Case Title: In re Knappenberger

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50864

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  March 24, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re Complaint as to the Conduct of
ALLAN F. KNAPPENBERGER,
Accused.
(OSB 02-13, 02-14, 02-106; SC S50864)
En Banc
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted January 7, 2005.
Peter R. Jarvis, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for the accused.  With him on the
briefs was David J. Elkanich.
Stacy J. Hankin, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State
Bar. 
PER CURIAM
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for 120
days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of this
decision.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charged the accused with violating Oregon Code of
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-104(A)(1),
which prohibits lawyers from communicating with represented
parties on the subject of the representation, and DR 5-105(C),
which bars former client conflicts. (1)  A trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board concluded that the accused had violated both
rules, and it imposed a 90-day suspension from the practice of
law.  The accused requested this court's review pursuant to ORS
9.536(1) (2001) and the Bar Rules of Procedure (BRs). (2)  We
review bar disciplinary matters de novo.  ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.6. 
COMMUNICATION WITH REPRESENTED PARTIES
The Bar alleges that the accused violated
DR 7-104(A)(1) by speaking to two of his employees about an
action that they had filed against him. 
We find that the Bar proved the following facts by
clear and convincing evidence.  Four of the accused's employees,
including Maddocks and Clark, sued the accused in federal court
on employment-related claims.  The accused received service of
the summons and complaint at his office between 4:30 and 5:00
p.m. on Friday, March 17, 2000.  Thirty to 45 minutes later, the
accused confronted Maddocks in her office, showing her the
summons and complaint, and asking, in an angry tone, what it was
and whose idea it had been.  Maddocks told him that they should
not be discussing the action.  The accused left, insisting that
they would discuss the matter the following week.  The entire
conversation lasted between 30 seconds and one minute.
Clark was in her office the next day, a Saturday, when
the accused entered and tossed a piece of paper at her.  He asked
her what it was, and she answered that it was the cover sheet of
a civil action.  The accused asked Clark why she was bringing the
action, who had decided to sue him, and whether "this is really
what you want to do."  Clark told the accused to direct his
questions to her lawyer, but the accused said that he had a right
to speak with her directly.  Finally, when Clark threatened to
leave the room if the accused did not discuss work-related
matters, he gave her some papers to file and left.  The
conversation lasted between 5 and 20 minutes. (3) 
Both Maddocks and Clark believed that the accused was
trying to intimidate them into dropping the action.  Both women
described the conversations with the accused to their lawyers,
who amended the complaint in the action to include retaliation
claims based on the conversations.  (The accused ultimately
prevailed in the action.)
The Bar alleged that the accused's conversations with
Maddocks and Clark violated DR 7-104(A)(1). (4)  That rule
provides:
"(A)  During the course of the lawyer's
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
"(1)  communicate or cause another to communicate
on the subject of the representation, or on directly
related subjects with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by a lawyer on that subject or on directly
related subjects, unless: 
"(a) the lawyer has the prior consent of a lawyer
representing such other person;
"(b) the lawyer is authorized by law to do so; or 
"(c) a written agreement requires a written notice
or demand to be sent to such other person, in which
case a copy of such notice or demand shall also be sent
to such other person's lawyer.  
"This prohibition includes a lawyer representing
the lawyer's own interests."
The trial panel concluded that the accused had violated
that rule as to Maddocks, but it further concluded, with one
member dissenting, that the violation had been de minimis because
the accused "should not be expected to engage in detached
reflection over his ethical responsibilities" immediately after
being served with a complaint. (5)  However, the trial panel
concluded that the accused had violated DR 7-104(A)(1) by
speaking with Clark the next day, after he had had time to
reflect on the proper course of conduct.  
The accused argues that this court should conclude that
he should not be sanctioned for either alleged violation of
DR 7-104(A)(1) because the communications with Maddocks and Clark
were "very brief," because the accused's emotional distress about
being sued caused him to act hastily, and because his intent was
to determine whether he could continue to work productively with
employees who were suing him and not to invade his employees'
relationships with their lawyers. 
Those arguments are insufficient to avoid the
conclusion that the accused violated DR 7-104(A)(1) by separately
communicating with Maddocks and Clark regarding the subject of
their action against him, when he knew that they were
represented.  The text of DR 7-104(A)(1) provides no exception
for otherwise prohibited communications, and the purposes
underlying the rule suggest no basis for such an exception. 
