Case Title: State v. Pepper

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2023-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 124,992 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JOHN PEPPER, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
The crime of aggravated criminal sodomy pursuant to K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
5504(b)(3)(A) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) sodomy 
occurred; (2) the victim did not consent; and (3) the victim was overcome by force or 
fear. 
 
2. 
 
"Overcome by force or fear" has the same meaning in our aggravated criminal 
sodomy statute as it has in our rape statute.  
 
3. 
 
Following a district court's ruling that evidence will not be admitted, the plain 
language of K.S.A. 60-405 provides that a district court may approve of various forms 
and methods of proffering a record for purposes of appellate review of that district court 
ruling. 
 
 
 
 
 
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4. 
 
If the district court does not approve an alternative form of proffer, the proponent 
of excluded evidence must indicate the substance of the expected evidence by questions 
indicating the desired answers.  
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN, judge. Oral argument held May 15, 
2023. Opinion filed December 8, 2023. Affirmed. 
 
Laura Stratton, of Capital Appeals and Conflicts Office, argued the cause, and Reid T. Nelson 
and Debra J. Wilson, of the same office, were on the brief for appellant.  
 
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, 
and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
WILSON, J.:  A jury convicted John Pepper of felony murder with the predicate 
felony of aggravated criminal sodomy. On direct appeal, he asserts three district court 
errors:  (1) evidence insufficiency, (2) erroneous exclusion of expert opinion, and (3) 
permission for one camera in the courtroom during trial and pretrial proceedings. On 
direct appeal, we affirm.  
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
When Wichita Police Detective Dustin Noll arrived at the Wichita residence 
where he had been dispatched, he heard screams coming from inside where C.C. had just 
discovered her 72-year-old mother, R.G., lying dead on the kitchen floor and nude from 
the waist down. As Noll attempted lifesaving measures on R.G., backup law enforcement 
 
 
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discovered Pepper in a nearby bedroom closet, sitting on the floor hugging his dog. The 
officers arrested him. Law enforcement also found a small knife in Pepper's pocket.  
 
At trial, the State called numerous witnesses. Witnesses at the scene had noticed a 
lot of blood in R.G.'s mouth and heard bones cracking when starting CPR. Shortly after 
Pepper's arrest, forensic nursing coordinator Amy Mitchell collected numerous DNA 
samples from Pepper's mouth, penis, anus, and the area between his left index and pointer 
fingers. 
 
Tina Peck, a sexual assault examination nurse who conducted a postmortem 
examination of R.G., took DNA samples from R.G.'s mouth, anus, and vagina. She noted 
bruising on R.G.'s genitals, which could have been caused by blunt force trauma from a 
finger or an erect penis. She testified the injuries could have resulted from either 
consensual or nonconsensual sex.  
 
Dr. Jamie Oeberst, a coroner, conducted an autopsy. She noted bruising and 
scrapes around R.G.'s mouth on her left cheek, bruising and scrapes on the inside of 
R.G.'s lower lip, bruising on the inside of R.G.'s upper lip, bruising and a "superficial 
laceration" inside R.G.'s left cheek, scrapes near her left eye and left cheek, bruising on 
her tongue, multiple scalp bruises, and scrapes on the eyelids. There were also bruises 
and scrapes on R.G.'s arms, legs, chest, and back. Dr. Oeberst explained bruises require 
blood pressure and that chest compressions circulate blood, but only the bruises on the 
left side of R.G.'s chest could have been caused by chest compressions. Further, R.G.'s 
lumbar vertebra in her lower back had been fractured. The muscle surrounding the 
fracture had been torn, meaning "she had a significant injury in this area of her back." 
The injury could have been caused by twisting or a sharp flexion like bending forward, 
but Dr. Oeberst concluded the cause of the injury was unknown. 
 
 
 
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Dr. Oeberst also testified that R.G. had petechial hemorrhages, which are small 
hemorrhages in the eyes and face that can be caused by many things including 
smothering. But petechial hemorrhages may also be caused by the resuscitation efforts 
and therefore she could not definitively identify their cause. R.G.'s toxicology screen was 
negative for drugs and alcohol.  
 
Based on these injuries, Dr. Oeberst testified that R.G.'s cause of death was a 
cardiac event caused by blunt force trauma. R.G. had a history of health issues including 
high blood pressure, an enlarged heart, atrial fibrillation, congestive heart failure, 
shortness of breath, lung disease, sarcoidosis, scarred lungs, and a prior pulmonary 
embolism. The blunt force trauma caused stress and pain that compromised these 
preexisting conditions. Dr. Oeberst testified that "but for the blunt force injuries, she 
wouldn't have died that day." She also noted that a potential, but not conclusive, cause of 
death was smothering based on R.G.'s mouth injuries and the petechial hemorrhages. 
These injuries suggested a hand could have been placed over R.G.'s mouth. R.G. had 
been intubated at the scene, and the intubation may have caused mouth injuries, but Dr. 
Oeberst had never seen an intubation cause injury on the insides of cheeks. R.G. also had 
several broken ribs, which Dr. Oeberst attributed to chest compressions.  
 
Steve Hoofer, a DNA analyst, testified that Pepper could not be excluded from the 
DNA found in R.G.'s anus, though DNA results could not provide information on how 
the DNA sample was deposited. The substance on Pepper's left index finger was 
presumptively blood, and R.G. could not be excluded as a major contributor to the 
blood's DNA profile.   
 
