Case Title: In re J.B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93453

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 93453-Agenda 6-January 2003.
In re J.B. et al., Appellees (The People of the State of Illinois, 
 								Appellee, v. Wanda B., Appellant).
Opinion filed April 24, 2003.

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The circuit court of Cook County found that the respondent,
Wanda B. (mother), was an unfit parent based on section 1(D)(q)
of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(q) (West 1998)). As
amended, this section creates a presumption that a parent is unfit
based on a conviction for any of the specified crimes. The mother
had previously been convicted of aggravated battery of a child, one
of the listed crimes. The circuit court subsequently terminated the
mother's parental rights. She appealed but failed to seek a stay of
enforcement of the termination order. While the appeal was
pending, the children were adopted. More than a year after the
entry of the children's final adoption orders, the appellate court
filed its judgment affirming the termination order. 328 Ill. App. 3d
175.
	In this appeal, the mother raises constitutional challenges to
amended section 1(D)(q), but prior to reaching these issues, we
must consider the threshold issue of whether her appeal is moot
pursuant to our recent decisions in In re Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d 282
(2002), and In re India B., 202 Ill. 2d 522 (2002). We hold that it
is and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.

I. BACKGROUND
	In July 1992, the mother pleaded guilty to aggravated battery
of one of her children and was sentenced to 70 days'
imprisonment, receiving credit for the time she had already served.
Subsequently, in March 1993 and March 1995, she gave birth to
the two children at issue in this appeal, J.B. and T.B., who were
taken into state custody shortly after birth and were later
adjudicated wards of the court. In 1998, the court entered
permanency orders setting the goal of substitute care for the
children, pending a decision on the termination of parental rights,
and the State filed supplemental petitions to appoint a guardian
with the right to consent to their adoptions.
	The State then sought summary judgment on the issue of the
mother's fitness based on amended section 1(D)(q) of the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(q) (West 1998)) because she had
previously been convicted of aggravated battery of a child. The
amendment took effect after the mother's conviction, and, in her
answer, she challenged the amended section's retroactive
application and constitutionality. The circuit court granted the
State's motion, finding that the retroactive application of the
amended statute was proper because the mother's interest in her
children was not an absolute vested right. Applying the amended
statute, the trial court found the mother unfit as a matter of law.
On August 10, 1999, the mother's parental rights were terminated
following a best interests hearing. The mother filed a timely notice
of appeal but did not seek to stay the enforcement of the
termination order in either the circuit court or the appellate court.
	On February 26, 2002, the appellate court affirmed, finding
that the amended statute could be applied retroactively and did not
violate the mother's due process and equal protection rights. The
mother then sought leave to appeal to this court, but she did not
raise the issue of retroactivity. After her petition was granted, the
public guardian reported that J.B. and T.B. had been adopted by
their foster parents on December 17, 1999, and February 9, 2000,
respectively.
	Prior to filing its brief, the State, joined by the public
guardian, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot based on
this court's decision in In re Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d 282 (2002). A
petition for rehearing was pending in Tekela when the State filed
its motion, and the motion was denied.

II. ANALYSIS 
	On appeal, the State reiterates the argument that this court
should not address the merit of the mother's claims because the
appeal is moot. Thus, the threshold question before us is whether
we may decide the issues raised in this appeal on their merits in
light of our recent holdings in In re Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d 282 (2002),
and In re India B., 202 Ill. 2d 522 (2002).
	In Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d  at 296, this court held that the filing of
a notice of appeal does not act as a stay of an order terminating
parental rights. We reasoned that after the passage of the one-year
period to challenge an adoption in section 20b of the Adoption Act
(750 ILCS 50/20b (West 1998)) any challenge to the validity of a
termination order would be rendered moot since our ruling could
have no practical effect on the controversy or the parties' rights in
the matter before the court. Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d  at 292-93. See also
In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 364 (1999).
	Similarly, in this case the mother did not seek a stay of the
termination order, and the adoption orders had been in place for
far more than one year before the appellate court filed its decision.
Applying the rationale in Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d  at 292, to this case,
the mother's challenges to the termination order were moot at the
time the appellate judgment was filed and remain moot in this
court.
	Initially, the mother argues that Tekela is inapplicable because
it did not involve a constitutional challenge. We disagree. This
court recently applied the reasoning in Tekela to dismiss as moot
an appeal of a termination order challenged on constitutional
grounds. India B., 202 Ill. 2d  at 544.
	In India B., the mother was barred from presenting either a
defense or further pleadings because she failed to appear at her
parental fitness hearing. On appeal, she maintained that the
sanction violated her constitutional rights to due process and
counsel. She also argued that if her appeal was deemed moot, this
court should apply an exception to the mootness doctrine.
	In this case, the mother claims that this court may hear her
appeal under only one such exception, the public interest
exception. This exception was also raised by the mother in India
B. In that case, we explained that the public interest exception is
applicable only if it is clearly shown that: (1) the question is of a
substantial public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative
decision to provide future guidance; and (3) the situation is likely
to recur. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 395 (1994). In rejecting the mother's argument in India B.,
we noted that the exception must be narrowly construed and each
of its criteria must be clearly established. India B., 202 Ill. 2d  at
543. We concluded that the case did not meet those "rigid
standards." India B., 202 Ill. 2d  at 543.
	We declined the mother's invitation to apply the public
interest exception in India B. because there were no conflicting
precedents requiring authoritative resolution. India B., 202 Ill. 2d 
at 543. Here, the mother cites no conflicting case law requiring
authoritative resolution. Since we are confronted with the same
scenario as in India B., we are compelled to apply the same
rationale. The exception is inapplicable in this case because at
least one of the criteria for the public interest exception is absent.
India B., 202 Ill. 2d  at 543.
	The mother, however, raises additional arguments refuting the
applicability of the India B. rationale. She briefly argues that the
State may not rely on our mootness holding in that case because it
did not previously raise the one-year statutory limitations period
on contesting adoptions in this case. This argument ignores the
basic principles that questions affecting a court's authority to hear
a given controversy may be raised at any time (see In re Estate of
Gebis, 186 Ill. 2d 188, 192-93 (1999)) and that reviewing courts
have a duty to raise such issues sua sponte if they are not raised by
the parties (Department of Central Management Services v.
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
182 Ill. 2d 234, 238 (1998)). We reject the mother's waiver
argument.
	The mother next attempts to distinguish her appeal from India
B. because, in that case, this court observed that the respondent
was unlikely to be subjected to the same penalty a second time.
We note that this contention addresses the third prong of the
public interest exception, the likelihood of recurrence. We need
not address this claim because, pursuant to our rationale in India
B., we have already determined that this case fails to satisfy
another prong of the public interest exception. Unless a case meets
the "rigid standard" requiring each element of a mootness
exception to be clearly established, the exception is inapplicable.
See India B., 202 Ill. 2d  at 543.
	Although the mother explicitly acknowledges that this case
may be procedurally similar to Tekela and India B., she maintains
that it is substantively closer to our decision in In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1 (2000). In that case, this court agreed to hear a constitutional
challenge to the Adoption Act that otherwise would have been
moot because "[t]he interpretation of the statute is of substantial
public importance, the relevant appellate court precedents are in
conflict, and the issue is one that is likely to recur." (Emphasis
added.) D.L., 191 Ill. 2d  at 8.
	Unlike D.L., here there is no need for an authoritative decision
from this court. See India B., 202 Ill. 2d  at 543. Thus, we reject the
mother's contention that D.L. supports the application of the
public interest exception in this case.
	Alternatively, the mother claims that we should not rely on
India B. because applying it effectively denies her the right to an
appeal. She suggests that we take a "less formalistic approach" and
refuse to deem the appeal of a termination order moot unless the
subsequent adoption was based on either valid parental consent or
a valid termination of parental rights. See Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d  at
299-300 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). This approach ignores a
parent's responsibility for preserving the opportunity to obtain
appropriate relief by seeking a stay of the termination order. As
this court made clear in both India B. and Tekela, it is this very
failure to obtain a stay that precipitates the chain of events
permitting adoption proceedings to continue lawfully, ultimately
creating the mootness problem. India B., 202 Ill. 2d  at 544; Tekela,
202 Ill. 2d  at 296. This case is procedurally indistinguishable on
this point. We are not persuaded to depart from our recent
directives in this matter.
	As we explained in Tekela, the right to meaningful appellate
review does not guarantee an absolute right to relief on the merits.
Moreover, the right to appellate review of a termination order is
"necessarily limited by its mootness." Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d  at 294.
We have adhered to this principle even in the face of a trial court's
finding of unconstitutionality. Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d  at 365-66.
	In Walgreen, the trial court found two sections of the
Adoption Act unconstitutional, but while the appeal was pending
the biological mother consented to the adoptions, rendering the
appeal moot. Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d  at 364. Despite the existence
of a circuit court decision finding the sections unconstitutional,
this court refused to apply the public interest exception. We
narrowly construed the exception and found that, although the
appeal presented a question of substantial public importance, the
need for authoritative guidance was questionable because there
were no conflicting precedents. Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d  at 365-66.
As we noted,
		"Our court has held that when an opinion on a question of
law cannot affect the result as to the parties or
controversy in the case before it, a court should not
resolve the question merely for the sake of setting a
precedent to govern potential future cases. [Citations.]
This limitation is no mere technicality. The existence of a
real controversy is a prerequisite to the exercise of our
jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d  at
365.
	Although the procedural circumstances differ in the instant
appeal, the two cases reflect the same underlying considerations:
(1) this court's inability to issue any order capable of affecting the
parent's rights to the adopted children and (2) the lack of
conflicting precedents requiring resolution to justify the imposition
of the public interest exception. We continue to uphold our
established principles in this matter.
	Finally, we note that our ability to address the substantive
issues raised in this appeal is further constrained by our long-standing proscription against resolving constitutional questions
that are not essential to the disposition of the case. See People ex
rel. Sklodowski v. State, 162 Ill. 2d 117, 130-31 (1994). We may
not reach the merits of the mother's constitutional claims when, in
light of the similarity of our recent precedents, the legitimacy of
our actions would be highly questionable at best. India B. and
Tekela clearly direct parents wishing to appeal the termination of
their parental rights to obtain a stay of enforcement of the
termination order and, whenever possible, to pursue expedited
proceedings to provide reviewing courts the opportunity to grant
meaningful relief. India B., 202 Ill. 2d  at 537; Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d 
at 294-95.
	In parental rights cases, countless issues of substantial public
importance may arise. If we broadly interpret the mootness
exceptions to permit the review of cases that do not strictly meet
our rigid standards, we would effectively obviate our holdings in
Tekela and India B. Such a broad interpretation of an exception
would result in a string of advisory opinions, including some of
constitutional proportion, that would have no effect whatsoever on
the rights of the parties or the outcome of the case before the court.
Our adherence to the established rule that mootness exceptions are
to be narrowly construed (see India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 543), and our
continued encouragement of the use of appropriate safeguards to
preserve a parent's right to effective appellate review, such as
stays and expedited proceedings (see India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 537),
ensure that reviewing courts will continue to address claims only
in cases within the proper scope of their authority.

III. CONCLUSION
	Based on our recent decisions in Tekela and India B., as well
as for the additional reasons stated, we hold that this appeal is
moot. Since we lack the authority to consider the merits of the
substantive questions raised, we dismiss the appeal.
	The judgment of the appellate court is vacated, and the appeal
is dismissed as moot.
Appellate court judgment vacated;
appeal dismissed.