Case Title: Pulera v. Town of Richmond

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP001119, 2015AP001016

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Margaret Pulera, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
Town of Richmond and Town of Johnstown, 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 20, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 17, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock and Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
Barbara W. McCrory and Phillip A. Koss 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. concurs. 
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. Bradley, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: KELLY, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant, there were briefs filed by 
Sarah A. Huck, Malinda Eskra and Reinhart, Boerner, Van Dueren, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Sarah Huck. 
 
For the respondents-respondents, there was a brief by Sara 
L. Gehrig and Nowlan & Mouat LLP, Janesville, and oral argument 
by Sara L.  Gehrig. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 61
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.   2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
(L.C. Nos. 2014CV1232 & 2014CV871) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Margaret Pulera, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Town of Richmond and Town of Johnstown, 
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20,2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
Appeal from consolidated orders of the Circuit Courts for 
Rock and Walworth Counties.  Reversed and cause remanded.    
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   This appeal comes 
before the court on certification by the court of appeals.1 
Margaret Pulera (Pulera) appeals dismissals of the petitions for 
certiorari review of highway orders recorded in Rock2 and 
                                                 
1 Pulera v. Town of Richmond and Town of Johnstown, Nos. 
2015AP1016 and 2015AP1119, unpublished certification (Wis. Ct. 
App. Dec. 23, 2015).   
2 The Honorable Barbara W. McCrory presided. 
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
2 
 
Walworth3 Counties.  The issue certified is:  what event triggers 
the thirty-day period under Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1)(2013-14)4 
during which certiorari review may be obtained for a town 
board's highway order.  To address this issue, we must interpret 
the terms of § 68.13(1), the statute affording certiorari 
review, in accord with Wis. Stat. § 82.15, the statute governing 
appeals of highway orders.5  
¶2 
We conclude that the thirty-day period during which 
certiorari review is available for a town board's highway order 
to lay out, alter or discontinue a highway begins to run on the 
date that the highway order is recorded by the register of 
deeds.6  This interpretation best comports with the language and 
structure of Wis. Stat. § 68.13 and Wis. Stat. § 82.15.  And, in 
addition, it provides aggrieved persons and parties a date 
certain for commencement of the thirty-day period during which 
judicial review of a highway order is available.   
                                                 
3 The Honorable Phillip A. Koss presided.  
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
5 In Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, 336 Wis. 2d 218, 
801 N.W.2d 316, we acknowledged the problems caused by the 
interplay of Wis. Stat. § 68.13 and Wis. Stat. § 82.15.  The 
legislature may wish to consider revisiting these statutory 
provisions.  
6 Both towns issued highway orders.  Accordingly, we need 
not address when the deadline begins to run when an individual 
seeks to appeal a town board's refusal to issue a highway order.  
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
3 
 
¶3 
Pulera's petitions were filed within thirty days of 
the dates on which the highway orders were recorded by the 
registers of deeds.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit courts' 
orders granting the town boards' motions to dismiss Pulera's 
petitions and remand for certiorari review in either Walworth 
County Circuit Court or Rock County Circuit Court, as the 
parties may agree.7  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The relevant facts in the present case are brief and 
uncontested.  The dispute arises from changes to an intersection 
located at the county line between Rock and Walworth Counties.  
Specifically, the intersection is located where County Highway M 
crosses North County Line Road.  Without notifying the Town of 
Richmond, the Rock County Highway Department made changes to 
this intersection.  To facilitate these changes, the Rock County 
Highway Department had to discontinue two existing roads.  
¶5 
On September 9, 2014, the Town of Johnstown (Rock 
County) and the Town of Richmond (Walworth County) held a joint 
meeting.  At the meeting, both town boards retroactively 
approved changes to the intersection that the Rock County 
Highway Department had already completed.  This required the 
                                                 
7 If the parties do not agree on which circuit court shall 
conduct the certiorari review, it shall be conducted in Walworth 
County Circuit Court. 
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
4 
 
town boards to approve construction of a new intersection as 
well as discontinuance of portions of former highways.8   
¶6 
On October 3, 2014, the Richmond Town Board recorded 
its highway order with the Walworth County Register of Deeds.  
The order memorialized changes approved at the joint meeting of 
the town boards.  The Johnstown Town Board followed a month 
later by recording its highway order with the Rock County 
Register of Deeds on November 3, 2014. 
¶7 
On November 3, 2014, Pulera filed a certiorari 
petition in Walworth County Circuit Court that sought review of 
the Town of Richmond's highway order altering the intersection 
and discontinuing portions of the highway.  Similarly, on 
December 1, 2014, Pulera filed a certiorari petition in Rock 
County Circuit Court seeking judicial review of the Town of 
Johnstown's highway order approving alterations to the same 
highway and intersection.  
¶8 
On January 23, 2015, each town filed a motion to 
dismiss Pulera's certiorari action.9  The towns alleged that 
                                                 
8 The actions of the Rock County Highway Department are not 
at issue in the present case.  They were the subject of Pulera 
v. Coopman, No. 2013AP322, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
Nov. 13, 2013) petition for review denied 2014 WI 50, 354 
Wis. 2d 863, 848 N.W.2d 859.  
9 On February 27, 2015, Pulera moved to consolidate the two 
actions in Walworth County Circuit Court.  The Walworth County 
Circuit Court did not address Pulera's motion.  Pulera later 
filed a motion to consolidate in Rock County Circuit Court; it 
also did not address the motion.  The court of appeals 
consolidated the cases before certifying Pulera's appeals to us.  
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
5 
 
Pulera's petitions were untimely because neither petition was 
filed within thirty days of Pulera's receipt of the towns' 
decision to alter the highway as they alleged is required by 
Wis. Stat. § 68.13.10   
¶9 
Rock County Circuit Court dismissed Pulera's action as 
untimely.  The court reasoned that the thirty-day period during 
which certiorari review may be sought for a highway order 
commenced when Pulera received actual notice of the vote of the 
Johnstown Town Board.  The circuit court rejected Pulera's 
argument that the thirty-day period commenced when the register 
of deeds recorded the town board's highway order.    
¶10 The Walworth County Circuit Court also dismissed 
Pulera's claim as untimely.  Unlike the Rock County Circuit 
Court, the Walworth County Circuit Court concluded that the 
thirty-day period for seeking certiorari review commenced with 
the town board's vote.  The Walworth County Circuit Court also 
dismissed the claim for improper venue because a portion of the 
highway is exclusively in Rock County.11   
                                                 
