Case Title: Manor Country Club v. Flaa

Citation: 387 Md. 197

Docket Number: 111/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Manor Country Club v. Betty Flaa
No. 111, September Term, 2004
Headnote:
Use of lodestar approach to calculate the attorney’s fees to be paid by a losing
party is appropriate where no statute delineating fee-determining criteria to be
considered otherwise exists.  The criteria of former Montgomery County Code
§ 27-7 (k)(1) provided sufficient basis for the calculation of a discretionary
award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a discrimination claim
brought pursuant to the Montgomery County Commission on Human Rights.
Thus, the initial use of the lodestar approach to calculate an initial award of
reasonable attorney’s fees was unnecessary.
Circuit Court for Mo ntgomery C ounty
Case # 238182 -V
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 111
September Term, 2004
Manor Country Club
v.
Betty Flaa
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Eldridge, John C. 
(Retired, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Bell, C.J. dissents
Filed: May 18, 2005
1 Mrs. Flaa did not file a petition for writ of certiorari.  Thus, our consideration is
limited to the issues properly raised by Manor.
After some twelve years of extensive litigation, the appeal now before us seeks to
determine the correct approach to be applied in calculating attorney’s fees where the award
of such fees is permitted and there existed, at the time this case was initiated and an award
was made, a provision of the Montgomery County Code that delineated criteria to be applied
to a determination of the discretionary award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a
discrimination suit.
Betty Flaa, respondent, (“Mrs. Flaa”) filed a complaint with the Montgomery County
Office of Human Rights (“MCOHR”), which, at that time, was known as the Montgomery
County Human Relations Commission, and prevailed in a substantial way on some aspects
of her discrimination claim against Manor Country Club, petitioner, (“Manor”).   The
subsequent award of attorney’s fees by a two-person Public Accommodations Panel of the
Montgomery County Human Relations Commission (“Panel”) in favor of Mrs. Flaa has been
the subject of two petitions for judicial review by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.
In the second of these petitions, the Panel had awarded Mrs. Flaa $22,440.00 in attorney’s
fees, an award which the hearing court affirmed.  Mrs. Flaa then appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals, which reversed the trial court and remanded the case to the Panel to
recalculate the award.  Manor then filed a petition for writ of certiorari1 which we granted
on December 17, 2004.  Manor Country Club v. Flaa, 384 Md. 448, 863 A.2d 997 (2004).
Manor’s petition for writ of certiorari presented the following questions for our
2 Generally, in the absence of a fee-shifting statute, the American Rule on
awarding attorney’s fees applies in Maryland, i.e., fee-shifting is not permitted; each
party is solely responsible for his own attorney’s fees.  This is the common law in
Maryland.
-2-
review:
1.
“When a county agency exercises its discretion to award attorney’s
fees, as specifically allowed by a county statute, is that agency required
to determine reasonable attorney’s fees according to a strict application
of the lodestar approach, or is it required to determine reasonable
attorney’s fees in accordance with the dictates of the statute that
provides it with the authority to award attorney’s fees?”
2.
“Did the Court of Special Appeals err by refusing to apply an abuse of
discretion standard to review the [Public Accommodations] Panel[] [of
the Montgomery County Human Relations Commission’s] attorney’s
fee award where the record shows that the Panel reviewed, in detail,
each factor required by the Montgomery County Code in making a fee
award and, thereby, determined an award of reasonable hours times
reasonable rate?” [Alterations added.] [Emphasis added.]
We hold that, when attorney’s fees are permitted by statute or ordinance, the lodestar
approach to the calculation of reasonable attorney’s fees is generally the correct approach,
except in instances where other criteria for the calculation of such fees are provided, as in
the present case, in the fee-shifting statute.2  As we further explain hereafter, we address the
second question only insofar as is necessary in our treatment of the first–and
consistent–question presented, given the discrepancy between the second question presented
by Manor in its petition for writ of certiorari and in its brief
I.  Facts and Procedural History
The longevity of this case has generated an extensive set of facts.  The issue before
3  “[Respondent] cited in her claim a specific incident in the spring of 1993 when
[she] was playing golf with her husband, a member of the country club, and one other
[female] member . . . . Concerning that incident, the hearing examiner found that 
‘the Assistant Golf Pro, Larry Velt[o]n, came careening over the course in
a golf cart and said to Col. Flaa:  “You know women can’t play on the golf
course.”  He asked [the other female present] if she was a member. When
she answered yes, he turned to Ms. Flaa and told her women don’t belong
on the course. He told her to pick up her ball and get off the course
immediately. She was not allowed to finish the hole.’ 
The Panel adopted the hearing examiner’s findings on this point.”  Flaa, 158 Md.App. at
487 n.2, 857 A.2d at 607 n.2 (footnote in original) (some alterations added).
-3-
this Court, however, is limited to the proper procedure for awarding attorney’s fees under
the circumstances of the present case.  In similarly recognizing this focus, the Court of
Special Appeals, in its reported decision, Flaa v. Manor Country Club, 158 Md.App. 483,
857 A.2d 604 (2004), confined its factual recitation of the underlying discrimination claim
to those details necessary to provide context and to frame properly the issue of Mrs. Flaa’s
request for attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we adopt in large part, the facts as set forth in the
Court of Special Appeals’s opinion, which states:
“On December 23, 1993, [Mrs. Flaa] filed a marital status
discrimination claim with the MCOHR. She averred that [Manor’s] policies,
which restricted access to and use of [Manor’s] golf course, were
discriminatory on the basis of marital status and resulted in disparate treatment
of her because of sex.[3]  [After having secured legal representation, Mrs. Flaa]
thereafter amended her claim [in May 1994] to add a sex discrimination claim,
asserting theories of disparate impact in the membership structure and hostile
environment in [Manor’s] indoor restaurant, known as the Grill Room.
“At about the same time, [respondent], with others, filed a complaint
with the Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, identifying the same
claims and setting forth the same legal theories as those alleged in the
MCOHR complaint. After the Attorney’s General Office launched an
-4-
investigation into [Mrs. Flaa’s] claims, [Manor] modified numerous club
policies to avoid potential prosecution for unlawful discriminatory practices.
