Case Title: Santo Hernandez v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC08-2321

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-2321 
____________ 
 
SANTO HERNANDEZ,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[December 9, 2010] 
 
QUINCE, J. 
 
We have for review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in 
Hernandez v. State, 994 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).  Petitioner Santo 
Hernandez argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that 
he was engaged in the trafficking or attempted trafficking of cocaine where the 
State failed to present evidence of the quantity of drugs involved in the alleged 
transaction.  Hernandez contends that, in upholding his conviction, the Third 
District is in express and direct conflict with the decision of the First District Court 
of Appeal in Williams v. State, 592 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), on a question 
of law.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the reasons 
 
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expressed below, we vacate Hernandez‟s convictions for first-degree felony 
murder and remand to the district court with instructions to direct the entry of 
judgments for third-degree felony murder. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Hernandez was charged by indictment in February 2003 with two counts of 
first-degree felony murder in the deaths of victims George Collazo and Michel 
Aleman.  The indictment alleged that on December 12, 2002, the victims were 
killed while Hernandez was engaged in the perpetration of, or the attempt to 
perpetrate, the felony offense of trafficking in cocaine, in violation of section 
893.135(1), Florida Statutes (2002).   See § 782.04(1)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2002) 
(providing that an unlawful killing committed during the perpetration or attempt to 
perpetrate a trafficking offense under section 893.135(1) is punishable as murder in 
the first degree).  The indictment also charged Hernandez as a principal in the first 
degree, see § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (2002), making him liable for any actions of his 
coperpetrator.  See generally Hodge v. State, 970 So. 2d 923, 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 
2008) (explaining that the focus in a felony murder charge is not on the accused‟s 
role in the actual killing, but on his or her participation in the underlying felony).  
After a three-day jury trial ending on January 12, 2007, Hernandez was found 
guilty of two counts of first-degree felony murder without personal possession of a 
firearm. 
 
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The evidence at trial demonstrated that on December 12, 2002, officers of 
the Hialeah Police Department responded to a call alerting them to a burning truck 
containing two bodies in the rear cargo area.  The bodies themselves were partially 
burned and each body was partially wrapped in a comforter.  Identification was 
found on both corpses, indicating that the men were Michel Aleman and George 
Collazo.  The victims‟ identities were later confirmed by dental records.  A 
medical examiner testified that the victims had died as a result of gunshot wounds 
and that the burning had occurred after death. 
Detectives obtained Collazo‟s phone records and learned that numerous 
phone calls had been exchanged between Collazo and a cellular phone belonging 
to Hernandez between 8:54 a.m. and 11:56 a.m. on the morning of December 12.  
Based on the phone records, the police were able to link Hernandez to the 
residence of Vicky Rodriguez.  Rodriguez was asked to come to the police station.  
There, she informed officers that she and Hernandez were in a romantic 
relationship and that Hernandez had been living at her home for several months.  
She told the officers that on December 12, Hernandez had called to tell her that he 
had broken a sliding glass door by falling through it.  She became suspicious when 
Hernandez told her that he was not injured.  When she arrived home and 
discovered a bullet hole in her front door as well as the broken sliding glass door, 
Hernandez first told her that there had been a drive-by shooting earlier in the day.  
 
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When she did not believe him, he told her that he had accidentally fired a gun in 
the house.  She then asked Hernandez to move out.  She also told the officers that 
two comforters were missing from her bedrooms.  After Rodriguez was shown 
photographs depicting the comforters in which the victims had been wrapped, she 
identified them as the ones missing from her home. 
When Rodriguez later testified at trial, she also stated that shortly after 
Hernandez moved out, he asked her to bring him a white box he had left in the 
house.  Rodriguez opened the package and found a substance that appeared to be 
cocaine.  However, she determined that the cocaine was not real and subsequently 
disposed of it by flushing it down the toilet.  On cross-examination, she stated that 
she tasted the powder and was able to determine based on prior experience that it 
was not real cocaine.  She informed Hernandez that she destroyed the substance, 
but testified that he did not seem concerned. 
Hernandez was taken into custody on January 25, 2003.  He subsequently 
gave a taped statement, which was played for the jury at trial.  In Hernandez‟s 
account of the events leading up to the victims‟ deaths, Hernandez was asked by 
Collazo, a childhood friend, whether he knew anyone who might be interested in 
purchasing cocaine.  Hernandez suggested the name of codefendant Ricky Valle.  
Hernandez subsequently agreed to allow the deal to occur at his girlfriend‟s 
townhome.  Although Hernandez stated that he was “like the middleman” in the 
 
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transaction, he denied having been promised any specific compensation.  
Hernandez admitted, however, that Collazo had indicated that he would receive 
some money.  When asked during the interrogation whether he was aware of how 
much money Valle was going to pay for the cocaine, Hernandez responded:  “If 
I‟m mistaken [sic] it was thirty thousand dollars.” 
 
On the morning of the intended transaction, Hernandez exchanged phone 
calls with Collazo and Valle.  Hernandez assured both men that “everything [was] 
okay.”  Hernandez stated that he was alone in the townhome when Valle arrived 
carrying a bag, although Hernandez claimed that he never saw its contents.  Valle 
immediately went upstairs.  Hernandez told the interrogating officer that he was in 
the kitchen when Collazo and Aleman arrived a few moments later.  Collazo was 
talking on a cell phone and carrying a box approximately two to three feet in 
height.  As Collazo and Aleman entered the house, Valle, wearing gloves and 
carrying a long-barreled gun, came down the stairs and shot both men in the back.  
Hernandez recalled hearing the sliding glass door behind him shatter.  According 
to Hernandez, Valle then threatened his life and the life of his family if he did not 
help clean up the bodies.  Hernandez helped Valle mop up the blood and at least 
one spent bullet casing and helped Valle wrap the bodies in comforters that Valle 
had retrieved from upstairs.  Hernandez told Valle that he had to deliver a suitcase 
to his girlfriend, Rodriguez, who was in beauty school.  Valle accompanied 
 
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Hernandez to deliver the suitcase.  When they returned to the house, Hernandez 
cleaned up the broken glass in the kitchen.  Hernandez then helped Valle load the 
bodies into a truck, which Valle drove away. 
 
Hernandez was also asked about the box that Rodriguez had found in the 
townhome.  Hernandez told the interrogating officer that the box contained fake 
cocaine that had been given to him by Collazo long before the planned drug 
transaction with Valle.  Collazo did not tell Hernandez why he wanted him to keep 
it, but Hernandez said he held on to it as a favor to Collazo.  When Rodriguez 
found the box after Hernandez moved out, Hernandez said, he told her to flush it 
down the toilet because it was “no good.” 
 
One other account of the events surrounding the murders was presented at 
trial.  According to Cesar Morales, a jailhouse informant, Hernandez told him that 
he had contacted Collazo and Aleman offering to sell them cocaine.  In this 
account, Hernandez had manufactured ten kilos of false cocaine, which he intended 
to sell to Collazo for $220,000 to $230,000.  After Collazo and Aleman arrived at 
the townhome, with Valle also present, Hernandez gave a sample of the cocaine to 
Collazo, then went upstairs to get a gun.  After Collazo discovered that the cocaine 
was fake, Hernandez came downstairs and shot both victims.  Hernandez then 
threatened to kill Valle, who helped him wrap the bodies and clean the house.  
Finally, Hernandez and Valle loaded the bodies into a truck, which Hernandez 
 
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drove away.  According to Morales, Hernandez told him that he would blame Valle 
for the murders.1 
 
After the State rested, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal on both 
counts of felony murder.  The defense argued in part that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish the underlying felony of trafficking in cocaine.  Because 
the State had not submitted any direct evidence that the transaction involved at 
least 28 grams of cocaine, the defense argued, the defendant could not be found 
guilty of the felony of trafficking and thus could not be convicted of felony 
murder.  The defense noted that the only testimony involving weight came from 
Morales, who testified that Hernandez intended to sell ten kilograms of “fake” 
cocaine.  This, in the view of the defense, was insufficient to establish the 
defendant‟s intent to engage in felony trafficking.  The court denied the motion.  
At the end of trial, the jury found Hernandez guilty of two counts of first-degree 
felony murder without personal possession of a firearm. 
Subsequently, Hernandez appealed his conviction to the Third District Court 
of Appeal, renewing his argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish 
                                          
 
 
1.  Morales reported several conflicting statements that Hernandez had also 
allegedly made about the crime.  Initially, when Hernandez learned that Valle was 
accusing him, Hernandez indicated that it was Valle who had committed the 
murders.  In another account, Hernandez told Morales that he had been paid 
$300,000 by a group called Casa Romero for a contract killing on Collazo and 
Aleman. 
 
