Case Title: Bosh v. Cherokee County Bldg. Authority.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 111037

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2013-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
BOSH v. CHEROKEE COUNTY BUILDING AUTHORITY2013 OK 9Case Number: 111037Decided: 02/12/2013THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

DANIEL BOSH, Plaintiff,v.CHEROKEE COUNTY BUILDING 
AUTHORITY, et al., Defendant.
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS OF LAW FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
Honorable James H. Payne, District Judge
¶0 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 
certified four questions of Oklahoma Law under the Revised Uniform Certification 
of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S. 2011 §§1601-1611.1 We have reformulated2 the questions: 
1. Does the Okla. Const. art. 2, §30 provide a private cause of action for 
excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental 
Tort Claims Act, 51 O.S. 2011 
§§151 et. seq.?3 
2. If such a right exists, is the cause of action recognized 
retrospectively?
3. Are the standards of municipal liability coterminous with a Federal §1983 
action or does the common law theory of respondeat superior apply to such 
action?
We answer the questions as follows:
1. The Okla. Const. art 2, §30 provides a private cause of action for 
excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental 
Tort Claims Act, 51 O.S. 2011 
§§151 et seq.
2. The action is recognized retrospectively.
3. The common law theory of respondeat superior applies to municipal 
liability under such an action.
QUESTIONS ANSWERED.
J. Spencer Bryan, Steven J. Terrill, D. Mitchell Garrett Jr., Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, for Plaintiff.Stephen L. Geries, Jamison C. Whitson, Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, for Defendant.
KAUGER, J.:
¶1 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 
certified four questions of Oklahoma Law under the Revised Uniform Certification 
of Questions of Law Act, 20 O.S. 2011 §§1601-1611, seeking clarification 
concerning the remedies available to a plaintiff who brings an excessive force 
lawsuit pursuant to the Okla. Const. art. 2, §30.4 We have reformulated the 
questions into three. 
FACTS
¶2 We note at the onset, that the facts presented by the parties in this 
Court are very limited and offer very little detail. It appears that on May 17, 
2011, jailers at the Cherokee County Detention Center, a jail facility operated 
by the Cherokee County Governmental Building Authority (the Authority) attacked 
the plaintiff, Daniel Bosh (detainee), while he was standing at the booking desk 
of the Detention Center with his hands secured in restraints behind his back. 
Presumably the detainee was being booked into the jail, but no explanation is 
offered as to why he was standing at the booking desk, why he was restrained, 
with what he was restrained, or what crime he was charged with, if any, or 
whether he had been convicted.
¶3 Nevertheless, video surveillance of the events captured images of one of 
the jailers, the defendant Gordon Chronister, Jr. (Chronister), approaching the 
detainee and grabbing him behind his back. Chronister then proceeded to slam the 
detainee's head into the booking desk by holding him from the back of the neck. 
He then placed the detainee's head underneath his arm and deliberately fell 
backwards causing the detainee to strike the crown of his head on the floor. 
Other jailers quickly joined the assault and moved the detainee to the showers, 
outside of the purview of video surveillance. The assault continued in other 
various off camera locations for an undisclosed amount of time. Afterwards, the 
jailers let the detainee languish in his cell for two days before taking him to 
treatment at a Tulsa hospital.
¶4 As a result of the attack, the detainee suffered a fracture of his 
vertebrae and had to undergo surgery to fuse several of the discs along his 
spinal cord. On September 29, 2011, the detainee filed a lawsuit in state court 
against the Authority, the assistant jail administrator and the jailers who 
initiated the attack. He asserted 42 U.S. §1983 (Civil Rights) claims against 
the individuals and state law claims against the Authority. On October 24, 2011, 
the Authority removed the case to the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Oklahoma. On October 31, 2011, the Authority filed a motion 
to dismiss the state tort claims based on exemptions from liability provided by 
Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, 51 O.S. 2011 §§151 et seq. (the 
OGTCA).
¶5 On December 6, 2011, the federal court permitted additional briefing on 
the motion to dismiss based upon the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals opinion in 
Bryson v. Oklahoma County ex. rel. Oklahoma 
County Det. Ctr., 2011 OK CIV APP 98, 261 P.3d 627 which was decided on August 30, 2011.5 On April 5, 2012, the 
federal court granted the Authority's motion to dismiss the detainee's state 
tort claims based on the Act, but the court permitted the detainee to amend his 
complaint to assert a claim of excessive force under art. 2, §30 of the Okla. 
Const.6 
¶6 On April 20, 2012, the detainee amended his complaint and the Authority 
filed a second motion to dismiss. On August 30, 2012, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma certified the questions of law to be 
answered to this Court. The certified questions were filed in this Court on 
September 5, 2012, and the next day, we ordered the parties to brief the issues. 
