Case Title: P. v. Navarro

Citation: 

Docket Number: S132666

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 2/26/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S132666 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 5 F044291 
HORACIO NAVARRO, 
) 
 
) 
Tulare County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. Nos. CRF020088051, 
 
 
) 
CRF020098496 
___________________________________ ) 
 
This court has long recognized that under Penal Code sections 1181, 
subdivision 6,1 and 1260, an appellate court that finds that insufficient evidence 
supports the conviction for a greater offense may, in lieu of granting a new trial, 
modify the judgment of conviction to reflect a conviction for a lesser included 
offense.  We granted review in this case to determine whether an appellate court 
may, upon finding insufficient evidence supports the judgment of conviction for 
one greater offense, substitute convictions for two lesser included offenses shown 
by the evidence at trial.  We conclude that the statutory provisions at issue do not 
authorize such a procedure.   
                                              
1  
Subsequent unspecified references will be to the Penal Code.   
 
 
2
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A.  Defendant’s Convictions 
On the evening of March 16, 2002, Kim Mapel was working at a Subway 
restaurant in Goshen when defendant entered, revealed a gun in his waistband, and 
demanded money from the cash register.  Mapel gave defendant about $200 from 
the register, whereupon defendant fled.  A couple of days after the incident, Mapel 
was at a gas station near the Subway restaurant when she saw defendant hiding 
behind one of the pumps.  Mapel contacted police, but defendant could not be 
found.   
On the morning of April 2, 2002, Mapel was standing near her vehicle in a 
parking lot at San Joaquin Valley College where she was a student when 
defendant approached her and asked why she “rat[ted] on him for having a gun?”  
Defendant then stated he knew Mapel “had two pretty little girls at home” and that 
if Mapel “ratted,” he would “use a gun” on her.  Defendant thereafter ran away 
and Mapel drove home.  Mapel told her boyfriend, Joe Martinez, with whom she 
lived, about the incident and he telephoned the police.  Martinez drove around the 
neighborhood to see if Mapel had been followed and drove by a white car with 
four occupants.  One of the men yelled out of the window, “What’s up?”  After 
Martinez returned home, he and Mapel noticed the same white car drive by their 
house.   
At that point, a Tulare County Sheriff’s detective responded to Martinez’s 
call and spotted a white Chevy Capri, which matched Martinez’s description.  The 
detective activated his car’s siren and a vehicle chase ensued.  During the pursuit, 
two of the four vehicle occupants fled on foot.  Officers eventually detained three 
of the occupants, but the fourth person escaped.   
Meanwhile, a Plymouth Neon belonging to Lonetta Hogue was stolen from 
the area.  A few minutes later, the Neon merged onto Highway 99 in Goshen and 
 
 
3
almost struck California Highway Patrol Officer Ryan Duran’s patrol vehicle.  A 
high-speed chase ensued, during which the Neon reached speeds of approximately 
100 miles per hour.  As the Neon attempted to navigate an off-ramp to Route 198, 
the car careened out of control and crashed.  Duran saw the driver exit the Neon 
and run eastbound onto Route 198.   
By this time, California Highway Patrol Officer Roy Frakes had responded 
to the scene and gave chase.  James Petersen, who was driving his pickup truck on 
Route 198, saw the chase and stopped his vehicle.  The suspect, later identified as 
defendant, entered Petersen’s pickup on the passenger’s side and stated, “Drive or 
I’ll kill ya.”  Petersen put the pickup in park, pulled the key out of the ignition, and 
jumped out.  Defendant locked the passenger door, got behind the steering wheel 
and attempted to drive the pickup.  At this point, Officer Frakes arrived and started 
to bang on the passenger’s side window.  Seeing that defendant was unarmed, 
Petersen returned to the pickup and pulled defendant out with the help of Officer 
Frakes and another man.  Mapel later identified defendant in a field show-up as 
the man who robbed her at the Subway restaurant and the man who accosted her at 
San Joaquin Valley College.   
The jury convicted defendant of attempted kidnapping during the 
commission of carjacking (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 209.5, subd. (a)) and attempted 
unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 664, Veh. Code, § 10851, 
subd. (a)) with respect to the incident involving victim Petersen.  Defendant was 
also convicted of various other counts related to the Subway robbery, his threats 
against victim Mapel, and the high-speed chase.2  The trial court sentenced 
                                              
