
way as the court room or the filings in an ongoing criminal 
prosecution.  See St. 1972, c. 805 (introducing CORI statutory 
scheme limiting public access to criminal records); St. 1971, 
c. 686 (introducing statutory sealing of certain criminal 
records).    
 
Importantly, the elements of the criminal judicial process 
that we have historically recognized as open to the press and 
the general public are not affected by the sealing of criminal 
records that occurs by way of G. L. c. 276, § 100C: 
"The public's ability to attend a criminal trial is 
not hindered.  The media's right to report on the 
court proceedings is not diminished.  The statute does 
not restrict the media's right to publish truthful 
information relating to the criminal proceedings that 
have been sealed. . . . [Indeed,] the public had a 
right of access to any court record before, during, 
and for a period of time after the criminal trial 
[until the request for sealing was granted]." 
 
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler, 101 Ohio St. 3d 
382, 385 (2004).  Accordingly, we conclude that the records of 
closed cases resulting in certain nonconvictions have not been 
open historically in the same sense as other, constitutionally 
cognizable elements of criminal proceedings. 
 
Second, we consider "whether public access plays a 
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular 
process in question."  Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8, 
citing Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606.  Here, we again 
25 
 
answer in the negative.  There is no indication that the 
availability of records of criminal cases that have been closed 
after nonconviction "enhances . . . the basic fairness of the 
criminal trial and the appearance of fairness," as the openness 
of criminal trials does.  Press-Enterprise II, supra at 9, 
quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 
508 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I).  The First Amendment 
presumption of openness stems in large part from the goal of 
"making the operations of government institutions subject to 
effective public scrutiny," see Fenton, 819 F. Supp. at 94-95, 
and the sealing of a small subset of criminal records after the 
cases have closed does not truly impede the functioning of this 
process.  See Winkler, 101 Ohio St. 3d at 385.  Sealed records 
are available to a number of entities and licensing commissions 
that, in the Legislature's determination, may have a particular 
need to know about such information.  See G. L. c. 6, §§ 172-
178B.  Further, sealing does not compromise law enforcement or 
criminal justice efforts because such records remain available 
to criminal justice agencies and may be used as relevant in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.  See G. L. c. 6, § 172; G. L. 
c. 276, § 100D.  See also G. L. c. 276, §§ 100A, 100B.  
Therefore, sealed records remain available in ways that are 
needed to preserve the integrity of the processes at issue. 
26 
 
 
As the Press-Enterprise II Court noted, "history and 
experience shape the functioning of governmental processes."  
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9.  Where "experience and 
logic" do not call for a First Amendment right of public access, 
the right does not attach.  See id.  It bears repeating that the 
class of records we are considering here is a narrow one:  the 
records of closed criminal proceedings that resulted in a 
dismissal or an entry of nolle prosequi.  We conclude that the 
records of closed criminal cases resulting in these particular 
dispositions are not subject to a First Amendment presumption of 
access, and therefore that the sealing of a record under G. L. 
c. 276, § 100C, need not survive strict scrutiny.  This 
conclusion, although at odds with that of the First Circuit and 
the implicit rationale of some of its sister circuits,22 is 
consistent with that of at least one other State supreme court, 
see State v. D.H.W., 686 So. 2d 1331, 1336 (Fla. 1996), and with 
                     
 
22 According to a recent opinion by the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland, every Federal 
circuit court except the United States Courts of Appeal for the 
Federal Circuit and the Tenth Circuit has applied the Press-
Enterprise II test and concluded that the First Amendment right 
of public access applies to "documents entered into evidence at 
a criminal trial or filed in connection with at least some types 
of substantive pretrial criminal proceedings."  Center for 
Constitutional Rights v. Lind, 954 F. Supp. 2d 389, 402 (D. Md. 
2013).  Of the cases cited for this proposition, however, only 
the First Circuit opinion, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 
F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989), explicitly pertains to the sealing of 
court records in closed criminal cases.  See Lind, supra at 402 
n.11. 
27 
 
our own jurisprudence on impoundment, see, e.g., Republican Co., 
442 Mass. at 222-223 (certain court documents not subject to 
First Amendment presumption may be impounded on lesser showing 
than required where constitutional right implicated).  
 
