Case Title: Milwaukee District Council 48 v. Milwaukee County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP001525

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 24 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP1525 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Milwaukee District Council 48, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Milwaukee County, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 379 Wis. 2d 322, 905 N.W.2d 140  
PDC No:  2017 WI App 82 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 19, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 24, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Stephanie Rothstein 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, J., dissents, joined by ROGGENSACK, 
C.J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there was a brief 
filed by Alan M. Levy, Samantha J. Wood, and Lindner & Marsack, 
S.C., Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Alan M. Levy. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed (in 
the court of appeals) by Mark A. Sweet and Sweet and Associates, 
LLC, Milwaukee.  There was an oral argument by Mark A. Sweet.    
 
 
2019 WI 24
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2016AP1525   
(L.C. No. 
2011CV16826) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Milwaukee District Council 48, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Milwaukee County, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 19, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.  Milwaukee County seeks to 
deny what it characterizes as "unusually generous" pension 
benefits to certain members of Milwaukee District Council 48 of 
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
(DC-48), citing the County's structural deficit, the escalating 
cost of the Employees' Retirement System of the County of 
Milwaukee 
(ERS), 
and 
the 
County's 
intention 
to 
grant 
a 
particular benefit to only those represented employees who were 
hired before 1994.  Known as the "Rule of 75," this benefit 
allows an eligible employee to receive a full pension when his 
age plus years of service total 75.  After the Wisconsin 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
2 
 
legislature enacted 2011 Wis. Act 10, which limited collective 
bargaining to base wages for municipal employees, the County 
resolved to codify existing Rule of 75 eligibility for non-
represented employees.  Instead, the County enacted an ordinance 
granting Rule of 75 benefits to all employees "not covered by 
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement" as long as those 
employees were hired before 2006.  At the time of enactment, 
County employees who were represented by DC-48 were no longer 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the last of 
which expired in 2009.  In order to avoid paying $6.8 million in 
benefits the County says it never intended to grant, the County 
urges the court to interpret "not covered by the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement" to mean "not represented by a 
union."  Because we must apply the plain meaning of the 
ordinance's text rather than rewrite it to reflect what the 
County may have intended, we reject the County's request and 
affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Milwaukee County has a history of negotiating CBAs 
with its employees, including DC-48 members.  In 1991, the 
County created the Rule of 75, which it amended in 1993.  The 
County's amended ordinance addressed Rule of 75 eligibility for 
employees "not covered by the terms" of a CBA.  See Milwaukee 
Cty. Gen. Or. § 201.24(4.1) (1993).  The amended ordinance 
reads: 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
3 
 
A member[1] who is not covered by the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement at the time his 
employment is terminated and who retires on and after 
September 1, 1993, shall be eligible for a normal 
pension when the age of the member when added to his 
years of service equals 75[.] 
Milwaukee Cty. Gen. Or. § 201.24(4.1) (1993).  Under this 
iteration of the ordinance, the Rule of 75 applied to each 
employee "not covered by the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement" if the employee's age added to years of service 
equaled 75, regardless of the hire date.  Id. 
¶3 
In 1994, the CBA between the County and DC-48 extended 
the Rule of 75 benefit to DC-48 members, but only those hired by 
the County "prior to January 1, 1994."  DC-48 members hired on 
or after January 1, 1994 were not eligible for the Rule of 75.   
¶4 
In 2005, the County amended Milwaukee County General 
Ordinance § 201.24(4.1) again, restricting its applicability 
within that category of employees not covered by a CBA to only 
those employees who were hired prior to January 1, 2006: 
A member who is not covered by the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement at the time his 
employment is terminated and whose initial membership 
in the retirement system . . . began prior to January 
1, 2006 who retires on and after September 1, 1993, 
shall be eligible for a normal pension when the age of 
the member when added to his years of service equals 
75[.] 
Milwaukee Cty. Gen. Or. § 201.24(4.1) (2006) (emphasis added).  
In other words, the County established a cutoff date for 
                                                 
1 "Member" means any member of the County's retirement 
system.  All County employees become members of the retirement 
system when hired.  
No.  2016AP1525    
 
4 
 
application of the Rule of 75 to employees not covered by the 
terms of a CBA:  employees within that category would be 
eligible for the Rule of 75 benefit only if they were hired 
before January 1, 2006.      
¶5 
In 2008, with the current CBA set to expire on 
December 31, 2008 the County started negotiating a new CBA with 
DC-48.  The County and DC-48 agreed to extend the CBA for 
another three months.  Although a tentative successor agreement 
was reached, the County Board never approved it and DC-48's 
members never ratified it.  DC-48's CBA expired on March 31, 
2009, and no subsequent CBA was ever consummated.  
¶6 
Effective June 2011, the legislature enacted 2011 Wis. 
Act 10, which limited collective bargaining for "general 
municipal employees" to base wages.2  See 2011 Wis. Act 10; see 
also Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(a) (2011-12).3  As a result of other 
changes 
made 
by 
Act 
10, 
DC-48's 
certification 
as 
a 
representative of County general employees was eventually 
revoked in January 2012.   
 
¶7 
After the enactment of Act 10, the County again 
amended Milwaukee County General Ordinance § 201.24(4.1) to 
codify Rule of 75 eligibility for employees covered by the terms 
of a CBA on September 29, 2011 and to add the demarcating date 
                                                 
2 It is undisputed DC-48 members are general municipal 
employees. 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
5 
 
of September 29, 2011 for that category of employees not covered 
by a CBA.  The relevant parts of the ordinance provide: 
(a) A member who, on September 29, 2011, is employed 
and is not covered by the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement, and whose initial membership in 
the retirement system . . . began prior to January 1, 
2006  . . . shall be eligible for a normal pension 
when the age of the member when added to his years of 
service equals seventy-five (75)[.] 
(b) A member who, on September 29, 2011, is employed 
and is covered by the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement with . . . District Council 48, or with the 
Technicians, Engineers and Architects of Milwaukee 
County, or with the International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and whose initial 
membership date is prior to January 1, 1994, shall be 
eligible for a normal pension when the age of the 
member when added to his years of service equals 
seventy-five (75)[.]  
Milwaukee Cty. Gen. Or. § 201.24(4.1)(2)(a)-(b) (2011)4 (emphasis 
added).5  The amendment applied the Rule of 75 to employees "not 
covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement" on 
September 29, 2011 and hired "prior to January 1, 2006."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  For an employee who, on September 29, was 
"covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement" with 
DC-48 or one of the other enumerated unions, the Rule of 75 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to this ordinance are to the 
2011 version unless otherwise indicated. 
5 Paragraphs (2)(c) through (2)(g) in the ordinance address 
employees "covered by the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement" with other unions.  The interpretation of these 
paragraphs was not raised by the parties and therefore is not 
before us.  See Milwaukee Cty. Gen. Or. § 201.24(4.1)(2)(c)-
(2)(g)(2011). 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
6 
 