2  
The jury additionally convicted defendant of second degree robbery (Pen. 
Code, §§ 211, 212.5) with an enhancement for firearm use (id., §§ 12022.5, subd. 
(a), 12022.53, subd. (b)) and dissuading a witness or victim by threat (id., § 136.1, 
subd. (c)(1)).  Defendant pleaded no contest to charges of unlawful driving or 
taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), driving with disregard for 
 
 
4
defendant to a prison term totaling 23 years and four months, which included a 
term of two years and four months for attempted kidnapping during the 
commission of carjacking.  (Calculated as one-third the midterm; see Pen. Code, 
§ 1170.1, subd. (a).)  Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.   
B.  Proceedings in the Court of Appeal 
As relevant here, defendant claimed on appeal that insufficient evidence 
supported his conviction for attempted kidnapping during the commission of a 
carjacking, which was based upon defendant’s attempt to drive away Petersen’s 
pickup truck.  Defendant argued the offense required a completed carjacking, 
which in turn required asportation of the vehicle.  (See People v. Lopez (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 1051, 1055-1063 [completed carjacking requires asportation of vehicle].)  
Since he was unable to move the vehicle, defendant asserted he did not commit a 
carjacking, and thus, did not commit an attempted kidnapping during the 
commission of carjacking.  (See People v. Contreras (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 760, 
763-765 [kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking requires a completed 
carjacking]; see also People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 627, fn. 3 
[suggesting in dicta that attempted kidnapping during the commission of 
carjacking would require a completed carjacking].)  The Attorney General 
conceded the issue and the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that insufficient 
evidence supported his conviction for attempted kidnapping during the 
commission of carjacking.   
                                                                                                                                      
 
safety while evading a pursuing officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), receiving 
stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)), transporting methamphetamine 
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor transporting marijuana 
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11360, subd. (b)), and admitted an enhancement for being 
on bail at the time of the offenses (Pen. Code, § 12022.1, subd. (b)).  Defendant 
also pleaded no contest to a charge of possessing a short-barreled shotgun (id., 
§ 12020, subd. (a)(1)) with respect to a prior, unrelated case.   
 
 
5
However, the Attorney General urged the Court of Appeal to reduce 
defendant’s conviction to reflect convictions for two lesser included offenses:  
attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 215, subd. (a)) and attempted simple kidnapping 
(§§ 664, 207, subd. (a)).  The Attorney General argued sections 1181, subdivision 
6, and 1260 (see discussion, post) authorized the Court of Appeal to so reduce 
defendant’s conviction, since the evidence at trial reflected that defendant had 
committed both lesser included offenses and the jury’s verdict necessarily 
reflected that the jury had found defendant had committed both lesser included 
offenses.   
In his reply brief, defendant opposed the proposed modification, claiming 
that the Court of Appeal could at most modify the judgment to reflect a conviction 
for only attempted carjacking.  Defendant noted that section 1181, subdivision 6, 
allows modification to a “lesser crime” in the singular and that no case had held 
that a single greater conviction could be modified to reflect multiple convictions 
for lesser offenses.  Defendant also objected to the modification on state double 
jeopardy and estoppel grounds.   
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Attorney General’s proposal.  Noting 
that the “ ‘purpose for allowing an appellate court to modify the judgment to a 
lesser included offense is to “obviate the necessity of a new trial when the 
insufficiency of the evidence only goes to the degree of the crime,” ’ ” the Court 
of Appeal commented that “[a]s long as an appellate court exercises its power to 
modify a conviction only ‘where the evidence would support a conviction of a 
lesser necessarily included offense, a lesser degree offense or an offense that was 
charged . . . ,’ there is no due process violation.  [Citation.]”  The Court of Appeal 
concluded that both attempted carjacking and attempted kidnapping were lesser 
included offenses of attempted kidnapping during the commission of carjacking 
and both offenses were supported by substantial evidence at trial.   
 
