Case Title: Washington v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 435, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
SHAVELLE M. WASHINGTON,
§
No. 435, 2003
§
    
Defendant Below,
§
Appellant,
§
Court Below:  Superior Court of 
§
the State of Delaware in and for
              v.
§
Sussex County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE,
§
Cr. ID No. 0302011631
§
Plaintiff Below,
§
Appellee.
§
§
Submitted:  January 12, 2004
Decided:     February 6, 2004
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices.
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED.
Karl Haller, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Georgetown, Delaware, for
Appellant.
Kim Ayvazian, Esquire, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware, for
Appellee.
VEASEY, Chief Justice:
In this appeal we consider whether a defendant should have been given an
opportunity after his conviction and sentencing to reconsider an earlier plea offer
made by the State and rejected by the defendant.  The defendant contends that the
Superior Court’s imposition of a term of imprisonment without providing the
defendant another opportunity to consider the State’s plea offer constitutes
punishment for the defendant’s imprudent rejection of the initial plea offer.  We
conclude that the defendant’s argument is without merit.  The defendant had no legal
entitlement to a plea bargain.  Once he rejected the State’s offer, the State had no
obligation to offer him another chance to plead, particularly after trial when the
benefits to the State of a plea agreement were lost. 
Facts
The defendant, Shavelle Washington, was indicted on two counts of second-
degree criminal solicitation in connection with his attempt to purchase drugs over the
telephone.  Before trial, at case review, the State offered a plea bargain to Washington
of two counts of misdemeanor criminal solicitation with the recommendation that the
sentence consist of imprisonment entirely suspended for probation.  Washington
rejected the plea offer and insisted on proceeding to trial.
Washington was tried before a jury in the Sussex County Superior Court.  Lynn
Deputy, a drug dealer who had been arrested some time before Washington’s arrest,
2
was among the State’s witnesses at trial.  The prosecution played for the jury a
recorded telephone conversation in which Deputy agreed to meet a caller at the
caller’s home in order to sell the caller some crack cocaine.  Deputy  identified
Washington as the caller.  Washington testified in his own defense and denied ever
meeting with or talking by telephone with Deputy.
The jury found Washington guilty of two counts of second-degree criminal
solicitation.  The court sentenced Washington to eighteen months’ imprisonment.
After his conviction and sentencing, Washington moved for a new case review date
in order to be permitted to reconsider the State’s plea offer.  The Superior Court
denied Washington’s motion as frivolous.  Washington appeals from the denial of his
motion for a new case review.
Issue on Appeal
Washington argues that he should have another opportunity to accept the State’s
original plea offer because, under the “unique” circumstances of the case, he is
receiving a penalty of eighteen months in prison for his imprudence in rejecting the
plea offer.  The State argues, based on contractual principles underlying plea
agreements, that Washington has no right to require the State to re-offer the plea
bargain that Washington rejected.
1See Slade v. State, No. 45, 1999, 2000 Del. LEXIS 18, at *2 (Del. Jan. 24, 2000) (ORDER) (“The decision
to accept or refuse a plea is committed to the discretion of the trial court and this Court, therefore, reviews for abuse of
discretion.”); see also id. at *3-4 (holding that the Superior Court acted within its discretion to control its own docket
and scheduling when refusing to accept a plea after the final, pre-trial case review deadline for tendering a plea had
passed).
2Id. at *1.
3
This Court reviews for abuse of discretion the Superior Court’s denial of
Washington’s motion for a new case review.  The appeal presents issues relating to
the trial court’s case management and the acceptance or rejection of a plea offer,
issues that this Court reviews for abuse of discretion.1
The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Washington’s
request for a post-trial case review so that he could accept a plea offer by the State
after he was convicted and sentenced.  To allow a defendant to accept a plea offer
after he or she has been convicted and sentenced would create significant problems
for judicial economy and would interfere with trial courts’ control over their dockets
and scheduling.  A defendant has no constitutional right or other legal entitlement to
a plea bargain.  Although Washington asserts that his case is “unique,” he has pointed
to no circumstance or fact that renders his case unique and warrants an exception to
the general principles controlling this issue.
Trial courts have significant control over and discretion in the management of
their dockets and the scheduling of cases.  In Slade v. State, the defendant rejected a
plea offer made by the State and proceeded toward trial.2  During jury selection the
3Id. at *2.
4Id. at *3-4 (footnotes omitted) (first and second alterations in original).
4
defendant changed his mind and sought to accept the plea offer.  The Superior Court
inquired whether any circumstances had arisen since the final case review that had
caused the defendant to change his mind regarding the plea.  The defendant said
nothing had changed, and the plea offer was the same as that which he had rejected.
The Superior Court denied the defendant’s request, explaining that the defendant “had
not established good cause to deviate from the court’s case management procedures,
which require the State to make its best offer and the defendant to accept or reject that
offer no later than the date of the final case review.”3  This Court upheld the Superior
Court’s denial of the defendant’s belated request to plead:
The Superior Court, like all trial courts, has inherent discretion to control
its own docket and scheduling.  Pursuant to that discretion, the Superior
Court has established guidelines identifying final case review as the last
time at which a plea may be tendered, absent good cause shown.  Those
guidelines are authorized by and consistent with Superior Court Criminal
Rule 11(e)(5), which provides that, “except for good cause shown,
notification of the existence of a plea agreement shall be given at . . .
such . . . time, prior to trial, as may be fixed by the court.”
[The defendant] could have accepted the plea at his final case
review, but he declined and chose to go to trial. He has shown no “good
cause” for his last minute change of heart.  Accordingly, we find that the
trial court acted well within its discretion in refusing to accept the plea
after its deadline had expired.4
5Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977); see also Slade, 2000 Del. LEXIS 18, at *2 (“A defendant
has no constitutional right to have the court accept a plea agreement.”).
6See State v. Williams, 648 A.2d 1148, 1151 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (“The plea bargain system is
founded on the ‘“mutuality of advantage” it affords to both the defendant and the State.’  Defendant obtains the benefit
of reduced penal exposure while the State is provided with the certainty of some punishment and the conservation of
limited resources.” (citation omitted)); see also id. (“This contractually-based principle necessarily requires that both
parties to the bargain voluntarily agree to its term.   A bargain cannot be imposed upon a defendant and, by the same
token, a defendant has no legal entitlement to compel a plea offer or a plea bargain; the decision whether to engage in
such bargaining rests with the prosecutor.”).
7Id. at 1150.
8Id.
5
Likewise in the present case, allowing Washington a second opportunity to accept a
plea agreement that he previously rejected would interfere with the court’s docket
management and would waste judicial resources.  The court acted within its discretion
in rejecting Washington’s request.
Defendants have no legal entitlement to a plea bargain.5  Rather, plea
agreements are undertaken for mutual advantage and governed by contract principles.6
In State v. Williams, a New Jersey case, the defendant, Williams, rejected the
prosecution’s plea offers.7  The trial court then imposed a plea cutoff date of
November 1, 1993.  On January 5, 1994, the first day of trial, Williams requested that
he be permitted to accept the State’s previous plea offer.  The court denied his request,
trial proceeded, and Williams was convicted of several charges.8  Williams then
moved for a directed verdict and to set aside the jury verdict.  The trial court vacated
Williams’ sentence and allowed Williams to plead according to the original plea
9Id.
6
offer.9  The State appealed.  The appellate court reversed, applying contractual
principles to the plea offer and the defendant’s rejection of the offer:
There is no evidence in the record of the necessary meeting of the
minds essential to a negotiated plea.  To the contrary, defendant rejected
the plea offer.
Even when defendant and the State agree upon a plea agreement,
the agreement is executory in nature and dependent on the court’s
approval.  Thus, the State is free to withdraw from a plea agreement
before the agreement is accepted by the court.  Similarly, a defendant has
no right to require the prosecutor to re-offer a plea which was rejected by
the defendant.  Under standard contract law principles, a defendant’s
rejection of a plea offer operates as a termination of the defendant’s right
to accept the offer.
While the State and the defendant are, therefore, free to engage in
plea negotiations, the court’s role is a different one.  The court has the
power to ultimately accept and enforce an agreement reached between
the parties.  This normally involves determining that the plea is
voluntarily and intelligently entered, is supported by a factual basis, and
is entered in the interests of justice.
* * *
. . . [A] judge may not tender a plea offer, especially over the
objection of the prosecutor.  Various courts have observed that such
action improperly assumes the executive or prosecutorial power and,
therefore, violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
. . . [A] plea could not have been entered herein because there was
no offer for the defendant to accept. . . .
10Id. at 1151-52 (citations and footnote omitted).
11Cf.  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (“Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not
only an essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons.  It leads to prompt and largely final
disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial
confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are
prone to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately
imprisoned.”), cited in Williams v. State, No. 340, 1983, 1985 Del. LEXIS 594, at *7 (Del. Mar. 8, 1985).
7
In the case at bar, at the time defendant made his request to be
permitted to enter a plea to the expired plea offer in question, the State
set forth no position.  Nor did it make a new plea offer or resurrect the
rejected plea offer.  The defendant had no right to enter into a plea
bargain at that time, and the State was not required to engage in
negotiations with the defendant or renew the expired offer.10
Similarly, in the present case Washington had rejected the State’s plea offer.
It was only after an unfavorable result at trial that he sought another opportunity to
accept the State’s original plea offer.  The State did not renew its plea offer.  The State
had no incentive to renew its offer.  Because Washington had already been tried, the
State would not gain the benefit of assuring some level of punishment that might not
be achieved at all if Washington were acquitted.  Nor would it save the resources
involved in trying Washington.  The Superior Court’s disposition of Washington’s
motion comported with the policies underlying the plea bargaining process11 and was
within the Superior Court’s discretion.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.