Case Title: Esser Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc. Breach of an oral contract and unjust enrichment

Citation: 

Docket Number: 33232

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2008-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 33232 
 
ESSER ELECTRIC, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
LOST RIVER BALLISTICS 
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
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Idaho Falls, October 2007 Term 
 
2008 Opinion No.  66 
 
Filed: May 15, 2008 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for Butte County.  The Hon. James C. Herndon, District Judge. 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
James Annest, Burley, for appellant. 
 
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey Chartered, Pocatello, for respondent.  Carol 
Tippi Volyn argued. 
 
 
 
EISMANN, Chief Justice. 
 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On December 23, 2003, Esser Electric, Inc., (Esser Electric) filed a verified complaint 
against Lost River Ballistic Technologies, Inc., (Lost River) seeking to recover for labor and 
materials it provided in performing electrical work in a building located in Arco.  Esser Electric 
was at that time represented by attorney Lary Sisson.  The complaint sought to recover for 
breach of an oral contract and unjust enrichment.  In its answer, Lost River admitted that it had 
entered into both an oral contract and a written contract with Esser Electric and alleged it had 
paid all sums due in full.  It asserted that Esser Electric had failed to perform the work according 
to the applicable code requirements and had over billed for the work done.  In addition to 
denying that it owed any additional sums, Lost River also counterclaimed for breach of contract, 
fraud, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Esser Electric filed a 
reply denying the material allegations in the counterclaim. 
 
On July 2, 2004, Lost River filed a motion for summary judgment.  It supported the 
motion with the affidavit of its president and with requests for admissions that were deemed 
admitted because Esser had not responded to them.1  The motion was set for hearing on 
September 22, 2004. 
 
On July 23, 2004, attorney Sisson on behalf of Esser Electric filed a motion to withdraw 
or amend some of the admissions.  He also filed an objection to the motion for summary 
judgment in which he stated that if the motion to withdraw or amend the admissions is granted, 
the motion for summary judgment should be denied.  He scheduled his motion to be heard on 
September 22, 2004, the same date as the oral argument on Lost River’s motion for summary 
judgment.  Attorney Sisson did not file any affidavits controverting allegations made in the 
affidavit of Lost River’s president, nor did he object to that affidavit. 
 
The district court heard both motions and took them under advisement.  On November 2, 
2004, the district court issued an opinion granting Lost River’s motion for summary judgment in 
part.  It determined, based upon the affidavit of Lost River’s president, that Esser Electric was 
not entitled to recover anything on its complaint and that Lost River had established liability on 
its counterclaims.  The only issue remaining to be tried was the amount of damages, if any, that 
Lost River was entitled to recover on its counterclaims.  Because it had granted Lost River’s 
motion for summary judgment based upon the affidavit of its president, the district court held 
that Esser Electric’s motion to amend or withdraw its admissions was moot. 
 
The damages were tried to a jury on April 5, 2005, and it awarded damages in the sum of 
$33,123.75.  After the trial, Esser Electric filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the 
jury’s award of damages appeared to have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice, that the damages were unsupported by the evidence, and that there were errors in law 
in the district court’s evidentiary rulings.  It also filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict.  Prior to argument on that motion, Sisson withdrew as counsel for Esser Electric and 
James Annest appeared on its behalf.  Both motions were heard and denied by the district court.  
                                                 
1 Lost River served the requests for admissions on Esser Electric on March 22, 2004.  Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a) 
in effect in 2004 provided that a request for admission was deemed admitted if a written answer or objection was not 
served within fifteen days upon the party who had served the request(s) for admission(s). 
 
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The district court also awarded Lost River costs and attorney fees totaling $23,551.37, resulting 
in a total judgment of $56,675.12.  Esser Electric timely filed a notice of appeal. 
 
II.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 
Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to Lost River where Esser 
Electric’s attorney Lary Sisson had failed to respond to the motion? 
2. 
Did the district court err in considering the affidavit of Lost River’s president in granting 
the motion for summary judgment? 
3. 
Did the district court err in failing to consider Esser Electric’s verified complaint insofar 
as it controverted the affidavit of Lost River’s president? 
4. 
Did the district court err in giving a jury instruction requested by Esser Electric’s 
counsel? 
5. 
Did the district court err in failing to grant either Esser Electric’s motion for a new trial or 
its motion for a judgment n.o.v on the ground that Lost River had waived the claimed 
defects by ratifying the contracts? 
6. 
Is Lost River entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to either Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3) or § 12-121? 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Did the District Court Err in Granting Lost River’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
where Esser Electric’s Attorney Lary Sisson Had Failed to Respond to the Motion? 
 
