Case Title: Hornecker v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hornecker v. State1999 WY 66977 P.2d 1289Case Number: 98-105Decided: 05/24/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

MICHAEL LEE HORNECKER, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

                                

Appeal from the District Court 
of Fremont County The Honorable D.

Terry Rogers, 
Judge.

 

Maureen T. Donohoue of 
Donohoue Law Office, Lander, Wyoming. Representing 
Appellant.

 William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Joseph S. Huey, 
Student Intern. Representing Appellee.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and 
TAYLOR, * JJ.

  * 
Retired November 2, 1998.

 

   
TAYLOR, Justice, Retired.

  [¶1]       After pleading guilty to one count of 
taking indecent liberties with a minor, appellant was sentenced to six to ten 
years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Appellant now contends that ineffective 
assistance of counsel renders his plea of guilt involuntary. He also contends 
the district court improperly used a Psychosexual Offender Evaluation in 
reaching the sentencing decision. Finding no evidence to support his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, and no plain error in the district court's 
consideration of the psychosexual evaluation, we affirm.

 

                  
           I. 
ISSUES

 

 [¶2]       Appellant, Michael Lee Hornecker 
(Hornecker), presents two issues for review:

 

1. Appellant was prejudiced by ineffective assistance 
of counsel at several critical stages of the proceedings rendering his guilty 
plea not knowing, intelligent or voluntary.

 

2. The trial court exceeded its authority when it 
ordered and considered a "Sex Offender Evaluation" in imposing sentence upon the 
appellant.

 

 As appellee, the State of Wyoming's 
statement of the issues is substantially similar:

 

I. Did appellant receive ineffective assistance of 
counsel in the district court, so that his plea of guilty was not knowing, 
intelligent or voluntary?

 

II. Did the district court err when it ordered that 
appellant submit to a sexual offender evaluation prior to 
sentencing?

 

                                
II. FACTS

 

 [¶3]       Hornecker was questioned in March of 
1997 after his former girlfriend's four-year-old sister revealed that he had 
touched her in a sexual manner. During the course of the interview, he admitted 
having had sexual contact with the victim on no less than five 
occasions.

 

 [¶4]       Hornecker's initial counsel negotiated a 
plea agreement before any charges were made, but counsel was fired before the 
deal was consummated. Hornecker's next attorney negotiated the same plea bargain 
as original counsel. In the plea agreement, Hornecker promised that he would 
plead either guilty or nolo contendere to one charge of indecent liberties 
instead of five. Hornecker signed the plea agreement in May of 
1997.

 

 [¶5]       In October of 1997, Hornecker was 
charged, pursuant to the plea agreement, with one count of indecent liberties 
with a minor in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 (Michie 1994).1 The preliminary hearing was waived, 
and Hornecker appeared at his arraignment ready to plead nolo contendere. The 
district court judge, however, refused to accept a nolo plea. After conferring 
with counsel, Hornecker pled guilty, and provided a factual basis for the 
plea.

 

 [¶6]       The district court judge ordered that a 
Psychosexual Offender Evaluation be completed in conjunction with the 
presentence investigation report (PSI). The evaluation was attached to the PSI, 
and submitted to the district court judge prior to the sentencing hearing. While 
the PSI recommended supervised probation and counseling, the district court 
judge sentenced Hornecker to a prison term of six to ten years. This constitutes 
the extent of the facts available in the record.

 

 [¶7]       Hornecker has attempted to add 
information to the record by attaching an affidavit to his appellate brief. In 
the patently self-serving affidavit, he spells out the many ways in which his 
two prior attorneys were deficient.

 

                     
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

 

   
A. VOLUNTARINESS OF GUILTY PLEA

 

 [¶8]       In order to prevail on his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, Hornecker must make the dual showings that 
his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced his defense. Smith v. State, 959 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Wyo. 1998); 
Martinez v. State, 943 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Wyo. 1997). We invoke a strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance, making all 
decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment. Mapp v. State, 
953 P.2d 140, 143 (Wyo. 1998); Jackson 
v. State, 902 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Wyo. 1995).

 

   
B. CONSIDERATION OF PSYCHOSEXUAL OFFENDER 
EVALUATION

 

 [¶9]       In imposing sentence, the district court 
is given broad discretion to consider a wide variety of factors about the 
defendant and his crimes. Swingholm v. State, 910 P.2d 1334, 1339 (Wyo. 1996) 
(quoting Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 (Wyo. 1993)). However, when no 
objection is made concerning the consideration of a particular factor, review is 
necessarily confined to a search for plain error. Plain error, as we have often 
stated, occurs when the record clearly shows an error that transgressed a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a substantial right. Craver 
v. State, 942 P.2d 1110, 1115 (Wyo. 1997).

 

                          
IV. DISCUSSION

 

                  
A. VOLUNTARINESS OF GUILTY PLEA

 

 [¶10]    
Hornecker points to three deficiencies in his trial counsel's 
representation to support the contention that his guilty plea was made 
involuntarily. First, he claims that the failure of his trial counsel to file a 
motion to suppress his confession constituted deficient performance. Second, he 
claims that his trial counsel failed to challenge the victim's identification, 
and failed to interview possible alibi witnesses. Finally, he claims that his 
trial counsel was deficient in failing to accurately explain the consequences of 
his plea.

 

 [¶11]    
At the outset, we must make clear what record it is we rely upon to make 
a determination regarding Hornecker's involuntary plea claim. In Calene v. 
State, 846 P.2d 679, 689-92 (Wyo. 1993), we described in detail the procedures 
that are available in bringing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where 
the deficiencies of counsel are not apparent on the face of the record. In that 
case, we relied upon Leach v. State, 836 P.2d 336, 340 (Wyo. 1992), where we 
said:

 

This court concludes under the present structure of 
Wyoming law that partial remand for a criminal appellant to obtain an 
ineffectiveness of counsel hearing will only be granted (a) when the contention 
of ineffectiveness specifies acts or 
conduct which could properly be considered to allege ineffectiveness within the 
text of the motion, and (b) factual information is provided by citation to the 
record, affidavit or otherwise sufficient documentation for this court to 
perceive something more definite than conjecture as an unsupported assertion. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984).

 

 In Calene, we 
continued:

 

Following a hearing, the trial court will provide a 
specific decision addressing separate contentions by examination and resolution 
of the validity of any trial court ineffectiveness of counsel contentions.  
Appellate briefing can then include 
ineffectiveness of counsel hearing transcripts and decision conjunctively with 
any appeal discussion considering other issues presented as claimed error in 
the initial 
trial.

 

 Calene, 
846 P.2d  at 692.

 

 [¶12]    
Rather than moving this court for remand, Hornecker has attempted to 
argue his ineffectiveness claim in his appellate brief. However, we are unable 
to consider Hornecker's affidavit in these appellate proceedings. Our discussion 
of similar appendices in Bird v. State, 901 P.2d 1123, 1131-32 (Wyo. 1995) is 
dispositive:

 

We admonish counsel Bird's appendices are not part of 
the record on appeal, and it was inappropriate to include them in the brief. W. 
R. A. P. 3.01 entitled "Composition of the record" identifies those matters of 
record in the trial court appropriate for inclusion in the record on appeal. We 
can only decide the issues before us on the record, and we do not consider 
documents such as those appended to the Brief of 
Appellant.

