Case Title: Prince v. Higgins

Citation: 572 So. 2d 1217

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1990-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
572 So. 2d 1217 (1990)
Jo PRINCE and First Alabama Bank, as Executors of the Estate of Elizabeth H. Plummer, Deceased
v.
Paul HIGGINS and Adelaide Higgins.
89-1448.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 30, 1990.
*1218 M. Roland Nachman, Jr., and Patricia A. Hamilton of Balch & Bingham, Montgomery, for appellants.
Joana S. Ellis of Ball, Ball, Matthews & Novak, Montgomery, for appellees.
John B. Scott, Jr. of Capell, Howard, Knabe & Cobbs, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Huntingdon College.
Laura L. Crum of Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black, Montgomery, for amicus curiae St. Margaret's Found., Inc.
SHORES, Justice.
Elizabeth H. Plummer died in Montgomery, Alabama, on December 29, 1989. Her 10-page will was admitted to probate on January 25, 1990. Under the terms of Mrs. Plummer's will, her "tangible personal property" was bequeathed to her brother, Paul Higgins, and a sister-in-law, Adelaide (even though Paul and Adelaide are not husband and wife, we shall refer to them as the "Higginses"). The residuary clause left the remainder of the estate "including real, personal and mixed properties" to eight named charitable beneficiaries.
The executors of the will, Jo Prince and First Alabama Bank, filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment, seeking a construction of the will and instructions pursuant to § 6-6-225, Ala.Code 1975, to resolve the issue of whether the 240 gold coins[1] found in the decedent's safety deposit box should be distributed to the Higginses or to the various residuary beneficiaries under the terms of the will. The executors took the position that the gold coins should pass pursuant to the residuary clause of the will, while the Higginses took the position that the coins were tangible personal property.
The trial court ruled that the gold coins were tangible personal property and therefore should be distributed to the Higginses under the terms of the will. The executors appeal.[2] We affirm.
The decedent bequeathed items of tangible personal property by Item III of her will. In Item III, paragraphs (a) through (s), she bequeathed items of personal property to specific individuals, making numerous, significant cash bequests to certain individuals. She then left all of her remaining "tangible personal property" to the Higginses in paragraph (t), as follows:
(R. 26). The residuary clause of the will, Item V, provides in pertinent part:
(R. 27.)
In the construction of a will, the cardinal rule is to ascertain the testator's intent. City National Bank of Birmingham v. Andrews, 355 So. 2d 341 (Ala.1978); Gafford v. Kirby, 512 So. 2d 1356, 1360 (Ala.1987). "We have repeatedly referred to this intent as the polestar that guides us." Id., citing Wiley v. Murphree, 228 Ala. 64, 151 So. 869 (1933). Therefore, the question before this Court is whether the trial court properly determined that the decedent intended the gold coins to pass *1219 under the bequest of her "remaining tangible personal property" or to pass as part of her residuary estate.
The bequest to the Higginses in Item III gives them "[a]ll of the remaining tangible personal property which I may own at the time of my death, not otherwise specifically bequeathed above, including...." It is clear on the face of the will that the testatrix intended that the Higginses receive the remaining tangible personal property of whatever nature, with the singular exception of any automobiles she might own at her death. The word "including" does not restrict the preceding general language, but is used as a term of enlargement. As we said in Sims v. Moore, 288 Ala. 630, 264 So. 2d 484 (1972):
288 Ala. at 635, 264 So. 2d  at 487.
"Tangible personal property" is not an ambiguous term. "Tangible property" has a specific legal definition:
Black's Law Dictionary 1305 (5th ed. 1979). "Tangible property" has been defined and distinquished from "intangible property" as follows:
73 C.J.S. Property § 15 at 184 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
"Tangible personal property" (as that phrase is used in a statute making certain items subject to sales and use tax) has been construed by the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama to include gold and silver coins bought and sold for investment and numismatic purposes:
Association of Alabama Professional Numismatists, Inc. v. Eagerton, 455 So. 2d 867, 869-870 (Ala.Civ.App.1984).
We find the reasoning in In re Macfarlane's Estate, 313 Pa.Super. 397, 459 A.2d 1289 (1983), persuasive. That case involved the interpretation of a provision of a will leaving all "tangible personal property" to the testator's wife. A residuary clause established a trust. In holding that certain gold and silver coins owned by the testator had passed to the wife as tangible personal property, rather than becoming part of the residuary estate, the Pennsylvania court said:
459 A.2d  at 1292.
The case before us presents an almost identical situation. Upon an analysis of the will before us, we find no ambiguity. It utilizes the technical words "tangible personal property." Clearly, the gold coins are "tangible personal property" and thus were meant to be distributed under the terms of Item III, whether bought for investment purposes, as the executors argue they were, or not.
Because we find no ambiguity in the will, we reject the argument of the executors that the doctrine of ejusdem generis should be applied to Item III(t) of the will to restrict the "tangible personal property" bequeathed to those articles of household or personal use or ornament. See Merchants National Bank of Mobile v. Hubbard, 220 Ala. 372, 125 So. 335 (1929); Martin v. First Nat'l Bank of Mobile, 412 So. 2d 250, 253 (Ala.1982).
The executors cite us to Matter of Brecklein's Estate, 6 Kan.App.2d 1001, 637 P.2d 444 (1981), and In re Neefus' Will, 110 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sur.Ct.1952). In these cases, the Court of Appeals of Kansas and the Surrogate's Court of Westchester County, New York, held that gold coins did not pass as items of a testator's personal effects or belongings. These cases are not persuasive, because neither of them involves the technical term "tangible personal property." Both involve the interpretation of the testator's intent in leaving "belongings" or "personal effects."
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, ADAMS and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
[1]  Consisting of 57 Kruggerands and 183 Canadian maple leaf coins.
[2]  Two residuary beneficiaries, Huntingdon College and St. Margaret's Foundation, Inc., have filed a joint amicus curiae brief.