Case Title: Cole/Dinsmore v. DMV

Citation: 

Docket Number: S48815

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  April 8, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DANIEL BOYD COLE,
Respondent on Review,
v.
DRIVER AND MOTOR VEHICLE
SERVICES BRANCH (DMV),
Petitioner on Review.
KAREN DINSMORE,
Respondent on Review,
v.
DRIVER AND MOTOR VEHICLE
SERVICES BRANCH (DMV),
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 9902-01073, DMV No. 81427; CA A108349, A109749; SC S48815,
S49117)
(Consolidated for Argument and Opinion)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 9, 2003.
Christina M. Hutchins, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. 
With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and
Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Wayne Mackeson, of Birmingham & Mackeson, L.L.P., Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review
Cole.  With him on the brief was Richard Lee Barton, of Barton &
Associates, Portland.
Robert J. McCrea, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
brief for respondent on review Dinsmore.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
BALMER, J.
In Cole, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the
judgment of the circuit court are affirmed, and the case is
remanded to DMV for further proceedings.  In Dinsmore, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, the order of DMV is
reversed, and the case is remanded to DMV.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Robert W. Redding, Judge. Cole v. DMV, 172 Or App 132, 17 P3d 573 (2001).
Judicial review from the Oregon Department of
Transportation, Dinsmore v. DMV, 175 Or App 509, 28 P3d 1268
(2001).
** Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
BALMER, J.In these cases, which we consolidated for argument and
decision, the Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Branch (DMV),
seeks review of Court of Appeals decisions holding that hearsay
evidence presented in two driver license suspension hearings did
not constitute substantial evidence sufficient to support DMV's
orders suspending the driver licenses.  Cole v. DMV, 172 Or App
132, 17 P3d 573 (2001); Dinsmore v. DMV, 175 Or App 509, 28 P3d
1268 (2001).  Substantial evidence supports a finding made in an
administrative hearing when the record, viewed as a whole,
permits a reasonable person to make that finding.  ORS
183.482(8)(c). (1)  The question before us on review is whether
this court's decision in Reguero v. Teacher Standards and
Practices, 312 Or 402, 822 P2d 1171 (1991), articulating the
standards to be used to determine whether and when hearsay
evidence may be substantial evidence under that statute, requires
a different outcome in these cases.  For the reasons that follow,
we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in Cole and the
judgment of the circuit court, although on different grounds than
the Court of Appeals, and remand the case to DMV for further
proceedings.  In Dinsmore, we affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals, reverse the order of DMV, and remand the case to DMV.
I. BACKGROUND
As we will describe in greater detail, DMV suspended
the driver licenses of Cole and Dinsmore after they had been
arrested for separate traffic violations.  They both requested
hearings to contest those suspensions, and, at those hearings,
DMV offered hearsay evidence in the form of police reports.  The
presiding hearing officers made findings in DMV's favor based on
information contained in those reports, and, as a result, DMV
ordered that Cole's and Dinsmore's licenses remain suspended. 
Before discussing the specific facts of the cases, it is useful
first to review this court's decision in Reguero, because that
case represents this court's most comprehensive discussion of the
substantial evidence test in administrative proceedings and of
the permissible use of hearsay evidence in those proceedings.  
Reguero was a teacher who had been fired by a school
district and whose state teaching license had expired after his
termination.  312 Or at 404.  In a contested case hearing at
which he sought to have his license reinstated, the Teacher
Standards and Practices Commission (TSPC) introduced hearsay and
multiple hearsay evidence (2) to support its allegations that
Reguero had engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with two
female students.  Id. at 404-05.  The hearsay evidence included
statements that the two students had made; neither student
testified at the hearing.  Id. at 405.  Reguero presented
countervailing evidence, including teachers and school employees
who refuted a number of the students' claims.  Id.  Following the
hearing, TSPC denied Reguero's license application based on its
findings that he had engaged in inappropriate sexual contact and
therefore "lack[ed] good moral character to serve as [a]
teacher."  Id. at 408.  
On review, this court analyzed the record to determine
whether evidence sufficient to satisfy the substantiality
requirement of ORS 183.482(8)(c) supported TSPC's findings.  Id.
at 417-18.  The court noted that, under the Oregon Administrative
Procedures Act (APA), ORS 183.310 to 183.550, "[h]earsay evidence
is as admissible under ORS 183.450(1) as any other evidence as
long as it meets the statutory test of reliability." (3)  Id.
at 417 (footnote omitted).  The court explained that ORS
183.482(8)(c) does not provide "for weighing some classes of
evidence in the record more heavily as classes than other classes
of evidence in the record * * * as a matter of law."  Id.
(emphasis in original).  The court adopted the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals that the legislature had not intended for
hearsay evidence that was reliable enough to be admissible under
ORS 183.450(1) to be "categorically incapable of being
substantial enough to permit a reasonable person to find in
accordance with it under ORS 183.482(8)(c)."  Id. (emphasis in
original; internal citation omitted).  Thus, the court rejected
the "residuum rule" (4) and affirmed the Court of Appeals'
holding that "hearsay evidence alone, even if inadmissible in a
civil or criminal trial, is not incapable of being 'substantial
evidence' under ORS 183.482(8)(c)."  Id.
The court noted that, rather than engaging in "any
categorical method of determining substantiality," the court must
make a case-specific inquiry to determine "whether the finding of
substantiality is reasonable in the light of countervailing as
well as supporting evidence."  Id. at 417-18.  The court stated
that "variable circumstances may be considered" when assessing
whether proffered hearsay evidence constitutes substantial
evidence in a given case and then provided a nonexclusive list of
factors: 
"[1] [T]he alternative to relying on the hearsay
evidence; [2] the importance of the facts sought to be
proved by the hearsay statements to the outcome of the
proceeding and considerations of economy; [3] the state
of the supporting or opposing evidence, if any; [4] the
degree of lack of efficacy of cross-examination with
respect to the particular hearsay statements; and [5]
the consequences of the decision either way."  
Id. at 418.  The court also noted that "[a]n underlying concern
must always be fundamental fairness."  Id. n 23. 
Notwithstanding its earlier conclusion that hearsay
could constitute substantial evidence under ORS 183.482(8)(c),
the court went on in Reguero to find that TSPC's findings were
not supported by substantial evidence and, thus, its conclusions
of law based on those findings were impermissible.  Id. at 422. 
