Case Title: Rebman v. Parson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC97307

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
LAWRENCE G. REBMAN, 
  ) 
  ) 
Respondent, 
  ) 
  ) 
v. 
  ) 
No.  SC97307 
  ) 
MIKE PARSON, et al., 
  ) 
  ) 
Appellants. 
  ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY 
The Honorable Jon E. Beetem, Judge 
Lawrence Rebman sought a declaratory judgment that an appropriations statute 
enacted by the general assembly, House Bill No. 2007, is unconstitutional and a permanent 
injunction to prevent the State1 from terminating his employment as an administrative law 
judge (ALJ).  The Cole County circuit court declared certain provisions of HB2007 
unconstitutional as applied to Rebman.  The circuit court severed the unconstitutional 
language from the statute and permanently enjoined the State from terminating Rebman’s 
1 Rebman sued the governor, the attorney general, the commissioner of the office of 
administration, the director of the department of labor and industrial relations, and the 
director of the division of workers’ compensation.  Accordingly, “the State,” as used in this 
opinion, refers to those individuals in their official capacity. 
Opinion issued April 16, 2019
 
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employment pursuant to the unconstitutional language.  The State appeals.  This Court 
holds restricting funding for the payment of an ALJ’s salary based on that ALJ’s date of 
appointment violates the separation of powers requirement of the Missouri Constitution.  
Rebman, therefore, was entitled to declaratory relief and a permanent injunction to prevent 
the State from terminating his employment based on the unconstitutional provisions of 
HB2007.  The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.  
Factual and Procedural Background 
Rebman is an ALJ employed by the department of labor and industrial relations.  
ALJs preside over claims filed under the workers’ compensation laws and have statutory 
authority to enter awards and approve settlements.  Although serving a decision making 
role, ALJs are employees of the executive branch of government, not the judicial branch.  
As such, authority to appoint and remove ALJs is vested solely in the director of the 
department of labor and industrial relations (“the director”).  Rebman was appointed as an 
ALJ in 2013.  While the department is authorized by statute to appoint up to 40 ALJs, the 
number of ALJs the department actually employs depends on the amount of funding for 
ALJ salaries appropriated by the general assembly each year. 
 
Section 287.615.1(1)2 sets ALJs’ compensation at 90 percent of an associate circuit 
judge’s salary. In 2017, the Missouri General Assembly appropriated sufficient funding to 
pay the salaries of 28 ALJs.  In 2018, the general assembly reduced the total appropriation 
for ALJ salaries by providing sufficient funding to pay the salaries of only 27 ALJs.  In 
                                                          
 
2 Statutory citations are to RSMo 2000, as amended. 
 
3 
 
addition to reducing the total appropriation for ALJ salaries, the general assembly placed 
restrictions on how the appropriated funds could be used.  Specifically, HB2007 provided 
the funds appropriated for the payment of ALJ salaries could be used to pay only the 
salaries of ALJs appointed before 2012 and after 2015.  The statute specifically 
appropriated $2,480,240 “[f]or the purpose of funding Administrative Law Judges 
appointed on or prior to January 1, 2012,” and $859,334 “[f]or the purpose of funding 
Administrative Law Judges appointed on or after January 1, 2015.”  Rebman was the only 
ALJ appointed between 2012 and 2015.  The director of the division of workers’ 
compensation (“division director”), therefore, informed Rebman his employment as an 
ALJ would be terminated when the funding for fiscal 2017 expired because the funding 
restrictions contained in HB2007 prevented the department from using its appropriated 
funds to pay his salary. 
 
