Case Title: People v. Johnson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85053

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 85053-Agenda 2-March 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
MILTON JOHNSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
	JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Will County,
defendant, Milton Johnson, was convicted of four counts of
murder and four counts of felony murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch.
38, pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(3)). The trial court found that defendant
was eligible for the death penalty and that there were no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude a death sentence. Accordingly, the
trial court sentenced defendant to death.
	On direct review, we affirmed defendant's conviction and
sentence. People v. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d 119 (1987) (Johnson I).
The United States Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for
a writ of certiorari. Johnson v. Illinois, 486 U.S. 1047, 100 L. Ed. 2d 629, 108 S. Ct. 2027 (1988). Defendant filed a first-amended
petition for post-conviction relief, which the State moved to
dismiss without an evidentiary hearing. The court granted the
State's motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed. Because the
judgment challenged in defendant's petition imposed a sentence
of death, the appeal was taken directly to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R.
651(a).
	On appeal, defendant is represented by the Capital Litigation
Division of the office of the State Appellate Defender.
Defendant's brief was written by a panel attorney for the Capital
Litigation Division, L.C. Redmond, Jr. Additionally, the names of
two staff attorneys for the Capital Litigation Division-John C.
Greenlees and Terri L. Marroquin-appear on defendant's brief.
	The State moved to strike defendant's original brief because
it did not comply with the supreme court rules. The State
identified three problems with the brief. First, the statement of
facts was inadequate and did not comply with Supreme Court Rule
341(e)(6) (177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(6) (made applicable to criminal
cases by Supreme Court Rule 612(i) (177 Ill. 2d R. 612(i)))).
Second, defendant failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule
341(e)(7) (177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7) (made applicable to criminal
cases by Supreme Court Rule 612(i) (177 Ill. 2d R. 612(i)))), by
inadequately citing to the record. Major portions of the brief
contained no citations to the record despite specific references to
trial court proceedings or to specific documents. Third, the brief
was filed with the wrong case number. This court granted the
State's motion to strike and gave defendant leave to file a
corrected brief.
	On June 7, 1999, defendant filed a new brief and corrected
some of the problems. The incorrect case number was crossed out,
and the correct number was written above it. Additionally, the
statement of facts was expanded. However, the statement of facts
was merely a recitation of evidence from the original trial and did
not include any information about the post-conviction
proceedings, except to mention that the court dismissed
defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. The statement
of facts does not mention what the allegations of the post-conviction petition are or what evidence the post-conviction
investigation uncovered. The problems with inadequate record
citations in the first brief were not corrected in the subsequent
brief.
	At the beginning of defendant's statement of facts, he states
that he will use the abbreviation "P.C." when he cites the common
law post-conviction record and "P.R." when he cites the post-conviction report of proceedings. These abbreviations never
appear again, as defendant fails to cite the post-conviction record
when referring to the post-conviction proceedings. The only
citations in defendant's brief are sporadic ones to the original trial
record, which he failed to make part of the record on appeal.
Additionally, the appendix to defendant's brief, which must
contain a "complete table of contents, with page references, of the
record on appeal" (155 Ill. 2d R. 342(a)), contains a table of
contents of the original trial record rather than of the post-conviction record.
	Throughout the argument section of defendant's brief, he
repeatedly refers to facts, events, documents, and statements of the
parties or the trial court, with no corresponding record citations. At
times, defendant even quotes from the record without providing
citations.
	Rule 341(e)(7) provides in relevant part that the appellant's
brief shall include:
			"Argument, which shall contain the contentions of the
appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the
authorities and the pages of the record relied on. Evidence
shall not be copied at length, but reference shall be made
to the pages of the record on appeal or abstract, if any,
where evidence may be found." 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).
Defendant makes virtually no attempt to comply with this rule.
Almost every page of defendant's brief contains references to the
record with no supporting citations.
	 An additional significant problem with defendant's brief is
the lack of legal citations supporting his arguments. At the
beginning of his brief, defendant presents many citations.