The neighbor who called 911 had known R.G. for nearly 20 years. During this 
time, she never saw R.G. with a boyfriend or male interest. She testified that R.G. had 
numerous health issues, used an inhaler, and did not drive. This neighbor also explained 
 
 
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that she had seen Pepper a few times before, and that he began hanging around R.G.'s 
house for nearly a week before R.G.'s death.  
 
R.G.'s best friend and landlord had known R.G. for 19 years. This close friend 
knew about R.G.'s health problems, noted that R.G. used a walking cane, and explained 
that she took R.G. out for errands. She never met Pepper and was under the impression 
that R.G. was celibate.  
 
C.C. testified that she met Pepper, who she knew as "HD," around a month and a 
half before R.G.'s death. C.C. had befriended Pepper shortly after he moved to Wichita 
from Colorado. When Pepper became homeless after being evicted from his residence, 
C.C. invited Pepper to stay at the home she shared with R.G. Initially, R.G. said the 
arrangement was fine. Pepper began sleeping inside, but at some point, R.G. told C.C. 
she wanted Pepper to leave. After that, Pepper slept in their yard with his belongings. 
R.G. stopped letting Pepper in and forced him to stay outside even during the hottest 
parts of the day.  
 
C.C. explained that Pepper and R.G. never napped together, but she was then 
shown a transcript of her conversation with a detective in which she explained they 
napped together several times. C.C. explained that Pepper was not supposed to be inside 
the house without her. That said, Pepper never did anything to make her worry about him 
harming R.G. In fact, R.G. told C.C. to not throw Pepper's property away, and R.G. 
would feed him and let him take showers and naps. C.C. never saw her mother in any 
romantic relationships and believed R.G. had been celibate for around 20 years.  
 
C.C. then recounted the day her mother died. C.C. had left the home around 3 p.m. 
When she left, R.G. was sitting on the loveseat because her upper respiratory issues made 
it difficult to breathe when lying down. C.C. returned around 6 p.m. She tried to get in the 
 
 
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front door, but it was locked so she went to the back door. The back door was usually 
"locked" by placing a knife between the door and jamb. When C.C. got to the back door 
on that day, the knife was on the porch. She moved to open the door and noticed R.G. 
was on the kitchen floor, lying face up. She blew into R.G.'s mouth and blood came out 
of R.G.'s nose. C.C. did not manipulate R.G.'s body beyond providing mouth to mouth. 
At this point she ran across the road, alerted a neighbor to call for help, and ran back to 
her mother.  
 
At the time, C.C. had been up for two days on a crack cocaine binge. She was 
drunk and high. She admitted to a drug and alcohol addiction. She was also schizophrenic 
and bipolar and had bad memory lapses.  
 
Following the State's evidence, the defense made a motion for a directed verdict, 
which was denied. Pepper then presented three witnesses.  
 
Jennifer Johnson, who has a doctorate in nursing practice and conducts forensic 
medical examinations, had reviewed the sexual assault examinations of Pepper and R.G., 
as well as the autopsy report and photographs. Johnson testified that R.G.'s genital 
bruising could have been caused by consensual sex or even "simple genital wiping." 
 
As for the autopsy, Johnson testified that the injuries on R.G.'s face could be 
consistent with lifesaving measures including mouth to mouth resuscitation, placing an 
endotracheal tube, and the velcro strap and device placed around the patient's head to 
hold the endotracheal tube in place. Johnson also noted that the petechiae could have 
been caused by a cardiac event. Johnson agreed that the injuries were potentially 
smothering injuries. In sum, Johnson suggested the injuries could have been caused by 
lifesaving measures, smothering, or the cardiac event that killed R.G.  
 
 
 
7 
 
Dr. Randy Lance Parker, a licensed psychologist, had conducted an evaluation of 
Pepper that included two interviews, various psychological tests, interviews with Pepper's 
family, and a review of many documents. Dr. Parker found Pepper was a high 
functioning autistic. He also opined that Pepper's crack cocaine use would have 
diminished Pepper's impulse control.  
 
Dr. Parker found Pepper had a medium IQ and had trouble in both school and the 
military. Pepper also suffered from alcohol abuse disorder, cannabis abuse disorder, and 
cocaine abuse disorder. His military service did not succeed because he could not stop 
using alcohol and marijuana. Dr. Parker explained it was impossible to understand Pepper 
without acknowledging his life-long alcohol and marijuana abuse, and that he began 
using crack cocaine in the time just before R.G.'s death.  
 
Finally, Pepper testified in his defense. The description of his relationship with 
R.G. differed from C.C.'s. Pepper testified that, during the time he had his own residence, 
he would visit R.G. when C.C. was not present. He explained that R.G. would let him in, 
and they would eat and watch game shows on a television in R.G.'s bedroom. He sat in a 
chair the first time they watched television, but as the visits continued, he began sharing 
the bed with R.G. He did not spend the night during this time.  
 
According to Pepper's account, he and R.G. developed a relationship that began as 
motherly but, over time, became sexual. He testified they had consensual penile/vaginal 
sex two times while he still had a separate residence. He also explained that he would call 
R.G. "pumpkin" and expressed regret that he never bought her flowers. He said C.C. was 
not aware these visits were occurring.  
  
 
 
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Pepper explained that C.C. invited him to stay at R.G.'s house after he was evicted. 
He brought some of his property and dropped it off in R.G.'s yard. Pepper testified that he 
only stayed at the residence for two days. He slept outside both days.  
 
