Case Title: Mark Mendes's Case

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12857

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12857 
 
MARK MENDES'S CASE. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 3, 2020. - October 29, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Workers' Compensation Act, Jurisdiction of Industrial Accident 
Board.  Words, "Significant contacts." 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Reviewing 
Board. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
John M. Sahady for the claimant. 
Richard L. Neumeier (John C. White also present) for the 
insurer. 
 
Kathy Jo Cook, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers, & Patrick 
M. Groulx, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The claimant, Mark Mendes, is a Massachusetts 
resident who entered into an employment contract, performed much 
                     
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
of the work, and was injured all outside the Commonwealth.  
After protracted administrative proceedings in the Department of 
Industrial Accidents (department), his claim for workers' 
compensation ultimately was denied and dismissed by the 
department's reviewing board (board), which determined that the 
department lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.  
The claimant appealed from that determination to the Appeals 
Court, and we granted an application for direct appellate 
review. 
We conclude that, given the significant contacts between 
the claimant's employment and the Commonwealth, the workers' 
compensation act (act), G. L. c. 152, confers jurisdiction on 
the department to adjudicate his claim.2 
Background.  1.  Workers' compensation act.  Originally 
passed in 1911, see St. 1911, c. 751, the act was a "response to 
strong public sentiment that the remedies afforded by actions of 
tort at common law did not provide adequate protections to 
workers."  Neff v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Indus. Accs., 
421 Mass. 70, 73 (1995), citing Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 
349 (1914).  The act provides:  "If an employee . . . receives a 
personal injury arising out of and in the course of his 
employment . . . in the business affairs or undertakings of his 
                     
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys. 
3 
 
employer, and whether within or without the commonwealth, he 
shall be paid compensation by the insurer or self-insurer" as 
provided for in the act.  G. L. c. 152, § 26. 
"The act was intended to guarantee that workers would 
receive payment for any workplace injuries they suffered, 
regardless of fault; in exchange for accepting the statutory 
remedies, the worker waives any common-law right to compensation 
for injuries. . . . The workers' compensation scheme provides 
predictability for both employee and employer, balancing 
protection for workers with certainty for employers" (quotations 
and citations omitted).  Benoit v. Boston, 477 Mass. 117, 122 
(2017).  It did so by "establish[ing] a scheme of interlinked 
rights, obligations, and remedies 'all its own, not previously 
known to the common or statutory law.'"  Merchants Ins. Group v. 
Spicer, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 262, 267 (2015), quoting Ahmed's Case, 
278 Mass. 180, 184 (1932). 
Payments to injured workers are made pursuant to insurance 
policies that employers are required to obtain under the act.3  
See G. L. c. 152, § 25A.  See Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 
460 Mass. 484, 494 (2011).  Depending on the nature and severity 
of the injury and the degree of the resulting incapacity, a 
                     
3 Alternatively, employers may join a workers' compensation 
self-insurance group, or license as self-insurer.  See G. L. 
c. 152, § 25A. 
4 
 
covered employee4 may be entitled to an array of benefits 
including compensation for medical bills, lost earnings, and 
lost earning capacity.  See G. L. c. 152, §§ 30, 31, 34, 34A, 
35, 36.  Where an injured employee's claim for benefits is 
contested by the insurer, it advances through a series of 
procedural stages in the department to determine whether the 
claimant is entitled to benefits, and if so, the type and 
amounts of those benefits.  See generally Murphy v. Commissioner 
of the Dep't of Indus. Accs., 415 Mass. 218, 223-225 (1993), 
S.C., 418 Mass. 165 (1994); G. L. c. 152, §§ 10-11C. 
Over the years, the Legislature has amended the act to 
broaden the protections and benefits afforded to injured 
employees.  See, e.g., Sellers's Case, 452 Mass. 804, 812, 814 
(2008) (Legislature broadened definition of "average weekly 
wages," made employer participation in workers' compensation 
scheme mandatory, and established fund to pay benefits to 
employees of uninsured employers); Lavoie's Case, 334 Mass. 403, 
406-407 (1956) (amendments to G. L. c. 152, § 26, intended to 
enlarge, not restrict, act's scope).  In sum, the act is "a 
humanitarian measure designed to provide adequate financial 
                     
