Case Title: P. v. Barker

Citation: 

Docket Number: S115438

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2004-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 8/30/01 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S115438 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/3 A093759 
DONALD BARKER, 
) 
 
) 
San Mateo County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super.Ct.No. SC47136 
___________________________________ ) 
 
A registered sex offender must, within five working days of the offender’s 
birthday, update his or her registration.  (Pen. Code, § 290, subd. (a)(1)(D).)1  
Willful failure to update one’s registration is a felony.  (§ 290, subd. (g)(2), 
hereafter section 290(g)(2).)  The question presented by this case is whether the 
willfulness element of the offense may be negated by just forgetting to register.  
We conclude it may not be. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Because the issue before us is narrow, the facts may be briefly stated.  
Defendant is a registered sex offender.  He was required to register because of two  
                                             
 
1  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
 
 
 
2
rape convictions; he was also convicted of attempted rape.  His victims were 70, 
73, and 84 years of age.  He beat them so severely they were hospitalized; the  
84-year-old was in critical condition for three days. 
 
Defendant understood his birthday triggered an obligation to update his 
registration.  In 1996, 1997, and 1998, he signed and dated boxes on forms that 
recited this obligation.  Seven months before he committed this offense, defendant 
again signed a sex offender registration form.  On this form he initialed 15 
statements advising him of his various registration obligations, including the 
following statement:  “I must, annually, within 5 working days of my birthday, go 
to the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over my location or place of 
residence and update my registration, name, and vehicle registration.”   
 
Nevertheless, in 2000, defendant failed, by his own admission, to update 
his registration within five working days of his birthday, as required by section 
290, former subdivision (a)(1)(C) (now subd. (a)(1)(D)).  When he was arrested, 
defendant acknowledged he had not only initialed the advisements regarding his 
registration obligations, but also that he had read and remembered them.  Asked 
why he had failed to update his registration within the grace period, defendant 
responded, “[B]ecause I’m in a program, I’m a house manager,” a job that “keeps 
me busy all the time.”  Pressed further, he said, “Well, you know what, I totally 
forgot about it, I’m not going to make up no excuses.”  Asked whether it was safe 
to say his annual registration obligation had “[k]ind of just skipped [his] mind,” 
defendant answered, “Yes.”   
 
Defense counsel summed up his theory of the case in his argument to the 
jury:  “This is a man that forgot to do what the law requires him to do.  Period.”  
Counsel added:  “He has a history of registration. . . .  It’s in the evidence.  Look at 
it.  This is a guy that does register.  In this instance, he forgot.” 
 
 
3
 
A jury convicted defendant of one count of violating section 290(g)(2), 
based on his failure to update his registration within five working days of his 
birthday (see § 290, former subd. (a)(1)(C); now subd. (a)(1)(D)).  The jury 
acquitted him of a second count of violating section 290(g)(2), which count 
alleged he had failed to register within five days of changing his residence (§ 290, 
subd. (a)(1)(A)).   
 
After denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial court dismissed 
all but one of his 10 prior strike convictions in the interests of justice pursuant to 
section 1385.  It then sentenced appellant to state prison for a total term of nine 
years as follows:  the upper term of three years on count 1, doubled under the three 
strikes law to six years, plus three consecutive one-year terms as to the prior 
prison terms charged pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b).  The trial court 
observed that “even a technical violation of the registration requirements by a man 
with defendant’s record is a very serious matter. . . . And with 10 prior strikes, 
nine of which are for the sort of conduct which, in my view, should have gotten 
him a life sentence when he did it, but the laws were not available to accomplish 
that at that time, . . . a man with that record has to be very careful to comply with 
all the laws and probably shouldn’t spit on the sidewalk.” 
 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.  “In sum, we hold that simply 
forgetting is not a defense to a charge of violating section 290, and [defendant’s] 
present claim that he lacked the necessary willfulness to commit the charged 
offense because he forgot the annual registration updating requirement is 
meritless.  For that reason, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that 
‘forgetting to register by itself does not provide a defense to a charge of willful 
failure to register.’  The instruction was a correct statement of the law; forgetting 
the mandatory registration requirement of section 290 is simply not a legitimate 
defense to the charge of willfully failing to register.  Section 290 imposes a duty 
 
 
4
upon all registrants, once they have received and understood advisement of the 
duty to register, to remember and fulfill that legal obligation.  We do not believe 
the Legislature intended that a defendant could successfully evade this duty by 
claiming that ‘I totally forgot about it.’ ”   
 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
 
The statutory context in which this question arises was set forth by the 
Court of Appeal.  “As amended in 1996, 1997 and 1998, and in effect at the time 
appellant registered in August 1999, section 290 provided in pertinent part that 
every person convicted of an enumerated sex offense is required ‘for the rest of his 
. . . life while residing in . . . California . . . to register . . . within five working days 
of coming into, or changing his . . . residence or location within, any city, county, 
or city and county . . . in which he . . . temporarily resides.’  (§ 290, former 
subd. (a)(1)(A), as amended by Stats. 1996, ch. 909, § 2; Stats. 1997, ch. 821, § 3; 
Stats. 1997, ch. 821, § 3.5; and Stats. 1998, ch. 930, § 1.1; see § 290, present 
subd. (a)(1)(A).)  In addition, ‘[b]eginning on his . . . first birthday following 
registration or change of address, the person shall be required to register annually, 
within five working days of his . . . birthday, to update his . . . registration . . . , 
including, verifying his . . . name and address, or temporary location, on a form as 
may be required by the Department of Justice.’  (§ 290, former subd. (a)(1)(C), as 
amended by Stats. 1997, ch. 821, § 3.5 and Stats. 1998, ch. 930, § 1.1; see § 290, 
present subd. (a)(1)(D).)  A person required to register because of a felony 
conviction who ‘willfully violates’ the registration provisions ‘is guilty of a felony 
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or 
three years.’  (§ 290, former subd. (g)(2), as amended by Stats. 1994, ch. 867, 
§ 2.7; see now § 290, present subd. (g)(2).)” 
 
