Case Title: McChesney v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-63

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
McChesney v. State1999 WY 138988 P.2d 1071Case Number: 97-63Decided: 10/20/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
BENJAMIN Q. McCHESNEY, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Campbell County, The Honorable Terrence O'Brien, 
Judge.

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Assistant Appellate Counsel; 
and Jennifer Stone, Student Intern. Argument presented by Ms. Stone, 
representing appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Robin Sessions Cooley, Assistant Attorney 
General. Argument presented by Ms. Cooley, representing 
appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* JJ., and KALOKATHIS, 
D.J.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Benjamin 
McChesney entered a conditional plea of guilty to a charge of possession of 
marijuana with intent to deliver, reserving the right to appeal the denial of 
his motion to suppress evidence. McChesney argues that the police officer who 
stopped his car in response to an anonymous tip of erratic driving did not have 
a reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigatory stop. We agree and 
now reverse.

ISSUES

[¶2]      McChesney 
presents one issue for our review:

Whether the 
district court erred by denying appellant's motion to suppress all evidence 
obtained after his arrest because there was no reasonable articulable suspicion 
to justify an investigatory stop.

[¶3]      The State of 
Wyoming, as appellee, states the issue in this manner:

The district 
court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress based on the information 
provided by the citizen-witness caller and based on the officer's independent 
corroboration of the call and his observations of the vehicle's 
occupants[.]

FACTS

[¶4]      Because the 
arresting officer, Gillette Police Officer Eric Will, was the only witness to 
testify at the suppression hearing, the events leading to the stop of 
McChesney's vehicle are essentially undisputed. Around 10:20 a.m. on July 12, 
1996, Officer Will heard a dispatch broadcast over mutual aid radio. A highway 
patrol dispatcher was relaying an anonymous REDDI (Report Every Drunk Driver 
Immediately) report of erratic driving. The dispatch indicated that a red 
Mercury with temporary plates was weaving between lanes, passing cars, and 
slowing down in order to pass them again. The red Mercury, later determined to 
be driven by McChesney, was traveling east on Interstate 90 twenty-five miles 
west of Gillette. Will positioned himself to intercept the vehicle as it 
approached Gillette; he parked his vehicle in the I-90 median and waited. When 
asked why he waited for the vehicle, Officer Will 
testified:

Q. [BY 
PROSECUTOR] Okay. And why were you waiting for the vehicle to come 
by?

A. So that I 
could observe its driving and verify the information that I'd received over the 
radio.

Q. And what were 
you going to do if you saw this car, as far as verifying?

A. I was going 
to make sure - I was going to make sure that the vehicle did, in fact, match 
what - what I had heard over the radio and then follow the vehicle to see if any 
violations did, in fact, occur, and to possibly speak with the 
driver.

Q. Based on the 
broadcast, what kind of violations were you looking for, 
Officer?

A. Reckless 
driving, such as weaving. Increase, decrease in speed.

[¶5]      Officer Will 
waited seven to ten minutes before McChesney approached. As the McChesney 
vehicle passed by, all three of its occupants turned their heads in Officer 
Will's direction. The officer followed as McChesney exited I-90, turned left on 
Skyline Drive, and drove north to the Highway 14/16 intersection. During this 
time, Officer Will noticed the passengers looking in his direction. He also 
noticed the driver looking into his side and rearview mirrors. At the 
intersection of Highway 14/16, McChesney turned left and traveled north on 
Highway 14/16. As McChesney made a left turn into a convenience store parking 
lot, Officer Will, who was one car length behind McChesney, activated his red 
and blue overhead lights in order to effectuate a stop. During the time that he 
followed McChesney, Officer Will did not observe any erratic driving or any 
violations of the law. 