Although these records are not subject to a First Amendment 
presumption, we conclude that they are subject to a common-law 
presumption of public access.  See Nixon v. Warner 
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) ("courts of this 
country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 
records and documents, including judicial records and 
documents"); New England Internet Café, LLC v. Clerk of the 
Superior Court for Criminal Business in Suffolk County, 462 
Mass. 76, 82-83 (2012), and cases cited.  See also Massachusetts 
Body of Liberties, art. 48 (1641) ("Every inhabitant of the 
Country shall have free liberty to search and review any rolls, 
records or registers of any Court or office").  Although this 
common-law presumption is of paramount importance, like its 
constitutional counterpart, it is not absolute.  See Nixon, 
supra at 597-598; Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 604.  Rather, it may be 
restricted on a showing of "good cause."  New England Internet 
Café, LLC, supra at 83, citing Republican Co., 442 Mass. at 223.  
 
Our conclusion that only a common-law presumption of public 
access applies enables us to depart from the exacting 
constitutional standard requiring narrowly tailored means toward 
28 
 
achieving a compelling government interest.  Consequently, we no 
longer will require that a defendant seeking sealing under G. L. 
c. 276, § 100C, second par., prove "that the value of sealing 
. . . clearly outweighs the constitutionally-based value of the 
record remaining open to society."  Doe, 420 Mass. at 151.  
Instead, we interpret the legislative directive that 
"substantial justice [will] best be served" by sealing to mean 
that the defendant must establish that good cause exists for 
sealing.  See G. L. c. 276, § 100C.  This is consistent with our 
case law regarding the appropriate substantive standard where a 
common-law presumption applies.  See, e.g., New England Internet 
Café, LLC, 462 Mass. at 78, 83; Republican Co., 442 Mass. at 223 
("The public's right of access to judicial records . . . may be 
restricted, but only on a showing of 'good cause'"), citing 
Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 604; Newspapers of New England, Inc. v. 
Clerk-Magistrate of the Ware Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 403 
Mass. 628, 631-632, 637-638 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 
(1989), and cases cited.23  Although a good cause analysis 
                     
 
23 This test is analogous to the test employed for 
impoundment of certain court records, which raises similar 
concerns of privacy and public access.  See Boston Herald, Inc. 
v. Sharpe, 432 Mass. 593, 604 n.22 (2000), quoting Rule 7 of the 
Uniform Rules on Impoundment Procedure (West 2000).  Where we 
have recognized a common-law presumption of access in a 
particular court record, we have employed a "good cause" 
standard to determine when impoundment is permissible.  See 
Republican Co. v. Appeals Court, 442 Mass. 218, 223 (2004).  See 
also New England Internet Café, LLC v. Clerk of the Superior 
29 
 
requires consideration of similar factors as an analysis where 
the First Amendment is implicated, see Republican Co., supra at 
223 n.8; Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 605 n.24, the weight of the scales 
is more balanced, and the burden on the defendant somewhat 
lessened.  See New England Internet Café, LLC, supra at 83.  
Nonetheless, the basic framework remains the same:  sealing may 
occur only where good cause justifies the overriding of the 
general principle of publicity.24  Cf. Republican Co., supra at 
223.   
                                                                  
Court for Criminal Business in Suffolk County, 462 Mass. 76, 83-
84 (2012) (impoundment requires showing of "good cause"); 
Newspapers of New England, Inc. v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Ware 
Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 403 Mass. 628, 632 (1988), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989), quoting H.S. Gere & Sons, Inc. v. 
Frey, 400 Mass. 326, 329 (1987) (search warrant affidavits, 
entitled to common-law presumption, may be impounded "when 
justice so requires"; this requires judge to "balance the 
parties' privacy concerns against the general principle of 
publicity" to determine if "'good cause' to order the 
impoundment exists").  The broader scope of sealing presents 
somewhat different consequences and has an impact on different 
interests than impoundment does, and judges must be cognizant of 
these heightened consequences in conducting a good cause 
analysis.  See Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827, 836 n.12 
(2009) (discussing difference between sealing and impoundment). 
 
