Case Title: Verrastro v. Bayhospitalists, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 233, 2018

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
NICOLE B. VERRASTRO, as  
§ 
Surviving Daughter of Bridget E. 
§  
Verrastro and Administratrix of the 
§ 
Estate of Bridget E. Verrastro, 
§ No. 233, 2018 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§   
 
Appellant, 
§ Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
§ of the State of Delaware 
 
v. 
 
§  
 
 
 
§ C.A. No. N14C-10-159 
BAYHOSPITALISTS, LLC, d/b/a 
§  
Bayhealth Hospitalists, LLC, 
§  
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
Submitted: January 16, 2019 
Decided: 
April 8, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, VAUGHN, SEITZ, and 
TRAYNOR, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
Ben T. Castle, Esquire (argued) and Bruce L. Hudson, Esquire, Hudson & Castle 
Law, LLC, Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellant Nicole B. Verrastro.  
 
Gregory S. McKee, Esquire and Lauren C. McConnell, Esquire (argued), Wharton 
Levin Ehrmantraut & Klein, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee 
Bayhospitalists, LLC. 
 
 
 
 
2 
TRAYNOR, Justice: 
 
Does the dismissal of a medical negligence claim against two physicians on 
statute-of-limitations grounds bar the prosecution of a timely filed claim based on 
the same underlying facts against the physicians’ employer under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior?  The Superior Court, relying on our decision in Greco v. 
University of Delaware,1 ruled from the bench that the dismissal of the physicians 
effectively extinguished the claims against the physicians’ employer and therefore 
entered summary judgment in the employer’s favor.2   
The Superior Court correctly read Greco, and under Greco’s teaching, the 
Superior Court’s dismissal was proper. In this en banc decision, however, we 
conclude that Greco should be overruled to the extent that it held that, if a plaintiff 
has failed to sue the employee whose malpractice allegedly injured her within the 
statute of limitations, she is for that reason alone barred from suing the employer 
under principles of respondeat superior. Because in this case the plaintiff sued the 
employer in a timely manner, settled principles of law authorize the plaintiff to 
proceed against that employer. Although the plaintiff must of course prove her claim 
against the employer, including that the employee was negligent, the fact that she 
                                         
1 619 A.2d 900 (Del. 1993). 
2 App. to Op. Br. A107 (“A__” hereafter). 
3 
failed to sue the employee in a timely manner does not act to immunize the employer. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
For the most part, the facts surrounding the medical negligence allegations are 
not germane to this appeal, but a brief summary of those facts follows. 
On August 12, 2012, Bridget Verrastro went to the emergency room at 
Milford Memorial Hospital complaining of breathing difficulties.3  She was 
discharged later that day with an antibiotic prescription and with instructions to 
schedule an appointment with a thoracic surgeon.4  Bridget’s breathing difficulties 
worsened, however, and the next day she went to the emergency room of Kent 
General Hospital, which is part of the same hospital system as Milford Memorial. 
At Kent General, Bridget was examined and treated by Dr. Rebekah Boenerjous and 
Dr. Tricia Downing (the “Doctors”), employees of Appellee Bayhospitalists, LLC, 
which operates under the name of Bayhealth Hospitalists, LLC (“Bayhealth”).  But 
despite the Doctors’ efforts, Bridget’s condition quickly worsened, and at 1:07 a.m. 
on August 14, 2012, Bridget was pronounced dead.5  Kent General performed an 
autopsy on Bridget, and the examining physicians found a large “mediastinal mass,” 
                                         
3 A393. 
4 A107–08; A104. 
5 A109–10. 
4 
i.e., a tumor, within Bridget’s chest.6  That tumor, while composed in part of benign 
substances, constricted Bridget’s breathing and blood flow and ultimately caused 
Bridget’s fatal heart failure.7 
In October 2014, Nicole Verrastro, Bridget’s daughter, acting as the personal 
representative of Bridget’s estate, filed a medical negligence action against several 
healthcare providers, including the Doctors and Bayhealth. Verrastro’s complaint 
alleged that the Doctors’ failure to diagnose and treat the tumor caused her mother’s 
suffering and death.  Verrastro did not file the action within the two-year statute of 
limitations period ordinarily applicable to medical negligence actions.  Instead, she 
attempted to toll the statute by sending Notices of Intent under 18 Del C. § 6856(4) 
to Bayhealth and the Doctors.8 
All three of the Notices were sent to Bayhealth’s address.  But unbeknownst 
to Verrastro, both of the Doctors had left the employ of Bayhealth, and the Notices 
to the Doctors went undelivered and were returned to Verrastro’s counsel as 
undeliverable.  Thus, Bayhealth received the Notice before the two-year statutory 
period had expired, but the Doctors did not.   
                                         
6 A111–12. 
7 A112. 
8 Under 18 Del. C. § 6856(4), “A plaintiff may toll the . . . statutes of limitations [for medical 
malpractice] for a period of time up to 90 days from the applicable limitations contained in this 
section by sending a Notice of Intent to investigate to each potential defendant or defendants by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, at the defendant’s or defendants’ regular place of 
business. . . . The 90 days shall run from the last day of the applicable statute of limitations 
contained in this section.” 
5 
Despite the failed delivery of the Doctors’ notices, when Verrastro filed her 
action on October 17, 2014—inarguably beyond the ordinary two-year statutory 
period but within the tolling 90-day period under 18 Del C. § 6856(4)—she named 
both Bayhealth and the Doctors as defendants.  Not surprisingly, the Doctors moved 
to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint was barred by the two-year statute of 
limitations.9  In September of 2015, the Superior Court granted the Doctors’ motion.  
After the Doctors were dismissed, the suit then proceeded to discovery, which failed 
to produce evidence supporting a direct, non-vicarious claim against Bayhealth.  
After discovery, Bayhealth moved for summary judgment on the grounds that, 
because all claims against the Doctors had been dismissed, the vicarious claims 
against Bayhealth based on the doctrine of respondeat superior were no longer 
viable.  The Superior Court, relying on our decision in Greco, granted Bayhealth’s 
motion.  This appeal followed. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review grants of summary judgment and questions of law de novo. 10 
III. ANALYSIS 
The essence of the Superior Court’s decision below and Bayhealth’s response 
to Verrastro’s contention on appeal—relying almost exclusively on Greco—is that, 
                                         
9 The Doctors also raised Verrastro’s failure to properly and timely serve the Doctors within 120 
days after the filing of the Complaint.  See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 4(j). 
10 Ramirez v. Murdick, 948 A.2d 395, 399 (Del. 2008); LeVan v. Indep. Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 
932 (Del. 2007). 
6 
in a suit against an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “a time bar 
against the individual [tortfeasor] employee accrues to the benefit of the 
employer.”11  For her part, Verrastro says that Bayhealth reads Greco too broadly 
and that settled respondeat superior law dictates a different result.  Because the 
application of Greco was case-dispositive below and further because a portion of 
Greco’s reasoning appears to be in tension with, if not contrary to, another precedent 
of this Court, Fields v. Synthetic Ropes, Inc.,12 we are compelled to re-examine 
Greco. 
A.  General respondeat superior principles 
Under the “well entrenched doctrine of agency law”13 known as respondeat 
superior,14 “[a]n employer is subject to liability for torts committed by employees 
while acting within the scope of their employment.”15  In Fields, Chief Justice 
Wolcott explained the doctrine’s rationale:   
The liability thus imposed upon the employer arises by reason of the 
imputation of the negligence of the employee to his employer through 
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior.  The foundation of 
                                         
11 Answering Br. 13. 
12 215 A.2d 427 (Del. 1965). 
13 Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, Inc., 115 A.3d 1187, 1209 (Del. 2015) (Vaughn, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Mark J. Loewenstein, Imputation, The Adverse Interest Exception, and The 
Curious Case of the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 305, 309–10 (2013)). 
14 “Respondeat superior” literally translated means “let the master answer.”  Respondeat Superior, 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 
781 (3d ed. 2011). 
15 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.04 (2005); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 
(1958). 
7 
the action against the employer is still negligence, even though 
liability for that negligence has been broadened to include the 
employer.  The imposition of liability on the employer thus arises, not 
because the employee is liable personally for his conduct, but because 
the employer selected an employee who performed the employer’s 
business negligently and caused an injury.  As such, the imputation of 
negligence rests squarely upon, and is justified by, the culpability of 
the employee, not upon the circumstance of whether or not the 
employee may, himself, be held liable for his act.16 
 
Under this explication of the rule, the employer’s liability hinges upon the 
employee’s culpability17—as distinguished from the employee’s liability.18  
Accordingly, in Fields, we held that an automobile driver’s employer could be held 
liable for the employee-driver’s negligence that resulted in injuries to the employee’s 
wife despite the fact that the employee was immune from suit under the doctrine of 
interspousal immunity.  Fields, it would seem, weighs heavily against the Superior 
Court’s entry of summary judgment for Bayhealth in this case.  But rather than 
applying Fields’ rationale, the Superior Court followed what appears to be equally 
clear guidance from this Court in Greco pointing in the opposite direction.  We 
therefore turn to that opinion. 
                                         
16 Fields, 215 A.2d at 432 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
17 I.e., whether the employee has breached a duty.  See Culpable, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th 
ed. 2014). 
18 I.e., whether a legal remedy is available against that employee.  See Liability, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“The quality, state, or condition of being legally obligated or 
accountable; legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by civil remedy or criminal 
punishment.” (emphasis added)). 
8 
B.  Greco v. University of Delaware 
In Greco, we held that “[i]f an employee, who is a licensed health care 
provider, is not liable to the plaintiff for medical negligence, neither is the 
employer.”19  Greco, a University of Delaware undergraduate student, had sued UD 
and one of its physicians after she received a prescription for an oral contraceptive 
that produced debilitating side effects, and a UD physician failed to instruct the 
student to stop taking the contraceptive even after the student complained of those 
side effects to the physician.20  The suit was filed two years and twelve days after 
the UD physician had last rendered care to Greco.  Therefore, after discovery, UD 
and the physician moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Greco’s claim 
was time-barred. 
Greco conceded that the claims against the physician were barred by the two-
year medical-negligence statute, but argued that, under Cole v. League for Planned 
Parenthood,21 the claim against UD was subject to the general statute of limitations 
applicable to personal injury actions found in 10 Del. C. § 8119 because UD itself 
was not a licensed health care provider.22  Although § 8119’s limitations period was 
                                         
19 Greco, 619 A.2d at 903. 
20 Id. at 901–02. 
21 530 A.2d 1119 (Del. 1987).  In Cole, we held that the two-year medical malpractice statute was 
inapplicable to a vicarious claim against on employer for when neither the employer nor the 
employee was a licensed health care provider.  Here, it is undisputed that the Doctors were licensed 
health care providers. 
22 Greco, 619 A.2d at 901 (“[Greco] contends that all of the defendants are subject to the general 
personal injury statute of limitations set forth in 10 Del. C. § 8119”). 
9 
also two years, Greco contended that our interpretation of the discovery rule as 
applied to § 8119 rendered her claim timely.   
The Superior Court rejected Greco’s argument and granted summary 
judgment in UD’s favor, and we affirmed.  We reasoned that on any vicarious 
liability claim, UD was protected by the same statute of limitations rule that applied 
to its employee.23   
We do not challenge Greco today to the extent that it stands for the 
straightforward proposition that, where the plaintiff first noticed an injury no later 
than December 8, 1987, a medical negligence suit filed on December 20, 1989 based 
on that injury without the benefit of any additional tolling is untimely.  And if that 
is all Greco had said, it would not pertain to Verrastro’s claims against Bayhealth, 
which were, after all, timely filed by virtue of § 6856’s tolling provision.  But that is 
not all we said.  We turn now to a closer examination of Greco’s rationale and how 
it has come into play here. 
Greco’s analysis is grounded on the sound principle that “a viable cause of 
action against the employee for negligence is a condition precedent to imputing 
vicarious liability for such negligence to the employer pursuant to the theory of 
                                         
23 Id. at 904 (“the two-year time limitation in the medical malpractice statute, which admittedly 
bars Greco’s claims against Dr. Talbot, accrues to the benefit of her employers”).  We also held 
that, independently of whether the plaintiff had any viable vicarious claims, the statute of 
limitations also barred any direct claim against UD.  That holding is not at issue in this case. 
10 
respondeat superior.24  Greco’s recognition of this principle was followed by 
equally sound statements of the rule: 
 
Where the alleged basis for the liability of an employer is the 
negligence of an employee, the employer cannot be held liable unless 
the employee is shown to be liable.  Hence, generally, if absence of 
culpability on the part of the employee to the injured person has been 
established by litigation, the employer cannot be held liable to the 
injured person . . . . 
 
Accordingly, in an action for medical malpractice, this Court has 
held that the alleged negligence of an employee, who is a health care 
provider, must be the focus of any inquiry into the vicarious liability of 
the employer of that health care provider under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior . . . . If an employee, who is a licensed health care 
provider, is not liable to the plaintiff for medical negligence, neither is 
the employer.  Consequently, the alleged negligence of Dr. Talbot must 
be the focus of our inquiry into Greco’s claims against the University 
and the Student Health Care Center, which allege their vicarious 
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.25 
 
 
To this point, Greco and Fields remain in harmony.  But Greco went a step 
further: 
 
Greco’s claims for medical negligence against Dr. Talbot are 
acknowledged by Greco to be barred by the medical malpractice statute 
of limitations.  18 Del. C. § 6856.  Since Dr. Talbot (the employee) is 
not liable to Greco on the merits, because Greco’s claims are barred by 
the medical malpractice statute of limitations, there is no vicarious 
liability to be imputed to Dr. Talbot’s employers, the University and the 
Student Health Care Center . . . . The result of the time bar to Greco’s 
claim for medical negligence against Dr. Talbot is a failure of Greco’s 
vicarious claims on the theory of respondeat superior against Dr. 
Talbot’s employers, the University and the Student Health Center.26 
                                         
24 Id. at 903 (citing 2 Mecham on Agency § 2012, pp. 1581–82 (1942) and Restatement (Second) 
of Agency § 217B(2) (1958)). 
25 Id. at 903–04 (emphasis added; quotations and citations omitted). 
26 Id. at 904 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
11 
 
Greco’s characterization of the physician’s statute-of-limitations dismissal as 
a determination of his liability “on the merits” was inspired by § 217B(2) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency.  Section 217B(2)—a provision that was not 
carried forward in the Third Restatement published in 200527—states that “[i]f the 
action is based solely upon the tortious conduct of the agent, judgments on the merits 
for the agent and against the principal, or judgments of varying amounts for 
compensatory damages are erroneous.”28  Because Greco concluded that the 
dismissal of the physician on statute-of-limitations grounds was a judgment on the 
merits for the physician, the application of § 217B(2) resulted in the “failure of 
Greco’s vicarious claims on the theory of respondeat superior against [the 
physician’s] employers . . . ,”29 there being “no vicarious liability to be imputed to 
[them].”30  
Thus, Greco’s reasoning, to the extent that it substituted the statute-of-
limitations dismissal of the physician for an assessment of the physician’s 
culpability, is in tension with itself.  Having announced that “the alleged negligence 
of the employee, who is a health care provider, must be the focus of any inquiry into 
                                         
27 See Restatement (Third) of Agency Par. Table (2006). 
28 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217B (1958) (emphasis added). 
29 Greco, 619 A.2d at 904. 
30 Id. 
12 
the vicarious liability of the employer of that health care provider under the doctrine 
of respondeat superior,”31 the Court shifted its gaze from the employee’s 
negligence/culpability and fixed its gaze on the employee’s dismissal on procedural 
grounds.32  And since Greco also appears to run counter to the principle underlying 
Fields, a re-examination of Greco’s application of § 217B(2) is appropriate. 
1.  Meaning of “on the merits” 
We note that, under Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 41, “[u]nless the 
Court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under . . . [Rule 41(b)] 
and any dismissal not provided for in this Rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates 
as an adjudication on the merits.”33  Thus, the Superior Court’s characterization of 
the dismissal of the Doctors as “on the merits,” a characterization that underpinned 
its application of Greco, finds support in Rule 41.34  But our review of traditional 
respondeat superior principles leads us to conclude that § 217B’s “on the merits” 
language was not intended to encompass procedural dismissals that do not adjudicate 
                                         
