Case Title: Commonwealth v. Carter

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12043

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12043 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MICHELLE CARTER. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 7, 2016. - July 1, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Youthful Offender Act.  Grand Jury.  Evidence, Grand 
jury proceedings.  Practice, Criminal, Grand jury 
proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on October 22, 2015. 
 
 
The case was reported by Botsford, J. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan (Joseph P. Cataldo with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
Shoshana E. Stern, Assistant District Attorney (Katie Cook 
Rayburn, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Eva G. Jellison & David J. Nathanson, for Youth Advocacy 
Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  On February 6, 2015, the defendant, Michelle 
Carter, was indicted as a youthful offender under G. L. c. 119, 
§ 54, on a charge of involuntary manslaughter after she, at the 
2 
 
age of seventeen, encouraged Conrad Roy (the victim), then 
eighteen years of age, to commit suicide.  To indict a juvenile 
as a youthful offender, the grand jury must hear evidence 
establishing probable cause that (1) the juvenile is between the 
ages of fourteen and eighteen at the time of the underlying 
offense; (2) the underlying offense, if committed by an adult, 
would be punishable by imprisonment in State prison; and (3) the 
underlying offense involves the infliction or threat of serious 
bodily harm.  G. L. c. 119, § 54.  The defendant moved in the 
Juvenile Court to dismiss the youthful offender indictment, 
arguing that the Commonwealth failed to present the grand jury 
with sufficient evidence of involuntary manslaughter and that 
the defendant's conduct did not involve the infliction or threat 
of serious bodily harm.  The motion was denied. 
 
The principal question we consider in this case is whether 
the evidence was sufficient to warrant the return of an 
indictment for involuntary manslaughter where the defendant's 
conduct did not extend beyond words.  We conclude that, on the 
evidence presented to the grand jury, the verbal conduct at 
issue was sufficient and, because a conviction of involuntary 
manslaughter is punishable by imprisonment in State prison and 
inherently involves the infliction of serious bodily harm, the 
grand jury properly returned an indictment under the youthful 
3 
 
offender statute.  Accordingly, we affirm the order of the 
Juvenile Court.1 
 
1.  Background.  The grand jury heard evidence from four 
witnesses over the course of three days.  That evidence, viewed 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see 
Commonwealth v. Moran, 453 Mass. 880, 885 (2012), included the 
following: 
 
On the afternoon of July 13, 2014, an officer with the 
Fairhaven police department located the deceased in his truck, 
parked in a store parking lot.  The medical examiner concluded 
that the victim had died after inhaling carbon monoxide that was 
produced by a gasoline powered water pump located in the truck.  
The manner of death was suicide. 
 
The victim had been receiving treatment for mental health 
issues since 2011.  In 2013, the victim attempted to commit 
suicide by overdosing on acetaminophen.  A friend saved his life 
by contacting emergency services. 
 
During the course of the investigation into the victim's 
suicide, a police review of his recent electronic communications 
caused them to further explore his relationship with the 
defendant.  The victim and the defendant met in 2011 and had 
been dating at various times during that period, including at 
                                                          
 
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Youth 
Advocacy Division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services 
and the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. 
4 
 
the time of the victim's death.  Because they did not live in 
the same town, the majority of their contact took place through 
the exchange of voluminous text messages and cellular telephone 
calls.2  The grand jury heard testimony and were presented with 
transcripts concerning the content of those text messages in the 
minutes, days, weeks, and months leading up to the defendant's 
suicide.  The messages revealed that the defendant was aware of 
the victim's history of mental illness, and of his previous 
suicide attempt, and that much of the communication between the 
defendant and the victim focused on suicide.  Specifically, the 
defendant encouraged the victim to kill himself,3 instructed him 
                                                          
 
 
2 In a written memorandum of decision, the judge stated 
that, although the defendant and the victim rarely were in the 
same physical location, "[t]he rapidity of the[ir] electronic 
exchanges was almost immediate, similar to a conversation." 
 
