Case Title: Steven V. v. Kelley H.

Citation: 2004 WI 47

Docket Number: 2002AP002860

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 47 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2860 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights to 
Alexander V., a Person Under the Age of 18: 
 
Steven V.,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Kelley H.,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 110 
Reported at: 263 Wis. 2d 241, 663 N.W.2d 817 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 28, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 8, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Grant   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert P. VanDeHey   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs  
and oral argument by Philip J. Brehm, Janesville. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Duane M. Jorgenson, Darlington. 
 
A guardian ad litem brief was filed by Douglas J. Heenan 
and Block, Scott & Heenan, LLC, Platteville, and oral argument 
by Douglas J. Heenan. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by David Wambach, E. 
Michael McCann, Mary Sowinski, and Thomas Binger, on behalf of 
Wisconsin District Attorney’s Association. 
 
2004 WI 47 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-2860  
(L.C. No. 
01 TP 6) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Alexander V., a Person Under the Age  
of 18: 
 
Steven V.,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Kelley H.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 28, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.     
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  This termination of parental 
rights (TPR) case presents two issues for our review: 1) whether 
partial summary judgment pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08 (2001-
02)1 is available in the first phase of a TPR case, at which 
parental unfitness is adjudicated; and 2) whether the circuit 
court is required at the initial TPR hearing to advise the 
nonpetitioning party of his or her right under Wis. Stat. § 
                                                 
 
1  All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise noted. 
  
No. 
02-2860   
 
2 
 
48.422(5) to a continuance to consult with counsel on the issue 
of judicial substitution. 
¶2  Alexander V.'s father filed a petition to terminate 
Kelley H.'s parental rights to Alexander, alleging as grounds 
that Kelley had been denied physical placement and visitation by 
court order for more than one year pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 
48.415(4).  Kelley requested a jury trial.  At the fact-finding 
hearing the circuit court granted the guardian ad litem's motion 
for summary judgment on the issue of unfitness, based upon the 
undisputed fact that Kelley had been denied placement and 
visitation by a court order that had been in place, unmodified, 
for more than two years.  After a dispositional hearing, the 
circuit court terminated Kelley's parental rights.  The court of 
appeals affirmed, concluding that although the circuit court had 
committed two procedural errors——by employing summary judgment 
procedure and failing to advise Kelley of her statutory right to 
a 
continuance 
to 
consult 
with 
counsel 
about 
judicial 
substitution——these errors were harmless.  Steven V. v. Kelley 
H., 2003 WI App 10, 263 Wis. 2d 241, 663 N.W.2d 817.  We affirm, 
although on different reasoning. 
¶3  A parent who contests a TPR petition has a statutory 
right to a jury trial at the fact-finding hearing at which his 
or 
her 
parental 
unfitness 
is 
adjudicated——the 
so-called 
"grounds" or "unfitness" phase of a TPR proceeding.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.31(2).  The statutory grounds for termination of parental 
rights are specified in Wis. Stat. § 48.415, and several of 
No. 
02-2860   
 
3 
 
these may be proved by official documentary evidence.  See, 
e.g., Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1m), (4), (9), and (9m). 
¶4  By statute and as a matter of procedural due process, 
parental unfitness must be proved by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745 (1982).  The jury trial right, however, is entirely 
statutory, not mandated by constitutional due process, and is 
therefore generally subject to the provisions of the civil 
procedure code, including the summary judgment statute, Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08, unless the TPR statutes provide otherwise.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2).  The TPR statutes do not provide 
otherwise, either explicitly or implicitly. 
¶5  We conclude that partial summary judgment in the 
unfitness 
phase 
of 
a 
TPR 
case 
is 
available 
where 
the 
requirements of the summary judgment statute and the applicable 
legal standards in Wis. Stat. §§ 48.415 and 48.31 have been met.  
An order granting partial summary judgment on the issue of 
parental unfitness where there are no facts in dispute and the 
applicable legal standards have been satisfied does not violate 
the parent's statutory right to a jury trial under Wis. Stat. §§  
48.422(4) and 48.31(2), or the parent's constitutional right to 
procedural due process. 
¶6  Accordingly, partial summary judgment may be granted in 
the unfitness phase of a TPR case where the moving party 
establishes that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact regarding the asserted grounds for unfitness under Wis. 
Stat. § 48.415, and, taking into consideration the heightened 
No. 
02-2860   
 
4 
 
burden of proof specified in Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1) and required 
by due process, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  We overrule Walworth County Dep't of Human 
Servs. v. Elizabeth W., 189 Wis. 2d 432, 525 N.W.2d 384 (Ct. 
App. 1994), to the extent that it outright prohibited summary 
judgment in TPR proceedings.  The circuit court's use of summary 
judgment procedure was not error. 
¶7 
We also withdraw the language in M.W. and I.W. v. 
Monroe County Dep't of Human Servs., 116 Wis. 2d 432, 342 N.W.2d 
410 (1984), that purported to articulate a requirement that the 
circuit court advise any nonpetitioning party in a TPR case of 
his or her right under Wis. Stat. § 48.422(5) to a continuance 
to consult with counsel about judicial substitution.  M.W. and 
I.W. described too broadly the statutory duties of the circuit 
court at the initial TPR hearing under Wis. Stat. § 48.422(1).  
In fact, the statute does not require the circuit court to 
advise nonpetitioning parties of the statutory right to a 
continuance 
to 
consult 
with 
counsel 
regarding 
judicial 
substitution.  The circuit court's failure to do so here was not 
error. 
   
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶8 
On August 8, 2001, Steven V., Alexander's father, 
filed a petition in Grant County Circuit Court to terminate 
Kelley H.'s parental rights to Alexander.  As grounds for 
termination Steven alleged continuing court-ordered denial of 
physical placement and visitation for more than one year 
No. 
02-2860   
 
5 
 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4).2  In his petition, Steven 
alleged that Kelley had been denied custody, placement, and 
visitation of Alexander by an order of the Brown County Circuit 
Court that had been in place and remained unmodified for more 
than one year. 
¶9 
Steven's petition did not contain the order to which 
it referred, but the motion for summary judgment that is the 
focus of this appeal did.  The documentary record reflects that 
on May 12, 1999, in Brown County Circuit Court, the Honorable 
William C. Griesbach awarded Steven sole legal custody and 
physical placement of Alexander, and denied Kelley custody, 
placement, and visitation.  In written "Findings of Fact, 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Statute § 48.415(4) provides: 
Continuing denial of periods of physical placement or 
visitation.  Continuing denial of periods of physical 
placement or visitation, which shall be established by 
proving all of the following: 
(a) That the parent has been denied periods of 
physical placement by court order in an action 
affecting the family or has been denied visitation 
under an order under s. 48.345, 48.363, 48.365, 
938.345, 938.363 or 938.365 containing the notice 
required by s. 48.356(2) or 938.356(2). 
(b)  That at least one year has elapsed since the 
order 
denying 
periods 
of 
physical 
placement 
or 
visitation 
was 
issued 
and 
the 
court 
has 
not 
subsequently modified its order so as to permit 
periods of physical placement or visitation. 
 
 
 
No. 
02-2860   
 
6 
 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of Custody and Placement," 
filed on June 28, 1999, the circuit court found that Kelley had 
physically neglected Alexander and had emotionally abused him by 
trying to "brainwash him" into believing that his father was 
evil.  The court also found that Kelley had attempted to arrange 
the murder of Steven and his wife, had absconded to California 
with Alexander, and had made false accusations of child abuse 
against Steven and his wife.  The court awarded sole custody and 
physical placement of Alexander to Steven, and denied Kelley 
custody, placement, and "any and all visitation," concluding 
that contact between mother and child would endanger Alexander's 
physical and especially emotional health.  The court also 
imposed a number of conditions that Kelley would need to satisfy 
before any modification of the ban on visitation would be 
considered.     
¶10 An initial hearing on the TPR petition was held in 
Grant County Circuit Court on September 4, 2001, before the 
Honorable Robert B. VanDeHey.  Kelley appeared with her attorney 
and requested a jury trial. 
¶11  On September 17, 2001, Alexander's guardian ad litem 
filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative 
Directed Verdict" in which he asserted that no genuine issue of 
material fact existed as to the grounds for termination alleged 
in the petition and that Steven was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.   The motion was supported by an affidavit of the 
guardian ad litem recounting the procedural history of the Brown 
No. 
02-2860   
 
7 
 
County custody proceeding, and included a copy of Judge 
Griesbach's June 28, 1999, order. 
¶12  Kelley responded to the motion by arguing that 
Elizabeth W. prohibits summary judgment in TPR proceedings.  
Kelley conceded that directed verdicts were permissible in TPR 
cases, but insisted that before a directed verdict could be 
entered in her case, the court was required to empanel a jury to 
hear evidence.     
¶13 On October 15, 2001, the circuit court conducted a 
hearing at which counsel and the court discussed the procedural 
issues 
occasioned 
by 
the 
guardian 
ad 
litem's 
motion.  
Ultimately, the court scheduled a fact-finding hearing for 
November 2, 2001, and stated that Kelley would have until 
October 25, 2001, to identify any facts in dispute that would 
necessitate a jury trial for fact-finding with respect to the 
TPR grounds alleged in Steven's petition.   
¶14 Kelley did not respond by the October 25, 2001, 
deadline.  At the November 2, 2001, hearing, the parties were 
presented with an order of the court apparently prepared and 
submitted sometime earlier by the guardian ad litem but dated, 
signed, and filed on November 2, 2001.  The order memorialized 
what had occurred at the prior hearing, and further provided as 
follows: 
[t]his matter will be scheduled for fact finding on 
November 2, 2001 at 2:30 p.m. at which time the Court 
will rule in favor of the Guardian ad Litem's motion 
for directed verdict unless Attorney Gaskell, on 
behalf of Kelley H., files notification to the Court 
No. 
02-2860   
 
