Case Title: Board of Professional Responsibility, Wyoming State Bar v. Kara Crawford-Fink, WSB # 6-3966

Citation: 2018 WY 130

Docket Number: D-18-0007

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING
2018 WY 130
October Term, A.D. 2018

November 28, 2018

BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, WYOMING
STATE BAR,

Petitioner,
1-18-0007,
ve 1-18-0008

KARA CRAWFORD-FINK, WSB#
6-3966,

Respondent.
ORDER OF 120-DAY SUSPENSION

[1.1] This matter came before the Court upon the Board of Professional Responsibility’s
“Report and Recommendation for Order of 30-Day Suspension,” filed herein October 24,
2018 in docket D-18-0007, and upon the Board of Professional Responsibility’s “Report
‘and Recommendation for Order of 90-Day Suspension,” filed herein October 24, 201:
docket D-18-0008. The Court finds the two dockets should be consolidated for purposes
of this order. Now, after a careful review of the Reports and Recommendations and the
file, the Court finds both Reports and Recommendations should be approved, confirmed
‘and adopted by the Court, and that Kara Crawford-Fink should be suspended from the
practice of law for a total of 120 days. Itis, therefore,

    

[{2] ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that, in docket D-18-0007, the Board of
Professional Responsibility’s “Report and Recommendation for Order of 30-Day
Suspension,” which is attached hereto and incorporated herein, shall be, and the same
hereby is, approved, confirmed, and adopted by this Court; and itis further

 

[53] ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that, in docket D-18-0008, the Board of
Professional Responsibility’ “Report and Recommendation for Order of 90-Day
Suspension,” which is attached hereto and incorporated herein, shall be, and the same
hereby is, approved, confirmed, and adopted by this Court; and itis further
[4] ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that, in accord with the recommendations, the two
periods of suspension shall run consecutively and not concurrently. Thus, effective
December 14, 2018, Kara Crawford-Fink shall be, and hereby is, suspended from the
practice of law for 120 days; and itis further

[95] ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 25 of the Wyoming Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure, Ms, Crawford-Fink shall, for each docket, reimburse the Wyoming State Bar
for costs in the amount of $50.00 as well as pay the administrative fee of $750.00. Ms.
Crawford-Fink shall pay the total amount of $1,600.00; and itis further

(46] ORDERED that, regarding docket D-18-0007, Ms. Crawford-Fink shall refund the
sum of $2,350,00 to the elient; and it is further

[47] ORDERED that Ms. Crawford-Fink shall satisfy the above financial obligations by
‘writing two checks. For costs, Ms. Crawford-Fink shall issue one check payable to the
‘Wyoming State Bar in the amount of $1,600.00. Ms. Crawford-Fink shall also issue a
second check payable to the client in docket D-18-0007 in the amount of $2,350.00, Both
‘checks shall be submitted to, and received by, the Wyoming State Bar on or before January
2,2019; and it is further

[98] ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall docket this Order of 1
Suspension, along with the incorporated Report and Recommendation for Order of 3
Suspension and the Report and Recommendation for Order of 90-Day Suspension, as a
‘matter coming regularly before this Court as public record; and it is further

  

 

[49] ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure, this Order of 120-Day Suspension, along with the incorporated Report and
Recommendation for Order of 30-Day Suspension and the Report and Recommendation
for Order of 90-Day Suspension, shall be published in the Wyoming Reporter and the
Pacific Reporter; and it is further

[410] ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court cause a copy of this Order of 120-Day
Suspension to be served upon Respondent Kara Crawford-Fink.

[11] DATED this 28" day of November, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
i

MICHAEL K. DAVIS
Chief Justice
D-18-0007

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
‘STATE OF WYOMING
ww IPREME

In the mater of ) Sr NERS
[KARA CRAWFORD-FINK, ) FLED

WSB #63966, > WSBNo207-116 got 24.298

)
Respondent. d 18 | eK

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
FOR ORDER OF 30-DAY SUSPENSION

 

THIS MATTER came before the Board of Professional Responsibility on the 3 day of
October, 2018, for consideration ofthe Stipulation for 30-Day Suspension submitted pursuant to
Rules 9 and 12 of the Wyoming Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, andthe Board having reviewed
the Stipulation, the accompanying affidavit of factual basis and being fly advised in the prem
ises, FINDS, CONCLUDES and RECOMMENDS as follows.

1, Respondent was admitted to practice in Wyoming in 2006, and maintains a law
practice in Casper, Wyoming.

2. This matter arises from a complaint which was submitted to Bar Counsel in Sep-
tember 2017 by Respondent's former client (“Client”) relating to Respondent's representation of
Client in a divorce action.

3. When Respondent first met with Client in late 2016, Client informed Respondent
that she was married in 2005 and had daughters bom of the marriage in 2010 and 2011. Late in
2016, the husband left the family home and moved 10 Laramie, where he obtained employment
in the construction trades. He was also active in the National Guard, for which he received a

'$500,00 per month salary and was able to cover his family on Tricare, military health insurance.
4. Client retained Respondent in late 2016 to bring a divorce action against her hus-
‘band. The October 13, 2016, fee agreement provided for payment by Client ofa $5,000.00 non-
refundable fee, which was an advance payment of fees which would be earned by Respondent at
‘the rate of $200.00 per hour. On the same date, Respondent interviewed Client and obtained per-
tinent information, such as her date of marriage, the names and dates of birth of the couple's two
children, and the husband's employment history. Respondent advised Client not to have any
contact with her husband. Most of Respondent's handwritten notes from that meeting relate to
alleged mental and physical abuse of Cliet and the children by the husband. There are notes
indicating thet Client owns a home in Casper and her husband owns a home ia Oklahoma, There
{is no other financial information to be found in the notes,

5. Respondent filed « divorce complaint on Client's behalf on October 21, 2016.
Service of process on the husband was obtained on December 2, 2016. The husband did not fle
an answer. On January 3, 2017, Respondent obtained an entry of default and requested a default
Judgment hearing. On January 4, 2017, a notice of seting was sent scheduling a default hearing
for January 31, 2017.

6. Respondent di not meet with or take other action to prepare Client forthe default
hhearing. As a result, Client was unprepared forthe series of questions Respondent put to her on
the record during the unreported hearing, inchuding, “What was the husband's current employ=
‘ment status?” (2) “What was his eurent status withthe National Guard?” and (3) “Had he reen-

 

ited?” These were all questions Client could have answered had she known in advance thet she
needed to collect such information.

7. In the complaint Client later submited to Bar Counsel, Client provided the fol-
lowing desetiption of her feelings about the lack of preparation going into a hearing:
Thad my Default Hearing with Judge Daniel L Forgey at2:00 pm. I called
[Ms. Cravfords office because she had not showed up 30 minutes prio to the
hearing, I talked to ] Ms. Crawford's assistant and she told me that Ms. Crave
ford was on her way. We never had the meeting before the heating so nothing
‘was discussed. After the hearing we bad allitle meeting with Ms. Crawford and
‘older how upset I was because of how the hearing went.

8. _Inresponse to Client's complaint, Respondent gave the following account
of the default hearing:

‘The default tial was set for January 31, 2017. [Client] had not spoken to [her
‘husband) for months, Further he had ad very litle contact with his daughters
since moving back to Laramie, Previous othe divorce [the husband] had been a
member of the National Guard. He had eamed between $300-S500 a month in the
‘National Guard. However at my inquiry a the default trial [Client] was unsure
whether (ber husband) had reenlisted after his contract had expired in the fll of
2016. Furtber [Client] did not know winether [her husband] was employed or un-
employed. At the hearing [Client] als testified that [her husband] had not gradu-
ated from high school.

