Case Title: Matter of GP

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-83-5

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of GP1984 WY 30679 P.2d 976Case Number: C-83-5Decided: 03/22/1984IN THE MATTER OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF GP, JP AND SP. LP, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT),

v.

NATRONA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, APPELLEE (PETITIONER).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
IN THE MATTER OF PARENTAL 
RIGHTS OF GP, JP AND SP. LP, APPELLANT (RESPONDENT),

v.

NATRONA COUNTY DEPARTMENT 
OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL SERVICES, APPELLEE (PETITIONER). 

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

John I. Henley 
of Vlastos, Reeves, Murdock & Brooks, Casper, for appellant.

Nancy Thornton, 
Casper, for appellee.

Ann Rochelle, 
Casper, guardian 
ad litem.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal comes here 
from an action brought by the appellee, Natrona County Department of Public 
Assistance and Social Services (DPASS) to terminate the parental rights of the 
appellant, LP, to his son, JP, and to his two daughters, GP and SP.1 Appellant raises sensitive and 
important issues concerning his rights to a jury trial and to a state-funded 
medical examination of GP. Appellant also challenges the admissibility of 
certain evidence and the sufficiency of the competent evidence to justify 
terminating his parental rights to each of his children. We will affirm the 
judgment of the district court.

[¶2.]     Appellant's three 
children were admitted to the Wyoming State Children's Home on March 1, 1980. At 
that time, GP was eight years old, JP was four, and SP was almost two. In 
December, 1981, following a hearing held at the request of the State Children's 
Home, DPASS assumed the custody and control of JP and SP and placed them with a 
foster family. GP previously had been placed in the foster care of her natural 
father.

[¶3.]     Based on observations 
of the physical condition of the children made by State Children's Home 
personnel and statements of the children themselves, DPASS, in May, 1982, filed 
a petition to terminate appellant's parental rights on the grounds that he had 
abused and neglected his three children and had left GP in the care of another 
person without provision for her support and without communication from him for 
at least one year. The petition goes on to allege that "the health and safety of 
each of these children will be 
seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to [LP]." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶4.]     The appellant filed a 
pro-se answer on June 22, 1982 generally denying the allegations of the 
complaint and demanding a jury trial but did not deposit the $12.00 statutory 
fee nor did he serve the jury demand upon DPASS as required by Rule 38, W.R.C.P. 
On June 28, 1982, the district court found that LP was a needy person and 
appointed counsel to represent him. On August 16, 1982, DPASS joined in what for 
LP was a second request for a jury trial, which the district court denied for 
the reason that it was not timely filed and the jury fee was not deposited with 
the clerk. Numerous motions were made, including a motion for costs to retain a 
qualified physician to examine and test GP to determine her prior sexual 
activity, which motion was denied. On April 25, 1983, the district court filed 
its order, judgment and decree terminating the parental rights of the appellant 
to each of his three children on the grounds that they had been abused and 
neglected by the respondent, that efforts at rehabilitating the family had been 
unsuccessful and that the health and safety of the children would be seriously 
jeopardized by returning to the father. The court did not, however, find that GP 
was left in the care of another person without provision for support and without 
communication from the appellant for a period of at least one year.

[¶5.]     The appellant, LP, 
submits the following issues for consideration:

"I. The trial court erred 
in denying the appellant a jury trial.

"II. The trial court 
erred in refusing the appellant's request for costs for an expert witness to 
examine GP.

"III. The trial court 
erred in refusing to allow the testimony of Kathy Peterson, regarding the 
appellee's pre-termination procedures.

"IV. The trial court 
erred by admitting the records of the Wyoming State Children's Home, including 
alleged statements of the children, into evidence.

"V. The trial court erred 
by admitting the hearsay statements, of GP to Nancy Johnson, into 
evidence.

"VI. The trial court 
erred in admitting into evidence the hearsay statements of JP to members of the 
Children's Home staff, to Walt Murray and to Bea Spiva.

"VII. The trial court 
erred in admitting into evidence hearsay statements of SP made on November 30, 
1981.

"VIII. There was 
insufficient evidence to prove clearly and convincingly that each of the 
children were abused and neglected by the respondent, and that each child's 
health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by the maintenance of the 
parent-child relationship between the appellant and each of his 
children."

Prefatory 
Concepts

[¶6.]     This case was brought 
under Wyoming's termination-of-parental-rights 
statutes, i.e., § 14-2-308 through § 14-2-318, W.S. 1977, 1983 Cum.Supp. and 
specifically § 14-2-309, according to which LP, the father, is charged and the 
court has found that he has "abused and neglected" his three minor children. 
Section 14-2-309 provides:

"Grounds for termination 
of parent-child legal relationship; clear and convincing evidence. 

"(a) The parent-child 
legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following 
facts is established by clear and convincing evidence:

"(i) The child has been 
left in the care of another person without provision for the child's support and 
without communication from the absent parent for a period of at least one (1) 
year. In making the above determination, the court may disregard occasional 
contributions, or incidental contacts and communications;

"(ii) The child has been 
abandoned with no means of identification for at least three (3) months and 
efforts to locate the parent have been unsuccessful;

"(iii) The child has been 
abused or neglected by the parent and efforts by an authorized agency or mental 
health professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the 
family has refused rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the child's 
health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning 
to the parent;

"(iv) The parent is 
incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a showing that the parent is 
unfit to have the custody and control of the child."

[¶7.]     Section 14-2-308 refers 
to § 14-3-202(a)(ii), W.S. 1977 for a definition of "abuse." There, abuse is 
defined as follows:

"`Abuse' means inflicting 
or causing physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to the physical or 
mental health or welfare of a child other than by accidental means, including 
abandonment, excessive or unreasonable 
corporal punishment, malnutrition or substantial risk thereof by reason of 
intentional or unintentional neglect, and 
the commission or allowing the commission of a sexual offense against a child as 
defined by law * * *." (Emphasis added.)

[¶8.]     We have held that the 
right to associate with one's family is a fundamental liberty under Art. 1, §§ 
2, 6, 7 and 36 of the Wyoming Constitution. In DS v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, Wyo., 607 P.2d 911, 918 (1980), we 
said:

"* * * The right to 
associate with one's immediate family is a fundamental liberty protected by the 
state and federal constitutions. Stanley 
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972) (integrity of the family unit 
protected by the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S. Ct. 1322 [1331], 
22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969) (implication that liberties guaranteed by the federal 
constitution are fundamental). See, also, State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 
Ohio St.2d 6, 
399 N.E.2d 66 (1980). Analysis of the Wyoming Constitution and case law also 
leads to the conclusion that the right to associate with one's family is a 
fundamental liberty. Article 1, Sections 2, 6, 7 and 36, Wyoming Constitution; 
Washakie County School District Number 
One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310 (1980); Matter of Adoption of Voss, Wyo., 550 P.2d 481 (1976); and In re Adoption of 
Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 (1948)."

[¶9.]     We also made clear that 
we indeed felt deeply about the family relationship:

"It may be that in 
matters such as this, lawyers, judges, parents - all of us - should digress from 
the ordinary course of things to contemplate how deeply seated the child-parent 
relationship is in the warp and woof of the American fabric. In this matter, 
where the law must decide whether a child will be separated from his mother, we 
have looked to the Declaration of Independence for guidance. We find the 
following familiar language to be helpful:

"`We hold these truths to 
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and 
the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their powers from the consent of the governed, . 
. .'

"While no complete 
listing of the `unalienable rights' endowed upon us can be easily defined - it 
is not, we suggest, too fantastic to assume that the rearing of our children 
might be one example of the pursuit of happiness that the founding fathers 
envisioned. If we accept this hypothesis, then it becomes important to recognize 
that the rights described in both the state and federal constitutions were 
formulated to protect the Declaration of Independence. This surely adds 
significance to the strict-scrutiny concept in matters affecting the rights of 
parents to rear their children." 607 P.2d  at 919.

[¶10.]  Strict scrutiny is the test which will be 
employed when balancing a fundamental right against a compelling state interest, 
which interest is, in this case, the welfare of the children. The compelling 
state interest having been established, it is necessary to prove that the method 
sought to achieve it is the least intrusive of those methods by which the 
state's interest can be fulfilled. State 
in Interest of C, Wyo., 638 P.2d 165 (1981), with the following citations: 
Meloon v. Helgemoe, 436 F. Supp. 528 
(D.C.N.H. 1977), aff'd 564 F.2d 602, cert. denied 436 U.S. 950, 98 S. Ct. 2858, 
56 L. Ed. 2d 793; Constructors Association 
of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936 (D.C.Pa. 1977), aff'd 573 F.2d 811 (1978); Alevy v. Downstate 
Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 348 N.E.2d 537 (1976); Duranceau v. City of Tacoma, 27 Wn. App. 777, 620 P.2d 533 (1980); State ex rel. 
McDonald v. Whatcom County District Court, 19 Wn. App. 429, 575 P.2d 1094 
(1978), aff'd 92 Wn.2d 35, 593 P.2d 546 (1978); DS v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, supra. See also, Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 
Wyo., 648 P.2d 512 (1982).

[¶11.]  The evidence which will countenance a 
termination must be clear and convincing (§ 14-2-309(a), supra). We explained 
what we mean by "clear and convincing" evidence in Thomasi v. Koch, Wyo., 660 P.2d 806, 811-812 (1983), where we 
said:

"* * * This court 
previously has adopted language to this effect:

"`* * * When the evidence 
is such that the mind readily reaches a satisfactory conclusion as to the 
existence or nonexistence of a fact in dispute, then the evidence is, of 
necessity, clear and satisfactory.' Continental Sheep Co. v. Woodhouse, 71 
Wyo. 194, 202, 256 P.2d 97 (1953), quoting language found in Good Milking Mach. Co. v. Galloway, 168 
Iowa 550, 150 N.W. 710, 712 (1915).

"We further have said 
that clear and convincing evidence is `that kind of proof which would persuade a 
trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable.' MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 
Wyo., 612 P.2d 830, 839 (1980)."

[¶12.]  In DS v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, supra, we said:

"We admonish that the 
burden of proving neglect or abuse is upon him who seeks to take the child from 
the parent. We emphasize that the trial court and the appellate court will 
strictly scrutinize claims that a natural parent is unfit because of abuse or 
neglect. This means that the court's duty to protect the child will be balanced 
against its duty to protect democratic values. It means that termination of 
parental rights cannot be ordered on the grounds of abuse or neglect unless the 
showing is clear and unequivocal that the child's health - mental or physical - 
and/or his social or educational well-being has actually been placed in jeopardy 
through the neglect or abuse by the parent." 607 P.2d  at 919.

ISSUE NO. 1

The Jury-Trial 
Question

[¶13.]  The appellant raises three questions 
which pertain to the jury-trial issue:

1. Does the appellant 
have a right to a jury trial in a parental-rights-termination suit?

2. If the appellant does 
have such a right, did he waive it? 

3. Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion under Rule 39(b), W.R.C.P., in denying a jury 
trial?

Facts Relevant to the 
Jury-Trial Question

[¶14.]  In his pro-se answer filed on June 22, 
1982, respondent-appellant asserted:

"* * * According to the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, I am entitled to a trial by jury in the case of my 
parental rights. I am hereby making it known that I demand that 
right."

[¶15.]  There is no certificate of service in the 
record to indicate that appellant served the appellee with either the answer or 
a jury demand. Furthermore, the record stands undisputed to the effect that the 
appellant failed to deposit the $12.00 jury-demand fee with the clerk of the 
court, as required by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rule 38(b)(3), 
W.R.C.P., infra. When the judge of the trial court determined that the appellant 
was a needy person and ordered that he was entitled to a court-appointed 
attorney, no mention was made in the court's order that appellant was entitled 
to proceed in forma pauperis as to jury-fee requirements.

Does the Appellant Have a 
Right to a Jury Trial?

