Case Title: Edmund Mady v. Daimlerchrysler Corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC08-808

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC08-808 
_____________ 
 
 
EDMUND MADY, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
 
March 24, 2011 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Mady v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 976 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2008).  The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with 
the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Dufresne v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 975 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.   
BACKGROUND 
In May 2003, Edmund Mady leased a 2003 Dodge Viper manufactured by 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation.  See Mady, 976 So. 2d at 1213.  After experiencing 
2 
 
problems with the vehicle and being unable to resolve the dispute with the 
manufacturer, Mady ultimately filed an action against DaimlerChrysler for breach 
of written warranty pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade 
Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000) (MMWA).  See 
976 So. 2d at 1213.   
In November 2005, DaimlerChrysler served an offer of judgment, pursuant 
to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 
1.442.  See 976 So. 2d at 1213.  In December 2005, DaimlerChrysler served a 
second offer of judgment along with a proposed release agreement.  On December 
29, 2005, the plaintiff accepted the later formal offer of judgment.  See id. 
Pursuant to the terms of the offer of judgment, DaimlerChrysler would pay 
the total sum of $8,500 exclusive of attorneys‘ fees.  See id.  It neither admitted 
liability nor conceded plaintiff‘s entitlement to attorneys‘ fees.  See id.  The 
agreement acknowledged that the plaintiff might seek attorneys‘ fees.  See id.  The 
settlement required the plaintiff to execute a complete release and voluntary 
dismissal with prejudice.  See id. at 1213-14. 
In June 2006, the plaintiff moved for attorneys‘ fees and costs.  See id. at 
1214.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, basing its denial on a 
finding that the plaintiff had not established he was a consumer who ―finally 
prevail[ed]‖ under 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2).   See id. 
3 
 
 
The Fourth District affirmed the trial court, holding that ―[t]here simply was 
no court-ordered change in the relationship of the parties in this case by the 
plaintiff‘s acceptance of DaimlerChrysler‘s proposal for settlement.‖  Id. at 1215.  
The Fourth District found ―that section 768.79(4)‘s provision for enforcement is 
not the same as the required affirmative court action that either approves of the 
terms of a settlement or affirmatively retains jurisdiction for enforcement.‖  Id. 
 
In direct conflict, the Second District held in Dufrense that a settlement 
agreement entered into pursuant to section 768.79 entitles a consumer to attorneys‘ 
fees under the MMWA.  See 975 So. 2d at 557.  The Second District concluded 
that the agreement ―is the functional equivalent of a consent decree and that 
Dufresne is not precluded from claiming entitlement to attorneys‘ fees under the 
MMWA simply because he accepted the proposal for settlement.‖  Id.  One month 
after Mady was issued, the Third District Court of Appeal in San Martin v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 983 So. 2d 620, 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), rejected the 
Mady decision, aligned itself with the Second District, and employed reasoning 
similar to that of the Second District in Dufrense. 
ANALYSIS 
A settlement produced pursuant to Florida‘s offer of judgment statute, 
section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 
4 
 
is under the auspices of the court in which the dispute is being processed and is 
tantamount to a consent judgment.  Florida‘s offer of judgment statute provides: 
An offer shall be accepted by filing a written acceptance with the 
court within 30 days after service.  Upon filing of both the offer and 
acceptance, the court has full jurisdiction to enforce the settlement 
agreement. 
 
§ 768.79(4), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied).  A consumer who has exhausted all 
non-judicial remedies as a condition required by the MMWA and later secures a 
favorable formal settlement offer of judgment from a defendant which is accepted 
in a Florida legal action filed under the MMWA, 15 U.S.C. § 2310, ―finally 
prevails‖ and may be entitled to recover costs, expenses, and attorneys‘ fees under 
the MMWA.   
 
The MMWA was designed to ―encourage warrantors to establish procedures 
whereby consumer disputes are fairly and expeditiously settled through informal 
dispute settlement mechanisms.‖  15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1).  To advance that goal, 
the MMWA requires warrantors to establish an ―informal dispute settlement 
procedure‖ that adheres to minimum requirements prescribed by the Federal Trade 
Commission.  See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2).  Participation in these procedures is 
mandatory for consumers seeking relief under the MMWA, as the act states that 
consumers ―may not commence a civil action (other than a class action) under 
subsection (d) of this section unless he initially resorts to [the warrantor‘s informal 
settlement procedure].‖  15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3).  It was the intent of Congress to 
5 
 
provide consumers with an efficient and affordable mechanism to resolve warranty 
disputes that would not require consumers to incur substantial costs and expenses.   
 