[¶6]      McChesney parked 
his vehicle at the front door of the convenience store, and Officer Will parked 
his vehicle directly behind McChesney's. When Officer Will approached McChesney, 
he noticed a green leafy material on his shirt and smelled the odor of 
marijuana. At the same time, Officer Will requested McChesney's driver's 
license, registration, and proof of insurance. Officer Will asked McChesney if 
he had been smoking, and McChesney admitted that he had smoked one joint earlier 
that day. Upon further questioning, McChesney handed Officer Will a baggy of 
marijuana from the back seat of the vehicle. He was then placed under arrest. 
Later, additional marijuana was found in a backpack taken from the 
vehicle.

[¶7]      McChesney was 
charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031 (a)(ii) (Michie 1997). After the 
district court denied McChesney's motion to suppress, McChesney entered a 
conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. 
This timely appeal follows.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8]      Findings on 
factual issues made by the district court considering a motion to suppress are 
not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994). Since the district court conducts the hearing on the 
motion to suppress and has the opportunity to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, 
and conclusions, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the district 
court's determination. Id. The issue of law, whether an unreasonable search or 
seizure has occurred in violation of constitutional rights, is reviewed de novo. 
Id.; Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170-71 (Wyo. 1997).

DISCUSSION

[¶9]      In determining 
whether encounters between police and citizens are constitutionally valid, we 
have classified these encounters into three categories or 
tiers.

The most 
intrusive encounter, an arrest, requires justification by probable cause to 
believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime. [2] The 
investigatory stop represents a seizure which invokes Fourth Amendment 
safeguards, but, by its less intrusive character, requires only the presence of 
specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime. 
[3] The least intrusive police-citizen contact, a consensual encounter, involves 
no restraint of liberty and elicits the citizen's voluntary cooperation with 
non-coercive questioning.

Wilson v. State, 
874 P.2d  at 220 (citations omitted); see also Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 
691-92 (Wyo. 1993); Brown v. State, 944 P.2d  at 1171.

[¶10]   Although the district court treated 
the encounter between Officer Will and McChesney as an investigatory stop, our 
de novo review requires that we first determine whether McChesney was "seized" 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.1 Perhaps recognizing the infirmity 
of the anonymous tip, the State contends that the encounter between McChesney 
and Officer Will was a consensual encounter, and the Fourth Amendment is not 
implicated. See Collins v. State, 854 P.2d  at 695. We 
disagree.

[¶11]   A person has been seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, "in view of all the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was 
not free to leave." Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d  at 220 (quoting U.S. v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980)). 
This test "is an objective one: not whether the citizen perceived that he was 
being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer's words and 
actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person." California v. Hodari 
D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991). In the 
vehicle context, there is no question that the stopping of a vehicle and the 
detention of its occupants is a seizure. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 
809, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.3, 101 S.Ct 42, 43-44 n.3, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1980); Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979). The question thus 
becomes whether, under the circumstances presented here, a reasonable person in 
McChesney's position would have believed that he was not free to 
leave.

[¶12]   Here, as McChesney turned into the 
convenience store parking lot, Officer Will, who was following one car length 
behind, activated his red and blue overhead lights and followed McChesney into 
the parking lot. At this point, had McChesney attempted to drive off or 
otherwise flee the scene, he could have been charged with a misdemeanor for 
attempting to elude a police vehicle after being "given visual or audible signal 
to bring the vehicle to a stop. . . ." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-225(a) (Lexis 
1999). Certainly, if McChesney could have been charged with a misdemeanor at 
this point, he was not free to leave in the eyes of the law. In similar 
situations, numerous courts have found that when an officer activates a police 
vehicle's emergency lights he has initiated a stop. Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549, 557-58 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); State v. Walp, 672 P.2d 374, 375 n.1 (Or.App. 
1983); State v. Stroud, 634 P.2d 316, 318-19 (Wash.App. 1981); Hammons v. State, 
940 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Ark. 1997); State v. Burgess, 657 A.2d 202, 203 (Vt. 1995); 
State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993); see 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 9.3(a), at 108-110, n.99-100 (3d ed. 1996).