[¶16.]  The answer to this question is that the 
appellant does have a statutory right 
to a jury trial in a parental-termination proceeding. Section 14-2-312, W.S. 
1977, 1983 Cum.Supp., provides in relevant part:

"* * * The Wyoming Rules 
of Civil Procedure, including the right of a parent, child or interested person 
to demand a jury trial, shall be applicable in actions brought under this 
act."

Waiver of Jury-Trial 
Rights

[¶17.]  It is to be observed that Rule 38(b)(1) 
and (3), W.R.C.P., governs the procedures by which a jury demand is made. Rule 
38(b)(1) and (3) provides:

"(b) Demand.

"(1) By Whom. - Any party 
may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by serving 
upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the 
commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after service of the last 
pleading directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of 
the party.

* * * * * *

"(3) Jury Fees. - All 
demands for trial by jury shall be accompanied by a deposit of twelve dollars 
($12.00). The jury fees in cases where jury trials are demanded shall be paid to 
the clerk of the court, and by him paid into the county treasury at the close of 
each week, and he shall tax as costs in each such case, and in all other cases 
in which a jury trial is had, a jury fee of twelve dollars ($12.00), to be 
recovered of the unsuccessful party, as other costs, and in case the party 
making such deposit is successful, he shall recover such deposit from the 
opposite party, as part of his costs in the case."

[¶18.]  There can be no doubt but that the demand 
was faulty in that service was not made in compliance with Rule 38(b)(1) and the 
jury fee was not deposited in compliance with Rule 38(b)(3). Rule 38(d), 
W.R.C.P. provides that the failure of a party to make a demand for jury as 
required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d), W.R.C.P.2 constitutes a waiver of trial by 
jury.

[¶19.]  We have held that the filing of a jury 
demand with the clerk does not fulfill the service requirements of the rules. In 
Patterson v. Maher, Wyo., 450 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1969) we said:

"Plaintiff's thesis that 
the mere filing of a jury demand with the clerk constituted service upon an 
opposing party under Rule 5(b) goes beyond the wording of the rule and is 
contrary to the provisions of Rule 38(d) that the failure `to serve a demand' 
constitutes a waiver. The Federal courts have long made clear their position, 
e.g., in McNabb v. Kansas City Life Ins. 
Co., 8 Cir., 139 F.2d 591, 595, the court called attention to the specific 
provision in Rule 38(d), and said, `Failure to serve such a demand is a legal 
waiver, whether it is inadvertent or intentional.' This court has heretofore 
stated its thinking regarding the necessity of such service, having held in a 
proceeding for writ of prohibition that the failure to serve demand for jury 
precluded jury trial. State ex rel. 
Frederick v. District Court of Fifth Judicial District in and for County of Big 
Horn, Wyo., 399 P.2d 583, 586, 12 A.L.R.3d 1." (Emphasis added.)

We have also 
held that the trial court was justified in refusing to honor a jury demand where 
it was not accompanied by the fee, Davidek v. Wyoming Investment Company, 
77 Wyo. 141, 308 P.2d 941 (1957), and a late demand constitutes waiver of the 
right to trial by jury, Baldwin v. 
McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 P. 27 (1916).

[¶20.]  We reiterate, then, that failure to 
properly serve a jury demand and the failure to deposit the fee constitute a 
waiver of the right to a jury trial.

Abuse of 
Discretion? (The Pro-se 
Litigant)

[¶21.]  Notwithstanding the aforesaid rules of 
waiver applicable to jury trials, the appellant argues that, for the district 
court to have refused to give effect to the jury demand was an abuse of 
discretion under Rule 39(b), W.R.C.P. This rule provides:

"Trial by jury or by the 
court.

* * * * * *

"(b) By the court. - Issues not demanded for 
trial by jury as provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; but, 
notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in which 
such a demand might have been made of right, the court in its discretion upon 
motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues."

[¶22.]  The burden of appellant's argument under 
this contention is that, since he was a pro-se litigant and did not know or 
understand the rules, it was an abuse of the court's discretion not to make room 
for his inadequacies and grant the jury trial notwithstanding his inadvertent 
waiver of this right. The appellant cites no authority for treating a pro-se 
litigant any different than any other litigant.

[¶23.]  A pro-se litigant will be granted no 
greater right than any other litigant and he must expect and receive

"* * * the same treatment 
as if represented by an attorney." Suchta 
v. O.K. Rubber Welders, Inc., Wyo., 386 P.2d 931, 933 (1963), citing Morgan v. Sylvester, D.C.N.Y., 125 F. Supp. 380, aff'd 220 F.2d 758 (2 Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 867, 76 S. Ct. 112, 100 L. Ed. 768, reh. denied 350 U.S. 919, 76 S. Ct. 201, 100 L. Ed. 805; Monastero v. Los Angeles Transit Company, 
131 Cal. App. 2d 156, 160-161, 280 P.2d 187 (1955).

[¶24.]  A party will not be permitted to benefit 
from his failure to employ counsel, Suchta v. O.K. Rubber Welders Inc., 
supra. To treat the pro-se litigant differently or to accommodate his 
refusal to employ counsel would be to unjustly reward his ignorance. This 
thought was expressed in Lombardi v. 
Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank of Los Angeles, 137 Cal. App. 2d 206, 289 P.2d 823 (1955), where the court said:

"A litigant has a right 
to act as his own attorney, Gray v. 
Justice's Court, 18 Cal. App. 2d 420, 63 P.2d 1160, `but, in so doing, should 
be restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as is required of 
those qualified to practice law before our courts; otherwise, ignorance is 
unjustly rewarded.' Knapp v. Fleming, 
127 Colo. 414, 258 P.2d 489; Monastero v. Los Angeles Transit Co., 
131 Cal. App. 2d 156, 160-161, 280 P.2d 187." 289 P.2d  at 824.

[¶25.]  We reiterated these various concepts in 
Johnson v. Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Company of Hartford, Connecticut, Wyo., 630 P.2d 514, 517 (1981), where we 
said: 

"Appellant represented 
himself in this matter. One has the right to appear pro se; but when a person 
chooses to do so, he must be held to the same standard as if he were represented 
by counsel. He cannot expect the court or the attorneys for other parties to 
present his case. He cannot be given an advantage by virtue of his pro se 
appearance, and he cannot be placed at a disadvantage thereby - other than 
whatever disadvantage results from his decision to proceed without the 
assistance of counsel. Stanton v. 
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 25 Wyo. 138, 165 P. 993 (1917), reh. denied 25 
Wyo. 138, 167 P. 709 (1917); Suchta v. 
O.K. Rubber Welders, Inc., Wyo., 386 P.2d 931 (1963)."

[¶26.]  Given these holdings, this court stands 
firmly committed to a rule which says that we will not apply different 
procedural standards for pro-se litigants than we do for those who come to court 
represented by an attorney. There was, therefore, no abuse when, in the exercise 
of his Rule 39(b) discretion, the judge refused to give the pro-se appellant a 
jury trial, when the appellant's reason for urging the exercise of favorable 
judicial discretion was that the appellant failed to deposit a jury fee and 
failed to serve his jury demand upon the opposing party for the reason that he 
was unfamiliar with the requirements in these respects.

Trial by Jury 
Inviolate (A Criminal 
Case?)

[¶27.]  The appellant further argues his 
jury-trial contention through the assertion of a deprivation of his Art. 1, § 9, 
Wyoming constitutional right. This provision of our Constitution 
says:

"Trial by jury 
inviolate.

"The right of trial by 
jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases * * *."

[¶28.]  The appellant has not been charged with a 
crime in this case and its outcome may not include criminal sanctions or 
punishment against the appellant. We are here involved with a civil matter - 
namely, the termination of parental rights and this litigation may not be 
interpreted as a "criminal case" in order that Art. 1, § 9 of the Wyoming 
Constitution will be permitted to come to the appellant's rescue for the purpose 
of insuring a jury trial. An examination of the appellant's authorities shows 
that they are all distinguishable from the facts and the law of this case. The 
appellant seems to fantasize that he has been charged with violations of 
criminal statutes § 14-3-101 and § 14-3-102, W.S. 1977, (repealed and now 
reappearing as § 6-4-403, W.S. 1977, 1983 Replacement)3 in order to fortify his contention 
that he stands exposed to the criminal sanctions provided for in § 14-3-103, 
W.S. 1977 (repealed and now reappearing in § 6-4-403, W.S. 1977, 1983 
Replacement).4 This argument fails under the 
disclosure that, while the statutes upon which he relies are indeed criminal in 
character, the appellant is, nevertheless, not charged with their violation and 
therefore is not subject to the penalties contemplated by § 14-3-103, W.S. 1977 
(now § 6-4-403, 1983 Replacement.)

[¶29.]  In Robertson v. Apuzzo, 170 Conn. 367, 365 A.2d 824, cert. denied 429 U.S. 852, 97 S. Ct. 142, 50 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976), where 
the appellant was charged with being the putative father, it was urged that the 
proceeding was criminal in nature, i.e., "quasi criminal," and thus the indigent 
defendant who could not pay a $100 jury fee had been deprived of his 
constitutional rights of due process when his jury demand was 
rejected.

[¶30.]  In holding that a bastardy proceeding, 
under the Connecticut statutes, was civil rather than criminal in nature, the 
court observed that the maintenance of a bastard child was sui generis, 
characterized altogether in the nature of a civil suit. The court noted that the 
general rules pertaining to a civil suit are applicable; the action can be 
prosecuted by an individual without joining the state; no punishment can be 
inflicted; the process is not criminal in nature; the end of the law is to 
redress a civil injury; and there is no public wrong to be remedied.

[¶31.]  All of the above reasons for holding the 
Connecticut bastardy proceedings to be civil in nature are equally applicable to 
parental-rights termination proceedings under the relevant Wyoming 
statutes.

[¶32.]  For these reasons, the appellant's 
arguments, to the effect that the criminal nature of the proceedings or the 
possibility of the enforcement of a termination-of-paternity order through a 
contempt citation gives him a constitutional right to a jury trial, are without 
foundation.

Due Process and the 
Jury-Fee Question (The 
Fundamental-Fairness Concept)

[¶33.]  It is further urged that, even though a 
defendant in a civil action does not have a constitutional right to a jury 
trial, given the fact that we are here involved in parental-termination 
proceedings, and it being settled law that the parent/child relationship 
structures fundamental rights, DS v. 
Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, supra, 607 P.2d 911, 
the fundamental-fairness characteristics of due process were violated when the 
judge refused to exercise his discretion in favor of granting a jury trial when 
that authority was available by rule.

[¶34.]  This due-process argument was made in 
heretofore discussed Robertson v. 
Apuzzo, supra, 365 A.2d 824, a bastardy proceeding where a Connecticut 
statute was under scrutiny. There, the defendant was indigent and could not pay 
the jury fee. Having held bastardy proceedings to be civil in nature, the 
court's decision goes on to comport with the notion that due process is, 
nevertheless, not denied, in a bastardy proceeding, where a jury trial is waived 
(whether intentionally or inadvertently) and the court thereafter refuses to 
exercise discretion in favor of reinstating the jury demand. The rationale for 
this result is that the defendant is rendered such process as is due when his 
case is tried by the court without a jury.

[¶35.]  In these due-process respects, the 
appellant makes the following argument:

[¶36.]  In view of this court's decision that the 
right to associate with one's family is a fundamental right under Art. 1, §§ 2, 
6, 7 and 36 of the Wyoming Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the 
Federal Constitution (DS v. Department of 
Public Assistance and Social Services, supra), due process of law prohibits 
a state from denying a defendant a trial by jury solely because he or she is 
indigent and cannot pay a jury fee. In support of this contention, the appellant 
relies upon Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371, 91 S. Ct. 780, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971), where the Court held that an 
indigent plaintiff could not be denied access to the courts in a divorce action 
simply because he could not afford a filing fee. In United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 
442, 93 S. Ct. 631, 636, 34 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1973), Justice Blackmun, writing for the 
Court and discussing Boddie, supra, 
said:

"Boddie was based on the 
notion that a State cannot deny access simply because of one's poverty to a 
`judicial proceeding [that is] the only 
effective means of resolving the dispute at hand.'" (Emphasis added.) 409 U.S.  at 443, 93 S. Ct.  at 637.