10 The towns argued that the petition filed in Rock County 
should be dismissed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)10.,  
another action pending between the same parties for the same 
cause.  The issue was not addressed by the circuit court, and 
was not properly developed before this court.  Accordingly, we 
do not address it.  
11 We observe that when an intersection is on the county 
line that separates two counties, venue is proper in either 
county.  See Wis. Stat. § 82.15.  Accordingly, venue is proper 
in Walworth County.  And, therefore, the Walworth County Circuit 
Court incorrectly dismissed Pulera's action for improper venue.   
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
6 
 
¶11 The court of appeals consolidated the cases on appeal 
and certified them for our review.  We now reverse.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶12 The present case requires us to interpret and apply 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 68.13 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 82.15. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation and application present questions of law that we 
review independently, while benefitting from the circuit courts' 
analyses.  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 
WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110.   
B.  Statutory Construction, General Principles 
¶13 "Judicial deference to the policy choices enacted into 
law by the legislature requires that statutory interpretation 
focus primarily on the language of the statute."  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 
Wis. 2d 
633, 
681 
N.W.2d 
110. 
 
Accordingly, 
"statutory 
interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute.  If the 
meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the 
inquiry.'"  Id., ¶45 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, 
¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  "Statutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  Id. (citing Bruno 
v. Milwaukee Cty., 2003 WI 28, ¶¶8, 20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 
N.W.2d 656).  
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
7 
 
¶14 "Context is important to meaning."  Id., ¶46.  For 
this reason, "statutory language is interpreted in the context 
in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  Id. (citing State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶13, 259 
Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416).  And, we interpret statutes in such 
a way as to give effect to each word.  Id. ("Statutory language 
is read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, 
in order to avoid surplusage." (citing State v. Martin, 162 
Wis. 2d 883, 894, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991)).  
¶15 "Where statutory language is unambiguous, there is no 
need to consult extrinsic sources of interpretation, such as 
legislative history."  Id. (citing Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶20).  
"The test for ambiguity generally keeps the focus on the 
statutory language:  a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of 
being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or 
more senses."  Id., ¶47 (citing Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶19).  
¶16 It is within this framework that we interpret and 
apply the time limits of Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1) as affected by 
Wis. Stat. § 82.15. 
C.  Wisconsin Stat. § 68.13 
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 68.01 governs appeals from many 
types of municipal administrative decisions.12  It provides: 
                                                 
12 A town is defined as a municipality under Wis. Stat. 
§ 68.04. 
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
8 
 
Any person having a substantial interest which is 
adversely affected by an administrative determination 
of a governing body, board, commission, committee, 
agency, officer or employee of a municipality or agent 
acting on behalf of a municipality as set forth in 
s. 68.02, may have such determination reviewed as 
provided in this chapter.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 68.13(1) provides further guidance:  "Any 
party to a proceeding resulting in a final determination may 
seek review thereof by certiorari within 30 days of receipt of 
the final determination."  A person aggrieved by a highway order 
has the same right of appeal.  Wis. Stat. § 82.15.  Accordingly, 
a person or party who receives a final adverse determination 
from a municipal administrative body has thirty days from its 
receipt to appeal.  However, when a determination is "final" and 
when a party is in "receipt" of such a determination are not 
defined.  These words can become particularly opaque in the 
context of highway orders issued under Wis. Stat. § 82.12.13  
¶18 Under Wis. Stat. § 82.03(1)(a), a "town board shall 
have the care and supervision of all highways under the town's 
jurisdiction."  However, a town board that decides to lay out, 
alter or discontinue a highway must follow the specific 
statutory 
requirements 
detailed 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
ch. 
82.  
Furthermore, there are two ways in which a town board may lay 
out, alter or discontinue a highway.  First, a town board, on 
its own initiative, can introduce a resolution to lay out, alter 
                                                 
13 The interplay between these two statutes renders each 
ambiguous.  However, nothing in the legislative history provides 
helpful 
guidance 
in 
ascertaining 
the 
meaning 
of 
these 
provisions. 
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
9 
 
or 
discontinue 
a 
highway. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 82.10(3).  
Alternatively, town residents may petition their town board to 
"lay out, alter, or discontinue any highway."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.12(10).  
¶19 Under either method, a town board is required to 
provide notice to various landowners and governmental bodies.  
See Wis. Stat. §§ 82.10(3)14 & (4).15  In addition, a town board 
is required to hold a public hearing to decide whether creating, 
altering or discontinuing a highway is in the public interest.  
Wis. Stat. § 82.11(1) ("At the time and place stated in the 
notice under s. 82.10, the town board shall hold a public 
hearing to decide, in its discretion, whether granting the 
application or resolution is in the public interest.").   
                                                 
14 This section provides:   
Upon receipt of an application under sub. (1) or the 
introduction of a resolution under sub. (2), the board 
shall provide notice of the time and that the place 
where it will meet to consider the application or 
resolution. 
 
The 
notice 
shall 
contain 
a 
legal 
description of the highway to be discontinued or of 
the proposed highway to be laid out or altered and a 
scale map of the land that would be affected by the 
application or resolution. 
Wis. Stat. § 82.10(3).  
15 A town board "shall publish a class 3 notice under ch. 
985" and is required to notify "owners of record lands through 
which the highway may pass," and the "owners of record of all 
lands abutting the highway" among others, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.10(4).   
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
10 
 
¶20 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 82.12(2), a town board must 
issue a "highway order" if it decides to grant a petition or 
approve a resolution to lay out, alter or discontinue a highway.  
The vote of a town board, in and of itself, does not create a 
highway order; rather, a "highway order" is a document that is 
statutorily described in regard to the particulars the document 
must include.16  Wis. Stat. § 82.01(3).  In addition, to give 
effect to a highway order, the town board is required to take 
several delineated steps.  Wisconsin Stat. § 82.12 provides:  
The highway order shall be recorded with the register 
of deeds for the county in which the highway is or 
will be located and shall be filed with the town 
clerk.  The town clerk shall submit a certified copy 
of the order to the county highway commissioner.  If 
the town has an official map, the order shall be 
incorporated into the official map.  
Wis. Stat. § 82.12(2).  
¶21 A person aggrieved by a highway order has the right to 
seek judicial review of a town board's highway order.  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 82.15 provides:  "Any person aggrieved by a highway 
order, or a refusal to issue such an order, may seek judicial 
review under s. 68.13.  If the highway is on the line between 2 
counties, the appeal may be in the circuit court of either 
county."  Wis. Stat. § 82.15.   
                                                 
