Case Title: Lyons v. Walsh & Sons Trucking Co., Ltd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49907

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  September 10, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
WILLIAM R. LYONS
and BARBARA A. LYONS,
Co-Personal Representatives of the
Estate of Scott Alan Lyons, Deceased,
Petitioners on Review,
v.
WALSH & SONS TRUCKING CO., LTD.,
Respondent on Review.
WALSH & SONS TRUCKING CO., LTD.,
Third-Party-Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES EUGENE MAY, JR.,
Third-Party-Defendant.
(CC 98-06-04337; CA A110332; SC S49907)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 13, 2004.
Meagan A. Flynn, of Preston Bunnell & Stone, LLP, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioners on review.
I. Franklin Hunsaker, of Bullivant Houser Bailey, PC,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review.  With him on the brief were Richard J. Whittemore and
Holly E. Pettit.
Helen T. Dziuba, Lake Oswego, filed the brief for amicus
curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
GILLETTE, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Janice Wilson, Judge. 183 Or App 76, 51 P3d 625 (2002). 
GILLETTE, J.
This personal injury case arose out of a fatal
automobile collision between a truck belonging to defendant Walsh
& Sons Trucking (Walsh) and an Oregon State Police (OSP) vehicle. 
Plaintiffs are the parents and copersonal representatives of OSP
Trooper Lyons, who was killed in the accident along with his
colleague, OSP Sergeant Rector.  Rector was driving the OSP
vehicle.  Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against
Walsh.  The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict
for Walsh.  Plaintiffs appealed, arguing to the Court of Appeals
that the trial court had erred both in admitting certain evidence
relating to Rector's fault in causing the accident and in
refusing to instruct the jury in the manner that plaintiffs had 
requested respecting the way in which the jury could consider
Rector's conduct. (1)  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Lyons v.
Walsh & Sons Trucking Co., Ltd., 183 Or App 76, 51 P3d 625
(2002).  We allowed plaintiffs' petition for review and now
affirm, but for reasons other than those that the Court of
Appeals stated.
We take our statement of the operative facts, together
with the procedural history of the trial, from the opinion of the Court of Appeals:
"On September 2, 1997, OSP Trooper Chin was
patrolling on Crescent Cutoff Road near Gilchrist when
he saw a pickup truck skid through a T-intersection and
crash down the embankment on the opposite side of the
road.  In response, Chin pulled his unmarked patrol car
off to the side of the eastbound travel lane and
activated the car's grille lights.
"At the same time, Trooper Lyons and Sergeant
Rector were patrolling in the area.  They learned about
the accident and, with Rector driving their marked OSP
Jeep Cherokee, approached the accident from the
opposite (westbound) direction.  Behind them, also
traveling west, was a tractor trailer driven by
defendant's employee, William Melillo.  As the Jeep
approached the accident scene, it began to slow and
move gradually onto the westbound shoulder of the road. 
Melillo continued to approach at more than 50 miles per
hour, but moved his truck to the left, partly over the
yellow center line.  At that point, Rector made a U-turn, turning in front of Melillo towards the opposite
side of the road where Chin was parked.  Melillo was
unable to stop, and his truck struck the Jeep in a "T-bone" fashion.  At the time of the collision, the
Jeep's blue and red flashing lights were activated, as
was its left turn signal.  Both Lyons and Rector died
as a result of the collision.  Later laboratory tests
revealed that Melillo had methamphetamine in his system
at the time of the collision.  
"In June 1998, plaintiffs brought this wrongful
death action against defendant.  Plaintiffs alleged
that Melillo had been negligent in numerous
particulars, including driving the truck at excessive
speed under the circumstances, failing to yield the
right-of-way to an emergency vehicle, and driving under
the influence of a controlled substance, and that
Melillo's negligence had caused Lyons's death.
"Before trial, plaintiffs moved to prevent
defendant from presenting any 'evidence, argument or
information that asks the jury to attribute any fault
for the accident to the actions of Sergeant Rector.' *
* * In addition, plaintiffs sought to exclude, as
'unhelpful,' opinion evidence by various OSP experts
that Rector's U-turn was the 'principal contributing
factor' in causing the accident.  The trial court
denied plaintiffs' motions."
