Case Title: Ex parte Jason Grimmett.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1200220

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
rel:  January 14, 2022
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300
Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022
____________________
1200220
____________________
Ex parte Jason Tyler Grimmett
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Jason Tyler Grimmett 
v. 
April Grimmett)
(Winston Circuit Court, DR-18-900122;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2190277)
PARKER, Chief Justice.
The Winston Circuit Court entered a judgment divorcing Jason Tyler
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Grimmett from April Grimmett1 on the ground of adultery by Jason and
dividing the couple's marital property. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed
the judgment without an opinion, Grimmett v. Grimmett (No. 2190277,
Nov. 20, 2020), ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (table), and Jason
petitioned this Court for certiorari review. This Court issued the writ to
examine, among other things, a potential conflict in the law regarding
whether adultery committed after a party files for divorce is a ground for
divorce. Because the language chosen by the Legislature, specifying
adultery as a ground for divorce, does not limit this ground to prefiling
conduct, and because this Court's early cases distinguishing between
prefiling and postfiling adultery must be read in light of the procedural
restrictions of equity practice under which they were decided, we affirm
the judgment.
I. Facts
Jason and April met in 2010 or 2011 while Jason, who owned a
1In the proceedings below, April Grimmett was sometimes called
"Yvette." This opinion will refer to her as "April" because that is how her
name appears on this Court's docket.
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home-construction business, was doing work on a house belonging to April
and her then-husband. Jason was also married at that time. Jason and
April each obtained a divorce shortly thereafter and, in February 2012,
married each other. They began experiencing various marital difficulties
within a few years, possibly as early as 2014. Accounts differ as to the
cause and nature of the strife, but it seems that it did not arise (at least
initially) from infidelity by either party.  Evidently, the parties' difficulties
resulted in a series of separations and reconciliations, culminating in a
final separation in November 2018.
In 2016, Jason met with Alexandra Yap2 regarding building a house
for her and her husband. Alexandra hired Jason a few months later.  He
began working on her house in fall 2017 and completed construction in fall
2018. In December 2018, Jason filed for divorce from April on the ground
of incompatibility. Alexandra also filed for divorce from her husband.  In
February 2019, Jason and Alexandra began to have an intimate
2At trial and in Jason's motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
judgment, the parties referred to Alexandra as "Alexandra Yap," Yap
being her husband's surname. In an affidavit, she stated her surname as
Dupont.
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relationship.
On June 11, 2019, less than a week before trial in Jason and April's
divorce case, April counterclaimed for divorce; she did not allege adultery
by Jason.
At trial, April testified that she had not known about any
relationship between Jason and Alexandra until about a month before
Jason filed for divorce, when she discovered from telephone-account
records that there had been many calls or text messages between Jason
and Alexandra. To April, these records bolstered her "gut feeling that
something was going on."
Jason was cross-examined about his relationship with Alexandra. He
admitted having a sexual relationship with her, but he did not specify
whether the relationship became sexual before he filed for divorce from
April. 
Alexandra did not testify at trial. After trial but before entry of
judgment, Jason filed an affidavit of Alexandra in which she averred that
she and Jason "did not become intimate and engage in any sexual activity
until mid February, 2019," about two months after Jason filed for divorce. 
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Toward the end of trial, the judge stated that it was undisputed that
Jason had committed adultery. The judge explained that he could not
divide the property equally because doing so would be tantamount to
condoning Jason's infidelity ("If I split down the middle, I'm saying it's
okay to cheat on your wife.... It ain't ever okay to cheat on your wife.").
The judge indicated that the marital property would be sold and the
proceeds divided "60/40" in favor of April.
The circuit court entered a final judgment divorcing Jason and April
on the ground of adultery and dividing the property, not "60/40" but in an
itemized way.3 On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the
judgment in a no-opinion order. Jason filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with this Court, and this Court granted review.