[¶37.]  In Boddie, the Court said:

"* * * a cost 
requirement, valid on its face, may offend due process because it operates to 
foreclose a particular party's opportunity to be heard. The State's obligations 
under the Fourteenth Amendment are not simply generalized ones; rather, the 
State owes to each individual that process which, in light of the values of a 
free society, can be characterized as due." 401 U.S.  at 380, 91 S. Ct.  at 
787.

The Court also 
stated that,

"* * * given the basic 
position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and 
the concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this 
relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of 
inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial 
dissolution of their marriages." 401 U.S.  at 374, 91 S. Ct.  at 784.

[¶38.]  In holding that the denial of the 
indigent's access by reason of his inability to pay a filing fee was denial of 
due process, the Court was careful to observe:

"* * * The legitimacy of the State's monopoly over 
techniques of final dispute settlement, even where some are denied access to its 
use, stands unimpaired where recognized, effective alternatives for the 
adjustment of differences remain." (Emphasis added.) 401 U.S.  at 375-376, 91 S. Ct.  at 785.

[¶39.]  The court then addressed itself to two 
important due-process principles - namely, the citizen's meaningful opportunity 
to be heard and the fact that a rule or statute may be constitutionally valid on 
its face but invalid when applied in those circumstances when it operates to 
deprive an individual of a protected right although its general validity as a 
measure enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond 
question.

[¶40.]  Of the first principle - the meaningful 
opportunity to be heard - the Court observed that it had long been the law 
that

"* * * `[w]herever one is 
assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend.' Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 [23 L. Ed. 914] (1876)." 401 U.S.  at 377, 91 S. Ct.  at 785. (See 401 U.S.  at 377, 91 S. Ct.  at 785 for other citations.)

The Court went 
on to say that the constitution does require - as it contemplates due process 
-

"* * * `an opportunity . . . granted at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,' Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 
[85 S. Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62] (1965) (emphasis added), `for [a] hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case,' Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 
supra [339 U.S. 306] at 313 [70 S. Ct. 652 at 657, 94 L. Ed. 865]. The 
formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the 
importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent 
proceedings. That the hearing required by due process is subject to waiver, and 
is not fixed in form does not affect its root requirement that an individual be 
given an opportunity for a hearing before 
he is deprived of any significant property interest, except for 
extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that 
justifies postponing the hearing until after the event. In short, `within the 
limits of practicability,' id., at 318 [70 S. Ct.  at 659], a State must afford to 
all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the 
promise of the Due Process Clause." 401 U.S.  at 378-379, 91 S. Ct.  at 
786.

 

[¶41.]  We have held that a fair judicial system 
requires notice and an opportunity to defend. State ex rel. Blonder v. Goodbrod, 77 
Wyo. 126, 307 P.2d 1073, 1075 (1957). We said in White v. Board of Trustees of Western 
Wyoming Community College District, Wyo., 648 P.2d 528, 535 
(1982):

"What procedures 
constitute due process have been frequently discussed by the United States 
Supreme Court. In fact it has concluded that:

"`Before a person is 
deprived of a protected interest, he must be afforded opportunity for some kind 
of a hearing, "except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental 
interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the 
event." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 [91 S. Ct. 780, 786, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113]. "While `[m]any controversies 
have raged about * * * the Due Process Clause,' * * * it is fundamental that 
except in emergency situations (and this is not one) due process requires that 
when a State seeks to terminate [a protected] interest * * *, it must afford 
`notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' 
before the termination becomes effective." Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 [91 S. Ct. 1586, 1591, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90]. * * *' Board of Regents of State Colleges v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570, fn. 7, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705, fn. 7, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 
(1972)."

[¶42.]  The deprivation of due process found to 
be present in Boddie is not present in the case at bar. Here, the jury fee was 
not paid by the presumed-indigent respondent but he was not thereby denied 
access to the courts as was the divorce plaintiff in Boddie. In that case, the 
plaintiff could not get into court without the fee. Here, LP was in court after 
having waived his statutory right to a jury trial, the consequence of which did 
not, however, deprive him of his right to fully litigate his claim before a 
competent fact-finder. Therefore he was furnished the required due-process 
hearing before deprivation of his fundamental liberty to associate with his 
family was imposed.

[¶43.]  We hold, then, that the right to a jury 
trial in a parental-termination action cannot be characterized as fundamental. 
Neither the Federal nor the State Constitutions secure a jury trial in this 
civil action. The Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution is not 
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and is not applicable to state court 
proceedings. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160, 93 S. Ct. 2448, 2454, 37 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1973); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93, 
23 L. Ed. 678 (1875); State v. Palko, 
122 Conn. 529, 191 A. 320, 326, aff'd, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288, 
overruled in part, on other grounds, in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793, 
89 S. Ct. 2056, 2061, 23 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1937). Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338, 335 A.2d 670, 675 (1975).

[¶44.]  LP, in the case at bar, has been 
furnished the "meaningful opportunity to be heard" which the Boddie case 
requires. It was said in McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 91 S. Ct. 1976, 1985, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647 
(1971):

"* * * [O]ne cannot say 
that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate 
factfinding. * * * Juries are not required, and have not been, for example, in 
equity cases, in workmen's compensation, in probate or in deportation 
cases."

[¶45.]  Unlike the situation in Boddie, the appellant here can point to 
no fundamental interest which he has lost by reason of the unavailability of a 
jury to hear his case. His constitutional position has not been altered or 
affected by the court's refusal to grant the jury demand, it having been waived 
in the first instance. His case was heard by a competent fact-finder and for the 
reasons set out herein, the trial court did not err in denying the appellant a 
jury trial.

ISSUE NO. 2

The Refusal to Order a 
Physical Examination of GP

[¶46.]  The appellee alleges that appellant 
abused GP, his eight-year-old daughter by having "sexual intercourse" with 
her.5 In buttressing his denial of this 
charge, LP, whose indigency had been acknowledged by the court, argues that it 
was error to refuse his request for funds with which to pay an expert witness to 
examine GP.

[¶47.]  The appellant's motion 
requested:

"Costs associated with 
the retention of a qualified physician to examine and test [SP] and [GP], to 
determine prior sexual activity, and to explain the physiological responses of 
children submitted to the types of incidences which are alleged in this case, 
and to explain other possibilities for any redness or abnormal condition of the 
vaginal area as alleged in this case."

Following oral 
argument, the trial court denied appellant's motion.

[¶48.]  It was LP's contention that even though § 
14-3-202(a)(ii) defined "abuse" to include "the commission * * * of a sexual 
offense against a child," he had a right to defend against the specific 
allegation of having had "sexual intercourse" since this is the sexual offense 
which DPASS said it was going to prove, and its answers to interrogatories did 
not indicate reliance upon any other type of abusive conduct as having been 
visited by LP upon his daughter, GP. It was the respondent's theory that a 
physical examination of the young girl would reveal whether the hymen had been 
ruptured,

"* * * and if not, the 
significance of that physical evidence to the respondent's defense; that is, 
that if the hymen were not broken, the allegations of the petitioner would be 
shown to be a virtual impossibility."

[¶49.]  At the time of the trial of the issues in 
this case, the attorney for DPASS called Nancy Clizbe Johnson, who was employed 
at the Wyoming State Children's Home when LP's children were in that 
institution's care. At one point in the proceedings, this witness 
testified:

"* * * [S]he [GP] also 
told me she had done it before with [LP]. She stated that in February of 1980 on 
a Saturday when her mother was at work, sometime in the evening [LP] made her 
come to his bedroom and he took her nightgown off and that he pulled down his 
pants, and she stated that he stuck his thing in her. She said it hurt a little, 
and she didn't like it, she also said that it happened again, I believe, the 
next day, and that her mother had caught him, and that was when her mother, 
[SP], had kicked [LP] out of the house."

[¶50.]  On the other hand, GP testified that LP 
never hurt her, and that he spanked her once "on the bottom." Nancy Johnson also 
testified that GP had told her that no one had ever touched her in the vaginal 
area as it would hurt and that she knew a lot about sex.

[¶51.]  The condition of the record with respect 
to the sexual abuse which LP is alleged to have visited upon GP is that Nancy 
Johnson testified that GP told her (1) that LP had "sexual intercourse" with her 
on two occasions, and (2) that no one had ever touched her in the vaginal 
area.

[¶52.]  Assuming for purposes of discussion that 
this inconsistent testimony is admissible, over hearsay objection, it behooves 
this court to accept as true the evidence of the successful party, leave out of 
consideration the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and 
give the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may 
fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom. DS v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, supra. This means that we must approach the issue raised by 
the court's denial of the motion to have GP examined from the point of view that 
the only evidence which we may consider is to the effect that LP in fact twice 
had sexual intercourse with GP.

[¶53.]  In furtherance of respondent-appellant's 
contention that the court should have made funds available for an examination of 
GP, Dr. Krause, who is an associate professor with the University of Wyoming 
Family Practice Training Center, was called. His qualifications were not 
questioned and he testified as follows:

"Q. Do you have an 
opinion as to whether the hymeneal ring in an eight year-old girl would be 
broken if an adult male had sexual intercourse with her?

"MISS THORNTON: 
Objection, lack of foundation.

"THE COURT: I will 
overrule the objection. * * *

"A. Yes, I have an 
opinion.

"Q. And what is that 
opinion?

"A. The opinion would be 
that there would be evidence of injury in an 8-year old girl if an adult male 
had intercourse, sexual intercourse with her.

"Q. And what type of 
injury would that be?

"A. There would be injury 
to the hymeneal ring.

"Q. Okay. Do you have an 
opinion as to whether a physical examination of that same girl would reveal that 
injury?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And do you have an 
opinion - what is that opinion?

"A. That the injury would 
be evidence.

"Q. Okay. Do you have an 
opinion as to whether a physical examination of that same girl three years later 
would reveal if the hymeneal ring had been injured?

"A. It would still be 
evidence."

[¶54.]  There was no impeachment of this 
testimony and therefore this record as regards GP stands for the following 
proposition: The allegation of abuse with which LP stands charged is having 
"sexual intercourse" with his eight-year-old daughter - that an examination 
could have shown that the child had never had "sexual intercourse." From this, 
LP argues that - if it is true, as Dr. Krause says, that prior "sexual 
intercourse" could have been detected at the time of the requested examination, 
then it follows that the denial of the respondent's motion resulted in 
foreclosing his defense from such evidence as could have exonerated him of the 
abuse which it is alleged he committed against GP. In these circumstances, the 
respondent concludes that this denial resulted in a violation of his 
constitutional rights of due process. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 2202, 68 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1981), and Bowen v. Eyman, D.Ariz., 324 F. Supp. 339 (1970), discussed in detail infra.

[¶55.]  It was the guardian ad litem's position 
at the hearing on the motion that

(a) "the examination 
would be emotionally and psychologically dangerous and/or damaging to the 
child," and

(b) "that an exam would 
be improper because the physical condition of GP was not in controversy."6

[¶56.]  The appellant, in reply, relied upon Rule 
35, W.R.C.P.,7 asserting that GP was either a 
party or the "person in the custody or under the legal control of a party 
[DPASS],"

"* * * and that the 
allegations of DPASS with respect to [GP]'s prior sexual conduct with the 
respondent and the respondent's denial of such sexual conduct, placed her 
physical condition in controversy."8

[¶57.]  There was no showing in this record that 
the emotional or psychological effect of an examination would be damaging to the 
child, and it is true as asserted by LP that the physical condition of GP ("a 
person in the custody or under the legal control of a party," i.e., DPASS) was 
in controversy within the meaning of Rule 35, W.R.C.P., supra n. 7.

[¶58.]  The appellee bases its entire 
medico-physical fact argument on authorities which hold that proof of rape can 
be accomplished by showing the physical condition of the victim soon after the 
outrage,

"* * * although evidence 
of the physical condition of the prosecutrix several months after the commission 
of the offense has been held too remote to throw light on the issues in the 
case." 65 Am Jur 2d, Rape § 63, p. 797.

