Case Title: State v. Betancourt

Citation: 

Docket Number: 106318

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2014-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 106,318 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ALEJANDRO E. BETANCOURT, JR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
 
The Kansas aiding and abetting statute does not create distinct material elements 
of a crime but simply assigns criminal responsibility. The statute describes factual 
circumstances that may be proved in order to obtain a conviction for other crimes.  
 
2. 
 
The legislative intent in creating the aiding and abetting statute is to make each 
individual who engages in a concerted action to carry out a crime equally culpable for the 
crime. 
 
3. 
 
The State is not required to charge aiding and abetting in order to pursue such a 
theory at trial. Even if aiding and abetting was not charged, if the jury could reasonably 
conclude from the evidence that the defendant's culpability lies in aiding and abetting 
another in the commission of a crime, it is appropriate to instruct the jury on a theory of 
aiding and abetting.  
 
 
2 
 
 
 
4. 
 
A defendant is entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction if there is evidence 
supporting such a defense. 
 
5. 
 
Unless the defendant presents sufficient evidence showing intoxication to the 
extent of impairing the ability to form the requisite intent, a court is not required to 
instruct the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication.  
 
6. 
 
Without evidence that the defendant is impaired to the extent that he or she has 
lost the ability to reason, to plan, to recall, or to exercise motor skills as a result of 
voluntary intoxication, it is not clear error to fail to give a voluntary intoxication 
instruction. 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BENJAMIN L. BURGESS, judge. Opinion filed April 11, 
2014. Affirmed. 
 
Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Boyd K. Isherwood, chief appellate attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, 
district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.: Alejandro E. Betancourt, Jr., appeals from his conviction of first-degree 
murder and criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building. Finding no reversible 
error, we affirm. 
3 
 
 
 
 
In May 2010, Daniel Betancourt was involved in an altercation at an apartment 
building on West 21st Street in Wichita that resulted in his hospitalization. Luis 
Guerrero-Lopez was associated with the assailants, and Guerrero-Lopez was at the time 
romantically involved with Maribel Andrade, who lived at a residence on North Jackson 
Avenue with her mother and brothers. Daniel is the brother of the defendant, Alejandro.  
 
Gregory Patton was a friend of Alejandro and Daniel's brother, Eli Betancourt. On 
June 19, 2010, Patton and Eli got together and went to a birthday party at a friend's 
house. Eli drove them there in his green Jeep at around 10:30 in the evening. Alejandro 
was already at the party when they arrived. Eli, Alejandro, and Patton all consumed 
alcohol at the party. At some point in time during the party, a man in a red jersey, who 
was later identified as Edward Laurel, was overheard saying that he knew where the 
individual who had been involved in the incident with Daniel lived. Alejandro, Eli, and 
Patton left the party together sometime shortly before sunrise. Eli was driving, and 
Alejandro sat in the passenger seat, with Patton sleeping part of the time in the back.  
 
Patton woke up when they pulled up in front of a house that was unfamiliar to 
him. Patton saw Eli, Alejandro, Laurel, and an unfamiliar Hispanic man talking in the 
front yard. Eli, Alejandro, and Laurel got back in the Jeep, with Alejandro driving. Laurel 
and Patton sat in the back seat, while Eli sat in the front passenger seat. Laurel explained 
that he was going to get back at somebody. He gave directions on how to get to a house 
on North Jackson Avenue. Alejandro slowly drove the car by the house when they 
arrived, parking just out of sight of the residence. Laurel was holding a semiautomatic 
gun and explained that the plan was to run up to the house and shoot into it.  
 
Alejandro told Eli and Laurel to run back to the car when they had finished their 
mission. Eli and Laurel got out of the Jeep and walked toward the house. Alejandro told 
4 
 
 
 
Patton, "Listen for it." They heard gunshots, and, after a few minutes, Alejandro backed 
the car up when Eli and Laurel failed to reappear. Alejandro saw that the two gunmen 
were running the wrong way, so he drove the car around the block to meet them and pick 
them up. Laurel said as he got in the car, "I got him," and Alejandro drove the car away at 
a high speed.  
 
