Case Title: Whippie v. O'Connor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2010-419

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Whippie v. O'Connor (2010-419)
 
2011 VT 97
 
[Filed 15-Aug-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 97
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2010-419
 
MAY TERM, 2011
 
Debra L. Whippie
}
APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
 
}
 
     v.
}
Superior Court, Bennington Unit,
 
}
Civil Division
 
}
 
Robert O'Connor
}
DOCKET NO. 34-1-05 Bncv
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: David A. Howard
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
This is defendant's second appeal in a partition action brought by his
former girlfriend to resolve the parties' respective interests in a house they
hold as tenants-in-common.  On remand following the first appeal, the
trial court determined that defendant had ousted plaintiff from their property
in August 2004 by sending her a no-trespass letter.  On appeal, defendant
argues, among other things, that (1) there was no ouster, and (2) if there
was ouster, the court erred in failing to properly account for plaintiff's
failure to pay towards maintenance of the property during the ouster
period.  We reverse and remand.
¶ 2.            
The basic facts are set forth in this Court's first decision involving
this dispute.  Whippie v. O'Connor (Whippie I),
2010 VT 32, 187 Vt. 523, 996 A.2d 1154.  The parties had had a
ten-year relationship and two children together when they purchased a
single-family residence together in 2002.  Both parties were obligated on
the mortgage, and both their names appeared on the deed.  In the
beginning, the parties agreed to share expenses equally; however, plaintiff
stopped paying her share of expenses in early 2003.  In January 2004, the
parties separated, and plaintiff filed a relief-from-abuse petition. 
The temporary order gave plaintiff possession of the home, but the final
relief-from-abuse order, issued in March 2004, granted
possession of the home and parental rights and responsibilities of the parties'
two children to defendant.[1] 
Id. ¶ 5.  The final relief-from-abuse
order expired by its terms in August 2004.  Shortly thereafter, defendant
sent plaintiff a no-trespass letter because he believed she was entering the
home and taking items.  He consistently refused her access to the property.

¶ 3.            
In January 2005, plaintiff filed this partition action.  She sought
public sale of the property and an equitable division of the proceeds. 
Following a bench trial, the court found that defendant's letter was in the
nature of ouster, but did not make findings as to exactly when the ouster
occurred or explain the evidence upon which the ouster award was based. 
The parties disputed the extent to which plaintiff had contributed to payment
of household expenses.  The court found that defendant had paid all of the
mortgage and tax payments on the property, but plaintiff had contributed to
some other property expenses.  Id. ¶ 8. 
Ultimately, the court granted plaintiff $15,216, representing forty percent of
one-half of the $46,081 equity in the home plus an additional $6000 for some
part of the "element of ouster" and in recognition of the fact that plaintiff's
income was necessary to qualify for the home financing.
¶ 4.            
Defendant appealed.  This Court affirmed the court's findings that
plaintiff initially acquired an equal share in the property, that she ceased
contributing to expenses in early 2003, and that defendant's letter of
no-trespass excluded her from the property.  We remanded for an accounting
of the parties' interests in the property based on their relative
contributions, directing the court to determine the parties' shares and
instructing the court not to credit plaintiff for certain expenses.  We
also instructed the court to determine if defendant's exclusion through the
no-trespass letter was unlawful and, if so, whether there was sufficient
evidence to determine when ouster occurred and to calculate an offset of rental
value.  
¶ 5.            
On remand, the court reconsidered the issues without an evidentiary hearing. 
Because plaintiff stopped contributing to residential expenses in April 2003,
the court deducted half of the costs of the mortgage, tax and insurance
payments for the property from the period of April 2003 to August 2004 from
plaintiff's share of the value of the property.  As to ouster, the court
held that plaintiff was wrongfully excluded from the property by defendant's
no-trespass letter.  The court determined there was sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that this ouster occurred in August 2004.  The court did not
deduct contribution costs from plaintiff's share after the ouster occurred.
 The court granted plaintiff an offset of $19,351, representing half of
the rental value for the period of ousterfrom September 2004 to September 2007. 
Including the offset credited to plaintiff as a result of the ouster, the court
awarded plaintiff 61% of the property's value.  Defendant
appeals.
¶ 6.            
At the outset, we reject two arguments made by defendant throughout his
briefthat the court erred in denying his request to submit additional evidence
and in crediting plaintiff's evidence over his own.  We find no error in
the court's decision not to conduct an additional evidentiary hearing. 
Our first decision directed the court to make a determination on the current
record of whether defendant's exclusion action was wrongful and, if so, to
determine duration and value.  Whippie
I, 2010 VT 32 mandate.  Furthermore, as we explained in Whippie I, it is within the trial court's
discretion to judge the credibility of witnesses.  Id.
¶ 12.  As long as the court's findings are supported by the
evidence, we will affirm them on appeal.  Id.
¶ 7.            
In addition, we do not reach some of defendant's arguments because they
were already decided by Whippie I. 
Under the law-of-the case doctrine, questions necessarily involved and already
decided by that decision will not be revisited in this second appeal.  Coty v. Ramsey Assocs., Inc., 154 Vt. 168, 171, 573 A.2d 694, 696 (1990).  That doctrine applies to legal issues resolved as
well as "to fact questions where there has been no new evidence."  Id.
 In this case, some of defendant's arguments are precluded on this
basis.  First, related to ouster, defendant claims that he had
insufficient notice of plaintiff's ouster claim at trial because she did not
include an ouster claim in her original complaint.  In Whippie
I, we addressed the ouster question, implicitly rejecting defendant's
lack-of-notice argument.  2010 VT 32, ¶¶ 19-23.  We do not reexamine
it in this appeal.  Second, defendant argues that plaintiff did not
contribute at all to maintenance of the property.  Because Whippie I affirmed the court's finding that
plaintiff contributed to household expenses during the first year, this matter
is settled and that factual question is resolved for purposes of this
appeal.  Id. ¶ 14. 
¶ 8.            
Defendant's remaining arguments are that the court erred in (1)
concluding that his letter to plaintiff amounted to ouster where a family court
order had granted him possession of the home; (2) finding that there was
sufficient evidence to demonstrate ouster occurred in August 2004 and to set a
reasonable rental value; and (3) failing to deduct from plaintiff's share her
lack of contribution to the property's necessary maintenance costs during the
ouster period.
¶ 9.            
Defendant argues that there was no ouster in this case because his right
to reside in the house was established by an existing family court order
regarding parental rights and responsibilities of the parties' children and
possession of the residence.  Plaintiff argues that the argument was
waived because the family court order was not admitted below and is therefore
not part of the record on appeal.  Introduction of the order itself is of
no moment.  However, even accepting defendant's version of the facts, the
family court's grant of occupancy to defendant did not preclude a finding of
ouster.  A family court deciding issues of parental rights and
responsibilities for children of unmarried couples has no jurisdiction over
property division.  Rogers v. Wells, 174 Vt. 492,
494, 808 A.2d 648, 650 (2002) (mem.) (explaining that family court has no statutory jurisdiction over the separation of unmarried parents outside parentage proceedings). 
¶ 10.        
Defendant next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support
the trial court's finding that he ousted plaintiff from the jointly owned home
in August 2004 and that damages resulted.  We will affirm the court's
findings if they are supported by credible evidence, including testimony based
on personal knowledge.  See Whippie I,
2010 VT 32, ¶ 12.  We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to
support the court's findings.  Defendant testified at trial that he
remembered sending a no-trespass letter to plaintiff and that he likely did it
in August 2004, although he was unsure of the exact date.  Given
defendant's admission, there was no requirement that the actual letter be
admitted.  The court did not abuse its discretion in relying on and
accepting defendant's testimony to find that an ouster occurred in August
2004.  
¶ 11.        
In addition, we reject defendant's argument that plaintiff offered
insufficient evidence to demonstrate the amount of offset to which she was
entitled as a result of ouster.  At trial, plaintiff submitted exhibits
depicting the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's fair market
rent in the area to establish a fair rental value.  While defendant
objected to admission of the exhibits at trial because he did not believe any
ouster occurred, he did not otherwise object to this evidence or offer any
countervailing evidence of rental value.  The court admitted the exhibits
conditioned on a finding of ouster, and defendant did not object.  Therefore,
defendant failed to preserve any objection to the validity or authentication of
these exhibits, and we do not consider the issue on appeal.  See In re