 
3 On July 8, 2014, between 8:09 P.M. and 8:18 P.M., the 
defendant and victim exchanged the following text messages:  
 
 
Defendant:  "So are you sure you don't wanna [kill 
yourself] tonight?" 
 
 
Victim:  "what do you mean am I sure?" 
 
 
Defendant:  "Like, are you definitely not doing it 
tonight?" 
 
 
Victim:  "Idk yet I'll let you know" 
 
 
 
Defendant:  "Because I'll stay up with you if you wanna do 
it tonight" 
 
 
Victim:  "another day wouldn't hurt" 
 
5 
 
as to when and how he should kill himself,4 assuaged his concerns 
over killing himself,5 and chastised him when he delayed doing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Defendant:  "You can't keep pushing it off, tho, that's all 
you keep doing" 
 
 
4 The defendant helped the victim determine the method he 
eventually used to kill himself.  On July 7, 2014, between 
10:57 P.M. and 11:04 P.M., they exchanged the following text 
messages: 
 
 
Defendant:  "Well there's more ways to make CO.  Google 
ways to make it. . . " 
 
 
Victim:  "Omg" 
 
 
Defendant:  "What" 
 
 
Victim:  "portable generator that's it" 
 
 
On July 11, 2014, at 5:13 P.M., the defendant sent the 
victim the following text message:  " . . . Well in my opinion, 
I think u should do the generator because I don't know much 
about the pump and with a generator u can't fail" 
 
 
On July 12, 2014, between 4:25 A.M. and 4:34 A.M., they 
exchanged the following text messages: 
 
 
Defendant:  "So I guess you aren't gonna do it then, all 
that for nothing" 
 
 
Defendant:  "I'm just confused like you were so ready and 
determined" 
 
 
Victim:  "I am gonna eventually"   
 
 
Victim:  "I really don't know what I'm waiting for. .  but 
I have everything lined up" 
 
 
Defendant:  "No, you're not, Conrad.  Last night was it.  
You keep pushing it off and you say you'll do it but u never do.  
Its always gonna be that way if u don't take action" 
 
 
Defendant:  "You're just making it harder on yourself by 
pushing it off, you just have to do it" 
6 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
Defendant:  "Do u wanna do it now?" 
 
 
Victim:  "Is it too late?" 
 
 
Victim:  "Idkk it's already light outside" 
 
 
Victim:  I'm gonna go back to sleep, love you I'll text you 
tomorrow" 
 
 
Defendant:  "No?  Its probably the best time now because 
everyone's sleeping.  Just go somewhere in your truck.  And no 
one's really out right now because it's an awkward time" 
 
 
Defendant:  "If u don't do it now you're never gonna do it" 
 
 
Defendant:  "And u can say you'll do it tomorrow but you 
probably won't" 
 
 
5 During the evening of July 11, 2014, and morning of July 
12, 2014, the victim and the defendant exchanged the following 
text messages: 
 
 
Victim:  "I'm just to sensitive.  I want my family to know 
there was nothing they could do.  I am entrapped in my own 
thoughts" 
 
 
Victim:  "like no I would be happy if they had no guilt 
about it.  because I have a bad feeling tht this is going to 
create a lot of depression between my parents/sisters" 
 
 
Victim:  "i'm overthinking everything. . fuck.  I gotta 
stop and just do it" 
 
 
Defendant:   "I think your parents know you're in a really 
bad place.  Im not saying they want you to do it, but I honestly 
feel like they can except it.  They know there's nothing they 
can do, they've tried helping, everyone's tried.  But there's a 
point that comes where there isn't anything anyone can do to 
save you, not even yourself, and you've hit that point and I 
think your parents know you've hit that point.  You said you're 
mom saw a suicide thing on your computer and she didn't say 
anything.  I think she knows it's on your mind and she's 
prepared for it" 
 
7 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Defendant:  Everyone will be sad for a while, but they will 
get over it and move on.  They won't be in depression I won't 
let that happen.  They know how sad you are and they know that 
you're doing this to be happy, and I think they will understand 
and accept it.  They'll always carry u in their hearts" 
 
. . . 
 