4 An employee has the right to opt out of the workers' 
compensation scheme and retain the right to sue the employer in 
tort by making such an intention clear in writing upon hire.  
See G. L. c. 152, § 24; Wentworth v. Henry C. Becker Custom 
Bldg. Ltd., 459 Mass. 768, 773 n.6 (2011). 
5 
 
protection to the victims of industrial accidents."  LaClair v. 
Silberline Mfg. Co., 379 Mass. 21, 27 (1979). 
2.  Factual and procedural history.  The material facts, 
taken from the record, are undisputed.  Franklin Logistics, Inc. 
(employer),5 a freight transportation trucking company, employed 
between 800 and 900 tractor-trailer drivers who transported 
goods across approximately twenty States east of the Mississippi 
River. 
The employer advertised for drivers nationally; the 
claimant responded to an advertisement the employer placed in a 
local Massachusetts newspaper.  He completed an online 
application for a position.  After screening the claimant's 
application, the employer invited him to its Pennsylvania 
headquarters to participate in a three-day orientation program.  
In January 2009, the claimant entered into an employment 
contract with the employer at the employer's Pennsylvania 
headquarters after successfully completing the program. 
As a tractor-trailer driver, the claimant picked up 
trailers loaded with goods and delivered them throughout the 
northeast and numerous other States.  Although the employer did 
not own cargo terminals in Massachusetts, it used three 
                     
5 At the time the claimant filed the claim, Franklin 
Logistics, Inc., was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Smith 
Transport Inc.  Neither was incorporated in Massachusetts. 
6 
 
facilities belonging to customers in Bondsville, Leominster, and 
Weymouth where drivers, including the claimant, exchanged empty 
trailers for trailers loaded with goods to be delivered. 
Over the course of his employment, the claimant drove a 
total of 112,436.2 miles.  Of those miles, he drove 31,739.9 
miles (28.23%) in Pennsylvania; 13,289.3 miles (11.82%) in 
Massachusetts; 11,416.4 miles (10.15%) in New York; and 10,754.2 
(9.56%) in Connecticut.  He drove the remaining 45,236.4 miles 
(40.2%) in twenty-one other States.  In addition, the claimant 
made 110 trips for which a city in Massachusetts was at least 
the city of origin, the city where goods were loaded into his 
trailer for hauling, the destination city where the goods were 
delivered, or the terminating city.  On an employer-generated 
report of the claimant's driving history with the company, 
Massachusetts appears more than 150 times as the location of a 
major trip event.  In total, the claimant drove or parked his 
truck in Massachusetts on approximately 166 of the 356 days 
during which he was employed by the employer, more than were 
spent in any other State. 
On January 18, 2010, the claimant injured his lower back 
while attempting to attach a loaded trailer to his truck at a 
location in Maine.  He was diagnosed with a bulging disc that 
caused him to be physically unable to continue his work as a 
truck driver. 
7 
 
The claimant filed a claim for workers' compensation 
benefits with the department.6  Although an administrative judge 
found that the claimant was disabled physically as a result of 
the work-related injury and had no earning capacity, the judge 
dismissed the claim on a procedural ground, determining that 
Massachusetts lacked jurisdiction over the claim because it was 
neither the place of injury nor the place of hire. 
The claimant appealed from this decision to the board, 
which recommitted the matter to the administrative judge for 
further findings.  On remand, a different administrative judge7 
found that the claimant's "numerous and ongoing contacts with 
Massachusetts" conferred jurisdiction in Massachusetts. 
The matter once again was appealed to the board, this time 
by the insurer.  The board concluded that the administrative 
judge erred in concluding that the department had jurisdiction 
over the claim and therefore reversed the decision.8 
                     
6 The claimant sought temporary total incapacity benefits, 
G. L. c. 152, § 34; partial incapacity benefits, G. L. c. 152, 
§ 35; and medical benefits, G. L. c. 152, §§ 13 and 30. 
 
7 The original administrative judge held further hearings on 
remand; however, he left the bench prior to making any 
additional findings.  The matter was transferred to a second 
administrative judge who relied on the testimony and exhibits 
already entered in evidence. 
 
8 The employer initially argued that Indiana had exclusive 
jurisdiction over the claimant's claim based on a forum 
selection agreement the claimant signed upon hire.  When the 
board found that the forum selection agreement was not 
8 
 
The claimant appealed from the board's decision to the 
Appeals Court in accordance with G. L. c. 152, § 12 (2).  We 
granted the insurer's application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  "Subject matter jurisdiction . . . among the 
[Commonwealth's] trial courts and administrative agencies 'is 
both conferred and limited by statute.'"  Middleborough v. 
Housing Appeals Comm., 449 Mass. 514, 520 (2007), quoting Edgar 
v. Edgar, 403 Mass. 616, 619 (1988), S.C., 406 Mass. 628 (1990).  
The act empowers the department to administer the Commonwealth's 
workers' compensation system.  The question of the department's 
jurisdictional limits, therefore, is one of statutory 
interpretation.  See, e.g., Merchants Ins. Group, 88 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 267. 
 