 
24 It is worth discussing briefly the first paragraph of 
G. L. c. 276, § 100C, although it is not at issue here.  That 
paragraph provides for mandatory sealing following the 
completion of a criminal case that ends in a finding of not 
guilty, a finding of no probable cause, or a failure to indict 
by a grand jury.  See id.  In Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 509-511, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that 
this automatic, mandatory sealing of cases violated the First 
Amendment presumption of public access to court records with 
regard to cases ending in "not guilty" or "no probable cause" 
findings, but not with regard to cases ending in "no bill" from 
30 
 
                                                                  
a grand jury.  The Pokaski court indicated, however, that 
discretionary sealing of such cases would be constitutional 
where the judge has made "specific, on the record findings that 
sealing [is] necessary to effectuate a compelling governmental 
interest"  -- in other words, where the standard set forth in 
that opinion for G. L. c. 276, § 100C, second par., is 
satisfied.  See id. at 511.   
 
 
Following Pokaski and our adoption of the Pokaski reasoning 
in Doe, 420 Mass. at 149, the District Court Department of the 
Trial Court determined that, with the exception of "no bill" 
cases, which were not disturbed by these decisions, it would 
seal criminal records under either paragraph of G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100C, pursuant to the standard set forth in Doe.  See The 
Administrative Office of the District Court, Guide to Public 
Access, Sealing & Expungement of District Court Records, at 13, 
13 n.42, 17, 42-44 (rev. Sept. 2013) (hereinafter Guide to 
Public Access).  Accordingly, rather than automatically sealing 
cases resulting in a finding of "not guilty" or "no probable 
cause," the District Court requires a defendant to file a 
petition for sealing and demonstrate that "the value of sealing 
. . . clearly outweighs the constitutionally-based value of the 
record remaining open to society."  Doe, supra at 151.  See 
Guide to Public Access, supra.  Sealing may occur only after a 
judge makes specific findings on the record that this standard 
has been met.  See Doe, supra at 152-153; Guide to Public 
Access, supra.  If the petition is granted, the District Court 
judge signs a form which the defendant may then provide to the 
probation department for sealing of his or her record there.  
See Guide to Public Access, supra.   
 
 
We suspect that other trial courts in the Commonwealth also 
may be taking this approach of employing one process and 
substantive standard for sealing decisions, regardless of 
whether the case resulted in a finding of not guilty, a finding 
of no probable cause, a dismissal, or an entry of nolle 
prosequi.  See Guide to Public Access, supra.  Because sealing 
under G. L. c. 276, § 100C, first par., is not directly at issue 
in this case, we decline to extend our holding and the analysis 
we employ to that portion of the statute.  However, until the 
Legislature revisits the language of G. L. c. 276, § 100C, first 
par., or until the issue of its interpretation comes before us, 
we observe that the solution adopted by the District Court is a 
reasonable one, as long as it is modified consistent with our 
holding in this case:  that sealing may occur where good cause 
justifies the overriding of the general principle of publicity. 
31 
 
 
In assessing whether the defendant has established good 
cause for sealing his or her record, judges must balance the 
interests at stake.  Cf. Republican Co., 442 Mass. at 223; 
Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 604-605, and cases cited.  If, after 
balancing those interests, the judge determines that the 
defendant has done so, the substantial justice standard will be 
satisfied.  This test achieves the necessary balance between the 
common-law presumption of access and the privacy interests at 
stake.25 
 
Other jurisdictions with discretionary sealing statutes or 
judicial standards for sealing have adopted such balancing 
tests.  See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.045(19) (West Supp. 
2014); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.52(B)(2)(d) (West 2006 & Supp. 
2014) (in determining whether sealing is appropriate, judge must 
consider statutory factors and "[w]eigh the interests of the 
person in having the official records pertaining to the case 
sealed against the legitimate needs, if any, of the government 
to maintain those records"); Johnson v. State, 50 P.3d 404, 406 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2002), quoting Anchorage v. Anchorage Daily 
                                                                  