 
Victim:  "i don't want anyone hurt in the process though" 
 
 
Victim:  "I meant when they open the door, all the carbon 
monoxide is gonna come out they can't see it or smell it.  
whoever opens the door" 
 
 
Defendant:  "They will see the generator and know that you 
died of CO. . . ." 
 
. . . 
 
 
Victim:  "hey can you do me a favor" 
 
 
Defendant:  "Yes of course" 
 
 
Victim:  "just be there for my family :)" 
 
 
Defendant:  "Conrad, of course I will be there for your 
family.  I will help them as much as I can to get thru this, ill 
tell them about how amazing their son/brother truly was" 
 
. . . 
 
 
Victim:  "Idk I'm freaking out again" 
 
 
Victim:  I'm overthinking" 
 
 
Defendant:  "I thought you wanted to do this.  The time is 
right and you're ready, you just need to do it!  You can't keep 
living this way.  You just need to do it like you did last time 
and not think about it and just do it babe.  You can't keep 
doing this every day" 
 
 
Victim:  "I do want to. but like I'm freaking for my 
family.  I guess" 
 
 
Victim:  "idkkk" 
 
8 
 
so.6  The theme of those text messages can be summed up in the 
phrase used by the defendant four times between July 11 and July 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Defendant:  "Conrad.  I told you I'll take care of them.  
Everyone will take care of them to make sure they won't be alone 
and people will help them get thru it.  We talked about this, 
they will be okay and accept it.  People who commit suicide 
don't think this much and they just do it" 
 
 
6 At various times between July 4, 2014, and July 12, 2014, 
the defendant and the victim exchanged several text messages: 
 
 
Defendant:  "You're gonna have to prove me wrong because I 
just don't think you really want this.  You just keeps pushing 
it off to another night and say you'll do it but you never do" 
 
. . . 
 
 
Defendant:  "SEE THAT’S WHAT I MEAN.  YOU KEEP PUSHING IT 
OFF!  You just said you were gonna do it tonight and now you're 
saying eventually. . . ." 
 
. . . 
 
 
Defendant:  "But I bet you're gonna be like 'oh, it didn't 
work because I didn't tape the tube right or something like 
that' . . . I bet you're gonna say an excuse like that" 
 
. . . 
 
 
Defendant:  "Do you have the generator?" 
 
 
Victim:  "not yet lol" 
 
 
Defendant:  "WELL WHEN ARE YOU GETTING IT" 
 
. . . 
 
 
Defendant:  "You better not be bull shiting me and saying 
you're gonna do this and then purposely get caught" 
 
. . . 
 
 
Defendant:  "You just need to do it Conrad or I'm gonna get 
you help" 
9 
 
12, 2014 (the day on which the victim committed suicide):  "You 
just [have] to do it." 
 
Cellular telephone records that were presented to the grand 
jury revealed that the victim and defendant also had two 
cellular telephone conversations at the time during which police 
believe that the victim was in his truck committing suicide.7  
The content of those cellular telephone conversations is only 
available as reported by the defendant to her friend, Samantha 
Boardman.  After the victim's death, the defendant sent a text 
message to Boardman explaining that, at one point during the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
Defendant:  "You can't keep doing this everyday" 
 
 
Victim:  "Okay I'm gonna do it today" 
 
 
Defendant:  "Do you promise" 
 
 
Victim:  "I promise babe" 
 
 
Victim:  "I have to now" 
 
 
Defendant:  "Like right now?" 
 
 
Victim:  "where do I go?  :(" 
 
 
Defendant:  "And u can't break a promise.  And just go in a 
quiet parking lot or something" (emphasis added). 
 
 
7 One call, at 6:28 P.M. on July 12, came from the victim's 
cellular telephone and the other, at 7:12 P.M., came from the 
defendant's cellular telephone.  Each call lasted over forty 
minutes. 
 
10 
 
suicide, the victim got out of his truck because he was 
"scared," and the defendant commanded him to get back in.8 
 
It was apparent that the defendant understood the 
repercussions of her role in the victim's death.  Prior to his 
suicide, the defendant sought (apparently unsuccessfully) to 
have the victim delete the text messages between the two, and 
after learning that the police were looking through the victim's 
cellular telephone, the defendant sent the following text 
message to Boardman:  "Sam, [the police] read my messages with 
him I'm done.  His family will hate me and I can go to jail."  
During the investigation, and after cross-referencing the text 
messages in the defendant's cellular telephone and those in the 
victim's cellular telephone, the police discovered that the 
defendant had erased certain text messages between her and the 
victim.  The defendant also lied to police about the content of 
her conversations with the victim.  Finally, the defendant 
acknowledged in a text message to Boardman that she could have 
stopped the victim from committing suicide:  "I helped ease him 
into it and told him it was okay, I was talking to him on the 
                                                          
 
 
8 The text message to Samantha Boardman, in relevant part, 
stated:  "Sam, [the victim's] death is my fault like honestly I 
could have stopped him I was on the phone with him and he got 
out of the [truck] because it was working and he got scared and 
I fucking told him to get back in Sam because I knew he would do 
it all over again the next day and I couldnt have him live the 
way he was living anymore I couldnt do it I wouldnt let him." 
11 
 
phone when he did it I coud have easily stopped him or called 
the police but I didn't." 
 
Based on the foregoing evidence, the Commonwealth 
successfully sought to indict the defendant for involuntary 
manslaughter, as a youthful offender, asserting that the 
defendant's wanton or reckless conduct was the cause of the 
victim's death.  After a judge of the Juvenile Court denied the 
defendant's motion to dismiss, the defendant filed a petition 
for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  On February 1, 2016, a 
single justice of this court reserved and reported the case to 
the full court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  "Ordinarily, a 'court will not inquire 
into the competency or sufficiency of the evidence before the 
grand jury.'"  Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36, 39 (2014), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 373 Mass. 591, 592 (1977).  
However, in Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982), 
we recognized a limited exception for when the grand jury 
"fail[] to hear any evidence of criminal activity by the 
defendant."  "At the very least, the grand jury must hear enough 
evidence to establish the identity of the accused and to support 
a finding of probable cause to arrest the accused for the 
offense charged" (footnote omitted).  Rex, supra at 40.  
"Probable cause requires sufficient facts to warrant a person of 
reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been 
12 
 
committed . . . ; this standard requires considerably less than 
that which is required to warrant a finding of guilt" (citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443, 447 (2002). 
 
a.  Involuntary manslaughter.9  Involuntary manslaughter can 
be proved under two theories, either (1) wanton or reckless 
conduct or (2) wanton or reckless failure to act.  Commonwealth 
v.  Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 456 Mass. 826, 832 (2010).  
                                                          
 
 
9 The Model Jury Instructions on Homicide 73 (2013) define 
"[i]nvoluntary manslaughter" as "an unlawful killing 
unintentionally caused by wanton and reckless conduct."  Wanton 
or reckless conduct 
 
"is conduct that creates a high degree of likelihood 
that substantial harm will result to another.  It is 
conduct involving a grave risk of harm to another that 
a person undertakes with indifference to or disregard 
of the consequences of such conduct.  Whether conduct 
is wanton and reckless depends either on what the 
defendant knew or how a reasonable person would have 
acted knowing what the defendant knew.  If the 
defendant realized the grave risk created by his 
conduct, his subsequent act amounts to wanton and 
reckless conduct whether or not a reasonable person 
would have realized the risk of grave danger.  Even if 
the defendant himself did not realize the grave risk 
of harm to another, the act would constitute wanton 
and reckless conduct if a reasonable person, knowing 
what the defendant knew, would have realized the act 
posed a risk of grave danger to another.  It is not 
enough for the Commonwealth to prove the defendant 
acted negligently, that is, in a manner that a 
reasonably careful person would not have acted.  The 
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant's actions 
went beyond negligence and amounted to wanton and 
reckless conduct as . . . defined . . . ." 
 
