Case Title: State v. Robbins

Citation: 

Docket Number: S055396

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: July 3, 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent
on Review,
v.
JENNIFER LYNN ROBBINS,
Petitioner
on Review.
(CC
050545301; CA A130659; SC S055396)
En Banc
On review from the
Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted
May 13, 2008.
Kristin A. Carveth,
Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
petitioner on review.  With her on the briefs was Peter Gartlan, Chief
Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem.
Susan G. Howe, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause and filed the briefs for
respondent on review.  With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
BALMER, J.
The order of the Court
of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.
*Appeal from Multnomah
County Circuit Court, Marshall L. Amiton, Judge. Order of Dismissal dated June
25, 2007; Order on Reconsideration dated September 26, 2007.
BALMER, J.
In this case, the Court of Appeals
dismissed an appeal from a criminal conviction because defendant, Jennifer Lynn
Robbins, had missed a single appointment with her probation officer while her
appeal was pending.  We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in its
interpretation of the rule of appellate procedure upon which it relied in
dismissing defendant's appeal, and we reverse the order of dismissal.
Defendant was charged with one count
of possession of a controlled substance.  Defendant moved to suppress certain evidence,
but the trial court denied the motion.  Defendant then was convicted in a
stipulated facts trial.  On November 15, 2005, the trial court entered a judgment
of conviction and sentence, sentencing defendant to (among other things) 13
months' probation.  Defendant appealed.
In August 2006, the trial court held
a show cause hearing to determine whether defendant had violated the terms of her
probation.  The court concluded that she had, because she admitted that she had
used drugs. (1) 
Because of the probation violation, the trial court extended her probation
until August 2007 and (among other things) ordered "strict
compliance" with the other conditions of probation.  Defendant had an
appointment to meet her probation officer on September 12, 2006.  She missed
the appointment.  Four days later, on September 16, 2006, defendant was
arrested for possession of methamphetamine.
On September 28, 2006, the trial
court entered an order and judgment revoking defendant's probation.  That
judgment was based, in part, on defendant's stipulation that she had failed to
report to her probation officer as required -- specifically, that she had failed
to appear for the September 12, 2006, appointment.  The judgment also was based
on defendant's stipulation that she had failed to complete required treatment
and had failed to make required financial payments.  The trial court sentenced
defendant to 90 days in jail.  She served that sentence in 2006.
Over six months later, in May 2007,
the state moved to dismiss defendant's pending appeal of her criminal conviction. 
The state relied on ORAP 8.05(3), which provides, in part:
"If a defendant in a criminal case * * *,
on appeal of an adverse decision, escapes or absconds from custody or
supervision, the respondent on appeal may move for dismissal of the appeal.  If
the appellant has not surrendered at the time the motion is decided by the
court, the court may dismiss the appeal * * *."
The state's motion was based primarily on defendant's
admission that she had failed to report to her probation officer on September
12, 2006, although the state noted other ways in which defendant allegedly had
failed to comply with the terms of her probation.  The state contended that
defendant had "absconded" from the supervision of her probation
officer.
Defendant opposed the motion to
dismiss, arguing that the only plausible basis for dismissal was the missed appointment
on September 12, 2006, and that the other allegations of probation violations were
irrelevant to the state's claim that she had absconded from supervision.  As to
the appointment, she argued that "absconds" in ORAP 8.05(3) means a
conscious effort to avoid custody or supervision and that missing a single
appointment does not show such a conscious effort.  Defendant's counsel submitted
an affidavit stating that defendant had missed the appointment due to illness
and that defendant had left messages to that effect with her probation officer.
The Court of Appeals granted the state's
motion and entered an order of dismissal.  It concluded that defendant had
absconded "because she failed to meet with her probation officer as
directed, and failed to keep her probation officer apprised of her
whereabouts."  Defendant petitioned the Court of Appeals to reconsider
that order.  Defendant renewed her contention that missing a single appointment
did not show a conscious effort to avoid custody or supervision.  She also argued
that the Court of Appeals had erred in concluding that she had failed to keep
her probation officer apprised of her whereabouts and that, even if she had
violated her probation in that way, that failure would not support the state's
claim that she had absconded.  Finally, defendant argued that, even if she had
absconded within the meaning of the rule, she subsequently had "surrendered,"
thereby precluding dismissal of her appeal more than six months later.
