Case Title: Herrig v. Herrig

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Herrig v. Herrig1992 WY 185844 P.2d 487Case Number: 92-116Decided: 12/28/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
Rodney R. 
HERRIG and Larry G. Bean, as next friend and guardian of Kelsey Lynn Herrig and 
Natalie Sue Herrig, minors, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
Angela 
HERRIG and Farmers Insurance Exchange, a/k/a Farmers Insurance Group, Appellees 
(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

 
 
Stephen R. 
Winship of Donald R. Winship & Associates, P.C., Casper, for appellants.

 
 
George E. 
Powers, Jr. of Godfrey & Sundahl, Cheyenne, for appellees.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellants Rodney R. 
Herrig and Larry G. Bean, as the next friend and guardian of Kelsey Lynn Herrig 
and Natalie Sue Herrig, filed a multiple-count complaint against Appellee 
Farmers Insurance Exchange to recover compensatory and punitive damages, as well 
as attorney's fees and interest, for alleged bad faith settlement practices. The 
district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted and denied Appellants' motion to amend the 
complaint.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     The issues we must 
address are:

 
 
1. Whether 
Appellants may assert a bad faith action against Farmers Insurance for an 
alleged breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing;

 
 
2. Whether 
Appellants may assert a private cause of action against Farmers Insurance for an 
alleged violation of Wyo. Stat. § 26-13-124 (1991), the 
unfair-claims-settlement-practices provision of the Wyoming Insurance 
Code;

 
 
3. Whether 
Appellants may assert a private cause of action against Farmers Insurance for an 
alleged violation of Wyo. Stat. § 26-15-124 (1991), the 
unreasonable-claim-denial provision of the Wyoming Insurance Code; 
and

 
 
4. Whether 
Appellants may assert a private cause of action against Farmers Insurance for an 
alleged violation of the Wyoming Consumer Protection Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 
40-12-101 to -112 (1977 & Supp. 1992).

 
 

[¶4.]     Rodney Herrig, his 
wife, Angela, and their two daughters, Kelsey and Natalie, enjoyed a picnic in 
the mountains west of Buffalo, Wyoming, on July 15, 1990. As the Herrigs were 
returning from the picnic, Angela was driving the family's van when she lost 
control of the vehicle and rolled it. Rodney, Angela, and Natalie escaped 
serious physical injury. Kelsey, however, was pinned under the van and suffered 
a brain injury diagnosed as "sixth nerve palsy." As a result of this injury, 
Kelsey received physical therapy to improve her left-body motor control. She 
also underwent several surgeries to restore her left-side vision and 
hearing.

 
 

[¶5.]     At the time of the 
accident, Rodney and Angela were named insureds under an E-Z Reader Car Policy 
issued by Farmers Insurance. The liability provision of the policy 
provided:

 
 
We will pay 
damages for which any insured person is legally liable 
because of bodily injury to any person . . . arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a private 
passenger car, a utility car, or a utility trailer.

 
 

[¶6.]     Rodney and his 
daughters submitted a policy limits settlement demand on August 6, 1991, to 
Farmers Insurance for their injuries. In essence, this demand asserted that 
Angela was liable for their injuries and that their injuries exceeded the policy 
limits. Farmers Insurance apparently failed to respond. Consequently, Rodney and 
his daughters filed a four-count complaint on October 11, 1991, against Angela 
and Farmers Insurance. Count I alleged that their injuries were the proximate 
result of Angela's negligent operation of the van. Count II alleged that Farmers 
Insurance engaged in unfair claims settlement practices in violation of § 
26-13-124. Count III alleged that Farmers Insurance violated § 26-15-124 by 
failing to respond to their settlement offer within forty-five days. Count IV 
alleged that their injuries were aggravated by Farmers Insurance's dilatory 
settlement practices.

 
 

[¶7.]     Farmers Insurance filed 
a W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer. Rodney and his 
daughters filed a traverse to the dismissal motion and a W.R.C.P. 151 motion to amend their complaint. 
The amended complaint asserted three additional counts against Farmers 
Insurance. Count IV alleged that Farmers Insurance breached its insurance 
contract with Rodney. Count V alleged that Farmers Insurance violated the 
Wyoming Consumer Protection Act. Count VI alleged that Farmers Insurance 
tortiously breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Count VII was a 
reiteration of the original complaint's Count IV.