16 "Highway order" is statutorily described as "an order 
laying out, altering, or discontinuing a highway or a part of a 
highway, that contains a legal description of what the order 
intends to accomplish and a scale map of the land affected by 
the order."  Wis. Stat. § 82.01(3).  
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
11 
 
¶22 If a person or party is aggrieved by a highway order, 
they may seek review of the order using the certiorari process 
outlined in Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1).  However, a person or party 
aggrieved by a highway order is subject to the same thirty-day 
period during which review may be sought, as are others who seek 
certiorari review under § 68.13(1).   
¶23 A "final determination" by the town is a condition 
precedent to certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 68.13.17  In 
addition, Wis. Stat. ch. 82 provides that a highway order must 
be issued when a town decides to lay out, alter or discontinue a 
highway.  Wis. Stat. § 82.12(2).  It is the highway order that 
"contains a legal description of what the order intends to 
accomplish and a scale map of the land affected by the order."  
Wis. Stat. § 82.01(3).   
¶24 In addition, it is the recording by the register of 
deeds that gives public notice of the town board's decision.  
Public notice is important because there may be persons 
aggrieved by the town board's decision that were not aware of 
it.  And, the legislature has recognized the importance of this 
function of the register of deeds.  For example, Wis. Stat. 
§ 840.11 governs petitions to alter streets, parks, and other 
public places.  It provides no "order, judgment or decree or 
                                                 
17 Wisconsin Stat. § 68.12 explains when a determination is 
final under municipal administrative proceedings.  However, 
municipal 
authorities 
do 
not 
have 
§ 68.11 
hearings 
when 
considering whether to issue highway orders, and therefore this 
provision is inapplicable here.   
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
12 
 
final resolution or order taking or affecting such land . . . 
shall be notice to any subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer 
unless 
a 
certified 
copy 
thereof, 
containing 
a 
legal 
description . . . of the land affected thereby, and accompanied 
with a map showing the location thereof, is recorded in the 
office of the register of deeds of the county in which the land 
is situated."  § 840.11(2); see also Wis. Stat. § 107.25.   
¶25 Moreover, when real estate is bought or sold, it is to 
the records of the register of deeds that one looks in a title 
search for restrictions on land.  One purpose recording in the 
register of deeds is to ensure the public has notice of any 
changes to real property that occur.  See generally, Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.43 (2015-16).  Therefore, a town's decision in regard to 
laying out, altering or discontinuing a highway is not final 
until the register of deeds records the town's highway order.   
¶26 Furthermore, the precise geographic location of the 
highway in its new form is not provided to the public until the 
register of deeds records the town's highway order.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 82.12(2) ("If the town has an official map, the 
[highway] order shall be incorporated into the official map.").  
Persons seeking to appeal a town's decision laying out, altering 
or discontinuing a highway may not know the metes and bounds 
description of the new form of the highway before it is recorded 
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
13 
 
by the register of deeds.18  Therefore, the triggering event for 
judicial review of a highway order cannot commence prior to the 
public being notified of the precise characteristics of the 
order, i.e. until the register of deeds records it.  It would be 
imprudent to expect persons or parties to make a reasoned 
decision about whether to seek certiorari review without a 
precise, recorded highway order.  And, for this reason, we 
generally require a written order from which to appeal.  See 
generally, Ramsthal Advertising Agency v. Energy Miser, Inc., 90 
Wis. 2d 74, 75, 279 N.W.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1979) ("An order, to be 
appealable, must be in writing and filed." (citation omitted)); 
Helmrick v. Helmrick, 95 Wis. 2d 554, 556, 291 N.W.2d 582 (Ct. 
App. 1980).  
¶27 Beginning the thirty-day period on the date on which 
the register of deeds records the order also gives effect to the 
word 
"receipt" 
in 
the 
phrase 
"receipt 
of 
the 
final 
determination" in Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1).  The register of deeds 
recording a highway order gives the public receipt of the 
proposed highway alteration.   
¶28 The practical benefits of concluding that recording 
the highway order starts the thirty-day period for judicial 
                                                 
18 Of course, notice pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 82.10 provides 
similar information prior to the hearing.  However, the 
information provided is subject to change at the hearing or at 
any time prior to the recordation of the highway order by the 
register of deeds.  For this reason, notice given antecedent to 
the hearing may not provide individuals with this information.  
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
14 
 
review are significant.  Specifically, it provides a clear and 
definite triggering event for commencement of the thirty-day 
period.19  And, persons and parties seeking certiorari review of 
a highway order easily can ascertain the start of that thirty-
day period.  The deadline for filing a certiorari petition will 
be the same for all, and factual disputes as to the date by 
which a certiorari action should have been filed will be less 
frequent.  
¶29 Accordingly, a person or party seeking certiorari 
review of a town board's decision to lay out, alter or 
discontinue a highway must file the petition for certiorari 
review within thirty days of the register of deeds recording the 
highway order.  This triggering event for finality and receipt 
                                                 
19 As the court of appeals explained:  
There 
are 
several 
positive 
aspects 
to 
this 
interpretation.  First, it creates a certiorari filing 
date that is the same for all potential petitioners.  
Second, the date of recording will normally be easy to 
establish from the record.  Third, the recording of 
the highway order creates a wide potential for notice 
to potential petitioners, because this is a place that 
attorneys and others will know to check for land 
records.  Fourth, at the time it is recorded, the 
highway order will be in its final legal form, thus 
allowing potential petitioners to fully evaluate its 
effects and decide whether to seek judicial review. 
Pulera v. Town of Richmond and Town of Johnstown, Nos. 
2015AP1016 and 2015AP1119, unpublished certification (Wis. Ct. 
App. Dec. 23, 2015).   
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
15 
 
of the highway order is consistent with the language and context 
of the relevant statutes.20  
D.  Circuit Court Interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 68.13 
¶30 The Walworth County Circuit Court and Rock County 
Circuit 
Court 
each 
reached 
a 
different 
conclusion 
when 
interpreting Wis. Stat. § 68.13 in the context of this highway 
order.  Each court's interpretation, while understandable, is 
ultimately, unpersuasive.  
¶31 The Walworth County Circuit Court concluded that the 
appeal period during which a certiorari action may be filed 
starts when a town board votes to lay out, alter or discontinue 
a highway.  The court concluded that "receipt of a final 
determination" under Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1) occurs when the town 
board votes.  Accordingly, persons and parties would have thirty 
days from the board's vote laying out, altering or discontinuing 
a highway during which to commence a certiorari review of the 
town board's decision.   
¶32 However, this interpretation is inconsistent with the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 68.13 and Wis. Stat. § 82.12.  
                                                 