The Court of Appeals granted the
petition to reconsider and modified its prior order, but it reaffirmed the decision
to dismiss.  The court vacated that part of the prior order that relied on defendant's
failure to keep her probation officer apprised of her whereabouts.  However,
the court concluded that the failure to meet with a probation officer, standing
alone, constituted a conscious effort to avoid custody or supervision and
therefore justified dismissal of the appeal.  The court also held that defendant's
arrest on unrelated charges four days after she had missed her appointment did
not amount to a "surrender" under ORAP 8.05(3), and thus did not
provide a basis for her to argue that she had surrendered before the court had
decided the dismissal motion.  Defendant filed the present petition for review,
which we allowed.
On review, defendant renews her
arguments that missing a single appointment with a probation officer does not
justify dismissal of an appeal under ORAP 8.05(3) and that her arrest counts as
having "surrendered" under the rule.  More broadly, defendant argues
that, if the rule does reach her conduct, then it exceeds both the inherent
power of the appellate courts to control proceedings before them and their
statutory authority to "make and enforce all rules necessary for the
prompt and orderly dispatch of the business of the court."  See ORS
2.120 (so providing regarding Supreme Court); ORS 2.560(2) (identical text used
to describe rulemaking power of Court of Appeals).
The state contends that defendant did
"abscond" when she failed to meet the conditions of her probation --
particularly the requirement that she attend scheduled appointments with her
parole officer -- and that her arrest did not constitute a
"surrender" under ORAP 8.05(3).  The state also argues generally that
the rule's failure to define the terms "absconds" and "surrendered"
reveals an intent to give the Court of Appeals "broad discretion"
regarding the enforcement of the rule.
We begin with the text of the rule itself,
part of which we quoted above.  ORAP 8.05(3) provides:
"If a defendant in a criminal case, a
petitioner in a post-conviction relief proceeding, a plaintiff in a habeas
corpus proceeding, a petitioner in a parole review proceeding, or a petitioner
in a prison disciplinary case, on appeal of an adverse decision, escapes or
absconds from custody or supervision, the respondent on appeal may move for
dismissal of the appeal.  If the appellant has not surrendered at the time the
motion is decided by the court, the court may dismiss the appeal or judicial
review.  If the court has not been advised otherwise, the court may assume that
the appellant has not surrendered when the court considers and decides the
motion."
The issue is whether defendant "abscond[ed]
from * * * supervision." (2) 
Neither the Oregon Rules of Appellate Procedure nor the Oregon statutes define
the word "abscond," so we turn to other sources.  The dictionary
defines "abscond" as:
"to depart secretly : withdraw and hide oneself * * * ;
specif : to evade the legal process of a court by hiding within or
secretly leaving its jurisdiction."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 6 (unabridged ed
2002).  Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed 2004) offers a similar
definition:  "To depart secretly or suddenly, esp. to avoid arrest,
prosecution, or service of process."  Id. at 7.  The words used to
define "abscond" all refer to some kind of conduct that a person
engages in with a particular intent -- "depart secretly,"
"withdraw * * * oneself," "hide oneself,"
"evade," "avoid."  For a person to "abscond," then,
it is not sufficient that the person simply engage in some course of action (or
inaction); the person must do so with the conscious intent to hide from or
otherwise evade legal process.
That conclusion is consistent with
the related word used in ORAP 8.05(3), "escape."  That term means:
"to get away (as by flight or conscious effort) : break
away, get free, or get clear ."
Webster's at 774.  See also Black's Law Dictionary
583 (defining "escape" as: "[t]he act or an instance of * * *
breaking free from confinement, restraint, or an obligation").  As with
"abscond," the word "escape" (in this context) combines the
act of movement from one place to another with the intent to "get
away" or "break free."  As an initial proposition, we conclude
that "abscond" requires a showing of some kind of conscious intent to
evade or avoid legal process.
That conclusion is consistent with
the context in which earlier cases discussed the dismissal of a criminal
defendant's appeal when the defendant has fled the jurisdiction.  The Oregon Rules
of Appellate Procedure have authorized appellate courts to dismiss the appeals
of escaped or absconded appellants only since 1994.  See Chief Justice
Order No. 93-091 (dated Oct 20, 1993) (adopting amendments to Oregon Rules of
Appellate Procedure -- including a predecessor of the rule at issue here -- effective
January 1, 1994).  This court, however, recognized the court's inherent authority
to dismiss such appeals much earlier than that.  In City of Portland v.
