Case Title: Ex parte Elizabeth Roper Carter et al. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Elizabeth Roper Carter et al. v. Colonial Bank, N.A., et al.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1091196

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
rel: 12/30/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
_________________________
1091196
_________________________
Ex parte Elizabeth Roper Carter et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Elizabeth Roper Carter et al.
v.
Colonial Bank, N.A., et al.)
(Madison Circuit Court, CV-09-1306)
PER CURIAM.
Elizabeth Roper Carter, John Randolph Roper, and the
Estate of Frances Elizabeth Parham Roper ("the estate"), the
1091196
2
plaintiffs in an action pending in the Madison Circuit Court
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs"),
petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
circuit court to vacate an order striking their demand for a
jury trial.  We deny the petition in part, grant it in part,
and issue the writ.
Factual Background and Procedural History
The plaintiffs allege the following facts. Frances
Elizabeth Parham Roper died on September 21, 2007.  Elizabeth
Roper Carter and John Randolph Roper are her niece and nephew
and primary heirs.  On the date of her death, the estate held
765,092 shares of Colonial Bank stock valued at $23.01 per
share or approximately $17,604,767.  After Roper died, the
value of the Colonial Bank stock began to decline.  On June
13, 2008, the plaintiffs, in order to pay the estate's tax
liability, executed a promissory note with Colonial Bank in
the amount of $6,000,000.  
The 
plaintiffs 
allege 
that 
before 
executing 
the
promissory note they expressed concerns to various Colonial
Bank employees regarding the financial security of the bank.
According to the plaintiffs, those employees assured them that
1091196
3
the bank stock was going to increase in value; that the bank
was financially sound; that, even if the bank's stock reached
a value of zero, the bank would remain solvent; and that
financially Colonial Bank was in a better position than other
banks. 
 
The 
plaintiffs 
stated 
that, 
based 
on 
those
representations, they executed the promissory note and related
documents, including an "Unconditional Guaranty of Specific
Debts" (hereinafter "the guaranty"), a "Real Estate Mortgage
and 
Security 
Agreement" 
(hereinafter 
"the 
mortgage
agreement"), and a "Term Loan Agreement" (hereinafter "the
loan agreement"). 
All four documents (collectively, "the loan documents")
contain provisions whereby the parties executing the documents
waived their rights to a jury trial should a dispute arise
between them.  The jury-waiver provisions in each of the loan
documents are similar but designate the parties differently.
The promissory note provides: "Maker hereby waives the right
to any jury trial in any action, proceeding, or counterclaim
brought by either Note Holder or Maker against the other."
The promissory note defines "Maker" as Carter in her capacity
as personal representative of the estate.  The promissory note
1091196
4
defines "Note Holder" as Colonial Bank and its successors and
assigns.
The guaranty provides: "Bank and Guarantors hereby waive
the right to any jury trial in any action, proceeding or
counterclaim brought by either Bank or Borrower against the
other."  The guaranty defines "Bank" as Colonial Bank and
defines "Guarantor" as Carter.  However, the guaranty does not
define the term "Borrower."  The guaranty separately provides
that Carter, as guarantor, agrees "to indemnify Bank and its
officers, directors, agents and attorneys" against certain
claims.
The mortgage agreement provides: "All parties to this
Mortgage hereby waive the right to any jury trial in any
action, proceeding or counterclaim brought by any party
against any other party."  Carter, individually and on behalf
of the estate, and John Randolph Roper executed the mortgage
agreement, granting Colonial Bank and its successors and
assigns a security interest in certain real property.
The 
loan 
agreement 
provides: 
"Bank, 
Borrower,
Accommodation Party and each Guarantor hereby waive the right
to any jury trial in any action, proceeding or counterclaim
1091196
5
brought by either Bank, Borrower, Accommodation Party or
Guarantors against the other."  The loan agreement defined
"Borrower" 
as 
Carter 
in 
her 
capacity 
as 
personal
representative of the estate; "Bank" as Colonial Bank;
"Guarantors" 
as 
Carter 
and 
John 
Randolph 
Roper; 
and
"Accommodation Party" as the "Frances Roper Corporation."  The
loan agreement also provides: "This agreement shall bind and
inure to the benefit of Borrower and Bank, and their
respective 
successors 
and 
assigns." 
 
In 
the 
section
immediately preceding the jury-waiver provision, the loan
agreement states: "Borrower shall indemnify and hold Bank and
its directors, officers, agents, employees and attorneys
(collectively, the 'Lender Parties') harmless of and from all
liability, loss, expense or damage of any kind or nature ...."
