Case Title: State v. Conley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 75PA19

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 75PA19 
 
Filed 3 April 2020 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
ADAM WARREN CONLEY 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 from a unanimous 
decision of the Court of Appeals, 825 S.E.2d 10 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019), reversing 
judgments entered on 16 August 2017 by Judge Robert T. Sumner in Superior Court, 
Macon County, and remanding for resentencing. Heard in the Supreme Court on 
8 January 2020. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by John R. Green Jr., Special Deputy 
Attorney General, for the State-appellant. 
 
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Emily Holmes Davis, Assistant 
Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee. 
 
 
DAVIS, Justice. 
 
 
Subsection 14-269.2(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes prohibits the 
possession of firearms on school property. In the present case, defendant Adam 
Warren Conley was convicted and sentenced on five separate counts for violation of 
the statute based on an incident in which he was discovered on the grounds of a school 
in possession of five guns. Based on our determination that N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) is 
STATE V. CONLEY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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ambiguous as to whether multiple convictions are permitted for the simultaneous 
possession of more than one firearm on a single occasion, we conclude that—under 
the rule of lenity—defendant could only lawfully be convicted on one count. 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
On 4 June 2015, a couple who lived on Union School Road in Macon County 
called the police after hearing several gunshots around 4:40 a.m. and observing two 
unknown persons walking in their front yard. At approximately 5:15 a.m., Alice 
Bradley, a school bus driver, was conducting a morning safety check at nearby South 
Macon Elementary School when she noticed two individuals in the parking lot. The 
two individuals were later identified as defendant and Kathryn Jeter. 
Bradley testified that as she was getting into her car, defendant held up a 
silver firearm and pointed it at her. The two individuals then began running toward 
her car. In response, Bradley drove her vehicle in their direction and swerved around 
them. Defendant and Jeter began walking toward an athletic field behind the school 
building. When she returned to her bus to radio for help, Bradley noticed that a black 
bag had been placed on the front seat of the bus. 
Deputy Audrey Parrish of the Macon County Sheriff’s Office responded to the 
initial call and began to search for defendant and Jeter on the school grounds. She 
located the two individuals walking near a fence by an athletic field behind the school 
and noticed that they were approaching the school building. Deputy Parrish 
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identified herself as a law enforcement officer and ordered defendant and Jeter to 
stop walking and turn around. Defendant turned toward Deputy Parrish, raised the 
silver pistol, and pointed it at her. Deputy Parrish heard defendant pull the trigger, 
but the gun did not fire. At that point, she fled to her car. 
Additional law enforcement officers arrived around 5:30 a.m. After a struggle, 
during which officers had to employ a Taser three times, defendant was taken into 
custody. As he was being detained, officers observed a silver handgun fall from 
defendant’s waistband to the ground. Officers recovered several other firearms and 
knives from defendant’s person. Ultimately, four firearms and two hunting knives 
were recovered at the scene. During a subsequent search of the school grounds, law 
enforcement officers discovered that the black bag that had been placed on Bradley’s 
school bus belonged to defendant and contained an additional .22 caliber pistol. 
On 29 June 2015, defendant was indicted by the Macon County grand jury on 
eleven charges: attempted murder, discharge of a firearm on educational property, 
assault by pointing a gun, cruelty to animals, possession of a knife on educational 
property, possession of a firearm in violation of a domestic violence protective order, 
and five counts of possession of a firearm on educational property. 
Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of attempted first-degree 
murder, five counts of possession of a gun on educational property, one count of 
possession of a knife on educational property, one count of cruelty to animals, and 
one count of assault by pointing a gun. Defendant was sentenced to three consecutive 
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terms of imprisonment: (1) 170 to 216 months for the attempted first-degree murder 
conviction; (2) a consolidated term of six to seventeen months for three convictions of 
possession of a firearm on educational property; and (3) a consolidated term of six to 
seventeen months, suspended for 24 months of probation, for all remaining 
convictions. Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal on 31 August 2017. On 27 
March 2018, he filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals, 
requesting that the court review his convictions despite the fact that his notice of 
appeal was not timely filed. The Court of Appeals allowed his petition on 19 February 
2019. 
Before the Court of Appeals, defendant argued, inter alia, that the trial court 
erred by entering judgment on five separate counts of possession of a firearm on 
educational property, contending that N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) did not clearly 
authorize the court to enter judgment on multiple counts for the simultaneous 
possession of more than one firearm. In a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeals 
held that N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) “is ambiguous as to whether multiple punishments 
for the simultaneous possession of multiple firearms is authorized.” State v. Conley, 
825 S.E.2d 10, 15 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019). Applying the rule of lenity, the Court of 
Appeals determined that the statute should be construed as permitting only a single 
conviction. Id. at 14–15. For that reason, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgments 
and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. Id. at 15. 
The State filed a petition for discretionary review with this Court on 25 March 
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2019. We allowed the petition on 14 August 2019. 
Analysis 
The sole issue before us is whether a defendant can lawfully be convicted of 
more than one count of possession of a firearm on educational property based on his 
simultaneous possession of multiple firearms.1 Subsection 14-269.2(b) of the General 
Statutes provides as follows: 
It shall be a Class I felony for any person knowingly to 
possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, any gun, 
rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind on educational 
property or to a curricular or extracurricular activity 
sponsored by a school. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) (2019) (emphasis added). The crux of the dispute in this appeal 
centers around the use of the phrase “any gun” in the statute—namely, whether the 
statute’s prohibition of possessing or carrying “any gun” on educational property 
means that separate punishments may be imposed for each gun possessed on a 
specific occasion or, alternatively, that only a single punishment may be imposed, 
regardless of the number of guns possessed. 
This Court has not previously had occasion to determine this precise issue. The 
Court of Appeals, however, addressed a similar issue in State v. Garris, 191 N.C. App. 
276, 663 S.E.2d 340 (2008), which was relied on by the Court of Appeals in reaching 
its result in the present case. 
                                            