applied only if the employee was hired "prior to January 1, 
1994."  Id. (emphasis added).  This disparate treatment of 
"covered" and "not covered" employees under the ordinance gives 
rise to the dispute before us.  Employees not covered by the 
terms of a CBA have a much later cutoff date-of-hire to be 
eligible for application of the Rule of 75, thereby expanding 
the pool of employees within that category who are eligible for 
the Rule of 75 benefit. 
¶8 
After DC-48's decertification, it sought a declaratory 
judgment that its members were not covered by the terms of a 
CBA, and therefore all members hired prior to January 1, 2006 
(as opposed to January 1, 1994) were eligible for the Rule of 
75.  Both parties moved for summary judgment.  The County argued 
that employees represented by DC-48 on September 29, 2011 were 
not entitled to the Rule of 75 unless they were hired prior to 
January 1, 1994.   The County asserted these employees were in 
fact represented by DC-48 and covered by the terms of a CBA 
despite the last CBA expiring in 2009.  DC-48 argued that, as of 
the September 29, 2011 trigger date, its members were not 
covered by the terms of a CBA, and were therefore entitled to 
the Rule of 75 as long as they were employed prior to January 1, 
2006.   
¶9 
The circuit court granted DC-48's motion and denied 
the County's.6  It reasoned the last CBA between DC-48 and the 
County expired in 2009; therefore, DC-48 members were not 
                                                 
6 The Honorable Stephanie G. Rothstein presiding. 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
7 
 
covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement on 
September 29, 2011.  The court of appeals affirmed.  Milwaukee 
Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cty., 2017 WI App 82, ¶1, 379 
Wis. 2d 322, 905 N.W.2d 140.  The County filed a petition for 
review, which we granted.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶10 Although the legislative changes made by Act 10 and 
the County's multiple amendments to its ordinance form the 
backdrop for this dispute, the central issue is quite simple:  
under Milwaukee County General Ordinance § 201.24(4.1)(2), were 
DC-48 members "covered by the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement" on September 29, 2011?  If so, only DC-48 members 
hired prior to January 1, 1994 would be eligible for the Rule of 
75.  This would leave DC-48 members hired between January 1, 
1994 and January 1, 2006 ineligible for the benefit.  However, 
if DC-48 members were not covered by the terms of a CBA on 
September 29, 2011, then the members hired between January 1, 
1994 and January 1, 2006 would be entitled to the Rule of 75 
benefit.   
A.  Standard of Review 
¶11 This 
issue 
involves 
the 
interpretation 
of 
an 
ordinance, which is a question of law we review de novo.  
Schwegel v. Milwaukee Cty., 2015 WI 12, ¶18, 360 Wis. 2d 654, 
859 N.W.2d 78.  In interpreting municipal ordinances, we apply 
the same principles used in statutory interpretation.  Stoker v. 
Milwaukee 
Cty., 
2014 
WI 
130, 
¶17, 
359 
Wis. 2d 347, 
857 
N.W.2d 102.  "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
8 
 
language of the statute.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court 
for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(quoted source omitted).  If the meaning of the language is 
plain, our inquiry ordinarily ends.  Id.  We give statutory 
language "its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except 
that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given 
their technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.  Context 
and structure are also important to meaning.  Id., ¶46.  
"Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in the context in 
which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id.  If this inquiry "yields a plain, clear statutory 
meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied 
according to this ascertainment of its meaning."  Id. (quoted 
source omitted).  If the language is unambiguous, then we need 
not "consult extrinsic sources of interpretation, such as 
legislative history."  Id. 
 
B.  Analysis 
¶12 The County argues DC-48 employees were in fact covered 
by the terms of the expired CBA on September 29, 2011.  This 
argument stems from Wis. Stat. § 111.70's duty to collectively 
bargain in good faith, which includes the duty to maintain the 
contractual status quo during contract negotiations, even if the 
previous CBA expired.  The County acknowledges that Act 10 
reduced the scope of collective bargaining, but nevertheless 
insists that its duty to maintain the previous wage rates under 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
9 
 
the expired CBA did not end until DC-48's decertification in 
2012——after September 29, 2011.  As a result, the County 
contends DC-48 members were "covered by the terms" of the 
expired CBA.  We disagree.   
¶13 Setting aside the duty to bargain in good faith, the 
County's ordinance, specifically its use of the phrase "covered 
by the terms" of a CBA, is plain.  The ordinance creates two 
classes of employees:  (1) those "covered by the terms" of a CBA 
with one of the enumerated unions and (2) those "not covered by 
the 
terms" 
of 
a 
CBA. 
 
See 
Milwaukee 
Cty. 
Gen. 
Or. 
§ 201.24(4.1)(2)(a)-(b). 
 
Regardless 
of 
what 
the 
County 
intended, the plain meaning of "covered by the terms" of a CBA 
includes only those employees bound by a valid CBA.  It is 
difficult to imagine how an employee could be "covered by the 
terms" of an expired CBA that no longer binds its parties.  If a 
CBA has expired, then, absent some other consideration, its 
terms no longer cover the parties.     
¶14 The County's invocation of the duty to bargain in good 
faith 
and 
maintain 
the 
status 
quo 
does 
not 
alter 
our 
interpretation of the plain text of the ordinance.  As part of 
the duty to "bargain collectively," federal law provides that 
employers have an obligation to "meet . . . and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment."  NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 
(1962) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  In Katz, the 
Supreme Court held a refusal to negotiate over mandatory 
subjects of collective bargaining violated the statutory duty to 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
10 
 
negotiate in good faith.  Id.  Accordingly, "an employer's 
unilateral 
change 
in 
conditions 
of 
employment 
under 
negotiation . . . is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate 
which frustrates the objectives" of the National Labor Relations 
Act.  Id.  Given a similar statutory obligation to negotiate in 
good faith, see Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(a), (3)(a),7 our courts 
adopted Katz's reasoning.  See St. Croix Falls Sch. Dist. v. 
WERC, 186 Wis. 2d 671, 677-80, 522 N.W.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(citing Katz and explaining that "[w]hile status quo recognizes 
that changes can occur during a contract hiatus if such changes 
would otherwise have been permitted under the expired contract, 
it does not permit an employer to make unilateral changes in 
areas that are otherwise mandatory subjects for the collective 
bargaining table"); Jefferson Cty. v. WERC, 187 Wis. 2d 647, 
654, 523 N.W.2d 172 (Ct. App. 1994) (explaining the "well-
established rule that an employer has a duty to maintain the 
status quo with respect to wages, hours and conditions of 
employment during contract negotiations, and that an employer's 
'unilateral change' in employment conditions or wages breaches 
                                                 
7 Paragraph (1)(a) defines "collective bargaining" in part 
as "the performance of the mutual obligation of a municipal 
employer, 
through 
its 
officers 
and 
agents, 
and 
the 
representative of its municipal employees in a collective 
bargaining unit, to meet and confer at reasonable times, in good 
faith, with the intention of reaching an agreement . . . with 
respect to wages for general municipal employees."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.70(1)(a).  Subdivision (3)(a)4 prohibits municipalities 
from refusing "to bargain collectively."  § 111.70(3)(a)4.  
No.  2016AP1525    
 