 
 

[¶8.]     Following a December 6, 
1991, motion hearing, the district court entered an order which (1) dismissed 
Count I of the complaint to the extent that it sought recovery from Farmers 
Insurance, (2) dismissed Counts II through IV of the complaint, and (3) denied 
the motion to amend the complaint. Subsequent to this order, Rodney and his 
daughters settled their liability claims against Angela, preserving for appeal 
only the district court's rulings on those counts relative to Farmers 
Insurance's settlement practices.

 
 

[¶9.]     When reviewing a 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court accepts all facts stated in the 
complaint as being true and views them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff. Nulle v. Gillette-CampbellCounty Joint Powers Fire Board, 797 P.2d 1171 (Wyo. 1990). We will sustain a W.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) dismissal only when it is certain from the face of the complaint that 
the plaintiff cannot assert any facts which would entitle him to relief. Mostert 
v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987). Consonant with these rules is our 
position that leave to amend a complaint under W.R.C.P. 15 should be freely 
granted when the amendment will serve a good purpose and when it will not unduly 
prejudice the defendant. Blanton v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 706 P.2d 1111 (Wyo. 1985). A district court's denial of a 
motion to amend will be reversed, however, only when it constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. Johnson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d 1299 (Wyo. 1980), after remand, 630 P.2d 514, appeal dismissed 
and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1118, 102 S. Ct. 961, 71 L. Ed. 2d 105 (1981).

 
 

[¶10.]  For the purpose of analysis, we address 
the issues in the order presented above rather than in the order they would 
arise if we were to review the district court's rulings count by count. Thus, 
the first issue for our consideration is whether Appellants may assert a bad 
faith action against Farmers Insurance for its failure to settle their liability 
claims against Angela as expeditiously as desired. In Counts IV and VI of their 
amended complaint, Appellants asserted bad faith actions against Farmers 
Insurance in contract and tort for breach of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. The district court denied Appellants' motion to amend their complaint 
to add Counts IV and VI on the ground that Appellants were third-party claimants 
to whom Farmers Insurance owed no duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.

 
 

[¶11.]  The duty of good faith and fair dealing 
which is implied by law to inhere in every insurance policy runs from the 
insurer to the insured. 14 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 51:136 (2d ed. 1982). 
Breach of this duty may give rise to a cause of action for "third party" bad 
faith or for "first party" bad faith. A cause of action for "third party" bad 
faith will lie when a liability insurer fails in bad faith to settle a 
third-party claim within policy limits against its insured. Western Casualty and 
Surety Company v. Fowler, 390 P.2d 602 (Wyo. 1964). Bad faith in this context would 
occur if an excess judgment were obtained under circumstances when the insurer 
failed "to exercise intelligence, good faith, and honest and conscientious 
fidelity to the common interest of the [insured] as well as of the [insurer] and 
[to] give at least equal consideration to the interest of the insured." 
Id. at 606. A 
cause of action for "first party" bad faith will lie when an insurer in bad 
faith refuses to pay its insured's direct claim for policy benefits. McCullough 
v. Golden Rule Insurance Co., 789 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1990). Bad faith in this context would 
occur if an insurer knowingly or recklessly denied a first-party claim for 
insurance benefits without having a reasonable basis for doing so. Id. at 860. An action for 
"first party" bad faith will also lie when an insurer fails to inform its 
insured of first-party policy benefits where the insured brings a third-party 
liability claim against another of the insurer's insureds and "it is apparent to 
the insurer that (1) there is a strong likelihood that its insured only can be 
compensated fully under her own policy and (2) the insured has no basis to 
believe that [she] must rely upon [her] policy for coverage." Darlow v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 822 P.2d 820, 828 (Wyo. 1991).

 
 

[¶12.]  As disclosed by the facts of this case, 
Appellants do not fit the mold necessary to bring an action against Farmers 
Insurance for either "third party" or "first party" bad faith. Appellants are 
third-party claimants against Farmers Insurance in its capacity as the liability 
insurer for Angela. They make no allegation that Farmers Insurance failed to 
inform them of first-party benefits under the Farmers Insurance policy. Rather, 
this portion of the case deals exclusively with whether this Court will extend 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing which runs from an insurer to its 
insured to also run to its insured's adversary - the third-party 
claimant.

 
 

[¶13.]  Appellants advance two arguments as to 
why they should be able to maintain a bad faith action against Farmers 
Insurance. First, Appellants argue that Farmers Insurance owes a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing to them because Rodney has a contractual relationship 
with Farmers Insurance. Similar arguments have been advanced and rejected in the 
analogous double-insured context. Double-insured cases occur when both the 
tort-feasor and an injured party are insured by the same insurer, although 
usually under different policies. In these cases, the courts almost universally 
hold that the insurer does not owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing to the 
injured party when he asserts a third-party claim against another of the 
insurer's insureds. See Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 553 P.2d 703 (Ct.App. 
1976); Pixton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. of Bloomington, Illinois, 809 P.2d 746 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1991); and Caserotti v. State Farm Insurance Company, 791 S.W.2d 561 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990).

 
 

[¶14.]  When faced with this issue, courts simply 
refuse to place an insurer in the untenable position of owing a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing to both the insured and the adversary of the insured, 
whether in the double-insured context or not. In Linscott v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, 368 A.2d 1161 (Me. 1977), the Maine Supreme Court 
explained:

 
 
     The pre-trial 
negotiations which may be conducted between a tort claimant and a defending 
insurance company are adversary in nature and, hence, will not give rise to a 
duty to bargain in good faith, as claimed by plaintiff. A "duty of good faith 
and fair dealing" in the handling of claims runs only to an insurance company's 
insured; it derives from a covenant implicit in the provisions of the insurance 
contract establishing the insurer as the authorized representative of the 
insured and is, therefore, without application for the benefit of the adversary 
third party tort claimant. Indeed, that the insurer is the representative of the 
insured logically imports that the third party tort claimant's status as the 
adversary of the insured renders him, ipso facto, the adversary of the insured's 
agent. Thus, prior to the establishment of legal liability, as the tort claimant 
has no legal right to require the tortfeasor to negotiate or settle, it likewise 
lacks right to require such action by his representative. This is true even if 
it is the insurer which voluntarily initiates the pre-litigation negotiations 
with the injured tort claimant.

 
 
368 A.2d  at 
1163-64 (citations omitted). Accord, Bates v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company, 
467 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 1991); O.K. Lumber 
Company, Inc. v. Providence Washington Insurance Company, 759 P.2d 523 
(Alaska 1988); Allstate Insurance Company v. 
Amick, 680 P.2d 362 (Okla. 1984); Kranzush v. Badger State Mutual 
Casualty Company, 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 265 (1981). We are persuaded 
that no basis is present for extending an insurers' duty of good faith and fair 
dealing to third-party claimants, even in the context of intra-family suits. To 
extend the duty would only compromise the insurer's ability to protect its own 
interests and those of its insured.

 
 

[¶15.]  Appellants argue secondly that they are 
third-party beneficiaries of the insurance contract who should be able to bring 
an action directly against Farmers Insurance for a violation of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing owed to Angela. The primary case cited by Appellants to 
support their contention is Thompson v. Commercial Union Insurance Company of 
New York, 250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971). The Thompson 
case, however, has been subsequently limited by Fidelity and Casualty Company of 
New York v. Cope, 462 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1985). In Cope, the 
Florida Supreme Court held that, when a third-party claimant executed a release 
of the insured without obtaining an assignment of the insured's claim for bad 
faith prior to satisfaction of an excess judgment, the third-party claimant 
could not maintain an action against the insurer. Therefore, the Thompson case 
simply does not support Appellants' contention that they may assert, independent 
of an assignment, a bad faith action directly against Farmers Insurance as 
third-party beneficiaries. The third-party-beneficiary argument has been 
rejected by virtually every court to address the issue, and we join those courts 
today. See, e.g., Page v. Allstate Insurance Company, 126 Ariz. 258, 614 P.2d 339 (Ct.App. 1980); Scroggins v. 
Allstate Insurance Company, 74 Ill. App.3d 1027, 30 Ill.Dec. 682, 393 N.E.2d 718 (1979); and Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Company, 17 Cal. 3d 937, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424, 553 P.2d 584 (1976).

 
 

[¶16.]  We hold that the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing runs only from the insurer to the insured. As Appellants are 
third-party claimants in the context of this suit, they have no direct cause of 
action against Farmers Insurance for bad faith, either in contract or in tort. 
Hence, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellants' 
motion to amend their complaint with Count IV or Count VI.