1 Defendant has not challenged the validity of his remaining convictions. 
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In Garris, the defendant was convicted of two counts of possession of a firearm 
by a felon after two firearms were simultaneously found on his person. Id. at 285, 663 
S.E.2d at 348. The relevant statute provided that it was unlawful for any felon to 
possess “any firearm or any weapon of mass death and destruction.” N.C.G.S. § 14-
415.1(a) (2007). The Court of Appeals determined that the legislature’s use of the 
phrase “any firearm” was ambiguous because “it could be construed as referring to a 
single firearm or multiple firearms.” Garris, 191 N.C. App. at 283, 663 S.E.2d at 346. 
Thus, the court explained that it was “unclear whether a defendant may be convicted 
for each firearm he possesses if he possesses multiple firearms simultaneously.” Id. 
Noting that “[t]he rule of lenity ‘forbids a court to interpret a statute so as to increase 
the penalty that it places on an individual when the Legislature has not clearly stated 
such an intention[,]’ ” id. at 284, 663 S.E.2d at 347 (quoting State v. Boykin, 78 N.C. 
App. 572, 577, 337 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1985)), the court in Garris concluded that the 
defendant could be “sentenced only once for possession of a firearm by a felon based 
on his simultaneous possession of both firearms.” Garris, 191 N.C. App. at 285, 663 
S.E.2d at 348. 
In the present case, based upon our thorough review of the language of 
N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) and guided by our prior case law, we conclude that the result 
reached by the Court of Appeals was correct. We believe this conclusion is mandated 
by our decision in State v. Smith, 323 N.C. 439, 373 S.E.2d 435 (1988), in which we 
engaged in an analogous exercise of statutory interpretation with regard to a statute 
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structurally similar to the one at issue here. 
In Smith, the defendant, a bookstore clerk, was arrested for selling two obscene 
magazines and one obscene film to an undercover officer. Id. at 440, 373 S.E.2d at 
436. The defendant was convicted of three separate violations of N.C.G.S. § 14-
190.1(a), which made it unlawful to “sell, deliver or provide any obscene writing, 
picture, record or other representation or embodiment of the obscene.” Id. at 440–41, 
373 S.E.2d at 436 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 14-190.1(a)(1) (1986)). The defendant argued 
that he could not lawfully be punished for three separate counts of the offense because 
the statute was ambiguous as to “the allowable unit of prosecution” when multiple 
obscene items are sold in a single transaction. Id. at 441, 373 S.E.2d at 437. 
This Court agreed with the defendant’s argument, reasoning that because the 
statute made “no differentiation of offenses based upon the quantity of the obscene 
items disseminated,” an ambiguity existed as to whether the legislature intended to 
punish a defendant for the dissemination of “each obscene item” or, instead, “intended 
that a single penalty attach to the unlawful conduct of disseminating obscenity.” Id. 
at 441, 373 S.E.2d at 436. Due to the statute’s failure to clearly express the General 
Assembly’s intent as to the allowable unit of prosecution, we determined that this 
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity toward the defendant. Id. at 441, 373 
S.E.2d at 437. 
In so holding, we cited with approval the rule articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court providing that “if Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal 
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offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single 
transaction into multiple offenses.” Id. at 442, 373 S.E.2d at 437 (quoting Bell v. 
United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83–84, 99 L. Ed. 905, 910–11 (1955)). We further stated 
that our result was “in accord with the general rule in North Carolina that statutes 
creating criminal offenses must be strictly construed against the State.” Smith, 323 
N.C. at 444, 373 S.E.2d at 438. Accordingly, because the defendant sold the three 
prohibited items in a single transaction, we concluded that “a single sale in 
contravention of G.S. § 14-190.1 does not spawn multiple indictments” and, therefore, 
the defendant could be convicted of only one count of violating the statute. Id. 
Although the facts in Smith are distinguishable from those of the present case 
and the convictions there arose under a different statute than the one presently 
before us, we are nevertheless compelled to apply the same legal principles that we 
applied in Smith in interpreting N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b). Because it is clear that 
N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) shares a parallel structure with the statute at issue in Smith, 
our rationale for applying the rule of lenity in that case applies equally here. 
The statute in Smith prohibited the dissemination of “any obscene writing, 
picture, record or other representation or embodiment of the obscene.” Smith, 323 
N.C. at 440–41, 373 S.E.2d at 436 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 14-190.1). 
Subsection 14-269.2(b) prohibits the possession of “any gun, rifle, pistol, or other 
firearm” on educational property. N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the 
statutes at issue in both cases contain the word “any” followed by a list of singular 
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nouns in order to enumerate the prohibited items. In both statutes, this grammatical 
structure could reasonably be construed as referring either to a single item or to 
multiple items.2 Accordingly, we similarly conclude that the statutory language here 
is ambiguous as to “the allowable unit of prosecution.” Smith, 323 N.C. at 441, 373 
S.E.2d at 437. Thus, defendant can be convicted of only one violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-
269.2(b). 
While the State attempts to explain why Smith should not control on these 
facts, we find the State’s arguments to be unpersuasive. The State first contends that 
the legislature’s use of the word “any” in N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) is merely intended to 
encompass the numerous types of firearms in existence—making clear that a person 
cannot possess a firearm on educational property regardless of whether the firearm 
is a pistol, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or other type of gun. But the same argument 
could have been made in Smith—that is, the argument that the term “any” in the 
statutory phrase “any obscene writing, picture, record or other representation or 
embodiment of the obscene” was intended to cover all obscene materials regardless of 
                                            
