Case Title: Stucco Plus, Inc. v. Rose

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
STUCCO PLUS, INC. v. Donald ROSE and Second
Injury Trust Fund

96-256                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 17, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- review of court of appeals case. -- When the supreme
     court grants review following a decision by the court of
     appeals, it reviews the case as though the appeal was
     originally filed with the supreme court.

2.   Workers' compensation -- Second Injury Fund -- Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-
     525(b)(5) prohibits consideration of total disability when determining
     employer's liability for benefits. -- Where the Workers'
     Compensation Commission reasoned that but for his June 1990
     injury and the corresponding 13% disability, appellee employee
     would not be permanently disabled, and, therefore, appellant
     employer should be responsible for 13% of the total
     disability, the supreme court held that the Commission's
     reasoning was flawed because it completely disregarded Ark.
     Code Ann.  11-9-525(b)(5)'s requirement that the last injury
     be considered alone and of itself and instead included the
     last injury and its contribution to the total disability;
     section 11-9-525(b)(5) clearly and unambiguously prohibits
     such consideration of the total disability when determining
     the employer's liability for benefits.

3.   Workers' compensation -- Second Injury Fund -- Commission's public-policy
     rationale regarding Fund's solvency was misplaced. -- The supreme court
     held that the Workers' Compensation Commission's reliance on
     what it called the public policy of protecting the solvency of
     appellee Second Injury Fund was misplaced; there was simply no
     evidence in the record of appellee Fund's solvency or
     insolvency, and therefore any concern in that regard was
     premature.

4.   Statutes -- construction -- clear and unambiguous statute given plain and
     ordinary meaning. -- The supreme court gives the language of a
     clear and unambiguous statute its plain and ordinary meaning.

5.   Workers' compensation -- Second Injury Fund -- provisions of Ark. Code Ann.
      11-9-525 clear and unambiguous. -- When a statute is plain and
     unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory
     construction; it is clearly expressed in Ark. Code Ann.  11-
     9-525 that the purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to fully
     compensate an employee for his total injuries while
     simultaneously protecting employers from having to pay for
     injuries that did not occur while the employee was working for
     that employer; the statute clearly and unambiguously provides
     for the Second Injury Trust Fund to make up the balance of the
     employee's total benefits and the employer's share.

6.   Workers' compensation -- Second Injury Fund -- payments from both employer
     and Fund within same period not prohibited. -- The supreme court
     determined that the language of Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-525(b)
     simply did not prohibit payments from both an employer and the
     Fund within the same period.

7.   Workers' compensation -- Second Injury Fund -- employer's liability for
     benefits limited to work-related injury considered alone and of itself --
     Fund held liable for balance of total disability benefits. -- The
     supreme court interpreted Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-525(b)(5) to
     mean that appellant employer's liability for appellee
     employee's benefits was limited to his work-related injury
     occurring in June 1990, considered alone and of itself; the
     court further interpreted section 11-9-525(b)(5) to mean that,
     after appellant's payment of its weekly liability, appellee
     Second Injury Fund must pay the balance of Rose's total
     disability benefits.

8.   Attorney's fees -- computation of fees due from employer in Second Injury
     Fund case. -- Where an employer demonstrates that it is liable
     for only a portion of a worker's present disability within the
     meaning of Second Injury Fund legislation, attorney's fees due
     from the employer should only be computed upon the basis of
     the amount of the employer's liability for benefits, not upon
     the amount of total disability benefits; an employer's
     liability for attorney's fees is limited to the amount of
     benefits awarded from injuries occurring while the worker was
     employed by that employer.


     Petition for Review from the Arkansas Court of Appeals;
reversed and remanded.
     Shaw, Ledbetter, Hornberger, Cogbill & Arnold, by: James A.
Arnold II and E. Diane Graham, for appellant.
     Lawrence W. Fitting, P.A., for appellee Donald Rose.
     Terry Pence, for appellee Second Injury Fund.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice. 
     Appellant Stucco, Incorporated, appeals the decision of the
Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission holding that Stucco is
liable for benefits to its employee, Appellee Donald Rose, at the
total disability benefits rate, that the liability of Appellee
Second Injury Trust Fund does not begin until Stucco's liability is
paid out, and that Stucco is responsible for an attorney's fee on
the difference between Rose's total disability benefits and
permanent partial disability benefits.  The Arkansas Court of
Appeals affirmed the Commission's decision.  Stucco, Inc. v. Rose,
52 Ark. App. 42, 914 S.W.2d 767 (1996).  We granted Stucco's
petition for review of that decision, which was decided by a tie
vote.  When we grant review following a decision by the court of
appeals, we review the case as though the appeal was originally
filed with this court.  Maloy v. Suttgart Memorial Hosp., 316 Ark.
447,