Case Title: Fresk v. Kraemer

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50443

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  October 21, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
MIRIAM FRESK,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
NATHAN KRAEMER,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 0001-00693; CA A115184; SC S50443)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted March 9, 2004.
Michael H. Bloom, of Bloom & Schuckman, P.C., Portland,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.
Michael A. Lehner, of Lehner & Rodrigues, P.C., Portland,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review.
CARSON, C.J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Michael H. Marcus, Judge. 185 Or App 582, 60 P3d 1147 (2003).
CARSON, C.J.
In this negligence action, the sole issue before us is
plaintiff's entitlement to attorney fees under ORS 20.080(1). 
That statute provides, in part, that "no attorney fees shall be
allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant
tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the
action * * * an amount not less than the damages awarded to the
plaintiff."  ORS 20.080(1) (emphasis added).  The question
presented in this case is whether defendant "tendered" a money
payment that precluded an award of attorney fees to plaintiff
under ORS 20.080(1) when defendant made a prelitigation payment
offer that exceeded the amount that plaintiff ultimately
recovered in the action, but conditioned that offer upon
plaintiff releasing defendant from further liability for
plaintiff's negligence claim.  The Court of Appeals answered that
question affirmatively and reversed the trial court's award of
attorney fees to plaintiff.  Fresk v. Kraemer, 185 Or App 582, 60
P3d 1147 (2003).  We agree with the Court of Appeals and,
consequently, affirm its decision.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We take the following undisputed facts from the opinion
of the Court of Appeals and from the record.  The dispute between
plaintiff and defendant arose from a vehicle collision that
occurred on December 14, 1998.  On December 6, 1999, plaintiff
made a written demand upon defendant for $5,500 for damages
resulting from that collision and notified defendant that she
planned to seek attorney fees under ORS 20.080(1) if she filed an
action against him.  On January 14, 2000, defendant responded
with a letter from his insurance carrier, in which he offered to
"resolve [plaintiff's] bodily injury claim for $3,806 in addition
to Personal Injury Protection benefits paid to date."  The
parties agree that defendant's payment offer to "resolve
[plaintiff's] bodily injury claim" was conditioned upon plaintiff
releasing defendant from further liability for her negligence
claim. (1)
Plaintiff did not accept defendant's offer.  Instead,
on January 20, 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint against
defendant in the Multnomah County Circuit Court, alleging
negligence and damages in the amount of $5,500, along with costs
and attorney fees under ORS 20.080(1).  In his answer, defendant
denied liability and also denied that plaintiff was entitled to
attorney fees under ORS 20.080(1).
  Because of the amount in controversy, the trial court transferred the case to arbitration.  See ORS 36.405(1)
(requiring arbitration for certain civil claims); Multnomah
County SLR 13.005 (requiring arbitration for matters with amounts
in dispute of less than $50,000).  After an arbitration hearing,
the arbitrator ruled in favor of plaintiff and awarded her $2,972
in damages.  The arbitrator's award was $834 less than
defendant's prelitigation offer of payment.  The arbitrator did
not award plaintiff attorney fees under ORS 20.080(1).
Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal of the
arbitrator's award and requested a trial de novo.  See ORS
36.425(2) (providing right to request trial de novo after
arbitrator files decision and award with court).  After a trial,
a jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, awarding her
$2,930 in damages.  The jury's verdict was $42 less than the
arbitrator's award and $876 less than defendant's prelitigation
offer of payment.
Following the jury's verdict, defendant and plaintiff
filed competing petitions for attorney fees and costs.  In his
petition, among other things, defendant argued that ORS
36.425(4)(b) and (5)(b) (2) entitled him to recover $550 in
attorney fees and $118 in costs that he had incurred after the
filing of the arbitrator's award upon the ground that plaintiff
had failed to improve her position in the judgment of the trial
de novo.  In her petition, by contrast, plaintiff argued that the
arbitrator had erred in denying her attorney fees because the
conditional nature of defendant's prelitigation payment offer had
prevented that offer from acting as an effective tender of a
money payment for purposes of ORS 20.080(1).  Plaintiff further
argued that, if the trial court agreed with that contention and
reversed the arbitrator's denial of attorney fees under ORS
20.080(1), then plaintiff would have improved her position in the
judgment that she obtained from the trial court and also would be
entitled to recover attorney fees and costs that she had incurred
after the filing of the arbitrator's award.
