Case Title: VAN RIPER v. OEDEKOVEN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
VAN RIPER v. OEDEKOVEN2001 WY 5826 P.3d 325Case Number: 00-274Decided: 06/20/2001

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                            

COURTNEY 
J. VAN RIPER,

Appellant(Plaintiff),

v.

BYRON 
OEDEKOVEN, Sheriff of Campbell

County, 
Wyoming; GREGORY BENNICK,

the 
Administrator of the Campbell County

Detention 
Center; JACKIE TARTER, Shift

Supervisor 
at the Campbell County Detention

Center,

Appellees(Defendants).

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Terrence O'Brien, Judge

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Courtney J. Van Riper, pro se, Rawlins, WY

 Representing 
Appellees:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney 
General; and John D. Rossetti, Assistant Attorney General Charlene Lynde, Deputy 
County and Prosecuting Attorney, Gillette, WY

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

 
            
HILL, Justice.

  [¶1]      Appellant, 
Courtney J. Van Riper (Van Riper), seeks review of an order of the district 
court which dismissed his Civil Rights Action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 
1983, for the reason that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.  W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6).

[¶2]      We will 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Van Riper 
presents this statement of the issues:

I.          
Whether the Circuit [sic] [District] Court Erred in Granting the 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the 42 USC § 1983 Civil Right Complaint for 
Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6)?

II.          
Whether the Clerk of Sixth Judicial Circuit [sic] [District] Court 
Exceeded Wyoming Statutory Authorization, as Codified at Wyo. Stat. § 5-2-202, 
in Demanding an $85.00 Supreme Court Filing Fee in this 
Matter?

Appellees, 
Byron Oedekoven (Odekoven), Gregory Bennick (Bennick), and Jackie Tartar (Tartar) 
(in their individual capacities) propose these issues for our 
consideration:

I.          
The District Court Correctly Granted Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for 
Failure to State a Claim Pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).

II.          
The Clerk of the Sixth Judicial District Court Correctly Assessed an 
$85.00 Supreme Court Filing Fee.

The 
Appellees (in their official capacities) state this issue:

1.  The District Court Properly Granted The 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Filed In Their Official Capacities, for Failure 
to State a Claim For Which Relief Could Be Granted Under § 42 U.S.C. 1983, 
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.

FACTS

[¶4]      On September 17, 
1998, Van Riper filed his Civil Rights Action in the district court1.  Van Riper purported to bring this action 
on behalf of himself, as well as a class of persons "comprised of all similarly 
situated past, present, and future pretrial and sentenced prisoners" confined in 
the Campbell County Detention Center (CCDC).  Appellee Oedekoven is the Campbell County 
Sheriff.  Appellee Bennick is a 
Campbell County Deputy Sheriff and Administrator of the CCDC.  Appellee Tartar is a Campbell County 
Deputy Sheriff who is in charge of the day shift at the CCDC.  We accept for purposes of the 
disposition of this appeal that all Appellees were acting, at all times, under 
color of the laws of the State of Wyoming.

[¶5]      Van Riper alleges 
these facts in his initial complaint.  
The law library at the CCDC is located in the Visiting Room.  The Visiting Room is used for many other 
purposes, including for visits with prisoners (16+ hours a week), church 
services and fellowship meetings (7.5 hours per week), AA and NA meetings (4 
hours per week), and counseling meetings (2 hours per week).  The law library contains a legal 
research computer, as well as a significant number and variety of legal research 
books.  There is no librarian and no 
other CCDC personnel who can assist prisoners in doing legal research.  The legal research computer is, in 
reality, "available" only to prisoners who are knowledgeable enough to use 
it.  Other legal materials are 
available through inter-library loan, but that takes "several days to a week or 
more."  Legal materials may only be 
used in the CCDC Visiting Room and may not be taken to jail cells.  Van Riper claims that, in addition to 
the various other uses of the law library listed above, other CCDC rules and 
regulations further reduce the number of hours that the law library is available 
for legal research purposes.  Van 
Riper claims that certain legal materials that are critical to a prisoner's 
research efforts are not available, and that CCDC "regularly" interferes with 
prisoners gaining access to the law library or allowing inmates with legal 
research experience (such as Van Riper) to assist other prisoners (Van Riper 
cites four circumstances where he was not permitted to assist other 
prisoners).

[¶6]      Van Riper 
contends CCDC does not provide carbon paper for use by prisoners but instead 
charges the "exorbitant" rate of $1.00 for the first copy and $.25 for each copy 
thereafter (on occasion the charges are even higher).  Van Riper contends he was charged $50.00 
for the copying "necessary" to complete the administrative procedures relevant 
to the instant matter, and that ZIP Printing of Gillette would have done it for 
$10.00.  According to Van Riper, 
these copying charges, as well as other CCDC policies, are used to chill and 
frustrate a prisoner's ability to pursue legitimate grievances and other legal 
remedies.  At a later time, Van 
Riper was again charged excessive sums for copies. 

[¶7]      Van Riper 
contends that CCDC requires inmates to use 50% of funds they have on account to 
pay for medical costs, even when they may be indigent.

[¶8]      Van Riper also 
avers that the CCDC policy which limits prisoners to making only collect phone 
calls at a cost of $2.95 (and does not permit "800" calls to be made to lawyers) 
chills and frustrates the prisoners' right to contact their families, the 
prisoners' right to self-representation and to contact lawyers and courts, and 
earns the CCDC an undue profit from every call made by prisoners.  In addition, CCDC does not maintain a 
mail log to ensure that legal mail is not tampered with or 
delayed.

[¶9]      Van Riper 
contends that prisoners, upon arrival at CCDC, are deprived of personal hygiene 
items, cleaning supplies, as well as bed, pillow, and linens.  In addition, overcrowded conditions 
often exist resulting in physical injury, and bright overhead lights that are on 
24 hours a day result in sleep deprivation.  Van Riper does not specifically allege 
that he was subjected to such treatment.

[¶10]   Van Riper contends that 
non-medically trained personnel are permitted to dispense prescription, 
non-prescription and controlled medications to prisoners on a regular 
basis.  Van Riper contends that 
mistakes are made by these non-trained personnel and that, in his own personal 
instance, he was given a double dose of a "strong sedative," and Van Riper had 
to call the error to a CCDC staff member's attention.

[¶11]   Van Riper asserts that the CCDC, 
contrary to the facility's policies, routinely allows violent and assaultive 
prisoners to be placed in the jail's general population.  CCDC then does nothing to prevent those 
violent and assaultive inmates from engaging in lengthy reigns of terror and 
intimidation over younger and weaker prisoners.  Van Riper relates a specific instance 
where such an event occurred, though it did not affect 
him.

[¶12]   In this initial complaint, Van 
Riper sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, nominal damages of $25.00 
against each Appellee, a refund of profits from the phone system, his fees, 
costs and expenses for this action, as well as any other relief the district 
court might find just and appropriate.

[¶13]   On September 28, 1998, Van Riper 
filed a "Supplemental and Amended Complaint."  This document contained additional 
allegations concerning Civil Rights Act violations.  Van Riper averred that another inmate at 
CCDC had sought to use the law library during nighttime hours and that request 
was denied.  He claimed that he 
asked for five legal texts and that, in retaliation for a yet unfiled complaint, 
Appellee Bennick deliberately delayed acting on that request for five days.  Van Riper asserted that other requests 
for legal materials were ignored or denied, including a request for information 
on how to serve the instant suit on Appellees.  However, the Appellees eventually 
accepted service of his complaints.  
He also contends that he was denied nighttime access to the law library, 
and that when another group cancelled its usual time to use the law library area 
and he was granted access to make use of that time, he was subjected to a 
pat-down search (degrading), and that the officer conducting the search 
deliberately slammed his hands into Van Riper's groin.

[¶14]   Van Riper alleges that on the day 
the instant law suit was filed and served, Van Riper's cell was subjected to a 
"shake-down" search and his legal materials were scattered about his cell (and 
were partially damaged), and CCDC personnel confiscated "two blue paper/clear 
plastic with soft metal clips [legal folders]."  Van Riper was not reimbursed for this 
loss.

[¶15]   Van Riper maintains that during May 
of 1998, he was asked by CCDC personnel to assist other inmates in doing legal 
research (because of his computer research expertise), and he successfully 
provided such assistance to a number of inmates.  After filing of the instant case, 
Appellee Bennick issued a new policy denying Van Riper the "right" to assist 
other inmates and, further, drastically reduced Van Riper's access to the law 
library and to legal materials.

[¶16]   Van Riper claims he was charged 
with a major disciplinary infraction (use of profanity) when, under normal 
circumstances, even much more offensive use of profanity goes 
unpunished.

[¶17]   Van Riper claims a disabled inmate, 
who filed a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, was placed in 
administrative segregation on the pretext that the inmate required medical 
monitoring.

[¶18]   Van Riper claims he was denied 
notary service necessary to his access to the courts.

[¶19]   Van Riper alleges that he was 
denied the right to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing (for use of 
profanity) that resulted in a punishment of five days in disciplinary lockdown 
status.

[¶20]   He further alleges that, in a 
staged incident, another inmate used the same profanity that Van Riper had used 
("take a meal tray and shove it up [Appellee] Bennick's ass").  That inmate was not punished; thus, 
according to Van Riper, demonstrating that the disciplinary action taken against 
him was retaliatory in nature.

[¶21]   On November 2, 1998, Van Riper 
filed his "Second Supplemental Complaint."  
In that document he asserted that, as a prisoner committed to an 
institution of the Department of Corrections (DOC)2, the DOC had always provided him 
with needed medical services including prescription eyeglasses, which he needs 
to read and write.  Van Riper's 
eyeglasses came up missing in April 1998.  
CCDC would not replace the missing eyeglasses but did loan him a pair of 
reading glasses and later permitted Van Riper to purchase a pair of reading 
glasses from K-Mart in October 1998, at a cost of $10.49.  Those eyeglasses were broken, and by way 
of CCDC "Inmate Request" form dated October 16, 1998, Van Riper informed the 
CCDC that his eyeglasses were broken and "unusable" and that he would like to 
purchase a new pair of eyeglasses.  
On October 17, 1998, Van Riper submitted another "Inmate Request" form, 
this one asking for the broken eyeglasses that had been replaced (he said he 
could use them in case one of the lenses in his new eyeglasses broke).  However, a CCDC employee named McElhiney 
had construed Van Riper's use of the word "unusable" to mean that they were 
"useless," and he had thrown them away.  
On October 19, 1998, Van Riper made demand on McElhiney for $10.49 via an 
"Inmate Request" form.  Appellee 
Bennick intercepted that request, and Bennick offered to give Van Riper $3.00 to 
settle his "claim."  In yet another 
"Inmate Request" form, Van Riper informed Appellee 
Bennick:

  Your offer of a $3.00 settlement for the 
glasses thrown away by D. McElhiney is hereby rejected. 
[Emphasis in original]

  Kindly refrain from interfering again 
with my attempt to comply with the small claims court requirement to make formal 
demand for payment on Officer D. McElhiney.  I could not care less about your 
communications with W.S.P.3!  What you should understand is that I 
intend to nail you to the courthouse door, and will spend every waking moment 
and penny to that end.  Now, 
retaliate against me to your heart's content!

[¶22]   Appellee Bennick's response was 
limited to a renewal of his offer to pay Van Riper $3.00 for the broken glasses 
and the provision of information which directed Van Riper how to obtain Small 
Claims Court forms.  Van Riper sent 
a two-page letter to Appellee Bennick asserting that Bennick was interfering 
with his access to the Small Claims Court by not permitting his demand to go 
directly to McElhiney.

[¶23]   On November 30, 1998, Van Riper 
filed a "Notice of Voluntary Dismissal" of the instant lawsuit, but the district 
court did not act on it.  On 
December 4, 1998, Van Riper filed a motion to withdraw his voluntary dismissal 
or for relief from dismissal if it had been granted.  Various motions to dismiss, as well as 
supporting legal memoranda, were submitted on behalf of all Appellees.  By order dated August 21, 2000, the 
district court entered a five-line decision which dismissed Van Riper's 
complaint "[f]or the reasons stated in the defendant's moving papers and 
briefs."

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶24]   When claims are dismissed under 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), this Court accepts the facts stated in the complaint as true 
and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Such a dismissal will be sustained only 
when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot 
assert any facts that would entitle him to relief.  Story v. State, 2001 WY 3, ¶19, 
15 P.3d 1066, ¶19 (Wyo. 2001).  
Dismissal is a drastic remedy and is sparingly granted; nevertheless, we 
will sustain a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal when it is certain  from the face of the complaint that the 
plaintiff cannot assert any set of facts that would entitle that plaintiff to 
relief.  Robinson v. 
Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1135-36 (Wyo. 2000).

DISCUSSION

[¶25]   Although Van Riper does appear to 
have abandoned some of the claims made in the district court, his brief focuses 
on two of those issues in particular, and he makes passing mention of several 
other issues.

[¶26]   First, Van Riper claims he was 
subjected to retaliatory mistreatment because he was a successful "jailhouse 
lawyer."  The State concedes his 
success with respect to matters affecting him, as well as success in helping 
others.  As set out above, he was at 
one time asked to help other inmates who were not familiar with computer-based 
research.  However, when he was no 
longer permitted to provide such assistance, CCDC made other arrangements for 
assisting other inmates.  We do not 
perceive any allegations made by Van Riper as suggesting this as retaliation 
either for his success as a "jailhouse lawyer," or as retaliation for the 
instant case against CCDC and its employees.  The remainder of Van Riper's allegations 
we view as merely an effort by him to unsuccessfully fit the "square pegs" of 
his experiences into the "round holes" of the standards enunciated in Penrod 
v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (10th Cir. 1996).  For example, Penrod averred that he was 
denied toothpaste to which he was entitled, and the basis for the denial was 
specifically stated to be the existence of his litigation.  Van Riper, on the other hand, contends 
CCDC personnel retaliated against him by disciplining him, but his own pleadings 
belie that because he admitted that he committed the offense for which he was 
disciplined.  His supposition was 
that another inmate who did the same thing was not disciplined and, therefore, 
it had to be that Van Riper was disciplined for retaliatory reasons.  We do not accept that reasoning process, 
and we agree with the district court that the allegations made by Van Riper do 
not demonstrate a retaliatory animus.

[¶27]   Second, Van Riper contends he was 
denied access to the courts because Appellee Bennick would not allow his demand 
under the small claims procedures to go directly to Officer McElhiney.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-202(a) 
(LEXIS Supp. 2000).  Van Riper 
misconstrues that statute.  It only 
requires that a demand for payment of a small claim have been made and 
refused.  Moreover, Van Riper never 
did file his small claim, so exactly how the district court would have treated 
his pleadings is unknown.  We 
conclude that Van Riper's real problem is not that he was denied access to the 
courts  but that he was denied the opportunity to nail Appellee Bennick to the 
courthouse door.

[¶28]   We agree with the district court 
that the remainder of Van Riper's claims were frivolous and properly dismissed 
under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(2) 
(2000).  This is especially true 
given that the district court did not dismiss the complaints until after 
summonses had been served on all Appellees and Van Riper had been given an 
opportunity to respond to Appellees' moving papers.

[¶29]   Van Riper suggests that he has a 
"right" to provide his legal services to other inmates, or at least that inmates 
have a "right" to consult with him.  
The United States Supreme Court has, in our view, put such a construct to 
rest.  Discussing the topic of an 
inmate's right to provide legal advice in the role of a "jailhouse lawyer," the 
court noted that the right to provide legal advice does not necessarily follow 
from a right to receive legal advice:

However, 
even if one right followed from the other, Murphy is incorrect in his assumption 
that there is a free-standing right to receive legal advice.  Under our right of access precedents, 
inmates have a legal right to receive legal advice from other inmates only when 
it is a necessary "means for ensuring a reasonably adequate opportunity to 
present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the 
courts."  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 
(1977)).

Shaw, et 
al. v. Murphy, 2001 
WL 387410, ___ U.S. ___, ___, n.3, 121 S. Ct. 1475, ___, ___, n.3, L.Ed.2d ____ 
(2001) (decided April 18, 2001, slip at p. 7, n.3).

[¶30]   We will briefly mention four other 
issues to which Van Riper makes direct reference in his 
brief.

[¶31]   (1)  Exorbitant copying charges.  Van Riper points to no actual injury to 
himself or to any other inmate, nor does he allege that he had no other 
reasonable alternatives to photocopying.  
See Johnson v. Moore, 926 F.2d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 
1991).

[¶32]   (2)  Exorbitant phone charges.  Van Riper points to no actual injury to 
himself or others.  There is no 
authority for the proposition that prisoners are entitled to a specific rate for 
telephone calls.  There is nothing 
in Van Riper's complaint that suggests that the rates charged are so exorbitant 
as to deprive the inmate of phone use altogether.  See Johnson v. State of 
California, 207 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 
2000).

[¶33]   (3)  Medical care payments by inmates.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-6-303 (LEXIS 1999) 
provides:

18-6-303.  Care of prisoners; audit of 
expenses.

   . . . 
.

   (b) The sheriff shall arrange for 
the administration of medical care reasonably required by prisoners committed to 
his custody.

   (c) The county commissioners shall 
pay for reasonable and necessary medical care for:

            
(i) Injuries incurred by a prisoner:

    (A) 
While in custody if the injuries are the proximate result of negligent or 
intentionally tortious acts committed by the sheriff or a member of his 
staff;

(B) 
During an arrest by the sheriff or a member of his staff for commission of a 
crime, provided the injuries were not incurred while unlawfully resisting 
arrest;

(C) 
While on work release or when performing  
duties assigned by the sheriff or a member of his 
staff.

        (ii) 
Any infectious, contagious or communicable disease which the prisoner contracts 
while he is in custody;  
or

        
(iii) Medical examinations required by law or court order unless the 
order otherwise provides.

   (d) Unless indigent, a prisoner 
shall pay the cost of medical treatment for:

        (i) 
Injuries incurred by that prisoner:

(A) 
While in custody if the injuries are not the proximate result of negligent or 
intentionally tortious acts committed by the sheriff or a member of his 
staff;

            
   (B) During the 
commission of a crime;  
and

   (C) While unlawfully resisting 
arrest or attempting to avoid an arrest.

       (ii) 
Self-inflicted injuries;

       (iii) 
Pre-custodial injuries or illness;

       (iv) 
Pre-custodial dental conditions;  
and

       (v) Any 
other injuries not covered under subsection (c) of this 
section.

   (e) A health care provider 
furnishing treatment to a prisoner for which the prisoner is liable for payment 
shall attempt to collect the cost of the treatment from the prisoner or his 
insurance carrier.  If the provider 
is unable to collect the cost after making reasonable efforts to secure 
collection, and the provider certifies by affidavit to the board of county 
commissioners that it is unable to collect the cost of medical treatment, the 
board of county commissioners, following payment, may initiate proceedings to 
collect from the prisoner any amounts so paid.

   (f) The sheriff may require a 
nonindigent prisoner to pay for any medical treatment under subsection (d) of 
this section, including any voluntary or involuntary mental health 
evaluation.  Necessary medical 
treatment shall not be denied based upon a prisoner's inability to 
pay.

Van 
Riper can point to no actual injury to himself, or to any other inmate, under 
this statute.

[¶34]   (4)  Dispensing medications by untrained 
personnel.  Van Riper can point to 
no actual injury to himself or any other inmate as a result of what he alleges 
to be a "policy."  In any event, the 
applicable standard of care is deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious 
medical needs.  Story, 
¶18.  Van Riper's allegations do not 
rise to that standard.

[¶35]   Finally, Van Riper asserts that he 
was improperly charged $85.00 for the docketing of his appeal in this 
Court.  Wyo. Stat. Ann § 5-2-202 
(LEXIS Supp. 2000) provides:

The 
clerk of the supreme court shall collect the following fees from the plaintiff 
in error or appellant, or in case of an original proceeding the plaintiff or 
relator shall, at the time of filing the petition in error or record on appeal 
or when commencing the cause in this court, the sum of twenty-five dollars 
($25.00).  At the time of filing, 
the clerk also shall collect a court automation fee in the amount of ten dollars 
($10.00) which shall be deposited into the judicial systems automation account 
established by W.S. 5-2-120.  Other 
fees or charges to be assessed within the clerk's office are to be determined 
under rules of the supreme court. 

[¶36]   Under the above statute, as well as 
authority established in W.R.A.P. 2.09(b) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-2-120 (LEXIS 
Supp. 2000), and by order entered on May 9, 2000, this Court set the fee for 
docketing an appeal at $75.00, plus $10.00 for the judicial systems automation 
account.  The district court was 
correct in dismissing this aspect of Van Riper's complaint for failure to state 
a claim.

[¶37]   The order of the district court 
dismissing Van Riper's complaint is affirmed in all 
respects.

FOOTNOTES

   
1State courts 
have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over § 1983 actions.  Teton Plumbing & Heating v. 
Laramie County School Dist. No. One, 763 P.2d 843, 847 n.2 (Wyo. 1988).  The elements required to establish a 
claim for relief pursuant to § 1983 are: "(1) that the conduct complained of was 
engaged in under color of state law, and (2) that such conduct subjected the 
plaintiffs to a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.  Id.

   2See Van Riper 
v. State, 999 P.2d 646 (Wyo. 2000); and Van Riper v. State, 882 P.2d 230 (Wyo. 1994).

   3This is a 
reference to Appellee Bennick's previous comment, made after consultation with 
the Wyoming State Penitentiary (WSP), that Van Riper could not have such broken 
glasses at the WSP.