Case Title: Dutton v. Dept. of Social Welfare

Citation: 168 Vt. 281, 721 A.2d 109

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-09-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dutton v. Dept. of Social Welfare  (97-222); 168 Vt. 281; 721 A.2d 109

[Filed 11-Sep-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 97-222

Dorothy Dutton, June Messier                 Supreme Court
& Lester Brown
                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      Human Services Board

Department of Social Welfare                 February Term, 1998

Theodore C. Kramer, Chair

       William Dysart, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Burlington for
  Plaintiffs-Appellants.

       Donelle Smith Staley, Assistant Attorney General, and Christopher L.
  White, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Waterbury, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Wesley,
          Supr. J., Specially Assigned.

       JOHNSON, J.  Petitioners appeal from Human Services Board Fair Hearing
  decisions denying their applications for fuel assistance.  Petitioners
  argue (1) that the definition of household in the Vermont Home Heating Fuel
  Assistance regulations is inconsistent with the definition found in the
  federal Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8621-8629, and
  (2) that this inconsistency results in the denial or reduction of fuel
  assistance to certain households in violation of the federal act.  We agree
  and reverse the orders of the Human Services Board.

       Petitioners are two elderly homeowners and a boarder, each of whom
  resides in a house in which a boarder rents a separate room.  In each case,
  the boarder either prepares his meals or eats with the rest of the
  household in a common kitchen and dining area.  The boarders do not make
  separate payments for heating fuel, rather, heat is furnished by the
  landlord and its cost is included in the rent.  Petitioners separately
  applied to the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) for supplemental fuel
  assistance and their applications were denied.  Petitioner Dutton's

 

  application was denied because she did not provide information regarding
  the income and assets of her son who rents a room in her house.  Petitioner
  Messier was refused fuel assistance because he failed to provide
  information about the income and resources of the individual to whom he
  rents a room.  Petitioner Brown was refused fuel assistance because he
  failed to provide information about the income and resources of the owners
  of the house in which he rents a room.  Petitioners appealed the denial of
  their applications to the Human Services Board, arguing that the State
  regulation defining a fuel "household" is inconsistent with the definition
  in the federal act.  The appeals were consolidated by agreement of the
  parties, and the Board affirmed DSW's denial of fuel assistance.

       The Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act establishes a federal
  program providing block grants to states to help low-income households
  defray the cost of their home energy. Participating states are authorized
  to design their own plans to administer and distribute the block-grant
  funds, and the federal act expressly delegates to states the authority to
  define "the eligibility requirements to be used by the State for each type
  of assistance to be provided."  Id. § 8624(c)(1)(A).  Under the Department
  of Health and Human Services regulations, "the States are primarily
  responsible for interpreting the governing statutory provisions."  45
  C.F.R. § 96.50(e) (1997).  Thus, under the federal act, states may craft
  their own fuel-assistance plans "so long as minimal requirements
  established under the Act are met."  Rodriguez v. Cuomo, 953 F.2d 33, 34
  (2d. Cir. 1992).

       The federal act defines a fuel household as "any individual or group
  of individuals who are living together as one economic unit for whom
  residential energy is customarily purchased in common or who make
  undesignated payments for energy in the form of rent."  42 U.S.C. §
  8622(4).  The concept of a fuel "household" plays a crucial role in the
  federal statutory scheme because it determines whose income and assets are
  considered when determining if the household meets the threshold
  requirements to be eligible for assistance.  See id. § 8624(b)(2). Other
  minimum requirements are similarly linked to the concept of a fuel
  household.

 

  Participating states must agree to "provide that the highest level of
  assistance will be furnished to those households which have the lowest
  incomes and the highest energy costs or needs in relation to income."  Id.
  § 8624(b)(5).  States may not condition assistance on whether the household
  owns or rents the residence, rather, they must agree to "treat owners and
  renters equitably."  Id. § 8624(b)(8).

       Vermont's fuel-assistance program, governed by 33 V.S.A. §§ 2601-2609,
  creates a trust fund from which fuel-assistance payments are distributed. 
  See 33 V.S.A. § 2603(a).  The Secretary of the Agency of Human Services is
  directed by statute to establish household income and asset eligibility
  requirements for participation in the program, see id. § 2604(a), and to
  adopt regulations governing the calculation of a household's fuel costs,
  see id. § 2604(b).

       The Vermont program's regulations define a fuel household as "one or
  more persons residing in a living unit who share a primary heating source,
  regardless of . . . the cost-sharing arrangement for living and heating
  expenses among those people, or whether secondary heating sources are
  shared, or the relationship of each person to other persons in the living
  unit." Welfare Assistance Manual (WAM) § 2901.1(4), 5 Code of Vermont Rules
  13170006-3 (1997). The regulations also require consideration of the income
  and assets of "all Fuel Program household members sharing a primary heating
  source."  Id. § 2904, 5 Code of Vermont Rules 13170006-6.  A primary
  heating source is "the fuel from which a household derives the largest
  portion of its heat. . . . [and] is considered to be shared unless the
  primary fuel supplier can identify for billing purposes discrete user
  groups within the living unit."  Id. § 2901.1(3), 5 Code of Vermont Rules
  13170006-3.  Thus, in contrast to the federal act, which focuses on the
  economic relationship between individuals or separate families, DSW's
  definition of an eligible household focuses on the heating source and to
  whom the fuel supplier sends a bill.

       The Human Services Board determined, pursuant to these regulations,
  that the homeowners and boarders in each of the three cases at bar were
  part of the same fuel household because they resided in the same living
  unit and shared a primary heating source.  Accordingly,

 

  the Board concluded petitioners were required to include the income and
  assets of both the homeowners and the boarder in their applications for
  fuel assistance.  The Board also concluded that because petitioners failed
  to include this information, their applications were properly denied.

       DSW contends that our review of the Board's interpretation of the
  federal act is limited. It argues that we have reviewed state
  administrative agency interpretations of federal statutes under the same
  standard employed by federal courts when reviewing federal agencies'
  interpretations of statutes.  See, e.g., Shedrick, 158 Vt. at 545-46, 613 A.2d  at 694 (reviewing DSW interpretation of food stamp act under federal
  standard); St. Amour v. Department of Social Welfare, 158 Vt. 77, 81, 605 A.2d 1340, 1342 (same).  It is true that where a statute is silent as to a
  specific issue, we will defer to an agency's interpretation provided that
  it "is based on a permissible construction of the statute."  St. Amour, 158
  Vt. at 81, 605 A.2d  at 1342 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
  Defense Council,