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the predicate offense of trafficking or attempted trafficking in cocaine.  See 
Hernandez, 994 So. 2d at 489.2  The court reviewed the evidence of drug quantity 
presented at trial.  The Third District first noted that Hernandez had placed the 
price of the cocaine at $30,000 in his pretrial statement and that Collazo had 
arrived with a box two or three feet in size.  With regard to the box, the court 
stated:  “The jurors could fairly conclude that a box would not be used to transport 
slightly less than an ounce of cocaine.”  Id. at 490.3  Second, the district court 
noted that Rodriguez had described a box containing what she determined to be 
fake cocaine.  The district court explained that regardless of whether the cocaine 
was real or fake, “the jury could have concluded that Hernandez thought it was the 
$30,000 worth of cocaine brought to him by Collazo.”  Id. 
Third, the district court reasoned that the jury could have concluded that a 
transaction for $30,000 would have involved an ounce or more of cocaine.  The 
court explained: 
                                          
 
 
2.  Hernandez also argued that the jailhouse statements to Morales should 
have been suppressed by the trial court.  See Hernandez, 994 So. 2d at 489-90.  
However, this claim was rejected by the Third District and Hernandez has not 
renewed the argument here. 
 
3.  The trafficking statute requires slightly less than one ounce of cocaine 
(28 grams) to support a conviction.  See § 893.135(1)(b).  When converted into 
metric units, one ounce equals 28.35 grams.  See Merriam-Webster‟s Collegiate 
Dictionary 1341 (10th ed. 1999). 
 
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Trial judges at the criminal court, prosecutors, defense lawyers—and 
probably even many jurors—know from other cases and news 
accounts that the price of an ounce of cocaine was (in 2002) and is far 
less than $30,000.  The “price for quantity” data, though best known 
by criminals, is also publicized by law enforcement as one metric 
regarding the efforts to cut the supply chain.  The State could have 
established street values rather easily.  The State‟s evidence, however, 
included other facts sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the 
quantity was 28 grams or more. 
 
Id. at 490 n.4.   
 
Finally, the Third District noted that Hernandez had told Morales that he 
intended to sell 10,000 grams of cocaine for a price of $220,000 to $230,000.  The 
court determined that this evidence “also support[ed] a conclusion that Hernandez 
was engaged in attempted trafficking.”  Id. at 490 (citing Brown v. State, 959 So. 
2d 146, 150 (Fla. 2007)).  The Third District concluded:  “For his part, Hernandez 
has not shown a reasonable doubt that the transactions described by the witnesses 
were for less than 28 grams.”  Id. (citing Madruga v. State, 434 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1983)).  Accordingly, the district court affirmed Hernandez‟s convictions for 
first-degree felony murder.  Id.  We granted review on September 11, 2009, based 
on conflict with Williams, 592 So. 2d at 737, dispensing with oral argument 
pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.320.  See Hernandez v. State, 15 
So. 3d 580 (Fla. 2009). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
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On appeal, we review Hernandez‟s contention that there was insufficient 
evidence to affirm his convictions for felony murder where neither underlying 
felony offense—trafficking or attempted trafficking in cocaine—was supported by 
evidence of a specific drug quantity.  In Williams, the First District overturned the 
conviction of a similarly charged defendant where the only evidence of attempted 
trafficking was the defendant‟s statement agreeing to participate in a “big deal.”  
See 592 So. 2d at 739.  The First District found that, although other testimony 
“indicate[d] that appellant‟s co-defendant was told the buyer wished to purchase an 
ounce or more of cocaine, no specific amounts were discussed on the two 
occasions when appellant was present, nor did appellant agree to furnish a specific 
amount of cocaine.”  Id.  We find that because here, as in Williams, no evidence of 
a specific amount of cocaine was presented to the jury, Hernandez‟s convictions 
for first-degree felony murder based on trafficking or attempted trafficking must be 
reversed. 
When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence presented to a trier of fact, our 
task is not to retry the case or reweigh the evidence.  “Rather, the concern on 
appeal must be whether, after all conflicts in the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom have been resolved in favor of the verdict on appeal, there is 
substantial, competent evidence to support the [decision].”  Brown, 959 So. 2d at 
149 (alteration in original) (quoting Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 
 