DR 7-104 is a prophylactic rule designed to insulate represented
persons "against possible overrreaching by other lawyers who are
participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with
the client-lawyer relationship, and the uncounselled disclosure
of information relating to the representation."  The Ethical
Oregon Lawyer § 7.42 (Oregon CLE 1991) (quoting ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.2, Comment [1]).  All violations
of the rule present that risk.  Accordingly, this court
previously has found violations of DR 7-104(A)(1) even when the
prohibited communication was brief, transitory, or not likely to
cause serious harm.  See In re Schenck, 320 Or 94, 879 P2d 863
(1994) (rule violated when lawyer mailed notice to produce
directly to adverse party whom lawyer knew to be represented by
counsel); In re Hedrick, 312 Or 442, 822 P2d 1187 (1991) (rule
violated when lawyer sent demand letter directly to represented
person, with copy to lawyer).  
The accused's related defenses also are unavailing. 
This court has rejected, as a defense to a charge of improperly
communicating with a represented party, the claim that the lawyer
and the represented party share a relationship separate from the
lawyer's status as a lawyer that requires them to interact with
each other regardless of the pending litigation.  See In re Otto
W. Heider, 217 Or 134, 155, 341 P2d 1107 (1959) (rejecting
lawyer's defense that improper communication occurred because
accused and represented party had business relationship).  This
court also has held that an accused lawyer's emotional state
during the communication is irrelevant.  See In re Lewelling, 296
Or 702, 706, 678 P2d 1229 (1984) (rejecting accused's
justification that he had communicated with represented party "on
sudden impulse" when he "was emotionally upset").  Moreover, a
lawyer need not intend to violate the lawyer-client relationship
of the represented party to violate DR 7-104(A)(1).  See In re
McCaffrey, 275 Or 23, 28, 549 P2d 66 (1976) (direct communication
with party lawyer knows to be represented, concerning subject of
representation, violates rule even if not done intentionally).  
Neither the text of the rule nor this court's cases
interpreting it recognize as a defense any of the arguments that
the accused makes.  The accused's arguments are relevant only in
determining the appropriate sanction, and we discuss them in that
context below.
We conclude that the Bar has proved, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the accused violated DR 7-104(A)(1)
with respect to both Maddocks and Clark.  
FORMER CLIENT CONFLICT
The Bar also alleges that the accused violated
DR 5-105(C) by first representing the husband in a divorce
proceeding and later representing the wife in the same divorce
proceeding and in a proceeding to overturn a related restraining
order.
On de novo review, we conclude that the Bar proved the
following facts by clear and convincing evidence.  On October 4,
2000, Richard Grossman, who was seeking to replace his existing
lawyer in a divorce proceeding, met with the accused to discuss
representation.  Richard asked whether the consultation was
confidential, and, although the accused did not provide Richard a
direct answer, he did not disabuse Richard of that
understanding. (6)  Richard provided a copy of a property
settlement agreement that he and his wife Linda had signed, and
he described the main issues in the divorce, including whether
Linda could share an annuity that he had purchased after the
couple had signed a postnuptial agreement.  Richard also told the
accused about his goals in the divorce proceeding.
Although Richard was seeking representation only in the
divorce proceeding, he also told the accused about the history of
Family Abuse Prevention Act restraining orders involving the
parties.  Richard previously had obtained a restraining order
against Linda.  At the time Richard consulted the accused, Linda
had obtained a restraining order against Richard.  The petition
that had been the basis for the latter restraining order alleged
that Richard had shoved and threatened Linda during a public
argument on August 13, 2000.  However, Richard described to the
accused a different version of those events, saying that Linda
had been the aggressor, "yelling" and "screaming" at Richard and
his female companion and preventing Richard from getting into his
car and leaving.  Richard told the accused that he believed Linda
had sought the restraining order as a defense to a stalking
complaint that his companion had filed against Linda.  Richard
told the accused that Linda had broken into his home sometime
after the August 13 incident and that he was concerned because he
believed that the police were not being responsive.  He said that
he was considering obtaining another restraining order against
Linda. 
On October 12, the accused wrote to Richard expressing
a desire to represent him in the divorce proceeding.  In a
subsequent telephone conversation, however, Richard told the
accused that he had decided to retain another lawyer, Urrutia. 