No formal charges were ever brought against [Manor] by the State.
“On January 6, 1997, following an investigation, MCOHR found
reasonable grounds to believe that [Manor] was a place of public
accommodation and had violated Montgomery County Code, § 27-8 (1987)
by engaging in unlawful discriminatory practices on the basis of marital status
and gender.
“MCOHR referred the matter to the Office of Zoning and
Administrative Hearings for a public hearing.”
Id. at 487-88, 857 A.2d at 607 (alterations added).  Six months later, on July 11, 1997, Mrs.
Flaa’s counsel submitted her first attorney’s fees application seeking $11,699.20 in fees and
$946.29 in expenses.  Fourteen months later, in September 1998, she submitted to opposing
counsel an updated statement showing total attorney’s fees of $32,579.50 and expenses of
$1,836.46.
“After five postponements, the parties appeared before a hearing examiner on
May 17, 1999, for the first day of what became a ten-day public hearing in
which 33 witnesses testified and 158 exhibits were submitted as evidence.”
Id. at 488, 857 A.2d at 607.  On July 9, 1999, Mrs. Flaa, through counsel, submitted a
statement of damages as well as a request for damages, attorney’s fees, and expenses in the
amounts of $1,000.00, $138,024.00, and $4,282.31, respectively.
“On September 30, 1999, the hearing examiner issued a 141-page
Report and Recommendation to the Public Accommodation Panel [“Panel”]
of the MCOHR.  The report stated the hearing examiner’s findings that
[Manor] was a place of public accommodation; that [Manor] had engaged in
sex discrimination (disparate treatment) against [respondent]  during the golf
course incident; and that [Manor] had engaged in gender-based discriminatory
practices, creating a hostile environment.  The hearing examiner did not find
that [Manor’s] practices had resulted in a disparate impact on women.  The
hearing examiner recommended the award to [Mrs. Flaa] of $1,000.00 in
-5-
damages (the statutory limit), $120,481.00 in attorney’s fees, and $4,282.31
in expenses.  [Mrs. Flaa] filed a brief seeking modification by the Panel of the
hearing examiner’s recommendation on the disparate impact claim. [Manor]
filed a response to [Mrs. Flaa’s] request for modification, and separately
requested that the Panel modify the hearing examiner’s recommendations with
respect to jurisdiction and the hostile environment claim.
“On March 1, 2000, the Panel held a public hearing on the matter and
allowed both parties to make oral arguments.”
Flaa, 158 Md.App. at 488, 857 A.2d at 606-07 (alterations added).
In an eight-page Memorandum Opinion and Order issued May 8, 2000, the Panel
adopted the hearing examiner’s findings that Manor was a place of public accommodation
and that Mrs. Flaa had endured harsh treatment when she was ejected from the golf course
at the time of the spring 1993 incident, but found that Manor’s membership practices
resulted in no disparate impact between male and female members.  In addition, the Panel
“rejected the hearing examiner’s finding that [Manor] had engaged in sex discrimination by
creating a hostile environment, concluding that such theories are reserved for employment
cases.” Id. at 489, 857 A.2d at 607 (alteration added).  The Panel noted that even if such
theories were available to Mrs. Flaa, the facts surrounding her claim were insufficient to rise
to the level of creating a hostile environment.
The Panel looked to Montgomery County Code § 27-7 in awarding Mrs. Flaa
$750.00  (of a maximum $1,000.00) in damages for humiliation and embarrassment and
generally invoked the criteria of Montgomery County Code § 27-7 (k)(1) in awarding
attorney’s fees of $3,000.00 (i.e., four times the damages award).  The Panel’s opinion did
not provide an analysis of each § 27-7 (k)(1) criterion.  Rather, in reaching its attorney’s fees
-6-
figure, the Panel explained that it “recognize[d] that some of the time billed was also related
to a proceeding before the Attorney General’s office, and therefore not directly related to this
case,” and it echoed the hearing examiner’s opinion that “‘Counsel’s time is difficult to
evaluate because several functions are bundled together in a manner that precludes
evaluation of their reasonableness’” and “that the total time billed was excessive given time
expended in similar cases with the same levels of difficulty.”
Mrs. Flaa and Manor each filed petitions for judicial review in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County of the Panel’s opinion and order.  In her memorandum urging that a
hostile environment could, indeed, constitute discrimination in Maryland public
accommodation, Mrs. Flaa also addressed the issue of attorney’s fees, referencing several
United States Supreme Court cases that address awarding attorney’s fees to a prevailing
party in civil rights litigation and introduced the position that “in civil rights cases, attorneys’
fees are calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable
hourly rate . . . commonly referred to as the ‘lodestar.’”  Mrs. Flaa then stated that
“Montgomery County Code § 27-7 (k)(1) provides additional guidelines for awarding
attorney’s fees which are parallel to the factors considered in awarding attorney’s fees
pursuant to Federal civil rights fee shifting statutes” (footnote omitted).  Mrs. Flaa also
included as an exhibit a July 1999 copy of the Rules of the U.S. District Court for
Maryland’s  “Appendix B, Rules and Guidelines for Determining Lodestar Attorneys’ Fees
in Civil Rights and Discrimination Cases.”  Manor’s memorandum in opposition did not
-7-
address Mrs. Flaa’s introduction of lodestar, and responded that the Panel had properly
exercised its discretion in awarding $3,000.00 in attorney’s fees.
Following oral argument, the Circuit Court entered a thirty-page Memorandum
Opinion and Order on August 10, 2001, affirming the Panel’s decision, with the exception
of its award of attorney’s fees, which the Circuit Court vacated and remanded to the Panel.
The Circuit Court held that, upon remand, the Panel:
“[M]ust consider the factors listed in Section 27-7 (k)(1) and indicate to a
reviewing court, how those factors, play a role in the determination of the
award of attorney’s fees.  The [Panel] also must evaluate Flaa’s degree of
success in the pursuit of her claims. . . .The [Panel] should include in its
consideration Flaa’s claim for attorney’s fees from July 9, 1999 to [August 10,
2001].” [Alterations added.]