‘At the Defuult hearing after testintony the Judge ordered the divorce be grant-
ed, {Client} was granted primary legal and primary custody. The defendant only

‘bad supervised visitation at Caspr Family Connections every other Saturday.

‘The only way he could change the visitation was with a petition to modify cust-

dy and visitation. The court found that both parties were capable of earning at

least minimum wage and ordered $380.00 in child support. Despitemy arge-

‘ments and requests, Judge Forgey ordered that [Client] would provide health in-

surance, forthe minor children.

‘The draft decree Respondent prepared in advance ofthe hearing ~ which Client had not seen
expressly provided that Client would pey for health insurance.

9. Respondeat brought a draft divorce decree tothe hearing. In addition to having a
different plaintiffs name in the opening paragraph, the draft decree contained other mistakes.
For instance, the decree drafted by Respondent awarded Client “the real property Located {sie}
731S B. Lake Drive, Evansvile, Wyoming.” The house at tht address is owned by Client's
‘mother. The decree made no provision forthe house awned by Client at 201 §. Forest Drive ia

‘Casper, nor did it mention the house owned by Client's husband in Oklahoma.
10. The draft decree provided that Client “shall continue to provide health insurance
forthe benefit of the parties’ minor child [sic.” Atte time ofthe defauit hearing, Client was
‘marginally employed, making ust enough money to disqualify her for Title 19, though she and
hier children were eligible for food stamps. Client could not afford health insurance for her
daughters. Respondent fsiled to consider tha the husband had coverage forthe children through
‘Tricare, the military health insurance program or that he was eligible for military retirement bene
fits

11, During the default hearing, Respondent made notes on the draft decree reflecting
Judge Forgey’s rulings on custody and visitation. Judge Forgey ordered the husband's visitation
‘ith the girls to be supervise, at leat initially, and ordered the husband to attend a parenting
class, Respondent's handwritten child support calculation attributed minimum wage to each par-
cnt, though Client alleges in this disciplinary proceeding that her husband was employed by a
‘drywall contractor in Laramie at $10.00/br. and received $500.00/mo. for his Nationa) Guard du-
y

12, _Atsome point afte the heating, Respondent prepared a second draftof the decree
{incorporating Judge Forgey's rulings regarding custody and visitation. ‘The second draft cartied
‘forward the errors and omissions contained in the first decree with respect o provision of health
‘insurance, treatment of real property, ad omission of any mention of the husband's retirement
benefits.

13, Four days after the default hearing, on February 3, 2017, Client wrote a letter ©
Respondent terminating the representation:

[Tam sending ths letter to ask for your withdrawal from my tase as my attor~
ney. Tam also asking you not to file this degree [si] at chis time.
will need my file from you as soon as possible. I would ike to have all,
‘charges and balances with the return of the money not used.

‘You stated that non-<disputed cases usually runaround $2,000.00 You also
stated that disputed cases usually cost around $5,000.00 which is why my mother
gave you a cheek for $5,000.00 as we did not know how this ease would go. I
‘would expect that we should get a least $3,000.00 retumed since this was no dis-
pte or work on this ease.

14, _Inresponse to Clients complaint agsinst Respondent, Respondent wrote, “Aer
the default tral I received Febuary 3 [sc] leter from [Client] wanting to discontinue our rela-
tionship. The decree was completed and an appointment was set on February 24." Respondent
further stated, “I asked that an appointment beset, and T wanted to go through the default divoree
‘decree with het and discuss the termination of my representation.”

15, Dueto bad weather, the meeting ended up being held on February 27,2017. Ina
letter to Bar Counsel, Respondent described the February 27 meeting as follow:

At that hearing [si] we again went over how a default works. That she was
now actually divorced and all thet was let was the decree. [further explained
that the Judge had made and [sc] order and techaically any changes would have
tobe through motion to set aside the judgment. However there may be a way to
get somethings [sic] that were not ordered into the decree but there were no guar
antees. I also explained thet seting aside the default and the judgment could al-
low her husband to come in and contest the divoree. There was a possibilty that
she could lose the primary legal and physical custody, not to mention the supet=
‘vised visitation. These were important things to consider based on his violent his
tory. (Client) argued that it was unfair that she has to take Complete responsibitity
{fot her children and was angry that he would not have any responsibility forthe
children.

 

   

[Cien) indicated there was a military retirement that he now ad a job, and
‘be had put the children on tri-care through the military. None ofthis information
was knowa by either [Client] or me at the time ofthe hearing. I explained that
id not send out discovery because between the time of service, default and de-
‘aut hearing there was One not enough time to get answers to discovery and two T
hhad no faith that he would answer discovery. Infact T explained that he could nat
‘bebothered to answer the complaint for divorce why Would he answer any re-
quest for productions. Through our meeting I was informed by my client thatthe
Job he had was hanging dry wall and it seemed he was getting peid cash under the
table, I further explained that sort of income is impossible to docurnest and the
child support would not change. At the conclusion ofthis meeting [Client] did
‘not want to find a new attorney. 1 asked her to provide me with any information
about retirement, income, et. I also stated it was not my advice thet she secks a
‘motion to se aside the judgment. That it was my advice to accept the decree as it
‘was, I further explained this was a default divorce decree and that it didnot e-
quire her signature however I never fle them without an appointment with my
client where they had an opportunity to review the decree.

16, Respondent's next activity in the case was on March 31, 2017, when Re-
spondent billed .5 hrs. with the description, “Contact benefits department for military re-
tirement.” On Aptl 3, 2017, Respondent billed 5.0 hrs. (a $1,000.00 charge) for services
described on the billing statement as, “letter regarding benefits and W-2's” Respond
cent's Apsil 3, 2017, letter to Client stated:

My office contacted the benefits department for the military. I am told that
‘prior to getting any information regarding his riltary retirement we will need to
have him sign a release. Tam also told that he would have had to reach 20 years
{nthe military to have a total vestment inthe retirement. 1am told that he would
1tave to have paid into the Thrift Savings Plan. He may also have signed up for
‘other benefits but without a release fons him there is no way of knowing whether
he did nor not.

{Tam also told that unless you were married for ten years or more you, asthe
former spouse, you would not be entitled to any benefit that [your husband]
signed up for andlor is receiving,

As for child support, his W-2's do aot support a change inthe child support
‘order, The Court cannot make an order based on hearsay but only what is proven.
‘The Court will not entertain a change of child support based on Your letter.

‘Based on the above the Decree will have to be submitted as originally ordered
by the Court and drafted.

In the draft divorce decree Respondent took to the January 31, 2017, default hearing, she
{identified the date of the parties’ marriage as April 30, 2005, i., more than ten years po
‘orto the divorce.

17. Client responded to Respondent's April 3 letter with a letter dated April
13,2017:
In response to your letter about [my hustand’s] military retirement don't
kaow why you need to know what he has paid into the Thrift Savings plan all you
have to dois include it into the decree. I was married to him for 11 years which
‘you should lready know. When he reenlisted into the national Guard I was still
‘married to him. He will retire in5 years which will make him being in the mili
tary a total of 20 years and most of those years stood by his side and took care of
‘the kids andthe house while he was deployed. Which me being yourclient you
should already know. I talked to an army official and be informed me all that
‘would need was a form called the DD93 wich I can go and get any time atthe
local Army Armory. I thought was paying you to do these services for me and
to find this information out for me but now I have to do it myself because you
Ihave been very unreliable.

