Case Title: HENSLEY v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
HENSLEY v. STATE2002 WY 9648 P.3d 1099Case Number: 00-174, 01-90Decided: 06/26/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

 

 

DEBORAH 
HENSLEY, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

DEBORAH 
HENSLEY, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

 

Appeals 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

The 
Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant in Case No. 00-174:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender; 
Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. Kerin, Assistant Appellate 
Counsel   

Representing 
Appellee in Case No. 00-174:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Devon Coleman, Interim 
Faculty Director of the Prosecution Assistance Program; Vicki K. Johnston, 
Student Intern for the Prosecution Assistance Program 

Representing 
Appellant in Case No. 01-90:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Marion Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender; 
Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Tina N. Kerin, Assistant Appellate 
Counsel   

Representing 
Appellee in Case No. 01-90:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Attorney General 

 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      After being 
convicted of conspiracy to deliver and delivery of methamphetamine, Deborah 
Hensley learned the state had failed to disclose evidence she could have used to 
impeach the prosecution's primary witness.  
Ms. Hensley filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963), which the trial court denied.  
The related case of Davis v. 
State, 2002 WY 88, is controlling and dictates we reverse and remand for a 
new trial because of the prosecution's failure to disclose potentially 
exculpatory evidence. We also consider and affirm the trial court's admission of 
the drug transaction tape as this question will likely recur in any new trial. 

 

 

 

[¶2]      The issues we 
will address are rephrased as follows:

 

1.  Did 
the trial court err in denying Ms. Hensley's motion for a new 
trial?

 

2.  Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion when it admitted the entire tape of the 
drug transaction into evidence?

 

 

 

 [¶3]     This appeal involves 
the same controlled methamphetamine buy as Davis, 2002 WY 88, in which we reversed Rex Davis' 
conviction.  Although the cases were 
prosecuted separately, Mr. Davis and Ms. Hensley faced identical charges.  Mr. Davis challenged the denial of his 
motion for a new trial based on the same Brady violation as Ms. Hensley alleges 
occurred in her case.  See Davis, 2002 WY 88, 
¶1.

 

[¶4]      In 1998, the 
Department of Criminal Investigation (DCI) tape recorded Roberta Morris selling 
methamphetamine to a DCI confidential informant on three occasions.  Ms. Morris subsequently agreed to work 
as an informant for DCI because she was told DCI would put in a good word for 
her with the prosecutor if she was officially charged on these methamphetamine 
sales. 

 

[¶5]      On June 3, 1999, 
DCI arranged for Ms. Morris to go to Richard Wilkie's1 residence as a DCI informant to 
purchase methamphetamine.  In order 
to prepare her for the controlled buy, the DCI agents searched her car and 
person, wired her with recording equipment to allow the transaction to be 
recorded, and gave her money to buy an "eightball"2 of methamphetamine.  The DCI agents then positioned 
themselves around Mr. Wilkie's residence in order to monitor the 
transaction.  

 

[¶6]      When Ms. Morris 
arrived on Mr. Wilkie's street, she saw him visiting with neighbors at their 
house.  She approached Mr. Wilkie 
and asked him to  "call and see if 
he could find any meth."  Mr. Wilkie 
made two telephone calls to an unidentified person and left messages.  For approximately forty-five minutes, he 
and Ms. Morris wandered back and forth between the neighbors' house and Mr. 
Wilkie's place.  Ms. Morris 
testified that one of the neighbors and Mr. Wilkie smoked marijuana during that 
time but she did not.  The tape 
recording of the encounter was difficult to understand because of disruptive 
background noise from conversations, barking dogs, a television, and extremely 
loud music.  Mr. Wilkie made a third 
call and purportedly spoke with Ms. Hensley.  Then he and Ms. Morris waited for Ms. 
Hensley and her friendMr. Davisto arrive. 

 

[¶7]      Ms. Hensley and 
Mr. Davis arrived in a pickup truck, and Mr. Wilkie and Ms. Morris walked to the 
curb in front of Mr. Wilkie's house to meet with them.  Ms. Morris spoke to Ms. Hensley at the 
door of the truck.  Two women's 
voices can be heard on the tape recording.  
Ms. Morris identified her voice as the voice requesting a "ball" and Ms. 
Hensley's voice as the voice responding they had a gram.  Ms. Morris asked how much, and Ms. 
Hensley replied, "eighty."  Although 
Ms. Morris testified Mr. Davis told Ms. Hensley how to respond, his voice cannot 
be heard on the tape.  After the 
interchange, the women and Mr. Wilkie went into the house to complete the 
transaction.