 
6
Addressing the arguments raised in defendant’s reply brief, the Court of 
Appeal acknowledged that section 1181, subdivision 6, uses the term “lesser 
crime” in the singular, but noted that, under section 7, “the singular number 
includes the plural, . . .”  As for defendant’s claim that no case law supported the 
proposed modification, the Court of Appeal acknowledged “the dearth of authority 
on this issue” but also asserted that “there is an equal lack of authority saying that 
we cannot undertake such a modification.”  The Court of Appeal additionally 
rejected defendant’s state double jeopardy and estoppel arguments.  We granted 
defendant’s petition for review.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
We address here the narrow question of whether an appellate court, upon 
finding insufficient evidence supports a conviction for one offense, may modify 
the judgment to reflect a conviction for two lesser included offenses.  In arriving at 
an affirmative answer to that question, the Court of Appeal had to reach two 
subsidiary conclusions.  First, the court concluded that attempted kidnapping 
during the commission of a carjacking required a completed carjacking, an issue 
conceded by the Attorney General.  Second, the court concluded that both 
attempted carjacking and attempted simple kidnapping were lesser included 
offenses of that greater offense.  We need not decide here whether the Court of 
Appeal was correct with respect to either of these conclusions.3  For purposes of 
this opinion, we will assume the truth of these conclusions and address the narrow 
issue stated above.  Although defendant raises various constitutional objections to 
the Court of Appeal’s modification of the judgment, we need not address such 
objections here since we find dispositive his claim that neither section 1181, 
                                              
3  
These issues are currently pending before this court in People v. Medina, 
review granted November 30, 2005, S137055.   
 
 
7
subdivision 6 nor section 1260 authorize the Court of Appeal’s procedure.  (Lyng 
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. (1988) 485 U.S. 439, 445 [“A 
fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts 
avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding 
them.”]; Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 
11 Cal.4th 220, 230-231; see also Ashwander v. Valley Authority (1936) 297 U.S. 
288, 347 (conc. opn. of Brandeis, J.).)   
Section 1181 prescribes the grounds upon which a trial court may grant a 
new trial after a verdict or finding has been made.  (See § 1179 [defining “new 
trial”].)  Subdivision 6 of section 1181 provides that a trial court may grant a new 
trial “[w]hen the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence, but if the 
evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of the degree of the crime of which 
he was convicted, but guilty of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser crime 
included therein, the court may modify the verdict, finding or judgment 
accordingly without granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall extend 
to any court to which the cause may be appealed . . . .”   
The Legislature added this provision in 19274 in response to our decision in 
People v. Nagy (1926) 199 Cal. 235.  In that case, we found insufficient evidence 
supported the defendant’s conviction for first degree arson because there existed 
no evidence that the structure was occupied at the time of the fire.  (Id. at pp. 236-
239.)  Nagy commented as to the proper remedy:  “We are presented with a 
somewhat anomalous situation.  The evidence in our opinion is sufficient to 
sustain a judgment of conviction of arson of the second degree, and insufficient to 
sustain a conviction of arson of the first degree, as found by the jury, and this court 
                                              
4  
In an amendment not pertinent here, section 1181, subdivision 6 was 
modified in 1951 to include references to a “finding.”  (Stats. 1951, ch. 1674,        
§ 117, p. 3851.)   
 
 
8
has neither the constitutional nor statutory authority to modify or interfere with the 
verdict of the jury in any respect.  It is within our power only to affirm or reverse 
the judgments in criminal cases.  The case must, therefore, be remanded for a new 
trial.”  (Id. at p. 239.)   
We first construed the 1927 enactment of section 1181, subdivision 6 in 
People v. Kelley (1929) 208 Cal. 387 (Kelley).  Kelley, in acknowledging that the 
amendment was made in response to Nagy, commented that the “meaning and 
purpose of the amendment are so clear that we need not consume time in 
discussing the reason for its passage, beyond saying that its application to many 
criminal prosecutions will prevent reversals and new trials.”  (Id. at pp. 391-392.)  
Kelley outlined the effect of the new statutory provision:  “The contention that 
there is no evidence to establish the charge set forth in the indictment presents a 
question of law, but, on appeal, the court having jurisdiction is no longer 
confronted with the necessity of reversing a judgment of conviction if it sustains 
the contention.  If it finds the evidence insufficient to justify the conviction for the 
crime alleged in the indictment, but sufficient to justify the conviction of a lesser 
degree of the crime or of some lesser and included crime, it need not set aside the 
verdict entirely, but may direct a modification of the judgment without ordering a 
new trial, and remand the cause to the trial court for the sole purpose of enabling 
that court to prescribe the proper penalty in punishment for the crime the appellate 
court finds to have been committed.”  (Id. at p. 392.)  Kelley found this provision 
constituted “a complete departure in our criminal jurisprudence, and one which on 
first impression seems a startling innovation in our procedure.”  (Ibid.)   
 
 
9
Kelley ultimately applied the new rule and, after finding insufficient 
evidence supported the defendant’s first degree murder conviction, modified the 
verdict to reflect a conviction for manslaughter.  (Kelley, supra, 208 Cal. at p. 
393.)  Kelley reasoned:  “Appellant was properly found guilty, on competent 
evidence, of a most serious offense, and the errors complained of did not, in our 
judgment, prejudicially contribute toward bringing about the finding that he killed 
[the victim].  No miscarriage of justice, therefore, resulted, except that, as a matter 
of law, the jury improperly fixed the degree of the crime and imposed the penalty 
therefor.  That injustice may now be righted without subjecting the state and the 
defendant to the delay and expense of a new trial.”  (Ibid.)   
Numerous cases, both from this court and the Courts of Appeal, 
subsequently applied Kelley to modify a verdict on appeal to reflect a conviction 
on a lesser included offense after finding insufficient evidence supported 
conviction of the greater offense.  (See, e.g., People v. Holt (1944) 25 Cal.2d 59, 
93 [modifying first degree murder verdict to second degree murder]; People v. 
Howard (1930) 211 Cal. 322, 329-330 [same]; see also People v. Shaver (1936) 7 
Cal.2d 586, 593 [“The power to . . . reduce the verdict is given to the trial court 
and also to an appellate court by subdivision 6 of section 1181 . . . and it has been 
exercised by this court and the District Court of Appeal.”].)   
In 1949, the Legislature amended section 1260, which generally specifies 
the power of an appellate court with respect to a judgment in a criminal case.  The 
amendment added the following italicized language:  “The court may reverse, 
affirm, or modify a judgment or order appealed from, or reduce the degree of the 
offense or the punishment imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify any or all 
of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgment or order, and 
 
 
10
may, if proper, order a new trial.”5  (Stats. 1949, ch. 1309, § 1, p. 2297.)  This 
court in People v. Odle (1951) 37 Cal.2d 52 (Odle), concluded that the amendment 
“did no more than bring section 1260 into accord with section 1181(6) with 
respect to reduction of the degree of an offense and make clear that the court may 
reduce the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial, when there is error relating 
to the punishment imposed.  The test for determining what action should be taken 
remains the same:  was there prejudicial error in the proceedings?  When, as in this 
case, the trial court is vested with discretion to determine the punishment 
[citation], and there has been no error, this court has no power to substitute its 
judgment for that of the trial court.”  (Id. at pp. 58-59.)   
After Odle, courts routinely cited, without further discussion, both section 
1181, subdivision 6, and section 1260 for the proposition that an appellate court 
may modify a verdict to reflect a conviction of a lesser included offense where 
insufficient evidence supports the conviction on the greater offense, and applied 
the rationale underlying Kelley to offenses other than murder.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Ruiz (1975) 14 Cal.3d 163, 165 [modifying conviction for possession of heroin for 
sale to simple possession of heroin]; People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 477 
[modifying conviction for assault by a prisoner serving less than a life sentence to 
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury].)   
                                              
5  
Section 1260 currently reads:  “The court may reverse, affirm, or modify a 
judgment or order appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or attempted 
offense or the punishment imposed, and may set aside, affirm, or modify any or all 
of the proceedings subsequent to, or dependent upon, such judgment or order, and 
may, if proper, order a new trial and may, if proper, remand the cause to the trial 
court for such further proceedings as may be just under the circumstances.”   
 
