Case Title: McMorris v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 072247

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, 
Agee,∗ and Goodwyn, JJ. 
 
 
RASHAD TYRIE MCMORRIS 
 
v.       Record No. 072247                 OPINION BY 
JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
          September 12, 2008 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of Rashad Tyrie 
McMorris (“McMorris”) of robbery as a principal in the 
second degree. 
 
McMorris was charged, in the Circuit Court for the City 
of Hampton, with one count of robbery in violation of Code 
§ 18.2-58. McMorris pled not guilty to the charge.  After a 
bench trial, McMorris was found guilty and sentenced to 
serve a term of 20 years in prison, with 11 years suspended.  
McMorris appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals; 
the Court of Appeals denied his petition for appeal.  This 
Court granted his appeal. 
FACTS 
 
On September 22, 2006, Darrin Ottey (“Ottey”) rode the 
bus to a friend’s apartment in Hampton.  He exited the bus 
                     
∗ Justice Agee participated in the hearing and decision 
of this case prior to his retirement from the Court on June 
30, 2008. 
 
and immediately noticed a group of approximately fifteen 
young men gathered in between buildings across the street.  
As Ottey walked past the group of young men, including 
McMorris, one of them said, “[T]hat’s the guy from Zooms.” 
 
The comment referred to an altercation the night before 
when Ottey was working with a female employee at Zooms, a 
convenience store.  Three young men, including McMorris, 
banged on the locked door of Zooms, causing a disturbance.  
The female employee attempted to call the police, but Ottey 
told her “don’t worry about it.”  The three men left, and 
Ottey did not see them again until the next day. 
As Ottey was walking towards his friend’s apartment, 
some of the young men followed Ottey, asking him why he 
called the police.  Ottey attempted to ignore them and 
knocked on his friend’s front door.  His friend did not 
answer the door, so Ottey attempted to leave the apartment 
complex.  Thereafter, one of the young men hit Ottey; four 
others joined in the attack, McMorris being the last to do 
so. 
As this group was attacking Ottey, his wallet, 
containing identification cards and two dollars, and his 
cellular telephone, worth $300, fell to the ground.  Because 
he was being attacked, Ottey was unable to retrieve his 
telephone.  He saw one of the young men involved in the 
 
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attack, other than McMorris, “grab[] the phone, look[] at it 
and [run] towards the crowd where the other boys were at.”  
Ottey did not see what happened to his wallet, but it was 
not on the ground when the fight ended. 
Ottey testified that no one demanded that he “hand 
over” his telephone or wallet, and that no one attempted to 
“go through” his pockets during the fight.  McMorris did not 
take Ottey’s property nor did McMorris leave the scene with 
the person who took Ottey’s property. 
The trial court found McMorris guilty of robbery as a 
principal in the second degree.  See Code § 18.2-18.  The 
trial court stated, “While [McMorris and others] were 
attacking Mr. Ottey, another one of the assailants was 
taking his property.  This was all contemporaneous.  
Therefore[,] the robbery statute applies.”  In refusing 
McMorris’ petition for appeal, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the evidence established that McMorris shared 
the criminal intent of those who did steal Ottey’s telephone 
and other items.  McMorris v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0630-
07-1, slip op. at 2-3 (Aug. 17, 2007). 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, the facts are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party at trial.  Porter v. 
Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 215-16, 661 S.E.2d 415, 419 
 
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(2008); Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 376, 626 
S.E.2d 383, 393 (2006).  However, this Court will reverse a 
judgment of the trial court that is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.  Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 
524, 659 S.E.2d 311, 319 (2008); Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 
Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005). 
The Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the charged 
crime.  See Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 276, 280, 645 
S.E.2d 433, 435 (2007); Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307, 
317, 410 S.E.2d 621, 627 (1991).  “ ‘Suspicion of guilt, 
however strong, or even the probability of guilt, is 
insufficient to support a conviction.’ ”  Rogers, 242 Va. at 
317, 410 S.E.2d at 627 (quoting Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 
Va. 26, 42, 393 S.E.2d 599, 608 (1990)). 
McMorris was found guilty of robbery as a principal in 
the second degree.  Robbery is “ ‘the taking, with intent to 
steal, of the personal property of another, from his person 
or in his presence, against his will, by violence or 
intimidation.’ ”  Pritchard v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 559, 
561, 303 S.E.2d 911, 912 (1983) (quoting Mason v. 
Commonwealth, 200 Va. 253, 254, 105 S.E.2d 149, 150 (1958)).  
To find a defendant guilty as a principal in the second 
degree, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant 
 
