Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Bowman

Citation: 2006-Ohio-4333

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Bowman, 110 Ohio St.3d 480, 2006-Ohio-4333.] 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BOWMAN. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Bowman, 110 Ohio St.3d 480, 2006-Ohio-
4333.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Mental-health disability — Two-year suspension. 
(No. 2006-0444 – Submitted May 23, 2006 – Decided August 23, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 05-063. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} We must decide in this case how to appropriately sanction 
respondent, Kevin Arthur Bowman of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 
0068223, admitted to the Ohio bar in 1997, who stipulated that he had violated 
several Disciplinary Rules while representing clients in three cases.  The Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended a sanction of 
suspension from the practice of law for two years, with one year stayed on 
conditions, and a term of probation.  We hold this sanction to be inadequate. 
{¶ 2} In June 2005, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint 
charging respondent with professional misconduct in three counts. The complaint 
alleges that respondent committed misconduct when he was employed as a senior 
associate with the Dayton, Ohio, law firm of Sebaly, Shillito & Dyer (“SS&D”). 
{¶ 3} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline heard the cause and made findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a 
recommendation, which the board adopted. 
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Misconduct 
Count I (Jones Representation) 
{¶ 4} Daniel and Leslie Jones retained respondent to defend them in a 
lawsuit filed by Peoples Community Bank.  The bank had filed a $2.8 million 
cognovit judgment against the Joneses, and the Joneses paid respondent a $5,000 
retainer to represent them.  After investigating the underlying facts of the case, 
respondent concluded that the case was not winnable.  Nevertheless, respondent 
filed an action against the bank to set aside the cognovit judgment, and the bank 
offered a settlement that respondent concluded was reasonable. 
{¶ 5} The Joneses rejected the offer, but respondent forged the signature 
of the Joneses and their former attorney, Timothy R. Evans, on the settlement 
agreement.  Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice and 
provided a copy of the motion and the forged settlement agreement to the Joneses. 
{¶ 6} The Joneses contacted SS&D through their new attorney and 
requested the return of their retainer.  When SS&D confronted respondent about 
the incident, he claimed that the Joneses were lying.  SS&D suspended 
respondent, at which time he admitted to SS&D that he had signed the settlement 
agreement without the authorization of Evans, but asserted that he had the 
Joneses’ permission to sign their names.  When questioned by police, however, 
respondent admitted that he had forged all the signatures. 
{¶ 7} The board found that respondent had violated  DR 1-102(A)(4) 
(barring an attorney from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation); 1-102(A)(5) (barring conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice); 1-102(A)(6) (barring conduct that adversely reflects 
upon an attorney’s fitness to practice law); 7-101(A)(1) (barring an attorney from 
intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of a client); 7-101(A)(2) 
(barring an attorney from failing to fulfill a contract of employment); 7-102(A)(3) 
(barring an attorney from concealing or knowingly failing to disclose that which 
January Term, 2006 
3 
he is required by law to reveal); 7-102(A)(5) (barring an attorney from knowingly 
making a false statement of law or fact); and 7-102(A)(8) (barring an attorney 
from knowingly engaging in illegal conduct or conduct that violates a 
Disciplinary Rule). 
Count II 
Miami University Representation 
{¶ 8} In June 2002, respondent filed a complaint in federal court against 
DuBois Book Store, Inc., on behalf of Miami University, alleging a violation of 
Miami’s intellectual-property rights.  In October 2002, DuBois Book Store 
offered to agree to an injunction and offered to pay a portion of Miami 
University’s legal fees.  Respondent failed to timely respond to DuBois Book 
Store’s offer, and the bookstore withdrew its offer to pay attorney fees.  Although 
respondent informed Miami University of the initial settlement offer at the time, 
he never advised SS&D or Miami University that the bookstore had withdrawn its 
offer to pay the attorney fees. 
{¶ 9} Respondent faxed the bookstore’s counsel a draft settlement 
agreement that had been agreed to by Miami University and the Attorney General.  
The agreement provided that the bookstore pay Miami University $5,000 in 
damages and reimburse Miami University’s legal fees up to $7,500.  The 
bookstore presented a counteroffer, but respondent failed to convey it to Miami 
University. 
{¶ 10} Later, respondent faxed the bookstore’s counsel a letter accepting 
its counteroffer, which did not include any payment of damages or attorney fees 
to Miami University.  He also lied in telling opposing counsel that Miami 
University had agreed to the bookstore’s settlement offer.  DuBois Book Store 
submitted an executed settlement agreement to respondent, but he never informed 
Miami University of the settlement terms. 
