Case Title: Van Arsdell v. Shumway

Citation: 165 Ariz. 289, 798 P.2d 1298

Docket Number: CV-90-0265-AP

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1990-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
165 Ariz. 289 (1990) 798 P.2d 1298 Madelene VAN ARSDELL, a qualified elector of the State of Arizona, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Jim SHUMWAY, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Arizona, and the Boards of Supervisors of Maricopa County, Pinal County, Pima County, Cochise County, Coconino County, Gila County, Mohave County, Yavapai County and the individual members thereof in their official capacities, Defendants/Appellees, Mike L. McCORMICK, an individual residing within the State of Arizona, Real Party in Interest/Appellant. No. CV-90-0265-AP. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. September 18, 1990. Reconsideration Denied October 26, 1990. *290 Ortega & Moreno, P.C. by Daniel R. Ortega, Phoenix, for plaintiff/appellee. Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by John B. Shadegg, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Lisa T. Hauser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for Jim Shumway, defendant/appellee. Mike L. McCormick, Phoenix, in pro. per. OPINION WILLIAM E. EUBANK, Court of Appeals Judge. Must a challenger of the nomination petitions of a candidate for statewide office in a primary election join the 15 county boards of supervisors in an action filed pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-351? We answer this question in the negative and affirm the judgment of the trial court. We hold that joining the Secretary of State is sufficient where the primary election involves "a state office, including a member of the legislature, or ... any other office for which the electors of the entire state or a subdivision of the state greater than a county are entitled to vote." See A.R.S. § 16-311(E). Mike McCormick, appellant, filed his nomination petitions for the 1990 Democratic primary election as a candidate for the state office of Superintendent of Public Instruction. Madelene Van Arsdell, appellee, timely challenged the number of signatures contained in Mr. McCormick's petitions. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the petitions contained insufficient valid signatures and ordered that Mr. McCormick's name not appear on the ballot for the primary election. At the hearing, Mr. McCormick moved to dismiss the complaint because appellee Van Arsdell had failed to join indispensable parties. The parties not joined were the Boards of Supervisors of Apache, Graham, Greenlee, La Paz, Navajo, Santa Cruz and Yuma Counties. The remaining Arizona counties were joined, along with Secretary of State Jim Shumway. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and Mr. McCormick filed his notice of appeal solely on the joinder issue. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5(6), and A.R.S. § 16-351(A). Following an accelerated oral argument on July 23, 1990, we took this appeal under advisement. The next day, by order, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court with our opinion to follow. This is that opinion. On appeal, Mr. McCormick does not contest the finding that his nomination petitions contain insufficient valid signatures. Rather, he contends that the trial judge should have granted his motion to dismiss the challenge because the challenger failed *291 to join indispensable parties, i.e., the 7 county boards of supervisors named above. He bases this contention on our decision in Mandraes v. Hungerford, 127 Ariz. 585, 623 P.2d 15 (1981). In Mandraes, we held that the challenger's failure to join the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors precluded relief in an action to enjoin a candidate for the county office of Maricopa County Recorder from the primary election ballot. Id. at 587, 623 P.2d at 17. The court said: Id. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the issue before us is whether the rule in Mandraes, involving a county office, controls a challenge to nomination petitions in a primary election involving a state office. ANALYSIS The Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction is a state office. Ariz. Const. art. V, § 1. Article VII, § 10, of the Arizona Constitution states: In compliance with the constitution, the Legislature enacted the direct primary law. See A.R.S. §§ 16-201 to 203, 16-401. Primary elections and election contests "are purely statutory and dependent upon statutory provisions for their conduct." Donaghey v. Attorney General, 120 Ariz. 93, 95, 584 P.2d 557, 559 (1978). Our part is to ascertain the legislature's intent as expressed in their direct primary enactments. Collins v. Stockwell, 137 Ariz. 416, 420, 671 P.2d 394, 398 (1983). A.R.S. § 16-401(A) provides: A.R.S. § 16-311(A) requires a person