Case Title: Owen v. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: 47304

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2021-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
Docket No. 47304 
 
CARL E. OWEN and ANITA R. OWEN, ) 
Husband and Wife,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Boise, September 2020 Term 
     Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-  
) 
    Appellants,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Opinion Filed:  April 14, 2021 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
DERIK L. SMITH and JESSICA R. 
) 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
SMITH, Husband and Wife, 
  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION. THE 
     Defendants-Counterclaimants-  
) 
COURT’S PRIOR OPINION 
     Respondents. 
 
 
 
) 
DATED NOVEMBER 16, 2020 
__________________________________ ) 
IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN. 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State  
of Idaho, Minidoka County.  Michael Tribe, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed.  Attorney fees and costs on 
appeal are awarded to Respondents.  
 
Carl E. Owen, Rupert, pro se for Appellant. 
 
 
Donald J. Chisholm, Burley, attorney for Respondent. 
______________________________ 
 
BEVAN, Chief Justice 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from a boundary dispute between Carl and Anita Owen (“Owens”) and 
Derik and Jessica Smith (“Smiths”). In 2018, the Smiths bought property next to the Owens’. 
The Smiths then erected a fence along the boundary defined in a survey that was completed as 
part of their purchase agreement. The Owens disputed the boundary established by the 2018 
survey and filed a complaint seeking damages for trespass, deprivation of real and personal 
property that was in the disputed area, loss in property value, and inability to inhabit and enjoy 
the property. The Smiths counterclaimed for quiet title and an easement guaranteeing them 
access to a buried irrigation pipeline that crossed the Owens’ property. The parties each filed a 
motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the Smiths’ motion for summary 
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judgment, holding the Owens had no right, title or interest in the disputed property and that the 
Smiths were bona fide purchasers with superior claim to any land described in their deed. The 
court also granted the Smiths permanent easement rights to the irrigation pipeline. The court 
dismissed the Owens’ claims for trespass and conversion of personal property. The Owens 
timely appealed to this Court. We affirm.  
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background  
In 1978, William and Eva Nichols divided land they owned in Rupert, Idaho, into five 
parcels. On May 17, 1978, Idaho Land Survey prepared a survey that showed the newly divided 
parcels. The 1978 survey was not recorded. The issues here stem from the boundary between two 
of the five parcels: Parcel 1, now owned by the Smiths, which is 27.65 acres; and Parcel 2, now 
owned by the Owens, which is 3.09 acres.  
In 1979, the Nichols sold Parcel 2 to their son, David Nichols, through warranty deed, 
using the legal description from the 1978 survey. The warranty deed passed the property free of 
encumbrances. David Nichols later filed for bankruptcy, and the Owens bought Parcel 2 through 
a bankruptcy trustee deed recorded on September 8, 2008. The property was conveyed “as is,” 
without representation or warranty. The Owens bought an ALTA extended title insurance policy 
which guaranteed their title to Parcel 2 by the description in the 1978 survey.  
In 1983, the Nichols conveyed Parcel 1 to Walter Woodworth using the legal description 
from the 1978 survey. In 1989, Mr. Woodworth conveyed Parcel 1 to Albert and Mary Ann 
Dureau using the same legal description. Mr. Woodworth and the Dureaus lived in California 
and did not frequent the property. Beginning in 1990, the Dureaus leased 25.7 farmable acres of 
Parcel 1 to Lind Garner. Mr. Garner was not charged rent for the nonarable portions of the 
property, specifically a treed area on the north side of Parcel 1 that bordered Parcel 2. Around 
1995, Mr. Garner testified that he and Mr. David Nichols, the owner of Parcel 2 at the time, 
created a small berm near the trees to keep the irrigation water from Parcel 2 off the crops Mr. 
Garner was growing on Parcel 1. Without specifying how long it had been there, Mr. David 
Nichols testified there was a berm and built up ground between the parcels that kept his irrigation 
water from going onto the alfalfa field on Parcel 1 and at some point he and Mr. Garner 
“enhanced” the natural berm to a higher level.  
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After Mr. Dureau died in 2011, Ms. Dureau conveyed the property to a survivor’s trust. 
In 2018, the Smiths bought Parcel 1 from the Dureau trust through a warranty deed recorded on 
April 11, 2018. During the process of acquiring title insurance for the sale, it was discovered that 
the County Assessor would need an updated legal description for the property. Thus, as a 
condition of the purchase agreement, the Smiths required Ms. Dureau have the property 
surveyed. On March 23, 2018, Trevor Reno of Desert West Land Surveyors surveyed Parcel 1. 
Mr. Reno concluded that the surveyor who prepared the 1978 survey incorrectly located the 
1/16th center corner of the NE1/4 of Section 7 about 3.8 feet west and 1.1 foot north of its correct 
location. Mr. Reno testified that the monument for the correct 1/16th corner was established by 
Steven Pearson in a 1993 survey performed for another landowner. That point has been used and 
accepted for all surveys in the surrounding area since 1993, including surveys conducted by 
Stanley Carper and Durrell Moon of Moon & Associates in 1993 and 1994. Mr. Reno conducted 
the 2018 survey from the correct 1/16th corner. Thereafter, a land surveyor intern for Desert West 
Surveyors placed wooden survey stakes with flags along the boundary identified in Mr. Reno’s 
2018 survey. The 2018 survey was recorded on April 2, 2018.  
 After receiving the results of the 2018 survey, Mr. Smith testified that he visited the 
property and did not observe any fence or feature along the common boundary of the Owens’ 
parcel that would suggest anyone was using or encroaching on Parcel 1. After the sale had 
closed, Mr. Smith placed T-post markers along the boundary identified in the 2018 survey. As he 
was placing the markers, Mr. Smith was approached by Mr. Owen who claimed his property line 
extended to the irrigation berm at the edge of the cultivated field on the Smiths’ property – 
contrary to the results of the 2018 survey. In June 2018, Mr. Owen installed a fence consisting of 
T-posts and wire, and attached “No Trespassing” signs on the disputed property. Mr. Smith 
demanded that the fence be removed. Between April and September 2018, the parties were 
unable to negotiate an agreement to their boundary dispute. On September 14, 2018, Mr. Smith 
built a 3-strand barbed wire fence along the 2018 survey line. Portions of the fence ran over 
personal property the Owens had left on the property.  
B. Procedural Background 
On September 25, 2018, the Owens, acting pro se, filed a “Civil Complaint for 
Trespassing and Suit for Damages and Relief,” which included a demand for a jury trial. The 
Owens sought damages for trespass, deprivation of real and personal property, loss in property 
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value, and inability to inhabit and enjoy the property because of the Smiths’ erection of the fence 
on what they claimed was their property. The Owens alleged that for several decades the 
disputed strip, which included a garden spot, a special Christmas tree, an asparagus patch and 
grape patch, had been maintained, irrigated, mowed, and kept in good condition by the owners of 
Parcel 2. In response, the Smiths filed a motion for more definite statement and motion to strike. 
The Smiths alleged that the Owens’ complaint was too verbose, contained inadmissible evidence, 
and failed to contain a short and plain statement of the claims for relief sought. The Owens 
opposed the Smiths’ motion.  
The Owens filed a motion and affidavit for entry of default. After a hearing, the district 
court denied the Owens’ motion for default and ordered the Owens to file an amended complaint 
that concisely stated their claims, narrowing the evidence to a short and plain statement of the 
supporting facts. On October 30, 2018, the Owens filed an amended complaint. The Smiths 
answered the amended complaint and filed a counterclaim which sought two things:  (1) quiet 
title to the disputed land; and (2) a judgment recognizing  the Smiths’ entitlement to use, operate, 
repair, maintain, and replace the irrigation diversion features and buried pipeline that run across 
the Owens’ property at their present location. The Smiths claimed their property had a permanent 
easement to use and maintain the irrigation works and pipeline along the west boundary of the 
Owens’ property.  
On November 8, 2018, the Smiths filed a motion for an order allowing a survey of the 
Owens’ property. The Owens opposed the motion, arguing that another survey would not resolve 
any of the issues raised in the amended complaint and would cause them to incur undue 
expenses. The district court denied the Smiths’ motion for a survey without prejudice and 
entered an order of mediation. The judge explained that the Owens’ property was probably going 
to be surveyed, but thought that it should be done in the context of a mediation.  
After the parties were unable to resolve their dispute through mediation, the Owens filed 
their own motion for an order requiring a survey of both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. The Smiths 
opposed the Owens’ motion, arguing that they were confident in the survey Mr. Reno had 
conducted before their purchase of Parcel 1 and there was no economic reason for another survey 
of their property. The Smiths also pointed out that the Owens objected to their request to have 
Parcel 2 surveyed for $600–700 due to cost, but were now proposing a joint survey that was 
estimated to cost around $3,000. The Owens explained that they thought a single survey of both 
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parcels would be more expedient because it was less likely to lead to another dispute where two 
surveyors would get together and each defend their position.  
During the hearing on the Owens’ motion, the district judge recused himself after the 
Smiths’ attorney raised concerns that his clients were being treated unfairly. The allegations 
stemmed from the judge’s comments that Smith’s attorney had made inflammatory statements 
towards the Owens. The judge recused himself without ruling on the motion or determining 
whether there was actual bias. The case was reassigned to a new district judge, Judge Tribe.  
Although it is not included in the record, the Owens apparently withdrew their motion to 
have both properties surveyed. The Smiths then renewed their motion for an order allowing a 
survey of the Owens’ property and the Owens filed a renewed opposition. After a hearing, the 
district court entered an order allowing a survey of the Owens’ property. The judge noted that the 
Owens would have ample opportunity to challenge the survey if they believed it was not done 
properly. On March 12, 2019, the same surveyor who surveyed Parcel 1, Trevor Reno of Desert 
West Surveyors, surveyed the Owens’ property. A copy of the 2019 survey was not included in 
the record on appeal. Mr. Reno testified the 2019 survey showed there was no overlap or gap 
between the legal description of the Owens’ property as determined under the 1978 survey and 
the legal description of the Smiths’ property as determined in the 2018 survey. Mr. Reno opined 
the difference arose along the common boundary line due to the incorrect and improper location 
of the NE center 1/16th corner established by the 1978 survey. Further, Mr. Reno advised that 
the 2018 survey actually decreased the Smiths’ acreage from 27.65 to 27.48, and the 2019 survey 
increased the Owens’ property from 3.09 to 3.10 acres.  
On April 19, 2019, the Owens filed a motion for summary judgment. The Owens argued 
that they were entitled to summary judgment because the Smiths had knowingly trespassed onto 
their property that was posted with “No Trespassing” signs. They also argued that the Smiths 
engaged in self-help by building a barbed wire fence through the Owens’ property, which took 
and willfully deprived the Owens of both real and personal property. In support, the Owens filed 
an affidavit from David Nichols, the previous owner of Parcel 2. Mr. David Nichols testified that 
he maintained a grape patch, asparagus patch, and garden spot up to the cultivated field on Parcel 
1 until he had to relinquish his property due to bankruptcy. Mr. Nichols also testified that when 
his parents sold Parcel 1 to Walter Woodworth in 1983, Mr. Woodworth and Mr. David Nichols 
agreed the trees Mr. David Nichols planted on the edge of the cultivated field were the boundary 
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line between the properties. The Owens also filed a separate statement of genuine material facts 
not in dispute. The Smiths moved to strike the affidavit of David Nichols.  
On April 26, 2019, the Smiths filed their own motion for summary judgment. The Smiths 
argued that none of the real property described in the bankruptcy trustee deed conveying Parcel 2 
to the Owens was situated within the boundaries of the Smiths’ property described in the 
warranty deed from the Dureau trust, which contained the legal description from the 2018 
survey. The Smiths asserted that Mr. Smith had walked the property before closing and did not 
observe any fences, monuments, or cultivation of property that would notify him that a portion of 
Parcel 1 was being occupied by the Owens. The Smiths also alleged a pump and pipeline 
easement along the western boundary of the Owens’ property were in place before the Owens’ 
purchase of Parcel 2 and had been installed to serve Parcel 1. The Smiths alleged the owners of 
Parcel 1 had used the easement without objection from at least 1990 to 2018.  
On May 6, 2019, the Owens filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint adding 
a claim for punitive damages. The Smiths opposed the Owens’ motion for punitive damages. On 
May 24, 2019, the Owens filed a motion for injunctive relief, asking the court to order the Smiths 
to remove the fence they had erected until the issues were resolved at trial. The Smiths opposed 
the Owens’ motion for injunctive relief.  
On July 29, 2019, the district court entered a memorandum decision granting the Smiths’ 
motion for summary judgment and denying the Owens’ motion for summary judgment. First, the 
district court granted the Smiths’ motion to strike the affidavit of David Nichols in part. The 
court struck several attachments and portions of the affidavit discussing the boundary between 
Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 for lack of foundation and impermissible legal conclusions. The court then 
held that the Owens had no right, title or interest in the property described in the Smiths’ deed. 
The court also held the Smiths were bona fide purchasers with a superior claim to any land 
described in the same instrument. The court held the Smiths and their successors in interest had a 
permanent easement for irrigation purposes and the Owens were prohibited from interfering with 
the irrigation equipment from the canal to the Smiths’ property. The court dismissed the Owens’ 
claims for trespassing and conversion of personal property. 
On August 6, 2019, the Smiths filed a memorandum of fees and costs seeking attorney 
fees under Idaho Code section 12-121. The Smiths filed an affidavit of counsel in support 
detailing the attorney fees billed. The Owens argued that they filed nothing frivolously and 
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objected to the Smiths’ memorandum of fees and costs. On August 9, 2019, the district court 
entered a judgment dismissing the Owens’ claims with prejudice and granting the Smiths’ 
counterclaims. On August 13, 2019, the Smiths moved to amend the judgment to contain 
additional language resolving the property dispute. On September 12, 2019, the district court 
entered a memorandum decision awarding costs and attorney fees to the Smiths. On the same 
day, the court entered an amended judgment. The Owens timely appealed to this Court.  
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 
Did the district court erroneously grant summary judgment in favor of the Smiths? 
2. 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs to the 
Smiths? 
3. 
Did the district court err by failing to rule on the Owens’ motions for leave to file 
punitive damages and injunctive relief? 
4. 
Have the Owens adequately raised judicial bias on the part of the second presiding judge?  
5. 
Are the Smiths entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court employs the same standard as the district court when reviewing rulings on 
summary judgment motions. Trumble v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 166 Idaho 132, 
140–41, 456 P.3d 201, 209–10 (2019) (citing La Bella Vita, LLC v. Shuler, 158 Idaho 799, 804–
05, 353 P.3d 420, 425–26 (2015)). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.” I.R.C.P. 56(a). A moving party must support its assertion by citing particular materials in 
the record or by showing the “materials cited do not establish the . . . presence of a genuine 
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact[s].” 
I.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(B). Summary judgment is improper “if reasonable persons could reach 
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented.” Trumble, 166 
Idaho at 41, 456 P.3d at 210 (quoting La Bella Vita, 158 Idaho at 805, 353 P.3d at 426). Even so, 
a “mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment.” Id.  
“Pro se litigants are not entitled to special consideration or leniency because they 
represent themselves.” PHH Mortg. v. Nickerson, 164 Idaho 33, 38, 423 P.3d 454, 459 (2018) 
(internal citation omitted). Rather, “[p]ro se litigants must conform to the same standards and 
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rules as litigants represented by attorneys, and this Court will address the issues accordingly.” Id.  
(quoting Mendez v. Univ. Health Servs. Boise State Univ., 163 Idaho 237, 242, 409 P.3d 817, 
822 (2018)). 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. 
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Smiths. 
The Owens allege the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Smiths in 
several respects. We will address each issue in turn. 
a. Boundary dispute  
The Owens’ primary argument on appeal is that Trevor Reno’s 2018 survey wrongly 
identified the boundaries of the Smiths property.1 That said, there is no evidence in the record 
that the Owens ever hired their own surveyor to refute Mr. Reno’s findings. Instead, the Owens 
insist that the 1978 survey was not erroneous. Mr. Owen testified that the 2018 survey and the 
Smiths’ corresponding legal description caused an overlap with the Owens’ property description 
based on the 1978 survey. This contradicts Mr. Reno’s testimony that there is no overlap or gap 
between the two legal descriptions; the Owens contend there is a difference in measurements of 
record along the common boundary line from the 1978 survey and actual measurements as 
observed by the 2018 and 2019 surveys. Even so, there is no evidence that Mr. Owen was 
qualified to testify to the accuracy of either the 1978 or the 2018 survey. The Owens’ failure to 
submit any admissible evidence to support their claim that the 2018 survey was incorrect – other 
than Mr. Owen’s affidavit – cannot create an issue of material fact. See Holdaway v. Broulim’s 
Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606, 612, 349 P.3d 1197, 1203 (2015) (holding that an injured party’s 
testimony about the medical cause of a post-operative internal injury would require knowledge 
outside the “usual and ordinary experience of the average person,” thus, it did not create an issue 
of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment). Ultimately, the Owens could “not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of . . . [their] pleadings,” but had to respond with admissible 
evidence “set[ting] forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
Mr. Owen’s affidavit does not meet this threshold.  
                                                 
1 The Owens make several allegations that Mr. Reno violated the Rules of Professional Responsibility by failing to 
notify “the Board” of any discrepancy. The Owens also allege Mr. Reno violated Idaho Survey rules by having an 
intern employee place wooden stakes along the boundary he identified in the 2018 survey. Mr. Reno is not a party to 
this action and any claims that he caused the Owens’ alleged harm will not be considered.  
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The Owens also take issue with the following boilerplate disclaimer on Mr. Reno’s 2018 
survey:  
This survey was completed by the surveyor without the benefit of a title policy, 
title commitment, or any other form of a title search. Easements, encumbrances 
and any other special exceptions to the property have not been provided to or 
researched by the surveyor. This survey was not completed to the ALTA/ACSM 
standards. Surveyed property is subject to all easements, encumbrances and any 
other special exceptions currently existing or of public record. 
The Owens allege “[r]elying on a survey with such a large disclaimer disavowing any research 
necessary to establish a boundary line between two adjoining parcels is absurd.” That said, Mr. 
Reno testified that the title policy note does not reflect on the accuracy of the survey; rather, it 
was intended to advise users that it did not address any additional issues that would be required 
for its use in an ALTA title insurance policy. Ultimately, the accuracy of Mr. Reno’s 2018 
survey of Parcel 1 was confirmed in 2019, when Mr. Reno surveyed Parcel 2. Mr. Reno 
determined there was no overlap or gap between the legal description of the Owens’ property 
determined under the 1978 survey and the legal description of the Smith property as determined 
in the 2018 survey. Mr. Reno stated that the difference arose along the common boundary line 
because of the incorrect and improper location of the NE center 1/16th corner established by the 
1978 survey. The Owens provided no admissible evidence to dispute Mr. Reno’s findings on the 
boundaries of Parcel 1 and Parcel 2.  
Rather than focus on the Owens’ arguments about the alleged discrepancy between the 
1978 and 2018 surveys, the district court saw this case as a claim for boundary by agreement. In 
their reply brief on appeal the Owens assert they have never claimed boundary by agreement to 
the disputed property. That said, the substance of the Owens’ argument emphasizes that the 
Smiths “could not have missed [their] decades old grape patch fence, [ ] riding lawnmower, [ ] 
garden tools, [ ] garden spot, [ ] fencing supplies and other equipment and tools that clearly gave 
notice that [the Owens] were possessing, maintaining, using, and cultivating the property in 
dispute.” The Owens argue that aerial photos show two distinct properties: a clearly defined 
agricultural property and a clearly defined residential property encircled by trees. Thus, despite 
their contentions otherwise, it appears the Owens are making a claim for boundary by agreement.  
“Boundary by agreement or acquiescence has two elements: (1) there must be an 
uncertain or disputed boundary and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary.” Cecil v. 
Gagnebin, 146 Idaho 714, 716, 202 P.3d 1, 3 (2009) (quoting Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 
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595, 166 P.3d 382, 385 (2007)). “A long period of acquiescence by one party to another party’s 
use of the disputed property provides a factual basis from which an agreement can be inferred.” 
Boyd-Davis v. Baker, 157 Idaho 688, 693, 339 P.3d 749, 754 (2014) (quoting Griffel v. Reynolds, 
136 Idaho 397, 400, 34 P.3d 1080, 1083 (2001)). However, acquiescence, by itself, does not 
constitute a boundary by agreement. Id. This Court has held that a fence or other visible 
demarcation is necessary to give later purchasers constructive notice of the agreed-upon 
boundary. Cecil, 146 Idaho at 717, 202 P.3d at 4; Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 117, 268 P.2d 
351, 353 (1954); Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 P.3d 525, 529 (2003).  
The Owens argue that the edge of the cultivated field or berm had been the accepted 
boundary line between the two parcels for decades. On the other hand, the Smiths maintain there 
is no evidence the Owens had an agreement with the prior owners of Parcel 1 about the location 
of the boundary. Mr. Woodworth and the Dureaus were California residents who did not frequent 
the property and the Owens provided no evidence that Mr. Woodworth or the Dureaus 
acknowledged or acquiesced in the incursion upon their property by Mr. David Nichols or the 
Owens. Indeed, Ms. Dureau testified that to the extent “neighbors to the north” (the Owens) were 
using part of Parcel 1, it was done without her knowledge. The Smiths allege the most the Owens 
have shown is that they encroached on the property now owned by the Smiths to different 
degrees at different times and intervals.  
The district court found the facts of Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 50 P.3d 987 (2002) to 
be analogous to this case. In Cox, the appellants believed a fence constituted an implied 
agreement for the boundary between two properties and made several improvements up to the 
fence line. Id. at 493, 50 P.3d at 988. The respondents did not know about the improvements 
because they rented their land to ranchers. Id. After a survey revealed the fence did not represent 
the boundary in their recorded deed, the appellants filed an action to quiet title, arguing the fence 
line should be the boundary based on a theory of boundary by agreement. Id. at 494, 50 P.3d at 
989. The respondents argued the boundary lines in the deeds should stand because the fence was 
built to contain cattle and there was no discussion or agreement between the adjoining 
landowners regarding the actual boundary. Id. This Court affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for the respondents, holding that although the actual boundary was unclear, 
appellants were unable to establish an express or implied agreement to treat the fence as the 
boundary. Id. at 495, 50 P.3d at 990.  
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Similarly, at all times the Owens allege they were maintaining and making improvements 
to the property up to the irrigation berm, the majority of the land on Parcel 1 was being farmed 
by Lind Garner. Mr. Garner leased the 25.7 farmable acres of Parcel 1 from the Dureaus 
beginning in 1990 until the Dureaus sold the property to the Smiths. Mr. Garner testified that 
around 1995, he and Mr. David Nichols created a small berm to keep the irrigation water off of 
Parcel 2. Mr. Garner testified that the berm was created to keep water off his crops, not to signify 
a boundary between the two parcels. Further, as the lessor of the property, Mr. Garner did not 
have authority to make any kind of boundary revision or agreement on behalf of Ms. Dureau. 
Fischer v. Croston, 163 Idaho 331, 337, 413 P.3d 731, 737 (2018) (an agreement changing the 
boundary line must be between the actual owners of the adjacent properties or an agent of an 
owner). Ms. Dureau testified that she did not know that Mr. Garner and Mr. David Nichols had 
created the berm and confirmed that Mr. Garner did not have authority to agree to change the 
boundary of her property. The Owens contend that the Smiths’ attorney drafted Mr. Garner’s 
affidavit and introduced it to contradict Mr. David Nichols affidavit but that it is “unworthy of 
belief.” The crux of the Owens’ argument appears to be that although Mr. Garner helped Mr. 
David Nichols enhance the irrigation berm, the berm had existed for decades before Mr. Garner 
began farming Parcel 1. Even if a preexisting berm was only enhanced in 1995, there is no 
evidence the berm was ever intended to alter the boundary line. Instead, the berm was intended 
to prevent water from Parcel 2 from damaging Mr. Garner’s crops on Parcel 1.  
Although the Owens dispute the location of the boundary line, to prevail on a claim for 
boundary by agreement they must also show there was an agreement fixing the boundary. Cecil, 
146 Idaho at 716, 202 P.3d at 3. Ms. Dureau testified that to the extent that neighbors owning 
Parcel 2 were using part of Parcel 1, it was done without her knowledge. The district court found 
the alteration of the landscape and the decision to allow the nonarable portions of the property to 
remain uncultivated did not amount to an agreement between the owners – and thus did not alter 
the legal boundaries established in the deed. This conclusion was correct. 
The district court also held that the Smiths were bona fide purchasers because they were 
unaware of any claim to the property they were purchasing. In Idaho, “the first recorded 
conveyances of real property, taken in good faith and for valuable consideration . . . have priority 
over subsequent purchasers or mortgagees of the same property.” I.C. § 55-812. The term “good 
faith” has been defined as one “who acquired real property without actual or constructive notice 
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of another’s claim or of any defect in title.” Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 226, 268 
P.3d 1167, 1178 (2012). Mr. Smith testified he visited the property before the sale and observed 
nothing that would reveal a prior claim: there was no cultivated area or monument to show that 
the disputed land was being used by another. Mr. Owen admitted that he had not cultivated the 
garden spot since 2016 due to health issues. Additionally, before purchasing Parcel 1 the Smiths 
were informed they needed an updated legal description to obtain title insurance. Mr. Reno 
conducted the required survey on March 23, 2018. The legal description in the deed conveying 
Parcel 1 from the Dureau trust to the Smiths was taken from Mr. Reno’s 2018 survey. The 
boundary established by that deed was the first recorded in relation to the boundary between 
Parcels 1 and 2. Thus, the district court properly held that because the Smiths recorded their deed 
in good faith for valuable consideration they had priority over any subsequent claims to the 
property.  
b. Irrigation rights  
Next, the Owens allege the district court impermissibly granted the Smiths a permanent 
easement to the irrigation pipeline on their land. The Owens focus their argument on an easement 
granted to Mr. David Nichols in 1979. On November 9, 1979, the Minidoka Irrigation District 
(“MID”) granted an easement to Mr. David Nichols for construction and maintenance of 
irrigation systems on Parcel 2. The Owens maintain that the grant for the pump, waterworks and 
right of way easement to MID’s 40-foot right of way passed to them free of encumbrances when 
they bought Parcel 2. However, whether Mr. David Nichols was granted an easement on Parcel 2 
is independent of whether an easement also could have been granted to Parcel 1.  
The Smiths’ property is irrigated with MID water diverted from the canal at the northwest 
corner of the Owens’ property. The water is delivered through a buried pipeline in the 125 West 
Road right of way. Before dividing the five parcels in 1978, William and Eva Nichols obtained 
approval from the Minidoka Highway District for the installation of the pipeline within the 125 
West road right of way.2 The district court held that the easement for the pipeline would have 
                                                 
2 Susan Allen, secretary of the Minidoka County Highway District, submitted an affidavit stating that the easement 
which was approved for William Nichols was located at 125 West 276 North. But the attached minutes from a 
meeting of the Board of Commissioners on March 7, 1977, show that a pipe easement was actually granted to 125 
West 275 North. The Owens contend that “[s]ince [the Smiths’ attorney] drafted and charged for drafting Susan 
Allen’s affidavit, and he received a judgment giving his client our pipeline, it can be inferred that the address error 
was intentional and deliberate to support an untenable argument.” 125 West 276 North is actually the Owens’ 
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passed through the division of the property and subsequent sales down the chain of title to the 
Smiths. Indeed, Idaho Code section 55-603 provides “[a] transfer of real property passes all 
easements attached thereto, and creates in favor thereof an easement to use other real property of 
the person whose estate is transferred, in the same manner and to the same extent as such 
property was obviously and permanently used by the person whose estate is transferred, for the 
benefit thereof, at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or completed.” The Smiths 
emphasize that the Owens’ ALTA insurance also notes “the existence of irrigation pipeline and 
equipment along the west boundary” that could be subject to an easement.  
Further, the irrigation equipment was buried and in use before the Owens bought their 
property in 1998. Mr. Garner testified that he irrigated Parcel 1 with MID water diverted from 
the B-1 canal through a buried mainline along the northwest corner of the Parcel 2 since he 
began leasing the 25.7 farmable acres of Parcel 1 in 1990. The Smiths admit they have been 
unable to determine who installed the pump and pipeline to serve Parcel 1, but claim it was done 
before 1990 with the knowledge of Mr. David Nichols, who owned Parcel 2 from 1979 until 
2008. There is no evidence the Owens ever objected to the previous Parcel 1 owners’ use of the 
irrigation pipelines. The district court properly granted the Smiths’ motion for a permanent 
irrigation easement over Parcel 2.  
c. Taking of personal property  
After listing their issues on appeal, the Owens assert those issues encompass the district 
court’s failure to address their proven damages for theft of personal property. The Owens allege 
that 90-95% of their personal property in the disputed area was removed and taken within 5-10 
days of the Smiths erecting their fence. The district court dismissed the Owens’ claim after 
finding they did not provide any evidence in the record to support their claims that the Smiths 
were responsible for the loss of any of their personal property. We affirm the district court’s 
dismissal of these claims. The Owens have merely submitted conclusory allegations that the 
Smiths were responsible for their missing property without providing any corroborating 
evidence. Mere conclusory allegations cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact. Gordon v. 
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 166 Idaho 105, 119, 455 P.3d 374, 388 (2019). 
d. Separate statement of facts.  
                                                                                                                                                             
property, Parcel 2. The Owens maintain that 125 West 275 North is across the highway from Parcel 1, however 
there is no support for that allegation in the record. 
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Alternatively, the Owens argue the district court improperly granted summary judgment 
for the Smiths when the Smiths disregarded the requirement of the court’s scheduling order that 
they file a separate statement of undisputed facts as part of their papers supporting their motion 
for summary judgment. The Owens argue that because the Smiths failed to file a separate 
statement of undisputed facts they did not have the opportunity to controvert the Smiths’ 
allegations. The Owens claim their uncontroverted genuine material facts should have been 
accepted as true, requiring summary judgment in their favor.  
Although the Smiths did not file a separate statement of undisputed facts, the Smiths 
detailed the relevant facts of the case in their memorandum in support of their motion for 
summary judgment. Thus, the Owens’ claim that they had no notice of what facts the Smiths 
were relying on lacks merit. “A party alleging error on appeal must also show that the alleged 
errors were prejudicial. Alleged errors not affecting substantial rights will be disregarded.” 
Baughman v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 162 Idaho 174, 179, 395 P.3d 393, 398 (2017) (internal 
quotation and citations and omitted). The Smiths’ failure to file a separate statement of 
undisputed facts did not prejudice the Owens.  
e. Striking of David Nichols’ affidavit  
In their reply brief, the Owens contest the district court’s memorandum decision striking 
portions of David Nichols’ affidavit. The Owens maintain there was no valid reason to strike any 
portion of the affidavit and argue the district court struck the affidavit at an inappropriate time by 
doing it at the same time as the summary judgment decision. In general, this Court will not 
consider arguments raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 
706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005) (citing Myers v. Workmen’s Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 
508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004)). A reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the 
issues presented because those are the arguments and authority to which the respondent has an 
opportunity to respond in the respondent’s brief. Id. We will not consider whether the district 
court incorrectly struck portions of David Nichols’ affidavit because the Owens failed to raise 
this issue in their opening brief.  
f. Undisputed facts cited by the district court  
In their reply brief, the Owens also dispute several facts the district court claimed were 
undisputed in its summary judgment decision: 
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1. The legal description of either deed does not provide for any overlap between 
the boundaries between the two properties. 
2. There is no document recorded in the property records of Minidoka County 
for a claim by Plaintiffs to any portion of parcel 1 before the purchase of the 
parcel by the Defendants in April 2018. 
3. The Smiths visited the property on several occasions before agreeing to the 
sale and did not see anything that would indicate a prior claim. 
4. Mr. Smith, using a copy of the March 23, 2018[,] survey, inspected the 
premises and boundary lines prior to closing and found no fences or 
monuments to indicate a portion of the parcel had been in use or claimed by 
another. 
5. Since April of 2018[,] the Defendants have requested that Plaintiffs have their 
property surveyed to settle the dispute or allow the Defendants to have their 
property surveyed but were refused each time.  
6. On June 5, 2018, Mr. Smith observed that the Plaintiffs had parked a vehicle 
and trailer on his property and contacted the Plaintiff to have it removed. 
7. In June of 2018, Mr. Owen installed a fence consisting of T posts, wire, and 
attached “No Trespassing” signs on Defendants’ property running 23 feet 
southward from the southeast corner of Plaintiffs’ property. 
However, the Owens’ efforts to dispute these facts are made up of conclusory statements that are 
unsupported by evidence in the record. Moreover, the Owens simply reiterate their arguments 
that we have already rejected over the alleged discrepancy between the 1978 and 2018 surveys. 
“I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations in the 
pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” 
Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172, 175 (2007) (quoting 
Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994)). Mere conclusory 
allegations will not raise a genuine issue of material fact. Gordon, 166 Idaho at 119, 455 P.3d at 
388. In addition, “[t]his Court will not search the record on appeal for error. Bach v. Bagley, 148 
Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (citing Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Prof’l Discipline, 138 
Idaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003)). We will not consider the merits of the Owens’ claims 
because they consist of conclusory statements that lack citations to the record. 
B. 
The Owens have failed to show how the district court abused its discretion in 
awarding the Smiths their attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code section 12-121. 
The Owens argue there is “absolutely no evidence” in the record to show that they filed 
and pursued their case frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. The Owens claim the 
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1978 survey, their deed, and the legal description show a valid reason for their case since they 
include different coordinates from the 2018 survey. The Owens assert the district court’s award 
of attorney fees should be vacated because no evidence supports the conclusion that they pursued 
their claims to protect their purchased and possessed property frivolously. 
An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(e)(1) will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Idaho Military Historical 
Soc’y, Inc. v. Maslen, 156 Idaho 624, 629, 329 P.3d 1072, 1077 (2014). Likewise, “[t]he district 
court’s determination as to whether an action was brought or defended frivolously will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “The party asserting the 
abuse of discretion carries the burden of demonstrating that an abuse of discretion occurred, and 
a failure to do so is fatal to its argument.” Nielson v. Talbot, 163 Idaho 480, 489, 415 P.3d 348, 
357 (2018) (citing Green River Ranches, LLC v. Silva Land Company, LLC, 162 Idaho 385, 397 
P.3d 1144, 1151 (2017)). When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court 
the sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essential questions. Whether the trial 
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries 
of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 
163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). 
The district court awarded attorney fees under section 12-121, finding the Owens brought 
and pursued the case frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation based on these actions: 
a. Prior to filing the action, Plaintiffs built a no trespassing sign on the property 
of the Defendants and parked motor vehicles on the property of the 
Defendants after being notified of the location of the boundary line between 
the parcels of Plaintiffs and Defendants[.] 
b. Plaintiffs refused to allow their property to be surveyed prior to [the] filing of 
their trespass action and continue[d] to refuse to allow their property to be 
surveyed during the pendency of the action. 
c. The actions of the Plaintiff[s] in refusing to allow their property to be 
surveyed substantially increased the cost of the litigation to the Defendants. 
d. The Plaintiffs frivolously and without foundation pursued a claim to deny 
Defendants the right to receive irrigation water through a pump and pipeline 
which were in existence prior to the time Plaintiffs acquired their property. 
e. The Defendants [sic] repetitiously asserted the same erroneous statements of 
facts and claims in various pleadings which substantially increased the cost to 
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Defendants of having their counsel review and respond to Plaintiff’s [sic] 
erroneous claims regarding the legal description of the Plaintiffs’ property and 
the pump and pipeline which serve[d] Defendants’ property prior to Plaintiffs’ 
purchase of the property.  
The Owens make several conclusory allegations that attorney fees should not have been 
awarded to the Smiths. However, the Owens never articulate how the district court abused its 
discretion in awarding attorney fees. “Failing to demonstrate that an abuse of discretion occurred 
under any part of the test applied by this Court ... is fatal to [an] argument that the court abused 
its discretion.”  Kelly v. Kelly, 165 Idaho 716, 731, 451 P.3d 429, 444 (2019) (quoting Matter of 
Doe I, 165 Idaho 33, 44, 437 P.3d 33, 44 (2019)). Although this Court can appreciate the 
intricacies of representing oneself pro se, it is well established that “[p]ro se litigants must 
conform to the same standards and rules as litigants represented by attorneys.” Nickerson, 164 
Idaho at 38, 423 P.3d at 459 (quoting Mendez, 163 Idaho at 242, 409 P.3d at 822). The Owens 
carried the burden of showing that an abuse of discretion occurred. Nielson, 163 Idaho at 489, 
415 P.3d at 357. The Owens’ failure to argue how the district court abused its discretion is fatal 
to their argument.  
C. 
The district court’s failure to rule on the Owens’ motion for injunctive relief and 
punitive damages is moot. 
The Owens also argue the district court erred by failing to rule on their pending motions 
for leave to file punitive damages and for injunctive relief. However, rather than rule on the 
Owens’ motions, the district court granted the Smiths’ motion for summary judgment, effectively 
resolving all the remaining issues in the case. In doing so, the district court held that the Owens 
have no right, title or interest in the disputed property described in the Smiths’ deed and held the 
Smiths were bona fide purchasers with a superior claim to any land described in the same 
instrument. Thus, the Smiths did not trespass on the Owens’ property. The district court’s 
holding rendered the Owens’ pending motions moot. We affirm that ruling. 
D. 
The Owens have failed to show the district court judge acted with bias. 
As an issue on appeal the Owens stated, “Judge Tribe Bias and Failure to maintain 
Judicial Conduct.” The Owens claim that the Smiths only prevailed because of their attorney’s 
longstanding relationship with the second judge who treated them with disdain because they 
were pro se. “Regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set forth in the party’s brief as one of 
the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent 
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argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court.” Bach, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d 
at 1152. The Owens have provided no legal authority on judicial bias, nor do they provide any 
citations to the record that demonstrate any specific acts of bias or prejudice by Judge Tribe. We 
also note that because the Owens did not move to disqualify the second district judge, they are 
precluded from raising that issue on appeal. Zylstra v. State, 157 Idaho 457, 468, 337 P.3d 616, 
627 (2014) (In the absence of a motion for disqualification, this Court will not review allegations 
of judicial bias on appeal); see also Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 469, 210 P.3d 563, 577 
(Ct. App. 2009); McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 396, 64 P.3d 317, 322 (2003). Accordingly, 
we will not consider the Owens’ claims that Judge Tribe acted with bias.   
E. 
We award attorney fees to the Smiths on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121.  
The Smiths request attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121, arguing 
that the Owens have not raised any meritorious issues on appeal but have inflicted additional 
monetary damage on the Smiths by requiring them to defend an appeal that has no merit. Idaho 
Code section 12-121 allows the award of attorney fees in a civil action if the appeal merely 
invites the Court to second guess the findings of the lower court. Bach, 148 Idaho at 797, 229 
P.3d at 1159 (citing Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 514, 181 P.3d 435, 440 (2007)). 
Attorney fees may also be awarded under section 12-121 “if the appeal was brought or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.” Id. An award of fees under section 12-121 is 
within this Court’s discretion. Id.  
The Owens have simply invited this Court to second-guess the district court’s findings in 
a lengthy brief without providing any new argument. The Owens have also advanced a number 
of redundant, conclusory allegations on appeal that are not supported by sufficient argument or 
authority. As a result, we award the Smiths attorney fees under section 12-121. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Smiths. We award 
attorney fees under Idaho Appellate Rule 41(c) and Idaho Code section 12-121. We award costs 
to the Smiths under Idaho Appellate Rule 40. 
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices STEGNER and MOELLER CONCUR. 
Justice pro tem KIDWELL dissenting in part: 
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I respectfully dissent from the award of attorney fees on appeal. Otherwise, I concur with 
the majority Opinion.