By October 2008, the price of Colonial Bank stock had
fallen to $3.25 a share.  The plaintiffs allege that certain
of Colonial Bank's employees continued to assure them that the
bank was financially secure.  On August 11, 2009, the value of
Colonial Bank stock had fallen to $.50 a share.  On August 14,
2009, the Alabama State Banking Department closed Colonial
Bank and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
1091196
6
("the FDIC") as its receiver.  The FDIC subsequently assigned
all  promissory notes and mortgages held by Colonial Bank to
Branch Banking and Trust Company ("BB&T").  The plaintiffs
ultimately sold the estate's stock in Colonial Bank for
approximately $.08 a share.  
The plaintiffs sued Colonial Bank; BB&T Colonial Bank's
former chief executive officer ("CEO"), Robert E. Lowder; and
Colonial Bank's former employees Colleen Misfeldt, Susan
Compton, Kim Russell, Phyllis Byers, John McMullen, and Paula
Renfroe.  The plaintiffs alleged several causes of action,
including fraudulent misrepresentation, deceit, suppression,
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment,
negligence, wantonness, and breach of contract.  The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had misrepresented
Colonial Bank's future prospects, causing them to execute the
loan documents and, ultimately, to retain the Colonial Bank
stock held by the estate through Colonial Bank's financial
demise.  The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' jury
demand, citing the above-quoted jury-waiver provisions.  On
April 30, 2010, after a hearing, the trial court entered an
order concluding that the waiver provisions were "sufficiently
1091196
In the same order, the trial court dismissed Robert E.
1
Lowder as a defendant.  The plaintiffs make no argument in
their petition challenging that dismissal.
7
broad to apply to all defendants and all claims asserted by
the plaintiffs" and granting the defendants' motion to strike
the jury demand.   The plaintiffs subsequently petitioned this
1
Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to
vacate its April, 30, 2010, order striking their jury demand.
Standard of Review
"A writ of mandamus will be 'issued only when
there is: 1) a clear legal right in the petitioner
to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex
parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501,
503 (Ala. 1993)."
Ex parte Horton Homes, Inc., 774 So. 2d 536, 539 (Ala. 2000).
This Court has stated: "A petition for a writ of mandamus is
the appropriate vehicle for seeking review by this Court of a
denial of a demand for a jury trial."  Ex parte Atlantis Dev.
Co., 897 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Ala. 2004).  In Atlantis
Development, this Court explained: "Because mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy, the standard of review on a petition for
a writ of mandamus is whether there is a clear showing of
error on the part of the trial court."  Id.
1091196
8
Analysis
I.  Colonial Bank and BB&T
The plaintiffs explicitly concede in their submissions to
this Court that the jury-waiver provisions in the loan
documents are fully enforceable as to Colonial Bank and BB&T.
In their mandamus petition, the plaintiffs state that the
issue presented is whether the trial court erred "in striking
the plaintiffs' jury demand with respect to claims asserted
against defendants who were not parties to the agreements
containing the jury waiver provision." (Petition, at 5.)  The
plaintiffs then acknowledge that the waivers would be fully
effective as between them and Colonial Bank, stating: "A plain
reading of the waivers reveals that they are limited to claims
between the plaintiffs and Defendant Colonial Bank ...."
(Petition, at 6.)  They then state in a footnote: "Colonial
Bank did not move to strike the jury demand.  Thus, whether
the trial court should strike the jury demand as to Colonial
Bank was not a question before the trial court and is not a
question now before this Court."  (Petition, at 6 n.2.)
However, the trial court's April 30, 2010, order seemingly
struck the plaintiffs' jury demand as to all defendants.  
1091196
9
In their reply brief, the plaintiffs appear to recognize
the broad reach of the April 30, 2010, order and assert that
the trial court erred "by striking the plaintiffs' jury demand
as to all of the defendants" and that "the jury demand should
not have been stricken as to all defendants in this case."
(Reply brief, at 2, 5.)  Having already conceded in their
mandamus petition that the jury waiver was textually
applicable to Colonial Bank, the plaintiffs went further in
their reply brief, stating: "The petitioners concede, subject
to the fraudulent inducement argument in Section II infra,
that as assignee, BB&T may enforce the jury waiver provisions
contained in the contracts that have been assigned BB&T
following the collapse of Colonial Bank."  (Reply brief, at 7
n.1.)  Thus, subject only "to the [plaintiffs'] fraudulent
inducement argument," the plaintiffs fully acknowledge and
concede the propriety of the striking of their jury demand
with respect to their claims against Colonial Bank and BB&T.
"Such an explicit admission in a brief is binding on the party
making it."  Ford v. Carylon Corp., 937 So. 2d 491, 502 (Ala.
2006).
1091196
10
As to the plaintiffs' "fraudulent inducement argument,"
they contend in their mandamus petition that "the jury waivers
are void, even as they relate to Colonial Bank, because the
plaintiffs were induced to execute the [loan documents] by
fraud."  (Petition, at 25.)  The plaintiffs expand that
statement in their reply brief after conceding that BB&T may
enforce the jury-waiver provisions to the same extent as
Colonial Bank, asserting that those provisions "are void and
unenforceable, even as they relate to Defendants Colonial Bank
and BB&T," based on fraud in the inducement.  (Reply brief, at
11.)  The argument the plaintiffs present in their mandamus
petition regarding fraudulent inducement consists of only 16
lines of text and appears to proceed on the theory that the
plaintiffs would have the right to rescind the loan documents
because they allegedly were fraudulently induced to enter into
them.  (Petition, at 25.)  Before the trial court, in their
response to the defendants' motion to strike the jury demand,
the plaintiffs framed the argument as follows: "The Plaintiffs
allege that they were fraudulently induced to enter into all
the relevant agreements and that they are entitled to
rescission of those agreements.  Accordingly, the jury waivers
1091196
11
contained within those agreements cannot be entered [into
evidence] by Colonial Bank to defeat the plaintiffs'
constitutional right to a trial by jury."  (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiffs attach to their mandamus petition their second
amended complaint as the version of the complaint on which
they rely.  The second amended complaint contains nine counts,
eight of which seek only money damages and the last of which
seeks injunctive relief; none of the claims request as relief
any form of rescission of any of the loan documents.
Consequently, with respect to the plaintiffs' fraudulent-
inducement argument as specifically articulated by them in the
trial court, the plaintiffs have not shown that they have a
clear legal right to have set aside the trial court's order
striking the jury demand as to Colonial Bank and BB&T.
II.  The Individual Defendants
As to the remaining individual defendants, Colonial
Bank's former employees (hereinafter referred to collectively
as "the individual defendants"), the plaintiffs contend that
the waiver provisions are not broad enough to apply to them.
The plaintiffs argue that, although jury-waiver provisions are
enforceable, Ex parte AIG Baker Orange Beach Wharf, L.L.C.,
1091196
"Public policy, the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, and
2
the Alabama Constitution all express a preference for trial by
jury. Ex parte Cupps, 782 So. 2d [772,] 775 [(Ala. 2000)].
That said, 'no constitutional or statutory provision prohibits
a person from waiving his or her right to trial by jury.'
Mall, Inc. v. Robbins, 412 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Ala. 1982)." ___
So. 3d at ___.
12
[Ms. 1080807, April 16, 2010] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala.
2010),  they must be strictly construed.  They reason that,
2
under a strict construction, the waiver provisions in the loan
documents extend only to the plaintiffs' claims against those
parties identified by the waiver provisions.  Because the
waiver provisions, as defined in the loan documents,
referenced only Colonial Bank and not its employees, the
plaintiffs contend that the waiver provisions are not broad
enough to encompass their claims against the individual
defendants.  We agree.  
Alabama Const. 1901, Art. I, § 11 provides: "[T]he right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."  Similarly, Rule
38(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides: "The right of trial by jury
as declared by the Constitution of Alabama or as given by a
statute of this State shall be preserved to the parties
inviolate."  In Ex parte Cupps, 782 So. 2d 772 (Ala. 2000), in
determining whether a defendant's tort-based counterclaims
1091196
13
"arose under" a contract within the meaning of a jury-waiver
provision, this Court stated: "In cases, such as this case,
that involve contractual waivers, we give the text of the
waiver a narrow and strict construction, in deference to the
constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial."  782
So. 2d at 775.
Although the jury-waiver provisions state that the
plaintiffs waived the right to a jury trial in "any action,"
the waiver provisions limit such actions to those brought by
either the plaintiffs or Colonial Bank "against the other."
The jury-waiver provisions, therefore, do not operate to waive
jury trials in any action involving only one of the parties;
instead, the waiver provisions apply only to actions by one of
the parties against the other.  Additionally, by their plain
language, the jury-waiver provisions apply only to explicitly
defined parties; Colonial Bank's former employees are not
expressly among them.  