Id. at 76-79.  The 2016 proposed model jury instructions are 
substantially similar in content to the 2013 model jury 
instructions. 
13 
 
The indictment was returned on the basis of the defendant's 
wanton or reckless conduct.10 
 
Wanton or reckless conduct is "intentional conduct . . . 
involv[ing] a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm 
will result to another."  Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482, 
496 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 399 
(1944).  Whether conduct is wanton or reckless is 
"determined based either on the defendant's specific 
knowledge or on what a reasonable person should have 
known in the circumstances. . . . If based on the 
objective measure of recklessness, the defendant's 
actions constitute wanton or reckless conduct . . . if 
an ordinary normal [person] under the same 
circumstances would have realized the gravity of the 
danger. . . .  If based on the subjective measure, 
i.e., the defendant's own knowledge, grave danger to 
others must have been apparent and the defendant must 
have chosen to run the risk rather than alter [his or 
her] conduct so as to avoid the act or omission which 
caused the harm"  (quotations and citations omitted). 
 
Pugh, supra at 496-497. 
 
 
b.  Sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand 
jury.11  The Commonwealth bore the burden of presenting the grand 
                                                          
 
 
10 Our case law uses the phrases "wanton and reckless 
conduct" and "wanton or reckless conduct" interchangeably.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482, 496-497 (2012). 
 
 
11 Before we consider whether the grand jury heard testimony 
sufficient to warrant an indictment against the defendant for 
involuntary manslaughter, we address her argument that G. L. 
c. 265, § 13 (punishing involuntary manslaughter), is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to her.  Specifically, the 
defendant argues that no one of ordinary intelligence -- never 
mind a juvenile -- would understand that encouraging suicide is 
prosecutable under existing law. 
14 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
A criminal statute must be "sufficiently explicit to give 
clear warning as to proscribed activities."  Commonwealth v. 
Orlando, 371 Mass. 732, 734 (1977).  "A statute is 
unconstitutionally vague if men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning. . . . If a statute has been 
clarified by judicial explanation, however, it will withstand a 
challenge on grounds of unconstitutional vagueness" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683, 
689 (2000).  "Where a statute's literal scope . . . is capable 
of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment [to the 
United States Constitution], the [vagueness] doctrine demands a 
greater degree of specificity than in other contexts" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Abramms, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 581 
(2006). 
 
 
The crime the defendant is charged with is neither 
objectively nor subjectively vague as applied to the defendant.  
"Manslaughter is a common-law crime that has not been codified 
by statute in Massachusetts" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth 
v. Rodriquez, 461 Mass. 100, 106 (2011).  General Laws c. 265, 
§ 13, does not describe the crime; instead, it sets out only the 
punishment, while the elements of the crime are created as part 
of the common law.  Under common law, conduct similar to that of 
the defendant has been deemed unlawful, see Persampieri v. 
Commonwealth, 343 Mass. 19, 22-23 (1961) (jury warranted in 
convicting defendant of involuntary manslaughter where he 
provided wife with gun, taunted her, and encouraged her to 
commit suicide, resulting in her killing herself), and it is 
therefore not objectively vague. 
 
 
On a subjective basis, the evidence presented by the 
Commonwealth showed that the defendant was personally aware that 
her conduct was both reprehensible and punishable:  the 
defendant asked the victim to delete the text messages between 
the two of them, deleted several of those messages from her own 
cellular telephone, and, after police began investigating the 
victim's cellular telephone, lied about her involvement and told 
her friend that, if the police uncovered the text messages 
between her and the victim, she could go to jail.  The charge of 
involuntary manslaughter is not vague as applied to the 
defendant. 
15 
 
jury with sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable 
cause that the defendant's conduct (1) was intentional;12 (2) was 
wanton or reckless; and (3) caused the victim's death.  Life 
Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 456 Mass. at 832. 
 
The defendant argues that, because she neither was 
physically present when the victim killed himself nor provided 
the victim with the instrument with which he killed himself, she 
did not cause his death by wanton or reckless conduct.13  She 
maintains that verbally encouraging someone to commit suicide, 
no matter how forcefully, cannot constitute wanton or reckless 
conduct.  Effectively, the argument is that verbal conduct can 
never overcome a person's willpower to live, and therefore 
cannot be the cause of a suicide.  We disagree. 
 
We have never required in the return of an indictment for 
involuntary manslaughter that a defendant commit a physical act 
in perpetrating a victim's death.14  We also never have had 
                                                          
 
 
12 Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 
there was evidence that the defendant intended to pressure the 
victim into killing himself.  The defendant told her friend, 
Samantha Boardman, that she "couldn't have [the victim] live the 
way he was living anymore.  [She] couldn't do it.  [She] 
wouldn't let him." 
 
 
13 Although not physically present when the victim committed 
suicide, the constant communication with him by text message and 
by telephone leading up to and during the suicide made the 
defendant's presence at least virtual. 
 
 
14 Physical acts are certainly one means by which the 
Commonwealth can show the commission prong of involuntary 
16 
 
occasion to consider such an indictment against a defendant on 
the basis of words alone.  This is not, however, the first time 
that we have contemplated the charge of involuntary manslaughter 
against a defendant where the death of the victim is self-
inflicted.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Atencio, 345 Mass. 627 
(1963); Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 343 Mass. 19 (1961). 
 
At issue in Atencio was a "game" of "Russian roulette" 
played by the two defendants, Atencio and Marshall, and the 
deceased.  Atencio, supra at 628.  Marshall took the gun first, 
pointed it at his own head, and pulled the trigger; nothing 
happened.  Id. at 628-629.  He passed the gun to Atencio, who 
also pointed the gun at his own head and pulled the trigger, 
again with no result.  Id. at 629.  Atencio then passed the gun 
to the deceased; when he pointed it at his own head and pulled 
the trigger, "[t]he cartridge exploded, and he fell over dead."  
Id. 
 
In affirming the involuntary manslaughter convictions 
against both defendants, we reasoned that "the Commonwealth had 
an interest that the deceased should not be killed by the wanton 
or reckless conduct of himself and others" (emphasis added).  
Id.  "Such conduct could be found in the concerted action and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
manslaughter.  See Pugh, 462 Mass. at 497.  However, the 
defendant does not point to -- and our research has not 
uncovered -- any case in which physical acts have been made a 
prerequisite of involuntary manslaughter. 
17 
 
cooperation of the defendants in helping to bring about the 
deceased's foolish act," id., as "[i]t would not be necessary 
that the defendants force the deceased to play or suggest that 
he play."  Id. at 630.  We concluded that it did not matter that 
Atencio was the one who handed the gun to the deceased, as 
opposed to Marshall, affirming both defendants' convictions.  
Id. at 630.  Indeed, had the deceased been the first to 
participate in the "game," and killed himself before either 
Atencio or Marshall touched the gun, his acts would still have 
been imputable to the defendants.  Id.  It was, instead, the 
atmosphere created in the decision to play the "game" that 
caused the deceased to shoot himself, as there was "mutual 
encouragement" to participate.  Id. 
 
In Persampieri, 343 Mass. at 22, the defendant told his 
wife that he intended to divorce her.  She threatened to commit 
suicide.  Id.  The defendant, knowing that the victim had 
already attempted suicide twice, said she was "chicken -- and 
wouldn't do it."  Id.  When she retrieved a .22 caliber rifle, 
he helped her to load it and handed it to her, noting that the 
safety was off.  Id.  With the gun barrel on the floor, the 
victim struggled to pull the trigger.  Id. at 23.  The defendant 
told her that if she took off her shoe she could reach the 
trigger, at which point she successfully shot and killed 
herself.  Id.  We concluded that the jury were warranted in 
18 
 
returning a verdict of involuntary manslaughter based on the 
theory of wanton or reckless conduct, id., noting that the 
defendant, "instead of trying to bring [the victim] to her 
senses, taunted her, told her where the gun was, loaded it for 
her, saw that the safety was off, and told her the means by 
which she could pull the trigger.  He thus showed a reckless 
disregard of his wife's safety and the possible consequences of 
his conduct."  Id. 
 
These cases elucidate that, because wanton or reckless 
conduct requires a consideration of the likelihood of a result 
occurring, the inquiry is by its nature entirely fact-specific.  
The circumstances of the situation dictate whether the conduct 
is or is not wanton or reckless.  We need not -- and indeed 
cannot -- define where on the spectrum between speech and 
physical acts involuntary manslaughter must fall.  Instead, the 
inquiry must be made on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Here, the particular circumstances of the defendant's 
relationship with the victim may have caused her verbal 
communications with him in the last minutes of his life on July 
12, 2014, to carry more weight than mere words, overcoming any 
independent will to live he might have had.  It is in those 
final moments, when the victim had gotten out of his truck, 
expressing doubts about killing himself, on which a verdict in 
this case may ultimately turn.  In that moment of equivocation, 
19 
 
the victim could have continued to delay his death, perhaps 
attempting suicide again at a later date, or perhaps seeking 
treatment; or he could have gotten back into the truck and 
followed through on his suicide.  The grand jury heard that the 
victim, after the defendant commanded him to "get back in," 
obeyed, returning to the truck, closing the door, and succumbing 
to the carbon monoxide. 
 
In our view, the coercive quality of that final directive 
was sufficient in the specific circumstances of this case to 
support a finding of probable cause.  Those circumstances 
included the defendant's virtual presence at the time of the 
suicide, the previous constant pressure the defendant had put on 
the victim, and his already delicate mental state.15  In sum, 
there was ample evidence to establish probable cause that the 
defendant's conduct was wanton or reckless, under either a 
subjective or an objective standard.  The grand jury could have 
found that an ordinary person under the circumstances would have 
realized the gravity of the danger posed by telling the victim, 
who was mentally fragile, predisposed to suicidal inclinations, 
                                                          
 
 
15 As in the case against the husband in Persampieri, the 
Commonwealth's evidence here shows that the defendant fully 
understood and took advantage of the victim's fragility.  Prior 
to July 12, 2014, the defendant had helped to plan the victim's 
suicide, assuaged the victim's guilt about leaving his family, 
expressed her frustration that the victim had, at various times, 
delayed killing himself, and threatened to seek mental health 
treatment for the victim (despite his protestations) if he did 
not kill himself. 
20 
 
and in the process of killing himself, to get back in a truck 
filling with carbon monoxide and "just do it."  See Levesque, 
436 Mass. at 452.  And significantly, the grand jury also could 
have found that the defendant -- the victim's girl friend, with 
whom he was in constant and perpetual contact -- on a subjective 
basis knew that she had some control over his actions.16 
 
The defendant argues that, even if she was wanton or 
reckless, her words (spoken when she was miles away from the 
victim) could not be the cause of the victim's death.  Instead, 
it was his decision to get back in the truck that resulted in 
his suicide.  We are not convinced.  Because there was evidence 
that the defendant's actions overbore the victim's willpower, 
there was probable cause to believe that the victim's return to 
the truck after the defendant told him to do so was not "an 
independent or intervening act" that, as a matter of law, would 
preclude his action from being imputable to her.  See Atencio, 
345 Mass. at 629-630.  The text messages suggest that the victim 
had been delaying suicide for weeks; to ignore the influence the 
defendant had over the victim would be to oversimplify the 
circumstances surrounding his death.  His delay of that suicide 
and subsequent excuses for such delays were followed by his girl 
                                                          
 
 
16 The defendant admitted to Boardman:  "I helped ease him 
into it and told him it was okay, I was talking to him on the 
phone when he did it I coud have easily stopped him or called 
the police but I didn't." 
21 
 
friend's disappointment, frustration, and threats to seek 
unwanted treatment on his behalf.  In sum, we conclude that 
there was probable cause to show that the coercive quality of 
the defendant's verbal conduct overwhelmed whatever willpower 
the eighteen year old victim had to cope with his depression, 
and that but for the defendant's admonishments, pressure, and 
instructions, the victim would not have gotten back into the 
truck and poisoned himself to death.  Consequently, the evidence 
before the grand jury was sufficient for a finding of probable 
cause that the defendant, by wanton or reckless conduct, caused 
the victim's death.17 
 
It is important to articulate what this case is not about.  
It is not about a person seeking to ameliorate the anguish of 
someone coping with a terminal illness and questioning the value 
                                                          
 
 
17 The speech at issue in this case is not protected under 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 16 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because the 
Commonwealth has a compelling interest in deterring speech that 
has a direct, causal link to a specific victim's suicide.  See 
Mendoza v. Licensing Bd. of Fall River, 444 Mass. 188, 197 n.12 
(2005) (content-based restrictions on expressive conduct must 
satisfy "strict scrutiny" standard, meaning government must 
"demonstrate that the restriction is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end" [citation omitted]); Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011); Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (State "has an unqualified 
interest in the preservation of human life" [citation omitted]).  
See also State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 
2014) (affirming in part constitutionality of statute 
prohibiting "assist[ing]" suicide as against First Amendment 
challenge). 
22 
 
of life.  Nor is it about a person offering support, comfort, 
and even assistance to a mature adult who, confronted with such 
circumstances, has decided to end his or her life.  These 
situations are easily distinguishable from the present case, in 
which the grand jury heard evidence suggesting a systematic 
campaign of coercion on which the virtually present defendant 
embarked -- captured and preserved through her text messages -- 
that targeted the equivocating young victim's insecurities and 
acted to subvert his willpower in favor of her own.  On the 
specific facts of this case, there was sufficient evidence to 
support a probable cause finding that the defendant's command to 
the victim in the final moments of his life to follow through on 
his suicide attempt was a direct, causal link to his death. 
 
3.  Conclusion.18  The grand jury were justified in 
returning an indictment of involuntary manslaughter against the 
                                                          
 
 
18 The defendant argues that the indictment is flawed where 
the grand jurors did not consider the charges from the 
perspective of a "reasonable juvenile of the same age" standard.  
Massachusetts currently does not require that a grand jury 
consider charges based on such a standard.  This issue was not 
raised below.  See G. L. c. 277, § 47A ("In a criminal case, any 
defense or objection based upon defects in the institution of 
the prosecution or in the complaint or indictment, other than a 
failure to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an 
offense, shall only be raised . . . by a motion in conformity 
with the requirements of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal 
Procedure").  There was not an evidentiary hearing on the issue, 
the judge did not offer any opinion as to the argument's merits, 
and the arguments presented by the defendant and amici at this 
stage regarding the impact of juvenile indictments are being 
23 
 
defendant.  Because involuntary manslaughter carries a potential 
punishment of incarceration in State prison and is inherently a 
crime that involves the infliction of serious bodily harm,19 and 
because the defendant was seventeen years of age at the time of 
the offense, her indictment as a youthful offender on the 
underlying involuntary manslaughter charge was also supported by 
the evidence.  The motion judge's denial of the defendant's 
motion to dismiss is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
raised for the first time on appeal.  The argument was therefore 
waived. 
 
 
19 The defendant argues that her conduct cannot constitute 
the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm, as is required 
for an indictment under the youthful offender statute, G. L. 
c. 119, § 54.  Having concluded that the grand jury were 
justified in returning an indictment for involuntary 
manslaughter, we are convinced that they were also justified in 
returning such indictment under the youthful offender statute, 
given that involuntary manslaughter under these circumstances 
inherently involves the infliction of serious bodily harm.