Case Title: JASON EUGENE MILLER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0190

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
JASON EUGENE MILLER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 125217 P.3d 793Case Number: S-08-0190, S-08-0191Decided: 10/13/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
JASON 
EUGENE MILLER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Fremont County

The 
Honorable Norman E. Young, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
H. Reese, Michael H. Reese, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Alan Johnson, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; Eric K. Thompson, Student Director; Cortney 
Kitchen, Student Intern.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]            
In 
this consolidated appeal, Jason Miller challenges his convictions on several 
counts of illegal possession of controlled substances.  He contends the district court erred in 
its denial of his motion to suppress evidence in each case.  He also claims a violation of his right 
to a speedy trial in both cases.  We 
find no error and affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]            
Mr. 
Miller presents three issues:

 
 

1.            
Was 
the court's denial of Mr. Miller's motion to suppress in docket no. 6171 correct 
in light of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 
4 of the Wyoming Constitution? 

 
 

2.            
Was 
the court's denial of Mr. Miller's motion to suppress in docket no. 6192 correct 
in light of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 
4 of the Wyoming Constitution?

 
 

3.            
Was 
there a violation of Mr. Miller's speedy trial rights pursuant to both the 
United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution and 
law?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]            
On 
October 18, 2006, Fremont County Sheriff's deputies and Wyoming Division of 
Criminal Investigation (DCI) agents executed a search warrant at the home of 
Randy Lowrey.  Officers discovered 
marijuana and methamphetamine during the search.  Mr. Lowrey identified Mr. Miller as 
one of his sources for the drugs.  He told officers that he had purchased 
methamphetamine from Mr. Miller the night before and that he had also purchased 
marijuana from him.  He also 
informed officers that he recently observed a large amount of controlled 
substances at Mr. Miller's home and provided details regarding where, in the 
residence, the drugs could be found.  During the interview, Mr. Lowrey 
received two telephone calls from Mr. Miller.  Mr. Lowrey did not answer the calls, but 
he recognized the incoming phone number and advised officers that 
Mr. Miller was the caller.  He 
told officers that Mr. Miller lived nearby.

 
 

[¶4]            
Law 
enforcement officers immediately went to Mr. Miller's home.  They found Mr. Miller in his vehicle in 
front of his residence.  Officers 
asked him to exit the vehicle and he complied.  The officers then handcuffed him and 
placed him in a patrol car.  At that 
point, three officers performed a "sweep" of Mr. Miller's home to determine if 
anyone else was inside the residence.  After discovering no one in the home, 
officers exited the residence and waited outside while one of the DCI agents 
left to obtain a search warrant.  
According to the officers, the "sweep" was completed in approximately two 
minutes.  Following the sweep, Mr. 
Miller's handcuffs were removed and he was released from the patrol car.  Law enforcement officers questioned Mr. 
Miller further before allowing him to leave.  In total, Mr. Miller was detained for 
approximately forty-five minutes. 

 
 

[¶5]            
In 
the meantime, officers maintained a perimeter around the home and waited for a 
search warrant.  The DCI agent was 
able to obtain a search warrant for Mr. Miller's home and vehicle.  Upon execution, officers discovered 7 
ounces of marijuana, 3.4 grams of methamphetamine, and assorted drug 
paraphernalia in Mr. Miller's vehicle.  In the home, officers found 34 ounces of 
packaged marijuana, an undetermined amount of loose marijuana, psilocybin 
mushrooms, and additional drug paraphernalia.  Mr. Miller was charged with three 
criminal counts: felony possession of marijuana with intent to deliver in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), misdemeanor possession of 
psilocybin in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A), and misdemeanor 
possession of methamphetamine in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(c)(i)(C).1  This case was docketed in the district 
court as criminal case no. 6171.  
Mr. Miller was released on bond.

 
 

[¶6]            
After 
his release, a Fremont County Sheriff's Deputy received an anonymous tip that 
Mr. Miller and his fiancée2 had driven to Phoenix, Arizona and 
purchased controlled substances.  A 
few days later, the deputy saw Mr. Miller and stopped to talk with him.  Relying upon one of the conditions of Mr. 
Miller's bond, the deputy requested that Mr. Miller submit to a urinalysis 
test.  Mr. Miller consented to the 
test.  He tested positive for 
marijuana and cocaine.  During this 
encounter, Mr. Miller admitted he had traveled to Arizona to visit his father 
but denied purchasing drugs.