[¶13]   However, there is even more in this 
case. Officer Will parked his vehicle directly behind McChesney's, which was 
parked at the convenience store's front doors. McChesney's vehicle was thus 
blocked in, and he could not have driven away had he wanted to. Such action has 
also been found sufficient to constitute a seizure. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 9.3(a), at 108, n.96. Therefore, under the totality of 
these circumstances, we conclude that Officer Will's actions constituted a show 
of authority sufficient to convey to any reasonable person that "voluntary 
departure from the scene was not a realistic alternative." State v. Stroud, 634 P.2d  at 319. The propriety of our decision is underscored by Officer Will's 
testimony that he turned on his overhead lights in order to stop McChesney. 
McChesney had been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.

[¶14]   Because McChesney was "seized" for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the next question is whether the stop complies 
with that amendment's protections from "unreasonable searches and seizures." We 
hold that it does not. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
(1968) and its progeny establish that law enforcement officers may stop and 
temporarily detain citizens short of arrest if the officer has a reasonable 
suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime. Wilson v. 
State, 874 P.2d  at 220. In order to establish the reasonable suspicion necessary 
to justify a second tier Terry or investigatory stop, "the police officer must 
be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences [drawn] from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion." Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107, 109 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S.  at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d  at 
220.

Reasonable 
suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the content of 
information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors - 
quantity and quality - are considered in the "totality of the circumstances - 
the whole picture," United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 
695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981), that must be taken into account when evaluating 
whether there is reasonable suspicion. Thus, if a tip has a relatively low 
degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the 
requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more 
reliable. The [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 
(1983)] Court applied its totality of the circumstances approach in this manner, 
taking into account the facts known to the officers from personal observation, 
and giving the anonymous tip the weight it deserved in light of its indicia of 
reliability as established through independent police work. The same approach 
applies in the reasonable suspicion context, the only difference being the level 
of suspicion that must be established.

Alabama v. 
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330-31, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 
(1990).

[¶15]   An anonymous informant's tip, if it 
carries enough indicia of reliability, may provide reasonable suspicion for an 
investigatory stop. See Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549, 555 (Wyo. 1992). The 
leading case in this area is Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412. 
There, an anonymous caller informed the police that "Vanessa White would be 
leaving 235-C Lynwood Terrace Apartments at a particular time in a brown 
Plymouth station wagon with the right taillight lens broken, that she would be 
going to Dobey's Motel, and that she would be in possession of about an ounce of 
cocaine inside a brown attachi case." 496 U.S.  at 327, 110 S. Ct.  at 2414. Police 
officers followed Ms. White and stopped her just short of Dobey's Motel. Id. In 
holding that the police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Ms. White, the 
Court placed special emphasis on the tipster's prediction of future 
behavior:

We think it also 
important that, as in Gates, "the anonymous [tip] contained a range of details 
relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time 
of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily 
predicted." [Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.] at 245, 103 S.Ct., at 2335-36. The 
fact that the officers found a car precisely matching the caller's description 
in front of the 235 building is an example of the former. Anyone could have 
"predicted" that fact because it was a condition presumably existing at the time 
of the call. What was important was the caller's ability to predict respondent's 
future behavior, because it demonstrated inside information - a special 
familiarity with respondent's affairs. The general public would have had no way 
of knowing that respondent would shortly leave the building, get in the 
described car, and drive the most direct route to Dobey's Motel. Because only a 
small number of people are generally privy to an individual's itinerary, it is 
reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such information 
is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individual's 
illegal activities.

496 U.S.  at 332, 
110 S. Ct.  at 2417.

[¶16]   Here, we have the classic anonymous 
tip - an unidentified voice on the telephone. Because an anonymous tipster's 
basis of knowledge and veracity are typically unknown, anonymous tips are 
considered less reliable. Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Utah 
App. 1997). The tip of an anonymous informant is unlike that of an identified 
citizen-informant. The latter tips are higher on the reliability scale because 
an identified informant exposes himself to possible criminal and civil 
prosecution if the report is false. Id.; see Borgwardt v. State, 946 P.2d 805, 
807 (Wyo. 1997) (citizen informants are presumptively reliable sources of 
information). Because the anonymous tip in this case is on the low end of the 
reliability scale, more information is required to raise a reasonable suspicion. 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.  at 330-31, 110 S. Ct.  at 2416.

[¶17]   The REDDI tip in the instant case 
merely recited the color, make, and direction of travel of the McChesney 
vehicle. These are facts that were available to anyone traveling on I-90 west of 
Gillette that July morning. Corroboration of this type of information does not 
increase the reliability of the tip.2 State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 
642 (N.D. 1994); Pinkney v. State, 666 So. 2d 590, 592 (Fla.App. 1996); 
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 564 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Mass. 1990); Campbell v. State of 
Wash. Dept. of Licensing, 644 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Wash.App. 1982); see 4 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(h), at 222, n.391-99. Where, as here, the 
informant makes no prediction of future behavior indicating "inside 
information," the investigating officer is required to corroborate the tip in 
some other fashion, usually by observing either a traffic violation or driving 
indicative of impairment. Pinkney v. State, 666 So. 2d  at 
592.

[¶18]   This enhanced corroboration 
requirement stems from a number of legitimate concerns. An anonymous tip, 
without more, may be no more than a citizen's hunch or merely an assertion based 
on rumor. In addition, the potential for citizen abuse is readily apparent. 
Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make that person the 
target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against that person, will certainly be 
able to formulate a REDDI tip. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.  at 333, 110 S. Ct. 
at 2418 (Stevens, J. dissenting). In the law enforcement context, there is the 
danger that "an officer prompted not by a tip at all, but only by a hunch, could 
relay a description and license number through the dispatcher and thereby 
effectuate a lawful stop." Mix v. State, 893 P.2d 1270, 1272-73 (Alaska App. 
1995).

[¶19]   In the instant case, any traveler 
on the highway that morning could have "predicted" the facts contained in the 
REDDI tip. The tip did not provide a description of the driver, the passengers, 
or any of their future activities. As such, the tip did not provide any "inside 
information" that would indicate that the tip was reliable. Even Alabama v. 
White was referred to as a "close case" on its facts. 496 U.S.  at 332, 110 S. Ct. 
at 2417. The facts of this case are far less compelling. Under these 
circumstances, we hold that the anonymous REDDI report was not sufficient to 
create a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory 
stop.

[¶20]   Officer Will properly investigated 
the REDDI report when he followed McChesney as he exited the interstate, made 
several turns, and traveled a substantial distance. Officer Will did not observe 
any erratic or illegal driving. He merely observed the passengers looking back 
at him and the driver looking into his mirrors. Although we have adopted the 
doctrine that "even conduct which is wholly lawful and seemingly innocent may 
form the basis for a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot," 
State v. Welch, 873 P.2d 601, 604 (Wyo. 1994), we conclude that this conduct did 
not provide a reasonable suspicion in this case. First, we dismiss the driver's 
glances in his mirrors as inconsequential; such action is undeniably the sign of 
a safe driver. Likewise, the glances of the passengers are not sufficient to 
provide a reasonable suspicion. The district court did not find these glances 
particularly significant, nor do we. See State v. Kupihea, 581 P.2d 765, 766 
(Haw. 1978) (two passengers in vehicle looked back in direction of police and 
crouched down, not grounds for stop); Thomas v. State, 297 So. 2d 850, 852 
(Fla.App. 1974); Parker v. State, 363 So. 2d 383, 386 (Fla.App. 1978); Rodriguez 
v. State, 578 S.W.2d 419 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979). Under these circumstances, we 
hold that the officer's observations did not provide a reasonable suspicion for 
an investigatory stop.