Other provisions of the loan documents evidence an intent
by Colonial Bank to expressly state certain rights relative to
its employees and agents, and the inclusion of those
provisions demonstrates Colonial Bank's awareness of its
1091196
14
ability to do so.  First, the loan agreement, in the section
immediately preceding the jury-waiver provision, expressly
provides indemnification rights for Colonial Bank's employees
and agents, stating: "Borrower shall indemnify and hold Bank
and its directors, officers, agents, employees and attorneys
(collectively, the 'Lender Parties') harmless of and from all
liability, loss, expense or damage of any kind or nature ...."
(Emphasis added.)  Colonial Bank, as the drafter of the loan
agreement, could have easily named the "Lender Parties," which
it had previously defined, or, separately, its employees or
agents, as parties to the subsequent jury-waiver provision.
Its choice not to do so evidences an intent not to bind its
employees or agents to the jury-waiver provision.
Similarly, the guaranty states that Carter, as guarantor,
agrees "to indemnify Bank and its officers, directors, agents
and attorneys" against certain claims.  (Emphasis added.)
Again, having done so in the indemnification provision,
Colonial Bank could have easily included similar language in
the jury-waiver provision in the guaranty.  Its choice not to
do so evidences an intent not to bind its employees or agents
to the jury-waiver provision.
1091196
15
Considering Colonial Bank's express inclusion of its
agents and employees with respect to indemnity rights and
considering the express language of the jury-waiver provisions
limiting those provisions to actions brought by specifically
defined parties against each other, we cannot say that the
jury-waiver provisions in the loan documents are broad enough
to apply to claims by or against Colonial Bank's former
employees.
Certainly, this Court has stated that a "corporation is
a legal entity, an artificial person, and can only act through
agents," Townsend Ford, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 656 So.
2d 360, 363 (Ala. 1995), and that agents "stand in the shoes"
of their principals and can enforce certain contractual
agreements, Stevens v. Phillips, 852 So. 2d 123, 129-30 (Ala.
2002) (a defendant nonsignatory agent had standing to enforce
an arbitration agreement between its principal and the
plaintiff).  Other courts, applying these principles, have
held that jury-waiver provisions extend to nonsignatory agents
of a corporation.  For example, in In re Credit Suisse First
Boston Mortgage Capital, L.L.C., 273 S.W.3d 843, 847-48 (Tex.
App. 2008), a Texas court applied the following analysis:
1091196
16
"We are asked to decide, as a matter of first
impression, whether a valid contractual jury waiver
applies to nonsignatories seeking to invoke the
waiver as agents of the signatory corporation. We
conclude that a valid waiver provision may be
invoked by a nonsignatory agent when it acts on
behalf of the signatory corporation.
"In 2007, the Texas Supreme Court adopted a
similar 
rule 
in 
the 
context 
of 
arbitration
provisions. In re Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 235
S.W.3d 206, 209 (Tex. 2007) ....
"....
"Relators urge us to analogize jury waiver
provisions to arbitration clauses, thereby extending
the Kaplan holding to the case before us. That a
rule may be applied in arbitration clauses, however,
does not necessarily render it appropriate for jury
waivers. See [In re] Credit Suisse [First Boston
Mortgage Capital, L.L.C.], 257 S.W.3d [486,] 491-92
[(Tex. App. 2008)]. Arbitration agreements and jury
waivers are subject to opposite presumptions:
"'Unlike arbitration agreements, which are
strongly favored under Texas law, the right
to a jury trial is so strongly favored that
contractual jury waivers are strictly
construed and will not be lightly inferred
or extended. Before a jury waiver will be
enforced, such waiver must be found to be
a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent act
that was done with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.'
"Id. at 490 (citations omitted). A handful of
federal courts have extended a jury waiver to a
nonsignatory through agency principles, but they
based their reasoning on principles unrelated to
relators' 
proposed 
analogy 
between 
arbitration
1091196
17
clauses and jury waivers. See Tracinda Corp. v.
DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 224-25 (3d Cir.
