Case Title: State v. Eley

Citation: 1996-Ohio-323

Docket Number: 19960285

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Eley, Appellant. 
[Cite as State v. Eley (1996), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Criminal law -- Aggravated murder -- Death penalty upheld, when. 
 
(No. 96-285 -- Submitted October 16, 1996 -- Decided December 18, 
1996.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, No. 87 C.A. 122. 
 
On August 26, 1986, defendant-appellant, John Jeffrey Eley, shot and 
killed Ihsan “Easy” Aydah during a robbery of the Sinjil Market in 
Youngstown, Ohio.  Eley confessed to the killing, and was subsequently 
convicted of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, and sentenced to 
death. 
 
During the early afternoon of August 26, 1986, Eley was visiting 
Melvin Green at the home of Green’s girlfriend in Youngstown.  According 
to Eley, he and Green were just sitting around when Green suggested that 
they go down to the “Arab store.”  Eley and Green left the house and 
proceeded down a path through the woods leading to the Sinjil Market.  
Along the way, Green showed Eley a “Black Snub nose gun,” and told Eley 
he “was going to take the Arab off.”  Since the proprietor of the store, Ihsan 
 
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Aydah, knew Green’s face, Eley agreed to go in alone and rob the store 
while Green waited outside. 
 
Eley entered the store and told Aydah to put his hands up and to turn 
and face the wall.  Green had told Eley that Aydah had a gun under the store 
counter, so when Aydah lowered his hands and went under the counter, Eley 
fired a shot.  Eley claimed that he aimed at Aydah’s shoulder.  However, the 
shot hit Aydah on the right side of his head, approximately four inches 
above the earlobe.  Aydah died the next day of shock and hemorrhage due to 
a gunshot wound to the head. 
 
Just before Eley fired the gun, Green entered the store.  After the shot, 
Green ran behind the counter and got into the cash register.  He took 
Aydah’s wallet while Aydah lay wounded on the floor.  As the two left the 
store, Green gave Eley a brown paper bag with the money and wallet.  
According to Eley, they went up the street, “got to the path and ran up the 
woods.” 
 
Around 2:00 to 2:30 p.m. that day, Cheryl E. Cooper left home for the 
Sinjil Market with her three children.  Cooper saw Melvin Green and 
another man enter the path to the store “walking fast in front of us.”  Cooper 
 
3 
saw the pair turning the corner heading to the store, and noticed that neither 
man was carrying anything at that time.  Shortly thereafter, Cooper saw 
Melvin Green and the other man, who was carrying a brown paper bag, 
come around the corner, passing them halfway on Davis Lane.  When 
Cooper arrived at the Sinjil Market, she saw magazines and cigarettes 
strewn all over the floor.  She looked over the counter and saw Aydah lying 
on the floor. 
 
Christopher Cretella lived half a block from the Sinjil Market, and 
around 2:30 p.m. that day was outside washing a car in his driveway.  He 
saw Melvin Green and “another fellow” walking away from the store, and 
then running toward the path, right into the woods.  Cretella noticed the pair 
holding a bag and passing something back and forth.  Two weeks before the 
murder, Cretella had seen Green and Aydah “[having] some words,” and 
“Easy told him to get out and not to come back.” 
 
Several days after the murder, Eley was arrested by Youngstown 
police at the residence of his cousin’s girlfriend, Carlotta Skinner.  After his 
arrest, Eley told police that he and Green had split the money taken in the 
 
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robbery, which was around $700.  However, Eley later gave the money back 
to Green “because he said it was all on him and he had to get out.” 
 
After apprehending Eley, Lt. Robert Kane, Detective Joseph Fajack, 
and Detective James Pasquale of the Youngstown Police Department 
brought Eley into the roll call room at police headquarters.  There, Eley was 
given his Miranda rights, and signed two forms.  In the first form, Eley 
waived his Miranda rights; in the second, Eley indicated that he could read 
and write English and reiterated the waiver of Miranda rights and his desire 
to make a voluntary statement. 
 
Eley told the detectives that he wanted to talk about his involvement 
in the Aydah murder.  Although there were tape-recording and video-
equipment devices available nearby, Fajack stated that he and the officers 
present “did not have access” to them.  Therefore, Fajack conducted his 
interview with Eley by writing down each of the questions asked.  Below 
each question, Fajack transcribed Eley’s response verbatim. 
 
In his voluntary statement Eley admitted that he and Green had 
robbed the Sinjil Market, and that he shot Aydah.  Fajack testified that Eley 
 
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did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs during the 
interview and was “very calm” and “passive.” 
 
The grand jury indicted Eley on one count of aggravated murder with 
a specification that the murder was committed during, or immediately after, 
the commission of an aggravated robbery (R.C. 2929.04[A][7]), and that 
Eley was the principal offender.  This count also carried a firearm 
specification.  In addition, Eley was indicted on one count of aggravated 
robbery (R.C. 2911.01[A][1] and [2]) and one count of conspiracy (R.C. 
2923.01[A]).  Each count carried a firearm specification. 
 