The accused sent Richard a bill for the October 4 consultation,
but Richard never paid it. 
On November 21, Richard filed a pro se petition seeking
a restraining order against Linda and citing the August 13
incident and the break-ins, among other incidents that had
occurred in the prior 180 days.  The court issued the order on
November 22. 
Richard did not know, at the time that he filed the
petition for a restraining order, that Linda also was seeking a
new lawyer because she was dissatisfied with her existing lawyer. 
On November 30, Linda interviewed the accused, discussed the
divorce and restraining order proceedings with him, and retained
him to represent her in both those matters.  The accused never
discussed with Linda the fact that he had consulted with Richard. 
Over the next few days, the accused took affirmative
steps in connection with his representation of Linda.  He wrote
to Linda's previous lawyer to request Linda's file, wrote to
Urrutia to notify him of the representation and discuss the
scheduling of discovery, and requested a hearing to contest the
restraining order.  He also wrote to Urrutia to request that
Linda be allowed to attend a class at Portland Community College
(PCC), a location that the restraining order barred her from
visiting.
On December 4, Laney, an associate of Urrutia's,
notified the accused that he had a conflict in representing Linda
because he had consulted with Richard previously.  They discussed
the propriety of the representation by fax and telephone.  Laney
requested that the accused withdraw from representing Linda in
the divorce proceeding because he had a conflict of interest as a
result of his prior consultation with Richard.  The accused said
that he did not remember speaking to Richard.  However, the
accused did not check any records that might have refreshed his
recollection.  Laney sent the accused a copy of the accused's
October 12 letter to Richard as evidence of the meeting.  The
accused responded by faxed letter that he still did not remember
Richard but that he would discuss the issue with his ethics
counsel.
During their communications on December 4, Laney and
the accused also continued to discuss whether Linda could go to
PCC.  Laney said that the couple might meet there, and that
Richard would consider any contact with Linda, however
accidental, a violation of the restraining order.  The accused
said that he intended to contest in court whether Linda's college
attendance violated the restraining order. 
On December 5, Laney asked the accused to decide
promptly whether he would continue to represent Linda, because a
hearing in the divorce proceeding was approaching.  The accused
responded that he would be meeting with his ethics counsel that
day, but he refused to withdraw until after that meeting.
On December 6, the accused informed Urrutia that he
would withdraw from representing Linda in the divorce proceeding. 
He withdrew from the divorce representation on December 8, but he
did not withdraw from the restraining order proceeding.  Urrutia
confirmed the divorce withdrawal by letter, noting that the
accused was still "undecided" as to whether he would withdraw
from the restraining order matter and requesting that he do so. 
The accused consulted his ethics counsel a second time.  On
December 12, he informed Linda that he was withdrawing from that
matter as well, and arranged for Linda's previous attorney to
resume representing her.  Urrutia, who was unaware of the change,
threatened to file a motion to disqualify the accused in the
restraining order proceeding.  On December 18, the other attorney
told Urrutia that the accused had withdrawn.
The Bar's complaint charged the accused with violating
DR 5-105(C).  That provision provides: 
"(C)Former Client Conflicts - Prohibition. 
Except as permitted by DR 5-105(D) [regarding consent
by both parties after full disclosure], a lawyer who
has represented a client in a matter shall not
subsequently represent another client in the same or a
significantly related matter when the interests of the
current and former clients are in actual or likely
conflict.  Matters are significantly related if either:
"(1)Representation of the present client in the
subsequent matter would, or would likely, inflict
injury or damage upon the former client in connection
with any * * * matter in which the lawyer previously
represented the former client; or 
"(2)Representation of the former client provided
the lawyer with confidences or secrets as defined in
DR 4-101(A), the use of which would, or would likely,
inflict injury or damage upon the former client in the
course of the subsequent matter."
When evaluating whether a lawyer has violated DR 5-105, we
consider all facts that "the lawyer knew, or by the exercise of
reasonable care should have known."  DR 5-105(B).
The trial panel found that Richard had been the
accused's client and that Richard's interests were in conflict
with Linda's.  It also found that the accused either knew or
should have known of that conflict when he met with Linda for the
first time and that the conflict was "so obvious * * * that no
consultation [with ethics counsel had been] required" on either
the restraining order or the divorce proceedings, which were
"inextricably intertwined."  The trial panel held that "the
Accused's failure to recognize the conflict when he undertook to
represent [Linda] in both the divorce and [restraining order]
matters and his failure to withdraw in a timely manner in both
matters when being alerted to the conflict, constitute a
violation of DR 5-105(C)."
