Case Title: Columb v. Columb

Citation: 161 Vt. 103, 633 A.2d 689

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
COLUMB_V_COLUMB.91-520; 161 Vt. 103; 633 A.2d 689

[Opinion filed 17-Sep-1993]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 22-Oct-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-520


 Gregory Columb                               Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Windsor Family Court

 Marjorie Columb                              June Term, 1992


 Paul F. Hudson, J. (motions to modify custody), and
 Theodore S. Mandeville, Jr., J. (motion for attorney's fees, costs and
 expenses)


 Philip H. White of Wilson & White, P.C., Montpelier, for plaintiff-
   appellant

 Barney L. Brannen of Plante, Hanley & Gerety, P.C., White River Junction,
   for defendant-appellee


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff Gregory Columb seeks to modify the 1988 decree
 divorcing him from defendant Marjorie Columb so that he may obtain custody
 of their daughter Merideth.  The trial court determined that the facts of
 this case do not meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Parental
 Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. { 1738A, and, therefore, Vermont
 courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.  We reverse this jurisdictional
 determination and remand for further proceedings.
      The parties separated in 1984 and the child went to live with her
 mother in New Hampshire.  The father continued to reside in Vermont and
 filed for divorce in 1987.  The divorce judgment issued in 1988 and gave

 

 the mother physical custody of the child with limited visitation rights to
 the father.  The mother began living with Robert Langlois and has since
 married him.  Prior to July 1991, they resided in New Hampshire, Nova Scotia
 and various locations in Maine.
      The events giving rise to this appeal began when the mother moved to
 New Hampshire in July 1991, while the child was visiting the father.
 According to the mother's affidavit, the move was temporary and she and Mr.
 Langlois intended to return to Maine after the tourist season to begin new
 jobs.  In fact, they moved to Utah in the fall of 1991 and have remained
 there since.
      During the 1991 summer visit to Vermont, the child reported physical
 abuse by Mr. Langlois.  After a clinical evaluation of the child, the father
 refused to return her to the mother and, on August 14, 1991, moved to modify
 the 1988 decree to transfer custody to him.  In response to the mother's
 motion to dismiss, the family court ruled that it lacked subject matter
 jurisdiction under Vermont's version of the Uniform Child Custody
 Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 15 V.S.A. {{ 1031-1051.  Specifically, the court
 ruled that Maine was the child's home state, that it would not be in the
 child's best interest to litigate custody in Vermont, and that Vermont was
 an inconvenient forum.
      The father moved to reconsider, alleging that the court had been misled
 into determining that Maine was the mother's and the child's home state
 when, in fact, the mother and Mr. Langlois were fighting extradition to
 Maine to respond to felony charges.  The motion was denied because the
 father's counsel failed to appear at the hearing.  The issues were, however,
 aired in response to a new motion, which was heard during a remand from this

 

 Court.  By that time, this Court had decided Shute v. Shute, 158 Vt. 242,
 247, 607 A.2d 890, 893 (1992), in which we held that, when there is a
 conflict, the PKPA preempts the UCCJA and determines which state has
 jurisdiction over child custody disputes.  Based on the PKPA, the family
 court concluded that Vermont did not have jurisdiction to modify the custody
 order and denied the motion.
      The father makes three arguments on appeal:  (1) we should limit or
 overrule Shute so that its holding does not apply in this case; (2) the
 mother waived any objection to jurisdiction over custody of the child by
 appearing in the divorce action; and (3) Vermont has jurisdiction to
 determine custody of the child because the child had no home state when the
 motions to modify custody were filed.  We begin with an analysis of Shute.
      Shute involved a noncustodial parent's attempt to enforce visitation
 rights contained in a Vermont divorce decree.  At the time the underlying
 divorce action was filed, the custodial parent and the child had resided in
 Connecticut for over six months.  The custodial parent did not contest the
 jurisdiction of the Vermont court to adjudicate the divorce and the custody
 issue.  When enforcement issues arose, however, the custodial parent began a
 proceeding in Connecticut to cut off visitation rights and asserted that the
 Vermont court did not have jurisdiction with respect to a child whose home
 state was Connecticut.  The trial court dismissed the Vermont proceeding in
 favor of the one pending in Connecticut.  Id. at 243-44, 607 A.2d  at 891-92.
      Although the parties litigated Shute under the UCCJA, which has been
 adopted in both Vermont and Connecticut, this Court concluded that the PKPA
 controlled.  That statute was enacted by Congress to establish "national
 standards for determining subject matter jurisdiction over custody matters."

 

 Id. at 245, 607 A.2d  at 893.  We found that "the language of the PKPA
 indicates that Congress intended to preempt the field of custody
 jurisdiction" and that intent was achieved through the Supremacy Clause.
 Id. at 246, 607 A.2d  at 893.
      The preemption issue was important in Shute because the PKPA and the
 UCCJA, although similar in purpose and approach, differ on the
 consideration to be given to the home state of the child.  The "home state"
 is defined as "the state in which the child immediately preceding the time
 involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as a parent,
 for at least six consecutive months."  15 V.S.A. { 1031(5); see also 28
 U.S.C. { 1738A(b)(4) (essentially identical definition).  In both statutes,
 periods of temporary absence are counted as part of the six-month period.
      The UCCJA grants jurisdiction to adjudicate custody to the child's home
 state at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, or, in certain
 circumstances, to the state that was the home state within six months
 before the proceedings commenced, 15 V.S.A. { 1032(a)(1), but it also grants
 jurisdiction to a state that is not the home state when there are certain
 contacts and "it is in the best interest of the child."  15 V.S.A. {
 1032(a)(2).  The PKPA, on the other hand, gives primacy to the home state or
 the recent home state (FN1) and does not authorize alternative "best interest"
 
 

 jurisdiction unless there is no home state.  See 28 U.S.C. {
 1738A(c)(2)(B)(i) (court may look to other tests to assert jurisdiction;
 "best interests" standard only applies if "it appears that no other state
 would have jurisdiction" as home state).
      In Shute, the home state of the child was Connecticut even at the time
 the original divorce action was filed as both mother and child had been
 residents of Connecticut for nine months before the divorce action was filed
 in Vermont.  158 Vt. at 247, 607 A.2d  at 894.  Thus, we held that
 Connecticut had jurisdiction under the PKPA, and it was improper for
 Vermont to assert jurisdiction.  Id. at 248, 607 A.2d  at 894.
      The facts of this case are in many respects similar to those in Shute.
 As in Shute, when the underlying custody order was issued, another state, in
 this case New Hampshire, was the home state of the child.  As in Shute, this
 state has never become the home state of the child although the noncustodial
 parent resides in Vermont and the child has been here for visits.  Unlike
 Shute, however, in this case, there is no proceeding pending in the home
 state of the child if, indeed, the child now has a home state.
      The father argues that the PKPA does not apply in this circumstance
 and, therefore, does not preempt the UCCJA because the PKPA deals only with
 situations when one state must give full faith and credit to the custody
 decision of another state and when a custody decision of one state is to be
 modified in another state.  Thus, in the father's view, the initial
 jurisdiction question, before any interstate conflict arises, is determined
 solely by the UCCJA and can be based on "best interest" jurisdiction.  Shute
 can be distinguished, the father argues, because in that case separate
 proceedings existed in Connecticut creating the interstate conflict.

 

      The father acknowledges that his argument would result in a custody
 order that is not entitled to full faith and credit in other states because
 the order would not meet PKPA requirements.  He argues that we should ignore
 this deficiency because other states are free to recognize our order even if
 they are not required to do so.
      We agree that in the narrow sense urged by the father the PKPA does not
 preempt the jurisdictional authority granted in the UCCJA.  See E.E.B. v.
 D.A.,