Case Title: State v. Roy R. Williams

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-46-00

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Long, J., writing for a Majority of the Court. This case involves the appropriate jury instruction to be used in the case of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. On June 22, 1995, Roy R. Williams, an off-duty police officer, was a passenger in his own vehicle, driven by his wife. At trial, Williams testified that his vehicle was rear-ended by Tammy Erickson. Williams testified that Erickson did not stop and that his wife pursued Erickson's vehicle in an attempt to obtain insurance information. Williams then testified that he and his wife lost sight of Erickson's vehicle, but then spotted it and attempted to bring it to a stop by blocking the road. Williams further testified that Erickson did not stop and was headed towards his wife who had exited the vehicle and who screamed when she saw Erickson's vehicle approaching at a high rate of speed. Williams testified that he too had exited the vehicle, with his police badge in hand, but that when he heard his wife's screams, he pulled out his service revolver, legally carried in a gunnysack attached to his waist, and began shooting in the direction of Erickson's vehicle. Williams testified that he discharged his revolver only in an attempt to defend his wife. A bullet struck Erickson's windshield, but she was not injured. Erickson testified, on the other hand, that she had not been involved in the alleged car accident and that she was on her way to work when she saw Williams' vehicle in the middle of the road. Erickson testified that Williams was the only person standing outside of the car, with gun in hand, pointing it in her direction. She further testified that upon seeing Williams, she accelerated and turned the corner, but not before a bullet went through her car's windshield. The State produced witnesses who substantially corroborated Erickson's version. Williams was found guilty of second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a, and fourth-degree aggravated assault by knowingly pointing a firearm at another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4). Williams appealed, arguing, among other things, that the jury was not properly instructed on the possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose charge. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision, but was divided over the issue of the adequacy of the jury instruction. Judge Wecker wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which she identified a number of errors in respect of the unlawful purpose jury instruction. The Supreme Court granted Williams' petition for certification as of right based on Judge Wecker's dissent. HELD: The trial court's instruction to the jury was insufficient in that it failed to identify the specific unlawful purpose. The trial court's failure to instruct the jury on Williams' honest though unreasonable belief that he was justified in using a weapon to defend his wife constituted plain error. 1. Williams' claim that he acted in defense of his wife presents two distinct defenses. First, Williams' defense may serve to exculpate him on a justification theory. Second, it provides a failure of proof defense to the charge that he possessed the weapon for an unlawful purpose. The exculpation defense requires that Williams acted reasonably. The failure of proof defense admits evidence to defeat the State's proof of the elements of the offense in the first instance. One of those elements in an unlawful possession case is that the defendant intended to use the weapon in an unlawful manner, making defendant's state of mind an essential element of the offense. Although an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to use force for protective purposes would not serve to exonerate Williams from the substantive charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault because of the Code's interdiction against imperfect self-defense, the use of such evidence for a different purpose altogether, that is, to controvert the State's proof of the intent element of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a is entirely proper and indeed unremarkable. Defendant had a right to show that he was motivated by an honestly held belief, though unreasonable, that the use of force was required to protect his wife. (Pp. 6-12) 2. To demonstrate plain error, R. 1:7-2, a defendant must show that the jury instruction was flawed and that the error possessed a clear capacity for producing an unjust result. The trial court's charge to the jury contained five separate references to the requirement of reasonableness. The court never informed the jury, however, that it could consider that an honest but unreasonable belief could negate the requisite state of mind for the unlawful purpose charge. By not purposely instructing the jury, the court left the jury to speculate about the applicable law. (Pp. 12- 18) 3. The jury charge failed to relate the law to the facts by not identifying the specific unlawful purpose harbored by Williams when he shot at Erickson's vehicle. The trial court's obligation is to identify the unlawful purpose(s) that may be suggested by the evidence. Failure to do so leaves the jury to its own notions. (Pp. 18-21) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for a new trial consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE VERNIERO joins, expressing the view that the trial court's jury instructions on the unlawful possession charge adequately explained the jury's responsibility and that any error was harmless. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LONG'S opinion. Justice COLEMAN filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE VERNIERO joins. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ROY R. WILLIAMS, JR., Defendant-Appellant. Argued March 26, 2001 -- Decided June 19, 2001 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Brian J. Neary argued the cause for appellant (Mr. Neary, attorney; Mr. Neary and John Richard Johnson, on the brief). Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The Opinion of the Court was delivered by LONG, J. A grand jury indicted Roy R. Williams, Jr., an off-duty police officer, for firing his service revolver at the automobile of another driver with whom he claimed to have been in a motor vehicle accident. The charges were second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count One); fourth-degree aggravated assault by knowingly pointing a firearm at another person, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(4) (Count Two); second-degree aggravated assault by purposely attempting to cause serious bodily injury to another person, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(1) (Count Three); and attempted murder, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1, 2C:11-3 (Count Four). Tried to a jury, Williams was acquitted on Counts Three and Four, but convicted on Counts One and Two. The trial court sentenced Williams to a five-year custodial term with three years of parole ineligibility on the conviction for possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and to a concurrent eighteen-month custodial term on the conviction for aggravated assault. Williams appealed, raising a series of issues including prosecutorial misconduct, erroneous evidential admissions, and an inadequate jury instruction on the possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose count. His conviction was affirmed in an unpublished opinion, although the Appellate Division was divided over the sufficiency of the jury instruction. The majority determined that the instruction adequately identified the unlawful purpose with which Williams was alleged to have possessed the firearm. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wecker disagreed, finding that although the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Williams's conviction, the inadequacy of the trial court's instruction allowed the jury to convict him without finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had the purpose to use his gun unlawfully against another. The dissent identified four errors with respect to the trial court's instruction: (1) failure to define the specific unlawful purpose ; (2) failure to relate the alleged unlawful purpose to the evidence; (3) failure to focus on the time when Williams's possession changed from lawful to unlawful; and (4) failure to instruct that Williams's purpose was to be determined by his subjective state of mind. The case is before us as of right by virtue of the Appellate Division dissent on the issue of the adequacy of the jury instruction regarding possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. I have already defined purpose for you. The mental element of purpose to use a firearm unlawfully requires that you find that the Defendant possessed the firearm with the conscious objective, design, or specific intent to use it against the person or property of another in an unlawful manner, as charged in the Indictment, and not for some other purpose. In this case, the State contends that the Defendant's unlawful purpose in possessing the firearm was to use it unlawfully against the person of Tammy Erickson. You must not consider your own notions of the unlawfulness of some other undescribed purpose of the Defendant, but, rather, you must consider whether the State has proven the specific unlawful purpose charges [sic]. The State need not prove which specific completed crime the Defendant intended to commit using the firearm. The unlawful purpose alleged by the State may be inferred from all of what was said and done and from all of the surrounding circumstances in this case. Any lawful purpose would be a defense to the charge. For example, if the Defendant believed his purpose was to lawfully use the firearm to protect himself or another against the use of unlawful force, then the Defendant's conscious object and design was not to use the firearm in an unlawful manner, and the State has failed to carry its burden of proof on this element beyond a reasonable doubt. If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proven each of the elements in this offense as I have defined them, then you must find the Defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, you find that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any one of the elements of this offense as I have defined them, then you must find the Defendant not guilty. [Emphasis added.] The trial court then went on to instruct the jury on the elements of aggravated assault and attempted murder. Immediately after completing those instructions, the trial court turned to Williams's claim that he should be exonerated of aggravated assault and attempted murder because he acted in defense of his wife. The court was careful to point out that a requisite element of that defense is a reasonable belief on the part of defendant that he had to use deadly force to defend against the conduct of another: [Y]ou must first determine whether the Defendant used deadly force. If you find the Defendant did so, then you must determine if the Defendant reasonably believed that he had to use deadly force to defend against the conduct of another. I'll read that again. If you find the Defendant did so, you must determine if the Defendant reasonably believed he had to use deadly force to defend against the unlawful conduct of another. A reasonable belief is one which would be held by a person of ordinary prudence and intelligence situated as this Defendant was. Accordingly, the law requires only a reasonable, not necessarily a correct, judgment. [Emphasis