"The interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with 
primary responsibility for administering it is entitled to 
substantial deference."  Gateley's Case, 415 Mass. 397, 399 
(1993).  See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7) (in reviewing board 
decisions, we give "due weight to the experience, technical 
competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency").  
"[U]ltimately, [however,] the duty of statutory interpretation 
                     
enforceable in Massachusetts as against public policy, the 
employer argued instead that the claimant's employment was 
localized in Pennsylvania, the place of hire, and that 
Pennsylvania -- and not Massachusetts -- had jurisdiction under 
a theory of localization of employment. 
9 
 
is for the courts" (quotation and citation omitted).  Moss's 
Case, 451 Mass. 704, 709 (2008).  We review the board's 
interpretation of the act on a de novo basis.  See McDonough's 
Case, 448 Mass. 79, 81 (2006); Merchants Ins. Group, 88 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 267. 
1.  Jurisdiction under the act.  "Our primary duty is to 
interpret a statute in accordance with the intent of the 
Legislature."  Pyle v. School Comm. of S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 
285 (1996).  We have noted on previous occasions that the act 
"is a remedial statute and should be given a broad 
interpretation, viewed in light of its purpose and to promote 
the accomplishment of it beneficent design" (quotation and 
citation omitted).  Neff, 421 Mass. at 73.  See Higgins's Case, 
460 Mass. 50, 53 (2011), quoting McCarty's Case, 445 Mass. 361, 
364 (2005). 
Although the act states that it applies to employees who 
receive a work-related injury "whether within or without the 
commonwealth,"9 G. L. c. 152, § 26, it does not specify its 
jurisdictional limits.  We have recognized, though, that the 
quoted language was intended to "enlarge, not restrict, the 
scope of the act."  Lavoie's Case, 334 Mass. at 407.  See 
Conant's Case, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 695, 697 (1992) ("Underlying 
                     
9 The act was amended to include the quoted language in 
1927.  See St. 1927, c. 309, § 3. 
10 
 
that provision is the State's legitimate interest in avoiding 
the undesirable consequence to a resident worker injured in 
another State of being unable to travel to seek benefits and 
possibly becoming a public charge"). 
We have interpreted the provision to grant Massachusetts 
jurisdiction over a claim where the employment contract was made 
in the Commonwealth even if the injury occurred elsewhere.  See 
McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 220 (1931).  We also have 
determined that Massachusetts may exercise jurisdiction over a 
claim when the injury occurred in the Commonwealth even if the 
employment contract was entered into elsewhere.  See Lavoie's 
Case, 334 Mass. at 407.  However, this court apparently has not 
had occasion before now to consider whether jurisdiction lies in 
circumstances where the Commonwealth is neither the place of 
hire nor the place of injury, although the board has.  See 
Carlin's Case, 3 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 41, 42 (1989). 
Acknowledging that the act is to be interpreted so as "to 
broaden, rather than narrow, Massachusetts jurisdiction," the 
board has considered an alternative test to determine 
jurisdiction -- the "place of the employment relation."  
Hillman's Case, 15 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 67, 74 (2001).  See 
Carlin's Case, 3 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. at 42.  As framed by 
the board, the place of the employment relation is the place of 
hire, unless something has happened to transfer the employment 
11 
 
relation to another State.  The employment relation may be 
transferred from the place of hire if a new contract is formed 
in another State, or if the employee acquires "a fixed and non-
temporary employment situs" in another State.  Hillman's Case, 
supra at 72, quoting Carlin's Case, supra.  Applying this test 
to determine the location of the employment relationship in 
Carlin's Case, the board determined, in the circumstances of 
that case, that an employee who was hired and injured elsewhere 
had "sufficient contacts" with Massachusetts such that he had 
"acquired a fixed and non-temporary employment situs," thus 
giving Massachusetts jurisdiction over his workers' compensation 
claim.  Carlin's Case, supra.  See Hillman's Case, supra at 75 
(Massachusetts had jurisdiction where "employee maintained 
sufficient contacts" with Commonwealth following involuntary 
transfer out of State such that employment relation was not 
transferred to other State). 
Other States also have used the location of the employment 
relationship as an alternative test to determine whether 
jurisdiction lies for the purposes of adjudicating workers' 
compensation claims.  See, e.g., DiMuro v. Industrial Comm'n of 
Ariz., 142 Ariz. 57, 61 (1984) ("For out-of-state injuries, it 
is the presence of the employment relationship in Arizona which 
establishes Arizona's interest for purposes of applying its 
compensation laws"); Burse v. American Int'l Airways, 262 Conn. 
12 
 