The accused argues on review that DR 5-105(C) does not
apply to this proceeding because that rule applies only to a
conflict between a current client and a "former client," and that
Richard was not a "former client" of the accused.  In the
accused's view, Richard was, at most, a "prospective client" of
the accused who never became an actual client and, therefore,
cannot be a former client.  The Bar, relying on OEC 503 and this
court's decision in In re Spencer, 335 Or 71, 58 P3d 228 (2002),
argues that this court should construe the word "client" in
DR 5-105(C) to include anyone who consults with a lawyer with a
view to obtaining professional services from the lawyer.  In the
Bar's view, Richard was the accused's "client" for purposes of
the former client conflict prohibition of DR 5-105(C), even
though he did not retain the accused.  For the reasons that we
discuss below, although we disagree with the Bar's broad reading
of the word "client" in DR 5-105(C) to include anyone who
consults with a lawyer with a view to retaining legal services,
we conclude that, in this proceeding, the Bar has proved by clear
and convincing evidence that Richard was a client of the
accused's, at least briefly, and, therefore, that he also was a
"former client" for purposes of DR 5-105(C).
In Spencer, this court considered whether the
requirement in DR 9-101(C)(4) that lawyers "promptly * * *
deliver to a client as requested by the client * * * properties
in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to
receive" applied to prospective clients.  This court noted that
OEC 503 extends the lawyer-client privilege to persons who
consult a lawyer "with a view to obtaining professional legal
services from the lawyer,"  Spencer, 335 Or at 83, and concluded
that, when a person delivers documents 
"to a lawyer who is considering whether to represent
that person, the person has entrusted those materials
to the lawyer as a lawyer and, as such, is as much
entitled to be considered a 'client' for that limited
purpose as if the person had made a confidential,
verbal communication to the lawyer."  
Id. at 84.
As noted previously, the Bar argues that Spencer and
OEC 503 support its argument that anyone who consults with a
lawyer with a view to obtaining legal services should be
considered a "client" for conflict of interest analysis under DR
5-105.  On the contrary, in Spencer this court specifically
declined to treat all "prospective clients" as "clients" for
purposes of the disciplinary rules and limited its interpretation
of "client" there to the use of that term in DR 9-101(C)(4).  335
Or at 84-85 and n 9.  Spencer does, however, recognize that this
court will consider as evidence that a person is a "client" for
purposes of the disciplinary rules whether the putative client
intended to establish a lawyer-client relationship and whether
the putative client could assert the lawyer-client privilege
under OEC 503 as to communications with the lawyer.  Id. at 84.
We now turn to the evidence in the record to determine
whether Richard ever was a "client" of the accused for purposes
of DR 5-105(C).  As described above, Richard consulted the
accused for approximately two hours concerning representation in
his divorce.  The accused provided Richard substantive advice on
various aspects of the divorce proceeding.  Richard reasonably
believed that the consultation was confidential, and the accused
also believed that it was confidential.  Richard expected to be
billed for his consultation with the accused, and the accused in
fact sent him a bill.  
Richard also discussed with the accused the factual
details regarding the restraining orders.  The accused provided
Richard with legal advice concerning the evidence a court would
require from Richard before he could obtain such an order.  The
accused never told Richard that he was not the accused's client,
that Richard should avoid disclosing confidential information, or
that the creation of a lawyer-client relationship would be
deferred until some later date.  