II. Standard of Review
Conclusions of law of a court of appeals are subject to de novo review
by this Court. Ex parte Thomas, 54 So. 3d 356, 358 (Ala. 2010). Because
the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating error by a lower court, Ex
3The judge explained that he believed that Jason would try to hinder
a fair auction of the marital property.
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parte Brown, 26 So. 3d 1222, 1225 (Ala. 2009), on certiorari review as on
appeal, this Court may affirm for any reason consistent with due process,
Ex parte Kelley, 870 So. 2d 711, 714 (Ala. 2003).
III. Analysis
Before this Court, Jason raises two primary arguments: (1) the
evidence before the circuit court was insufficient to prove that he
committed adultery before his divorce complaint was filed, and the Court
of Civil Appeals' affirmance of the judgment conflicted with prior decisions
articulating the standard of proof for adultery; and (2) adultery committed
after the filing of a divorce complaint is not a proper ground for divorce,
and the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance of the judgment conflicted with
prior decisions so holding. We will address each argument in turn.
A. Prefiling adultery
Adultery is a statutory ground for divorce in Alabama. § 30-2-1(a)(2),
Ala. Code 1975. For purposes of divorce, adultery is voluntary sexual
intercourse of a married man or woman with a person other than the
offender's wife or husband. Rowe v. Rowe, 575 So. 2d 584, 586 (Ala. Civ.
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App. 1991).4 Jason first argues that, as to the period before the filing of his
divorce complaint in December 2018, the evidence was insufficient to
prove that he committed adultery. April disagrees.
This Court has recognized that adultery is rarely capable of direct
proof but that caution is warranted when evaluating circumstantial
evidence of adultery:
"It is a fundamental principle of the law of divorce that
direct proof of adultery by evidence of eyewitnesses is not
required, for, on account of the secret nature of the act, it is
seldom susceptible of proof except by circumstantial evidence.
However, its stigma is so degrading and humiliating and its
legal consequences so serious, that the courts should never
accept as sufficient proof of the commission of the act of
adultery anything less than circumstances such as would lead
the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the
conclusion that the act of adultery has been committed." 
Rudicell v. Rudicell, 262 Ala. 41, 44, 77 So. 2d 339, 342 (1955). "[T]he proof
4The term "adultery" had essentially the same meaning two
centuries ago when the Legislature enacted the State of Alabama's
original divorce statute, which included adultery as a ground. See "An Act
Concerning Divorce" § 1, Ala. Acts 1820, at p. 79; Noah Webster, An
American Dictionary of the English Language, "Adultery" (1828)
("[v]iolation of the marriage bed"; "sexual intercourse of any man, with a
married woman, is ... adultery in both"; "such intercourse of a married
man, with an unmarried woman, is ... adultery of the man"; "the
unfaithfulness of any married person to the marriage bed").
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must be such as to create more than a mere suspicion, but be sufficient to
lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just mind to the
conclusion of adultery as a necessary inference." Maddox v. Maddox, 281
Ala. 209, 212, 201 So. 2d 47, 49 (1967). 
Two of this Court's cases will suffice to illustrate when evidence is
insufficient to meet this standard. In Hilley v. Hilley, 275 Ala. 617, 157
So. 2d 215 (1963), a wife visited with her alleged paramour while she was 
on vacation with her two children. During the trip, she called the husband
to get permission to send the children back home by plane. This Court
held that these facts were insufficient to prove adultery. In Maddox v.
