Case Title: Marc A. Ayers v. James E. O'Brien

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
- 1 -
=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 204  
Marc A. Ayers,
            Appellant,
        v.
James E. O'Brien, et al.,
            Respondents.
Denis J. Bastible, for appellant.
Mark D. Goris, for respondents.
PIGOTT, J.:
Operators of authorized emergency vehicles are
protected from liability for conduct privileged under Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1104, unless their conduct rises to the level of
reckless disregard.  In this personal injury action, we are asked
whether an emergency vehicle operator may assert that same
- 2 -
No. 204
1  Ayers does not assert any statute, ordinance or
governmental regulation that defendants violated, and thus makes
no claim under General Municipal Law § 205-e (see generally
Aldrich v Sampier, 2 AD3d 1101, 1103 [3d Dept 2003]).
- 2 -
statute in an action in which he is the plaintiff, thereby
preventing the defendant from raising a comparative fault
defense.  We hold that he may not.
On July 31, 2005, plaintiff Marc A. Ayers, a Broome
County Deputy Sheriff, was on patrol in the Town of Chenango. 
While Ayers was executing a U-turn to pursue a speeding vehicle,
his car was struck by another vehicle, owned and operated by
defendants.
Ayers commenced this action alleging serious injury as
a result of defendants' common law negligence1.  In their Answer,
defendants denied the material allegations of the Complaint and
asserted four affirmative defenses, including that any damages
"must be diminished in the proportion which [the] culpable
conduct, including contributory negligence and assumption of the
risk, attributable to [Ayers] bears to the culpable conduct which
caused the damages."
Following discovery, Ayers moved to dismiss defendants'
comparative fault defense, arguing that the liability standard
for drivers of authorized emergency vehicles under Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 1104 (e) is "reckless disregard", and that he had
- 3 -
No. 204
2  A police vehicle is an "authorized emergency vehicle"
under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 101.
- 3 -
not acted recklessly2.  Supreme Court granted the motion striking
the defense.  
The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the
defense, holding that Ayers, as a plaintiff, is not entitled to
the protections afforded under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104
(e).  The Appellate Division then certified to this Court the
question whether it had erred as a matter of law.  We conclude
that the Appellate Division did not err, and we hold that the
reckless disregard standard of liability does not apply in
determining the culpable conduct of the operator of an emergency
vehicle when he or she is the individual bringing the action.
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104, broadly describing the
privileges afforded a driver of an authorized emergency vehicle
when involved in an emergency situation, contains the following
language:
"The foregoing provisions shall not relieve
the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle
from the duty to drive with due regard for
the safety of all persons, nor shall such 
provisions protect the driver from the
consequences of his reckless disregard for
the safety of others" (Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 1104 [e]).  
Clearly, this section "precludes the imposition of
liability for otherwise privileged conduct except where the
conduct rises to the level of recklessness," as we held in
Saarinen v Kerr (84 NY2d 494, 497 [1994]).  In that case, we
- 4 -
No. 204
- 4 -
concluded that a reckless disregard standard was appropriate, in
determining the liability of a defendant emergency vehicle
driver, because of the plain language of Vehicle and Traffic Law
§ 1104 (e), and in light of the purpose of the statute, which is
to give "operators of emergency vehicles the freedom to perform
their duties unhampered by the normal rules of the road" (id. at
502).  We noted that "the possibility of incurring civil
liability for what amounts to a mere failure of judgment could
deter emergency personnel from acting decisively and taking
calculated risks in order to save life or property or to
apprehend miscreants" (id.).  The reckless disregard standard,
which requires that a plaintiff show "more than a momentary
judgment lapse" on the part of the defendant, allows emergency
personnel to act swiftly and resolutely while at the same time
protecting the public's safety (id.).  
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) cannot be used as a
sword to ward off a comparative fault defense.  It is to be
applied only when the emergency vehicle operator is sued or
countersued.  Plaintiff's proposed interpretation of the statute
would shift the responsibility for any contributory negligence on
the part of an emergency vehicle operator to the driver of
another vehicle whom the emergency vehicle operator sues.  This
would result in significant unfairness in some cases.  For
instance, the operator of an emergency vehicle whose own
negligence, while not rising to the level of reckless disregard,
- 5 -
No. 204
- 5 -
caused his or her injuries would be entitled to full damages even
from a minimally negligent defendant.  There is no evidence that
such a financial windfall was intended or foreseen by the
Legislature when it granted emergency vehicle operators greater
freedom to disregard rules of the road while undertaking their
responsibilities. 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question answered in
the negative.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed, with costs, and certified question answered in
the negative.  Opinion by Judge Pigott.  Chief Judge Lippman and
Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones concur.
Decided December 17, 2009