Case Title: O.I.C.L. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC15-1570

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2016-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC15-1570 
____________ 
 
O.I.C.L.,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,  
Respondent. 
 
[September 22, 2016] 
 
POLSTON, J. 
 
O.I.C.L. seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
in O.I.C.L v. Department of Children & Families, 169 So. 3d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2015), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the 
First District Court of Appeal in In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), 
and the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in In re T.J., 59 So. 3d 1187 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2011), regarding the definition of a dependent child under section 
39.01(15)(e), Florida Statutes.1  However, because the individual in the case under 
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
 
 
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review is now an adult who cannot be adjudicated a dependent child under Florida 
law, we dismiss this case as moot. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A private petition for an adjudication of dependency under sections 
39.01(15)(a) and (e), Florida Statutes, was filed in the trial court on behalf of 
O.I.C.L. approximately two and a half months before O.I.C.L.’s 18th birthday.  
O.I.C.L., 169 So. 3d at 1246.  The petition alleged that O.I.C.L.’s father abandoned 
him during his mother’s pregnancy, that his mother neglected him since the age of 
twelve by failing to provide him with sufficient food and clothing in Guatemala, 
and that his mother forced him to leave her home in Guatemala when he turned 
seventeen.  See id.  The petition further stated that O.I.C.L. was detained by the 
federal Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) after illegally entering the United 
States and that ORR later released him to his uncle in Palm Beach County. 
 
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition for child 
dependency.  The trial court ruled that O.I.C.L. did “not qualify as dependent 
under section 39.01 because he left his Mother in Guatemala and he now resides 
with and is cared for by his Uncle, against whom there are no allegations of 
abandonment, abuse, or neglect.” 
 
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed.  Id.  The Fourth District ruled that 
the uncle qualified as a “caregiver” under section 39.01(10), Florida Statutes, 
 
 
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because ORR (a government agency that is considered a caregiver) released 
O.I.C.L. to his uncle, thereby entrusting him to his uncle’s care.  Id. at 1247.  The 
Fourth District explained that, “[a]s there were no allegations of abandonment, 
abuse, or neglect against the uncle, a presumption arose that he was indeed 
‘capable of providing [both] supervision and care’ to [O.I.C.L].”  Id. at 1248. 
 
Judge Forst dissented in the Fourth District.  Although he generally agreed 
with the majority’s analysis and conclusion, Judge Forst believed that the trial 
court failed to adequately address whether O.I.C.L. presented a prima facie case of 
child dependency under section 39.01(15)(e).  Id. at 1251 (Forst, J., dissenting).   
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
O.I.C.L. argues that the Fourth District failed to acknowledge section 
39.01(15)(e) as a separate basis for a finding of child dependency.  However, we 
dismiss this case because the issue of whether O.I.C.L. is a dependent child 
pursuant to section 39.01(15)(e) is moot.   
While the petition for child dependency was filed approximately two months 
before O.I.C.L.’s 18th birthday, O.I.C.L. reached majority age in 2015.  Now that 
O.I.C.L. is over 18 years old the question of whether O.I.C.L. should be deemed a 
dependent child pursuant to Florida law is no longer an issue.  See Godwin v. 
State, 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992) (“A case is ‘moot’ when it presents no 
actual controversy or when the issues have ceased to exist.”); Lund v. Dep’t of 
 
 
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Health, 708 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“The general rule in Florida is 
that a case on appeal becomes moot when a change in circumstances occurs before 
an appellate court’s decision, thereby making it impossible for the court to provide 
effectual relief.”).  
Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, entitled “Proceedings Relating to Children,” 
provides no authority for a Florida court to adjudicate an adult living in Florida to 
be a dependent child of the State.  Section 39.001(1)(a), Florida Statutes, explains 
that the purpose of chapter 39 is “[t]o provide for the care, safety, and protection of 
children” and “to promote the health and well-being of all children under the 
state’s care.”  Section 39.01(12), Florida Statutes, further provides that “ ‘[c]hild’ 
or ‘youth’ means any unmarried person under the age of 18 years who has not been 
emancipated by order of the court.”  Moreover, section 39.01(15) clearly specifies 
that a “ ‘[c]hild who is found to be dependent’ means a child.”  Therefore, an 
individual over the age of 18 fails to satisfy Florida’s statutory definition of a 
“child” who can be adjudicated a dependent child under any of the grounds listed 
in section 39.01(15). 
“[W]hen a Florida court is presented with a dependency petition, the court’s 
concern should be whether the allegations made in support of an adjudication of 
dependency satisfy Florida’s statutory grounds for such an adjudication, not 
whether the [individual] hopes to obtain [Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ)] status.”  
 