Although Richard ultimately decided not to retain the
accused to appear on his behalf in the divorce proceeding (or in
connection with the restraining orders), we conclude that the Bar
has proved by clear and convincing evidence that Richard was a
client of the accused for purposes of DR 5-105, at least during
their consultation on October 4, 2000.  The accused identifies
certain evidence that, he asserts, supports his view that Richard
was only a prospective client, including correspondence from
Urrutia and Laney to the accused that refers to the accused's
"potential representation" of Richard.  The accused is correct
that some evidence in the record supports his claim that Richard
was a prospective client; however, as we have determined, clear
and convincing evidence in the record supports our conclusion
that Richard was a client.  The accused also correctly points out
that Richard never affirmatively retained the accused to
represent him as trial counsel in the divorce proceeding.  The
lawyer-client relationship, however, is not as narrow as the
accused suggests, and a lawyer-client relationship may be -- and
often is -- limited to office consultations in which a client
seeks, and the lawyer gives, legal advice.  The conflicts rules
protect clients who seek and obtain such advice as much as they
do clients who retain lawyers to represent them in court
proceedings.  Because Richard was the accused's client for a
time, when Richard decided to retain another lawyer instead of
the accused, and so informed the accused, Richard became a
"former client" of the accused for purposes of DR 5-101(C). (7)
DR 5-105(C) prohibits a lawyer who has represented a
client in a matter from representing a subsequent client in the
same matter, when the two clients' interests are in actual or
likely conflict.  An "actual conflict" exists when "the lawyer
has a duty to contend for something on behalf of one client that
the lawyer has a duty to oppose on behalf of another client."  DR
5-105(A)(1). 
The accused represented Richard in connection with the
divorce proceeding.  He subsequently represented Linda in the
same proceeding.  By representing Linda, the accused assumed a
duty to advocate for her financial interests in the distribution
of the marital estate -- a duty diametrically opposed to his
obligations when he had advised Richard in connection with the
divorce.  We conclude that the Bar has proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused had an actual conflict of
interest in representing Linda in the divorce. 
The accused contends that he actually did not represent
Linda in the divorce because he undertook no actions on her
behalf.  We reject that argument because we find, as a factual
matter, that the accused did take such actions, including but not
limited to several meetings in which he advised Linda on the
appropriate legal strategy in the divorce.  
The Bar also contends that the accused violated DR 5-105(C) by representing Linda in the proceeding concerning the
November 2000 restraining order that Richard had obtained against
her.  According to the Bar, that violation occurred because the
order was "significantly related" to the divorce.
DR 5-105(C) prohibits a lawyer who has represented a
client from representing a subsequent client on a "significantly
related matter" when the two clients' interests are in actual or
likely conflict.  That rule provides that a subsequent matter is
"significantly related" to an earlier matter when, in part, the
representation of the former client provided the lawyer with
"confidences" or "secrets," as defined in DR 4-101(A), the use of
which would, or likely would, inflict injury or damage upon the
former client in the course of the subsequent matter. (8)    
The accused received confidences and secrets from
Richard.  As described above, Richard shared his version of the
facts underlying the restraining order that Linda obtained
against him.  He also discussed additional incidents in which he
believed Linda had threatened him and possible grounds for
obtaining a restraining order against her.  Richard later based
his petition for a restraining order against Linda on some of the
same facts.  Richard also discussed with the accused Linda's
motivation for obtaining her restraining order against him and
his motivation for obtaining a restraining order against her. 
Those views likely would have been important to Richard's
prosecution of his petition for a restraining order and his
responses to Linda's defense.  As previously noted, both Richard
and the accused believed that the consultation was confidential,
and the accused understood that his conversation with Richard was
covered by the lawyer-client privilege.
The Bar does not claim that the accused used the
confidences communicated to him by Richard in his representation
of Linda.  However, DR 5-105(C)(2) requires only that the accused 
could have used them in a way that would have been likely to harm
Richard, and we find that requirement met here.
We conclude that the accused's representation of Linda
in connection with the restraining order that Richard sought
against her was significantly related to his earlier
representation of Richard.  The interests of Richard and Linda
were in actual conflict in that matter because Richard sought to
obtain and sustain a restraining order that Linda sought to
overturn.  The accused therefore violated DR 5-101(C) by
representing Linda in the restraining order matter.
The accused argues that he should not be deemed to have
violated DR 5-105(C) because he had ended the representation as
soon as possible after he had discovered the conflict and
consulted with ethics counsel.  He contends that finding a
violation here is inappropriate because it would discourage
lawyers from consulting ethics counsel in the future.  
We disagree.  The accused should have known of the
conflict before he began representing Linda; he did not because
he had no real procedure for checking for conflicts.  The accused
did not conduct routine "conflicts checks" to determine whether
the representation of a potential new client might present a
conflict.  He kept a client address list, to which he added the
names of potential clients if he thought that they might become
clients.  That file contained Richard's name.  Indeed, the
accused not only placed Richard's name on that list, but also
opened a file, which included documents, correspondence, and the
bill that he sent Richard.  However, the accused checked his list
or other files only when his memory alerted him to a potential
problem.  According to his testimony, he did not check his client
list when Linda consulted him or before agreeing to represent
her.  Clearly, he should have.    