 

[¶8]      The DCI agents 
ultimately arrested Ms. Hensley and Mr. Davis and charged each with one count of 
delivery of methamphetamine and one count of conspiracy to deliver 
methamphetamine.  The state tried 
them separately.  Ms. Morris was the 
only witness to testify regarding the alleged drug buy because Mr. Wilkie died 
before the trial and neither Ms. Hensley nor Mr. Davis testified.  

 

[¶9]      The primary issue 
at trial was Ms. Hensley's objection to the admission of the tape recording of 
the buy on the basis that it included the neighbors' and Mr. Wilkie's voices and 
they were unavailable at trial.  Ms. 
Hensley argued, therefore, the admission of the tape violated the hearsay rule 
and her constitutional right to confront witnesses.  The prosecution contended the tape was 
akin to a crime scene photograph and merely used to corroborate Ms. Morris' 
testimony regarding the controlled buy.  
The defense presented the theory, through cross-examination, that Ms. 
Morris was not credible because she was a drug user and former drug dealer who 
knew how to, and did, manipulate the recording device by creating loud 
background noise to cover up her own drug use during the controlled buy.  The trial court admitted the tape into 
evidence, ruling it was not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted 
by the unavailable witnesses and was the best evidence of what occurred at the 
scene.

 

[¶10]   In order for the state to prevail, 
the jury had to be convinced Ms. Morris was a reliable and credible informant. 
The prosecution sought to bolster Ms. Morris' credibility through the testimony 
of a veteran Green River police department officer who worked concurrently as a 
DCI agent.  The agent testified 
regarding his experience with confidential informants and how Ms. Morris' work 
compared to others:

 

Q.  How 
many CIs have you personally worked with?

 

A.  Probably 
-- probably about ten in the last year.  
Excuse me, the last year and a half.  Almost two years now, I would say 
ten.

 

Q.  You 
heard [Ms. Morris] testify, and in fact, she agreed with [the defense's] 
question regarding how many buys she had made for DCI, and I think that it was 
somewhere around five, five to ten?

 

A.  Yes.

 

Q.  Do 
you know how many buys [Ms. Morris] has personally made?

 

A.  It's closer to -- between 10 and 
12.  I'm not positive.  It was between 10 and 12, I 
believe.  Definitely more than 
5.

 

Q.  In your experience, does your average CI 
do that many buys?

 

A.  No.  She's probably done the best job so far 
since I've been here.

 

Q.  In terms of number of 
buys?

 

A.  And quality and numbers and keeping in 
touch, yes.

 

In a 
further effort to reinforce Ms. Morris' credibility, the prosecution elicited 
testimony from her that she was trying to address her methamphetamine addiction 
and extricate herself from the drug lifestyle.  Ms. Morris testified that she used methamphetamine only once during the 
two years she worked for DCI.  The 
jury convicted Ms. Hensley, and the trial court sentenced her to concurrent 
four- to eight-year prison terms on each count with credit for presentence 
confinement.   

 

[¶11]   Shortly after Mr. Davis' sentencing 
was reported in the local newspaper, Charlotte Shepard, formerly known as 
Charlotte Powell,3 an informant for the Rock Springs 
police department and former DCI informant, contacted Mr. Davis' defense counsel 
and told him she had taped a conversation with Ms. Morris in February of 2000, 
approximately two months before Ms. Hensley's trial, in the context of a murder 
investigation.  Ms. Morris was not a 
suspect in the murder case but was thought to have some relevant information.4  Ms. Powell advised the defense that Ms. 
Morris was recorded on the tape using narcotics.  On this evidence, the defense filed a 
motion for a new trial alleging a Brady violation.  