Eli and Laurel fired at least 15 shots into the house, using a .22 caliber firearm and 
a 9 mm firearm. An examination of damage to the front doors indicated that someone had 
held the screen door open and had fired shots directly into the main door.  
 
That night, 13-year-old Miguel Andrade, the younger brother of Maribel, had 
stayed up late watching television and had gone to sleep on the living room sofa. Around 
6 in the morning, his mother heard a loud bang and then heard Miguel shouting in 
Spanish that he had been hit. She went into the living room, where she found Miguel 
lying on the floor by the front door. She initially thought someone had hit Miguel with a 
fist, but then he said, "They shot me." She saw blood on him, and she called 911 and 
began shouting out a window to neighbors. Miguel was taken to a hospital by ambulance, 
where he died from multiple gunshot wounds.  
 
Neighbors who observed the scene were able to describe what happened and give 
descriptions of the two gunmen. They saw two Hispanic men walk up to the house, where 
one of the men either knocked on the door or rang the doorbell while the other looked in 
through a window. The two started shooting at the door when it appeared that someone 
inside the house was approaching the door. A neighbor across the street had set up 
motion-sensitive security cameras to help safeguard construction materials on his 
property, and at about 6 in the morning the cameras recorded a vehicle resembling Eli's 
Jeep slowly driving by the house several times before it finally parked.  
 
  
5 
 
 
 
After leaving the scene of the shooting, Alejandro drove back to the house where 
he and the others had initially met up with Laurel. Laurel took the guns and got out of the 
Jeep, and Eli took over driving from Alejandro. Police intercepted the Jeep soon 
afterwards, and several eyewitnesses identified Eli as one of the shooters.  
 
The State filed an information charging Alejandro with one count of premeditated 
first-degree murder, or, in the alternative, one count of felony first-degree murder, and 
one count of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied building. A jury found 
Alejandro guilty of first-degree murder under both theories and guilty of criminal 
discharge of a firearm. 
 
On May 13, 2011, the court sentenced Alejandro to a hard 25 life sentence for 
murder and a consecutive 17-month sentence for the criminal discharge of a firearm. 
Alejandro filed a timely appeal to this court.  
 
Jury Instructions With Respect to Intent 
 
In order to be guilty of aiding and abetting, "'a defendant must willfully and 
knowingly associate himself with the unlawful venture and willfully participate in it as he 
would in something he wishes to bring about or to make succeed.'" State v. Llamas, 298 
Kan. 246, 253, 311 P.3d 399 (2013) (quoting State v. Schriner, 215 Kan. 86, 92, 523 P.2d 
703 [1974]). "[W]hen a person knowingly associates with an unlawful venture and 
participates in a way that demonstrates willful furtherance of its success, guilt as an aider 
and abettor is established. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Herron, 286 Kan. 959, 968, 189 
P.3d 1173 (2008). 
 
6 
 
 
 
Jury Instruction 7 explained aiding and abetting: 
 
"A person who, either before or during its commission, intentionally aids another 
to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission is criminally 
responsible for the crime committed regardless of the extent of the defendant's 
participation, if any, in the actual commission of the crime."  
 
Jury Instruction 8 explained premeditated murder: 
 
 
"The defendant is charged with the crime of first degree murder. The defendant 
pleads not guilty. To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 
 
"1. That the defendant intentionally killed Miguel Andrade; 
 
"2. That such killing was done with premeditation; 
 
"3. That this act occurred on or about the 20th day of June, 2010, 
in Sedgwick County, Kansas. 
 
. . . . 
 
"Intentionally means conduct that is purposeful and willful and not accidental. 
Intentional includes the terms 'knowing', 'willful', 'purposeful' and 'on purpose.'"  
 