[¶21]   Finally, our decision to require 
independent police corroboration of an anonymous REDDI report appears to be 
consistent with the practice of law enforcement in this state, which will not 
make a stop unless police observation confirms either the reported or some other 
illegal or suspicious activity. On this point, the district court made the 
following observations in rendering its decision:

[APPELLANT'S 
COUNSEL:] The next consideration that the courts need to make is given that the 
basis for this investigation was an anonymous tip or anonymous information, is 
that an adequate basis for the officer to make the 
inquiry?

THE COURT: 
Apparently the highway patrol doesn't think so, because all of their information 
on REDDI stops is that nobody has to identify themselves and that the police 
will establish probable cause based upon their own observations not relying on 
the REDDI test, is what the highway patrol and other law enforcement officers 
advertise about the REDDI stops.

(Emphasis 
supplied.) The district court's observation is confirmed by Officer Will's 
testimony that he intended to verify the anonymous tip by "follow[ing] the 
vehicle to see if any violations did, in fact, occur."3

CONCLUSION

[¶22]   As Wyoming law enforcement has 
recognized, anonymous REDDI tips, such as this one, by themselves, are not 
sufficiently reliable to warrant an investigatory stop. Without independent 
observation of suspicious or illegal activity, Officer Will did not have a 
reasonable suspicion to stop McChesney. The seizure of McChesney was illegal. 
This illegal seizure "bar[s] from trial physical, tangible materials obtained 
either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion." Wilson v. State, 
874 P.2d  at 225 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963)). The decision of the district court to deny 
suppression is reversed. Upon remand, McChesney "shall be allowed to withdraw" 
his plea of guilty. W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2).

Footnotes

1 In his 
brief, McChesney makes reference to Wyo. Const. art. 1 § 4, the Wyoming 
counterpart to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Because McChesney has failed to offer any argument to support an independent 
state constitutional claim, we will limit our discussion to federal 
constitutional principles. See Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d  at 
218-19.

2 We 
recognize that several courts have found that corroboration of this type of 
information is sufficient to establish reliability. See State v. Robles, 831 P.2d 440, 441-43 (Az.App. 1992); State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 340-41 (N.H. 
1995); State v. Smith, 638 N.E.2d 1353, 1355-56 (Ind. App. 1994); State v. 
Markus, 478 N.W.2d 405, 408-9 (Iowa App. 1991). We decline to follow these cases 
because we find them inconsistent with Alabama v. 
White.

3 In a recent 
issue of Destinations, the official publication of the Wyoming Department of 
Transportation, it was written: "As soon as a REDDI report is made, the law 
officer in the best position to respond does. Officers in the vicinity are 
radioed with an advisory that includes a description of the vehicle and driver. 
If and when the vehicle is located, the officer involved observes long enough to 
decide if there is probable cause to believe the driver is `driving under the 
influence.' If there is, a stop is made." REDDI still ridding roads of drunk 
drivers, DESTINATIONS, Vol. 5, Issue No. 1, Summer 1998, at 
9.

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, 
with which KALOKATHIS, District Judge, joins.

[¶23]   I would affirm McChesney's 
conviction in this case. Is it merely an accident of alliteration that the word 
"Life" precedes the word "Liberty" in the Declaration of Independence,1 or did the signatories of that 
historic document intend to prioritize life over liberty interests? The correct 
answer is that the order was intentional, and the lives of our Wyoming citizens 
surely weigh more on the scales of justice than the relative inconvenience of an 
investigatory stop of a motorist.

[¶24]   An appropriate refutation of the 
majority opinion in this case is set forth in a decision of the Court of Appeals 
of Oregon, where that court said:

The officer may 
corroborate the tip either by observing the illegal activity or by finding the 
person, the vehicle and the location substantially as described by the 
informant.