Maddox, 281 Ala. 209, 201 So. 2d 47 (1967), a witness saw a wife stop her
car at a point north of Cullman. A car occupied by a man was stopped at
the same place. The two cars then proceeded to Falkville, and then the
wife and the man traveled to Decatur in one car, where they entered a
motel. About an hour later, the witness drove by and saw the car still at
the motel. Again, this Court held the evidence insufficient. See also
Fowler v. Fowler, 636 So. 2d 433, 435-36 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (holding
evidence insufficient when, among other things, husband had made
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numerous and lengthy (almost daily) telephone calls to alleged paramour,
including long-distance collect calls, calls at unusual times and from
public telephones, calls while he was on business out of state, calls from
the parties' lake cabin, and calls while attending an out-of-state football
game with the wife; when husband had denied calling alleged paramour;
when alleged paramour had visited the lake cabin and the marital
residence; when husband had visited alleged paramour's apartment three
times and given her flowers and a gift; and when husband had shunned
wife in several ways); Turner v. Turner, 210 So. 3d 603, 606-07 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2016) (holding evidence insufficient when husband had seen wife
talking with alleged paramour at at least one of child's sports games and
husband testified that, during time leading up to wife's filing of divorce
complaint, wife had engaged in " 'a lot of secretness, texting and on the
phone all the time' ").
Similarly, here the evidence of Jason's prefiling conduct was
insufficient to prove adultery. Although April testified that telephone-
account records showed many calls or text messages between Jason and
Alexandra and that April had a "gut feeling" that something was amiss,
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that evidence alone was insufficient under our precedent to rise above a 
"suspicion" of adultery.
B. Postfiling adultery
Jason next contends that adulterous conduct after the filing of a
divorce complaint is not a ground for divorce under Alabama law. On the
other hand, April argues that postfiling adultery was a proper ground here
because evidence of that adultery was before the circuit court and because
her counterclaim was amended to conform to that evidence, by implied
consent, under Rule 15(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.
In enumerating adultery as one of the grounds for divorce, the
relevant statute provides:
"The circuit court has power to divorce persons from the bonds
of matrimony ... for the causes following:
"....
"... For adultery."
§ 30-2-1(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975. Notably, the language of the statute simply
refers to "adultery" and does not specify that it must occur before the
filing of the divorce complaint. Moreover, nothing about the legal meaning
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of adultery -- voluntary sexual intercourse of a married man or woman
with a person other than the offender's wife or husband -- implies that it
does not apply after a divorce complaint is filed. A husband and wife are
legally married until a divorce judgment is entered, see 24 Am. Jur. 2d
Divorce & Separation § 373 (2018), so the filing of the complaint does not
remove such conduct from the category of adultery.
Further, unlike the ground of adultery, certain other grounds within
§ 30-2-1(a) do specify that the facts supporting the ground must be present
before the filing of the complaint:
"(3) ... voluntary abandonment from bed and board for
one year next preceding the filing of the complaint.
"....
"(8) ... when the other [spouse], after marriage, shall have
been confined in a mental hospital for a period of five
successive years, if such party from whom a divorce is sought
is hopelessly and incurably insane at the time of the filing of
the complaint ....
"....
"(12) In favor of the wife when the wife has lived, or shall
have lived separate and apart from the bed and board of the
husband for two years and without support from him for two
years next preceding the filing of the complaint ...."
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§ 30-2-1(a) (emphasis added). "[W]e presume that a difference in wording,
especially in provisions within similar statutes, reflects a difference in
meaning." Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth., 982 So. 2d 484, 488
(Ala. 2007); see 2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Sutherland
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46:6 (7th ed. 2019-2020 Supp.)
(discussing inference of difference in meaning when "a legislature includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it from another
section of the same or a related act" or based on the legislature's "omission
of the same term or phrase from a similar section"). Subdivisions (3), (8),
and (12) quoted above make clear that, as to grounds that the Legislature
found appropriate to limit to prefiling conduct, "it knew how to do so,"
Edwards v. Kia Motors of Am., Inc., 8 So. 3d 277, 281 (Ala. 2008). And "[i]t
is not proper for a court to read into the statute something which the
legislature did not include although it could have easily done so." Noonan
v. East-West Beltline, Inc., 487 So. 2d 237, 239 (Ala. 1986). "The judiciary
will not add that which the Legislature chose to omit." Ex parte Jackson,
614 So. 2d 405, 407 (Ala. 1993). Accordingly, the language of § 30-2-1(a)
does not indicate that postfiling adultery is excluded from this ground for
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divorce.