To ensure meritorious warranty claims are resolved in informal non-judicial 
proceedings, the MMWA provides protection to consumers with regard to 
warrantors who fail to resolve warranty claims that are later determined to be 
meritorious.  Subsection (d)(1) of the MMWA provides: 
Subject to subsections (a)(3) and (e) of this section, a consumer who 
is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service 
contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under 
a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring 
suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief— 
 
(A)  in any court of competent jurisdiction in any State 
or the District of Columbia; or 
 
(B)  in an appropriate district court of the United States, 
subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection. 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Reading subsection (d)(1) in unison with subsection (a)(3), it 
becomes apparent that an individual consumer can proceed with an MMWA action 
in court only after ―he initially resorts to [the warrantor‘s informal settlement 
procedure].‖  15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3).  To encourage warrantors to resolve disputes 
without the expense of judicial resources, subsection (d)(2) of the MMWA 
provides: 
If a consumer finally prevails in any action brought [pursuant to this 
subsection], he may be allowed by the court to recover as part of the 
judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses 
(including attorneys‘ fees based on actual time expended) determined 
6 
 
by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in 
connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action, 
unless the court in its discretion shall determine that such an award of 
attorneys‘ fees would be inappropriate. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (emphasis supplied).   
Subsection (d)(2)‘s fee-shifting provision is consistent with the MMWA‘s 
overarching concern to provide consumer protection at the lowest cost possible.  In 
enacting the MMWA, Congress designed a process intended to encourage 
warrantors to resolve claims quickly, efficiently, and informally without the 
necessity of forcing consumers to file legal actions.  See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1).  If 
a warrantor waits to resolve a meritorious claim until after the consumer is forced 
to involve the courts, the MMWA provides a remedy and method of shifting costs 
to the warrantor which at times may be associated with a more extensive resolution 
process in our courts when the outcome acknowledges the validity of the warranty 
claim.  See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2).  The critical issue, therefore, is whether the 
resolution of a claim filed pursuant to subsection (d)(1) of the MMWA by a 
monetary settlement pursuant to an offer of judgment statute applicable to the 
proceeding bears the imprimatur of a court. 
Unlike a settlement before an action is filed, any offer made and accepted 
pursuant to Florida‘s offer of judgment statute is, as illustrated by the very name of 
the statute, under the auspices of the court in which the offer is made and accepted.  
A resolution reached pursuant to the offer of judgment statute, as opposed to an 
7 
 
extrajudicial settlement agreement that is not subject to judicial enforcement, bears 
the imprimatur of the court because a party that fails to accept that resolution is 
subject to judicial penalty and sanctions.  See § 768.79(4), Fla. Stat.  Further, a 
settlement produced pursuant to Florida‘s offer of judgment statute is subject to 
that court‘s full continuing jurisdiction thereafter.  The offer of judgment statute 
would actually provide a basis to further penalize the consumer if this were not the 
end result.  Consequently, a settlement produced under Florida‘s offer of judgment 
statute necessarily carries judicial implications.  
Here, Mady‘s action could be filed only after informal dispute settlement 
procedures failed to achieve a resolution.  See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3).  After 
failing to resolve the dispute, Mady, acting pursuant to subsection (d)(1) of the 
MMWA, was forced to file an action under the MMWA in state court.  The 
statutory offer pursuant to the offer of judgment statute ―neither admitted liability 
nor conceded plaintiff‘s entitlement to attorney‘s fees, but specifically 
acknowledged that the plaintiff might seek attorney‘s fees.‖  Mady v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 976 So. 2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). 
Although the trial court may not have needed to actually enter a final 
judgment document, Mady achieved the same result with a monetary settlement 
only after being forced to bear all of the costs and expenses associated with 
litigation and facing the statutory penalty if the offer of judgment had not been 
8 
 