 

[¶12]   At the hearing on the motion, the 
defense contended Ms. Morris could be heard on Ms. Powell's tape consuming 
methamphetamine which proved, contrary to her trial testimony and the 
prosecution's trial contentions, she was actively using illegal drugs at the 
time of trial.  Ms. Powell testified 
that DCI personnel were angry with her when they learned she had worn a wire to 
record her conversation with Ms. Morris.  
She stated that she went to Ms. Morris' apartment where she saw 
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.  
She also testified that both her conversation with Ms. Morris about the 
murder investigation and sounds of Ms. Morris and another person consuming 
methamphetamine were recorded on the audio tape.  She also had observed Ms. Morris using 
drugs on several other occasions after February 2000.  Ms. Powell further testified Ms. Morris 
told her, after Mr. Davis' trial, that Mr. Davis had not been involved in the 
drug transaction but she felt compelled to testify against him because of her 
desire to have DCI assist her in retaining custody of her children.  Ms. Powell claimed Ms. Morris told her, 
again contrary to Ms. Morris' trial testimony, she knew how to manipulate the 
recording device to prevent DCI from hearing what actually occurred during a 
controlled buy and had provided perjured testimony regarding her drug 
use.

 

[¶13]   The trial court determined that no 
Brady violation had occurred and 
denied Ms. Hensley's motion for a new trial.  This appeal 
followed.

 

 

A.        
Brady Violation Analysis

 

[¶14]   

We must 
determine . . . whether the government's failure to disclose evidence 
favorable to the defendant deprived the defendant of a fair trial under Brady by considering whether the 
"favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a 
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict."  [Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263,] 290, 
119 S. Ct. [1936,] 1952 [(1999)] (quoting Kyles [v. Whitley], 514 U.S. [419,] 435, 115 S. Ct. 
[1555,] 1566 [(1995)]).  In order to 
establish a Brady violation, a 
defendant must demonstrate that the prosecution suppressed evidence, the 
evidence was favorable to the defendant, and the evidence was material.  We have previously decided that the 
materiality of withheld evidence and its possible effect on the outcome of the 
trial are mixed questions of fact and law.  
Generally, the denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion; however, a claim of failure to disclose evidence in 
violation of Brady is properly 
reviewed de novo. 

 

Davis, 2002 
WY 88, ¶16 (some citations omitted).  

 

[¶15]   The analysis of the Brady issue in Ms. Hensley's trial is 
indistinguishable from our analysis of the same issue in Davis.  Therefore, our decision in Davis governs and provides in relevant 
part:

 

The 
first element requires that we determine whether [the defendant] showed that the 
prosecution suppressed evidence.  
[The defendant] presented testimony showing that DCI knew about the 
Powell tape before trial.  When the 
prosecution learned about it after trial, it did disclose.  A prosecutor has a duty to learn of any 
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the 
case, including the police.  Kyles, 514 U.S.  at 437-38, 115 S. Ct.  at 
1567.  In this case, the Powell tape 
is admissible (FN3)[5] to impeach Morris' 
testimony at [the defendant's] trial that she had used drugs two months before 
trial when she had actually used drugs more recently and to impeach the DCI 
agents' testimony vouching for Morris' credibility.  The discovery of the Powell tape 
directly led to the defense's discovery of Powell's post-trial conversation with 
Morris where Powell alleges that Morris said she had intentionally shut off the 
tape recorder, and stated different motives for testifying 
. . . . Powell's version of Morris' post-trial statements 
contradicts Morris' trial testimony and could potentially be recognized as 
improperly suppressed Brady 
evidence.  See Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169, 
1178-79 (9th Cir. 2001).  
These post-trial contradictions obviously could not have been disclosed 
before trial, however, and, because they were not in existence before trial, 
cannot be part of an analysis as to whether the suppression of the Powell tape 
was a Brady violation.  Strickler, 527 U.S.  at 283, 119 S. Ct. 
at 1949.  Nevertheless, by showing 
that the State failed to disclose the Powell tape which did exist before trial, 
[the defendant] has met [her] burden on this element.  

 

The next 
element, that [the defendant] prove the evidence would have been favorable to 
[her], is also established by the record.  
Favorable evidence includes impeachment evidence, and the undisclosed 
Powell tape of Morris' use of drugs is impeachment evidence, particularly so 
when her use was at a time different than that to which she had testified.  The Powell tape is also impeachment 
evidence because, at trial, the defense had no evidence and could only suggest 
that Morris' motives were not as pure as she testified.  Further, the defense at trial had no 
evidence with which to challenge the prosecution's bolstering (FN4)[6] of Morris' credibility with the testimony 
of  [the] DCI agent[] who vouched 
for Morris' credibility [stating she was the best CI he had worked with both as 
to quality and quantity of her work]. (FN5)[7]  In 
the hands of defense counsel, the Powell tape's disclosure indicating that DCI 
knew that Davis was engaging in illegal activities would have been most useful 
for challenging all of this testimony.  

