Case Title: Smith v. Cooper

Citation: 475 P.2d 78

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1970-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
475 P.2d 78 (1970)
Phyllis L. SMITH, As Executrix of the Estate of Clinton C. Smith, Deceased, Appellant,
v.
Forrest COOPER (State Highway Engineer); L.C. Smitton (District Maintenance Superintendent); and A.F. Parson (Division Engineer), Respondents.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.
Argued and Submitted June 3, 1969.
Decided September 18, 1970.
Reargued December 8, 1969.
*79 Harry A. Slack, Jr., Coquille, argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Slack & Slack, Coquille.
Norma Paulus, Salem, argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief were Clark & Marsh, Salem.
Before PERRY,[*] C.J., and McALLISTER, SLOAN, O'CONNELL, GOODWIN,[**] DENECKE and HOLMAN, JJ.
DENECKE, Justice.
The plaintiff executrix brought this action to recover damages for the death of her testator which occurred when a car *80 in which he was riding went off the highway and crashed. The defendants are State Highway Commission officials and employees and their alleged negligence was in planning, establishing and maintaining the highway at the place of the accident. The defendants moved to quash the service of summons upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction because the defendants as officers and agents of the state are immune from action. The motion was allowed and plaintiff appeals.
Some procedural problems are present which we believe should be discussed although the parties did not raise them.
This appeal is from an order quashing service of summons. We have previously expressly approved the practice of both the state and its employees raising their defense of immunity by filing either a demurrer or a motion to quash. Hanson v. Mosser, 247 Or. 1, 5-6, 427 P.2d 97 (1967). When the defense of immunity is raised the issue is whether the complaint states a cause of action or does it show on its face that the defendants are immune from suit because they are either the state or state officials or employees entitled to immunity.
The sufficiency of the allegations of a complaint is normally tested by a demurrer. We have held in a case not involving immunity that a motion to quash service is not a proper method to determine the sufficiency of a complaint. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Tazwell, 123 Or. 326, 333, 262 P. 220 (1927), cert. granted 276 U.S. 613, 48 S. Ct. 324, 72 L. Ed. 731, dismissed 277 U.S. 575, 48 S. Ct. 527, 72 L. Ed. 995 (1928).
We conclude that to be consistent with the general rules of pleading the proper precedure to raise the issue of immunity should be by the filing of a demurrer. The holding of Hanson v. Mosser, supra (247 Or. 1, 427 P.2d 97), to the contrary is overruled.
Very recently in Ter Har v. Backus, Or., 473 P.2d 143 (1970), we reviewed decisions discussing appeals brought both from orders granting motions to quash and sustaining demurrers. In Ter Har v. Backus, supra, we dismissed the appeal from an order granting a motion to quash.
In that case it was obvious that the order quashing the service did not terminate the action because the statute of limitations could not have run on the cause of action for property damage. We stated in effect that if the order quashing service did effectively dispose of the action we would probably not dismiss that particular appeal. We did announce, however, that in the future we would not entertain an appeal from an order quashing service, but only from a final judgment.
We give prospective application to a similar rule in this case. Because our opinion in Hanson v. Mosser, supra (247 Or. 1, 427 P.2d 97), probably caused defendant to challenge the complaint in this case with a motion to quash instead of a demurrer, we will treat the motion as did the parties and the trial court as asserting the contention of the defendants that the complaint did not state a cause of action against them because they were immune from liability. Hanson v. Mosser, supra (247 Or. 1, 427 P.2d 97), also probably caused the plaintiff to appeal from the order quashing service rather than an order of dismissal. In the future that contention of immunity must be raised by a demurrer and the appeal must be taken from a final judgment. Ter Har v. Backus, supra.
The facts to be considered are as alleged in the complaint. The defendant Cooper was the State Highway Engineer. The defendant Smitton was the acting District Maintenance Superintendent of the Highway Commission for District 5-B. The defendant Parson was the acting Division Engineer of the Commission for Division 5.