 
Alejandro argues on appeal that these instructions were deficient because they did 
not inform the jury that a defendant who is guilty on an aiding and abetting theory of 
premeditated murder must share the principal's premeditated intent. Alejandro did not 
object to the instructions on premeditated murder. This court therefore applies a clear-
error rule. See State v. Dobbs, 297 Kan. 1255, 1237, 308 P.3d 1258 (2013). In 
determining whether an instruction was clearly erroneous, this court first determines 
whether the instruction was erroneous, which is a legal question subject to de novo 
review. If the instruction was erroneous, the court then determines whether it is firmly 
convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict without the error, in which 
case reversal is required. Reversibility is subject to unlimited review and is based on the 
7 
 
 
 
entire record. It is the defendant's burden to establish clear error under K.S.A. 22-
3414(3). 297 Kan. at 1237. 
 
Alejandro refers to language contained in State v. Overstreet, 288 Kan. 1, 200 P.3d 
427 (2009), where the trial court provided a dual instruction on aiding and abetting:  
 
"'A person who, either before or during its commission, intentionally aids, abets 
or procures another to commit a crime with the intent to promote or assist in its 
commission, is criminally responsible for the crime committed regardless of the extent of 
the person's participation, if any, in the actual commission of the crime. 
"'A person who intentionally aids another to commit a crime is also responsible 
for any other crime committed in carrying out or attempting to carry out the intended 
crime, if the other crime was reasonably foreseeable.'" 288 Kan. at 8. 
 
The court followed State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005), and 
held that the two-part instruction impermissibly lowered the State's burden of proving the 
element of intent because the instruction stated that the prosecution was required only to 
prove that the murder was a foreseeable consequence of another criminal act—not that 
the murder was premeditated. Overstreet, 288 Kan. at 10-11. The court noted that in 
Engelhardt the conviction based on the same instruction was affirmed because of the 
overwhelming evidence against the defendant. 288 Kan. at 11. The Overstreet court held, 
however, that the foreseeability part of the instruction inaccurately stated the law and 
could have confused the jury on the subject of intent. 288 Kan. at 14-15. 
 
Alejandro pulls from Overstreet, 288 Kan. 1, the second and third syllabus 
paragraphs to support his argument that the instruction was incomplete: 
 
 
"2. For a defendant to be convicted of a specific intent crime on an aiding and 
abetting theory, that defendant must have the same specific intent to commit the crime as 
the principal." 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
"3. The specific intent required to be proved for conviction on a premeditated 
first-degree murder charge is premeditation. Therefore, under K.S.A. 21-3205(1), a 
person guilty of aiding and abetting a premeditated first-degree murder must be found, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, to have had the requisite premeditation to murder the victim." 
 
Alejandro's case differs significantly from Overstreet and Engelhardt in that the 
second part of the aiding and abetting instruction—the part negating the intent portion—
was not given here. Instead, in this case the jury was given Instructions 7 and 8, which 
explicitly required the jury to find that Alejandro intended to aid and abet in a killing 
done with premeditation. See Llamas, 298 Kan. at 261 (when reviewing for error, 
appellate courts examine instructions as a whole, rather than any one isolated instruction, 
and appropriately consider the elements instruction together with the aiding and abetting 
instruction). Considering the entirety of the jury instructions, we conclude that the 
instructions as given accurately stated Kansas law and did not mislead or confuse the 
jury.  
 
Aiding and Abetting as Alternative Means 
 
Alejandro argues on appeal that committing murder as the principal and 
committing murder as an aider and abettor constitute two alternative means for 
committing first-degree murder. Because the State presented no evidence tending to 
prove that Alejandro actually fired a weapon, he argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction under one of the alternative means, and it is impossible 
to determine whether the jury was unanimous in finding him guilty only under the theory 
of aiding and abetting. 
 
9 
 
 
 
Whether a statute creates alternative means of committing a crime is a matter of 
statutory interpretation and construction and is a question of law subject to de novo 
review on appeal. State v. Foster, 298 Kan. 348, 353, 312 P.3d 364 (2013) . 
 
In State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 194, 284 P.3d 977 (2012), we held that 
alternative means are legislatively determined distinct, material elements of a crime, as 
opposed to legislative descriptions of material elements or factual circumstances that 
would prove the crime. We explained: 
 
"The listing of alternative distinct, material elements, when incorporated into an elements 
instruction, creates an alternative means issue demanding super-sufficiency of the 
evidence. But merely describing a material element or a factual circumstance that would 
prove the crime does not create alternative means, even if the description is included in a 
jury instruction. [Citation omitted.]" 295 Kan. at 194. 
 
The present case calls for an unusual analysis of the alternative means problem. 
Unlike the challenge in a typical alternative means case, Betancourt does not argue that a 
disjunctive "or" in the language of a particular statute creates two criminal acts, both of 
which the State must prove. Instead, Betancourt maintains that two separate statutes, 
when applied together, create two criminal acts, with a concurrent burden on the State to 
prove both. Our inquiry is whether the aiding and abetting statute adds distinct, material 
elements to the crime of first-degree murder, or whether it is a factual circumstance that 
would prove the crime. See Brown, 295 Kan. at 193 (identifying alternative means issues 
more complicated than simply finding word "or"). 
 
10 
 
 
 
K.S.A. 21-3401 defines first-degree murder: 
 
"Murder in the first degree is the killing of a human being committed: 
"(a) Intentionally and with premeditation; or  
"(b) in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from any inherently 
dangerous felony." 
 
K.S.A. 21-3205 defines liability for crimes committed by another: 
 
"(1) A person is criminally responsible for a crime committed by another if such 
person intentionally aids, abets, advises, hires, counsels or procures the other to commit 
the crime. 
"(2) A person liable under subsection (1) hereof is also liable for any other crime 
committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by such person as 
a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended. 
"(3) A person liable under this section may be charged with and convicted of the 
crime although the person alleged to have directly committed the act constituting the 
crime lacked criminal or legal capacity or has not been convicted or has been acquitted or 
has been convicted of some other degree of the crime or of some other crime based on the 
same act."  
 
Alejandro argues that the elements contained in the aiding and abetting statute add 
material elements to the definition of the crime. Applying Alejandro's rationale, the 
aiding and abetting statute, standing alone, would not apply to Laurel, for example, 
because he did not aid the others in committing the crime. Similarly, the first-degree 
murder statute, standing alone, would not apply to Alejandro, because he did not kill 
anyone. Alejandro reasons that the elements of the two theories of guilt are different, and 
the State failed to prove both theories.  
 
11 
 
 
 
This argument has at least two shortcomings. First, the first-degree murder statute 
itself does not expressly require that the defendant perform the act resulting in death. 
Guilt can be predicated on the "killing of a human being," without the actual killer being 
specified and prosecuted. Second, Laurel did in fact aid the others in committing the 
crime:  All four individuals in the car participated in the killing, and each of the four 
aided and abetted the three others in carrying out the crime.  
 
Requiring the State to prove which participant in a concerted-effort crime was the 
principal actor and which was the accessory has the potential to create insoluble problems 
for a jury. In the present case, for example, the evidence is overwhelming that both Eli 
and Laurel went to the victim's front door and fired shots through it. It would be virtually 
impossible for the State to prove that one shooter, or the other shooter, or both, ultimately 
killed the victim when both inflicted serious wounds. Furthermore, in order to obtain a 
proper conviction in a case such as this one, a special verdict might be necessary, because 
instructing the jury that it could only find the defendant guilty of murder under a theory 
of aiding and abetting could prove complex and confusing. See Brown, 295 Kan. at 196 
(criticizing special verdicts); State v. McDonald, 138 Wash. 2d 680, 687, 981 P.2d 443 
(1999) (rejecting alternative means analysis spares jury potentially impossible task of 
deciding which of two gunmen actually killed victim). 
 
The more accurate approach is to consider the language of the aiding and abetting 
statute to be an assignment of criminal responsibility, rather than the creation of a distinct 
element of a crime. K.S.A. 21-3205 makes a person equally liable for crimes of others if 
there is a concerted effort to carry out the crime. It does not, for instance, establish two 
different crimes, one consisting of shooting a victim and the other consisting of handing a 
gun to someone for the purpose of shooting a victim. Similarly, it does not establish two 
different crimes for committing a murder, one committed by firing a gun and the other by 
driving the getaway car. Instead, the legislative intent, as expressed in the language of the 
12 
 
 
 
aiding and abetting statute, is to make each individual who engages in a concerted action 
to carry out a crime equally culpable. See Rosemond v. United States, No. 12-895, 572 
U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1246, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___ (2014) (under both common-law and 
federal statute, aiding and abetting does not have to advance every element of principal 
crime).  
 
This approach avoids problems in distinguishing a principal from an accessory. 
For example, if two individuals enter a store and demand money from the register, and 
one holds open a bag and the other deposits the money into the bag, then only one crime 
has been committed. It is not necessary to distinguish which of the perpetrators was the 
thief and which was the aider and abettor to the thief. See Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1246 
(citing 1 Wharton, Criminal Law § 251, p. 322 [11th ed. 1912]). As this court explained 
in State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 1038, 270 P.3d 1183 (2012), "[a]iding and abetting 
is not a separate crime in Kansas. Instead it extends criminal liability to a person other 
than the principal actor. [Citation omitted.]" 
 
This analysis is also consistent with the position that this court has taken with 
regard to charging documents. The State is not required to charge aiding and abetting in 
order to pursue such a theory at trial. If at trial the jury could reasonably conclude that the 
defendant aided and abetted another in the commission of the crime, it is appropriate to 
instruct the jury on aiding and abetting. See, e.g., State v. Amos, 271 Kan. 565, 23 P.3d 
883 (2001); State v. Pennington, 254 Kan. 757, 764, 869 P.2d 624 (1994); State v. Motor, 
220 Kan. 99, 102, 551 P.2d 783 (1976). This is because the statutory scheme explicitly 
states that one who aids and abets in the commission of any offense may be charged, 
tried, and convicted in the same manner as if acting as a principal. 220 Kan. at 102.  
 
We are persuaded that murder by shooting a gun and murder by facilitating the 
shooter are not separate means of committing a shooting crime that require alternative 
13 
 
 
 
instructions. The legislature has not differentiated between the penalty for aiding and 
abetting and the penalty for actions as a principal; as this court has previously decided, 
aiding and abetting does not constitute a separate crime in this state. It does not have to 
be charged separately prior to trial. Jurors are not required to differentiate among like-
minded individuals who jointly carry out a crime, some perhaps by firing deadly shots 
and others perhaps by driving a getaway car.  
 
 
We conclude that the jury was properly instructed on the elements of first-degree 
murder and that sufficient evidence supported the conviction. 
 
Our Court of Appeals has published at least four cases on the issue, with panels 
taking opposing positions. See, e.g., State v. Boyd, 46 Kan. App. 2d 945, 268 P.3d 1210 
(2011), petition for rev. filed January 23, 2012 (aiding and abetting is not alternative 
means); State v. Cato-Perry, 48 Kan. App. 2d 92, 284 P.3d 363 (2012), petition for rev. 
filed September 12, 2012 (aiding and abetting is alternative means); State v. Snover, 48 
Kan. App. 2d 298, 287 P.3d 943 (2012), petition for rev. filed December 10, 2012 (no 
alternative means; statutory language simply sets out degree of culpability as accessory); 
State v. Jackson, 49 Kan. App. 2d 116, 305 P.3d 685 (2013), petition for rev. filed August 
12, 2013 (no alternative means; aiding and abetting statute merely provides descriptors of 
how defendant person participated in crime). We note that most of the cases finding no 
alternative means conflict were decided after our ruling in Brown and relied on the 
analysis in Brown. To the extent that Cato-Perry and any other Court of Appeals' 
opinions are inconsistent with our holding in the present matter, those opinions are 
overruled. 
 
