Case Title: U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Mackenzie

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016 ME 149

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2016-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2016 ME 149 
Docket: 
And-15-379 
Submitted 
 
  On Briefs: 
May 26, 2016 
Decided: 
October 11, 2016 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR LSF8 MASTER PARTICIPATION 
TRUST 
 
v. 
 
BEVIN L. (HOOPER) MACKENZIE 
 
 
HJELM, J.  
[¶1]  In this foreclosure action brought by U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as 
Trustee for LSF8 Master Participation Trust (the Bank), Bevin L. (Hooper) 
Mackenzie—the mortgagor—moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that, inter alia, the requisite notices of default and right to cure were deficient.  
Although the District Court (Lewiston, Dow, J.) agreed with Mackenzie’s 
contention, it entered an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice, 
expressly reserving to the Bank the right to commence a new action if it were 
to issue a statutorily compliant notice of default and right to cure.  On this 
appeal by Mackenzie, she argues that she is entitled to a summary judgment 
rather than merely a dismissal of the matter without prejudice because the 
defective notices of right to cure constitute a substantive defect in the Bank’s 
 
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cause of action.1  In the absence of a cross-appeal by the Bank, we affirm the 
dismissal of the complaint but remand with instructions for the court to revise 
its order so that it is with prejudice but does not establish the parties’ rights in 
any future litigation.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In its complaint, the Bank alleges the following facts, which we 
recite to provide some context for our discussion of the procedural issues in 
this case.   
[¶3]  In 2001, Mackenzie and Jim B. Hooper acquired two parcels of real 
property located in Leeds.  In September 2004, Hooper executed a loan 
repayment and security agreement with Beneficial Maine, Inc.  To secure 
Beneficial’s right to receive payments under the loan agreement, Mackenzie 
and Hooper executed a mortgage deed in favor of Beneficial. 
[¶4]  Having received no payments since 2011 toward the loan 
obligation, in December 2013 Beneficial sent separate but substantively 
identical notices of default and right to cure to Hooper and Mackenzie.  
                                         
1  Although Mackenzie’s appeal is from a judgment in her favor, she has standing to appeal 
because “sufficient adverse collateral consequences could arise from the portion of the judgment 
that [s]he challenges.”  U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tannenbaum, 2015 ME 141, ¶ 3 n.2, 126 A.3d 734. 
 
 
3 
See 14 M.R.S. § 6111 (2014).2  After sending the notices, Beneficial still did not 
receive any payments, and in March 2014, it filed a complaint in the District 
Court against Mackenzie and Hooper, alleging a default for failure to make 
payments required under the loan agreement and seeking to foreclose on the 
mortgaged properties.  See 14 M.R.S. §§ 6321-6326 (2015).  Beneficial 
attached copies of the notices of right to cure as exhibits to the complaint. 
[¶5]  While the action was pending, Beneficial assigned the loan 
agreement and mortgage to the Bank, and the court (Schneider, J.) granted 
Beneficial’s motion to substitute the Bank as the plaintiff.  Following two 
unsuccessful mediation sessions, Mackenzie filed a motion for summary 
judgment supported by a statement of material facts.  See M.R. Civ. P. 56.  In 
her motion, Mackenzie argued, among other things, that the notices of right to 
cure were deficient because they did not satisfy the requirements of 
section 6111(1-A).3  The Bank opposed the motion and argued in part that the 
motion for summary judgment should be denied because Mackenzie’s 
statement of material facts failed to establish that her factual assertions would 
be admissible in evidence and therefore did not comply with the requirements 
                                         
2  Title 14 section 6111 has since been amended.  See P.L. 2015, ch. 36, §§ 1, 2 (effective 
Oct. 15, 2015) (codified at 14 M.R.S. § 6111 (2015)).  References in this opinion to section 6111 are 
to the version in effect at the time the notices of right to cure were sent. 
3  The parties do not dispute that section 6111, which establishes the requirements and 
procedure for notices of right to cure affecting residential mortgages, applies in this case. 
 
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of M.R. Civ. P. 56(e).  The Bank also argued that the notices of right to cure 
were sufficient.  In her reply, Mackenzie filed an amended statement of 
material facts in an apparent attempt to rectify the formal deficiencies in her 
original statement. 
[¶6]  After holding a hearing on the motion, in July 2015 the court 
(Dow, J.) issued an order concluding that “the notice of right to cure did not 
comply with statutory requirements.”  On that basis, the court dismissed the 
complaint without prejudice “so that [the Bank] may send notice in 
compliance [with] 14 M.R.S. § 6111 at least thirty[-]five days before filing its 
complaint for foreclosure.”4  Mackenzie’s appeal followed. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  Mackenzie contends that the court erred by dismissing the 
complaint without prejudice rather than issuing a summary judgment in her 
favor because the court’s conclusion that the notices of right to cure did not 
comply with statutory requirements constitutes an adjudication of the Bank’s 
claim on the merits.   
                                         
4  Hooper did not join in Mackenzie’s motion, perhaps because, as the record suggests, Hooper 
no longer is an owner of the mortgaged properties.  At the motion hearing, however, the Bank 
acknowledged that if the court ruled in favor of Mackenzie, the judgment would also run in favor of 
Hooper.  The court’s order of dismissal disposed of all claims asserted in the complaint, including 
the claim against Hooper, and it therefore operates as a final judgment.  See M.R. Civ. P. 54. 
 
