Case Title: Mkller v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 709, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
JOHN E. MILLER,                      
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 709, 2002 
 
   Court Below–Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   Cr. A. No. IN97-12-0663 
                      
 
Submitted: October 31, 2003  
   Decided:  December 23, 2003   
 
Before HOLLAND, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
Upon Appeal from the Superior Court’s Denial of Appellant’s Motion for 
Postconviction Relief.  Affirmed. 
 
 
 
John E. Miller, pro se. 
 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for 
Appellee State of Delaware. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
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The defendant-appellant, John E. Miller, filed an appeal from the Superior 
Court’s December 2, 2002 order denying his motion for postconviction relief.  The 
Court has before it for consideration the briefs on appeal and the record below. 
 
On April 13, 1998, Miller pleaded guilty to Robbery in the First Degree.  He 
was later sentenced as an habitual offender1 to thirty years incarceration at Level 
V, to be followed by six months of Level IV work release.  This Court affirmed 
Miller’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal.2  Miller subsequently filed a 
motion for correction of sentence, which the Superior Court denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
Issues on Appeal 
 
In the instant appeal, Miller asserts several claims that may fairly be 
summarized as follows: a) his guilty plea was involuntary because his counsel 
incorrectly advised him that he was not eligible for sentencing as an habitual 
offender; b) his counsel provided ineffective assistance by permitting him to plead 
guilty to Robbery in the First Degree, where there was no evidence that a deadly 
weapon was displayed and he did not resemble the description of the perpetrator in 
the police report; and c) responsibility for the robbery lies with Probation and 
Parole, which failed to properly supervise him while he was on probation.  To the 
extent Miller has not argued other grounds to support his appeal that were 
                                                 
1 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a) (2001). 
2 Miller v. State, No. 420, 1998 (Del. Aug. 4, 1999). 
 
 
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previously raised, those grounds are deemed waived and will not be addressed by 
this Court.3 
 
 
 
 
 
Guilty Plea Voluntary 
 
The transcript of the April 13, 1998 guilty plea hearing reflects that the 
prosecutor began the proceedings by stating, “Your Honor, by the terms of Mr. 
Miller’s plea agreement, he has agreed to enter a guilty plea . . . .  The State is 
recommending a presentence investigation and will file an habitual offender 
petition.  And that concludes the plea agreement.”  Defense counsel then stated, “ . 
. . one of the things that we’re concerned about obviously is this habitual offender 
[petition].  And I took an opportunity before we entered the plea to review, in JIC,4 
the various dates of conviction and sentencing.  And . . . the dates are such that he 
really only has two sentencing dates, although there are three prior felonies.  And 
my understanding of the habitual offender act . . . is that he will not be an habitual 
offender.” 
                                                 
3 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).  In the Superior Court, Miller also 
argued that he was improperly prevented from making objections at trial, counsel was ineffective 
for failing to assist him at trial, counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issues on direct appeal, 
prison overcrowding prevented him from raising issues on direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme 
Court did not properly address his issues on direct appeal, the Superior Court should not have 
granted a continuance to the State to file a motion to have him declared an habitual offender, and 
the Superior Court sentenced him with a closed mind. 
4 The State of Delaware Judicial Information Center. 
 
 
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The Superior Court judge then conducted the plea colloquy with Miller, 
confirming that he had some college education, that he had read, signed and 
understood the plea agreement, that he had committed the crime to which he was 
pleading guilty, that no one had promised him what his sentence would be, that he 
could receive up to twenty years incarceration, and that, if his attorney were 
incorrect and he qualified as an habitual offender, he was subjecting himself to a 
possible life sentence.  Defense counsel then added, “So the record is clear, Your 
Honor, he also understands that, under the present habitual offender act, that if I 
were wrong, the sentence in fact would include a minimum of 20 years, up to life 
in jail.”  The judge then asked Miller if he understood that and Miller stated, 
“Yes.” 
 
By the time of the August 28, 1998 sentencing hearing, both the prosecutor 
and defense counsel agreed that Miller’s record of prior convictions qualified him 
for habitual offender status.  After moving to dismiss his counsel, Miller again 
admitted that he had committed the robbery and made a lengthy statement 
disputing the contents of the presentence report.  The judge then asked him if he 
had any basis for disputing the offenses or dates underlying the State’s petition to 
have him declared an habitual offender, to which Miller replied, “No.”  Following 
argument by the State that a life sentence should be imposed and argument by 
 
 
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defense counsel that no more than twenty years should be imposed, the Superior 
Court judge imposed a thirty-year Level V term.     
 
The transcript of the guilty plea colloquy refutes Miller’s claim of an 
involuntary guilty plea.  While defense counsel stated his belief that Miller’s 
record did not warrant a declaration of habitual offender status, the subsequent 
colloquy with the judge and counsel clearly placed Miller on notice of the 
consequences of his plea should his counsel be incorrect.  The transcript reflects 
that Miller understood the nature of the plea and its consequences, was satisfied 
with the representation provided by his counsel, and knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entered the plea.  Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, 
Miller is bound by the representations he made at the time the plea was entered.5  
To the extent Miller argues that his counsel was responsible for his rejecting a 
prior plea offer that would not have required him to be sentenced as an habitual 
offender, there is no factual support for that contention in the record.   
 
 
 
 
Counsel’s Assistance Effective 
 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
                                                 
5 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
 
 
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there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have 
been different.6  In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in connection with a guilty plea, a defendant must show that, but for his counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on 
proceeding to trial.7   
 
There is no evidence that any alleged error on the part of counsel, either 
prior to or in connection with the guilty plea hearing, altered the outcome of 
Miller’s case.  The record reflects that Miller admitted he committed the robbery, 
both at the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing.  Under such circumstances, 
defense counsel cannot be charged with error in failing to argue a lack of evidence 
supporting Miller’s commission of the crime.  There is, moreover, nothing in the 
record to suggest that Miller would have decided not to plead guilty if his counsel 
had told him at the time of his plea that he qualified as an habitual offender.  Nor is 
there any evidence that Miller would have received a lesser sentence if he had 
proceeded to trial.  Finally, to the extent Miller bases his claims on alleged errors 
or defects preceding the entry of the plea, his voluntary guilty plea constitutes a 
waiver of any such claims.8   
                                                 
6 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
7 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d at 631. 
8 Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312-13 (Del. 1988). 
 
 
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Miller’s Own Responsibility 
 
In his third claim Miller argues that the robbery was the fault of Probation 
and Parole.  He contends that the robbery occurred when he was on probation and 
he would not have committed the crime if Probation and Parole had supervised him 
properly.  This argument is without merit because there are no facts to support it 
and because Miller may not avoid responsibility for his own actions in committing 
the crime of which he was convicted.   
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.