2007); Mowbray v. Zumot, 536 F. Supp. 2d 617, 623
(D. Md. 2008). Those courts explained that, because
a corporation can act only through its agents and
employees, by definition, one who agrees to a
jury-waiver clause knows--and intends--that the
clause naturally must extend to the corporation's
nonsignatory agents, too. See Tracinda, 502 F.3d at
223-25; see also In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB,
235 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding)
('[C]ontracting parties [that] agree to arbitrate
all disputes "under or with respect to" a contract
... generally intend to include disputes about their
agents' actions because "[a]s a general rule, the
actions of a corporate agent on behalf of the
corporation are deemed the corporation's acts."').
Thus, extension-through-agency does not run afoul of
the requirement that jury waivers be knowingly and
voluntarily made. See Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970),
quoted in [In re] Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d
[124,] 132 [(Tex. 2004)].
"Accordingly, we hold that, when a valid
contractual jury waiver applies to a signatory
corporation, 
the 
waiver 
also 
extends 
to
nonsignatories that seek to invoke the waiver as
agents of the corporation. See Tracinda, 502 F.3d at
225; Kaplan, 235 S.W.3d at 209."
We agree with the reasoning of the Texas court that
analogy to arbitration cases is inappropriate because of the
inapplicability of the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution based on cases from the United States Supreme
Court construing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq., and the resulting application of opposite presumptions
1091196
18
in interpreting arbitration and jury-waiver provisions.
However, regarding the application of agency principles, based
on the facts presented in this case, we must reach a different
conclusion.  There was no indication in Credit Suisse that the
jury-waiver provision at issue there included language
limiting the waiver to specifically defined parties against
each other or that the documents expressly included the
corporation's agents with respect to other rights.  See Credit
Suisse, 273 S.W.3d at 846 ("Relators moved to quash
Developer's jury demand, citing a clause in the Loan Agreement
in which the parties to the contract waived their right to
submit disputes to a jury.").  The distinction is material. 
The loan documents in this case evidence a failure by
Colonial Bank to confer upon its employees or agents the
benefits of a jury-waiver provision.  Specifically, when the
opportunity was presented at other places in the loan
documents to expand the scope of the agreement to protect
employees or agents, Colonial Bank demonstrated its ability to
do so, yet it failed to do so in the context of the jury-
waiver provision.   We cannot rewrite the loan documents to
give the jury-waiver provisions a broader effect when our
1091196
19
standard of review requires strict construction of such
provisions in deference to the constitutional guarantee of the
right to trial by jury.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs have
shown a clear legal right to the reinstatement of their jury
demand as to the individual defendants and, to that extent,
the petition is due to be granted.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we deny the plaintiffs' petition
for a writ of mandamus with respect to that portion of the
trial court's April 30, 2010, order striking their jury demand
as to their claims against Colonial Bank and BB&T.  We grant
the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of mandamus to the extent
that it relates to their claims against the individual
defendants, and we direct the trial court to vacate that
portion of its April 30, 2010, order striking the plaintiffs'
jury demand as to those defendants and to enter an order
consistent with this opinion. 
PETITION DENIED IN PART; PETITION GRANTED IN PART; WRIT
ISSUED.
1091196
20
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons and Shaw, JJ., and Harwood, Special
Justice,* concur. 
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.
  
Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and Bolin, JJ., concur in part
and dissent in part.  
Parker, J., recuses himself.
*Retired Associate Justice Robert Bernard Harwood, Jr.,
was appointed November 30, 2010, to be a Special Justice in
regard to this petition.
1091196
This principle was applied in Townsend Ford, as it
3
commonly is, in order to establish that the employer was bound
21
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I concur in the result reached by the main opinion. 
As to Part I of the Analysis section thereof, I do not
agree with the characterization of the plaintiffs' argument
regarding fraud in the inducement as an argument that "appears
to proceed on the theory that the plaintiffs would have the
right to rescind the loan documents because they allegedly
were fraudulently induced to enter into them."  ___ So. 3d at
___.  Nonetheless, I do not find that the analysis and
authority provided in the petition demonstrate a "clear legal
right" to relief based on the ground that a jury-waiver
provision in a contract is unenforceable when the party
against whom the provision is sought to be enforced was
fraudulently induced to enter the contract itself.  I do not
read the main opinion as addressing this more general issue.
Part II of the Analysis section of the main opinion
couples the general principle that a "'corporation is a legal
entity, an artificial person, and can only act through
agents,'" which it quotes from Townsend Ford, Inc. v.
Auto-Owners Insurance Co., 656 So. 2d 360, 363 (Ala. 1995),3
1091196
by the acts of its employee.  656 So. 2d at 363.
22
with the holding in Stevens v. Phillips, 852 So. 2d 123 (Ala.