The briefing schedule was completed on October 8, 2012. 
I.
THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION, ART. 2, §30 PROVIDES A 
PRIVATECAUSE OF ACTION FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE NOTWITHSTANDINGTHE 
REQUIREMENTS/LIMITATIONS PROVIDED BY THE OKLAHOMAGOVERNMENTAL TORT CLAIMS 
ACT, 51 O.S. 2011 
§§151 ET SEQ.
¶7 This controversy centers around the alleged conflict between the Oklahoma 
Constitution, which protects citizens of the State of Oklahoma from unreasonable 
seizures7 and the OGTCA which appears to allow the state, or, in 
this case the Authority, to elude tort liability when its employees beat and 
injure a citizen who is detained at one of its facilities.8 
¶8 The Authority acknowledges that a court may recognize private causes of 
action.9 Nevertheless, it argues that it cannot be held liable 
for its employees who exert excessive force against detainees because the OGTCA 
immunizes it from any liability for the operation of any prison, jail or 
correctional facility.10 The detainee contends that regardless of what the OGTCA 
immunizes, the Okla. Const. art. 2, §3011 protects citizens from being physically abused by the 
employees of state and local entities that operate jails and correctional 
facilities, and such protection includes legal liability for such conduct.
¶9 Employers being held legally liable for the acts of their employees is 
nothing new. Under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior a 
principal or employer is generally held liable for the wilful acts of an agent 
or employee acting within the scope of the employment in furtherance of assigned 
duties.12 The doctrine rests on the premise that the employer 
answers for an employee's conduct provided the employee was acting within the 
scope of employment.13 An employer is liable for an employee's torts if the 
conduct was committed within the scope of employment.14
¶10 Employer liability extends when an employee's conduct is an assault of 
excessive force if the conduct also occurs within one's scope of employment.15 Under the theory of respondeat superior, one 
acts within the scope of employment if engaged in work assigned, or if doing 
what is proper, necessary and usual to accomplish the work assigned, or doing 
that which is customary within the particular trade or business.16 
¶11 For example, in Nail v. City of Henryetta, 
1996 OK 12, 911 P.2d 914, we addressed the question of whether a 
police officer was acting within the scope of employment and thus, whether the 
city was liable when the officer shoved an intoxicated 15-year-old who was 
handcuffed and not resisting arrest.17 In Nail, the 15 year-old brought suit against 
city, alleging that its employee, the arresting officer, injured him either 
intentionally and maliciously or negligently by excessive force. 
¶12 We said that:
As a general rule, it is not within the scope of an employee's employment to 
commit an assault on a third person. However, this general rule does not apply 
when the act is one which is `fairly and naturally incident to the business,' 
and is done `while the servant was engaged upon the master's business and be 
done, although mistakenly or ill advised, with a view to further the master's 
interest, or from some impulse of emotion which naturally grew out of or was 
incident to the attempt to perform the master's business.' An employee's act is 
within the scope of employment if it is incident to some service being performed 
for the employer or arises out of an emotional response to actions being taken 
for the employer. (Citations omitted.)
¶13 This rationale has been illustrated in at least 100 years of Oklahoma's 
caselaw. In Baker v. Saint Francis Hospital, 
2005 OK 36, ¶18, 126 P.3d 602 a jury question was presented whether a 
daycare caregiver was acting within the scope of employment so as to hold her 
employer liable for intentionally striking a child's head on corner of shelf. 
The Court noted at ¶12 that:
Oklahoma case law provides examples of cases involving torts for which the 
employer was held liable and those in which the employer was not held liable. 
Early in statehood the Court held that a railroad company was liable for the 
actions of the train auditor, who falsely imprisoned a passenger arising out of 
a controversy over the payment of a fare. The Court stated the general rule that 
a corporation, like an individual, is liable for any tort committed by its agent 
in the course of his employment, "even though the act is done wantonly and 
recklessly, or was against the express orders of the company." Chicago 
R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. 