20 A different triggering event must apply when a town board 
votes not to lay out, alter or discontinue a highway.  In such a 
case, the town will not issue a highway order, so there will be 
nothing to record.  Also, different provisions govern finality 
of 
such 
a 
decision. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 82.12(3) 
("The 
determination not to issue a highway order shall be final for 
one year.  No application to lay out, alter, or discontinue a 
highway shall be filed within one year from the date of a 
determination not to issue a highway order covering the highway 
or portion of the highway covered in the refused application.").  
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
16 
 
The vote of a town board is not what is appealable under Wis. 
Stat. § 82.15.  It is a highway order that is appealable.  Every 
town board vote will not result in a highway order, e.g., when a 
town board votes against laying out, altering or discontinuing a 
highway.  Wis. Stat. § 82.12(3).  In addition, the circuit 
court's interpretation reads the word "receipt" out of § 68.13 
because persons and parties are not in "receipt" of the highway 
order when the board votes.   
¶33 Moreover, 
there 
would 
be 
significant 
practical 
difficulties with beginning the period for judicial review with 
a town board vote.  Notably, Wis. Stat. § 82.12 does not contain 
a requirement that an aggrieved person or party be present at 
the vote.  And, even though a party may be present at the board 
meeting where a vote is taken, there is nothing to suggest that 
a person who is aggrieved, but not present at the town board 
meeting, would have any way of receiving notice of a town 
board's vote.  However, as discussed above, the register of 
deeds' recording of the highway order does provide receipt by 
public notice of laying out, altering or discontinuing a 
highway.   
¶34 The Rock County Circuit Court concluded that the 
thirty-day period for an appeal was triggered by actual notice 
of the board's decision.  However, this interpretation does not 
give effect to each word in the relevant statutes insofar as it 
reads the word "receipt" and "final determination" out of Wis. 
Stat. § 68.13(1).  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ("Statutory 
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
17 
 
language is read where possible to give reasonable effect to 
every word, in order to avoid surplusage." (citing Martin, 162 
Wis. 2d at 894)). 
¶35 A town board issues a highway order which the register 
of deeds records.  Wis. Stat. § 82.12(2).  But nothing in the 
statutes requires a town board to provide interested persons 
with a copy of the highway order.  Therefore, no person or party 
is statutorily required to be in "receipt" of a town board's 
final determination other than the town clerk, the county 
highway commissioner and the register of deeds.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.12(2). 
¶36 Moreover, a person or party may receive actual notice 
that there will be changes to the highway before the highway 
order is filed with the register of deeds or incorporated into 
the official map of the town due to filing with the town clerk.  
Wis. Stat. § 82.12(2) ("The highway order shall be recorded with 
the register of deeds for the county in which the highway is or 
will be located and shall be filed with the town clerk.  The 
town clerk shall submit a certified copy of the order to the 
county highway commissioner.  If the town has an official map, 
the order shall be incorporated into the official map.").  
Choosing alternate places in which a highway order is filed 
could result in inconsistent dates as triggering events for the 
thirty-day period during which certiorari review under Wis. 
Stat. § 68.13 is available.   
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
18 
 
¶37 Neither the Walworth County Circuit Court's nor the 
Rock County Circuit Court's interpretation fully comports with 
the language of Wis. Stat. § 68.13 in the context of Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.15.  Therefore, as explained above, we reject those 
interpretations and conclude that the thirty-day period during 
which judicial review of a highway order may be commenced starts 
on the date that the register of deeds records the highway 
order.  
E.  Timeliness of Pulera's Petitions 
¶38 In the present case, both of Pulera's petitions were 
timely filed.21  Each petition was filed in circuit court within 
thirty days of the dates on which registers of deeds recorded 
each highway order.  The Richmond Town Board's order was 
recorded by the Walworth County Register of Deeds on October 3, 
2014.  And, within the thirty-day period for filing a certiorari 
action, on November 3, 2014, Pulera filed a petition for 
certiorari review of the highway order in Walworth County 
Circuit Court.22    
                                                 
21 We assume without deciding that Pulera was aggrieved by 
the highway orders.  
22 Although the action was filed 31 days after October 3, 
2014, it falls within the thirty-day filing deadline because the 
thirtieth day, November 2, 2014, was a Sunday.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.15(1)(b) ("Notwithstanding ss. 985.09 and 990.001(4), in 
computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by chs. 801 
to 847, by any other statute governing actions and special 
proceedings, or by order of court, the day of the act, event or 
default from which the designated period of time begins to run 
shall not be included.  The last day of the period so computed 
shall be included, unless it is a day the clerk of courts office 
(continued) 
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
19 
 
¶39 Likewise, Pulera's petition for certiorari review in 
Rock County Circuit Court was timely filed.  The register of 
deeds recorded the Town of Johnstown's highway order on November 
3, 2014, and Pulera timely filed a petition for certiorari 
review in Rock County Circuit Court on December 1, 2014.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶40 Accordingly, we conclude that the thirty-day period 
during which certiorari review is available for a town board's 
highway order to lay out, alter or discontinue a highway begins 
to run on the date that the highway order is recorded by the 
register of deeds.  This interpretation best comports with the 
language and structure of Wis. Stat. § 68.13 and Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.15.  And, in addition, it provides aggrieved persons and 
parties a date certain for commencement of the thirty-day period 
during which judicial review of a highway order is available.   
¶41 Pulera's petitions were filed within thirty days of 
the dates on which the highway orders were recorded by the 
registers of deeds.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit courts' 
orders granting the town boards' motion to dismiss Pulera's 
petitions and remand for certiorari review in either Walworth 
County Circuit Court and Rock County Circuit Court, as the 
parties may agree.  
                                                                                                                                                             
is closed.").  
Nos. 2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119 
 
 
20 
 
By the Court.—The orders of the circuit courts are reversed 
and the cause is remanded.23  
¶42 DANIEL KELLY, J., did not participate. 
 