 
 

[¶7]            
The 
deputy then sought out Mr. Miller's fiancée.  After receiving information that she was 
seen going to her mother's house, he attempted to contact her there.  When he arrived at the residence, the 
deputy observed a vehicle in the driveway matching the informant's description 
of the car driven to Arizona.  The 
deputy spoke with the fiancée's mother who told him her daughter had left the 
car and its keys at the house while she and her father traveled to Cheyenne for 
a medical appointment.  In response 
to an inquiry from the deputy, mother advised that the vehicle was registered in 
her name and consented to a search of the vehicle.  Before searching the vehicle, the deputy 
asked that a "drug detection canine" be dispatched.  Upon arrival, the dog alerted to the 
vehicle.  The deputy then searched 
the vehicle and found drug paraphernalia and more than 20 ounces of marijuana. 
 Mr. Miller was not present during 
the search.  He was subsequently 
arrested and charged with conspiracy to distribute marijuana in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 35-7-1042, and possession of marijuana 
with intent to deliver in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii).3  This case was docketed in the district 
court as criminal case no. 6192.

 
 

[¶8]            
During 
the course of the legal proceedings, Mr. Miller had six attorneys.  Some of these attorneys withdrew at Mr. 
Miller's request.  As a result of 
the numerous changes in Mr. Miller's representation, as well as other 
factors, including a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation, both proceedings were 
delayed considerably.  Mr. Miller 
filed a written waiver of his right to speedy trial on two occasions. 

 
 

[¶9]            
Mr. 
Miller moved to suppress evidence derived from the searches in both cases.  In each case, the court denied the 
motion.  A jury found Mr. Miller 
guilty of all three counts charged in docket no. 6171.  He appealed that conviction.  In docket no. 6192, Mr. Miller 
entered a conditional plea of nolo 
contendere, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress.  He subsequently filed an 
appeal in that case.  We 
consolidated the appeals.  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

A.   Motions 
to Suppress

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶10]        
This 
Court reviews a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence de novo, giving deference to the trial 
court's findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous.  Gompf v. State, 2005 WY 112, ¶ 14, 120 P.3d 980, 984-85 (Wyo. 2005).  
When 
a claim is raised for the first time on appeal, the appellant has the burden of 
establishing plain error.  Strange v. State, 2008 WY 132, ¶ 4, 195 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Wyo. 2008).  To 
establish plain error, Mr. Miller must show: (1) the record is clear about the 
incident alleged as error; (2) there was a transgression of a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law; and (3) he was denied a substantial right which 
materially prejudiced him.  Duke v. State, 2009 WY 74, ¶ 22, 209 P.3d 563, 571 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 

Docket 
No. 6171

 
 

[¶11]        
Mr. 
Miller contends the sweep of his home violated his Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable searches because officers entered his home without a 
search warrant.4  There are "well-delineated exceptions to 
the warrant requirement."  Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 19, 99 P.3d 987, 995 (Wyo. 2004).  Among 
them is the exception for exigent circumstances.  Pena v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004).  In order 
for the exception to apply, the government must establish that the officers had 
probable cause supporting the search and that exigent circumstances made it 
impracticable to obtain a warrant before conducting the search.  Id.  Among the exigent circumstances 
justifying a warrantless search is a need "to prevent the imminent destruction 
of evidence."  Id.; Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 691 (Wyo. 
1995).

 
 

[¶12]        
We 
applied the exigent circumstances exception to a warrantless entry in Rideout v. State, 2005 WY 141, 122 P.3d 201 (Wyo. 2005).  In Rideout, officers went to the 
defendants' residence to investigate drug-related activities.  As they exited their vehicles, they 
smelled burning marijuana coming from the residence, and the officers realized 
"their presence was known to the occupants."  Id., ¶¶ 5, 24, 122 P.3d  at 203, 208. 
 At that point, officers decided to 
enter the house and secure it to prevent the destruction of evidence before 
seeking a search warrant.  Id., ¶ 7, 122 P.3d  at 203.  We affirmed the denial of the motion to 
suppress and found no Fourth Amendment violation because: (1) officers possessed 
probable cause that a crime was being committed within the residence; (2) 
exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry to secure the residence 
and prevent destruction of any evidence; and (3) the officers refrained from 
searching the home until they had authorizationeither in the form of consent or 
a search warrant.  Id., ¶ 25, 122 P.3d  at 208.  The district court found similar 
justification in this case.    

 
 

[¶13]        
The 
district court determined that Mr. Lowrey was a reliable and credible witness 
and that the information he provided was sufficient to establish probable 
cause.  When an officer receives 
information from an informant, it must be evaluated under the totality of the 
circumstances.  Holzheuser v. State, 2007 WY 160, ¶¶ 8, 
10, 169 P.3d 68, 74-76 (Wyo. 2007).  
This Court has held that certain factors are relevant in determining 
whether an informant's statements contain the requisite indicia of veracity and 
basis of knowledge, including:

 
 
whether 
the informant has previously given reliable information to law enforcement; 
whether the statements of the informant are against the informant's penal 
interests; whether the informant acquired knowledge of the events through 
firsthand observation; whether the amount of detail provided is sufficient to 
make the statement self-verifying; the interval between the date of the events 
and the law enforcement officer's application for a warrant; and the extent to 
which law enforcement officers have corroborated the informant's statements. 

