Case Title: Newman v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR96-685

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
David NEWMAN v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-685                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 17, 1997


1.   Jury -- jurors presumptively unbiased -- abuse of discretion
     required for reversal. -- Jurors are presumptively unbiased,
     and the burden is on the appellant to prove otherwise; a trial
     court's findings regarding juror bias will not be reversed
     absent an abuse of discretion.  

2.   Jury -- juror bias never shown although opportunity given --
     no abuse of discretion in failure to quash juror panel. --
     Where all of the jurors seated in the prior trial were
     excluded from the venire; the trial court allowed counsel to
     pursue the possibility of bias in voir dire; appellant failed
     to explore the possibility of juror bias with regard to their
     presence in the prior voir dire, except for asking one
     question about whether anyone had not been present the prior
     week; appellant failed to identify any particular jurors who
     were biased; and appellant also failed to present evidence
     that any jurors were biased by their presence during voir dire
     the previous week, the trial court did not abuse its
     discretion by failing to quash the jury panel.

3.   Evidence -- trial court may impose reasonable limits on cross-
     examination -- ruling will not be reversed absent abuse of
     discretion. -- A trial court has wide latitude to impose
     reasonable limits on cross-examination based upon concerns
     about confusion of issues or interrogation that is only
     marginally relevant; the supreme court will not reverse the
     trial court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion.  

4.   Evidence -- proffered testimony marginally relevant at best --
     no abuse of discretion in trial court's imposing reasonable
     limits on cross-examination. -- Where the proffered testimony
     concerning when and against whom the task force decided to
     file charges was, at best, only marginally relevant to
     appellant's case, the trial court did not abuse its wide
     discretion in imposing reasonable limits on cross-examination
     by excluding the proffered testimony. 

5.   Appeal & error -- record on appeal confined to that which is
     abstracted -- point affirmed without reaching merits. --
     Appellant's objection to a tape that was admitted into
     evidence was not addressed where appellant failed to abstract
     the transcript of the tape that was in the record or what was
     recorded on the tape; the record on appeal is confined to that
     which is abstracted, and failure to abstract a critical matter
     precludes the court from considering the issue on appeal; it
     was impossible for the appellate court to review the contents
     of the tape in order to determine whether the trial court
     abused its discretion; the point was affirmed without reaching
     the merits.

6.   Evidence -- admissibility of evidence left to trial court's
     sound discretion -- purpose of establishing chain of custody
     discussed. -- Evidentiary matters regarding the admissibility
     of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial
     court and rulings in this regard will not be reversed absent
     an abuse of discretion; the purpose of establishing a chain of
     custody is to prevent the introduction of evidence that is not
     authentic or that has been tampered with; however, the trial
     court must be satisfied within a reasonable probability that
     the evidence has not been tampered with; it is not necessary
     that the State eliminate every possibility of tampering.

7.   Evidence -- State established with reasonable probability that
     evidence had not been tampered with -- admission of exhibits
     not abuse of discretion. -- Appellant's argument that the
     trial court erred in admitting evidence over his objection
     based on chain of custody was without merit where the State
     established within a reasonable probability that the evidence
     had not been tampered with; the State established an adequate
     chain of custody, and the trial court did not abuse its
     discretion in admitting the State's exhibits.

8.   Appeal & error -- ruling must be obtained at trial to preserve
     arguments for appeal -- point summarily affirmed for failure
     to obtain ruling below. -- To preserve arguments for appeal,
     even constitutional ones, the appellant must obtain a ruling
     below; because appellant failed to obtain a ruling from the
     trial court on his objection to the bifurcated proceedings, he
     did not preserve that issue for appeal; the point was
     summarily affirmed for failure to obtain a ruling below.

9.   Appeal & error -- no authority cited for argument -- point
     affirmed. -- Appellant's contention that "he was denied due
     process and equal protection under state and federal
     constitutions because of the manner in which charges were
     filed against him," was made without reference to any
     convincing legal argument as to how the "manner in which
     charges were filed against him" deprived him of due process or
     equal protection of the laws; moreover, he failed to cite to
     any authority for this proposition; the supreme court affirmed
     for failure to cite to authority. 