Jason relies on decisions of the Court of Civil Appeals that have
distinguished between prefiling and postfiling adultery. As will be seen
below, those decisions ultimately relied on earlier decisions of this Court.
To grasp the import of this Court's earlier decisions, however, it is first
necessary to understand the era of court procedure in which they were
decided, an era very different from our own.
Before 1973, Alabama cases in equity were handled under a different
type of court procedure from cases at law. See Jenelle Mims Marsh,
Alabama Law of Damages § 11.4 (6th ed. 2012). And divorce cases were
governed by equity procedure. John Shipley Tilley, Tilley's Alabama
Equity § 345 (1954). In equity procedure, a case was initiated by filing a
"bill" (the rough equivalent of today's complaint). Id. § 48; Rule 2, Ala. R.
Equity (repealed). And composing a bill was a demanding process. The
"stating section" had to "contain averment of every fact which ... [would]
enable the [trial] court to arrive at a proper settlement of the issues."
Tilley, supra, § 48. That is, the bill had to "set forth ... every material
averment of fact necessary to [the] complainant's right of recovery."
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McDonald v. Mobile Life Ins. Co., 56 Ala. 468, 470 (1876); Majors v.
Killian, 230 Ala. 531, 534, 162 So. 289, 292 (1935). Facts not alleged in the
bill could not be a basis for relief; they " '[we]re deemed not to exist.' "
Tilley, supra, § 50 (quoting Cullman Prop. Co. v. H.H. Hitt Lumber Co.,
201 Ala. 150, 154, 77 So. 574, 578 (1917)); see Bone v. Lansden, 85 Ala.
562, 564, 6 So. 611, 612 (1888) ("Chancery does not grant relief in the
absence of appropriate averments."); Equitable Mortg. Co. v. Finley, 133
Ala. 575, 578-79, 31 So. 985, 985-86 (1902) (explaining this general
principle of equity procedure; "[P]roof without averment is not available
for relief.").
Thus, in that procedural era, the evidence at trial had to conform to
the bill's allegations. Tilley, supra, § 48. The evidence was "never ...
allowed to supply omissions and defects in the [allegations]." McDonald,
56 Ala. at 470; Majors, 230 Ala. at 534, 162 So. at 292. Consequently, "the
allegations [had to] be such as to justify presentation of the evidence."
Tilley, supra, § 48.5
5A party could file an amended bill to conform to the evidence, so
long as the amendment did not "work[] a radical departure" from the
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All of that changed in 1973. In that year, this Court merged law and
equity procedure when the Court adopted the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Rule 2, Ala. R. Civ. P.; id., Committee Comments on 1973
Adoption. See generally Frank W. Donaldson & Michael Walls, Merger of
Law and Equity in Alabama - Some Considerations, 33 Ala. Law. 134,
134-41, 148-50 (1972). (The Legislature had specifically authorized this
merger two years earlier. See Act No. 1311, Ala. Acts 1971.) The Rules
also made a "drastic change[]" to the relationship between pleadings and
evidence in cases formerly governed by equity procedure. Rule 15,
Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption, 2d para. Under the Rules,
"[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings." Rule 15(b). Thus, "where evidence is
introduced or an issue raised with the express consent of the other party,
or without objection from him, the pleadings 'shall' be deemed amended
original bill. Rudulph v. Burgin, 219 Ala. 461, 463, 122 So. 432, 433
(1929); see Rule 28, Ala. R. Equity (repealed); Tilley, supra, § 65; Pitts v.
Powledge, 56 Ala. 147, 149-50 (1876); McCrory v. Guyton, 164 Ala. 365, 51
So. 312 (1910); Farmer v. Hill, 243 Ala. 543, 11 So. 2d 160 (1942).