31 Id. (emphasis added). 
32 Id. 
33 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 41(b) (emphasis added). 
34 In the Superior Court’s defense, although Verrastro argued in her response to Bayhealth’s 
summary judgment motion that “the decision dismissing the [Doctors] was made strictly on 
technical and procedural grounds and had nothing to do with the merits of the alleged medical 
negligence,” A305–06, neither party cited Fields or undertook an extensive analysis of Greco’s 
implications. 
13 
the wrongfulness of the agent’s conduct.  Instead and in context, we believe that the 
phrase “judgment on the merits” in § 217B(2) means judgment on the merits of the 
conduct, that is, a judgment finding that the employee is not culpable. 
This conclusion is consistent with Fields and the notion that “the crux of 
respondeat superior liability is a finding that the employee was negligent”35 and not 
whether the injured person has a right of action against the employee.  Likewise, this 
approach is consistent with how procedural dismissals are treated in the res judicata 
context, where “[a] judgment against the injured person that bars him from 
reasserting his claim against the defendant in the first action extinguishes any claim 
he has against the other person responsible for the conduct unless . . . [t]he judgment 
in the first action was based on a defense that was personal to the defendant in the 
first action.”36  Thus, a dismissal can be “on the merits” as it concerns the viability 
of another suit against the dismissed party without having a collateral effect on a 
potentially responsible third party. 
Section 217B(2), in our view, was meant to prevent substantively inconsistent 
outcomes and not meant to reach the issue of whether procedural defenses run from 
an agent to a principal.  For example, § 217 of the same Restatement states that “[i]n 
an action against a principal based on the conduct of a servant in the course of 
                                         
35 Hughes v. Doe, 639 S.E.2d 302, 204 (Va. 2007). 
36 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 51 (1982). 
14 
employment . . .  [t]he principal has no defense because of the fact that the agent 
had an immunity from civil liability as to the act.”37  The only consistent reading of 
the two sections of the Restatement is to say that, even if a case against an agent 
were subject to an immunity defense as in Fields, that immunity would not accrue 
to the benefit of the principal except to the degree that the immunity applies equally 
to both principal and agent regardless of any principal-agent relationship.  In this 
regard, we view a time bar as analogous to a claim of immunity in that neither 
indicates the absence of wrongdoing, but only that the wrongdoer may not be held 
liable.  In the respondeat superior context, an agent’s assertion of immunity does 
not depend on his lack of culpability, and the same can be said of any statute-of-
limitations defenses that might be applicable. 
We believe that this application of pertinent respondeat superior principles 
serves the purpose of that doctrine more faithfully than does Greco’s conclusion that, 
if a claim against the agent is time-barred, the principal is relieved of responsibility 
even though a timely claim has been made against the principal.  It bears noting that, 
in contrast to the claims against Bayhealth here, none of the claims against the 
physicians in Greco were timely filed; in other words, UD need not have piggy-
backed on the physician’s time-bar defense.  And for that reason, we do not question 
                                         
37 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217 (1958); see also Restatement (First) of Judgments § 99 
(1942) (cited by Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217B cmt. c (1958)). 
15 
the ultimate result in Greco.  But to the extent that Greco is read—as the Superior 
Court did in this case—to eradicate otherwise timely claims against a principal 
because claims based on the same facts would be time-barred if made against the 
principal’s agent, we overrule it.  We hold that, in a negligence action against a 
principal based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the dismissal of the agent on 
defenses personal to the agent does not automatically eliminate the principal’s 
vicarious liability. 
2. Avoidance of absurd results 
Greco’s treatment of a statute-of-limitations dismissal of a tort action against 
an agent as a merits-based determination that bars the prosecution of the action 
against the principal under the doctrine of respondeat superior can lead to absurd 
results.  For instance, as recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the 
general rule is that the employee is not even a necessary party to an action against 
the employer based on respondeat superior: 
[B]oth the primary [tortfeasor] and the person vicariously 
responsible for his conduct are ordinarily subject to liability to the 
injured person.  In some situations, the vicariously responsible person 
is liable only if the liability of the primary obligor is established; this is 
true, for example, of an insurer’s liability for the acts of the insured.  
Ordinarily, however, the person vicariously responsible may be held 
liable even though the liability of the primary obligor has not been 
established.  Moreover, in some situations the person vicariously 
responsible may be held liable even though an action cannot be 
maintained against the primary obligor. . . . [U]nder prevailing 
procedural rules the injured person ordinarily is not required to join 
16 
both and may decide to bring suit in the first instance against only one 
of them.38 
 