10.  Evidence -- appellant's contention not supported by
     authorities cited -- trial court did not err in denying motion
     to suppress. -- Appellant's argument that the trial court
     erred in failing to suppress the evidence, as charges filed
     against him were based on the unsworn statement of a
     confidential informant, was without merit where the
     authorities cited by appellant did not support his contention;
     here, the officer applied for an arrest warrant under oath,
     stating that two confidential informants met with appellant
     and purchased marijuana and methamphetamine from him;
     supporting affidavits commonly contain hearsay statements from
     informants and Ark. R. Crim. P. 7.1 does not require that such
     statements be made under oath; the trial court did not err in
     denying the motion to suppress.


     Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court; Harold Erwin, Judge;
affirmed.
     Larry J. Steele, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Vada Berger, Asst. Att'y
Gen., for appellee.
     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice. 
     This is a criminal case where the appellant, David Newman, was
convicted of the delivery of controlled substances.  Newman relies
upon six points of error in this appeal.  We affirm for the reasons
stated herein.
     On December 1, 1994, Sheriff Richard Rapert, working for the
Drug Task Force of the Third Judicial District, prepared two
confidential informants, Mike Sanders and Patricia Williams, to
make a controlled drug buy from the appellant, David Newman. 
Williams was Newman's ex-wife.  Rapert wired them with body
microphones in order to make a tape recording of their
conversations, and gave them purchase money.  Rapert also searched
them for the presence of drugs.  Joe Grooms, a marshall in Maynard
and Sanders's half-brother, aided Rapert by searching Williams's
vehicle for drugs.
     Williams and Sanders drove to Newman's house, followed by
Rapert and Grooms.  No one was at Newman's residence.  They then
proceeded to Donald Stacy's house.  Newman was there and Williams
went inside to initiate the purchase.  Newman came outside and met
Sanders.  Sanders asked Newman "if he had some smoke."  Newman
explained that he had methamphetamine and marijuana available. 
Sanders ultimately bought a quantity of marijuana and
methamphetamine for a total of $75.  Rapert later met with the
informants and Williams handed him two bags containing
methamphetamine and marijuana.
     The conversation between Newman and Sanders was recorded on
tape.  Rapert and Grooms, who both knew Newman, testified that they
recognized the voice on the tape as Newman's.  The testimony at
trial conflicted as to where the actual transaction took place. 
Sanders testified that the sale took place outside of Stacy's
residence, while Williams said that they drove back to Newman's
house to make the sale.  On re-direct, Williams conceded that she
did not know where the sale took place.  
     David Newman was tried and convicted of delivery of
methamphetamine and delivery of marijuana.  The jury imposed
sentences of forty years and ten years, respectively, along with
$50,000 in fines.  On appeal, Newman raises six points of error.  
                 1.  Disqualification of jurors.
     Newman's first argument is that the trial court erred in
failing to disqualify prospective jurors. The week before his
trial, Newman was tried in another drug case involving delivery of
methamphetamine.  This prior trial resulted in a mistrial due to
evidence that was improperly admitted.  Nonetheless, the trial
court utilized the same jury panel to select jurors in both trials,
excluding those thirteen jurors that were seated in the prior trial
from the panel in the present case.  Of those present in the panel,
only two prospective jurors had not been a part of the panel the
prior week.  
     Newman moved to quash the panel, arguing that they were
tainted by their knowledge that Newman had been charged in another
matter and by their voir dire the previous week.  The trial court
denied the motion and voir dire of the panel proceeded.
     Jurors are presumptively unbiased and the burden is on the
appellant to prove otherwise.  Esmeyer v. State, 325 Ark. 491, 930 S.W.2d 302 (1996).  Moreover, a trial court's findings regarding
juror bias will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.  Id.
     In Goins v. State, 318 Ark. 689,