Case Title: Comparato v. Schait

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-43-03

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). 1. During the period relevant to this appeal, the rule was that a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator, or law clerk to such a person unless all parties to the proceeding consent after disclosure. RPC 1.12(a). The rule does not define personally and substantially. In Marxe v. Marxe, 238 N.J. Super. 490 (Ch. Div., 1989), the Chancery court held that an attorney who had clerked for a judge during a period when the court decided several motions in a matrimonial case had not participated personally and substantially in that case. The Marxe court noted that the legal papers submitted to the judge were public documents, suggesting that the law clerk was not privy to any confidential information about the case. The court further observed that at no time does anyone other than the judge ever decide any issue. Since Marxe appears to be the one published New Jersey decision addressing the language of the rule at issue here, fairness requires that the former law clerk s conduct be evaluated on the basis of that case. The Court is satisfied that Miller s involvement as a law clerk with earlier aspects of this litigation did not rise to the level of personal and substantial participation as interpreted by Marxe. (pp. 8-10) 2. There is one aspect of Marxe s analysis of the personal and substantial question that the Court does not embrace. The Court disagrees to the extent Marxe suggests that because a judge has decided an issue as part of a crowded docket, his or her law clerk cannot be viewed as having substantially participated in that decision. That a judge independently has rendered a decision in one of many cases does not foreclose a conclusion that his or her law clerk participated substantially in the matter within the meaning of RPC 1.12(a). Whether such participation has occurred ultimately depends on the circumstances in a given case. Relevant to the inquiry is whether the law clerk recommended a disposition to the judge or otherwise contributed directly to the judge s analysis of the issues before the court. (pp. 10-12) 3. It is unnecessary for the Court to engage in an extended discussion of the appearance of impropriety rule, RPC 1.11(b). The Court agrees with the Appellate Division that, in this narrow context, given the permissive wording of RPC 1.12(a) in the absence of personal and substantial involvement, we decline to find a disqualification under the appearance of impropriety standard. Even assuming that a contrary conclusion could be reached, it would be mooted by the Court s acceptance of Schait s proposal to screen Miller from continued involvement in the matter. Schait s counsel suggested such screening, not as an admission that an ethical violation had occurred, but to eliminate any potential argument in that respect. The Court concurs, and directs that Miller screen herself from any further involvement with this litigation. (pp. 12-15) 4. The Appellate Division succinctly analyzed the question of the judge s recusal, an analysis with which this Court substantially agrees. Judge Convery presumably formed the bulk of his impressions regarding this litigation after he presided over the initial trial and divorce judgment, all before Miller commenced her clerkship. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Miller s subsequent representation of Schait caused the judge to be predisposed to rule against Comparato. (pp. 15-17) 5. The Court reiterates that this holding is influenced in large measure by the text of RPC 1.12 as interpreted at the time of Miller s conduct. The Court is open to considering whether the system would be better served by a revised rule. Accordingly, the Professional Responsibility Rules Committee is directed to review RPC 1.12 to determine whether it embodies an appropriate standard. The Committee should not feel constrained by any view expressed here or in prior cases, but rather should consider whether the rule s wording should be retained or revised in light of all considerations the Committee deems relevant. (pp. 17-20) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED. JUSTICE ALBIN has filed a separate, dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE LaVECCHIA joins, expressing the view that the majority s narrow interpretation of what it means for a law clerk to personally and substantially participate in a case will undermine the appearance of judicial impartiality and the public s confidence in the fair administration of justice. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES ZAZZALI and WALLACE join in JUSTICE VERNIERO S opinion. JUSTICE ALBIN has filed a separate, dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE LaVECCHIA joins. JUSTICE LONG did not participate. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROCHELLE SCHAIT (formerly known as Comparato), Defendant-Respondent. Argued March 2, 2004 Decided June 2, 2004 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 362 N.J. Super. 113 (2003). Patricia M. Barbarito argued the cause for appellant (Einhorn, Harris, Ascher, Barbarito, Frost & Ironson, attorneys; Bonnie C. Frost, of counsel and on the brief). Neil S. Braun argued the cause for respondent(Gomperts & Braun, attorneys; Mr. Braun and Priscilla A.J. Miller, on the brief). JUSTICE VERNIERO delivered the opinion of the Court. In this matrimonial matter, plaintiff seeks to disqualify the trial judge as well as defendant s present and prior counsel, including an attorney who formerly served as the judge s law clerk. The trial court and Appellate Division each denied plaintiff s requested relief. We affirm, except that we modify the Appellate Division s judgment by directing that the former law clerk screen herself from any further involvement with this litigation. After hearing argument, Judge Convery declined to recuse himself. The court also denied plaintiff s motion to disqualify the attorneys at the Donahue and Gomperts firms, including Miller. In his oral decision, the judge essentially corroborated Miller s description of her duties as a law clerk. The court stated: [Ms.] Miller dealt with such duties, including keeping track of many motions submitted to the [c]ourt every week for review. The judge also found that a former clerk such as Miller would have no special or intimate knowledge in the current post-judgment matter before this [c]ourt. Plaintiff moved for leave to appeal before the Appellate Division, which granted the motion and then affirmed the trial court s denial of plaintiff s application in all respects. Comparato v. Schait, 362 N.J. Super. 113 (2003). We granted plaintiff s motion for leave to appeal to this Court. 