2 As the Supreme Court of Alabama has noted, in order to discern the legislature’s 
intent as to the intended unit of prosecution, courts often focus on whether a statute uses the 
word “any” or the words “a” or “another” to describe the prohibited item. McKinney v. State, 
511 So. 2d 220, 224–25 (Ala. 1987) (citation omitted). The court elaborated on this point as 
follows: “How, then, should the unit of prosecution be described so that an intent to allow 
multiple convictions is clear and unequivocal? Instead of using the word ‘any’ to describe the 
unit of prosecution, the singular words ‘a’ or ‘another’ should be used.” Id. at 224 (citation 
omitted). 
 
 
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the form they took. 
Moreover, the State’s argument is further refuted by the fact that the phrase 
“or other firearm of any kind” in N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) already conveys the meaning 
that all types of firearms are encompassed by the statute. Therefore, under the State’s 
argument, the General Assembly’s use of either the word “any” or the phrase “or other 
firearm of any kind” would be merely an act of redundancy. It is a well-established 
rule of statutory construction that a statute “must be considered as a whole and 
construed, if possible, so that none of its provisions shall be rendered useless or 
redundant. It is presumed that the legislature . . . did not intend any provision to be 
mere surplusage.” Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 556, 
276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981) (citations omitted). 
Second, the State contends that Smith is distinguishable from this case 
because the statute at issue there dealt with the dissemination, as opposed to the 
possession, of the enumerated items. However, the fact that N.C.G.S. § 14-190.1(a)(1) 
concerned the dissemination—rather than the possession—of prohibited items is a 
distinction without a difference. Our ruling in Smith was predicated on the ambiguity 
of the language contained in the above-referenced portion of the statute rather than 
on any substantive distinction between the act of disseminating and the act of 
possessing. An act of possession, like an act of dissemination, may involve either one 
or multiple items. Just as the obscenity statute in Smith “ma[de] no differentiation 
of offenses based upon the quantity of the obscene items disseminated,” Smith, 323 
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N.C. at 441, 373 S.E.2d at 436, subsection 14-269.2(b) likewise makes no 
differentiation of offenses based on the quantity of firearms possessed. 
Third, the State asserts that unlike the relatively modest increase in the 
amount of harm caused by the dissemination of each additional obscene item in 
Smith, defendant’s possession of each additional firearm on school property 
represents a separate and discrete potential for violence. The State argues that the 
General Assembly could not have intended that a person who brings five firearms 
onto school property would receive no greater punishment than an individual who 
brings only one. 
We disagree. Indeed, the question of whether to impose one or multiple 
punishments under N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) in this context is a quintessential example 
of a policy decision reserved for a legislative body. Our recognition of the serious 
danger resulting from the presence of guns on school property does not allow us to 
usurp the General Assembly’s authority to make such policy decisions. See Rhyne v. 
K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 169, 594 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2004) (“The General Assembly is 
the ‘policy-making agency’ because it is a far more appropriate forum than the courts 
for implementing policy-based changes to our laws.”). Once such a policy decision has 
been made by the General Assembly and codified by statute, it is the duty of the 
courts to give meaning to the legislature’s clearly stated intent. However, we are 
unable to discern such an unambiguous expression of intent based on our reading of 
N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) in its present form. 
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The dissent asserts that N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) is a unique statute because it 
transforms what might otherwise be a lawful act—the possession of a firearm—into 
an unlawful one based solely upon the location where the possession occurs. The 
dissent takes this as proof that the legislature intended for possession of a gun on 
school property to generate a heightened degree of concern, thereby rendering this 
statute deserving of special treatment. The dissent also believes that this location-
focused nature of the criminal prohibition on firearms on school property makes 
N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) distinguishable from the statutes at issue in Smith and Garris, 
given that the statutes in those two cases merely imposed generalized bans on 
possession or dissemination of certain items that applied in any location. 
However, the dissent does not explain why the location-based nature of the 
criminal prohibition in N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) renders it materially distinguishable 
from the obscenity statute at issue in Smith for purposes of the rule of lenity’s 
applicability. It is certainly true that the two statutes might have different aims, each 
seeking to address a distinct type of criminal conduct. But this does not change the 
key fact that both statutes share the same core ambiguity in that neither one clearly 
indicates the intended allowable unit of prosecution. 
Statutory language is either ambiguous or it is not. Moreover, language that 
is ambiguous in one statute does not magically shed its ambiguity when used in a 
second statute just because the evil sought to be addressed in the latter law is deemed 
to be of greater public concern than that addressed by the former one. We are not 
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permitted to disregard the rule of lenity simply because its application in a particular 
case may be perceived as inconvenient. 
The dissent contends that our analysis neglects the spirit of the law and what 
it believes was the likely result that the legislature sought to accomplish. But the 
dissent’s subjective belief as to the legislature’s intent does not change the fact that 
there are two reasonable constructions of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) with regard to the 
intended allowable unit of prosecution. As a result, this is precisely the type of 
scenario for which the rule of lenity exists. The statutory language at issue in 
N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) is ambiguous for the very same reason that the analogous 
language in the obscenity statute in Smith was held to be ambiguous by this Court. 
Unless we were to overrule Smith—a result that the dissent does not advocate—
adherence to our prior decision mandates that we reach the same result here. 
Smith stands for the proposition that a statute possessing this same type of 
structure—i.e., employing the word “any” followed by a list of singular nouns to 
enumerate the prohibited items—is ambiguous as to the allowable unit of 
prosecution. Accordingly, we are bound by Smith to conclude that this ambiguity 
triggers the rule of lenity in the present case, and we decline to take the dissent up 
on its invitation to engage in what would be an act of pure judicial speculation in 
guessing which interpretation the legislature actually intended. 
It is important to emphasize that the General Assembly is, of course, free to 
amend the language of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) at any time to allow for multiple 
STATE V. CONLEY 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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punishments when an individual simultaneously possesses more than one firearm on 
educational property. But any such amendment must unambiguously state a 
legislative intent to accomplish this result. Given the existing ambiguity in N.C.G.S. 
§ 14-269.2(b), we are required by our prior decision in Smith to invoke the rule of 
lenity and to hold that defendant may be convicted of only a single violation of this 
statute.3 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
AFFIRMED. 
 