 
 

Schirber 
v. State, 
2006 WY 121, ¶ 8, 142 P.3d 1169, 1173 (Wyo. 2006) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-34, 
103 S. Ct. 2317, 2329-30, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 
583-85, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2082, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723, 734 (1971); United States v. Mykytiuk, 402 F.3d 773, 
776-77 (7th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Zayas-Diaz, 95 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 
1996)).

 
 

[¶14]        
Many 
of these indicia of reliability are present in this case.  Mr. Lowrey told law enforcement officers 
that he had purchased methamphetamine from Mr. Miller the night before and that 
he had recently been in Mr. Miller's residence.  His admission that he had purchased drugs 
was a statement against his penal interests.  Bonsness v. State, 672 P.2d 1291, 1293 
(Wyo. 1983).  "Such admissions of 
crime carry their own indicia of credibilitysufficient at least to support a 
finding of probable cause to search.'"  Id. (quoting Harris, 403 U.S.  at 583, 91 S.Ct. at 
2082).  He described Mr. Miller's 
home in some detail.  He mentioned 
that Mr. Miller stored the drugs in a gray duffle bag and a safe located in the 
residence.  He provided the officers 
with the location of the safe.  
Additionally, Mr. Lowrey's statements were made in close temporal 
proximity to the events and observations he described.  In short, Mr. Lowrey's statements to the 
officers were based upon firsthand knowledge, were against his penal interests, 
and were close in time to the events he described.  We find no error in the district court's 
determination that Mr. Lowrey's statements were sufficiently reliable to 
provide officers with probable cause.

 
 

[¶15]        
We 
must next determine if there was sufficient evidence to support the district 
court's conclusion that exigent circumstances justified the decision to secure 
the residence before obtaining a warrant.  Uniformed police officers in marked 
vehicles conducted the search at Mr. Lowrey's home.  Officers were aware that Mr. Lowrey's 
home and Mr. Miller's residence were located only a block and a half away from 
each other.  Officers testified that 
Mr. Miller called Mr. Lowrey twice, in rapid succession, while he was being 
questioned.  Based on evidence 
provided by Mr. Lowrey, officers suspected Mr. Miller was in possession of 
controlled substances.  The officers 
testified that they were concerned that, without detaining Mr. Miller and 
conducting a sweep of the home, the evidence in the home might be destroyed 
before they could obtain and execute a search warrant.  The phone calls, the close proximity of 
the homes, and the obvious police presence, officers said, all added to their 
concern that Mr. Miller, or others inside his home, might try to destroy 
evidence.  

 
 

[¶16]        
The 
nature of the evidence that officers sought to preserve also plays a significant 
role in determining whether exigent circumstances existed.  "Reported cases are legion where 
criminals have been caught attempting to flush narcotics away."  State v. Galvin, 391 A.2d 1275, 1284 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).  See also Rideout, ¶ 24, 122 P.3d  at 208; Hughes v. State, 2003 WY 35, ¶ 13, 65 P.3d 378, 382 (Wyo. 2003); Patterson v. 
State, 691 P.2d 253, 258 (Wyo. 1984).  
The officers testified that they were concerned that the controlled 
substances would be destroyed if the vehicle and residence were not 
secured.  The district court found 
this concern was reasonable:

 
 
Here, 
the evidence is, we were talking about marijuana and perhaps 
methamphetamine.  And both types  
those drugs are easily destroyed.  
They can be flushed.  They 
can be worked through the garbage disposal.  All of those things can happen, and so I 
don't have any trouble with  or I am not troubled by that fact.  Given what the officers believe they 
were dealing with, the evidence was of a type that certainly was susceptible to 
being destroyed.  I don't have any 
issue with that.  

 
 

[¶17]        
The 
district court also found that the officers restricted their sweep of the 
residence to actions which would eliminate those exigent circumstances.  As in Rideout, the officers did what was 
necessary to secure Mr. Miller's residence, but otherwise did not conduct a 
search until they had obtained a warrant.  They walked through the residence to 
ensure that there was no one inside who might destroy evidence or threaten 
officer safety.  The sweep took a 
total of two minutes.  Officers then 
left the residence and waited outside for the search warrant.  

 
 

[¶18]        
The 
district court properly recognized that the presence of evidence that is easily 
destroyed does not, by itself, create an exigency justifying a warrantless 
search.  It did, however, conclude 
that the presence of drugs, along with all of the other circumstances known to 
the officers at the time, created exigent circumstances justifying the sweep of 
Mr. Miller's residence.  We find no 
error in this conclusion.

 
 

[¶19]        
Next, 
we turn to Mr. Miller's assertion that his detention was impermissible under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Because Mr. 
Miller did not raise this issue with the district court, we review for plain 
error.  "To suppress evidence as the 
fruit of his unlawful detention or unlawful search, [a defendant] must make two 
showings: (1) that the detention [or search] did violate his Fourth Amendment 
rights; and (2) that there is a factual nexus between the illegality and the 
challenged evidence.'"  United States v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 
1260 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United 
States v. DeLuca, 269 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001)).  We need not address the first element 
because Mr. Miller has not satisfied his burden of proving that the challenged 
evidence bears the requisite causal connection to the detention.  

 
 

[¶20]        
In 
the district court, Mr. Miller asserted that information obtained during the 
sweep "provided . . . a basis for the search warrant that . . . taints the 
search warrant and   . . . all 
information seized from the search."  The district court rejected this 
argument, noting from the bench, "I didn't hear any testimony, not one bit of 
anything that the officers saw or seized . . . when they did go through the 
residence."  

 
 

[¶21]        
 From our review, it appears that the 
search warrant affidavit was based solely on the information provided by Mr. 
Lowrey.  Only one paragraph in the 
affidavit referenced the encounter with Mr. Miller.  It states: "Based on the above 
information, Officers went to the Miller residence, made contact with Jason 
Miller, who appeared to be just getting into his vehicle to leave, and secured 
the residence and the vehicle, while Agents sought to obtain a Search Warrant." 
 In his motion to suppress, Mr. 
Miller never alleged that law enforcement officers obtained any evidence as a 
result of his detention.

 
 

[¶22]        
It 
is undisputed that the challenged evidence was obtained during execution of the 
search warrant.  On appeal, Mr. 
Miller does not identify any evidence or information that was found during the 
sweep or his detention that was used to obtain the warrant.  He has failed to establish the required 
nexus between the alleged misconduct and the evidence that he seeks to 
suppress.  We find no error in the 
district court's denial of his motion to suppress in docket no. 6171.

 
 
Docket 
no. 6192

 
 

[¶23]        
In 
docket no. 6192, Mr. Miller sought to suppress evidence found as a result of the 
search of his fiancée's vehicle.  The district court denied the motion on 
the basis that Mr. Miller lacked standing to challenge the search.  The district court also found that a 
warrant was not necessary to search the vehicle because the owner of the vehicle 
had consented to the search.5  On appeal, Mr. Miller claims that the 
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.  We conclude that Mr. Miller lacked 
standing to challenge the search and find no error in the district court's 
denial of the motion.  

 
 

[¶24]        
In 
order to challenge a search as unconstitutional, a defendant must first 
establish that "he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property 
searched."  Andrews v. State, 2002 WY 28, ¶ 20, 40 P.3d 708, 712 (Wyo. 2002).  To meet 
this initial prerequisite, Mr. Miller must demonstrate that he had a subjective 
expectation of privacy and also a "reasonable expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognize.'"  Id., ¶ 20, 40 P.3d  at 712-13 (quoting Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 613 (Wyo. 
1993)).  To determine whether a 
reasonable expectation of privacy exists, this Court examines four factors: (1) 
the precautions taken to maintain privacy as to the item; (2) the framers' 
intent when drafting the United States Constitution; (3) the property rights the 
defendant had in the searched item; and (4) the legitimacy of the defendant's 
possession of the property searched. Andrews, ¶ 20, 40 P.3d  at 713.  The burden of proving a reasonable 
expectation of privacy falls on the proponent of the motion to suppress.  Grissom v. State, 2005 WY 132, ¶ 15, 121 P.3d 127, 
133 (Wyo. 2005). 

 
 

[¶25]        
Generally, 
an individual will have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle if he 
has an ownership interest in the vehicle or is lawfully present in the car. 
 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3(e), at 192 
(4th ed. 2004).  Our jurisprudence 
supports this proposition.  For 
example, in Yoeuth, ¶ 39, 206 P.3d  at 
1288, and Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1374 (Wyo. 1981), the passengers in vehicles had standing to 
challenge the searches because they were lawfully present in the vehicle at the 
time of the search.  On the other 
hand, in Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 
29, ¶ 16, 152 P.3d 376, 382 (Wyo. 2007) and Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 636 (Wyo. 
2000), the defendants lacked standing to challenge the searches because they 
presented no evidence that they were lawfully present in the vehicle at the time 
of the search. 

 
 

[¶26]        
We 
note initially that there is some dispute in the record regarding ownership of 
the vehicle.  At the time of the 
search, the vehicle was parked in the driveway of the fiancée's parents.  The keys to the vehicle had been left 
with the fiancée's mother.  When 
contacted by police, mother told the investigating officer that title to the 
vehicle was held in her name.  At 
the suppression hearing, mother testified that she had given the vehicle to her 
daughter.  The ownership status of 
mother was relevant in determining whether mother could consent to the 
search.  It is not relevant in 
analyzing whether Mr. Miller had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle.  We will assume for 
purposes of our analysis that the fiancée had an ownership interest in the 
vehicle.  

 
 

[¶27]        
It 
is undisputed that Mr. Miller did not own the vehicle and was not present in the 
vehicle either as the driver or as a passenger when the search was 
initiated.  He was not present at 
any time during the search.  
Nevertheless, Mr. Miller contends that he had a "possessory interest" in 
the vehicle.  He claims that this 
"possessory interest" arises because the vehicle was owned by his fiancée, he 
had used the vehicle in the past, and that his fiancée had given him permission 
to use the vehicle in the future.  
Mr. Miller asserts that by virtue of their relationship, he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle at the time of the search. 

 
 

[¶28]        
Mr. 
Miller cites two cases to support his position: United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548 
(10th Cir. 1993) and United States v. 
Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir. 1990).  Both cases are easily 
distinguishable.  In both Soto and Rubio-Rivera, neither defendant owned 
the vehicle.  Nevertheless, both had 
standing to challenge the searches because each was in possession of the vehicle 
at the time of the search and had permission from the owner to use the vehicle. 
 Soto, 988 F.2d  at 1550, Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d  at 1275.  Here, Mr. Miller was not present and was 
not in possession of the vehicle at the time of the search.  If a non-owner is not using the vehicle 
at the time of the search, he does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 See State v. Morrill, 498 A.2d 76, 96 
(Conn. 1985) (non-owner, who often used the searched car, lacked standing 
because he was not using the car at the time of search); see also Tompkins v. State, 705 P.2d 836, 843 
(Wyo. 1985) (finding no possessory interest when person was neither in 
possession of nor present in a home, which he did not own, at time of 
search).  The mere fact that 
Mr. Miller's fiancée owned the vehicle is not by itself sufficient to 
provide Mr. Miller with the requisite expectation of privacy.  See Neal v. Acevedo, 114 F.3d 803, 807 
(8th Cir. 1997) ("Neal lacked standing to 
challenge the search of his fiancée's car."); Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653, 658 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1985) (Appellant lacked standing to object to a search of the car 
owned by his common-law wife, as he had neither a possessory nor a property 
interest in the vehicle.); Anderson v. 
State, 992 P.2d 409, 417 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) ("We are not persuaded by 
Appellant's argument that he had [privacy] interests merely because his wife 
purportedly owned the car.").  
Additionally, permissive use of the vehicle on some prior occasion does 
not confer on the user either a property or possessory interest in the vehicle: 
"A person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy . . . with regard to 
a car he has permission to use but is not using at the time of the search." 
 United States v. Smith, 340 F. Supp. 1023, 1030 (D. Conn. 1972); see also 
Morrill, 498 A.2d  at 96 (rejecting defendant's claim that his prior use of 
his mother's car, together with his continuing permission to use the car, gave 
him a protected expectation of privacy in the car).  

 
 

[¶29]        
We 
affirm the district court's finding that Mr. Miller did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle.  
Accordingly, he lacks standing to challenge the search.  Because we find Mr. Miller does not have 
standing to challenge the search of the vehicle, we need not determine whether 
the officer had consent to search the vehicle or whether the alert of the drug 
dog provided the officers with probable cause to search the vehicle. 

 
 

B.   Speedy 
Trial

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶30]        
Mr. 
Miller asserts a violation of his right to speedy trials in both cases.  

 
 
We 
review a speedy trial claim to ensure the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) and 
constitutional guarantees have been met.  
Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 
1032 (Wyo. 1995).  We examine de 
novo the constitutional question of whether a defendant has been denied a speedy 
trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.  
We review the district court's factual findings for clear error.  Sisneros v. State, 2005 WY 139, ¶ 16, 
121 P.3d 790, 796-97 (Wyo. 2005); [State 
v.] Humphrey, [2005 WY 131,] ¶ 8, 120 
P.3d [1027,] 1029 [(Wyo. 2005)].