Parchen, 113 Or 209, 231 P 980 (1925), the defendant had been arrested for
violating a city ordinance.  After the defendant had appealed to this court,
the trial court entered an order requiring him either to appear in person or to
perfect his appeal by securing a bond.  But the defendant never appeared, did
not secure a bond, and was "a fugitive from justice."  Id. at
210.  This court described the "substantial and just rule that courts will
not hear an appeal while the appellant is fleeing from justice."  Id. 
In that case, however, the court dismissed the appeal for a different reason, concluding
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a conviction for violating
a city ordinance.  Id. at 210-11.
The court next considered the rule in
State v. Broom, 121 Or 202, 253 P 1044 (1927).  In that case, the
defendant, following his conviction, had posted a bail bond pending appeal.  He
later failed to surrender himself to custody, because he was in jail in a
different county for another offense.  Before completing that other jail
sentence, defendant escaped.  This court characterized the defendant as a
"fugitive from justice," id. at 206, a term that it defined as
meaning "[a] person who commits a crime within a state and withdraws
himself from such jurisdiction, without waiting to abide the consequences of
such act[.]"  Id. at 205 (internal quotes omitted).  The court then
reviewed in detail cases from other jurisdictions regarding the discretion to
dismiss the appeal of an escaped defendant.  Id. at 206-08.  The
defendant's posting of a bail bond did not affect the applicability of that
rule, the court held, because bail constituted constructive custody over the
defendant.  Id. at 208-09.  This court stated:
"[W]e are unqualifiedly committed to the doctrine
announced by the highest authorities and the most eminent criminal law-writers
of America, that, when it satisfactorily appears to the appellate court that a
convicted criminal has fled from the jurisdiction of the court, it is within
the power of that court to refuse to hear his appeal."
Id. at 210. (3)
Most recently, this court dismissed a
petition for review in State v. Smith, 312 Or 561, 822 P2d 1193 (1992). 
In that case, the defendant was on probation.  The defendant allegedly had
"fail[ed] to remain under the supervision and control of the Probation
Department" and "fail[ed] to truthfully report monthly at times and
in a manner specified by the Probation Department."  Id. at 563
(internal quotes omitted).  The trial court had issued both an order to show
cause why defendant's probation should not be revoked and a bench warrant, and
the state considered him "a fugitive from justice."  Id.  Defendant's
lawyer did not disagree with those facts.  Id.  After briefly reviewing Broom
and Parchen, and emphasizing the references in those cases to the term "fugitive
from justice," the court concluded:
"No persuasive reason has been given why
this court should proceed to decide the merits of this criminal case after
defendant has failed to make himself available for probation supervision as
required by the trial court on his conviction.  Although defendant's absconding
from probation does not deny this court the power to review his case, we, in
our discretion, decline to call upon the resources of this court for a review
of his case."
Id. at 564.
As the court noted in Smith,
the failure to comply with the supervision requirements of probation may
justify a determination that a defendant has absconded.  But, as we discussed
earlier, the definitions of "abscond" and "escape" both
show that the purpose behind the defendant's actions are key -- the defendant
must intend to evade justice by flight, by hiding, by avoiding probation
supervision, or by some combination of those actions.  That conclusion is
further confirmed by this court's earlier cases asserting discretion to dismiss
an appeal when a defendant has become a "fugitive from justice," the
term "fugitive from justice" being used in all three cases.
In the end, our review of the text of
the rule and this court's case law confirm that the dictionary definition of
"abscond" accurately reflects the requirements of ORAP 8.05(3).  In
determining whether a defendant has absconded from supervision, appellate
courts must consider whether the defendant's acts show the intent that inheres
in the definition of "abscond" -- not simply that the defendant failed
to attend one meeting with a probation officer or could not be located for a
brief period of time, but that the defendant sought to "evade the legal
process of a court by hiding within or secretly leaving its
jurisdiction."  Webster's at 6.  Moreover, as our prior cases
reflect, the "legal process" sought to be evaded may include
compliance with the terms of one's sentence, including the defendant's conduct
in "mak[ing] himself available for probation."  Smith, 312 Or
at 564.