The Circuit Court, labeling the Panel’s award as a variation of a “cost-benefit analysis,”
concluded that the Panel “made an error of law in its determination of the attorney’s fee
award in this case and in so doing abused its discretion to make such an award.”  Neither
party appealed this remand decision.
Pursuant to the Circuit Court’s order, the Panel directed that Mrs. Flaa’s counsel
submit an application for an award of attorney’s fees that incorporated “a detailed analysis
of each of the factors contained in Section 27-7 (k)(1) of the Montgomery County Code .
. . .”  Counsel thereafter submitted a revised application which echoed her earlier labeling
of the hearing examiner’s attorney’s fees award figure of $120,481.00 as “the lodestar” and
then analyzed each of the § 27-7 (k)(1) factors as they related to the so-called lodestar.  After
adding fee requests for work subsequent to the Panel’s May 2000 decision, counsel arrived
-8-
at final requested figures of $225,438.80 in attorney’s fees and $9,306.10 in expenses.
These figures represented fees from May 3, 1994–the day Mrs. Flaa engaged legal
representation–until September 27, 2001–the day of the fee application.
Manor filed an opposition, dated October 22, 2001, to the application for attorney’s
fees and costs arguing, inter alia, that Mrs. Flaa’s County-based litigation was duplicative
of her claim filed with the State Attorney General’s Office–under laws that did not award
attorney’s fees, and that more than $80,000 of her time entries were non-specific, improperly
bundled, excessive, non-billable clerical functions and/or unreasonable according to § 27-7
(k)(1).  Manor, although not clearly disputing the application of a lodestar methodology,
urged that opposing counsel’s use of a “lodestar figure” was “neither helpful nor accurate.”
Each party also included a July 2001 exhibit copy of the aforementioned Lodestar Appendix
B, from the U.S. District Court Rules.
In March 2002, the Panel sent the parties a memorandum requesting that Mrs. Flaa’s
counsel submit “a revised billing report indicating the estimated time spent only on the issue
of determining Manor Country Club to be a place of public accommodation[.]”  In response,
counsel submitted a request for attorney’s fees totaling $202,520.14, consisting of
$131,476.10 based on 757.17 hours spent on the issue of “place of public accommodation”
plus $71,044.04 based on 436.17 hours spent litigating the attorney’s fees issue.  Manor
opposed this revised figure contending that counsel’s representation that nearly seventy
percent of the total billing arose from litigating the jurisdiction of the MCOHR in terms of
4 This subsection was repealed in 2001 and the replacement subsection is now
found at Montgomery County Code § 27-8 which provides:
“§ 27-8. Penalties and relief.
     (a) Damages and other relief for complainant. After finding a violation
of this article, the case review board may order the payment of damages
(other than punitive damages) and any other relief that the law and the facts
warrant, such as:
(1) compensation for:
     (A) reasonable attorney’s fees;
     (B) property damage;
     (C) personal injury;
     (D) unreimbursed travel or other reasonable expenses;
    (E) up to $5,000 for humiliation and embarrassment, based on the
nature of the humiliation and embarrassment, including its severity,
duration, frequency, and breadth of observation by others; and
     (F) interest on any damages from the date of the discriminatory act,
as provided in subsection (c).” [Emphasis added.]
-9-
whether Manor constituted a place of public accommodation presented an unreasonably
skewed estimate of the attorney’s fees incurred on that issue.
As of the time Mrs. Flaa brought her action in 1993, Montgomery County had in
place within its legislation establishing the then-denominated Montgomery County Human
Relations Commission, a subsection allowing, inter alia, a Commission panel, upon finding
that unlawful discrimination has occurred, to award reasonable attorney’s fees.  This
provision, found at Montgomery County Code § 27-7 (k)(1) (1987), provided4 as follows:
“§ 27-7. Administration and Enforcement.
 . . .
     (k) Other Commission panel awards and remedies.  In addition to the other
awards and relief which are hereinafter provided, the Commission panel may,
in accordance with the standards of proof set forth in Section 27-26, also
make the following monetary orders determined by the Commission panel
from the evidence of record as the actual damages, costs or losses involved or
-10-
in such amounts as may be specified below:
(1) The complainant may be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees.  In
determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees claimed by the complainant,
the Commission panel shall consider the following factors:
     a.  Time and labor required;
     b.  The novelty and complexity of the case;
     c.  The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
   d. The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case;
     e.  The customary fee;
     f.  Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
     g.  Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
     h.  The experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; and
     i.   Awards in similar cases.”
It is the dispute over the appropriate methodology–that of lodestar, or that mandated
by Montgomery County Code § 27-7 (k)(1)–for the awarding of attorney’s fees, based on
the present facts, that is central to the instant case.
On October 10, 2002, the Panel issued a revised “Order and Opinion Awarding
Attorney’s Fees,” invoking the § 27-7 (k)(1) “factors [which] encompass what has become
known as the ‘lodestar amount’” (alteration added).  The opinion noted the Panel’s
interpretation that “the remand order did not require us to change the amount of our prior
award of attorney’s fees, but merely to explain how we calculated them so that the parties
and any Judge reviewing our award could, for themselves, determine its basis.”  Under the
opinion subheading entitled, “Lodestar Analysis Under Section 27-7 (k)(1) Under the
Montgomery [County] Code” (alteration added), the Panel emphasized its discretion under
former Montgomery County Code § 27-1 (f) to “adopt, reverse, modify or remand the
recommended decision and order of the hearing examiner” and renewed its decision to reject
-11-
the hearing examiner’s proposed $120,481.00 award.  The Panel found much of the billing
to be non-specific and continued, stating: 
“The Panel has scrutinized the time records involved and read the briefs of
both parties, but cannot, with any degree of reliability, determine what tasks
were accomplished related to which of the causes of action in this matter. We
do not believe that [Mrs. Flaa] and her counsel have met their burden of proof
to demonstrate to this Panel what time was spent on the issue of the
jurisdiction of the Commission.”
As to bundling of the time entries, the Panel determined that, although bundling may be a
frequent practice in legal billing, the quantity of bundling in counsel’s request inhibited the
Panel’s ability to “determine accurately the amount of time spent and the fees incurred for
many tasks.”  The Panel stated:
“[I]t is not our responsibility to make subjective estimates as to how such
entries should be allocated. Moreover, the Panel is comprised of volunteers
and does not have access to staff who could spend large amounts of time to
attempt to make such estimates, even if the Panel thought it wise to attempt to
do so, which it does not. For those reasons, we will make the rate percentage
cuts in the final award.”