Pepper then gave his account of R.G.'s death. That morning, he noticed the back 
door was ajar and started talking with R.G. R.G. allowed him to put his dog in the closet, 
and then Pepper met R.G. in the kitchen. R.G. told him she was constipated. Pepper 
suggested having anal sex to help with her constipation. R.G. thought about it and then 
agreed. Pepper then removed R.G.'s undergarments, and they had sex in the kitchen, 
rather than the bedroom, because Pepper knew C.C. was returning home soon and he 
wanted to complete the act in a hurry to avoid being caught. After Pepper had an orgasm, 
R.G. "just fell right on her face, kind of like—right like that, on her jaw, her face . . . ." 
Pepper then put his finger in her mouth to try to remove her teeth. He also unsuccessfully 
tried to roll her over. He did not notice any blood at the time. He thought R.G. was dead, 
so he went to sit in the closet with his dog. He explained that he was in shock, and he 
waited in the closet until the police found him. He had no explanation for the bruising 
covering R.G.'s body.  
 
Pepper admitted to at first telling police that someone put him in the closet, even 
though at trial he conceded that was incorrect. Pepper also contested some of the 
neighbors' testimony about his interactions with them. Finally, Pepper testified that his 
morals deteriorated after he began using crack cocaine, but he insisted he never forced 
anything on R.G.  
 
The jury found Pepper guilty of one count of first-degree felony murder and one 
count of aggravated criminal sodomy. Pepper filed a motion for judgment of acquittal and 
a motion for new trial, which were both denied. The court sentenced Pepper to life in 
prison with no possibility of parole for 25 years for the first-degree murder conviction, 
 
 
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and 195 months in prison for the aggravated criminal sodomy conviction. The court 
ordered the sentences to run consecutive.  
 
Pepper directly appeals. Jurisdiction is proper. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3) 
(Supreme Court has jurisdiction over life imprisonment cases); K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-
3601(b)(4) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction over off-grid crimes); K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-
5402(b) (felony murder is an off-grid crime). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
There was sufficient evidence for a rational fact-finder to conclude that Pepper 
committed aggravated criminal sodomy. 
 
Pepper first challenges his aggravated criminal sodomy conviction, arguing that 
the State did not present sufficient evidence to show that he committed a forcible act. The 
State responds that Pepper asks this court to reweigh the evidence. This issue is properly 
preserved for review. State v. Farmer, 285 Kan. 541, 545, 175 P.3d 221 (2008) (criminal 
defendant need not challenge sufficiency of the evidence before the trial court to preserve 
it for appeal). 
 
Standard of Review 
 
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime 
charged. It also requires fact-finders to rationally apply the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard to the facts in evidence. So when a criminal defendant challenges the 
evidence's sufficiency, a reviewing court must examine the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution and decide whether 'any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' 'All that a 
 
 
10 
 
defendant is entitled to on a sufficiency challenge is for the court to make a "legal" 
determination whether the evidence was strong enough to reach a jury at all.' [Citations 
omitted.]" State v. Sieg, 315 Kan. 526, 530-31, 509 P.3d 535 (2022). 
 
 
Generally, we will not reweigh evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make 
witness credibility determinations. State v. Zeiner, 316 Kan. 346, 350, 515 P.3d 736 
(2022). Instead, "[a] reviewing court need only look to the evidence in favor of the 
verdict to determine whether the essential elements of a charge are sustained." 316 Kan. 
at 350. Additionally, our review is unlimited insofar as this issue requires statutory 
interpretation. State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 906, 327 P.3d 425 (2014). 
 
"'The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the Legislature 
governs if that intent can be ascertained. In ascertaining this intent, we begin with the 
plain language of the statute, giving common words their ordinary meaning. When a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court should not speculate about the 
legislative intent behind that clear language, and it should refrain from reading something 
into the statute that is not readily found in its words. But if a statute's language is 
ambiguous, we will consult our canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity. 
[Citations omitted.]'" State v. Eckert, 317 Kan. 21, 27, 522 P.3d 796 (2023).  
 
Analysis  
 
Pepper was convicted of aggravated criminal sodomy. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5501 
defines sodomy as "oral contact or oral penetration of the female genitalia or oral contact 
of the male genitalia; anal penetration, however slight, of a male or female by any body 
part or object; or oral or anal copulation or sexual intercourse between a person and an 
animal." 
 
The amended charging document alleged Pepper "unlawfully engage[d] in sodomy 
with [R.G.] or cause[d] [R.G.] to engage in sodomy with any person or animal, without 
 
 
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[R.G.]'s consent under circumstances when [R.G.] was overcome by force or fear." Thus, 
Pepper was convicted under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5504(b)(3)(A): 
 
"(b) Aggravated criminal sodomy is: 
 
. . . . 
 
(3) sodomy with a victim who does not consent to the sodomy or causing a 
victim, without the victim's consent, to engage in sodomy with any person or an 
animal under any of the following circumstances: 
 
(A) When the victim is overcome by force or fear." 
 
This version of aggravated criminal sodomy requires the State to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that (1) sodomy occurred; (2) the victim did not consent; and (3) the 
victim was overcome by force or fear. State v. Ninh, 63 Kan. App. 2d 91, 100, 525 P.3d 
767 (2023). Here, no one contests that sodomy occurred. Pepper contends the issue on 
appeal is whether R.G. consented to anal sex "or whether it was violently forced upon 
her." The State agrees.  
 