accepted.  DaimlerChrysler could have resolved this dispute during the ―informal 
dispute settlement‖ phase, but instead waited until after Mady was forced to 
commence this action and incur the expenses of this litigation.  Litigation had 
commenced, an offer was produced pursuant to the offer of judgment statute and 
corresponding rule of procedure, and the result necessarily falls under the auspices 
of a court, which is exactly the design of the MMWA.  This interpretation is the 
only method through which subsection (d)(2) of that act is implemented to afford 
the designed remedy.  Further, this Court has long and consistently held that when 
a defendant settles a disputed case only after litigation has developed, the 
corresponding payment is tantamount to a final judgment when considering 
prevailing party type attorney fee assessments.  See, e.g., Pepper‘s Steel & Alloys, 
Inc. v. United States, 850 So. 2d 462, 465 (Fla. 2003); Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
774 So. 2d 679, 684 (Fla. 2000); Wollard v. Lloyd‘s & Companies of Lloyd‘s, 439 
So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1983).  Accordingly, Mady should recover the costs, 
expenses, and attorneys‘ fees as allowed by subsection (d)(2) of the MMWA 
because DaimlerChrysler ultimately agreed to pay pursuant to a statutorily 
recognized offer of judgment after the commencement of litigation and also while 
the consumer faced monetary sanctions pursuant to the offer of judgment concept 
which could have penalized Mady if the offer had not been accepted. 
9 
 
This result is also consistent with federal authority.  The United States 
Supreme Court has held that settlement agreements enforced through a consent 
decree may serve as a basis for an award of attorneys‘ fees.  See Maher v. Gagne, 
448 U.S. 122, 129-30 (1980).  Although there is no actual consent decree present 
here, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: 
[E]ven where there has been no formal entry of a consent decree 
following a settlement agreement, a district court may still award 
attorney‘s fees to the prevailing party as long as: (1) it has 
incorporated the terms of the settlement into the final order of 
dismissal or (2) it has explicitly retained jurisdiction to enforce the 
terms of the settlement.  American Disability Ass‘n v. Chmielarz, 289 
F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2002).  Under either option, the district 
court ―clearly establishes ‗judicially sanctioned change in the legal 
relationship of the parties,‘ as required by Buckhannon [Bd. & Care 
Home v. W. Va. Dep‘t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 
(2001)], because the plaintiff thereafter may return to court to have the 
settlement enforced.‖  Id.  A formal consent decree is unnecessary 
because the incorporation of the settlement into a court order or the 
explicit retention of jurisdiction over the terms of the settlement are 
the ―functional equivalent of an entry of a consent decree.‖  Id. 
 
Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach, 353 F.3d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis 
supplied).  Florida‘s offer of judgment statute explicitly states that ―the court has 
full jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.‖  § 768.79(4), Fla. Stat.  The 
resolution under the offer of judgment statute and rule before us today is the 
―functional equivalent of a consent decree,‖ and under Smalbein, Mady is a 
prevailing party under subsection (d)(2) of the MMWA even if Buckhannon Board 
10 
 
& Care Home v. West Virgina Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 
U.S. 598 (2001), is applied as argued by the dissent. 
 
The dissent incorrectly relies on the United States Supreme Court‘s decision 
in Buckhannon, which is completely distinguishable from the facts before us today.  
In Buckhannon, plaintiffs did not seek relief under the MMWA and instead 
pursued claims under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).  See 532 U.S. at 601.  Further, 
there was no resolution within the legal action such as the settlement here.  In 
Buckhannon the case was terminated due to legislative action separate and apart 
from the legal action.  The ultimate resolution was achieved absent any judicial 
involvement: 
Respondents agreed to stay enforcement of the cease-and-desist 
orders pending resolution of the case and the parties began discovery.   
In 1998, the West Virginia Legislature enacted two bills eliminating 
the ―self-preservation‖ requirement, see S. 627, I 1998 W. Va. Acts 
983-986 (amending regulations); H.R. 4200, II 1998 W. Va. Acts 
1198-1199 (amending statute), and respondents moved to dismiss the 
case as moot.  The District Court granted the motion, finding that the 
1998 legislation had eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions and 
that there was no indication that the West Virginia Legislature would 
repeal the amendments. 
 
