Case Title: Perkins v. Blackledge

Citation: 285 So. 2d 761

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1973-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
285 So. 2d 761 (1973) Dr. David L. PERKINS v. H.W. BLACKLEDGE and Jean Blackledge. No. 47295. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 3, 1973. Bacon & Smith, Jackson, for appellant. Barnett, Montgomery, McClintock & Cunningham; James R. Ford, Jackson, for appellees. ROBERTSON, Justice: Appellant, Dr. David L. Perkins, sued Appellees, H.W. Blackledge and wife, Jean Blackledge, in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, for $6,000, the rental for two years under a five-year written lease contract; and also the cost of restoring the leased space to its former condition. Plaintiff charged that the Defendants moved out without notice to him, and thus, wrongfully terminated the written lease contract. After a full trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Defendants Blackledge. Perkins appeals. *762 On September 10, 1969, Perkins entered into a written lease with the Blackledges for space in an office building and small shopping center owned by him, which space would be used for a ladies beauty parlor. The lease was for a five-year term, beginning September 15, 1969, and the annual rental was $3,000 payable in advance. The Blackledges paid the first year's rental, which covered the period from September 15, 1969, to September 15, 1970. Almost immediately after opening up, according to the testimony of the Blackledges and their witnesses, vulgar and obscene language could be heard through the partition wall between the beauty shop and the office of Dr. Perkins next door thereto. The Blackledges testified that they complained to Dr. Perkins, that he promised to remedy the situation, but that the rough language of Dr. Perkins and his friends continued to come through the wall and to be heard by the Blackledges and their customers. Testimony offered by the Blackledges was that Perkins operated a package liquor store on the south side of the beauty salon and that drinking went on in Dr. Perkins' office on the north side of the beauty salon, and that friends or patients of Dr. Perkins would from time to time mistakenly enter the beauty salon, thinking that they were returning to Dr. Perkins' office. The Blackledges and some of their customers testified that a physical altercation took place on the parking lot in front of the beauty shop between a friend of Dr. Perkins and another person, and that customers of the beauty salon feared for their safety. The Blackledges also testified that the only restroom provided for their beauty parlor was used from time to time by Dr. Perkins and his friends, and that on some occasions his friends passed through a part of the beauty shop in tee shirts, and used boisterous and vulgar language on their way to the restroom. In early December, 1969, the Blackledges finally blocked the entrance from Dr. Perkins' office with a counter or table on their side of the partition. Perkins came into the beauty salon complaining of this closing of the passageway, and Mr. Blackledge testified that Perkins told him on that occasion: "You can get you another place to go and I'll release you of your lease, because I want my bathroom." Blackledge also testified: "This was the only occasion that Dr. Perkins said he wanted his building and he would release us of our lease." On March 9, 1970, the Blackledges purchased a vacant lot on West Capitol Street and began construction of a new beauty salon. Blackledge testified that after buying the vacant lot he had a conversation with Dr. Perkins and that: Blackledge testified that they moved the beauty shop to the new location on West Capitol Street on June 13, 1970, that Dr. Perkins witnessed the moving and wished them luck in their new location, and that he handed the keys to the leased premises to Dr. Perkins. The testimony of Dr. Perkins and his witnesses was in direct conflict with that of the Blackledges and their witnesses. Perkins testified that there was no loud, boisterous, obscene or vulgar language in his office next to the beauty shop; that he did not tell the Blackledges that they could *763 find another building and move out; that he did not tell Mr. Blackledge that he had another tenant for the space leased to them; that he was well satisfied with his lease to them; that he did not object to their moving out on June 13, 1970, because he did not know what their plans were and that they had prepaid the rent to September 15, 1970, and he would have no right to object. Perkins testified that Blackledge did not give him the keys to the leased space, and that he, Perkins, had to have a new set of keys made. Although he had tried very hard, he had not been able to rent the space vacated by the Blackledges. Perkins complains that the trial court erred in granting Defendants' Instruction No. 4 and in refusing to grant Plaintiff's Instruction No. 9. Plaintiff's Instruction No. 9 was, as follows: We think that the trial court was correct in refusing to grant Plaintiff's Instruction No. 9. Section 264 does not require a cancellation to be in writing, and we are unwilling to so hold. We did hold in Nason v. Morrissey et al., 218 Miss. 601, 67 So. 2d 506 (1953), and we think correctly so, that: In the case at bar, the defendants asserted by way of defense only that the plaintiff had agreed to release them from their written lease in consideration of their agreement to let him retain 3 1/2 months unearned rent. They also contended, by way of defense, that the plaintiff first breached the contract by constructively evicting them. The facts are greatly different from Nason where the attempt was to orally change or modify a written contract and then to specifically enforce the original written contract as orally modified. We do think that the court erred in granting Defendants' Instruction No. 4, which provided: This was a general instruction using such vague and general terms as "mutually agreed upon mutual considerations" and "mutual cancellation and consideration" without any tie-in to the facts of this particular case and without any guidelines or standards to aid the jury in considering the conduct, actions and language of the parties. Appellant next complains that the trial court erred in granting Defendants' Instructions 2 and 3 and refusing Plaintiff's *764 Instruction 11. Plaintiff's Instruction 11 provided: We think that the trial court correctly refused to grant this instruction. The language was entirely too broad. The only meaning that the jury could get from the language used in the instruction was that there must be an actual ouster, dispossession or eviction, or an actual physical invasion of the leased premises. This instruction was not complete; it omitted any reference to a constructive eviction. Appellant complained of Instruction 2 granted the Defendants, which instruction attempted to define constructive eviction in this way: 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 455 (1968) has this to say about constructive eviction: A careful reading of Defendants' Instruction 2 discloses these fatal defects in the definition of constructive eviction: There was no mention of "an intentional act or omission of the landlord" and also no mention of a permanent deprivation of the use and beneficial enjoyment of the demised premises. Where constructive eviction is to take the place of actual eviction, the term must be carefully and accurately *765 defined; otherwise the jury will be hopelessly confused. In addition such an instruction must specifically tie-in with the facts of a particular case. It was no help to the jury for Instruction 2 to provide: Such general words as "conduct or acts" actually tell the jury nothing. There were no guidelines, no standards, no limitations and no restrictions given the jury in this instruction. It was fatally defective in these particulars. Appellant also complains of Defendants' Instruction No. 3, which provided in part: As we see it, the general term "reasonable care" has no place in an instruction on what constitutes a breach of the covenant of quiet and peaceful enjoyment of leased premises. This was an action on a written contract, not a tort action. The only effect the use of the general term "reasonable care" would have on the jury would be to confuse and mislead them. Because of these fatal defects in the three instructions complained of, we must reverse the judgment of the lower court and remand this case for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. RODGERS, P.J., and PATTERSON, SMITH and SUGG, JJ., concur. SUGG, Justice (specially concurring). I concur in the result reached but am unable to agree with the statement in the opinion that "Section 264 does not require a cancellation to be in writing and we are unwilling to so hold." This statement, without qualification, in my opinion, is contrary to the holding of Bradbury v. McLendon, 119 Miss. 210, 80 So. 633 (1918) where this Court stated: Bradbury holds that a cancellation of a lease contract required to be in writing under the statute of frauds must be in writing unless the cancellation falls within the exception recognized therein.