Case Title: The Florida Bar v. Louis Randolf Townsend, Jr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC11-2286

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2014-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-2286 
____________ 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR,  
Complainant, 
 
vs. 
 
LOUIS RANDOLF TOWNSEND, JR.,  
Respondent. 
 
[April 24, 2014] 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Respondent Louis 
Randolf Townsend, Jr., not be held in contempt of this Court’s January 17, 2008, 
suspension order in Florida Bar v. Townsend, case number SC07-81.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  As discussed in this opinion, we 
disapprove the referee’s recommendation in part, and hold Townsend in contempt 
based on his failure to notify the circuit court of his thirty-day suspension in case 
number SC07-81, in violation of Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h).  We 
also conclude that Townsend made misrepresentations of fact to the circuit court in 
his 2006 “Application for Appointment As Guardian,” in violation of Bar Rules 4-
 
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3.3(a)(1) (a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal); 4-8.4(c) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in 
conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).  Because the referee did not reach the issue of discipline, 
we remand this case to the referee for a hearing and a recommendation as to the 
appropriate sanction. 
FACTS 
 
On January 17, 2008, this Court entered an order in Florida Bar v. 
Townsend, case number SC07-81, suspending Respondent Townsend from the 
practice of law for thirty days.  Townsend was required to comply with Rule 
Regulating the Florida Bar 3-5.1(h), which provides: 
 
Upon service on the respondent of an order of disbarment, disbarment 
on consent, disciplinary revocation, suspension, emergency 
suspension, emergency probation, or placement on the inactive list for 
incapacity not related to misconduct, the respondent shall, unless this 
requirement is waived or modified in the court’s order, forthwith 
furnish a copy of the order to: (1) all of the respondent’s clients with 
matters pending in the respondent’s practice; (2) all opposing counsel 
or co-counsel in the matters listed in (1), above; and (3) all courts, 
tribunals, or adjudicative agencies before which the respondent is 
counsel of record.   
 
Within 30 days after service of the order the respondent shall furnish 
bar counsel with a sworn affidavit listing the names and addresses of 
all persons and entities that have been furnished copies of the order. 
 
 
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As discussed below, Townsend’s suspension was made effective nunc pro tunc, 
December 10, 2007.  See Fla. Bar v. Townsend, No. SC07-81 (Fla. order on 
rehearing entered Feb. 6, 2008).  Thus, Townsend served his suspension and was 
automatically reinstated in January 2008. 
 
In November 2011, The Florida Bar (Bar) filed a Petition for Contempt and 
Order to Show Cause, alleging that Townsend violated the Court’s January 2008 
suspension order; the Bar later filed an amended petition, adding an additional 
count, in October 2012.  A referee was appointed to consider the matter.  
Following a hearing on the amended petition, the referee has submitted his report 
for the Court’s review, in which he makes the following findings and 
recommendations. 
 
The sequence of events in case number SC07-81 plays a significant role in 
the contempt case at issue here.  In January 2007, the Bar filed its complaint in 
SC07-81.  Several months later, in November 2007, Townsend and the Bar agreed 
to a Conditional Guilty Plea for Consent Judgment.  In the Consent Judgment, 
Townsend admitted to violations of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (Bar 
Rules), related to his representation of two clients outside his law firm.  Townsend 
and the Bar agreed to a thirty-day suspension, set to begin December 10, 2007.   
 
In November 2007, the referee filed a report recommending that the Court 
approve the consent judgment.  While the case was pending before the Court, on 
 
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December 10, Townsend’s agreed-upon thirty-day suspension began to run.  
Subsequently, on January 17, 2008, the Court issued its order approving the 
referee’s report and suspending Townsend for thirty days.  Townsend filed a 
motion for rehearing, asking the Court to make his thirty-day suspension effective 
nunc pro tunc, December 10, 2007, as agreed to in the Consent Judgment.  On 
February 6, 2008, the Court entered an order granting the motion. 
 
Following the Court’s order, on March 19, 2008, Townsend sent an affidavit 
to the Bar pursuant to rule 3-5.1(h), in which he stated: 
 
In living up to my agreement in the Consent Judgment, I closed my 
office on December 10, 2007 for thirty (30) days by closing all 
inactive files and transferring all active litigation files to another 
attorney to handle during the thirty (30) day suspension period, 
including the cases pending in state and federal court.  These actions 
were all taken prior to the entry of the Court order by the Supreme 
Court which was effective nunc pro tunc, December 10, 2007. 
 