However, over the course of the brief, the frequency of the
citations steadily deteriorates. Indeed, by the time he reaches his
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel argument, defendant
does not even cite the standard by which such claims are measured
and does not attempt to apply that standard to his claims. When
asked at oral argument about this deficiency, Redmond responded
that he was under a page constraint and wanted to focus on his
most important arguments. We note that defendant's brief was 20
pages under the 75-page limit and that the only way in which most
of his arguments could be considered would be if they were argued
as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims.
	Generally, the consequences for failure to comply with Rule
341(e)(7) are that the issues will be deemed waived. People v.
Lantz, 186 Ill. 2d 243, 261-62 (1999). More specifically, the
appellate court has held that the failure to include record citations
when the argument requires an examination of the record results
in waiver of the issue on appeal. People v. Loera, 250 Ill. App. 3d
31, 54 (1993); see also People v. Isbell, 177 Ill. App. 3d 854, 864
(1988). When the appellate court is faced with briefs that fail to
comply with Rule 341(e)(6) or 341(e)(7), but the record is short
and the issues are simple, the court ordinarily will admonish the
attorney but address the issues anyway. See, e.g., First National
Bank v. Loffelmacher, 236 Ill. App. 3d 690, 691-92 (1992); Ryan
v. Katz, 234 Ill. App. 3d 536, 537 (1992). In these cases, the courts
chose to reach the merits only because of the simplicity of record
and the issues.
	Here, defendant has not presented the issues in such a way
that they can be considered without this court doing much of
defendant's work for him. Time after time, defendant refers to
matters in the record without providing supporting record
citations. The post-conviction record is over 4,500 pages long, and
the direct appeal record, of which we take judicial notice, is over
3,500 pages long. Every time defendant refers to the record, he
leaves to this court the task of combing through these 8,000-plus
pages to find the material to which he refers. That is not the job of
a reviewing court. Not only is the record lengthy, the issues arise
from the dismissal of a capital post-conviction petition and are not
simple.
	Although we are loathe to delay further the proceedings in this
cause, rather than hold that the issues are waived, we retain
jurisdiction over the case and order that it be rebriefed. Supreme
Court Rule 651 (134 Ill. 2d R. 651) governs appeals in post-conviction proceedings. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(a),
defendant has an appeal to this court as a matter of right. Further,
Supreme Court Rule 651(c) provides for the appointment of
counsel on appeal to indigent defendants. Rule 651 guarantees
defendant a reasonable level of assistance of counsel. See People
v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 410 (1999); People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 276 (1992). An attorney who files a brief that is so
fundamentally deficient that it precludes review by the supreme
court has not provided a reasonable level of assistance.
	Because defendant has not received the reasonable level of
assistance required by Rule 651, we order this case to be rebriefed.
The Capital Litigation Division of the office of the State Appellate
Defender is ordered to assign the case to a staff attorney in its
office. The case may not be contracted to outside counsel. The
appellant's brief is due 35 days from the date that any petition for
rehearing in this cause is disposed of or, if no petition for
rehearing is filed, within 35 days of the expiration of the time
period for filing such a petition. Further briefing will be in
accordance with the supreme court rules.
Rebriefing ordered;
 jurisdiction retained.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
	The court correctly holds that the brief filed by defendant in
this case violates Supreme Court Rule 341 and, as such, does not
constitute the reasonable level assistance of counsel required by
Rule 651. Slip op. at 3-4. I, therefore, concur in that part of today's
opinion that orders the matter be rebriefed. As noted in the court's
opinion, the consequences for failing to comply with Rule 341 can
vary. Slip op. at 3. Our conclusion that this matter must be
rebriefed evinces our concern that defendant's right to appeal be
protected and that his arguments be presented thoroughly and
adequately in accordance with our rules. See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch.
110A, par. 341, Historical & Practice Notes, at 478 (Smith-Hurd
1985) (noting that what action a court of review will take when a
party is in noncompliance with the appellate rules "is a matter
entirely in its discretion, a discretion usually exercised by
reference to the effect of the case on the public and on the parties"
and collecting cases). Moreover, the court's decision to preclude
defendant's attorneys of record from further participation in this
case is justified in light of the fact that these attorneys have been
given two chances to submit briefs that conformed to our rules, but
have failed to do so. See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 341,
Historical & Practice Notes, at 478 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (stating
that when there is noncompliance with the appellate rules, the
court of review "does not necessarily have to visit the
consequences *** on the litigant").
	Notwithstanding my concurrence in the decision to rebrief this
case, I part ways with the court with respect to the following
directions imposed during the rebriefing period:
		"The Capital Litigation Division of the office of the State
Appellate Defender is ordered to assign the case to a staff
attorney in its office. The case may not be contracted to
outside counsel. The appellant's brief is due 35 days from
the date that any petition for rehearing in this cause is
disposed of or, if no petition for rehearing is filed, within
35 days of the expiration of the time period for filing such
a petition." Slip op. at 4.
In my opinion, it is unwise for this court to limit reassignment of
this case to only "staff attorneys" without first ensuring that this
action will not cause more problems than it attempts to cure.
Unfortunately, we, as a court, have not done this. The members of
this court, for example, have no knowledge of, nor have they
sought to ascertain, the number of "staff attorneys" currently
employed in the Office of the State Appellate Defender
(hereinafter OSAD) or the status of their workloads. Further, the
members of this court have no knowledge of, nor have they sought
to assess, the OSAD's legitimate need for utilizing "outside
counsel" in light of its present workload. Thus, precluding the case
from being reassigned to anyone but a staff attorney has the
potential to create an unmanageable burden for the OSAD, an
agency that has long suffered from understaffing and
underfunding. See, e.g., Annual Report of the Illinois Courts,
Administrative Summary-1995, 1995 Annual Report to the
Eighty-Ninth Illinois General Assembly, at 2-3; Annual Report of
the Illinois Courts, Administrative Summary-1996, 1996 Annual
Report to Ninetieth Illinois General Assembly, at 2; Annual Report
of the Illinois Courts, Administrative Summary-1993, 1993
Annual Report of the Supreme Court to the Eighty-Eighth General
Assembly, at 29-30 (all noting that budget cuts and staff reductions
in the OSAD have caused inordinate delay in processing capital
appeals). More important, such a burden can be harmful to
defendant-if defendant's new attorney is to be a staff attorney, as
the court today orders, that attorney will assuredly have other
capital cases for which he or she is also responsible. I, therefore,
am hesitant to forbid this matter from being contracted to outside
counsel without facts that would indicate that such a course of
action would inure to the defendant's benefit and not to his
detriment. For these reasons, I believe that the better approach to
this situation is for this court to leave the decision as to whom this
appeal should be reassigned to the discretion of the State Appellate
Defender, who, as head of the state agency involved (see 725 ILCS
105/3, 10 (West 1992)), is in the best position to make the
appropriate reassignment.
	In addition, unlike my colleagues, I do not feel that the 35-day
rebriefing period ordered by the court constitutes a reasonable
amount of time in which to expect the new attorney to complete an
appellant's brief in this case. Presumably, the new staff attorney
will enter the case without any working knowledge of it or of the
issues it presents. The justices in the majority today point to the
length of the record in this appeal-the "post-conviction record is
over 4,500 pages long" and the "direct appeal record *** is over
3,500 pages long"-and state that the issues raised "are not simple."
Slip op. at 4. Elsewhere my colleagues refer to "the task of
combing through these 8,000-plus pages." Slip op. at 4. I do not
believe that we can expect new appellate counsel to familiarize
himself or herself with this same 8,000-plus page record, identify
the colorable issues for appeal, and write an adequate brief in a 35-day time span.(1) Given the lengthy record in this matter in addition
to the fact that the issues "are not simple," I must disagree with the
court's decision to allow the new attorney only 35 days to submit
a new brief. 
	In light of the above, I believe the court's directions in this
matter are ill-advised. I, therefore, dissent from that portion of the
court's opinion. I would order, instead, that the State Appellate
Defender reassign the case in the manner he deems appropriate
and in the best interests of defendant. I would further order that the
appellant's brief be due 90 days from the date that that this court's
decision becomes final.
1.      1New counsel will actually have less than 35 days to prepare the brief
because of the time it takes to process the record in this case from our
clerk's office in Springfield to the Capital Litigation Division of the
OSAD.