 
 

Humphrey 
v. State, 
2008 WY 67, ¶ 18, 185 P.3d 1236, 1243 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
Docket 
No. 6192

 
 

[¶31]        
Mr. 
Miller entered a plea of nolo 
contendere in docket no. 6192.  
A plea of nolo contendere has 
the same effect as a plea of guilty, including waiver of non-jurisdictional 
defenses.  Meyers v. State, 2005 WY 163, ¶ 14, 124 P.3d 710, 715 (Wyo. 2005); Ochoa v. 
State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1361-62 (Wyo. 1993).  A claim of violation of the right to a 
speedy trial is a non-jurisdictional defense.  
Cohee v. State, 2005 WY 50, ¶ 13, 110 P.3d 267, 272 (Wyo. 2005); Davila v. State, 831 P.2d 204, 206 (Wyo. 
1992).   

 
 

[¶32]        
This 
plea of nolo contendere was made 
pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) which allows a defendant to plead guilty while 
reserving the right to seek review on appeal of any specified pretrial 
motion.  Morgan v. State, 2004 WY 95, ¶ 23, 95 P.3d 802, 808 (Wyo. 2004).  We have 
said, however, that "a conditional plea of guilty does not provide carte blanche permission for the 
appellant to present any and all arguments on appeal."  Id., ¶ 24, 95 P.3d  at 808; see also Bailey v. State, 12 P.3d 173, 
177 (Wyo. 2000).  An appellant may 
only raise arguments clearly presented before the district court.  Morgan, ¶ 24, 95 P.3d  at 808-09.  In this case, Mr. Miller entered a 
conditional plea in docket no. 6192 reserving only the right to appeal from the 
adverse resolution of the motion to suppress evidence found in his fiancée's 
vehicle.  He did not assert a speedy 
trial defense in the district court and did not reserve his right to assert that 
issue on appeal.  Mr. Miller has 
waived his right to appeal this issue in docket no. 6192.

 
 
Docket 
No. 6171

 
 

[¶33]        
Mr. 
Miller proceeded to trial and was convicted by a jury in docket no. 6171.  The record reflects he signed two 
waivers of the right to a speedy trial in this case the first in April 2007 and 
the second in October 2007.  The 
April document, entitled "Waiver of Speedy Trial," is signed by both Mr. Miller 
and his counsel.  It stated, in 
full: 

 
 
The 
Defendant, having first been fully advised of his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial, hereby knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waives his right 
to a speedy trial in the above-captioned matter. 

 
 

[¶34]        
Mr. 
Miller, and his new counsel, signed a second "Verified Waiver of Speedy Trial" 
in October 2007.  This document 
stated:

 
 
I, 
JASON MILLER, Defendant in the above entitled matter Waive my right to a Speedy 
Trial in this matter as follows:

 
 
1.         
I understand that I have been charged with the crime(s) of Possession of 
a Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver-Marijuana, W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(ii), 
Possession of a Controlled Substance-Methamphetamine, W.S. 35-7-1031(c)(i)(C) 
and Possession of a Controlled Substance-Psilocybin, W.S. 
35-7-1031(c)(i)(A).

 
 
2.         
I have been advised that I have a right to a jury trial within 180 days 
of the date of my arraignment, and that I can demand that my trial take place 
within that 180 day time limit.

 
 
3.         
After consultation with my attorney, I agree to waive my right to have a 
jury trial within 180 days of arraignment as provided by Rule 48(b), Wyoming 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

 
 

[¶35]        
Mr. 
Miller does not challenge the validity of the waivers.6  Instead, he contends that, in general, 
the right to a speedy trial may not be waived prospectively.  He supports this assertion with the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Williams, 511 F.3d 1044 
(10th Cir. 2007).  In Williams, the Tenth Circuit held that a 
defendant's prospective waiver of speedy trial was invalid.  511 F.3d  at 1054-55.  In doing so, it relied upon the United 
States Supreme Court's holding in Zedner 
v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 164 L. Ed. 2d 749 (2006), that 
a defendant may not prospectively waive the application of the Speedy Trial Act 
of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et 
seq.

 
 

[¶36]        
Although 
Mr. Miller presents no Wyoming case law or statute indicating that a defendant 
may not execute a prospective waiver, his assertion that a speedy trial cannot 
be waived indefinitely does have some merit.  See, e.g., State v. Rose, 202 P.3d 749 (Mont. 
2009).  A signed waiver of a speedy 
trial does not give the State free reign to delay a defendant's trial 
unreasonably for all time.  The 
cases Mr. Miller relies upon, however, are distinguishable.  First, Williams and Zedner both interpret the Speedy Trial 
Act, a law of federal criminal procedure that does not apply to proceedings in 
Wyoming state courts.  Second, the 
defendants in Williams and Zedner suffered delays after waiving 
their rights to a speedy trial that far exceeded the allowable delay under the 
applicable rule.7  Zedner went to trial more than six years 
after waiving his right to a speedy trial and Williams waited 252 days.  Mr. Miller did not suffer comparable 
delays under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b). 