31, 38 (2002) (jurisdiction lies if State is "[1] the place of 
the injury; [2] the place of the employment contract; or [3] the 
place of the employment relation" [citation omitted]); Johnson 
v. United Airlines, 550 So. 2d 134, 135 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989) (in 
determining jurisdiction under State workers' compensation 
statute, "it is the principal location of the claimant's 
employment and not the principal location of the employer's 
business which is relevant"); Shannon v. Communications 
Satellite Corp., 302 A.2d 582, 585 (Me. 1973) (jurisdiction may 
lie if State is "place employment relationship exists or is 
carried out"); Matter of Bugaj v. Great Am. Transp. Inc., 20 
A.D.3d 612, 613 (N.Y. 2005), citing Matter of Nashko v. Standard 
Water Proofing Co., 4 N.Y.2d 199, 201 (1958) ("The inquiry does 
not focus on the location of the employer, but upon the location 
of the employment"); Todacheene v. G & S Masonry, 116 N.M. 478, 
481 (1993) (claimant may recover under State workers' 
compensation act if employment "principally localized" in State, 
as defined by statute to mean employee is domiciled in State and 
spends "substantial part of his working time in service of his 
employer" in State); Perkins v. Arkansas Trucking Servs., 351 
N.C. 634, 637 (2000) (jurisdiction lies for out-of-State 
injuries if [1] employment contract was made in State; [2] 
employer's principal place of business is in State; or [3] "the 
employee's principal place of employment" is in State); Madden 
13 
 
v. The Holland Group of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898-899 
(Tenn. 2009) (by statute, jurisdiction may lie if employment is 
"principally localized" in State or if employee is resident of 
State and State has "substantial connection" to employer-
employee relationship). 
 
States have taken different approaches to determining 
whether an employment relationship is located within their 
borders.  Some, as did the board here, start from the 
presumption that the place of hire is the place of the 
employment relationship unless that relationship has been 
transferred to another State.  See, e.g., DiMuro, 142 Ariz. at 
62.  Other States conduct a comparative analysis of the contacts 
between the State and the employment relationship, concluding 
that jurisdiction may only lie if the State has more significant 
contacts with the employment relationship than does any other 
State.  See, e.g., Perkins, 351 N.C. at 638 (jurisdiction lies 
where State is employee's "principal place of employment" and no 
other State has same degree of "significant contacts to 
plaintiff's employment").  Still other States have concluded 
that the location of the employment relationship within those 
States depends upon the nature and extent of the employment 
contacts with the State.  See, e.g., Burse, 262 Conn. at 38 
(ties to Connecticut must be significant in order for it to be 
place of employment relationship); Hazealeferiou v. Labor Ready, 
14 
 
947 So. 2d 599, 605 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007) (for court evaluating 
"principal localization" of employment relationship, "temporal 
distribution" of employment is "a critical factor," which must 
be considered in conjunction with nature of contacts with State 
to determine whether sufficient contacts with State exist); 
Harlow v. Emery-Waterhouse Co., 484 A.2d 1002, 1004-1005 (Me. 
1984) (evaluating contacts with State arising from employment 
relationship); Matter of Nashko, 4 N.Y.2d at 201 ("If sufficient 
significant contacts with this State appear so that it can 
reasonably be said that the employment is located here, then the 
Workmen's Compensation Board has jurisdiction"); Knapp v. Hamm & 
Phillips Serv. Co., 824 N.W.2d 785, 789 (S.D. 2012) ("We look 
for factors that tend to show a 'substantial connection' with 
South Dakota on a case-by-case basis to determine the location 
of the employment relationship" [citation omitted]); Madden, 277 
S.W.3d at 900-901 (Tennessee resident must demonstrate 
"substantial connection" between State and employer-employee 
relationship to establish jurisdiction based on employment 
relationship).  See also Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 
U.S. 469, 476 (1947) (State's "legitimate interest in providing 
adequate work[ers'] compensation measures for its residents 
. . . depends upon some substantial connection between the 
[State] and the particular employee-employer relationship"). 
15 
 