‘You never responded to me requesting you to put in the deeree that he will
provide insurance on our kids, He has already enrolled them on Tricare.

{fel ike you miss represented me at the deft hiring because you never
discussed with me what was going to happen and what I wanted in the decree.
rm your client paid you $5,000 to you for youto represent me and to do this d-
vorce but I fee! like you haven't done anything that we discussed you to do our
‘ery frst meeting whea [hired you. Everyting you sey you are going todo you
do not do. At this point I'm very disappointed with your services. You do not
‘communicate with me at all. I have tried to email you at
Kerawford@crawfordlawwy.com and I get an email back stating my email can
‘not be delivered because your email is full. I have called you and asked your as-
eee ener | feel like this is very unprofes-
mma.

{want a statement showing what you have done for my divorce and the
chargers you have charted out of the $5,000. I want this as soon as possible.

18, On April 21, 2017, Respondent met with Client and her mother. Two weeks after
the April 21 meeting, Respondent sent Client the following letter dated May 8,2017:

After having met with you on Friday April 21, 2017 and having reviewed my
‘notes, ths letter will advise you of the following.

‘You have stated that you want to cequest the Judge’s ruling be reopened and
have the court amend its judgment that Your ex-husband be responsible for the
‘ealth insurance coverage on your children. Ifthe court allows you to set aside its
judgment and reopen the divorce, that opens the door for [Your husband] 10 enter
‘nto the proceedings which could change what the cout has already ordered. I do
‘ot recommend this course of action.
fhe enters [your husband] could ty to contest custody and visitation and the
result could be a standard visitation schedule, Further, the current decree states
that you get to claim both children on taxes every year. Ifthe divorce judgments
set aside he could change this provision,

{Your husband] currently has your children covered through his employer
‘without being ondered by the court to do so. To reopen the divorce matter leaves
‘you wide open to other changes should [he] seek to respond and become an active
‘articipant which could possibly raise the cost ofthe divorce and open you up to
more liability such taking on half ofthe marital debt.

 

Also for [your husband's} participation in this divorce process, it would be my
advice that you keep the children on insurance and not trust [your husband] to do
‘0. Itis my professional opinion that ths isthe reason thatthe Judge did not or-
<r [your husband] to cover the children under his insurance.

In addition, the information that you now have is not information that you had
atthe time ofthe default hearing and the court may not entertain reopening the
matter without a hearing and without frst notifying [your husband] that the d-
vorce has been reopened.

Itis my advice that you not request the court to set aside the divorce judgment
and file the decree as we

On May 16,2017, Client sent a letter stating:

Pm requesting your resignation from my case forthe following reasons. I feel
{You are unprofessional you were nat prepared forthe Default Hearing on January
31, 2017. You did not show up 30 minutes before the hearing like] was told you
‘were going to. Therefore, Thad no idea what exactly goes on during a Default
Hearing. You never advised me on waat to expect which according to you thats
‘why Thired you was for you to inform me on the Iaw and procedures. I filled out
‘apacket when I hired your detailing ell my assets and information about the mii-
{ary retirement and other important information to help with thease. I provided
‘you with the information you needed but you somehow lost that information and
‘ever addressed it n court which makes me fee like you were nat organized and
‘not prepared for court. Thave requested multiple times in letters and in meetings
for You to provide me documentation on the funds that I paid you to take on my
‘case and you have never provided me with that information.”

‘There is no communication and when there is Communication t seems lik it
takes months to get a meeting or reply from You. When there is communication |
feel like what your assistant [] informs me is completely different then what we
discuss in our meetings. Ihave repeatedly asked you in two letters and one email
and multiple times verbally to provide me documentations onthe funds I have

provided you with and how they ae being used. In our last meeting you toll re
you would send that to me and you never did. The communication site to no
communication which feel is very unprofessional.

1 disagree with how you have handled my case I feel like you do not do any
research into the information my case needs so that!'m correctly represented, I
fee! like you just want me to settle my case. You don't show dedication or com-
passion to me and my situation. You do not understand my goals and aspirations
tomy case.

rm requesting my case file and the retum of what money is lft from the
$5,000 you received. Also an invoice showing the funds I provided you and doe-
‘umentation on what those funds went to. T request you do this within 10 business
days of receiving this letter.

19, Upon receipt of Clien’s letter, Respondent took steps to withdraw from the di-
‘voree case. On May 31, 2017, Respondent filed the stipulated motion to withdraw.

(On June 12, 2017, Client seat. letter stating:

‘On May 22, 2017 I signed the stipulated motion to with draw and the stipulat-

ed order to with draw! and Ihave not received my case file and the retum of the

‘emanding amount of the money I paid you. I paid you 5,00 andI should have

money leftover ftom that amount. You stated it would cost $2,500 If {my bus-

band] did not contest and be did not contest. I called Fune 8, 2017 and talked to

(your legal assistant} and she told me tha the judge has not released you from my

case, I need my case file and retumed money as soon as possible. Sol ean pur

‘sue my divorce with an attomey that understands military law.

20, Judge Forgey did not sign the order allowing Respondent's withdrawal until June
12,2017,

21. OnJune 19, 2017, Respondent sent the following letter to Client:

Enclosed please find a disc which contsins your entire file from this office.

Please also find enclosed our final invoice on Your matter. Please note that you

‘have $2,405.00 left inthe retainer paid to this office. Unless we hear from you

Within tn (10) days from the dete ofthis letter that you disagree with the refind

‘amount of $2,405.00, this office will issue check in that amowt.
‘The amount Respondent intended o refund was miscalculated. $2,405.00 is the total amount of
Respondent's fees. The correct refund amount ~ setting aside erors in the billing statement self

~ should have been $5,000.00 ~ $2,405.00 = $2,595.00.
22, OnJuly25, 2017, Respondent sent the following letter to Client:

Please be advised that in my letter of June 19, 2017 I advised you of the
‘amount of the refund and that if you had any questions about the refund or disa-
greed with the amount you were to contact my office within ten (10) days from
the date ofthe letter. You never advised my office that you disagreed with the
‘amount of the refund either during any telephone conversations you had with my
‘office or by letter. The first time you mentioned you had a disagreement or ques-
‘tons regarding the refund was not until after I had written the check and handed it
to you. I will review my invoices to you when have time and am able tocarefule
ly review them. It will not be within the ten (10) business days that you demand-
ed.

To date, Respondent has not refunded the disputed $190.00.
23. Client ultimately hired another lawyer to reopen the divorce proceeding and geta
decree entered, On Apri 17,2018, Judge Forgey entered a Stipulated Desres of Divorce which
provided for supervised visitation by the husband, odered the husband to provide health insur
‘ance forthe childrea, and ordered the husband to pay child support in the amount of $1,292.00
‘per month beginning March 1, 2018,
24, Respondent fled to comply with her duty to exerise reasonable diligence and

 

‘prompness in her representation of

+ Respondent failed to obtain complete information regarding the couple's assets Liabilities
and finances at the outset ofthe representation, and failed to remedy that oversight before
the default hearing.