After briefing and argument, the trial court, for the
most part, agreed with plaintiff's position.  Based upon its
reading of this court's decision in Butler v. United Pacific Ins.
Co., 265 Or 473, 509 P2d 1184 (1973), the trial court determined
that, because defendant had conditioned his prelitigation payment
offer upon plaintiff releasing him from further liability for her
negligence claim, defendant's offer did not defeat plaintiff's
claim to attorney fees under ORS 20.080(1).  Relying upon that
determination, the trial court further concluded that plaintiff
had improved her position in the judgment that she had obtained
from the trial court and, consequently, denied defendant's
petition for attorney fees and costs.  In a supplemental judgment
and a second supplemental judgment, the trial court awarded
plaintiff $33,865 (3) in attorney fees and $1,922 in costs that
she had incurred in connection with both the arbitration and the
trial court proceedings.
Defendant appealed the trial court's supplemental
judgments awarding attorney fees and costs to plaintiff and its
order denying defendant's petition for attorney fees. (4)  The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had erred
in granting plaintiff attorney fees.  After construing the word
"tender" under ORS 20.080(1) to possess its well-established
legal meaning, that court concluded that defendant's
prelitigation payment offer had constituted an effective tender
that precluded an award of attorney fees to plaintiff under ORS
20.080(1).  Fresk, 185 Or App at 596.  Based upon that
conclusion, the court also determined that plaintiff had failed
to improve her position in the judgment of the trial court and
that defendant therefore was entitled to recover attorney fees
under ORS 36.425(4)(b) and (5)(b). (5)  Id.
We allowed plaintiff's petition for review.  Because we
agree that defendant's condition that plaintiff release him from
further liability for her negligence claim did not prevent his
prelitigation payment offer from acting as an effective "tender"
for purposes of ORS 20.080(1), we affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
DISCUSSION
The legislature enacted ORS 20.080(1) in 1947 and, for the purposes of our analysis here, has not made material changes
to that statute since that time. (6)  See Or Laws 1947, ch 366,
§ 1. ORS 20.080(1) now provides:
"In any action for damages for an injury or wrong
to the person or property, or both, of another where
the amount pleaded is $5,500 or less, and the plaintiff
prevails in the action, there shall be taxed and
allowed to the plaintiff, at trial and on appeal, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney
fees for the prosecution of the action, if the court
finds that written demand for the payment of such claim
was made on the defendant not less than 10 days before
the commencement of the action or the filing of a
formal complaint under ORS 46.465, or not more than 10
days after the transfer of the action under ORS 46.461.
However, no attorney fees shall be allowed to the
plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant
tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of
the action or the filing of a formal complaint under
ORS 46.465, or not more than 10 days after the transfer
of the action under ORS 46.461, an amount not less than
the damages awarded to the plaintiff."
Or Laws 1999, ch 947, § 1 (emphasis added).This court repeatedly has recognized that the
legislative purpose underlying ORS 20.080(1) is "to encourage
settlement of small claims, to prevent insurance companies and
tortfeasors from refusing to pay just claims, and to discourage
plaintiffs from inflating their claims."  Rodriguez v. The
Holland, Inc., 328 Or 440, 446, 980 P2d 672 (1999); see also
e.g., Heen v. Kaufman, 258 Or 6, 8, 480 P2d 701 (1971) (stating
same); Johnson v. White, 249 Or 461, 464, 439 P2d 8 (1968)
(same).  To achieve that goal, ORS 20.080(1) entitles a plaintiff
to recover attorney fees in a tort action for damages of $5,500
or less if the plaintiff makes a written demand for payment upon
the defendant at least 10 days before the start of the action and
the plaintiff ultimately recovers more than any prelitigation
amount that the defendant had "tendered" to the plaintiff.  ORS
20.080(1); see also Landers v. E. Texas Motor Frt. Lines, 266 Or
473, 476, 513 P2d 1151 (1973) (noting requirements for recovery
of attorney fees award under ORS 20.080(1)).  If the defendant
had "tendered" an amount before the start of the action that
exceeded the plaintiff's ultimate recovery, however, then that
tender defeats a plaintiff's claim to attorney fees under ORS
20.080(1).  Landers, 266 Or at 477. 
As discussed above, the parties' dispute in this case
concerns the meaning of the word "tendered" under ORS 20.080(1) -- specifically, whether ORS 20.080(1) contemplates that a
defendant's prelitigation payment offer that is conditioned upon
a release from further liability for the plaintiff's underlying
claim can constitute an effective "tender" under that statute. 
Because that question is one of statutory interpretation, our
task in answering it is to discern the intent of the legislature. 
See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859
P2d 1143 (1993) (in interpreting statute, court's task is to
discern intent of legislature).  To do so, we first examine the
text and context of the statute.  Id. at 610-11.  In considering
the text of a statute, we give words of common usage their plain
and ordinary meanings, and we give words that have well-defined
legal meanings those meanings.  Norden v. Water Resources Dept.,
329 Or 641, 645, 996 P2d 958 (2000).  Statutory context includes
other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes,
as well as the preexisting common law and the statutory framework
within which the statute was enacted.  Denton and Denton, 326 Or
236, 241, 951 P2d 693 (1998).  At the first level of analysis, we
also consider this court's prior interpretations of the same
statute.  State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 532, 964 P2d 1007 (1998).  
Neither ORS 20.080(1) nor any other applicable statute
defines the word "tender." (7)  In common parlance, "tender" is
defined, in part, as "to proffer in satisfaction of an obligation
or condition arising from a relationship between parties * * * to
present for acceptance: offer freely * * *."  Webster's Third New
Int'l Dictionary 2355 (unabridged ed 1993).  In addition, one
legal dictionary definition of the word "tender" is "[a]n
unconditional offer of money or performance to satisfy a debt or
obligation[.]"  Black's Law Dictionary 1479 (7th ed 1999); see
also Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1170 (1926) (defining "tender" as
"[a]n offer to deliver something, made in pursuance of some
contract or obligation, under such circumstances as to require no
further act from the party making it to complete the transfer").
As the Court of Appeals did in this case, this court
previously has construed the word "tender" in other attorney fees
statutes providing similar tender defenses consistently with the
meaning of that term under this court's common law.  See, e.g.,
Butler, 265 Or at 479, 479 n 3 (noting that described
requirements for effective tender under this court's common law
were not changed "by our tender statutes, ORS ch 81" and applying
that understanding of tender in deciding whether defendant had
made "tender" that precluded award of attorney fees under former
ORS 743.114 (1971), renumbered as ORS 743.061 (1989)); State
Highway Com. v. Efem Whse. Co., 207 Or 237, 245, 295 P2d 1101
(1956) (applying this court's common law understanding of tender
in deciding whether plaintiff Highway Commission had made
"tender" that precluded award of attorney fees under former ORS
366.380(7) (1955), repealed by Oregon Laws 1971, chapter 741,
section 38).  Both parties agree, as do we, that, although
"tender" under this court's common law often is described as an
"unconditional offer to pay money," see, e.g., Dockins v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 329 Or 20, 33, 985 P2d 796 (1999) (so describing
"tender"), its meaning more precisely is stated as an offer of
payment that is coupled either with no conditions or only with
conditions upon which the tendering party has a right to insist. 
See Lowe v. Harmon, 167 Or 128, 138, 115 P2d 297 (1941) (so
stating); Comstock Mfg. Co. v. Schiffmann et. al., 113 Or 677,
684, 234 P 293 (1925) (same); see also Fresk, 185 Or App at 589
(so describing meaning of "tender" under this court's common
law).
Defendant disputes that the definition of an effective
"tender" at common law informs the proper construction of that
term under ORS 20.080(1).  Instead, defendant asserts that the
term "tender[]" under ORS 20.080(1) properly is construed as
possessing its ordinary dictionary meaning of "to offer" because,
according to defendant, that construction is more consistent with
the recognized purpose of ORS 20.080(1) to promote the settlement
of small tort claims.
We, however, disagree with defendant's assertion and
decline to read the term "tender" under ORS 20.080(1) more
expansively than this court has read that term in other attorney
fees statutes providing similar tender defenses.  Defendant
points to nothing in the context of ORS 20.080(1) that suggests
that the term "tender" under that statute enjoys a broader or
different meaning than it does under other statutes governing
attorney fees awards.  Indeed, one of the means by which ORS
20.080(1) achieves its statutory objective of promoting
settlement –- that is, by providing attorney fees awards to
plaintiffs as a disincentive for tortfeasors to refuse paying
legitimate claims -- reinforces our view that the narrower
meaning of "tender" under this court's common law applies.  That
is so because, given that context, it is unlikely that the
legislature intended to enable a defendant to avoid an award of
attorney fees to a plaintiff under ORS 20.080(1) with a
prelitigation payment offer subject to any condition of the
defendant's choosing, no matter how onerous to the plaintiff, so
long as the amount of the defendant's offer exceeded the
plaintiff's ultimate recovery.