[¶59.]  The appellee relies upon such statutory 
authority as is exemplified by § 6-2-309(f), W.S. 1977, which 
provides:

"If a report of the 
alleged sexual assault is received more than ten (10) days after the alleged 
incident, the medical examination shall not be mandatory."

The quoted 
American Jurisprudence 2d rule and the statute simply identify the time 
limitations beyond which medical evidence from the usual rape victim becomes 
remote and thus so speculative that it no longer accomplishes the purpose for 
which it was designed. These doctrines are intended to protect the rape 
defendant from testimony which is elicited through unreliable medical evidence 
and it can hardly be said that they are calculated to serve as a bar to the 
citizen accused from pursuing exonerating evidence which, in turn, insures his 
receiving such fair trial as is contemplated by the due-process clauses of the 
federal and state constitutions. The constitutional aspects of these rights are 
highlighted when it is remembered that this court has held that the right to 
associate with one's family and to have custody of a minor child is a 
fundamental right, DS v. Department of 
Public Assistance and Social Services, supra. Due-process considerations 
are, therefore, paramount in a termination-of-parental-rights 
proceeding.

[¶60.]  But, we think that the appellee misses 
the entire point for which the appellant contends. The logic of appellant's 
request must necessarily lie in the existence or nonexistence of acknowledged 
medical facts as tested against known and accepted medical and legal 
propositions. The appellee's objection to the physical examination must be able 
to overcome any such facts and assumptions.

[¶61.]  The medical propositions are these: If 
it is a medical fact that the hymen of an eight-year-old girl would necessarily 
be torn or ruptured by "sexual intercourse" (as that term is contemplated in law) and 
would not repair itself either at any time at all or, at least, in the period of 
time between the alleged intrusions and the examination, then the presence and 
condition of the child's hymen and the associated area is tellingly relevant to 
LP's defense to the charge of having had sexual intercourse with her. This would 
be so because, if, upon examination, the hymen were found to be intact and the 
expert testimony was that this could not be its condition had "sexual 
intercourse" occurred, and if it were further to be shown that "sexual 
intercourse" in medicine and "sexual intercourse" in law mean the same thing, 
then the factfinder would be forced to the conclusion that the accused had not 
engaged in intercourse with the girl - an exonerating conclusion. On the other 
hand, if it were shown to be a medical fact that a child's vagina could have been penetrated through 
"sexual intercourse" without leaving evidence of rupture of the hymen tissues - 
and an examination were to find the hymen without rupture or tear - then the 
examination would not necessarily 
prove favorable to the accused. The third possibility is that the medical 
testimony might be that the hymen could be found to be ruptured but that this 
could occur through some trauma or intrusion other than intercourse.

[¶62.]  However, of these three possibilities, 
the respondent argues that it would clearly be weighty, in behalf of his defense 
to the accusation that he had abused GP by having intercourse with her, if 
medical evidence were to show that

(a) "sexual intercourse," 
as described by Dr. Krause, could not have occurred without the hymen being 
ruptured, no matter how long after the event, and

(b) the hymen was still 
in place and without rupture as long as a year or two after the alleged 
intrusion.

[¶63.]  Due process requires expenditure of 
public monies for tests performed by a defense expert where those tests could 
exclude a defendant as the guilty party. Bowen v. Eyman, supra, 324 F. Supp. 339. 
In Bowen, the court said:

"Petitioner, an indigent, 
was tried and convicted of rape and robbery. Prior to trial, he moved, without 
success, for a court-appointed expert to test the seminal fluid removed from the 
vaginal tract of the victim and petitioner's blood for the purpose of excluding 
petitioner as the perpetrator of the rape. That a comparison of the blood types could 
have negated guilt is not disputed herein and is supported by ample 
authority. See, e.g., State v. 
Bowen, supra [104 Ariz. 138, 449 P.2d] at 605; People v. Kemp, 55 Cal. 2d 458, 359 P.2d 913, 924, 11 Cal. Rptr. 361, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 932, 82 S. Ct. 359, 7 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1961); see also 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 165a-b (3d ed. 1940).

"Cases concerning the 
right to a court-appointed expert at public expense are few in number, but, on 
various constitutional grounds, courts have increasingly recognized such a 
right. E.g., Davis v. United States, 
413 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1969) (dictum); Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876, 87 S. Ct. 153, 17 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1966); Bush v. McCullom, 231 F. Supp. 560 
(N.D.Tex. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965); People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966); State v. Second Jud. 
Dist. Ct., 85 Nev. 241, 453 P.2d 421 (1969); State v. Green, 55 N.J. 13, 258 A.2d 889 
(1969); see Report of Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the 
Administration of Criminal Justice 12 (1963). In the Court's view, `fundamental 
fairness' is the touchstone, i.e., whether or not a defendant is entitled to a 
court-appointed expert depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. And there can be no doubt that in this case, 
where tests could have been run which might have excluded petitioner as the 
guilty party, fundamental fairness was not accorded the petitioner in refusing 
to appoint an expert. See People v. 
Bynon, 146 Cal. App. 2d 7, 303 P.2d 75 (1956). Furthermore, since the state 
could have tested petitioner's blood as well as the fluid extracted from the 
victim's vagina, see, e.g., Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514 (9th 
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 966, 90 S. Ct. 1001, 25 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1970), 
and thus itself excluded petitioner as the rapist, its refusal to run the tests 
is tantamount to a suppression of evidence such as there was in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and a deprivation of due process. Accordingly, the 
Court holds that petitioner was denied due process of law by the trial court's 
failure to grant his motion to appoint an expert at state expense to perform 
blood tests or by the state's failure to independently conduct such tests." 
(Emphasis added.) 324 F. Supp.  at 340.

[¶64.]  In Little v. Streater, supra, 452 U.S.  at 
12, 101 S. Ct.  at 2208 (where in paternity litigation the putative, indigent 
father was refused costs for blood tests), Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a 
unanimous Court, said:

"* * * [I]t [the denial of the blood test] in 
effect forecloses what is potentially a conclusive means for an indigent 
defendant to surmount that disparity and exonerate himself. Such a practice is 
irreconcilable with the command of the Due Process Clause." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶65.]  In Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services, 452 U.S. 18, 24-25, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2158-2159, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 
(1981), the United States Supreme Court observed:

"For all its consequence, 
`due process' has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined. 
`[U]nlike some legal rules,' this Court has said, due process `is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and 
circumstances,' Cafeteria Workers v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230, 81 S. Ct. 1743 [1748]. Rather, 
the phrase expresses the requirement of `fundamental fairness,' a requirement 
whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty. Applying the Due 
Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what 
`fundamental fairness' consists of in a particular situation by first 
considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests 
that are at stake."

The respondent 
argues that his case is like Bowen v. 
Eyman, supra, and Little v. 
Streater, supra, where, as announced in Bowen, the rule is:

"* * * [W]here tests 
could have been run which might have excluded petitioner as the guilty party, 
fundamental fairness was not accorded the petitioner in refusing to appoint an 
expert." 324 F. Supp.  at 340.

and its refusal 
to run the test (according to Bowen v. 
Eyman, supra),

"* * * is tantamount to a 
suppression of evidence such as there was in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) and a deprivation of due process." 324 F. Supp.  at 
340.

[¶66.]  The rule of Bowen and Little would apply 
in the case at bar only if the test could have exonerated the respondent from 
the charge of having sexual intercourse with his daughter, GP.

[¶67.]  The question for decision is: Would the 
examination have exonerated LP had the hymen been found to be intact? We think 
it would not have exonerated him and therefore his due-process rights were not 
violated.

[¶68.]  We hold that the court did not commit 
error when it held that the State would not pay for the medical examination in 
question.

[¶69.]  The key to the solution lies in our 
interpreting the meaning of the term "sexual intercourse," because the abuse 
with which LP is charged is having "sexual intercourse" with GP. In answer to 
the question,

"Do you have an opinion 
as to whether the hymeneal ring in an eight year-old girl would be broken if an 
adult male had sexual intercourse with her?",

Dr. Krause said 
he did have an opinion and that his opinion would be

"* * * that there would 
be evidence of injury in an 8-year old girl if an adult male had intercourse, 
sexual intercourse with her."

[¶70.]  It is, of course, evident beyond 
contradiction that the answer presupposes contact between the male penis and the 
female hymen. In other words, the doctor's answer, in a medical context, assumes 
such penetration as would result in contact with that membrane or at least the 
area where the hymeneal ring is located in the body of GP. It is true that, in 
order that "sexual intercourse" be effected in the legal sense there must be 
penetration "of the genital organs of the female." State v. Hines, 79 Wyo. 65, 74, 331 P.2d 605 (1958). However, "sexual intercourse" within the contemplation of this rule 
of law does not necessarily assume that degree of penetration which is 
contemplated by the medical testimony in this case. It was said in State v. Murry, 277 N.C. 197, 176 S.E.2d 738, 742 (1970):

"`The terms "carnal 
knowledge" and "sexual intercourse" are synonymous. There is "carnal knowledge" 
or "sexual intercourse" in a legal sense if there is the slightest penetration 
of the sexual organ of the female by the sexual organ of the male. It is not 
necessary that the vagina be entered or that the hymen be ruptured; the entering 
of the vulva or labia is sufficient. G.S. § 14-23; State v. Monds, 130 N.C. 697, 41 S.E. 789; State v. Hargrave, 65 N.C. 466; 
State v. Storkey, 63 N.C. 7; Burdick: 
Law of Crime, section 477; 44 Am.Jur., Rape, section 3; 52 C.J., Rape, sections 
23, 24.' State v. Bowman, 232 N.C. 
374, 61 S.E.2d 107; State v. Jones, 
249 N.C. 134, 105 S.E.2d 513."

See to the same 
effect Walker v. State, 197 Tenn. 
452, 273 S.W.2d 707 (1954), citing and quoting the North Carolina Supreme Court 
in State v. Bowman, 232 N.C. 374, 61 S.E.2d 107, 108 (1950).

[¶71.]  In State v. Wilson, 32 Wyo. 37, 228 P. 803 
(1924), where the defendant was charged with an assault with intent to have 
carnal knowledge (intercourse), we held that penetration "though to no 
particular depth" must be proved, thereby holding with the sense of the 
previously quoted cases to the effect that it is possible, in law, to have 
carnal knowledge ("sexual intercourse") given the slightest degree of 
penetration. This means that a man charged with having sexual intercourse with a 
female child could, in the legal sense, accomplish the act without doing such 
violence to the hymeneal ring as was contemplated by the testimony of Dr. 
Krause.

[¶72.]  We again acknowledged the aforesaid legal 
definition of "sexual intercourse" when we approved, in Kennedy v. State, Wyo., 470 P.2d 372, 
376 (1970) the following instruction in a rape case:

"`YOU ARE INSTRUCTED 
there is "carnal knowledge" if there is the slightest penetration of the sexual 
organ of the female by the sexual organ of the male. It is not necessary that 
the vagina be entered; the entering of the vulva or labia is sufficient. Proof 
of emission is not required.'"

[¶73.]  We are, then, brought to this 
conclusion:

[¶74.]  The trial court did not err in denying 
respondent's motion for costs to examine GP because even if the examination 
would have revealed no rupture or trauma to the hymeneal area - a factor which 
would serve to deny sexual intercourse under Dr. Krause's medical testimony - from the legal point of view, this 
physical evidence would not mean that the respondent had not engaged in sexual 
intercourse with GP.

[¶75.]  Sexual intercourse, as defined in law, 
can be accomplished with less penetration than that degree to which Dr. Krause 
testified, and therefore the examination would not have absolved the respondent 
of having had sexual intercourse with GP.

ISSUE NO. 3

The Refusal of the Trial 
Court to Allow Testimony Concerning Appellee's Pre-Termination 
Procedures

[¶76.]  This portion of the appeal raises 
questions concerning tendered but rejected offer-of-proof testimony to the 
effect that DPASS failed to comply with its own procedural rules in deciding to 
seek termination of appellant's parental rights.

[¶77.]  At trial, the attorney for appellant 
sought to elicit from Kathleen Petersen, a family community services specialist 
with Natrona County DPASS, testimony concerning the usual procedural process 
followed by the agency in terminating parental rights. Upon objection by 
appellee's attorney, the trial court excluded this line of questioning for the 
reason that the testimony was not relevant to the issues. Appellant's attorney 
then made the following offer of proof:

"MR. HENLEY: Your Honor, 
we would like to make an offer of proof on this. We would ask Mrs. Petersen if 
D-PASS had a usual procedure by which they terminate parental rights, she would 
have responded, yes, when part of that procedure was having what is called a 
parental permanency -

"MISS THORNTON: 
Permanency Planning Team meeting. 

"MR. HENLEY: Planning 
Team meeting, and we would have asked Mrs. Petersen what the Permanency Planning 
Team meeting was all about, she would have stated they had reviewed the records 
of D-PASS, we would have asked who was on the Permanency Planning Team, we 
believe she would have answered that at least one person from outside the agency 
was on the Permanency Planning Team. We would have asked why that person was on 
the Permanency Planning Team, we believe that she would have answered that it 
operated, that person operated as an internal control, and as a check on the 
system, and in the reviewing of the records to make sure that obvious 
discrepancies, obvious misstatements of fact were not considered by the Agency 
when they made the decision to terminate, and that that individual person would 
also have been on the Permanency Planning Team and could have pointed out other 
causes for particular behaviors, which are evidenced in the children, which 
might influence the Permanency Planning Team's decision to terminate our 
client's rights. We would have asked if a Permanency Planning Team meeting were 
held in this case, we believe she would have answered that there was not one 
held. And that is our offer of proof."

It is 
appellant's position that the offered testimony was relevant to show whether 
certain constitutional protections had been abridged by DPASS in reaching its 
decision to terminate his parental rights. Appellant asserts that the failure of 
Natrona County DPASS to abide by its regular termination procedures would 
constitute a violation of his rights to due process and equal protection under 
the United States and Wyoming Constitutions.

[¶78.]  The procedural rules to which appellant 
has reference were not made a part of this record, but we are entitled to take 
judicial notice of them. Yeik v. 
Department of Revenue and Taxation, Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 (1979). We obtained 
from the Wyoming Department of Health and Social Services a copy of Volume III 
of the Social Services Manual containing those provisions which, at the time 
pertinent here, were relevant to foster care services for children. In addition, 
we obtained from the Secretary of State10 a certified copy of Chapter V, 
entitled Foster Care, of the rules and regulations adopted by the State 
Department of Health and Social Services, which rules went into effect on 
November 17, 1982, after Natrona County DPASS had filed its petition to 
terminate appellant's parental rights.

[¶79.]  Section 1076.31 of Volume III of the 
Social Services Manual (July, 1981 revision) contains the following directive 
with respect to periodic reviews of children in foster care:

[¶80.]  "1076.31 Contacts and Reviews

"Continuing services to 
children in foster care include at least monthly contact with the child, ongoing 
effort to work with the natural parents so long as parental rights have not been 
terminated. Review of the progress of the child in foster care and progress 
towards the goals established in the case plan developed at placement * * * 
should be made at six-month intervals for foster care. Six-month reviews shall 
be made in the format of a staffing and shall include at least one person who is 
not responsible for the case management of or the delivery of services to the 
child or the parents. The review shall be open to the participation of the 
parents and they should be notified in writing of the scheduled review. * * 
*"

Chapter V of the 
state DPASS rules and regulations provides for periodic reviews as 
follows:

"Section 11. Reviews.

"a. Each child in foster 
care shall be reviewed at six-month intervals. The review shall be conducted by 
a team including at least one person who is not responsible for the management 
or delivery of services to the child or parent. Parental participation in the 
review shall be sought. The review shall include:

"(1) Progress the child 
is making while in care.

"(2) Progress of parents 
toward reuniting the family.

"(3) Short-term goals for 
parents and child.

"(4) Long-term goals for 
reuniting family or developing a permanent plan for the child.

"b. A copy of each review 
shall be forwarded to SD-PASS and to the court of competent 
jurisdiction."

The manual 
provision is substantially similar to the subsequently promulgated agency rule. 
However, the rule was adopted pursuant to the rulemaking procedure set out in §§ 
16-3-102 through 16-3-104, W.S. 1977 of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act,11 whereas the manual provision was 
not subjected to this formal process.

[¶81.]  Under § 16-3-103, all administrative rules, other than 
interpretative rules or statements of general policy, are to be adopted in 
accordance with the rulemaking process set out in the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act.12 Thus, all rules which establish an 
agency's procedures must be duly adopted pursuant to § 16-3-103. In addition, § 
16-3-102(a)(i) directs agencies to adopt rules establishing informal as well as 
formal procedures available in connection with contested cases.13 When properly promulgated and 
adopted by an agency pursuant to statutory authority, such rules have the force 
and effect of law. Yeik v. Department of 
Revenue and Taxation, supra, 595 P.2d  at 968. 

[¶82.]  In compliance with §§ 16-3-102(a)(i) and 
16-3-103, supra, the state DPASS formally adopted review procedures for children 
in foster care. Prior to the date that these procedures became effective, 
however, the state DPASS had incorporated into its Social Services Manual 
similar procedures for review of children in foster care. Since the pertinent 
manual provision predated the formal adoption of the review process, the manual 
provision cannot be designated a "procedure" within the meaning of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act. This fact, however, is not determinative of the 
legal effect of the manual directive concerning review of children in foster 
care.

[¶83.]  In attempting to determine the legal 
effect of the pertinent manual provision, we must examine its content, impact 
and purpose. Section 1076.31, supra, announced an expanded review process in 
July, 1981,14 which process provided for the 
involvement of parents and persons outside of the agency. This new procedure 
required each county DPASS to set up properly constituted review teams and to 
solicit the participation of the parents. By updating its manual pending the 
adoption of the formal rules, the state agency furnished guidance to the county 
DPASS personnel, thereby enabling them to become accustomed to the new 
requirements.

[¶84.]  As a guideline to or an interpretation of 
the subsequently promulgated agency rules, the manual provision did not have the 
force of law and was not legally binding upon Natrona County DPASS. Schwartz, 
Administrative Law, § 59, pp. 160-161 (1976); 2 Davis, Administrative Law 
Treatise, § 7:21, pp. 99-105 (2d Ed. 1979). In reviewing a comparable agency 
directive, the Sixth Circuit in Modern 
Plastics Corporation v. McCulloch, 400 F.2d 14, 19 (6th Cir. 1968), held 
that a National Labor Relations Board statement of procedure was a "guideline" 
and, as such, did not bind the agency in a prehearing investigation:

"* * * [T]he statement of 
procedure is simply a guideline for Board personnel; it does not constitute 
formal rules or regulations that could appropriately serve as a standard binding 
the Board to a particular form of prehearing investigation in every 
case."

See also National Labor Relations Board v. Monsanto 
Chemical Company, 205 F.2d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1953). We hold, then, that 
Natrona County DPASS was not bound by the interpretative rule or guideline in 
the Social Services Manual, since the guideline was not the equivalent of a duly 
promulgated rule or regulation having the force of law. Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 
supra.

[¶85.]  Appellant asserts, however, that the 
failure of DPASS to follow its review procedures deprived him of his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. We cannot agree. 
Appellant was afforded a full trial before the district court. He received the 
assistance of an appointed counsel, and the State was required to prove the 
allegations against him by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, appellant was 
afforded all of the safeguards provided by Wyoming's parental-rights-termination 
statutes. These safeguards meet or exceed those mandated by constitutional due 
process. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 603 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Social 
Services, supra; DS v. Department of 
Public Assistance and Social Services, supra. Accordingly, we hold that the 
failure of DPASS to abide by the review provisions set out in the Social 
Services Manual was not a relevant issue in appellant's 
parental-rights-termination proceeding and the district court committed no error 
in refusing to allow such testimony.

ISSUES NOS. 4 THROUGH 
7

The Admissibility of the 
Evidence Under Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule

Records of the Wyoming 
State Children's Home

[¶86.]  During the trial, various records of the 
Wyoming State Children's Home, consisting of medical reports, progress notes 
made by the caseworkers, general observations by the houseparents, and behavior 
books containing the houseparents' notations of their daily observations of each 
child were received as evidence. These records were admitted into evidence 
pursuant to Rule 803(6), W.R.E., the hearsay exception for records of a 
regularly conducted activity. Rule 803(6) provides:

"The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness:

* * * * * *

"(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. 
- A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, 
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of 
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data 
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of 
preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term `business' as used in 
this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, 
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit; * * 
*."

[¶87.]  Appellant contends that the source of the 
information in the admitted records as well as the method and circumstances of 
their preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness and that, therefore, the 
records are inadmissible under Rule 803(6). Appellant points out that much of 
the factual information in the records was supplied by the children, rather than 
employees of the State Children's Home. Rule 803(6) permits records to be 
admitted into evidence only when each person who contributed to the preparation 
of the particular record acted in the routine of the business. United States v. Plum, 558 F.2d 568, 572 
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 441 U.S. 910; 4 Louisell and Mueller, Federal 
Evidence, § 446, p. 655 (1980).15 This requirement assures that the 
records are sufficiently trustworthy to be useful at trial. However, to the 
extent that the records were received to prove that the children actually made 
such statements, rather than to prove the truth of the matters asserted, the 
records retain the trustworthiness inherent in any regularly kept business 
records. United States v. Lieberman, 
637 F.2d 95, 99-101 (2nd Cir. 1980); Louisell and Mueller, supra, § 448, pp. 
683-684.

[¶88.]  The houseparents and caseworkers recorded 
in the regular course of their business the statements made by the children. 
These statements were recorded daily by the employees of the State Children's 
Home who had actually heard the children say the words. Therefore, the records 
admitted into evidence are competent to show the vocabulary of the children and 
the concepts they were able to articulate. We hold that, although the records 
were not sufficiently trustworthy to prove the truth of the children's 
statements contained therein (unless the statements are deemed trustworthy by 
reason of their falling within some other exception to the hearsay rule), the 
State Children's Home records were admissible to prove that the children 
actually made the statements. 

[¶89.]  Appellant further contends that the State 
Children's Home records are untrustworthy because they are incomplete. In 
particular, appellant points out that the behavior book covering March 1, 
through April 4, 1980, and the houseparents' book from November 24, 1981, to the 
end of the children's stay were not located. Furthermore, certain pages and 
portions of pages had been removed from the spiral notebooks.

[¶90.]  Without question, the complete records, 
unmarred by torn pages and missing segments, would have been more useful to the 
trial court than those records actually admitted. However, such discrepancies go 
to the weight rather than to the admissibility of the evidence. So long as the 
available records satisfied all of the safeguards set out in Rule 803(6), we 
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting them into 
evidence.

[¶91.]  In a related situation, the Seventh 
Circuit upheld the receipt of an appointment book against charges that 
nonsequential and possibly noncontemporaneous entries impugned the 
trustworthiness of the entire book. The court ruled that irregularities of this 
sort did not undermine the integrity of the records as a whole:

"* * * We do not however 
agree with the defendants that nonsequential entries preclude admissibility as 
business records. * * * As long as the entries satisfy the contemporaneity and 
regularity requirements, their sequence is irrelevant. * * * [T]here is no 
reason to require that an appointment calendar remain a `static document'; 
indeed as appointments and other matters change the calendar to be useful must 
be nonsequentially revised. The only requirement is that these revisions be 
contemporaneous and regular * * *. However, even if several of the entries were 
made non-contemporaneously, it remains within the district court's discretion to 
determine whether the few non-contemporaneous entries so undermine the 
reliability of the record as to preclude admissibility. Given that there were 
only fifteen non-sequential entries over a two year period, even if many of 
these were shown to be non-contemporaneous, we could not say that this 
discretion was abused." United States v. 
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1348-1349 (7th Cir. 1979).

[¶92.]  In the present case, the records of the 
State Children's Home which were admitted into evidence are substantially 
complete. The behavior books show regular entries from April 8, 1980, until 
December 18, 1981, when the children left the State Children's Home to live with 
foster families. The notebooks containing the house-mothers' general 
observations are complete from May 5, 1980, to August 3, 1981. Therefore, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the unavailability 
of some portions of the records failed to undermine the reliability of the 
records which were admitted.

[¶93.]  Finally, appellant contends that the 
houseparents' records were untrustworthy because no written rules or regulations 
governed the making of their notations. The houseparents were merely required to 
record daily their observations and the remarks made by the children. Appellant 
objects to the fact that the entries vary widely and were uncontrolled and 
unindexed. Rule 803(6) does not require that business records be prepared 
according to formal rules in order to be admissible. Regardless of the method of 
preparation, the records of a regular business are deemed reliable if they are 
made routinely for a serious and continuing purpose related to business 
activities apart from litigation. Louisell and Mueller, supra, § 446, at 647. 
Assuming, as we do, that the records in the present case assisted the State 
Children's Home personnel in meeting the continuing needs of those children in 
its care, we hold that the records were properly admitted under Rule 
803(6).

Hearsay Statements of 
GP

[¶94.]  At trial Nancy Johnson, the social 
services manager at the State Children's Home during the time relevant here, was 
permitted to testify that on April 21, 1980, GP said that appellant had sexual 
intercourse with her on two separate occasions in February, 1980. This evidence 
was offered and received under the "catch-all" exception to the hearsay 
doctrine, Rule 803(24), W.R.E. That rule provides:

"The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness:

* * * * * *

"(24) Other exceptions. - A statement not 
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) 
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general 
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be 
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the 
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to 
offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of 
the declarant."

[¶95.]  In Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 
(1981), this court considered the requirements for admissibility of hearsay 
evidence under Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E., which is identical to Rule 803(24). We 
observed that these catch-all exceptions were created to allow courts additional 
flexibility in admitting hearsay. We then went on to say:

"These exceptions are 
designed to allow trustworthy hearsay into evidence but only when it is both in 
fact worthy of trust and necessary to effectuate justice." 632 P.2d  at 
130.

Based on 
pertinent federal case law and our own reading of Rule 804(b)(6), we set out six 
requirements for admissibility:

"* * * First, the 
declarant must be unavailable. Second, the adverse party must either have been 
given pretrial notice or a sufficient opportunity to prepare for and contest the 
admission of the hearsay. Third, the truth of the matter asserted must be 
evidence of a material fact. Fourth, the hearsay statement must be more 
probative than any other evidence which could be procured through reasonable 
efforts. Fifth, and finally, the statement must be supported by circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness; this may be established either through other 
corroborating evidence or by considering the motivation and/or behavior pattern 
of the declarant." 632 P.2d  at 131-132.

[¶96.]  Only the fifth requirement - that the 
evidence be trustworthy - concerns us here. The first requirement is 
inapplicable since we are concerned with Rule 803(24) which permits the use of 
hearsay evidence even though the declarant is available as a witness. Appellant 
does not argue that the other conditions of Rule 803(24) were not met. His 
position is that the hearsay evidence lacks circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness since no corroborating evidence exists and since the behavior 
pattern of GP refutes the reliability of the testimony. We agree.

[¶97.]  The hearsay statement represents the only 
allegation in the record that appellant molested GP. GP testified at trial that 
LP had not hurt her and had never undressed her. Furthermore, the State 
Children's Home records indicate that GP had previously denied having sexual 
contact with appellant in an interview with Nancy Johnson on April 2, 1980. 
Indeed, the behavior books and progress notes prepared by the State Children's 
Home employees indicate a general pattern of inconsistent statements on the part 
of GP.

[¶98.]  The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Hinkson, 632 F.2d 382 
(4th Cir. 1980), upheld the trial court's exclusion of evidence offered under 
Rule 803(24), F.R.E., where the declarant had reason to prevaricate and there 
was no corroborating evidence:

"The only guarantee of 
trustworthiness is the fact that [the declarant's] alleged statement was 
self-inculpatory. But we deem that insignificant in view of the other evidence 
and lack of evidence. [The witness] testified that [the declarant] gloried in 
parading his motorcycle gang member image before his girlfriend's acquaintances. 
A claim that he killed [the victim], made to a relatively casual acquaintance 
hundreds of miles from the scene of the killing, would seem to be braggadocio. 
There was no physical evidence or testimonial evidence to support either the 
fact that [the declarant] made the statement or that it represented the truth." 
632 F.2d  at 386.

In similar 
fashion, the record in the instant case is devoid of those guarantees of 
trustworthiness which the rule requires.

[¶99.]  We are mindful of the principle that the 
degree of reliability necessary for admission is greatly reduced where the 
declarant is testifying and is subject to cross-examination. United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1350 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 833, 100 S. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 2d 43. This principle, however, is of no significance where, as here, the declarant 
GP testified that she did not remember discussing embarrassing topics with Nancy 
Johnson. Under such circumstances, effective cross-examination concerning the 
hearsay statement is impossible. See United States v. Swanson, 572 F.2d 523, 
528 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 849, 99 S. Ct. 152, 58 L. Ed. 2d 152. We 
hold, then, that the court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony of Nancy 
Johnson that LP engaged in sexual intercourse with GP. Such evidence could not 
properly be considered in terminating the parental rights of appellant with 
respect to GP.

Hearsay Statements of 
JP

[¶100.]            
Walter Murray, a deputy prosecutor for Natrona County, testified at trial 
that JP said that he saw appellant fondle the genital area of GP. Ellen Bea 
Spiva, foster parent to SP and JP after they left the State Children's Home, 
testified that JP said that while he, LP, LP's wife, and SP were naked, LP had 
lain on top of his wife and had encouraged JP to touch SP and LP's wife. This 
evidence was offered and received under the catch-all exception, Rule 803(24), 
supra. Appellant questions the trustworthiness of these out-of-court statements 
by JP, given the fact that JP testified at trial that appellant had had sexual 
intercourse with SP and then admitted on cross-examination that he had not seen 
this event but that someone at the State Children's Home had told him about it. 
Appellant further points out that expert medical testimony revealed that SP had 
never experienced sexual intercourse.

[¶101.]            
We do not believe that JP's equivocal testimony at trial or the evidence 
refuting the possibility of medical sexual intercourse sufficiently counter the 
indicia of trustworthiness surrounding these statements so as to preclude their 
receipt into evidence. JP's statements were corroborated, at least in part, by 
reliable assertions by SP that appellant had hurt her. See discussion infra. The 
tenor of JP's statements remained consistent over a period of several months and 
he never retracted his version of these events. He was five and six years old at 
the times that the statements were made, a fact which supports our finding of 
candor and absence of motivation to falsify. We conclude that the foregoing 
factors supply the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness contemplated by 
Rule 803(24) and the standards set out in Hopkinson v. State, supra, and that the 
statements by JP to Walter Murray and Ellen Bea Spiva were properly received 
into evidence.

[¶102.]            
Appellant also objects to the testimony by Nancy Johnson, social services 
manager at the State Children's Home, that, following a home visit in April, 
1980, JP said that his dad had gotten made and had hit him with an Easter 
bucket. We will hold that this statement, in the context in which it was used at 
trial, does not fall within the definition of hearsay evidence and, therefore, 
was properly admitted. Rule 801, W.R.E. defines hearsay and specifies certain 
statements which are not hearsay. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides: 

"(d) Statements which are not hearsay. - A 
statement is not hearsay if:

"(1) Prior Statement by 
Witness. - The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is * * * (B) 
consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied 
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive * * 
*."

[¶103.]            
JP was the first witness to testify at the parental-rights-termination 
proceedings. On direct examination he testified that appellant had hit him with 
an Easter bucket. When questioned about the incident on cross-examination, JP 
said that he had not been hit with a bucket, but that the "nursery ladies" had 
told him to say that appellant had struck him. Nancy Johnson testified directly 
after the testimony of JP. She reported that following a home visit she had 
questioned JP about bruises on his body, at which time he revealed that 
appellant had hit him with an Easter bucket.

[¶104.]            
So long as a witness is subject to cross-examination concerning an 
earlier statement which is consistent with his testimony, any prior consistent statement may 
potentially be excluded from the definition of hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). 
Louisell and Mueller, supra, § 420, pp. 187, 199. The situation at bar falls 
directly within the language of the rule. After testifying on direct examination 
concerning the Easter-bucket incident, JP's testimony was impeached during 
cross-examination by the charge that the nursery ladies had encouraged him to 
fabricate the story for trial. Therefore, JP's earlier statement to Nancy 
Johnson shortly after his visit home, which statement was consistent with his 
direct testimony, was properly admitted to rebut the suggestion of recent 
fabrication. See Garcia v. Watkins, 
604 F.2d 1297, (10th Cir. 1979). Once the statement was admissible under Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) to rehabilitate JP's direct testimony, his prior statement could 
also be considered as substantive evidence that appellant had hit him with the 
bucket. Louisell and Mueller, supra, § 420 at 190. United States v. Lanier, 578 F.2d 1246, 1255-1256 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 856, 99 S. Ct. 169, 
58 L. Ed. 2d 163.

Hearsay Statements of 
SP

[¶105.]            
At trial, Barbara Weiss, a housemother employed by the State Children's 
Home, and Grace Riley, the superintendent of the State Children's Home, 
testified that following a weekend visit with appellant and his wife in 
November, 1981, SP complained that appellant had hurt her. We will hold that the 
testimony of Weiss was properly admitted under Rule 803(2), W.R.E., the "excited 
utterances" exception to the hearsay doctrine. We will not address, therefore, 
the propriety of admitting Riley's hearsay evidence which was offered and 
received under Rule 803(24), since her testimony was substantially similar to 
that of Weiss and described the same incident.

[¶106.]            
Weiss testified that she and another housemother were present when 
appellant and his wife returned the children to the State Children's Home after 
a Thanksgiving holiday visit. She testified that it was late and that appellant 
told her that SP had already had her bath. Her testimony continued:

"A. * * * When we were 
getting [SP] ready to go to bed, we were trying to change her underclothes, 
which is customary, and get her pajamas on, and she kept squiggling, screaming, 
got upset and didn't want her clothes on and said it hurt her, and hurt her, I 
asked her what hurt her, she said my dad hurt me and hurt me here.

"[Objection 
omitted.]

"A. And finally I asked 
[SP] what happened, did you fall, did you hurt yourself. Now, this is the best 
of my memory.

"Q. That is all we can 
ask.

"A. And she said, no, my 
daddy hurt me. And I said, did you and [JP] were probably playing and [JP] hurt 
you, and she said, no, daddy hurt me. She started crying, really upset, and 
Luanne went and called our supervisor, which was Mrs. Grace Riley at that 
time."

 

[¶107.]            
Rule 803(2), W.R.E., provides the following exception to the hearsay 
doctrine:

"(2) Excited utterance. - A statement 
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under 
the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition; * * *."

The rationale 
behind this exception is that the out-of-court declaration constituted a 
spontaneous reaction to an exciting event which overpowered the declarant's 
capacity to reflect and deliberate. Such statements are considered trustworthy 
because the declarant was rendered, for the moment, incapable of fabrication and 
because the statement was made while his memory of the event was still fresh. 
Louisell and Mueller, supra, § 439, pp. 491-492.

[¶108.]            
In deciding whether a statement properly fits within the 
excited-utterances exception, courts have considered the nature of the startling 
event, the declarant's physical manifestations of excitement, his age, the lapse 
of time between the event and the hearsay statement, and whether the statement 
was made in response to an inquiry. In United States v. Iron Shell, 55 A.L.R.F. 
664, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 1001, 101 S. Ct. 1709, 68 L. Ed. 2d 203, the Eight Circuit upheld the admission of the out-of-court 
declaration made by a nine-year-old sexual-assault victim to an investigative 
officer approximately one hour after the event. Appellant had argued that Lucy, 
the victim, was no longer under the stress of excitement when she talked to 
Officer Marshall, that she was quiet and not crying, and that her statements 
were deliberate answers to an inquiry. In discounting these arguments, the court 
said:

"The lapse of time 
between the startling event and the out-of-court statement although relevant is 
not dispositive in the application of rule 803(2). [Citations.] Nor is it 
controlling that Lucy's statement was made in response to an inquiry. 
[Citations.] Rather, these are factors which the trial court must weigh in 
determining whether the offered testimony is within the 803(2) exception. Other 
factors to consider include the age of the declarant, the physical and mental 
condition of the declarant, the characteristics of the event and the subject 
matter of the statements. In order to find that 803(2) applies, it must appear 
that the declarant's condition at the time was such that the statement was 
spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather than the product of reflection and 
deliberation. [Citations.]

"Determination of this 
issue is a close question. There is testimony that the declarant was calm and 
unexcited. In contrast the same witness described Lucy as nervous and scared. 
Testimony from other sources suggested that Lucy had struggled with the 
defendant, that he had threatened her with serious harm and that he had 
unsnapped and pulled down her jeans. The stress and fear that such an occurrence 
would impose upon a young girl cannot be discounted. Officer Marshall testified 
that Lucy did not give a detailed narrative but spoke in short bursts about the 
incident. The officer emphasized at trial that she did not ask Lucy suggestive 
questions but merely reported what Lucy said. The officer only asked Lucy, `what 
happened?'

* * * * * *

"* * * The single 
question `what happened' has been held not to destroy the excitement necessary 
to qualify under this exception to the hearsay rule. [Citations.] A lapse of 
about one hour has also been held not to remove the evidence from the 803(2) 
exception, especially where the declarant is a young child. [Citations.] * * * 
It is a truism to state that each of these cases must be decided on its own 
circumstances. We find that in these circumstances considering the surprise of 
the assault, its shocking nature and the age of the declarant, it was not an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to find that Lucy was still under the 
stress of the attack when she spoke to Officer Marshall. It was not 
unreasonable, in this case, to find that Lucy was in a state of continuous 
excitement from the time of the assault. [Citations.]" 633 F.2d  at 
85-86.

Similarly, the 
Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. 
Stewart, 39 Colo. App. 142, 568 P.2d 65, 68, cert. denied, (1977), upheld 
the receipt of the hearsay testimony of a police officer concerning statements 
made by the six-year-old sexual-assault victim two hours after she released 
herself from the tree to which she had been tied. See also Wheeler v. United States, 93 App.D.C. 
159, 211 F.2d 19, 23-24 (1953), reh. denied, 347 U.S. 1019, 74 S. Ct. 876, 98 L. Ed. 1140 (1954).

[¶109.]            
In the case at bar Weiss testified that SP, who was three and one-half 
years old at the time, cried and screamed and complained of pain upon 
preparations for bed shortly after appellant returned her to the State 
Children's Home. According to Weiss, SP was obviously upset and volunteered that 
"daddy hurt me." Nevertheless, appellant asserts that this testimony does not 
fit within the "excited utterances" exception because Burgess, a second 
housemother who was present, testified that she first raised the possibility 
with SP that appellant had hurt her, thereby planting the idea in SP's mind. 
Furthermore, Burgess testified that SP was quiet during questioning.

[¶110.]            
Considering, as we must, the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
appellee and resolving all conflicts in the evidence for the appellee, DS v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, supra, 607 P.2d  at 919-920, we cannot say that the trial 
court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Weiss pursuant to Rule 
803(2). There was evidence that SP was in a state of excitement and that she 
appeared to be experiencing pain. The fact that she might also have exhibited 
signs of calmness does not rule out a finding that she was emotionally 
distraught. United States v. Iron 
Shell, supra. Neither does the fact that her remarks were made in response 
to an inquiry while she was in this state preclude application of the rule. 
Whether SP's statements were triggered by the abusive act during her home visit 
or the subsequent pain she experienced while being dressed for bed, see United States v. Napier, 518 F.2d 316, 
317-318 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 895, 96 S. Ct. 196, 46 L. Ed. 2d 128, we conclude that adequate safeguards against reflection and fabrication 
were present and that the hearsay testimony of Weiss was properly received under 
Rule 803(2).

[¶111.]            
Finally, appellant objects to the testimony of Dr. Lloyd Klatt, an 
emergency-room physician at Natrona County Memorial Hospital, who examined SP on 
the night of November 29, 1981, at the request of State Children's Home 
personnel. Relying on records prepared at the time of the medical examination, 
Dr. Klatt testified that the vaginal area and labia of SP were inflamed, and 
that SP told him that her father had hurt her. Based on this information, Dr. 
Klatt and an assisting specialist in gynecology diagnosed SP as a "probable 
molested child."

[¶112.]            
Regardless of whether SP's out-of-court declaration to Dr. Klatt was 
properly admitted,16 Rule 703, W.R.E.,17 authorizes receipt of an expert 
conclusion even when based on inadmissible hearsay, so long as other experts in 
the field would reasonably rely on similar evidence. Madison v. Marlatt, Wyo., 619 P.2d 708, 
716 (1980). Since no evidence was presented as to the unreasonableness or 
nonexistence of reliance by other medical doctors on the patient's statements to 
diagnose abuse, Dr. Klatt's opinion testimony was properly received under Rule 
703. 

ISSUE NO. 8

The Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

[¶113.]            
In our discussion, supra, of the general concepts which apply in this 
state to proceedings to terminate parental rights, we said that the right to 
associate with one's family is a fundamental liberty. We said that in reviewing 
any infringement of such a fundamental right we must exercise strict 
scrutiny.

[¶114.]            
The State has a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of its 
children. Matter of the Parental Rights 
of SKJ and SLJ, Wyo., 673 P.2d 640, 642 (1983). So long as there is reason 
to believe that a positive, nurturing parent-child relationship exists, the 
State's interest coincides with the parents' interest in preserving, not 
severing, family bonds. Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S.  at 766, 102 S. Ct.  at 1401. Once a parent has been proven 
unfit, however, the State's interest in terminating that parent's rights arises. 
Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 
at 767, n. 17, 102 S. Ct.  at 1401, n. 17.

[¶115.]            
We set out standards in DS v. 
Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, supra, to guide courts 
in determining when termination of parental rights would be permissible. There 
we said:

"* * * [W]e hold that a 
court may not terminate parental rights because of abuse or neglect unless the 
abuse or neglect renders the parent unfit in the context that such abuse or 
neglect poses a serious danger to the child's physical or mental well-being, 
i.e., clearly detrimental to the child. Thus, for example, punishment which may 
seem severe but which does not harm, is not such abuse as will suffice * * * to 
terminate parental rights. * * *

"* * * [T]ermination of 
parental rights cannot be ordered on the grounds of abuse or neglect unless the 
showing is clear and unequivocal that the child's health - mental or physical - 
and/or his social or educational well-being has actually been placed in jeopardy 
through the neglect or abuse by the parent." 607 P.2d  at 919.

These standards 
are reflected in our present statute, § 14-2-309, supra, which establishes the 
grounds for termination of the parent-child legal relationship. See Comment, Wyoming's New Termination of Parental Rights 
Statute, 17 Land and Water L.Rev. 621, 623 (1982). In reviewing the case at 
bar, we must strictly scrutinize the application of § 14-2-309 to determine 
whether the State has proven these elements: (1) abusive treatment or neglect by 
the parent; (2) unsuccessful efforts to rehabilitate the family (i.e. 
termination of parental rights is the least intrusive means to satisfy the 
State's interest); and (3) the child's health and safety would be seriously 
jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent. Once these elements 
are established by competent, clear and convincing evidence, § 14-2-309(a), 
supra, then we can say that the State's compelling interest in preserving and 
promoting the welfare of its children will in fact be served by permanently 
removing these children from their parent.

[¶116.]            
In reviewing the facts of this case, we abide by the appellate directive 
to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and to 
resolve all conflicts in evidence for the appellee. We will assume the evidence 
in favor of the successful party is true, disregard entirely the evidence of the 
unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the 
successful party every favorable inference which may fairly be drawn. DS v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, supra, 607 P.2d  at 919-910.

Abuse

[¶117.]            
We must examine the evidence of abuse with respect to each child to 
determine whether it meets the clear-and-convincing standard necessary to 
terminate appellant's rights to that child. "Abuse" as it is used in the 
parental-rights-termination statutes is defined in § 14-3-202(a)(ii), supra, 
which provides in pertinent part:

"(ii) `Abuse' means 
inflicting or causing physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger to the 
physical or mental health or welfare of a child other than by accidental means, 
including * * * the commission or allowing the commission of a sexual offense 
against a child as defined by law:

"(A) `Mental injury' 
means an injury to the psychological capacity or emotional stability of a child 
as evidenced by an observable or substantial impairment in his ability to 
function within a normal range of performance and behavior with due regard to 
his culture;

"(B) `Physical injury' 
means death or any harm to a child including but not limited to disfigurement, 
impairment of any bodily organ, skin bruising, bleeding, burns, fracture of any 
bone, subdural hematoma or substantial malnutrition;

"(C) `Substantial risk' 
means a strong possibility as contrasted with a remote or insignificant 
possibility;

"(D) `Imminent danger' 
includes threatened harm and means a statement, overt act, condition or status 
which represents an immediate and substantial risk of sexual abuse or physical 
or mental injury."

Thus, abuse may 
affect the mental as well as the physical health or welfare of the child and the 
harm posed by the abuse may be actual or imminent.

[¶118.]            
We will consider first the evidence of sexual abuse of SP. In late March, 
1980, members of the State Children's Home staff observed that SP's vaginal area 
was unusually red. She was examined on March 26, 1980, by Dr. Martin Ellbogen, 
who was employed as a physician at the State Children's Home. He testified that 
SP's hymen was inflamed but that he was unable to specify the cause of 
injury.

[¶119.]            
There was testimony that SP's vaginal area was bright red and had an 
unusual odor following the children's visit home during Easter, 1980. Dr. 
Ellbogen testified that he examined SP at this time. He noted that her hymen was 
mildly swollen and that she appeared to have no new trauma.

[¶120.]            
Following a visit with appellant over Thanksgiving weekend, 1981, the 
housemothers noticed extreme redness around the vaginal-rectal area of SP. She 
was upset and crying and told the housemothers that appellant had hurt her. Dr. 
Klatt, an emergency-room doctor at Natrona County Memorial Hospital, examined SP 
following this visit home and diagnosed the cause of the injury as "probable 
molested child." There was evidence that appellant had sexually fondled SP and 
had encouraged JP to do so. JP testified on direct examination that he had seen 
LP sexually molest SP, although on cross-examination he stated that he had not 
seen this act but that it had happened.

[¶121.]            
We believe that the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that 
appellant committed a sexual offense against SP as defined by law. "Sexual 
contact" when committed by a parent against a child constitutes third-degree 
sexual assault under § 6-4-304, W.S. 1977 (now recodified as § 6-2-304, W.S. 
1977, 1983 Replacement).18 Sexual contact is defined in § 
6-4-301(a)(vii), W.S. 1977 (recodified as § 6-2-301(a)(vi), W.S. 1977, 1983 
Replacement), as follows: 

"`Sexual contact' means 
the touching for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse of the 
victim's intimate parts by the actor, or of the actor's intimate parts by the 
victim, or the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's 
intimate parts; * * *."

Behavior of this 
sort, which constitutes a sexual offense under our statutes, obviously posed a 
serious danger to the physical and mental well-being of SP. DS v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, supra. Such conduct amounts to abuse within the meaning of 
§ 14-2-309, supra.

[¶122.]            
The evidence concerning JP indicates that he had bruises on his body when 
he returned to the State Children's Home after spending Easter, 1980, with 
appellant and that appellant had hit him with an Easter bucket. The records of 
the State Children's Home for the week following Easter vacation, 1980, show 
that JP engaged in sexual play with other children during this time. He was 
aware of a number of sexual terms and drew suggestive pictures. There was 
evidence that JP observed LP sexually abuse SP. On one occasion, when LP and his 
wife were in bed together and all were unclothed, LP encouraged JP to touch his 
wife and SP.