Radford, 1913 OK 
7, 
¶ 4, 129 P. 834, 837. Other cases holding the employer liable for the tort of the 
employee include: Ada-Konawa Bridge Co. v. Cargo, 
1932 OK 790, 21 P.2d 1 (the servant of the toll bridge company 
shot an automobile driver when he drove past the toll gate and failed to pay the 
toll); Russell-Locke Super-Service v. Vaughn, 
1935 OK 90, 40 P.2d 1090 (the servant of a corporation selling and 
servicing automobile batteries injured the plaintiff in a fight after the 
servant tried to repossess a battery from the plaintiff's vehicle); 
Mistletoe Express Service v. Culp, 1959 OK 250, 353 P.2d 9 (the servant for a common carrier of 
freight assaulted the plaintiff when he refused to accept a television tube 
after the common carrier denied the plaintiff's claim for damage in transit); 
and Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd., 
1993 OK 160, 867 P.2d 1241 (the employee of a nursing home forcefully 
slapped a combative male Alzheimer's patient while bathing the patient).18 
¶14 However, different rules apply when the employer is a governmental 
entity. In Oklahoma, governmental entities were once protected from tort 
liability through the judicially created doctrine of governmental immunity.19 In 1983, in Vanderpool v. State, 
1983 OK 82, 672 P.2d 1153, we abrogated the court created doctrine 
of governmental immunity and acknowledged the Legislature's right to enact 
sovereign immunity by statute.20 
¶15 The Legislature's Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, now known as the 
OGTCA, came to be known as the exclusive remedy for an injured plaintiff to 
recover against a governmental entity in tort.21 Subject to specific limitations and exceptions, 
governmental immunity was waived under the OGTCA and governmental accountability 
was extended to torts for which a private person would be liable, unless they 
were committed in bad faith or in a malicious manner.22 
¶16 Under the OGTCA, the question for governmental employer liability 
continued to hinge on whether one acted within the scope of employment by 
engaging in work assigned, or if doing what was proper, necessary and usual to 
accomplish the work assigned, or doing that which was customary within the 
particular trade or business.23 Consequently, governmental employees such as police 
officers, whether on duty or off duty, have been held to the possibility that 
conduct such as striking arrestees,24 physically and verbally attacking customers of a 
private business,25 causing a car accident,26 or injuring detainees/arrestees,27 may have occurred within the scope of employment 
subjecting their employers to liability. 
¶17 However, here, the assault was committed not by a police officer, but by 
an employee of a detention center, and the OGCTA expressly immunizes the state 
and political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities from liability 
arising out of the operation of prison facilities.28 This does not mean that injured tort victims are at the 
mercy of their captors to be beaten, assaulted, and left without medical 
attention without any remedy to deter such conduct. 
¶18 In Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, 55 P.3d 1036, this Court held that a private cause of 
action may exist for inmates to recover for excessive force under the provisions 
of the Okla. Const. art. 2, §929 and the 8th Amendment of the 
United States Constitution30 -- despite the provisions of the OGTCA.31
¶19 Washington, supra, involved a prisoner who alleged that he was 
injured when prison officials forcibly removed handcuffs and leg restraints from 
him. Thus the claim was for excessive force raised by a convicted prisoner in a 
penal institution. We addressed the existence of a cause of action for excessive 
force and the requirements a prisoner must meet to assert such a claim. We noted 
that our analysis differed significantly from prior cases involving 
pre-incarcerated individuals because plaintiffs who are not prisoners have 
significantly broader rights from the application of force by police officers 
making arrests than those who are incarcerated. Accordingly, a prisoner has a 
significantly greater burden to bear in establishing the right to a cause of 
action than does a person who is not incarcerated.
¶20 The Court further explained that: 1) the OGTCA barred the plaintiff's 
claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of mental anguish and 
emotional distress; but 2) the nature of a claim made under the Oklahoma 
Constitution differs because a prisoner in a penal institution ordinarily has no 
right to recover for the use of excessive force by prison employees unless the 
force applied was so excessive that it violated the prisoner's right to be 
protected from the infliction of cruel or unusual punishment under the state and 
federal constitutions. 
¶21 Though we held that the prisoner in Washington, supra, did not 
successfully state an actionable claim for excessive use of force by the 
defendant prison employees, we held such a potential cause of action existed in 
spite of the OGTCA. We also said that such a cause of action could also exist 
for persons who were not already incarcerated inmates, because they have 
significantly broader rights.
¶22 The Okla. Const. art. 2, §30 applies to citizens who are seized -- 
arrestees and pre-incarcerated detainees. In Washington, we declared 
that, not withstanding the provision of the OGTCA, a private action for 
excessive force exists pursuant to the Okla. Const. art 2, §9 for incarcerated 
persons. Having done so, and having explained that those not yet convicted are 
assured of even greater rights, it would defy reason to hold that 
pre-incarcerated detainees and arrestees are not provided at least the same 
protections of their rights, the same cause of action for excessive force under 
the Okla. Const. art. 2, §30.32 
¶23 The OGTCA cannot be construed as immunizing the state completely from all 
liability for violations of the constitutional rights of its citizens. To do so 
would not only fail to conform to established precedent which refused to 
construe the OGTCA as providing blanket immunity, but would also render the 
Constitutional protections afforded the citizens of this State as ineffective, 
and a nullity. Therefore we answer the reformulated question and hold that the 
Okla. Const. art 2, §30 provides a private cause of action for excessive force, 
notwithstanding the requirements and limitations of the OGTCA.33 
II. Retrospective.
¶24 This is not new ground. We recognized a cause of action for excessive 
force in Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, 55 P.3d 1036, for prisoners. The Court of Civil Appeals 
first recognized that the cause of action should extend to pre-incarcerated 
detainees in Bryson v. Oklahoma County, 2011 OK CIV APP 98, 261 P.3d 627. Today, we recognize that the Court of 
Civil Appeals' Opinion followed the legal ground which had been plowed by our 
precedent in Washington v. Barry, 2002 OK 45, 55 P.3d 1036. 