State v. Bybee, 
131 Or. App. 492, 884 P.2d 906, 908 (1994) (emphasis added). In this case, the 
Gillette police officer quite clearly found the person, the vehicle, and the 
location substantially as described by the informant. When the informant 
describes behavior that involves violation of the state statutes, a prediction 
of future behavior is superfluous.

[¶25]   We have applied the principles of 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990), in 
Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549, 554-55 (Wyo. 1992), in which we 
said:

In prior cases, 
this court has recognized the validity of a "Terry stop" and also has adopted 
the "totality of the circumstances" test. See Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112 (Wyo. 1992). In Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682 (Wyo. 1982), a police 
officer's independent observations of an automobile and a suspect driving the 
car which matched descriptions by eyewitnesses were held to be adequate probable 
cause for an investigatory stop. In Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5 (Wyo. 1981), the 
circumstances that occurred following a robbery, together with reasonable 
inferences made by an experienced police officer, furnished adequate grounds for 
an investigatory stop. In Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369 (Wyo. 1981), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S. Ct. 402, 70 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1981), the police officers 
were given a description of a car used by two individuals to flee from the scene 
of the murder, and they also were told the direction the car was traveling. The 
court held the officers were justified in making an investigatory stop when a 
car fitting that description was spotted. In the course of developing our state 
precedent, we consistently have held that something less than probable cause 
will suffice for an investigatory or "Terry stop." Simmons v. State, 712 P.2d 887 (Wyo. 1986); Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1985); Lopez; Cook. "A 
policeman is not required to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to 
occur merely because he lacks the necessary information required for probable 
cause to arrest. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 
(1972). He may make an investigatory stop." Olson, 698 P.2d  at 
109-10.

[¶26]   Examining the "totality of the 
circumstances" as disclosed by the record in this case, in the light of the 
decision in White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, we conclude that sufficient 
probable cause was present to justify the investigatory stop of Goettl's car. We 
hold that the informant's tip, particularly the prediction of future events, the 
details of which were verified by the observation of the law enforcement 
officers, furnished more than adequate probable cause to stop the Goettl 
vehicle. The subsequent events, including the consensual searches, then 
justified the arrest of Goettl and the others in the 
vehicle.

[¶27]   More recently we have summarized 
our approach to investigatory stops in this way:

We have 
consistently held that something less than probable cause will suffice to 
justify an investigatory stop. Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549, 554 (Wyo. 1992). 
We will not require a police officer to "`simply shrug his shoulders and allow a 
crime to occur merely because he lacks the necessary information required for 
probable cause to arrest.'" 842 P.2d  at 555 (quoting Olson v. State, 698 P.2d 107, 109-10 (Wyo. 1985)). An investigatory stop "requires only the presence of 
specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime." 
Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 (Wyo. 1994). The validity of such a stop 
depends on whether, in light of the totality of the circumstances, an officer 
possessed sufficient information to create such a reasonable suspicion. Goettl, 
842 P.2d  at 554; see also Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5, 8 (Wyo. 1981). In applying 
the totality of the circumstances test to situations involving a confidential 
informant's tip, we consider: "(1) the sufficiency of the information set forth 
in the informant's tip; (2) the prediction of future activity or events by the 
informant; and (3) some corroboration of the current and predicted future events 
by the police officers." Goettl, 842 P.2d  at 554.

Frederick v. 
State, 981 P.2d 494, 497 (Wyo. 1999). Given the totality of the circumstances in 
this case, which included the description of the vehicle driven by McChesney; 
the location and direction of travel; the discovery by the officer of a vehicle 
matching that description; the arrival of that vehicle within a predictable time 
frame; and the clear statement of aberrant driving that could be perceived as 
reckless, the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion to accomplish an 
investigatory stop.

[¶28]   It is right to consider the policy 
factors that are involved in an issue such as this. Those factors were captured 
plainly by the Kansas Court of Appeals in State v. Tucker, 19 Kan. App. 2d 920, 
878 P.2d 855, 858 (1994), when the court said:

This case 
involves the ever-changing equation used to balance the rights of an individual 
to be free from unwarranted intrusions of his or her freedom of movement and 
right to privacy with the right of the public to be protected from unreasonable 
danger. This equation and the balance change with the facts presented. It is 
clear that, when the focus of the stop or search is a mobile automobile, the 
requirements to justify a stop or search or arrest are 
lessened.

