Case Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Stenson

Citation: 2024-Ohio-995

Docket Number: 2023-0041

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Stenson, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-995.] 
  
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-995 
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. STENSON. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Stenson, Slip Opinion No.  
2024-Ohio-995.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—One-
year suspension with six months conditionally stayed. 
(No. 2023-0041—Submitted February 6, 2024—Decided March 20, 2024.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2022-047. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, David Edmund Stenson, of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0042671, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989. 
{¶ 2} On June 4, 2014, this court imposed a conditionally stayed six-month 
suspension on Stenson’s license to practice law for his failure to abide by a client’s 
decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which 
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those objectives were to be pursued and for his neglect of another client’s legal 
matter.  Dayton Bar Assn. v. Stenson, 139 Ohio St.3d 428, 2014-Ohio-2339, 12 
N.E.3d 1182, ¶ 10, 14, 20. 
{¶ 3} In a December 2022 complaint, relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, 
alleged that Stenson neglected a single client’s legal matter, failed to reasonably 
communicate with the client, and failed to inform the client that he did not maintain 
professional-liability insurance.  In January 2023, relator certified to this court that 
Stenson had failed to file an answer to the complaint, and we ordered Stenson to 
show cause why an interim default suspension should not be imposed and the 
corresponding disciplinary order should not be entered against him.  After Stenson 
filed a timely response to our show-cause order and a motion for leave to file an 
answer to relator’s complaint, we remanded the matter to the board for further 
proceedings, 169 Ohio St.3d 1453, 2023-Ohio-660, 204 N.E.2d 557. 
{¶ 4} In September 2023, relator amended its complaint to allege additional 
rule violations and to add a second count alleging similar misconduct regarding 
another client.  The parties submitted stipulations of fact and misconduct, including 
ten exhibits, and the matter proceeded to a hearing before a three-member panel of 
the Board of Professional Conduct.  At the conclusion of the evidence and on 
relator’s motion, the panel unanimously dismissed three alleged rule violations.  
The panel issued a report finding that Stenson committed the remaining charged 
misconduct, with the exception of one alleged violation under the second count, 
which it unanimously dismissed.  The panel recommended that Stenson be 
suspended from the practice of law for one year with six months stayed.  The panel 
also recommended that certain conditions be placed on Stenson’s reinstatement to 
the practice of law and that he be required to serve a one-year period of monitored 
probation. 
January Term, 2024 
 