                                            
3 We note that our decision today is consistent with several cases from other 
jurisdictions similarly holding that multiple punishments are not permitted for a single 
instance of unlawful possession in violation of a statute that uses the term “any” to describe 
the items to be prohibited. See, e.g., United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 
1998) (construing a federal statute prohibiting the possession of “any firearm” by a felon to 
mean that the defendant’s “possession of [ ] six firearms and ammunition, seized at the same 
time from his house, supports only one conviction”); State v. Watts, 462 So. 2d 813, 814–15 
(Fla. 1985) (holding that a Florida statute prohibiting inmates from possessing “[a]ny firearm 
or weapon” on prison grounds permitted a defendant who possessed two knives to be 
convicted of only one count of the offense). 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice MORGAN dissenting. 
 
 
I respectfully dissent from my esteemed colleagues in the majority who, in my 
view, have mistakenly considered our decision in State v. Smith, 323 N.C. 439, 373 
S.E.2d 435 (1988) to be controlling authority in the present case. As a result, I am of 
the opinion that the majority has ignored the presence of clear legislative intent in 
subsection 14-269.2(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes, misapplied the rule of 
lenity, and, consequently, reached the unfortunate conclusion that a person who 
violates the statute by carrying multiple firearms on educational property is subject 
to only a single conviction for such criminal activity. In my view, such a person 
presents a significant threat to the sanctity of educational property which is so 
abhorrent in its potentiality that the imposition of multiple punishments for the 
offense should be available as warranted. Although the majority finds ambiguity in 
the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b), which would inure to the benefit of its 
violator regarding the administration of punishment for an offense under this law, I 
would instead hold that N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) permits multiple convictions to be 
entered against defendant under the facts of this case, wherein defendant carried 
several firearms on his person and carried a separate firearm that was placed on a 
school bus. Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
reinstate the judgment of the trial court.    
“Legislative intent controls the meaning of a statute.” Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 
STATE V. CONLEY 
 
Morgan, J., dissenting 
 
 
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520, 522, 507 S.E.2d 894, 895 (1998) (citation omitted). “To determine legislative 
intent, a court must analyze the statute as a whole, considering the chosen words 
themselves, the spirit of the act, and the objectives the statute seeks to accomplish.” 
Id. As this Court explained in State v. Earnhardt,  
[w]here [a statute] is clearly worded, so that it is free from 
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded in favor 
of a mere presumption as to what policy was intended to be 
declared . . .  But where it admits of more than one 
construction, or is doubtful of meaning, uncertain, or 
ambiguous, it is not to be construed only by its exact 
language, but by its apparent general purpose; that 
meaning being adopted which will best serve to execute the 
design and purpose of the act.  
 