‘+ Respondent failed to meet with Client in advance ofthe default hearing in oedet to inform
her of what information would be required forthe hearing. Had Respondest done so,
CCient would have been able to contact her husband in advance ofthe hearing instead of
afer) and present evidence regarding her husband's National Guard reenlistment, his sa
ary for that service; the fact thatthe children were eligible for health coverage through
Tricare; the existence of military retirement benefits; andthe fact that he had found em
ployment in Laramie. This oversight on Respondents pat resulted in a chili support
‘alculation for the husband that was lower than it should have been

‘+ After being informed of the evidence listed above that should have been preseated at the
hearing, Respondent did nothing to remedy the oversight.

+ The defauls decree of divorce Respondent prepared awarded # house to Clicat that is
‘owned by het mother. Itcontained no mention of Cliet's house in Wyoming nor the
‘husband’ house in Oklahoma, It carried forward the erroneous child support calculation

in the following respects:
respects:

and said nothing about military retirement benefits or the availabilty of health insurance
for the children through the husband's National Guard service.

‘After the default hearing, Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence in geting
the matter concluded. Respondent met with Client and her mother just twice more, on
February 27, 2017, and April 21, 2017, but did nothing else to bring the matter to « con-
clusion. As a result, Client went months without child supportto which she was entitled,

25, Respondent failed inher duty to communicate with Client inst leat the following

 

‘Respondent did not adequately inform Client of the evidence that would be required at
‘the default hearing in order forher to achieve the objectives of the representation.
Respondent failed to return numerous calls from Client.

‘When Client asked for an accounting of my time inthe matter, Respondent delayed re-
‘sponding to that request for more than four months.

26, Respondent violated her duties regarding legal fees charged to the Client inthe

following respects:

‘Respondent charged 5 hours at $200.00 per hour forthe preparation of the letter of April
3,2017. That letter would not have taken Respondent more than one-half hour to waite,
‘Respondent charged 4 hours to prepare the motion to withdraw. Having been terminated
by Client for her failure to discharge Respondent's professional obligations to Client, it
‘was not reasonable for Respondent to charge Client forthe preparation of that motion.
Respondent miscalculated the amount of Client's refund and did not cortect that ertor
when it as brought Respondens tention. That eno edt! in overcharging Ct
ent $190.00.

27. Respondent violated her duty to refund unearned fees upon termination of the sep-

resentation as indicated above.

28. In summary, Respondent committed multiple violations of Rule 1.3 (diligence)

and 1.4 (communication with client), Rule 5 (fees) and Rule 1.16 (duties upon tertination of

representation) of the Wyoming Rales of Professional Conduct as set forth above. AS part ofthe

resolution of this matter, Respondent has agreed to refund $2,350.00 to Client on or before De-
‘cember 14, 2018,

u
29, Ageravating factors include: (1) a disciplinary history (Respondent received a
private reprimand in 2017); (2) a pate of misconduct; and (3) multiple offenses. Respondent's
‘agreement to refund a substantial portion of the fee tothe client is a mitigating factor.

30. A 30-day suspension is an appropriate sanction for Respondent's misconduct. if
the Court issues an Order of 0-Day Suspension in accordance with this report and recommends:
tion, Bar Counsel and Respondent have agreed to the following press release:

‘The Wyoming Supreme Court issued an order of 30-day suspension of
(Casper attomey Kara Crawford-Fink. The disciplinary order resulted from Craw.
ford-Fink’s representation of a clieat in a divorce matte. The client paid a
$5,000.00 fee at the outset. Crawford-Fink neglected to pursue the matter dii-
gently and failed to maintain adequate communication with her client, who ult-
mately temninaied Crawford-Fink's representation and retained other counsel
‘Cravford-Fink also charged an unreasonable fee for her work on the case. After
the client discharged Crawford-Fink, Crawford-Fink filed to retura all ofthe un-
ceamed portion of the fee. Crawford-Fink agreed that she committed multiple vio-
lations of Rules 1.3 (diligence), Rule 14 (Communication with lien), Rule 1.5
(Gees) and Rule 1.16 (duties upon termination of representation, Crawford-Fink
agreed to return $2,350.00, representing the remaining unearned sortion of the
fe, to the client. Crewford-Fink stipulated to a 30-day suspension in the matter,
Which was approved by the Board of Professional Responsibility and subnsitted to
the Court. In addition to receiving a 30-day suspension, Crawford-Fink was or
ered to pay an administrative fee inthe amount of $750.00 and costs of $50.00 to
the Wyoming State Bar.

Conclusions of Law

31. Rule 13, Wy0.R-ProfCond, provides, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable dii-
‘gence and prompiness in representing a client”

32. Rule 14, Wyo.R.ProfiCond, requires, among other things, that a lawyer reasona-
bly consult with the client about the means by which the clien’s objectives are to be accom
plished and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information, The rule further requires
4 lawyer to Yexplaia a matter tothe extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to male in-
formed decisions regarding the representation” Comment [6] to Rule 14 provides, in relevant

2
part, “The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions com
‘cerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are tobe pursued”

33. Rule 1.5(@), Wyo.R Prof Cond, provides, “A lawyer shall not make an agreement
fo, charg, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.” The Wyo
‘ming Supreme Court has held that « lawyer may only charge a client for work actually per
formed, and that « lawyet’s invoices must “accurately describe the legad services and antounts
charged to the client” Bd. of Prof! Responsibility v. Casper, 318 P.3d 790, 795 (Wyo. 2014).
In addition, a lawyer is required to exercise “billing judgment” inthe fees charged, which is usu-
ally demonstrated “by the attomey writing off unproductive, excess or redundant hows.” Cas-
‘Per, supra, 318 Pd at 796 (quoting In re NRF, 294 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo. 2013).

34 Upon termination of representation, Rue 1.16(8), Wyo.RProfCond., requses
lawyer to refund any advance payment of fees that have not been earned.

35. Rule 15(6)(3)(D), Wyo.RDisc.Proc., provides that in imposing a sanction for
‘professional conduct, the BPR shall apply the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(the “ABA Standards"). Pertinent to the present Spulation, itis necessary 10 apply the ABA
Standards relevant to the dues violated by Respondent as well as aggravating and exitigating
actors.

36. Respondent's violations of Rules 1.3 and 14 eal into play Standard 44, “Lack of
Diligence,” ofthe ABA Standards. Standard 44 ses forth the following guidelines:

441 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

(0) ln: sbanden the pice wd ees sows or poeta sa

(©) a lawyer knowingly fils to perform services for aclint and cause se-
‘ious or potentially serious injury to client; or

© a lawyer engages in a pattera of neglect with respect to tient matters

and causes serious or potentially serious injury to aClient.
442. Suspension is generally appropriate when:

B
(@) 2 lawyer knowingly falls to perform services fora client and causes in-

Jury or potential injury to client, or

(b) 2 lawyer engages in a pattem of neglect with respect to client matters
and causes injury or potential injury to nclient.
443° Reprimand (ie, “public censure” under Rule 9(8)(3) of the Rules of Dis-
ciplinary Procedure] is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent
‘and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and
‘causes injury or potential injury to a client.

{ie, “private reprimand” under Rule 9(0)(4) of the Rules of
Procedure] is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negli-
‘gent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client,
‘and causes little orno actual or potential injury to a client.

444

  

37. Respondent's violations of Rules 1.5 and 1.16 implicate Standard 7.0, which pro-

 

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors
set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases
involving false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's
services, improper communication of fields of practice, improper solicitation of
{professional employment from & prospective elient, unreasonable or improper
fees, unauthorized practice of law, improper withdrewal from misrepreseniation,
‘or failure to report professional misconduct.