Estate of Peters, 171 Vt. 381, 390, 765 A.2d 468, 475-76
(2000).
¶ 12.        
We turn then to the court's accounting.  Defendant argues that the
court incorrectly proportioned the equity in the property, and that he should
have received a greater share.  He also claims that plaintiff's assertion
of contribution to household expenses is not credible, but because this matter
was previously decided, we do not address it.  Whippie I, 2010 VT
32, ¶ 14.  We do, however, find merit in defendant's arguments
regarding the court's accounting of maintenance costs.  Pursuant to the
court's findings, plaintiff ceased contributing to any expenses related to the
property after April 2003.  The court deducted from plaintiff's share the
expenses accrued between that date and August 2004 when the ouster occurred,
but not afterwards.  We conclude that this was error.
¶ 13.        
A review of our law on this point is instructive.  In Massey v. Hrostek, we set forth the general law regarding
allocation of property in partition actions.  2009 VT
70, 186 Vt. 211, 980 A.2d 768.  Our law on joint tenancies, 27
V.S.A. § 2(b)(2)(A), establishes a statutory
presumption that joint tenants will share equally.  Massey,
2009 VT 70, ¶ 17.  Allocation is then based on the principle that
all tenants share equally in the burdens and responsibilities of ownership and
therefore "a cotenant who pays necessary maintenance
costs associated with jointly owned property is entitled to a setoff for the other tenant's portion of those
costs."  Id. ¶¶ 21-22.  Discretionary improvements are
compensable only to the extent there is a resultant increase in fair market
value, subject to certain conditions.  Id. ¶ 23. 
Finally, "a cotenant who ousts his cotenant from
possession and enjoyment of the property will have his share of the partition
proceeds set off by the rental value of the ousted cotenant's interest for the
period of the ouster."  Id. ¶ 24.  We
affirm these principles today.  
¶ 14.        
The ensuing discussion in Massey went further, however, and
stated that "the cotenant who excludes his cotenants from possession and
enjoyment of the jointly owned property is not entitled to credit for costs
incurred, for either maintenance or improvements, during the period of
the ouster."  2009 VT 70, ¶ 25.  To the
extent that this statement precludes a tenant in possession from claiming
contribution for necessary maintenance costs such as mortgage, taxes and
insurance during the period of ouster, it is overruled.[2]  This statement was contrary to
prior Vermont law, which followed the "general rule" that "when a tenant who
has ousted his co-tenants is charged with rents or profits he should be
credited with payments on encumbrances, taxes, insurance and repairs."  Richardson v. Richardson, 111 Vt. 140, 149-50, 11 A.2d 227,
231 (1940).  Massey did not explicitly overrule Richardson,
nor did it discuss why a change in the general rule was necessary or prudent
from a public policy perspective.  
¶ 15.        
Other than Massey and the sole case cited therein, plaintiff
cites no law in support of her position that her ouster entitles her to a
double benefit of ousterhalf the rental value plus no contribution for the
maintenance costs of the property.  As explained, to the extent that Massey
condoned such accounting it is overruled.  In addition, the case cited for
this point in Massey, Rinehart v. Schubel,
2002 ME 53, 794 A.2d 73, does not support that proposition.  In Rinehart,
the court held that the tenant in possession was not entitled to contribution
from the excluded tenants for "improvements, maintenance, insurance and taxes"
because these costs were offset by the value of the tenant's exclusive
possession.  2002 ME 53, ¶ 11.  There was no double recovery,
however, because the excluded tenants were relieved of their obligation to
contribute to the maintenance of the property, but also received no rental
value to compensate for the exclusion.  As explained more fully elsewhere
in the opinion, there was no need for reimbursement because the "periods of
exclusive possession of the [property] equalled in
value [the tenant in possession's] expenditures on the property so that [the
excluded tenants] need not reimburse him for maintenance, insurance or
taxes."  Id. ¶ 4.  
¶ 16.        
In fact, the great weight of authority is that an ousted tenant is
entitled to the reasonable rental value of their portion of the property, but
is still responsible for "their share of the necessary property maintenance
expenses after ouster."  Yakavonis v.
Tilton, 968 P.2d 908, 912 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); accord Wood v. Collins,
812 P.2d 951, 958 (Alaska 1991) (explaining that excluded cotenant who paid all
of the maintenance costs was entitled to half of the rental value and credit
for half of the maintenance payments); First Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Groussman, 483 P.2d 398, 402 (Colo. App. 1971)
(deducting maintenance costs from rental value); Capital Fin. Co. of Del.
Valley, Inc. v. Asterbadi, 942 A.2d 21, 28 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (reciting rule that ousted tenant may receive rental
value minus maintenance payments made by tenant in possession); Sirianni v. Sirianni,
221 N.Y.S.2d 693, 699 (App. Div. 1961) (explaining that excluded tenant "may
recover from his co-tenant his just proportion of the rents and profits of the
property so held," but "the court may take into account and charge against
receipts, the carrying charges of the property"); Kerney
v. Kerney, 386 A.2d 1100, 1103 (R.I. 1978)
(awarding no contribution expenses to tenant in possession where rental value
offset these costs); Parker v. Shecut, 597 S.E.2d 793, 797 (S.C. 2004) (explaining that ouster damages are rental value
minus allowable expenses).  It is entirely reasonable that ousted tenants
remain obligated to contribute to maintenance costs because these are required
to preserve the property, which is in the interest of all tenants.  Groussman, 483 P.2d  at 402. 
While the ousted tenant receives the value of reasonable rent to compensate for
the loss of occupancy, that tenant retains an interest in the property's equity
and is responsible for preserving it through payments for mortgage, taxes and
insurance.  If the tenant in possession had failed to make the payments,
"all interests of both tenants might have been lost."  Id.  If
the occupying tenant continues to preserve the value of the asset for all
tenants through ongoing maintenance, then that tenant is entitled to credit for
these payments.  Such a rule comports with the equitable nature of a
partition action and encourages responsible use by the occupying tenant.  
¶ 17.        
Thus, we conclude that defendant was entitled to compensation for half
of the maintenance costs he paid for the entire period, even after the
ouster.  On remand, the court is directed to determine the value of
defendant's expenditures on maintenance costs for the period of September 2004
to September 2007.  Half of this amount should be deducted from
plaintiff's share.  Her share should then be credited with the already
determined rental value for the ouster period.  No new evidence need be
taken on these matters.
           
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Geoffrey W. Crawford,
  Superior Judge,
Specially Assigned
 

[1]  At the same time, the family court
issued a temporary order on parental rights and responsibilities reflecting the
same terms.  Whippie I, 2010 VT 32, ¶ 5.
[2]  We acknowledge that Massey was
a recent decision and we do not "lightly overturn recent precedent," O'Connor
v. City of Rutland, 172 Vt. 570, 570, 772 A.2d 551, 552 (2001) (mem.), but the law as stated in Massey is incorrect
and the error should not be perpetuated.