Case Title: In the Matter of J.G.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20120199

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 2013-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2013 ND 26In the Matter of
J.G. Brian D. Grosinger, Morton County Assistant State's Attorney, Plaintiff and Appelleev. J.G., Defendant and AppellantNo. 20120199Appeal from the District Court of Morton
County, South Central Judicial District, the Honorable Thomas J. Schneider, Judge.AFFIRMED.Opinion of the Court by Sandstrom, Justice.Brian D. Grosinger (on brief), Assistant State's Attorney,
210 Second Avenue NW, Mandan, N.D. 58554, for plaintiff and appellee.Kent M. Morrow (on brief), 411 North Fourth Street, P.O.
Box 2155, Bismarck, N.D. 58502-2155, for defendant and appellant.Matter of J.G.No. 20120199Sandstrom, Justice.[¶1] J.G. appeals from a district court order denying his petition for discharge
from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3.
Concluding the district court did not err in finding J.G. engaged in sexually predatory conduct and
the State established by clear and convincing evidence that J.G. remains a sexually dangerous
individual, we affirm.I[¶2] In November 2002,
J.G. was initially committed as a sexually dangerous individual, and his commitment was not
appealed. J.G. again petitioned for discharge in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2008, and each petition
was subsequently denied. J.G. did not appeal the denial of any of these petitions. In June 2009,
J.G. petitioned for discharge, and after a November 2010 hearing, a district court denied his
petition. J.G. appealed, arguing insufficient evidence supported his continued commitment, and
we summarily affirmed. Matter of J.G.,
2011 ND 73, ¶ 1, 799 N.W.2d 406. In March 2012, the district court held a hearing on J.G.'s petition for discharge and annual
review. Robert Lisota, Ph.D., a State Hospital psychologist, and Stacey Benson, Psy.D., an
independent psychologist, filed reports and testified before the district court. At the hearing, the
two experts agreed J.G. has a congenital or acquired condition manifested by a sexual disorder, a
personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction, and the respective diagnoses were
made in their reports. The experts disagreed, however, on whether he had previously engaged in
sexually predatory conduct warranting commitment and whether he is likely to
reoffend.[¶3] Dr. Benson testified and wrote in her report that she
is not certain J.G.'s crime of indecent exposure at age 12 constitutes the statutory definition of
sexually predatory conduct. In her testimony and report, Dr. Benson expressed her concern with
the difficulty in determining whether J.G. is likely to reoffend, because the juvenile actuarial
instruments used to predict future risk are no longer appropriate now that J.G. is an adult. She
testified case history and clinical judgment are less effective in predicting who will reoffend. In his
testimony and report, Dr. Lisota identified a number of dynamic risk factors he believes indicate a
high risk of future sexually offensive behavior. He also noted that because of J.G.'s diagnosed
cognitive and personality disorders, as well as his failure to complete sex offender treatment, J.G.
would likely have serious difficulty controlling his behavior.[¶4]
After reviewing both experts' reports and hearing their testimony, the district court found the
State established by clear and convincing evidence J.G. is likely to reoffend and has serious
difficulty controlling his behavior. The district court ordered him to remain committed as a
sexually dangerous individual.[¶5] J.G. argues the State did not
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he remains a sexually dangerous individual under
N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3.[¶6] The district court had jurisdiction under
N.D. Const. art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-02. The appeal was
timely under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-19. We have jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art.
VI, §§ 2 and 6, and N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-19.II[¶7] On appeal, J.G. argues the district court
erred in finding the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that he engaged in sexually
predatory conduct and that he is likely to reoffend.[¶8] We review
the civil commitment of a sexually dangerous individual under a modified clearly erroneous
standard of review. Matter of Rubey,
2012 ND 133, ¶ 8, 818 N.W.2d 731. We will affirm a district court order denying a petition for discharge unless it is induced by
an erroneous view of the law or we are firmly convinced the order is not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. Id.[¶9] At a
discharge hearing, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the
petitioner remains a sexually dangerous individual. Matter of Midgett, 2010 ND 98, ¶ 7, 783 N.W.2d 27. Under
N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8), a sexually dangerous individual
is:[A]n individual who is shown to have engaged in sexually predatory
conduct and who has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, a
personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction that makes that individual likely to
engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a danger to the physical or
mental health or safety of others. In addition, to satisfy the due process
requirements of Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002), we have said, "Substantive
due process requires proof that the individual facing commitment has serious difficulty controlling
his behavior." Matter of Rubey, 2012 ND
133, ¶ 8, 818 N.W.2d 731
(quoting Matter of Rubey, 2011 ND 165,
¶ 5, 801 N.W.2d 702). "We have
construed the definition of a sexually dangerous individual to require a nexus between the
disorder and dangerousness, which distinguishes such an individual from other dangerous
persons." Matter of G.R.H., 2011 ND 21,
¶ 11, 793 N.W.2d 460.A[¶10] J.G. first argues the district court's finding
he engaged in sexually predatory conduct was not supported by clear and convincing evidence,
because his index offense of indecent exposure did not constitute a "sexual act" or "sexual
contact" under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(6) or (7). He argues that under Interest of Maedche, 2010 ND 171, ¶ 17, 788 N.W.2d 331, in which
this Court noted indecent exposure "may not be a sexual act or sexual contact," the State has not
satisfied the requirement under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) that he be shown to have
engaged in sexually predatory conduct. His argument, however, is barred by res judicata. In
Laib v. Laib, we
said,"Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of claims
or issues that were raised or could have been raised in a prior action between the same parties or
their privies, and which were resolved by final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Under res judicata principles, it is inappropriate to rehash issues which were tried or could have
been tried by the court in prior proceedings." 2010 ND 62, ¶ 10, 780 N.W.2d 660 (quoting Wetch v. Wetch, 539 N.W.2d 309, 311 (N.D. 1995)).[¶11] J.G. did not argue his underlying conduct did not meet the statutory
definition of "sexually predatory conduct" under N.D.C.C. § 25-03.3-01(8) in any of
the six previous judicial proceedings regarding his commitment as a sexually dangerous individual;
thus the issue of whether J.G. engaged in sexually predatory conduct was resolved by final order
in 2002. Whether an individual engaged in sexually predatory conduct is barred by res judicata
from being relitigated on a petition for discharge.B[¶12] J.G. also argues the district court erred in finding he is likely to reoffend.
J.G. relies on Dr. Benson's report and testimony in which she contends the actuarial risk
assessment instruments are not appropriate because they are intended for juveniles. Dr. Benson
testified the use of clinical judgment is a less effective and problematic way to assess an
individual's risk of reoffense. She testified an "inherent difficulty" exists when trying to prove the
likelihood of reoffense in an adult male whose last sexual charge occurred when he was twelve
years old. Dr. Benson further testified that adolescents are by nature more impulsive and that
developmental changes as one ages must be kept in mind when assessing an adult whose only
offenses occurred when he was a child.[¶13] Dr. Lisota testified,
however, about a number of dynamic risk factors he found to be "problematic." Factors Dr. Lisota
reported as problematic included significant social influences, hostility toward women, general
social rejection and loneliness, lack of concern for others, impulsiveness, poor cognitive
problem-solving, negative emotionality, sex drive and sexual preoccupation, sex as coping,
deviant sexual preference, and cooperation with supervision. He concluded in his report J.G.
poses a high risk of sexually offensive behavior. In her testimony, Dr. Benson agreed her
examinations identify similar dynamic risk factors, though not labeled exactly the same, and her
results of J.G.'s risk factors were "consistent" with Dr. Lisota's.[¶14] The district court found, in regard to J.G.'s likelihood of
reoffense:The Respondent's behavior through the history of the case
shows a likelihood of re-offense. In recent history is the example of him propositioning a peer,
and then being offending by the rejection and assertion of boundaries; which demonstrates his
inability to understand the rights of others in addition to showing his inability to control his
behavior by not following institutional rules.To the other extreme, in his early history, there
are the Respondent's offenses against peers in the juvenile rehabilitative system. Looking at this
range shows a likelihood of re-offense.The Court cannot accept Dr. Benson's theory that the
juvenile risk evaluation tools are no longer valid due to the passage of time. The example of
recent behavior shows the concern has not abated through the passage of time.The Court also
finds the failure of the Respondent to successfully complete treatment has relevance and is an
important fact in the proof of the third prong. This Court recognizes and understands the
challenge the Respondent faces is even greater than normal due to his Cognitive Difficulties.
Nevertheless, the danger the Respondent presents remains paramount.Dr. Lisota's testimony
identified multiple dynamic factors regarding the Respondent that are problematic for the present.
Those factors are identified at pages 7-8 of Dr. Lisota's written report. All of those factors are
relevant to the proof of the likelihood of re-offense. Of particular concern are the factors Sexual
preoccupation, and deviant sexual preference. The Court finds these factors not just prove the
likelihood of re-offense but significantly increase the danger presented by this
Respondent.[¶15] A review of the district
court order shows the court based its decision to deny J.G.'s petition for discharge on specific
findings after it found Dr. Lisota's testimony more credible. "The district court is the best
credibility evaluator in cases of conflicting testimony, and we will not second-guess the district
court's credibility determinations." Matter of
Hanenberg, 2010 ND 8, ¶ 9, 777 N.W.2d 62. Because it is
established in experts' reports and testimony in the record, the district court's finding that J.G. is
likely to reoffend is not clearly erroneous.[¶16] We conclude
from our review of the record, the district court's order denying J.G.'s petition for discharge from
commitment is not based on an erroneous view of the law and is supported by clear and
convincing evidence J.G. remains a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3.
We therefore conclude the district court did not clearly err in denying J.G.'s petition.III[¶17] We affirm the district court
order.[¶18] Dale V. SandstromDaniel J. CrothersMary Muehlen
MaringCarol Ronning KapsnerGerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.