We have not evaluated the "overcome by force or fear" language in our aggravated 
criminal sodomy statute, but we have outlined the meaning of the identical phrase in our 
rape statute. Compare K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5503(a)(1)(A) ("[w]hen the victim is 
overcome by force or fear"), with K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5504(b)(3)(A) ("[w]hen the 
victim is overcome by force or fear"); see, e.g., State v. Brooks, 298 Kan. 672, 692, 317 
P.3d 54 (2014) (explaining "a rational factfinder could clearly conclude that J.P. did not 
consent to the sexual intercourse because she was overcome by fear, i.e., her fear got the 
better of her; her fear affected or influenced her so strongly as to make her physically 
helpless; her fear overpowered, conquered, and subdued her"); State v. Borthwick, 255 
 
 
12 
 
Kan. 899, 913-14, 880 P.2d 1261 (1994) (discussing the "force or fear" language in 
Kansas' rape statute). 
 
We interpret the language the same in both the aggravated criminal sodomy and 
the rape statutes because of the identical statutory language and the similarity of the 
proscribed conduct. See Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 
427, 428, 93 S. Ct. 2201, 37 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1973) ("The similarity of language in § 718 
and § 204[b] is, of course, a strong indication that the two statutes should be interpreted 
pari passu."); Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 580, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 192 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2015) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (noting "identical language in two statutes having similar purposes should 
generally be presumed to have the same meaning"); State ex rel. Brant v. Bank of 
America, 272 Kan. 182, 188, 31 P.3d 952 (2001) ("Ordinarily . . . identical words or 
terms used in different statutes on a specific subject are interpreted to have the same 
meaning absent anything in the context to suggest that a different meaning was 
intended."). 
 
Given the identical meaning of "overcome by force or fear," our cases interpreting 
the rape statute inform our understanding of the statutory requirements of the relevant 
subsection of the aggravated criminal sodomy statute. In State v. Chaney, 269 Kan. 10, 
20, 5 P.3d 492 (2000), we "declined to define in absolute terms the degree of force 
required to sustain a rape conviction." Force "is a highly subjective concept that does not 
lend itself to definition as a matter of law." State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 198, 262 P.3d 
314 (2011) (citing Chaney, 269 Kan. at 20). We must "consider the record as a whole" 
and decide each case "on its [own] unique facts." Borthwick, 255 Kan. at 911. We have 
provided the following guidance: 
 
 
 
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"The 'force' required to sustain a rape conviction in this state does not require that a rape 
victim resist to the point of becoming the victim of other crimes such as battery or 
aggravated assault. [The Kansas rape statute] does not require the State to prove that a 
rape victim told the offender she did not consent, physically resisted the offender, and 
then endured sexual intercourse against her will. It does not require that a victim be 
physically overcome by force in the form of a beating or physical restraint. It requires 
only a finding that she did not give her consent and that the victim was overcome by force 
or fear to facilitate the sexual intercourse." Borthwick, 255 Kan. at 914. 
 
Pepper first argues the State relies entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove 
lack of consent and force. But even the gravest crime can be proved with circumstantial 
evidence and the logical inferences properly drawn from that evidence. Zeiner, 316 Kan. 
at 350; State v. Chandler, 307 Kan. 657, 669-70, 414 P.3d 713 (2018).  
 
Next, Pepper's brief provides many ways that the evidence presented at trial could 
be understood to show his innocence. His argument is that the medical interventions, 
such as chest compressions and the endotracheal tube, caused the injuries to R.G.'s body, 
rather than a forcible act of sodomy.  
 
The State agrees Pepper's brief is replete with ways R.G.'s injuries could have 
occurred, but asserts it is not our role to make that determination. The State is right. 
Pepper's argument asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. State v. Harris, 
310 Kan. 1026, 1030, 453 P.3d 1172 (2019) ("reviewing court generally will 'not reweigh 
evidence, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or make witness credibility determinations'"). 
Instead, jurors are best equipped to evaluate the evidence presented at trial. See State v. 
Franklin, 206 Kan. 527, 528, 479 P.2d 848 (1971) (jury's function to evaluate evidence 
within framework of all evidence adduced). "[T]he jury discerns the truth through the 
process of trial, particularly the taking of the oath or affirmation, the jury's observation of 
the witness' demeanor, and the refining fires of cross-examination." DeCoux, Textual 
 
 
14 
 
Limits on the Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule:  The "Near Miss" Debate and 
Beyond, 35 S.U. L. Rev. 99, 100 (2007).   
 
Rather than resolving evidentiary conflicts or evaluating the credibility of Pepper, 
C.C., or the other witnesses, our role is to "look to the evidence in favor of the verdict to 
determine whether the essential elements of a charge are sustained." Zeiner, 316 Kan. at 
350. In doing so, we must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the State and 
determine whether a rational fact-finder could have found Pepper guilty of aggravated 
criminal sodomy beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude a rational fact-finder could 
have done so here.  
 
As noted above, the State need not prove "beating or physical restraint" and must 
instead prove "that [R.G.] did not give her consent and that [R.G.] was overcome by force 
or fear to facilitate the sexual intercourse." Borthwick, 255 Kan. at 914. We find that, 
based on the following nonexhaustive list of evidence, a reasonable juror could have 
found R.G. did not consent and was overcome by force or fear:  
 
• Detective Dustin Noll's testimony that R.G. was naked from the waist down when 
he arrived on scene.  
• C.C.'s testimony that blood came out of R.G.'s airway just after C.C. attempted 
mouth to mouth.  
• EMS testimony that R.G. had a significant amount of blood in her airway when 
resuscitative efforts began. 
• Peck's testimony that R.G. had genital bruising that could be caused by 
nonconsensual sex. 
• Dr. Oeberst's testimony about the bruises and scrapes covering R.G.'s body. 
• Dr. Oeberst's testimony that only some bruises could have been caused by chest 
compressions.  
 