8 
 
on or before October 25, 2001 that a legitimate issue 
exists to be tried at trial. 
The order also stated that the Motion for Summary Judgment or in 
the Alternative for Directed Verdict would be heard on October 
15, 2001, that is, the date of the prior hearing, two weeks 
before the order was signed and entered. 
¶15  Despite these incongruities, the parties agreed at the 
November 2 hearing that there were no facts in dispute as to the 
existence of an unmodified court order denying Kelley placement 
and visitation with Alexander, and that the order had been in 
place for more than one year.  Kelley's attorney stated that 
"it's clear that, based on what the elements are as grounds in 
this case, that the Court does have the authority to direct a 
verdict in regard to that——or summary judgment, I guess, type 
motion."  There was a brief discussion about whether the reasons 
for Kelley's noncompliance with the conditions set forth in 
Judge Griesbach's order for modification of the visitation ban 
would be relevant at the unfitness phase or at the dispositional 
phase.  Kelley's position was not entirely clear, although at 
one point her attorney conceded that "if the reasons why she did 
not comply with that order we believe would not be relevant at 
the first phase of that, then I agree that fact-finding hearing 
is not required and we don't need a trial." 
¶16  The circuit court concluded that the reasons for 
Kelley's noncompliance "are very relevant but not at this 
stage."  The court then took judicial notice of the file in the 
Brown County case, which "substantiate[s] that both elements are 
No. 
02-2860   
 
9 
 
present, first that [Kelley H.] has been denied periods of 
physical placement by court order in an action affecting the 
family and that the notice was given, and second that at least a 
year elapsed since the order denying periods of physical 
placement was issued, and there was no modification."  The court 
then scheduled a dispositional hearing, and discussed with 
counsel the parameters of that hearing.  On November 9, 2001, 
the circuit court entered a written order directing a verdict in 
favor of Steven on the issue of Kelley's parental unfitness 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4).  The dispositional hearing 
was held on April 11 and 12, 2002, after which the circuit court 
concluded that it was in Alexander's best interests to terminate 
Kelley's parental rights, and entered judgment accordingly.       
¶17 Kelley moved for new fact-finding and dispositional 
hearings, arguing that she had been denied her right to a jury 
trial for fact-finding and her right to due process, and that 
there was insufficient evidence to support termination.  She 
also argued that at the time of the initial hearing she had not 
been informed of her right under Wis. Stat. § 48.422(5) to a 
continuance 
to 
consult 
with 
counsel 
regarding 
judicial 
substitution.  The circuit court denied the motion.     
¶18 Kelley appealed, reiterating the claims of error 
stated in her post-judgment motion.  The court of appeals held 
that pursuant to Elizabeth W., the circuit court had erred by 
granting what amounted to summary judgment at the grounds phase.  
However, the court concluded that the error was harmless because 
there was no dispute of fact relevant to the grounds for 
No. 
02-2860   
 
10 
 
termination, and Kelley was not prejudiced by the error.  Kelley 
H., 263 Wis. 2d 241, ¶¶22-28.  The court of appeals also 
suggested that Elizabeth W.'s prohibition on summary judgment in 
TPR proceedings might be overbroad, considering that certain 
grounds for termination were provable by undisputed court order.  
Id., ¶¶15-21.  The court nevertheless considered itself bound by 
Elizabeth W., and stated that any argument that the case had 
been incorrectly decided must be directed to this court.  Id., 
¶21. 
¶19 The court of appeals also held that the circuit 
court's failure to inform Kelley of her right to request a 
continuance 
to 
consult 
with 
her 
attorney 
about 
judicial 
substitution was error, citing language in this court's decision 
in M.W. and I.W. that purports to impose such a warning 
requirement.  Id., ¶¶31-35.  While the statutory right to a 
continuance to confer with counsel about judicial substitution 
was not in fact at issue in M.W. and I.W., this court's opinion 
contained 
broad 
language 
specifying 
the 
circuit 
court's 
statutory duties at the initial TPR hearing, including a duty to 
advise the nonpetitioning party of his or her right to a 
continuance to consult with counsel about judicial substitution.  
See M.W. and I.W., 116 Wis. 2d at 440-41.  The court of appeals 
majority 
declined 
to 
treat 
this 
language 
as 
dicta, 
but 
ultimately concluded that the circuit court's error in failing 
to follow it was harmless.  Kelley H., 263 Wis. 2d 241, ¶¶34-35, 
41-42. 
 
 
 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
No. 
02-2860   
 
11 
 
¶20  The two questions in this case——whether the summary 
judgment statute applies in TPR cases and whether a circuit 
court is statutorily required to advise a nonpetitioning party 
in a TPR case of his or her right to a continuance to consult 
with counsel about judicial substitution——are questions of law 
subject to de novo review.  Brandon S.S. v. Laura S., 179 Wis. 
2d 114, 127, 507 N.W.2d 94 (1993). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶21 Parental rights termination adjudications are among 
the most consequential of judicial acts, involving as they do 
"the awesome authority of the State to destroy permanently all 
legal recognition of the parental relationship." Evelyn C.R. v. 
Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768 (quoting 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996)).  Termination of 
parental rights permanently extinguishes "all rights, powers, 
privileges, immunities, duties and obligations existing between 
parent and child."  Wis. Stat. § 48.40(2). 
¶22  A parent's interest in the parent-child relationship 
and in the care, custody, and management of his or her child is 
recognized as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 
(1982).  The United States Supreme Court has described the 
fundamental nature of parental rights in this way: 
It is plain that the interest of a parent in the 
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or 
her children "come[s] to this Court with a momentum 
for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties 
which 
derive 
merely 
from 
shifting 
economic 
No. 
02-2860   
 
12 
 
arrangements."  Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 
(1949)(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 
The 
Court 
has 
frequently 
emphasized 
the 
importance of the family.  The rights to conceive and 
to raise one's children have been deemed "essential," 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), "basic 
civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535, 541 (1942), and "rights far more precious . . . 
than property rights," May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 
533 (1953).  "It is cardinal with us that the custody, 
care and nurture of the child reside first in the 
parents, whose primary function and freedom include 
preparation for obligations the state can neither 
supply nor hinder."  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 166 (1944).  
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
¶23  Thus, due process requires that "[w]hen the State 
moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the 
parents with fundamentally fair procedures."  Santosky, 455 U.S. 
at 753-54.  These include the requirement of a hearing, Stanley, 
405 U.S. at 649, and proof of parental unfitness by clear and 
convincing evidence, Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48. 
 ¶24 Wisconsin has a two-part statutory procedure for the 
involuntary termination of parental rights.  Sheboygan County 
DHHS v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶24, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 
N.W.2d 402.  In the first, or "grounds" phase of the proceeding, 
the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
one 
or 
more 
of 
the 
statutorily 
enumerated 
grounds 
for 
termination of parental rights exist.  Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1); 
Waukesha County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. C.E.W., 124 Wis. 2d 47, 
60, 368 N.W.2d 47 (1985). 
¶25  There are 12 statutory grounds of unfitness for 
termination of parental rights, see Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)-(10), 
No. 
02-2860   
 
13 
 
and if a petitioner proves one or more of the grounds for 
termination by clear and convincing evidence, "the court shall 
find the parent unfit."  Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4); Julie A.B., 255 
Wis. 2d 170, ¶26.  There are no "degrees of unfitness" under the 
statutory scheme; a court has no discretion to refrain from 
finding a parent unfit after all the elements of a statutory 
ground have been established.  Id., ¶¶36-37. 
¶26 The consistent legislative objective throughout the 
Children's Code is "the best interests of the child."  Wis. 
Stat. § 48.01(1).  However, in TPR cases, the "best interests" 
standard does not "dominate every step of every proceeding." 
Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶22.  The best interests of the 
child do not "prevail" until the parent has been declared unfit 
after fact-finding by the court or jury at the grounds phase of 
the TPR proceeding.  Id.  A finding of parental unfitness is a 
necessary prerequisite to termination of parental rights, but a 
finding of unfitness does not necessitate that parental rights 
be terminated.  Once the court has declared a parent unfit, the 
proceeding moves to the second, or dispositional phase, at which 
the child's best interests are paramount.  Id., ¶28. 
¶27  At the dispositional phase, the court is called upon 
to decide whether it is in the best interest of the child that 
the parent's rights be permanently extinguished.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.426(2).  "The outcome of this hearing is not predetermined, 
but the focus shifts to the interests of the child."  Julie 
A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶28.  In making this determination, which 
we have described as "one of the most wrenching and agonizing in 
No. 
02-2860   
 
