Case Title: World Family Corp v. Windjammer Commc'ns, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0165

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
WORLD FAMILY CORPORATION, A WYOMING CORPORATION, DBA MORROW GLOBAL v. WINDJAMMER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIBABILITY COMPANY DOMESTICATED IN WYOMING AND UINTA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, STATE OF WYOMING, EVANSTON, WYOMING, AND WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 48Case Number: S-11-0165Decided: 03/28/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
WORLD 
FAMILY CORPORATION, A Wyoming Corporation, dba MORROW GLOBAL,Appellant 
(Plaintiff),v.WINDJAMMER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, a Delaware Limited 
Liability Company Domesticated in Wyoming, andUINTA COUNTY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, STATE OF WYOMING, Evanston, 
Wyoming,andWYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellees (Defendants).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County
The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Tara 
B. Nethercott, Woodhouse Roden, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellees Windjammer Communications, LLC and Uinta County School District No. 
1:
Mark 
W. Harris, Harris Law Firm, P.C., Evanston, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee State of Wyoming, Department of 
Transportation:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Moench.
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]  World Family Corporation, dba Morrow 
Global (Morrow), sought judgment against Uinta County School District No. 1 (the 
District) and Windjammer Communications, LLC (Windjammer) declaring that Morrow 
is a co-owner with the District of a conduit located under Interstate 80 in 
Evanston, Wyoming.  Morrow also 
sought an order permanently enjoining the District from interfering with, 
excluding or converting Morrow’s use of the conduit.  Finally, by way of a quantum meruit 
claim, Morrow asserted that Windjammer had been unjustly enriched by using the 
conduit without paying for it. 
 
 
[¶2]  The District and Windjammer moved to 
dismiss the complaint.  They argued 
that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims 
against the District, Morrow had failed to join the Wyoming Department of 
Transportation (WYDOT) as an indispensable party and World Family Corporation, 
the party designated as plaintiff in the complaint, did not exist at the time of 
the events giving rise to the action.  
Morrow moved to join WYDOT as a defendant and the district court granted 
the motion.  Because both parties 
submitted matters outside the pleadings in presenting argument on the motion to 
dismiss, the district court treated the motion as one for summary judgment.  After a hearing, the court granted the 
motion, finding that Morrow had failed to present any facts showing that it was 
an owner of the conduit and entitled to the relief sought. Morrow appealed.  We conclude the district court 
improperly granted summary judgment when the parties had no opportunity to 
present evidence and argument on the issue of Morrow’s ownership.  We reverse the summary judgment 
order.  
 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]  Morrow presents two issues, which we 
rephrase as follows:
 
            
Whether the district court erred in sua sponte deciding an issue that was 
not presented, thereby improperly shifting the burden to 
Morrow.
 
            
Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment for 
Windjammer, the District and WYDOT on the ownership issue when that issue was 
not raised in the motion and the parties had no notice the district court 
intended to address it.
 
Windjammer, 
the District and WYDOT contend the district court properly granted summary 
judgment in their favor.   

 
FACTS
 
[¶4]  In August of 1995, the District and 
Morrow entered into a contract whereby Morrow was to construct an improved voice 
and data telecommunications system for the District.  In September the same year, WYDOT issued 
a license to Morrow and the District to enable Morrow to install copper and 
fiber optics telecommunications cables and conduits under Interstate 80 in Uinta 
County, Wyoming.    

 
[¶5]  In August of 2008, Morrow became aware 
that a fiber optic cable belonging to Time Warner Cable, the local cable 
television company, had been placed in one of the conduits Morrow and the 
District were leasing from WYDOT.  
Morrow contacted Time Warner and learned that the franchise had been sold 
to Windjammer.  Morrow subsequently 
learned the City of Evanston had issued a franchise agreement to Windjammer for 
the city’s cable television.
 
[¶6]  Morrow contacted Windjammer in 
2009.  Windjammer admitted that it 
was using the conduit.  After 
initially agreeing to enter into a lease purchase agreement with Morrow for use 
of enough space in the conduit for one fiber optic cable, Windjammer requested 
instead that the parties execute an irrevocable right of use agreement.  As part of the agreement, Windjammer 
asked Morrow to notify the District and make sure it did not object to 
Windjammer using the conduit.  
Morrow notified the District, which responded by denying that Morrow 
co-owned the conduit.  As a 
consequence, Windjammer did not enter into an agreement with Morrow for use of 
the conduit.  
 