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{¶ 11} The case was dismissed with prejudice.  Respondent later lied to 
Miami University’s General Counsel, Robin Parker, and also to his co-counsel 
about the terms of the settlement.  He falsely informed Parker that DuBois Book 
Store had accepted the agreement proposed by Miami University.  Respondent 
faxed a document to Parker that appeared to have been signed by a DuBois Book 
Store representative, as well as a document purporting to be a dismissal order.  
Respondent had cut the signature from the agreement actually signed by the 
bookstore representative but never provided to Miami University, pasted it to a 
separate document, and made a clean copy of the signature page that he then sent 
to Miami University. 
{¶ 12} Respondent forwarded Parker a copy of the agreement, along with 
a cover letter asking Parker to have the agreement executed by Miami University 
and returned.  Along with the agreement, respondent provided a $5,000 cashier’s 
check, which he identified as the first payment to Miami University from the 
bookstore, but which was actually the retainer from the Joneses.  An authorized 
Miami University representative executed the document, and Parker returned it to 
respondent, who never filed the purported agreement with the federal court. 
{¶ 13} When questioned about the $7,500 balance owed, respondent 
drafted a letter dated September 21, 2003, to Parker purporting to send a $7,500 
cashier’s check.  Respondent placed the letter and photocopy of a fictitious $7,500 
cashier’s check in the case file, but he never sent the letter to Parker.  In doing so, 
he stalled for time to obtain the $7,500 that Miami University was expecting.  
Later, respondent paid Miami University $7,500 out of his own personal funds.  
When Miami University later discovered what had occurred, it filed a motion for 
relief from judgment, and the federal court vacated its previous dismissal order 
and issued a permanent injunction against DuBois Book Store. 
{¶ 14} The board found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-
102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 7-101(A)(1), 7-102(A)(3), 7-102(A)(5), and 7-102(A)(8). 
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Count III 
Doyle Representation 
{¶ 15} In state court, respondent represented Robert Doyle in a lawsuit 
against Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company involving an alleged breach of an 
insurance contract.  Respondent voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit and later refiled 
it in federal court.  Respondent never supplied the initial disclosures required 
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a) requested by counsel for Mutual of Omaha. 
{¶ 16} Counsel for Mutual of Omaha filed a motion to compel discovery 
and to disqualify Doyle’s expert witnesses because respondent had disclosed the 
expert’s names over a month late.  Counsel also filed a motion for sanctions.  
Respondent failed to respond, and later, without the approval of Doyle, he moved 
to dismiss the lawsuit, and the case was dismissed with prejudice.  Respondent 
lied to his firm about the status of the case, and he was later fired as a result of the 
three incidents alleged in Counts I, II, and III. 
{¶ 17} The board found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-
102(A)(5), 1-102(A)(6), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), and 7-101(A)(2). 
Sanction 
{¶ 18} The panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the 
practice of law for two years, with one year stayed on the condition that 
respondent complete his current contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance 
Program (“OLAP”) and remain on probation for an additional two years, during 
which time he would remain in mental-health treatment and under a contract with 
OLAP similar to his current one.  Moreover, the panel recommended that 
respondent provide to Disciplinary Counsel a letter from his qualified treating 
psychologist at the conclusion of the second year of his suspension.  The letter 
was to verify respondent’s adherence to the treatment plan and to indicate whether 
respondent is able to return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of 
law under specified conditions.  On March 2, 2006, the board certified its findings 
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of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations, adopting the panel’s findings 
and recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two 
years with one year stayed upon conditions, followed by two years of probation. 
{¶ 19} Relator objects to the recommended sanction, contending that 
given the severity of respondent’s misconduct, the case warrants, at a minimum, 
an indefinite suspension from the practice of law. 
{¶ 20} Because the parties stipulated to the disciplinary violations, the 
sole issue before the court today is the sanction.  The appropriate sanction in a 
case of professional misconduct depends on “the duties violated, the actual injury 
caused, the attorney's mental state, the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances, and sanctions imposed in similar cases.”  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. King, 103 Ohio St.3d 438, 2004-Ohio-5470, 816 N.E.2d 
1040, ¶ 21; Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 106 Ohio St.3d 418, 2005-Ohio-
5411, 835 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 34. 
