Case Title: In Re Estate of Holder

Citation: 168 Kan. 657, 215 P.2d 166

Docket Number: 37,811

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1950-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
168 Kan. 657 (1950)
215 P.2d 166
In the Matter of the Estate of Anna C. Holder, an Incompetent Person
(W.D. JOCHEMS, Guardian, Appellant,
v.
P.D. WARNICK, et al., Appellees.)
No. 37,811

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed February 28, 1950.
Emmet A. Blaes, of Wichita, argued the cause for the appellant.
Joe T. Rogers, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Roy L. Rogers and Pat Warnick, both of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SMITH, J.:
This was a claim by two attorneys for fees and by three additional parties for services and expenses incurred in a hearing on the application of an incompetent person to be declared restored.
There were two claims for attorney fees, two claims by doctors and one claim by the Wichita Guidance Center. They were all allowed by the probate court and on appeal by the district court. The guardian has appealed.
There is not much dispute about the facts. Anna C. Holder was adjudged incompetent in the probate court on December 9, 1946. On October 25, 1947, she submitted a petition for restoration to capacity. On December 2 the matter was tried in the probate court and the petition denied. Thereupon an appeal was taken to the district court, where the proceedings were tried before a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of the incompetent on June 3, 1948. On the 16th of July, 1948, the district court having previously set aside the verdict of the jury rendered a judgment finding the incompetent had not been restored and she still was incapable of managing her property and affairs. An appeal was taken to this court on the question of whether she was entitled to a jury trial as a matter of law or whether the district court had the power to consider the *658 jury's verdict as being merely advisory. We affirmed the judgment of the district court. (See Holder v. Jochems, 167 Kan. 83, 204 P.2d 777.) On July 21, 1948, the appellees herein, that is, the two lawyers, the two doctors and the Wichita Guidance Center, filed their petitions in the probate court for allowances for fees and expenses in connection with the restoration case. On the 24th of July the probate court entered an order making the allowances. Thereupon the guardian of the estate of Anna C. Holder appealed to the district court. In the district court the evidence was all stipulated by the parties. That stipulation is, as follows:
"IT IS SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED.
The guardian appealed and his specifications are that the trial court erred in allowing the appellees' claims and adjudging that the guardian should pay the same out of the funds of the estate of the incompetent and also adjudging that the costs should be paid by the guardian out of the estate of the incompetent. He states the questions here to be:
The guardian bases his argument on the provisions of G.S. 1947 Supp. 59-1801, 1804.
G.S. 1947 Supp. 59-1804, reads as follows:
Appellant argues from the above provisions that one declared incompetent does not have power to enter into contracts on his own behalf. He argues the statute does not allow room for any person to render services allegedly for the benefit of the incompetent, but without the authority or approval of the guardian, and to then claim payment for the same from the guardian, that is, as long as the guardianship continues, the only contracts, either express or implied, binding upon the guardian of the estate of his ward are those which the guardian makes in the case of direct contracts and those which the guardian causes to come into being by his conduct in the case of quasi contracts. Authorities are cited where we have held such to be the law as to direct contracts. The argument of the appellant is that, should it be held these attorneys may be paid from the assets of the estate of the ward, then it will be an invitation for proceedings without merit to be brought by intermeddlers to restore incompetent persons. The argument is that before counsel instituted these proceedings they should have requested the guardian to give them permission to do so and on the refusal of the guardian they should have asked permission of the probate court. This argument is answered in part by the provisions of G.S. 1947 Supp., 59-2268. That section provides as follows:
It is noted that a petition to restore any person who has been adjudged incompetent may be brought by the incompetent person, by *661 his guardian or by any other person interested in him or his estate. The statute thus confers authority on the incompetent person to petition the court to be restored. It also bestows that power on any person interested in him. We cannot say from this record that the two attorneys who made the claim for fees in this case were not interested in Anna C. Holder. There is no doubt about the meaning of the above provisions. If the legislature had intended the proceedings to restore an incompetent could only be brought by the guardian or with the consent of the guardian, then it would not have made the provision that the petition might be brought by any person interested in the incompetent. This provision carries with it by implication that a lawyer who files such a petition and presents it to the probate court may be paid from the estate of the incompetent. That is undoubtedly what the legislature intended when it enacted such broad authority to file such a petition. Should we hold in conformity with the argument of the guardian here, no lawyer could undertake such a proceeding except on a contingent basis unless he were paid by some person interested in the incompetent. We cannot read such an intention from the provisions of this statute.
Appellant argues the matter should have been brought to the attention of the probate court and the court's consent to the proceedings should have been had. If it refused, an appeal could have been taken to the district court. That is not what the statute requires, however. In this matter no question is raised about the value of the services of the counsel. No question is raised about the good faith of the lawyers. They appeared in probate court and on appeal in the district court and in this court. They were recognized before all three courts and spoke for the incompetent person. Nothing happened except to permit the ward's condition to be presented in court. No question of any advantage being taken of an incompetent person was raised.
Sheneman v. Manring, 152 Kan. 780, 107 P.2d 741, was a case where an action had been brought against a guardian of an incompetent to compel the guardian to contribute to the support of the incompetent person's indigent daughter. We held that it was proper for the guardian to be compelled to make the contribution. We also said:
*662 The analogous precedents referred to in the above were all cases where we held in an action to construe wills the lawyer who brought the action for the contestant should be paid out of the assets of the estate even though the contest was not successful. There is an analogy between these authorities and the instant case. The statute provides for proceedings to ascertain whether or not an incompetent has been restored. The counsel in this action simply presented the matter to the three courts, as has been heretofore remarked. Their services were a great deal the same as services performed by the contestant of a will and in which we have held that the lawyer should be paid out of the assets of the estate. (See Weightman's Estate, 126 Pa. Sup. Ct. Rep. 221, 190 Am. R. 552; In Re Schulte, 231 Iowa 237, ] N.W.2d 193; 32 C.J. 738, § 522; and 32 C.J. 741, § 526.)
This is not to say that in every case brought to restore a ward to competency, counsel may be reimbursed out of the assets of the estate. Every case will depend upon its own surrounding facts and circumstances. Here the probate court of Sedgwick county heard the proceedings in the first place, the same court heard the application for allowance of attorney fees and other expenses incident to the restoration hearing and would have been the court to pass upon whether or not the action should have been brought in the first place had the proceeding contended for by the guardian have been followed. The value of the services as well as the good faith of the lawyers is conceded.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
THIELE and WEDELL, JJ., dissent.