 
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• Dr. Oeberst's testimony that R.G.'s vertebra fracture could have been caused by a 
sharp forward movement.  
• Dr. Oeberst's testimony that R.G. had petechial hemorrhages which could suggest 
smothering. 
• Dr. Oeberst's testimony that she had never seen an endotracheal tube cause some 
injuries in R.G.'s mouth, particularly the injuries to the insides of R.G.'s cheeks. 
• Dr. Oeberst's conclusion that blunt force trauma caused R.G.'s cardiac event. 
• The landlord's testimony that R.G. was her best friend and revealed nothing about 
Pepper.  
• The landlord's testimony that she believed R.G. was celibate.  
• C.C.'s testimony that she believed R.G. was celibate. 
• C.C.'s testimony that R.G. wanted Pepper to leave. 
• C.C.'s testimony that she did not believe R.G. and Pepper had ever been intimate.  
• Johnson's testimony that some of R.G.'s injuries could have been caused by 
smothering.  
• Pepper's testimony that he at first told police that someone else had put him in the 
closet.  
 
Though the evidence allows for alternative inferences, "[s]ufficient circumstantial 
evidence does not need to exclude every other reasonable conclusion to support a 
conviction." Zeiner, 316 Kan. at 350.  
 
When viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude a 
rational fact-finder could have found Pepper guilty of aggravated criminal sodomy 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
Pepper did not sufficiently proffer Dr. Parker's testimony about sexual deviance. 
 
Pepper next argues the district court erroneously excluded Dr. Parker's testimony 
that Pepper did not suffer from a sexual deviancy. The State responds in three ways. First, 
the evidence was insufficiently proffered and therefore the issue is not properly preserved 
for appellate review. Second, if the proffer is sufficient for appellate review, the district 
court appropriately excluded the evidence. Finally, any error was harmless. We agree 
Pepper made an inadequate proffer. 
 
Preservation 
 
When a party objects to an opposing party's presentation of evidence, the court 
must rule on that objection. If the objection is sustained, the proposed evidence is 
excluded from jury consideration. "When a district court excludes evidence at trial, the 
party seeking to admit that evidence must make a sufficient substantive proffer to 
preserve the issue for appeal." State v. White, 316 Kan. 208, 212, 514 P.3d 368 (2022). 
This rule "has dual purposes:  (1) It assures the trial court is advised of the evidence at 
issue and the parties' arguments, and (2) it assures an adequate record for appellate 
review." State v. Gonzalez, 311 Kan. 281, 299, 460 P.3d 348 (2020); see also 3 Kan. Law 
& Prac., Guide Kan. Evid. § 1:12 (5th ed.) ("As indicated, the proffer is a requirement to 
preserve appellate review. In addition, it gives the judge an opportunity to reconsider and 
change the ruling after a more complete disclosure of the proffered evidence."). 
 
"A formal proffer is not required, and we may review the claim as long as 'an 
adequate record is made in a manner that discloses the evidence sought to be 
introduced.'" White, 316 Kan. at 212 (quoting State v. Swint, 302 Kan. 326, 332, 352 P.3d 
1014 (2015). Though a proffer need not be formal, there are still rules about what may be 
 
 
17 
 
considered as being part of the proffer. We first turn to the relevant statute. K.S.A. 2022 
Supp. 60-405 provides:  
 
"A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based 
thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless it appears of 
record that the proponent of the evidence either made known the substance of the 
evidence in a form and by a method approved by the judge, or indicated the substance of 
the expected evidence by questions indicating the desired answers." (Emphasis added.) 
 
In Gonzalez, defense counsel told the court at a bench conference that they would 
ask the accomplice what they saw Gonzalez do on the night in question. We held the 
proffer insufficient because it was "not clear from this what Gonzalez anticipated [the 
accomplice] saying." Gonzalez, 311 Kan. at 300.  
 
 
Similarly, in State v. Hudgins, 301 Kan. 629, 650-51, 346 P.3d 1062 (2015), we 
found a proffer of evidence about a police department policy was insufficient. During a 
sidebar, defense counsel only stated, "Yes, naturally, I would proffer that the Court 
accept the policy in the record for review for purposes of appeal." 301 Kan. at 650. The 
policy was not admitted as evidence at trial, and the policy was not included in the record 
on appeal. Based on this dearth of information, we concluded we could not review the 
district court's finding that the policy was not relevant. 301 Kan. at 651. 
 
 
In State v. Swint, the defense wanted to present witness testimony that the victim 
asked the witness to file false claims against the defendant. The State filed a motion to 
exclude the evidence, the defendant filed a responsive pleading addressing the topic, and 
the district court held a hearing on the motion. We found this proffer was sufficient. 
Swint, 302 Kan. at 334. 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
In State v. Evans, 275 Kan. 95, 99-101, 62 P.3d 220 (2003), a murder defendant 
proffered that potential witness testimony would show that someone else committed the 
crime. While arguing a motion in limine, defense counsel explained the witnesses would 
testify that the alternative suspect had a gun, the gun was in the alternative suspect's hand 
following the shooting, and the witnesses never saw the defendant with a gun. We found 
this proffer was sufficient to allow review. 275 Kan. at 101.   
 