 
 
25 It is only logical that the standard for the closure of a 
court record from public view after the completion of the 
criminal proceeding be a lesser one than that for closure of the 
criminal proceeding itself.  Yet the standard articulated in Doe 
and Pokaski is essentially the same standard as articulated for 
closure of ongoing judicial proceedings in criminal cases.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 107 (2010), 
and cases cited. 
32 
 
News, 794 P.2d 584, 590 (Alaska 1990) ("In cases where there is 
no express exception to the state's disclosure laws, we balance 
'the public interest in disclosure on the one hand, and the 
privacy and reputation interests of the affected individuals 
together with the government's interest in confidentiality, on 
the other,'" and in cases involving criminal records, court 
"balance[s] the public's right to know about an individual's 
past crimes against the convicted individual's right to 
privacy"); D.H.W., 686 So. 2d at 1336 ("policy of public access 
to old records must be weighed against the long-standing public 
policy of providing a second chance to criminal defendants who 
have not been adjudicated guilty"); In re Kollman, 210 N.J. at 
577 ("judges will balance . . . [articulated] factors as they 
decide whether expungement [akin to sealing] serves the public 
interest in a particular case" and will "weigh the risks and 
benefits to the public of allowing or barring expungement"); 
Winkler, 101 Ohio St. 3d at 384-385 (discussing Ohio balancing 
test).   
 
We turn now to what this balancing test will entail.  
Judges should begin by recognizing the public interests at 
stake.  The public has a general right to know so that it may 
hold the government accountable for the proper administration of 
justice.  See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598; Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 502; 
George W. Prescott Publ. Co. v. Register of Probate for Norfolk 
33 
 
County, 395 Mass. 274, 279 (1985).  As this court acknowledged 
in Doe, 420 Mass. at 151, "[e]ven [where] a case has not been 
prosecuted, information within a criminal record may remain 
useful" to the public. 
 
Next, judges evaluating a petition for sealing must 
recognize the interests of the defendant and of the Commonwealth 
in keeping the information private.  These interests include the 
compelling governmental interests in reducing recidivism, 
facilitating reintegration, and ensuring self-sufficiency by 
promoting employment and housing opportunities for former 
criminal defendants.  See DeLeo, House Passes Criminal Offender 
Record Information Reform, State House News Service, supra; 
Massing, supra at 23-24.  Where there is persuasive evidence 
that employers and housing authorities consider criminal history 
in making decisions, there is now a fully articulated 
governmental interest in shielding criminal history information 
from these decision makers where so doing would not cause 
adverse consequences to the community at large.26  See Globe 
                     
 
26 The corollary that the sealing of nonconvictions does not 
have deleterious effects on the safety of the community is 
evidenced by the fact that, according to one national survey, 
the vast majority of States either permit the sealing of 
nonconviction information or do not make such information 
available to the public at all.  See Mukamal & Samuels, 
Statutory Limitations on Civil Rights of People with Criminal 
Records, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1501, 1509-1510 (2003) (forty 
States permit expungement/sealing of some or all nonconviction 
criminal records, whereas only sixteen permit sealing of some 
34 
 
Newspaper Co., 439 Mass. at 384; Doe, 420 Mass. at 146, 151.  
Given the evidence of the long-term collateral consequences of 
criminal records, judges may take judicial notice that the 
existence of a criminal record, regardless of what it contains, 
can present barriers to housing and employment opportunities.  
See Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 505-506; Fenton, 819 F. Supp. at 97. 
See also Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of 
Criminality, 39 J.L. & Econ. 519, 519 (1996) ("A convicted 
criminal suffers not only from public penalties but from stigma, 
the reluctance of others to interact with him economically and 
socially").  These concerns are heightened by the immediate and 
effectively permanent availability of criminal history 
information on the Internet.  See Jacobs & Crepet, supra. 
 