In May 1987, Eley waived his right to a jury trial and opted for a trial 
before a three-judge panel.  Eley pled not guilty to the charges against him, 
thereby withdrawing a prior plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.  In May 
1987, the trial court rejected Eley’s motion to suppress his confession and 
found that Eley had made a knowing, intelligent ,and voluntary waiver of 
his rights at the time of the confession. 
 
Trial was held before a three-judge panel on May 11-12, 1987, but the 
defense chose not to present any evidence.  The panel found Eley guilty of 
aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, the felony-murder capital 
 
6 
specification, and two of the three firearm specifications, but not guilty of 
conspiracy. 
 
During the mitigation hearing, several family members testified on 
Eley’s behalf.  Eley’s mother, Cecilia Joseph, divorced Eley’s father when 
Eley was seven or eight years old, and stated that Eley had “not much” of a 
relationship with his father.  Joseph testified that on Christmas night 1964, 
her second husband had been drinking and began choking her and her 
daughter.  At that time, Eley stabbed the second husband with a knife in 
order to stop him.  Joseph testified that Eley dropped out of high school in 
the ninth grade, but later entered the Job Corps and learned to be a welder.  
Eley sent money home to his mother during this time, and gave her money 
to help her finish paying for nursing school.  Joseph stated that while Eley 
has had problems with drugs and alcohol, he is a better person when he is 
not under the influence.  She characterized Eley as “church oriented,” and 
believed he had been “born again.” 
 
Eley’s sister, Susan Laury, testified that Eley had helped the family 
financially while he was in the Job Corps, and that Eley is normally a “quiet, 
sweet, gentle person that wouldn’t hurt anybody.” 
 
7 
 
Dr. Douglas Darnall, a clinical psychologist, found Eley to be of 
borderline intelligence, and ranked him in the twelfth percentile on the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test.  According to Darnall, Eley has a history 
of chronic alcohol and polysubstance abuse, but exhibited “no evidence of 
psychosis or major defective disorder.”  In addition, Darnall testified that 
Eley understands the difference between right and wrong.  Darnall found 
Eley to be remorseful, but Eley never mentioned that he felt remorse for the 
victim.  However, two police officers who witnessed Eley’s confession 
testified that Eley was remorseful before he made that statement.  Eley made 
a short unsworn statement at the mitigation phase that consisted of several 
biblical quotations from the Book of Romans. 
 
After deliberation, the panel unanimously found that the aggravating 
circumstance outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and sentenced Eley to death.  Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the 
convictions and sentence of death. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
James A. Philomena, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Michele G. Cerni, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
8 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Linda E. Prucha and 
Cynthia A. Yost, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.  In this appeal, Eley has raised eighteen 
propositions of law.  Finding none meritorious, we affirm his convictions.  
In addition, we have independently reviewed the record, weighed the 
aggravating circumstance against the mitigating factors, and compared the 
proportionality of the death sentence in this case to the penalty imposed in 
similar cases.  Upon a complete review of the record, we affirm Eley’s 
convictions and sentences. 
I 
Suppression Issues 
 
In Proposition of Law III, Eley contends that his confession to police 
was the product of his drug and alcohol intoxication, as well as 
psychological coercion and the manipulative actions of Youngstown police 
officers.  Eley asserts that because of his intoxication at the time of his 
arrest, he lacked the capacity to comprehend the nature of his right against 
self-incrimination and the consequences of waiving it.  In addition, Eley 
 
9 
argues that he lacked the intelligence to voluntarily waive his constitutional 
rights. 
 
During the suppression hearing, both Eley and Carlotta Skinner, with 
whom he was staying at the time of his arrest, testified that Eley had 
consumed large quantities of Valium, sleeping pills and alcohol during the 
two-day period leading up to his arrest.  As a result, Eley claims to 
remember very little about the events subsequent to his arrest when he 
confessed to the crimes. 
 
Defense witness Dr. Russell Morrison, a physician, testified that 
combining alcohol with the drugs Eley allegedly ingested would prolong the 
effect and deepen one’s state of sedation.  However, Morrison also stated 
that ingesting the quantity of alcohol and drugs allegedly consumed by Eley 
could put a person near death. 
 
The testimony of the three officers who interrogated Eley weakens 
defense arguments under this proposition.  Detective Fajack stated that he 
did not notice anything that would indicate that Eley was under the 
influence of any medication, drugs, or stimulants.  Detective Robert Kane 
testified that Eley told Fajack at the time of the confession that he (Eley) 
 
10 
wanted to tell his side of the story of what happened at the Sinjil Market.  
Detective Pasquale felt that Eley understood the questions posed to him by 
Fajack. 
 