2002), that the nonsignatory agent in that case could enforce
for his personal benefit an arbitration agreement to which his
principal was a party.  Approximately a year before Stevens v.
Phillips was decided, this Court decided Auvil v. Johnson, 806
So. 2d 343 (Ala. 2001), in which it analyzed why, in certain
types of cases, a corporate employee was entitled to arbitrate
claims asserted against him or her individually.  The Auvil
Court explained a group of four precedential decisions as
extending to nonsignatory agents the right to compel
arbitration as decisions that "rely or may rely on express
inclusive language in the arbitration agreements."  806 So. 2d
at 350 (emphasis omitted).  The Court in Auvil explained four
other precedents extending to nonsignatory agents the right to
compel arbitration as dependent upon the "intertwined" nature
of the claims against the nonsignatory agent in relation to
claims against a signatory that had been successful in
compelling arbitration.  Id.
Even if we were to apply by analogy the law regarding the
right of agents to arbitrate claims made directly against them
1091196
23
to cases such as this one that involve only a jury-waiver
provision, the first group of precedents as analyzed in Auvil
would provide no support for extending the jury-waiver
provision in the present case for the benefit of Colonial
Bank's former employees.  I see no material distinction
between the contractual language at issue in that group of
precedents  and Auvil, on the one hand, and the present case,
on the other hand.  In none of these cases is there any
language that purports to extend the benefit of the
arbitration or jury-waiver provision to an entity that is not
a party to the agreement.  
As to the second group of precedents analyzed in Auvil,
the claims against the employees in the present case are in
fact intertwined with the claims against the principal.
Further, it has been established in the present case that the
jury-waiver provision will be applied to the principal.
I am not persuaded, however, that the rationale for
allowing 
nonsignatory 
employees 
and 
agents 
to 
compel
arbitration of claims against them that are intertwined with
claims against signatory principals that are to be arbitrated
applies when the issue is solely the waiver of a jury trial.
1091196
24
As Auvil notes, arbitration cases concerned with the
intertwined 
nature 
of 
claims 
against 
signatories 
and
nonsignatories are in some measure rooted in a concern that
"'"[s]eparate forums may result in varying decisions[,]
discreditable to the administration of justice."'"  806 So. 2d
at 347 (quoting Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
McNeal, 143 Ga. App. 579, 581, 239 S.E. 2d 401, 404 (1977), in
turn quoting Starr v. O'Rourke, 5 Misc. 2d 646, 647, 159
N.Y.S. 
2d. 
60, 
62 
(1957) 
(emphasis 
omitted)). 
 
The
adjudication of a claim against one defendant by a judge and
the adjudication of the claims against other defendants by a
jury do not require separate forums.
More generally, I agree with the skepticism expressed in
the main opinion as to the appropriateness of analogizing
principles distilled from arbitration cases to cases involving
jury-waiver provisions.  As the main opinion notes, the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution applied in
relation to cases construing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 1 et seq., on the one hand, and the constitutional
right to a trial by jury, on the other hand, result in
1091196
25
"opposite presumptions in interpreting arbitration and jury-
waiver provisions." ___ So. 3d at ___.
1091196
26
WOODALL, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Insofar as the main opinion denies the plaintiffs'
petition for a writ of mandamus with respect to that portion
of the trial court's order striking their jury demand as to
their claims against Colonial Bank and BB&T, I concur.
However, insofar as the main opinion grants the petition with
respect to the plaintiffs' claims against the individual
defendants and directs the trial court to vacate that portion
of its order striking the plaintiffs' jury demand as to the
individual defendants, I respectfully dissent.  
"[T]his Court must uphold the intent of the parties as
expressed in their contract."  Ex parte AIG Baker Orange Beach
Wharf, L.L.C., [Ms. 1080807, April 16, 2010] ___ So. 3d ___,
___ (Ala. 2010).  Pursuant to each of the loan documents, the
plaintiffs "waive[d] the right to any jury trial in any action
... brought by [them] against [Colonial Bank]."  (Emphasis
added.) In my opinion, this broad waiver is unambiguous and
applies 
to 
the 
entire 
pending 
action, 
including 
the
plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants, and is
not limited to the plaintiffs' claims against Colonial Bank
and its successor, BB&T.  In my judgment, the construction in
1091196
27
the main opinion of the waiver is not true to its terms and,
further, because a corporation can act only through its
agents, has created a procedural morass.
Stuart, Smith, and Bolin, JJ., concur.