With these interests in mind, we turn next to the factors 
relevant to conducting this balancing, noting at the outset that 
judges may consider any relevant information in weighing the 
interests at stake.  See New England Internet Café, LLC, 462 
Mass. at 92 ("'good cause' analysis is sufficiently flexible" to 
allow consideration of any factors relevant to specific facts of 
case); Globe Newspaper Co., petitioner, 461 Mass. 113, 122 
(2011) (under good cause standard, judge must "consider and 
                                                                  
conviction records).  See also United States Dep't of Justice v. 
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 754 n.2 
(1989). 
 
35 
 
balance the relevant factors that apply to a particular case").  
At a minimum, judges should evaluate the particular 
disadvantages identified by the defendant arising from the 
availability of the criminal record; evidence of rehabilitation 
suggesting that the defendant could overcome these disadvantages 
if the record were sealed; any other evidence that sealing would 
alleviate the identified disadvantages; relevant circumstances 
of the defendant at the time of the offense that suggest a 
likelihood of recidivism or of success; the passage of time 
since the offense and since the dismissal or nolle prosequi; and 
the nature of and reasons for the particular disposition.  We 
consider each of these factors in greater detail.27   
 
First, of central importance are the disadvantages the 
defendant claims to face due to the availability of his or her 
criminal record.  Although the defendant need not establish a 
risk of specific harm, contrast Doe, 420 Mass. at 152, he or she 
must allege with sufficient particularity and credibility some 
disadvantage stemming from CORI availability that exists at the 
time of the petition or is likely to exist in the foreseeable 
future.28  This can include, but is not limited to, a risk of 
                     
 
27 Although we have numbered the factors here for ease of 
comprehension, this list is not exhaustive, and the factors 
should be tailored appropriately to the particular circumstances 
of each case. 
 
36 
 
unemployment, underemployment, or homelessness attributable to 
CORI availability; a demonstrated desire to pursue an occupation 
in which employers have access to nonconviction records; an 
impeded ability to participate in community or volunteer 
activities due to CORI availability; or the potential for 
reduced opportunities for economic or professional advancement 
due to CORI availability.  It may also involve a demonstration 
that under- or unemployment, despite efforts to achieve gainful 
employment, has led the defendant to rely on public assistance 
to support him or herself, and his or her family.29  As noted 
above, judges may take judicial notice of the well-known 
consequences for employment and housing prospects from the 
existence of a criminal record. 
 
Second, evidence of rehabilitation should be considered in 
conjunction with the judge's assessment of whether sealing would 
                                                                  
 
28 As the facts of this case demonstrate, it may be 
difficult to attribute causation to nonconvictions where a 
defendant has convictions or other criminal matters on his or 
her CORI.  It is unrealistic, however, to require a defendant to 
prove causation in any circumstance, and instead, we entrust the 
assessment of a plausible relationship between CORI availability 
and the alleged adversity, and the extent to which the alleged 
adversity may be relieved by the sealing of the particular 
nonconviction at issue, to the sound discretion of the judge.   
 
 
29 This consideration is particularly important where we 
have recognized a compelling State interest in ensuring that 
parents are able to support their children.  See L.W.K. v. 
E.R.C., 432 Mass. 438, 446 (2000); Gray v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 422 Mass. 666, 675 (1996), quoting Duranceau v. 
Wallace, 743 F.2d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 
37 
 
assist the defendant in overcoming the identified disadvantages.  
Employment attempts, community or civic engagement, successful 
completion of a probationary period or a sobriety or mental 
health treatment, lack of further contact with the criminal 
justice system, or other accomplishments may weigh in favor of 
sealing by demonstrating that the defendant bears a low risk of 
recidivism and a likelihood of success in future employment.  
See In re Kollman, 210 N.J. at 576-577.  This evidence of 
rehabilitation can begin from the date of the alleged offense, 
and need not be limited to the date of the disposition, given 
the significant passage of time that can occur between these 
events.30   
 
Third, judges should consider other evidence on whether 
sealing would alleviate the identified disadvantages.  In this 
respect, it may be useful to consider the nature of the 
underlying crime, the stigma or stereotypes attached to it, and 
whether the defendant would be benefited by the sealing of the 
record without posing an additional safety threat to the 
                     
 
30 This factor may place the defendant in somewhat of a 
"Catch-22" situation, in that sealing is intended to enable 
rehabilitation and reintegration where a criminal record impedes 
such progress.  Nonetheless, the defendant should be able to 
show some meaningful effort toward rehabilitation, even in the 
face of the barriers that the availability of his or her 
criminal record may impose. 
 