 
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In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 581.  While “a state court’s adjudication of dependency or 
other custody determination is the first step in the process of [] obtaining SIJ 
status,” federal immigration law “then requires additional findings, which may 
come from any judicial or administrative body.”  Id. at 580 (summarizing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J)).  Federal law is clear, however, that “the ultimate decision on the 
child’s immigration status remains with the federal government through the 
required consent of the Secretary of Homeland Security.”  Id. (relying on 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)); see also Eddie E. v. Super. Ct. of Orange Cty., 183 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 773, 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (noting that it is the role of the federal 
government, not state courts, to determine whether SIJ status is appropriate).  
Recognizing that the federal government determines immigration status, section 
39.5075(6), Florida Statutes (emphasis added), provides that a Florida court may 
retain jurisdiction over a dependency case until the age of 22 “solely for the 
purpose of allowing the continued consideration of the [SIJ status] petition and 
application by federal authorities,” and only “[i]f a petition and application have 
been filed and the petition and application have not been granted by the time the 
child reaches 18.”      
Accordingly, the fact that obtaining a state court order of child dependency 
is a first step in potentially securing SIJ status from the federal government at a 
later date does not change our mootness analysis by transforming the immigration 
 
 
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context into a collateral legal consequence.  Florida courts simply cannot declare 
an individual over 18 years of age to be a dependent child under current Florida 
law.  
Citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (quoting S. Pac. Terminal 
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)), the dissent claims that mootness should not 
prevent this Court’s review because these types of petitions are “capable of 
repetition, yet evading review.”  However, petitions for adjudications of 
dependency can be and are filed on behalf of children, including undocumented 
children, before the children are about to turn 18 years of age.  In fact, the Third 
District Court of Appeal’s decision in In re B.R.C.M., 182 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2015) (pending review in this Court, SC16-179), addresses an issue that is 
very similar to the issue in this case, but the Third District’s decision involves a 
child who is currently less than 18 years of age.  Therefore, the legal questions 
raised are not likely to evade appellate review, and we cannot ignore the mootness 
of this particular case.     
III.  CONCLUSION 
Because O.I.C.L. is no longer a child as defined in chapter 39 and cannot be 
adjudicated a dependent child of the State of Florida pursuant to section 39.01(15),  
we dismiss this case as moot. 
It is so ordered.   
 
 
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LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
LABARGA, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE and PERRY, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
CANADY, J., concurring in result. 
 
I agree with the view that this case should be discharged because it is moot.  
I would conclude that the retention of jurisdiction provided for in section 
39.5075(6), Florida Statutes, does not apply when—as in this case—a private 
petition has been filed.   
 
The full statutory context makes clear that even if the court may act on a 
petition after a child has reached 18 years of age, the authority to do so extends 
only to petitions filed either by the Department of Children and Families or a 
community-based care provider—not to petitions filed by a private party.  The 
petitions referred to in section 39.5075(6), which are subject to extended 
jurisdiction, must be understood to be petitions filed in accordance with section 
39.5075(4), which provides: “If the child may be eligible for special immigrant 
juvenile status, the department or community-based care provider shall petition the 
court for an order finding that the child meets the criteria for special immigrant 
juvenile status.” 
 