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to conform to such evidence." Committee Comments, supra (quoting Rule
15(b)). Accordingly, since 1973, the strict requirement of equity procedure
that the evidence conform to the pleadings no longer exists, when
nonconforming evidence is admitted without objection.
In divorce cases, the effect of this procedural change is significant.
Now, "Rule 15(b) ... authorizes a trial court to grant the divorce upon
unrequested grounds when supported by sufficient evidence." 1 Judith S.
Crittenden & Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Alabama Family Law 5:2 (2008).
Accordingly, in a case involving the ground of cruelty, the Court of Civil
Appeals explained: "Although there was no specific allegation of cruelty
in the complaint for divorce, the trial court had the authority under [Rule]
15(b) to grant the divorce upon unrequested grounds so long as there [was]
sufficient support in the evidence for the decree." Lassitter v. Lassitter,
371 So. 2d 918, 919 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979).
With that historical background in mind, we turn to examine this
Court's cases addressing postfiling adultery. In Morrison v. Morrison, 95
Ala. 309, 10 So. 648 (1892), a husband filed a bill for divorce based on
adultery. There was evidence that the wife committed adultery before the
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bill was filed and that she cohabited with the alleged paramour both
before and after the bill was filed. This Court noted that the evidence of
postfiling cohabitation "[was] admissible to show a previous adulterous
intercourse." 95 Ala. at 310, 10 So. at 648. The Court cited three criminal
cases involving convictions of adultery or fornication, in which this Court
had held that evidence of the defendant's postindictment conduct was
admissible only to shed light on the defendant's preindictment conduct.
See id. (citing Lawson v. State, 20 Ala. 65 (1852); Smitherman v. State, 40
Ala. 355 (1867); Alsabrooks v. State, 52 Ala. 24 (1875)). Those criminal
cases' holdings reflected the due-process principle that a person cannot be
criminally convicted for uncharged conduct. See generally 16C C.J.S.
Constitutional Law § 1643 (2015). By citing those criminal cases, Morrison
indicated its reliance on the analogous principle, under the old equity
procedure, that the evidence had to conform to the bill.
This Court's reliance on strict equity procedure was further
demonstrated in Scott v. Scott, 215 Ala. 684, 112 So. 218 (1927). There, a
husband presented evidence that apparently suggested both prefiling and
postfiling adultery by the wife. This Court held that the evidence of
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postfiling adultery was admissible only to show prefiling adultery because,
necessarily, only prefiling adultery was alleged in the bill:
"While evidence tending to show acts of illicit sexual
intercourse between the [wife] and [the alleged paramour]
subsequent to the filing of the bill was admissible[] when
offered in connection with or subsequent to the introduction of
evidence tending to show adulterous intercourse between the
parties during the time covered by the averments of the bill,
the right to relief must rest upon proof of the adulterous
intercourse charged in the bill."
215 Ala. at 684, 112 So. at 218 (emphasis added). The Court cited
Morrison, thus indicating that it had been decided on the same procedural
basis.
Next, a procedural variation on this fact pattern came before this
Court in Rudicell v. Rudicell, 262 Ala. 41, 77 So. 2d 339 (1955). A wife filed
a bill for divorce on the ground of cruelty. Later, the husband filed a cross-
bill (the rough equivalent of today's counterclaim) for divorce on the
ground of adultery. There was evidence of cruelty by the husband after the
filing of the wife's bill, and there was evidence of the wife's relationship
with the alleged paramour after the filing of the husband's cross-bill.