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procured, encouraged, countenanced, or approved the criminal 
act.  Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 124, 306 
S.E.2d 886, 888-89 (1983); Spradlin v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 
523, 526-27, 79 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1954); Brown v. 
Commonwealth, 130 Va. 733, 736-37, 107 S.E. 809, 810-11 
(1921). 
Mere presence is not sufficient to convict a defendant 
as a principal in the second degree.  Augustine, 226 Va. at 
124, 306 S.E.2d at 888; Brown, 130 Va. at 736, 107 S.E. at 
810; Spradlin, 195 Va. at 527, 79 S.E.2d at 445.  The 
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant consented to the 
felonious purpose and the defendant contributed to its 
execution.  Hall v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 533, 537, 303 
S.E.2d 903, 905 (1983); Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370, 
373, 157 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1967).  It is essential that the 
Commonwealth establish that the defendant shared in the 
criminal intent of the principal who committed the crime.  
Jones, 208 Va. at 373, 157 S.E.2d at 909. 
It is a well-settled rule that a defendant is guilty as 
a principal in the second degree if he is guilty of some 
overt act done knowingly in furtherance of the commission of 
the crime, or if he shared in the criminal intent of the 
principal committing the crime. See Augustine, 226 Va. at 
124, 306 S.E.2d at 889; Hall, 225 Va. at 537, 303 S.E.2d at 
 
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905; Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 876, 55 S.E.2d 24, 
32 (1949); Code § 18.2-18.  This rule cannot be interpreted 
to mean that any overt act that is advantageous to the 
principal’s criminal plan is sufficient; the defendant must 
also share in the principal’s criminal intent.  The overt 
act must be “knowingly in furtherance of the commission of 
the crime.”  Therefore, lack of intent is usually a defense 
to a conviction as a principal in the second degree.  See 
Jones, 208 Va. at 373-74, 157 S.E.2d at 909; Spradlin, 195 
Va. at 528, 79 S.E.2d at 446.  The one exception exists when 
there was concert of action and the resulting crime, whether 
such crime was originally contemplated or not, is a natural 
and probable consequence of the intended wrongful act.  
Spradlin, 195 Va. at 528, 79 S.E.2d at 445.   
In this case, the trial court found McMorris guilty as 
a principal in the second degree based on the fact that he 
was attacking Ottey while someone else contemporaneously 
stole his telephone and wallet.  The Commonwealth presented 
no evidence of a common plan to steal Ottey’s property.  
Neither McMorris nor any of the other assailants demanded 
Ottey’s money or attempted to “go through” his pockets.  
McMorris did not leave the scene of the crime with the 
principal actor, nor is there evidence he benefited from the 
theft.  In fact, no direct evidence was introduced showing 
 
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that McMorris was aware that Ottey’s property had fallen on 
the ground or that a co-assailant took it.  McMorris could 
not have procured, encouraged, countenanced, approved or 
knowingly committed an overt act in furtherance of the 
robbery without the knowledge that the crime was occurring. 
The Commonwealth insists that such knowledge can be 
inferred through the circumstantial evidence presented.  In 
particular, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court 
could have properly concluded that McMorris observed the 
robber steal the telephone based on McMorris’ proximity to 
the victim and the robber. 
The Commonwealth can, and most often must, present 
circumstantial evidence to prove that a defendant aided or 
abetted in the commission of a crime.  See Augustine, 226 
Va. at 123, 306 S.E.2d at 888; Spradlin, 195 Va. at 527, 79 
S.E.2d at 445.  However, when the Commonwealth relies on 
circumstantial evidence, all circumstances proved must be 
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and 
exclude all reasonable conclusions inconsistent with guilt.  
Rogers, 242 Va. at 317, 410 S.E.2d at 627; Augustine, 226 
Va. at 123, 306 S.E.2d at 888. 
 
Here, there was no evidence showing the relative 
vantage point of McMorris to the property when it fell and 
was taken.  McMorris’ proximity may have created a suspicion 
 
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that McMorris observed the property fall to the ground.  
However, to sustain a criminal conviction, the Commonwealth 
is required to prove more than a suspicion of guilt or 
probability of guilt.  Rogers, 242 Va. at 317, 320, 410 
S.E.2d at 627, 629. 
 
Furthermore, because the evidence offered against 
McMorris is wholly circumstantial, such evidence must 
exclude all reasonable conclusions inconsistent with that of 
guilt.  See id.  The circumstantial evidence presented is 
insufficient to prove that McMorris had actual knowledge of 
his co-assailants’ theft of Ottey’s property.  Even though 
McMorris was one of the five men involved in the attack and 
he was near the proximate area where Ottey’s telephone fell 
to the ground, the circumstances of McMorris’ conduct do not 
exclude the reasonable conclusion that McMorris did not 
observe Ottey’s property fall to the ground and that he did 
not have knowledge of the principal’s intent to commit the 
robbery.  Therefore, the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that McMorris shared the criminal intent 
of the principal to commit the robbery. 
 
The Commonwealth also contends that McMorris’ concert 
of action with Ottey’s other assailants is sufficient to 
support a finding that McMorris is guilty of robbery as a 
principal in the second degree.  Lack of intent cannot be 
 
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used as a defense when there was concert of action and the 
resulting crime was a natural and probable consequence of 
the intended wrongful act.  Spradlin, 195 Va. at 528, 79 
S.E.2d at 445.  McMorris was among the five young men who 
surrounded and attacked Ottey.  The apparent reason for the 
attack was an incident the previous night.  McMorris had the 
shared intent to wrongfully assault Ottey.  The issue raised 
is whether robbery is a natural and probable consequence of 
an assault. 
When someone harbors ill feelings toward another and 
the situation escalates into a fight, there is no reasonable 
probability that the aggressor will steal the victim’s 
property.  See Brown, 130 Va. at 737-38, 107 S.E. at 811.  
We discussed similar facts in a hypothetical situation 
described in Kemp v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 443, 450-51 (1885) 
(quoting 1 Joel P. Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law 
§ 634, at 384 (7th ed. 1882)): 
“Even when persons are unlawfully together, and by 
concurrent understanding are in the actual 
perpetration of some crime, if one of them, of his 
sole volition, and not in pursuance of the main 
purpose, does a criminal thing in no way connected 
with what was mutually contemplated, he only is 
liable."  "Thus, . . . if in England, poachers 
join in an attack on the game-keeper, and leave 
him senseless, – then, if one of them returns and 
steals his money, this one alone can be convicted 
of the robbery.” 
 
 
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Robbery is not an incidental, probable consequence of an 
assault; robbery requires a completely different type of 
wrongdoing:  stealing.  Therefore, McMorris’ conviction for 
robbery as a principal in the second degree cannot be 
affirmed based on the robbery being a natural and probable 
consequence of the concerted assault. 
The evidence presented by the Commonwealth was 
insufficient to prove that McMorris knowingly committed an 
overt act in furtherance of the robbery, shared in the 
criminal intent of the principal committing the robbery, or 
that the robbery was a natural and probable consequence of 
the wrongful assaults.  Thus, the trial court erred in 
finding McMorris guilty of robbery as a principal in the 
second degree. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals affirming McMorris’ conviction of robbery as a 
principal in the second degree, vacate McMorris’ conviction 
of robbery, and dismiss the indictment against him. 
Reversed, vacated, and dismissed. 
 
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