Here, Bayhealth has acknowledged that Verrastro need not have sued the Doctors.39  
To allow Verrastro’s unnecessary choice to belatedly sue the Doctors to eviscerate 
her otherwise-viable claim against their employer would be to condone an absurd—
and, we suggest, unintended—result. 
A yet even more bizarre result could be in store if inordinate emphasis is 
placed on the viability of the cause of action against the agent as opposed to the 
viability of the claim that the agent acted tortiously.  In particular, the literal 
application of the language in Greco that it is the viability of the cause of action—
and not the agent’s negligence—that breathes life into the claim against the principal 
would logically justify a dismissal of the principal even in an action in which the 
agent was not named once the limitation period applicable to the agent runs.  Such 
results make no sense to us and weigh heavily in favor of our reconsideration of 
Greco. 
We also think that allowing a plaintiff to proceed against an employer where 
the statute of limitations has run on the plaintiff’s suit against the employee but not 
                                         
38 Id. § 51, cmt. a (emphases added); see also Restatement (First) of Judgments § 99 (1942) (cited 
by Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217B cmt. c (1958)); Appriva S’holder Litig. Co., LLC v. 
EV3, Inc., 937 A.2d 1275, 1286 (Del. 2007); Super. Ct. R. 19; Fed. R. Civ. P. 19; Lomando v. 
United States, 667 F.3d 363, 384 (3d Cir. 2011). 
39 Oral Arg. 15:06–13 (Dec. 5, 2018) (“We agree that you don’t have to sue the individual 
physicians or agents of the employer . . . .”). 
17 
on the suit against the employer is consistent with the rationale underlying the 
doctrine of respondeat superior.  In particular, it is the negligence of the employee 
that is imputed to the employer, not the employee’s liability.  The principle was 
faithfully observed in Fields,40 and Greco itself recognized that “the negligence of 
[the] employee . . . must be the focus of any inquiry into the vicarious liability of the 
employee . . . under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”41 
3.  Other jurisdictions 
 
Although the case law from our sister states appears to be split, the 
jurisprudential trend is tending toward the rule we adopt today.42  For example, in 
                                         
40 We note that Greco cautioned the reader to “see interspousal immunity exception in Fields v. 
Synthetic Ropes.”  Greco, 619 A.2d at 903 (citation omitted).  But we do not view Fields as being 
limited to the interspousal immunity context.  Rather, we see it as a specific application of the 
more general principle that a judgment has no preclusive effects where that judgment “was based 
on a defense that was personal to the defendant.”  Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 51 (1982); 
see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 217 (1958). 
41 Greco, 619 A.2d at 903. 
42 See, e.g., Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434, 441 (Iowa 2013) (state not immune from liability 
despite personal immunity of volunteer employee); Hughes v. Doe, 639 S.E.2d 302, 204 (Va. 
2007); Cohen v. Alliant Enterprises, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 536, 538 (Ky. 2001); Leow v. A & B Freight 
Line, Inc., 676 N.E.2d 1284, 1289 (Ill. 1997); Byrd v. J Rayl Transp., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 999, 
1001 (D. Minn. 2015); Juarez v. Nelson, 61 P.3d 877, 886 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (“Defendant has 
not cited, and we are not aware of, any New Mexico case applying the principle that the 
exoneration of the servant operates in tort to exonerate the principal of vicarious liability where 
the employee has been exonerated by a statute of limitations”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), overruled on other grounds by Tomlinson v. George, 116 P.3d 105 (N.M. 2005); 
Gallegos v. City of Monte Vista, 976 P.2d 299, 301 (Colo. App. 1998); Vern J. OJA & Assoc. v. 
Washington Park Towers, Inc., 549 P.2d 63, 67 (Wash. App.), aff’d, 569 P.2d 1141 (Wash. 1977); 
see also Women First Ob/Gyn v. Harris, 161 A.3d 27, 45 (Md. App. 2017) (“we are persuaded 
that the better view is that the dismissal with prejudice of a tort claim against an agent does not 
necessarily have the effect of rendering the vicarious liability claim against the agent's principal 
non-viable”); State ex rel. Sawicki v. Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 931 N.E.2d 1082, 1088–
89 (Ohio 2010); Stanley ex rel. Estate of Hale v. Trinchard, 579 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 2009); 
18 
the 2004 case Fuentes v. Brookhaven Memorial Hospital,43 the New York Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division faced nearly the exact situation that Verrastro and 
Bayhealth present to us here.  In Fuentes, 
the [trial court] granted [the doctor’s] motion to dismiss the complaint 
insofar as asserted against him on the ground that the plaintiffs failed 
to serve a timely notice of claim upon him . . . and judgment was entered 
dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. . . . However, 
the dismissal of a complaint as against one party need not be given res 
judicata effect as against another vicariously liable for the same conduct 
when the dismissal was based upon a defense that was personal to that 
party. . . . Further, the dismissal was not based upon and did not 
determine the merits of the underlying allegations of medical 
malpractice. . . . Accordingly, application of the doctrine of res judicata 
to dismiss the complaint as against [the hospital] was not warranted.44 
The New York Appellate Division accordingly reversed the trial court’s dismissal 
of the case against the hospital.  Although the Superior Court did not use the words 
“res judicata” in its ruling, it in effect applied that doctrine: it held that where a 
plaintiff lost a case against a defendant, the plaintiff could not press claims based on 
the same facts against another party in privity with the defendant.45  But, for the 
                                         