Whether a statement was made voluntarily and whether an accused 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel and 
right against self-incrimination are distinct issues.  However, both are 
measured by the “totality of circumstances” standard.  State v. Clark (1988), 
38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261, 527 N.E.2d 844, 854.  Evidence of police coercion 
or overreaching is necessary for a finding of involuntariness, and not simply 
evidence of a low mental aptitude of the interrogee.  State v. Hill (1992), 64 
Ohio St.3d 313, 318, 595 N.E.2d 884, 890, citing Colorado v. Connelly 
(1986), 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 482-483. 
 
Here, there is no evidence that the police subjected Eley to threats or 
physical abuse, or deprived him of food, sleep, or medical treatment.  See 
State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 28, 544 N.E.2d 895, 908.  The 
transcript from the suppression hearing reveals no hint or allegation of 
coercive activity by the police, either in the testimony elicited from the 
officers or in Eley’s testimony.  Also, the time between Eley’s arrest and 
 
11 
confession was not lengthy, as the two events took place less than two hours 
apart.  According to Detective Pasquale, the whole interrogation process 
with Eley encompassed “roughly an hour.”  See State v. Smith (1991), 61 
Ohio St.3d 284, 288, 574 N.E.2d 510, 515. 
 
Eley testified at the suppression hearing that he understood his 
constitutional rights prior to giving his confession to the police.  Moreover, 
evidence of a written waiver form signed by the accused is strong proof that 
the waiver is valid.  Clark, supra, 38 Ohio St.3d at 261, 527 N.E.2d at 854, 
citing N. Carolina v. Butler (1979), 441 U.S. 369, 375-376, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 
1758-1759, 60 L.Ed.2d 286, 293-294. 
 
Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Eley made a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights, and 
that his confession to police was voluntarily made.  Eley’s claims of heavy 
drug and alcohol intoxication are inconsistent with the testimony given by 
the police officers, nor do they appear to be credible in view of Dr. 
Morrison’s testimony at the suppression hearing.  See State v. Fanning 
(1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 1 OBR 57, 58, 437 N.E.2d 583, 584 (weight of 
 
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the evidence and credibility of witnesses are primarily for trier of fact).  
Accordingly, we overrule Proposition of Law III. 
 
In Proposition of Law IV, Eley claims that the trial court violated 
Crim.R. 12(E) by failing to state essential findings of fact on the record 
when it ruled on his motion to suppress the confession.  However, Crim.R. 
12(E) does not control because Eley did not request factual findings.  “[I]n 
order to invoke the rule, the defendant must request that the court state its 
essential findings of fact in support of its denial of a motion.  See Bryan v. 
Knapp (1986), 21 Ohio St.3d 64, 21 OBR 363, 488 N.E.2d 142.  ”  State v. 
Benner (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 317, 533 N.E.2d 701, 718; State v. 
Richey (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 366, 595 N.E.2d 915, 927; State v. 
Brown (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 476, 481, 597 N.E.2d 97, 101.  Eley’s failure 
to invoke the rule waived any error.  State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 
112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364.  Thus, we reject Eley’s fourth 
proposition of law. 
II 
Evidentiary Issues 
 
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In Proposition of Law II, Eley argues that the evidence proffered by 
the state was insufficient to prove every essential element of the capital 
crime with which he was charged.  Eley further contends that his conviction 
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
 
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, the relevant inquiry 
is whether any rational factfinder, viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the state, could have found the essential elements of the crime 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 
307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573; State v. Jenks (1991), 
61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus.  The 
verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds that reasonable 
minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier of fact.  Id. at 273, 
574 N.E.2d at 503. 
 
Eley points out that neither of the two witnesses who saw Melvin 
Green and another man at the scene could identify him as the other person.  
However, Eley put himself at the crime scene with Green when, in front of 
three police detectives, he confessed to the killing.  The testimony of 
 
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Cooper and Cretella, who were in the vicinity of the Sinjil Market at the 
time of the murder, corroborated Eley’s confession. 
 
Eley also asserts that he did not possess the culpable mental state 
required for conviction under R.C. 2903.01(B) and (D), and that specific 
intent is lacking, since his statement to police indicated that he tried to shoot 
Aydah in the shoulder.  Therefore, Eley submits that his specific intent was 
only to wound the victim, who was reaching for a gun. 
 
However, intentional use of an inherently dangerous weapon during 
the commission of a felony, resulting in death, is sufficient to establish the 
element of purposefulness.  State v. Esparza (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 8, 14, 
529 N.E.2d 192, 199.  Intent need not be proven by direct testimony.  State 
v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 168, 555 N.E.2d 293, 302.  Instead, an 
intent to kill “may be deduced from all the surrounding circumstances, 
including the instrument used to produce death, its tendency to destroy life 
if designed for that purpose, and the manner of inflicting a fatal wound.”  
State v. Robinson (1954), 161 Ohio St. 213, 53 O.O. 96, 118 N.E.2d 517, 
paragraph five of the syllabus.  Here, Eley entered the market with a loaded 
gun and fired it at Aydah when it appeared that Aydah was reaching for a 
 
15 
gun that Green had told him was kept under the counter.  Eley’s self-serving 
statement that he was trying to shoot Aydah in the shoulder supports Eley’s 
preferred interpretation as to his intent.  However, the evidence and 
surrounding circumstances strongly support the panel’s conclusion that Eley 
intended to kill Aydah, since the shot allegedly intended for his shoulder 
struck him in the upper part of his head.  Under the evidentiary test outlined 
in Jenks, supra, there was sufficient evidence to convict Eley of aggravated 
murder. 
 