 

The 
final element requires that we focus on the materiality of the undisclosed 
evidence, mindful that favorable evidence is material if "its suppression 
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."  [United States v.] Bagley, 473 U.S. [667,] 678, 105 S. Ct. 
[3375,] 3381 [(1985)].  In Kyles, the Court further reviewed the 
meaning of materiality as it relates to the final result of the trial:  "Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a 
reasonable probability' of a different result, and the adjective is important. 
The question is not whether the 
defendant would more likely than not 
have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its 
absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict 
worthy of confidence.  A reasonable 
probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's 
evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the 
trial.'"  Kyles, 514 U.S.  at 434, 115 S. Ct.  at 
1566 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S.  at 678, 
105 S. Ct. at 3381) (emphasis added).

 

In Strickler, the Court distinguished 
between finding a "reasonable probability" that the outcome might have been 
different requiring a reversal and finding a "reasonable possibility" requiring 
that the conviction be affirmed.  
527 U.S.  at 291, 119 S. Ct.  at 1953.  The dissent in Strickler cautioned that the continued 
use of the term "probability" promoted the likelihood that courts would apply 
the forbidden "more likely than not" determination and thus violate Kyles, and it proposed that the term be 
deemed "inevitably imprecise," thus warranting changing the term to a 
"significant possibility."  Id. at 298, 119 S. Ct.  at 1956 (Souter 
and Kennedy, JJ., concurring and dissenting).  The differing conclusions on materiality 
reached by Strickler's majority and 
dissent in analyzing the particular facts illustrate not only that the preceding 
discussion is not idle intellectualizing but also that a conclusion regarding 
materiality may well be entirely subjective when credibility judgments are at 
issue.  

 

The 
subjectivity presented when evaluating the significance of credibility 
determinations is particularly troublesome in this case where Morris' 
credibility was the critical issue.  
Perhaps we could simply dispose of this case by simplistically concluding 
that had the Powell tape been disclosed, Morris would not have testified that 
she had used drugs two months earlier, but would have testified that she used 
them one month earlier; or by agreeing with the trial court that Morris had 
admitted that she had used drugs on a single occasion and a new trial is not 
required; or by deciding that the difference in time frames relating to Morris' 
drug use does not undermine our confidence in the verdict.

 

However, 
our review indicates that . . . portions of the Morris tape [were] 
inaudible, and, therefore, [the defendant's] trial was dependent entirely upon 
Morris' testimony.  Impeachment 
evidence that could be used to discredit such an important witness or cast doubt 
on her veracity is usually material.  
As previously discussed, the prosecution presented DCI agent testimony 
that bolstered Morris' credibility . . . . The Powell tape 
could have been used to discredit that testimony also.  "The question is not whether the State 
would have had a case to go to the jury if it had disclosed the favorable 
evidence, but whether we can be confident that the jury's verdict would have 
been the same."  Kyles, 514 U.S.  at 453, 115 S. Ct.  at 
1575.

 

Davis, 2002 
WY 88, ¶¶17-22.

 

[¶16]   The only evidence implicating Ms. 
Hensley in the controlled buy was Ms. Morris' testimony and an exceptionally bad 
tape recording.  We must, therefore, 
conclude the undisclosed evidence, which could have been used to impeach Ms. 
Morris, was material.  We reverse 
Ms. Hensley's conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 

 

B.        
Admission of Audio Tape

 

[¶17]   We address the admissibility of the 
audio tape of the drug transaction because that issue will likely arise again in 
the event of a new trial. 

 

            
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

 

W.R.E. 
403.  "The balancing test required 
by Rule 403 is assigned to the sound discretion of the trial court."  Prindle v. State, 945 P.2d 1180, 1183 
(Wyo. 1997), abrogated on other grounds 
by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).

            

"Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.'"  Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957, 960 (Wyo. 
2000) (quoting  [Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986)]).

 

Stout v. 
State, 2001 
WY 114, ¶7, 35 P.3d 1198, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶18]   "[T]his Court [has] said that tape 
recordings of drug transactions are non-testimonial, and should be made 
available for a jury's review as any other exhibit.'  Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 475 (Wyo. 
1995)."  Contreras v. State, 7 P.3d 917, 919 
(Wyo. 2000).  The court has stated 
further

 

"a trial 
court's ruling permitting a jury to review the tapes should not be disturbed on 
appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. . . . In 
addition, the exercise of that discretion should be upheld so long as the audio 
recording is otherwise admissible, and where the state introduces something more 
than a minimal amount of other evidence of culpability." 