                                                 
23 Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler and Justice Michael J. 
Gableman join this opinion.  Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley 
joins only the mandate of reversal.   
 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶43 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I join the 
mandate of the lead opinion reversing the circuit courts' orders 
and remanding for certiorari review, but I cannot join its 
reasoning.  The legislature imposes upon this court the hopeless 
task of reconciling Wis. Stat. § 82.15——which permits a person 
aggrieved by a highway order or a refusal to issue one to seek 
judicial review under Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1)——with the language 
of § 68.13, which allows "[a]ny party to a proceeding resulting 
in a final determination," to seek certiorari review "within 30 
days of receipt of the final determination."  Here, Pulera was 
not a "party to a proceeding," there was no set process for 
sending her (or anyone else) a "final determination," and no 
procedure 
assured 
any 
person's 
"receipt" 
of 
the 
final 
determination.  Faced with this conundrum, the lead opinion 
creates its own procedure governing the deadline for filing a 
petition for certiorari following the issuance of a highway 
order.  Although the lead opinion attempts to make the language 
of the statute fit these circumstances, I cannot join its 
statutory analysis.  As the court of appeals explained in its 
certification to this court, the statutory language enacted by 
the legislature has "little connection to the highway order 
process" and lacks any "useful guidance."  It is not this 
court's job to make up the law, but the lead opinion does so 
because the legislature unmindfully incorporated the statutory 
language governing municipal administrative appeals (§ 68.13) 
into the statute governing appeals over highway orders (§ 82.15) 
where it simply does not fit. 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.rgb 
 
2 
 
¶44 Nonetheless, I join the lead opinion in reversing and 
remanding because I conclude Pulera's petition is not untimely.  
None of the three proposed trigger dates work, and Pulera did 
not receive a "final determination" because the notice she 
received did not include the map the statute dictates must be 
included in order to be a "highway order."1  The time period for 
certiorari review would not expire until 30 days after Pulera 
received the "final determination"——that is, a highway order 
containing the requisite scale map.  I would not create the 
bright-line rule set forth in the lead opinion, but I agree with 
the mandate.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶45 I write separately for three reasons:  (1) to urge the 
legislature to enact a statute specifically governing appeals 
challenging the issuance of and refusal to issue highway orders; 
(2) to question whether Pulera was "aggrieved" by the Towns' 
highway orders or whether Pulera was instead aggrieved by Rock 
County's alteration of the intersection before the highway 
orders were issued and recorded with the register of deeds; and 
(3) to highlight Rock County's apparent disregard for Chapter 82 
by reconstructing the roads before obtaining the statutorily-
required highway orders. 
                                                 
1 A "highway order" must include "a legal description of 
what the order intends to accomplish and a scale map of the land 
affected by the order."  Wis. Stat. § 82.01(3).  Requiring the 
inclusion of a scale map necessitates a written and not an oral 
order. 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.rgb 
 
3 
 
I 
¶46 In 2011, this court decided Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 
2011 WI 77, 336 Wis. 2d 318, 801 N.W.2d 316, which described the 
lack of clarity in Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1) regarding highway 
orders:  "The phrase 'receipt of a final determination' is not 
clear in the context of a highway order."  See Dawson, 336 
Wis. 2d 318, ¶66 n.5.  In Dawson, which involved a town's 
decision to deny a request for a highway order, this court 
surmised that the 30-day time limit might be triggered by either 
the date the town votes to "grant or deny" a request involving a 
highway order or "the date that a notice of that determination 
is received by an applicant, if a notice is sent."  Id. 
(emphasis added).  This court resolved Dawson without deciding 
the trigger date for the 30-day time limit because, no matter 
what trigger date applied, Dawson did not meet the 30-day 
deadline.  Id. 
¶47 Six years later, this court is called upon again to 
apply the incongruous words the statutes say control an appeal 
of a highway order.  Read together, the statutes are so unclear 
that the two circuit courts deciding Pulera's petitions applied 
different trigger dates.  The Walworth County Circuit Court 
dismissed Pulera's petition as untimely by using the date the 
Town voted to issue the highway order because Pulera attended 
the meeting.  In contrast, the Rock County Circuit Court 
dismissed Pulera's petition as untimely because she did not file 
it within 30 days of receiving "actual" notice of the not-yet-
recorded highway order. 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.rgb 
 
4 
 
¶48 As 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
explained, 
both 
interpretations are problematic.  Using the town vote as the 
trigger date ignores the "receipt" language of the statute, 
disregards the statutory definition of "highway order," and 
would give notice only to persons in attendance.  Using receipt 
of the unrecorded highway order is problematic because the 
statutes do not contemplate sending an aggrieved person a copy 
of the highway order.  A receipt-based trigger date could also 
vary from person to person, depending on when each aggrieved 
person requested and received the highway order.  In the present 
case, Pulera received the highway orders only because she asked 
each Town to send them, and what she received did not constitute 
statutorily-compliant highway orders because they did not 
include maps. 
¶49 Pulera suggests a third possible trigger date:  the 
date the highway orders are recorded with the register of deeds.  
She argues that recording signifies a final determination and 
provides a date certain that will be the same for any person 
aggrieved.  The lead opinion adopts Pulera's approach and 
decides the trigger date is the date the highway order is filed 
with the register of deeds.  Although this resolution may sound 
reasonable, it does not come from the language of the statute 
the legislature tells us to apply. 
¶50 My analysis focuses on the text of the statute:  "Any 
party to a proceeding resulting in a final determination may 
seek review thereof by certiorari within 30 days of receipt of 
the final determination."  Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1).  "Receipt" is 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.rgb 
 
5 
 
not defined in the statute, but according to Black's Law 
Dictionary it means "[t]he act of receiving something" or "[a] 
written acknowledgement that something has been received."  
Receipt, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  A non-legal 
dictionary 
similarly 
defines 
"receipt" 
as 
"[t]he 
act 
of 
receiving" or "[a] written acknowledgment that a specified 
article . . . has been received."  Receipt, American Heritage 
Dictionary (5th ed. 2011).  The statutory language says the 30 
days begin to run on the date the person is in "receipt of the 
final determination."  How can a person be deemed in receipt of 
the final determination at the time the highway order is 
recorded at the register of deeds?  The register of deeds is 
certainly in "receipt" when the document is recorded, but under 
the plain meaning of "receipt" no aggrieved person could be in 
"receipt" by virtue of such recording.  How could an aggrieved 
person know the highway order has been recorded?  Would this 
require an aggrieved person to check the register of deeds daily 
after the town vote?  Here, Rock and Walworth Counties each 
recorded the highway order at the respective register of deeds 
on different dates:  Rock recorded its highway order 55 days 
after the joint town meeting, and Walworth recorded its highway 
order 24 days after the joint town meeting.  So, should the lead 
opinion's bright-line rule run 30 days from the first recording 
or 30 days from the last recording?  Would this interpretation 
be subject to a discovery rule, making "receipt" the date the 
aggrieved person discovers or should have discovered the highway 
order has been recorded?  Whatever "receipt" means in the 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.rgb 
 