 

Accordingly, our 
consideration of Hornecker's claims will be limited to the appropriate record, 
which does not include Hornecker's affidavit.2

 

 [¶13]    
While ineffective assistance of counsel can render a guilty plea 
involuntary, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970), we find no record support for such a claim. The only contention 
which is supported by the record is the absence of a motion to suppress. 
However, if the failure to move to suppress is a trial tactic or strategy, it 
will not, in hindsight, be judged as unconstitutionally ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Dennis v. State, 963 P.2d 972, 977 (Wyo. 1998). There is no further 
support for Hornecker's claim; the only other record evidence is Hornecker's own 
admission to the district court judge that he was entering his plea voluntarily, 
and that he was satisfied with his trial counsel's performance.  Additionally, the plea agreement reveals 
that trial counsel successfully negotiated a plea agreement wherein four out of 
the five possible charges were dropped. There is simply no evidence in the 
record which contradicts Hornecker's statements to the district court, and when 
coupled with seemingly effective plea negotiations, Hornecker's claims of error 
must fail.

 

   
B. CONSIDERATION OF PSYCHOSEXUAL OFFENDER 
EVALUATION

 

 [¶14]    
Hornecker contends that the district court was without authority to order 
and consider a Psychosexual Offender Evaluation under W. R. Cr. P. 32(a)(2). W. 
R. Cr. P. 32(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part:

 

            (2) Report. 
B The report of the presentence investigation shall 
contain:

 

(A) 
Information about the history and characteristics of the defendant, including 
prior criminal record, if any, financial condition, and any circumstances 
affecting the defendant's behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence or 
in the correctional                         
treatment of the defendant;

 

                        
* * *

 

                        
(D) Such other information as may be required by the 
court.

 

 [¶15]    
The plain language of the rule gives the district court judge discretion 
to include any information which may aid him in his task of imposing a fair 
sentence in light of all the available facts without limitation. Even so, 
Hornecker asks us to view the repeal of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-601 through 
7-13-605 as withdrawing judicial authority to order such mental 
evaluations.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
7-13-601 through 7-13-605, repealed in 1987, provided for compulsory mental 
health evaluations for certain enumerated sex offenses prior to sentencing. 
Hornecker argues that under the current statutory scheme, mental evaluations can 
only be ordered pursuant to W. R. Cr. P. 12 (where the defendant pleads not 
guilty by reason or mental illness of deficiency) or Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-301 
through 7-11-307 (Michie 1997) (where it appears that the defendant is unfit to 
proceed due to mental illness or deficiency). We decline to draw such an 
inference from the repeal. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from 
the repeal of mandatory mental evaluation statutes, where the legislature has 
not specifically withdrawn the power of the court to order the evaluations, is 
that the legislature intended to make the decision to order an evaluation 
discretionary.  Therefore, we hold 
that the repeal of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-601 through 7-13-605 did not deprive 
the courts of their power to order mental health evaluations for sentencing 
purposes pursuant to W. R. Cr. P. 32(a)(2).

 

 [¶16]    
Here, the Psychosexual Offender Evaluation was relevant in establishing 
Hornecker's continued danger to the community, and informing the district court 
of his prospects for rehabilitation.  
Such information is certainly of assistance in "imposing sentence" and 
"in the correctional treatment of the defendant[.]"  W. R. 
Cr. P. 32(a)(2)(A). Therefore, there was no error in ordering or considering the 
evaluation.

 

        
                   V. 
CONCLUSION

 

 [¶17]    
Since Hornecker's claim that his guilty plea was involuntary due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel is not supported by the record, we affirm the 
district court's finding of voluntariness.  
Additionally, the claim that the Psychosexual Offender Evaluation could 
not be considered by the district court is to no avail based on the clear 
language of W. R. Cr. P. 32(a)(2). The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed.

  

       

FOOTNOTES

1 Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 provides, in part: (a) Any person knowingly taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly causing or 
encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him any 
immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be 
fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand 
dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) 
years, or both.

  

2 As the 
proper procedures outlined above are well known, we are unable to discern why 
they were not employed by appellate counsel in this case. Clearly, Hornecker is 
not precluded from asserting, in a petition for postconviction relief under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 (Michie 1997), that the failure of 
appellate counsel to follow established procedures renders such assistance 
ineffective.