Eley’s manifest-weight argument must also fail, since this court lacks 
the constitutional power to consider and pass upon the weight of the 
evidence.  Cooey, supra, 46 Ohio St.3d at 26, 544 N.E. at 906.  This court 
will not sit as a “‘thirteenth juror,’” even in capital cases.  State v. Tyler 
(1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 33, 553 N.E.2d 576, 589, quoting Tibbs v. Florida 
(1982), 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2218, 72 L.Ed.2d 652, 661. 
 
In State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384, 513 N.E.2d 754, 759, 
this court reaffirmed that it will indulge “in the usual presumption that in a 
bench trial in a criminal case the court considered only the relevant, 
material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it 
 
16 
affirmatively appears to the contrary.”  Id., citing State v. White (1968), 15 
Ohio St.2d 146, 151, 44 O.O.2d 132, 136, 239 N.E.2d 65, 70.  In 
Proposition of Law VII, Eley asserts that this presumption allows the state 
to present inflammatory and prejudicial evidence without cost, and thereby 
denies him due process and equal protection. 
 
However, we believe that this presumption appropriately credits the 
judiciary with knowledge of the law and the ability to correctly apply it.  
Moreover, a capital defendant has a full and fair opportunity to point out 
any errors occurring during a trial before a three-judge panel, and to 
subsequently on appeal demonstrate how such errors were relied upon by 
the court in arriving at its judgment.  Eley’s arguments in this vein are 
unpersuasive.  Therefore, we reject Proposition of Law VII. 
 
In Proposition of Law XI, Eley contends that the testimony of the 
coroner, Dr. Nathan D. Belinky, did not meet the requirements of Evid.R. 
703:  “The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by him or admitted in evidence 
at the hearing.”  Eley contends that Belinky’s mere observation of the 
autopsy performed on Aydah provided insufficient facts upon which he 
 
17 
could have based his testimony.  Eley submits that since the coroner’s report 
was never admitted into evidence, Belinky’s testimony was improper.  Eley 
further asserts that his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against 
him was violated. 
 
At trial, Belinky testified as to the autopsy findings and Aydah’s 
cause of death.  While Belinky did not perform the autopsy on Aydah’s 
body, he was present while it was done, and it was done at his direction.  
However, Belinky admitted that he did not supervise the autopsy or tell the 
performing pathologist what to do.  Belinky used the coroner’s report to 
refresh his memory while he testified, but the report was not admitted into 
evidence. 
 
In State v. Solomon (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 124, 570 N.E.2d 1118, we 
rejected a similar argument that testimony is rendered inadmissible if an 
expert opinion is based in part on reports not admitted into evidence.  
Therein, we held that “[w]here an expert bases his opinion, in whole or in 
major part, on facts or data perceived by him, the requirement of Evid.R. 
703 has been satisfied.”  Id., syllabus. 
 
18 
 
In this case, Belinky, as county coroner, was clearly qualified to 
testify as an expert when he observed the autopsy performed on the victim.  
His testimony was based on his personal observations, which were refreshed 
by the autopsy report and hospital records.  Belinky’s testimony regarding 
the entrance wound on Aydah’s head was plainly based on his personal 
observations. 
 
In addition, Eley’s constitutional arguments are not valid.  Defense 
counsel cross-examined Belinky at trial concerning his testimony and, thus, 
there was no denial of Eley’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
against him.  Therefore, we overrule Proposition of Law XI. 
 
In Proposition of Law XIV, Eley claims that he was denied a fair trial 
during both phases when the trial court admitted gruesome, inflammatory 
and repetitive photographic evidence. 
 
Under Evid.R. 403 and 611(A), the admission of photographs is left 
to the sound discretion of the trial court.  State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio 
St.3d 239, 264, 15 OBR 379, 401, 473 N.E.2d 768, 791.  Nonrepetitive 
photographs in capital cases, even if gruesome, are admissible if the 
probative value of each photograph outweighs the danger of material 
 
19 
prejudice to the accused.  Id. at paragraph seven of the syllabus; State v. 
Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 258, 513 N.E.2d 267, 273-274. 
 
A review of the two photos assailed by Eley, State Exhibits 2 and 3, 
does not support his assertion that they were gruesome or repetitive.  The 
photos at issue portray two different views of Aydah’s cranial area, with the 
wound sutured closed, and were illustrative of the coroner’s testimony.  
Both are in black-and-white.  In addition, the photos were probative of 
purposefulness in the guilt phase, and were probative in the penalty phase 
with regard to the aggravating circumstance.  Accordingly, we reject 
Proposition of Law XIV. 
III 
Miscellaneous Trial Issues 
 
In Proposition of Law VI, Eley argues that the trial panel failed to 
ensure an intelligent, voluntary, and knowing jury waiver, because it failed 
to consider his limited intellectual ability in assessing his knowledge of the 
relevant circumstances and likely consequences of his jury trial waiver. 
 
In this case, Eley submitted a written jury waiver and opted for a trial 
before a three-judge panel.  While the court questioned Eley at the time 
 
20 
about his jury waiver, such an interrogation is not required to determine 
whether an accused is fully apprised of his or her right to a jury trial.  State 
v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 25-26, 559 N.E.2d 464, 468.  Eley’s bald 
assertion that he is so mentally challenged as to be incapable of giving a 
valid waiver is not supported in the record.  Moreover, the trial court 
complied with all the requirements of a jury waiver in this case.  See State v. 
Pless (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 333, 658 N.E.2d 766, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  Therefore, Proposition of Law VI is without merit. 
 
In Proposition of Law IX, Eley alleges that the three-judge panel 
erred by stating that it would consider the lesser included offenses of 
murder and involuntary manslaughter only if any of the necessary elements 
of aggravated murder had not been proven, a procedure rejected in State v. 
Thomas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, paragraph three of the 
syllabus.  The trial transcript, however, does not support Eley’s contention. 
 
The statement challenged by Eley was actually a question asked by 
one of the panel to the prosecutor: 
 
“JUDGEHOUSER [sic]:  May I ask a question? 
 
“MR. ZENA [defense attorney]: Go ahead. 
 
21 
 
“JUDGE HOUSER:  Mr. Van Brocklin [prosecutor], is it your posture 
that the lessor [sic] included offense of which Mr. Zena says should be 
considered by the Court -- you know -- depending on whether aggravated 
murder with specifications -- you know -- first we should consider that, but 
also if any of the necessary elements have not been proven -- you know -- 
going to the lessor [sic] included offenses.  Is it your posture, sir, that under 
no circumstances is murder or voluntary manslaughter is a lessor [sic] 
included offense in this case?” 
 
Here, the judge was asking the prosecutor whether in his view of the 
case lesser included offenses should be considered by the panel.  The judge 
was not expressing his own opinion or position, as Eley suggests.  Shortly 
after this question was posed, Judge Jenkins stated that the panel would 
consider three charges:  aggravated murder, murder, and involuntary 
manslaughter.  Moreover, it is presumed that the three-judge panel knew the 
law.  State v. Davis (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 44, 48, 584 N.E.2d 1192, 1195; 
Post, supra, 32 Ohio St.3d at 384, 513 N.E.2d at 759.  Therefore, we 
overrule Proposition of Law IX. 
 
22 
 
In Proposition of Law X, Eley next argues that the trial court should 
have conducted a competency hearing, since there was a bona fide doubt as 
to his competency.  See Pate v. Robinson (1966), 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 
836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815.  Eley submits that the court’s failure to conduct such a 
hearing precluded the development of evidence which would have revealed 
sufficient indicia of incompetence. 
 
The record indicates that on December 29, 1986, Eley’s counsel 
requested the appointment of a psychiatric expert and a competency hearing.  
The court ordered an examination and on February 4, 1987, set a 
competency hearing for February 10, 1987.  On February 10, Dr. Douglas 
Darnall was appointed by the court to reexamine Eley.  The competency 
hearing, however, was never held.  Then, on May 11, 1987, Eley withdrew 
his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and chose to proceed solely on a 
plea of not guilty.  At that time, Eley filed a document acknowledging that 
he “knowingly and intelligently” withdrew “any challenge to his 
competency to proceed with the trial of this action.”  Thus, Eley 
affirmatively waived his right to a competency hearing that he previously 
requested pursuant to R.C. 2945.37. 
 
23 
 
Even if we were to find Eley’s waiver invalid, any error by the trial 
court in not conducting a hearing was harmless, since the record fails to 
reveal sufficient indicia of incompetency.  See State v. Bock (1986), 28 Ohio 
St.3d 108, 28 OBR 207, 502 N.E.2d 1016, paragraph one of the syllabus.  
Other than mentioning a few aspects of his background that were brought 
out during the mitigation phase, Eley fails to cite any portion of the record 
which reveals any suggestion of incompetency.  Accordingly, we reject 
Proposition of Law X. 
 
In Proposition of Law XII, Eley contends that the three-judge panel 
erred by separating prior to deliberations during both phases of the trial. 
However, defense counsel expressly declined to object to the separation of 
judges during either phase of trial.  This waived any objection. 
 