That court also 
said:

We must apply 
that balancing test in the instant case. A motor vehicle in the hands of a 
drunken driver is an instrument of death. It is deadly, it threatens the safety 
of the public, and that threat must be eliminated as quickly as possible. An 
investigatory or safety stop of a suspected drunken driver is a minimal 
intrusion upon that driver's freedom of movement and 
privacy.

Id. at 
861.

[¶29]   A telling analogy can be drawn to 
the decisions of several jurisdictions that have justified brief investigatory 
stops in cases involving anonymous tips of suspects carrying deadly weapons. 
United States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1070 (1993) (police may take into account "hazards that the illegal use of 
firearms presents to officer and citizens alike."); United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 104 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1250 (1996) (information 
from anonymous informant sufficient for stop of person suspected of gun 
possession even though corroboration is of present rather than future events); 
United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[a]rmed persons are 
so dangerous to the peace of the community that the police should not be 
forbidden to follow up a tip that a person is armed, and as a realistic matter 
this will require a stop in all cases."). See generally, 4 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 9.4(h) (3rd ed. 1996). An automobile in the hands of a 
drunk or otherwise irresponsible driver is as lethal as a firearm, and, indeed, 
deserves the same attention from officers.

[¶30]   We previously have made a 
distinction between a citizen informant and a police informant, and have 
suggested that courts ordinarily deem citizen informants to be presumptively 
reliable sources of information. Borgwardt v. State, 946 P.2d 805, 807 (Wyo. 
1997). An anonymous tip does not permit verification of the honesty or 
reliability of the citizen informant. In the instance of a telephone call, 
however, the disclosure of the identity of the caller does not add substantially 
to the honesty or reliability of the information because the officer must react 
before there is any opportunity to verify the identity, honesty, or reliability 
of the citizen informant. If the caller is involved in a prank or a vendetta, a 
false name could be given, and the law enforcement personnel would have no way 
of determining the validity of the identity within the response time. I 
understand that there are occasions in which law enforcement officers may act 
improperly, but I have difficulty in making an assumption, not warranted on this 
record, that they will submit false reports to justify investigatory stops. What 
the officer did in this instance was corroborate by observation the caller's 
description of the car, a red Mercury with temporary plates; a particular 
location, eastbound on I-90 traveling towards Gillette; and its arrival within 
the time frame consistent with the location of the subject vehicle when the call 
was made. Reliability based upon identification of the informant who offers the 
information is not an exclusive determinant with respect to the question of 
reasonable suspicion. The content of the tip is a critical factor, and the level 
of danger that the tip alludes to is particularly important. State v. Pully, 863 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tenn. 1993).

[¶31]   In Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah. App.), cert. denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997), the Court of 
Appeals of Utah was confronted with a case very similar to this case. The 
citizen informant had given a name to the dispatcher in Kaysville City, but the 
opinion does not say that the name of the informant was passed on from the 
dispatcher to the officer. The Utah Court of Appeals offered a very incisive 
analysis of such cases, but perhaps the most persuasive aspect of this opinion 
is this language:

[W]e supplement 
and clarify our analysis with pertinent principles from the numerous other 
states addressing facts more on point with those of this case-the overwhelming 
majority of which have upheld the stops involved in those cases as supported by 
reasonable suspicion.

Id. at 235.2 Several of the cases relied upon by 
the Utah Court of Appeals involved anonymous reports. 