14 
 
the law," the court "should welcome" any evidence relevant to 
the issue of disposition, including any "factors favorable to 
the parent," and must at a minimum consider the six "best 
interests" factors set forth in Wis. Stat. § 48.426(3).  Id., 
¶29. 
A.  Summary judgment in TPR proceedings 
 
¶28 We 
are 
concerned 
here 
with 
the 
"grounds" 
or 
"unfitness" phase of a TPR case, and specifically whether the 
use of summary judgment procedure under Wis. Stat. § 802.08 at 
this first phase of the proceeding violates the parent's rights 
under the TPR statutes or procedural due process.  Kelley 
asserts that this question has already been answered by the 
court of appeals' decision in Elizabeth W. 
¶29  Elizabeth W. involved a petition to terminate parental 
rights on grounds of abandonment and continuing need of 
protection or services.  Elizabeth W., 189 Wis. 2d at 434.  The 
circuit court granted a motion for summary judgment against 
Elizabeth, having concluded that the affidavit and supporting 
documents filed by her attorney in opposition to the motion were 
nonevidentiary and insufficient to defeat the petitioner's 
motion.  Id. at 435.  After a dispositional hearing, the circuit 
court 
terminated 
Elizabeth's 
parental 
rights 
to 
her 
two 
children.  Id. 
¶30 The court of appeals reversed, broadly concluding that 
"summary judgment is inappropriate in TPR cases where a parent 
contests the termination."  Id. at 436.  The court premised this 
conclusion on the principle that parental rights are fundamental 
No. 
02-2860   
 
15 
 
liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment, 
and 
therefore 
any 
state 
action 
to 
terminate parental rights "'must be accomplished by procedures 
meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause.'"  Id. at 436-
37 (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753).  The court stated that a 
hearing on the issue of unfitness is required by statute, Wis. 
Stat. §§ 48.422(2), 48.31(1), as well as by due process.  Id. at 
437.  The court of appeals then concluded that: 
[A] TPR proceeding can never be without material 
issues of fact if a parent refuses to voluntarily 
terminate his or her right to the child. . . . By 
contesting the termination, a parent automatically 
raises the issue of whether he or she is a fit parent.  
This creates a genuine issue of material fact which 
cannot be disposed of by summary judgment. 
Id. at 438. 
 
¶31  The principles underlying the decision in Elizabeth W. 
were unquestionably sound and well-established; we conclude, 
however, that the court's holding was overbroad.  Neither due 
process nor the TPR statutes require an absolute prohibition on 
summary judgment in the grounds or unfitness phase of a TPR 
proceeding.  That a parent has contested the termination of his 
or her parental rights does not automatically mean there are 
material facts in dispute regarding the grounds for unfitness. 
 
¶32  The code of civil procedure applies to "all civil 
actions and special proceedings" unless a "different procedure 
is prescribed by statute or rule."  Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2).  
Parental rights termination proceedings under Chapter 48 are 
civil proceedings, and this general rule of civil procedure 
No. 
02-2860   
 
16 
 
applicability has been cited in the context of TPR cases on 
numerous occasions: Evelyn C.R., 246 Wis. 2d 1, ¶17 (default 
judgment as a sanction for violation of a court order pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. §§ 802.10(7), 804.12(2)(a), and 805.03 is 
available in TPR proceedings; also, the harmless error rule of 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) applies in TPR cases); Brandon S.S., 179 
Wis. 2d at 143-44, (citing the general rule that the civil 
procedure code governs Chapter 48 proceedings but concluding 
that the general intervention statute, Wis. Stat. § 803.09, 
conflicts with the exclusive procedure in Wis. Stat. § 48.42(2) 
for determining proper parties to a TPR proceeding); Waukesha 
County DSS, 124 Wis. 2d at 53, 66-70 (rules regarding jury 
instructions, preremptory strikes and summation pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
805.13(3), 
805.08(3), 
and 
805.10 
apply 
in 
TPR 
proceedings); Door County Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. 
Scott S., 230 Wis. 2d 460, 465, 602 N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 
1999)(directed verdict pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.14(4) 
applies in TPR proceedings); J.A.B. v. Waukesha County Human 
Servs. Dep't, 153 Wis. 2d 761, 765, 451 N.W.2d 799 (Ct. App. 
1989)(same). 
 
¶33  There is nothing in the TPR statutes that explicitly 
or implicitly prohibits the use of summary judgment procedure 
under Wis. Stat. § 802.08 in the unfitness phase of a TPR case.  
Nor do the TPR statutes prescribe a procedure different from 
Wis. Stat. § 802.08 for TPR cases in which there is no genuine 
dispute of fact on the issue of unfitness under Wis. Stat. § 
48.415.  Kelley argues that a court order granting partial 
No. 
02-2860   
 
17 
 
summary judgment on parental unfitness conflicts with the right 
to a jury trial at the fact-finding hearing, which she contends 
is 
an 
absolute 
right 
under 
the 
statutes, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 48.422(3), (4), and 48.31(2), and as a matter of due process.  
We disagree. 
 
¶34  The jury trial right at the fact-finding hearing in 
the unfitness phase of a TPR case is entirely statutory, not 
mandated by constitutional due process, and is therefore subject 
to the general provisions of the civil procedure code, including 
the provisions regarding summary judgment, Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  
A parent may, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.422(4), request a jury 
for the fact-finding hearing, and the jury, if one is requested, 
makes findings of fact on the grounds for unfitness alleged in 
the TPR petition pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.31(3) and (4).  The 
circuit court, however, is always responsible for conclusions of 
law, as is specifically recognized in the TPR statutes.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 48.31(4).  If a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 802.08, the circuit 
court may properly conclude at the fact-finding hearing that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and the 
moving party is entitled to partial summary judgment on parental 
unfitness as a matter of law.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
 
¶35  Summary judgment is a legal conclusion by the court, 
and, 
if 
carefully 
administered 
with 
due 
regard 
for 
the 
importance of the rights at stake and the applicable legal 
standards, is just as appropriate in the unfitness phase of a 
TPR case where the facts are undisputed as it is in any other 
No. 
02-2860   
 
18 
 
type of civil action or proceeding which carries the right to a 
jury trial.3  Summary judgment procedure requires notice, an 
opportunity to respond, and a hearing, and imposes on the moving 
party the burden of demonstrating both the absence of any 
genuine factual disputes and entitlement to judgment as a matter 
of law under the legal standards applicable to the claim.  Wis. 
Stat. § 802.08(2) and (3). 
¶36  In many TPR cases, the determination of parental 
unfitness will require the resolution of factual disputes by a 
court or jury at the fact-finding hearing, because the alleged 
                                                 
 
3    Article I, § 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution states 
that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and 
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in 
controversy."  Kelley does not argue that she has a state 
constitutional right to a jury trial under art. I, § 5; in any 
event, no case has ever held that the summary judgment statute 
is unconstitutional under art. I, § 5, that is, that summary 
judgment procedure violates the state constitutional jury trial 
right.  The general statutory civil jury trial right is 
contained in Wis. Stat. § 805.01, and several other statutes 
confer the right to a jury in specific types of cases.  See, 
e.g., Wis. Stat. § 879.45 (probate code); Wis. Stat. § 767.50 
(paternity); Wis. Stat. § 799.21 (small claims); Wis. Stat. § 
345.43 (traffic code).  No case has ever held that summary 
judgment procedure violates any of these statutory jury trial 
provisions (although it would be highly unusual for a party to 
attempt to invoke summary judgment in some of these very fact-
intensive contexts.)  Thus, while we certainly agree with the 
dissent's discussion of the importance of the jury trial as a 
check on government power, dissent, ¶66, we cannot agree that 
the careful application of the summary judgment statute imperils 
the civil jury trial right, whether constitutional or statutory.  
If summary judgment procedure does not impermissibly impair the 
state constitutional or statutory civil jury trial right in any 
other context, we know of no independent basis to hold that it 
impermissibly impairs the jury trial provisions of Wis. Stat. §§ 
48.422(3), (4), and 48.31(2). 
  
No. 
02-2860   
 
19 
 
grounds for unfitness involve the adjudication of parental 
conduct 
vis-à-vis 
the 
child. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
48.415(1)(abandonment); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
48.415(2)(child 
in 
continuing need of protection or services); Wis. Stat. § 
48.415(3)(continuing 
parental 
disability); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
48.415(5)(child abuse); Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(failure to assume 
parental 
responsibility); 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(7)(incestuous 
parenthood).  Summary judgment will ordinarily be inappropriate 
in TPR cases premised on these fact-intensive grounds for 
parental unfitness. 
¶37  Some statutory grounds for unfitness, however, are 
expressly provable by official documentary evidence, such as 
court orders or judgments of conviction.  See  Wis. Stat. § 
48.415(1m)(relinquishment, provable by court order); Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(4)(continuing denial of periods of physical placement 
or 
visitation, 
provable 
by 
court 
order); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
48.415(8)(homicide or solicitation to commit homicide of parent, 
provable 
by 
judgment 
of 
conviction); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
48.415(9)(parenthood as a result of sexual assault, provable by 
judgment of conviction); Wis. Stat. § 48.415(9m)(commission of 
serious felony against one of the person's children, provable by 
judgment 
of 
conviction); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
48.415(10)(prior 
involuntary termination of parental rights to another child, 
provable by court order).4  Some of these so-called "paper 
                                                 
 
4    We do not mean to imply that the general categorization 
of statutory grounds in this and the preceding paragraph 
represent a definitive statement about the propriety of summary 
No. 
02-2860   
 
20 
 
grounds" for parental unfitness have been recently adopted, 
seriously undermining the broad holding of Elizabeth W. 
¶38  In 1995, the legislature enacted a new ground for 
termination in cases of parenthood as a result of sexual 
assault: Wis. Stat. § 48.415(9) provides that conception as a 
result of sexual assault "may be proved by a final judgment of 
conviction . . . indicating that the person who may be the 
father of the child committed, during a possible time of 
conception, a sexual assault as specified in this paragraph 
against the mother."  Wis. Stat. § 48.415(9).  Later in the same 
session, the legislature enacted two more new grounds for 
unfitness: commission of a serious felony against one of the 
parent's children, "as evidenced by a final judgment of 
conviction," see Wis. Stat. § 48.415(9m); and prior involuntary 
termination of parental rights to another child, provable by 
court order, see Wis. Stat. § 48.415(10).   
 
