Case Title: Dunham v. Chase

Citation: 165 Vt 543, 674 A.2d 1279

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dunham v. Chase  (94-318); 165 Vt 543; 674 A.2d 1279

[Opinion Filed 26-Feb-1996]


                               ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 94-318

                              MAY TERM, 1995



Richard D. Dunham                    }     APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
     v.                              }     District Court of Vermont,
                                     }     Unit No. 1, Windsor Circuit
Douglas Chase and Patrick Kelley     }
                                     }     DOCKET NO. S0401-92WrC



       In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Plaintiff Richard Dunham appeals an order granting defendant Patrick
  Kelley's motion for summary judgment in an action to recover damages for
  workplace injuries.  We affirm.

       In August 1989, plaintiff was seriously injured while working in the
  service department of Kelley Chrysler, Plymouth, Dodge, Inc. (Kelley, Inc.)
  when a fellow employee, Daniel Wirta, drove a customer's car with its hood
  open into a service bay and hit plaintiff.  This was not the first time
  Wirta had driven a car in the service area while its hood was up, though
  doing so violated the company's safety policy.  Plaintiff received workers'
  compensation benefits for his injuries.  He then sued Patrick Kelley, the
  principal stockholder and president of Kelley, Inc., and the dealership's
  service manager, Douglas Chase, for negligent supervision.  Kelley moved
  for summary judgment, arguing that he was not personally liable to
  plaintiff because he had not participated in the actions that caused
  plaintiff's injuries.  Plaintiff thereafter sought to amend his complaint
  to add a claim of negligent entrustment.  The court granted Kelley's
  summary judgment motion, and plaintiff moved for reconsideration because
  the court had not ruled on plaintiff's motion to add the negligent
  entrustment claim.  The court granted the motion to amend nunc pro tunc,
  denied the motion to reconsider, and granted plaintiff's motion for entry
  of a final judgment with respect to Kelley under V.R.C.P. 54(b).

       Plaintiff argues that summary judgment was improper because a
  reasonable jury could find Kelley individually liable for (1) negligently
  supervising Wirta, or (2) negligently entrusting Wirta with the car he
  drove into plaintiff.  When reviewing summary judgment orders, we employ
  the same standard as the trial court.  State v. G.S. Blodgett Co., ___ Vt.
  ___, ___,