Anticipating our application of the meaning of "tender"
under this court's common law –- that is, an offer that is
coupled with no conditions or only conditions for which the
tendering party has a right to insist -- to ORS 20.080(1), the
parties next dispute whether defendant's condition of release
from further liability for plaintiff's underlying claim was a
permissible condition to payment for an effective tender under
that statute.  Plaintiff argues that, to make an effective tender
under ORS 20.080(1), a defendant is entitled to insist upon only
conditions requiring the performance of preexisting contractual
obligations or conditions provided by law.  Thus, according to
plaintiff, although a defendant is entitled to demand credit for
any amount actually paid towards a plaintiff's claim, a defendant
does not have a legal right to insist upon any form of release,
even one that is confined to the plaintiff's underlying claim and
that carries no other conditions, as a condition to payment under
ORS 20.080(1).  Defendant responds that, because ORS 20.080(1)
serves to promote settlement of claims, and because a settlement
is the payment of money in exchange for the release of a disputed
claim, ORS 20.080(1) contemplates that an effective tender under
that statute may include an offer subject to the condition of
release from further liability for the plaintiff's underlying
claim.  For the reasons explained below, we agree with defendant. 
Although this court has construed the term "tender" in
other statutes providing a tender defense to attorney fees awards
consistently with the meaning of that term under this court's
common law, this court also has explained that, in deciding what
constitutes an effective tender in such circumstances, this court
considers the relevant statutory context.  See Efem, 207 Or at
242 (validity of tender determined in light of governing
statute).  In Efem, this court considered the defendant's claim
that it was entitled to an award of attorney fees under former
ORS 366.380(7) (1955) (8) because the plaintiff agency had
failed to make an effective prelitigation tender of payment in
the condemnation proceeding that had been the subject of the
underlying litigation between the parties.  Among other things,
the defendant in that case asserted that the plaintiff's
prelitigation payment offer was not an effective tender because
that payment offer had been conditioned upon a warranty deed
conveying the property at issue to the state.  After examining
the statutes governing condemnation proceedings, this court
concluded that "[r]equesting a warranty deed was not improper,
nor did it impose a condition upon which the [plaintiff] had no
right to insist.  In fact, it was a condition of purchase
contemplated by the highway code."  Id. at 245. 
In this case, we are similarly persuaded that defendant
was entitled to insist upon a release from further liability for
plaintiff's negligence claim as a condition to payment under ORS
20.080(1).  As the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, this
court previously has explained that the operation of ORS
20.080(1) serves not only to protect plaintiffs by discouraging
tortfeasors from refusing to pay just claims, but also to protect
tortfeasors by providing "a warning to plaintiffs not to inflate
small claims beyond just amounts, in order that the tort-feasor
may in good faith make settlement of such claims without
resorting to the courts."  Heen, 258 Or at 8 (quoting Johnson,
249 Or at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Fresk, 185 Or App at 595 (noting that defendant-protective
purpose).  Indeed, consistently with that understanding of ORS
20.080(1), this court previously has described "tender" under ORS
20.080(1) as an "offer of settlement," that is, an offer that is
subject to the condition of release from the disputed claim. 
See, e.g., Landers, 266 Or at 476 (to be entitled to attorney
fees award under ORS 20.080(1), "[p]laintiff's judgment [must] be
greater than any offer of settlement made by the defendant prior
to the commencement of the action" (emphasis added)).  In light
of that statutory context, we conclude that, without more, a
condition of release from further liability for a plaintiff's
underlying claim does not prevent a defendant's offer of payment
from acting as an effective "tender" under ORS 20.080(1).  A
contrary conclusion would be inconsistent with both the statutory
purpose of ORS 20.080(1) and this court's prior case law
interpreting that statute.