¶39 Each of these newly-created grounds for involuntary 
termination of parental rights expressly provides that circuit 
court orders or judgments constitute proof of unfitness.  
Similarly, the ground for termination alleged in this case, 
continuing 
denial 
of 
periods 
of 
physical 
placement 
or 
visitation, is expressly provable by evidence of a court order.  
See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4)(a) and (b).  This evinces the 
legislature's manifest intent to enable unfitness determinations 
                                                                                                                                                             
judgment in any particular case.  The propriety of summary 
judgment is determined case-by-case. 
  
No. 
02-2860   
 
21 
 
to conclusively flow from certain existing court orders that 
satisfy the statutory requirements.  We fail to see how this 
intent is furthered by requiring the empanelment of a jury to 
receive evidence of the existence of a court order or judgment 
about which there is no dispute.  The availability of partial 
summary judgment in the grounds phase of a TPR proceeding where 
the entire proof of unfitness under the statute is an undisputed 
court 
record 
furthers 
the 
legislature's 
purpose 
and 
is 
consistent with the general rule that the provisions of the code 
of civil procedure apply to all civil actions and proceedings.5 
 
¶40  Kelley's argument that applying summary judgment at 
the unfitness phase of a TPR case violates due process is not 
well-developed.  Its premise seems to be that there is a 
constitutional right to fact-finding by a jury in all TPR cases, 
                                                 
5 The dissent concludes that the legislature intended the 
statutory jury trial right in TPR cases to be unconditional and 
absolute, essentially the equivalent of the jury trial right in 
criminal cases.  Dissent, ¶¶75, 86.  In the context of enacting 
a civil proceeding for the adjudication of alleged sexually 
violent persons, the legislature has expressed itself quite 
explicitly in creating the statutory equivalent of a criminal 
jury 
trial 
right 
in 
a 
civil 
proceeding. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. §§  980.03, 980.05(1m).  If the legislature had 
intended to enact a right to a jury trial in TPR cases that is 
the equivalent of a constitutional criminal jury trial right, it 
would have expressly said so, as it did in Chapter 980.  
No. 
02-2860   
 
22 
 
even where the facts of unfitness are undisputed.6  This appears 
also to be the premise of Elizabeth W., although the court of 
appeals did not apply the Supreme Court's three-part test for 
determining what process is constitutionally due in TPR cases.  
In Santosky, the Supreme Court held: 
[T]he nature of the process due in parental rights 
termination proceedings turns on a balancing of the 
"three distinct factors" specified in Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 
L.Ed.2d 18 (1976): the private interest affected by 
the proceeding; the risk of error created by the 
State's 
chosen 
procedure; 
and 
the 
countervailing 
governmental interest 
supporting 
the use 
of the 
challenged procedure.  
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754. 
 
¶41  Applying this test here, we reiterate that the private 
interest affected by a TPR proceeding is unquestionably very 
strong.  However, the remaining two factors in the three-factor 
test weigh heavily against a conclusion that a jury trial is 
constitutionally required in TPR cases. 
¶42  The risk of error in applying partial summary judgment 
at the grounds phase of a TPR proceeding where the facts of 
unfitness are undisputed is extremely low.  The grounds for 
unfitness most likely to form the basis of a successful motion 
                                                 
6 Kelley's constitutional argument is grounded in procedural 
due process.  She does not mount a facial or as-applied 
substantive due process challenge to the statutory ground for 
unfitness invoked in her case, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4).  This 
difference distinguishes this case from Monroe County Department 
of Human Services v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, another termination of parental rights case also 
mandated this date.     
No. 
02-2860   
 
23 
 
for partial summary judgment in a TPR case are those that are 
sustainable on proof of court order or judgment of conviction, 
the reliability of which is generally readily apparent and 
conceded.  Furthermore, as we have noted, a finding of unfitness 
is only the first of two steps in the process.  A finding of 
unfitness——whether on fact-finding by the court or jury where 
the facts are disputed or on partial summary judgment where the 
facts are undisputed——does not mandate termination of parental 
rights, nor does it foreclose the parent's opportunity to 
present 
evidence 
and 
argue 
against 
termination 
at 
the 
dispositional hearing. 
¶43  Finally, the countervailing governmental interest in 
avoiding pointless jury trials where there is nothing to try is 
substantial.  Jury trials are expensive and time-consuming.  
Parental 
rights 
termination 
cases 
generally 
require 
the 
participation of at least three publicly-financed attorneys (the 
guardian ad litem, and the attorneys for the county and the 
parent), as well as the circuit court judge, court staff, and 
jurors.  Elizabeth W.'s bright-line prohibition of summary 
judgment in TPR cases appears to require the empanelment of a 
jury to listen to evidence even when it is a foregone conclusion 
that a directed verdict is the only possible outcome.  To 
mandate a jury trial where the parent does not dispute the facts 
regarding unfitness alleged in the petition is a complete waste 
of judicial resources. 
¶44  Accordingly, although the private interest at stake is 
fundamental, we conclude that due process does not mandate a 
No. 
02-2860   
 
24 
 
jury trial in the unfitness phase of a TPR case.  The jury trial 
right in TPR cases is statutory only, and is therefore subject 
to the provisions of the code of civil procedure, including 
summary judgment procedure as specified in Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  
Due process requires a hearing, Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649, and 
clear and convincing proof of unfitness, Santosky, 455 U.S. at 
747-48, and summary judgment procedure under Wis. Stat. § 802.08 
accommodates both.  Elizabeth W.'s broad prohibition against the 
use of summary judgment in the unfitness phase of a TPR case was 
statutorily and constitutionally unwarranted, and we therefore 
overrule it.7 
                                                 
7  Our research into the use of summary judgment in TPR 
cases in other states has revealed no particular trend; several 
states permit summary judgment at the grounds phase of a TPR 
proceeding, several do not, and many seem not to have addressed 
the question.  For instance, the Supreme Court of Wyoming has 
held that summary judgment is available in TPR cases on a case-
by-case basis, provided that the parties are granted a hearing 
on the motion.  In re the Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624, 629 
(Wyo. 1989).  The Illinois Court of Appeals has upheld the grant 
of summary judgment in a TPR case in which the ground for 
termination was criminal conviction resulting from the death of 
a child by physical abuse.  State v. Ray, 411 N.E.2d 88, 92 
(Ill. Ct. App. 1980).  Similarly, the Court of Appeals of New 
Mexico has held that "summary judgment is a procedure which may 
be used to terminate parental rights where there are no issues 
of fact underlying the basis for termination."  State ex rel. 
Children, Youth and Families Dep't in re T.C. and D.C., 881 P.2d 
712, 713 (Ct. App. N.Mex. 1994). 
No. 
02-2860   
 
25 
 
¶45 We also conclude that partial summary judgment was 
properly granted in this case.  The guardian ad litem's motion 
was presented, somewhat irregularly, as "Motion for Summary 
Judgment or in the Alternative Directed Verdict," but the motion 
was legally sufficient as a motion for summary judgment, and was 
accompanied by an affidavit of the guardian ad litem attaching 
the unmodified Brown County Circuit Court order denying Kelley 
placement and visitation.  Kelley was given an opportunity to 
respond to the motion.  She filed a written response, which the 
court considered and discussed with the parties at the October 
15, 2001, hearing.  Judge VanDeHey postponed ruling on the 
motion until the November 2, 2001, hearing, at which Kelley was 
                                                                                                                                                             
Those states that have rejected summary judgment in TPR 
proceedings have done so for reasons that do not find a parallel 
in Wisconsin law.  For instance, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
has prohibited the use of summary judgment in termination 
proceedings on the assumption that if summary judgment were 
available, the parties would not have the right to a hearing.  
In re Christina T., 590 P.2d 189, 191 (Okla. 1979).  In 
contrast, Wisconsin's summary judgment rule mandates a hearing 
on the motion.  The North Carolina Court of Appeals has held 
that 
summary 
judgment 
is 
not 
permitted 
in 
termination 
proceedings because the exclusive procedural scheme for parental 
rights terminations could not be supplemented by provisions in 
the general civil code.  Curtis v.  Curtis, 410 S.E.2d 917, 919 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1991).  The general rule in Wisconsin, however, 
is that the civil procedure code applies to all civil actions, 
including TPR cases, unless a different procedure is prescribed.  
See Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2).  The California Court of Appeals has 
also ruled out the use of summary judgment in termination 
proceedings, but it did so after finding that summary judgment 
would upset the time periods required by the termination 
statutes.  Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Harold K., 205 Cal. Rptr. 
393, 397-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).  Application of Wisconsin's 
summary judgment rule to TPR cases does not suffer from the same 
infirmity. 
No. 
02-2860   
 
26 
 
present, represented by counsel, and was again given an 
opportunity to be heard. 
¶46  At the November 2 hearing, Kelley conceded that there 
was no dispute of fact regarding the grounds alleged in the 
petition——that she had been denied physical placement and 
visitation by court order and that the court order had remained 
in effect, unmodified, for more than one year.  The circuit 
court took judicial notice of the Brown County Circuit Court 
order and concluded that it satisfied the statutory elements 
necessary for unfitness under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4).  Although 
the written order that was entered after the hearing used the 
terminology of a directed verdict, we conclude it is sufficient 
as an order granting partial summary judgment of unfitness.  
¶47 Kelley makes a fallback argument that summary judgment 
was inappropriate because she was entitled to present evidence 
regarding her reasons for having failed to comply with the 
conditions for re-establishing visitation set forth in the Brown 
County judgment.  She cites State v. Fredrick H., 2001 WI App 
141, 246 Wis. 2d 215, 630 N.W.2d 734, in which the court of 
appeals held that such evidence was relevant at the grounds 
phase of a TPR proceeding, and, further, that a circuit court's 
refusal to allow such evidence at the grounds phase deprived the 
parents of the right "to meaningfully participate in the 
termination proceedings."  Id., ¶13. 
¶48 Fredrick H. is no longer valid in light of our 
decision in Julie A.B.  The court in Fredrick H. relied on 
language from B.L.J. v. Polk County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 163 
No. 
02-2860   
 
27 
 
Wis. 2d 90, 470 N.W.2d 914 (1991), which described the unfitness 
phase of a TPR proceeding as encompassing an intermediate 
determination by the circuit court regarding whether the degree 
of parental unfitness was sufficient to warrant termination of 
parental rights.  Frederick H., 246 Wis. 2d 215, ¶14 (quoting 
B.L.J., 163 Wis. 2d at 104).  The court in Frederick H. held 
that mitigating evidence regarding parental efforts to regain 
visitation was relevant to this discretionary determination 
regarding the degree of parental unfitness.  Id., ¶¶15-17.  
However, in Julie A.B., we expressly withdrew the language from 
B.L.J. 
that 
imposed 
this 
intermediate 
degree-of-unfitness 
determination.  Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 17, ¶¶36-37.  Frederick 
H. is thus inconsistent with Julie A.B., and we therefore 
overrule it.8      
                                                 
8 The dissent asserts that although Sheboygan County DHHS v. 
Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402, 
eliminated the intermediate "degree-of-unfitness" determination, 
there may nonetheless be "defenses" or "explanations" for some 
of the grounds of parental unfitness that ought to be considered 
in the grounds phase of the TPR proceeding.  Dissent, ¶97.  If 
the applicable statutory basis for unfitness indeed provides for 
a "defense" or "explanation" that would preclude a finding of 
unfitness, and there are material facts in dispute regarding a 
parent's asserted "defense" in this regard, then summary 
judgment will not be appropriate.  Here, however, the applicable 
statutory ground for unfitness——denial of physical placement and 
visitation by court order for more than one year pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4)——does not provide for a defense based 
upon a parent's explanation for noncompliance with the court 
order.  Accordingly, the circuit court correctly concluded that 
while Kelley H.'s explanation for having failed to comply with 
the court-ordered conditions for re-establishing visitation was 
highly 
relevant 
at 
the 
dispositional 
phase 
of 
the 
TPR 
proceeding, it was not relevant at the grounds phase.   
No. 
02-2860   
 
28 
 
B.  Continuance to Consult on Substitution of Judge 
¶49 Kelley also contends she is entitled to a new hearing 
because the circuit court failed to inform her, at the initial 
hearing, that she had a right under Wis. Stat. § 48.422(5) to a 
continuance to consult with counsel regarding substitution of 
judge.  Kelley relies on Burnett County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. 
Kimberly M.W., 181 Wis. 2d 887, 892, 512 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 
1994), which in turn relied on language in M.W. and I.W., 116 
Wis. 2d at 441, which appears to impose such a duty on the 
circuit courts. 
¶50 Parties to TPR proceedings may request a continuance 
of the initial hearing to consult with counsel about judicial 
substitution.  Wis. Stat. § 48.422(5).  However, the circuit 
court does not have an affirmative duty to advise parties of 
this right.  Wis. Stat. § 48.422(1). 
¶51  As is pertinent here, Wis. Stat. § 48.422 provides: 
Hearing on the petition.  (1)  . . . At the hearing on 
the petition to terminate parental rights the court 
shall determine whether any party wishes to contest 
the petition and inform the parties of their rights 
under sub. (4) and s. 48.423 [relating to persons 
alleging their paternity]. 
. . . .  
(4)  Any party who is necessary to the proceeding or 
whose rights may be affected by an order terminating 
parental rights shall be granted a jury trial upon 
request if the request is made before the end of the 
initial hearing on the petition. 
(5)  Any nonpetitioning party, including the child, 
shall be granted a continuance of the hearing for the 
purpose of consulting with an attorney on the request 
No. 
02-2860   
 
29 
 
for a jury trial or concerning a request for the 
substitution of a judge. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422.  In M.W. and I.W., this court broadly 
construed Wis. Stat. § 48.422 as follows: 
The statutory direction is unequivocal:  A parent has 
the right to representation in court unless there is a 
waiver; and, in any case, the trial court has the duty 
to make a full explication of the statutory rights —— 
the 
right 
to 
representation, 
the 
right 
to 
a 
continuance, the right to request a jury trial, and 
the right to request a substitution of judge. 
M.W. and I.W., 116 Wis. 2d at 441.  
¶52 M.W. and I.W. was mistaken that the statute is 
unequivocal in this regard.  In fact, as Court of Appeals Judge 
Lundsten noted in his concurrence in this case, the statute 
unequivocally does not direct the circuit court to inform 
parties of the right to a continuance to consult with counsel 
regarding judicial substitution.  Kelley H., 263 Wis. 2d 241, 
¶48.  M.W. and I.W. did not purport to impose such a duty as a 
constitutional 
requirement 
or 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
judicial 
administration.  We withdraw this language from M.W. and I.W.; 
the circuit court does not have a statutory duty to inform a 
party in a TPR case of the right to a continuance to consult 
with counsel about judicial substitution.9  The circuit court's 
failure to do so here was not error. 
                                                 
 
9  As we have noted, Kelley relied for this argument on 
Burnett County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Kimberly M.W., 181 Wis. 
2d 887, 892, 512 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1994), in which the court 
of appeals followed M.W. and I.W. v. Monroe County Dep't of 
Human Servs., 116 Wis. 2d 432, 342 N.W.2d 410 (1984), and 
imported the procedure of State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986), for determining whether the failure to provide 
the continuance warning was reversible error.  Because it was 
No. 
02-2860   
 
30 
 
¶53 Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude 
that partial summary judgment may be granted in the unfitness 
phase of a TPR case where the moving party establishes that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the 
asserted grounds for unfitness under Wis. Stat. § 48.415, and, 
taking into consideration the heightened burden of proof 
specified in Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1) and required by due process, 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  We 
further conclude that Wis. Stat. § 48.422(1) does not impose 
upon the circuit court a duty to advise parties of the right 
under Wis. Stat. § 48.422(5) to a continuance to consult with 
counsel regarding judicial substitution.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
       
 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
premised on the overbroad language of M.W. and I.W., which we 
have now withdrawn, we overrule Kimberly M.W. 
  
No.  02-2860.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶54 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I join 
the majority opinion.  I write separately, however, to express 
my concern about the current statutory scheme for involuntary 
terminations 
of 
parental 
rights. 
 