 
11
Although this court has stated with respect to section 1260 that “ ‘the power 
to change the offense is as unlimited as the power to change the degree’ ” (People 
v. Enriquez (1967) 65 Cal.2d 746, 749, quoting Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure 
(1963) § 730, p. 702), it has also been recognized that an appellate court’s power 
to modify a judgment is purely statutory.  (See People v. Romo (1967) 256 
Cal.App.2d 589, 596.)  We confirmed this in People v. Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 
1030, in which we rejected a claim that principles of due process authorized courts 
to modify a verdict to reflect a conviction on a lesser related offense.  Lagunas 
noted that section 1181, subdivision 6 only allowed modification to “a lesser crime 
included therein,” and the same policy considerations underlying jury instructions 
on lesser related offenses simply did not apply to a court’s power to modify the 
verdict.  (Lagunas, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1036-1039.)  Lagunas concluded that 
the “trial court exceeded the statutory authority of section 1181 when it modified 
the jury’s residential burglary verdict to the lesser related offense of receiving 
stolen property.”  (Id. at p. 1040.)   
Examining the statutory scheme, neither the language nor the legislative 
history of sections 1181, subdivision 6, and 1260 provide authority for the Court 
of Appeal’s modification of the judgment here.  As discussed, the Legislature 
added section 1181, subdivision 6, for the purpose of overturning the result in 
Nagy, in which the court acknowledged that it may be appropriate under some 
circumstances to modify a judgment to reflect a conviction of a single lesser 
included offense shown by the evidence, but concluded it lacked the authority to 
do so.  This court in Kelley characterized section 1181, subdivision 6 as 
empowering courts which find that insufficient evidence supported a jury’s verdict 
on a greater offense “to prescribe the proper penalty in punishment” and to correct 
the “injustice” resulting from the circumstance that “the jury improperly fixed the 
degree of the crime and imposed penalty therefor.”  (Kelley, supra, 208 Cal. at pp. 
 
 
12
392, 393.)  Likewise, this court in Odle made clear that section 1260, like section 
1181, subdivision 6, empowered courts to “reduce the punishment in lieu of 
ordering a new trial, when there is error relating to the punishment imposed.”  
(Odle, supra, 37 Cal.2d at p. 58.)  In rejecting a due process claim that section 
1181, subdivision 6 violated the defendants’ right to have the jury fix the degree of 
the offense, People v. Cowan (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 155 stated:  “[T]he jury was 
not free to fix either degree [of murder] as a matter of mere discretion or choice 
resting with them, but it was their duty to fix it in accordance with the facts as 
disclosed by the evidence.  Their error in performing that duty could be and was 
corrected on appeal, not by finding or changing any fact, but by applying the 
established law to the existing facts as found by the jury, the correction itself being 
in favor of and beneficial to the appellants.”  (Id. at p. 162.)   
From the beginning, section 1181, subdivision 6, and later section 1260, 
have been understood to provide courts a mechanism for correcting the jury’s error 
in “fix[ing] the degree of the crime.”  (Kelley, supra, 208 Cal. at p. 393; see 
Cowan, supra, 44 Cal.App.2d at p. 162.)  The statutory scheme properly serves 
this corrective function if a court replaces a single greater offense with a single 
lesser offense, since such a modification merely brings the jury’s verdict in line 
with the evidence presented at trial.  Every subsequent case that has applied these 
provisions to date, including those cited and discussed ante, has modified a greater 
offense to a single lesser offense, a point readily acknowledged by the Court of 
Appeal below.  Far from providing a “dearth of authority” on the point as the 
Court of Appeal suggested, these cases constitute an acknowledgement of the 
long-standing historical understanding of the purpose underlying the statutory 
scheme to solve the problem presented in Nagy, a case involving a one-for-one 
modification, and to serve the corrective function articulated in Kelley and like 
 
 
13
cases.  We are reluctant to expand the statute beyond the scope of its evident 
purpose. 
Further underscoring the purpose of the statutory scheme, both statutes 
repeatedly refer to “the crime” or “the offense” in the singular.  The Court of 
Appeal cited Penal Code section 7 in support of its interpretation of sections 1181, 
subdivision 6, and 1260, which provision defines commonly used terms appearing 
throughout the Penal Code.  In a laundry list of general provisions, section 7 
provides in relevant part that “the singular member includes the plural, and the 
plural the singular.”  This general provision would appear to be a slim reed upon 
which to support the Court of Appeal’s unprecedented action.  “ ‘ “ ‘General terms 
should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice or oppression or 
an absurd consequence.  It will always be presumed that the legislature intended 
exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character.  The reason 
of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.’ ” ’ ”  (In re Michele D. 
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 607, quoting People v. Oliver (1961) 55 Cal.2d 761, 767.)   
It would be inappropriate to apply the general provision of section 7 that 
“the singular member includes the plural” to sections 1181, subdivision 6, and 
1260.  As discussed, Kelley commented with respect to section 1181, subdivision 
6, that it “mark[ed] a complete departure in our criminal jurisprudence,” which 
constituted a “startling innovation in our procedure.”  (Kelley, supra, 208 Cal. at p. 
392.)  Kelley made its remarks with respect to the modification of one greater 
offense for a single lesser included offense.  There is little doubt that modifying 
one greater offense to reflect convictions for two lesser offenses would have been 
an even greater “departure in our criminal jurisprudence” and an even more 
“startling innovation.”  (Ibid.)  As we have stated, “it should not ‘be presumed that 
the Legislature in the enactment of statutes intends to overthrow long-established 
principles of law unless such intention is made clearly to appear either by express 
 