Id.  In Buckhannon, the change in the legal relationship of the parties had nothing 
to do with the courts; it was a product of separate and independent legislative 
action.  The Buckhannon Court reasoned that there was no ―judicially sanctioned 
change.‖  Id. at 605. 
11 
 
 
Here, unlike Buckhannon, the settlement agreement between the parties in 
litigation produced pursuant to an offer of judgment statute represents a ―judicially 
sanctioned change.‖  A settlement made pursuant to Florida‘s offer of judgment 
statute remains under that court‘s full jurisdiction.  See § 768.79(4), Fla. Stat.  It 
thus becomes clear that there is direct judicial involvement in this case because the 
court in which the settlement agreement was produced retains jurisdiction over that 
agreement.  Further, the dissent fails to provide any authority that applies 
Buckhannon to the MMWA or any other circumstances similar to the case before 
us.  When other courts have extended Buckhannon beyond the scope of the FHAA 
and the ADA, they provided authority for doing so.  See, e.g., El Paso Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Richard R., 591 F.3d 417, 422 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009).  Accordingly, 
Buckhannon is completely distinguishable and has no bearing on this case. 
 
Even if Buckhannon has some application, which it does not, Mady is still a 
―prevailing party‖ under the MMWA and the reasoning in Buckhannon does not 
alter this outcome.  In that decision, the United States Supreme Court merely 
rejected the catalyst theory for legislative action as a legitimate justification for an 
award of attorneys‘ fees pursuant to a fee-shifting statute.  See Buckhannon, 532 
U.S. at 605.  The Court stated: 
A defendant‘s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps 
accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, 
lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.  Our 
precedents thus counsel against holding that the term ―prevailing 
12 
 
party‖ authorizes an award of attorney‘s fees without a corresponding 
alteration in the legal relationship of the parties. 
 
Id. (emphasis supplied).  Where, as here, a court retains jurisdiction to enforce an 
offer of judgment, the resulting settlement contains the requisite judicial 
imprimatur to classify a plaintiff as a prevailing party.  See supra p. 9 (citing 
Smalbein, 353 F.3d 901).  The dissent‘s narrow reading of Buckhannon has been 
explicitly rejected by a number of the federal circuit courts of appeals, including 
the Eleventh Circuit.  See, e.g., Perez v. Westchester Cnty. Dep‘t. of Corrections, 
587 F.3d 143, 150 (2nd Cir. 2009) (―[N]othing in Buckhannon or its sequelae 
limits judicial imprimatur to [a judgment on the merits, a consent decree, or a 
judicially enforceable settlement agreement] . . . .‖) (emphasis supplied); Mynard 
v. Office of Personal Management, 348 Fed. Appx. 582, 586-87 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 
Johnson v. City of Tulsa, 489 F.3d 1089, 1108 (10th Cir. 2007) (―[W]e cannot 
accept the proposition that attorney fees for post-decree efforts are compensable 
only if they result in a judicially sanctioned change in the parties' legal 
relationship.‖); Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach, 353 F.3d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
 
Without providing any authority to support its conclusion, the dissent asserts 
that ―a judicially enforceable agreement is not equivalent to a judicially approved 
or sanctioned agreement.‖  Dissenting op. at 23-24.  Through this claim, the dissent 
attempts to create a rule that provides that a court‘s retention of jurisdiction over an 
13 
 
agreement is insufficient to confer prevailing party status upon a party.  None of 
the decisions relied on by the dissent, however, supports its bold assertion that 
judicial retention over an agreement is insufficient to confer prevailing party status 
to a plaintiff.  In fact, all of the decisions relied on by the dissent to support its 
contention are materially distinguishable.  In T.D. v. LaGrange School Dist. No. 
102, 349 F.3d 469, 479 (7th Cir. 2003), the Seventh Circuit expressly noted that 
―the district court has no continuing jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.‖  The 
court also noted that the agreement ―was merely a private settlement agreement 
between the parties.‖  Id. at 479 (emphasis supplied).  Similarly, in John T. v. Del. 
County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2003), the two parties reached an 
agreement completely outside the confines of the judicial system.  See 318 F.3d at 
551.  Not only did the parties in John T. reach an extrajudicial agreement, the trial 
court also granted the plaintiff‘s motion for voluntary dismissal, effectively 
discharging the matter from the jurisdiction of the court.  See id.  In Doe v. Boston 
Public Schools, 358 F.3d 20, 21-22 (1st Cir. 2004), the agreement in question was 
also reached privately, and the only ―litigation‖ at issue that took place before the 
agreement was reached was through an administrative hearing officer.  Next, in 
New York State Federation of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. Westchester County Taxi & 
Limousine Commission, 272 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2001), the district court 
dismissed the case as moot due to the parties entering into a private settlement.  
14 
 
Finally, in Smyth ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 276-81 (4th Cir. 2002), 
the Fourth Circuit merely held that a preliminary injunction did not make the 
beneficiaries of that injunction ―prevailing parties‖ for purposes of the civil rights 
attorney fee statute, never addressing whether the retention of jurisdiction is 
sufficient.  None of these cases involve an agreement made within the confines of 
the judicial system, let alone pursuant to an offer of judgment statute. 
 