11 
 
the duty to bargain collectively" (quoting Katz, 369 U.S. at 
742-46; emphasis added)).   
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.70 requires municipal employers 
"to meet and confer at reasonable times, in good faith, with the 
intention of reaching an agreement . . . with respect to wages 
for general municipal employees," and the statute provides "[i]t 
is a prohibited practice for a municipal employer . . . [t]o 
refuse to bargain collectively."  Wis. Stat. § 111.70(1)(a), 
(3)(a)4.  An employer violates this duty to bargain collectively 
if it makes any unilateral changes; the employer must maintain 
the status quo with respect to those terms subject to mandatory 
collective bargaining.  Since enactment of Act 10, the only 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining for general municipal 
employees is base wages.  Accordingly, the County was obligated 
to maintain base wages at the same rate specified in the expired 
CBA.8 
¶16 The obligation to maintain the status quo does not, 
however, support the County's argument.  The status quo 
obligation arises statutorily, as recognized in our case law; it 
does not arise from the expired CBA.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 111.70(1)(a), 
(3)(a); 
St. 
Croix 
Falls 
Sch. 
Dist., 
186 
Wis. 2d at 677-80.  The parties agree the last CBA expired in 
March 2009, and no successor agreement was reached.  Because no 
contractual obligations existed on September 29, 2011, the 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 111.70 also limits any increase in base 
wages to the increase in the consumer price index. 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
12 
 
members of DC-48 were not "covered by the terms" of a CBA on 
that date.  The CBA did not give rise to any obligation to 
maintain base wages; rather, only § 111.70 did.  The dissent 
sidesteps this distinction and confuses the County's statutory 
obligation 
to 
maintain 
the 
status 
quo 
during 
contract 
negotiations, with contractual obligations that no longer 
existed after the CBA expired, insisting that these statutory 
obligations mean that "terms of DC-48's expired CBA with 
Milwaukee County remained in effect."  Dissent, ¶49.  The 
dissent neglects to explain how a statute is capable of 
resuscitating a defunct contract.  Expiration of the CBA means 
none of its terms survive and even importing the County's 
statutory status quo obligation into the Rule of 75 ordinance, 
as the dissent does, would not resurrect them.9 
¶17 The 
dissent 
complains 
that 
our 
reading 
of 
the 
ordinance results in meaningless surplusage.  Dissent, ¶¶31, 49.  
This concern is misplaced.  The canon against surplusage guides 
us to read legislative language "where possible to give 
                                                 
9 Peculiarly, the dissent accuses the court of failing to 
consider "how collective bargaining works," referring to the 
County's status quo obligations.  Dissent, ¶49.  We do not 
overlook "how collective bargaining works" but with some detail 
reject the dissent's proffered construction of the ordinance 
because it improperly reaches beyond the ordinance's text, and 
necessarily injects an assessment of the efficacy of the 
County's legislative choices, which we decline to do.  By 
relying solely on collective bargaining law rather than the 
actual text of the ordinance, the dissent's construction 
improperly "travel[s] . . . beyond the borders of the statute."  
United States v. Great N. Ry., 287 U.S. 144, 154 (1932). 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
13 
 
reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (emphasis added); see also Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 176 (2012) ("Because legal drafters should not 
include words that have no effect, courts avoid a reading that 
renders 
some 
words 
altogether 
redundant.").10 
 
Under 
our 
interpretation, both paragraphs (2)(a) and (2)(b) operate on 
different 
categories 
of 
employees 
and 
perform 
different 
functions.  See Milwaukee Cty. Gen. Or. § 201.24(4.1)(2)(a)-(b).  
Paragraph (2)(a) provides an eligibility date of January 1, 2006 
                                                 
10 Even 
if 
a 
plain 
meaning 
interpretation 
creates 
surplusage, sometimes legislatures do create surplusage and 
redundancies of language, and therefore the canon against 
surplusage is not absolute.  See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal Texts 176-77 
(2012); State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 
WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 ("Statutory language 
is read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, 
in order to avoid surplusage." (emphasis added)); State v. 
Mason, 2018 WI App 57, ¶26, 384 Wis. 2d 111, 918 N.W.2d 78 
(explaining that "[t]he directive that we endeavor to give 
meaning to all parts of statutes so as to avoid surplusage is 
not a directive that we give different terms different meanings, 
regardless where that leads" and "the 'preference for avoiding 
surplusage constructions is not absolute'" (quoted source 
omitted; emphasis omitted)); see also Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. 
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (explaining that canons of 
construction, like the canon against surplusage, "are no more 
than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of 
legislation, and in interpreting a statute a court should always 
turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others," the canon 
"that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute 
what it means and means in a statute what it says there").  The 
dissent's supposition that the use of "covered by the terms of" 
means something different than "covered by a" CBA in fact leads 
nowhere, as the dissent fails to identify any textual difference 
in meaning between the two phrases. 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
14 
 
for employees not covered by the terms of a CBA.  Id.  Paragraph 
(2)(b), on the other hand, provides an earlier eligibility date 
of January 1, 1994 for employees covered by the terms of a CBA 
with DC-48 or other specified unions.  Id.  Neither paragraph is 
left without a textual function and every word is given meaning.   
¶18 Even if no employees were in fact covered by the terms 
of a CBA with DC-48 (due to the expiration of the previous CBA), 
this 
extrinsic 
fact 
is 
immaterial 
to 
ascertaining 
the 
ordinance's plain meaning.  The concept of surplusage is 
intrinsic to the text of the ordinance; attempting to avoid 
surplusage is a tool employed as part of our textual analysis.  
While we endeavor to give effect to every word, we do not reach 
beyond the statutory text itself to consider the practical, 
political, or policy implications of the law, nor do we weigh 
the extrinsic ramifications of our construction, such as the 
"cost to taxpayers" noted by the dissent.  Dissent, ¶41 n.6.  
Instead, we confine our analysis of unambiguous laws to their 
text.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶46, 50 (explaining that 
"Wisconsin courts ordinarily do not consult extrinsic sources of 
statutory interpretation unless the language of the statute is 
ambiguous," and extrinsic sources are "interpretive resources 
outside the statutory text").  It would be improper to consider 
extrinsic evidence of whether the ordinance accomplished the 
County's goals.  It does not matter if the County created a 
category no employees filled when the County passed the 
ordinance; each paragraph of Milwaukee County General Ordinance 
§ 201.24(4.1) bears a textual function.  Accordingly, there is 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
15 
 
no surplusage problem.  Any apprehension about the existence of 
a category into which no employee may fit necessarily concerns 
the wisdom of the County's choice of language.  Such second-
guessing of the prudence of the County's ordinance would reach 
beyond 
the 
proper 
judicial 
role, 
which 
is 
limited 
to 
interpreting and applying the clear text. 
¶19 The canon against surplusage usually applies only if 
there are two ways to read a text.  See Scalia, supra ¶17, at 
176 (explaining that the canon typically applies when a 
statutory 
provision 
is 
susceptible 
to 
two 
different 
interpretations, one of which will result in surplusage while 
the other does not); see also Bourne Valley Court Tr. v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, NA, 832 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir. 2016) (Wallace, 
J., dissenting) (explaining that "courts should not apply the 
canon without first deciding that there are at least two 
potential readings of the statute (one that renders parts 
superfluous and one that does not)").  The meaning of the phrase 
"covered by the terms" of a CBA is plain, and it is not 
susceptible 
to 
the 
County's 
(or 
the 
dissent's) 
desired 
construction. 
¶20 Disregarding the actual text of the ordinance, the 
County proffers an alternative definition of "covered by the 
terms" of a CBA.  It claims that "covered by the terms" of a CBA 
was merely a "commonly understood method of categorization" 
meant to distinguish union employees (including those with 
expired CBAs) from those who had never worked under a CBA.  
Citing Local 321, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. City of 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
16 
 
Racine, 2013 WI App 149, 352 Wis. 2d 163, 841 N.W.2d 830, the 
County argues an employee is "covered by the terms" of a CBA 
"whenever a CBA has been approved and the employee falls within 
the category of to whom the CBA pertains."  In other words, the 
County wants "covered by the terms" of a CBA to mean any 
employee represented by a union who was at one point subject to 
a CBA.   
¶21 In support of this construction, the County points to 
the whereas clauses of the 2011 amendments to Milwaukee County 
General Ordinance § 201.24(4.1)(2).  One of these clauses 
expressed the County Board's "wish[]" to "codify in the 
ordinances 
pension 
provisions 
previously 
found 
in 
such 
collective bargaining agreements units for" general municipal 
employees "related to the pension multiplier, the normal 
retirement age and the Rule of 75[.]"  Based on the County 
Board's "wishes," the County insists that it could not have 
meant to expand eligibility for the Rule of 75 to DC-48 
employees hired after January 1, 1994 because the expired CBA 
did not do so.  The language the County enacted, however, says 
otherwise, and it is the enacted language the court must apply.  
"The words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and 
what they convey, in their context, is what the text means."  
Scalia, supra ¶17, at 56; see also Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶44-
46 (explaining that we begin statutory analysis "with the 
language of the statute" read "in the context in which it is 
used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to 
the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
17 
 
reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results," and if 
this analysis yields a plain meaning, we end our inquiry).  
Although whereas clauses and statutory preambles may be useful 
in resolving ambiguities, such language "cannot enlarge [a 
statute's] scope and operation."  See Smith v. City of 
Brookfield, 272 Wis. 1, 3-5, 74 N.W.2d 770 (1956); see also 
Scalia, supra ¶17, at 218 (explaining that while language 
appearing in a statutory prologue may be "considered in 
determining 
which 
of 
various 
permissible 
meanings 
the 
dispositive text bears," prefatory statements of legislative 
intention "cannot give words and phrases of the dispositive text 
itself a meaning that they cannot bear").  "It is the law that 
governs, not the intent of the lawgiver," and "[m]en may intend 
what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which 
bind us."  Kalal, 271 Wis 2d 633, ¶52 (quoting Antonin Scalia, A 
Matter of Interpretation:  Federal Courts and the Law 17 (1997) 
(emphasis omitted)).  "[I]t is the text's meaning, and not the 
content of anyone's expectations or intentions, that binds us as 
law."  Lawrence H. Tribe, Comment, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter 
of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 66 (1997); see 
also Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶44-46, 52. 
¶22 The dissent similarly strays from the text of the 
ordinance while assigning unwarranted import to the phrase "the 
terms of" in isolation from the full phrase:  "covered by the 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement."  The dissent 
admonishes 
that 
our 
reading 
of 
Milwaukee 
County 
General 
Ordinance § 201.24(4.1)(2) renders the phrase "'by the terms 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
18 
 
of' . . . functionally 
useless 
within 
subsection 
(4.1)(2)."  
Dissent, ¶38.  The dissent accuses us of conflating the phrase 
"covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement" with 
the phrase "covered by a collective bargaining agreement," 
insisting there must be a difference between the two.  Dissent, 
¶42.   
¶23 Specifically, 
the 
dissent 
cites 
Milwaukee 
County 
General 
Ordinance 
§ 201.24(3.11)(1)(a), 
(1)(e), 
and 
(1)(f) 
(2018) as other instances of the County's use of both "covered 
by the terms of" a CBA and "covered by" a CBA.  Dissent, ¶¶45-
47.  The dissent insists "[t]he Board of Supervisors' choice to 
use differing language in neighboring sections of the County 
Employee Retirement System ordinances should be respected," and 
the use of these phrases in paragraph (1)(a) in particular "is a 
distinction with a difference."  Dissent, ¶45.  Much like its 
analysis of § 201.24(4.1)(2), however, the dissent offers 
nothing more than a bare conclusion that the phrases must mean 
something different.  Dissent, ¶45.  The dissent cites two other 
ordinance sections using the phrase "covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement," but its analysis of these provisions is 
similarly conclusory.  Dissent, ¶48.  The dissent's inability to 
identify any operative difference between being "covered by" a 
CBA and being "covered by the terms" of a CBA lends credence to 
the likelihood that the use or omission of "the terms of" is 
nothing more than a "stylistic mannerism."  See Scalia, supra 
¶17, at 177.  
No.  2016AP1525    
 
19 
 
¶24 By insisting that "covered by the terms" of a CBA is 
different than "covered by" a CBA without identifying a textual 
basis for the distinction, the dissent disregards the reality 
that "[s]ometimes drafters do repeat themselves and do include 
words that add nothing of substance[.]"  Scalia, supra ¶17, at 
176; see also  Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 299 n.1 (2006) ("While it is generally 
presumed that statutes do not contain surplusage, instances of 
surplusage are not unknown."); United States v. Bronstein, 849 
F.3d 1101, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (declining to apply the canon 
against surplusage, and observing that at times "drafters do 
repeat themselves and do include words that add nothing of 
substance" (quoting Scalia, supra ¶17, at 176); Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("Statutory language is read where possible to 
give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid 
surplusage." (emphasis added)); State v. Mason, 2018 WI App 57, 
¶26, 384 Wis. 2d 111, 918 N.W.2d 78 ("[S]ometimes the most 
reasonable reading of a statute, one that gives it the 
legislatively intended effect, is one that renders some language 
in the statute surplusage.").   
¶25 "Though 
one 
might 
wish 
it 
were 
otherwise, 
drafters . . . often (out of a misplaced pursuit of stylistic 
elegance) use different words to denote the same concept."   
Scalia, supra ¶17, at 170; see also Freeman v. Quicken Loans, 
Inc., 566 U.S. 624, 635 (2012) (interpreting "portion," "split," 
and "percentage" to "mean the same thing" explaining this is "a 
perhaps regrettable but not uncommon sort of lawyerly iteration" 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
20 
 
to include redundant terms, and "the canon against surplusage 
merely favors that interpretation which avoids surplusage" 
(emphasis omitted)); Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877, 881-82 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (explaining "the presumption against surplusage does 
not apply to doublets——two ways of saying the same thing that 
reinforce its meaning" and noting "[t]he U.S. Code is replete 
with meaning-reinforcing redundancies").11  We should be wary, 
however, of "creat[ing] unforeseen meanings or legal effects 
from" what is nothing more than a "stylistic mannerism."  
Scalia, supra ¶17, at 177; see also Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. 
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (explaining that the canon 
against surplusage must yield to the "cardinal" canon "that 
courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it 
means 
and 
means 
in 
a 
statute 
what 
it 
says 
there").  
                                                 
