Case Title: WILLIAMS v PASMA

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82-050

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1982-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 82-50 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 LARRY WILLIAMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, VS . JAMES PASMA, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Yellowstone Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Gerald J. Neely argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Herron, Meloy and Llewellyn, Helena, Montana Peter M. Meloy argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: N'ovember 15, 1982 Decided: December 29, 1982 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . P l a i n t i f £ / a p p e l l a n t , L a r r y W i l l i a m s , f i l e d a complaint i n t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Yellowstone County. a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t / r e s p o n d e n t , James Pasma, c l a i m i n g l i b e l and a s k i n g f o r damages. On J a n u a r y 8 , 1982, t h e D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t e d summary -judgment t o Pasma. W i l l i a m s a p p e a l s . The a l l e g e d l i b e l w a s prompted by an o c c u r r e n c e of e v e n t s which began i n October 1979. A t t h a t t i m e t h e r e was " t a l k " t h a t S u p e r i n t e n d a n t of P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n , Georgia Ruth R i c e , would be opposed by a former employee, J u d i Fenton. On O c t o b e r 24, 1979, Kenneth Dunham, S e c r e t a r y t o t h e S t a t e Republican C o m m i t t e e , made a c r i t i c a l comment about both R i c e and Fenton which was c a r r i e d by t h e Great F a l l s T r i b u n e . I n t h e same e d i t i o n of t h e Tribune - - - - - - - - t h e r e was a n o t h e r s t o r y announcing t h a t u n s u c c e s s f u l U .S . S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e Williams and former Governor Tim Babcock had been s e l e c t e d and agreed to head a John C o n n a l l y f o r P r e s i d e n t c o m m i t - t e e . When Pasma, a member of t h e S t a t e Democratic C o m m i t t e e , read t h e t w o news r e p o r t s , he found it i r o n i c t h e r e p u b l i c a n s were c r i t i c i z i n g t h e two p o t e n t i a l democratic c a n d i d a t e s w h i l e a t t h e same t i m e t h e y announced t h e appointment of two i n d i v i d u a l s ( W i l l i a m s and Babcock) who had had " t r o u b l e w i t h t h e law" to r u n C o n n a l l y l s campaign committee. Pasma t h e n composed a p r e s s r e l e a s e which was p r i n t e d i n t h e - Great - - - - - F a l l s - - . - Tribune - - - --- on O c t o b e r 2 7 , 1979. Pasma s t a t e d , "The e n t i r e t h r u s t of my article was f o r M r . Dunham to busy himself c l e a n i n g up h i s own house r a t h e r t h a n a t t a c k i n g unannounced d e m o c r a t i c c a n d i d a t e s and d e l v i n g o r messing around i n any way i n t h e democratic primary." The p r e s s release s t a t e d : "A Democratic P a r t y o f f i c i a l F r i d a y accused state Republican spokesman Ken Dunham of making s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t Democrats t h a t were ' s h o r t on c o n t e n t and long on poor t a s t e and bad manners. "Democratic n a t i o n a l committeeman J i m Pasma, Havre, t o o k i s s u e w i t h comments Dunham made t h i s week a b o u t P u b l i c I n s t r u c t i o n S u p t . Georgia Ruth Rice and h e r p o s s i b l e Democratic opponent, J u d i Fenton. R i c e a l s o is a Democrat. " Dunham had q u e s t i o n e d R i c e I s competency and s a i d he was d i s t u r b e d t h a t Democrats would c o n s i d e r nominating ' a n o t h e r b u r e a u c r a t 1 l i k e Fenton f o r t h e job. " Pasma c a l l e d Dunham's comments t y p i c a l of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l n e g a t i v e c h a t t e r t h a t comes from t h e Republican s t a t e o f f ice. ' H e s a i d Dunham's p r e s s releases, which included a ' v i c i o u s p e r s o n a l a t t a c k 1 on R i c e and ' a n e q u a l l y unbecoming media s a l v o ' a g a i n s t Fenton 'may v e r y w e l l set t h e t o n e f o r t h e type of campaign r h e t o r i c w e can e x p e