The Bar did not raise any objection to Townsend’s affidavit at that time. 
 
Turning to the instant contempt case, the Bar’s amended petition for 
contempt raised three issues.  First, the Bar alleged that Townsend violated the 
Court’s January 2008 suspension order because he did not properly notify his 
clients of his suspension, in violation of Bar Rule 3-5.1(h).  Specifically, the Bar 
alleged that Townsend’s act of transferring his active cases to another attorney 
prior to serving his suspension, and prior to the Court’s order actually imposing the 
suspension, did not relieve him of the requirement under the rule to provide notice 
 
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of the suspension to his clients.  However, the referee found that the “triggering 
date” for determining which clients, attorneys, and courts must be notified is the 
date the suspension order is served on the attorney.  In this instance, Townsend’s 
thirty-day suspension ran from December 10, 2007, to January 9, 2008; the Court’s 
order approving the suspension was entered on January 17, 2008.  Thus, the referee 
concluded that the triggering date for Townsend to comply with rule 3-5.1(h) came 
on January 17, after the suspension was completed.  Because the referee found 
that, in this particular case, Bar Rule 3-5.1(h) is subject to “different, confusing, 
and contradictory readings,” the referee concluded that the rule cannot be read so 
as to sustain a disciplinary action against an attorney.  Additionally, the referee 
also noted that, in anticipation of his suspension, Townsend transferred his active 
cases to another lawyer.  Thus, the referee found that Townsend’s May 2008 
affidavit of compliance was truthful, and did not make any misrepresentations to 
the Bar as to how Townsend complied with the suspension order.  Accordingly, the 
referee recommends that Townsend be found not guilty of contempt on this 
ground. 
 
As to the second issue alleged in its amended petition for contempt, the Bar 
asserted that Townsend violated the Court’s January 2008 suspension order 
because he failed to notify a court of his thirty-day suspension, in violation of Bar 
Rule 3-5.1(h).  In 2006, Townsend was appointed by a circuit court to serve as the 
 
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guardian for an incapacitated person (the ward); at the time of the Court’s January 
2008 order in SC07-81, Townsend continued to serve in that role.  There is no 
dispute that Townsend did not provide the guardianship court notice of the thirty-
day suspension.  In 2011, the court learned on its own of Townsend’s suspension, 
and entered an order suspending Townsend as guardian for the ward.  
 
The central question before the referee was whether Townsend was “counsel 
of record” in the guardianship case, and thus required to provide notice of his 
suspension to the court pursuant to rule 3-5.1(h).  The referee noted that Townsend 
performed a number of legal tasks in the case that only a lawyer would be 
authorized to perform.  Townsend also filed petitions for payment of attorney’s 
fees and billed his services as an attorney at a higher rate than the services he 
performed as guardian.  However, the referee found that, although Townsend took 
an oath as guardian and was issued “letters of guardianship,” he did not file a 
notice of appearance as counsel of record.  The referee concluded that Bar Rule 3-
5.1(h) does not specifically address the notification required in this case.  Thus, he 
recommends that Townsend be found not guilty of contempt. 
 
Finally, the Bar’s amended petition for contempt asserted that Townsend 
made misrepresentations of fact to the guardianship court.  In 2006, Townsend 
submitted an “Application for Appointment As Guardian” in the guardianship case.  
Question 29 on the application asked: “Has applicant ever been discharged from 
 
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employment?”  Townsend answered the question “No,” and provided a comment 
indicating that he was “let go” from his former law firm because the malpractice 
case he was working on settled.  Further, in question 28 on the application, 
Townsend indicated that he left his former firm because he started a new job.  In 
fact, Townsend was discharged from his former law firm for representing clients 
outside the firm (the basis for the disciplinary case in SC07-81).  The referee found 
that Townsend’s answers on the guardianship application were a “knowing and 
material and intentional misrepresentation” of fact.  Nonetheless, the referee 
concluded that the question before him was solely whether Townsend should be 
held in contempt of the Court’s January 2008 suspension order.  Because 
Townsend’s guardianship application was submitted in 2006, two years before the 
Court’s January 2008 order in case number SC07-81, the referee determined that 
Townsend’s answers on the application could not be a basis for holding him in 
contempt of the order. 
 
Ultimately, based on these factual findings, the referee recommends that 
Townsend be found not guilty of contempt, and that no discipline be imposed.  The 
Bar has filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Review of Report of Referee, challenging 
the referee’s recommendation that Townsend be found not guilty of contempt 
based on his failure to notify the guardianship court of his suspension, as well as 
 
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the referee’s recommendation that Townsend be found not guilty of additional rule 
violations based on his misrepresentations of fact to the guardianship court. 
ANALYSIS 
The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar authorize this Court to review 
petitions for contempt filed by the Bar, and any response from the respondent, and 
issue an appropriate judgment.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.11(f)(1)(F).  The 
judgment may include “any sanction that a court may impose for contempt and, if 
the person found in contempt is a member of The Florida Bar, may include any 
disciplinary sanction authorized under these rules.”  Id.  “Proceedings for contempt 
referred to a referee shall be processed in the same manner as disciplinary 
proceedings under these rules.”  Id.  Thus, in reviewing the referee’s 
recommendations as to Townsend’s guilt, we must determine whether the referee’s 
factual findings are sufficient under the applicable rules to support the 
recommendation.  See Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 913 So. 2d 554, 557-558 (Fla. 2005). 
 
First, before this Court the Bar does not challenge the referee’s 
recommendation that Townsend be found not guilty of contempt based on the 
Bar’s allegation that he failed to notify clients of his suspension, in violation of Bar 
Rule 3-5.1(h).  Although we approve the referee’s recommendation on this issue, 
we refer to The Florida Bar the issue of whether amendments to rule 3-5.1(h) are 
necessary to address the situation presented here, where an attorney begins serving 
 
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his or her suspension (or other discipline) before the Court’s order imposing the 
discipline is entered (thus triggering the obligation to notify clients under the rule). 
 
The Bar does urge the Court to disapprove the referee’s recommendation 
that Townsend be found not guilty of contempt based on his failure to notify the 
guardianship court of his suspension.  Rule 3-5.1(h) provides, in relevant part, that 
when an attorney is served with an order of suspension, the attorney must furnish a 
copy of the order to “all courts, tribunals, or adjudicative agencies before which the 
respondent is counsel of record.”  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-5.1(h)(3).  It is not 
disputed that Townsend did not notify the guardianship court of the Court’s 
January 2008 order in SC07-81, suspending him for thirty days.  Nonetheless, the 
referee concluded that Townsend was not required to notify the court because he 
was not counsel of record.  We disagree; for all practical purposes, Townsend was 
the attorney in the case.  Pursuant to Florida Probate Rule 5.030, every guardian 
must be represented by an attorney admitted to practice in Florida; if the guardian 
is an attorney, he or she may represent himself or herself as the guardian.  Here, 
Townsend did not hire a separate attorney to represent him as the guardian.  
Indeed, the former circuit court judge who presided in the guardianship case 
testified before the referee that he believed Townsend served as both the guardian 
and the attorney.  Moreover, as noted, the referee found that Townsend performed 
a number of legal tasks in the case that only a lawyer would be authorized to 
 
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perform.  He also filed petitions for orders authorizing payment of attorney’s fees.  
Townsend billed for this legal work at a higher rate than he did for his services as 
the guardian.   
 
Given these facts, Townsend’s argument that he was not the attorney in the 
guardianship case, and that he was not required to notify the guardianship court of 
his suspension, is unreasonable.  It is apparent that Townsend was the attorney in 
the case, even if he never filed a formal notice of appearance.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that Townsend was required to notify the guardianship court of his 
suspension in case number SC07-81, and he failed to do so.  Thus, we hold 
Townsend in contempt. 
 
The Bar next urges the Court to disapprove the referee’s recommendation 
that Townsend be found not guilty of any ethical misconduct based on his 
misrepresentations of fact on the guardianship application.  As noted, in October 
2006, Townsend submitted to the circuit court an “Application for Appointment as 
Guardian,” and he stated in the application that he had never been discharged from 
any employment.  However, Townsend admitted in the proceedings before the 
referee that he was fired from his former law firm for representing clients outside 
the firm.  Thus, the referee expressly found that Townsend’s answers on the 
guardianship application were a “knowing and material and intentional” 
misrepresentation of fact.  However, the referee concluded that he was solely 
 
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limited to determining whether Townsend’s actions are in contempt of the Court’s 
January 2008 suspension order.  We do not agree, and conclude instead that the 
referee could have considered additional rule violations, as alleged and argued by 
the Bar, based on Townsend’s misconduct. 
 
We have long held that due process is satisfied in a disciplinary proceeding 
“where the attorney is served with notice of the Bar’s charges and is afforded an 
opportunity in the disciplinary hearing to be heard and defend himself.”  Fla. Bar v. 
Tipler, 8 So. 3d 1109, 1118 (Fla. 2009) (citing Fla. Bar v. Committe, 916 So. 2d 
741, 745 (Fla. 2005)).  Moreover, this Court has held that a referee may consider 
instances of misconduct not specifically pled in the Bar’s complaint if such 
misconduct is “within the scope of the Bar’s accusations” and the attorney was 
“clearly notified of the nature and extent of the charges pending against [him or 
her].”  Fla. Bar v. Nowacki, 697 So. 2d 828, 832 (Fla. 1997); see also Fla. Bar v. 
Vaughn, 608 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1992) (finding the respondent guilty of a rule 
violation not specifically charged in the Bar’s complaint, where the complaint put 
the respondent on notice of the misconduct at issue). 
 
Here, Townsend was notified of the nature and extent of the charges pending 
against him by the Bar’s amended petition for contempt.1
                                          
 
 
1.  The Bar also states that, in September 2012, it sent Townsend a Notice of 
Grievance Committee Review, alleging that Townsend’s answers on the 
guardianship application may have violated three Bar Rules: 4-3.3(a)(1) (a lawyer 
  The amended petition 
 
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specifically alleged that Townsend misrepresented facts on the guardianship 
application.  Moreover, this issue was addressed in the proceedings before the 
referee.  Indeed, as noted, the referee held that the Bar presented clear and 
convincing evidence to demonstrate that Townsend was guilty of 
misrepresentations to the court.  Because Townsend was aware of the scope of the 
Bar’s allegations, he had notice of the accusations, and he was afforded an 
opportunity to defend against them, we conclude that due process is satisfied.  We 
find that Townsend made misrepresentations of fact to the court in the 
guardianship case, in violation of Bar Rules 4-3.3(a)(1) (a lawyer shall not 
knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal); and 4-8.4(c) (a 
lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation).  Further, we find that, because Townsend’s misrepresentations 
misled the guardianship court, and eventually caused the court to suspend him as 
guardian for the ward and to appoint a new guardian, his conduct was prejudicial to 
the administration of justice in violation of Bar Rule 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not 
                                                                                                                                        
shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal); 4-8.4(c) (a 
lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation); and 4-8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct in 
connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice).  The Bar asserts that Townsend’s counsel waived a finding of probable 
cause, and consented to consolidation of the two matters within the already 
existing contempt petition. 
 
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engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice). 
CONCLUSION 
 
Accordingly, we approve the referee’s findings of fact set forth in the report 
of the referee, as well as the referee’s recommendation that Townsend be found not 
guilty of contempt based on the Bar’s allegation that he failed to notify clients of 
his suspension in violation of Bar Rule 3-5.1(h).  However, we disapprove the 
referee’s recommendation that Townsend be found not guilty of contempt based on 
his failure to notify the guardianship court of his suspension, and instead hold 
Townsend in contempt of the Court’s January 2008 suspension order in case 
number SC07-81.  We also find Townsend guilty of violating Bar Rules 4-
3.3(a)(1), 4-8.4(c), and 4-8.4(d).  Finally, because the referee did not reach the 
issue of discipline, we remand this case to the referee for a hearing and a 
recommendation as to the appropriate discipline. 
 
It is so ordered. 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur.  
 
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER THE 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS SUSPENSION.  
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar  
 
 
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John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, and Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Staff 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Michael C. Greenberg, Bar 
Counsel, The Florida Bar, Sunrise, Florida,  
 
for Complainant  
 
Andrew DeGraffenreidt, III, West Palm Beach, Florida,   
 
for Respondent