The court emphasized that the agency's findings were based
entirely on hearsay and that no reason had been given as to why
TSPC had not called the alleged victims as witnesses, despite
their being available.  Id. at 419.  The court noted that the
witnesses that did testify on behalf of TSPC had been permitted
to express their opinions regarding the alleged victims'
credibility "based on * * * hearsay [and] multiple hearsay."  Id. 
Moreover, the court stated that, 
"[w]hen unsworn hearsay constitutes the major (in this
case, the entire) support for the administrative
decision, the importance of providing [the petitioner]
with the opportunity to test on cross-examination each
of the available declarants' perception, memory,
narration, and veracity is undeniable."  
Id. at 421 (emphasis in original).  Thus, although hearsay
evidence may constitute substantial evidence, nothing in Reguero
compels the conclusion that the hearsay evidence in a particular
case will satisfy that standard.  See also Younger v. City of
Portland, 305 Or 346, 358, 752 P2d 262 (1988) (noting that, under
LUBA provisions analogous to APA, whether particular decision is
supported by substantial evidence depends upon evaluation of
unique evidence in each case).
II. FACTS
With that background in mind, we now return to the
facts in the cases before us, which we take from the record and
the Court of Appeals opinion in each case.  We begin with Cole. 
In 1998, Gresham Police Sergeant Gurkman stopped Cole's car. 
According to a written report that Gurkman prepared, Gurkman had
observed Cole commit a number of traffic infractions, including
crossing the center line of the road numerous times, exceeding
the speed limit by 20 miles per hour, and making an unsignaled
lane change.  Gurkman stopped him, and, shortly thereafter,
Gresham Police Officer Nguyen arrived at the scene.  Gurkman told
Nguyen that he suspected that Cole had been driving under the
influence of intoxicants (DUII), and Nguyen requested that Cole
perform several field sobriety tests.  After Cole performed the
tests, Nguyen concluded that he had probable cause to arrest Cole
for DUII. (5)  Thereafter, Cole submitted to a chemical breath
test, which registered his blood alcohol level as 0.12 percent. 
DMV notified Cole that it intended to suspend his
driving privileges.  A second notice of Cole's rights and
procedures in a DMV implied consent hearing also informed Cole
that he could request DMV to subpoena witnesses on his behalf to
appear at the hearing. (6)  Cole requested a hearing to contest
the suspension and, in preparation for the hearing, sought
discovery of "photocopies of all documents that [were] public
records relating to [his] hearing in the possession of [DMV]" and
"copies of any and all police reports in the possession of the
arresting officer and agency in this case."  DMV responded by
providing Cole with a report prepared by Nguyen and a separate
page on which appeared the following statement:  "Under
difficulty presenting documents, see Sergeant German's [sic]
report."  DMV did not provide Cole with any report prepared by
Gurkman. 
At Cole's hearing, Nguyen testified, but Gurkman did
not appear.  Cole had not requested DMV to subpoena any
witnesses; however, DMV had issued its own subpoena for Nguyen.
DMV sought to introduce a report prepared by Gurkman to prove
that Gurkman had stopped Cole lawfully. (7)  Cole objected to
the admission of the Gurkman report, arguing that he had not
received a copy of the report and did not know that Nguyen was
not the stopping officer until the hearing.  Cole further alleged
that, had he known Gurkman's identity, he would have subpoenaed
him to appear at the hearing.  Cole contended that the "heart of
[his] defense" was the validity of the stop and, therefore, it
was essential that he have "adequate opportunity to confront,
cross-examine, and test" that validity.
The hearing officer overruled Cole's objection to the
admission of the Gurkman report and denied his request for a
continuance. (8)  Cole cross-examined Nguyen but presented no
contrary evidence, stating, "We'll produce no evidence, in light
of the absence of Sergeant Gurkman." 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer
upheld the lawfulness of the stop solely on the basis of
Gurkman's report, finding that "Gurkman's report provides a
sufficient basis for the traffic stop * * *.  No evidence
contradicted the information contained in Gurkman's report." 
After concluding that Nguyen had had probable cause to arrest
Cole, the hearing officer affirmed the suspension of Cole's
driver license.
Cole sought judicial review pursuant to ORS 813.410 and
ORS 813.450. (9)  He argued that the hearing officer's finding
that he had been stopped lawfully was not supported by
substantial evidence in the record.  In addition, Cole contended
that, because he had not known Gurkman's identity before the
hearing, he had not had a meaningful opportunity to secure
Gurkman's attendance by subpoena and, therefore, reliance on
Gurkman's report offended due process.  The circuit court agreed
with Cole's due process argument and set aside DMV's suspension
order, concluding that Cole had had "no means available to
determine the identity of the stopping officer or to obtain a
copy of his police report" before his hearing.  Consequently, the
court held that the administrative hearing did not comport with
due process:
"While the law does allow the state to prove essential
elements of its case by hearsay, due process requires
that the defendant, at the least, have an opportunity
to subpoena critical witnesses to subject their hearsay
assertions to cross-examination.  To have any type of
hearing, a defendant has to at least have the right to
subpoena witnesses whose out of court, unsworn, written
statements are used against him.  To rule otherwise
means that the administrative hearing is no hearing at
all, but is simply an administrative review of the
facial sufficiency of the state's assertions with no
meaningful opportunity to challenge the truthfulness or
accuracy of those assertions."
DMV appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  172
Or App at 141.  That court examined the hearsay evidence that DMV
had offered in light of each of the Reguero factors and held
that, "Gurkman's report did not, by itself, constitute
substantial evidence of the validity of the stop."  Id.  The
court concluded that the consequences of DMV's decision to
suspend Cole's license were "significant," but not "devastating,"
and that the alternative to relying on the hearsay evidence
"militates against reliance on Gurkman's report" because DMV knew
of Gurkman's identity, could have compelled his attendance
through subpoena, and failed to explain why he did not testify. 
Id. at 139, 141.  In addition, the court concluded that Gurkman's
report had been determinative to the outcome of Cole's suspension
hearing because it was "the only evidence in the record from
which the hearing officer could assess the lawfulness of
Gurkman's initial stop of [Cole]."  Id. at 140 (emphasis in
original).  The court emphasized that it considered the ability
to cross-examine Gurkman "essential." (10)  Id. at 141.