170 N.C. 725, 86 S.E.2d 960, 961 (1915) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). While 
it is true that a statute creating a criminal offense “must be strictly construed against 
the State[,]” Smith, 323 N.C. at 444, 373 S.E.2d at 438, “[t]he statute . . . should be 
construed sensibly, and, in order to make sure of the true intent, the meaning of [the] 
words or phrases may be extended or narrowed or additional terms implied, or it may 
be presumed that the [l]egislature intended exceptions to its language, where this is 
necessary to be done in order to enforce the evident purpose” of the statute. 
Earnhardt, 170 N.C. at 725, 86 S.E.2d at 961. Moreover, “if a literal interpretation of 
a word or phrase’s plain meaning [in a statute] will lead to absurd results, or 
contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature, as otherwise expressed, the reason 
and the purpose of the law shall control.” State v. Rankin, 371 N.C. 885, 889, 821 
S.E.2d 787, 792 (2018) (emphasis added).   
STATE V. CONLEY 
 
Morgan, J., dissenting 
 
 
-3- 
 
N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) reads, in pertinent part: “It shall be a Class I felony for 
any person knowingly to possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, any gun, rifle, 
pistol, or other firearm of any kind on educational property.” N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) 
(2015) (emphasis added). The only element of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) that would 
render unlawful an otherwise lawful ability to possess or carry any gun or other 
firearm is the inability to legally possess or carry it on educational property. Hence, 
it is clear that the legislature intended that the presence of any gun or other firearm 
on educational property generate a heightened degree of concern in comparison to a 
more generalized type of item, and generate a heightened degree of treatment in 
comparison to a more generalized type of place where a gun or other firearm is 
possessed or carried. The obvious legislative intent of this focused statutory 
enactment is to prevent violence in the schools located in North Carolina. An increase 
in the number of firearms possessed or carried by a person on educational property 
begets an increase in the dangers faced by those who learn, teach, administrate, work, 
or are otherwise found in the facilities of these academic institutions or upon their 
grounds. In its brief, the State’s depiction of each firearm possessed or carried on 
educational property as “a separate, discrete instrument of death” which affords a 
potential shooter with the means to minimize a need to reload a firearm or the 
requisite time to replenish its ammunition is a grim observation of the realities of the 
existence of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) and the properness of an interpretation of the 
statute to allow the prospect of multiple convictions for a violation of the law.   
STATE V. CONLEY 
 
Morgan, J., dissenting 
 
 
-4- 
The majority, however, finds ambiguity in the phrase “any gun” as utilized in 
N.C.G.S. §14-269.2(b) and resolves this ambiguity in favor of lenity toward defendant, 
concluding that the statute does not authorize the entry of multiple convictions for 
the simultaneous possession of multiple guns on educational property. My esteemed 
colleagues of the majority believe that this conclusion is mandated by our decision in 
Smith, a case in which this Court determined that the rule of lenity prevented a 
defendant from receiving multiple convictions for the dissemination of multiple items 
of obscenity in one single sales transaction. See Smith, 323 N.C. at 440, 373 S.E.2d 
at 436. In construing N.C.G.S. § 14-190.1, which established that it is unlawful to 
disseminate “any obscene writing, picture, record or other representation or 
embodiment of the obscene,” we found the principle espoused by the United States 
Supreme Court in Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 99 L. Ed. 2d 905 (1955) to be 
persuasive. The principle states that “when the legislature does not clearly express 
legislative intent, . . . any ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Smith, 323 
N.C. at 441, 373 S.E.2d at 437 (citing Bell, 349 U.S. at 81, 99 L. Ed. 23 at 905). 
However, despite the specific strictures of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b), the majority in the 
instant case nonetheless likens this statute to N.C.G.S. § 14-190.1—the 
dissemination of obscenity statute addressed in Smith—to apply the rule of lenity, 
due to statutory ambiguity in the absence of an express legislative intent. But in 
Smith, the subject matter of the statute concerned obscenity outlawed generally from 
being disseminated; here, the subject matter of the statute concerns firearms 
STATE V. CONLEY 
 
Morgan, J., dissenting 
 
 
-5- 
outlawed specifically from being on educational property. In Smith, there was no 
identifiable purpose to punish more severely the dissemination of individual items of 
obscenity than the dissemination of a group of items of obscenity as to the commission 
of one offense, because the harm to society was still quantitatively the same; on the 
other hand, there is an identifiable purpose to punish more severely the act of 
possessing or carrying individual firearms than a group of firearms as to the 
commission of one offense, due to the significant threat of danger to human life which 
is quantitatively increased by the presence of multiple firearms.   
The majority also cites the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Garris, 191 
N.C. App. 276, 663 S.E.2d 340 (2008) as helpful guidance in this case of first 
impression in our Court. In Garris, the lower appellate court determined that the 
language of N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1, which makes it unlawful for a person who has been 
convicted of a felony “to . . . have in his custody, care, or control any firearm . . . ,” was 
ambiguous as to whether “the statute would allow for multiple convictions for 
possession if multiple firearms were possessed, even if they were possessed 
simultaneously.” Smith, 323 N.C. at 283, 663 S.E.2d at 346 (quoting N.C.G.S. §§ 14-
288.8(c), 14-415.1(a) (2007)). The Court of Appeals held that, under the Court’s 
reasoning in Bell, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity so as to allow 
the defendant felon in Garris to be convicted and sentenced only once for possession 
of a firearm by a felon based upon his simultaneous possession of multiple firearms 
STATE V. CONLEY 
 
Morgan, J., dissenting 
 
 
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“in the absence of a contrary legislative intent.” Id. at 284, 663 S.E.2d at 347 (citation 
omitted). The majority analogizes N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1(a) to N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) 
and hence applies the rule of lenity, due to statutory ambiguity in the absence of 
contrary legislative intent. But in Garris, the subject matter of the statute had 
application to a firearm possessed by a felon anywhere; here, the subject matter of 
the statute has application to a firearm carried or possessed specifically on 
educational property by anyone. Although the majority in the present case cites 
Garris primarily to support its premise that there is an appellate court consistency 
in these two case outcomes, I submit that the dominant consistency lies in the 
majority’s automatic association of a criminal statute’s provision beginning with the 
term “any” with the majority’s propensity to invoke the rule of lenity in such 
circumstances, which is compounded in the instant case by the majority’s express 
view that there is no evident expression of legislative intent to authorize multiple 
punishments for multiple firearms being possessed or carried on educational property 
in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b).  
In stretching the tight confines of the present case in order to capture the 
generalities afforded by N.C.G.S. § 14-190.1 as construed in Smith and N.C.G.S. § 14-
415.1 as interpreted in Garris, the majority conveniently ignores the clear legislative 
intent that undergirds N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b). It also unduly inflates the similarities 
between and among the legal authorities upon which it relies in order to rationalize 
STATE V. CONLEY 
 
Morgan, J., dissenting 
 
 
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its determination that these cited statutes and cases constitute binding precedent, 
thus misappropriating the rule of lenity. In relying primarily and heavily upon the 
doctrine, the majority fails to comport with the guidance provided by the United 
States Supreme Court in Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 815 S. Ct. 321, 5 
L.Ed. 2d 312 (1961) regarding the correct application of the rule of lenity: “The rule 
[of lenity] comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what [the 
legislative body] has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration 
of being lenient to wrongdoers. That is not the function of the judiciary.” Id. at 596, 
815 S. Ct. at 326.      
 