Eley further argues that counsel’s failure to object constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  However, counsel lacked any basis to 
object in light of State v. Davis, supra, which held that “the rules pertaining 
to jury sequestration need not apply to a three-judge panel which is 
presumed to consider only relevant, competent and admissible evidence in 
its deliberations.”  Davis, supra, 63 Ohio St.3d at 48, 584 N.E.2d at 1196. 
 
24 
 
Moreover, Eley fails to demonstrate prejudice, “a reasonable 
probability that were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would 
have been different.”  State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 
N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
 
Eley next argues that the panel erred in failing to ensure his presence 
at all proceedings.  Specifically, counsel for Eley objected at the beginning 
of the capital trial that Eley had not been present for the selection process of 
the three-judge panel.  In a related argument, Eley claims that the panel 
erred in failing to grant his motion for individual voir dire of its members. 
 
R.C. 2945.06 provides that the three-judge panel is to be composed of 
three judges: the judge presiding at the time in the trial of criminal cases and 
two judges to be designated by that judge or by the presiding judge or chief 
justice of that court.  The statute makes no provision for any hearing or voir 
dire of the judges to be selected for the panel.  Since there is no right to voir 
dire the members of a three-judge panel, Eley’s presence during its selection 
had no “reasonably substantial” relationship “to the fullness of his 
opportunity to defend against the charge.”  Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), 
 
25 
291 U.S. 97, 105-106, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674, 678.  Therefore, he 
had no right to be present when the judges were selected.   
 
In Proposition of Law XV, Eley contends that R.C. 2901.05(D), 
which defines “reasonable doubt,” encourages the trier of fact to adopt a 
standard below that which is required by due process.  However, we have 
consistently rejected this argument.  See, e.g., State v. Frazier (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 323, 330, 652 N.E.2d 1000, 1008. 
IV 
Sentencing Issues 
 
In his first proposition of law, Eley contends that the death sentence is 
inappropriate based on the mitigating evidence.  In Proposition of Law V, 
Eley asserts that the three-judge panel failed to consider and give effect to 
relevant mitigating evidence. 
 
In support of both propositions, Eley submits that the substantial 
evidence in mitigation outweighs the single aggravating circumstance he 
was found guilty of committing (i.e., murder during aggravated robbery).  
Eley claims that the following evidence submitted by him should have 
precluded imposition of the death penalty:  that he came from a 
 
26 
dysfunctional family; that despite this, he established positive relationships 
with other family members; that he has limited intellect and education; that 
he suffers from chronic alcoholism and polysubstance abuse and related 
blackouts, which caused him to act out impulsively; that he exercises poor 
judgment with minimal control of his behavior; that he suffered head 
injuries as a teenager; that he has behaved well while incarcerated and has 
undergone a religious conversion; and that Melvin Green, the instigator and 
planner of the crimes, has gone unpunished. 
 
While a defendant has wide latitude in introducing any evidence 
alleged to be mitigating, a court is not necessarily required to accept as 
mitigating everything offered by the defendant and admitted.  Nor is the 
court automatically required to give such admissible evidence any weight.  
State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  While Eley’s family background may have 
been dysfunctional, the fact that others with similar backgrounds have 
grown up as law-abiding citizens tends to diminish this factor as mitigating.  
Id. at 129, 31 OBR at 288, 509 N.E.2d at 399. 
 
27 
 
Likewise, Eley’s assertions about his intellectual ability, alcoholism, 
and polysubstance abuse have diminished mitigating value in light of 
Darnall’s testimony.  Darnall testified that Eley was literate, could function 
day to day, and was sane and competent at the time of the murder.  
Moreover, Darnall opined that it did not appear that Eley was in any 
alcohol- or drug-induced blackout when the murder took place 
 
Although Eley’s accomplice, Melvin Green, was acquitted, disparity 
of treatment between accomplices does not justify reversal of a death 
sentence where the sentence is neither illegal nor an abuse of discretion.  
State v. Burke (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 399, 407, 653 N.E.2d 242, 249; State v. 
Green (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 141, 151, 609 N.E.2d 1253, 1261. 
 
Other points raised by Eley will be discussed as part of this court’s 
independent review.  Even if error did occur in the courts below, it can be 
readily cured by this court’s independent review and assessment.  Lott, 
supra, 51 Ohio St.3d at 170, 555 N.E.2d at 304. 
 
In Proposition of Law XIII, Eley argues that the trial court erred in 
considering information in the presentence investigation (“PSI”) report 
about former charges brought against him that were dismissed.  However, 
 
28 
the inclusion of this information in the PSI report was not erroneous.  
Cooey, supra, 46 Ohio St.3d at 35, 544 N.E.2d at 914; State v. Hutton 
(1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 36, 559 N.E.2d 432, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
Eley also claims that the court erroneously considered the 
prosecutor’s death penalty recommendation, which was included in the PSI 
report.  In Cooey, the defendant similarly claimed error where the PSI report 
included a police captain’s death penalty recommendation.  As in Cooey, 
supra, it does not appear that the trial court placed any reliance on the 
prosecutor’s recommendation.  Any error is harmless.  Id. at 35, 544 N.E.2d 
at 914. 
 
In Proposition of Law XVI, Eley contends that the proportionality 
review process required by R.C. 2929.05 is fatally flawed.  We have 
rejected this argument many times.  See, e.g., Steffen, supra, 31 Ohio St.3d 
at 123, 31 OBR at 273, 509 N.E.2d at 394, and paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
 
Eley also argues that his sentence is disproportionate given the fate of 
Melvin Green, who was acquitted of an aggravated murder charge for 
Aydah’s death in a separate trial.  Eley asserts that his death sentence was 
 
29 
arbitrary and inappropriate, since Green planned the crime and was the only 
person identified near the crime scene. 
 
Steffen, Burke, and Green, supra, make clear that Green’s acquittal is 
irrelevant to proportionality review.  Obviously, since Green was acquitted, 
his is not a “similar” case under R.C. 2929.05(A). 
V 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Under Proposition of Law VIII, Eley alleges seven areas of 
prosecutorial misconduct encompassing both phases of the trial: (1) 
misstatements concerning the evidence and permissible inferences; (2) 
inappropriate expression of opinion regarding the truth or falsity of 
testimony and other evidence; (3) misstatements concerning the amount and 
quality of mitigating evidence and the law applicable thereto; (4) 
inflammatory arguments; (5) injection of extraneous issues to improperly 
influence deliberations; (6) presentation of nonstatutory aggravating 
circumstances; and (7) cumulative misconduct. 
 
The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the remarks were 
improper, and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of 
 
30 
the accused.  State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14-15, 14 OBR 317, 
318, 470 N.E.2d 883, 885.  In this case it is presumed that the three-judge 
panel considered only relevant, competent, and admissible evidence in its 
deliberations.  Davis, supra, 63 Ohio St.3d at 48, 584 N.E.2d at 1195.  In 
addition, the prosecution is entitled to a certain degree of latitude in 
summation.  State v. Liberatore (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 583, 589, 23 O.O.3d 
489,  493, 433 N.E.2d 561, 566. 
 
(1)  With respect to alleged misstatements of evidence and 
impermissible inferences, no objection was raised by Eley at the time any of 
the cited statements were made.  Therefore, all but plain error is waived.  
State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 604, 605 N.E.2d 916, 925.  
Except for the second statement cited by Eley, that Aydah “expired about 
three or four hours after the shooting,” all of these statements were 
reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence.  See State v. 
Stephens (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 76, 82, 53 O.O.2d 182, 185, 263 N.E.2d 
773, 777.  Moreover, both parties are permitted wide latitude during closing 
argument.  State v. Brown (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 317, 528 N.E.2d 523, 
538.  Eley has not demonstrated that the one misstatement set forth above 
 
31 
clearly altered the outcome of the trial.  See State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio 
St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
(2)  With regard to Eley’s allegations of inappropriate expressions of 
opinion by the prosecutor, the six statements cited by Eley as inappropriate 
were not objected to and, therefore, all but plain error is waived.  Slagle, 
supra.  Moreover, none of the alleged expressions of opinion was improper.  
The prosecutor was simply arguing his case.  Plain error is absent here. 
 
(3) Eley alleges prosecutorial misstatements concerning the amount 
and quality of mitigating evidence.  Generally, the prosecution is entitled to 
challenge defense mitigation evidence by cross-examination or rebuttal.  
Lott, supra, 51 Ohio St.3d at 174, 555 N.E.2d at 307.  Moreover, even if 
these comments were improper, they did not prejudicially affect the 
substantial rights of Eley.  Smith, supra, 14 Ohio St.3d at 14, 14 OBR at 
318, 470 N.E.2d at 885.  The panel is presumed to have considered only 
relevant, competent and admissible evidence in its deliberations.  Davis, 
supra, 63 Ohio St.3d at 48, 584 N.E.2d at 1195.  Moreover, any prejudicial 
impact is minimized by this court’s independent review.  State v. Lundgren 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 474, 486, 653 N.E.2d 304, 318. 
 
32 
 
(4)  Eley next complains about inflammatory arguments made by the 
prosecutor that he contends deprived him of a fair trial.  However, Eley’s 
failure to object to any of the cited statements waives all but plain error.  
Slagle, supra.  None of these statements constituted plain error, since they 
were clearly not outcome-determinative.  Long, supra. 
 
(5)  Eley argues that the prosecutor improperly urged the sentencer to 
impose the death penalty based on something other than individualized 
determination of the appropriateness of his sentence.  However, the panel is 
presumed to know the law and to consider only relevant, competent and 
admissible evidence in its deliberations.  Davis, supra.  Any error is 
harmless at best. 
 
(6)  Next, Eley contends that the prosecutor argued nonstatutory 
aggravating circumstances.  Eley relies on State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio 
St.3d 369, 371, 513 N.E.2d 744, 746, for the proposition that it is error to 
invoke the words “prior calculation and design” when referring to an 
offender who personally killed the victim.  However, a review of the context 
in which the words “prior calculation and design” were invoked indicates 
 
33 
that such terminology was not being argued as an additional, uncharged 
aggravating circumstance.  Thus, Penix is readily distinguishable. 
 
(7)  Last, Eley relies on State v. Thompson (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 
14, 514 N.E.2d 407, 420, in arguing that the accumulation of prosecutorial 
misconduct during closing arguments in both phases impaired his right to a 
fair trial.  However, the record indicates that Eley received a fair trial, that 
the closing arguments were generally within the bounds of propriety, and 
that any error committed by the prosecutor was clearly nonprejudicial.  
Therefore, Thompson does not require reversal.  Accordingly, we overrule 
Eley’s Proposition of Law VIII. 
VI 
Constitutionality 
 
In Propositions of Law XVII and XVIII, Eley raises several 
arguments claiming that Ohio’s death penalty provisions are 
unconstitutional on their face and as applied.  However, these arguments 
have previously been rejected by this court and are summarily rejected here.   
State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus. 
VII 
 
34 
Independent Review and Proportionality Analysis 
 
After independent assessment, we find that the evidence supports 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Eley murdered Ihsan “Easy” Aydah while 
committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery, and that Eley was 
the principal offender in the aggravated murder.  R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 
 
We find nothing in the nature and circumstances to be mitigating.  
Eley participated in a robbery where, under the circumstances, a murder was 
likely to occur.  Eley used a gun, and was aware that the proprietor kept a 
gun under the store counter.  After shooting Aydah and fleeing the scene of 
the crime, Eley divided the stolen money with his accomplice, and then hid 
out until his arrest. 
 
Eley’s history, character, and background are entitled to modest 
weight in mitigation.  Eley was seven or eight years of age when his parents 
divorced, and he had a weak relationship with his father.  At one time, Eley 
had a good relationship with his stepfather, but the stepfather would get 
“nasty” when he drank alcohol.  On one occasion, he physically abused 
Eley’s mother and sister.  Eley defended them by stabbing his stepfather. 
 
35 
 
Eley’s mother and sister testified that Eley had expressed frustration 
over being placed in slow learner classes, but they encouraged him that he 
had a good mind.  Nevertheless, Eley quit school in the ninth grade, then 
entered the Job Corps at age seventeen and learned how to be a welder.  
While in the Job Corps, Eley would send money home to his family and, in 
one instance, gave his mother $100 to finish payments for her nursing 
education. 
 
Eley’s mother and sister both conceded that Eley had problems with 
alcohol and drugs, but maintained that “you wouldn’t want to meet a better 
person” when he wasn’t abusing these substances.  Eley’s sister described 
him as normally a “quiet, sweet, gentle person that wouldn’t hurt anybody.”  
Eley’s brother-in-law stated that Eley was kind and concerned with his 
children, especially with the one who has a learning disability.  Eley’s 
mother stated that all his siblings love him, and that Eley was “church 
oriented” growing up, and is now “born again.”  Eley’s unsworn statement, 
consisting mostly of Bible verses, seems to support this assertion.  However, 
Eley had served time in prison for shooting a man in the legs, and for 
breaking and entering. 
 
36 
 
Dr. Douglas Darnall testified that Eley was of borderline intelligence, 
but could comprehend most material he would encounter day-to-day and is 
literate.  Darnall stated that Eley has a chronic history of both alcohol and 
polysubstance abuse, but found “no evidence of psychosis or major 
defective disorder.”  Eley understands the difference between right and 
wrong, but has a history of impulsivity.  Darnall found Eley to be 
remorseful, but not about the victim of his crime.  However, two of the 
police detectives present when Eley confessed testified that Eley appeared 
to be remorseful and sorrowful for murdering Aydah. 
 
We find none of the first six statutory mitigating factors in R.C. 
2929.04(B) to be relevant.  However, several aspects of factor (7), the 
catchall factor, deserve some weight in mitigation.  Eley’s longstanding, 
consistent devotion and care for his family deserve some weight.  See State 
v. Lawrence (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 24, 33, 541 N.E.2d 451, 460.  While the 
testimony was conflicting, Eley had shown remorse, which is worthy of 
some weight in mitigation.  See State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 
107, 125, 559 N.E.2d 710, 730. 
 
37 
 
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that  the aggravating 
circumstance outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Eley confessed to the crimes of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery 
against Ihsan Aydah, and his actions merit the capital penalty to which he 
was sentenced. 
 
Eley’s death sentence is both appropriate and proportionate when 
compared with similar cases of murder combined with aggravated robbery.  
See Green, supra, 66 Ohio St.3d 141, 609 N.E.2d 1253; State v. Tyler 
(1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 553 N.E.2d 576; Clark, supra, 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 
527 N.E.2d 884; and State v. Scott (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 92, 26 OBR 79, 
497 N.E.2d 55. 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals 
is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.