14 
 
 
 
Voluntary Intoxication Instruction 
 
Alejandro argues that, despite his failure to request a voluntary intoxication 
instruction, the trial court committed reversible error by failing to give the instruction. 
Because he did not object to the instructions as given or request an instruction on 
voluntary intoxication, this court applies the clear-error rule with the same standard of 
review as in the first two issues. This court first determines whether the instruction was 
erroneous, which is a legal question subject to de novo review. If the instruction was 
erroneous, the court then determines whether it is firmly convinced that the jury would 
have reached a different verdict without the error, in which case reversal is required. 
Reversibility is subject to unlimited review and is based on the entire record. It is the 
defendant's burden to establish clear error under K.S.A. 22-3414(3). Dobbs, 297 Kan. at 
1237. 
 
A defendant is entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction if there is evidence 
supporting such a defense. See State v. Moore, 287 Kan. 121, 134, 194 P.3d 18 (2008); 
State v. Baker, 281 Kan. 997, Syl. ¶ 2, 135 P.3d 1098 (2006). Unless the State or the 
defendant presents sufficient evidence showing intoxication to the extent of impairing the 
ability to form the requisite intent, a court is not required to instruct the jury on the 
defense of voluntary intoxication. State v. Gadelkarim, 247 Kan. 505, 508, 802 P.2d 507 
(1990). Loss of memory or inability to remember events before or during the offense may 
show an inability to form intent. See State v. Minski, 252 Kan. 806, 811-12, 850 P.2d 809 
(1993). Without evidence that the defendant is so impaired that he or she has lost the 
ability to reason, to plan, to recall, or to exercise motor skills as a result of voluntary 
intoxication, it is not clear error to fail to give a voluntary intoxication instruction. State 
v. Warren, 252 Kan. 169, 174, 843 P.2d 224 (1992). 
 
15 
 
 
 
The evidence to which Alejandro points as supporting the instruction comes from 
the testimony of Detective Dan Harty. Harty testified that during a custodial interview, 
Alejandro discussed his mental state at the time of the crime: 
 
"And he told me that he was—he was drunk but he was conscious and alert or awake the 
entire time. 
 
. . . .  
 
"He said:  'I wasn't sleeping, man. I was—I was—I mean I was drunk but I mean 
I was conscious the whole time. I just—I really honestly wasn't thinking about none of 
that stuff. I was probably just drinking.'"  
 
Harty also testified that Alejandro told him he had been using cocaine that night 
and had been drinking well into the party and was "pretty effed up." There was thus 
substantial evidence that Alejandro had been consuming intoxicants, and there was some 
limited evidence that he was impaired. It would require expansive understanding of that 
evidence, however, to find within it substantive indicators that Alejandro was so 
intoxicated that he was unable to form a specific intent to commit the crimes.  
 
In fact, the evidence showed that Alejandro possessed sufficient mental function to 
drive the perpetrators to the scene of the crime, drive by the house several times, pull the 
car up to where it would not be seen from the house, direct the gunmen on their escape 
activities, back up to check on what was happening, observe that the shooters were 
running the wrong way and drive around the block to pick them up, and then drive away 
from the scene at a high rate of speed.  
 
In his closing argument, defense counsel mentioned that Alejandro was 
"conscious" but that he was "messed up," high," and "drunk." Defense counsel never 
argued to the jury, however, that Alejandro was so intoxicated that he was unable to form 
the intent to participate in a shooting. The defense argued instead that the four did not 
16 
 
 
 
intend to engage in any gunfire but were startled when someone came to the door after 
they knocked. Defense counsel also argued that Alejandro was not aware that guns were 
going to be part of the picture when they got to the house.  
 
