Case Title: Gill v. Gill

Citation: 152 N.W.2d 309

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1967-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
152 N.W.2d 309 (1967) Mary A. GILL, Appellant, v. Raymond S. GILL, Respondent. No. 40464. Supreme Court of Minnesota. June 30, 1967. *310 Smith & Munro, Minneapolis, for appellant. NELSON, Justice. This appeal involves a divorce action in which the summons was served upon defendant-husband, Raymond S. Gill, by publication. Plaintiff, Mary A. Gill, the appellant herein, obtained an order for publication based on her affidavit that defendant was secreting himself within the state to avoid personal service. Her affidavit stated: Defendant did not appear personally or through an attorney, the only service of process being substitute service by publication pursuant to Rule 4.04(3), Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for such service "[w]hen the action is for divorce or separate maintenance and the court shall have ordered that service be made by published notice." After trial the district court found that the facts stated in the affidavit for publication were consistent with the testimony offered at the trial; that defendant was secreting himself within the state to avoid personal service; and that plaintiff was entitled to an absolute divorce and to the custody of the parties' minor children. However, the court specifically reserved awarding support and alimony "until such *311 time as this Court shall have personal jurisdiction over the defendant." Plaintiff's appeal is limited to one question: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to award alimony and support where service of process is made by publication pursuant to a court order based upon an affidavit of the plaintiff stating that defendant is a resident but is secreting himself within the state to avoid personal service. The question whether such a service confers jurisdiction to render a personal judgment for alimony was directly decided in this state in Roberts v. Roberts, 135 Minn. 397, 161 N.W. 148, L.R.A.1917C, 1140. As was said in the Roberts case, it is well settled that a personal judgment or decree for alimony rendered in a divorce case against a nonresident where the only service is by publication is void everywhere and the rule is the same in any action in personam where the defendant is a nonresident, the service is by publication, and no property within the state is seized. It is equally clear that an attempted service by publication upon a resident defendant who is personally present within the state and can be found therein confers no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment, because not due process of law. In Bardwell v. Collins, 44 Minn. 97, 46 N.W. 315, 9 L.R.A. 152, 20 Am.St.Rep. 547, the defendant was a resident of this state, personally within it, and could be found therein, and a statute purporting to authorize service upon such persons by publication was held unconstitutional. However, the opinion of Mr. Justice Mitchell in the Bardwell case clearly recognizes the validity of statutes authorizing service by publication against defendants who could not be found within the jurisdiction, either because of nonresidence or because they have absconded or concealed themselves to avoid the service of process. Mr. Justice Bunn, in Roberts v. Roberts, 135 Minn. 397, 400, 161 N.W. 148, 149, L.R.A.1917C, 1140, said: Thus, in substance, the Roberts case holds (135 Minn. 397, 161 N.W. 148): In order for the Roberts case to be presently binding in this court, the Minnesota statutes under which the Roberts case was decided must be similar in content to Rule 4.04, Rules of Civil Procedure, and the holding must not transgress present-day concepts of due process. The first Minnesota publication statute, G.S.1866, c. 66, § 49, provided in part: L.1869, c. 73, § 1, amended and modified the 1866 statute by eliminating the requirement that the court make a finding as to the sufficiency of the complaint before ordering service by publication. L.1903, c. 341, amended the 1869 statute to provide for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over resident individuals who have departed from the state or cannot be found. The law of Minnesota continued in similar form in Minn.St. 543.11 and 543.12 until 1952 when Minnesota adopted Rule 4.04, Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in part: It is clear that in content Rule 4.04 is substantially the same as the statute in effect when Roberts was decided and thus empowers Minnesota courts to exercise personal jurisdiction by means of service through publication over a resident defendant who conceals himself within the state for the purpose of avoiding personal service unless the holding in Roberts contravenes the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. Four frequently cited United States Supreme Court cases establish the permissible limits under the due process clause. In the first, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565, it was held that an in personam judgment obtained against a nonresident on constructive service of process was invalid under the due process clause and unenforceable against the nonresident's property within the state. The second case, Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 37 S. Ct. 282, 61 L. Ed. 713, held valid under the due process clause a judgment directing a bank to make payments from a nonresident's account to his wife, where the nonresident had been served by publication only. The third case, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462, 61 S. Ct. 339, 342, 85 L. Ed. 278, 283, determined that as far as Federal constitutional due process requirements are concerned, domicile within a state The last of the four cases wherein the Supreme Court considered whether service by publication met the requirement of due process is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865. Although the principal concern there was the sufficiency of notice by publication to beneficiaries of judicial settlement of trust accounts, the problem involved notice to beneficiaries of unknown interests and of unknown whereabouts. The court said that an elementary and fundamental requirement of due process is "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present objections." 339 U.S. 314, 70 S. Ct. 657, 94 L. Ed. 873. Further, while the court agreed that publication is not a reliable means of acquainting interested parties with the fact that their rights are before the court, it observed that it has not hesitated "to approve of resort to publication as a customary substitute in another class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or practicable to give more adequate warning." 339 U.S. 317, 70 S. Ct. 658, 94 L. Ed. 875. Following this reasoning, the court held that notice by publication was sufficient as to beneficiaries whose interests or whereabouts could not be ascertained. Following these authorities, does the Minnesota rule violate the due process clause? We think not. The assertion of such jurisdiction by publication in a divorce suit over a resident who hides himself is justified by the state's power over its residents.[1] Such service, being the only service possible in this case, is in fact dictated by necessity. Therefore, following the Roberts case and the guideline of due process, we hold that Rule 4.04(3), Rules of Civil Procedure, empowers Minnesota courts in an action for divorce to exercise personal jurisdiction over a resident defendant served by publication subsequent to the filing of an affidavit stating that the defendant is a resident secreting himself within the state to avoid personal service and the issuance of an order granting publication. When these are the facts, there is no reason why personal jurisdiction should not attach in divorce cases. The Roberts case has been well received. It is cited in support of the following statement in 24 Am.Jur. (2d) Divorce and Separation, § 543: The Roberts case is also cited for the statement in 27B C.J.S., Divorce, § 247: In Dirksen v. Dirksen, Sup., 72 N.Y.S.2d 865, defendant had been served by means of publication and the referee held that no grant of alimony could be made in the absence of personal service of process upon the defendant. In so holding, the referee relied on an earlier case, May v. May, 233 App.Div. 519, 253 N.Y.S. 606. The appellate court held that this case was authority for the position taken by the referee prior to amendments to the Civil Practice Act, but that the legislative history of these amendments showed that their purpose was to take advantage of the decision of Milliken v. Meyer, supra. The court then said (72 N.Y.S.2d 866): The attitude of the Minnesota court regarding service by publication is exemplified in Wiik v. Russell, 173 Minn. 580, 583, 218 N.W. 110, 111: It is unnecessary to further extend this opinion except to state that the order, decree, and judgment of the court below are affirmed, except insofar as they provide that the court is reserving the ordering of support and alimony until such time as it shall have obtained personal jurisdiction over the defendant through personal service, which holding is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court to order support and alimony pursuant to the jurisdiction acquired on the service of publication in the instant case and to render a personal judgment therefor. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. [1] The general rule is that a court has no jurisdiction to award a personal judgment for alimony in a divorce action against a nonresident if there is no personal service of process in the action within the state and defendant does not appear, it being insufficient that there has been service by publication or by personal service in another state. 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment (2 ed.) § 14.12, and cases cited; Allegrezza v. Allegrezza, 236 Minn. 464, 53 N.W.2d 133.