11 Surely the dissent, in endeavoring to find outcome-
determinative meaning in each and every word, would not ascribe 
interpretive 
significance 
to 
the 
"doublets 
and 
triplets" 
prevalent in legal writings of every kind, such as "[e]xecute 
and perform——what satisfies one but not the other?  Rest, 
residue 
and 
remainder——could 
a 
judge 
interpret 
these 
as 
referring to three distinct things?  Peace and quiet——when is 
peace not quiet?"  See Scalia, supra ¶17, n.10, at 177.  As yet 
another example of how slight variations in the expression of a 
term often bear no substantive meaning, "[b]efore the 2007 
revisions, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contained 
varying requirements for cause, for good cause, for cause shown, 
and for good cause shown.  There was no reason to believe that, 
after removal of the attendant modifiers, the cause did not have 
to be good or did not have to be shown."  Scalia, supra ¶17, 
n.10, at 177.  So too here; there is no reason to assign a 
different meaning to "covered by the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement" than "covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement" and the dissent identifies no textual basis for doing 
so, despite its repeated invocations of plain meaning.    
No.  2016AP1525    
 
21 
 
Additionally, the dissent offers no elaboration on how our 
interpretation leaves "by the terms" functionally useless.  Our 
interpretation gives the phrase "covered by the terms" of a CBA 
its plain meaning; it means that the terms of the CBA——not 
statutory obligations——must cover the employees at issue.     
¶26 Although 
the 
dissent 
would 
adopt 
it, 
we 
are 
unpersuaded by the County's largely unsupported assertion that 
there existed some "commonly understood" definition of "covered 
by the terms" of a CBA that included employees who were not in 
fact covered by the terms of a CBA.  An employee is not "covered 
by the terms" of a CBA merely by virtue of being represented by 
a union.  If the County had intended such a categorization, it 
could have easily written the ordinance to accomplish this, as 
the court of appeals noted.  See Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 379 
Wis. 2d 322, ¶23 ("If the County intended by the ordinance to 
exclude general county employees whose CBAs expired before the 
effective date, the County could have said so.").  The County 
Board's generally expressed "wishes" to codify existing CBAs 
does not change our analysis.  Although whereas clauses may be 
useful in ascertaining meaning in the face of an ambiguous 
ordinance, they are not part of the ordinance and may not 
override the unambiguous language of the ordinance itself.  See 
City of Brookfield, 272 Wis. at 3-5 (addressing a whereas clause 
in a zoning ordinance and explaining "the preamble of a statute 
cannot enlarge its scope and operation, but it may be considered 
in determining the intent of the act." (citation omitted)); 
State ex rel. Columbia Corp. v. Town Bd. of Pac., 92 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
22 
 
Wis. 2d 767, 779-780 & n.10, 286 N.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1979) 
(explaining that a statutory preamble is not part of the 
enactment 
and 
is 
"merely 
'instructive 
of 
legislative 
intent'"(quoted source omitted)); see also District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577-78 & n.3 (2008) (explaining that 
"in America 'the settled principle of law is that the preamble 
cannot control the enacting part of the statute in cases where 
the enacting part is expressed in clear, unambiguous terms,'" 
but prefatory language may help to clarify an ambiguity (quoted 
source omitted)).   
¶27 In this case, we are not called upon to construe an 
ambiguous ordinance; the ordinance is quite clear so we need not 
consult extrinsic sources.  "We assume that the legislature's 
intent is expressed in the statutory language."  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶44.  Any indicia of the County's subjective 
purpose in enacting the ordinance beyond what is expressed in 
the text of the ordinance itself are irrelevant because the 
meaning of the enacted text is plain.  See id., ¶46.   
¶28 The County takes Local 321 out of context in an 
attempt 
to 
support 
its 
proffered 
"commonly 
understood" 
definition of "covered by the terms" of a CBA; the case does not 
support the County's construction.  In Local 321, the City of 
Racine and the union signed two successive CBAs, and the second 
CBA——although signed and legally binding——was not yet in effect.  
Local 321, 352 Wis. 2d 163, ¶¶1, 3.  The City argued the second 
CBA did not "cover" certain employees because it was not 
currently in effect.  Id., ¶14.  The court of appeals rejected 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
23 
 
this argument because under "ordinary principles of contract 
law . . . the fact that a contract contemplates that performance 
will not begin until some date in the future does not change the 
fact that the contract exists and is an enforceable, legally 
protected relationship."  Id.  The court of appeals correctly 
recognized that the plain meaning of "covered by" a CBA meant 
"an employee is 'covered by' a CBA whenever a CBA has been 
approved and the employee falls within the category of to whom 
the CBA pertains."  Id., ¶12.  The County takes this statement 
out of context to mean that an expired CBA still covers the 
member who originally agreed to it.  In doing so, the County 
disregards the distinction between the legally binding CBA 
governing 
the 
affected 
employees 
in 
Local 
321 
and 
the 
inoperative CBA in this case.  Logically, DC-48 employees cannot 
be covered by the terms of the expired CBA because it is a legal 
nullity.  Accepting the County's argument would lead to the 
absurdity of sustaining an expired contract in perpetuity. 
¶29 Finally, other portions of Milwaukee County General 
Ordinance 
§ 201.24(4.1) 
rebut 
the 
County's 
position 
that 
"covered by the terms" of a CBA really means "represented by a 
union."  The ordinance uses each of these phrases to identify 
different groups of employees.  Compare Milwaukee Cty. Gen. Or. 
§ 201.24(4.1)(2)(a)-(b) (using "covered by the terms" of a CBA) 
with § 201.24(4.1)(2)(f)-(g) (applying to employees "covered by 
the terms" of a CBA but "not represented by" particular unions 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
24 
 
(emphasis added)).12  Logically, the County could not have meant 
"represented by a union" when it wrote "covered by the terms" of 
a CBA because in paragraph (2)(f) it created a category of 
members who were both "covered by the terms of a collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
with 
the 
Milwaukee 
Deputy 
Sheriffs 
Association" and "not represented by the Milwaukee Deputy 
Sheriffs Association," and in paragraph (2)(g) it created a 
category of members who were both "covered by the terms of a 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
with 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Firefighters Association (IAFF Local 172)" and "not represented 
by the Milwaukee County Firefighters Association (IAFF Local 
172)."  "When the legislature uses different terms in a statute—
—particularly in the same section——we presume it intended the 
terms to have distinct meanings."  Johnson v. City of Edgerton, 
207 Wis. 2d 343, 351, 558 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996); see also 
Armes v. Kenosha Cty., 81 Wis. 2d 309, 318, 260 N.W.2d 515 
(1977) 
("Where 
the 
legislature 
uses 
two 
different 
phrases, . . . in two paragraphs in the same section, it is 
presumed to have intended the two phrases to have different 
                                                 