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{¶ 5} The board adopted the panel’s report and recommendation, and the 
parties have jointly waived objections.  After a thorough review of the record, we 
adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and the recommended sanction. 
MISCONDUCT 
Count I—The Grim Matter 
{¶ 6} In May 2020, Shaunice Grim retained Stenson to assist her in 
administering the estate of her deceased mother.  She paid Stenson a retainer of 
$1,500 using an electronic-payment application that deposited the payment directly 
into one of two operating accounts maintained by Stenson.  At his disciplinary 
hearing, Stenson admitted that he had not maintained a separate record for each 
client for whom he held funds.  In addition, Stenson stipulated that he did not 
maintain professional-liability insurance during the time he represented Grim.  
Although he testified that his staff provided Grim with a fee agreement that would 
have included a notice to that effect, neither he nor Grim have been able to locate a 
signed copy of that agreement. 
{¶ 7} Stenson filed an application to administer Grim’s mother’s estate in 
the Hamilton County Probate Court on May 27, 2020.  Because Stenson did not file 
the appropriate bond with that application, the letters appointing Grim as 
administrator of the estate were not timely issued.  Consequently, the probate court 
set an August 2020 hearing “for entry or dismissal” of the case.  Ten days after that 
hearing, Stenson filed a fiduciary’s bond and Grim was appointed as fiduciary of 
the estate. 
{¶ 8} Beginning in December 2020, the probate court issued multiple 
delinquency notices and orders—including orders for Stenson and Grim to appear 
in court and for extensions of time to file—regarding the overdue estate inventory 
and certificate of fee agreement.  Those orders culminated with a body-attachment 
order, served by the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, compelling Stenson to 
appear on March 31, 2021, and show cause why he should not be held in contempt 
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of court.  Following the issuance of that body-attachment order and before the 
scheduled hearing, Stenson filed a certificate of fee agreement and estate inventory 
in the probate court. 
{¶ 9} In the interim, the probate court issued a notice that the estate’s final 
account was overdue.  The court later issued a citation ordering Stenson and Grim 
to appear in court on May 12, 2021, regarding the overdue account, and Stenson 
subsequently obtained an extension of time to file the final account on or before 
September 21, 2021.  Stenson did not meet that deadline, and he did not comply 
with a subsequent citation ordering him to appear and show cause for his failure to 
file the account.  The court continued the filing deadline for the account twice more 
before Stenson was permitted to withdraw as counsel in January 2022.  Grim 
retained new counsel to complete the administration of the estate, and on May 13, 
2022—nearly two years after the estate was opened—the court approved the final 
account. 
{¶ 10} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing 
evidence that Stenson’s conduct in the Grim matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 
(requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing 
a client), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable with a 
client’s reasonable requests for information), 1.4(c) (requiring a lawyer to inform a 
client if the lawyer does not maintain professional-liability insurance and to obtain 
a signed acknowledgment of that notice from the client), and 1.15 (requiring a 
lawyer to hold the property of clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, 
separately from the lawyer’s own property, to maintain a copy of any fee agreement 
with each client, and to maintain a record for each client on whose behalf funds are 
held that sets forth the name of the client and the date, amount, and source of all 
funds received on behalf of such client).  We adopt these findings of misconduct 
and note that based on the parenthetical descriptions of the rules offered in the 
amended complaint, the parties’ stipulations, and the board’s report, the 
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parenthetical description of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15 found by the board shows that the 
violation is a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a). 
Count II—The Russell Matter 
{¶ 11} Around late September or early October 2020, Arnesta Russell 
talked to Stenson about injuries she suffered in a fall at a Macy’s department store 
in August 2020.  Approximately one week after that discussion, Russell met with 
Stenson at his office to discuss her claim.  At that time, Stenson instructed Russell 
to contact him when she completed her course of physical therapy.  Stenson did not 
maintain professional-liability insurance during the time he represented Russell and 
could not produce a written notice signed by Russell advising her of that fact. 
{¶ 12} In October 2020, Stenson sent a letter to inform Macy’s that he 
represented Russell in relation to her claim against the company.  Stenson had 
minimal contact with Russell until she completed her course of physical therapy in 
August 2021.  In September 2021, Stenson informed Russell that he had received 
an offer to settle her claim for $2,500, and Russell rejected the offer. 
{¶ 13} The following May, Stenson sent Russell a letter asking her to send 
him $335 for the fee to file a lawsuit on her behalf against Macy’s.  Russell 
informed Stenson that she would need some time to gather the money.  Although 
Russell delivered a $250 check to Stenson in September 2022, Stenson did not 
attempt to file a lawsuit until December 2022 and January 2023.  However, his 
online filings were rejected because the credit-card number he entered to pay the 
filing fee was invalid.  In his testimony before the hearing panel, Stenson 
acknowledged that it was not until after those filings were rejected that he realized 
that the statute of limitations had elapsed on Russell’s claim. 
{¶ 14} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing 
evidence that Stenson’s conduct in the Russell matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 
1.4(c), and 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with a client about 
the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished), 1.4(a)(3) 
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(requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter), and 1.4(a)(4).  We adopt these findings of misconduct.  And although the 