Lyons, 183 Or App at 78-79.
The parties agreed that both Rector and his employer,
OSP, were immune from liability for the accident under the
"exclusive remedy" provision of the workers' compensation
statutes.  ORS 656.018(1)(a). (2)  However, the parties
disagreed as to how the jury was to be informed of that fact. 
Plaintiffs asked the trial court to give one of three alternative
instructions, the gist of each of which was that the jury should
not "weigh or consider" Rector's conduct unless the jury found
that the accident had been the "sole and exclusive" result of
that conduct.  The court declined, on grounds not relevant to our
disposition of this case, to give any of the three instructions. 
Instead, the court instructed the jury as follows:
"Sergeant Rector is not a party to this case
because, under Oregon law, he and the Oregon State
Police are immune from liability for negligence to the
estate of Scott Lyons.
"You may, however, consider his actions as part of
the overall circumstances existing at the time of this
accident in assessing the claims of negligence in this
case.  If you find that Defendant Walsh & Sons' truck
driver was negligent and that his negligence was a
substantial factor in causing the accident and the
death of Scott Lyons, you will not compare that
negligence with any negligence by Sergeant Rector."
Plaintiffs then asked the trial court to pose a special
interrogatory to the jury that asked whether the accident was
caused "solely and exclusively" by Rector's conduct.  The court
declined to do so.  What happened next is pivotal to our
disposition of this case.  The court submitted a special verdict
form to the jury, the first question of which asked:
"Was defendant WALSH & SONS TRUCKING CO., LTD.
negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the
plaintiffs and, if so, was such negligence a cause of
damage to the plaintiffs?"
The jury answered "No" to that question, resulting in a verdict
in favor of Walsh.
On appeal, plaintiffs assigned several errors
respecting the trial court's consistent refusal to instruct the
jury that it could not consider Rector's conduct unless it were
to find that Rector's conduct had been the "sole and exclusive"
cause of the accident.  In so arguing, plaintiffs relied on
former ORS 18.470 (2001), renumbered as ORS 31.600 (2003), which
provides, in part:
"(2) The trier of fact shall compare the fault of
the claimant with the fault of any party against whom
recovery is sought, the fault of third party defendants
who are liable in tort to the claimant, and the fault
of any person with whom the claimant has settled.  The
failure of a claimant to make a direct claim against a
third party defendant does not affect the requirement
that the fault of the third party defendant be
considered by the trier of fact under this subsection. 
Except for persons who have settled with the claimant,
there shall be no comparison of fault with any person:
"(a) Who is immune from liability to the claimant;
"* * * * *
"(5) This section does not prevent a party from
alleging that the party was not at fault in the matter
because the injury or death was the sole and exclusive
fault of a person who is not a party in the matter."
(Emphasis added.)  
The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs' arguments,
ruling that the text of former ORS 18.470 concerned apportionment
of comparative fault, not substantial factor causation:
"We * * * conclude that ORS 18.470(2) and (5) do not * * * render inadmissible evidence of an immune actor's
conduct that is relevant to determining whether a
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing
an injury."
Lyons, 183 Or App at 85.  Plaintiffs' requested instructions were
incorrect, the court concluded, because they were based on a
contrary assumption.  Id. at 85-86.  Plaintiffs' objection to the
instruction that the trial court did give was unwarranted for the
same reason, in the Court of Appeals' view.  Id. at 86.  After
addressing one further assignment of error, which dealt with the
separate question whether the trial court had erred in admitting
certain evidence concerning Rector's responsibility for the
accident, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for Walsh. 
Id. at 88.
Plaintiffs petitioned for, and we allowed, review in
this court to consider whether the Court of Appeals' reading of
the wording of former ORS 18.470(2) and (5) is correct.  However,
upon examining the record, we now conclude that we cannot reach
that issue because of the nature of the verdict that the jury
rendered.  
As noted, the first question on the special verdict
form asked the jury:
"Was defendant WALSH & SONS TRUCKING CO., LTD.
negligent in one or more of the ways claimed by the
plaintiffs and, if so, was such negligence a cause of
damage to the plaintiffs?"