71 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in
‘conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a profesional withthe intent
10 obiain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or poten-
tally serous injury to lien, the pablic or the legal system.

72 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in
‘conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as professional and causes in-
jury or potential injury toa client, the publi, or the legal system.

73 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in
‘conduct thet isa violation of a duty owed asa professional and causes im
jury o potential injury toa client, the publi, or the egal system.

74, ‘Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated
{instance of negligence tat isa Violation of duty owed as a professional,
and causes litte or no actual or potential infury to a client, the public, or

 

the legal system,
38. ABA Standard 9.0, entitled “Aggravation and Mitigation.” provides as follows:
9.1 Generally

‘After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating cit
‘cumstances may be Considered in deciding what sanction to impose.
92 Aggravation

4
921

922

93
931

932

Definition. Aggravation or aggravating circumstances are any consid-
erations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of disci-
pline to be imposed.

Factors which may be considered in aggravation. Aggravating factors

fnclude:

(@ prior disciptinary offenses;

(b) dishonest or selfish motive;

(© apattem of misconduct;

(@ multiple offenses;

(©) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intcational-
ly failing to comply with roles or orders of the disciplinary agency;

® submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
practices during the disciplinary process;

(2) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;

(1) vulnerability ofthe vietim,

G@) substantial experience in the practice of law;

@) inditference in making restitution; and

(6) illegal conduc, including thet involving the use of controlled sub-
stances.

Mitigation,

Definition. Mitigation or mitigating circumstances are any considers-

tions of factors that may justify a reduction inthe degree of discipline

tw be imposed,

Factors which may be considered in mitigation. Mitigating factors in-

clude:

(@) absence of a prior disciplinary record;

() absence ofa dishonest or selfish motive;

(©) personal or e«otional problems;

(@ timely good faith effort to make restitution or to sectify conse-
quences of misconduct,

(©) fill and five disclosure of disciplinary board or cooperative attitude
toward proceedings;

Seek
(@) character or reputation;

() physical disability;

@) mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or
dg abuse when:

(1) there is medical evidence thet the respondent is affected by a
‘chemical dependency or mental disability;

@) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the mis-
conduct;

G) the respondent's recovery from the chemical dependency or
‘mental disability is demonstrated by # meaningful and sus-
tained petiod of socessful rehabilitation; and

@) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurence of that
misconduct is unlikely.

  
) delay in disciplinary proceedings,
(8 imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
() remorse; and
{m) remoteness of prior offenses.
94° Factors Which Are Neither Aggravating nor Mitigating.
‘The following factors should not be considered as either aggravating nor
smitigating:
(8) forced or compelled restitution,
(©) agreeing tothe client's demand for certain improper behavior or rest
(©) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer,
(@ resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings,
(©) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and
(© failure of injured client to complain.

Recommendations
{In consideration ofthe Boards findings of fact and conclusions of law, the partie’ Stipur

 

lation, the fuets and conditional admissions in the accompanying AGfidavit, and the Supplemental
Stipulation entered into by the parties regarding both this proceeding as well as BPR #2017-024,
the Board recommends the Wyoming Supreme Court issue an order:

1. Suspending Respondent from the practice of lw fora period of 30 days.

2. Requiring Respondent to refund the sum of $2.350.00 to Client on or before De-
cember 14, 2018.

3. Reguiring Respondent to pay an administrative feo of $750.00 and costs of $50.00
to the Wyoming State Bar within 10 days ofthe order of suspension.

4. Directing the Wyoming State Bar to issue the partes’ sipulated press release as
set forth above.

5. Ifthe Court approves the Board’s recommendation ofa 90-day suspension in BPR
#2017-024, such suspension should run consecutively and not concurrently with the 30-day sus-
pension recommended herein.

16
6. Ifthe Court approves the Board's recommendation and orders a 30-day suspen-
sion, such suspension should begin December 14, 2018, s0 as not to disadvantage Respondent's
‘current clients, given the status and cout schedules of matters in which Respondent is curently
involved.

7. While not controlling, the Board recommends Respondest complete continuing
legal education regarding law firm business management, law firm practice managemeat and
seek a mentor to assist with her practice once reinstated,

DATED this_22._ day of October 2018,
Sirkater
Bod of Professional Responsibility

‘Wyoming State Bar

”
D-18-000

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
‘STATE OF WYOMING 1N THE supa:
Soe Sr WONG
In the matter of
‘KARA CRAWFORD-FINK, 4 2018
WSB tt 6-3966,

|
it

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
FOR ORDER OF 90-DAY SUSPENSION

 

‘THIS MATTER came before the Board of Professional Responsibility on the 3” day of
October, 2018, for consideration of the Stipulation for 90-Day Suspension submitted parsuant to
Rules 9 and 12 of the Wyoming Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, and the Board having reviewed
the Stipulation, the accompanying affidavit of factual basis and being fully advised in the prem-
ises, FINDS, CONCLUDES and RECOMMENDS as follows.

1. Respondent was admitted to practice in Wyoming in 2006, and maintains a law
practice in Casper, Wyoming.

2. The complaint against Respondent in the above-captioned matter was submitted
{in March 2017 by Casper lawyer Alaina Stelle (“Stelle”), who represented the defendants,
Mike and Stacy Carruth (“Caruths"), in a case Respondent filed in Natrona County on behalf of
Drakes Landscaping LLC ("Drakes").

3. Carmuths undertook the construction of a home on Goose Egg Road west of Cas-
erin 2013 and 2014. In Apsil 2014, Drakes was the successfil bidder for Landscaping work on
‘the home, with « bid price of $248,127.10. Pursuant to Drakes' bid, on May 5, 2014, Carruths
paid Drakes half the bid amount, or $124,063.55.
On June 17, 2014, Carruths made a second payment in the amount of

 

‘$111,657.19, bringing total payments to $235,720.74. In addition, Camuths and Tony Kiser,
‘owner of Drakes, agreed that Caruths would receive a credit of $5,500.00 against the bid for a
Dodge Dakota truck transferred to Kiser by Carruths.

5. In August 2014, with much remaining to be done in terms ofthe work proposed in
the April bid, Drakes presented additional invoices totaling nearty $40,000.00 for work allegedly

 

requested by Carruths, but not included inthe original estimate. In early September 2014, Car-
truths paid one of the invoices in the amount of $6,906.36, but refused to pay any more. With
this payment and including $5,500.00 forthe value ofthe vehicle conveyed by Carruthsto Tony
Kiser, payments made to Drakes totaled $248,127.10, ie. the amount of Drakes’ original bid.

6. Drakes discontinued work on the job and engaged Respondent to represent the
‘company in the matter. Respondent wrote a letter dated October 10, 2014, demanding that Ca.
tuths pay $29,271.48 within 20 days, ora lien would be fled against the property.

7. Carruths engaged Jennifer McDowell (Stedilie's law partner) to respond toRe-
spondent’s demand letter. By letter dated October 28, 2014, McDowell notified Respondent of
problems with the quality of Drakes’ work done to date and hentified significant work thatre-
mained to be done. McDowell advised that Carruths were obtaining a bid from another land-
scaping company to repair and complete the work undertaken by Drakes and intented to present
‘8 demand fora refund “based on Drakes Landscaping’s breach of warranty and breach ofthe Bid
contract.”

8. Carruths engaged Jennifer McDowell (Stedilic’s law partner) to respond to Re-
spondent’s demand letter. By letter dated October 29, 2014, McDowell notified Respondent of
problems with the quality of Drakes’ work done to date and identified significant work that re-
‘mained to be done. McDowell advised that Caruths were obtaining a bid from another land-
scaping company to repair and complete the work undertaken by Drakes and intended to present
‘a demand for a refund “based on Drakes Landscaping’s breach of warranty and breach of the Bid
contract.”

9. Respondent responded to McDowell with an undated letter asserting that Canruths
had demanded, and Drakes had completed, additional work not included in Drakes’ origina bid.
Respondent communicated an offer to sete Drakes’ remaining claims against Caruths for
$25,000.00.

10, Inthe spting of 2015 Caruths engaged a different landscaping company to do the
1epair and completion work.

11, There were no further communications between Drakes and Carrs until August
2015, when Respondent filed a verified complaint (signed under oath by Tony Kiser, owner of
rakes) on behalf of Drakes and against Camuths in Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Dis-
trict. Respondent conditionally admits that the verified complaint was replete with errors, mis-
stating the amount of Drakes’ bid and the amount of payments made by Carruths. It sought re-
covery of $38,811.10 plus attomeys’ fees from Carruths.

12, MeDowell responded with an answer and counterclaim on behalf of Carruths and
‘added Drakes owner, Tony Kiser, as third-party defendant, Respondent timely filed answers to
Carruths’ counterclaim against Drakes and the third-party complaint against Kiser. McDowell
then filed « motion for judgment on the pleadings and to dismiss the Drakes complaint, asserting
that the allegations of the Drakes complaint make clear that nothing was due and owing to
Drakes. MeDowell also served a Rule 68 offer of settlement demanding payment of
{$103,526.21 to Carruths by Drakes. On October 19, 2015, Respondent served disclosures pursa-
ant to Rule $ ofthe Rules of Procedure for Circuit Courts.

13, The case was thereafter removed from Circuit Court to District Court with Stedil-
lie replacing McDowell as counsel for Carruths. In February 2016, Stedillie served combined
‘writen discovery requests. Respondent served timely responses. On March 18, 2016, Stedillie
‘wrote to Respondent about deficiencies in the responses ~ specifically, disorganized and undated
‘ext messages. On April 15, 2016, Respondent served supplemental responses. On June 16,
2016, Stedillie sent Respondent an email advising that a motion to compel would be filed if pre-
viously-identified deficiencies in the discovery were not remedied.

14, On June 30, 2016, Judge Sullins entered a scheduling order which required Re-
spondent to designate experts by July 15, 2016; to list other witnesses by November 11, 2016;
‘and setting a bench trial to begin February 6,2017,

15, Respondent failed to serve Stedilie with a copy of the witness designation until
Jaty 18,2016 When hs enor was brought to Responden'sateson, Responded ignored
‘Stedilie's request that an amendedeorrected certificate of service be filed,

16. On July 17, 2016, Stdilie fled a motion to compel discovery regarding the pre-
viously-idenified problems with text messages produced by Respondent. Respondest did not
filea response tothe motion to compel.

17, On July 26, 2016, Stedili filed a motion to stike Respondents list of witnesses
[Respondent did not flea response to the motion to strike.

18, On August 19, 2016, Judge Sullins entered an onder granting the motion to com-
pel directing Respondent to serve “property labeled and bates numbered copies ofthe test mes-
sages requested in discovery, in chronological order, and with all phone numbers identified,
within five (5) days after eniry of this Order” Judge Sullin invited Stedilie to submit an appli-
cation for attorney's fees and costs. Stdillie did so on August 26, 2016,

19. On August 30, 2016, Stedille sent an email to Respondent noting thatthe time for
‘compliance with the order compelling discovery had expired and advised thet a motion for order
to show cause would be filed if Respondent did not comply. Respondent responded with an
‘email dated September 2, 2016, stting, “The documents will be to you with all interrogatories
‘and attachments on tuesday [September 6] by Spm.”

20, On September 6, 2016, an envelope containing copies of text messages was deliv-
«ered to Stedilie's office, but the documents were disorganized and not in compliance with Judge
Sullins' order.

21, On September 7, 2016, Stedilie fled a motion for order to show cause. Re-
spondent didnot file a response.

22. On October 10, 2016, Judge Sullins issued an order granting the motion to stike,
ruling that Respondent coud still designate non-expert witnesses by the witness designation
deadline of November 1, 2016. Judge Sullins awarded Carruths $840.00 in attomey's fees as
requested in Stedillie’s fee application on the motion to compel, With respect to the order to
show cause, Judge Sullins again ordered Respondent to produce the Bates labeled text messages
identifying all phone numbers associated with each text message within 20 days of September
30, 2016 (the date the motion to strike was heard).

23. On November 1, 2016, Stedillie took the deposition of Tony Kiser, owner of
Drakes. In the deposition, Kiser contradicted a number of the allegations of the complaint and
similarly contradicted statements made in Drakes’ written discovery responses. Following the
<eposition, Stile asked Respondent to amend the verified complaint and prepare amended
Aiscovery responses setting the facts straight. Respondent never did so.
24, Also duting the deposition, Stelle leamed that Drakes was insured. Stedilie

demanded a copy of the insurance policy. Respondent said she would provide it but failed to do

 

0 despite numerous requests. However, on or about November 1, 2016, Respondent put Na~
‘tonwide, Drakes’ insurer, on notice of the claims asserted against its insured by Carruths

25, ‘Though Nationwide reserved its tight to deny coverage on Carruths' claims, it id
‘undertake to provide a defense and engaged Pete Young, then of White and Steele in Denver, to
<defead Drakes on the counterclaim and Tony Kiser onthe thideparty claim.

26, On November 14, 2016, Stille filed a motion to compel production of the in-
‘surance policy. Respondent did not respond to the motion. The court granted the motion during
shearing held January 6, 2017, but dectined to award attomey's fees. Young, wito had entered
‘an appearance in the case in mid-December, finally provided Stedlie with a copy of the policy
in mid-January.

27. On November 16, 2016, Stedilie filed a second show cause motion after Re-
spondent did not comply with Judge Sullins' order regarding text messages and paymmedt of at-
tomey's fees in the amount of $840.00. Stedillie withdrew the motion two days lates, after Re-
spondent paid the fee award,

28 OnNovember 29, 2016, Stille sent Respondent a draftof a Rule 11 motion she
proposed to file if Respondent did not correct the record regarding some material misstatements,
stated:

 

In ber transmittal letter, Sted

Under Rule 11 ofthe Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, I am required to
provide you witha copy of this Motion twenty-one (21) days prior to filing it with
the Court to allow you an opportunity to Cure the issues set forth therein. Based
con the date of ths eter, Icalelate your deadline to cure as December 20, 2016.
‘As you will ee, I set forth the multiple misstatements of material fact contained

‘within the Verified Complain, along with proof that they are misstatements of

‘material fact, and proof that you are aware of their falsity and have done nothing

to disclose their falsity to the Court or correct them as required under the Rules of

Civil Procedure and Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct.