This court's decision in Butler, 265 Or 473, does not
dictate a different result and, indeed, offers an example of a
payment offer that did not qualify as an effective tender because
it was subject to conditions to which the tendering party had no
right to demand.  In Butler, the plaintiff had obtained a
judgment awarding him both compensatory and punitive damages
against an automobile dealer.  The plaintiff made a demand upon
the dealer's surety to recover the full amount of the judgment
against the dealer.  Id. at 474.  The defendant surety offered to
pay the plaintiff only the amount of the compensatory damages
award, but conditioned that offer upon the plaintiff releasing
his claim against the dealer for both the compensatory and
punitive damages awards.  Id. at 479.  The plaintiff refused that
offer and brought an action against the defendant surety to
recover the full amount of the judgment that he had obtained
against the dealer. 
On review, this court concluded that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover only the compensatory damages award from the
defendant surety.  Id. at 478.  The court, however, also
concluded that the defendant surety's prelitigation offer to pay
the amount of the plaintiff's compensatory damages award did not
defeat the plaintiff's claim to attorney fees under former ORS
743.114 (1971), (9) stating that, "[t]o make it effectual, a
tender must not be fettered with a condition, imposed by one
making it, that a discharge shall be executed releasing him from
all demands."  Id. at 479 (quoting Purdin v. Hancock, 67 Or 164,
166, 135 P 515 (1913) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We acknowledge that, in view of the similarities
between the statute at issue in Butler and ORS 20.080(1), the
above-quoted pronouncement in Butler, on its face, appears to
support plaintiff's contention that a condition of release
prevents an offer from qualifying as an effective "tender" under
ORS 20.080(1).  Viewed in context, however, Butler does not stand
for the proposition that an effective tender never can be subject
to any condition of release from liability.  In Butler, at the
time of the defendant surety's offer, the plaintiff already had
obtained enforceable judgments against the dealer entitling the
plaintiff to recover the full amount of both the compensatory and
punitive damages that the jury had awarded.  The defendant
surety, however, had conditioned its payment offer not only upon
a release from the claim for the compensatory damages award that
the defendant surety covered, but also upon a release from the
plaintiff's claim for the punitive damages award for which the
surety was not liable.  In view of those facts, the defendant
surety demanded more than it was entitled to require as a
condition to its payment, and, for that reason, its offer did not
operate as an effective tender. 
In the context of ORS 20.080(1), by contrast, a
defendant's offer of payment precludes an award of attorney fees
only if that offer is made before the commencement of the action. 
Thus, to preclude an award of attorney fees under ORS 20.080(1),
a defendant's offer of payment necessarily is made before the
plaintiff has established the defendant's liability.  In view of
that statutory context, a defendant's condition of release from
further liability for the disputed claim at issue does not demand
more than the defendant is entitled to require as a condition to
payment.  In short, Butler does not compel an outcome in
plaintiff's favor here.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that defendant's condition of release from
further liability for plaintiff's negligence claim, without more,
did not prevent his prelitigation payment offer from qualifying
as an effective "tender" within the meaning of ORS 20.080(1). 
Because that tender exceeded the amount of plaintiff's ultimate
recovery, plaintiff is not entitled to an attorney fees award
under ORS 20.080(1).  Finally, because plaintiff failed to
improve her position from the arbitrator's award, defendant is
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees under ORS
36.425(4)(b) and (5)(b) in connection with the trial de novo.   The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. 
1. Because defendant's offer of payment was conditioned
upon plaintiff releasing him from further liability for the
negligence claim that was the subject of plaintiff's complaint,
we observe, as did the Court of Appeals, that our analysis that
follows applies to only those circumstances in which a defendant
has limited the condition of release to claims that are the
subject of the underlying litigation between the parties.  See
Fresk, 185 Or App at 589-90 n 9 (noting same).  We also are not
called upon here to consider the effect of any other conditions
to payment under ORS 20.080(1).
2. ORS 36.425 provides, in part:
"(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or
the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure:
"* * * * * 
"(b) If a party requests a trial de novo under the
provisions of this section, the action is subject to
arbitration under ORS 36.405(1)(a), the party is not
entitled to attorney fees by law or contract, and the
position of the party is not improved after judgment on
the trial de novo, pursuant to subsection (5) of this
section the party shall be taxed the reasonable
attorney fees and costs and disbursements of the other
parties to the action on the trial de novo incurred by
the other parties after the filing of the decision and
award of the arbitrator.