The only decision relied on by the dissent that does involve an offer of 
judgment statute actually undermines the dissent‘s own argument.  In Utility 
Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Electric Cooperative, Inc., 298 F.3d 
1238, 1239 (11th Cir. 2002), the plaintiff sought attorneys fees pursuant to the 
federal offer of judgment rule,1 the Alabama Trade Secrets Act, and a contract 
entered into with the defendant.  Although the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit awarded attorneys‘ fees to the plaintiff pursuant to the terms 
of a contract, it discussed the federal offer of judgment statute and explicitly stated 
that the plaintiff would also be a prevailing party because of the offer of judgment 
statute.  Id. at 1247: 
Prior to Buckhannon, courts attempted to determine whether a 
party was a ―prevailing party‖ for the purpose of recovering attorneys‘ 
fees primarily by weighing the relief obtained against the relief 
sought.  See, e.g., Fletcher v. City of Fort Wayne, 162 F. 3d 975, 976 
(7th Cir.1998). . . . In Buckhannon, however, the Supreme Court 
defined a prevailing party as ―[a] party in whose favor a judgment is 
                                         
1.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. 
15 
 
rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded.‖  532 U.S. at 
603 (quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)).  In holding that 
a plaintiff was not entitled to an award of attorneys‘ fees when the 
lawsuit had been dismissed as moot, even though it appeared that the 
suit had induced the legislation that rendered the action moot, the 
Court explained that a ―material alteration of the legal relationship of 
the parties‖ is necessary to permit the award.  Id. at 604 (quoting 
Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 
782, 792-793 (1989)).  The Court gave two examples of judicial 
outcomes that satisfy this requirement: an enforceable judgment on 
the merits or a settlement agreement enforced through a court-ordered 
consent decree.  Id.  An enforceable judgment establishes a plaintiff as 
a prevailing party because the plaintiff has received at least some 
relief based upon the merits of a claim.  Id.  A consent decree also 
passes the test because ―[a]lthough [it] does not always include an 
admission of liability by the defendant, . . . it nonetheless is a court-
ordered ‗change [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and 
the defendant.‘ ‖  Id.  (quoting Texas State Teachers at 792). 
Although Buckhannon does not specifically mention Rule 
68 offers of judgment, we find its rationale equally applicable in the 
present context.  Admittedly, an offer of judgment falls somewhere 
between a consent decree and the minimalist ―catalyst theory‖ the 
Court rejected in Buckhannon.  Unlike a consent decree, the court 
exercises little substantive review over a Rule 68 offer; upon 
notification that the plaintiff has accepted the offer, the court 
mechanically enters judgment.  However, the court does ensure that 
the offer conforms with the Rule (it must include costs).  More 
importantly, an accepted offer has the ―necessary judicial imprimatur‖ 
of the court, Buckhannon at 605 (emphasis in original), in the crucial 
sense that it is an enforceable judgment against the defendant.  Thus, 
unlike a ―defendant's voluntary change in conduct‖ or a purely private 
settlement resulting in a dismissal, a Rule 68 judgment represents a 
―judicially sanctioned change in the relationship between the parties.‖  
Id.  Indeed, this Court recently held that a district court's approval of a 
private settlement along with its explicit retention of jurisdiction to 
enforce the settlement terms, made the settlement the functional 
equivalent of a consent decree as described in Buckhannon, and thus 
rendered the plaintiff a prevailing party under the ADA.  
16 
 
See American Disability Ass‘n, Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315 
(2002). 
 