In a letter dated May 25, 2018, the division director informed Rebman his 
employment as an ALJ would terminate June 15, 2018.  Rebman filed a declaratory 
judgment action on June 7, 2018, seeking a declaration that the funding restrictions 
contained in HB2007 were unconstitutional and a permanent injunction to prevent the State 
from terminating his employment as an ALJ.  Rebman petitioned the circuit court for a 
temporary restraining order the same day.  The circuit court issued a temporary restraining 
order to prevent the State from terminating Rebman’s employment while his case 
 
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proceeded.3  The circuit court ultimately entered judgment in favor of Rebman, declaring 
HB2007 unconstitutional to the extent it restricted the use of funds appropriated for the 
payment of ALJ salaries based on an ALJ’s date of appointment and permanently enjoining 
the State from terminating Rebman’s employment pursuant to the unconstitutional funding 
restrictions.  The State appeals. 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The circuit court found HB2007 unconstitutional.  This Court has exclusive 
appellate jurisdiction over cases challenging the validity of a statute.  MO. CONST. art. V, 
§ 3. 
 
“When reviewing a declaratory judgment, an appellate court’s standard of review is 
the same as in any other court-tried case.”  Guyer v. City of Kirkwood, 38 S.W.3d 412, 413 
(Mo. banc 2001).  “[T]he trial court’s decision should be affirmed unless there is no 
substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it 
erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law.”  Id.  “Challenges to 
a statute’s constitutional validity are questions of law, which this Court reviews de novo.”  
City of Normandy v. Greitens, 518 S.W.3d 183, 190 (Mo. banc 2017). 
Analysis 
 
 
The State raises multiple points on appeal.  The central issue is whether an 
appropriations statute that precludes the director from exercising discretion over certain 
                                                          
 
3  After the circuit court issued the temporary restraining order, the director elected to 
terminate the least senior ALJ instead of Rebman to avoid spending more funds on ALJ 
salaries than appropriated by the general assembly. 
 
5 
 
personnel choices by effectively requiring the termination of a specific ALJ violates the 
separation of powers requirement of the Missouri Constitution. 
I. 
HB2007 violates the separation of powers requirement of the Missouri 
Constitution. 
 
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle embedded in the Missouri 
Constitution.  Article II, section 1 of the Missouri Constitution provides: 
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments--
the legislative, executive and judicial--each of which shall be confided to a 
separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons, charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall 
exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the 
instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. 
 
“The purpose of the doctrine of separation of powers … is to prevent the abuses that can 
flow from the centralization of power.”  State Tax Comm’n v. Admin. Hearing Comm’n, 
641 S.W.2d 69, 73-74 (Mo. banc 1982).  This principle reflects the Framers’ “belief in 
Thomas Jefferson’s proposition that concentration of the three powers in the same hands 
is precisely the definition of despotic government.”  Mo. Coal. for Envtl. v. Joint Comm. 
on Admin. Rules, 948 S.W.2d 125, 134-35 (Mo. banc 1997) (internal quotations omitted).  
It “prohibits one branch from exercising powers belonging to another.” City of Normandy, 
518 S.W.3d at 200.  As James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 47, “The accumulation of 
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands … may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”  For these reasons and others, the separation 
of powers doctrine is “fundamentally vital to our form of government.”  State ex inf. 
Danforth v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Mo. banc 1970). 
 
6 
 
In the most general terms, the legislative branch is charged with making the law; the 
executive branch is charged with enforcing the law; and, as Chief Justice Marshall wrote 
more than two centuries ago, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).  To 
facilitate its constitutional prerogative, the general assembly is vested with both the 
authority and the responsibility to raise revenue and allocate funds from the treasury to pay 
the State’s expenses.   
The Missouri Constitution provides, in pertinent part, “All revenue collected and 
money received by the state shall go into the treasury and the general assembly shall have 
no power to divert the same or to permit the withdrawal of money from the treasury, except 
in pursuance of appropriations made by law.”  MO. CONST. art. III, § 36; see also Henry v. 
Manzella, 201 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Mo. banc 1947) (recognizing that enacting statutes “for 
levying taxes and providing the means of enforcement are within the unquestioned power 
of the legislature”).  The constitution vests this power of the purse in the general assembly 
for good reason.  The legislative branch is historically the branch of government closest to 
the people and the branch that most directly represents the citizens of this state.  The power 
of the purse, however, is not unlimited.  The general assembly may not use its appropriation 
authority to encroach on powers vested solely in the separate, coequal branches of 
government.  
Here, Rebman sought a declaratory judgment holding HB2007 is unconstitutional.  
The declaratory judgment is intended “to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and 
 
