Case Title: Loeb and Co., Inc. v. Martin

Citation: 327 So. 2d 711

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1976-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
327 So. 2d 711 (1976)
LOEB AND CO., INC.
v.
D. L. MARTIN, Jr.
SC 1524.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 20, 1976.
Norman W. Harris and William E. Shinn, Jr., Decatur, for appellant.
W. H. Rogers, Moulton, for appellee.
FAULKNER, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Lawrence County denying Loeb's motion for new trial. We reverse.
Martin entered into a forward contract to sell cotton to Loeb for 33 cents per pound. When time came to deliver, a dispute arose between Martin and Loeb as to how much cotton Loeb purchased under the contract. We set out the facts leading to the dispute.
In March, 1973, Loeb's agent, Agnew, learned that Martin wanted to sell his cotton for 33 cents a pound. Agnew telephoned Martin and asked him if he would take 33 cents for his cotton. Martin answered yes, and stated he was going to plant about the same amount as he had in 1972. Loeb, through Agnew, had purchased a portion of Martin's 1972 crop. During the telephone conversation, Martin and Agnew arranged a meeting place to close the trade.
*712 When they met to discuss the terms of the contract, Agnew asked Martin how much cotton he was going to have. Martin said he was going to plant 400 acres or more. Agnew said, "Well, I will buy 400 acres." Agnew made a handwritten memorandum of the agreement. The pertinent part of the agreement is as follows:
At the time of the agreement, Martin had not planted his crop. Subsequently, he planted cotton in two patterns: one pattern known as "solid" pattern where rows are planted consecutively, and the other known as "two and one skip row," where two rows are alternated with one row of idle land. Martin's "solid" row planting was 163.2 acres, while his "skip row" planting was 342.2 acres.
Martin's cotton allotment for 1973 was 401.9 acres. The A.S.C.S. office calculated Martin had 163.2 acres of solid row cotton, and 229.6 acres of skip row, totaling 392.8 acres of cotton. A.S.C.S. subtracted the idle land in the skip row pattern in arriving at its figure of 229.6 acres. It did not count one-third of the land used in the skip row planting.
The market price of cotton had doubled in the fall of 1973 from what it was in the spring. And, in September or October, Martin called Agnew to ask if they were going to divide the cotton as they had in 1972. Agnew replied, he guessed so, and then he asked Martin if he had planted more cotton than he sold. Martin said, "Yeah," and told Agnew that he had planted over 500 acres. He told Agnew, "I am going to deliver you acres of land this year instead of acres of cotton." Agnew replied, "We can't take that." Thus, the dispute arose.
Martin contended the contract called for his delivering all cotton produced on 400 acres of land. Loeb contended the contract meant that Martin was to deliver 400 acres of cotton. Martin eventually delivered his entire cotton crop to Loeb under protest, and reserved the right to litigate the extent of his obligation under the contract. The parties stipulated that if Martin was correct, his damages would be $12,516.25.
At the conclusion of Loeb's evidence, the trial court directed a verdict for Martin, on his written motion. Loeb's motion for new trial was denied.
The primary issue is whether the trial court was correct in granting the motion for a directed verdict. Another issue is whether the trial court improperly excluded evidence of customs and usage.
Rule 50, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, providing for directed verdicts, is identical to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except for expansion of time limits therein from 10 to 30 days and express retention of the scintilla evidence rule under Subsection (e). The motion for directed verdict performs the functions of motion to exclude the evidence, demurrer to the evidence, and motion for the affirmative charge. See Committee Comments.
Professor Moore says the directed verdict is normally used in two overlapping categories of cases: First, where there is a complete absence of pleading or proof on an issue or issues material to the cause of action or defense, and second, where there are not any controverted issues of fact upon which reasonable men could differ. Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 5A, p. 2317.
*713 In this case we are concerned with the second category. Were there no controverted issues of fact upon which reasonable men could differ? What standard do we use to determine the absence of any controverted issues of fact?
In Brady v. Southern Railway, 320 U.S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 232, 88 L. Ed. 239 (1943), the Supreme Court of the United States announced the standard under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in the following terms:
But, where there is conflicting evidence or where there is insufficient evidence, the Supreme Court says a directed verdict is improper. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 93 L. Ed. 497 (1949); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 82 S. Ct. 1404, 8 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1962). In this last cited case, Continental sued under § 4 of the Clayton Act to recover private treble damages, and alleged violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The Court of Appeals had held that there was insufficient evidence to justify a jury finding, and the defendant should have gotten a directed verdict. The Supreme Court said the Appeals Court erred by failing to view evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and by not giving them benefit of all inferences which the evidence fairly supported; it was the jury's function to weigh the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, and to come to an ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The court ordered a new trial.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Herron v. Maryland Casualty Co., 347 F.2d 357 (1965), that the trial judge may grant a directed verdict only when there is no evidence, which, if believed, would authorize a verdict against the movant. The trial judge must draw against the movant all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion. The case must be submitted to the jury if reasonable men may reach different conclusion. Cf. Geddes v. Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul, Inc., 348 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1965). And, in Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) a "SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OR REASONABLE MAN TEST" was set out, as follows:
It will be noted that the Federal Court does not have the scintilla rule, while our Rule 50(e) retains it. This subsection specifically states that the court may direct a verdict, or enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict under this rule, whether or not the party making the motion has the burden of proof, in accordance with the scintilla evidence rule.
In Noonan v. Midland Capital Corporation, 453 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1972) the "Reasonable Man Test" was applied. The court said,
Whether the "Reasonable Man Test" or the scintilla evidence rule is applied here, the result is the same: the trial court erred in directing a verdict against Loeb. In reviewing the evidence, we find Martin saying to Agnew, "I am going to deliver you acres of land this year instead of acres of cotton," and Agnew replying, "We can't take that." And, also, the agreement is subject to two interpretations. Martin's evidence was that he intended the phrase in writing to mean, "All cotton planted on 400 acres of land," and Agnew says he intended the phrase to mean "400 acres of cotton." Moreover, there was evidence that it takes 3 acres of land to make two acres of cotton when the cotton is planted the skip row pattern; that Martin's allotment for 1973 was 401.9 acres; that the A.S.C.S. office calculated Martin had 163.2 acres of solid row cotton and 229.6 acres of skip row, totaling 392.8 acres of cotton, and evidence of the 1972 crop under similar contracts. We are of the opinion the evidence was insufficient for a "one way" verdict, and the directed verdict was improper.
In explaining the reasons for his decision to direct a verdict for Martin, the trial court said:
The "latest case" the trial judge was referring to in his colloquy was Jewell v. Jackson & Whitsitt Cotton Co., 294 Ala. *715 112, 313 So. 2d 157 (1975), a case heard ore tenus. In Jewell this court said,
We are unable to say Martin was as unknowledgable as Jewell apparently was. Otherwise, why would he say to Agnew, "I am going to deliver you acres of land this year instead of acres of cotton."
Evidence of custom and usage was admissible by virtue of U.C.C. § 2-202, Code of Ala., Tit. 7A, providing that confirmatory memoranda may be explained by course of dealing, or usage of trade. The Official Comment to U.C.C. § 2-202 says,
Whether there was a custom and usage of trade was a question of fact for the jury to determine, under the present conditions. Cf. Official Comment to U.C.C. § 1-205, and Anderson's Uniform Commercial Code, § 1-205:6, p. 175.
Reversed and remanded.
MERRILL, MADDOX, JONES, SHORES and EMBRY, JJ., concur.