Regarding both of those aspects of the evidence, this Court noted that
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"[s]uch evidence was admissible but the right to a decree of divorce could
not be rested thereon." 262 Ala. at 43, 77 So. at 341. The Court then
quoted the above-quoted language of Scott. Notably, the Court also cited
a Maryland case,  Renner v. Renner, 177 Md. 689, 12 A.2d 195 (1940). In
Renner, the Maryland court explained the procedural reason why, at that
time, a divorce judgment could not be grounded on postfiling adultery:
"In the Ecclesiastical Courts of England, either party to a
divorce suit was allowed to enter supplemental proceedings to
show that acts of adultery had been committed by the other
party after the commencement of litigation, and a decree could
be obtained thereon. But in most of the American Courts the
rules of Equity practice have been applied to actions for
divorce with the result that adultery committed by a defendant
subsequent to institution of suit can not be used as the basis
for a decree. Maryland has followed the prevailing view that
testimony as to acts of adultery by a defendant after
institution of suit is inadmissible. This rule can not be evaded
by amendment or by a supplemental bill; no engrafting of a
new cause can be made upon the original action. To make such
evidence admissible, the existing suit for divorce should be
dismissed by consent of the Court, and a new action should be
instituted."
177 Md. at 690, 12 A.2d at 198 (emphasis added). Later in the Rudicell
opinion, this Court reiterated this equity-procedure limitation on evidence
of postfiling adultery: "[T]he evidence of subsequent acts is admissible as
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tending to explain evidence already introduced in reference to the act
originally charged." 262 Ala. at 44, 77 So. at 343 (emphasis added).
This Court's final case addressing postfiling adultery was decided a
decade before the 1973 procedural changes discussed above. In Hilley v.
Hilley, 275 Ala. 617, 157 So. 2d 215 (1963), a wife filed a bill for divorce
on the ground of fear of violence. The husband answered (but did not file
a cross-bill), opposing the divorce by alleging that the wife had committed
adultery.  The husband presented evidence showing that the wife
committed adultery about two months after the bill was filed. Again
emphasizing the equity-procedure limitations on evidence of postfiling
conduct, this Court noted: 
"This evidence was relevant and admissible to
corroborate proof of adultery ... prior to [the filing of the bill]
.... 
"But, in the absence of proof of adultery prior to the date
of filing suit for divorce, we are controlled by ... Rudicell ...." 
275 Ala. at 621, 157 So. at 220. The Court then quoted the portions of
Rudicell and Scott discussed above. Thus, Morrison, Scott, Rudicell, and
Hilley were all decided on the same procedural basis.
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Accordingly, this Court's earlier treatment of postfiling adultery was
rooted in that procedural era's requirement that, in equity proceedings
(including divorce actions), all evidence had to conform to the facts
pleaded in the bill, and thus the judgment could not be based on events
that occurred after the filing of the bill. As discussed above, that
procedural stricture was eliminated in 1973 by the adoption of Rule 15(b).
Therefore, the procedural basis for this Court's earlier treatment of
postfiling adultery no longer exists.
Notably, before other states adopted modern civil procedure, their
courts similarly held or suggested that postfiling conduct could not be a
ground for divorce. See Thomas v. Thomas, 208 Ark. 20, 22-23, 184 S.W.2d
812, 813 (1945) (adultery); Renner v. Renner, 177 Md. 689, 690, 12 A.2d
195, 198 (1940) (adultery); Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 111, 112-14 (1869)
(adultery); Segelbaum v. Segelbaum, 39 Minn. 258, 260, 39 N.W. 492, 494
(1888) (cruelty); Campbell v. Campbell, 69 A.D. 435, 74 N.Y.S. 979 (1902)
(adultery); Brown v. Brown, 142 W. Va. 695, 708, 97 S.E.2d 811, 819
(1957) (habitual drunkenness). But several states now permit divorce
based on postfiling conduct, specifically citing their adoption of modern
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rules of civil procedure. See Milne v. Milne, 266 Ark. 900, 904, 587 S.W.2d
229, 232 (Ct. App. 1979) (general statement); Scherer v. Scherer, 150 So.
2d 496, 497-98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (adultery; rejecting Thomas);
Clifford v. Clifford, 354 Mass. 545, 546-47, 238 N.E.2d 522, 523-24 (1968)
(adultery; rejecting Thayer); Schmitt v. Schmitt, 9 N.J. Super. 470, 75
A.2d 480 (Ch. Div. 1950) (adultery); Otto v. Otto, 220 A.D. 130, 220 N.Y.S.