 
 
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LABARGA, C.J., dissenting. 
Although O.I.C.L. has already reached majority age, “[i]t is well settled that 
mootness does not destroy an appellate court’s jurisdiction . . . when the questions 
raised are of great public importance or are likely to recur.”  Del Valle v. State, 80 
So. 3d 999, 1005 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 218 n.1 (Fla. 
1984)).  The prevalence of seventeen-year-old unaccompanied minors seeking 
adjudications of dependency presents precisely the type of situation that is 
“capable of repetition, yet evading review.”  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 
(1973) (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).  In these 
cases, if reaching majority age renders the case moot, dependency litigation will 
rarely survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively 
denied.   
In fiscal year 2015, an estimated 39,970 unaccompanied minors were 
apprehended at the border.2  Approximately 2,908 of those children were released 
to sponsors in Florida.3  This number increased in fiscal year 2016, with 
                                          
 
 
2.  Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children (0-17 yr old) 
Apprehensions, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-
children/fy-2016 (last visited July 11, 2016).   
 
3.  Unaccompanied Children Released to Sponsors by State, OFFICE OF 
REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (August 25, 2016), 
 
 
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approximately 4,264 unaccompanied minors released to sponsors in Florida as of 
July 2016.4  One of the common types of relief sought by these children is Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS), which allows unaccompanied minors to apply 
for lawful permanent residency in the United States.  As noted by the majority 
opinion, “a state court’s adjudication of dependency or other custody determination 
is the first step in the process of [] obtaining SIJ status.”  Majority op. at 5.  See 
also In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d 576, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).  Notably, “[s]eventeen-
year-olds are the most frequent SIJS applicants—from 1999 to 2012, the median 
age has hovered between seventeen and eighteen annually, with an overall median 
age of 17.4.”  Lailah Hlass, States & Status: A Study of Geographical Disparities 
for Immigrant Youth, 46 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 266, 290 (2014).  This appears 
to be the most common age for various reasons:  
First, the average age of unaccompanied minors entering the country 
is around sixteen or seventeen, and . . .  many of these youths are SIJS 
eligible.  Further, for someone who has not been apprehended by the 
immigration agency, this is the age at which he may consider getting a 
driver’s license or taking college entrance tests.  These events can 
trigger a realization that he is unauthorized, because he does not have 
the required identification.  At this point, he may be more likely to 
seek help and get screened for eligibility.  Lastly, age seventeen might 
be so common because many state laws lose jurisdiction over youths 
at age eighteen, so SIJS-eligible youths eighteen and older may not be 
able to obtain the predicate state court order and therefore never apply 
                                          
 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/ucs/state-by-state-uc-placed-
sponsors.   
4.  See note 2, supra.  
 
 
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for federal immigration protection.  These hypotheses are certainly not 
exhaustive, but they are reflective of the conventional understanding 
of child advocates.   
 
Id. at 290-91 (footnotes omitted).   
The Fourth District recognized that dependency petitions filed on behalf of 
unaccompanied minors have become increasingly common, observing that:  
These types of petitions . . . routinely share the following common 
elements: the child is about to turn eighteen years old; the Department 
of Children and Families (“DCF”) neither supports nor opposes the 
child’s petition; the child agrees not to seek any services from the State; 
one or more of the child’s parents sign consent forms agreeing to entry 
of a dependency order; no testimony is presented to the court opposing 
the petition; and, DCF files no briefs in any subsequent appeal. As 
courts are likely to continue encountering more of these cases in the 
future, we believe some guidance on the proper handling of these cases 
is required. 
 
O.I.C.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 169 So. 3d 1244, 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2015).   
The frequency with which such dependency petitions are filed, and the 
failure of trial courts to make adequate factual findings—as occurred in this case—
create a situation in which improper denials are likely to recur.  Yet, with 
unaccompanied minors customarily filing petitions within a year or two of 
reaching eighteen, these cases are likely to evade review.  Here, we have 
recognized that the Fourth District’s conclusion conflicts with the decisions of the 
First District in In re Y.V. and the Third District in In re T.J.  Accordingly, I would 
 