38 
 
community.31  Similarly, where the crime or the case was 
newsworthy, the judge should consider whether the defendant 
maintains any sense of privacy, such that sealing could still 
have a positive impact.32 
 
Fourth, consideration of the defendant's circumstances at 
the time of the offense may prove instructive in assessing his 
or her likelihood of recidivism or success.  For example, 
significant criminal justice research suggests that younger 
individuals have a great capacity for rehabilitation and should 
not face the harshest consequences for their youthful 
indiscretions.  See Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the 
Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 669-671 (2013).  On the other 
hand, a history of prior criminal activity leading up to the 
offense weighs against sealing, as it suggests a greater 
likelihood of reoffense. 
                     
 
31 It is no longer necessary, however, to consider the value 
to law enforcement of keeping the record open to the public.  
See Police Comm'r of Boston v. Municipal Court of the Dorchester 
Dist., 374 Mass. 640, 656 (1978).  Under the revised CORI 
framework, law enforcement have automatic access to sealed and 
unsealed records.  See G. L. c. 276, § 100D.  See also G. L. 
c. 6, §§ 167, 172 (a) (1).  Cf. State v. Noel, 101 Wash. App. 
623, 628 (2000). 
 
 
32 Where the defendant is a public figure, a different 
analysis may be necessary.  Cf. Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 611-612.  
As those facts are not before us, we decline to discuss this 
analysis further. 
 
39 
 
 
Fifth, the passage of time since the date of the offense 
and the date of the dismissal or nolle prosequi is an important 
factor that can weigh in favor of either interest.  If sealing 
is sought immediately following the disposition, there may be 
concerns that the public has not had sufficient opportunity for 
access, and that the defendant may be likely to reoffend.  With 
the passage of at least some time, however, the potential damage 
resulting from public availability is done, and the record may 
exist in the databases of third-party background check services, 
immune in practice (but not in law) from sealing.  See Doe, 420 
Mass. at 152; Calvert & Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History 
Clashes with the First Amendment and Online Journalism:  Are 
Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the Digital Age?, 19 CommLaw 
Conspectus 123, 123-124 (2010).  But see G. L. c. 93, § 54 
(requiring background check services to update records).  In 
addition, as the passage of time since the offense lengthens, 
the risk of recidivism lessens, and the case for enabling full-
fledged participation in the workforce becomes even stronger and 
the burden on the public weaker.33  See Police Comm'r of Boston, 
374 Mass. at 658 (after time, maintenance of records "cannot be 
said to serve any valid law enforcement purpose").   
                     
 
33 Once the defendant has reached the five- or ten-year 
marks from the date of the disposition, he or she likely will be 
eligible for automatic sealing under G. L. c. 276, § 100A. 
40 
 
 
Sixth, the nature of and reasons for the disposition, 
meaning whether the case was dismissed with prejudice, without 
prejudice, as part of an agreed-upon disposition, or as the 
result of a nolle prosequi, should be considered.  Cf. N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:52-2(a)(2) (West Supp. 2014); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2953.52(B)(2) (West 2006 & Supp. 2014).  Defendants who 
were subject to wrongful accusations present the strongest case 
for sealing.  See Commonwealth v. Roberts, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 
355, 358 (1995) ("It is peculiarly unjust to saddle an 
individual with a record in a case that should never have been 
begun").  Dismissals after admission of guilt and periods of 
probationary conditions may require more evidence of 
demonstrated rehabilitation. 
 
d.  Application of new standard.  For the purpose of 
providing guidance to the lower courts on how to apply the 
balancing test we announce today, we consider how the defendant 
in this case would fare under the test, recognizing that his 
record has already been sealed under G. L. c. 276, § 100A. 
 