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insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations.”  § 527.120.  The interest 
of being “free from the constraints of an unconstitutional law” is an interest that “is entitled 
to legal protection.”  Mo. Alliance for Retired Ams. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. Relations, 
277 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Mo. banc 2009). 
Rebman argues HB2007 is unconstitutional because it violates the separation of 
powers requirement of the Missouri Constitution by infringing on the director’s authority 
to appoint and remove ALJs. “A statute is presumed to be constitutional and will not be 
invalidated unless it clearly and undoubtedly violates some constitutional provision and 
palpably affronts fundamental law embodied in the constitution.”  Sch. Dist. of Kan. City 
v. State, 317 S.W.3d 599, 604 (Mo. banc 2010) (internal quotations omitted).  “Doubts will 
be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute.”  Id.  “The person challenging 
the validity of the statute has the burden of proving the act clearly and undoubtedly violates 
the constitutional limitations.”  Id. 
In this case, the funding restraints in HB2007 demonstrate a manifest encroachment 
on executive authority by the general assembly.  Article IV, § 19 of the Missouri 
Constitution vests the power to “select and remove all appointees in the department” 
exclusively with “[t]he head of each department.”  Although HB2007 does not expressly 
require the director to terminate Rebman’s employment, the funding restrictions effectively 
leave the director without discretion to decide which ALJ to terminate to stay within the 
limits of the general assembly’s appropriation for ALJ salaries.  This attempt by the general 
 
8 
 
assembly to select and remove ALJs in the department through the enactment of HB2007 
violates article IV, § 19 and article II, § 1.   
The State argues HB2007 is a constitutional exercise of the general assembly’s 
authority over appropriations and the disposition of tax revenue.  Pursuant to this power, 
the State contends the general assembly has plenary authority to defund ALJ positions as 
it sees fit.  But the State’s characterization of the general assembly’s appropriation 
authority as absolute is misplaced.  To be sure, the general assembly “has the undoubted 
power to make or to refuse to make an appropriation authorized by the Constitution, and it 
has the power to create or abolish an office when unrestrained by constitutional 
limitations.”  State ex rel. Tolerton v. Gordon, 139 S.W. 403, 410 (Mo. 1911).  
Additionally, “[t]he legislature may … attempt to control the executive branch … by the 
power of appropriation.”  State Auditor v. Joint Comm. on Legislative Research, 956 
S.W.2d 228, 233 (Mo. banc 1997) (internal quotations omitted).   It is clear, therefore, the 
general assembly may exert some degree of influence over the decisions of the executive 
branch.  But it is equally clear executive departments are constitutionally empowered to 
make personnel choices without interference by the general assembly.  See MO. CONST. 
art. IV, § 19.  It is from this principle this Court concludes the General Assembly may not 
compel an executive department, directly or indirectly, to fire a specific employee. 
Here, the general assembly violated the separation of powers requirement by 
effectively compelling the director to terminate the employment of a specific ALJ through 
the funding restrictions of HB2007.  The State argues the general assembly’s power to 
 
9 
 
create and abolish executive offices grants authority to effectively single out certain 
executive employees for termination.  But this assertion runs afoul of the separation of 
powers requirement of article II.    True, the general assembly has the power “to create or 
abolish an office,” but only “when unconstrained by constitutional limitations.”  Tolerton, 
139 S.W. at 410.  Although the general assembly may “create” an office, only the 
department director may decide who will hold that office.  Indeed, the general assembly 
“has not the power to say who shall not be compensated out of an appropriation.”  Id.   
Based on these principles, the general assembly may control how many ALJs the 
department can appoint, but it may not dictate who will fill those positions.  Given Rebman 
was the only ALJ affected by the funding restrictions, the funding restrictions were no more 
than an attempt by the legislative branch to force the executive branch to terminate a 
specific employee.  Isolating a single executive branch employee in this way exceeded the 
general assembly’s plenary authority to appropriate funds because it effectively precluded 
the director of the department from selecting which ALJ to dismiss, which is the director’s 
constitutional prerogative. 
For these reasons, HB2007 is unconstitutional to the extent it restricts the use of funds 
appropriated for the payment of an ALJ’s salary based on the ALJ’s date of appointment.  
The circuit court’s judgment declaring HB2007 unconstitutional is affirmed for this reason.   
II. 
The unconstitutional language is severed from HB2007. 
“The provisions of every statute are severable.”  § 1.140.  When part of a statute is 
declared unconstitutional, this Court will presume the legislature intended to give effect to 
 
10 
 
the valid portions of the statute.  See § 1.140; City of Normandy, 518 S.W.3d at 197 n.19.  
Pursuant to § 1.140, this Court will uphold the remainder of the statute unless it finds: 
the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably 
connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be 
presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the 
void one; or unless the court finds that the valid provisions, standing alone, 
are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the 
legislative intent.  
 
Here, there is nothing to indicate the date restrictions were so essential or 
inseparable from the remainder of HB2007 to warrant a presumption the general assembly 
would not have enacted HB2007 without the unconstitutional restrictions.  Nor is there any 
indication the general assembly would have funded no ALJs unless it could restrict funding 
by an ALJ’s date of appointment.  “Therefore, severance is appropriate.”  City of 
Normandy, 518 S.W.3d at 197 n.19.  Accordingly, the phrases “appointed on or prior to 
January 1, 2012” and “appointed on or after January 1, 2015” are severed from HB2007.  
The remainder of the statute remains in full force and effect.  The circuit court’s judgment 
severing the unconstitutional language from HB2007 is affirmed. 
III. 
The State is permanently enjoined from terminating Rebman based on the 
funding restrictions severed from HB2007. 
 
The circuit court’s judgment permanently enjoined the State from terminating 
Rebman’s employment as an ALJ pursuant to the unconstitutional funding restrictions of 
HB2007.  The State, citing State ex rel. Director of Revenue v. Gabbert, 925 S.W.2d 838 
(Mo. banc 1996), argues the circuit court erred by issuing the injunction because the 
 
11 
 
prospect of harm to other parties and the public interest at stake do not warrant injunctive 
relief.  The State, however, mistakes the type of injunctive relief the circuit court awarded.   
Gabbert addresses “the elements required to obtain a preliminary injunction.”  Id. 
at 839 (emphasis added).  But the circuit court, in this case, awarded permanent injunctive 
relief, and the State’s appeal of the circuit court’s permanent injunction is the issue 
currently before this Court.  Although a party must demonstrate a risk of irreparable injury 
to obtain either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief, a party seeking a permanent 
injunction must show only irreparable harm and a lack of adequate remedy at law.  City of 
Greenwood v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 311 S.W.3d 258, 265 (Mo. App. 2010). 
  With respect to Rebman’s injury, the State argues a loss of employment cannot 
constitute irreparable harm because a terminated employee may seek damages in the form 
of lost wages.  But this is not an ordinary case of employment termination.  Here, the 
division director informed Rebman the legislature would terminate his employment at a set 
date in violation of the constitution’s separation of powers requirement.  The United States 
Supreme Court has held being subject to an unconstitutional statute, “for even minimal 
periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”  Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 
347, 373 (1976). 4  Because the funding restrictions of HB2007 would result in his 
                                                          
 
4  Although Elrod came before the United States Supreme Court upon the denial of 
preliminary injunctive relief, see 427 U.S. at 350, as explained above, a party seeking either 
preliminary or permanent injunctive relief must prove he or she will suffer irreparable 
injury unless the court enters an injunction. 
 
12 
 
employment being unconstitutionally terminated, Rebman was subject to an 
unconstitutional statute and, therefore, irreparably injured. 
Rebman also has no adequate remedy at law.  It is true that persons affected by 
unconstitutional statutes often have adequate means of addressing those constitutional 
violations without seeking a declaratory judgment.  See State ex rel. SLAH, L.L.C. v. City 
of Woodson Terrace, 378 S.W.3d 357, 362 (Mo. banc 2012) (holding statute establishing 
procedure for taxpayer to challenge tax as unconstitutional provided adequate remedy at 
law to preclude declaratory judgment); Schaefer v. Koster, 342 S.W.3d 299, 300 (Mo. banc 
2011) (holding declaratory judgment action inappropriate because criminal defendant 
could challenge constitutional validity of penalty enhancement statute during regular 
course of criminal prosecution).  But seeking a declaratory judgment was appropriate in 
this case because Rebman would have had no other way to challenge the constitutional 
validity of HB2007.  Given Rebman would have been left without recourse if he were 
terminated pursuant to the unconstitutional language, he had no adequate remedy at law.  
Accordingly, the circuit court’s judgment permanently enjoining the State from 
terminating Rebman based on the unconstitutional funding restrictions is affirmed. 
IV. 
The circuit court’s order does not result in the judiciary directing the 
expenditure of state funds. 
 
Finally, the State argues the circuit court’s order encroaches on the general 
assembly’s plenary authority to appropriate funds by ordering the expenditure of state 
funds not authorized by a duly enacted appropriations statute.  The State characterizes the 
circuit court’s order as an order to the department to spend money it does not have on 
 
13 
 
Rebman’s salary because, even after the date restrictions are severed from the statute, the 
general assembly appropriated only enough funds to pay the salaries of 27 ALJs, not 28.  
The State argues, then, the circuit court’s order leaves the department with no choice but 
to draw on funds not appropriated for the payment of ALJ salaries to pay Rebman’s salary. 
The State, however, mischaracterizes the nature of the circuit court’s order. 
The judiciary, of course, has no authority to appropriate funds.  The circuit court’s 
order, however, did not direct the department to spend funds the general assembly had not 
appropriated.  The general assembly specifically appropriated $3,339,574 to pay ALJ 
salaries, and the circuit court did not order the department to spend in excess of this 
appropriation for the stated purpose.  Nor did the circuit court order the department to retain 
Rebman.  Rather, the circuit court merely declared it would be unconstitutional to terminate 
Rebman based on the date restrictions of the appropriations statute.  Indeed, the circuit 
court expressly noted nothing in the order prohibited the director “from terminating any 
ALJ, including but not limited to [Rebman], in order to not exceed its appropriation for 
administration, so long as the basis for the termination is otherwise constitutional and 
legally permissible.”  Likewise, nothing in the circuit court’s order limited the director’s 
constitutional authority and discretion over how to spend the appropriation for ALJ 
salaries.    
Accordingly, the circuit court did not order the expenditure of state funds not 
lawfully appropriated.  Far from requiring the department to retain an employee whom the 
general assembly did not appropriate sufficient funds to pay, the circuit court’s judgment 
 
14 
 
simply left the decision of how to spend the appropriation for ALJ salaries to the discretion 
of the director.  This is all the constitution requires. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, HB2007 is unconstitutional to the extent it restricts 
the use of funds for the payment of ALJ salaries based on the ALJ’s date of appointment, 
as applied to Rebman, because doing so violates the separation of powers requirement of 
the Missouri Constitution.  The circuit court properly declared HB2007 to be 
unconstitutional and enjoined the State from terminating Rebman’s employment on the 
basis of the severed language; therefore, its judgment is affirmed.5 
 
 
 
___________________ 
W. Brent Powell, Judge 
 
 
All concur. 
 
 
                                                          
 
5  The circuit court also declared HB2007 invalid to the extent it purported to remove 
Rebman for cause without following the procedure laid out in § 287.610.  This Court does 
not consider the interplay between § 287.610 and HB2007.