 
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address the question of law at issue and provide guidance on the proper handling of 
these cases. 
What is more, I would not dismiss this case as moot because it is clear that 
the federal and state statutory schemes, which provide a pathway for 
unaccompanied minors to obtain lawful permanent residency via SIJS, allow for 
retention of jurisdiction.  Although chapter 39 specifies that only a child may be 
found dependent, O.I.C.L. was a child at the time the dependency petition was 
filed and an appropriate adjudication by the trial court could have resulted in the 
retention of jurisdiction over his dependency case.   
The concurring in result opinion asserts that the retention of jurisdiction 
provided for in section 39.5075(6) does not apply when a private petition has been 
filed.  This assertion confuses the statutory schemes laid out in title 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(27)(J), and section 39.5075, Florida Statutes.  A private petition for an 
adjudication of dependency—like the one filed in this case—petitions a state court 
for a determination of dependency in the same manner as a petition filed by DCF 
or a community-based care provider.  Dependency proceedings are commenced 
when a petition alleging dependency is filed, and “[a]ll proceedings seeking an 
adjudication that a child is dependent shall be initiated by the filing of a petition by 
an attorney for the department, or any other person who has knowledge of the facts 
alleged or is informed of them and believes that they are true.”  § 39.501(1), Fla. 
 
 
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Stat. (emphasis added).  See also Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.201(a)(2).  It is only after a 
determination of dependency by the state court and a determination of eligibility 
for SIJS that “the department or community-based care provider shall petition the 
court for an order finding that the child meets the criteria for [SIJS].”  
§ 39.5075(4), Fla. Stat.  Thereafter, “the department or community-based care 
provider shall . . . file a petition for [SIJS] and the application for adjustment of 
status to the appropriate federal authorities on behalf of the child.”  § 39.5075(5), 
Fla. Stat.  Additionally, the court may retain jurisdiction over a child’s dependency 
case until the child’s twenty-second birthday pending the disposition of the SIJS 
petition and application by federal immigration authorities.  § 39.5075(6), Fla. Stat.   
Accordingly, the fact that a private petition for adjudication of dependency 
was filed on behalf of O.I.C.L. is not dispositive of whether the state court may 
retain jurisdiction over his dependency case for the purpose of obtaining SIJS.  The 
determining factor regarding retention of jurisdiction is whether the petition for 
SIJS and the application for adjustment of status were filed before he reached 
eighteen.  For this reason, it is imperative to consider whether the trial court made 
an appropriate determination of dependency that would have qualified O.I.C.L. for 
SIJS before his eighteenth birthday.   
 
 
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BACKGROUND 
At the time this case arose, seventeen-year-old O.I.C.L. resided with his 
uncle who provided him with supervision and care on a voluntary basis.  
Nonetheless, a private petition for dependency was filed on behalf of O.I.C.L. 
alleging that he was dependent under sections 39.01(15)(a) and 39.01(15)(e) 
because he had “been abandoned . . . by [his] parent or parents or legal 
custodians,” and had “no parent or legal custodians capable of providing 
supervision and care.”  O.I.C.L., 169 So. 3d at 1246.  The petition asserted that 
O.I.C.L.’s father abandoned him before his birth, that his mother neglected him 
since he was twelve years old, and that his mother was unable to provide support 
as of the time he turned seventeen years old and forced him to leave the home.  
The trial court conducted a brief evidentiary hearing during which O.I.C.L. 
testified about these circumstances.  DCF did not appear in the trial court 
proceeding or on appeal before the Fourth District, and O.I.C.L.’s allegations and 
testimony were not contested.   
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered a final order denying the 
petition for dependency.  The trial court found that the O.I.C.L. had been living 
with his uncle since being released to him by ORR.5  Consequently, the trial court 
                                          
 
5.  Notably, while the petition alleged and the trial court found that ORR 
released O.I.C.L. to the care and custody of his uncle, Rigoberto Castro Lopez, the 
 
 
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reasoned that O.I.C.L. was not dependent because he was cared for by a “ready, 
willing, and able relative” against whom there were no allegations of 
abandonment, abuse, or neglect.   
On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the denial of the petition.  As noted 
by the majority opinion, the Fourth District explained that O.I.C.L. was released by 
ORR to his uncle, who qualified as a caregiver pursuant to section 39.01(10), 
Florida Statutes.  Thus, the Fourth District concluded: “As there were no 
allegations of abandonment, abuse, or neglect against the uncle, a presumption 
arose that he was indeed ‘capable of providing [both] supervision and care’ to the 
Child.”  Id. at 1248. 
This Court subsequently granted review of the Fourth District’s decision 
based on express and direct conflict with In re Y.V. and In re T.J.  
CONFLICT 
In In re Y.V., the First District reversed the dismissal of a private petition for 
dependency filed on behalf of an unaccompanied minor who was being cared for 
by his uncle in Florida.  160 So. 3d at 577.  The petition alleged that Y.V. was a 
dependent child pursuant to sections 39.01(15)(a) and 39.01(15)(e) because he was 
abused and abandoned by his parents in Honduras and had no parent or legal 
                                          
 
record before this Court identifies O.I.C.L.’s sponsor as Mario Lopez Castro, his 
first cousin. 
 
 
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custodian capable of providing supervision and care.  Id.  Yet the trial court 
dismissed the petition without a hearing.  Id. at 578.  In reversing the trial court’s 
decision, the district court reasoned that section 39.01(15) establishes seven 
independent grounds for adjudicating a child dependent and that the petition 
alleged sufficient facts.  Id.  Thus, the First District concluded that even though 
Y.V. had locatable, living parents in his country of origin and was being 
voluntarily cared for by an adult relative in Florida, the petition established a prima 
facie case for dependency.  Id. at 579.  Thus, the district court remanded the case 
for further proceedings.  Id. at 581. 
Similarly, in In re T.J., the Third District reversed the summary denial of a 
private petition for dependency filed on behalf of an unaccompanied minor who 
was being voluntarily cared for by an aunt in Florida after her mother’s death.  59 
So. 3d at 1189.  The petition alleged that T.J.’s father left her mother when the 
child was an infant, and the father’s whereabouts were unknown at the time the 
petition was filed.  Id.  The Third District determined that the petition established a 
prima facie case for dependency under section 39.01(15)(e) based on allegations 
that T.J.’s mother was deceased, her father had not been located after a diligent 
search, and her aunt did not have any judicially conferred status as a custodian or 
guardian.  Id. at 1190.  Accordingly, the district court remanded the case for further 
proceedings.  Id. at 1194. 
 
 
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It is apparent from these cases that there is conflict regarding whether a 
district court is required to remand a case where the trial court failed to make 
adequate factual findings relating to each ground for dependency for which 
sufficient facts were alleged in the dependency petition.  Accordingly, I would 
resolve the conflict presented here.   
ANALYSIS 
Section 39.01(15), Florida Statutes, provides seven independent grounds 
upon which a child may be adjudicated dependent.  See § 39.01(15), Fla. Stat.  See 
also In re Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 578.  Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.310(a)(1) 
requires that a dependency petition “allege sufficient facts showing the child to be 
dependent based upon applicable law.”  “[W]hen a Florida court is presented with 
a dependency petition, the court’s concern should be whether the allegations made 
in support of an adjudication of dependency satisfy Florida’s statutory grounds for 
such an adjudication, not whether the juvenile hopes to obtain SIJ status.”  In re 
Y.V., 160 So. 3d at 581.  Moreover, “[i]f federal law grants a right to alien children 
to regularize their immigration status by first obtaining a state court adjudication of 
dependency, then there is no basis for failing to declare a child dependent so long 
as he or she meets the statutory criteria for dependency.”  F.L.M. v. Dep’t of 
Children & Families, 912 So. 2d 1264, 1269 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).  Thus, when a 
petition establishes a prima facie case for dependency, it is the role of the trial 
 
 
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judge to “act as the fact-finder, make decisions to accept or reject testimony, and 
then make its ruling.”  O.I.C.L., 169 So. 3d at 1253 (Forst, J., dissenting).   
Accordingly, when a petition alleges sufficient facts for dependency under 
any of the seven statutory grounds, the trial court must make factual findings as to 
each separate ground in order to properly determine whether a child is dependent.  
In this case, O.I.C.L.’s petition alleged facts presenting a prima facie case for 
dependency under section 39.01(15)(a) and the trial court appropriately considered 
whether O.I.C.L. was abandoned, abused, or neglected.  The trial court found that 
O.I.C.L.’s uncle qualified as a caregiver and that there was no evidence that 
O.I.C.L. was abandoned, abused, or neglected by his caregiver.  However, the trial 
court failed to address O.I.C.L.’s dependency under section 39.01(15)(e), despite 
the petition alleging sufficient facts.   
To properly determine O.I.C.L.’s dependency under section 39.01(15)(e), 
the trial court must examine whether he had a parent or legal custodian capable of 
providing supervision and care.  As evidenced by the petition and O.I.C.L.’s 
testimony, his father was unknown, his mother was unable to provide him with 
basic necessities and support, and he was forced to leave the home.6  The trial court 
                                          
 
 
6.  See C.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 816 So. 2d 1229, 1230 (Fla. 
5th DCA 2002) (in which a child was found dependent pursuant to section 
39.01(15)(e) because the mother was financially unable to provide basic 
necessities, such as food and water).   
 