c t from t h e GOP i n 1980. ' "Pasma s a i d it was i r o n i c t h a t on t h e same day t h a t Dunham a t t a c k e d t h e Democrats, a s t o r y r a n i n d i c a t i n g t h a t former Republican Gov. Tim Babcock and L a r r y Williams, u n s u c c e s s f u l 1978 GOP S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e , were among t h e l e a d e r s o f a s t a t e committee promoting t h e p r e s i d e n - t i a l c a n d i d a t e John Connally. " 'When we c o n s i d e r t h a t a l l t h r e e have a t one t i m e o r a n o t h e r been under f e d e r a l i n d i c t m e n t f o r p o l i t i c a l and f i n a n c i a l s h e n a n i g a n s , it is small wonder t o me a t least t h a t Ken Dunham b u s i e s himself c a l l i n g a t t e n t i o n to what he c o n s i d e r s t h e s h o r t c o m i n g s of p o s s i b l e Democratic opponents, Pasma s a i d . ' "Connally, a former Democratic g o v e r n o r of Texas, was a c q u i t t e d of c h a r g e s t h a t he was b r i b e d by m i l k p r o d u c e r s when he was s e c r e t a r y of t h e t r e a s u r y . Babcock pleaded g u i l t y and was f i n e d f o r making an i l l e g a l campaign c o n t r i b u t i o n to former P r e s i d e n t Richard Nixon. W i l l i a m s was s t r i p p e d of h i s l i c e n s e s a s an i n v e s t o r and commodity a d v i s e r , b u t a c o u r t r u l e d i n h i s f a v o r and h i s l i c e n s e s have been re t u r n e d . "Pasma urged Dunham t o spend h i s t i m e making s u r e t h e Republicans come up w i t h t h e i r b e s t q u a l i f i e d c a n d i d a t e f o r s u p e r i n t e n d e n t to i n s u r e a h e a l t h y d e b a t e of t h e i s s u e s i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n ." Pasma ' s misconception about W i l l i a m s evolved from an a r t i c l e which appeared i n - Forbes -- - - - Magazine - - - - - - and w a s r e p r i n t e d i n t h e B i l l i n g s G a z e t t e . The a r t i c l e c o n t a i n e d t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t : - - - . -- - . -- - . - - - - - - "Court r e c o r d s show t h a t W i l l i a m s was t h r e e times charged w i t h v i o l a t i o n s of f e d e r a l regu- l a t i o n s c o v e r i n g commodities and s e c u r i t y i n v e s t m e n t c o u n s e l o r s . " Pasma claims he d i d n o t know t h e d i f f e r e n c e between "charged w i t h a f e d e r a l o f f e n s e " and "being under f e d e r a l i n d i c t m e n t . " I n a s t o r y which appeared i n t h e Great F a l l s Tribune on October 3 0 , 1979, W i l l i a m s demanded a r e t r a c t i o n from Pasma. Williams s t a t e d Pasma's c h a r g e s t h a t W i l l i a m s had been under f e d e r a l i n d i c t m e n t were f a l s e and c o n s t i t u t e d " d i r t y p o l i t i c s " and he would f i l e a l i b e l s u i t i f a formal r e t r a c t i o n w a s not made. W i l l i a m s s a i d , "Somebody has t o t e a c h p o l i t i c a l people i n Montana t o p l a y t h e game by t h e f a c t s and by t h e t r u t h , and i f t h a t happens t o be m e , so be i t . " I n a t e l e p h o n e i n t e r v i e w a f t e r W i l l i a m s demanded a retrac- t i o n , Pasma s t a t e d : " I f M r . W i l l i a m s s a y s he w a s n ' t i n d i c t e d , t h e n I have no c h o i c e b u t to b e l i e v e him u n l e s s someone informed m e o t h e r w i s e . " T h i s s t a t e m e n t was p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Great F a l l s - -- - -- - - - - - T r i b u n e on October 30, 1979. Pasma f u r t h e r admitted t h a t " h i s - - - - -- . - use o f t h e words ' f e d e r a l i n d i c t m e n t ' i n a p r e s s release ' a p p a r e n t l y was a poor one. " I I n an i n t e r v i e w p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Great -- - F a l l s Tribune on December 11, 1979, Pasma s t a t e d , " A t t h e - - - - -- - - - - -- t i m e I made t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t M r . Williams had been f e d e r a l l y i n d i c t e d , as had former Governor Babcock and former Governor Connally, I s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e d it, . . . t a l k i n g to M r . W i l l i a m s by phone he a s s u r e d m e t h a t t h i s was i n c o r r e c t and as I s a i d i n a p r e v i o u s news r e l e a s e , I b e l i e v e him." A f t e r Pasma r e f u s e d to make a formal r e t r a c t i o n , Williams f i l e d a complaint i n Yellowstone County a g a i n s t Pasma a l l e g i n g t h a t he had been l i b e l e d and s u f f e r e d damages by v i r t u e of t h e a r t i c l e p u b l i s h e d i n t h e Great F a l l s T r i b u n e . Pasma moved t o - - - - - -- --- - - - -- - -- d i s m i s s t h e a c t i o n c l a i m i n g W i l l i a m s was a " p u b l i c f i g u r e " and t h e r e f o r e i n o r d e r f o r W i l l i a m s to r e c o v e r he must a l l e g e and p r o v e a c t u a l malice. Before t h e D i s t r i c t Court a c t e d on t h e motion to d i s m i s s , Williams amended h i s complaint charging Pasma w i t h a c t u a l m a l i c e . On J a n u a r y 8 , 1982, f o l l o w i n g cross-motions f o r summary judgment , t h e D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t e d Pasma ' s mot i o n and o r d e r e d judgment be e n t e r e d i n f a v o r of Pasma. W i l l i a m s a p p e a l s . The s u b s t a n c e of t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d on a p p e a l is as f o l l o w s : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by g r a n t i n g summary judgment which held Williams is a p u b l i c f i g u r e a s a matter of law. 2. Whether t h e r e is any genuine i s s u e as to any material f a c t a f f e c t i n g W i l l i a m s ' a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t Pasma a c t e d w i t h malice, and i f n o t , is t h e r e any f a c t u a l b a s i s upon which a j u r y c o u l d conclude t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s were made w i t h m a l i c e . 3. Whether t h e state and f e d e r a l r u l e s p r o t e c t i n g freedom of s p e e c h and p r e s s i n l i b e l a c t i o n s a p p l y to a nonmedia d e f e n d a n t . 4. Whether t h e d e f e n s e s of " b e l i e f i n t h e t r u t h " and " f a i r comment" were p r o p e r l y pleaded and i f so, whether t h e s e d e f e n s e s and t h e p r i v i l e g e s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 27-1-804, MCA, a p p l y i n t h i s a c t i o n . W i l l i a m s c o n t e n d s summary judgment w a s i n a p p r o p r i a t e claiming t h e i s s u e of whether o r n o t he was a p u b l i c f i g u r e is f o r t h e j u r y to d e t e r m i n e . Williams cites Article 11, S e c t i o n 7 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n : " I n a l l s u i t s and p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r l i b e l or s l a n d e r t h e t r u t h t h e r e o f may be g i v e n i n e v i d e n c e , and t h e j u r y , under t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e c o u r t , s h a l l d e t e r m i n e t h e l a w and t h e f a c t s ." I n s u p p o r t o f h i s p o s i t i o n , W i l l i a m s relies upon t h e f o l l o w i n g language from Madison v. Yunker ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 180 Mont. 54, "Likewise it may be contended i n t h e r e t r i a l t h a t Madison is a ' p u b l i c f i g u r e . ' Whatever h i s s t a t u s , it is a q u e s t i o n f o r t h e j u r y to d e t e r m i n e , because of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l pro- v i s i o n t h a t t h e j u r y under t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e c o u r t is t h e judge of both l a w and f a c t . A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 7 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . With a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h e j u r y can d e t e r m i n e t h e s e matters and t h e i r s t a t u s i n any t r i a l , u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e s t i p u l a t e d . " 589 P.2d a t 133. However, t h i s language is n o t c o n t r o l l i n g and must be q u a l i f i e d . I n G r i f f i n v. Opinion P u b l i s h i n g Co. ( 1 9 4 3 ) , 114 Mont. 502, 138 P.2d 580, t h i s Court c o r r e c t l y s t a t e d : "While o u r C o n s t i t u t i o n l i k e t h a t of M i s s o u r i , Colorado, South Dakota and Wyoming p r o v i d e s t h a t i n l i b e l s u i t s ' t h e j u r y , under t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e c o u r t , s h a l l d e t e r m i n e t h e l a w and t h e f a c t s , ' y e t t h e d e c i s i o n s c l e a r l y show t h a t t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e c o u r t and j u r y is n o t g r e a t l y d i f f e r e n t i n t h e t r i a l of l i b e l from what it is i n o t h e r cases. " I n o t h e r words, it is f o r t h e c o u r t and n o t t h e j u r y t o p a s s upon demurrers t o t h e c o m p l a i n t ; upon t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h e e v i d e n c e ; upon motions f o r n o n s u i t ; upon motions f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t ; upon motions f o r a new t r i a l and upon motions to set a s i d e v e r d i c t s or v a c a t e judgments." 114 Mont. a t 512. Thus, t h e r e is no a b s o l u t e p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t g r a n t i n g sum- mary judgment i n l i b e l cases. A s t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court commented i n R o s e b l a t t v. Baer ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 383 U.S. 75, 8 8 , 86 S.Ct. 669, 1 5 L.Ed.2d 597: "we remark o n l y t h a t , as i n t h e case w i t h q u e s t i o n s of p r i v i l e g e g e n e r a l l y , it is f o r t h e t r i a l judge i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e p r o o f s show respon- d e n t t o be a ' p u b l i c o f f i c i a l . ' " Next, w e must d e c i d e whether t h e District Court w a s correct i n f i n d i n g W i l l i a m s w a s a p u b l i c f i g u r e as a matter of law. I f W i l l i a m s w a s a p u b l i c f i g u r e a t t h e t i m e of t h e a l l e g e d l i b e l , t h e n he cannot r e c o v e r damages u n l e s s he can show t h e s t a t e m e n t w a s made w i t h a c t u a l malice. his r u l e w a s s t a t e d by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n N e w York Times v. S u l l i v a n ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 376 U.S. 254, 279-280, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686: "The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s r e q u i r e , we t h i n k , a f e d e r a l r u l e t h a t p r o h i b i t s a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l from r e c o v e r i n g damages f o r a defama- t o r y f a l s e h o o d r e l a t i n g to h i s o f f i c i a l con- d u c t u n l e s s he proves t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t w a s made w i t h ' a c t u a l malicet - t h a t is, w i t h knowledge t h a t it w a s f a l s e or w i t h r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d of whether it was f a l s e or n o t ." For a p e r i o d of t i m e t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court d i f - f e r e n t i a t e d between p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s and p u b l i c f i g u r e s . See C u r t i s P u b l i s h i n g Co. v . B u t t s ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 388 U.S. 130, 8 7 S.Ct. 1975, 1 8 L.Ed.2d 1094. F i n a l l y , i n G e r t z v. Robert Welch, I n c . ( 1 9 7 4 ) r 418 U.S. 323, 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 4 1 L.Ed.2d 789, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court removed t h e d i s t i n c t i o n and c l a s s i f i e d p u b l i c f i g u r e s as f a l l i n g i n t o one of t w o g r o u p s : " I n some i n s t a n c e s an i n d i v i d u a l may a c h i e v e s u c h p e r v a s i v e fame or n o t o r i e t y t h a t he be- comes a p u b l i c f i g u r e f o r a l l purposes and i n a l l c o n t e x t s . More commonly, an i n d i v i d u a l v o l u n t a r i l y i n j e c t s himself or is drawn i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r p u b l i c c o n t r o v e r s y and t h e r e b y becomes a p u b l i c f i g u r e f o r a l i m i t e d range of i s s u e s . I n e i t h e r c a s e such persons assume s p e c i a l prominence i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n of p u b l i c q u e s t i o n s . " I n t h i s i n s t a n c e , i f Williams f a l l s i n t o e i t h e r of t h e above- mentioned groups, it would most l i k e l y be t h e former. Obviously, t h e r e is a l i m i t e d number who can be included i n t h e group of p u b l i c f i g u r e s f o r a l l purposes. I n - G e r t z - t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court s t a t e d : "Absent c l e a r e v i d e n c e of g e n e r a l fame o r n