The Panel went on to examine each of the § 27-7(k)(1) criteria, finding as follows:
“With respect to time and labor required, the Panel stated that clerical work
and inefficient and redundant work had to be excluded from billable time.
The Panel determined that ‘the same task and research were performed by
counsel multiple times.’”
Flaa, 158 Md.App. at 492, 857 A.2d at 609-10.  The Panel, dubious that Mrs. Flaa would
find it worthwhile to pursue such extensive litigation, stated:
“[W]e cannot fathom how any person, dealing with the facts alleged, could
have decided that it was worth $250,000 or so to litigate these issues. We
believe that an attorney has a responsibility to dissuade clients or potential
-12-
clients from launching costly litigation, knowing that the other party will incur
enormous defense costs, where the cost/benefit ratio of that litigation is low.
In this case particularly, damages were capped [at $1,000.00] under the
statute.  Rather, it is our decision on this issue that any reasonable client would
not have been willing to spend more than $25,000 to pursue claims of the type
made in this proceeding.” [Alterations added.]
In addressing the second criterion of § 27-7 (k)(1), the novelty and complexity of the case:
“[T]he Panel credited [Mrs. Flaa] for successfully litigating the jurisdictional
issue, which was a case of first impression in Maryland.  The Panel also
pointed out that [Mrs. Flaa] had presented no evidence that counsel was
precluded from other employment while litigating the instant case or that there
were strict time limitations.
“Neither the Panel nor [Manor] contested the hourly rates used in
calculating attorney’s fees; the Panel therefore deemed the rates reasonable.
The Panel decided to make no adjustment relating to the skill required to
litigate the case, the customary fee for similar cases, or whether the fee was
fixed or contingent.
“Despite finding that lead counsel was experienced in this area of the
law, the Panel declined to make an upward adjustment on that basis. With
respect to awards in similar cases, the Panel found little evidence on that
point, but nonetheless described [counsel’s] request for fees as ‘excessive.’”
Flaa, 158 Md.App. at 493, 857 A.2d at 610 (alterations added).
Having concluded its examination of the § 27-7 (k)(1) criteria, the Panel addressed
the relative success of Mrs. Flaa’s case, stating:
“We found some of [Mrs. Flaa’s] major theories and alleged causes of action
brought in this case to be without merit and therefore declined to follow the
recommendations of the Hearing Examiner on those issues of law.  Moreover,
in awarding the monetary damages that we did, this Panel was well aware of
the fact that there was one (and only one) proven instance of ‘discrimination.’
We felt compelled by the statute to award injunctive relief, regardless of
whether we believed that there were systemic wrongs to be righted. As
discussed above, only the argument and decision in favor of finding for the
jurisdiction of the Commission was a major victory for [Mrs. Flaa].  As a
result, we do not believe that [Mrs. Flaa’s] award of attorney’s fees should be
5  The parties have not disputed the reasonableness of this hourly rate.
6 As we have indicated, respondent did not file a petition for writ of certiorari,
raising the cost-benefit issue.  Accordingly, we do not address it although it was utilized
in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated in
part, Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93, 109 S.Ct. 939, 944, 103 L.Ed.2d 67
(1989), which we discuss, infra, and which was proffered by respondent in support of the
position she took in her brief.  The primary issue before us relates to whether the Panel
was required to use the lodestar approach.
-13-
adjusted upward as a result of [the relative success of the case].” [Alterations
added.]
The Panel concluded that “[b]ased on our [l]odestar analysis of all of the factors that we are
required to base this ruling upon” (alterations added) Mrs. Flaa should be awarded attorney’s
fees of $22,440 which comprised its figure of 132 hours multiplied by the counsel’s average
firm billing rate of $170/hour.5  The Panel did not award any expenses.
On November 12, 2002, Mrs. Flaa filed her second petition in the Circuit Court
seeking judicial review of the Panel’s October 2002 opinion and order.  Manor opposed
Mrs. Flaa’s petition.   Mrs. Flaa urged that the Panel had committed an error of law, by
failing to consider, inter alia, her degree of success in prevailing on her discrimination claim
and that the Panel had erroneously reached its award by applying a cost-benefit analysis.6
Following oral argument on June 17, 2003, the judge, ruling from the bench, affirmed the
Panel’s October 10, 2002, attorney’s fees award.
In appealing to the intermediate appellate court, Mrs. Flaa emphasized anew the
notion of the Panel’s failure to apply the lodestar approach to the calculation of an award of
attorney’s fees, and this issue formed the sole basis of her appeal.  She presented to the
-14-
Court of Special Appeals a single matter of law issue for review:
“‘Whether the Montgomery County Circuit Court committed an error of law
by affirming the Public Accommodations Panel’s Order and Opinion
Awarding Attorney’s Fees, in which the Panel failed to apply the lodestar
method in its calculation of attorney’s fees and costs.’”
Flaa, 158 Md.App. at 486, 857 A.2d at 606.
In a reported opinion issued September 8, 2004, the Court of Special Appeals vacated
the Circuit Court’s decision and directed the matter’s remand to the Panel to “first determine
the lodestar amount, and, if reductions are made, provide an explanation for the disallowed
hours.” Flaa, 158 Md.App. at 500, 857 A.2d at 615.  
II. Discussion
A.  Lodestar Examined
We begin by undertaking a brief overview of the much-discussed lodestar approach
that, under appropriate circumstances, may be used to calculate attorney’s fees, when the
award of such fees is permitted generally by statute.  In this Court’s opinion in Friolo v.
Frankel, 373 Md. 501, 819 A.2d 354 (2003), filed approximately three months prior to the
time respondent sought review in the Court of Special Appeals, Judge Wilner examined at
great length the evolution of the lodestar approach and noted the origin of this term.  He
explained:
“The term ‘lodestar’ has an Anglo-Saxon origin–‘lad,’ a way or path, and
‘sterre,’ a star. It thus was a guiding star. See WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY at 1062. It later came to denote a ‘guiding ideal; a model for
imitation.’ Id.  At some point, the term began to be applied to the method
noted for determining reasonable attorneys’ fees.”
-15-
Friolo, 373 Md. at 504 n.1, 819 A.2d at 356 n.1.  The lodestar approach, as applied in
Maryland in Friolo, consists of the somewhat elementary formula articulated in Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983):
“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a
reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.  This calculation provides an objective
basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services.
The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the
hours worked and rates claimed. Where the documentation of hours is
inadequate, the district [trial] court may reduce the award accordingly.”
Id. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939 (alteration added) (emphasis added). 
Respondent compares her status as a “successful civil rights complainant” to the
situation present in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974),
vacated in part, Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989)
(Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 93, 109 S.Ct. at 944, noted that “a contingent-fee contract does not
impose an automatic ceiling on an award of attorney’s fees, and to hold otherwise would be
inconsistent with the statute [Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988]
and its policy and purpose” (alteration added)).  In Johnson, a case arising from an
interlocutory appeal by plaintiffs who had brought a Title VII action alleging racial
discrimination in their employment, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit promulgated
a number of factors, later adopted by the Supreme Court in Hensley, to apply in exercising
the court’s discretion when awarding attorney’s fees against a party in a civil rights action:
“(1) The time and labor required. . . . (2) The novelty and difficulty of the
questions. . . . (3) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly. . .
-16-
. (4) The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance
of the case. . . . (5) The customary fee. . . . (6) Whether the fee is fixed or
contingent. . . . (7) Time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances. . . . (8) The amount involved and the results obtained [This is
a cost-benefit standard.]. . . . (9) The experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys. . . . (10) The ‘undesirability’ of the case. . . . (11) The nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client. . . . (12) Awards in
similar cases.”
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19 (alteration added).  Clearly, the factors in Johnson are, in large
part, comparable to the factors of Montgomery County Code § 27-7 (k)(1).  Johnson also
stated that “[t]he reasonableness of the award is to be judged by the abuse of discretion
standard of review.”  Id. at 717.  
This Court in Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 745 A.2d 1026 (2000)
(stating in dicta that an employee from whom the employer had withheld commissions was
entitled to collect attorney’s fees, and since there were no criteria contained in the fee-
shifting statute for the court to determine the amount of fees, the lodestar method served as
the proper basis for the judge’s calculation of the attorney’s fees award) noted the logic of
having the judge, rather than a jury, determine the attorney’s fees and provided some other
criteria for analysis under the lodestar approach, stating:
“In the Federal system, attorneys’ fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes are
calculated in accordance with the ‘lodestar’ approach–the product of
reasonable hours times a reasonable rate. Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557,
112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992).  The determination of those two
items, however, involves a number of factors that are both subjective and
judgmental.  In Maryland, they would include consideration of the factors set
forth in Rule 1.5 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, among
which are ‘the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved’ and ‘the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly.’  Those factors are more
7 Montgomery County has its own Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 2A of
the Montgomery County Code.  In § 2A-11 it provides for judicial review pursuant to the
“Maryland Rules of Procedure governing administrative appeals.”  We have been unable
to find in the County statute any standard of review different than the standard of review
applicable generally to administrative appeals and the parties directed us to none. 
-17-
judgmental than fact-based and are more apt to be within the expertise of a
judge rather than of lay jurors.”
Admiral Mortgage, Inc., 357 Md. at 552-53, 745 A.2d at 1036 (footnote omitted).
B.  Standard of Review7
As a threshold matter, the parties also disagree on the approach we are to take in
reviewing the intermediate appellate court’s conclusion that the Panel “did not properly
apply the lodestar approach.” Flaa, 158 Md.App. at 495, 857 A.2d at 611.  Citing her belief
that the Panel’s failure to employ the lodestar approach is an error of law, Mrs. Flaa urges
that we undertake a de novo review of the Panel’s attorney’s fees determination.  She
references our opinion in Caucus Distributors, Inc. v. Maryland Securities Com’r, 320 Md.
313, 577 A.2d 783 (1990), wherein we stated that an agency’s fact-finding and inferences
are entitled to deference, but “[w]hen, however, the agency’s decision is predicated solely
on an error of law, no deference is appropriate and the reviewing court may substitute its
judgment for that of the agency.”  Id. at 324, 577 A.2d at 788.  See also Washington Nat’l
Arena v. Comptroller, 308 Md. 370, 378-79, 519 A.2d 1277 (1987); Ramsay, Scarlett & Co.
v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 825, 490 A.2d 1296 (1985).  On the other hand, Manor contends
that the Panel’s attorney’s fees review, undertaken according to the factors of Montgomery
-18-
County Code § 27-7 (k)(1), was appropriate and Manor suggests that our evaluation should
be deferential, recognizing that “an administrative agency’s interpretation and application
of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight
by reviewing courts.”  Board of Physician Quality Assur. v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729
A.2d 376, 381 (1999); see also Lussier v. Maryland Racing Commission, 343 Md. 681, 696-
697, 684 A.2d 804, 811-812 (1996).  Thus, although not luminously articulated, it seems
that Manor is suggesting that the Panel did apply a lodestar approach in some fashion, but
that approach was in conformance with the standards described in Montgomery County
Code § 27-7 (k)(1), and we should leave the decision of the Panel untouched if we find that
the Panel did not abuse its discretion, i.e., it had substantial evidence to support its attorney’s
fees award.  As we have previously stated, “[a] court’s role is limited to determining if there
is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and
conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous
conclusion of law.”  United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel, 336 Md. 569, 577, 650
A.2d 226, 230 (1994), quoted in Bucktail, LLC v. County Council, 352 Md. 530, 552-53, 723
A.2d 440, 450 (1999).  
We were confronted with similarly competing arguments in Friolo.  In Friolo, a case
in which this Court was called upon to evaluate whether the lodestar approach was the
appropriate methodology to calculate the award of attorney’s fees in a case litigated under
the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, Md. Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.), §§ 3-401 et seq. of
8 By reason that it is a discretionary act, the granting of fees in Maryland is not
mandatory, although it may be an abuse of discretion to deny such fees in a given
circumstance.  The statutes in Friolo and in the present case state that the court (or the
agency) may allow fee-shifting.
