Case Title: Stever v. Wainwright

Citation: 2020-Ohio-1452

Docket Number: 2019-1041

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Stever v. Wainwright, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1452.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-1452 
STEVER, APPELLANT, v. WAINWRIGHT, WARDEN, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Stever v. Wainwright, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1452.] 
Habeas corpus—Evidence refuted petitioner’s claim that trial court had lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction over case involving offense committed by 
petitioner when petitioner was a juvenile—Court of appeals’ judgment 
dismissing petition affirmed. 
(No. 2019-1041—Submitted December 10, 2019—Decided April 15, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County, No. 9-18-25. 
___________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Stanley J. Stever, appeals the judgment of the Third 
District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  We 
affirm. 
Facts and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} In 1987, Stever was charged in the Wyandot County Court of 
Common Pleas with the aggravated murder of Estella Heck.  Stever was a juvenile 
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when he committed the offense.  Stever pleaded guilty to the offense and was 
sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after he had served 20 
years. 
{¶ 3} On August 27, 2018, Stever filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
in the Third District against appellee, Lyneal Wainwright, warden of the Marion 
Correctional Institution, arguing that he was entitled to immediate release because 
the court of common pleas  had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his case 
since it had not commenced in the Wyandot County Juvenile Court and there had 
not been filed in the juvenile court a (1) complaint, (2) motion to transfer 
jurisdiction to the court of common pleas, (3) judgment entry finding probable 
cause, or (4) judgment entry transferring jurisdiction to the court of common pleas.  
Stever attached as evidence a letter that he had received from the deputy clerk of 
the juvenile court informing him that “[t]he court does not have a case in 1987 for 
you.” 
{¶ 4} The warden filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), 
arguing that Stever’s unsupported statements were insufficient to overcome the 
presumption of regularity of the court proceedings and that Stever’s claims were 
not cognizable in a habeas corpus action.  The court of appeals denied the motion 
to dismiss and ordered the warden to file a return of writ showing why the 1987 
judgment of conviction is not a nullity and void ab initio due to the trial court’s lack 
of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
{¶ 5} The warden filed a return of writ, stating that Stever’s claims were 
false and presenting nine exhibits showing that (1) a juvenile-delinquency 
complaint had been filed on June 4, 1987, (2) the juvenile court had held a detention 
hearing, (3) Stever had been ordered by the juvenile court to be examined by the 
Forensic Diagnostic Center for purposes of relinquishment of jurisdiction, and (4) 
a bindover hearing had been conducted on October 29, 1987 and jurisdiction had 
been transferred to the court of common pleas. 
January Term, 2020 
 
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{¶ 6} On June 20, 2019, the court of appeals dismissed the complaint, 
determining that “the premise of Petitioner’s claim is false and, thus, the trial 
court’s 1987 judgment of conviction and sentence is not void ab initio for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.” 
{¶ 7} In three propositions of law, Stever asks this court to reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Analysis 
{¶ 8} To prevail on a habeas corpus claim alleging that a trial court lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction, a habeas petitioner must establish that the lack of 
jurisdiction was “patent and unambiguous.”  Ross v. Saros, 99 Ohio St.3d 412, 792 
N.E.2d 11, ¶ 14. 
{¶ 9} In proposition of law No. I, Stever argues that the court of common 
pleas had not acquired subject-matter jurisdiction, because he had not been placed 
into juvenile custody, a juvenile complaint had not been filed, and there had been 
no bindover hearing before his case was transferred to the court of common pleas.  
But the warden presented evidence proving otherwise.  Thus, the court of appeals 
correctly determined that the premise of Stever’s claim is false and that “the trial 
court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction.”  Accordingly, we 
reject proposition of law No. I. 
{¶ 10} In proposition of law No. II, Stever argues that the court’s failure to 
maintain his records in accordance with R.C. 2152.71(A) shows that “nothing was 
ever filed in this case or boundover, and therefore [the court of common pleas] 
could have never properly obtained jurisdiction.” 
{¶ 11} R.C. 2152.71(A)(1) states: 
 
 
The juvenile court shall maintain records of all official cases 
brought before it, including, but not limited to, an appearance 
docket, a journal, and, in cases pertaining to an alleged delinquent 
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child, arrest and custody records, complaints, journal entries, and 
hearing summaries. 
 
First, R.C. 2152.71(A)(1) was enacted in 2002, well after Stever appeared in 
juvenile court.  See 2002 Am.H.B. No. 393.  Second, despite any alleged deficiency 
in maintaining Stever’s juvenile-court records, nothing prohibited the warden from 
using copies of Stever’s records to refute his claim that they had never existed.  
Thus, we reject proposition of law No. II. 
{¶ 12} In proposition of law No. III, Stever argues that the court of appeals 
should not have considered the nine exhibits refuting his claims, because the court’s 
consideration of them violated Evid.R. 301 and 1005.  Stever did not, however, 
raise this issue in the court of appeals, so he has waived it on appeal to this court.  
See State ex rel. Gibson v. Sloan, 147 Ohio St.3d 240, 2016-Ohio-3422, 63 N.E.3d 
1172, ¶ 10; Phillips v. Irwin, 96 Ohio St.3d 350, 2002-Ohio-4758, 774 N.E.2d 1218, 
¶ 6.  Thus, we reject proposition of law No. III.  
 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
 
Stanley J. Stever, pro se. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Stephanie L. Watson, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
_________________