Case Title: State v. Drew

Citation: 490 P.2d 230

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1971-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
490 P.2d 230 (1971) The STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jonathan Woodbury DREW, Defendant and Appellant. No. 12073. Supreme Court of Montana. November 3, 1971. *231 McKinley Anderson, Jr., Bozeman, James H. Goetz, argued, Bozeman, for appellant. Robert L. Woodahl, Atty. Gen., Helena, David V. Gliko, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, Helena, Thomas A. Olson, County Atty., Bozeman, Thomas D. Gai, appeared, Bozeman, for respondent. DALY, Justice. Defendant, Jonathan Drew, aged 18, plead guilty to possession of four marihuana cigarettes, being less than 60 grams, a misdemeanor, in violation of section 54-133, R.C.M. 1947. It was defendant's first offense. On the 26th of April, 1971, the district court of Gallatin County imposed this sentence: Defendant appeals from the final judgment and sentence of the trial court. The state has conceded that the trial court by its judgment determined defendant was entitled to a deferred imposition of *232 sentence under section 54-133(c), R.C.M. 1947. The only remaining issue for review is whether a six month imprisonment is proper under the presumption of entitlement to a deferred imposition of sentence, directed by section 54-133(c), R.C.M. 1947. We think not. The state's principal argument is that section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, Montana's sentencing statute, provides: The state argues that section 95-2206 read literally authorizes the combination of a deferred sentence and a jail term. The defect in this argument lies in the one fact which has been overlooked. Here, we are considering the sentencing mandate of a special statute under the Dangerous Drug Act, section 54-133(c), R.C.M. 1947. Under this Act, once the presumption provided for in section 54-133(c) has been found by the trial judge not to have been overcome (State v. Simtob, 154 Mont. 286, 462 P.2d 873; Campus v. State, Mont., 483 P.2d 275, 28 St.Rep. 339), then the court's discretion is limited by this Act to defer the imposition of sentence as provided under section 95-2206(2), R.C.M. 1947. We have other examples of special provisions which limit the court's sentencing discretion such as section 94-2505, R.C.M. 1947, which provides the mandatory penalty for murder in the first degree. However, in all cases when there are no special sentencing provisions the wide discretion of section 95-2206, R.C.M. 1947, applies. The state further argues with citations on "suspended sentences", that the purpose of "suspended" and "deferred" is not dissimilar and conditions of probation can be attached. This is true but not in point with the issue presented in this appeal. For clarity: Where the defendant is granted a suspended sentence, sentence is imposed and execution of the sentence is suspended in whole or in part up to the maximum time of sentence allowed by law and the defendant can be released on probation during the time interval with the conditions of probation imposed by the court. Where the defendant is granted deferred imposition of sentence as directed by section 54-133(c), R.C.M. 1947, it contemplates that the verdict or plea will be taken and the imposition of sentence deferred, or if you prefer, stayed, for a period not to exceed three years. The court can impose conditions of probation during this time of deferment which are not in contradiction to a stay of sentence or deferred sentence. This then means defendant will not be sentenced, which includes a sentence to a term in jail. At the termination of the time of deferment or stayed imposition, section 95-2207, R.C.M. 1947, authorizes the court to accept a plea *233 withdrawal or to strike the verdict of guilty and order the charge dismissed. The passage of section 95-2207, R.C.M. 1947, demonstrates the intent of the legislature in regard to deferred imposition of sentence. If sentence were imposed or executed in any part, then the end advantage to the entire concept of the deferred sentence could not be attained and section 95-2207 would become inoperative. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of the trial court is vacated and this cause remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment and deferred sentence not inconsistent with the statutes controlling or this opinion. JAMES T. HARRISON, C.J., and HASWELL and CASTLES, JJ., concur.