First, the defendant alleged specific difficulties in 
obtaining employment, including noting that he had applied to 
over 300 positions and obtained a small number of interviews, 
identifying specific employers who had rejected his applications 
and specific challenges he faced in obtaining employment or 
educational opportunities in his chosen field of social work.  
41 
 
He also alleged that because of his OUI charge, he was unable to 
resume his prior work as a commercial truck driver, and instead 
has had to pursue new career opportunities.  The Commonwealth 
contends that the defendant's prior criminal history, portions 
of which at the time of his petition for sealing had not yet 
been sealed and which reflected long-past firearm and drug 
convictions, was the basis for his employment challenges.34  The 
defendant's prior, serious criminal history weighs against 
sealing here, but it is notable that these convictions occurred 
over twenty years ago.  We therefore do not find it dispositive 
that the defendant cannot demonstrate that the specific charges 
he seeks to seal are the ones that have prevented his 
employment, and consider his allegations sufficient to 
demonstrate meaningful employment disadvantages stemming from 
the availability of his record. 
                     
 
34 The defendant pleaded guilty in 1995 to seven crimes 
arising out of two sets of indictments.  These charges were for 
unlawful possession of a firearm, distribution of cocaine in a 
school zone, and criminal conspiracy.  At the time of his 
petition for sealing of his OUI and property damage charges, the 
defendant indicated that portions of his CORI record had been 
sealed "administratively," presumably under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100A, but that his record still contained several dismissed 
charges from District Court, for which he would be petitioning 
for sealing separately.  Although it appears that the 
defendant's record has since been sealed in full, it is unclear 
from the record before us whether the drug and firearms 
convictions from 1995 were sealed at the time of the instant 
petition, and it is further unclear what the defendant's 
criminal history is over-all.  In conducting the balancing test 
we introduce here, it is important that the judge have a 
complete record of the defendant's criminal history. 
42 
 
 
Second, the defendant submitted significant evidence of 
rehabilitation, demonstrating his sobriety, his successful 
efforts to obtain at least occasional employment, his efforts 
toward self-improvement through enrollment in financial 
workshops, and his extensive volunteer work, which was 
corroborated by three letters of recommendation from individuals 
who work at the volunteer organizations.  The evidence on this 
factor weighs heavily toward sealing where the defendant seems 
clearly capable of contributing fully to society, and sealing 
would remove the barrier that prevents him from doing so.35   
This evidence, along with the fact that five years had passed 
between the date of the dismissal and the date of the 
defendant's petition, suggest minimal if any risk of recidivism.   
 
The Commonwealth urges us to place great weight on the 
defendant's admission to sufficient facts for a finding of 
guilty on the OUI charge and the accompanying charge of leaving 
the scene of property damage, and the subsequent dismissal of 
these charges only after a continuance without a finding.36  
                     
 
35 We are not persuaded by the Commonwealth's assertion that 
sealing would have no effect on his employment prospects because 
private background check services are available.  Were we to 
accept this argument, sealing would never be justified.  The 
operations of third-party providers who disregard sealing orders 
do not dictate our analysis. 
 
 
36 This disposition was previously excluded from the sealing 
provision of G. L. c. 276, § 100C.  See St. 2010, c. 256, § 131. 
 
43 
 
However, we are not persuaded that this factor outweighs the 
significant evidence of rehabilitation and disadvantages that 
may be remedied from sealing.  Accordingly, a judge properly 
could conclude that the defendant carried his burden of 
demonstrating that good cause exists to justify sealing.  The 
evidence presented by the defendant illustrates that the 
governmental interest of removing stigma to enable a 
rehabilitated individual to obtain gainful employment in his or 
her area of training or chosen profession would be well served 
here, and that there is little need to keep the defendant's 
record available for public inspection where so much time has 
passed.  
 