parties stipulated that Stenson’s conduct also violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15, the board 
unanimously dismissed the alleged violation of that rule, citing the insufficiency of 
the evidence supporting that alleged violation. 
SANCTION 
{¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 16} The parties have stipulated that Stenson’s prior discipline and 
multiple offenses are aggravating factors in this case.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1) 
and (4).  The board adopted those stipulations and also noted that Stenson’s 
misconduct in this case is substantially similar to his misconduct in his previous 
disciplinary case.  That fact weighs in favor of a more severe sanction because the 
prior sanction failed to serve the desired deterrent effect.  See, e.g., Lorain Cty. Bar 
Assn. v. Nelson, 168 Ohio St.3d 596, 2022-Ohio-1288, 200 N.E.3d 1039, ¶ 36.  The 
board further found the aggravating factor of harm to the victim because Stenson’s 
lack of diligence harmed Russell, whose personal-injury claim is now barred by the 
statute of limitations.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(8).  The board also found that 
Stenson refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  See Gov.Bar 
R. V(13)(B)(7).  Specifically, the board noted that Stenson attempted to blame his 
clients for his misconduct by claiming that they had failed to return their signed fee 
agreements to him.  In addition, the board found that Stenson’s waiting until the 
morning of his disciplinary hearing to refund the payments made by Grim and 
Russell constituted an aggravating factor.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(9). 
{¶ 17} As for mitigating factors, the parties stipulated and the board agreed 
that Stenson did not act with a dishonest or selfish motive.  See Gov.Bar R. 
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V(13)(C)(2).  The board noted that Stenson offered no evidence of his character or 
reputation.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(5).  And while he testified about the stress he 
experienced following the deaths of several family members, Stenson provided no 
evidence that he had been diagnosed with any disorder that would qualify as a 
mitigating factor under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7). 
{¶ 18} Relator recommended that Stenson be suspended from the practice 
of law for one year with six months stayed on conditions that would require him to 
complete six hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) focused on law-office 
management, serve a period of monitored probation, and participate in counseling 
through the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”).  Stenson requested a 
fully stayed one-year suspension with the conditions recommended by relator.  
Although neither party provided any caselaw to support its position, the board 
considered three cases that support the imposition of an actual suspension from the 
practice of law—namely, Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabol, 118 Ohio St.3d 65, 2008-
Ohio-1594, 886 N.E.2d 191; Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Weir, 156 Ohio St.3d 566, 
2019-Ohio-2151, 130 N.E.3d 275; and Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 127 
Ohio St.3d 97, 2010-Ohio-4832, 936 N.E.2d 938. 
{¶ 19} After voluntarily dismissing a client’s personal-injury case with the 
client’s consent, Sabol realized that he had improperly calendared—and missed—
the deadline to refile the action.  He immediately told his client to consult another 
lawyer about the potential legal-malpractice claim.  Sabol at ¶ 3-4.  Sabol had failed 
to inform the client that he did not carry professional-liability insurance during his 
representation.  He agreed, however, to settle the client’s malpractice claim and 
paid the agreed amount in full.  Id. at ¶ 5.  Although Sabol cooperated in the 
disciplinary proceeding and made full restitution to his client by resolving the 
malpractice claim, he had prior discipline—he was publicly reprimanded more than 
ten years earlier for dismissing the personal-injury claims of two clients without 
their consent.  Id. at ¶ 9.  Citing that disciplinary history, we concluded that Sabol’s 
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misconduct warranted a stricter sanction than a fully stayed suspension and 
suspended him from the practice of law for six months.  Id. at ¶ 9-10. 
{¶ 20} Weir neglected two client matters and failed to provide competent 
representation to one of his clients.  Weir at ¶ 7, 18-19.  He also failed to reasonably 
communicate with one of those clients, failed to promptly deliver that client’s 
settlement funds to her, failed to notify her that he did not carry professional-
liability insurance, and failed to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary 
investigation.  Id. at ¶ 5-9.  For aggravating factors, Weir had a prior attorney-
registration suspension and committed multiple offenses.  Id. at ¶ 21.  Weir also 
failed to make restitution to a client for a financial loss occasioned by his neglect.  
Id. at ¶ 23.  As in this case, the sole mitigating factor in Weir was the fact that Weir 
did not act with a dishonest or selfish motive.  See id. at ¶ 22.  We suspended Weir 
from the practice of law for one year with six months stayed on the conditions that 
he commit no further misconduct, make restitution to his client, complete a CLE 
course on law-office management, and submit to an assessment conducted by 
OLAP and comply with all treatment recommendations arising from that 
assessment.  Id. at ¶ 28. 
{¶ 21} Johnson neglected two unrelated legal matters by, among other 
things, failing to participate in the discovery process and failing to respond to 
dispositive motions.  Johnson, 127 Ohio St.3d 97, 2010-Ohio-4832, 936 N.E.2d 
938, at ¶ 3-4.  In one of those matters, Johnson’s failures resulted in a default 
judgment of more than $330,000 being entered against her clients.  Id. at ¶ 3.  
Johnson’s failure to prosecute the second matter resulted in the dismissal of the 
client’s complaint without prejudice.  Id. at ¶ 4.  Johnson’s subsequent failure to 
notify that client of the deadline for refiling the case after her withdrawal as counsel 
resulted in the client’s claims being time-barred.  Id. 
{¶ 22} Aggravating factors in Johnson included a history of prior discipline 
for similar offenses and Johnson’s admitted failure to notify her clients that she did 
January Term, 2024 
 