added.] Following that instruction, the jury was excused to commence deliberations. Approximately ninety minutes later, the jurors sent out the following request for clarification: Please re-read self-defense clause and how it pertains to the third party protection, and please re-read or explain the four criteria that need to exist to find someone guilty of the first charge on our jury sheet [possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose]. With no objection from counsel, the trial court simply re-read the justification instruction on defense of another which contains five separate references to the requirement of reasonableness. The court then repeated the charge on possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, without informing the jury that an honest but unreasonable belief concerning the need to use the weapon could be considered by the jury in evaluating whether the State proved that Williams intended to use the weapon unlawfully. The jury's questions highlight the potential for confusion that arises when a justification defense such as self-defense or defense of another is at issue in a case in which a defendant is also charged with possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. See State v. Bilek, 308 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 1998) (noting that where self-defense principles are intertwined with possessory offense charge jurors may be misled into focusing on whether defendant was justified in his conduct, rather than on whether he was affirmatively acting with criminal purpose). It is not only possible, but likely, because of the juxtaposition of the jury instruction and re-instruction, that the jury improperly imported the reasonableness requirement from the justification defense to the determination of whether Williams had the requisite state of mind to be convicted under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a. In other words, on this record, it is impossible to know whether the jury convicted Williams because it concluded that he was not acting in defense of his wife at all, or because it concluded that he was unreasonable in believing that there was a need to use force on her behalf. The court was required to explain to the jury that in order to negate the unlawful purpose element of the possession offense, Williams's belief in his need to fire the gun did not need to be reasonable, as is required to establish a justification defense to the substantive charges. To be sure, the court correctly instructed the jury regarding the justification defense. However, it was the entirely proper emphasis on reasonableness in that charge that contributed to the prejudice resulting from insufficient instruction on the possession charge. Irrespective of Williams's failure to request it, the court should have instructed the jury that even if it found his explanation - that he fired his gun to stop Erickson from killing his wife - to be unreasonable, it nevertheless had to consider whether that belief was an honestly held one. If it was, the jury could have acquitted Williams of the possessory weapons' offense because he lacked the requisite mental state: a purpose to use the gun unlawfully. By failing to explain that a reasonable belief in the need to defend another is required for justification, but that only an honest, though unreasonable, belief is sufficient to negate a purposeful mental state, the judge left the jury to speculate about the applicable law. Accordingly, because the charge had the clear capacity to mislead the jury, we reverse Williams's conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a and remand the case for a new trial. Further, we refer the issue of the jury instruction to be used in those circumstances to the Supreme Court Committee on Model Jury Charges (Criminal). Its mission will be to develop an instruction that distinguishes between the mental state required for justification (an honest and reasonable belief) and that required to negate an element of the crime (an honest but not necessarily reasonable belief) for use in cases such as the one before us. V Our ruling makes it unnecessary for us to grapple with the other jury instruction issues raised by the defense and in the dissent. However, we choose to make the following comments. The trial court did not adequately define what specific unlawful purpose, if any, Williams harbored when he shot at Erickson. The sole instruction in this connection was as follows: In this case, the State contends that the Defendant's unlawful purpose in possessing the firearm was to use it unlawfully against the person of Tammy Erickson. That charge was inadequate to meet the requirement of State v. Petties, 139 N.J. 310, 321 (1995), that the court properly guide the jury by relating the law to the facts. It also violated the rule enunciated in State v. Jenkins, 234 N.J. Super. 311, 316 (App. Div. 1989), that a jury instruction on a charge of gun possession for unlawful purpose must include an identification of such unlawful purposes as may be suggested by the evidence and an instruction that the jury may not convict based on their own notion of the unlawfulness of some other undescribed purpose. The trial court adhered to the latter portion of that instruction, but not the former, and did not clearly identify such unlawful purposes as [might have been] suggested by the evidence so as to avoid the possibility that the jury would convict based upon impermissible considerations. Ibid. Although the jury is permitted to infer an unlawful purpose from circumstantial as well as direct evidence, Petties, supra, 139 N.J. at 316, such an inference is not compelled, and, in fact, may be countered by other evidence regarding a defendant's actual state of mind. Thus one may at once be guilty of an aggravated assault through pointing a weapon at another yet be innocent of possession of the weapon for an unlawful purpose. Harmon, supra, 104 N.J. at 205 (citing State v. Mieles, 199 N.J. Super. 