513 (1927) (adultery; rejecting Campbell); Sanford v. Sanford, 2 Pa. D. &
C.2d 603, 609-10 (Pa. C.P., Delaware Cnty. 1955) (indignities). As an
American Law Reports author summarized in the midst of that
nationwide procedural transition, "the problem [of whether postfiling
conduct can be a ground for divorce] is largely controlled by pleading
practice, which has, in many jurisdictions, been modified in fairly recent
times." B. Finberg, Annotation, Acts Occurring After Commencement of
Suit for Divorce as Ground for Decree Under Original Complaint, 98
A.L.R.2d 1264, § 1 n.2 (1964).
Therefore, the language of the divorce-grounds statute, the legal
definition of adultery, and this Court's precedent read in procedural
context do not support a substantive rule that postfiling adultery cannot
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be a ground for divorce. Rather, under Rule 15(b), if adultery that
occurred after the filing of the operative pleading is tried by consent,
whether express consent or consent implied by the absence of a proper
objection,6 then that adultery is properly a ground for divorce.
We now turn to examine the Court of Civil Appeals' cases addressing
the issue of postfiling adultery. Jason relies on Smith v. Smith, 599 So. 2d
1182 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991), for the proposition that postfiling adultery
cannot constitute a ground for divorce. In Smith, a wife filed a complaint
for divorce, and, four months later, the husband counterclaimed for
divorce on the ground of adultery. The evidence regarding the wife's
adultery included events that occurred before and after the filing of the
wife's complaint. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the divorce could
6In general, a failure to object to admission of evidence that supports
an unpleaded issue allows that issue to be deemed tried by consent. See
Scrushy v. Tucker, 70 So. 3d 289, 314 (Ala. 2011). An exception exists for
when that evidence, in addition to being relevant to the unpleaded issue,
is relevant to a pleaded issue; in such a case, a party's failure to object or
to seek limitation of the evidence's relevance does not imply consent to
trial of the unpleaded issue. Cf. McCollum v. Reeves, 521 So. 2d 13, 17
(Ala. 1987); Koch v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 565 So. 2d 226, 229 (Ala.
1990). Jason does not assert this exception, so we have no occasion to
address its applicability in this case.
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not be grounded on postfiling adultery: "[I]ncidents of adultery subsequent
to the filing of the divorce petition are admissible to corroborate evidence
of adultery prior to the date of filing, but the subsequent incidents cannot
be the sole basis to grant the divorce." Id. at 1184. The court cited Hilley
and Vail v. Vail, 360 So. 2d 985 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); in Vail, the court
had relied on Rudicell and Hilley for the same proposition. Under the facts
of Smith, the court held that the relevant filing was the husband's
counterclaim rather than the wife's complaint. Thus, the court appears to
have treated this Court's earlier preclusion of postfiling adultery as if it
were a substantive rule, rather than an application of equity procedure.
Notably, the Court of Civil Appeals did not discuss the effect of the 1973
adoption of Rule 15(b) or its concept of trial by consent, nor did the court
mention whether that effect had been argued by any party.
Jason also cites Ragan v. Ragan, 655 So. 2d 1016 (Ala. Civ. App.
1995), in which the Court of Civil Appeals repeated that postfiling
adultery "[could ]not be the sole basis for granting a divorce on the ground
of adultery," id. at 1018, citing Smith. The husband admitted that he
committed adultery after the parties separated, but he apparently did not
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state whether that adultery occurred before or after the divorce complaint 
was filed. The court held that that and other evidence was insufficient  to
prove prefiling adultery. Again, the court did not mention Rule 15(b).
Finally, Jason points us to Turner v. Turner, 210 So. 3d 603 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2016). There, the evidence of prefiling adultery by the wife was
minimal, as detailed in part III.A of this opinion, although she admitted
postfiling adultery. The court recited that postfiling conduct could not
support the ground of adultery, again without addressing Rule 15(b).