The majority notes that “N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) shares a parallel structure to 
the statute at issue in Smith” and is “a structurally similar statute.” In its analyses 
of both Smith and Garris, which the majority has chosen to serve as precedent for its 
determination of the instant case, along with the corresponding statutes featured in 
those appellate cases, it appears that the majority has become so lulled by, and 
enthralled with, the rhythmic cadence of the structurally similar provisions of 
N.C.G.S. § 14-190.1—“any obscene writing . . . .”—and N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1—“any 
firearm”—that the language of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b)—“any gun”—is hypnotically 
viewed through the same lens, even though N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) is more grounded 
in a specific narrow statutory enactment with clearer legislative intent than the other 
STATE V. CONLEY 
 
Morgan, J., dissenting 
 
 
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statutes, which I opine should obviate any perceived statutory ambiguity and 
eliminate any need to invoke the rule of lenity. 
 
Just as the majority looks to the Garris decision of the Court of Appeals to 
support its determination, I am likewise inclined to cite an opinion, In re Cowley, 120 
N.C. App. 274, 461 S.E.2d 804 (1995), from our distinguished colleagues of the lower 
appellate court. In determining in In re Cowley that a gun possessed on educational 
property did not have to be operable in order to violate the “any gun” provision of 
N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b), the Court of Appeals recognized that the General Assembly 
had already fashioned the statute in such a manner that the court was obliged to take 
note that “the focus of the statute is the increased necessity for safety in our schools.” 
Id. at 276, 461 S.E.2d at 806. In expressly distinguishing N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) from 
other criminal offense statutes pertaining to firearms such as the offense of 
possession of a firearm by a felon embodied in N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1(a) and the offense 
of armed robbery found in N.C.G.S. § 14-87, the unanimous panel of the Court of 
Appeals in In re Cowley expressly noted: 
“Public policy favors that [N.C.G.S.] § 14-269.2(b) be 
treated differently from the other firearm statutes. The 
other statutes are concerned with the increased risk of 
endangerment, while the purpose of [N.C.G.S.] § 14-
269.2(b) is to deter students and others from bringing any 
type of gun onto school grounds.”  
 
Id. at 276, 461, S.E.2d at 806.  
STATE V. CONLEY 
 
Morgan, J., dissenting 
 
 
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The majority’s pervasive holding that the Court of Appeals is correct in the 
current case that N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) “should be construed as only permitting a 
single conviction” is an unfortunate construction of this statute which was clearly 
intended by the legislature to protect a community of individuals with inherently 
minimal defenses in the educational setting. In determining that in any and all 
circumstances, a criminal defendant can only be convicted by the trial court of a single 
offense under N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b)—regardless of the number of guns, rifles, 
pistols, or other firearms which are knowingly carried on educational property or to 
a curricular or extracurricular activity sponsored by a school—the majority has 
prospectively limited a statutory violation involving multiple firearms in a school 
setting to merely one firearm conviction for scenarios about the likes of which I shall 
not speculate. Even here, defendant’s placement of a firearm in a black bag, found on 
a school bus at an elementary school in the early morning hours of a school day, in 
addition to the multiple firearms that were found on his person, is sufficient to give 
pause, in my view, to the ramifications of this case’s outcome, especially as it impacts 
the deterrent effects of N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b).  
 
In holding that N.C.G.S. § 14-269.2(b) does not allow for the prospect of 
multiple convictions for the simultaneous possession of multiple guns on educational 
property, I am of the opinion that this Court’s majority has made a determination 
that contravenes the statute’s manifest purpose and defies the legislature’s clear 
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Morgan, J., dissenting 
 
 
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intent to protect a vulnerable population from potential school shootings. In doing so, 
I respectfully consider the majority to have neglected to analyze N.C.G.S. § 14-
269.2(b) as a whole in order to consider the chosen words, the spirit of the law, and 
the objectives that the statute seeks to accomplish.  
 
For the reasons given, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Justice NEWBY joins in this dissenting opinion.