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not maintain professional-liability insurance.  Id. at ¶ 7 and fn. 2.  We also found 
as aggravating factors a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses.  Id. at 
¶ 18.  In mitigation, we found that Johnson had not acted with a selfish motive and 
that in contrast to Stenson, she cooperated in the disciplinary process.  See id. at  
¶ 8.  As in this case, we declined to consider Johnson’s generalized stress arising 
from family and other personal matters as a mitigating factor.  See id. at ¶ 8, 11-15.  
We suspended Johnson from the practice of law for one year with six months stayed 
on the conditions that she commit no further misconduct, submit to a mental-health 
assessment conducted by OLAP, enter into an OLAP contract, and comply with all 
of OLAP’s treatment recommendations.  Id. at ¶ 23.   
{¶ 23} The board acknowledged the similarities between the misconduct at 
issue in Sabol, Weir, and Johnson and the misconduct at issue in this case.  It found 
that Stenson’s prior discipline for similar offenses, his refusal to acknowledge his 
wrongdoing, and his attempts to deflect blame to his clients suggested that an actual 
suspension from the practice of law is necessary to protect the public.  The board 
therefore recommends that Stenson be suspended from the practice of law for one 
year with six months stayed.  In addition, the board recommends that Stenson’s 
reinstatement to the practice of law be conditioned on the submission of proof that 
he has (1) completed a minimum of six hours of CLE focused on law-office 
management, in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, (2) completed a 
client-trust-account training program offered by disciplinary counsel or a bar 
association that maintains a certified-grievance committee, (3) submitted to an 
assessment conducted by OLAP, and (4) complied with any treatment 
recommendations arising from that assessment.  Furthermore, the board 
recommends that upon reinstatement to the practice of law, Stenson be required to 
serve a one-year period of monitored probation focused primarily on law-office 
management and compliance with client-trust-account regulations. 
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{¶ 24} In this case, Stenson disregarded a statute of limitations in the 
Russell matter and multiple filing deadlines and court orders in the Grim matter.  
He failed to reasonably communicate with his clients, failed to notify them that he 
did not carry professional-liability insurance, failed to deposit an unearned fee into 
his client trust account, and failed to maintain required records regarding that 
account.  Although he stipulated to multiple rule violations, he has failed to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct and has instead attempted to 
blame his clients and his own difficult family circumstances for his failures.  In 
light of these facts and their similarity to the facts of Sabol, Weir, and Johnson, we 
agree that a partially stayed one-year suspension with the reinstatement conditions 
recommended by the board is the appropriate sanction for the misconduct at issue 
in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 25} Accordingly, David Edmund Stenson is hereby suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio for one year with six months stayed on the condition that 
he engage in no further misconduct.  If Stenson fails to comply with the condition 
of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will be required to serve the full one-year 
suspension. 
{¶ 26} In addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(24), Stenson’s 
reinstatement to the practice of law shall be conditioned on the submission of proof 
that he has (1) completed a minimum of six hours of CLE focused on law-office 
management, in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, (2) completed a 
client-trust-account training program offered by disciplinary counsel or a bar 
association that maintains a certified-grievance committee, (3) submitted to an 
assessment conducted by OLAP, and (4) complied with any treatment 
recommendations arising from that assessment.  Further, upon reinstatement to the 
practice of law, Stenson shall serve a one-year period of monitored probation in 
accordance with Gov.Bar R. V(21) to be focused primarily on law-office 
January Term, 2024 
 
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management and compliance with client-trust-account regulations.  Costs are taxed 
to Stenson. 
Judgment accordingly. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and DETERS, 
JJ., concur. 
BRUNNER, J., not participating. 
_________________ 
Maria C. Palermo, Bar Counsel, for relator. 
Bieser, Greer & Landis, L.L.P., and David P. Williamson, for respondent. 
_________________