178 N.J. 248 (2003). After conducting a plenary hearing, the trial court resolved defendant s underlying request for increased alimony, awarding her that increase in an order dated January 5, 2004. Plaintiff appealed the alimony question to the Appellate Division in an application now before that court. We granted plaintiff s motion staying the trial court s January 5, 2004, order. RICHARD COMPARATO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROCHELLE SCHAIT (formerly known as Comparato), Defendant-Respondent. JUSTICE ALBIN, dissenting. As a law clerk, Priscilla Miller assisted a family law judge who decided a motion that held plaintiff in contempt for failure to comply with a final divorce judgment and who issued a bench warrant for plaintiff s failure to abide by an order of the court. After concluding her clerkship, Ms. Miller entered the private practice of law with a firm that represented defendant in that case. At some later point, Ms. Miller assisted in the representation of defendant in the very case on which she did substantive work during her judicial clerkship. I cannot conclude, as does the majority, that there is nothing wrong with this picture. The majority sanctions Ms. Miller s involvement in defendant s case by concluding that she did not participate personally and substantially as a law clerk in that matter. Such a narrow interpretation of what it means for a law clerk to personally and substantially participate in a case, I fear, will undermine the appearance of judicial impartiality and the public s confidence in the fair administration of justice. I would give clear direction to the bar and to our judges that a law clerk, who digests or summarizes a motion, a brief, or a transcript; conducts research; prepares an order; or performs other substantive work on a case for a judge, has participated personally and substantially in that matter. That Ms. Miller had no more contact with this [matter] than any other matter pending during [her] clerkship, does not excuse her from abiding by the disqualification rule. See RPC 1.12. The number of matters on which Ms. Miller worked as a law clerk is not an indication that she did not substantially participate in assisting the judge in many, if not most, of those matters. To the extent that Ms. Miller participated in a judicial matter, she should not, after her clerkship, represent one of the litigants in that same matter. It is not surprising that Ms. Miller has no specific recollection of having any contact with this file other than [her] routine involvement as a law clerk. Every year, a high volume of cases pass through the family court, and the passage of time undoubtedly will diminish the law clerk s ability to remember precisely what she did in any one case. However, each one of those cases is significant to the party contesting such important issues as custody of children and the division of marital assets. One party to the case should not be disadvantaged or feel disadvantaged because the other party has retained an attorney who, while a law clerk, assisted the judge in that very matter. The majority relies on the Law Division case of Marxe v. Marxe, 238 N.J. Super. 490 (1989). Unlike this case, the law clerk in Marxe was screened from the case in which she had participated as a law clerk. Id. at 497. Had Ms. Miller s law firm taken the same precautionary steps as the law firm in Marxe, it is highly unlikely this case would be before us. See footnote 1 I do not find persuasive the rather constricted view in Marxe of what it is for a law clerk to personally and substantially participate in a case. The Marxe court concluded that the law clerk had minimal involvement because her duties were limited to summarizing pleadings for the judge s review. Id. at 493. For anyone who has ever served as a law clerk or a judge, it is clear that even summarizing or digesting a brief, a transcript of testimony, or moving papers may involve subjective, editorial judgments filtered through the particular value system of the clerk. In light of the significant volume of litigation before a family law judge, the Marxe court suggested that a law clerk will not have substantial involvement in any one matter. Ibid. However, substantial involvement is not defined by the time spent on the matter but the nature of the participation of the clerk in that matter. A family law judge is substantially involved in each of the cases over which that judge presides, however little time is spent on any one case and however many cases may be decided in a day. That same concept applies to the law clerk. Last, although I agree with the Marxe court s axiomatic conclusion that at no time does anyone other than the judge ever decide any issue, id. at 493-94, that surely cannot mean that a law clerk does not personally and substantially participate in a case, simply because the clerk is not the decision maker. I would broadly construe the term personally and substantially to disqualify any law clerk from later representing a litigant in a case on which the clerk did substantive work for a judge. Ministerial work, such as calendaring or completing a checklist of items received in a case, would not be a basis for disqualification under RPC 1.12. Such a bright-line rule will give guidance to law clerks in their future employment. This rule would not bar a lawyer from accepting employment with a firm representing one of the parties in a case in which the lawyer substantially participated as a law clerk. The rule only would require that, when the lawyer has substantially participated in that case as a law clerk, the lawyer be screened by the law firm from any involvement in the case. The interpretation I would give to the words personal and substantial participation would instill greater public confidence that the integrity of our judicial system will not be compromised. The majority s opinion will invite further litigation to define the contours of personal and substantial participation. An aggressive party may seek to depose the law clerk and perhaps the judge to determine the precise nature of the clerk s involvement in the case. Such an intrusion into the judicial function can have only negative repercussions. The majority concludes that Ms. Miller did not participate personally and substantially as a law clerk in the case, and yet requires that she be screened from any further participation as a lawyer. This inconsistent approach to the issue betrays a certain uneasiness that the majority has with the unseemly appearance of Ms. Miller representing one of the litigants in this matter. Although I disagree with the result reached by the majority in this case, I welcome the majority s referral of RPC 1.12 to the Professional Responsibility Rules Committee to determine whether [that rule] embodies an appropriate standard. I believe that my interpretation of the current rule sets an appropriate standard that will promote public confidence in the judiciary and the legal profession. Because I conclude that Ms. Miller participated personally and substantially as a law clerk in the same case in which she is representing defendant, I would disqualify both her and her law firm from any further participation in that case. That result, although harsh for defendant who would have to find new counsel, is dictated by the need to assure litigants that our judicial system is both impartial and just. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. Justice LaVecchia joins in this dissent. RICHARD COMPARATO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROCHELLE SCHAIT (formerly known as Comparato), Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED June 2, 2004 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Verniero CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Albin (1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and (2) written notice is promptly given to the parties and any appropriate tribunal to enable them to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule. [RPC 1.12(b).]