In addition to those cases, the Court of Civil Appeals has relied on
its prefiling/postfiling distinction as to adultery in several other cases. See
Vail, reversed on other grounds, 360 So. 2d 992 (Ala. 1978); Duke v. Duke,
457 So. 2d 432, 433-34 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Zinnerman v. Zinnerman,
803 So. 2d 569, 574-75 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); Morgan v. Morgan, 183 So.
3d 945, 955-56 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014); cf. Mosley v. Mosley, 747 So. 2d 894,
898-99 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (applying this distinction to adultery as a
misconduct factor in property-division analysis). Those decisions likewise
did not discuss Rule 15(b) and trial by consent.
Nevertheless, in the present case the Court of Civil Appeals seems
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to have recognized the effect of Rule 15(b). In its order affirming the
judgment, immediately before citing the statutory ground of adultery, the
court cited Rule 15(b). Thus, it appears that the court now acknowledges
that, in a case like this one, postfiling conduct may support the ground of
adultery if it is tried by consent.
Accordingly, nothing in the decisions of the Court of Civil Appeals
persuades us that this Court's pre-1973 decisions implied a substantive
rule that postfiling conduct can never be a basis for the ground of
adultery. Rather, as the Court of Civil Appeals may now have recognized,
no such substantive rule exists, and the procedural basis for this Court's
earlier distinction between adultery before and after filing has been
abrogated by Rule 15(b)'s concept of trial by consent. Thus, to the extent
that the Court of Civil Appeals' prior decisions can be read as inconsistent
with this recognition, we disapprove them.
In this case, Jason does not dispute that he committed adultery
during the pendency of the divorce case and before trial. Indeed, he
admitted as much at trial, and he later filed Alexandra's affidavit
testifying to the same. Thus, under Rule 15(b), the ground of adultery,
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based on Jason's postfiling conduct, was before the circuit court by Jason's
implied consent, and the court did not err by basing its divorce judgment
on this ground.7 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals
affirming the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.
IV. Conclusion
Neither the language chosen by the Legislature within the divorce-
grounds statute nor this Court's precedent, read in light of modern civil
procedure, requires that adultery as a ground for divorce be limited to
conduct before the commencement of the divorce proceeding. Thus,
adultery that occurs after the operative pleading is filed and before a
divorce is granted may be deemed to have been tried by consent if
evidence of that adultery is admitted without objection by the defending
7Jason also contends that the circuit court erred by inequitably
dividing the marital property. Jason's certiorari petition, however,
expressly disclaimed that issue, and any conflict with precedent arising
out of it, as a basis for review. Jason's petition, at pp. 7-8 n.1. Therefore,
this Court's order issuing the writ of certiorari did not grant review as to
that issue, and we will not consider it. See Ex parte State Dep't of
Revenue, 993 So. 2d 898, 899-900 (Ala. 2008) ("The [petitioner] did not
challenge in its petition the Court of Civil Appeals' [particular ruling in
question]; therefore, we did not grant certiorari review on that ground,
and we cannot review it.").
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spouse and is properly considered by the trial court. In this case, the
circuit court properly considered and based its judgment on undisputed
evidence of postfiling adultery. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment
of the Court of Civil Appeals.
AFFIRMED.
Mitchell, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.
Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ.,
concur in the result.
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result).
 I join all but Part III.A. of the main opinion.  I agree that the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the procedural strictures that
once barred courts from granting divorce based on postfiling adultery. 
The main opinion's historical analysis on this point is thorough and
compelling, and I would affirm the judgment on this basis alone.  I write
specially only because I do not believe Part III.A. of the opinion is
necessary to decide this case.  For that reason, I take no position on the
analysis or conclusions in that portion of the opinion, and likewise reserve
judgment about whether the cases cited in that part were correctly
decided.  
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