As these cases show, the proffer presented to the court need not always be 
presented contemporaneously to the objection. See also Marshall v. Mayflower Transit, 
Inc., 249 Kan. 620, 622-23, 822 P.2d 591 (1991) (finding a proffer of expert testimony 
was sufficient because the court read the deposition prior to trial, the testimony was 
included in a pretrial motion, the court heard arguments on the matter, and the court 
allowed a written proffer to be filed posttrial). The plain language of the statute allows 
the court to agree to various forms of the proffer. See Swint, 302 Kan. at 332 ("Answers 
to discovery, the parties' arguments, or in-court dialogue may satisfy K.S.A. 60-405 
depending on the circumstances.").  
 
Here, Pepper claims that he presented his proffer in three parts, though this 
assertion is made for the first time on appeal. Thus, our first task is to ascertain from the 
record exactly what the proffer was. Next, we will explore the adequacy, or reviewability, 
of that proffer. 
 
Pepper claims his proffer concerning Dr. Parker's sexual deviancy evidence 
collectively consisted of the following:  (1) a written pretrial motion filed by the State to 
limit evidence, (2) defense counsel's informal oral colloquy at trial made immediately 
after, and in response to, the State's oral objection to the sexual deviancy evidence, and 
(3) Pepper's written posttrial motion for departure sentence.  
 
 
 
19 
 
Pretrial, the State filed a motion to exclude Dr. Parker's testimony. Notably, the 
motion's focus was Pepper's autism, not the lack of sexual deviancy. The motion did, 
however, briefly reference Dr. Parker's lack-of-sexual-deviancy findings by quoting a 
portion of Dr. Parker's report, though the report is not included in the record on appeal. 
The relevant quotation from the motion, about the report, reads:  "Further, psychological 
testing did not find that [Pepper] harbored any sexual deviancies. Testing suggested that 
[Pepper] holds traditional views of sex, is a follower in a relationships [sic] and is less 
likely to act on sexual thoughts than others." Pepper's response to the motion does not 
reference the sexual deviancy testimony.   
  
During trial, but before Dr. Parker testified, the State made the following 
objection: 
 
"We had talked last week, I believe, maybe earlier this week about Dr. Parker's 
testimony and my objection to eliciting any testimony concerning tests he may have 
conducted on Mr. Pepper that would indicate he does not suffer from a sexual deviancy 
of any kind or speak to his sexual proclivities. I'm going to object to the relevance of 
that."  
 
Pepper's counsel responded: 
 
"Yes, Your Honor, I understand the State's position. The only thing I would add 
on our side of the situation is I think it is relevant. We aren't talking about any type of 
specific behavior or if Mr. Pepper has more proclivity to try to rape somebody or not try 
to rape somebody.  
 
"The basic fact is is [sic] that Dr. Parker found that Mr. Pepper does not suffer 
from any type of sexual deviancy, even though he's charged with aggravated criminal 
sodomy. And it isn't overwhelming, there's no allegations, it's not particularly at issue 
 
 
20 
 
whether, you know, those—you know, those particular points. The particular point is we 
have a sexual act. And that's our position, Your Honor."  
 
 
Posttrial, Pepper filed a motion for a durational departure sentence. The motion 
explains that Dr. Parker used the Garos Sexual Behavior Inventory (GSBI) to evaluate 
Pepper. Based on Pepper's scores, Dr. Parker concluded:  
 
• 
"He was not likely to engage in extreme or aberrant sexual behavior," 
• 
"Defendant's sexual interest did not interfere with his normal functioning," 
• 
"His view on sexuality was conventional," 
• 
"He was able to be sexually stimulated without engaging in high risk or unrestrained 
sexual activity," and 
• 
"Defendant did not display any sexual deviancies."  
 
The posttrial motion also stated:  "The GSBI scores are at odds with the behavior 
that led to Defendant's convictions. Defendant's lack of a history of any type of violence 
further demonstrates Defendant's actions were aberrant and in stark contrast with his 
behavior during the previous fifty years of his life." 
 
The district court did not state explicitly which part, or parts, of the record it 
considered as the proffer, but the court ruled on the objection to the evidence after the 
second part was presented. The court sustained "any objection to [Dr. Parker] testifying 
about suffering from a sexual deviancy or likelihood of reoffending, the degree to which 
[Pepper] may suffer from some sort of sexual disorder or deviancy, ability to be able to 
rehabilitate or amenability to treatment." The court had two bases for doing so:  (1) the 
testimony would invade the province of the jury, and (2) the probative value was 
questionable and outweighed by potential prejudice. The court did not reference either 
pretrial matters or potential posttrial matters in its ruling. 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
The plain language of K.S.A. 60-405 provides that a district court may approve of 
various forms and methods of proffering evidence. See National Bank of Andover v. 
Kansas Bankers Sur. Co., 290 Kan. 247, 278, 225 P.3d 707 (2010) ("As noted, the court 
and counsel agreed that KBS could submit its proffer posttrial."). However, if the district 
court does not approve any particular form or method of proffering evidence, then the 
same statute demands that the "substance of the expected evidence" must be indicated 
"by questions indicating the desired answers."  
 
 
Here, there  is no indication in the record the district court explicitly approved an 
alternative to a substance-by-questions proffer. When the State objected to the sexual 
deviancy portion of Dr. Parker's report, Pepper did not ask the court to consider as his 
proffer pretrial motions and arguments, informal statements of counsel, posttrial motions 
or arguments, or even Dr. Parker's report.  
 