2.  Procedure for discretionary sealing under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100C.  We turn finally to the question of the procedure courts 
should employ with regard to petitions for sealing under G. L. 
c. 276, § 100C.  In Doe, 420 Mass. at 149-150, we adopted a two-
stage hearing process suggested in Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 507-508, 
for the resolution of petitions for sealing under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100C.   
 
The Commonwealth asks this court to affirm the two-stage 
hearing process because it enables judicial efficiency by 
providing for summary dismissal of sealing requests without a 
prima facie case and reserves only the potentially meritorious 
petitions for full hearings conducted with notice to the public.  
44 
 
In contrast, the defendant asserts that a one-stage hearing 
process is a more effective case management tool that promotes 
judicial economy and access to justice and does not depart from 
any procedural requirement imposed by Doe and Pokaski.  We agree 
with the defendant that an initial hearing may no longer be 
necessary, and accordingly modify the procedure articulated in 
Doe. 
 
Under the procedural framework set forth in Doe, after a 
defendant files a petition for sealing under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 100C, the defendant must appear for an informal hearing at 
which he or she must make a prima facie case for sealing.37  Doe, 
420 Mass. at 149.  If a prima facie showing is not made, the 
petition is dismissed summarily.  Id.  If, however, the 
defendant makes an adequate showing, a second, more extensive 
hearing is held, with notice provided to the district attorney's 
office, the probation department, and the public.  Id. at 150.   
 
According to the parties, some courts have departed from 
this two-hearing process in the interest of judicial economy, 
opting instead to conduct a single, final hearing.  See Survey 
of Greater Boston Area Court Procedures for Criminal Record 
Sealing, Mass. Legal Services (Oct. 22, 2013).  Given that we 
announce today a lower standard for sealing and no longer 
                     
 
37 No notice is provided to the public or any other 
interested party of this initial hearing.  See Doe, 420 Mass. at 
149-150.   
45 
 
require defendants to overcome the weight of a constitutional 
presumption, we conclude that an initial hearing may not be 
necessary.  We are satisfied that eliminating the requirement of 
an initial hearing will go far in improving judicial efficiency 
and minimizing the burden on pro se litigants without 
compromising public access to such determinations or depriving 
defendants of an adequate opportunity to be heard.38   
 
Where a defendant files a petition and accompanying 
documents setting forth facts that demonstrate good cause for 
overriding the presumption of public access to court records, a 
judge may determine on the pleadings whether a prima facie 
showing has been made.39  If such a showing is made, the petition 
should proceed to a hearing on the merits.  Notice of the 
hearing must be provided to the public and other interested 
parties, as detailed in Doe, 420 Mass. at 150.40  See United 
States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 59 (1st Cir. 2013) ("It is 
axiomatic that protection of the right of access suggests that 
the public be informed of attempted incursions on that right.  
                     
 
38 Under this revised procedure, courts may hold a single 
sealing petition session, at which many such petitions are heard 
and resolved expeditiously. 
 
 
39 In some cases, where a prima facie case is not made on 
the papers, a preliminary hearing may be desirable.  We leave 
this determination to the discretion of the motion judge. 
 
 
40 If a prima facie showing is not made, the sealing 
petition may be summarily dismissed on the pleadings.  See Doe, 
420 Mass. at 149. 
46 
 
Providing the public with notice ensures that the concerns of 
those affected by a closure decision are fully considered"); 
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 609 n.25, quoting Gannett v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(public and press must have opportunity to be heard on "question 
of their exclusion" where case-by-case assessment employed).  
After hearing the arguments and balancing the interests at 
stake, if the judge is satisfied that good cause merits sealing, 
the judge must make "specific findings on the record setting 
forth the interests considered by the judge and the reasons for 
the order directing that such sealing occur."  Doe, 420 Mass. at 
152-153.  This requirement reflects the gravity of the decision 
and ensures that the common-law presumption of public access is 
afforded careful consideration.   
 
Conclusion.  The case is remanded for dismissal of the 
action as moot.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.