Id. at 1248 (emphasis supplied) (parallel citations omitted). 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
We hold that a consumer who resolves a legal action with a warrantor 
pursuant to Florida‘s offer of judgment statute constitutes a prevailing party under 
the MMWA and may recover attorneys‘ fees as allowed by that statute.  Therefore, 
we quash the decision on review and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  We also approve the decisions of the Second District Court of 
Appeal in Dufresne and the Third District Court of Appeal in San Martin.   
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON and LABARGA, 
JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
CANADY, J., dissenting. 
 
I would affirm the Fourth District‘s decision for two reasons.  First, the 
interpretation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act (MMWA) attorney-fee provision should adhere to the reasoning 
of Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health 
& Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001).  That reasoning points to the 
17 
 
inescapable conclusion that the private settlement between Mady and 
DaimlerChrysler was insufficient to qualify Mady for the recovery of fees under 
the MMWA because that settlement did not involve a court-ordered or judicially 
sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.  Second, the MMWA 
specifically provides that a finally prevailing consumer may recover attorney fees 
―as part of the judgment.‖  The statute thus clearly contemplates that attorney fees 
will be awarded only if some other relief is awarded by way of a judgment.  No 
such relief was awarded to Mady. 
In the MMWA, Congress authorized the award of attorney fees to the 
consumer only ―[i]f a consumer finally prevails.‖  15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) 
(emphasis added).  The majority‘s conclusion that ―a consumer who resolves a 
legal action with a warrantor pursuant to Florida‘s offer of judgment statute 
constitutes a prevailing party under the MMWA and may recover attorneys‘ fees as 
allowed by that statute‖ cannot be reconciled with Buckhannon‘s understanding of 
what is necessary for a litigant to be a prevailing party.  Majority op. at 18. 
In Buckhannon, the plaintiff sought an award of attorney fees and expenses 
as the prevailing party in a case under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 
(FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).  532 U.S. at 601.  
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. (BBCH), which operated care homes 
providing assisted living to their residents, failed a fire inspection because some of 
18 
 
the homes‘ residents were incapable of ―self-preservation‖ under state law.  Id. at 
600-01.  BBCH instituted an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the 
ground that the self-preservation requirement violated the FHAA and ADA.  Id.  
Before the case was resolved on the merits, the State eliminated the self-
preservation requirement, and the case was dismissed as moot.  Id. at 601.  BBCH 
moved for costs and attorney fees, which the trial court denied.  Id. at 602.  BBCH 
―argued that they were entitled to attorney‘s fees under the ‗catalyst theory,‘ which 
posits that a plaintiff is a ‗prevailing party‘ if it achieves the desired result because 
the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant‘s conduct.‖  Id. at 
601. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of attorney fees, holding that the 
circumstances of the case could not support the conclusion that BBCH was a 
prevailing party.  See id. at 602, 605.  The Supreme Court specifically rejected the 
―catalyst theory,‖ concluding that ―[i]t allows an award where there is no judicially 
sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.‖  Id. at 605.  According 
to the Supreme Court, its caselaw reflects the settled view that ―a ‗prevailing party‘ 
is one who has been awarded some relief by the court.‖  Id. at 603 (emphasis 
added).  For example, ―enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered 
consent decrees create the ‗material alteration of the legal relationship of the 
parties‘ necessary to permit an award of attorney‘s fees.‖  Id. at 604 (quoting Texas 
19 
 
State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Ind. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989)).  
―Although a consent decree does not always include an admission of liability by 
the defendant, it nonetheless is a court-ordered ‗chang[e] [in] the legal relationship 
between [the plaintiff] and the defendant.‘‖  Id. (alterations in original) (citation 
omitted) (quoting Garland, 489 U.S. at 792).  Additionally, ―settlement agreements 
enforced through a consent decree may serve as the basis for an award of 
attorney‘s fees.‖  Id.  But private settlements alone ―do not entail the judicial 
approval and oversight involved in consent decrees.‖  Id. at 604 n.7.  Similarly, the 
catalyst theory is problematic because ―[a] defendant‘s voluntary change in 
conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by 
the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.‖  Id. at 605.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court emphasized that ―[n]ever have we awarded attorney‘s 
fees for a nonjudicial ‗alteration of actual circumstances.‘‖  Id. at 606. 
The Supreme Court considered the argument that ―prevailing party‖ should 
be read to include the ―catalyst theory‖ based on legislative history which included 
a committee report stating that ―parties may be considered to have prevailed when 
they vindicate rights . . . without formally obtaining relief.‖  Id. at 607.  The 
Supreme Court expressed its ―doubt that legislative history could overcome . . . the 
rather clear meaning of ‗prevailing party‘—the term actually used in the statute.‖  
Id.  The Supreme Court concluded that ―the legislative history cited by petitioners 
20 
 