[¶7]  In 2010, Morrow filed an action in 
Laramie County for a judgment declaring it to be a co-owner with the District of 
the conduit with the right to contract for its use and an order prohibiting the 
District from interfering with its use of the conduit.  The District and Windjammer responded 
with their motion to dismiss.  They 
argued the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims 
asserted against the District because Morrow had not presented a notice of claim 
as required by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
1-39-101 to 121 (LexisNexis 2011).   
Additionally, they asserted venue was improper in Laramie County.  They also asserted Morrow had failed to 
join WYDOT as an indispensable party.  
Finally, they argued that World Family Corporation, the party named as 
plaintiff, was dissolved in 1998 and the World Family Corporation existing at 
the time Morrow filed its complaint came into existence only after the events 
giving rise to the action. 
 
[¶8]  In response to the motion, Morrow sought 
to join WYDOT as a defendant.  The 
district court granted the motion.  
WYDOT answered the complaint, generally denying the claims, asserting the 
license it issued allowed Morrow only to use the highway right-of-way owned by 
WYDOT and asking for judgment in its favor.    
 
[¶9]   Responding to the other arguments 
the District and Windjammer presented in their motion, Morrow asserted the WGCA 
did not apply because Morrow was not seeking money damages; therefore, it was 
not required to present a notice of claim to the District.  Morrow maintained venue was proper in 
Laramie County.  Morrow also 
maintained it was the real party in interest because it was a party to and 
maintained ownership of the licensing agreement with the District, it had been 
in existence and used the trade name “Morrow Global” since 1994 and World Family 
Corporation does business as Morrow Global.   
 
[¶10]  After Morrow filed its response, the 
District and Windjammer filed a request for a hearing and requested a court 
reporter.  The district court 
convened a hearing but it was not reported.  Subsequently, the district court entered 
an order granting summary judgment in favor of the District and Windjammer.  The order does not address the WGCA, 
venue or the real party in interest issues presented in the motion and 
responses.  Instead, the district 
court concluded the dispositive issue was whether Morrow had any ownership 
interest in the conduit.  Addressing 
that issue, the district court concluded there were no disputed material facts 
presenting a genuine issue that Morrow had any ownership interest under the 
license and granted summary judgment for the District and Windjammer.  Morrow timely appealed from the district 
court’s order.         

 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶11]   Summary judgments are governed by 
W.R.C.P. 56(c):
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  
 
We 
review a district court’s summary judgment rulings de novo, using the same materials and 
following the same standards as the district court.  The facts are reviewed from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  
 
Grynberg 
v. L & R Exploration Venture, 
2011 WY 134, ¶ 16, 261 P.3d 731, 736 (Wyo. 2011).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶12]  In its first issue, Morrow contends the 
district court erred when it sua 
sponte decided the case on the basis of an issue not raised in the motion to 
dismiss, that is, whether Morrow had an ownership interest in the conduit.  Morrow contends that in entering summary 
judgment for the District and Windjammer on that issue, the district court 
effectively decided the merits of the action without notice to the parties or 
providing them an opportunity to conduct discovery and present evidence.  In essence, Morrow asserts it showed up 
for the hearing prepared to argue and expecting the district court to consider 
whether the WGCA applied, venue was proper, and World Family was the real party 
in interest, but the district court expressed no interest in those issues.  Rather, without warning or providing 
Morrow any time to prepare or adequately respond, the court focused on the 
substance of its complaint for declaratory relief and, subsequently, entered 
judgment against it.  The District 
and Windjammer maintain the issue of ownership was before the court at the 
motion hearing and the court properly decided the issue in their favor.  They assert the issue was placed before 
the district court in the complaint, answer, motion to dismiss, and the 
affidavit Morrow filed in response to the motion.
 
[¶13]  As reflected in paragraph 11 above, 
summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  W.R.C.P. 56(c).   “Summary judgment is a drastic 
remedy designed to pierce the formal allegations and reach the merits of the 
controversy, but only where no genuine issue of material fact is present.”  Mathisen v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 
2007 WY 161, ¶ 9, 169 P.3d 61, 64 (Wyo. 2007), citing Weaver v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Wyoming, 609 P.2d 984, 986 (Wyo. 1980).  Rule 56 clearly contemplates a motion 
and full adversary proceedings before a summary judgment is granted.  Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Caballo Coal 
Co., 2011 WY 24, ¶ 31, 246 P.3d 867, 875 (Wyo. 2011).  The rule also requires notice and an 
opportunity to present admissible evidence and be heard before judgment is 
granted.  Id., citing Kimbley v. Green River, 642 P.2d 443, 
445 (Wyo. 1982).  When a district 
court enters summary judgment without satisfying these requirements, it deprives 
the parties of the due process protections afforded by the applicable civil 
rules.  Union Pacific, ¶ 32, 246 P.3d  at 875, 
citing Abraham v. Great Western Energy, 
LLC, 2004 WY 145, ¶ 19, 101 P.3d 446, 455 (Wyo. 2004).  Under either Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56, 
notice and an opportunity for the parties to present evidence and be heard is 
required before a district court may dismiss an action.  Union Pacific, ¶ 32, 246 P.3d  at 875, 
citing Jenkins v. Miller, 2008 WY 45, 
¶ 21, 180 P.3d 925, 932-33 (Wyo. 2008) and Lee v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of the County 
of Sweetwater, 644 P.2d 189, 190 (Wyo. 1982).  However correct the district court’s 
conclusion may be in the end, this Court cannot allow these principles to be 
disregarded.  Union Pacific, ¶ 31, 246 P.3d  at 875, 
citing Kimbley, 642 P.2d  at 445-46. 