Dinsmore also had her license suspended following a DMV
hearing in which the hearing officer admitted hearsay evidence in
the form of police reports and based her necessary findings of
fact on that evidence.  In 1999, Dinsmore's truck collided with
two other vehicles that were stopped in her lane of travel on
Highway 20.  The collision killed one person and seriously
injured another.  State Trooper Johnson, who arrived at the scene
after the accident, interviewed two witnesses -- drivers of two
cars that had been traveling in the opposite direction from
Dinsmore when the collision occurred -- and included their
comments in his report.  According to the report, those witnesses
told Johnson that the vehicles that Dinsmore had struck with her
truck had had their turn signals on at the time of impact and
appeared to be waiting to turn left.  Johnson noted that one of
the witnesses described Dinsmore's vehicle as traveling "really
fast" when it ran into the two stopped vehicles; the other
witness opined that Dinsmore's vehicle "was going too fast." 
Johnson also interviewed Dinsmore and recorded in his report that
she had told him that she had drunk one beer, was taking
medications for high blood pressure and allergies, had slept only
a few hours the night before, and had not seen the two vehicles
in front of her.  As a result of his on-site investigation,
Johnson cited Dinsmore for DUII and reckless driving. 
State Trooper Skinner, an accident reconstructionist
for the Oregon State Police, prepared a collision reconstruction
report based on Johnson's report, forensic tests performed on the
victims' vehicles, and Skinner's own investigation of the
accident scene.  Skinner made findings regarding the conditions
and grade of the road, and whether the victims' cars had
functioning brake lights and operating turn signals when
Dinsmore's truck collided with them.  Based on those findings and
the speed that Dinsmore had told Johnson that she had been
traveling at the time of the accident, Skinner estimated that
Dinsmore would have had more than 1,000 feet in which to see and
react to the cars stopped in front of her.  Skinner also
concluded in his report that Dinsmore had been using her cell
phone when she collided with the other vehicles.  In addition,
Skinner's report contained an estimate that Dinsmore's blood
alcohol level at the time of the crash had been between 0.10
percent and 0.14 percent.  He arrived at that estimate by
calculating backwards from a breath test that Dinsmore had taken
four hours after the accident and that registered her blood
alcohol level as 0.06 percent. (11) 
On the basis of Skinner's and Johnson's reports, DMV
notified Dinsmore that it was suspending her driving privileges
on the grounds that she had caused or contributed to an accident
resulting in the death of another due to recklessness or criminal
negligence and that she posed a potential danger to persons or
property.  Dinsmore requested and was granted a hearing, which
was held in January 2000.
Although entitled to do so under ORS 183.400, Dinsmore
had not requested DMV to subpoena either Johnson or Skinner on
her behalf.  DMV had issued subpoenas for the officers on its own
motion, but neither appeared at the hearing.  In their absence,
DMV offered into evidence the reports that the officers had
prepared.  Dinsmore objected on the grounds that the reports
constituted hearsay and double hearsay, and that due process
required that she have the opportunity to cross-examine the
officers regarding their investigation and the "underpinnings,"
accuracy, and sufficiency of the information contained in the
reports.  The hearing officer received the reports as evidence
over Dinsmore's objection, reasoning in the final order that
"hearsay is admissible in an administrative hearing. * * * The
fact that the reports are hearsay goes to their weight and not
their admissibility."
At the hearing, Dinsmore presented witnesses and
offered evidence that contradicted several of the assertions that
Skinner had made in his report. (12)  Dinsmore offered her cell
phone records to show that she had not been on the phone at the
time of the collision and a letter by a doctor stating his
opinion that it would be very difficult to calculate accurately
Dinsmore's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident.  In
addition, a witness testified to having seen Dinsmore maneuver
her car out of a cramped parking space without any difficulty
just before the collision.
Following the hearing, DMV issued its final order
upholding Dinsmore's license suspension on the ground that, at
the time of the accident, petitioner was "operating her vehicle
either recklessly or with criminal negligence."  Former ORS
809.410(15), repealed by Or Laws 2003, ch 402, §§ 6a, 43 (13);
OAR 735-070-0130.  The order contained findings of fact that were
based almost entirely on the officers' reports.  However, on the
issues for which Dinsmore had presented evidence that
contradicted the information in those reports, the hearing
officer made findings in Dinsmore's favor, specifically, that she
had not been on her cell phone or driving under the influence at
the time of the accident. 
Dinsmore sought judicial review of the DMV order,
pursuant to ORS 183.482, arguing that DMV's decision to admit the
police reports into evidence violated due process notions of
"fundamental fairness" because she was denied an opportunity to
cross-examine the officers who prepared the reports.  In
addition, Dinsmore contended that, because the reports formed the
entire basis for the department's order, that order was not
supported by substantial evidence.  
Relying on its recent decision in Cole, the Court of
Appeals concluded that DMV's conclusions were not supported by
substantial evidence: (14)
"We see no meaningful distinction between this case and
Cole.  As in Cole, the department does not dispute that
the report constitutes hearsay.  Moreover, petitioner
has been denied the opportunity to cross-examine the
source of those statements, which formed an important,
and perhaps the sole, basis for the department's
findings of fact.  Following Cole, we conclude that the
department's conclusions are not supported by
substantial evidence."
Dinsmore, 175 Or App at 514.  The court therefore reversed and
remanded the case to DMV.
III. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
DMV argues that, in its decisions in these cases, the
Court of Appeals improperly has reduced the multi-factored, case-and-evidence-specific Reguero inquiry to "one unbending and
universally applicable dictate:  Hearsay alone can never be
substantial evidence to support any finding necessary to an
agency's ultimate determination."  DMV contends that Reguero
holds that the APA "necessarily permits" hearsay evidence,
without other corroborating evidence, to be sufficiently
substantial to support a finding of fact.  Consequently, DMV
reasons that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of ORS
183.482(c) is inconsistent with this court's interpretation in
Reguero.  DMV makes further arguments respecting the separate
cases at issue here -- as do Cole and Dinsmore -- as summarized
below.
A. Cole
In Cole, DMV concedes that the Court of Appeals applied
the Reguero factors, but argues that the conclusions that the
court drew were incorrect and contrary to Reguero's holding. 
Specifically, DMV maintains that the Court of Appeals failed to
consider the reliability of the hearsay evidence, the lack of
countervailing evidence presented, and the lack of efficacy of
cross-examining the police officer whose report formed the basis
for the hearing officer's decision.  
