Case Title: State v. Barber

Citation: 118 Wash. 2d 335, 823 P.2d 1068

Docket Number: 56416-7

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1992-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
118 Wn.2d 335 (1992) 823 P.2d 1068 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. DARRON W. BARBER, Petitioner. No. 56416-7. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. February 6, 1992. *336 Norm Maleng, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy Michael Blood, Deputy, for petitioner. Jesse Wm. Barton of Washington Appellate Defender Association, for respondent. Jeffrey L. Needle on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae for respondent. ANDERSEN, J. At issue in this case is whether racial incongruity, i.e., a person of any race being allegedly "out of place" in a particular geographic area, can ever constitute a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior; we hold that it cannot. On the evening in question, a police officer observed three young men walking along the 13300 block of Northeast Eighth Street in Bellevue, Washington. One of the three was carrying a bundle wrapped in a blanket, another a brown paper bag and the third (the defendant, Darron W. Barber) a duffel bag. The bags appeared to be filled with objects of some kind. After the officer drove past, he continued to observe the three, then made a U-turn, drove back, stopped and began questioning them. As was to develop, the three men were burglars carrying loot taken in a recent residential burglary. The defendant, Darron W. Barber, was very shortly thereafter arrested and charged with burglary in the second *337 degree and possession of stolen property in the second degree. In the trial court, he challenged the legality of the officer stopping him as well as the legality of his arrest, and moved to suppress the evidence seized by the police at the time of the arrest. At the suppression hearing before the trial court, testimony was taken. Pursuant to the Superior Court Criminal Rules,[1] the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therein the trial court detailed the facts of the case and the conclusions it drew therefrom, and denied defendant's motion to suppress. To understand this case, it is first necessary to have the trial court's findings and conclusions before us. They are as follows:[2] Following the trial court's ruling adverse to the defendant on his motion to suppress evidence, the facts including police reports were stipulated to by the defendant and the case was submitted to the trial court for decision based on those facts. These facts included the following: at the time the defendant was stopped, he was carrying loot taken in a very recent Bellevue residential burglary; police fingerprint experts lifted defendant's palm print from inside the burglarized premises; and, in addition, the defendant had other property in his possession which proved to have been stolen elsewhere. Based on the stipulated facts and evidence, the trial court found the defendant guilty of the crimes of burglary in the second degree and possession of stolen property in the second degree, then entered judgment and sentence accordingly. Following his conviction in the trial court, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. That court, in a very short unpublished opinion, reversed defendant's convictions on the basis that the initial stop by the police officer was unlawful; that court did not, however, discuss the racial incongruity issue.[3] The Prosecuting Attorney for King County thereupon petitioned this court for discretionary *342 review; we granted the petition. We also permitted the American Civil Liberties Union to file an amicus brief on the racial incongruity issue. Two issues are here determinative. ISSUE ONE. Are the trial court's suppression hearing findings of fact sufficient to permit us to properly review the trial court's decision as to the legality of the police officer's investigative or "Terry-type" stop of the defendant? ISSUE TWO. May racial incongruity, i.e., a person of any race being allegedly "out of place" in a particular geographic area, ever support a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior? CONCLUSION. The findings of fact entered following the suppression hearing in the trial court did not sufficiently comply with the requirements of CrR 3.6 to permit a meaningful appellate review of the critical aspects of the trial court's decision on the Terry-type stop issue; therefore, the case must be remanded to the trial court for more specific findings as to the reasons that may justify the initial stop of the defendant and his companions. The problems we are presented with in this case come about in the following way. [1] The case involves the often difficult question of when a police officer, absent probable cause to arrest, is legally justified in stopping and questioning a citizen. The leading case in this area of the law is, of course, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968) wherein the United States Supreme Court stated the permissible grounds for an officer to make an investigative or "Terry-type" stop as follows: (Footnotes omitted.) Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. Any number of cases, our own as well as federal, have followed and elaborated upon this rule; it remains, however, the touchstone of the law in police investigative stop situations. Where an unlawful stop is alleged, and evidence of crime is discovered as a result of the stop, as in this case, the issue is usually brought before the court by a defense motion to suppress the evidence so obtained. As a guide to the trial court in carrying out its duty of "neutral scrutiny" in assessing Terry stops, we have prescribed the trial court's duty at a suppression hearing by the following court rule: CrR 3.6. [2] The difficulty here is that on the central "legality of the initial stop" issue, the trial court's findings do not tell us precisely what "specific and articulable facts ..., taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."[4] In reviewing the CrR 3.6 findings and conclusions quoted above on the legality of the initial stop issue, we find this issue dealt with in the trial court's statement of the following disputed fact: Finding of fact II(1). Then in the trial court's findings of fact as to disputed facts, the following is the very conclusory finding on this issue: (Italics ours.) Finding of fact III(1). We are left guessing, however, as to what those facts are. Finally, the trial court's conclusion of law on the legality of the stop is the following: Conclusion of law IV(1) (part). Thus, as noted at the outset of this discussion, the crucial finding of the trial court on this issue is entirely conclusory and fails to inform us what "specific and articulable facts" the trial court felt justified the investigative or "Terry-type" stop of the defendant and his companions. A principal purpose of requiring such findings is to facilitate appellate review of the trial court's decision regarding the suppression motion.[5] The trial court's failure to set out in its findings what specific and articulable facts it relied on leaves the parties to argue widely divergent views of why the stop was made, as they did in the Court of Appeals and again in this court. The Court of Appeals, having been left without guidance from the trial court on what "specific and articulable facts" warranted the stop, selected its own from the various facts and held them insufficient as a matter of law and reversed the defendant's convictions. On petitioning this court for review, the State argues with considerable justification that there were other facts amply justifying the stop. The State then urges that we consider additional facts in the record, *345 reach a decision contrary to that reached by the Court of Appeals on the legality of the stop issue and affirm the convictions. The findings that were entered by the trial court basically constitute a narrative account of what occurred at the scene of the investigatory stop and the subsequent investigation and arrest, but nowhere point to what "specific and articulable facts" reasonably support a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The problem in this case is that the absence of such particularized findings does not permit us to determine whether the stop was based on legally permissible and adequate reasons or whether it was based on a perceived racial incongruity between the suspects and the locale in which they were stopped, as will be discussed under Issue Two herein. As we recently held in In re LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 218, 728 P.2d 138 (1986), "where findings are required, they must be sufficiently specific to permit meaningful review." Since we have not been provided with the sufficiently specific findings needed to review the trial court's decision on the legality of the initial stop in this case, we reverse the Court of Appeals order dismissing the case and remand it to the trial court for entry of findings of fact in accordance with the mandates of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), CrR 3.6 and this opinion. CONCLUSION. We answer "no" to the question posed by this issue, and remand to the trial court for additional findings in regard to the facts supporting a Terry stop. These facts cannot include any consideration of "racial incongruity" as defined herein. The defendant and his two companions, who were stopped by the police officer, were black and were walking in a predominantly white neighborhood at the time they were stopped. The defendant and amicus argue that the reason the officer made the investigative stop of the defendant and his companions is that they were blacks in a predominantly *346 white neighborhood, and that the stop was thus illegal. There is testimony in the record that arguably supports this view. There is also testimony in the record, however, that arguably supports a contrary view. This includes the following: (1) one of the three persons walking along the Bellevue street at approximately 8 p.m. was carrying a large blanket-covered bundle; (2) as the officer drove past them in his marked police patrol car, they noticed the officer and began glancing at him and at each other; (3) after the officer had passed the group, he continued observing them through his rearview mirror, and they continued to glance at him and at each other; (4) the officer then saw the one carrying the blanketed bundle heave the bundle into brush off the shoulder of the roadway; (5) the contents of the blanket appeared to the officer to be of substantial weight, since the bundle did not fall very far into the brush despite what appeared to have been a fair amount of exertion by the person throwing the bundle; (6) the acts of the person throwing the bundle constituted at least littering; (7) to this police officer (of some 10 years' experience), when a person is carrying a bundle within a blanket on a street at night, the items covered are usually the fruits of a recent burglary and (8) according to uncontroverted testimony at the suppression hearing, when seen by the officer, the defendant was walking out in the street in violation of law.[6] In short, the testimony given at the suppression hearing is conflicting on a critical factual issue. [3] It is the law that racial incongruity, i.e., a person of any race being allegedly "out of place" in a particular geographic area, should never constitute a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior.[7] Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are odious to a free *347 people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.[8] Of assistance in putting the factual situation of this case into context is the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the frequently cited case[9] of United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 75 L. Ed. 2d 447, 103 S. Ct. 1206 (1983). In that case, Circuit Judge Jerome Farris (formerly of the State of Washington Court of Appeals) writing for the Ninth Circuit declared the law as follows: (Footnote omitted.) Bautista, 684 F.2d at 1288-89. The Bautista court then went on to explain and apply this rule: Bautista, 684 F.2d at 1289. Thus, Bautista indicates that appearance, including race and other physical attributes of a suspect, may be relevant in forming a suspicion of criminal activity; racial incongruity, however, is never relevant in forming such a suspicion. In reading the trial court's findings and conclusions entered following the suppression hearing in this case, it is at once apparent that the trial court's only reference to race was its observation that both the defendants and the Bellevue police officer who arrested them were black. That statement alone, however, does not indicate that the trial judge found that racial incongruity was a factor which supported the Terry stop. So that the basis for the trial court's decision in this case may be clarified, the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court to make additional findings of fact as to the following: eliminating any consideration of racial incongruity whatsoever, were there facts to support a legally justified and well-founded suspicion of criminal activity at the time the arresting officer stopped the defendant and his companions? If such facts do exist, the trial court is required to specify them. In requesting such specification, we are not abdicating our responsibility (as the dissenting opinion suggests); we are remanding this case (as is our function) so that the trial court, as the trier of fact (as is its function) may make the factual determinations necessary to assess the legal validity of the investigative stop. Further response to the dissent is necessary. First, the dissent declares that the Terry stop in this case was based on a police officer's assumption that "three black men walking in Bellevue must be up to no good" and therefore was unlawful.[10] The dissent overlooks the fact that, in examining *349 the legal validity of a Terry stop, the police officer's assumptions are irrelevant and not to be taken into account by the trial court in its redetermination. As our opinion makes clear, it is well-established law, federal and state, that the facts surrounding an investigative stop must be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate?[11] Under the terms of our remand, the trial court is required to reexamine the facts surrounding the investigative stop in this case against this objective standard. If the facts that the trial court relies upon include any reference to racial incongruity, the Terry stop was unlawful. If, however, the trial court cites objective facts that support a legally justified and well-founded suspicion of criminal activity i.e., one based on facts that make no reference to racial incongruity then the Terry stop was valid and the motion to suppress was properly denied. The Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions. BRACHTENBACH, DURHAM, and GUY, JJ., and CALLOW, J. Pro Tem., concur. DORE, C.J., concurs in the result. DOLLIVER, J. (dissenting) It has been a long and difficult period of gestation for this case; in the interval, the defendant has been freed from prison. But, the significance of the issue now before us remains. The majority makes the forthright declaration that "racial incongruity ... should never constitute a finding of reasonable suspicion" justifying an investigative stop. Majority, at 346. While I agree with and applaud this statement, as far as it goes, I nonetheless cannot sign the majority opinion and therefore dissent. *350 At the outset, contrary to the majority, I see no confusion in the record and no need for remand. The source of the confusion lies not with the facts but with the trial court's and now the majority's mischaracterization of issues of law as disputed facts. Majority, at 340, 343-44. CrR 3.6 creates a duty for the trial court to set forth the disputed facts and its findings of fact, but in this case the facts were undisputed. As a consequence, the trial court, apparently, incorrectly labeled the issues of law as disputed facts. We should not continue this error. Further, CrR 3.6 does not create a duty that requires a trial judge to set forth "`specific and articulable facts'" it "felt justified the investigative or `Terry-type' stop". Majority, at 344. That duty is on the police officer. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). The duty of the trial court and this court is to determine whether a stop was justified based on the evidence. See State v. Mennegar, 114 Wn.2d 304, 309-10, 787 P.2d 1347 (1990). A remand is unwarranted. The evidence shows that, but for the race of the defendants, Officer Hershey would not have slowed down to look at them twice. As he testified, when he saw them he "became suspicious. It was unusual to see three black guys carrying items, walking, at least in that part of the city." Report of Proceedings, at 6 (Jan. 19, 1988). When asked to explain his statement given a chance to deny that his suspicion was merely a racially motivated hunch Officer Hershey stated that, based on his experience, "the whole circumstance" (which at that point consisted of three black men walking together on a street in Bellevue on an evening in late spring, one carrying a gym bag, one a brown paper bag, and one an item wrapped in a blanket) "[n]ormally" meant "a crime had just been committed ...". Report of Proceedings, at 6 (Jan. 19, 1988). This type of assumption by a police officer is simply unacceptable. The fact that Officer Hershey is black does not make it more acceptable, nor does the fact that, in this case, Officer Hershey's hunch turned out to be correct. Everything *351 that happened and everything Officer Hershey saw after he initially decided three black men walking in Bellevue must be up to no good is tainted by that decision, and this court should say so. The majority's holding would allow Terry stops if there are sufficient "facts to support a legally justified and well-founded suspicion of criminal activity at the time" of the stop, regardless of whether the initiating factor in the sequence of events leading up to the stop was solely based upon racial incongruity. Majority, at 348. I strongly disagree with this test. The court has consistently applied the exclusionary rule where it has deemed it necessary to deter police misconduct and preserve the dignity of the judiciary. See State v. Bonds, 98 Wn.2d 1, 12, 653 P.2d 1024 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983). The same mandates should be applied here. Racial incongruity overhangs this entire case like a noxious pall, and it will not be eliminated by the test set forth by the majority anymore than all the perfumes of Arabia would sweeten the little hand of Lady Macbeth. Some might argue that adopting my view would merely encourage police officers not to tell the truth, unlike Officer Hershey who, to his great credit, did. Human nature being what it is, this gloomy view may have some force. There is, however, another more important characteristic of human nature which must be considered. If appropriate conduct is practiced, even hypocritically at first, the conduct will eventually become the belief. Put another way, the mask will become the face. The most celebrated literary example of this truth is the short story by Max Beerbohm entitled "The Happy Hypocrite" (see M. Beerbohm, The Incomparable Max 364 (1962)). And, as all sentient persons know, it happens as well in real life. However unhappily, the mask of civilized conduct may be put on and worn. For most who don it, the truth will ultimately shine through. Changed attitudes on the matter of racial equality and civil rights since 1954 bear testimony to this. *352 I would hold that if racial incongruity, alone, initiates the sequence of events leading to an investigative stop as I am convinced it does here then the conviction must be overturned. I think this court should do no less. UTTER and SMITH, JJ., concur with DOLLIVER, J. [1] CrR 3.6. [2] Findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to 3.6 of the Superior Court Criminal Rules (hereinafter Findings and Conclusions). [3] State v. Barber, 54 Wn. App. 1045 (1989). [4] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). [5] See 12 Wash. Prac., Criminal Practice § 2409, at 468 n. 2 (1984). [6] See former RCW 46.61.240 (Laws of 1965, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 155, § 35); former RCW 46.61.250 (Laws of 1965, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 155, § 37). [7] See People v. Bower, 24 Cal. 3d 638, 644, 597 P.2d 115, 156 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1979); State v. Hobart, 94 Wn.2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429 (1980). [8] Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967). [9] See Harbin v. Alexandria, 712 F. Supp. 67, 71 n. 5 (E.D. Va. 1989); United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1401, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 605 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Magana, 797 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir.1986). [10] Dissenting opinion, at 350-51. [11] Majority opinion, at 342-43 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)).