In the instant case, the board appears to have adopted the 
narrowest of these tests for determining whether an employment 
relationship is located in Massachusetts.  Citing Carlin's Case, 
3 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 41, the board concluded that because 
Massachusetts was neither the place of hire nor the place of 
injury, the only way for the Commonwealth to have jurisdiction 
over the employee's claim would be if "something happened" to 
transfer the relationship from the place of hire, Pennsylvania, 
to Massachusetts.  Because the employee did not make such a 
showing, the board concluded that jurisdiction in the 
Commonwealth could not be established. 
Given the remedial nature of the statute, and the mandate 
to broaden rather than restrict jurisdiction under the act, we 
conclude that a more flexible approach is necessary.  We hold, 
therefore, that jurisdiction to adjudicate workers' compensation 
claims lies in Massachusetts where there are sufficient 
significant contacts between the Commonwealth and the employment 
such that the employment can be said to be located in the 
Commonwealth.10  Consideration of the location of the employment 
                     
 
10 We note that it is possible for jurisdiction to lie in 
more than one State.  See Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. National Van 
Lines, Inc., 613 F.2d 972, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (State with 
"substantial contacts to an employment relationship may apply 
its compensation laws without regard to whether another 
jurisdiction has or could have asserted jurisdiction"); Springer 
v. J.B. Transp., 145 Conn. App. 805, 817 (2013) (question of 
16 
 
relationship for jurisdictional purposes more accurately 
embodies the intent of the Legislature because it better 
reflects the reality of the geographical mobility of large 
segments of workers. 
Although determining the location of the employment 
relationship will depend upon the facts of each case, relevant 
considerations may include whether the employee is a resident of 
the Commonwealth; the employer's contacts with and presence in 
the Commonwealth; whether the employee was recruited or hired in 
the Commonwealth; whether and under what conditions the employee 
is able, or expected, to return to the Commonwealth between 
assignments; and whether the employer procured workers' 
compensation insurance in Massachusetts.  See Burse, 262 Conn. 
at 40; Matter of Nashko, 4 N.Y.2d at 202; Matter of Galster v. 
Keen Transp., 158 A.D.3d 959, 960-961 (N.Y. 2018); Matter of 
Bugaj, 20 A.D.3d at 613-614; Matter of Edick v. Transcontinental 
Refrigerated Lines, 300 A.D.2d 848, 849 (N.Y. 2002); Knapp, 824 
N.W.2d at 790-791. 
2.  Analysis.  Evaluating the contacts between the 
claimant's employment and the Commonwealth, we note that prior 
                     
jurisdiction based on location of employment relationship does 
not require showing that employment relationship exists only in 
forum State); Martin v. American Colloid Co., 804 N.W.2d 65, 69 
n.2 (S.D. 2011) (more than one State may have "substantial 
connection to employment relationship, and both could therefore 
be considered the location of the employment relationship"). 
17 
 
to and during his employment, the claimant was a Massachusetts 
resident who was licensed by the Commonwealth to drive 
commercial vehicles, including tractor-trailers.  See, e.g., 
Matter of Edick, 300 A.D.2d. at 849.  The claimant learned of 
the position with the employer by way of an advertisement placed 
in a local Massachusetts newspaper.  See, e.g., Matter of Bugaj, 
20 A.D.3d at 614. 
During the course of his employment, the claimant drove the 
employer's tractor-trailer thousands of miles in Massachusetts, 
more than he drove in any other State except Pennsylvania.  
Further, the claimant had employment-related contact with 
Massachusetts on almost one-half (46.6%) of the days he worked 
for the employer, more than with any other State.  He picked up 
tons of goods from, and delivered tons of goods to, the 
employer's Massachusetts customers.  See, e.g., Springer v. J.B. 
Transp., Inc., 145 Conn. App. 805, 825-826 (2013). 
The employer made regular use of three customer-owned 
facilities where drivers, including the claimant, regularly 
would drop off empty trailers and pick up loaded ones.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Edick, 300 A.D.2d. at 849.  The claimant was 
permitted to park the tractor-trailer in Massachusetts and stay 
at home during days off.  See, e.g., Matter of Bugaj, 20 A.D.3d 
at 614. 
18 
 
After sustaining his injury, the claimant returned to 
Massachusetts for medical care.  See, e.g., Matter of Galster, 
158 A.D.3d at 960.  The employer maintained workers' 
compensation insurance with the insurer, which provided 
insurance to Massachusetts companies.  See, e.g., Matter of 
Nashko, 4 N.Y.2d at 202. 
Considering the foregoing, there were sufficient 
significant contacts between Massachusetts and the claimant's 
employment such that the employment relationship was located in 
Massachusetts.  We therefore conclude that the Commonwealth has 
jurisdiction over the claimant's claim. 
Conclusion.  We vacate the board's decision and remand the 
case to the department for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.