12 We are aware that the County added paragraphs (f) and (g) 
of Milwaukee County General Ordinance § 201.24(4.1)(2) after 
adopting the revisions at issue in this case.  Regardless of 
when the ordinance paragraphs were enacted, the use of both 
"covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement" and 
"represented 
by" 
a 
union 
indicates 
the 
phrases 
are 
not 
synonymous and cannot mean the same thing.  We interpret the 
language of the ordinance "not in isolation but as part of a 
whole" and "in relation to the language of surrounding or 
closely-related statutes."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
25 
 
meanings.").  The County's argument works only if we understand 
"covered by the terms" of a CBA to identify the same group of 
people as those "represented by" a union.  The use of both 
phrases in different portions of the same section of an 
ordinance belies this construction.  The County demonstrated it 
knows the difference between the two phrases by using them in 
different ways.  Indeed, the County created a class of members 
who were both covered by the terms of a CBA with a particular 
union but not represented by that union.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶30 The meaning of Milwaukee County General Ordinance 
§ 201.24(4.1) is plain.  Employees not covered by the terms of a 
CBA are entitled to the benefit of the Rule of 75 if they were 
hired prior to January 1, 2006.  On September 29, 2011, the 
operative date in the County's amended ordinance, DC-48 members 
were not covered by the terms of a CBA because the last CBA had 
expired.  Although the County may have been obligated to 
maintain base wages at the same rates expressed under the 
expired CBA, the obligation derives from statutes, not any 
contract.  DC-48 members were not "covered by the terms" of the 
expired CBA, which lacks any legal force or validity.  If the 
County intended a different allocation of benefits, it should 
have chosen different language.  But with respect to County 
employees hired between 1994 and 2006, the plain text enacted by 
the County does not confine the application of the Rule of 75 to 
unrepresented employees and the court may not rewrite the 
ordinance to give effect to the County's purported intentions. 
No.  2016AP1525    
 
26 
 
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
  
 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
1 
 
¶31 ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND 
ZIEGLER, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
I 
dissent from the majority opinion because it misconstrues 
Milwaukee County General Ordinances ("MCGO") §§ 201.24(4.1)(2) 
and 201.24(3.11)(1).  It errantly dispenses with the choices set 
out in the ordinances that use two different phrases: (1) 
"covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement" and 
(2) "covered by a collective bargaining agreement."  The opinion 
pays no heed to whether the phrases chosen by the Milwaukee 
County Board of Supervisors have distinct meanings.  Rather, it 
conflates the terms despite their use in the context of this and 
also nearby, closely-related ordinance sections.  The majority 
completely disregards this language and yet claims to engage in 
a plain meaning analysis that serves to render "by the terms of" 
mere surplusage.  Instead of evaluating whether that language 
can be construed to have meaning, the majority injects its 
conclusion that the Board of Supervisors did not mean what it 
said, 
relying 
on 
the 
notion 
"that 
at 
times 
drafters . . . include words that add nothing of substance."  
Majority op., ¶24 (internal quotations omitted).  Such an 
interpretation 
stands 
in 
opposition 
to 
basic 
rules 
of 
construction, which traditionally strive to give effect to each 
word of an ordinance when possible.  Due to the majority's 
significant 
departure 
from 
a 
plain 
meaning 
analysis 
of 
§ 201.24(4.1)(2), I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶32 The 
most 
glaring 
error 
in 
the 
majority's 
interpretation of MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2) lies in its failure to 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
2 
 
evaluate whether the language "covered by the terms of a 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement," 
as 
used 
throughout 
the 
subsection, could indeed have meaning when compared with a 
previous section of the ordinance that does not use that phrase.  
The majority proclaims its intent to adhere to the plain text of 
the 
ordinance, 
and 
then 
ignores 
traditional 
tools 
of 
construction 
to 
conclude 
that 
"[b]ecause 
no 
contractual 
obligations existed on September 29, 2011," pursuant to an 
active collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), "the members of 
DC-48 were not 'covered by the terms' of a CBA on that date."  
Majority op., ¶16.  As will be explained below, such an 
interpretation belies the plain meaning of the ordinance. 
A 
¶33 It is well-established that the rules regarding the 
interpretation of state statutes apply equally when interpreting 
local ordinances.  State v. Ozaukee Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 152 
Wis. 2d 552, 
559, 
449 
N.W.2d 47 
(Ct. 
App. 
1989) 
(citing 
Hambleton v. Friedmann, 117 Wis. 2d 460, 462, 344 N.W.2d 212 
(Ct. App. 1984)).  I start then by addressing longstanding and 
fundamental principles of statutory interpretation that should 
guide our analysis.     
¶34 In construing statutes, "[s]tatutory language is given 
its 
common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning, 
except 
that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  However, "statutory language is 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
3 
 
interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation 
but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46.  "If this 
process of analysis yields a plain, clear statutory meaning, 
then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied according 
to this ascertainment of its meaning."  Id.  "In construing or 
interpreting a statute the court is not at liberty to disregard 
the plain, clear words of the statute."  Id. 
¶35 Additionally and importantly, "[s]tatutory language is 
read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in 
order to avoid surplusage."  Id.  The majority correctly states 
that this rule is not absolute, as "[s]ometimes drafters do 
repeat themselves and do include words that add nothing of 
substance[.]"  Majority op., ¶24 (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan 
A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 176 
(2012)).  However, this is the exception, not the rule, when 
interpreting statutes.  Indeed, we have repeatedly stated that 
we should strive to not interpret statutes in a manner that 
renders any word or phrase unnecessarily superfluous.  See, 
e.g., Metropolitan Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2018 WI 4, 
¶¶41-42, 379 Wis. 2d 141, 905 N.W.2d 784 (interpreting Wis. 
Stat. § 70.32(1) so as to give effect to the word "practicably," 
leading to a conclusion that mass appraisal techniques are 
authorized by statute); Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 
WI 99, ¶151, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 337 (construing Milwaukee 
Charter 
Ordinance 
§ 36–13–2–d 
as 
distinguishing 
between 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
4 
 
contributions made by the City of Milwaukee and contractually 
protected benefits of plan members such that "contributions" 
could 
not 
be 
considered 
a 
"benefit" 
because 
such 
an 
interpretation gave effect to each word of the ordinance and 
avoided surplusage); Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage 
Dist., 2013 WI 78, ¶55, 350 Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160 (reading 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(3) to give effect to the phrase "the amount 
recoverable by any person" in the interest of avoiding rendering 
part of the statute surplusage, and thus concluding that an 
order for abatement is not covered by § 893.80(3) because 
abatement does not entitle "any person" to "recover" any 
amount); see also Scalia & Garner, supra ¶35, at 176 ("Because 
legal drafters should not include words that have no effect, 
courts avoid a reading that renders some words altogether 
redundant."). 
¶36 Moreover, when considering statutes, "[i]t is presumed 
that the legislature acted with full knowledge of the existing 
law, both the statute[s] and the court decision[s] interpreting 
it."  Kindy v. Hayes, 44 Wis. 2d 301, 314, 171 N.W.2d 324 
(1969); 
see 
also 
Blazekovic 
v. 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
225 
Wis. 2d 837, 845, 593 N.W.2d 809 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating that 
an analysis of statutes "begins with the presumption that the 
legislature knew the case law in existence" when it enacted the 
statutes); Carol J.R. v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 196 Wis. 2d 882, 
888, 540 N.W.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1995).  As we interpret state 
statutes and local ordinances the same way, there is no reason 
to disrupt that presumption here. 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
5 
 