Esser Electric’s attorney Lary Sisson did not present any sworn statements in opposition 
to Lost River’s motion for summary judgment.  As a result, the district court granted partial 
summary judgment holding that Esser Electric was not entitled to recover on its complaint and 
that Lost River was entitled to recover damages on its counterclaims.  On appeal, Esser Electric 
contends that the district court should have refused to grant summary judgment because of the 
gross misfeasance of its counsel.  It points out that defendants in criminal cases have the right to 
effective assistance of counsel.  It argues that we should create a similar right in civil cases 
where counsel’s errors have deprived a party of the right to a fair trial on all or some of the issues 
in the case. 
 
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 In 1906 this Court addressed the issue of whether parties against whom a judgment had 
been entered could obtain equitable relief on the ground that they had been unable to present a 
full and complete defense due to the negligence and unskillfulness of their counsel.  We held that 
they could not.  In so holding, we quoted with approval from 1 Black on Judgments, section 375, 
as follows:  “It is well settled that equity will not relieve against a judgment at law on account of 
any ignorance, unskillfulness, or mistake of the party’s attorney (unless caused by the opposite 
party) nor for counsel’s negligence or inattention.  The fault in such cases is attributed to the 
party himself.”  Donovan v. Miller, 12 Idaho 600, 606, 88 P. 82, 83 (1906). 
 
Most recently, in Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 151 P.3d 818 (2007), a party to 
the litigation argued that she should be relieved from a mediation agreement because she would 
not have entered into the agreement but for her attorney’s failure to properly advise her on the 
applicable law.  Citing the Donovan v. Miller case, we rejected her argument, stating, “She 
voluntarily chose her attorney and cannot avoid the consequences of any failure on his part to 
advise her of the applicable law.”  143 Idaho at 627, 151 P.3d at 823. 
 
For over 100 years this Court has held that a party is not entitled to relief from a 
judgment on the ground that the judgment was entered due to the negligence or unskillfulness of 
the party’s attorney.  Esser Electric has not convinced us that we should change that policy.  
Therefore, it is not entitled to a new trial on the ground that its counsel committed misfeasance in 
failing to respond adequately to the motion for summary judgment. 
 
B.  Did the District Court Err in Considering the Affidavit of Lost River’s President in 
Granting the Motion for Summary Judgment? 
 
Lost River’s motion for summary judgment was supported by the affidavit of its 
president.  Esser Electric did not object to that affidavit in the trial court.  On appeal, Esser 
Electric contends that the district court erred in relying upon it because it did not comply with 
Rule 56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  That rule states, “Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein.”  “The party offering the evidence must also affirmatively show that the witness is 
competent to testify about the matters stated in his testimony.  Statements that are conclusory or 
speculative do not satisfy either the requirement of admissibility or competency under Rule 
 
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56(e).”  Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002) 
(citations omitted).  Esser Electric contends that the district court should not have considered the 
affidavit of Lost River’s president because it contained hearsay and conclusory statements. 
 
A trial court has the discretion to decide whether an affidavit offered in support of or 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is admissible under Rule 56(e), even if that issue 
is not raised by one of the parties.  Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994).  
However, we have not required the trial court to rule on the admissibility of the affidavit when 
there is no objection to it.  If there is no timely objection, the trial court can grant summary 
judgment based upon an affidavit that does not comply with Rule 56(e).  State, Dept. of Agric. v. 
Curry Bean Co. Inc., 139 Idaho 789, 86 P.3d 503 (2004) (conclusory affidavit); Tolmie Farms, 
Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 607, 862 P.2d 299 (1993) (statements containing hearsay 
and lacking adequate foundation); East Lizard Butte Water Corp. v. Howell, 122 Idaho 679, 837 
P.2d 805 (1992) (statements lacked adequate foundation).  Because Esser Electric did not object 
to the affidavit of Lost River’s president, the district court did not err in relying upon it when 
granting Lost River’s motion for summary judgment. 
 
C.  Did the District Court Err in Failing to Consider Esser Electric’s Verified Complaint 
Insofar as It Controverted the Affidavit of Lost River’s President? 
 
Esser Electric argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
because at least some of the allegations in the affidavit of Lost River’s president were 
controverted by allegations in Esser Electric’s verified complaint.  A motion for summary 
judgment can be countered by sworn statements in the record that comply with Rule 56(e) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 820 P.2d 360 (1991).  Those 
statements can be in affidavits, depositions, or in a verified pleading.  Id.  They can also be 
statements that were already in the record prior to the filing of the motion for summary 
judgment.  Id.  However, in this case Esser Electric’s original attorney did not call the district 
court’s attention to the fact that the complaint was verified or argue that it was sufficient to 
oppose the summary judgment. 
 
In response to Lost River’s argument that there were no affidavits opposing its motion for 
summary judgment and that it was entitled to judgment dismissing the complaint and 
establishing liability on the counterclaims, Esser Electric’s original attorney argued as follows: 
 
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MR. SISSON:  I would not, first attacking the issue of summary judgment, 
in the – in Rule 56(c), talking about that, it says, “The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” 
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Now, its your position this morning that you’re 
entitled to rely upon your pleading? 
 
MR. SISSON:  That’s correct, Your Honor.  We cannot – it’s our position 
that, first of all, that we have to take a whole – the whole totality of the file, 
including pleadings, admissions, so on and so forth, to determine summary 
judgment. 
 
Second of all, if we’re operating under the theory that Mr. Erickson is 
going under, we’re essentially circumventing the opportunity for our client to 
place his, his, his claims before a trier of fact.  We’re essentially not allowing him 
to present the merits of his action. 
 
We’d also note that case law shows that in a motion for summary 
judgment, all facts and inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving 
party.  Obviously that would be the plaintiff in this case. 
 
Like I said, in regards to summary judgment, this is an attempt by the 
defense to circumvent having a jury listen to our claims; allowing us to present 
our claims in a jury – before a jury, who is the ultimate trier of fact; and have 
them determine whether there was a breach of contract, if Mr. Esser was at fault, 
or Lost River Ballistics was at fault, who was at fault. 
 
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Esser Electric’s original counsel did 
not expressly mention the verified complaint.  He simply quoted a portion of one sentence in 
Rule 56(c) and argued that granting Lost River’s motion for summary judgment was merely an 
attempt to prevent Esser Electric from presenting its claims to a jury. 
The entire sentence in Rule 56(c) from which Esser Electric’s original counsel quoted 
reads, “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  When 
faced with a motion for summary judgment, a trial court must look at the pleadings in the case to 
determine whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The trial court must examine the pleadings to determine what issues are raised in the 
case.  The only issues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the pleadings.  
Vanvooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440, 111 P.3d 125 (2005); Lexington Heights Dev., LLC v. 
Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 92 P.3d 526 (2004); Beco Constr. Co. v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 
Idaho 859, 865 P.2d 950 (1993); Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 719 P.2d 1185 (1986).  The 
trial court must also examine the pleadings to determine whether all or only some issues raised in 
 
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the pleadings have been placed at issue by the motion for summary judgment.  The trial court 
may not decide an issue not raised in the moving party’s motion for summary judgment, 
Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 39 P.3d 612 (2001), and it must determine whether the 
moving party has shown that there is a lack of any genuine issue of material fact as to each issue 
raised by the motion, Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 987 P.2d 300 (1999).  
Finally, the trial court must examine the pleadings to determine what allegations have been 
admitted by the parties.  There is no genuine issue of material fact as to issues admitted by the 
parties in their pleadings.  McKee Bros., Ltd. v. Mesa Equip., Inc., 102 Idaho 202, 628 P.2d 1036 
(1981). 
In this case, the district court’s opinion shows that the district court did examine the 
pleadings to determine the issues raised.  There is no indication, however, that the court noticed 
that the complaint was verified.  The verification was on a page following the prayer for relief.  
Esser Electric’s counsel did not argue below that the verified complaint was sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.  Therefore, we will not consider it 
on appeal.  Sprinkler Irrig. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 85 P.3d 667 
(2004) (argument that verified complaint furnished sufficient, material facts to rebut a motion for 
summary judgment would not be considered on appeal where it was not argued below). 
There is a valid reason for requiring a party to argue to the trial court that a verified 
pleading should be considered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.  To be 
considered, a verified pleading must satisfy the requirements of Rule 56(e), just as would an 
affidavit or deposition testimony.  It must be “made on personal knowledge,” “set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence,” and “show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein.”  In addition, the party offering the verified pleading must 
affirmatively show that the person who verified it is competent to testify about the matters stated 
therein.  Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002).  
Statements in a verified pleading that are conclusory or speculative would not satisfy either the 
requirement of admissibility or competency under Rule 56(e).  Id.  Requiring that the proponent 
of the verified pleading argue that it should be considered by the court gives an opposing party 
an opportunity to object to its consideration on the ground that it does not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 56(e).  The trial court can then rule on its admissibility.  In its opening brief 
 
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on appeal, Esser Electric admitted, “Whether the verification satisfies the requirements of rule 
56(e) is questionable.” 
In addition, the trial court is not required to search the record looking for evidence that 
may create a genuine issue of material fact; the party opposing the summary judgment is 
required to bring that evidence to the court’s attention.  Coeur d’Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat’l 
Bank of North Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026 (1990) (where trial court denied motion for 
summary judgment but specified what material facts existed without substantial controversy 
pursuant to Rule 56(d), it did not err in denying motion to reconsider the specification of 
uncontroverted facts where the moving party did not bring relevant deposition testimony to the 
trial court’s attention).  Where Esser Electric’s counsel did not argue to the district court that the 
verified complaint should be considered as a sworn statement in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment, we will not consider on appeal whether the district court erred in failing to 
do so.  
 
D.  Did the District Court Err in Giving a Jury Instruction Requested by Esser Electric’s 
Counsel? 
 
Esser Electric’s trial counsel requested a jury instruction specifying the applicable 
measure of damages if the jury determined that Lost River was entitled to recover damages.  The 
district court gave an instruction that was in substance identical to that requested by Esser 
Electric’s trial counsel.  It stated that the damages recoverable were the cost of bringing the work 
done by Esser Electric into compliance with the applicable electrical, building, and plumbing 
codes.  Esser Electric now contends that the instruction was incorrect because it did not instruct 
the jury regarding the correct measure of damages.  It is unnecessary for us to evaluate Esser 
Electric’s challenge to the jury instruction. 
 “[O]ur cases clearly reject the notion that one may assert as error the court’s instructing 
in language which that person has specifically requested the court to give, regardless of whether 
it was a correct statement of the law.”  McBride v. Ford Motor Co., 105 Idaho 753, 762, 673 
P.2d 55, 64 (1983); Accord, Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 903 P.2d 
730 (1995) (party cannot argue on appeal that trial court erred in giving a jury instruction 
requested by that party); Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 555 P.2d 144 (1976) (party could not 
assign as error on appeal the giving of a jury instruction that was substantially identical to an 
 
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instruction requested by that party, regardless of whether the instruction was a correct statement 
of the law).  Since the instruction challenged was virtually identical to the one requested by Esser 
Electric, we will not consider this issue on appeal.      
 
E.  Did the District Court Err in Failing to Grant either Esser Electric’s Motion for a New 
Trial or Its Motion for a Judgment N.O.V. on the Ground that Lost River Waived the 
Claimed Defects by Ratifying the Contracts? 
 
1.  The motion for a new trial.  Esser Electric moved for a new trial on three grounds:  
(a) the jury awarded excessive damages that appeared to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice; (b) there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict; and (c) there were 
errors in law occurring at the trial.  The district court denied the motion on those grounds and 
Esser Electric does not challenge that denial on appeal.  Instead, it challenges the district court’s 
failure to address a different issue that Esser Electric raised for the first time in its briefing in 
support of the motion for a new trial. 
In its brief in support of the motion for a new trial, Esser Electric raised the contention 
that it was entitled to a new trial because Lost River had waived the claimed defects and fraud by 
ratifying the contracts.  Esser Electric did not raise that issue in its pleadings, nor did it argue that 
issue in response to the motion for summary judgment.  It first raised the issue after judgment 
had been entered on the jury’s verdict.  In its decision denying the motion for a new trial, the 
district court did not address the issue of ratification.  Esser Electric argues that the district court 
abused its discretion by failing to address the issue and that Esser Electric is entitled to a new 
trial because of it. 
Rule 59(a) lists several reasons for granting a new trial.  The reasons listed do not include 
that a new trial may be granted so the jury can consider issues the party did not raise until after 
the conclusion of the trial.  Therefore, there was no harm in the district court’s failure to address 
whether Esser Electric is entitled to a new trial so that the jury can consider the issue of 
ratification. 
 
2.  The motion for a judgment n.o.v.  Esser Electric moved for a judgment n.o.v. 
pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.  It based its motion upon the 
assertion “that the evidence was [of] insufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable 
minds could not reach the same conclusion as did the jury.”  The district court denied the motion, 
 
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and on appeal Esser Electric contends that it was entitled to a judgment n.o.v. because Lost River 
had waived the claimed defects and fraud by ratifying the contracts.  As mentioned above, that 
issue was not raised until after the trial.  The district court did not err in failing to grant the 
motion for a judgment n.o.v. 
 
F.  Is Lost River Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal Pursuant to Either 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) or § 12-121? 
 
Lost River seeks an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) on the ground 
that this is an action on a commercial transaction.  That statute provides, “In any civil action to 
recover . . . in any commercial transaction. . ., the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney’s fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.”  A commercial 
transaction is defined as “all transactions except transactions for personal or household 
purposes.”  I.C. § 12-120(3). 
 
The transaction between Esser Electric and Lost River was a commercial transaction.  
Esser Electric was to provide upgrades and improvements to a building used by Lost River in its 
business.  Esser Electric sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment seeking to recover 
sums it contended were still owing for the work it performed.  Lost River counterclaimed for 
breach of contract, fraud in billing under the parties’ agreements, and breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Esser Electric contends that only one of Lost River’s 
claims for relief was for breach of contract, and even the breach of contract could be viewed as 
negligence in performing the services required under the contract. 
 
“The critical test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the 
lawsuit; the commercial transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon 
which the party is attempting to recover.”  Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 704, 
874 P.2d 506, 515 (1993).  The gravamen of the claims at issue in this case arose out of the 
commercial transaction between Esser Electric and Lost River to improve Lost River’s 
commercial premises.  Esser Electric’s claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment were 
both to recover on the commercial transaction.  Willie v. Board of Trustees, Oneida School Dist. 
No. 351, 138 Idaho 131, 136, 59 P.3d 302, 307 (2002) (“Under I.C. § 12-120(3), the prevailing 
party in a civil action involving a commercial transaction based on a contract is entitled to an 
award of reasonable attorney fees”); Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 
 
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Idaho 466, 36 P.3d 218 (2001) (gravamen of an unjust enrichment claim can be a commercial 
transaction).  Contrary to Esser Electric’s assertion, Lost River’s counterclaim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a breach of contract claim.  Bakker v. Thunder 
Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 108 P.3d 332 (2005).  Thus, the counterclaim alleged two 
breach of contract claims, both of which arose out of the commercial transaction.  The third 
claim alleged by Lost River was for fraud.  When a claim for fraud is integral to the commercial 
transaction between the parties, attorney fees are awardable under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) to the 
prevailing party on that claim.  Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 
594 (2007); Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 141 Idaho 362, 109 P.3d 1104 (2005).  In this 
case, the claim for fraud was integral to the parties’ commercial transaction because it arose out 
of the manner in which Esser Electric billed for its work.  Thus, the gravamen of all of the claims 
alleged by both parties in this lawsuit was the commercial transaction between the parties.  As 
the prevailing party on appeal, Lost River is entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney fee 
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3).  Because we award fees under that statute, we need not address 
whether Lost River is also entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.  We award costs on appeal, including a 
reasonable attorney fee, to the respondent. 
 
 
Justices BURDICK, HORTON and Justice Pro Tem BUSH CONCUR. 
 
 
J. JONES, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur in the Court’s legal analysis of the issues presented on appeal in this case.  I 
disagree, however, with the conclusion reached in Part III.C. – that Esser Electric did not 
adequately bring its grounds for opposing the summary judgment to the district court’s attention.  
Under the circumstances presented, where Esser Electric’s counsel specifically identified the 
complaint as the basis for opposing the summary judgment, the district court should have looked 
at the entire complaint and noticed the verification page.   
 
During the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the district court inquired of 
Esser’s counsel, “Now, it’s your position this morning that you’re entitled to rely upon your 
 
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pleading?”  Counsel responded, “That’s correct, Your Honor.”  In its ruling on the motion, the 
court noted, “At oral argument, Esser explicitly relied upon its pleadings to support its opposition 
to Lost River’s motion for summary judgment.”  The memorandum opinion does not indicate 
whether the judge noticed the complaint contained a verification clause but a fair reading of the 
opinion would indicate that the court appeared to be of the view that opposition to a summary 
judgment must be by way of affidavits or depositions.  The court seems not to have been aware 
that a properly verified complaint can be the source of facts upon which a summary judgment 
can be opposed.  Sherer v. Pocatello School Dist. No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 490, 148 P.3d 1232, 
1236 (2006) (factual allegations in a verified complaint sufficient to raise genuine issue in 
summary judgment proceeding).   
Here, the district court was obviously aware of the complaint, as demonstrated by the 
colloquy at the summary judgment hearing, as well as six footnote references to the complaint in 
the court’s memorandum opinion granting summary judgment.  The complaint was only four 
pages long.  Had the district court checked to ensure that Esser had properly demanded a jury 
trial, it would have noticed the verification clause, as both were located on page 4.  The district 
court erred either in believing the complaint to be unverified or in believing something more than 
the verified complaint was required to oppose the motion for summary judgment.   
 
This is not a case where counsel opposing summary judgment failed to specifically 
highlight his pleading as the basis for opposing the summary judgment.  Nor is it the case, as 
sometimes happens, where the verification occurs in a later affidavit.  The complaint was 
identified as the basis for opposing the summary judgment, the district court made numerous 
references to the complaint, and the court should have examined the entire complaint.