¶24 The parties disagree whether our holding today should be applied 
retroactively, before the date of today's decision. This Court is neither 
prohibited from giving, nor compelled to give, judicial decisions retrospective 
operation.34 Judicial policy determines whether, and to what extent, 
a new rule will operate retroactively.35 We may give prospective operation to our announcements 
when necessary to avoid disruption and to allow a period for adjustment.36 In making such a determination, we must consider: 1) 
the purpose of the new rule; 2) the extent of reliance on old doctrines; and 3) 
the burden likely to be imposed on administering the legal process due to 
additional litigation or curative actions.37
¶25 Today's holding was foreshadowed by our decision in Washington v. 
Barry, 2002 OK 
45, 55 P.3d 1036. Recognizing today's holding retroactively will help to maintain a 
proper balance for law enforcement officials to constrain detainees as needed, 
but without using unnecessary excessive force that can cause permanent injuries 
to detainees. Retroactive application will only further and advance proper 
behavior. 
¶26 No unfairness or undue hardship would be imposed upon the offending 
officials, but mere by prospective application would deprive detainees who have 
suffered injuries from recovering for those injuries. Virtually no inequity will 
result from retrospective application. Accordingly, we hold that today's 
decision shall be given retroactive application to all matters which were in the 
litigation pipeline, state and federal, when Bryson v. Oklahoma 
County, 2011 OK CIV APP 
98, 261 P.3d 627 was decided as well as any claims which arose when Bryson, was 
decided.
III.
THE COMMON LAW THEORY OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR APPLIES TO 
SUCH ACTIONS.
¶27 The detainee argues that if a cause of action for excessive force is 
recognized under the Okla. Const., there is no reason to import federal 
constitutional standards that have been applied to §1983 civil rights actions to 
develop a body of state law. The Authority counters that although the Court does 
not have to so, it should adopt federal case law standards developed for §1983 
actions rather than to adopt a respondeat superior standard of government 
liability.
¶28 Assaults of excessive force can certainly occur within one's scope of 
employment.38 Under 42 U.S.C. §1983, respondeat superior does 
not serve as a basis for government liability.39 Rather, other standards, depending on the conduct, are 
applied such as a governmental policy, custom, or direct participation by a 
governmental employer.40 However, Oklahoma is not bound by the constraints of 
federal law when determining whether the doctrine of respondeat superior 
serves as a basis for municipal liability under a cause of action for 
excessive force pursuant to the Okla. Const. art 2, §30.41 
¶29 Oklahoma recognizes the application of the doctrine of respondeat 
superior to the OGTCA.42 Indeed, in the context of law enforcement, we have 
taken pains to point out that a municipality is liable for the tortious acts of 
police officers committed within the scope of employment as defined by the 
OGTCA.43 
¶30 In other contexts, the scope of employment has included assaults with 
excessive force. For example: Rodebush By and 
Through Rodebush v. Oklahoma Nursing Homes, 
Ltd., 1993 OK 
160, ¶12, 867 P.2d 1241 [Intoxicated nurse's aide slapping Alzheimer's patient was acting within 
the scope of employment.]; Mistletoe Express Serv. v. 
Culp., 1959 OK 
250, ¶31, 353 P.2d 9 
[Assault on customer by a truck driver within scope of employment.]; 
Brayton v. Carter, 1945 OK 289, ¶10, 163 P.2d 960 [Automobile accident within scope of 
employment even though occurred twenty-eight miles out of the way.]; Corn 
v. City of Sapulpa, 1941 OK 44, ¶4 , 110 P.2d 290 [Allegations withstood demurrer that 
employee could be acting within scope of employment even though he made an 
illegal u-turn while assigned to a task for employer]; Patsy Oil 
& Gas Co. v. Odom, 1939 OK 341, ¶28, 96 P.2d 302 [Employer held responsible for employee's 
taking dynamite caps to well even though employer had not authorized use of 
dynamite.].
¶31 Although a claim for excessive force under the Okla. Const. art 2, §30 
does not arise from the OGTCA, there is no reason why the doctrine of 
respondeat superior should not apply to hold employers liable for their 
employees violations of a plaintiff's rights under art. 2, §30 where the 
employees act within the scope of their employment.44 The problems of federalism which preclude the 
application of respondeat superior to §1983 actions are obviously not 
present when the action is for a violation of a state's constitution.45 Consequently, the common law doctrine of respondeat 
superior in tort litigation should apply under State law to municipal 
corporations. Accordingly, we hold that in an action pursuant to the Okla. 