B 
¶37 My analysis is driven by the plain meaning of the 
language in the ordinances at issue.  Specifically, certain 
parts of the ordinances use the phrase "covered by the terms of 
a collective bargaining agreement" and other parts use the 
phrase "covered by a collective bargaining agreement."  Instead 
of ascertaining why this choice might have been made, the 
majority quickly surmises that the language has no meaning and 
was gratuitously added.  
¶38 The majority starts its analysis at the finish line, 
reading MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2) in a manner that ascribes no 
meaning to the phrase "by the terms of," thus rendering the 
phrase functionally useless within subsection (4.1)(2).  It 
concludes that, "[r]egardless of what the County intended, the 
plain meaning of 'covered by the terms' of a CBA includes only 
those employees bound by a valid CBA," stating that it cannot 
"imagine how an employee could be 'covered by the terms' of an 
expired CBA that no longer binds its parties."  Majority op., 
¶13.  But, as will be demonstrated, such an interpretation 
contradicts the plain text of the ordinance.1  By utilizing the 
phrase "covered by the terms of," this section has broader 
reach, in that it results in fewer people being able to claim 
                                                 
1 I note that Milwaukee County also raises significant 
concerns regarding what it phrases as the duty to "maintain the 
status quo about mandatory subjects of bargaining" and its 
effect on the Milwaukee County General Ordinances.  As I focus 
on the plain meaning of MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2) based upon the 
ordinance's text, I will not further address Milwaukee County's 
argument regarding the status quo obligation. 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
6 
 
Rule of 75 benefits because even though they are not "covered by 
a collective bargaining agreement" then in existence, they may 
still be "covered by the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement."  If the drafters of the ordinance had intended to 
include all, rather than exclude some, a much simpler provision 
could have been drafted. 
¶39 The at-issue ordinance determines eligibility for the 
"Rule of 75," which provides eligible Milwaukee County employees 
a full pension plan when an employee's age and years of service 
equals 
or 
exceeds 
75. 
 
Milwaukee 
Cty. 
Gen. 
Or. 
§ 201.24(4.1)(2)(a) creates Rule of 75 eligibility for any 
member who, on September 29, 2011, "is employed and is not 
covered by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, and 
whose initial membership in the retirement system under section 
201.24 began prior to January 1, 2006, and who retires on and 
after September 1, 1993."2  MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2)(a).  Thus, 
                                                 
2 Milwaukee Cty. Gen. Or. § 201.24(4.1)(2) creates seven 
groups of members who may be eligible for Rule of 75 pension 
benefits, but only subsections (4.1)(2)(a) and (4.1)(2)(b) are 
at issue here.  The majority criticizes my purported failure to 
address or explain the effect of MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2)(f)–(g).  
Subsections (4.1)(2)(f) and (4.1)(2)(g) did not appear in the 
Milwaukee County General Ordinances until July of 2016——
approximately 20 months after this action was commenced.  
However, subsections (4.1)(2)(f) and (4.1)(2)(g) merely state 
that if an employee is covered by the terms of a CBA on 
September 29, 2011, and is no longer represented by either of 
the two enumerated unions at the date of retirement, the 
employee 
is 
eligible 
for 
a 
Rule 
of 
75 
pension. 
 
See 
§ 201.24(4.1)(2)(f)–(g).  The subsections seem to ensure that 
employees who fall within either subsection will have a pension 
despite no longer being represented by either of the two 
enumerated unions when they retire. 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
7 
 
§ 201.24(4.1)(2)(a) creates eligibility for any employee who: 
(1) initially became a member of the retirement system before 
January 1, 2006; (2) retires on or after September 1, 1993; and 
(3) on September 29, 2011, was employed and was not covered by 
the terms of a CBA.3 
¶40 Subsection (4.1)(2)(b) creates eligibility for any 
"member who, on September 29, 2011, is employed and is covered 
by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement" with a few 
unions, including Municipal Employe[e]s District Council 48, 
"and whose initial membership date is prior to January 1, 1994."  
MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2)(b).  Thus, under subsection (4.1)(2)(b), 
Rule of 75 benefits are afforded to any member of DC-48 or other 
enumerated union who: (1) initially became a member prior to 
January 1, 1994; and (2) on September 29, 2011, was employed and 
was covered by the terms of a CBA.4 
¶41 The majority construes subsections (4.1)(2)(a) and 
(4.1)(2)(b) in a vacuum to surmise that it creates two groups of 
members: (1) those covered by an existing CBA with one of the 
                                                 
3 The remainder of subsection (4.1)(2)(a) limits eligibility 
for certain employees, such as "any member eligible under 
section 4.5," which addresses "deferred vested retirement," for 
certain 
sheriffs 
or 
correctional 
officers. 
 
MCGO 
§ 201.24(4.1)(2)(a).  Such limitations are not relevant for our 
purposes here. 
4 Like subsection (4.1)(2)(a), subsection (4.1)(2)(b) states 
that it does not apply to "any member eligible under section 
4.5."  MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2)(b). 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
8 
 
enumerated unions5; and (2) those not covered by an existing CBA.  
Majority op. ¶13.  The majority's construction is problematic, 
because it looks no further to determine why the phrase "by the 
terms of" was chosen when in the previous section it was not.  
Perhaps it is used because members could still be covered by the 
terms of a CBA no longer in effect.  Since DC-48 members were 
not actually covered by an existing CBA on September 29, 2011, 
the majority creates, out of thin air, Rule of 75 eligibility 
for DC-48 members (along with members of other unions specified 
in 
subsection 
(4.1)(2)(b)) 
whose 
membership 
began 
after 
January 1, 1994, but before January 1, 2006.  By not accounting 
for employees who might still be covered by the terms of an 
expired CBA, the majority's interpretation of subsections 
(4.1)(2)(a) and (4.1)(2)(b) results in Rule of 75 benefits being 
afforded to more DC-48 members than called for under the 
ordinance.6  
¶42 The majority's construction of MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2) 
goes no further to determine whether the different language 
might have meaning.  Instead it conflates "covered by the terms 
                                                 
5 Subsections 
(4.1)(2)(c) 
through 
(4.1)(2)(g) 
of 
the 
ordinance 
further 
define 
which 
members 
of 
specifically 
enumerated unions, who were covered by the terms of a CBA on a 
particular date, are eligible under the Rule of 75.  See MCGO 
§ 201.24(4.1)(2)(c)–(g). 
6 While the cost to taxpayers cannot drive statutory 
interpretation, the majority's misinterpretation is not a 
distinction without a difference.  Indeed, the majority's errant 
construction of MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2) would result in Milwaukee 
County taxpayers providing an additional $6.8 million in 
benefits. 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
9 
 
of a collective bargaining agreement" with "covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement" and declares, without more, 
that the Board of Supervisors included words that added nothing 
of substance.  See majority op., ¶24.  In other words, the 
majority begins its analysis with an assumption that the 
legislative body did not mean what it said.   
¶43 We most typically do not begin our analysis with an 
assumption 
that 
mandates 
one 
conclusion 
without 
further 
considering whether the words used might actually have meaning, 
especially in the context of a provision that was drafted in 
order to exclude certain people from Rule of 75 benefits.  If 
the Rule of 75 was intended to apply to all, this provision 
would be unnecessary. 
¶44 The majority dashes to interpret MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2) 
by ignoring key language of the text itself and the fact that 
each phrase appears in surrounding provisions, for example, MCGO 
§ 201.24(3.11).  Under a proper understanding of the plain 
meaning of § 201.24(4.1)(2), since DC-48 members were covered by 
the terms of a CBA on September 29, 2011, they are eligible for 
Rule of 75 benefits only if they were employed on September 29, 
2011, and initially became members prior to January 1, 1994.  
See MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2)(b).  This language has distinct 
meaning as is demonstrated by its use elsewhere. 
¶45 As noted previously, statutory interpretation requires 
an evaluation of the context in which a statute appears, as 
statutes are viewed not in isolation, but as part of a whole.  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  Ordinance interpretation follows 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
10 
 
the same rules.  Ozaukee Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 152 Wis. 2d at 
559.  We thus must consider MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2) "in relation 
to the language of surrounding or closely-related [ordinances]."  
Kalal, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
¶46. 
 
The 
context 
surrounding 
§ 201.24(4.1)(2) provides further support for my plain meaning 
interpretation.  Crucially, in close proximity to the Rule of 75 
ordinance, the Board of Supervisors directly distinguishes 
between "covered by the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement" and "covered by a collective bargaining agreement" in 
a section dealing with mandatory employee contributions of funds 
to the retirement system.  See MCGO § 201.24(3.11).  Section 
201.24(3.11)(1)(a) states, in pertinent part, "Each member of 
the employes' retirement system . . . who is not covered by the 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement, or who is covered by 
a 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
that 
has 
adopted 
this 
ordinance," § 201.24(3.11)(1)(a) (emphasis added), except those 
contributing under a different subsection must contribute a 
percentage of the member's compensation under § 201.24(3.11).7  
The Board of Supervisors' choice to use differing language in 
neighboring sections of the County Employee Retirement System 
ordinances should be respected.  Specifically, the subsection 
(3.11)(1)(a) ordinance language "covered by the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement" and "covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement" is a distinction with a difference.  We 
                                                 
7 Subsections 
(3.11)(1)(c) 
and 
(3.11)(1)(d) 
operate 
similarly 
to 
subsection 
(3.11)(1)(a). 
 
See 
MCGO 
§ 201.24(3.11)(1)(c)–(d). 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
11 
 
must presume that the Board of Supervisors' decision to use 
distinct language was purposeful.  One of the two phrases would 
be completely unnecessary if the other has the exact same 
meaning, yet the two phrases coexist, in the disjunctive, and in 
the same sentence, hence leading to the observation that they 
must have different meanings.  While the majority does not 
assign any import to the different terms used in any section, it 
ought to be concerned with whether these phrases were chosen 
because they indeed each have a distinct, proscribed meaning.  
If they were identical in meaning, subsection (3.11)(1)(a) would 
not list them as alternatives to each other. 
¶46 Subsection (3.11)(1)(a) means to include only employee 
retirement system members who are "covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement that has adopted this ordinance," or who 
are "not covered by the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement."  This begs the question:  When would one be subject 
"to the terms of" a CBA but not be covered by it?  The answer to 
this question:  members may still be covered by the terms of a 
CBA when the CBA has expired but the terms might continue to 
apply. 
¶47 Subsections (3.11)(1)(e) and (3.11)(1)(f) similarly 
illustrate this linguistic distinction.  Subsection (3.11)(1)(e) 
applies to any member "who is covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement." 
 
MCGO 
§ 201.24(3.11)(1)(e) 
(emphasis 
added).  
Subsection (3.11)(1)(f) applies to any member "who is covered by 
the 
terms 
of 
a 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement."  
§ 201.24(3.11)(1)(f) (emphasis added).  Why again presume, as 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
12 
 
the majority does, that the Board of Supervisors' choice to 
create these distinctions deserves no significance?  There are 
indeed categories of employees who may be covered by the terms 
of a CBA but are not actually covered by a CBA. 
¶48 Moreover, my interpretation of the plain meaning of 
MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2) is further supported by a review of other 
parts of the ordinances, where the Board of Supervisors 
exclusively uses the phrase "covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement," without reference to "the terms of" any CBA.  See 
§ 201.24(2.18)(3)(a) (defining "[n]ormal retirement age" as 64 
for a member (a) "who is not covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement" at the time his employment terminates; (b) who is 
"not an elected official" at the time his employment terminates; 
and (c) "whose initial membership in the retirement system began 
on 
or 
after 
January 
1, 
2010" 
(emphasis 
added)); 
MCGO 
§ 203.2.6.f. (defining "[e]mploye" in part as "[t]hose employes 
who are members of a collective bargaining unit covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement which (as a result of good faith 
bargaining between the county and representatives of such unit) 
does not provide for their inclusion" (emphasis added)). 
¶49 As a practical matter, the majority's interpretation 
of MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2) is further flawed, as it renders the 
phrase "by the terms of" surplusage without consideration of how 
collective bargaining works.  Given the status quo requirement——
that even the parties agree has been and is controlling——key 
terms of the CBA must remain in effect until a successor CBA is 
negotiated and agreed to by the employer and the union.  Might 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
13 
 
that be a reason for using the phrase "by the terms of"?  Yes.  
Simply stated, certain terms of a CBA may have significance even 
after a CBA has expired.  It is undisputed that on September 29, 
2011, DC-48 employees were not actually covered by an existing 
CBA, as the CBA expired in 2009 and no new CBA was executed.  
Despite that, Milwaukee County was still required to maintain 
the terms of DC-48's expired CBA regarding base wages.  Thus, 
terms of DC-48's expired CBA with Milwaukee County remained in 
effect, and on September 29, 2011, DC-48 members were covered by 
the terms of a CBA despite the fact that the CBA was expired.  
The majority's reading of § 201.24(4.1)(2) fails to give any 
consideration to this basic principle to which the parties even 
agree. 
¶50 Thus, these ordinances can indeed be interpreted to 
give meaning to this language and with reason, draw a 
distinction between members "covered by the terms of" a CBA and 
members "covered by" a CBA.  The majority claims that my 
analysis "strays from the text of the ordinance while assigning 
unwarranted import to the phrase 'the terms of'" in the CBA.  
Majority op., ¶22.  To the contrary, as I have shown, I adhere 
to the text of the ordinance, reading MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2) 
completely and giving effect to each word in the ordinance.   
¶51 In 
order 
for 
the 
majority's 
reading 
of 
MCGO 
§ 201.24(4.1)(2) to pass muster, one must assume that the Board 
of Supervisors' choice to sometimes use different, distinct, and 
disjunctive provisions was haphazard and is entitled to no 
consideration whatsoever.  The majority fails to even attempt to 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
14 
 
reconcile how these choices might have meaning.  Therein lies 
the Achilles heel in the majority's reasoning. 
¶52 Due to the majority's significant misinterpretation of 
MCGO § 201.24(4.1)(2), I respectfully dissent from the majority 
opinion. 
¶53 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice PATIENCE 
DRAKE ROGGENSACK joins this dissent. 
 
No.  2016AP1525.akz 
 
 
 
1