29 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 101 N.J. 265 (1985)). Just as lawful use of a weapon will not necessarily legitimate prior possession for an illegal purpose, illegal use of a weapon alone does not establish the necessary mental element under that statute. The issue of unlawful possession turns on 'the purpose for which defendant possessed the gun and not how he used it.' State v. Blanks, 313 N.J. Super. 55, 73 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting Mieles, supra, 199 N.J. Super. at 41) (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to the dissenters' view, post at ___ (slip op. at 16-18), the mere fact that Williams was charged with and convicted of an offense stemming from use of the weapon does not supply the unlawful motive and is not a substitute for a proper charge. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ROY R. WILLIAMS, JR., Defendant-Appellant. COLEMAN, J., dissenting. This is a road-rage case by a police officer in which the Court concludes that it is likely that the jury improperly imported the reasonableness requirement from the justification defense to the determination of whether Williams had the requisite state of mind to be convicted under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a. Ante at (slip op. at 16). The majority reaches that conclusion by asserting that, on this record, it is impossible to know whether the jury convicted Williams because it concluded that he was not acting in defense of his wife at all, or because it concluded that he was unreasonable in believing that there was a need to use force on her behalf. Id. at (slip op. at 16- 7). The Court also concludes that the jury should have been instructed that even if it found [defendant's] explanation__that he fired his gun to stop Erickson from killing his wife__to be unreasonable, [the jury] nevertheless had to consider whether that belief was an honestly held one. Id. at (slip op. at 17). The Court finds that under the plain error rule, a reversal of defendant's conviction for possession of the weapon for an unlawful purpose is required because [b]y failing to explain that a reasonable belief in the need to defend another is required for justification, but that only an honest, though unreasonable, belief is sufficient to negate a purposeful mental state, the judge left the jury to speculate about the applicable law. Id. at (slip op. at 17-8). I disagree with the majority's conclusion that, applying the plain error standard, the jury instructions given in this case require reversal of defendant's conviction. I therefore dissent. The trial court's instruction stressed to the jury the importance of determining whether defendant had the purpose__the conscious object__to use his gun unlawfully against Tammy Erickson. In light of that fact, I am satisfied that the jury understood that it could not convict defendant of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose unless each juror found that defendant had the specific subjective intent to use his gun against Tammy Erickson in an unlawful manner when he pointed the gun and fired into Erickson's vehicle. Because defendant claimed that he fired his gun in defense of his wife, the trial court instructed the jury on the law of defense of a third person. The court explained that the applicable statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4 and -5, requires three elements to be met: [O]ne, the actor would be justified in using such force to protect himself against the injury believed to be threatened to the person whom he seeks to protect; and, two, under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such protective force; and three, the actor reasonably believes that his intervention is necessary for the protection of another person. The jury instructions on defense of another properly informed the jury that defendant's belief in the necessity to use deadly force to prevent harm to his wife and child had to be reasonable and honest. In accordance with State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 198-99 (1984), the jury was instructed that [s]elf defense exonerates a person who uses force in the reasonable belief that such action was necessary to prevent his death or serious injury, even though his belief was later proven mistaken. . . . Accordingly, the law requires only a reasonable, not necessarily a correct, judgment. The majority agrees that the court correctly instructed the jury regarding the justification defense. Ante at (slip op. at 16). Self-defense and defense of another as justifications mean that the actor's conduct was volitional. Under those two theories of justification, exoneration is based on a legal excusal for intentional conduct__not on an actor's mental state. Viewed in that context, the honest component of self-defense or defense of another as legal justifications cannot serve to reduce the mental culpability required for a conviction pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a. Under our Code of Criminal Justice, the honesty of a defendant police officer's belief, who is a police officer, that his or her conduct is lawful when he or she intentionally fires a loaded service revolver at another is irrelevant to whether the requisite mental culpability has been established for an offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a. The Code provides that [n]either knowledge nor recklessness nor negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such an offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2d. NO. A-46 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ROY R. WILLIAMS, JR., Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED June 19, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz