Case Title: Sunset Sky Ranch Pilots v. County of Sac.

Citation: 47 Cal. 4th 902

Docket Number: S165861

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2009-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 12/28/09 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
SUNSET SKY RANCH PILOTS 
) 
ASSOCIATION, et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
) 
 
 
) 
S165861 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C055224 
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., 
) 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
Defendants and Respondents; )  
Super. Ct. No. 06CS00265 
 
 
)  
JOHN M. TAYLOR, et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest and 
) 
 
Respondents. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
 
The County of Sacramento declined to renew a conditional use permit for a 
privately owned airport.  A mandamus petition seeking to prevent the airport‟s 
closure was denied.  The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the county‟s 
action amounted to a “project” subject to the requirements of the California 
Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq. (CEQA).)1 
 
The Court of Appeal erred because it misconstrued the nature of the project 
at issue.  Declining to renew the conditional use permit was not a public project 
under CEQA, because the county did not “directly undertake[]” to close the 
airport.  (§ 21065, subd. (a).)  Instead, it decided not to reauthorize a private 
                                              
1 
 Further statutory references are to the Public Resources Code. 
 
2 
activity that required “the issuance . . . of a . . . permit.”  (§ 21065, subd. (c).)  The 
airport operation was the “project” in question, and projects rejected by a public 
agency are specifically exempted from CEQA requirements.  (§ 21080, subd. 
(b)(5).) 
I.  BACKGROUND2 
 
  This litigation pits the owner and users of the Sunset Sky Ranch Airport 
against nearby property owners and Sacramento County.  Appellants are Daniel 
Lang, the airport owner, and the Sunset Sky Ranch Pilots Association 
(collectively, the Airport).  Real parties in interest, John Taylor and the law firm of 
Taylor and Wiley, represent the neighboring property owners.  They are aligned as 
respondents with Sacramento County and its board of supervisors (the County).  
 
An airstrip began operating in 1934, when there were no applicable zoning 
regulations.  Since 1968 a zoning ordinance has allowed airports in the area, if the 
operator obtains a conditional use permit (CUP).  Lang acquired the property in 
1971 and was granted a two-year CUP to operate a private airport, which was then 
used mainly for agricultural flights.  In 1972, the Sacramento County General Plan 
was amended to allow a public use airport at the location, and Lang acquired a 
state airport permit for that purpose.  The CUP expired in 1973.  Lang did not 
apply for renewal, but continued operating the airport. 
 
In 1989, Lang lost his business license because he was out of compliance 
with the zoning code.  He appealed the denial and applied for a certificate of 
nonconforming use.  The County upheld the license denial and refused to certify a 
nonconforming use, citing “considerable expansion” of the airport.  (See Hansen 
Brothers Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1996) 12 Cal.4th 533, 552.)  It 
recommended that Lang obtain a CUP.  Lang sued, and the County prevailed. 
                                              
2 
We accept the Court of Appeal‟s statement of the facts, which are 
undisputed.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(c)(2).) 
 
3 
 
In 1999, the Airport applied for a 10-year CUP.  The County, however, 
granted only a 5-year permit, anticipating that an East Elk Grove Specific Plan 
approved in 1996 might lead to urbanization of the area.  The CUP required that 
“[t]he airport operator shall inform all airplane owners with tie-downs who intend 
to install or improve airport hangars on the property of the terms of this use 
permit, including the expiration date.”  The County approved a negative 
declaration under CEQA, finding that the CUP would have no significant effect on 
the environment.  (See § 21064.)  A challenge to the negative declaration was 
unsuccessful.  (See Fat v. County of Sacramento (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1270.) 
 
In September 2004, two weeks before the 1999 CUP expired, the Sunset 
Sky Ranch Pilots Association applied for renewal.  The County Project Planning 
Commission voted to approve a renewed CUP for two years, with no further 
extension.  Real parties in interest filed an administrative appeal with the County 
Board of Supervisors (the Board).  The Board upheld the appeal and denied 
renewal of the CUP.  Its findings stated:  “The action taken by the Board of 
Supervisors is not a revocation of an existing use permit but, rather, merely a 
decision not to renew a use that has already expired.  It accordingly reflects a 
decision to not re-grant a permit for a use that has been determined to no longer be 
compatible with its surroundings.  Furthermore, [CEQA] does not require that 
environmental analysis be conducted before an agency denies a project since a 
denial does not constitute a project for the purposes of CEQA.” 
 
The Board noted the development of new residential neighborhoods in the 
area, the local school district‟s difficulty in finding a suitable school site due to the 
airport‟s overflight zone, and the existence of other airport facilities at more 
appropriate locations.  It declared that the denial of a CUP did not amount to 
action on any future developments that might be feasible with the elimination of 
the airport.  The Board observed that such developments would themselves require 
environmental review before they could be approved. 
 
4 
 
The Airport sought a writ of mandate, injunctive relief, and monetary 
damages.  Among other claims, it contended the County had failed to comply with 
CEQA because it had not analyzed the environmental impacts of closing the 
airport.  The trial court denied relief.  The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning 
that the CUP denial was part of a County plan to enforce its zoning code by 
closing the airport and transferring pilots to other airports.  Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the County‟s action amounted to a project requiring environmental 
review under CEQA. 
 
We granted respondents‟ petition for review of the CEQA issue. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
Whether an activity is regulated by CEQA is a question of law that may be 
decided on undisputed facts.  (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land 
Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 382.)  When it enacted CEQA, the Legislature 
imposed certain limitations on its scope.  CEQA applies only to activities that 
meet the definition of a “project” under the statute and its implementing 
administrative regulations.3  (Muzzy Ranch, at p. 380.)  In addition, the Legislature 
specifically exempted certain activities from environmental review.  (Ibid.; 
§ 21080, subd. (b).)  These exemptions reflect legislative policy decisions.  
Although we construe CEQA broadly “ „to afford the fullest possible protection to 
the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language,‟ ” we do 
not balance the policies served by the statutory exemptions against the goal of 
environmental protection.  (Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. 
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 370, 376.)  Indeed, the purposes of the various exemptions are 
                                              
3 
Hereafter, we refer to these regulations, found in title 14 of the California 
Code of Regulations, section 15000 et seq., as CEQA Guidelines.  “In interpreting 
CEQA, we accord the CEQA Guidelines great weight except where they are 
clearly unauthorized or erroneous.  (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of 
Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 564, fn. 3.)”  (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano 
County Airport Land Use Com., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 380, fn. 2.) 
 
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not necessarily consistent with CEQA‟s general purposes.  (Napa Valley Wine 
Train, at pp. 381-382.) 
 
A CEQA “project” falls into one of three categories of “activity which may 
cause either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably 
foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment . . . .”  (§ 21065.)  
Generally, the statute applies to actions that a public agency undertakes, funds, or 
approves.4  Respondents contend the only applicable category here is the one for 
activities requiring governmental approval.  (§ 21065, subd. (c).)  Because the 
County refused to issue a CUP for continued airport operations, respondents claim 
this case falls squarely within the statutory exemption provided by CEQA for 
“[p]rojects which a public agency rejects or disapproves.”  (§ 21080, subd. (b)(5); 
see Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster v. State Water Resources Control Bd. 
(1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1380.)  
 
The Airport, on the other hand, argues that the cessation of operations 
resulting from denial of a CUP was itself a “project,” because it was in effect “[a]n 
activity directly undertaken by any public agency” as contemplated by 
section 21065, subdivision (a).  The Airport emphasizes that “ „[p]roject‟ means 
the whole of an action, which has a potential for resulting in either a direct 
physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical 
change in the environment . . . .”  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15378, subd. (a).)  It urges 
us to follow the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, which decided that the “whole 
of the action” in this case included not just the denial of a CUP, but also a broader 
County decision to close the airport, shift its operations elsewhere, and enforce the 
zoning code.  This approach, however, blurs the statutory distinction between 
                                              
4 
The statutory categories are:  “(a) An activity directly undertaken by any 
public agency.  [¶]  (b) An activity undertaken by a person which is supported, in 
whole or in part, through contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of 
assistance from one or more public agencies.  [¶]  (c) An activity that involves the 
issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for 
use by one or more public agencies.”  (§ 21065.) 
 
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projects “directly undertaken by  [a] public agency” (§ 21065, subd. (a)) and 
projects submitted to an agency for approval (§ 21065, subd. (c)).  It also conflicts 
with the statutory exemption of rejected projects from CEQA review.  
 
As the Court of Appeal recognized, the fact that the airport is privately 
owned and operated distinguishes this case from those in which closures of public 
facilities have been deemed “projects” for CEQA purposes.  (See San Lorenzo 
Valley Community Advocates for Responsible Education v. San Lorenzo Valley 
Unified School Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1380; Association for a 
Cleaner Environment v. Yosemite Community College Dist. (2004) 116 
Cal.App.4th 629, 639.)  The CEQA Guidelines make it clear that “[p]rivate action 
is not subject to CEQA unless the action involves governmental participation, 
financing, or approval.”  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15002, subd. (c).)  “The term 
„project‟ refers to the activity which is being approved and which may be subject 
to several discretionary approvals by governmental agencies.  The term „project‟ 
does not mean each separate governmental approval.”  (Id., § 15378, subd. (c).)  
Thus, the County‟s action on the Airport‟s application for a CUP renewal was not 
part of the “project,” and closing the airport was not an “activity directly 
undertaken” by the County within the meaning of section 21065, subdivision (a).  
 
Instead, as respondents argue, the relevant “activity” for CEQA purposes 
was the proposed continued operation of the airport.  That activity required the 
issuance of a permit, making it a private “project” under section 21065, 
subdivision (c).  Notably,  if the Airport had decided on its own to go out of 
business and allow the CUP to expire, there would have been no occasion for 
CEQA review by the County.  The Airport‟s application for a renewal of the CUP 
did not place the County in the position of proceeding with a project, even though 
the County may have rejected the application as part of a plan to bring 
development in the area into conformity with the zoning code.  It was the Airport 
that sought a new approval for its operations, and the County‟s denial of that 
 
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project application was statutorily exempt from CEQA review under section 
21080, subdivision (b)(5).  
 