is at best ambiguous as to the availability of the ‗catalyst theory‘ for awarding 
attorney‘s fees.‖  Id. at 607-08.  Such legislative history was not sufficient to 
displace the well-established meaning of ―prevailing party‖:  ―Particularly in view 
of the ‗American Rule‘ that attorney‘s fees will not be awarded absent ‗explicit 
statutory authority,‘ such legislative history is clearly insufficient to alter the 
accepted meaning of the statutory term.‖  Id. at 608 (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994)). 
Although Buckhannon only dealt with the fee-shifting provisions of the 
FHAA and the ADA, there is no basis for applying a different line of reasoning to 
the MMWA.  The Buckhannon court understood ―prevailing party‖ as a legal term 
of art to be interpreted consistently across fee-shifting statutes.  532 U.S. at 603 
n.4.  ―[T]he principles underlying Buckannon‘s holding are broadly stated and are 
not statute-specific.‖  Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2004); see 
also John T. v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556-57 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(applying Buckhannon to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and 
noting that ―Buckhannon heralded its wider applicability‖).  Indeed, the 
Buckhannon court referenced the MMWA when it cited the appendix in Marek v. 
Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985) (appendix to opinion of Brennan, J., dissenting), 
which lists over 100 federal fee-shifting statutes, including the MMWA.  See 
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.  In a footnote immediately following the reference 
21 
 
to the Marek appendix, the Supreme Court stated:  ―We have interpreted these fee-
shifting provisions consistently, and so approach the nearly identical provisions at 
issue here.‖  Id. at 603 n.4 (citation omitted).  The fact that the text of the MMWA 
reads ―finally prevails‖ instead of ―prevailing party‖ is thus of no consequence. 
When we are called on to interpret and apply a federal statute authorizing the 
award of attorney fees to a prevailing party, we are bound by Buckhannon‘s 
explication of what it means to be a prevailing party.  We should diverge from 
Buckhannon‘s reasoning only when the federal statute at issue provides a clear 
basis for concluding that Congress did not use the prevailing-party terminology in 
the ―traditional ‗term of art‘ sense‖ explained in Buckhannon.  T.D. v. LaGrange 
Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2003).  Here, there is no such basis. 
Under Buckhannon, the mere entry of a settlement agreement is not 
sufficient to confer ―prevailing party status.‖  Buckhannon is crystal clear in its 
holding that a litigant can be considered a prevailing party only when the litigant 
―has been awarded some relief by the court.‖  532 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added).  
Where the parties have entered a settlement, ―[t]here must be some official judicial 
approval of the settlement and some level of continuing judicial oversight.‖  
LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d at 479 (emphasis added).  There can be no 
―‗judicial imprimatur‘ on the cha[n]ge‖ in the legal relationship of the parties as 
required by Buckhannon in the absence of such ―official judicial approval‖ of a 
22 
 
settlement.  Id. at 474, 479; see also John T., 318 F.3d 545 at 558 (noting that a 
stipulated settlement could confer prevailing party status under circumstances 
where the settlement (1) contained mandatory language, (2) was entitled ―Order,‖ 
(3) bore the signature of the district court judge, not the parties‘ counsel, and (4) 
provided for judicial enforcement); Util. Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee 
Elec. Co-op., Inc., 298 F.3d 1238, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding plaintiff 
prevailed where district court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, 
entered ―an enforceable judgment against the defendant‖ based on accepted offer 
of judgment); Smyth ex rel. Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 281 n.10 (4th Cir. 
2002) (holding that its precedent ―[upholding] awards of attorney‘s fees based on 
private settlements not integrated into consent decrees or court orders . . . do[es] 
not survive Buckhannon‘s rejection of private settlements as a basis for prevailing 
party status.‖); N.Y. State Fed‘n of Taxi Drivers, Inc. v. Westchester Cnty. Taxi & 
Limousine Comm‘n, 272 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing grant of fees 
where the parties entered a private settlement and the district court simply entered 
an order dismissing the case as moot). 
Here, there was no award of ―some relief by the court,‖ no ―official judicial 
approval of the settlement,‖ and no ―judicial imprimatur‖ on the change in the 
parties‘ relationship.  As the Fourth District noted, ―[t]here simply was no court-
ordered change in the relationship of the parties in this case by the plaintiff‘s 
23 
 
