Case Title: Samplid Enterprises v. First Vermont Bank

Citation: 165 Vt 22, 676 A.2d 774

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Samplid Enterprises, Inc. v. First Vermont Bank (95-347); 165 Vt 22; 676 A.2d 774

[Opinion Filed 08-Mar-1996]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 95-347


Samplid Enterprises, Inc.                         Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Windsor Superior Court

First Vermont Bank                                January Term, 1996

     v.

Gertrude Holl


Alan W. Cheever, J.

Bruce M. Lawlor of Lawlor & Koitto, Springfield, for plaintiff-appellant

John A. Serafino of Ryan Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff entered a purchase and sale agreement to buy
  property defendant had obtained by deed in lieu of foreclosure, and sued
  defendant for return of its deposit after the transaction failed to close. 
  Defendant counterclaimed against plaintiff and brought a third-party action
  against Gertrude Holl, plaintiff's president, who was to take title.  The
  court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.  We affirm.

                                   I.

       Defendant received title to the real property at the center of this
  dispute via deed in lieu of foreclosure from Classical Chef, Inc. in 1993,
  pursuant to an agreement between defendant and Classical Chef.  That
  agreement was executed by the president of Classical Chef and two of its
  four shareholders, representing 90% of the voting power of the corporation. 
  Defendant took title to the real and personal property and listed it for
  sale.  In January 1994, the parties entered into a purchase and sale
  contract for the purchase of the property for $135,000, and a

 

  deposit of $13,500 was paid to the broker.  The contract provided for a
  closing on March 7, 1994, but it did not state that time was of the
  essence, nor did it include a financing contingency.

       On March 4, 1994, counsel for plaintiff notified defendant that
  missing from critical documents in the chain of title was a corporate
  resolution from Classical Chef, as required under the then-applicable
  statute, 11 V.S.A. § 2002,(FN1) raising a question about the validity of the
  transfer from Classical Chef to defendant, and hence from defendant to
  plaintiff.

       The parties thereafter proceeded on the basis that defendant would
  arrange for title insurance to cover any potential claim arising out of the
  alleged failure to comply with § 2002. Counsel for plaintiff objected to
  the coverage language of the first draft submitted for approval, suggesting
  removal of a policy exception and an adjustment in the coverage language to
  insure that the corporate problem was within the coverage.

       A trial affidavit of plaintiff's counsel concedes that on April 6,
  1994 he was advised that the title insurance company was willing to issue a
  policy omitting the exception objected to. Counsel further stated:

       11.  That on 7 April 1994, defendant, through its counsel, notified
       me that the corporate resolution I had requested from Classical Chef,
       Inc. to bring it into conformity with 11 V.S.A. § 2002 had still not

  

       been executed.  At that time, I declined to accept the documentation
       proffered by the defendant and, pursuant to Paragraph 12 of the
       Purchase and Sale Contract, further declined to extend the date for
       closing; . . . .

  In plaintiff's memorandum of law opposing defendant's motion for summary
  judgment, the only objection noted to the April 6, 1994 version of the
  title insurance policy was that "defendant had yet to secure a resolution
  executed by the minority shareholders."  The same memorandum noted that
  defendant was still pursuing acquisition of a corporate resolution from
  Classical Chef when the time for performance expired.  The court found,
  however, and plaintiff did not contest, that as of April 7, 1994 defendant
  had tendered a corporate resolution signed by two Classical Chef
  shareholders representing a 90% ownership interest.

       The closing did not occur for the reasons stated in the trial
  affidavit of plaintiff's counsel. The real estate broker for the
  transaction retained the deposit of $13,500,(FN2) and plaintiff brought the
  present action for its return.  Defendant moved for summary judgment, which
  the court granted, concluding that defendant took title via a mortgage
  deed, no shareholder of Classical Chef had grounds to complain, and
  defendant was ready, willing and able to convey title on April 7, 1994. 
  Gertrude Holl's motion to be dismissed as third-party defendant was denied.
  Plaintiff's appeal followed.

                                II.

       Summary judgment is appropriate only where the moving party
  establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
  party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

 

  Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621, 628, 587 A.2d 975, 979 (1991); V.R.C.P.
  56(c).  In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the
  nonmoving party receives the benefit of all reasonable doubts and
  inferences.  Pierce v. Riggs, 149 Vt. 136, 139,