Const. art 2, §30, respondeat superior applies to hold municipal 
corporations liable for the actions of their employees where those employees are 
acting within the scope of their employment.
QUESTIONS ANSWERED.
¶32 The Okla. Const. art 2, §30 provides a private cause of action for 
excessive force, notwithstanding the limitations of the Oklahoma Governmental 
Tort Claims Act, 51 O.S. 2011 
§§151 et seq. This action is recognized retrospectively. The common law 
theory of respondeat superior applies to municipal liability under such 
an action to determine when an employee of a municipality uses excessive force 
within the scope of employment.
COLBERT, C.J., REIF, V.C.J, KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, COMBS, GURICH, JJ., 
concur.
WINCHESTER, TAYLOR, JJ., dissent.
FOOTNOTES
1 The questions certified 
were as follows:
1. Does Oklahoma law recognize a private right of action for excessive force 
under Oklahoma Constitution art. 2, §30, as discussed by the Oklahoma Court of 
Civil Appeals in Bryson v. Oklahoma County ex rel. 
Oklahoma County Det. Ctr., 2011 OK CIV APP 98, ¶¶28-31, 
261 P.3d 627, 638-40?
2. If Oklahoma recognizes such an action, is a right of action available for 
deprivations occurring before the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in 
Bryson?
3. If Oklahoma recognizes such a cause of action, are its standards of 
municipal liability coterminous with a federal cause of action pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §1983, or does Oklahoma law provide wider protections?
4. Specifically, does any actionable right under the Oklahoma Constitution 
art. 2, §30 impose municipal or entity liability under a theory of respondeat 
superior? 
2 Title 20 O.S. 2011 §1602 provides:
Power to Answer. The Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals may 
answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States, or by 
an appellate court of another state, or of a federally recognized Indian tribal 
government, or of Canada, a Canadian province or territory, Mexico, or a Mexican 
state, if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in 
the certifying court and there is no controlling decision of the Supreme Court 
or Court of Criminal Appeals, constitutional provision, or statute of this 
state.
Title 20 O.S. 2011 
§1602.1 provides:
The Supreme Court of this state may reformulate a question of law certified 
to it. 
3 The Okla. Const. art. 2, §30 provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects against unreasonable searches or seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
describing as particularly as may be the place to be searched and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
4 The Okla. Const. art 2, §30, see note 3, supra. 
5 In Bryson v. Oklahoma County ex 
rel. Oklahoma County Det. Ctr., 2011 OK CIV APP 98, 261 P.3d 627, the Court of Civil Appeals in a similar 
cause in which a jail detainee was attacked by a detention officer held that the 
trial court had improperly granted summary judgment based upon the detainee's 
assertion of his federal civil rights 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim based upon the 
alleged violation of the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution and his 
claim based upon a violation of the Okla. Const. art. 2, §30. The 4th Amendment 
to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.
The Okla. Const. art. 2, §30, see note 3, supra. 
6 Okla. Const. art. 2, §30, see note 3, supra. 
7 Okla. Const. art. 2, §30, see note 3, supra. 
8 Title 51 O.S. Supp. 2012 §155 provides in pertinent 
part:
The state or a political subdivision shall not be liable if a loss or claim 
results from:... 24. Provision, equipping, operation or maintenance of 
any prison, jail or correctional facility, or injuries resulting from the parole 
or escape of a prisoner or injuries by a prisoner to any other prisoner; 
provided, however, this provision shall not apply to claims from individuals not 
in the custody of the Department of Corrections based on accidents involving 
motor vehicles owned or operated by the Department of Corrections;...
The relevant portions of the statute remain unchanged from the version in 
effect when the detainee's injuries occurred. 
9 See, Ohio Casualty Ins. 
Co. v. Todd, 1991 OK 54, 813 P.2d 508. 
10 Title 51 O.S. Supp. 2012 §155, see note 8, supra. 
11 Okla. Const. art. 2, §30, see note 3, supra. 
12 Schovanec v. Archdiocese of 
Oklahoma City, 2008 OK 70, ¶5, 188 P.3d 158; N.H. v. Presbyterian 
Church, 1999 OK 
88, ¶14, 998 P.2d 592. 
13 Bierman v. Aramark Refreshment 
Services, Inc., 2008 OK 29, ¶3, fn. 3, 198 P.3d 877. Respondeat superior is a Latin 
phrase that translates to "let the superior answer." Sisk v. 
J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 2003 OK 69, ¶7, fn.15, 81 P.3d 55. Under the doctrine, an employer is liable 
to the general public for acts of its employee, provided the employee was acting 
within the scope of employment. State ex rel. Okla. 
Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, 2000 OK 35, ¶19, fn. 31, 4 P.3d 1242. 
14 Baker v. Saint Francis 
Hospital, 2005 OK 
36, ¶10, 126 P.3d 602 [Employer may be liable where the act is incidental to and done in the 
furtherance of the business of the employer even though the servant or agent 
acted in excess of the authority or willfully or maliciously committed the 
wrongs.]; Ada-Konawa Bridge Co. v. Cargo, 
1932 OK 790, ¶31, 21 P.2d 1. An employee's act is within the scope of 
employment if it is incident to some service being performed for the employer or 
arises out of an emotional response to actions being taken for the employer. 
Rodebush By & Through Rodebush v. 
Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd., 1993 OK 160, ¶12, 867 P.2d 1241. 
15 In N.H. v. Presbyterian 
Church, see note 12, supra, where we held that even a wilful assault can 
be within the scope of employment if: 1) the act is fairly and naturally 
incident to the employer's business; 2) the act occurs while the employee is 
engaged in an act for the employer; or 3) the assault arises from a natural 
impulse growing out of or incident to the attempt to complete the master's 
business. See also, Bierman v. Aramark Refreshment 
Services, Inc., see note 13, supra, which, although not an 
assault, the Court of Appeals decision that a negligent and drunk driver's 
determination that the accident occurred within the scope of employment was 
upheld on basis of res judicata. 
16 Tuffy's Inc. v. City of 
Oklahoma City, 2009 OK 4, ¶7, 212 P.3d 1158; DeCorte v. Robinson, 
1998 OK 87, ¶12, 969 P.2d 358; Nail v. City of 
Henryetta; 1996 OK 
12, ¶11, 911 P.2d 914. 
17 The predecessors to Nail v. City 
of Henryetta, see note 16, supra, were Parker v. 
City of Midwest City, 1993 OK 29, 850 P.2d 1065 and Holman By and 
Through Holman v. Wheeler, 1983 OK 72, 677 P.2d 645. Neither of these cases were dispositive 
of Nail's claim. In Parker, supra, this Court addressed the question of 
whether a municipality may be immunized from liability for a malicious 
prosecution action under the OGTCA. We recognized that generally: 1) individual 
employees are immunized from tort liability when they act within the scope of 
employment; 2) a municipality is not liable for any act or omission of an 
employee acting outside the scope of employment; and 3) the scope of employment 
is defined as the performance of an employee acting in good faith within the 
duties of office or employment or of tasks lawfully assigned. We noted that an 
employee could not be acting within the scope of employment if the employee 
acted maliciously, or in bad faith. Because a claim for malicious prosecution 
included elements of bad faith, we held that the municipality was immunized from 
liability under the OGTCA, and that only the individual police officer could be 
held liable in tort. In Holman, supra, a ten-year-old brought a tort 
action against a school superintendent, alleging that the superintendent 
violently and in a fit of intoxicated rage, spanked and beat the child with 
excessive force. The superintendent countered that: 1) his acts and conduct 
while he was punishing the child were within the scope of his employment; and 2) 
because he was acting within the scope of employment, he was immune from 
individual liability under the Act. The Holman Court found that the 
governmental immunity afforded by the OGTCA does not extend to employees who act 
in a wilful or wanton manner while performing functions within the scope of 
employment. Accordingly, because the superintendent acted in a wilful and wanton 
manner, we held that he was not protected by the Act, and that he could be held 
individually liable in tort. 
18 Other cases exist in which the employer was not held 
liable including: Hill v. McQueen, 1951 OK 47, 230 P.2d 483 (the manager of a seed company assaulted a 
former independent sales contractor after the two got into an argument over a 
disputed debt); Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Sandford, 
1953 OK 394, 258 P.2d 604 (bus driver for bus company left his bus 
parked and assaulted the driver of an automobile and held him for arrest after 
the bus driver concluded he was drunk); Tulsa General 
Drivers, Warehousemen, and Helpers Union, 
Local No. 523 v. Conley, 1955 OK 277, 288 P.2d 750 (the agent of the union was picketing a 
business but left to follow the plaintiff four and one-half blocks to beat him 
with a board studded with nails, because he had crossed the picket line); 
Allison v. Gilmore, Gardner & Kirk, 
Inc., 1960 OK 
48, 350 P.2d 287 (a gasoline truck driver was employed by the defendant to drive a truck 
and deliver gasoline, and while fulfilling those duties, assaulted the plaintiff 
who was climbing on the gasoline truck); and N. H. v. 
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 1999 OK 88, 998 P.2d 592 (A Presbyterian minister molested minors, 
including the plaintiff, during recreational activities aimed at recruiting new 
members and their families). 
19 Fuller v. Odom, 1987 OK 64, ¶3, 741 P.2d 449; Vanderpool v. State, 
1983 OK 82, ¶¶7-9, 672 P.2d 1153. 
20 Fuller v. Odom, see note 19, supra. 
21 Tuffy's, Inc.v. City of 
Oklahoma City, see note 16, supra; Teeter v. City 
of Edmond, 2004 OK 5, ¶21, 85 P.3d 817; Nail v. City of 
Henryetta, see note 16, supra; Fuller v. Odom, see note 9, 
supra at ¶4. 
22 Tuffy's, Inc.v. City of 
Oklahoma City, see note 16, supra; Nail v. City 
of Henryetta, see note 17, supra; 
23 Tuffy's Inc. v. City of 
Oklahoma City, see note 16, supra; DeCorte v. 
Robinson, see note 16, supra; Nail v. City of 
Henryetta; see note 17, supra. 
24 DeCorte v. Robinson, see note 16, supra 
at ¶13, involved the misconduct of an off duty police officer who helped arrest 
a civilian driver and struck the driver and grabbed him by the throat while he 
was handcuffed resulting in a herniated disk in his neck which required surgery. 
The jury's determination that these actions were withing the scope of employment 
were affirmed on appeal. 
25 Tuffy's, Inc. v. City of 
Oklahoma City, see note 16, supra, held that a municipality is not 
immunized from a negligence claim based on its officers actions in the midst of 
law enforcement if the tortious acts were committed within the scope of 
employment. The officers in question allegedly attacked, harassed and assaulted 
customers at a nightclub. 
26 Fuller v. Odom, see note 19, supra. 
27 In Morales v. City of 
Oklahoma City ex rel. Oklahoma City 
Police Dept., 2010 OK 9, ¶29, 230 P.3d 869, we held a fact question existed for a 
broken wrist and elbow allegedly sustained when the officer arrested a girl 
after a fight broke out in a school cafeteria. We noted that once an officer 
makes the decision to enforce a law by making an arrest, he or she must do so in 
a lawful manner. 
28 Title 51 O.S. Supp. 2012 §155, see note 8, supra. 
29 The Okla. Const. art. 2, §9 provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
or unusual punishments inflicted. 
30 The 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
31 Title 51 O.S. Supp. 2012 §155, see note 8, supra. 
32 See, Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (The applicable standards for 
federal claims of excessive force apply the same, whether the victim was a 
pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner. The standard is whether or not a 
prison guard's application of force is actionable turns on whether that force 
was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or 
maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.). 
33 In Binette v. Sabo, 244 Conn. 23, 45-46, 
710 A.2d 688, 699 (Conn. 1998) the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed a 
private, Constitutional right of action for money damages against officials 
stemming form alleged violations of search and seizure and arrest. Following the 
analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 20 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1971) the 
Court recognized that compelling policy considerations favored the creation of a 
constitutional tort to ensure the citizens a remedy when their constitutional 
rights were violated by a police officer or similar actor. The availability of 
other remedies did not defeat such a claim. In contrast, the Supreme Court of 
Alaska in State Dep't of Corr. v. Heisey, 271 P.3d 1082, 1093-94 (Ala. 2012) refused to recognize a state constitutional claim 
for excessive force by an inmate because such a claim was barred by the state's 
sovereign immunity and an alternative remedy of a §1983 claim was available. 

34 Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 
2008 OK 105, ¶26, 202 P.3d 144; Resolution Trust 
Corp. v. Grant, 1995 OK 68, ¶22, 901 P.2d 807; Great Northern Ry. 
Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining 
Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-65, 53 S. Ct. 145, 77 L. Ed. 360 (1932). Neither the 
United States Constitution nor the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma 
delineate the effective date of judicial opinions. 
35 Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 
see note 34, supra; Harry R. Carlile Trust v. 
Cotton Petroleum, 1986 OK 16, ¶16, 732 P.2d 438, cert. denied 483 U.S. 1007, 
107 S. Ct. 3232, 97 L. Ed. 2d 738 and 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S. Ct. 3265, 97 L. Ed. 2d 764 (1987). 
36 Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 
see note 34, supra; Aple Auto Cash Express, 
Inc. v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Dept. 
of Consumer Credit, 2003 OK 89, ¶20, fn. 27, 78 P.3d 1231; Campbell v. White, 
1993 OK 89, ¶18, 856 P.2d 255. In Great Northern 
Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining 
Co., see note 21, supra, a noncriminal cases involving no question of 
constitutional law, the Court developed the Sunburst Doctrine, holding that a 
state may choose for itself between the principle of relation back and forward 
operation of its precedents. Globe Life and Acc. 
