Case Title: Reittinger v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 991417

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 
 
CHRISTOPHER REITTINGER 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 991417 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
June 9, 2000 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in holding that the trial court correctly refused to 
suppress certain evidence found during a search of the defendant 
by a deputy sheriff. 
I 
 
In a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Rockbridge County, 
Christopher Reittinger was found guilty of possession of 
marijuana, in violation of Code § 18.2-250.1, and fined $150.  
The court also suspended Reittinger's driver's license for a 
period of six months, pursuant to the provisions of Code § 18.2-
259.1. 
 
On July 21, 1998, a panel of the Court of Appeals reversed 
Reittinger's conviction.  Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. 
App. 80, 502 S.E.2d 151 (1998).  Upon a rehearing en banc, 
however, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.  
Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 724, 514 S.E.2d 775 
(1999) (en banc). 
II 
 
On May 3, 1996, about 10:30 p.m., Deputy Sheriff Hugh Bolen 
stopped a van on Route 11 in Rockbridge County because the van 
had "only one operable headlight."  Deputy Bolen approached the 
driver's side of the van, and Deputy Max Smith approached the 
van's passenger side.  Deputy Bolen asked Reittinger, the 
driver, for his operator's license and vehicle registration and 
informed Reittinger that the van had only one illuminated 
headlight.  Thereupon, Reittinger displayed a new headlight that 
he said he planned to install the following day.  Deputy Bolen, 
having decided against issuing a citation, simply gave 
Reittinger a verbal warning.  Deputy Bolen then told Reittinger 
that he was "free to go." 
 
Immediately thereafter, however, Deputy Bolen asked 
Reittinger whether he had any illegal weapons or drugs in the 
vehicle, and Reittinger stated that there was nothing illegal in 
the van.  Deputy Bolen then asked Reittinger for permission to 
search the van.  The deputy twice repeated the request to search 
while Reittinger appeared to consult with the passengers in the 
van.   
 
Rather than answer the deputy, Reittinger exited the van. 
Deputy Bolen then saw a "large bulge" in Reittinger's right 
pants pocket and conducted a "pat down" search of Reittinger.  
The bulge felt "hard," and Deputy Bolen thought Reittinger might 
 
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be carrying a weapon.  Deputy Bolen then ordered Reittinger to 
empty his pocket.  Reittinger removed an object that proved to 
be a smoking pipe containing marijuana residue.  Deputy Bolen 
testified that, when he requested consent to search the van, he 
had no reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
on the part of Reittinger. 
III 
 
Reittinger contends that, under the facts of this case, the 
search was the product of an unlawful seizure and, therefore, 
was invalid.  He further asserts that, assuming arguendo he was 
engaged in a consensual encounter with the deputy when he exited 
his vehicle, no legal justification existed for his seizure and 
search. 
 
The Commonwealth contends that Reittinger was not 
unlawfully seized but that, after he was told that he was free 
to leave, he and the deputy were engaged in a consensual 
encounter following the completion of a lawful traffic stop.  
The Commonwealth further contends that, after Reittinger exited 
the vehicle and while the deputy and Reittinger continued to be 
engaged in a consensual encounter, the deputy saw a bulge in 
Reittinger's pocket that he believed could have been a weapon.  
Therefore, the Commonwealth asserts, the search of Reittinger 
was lawful because it was done for the deputies' protection. 
 
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In affirming the trial court's denial of Reittinger's 
motion to suppress, the Court of Appeals essentially adopted the 
Commonwealth's contentions.  The Court of Appeals held that, 
where a lawful encounter based on reasonable suspicion 
or probable cause flows immediately into a consensual 
encounter, an officer remains lawfully in the presence 
of the individual previously detained for purposes of 
conducting a pat-down search[, and, t]herefore, the 
officer may frisk the individual for weapons if he 
develops a reasonable suspicion that the individual 
may be armed and dangerous. 
Reittinger, 29 Va. App. at 733-34, 514 S.E.2d at 779-80. 
 
IV 
 
The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides, 
in pertinent part, that "[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, . . . and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated."  It is firmly 
established that warrantless searches and seizures are per se 
unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically-established and 
well-delineated exceptions.  Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 
19-20 (1984).  Thus, "the Commonwealth has the burden of proving 
the legitimacy of a warrantless search and seizure."  Simmons v. 
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 204, 380 S.E.2d 656, 659 (1989). 
Whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated "'is a question 
of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.'"  Ohio v. 
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) (quoting Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973)). 
 
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In considering a challenge under the Fourth Amendment, 
questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause involve 
questions of both law and fact and are reviewed de novo on 
appeal.  Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); 
Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 
(2000).  Similarly, the question whether a person has been 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is reviewed de novo 
on appeal.  See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226; see also United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 n.5 (1980).  An 
appellate court, however, "should take care both to review 
findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due 
weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges 
and local law enforcement officers."  Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699. 
 
In the present case, the trial court found that "[t]he 
deputy effectively seized [Reittinger] without probable cause 
and without an articulable suspicion to investigate further." ∗ 
The court further found that "[a] reasonable person . . . upon 
immediately being subjected to a new and unrelated inquiry would 
conclude his detention continued . . . and [that] the reasonable 
inference to be drawn from [Reittinger's] voluntarily exiting 
his vehicle is that [he] concluded he was not free to leave."  
                     
∗ A person is "seized" "only when, by means of physical force or 
a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained."   
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553. 
 
 
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Despite the trial court's conclusion that "[t]he detention of 
[Reittinger] after the investigation of the [traffic] violation 
was completed was illegal," the court ruled that the subsequent 
"pat down" search was justified for the deputies' protection. 
 
While law enforcement officers may engage in consensual 
encounters with citizens, the Supreme Court has limited such 
encounters to those in which "a reasonable person would feel 
free 'to disregard the police and go about his business.' "  
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (quoting California 
v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)); accord Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (plurality opinion).  In the 
present case, Reittinger had been stopped in a rural area in the 
nighttime.  He was in the presence of two armed deputies, one on 
each side of the vehicle.  Deputy Bolen asked Reittinger to 
waive his Fourth Amendment right and consent to a search of the 
vehicle.  When Reittinger did not respond, the deputy asked a 
second and then third time for consent to search.  These 
requests for permission to search were made even though Deputy 
Bolen admitted that he "had no reasonable and articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity on the part of [Reittinger]." 
 
Although Deputy Bolen had told Reittinger that he was free 
to go, we think that the events that transpired immediately 
thereafter would suggest to a reasonable person that just the 
opposite was the case.  We do not think that a reasonable 
 
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person, under the circumstances, would have considered that he 
was free to disregard the deputies and simply drive away.  
Therefore, we conclude, from our de novo review of the facts, 
that Reittinger was unlawfully seized in violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights; that the trial court, though correct about the 
seizure, erred in refusing to suppress the product of the 
unlawful seizure and search of Reittinger; and that the Court of 
Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's judgment. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, vacate Reittinger's conviction, and remand the case to 
the Court of Appeals with direction that the case be remanded to 
the trial court for further proceedings if the Commonwealth be 
so advised. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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