Case Title: HONORABLE v. AMERICAN WYOTT CORP.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-10-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
HONORABLE v. AMERICAN WYOTT CORP.2000 WY 18411 P.3d 928Case Number: 00-21Decided: 10/03/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
ROY HONORABLE, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),v. AMERICAN WYOTT CORPORATION, Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Laramie County The Honorable Edward L. Grant, 
Judge

Representing 
Appellant: Bernard Q. Phelan of 
Phelan-Watson Law Office, Cheyenne, Wyoming.Representing Appellee: 
Michael P. Hutchins of Karger Key Barnes & Springer, LLP, Irving, Texas; 
Bruce S. Asay of Associated Legal Group, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. 
Asay.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1] In this 
case a terminated "at-will" employee appeals the district court's summary 
judgment order entered in the employer's favor in the employee's wrongful 
dismissal action based upon a promissory estoppel theory. We are asked to decide 
whether concededly legally sufficient disclaimer language contained in an 
acknowledgement form signed by the employee when he received an employee 
handbook prevents later oral representations of job security made to the 
employee and a medical leave provision in the employee handbook from attaining 
"promise" status. We hold that it does, and we affirm.

[¶2] The 
discharged employee has stated two versions of the single issue 
presented:

[¶3] Is 
promissory estoppel applicable in a wrongful discharge action where an "at-will" 
employee, relying on a clearly written policy promising authorized unpaid 
medical leave, is terminated for job abandonment because he justifiably utilized 
the policy?

[¶4] 
Or:

[¶5] Does an 
"at-will" disclaimer preclude recovery under the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
where an employee takes authorized leave and is then terminated for job 
abandonment?

[¶6] The 
employer has responded with this statement of the issues:

1) Did the trial court 
correctly rule that the appellant did not establish a cause of action for 
promissory estoppel?

2) Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion by granting the appellant's motion for leave to amend his 
complaint with a claim of promissory estoppel?1

[¶7] We state 
the facts in the light most favorable to Honorable. The employer, American Wyott 
Corporation, is a food service equipment company. It hired Honorable on or about 
January 23, 1996, at which time it gave him its employee handbook and an 
employee acknowledgement form which he read and signed. The form acknowledges 
his receipt of the employee handbook and also contains these pertinent 
provisions:

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE 
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK IS A GENERAL GUIDE ONLY AND THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS MANUAL 
DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT OR ALTER MY STATUS AS AN "AT-WILL" 
EMPLOYEE, NOR DO SUCH PROVISIONS ESTABLISH ENFORCEABLE POLICIES OR 
PROCEDURES.

I UNDERSTAND THAT NO 
SUPERVISOR OR MANAGER HAS THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE ORAL PROMISES OR CONTRACTS WITH 
REGARD TO MY EMPLOYMENT OR THE COMPANY'S POLICIES OR PROCEDURES AND THAT I 
SHOULD NOT RELY UPON ANY REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING MY EMPLOYMENT STATUS UNLESS 
MADE IN WRITING AND SIGNED BY ONE OF THE PRINCIPALS, VICE PRESIDENT OF FINANCE, 
OR PERSONNEL.

I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT 
THE COMPANY RESERVES THE RIGHT TO UNILATERALLY RETRACT, REVOKE, OR CHANGE THE 
PROVISIONS OF THIS HANDBOOK AT ANY TIME.

[¶8] The 
employee handbook contains various provisions relating to working conditions, 
employee benefits, and employment policies, one of which concerns medical leave. 
It reads:

[¶9] Medical 
Leave includes some period of disability during which the employee is unable to 
work. Employees who request leave for medical reasons may use accrued vacation 
to cover part of their absence from work. When this type of leave is exhausted, 
employees are initially entitled to unpaid Medical Leave of up to 90 days, with 
possible extensions upon Management approval for up to one year. Periods of 
unpaid Medical Leave will be considered time worked for seniority and 
benefit-entitlement purposes. Every effort will be made to place employees 
returning from Medical Leave in the same or equivalent job position depending on 
the availability of such positions. If no such position is available at the time 
the employee desires to return to work then leave will be extended until such 
time as a suitable position is available. Pregnancy will be treated in the same 
manner as any other illness or disability.

[¶10] At some 
point in the summer of 1996, a doctor tentatively diagnosed Honorable as having 
tuberculosis. Honorable provided his employer's Director of Human Resources with 
a written document from his doctor indicating that Honorable needed to be absent 
from work pending a determination whether the tuberculosis was contagious. 
According to Honorable, the Director of Human Resources told him that his "need 
to take off work" was acceptable to his employer. According to Honorable, "it 
had always been made clear by people at [the company] that since it was 
necessary for me to be off work due to my diagnosis that such was acceptable to 
[the company], not a cause for my termination, and I would return to work." 
Moreover, Honorable states he took unpaid medical leave "with the implied 
promise made by those that [sic] I dealt with that upon release by my physician 
that I could return . . . ." Honorable's doctor determined that Honorable did 
not have contagious tuberculosis; Honorable returned to work with his doctor's 
written release to work. The Director of Human Resources informed Honorable, 
however, that his position had been filled and Honorable terminated under a "no 
call no show" determination.

[¶11] Relying on 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel2 to support his claim of wrongful 
dismissal, Honorable contends that the medical leave provision in the employee 
handbook and the oral representations of the Director of Human Resources that 
Honorable could take unpaid medical leave under that provision and return to his 
job constitute "promises" upon which he reasonably relied. Although Honorable 
acknowledges that his legal position is tenuous in light of this Court's 
precedent, he declares "this case is a direct effort to invoke the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel in circumstances where a formalistic contractual analysis 
defeats the plaintiff's claim - but results in an 
injustice."

[¶12] Under the 
employment-at-will rule in Wyoming, "an employer may dismiss an at-will employee 
at any time for a good reason, a bad reason, or for no reason at all." 1 Henry 
H. Perritt, Jr., Employee Dismissal Law and Practice § 1.1 at 3 n. 1 (4th ed. 
1998); and see Boone v. Frontier Refining, Inc., 987 P.2d 681, 685 (Wyo. 1999), 
and Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d 25, 27 (Wyo. 1984). This 
Court has acknowledged, however, that oral representations or employment 
handbook provisions concerning job security directed to employees may modify the 
"at-will" rule. See Davis v. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc., 934 P.2d 1246, 
1249-50 (Wyo. 1997); Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1996). 
But, we have consistently held that such modification may be avoided by a 
conspicuous and unambiguous disclaimer. Bouwens v. Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941 
(Wyo. 1999); Loghry, 927 P.2d  at 710.

[¶13] Honorable 
does not challenge the district court's decision that the disclaimer language 
placed by his employer in the employee acknowledgement form is conspicuous and 
unambiguous and, therefore, legally sufficient to prevent modification of his 
"at-will" employment status. As pertinent to the significant facts in this case, 
that language told the employee that (1) only signed written representations 
about his "at-will" status made "by one of the principals, vice president of 
finance, or personnel" would constitute a promise on which the employee could 
rely; and (2) the employee handbook provisions (such as the medical leave 
provision) neither constitute a contract, nor alter the employee's at-will 
status, nor establish an enforceable policy. We conclude that Honorable's 
valiant argument fails to present any factual or legal justification for 
departing from our strong precedent. Following our precedent, as we must, we 
hold that the employer's disclaimer language prevented any oral representations 
made to Honorable and the medical leave provision in the employee handbook from 
being promises for the purpose of invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
"Consequently, the first necessary element of the promissory estoppel doctrine 
is missing." Bouwens, 974 P.2d  at 947.

[¶14] This Court 
affirms the summary judgment entered below.

FOOTNOTES

1 The 
employer did not file a notice of appeal on this separate issue; therefore, we 
do not have jurisdiction to consider it. Because of our decision on the single 
issue presented, however, the absence of jurisdiction on this separate issue is 
of no consequence.

2 The 
elements of that doctrine are captured in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
90(1) (1981), which states: A promise which the promisor should reasonable 
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third 
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice 
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach 
may be limited as justice requires.

See 
Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706, 710 (Wyo. 1996); Hanna State & 
Savings Bank v. Matson, 53 Wyo. 1, 16, 77 P.2d 621, 625 
(1938).