 
 

[¶17.]  The second issue for our consideration is 
whether Appellants may assert a private cause of action against Farmers 
Insurance for a violation of § 26-13-124 of the Wyoming Insurance Code. Section 
26-13-124 falls within Article 1 of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, Wyo. Stat. 
§§ 26-13-101 to -124 (1991). It provides that a person violates the Act if he 
"commits or performs with such frequency as to indicate a general business 
practice" one or more of fourteen enumerated unfair claims settlement 
practices.2 In Count II of their complaint, 
Appellants alleged, in substance, that Farmers Insurance violated paragraphs 
(ii) through (vi) of § 26-13-124(a) while handling their liability claims 
against Angela. The district court dismissed Count II on the ground that § 
26-13-124 is a regulatory statute which does not create a private right of 
action in third-party claimants.

 
 

[¶18.]  Appellants acknowledge on appeal that the 
Wyoming Legislature did not expressly create a private right of action to 
enforce the provisions of § 26-13-124; however, they urge this Court to find by 
implication that the Wyoming Legislature intended that such a right exist. 
Appellants advance three main arguments in support of this position. First, they 
argue that they are within the class of persons the Wyoming Legislature intended 
to protect by enacting § 26-13-124. Appellants note that paragraphs (xi) and 
(xii) of § 26-13-124(a) specifically refer to both "insureds" and "claimants." 
Second, they argue that the Wyoming Legislature intended to allow private 
enforcement of § 26-13-124 by creating a private right of action under § 
26-15-124. Third, and finally, they implore this Court to follow Klaudt v. 
Flink, 202 Mont. 247, 658 P.2d 1065 (1983), and 
Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 167 W. Va. 597, 280 S.E.2d 252 (1981). These two 
cases represent the minority position that an implied private right of action 
lies for violations of an unfair-claims-settlement-practices 
statute.

 
 

[¶19.]  In Julian v. New Hampshire Insurance 
Company, 694 F. Supp. 1530 (D.Wyo. 1988), the United States District Court for 
the District of Wyoming addressed the very issue and arguments now presented to 
this Court. Employing Wyoming rules of statutory construction, the District 
Court noted that, while § 26-13-124 may have been enacted to protect both 
insureds and claimants against unfair settlement practices, no indication was 
present that the Wyoming Legislature intended to create a private right of 
action under the statute. 694 F. Supp.  at 1531. The District Court also 
determined that no indication existed that the Wyoming Legislature intended for 
the private right of action created in § 26-15-124 to extend beyond the 
circumstances therein stated. Id. at 1532. Lastly, the District Court 
distinguished the minority position cases, including Klaudt and Jenkins, and 
joined those courts which were unwilling to imply a private right of action 
under an unfair-claims-settlement-practices statute. Id. at 1532-33. The 
District Court concluded:

 
 
     As with the acts in 
other states, Wyoming penalizes unfair claims settlement 
practices that are committed or performed with such frequency as to indicate a 
general business practice. As such, "it does not readily lend itself to 
enforcement by a private cause of action arising from a single claim." O.K. 
Lumber Company, Inc., 759 P.2d  at 524. Second, the Wyoming Insurance 
Commissioner has power to examine and inquire into violations of the Insurance 
Code, enforce the Insurance Code with impartiality, execute the duties imposed 
upon him by the Insurance Code, and ha[s] the powers and authority expressly 
conferred upon him by or reasonably implied from this code. Finally, as 
illustrated by Wyo. Stat. § 26-15-124(c), the Wyoming Legislature knows how to 
expressly create a private right of action if it chooses to do so. Having 
reviewed Wyo. Stat. § 26-13-124 (unfair claims settlement practices), this court 
cannot conclude that the legislature intended to create a private right of 
action under this section.

 
 

Id. at 1533 
(some citations omitted).

 
 

[¶20.]  Upon an independent review of the 
statutes, cases, and counsel's arguments, we arrive at the same conclusion as 
did the District Court in Julian. The Wyoming Insurance Code, Wyo. Stat. §§ 
26-1-101 to 26-44-117 (1991 & Supp. 1992), is a comprehensive enactment for 
the regulation of the insurance industry. The insurance commissioner is charged 
with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of the Code. Section 
26-2-109(a)(iii). In order to carry out this responsibility, the insurance 
commissioner is granted broad rule making, investigatory, and enforcement 
authority. See generally §§ 26-2-101 to -130. Absent an express provision to the 
contrary, we do not believe that the Wyoming Legislature intended for the Code 
to also be enforced by private action. Accordingly, we hold that no implied 
private right of action exists under § 26-13-124 of the Wyoming Insurance 
Code.3 In light of this conclusion, it 
follows that Appellants cannot assert any facts which would entitle them to 
relief under § 26-13-124. Thus, the test for dismissal has been met. We affirm 
the district court's dismissal of Count II.