acceptance of DaimlerChrysler‘s proposal for settlement.‖  Mady, 976 So. 2d at 
1215.  Unlike the situation where there is a consent decree, the trial court here did 
not review or approve the agreement and played no role in changing the legal 
relationship between the parties.  The court had no involvement whatsoever in the 
settlement entered into by the parties.  That reality is not altered by the majority‘s 
bare assertion that ―any offer made and accepted pursuant to Florida‘s offer of 
judgment statute is . . . under the auspices of the court in which the offer is made 
and accepted‖ and thus ―bears the imprimatur of the court.‖  Majority op. at 6-7.  
Imprimatur means ―approval.‖  Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary of 
the English Language 1137 (1993).  Contrary to the majority‘s assertion, a 
judicially enforceable agreement is not equivalent to a judicially approved or 
sanctioned agreement.  The prospect that some relief may be available in the future 
does not meet Buckhannon‘s requirement that a litigant ―has been awarded some 
relief by the court.‖  532 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added). 
In both San Martin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 983 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2008), and Dufresne v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 975 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2008), the district courts—like the majority here—inappropriately focus on the 
parties‘ actions rather than on judicial action to determine whether the settlements 
were akin to consent decrees.  In San Martin, the court stated that ―the use of the 
procedural vehicle [section 768.79, Florida Statutes] as it was employed by the 
24 
 
parties in this case removes their arrangement from that of a private settlement or 
voluntary cessation.‖  983 So. 2d at 625.  Similarly, the court in Dufresne focused 
on the nature of the settlement and the fact that the settlement pursuant to section 
768.79 gave the trial court the authority to enforce the agreement.  975 So. 2d at 
557.  However, Buckhannon‘s reasoning necessarily turns on the court‘s actions—
not the private parties‘ actions—as the basis for determining whether there is a 
judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties. 
Beyond the ―finally prevails‖ terminology in the statute, the text of the 
attorney-fee provision of the MMWA expressly points to the conclusion that 
attorney fees will be awarded only in conjunction with other relief from the court.  
The MMWA provides that ―[i]f a consumer finally prevails . . . , he may be 
allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the 
aggregate amount of cost and expenses (including attorneys‘ fees based on actual 
time expended).‖  15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (emphasis added).  The statute thus 
provides that the award of attorney fees is ancillary to the granting of other relief 
by the court.  The statute does not contemplate that fees will be awarded apart from 
some other relief obtained by way of a judgment. 
Mady relies on legislative history to support his argument that 
Buckhannon‘s reasoning should not apply to the MMWA.  Mady cites a Senate 
committee report that states that an injured consumer ―may resort to formal 
25 
 
adversary proceedings with reasonable attorney‘s fees available if successful in the 
litigation (including settlement).‖  S. Rep. No. 93-151, at 22-23 (1973).  This 
argument is no more persuasive than the legislative-history argument rejected in 
Buckhannon.  Mady‘s argument should be rejected for the same reasons that the 
Supreme Court rejected the similar argument presented in Buckhannon.  The 
legislative history relied on by Mady is at the very best ambiguous.  Although it 
mentions ―settlement,‖ it is silent concerning whether such a settlement must be 
sanctioned by a judgment entered by the court.  Such ambiguous legislative history 
―is clearly insufficient to alter the accepted meaning‖ of the statutory text.  
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608.  The text of the MMWA is if anything clearer on the 
question at issue than was the text considered by the court in Buckhannon. 
Accordingly, I would affirm the Fourth District‘s decision that is on review 
and disapprove Defresne and San Martin. 
POLSTON and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D07-842 
 
 
(Palm Beach County) 
 
 
Theodore F. Greene, III, of the Law Offices of Theodore F. Greene, LC, Orlando, 
Florida, and Aaron David Radbil of Krohn & Moss, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois, 
 
26 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
John Jason Glenn and Wilnar Jeanne Julmiste of AndersonGlenn, LLC, Boca 
Raton, Florida, and Gregory Andrew Anderson of AndersonGlenn, LLC, Ponte 
Vedra Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent