Case Title: Passwater v. State

Citation: 229 N.E.2d 718, 248 Ind. 454

Docket Number: 30,828

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1967-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
248 Ind. 454 (1967)
229 N.E.2d 718
PASSWATER
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,828.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed September 25, 1967.
*455 Chester H. Wilson, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Raymond I. Klagiss, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
HUNTER, C.J.
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for the offense of second degree burglary. Trial was by the Court without the intervention of a jury.
The Court found the defendant to be twenty-two (22) years of age and sentenced him to the Indiana State Reformatory for not less than two (2) years nor more than five (5) years.
Appellant's motion for new trial was overruled. The motion for new trial and assignment of errors present the following questions:
Thus, upon the questions presented by this appeal, two (2) sections of the Criminal Code are involved as follows:
(1) Second degree burglary is defined by Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-701 (b) (1956) as follows:
(2) The intent to commit the felony as charged is defined by the Offenses Against Property Act (hereinafter referred to as the Theft Code) in Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-3030(1a) (Supp. 1967) as follows:
and § 10-3030 (2a):
The affidavit filed by the appellee State is in words and figures as follows:
Propositions (1) and (2) of the errors presented by the motion for new trial and assignment of errors raise identical *457 questions of law and are grouped and argued together under propositions (1) and (2). The appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to prove material elements of the offense of second degree burglary, i.e.,
The third proposition advanced in this appeal is that no property was taken from the Keyless Lock Company but was only taken from a vending machine owned by an outside concern. Thus, the third proposition raises a question of variance.
Upon the issues presented in this case, the burden of proof rested upon the State to prove each of the following material elements:
Appellee submits that in regard to all of these elements, there is sufficient evidence.
Addressing our attention to propositions (1) and (2) first on the breaking and entering, the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom when viewed most favorable to the appellee State reveals the following:
There was testimony by the plant manager of Keyless Lock Company to the effect that the plant was locked when he left it earlier on the night in question. Police officers received a report of an alarm at the Keyless Lock Company, a manufacturing plant in which no one resided, and which was located in Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana. The police arrived at the plant shortly afterwards and discovered appellant's *458 station wagon parked out of sight behind the Keyless Lock Company building and observed that an overhead door of the building was open about six (6) to eight (8) inches from the ground and further observed three (3) individuals, the appellant being one of them in the process of breaking into a Coke vending machine. The deputy sheriff entered the building and called to the three (3) to stop, appellant and another broke and ran but only to be in the path of another police officer who at this time apprehended them. At the time of his apprehension the appellant remarked to one of the police officers and deputy sheriff that the next time he would enter a building he would be armed. In a conversation with the plant manager of Keyless Lock Company, the appellant stated that the decision to break into the building had been made the same night by the appellant and the other two accomplices who were cruising around in an automobile following a poker game. At the trial the appellant admitted on the stand that he had broken into one of the vending machines and that he and one of the others had raised the overhead door in order to gain entrance to the plant. The evidence further demonstrated that five (5) vending machines had been damaged in the attempts to open them and that about $20 had already been removed by appellant and his companions which money was discovered in the topcoat of one of his accomplices where the money had been placed by the three (3) as it was removed from the machines. The evidence finally indicates that the appellant did not have permission or authority to enter the premises in question. We therefore hold that there is sufficient evidence of probative value and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom to establish the element of breaking and entering. Cockerham v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 303, 204 N.E.2d 654. The rule was stated therein:
This Court stated in Barrick v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 333, 339, 119 N.E.2d 550, 553:
See also Link v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 466, 113 N.E.2d 43.
The chief thrust of the appellant's argument is addressed to proposition (3) above and that is that there is a fatal variance between the crime charged in the affidavit and the proof submitted thereunder at the trial. Appellant stated that there was no property in which the Keyless Lock Company had title and ownership outright that was the subject of the alleged felonious intent to commit the theft. It should be noted that the Theft Code combines embezzlement, larceny and other crimes against property into what appears to be a single crime of theft with multiple definitions and this Court must look to the law as it was enunciated by this Court from time to time under questions raised on convictions of second degree burglary with intent to commit larceny under the law as it existed prior to the 1963 Theft Code. The rule is well established that it is not necessary to prove absolute title or ownership to be in the person alleged to be the owner. This Court had held it sufficient if the evidence shows him to be in possession of the property as bailee, agent, trustee, executor or administrator. We construe this to be a possessory right and sufficient to negate the question of variance. State v. Tillett (1909), 173 Ind. 133, 89 N.E. 589; Rhoades v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 569, 70 N.E.2d 27; Sneed, Lockridge v. State (1955), 235 Ind. 198, 130 N.E.2d 32; Lunce, Reynolds v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 685, *460 122 N.E.2d 5; Cockerham v. State, supra; R.L. Lake v. State of Indiana (1967), 248 Ind. 451, 229 N.E.2d 724.
Under proposition (3), the appellant in his brief also asserts that
We construe such contention to mean that the defendant would not be guilty of second degree burglary in the case at bar. With such contention we cannot agree for Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-101 (1956), provides as follows:
And further the penalty section of the Theft Code as found in Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-3039 (Supp. 1967) states as follows:
This question has already been determined by this Court in the case of Hunter v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 494, 207 N.E.2d 207.
We therefore hold that the affidavit herein charged defendant with the crime of burglary with the intent to commit a felony, violation of the Theft Code, when the penalty section *461 of the Theft Code is construed with § 9-101, supra, regardless of the amount involved. Hunter v. State, supra.
Having considered all assignments of error we find them to be without merit and that the judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Arterburn, Lewis and Mote, JJ., concur.
Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 229 N.E.2d 718.