And, as noted, the jury's answer to that question was a simple
"No."  Because the instruction asked a compound question, the
issue naturally arises:  Did the jury decide that Walsh was not
negligent or, instead, did the jury decide that Walsh, although
negligent, did not cause damage to plaintiffs?  The answer is
that we cannot tell; either decision would have been permissible
on the evidence presented.
Our inability to determine which ground led the jury to
decide as it did is important, because plaintiffs have focused
all their arguments in this court on the second part of the
question.  That is, plaintiffs assert that the instructions that
the trial court gave and the evidence that it admitted improperly
permitted the jury to consider Rector's conduct in assessing
whether Walsh's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the
accident.  But such errors by the trial court, if errors they
were, are irrelevant if the jury decided the case instead on the
pristine proposition that Walsh was not negligent. (3)
When, as here, a party seeks reversal of a jury verdict
and a remand for a new trial, ORS 19.415(2) directs us to grant
such relief only for an error "substantially affecting the rights
of a party."  Recently, in Shoup v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 335 Or
164, 61 P3d 928 (2003), this court explained that that statute
requires more than speculation concerning whether an alleged
error affected a jury's verdict:
"The possibility that an error might have resulted in a
different jury verdict is insufficient under the
statute.  Instead, the court must be able to conclude,
from the record, that the error 'substantially
affect[ed]' the rights of the losing party.  Moreover,
the statute protects the trial court judgment from
reversal or modification 'except for' error
substantially affecting a party's rights, indicating
that reversal of a judgment is the exception, not the
rule.  The rule embodied in ORS 19.415(2) is neutral as
between plaintiffs and defendants; it places the burden
to make a record that demonstrates prejudicial error on
whichever party loses in the trial court and then seeks
reversal or modification of the judgment on appeal."
Id. at 173-74.
What this court stated in Shoup applies equally to the
narrow problem that the form of jury verdict used in the present
case poses.  This was not a case in which the plaintiff advanced
a single factual theory of liability that the form of jury
verdict reflected.  Nor did this case involve other kinds of
asserted trial error, such as a faulty jury instruction, that may
call for a different analysis of whether the error "substantially
affect[s] the rights of a party" under ORS 19.415(2).  The jury
verdict could have been based on one of two different rationales
that the jury verdict form identified; it is impossible to tell
which the jury used.  Plaintiffs' claims of error may or may not
be well taken, but they depend on an assumption that the jury's
verdict was based on one rationale only.  The present record does
not support plaintiffs' assumption, and, because they are
asserting error, the consequences of the inadequacy of the record
in that respect fall on plaintiffs.  Id. at 174.  That is,
plaintiffs cannot show, on this record, that any of the alleged
errors about which they complain "substantially affect[ed]" their
rights.  Plaintiffs thus cannot prevail here.
It follows from the foregoing that we must affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial
court.  In doing so, however, we express no opinion concerning
the merits of the analysis of the issues in the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. Specifically, the trial court declined on several
different occasions to instruct the jury that the jury could
consider Rector's conduct only if that conduct were the "sole and
exclusive" cause of Lyons's death.
2. ORS 656.018(1)(a) provides:
"The liability of every employer who
satisfies the duty required by ORS 656.017(1)
is exclusive and in place of all other
liability arising out of injuries, diseases,
symptom complexes or similar conditions
arising out of and in the course of
employment that are sustained by subject
workers, the workers' beneficiaries and
anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages
from the employer on account of such
conditions or claims resulting therefrom,
specifically including claims for
contribution or indemnity asserted by third
persons from whom damages are sought on
account of such conditions, except as
specifically provided otherwise in this
chapter."
3. The only suggestion that plaintiffs advanced that might
have clarified the jury's actual reason for rendering a verdict
for Lyons was their request for a special interrogatory. 
However, plaintiffs' only argument to the trial court (and,
later, to the Court of Appeals) in support of their request for
the special interrogatory was based on the same theory that
underlay their other arguments.  Plaintiffs never argued, either
to the trial court or to the Court of Appeals, that the special
interrogatory was necessary to permit plaintiffs to demonstrate
that the trial court's errors (if errors they were) actually
harmed their case.  And, in this court, plaintiffs have abandoned
altogether their argument that the failure to give the special
interrogatory was error.