-19-
the Labor and Employment Article and under the Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md.
Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.), §§ 3-501 et seq. of the Labor and Employment Article, we
determined that awarding a fee was a permitted, discretionary act,8 thus mooting the
argument of legal error in respect to that issue.  Contrary to the Friolo petitioner’s urging
that this Court in Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 745 A.2d 1026, had
“‘strongly suggested’ that Maryland courts follow the lodestar approach,” Friolo, 373 Md.
at 518, 819 A.2d at 364, we determined in Friolo that, although lodestar was the correct
approach in the Friolo case, application of lodestar is a fact-sensitive endeavor:
“[T]he lodestar approach is ordinarily the appropriate one to use in
determining a reasonable counsel fee.  We stress, however, that the approach
we approve is broader than simply hours spent times hourly rate but also
includes careful consideration of appropriate adjustments to that product,
which, in almost all instances, will be case-specific.”
Id. at 505, 819 A.2d at 356 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, our Friolo holding did not
establish lodestar as the only approach for calculation of an award of attorney’s fees in
Maryland cases. 
In the instant case, we similarly find it unnecessary to further the debate as to whether
the Court of Special Appeals’s decision should have examined the lower court’s decision
for error of law or abuse of discretion.  As we have indicated, and as we shall explain, the
9 See Caffrey v. Department of Liquor Control, 370 Md. 272, 805 A.2d 268 (2002)
for a further discussion of the American Rule and, in respect to certain exceptions, not
relevant here, see St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md. 337, 346-
47, 568 A.2d 35, 39 (1990) as to wrongful conduct of a managing director of a
corporation operating for his own benefit instead of for the benefit of the corporation and
his actions force the corporation to initiate litigation against a third party, and  McGaw v.
Acker Merrall & Condit Co., 111 Md. 153, 73 A. 731 (1909), as to damages in malicious
prosecution actions, Tully v. Dasher, 250 Md. 424, 442, 244 A.2d 207, 217 (1968).
-20-
use of the lodestar approach, under the circumstances of the instant case, was unnecessary,
given the presence of the Montgomery County Code § 27-7 (k)(1) criteria.  As we explain
further, the Panel’s invocation–and subsequent analysis of those criteria, following the
earlier remand, was generally sufficient. 
C.  Attorney’s Fees Methodology
We continue our explanation by examining whether, even in light of the § 27-7 (k)(1)
criteria, the Panel was required to use lodestar to determine an attorney’s fees award.  That
is, we must determine whether lodestar can preempt a similar methodology or scheme set
out in a local code.  We first note, again, that the American Rule generally applies in
Maryland, except when a fee-shifting statute or a contractual provision to the contrary
exists.9  The American Rule is the Maryland common-law rule.  Generally, the lodestar rule
is one method of calculation when a statute trumps the common-law rule.  
The Court of Special Appeals determined that the Panel’s failure to arrive at an initial
lodestar figure was erroneous.  That court stated:
“As we review the Panel’s decision, we observe preliminarily that there
is no indication how, if at all, the Panel calculated the lodestar before
-21-
considering the adjustment factors. Calculation of the lodestar, however, is the
first step in the lodestar analysis. That fact alone leads us to conclude that the
Panel committed legal error in calculating the fee award and that the case must
be remanded for a determination of the lodestar.”
Flaa, 158 Md.App. at 497, 857 A.2d at 612-13.
Manor contends, however, that, under the facts of the instant case, instead of a
lodestar method, Montgomery County Code § 27-7 (k)(1) governs the calculation of any
attorney’s fees that the Panel may, in its discretion, award in this case.  Manor states that
“under this Montgomery County Code provision, no precise, mathematical, formulaic
application of the ‘lodestar amount’ is required since the statute itself ensures that a Panel
adhering to the statute will include a determination of reasonable hours in its consideration
of reasonable attorney’s fees.”  Manor urges that the Court of Special Appeals was incorrect
in holding that its inability to “determine whether the Panel first established a lodestar figure,
prior to reviewing the factors set forth in the Montgomery County Code, [leads to the
conclusion that] the Panel erred as a matter of law.”  Manor summarizes its argument as
follows:
“Whether we say that the Panel determined the ‘reasonable hours’ by
evaluating the ‘time and labor required’ factor of the [§] 27-7 (k)(1) factors,
or we say that, in computing the lodestar figure the Panel determined that it
was reasonable to spend 132 hours on the jurisdictional issue, but then,
applying the factors from Friolo and Hensley, determined that no upward or
downward adjustment of that number is necessary, the only difference is a
matter of semantics.” [Alteration added.]
Mrs. Flaa, on the other hand, argues to this Court that any award of attorney’s fees under
civil rights legislation must be comprised of a two-step process:  First, the calculating and
-22-
awarding entity–whether an administrative body or a court–must determine a lodestar, i.e.,
the product of a reasonable number of hours expended on the case multiplied by a
reasonable hourly fee.  Next, the calculating and awarding entity may adjust the lodestar-
derived figure upward or downward based upon the application of adjustment factors such
as those prescribed in Montgomery County Code § 27-7 (k)(1) or such as those delineated
in Johnson and adopted by Healey.  Thus, according to respondent, the Court of Special
Appeals was correct in its finding that the Panel’s failure to arrive at an initial lodestar
number was a repudiation of the case law, and thus, an error of law, and not simply an
option within the discretion of the calculating and awarding entity.
Respondent further argues that § 27-7 (k)(1) cannot be considered either the
functional equivalent or an acceptable substitute for the lodestar method because the § 27-7
(k)(1) criteria address only the “second, and far less important, part” of the lodestar test, i.e.,
guidelines by which to increase or decrease an already lodestar-calculated attorney’s fees
award.  Thus, according to respondent, the so-called “secondary adjustment factors”
contained in the MCOHR’s former fee-shifting provision did not abolish the requirement
that the Panel employ the lodestar approach because:
“(i) the county statute is incomplete on its face in that it does not require the
Panel to begin its analysis with a calculation of ‘reasonable hours times
reasonable rate’ and is missing important lodestar ‘adjustment factors’; and
(ii) the county statute does not reflect legislative intent to preempt or
10 Respondent fails to recognize that, but for the statute, the American Rule would
apply and there would be no fee-shifting, thus, making the issue of a lodestar approach
non-existent.  Under the common law applicable in this State, there is no fee-shifting. 
Fee-shifting in Maryland arises by way of statute.
-23-
supersede common law.”10
Our review of the considerable procedural history of this case reveals that Mrs. Flaa
did not urge the application of the lodestar approach until such time as she filed her first
petition for judicial review in the circuit court.  Nevertheless, respondent suggests that
Friolo should govern the award of attorney’s fees under fee-shifting statutes in Maryland
and she urges this Court to extend its Friolo holding, which applied the lodestar method to
the fee-shifting statutes invoked in that case, to the matter before us.  She observes that her
case is a particularly worthy candidate for a lodestar calculation given its civil rights genre
and the apparent novelty of its issues.
Manor contends that Friolo does not stand for the proposition that attorney’s fees can
be calculated only upon the calculation initially of a total number of hours multiplied by an
hourly rate.  Rather, according to Manor, Friolo indicates that, in the absence of other
statutory criteria for calculating an attorney’s fees award, one must begin with a lodestar
figure, i.e., a result obtained by multiplying a number of hours by an hourly rate.  In the
present case, Manor contends that the presence of the Montgomery County Code § 27-7
(k)(1) criteria renders use of the lodestar method unnecessary, and the Panel’s application
of the Montgomery County Code criteria pursuant to the circuit court’s mandate has resulted
-24-
in a properly-determined discretionary award of attorney’s fees.
We determine, under the circumstances of the present case, that the criteria of § 27-7
(k)(1) are the proper method by which to determine reasonable attorney’s fees.  Respondent
has clearly misunderstood the thrust of our Friolo decision.   By virtue of this Court’s
opinion in Friolo, we did not mandatorily “adopt a lodestar approach . . . as a matter of
Maryland law”  id. at 520, 819 A.2d at 366, for all situations.  Rather, our language
articulated in Friolo applied lodestar to Md. Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.), §§ 3-427 and
3-507.1 of the Labor and Employment Article, and indicated a general approval of the
approach in conjunction with other fee-shifting statutes that provide for the possible award
of attorney’s fees, but lack criteria for how to calculate such fees.   Friolo, 373 Md. at 504-
05, 819 A.2d at 356.   Friolo did not preclude the use of criteria other than those found in
Johnson, Hensley, Rule 1.5 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, or others.  
In the present matter, the case-specific facts indicate that at the time the Panel elected
to make an attorney’s fees award, legislative directions existed in Montgomery County Code
§ 27-7 (k)(1), which were required to be considered in arriving at an award amount.
Accordingly, these criteria formed the basis of the Panel’s award consideration, and in
basing its award on these criteria, the Panel did not act contrary to Friolo.  Thus, Friolo
remains intact as to those cases for which it is applicable.  Mandatory legislative criteria,
where they exist, for the setting of fee-shifted awards, are entirely appropriate for
determining an award of attorney’s fees, and in such circumstances, are to be utilized.  In
-25-
such instances where a statute creates the right to fee-shifting and contains criteria for the
setting of such fees, the statutory criteria are to be invoked primarily; not as adjustment
factors after the determination of some initial, foundational number under a lodestar
approach.
As a final matter, we note that respondent has observed that Montgomery County has
replaced the entirety of Montgomery County Code § 27-7 (k)(1) with Montgomery County
Code § 27-8 (a)(1)(A) which provides simply for the award of “reasonable attorney’s fees”
upon a finding of a violation of the County’s Human Rights article.  Montgomery County’s
ordinance change is noteworthy only for its prospective effect.  The change does not alter
the result in this case, as the Panel made its initial attorney’s fees determination in 2000,
prior to the repeal of Montgomery County Code § 27-7 (k)(1), which occurred in 2001.
III. Conclusion
The criteria in former Montgomery County Code § 27-7 (k)(1) make unnecessary the
use of a lodestar approach for calculating the attorney’s fees awarded to a successful
claimant under Montgomery County’s Commission on Human Rights Article.  The Panel’s
attorney’s fees calculation made pursuant to an analysis of each of the criterion contained
in the former § 27-7 (k)(1) resulted in a properly-determined award of attorney’s fees.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED;
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
COURT 
WITH 
DIRECTION 
TO
-26-
AFFIRM 
THE  
JUNE 
30, 
2003
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
MONTGOMERY
COUNTY; COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY
RESPONDENT.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 111
September Term, 2004
Manor Country Club
v.
Betty Flaa
Bell, C. J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Eldridge, John C. 
(Retired, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J.
Filed:   May 18, 2005
1The hearing examiner found that Manor Country Club was a place of public
accommodation;  that the petitioner had engaged in one instance of sex discrimination, by
treating her right of access to use of the golf course disparately;  and that the petitioner
had engaged in gender-based discriminatory practices, creating a hostile environment.   
Betty Flaa, the respondent, filed with the Montgomery County Office of Human
Rights (“MCOHR”) a marital status discrimination claim against Manor Country Club, the
petitioner.  That claim, to which she later added a claim  for sex discrimination, alleged that
the petitioner’s  policies with respect to access to and use of its golf course were
discriminatory on the basis of marital status and resulted in disparate treatment of women,
in general and her, in particular, because of sex.  She also asserted theories of disparate
impact against women in the membership structure and a hostile environment for them in the
petitioner’s indoor restaurant.  
The respondent substantially prevailed on her claims.   While, to be sure, the MCOHR
panel did not adopt all of the findings and conclusions of the hearing examiner1 assigned to
conduct the hearing in the case, it did adopt the most significant, the foundational one, that
Manor Country Club is a place of public accommodation.  The Panel also agreed that the
petitioner had engaged in the act of sex discrimination against the respondent that the hearing
examiner had identified.   Having made those findings, it ordered the petitioner “to cease and
desist from all activities and conduct that discriminate against women;” “to establish a formal
and written policy against discrimination against women in the use of any facilities, services
and activities of the club;” “to provide for a confidential and unbiased procedure for filing
complaints of discrimination;” and “to provide reasonable access for [MCOHR] staff to
2Section  27-7(k)(1) of the Montgomery County Code, as in effect when this case
was decided, provides: 
“The complainant may be awarded reasonable attorney's fees.  In
determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees claimed by the
complainant, the commission panel shall consider the following factors: 
“a. Time and labor required; 
“b. The novelty and complexity of the case; 
“c. The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
“d. The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; 
“e. The customary fee; 
“f. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 
“g. Time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; 
“h. The experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; 
and 
“i. Awards in similar cases.”
-2-
monitor compliance with [its] order.”  As the hearing examiner had done, although in lesser
amounts, the panel awarded the respondent monetary damages and attorney’s fees.   Rather
than the maximum damages of $1,000 recommended by the hearing examiner, the panel
awarded the petitioner $750.00 in damages, and significantly reduced the $120,481 in
attorney’s fees recommended, awarding the petitioner only  $3,000.
The Circuit Court for Montgomery County having reversed the attorney’s fee award,
noting that it was arrived at without regard to the factors enumerated  in Montgomery County
Code, § 27-7(k)(1) (1987)2 and without refuting the findings supporting his fee
recommendation, made by the hearing examiner, and remanded the case for a
redetermination of the award, the panel issued its Order and Opinion Awarding Attorney's
Fees.  In its Opinion, the panel addressed each of the § 27-7 (k) (1) factors, concluding, in
-3-
the Order, to award attorney’s fees of $22,440,  “[b]ased on our Lodestar analysis of all of
the factors that we are required to base this ruling upon.”  That amount was calculated on the
basis of 132 hours multiplied by the average firm billing rate, $170 per hour, of the
petitioner’s counsel.  In considering, as it was instructed to do, the degree of success the
outcome represented for the petitioner, the panel observed:
“We found some of [the respondent’s] major theories and alleged causes of
action brought in this case to be without merit and therefore declined to follow
the recommendations of the Hearing Examiner on those issues of law.
Moreover, in awarding the monetary damages that we did, this Panel was well
aware of the fact that there was one (and only one) proven instance of
‘discrimination.’  We felt compelled by the statute to award injunctive relief,
regardless of whether we believed that there were systemic wrongs to be
righted.  As discussed above, only the argument and decision in favor of
finding for the jurisdiction of the Commission was a major victory for [the
respondent].”
Accordingly, not believing the degree of success the respondent enjoyed to have been
significant, the panel declined to adjust the attorney’s fees upward. Earlier, when addressing
the time and labor factor, the panel had commented, tellingly:
“We cannot fathom how any person, dealing with the facts alleged, could have
decided that it was worth $250,000 or so to litigate these issues.  We believe
that an attorney has a responsibility to dissuade clients or potential clients from
launching costly litigation, knowing that the other party will incur enormous
defense costs, where the cost/benefit ratio of that litigation is low.  In this case
particularly, damages were capped under the statute. Rather, it is our decision
on this issue that any reasonable client would not have been willing to spend
more than $25,000 to pursue claims of the type made in this
proceeding.”[Alterations Added]
I have not the slightest doubt that the panel erred in its determination of the attorney’s
fees in this case and that, as the Court of Special Appeals held, the Circuit Court erred in
-4-
affirming that award.   As the Circuit Court on initial review noted, although the respondent
did not prevail on her claims of hostile environment and disparate  impact, she prevailed on
a matter of first impression in Maryland, her claim that Manor Country Club  was a place of
public accommodation,  and on her claim of sex discrimination.   Moreover, whatever might
have been the motivation of the panel in awarding it, the respondent obtained the injunctive
relief she sought, which relief benefitted, in any event, not just the respondent, but all women
using  any of the petitioner’s “facilities, services and activities.”  Furthermore, this
discrimination matter has taken more than ten years to resolve, without regard to the appeal
concerning the attorney’s fees, the fees as to which are also recoverable by the prevailing
party.  Like the Court of Special Appeals, I am unable to understand the reason for, or
discern support for, “an 89 percent reduction in hours in a case in which the party seeking
attorney's fees prevailed on two of its four claims and one of those claims was a matter of
first impression.” Flaa v. Manor Country Club, 158 Md. App. 483, 498, 857 A. 2d 604, 613
(2004).  It is even more perplexing when it is recalled that the respondent was awarded an
amount equal to three-quarters of the maximum damages allowed.
It is absolutely clear to me that the panel did precisely what the Circuit Court, on
initial review, surmised that it had done, engaged in and applied a cost-benefit analysis.  Such
an approach, because it requires the attorney’s fee award to be proportional to the monetary
judgment award, is inconsistent with the purpose of the ordinance, to allow, not discourage,
access to the courts for meritorious, though small, in terms of actual damages, claims.   See
3I am aware that the respondent did not cross-appeal on the issue of whether the
panel improperly applied a cost benefit analysis and that, although going to some pains to
frame it, the Court of Special Appeals purported not to reach the merits of that issue.  
Nevertheless, I believe it would be putting form over substance to overlook the thrust, the
real substance, of the intermediate appellate court’s analysis.   
-5-
City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 577, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2695, 91 L. Ed. 2d 466, 482
(1986) (“[a] rule of proportionality would make it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals
with meritorious civil rights claims but relatively small potential damages to obtain redress
from the courts.  This is totally inconsistent with Congress' purpose in enacting [42 U.S.C.]
§ 1988.”); Blaylock v. Johns Hopkins Fed. Credit Union, 152 Md. App. 338, 356, 831 A. 2d
1120, 1130 (2003).   See also Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc.,  569 N.E. 2d 464, 466
(Ohio,1991), in which the Ohio Supreme Court offered another argument against
proportionality:
“In addition to addressing an individual wrong, pursuing a claim under the Act
may produce a benefit to the community generally. A judgment for the
consumer in such a case may discourage violations of the Act by others.
Prohibiting private attorneys from recovering for the time they expend on a
consumer protection case undermines both the purpose and deterrent effect of
the Act.”
The validity of that argument is not at all affected by the fact that the statute at issue in that
case was a consumer protection statute.
I dissent.3