 

Id. 
(quoting Warner, 897 P.2d at 
475).  

 

[¶19]   Ms. Hensley objected to the tape of 
the controlled buy, arguing it violated the hearsay rule and her constitutional 
right to confront witnesses because the neighbors' and Mr. Wilkie's voices could 
be heard on the tape and they did not testify at trial.  The trial court overruled the objection, 
concluding the tape was not offered to prove the matters asserted by the 
unavailable witnesses and was the best evidence of what was said that day by Ms. 
Hensley and Ms. Morris. 

 

[¶20]   We conclude admission of the tape 
was within the trial court's broad discretion.  Ms. Morris' eyewitness testimony and the 
DCI witnesses' testimony laid a proper foundation for the tape, assuring its 
trustworthiness.

 

The 
informant explained how she had been equipped with the portable recording device 
by the DCI agents, and she described the transaction . . . in 
detail.  The DCI agent testified 
that he assisted in equipping the informant with the tape recorder; monitored 
the informant throughout the transaction; and retrieved the micro cassette from 
the informant after the transaction was completed.  "Admission is especially appropriate 
where a witness who heard the statements also testifies and the recording gives 
independent support to his testimony." U.S. v. Davis, 780 F.2d 838, 846 
(10th Cir. 1985), followed by, U.S. v. Hanif, 1 F.3d 998, 1002 (10th Cir. 1993).  The testimony from the informant and the 
DCI agent who monitored the transaction laid more than sufficient foundation to 
insure the trustworthiness and accuracy of the tape recordings.  They were properly admitted into 
evidence . . . .

            

Crisp v. 
State, 944 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Wyo. 1997).  The 
tape was difficult to understand and, consequently, may not have been of 
significant benefit to the state's case.  
Discerning what was said by Mr. Wilkie and the neighbors is difficult, 
but none of what was said by them appears to implicate Ms. Hensley in any 
criminal activity.  The tape was 
relevant to the proceedings, and the trial court had the discretion to allow its 
admission.  The tape was properly 
admitted and played for the jury.  
See Contreras, 7 P.3d  at 
919-20.

 

[¶21]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded.   

 

            

 

FOOTNOTES

  1Mr. Wilkie died 
prior to Ms. Hensley's trial. 

2  Ms. Morris testified that an 
"eightball" was short for one-eighth of an ounce of 
methamphetamine.

  3Consistent with 
the references in Davis, we shall 
refer to Ms. Shepard as Ms. Powell throughout the remainder of this 
opinion.

  4Mr. Wilkie's 
death was unrelated to the murder investigation.

  5Footnote three 
reads:

 

"Prior inconsistent statements by a 
witness are admissible under W.R.E. 613(b): (b) Extrinsic evidence of a prior 
inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is 
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is 
afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice 
otherwise require.  This provision 
does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 
801(d)(2).'"  Monn v. State, 811 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Wyo. 
1991).

 

Davis, 
2002 WY 88, ¶17 n.3.

 

  6Footnote four 
reads:

 

"The jury is charged with resolving the 
factual issues, judging the witnesses' credibility, and ultimately determining 
whether the accused is guilty or innocent.  
Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 
860 (Wyo. 1998); Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 362 (Wyo. 1988).  A 
witness may not, therefore, vouch for the credibility of another witness or a 
victim.  Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 860; Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 373-74 
(Wyo. 1995)."  Newport v. State, 983 P.2d 1213, 1215 
(Wyo. 1999).  Whether [the 
defendant] can be heard on the tape making the precise statements that Morris 
alleged [she] made is a question of fact for the jury to determine.  

 

Davis, 
2002 WY 88, ¶18 n.4.

 

  7Footnote five 
reads in pertinent part:

 

In its presentation of its case, the 
prosecution established Morris as an informant whom the jury could find 
trustworthy in several ways.  First, 
Morris testified that her motives for acting as a DCI informant were to 
cooperate for favorable treatment regarding her own arrests for drug violations; 
to avoid the possibility of losing custody of her children; and to escape her 
life as a drug addict in the drug world although she forthrightly disclosed that 
since becoming a DCI informant, she had used drugs once two months before 
trial.  Second, a DCI agent 
testified and vouched for Morris' credibility.

 

Davis, 
2002 WY 88, ¶18 n.4.