6 
 
statute, the general recording of a document at the register of 
deeds cannot possibly constitute receipt by any person aggrieved 
by a highway order.  If this is what the legislature had in mind 
it could have plainly said so. 
¶51 The legislature has been on notice for at least six 
years (since this court decided Dawson) that the statutory 
language it tells us to apply in highway order cases does not 
work, and I write to urge the legislature to enact a statute 
outlining timeframes for appealing the issuance of a highway 
order as well as the denial of a highway order.  Perhaps the 
legislature will adopt the trigger date the lead opinion 
suggests, but the legislature rather than this court should 
choose.  If the legislature selects the date of recording at the 
register of deeds for issued orders, it must enact a separate 
trigger date for cases where the town board refuses to issue a 
highway order, because refusals do not require a recording at 
the register of deeds.  Clarity in this area of the law is 
needed, and I respectfully urge the legislature to promptly 
address it. 
II 
¶52 As a foundational matter, I question whether Pulera 
was aggrieved by the Towns' retroactive highway orders or 
whether Pulera was instead aggrieved by Rock County's act of 
altering the intersection before the Towns issued highway orders 
and recorded them with the register of deeds.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 68.06 
defines 
a 
"person 
aggrieved" 
as 
"any 
individual . . . whose 
rights, 
duties 
or 
privileges 
are 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.rgb 
 
7 
 
adversely affected by a determination of a municipal authority."2  
By the time the Towns voted to issue the highway orders, the 
construction project altering the intersection was done.  How 
can these hollow highway orders have aggrieved anyone?  The 
orders were an after-the-fact formality to dot the i's and cross 
the t's.  The highway orders were not the official approval 
permitting the project to begin; they were ostensibly a way to 
legitimize what had already been finished a year earlier. 
¶53 Pulera complains that she was adversely affected by 
the alteration of the intersection.  It appears to me her 
grievance lies with Rock County, which altered an intersection 
and discontinued two existing roads without the requisite 
highway orders.3  She was not aggrieved by the issuance of 
                                                 
2 Note that Wis. Stat. § 68.01 provides: 
Any person having a substantial interest which is 
adversely affected by an administrative determination 
of a governing body, board, commission, committee, 
agency, officer or employee of a municipality or agent 
acting on behalf of a municipality as set forth in 
68.02, 
may 
have 
such 
determination 
reviewed 
as 
provided in this chapter. 
3 I acknowledge that Pulera attempted to challenge the Rock 
County Board of Supervisors' reversal of its decision precluding 
the proposed redesign of the intersection, and that her petition 
seeking judicial review was dismissed on the ground that the 
County's action was not reviewable because it was a "legislative 
enactment," see Wis. Stat. § 68.03(1), and because Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.01(6) applies only to cities, villages, and towns.  See 
Pulera v. Coopman, No. 2013AP322, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. Nov. 13, 2013).  In that case it appears, however, that 
Pulera only sought review of the Rock County Board of 
Supervisor's reversal of its initial decision to leave the 
intersection as it was.  That suit did not challenge Rock 
County's or the Rock County Highway Department's physical 
alteration of the intersection without any apparent fulfillment 
(continued) 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.rgb 
 
8 
 
paperwork 
that 
obviously 
had 
no 
effect 
on 
a 
completed 
construction project. 
III 
¶54 A related issue lurks beneath the surface of this case 
but neither party raised it:  did the Rock County Highway 
Department violate the law by altering an intersection and 
discontinuing 
town 
roads 
without 
first 
obtaining 
the 
statutorily-required highway order?  The record is limited as to 
why the Rock County Highway Department ignored the statutorily-
required procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 82, "Town 
Highways." 
¶55 Some facts are not in dispute.  The intersection at 
County Highway M and North County Line Road was changed.  Town 
roads were eliminated.  North County Line Road runs along the 
border with Rock County on one side and Walworth County on the 
other.  Construction began in June 2012 and was completed by 
August 2013. 
¶56 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 82.10-.12 set forth the procedures 
controlling such construction.  Sections 82.10(1) and (2) 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the procedural requirements of Wis. Stat. § 82.21(1)(b), 
which provides that "[t]he procedure to lay out, alter, or 
discontinue a highway on the line between a town and another 
town . . . shall 
begin 
only 
when . . . in 
each 
affected 
municipality . . . [t]he town board, city council, or village 
board introduces a resolution to lay out, alter, or discontinue 
a town line highway."  (Emphasis added.)  Although a county 
board has broad discretion in addressing highway construction 
projects under Wis. Stat. § 83.03(1), this intersection involved 
town roads.  When town roads are involved, the county must 
comply with the law set forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 82. 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.rgb 
 
9 
 
identify who can initiate the process and the documents required 
to do so.  Sections 82.10(3) and (4) provide notice requirements 
and specify who must receive notice.  Section 82.11 requires the 
town board to "personally examine the highway or proposed 
highway" and "hold a public hearing to decide, in its 
discretion, whether granting the application or resolution is in 
the public interest."  Section 82.12 describes the time the town 
board has to decide whether to issue or not issue the highway 
order, as well as the recording requirements if a highway order 
is issued. 
¶57 Rock County did not follow the statutory process 
before beginning or completing construction.  The County began 
construction before getting highway orders from either Town.  
When the Town Board of Richmond sent a letter to the Rock County 
Highway Department explaining it unanimously voted to leave the 
intersection as is, it was ignored.  The position of the Town 
Board of Johnstown is not as apparent.  What is clear is that 
neither Town issued highway orders until after construction was 
completed in August 2013.  The statutorily-required highway 
orders were issued only after the Richmond Town Board and the 
Johnstown Town Board held a joint meeting on September 9, 2014.  
The Richmond Town Board recorded its highway order approving the 
new intersection on October 3, 2014.  The Johnstown Town Board 
recorded its highway order approving the new intersection on 
November 3, 2014.  From this record, it appears that the Rock 
County 
Highway 
Department 
did 
not 
follow 
the 
statutory 
procedures in Wis. Stat. ch. 82, performed the construction in 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.rgb 
 
10 
 
violation of the law, and thereby forced the Towns' issuance of 
highway orders. 
¶58 Laws are not written to be ignored.  People who live 
and work in these towns travel these roads and are affected by 
the layout of town highways.  The legislature has determined 
that when town highways are "laid out, altered, or discontinued" 
certain procedures affording notice and due process to those 
most affected must be followed.  The Rock County Highway 
Department 
apparently 
decided 
these 
laws 
did 
not 
apply.  
Regardless of whether there are facts not in this record to 
explain Rock County's actions, all county highway departments 
changing a town's highways should take care to follow the basic 
procedures and law set forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 82.  Failure to 
follow these procedures deprives people who are adversely 
affected by the decisions of their governing bodies of any 
meaningful recourse. 
¶59 For these reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.awb 
 
1 
 
¶60 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  We are asked to 
determine what event triggers the thirty-day deadline for filing 
a certiorari petition for judicial review of a town highway 
order.  Specifically, we are tasked with interpreting the terms 
of Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1) (providing for certiorari review) in 
conjunction with the terms of Wis. Stat. § 82.15 (governing 
appeals of highway orders).   
¶61 There are several areas of intrinsic disconnect 
between these statutory provisions that cannot be easily and 
forthrightly reconciled.  We have previously brought our 
concerns 
about 
these 
statutes 
to 
the 
attention 
of 
the 
legislature and do so again here.1  Accordingly, there is no 
clear answer as to when the certiorari filing deadline for 
judicial review of a town highway order begins to run.   
¶62 Given this conundrum, we are asked to discern whether 
either of the interpretations advanced by the parties provide a 
workable solution under the statutes as they are currently 
written.  The petitioner, Margaret Pulera, argues that the 
triggering event is the recording with the register of deeds of 
a highway order adopting a proposed change.  The respondents, 
Towns of Richmond and Johnstown, counter that the triggering 
event is the date of a publicly noticed hearing at which the 
town board votes to grant or deny a highway order.   
                                                 
1 See Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, 336 Wis. 2d 
318, 801 N.W.2d 316. 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.awb 
 
2 
 
¶63 The 
lead 
opinion 
adopts 
the 
petitioner's 
interpretation.2  Lead op., ¶2.  According to the lead opinion, 
it is the recording of the highway order with the register of 
deeds that "best comports with the language and structure of 
Wis. Stat. § 68.13 and Wis. Stat. § 82.15."  Id. 
¶64 As the court of appeals certification acknowledged, 
there are strengths and flaws to each interpretation.3  The lead 
                                                 
2 I use the term "lead" opinion for two reasons.  First, I 
am concerned that without this cue, the reader may mistakenly 
believe that the first opinion has precedential value.  Although 
four justices join in the mandate of the opinion to reverse the 
circuit 
courts' 
orders 
and 
remand 
for 
certiorari 
review 
(Roggensack, C.J., joined by Ziegler, J., Gableman J., and 
Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J.), it represents the reasoning of only 
three justices (Roggensack, C.J., joined by Ziegler, J., and 
Gableman, J.).  Kelly, J., did not participate.  Accordingly, 
there is no opinion that represents the reasoning of the 
majority of the court.     
Second, I use the term "lead" opinion because although it 
is undefined in our Internal Operating Procedures, its use here 
is consistent with past description. I have said "that a lead 
opinion is one that states (and agrees with) the mandate of a 
majority of the justices, but represents the reasoning of less 
than a majority of the participating justices." State v. Lynch, 
2016 WI 66, ¶ 143, 371 Wis.2d 1, 885 N.W.2d 89 (Abrahamson & Ann 
Walsh Bradley, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(citing Hoffer Props., LLC v. State, Dep't of Transp., 2016 WI 
5, 366 Wis.2d 372, 874 N.W.2d 533); see also State v. Weber, 
2016 WI 96, ¶83 n. 1, 372 Wis. 2d 202, 887 N.W.2d 554 (Ann Walsh 
Bradley, J., dissenting). 
3 In Pulera v. Town of Richmond and Town of Johnston, Nos. 
2015AP1016 and 2015AP1119, unpublished certification (Wis. Ct. 
App. Dec. 23, 2015), the court of appeals discussed three 
possible triggering events: (1) the town board vote on a 
proposed highway change; (2) the recording of a highway order 
adopting a proposed change; or (3) actual notice of the town 
board's determination. 
(continued) 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.awb 
 
3 
 
opinion errs in failing to acknowledge the flaws of the 
interpretation it adopts.  In particular, adopting the date of 
the recording of the highway order addresses only half of the 
problem.  It provides no triggering event for certiorari review 
when a town board issues no highway order because it votes 
against a proposed change.  Additionally, the necessary notice 
that will be provided by the lead opinion's procedure is 
unpredictable at best and illusory at worst.  
¶65 Contrary to the lead opinion, I determine that the 
date of the town vote is the event triggering the deadline for 
certiorari review.  Admittedly, the date of the town vote does 
not fit perfectly with the statutory language.  However, this 
                                                                                                                                                             
The strengths and flaws of the first two approaches 
advanced by the parties are set forth in the analysis section 
below.  Because neither party asks this court to adopt the date 
of actual notice as the triggering event, I do not analyze it. 
Nevertheless, I set forth the advantages and disadvantages 
of that interpretation as proffered in the certification of the 
court of appeals.  It explained that one positive aspect of this 
interpretation was that it closely tracked the statutory 
language requiring "receipt of a final determination."  Wis. 
Stat. § 68.13(1).  However, it acknowledged that a significant 
flaw in this interpretation is that there is no requirement in 
the town highway chapter that highway orders be sent to anyone 
other than the register of deeds, the town clerk, and the county 
highway commissioner.  Wis. Stat. § 82.12(2).  
Additionally, the court of appeals determined that if the 
thirty-day deadline for each petitioner starts to run from only 
the petitioner's receipt of the highway order, this could lead 
to a continuing series of certiorari filing dates that are 
individual to each potential petitioner.  This would result in 
problems due to lack of finality and leave the town uncertain as 
to when it could begin the actual road work without the 
possibility of judicial review. 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.awb 
 
4 
 
interpretation has the advantage of providing notice and a 
review procedure to the largest number of interested parties on 
a date certain.  
¶66 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶67 Before discussing the advantages and disadvantages of 
each interpretation, I provide a brief analysis of the statutory 
provisions at issue.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 82.15, which 
provides for judicial review of highway orders, "[a]ny person 
aggrieved by a highway order, or a refusal to issue such an 
order, may seek judicial review under s. 68.13."  The cross-
referenced judicial review statute provides in relevant part 
that "[a]ny party to a proceeding resulting in a final 
determination may seek review thereof by certiorari within 30 
days of receipt of the final determination."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 68.13(1).   
¶68 There are several areas of disconnect between these 
statutory provisions.  The highway order process does not use 
the term "final determination" or any similar term.  Nor does it 
have a "party to a proceeding" in the same manner as does a 
municipal administrative proceeding under Wis. Stat. ch. 68.  
Additionally, because there is no requirement that a highway 
order be sent to all interested parties, it is not clear how to 
apply the requirement that a certiorari petition be filed within 
thirty days of "receipt" of the "final determination."  Wis. 
Stat. § 68.12(1).   
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.awb 
 
5 
 
¶69 The lead opinion resolves the issue presented by 
concluding that "the thirty-day period during which certiorari 
review is available for a town board's highway order to lay out, 
alter or discontinue a highway begins to run on the date that 
the highway order is recorded by the register of deeds."  Lead 
op., ¶2.  Admittedly, this interpretation has some advantages.  
At the time it is recorded, the highway order will be in its 
final legal form.  As the lead opinion explains, this comports 
with the statutory language allowing review of a "final 
determination."  Wis. Stat. § 68.13(1). 
¶70 However, 
there 
are 
several 
significant 
flaws 
associated with determining that the recording of the highway 
order with the register of deeds triggers the certiorari filing 
deadline.  First, as the lead opinion acknowledges in a 
footnote, its new rule applies only to petitioners seeking 
certiorari review of a town board vote to issue a highway order, 
adopting a proposed change.  Lead op., ¶30 n.20.  Accordingly, 
the lead opinion provides no solution for petitioners seeking 
certiorari review of a decision to deny a proposed change.  As 
it explains, "[i]n such a case, the town will not issue a 
highway order, so there will be nothing to record."  Id.   
¶71 This is problematic because a whole category of people 
are left without a procedure for review. Under Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.15, the thirty-day deadline for filing a petition for 
certiorari review is the same regardless of whether a town board 
votes for or against a proposed highway change.  Yet, when a 
town board votes against a highway change, the lead opinion 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.awb 
 
6 
 
leaves those potential petitioners clueless and void of any 
direction or avenue for review.  See Lead op., ¶30 n.20. 
¶72 Second, the lead opinion further errs in contending 
that "persons and parties seeking certiorari review of a highway 
order easily can ascertain the start of that thirty-day period."  
Lead op., ¶28.  It should acknowledge, as the court of appeals 
indicated in its certification, that the only way for potential 
petitioners to know when the highway order is recorded is to 
repeatedly check the land records.  See Pulera v. Town of 
Richmond and Town of Johnston, Nos. 2015AP1016 and 2015AP1119, 
unpublished certification (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015).  In 
reality, the lead opinion's interpretation does not mandate 
notice to anyone other than the register of deeds, the town 
clerk, or the county highway commissioner.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 82.12(2).  For all others it is a "constantly seek and you may 
find" notice procedure. 
¶73 Third, because there is no time limit for the 
recording of the highway order with the register of deeds, this 
interpretation has the potential to indefinitely delay the 
review process.  This constant seeking could last for an 
indeterminate and unpredictable length of time. If the highway 
order is never filed, then any review is illusory. 
¶74 Finally, the lead opinion's analogy to Wis. Stat. 
§ 840.11, which governs petitions to alter streets, parks, and 
other public places, is misplaced.  See lead op., ¶24.  The 
notice 
provided 
here 
is 
distinguishable 
because 
of 
the 
differences between the interested parties requiring notice.   
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.awb 
 
7 
 
¶75 Wisconsin Stat. § 840.11(2) provides that no final 
order 
shall 
be 
notice 
to 
any 
subsequent 
purchaser 
or 
encumbrancer unless recorded in the office of the register of 
deeds.  It is reasonable to put the onus on a potential 
purchaser to check with the register of deeds before purchasing 
property.  It is less reasonable to require an unknown number of 
potential petitioners to continually check with the register of 
deeds to determine if a highway order has been recorded.  
II 
¶76 Contrary to the lead opinion, I interpret the date of 
the public town vote as the event triggering the deadline for 
certiorari review.  There are several advantages to this 
interpretation.   
¶77 First, and most significant, it would provide all 
petitioners with the same filing deadline regardless of whether 
the town board voted to adopt or deny the proposed change.  
Second, factual disputes about the date of the vote are unlikely 
and thus the date is a date certain.  Third, this is the 
earliest event from which the certiorari filing date could begin 
to run, meaning that the town board decision would become final 
at the earliest possible date.   
¶78 Finally, 
before 
a 
vote 
can 
be 
taken, 
notice 
requirements must be met.  Wisconsin Stat. § 82.10(3) requires 
public notice of any meeting where the town intends to vote on a 
resolution to reconfigure a road.  "The notice shall contain a 
legal description of the highway to be discontinued or of the 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.awb 
 
8 
 
proposed highway to be laid out or altered and a scale map of 
the land that would be affected . . . ."  Id.  
¶79 Like all of the possible interpretations, the date of 
the town vote also has disadvantages.  The lead opinion is 
correct that the vote of a town board does not create a written 
"highway order."  Lead op., ¶20.  A "highway order" is defined 
as a written document that contains a legal description and a 
scale map.  Wis. Stat. § 82.01(3).  Yet, as noted above, through 
the mandated public notice, potential petitioners have the 
required information. 
¶80 Admittedly, not all potential petitioners may attend 
the town board meeting or receive notice of the vote after it 
occurs.  Although this solution is not a perfect fit with the 
statutory language, the issue of notice is lessened here because 
a town vote on a proposed highway change takes place at a 
publicly noticed meeting.  As the Walworth County circuit court 
explained in ruling that the triggering event was the date of 
the town board vote, "[a]nybody that is interested in what is 
going to happen at that intersection attends those meetings and 
finds out what happens."  Br. of Pet., app. at 69. The circuit 
court further reasoned that unlike the recording of the highway 
order, the date of the vote would provide a specific date on 
which all interested parties would receive notice. 
¶81 Although none of the possible interpretations is a 
perfect fit, the advantages of using this event as the 
triggering event outweigh the disadvantages.  Additionally, in 
Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011 WI 77, ¶66 n.5, 336 Wis. 2d 318, 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.awb 
 
9 
 
801 
N.W.2d 316, 
this 
court 
highlighted 
the 
statutory 
imperfections at issue in this case and advanced a solution 
consistent with this interpretation. 
¶82 In sum, I interpret the date of the town vote as the 
event triggering the deadline for certiorari review of a highway 
order.  The date of the town vote does not fit perfectly with 
the statutory language.  However, this interpretation has the 
advantage of providing notice and a review procedure to the 
largest number of interested parties on a date certain.  
¶83 I commend the petitioner in this case for advancing 
her cause in the interest of ensuring safe roadways in her 
community.  However, because she sought certiorari review more 
than thirty days after the town vote, I conclude that her 
petitions were untimely.   
¶84 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶85 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
Nos.  2015AP1016 & 2015AP1119.awb 
 
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