desiring to become a candidate at a primary election to file a "nomination paper" setting forth his or her basic background information and intention to be a candidate. Subsection (E) requires a candidate for state office to file the nomination paper with the Secretary of State, while subsection (F) requires a candidate for county office to file the nomination paper with the clerk of the board of supervisors. These subsections read: A.R.S. § 16-314 establishes the form for the nomination petition and requires that petitions be filed along with the nomination paper and with the same officer as provided by A.R.S. § 16-311, i.e., the Secretary of State for state office and with the clerk of the county board of supervisors for county office. Following the printing of the primary ballot, the appointment of primary election officials, the actual primary election, and the tally of the vote, A.R.S. § 16-622 provides for the "official canvass" and certification of the canvass by the board of supervisors. A.R.S. § 16-623 then provides: A.R.S. § 16-645(B) then requires that the Secretary of State canvass the primary returns for state officers or officers representing areas larger than a county or multicounty districts and issue the successfully elected persons certificates of nomination. Subsection (B) reads: This certificate of nomination permits the candidate's name to appear on the general election ballot, if not enjoined. Any elector may challenge nomination petitions prior to the primary election. A.R.S. § 16-351 provides: (Emphasis added.) The foregoing statutes clearly express legislative intent to create two levels of candidates for the direct primary election. One is for county, district and precinct office, and the other is for state office or "any other office for which the electors of the entire state or a subdivision of the state greater than a county are entitled to vote...." A.R.S. § 16-311(E) and (F). Mr. McCormick filed a motion to dismiss this action both in the trial court and this court relying solely on our opinion in Mandraes. Ms. Mandraes was a primary candidate for the office of Maricopa County Recorder. Our holding in Mandraes stated that the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors was an indispensable party to an A.R.S. § 16-351 challenge contest. This conclusion is fully supported by the above cited statutes. We acknowledge that Mandraes emphasized ballot preparation as the basis for our opinion involving a county office. We do not dispute that important function now. However, responsibility for printing ballots is not controlling here. As stated above, the legislature intended a different result where "a state office, including a member of the legislature, or ... any other office for which the electors of the entire state or a subdivision of the state greater than a county are entitled to vote." A.R.S. § 16-311(E). In such a circumstance, the Secretary of State and not the board of supervisors directs the election process. Finally, in this case, the complaint named a state officer, the Secretary of State, who can be enjoined by the courts if necessary. The Secretary of State is charged with the duty of issuing certificates of nomination following the primary to the nominees "who filed nominating petitions and papers with the secretary of state pursuant to § 16-311, subsection B." A.R.S. § 16-645(B). Because the Secretary of State has direct statutory involvement in a primary election contest for a statewide office from the filing of nominating petitions to the canvassing of votes and the issuing of certificates of nomination, joining him as a party defendant is sufficient joinder for A.R.S. § 16-351 purposes. In such circumstances, it is not necessary to join the boards of supervisors as parties. CONCLUSION The trial court properly denied Mr. McCormick's motion to dismiss. We hold that the challenge of the sufficiency of nominating petitions in an action brought pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-351, where the office sought by the candidate is "a state office, including a member of the legislature, or ... any other office for which the electors of the entire state or a subdivision of the state greater than a county are entitled to vote," the joinder of the Secretary of State is sufficient to vest the superior court with jurisdiction to determine the challenge. Thus, the trial court properly denied Mr. McCormick's motion to dismiss. Affirmed. CAMERON, MOELLER and CORCORAN, JJ., and MELVYN T. SHELLEY, Court of Appeals Judge, concur. NOTE: Chief Justice Frank X. Gordon, Jr., and Vice Chief Justice Stanley G. Feldman did not participate in the determination of this matter. Honorable William E. Eubank and Honorable Melvyn T. Shelley, Judges of the Court of Appeals, Division One, were assigned to sit in their stead, pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 3.