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[¶8]  The Bank argues that the court erred by granting any relief to 
Mackenzie, including a dismissal of the complaint, because Mackenzie’s 
summary judgment submissions did not satisfy the evidentiary standards of 
Rule 56(e) and because, in any event, the notices of default and right to cure 
satisfied the requirements of section 6111.  The Bank, however, did not file a 
cross-appeal.  “A cross-appeal is essential if a party other than the appellant 
wishes to raise an issue and modify a judgment in a manner that is different 
from the change in the judgment sought by the appellant.”  Alexander, 
Maine Appellate Practice § 2.7(a) at 39 (4th ed. 2013); see also Costa v. Vogel, 
2001 ME 131, ¶ 1 n.1, 777 A.2d 827.  Because the Bank failed to file a 
cross-appeal, it has forfeited any opportunity to argue on appeal that the 
court’s order should be vacated and the case remanded for trial.  The only 
remaining question therefore is whether, when the court dismissed the 
complaint, it committed error by stating that the dismissal was without 
prejudice and explicitly providing that the Bank could send a new notice of 
default and right to cure and then file a new complaint for foreclosure. 
[¶9]  Although Mackenzie framed her motion as one for summary 
judgment, one of the bases for her motion—and the basis that ultimately the 
court invoked to grant the motion—was the sufficiency of the notices of 
 
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default and right to cure sent to Hooper and her.  The original plaintiff, 
Beneficial, had attached the notices to its complaint and incorporated them by 
reference, and so the notices are part of the complaint.  See Andrews v. 
Sheepscot Island Co., 2016 ME 68, ¶¶ 2, 8, 138 A.3d 1197.  Accordingly, 
Mackenzie’s motion did not go beyond the complaint and the incorporated 
notices, and in effect the parties and the court itself treated Mackenzie’s 
motion as a motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which tests 
the legal sufficiency of a complaint to state a claim for relief.  Richards v. Soucy, 
610 A.2d 268, 270 (Me. 1992).  Although the Bank argues here, as it did below, 
that Mackenzie did not create a proper summary judgment record, the Bank 
cannot be heard to complain that the court erred in considering the notices of 
default and right to cure that were attached to its complaint by Beneficial, the 
entity that assigned the underlying rights to the Bank.5 
[¶10]  Because the Bank did not file a cross-appeal, we are not called on 
to address the merits of the court’s determination that the notices of default 
and right to cure failed to satisfy the requirements of section 6111.  Rather, 
                                         
5  Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b), the court may treat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim as a motion for summary judgment when the motion is dependent on material 
extrinsic to the complaint.  If it does so, the court must allow the parties an opportunity to engage in 
the summary judgment motion process created in Rule 56.  Here, because the parties’ arguments 
were based on the complaint and the attached notices, the parties and the court did the opposite—
they treated Mackenzie’s Rule 56 motion as if it were a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  In the unique 
circumstances of this case, we assume that this process is permissible, and we need not and do not 
address whether the Rules actually allow this analytical transformation. 
 
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because Mackenzie argues that the disposition of her motion should be on the 
merits, we consider only the effect of the dismissal. 
[¶11]  When in a foreclosure action a court determines that a notice of 
default and right to cure sent to the mortgagor is defective, that determination 
reaches the merits of the claim for foreclosure.  See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 
Girouard, 2015 ME 116, ¶ 9, 123 A.3d 216; see also Tannenbaum, 2015 ME 
141, ¶ 5, 126 A.3d 734.  In Girouard, that disposition was in the form of a 
summary judgment.  2015 ME 116, ¶¶ 7, 9, 123 A.3d 216.  Here, the court’s 
order was based on a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.  A dismissal pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) nonetheless is an adjudication on the merits, and it “is with 
prejudice.”  Potter, Prescott, Jamieson & Nelson, P.A. v. Campbell, 1998 ME 70, 
¶ 9, 708 A.2d 283.  The court therefore erred by dismissing the complaint 
without prejudice rather than with prejudice.6  See id.   
                                         
6  In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Girouard, we held that when a notice of right to cure is defective, 
the mortgagor is entitled to a judgment on the merits.  2015 ME 116, ¶ 11, 123 A.3d 216.  The trial 
court in Girouard, acting on the mortgagor’s motion for summary judgment, issued an order 
dismissing the complaint without prejudice.  Id. ¶ 3.  We vacated the order and remanded for entry 
of a summary judgment in favor of the mortgagor.  Id. ¶ 11.  Here, we amend the judgment so that 
the dismissal of the complaint is with prejudice and therefore clearly stands as an adjudication on 
the merits, see Potter, Prescott, Jamieson & Nelson, P.A. v. Campbell, 1998 ME 70, ¶ 9, 708 A.2d 283—
just as a summary judgment would.  Although we stated in Girouard that when the notice of right to 
cure is defective, a trial court errs by “characteriz[ing] the disposition of the claim as a dismissal,” 
2015 ME 116, ¶ 11, 123 A.3d 216, we clarify by noting that a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is 
proper if it is apparent that the dismissal is with prejudice. 
 
Furthermore, the situation presented here, where the defendant seeks an adjudication on the 
merits, is distinct from an instance where a plaintiff seeks to dismiss its own claim under M.R. 
 
8 
[¶12]  As we also stated in Girouard, however, a court should refrain 
from addressing the effect that an adjudication on the merits will have on 
some future action: 
Consideration of this issue is necessarily speculative . . . because, if 
the issue arises at all, it will be generated by events that have not 
yet happened and at present are entirely hypothetical.  Therefore, 
we do not address this issue, leaving it to another day if it 
becomes an actual controversy. 
 
See 2015 ME 116, ¶ 10, 123 A.3d 216; see also Tannenbaum, 2015 ME 141, ¶ 6 
n.3, 126 A.3d 734 (“[T]he contours of any potential future [foreclosure] action 
are unknowable, and a determination as to whether res judicata would bar 
that action would not resolve a concrete, certain, and immediate legal 
problem.” (quotation marks omitted)).  Here, the court explained that it 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice “so that [the Bank] may send 
notice in compliance [with] 14 M.R.S. § 6111 at least thirty[-]five days before 
filing its complaint for foreclosure.”  To the extent that this comment is seen as 
a determination of the parties’ rights in connection with some future legal 
proceeding, the comment is premature.7  Rather, any proper consideration of 
                                                                                                                                   
Civ. P. 41(a)(2) due to lack of standing.  See U.S. Bank N.A. v. Curit, 2016 ME 17, ¶¶ 9-10, 131 A.3d 
903.  In that instance, the dismissal is without prejudice because the court has not reached the 
merits.  See id. ¶ 10.  
 
7  If, on the other hand, such a comment is treated merely as a neutral statement of the actions 
the Bank might take in the future, without reaching the question of whether those actions are 
legally proper, then the comment is not an advisory opinion.  Because the court’s comment can be 
 
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the parties’ rights—including the right of the Bank to commence a new 
foreclosure action—must be deferred to “another day.” Id.; see also Clark v. 
Hancock Cty. Comm’rs, 2014 ME 33, ¶ 12, 87 A.3d 712 (stating that when there 
is no pending action, a court’s adjudication of the issues that might be 
presented there “would result in an improper advisory opinion.”).  That future 
occasion—if there is one—is when it will be proper for the court to adjudicate 
any claims that the parties assert, based on an actual pending controversy, 
and not on speculative and hypothetical facts. 
 
[¶13]  We therefore affirm the dismissal of the complaint but remand 
with instructions to correct the order so that it provides for a dismissal with 
prejudice and leaves for any future proceeding a determination of what effect, 
if any, the dismissal with prejudice in this action will have on that proceeding.8 
The entry is: 
                                                                                                                                   
read in the broader terms we have described in the text, however, we remand the matter for the 
trial court to revise the terms of its order. 
 
8  In her brief, Mackenzie asks us to remand the case with instructions that the trial court direct 
the Bank to discharge the mortgage.  Mackenzie did not request this relief in the trial court and 
therefore has not preserved this claim for appeal.  See Warren Constr. Group, LLC v. Reis, 2016 ME 
11, ¶¶ 9-10, 130 A.3d 969.   
 
10 
Order of dismissal affirmed.  Remanded for 
correction of the order as set forth in this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
L. Clinton Boothby, Esq., Boothby Perry, LLC, Turner, for 
appellant Bevin L. (Hooper) Mackenzie 
 
Leonard F. Morley, Jr., Esq., William B. Jordon, Esq., and 
Corey S. Hadley, Esq., Shapiro & Morley, LLC, South 
Portland, for appellee U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as Trustee for 
LSF8 Master Participation Trust 
 
 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number RE-2014-76 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY