Case Title: Kinkle v. Kinkle

Citation: 1998-Ohio-119

Docket Number: 19970061

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
KINKLE ET AL., CO-EXECUTORS, APPELLEES, v. KINKLE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Kinkle v. Kinkle (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Contracts — Antenuptial agreement waiving spouse’s interest in individual 
retirement account controls over beneficiary designation clause of an 
individual retirement account contract entered into prior to the antenuptial 
agreement. 
An antenuptial agreement waiving a spouse’s interest in an individual retirement 
account controls over the beneficiary designation clause of an individual 
retirement account contract entered into prior to the antenuptial agreement. 
(No. 97-61 — Submitted April 22, 1998 at the Seneca County Session — Decided 
September 23, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Allen County, No. 1-96-40. 
 
In June 1992, decedent, Harold Kinkle (“Harold”), opened an individual 
retirement account (“IRA”) with Fidelity Investments Southwest Company 
(“Fidelity”).  On the IRA application, Harold did not designate a beneficiary.  The 
application states that if no beneficiary is designated, the beneficiary will be the 
surviving spouse or, if the applicant has no surviving spouse, the decedent’s 
estate.  At the time he opened the IRA account, Harold was a widower with two 
adult children, appellees herein. 
 
In December 1994, decedent married appellant, Mary E. Kinkle (“Mary”).  
Shortly before their marriage, the couple entered into an antenuptial agreement 
whereby each released all rights to the other’s property.  Both parties agreed that 
they would “waive and release all rights, claims, titles, and interests * * * which 
he or she might, by reason of his or her marriage to the other, acquire in his or her 
property or estate * * * .”  Harold expressly included the Fidelity IRA as an 
 
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individual asset in the inventory attached as an exhibit to the antenuptial 
agreement. 
 
Three months later, Harold passed away.  On September 8, 1995, Fidelity 
made payment of the IRA funds in the amount of $36,234.65 to Mary.  In October 
1995, Harold’s children brought this action on behalf of his estate in the Allen 
County Common Pleas Court to recover the IRA funds paid to Mary.  The trial 
court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the IRA funds 
were property of the estate and should be paid over to the appellees.  The Third 
District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Brad C. Roush, for appellees. 
 
James F. Blair and Derek A. Younkman, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  We hold that an antenuptial agreement waiving a spouse’s 
interest in an IRA controls over the beneficiary designation clause of an IRA 
contract entered into prior to the antenuptial agreement. 
 
Appellant argues that the IRA contract, and its Massachusetts choice of law 
provision, should determine the disbursement of the IRA funds.  Appellant argues 
that under Massachusetts law the beneficiary designation clause is controlling and 
effective according to its terms.  The relevant portion of the “IRA Beneficiary 
Designation” clause reads as follows: 
 
“I understand that if I choose not to designate my beneficiary(ies) my 
beneficiary will be my surviving spouse, or if I do not have a surviving spouse, my 
 
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estate.  I am aware that this form becomes effective when delivered to Fidelity and 
will remain in effect until I deliver to Fidelity another form with a later date.” 
 
Pursuant to statute and case law in Massachusetts, testamentary disposition 
of retirement funds does not override the beneficiary designation made in the 
account contract.  The relevant statute reads: 
 
“Any designation of any beneficiary in connection with and as provided by 
an instrument intended to establish a pension, profit-sharing, or other deferred 
compensation or retirement plan * * * shall be effective according to its terms, 
notwithstanding any purported testamentary disposition allowed by statute, by 
operation of law or otherwise to the contrary * * * .” M.G.L.A., Ch. 167D, Section 
30. 
 
Thus, in Massachusetts, one cannot defeat the beneficiary designation on a 
retirement fund contract by noting in a will that one is changing the beneficiary.  
The change must be made within the retirement fund contract itself.  In Fitzpatrick 
v. Small (1991), 29 Mass App. 704, 564 N.E.2d 1035, the court ruled that the 
decedent’s statement in his will that the proceeds of his IRAs should be divided 
equally between his brother and sister had no effect, since the beneficiary 
designation in the account contract listed only his brother. 
 
Even if Massachusetts law were controlling, the statute and case cited by 
appellant would be inapplicable.  They concern testamentary disposition, which 
involves a unilateral decision by the holder of the retirement fund to change the 
beneficiary in a separate document outside the IRA contract.  However, there is no 
testamentary disposition at issue in this case.  Here, the beneficiary herself denied 
any interest in the funds at issue.  She did so pursuant to an antenuptial agreement 
of unquestioned validity, a contract evidencing a meeting of the minds of her and 
her soon-to-be husband. 
 
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Thus, there are two contracts involved in this case.  The first, the contract 
between Fidelity and Harold, was performed according to its terms.  Since Harold 
did not designate a specific beneficiary, the beneficiary became his wife through 
the language of the IRA contract.  Fidelity performed under the contract.  At that 
point, the second contract, the antenuptial agreement governed by Ohio law, came 
into play.  The question is whether through an antenuptial agreement a spouse may 
waive her right to be a beneficiary under an IRA contract.  We find that she may 
certainly do so. 
 
This court has long held that prenuptial agreements controlling the 
distribution of assets upon the death of a spouse are enforceable. Juhasz v. Juhasz 
(1938), 134 Ohio St. 257, 12 O.O. 57, 16 N.E.2d 328.  In fact, this court has held, 
“In Ohio, there is no public policy, statute or case law which prevents parties to 
antenuptial agreements from cutting one another off entirely from any 
participation in the estate of the other upon the death of either.” Hook v. Hook 
(1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 234, 235, 23 O.O.3d 239, 239-240, 431 N.E.2d 667, 668.  
Appellant disputes neither those holdings nor the validity of her antenuptial 
agreement.  She would have us simply ignore the existence of the antenuptial 
agreement as far as the IRA at issue is concerned.  However, the contract that she 
entered into with Harold Kinkle determines her rights to Harold’s property and 
estate, not the contract Harold entered into with Fidelity. 
 
The language of the prenuptial agreement is bluntly straightforward: 
 
“Except as herein provided, Harold Kinkle and Mary E. Downey do hereby 
covenant and agree with each other that they will neither during the lifetime of 
each other nor after his or her death take, claim demand, or receive, and do hereby 
waive and release all rights, claims, titles, and interests, actual, inchoate, or 
contingent, in law and equity which he or she might, by reason of his or her 
 
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marriage to the other, acquire in his or her property or estate * * * .”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Mary Kinkle expressly waived and released all rights and interests, 
including contingent interests, that she might acquire in Harold’s property or 
estate by virtue of her marriage to him.  Mary’s interest in the IRA account was 
contingent on Harold’s death, and arose only by virtue of her marriage to him — 
she was never listed specifically as a beneficiary under the IRA contract. 
 
At the time Harold entered into the contract, Mary was not his wife.  Only 
because she became a “surviving spouse,” i.e., by reason of her marriage to 
Harold, did Mary’s interest arise.  Mary waived any interest of that kind in the 
antenuptial agreement.  The Fidelity IRA specifically was listed as Harold’s 
property in Exhibit B to the antenuptial agreement.  Mary, the would-be rightful 
beneficiary of the IRA funds under the IRA contract, therefore specifically waived 
an interest in them under the terms of the antenuptial agreement. 
 
We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.