But the record indicates the district court implicitly approved the form and method 
of counsel's informal colloquy during trial. We infer the court agreed to accept defense 
counsel's informal colloquy during trial for three reasons. First, the State's oral objection 
to admission of evidence was directly related to the specific subject of Dr. Parker's 
opinion that Pepper lacked sexual deviancy. Second, defense counsel's oral colloquy was 
made immediately after the State's objection and was also confined to the specific subject 
of Dr. Parker's opinion about Pepper's lack of sexual deviancy. Finally, the court's ruling 
came immediately after both parties' positions had been made concerning the specific 
matter of sexual deviancy and before Dr. Parker was scheduled to testify. The timing of 
the ruling implicitly indicates the district court believed it had received and considered 
the entirety of the information from which it was to render its ruling on the specific 
subject of Dr. Parker's sexual deviancy evidence.  
 
 
 
22 
 
Conversely, we cannot reasonably infer the district court implicitly approved 
Pepper's other asserted forms of proffer. The focus of the pretrial motion and hearing was 
Pepper's autism, not a lack of sexual deviancy. The posttrial motion's focus was Pepper's 
sentence, not trial evidence. Because the court did not explicitly or implicitly agree to 
consider these pretrial or posttrial motions and hearings for purposes of a proffer, 
Pepper's proffer was limited to defense counsel's colloquy during the trial.  
 
After reviewing the content of defense counsel's oral colloquy, we hold it is 
insufficient for us to review the propriety of the district court's ruling to disallow the 
evidence. Though we have more information than in Gonzalez because we know Dr. 
Parker's conclusion, neither we nor the district court were provided with information 
explaining how Dr. Parker defined sexual deviancy, or the reason or purpose for 
admitting such evidence—in other words, how Pepper intended to use such evidence to 
bolster his defense in a manner consistent with the rules of evidence. Without that, the 
defendant fails to show the relevance of this evidence. In other words, even if we assume 
Pepper lacks sexual deviancy, we cannot judge from the proffer at trial why that matters. 
Cf. Gonzalez, 311 Kan. at 300 ("But even if the proffer established [the accomplice] 
would say he saw Gonzalez smoke marijuana or take a Xanax, there is nothing else about 
any other potentially relevant details his testimony could provide such as how much, 
when, or what specifically he observed about Gonzalez' behavior near the time of the 
crime."); State v. Mays, 254 Kan. 479, 486, 866 P.2d 1037 (1994) (proffer approved 
because it contained both the nature of the excluded evidence and its significance to the 
case). Nor can we review the district court's weighing of the proffered testimony's 
probativeness compared to its potential for unfair prejudice or the district court's finding 
that the testimony would impermissibly invade the province of the jury.  
 
In summary, we hold Pepper did not sufficiently proffer Dr. Parker's testimony to 
enable appellate review. The issue is not preserved. 
 
 
23 
 
 
Pepper was not prejudiced by the presence of one camera in pretrial and trial 
proceedings.  
 
Pepper's third argument on appeal is that the district court erred in allowing one 
camera in the courtroom to record pretrial and trial proceedings. The State replies that 
Pepper does not establish there was a camera in the courtroom during trial and, even if 
there were a camera, Pepper does not demonstrate the camera's presence was prejudicial. 
Pepper's objections to camera coverage were raised below, so they are preserved for 
appeal. See State v. Johnson, 309 Kan. 992, 995, 441 P.3d 1036 (2019) ("Litigants 
generally are precluded from raising an issue on appeal when they failed to raise the issue 
in the district court.").  
 
Standard of Review 
 
"Where a trial court permits photographic, audio, and television reproduction of 
the trial proceedings, the defendant has the burden to prove prejudice by showing that 
media coverage prevented the defendant from presenting his or her defense or in some 
way affected the ability of the jury to judge defendant fairly." State v. Ji, 251 Kan. 3, 32, 
832 P.2d 1176 (1992). 
 
Analysis 
 
In State v. McNaught, we explained the competing interests that inform 
considerations about cameras in courtrooms: 
 
"Generally speaking, the propriety of granting or denying permission to the 
media to broadcast, record, or photograph court proceedings involves weighing the 
constitutional guaranties of freedom of the press and the right to a public trial on the one 
 
 
24 
 
hand and, on the other hand, the due process rights of the defendant and the power of the 
courts to control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial administration 
of justice." State v. McNaught, 238 Kan. 567, 574, 713 P.2d 457 (1986).  
 
 
The right to a public trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. State v. 
Albano, 313 Kan. 638, 644, 487 P.3d 750 (2021). "The concept of a public trial implies 
that doors of the courtroom be kept open and that the public, or such portion thereof as 
may be conveniently accommodated, be admitted, subject to the right of the court to 
exclude objectionable characters." State v. Galloway, 311 Kan. 238, 250, 459 P.3d 195 
(2020). This right, however, "is primarily for the benefit of the defendant" and "does not 
entitle the press to broadcast, record, or photograph court proceedings." McNaught, 238 
Kan. at 574.  
  
 
The second consideration, the defendant's due process rights, was at issue in 
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 101 S. Ct. 802, 66 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1981). The Court 
concluded that cameras in the courtroom do not amount to a per se due process violation. 
McNaught, 238 Kan. at 574. That said, a due process violation may occur depending on 
the factual circumstances. 238 Kan. at 574. In McNaught, we outlined several factors to 
consider when making this determination:  "the location of the broadcast or photographic 
equipment in the courtroom; the degree of distraction or disruption, if any, caused by the 
presence; and the effect of the presence and use of such equipment on the defendant's 
ability to present his case." McNaught, 238 Kan. at 575. 
 