Because 
there 
may 
be 
situations when one of the grounds for termination is met, but 
the facts themselves do not indicate parental unfitness, I write 
separately. 
¶55 In Sheboygan County Department of Health & Human 
Services v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶¶24-28, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 
648 
N.W.2d 402, 
this 
court 
clarified 
that 
a 
termination 
proceeding is a two-step process rather than a three-step 
process as two prior cases had determined.10  Specifically, we 
concluded 
that 
the 
legislature 
did 
not 
contemplate 
an 
intermediate step at which the circuit court decides, after the 
fact-finder has found that a ground exists, whether the parent's 
unfitness is egregious enough to warrant termination.11  We 
explained that "'[i]f grounds for the termination of parental 
rights are found by the court or jury, the court shall find the 
parent unfit.'  Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4)."12    
                                                 
10 The two prior cases were B.L.J. v. Polk County Department 
of Social Services, 163 Wis. 2d 90, 470 N.W.2d 914 (1991), and 
State v. Kelly S., 2001 WI App 193, 247 Wis. 2d 144, 634 
N.W.2d 120. 
11 Sheboygan County Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. 
Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶36, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402. 
12 Id., ¶26. 
No.  02-2860.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶56 Our decision in Julie A.B. was the correct one under 
the statutory scheme.  The problem with the statutory scheme, 
however, becomes exceedingly clear in the present case.  Here, 
the petition alleged that Kelley had been denied physical 
placement and visitation by court order for more than one year 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4).13  As the dissent recognizes, 
there may be reasons a court did not modify the order denying 
placement and visitation, including serious illness, temporary 
incarceration, or involuntary absence from the jurisdiction, or 
a judge's illness or death.14  These reasons, however, cannot 
currently be considered to defeat the determination of unfitness 
once a ground has been found.15   
¶57 In certain cases, a parent will be able to raise his 
or her legitimate explanation about why his or her conduct does 
not constitute unfitness by means of a constitutional challenge.  
In those cases where the legislative scheme seems to bypass any 
meaningful determination of unfitness, the petitioner can assert 
that the statutory ground for unfitness is not sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to meet the constitutional standards.  See 
Monroe County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Kelli B., 2004 WI 48, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.     
¶58 Mounting a constitutional challenge is not, however, 
easily accomplished given the presumption of constitutionality 
                                                 
13 Majority op., ¶2. 
14 Dissent, ¶97. 
15 See Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4). 
No.  02-2860.ssa 
 
3 
 
and the burden of proof.16  Other cases, which may not rise to 
the level of a constitutional challenge, seem to cry out for 
relief.  A parent who has a legitimate explanation about why his 
or her conduct does not constitute unfitness in fact should be 
heard before a circuit court declares that parent unfit. 
¶59 The majority here encourages parents to raise in the 
dispositional stage their explanations as to why their conduct 
does not make them in fact unfit.  Yet given the fundamental 
liberty interest involved, I am concerned that raising the 
legitimate explanation in the dispositional stage provides an 
inadequate safeguard.  At the dispositional stage, the best 
interests of the child serves as the "polestar" for the court.17  
Although a court may consider factors favorable to a parent, it 
is only required to consider the six factors set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 48.426(3).18  Significantly, not one of these factors 
addresses a parent's explanation.   
                                                 
16 See Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Darrell 
A., 194 Wis. 2d 627, 637, 534 N.W.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1995); State 
v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 706, 524 N.W.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1993). 
17 Julie A.B., 255 Wis. 2d 170, ¶4. 
18 See id., ¶29.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.426(3) states: 
(3) FACTORS.  In considering the best interests of the 
child under this section the court shall consider but 
not be limited to the following: 
(a) The likelihood of the child's adoption after 
termination. 
(b) The age and health of the child, both at the time 
of the disposition and, if applicable, at the time the 
child was removed from the home. 
No.  02-2860.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶60 Given the significance of termination proceedings for 
parents, children, and society, I believe that the legislature 
should revisit the statutory scheme to ensure the legitimacy and 
constitutionality of the process.  Accordingly, I urge the law 
revision committee and the revisor of statutes to exercise their 
statutory duties under Wis. Stat. § 13.83(1) and § 13.93(2)(d) 
and examine the statutes, as they are, in my opinion, in need of 
revision. 
¶61 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) Whether the child has substantial relationships 
with the parent or other family members, and whether 
it would be harmful to the child to sever these 
relationships. 
(d) The wishes of the child. 
(e) The duration of the separation of the parent from 
the child. 
(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into a 
more stable and permanent family relationship as a 
result of the termination, taking into account the 
conditions of the child's current placement, the 
likelihood of future placements and the results of 
prior placements. 
No.  02-2860.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶62 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶63 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Last term I 
expressed concern that summary judgments were eating into the 
constitutional right of trial by jury in civil cases.  Trinity 
Evangelical v. Tower Ins. Co., 2003 WI 46, ¶¶71-86, 261 
Wis. 2d 333, 661 N.W.2d 789 (Prosser, J., dissenting).  The 
decision prompting this concern involved an insurance company 
that was accused of acting in bad faith toward its insured.  The 
circuit court granted summary judgment to the insured, finding 
that the insurer was liable to the insured as a matter of law.  
The court found that every element of the tort of bad faith was 
established beyond dispute without the need for a trial.  Thus, 
the court denied the insurer the right to a jury's determination 
of the facts, reserving for jury determination only the issue of 
damages.  After receiving the court's instructions, the jury 
awarded the insured the staggering sum of $3.5 million in 
punitive damages.  This court upheld the award and all the 
procedures leading up to it. 
¶64 The present case heightens my apprehension because it 
involves more than a suit among private parties over money.  It 
involves a government effort to terminate a mother's rights to 
her child.  The type of proceeding, the nature of the parties, 
and the potential stakes all are different.  Once again, 
however, this court strips a defendant of the right of trial by 
jury——this time, a right granted by statute——by asserting that 
there is simply no disputed issue of fact for a jury to decide.  
No.  02-2860.dtp 
2 
 
As the court sees it, convening an "expensive and time-
consuming" jury of citizens from the community to assess whether 
a mother is "unfit," before the judge decides whether to 
terminate her parental rights, would serve no purpose.  See 
Majority op., ¶43.  In short, a jury trial would be "pointless."  
Id. 
¶65 The founders of our Nation believed that "trial of 
fact by juries rather than by judges was an essential bulwark of 
civil liberty."  Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 
(1943) (Black, J., dissenting).19  Justice Black anticipated the 
tension in this case when he observed that either a judge or a 
jury must decide facts and "to the extent that we [in the 
judiciary] 
take 
this 
responsibility, 
we 
lessen 
the 
jury 
function."  Id. at 407.  The judicial duty to preserve the right 
of trial by jury "may be peculiarly difficult, for here it is 
our own power which we must restrain."  Id. 
¶66 The majority opinion speaks of the low risk of error 
in some judicial fact-finding and the "complete waste of 
judicial resources" in the jury trial requested here.  Majority 
op., ¶¶42-43.  But it fails to recognize that trial by jury is 
intended to protect civil litigants from overreaching and abuse 
by officials in all three branches of government, not just the 
judiciary.  The American jury represents a classic check on 
government power.  Hence, "the jury is not controlling merely 
                                                 
19 Justice Black quoted Thomas Jefferson as saying: "I 
consider trial by jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by 
man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its 
constitution."  Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 
(quoting 3 Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington ed.) 71). 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
3 
 
the immediate case before it, but the host of cases not before 
it which are destined to be disposed of by the pre-trial 
process. . . .  [T]he jury, like the visible cap of an iceberg, 
exposes but a fraction of its true volume."  Harry Kalven, Jr. & 
Hans Zeisel, The American Jury, 31-32 (1966). 
¶67 The decision in this case undermines a basic right 
crafted by the legislature.  In curtailing this right, the court 
will impact the dynamics of termination proceedings in ways that 
are not yet fully apparent.20  It may impair the legitimate 
interests of parents and complicate the operation of the 
termination law.  Because I believe the court is making a 
serious mistake, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
 
¶68 Chapter 48——the Children's Code——addresses a wide 
range of matters affecting children.  In the subchapter on 
procedure, Wis. Stat. § 48.31 establishes fact-finding hearings 
(1) to determine if the allegations in a petition for children 
alleged to be in 
need 
of 
protection 
or 
services 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.13 are proved by clear and convincing evidence; 
(2) to determine if the allegations in a petition for unborn 
children alleged to be in need of protection or services under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.133 are proved by clear and convincing evidence; 
and (3) to determine if the allegations in a petition to 
                                                 
20 Chief Justice Abrahamson has removed any doubt about one 
of the ways the dynamics will change.  Concurring op., ¶¶56-57.  
The judiciary's evisceration of the right of trial by jury will 
encourage parents to launch constitutional challenges against 
the termination statute. 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
4 
 
terminate parental rights are proved by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
 
¶69 Subsection (2) of § 48.31 then reads: 
 
(2) The hearing shall be to the court unless the 
child, 
the 
child's 
parent, 
guardian, 
or 
legal 
custodian, the unborn child by the unborn child's 
guardian ad litem, or the expectant mother of the 
unborn child exercises the right to a jury trial by 
demanding a jury trial at any time before or during 
the plea hearing. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.31(2) (emphasis added). 
 
¶70 This provision permits either a parent or a child or a 
child's representative to demand a jury trial in a termination 
proceeding. 
 
The 
legislature's 
intent 
in 
§ 48.31(2) 
is 
reinforced in Wis. Stat. § 48.422(4), which reads: "Any party 
who is necessary to the proceeding or whose rights may be 
affected by an order terminating parental rights shall be 
granted a jury trial upon request if the request is made before 
the 
end 
of 
the 
initial 
hearing 
on 
the 
petition."  
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(4) (emphasis added).  The circuit court is 
required 
to 
inform 
the 
parties 
of 
this 
right.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.422(1). 
 
¶71 Subsection (2) of § 48.31 continues:  
If a jury trial is demanded in a proceeding under s. 
48.13 or 48.133, the jury shall consist of 6 persons.  
If a jury trial is demanded in a proceeding under s. 
48.42 [petition for termination of parental rights], 
the jury shall consist of 12 persons unless the 
parties agree to a lesser number. 
 