Ins. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, 
1996 OK 39, ¶20, fn. 41, 
913 P.2d 1322. 
37 Kruchowski v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 
see note 34, supra; Resolution Trust Corp. v. Grant, 
see note 34, supra; Short v. Kiamichi Area Vo-Tech 
School, 1988 OK 
89, ¶19, 761 P.2d 472, cert. denied 489 U.S. 1066, 109 S. Ct. 1341, 103 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1989); 
Henry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton 
Petroleum Corp., see note 34, supra; Thompson v. 
Presbyterian Hosp. Inc., 1982 OK 87, ¶33, 652 P.2d 260. 
38 In N.H. v. Presbyterian 
Church, see note 25, supra where we held that even a wilful assault can 
be within the scope of employment if: 1) the act is fairly and naturally 
incident to the employer's business; 2) the act occurs while the employee is 
engaged in an act for the employer; or 3) the assault arises from a natural 
impulse growing out of or incident to the attempt to complete the master's 
business. See also, Bierman v. Aramark Refreshment 
Services, Inc., see note 26, supra, which, although not an 
assault, the Court of Appeals decision that a negligent and drunk driver's 
determination that the accident occurred within the scope of employment was 
upheld on basis of res judicata. 
39 Barnthouse v. City of 
Edmond, 2003 OK 
42, ¶30, 73 P.3d 840 cert. denied Cochran v. Barnthouse, 
540 U.S. 981, 124 S. Ct. 464, 157 L. Ed. 2d 371 (2003); Brander's Club, 
Inc. v. City of Lawton, 1996 OK 66, 918 P.2d 69, ¶11, 918 P.2d 69; Jett v. Dallas 
Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731, 109 S. Ct. 2702, 
2721, 105 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1989); Monell v. City of New 
York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 576 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). 
40 See also, Estate of Crowell 
v. Board of County Commissioners of 
County of Cleveland, 2010 OK 5, 237 P.3d 134 (Recognizing that a §1983 action for the 
failure of prison officials to respond to an inmates medical attention requires 
the establishment of a deliberate indifference on the part of the employer.); 
Seiler v. City of Bethany, 1987 OK CIV APP 77, 746 P.2d 699 (Civil rights action required plaintiff to 
establish municipality had a policy of deliberate indifference before recovery 
could be had concerning alleged negligence in detainee's suicide.); 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290, 
50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976) (Deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious illness or 
injury constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.). 
41 The Okla. Const. art 2 §30, see note 3, supra. Our 
holding is based on Oklahoma law which provides bona fide, separate, adequate 
and independent grounds for our decision. Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032, 1042, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1214 (1983). State 
statutes or state constitutions which afford greater rights than the federal 
constitution must be determined by following state law. The state of Oklahoma in 
the exercise of its sovereign power may provide more expansive individual 
liberties than those conferred by the United States Constitution - it is only 
when state law provides less protection that the question must be determined by 
federal law. The Constitution of the State of Oklahoma contains independent 
sources of rights and liberties, which may, under some circumstances, offer more 
protection than the federal constitution. The Oklahoma Constitution does not 
merely project a mirror image of the federal constitution. The people of this 
state are governed by the Oklahoma Constitution, and when it grants a right or 
provides a principle of law or procedure beyond the protections supplied by the 
federal constitution, it speaks for every person as the supreme law and final 
authority for everything which is done in pursuance of its provisions. 
Turner v. City of Lawton, 1986 OK 51, ¶10, 733 P.2d 375. 
42 Tuffy's, Inc.v. City of 
Oklahoma City, see note 16, supra; Speight v. 
Presley, see note 16, supra; DeCorte v. Robinson, see note 
16, supra; Nail v. City of Henryetta see note 16, 
supra. 
43 Morales v. City of Oklahoma 
City, see note 27, supra [If a tort is committed in the process of making 
an arrest, §155(4) does not provide immunity from suit to the officer's 
government employer for the resulting damages.]; Tuffy's Inc. v. 
City of Oklahoma City, see note 16, supra at ¶20 [To 
construe §155(4) as providing blanket immunity to political subdivisions for any 
claim arising from law enforcement would not conform to established precedent. 
We have consistently held that a municipality is liable for the tortious acts of 
police officers committed within the scope of employment as defined by the 
OGTCA.]. 
44 Although the term respondeat superior is not 
expressly used, Illinois, another state which has also abrogated sovereign 
immunity for tort actions against municipalities, determined in Newell v. 
City of Elgin, 34 Ill. ApP.3d 719, 723, 340 N.E.2d 344, 348 
(Ill. 1976), that a motorist injured during a high speed chase stated an action 
against the municipality noting that the officers were obviously acting in the 
execution or enforcement of law and that they were the agents and employees of 
the municipality. 
45 Monell v. City of New 
York, see note 39, supra at 691-694 for a discussion of the problems of 
federalism and the interpretation of the express language of §1983 which 
preclude a federal recognition of the application of respondeat superior 
to §1983 actions.