Usually, of course, an appellate
court has no direct way to discern a defendant's intent in taking particular
actions.  But a court may infer intent from the nature of the defendant's acts
themselves.  As this court has noted in connection with the intent requirements
for crimes generally:
"Evidence of a defendant's intent is
rarely, if ever, proven by direct evidence.  Intent is an operation of the
mind, and it is seldom susceptible of direct proof.  This subjective fact is
usually established by a consideration of objective facts, and from these
objective facts an ultimate conclusion is drawn."
State v. Rose, 311 Or 274, 282, 810 P2d 839 (1991)
(citation omitted).  This court did exactly that in Smith, where it
inferred the necessary evasive intent from the defendant's conduct in failing
to report monthly to his probation officer, the trial court's issuance of a
show cause order for revocation of probation, the trial court's issuance of a
bench warrant and the state's assertion, undisputed by defense counsel, that
defendant was a "fugitive from justice."  312 Or at 564.
Similarly, in many cases, an
appellate court reasonably can infer from a defendant's actions that the defendant
intended to evade probation supervision because the defendant hid or secretly left
the jurisdiction or because a pattern of violations permits the inference that
the defendant is intentionally evading the legal process.  Here, however, the
Court of Appeals dismissed defendant's appeal solely because defendant had
missed a single appointment with her probation officer.  The court could not
infer the required intent from so little:  A single missed appointment is not
enough to conclude that defendant was hiding or that she sought to evade the
court's jurisdiction.  Neither, for that matter, does missing a single
probation appointment, standing alone, make a defendant a "fugitive from
justice."
The state nevertheless argues that,
because ORAP 8.05(3) does not define such terms as "abscond" and "escape,"
the Court of Appeals has been granted "broad discretion in determining
whether an appellant had become a fugitive."  We disagree.  It is true
that this court and the Court of Appeals have discretion to decide whether to
dismiss an appeal if the defendant has escaped or absconded, but that
discretion does not extend to determining the meaning of the words of the
rule.  The absence of a specific definition for a term that appears in a rule does
not mean that the term is an empty vessel, to be filled with whatever meaning a
court chooses.  This court has held that a court's task in interpreting an
administrative rule is to ascertain the intent of the body that promulgated the
rule, beginning with an examination of the text and context of the rule.  Marshall's Towing v. Department of State Police, 339 Or 54, 62, 116 P3d 873 (2005). 
Although the Oregon Rules of Appellate Procedure are not administrative rules
subject to the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, ORS
183.325 to 183.410, but rather are adopted by a joint order of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals
pursuant to the statutory authority previously cited, we see no reason not to
apply the same interpretive method here, and we have done so.  We reject the
state's argument that the Court of Appeals has "broad discretion" in
its interpretation of ORAP 8.05(3).  The meaning of the word
"abscond" does not vary with the discretion of the court.
That said, we emphasize that our
ruling today is limited to the interpretation and application of ORAP 8.05(3),
because the state's motion to dismiss and the Court of Appeals orders at issue
here rely only on that rule.  We do not address the authority of an appellate
court to dismiss an appeal as a sanction for misconduct.  See Pruett
and Pruett, 185 Or App 669, 678, 60 P3d 1094, rev den, 335 Or 443
(2003) (dismissing appeal because "defendant has deliberately and
repeatedly flouted the trial court's contempt judgments by failing to surrender
to authorities to serve his jail sentence").  Moreover, because we
conclude that defendant did not "abscond" for purposes of ORAP
8.05(3), we need not consider her argument that her appeal should not be
dismissed because she had "surrendered" within the meaning of that
rule by the time the Court of Appeals decided the motion to dismiss or her
claim that the rule, if interpreted to permit the dismissal of her appeal,
exceeds the appellate courts' statutory authority to make rules regarding the
appellate process.
The order of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
1. The state had alleged that defendant had violated her probation in
other ways -- in particular, by failing to report to her probation officer --
but the trial court made no findings on those allegations.
2. The
state does not contend that defendant "escaped from custody or
supervision."
3. Nevertheless, this court did not exercise its discretion to dismiss
in Broom; this court already had heard the case on the merits and
concluded that the conviction should be affirmed.  Id. at 210.