 
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failed to inquire further about the mother’s capability of providing supervision and 
care in light of these allegations and, despite the Fourth District’s assumption, 
there was no evidence that the mother granted permission for O.I.C.L. to reside 
with his uncle.  Furthermore, the trial court made no findings about whether the 
uncle was O.I.C.L.’s legal custodian which, pursuant to section 39.01(34), entails a 
legal status that is determined by a court.  “[T]herefore the uncle’s care for the 
Child would not automatically rule out a finding of dependency under section 
39.01(15)(e).”  O.I.C.L., 169 So. 3d at 1252 (Forst, J., dissenting).  Although the 
uncle qualified as a caregiver and provided O.I.C.L. with supervision and care, 
these facts alone do not create a presumption that O.I.C.L. had a parent or legal 
custodian capable of providing supervision and care.   
The trial court in this case did not apply the correct law when it failed to 
make any factual findings about whether O.I.C.L. had a parent or legal custodian 
capable of providing supervision and care.  Moreover, the trial court ruling is not 
supported by competent substantial evidence because the testimony from O.I.C.L. 
and his uncle did not establish that O.I.C.L. had a parent or legal custodian capable 
of providing supervision and care.  Thus, the trial court’s denial of the dependency 
petition with regard to section 39.01(15)(e) cannot be sustained.  See C.A. v. Dep’t 
of Children and Families, 958 So. 2d 554, 557 (Fla. 4th DCA (2007)) (“A court’s 
final ruling of dependency . . . will be sustained on review if the court applied the 
 
 
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correct law and its ruling is supported by competent substantial evidence in the 
record. . . . reversal is required where the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain 
the findings of the trial court.”).  See also C.R. v. Dep’t of Children & Family 
Servs., 53 So. 3d 240, 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); G.C. v. Dep’t of Children & 
Families, 791 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).  Accordingly, the Fourth District 
should have remanded this case for further proceedings.   
The conflict of decisions presented here and the apparent need for guidance 
in the lower courts merit a suitable resolution by this Court.  Accordingly, I dissent 
from the majority’s opinion that this case is moot, and would quash the Fourth 
District’s decision and remand this case for an adequate evidentiary hearing. 
PARIENTE and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions  
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D15-53 
 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
Jan Peter Weiss and Liah Shitomi Frazier, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Stephanie Christina Zimmerman, Deputy Director & Statewide Director of 
Appeals, Children’s Legal Services, Bradenton, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
Bernard Pines Perlmutter of The University of Miami School of Law Children & 
Youth Law Clinic, Coral Gables, Florida, 
 
 
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for Amici Curiae The University of Miami School of Law Children & Youth 
Law Clinic, Health Rights Clinic, and Immigration Clinic 
 
Stephanie Lauren Varela, Julissa Rodriguez, Elliot H. Scherker, Katherine Marie 
Clemente, and Joshua Eli Truppman of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, Florida; 
and Robin L. Rosenberg, Tampa, Florida,  
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida’s Children First 
 
Paolo Giuseppe Annino and Brandon Ray Smoot, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Amicus Curiae Florida State University College of Law Public Interest 
Law Center 
 
Larry Scott Rifkin, Jacqueline Villalba of Rifkin & Fox-Isicoff, P.A., Miami, 
Florida; and Edward Maurice Mullins of Astigarraga Davis Mullins & Grossman 
P.A., Miami, Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae The International Law Section of The Florida Bar and The 
Public Interest Law Section of The Florida Bar 
 
Jennifer Lissette Anzardo, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Amicus Curiae Americans for Immigrant Justice