Case Title: Marquez v. Dairyland Mutual Insurance Company

Citation: 430 P.2d 766, 78 N.M. 269

Docket Number: 8336

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1967-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
430 P.2d 766 (1967) 78 N.M. 269 Joe V. MARQUEZ, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAIRYLAND MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a Wisconsin Corporation, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. No. 8336. Supreme Court of New Mexico. July 31, 1967. Farlow & Duffey, Albuquerque, for appellant. Hannett, Hannett & Cornish, H. Vern Payne, Albuquerque, for appellee. OMAN, Judge, Court of Appeals. This cause is before us on appeal from a judgment in favor of the third party plaintiff, hereinafter called plaintiff, upon a claim against the third party defendant, hereinafter called defendant, under a policy of automobile insurance issued by defendant to plaintiff. The policy of insurance, a copy of which was attached to plaintiff's third party complaint as an exhibit thereto and as a part thereof, covered a 1956 Chevrolet automobile. The policy period, as expressly provided by the policy, became effective as of 12:01 A.M. on January 14, 1965 and continued to April 14, 1965. In plaintiff's opening statement, made at the separate trial on the issues tendered by *767 the third party complaint and answer thereto, it was stated: As part of defendant's opening statement the following was stated and stipulated to: The trial court found that the policy was issued by defendant and that "* * * said insurance policy became effective at 12:01 A.M. January 14, 1965, and provided for liability coverage until April 14, 1965." The court also found: The court concluded: Although defendant has asserted four separate points relied upon for reversal, and the parties have presented arguments in support of their respective positions regarding the correctness of some of the court's findings and conclusions other than those above-quoted, we are of the opinion that this appeal turns entirely upon one question, to wit: Was the Ford automobile, which had been purchased and was owned by plaintiff prior to the effective date of the policy, covered under the policy as a newly acquired automobile pursuant to the provisions of insuring agreement IV (a) (4), as concluded by the trial court? This particular insuring agreement, insofar as here applicable, is as follows: Plaintiff is the named insured. The policy coverages with which we are here involved are those other than C-2. Defendant was notified of the accident on January 15, 1965, and was notified of plaintiff's ownership of the Ford automobile shortly after the accident and within thirty days of the acquisition thereof by plaintiff. We have never had occasion to pass upon the question of whether or not a newly acquired automobile clause, such as that here involved, embraces an automobile acquired by an insured before the effective date of the policy, and which said newly acquired automobile replaces an automobile covered by the policy. Here there is no question but what the Chevrolet was replaced by the Ford, and that the Ford was acquired by the plaintiff before the effective date of the policy. Courts which have passed upon this question have taken directly opposite views. We find only two cases which have held that a vehicle acquired prior to the effective date of the policy is covered by the newly acquired vehicle provision. National Indemn. Co. v. Giampapa, 65 Wash. 2d 627, 399 P.2d 81 (1965); Boston Ins. Co. v. Smith, 149 So. 2d 68 (Fla.App. 1963). In the Washington case the newly acquired automobile provision, insofar as it was there concerned, is identical with the provision in the policy involved in the present case. However, as pointed out in the dissent, which was concurred in by three of the justices, the only case which was cited by the majority and which is directly in point, is the Florida case cited above. The decision in the Florida case was issued by the First District Court of Appeals of that State, and is a two to one decision. In Coleman v. Atlantic Nat. Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 620 (Fla.App. 1964), decided by the Third District Court of Appeals the following year, a directly opposite result was reached, and the prior case of the First District was not even noted. In the Coleman case the policy provision was identical with that with which we are here concerned, and the court stated: The following cases have also held that a newly acquired automobile provision in a policy of insurance does not cover another automobile owned by the insured prior to the time the policy becomes effective, but which is not described therein. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shaffer, 250 N.C. 45, 108 S.E.2d 49 (1959); Brown v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1957); Utilities Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 207 Okl. 574, 251 P.2d 175 (1952); Howe v. Crumley, Jones & Crumley Co., 57 N.E.2d 415, Ohio App., 44 Ohio L.Abs. 115 (1944); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Central Produce Co., 42 F. Supp. 31 (M.D.Tenn. 1940), aff'd. per curiam; 122 F.2d 1021 (6th Cir.1941). See also Lynam v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 218 F. Supp. 383 (D.Del. 1963); Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 936, 940 (1954); 12 Couch, Insurance § 45:193 (2d ed. 1964). As stated in Couch: We agree with the majority of the courts which have passed upon the question, and with the language just quoted from Couch. As stated above, we have considered all the questions and arguments urged upon us by the parties, but find our answer to the one stated problem determinative of this appeal. It follows from what has been said that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed with directions to set the same aside and to enter a judgment dismissing the plaintiff's third party complaint. It is so ordered. NOBLE and COMPTON, JJ., concur.