The Court of Appeal erred by deeming the consequences of a project denial 
to be part of the project itself.  Its reasoning would effectively abrogate the 
statutory exemption for projects disapproved by a public agency.  (§ 21080, subd. 
(b)(5).)5  In many cases, disapproval of a proposed project could have possible 
environmental impacts associated with alternative courses of action.  “Yet the 
Legislature has determined for reasons of policy to exempt project disapprovals 
from environmental review under CEQA.  Our state legislators  evidently 
concluded that public agencies should not be forced to commit their resources to 
the costly and time-consuming environmental review process for proposed private 
development projects slated for rejection, whatever the reason for agency 
disapproval.  This court does not sit in judgment of the Legislature‟s wisdom in 
balancing such competing public policies.  (Napa Valley Wine Train, Inc. v. Public 
Utilities Com. [supra,] 50 Cal.3d 370, 376.)”  (Main San Gabriel Basin 
Watermaster v. State Water Resources Control Bd., supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
1383-1384.)  As we noted in Napa Valley Wine Train, the very purpose of the 
statutory CEQA exemptions is to avoid the burden of the environmental review 
process for an entire class of projects, even if there might be significant 
environmental effects.  (Napa Valley Wine Train, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 381.) 
 
The Airport argues that a CUP renewal presents a special situation because 
there is already an existing project, so that denying a permit will result in 
alteration of the environmental status quo.  However, the denial of a permit for a 
new project may also have foreseeable environmental effects, in that the same 
                                              
5  
“This division does not apply to any of the following activities:  [¶] . . . [¶]  
(5) Projects which a public agency rejects or disapproves.”  (§ 21080, subd. (b).)  
In Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 
supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pages 1381-1382, the court reviewed the legislative 
history of this exemption, which is not extensive, and concluded there was nothing 
to indicate that the Legislature did not mean what it said. 
 
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kind of development may be diverted to a different site.  In any event, neither 
CEQA nor the CEQA Guidelines make any special provision for CUP denials.  
Furthermore, requiring CEQA review in such circumstances could be burdensome 
for applicants.  “A lead agency may charge and collect a reasonable fee from any 
person proposing a project subject to this division in order to recover the estimated 
costs incurred by the lead agency in preparing a negative declaration or an 
environmental impact report for the project and for procedures necessary to 
comply with this division on the project.”  (§ 21089, subd. (a).)  If review were 
required whenever the status quo is altered by the denial of a CUP, unsuccessful 
applicants would not only have to cease operations but also pay for environmental 
review of that undesired outcome.  There is no reason to believe the Legislature 
intended to impose that cost on everyone who fails to obtain a CUP renewal.6
                                              
6 
An applicant may be required to pay for necessary preliminary review of a 
project before an agency acts on an application to renew a CUP.  The exemption 
for rejected or disapproved projects does “not relieve an applicant from paying the 
costs for an EIR [Environmental Impact Report] or negative declaration prepared 
for his project prior to the lead agency‟s disapproval of the project after normal 
evaluation and processing.”  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15270, subd. (c).)  Such review 
may include discussion of a “no project” alternative.  (Id., § 15126.6, subd. (e).) 
 
However, the rule urged by the Airport would require routine review of the 
environmental effects of CUP denials, opening the door to the imposition of costs 
on applicants even where, as here, the agency has the information it needs to 
evaluate a renewal request.  The exemption “is intended to allow an initial 
screening of projects on the merits for quick disapprovals prior to the initiation of 
the CEQA process where the agency can determine that the project cannot be 
approved.”  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15270, subd. (b); see Main San Gabriel Basin 
Watermaster v. State Water Resources Control Bd., supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 
1380-1381.) 
 
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III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The Court of Appeal‟s judgment is reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Sunset Skyranch Pilots Association v. County of Sacramento 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 164 Cal.App.4th 671 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S165861 
Date Filed: December 28, 2009 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Jack Sapunor 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Law Office of Lanny T. Winberry and Lanny T. Winberry for Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Robert A. Ryan, County Counsel, and Krista C. Whitman, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Gordon Burns, Deputy State Solicitor General, J. Matthew 
Rodgiquez, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary E. Hackenbracht, Assistant Attorney General, Denise 
Ferkich Hoffman and Bruce Reeves, Deputy Attorneys General, for State Water Resources Control Board, 
Natural Resources Agency, California Environmental Protection Agency, California Integrated Waste 
Management Board, Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy and Department of Parks and Recreation as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Jennifer B. Henning for California State Association of Counties and League of California Cities as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents. 
 
Taylor & Wiley, John M. Taylor, Kate Leary Wheatley and Matthew S. Keasling for Real Parties in 
Interest and Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Lanny T. Winberry 
Law Office of Lanny T. Winberry 
8001 Folsom Boulevard, Suite 100 
Sacramento, CA  95826 
(916) 386-4423 
 
Krista C. Whitman 
Deputy County Counsel 
700 H Street, Suite 2650 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 874-5100