 
 

[¶21.]  The third issue for our consideration is 
whether Appellants may assert a private cause of action against Farmers 
Insurance for an unreasonable claim denial under § 26-15-124 of the Wyoming 
Insurance Code. Liberally construing Count III of their complaint, Appellants 
assert that Farmers Insurance's failure to accept and pay or reject their 
settlement demand within forty-five days violated § 26-15-124(b) and entitled 
them to seek attorney's fees and interest under § 25-15-124(c). The district 
court dismissed Count III, presumably on the ground that Farmers Insurance had 
not refused to pay a claim which Appellants had reduced to 
judgment.

 
 

[¶22.]  Section 26-15-124 
provides:

 
 
     (a) Claims for 
benefits under a life, accident or health insurance policy shall be rejected or 
accepted and paid by the insurer or its agent designated to receive the claims 
within forty-five (45) days after receipt of the proofs of loss and supporting 
evidence. Exceptions to the time of forty-five (45) days shall be made for 
accident and health insurance claims if there is any question as to the validity 
or the amount of the claim and the question is referred to the Wyoming state 
medical peer review committee for adjudication.

 
 
     (b) Claims for 
benefits under a property or casualty insurance policy shall be rejected or 
accepted and paid by the insurer or its agent designated to receive those claims 
within forty-five (45) days after receipt of the claim and supporting 
bills.

 
 
     (c) In any actions or 
proceedings commenced against any insurance company on any insurance policy or 
certificate of any type or kind of insurance, or in any case where an insurer is 
obligated by a liability insurance policy to defend any suit or claim or pay any 
judgment on behalf of a named insured, if it is determined that the company 
refuses to pay the full amount of a loss covered by the policy and that the 
refusal is unreasonable or without cause, any court in which judgment is 
rendered for a claimant may also award a reasonable sum as an attorney's fee and 
interest at ten percent (10%) per year.

 
 

[¶23.]  The plain language of subsections (a) and 
(b) imposes a statutory duty on insurers to accept and pay, or reject, claims 
for insurance benefits within forty-five days of receiving adequate proof of a 
loss. In the event that the insurer rejected a claim or failed to timely act 
upon a claim, subsection (c) contemplates that the insured or his beneficiary 
would bring a contractual action against its insurer for claimed benefits. 
Subsection (c) provides that a court may, in addition to entering a judgment for 
the insured or its beneficiaries on the contractual action, award attorney's 
fees and interest if it is determined that the insurer's refusal to accept and 
pay the claim within forty-five days of receiving proof of the loss was 
unreasonable or without cause. An underlying action for contractual benefits, 
however, is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. An insured or his beneficiary may 
maintain an independent action to recover attorney's fees and interest for an 
unreasonable refusal to pay within forty-five days despite the insurer's 
ultimate payment of the claim prior to trial. Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society, 614 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1980).

 
 

[¶24.]  The purpose of this statute, as it 
relates to claims for insurance benefits, is to encourage the prompt settlement 
of justifiable claims by providing redress for an insurer's wrongful refusal to 
pay. Id. at 
723. The statute complements and enforces the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing that an insurer owes to its insured. Appellants' problem is that they 
are not insureds or named beneficiaries; they are third-party claimants to a 
liability insurance contract. As discussed above, an insurer owes no duty of 
good faith and fair dealing to a third-party claimant. Accordingly, we interpret 
subsection (c), the only subsection arguably applicable to third-party 
claimants, to provide that a court may award attorney's fees and interest under 
very limited circumstances. Those circumstances are when: (1) the third-party 
claimant has reduced his liability claim against an insured to judgment4 or has reached a settlement 
agreement with the insured and insurer; (2) the insurer subsequently has refused 
to pay the judgment or the settlement amount to the extent covered by the 
policy; and (3) the refusal to pay has been determined to be unreasonable or 
without cause in an action to collect on the judgment or to enforce the 
settlement agreement. Cf. Farmco, Inc. v. Explosive Specialists, Inc., 9 
Kan. App. 2d 
507, 684 P.2d 436 (1984) (construes similar statute to permit judgment creditor 
to recover attorney's fees in a garnishment action against an insurer to collect 
a judgment against an insured). Consistent with the overall objective of the 
statute, this construction of § 26-15-124(c) encourages the prompt payment of 
liability insurance proceeds to injured persons once the predicate of the 
insured's liability has been established in a court of law or has been settled 
by an agreement.

