Case Title: Byrd v. State

Citation: 597 So. 2d 252

Docket Number: 74691

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1992-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
597 So. 2d 252 (1992)
Milford Wade BYRD, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 74691.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 20, 1992.
Rehearing Denied May 26, 1992.
*253 Larry Helm Spalding, Capital Collateral Representative, Martin J. McClain, Deputy Chief Asst. CCR and Julie D. Naylor, Asst. CCR, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Fariba N. Komeily, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
Milford Wade Byrd appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed, we affirm.
Byrd was convicted of murdering his wife. In accordance with the jury's recommendation, the trial judge sentenced Byrd to death. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in Byrd v. State, 481 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S. Ct. 2261, 90 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1986). In May, 1988, Byrd filed a motion for postconviction relief and presented nineteen claims to the circuit court. The circuit court summarily denied sixteen claims and denied relief on the remaining three claims after an evidentiary hearing.
The essential facts surrounding the murder were set fourth in our original opinion, as follows:
481 So. 2d  at 469-70.
On appeal, Byrd has presented seventeen claims for our consideration. We find that eleven of these claims are procedurally barred because they either were or could have been raised in the direct appeal. To the extent that the claims also suggest ineffective assistance of counsel, they are denied on the merits. The claims so disposed of include: (1) whether Byrd was convicted on the basis of evidence obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and his invocation of his right to silence was ignored and a confession was coerced from him and used against him because his counsel failed to present the proper facts; (2) whether Byrd was convicted and sentenced on the basis of statements obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; (3) whether Byrd's constitutional rights were violated when law enforcement officers entered his home without a warrant to effectuate his arrest; (4) whether the exclusion of critical evidence rendered Byrd's sentence of death fundamentally unreliable; (5) whether Byrd was improperly denied his right to cross-examine key State witnesses on matters that would have undermined their credibility; (6) whether the trial court unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof by its sentencing instructions; (7) whether the jury's sense of responsibility for sentencing was diluted by the court's instructions and counsel's arguments; (8) whether the jury instructions regarding aggravating factors perverted the sentencing phase, resulting in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty; (9) whether the jury instructions regarding nonstatutory aggravating factors perverted the sentencing phase resulting in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty; (10) whether the presentation of victim-impact testimony denied Byrd's rights to a fundamentally fair and reliable capital sentencing; and (11) whether failure to consider nonstatutory mitigating factors violated Byrd's rights.
We find it appropriate to discuss the remaining claims under four headings: (1) whether Byrd was deprived of his due process rights and a fair trial when he was prosecuted by an assistant state attorney with a personal, familial, and financial interest in obtaining a conviction, as well as his claim that he was deprived of a fair trial as a result of the State's nondisclosures; (2) whether the jury was misled about its function at the sentencing phase; (3) whether Byrd received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) whether the State withheld exculpatory evidence.
Regarding the first claim, Byrd alleges that he was denied the right to due process and a fair trial because the assistant state attorney who prosecuted him had a personal, familial, and financial interest in obtaining his conviction. Byrd alleges that the assistant state attorney received $1,600 from his brother-in-law, who received a $16,000 contingency fee as a result of a civil action brought by the victim's sister to obtain life insurance proceeds. *255 This money resulted from the termination of Byrd's rights to his deceased wife's life insurance proceeds. Byrd claims that the assistant state attorney and his family benefitted from his exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In response to Byrd's motion for postconviction relief, the circuit court held a full evidentiary hearing regarding these claims. In his order, the trial judge set forth in detail his findings as follows:
We find that the circuit judge took particular care in setting forth his findings after noting that he considered (1) the evidence and testimony introduced at the defendant's trial, (2) the evidence and testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, and (3) the law submitted to the court by counsel. After a careful review of the record in this case, we find that the findings and holdings of the trial judge are clearly supported by the record. We specifically agree that the record supports the trial court's conclusion that the assistant state attorney had no knowledge that he was going to receive a referral fee from his brother-in-law. Further, we find that the record supports the trial court's finding that there was no nondisclosure of information known by the prosecution at trial.
We next consider Byrd's second claim, in which he alleges that the jury was misled and incorrectly informed about its function during the sentencing phase, in violation of Byrd's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Byrd claims that the *256 jury was not informed that, if there was a six-to-six split, life would be recommended. Byrd asserts that the prosecutor's comments and the jury instructions deprived him of his rights by informing the jury that the verdict would be by majority vote.
Byrd argues that since Hitchcock v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S. Ct. 1821, 95 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987), held for the first time that the Eighth Amendment applied to Florida penalty phase proceedings in front of the jury, this retroactive change in the law is cognizable in a rule 3.850 proceeding. Byrd argues that the principles established in Hitchcock were a change in the law, that he is entitled to the benefits of this change, and, consequently, that this Court must vacate his sentence of death for a new sentencing proceeding.
We agree with the trial court that this claim is procedurally barred since it was not raised on direct appeal. See Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So. 2d 1377 (Fla. 1987). Further, and as important, there was no erroneous jury instruction in this case. The jury was specifically instructed:
(Emphasis added.) Accordingly, there is no justification for relief on this claim.
Byrd also argues that the State improperly withheld exculpatory evidence. We conclude that there is no violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
Finally, Byrd made numerous claims in this rule 3.850 proceeding that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, in violation of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The trial judge specifically addressed each of these claims and denied relief. We find that the trial judge properly applied the principles of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and this record clearly supports his holding.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Byrd's motion for postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, McDONALD, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
SHAW, C.J., and BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur in result only.