 
14
declaration or by necessary implication.’ ”  (Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 
Cal.3d 77, 92, quoting County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 
644.)  It is doubtful that the Legislature would have authorized by silence or by 
implication through a statute of general application such a departure from 
established precedent.  Under these circumstances, applying section 7 to the 
present statutory scheme would lead to an interpretation that runs counter to both 
the legislative purpose of the statutory scheme and subsequent historical practice.  
(See People v. Kunitz (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 652, 655-656 [concluding that 
applying section 7 to restitution fines under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) would 
run counter to legislative intent].)   
For all of the above reasons, we conclude that sections 1181, subdivision 6, 
and 1260 do not authorize an appellate court to modify a judgment to reflect 
convictions for two lesser included offenses upon finding insufficient evidence of 
a single greater offense, and the Court of Appeal’s two-for-one modification of the 
judgment here was improper.   
Having so concluded, the proper remedy remains to be determined.  There 
is no guidance in prior decisions construing sections 1181, subdivision 6, and 1260 
on the matter.  However, it seems logical that, where there are multiple lesser 
included offenses supported by the evidence at trial, a court exercising its 
discretion to modify the judgment pursuant to these provisions should choose the 
offense with the longest prescribed prison term so as to effectuate the fact finder’s 
apparent intent to convict the defendant of the most serious offense possible.  (Cf. 
§ 654, subd. (a) [“An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by 
different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for 
the longest potential term of imprisonment . . . .”].)  As between attempted 
carjacking and attempted kidnapping, the former provides a marginally greater 
sentencing range, since attempted carjacking is punishable by 18 months, two 
 
 
15
years and six months, or four years and six months (§§ 215, subd. (b), 664, subd. 
(a)), while attempted simple kidnapping is punishable by 18 months, two years 
and six months, or four years (§§ 208, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)).6   
We therefore order the Court of Appeal, upon remand, to strike the 
modification of count 6 to the extent it reflected a conviction for attempted 
kidnapping and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.  Although the 
Court of Appeal’s prior remand order was for resentencing “on the modified 
convictions only,” we believe a remand for a full resentencing as to all counts is 
appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the 
changed circumstances.  (See People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 
1259 [“upon remand for resentencing after the reversal of one or more subordinate 
counts of a felony conviction, the trial court has jurisdiction to modify every 
aspect of the defendant’s sentence on the counts that were affirmed, including the 
term imposed as the principal term”]; see also People v. Bautista (2005) 129 
Cal.App.4th 1431, 1439; People v. Jones, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at pp. 635-636.)   
                                              
6  
As a subordinate term under the determinate sentencing law (see § 1170.1, 
subd. (a)), a consecutive sentence for either attempted carjacking or attempted 
kidnapping would result in the same term, namely, 10 months (calculated as one-
third the midterm of two years and six months).  However, the trial court upon 
resentencing is not obligated to impose a consecutive term on this count, thus 
possibly bringing into play the higher sentencing range for attempted carjacking.   
 
 
16
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed to the extent it is 
inconsistent with this opinion.  The matter is remanded to that court with 
directions to strike in count 6 the conviction for attempted kidnapping and to 
remand to the trial court for resentencing on all counts.  In all other respects, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
MORENO, J. 
 
WE CONCUR:  
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
KITCHING, J.* 
 
 
                                              
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 
Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 
the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Navarro 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 127 Cal.App.4th 159 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S132666 
Date Filed: February 26, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Tulare 
Judge: David L. Allen* 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Patricia L. Watkins and William Joseph Arzbaecher III, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, 
Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna, Louis M. Vasquez and Brian Alvarez, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
*Retired judge of the Tulare Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 
of the California Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
William Joseph Arzbaecher III 
Central California Appellate Program 
2407 J Street, #301 
Sacramento, CA  95816 
(961) 441-3792 
 
Brian Alvarez 
Deputy Attorney General 
2550 Mariposa Mall, Room 5090 
Fresno, CA  93721 
(559) 477-1671