"* * * * *
"(5) * * * If a party is entitled to an award of
attorney fees solely by reason of subsection (4) of
this section, the court shall award reasonable attorney
fees not to exceed the following amounts:
"* * * * * 
"(b) Ten percent of the amount claimed in the complaint, if the plaintiff requests the trial de novo
but the position of the plaintiff is not improved after
the trial de novo."
3. In her petition and supplemental petition for
attorney fees, plaintiff claimed a total of $42,072 for
attorney fees.  In considering the reasonableness of
plaintiff's attorney fees, the trial court concluded that
plaintiff was not entitled to the full amount that she had
claimed because her fees "must reflect a substantial
discount for the results obtained [from the jury trial] and
the failure to address the attorney fee issue without
requiring a trial de novo on the merits [of plaintiff's
underlying claim]."
4. As discussed above, __ Or at __ (slip op at 5),
the trial court denied defendant's petition for attorney
fees and costs under ORS 36.425(4)(b) and (5)(b) because it
concluded that plaintiff had improved her position in the
judgment of the trial court.  In doing so, however, the
trial court noted that it would have denied defendant's
petition for costs in any event because defendant had filed
his statement of costs in an untimely manner.  See ORCP 68
C(4)(a) (party seeking attorney fees and costs shall file
signed statement of costs with court not later than 14 days
after entry of judgment).  On his subsequent appeal to the
Court of Appeals, defendant did not challenge the trial
court's denial of his petition for costs.
5. Before the Court of Appeals and this court,
defendant also alternatively argued that, under ORS
36.425(4)(a), plaintiff had lost her right to attorney fees
under ORS 20.080(1) even if his prelitigation payment offer
had not been an effective tender because the arbitrator's
award had exceeded the amount of the jury's verdict on the
trial de novo for plaintiff's negligence claim.  See ORS
36.425(4)(a) (providing that party entitled to attorney fees
by law or contract who does not improve position after
requesting and having trial de novo shall not be entitled to
award of attorney fees or costs incurred before filing of
arbitrator's decision and award and shall be taxed
reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by other parties
in connection with trial de novo).  Because it concluded
that plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees under ORS
20.080(1), the Court of Appeals did not reach defendant's
alternative argument.  Because we arrive at the same
conclusion as the Court of Appeals respecting plaintiff's
entitlement to attorney fees under ORS 20.080(1), we also do
not reach defendant's alternative argument under ORS
36.425(4)(a).
6. In 1955, the legislature amended ORS 20.080(1) to
limit a plaintiff's right to recover attorney fees under
that statute by the amount pleaded in the complaint, rather
than the amount recovered.  Or Laws 1955, ch 554, § 1; see
also Johnson v. White, 249 Or 461, 462-63, 439 P2d 8 (1968)
(noting 1955 amendment to ORS 20.080 and observing that
amendment did not alter purpose of statute).  In addition,
among other amendments not relevant here, the legislature
also repeatedly has amended ORS 20.080(1) to increase the
dollar amount of the claims that qualify under the statute. 
See Or Laws 1955, ch 554, § 1 (increasing from $500 to
$1,000); Or Laws 1979, ch 525, § 1 (increasing to $3,000);
Or Laws 1985, ch 342, § 7 (increasing to $4,000); Or Laws
1999, ch 947, § 1 (increasing to $5,500).   
7. ORS 81.010 does not define "tender," but provides
that a written offer to pay a particular sum of money, if
not accepted, is the equivalent to "the actual production
and tender of the money[.]"  In addition, contrary to
plaintiff's assertions, ORS 20.180 also does not define
"tender" for purposes of ORS 20.080(1).  See ORS 20.180 (in
action for recovery of money or damages only, plaintiff
shall not recover costs from defendant, and defendant shall
recover them from plaintiff, if defendant alleges in answer
that defendant tendered to plaintiff a certain amount in
satisfaction of plaintiff's claim and deposits that sum in
court, and plaintiff does not recover more than amount so
tendered).   
8. Former ORS 366.380(7) (1955) provided:
"The costs and disbursements of the defendants,
including a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by
the court, shall be taxed by the clerk and recovered
from the state; but if it appears that the commission
tendered the defendants before commencing the action an
amount equal to or greater than that assessed by the
jury, the state shall recover its necessary
disbursements from the defendants."
(Emphasis added.)
9. Former ORS 743.114 (1971) entitled a plaintiff to
recover attorney fees if "plaintiff's recovery exceeds the
amount of any tender made by the defendant in such action *
* *."