¶72 This language makes plain that while the legislature 
considers each of the three fact-finding hearings significant, 
it considers the fact-finding hearing on a termination petition 
to be more significant than a hearing under § 48.13 because the 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
5 
 
jury in the termination hearing is a jury of 12 persons, not 6 
persons. 
 
¶73 Subsection (2) adds that "At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the court or jury shall make a determination of the 
facts . . . ."  Subsection (4) of § 48.31 thereafter provides:  
The court or jury shall make findings of fact and 
the court shall make conclusions of law relating to 
the allegations of a petition filed under s. 48.13, 
48.133 or 48.42, except that the court shall make 
findings of fact relating to whether the child or 
unborn child is in need of protection or services 
which can be ordered by the court. 
The 
jury's 
fact-finding 
duties 
are 
also 
alluded 
to 
in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 48.415 (introduction) and 48.424(3) and (4). 
 
¶74 Subsection (4) of § 48.31 and subsection (3) of 
§ 48.424 outline situations in which the court plays an 
exclusive role in termination proceedings.  Judicial authority 
to deny a party a jury trial because the court believes that 
grounds exist for a partial summary judgment is not mentioned in 
these statutes. 
 
¶75 The legislature's intent in these statutes is not 
ambiguous.  The legislature intends to afford affected parties 
in termination cases the same right to a jury trial as 
defendants in criminal cases.  The fact that parents may demand 
a jury trial on the issue of their "fitness" does not mean that 
they will always exercise this right.  It means that officials 
seeking termination are likely to be more cautious in their 
approach and more thorough in making the case than they would be 
if they didn't have to deal with people who are not part of the 
courthouse establishment. 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
6 
 
II 
 
¶76 Jury trials in Wisconsin child custody cases date back 
more than a century.  See Chapter 90, Laws of 1901 ("An act to 
regulate the treatment and control of dependent, neglected and 
delinquent children in counties having over one hundred and 
fifty thousand population.").  After defining "dependent child," 
"neglected child," and "delinquent child" in Section 1, the 
legislature asserted in Section 2 that: 
In all trials under this act of any dependent or 
delinquent child, any person interested therein may 
demand a jury of six, or the judge of his own motion 
may order a jury of the same number to try the case.  
Such jury when demanded or ordered shall be obtained 
in the manner provided in chapter 194 of the Wisconsin 
statutes of 1898 and the provisions of sections 4750 
to 4758, both inclusive, of said chapter 194, shall be 
applicable to all such trials. 
§ 2, ch. 90, Laws of 1901. 
 
¶77 This early provision evolved over time.  Since 1901, 
however, our legislature has always conferred a right to demand 
trial by jury in certain cases involving the custody and control 
of children.  Historically, this right predates the appearance 
of summary judgment in Wisconsin law. 
 
¶78 The first summary judgment rule was adopted by Supreme 
Court Order in 1931.  See In the Matter of the Promulgation of 
Rules Relating to Pleading, Practice and Procedure in the Courts 
of 
the 
State 
of 
Wisconsin, 
204 
Wis. 
viii, 
creating 
Wis. Stat. § 270.635.  This rule was quite limited in scope.  
Some 45 years later, on January 1, 1976, this court replaced a 
modified § 270.635 with Wis. Stat. § 802.08, as part of the 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
7 
 
Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure.  67 Wis. 2d 585, 630-31 
(1975). 
 
¶79 As part of the same rule-making process, the court 
adopted Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2), which read: 
 
(2) Scope.  The sections in this title govern 
procedure and practice in circuit and county courts of 
the state of Wisconsin in all civil actions and 
special proceedings whether cognizable as cases at 
law, in equity or of statutory origin except where 
different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule.  
They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and 
inexpensive determination of every action. 
67 Wis. 2d at 588 (emphasis added).  This latter provision is 
the court-made rule the majority relies on to apply summary 
judgment to § 48.31 fact-finding proceedings.  Essentially, the 
majority is saying that the civil procedure code, including 
summary judgment, applies to all civil actions except those for 
which a different procedure is prescribed by statute.  A 
proceeding to establish a ground for termination in a TPR case 
is a civil action, and it does not prescribe an exception for 
summary judgment.  Therefore, summary judgment applies in a 
proceeding to establish a ground for termination of parental 
rights. 
 
¶80 There are several difficulties with this conclusion.  
First, because Wis. Stat. §§ 48.31(2) and 48.422(4) establish a 
right to demand a trial by jury, they arguably prescribe, "by 
statute," "a different procedure" from summary judgment. 
¶81 It must be acknowledged that Wis. Stat. § 805.01(2) 
also uses the word "demand"——any "party entitled to a trial by 
jury . . . may demand a trial in the mode to which entitled"——
and this "demand" language has not prevented summary judgment in 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
8 
 
the typical civil case.  However, the language in § 805.01 has a 
history very different from the language in Wis. Stat. § 48.31.  
The language in § 805.01 was lifted from Rule 38 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which was drafted long after the 
"demand" language in § 48.31(2).  There is something quite 
disconcerting about borrowing the interpretation of one statute 
to nullify a longstanding right in another statute. 
 
¶82 Second, the Judicial Council Committee's Note to 
Wis. Stat. § 801.01, 
prepared 
shortly 
before 
the 
rule's 
promulgation, offers an interpretation of the rule that is 
different from the interpretation provided by the majority.  The 
Note explains that the statutes contained in chapters 801 
through 807 are general in their application to civil actions 
and govern all matters of practice and procedure "except to the 
extent that contrary provisions otherwise provide."  Wisconsin 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 Wis. 2d 589 (1976).  Thus, the Note 
explains: 
they are subject to the special rules applicable to 
actions affecting marriage under ch. 247, small claims 
actions under ch. 299, actions to recover forfeitures 
under ch. 288, illegitimacy proceedings under ch. 52, 
probate proceedings under chs. 851-879, provisional 
and extraordinary remedies under chs. 264-268 and any 
other special rule governing particular kinds of 
actions or special proceedings. 
Id. (emphasis added).   
¶83 The 
exceptions 
cited 
in 
the 
Judicial 
Council 
Committee's Note should be compared to the majority's analysis 
in ¶35, n.3.21  The chapter numbers have changed over the past 
                                                 
21 The majority states in ¶35, n.3 that: 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
9 
 
quarter century but there is considerable overlap in the subject 
areas.  Consequently, the majority's analysis appears to 
conflict with the Judicial Council Committee's Note. 
¶84 Chapter 48 proceedings are not specifically mentioned 
in the Judicial Council Committee's Note.  However, fact-finding 
proceedings under Chapter 48——which at the time of adoption of 
the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure included proceedings to 
determine "delinquency"——obviously have special rules.  Juvenile 
delinquency proceedings and termination proceedings are "special 
proceedings."22  They are not the same as general civil actions 
and thus implicate "any other special rule governing particular 
kinds of actions."  Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 
Wis. 2d 589. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The general statutory civil jury trial right is 
contained in Wis. Stat. § 805.01, and several other 
statutes confer the right to a jury in specific types 
of cases.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 879.45 (probate 
code); 
Wis. Stat. § 767.50 
(paternity); 
Wis. Stat. § 799.21 
(small 
claims); 
Wis. Stat. § 345.43 (traffic code).  No case has ever 
held that summary judgment procedure violates any of 
these statutory jury trial provisions (although it 
would be highly unusual for a party to attempt to 
invoke summary judgment in some of these very fact-
intensive contexts). 
 
22 In Lueptow v. Schraeder, 226 Wis. 437, 443-45, 277 N.W. 
124 (1938), the court said: "The proceedings authorized by ch. 
48, Stats., are new in this state. . . .  In our view, [a 
delinquency] 
proceeding, 
strictly 
speaking, 
is 
neither 
a 
criminal nor a civil action.  It is a special proceeding with 
certain incidents common to both civil and criminal actions."  
(Emphasis added.) 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
10 
 
 
¶85 Finally, 
this 
court 
adopted 
Wis. Stat. §§ 801.01 
(scope of chs. 801-847) and 802.08 (summary judgment) "pursuant 
to its inherent authority and sec. 251.18, Stats."  Preface to 
Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 Wis. 2d 585.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 251.18 in 1975 and Wis. Stat. § 751.12 now are the 
statutes that have authorized this court to promulgate rules of 
pleading, practice, and procedure.  They both contain the 
admonition that court-made rules "shall not abridge, enlarge, or 
modify the substantive rights of any litigant."  This raises the 
question whether a legislatively conferred right of trial by 
jury is a substantive right.  If it is, then this court may not 
abridge that right by rule.  If it is not, then this court has 
been given the awesome power to abolish the right of trial by 
jury by rule in any situation in which the right is not 
protected by the state or federal constitution. 
 
¶86 It would be ill advised for this court to embrace the 
premise that its court-made rule wipes out an unconditional 
legislatively established right of trial by jury in termination 
cases whenever a judge finds that there is no issue of material 
fact concerning an alleged statutory ground for termination.  
Arguably, the legislature authorized a jury to determine whether 
a statutory ground for unfitness exists so that no judge could 
unilaterally terminate a parent's rights. 
III 
 
¶87 The majority opinion minimizes my concern that the 
statutory right of jury trial in termination cases has been 
impaired by emphasizing that summary judgments are available 
only "where the requirements of the summary judgment statute and 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
11 
 
the applicable legal standards in Wis. Stat. §§ 48.415 and 48.31 
have been met."  Majority op., ¶5.  "Accordingly, partial 
summary judgment may be granted in the unfitness phase of a TPR 
case where the moving party establishes that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact regarding the asserted grounds for 
unfitness under Wis. Stat. § 48.415, and . . . the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a mater of law."  Id., ¶6. 
 
¶88 The majority explains that there are now 12 grounds of 
unfitness in § 48.415 for the termination of parental rights, 
"and several of these may be proved by official documentary 
evidence."  Id., ¶3.  The majority cites the following: 
 
a. 
48.415(1m)——relinquishment; 
 
b. 
48.415(4)——continuing denial of periods of 
physical placement or visitation; 
 
c. 
48.415(8)——homicide 
or 
solicitation 
to 
commit homicide of parent; 
 
d. 
48.415(9)——parenthood as a result of sexual 
assault; 
 
e. 
48.415(9m)——commission 
of 
serious 
felony 
against one of the person's children; 
 
f. 
48.415(10)——prior involuntary termination of 
parental rights to another child. 
Id., ¶37.   
¶89 Significantly, the court has listed half the grounds 
of unfitness as being subject to potential summary judgment 
because they may be proved by official documentary evidence.  
However, in some cases, child abuse under § 48.415(5) and 
incestuous parenthood under § 48.415(7) may also be proved by 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
12 
 
documentary evidence.23  Therefore, at least two-thirds of the 
grounds of unfitness may be determined without a jury trial.  In 
fact, the majority implies that summary judgment may be granted, 
where appropriate, on a case-by-case basis, irrespective of the 
grounds.  Majority op., ¶37, n.4.  It overrules Walworth County 
Department of Human Services v. Elizabeth W., 189 Wis. 2d 432, 
525 N.W.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1994), a case in which the court of 
appeals 
disapproved 
summary 
judgment 
for 
the 
grounds 
of 
abandonment and continuing need of protection or services, 
neither of which is a candidate for summary judgment on the 
majority's list. 
 
¶90 One consequence of this is that the party initially 
petitioning for termination of parental rights——sometimes the 
child's other parent——may deliberately choose a ground of 
unfitness that will maximize the chances of avoiding a jury 
trial.   
¶91 This is not the only problem the court has created.  A 
termination of parental rights proceeding is frequently preceded 
by a CHIPS proceeding pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.13 as well as 
a disposition hearing under Wis. Stat. § 48.335.  At the CHIPS 
fact-finding hearing, the parent is entitled to a jury trial.  
Wis. Stat. § 48.243(1)(g).  Often, however, the parent does not 
contest the child's need for protection or services because the 
parent is overwhelmed with personal problems and needs time to 
                                                 
23 Initially, the circuit court granted summary judgment on 
incestuous parenthood grounds in Monroe County Department of 
Human Services v. Kelli B., 2003 WI App 88, ¶5, 263 Wis. 2d 413, 
662 
N.W.2d 360, 
aff'd 
2004 
WI 
48, 
___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 
___ 
N.W.2d ___. 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
13 
 
recover.  Now, however, because failure to contest a petition at 
the CHIPS fact-finding hearing may eliminate the chance for a 
parent ever to present testimonial evidence on the issue of the 
parent's unfitness, there will be an incentive for the parent to 
contest the initial CHIPS proceeding.  In any event, the court 
may employ summary judgment at the CHIPS fact-finding hearing.  
N.Q. 
v. 
Milwaukee 
County 
Dep't 
of 
Social 
Servs., 
162 
Wis. 2d 607, 611-12, 470 N.W.2d 1 (1991). 
 
¶92 At 
the 
CHIPS 
disposition 
hearing, 
there 
is 
no 
requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence.  S.D.S. 
and K.A.S. v. Rock County 
Dep't 
of 
Soc. 
Services, 152 
Wis. 2d 345, 356-57, 448 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 1989).  Rather, 
because CHIPS dispositional hearings "emphasize the child's 
future well-being and family values, not culpability," the 
greater weight of the credible evidence standard applies.  Id. 
at 357. 
¶93 What this means is that the predicate fact-finding 
leading up to an involuntary termination proceeding may be based 
upon a waiver, or summary judgment, or a reduced burden of 
proof.   
 
¶94 In this case, a judge in Brown County conducted a 
CHIPS fact-finding hearing and a CHIPS dispositional hearing.  
The dispositional hearing had a reduced burden of proof.  The 
child's 
father 
later 
petitioned 
in 
Grant 
County 
for 
a 
termination of the mother's rights on the ground set out in 
§ 48.415(4) (continuing denial of periods of physical placement 
or visitation).  Subsection (4) reads: 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
14 
 
(4) Continuing Denial of Periods of Physical 
Placement or Visitation.  Continuing denial of periods 
of physical placement or visitation, which shall be 
established by proving all of the following: 
(a) That the parent has been denied periods of 
physical placement by court order in an action 
affecting the family or has been denied visitation 
under an order under s. 48.345, 48.363, 48.365, 
938.345, 938.363 or 938.365 containing the notice 
required by s. 48.356(2) or 938.356(2). 
(b) That at least one year has elapsed since the 
order 
denying 
periods 
of 
physical 
placement 
or 
visitation 
was 
issued 
and 
the 
court 
has 
not 
subsequently modified its order so as to permit 
periods of physical placement or visitation. 
Wis. Stat. § 48.415(4) 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§§ 48.345, 48.363, and 48.365 involve dispositional hearings 
with a reduced burden of proof.   
¶95 In this case, Kelley H. was denied physical placement 
and denied visitation of her son by court order.  At least one 
year elapsed from the date the order was issued and the court 
had not modified the order so as to permit periods of physical 
placement or visitation. 
¶96 The Grant County Circuit Court would not permit Kelley 
H. to explain, at the fact-finding hearing on unfitness, why at 
least one year had elapsed since the order denying periods of 
physical placement or visitation was issued and why the court 
had not subsequently modified its order so as to permit periods 
of physical placement or visitation.  That evidence could not 
come in, the court said, until the dispositional hearing.  See 
Majority op., ¶¶15-16.  This court affirms that ruling.  As a 
practical matter, this court is saying that there are no facts——
including a parent's serious illness, temporary incarceration, 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
15 
 
or involuntary absence from the jurisdiction, or a judge's 
illness or death——that will ever legally excuse a failure to 
modify the placement/visitation order within a year after it is 
issued.  This strikes me as going well beyond what the court 
decided in Sheboygan County DHHS v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, 
¶¶36-37, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648 N.W.2d 402. 
 
¶97 The legislature has established multiple legal grounds 
of parental unfitness that may serve as the foundation for a 
termination of parental rights.  Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)-(10).  I 
agree that there are no "degrees of unfitness" under this 
statutory scheme.  Majority op., ¶25.  On the other hand, there 
may be "defenses" or "explanations" for some of these grounds 
that ought to be raised by the defendant for consideration by 
the fact-finder making the determination of unfitness, as 
opposed to the court determining the best interests of the 
child; for when the court considers the best interests of the 
child, the court's decision revolves around the child, not the 
parent.24 
 
¶98 In my view, depriving the fact-finder, especially a 
jury, of the full story before the fact-finder determines that 
grounds of unfitness exist, is not what the legislature 
                                                 
24 In her concurrence, the Chief Justice writes that 
Wis. Stat. § 48.424(4) does not permit a defendant to present a 
"defense" at the fact-finding hearing if there are undisputed 
facts to support one of the statutory grounds.  Concurring op., 
¶56.  I disagree.  Wisconsin Stat. § 48.424(4) directs the court 
to "find the parent unfit" if grounds for the termination of 
parental rights are found.  It does not prohibit a defendant 
from presenting a legal defense.  A court has the right to 
determine whether there is a legal defense to a statutory 
grounds of unfitness, but the fact-finder should determine 
whether that defense has been established. 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
16 
 
intended.  Depriving a parent of the right to the jury trial 
granted by statute is even worse.  The right of trial by jury 
should not be granted by judges on a case-by-case basis, because 
the legislature conferred a blanket right.  See Majority op., 
¶37, n.4. 
IV 
¶99 As the majority correctly observes, few judicial 
decisions are as consequential as a termination of parental 
rights.  Majority op., ¶21.  A termination judgment severs 
permanently "the parent's interest in the companionship, care, 
custody, and management of his or her child," T.M.F. v. 
Children's Service Society, 112 Wis. 2d 180, 184, 332 N.W.2d 293 
(1983), who is usually the parent's own flesh and blood.  It is 
thus one of "the most severe forms of state action," M.L.B. v. 
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 128 (1996) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 445 
U.S. 
745, 
759 
(1982)), 
invoking 
the 
outer 
reaches 
of 
governmental power. 
¶100 The Wisconsin legislature has recognized the vital 
stakes in a termination decision and established a balanced 
regimen to assure fairness to all concerned parties.  Courts 
should resist the temptation to try to improve the process by 
modifying either the substance or procedures of the law.  In 
doing so, they may inadvertently shortchange interests that the 
legislature sought to protect and unravel the entire statutory 
scheme.  I cannot agree that the majority has improved the 
process established by the legislature and thus, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  02-2860.dtp 
 
 
1