 
[¶14]  In the present case, the District and 
Windjammer presented three grounds for dismissal in their Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion:  failure to comply with the 
WGCA, improper venue and failure to state a claim based on the assertion that 
World Family Corporation was not the real party in interest.  Nowhere in either their motion or the 
accompanying memorandum did the District and Windjammer argue that the action 
should be dismissed because Morrow had no ownership interest in the 
conduit.  Accordingly, in responding 
to the motion, Morrow claimed that compliance with the WGCA was not required, 
venue was proper in Laramie County and World Family Corporation, doing business 
as Morrow Global, was a real party in interest.  Morrow presented no argument concerning 
its alleged co-ownership of the conduit.  

 
[¶15]  Despite the posture of the case leading 
into the hearing, the district court apparently focused during the hearing on 
the question of Morrow’s ownership.  
At that time, the record contained the following evidence concerning 
Morrow’s alleged co-ownership:  

 
-          
the 
license WYDOT issued to Morrow, the District “and their successors and 
assignors” granting them permission as “licensee[s]/owner[s]” to occupy a 
portion of the right-of-way under I-80 in Uinta County controlled by WYDOT;  
-          
the 
1995 contract between the District (“Owner”) and Morrow (“Contractor”) for 
construction of a telecommunications system; 
-          
the 
affidavit of James W. Morrow, project manager for Morrow, stating that Morrow 
became a co-owner with the District of three conduits under I-80 through a 
licensing agreement issued by WYDOT and that the licensing agreement was for the 
purpose of co-ownership of three conduits containing fiber optic cables;  
-          
a 
letter from Morrow’s attorney to the District stating that, by virtue of the 
WYDOT license, Morrow is “owner of the conduit space and vault or 'handhole’ 
space (MG SPACE), of Conduit D” and the District “is a joint owner of the 
conduit space.”; 
-          
a 
letter from the District’s attorney to Morrow’s attorney stating that the 
District “does not believe and affirmatively denies that World Family Corp. has 
any ownership interest in the conduit[.]”  
       
 
[¶16]  At the time of the hearing, the District 
and Windjammer had not answered the complaint and, therefore, had not formally 
admitted or denied Morrow’s claim of ownership, the District and Windjammer had 
not requested dismissal on the ground that Morrow did not own or co-own the 
conduit, no discovery had been conducted and the parties had not briefed the 
ownership issue.   Under these 
circumstances, we conclude the district court erred in ruling that Morrow had no 
ownership interest and granting summary judgment for the District and Windjammer 
on that basis.  Morrow did not have 
notice that the district court intended to consider and rule on the issue of 
ownership and did not have an adequate opportunity to present evidence or 
argument on that issue.  Thus, the 
district court violated the procedures set forth in Rule 56 and deprived Morrow 
of its due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.   
 
[¶17]  The District and Windjammer contend the 
district court properly considered the ownership issue because the issue was 
placed before it by way of the complaint, WYDOT’s answer, their motion to 
dismiss and the affidavit Morrow attached to its response to the motion.  There is no question Morrow’s ownership 
of the conduit was placed at issue in its complaint; Morrow sought a judgment 
declaring that it co-owned the conduit.  
There is also no question that WYDOT in its answer denied that issuing 
the license resulted in co-ownership of the conduits.  It is not true, however, that the 
District and Windjammer placed Morrow’s ownership at issue in their motion to 
dismiss.  Nowhere in either their 
motion or the accompanying memorandum did they argue the action should be 
dismissed because Morrow had no ownership interest in the conduit.  Finally, although the affidavit attached 
to Morrow’s response asserts Morrow’s co-ownership, the substance of the motion 
to dismiss and the response simply did not pertain to the ownership interest; 
consequently, in its response Morrow provided no argument or authority 
supporting its assertion that it was an owner. Under these circumstances, we 
conclude Morrow’s ownership was not at issue at the motion hearing and the 
district court should not have decided the issue without providing notice of its 
intent to do so and an adequate opportunity for Morrow to present evidence and 
be heard on the issue.  

 
[¶18]   We reverse the summary judgment 
order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.