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1981)).4  Questions relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of 
witnesses are reserved exclusively to the trial court.  See Brown, 959 So. 2d at 150; 
see also Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001) (“We recognize and honor 
the trial court‟s superior vantage point in assessing the credibility of witnesses and 
in making findings of fact.”). 
Under Florida law, a person commits the first-degree felony of trafficking in 
cocaine when that person knowingly sells, purchases, manufactures, delivers, 
brings into this state, or actually or constructively possesses 28 grams or more of 
cocaine or any mixture containing cocaine.  See § 893.135(1)(b)1.a., Fla. Stat. 
(2002).  The State bears the burden of proving the following elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt: (a) the accused knowingly sold, purchased, manufactured, 
brought into the state, or actively or constructively possessed a certain substance; 
(b) the substance was cocaine; and (c) the quantity of the substance was 28 grams 
or more.  See Snell v. State, 939 So. 2d 1175, 1179, 1179 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2006).5  A person commits the crime of attempted trafficking when that person (a) 
                                          
 
 
4.  In finding that Hernandez failed to show a “reasonable doubt” that the 
transaction was for less than 28 grams, Hernandez, 994 So. 2d at 490, the district 
court did not apply the correct standard of review.  The issue is not whether 
Hernandez can demonstrate a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, but whether 
competent, substantial evidence was presented at trial in support of the jury‟s 
verdict. 
 
5.  Previously, the State was also required to prove that an accused had 
knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance—i.e., knowledge that the substance 
 
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intends to commit each element of the actual offense, and (b) commits an overt act 
toward the completion of the offense.  See Brooks v. State, 762 So. 2d 879, 897 
(Fla. 2000) (citing § 777.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1995)). 
Initially, we note that because Hernandez was charged with attempted 
trafficking as well as actual trafficking, “[t]he State was not required to prove that 
the substance involved was actually cocaine or a mixture thereof.”  Id.  When a 
                                                                                                                                        
was in fact cocaine—as an additional element of the offense of trafficking in 
cocaine.  See State v. Dominguez, 509 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1987).  In 2002, the 
Legislature enacted section 893.101, Florida Statutes, eliminating knowledge of a 
controlled substance‟s illicit nature as an element of any offense under chapter 893.  
Instead, the lack of such knowledge may be raised as an affirmative defense.  See § 
893.101(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). 
 
We observe that although several provisions of the Florida Standard Jury 
Instructions were amended to conform to section 893.101, the instruction on the 
offense of trafficking in cocaine was left unchanged.  See In re Standard Jury 
Instructions in Criminal Cases (No. 2005-3), 969 So. 2d 245, 262-63 (Fla. 2007).  
Indeed, in this case the jury was instructed that trafficking in cocaine was a four-
element offense, even though Hernandez committed his crime after May 13, 2002, 
the date the new statute became effective.  See ch. 2002-258, § 2 Laws of Fla.  
There appears to be some confusion among the district courts as to whether 
knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance remains an element of trafficking in 
cocaine.  Compare Leigh v. State, 967 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) 
(listing “the defendant knew the substance was cocaine” as an element of 
trafficking, when the appellant‟s offense occurred after the enactment of section 
893.101), with Barrientos v. State, 1 So. 3d 1209, 1216-17 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) 
(upholding the trial court‟s decision to remove knowledge of the illicit nature of 
the substance from an instruction on trafficking in cocaine, and noting that, “for 
offenses occurring after section 893.101 became effective, the standard jury 
instruction is inaccurate”).  We direct the Supreme Court Committee on Standard 
Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases to consider whether the instruction on this 
offense must be altered in light of section 893.101. 
 
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defendant has been charged with attempted trafficking, there is no need to prove 
that the defendant in fact bought or sold 28 grams or more of cocaine, or even that 
actual cocaine existed.  Instead, it is sufficient that the defendant intended to be a 
party to a transaction involving at least 28 grams of cocaine, and committed an 
overt act toward the completion of that offense.  See id. 
In Kocol v. State, 546 So. 2d 1159, 1159-60 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), for 
example, the defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine after selling to 
another party what the defendant claimed was a full ounce of cocaine.  In fact, the 
amount delivered was determined by police to be only 27.58 grams of cocaine, just 
short of the 28 grams required to convict for actual trafficking.  See id. at 1160.  
Regardless, it was held that the deficiency did not defeat the defendant‟s 
conviction for conspiracy to traffic.6  Instead, where there was evidence that the 
defendant had explicitly agreed to deliver an ounce of cocaine, the district court 
found competent, substantial evidence of his intent to sell a trafficking quantity.  
See id.  Similarly, in Spera v. State, 656 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), the 
Second District upheld a conviction for conspiracy to traffic, despite the 
defendant‟s delivery of only 26.8 grams of cocaine, where the evidence established 
                                          
 
 
6.  As we noted in Brooks, “[t]he fact that Kocol involved conspiracy, rather 
than attempt, does not render that case inapplicable here.”  Brooks, 762 So. 2d at 
897 n.23.  Brooks, Kokol, and the present case all concern the same issue, namely, 
a defendant‟s intent to traffic in cocaine. 
 
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that the defendant had previously agreed with his coconspirators to deliver a full 
ounce. 
Even the existence of actual cocaine is not necessary to convict a defendant 
for conspiracy or attempt to traffic.  More recently, in Campbell v. State, 935 So. 
2d 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), the Third District upheld a conviction for attempted 
trafficking despite the absence of any actual cocaine.  There, the defendant had 
agreed to participate in a plot to steal cocaine from the boss of a disgruntled drug 
courier.  In actuality, the courier was an undercover police officer and the plot was 
a sting operation orchestrated by the Miami-Dade Police Department.  See id. at 
615-16.  Even though the cocaine, too, was fictional, the defendant‟s attempted 
trafficking conviction was upheld where he agreed to participate in the drug 
transaction and committed an overt act toward that objective.  See id. at 617. 
In this case, Hernandez admitted in his pretrial statement that he had agreed 
to act as a middleman in a transaction involving cocaine.  According to his 
statement, Hernandez placed George Collazo, the seller, in touch with Ricky Valle, 
the purchaser.  He exchanged multiple phone calls with both parties in order to 
facilitate the transaction on the morning the sale was to occur.  He admitted Valle, 
Collazo and Aleman into his residence for the purpose of conducting the 
transaction.  We find that this testimony clearly provides competent, substantial 
evidence that the defendant intended to commit an offense involving the sale and 
 
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purchase of cocaine.  See Brooks, 762 So. 2d at 897.  Hernandez‟s statement 
indicates that he intended to facilitate the sale and purchase of a certain substance, 
and that he intended the substance to be cocaine.  He also described numerous 
overt acts toward the completion of that objective.  See id.  Thus, this admission 
provides competent, substantial evidence that Hernandez attempted to commit the 
first two elements of the crime of trafficking in cocaine.  See Snell, 939 So. 2d at 
1179, 1179 n.1 (setting out the three elements of trafficking in cocaine for offenses 
occurring after the enactment of section 893.101). 
As to the remaining element of the offense, the questions that must be 
resolved are whether sufficient evidence was presented to prove the intended 
weight of the drug and whether the weight proven was a trafficking amount.  In 
upholding the petitioner‟s conviction, the district court cited the following 
evidence in finding that Hernandez believed the transaction would involve at least 
28 grams of cocaine:  First, Hernandez expressed his belief that the cocaine would 
be sold for $30,000.  Second, Hernandez stated that Collazo arrived with a box two 
to three feet in height.  Third, Hernandez later asked his girlfriend to remove a 
package containing a white powder from the townhome.  Fourth, a jailhouse 
informant testified that Hernandez intended to sell Collazo ten kilograms of false 
cocaine for $220,000 to $230,000.  See Hernandez, 994 So. 2d at 490.  On review, 
we find that these items of evidence, alone or in combination, were insufficient to 
 
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prove the defendant‟s intent to buy, sell, manufacture, deliver, bring into the state, 
or possess at least 28 grams of cocaine. 
Regarding the jailhouse informant‟s testimony, we find that this statement 
does not provide competent, substantial evidence in support of the intended weight 
of the drug.  While it is not necessary to prove the existence of actual cocaine in 
order to establish a defendant‟s intent to engage in drug trafficking, see, e.g., 
Campbell, 935 So. 2d at 617, the State must still submit evidence showing that the 
defendant intended to traffic in actual cocaine.  In the version of the events related 
by the jailhouse informant, Hernandez stated only that he intended to sell ten 
kilograms of false cocaine to Collazo for $220,000 to $230,000.  This testimony 
might have provided competent, substantial evidence that Hernandez intended to 
engage in the sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, had that offense been 
charged.  See § 817.563, Fla. Stat. (2002) (making it “unlawful for any person to 
agree, consent, or in any manner offer to unlawfully sell to any person a controlled 
substance . . . and then to sell to such person any other substance in lieu of such 
controlled substance”); see also Carruthers v. State, 636 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1994) (discussing the offense of attempted sale of a counterfeit controlled 
substance).  Where an accused‟s only assertion, however, is that he or she intended 
to sell a substance that was not the controlled substance whose possession, sale, or 
 
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purchase is prohibited by statute, that statement alone provides no evidence of the 
suspect‟s intent to engage in the trafficking of the actual substance.7 
 
Similarly, we reject the district court‟s conclusion that attempted trafficking 
was supported by Vicky Rodriguez‟s account of finding a box of false cocaine in 
her home.  Again, Rodriguez testified only that the substance was false cocaine, 
and she did not give any statement regarding its quantity.  Like Rodriguez, 
Hernandez stated only that the substance was false cocaine.  In the absence of any 
evidence that the contents of the box included 28 grams or more of cocaine or that 
the substance inside was actual cocaine, rather than counterfeit cocaine, we find 
this evidence insufficient to support the charge that Hernandez was guilty of 
trafficking or attempting to traffic in at least 28 grams of cocaine. 
As to Hernandez‟s specific statement that the box carried by Collazo was 
two or three feet in height, this evidence likewise fails to support the element of 
quantity where there was no evidence indicating that the box in fact contained 
cocaine.  While it is possible to infer, as the district court concluded, that 
Hernandez believed the box contained the $30,000 worth of cocaine Collazo was 
expected to bring to the transaction, see Hernandez, 994 So. 2d at 490, Hernandez 
                                          
 
 
7.  Additionally, although in the informant‟s account Hernandez himself was 
the one who shot the victims, the jury necessarily rejected this testimony by 
finding Hernandez guilty of first-degree felony murder without personal possession 
of a firearm. 
 
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did not make any statement indicating that he believed this to be true.  Further, 
there was no discussion of the quantity of cocaine that might have been contained 
in the box.  In the absence of such testimony, the box alone provides no evidence 
of Hernandez‟s intent to buy or sell a specific quantity of cocaine of at least 28 
grams. 
 
 The remaining item of evidence was Hernandez‟s statement that he believed 
the cocaine would be sold for the price of $30,000.  We find this evidence 
comparable to that reviewed in our decision in Brooks, 762 So. 2d at 879.  In that 
case, the only evidence supporting the defendant‟s intent to engage in a transaction 
involving at least 28 grams of cocaine was his statement agreeing to purchase 
thirty “jugglers” of crack cocaine.  See id. at 898.  Alone, this evidence would not 
have been sufficient to support the conviction, since it is doubtful, to say the least, 
that the specific meaning of the term “juggler,” as it is used in a drug transaction, 
was within the common knowledge of the jury pool.  However, we found sufficient 
evidence of the defendant‟s intent where another witness, an experienced drug 
dealer, testified that “juggler” was a common term for a one-gram rock of crack 
cocaine.  See id.  Based on this testimony, we found that “this evidence was 
sufficient to establish that Brooks intended to obtain a specific amount of crack 
cocaine—28 or more grams—that was above the requisite amount to prove 
trafficking.”  Id. 
 