[¶123.]            
We believe that this last-mentioned behavior constitutes sexual contact 
as defined by § 6-4-301(a)(vii), supra, and endangered the mental, if not the 
physical, welfare of JP. We conclude that competent, clear and convincing 
evidence establishes that appellant abused JP within the meaning of § 14-2-309, 
supra.

[¶124.]            
Turning to the evidence with respect to GP, there is no direct indication 
that LP sexually assaulted her, absent the inadmissible hearsay testimony to 
that effect. The records of the State Children's Home indicate that on April 20, 
1980, GP exposed herself to young boys. Her vocabulary included slang terms for 
sexual acts. GP testified that appellant never hurt her, that on one occasion he 
got mad and "knocked off the light," that he spanked her on the bottom and that 
he hit her on the arms, sometimes with a belt.

[¶125.]            
While there is no competent evidence that appellant sexually molested GP, 
we believe that the abusive behavior of appellant with respect to the other 
children constituted imminent, serious danger to the physical and mental welfare 
of GP. Her close proximity to these abusive acts and the fact that appellant had 
authority over her created an immediate and substantial risk of sexual abuse or 
physical or mental injury. Under our statutes, abusive conduct which will 
justify termination of parental rights need not have caused actual damage. 
Rather conduct which produces "imminent danger to the physical or mental health 
or welfare of a child," § 14-3-202(a)(ii), supra, will suffice. As we said in DS v. Department of Public Assistance and 
Social Services, supra:

"It would, indeed, be a 
sad commentary upon the law if it were unable to come to the aid of an abused or 
neglected child until there was an 
actual manifestation of some serious damage. We do not so hold. However, if the 
State wishes to demonstrate that parental abuse or neglect is sowing the seeds 
for future problems, it must do so in a more convincing manner than it did in 
this case." 607 P.2d  at 922-923.

We conclude that 
in the instant case the State has clearly and convincingly demonstrated that 
appellant's abuse was sowing the seeds for future problems for GP.

Efforts to 
Rehabilitate

[¶126.]            
We now consider whether efforts by an authorized agency or mental-health 
professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating appellant. On July 27, 
1981, appellant began counseling sessions with Dr. Dennis Mercadal at the 
Central Wyoming Counseling Center. Twelve sessions were held over a period of 
four months. Dr. Mercadal believed that appellant was progressing in these 
sessions, and in November, 1981, the children were permitted to resume home 
visits as a preliminary step toward reuniting the family. However, following the 
third home visit SP exhibited signs of sexual abuse, and Dr. Mercadal concluded 
that efforts at rehabilitation had not succeeded. The following dialogue took 
place at trial:

"Q. Dr. Mercadal, 
regarding the statement that you felt there had been progress made by [LP] 
during this therapy, as a take off from that, did you feel the therapy had been 
effective?

"[Objection 
omitted.]

"A. Oh, no, I don't think 
so, not effective enough.

"Q. All right, and why is 
that your opinion?

"A. Because Mr. [P] 
sexually abused his daughter.

"Q. Following your 
intervention?

"A. Right."

[¶127.]            
In Matter of Parental Rights of 
PP, supra, 648 P.2d  at 515-516, we upheld the termination of parental rights 
where extensive efforts to protect the child through means less intrusive than 
termination had been attempted without success. In the instant case, although 
there was evidence that appellant had benefited from therapy, his counselor 
ultimately concluded that treatment had been unsuccessful. We hold that this 
uncontradicted, expert opinion testimony clearly and convincingly supports the 
trial court's finding that efforts by a mental-health professional to 
rehabilitate appellant had been unsuccessful.

Future Health and Safety 
of the Children

[¶128.]            
Finally, we direct our attention to whether the health and safety of the 
children would be seriously jeopardized by returning to appellant. Dr. Mercadal 
testified that, based upon his professional expertise and his experience with 
appellant, sexual abuse would again take place if appellant were reunited with 
his children.

[¶129.]            
David Nees, a clinical therapist at the Central Wyoming Counseling 
Center, testified that he met with appellant for seven one-hour counseling 
sessions between May and August of 1982. Based upon these contacts and his 
familiarity with the situation, Mr. Nees concluded that the children would face 
"a very present danger" should they be reunited with appellant. We conclude that 
the expert opinions in this case provide clear and convincing evidence in 
support of the trial court's finding that the health and safety of the children 
would be seriously jeopardized by their return to appellant.

[¶130.]            
As a result of our strict scrutiny of the application of the 
parental-rights-termination statutes in this case, we hold that the State's 
compelling interest in protecting the welfare of these three children can be met 
only by terminating appellant's parental rights with respect to each 
child.

[¶131.]            
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The names of the 
appellant father and the children will not be used in this opinion.

2 Rule 5(d), W.R.C.P. 
provides:

"All papers after the 
complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court 
either before service or within a reasonable time thereafter."

3 Section 14-3-101, W.S. 
1977 read:

"(a) No parent, guardian 
or custodian of any child shall:

"(i) Abandon the child 
without just cause;

"(ii) Abuse, torture, 
expose or cruelly punish the child; or

"(iii) Knowingly or 
negligently cause, permit or contribute to the endangering of the child's life, 
health or welfare."

Section 
14-3-102, W.S. 1977 read:

"(a) No person shall 
knowingly:

"Cause, encourage, aid or 
contribute to a child's violation of any law of this state;

"(ii) Cause, encourage, 
aid or permit a child to enter, remain or be employed in any house of 
prostitution or in any gambling place;

"(iii) Commit any 
indecent or obscene act in the presence of a child;

"(iv) Sell, give or 
otherwise furnish a child any drug prohibited by federal law without a 
physician's prescription; or

"(v) Cause, encourage, 
aid or contribute to the endangering of a child's health, welfare or morals, 
including using, employing or permitting a child:

"(A) In any business 
enterprise which is injurious or dangerous to the health, morals, life or 
physical safety of the child;

"(B) In any place for any 
mendicant purposes;

"(C) To be exhibited for 
the purpose of displaying any deformity of a child, except to 
physicians;

"(D) In a house of 
prostitution; or

"(E) In any obscene or 
indecent exhibition or practice."

4 Section 14-3-103, W.S. 
1977 read:

"(a) Any person violating 
any provision within W.S. 14-3-101 and 14-3-102 is guilty of a misdemeanor and 
upon conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor 
more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) plus court costs or imprisoned in the 
county jail not more than one (1) year, or both.

"(b) Upon the second and 
each subsequent conviction of subsection (a) of this section, a person shall be 
imprisoned in the state penitentiary not more than five (5) years."

5 In answer to the 
interrogatory:

"Please state with 
particularity the date, time, and place of each alleged incident of abuse, of 
any or any combination of the children, by [LP],"

DPASS 
responded:

"* * * In the late part 
of February, 1980, [LP] had sexual intercourse with [GP]."

6 The quotation is from 
the respondent-appellant's "STATEMENT OF PROCEEDING" which was made a part of 
the record at the trial level.

7 Rule 35, W.R.C.P. 
provides:

"Physical and mental 
examination of persons.

"(a) Order for examination. - When the mental 
or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the 
legal control of a party, [emphasis added] is in controversy, the court in 
which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or 
mental examination by a physician or to produce for examination the person in 
his custody or legal control. The order may be made only on motion for good 
cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and 
shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination 
and the person or persons by whom it is to be made."

8 Respondent's "STATEMENT 
OF PROCEEDINGS", supra n. 6.

10 The Secretary of State 
is the official registrar of rules promulgated by state agencies. Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, § 16-3-104, W.S. 1977.

11 The director of the 
State Department of Health and Social Services has certified that the rules in 
Chapter V, relating to foster care, were adopted in accordance with the 
requirements of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.

12 Section 16-3-103, W.S. 
1977, provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Prior to an agency's 
adoption, amendment or repeal of all rules other than interpretative rules or 
statements of general policy, the agency shall:

"(i) Give at least thirty 
(30) days notice of its intended action. The notice shall include a statement of 
either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the 
subjects and issues involved and of the time when, the place where and the 
manner in which interested persons may present their views on the intended 
action. Notice shall be mailed to all persons making timely requests of the 
agency for advanced notice of its rulemaking proceedings and to the attorney 
general and the legislative service office if a state agency;

"(ii) Afford all 
interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit data, views or arguments, 
orally or in writing. In the case of substantive rules, opportunity for oral 
hearing must be granted if requested by twenty-five (25) persons, or by a 
governmental subdivision, or by an association having not less than twenty-five 
(25) members. The agency shall consider fully all written and oral submissions 
respecting the proposed rule. Upon adoption of the rule, the agency, if 
requested to do so by an interested person, either prior to adoption or within 
thirty (30) days thereafter, shall issue a concise statement of the principal 
reasons for overruling the consideration urged against its adoption.

* * * * * *

"(c) No rule is valid 
unless submitted, filed and adopted in substantial compliance with this section. 
A proceeding to contest any rule on the ground of noncompliance with the 
procedural requirements of this section must be commenced within two (2) years 
from the effective date of the rule.

"(d) No state agency rule 
or any amendment, repeal, modification or revision of the rule may be filed with 
the registrar of rules unless the rule has been submitted to the governor for 
review and the governor has approved and signed the rule. The governor shall not 
approve any rule or any amendment, repeal, modification or revision of the rule 
unless it:

"(i) Is within the scope 
of the statutory authority delegated to the adopting agency;

"(ii) Appears to be 
within the scope of the legislative purpose of the statutory authority; 
and

"(iii) Has been adopted 
in compliance with the procedural requirements of this act [§§ 16-3-101 through 
16-3-115]. For the purposes of this subsection, an `agency' means any authority, 
bureau, board, commission, department, division, officer or employee of the 
state, excluding the state legislature and the judiciary."

13 Section 16-3-102(a)(i), 
W.S. 1977, provides:

"(a) In addition to other 
rulemaking requirements imposed by law, each agency shall:

"(i) Adopt rules of 
practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal 
procedures available in connection with contested cases; * * *."

14 The Social Services 
Manual provided for the following review procedure between July, 1979, and July, 
1981:

"1076.3 Continuing Services

"Continuing services to 
children in foster care include at least monthly contact with the child, ongoing 
effort to work with the natural parents so long as parental rights have not been 
terminated. Review of the progress of the child in foster care and progress 
towards the goals established at placement should be made at six-month intervals 
for foster care."

15 Since the Wyoming Rules 
of Evidence which we will consider in this opinion are identical to their 
federal counterparts, authority interpreting the federal rules is relevant to 
our application of the Wyoming rules. Hicklin v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 743, 
748 (1975).

16 We need not address 
whether Dr. Klatt's testimony concerning SP's out-of-court statement was 
properly received into evidence, since this portion of his testimony was 
cumulative to that of Barbara Weiss, whose testimony we have held was properly 
admitted under Rule 803(2), W.R.E.

17 Rule 703, W.R.E., 
provides:

"The facts or data in the 
particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those 
perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence."

18 Section 6-4-305, W.S. 
1977, provided as follows:

"Any actor who subjects a 
victim to sexual contact under the circumstances of W.S. 6-63.2(a)(i) through 
(iv) [§ 6-4-302(a)(i) to (iv)] or W.S. 6-63.3(a)(i) through (vii) [§ 
6-4-303(a)(i) to (vii)] under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in 
either the first or second degree commits sexual assault in the third 
degree."

When § 6-4-305, 
was recodified in 1983, the offense was reclassified as fourth-degree sexual 
assault.

The 
circumstances which cause the sexual contact in the instant case to constitute 
third-degree sexual assault are specified in § 6-4-303(a)(v) and (vi), W.S. 1977 
(recodified as § 6-2-303(a)(v) and (vi), W.S. 1977, 1983 
Replacement):

"(v) At the time of the 
commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age and the 
actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim;

"(vi) The actor is in a 
position of authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to 
cause the victim to submit; * * *."