In our view, a lawyer in the accused's situation may
not rely solely on his or her memory to avoid prohibited
conflicts of interest.  If the accused had established and used a
more reliable procedure, then he would have known of his prior
consultation with Richard and would have been able to consult
with ethics counsel before he met with Linda.  The accused
emphasizes the benefits to the public and to the bar if lawyers
consult with ethics counsel when faced with a possible conflict,
and we encourage that sort of consultation.  However, in contrast
to complex transactions or cases involving numerous parties and
close questions of whether parties' interests may be adverse,
this was a straightforward, if contentious, divorce proceeding
(with related restraining order disputes) between two people who
had the same last name.  We agree with the trial panel that the
conflict here should have been obvious to the accused and should
have caused the accused to decline to represent Linda when he
first met with her.
SANCTION
In determining an appropriate sanction, this court
refers to the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards).  Spencer,
335 Or at 85-86.  The ABA Standards provide that, when imposing
sanctions, the court should consider the following factors:  "(a)
the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; (c) the
potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; 
and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors."  
ABA Standard 3.0. 
The accused's conduct violated two ethical obligations. 
A lawyer violates a duty to the legal system by speaking to a
represented party, contrary to the prohibition of DR 7-104(A)(1). 
ABA Standard 6.3.  A lawyer's most important ethical duties are
those owed to clients, including the duty to avoid conflicts of
interest that violate DR 5-105(C).  ABA Standards at 8.   
The Standards recognize three culpable mental states: 
intent, knowledge, and negligence.  ABA Standards at 12.  Intent
is "the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  Id.  Knowledge is "the conscious awareness of the
nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  Id.  Negligence is "the failure of a lawyer to heed a
substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will
follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation."  Id.
As to the accused's violations of DR 7-104(A)(1), we
conclude that the accused's state of mind was intentional.  He
knew that Clark and Maddocks were represented parties, and he
continued to speak with them about the subject of the
representation, even after they informed him that he should speak
with their counsel.  We reject the accused's defense that he
intended only to determine whether he could continue to work with
his employees because the content of the conversations related
not only to whether he could work with Maddocks and Clark, but
also to their action against him and their reasons for bringing
it.
The accused's violation of DR 5-105(C) was knowing. 
Even if we accept the accused's assertion that he was unaware of
his conflict of interest until Richard's lawyer, Urrutia,
informed him that he previously had represented Richard and
therefore had a conflict, the accused continued to represent
Linda on both matters after being so informed.  That
representation was not intentional, because we do not find that
the accused intended to use that conflict to his advantage. 
However, we conclude that it was knowing because the accused
persisted in the representation despite knowing facts that should
have led him to conclude that he had a conflict.  
The Standards require consideration of both injury and
potential injury that results from a lawyer's violation of the
disciplinary rules.  Injury is any actual harm, from "serious"
injury to "little or no" injury.  ABA Standards at 12.  Potential
injury is harm that was reasonably forseeable at the time of the
violation and that did not occur, but that would have occurred
absent some intervening factor.  Id.  Both injury and potential
injury are measured by their impact on "a client, the public, the
legal system or the profession."  Id.
The accused's violations of DR 7-104(A)(1) caused
potential injury.  Although the accused's communications with
Clark and Maddocks injured neither employee, it was reasonably
foreseeable that one or both employees would reveal privileged
information in response to his inquiries or would be so
intimidated by the threatening behavior of their employer that
they would cease or limit their participation in the action
because they feared adverse consequences for their jobs.
The accused's violation of DR 5-105(C) caused actual
injury, because both Linda and Richard were billed for time spent
by their lawyers in resolving the conflict.  It also caused
actual injury to Linda by complicating and delaying her effort to
change counsel at a critical time in her case.  Because of the
time spent resolving the conflict, Linda, who previously had
decided to change counsel by hiring the accused, had to return to
her earlier lawyer because she was the only available lawyer
familiar with the circumstances of Linda's case when the hearings
arose.  The accused's conduct also caused potential injury to
Richard because of the risk that the accused would use
confidential information obtained from Richard against him.
We find the following aggravating factors relevant in
determining the appropriate sanction.  The accused, who was
admitted to the Oregon bar in 1973, has substantial experience in
the practice of law.  ABA Standard 9.22(i).  He has several prior
disciplinary violations, which we discuss below.  The victims in
the DR 7-104(A)(1) violations -- Clark and Maddocks -- were
vulnerable because they were the accused's employees.  ABA
Standard 9.22(h).  In committing the DR 7-104(A)(1) violations,
the accused had a selfish motive and committed multiple offenses,
and in the DR 5-105(C) violation, the accused also had a selfish
motive.  ABA Standards 9.22(b), (d).  
As to mitigating factors, the accused asserts, and the
Bar agrees, that the accused has demonstrated a cooperative
attitude in these disciplinary proceedings.  The accused argues
that two other mitigating factors are present here.  First, as
discussed above, the accused argues that his DR 7-104(A)(1)
violations were brief, were justified by his understandable
emotional reaction to being sued by his employees, and occurred
in connection with his effort to determine whether he could
continue to work with Maddocks and Clark.  We do not accept the
accused's characterization of his purpose in communicating with
Maddocks and Clark, but it is true that the communications were
brief and transitory.  For that reason, the accused argues that
reprimand is the appropriate sanction.  We discuss that argument
below.  At this point, we simply note that nothing in the
disciplinary rules or in the ABA Standards supports the accused's
contention regarding these proposed mitigating factors.  On the
contrary, as discussed previously, the potential injury that the
rule is intended to prevent is present even when the prohibited
communication results from a lawyer's understandable emotional
reaction and even if the communication is brief and transitory.
Second, the accused argues that his quick withdrawal as
Linda's lawyer after learning of the conflict involving Richard
is a mitigating factor in connection with the sanction for the
DR 5-105(C) violation.  We already have rejected that argument as
a defense to the Bar's charge, and we now reject it as a
mitigating factor.  The accused knew or should have known that he
previously had represented Richard, and therefore had a conflict
of interest, when he first met with Linda.  He had actual
knowledge of the fact of his prior representation and therefore
of the conflict within a few days.  The accused did not act with
alacrity.  
Based on the discussion above, we now consider the
preliminary sanction for the accused's violations.  Suspension is
generally appropriate when a lawyer communicates with an
individual regarding a legal matter when the lawyer knows that
the person is represented, and the communication causes injury or
potential injury.  ABA Standard 6.32.  Reprimand is generally
appropriate when a lawyer negligently accepts a representation
that creates a conflict of interest, ABA Standard 4.33, but
suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer does so
knowingly.  ABA Standard 4.32.  As previously discussed, the
accused argues that the nature of his DR 7-104(A)(1) violations
justifies a reprimand, rather than a suspension.  If the accused
had not previously been sanctioned for violating DR 7-104, and if
he had not also violated DR 5-105, we might agree with the
accused that a reprimand is the appropriate sanction.  See
Lewelling, 296 Or at 706-07 (noting three prior cases imposing
reprimands for lawyers who communicated with represented persons,
but there imposing suspension because of dishonesty, breach of
trust, and additional violation).  As we discuss below, however,
that is not the case here.  We find that a suspension from the
practice of law is the appropriate preliminary sanction for the
accused's two violations.  
We now consider the appropriateness of that preliminary
sanction in light of Oregon case law and, in particular, in light
of this court's cases concerning the aggravating factor we have
not yet developed, viz., the accused's prior disciplinary
violations.  When evaluating "prior offenses" to determine a
sanction for lawyer misconduct, this court reviews all "offenses
that have been adjudicated prior to imposition of the sanction in
the current case."  In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149
(1997).  However, in determining the weight of each offense, we
consider five factors:  
"(1) the relative seriousness of the prior offense and
resulting sanction; (2) the similarity of the prior
offense to the offense in the case at bar; (3) the
number of prior offenses; (4) the relative recency of
the prior offense; and (5) the timing of the current
offense in relation to the prior offense and resulting
sanction, specifically, whether the accused lawyer had
been sanctioned for the prior offense before engaging
in the offense in the case at bar." 
Id.
The accused has four prior offenses.  He received a
letter of admonition for violating DR 7-104(A)(1) in February
1995.  He was reprimanded for violating that rule in September
2000.  In May 2004, this court suspended the accused for 90 days
for two additional offenses:  one violation of DR 5-107(A) (self-interested conflict of interest) and one violation of DR 6-101(B)
(neglecting legal matter).  In re Knappenberger, 337 Or 15, 90
P3d 614 (2004).  
As to the temporal relation between those prior
offenses and the violations that we have found here, we note that
in March 2000, when the accused committed the DR 7-104(A)(1)
violations at issue here, the Bar already had admonished him for
one violation of that rule and was prosecuting him for a second
violation.  In November 2000, when the accused violated DR 5-105(C), the trial panel in his earlier case had found that he had
committed the second DR 7-104(A)(1) violation.  Since then, he
has been sanctioned for violating two other rules.  We note that
the accused's first prior offense is 10 years old and that his
two most recent offenses occurred after the violations we
consider today.  However, all his prior offenses taken together
present an unsettling record of violating the disciplinary rules. 
In particular, they show that he has a history of improper
communications with represented parties.  
As we previously noted, this court has reprimanded some
lawyers for violations of DR 7-104(A)(1) but has suspended other
lawyers who violated that rule along with another rule.  See
Lewelling, 296 Or at 706-7 (60-day suspension for communication
with represented party and other violation).  This court
ordinarily suspends lawyers who violate DR 5-105(C).  In re
Hockett, 303 Or 150, 163-64, 734 P2d 877 (1987) (30-day
suspension appropriate for single violation of DR 5-105(C)); In
re Wyllie, 331 Or 606, 625 (2001) (90-day suspension for
violation of DR 5-105(C) and for other violations that were the
product of the lawyer's "sloppy and careless office practices,
not [his] intentional or knowing misconduct").
The principal difference between this case and those is
the extent of the accused's record of prior sanctions, many of
which involve the same kind of violations as are involved here. 
We conclude that, in order to get the accused's attention -- and
thereby protect the public -- the accused should receive a
significant period of suspension.  On the violations that the
trial panel found, we might agree with the trial panel's
determination that a 90-day suspension was appropriate.  The
trial panel, however, essentially disregarded the accused's
prohibited communication with Maddocks.  As we have explained
elsewhere, we view the accused's actions in that instance more
seriously.  We conclude that the appropriate sanction is a 120-day suspension.  
The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
120 days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of this
decision.
1. The Bar also charged the accused with violating a third disciplinary rule, but the trial panel
concluded that the accused had not violated that rule.  We do not discuss that decision because
the Bar has not challenged it on review.
2. The trial panel issued its decision on October 2, 2003.  At that time, Oregon law provided
for review as a matter of right from trial panel decisions that resulted in sanctions of six months
or less.  ORS 9.536(1) (2001), amended by Or Laws 2003, ch 192, § 4.  That statute now
provides for review as a matter of right for all lawyer discipline proceedings, regardless of
sanction.  ORS 9.536 (2003).
3. Clark initially asserted that the conversation had lasted
between 15 and 20 minutes, but on cross-examination she testified
that it could have been as short as 5 minutes.
4. The Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct became effective
January 1, 2005.  Because the conduct at issue here occurred
before that date, the Code of Professional Responsibility
applies.
5. The trial panel used the term "de minimis" to describe conduct that violated DR 7-104(A)(1) but that should not result in a sanction.  The accused also uses that term in his brief. 
We decline to use that term, because the disciplinary rules do not use the term and because it
states a conclusion regarding an alleged violation but does not explain how that conclusion was
reached.  We find it more useful to focus on the brevity and other aspects of the communication
that the accused asserts should lead us not to impose a sanction for conduct that violated the rule.
6. The accused testified that Richard did not ask whether the consultation was confidential,
although the accused assumed that it was.  Richard testified that he assumed that the consultation
was confidential and that he asked the accused whether that assumption was accurate, but that
the accused never answered his question directly.  
7. We do not need to decide, for purposes of this case, the date that Richard became a "former
client" of the accused.  Certainly, he had become a former client before November 30, the date
that the accused met with Linda.
8. DR 4-101(A) provides:
"(A) 'Confidence' refers to information protected
by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law,
and 'secret' refers to other information gained in a
current or former professional relationship that the
client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be
likely to be detrimental to the client."