o t o r i e t y i n t h e community, and p e r v a s i v e involvement i n t h e a f f a i r s of s o c i e t y , an i n d i v i d u a l should n o t be deemed a p u b l i c per- s o n a l i t y f o r a l l a s p e c t s of h i s l i f e . " 418 U.S. a t 352. W e must determine h e r e whether t h e r e is c l e a r evidence t h a t Williams had " g e n e r a l fame or n o t o r i e t y i n t h e community" and e x h i b i t e d " p e r v a s i v e involvement i n t h e af f a i r s of s o c i e t y . " P r i o r to t h e t i m e of t h e a l l e g e d l i b e l Williams had: p u b l i s h e d an investment a d v i s o r y s e r v i c e and t r a d e d i n s t o c k s and commodities ; authored t h r e e books on s t o c k s and commodities; been t h e s u b j e c t of an a r t i c l e i n Forbes Magazine i n 1975 and a n - - - - - - - - - - - a r t i c l e i n t h e Wall S t r e e t J o u r n a l i n 1976, and gave a speech to -- - a n economic conference i n L o s Angeles; u n s u c c e s s f u l l y r a n f o r t h e p o s i t i o n of United S t a t e s S e n a t o r f o r t h e S t a t e of Montana i n 1978; a t t e n d e d a r e p u b l i c a n p a r t y convention i n 1979 and gave a speech; s e r v e d a s chairman f o r t h e Montana r e p u b l i c a n p a r t y ; and been an a c t i v e member of t h e N a t i o n a l T a x p a y e r ' s Union. Some c o u r t s have h i n t e d t h a t n a t i o n a l n o t o r i e t y is n e c e s s a r y to a t t a i n g e n e r a l p u b l i c f i g u r e s t a t u s . S e e , S w a t s l e r , - The - -- E v o l u t i o n -- . o f . -. - t h e P u b l i c F i g u r e D o c t r i n e i n Defamation A c t i o n s , 4 1 Ohio S t . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- . - - -- - - - -- -- L . J . 1009, 1030 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . However, we cannot f i n d any a u t h o r i t y from t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court nor S t a t e Supreme Court c a s e s t h a t e x p r e s s l y sets such a requirement. I n f a c t , t h e language " i n t h e community" a p p e a r s to r e q u i r e o n l y l o c a l n o t o r i e t y . W e f i n d t h e above-mentioned a c t i v i t i e s do e s t a b l i s h c l e a r evidence t h a t Williams had g e n e r a l fame o r n o t o r i e t y i n t h e community (Montana) and e x h i b i t e d p e r v a s i v e involvement i n t h e a f f a i r s of s o c i e t y and t h u s was a p u b l i c f i g u r e a s a m a t t e r of law. I n view of o u r f i n d i n g t h a t Williams was a p u b l i c f i g u r e a s a m a t t e r of law, we must determine whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n h o l d i n g t h e r e is no f a c t u a l b a s i s upon which a j u r y could conclude Pasma's s t a t e m e n t s were made w i t h m a l i c e . A s s t a t e d above, t h e r u l e t h a t a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l cannot r e c o v e r damages upon a c l a i m f o r defamation w i t h o u t a showing of a c t u a l m a l i c e was s t a t e d i n New York Times v. S u l l i v a n , s u p r a . T h e r e , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court h e l d m a l i c e must be proved by a showing t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t was published "with knowledge t h a t it was f a l s e o r w i t h r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d of whether it was f a l s e o r n o t . " I n New York Times t h e a l l e g e d l i b e l stemmed from a f u l l page -- - - - - . . . -- - - - a d v e r t i s e m e n t published i n t h e New York Times - which spoke of a l l e g e d human r i g h t s i n f r a c t i o n s by t h e p o l i c e department i n Montgomery, Alabama. About whether t h e r e was a showing t h a t t h e p u b l i c a t i o n was made w i t h m a l i c e , t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court s t a t e d : "The s t a t e m e n t does not i n d i c a t e malice a t t h e t i m e of t h e p u b l i c a t i o n ; even i f t h e adver- t i s e m e n t w a s n o t ' s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o r r e c t ' - a l t h o u g h r e s p o n d e n t ' s own p r o o f s tend t o show t h a t it was - t h a t o p i n i o n was a t l e a s t a r e a s o n a b l e o n e , and t h e r e w a s no evidence to impeach t h e w i t n e s s ' good f a i t h i n holding i t . " 376 U.S. a t 286. W e f i n d h e r e , a s i n N e w York T i m e s , t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t was - - - - --- made i n good f a i t h and a l t h o u g h it was not a correct s t a t e m e n t , t h e r e is simply no evidence t h e s t a t e m e n t was made w i t h a c t u a l m a l i c e . The d i f f e r e n c e between t h e l e g a l words " i n d i c t e d " o r "charged" is r e l a t i v e l y minor i n t h e minds of t h e average Montana c i t i z e n and Pasma s t a t e d he d i d not know t h e r e was a d i f f e r e n c e . Pasma's s t a t e m e n t s to t h e p r e s s which were published a f t e r t h e a l l e g e d l i b e l s u r e l y a b d i c a t e any a l l e g a t i o n t h e s t a t e m e n t was made w i t h a c t u a l malice: "At t h e t i m e I made t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t M r . Williams had been f e d e r a l l y i n d i c t e d . . . I s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v e d it, . . . t a l k i n g to M r . W i l l i a m s by phone he a s s u r e d me t h a t t h i s w a s i n c o r r e c t and as I s a i d i n a p r e v i o u s news release, I b e l i e v e him." W i l l i a m s n e x t a r g u e s t h e F i r s t Amendment p r i v i l e g e e s t a b l i s h e d by New - York . Times does not a p p l y because Pasma is a nonmedia d e f e n d a n t . The New York Times p r i v i l e g e evolved from -- t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e need f o r f a r - r e a c h i n g F i r s t Amendment p r o t e c t i o n i n c e r t a i n cases. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court s t a t e d : "Such a p r i v i l e g e f o r criticism of o f f i c i a l conduct is a p p r o p r i a t e l y analogous to t h e pro- t e c t i o n accorded a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l when h e is sued f o r l i b e l by a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n . . . The r e a s o n f o r t h e o f f i c i a l p r i v i l e g e is s a i d to be t h e t h r e a t of damage s u i t s would o t h e r w i s e ' i n h i b i t t h e f e a r l e s s , v i g o r o u s , and e f f e c t i v e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of government' and 'dampen t h e a r d o r of a l l b u t t h e most r e s o l u t e , or t h e most i r r e s p o n s i b l e , i n t h e u n f l i n c h i n g d i s c h a r g e of t h e i r d u t i e s . ' [ c i t a t i o n omitted ] Analogous c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s u p p o r t t h e p r i v i l e g e f o r t h e c i t i z e n - c r i t i c of government. It is a s much h i s d u t y t o c r i t i c i z e as it is t h e o f f i c i a l ' s d u t y t o a d m i n i s t e r . " 376 U.S. a t 282. T h i s p r i v i l e g e was expanded to i n c l u d e matters i n v o l v i n g a l l p u b l i c f i g u r e s . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court d i d n o t l i m i t its e x t e n s i o n to o n l y media d e f e n d a n t s i n G e r t z , s u p r a . W e a g r e e w i t h t h e h o l d i n g of t h e Oregon Supreme Court i n Wheeler v. Green ( 1979 -- ---- O r e . . , 593 P.2d 777: "There is, however, nothing i n G e r t z which s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e cases a p p l y i n g t h e ~ k w -- York Times r u l e to non-media d e f e n d a n t s - were i n c o r r e c t or would n o t be followed i n f u t u r e a c t i o n s b r o u g h t by p u b l i c o f f i c i a l or p u b l i c f i g u r e s . The C o u r t ' s concern i n t h o s e cases t o p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e p r o t e c t i o n f o r freedom of p u b l i c d e b a t e on i s s u e s of p u b l i c importance h a s n o t been r e p u d i a t e d . W e conclude t h a t a l l d e f e n d a n t s , n o t o n l y t h o s e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e media, c o n t i n u e to be p r o t e c t e d by t h e N e w York Times r u l e i n cases i n v o l v i n g comment - - - - upon p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s and p u b l i c f i g u r e s . " 593 P.2d a t 784. T h i s h o l d i n g is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n G a l l a g h e r v. Johnson (1980 ) , - - - Mont . - -. - - . - , 611 P.2d 613, 37 St.Rep. 940. I n G a l l a g h e r w e h e l d t h e New York Times r u l e - - - a p p l i e d t o a nonmedia d e f e n d a n t who purchased a d v e r t i s i n g s p a c e i n a l o c a l newspaper t o v e n t h i s criticisms o f , and f r u s t r a t i o n s w i t h , t h e government f o r t h e c i t y of Anaconda, Montana. W i l l i a m s ' l a s t a s s e r t i o n is t h a t t h e d e f e n s e s of " b e l i e f i n t h e t r u t h " and " f a i r comment" were not p r o p e r l y pleaded and t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r i v i l e g e s contained i n s e c t i o n 27-1-804, MCA, a r e n o t a v a i l a b l e i n t h i s a c t i o n . The d e f e n s e s of " b e l i e f i n t h e t r u t h " and " f a i r comment" were common law p r i v i l e g e s which led to t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n N e w York T i m e s , v . S u l l i v a n , s u p r a . A c l o s e reading of - New - York Times r e v e a l s t h a t t h e common law p r i v i l e g e of f a i r comment w a s t h e p r i v i l e g e which t h e United S t a t e s Supreme Court was a d d r e s s i n g when it s t a t e d : "Thus we must c o n s i d e r t h i s c a s e a g a i n s t t h e background of a pro- found n a t i o n a l commitment t o t h e p r i n c i p a l t h a t d e b a t e on p u b l i c i s s u e s should be u n i n h i b i t e d , r o b u s t , and wide open, . . ." 376 U.S. a t 270. The common law p r i v i l e g e of b e l i e f i n t h e t r u t h was s i m i l a r l y i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e - N e w --- York -- Times r u l e a s going to t h e proof of a c t u a l m a l i c e . A s t h e s e p r i v i l e g e s were incor- p o r a t e d i n t o t h e r u l e set f o r t h i n - N e w York - . Times, - t h e r e is no l o n g e r a requirement t h a t t h e y be pled a s s p e c i f i c d e f e n s e s or l o s t . Throughout t h e c o u r s e of t h i s a c t i o n , Pasma maintained Williams was a p u b l i c f i g u r e and t h e r e was no evidence t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t was made w i t h a c t u a l m a l i c e . T h i s is a l l t h e d e f e n s e Pasma was r e q u i r e d to p l e a d . W e f i n d no need to comment upon Williams' c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e p r i v i l e g e s c o n t a i n e d i n s e c t i o n 27-1-804, MCA, a r e not a p p l i c a b l e h e r e . W e have a l r e a d y a p p l i e d t h e - N e w - - York - - - Times - - - -- r u l e and its e x t e n s i o n s t o t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e . I n so doing , w e f i n d Williams was a p u b l i c f i g u r e a t t h e t i m e of Pasma's s t a t e m e n t and t h e r e is no evidence t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t was made w i t h a c t u a l m a l i c e . Judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is a f f i r m e d . T.7 ire concur: Chigf Justice Mr. C h i e i J u s t l c e Prank I. Haswell, d i s s e n t i n g : I would v a c a t e t h e summary judgment and remand t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . The l y n c h p i n of t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n is t h a t p l a i n t i f f L a r r y Williams is a p u b l i c f i g u r e f o r a l l p u r p o s e s a s a m a t t e r of law. I d i s a g r e e . I n my view, t h i s is a j u r y q u e s t i o n p r e c l u d i n g summary judgment. I n a l i b e l a c t i o n t h e j u r y , under t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t , d e t e r m i n e s the law and t h e f a c t s . A r t . 11, Sec. 7 , I 9 7 2 Mont. Const. W e have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t a p e r s o n ' s s t a t u s a s a p u b l i c f i g u r e is a q u e s t i o n f o r t h e j u r y t o d e t e r m i n e . Madison v. Yunker ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 180 Mont. 54, 66, 589 P.2d 126, 133. The m a j o r i t y now l i m i t Madison t o cases where t h e r e is a g e n u i n e i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t f o r t h e j u r y t o d e t e r m i n e . I a g r e e . M y q u a r r e l is w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e is no j u r y q u e s t i o n i n t h i s c a s e . I n my view, t h e r e is a g e n u l n e l s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t as t o whether p l a i n t i f f L a r r y W i l l i a m s is a p u b l i c f i g u r e f o r a l l p u r p o s e s which f o r e - c l o s e s summary judgment. The s u b s t a n c e of t h e u n c o n t e s t e d e v i d e n c e of r e c o r d i n t h l s c a s e d i s c l o s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t s r e l a t i n g t o W i l l i a m s ' s t a t u s a s a p u b l i c f i g u r e a t t h e time of t h e a l l e g e d l i b e l (October 27, 1 9 7 9 ) : (1) N i l l i a m s was a n u n s u c c e s s f u l c a n d i d a t e f o r U n i t e d S t a t e s S e n a t o r i n 1978 and i n c o n n e c t i o n t h e r e w i t h made numerous s p e e c h e s , i s s u e d p r e s s r e l e a s e s , appeared on TV, and made numerous p u b l i c a p p e a r a n c e s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s campaign ; ( 2 ) W i l l i a m s a u t h o r e d t h r e e b o o k s on s t o c k s a n d commodities prior to 1978; (3) Williams published an investment advisory service and traded in stock and commodities; (4) Williams and others were selected to be members of the State Committee for Republican presidential candidate John Connally; (5) Williams was the subject of an article in Forbes magazine in 1975 and the Wall Street Journal in 1976; (6) Williams gave a speech to an Economic Conference in Los Angeles; (7) Williams attended a Republican convention and gave a speech for a candidate for State Republican Chairman; (8) Williams was a member of the National Taxpayers Union and gave testimony to a legislative committee and worked at the legislative level, made a public statement promoting balanced budgets, and issued three press releases during the legislative session. Do these uncontested facts make Williams an all- purpose public figure as a matter of law? Not at all. To establish such there must be "clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and persuasive involvement in the affairs of society." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323, 352, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3013, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 812. It has been held by a federal appeals court that "a person can be a general public figure only if he is a 'celebrity1--his name is a 'household word1--whose ideas and actions the public in fact follows with great interest." Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc. (D.C. Cir. 1980), 627 F.2d 1287, 1292, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898, 101 S.Ct. 266, 62 L.Ed.2d 128. Examples of persons the courts have held to be all-purpose public figures are Johnny Carson [Carson v . Allied News Co. (7th Cir. 1976), 529 F.2d 2061 and William F. Buckley, Jr. [Suckley v. Littell (2nd Cir. 1976), 539 F.2d 882, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct. 786, 50 L.Ed.2d 7771. Measured by these standards, isn't there at least a jury question as to whether Larry Williams qualifies as an all-purpose public figure? Is Williams a celebrity whose name is a household word and whose ideas and actions the public follows with great interest? There is no evidence that the general public is even aware of his many publications and activities. Nor is there evidence of the impact of his activities on the public. It is equally important to note other facts disclosed by the record: (1) Williams was not a public official; (2) Williams did not inject himself into the Pasma- Dunham controversy that gave rise to the alleged libel; (3) Prior to the alleged libel, Williams had not served as a n officer of the Republican Party, was not involved in promoting placement of Initiative 86 on the ballot, and was not involved in any activity in connection with the John Connally campaign. A party opposing summary judgment is entitled to the benefit of all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the offered proof. Mally v. Asanovich (1967), 145 Mont. 99, 105, 423 P.2d 294, 297. A case should never be withdrawn from the jury unless it appears, as a matter of law, that a recovery cannot be had upon any view of the facts which the evidence reasonably tends to establish. Miller Insurance Agency v . Home Fire Etc. Ins. Co. (1935), 100 Mont. 551, 561, 51 P.2d 6 2 8 , 630. Such is n o t t h e c a s e here. The summary judgment s h o u l d be v a c a t e d and t h e c a s e s h o u l d proceed t o jury t r i a l .