 
 

[¶37]        
Other 
than quoting the language of the rule and claiming that the right to a speedy 
trial cannot be waived prospectively, Mr. Miller does not claim a violation of 
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b).  Significantly, he 
does not contend that his trial was delayed more than 180 days after each waiver 
or that the delay violated W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) in some other manner.  Accordingly, we will not consider the 
matter further.  We do note that 
when all properly excluded time is accounted for, including defense counsel's 
request for a mental examination and motions for continuances to allow new 
defense counsel adequate preparation time, Mr. Miller's trial was held well 
within the 180-day mandate of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b). 

 
 

[¶38]        
We 
move next to Mr. Miller's contention that his constitutional right to a speedy 
trial was violated.  In determining 
whether a constitutional violation of the right to a speedy trial has occurred, 
we are guided by the four-factor test set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).  That 
test requires us to evaluate the following factors: (1) the length of the delay; 
(2) the reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion of the right; and (4) 
prejudice to the defendant.  Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87, 92 (Wyo. 
1989) (citing Barker, 407 U.S.  at 
530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192).  These 
factors are considered together and balanced in relation to all relevant 
circumstances.  Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 31, 93 P.3d 222, 231 (Wyo. 2004).  The 
burden of proving prejudicial delay from a speedy trial violation lies with the 
defendant.  Rodiack v. State, 2002 WY 137, ¶ 11, 55 P.3d 1, 3 (Wyo. 2002).    

 
 
Length 
of Delay

 
 

[¶39]        
The 
first factor, length of delay, is a threshold requirement.  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2192.  Only if the length of delay 
is "presumptively prejudicial" will an examination of the remaining three 
factors be necessary.  Id.  The constitutional right to a speedy 
trial attaches at the filing of a criminal complaint or the arrest of the 
defendant, whichever occurs first.  Humphrey, ¶ 21, 185 P.3d  at 1244; Strandlien v. State, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 8, 
156 P.3d 986, 990 (Wyo. 2007); Jennings 
v. State, 4 P.3d 915, 921 (Wyo. 2000).  Mr. Miller was arrested on charges in 
docket no. 6171, on October 24, 2006, and was brought to trial on March 11, 
2008, a delay of 504 days.  We have 
previously found that a 500-day delay is presumptively prejudicial.  Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 655-56 
(Wyo. 2000).  We therefore move 
forward and examine the remaining factors of the Barker test. 

 
 
Reason 
for Delay

 
 

[¶40]        
In 
reviewing the reason for delay, we examine which party was responsible for the 
delay.  We have previously noted: 

 
 
A 
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be 
weighted heavily against the government.  
A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be 
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate 
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than 
with the defendant.  Finally, a 
valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate 
delay.

 
 

Wehr 
v. State, 
841 P.2d 104, 112-13 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S.  at 531, 92 S.Ct. 
at 2192).  We have also stated 
"[u]nquestionably, delays attributable to the defendant may disentitle him to 
speedy trial safeguards."  Berry, ¶ 35, 93 P.3d  at 232.  Delays attributable to changes in defense 
counsel, to the defendant's requests for continuances, and to the defendant's 
pretrial motions are all considered delays attributable to the defense.  Strandlien, ¶ 12, 156 P.3d  at 991.   

 
 

[¶41]        
A 
review of the record shows most of the delay was attributable to Mr. Miller's 
six changes in defense counsel and the requests by the defense to allow adequate 
time for new counsel to prepare for trial.  Delays due to changes in defense counsel 
weigh against the defendant in a speedy trial analysis.  Berry, ¶ 35, 93 P.3d  at 232.  Adding to the delay, the district court, 
at the request of defense counsel, ordered Mr. Miller to undergo a competency 
examination.  The examination caused 
an additional delay of 50 days.  
Delays attributable to competency evaluations fall into the "neutral" 
category in the Barker balancing 
test.  Potter v. State, 2007 WY 83, ¶¶ 30, 37, 
158 P.3d 656, 664-65 (Wyo. 2007).  Mr. Miller identifies no delays 
attributable to the State or the district court.  This factor weighs substantially in the 
State's favor.

 
 
Defendant's 
Assertion of the Right

 
 

[¶42]        
Mr. 
Miller signed two waivers of his right to a speedy trial.  He did not otherwise bring any speedy 
trial claims to the attention of the district court.  This factor weighs substantially in 
favor of the State.

 
 
Prejudice 
to the Defendant

 
 

[¶43]        
The 
last Barker factor, prejudice to the 
defendant, is evaluated in light of the interests the speedy trial right was 
designed to protect: "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to 
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility 
that the defense will be impaired."  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 532, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2193.