 
 

[¶25.]  In the instant case, Appellants settled 
all their liability claims against Angela, and Farmers Insurance thereafter 
timely paid the amount of loss covered by its policy. Thus, Appellants cannot 
state any facts to bring themselves within the terms of § 26-15-124(c). Once 
again, the test for dismissal has been met. We affirm the district court's 
dismissal of Count III.

 
 

[¶26.]  The fourth and last issue for our 
consideration is whether Appellants may assert a cause of action against Farmers 
Insurance under the Wyoming Consumer Protection Act. Construing Count V of the 
amended complaint in conjunction with their appellate brief, Appellants assert 
that Farmers Insurance engaged in "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in 
violation of § 40-12-105(a)(xv) by failing to settle their third-party claims 
immediately. Upon a review of the Wyoming Consumer Protection Act, we detect no 
evidence that the Wyoming Legislature intended to create a private cause of 
action for third-party claimants to sue a tort-feasor's liability insurer over 
settlement disputes. See McCarter v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company, 130 Ill. App.3d 97, 85 Ill. Dec. 416, 473 N.E.2d 1015 (1985); Green v. Holm, 28 Wn. App. 135, 622 P.2d 869 (1981); Bowe v. Eaton, 
17 Wn. App. 840, 565 P.2d 826 (1977). The Wyoming Consumer Protection Act was 
drafted primarily to protect consumers from unscrupulous and fraudulent 
marketing practices. The Wyoming Legislature has addressed the problem of and 
remedies for unfair claims settlement or payment practices in the Wyoming 
Insurance Code. See Pierzga v. Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance Companies, 208 
N.J. Super. 40, 504 A.2d 1200, cert. denied, 104 N.J. 399, 517 A.2d 402 (1986); 
and Britton v. Farmers Insurance Group (Truck Insurance Exchange), 221 
Mont. 67, 721 P.2d 303 (1986). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Appellants' motion to amend their complaint with Count V.

 
 

[¶27.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Revised 
effective March 24, 1992.

 
 

2 Section 
26-13-124 provides:

(a) A 
person is considered to be engaging in an unfair method of competition and 
unfair and deceptive act or practice in the business of insurance if that person 
commits or performs with such frequency as to indicate a general business 
practice any of the following unfair claims settlement 
practices:

(i) 
Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to 
coverages at issue;

(ii) 
Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with 
respect to claims arising under insurance policies;

(iii) 
Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation 
of claims arising under insurance policies;

(iv) 
Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon 
all available information;

(v) Failing 
to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of 
loss statements have been completed;

(vi) Not 
attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of 
claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;

(vii) 
Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an 
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately 
recovered in actions brought by such insureds;

(viii) 
Attempting to settle a claim for less than the amount to which a reasonable 
person would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed 
advertising material accompanying or made part of an 
application;

(ix) 
Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered 
without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the 
insured;

(x) Making 
claims payments to insureds or beneficiaries not accompanied by a statement 
setting forth the coverage under which the payments are being 
made;

(xi) Making 
known to insureds or claimants a policy of appealing from arbitration awards in 
favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling them to accept 
settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in 
arbitration;

(xii) 
Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, 
claimant or the physician of either to submit a preliminary claim report and 
then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of 
which submissions contain substantially the same 
information;

(xiii) 
Failing to promptly settle claims, where liability has become reasonably clear, 
under one (1) portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence 
settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage; 
or

(xiv) 
Failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the 
insurance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a 
claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.

 
 

3 For other 
cases declining to imply a private right of action to enforce an unfair claims 
settlement statute, see, e.g., Bates, 467 N.W.2d 255; O.K. Lumber Company, Inc., 
759 P.2d 523; Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, 46 Cal. 3d 287, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58 (1988); and Tank v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Company, 105 Wn.2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986) (en 
banc).

 
 

4 Wyoming does not have a 
direct action statute.