*81 The automobile in which the decedent was riding was driving north on Highway 74 approaching a junction at which the driver intended to turn and proceed westerly on Highway 30. At the junction, allegedly due to the negligence of the defendants, the vehicle continued to the north instead of turning and went off the road and crashed.
All of the defendants were alleged to be negligent in designing the road so that a driver was not aware that he was to turn west rather than to continue straight, in failing to place a guardrail on the north edge of the turn, in failing to post any or adequate signs warning of the dangerous turn, in posting misleading and distracting signs, in designing a tight, unbanked turn, in failing to provide lighting, in painting the center stripe to indicate that traffic was to continue straight ahead, in failing to provide reflectors indicating the turn, and in providing a left turn sign which was not uniform with other signs at other junctions in Oregon.
This cause of action arose before the effective date of the Oregon Tort Claims Act, ORS 30.260-30.300. However, under that Act some of the problems present in this appeal still remain.
The defendants contend that although this action is nominally against state officials and employees, it is in reality an action against the State of Oregon and the court does not have jurisdiction because the state has not waived its sovereign immunity. The defendants primarily rely upon Bacon v. Harris, 221 Or. 553, 352 P.2d 472 (1960), in support of their contention. The plaintiff in that case was injured when she fell on a stairway while attending a basketball game at the University of Oregon's McArthur Court. She named as defendants the Department of Higher Education, the nine members of the State Board of Higher Education, the University President and Athletic Director and a university employee who had charge of the ushers at McArthur Court. The trial court set aside a judgment for the plaintiff and we affirmed.
We there stated, "[a]lthough it is not named as a defendant we think this is, in legal effect, an action against the State Board of Higher Education and will so treat it." 221 Or. at 555, 352 P.2d  at 473. We held that the State Board had governmental immunity and, therefore, the action could not be maintained against it. A reading of the entire opinion makes it clear that the above-quoted statement was intended to refer only to the action against the nine members of the State Board. The opinion closes:
Plaintiff's action is not, in effect, an action against the State of Oregon. The action is against the defendants individually; any liability established will be a personal liability against the defendants as individuals; and the government's property and activities are not directly threatened. This action is maintainable unless the defendants as officers, agents or employees of the state have immunity because of their relationship to the state.
The plaintiff contends that ORS 243.110[1] authorizing state agencies to purchase insurance to protect its officers and employees against liability and the Highway Commission's purchasing of such insurance *82 lifted any immunity the defendants might have had.[2]
Plaintiff relies upon Vendrell v. School District No. 26C, 226 Or. 263, 360 P.2d 282 (1961). Plaintiff's reliance upon Vendrell is misplaced:
Art. IV, § 24, of the Oregon Constitution and Vendrell concern the immunity of the state and its subdivisions, that is, sovereign immunity. In this appeal we are not concerned with sovereign immunity; we are concerned with the immunity of state officers and employees. Sovereign immunity and the immunity of state officers and employees are two different legal concepts and have two different origins and purposes. Art. IV, § 24, of the Oregon Constitution, providing that sovereign immunity can be lifted by the legislature enacting a general law to that effect does not apply to the immunity of state employees.
Mr. Justice Traynor remarked in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District (the case ending sovereign immunity in California), 55 Cal. 2d 211, 221, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 95, 359 P.2d 457, 463 (1961): "Thus this immunity [that of state employees] rests on grounds entirely independent of those that have been advanced to justify the immunity of the state from liability for torts for which its agents are admittedly liable."