 
5
 
People v. Cox (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1371 (Cox) was the first case to 
address the question whether just forgetting to register may negate the willfulness 
requirement of section 290(g)(2).  Cox held, “Once a person is made aware of the 
registration responsibility, he or she may not defend on the basis that the 
requirement simply ‘slipped’ his or her mind.”  (Cox, at p. 1377.) 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Cox court found our decision in People v. 
Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744 (Garcia) distinguishable.  In Garcia, the defendant 
contended the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to make clear in its 
instructions to the jury that “a ‘willful’ failure to register requires a finding that [a 
defendant] actually knew about his duty to register.”  (Id. at p. 751.)  The Attorney 
General responded that “actual knowledge is not an element of the offense, and 
that it was sufficient to find that the appropriate officers notified defendant of his 
duty, as required by section 290.”  (Ibid.) 
 
We agreed with the defendant in Garcia.  “In a case like this, involving a 
failure to act, we believe section 290 requires the defendant to actually know of 
the duty to act.  Both today and under the version applicable to defendant, a sex 
offender is guilty of a felony only if he ‘willfully violates’ the registration or 
notification provisions of section 290.  (§ 290, former subd. (g)(3), as amended by 
Stats. 1994, ch. 867, § 2.7, p. 4393; § 290, present subd. (g)(3).)  The word 
‘willfully’ implies a ‘purpose or willingness’ to make the omission.  (§ 7.)  
Logically one cannot purposefully fail to perform an act without knowing what act 
is required to be performed.  As stated in People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 
289, 334, ‘the term “willfully” . . . imports a requirement that “the person knows 
what he is doing.”  [Citation.]  Consistent with that requirement, and in 
appropriate cases, knowledge has been held to be a concomitant of willfulness. 
[Fn. omitted.]’  Accordingly, a violation of section 290 requires actual knowledge 
of the duty to register.  A jury may infer knowledge from notice, but notice alone 
 
 
6
does not necessarily satisfy the willfulness requirement.”  (Garcia, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at p. 752.)  We concluded, however, the potentially misleading instructions 
given the jury with regard to the actual knowledge requirement were harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt because there was strong evidence the defendant did 
actually know of the registration requirements.  (Id. at p. 755.) 
 
The Cox court found Garcia distinguishable on the following grounds:  
“We conclude there is a fundamental difference between Garcia’s claim that he 
did not know he was required to register and appellant’s claim that he forgot to 
register.  Forgetting presupposes knowledge.  Appellant, in our view, conceded 
that he had actual knowledge of the registration requirement.  Human beings store 
in their brains a myriad of facts.  At any given time the vast majority of those facts 
are in storage waiting for some cue to bring them to conscious recognition.  A 
spouse may forget a wedding anniversary, a patient a medical appointment; such 
lapses arise not from a lack of actual knowledge but a failure to respond to cues. 
Persons keep calendars and appointment books, ask others to remind them of 
duties and obligations and tie strings around their fingers all to insure that 
important responsibilities are met.  We conclude that within this context one 
willfully fails to register when possessed of actual knowledge of the requirement 
he or she forgets to do so.”  (Cox, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376.) 
 
“There are simply some things,” the Cox court observed, “that cannot be 
forgotten.”  (Cox, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377.)  “We think it is inconceivable 
the Legislature could have intended otherwise.  Because the Legislature believed it 
is essential the authorities know at all times the whereabouts of those who have 
been convicted of committing sex offenses, it has created a demanding and 
rigorous registration scheme.  (See Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 
521, 527-528.)”  (Cox, at p. 1376.) 
 
 
7
 
As the Cox court observed, the registration scheme “places strict demands 
not only on registrants but also on state and local agencies.”  (Cox, supra,  
94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377.)  “A person convicted of a qualifying crime is required 
to register for the rest of his life.  (§ 290, subd. (a)(1)(A).)  A registrant with no 
residence address is required to update his registration every 90 days.  (§ 290, 
subd. (a)(1)(B).)  A registrant is required to register annually within five working 
days of his birthday.  (§ 290, subd. (a)(1)(C).)  He must within five working days 
register with the police agency of the location where he has taken up residence.  
(§ 290, subd. (a)(1)(A).)  He must within five working days notify the police 
agency with which he last registered of any change of address.  The agency must 
within three days notify the Department of Justice, which in turn must notify the 
jurisdiction to which the registrant is moving.  (§ 290, subd. (f)(1).)  A registrant 
must notify within five days the police agency of the location in which he resides 
of any change of name and it must so notify the Department of Justice.  (§ 290, 
subd. (f)(2).)  [¶]  Section 290, subdivisions (b)(1), (2), (c), requires all registrants 
on release from confinement or to probation be informed of their registration 
requirements.  The official who explains the registration requirement must sign a 
form required by the Department of Justice indicating the notification has been 
given.  The official is required to obtain the address where the registrant plans to 
reside and report it to the Department of Justice and the police agency responsible 
for that location.  If the qualifying conviction was for a felony, the notification 
required must be made not later than 45 days before the registrant’s release from 
confinement.  [¶]  When changes have been made in registration requirements, the 
Legislature has made provision for registrants to be so informed.  The Legislature 
has provided that the failure to receive such notification is a defense to a charged 
failure to comply with the new requirement.  (See, e.g., § 290, subd. (l)(1).)”  
(Cox, at pp. 1376-1377.) 
 
 
8
 
“In the face of such rigorous notification and registration requirements,” the 
Cox court concluded, “it is unreasonable to believe . . . the Legislature intended 
that a mere lapse of memory would excuse a failure to register.  There are simply 
some things that cannot be forgotten.  To allow forgetfulness to excuse a failure to 
register, would serve, in this context, as an incentive not to remember.”  (Cox, 
supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377.) 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeal was divided.  The majority of the court 
agreed with Cox.  “[W]e are of the opinion that—as a matter of law—forgetting, 
by itself, does not negate willfulness for purposes of a charge of violating the 
registration updating requirement of section 290. . . .  [¶]  Section 290 imposes a 
statutory obligation to register and reregister at certain times and under 
enumerated conditions.  As is the case with any legal obligation, inherent in that 
statutory mandate is the duty not to forget to perform it.  In contrast to the kind of 
subjective ‘forgetfulness’ defense argued by appellant here, under the statutory 
definition of ‘willfully’ found at section 7, subdivision 1, an omission to act would 
not be ‘willful’ if objective circumstances beyond the defendant’s control 
prevented him from acting.  For example, a debilitating injury, illness or mental 
infirmity might objectively prevent a defendant from registering in timely fashion, 
thereby rendering ‘unwillful’ the defendant’s failure to register in compliance with 
the strict time deadlines of section 290, and providing a defense whether or not the 
defendant had also simply forgotten his obligation to register.  [Fn. omitted.]  
Mere forgetfulness, however, does not rise to the level of such an objective 
circumstance preventing compliance with the statute.  Whether the obligation has 
simply slipped the individual’s mind is essentially irrelevant, because he was at all 
times obliged not to let that happen.  Without an objective circumstance 
preventing compliance with the statutory obligation, a mere subjective failure to 
remember to do so therefore remains ‘willful.’  [Citations.]” 
 
 
9
 
The dissenting justice below objected:  “The conclusion reached in Cox and 
reaffirmed here—in effect, that a defendant is deemed to know whatever he once 
knew—is inconsistent with both the language and the reasoning of Garcia.  In 
Garcia the Supreme Court concluded that ‘the court’s instructions on 
“willfulness” should have required proof that, in addition to being formally 
notified by the appropriate officers as required by section 290, in order to willfully 
violate section 290 the defendant must actually know of his duty to register.’  
(Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 754, italics added.)  The court said ‘know,’ not 
‘knew’ or ‘have known.’  Implicit in the court’s analysis is that the defendant must 
have the necessary knowledge at the time he was required but failed to register—
not at some time in the past.” 
 
The dissenting justice below read too much into the fact that we used the 
present tense know in Garcia.  In Garcia, we were not considering the question 
presented here, and it is axiomatic that a decision does not stand for a proposition 
not considered by the court (People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1071).  
Moreover, as the majority below pointed out, “Forgetting something is 
fundamentally different from not knowing that thing.” 
 
The majority below explained:  “Although under Garcia, knowledge is 
required for willfulness, forgetting a fact does not negate the preexisting 
knowledge thereof.  To the contrary, forgetfulness requires the preexistence of 
knowledge, since one cannot forget something unless one already knows it. . . .  
The opposite of knowledge is ignorance.  Because knowledge of the registration 
requirement is a necessary element of the crime as defined by section 290, 
subdivision (g), in this instance ignorance of the law must be a defense to a charge 
of failing to register under section 290.  However, forgetfulness is neither a loss of 
knowledge, nor a form of ignorance.  Although forgetfulness may temporarily or 
momentarily negate the immediate awareness that one must undertake a given 
 
 
10
action at a given time, it does not alter or affect the underlying knowledge that 
such action is required.  If someone forgets something he or she already knows, a 
simple reminder is generally sufficient to restore the preexisting knowledge to 
awareness.  Thus, one may know that one has an obligation, even if one has a 
temporary lapse in awareness thereof at the particular moment the obligation is 
due to be performed.  In contrast, if one does not know something in the first 
instance, no amount of reminding will bring it to awareness until actual knowledge 
of the fact is imparted.” 
 
Contrary to the reading of it by the dissenting justice below, the legislative 
history of section 290(g)(2) casts little light on the question whether the 
willfulness element of the offense may be negated by just forgetting to register. 
 
Section 290 is “regulatory in nature, intended to accomplish the 
government’s objective by mandating certain affirmative acts.”  (Wright v. 
Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 527, italics added (Wright).)  In Morissette 
v. United States (1952) 342 U.S. 246, 255-256, the high court explained that many 
regulatory offenses “are not in the nature of positive aggressions or invasions, with 
which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where the 
law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty.  Many violations of such 
regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely 
create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize. . . .  
[L]egislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify 
intent as a necessary element.  The accused, if he does not will the violation, 
usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might 
reasonably expect and no more exertion that it might reasonably extract from one 
who has assumed his responsibilities.  Also, penalties commonly are small, and 
conviction does not grave damage to an offender’s reputation.” 
 
 
11
 
Initially, failure to register as a sex offender was clearly a regulatory 
offense within the Morissette definition.  When section 290 was enacted in 1947, 
violations were misdemeanors with no element of intent.  (Stats. 1947, ch. 1124, 
§ 1, p. 2563 [“Any person required to register under the provisions of this section 
who shall violate any of the provisions thereof is guilty of a misdemeanor”].)   
 
A decade after the enactment of section 290, the United States Supreme 
Court considered a due process challenge to another registration ordinance―a Los 
Angeles ordinance requiring the registration of felons―that did not require 
willfulness for its violation.  (Lambert v. California (1957) 355 U.S. 225, 227 
(Lambert).)  The high court held that “actual knowledge of the duty to register or 
proof of the probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply are 
necessary before a conviction under the ordinance can stand.”  (Id. at p. 229.) 
 
In 1979, two decades after the Lambert decision, a willfulness element was 
for the first time introduced into section 290.  All failures to register remained 
misdemeanors.  However, a person convicted of specified sex offenses who 
“willfully” violated the statute was required to spend at least 90 days in county 
jail.  (§ 290, former subd. (f), as amended by Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 8, p. 3256.)2  
As introduced, this provision had no element of willfulness.  “Any person required 
to register under the provisions of this section who shall violate any of the 
provisions thereof is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to serve a 
term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county jail.”  (Legis. 
Counsel’s Dig. Sen. Bill No. 13 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) as introduced 
                                             
 
2  
In 1989, willfully failing to register became a felony if the offender had two 
prior convictions for failure to register.  All other failures to register under section 
290 remained misdemeanors.  (§ 290, former subd. (g)(1), (2), as amended by 
Stats. 1989, ch. 1407, § 4, pp. 6194-6195.)  Since 1994, only willful violations 
have been punishable.  (§ 290, subd. (g)(1), as amended by Stats. 1994, ch. 867,  
§ 2.7, p. 4393.) 
 
 
12
Dec. 4, 1978.)  The bill was amended seven times before the willfulness element 
was added.  (Legis. Counsel’s Dig. Sen. Bill No. 13 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Aug. 30, 1979.)   
 
The parties have not drawn our attention to, nor has our research revealed, 
any explanation in the legislative history as to why the willfulness element was 
added in the 1979 amendment.  Lambert, however, provides a basis for 
speculation.  The 1979 amendment provided a greater penalty—at least 90 days in 
county jail and probation for at least one year—for failure to register by those 
convicted of specified sex offenses.  In light of Lambert, the Legislature may have 
concluded that a conviction carrying the greater penalty would (or should) stand 
only if, in the words of Lambert, “actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof 
of the probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply” (Lambert, 
supra, 355 U.S. at p. 229) were shown.  The Legislature may have added the 
willfulness element because it reasoned, as we later reasoned in Garcia, that 
knowledge is a concomitant of willfulness (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 752). 
 
This is speculation, but it has at least some basis.  The legislative history, 
being completely silent on the question why the willfulness element was added by 
the 1979 amendment, provides no basis whatsoever for the assertion made by 
defendant—that the Legislature in 1979 intended that the willfulness element 
might be negated by proof that an offender just forgot to register.   
 
The dissenting justice below finds significance in the fact that subsequent 
attempts to amend section 290 to delete the willfulness element were unsuccessful.  
However, unpassed bills, as evidence of legislative intent, have little if any value.  
(Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 
1396.) 
 
The dissenting justice below also found significance in the fact that federal 
income tax law, immigration law, and selective service law recognize the 
 
 
13
“significant difference between a statute criminally punishing the mere failure to 
perform a legally required act, as to which forgetting provides no defense, and the 
willful failure to do so, for which the penalty typically is greater but which is not 
made out unless the failure reflects a conscious decision not to comply.”  
However, as we explained in Wright, in interpreting section 290, it is not 
particularly helpful to resort to case law arising from “a different statutory scheme 
addressing a different substantive evil enacted by a different legislative body.”  
(Wright, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 530.) 
 
Admittedly, the argument that a person cannot be said to know something if 
he or she has forgotten it, for whatever reason, does have a superficial plausibility.  
However, we agree with Cox and the majority below:  It is simply inconceivable 
the Legislature intended just forgetting to be a sufficient excuse for failing to 
comply with section 290’s registration requirements. 
 
“Our role in construing a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as 
to effectuate the purpose of the law.  (People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 
1215.)”  (Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 1000.)  In the end, we 
must adopt the construction that is most consistent with the apparent legislative 
purpose and avoids absurd consequences.  (In re J. W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 213; 
Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003; People v. 
Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 328.) 
 
“The purpose of section 290 is to assure that persons convicted of the 
crimes enumerated therein shall be readily available for police surveillance at all 
times because the Legislature deemed them likely to commit similar offenses in 
the future.  [Citation.]”  (Barrows v. Municipal Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 821,  
825-826; accord, Wright, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 527; People v. McClellan (1993) 
6 Cal.4th 367, 376, fn. 7.)  “Plainly, the Legislature perceives that sex offenders 
 
 
14
pose a ‘continuing threat to society’ [citation] and require constant vigilance.  
[Citation.]”  (Wright, at p. 527.) 
 
“To this end, a convicted sex offender must register not only on conviction, 
but whenever ‘coming into any city, county, or city and county in which he or she 
temporarily resides or is domiciled . . . .’  (§ 290, subd. (a).)  Supplemental address 
change information helps law enforcement agencies keep track of sex offenders 
who move within the same city or county or are transient.  In large cities such as 
Los Angeles or huge counties like San Bernardino, where offenders can easily 
relocate without reregistering, section 290(f) seeks to prevent them from 
disappearing from the rolls.  Ensuring offenders are ‘readily available for police 
surveillance’ (Barrows v. Municipal Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 825) depends on 
timely change-of-address notification.  Without it law enforcement efforts will be 
frustrated and the statutory purpose thwarted.  The statute is thus regulatory in 
nature, intended to accomplish the government’s objective by mandating certain 
affirmative acts.  Compliance is essential to that objective; lack of compliance 
fatal.”  (Wright, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 527, italics added.) 
 
In Wright, we noted with approval an observation made by the district 
attorney in that case:  “[S]ex offenders often have a transitory lifestyle or 
deliberately attempt to keep their movements secret.  Requiring a prosecutor to 
prove when the person moved—information uniquely within that individual’s 
knowledge and control—would hinder or even foreclose many prosecutions under 
section 290(f).”  (Wright, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 529.)  Predictably, were we to 
accept defendant’s position, every sex offender charged with failure to register 
would claim to have forgotten to do so.  Defendant makes light of the burden this 
would entail for the prosecution, asserting the prosecution would be able to present 
circumstantial evidence of the improbability the offender forgot, such as failure to 
“respond to reminders.”  Proving a sex offender failed to update his or her 
 
 
15
registration within the grace period is straightforward enough, largely a matter of 
documentary evidence.  On the other hand, whether an offender was reminded of the 
registration obligation and failed to respond to the reminders is information, like 
information as to when an offender moved, “uniquely within that individual’s 
knowledge and control” (Wright, at p. 529).  Identifying the sex offender’s 
associates, and then attempting to prove through their testimony that the offender 
had failed to respond to reminders, would be a burden of an altogether different 
character and incalculably greater magnitude than the prosecution has heretofore 
been required to shoulder.  Imposing such burden, we believe, cannot have been the 
Legislature’s intent.  “Impeding vigorous prosecution can only encourage scofflaws, 
resulting in further violations and compounding ‘the substantive evil [the 
Legislature] sought [through section 290] to prevent.’  [Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 529.) 
 
In summary, we conclude that countenancing excuses of the sort given by 
defendant―that he just forgot about his registration obligation―“would 
effectively ‘eviscerate’ the statute” just as surely as characterizing violation of the 
statute as an instantaneous offense would have eviscerated it.  (Wright, supra, 15 
Cal.4th at p. 528.) 
 
We emphasize the limits of our holding.  We do not here express an 
opinion as to whether forgetfulness resulting from, for example, an acute 
psychological condition, or a chronic deficit of memory or intelligence might 
negate the willfulness required for a section 290 violation.3   
                                             
 
3  
As previously noted, the majority below, in dictum, opined:  “In contrast to 
the kind of subjective ‘forgetfulness’ defense argued by appellant here, under the 
statutory definition of ‘willfully’ found at section 7, subdivision 1, an omission to 
act would not be ‘willful’ if objective circumstances beyond the defendant’s 
control prevented him from acting.  For example, a debilitating injury, illness or 
mental infirmity might objectively prevent a defendant from registering in timely 
fashion, thereby rendering ‘unwillful’ the defendant’s failure to register in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
 
 
16
 
Finally, defendant contends the trial judge made several instructional errors 
regarding his claim that he forgot to update his registration:  “[Defendant] was 
denied his rights under the United States and California Constitutions to the due 
process of law, to a jury trial, and to present a defense by the combination of (a) 
the court’s failure to instruct as to the ‘knowledge’ element of violation of section 
290, (b) the court’s instruction to the effect that ‘ignorance of the law is not an 
excuse,’ and (c) the court’s informing the jury that ‘forgetting’ is not a defense to 
violation of section 290.” 
 
This case was tried in 2000, the year before we issued our opinion in 
Garcia.  Therefore, the jury was not instructed, as we held in Garcia a jury trying 
an alleged section 290 violation should be instructed―that willful failure to 
register requires actual knowledge of the duty to register (Garcia, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at p. 752).  However, as it was in Garcia, this instructional error here was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Id. at p. 755.)  The record amply reflects 
that defendant actually knew of his duty to update his registration within five 
working days of his birthday.  Moreover, in trying the case to the jury, defense 
counsel effectively conceded the point, arguing, instead, that defendant had simply 
forgotten to update his registration. 
 
As previously stated, the record demonstrates defendant was not only 
notified of his annual registration obligation, but also actually knew what his 
obligation was.  In 1996, 1997, and 1998, defendant signed and dated boxes on 
forms that recited this obligation.  Seven months before he committed this offense, 
defendant again signed a sex offender registration form.  On this form he initialed 
15 statements advising him of his various registration obligations, including the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
compliance with the strict time deadlines of section 290, and providing a defense 
whether or not the defendant had also simply forgotten his obligation to register.  
[Fn. omitted.]” 
 
 
17
following statement:  “I must, annually, within 5 working days of my birthday, go 
to the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over my location or place of 
residence and update my registration, name, and vehicle registration.”  When he 
was arrested for this offense, defendant acknowledged he had not only initialed 
these advisements but also that he had read and remembered them, although only 
“vaguely.”  Asked why he had failed to update his registration within the grace 
period, defendant responded, “[B]ecause I’m in a program, I’m a house manager,” 
a job that “keeps me busy all the time.”  Pressed further, he said, “Well, you know 
what, I totally forgot about it, I’m not going to make up no excuses.”  Asked 
whether it was safe to say his annual registration obligation had “[k]ind of just 
skipped [his] mind,” defendant answered, “Yes.” 
 
Defense counsel tried this case to the jury on the theory that defendant 
forgot to register, not that he did not actually know of the obligation.  “What did 
he tell the police?  That he forgot.  It slipped his mind.  Well, you know what, I 
totally forgot about it.  I’m not going to make up no excuses.  I was busy.  I’m a 
house manager.  I’m in the program.  [¶]  To find Don Barker not guilty obviously 
you need to accept that statement.”  Defense counsel elaborated on this argument:  
“I know automatically one would think, how the heck can you forget such an 
important thing.  And it comes up on an important day.  For Don Barker, it’s a 
landmark day.  It’s March 5th.  It’s his 50th birthday.  [¶]  The answer I’ve just 
given you.  He’s focused on his issues, his substance abuse, his treatment, his new 
duties as a house manager.  It happens.  It happened here.  This is not a guy who’s 
on the run.  This is not a guy that’s in hiding.  This is a man that forgot to do what 
the law requires him to do.  Period.”  “He has a history of registration. . . .  It’s in 
evidence.  Look at it.  This is a guy that does register.  In this instance, he forgot.”  
 
We turn to defendant’s second related claim of instructional error.  In 
Garcia, we held the trial court “erred in giving an ‘ignorance of the law is no 
 
 
18
excuse’ instruction (CALJIC No. 4.36), which on its face would allow the jury to 
convict defendant of failing to register even if he were unaware of his obligation to 
do so.”  (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 754.)  CALJIC No. 4.36 was not given 
here.  However, defendant contends an instruction that was given―CALJIC  
No. 3.30― was also “clearly an ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ instruction, 
inappropriate in a registration case.” 
 
CALJIC No. 4.36 (Jan. 2004 ed.) states:  “When the evidence shows that a 
person voluntarily did that which the law declares to be a crime, it is no defense 
that [he] [she] did not know that the act was unlawful or that [he] [she] believed it 
to be lawful.”  In accordance with CALJIC No. 3.30, the jury here was instructed:  
“In the crimes charged in the information, there must exist a union or joint 
operation of act or conduct and general criminal intent.  General criminal intent 
does not require an intent to violate the law.  When a person intentionally does that 
which the law declares to be a crime, he is acting with general criminal intent, 
even though he may not know that his act or conduct is unlawful.” 
 
Defendant’s position is supported by People v. Edgar (2002) 104 
Cal.App.4th 210.  “The trial court in this case gave the same willfulness 
instruction found inadequate in Garcia.  (See CALJIC No. 1.20.)  Furthermore, 
like the ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ instruction (CALJIC No. 4.36) given 
in Garcia, the general intent instruction given here (CALJIC No. 3.30) ‘on its face 
would allow the jury to convict [appellant] of failing to register even if he were 
unaware of his obligation to do so.’  (People v. Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 
p. 754.)  We therefore find that the instructions given in this case also were 
erroneous in that they failed to clearly state that a conviction required actual 
knowledge of the duty to register.  (Ibid.)”  (Edgar, at p. 219; accord, People 
v. Poslof (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 215, 223-226; People v. Jackson (2003) 109 
Cal.App.4th 1625, 1634-1635.) 
 
 
19
 
While the dissenting justice below agreed with Edgar, the majority did not.  
“In short, we conclude that, read in combination with the CALJIC No. 1.20 
instruction on willfulness, the trial court’s general intent instruction pursuant to 
CALJIC No. 3.30 did not mislead the jury.  ‘The general intent instruction 
required an “intentional” failure to register.  The “willful” instruction required a 
“purpose or willingness” to make the omission.’  (People v. Johnson [(1998)]  
67 Cal.App.4th [67,] 73.)  Together, these two instructions correctly informed the 
jury that in order to be convicted of violating section 290, appellant had to have 
knowledge that he was required to register.  There was no error.” 
 
We agree with Edgar that a jury might take the same lesson from CALJIC 
No. 3.30 as from CALJIC No. 4.36—that a defendant may be guilty of violating 
section 290 even if unaware of his or her obligation to register.  However, for the 
reasons stated above, we conclude the error here was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The record amply reflects defendant was aware of his 
registration obligation, and his counsel did not claim the contrary in trying the case 
to the jury.  (See Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 754-755.) 
 
Defendant’s last claim of instructional error arises from the trial court’s 
response to a question asked by the jury.  In a note, the jury asked, “Is forgetting to 
regester [sic] a ‘willful’ act according to the law.”  The judge instructed them:  
“[F]orgetting to register by itself does not provide a defense to a charge of willful 
failure to register.”  We have concluded the willfulness element of a section 290 
violation may not be negated by just forgetting to register.  Accordingly, in the 
circumstances of this case, the instruction in question was not erroneous.  Again, 
we express no opinion as to whether the instruction would be erroneous where a 
defendant’s forgetfulness allegedly arose from an acute psychological condition, 
or a chronic deficit of memory or intelligence.   
 
 
20
CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BROWN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
Penal Code section 2901 requires a person convicted of a sex offense to 
register with law enforcement authorities as a convicted sex offender.  The 
registration must be updated within five working days of the offender’s birthday.  
(§ 290, former subd. (a)(1)(C), now subd. (a)(1)(D).)  If the sex crime that gave 
rise to the registration requirement was a felony, a “willful” failure to update the 
registration is also a felony.  (Id., subd. (g)(2).)   
I disagree with the majority’s holding that an offender who inadvertently is 
one day late in updating his already registered address has willfully violated 
section 290. 
I 
Twenty-five years ago, defendant was convicted of three forcible sex 
offenses, for which he was sentenced to prison and ordered to register as a sex 
offender for the rest of his life.   
In the year 2000, defendant was living in San Mateo at Project 90, a 
rehabilitation project for alcohol and drug abusers.  He had registered with the San 
Mateo Police Department, giving Project 90 as his address.  Because his birthday 
                                             
 
1  
All further statutory citations are to this code. 
 
2 
was March 5, he was statutorily required to update his registration by March 10, 
the fifth working day after his birthday.  He did not do so.  On the morning of 
March 13, which was a Monday and the first working day after the time to update 
his registration expired, a San Mateo police officer called Project 90 and left a 
recorded message asking to speak to defendant.  Defendant returned the call in 15 
minutes and appeared at the police station within an hour.  He said he had 
forgotten to update his registration.   
Although defendant was only a day late in updating his registration, he was 
arrested and charged with violating section 290.  At trial, the jury submitted this 
question during its deliberations:  “Is forgetting to regester [sic] a ‘willfull’ [sic] 
act according to the law.”  The trial court responded that “forgetting to register by 
itself does not provide a defense to a charge of willful failure to register.”  The 
jury convicted defendant of violating section 290.  Because of defendant’s prior 
felony convictions, the trial court could have sentenced him to 25 years to life 
under the “Three Strikes” law.  Instead, the court struck all but one of his prior 
convictions and sentenced him to nine years in prison. 
II 
Subdivision (g)(2) of section 290 provides that with exceptions not relevant 
here, “any person who is required to register under this section based on a felony 
conviction . . . who willfully violates any requirement of this section . . . is guilty 
of a felony . . . .”  (Italics added.)  At issue is whether a defendant who initially 
knew of the duty to update the registration within five working days of his or her 
birthday, but who forgets to do so in that period, has willfully violated section 290. 
Pertinent here is People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744 (Garcia).  There, 
the defendant argued that for an offender to “willfully” violate section 290 the 
 
3 
offender must have actual knowledge of the duty to do so.  This court 
unanimously2 agreed. 
Unlike the defendant in Garcia, who claimed he never learned of the duty 
to register, defendant here admits he knew he had to update his registration but 
says he forgot he had to do so within the requisite five days after his birthday.  
Although Garcia is factually distinguishable, its reasoning is dispositive here.  
Garcia explained:  “Logically one cannot purposefully fail to perform an act 
without knowing what act is required to be performed.  As stated in People v. 
Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 334, ‘the term “willfully” . . . imports a 
requirement that “the person knows what he is doing.” ’ ”  (Garcia, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at p. 752, italics added.)   
Forgetting to do something means an inadvertent failure to do something.  
That is the opposite of a purposeful or willful failure to act.  “The word ‘willfully,’ 
when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a 
purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make the omission referred to.”  (§ 7.)  
A “willful” omission to perform a duty imposed by law, such as the duty to 
register as a sex offender, is an intentional omission, not an omission caused by 
negligence, inadvertence, or forgetfulness.  (See, e.g., Boags v. Municipal Court 
(1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 65, 71 [a public officer’s “willful omission” to perform a 
legal duty means “a willing intentional omission” to perform the duty].)  A willful 
act is one done “ ‘intentionally or purposely as distinguished from accidentally or 
                                             
 
2  
Although I authored a concurring and dissenting opinion in Garcia, I 
disagreed only with the majority’s conclusion that the instructional error in that 
case was harmless.  (Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 759-762 (conc. & dis. opn. 
of Kennard, J.).) 
 
4 
negligently . . . .’ ”  (Black’s Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) p. 1593, quoting Perkins & 
Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) pp. 875-876.)  Here, defendant’s inadvertent 
failure to register timely was unquestionably negligent, but it was not willful. 
III 
Section 290 is a regulatory offense.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 10; see also 
Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 527.)  Such offenses often require 
a degree of culpability that is less than the criminal negligence customarily 
required for conviction of a crime.  This court has “assumed” that regulatory 
offenses with such reduced culpability levels “are constitutionally permissible 
where the purpose is to protect public health and safety and the penalties are 
relatively light.”  (People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 521, italics added.)   
But the penalties for violating section 290’s registration requirements are 
anything but light.  Many sex offenders charged with failing to update their 
registration have two or more prior convictions that qualify as “strikes” under the 
Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(f), 1170.12), because most sex offenses are 
strikes (see 667.5, subd. (b) [listing crimes qualifying as strikes], 1192.7, subd. (c) 
[same]), and because even a single sexual assault involving a single victim often 
results in convictions on multiple counts, each of which is a strike (see generally 
People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321).  Thus, many violators of section 290 
face sentences of 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law.  To impose such a 
sentence on defendants who inadvertently fail to timely update their registrations, 
a degree of culpability below that of criminal negligence, may violate the state 
Constitution’s prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17) 
 
5 
or the federal Constitution’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. 
Const., 8th Amend.).3 
When a statute is susceptible to two constructions, one of which raises 
serious constitutional questions, courts construe the law to avoid such questions.  
(People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 509.)  Therefore, I 
would construe the term “willfully” in section 290 as not applying to a convicted 
sex offender who inadvertently does not register timely with the police.  
IV 
In holding that forgetting to update registration as a convicted sex offender 
is a willful violation of section 290, the majority relies on a Court of Appeal 
decision, People v. Cox (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1371.  Quoting Cox, the majority 
states:  “ ‘A spouse may forget a wedding anniversary, a patient a medical 
appointment; such lapses arise not from a lack of actual knowledge but a failure to 
respond to cues.  Persons keep calendars and appointment books, ask others to 
remind them of duties and obligations and tie strings around their fingers all to 
insure that important responsibilities are met.  We conclude that within this 
                                             
 
3  
In People v. Carmony (July 8, 2004, S115090) 33 Cal.4th ___), the 
defendant was convicted of violating section 290 and sentenced to a term of 25 
years to life in prison based on his failure to update his registration as a sex 
offender within five days of his birthday, which the defendant claimed was 
inadvertent.  After addressing other unrelated issues, this court remanded the case 
to the Court of Appeal to consider the defendant’s contention that his sentence 
violated the state and federal Constitutions’ prohibitions against cruel and/or 
unusual punishment.  (Id. at p. ___, fn. 6.)  The question whether the defendant’s 
sentence violated those constitutional provisions was not before this court in 
Carmony.  Nor was the question at issue here:  the meaning of the term “willfully” 
as used in section 290. 
 
6 
context one willfully fails to register when possessed of actual knowledge of the 
requirement he or she forgets to do so.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 6.)   
In response, I quote the observation by the dissenting Court of Appeal 
justice in this case:  “One who forgets to do something – such as celebrate a 
wedding anniversary, or keep a medical appointment, using the examples in Cox – 
does not willfully insult their spouse or willfully stand up their doctor.  Whatever 
the consequences of such an inadvertent omission may be, if one has forgotten, the 
omission is not willful.”  
The majority fears that, unless inadvertently failing to register is treated as 
a violation of section 290, offenders who choose not to register will falsely claim 
they forgot to do so, thus making it hard for prosecutors to prove their guilt.  (See 
maj. opn., ante, at pp. 14-15.)  Such a claim, however, will succeed only if the jury 
believes it.  Jurors are notoriously reluctant to attach great credibility to the 
testimony of convicted sex offenders.  Also, the longer the delay in registering, the 
less credible the claim of “I forgot” becomes.   
When, as here, the offender was only one day late in updating the 
registration, it may indeed be more difficult to establish that the violation was 
willful under section 290.  Why shouldn’t it be?  It may be just as difficult to 
prosecute for willful tax evasion a taxpayer who is one day late in filing a 
mandatory tax return.  (See 26 U.S.C. § 7203 [a person who “willfully” fails to 
pay taxes is guilty of a misdemeanor].)  In this case, defendant’s claim that he 
forgot to update his registration was highly credible:  He was working as a house 
manager at Project 90, he responded immediately to the telephone call from the 
police, and he was only one day late in updating his registration.  At sentencing, 
 
7 
the trial court found that there was no evidence that defendant had deliberately 
tried to conceal his whereabouts from the police.   
The majority’s holding defeats the purpose of section 290’s registration 
requirement, which is “to assure that persons convicted of the crimes enumerated 
therein shall be readily available for police surveillance at all times because the 
Legislature deemed them likely to commit similar offenses in the future.”  
(Barrows v. Municipal Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 821, 825-826.)  As a result of the 
majority’s holding, a person who genuinely forgets to register on time is likely to 
go into hiding to avoid arrest, particularly when facing, like defendant here, a 
sentence of 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law.  In making it more 
difficult to track down these offenders, the majority has frustrated the 
Legislature’s goal of making those individuals “readily available for police 
surveillance at all times.”  (Ibid.) 
CONCLUSION 
That people may forget to do things they sincerely want and intend to do is 
a matter of common experience.  Forgetting cannot be willed; it is an unplanned 
malfunction of the conscious mind.  For this reason, a person who intends to do 
something, but forgets to do it, has not willfully failed to do that thing.  Thus, I 
disagree with the majority that a person may commit the criminal offense of 
“willfully” violating the sex offender registration law—a crime for which a 
defendant may spend the rest of his life in prison—by mere forgetfulness. 
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Barker 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 107 Cal.App.4th 147 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S115438 
Date Filed: August 30, 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Mateo 
Judge: Dale A. Hahn 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Richard Such, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Jack Funk, Assistant Public Defender, for California Public Defenders Association as Amicus Curiae on 
behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Gerald A. Engler and Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorneys 
General, René A. Chacón, Laurence K. Sullivan, Ronald E. Niver, Stan Cross and Janet E. Neeley, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Richard Such 
First District Appellate Project 
730 Harrison Street, No. 201 
San Francisco, CA  94107 
(415) 495-3119 
 
Janet E. Neeley 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street 
P.O. Box 944255 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5257