As stated, you have an opportunity to cure under Rule 11 before file the Mo-
ton with the Court. Given the late date ofthe litigation, I eannot imagine thatthe
‘Court would allow you leave to amend the Verified Complaint at this point, espe-
cially since you have been on notice ofthe material misstatements since we filed
‘our Motion or Judgment on the Pleadings since that ime, the problem bas only
compounded itself due to discovery responses tht are intemally inconsistent and
that contradict the claims made in the Verified Complaint, as well as deposition
testimony that contradicts discovery answers andthe claims made inthe Verified
Complaint, {therefore believe thatthe best way for you to cure this issue is to
withdraw your Verified Complaint.

Respondent did not respond.

29. OnDecember 15, 2016, Stele fled « motion for summary judgment. Re-
‘spondent did not file a response 10 the motion. On the same day, Steditie filed a motion to ste
[Respondent's witnesses and exhibits and for sanctions citing a number of discovery abuses by
Respondent, On January 5,2017, Respondent filed a response to the motion to stike.

30. OnDecember21, 2016, Steilie filed the Rule 11 motion she had provided to
Respondent three weeks before, styled a “Combined Motion for Sanctions Pursuast to
Wyo.R-Civ.P. 11 and Notice of Material Mistatement of Material Facts Pursuant 1
‘Wyo.R-Prof.Conduct 3.3." In the ten-page motion, Stel zcited numerous matedal misrepre-
sentation and contradictions contained inthe Verified complaint, Drakes’ written discovery re-
sponses and Tony Kiser's deposition.

31. OnJanuary 6,2017, a motion hearing was held before Judge Sullins during which
the motion to compel production of Drakes? insurance policy was granted. Judge Sullins contin

ued the hearing on Steillie's motion to strike and Rule 1! motion in order to give Respondent a
‘chance to respond. By the date of that hearing, Stedillie and Young were working together to get
the ease set for mediation.

32. OnJanuary 18, 2017, Young filed an unopposed motion to assign the case to l-
ternative dispute resolution and continue the February 6, 2017, til date. Judge Suilins signed
an order granting the motion the following day.

33. OnFebraary 6, 2017, « mediation was held with Judge Dave Park, The ease set
ted with $55,000.00 being paid to Carruths, split equally between Drakes and Nationwide. An
‘order of dismissal was entered on February 22, 2017.

34, In.summary, what began with an offer to settle Drakes’ claims against Carruths
for $25,000.00 ended with $55,000.00 being paid to Camruths by Drakes and its insurer. The
lawsuit generated six pages of docket entries. Many of these filings were occasioned by Re-
spondent’s failure and refusal to abide by rules of pleading and discovery.

35. Respondent did her clients a disservice inthis matter. Moreover, ber actions im
posed significant burdens on the Carruths, who, though they ultimately prevailed in terms of re-
covery of a sum of money, incurred significant legal fees defending a case that never should
have been filed inthe first place. The case required good deal of Judge Sullins’ time and ne
doubt affected the edministration of justice inhis cour.

36, Respondent also engaged in duplicative billing to her clint, billed the client for
‘work not actually performed and submitted billing statements that were erroneous in numerous
respects.

37. Respondent's conduct as st forth above constitutes multiple violations of Rules
1.3 iligence), 1.5 (fees) 3:3 (candor tothe tribunal), 3.4(c) (failure to follow rules of the tribu-
nal) and 8.4() (Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) ofthe Wyoming Rules of
Professional Conduct.

38 Aggravating factors include: (1) a disciplinary history (Respondent recived a
private reprimand in 2017); (2) a patter of misconduct; and (3) multiple offenses. There are no
gating factors.

39. 90-day suspension is an appropriate sanction for Respondent's misconduct. If
the Cour issues an Order of 90-Day Suspension in accordance with this eport and recommenda-
tion, Bar Counsel and Respondeat have agreed tothe following press release:

‘The Wyoming Supreme Coust issued an order of 90-day suspension of Casper
sttomey Kara Crawford-Fink. The disciplinary order resulted from Crawford
Fink’s conduct in the representation of a client in & contract dispute. The client, a
landscaping contractor, claimed that it was owed approximately $35,000 for its
‘work on a residential construction project. Crawford-Fink filed a lawsuit on be-
half of the landscaping contractor against the homeowners seeking recovery of
‘that amount. The homeowners filed a counterclaim against the landscaping com
tractor and « third-party claim against its ovmer. The lawsuit was eventually set
‘led, with the landscaping contractor and its insurer paying $55,000 to the home-
‘owners. The homeowners’ attomey filed a complaint with the Office of Bar
‘Counsel at the Wyoming State Bar, contending that Crawford-Fink violated mu-
merous Rules of Professional Conduct in her representation of the landscaping
contractor and its owner.

 

 

Following investigation of the complaint ty Bar Counsel and filing of a for
sal disciplinary charge, Crawford-Fink admitted that she committed multiple vio-
laiions of Rules 1.3 (diligence), Rule 15 (fes), Rule 33 (candor to the tibunal),
Rule 3.4(0) (failure to follow rules of the tribunal) and 8.4() (conduct prejudicial
‘0 the administration of justice) in the matter. Crawford-Fink sipalated 10 a 90-
day suspension in the matter, which was approved by the Board of Professional
Responsibility and submitted to the Court. In addition to receiving a 90-day su
pension, Crawford-Fink was ordered to pay an administrative fee in the amount of
{$750.00 and costs of $50.00 to the Wyoming State Bar.

‘Conchusions of Law.
40, Rule 1.3, Wyo.RProf Cond, provides, “A lawyer shall att with reasonable dil
‘Bence and promptness in representing aclient.”
41, Rule 1.5(@), Wyo.RProfCond, provides, “A lawyer shall not make an agreement
for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses” The Wyo-
ring Supreme Court has held that a lawyer may only charge a client for work actually per
formed, and that a lawyer's invoices must “accurately describe the legal services and amounts
charged to the client.” Bd. of Prof! Responsibility v. Casper, 318 P.34 790, 795 (Wyo. 2014).
In addition, a lawyer is required to exercise “billing judgment” in the fees charged, which is usa
Ally demonstrated “by the atiomey writing off unproductive, excess or redundant hows” Cas-
‘Per, supra, 318 P34 at 796 (quoting Jnve NRF, 294 P.34 879, 883 (Wyo. 2013).

42. Rule 3:3(a)(1), Wyo RProfCond, provides, “A lawyer shall not knowingly ..
make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correcta flse statement of material
factor law previously made tothe tribunal by the lawyer.”

43, Rule3.4(¢), Wyo.RProf.Cond, provides, “A lawyer shall not... knowingly diso-
bey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusel based on an assertion
that no valid obligation exists”

44, Rule 8.4(4), Wyo.RProfCond, provides, “It is professional misconduct br a
lawyer to... engage in conduct that is prejudicial tothe administration of justice.”

45. Rule 15(0)3\D), Wyo.RDise-Proc, provides that in imposing a sanction for
professional conduct, the BPR shall apply the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sasetions
(the “ABA Standards"). Pertinent to the present Stipulation, itis necessary to apply the ABA.
Standards relevant tothe duties violated by Respondent as well as aggravating and mitigating
factors

46, Respondent's violations of Rule 1.3 eal into play Standard! 44, “Lack of Dili-
gence," ofthe ABA Standards. Standard 44 sets forth the following guidelines:

10
4a2

443

444

41.

Absent aggravating o mit

Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
(@ a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially sed-
us injury o aclient; or
Jawyer knowingly fails to perform services fora client and cause se-
rious or potentially serious injury toa client; or
(©) a lawyer engages in a patter of neglect with respect to client matters
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to aclient.
Suspension is generally appropriate when:
(@) a lawyer knowingly fils to perform services for client and causes in-
jury or potential injury toa cient, or
(b) a lawyer engages in a pattem of neglect with respect to client matters
and causes injury or potent injury to aclient
Reprimand [Le, “public censure” under Rule (a)(3) ofthe Rules of Dis
ciplinary Procedure] is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent
and does not act with zeasonable diligence in representing a client, and
‘causes injury or potential injury to a client.
Admonition fie. “private reprimand” under Rule 9(«)(4) of the Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure] is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negl-
‘gent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client,
‘and causes litle oF no actual or potential injury toa client.

‘Respondem’s violations of Rule 1.5 implicate Standard 7.0, which provides:

 

ting circumstances, upon application of the factors

 

tet out in Sandrd 90, loving sancions te peal appnpiatsn casa

involving false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's

services, improper communication of fields of practice, improper solicitation of

Ei enoubcrnd aco of " ‘irl own immseaaten
improper mi

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73

74,

Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in
conduct that sa violation ofa duty owed as a professional with te intent
to obtain a benefit forthe lawyer or another, and causes serious or potea-
tially serous injury toa client, the public or the legal system,
‘Suspension is generally epproprate when a lawyer knowingly engages in
conduct that isa violation of a duty owed as professional and causes ine
Jury or potential injury toa cient, te public or the legal sytem.
Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer aegligenty engages in
conduct that isa violation of& duty owed as professional and cases in-
jury or injury to cient, the public, o the legal system,
‘Admonition i generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated
instance of negligence tht is « violation of a duty owed as 8 professional,
and causes litle or no actual or potential injury to# cieny the public, or
the legal system.

 

u
48. Respondent's violations of Rules 3.3 and 8.4(4) fall within Standard 6.1, which
provides:

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the
factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate
in cases involving conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or
that involves dishonesy, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation toa court:

6.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, withthe intent to deceive the
court, makes false statement, submits false document, or improperly withholds
‘material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a paty, or
‘causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the lege proceed-

ing.

6.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when & lawyer knows that false statements or
documents are being submitted to the court or that material information is im-
properly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, and causes injury or poten-
tial injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially
adverse effect on the lege proceeding.

6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent ether in determin
{ng whether the statements or documents are false or in taking remedial action
‘when material information is being withbeld, and causes injury or potential injury
to party tothe lege system, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on
the legal proceeding.

6.14 Admonition is generally appropriate when a layer engages in an isolated ine
stance of neglect in determining whether the submitted statements or documents
ae false o in filing to disclose material information pon learning of is Tasty,
‘and causes lite or no actual or potential injury to a party, or causes litle oF no
adverse or potetially adverse effect on the legal proceeding,

49. Respondent's violations of Rule 3.4(c) implicate Standard 62, which provides:

 

 

Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the
factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate
in cases involving feilure to expedite litigation or bring a meritorious clsim, or
failure to obey any obligation under the rules of the tribunal except for an open re-
fasal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists:

6.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a
court order or rule with the inten to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or
‘another, and Causes serious or potentially serious injury toa party or caus-
es serious or potentially serious interference with @ legal proceeding.

622 Suspension is generally appropriate when & lawyer knows that he or she is
violating a court ordet of rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a
client or a party, or Causes interference or potential interference With @le-
wal

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623. Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to
comply with a court arder or rale, and causes injary or potential injury to a
client or other party, or causes interference or potential interference with a
legal proceeding.

624 Admoniton is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isohated
instance of negligence in complying with a court order or nae, and causes
Tittle or no actual or potential injury to a party, or causes lite or no actual
or potential interference witha legal proceeding.

50. ABA Standard 9.0, entitled “Aggravation and Mitigation,” provides as follows:

91 Generally
‘After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating cir-
‘cumstances may be considered in deciding what sanction to impose.
92 Aggravation
921 Definition. Aggravation or aggravating circumstances are any consid-
cezations or factors thet may justify an increase in the degree of disci-
line to be imposed.
9.22 Factors which may be considered in aggravation. A ggravating factors
fnelude:
(@) prior disciplinary offenses,
(©) dishonest or selfish motives
(© apattem of misconduct;
@ multiple offenses,
(©) bed faith obstrvetion of the disciplinary proceeding by intentional
ly failing to comply with rules or orders ofthe disciplinary agency;
submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
practices during the disciplinary process;
(8) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
(h) vulnerability of the victims;
) substantial experience in the practice of laws
) indifference in making restitution; and
(illegal conduc, including that involving the use of controlled sub-
stances.

93 Mitigation.
931 Definition. Mitigation or mitigating circumstances are any considere-
tions or factors that may justify a reduction inthe degree of discipline
10 be imposed.
932 Fate which maybe consdred in mitigation. Ntiging factors io-
lude:
(@) absence of a prior disciplinary record;
(©) absence of a dishonest or selfish motives
(©) personal or emotional problems;
@ timely good faith effort to make resitution or to rectify conse-
‘quences of misconduct;

B
(©) fill and free disclosure of disciplinary board or cooperative attitude
toward 3%
(9 inexperience inthe practice of lave,
(@) character or reputation;
(Gh) physical disability;
© mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or
drug abuse when:
(1) there is medical evidence thet the respondent is affected by @
chemical dependency or mental disabiliy
@) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the mis-
conduct

G) the respondent's recovery from the chemical dependency or
mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sus-
‘tained period of successful rehabilitation; and
(&) the recovery amested the misconduct and recurenee of that
misconduct is unlikely.
) delay in disciplinary proceedings
(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
() remorse and
(m) remoteness of prior offenses.
94° Factors Which Are Neither Aggravating nar Mitigating
following factors should not be considered as either aggravating nor

 

(@) forced or compelled restitution;

(b) agreeing to the client's demand for certain improper behavior or result;
(©) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;

(@ resignation prior o completion of dsciplinay proceedings,
(©) complsinant’s recommendation as to sanction; and

(@ failure of injured client to complain.

‘Recommendations
In consideration of the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, the parties’ Sip

 

lation, the facts and conditional admissions in the accompanying Affidavit, andthe Supplemental
‘Stipulation entered into by the parties regarding both this proceeding as well as BPR #2017-116,
the Board recommends the Wyoming Supreme Court issue an order:

1. Suspending Respondent from the practice of law for a pesiod of 90 days.

2. Requiring Respondeat to pay an administrative fee of $750.00 and costs of $50.00
‘othe Wyoming State Bar within 10 days of the order of suspension

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3. Directing the Wyoming State Berto issue the partes’ stipulated press release as
set forth above.

4. Ifthe Court approves the Board's recommendation ofa 30-day suspension in BPR
#2017-116, such suspension should run consecutively and not concurrently withthe 90-day sus-
‘pension recommended herein.

5. Ifthe Court approves the Board's recommendation and orders a 90-day suspen
‘sion, such suspension should begin no sooner than December 14, 2018, 0 as not to disadvantage
‘Respondent's curent clients, given the states and court schedules of matters in which Respond-
cnt is curently involved.

6. While not controling, the Board recommends Respondeat complete continuing
legal education regarding law firm business management, law firm prattice management and
seck a mentor to assist with her practice once reinstated.

DATED this_22 day of October 2018.
watch fevile, Chair
of Professional Responsibility

‘Wyoming State Bar

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