Although Alejandro's consumption of intoxicants was introduced, it was never 
emphasized or shown to have impaired his ability to form the intent to aid and abet a 
murder. It was therefore not error, let alone clear error, to omit an instruction on 
voluntary intoxication.  
 
Juror's Statement During Voir Dire 
 
Before the trial, the State filed a motion to admit evidence of gang membership as 
defined in K.S.A. 21-4226. Alejandro subsequently filed a motion in limine asking the 
court to exercise control over witnesses to prevent jurors from learning about possible 
gang associations with the homicide. The trial court denied the State's motion and granted 
Alejandro's motion in limine. 
 
During voir dire, the following dialogue took place between the prosecutor and a 
prospective juror: 
 
 
"[PROSECUTOR]:  [K.G.], I saw you raise your hand. You have knowledge of 
this case? 
 
"[PROSPECTIVE JUROR]:  Uh-huh. 
 
"[PROSPECUTOR]:  And how—what's your knowledge? 
 
"[PROSPECTIVE JUROR]:  I actually volunteer at Big Brothers Big Sisters and 
my Little Sister, this was a family member of theirs, the child was. 
 
. . . . 
 
"[PROSECTUOR]:  Did your sister tell you anything about the case that you 
didn't read in the newspaper, anything like that? 
17 
 
 
 
 
"[PROSPECTIVE JUROR]:  Her mother filled me in on how the family was 
doing and things like that. They told me that it's gang related, things like that. But—yeah. 
That's— 
 
"[PROSECUTOR]:  Do you think you would be able to set aside your opinions 
on this case, the information you have, and just listen to what the actual physical 
evidence is? 
 
"[PROSPECTIVE JUROR]:  Yes."  
 
Subsequent questions were then directed to the venire on their independent 
knowledge of the case, with no reference made to gang associations.  
 
Shortly afterwards, defense counsel made an oral motion for mistrial based on a 
violation of the earlier order and because the jury panel was allegedly tainted. The court 
denied the motion for three reasons:  The court had not yet issued a final ruling on gang 
evidence; the jurors all had stated that they could base their decision on the evidence 
before them and not on outside sources; and a limiting instruction could be given at the 
conclusion of the evidentiary presentation. 
 
K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c) allows a trial court to declare a mistrial if prejudicial 
conduct occurred within the courtroom that makes it impossible for the trial to proceed 
without injustice. The statute creates a two-step process for the trial court. First, the court 
must determine whether there was some fundamental failure in the proceeding, and, if so, 
it then must determine whether it is possible to continue the trial without injustice. State 
v. Race, 293 Kan. 69, 80, 259 P.3d 707 (2011). 
 
On appeal, a motion for mistrial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. 
State v. Leaper, 291 Kan. 89, 96, 238 P.3d 266 (2010). A trial court abuses its discretion 
if its action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; in other words, if no reasonable 
person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of 
18 
 
 
 
law; in other words, if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is 
based on an error of fact; in other words, if substantial competent evidence does not 
support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of 
discretion is based. See State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181, 206, 284 P.3d 977 (2012). 
 
When making the determination that error was harmless in the context of a 
violation of statutory evidentiary limitations, this court applies the harmless error 
standard of K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 to determine whether a reasonable 
probability exists that the error affected the outcome of the trial in light of the record as a 
whole. The State, as the party benefitting from the introduction of the evidence, has the 
burden of persuading the court that the error was harmless. State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 
484, 513, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012). 
  
It should be noted that this is not an instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. 
The prosecutor's question was open-ended and fair; the prospective juror's comment 
about gang involvement was spontaneous and was not specifically solicited. The 
prosecutor did not dwell on that part of the answer, and the prosecutor did not argue to 
the jury that gang violence was a factor in the homicide.  
 
Cases dealing with similar situations in other jurisdictions are instructive.  
 
In United States v. Howard, 216 Fed. Appx. 463, 473 (6th Cir. 2007), a 
prospective juror announced during voir dire that he would not believe a certain witness 
"if he laid his hands on a stack of bibles" based on prior dealings with the witness. The 
defense immediately moved for a mistrial. The district court questioned the jurors 
remaining after strikes for cause and made general inquiries about their inclination to 
evaluate the veracity of witnesses based on the opinions voiced by other jury members. 
The court also cautioned the jury panel not to give any particular witness more or less 
19 
 
 
 
credibility based on the voir dire proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court's decision to deny the motion for a mistrial, applying an abuse of discretion 
standard. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the jury panel indicated that it 
was not prejudiced by the prospective juror's statement and the witness' testimony was 
not "pivotal" to the case. 216 Fed. Appx. at 473-74. 
 
In State v. Taito, No. CAAP-12-0000185, 2013 WL 2908670 (Hawaii App. 2013) 
(unpublished opinion), the court found no prejudicial error requiring a mistrial based on 
remarks made by a single prospective juror during voir dire. The court noted that the 
juror was excused from the panel and that the defendant failed to point to any evidence 
that the impaneled jurors were tainted by the comments or did not comply with the 
district court's instructions.  
 
In State v. Harrison, 743 So. 2d 883, 888 (La. App. 1999), two prospective jurors 
referred to a crime problem in the area and one juror said that he had heard that the 
defendant "was back in jail." Because the prosecution did not invite the comments, no 
mandatory mistrial was in order, and because there was no demonstrated prejudice, no 
discretionary mistrial was appropriate. The court noted that mistrial is a drastic remedy 
lying within the sound discretion of the trial court, and it is a remedy that should be 
applied only if substantial prejudice would otherwise result. 743 So. 2d at 889. 
 
In State v. Price, 104 N.M. 703, 708, 726 P.2d 857 (1986), the court held that 
when a juror makes a spontaneous comment in open court, the defendant has the burden 
of demonstrating prejudice. A juror's comment that may be improper does not necessarily 
demonstrate bias by that juror and does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that other 
jurors were prejudiced by the comment. 104 N.M. at 708. 
 
20 
 
 
 
In State v. Sanders, 92 Ohio St. 3d 245, 750 N.E.2d 90 (2001), a prospective juror 
made a comment during voir dire that the defendant reminded him of Louis Farrakhan, 
whom he regarded as anti-white and anti-American. Both the district court and the 
appellate court declined to find prejudice to the remainder of the jury panel, largely 
because the defense failed to ask the court to question the other panel members about the 
effect of the comment on their ability to act impartially. 92 Ohio St. 3d at 249. The court 
found no inherent prejudice when the prospective juror gave only personal opinions and 
did not speak at length on the subject. 92 Ohio St. 3d at 248.  
 
In the present case, the juror mentioned gang involvement only in passing, and the 
topic was not brought up again. The defense did not ask for permission to conduct an 
examination of the jury for prejudice and did not request an instruction directing the jury 
to disregard unsworn statements by jury members. Furthermore, the defense did not seek 
to strike the juror in question for cause. This case thus resembles those cases from other 
jurisdictions finding no reversible error based on prejudice to other jury members. The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Alejandro's motion for a mistrial.  
 
Cumulative Error 
 
 
When a party argues that the cumulative impact of alleged errors is so great that 
they result in an unfair trial, this court aggregates all errors and, even if those errors 
individually would be considered harmless, analyzes whether their cumulative effect is so 
great that they collectively cannot be determined to be harmless. State v. King, 297 Kan. 
955, 986, 305 P.3d 641 (2013). In undertaking such an analysis, this court reviews the 
entire record and exercises unlimited review. State v. Cruz, 297 Kan. 1048, 1074, 307 
P.3d 199 (2013). Because we determine that no errors were committed, the cumulative 
error doctrine does not apply. See State v. Lowrance, 298 Kan. 274, 298, 312 P.3d 328 
(2013). 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
Affirmed.