Injury to Clients 
{¶ 21} The panel declined to find that respondent “intentionally * * * 
[p]rejudice[d] or damage[d] his client during the course of the professional 
relationship” and thus declined to find any violation of DR 7-101(A)(3).  The 
panel concluded that relator did not provide clear and convincing evidence that 
any of the clients suffered actual prejudice or damage.  We disagree.  Respondent 
intentionally damaged his clients by lying, forging their signatures, neglecting 
their legal matters, dismissing their cases, and fostering the retraction of an offer 
to pay a client’s attorney fees.  In all three counts, respondent treated clients, 
counsel, and his own colleagues with deceit and dishonesty.  He also violated his 
duty to the legal system, the profession, and the community. 
January Term, 2006 
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Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances 
{¶ 22} In determining the sanction for respondent’s misconduct, we must 
review the aggravating and mitigating features of respondent's case.  See Section 
10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
{¶ 23} We adopt the board's findings in aggravation that respondent 
committed his misconduct with a dishonest or selfish motive, BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(b),  although his conduct was tempered by his diagnosed depression.  
Further, we adopt the board’s findings that respondent engaged in a pattern of 
misconduct, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c), and committed multiple offenses, 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d). 
{¶ 24} Regarding mitigation, we adopt the board’s findings that 
respondent has no prior record of professional discipline, BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a), made a timely, good-faith effort to make restitution and rectify the 
consequences of his misconduct, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(c), made a full and 
free disclosure to the board and had a cooperative attitude, BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(d), had a diagnosis of a mental disability pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g), and showed genuine remorse and sorrow. 
Respondent’s Mental State 
{¶ 25} To have significant mitigating effect under BCGD Proc.Reg. 
(10)(B)(2)(g), a mental disability must be supported by all of the following: (1) a 
diagnosis of a mental disability by a qualified health-care professional, (2) a 
determination that the mental disability contributed to the misconduct, (3) a 
sustained period of successful treatment, and (4) a prognosis from a qualified 
health-care professional that the attorney will be able to return, under specified 
conditions if necessary, to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of 
law. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv). 
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{¶ 26} Stephanie Krznarich, a licensed independent social worker and 
certified chemical dependency counselor, testified at respondent’s hearing.  
Krznarich is the Associate Director and Clinical Director of OLAP.  She first met 
respondent in November 2004, when she conducted a chemical-dependency and 
mental-health assessment.  She diagnosed respondent with dysthymia, a low-level 
depression that lasts two or more years.  Respondent was experiencing anhedonia, 
a loss of pleasure in things once enjoyed, difficulty concentrating and focusing, 
and memory lapses.  In addition, respondent had a sense of hopelessness, 
difficulty falling asleep, difficulty staying asleep, and suicidal ideation.  
Respondent told her that the stressors in his life resulted from unresolved grief 
regarding the loss of a dear friend and colleague and the loss of his mother after a 
prolonged illness. 
{¶ 27} According to Krznarich, respondent suffered a skull fracture when 
he was hit by a car at age 17.  Krznarich testified that traumatic brain injury can 
lead to poor impulse control, depression, anxiety, paranoia, sexual preoccupation, 
and poor anger management. 
{¶ 28} Krznarich testified that respondent had signed a three-year OLAP 
mental-health contract.  His obligation was to call OLAP daily, seek 
psychological counseling, investigate occupational counseling, exercise three 
times per week, play a musical instrument for at least ten minutes a day, and not 
harm himself. 
{¶ 29} Krznarich testified that initially, respondent did well in contacting 
the OLAP office as required by his contract, but from January 1, 2005, until 
September 28, 2005, respondent did not make contact with OLAP.  However, he 
did continue his therapy during that time.  After September 2005, respondent’s 
contact improved, and Krznarich testified that at the time of the hearing, he was 
compliant with his contract. 
January Term, 2006 
9 
{¶ 30} Krznarich saw respondent again in October 2005 and testified at 
the December 2005 hearing that respondent was taking care of himself and was 
taking his medications and that his symptoms had improved.  Krznarich also 
testified that as long as respondent takes his medication and participates in 
counseling, he will have the tools to deal with daily life stressors.  Krznarich 
testified that she believed respondent’s symptoms contributed to his misconduct.  
Krznarich also testified that respondent had demonstrated guilt and shame 
regarding his misconduct and as recently as 48 hours before the hearing offered to 
resign his license to practice law. 
{¶ 31} Respondent also testified.  He said that in April 2002, a former 
associate at his firm who had been a mentor to him died at the age of 33.  
Respondent began to think about his own mortality, and this event triggered a 
period when respondent was “overworked and overstressed” and began to neglect 
cases. 
{¶ 32} In early 2003, respondent’s mother was diagnosed with cancer.  
Respondent was living in Dayton, and his mother was in Cincinnati, so 
respondent’s wife went to Cincinnati to take care of his mother five days a week.  
The situation created stress for his immediate family and finances.  Moreover, 
respondent felt guilty because he was too busy to visit his mother while she was 
ill.  Respondent testified that he began to lose his ability to concentrate.  In 
addition, respondent’s involvement in a trademark case that required frequent 
travel caused stress on his marriage. 
{¶ 33} Respondent submitted a letter written in December 2005 by Dr. 
Kimberly Tate, a clinical psychologist, who had diagnosed respondent with 
“major depression recurrent” and general anxiety disorder.  The letter stated her 
opinion, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that if respondent “continues to 
take his medications and work on the issues referenced in [her] previous letter, 
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Mr. Bowman is currently able to practice competent, ethical professional practice 
[sic] of law.” 
Sanctions in Similar Cases 
{¶ 34} We have held that when an attorney has engaged in a course of 
conduct that violates DR 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), the attorney will be 
actually suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 191, 658 N.E.2d 
237. 
{¶ 35} Relator notes that we have called the “fabrication of a judicial 
officer’s signature ‘abhorrent to our legal system.’ ” Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Insley, 104 Ohio St.3d 424, 2004-Ohio-6564, 819 N.E.2d 1109, ¶ 12, quoting 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hutchins, 102 Ohio St.3d 97, 2004-Ohio-1805, 807 
N.E.2d 303, ¶ 31.  In Insley, we issued an indefinite suspension.  Respondent in 
this case fabricated both a client’s signature and the signature of another attorney.  
We find the deception equally abhorrent to our legal system.  But we are 
permitted to “temper the sanction we impose for a lawyer’s dishonesty to a client 
and court upon proof that mental disability caused the misconduct, under some 
circumstances.”  Toledo Bar Assn. v. Lowden, 105 Ohio St.3d 377, 2005-Ohio-
2162, 826 N.E.2d 836, ¶19, citing BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g). 
{¶ 36} We find that respondent’s psychological mitigation justifies a 
lesser sanction than the indefinite suspension sought by relator.  Although not as 
significant as in Lowden, Krznarich testified that respondent’s depression 
contributed to his misconduct.  Moreover, respondent’s willingness to commence 
treatment and his present ability to practice law, as noted by both Krznarich and 
the psychologist, are persuasive.  However, we note that much of respondent’s 
conduct involves active lying and deceit, rather than the neglect of client matters 
that is more common in cases involving depression.  Moreover, we note that 
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respondent allowed a nine-month period to pass in 2005 without contacting the 
OLAP office daily, contrary to his agreement with OLAP. 
{¶ 37} In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Stidham (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 455, 721 
N.E.2d 977, Stidham failed to deposit client funds in an identifiable bank account, 
failed to maintain records of funds and render an appropriate accounting, failed to 
promptly pay funds that the client was entitled to receive, and otherwise neglected 
entrusted legal matters.  Due to Stidham’s depression, we imposed a two-year 
suspension with one year stayed on conditions.  We find Bowman’s misconduct 
more extreme than that demonstrated in Stidham. 
{¶ 38} Disciplinary Counsel v. Golden, 97 Ohio St.3d 230, 2002-Ohio-
5934, 778 N.E.2d 564, involved an attorney whose pattern of neglect of client 
matters and failure to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation resulted from her 
debilitating clinical depression.  Although we issued an indefinite suspension, we 
did so to protect the public because the attorney’s misconduct involved eight 
cases that spanned several years.  Id. at ¶ 23.  Respondent’s depression and 
depression-related issues contributed to his misconduct.  Respondent fully 
cooperated with the relator and the board and has been found by his treating 
psychologist to be currently able to practice law ethically and competently. 
{¶ 39} Respondent’s acknowledgement of his need for mental-health 
services and his seeking professional advice and using the services offered by 
OLAP are commendable.  While an indefinite suspension is not merited due to 
defendant’s mental-health disability, we hold that a two-year suspension is 
warranted in order to protect the public and to ensure that respondent is able to 
successfully manage his illness. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 40} Thus, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for 
two years.  To ensure that respondent successfully manages his condition, he is 
ordered to complete his current OLAP contract and to provide quarterly reports to 
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relator about his progress throughout his suspension period.  Prior to 
reinstatement, respondent shall supply to relator a letter from his qualified treating 
psychologist, indicating his adherence to the treatment plan and the 
recommendations of the psychologist and including a statement that respondent 
will be able to return to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law 
under specified conditions.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, 
JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Stacy Solochek 
Beckman, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Lane Alton & Horst, L.L.C., and Alvin E. Mathews Jr., for respondent. 
______________________