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Just as “juggler” was used as a proxy for drug quantity in Brooks, we are 
asked in this case to apply the dollar value of the cocaine as a proxy for quantity in 
the transaction between Collazo, Aleman, and Valle.  Price may clearly be used as 
evidence of drug quantity (or intended drug quantity) under certain circumstances.  
As the New York Court of Appeals has noted:  “Where there is evidence of the 
price paid for a quantity of drugs, then there is evidence [a] defendant knew its 
weight, since value is based on weight.”  People v. Sanchez, 652 N.E.2d 925, 929 
(N.Y. 1995).  Similarly, under federal law, courts are permitted to take the general 
price of a drug into account when estimating the quantity of drugs involved in an 
illicit enterprise or conspiracy.  The application notes to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines provide:  
Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect 
the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the quantity of the 
controlled substance.  In making this determination, the court may 
consider, for example, the price generally obtained for the controlled 
substance, financial or other records, similar transactions in controlled 
substances by the defendant, and the size or capability of any 
laboratory involved. 
 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 cmt. n.12 (2010) (emphasis added). 
In United States v. Paulino, 996 F.2d 1541, 1546 (3d Cir. 1993), for 
example, the defendants were charged with conspiring to distribute over five 
kilograms of cocaine over a period of thirty months.  Examining the evidence 
relied on by the trial court in calculating the defendants‟ sentences under the 
 
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Sentencing Guidelines, the federal appellate court explained that “[t]he most 
specific evidence of volume” presented by the government was a statement by one 
of the defendants‟ employees that the defendants‟ drug business had grossed 
$12,000 in a single night.  Id.  Following the presentation of this evidence, the 
government called an agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency to testify that 
cocaine sold at a price of $1,000 per ounce during the period of the conspiracy.  Id.  
The appellate court determined that this testimony constituted “quantifiable trial 
evidence” on which the sentencing judge was permitted to estimate the amount of 
cocaine involved in the conspiracy.  Id. at 1548. 
In the present case, however, there was no evidence on which the jury could 
have reasonably connected the price of $30,000 to a specific quantity of at least 28 
grams.  As the district court noted, the State could have submitted evidence that 
$30,000 was greater than the value of one ounce of cocaine.  See Hernandez, 994 
So. 2d at 490 n.4.  However, no such evidence was presented at trial.  And 
although it may be true that “[t]rial judges at the criminal court, prosecutors, 
defense lawyers—and probably even many jurors—know . . . that the price of an 
ounce of cocaine was (in 2002) and is far less than $30,000,” id., we do not believe 
the price of cocaine is sufficiently known to the public at large that a jury can be 
left to infer on its own that a dollar value alone proves that a trafficking quantity of 
cocaine was involved in a particular transaction. 
 
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As in Williams, where the First District found the defendant‟s statement 
agreeing to participate in a “big deal” insufficient to establish his intent to purchase 
a trafficking quantity of cocaine, see 592 So. 2d at 739, there was no evidence in 
this case from which the jury could reasonably infer that Hernandez intended to 
participate in a transaction involving at least 28 grams of cocaine.  Accordingly, 
we find that the State failed to establish each element of trafficking or attempted 
trafficking, and conclude that Hernandez‟s convictions for felony murder in the 
first-degree must be reversed. 
REMEDY 
Having concluded that Hernandez‟s convictions must be vacated, we 
consider the remedy to be applied.  Under section 924.34, Florida Statutes (2010): 
When the appellate court determines that the evidence does not prove 
the offense for which the defendant was found guilty but does 
establish guilt of a lesser statutory degree of the offense or a lesser 
offense necessarily included in the offense charged, the appellate 
court shall reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter 
judgment for the lesser degree of the offense or for the lesser included 
offense. 
 
In I.T. v. State, 694 So. 2d 720, 724 (Fla. 1997), we interpreted section 924.34 to 
allow an appellate court to modify the trial court‟s verdict and to enter a judgment 
either for a necessarily lesser included offense or for a permissive lesser included 
offense where supported by the allegations in the charging document and the proof 
 
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at trial.8  See also State v. Sigler, 967 So. 2d 835, 842 (Fla. 2007) (explaining that 
in order for an appellate court to direct a verdict for a lesser included offense, the 
jury must have found every element of that lesser offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt). 
In this case, the allegations in the charging document and the proof at trial 
support the entry of a judgment for third-degree felony murder as a permissive 
lesser included offense of first-degree felony murder.9  Hernandez was charged 
with first-degree felony murder pursuant to section 782.04(1), Florida Statutes 
(2002), with the underlying felony of trafficking or attempted trafficking in 28 or 
                                          
 
 
8.  The distinction between necessarily and permissive lesser included 
offenses was explained by this Court in Sanders v. State, 944 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 
2006): 
 
Necessarily lesser included offenses are those offenses in which the 
statutory elements of the lesser included offense are always subsumed 
within those of the charged offense.  State v. Paul, 934 So. 2d 1167, 
1176 (Fla. 2006).  A permissive lesser included offense exists when 
“the two offenses appear to be separate [on the face of the statutes], 
but the facts alleged in the accusatory pleadings are such that the 
lesser [included] offense cannot help but be perpetrated once the 
greater offense has been.”  State v. Weller, 590 So. 2d 923, 925 n.2 
(Fla. 1991). 
 
Id. at 206 (alterations in original). 
 
 
9.  The jury was in fact instructed on third-degree felony murder as a lesser 
included offense.  The trial court‟s instruction stated that the jury should find 
Hernandez guilty of third-degree felony murder if it determined that he was 
engaged in the commission of or attempt to commit the offense of possession with 
the intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver less than 28 grams of cocaine. 
 
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more grams of cocaine as prohibited by section 893.135(1).  Section 782.04(1) 
defines first-degree murder as any unlawful killing committed by a person engaged 
in any felony listed in that section, including any trafficking offense under section 
893.135(1).  See § 782.04(1)(a)2.a., Fla. Stat. (2002).  Under section 782.04(4), 
however, an unlawful killing committed by a person engaged in any felony not 
listed in section 782.04(1) is felony murder in the third degree.  See § 782.04(4), 
Fla. Stat. (2002). 
Even without evidence that Hernandez intended to engage in a transaction 
involving at least 28 grams of cocaine, then, the jury verdict supports a finding that 
Hernandez committed a qualifying felony under section 782.04(4).  Under section 
893.13(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2002), possession with the intent to sell, 
manufacture, or deliver a schedule II controlled substance, regardless of weight, is 
a felony of the second degree.  See § 893.03(2)(a)4., Fla. Stat. (2002) (classifying 
cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance).  Further, an attempt to commit a 
second-degree felony is classified as a felony in the third degree.  See § 
777.04(4)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (2002).  In the present case, sufficient evidence was 
presented to prove that Hernandez attempted to engage in a transaction involving 
an unspecified quantity of cocaine.  See Ross v. State, 528 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1988) (reducing a conviction for trafficking in cocaine to mere possession 
where the evidence was insufficient to establish the defendant‟s possession of at 
 
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least 28 grams of cocaine).  Accordingly, because Hernandez was charged and 
convicted in a manner encompassing each element of third-degree felony murder, 
this Court may direct a verdict for the lesser included offense pursuant to section 
924.34.  See Sigler, 967 So. 2d at 842. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons expressed above, we quash the decision below affirming 
Hernandez‟s convictions for first-degree felony murder and remand to the district 
court with instructions to vacate the convictions and direct the entry of judgments 
for third-degree felony murder. 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
CANADY, C.J., dissenting. 
 
I would discharge jurisdiction because there is no basis for this Court to 
exercise conflict jurisdiction.  The majority errs in concluding that there is express 
and direct conflict between the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal on 
review and the First District Court of Appeal‟s decision in Williams v. State, 592 
So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). 
 
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In Williams, the First District concluded that the defendant‟s agreement “to 
participate in „a big deal‟” was not sufficient to establish that he “contemplated a 
transaction involving an ounce or more of cocaine.”  592 So. 2d at 739.  Here, the 
evidence concerning the amount of the drugs to be involved in the transaction 
contemplated by Hernandez was based on his statement that the transaction was to 
be for $30,000 and that the sellers “arrived with a box two or three feet in size.”  
Hernandez v. State, 994 So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). 
 
The nature of the evidence at issue in the case on review thus is entirely 
distinct from the type of evidence in Williams.  There is no express and direct 
conflict. 
POLSTON, J., concurs. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D07-715 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant Public 
Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard L. Polin, Bureau 
Chief, and Timothy R.M. Thomas, Assistant Attorneys General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
 
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