Judge Learned Hand stated that the doctrine of immunity for public employees was based upon a policy of freeing public employees from fear of retaliation for unpopular decisions so that they could function freely and thereby give unflinching discharge of their duties. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949), cert. den. 339 U.S. 949, 70 S. Ct. 803, 94 L. Ed. 1363 (1950). Prosser also believed that public employees would be unduly intimidated in the discharge of their duties if they could be sued for actions which later were determined to be negligent. Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed.), 1014. Another reason advanced for the immunity of state employees is that without immunity, highly skilled employees would not accept public positions because the potential liability was not commensurate with the relatively low compensation that public bodies pay. Van Alstyne, Government Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 463, 474, 478 (1963).
*83 In Oregon as well as most jurisdictions this immunity for public employees is court made. On the other hand, sovereign immunity is incorporated in our constitution. Vendrell, supra, at 226 Or. 228-229, 360 P.2d  at 282. Accordingly, we are not concerned whether ORS 243.110 is a "general law" as that phrase is used in Art. IV, § 24, waiving immunity.
Although immunity for public officials is judicially created, it can be set aside by legislative act. However, judicially-created law is not changed by legislative act unless the intent of the legislature to do so is clearly shown. Lovell v. School Dist. No. 13, 172 Or. 500, 143 P.2d 236 (1943). We do not construe this statute as clearly evidencing a legislative intent to change the law and to take away the immunity granted to public employees. Plaintiff argues that the statute would be meaningless unless it is construed to eliminate the employee immunity, for otherwise the insurance would be useless. This argument is defective because the traditional immunity of government employees is not all-encompassing, as is discussed, infra. Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity, the insurance provided for by ORS 243.110 would be useful with regard to matters in which the employees have traditionally not enjoyed immunity.
The statute declares that it is for the protection of public employees. Nothing is accomplished for the protection of employees by taking away their immunity and substituting liability insurance.
We hold that the immunity of state employees was not withdrawn by the legislature by the enactment of ORS 243.110.
The defendants contend they are immune from liability for negligence because their work is alleged to have been done negligently was in the exercise of their "discretionary" function as distinguished from their "ministerial" function.
This court, as well as the courts of other jurisdictions, has held that a public employee is not liable for negligently performing a discretionary function, whereas a public employee is liable for negligently performing a ministerial function. A line differentiating ministerial functions from those which are discretionary has never been clearly drawn. This court and many others have had difficulty with this task.
In Jarrett v. Wills, 235 Or. 51, 383 P.2d 995 (1963), we held the state employee was performing a discretionary function and, therefore, was immune. We acknowledged the absence of a clear guideline but found that the duties and functions of the particular state employee, the superintendent of a state hospital for the mentally retarded, were obviously discretionary. His allegedly negligent act was granting an inmate a leave of absence. We did not attempt to set standards for classifying functions as "discretionary" or "ministerial."
In Antin v. Union High School Dist. No. 2, 130 Or. 461, 468-469, 280 P. 664, 666, 66 A.L.R. 1271 (1929), this court attempted to state the distinction between "discretionary" and "ministerial":
This distinction is made in the Antin case to determine whether or not a governmental body, a school district, should be held liable.
Our decisions involving the planning and construction of roads are not helpful in answering the problem of what is "discretionary" and what is "ministerial." Rankin v. Buckman, 9 Or. 253 (1881); Batdorff v. Oregon City, 53 Or. 402, 409, 100 P. 937 (1909); Giaconi v. City of Astoria, 60 Or. 12, 113 P. 855, 118 P. 180, 37 L.R.A.,N.S., 1150 (1911).
In Ashland v. Pacific P. & L. Co., 239 Or. 241, 254, 395 P.2d 420, 397 P.2d 538 (1964), we stated as dictum that a highway commission employee would be liable if he failed to erect an adequate highway sign and this was the cause of plaintiff's injuries. We did not discuss any possible immunity for the state employee.
Decisions from other jurisdictions involving road planning, construction and maintenance have generally followed the line that the planning and designing of the road or highway is done in the performance of a discretionary function while maintenance is the performance of ministerial function. Bennett and Sather, State Tort Liability  The Design, Construction and Maintenance of Public Highways  Vehicular Accidents, 19 Drake L.Rev. 33 (1969); Annotations, 40 A.L.R. 39 (1926), 57 A.L.R. 1037 (1928).
Wilbrecht v. Babcock, 179 Minn. 263, 228 N.W. 916 (1930), is an example of such decisions. A defendant was the commissioner of highways and the plaintiff alleged he planned and constructed a highway in such a manner that the highway caused surface water to flow upon plaintiff's land to his damage. The court held the commissioner's demurrer should have been sustained as he was performing a discretionary function:
The difficulty with all these attempts to state the distinction between "discretionary" and "ministerial" is that all, or almost all, acts performed by government employees involve some judgment or choice; that is, the employees have more than one alternate course of performance and they make a decision to follow one of the several alternatives. The issue is really, how much "discretion" must be involved in the performance so as to render the employee immune? This means that at some point along the continuum of discretion a division must be made with liability on one side and immunity on the other and this division must necessarily be arbitrary.[3]
The Federal Tort Claims Act has a similar problem and decisions interpreting that act should be examined. The Act provides that the United States shall not be liable for injury caused by performance of a "discretionary function" on the part of an agency or employee. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (a). The United States Supreme Court interpreting this portion of the act had the same semantic difficulty as other courts. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35-36, 73 S. Ct. 956, 968, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953):
The Dalehite case was subsequently modified in some respects; however, the principle above quoted remains the approved interpretation. The Court and the Act were concerned with the liability or immunity of the government and not employees.
Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3d Cir.1962), applied the Dalehite principle to highway construction. The plaintiffs were injured when a car in which they were riding hit a boulder that had fallen from a steep embankment alongside the highway. Plaintiffs contended that the United States was liable because the Secretary of Commerce had approved faulty plans for the highway and the faulty planning caused the boulder to be on the highway. The court held the secretary was performing a discretionary function when he approved the design of the highway and, therefore, the United States was immune:
In Sisley v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 273 (D.C.D.Alaska 1962), plaintiff alleged that the Bureau of Public Roads had planned the highway without providing culverts under the highway to drain away the water and it flooded plaintiffs' land. The court applied the same planning-operational distinction and held the omission of culverts was a part of the planning which involved a "discretionary" function.
Making the distinction between "discretionary" and "nondiscretionary" depend upon whether the negligence was at the planning or at the operational stage does not, in our opinion, necessarily follow from the Dalehite opinion; and even if it does, such reasoning is open to criticism. The above quote from Dalehite, we believe, evidences that the Court did not intend to make the distinction that the planning function was discretionary whereas the operational function was not. In our opinion the distinction attempted to be drawn was largely a semantic one, i.e., "Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion." 346 U.S.  at 36, 73 S. Ct.  at 968.
Some of the criticism of the planning operational distinction is:
American Exch. Bank of Madison, Wis. v. United States, 257 F.2d 938 (7th Cir.1958), illustrates that what is termed operational and what is termed planning depends upon how widely or narrowly the court views the category. The plaintiff fell on postoffice steps and alleged the government was negligent in failing to include a handrail in designing the steps:
The Court of Appeals reversed, stating:
Omitting culverts under a highway is considered by one court to be an omission in the planning stage while omission of a handrail on a stairway is considered by another court to be an omission at the operational level.
This court was critical of this planning-operational distinction many years ago:
For reasons above stated we do not find the planning-operational dichotomy to be of assistance and do not adopt it.
The California Tort Claims Act also provides that neither employees nor the state are liable if the employee's conduct causing the injury occurred in the performance of a "discretionary" function. West's Ann.Gov.Code, §§ 815.2(b), 820.2. The California court has not adopted the planning-operational distinction. It has attempted to interpret discretionary by using a variety of factors, which it finds in the underlying reasons for making discretionary acts immune. Although the California court has not been definitive in stating the factors or the content of each factor, we find its basic reasoning of assistance.
*88 In attempting to state when acts are deemed "discretionary" the California court in Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 230, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99, 359 P.2d 465, 467 (1961), stated:
Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965), contains a particularly good statement on the subject:
The literal meaning of "discretionary" can be a factor in solving the problem when the facts are well on the "discretionary" side of the continuum.[4] For example, in Jarrett v. Wills, 235 Or. 51, 383 P.2d 995 (1963), we held the superintendent of the state hospital was exercising a discretionary function when he granted an inmate a leave of absence. Such a decision is discretionary in the sense that the superintendent has a wide latitude of decision uncontrolled by any specific rules.
The most decisive factor but one most difficult to articulate is that it is essential for efficient government that certain decisions of the executive or legislative branches of the government should not be reviewed by a court or jury. The reason behind such factor is that the bases for the legislative or executive decision can cover the whole spectrum of the ingredients for governmental decisions such as the availability of funds, public acceptance, order of priority, etc.
Judge Fuld, in Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 167 N.E.2d 63 (1960), attempted to state this principle that certain decisions of the legislative or executive branches should not be reviewable by the judicial branch. In that case the plaintiff brought a personal injury action for a traffic accident against the city of Buffalo. She claimed that the city had negligently fixed the clearance interval for an intersection traffic signal and that as a result, before the north-south traffic could clear the intersection, the signal turned green, permitting the east-west traffic to enter the intersection. A verdict against the city was set aside by a majority of the Court of Appeals:
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in In Re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F.2d 771 (5th Cir.1952), states the same principle in a different form:
Professor Jaffe has stated some of the factors which he believes should be considered in determining if immunity is to be granted. One of these is similar to the reasoning expressed above. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv.L.Rev. 209, 219 (1963).
Professor Jaffe explained the nature of this factor by pointing out that the Texas City disaster cases were extreme examples of the judiciary's lack of capacity to evaluate government action. The prime risk taken by the government was the policy decision to undertake a "crash" program to provide fertilizer for war-torn countries by using a very unstable, explosive material. A court or jury should not be delegated the function of determining whether this decision was reasonable. Obviously, the decision of the government had to be based upon an assessment of such factors as time, expense, necessity, etc.
The complaint in the instant case charges:
These allegations charge conduct by the executive branch of the government which should not be reviewed by the judicial branch. The decisions that were made to do or not to do these things appear to have been dependent upon considerations that a court or jury should not consider, particularly by hindsight, such as the funds available for the project, the amount of additional land necessary to make a more gradual curve, the cost of the land, the loss of the land for recreational or agricultural purposes, the amount and kind of traffic contemplated, the evaluation of traffic and safety technical data, etc.
We hold that state employees are generally immune from liability for alleged negligence in planning and designing highways.
We have used the term "generally immune" in the realization that it is conceivable that a complainant could allege and prove a defect in design or planning that could adequately and appropriately be passed upon by a judge or jury, for example, ludicrous for the sake of clarity, a road designed so that it ended at the edge of a cliff. We do not construe the allegations in this complaint as alleging this type of negligent design.
The complaint in VII(a) charges the defendants with negligence not only in the *91 designing and planning of the junction but with negligence in "maintaining" the junction. Because of the context in which "maintaining" is used, we find it obvious that the plaintiff is using "maintaining" in the sense that the defendants continued in effect the junction as planned and designed, including the planned and designed safety precautions or lack of safety precautions. Plaintiff is not using "maintain" to mean keeping in a state of repair. For these reasons the charge against the defendants for the manner in which they "maintain" the junction does not add anything to the charge of faulty "designing and planning."
We realize we are construing pleadings and not interpreting proof and we judge the sufficiency of the pleadings by what proof can be introduced in support of the pleadings. However, when a pleading has been attacked and the pleader chooses to stand on his allegations, the pleadings are construed most strongly against the pleader. Medford v. Pac. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 189 Or. 617, 628, 219 P.2d 142, 222 P.2d 407, 16 A.L.R.2d 1181 (1950).
In Ogle v. Billick, Or., 453 P.2d 677 (1969), the plaintiff alleged that the county engineer was negligent "[i]n grading the aforesaid county roadway down so low below the aforesaid stairway so as to create a dangerous condition for those using said stairway." 453 P.2d  at 680. We held that we could not determine from the pleadings whether this alleged conduct was in the engineer's performance of a discretionary function. Taken literally, such allegation creates the image that the engineer, on the scene, directed the grader operator to cut below the bottom of the stairway. If that were the proof, the issue of negligence is of a type that a jury or judge constantly decides. The considerations involved in deciding such an issue of negligence are substantially different than those involved in deciding whether a curve is too tight or what traffic warning signs are appropriate.
The trial court was correct in granting the motion.
Affirmed.
SLOAN, Justice (dissenting).
Assuming that the rationale of the majority opinion is correct in its attempt to solve the impossible distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary functions, it seems to me that the complaint does allege a cause of action of non-discretionary acts. The complaint is capable of being read to allege that defendants created a death trap and had reason to be aware of the hazard. The evidence may not sustain the allegations but the complaint does state a cause of action. The majority assume facts not alleged in order to reach the contrary result. A decision of this consequence, in its impact on the Oregon Tort Claims Act, ORS 30.260 et seq. should not be based on assumption of fact.
[*]  PERRY, C.J., retired June 1, 1970.
[**]  GOODWIN, J., resigned December 19, 1969.
[1]  Since repealed, however, replaced by ORS 30.280.
[2]  ORS 243.110: "(1) Any county, school district, municipal corporation and any state agency, including any state officer, board, commission, department, institution or branch of the state government, may purchase liability insurance, in such amounts and containing such terms and conditions as it may deem necessary, for the protection of its board or commission members, officers and employes against claims against them incurred by such board or commission members, officers and employes in the performance of their official duties. The premiums for such insurance shall be paid out of appropriations or funds available for expenditure by the state agency, district or county purchasing the insurance.

"(2) No state agency, county, school district or municipal corporation shall purchase or renew liability insurance under this section unless the policy or contract of insurance provides that the insurer will not, in any proceeding brought on the policy or contract, assert as a defense the immunity of this state, or such county, school district or municipal corporation, against suit.
"(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as a waiver by the State of Oregon of any immunity against suit."
[3]  Some of the discussion of whether an employee was acting in a "discretionary" function may really be an inquiry whether the employee was negligent. In Sisley v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 273 (D.C.D. Alaska 1962), considering the function of planning the grade and culverts of a highway, the court stated: "Errors in judgment, if such may be found, are not negligence in construction. These plans were the result of policy judgment and decision and as we have noted, where there is room for such there is discretion." 202 F. Supp.  at 275.

This court and others have distinguished between errors in judgment and negligence and held there is no liability for the former. Brown v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry. Co., 248 Or. 110, 123, 431 P.2d 817 (1967). In discussing whether an act is "discretionary," courts freely use "judgment" as a synonym of "discretion."
The attempt to determine whether the function was "discretionary" may be an inquiry whether the employee was negligent in another sense. The employee sued may have performed exactly as his superior directed or he may have performed in the only fashion possible under the restrictions placed upon him by his superiors. An employee under such circumstances should not be liable if he is a public employee. For example, in this case, evidence might be introduced that the tightness of the curve resulted from a decision of the highway commission, dictated by available funds, that only so much property could be purchased for the junction and, therefore, a curve such as the one built was the only feasible one.
Dalehite v. United States, infra (346 U.S.  at 36, 73 S.Ct. at 968), referring to the liability of the United States and not employees, stated: "It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable."
[4]  Despite the problems created by the use of the word "discretionary," we are obliged to continue using the word because it is incorporated in the Oregon Tort Claims Act. ORS 30.265(2) (d).