In contrast to what DMV characterizes as the "classic
hearsay" in Reguero, DMV asserts that the hearsay evidence
offered in Cole contained adequate indicia of reliability and
sufficient probative force to constitute substantial evidence
when no countervailing evidence rebutted Gurkman's report or
called into question Gurkman's credibility.  DMV emphasizes that
Gurkman's report detailed his personal observations of Cole's
vehicle violating a variety of traffic laws and that Gurkman had
prepared the report near the time of the stop, was acting within
the scope of his duties imposed by law in making the report, and
had a duty to report his observations accurately.  DMV analogizes
those factors to similar ones discussed in the legislative
commentary to the recorded-recollection exception to the hearsay
rule under the Oregon Evidence Code and urges that those
considerations suggest that reports made in such a manner are
inherently reliable.  See Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence §
803.05[2], Art. VIII-89 (4th ed 2002) (discussing guaranty of
trustworthiness found in inherent reliability of record made
while events still fresh in mind and record intended accurately
to reflect those events).  DMV also argues that Gurkman's report
was supported by additional guarantees of trustworthiness because
he could have been subject to disciplinary action or civil or
criminal liability for making a false report. 
DMV next contends that Cole's failure to offer any
countervailing evidence, such as an alternative account of the
events reported by Gurkman, when taken in conjunction with the
indicia of reliability accompanying Gurkman's report, reduces the
likelihood that cross-examining Gurkman would have been useful in
this case. (15)  DMV argues that, unlike in Reguero, in which
the teacher had offered evidence that directly contradicted the
hearsay statements, Cole failed to present any evidence
suggesting what favorable evidence he expected to procure by
cross-examining Gurkman.  DMV characterizes the fact proved by
the hearsay -- that Cole was stopped lawfully -- as an antecedent
fact that it was required to prove but contends that the central
issue at the hearing was whether Cole was driving under the
influence.
Finally, DMV argues that the Court of Appeals did not
adequately take into account considerations of economy implicated
by DMV's procedure for processing the suspension of DUII drivers
when the court evaluated the evidence for substantiality.  DMV
asserts that it holds close to 400 DUII license suspension
hearings a month; that, in many of those cases, a stopping
officer and an arresting officer are involved; and that the
agency must issue a final order within 30 to 60 days from the
date of the arrest. (16)  DMV argues that those facts make it
uneconomical to subpoena two officers when it has no reason to
believe that both are necessary -- for example, when the driver
has not expressed his intent to challenge the validity of the
stop or requested DMV to subpoena the officers.  Moreover, DMV
asserts that, if required to testify, officers are unlikely to
have an independent recollection of the stop and merely will be
repeating the information in their reports.  Thus, DMV reasons
that the value of having them testify is minimal.
Cole counters that the Court of Appeals correctly
applied the Reguero factors in holding that the police report, by
itself, did not constitute substantial evidence of the validity
of the stop.  He notes that, contrary to DMV's assertion that
whether he was stopped lawfully was not the central issue of the
hearing, the hearing officer must determine that the driver was
validly under arrest for DUII when he was asked to take the
breath test for the ensuing suspension to be valid.  See Pooler
v. MVD, 306 Or 47, 51, 755 P2d 701 (1988) ("Without a valid
arrest, there can be no request to take a breath test which may
lead to a lawful suspension.").  
In addition, Cole argues that DMV's failure to notify
him that it intended to submit a report prepared by an officer of
whose existence he was unaware violates due process because it
deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to subpoena that
officer. He contends that, if DMV fails to provide reasonable
notice of its intent to offer a hearsay police report at an
implied consent hearing, then either that report should be
excluded from evidence or the party against whom the report is to
be used should be entitled to a continuance of the hearing in
order to subpoena the declarant.  Cole notes that the trial court
specifically found that Gurkman's name did not appear in a public
record to which Cole had access and that Cole had no means
available to obtain his name or a copy of his report.  
In response, DMV asserts that Cole knew that more than
one officer had been involved in his arrest because Gurkman was
referred to in Nguyen's report, albeit incorrectly as "German,"
and therefore Cole could have subpoenaed Gurkman.  Thus, DMV
argues that Cole received all the process that he was due. (17)
B. Dinsmore
DMV argues that the Court of Appeals merely relied on
its decision in Cole and mechanically applied the Reguero factors
to the evidence in Dinsmore's case.  In particular, DMV claims
that the Court of Appeals did not evaluate properly whether the
hearsay evidence contained in the officers' reports could have
been subjected to effective cross-examination, but rather simply
assumed that it could.  DMV argues that the nature of the
information contained in those reports would not be susceptible
to meaningful cross-examination because (1) Johnson's report
contained the officer's own observations and statements that
Dinsmore and the two witnesses had made; and (2) Skinner's
reconstruction report comprised "simple measurements and
descriptions of objective information."  In terms of the
importance of the facts sought to be proved by the hearsay
evidence, DMV concedes that the police reports formed the only
evidentiary support for the hearing officer's findings of fact
about the accident.
In response, Dinsmore disputes DMV's contention that
the Court of Appeals applied its ruling in Cole as a "blanket
rule" that hearsay alone never could be sufficient to support an
agency's finding.  She asserts that, because the court expressly
found that the facts in her case were substantially similar to
those in Cole, its application was appropriately case-specific. 
See Dinsmore, 175 Or App at 514 (finding no meaningful
distinction between this case and Cole).  
Next, Dinsmore notes that the alternative to relying on
the hearsay was to require the officers to appear at the hearing
and provide testimony, and she contends that, "[a]s in Reguero,
the officers' direct testimony would have been better evidence
than their hearsay statements and those of other witnesses." 
Dinsmore emphasizes that both officers disobeyed their DMV
subpoenas and that no explanation was offered as to why they did
not appear.  Dinsmore contends that their failure to honor the
subpoenas casts doubt on the reliability of the statements made
in their reports and that reliance on those reports was therefore
not reasonable.  Relatedly, Dinsmore claims that she was
depending on the officers to honor their subpoenas and was
prepared to cross-examine them, and asserts that it was
reasonable for her to rely on DMV's subpoenas rather than request
the agency to subpoena the officers on her behalf.  
As to the state of the opposing and supporting hearsay
evidence, Dinsmore contrasts DMV's lack of corroborating evidence
with the considerable amount of countervailing evidence that she
offered and on which the hearing officer relied in part.  As to
economy concerns, Dinsmore asserts that the convenient and
inexpensive alternative had been implemented in her case because
DMV had subpoenaed the officers.  She also contends that allowing
the hearing officer to rely on the multiple hearsay statements
contained in the reports, which "lacked any showing of expertise
or qualification, specific and accepted engineering principles,
or * * * foundation," similarly violated notions of due process.
As to the efficacy of cross-examination, Dinsmore
argues that being able to cross-examine the accident
reconstructionist would have yielded important information
regarding Skinner's training, experience, and expertise in
reconstructing accidents (none of which DMV offered), and could
have revealed errors in the models that he used to generate his
findings. 
Finally, in regard to the importance of the outcome of
the proceedings, Dinsmore alleges that, because she lives in
Burns and lacks transportation alternatives, the consequences for
her of a driver license suspension are dire.
IV. DISCUSSION
We consider the parties' subconstitutional arguments
first.  State v. Hancock, 317 Or 5, 9, 854 P2d 926 (1993). 
Before doing so, we briefly review the applicable standards of
review and burdens of proof under the APA and restate the Reguero
factors.  As mentioned above, in cases such as these that
challenge an order issued by an administrative agency after a
contested case hearing, if we conclude that the order is not
supported by substantial evidence in the whole record, then we
must "set aside or remand the order."  ORS 183.482(8)(c).  "Whole
record" review requires us to consider whatever evidence the
record may contain that would detract from, as well as support,
the agency's order.  Norden v. Water Resources Dept., 329 Or 641,
647-48, 996 P2d 958 (2000) (citing Younger, 305 Or at 354 (1988)
(quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 US 474, 488, 71 S Ct
456, 95 L Ed 456 (1951))).  Under the APA, only evidence that is
irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious is excluded; all
other evidence that a reasonably prudent person would rely on is
admissible.  ORS 183.450(1); Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., 309
Or 292, 295, 787 P2d 884 (1990).
In contested case hearings, the proponent of a fact or
position bears the burden of presenting evidence to support that
fact or position.  ORS 183.450(2).  See also Reguero, 312 Or at
418 (agency bore burden of proving sexual misconduct allegation);
Rencken v. Young, 300 Or 352, 364-65, 711 P2d 954 (1985)
(proponents of water right cancellation bore burden to prove
requisite nonuse of water).  Thus, in these cases, DMV had the
burden of presenting reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence to support its allegations that Cole was lawfully
stopped and arrested for DUII and that Dinsmore had operated her
vehicle either recklessly or with criminal negligence.  See ORS
183.450(5).  
As previously discussed, Reguero provides a list of
factors that courts may consider when assessing whether hearsay
evidence constitutes substantial evidence:  (1) the alternative
to relying on the hearsay evidence; (2) the importance of the
facts sought to be proved by the hearsay statements to the
outcome of the proceeding and considerations of economy; (3) the
state of the supporting or opposing evidence, if any; (4) the
degree of lack of efficacy of cross-examination with respect to
the particular hearsay statements; and (5) the consequences of
the decision either way.  We conclude that the last Reguero
factor can be dispensed with at the outset, because the
consequences of DMV's decision is the same in both cases. 
Although it is clear that a driver has an interest in maintaining
a valid driver license, it is equally apparent that DMV has an
interest in removing unsafe drivers from the roads.  We therefore
find that that factor does not strongly favor either party in
either case.  
A. Cole 
We begin our analysis of Cole's proceeding by
considering each of the Reguero factors to determine whether
substantial evidence existed to support DMV's order suspending
his license.  More specifically, we examine whether the hearsay
evidence upon which the agency relied to determine that Cole was
lawfully stopped -- that is, Gurkman's report -- constituted
substantial evidence to support that finding by DMV. (18)  The
first factor is whether there are alternatives to relying on the
hearsay evidence.  Here, DMV could have compelled Gurkman to
attend the hearing, which demonstrates that a viable alternative
existed to DMV's decision to rely instead on Gurkman's report.
Next, we evaluate the potential efficacy of cross-examining the preparer of the hearsay report.  We conclude that
the record does not support the state's contention that the
cross-examination of Gurkman would have been without effect. 
Nguyen, who testified at Cole's hearing, appeared to have an
independent recollection of the event; the same could have been
true for Gurkman, and we have no reason to presume otherwise.
However, the next Reguero factor that we consider, the
state of the corroborating and opposing evidence, supports the
conclusion that it was reasonable for DMV to rely on this
particular hearsay evidence to find that Cole had been stopped
lawfully.  At Cole's hearing, DMV did not offer any evidence that
corroborated the statement in Gurkman's report that Cole had
violated several traffic laws before the stop, and Cole declined
to submit any contradictory evidence.  Therefore, the only
evidence as to whether Cole had been stopped lawfully was
Gurkman's report.  Because DMV bore the burden of presenting
evidence to prove its position that Cole's stop had been lawful,
Cole was not obliged to offer an affirmative defense.  However,
his failure to do so tends to make it more reasonable for the
agency to have relied on Gurkman's report in making its findings. 
See ORS 183.482(8)(c) (substantial evidence exists to support
finding of fact when whole record would permit reasonable person
to make that finding).  As this court stated in Reguero, the
reliability of particular evidence depends upon "the quantity and
quality of supporting and opposing evidence and on the whole
circumstantial setting[.]"  312 Or at 419-20 (quoting 3 Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise 245 (2d ed 1980)).  Here, the hearsay
evidence was a police report prepared in the ordinary course of
business and pursuant to the officer's official duties, and no
evidence was offered that challenged the veracity of the
information contained in that report.  Thus, although the Court
of Appeals correctly assessed that the state of the evidence was
"neutral" in the sense that neither party offered additional
evidence, 172 Or App at 140, Cole's failure to question Gurkman's
account of the incident or offer any explanation that countered
Gurkman's description of Cole's driving before Gurkman had
stopped him (19) tends to support a determination that the
report's account of the events was reliable.  
Finally, we consider the importance of the facts sought
to be proved by the hearsay statements and considerations of
economy.  This court's decision in Pooler directly refutes DMV's
contention that the fact to be proved by the hearsay evidence in
Cole's case was anything less than integral to the outcome of the
proceeding.  In Pooler, this court held that a hearing officer at
a license suspension hearing for a driver arrested for DUII must
determine whether the driver lawfully was under arrest for DUII
when asked to take a breath test under former ORS 482.541(2),
renumbered as ORS 813.410 (1985).  306 Or at 51.  If the hearing
officer fails to make that determination, then the suspension
could be invalid.  Id.  
However, we find that the considerations of economy
that DMV raises loom large here.  DMV is responsible for holding
hundreds of DUII hearings monthly and, by statute, must issue
orders on strict time lines.  See ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 20-21).  We agree with DMV that, in general, when a party fails to
exercise its right to request the agency to subpoena witnesses on
its behalf, the agency is not obligated to procure the attendance
of those witnesses and may submit reports that they have
prepared.  As we discuss below, however, Cole lacked such an
opportunity, because he was unaware of Gurkman's identity before
his hearing.  Although that fact is significant, we determine
that it pertains to whether Cole's hearing complied with due
process, rather than to the question whether the evidence on
which DMV relied to suspend Cole's license satisfied the
statutory substantial evidence requirement.
We conclude that the hearsay evidence in this case was
sufficiently reliable and probative for the agency to employ it
as a basis for its findings of fact.  In light of the above
analysis, it constituted substantial evidence to support the
hearing officer's finding that Cole lawfully had been stopped and
arrested for DUII, on which DMV predicated its order suspending
Cole's license.
Having concluded that no state statutory violation
occurred, we now address whether DMV violated Cole's due process
rights when it failed to give him the name of the stopping
officer or a copy of the report prepared by that officer and then
introduced that report at Cole's hearing.  A driver license
suspension hearing must satisfy the requirements of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (20)  See, e.g.,
Dixon v. Love, 431 US 105, 112, 97 S Ct 1723, 52 L Ed 2d 172
(1977) ("It is clear that the Due Process Clause [of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution] applies
to the deprivation of a driver's license by the State[.]").  Due
process requires the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner. (21)  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US
319, 333, 96 S Ct 893, 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976) (internal quotation
marks omitted).  In addition, when important governmental
decisions are based on determinations of fact, due process
usually requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US 254, 269, 90 S Ct
1011, 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970). 
In Cole's case, we conclude that, although the hearsay
evidence offered was sufficiently reliable to constitute
substantial evidence for purposes of ORS 183.482(8)(c), Cole's
hearing did not comport with the fundamental requirements of due
process.  That is so, because, despite having received Cole's
discovery request, DMV did not provide Cole with Gurkman's name
or a copy of Gurkman's report, but then offered that report at
Cole's hearing. 
We agree with Cole that that lack of notice
distinguishes his case from Richardson v. Perales, 402 US 389, 91
S Ct 1420, 28 L Ed 2d 842 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held
that
"a written report by a licensed physician who has
examined the claimant and who sets forth in his report
his medical findings in his area of competence may be
received as evidence in a disability hearing and,
despite its hearsay character and an absence of cross-examination, and despite the presence of opposing
direct medical testimony and testimony by the claimant
himself, may constitute substantial evidence supportive
of a finding by the hearing examiner adverse to the
claimant, when the claimant has not exercised his right
to subpoena the reporting physician and thereby provide
himself with the opportunity for cross-examination of
the physician."
402 US at 402.  In reaching that conclusion, the Court emphasized
that the claimant, Perales, had had ample opportunity to examine
the physicians' reports before the hearing because those reports
were "on file and available for inspection by the claimant and
his counsel" and "the authors of those reports were known and
were subject to subpoena and to the very cross-examination that
the claimant asserts he has not enjoyed."  Id. at 407.  The Court
also found it significant that Perales had failed to take
advantage of the opportunity afforded to him under the Social
Security Act to request subpoenas for the physicians and that
such inaction on his part precluded him from "now complaining
that he was denied the rights of confrontation and cross-examination."  Id. at 404. 
As in Perales, Cole failed to take advantage of his
statutory opportunity to subpoena Gurkman.  See ORS 183.440
(permitting parties to request DMV to subpoena witnesses for
hearing).  However, because he did not know Gurkman's identity at
the time of the hearing, Cole lacked a meaningful opportunity to
subpoena Gurkman and secure his attendance.  Moreover, unlike the
reports in Perales, Gurkman's report was neither on file nor
available for inspection before the hearing.  Thus, we hold that,
under those circumstances, Cole's due process rights were
violated and he is entitled to a new hearing.
B. Dinsmore
Before her hearing, Dinsmore knew the identity of the
officers who prepared the reports that DMV offered into
evidence. (22)  However, we must determine whether those
reports were sufficiently reliable and probative to constitute
substantial evidence.  We do so by considering the Reguero
factors.
In Dinsmore's case, the alternative to relying on the
hearsay evidence was to have Johnson and Skinner testify at
Dinsmore's hearing, and we find that that would have been better
evidence than relying on their reports alone.  As in Cole, the
facts that DMV sought to prove by the reports were essential to
the outcome of Dinsmore's hearing, because DMV offered no
nonhearsay evidence to corroborate what was in the officers'
reports.  In contrast to Cole, however, Dinsmore offered
significant evidence contradicting the content of Skinner's
report, as we described above.  See __ Or at __ (slip op at 15). 
Moreover, the fact that DMV already had subpoenaed Johnson and
Skinner bolsters Dinsmore's contention that having them present
at the hearing satisfied economy concerns.  We therefore conclude
that the Reguero factors regarding the state of the evidence and
the alternative to the use of hearsay weigh in Dinsmore's favor.
We also find that the fourth Reguero factor -- whether
Dinsmore could have cross-examined the officers effectively about
their reports -- similarly favors Dinsmore, particularly with
regard to Skinner's accident reconstructionist report.  In
contrast to Johnson's report, which consisted mainly of a
description of his actions after he arrived at the scene of the
accident, Skinner's report set out his conclusions based on
reviewing reports prepared by others, examining the collision
scene several days after the accident, and viewing the damaged
vehicles.  In other words, Skinner offered his opinion based in
part on hearsay and multiple hearsay (that is, the statements
made by Dinsmore and witnesses that were included in Johnson's
report), a practice that this court found problematic in Reguero. 
312 Or at 419-20.  In addition, in objecting to Skinner's report,
Dinsmore specifically challenged the model that Skinner had used
to develop his conclusions.  Although unable to question him
directly, Dinsmore contested how Skinner had determined that she
would have had the equivalent of a distance of six football
fields in which to see the stopped vehicles ahead of her and
react appropriately, a distance upon which the hearing officer
relied to determine that the collision had been caused by
Dinsmore's recklessness or criminal negligence. 