[¶32]   Circumstances such as those found 
in this case demand that the danger to the public if the driver is left alone be 
weighed against the interest of the individual in personal liberty. Certainly 
the individual is concerned, and justifiably, with an "intrusion upon cherished 
personal security * * *." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1882, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). The duty of the officer is to concern himself with 
protection of the public from the hazards associated with intoxicated drivers. 
The dangers that are associated with driving while intoxicated are well 
documented by the number of deaths that occur on our highways and the social 
concern over innocent lives that are lost each year. These factors clearly 
impact the State of Wyoming.

[¶33]   One method of analyzing 
reasonableness is to consider what action would be responsible under the 
circumstances. Any responsible parent, given the same information as this 
officer was given about the driving of a teenager, albeit the information was 
furnished anonymously, would sit down with the youngster for a discussion. That 
would be a responsible response by the parent. Like that parent, the officer in 
this case had "`specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which 
[gave] rise to a reasonable suspicion that [McChesney] ha[d] committed or may 
[have been] committing a crime,'" based upon a totality of the circumstances. 
Frederick, 981 P.2d  at 497 (quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 (Wyo. 
1994)). That reasonable suspicion justified the relatively minor inconvenience 
suffered by McChesney in the investigatory stop, even assuming he had done 
nothing wrong. Clearly, the events that followed the investigatory stop 
furnished ample probable cause for his arrest. Effective enforcement of our laws 
prohibiting driving while intoxicated requires immediate response to any 
potential threats to the public safety.

[¶34]   After balancing the competing 
interests, I would hold that neither the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States nor the provisions of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 4 is offended by 
an investigatory stop based on an anonymous report that included observations of 
a vehicle, its identifying characteristics, its occupants, its location and 
aberrant driving behavior. If the circumstances involve a threat to the lives or 
safety of others that is posed by someone who may be driving while intoxicated 
or impaired, the responsible officer must pursue an investigation. I would 
affirm McChesney's conviction in this case.

Footnotes

1 "We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." Declaration of Independence - 
1776.

2 The cases 
cited in support of the telling statement by the Court of Appeals of Utah 
are:

See, e.g., Goodlataw v. State, 847 P.2d 589, 590-91 (Alaska.Ct.App. 
1993); State v. Robles, 171 Ariz. 441, 831 P.2d 440, 441-43 
(Ct.App. 1992); People v. Willard, 183 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 228 Cal. Rptr. 895, 
896-97 (Super.Ct. 1986); Peterson v. Tipton, 833 P.2d 830, 831-32 (Colo.Ct.App. 
1992); State v. Evans, 692 So. 2d 216, 218-19 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1997); State v. 
Butler, 224 Ga. App. 397, 480 S.E.2d 387, 388-89 (1997); State v. Smith, 638 N.E.2d 1353, 1355-56 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994); State v. Markus, 478 N.W.2d 405, 408-09 
(Iowa.Ct.App. 1991); State v. Tucker, 19 Kan. App. 2d 920, 878 P.2d 855, 862-64 
(1994); State v. Sampson, 669 A.2d 1326, 1328 (Me. 1996); Playle v. Commissioner 
of Pub. Safety, 439 N.W.2d 747, 748-49 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989); State v. Melanson, 
140 N.H. 199, 665 A.2d 338, 340-41 (1995); State ex rel. Taxation & Revenue 
Dep't v. Van Ruiten, 107 N.M. 536, 760 P.2d 1302, 1304-05 (Ct.App. 1988); People 
v. Rance, 227 A.D.2d 936, 644 N.Y.S.2d 447, 447 (1996); State v. Bryl, 477 N.W.2d 814, 817 (N.D. 1991); Rittman v. State, 875 P.2d 439, 441 (Okla.Ct.App. 
1994); State v. Perrin, 143 Or. App. 123, 923 P.2d 1249, 1251 (1996); State v. 
Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 900 (S.D. 1993); State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 188-89 
(Tex.App. 1995). But see Campbell v. State, 31 Wn. App. 833, 644 P.2d 1219, 
1220-21 (1982).

Kaysville City, 943 P.2d  at 235.