 
 

[¶44]        
Mr. 
Miller makes no argument that his pretrial incarceration was oppressive and we 
will not consider it further.  When 
examining the anxiety and concern of the accused, this Court has said "because a 
certain amount of pretrial anxiety naturally exists, a defendant must 
demonstrate he suffered prejudice in an extraordinary or unusual manner.'" 
 Strandlien, ¶ 16, 156 P.3d  at 992.  A "bare assertion" of anxiety will not 
suffice.  Id.  Mr. Miller makes no assertion of anxiety 
at all.

 
 

[¶45]        
The 
last factor, the possibility that the defense was impaired by the delay, is the 
most serious factor in determining prejudice because "the inability of a 
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire 
system."  Barker, 407 U.S.  at 532, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2193.  Mr. Miller asserts his 
defense was impaired because the delay allowed the State to locate Mr. Miller's 
former roommate who then testified against him at trial.  This argument mischaracterizes the 
purpose of this factor.  This 
inquiry is designed to prevent a defense from becoming impaired by death, 
disappearance, or memory loss of witnesses for the defense, not to prevent the 
prosecution from developing its case.  5 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 18.2(e), at 131 
n.81 (3d ed. 2007).  Mr. Miller has 
failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the delay.  This last factor also weighs in favor of 
the State.

 
 

[¶46]        
In 
balancing the four factors, we must conclude that Mr. Miller's constitutional 
right to a speedy trial in docket no. 6171 was not violated.  The delay in trial was primarily 
attributable to Mr. Miller's numerous changes of counsel.  Mr. Miller waived his right to a speedy 
trial on two occasions, and he has shown no prejudice to his defense as a result 
of the delay. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶47]        
The 
district court did not err in denying the motions to suppress in docket no. 6171 
and docket no. 6192, and Mr. Miller was not denied his statutory or 
constitutional right to a speedy trial in either case.

 
 

[¶48]        
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005) reads as 
follows:

 
 
(a) 
Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, 
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 
substance. Any person who violates this subsection with respect 
to:

 
 
(ii) 
Any other controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of 
a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, 
fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or 
both[.]

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(c)(i)(A) and (c)(i)(C) read, in pertinent part, as 
follows:

 
 
(c) 
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled 
substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to a 
valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this act.  Any person who violates this 
subsection:

 
 
(i) 
And has in his possession a controlled substance in the amount set forth in this 
paragraph is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than twelve (12) months, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00), or both. . . .  For 
purposes of this paragraph, the amounts of a controlled substance are as 
follows:

 
 
(A) 
For a controlled substance in plant form, no more than three (3) 
ounces;

 
 
. 
. . 

 
 
(C) 
For a controlled substance in powder or crystalline form, no more than three (3) 
grams[.]

 
 

2It 
is not necessary to identify this individual by name.  The anonymous tip to the deputy 
identified her as Mr. Miller's girlfriend.  
However, in the motion to suppress, she was identified as his 
fiancée.  Mr. Miller contends that 
the nature of this relationship supports his assertion that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in her vehicle.  
We will refer to her as his fiancée.

 
 

3Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1042 reads as follows:

 
 
Any 
person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this article within 
the state of Wyoming or who conspires to commit an act beyond the state of 
Wyoming which if done in this state would be an offense punishable under this 
article, shall be punished by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed 
the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of which was 
the object of the attempt or conspiracy.

 
 

4Although 
Mr. Miller formulates his statement of the issues in terms of the Wyoming and 
Federal Constitutions, when advancing an independent argument under the state 
constitution, an appellant must present a "precise [and] analytically sound 
approach."  Yoeuth v. State, 2009 WY 61, ¶ 34, 206 P.3d 1278, 1286 (Wyo. 2009).  
Because Mr. Miller does not articulate any basis for interpreting the 
Wyoming Constitution more broadly than its federal counterpart, we will limit 
our review to a claimed violation of the United States Constitution.  Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 13, 169 P.3d 538, 543 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

5The 
State also contended that a search warrant was not necessary because a drug dog 
had alerted to the vehicle providing probable cause for the search.  The district court did not address that 
issue and, in light of the result we reach here, it is also unnecessary for us 
to address it.

 
 

6At 
the district court level, Mr. Miller asserted that he signed the first waiver 
because he was "threatened" by his then current counsel.  The district court addressed this claim 
in open court and found Mr. Miller signed the waiver voluntarily.  Mr. Miller does not challenge the 
district court's resolution of this issue. 

 
 

7The 
Speedy Trial Act requires a defendant be brought to trial within 70 days of the 
filing of an indictment, or from the date of the defendant's initial appearance, 
whichever occurs later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).