Case Title: Hayes v. Com.

Citation: 625 S.W.2d 583

Docket Number: 

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 1981-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
625 S.W.2d 583 (1981) Daniel J. HAYES, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. Supreme Court of Kentucky. November 24, 1981. Rehearing Denied January 12, 1982. *584 Frank W. Heft, Jr., Chief Appellate Defender, Daniel T. Goyette, Chief Deputy Defender, Bruce P. Hackett, Asst. Dist. Defender, Jefferson Dist. Public Defender, Louisville, for appellant. Steven L. Beshear, Atty. Gen., Martin Glazer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee. Appellant was found guilty of the murder of Victor White and sentenced to life imprisonment. The police investigation did not center on appellant until several months after the shooting death occurred. Although he first denied knowing the victim, appellant confessed to the killing when confronted with the murder weapon. He then gave the police a statement detailing the homicide. Appellant presents four issues on appeal. The first two can be considered jointly and may be stated as follows: The instruction submitted to the jurors was worded so as to allow them to find appellant guilty of murder if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant shot Victor White with a pistol and The question is: was there any proof upon which the jury could have made a determination that appellant was acting wantonly? If not, then consistent with our opinion in Boulder v. Commonwealth, Ky., 610 S.W.2d 615 (1980), the appellant was denied a unanimous verdict. Therein we said that there is no unanimity if the state of the evidence is such that it would be clearly unreasonable for a juror to believe that the defendant's conduct was other than intentional, because it could not be ascertained that the jurors based their decision only on the theory supported by the evidence. To the contrary, an alternative type instruction is proper and nonviolative of the unanimity requirement of Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution if either theory in the instruction is reasonably supported by the evidence. See Wells v. Commonwealth, Ky., 561 S.W.2d 85 (1978). The evidence herein does not allow an inference that the shooting was anything but intentional. There were no witnesses *585 to the crime. The only details of the shooting came from appellant's statement. The pertinent portion of the statement reads as follows: Appellant clearly shot at White, intending to stop him. There was no physical evidence of random shooting at the scene. It would be clearly unreasonable for the jury to believe that appellant's conduct was other than intentional. See Boulder, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that the murder instruction was improper and reverse for a new trial. Because they address the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence, it is necessary that we briefly address the remaining two issues raised by appellant. KRS 507.020 defines murder as death caused by intentional or wanton conduct in the absence of extreme emotional disturbance. KRS 500.070 says that: The evidence adduced does strongly indicate that appellant has been the victim of chronic mental illness. His expert witness, Dr. Pran Ravani testified that appellant suffers from paranoid schizophrenia. In Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 607 S.W.2d 97, 109 (1980), we discussed this issue of emotional disturbance and the proof requirements relating thereto. The Commonwealth did all that it was required to do. A review of the record convinces us that the evidence of emotional disturbance was not so substantial as to mandate a directed verdict of acquittal. The cross examination of Dr. Ravani sufficiently raised a factual issue as to whether appellant was schizophrenic or perhaps in a state of remission on the night of the slaying. We held in Edwards v. Commonwealth, Ky., 554 S.W.2d 380 (1977) that introduction of proof of insanity does not place a burden on the Commonwealth to prove a defendant sane. The introduction of such evidence merely entitles the defendant to an instruction on the issue and leaves the persuasiveness of the proof to the jury's determination. Where there is any evidence indicative of sanity, a jury issue is presented. See Wiseman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 587 S.W.2d 235, 237 (1979). Dr. Ravani certainly presented some evidence of sanity when he testified on cross examination that appellant's flight from the scene of the crime and his denial that he knew the victim could indicate that he understood right from wrong and appreciated the criminality of his act. However strong the evidence of his insanity may be, we cannot say that the jury was unreasonable in finding him guilty of murder. See Wiseman, supra, and Trowel v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 530 (1977). The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed with directions for a new trial. All concur, except CLAYTON, J., dissents.