Moreover, unlike Johnson's police report, which had
been based on his personal knowledge and observations as he
investigated the accident, Skinner's accident reconstruction
report lacked sufficient foundation to support all his
conclusions.  For example, in evaluating Dinsmore's impairment,
Skinner stated that she had been "using her cell phone at the
time of the crash" without identifying what source led him to
that conclusion.  As discussed above, Dinsmore refuted that
conclusion at the hearing by introducing her cell phone records. 
Dinsmore also argued that Skinner was unqualified to offer any
opinion as to what her blood alcohol content at the time of the
accident might have been because he had not been shown to have
any expertise in that area.  In addition, she alleged that
Skinner's conclusion about her blood alcohol level at the time of
the accident lacked proper foundation because the only evidence
on that point consisted of the results of a later breath test
that was not itself offered into evidence and that had not been
shown to have been administered properly.  We conclude that it is
likely that Dinsmore would have been able to question Skinner
effectively as to the content of his report.
When, as here, critical evidence is in the form of a
hearsay report that is prepared by an expert witness who does not
testify and that is based partially on hearsay and multiple
hearsay, and when significant questions have been raised as to
the methods used to prepare that evidence, we are not satisfied
that a reasonable person could rely on the report to support a
conclusion that a driver has been either reckless or criminally
negligent.  We therefore hold that the reports that DMV offered
at Dinsmore's hearing did not constitute substantial evidence
under ORS 183.482(8)(c) to support the hearing officer's finding
of criminal negligence or recklessness, which formed the basis
for the agency's decision to continue to suspend Dinsmore's
license.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the
order suspending Cole's license must be reversed because the
proceedings that preceded that order violated Cole's due process
rights.  Thus, Cole is entitled to a new hearing.  We conclude
that the order suspending Dinsmore's license must be reversed
because it was not supported by substantial evidence.  We remand
to DMV to dismiss Dinsmore's proceeding.
In Cole, the decision of the Court of Appeals and the
judgment of the circuit court are affirmed, and the case is
remanded to DMV.  In Dinsmore, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed, the order of the DMV is reversed, and the
case is remanded to DMV.
1. ORS 183.482(8)(c) provides:
"The court shall set aside or remand the order [of
the agency] if it finds that the order is not supported
by substantial evidence in the record.  Substantial
evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the
record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable
person to make that finding."
2. We use the term "hearsay" in this opinion in the same
manner as this court used it in Reguero:
"[T]he term 'hearsay' means 'a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the * * *
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.'  OEC 801(3).  A 'declarant' is a
person who makes a statement.  OEC 801(2).  The phrase
'multiple hearsay' or 'hearsay within hearsay' refers
to hearsay (e.g., police report) that contains within
it another level (or levels) of hearsay (e.g., a
bystander's statement)."
312 Or at 405 n 4.
3. ORS 183.450(1) provides, in part:
"Irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious
evidence shall be excluded but erroneous rulings on
evidence shall not preclude agency action on the record
unless shown to have substantially prejudiced the
rights of a party.  All other evidence of a type
commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in
conduct of their serious affairs shall be admissible. * * * Objections to evidentiary offers may be made and
shall be noted in the record.  Any part of the evidence
may be received in written form."
4. Under the so-called "residuum rule," an administrative
agency's findings must be supported by some evidence that would
be admissible in a civil or criminal trial.  Reguero, 312 Or at
414-15.  Thus, "a finding based solely on hearsay that would not
be admissible in a civil or criminal trial could never be
supported by substantial evidence in the whole record."  Id. at
415.  As noted, this court in Reguero expressly rejected the
residuum rule. 
5. ORS 813.010(1)(a) provides that a person commits the
offense of DUII if the person drives a vehicle while the person
"[h]as 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the blood of
the person as shown by chemical analysis of the breath."
6. A party in a contested case before an agency may
request that the agency subpoena witnesses on his or her behalf
pursuant to ORS 183.440, which provides:
"(1) An agency may issue subpoenas on its own
motion in a contested case.  In addition, an agency or
hearing officer in a contested case may issue subpoenas
upon the request of a party to a contested case upon a
showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of
the evidence sought.  A party entitled to have
witnesses on behalf of the party may have subpoenas
issued by an attorney of record of the party * * *."
7. Because Nguyen had not been the stopping officer, he
had not witnessed any of the driving and therefore could not
testify whether Cole had been stopped lawfully. 
8. In the alternative to his objection to the admission of
the Gurkman report, Cole had moved to continue the hearing until
he could subpoena Gurkman.  As the Court of Appeals explained:
 "The hearing officer denied [Cole's] request for a
continuance because, in the hearing officer's view,
[Cole's] proffered basis for the request -- the need to
subpoena the stopping officer -- did not justify a
continuance under DMV administrative policy and because
granting the request 'would be new or a precedent-setting' allowance.  The hearing officer was correct. 
The circumstances here did not fall within the
definition of 'other just cause' set out in OAR 735-090-0000(5)."
Cole, 172 Or App at 135 n 1.  Since the time of Cole's hearing,
OAR 735-090-0000 has been revised so that now someone in Cole's
position would be able to request a continuance if a "necessary
witness does not appear at the hearing because the necessary
witness was unknown to the petitioning party prior to a recorded
or reported hearing that determines the validity of a suspension
of driving privileges[.]"  OAR 735-090-0000(4)(b)(A).
9. ORS 813.410 provides, in part:
"(7) * * * [A] person shall have the right to appeal
any final order by the department after a hearing under [the
Implied Consent Law] by filing a petition."
ORS 813.450 provides, in part:
"(4) Upon review in the circuit court and Court of
Appeals, the court may affirm, reverse or remand the
order as follows:
"* * * * *
"(c) The court shall set aside or remand the order
if it finds that the order is not supported by
substantial evidence in the record."
10. Because the Court of Appeals affirmed on the narrower
ground that substantial evidence did not exist to support DMV's
findings, that court did not reach or address the due process
violation that was the basis for the circuit court's holding.
11. Skinner's report states that he used a "dissipation
rate range of 0.01 [percent] to 0.02 [percent] per hour" in
making his calculations.  
12. At the time of their administrative hearings, criminal
charges were pending against both Dinsmore and Cole based on the
incidents that led to their license suspensions; neither
testified at their own hearings.
13. The 2003 Legislative Assembly also passed ORS 809.417,
which provides that the Department of Transportation "may suspend
the driving privileges of a person who, while operating a motor
vehicle, causes or contributes to an accident resulting in death"
if the department has "reason to believe" that the person's
recklessness or criminal negligence "caused or contributed to the
accident."  ORS 809.417(3)(a).
14. Before the Court of Appeals, DMV argued that Dinsmore's
subsequent conviction for criminally negligent homicide should
preclude her from continuing to assert that she was not
criminally negligent.  The Court of Appeals held that,
"in order to rely on the doctrine of issue preclusion,
the department first had to introduce the judgment into
evidence and provide petitioner with an opportunity to
show that issue preclusion does not apply.  The
department did not do so, and, having failed to comply
with the prerequisites for claiming issue preclusion,
it may not rely on that doctrine here."
175 Or App at 513 (internal citations omitted).  DMV does not
raise that issue on review, and we do not address it.
15. DMV also contends that direct evidence lends credence
to the inference that Gurkman's report contained accurate
information.  The agency asserts that the fact that Gurkman
stopped Cole supports the inference that Gurkman thought that
Cole was committing a traffic infraction, and the fact that
Cole's blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit suggests that
his driving might have been affected in the manner that Gurkman
described.  It is beyond dispute that DMV cannot rely on the fact
that the stop occurred as evidence that the stop was valid. 
Likewise, the fact that, ex post, Cole's blood alcohol level was
found to be above the legal limit cannot, standing alone, be used
to prove that his driving was impaired at the time of the stop. 
See, e.g., State v. Clark, 286 Or 33, 39, 593 P2d 123 (1979)
(noting that some persons may exhibit no observable symptoms of
intoxication and yet may have blood alcohol content exceeding
legal limit).
16. Under the Implied Consent Law, if DMV receives a police
report indicating that a driver has been arrested for driving
under the influence, ORS 813.120, then DMV is required to suspend
the individual's driver license.  ORS 813.410(1).  Drivers may
request a hearing within 10 days of the arrest or notice of
suspension, and, in most cases, the department is required to
hold the hearing and issue a final order within 30 or 60 days of
the date of the arrest.  ORS 813.410(3),(4)(e).  According
to DMV, many police departments utilize a dual-officer system
such as the one in Cole's case, i.e., a stopping officer and an
arresting officer, to enforce drunk driving laws. 
17. DMV also argues that, due to the way in which the
implied consent statutes operate, DMV itself did not did not have
a copy of Gurkman's report before the hearing.  ORS 813.100(3)
describes the procedure for suspending license after a driver
fails a breath test and provides, in part:
"[T]he police officer shall do all of the
following:
"* * * * * 
"(d) Within a period of time required by the
department by rule, report action taken under this
section to the department and prepare and cause to be
delivered to the department a report as described in
ORS 813.120, along with the confiscated license or
permit and a copy of the notice of intent to suspend."
Under ORS 813.120(1), a report required by ORS 813.100
need not state whether more than one officer was involved in the
stop or whether the reporting officer was the stopping officer,
although it must disclose "[w]hether the person, at the time the
person was requested to submit to a test, was under arrest for
driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants
in violation of ORS 813.010 or of a municipal ordinance."  ORS
813.120(1)(a).
Here, Nguyen prepared the report required by ORS
813.100 and submitted it without a copy of Gurkman's report. 
According to DMV, Nguyen then brought Gurkman's report to Cole's
hearing.  DMV claims that, because it was not in possession of
the report until the hearing, it gave Cole all the documents in
its possession at the time that he requested them.  Although such
an argument might be a defense to an alleged discovery violation,
it does not suffice to address whether DMV's actions violated
Cole's right to due process.
DMV also claims that Cole had the right under ORS
192.420 and ORS 192.501(3) to request that the Gresham Police
Department provide him with copies of all relevant reports.  Cole
argues that Gurkman's report was not a public record subject to
disclosure under those statutes because it constituted
investigatory information compiled for criminal law purposes,
which is exempt under ORS 192.501(3).  We do not find it
necessary to decide this issue, because, as we explain below, we
conclude that DMV's failure to notify Cole of Gurkman's identity
and the existence of Gurkman's report constitutes a due process
violation.  See __ Or at __ (slip opinion at 33-34).
18. We have organized our discussion based on the factors
enumerated in Reguero for the sake of clarity, not because those
factors are intended to be treated as a checklist.  As we discuss
in further detail below, other considerations may, and at times
should, be taken into account when evaluating whether hearsay
evidence in a particular case constitutes substantial evidence
sufficient to support an agency's order.  Moreover, depending on
the circumstances of a particular case -- for example, the nature
of the hearsay evidence and the issue it is being used to prove
-- the importance accorded to an individual Reguero factor in the
overall determination may vary.
19. In addition to the objections made to the hearsay
evidence, Cole's entire defense consisted of his counsel's
suggestion, while cross-examining Nguyen, that Cole's alleged
swerving might have been due to his effort to avoid a disabled
vehicle in the roadway and his counsel's assertion that "we most
strenuously dispute any allegations that there [were] any traffic
infractions or other driving committed by [Cole] that would've
given rise to the stop."
20. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides:
"No State shall * * * deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]"
21. This court previously has held that the Implied Consent
Law at issue in Cole's case satisfies due process, because the
law provides for an administrative hearing subject to judicial
review.  Heer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 252 Or 455, 463, 450
P2d 533 (1969).  The same is true of the procedures under which
DMV suspended Dinsmore's license.  
22. Unlike the notice that Cole received regarding his
rights and the procedures that would be followed at his hearing,
the notice that Dinsmore received from DMV did not state that she
had a right to request the agency to subpoena witnesses on her
behalf, but merely referred to her right to a hearing under the
APA.  Although notice of the right to subpoena is not required
expressly by ORS 183.413, which details what information an
agency must provide to a party to a contested case before the
hearing, we note that the sample "Notice of Contested Case Rights
and Procedures" provided by the Attorney General includes a
statement that "the agency will issue subpoenas for witnesses on
[the party's] behalf upon a showing that [the witnesses']
testimony is relevant to the case and is reasonably needed * * *
to establish [the party's] position."  Oregon Attorney General's
Administrative Law Manual and Uniform and Model Rules of
Procedure, p. A-37 (2001).  In addition, the Attorney General
directs agencies to be as "specific and informative as possible"
in the statement of rights sent to parties in contested cases to
"comply with the spirit of ORS 183.413."  Id. at 90.