 
On appeal, Pepper argues the camera impacted his right to a fair trial in several 
ways. Before we get to that, we must first address the State's argument that there is no 
evidence in the record to establish the existence of cameras at all. The State is correct that 
it is Pepper's burden to designate a record showing reversible error. State v. Nguyen, 285 
Kan. 418, 430, 172 P.3d 1165 (2007). The State is also correct that, on appeal, Pepper 
 
 
25 
 
does not direct us to any portion of the record where defense counsel conveyed the 
camera was in the courtroom during trial.   
 
But during a pretrial hearing, defense counsel asserted Pepper had been videotaped 
in prison garb while remotely making his first appearance before the court on a video 
screen. Neither the prosecutor nor the judge refuted that assertion. So we find there is 
sufficient evidence that Pepper was videotaped during his first appearance while he was 
wearing prison garb.  
 
And following jury selection, the court told the jury:  "Don't be concerned about 
being photographed or videotaped during the trial. The law, court rules prohibit media 
from doing that in any way which would allow you to be identified." This statement 
appears to reference Supreme Court Rule 1001(e)(6), which provides that the media may 
record proceedings in Kansas courts with permission but may not do so in a way that 
allows for juror identification. Supreme Court Rule 1001(e)(6) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 
651). In context, it makes no sense for the court to make this statement if there had been 
no cameras in the courtroom during the trial. So we hold the record sufficiently reflects 
the presence of a camera during Pepper's first appearance and trial. 
 
 
Pepper suggests the camera impacted the trial because "witnesses would have been 
aware that their testimony was reaching a possibly very large audience." He argues that 
the camera "in the courtroom could have influenced the jurors or witnesses" and that 
"witnesses may be more nervous testifying in front of a camera, and may not testify as 
openly knowing there is a far broader audience than the people present in the courtroom." 
(Emphases added.) But Pepper cannot point to a single witness whose testimony was 
affected by the camera's presence. See State v. Viurquez, No. 88,653, 2003 WL 
27393652, at *2-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (rejecting a McNaught 
challenge related to defendant's testimony because, among other things, defendant was 
 
 
26 
 
not overtaken by nervousness or hesitation while testifying). In fact, the phrasing of his 
statement belies the speculative nature of his argument. Without evidence of witness 
influence by the camera, we need not address prejudice. This argument has no merit.   
 
Next, Pepper argues "it was possible that [Pepper] was recorded while sitting with 
counsel at the defense table." The phrasing of this argument also shows it is speculative. 
Though we have already inferred the existence of a camera in the courtroom because of 
general statements referring to a camera, we cannot also infer specifically what the 
camera captured while Pepper was seated with his counsel at the defense table. We only 
know it is "possible." Without citing to the record where Pepper is on camera sitting at 
counsel table, it is only speculation. This argument also fails. 
  
Finally, Pepper argues that the recording of him in a jumpsuit at his first 
appearance could have been seen by individuals who later became jurors. See State v. 
Alston, 256 Kan. 571, 580, 887 P.2d 681 (1994) ("We have noted that adverse pretrial 
publicity may endanger the ability of a defendant to receive a fair trial in situations where 
prospective jurors read or hear the adverse publicity and are affected in their judgment 
should they later sit as jurors."). Though the court granted Pepper's motion to wear 
civilian clothing in the pretrial and trial proceedings, Pepper suggests the footage of him 
at his first appearance shows prejudice had already occurred.  
 
In State v. Hall, 220 Kan. 712, 714-15, 556 P.2d 413 (1976), we explained that 
"requiring an accused to stand trial in distinctive prison clothing . . . may result in an 
unfair trial and may deny the prisoner the presumption of innocence . . . ." But we also 
observed "the appearance of an accused in prison garb at a trial or some portion thereof, 
does not in and of itself constitute reversible error. It must be shown that the accused was 
prejudiced by such appearance in that such appearance resulted in an unfair trial." Hall, 
220 Kan. at 715. In Hall, the defendant briefly wore prison attire but then wore civilian 
 
 
27 
 
clothes during voir dire questioning and the remainder of the trial proceedings. We found 
there was no prejudice because the record did not reveal any jurors knew the defendant's 
initial clothing was prison attire. 220 Kan. at 715.  
 
Here, while there is evidence Pepper was videotaped wearing prison clothing, 
there is no evidence his jurors were aware of it. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the 
potential jurors whether anyone had heard about the case. One potential juror indicated 
she had heard about it in the media but did not elaborate. The prosecutor then asked if 
anyone else had encountered Pepper's case in the media, and no other potential jurors said 
they had. The potential juror who responded was struck and did not sit on Pepper's jury, 
meaning the only person who may have come across a prior media report with footage of 
Pepper wearing prison attire did not determine his guilt. Consequently, Pepper has not 
presented any "evidence that any individual juror's ability to judge the defendant fairly 
was influenced by media coverage prior to trial." McNaught, 238 Kan. at 576. 
 
Again, without evidence any member of the jury saw Pepper in prison clothing, he 
has no evidence upon which he could claim prejudice. Pepper has no basis to prove 
prejudice from what might not have happened. Pepper also suggests that jurors may not 
have admitted to seeing his first appearance video during voir dire, but this is entirely 
speculative. This argument also has no merit. 
 
We conclude Pepper fails to show he was prejudiced by the camera and, therefore, 
the district court did not err. 
 
Affirmed.