Davis v. Lambert-St. Louis Int’l Airport, 193 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Mo. 2006); Hooper v. Clements 
Food Co., 694 P.2d 943, 945 (Okla. 1985).  But see Stephens v. Petrino, 86 S.W.3d 836, 843 (Ark. 
2002); Al-Shimmari v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 731 N.W.2d 29, 37–38 (Mich. 2007). 
43 10 A.D.3d 384 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
44 Id. at 385–86. 
45 We think the type of preclusion applied by the Superior Court is more aptly characterized as 
claim preclusion and not issue preclusion.  For one, the Superior Court’s analysis did not rely on 
why Verrastro’s case against the doctors was dismissed; any final judgment would have sufficed. 
Relatedly, if Verrastro had sued Bayhealth alone, the statute of limitations as applied to the Doctors 
would never even have been a question of concern.  A question that would not be a factor but for 
a former adjudication is better conceived as a matter of claim preclusion. 
19 
reasons we have expressed, we think the approach of the New York Appellate 
Division is more sensible. 
Finally, the recent United States Supreme Court case Simmons v. 
Himmelreich46 is worthy of notice here.  In Simmons, the plaintiff first filed suit 
against the United States on the basis that prison officials were negligent in the way 
they handled his housing arrangements.  That claim was dismissed under an 
exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act. The plaintiff then sued the individual 
prison officials, and the Supreme Court held that the individual suits could proceed 
despite the dismissal of the suit against the United States.47  Simmons reasoned that 
the judgment bar against the United States “has no logical bearing on whether an 
employee can be held liable instead.”  It furthermore noted that holding otherwise 
would “yield the strange result” that “the viability of a plaintiff's meritorious suit 
against an individual employee [might] turn on the order in which the suits are 
filed.”48  Although Simmons dealt with an employee’s liability where the employer 
had been held immune, we think the same reasoning and concerns apply in reverse. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the Superior Court’s entry of summary judgment in Bayhealth’s 
favor should not stand; we so hold not because the court misapplied Greco, but 
                                         
46 136 S.Ct. 1843 (2016). 
47 Id. at 1850. 
48 Id. 
20 
because Greco’s reasoning on the point relevant to this case has lost its persuasive 
force.49  Therefore, we REVERSE the judgment of the Superior Court and 
REMAND for a trial or other proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                         
49 See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Lake, 594 A.2d 38, 46 (Del. 1991) (“A court clearly has the 
authority, indeed the responsibility, to overrule its own common law decisions when they lose their 
legal vitality.”).