Case Title: Toni L. (Dumler) Rottscheit v. Terry L. Dumler

Citation: 2003 WI 62

Docket Number: 2001AP002213

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 62 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2213 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Toni L. (Dumler) Rottscheit,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Respondent, 
 
v. 
Terry L. Dumler,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
No cite 
(Ct. App.-Unpublished order) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 25, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 3, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Clark   
 
JUDGE: 
Jon M. Counsell   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Todd G. Smith and LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison, and 
oral argument by Todd G. Smith. 
 
For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument by 
Frank R. Vazquez, Clark County Corporation Counsel. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott A. Sussman, 
Madison, and Anne Arnesen and Carol W. Medaris, Madison, on 
behalf of the Center on Fathers, Families, and Public Policy and 
the Wisconsin Council on Children and Families. 
 
2003 WI 62 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2213  
(L.C. No. 
90 FA 124) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Toni L. (Dumler) Rottscheit,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Terry L. Dumler,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 25, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This is a review of an unpublished 
court of appeals summary decision, Rottscheit v. Dumler, No. 01-
2213, order (Wis. Ct. App. April 2, 2002), which affirmed an 
order by the Clark County Circuit Court, Jon M. Counsell, Judge, 
denying Terry Dumler's (Dumler) motion for modification of his 
child support order.  Dumler, the petitioner, was incarcerated 
in January 2000.  In 2001, he requested modification of an order 
that required him to pay $543 per month for the support of his 
No. 
01-2213   
 
2 
 
three children.  The central issue before this court is whether 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
refusing to reduce Dumler's child support payments in light of 
Dumler's incarceration and resulting change in income.  Although 
we find it appropriate for a court to consider incarceration 
when reviewing a request for modification, we find that the fact 
of incarceration by itself neither mandates nor prevents 
modification.  Incarceration is one factor that should be 
considered, but the determination should be made on a case-by-
case 
basis, 
looking 
at 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
relevant 
circumstances.  We conclude that under the circumstances 
presented in this case, the circuit court properly exercised its 
discretion under Wis. Stat. § 767.32 (1999-2000)1 in finding that 
the facts in this case did not constitute a substantial change 
in circumstances sufficient to warrant modification. 
I 
¶2 
The following facts are undisputed.  Dumler married 
Toni Dumler2 (now Rottscheit) on April 19, 1989.  They had three 
children:  Jeffrey Lee, born October 22, 1987; Greggory Douglas, 
born October 4, 1988; and Trenten Michael, born November 30, 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Since her divorce from Terry Dumler, Toni L. Dumler has 
remarried and changed her name to Toni L. Rottscheit.  While her 
name changed after many of the relevant orders in this case, we 
will refer to Toni Dumler as Rottscheit throughout this opinion 
for the purpose of clarity. 
No. 
01-2213   
 
3 
 
1990.  During their marriage, Rottscheit worked as a nurse's 
assistant and Dumler worked as a laborer.3 
¶3 
In 1990, Rottscheit filed for divorce.  The parties 
entered a stipulated divorce, and Rottscheit received custody of 
their three minor children.  The judgment of divorce was signed 
on July 7, 1992, and, consistent with state guidelines, provided 
that Dumler was required to pay 29 percent of his gross income 
for child support.  In 1998, Dumler's child support order was 
reconciled to a fixed amount set at $543 dollars per month.4   
¶4 
In 
1999, 
Dumler 
was 
convicted 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) for his fifth or greater offense of 
operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI).  He was also 
convicted 
of 
cocaine 
possession 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(c).  Dumler was sentenced to two years 
in a correctional facility for the OWI charge.  He also received 
a consecutive one-year sentence for the drug conviction.  Dumler 
had been incarcerated on at least three previous occasions for 
OWI convictions. 
¶5 
In 
January 
2000, 
Dumler 
entered 
the 
Racine 
Correctional 
Institution. 
 
He 
initially 
earned 
wages 
of 
                                                 
3 According to Dumler's counsel at oral argument, Dumler is 
a roofer and construction worker by trade. 
4 The record indicates that the order reconciling the 
previous percentage order was issued by Judge Michael W. Brennan 
of the Clark County Circuit Court on September 9, 1998.  We were 
unable to locate a copy of this order in the record for this 
case, but as indicated by the court of appeals, the "Monthly 
Statement of Account" attached to Dumler's motion, indicates 
that the amount was set at $543 per month. 
No. 
01-2213   
 
4 
 
approximately $60 per month from working at the institution.  
However, 25 percent of this amount had to be withheld to pay 
court fines.  While incarcerated, Dumler made several nominal 
child support payments, most under $10 per month.   
¶6 
On May 21, 2001, Dumler petitioned the circuit court 
for a modification of the child support order.  He claimed that 
as a result of his incarceration, he could not make the child 
support payments.  At the time of the petition, Dumler 
acknowledged that he was over $12,500 in arrears.  He requested 
that 
the 
child 
support 
order 
be 
suspended 
during 
his 
incarceration or, alternatively, modified to 29 percent of his 
institutional wages.  He asserted that if the order was not 
modified, he would accumulate over $25,000 in back arrearages, 
not including interest.   
¶7 
The circuit court held a hearing on the motion on 
August 1, 2001.  Dumler appeared by telephone without counsel.  
At the hearing, Dumler stated that he had a pay rate of 28 cents 
an hour for approximately 160 hours per month, and thus made 
just under $45 per month.  He acknowledged that the child 
support order had been set at a level he could pay when not 
incarcerated.  Dumler explained that he would owe in excess of 
$25,000 if he was not granted relief, and that because the child 
support agency had a lien on him, it was unlikely that he could 
get a loan. 
¶8 
In response to questioning from the court, Dumler 
testified about his criminal record.  As noted, at the time of 
the hearing, Dumler was serving a three-year sentence, one year 
No. 
01-2213   
 
5 
 
for cocaine possession and two years for his fifth or greater 
OWI offense.  Dumler acknowledged that he had been involved in 
11 criminal court cases since 1986, although there were not 
convictions in all cases.  He further admitted that at least 
three prior OWI convictions had resulted in incarceration.  
Also, the hearing record indicates that the one-year sentence 
for cocaine possession resulted from a revocation of probation.  
When asked if he was aware of the consequences of his criminal 
behavior, Dumler stated:  "Yes, and I have always gotten out and 
paid my child support."  The court noted that the needs of the 
children 
had 
not 
changed 
since 
or 
because 
Dumler 
was 
incarcerated.  When asked if there was anything else he would 
like to put before the court in support of his claim, Dumler 
stated that he believed the court had before it all the relevant 
information, including the record of child support payments.  
Dumler admitted alcohol and drug dependency, and noted that the 
institution had a program to help him solve that.   
¶9 
The circuit court held that Dumler's child support 
order should not be modified.  The court found that Dumler's 
financial condition was Dumler's fault and resulted from 
Dumler's voluntary actions.  The court further explained:   
This is not a situation where you need to 
wilfully avoid [] child support duty.  In other words, 
he may not have had this intent in mind when he was 
deciding that he was going to [do] something involving 
him going to prison, but the consequences of prison 
were 
known, 
and 
really 
under 
the 
circumstances 
presented here, and given the intentional decision to 
drink and drive, intentional decision to possess 
cocaine, the intentional decision to undergo an act 
No. 
01-2213   
 
6 
 
which resulted in the revocation of that probation, 
involved a definite effect on his future income, but 
looking at the fact that he will be——he's in treatment 
now 
which 
should 
improve 
his 
future 
employment 
prospects, 
and 
in 
considering 
everything 
else 
presented 
here, 
along 
with 
the 
fact 
that 
the 
children's needs don't go down just because somebody's 
put in prison, upon release from prison and after 
becoming gainfully employed, he could pay on these 
arrearages, and so I think it is appropriate that the 
order not be modified. 
¶10 Dumler appealed the circuit court's order and on April 
2, 2002, the court of appeals issued a summary disposition order 
affirming the circuit court's ruling.  This court then granted 
Dumler's petition for review on June 25, 2002. 
II 
¶11 The decision whether a child support judgment should 
be modified is left to the circuit court's discretion.  Abitz v. 
Abitz, 155 Wis. 2d 161, 174, 455 N.W.2d 609 (1990).  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(a), revision to a child support judgment 
"may be made only upon a finding of a substantial change in 
circumstances."  The burden of showing that there has been a 
change in circumstances sufficient to justify a modification 
falls to the party seeking modification.  Parker v. Parker, 152 
Wis. 2d 1, 4, 447 N.W.2d 64 (Ct. App. 1989).  Unless the circuit 
court has erroneously exercised its discretion, the decision 
will not be overturned. Abitz, 155 Wis. 2d at 174; see also 
Burger v. Burger, 144 Wis. 2d 514, 523, 424 N.W.2d 691 (1988).  
As the court of appeals has stated:  "All that is required for 
us to affirm a trial court's exercise of discretion is a 
demonstration that the court examined the evidence before it, 
No. 
01-2213   
 
7 
 
applied the proper legal standards and reached a reasoned 
conclusion."  Voecks v. Voecks, 171 Wis. 2d 184, 189, 491 
N.W.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1992).  Even if a circuit court fails to 
articulate the reasons for its decision, this court will 
independently review the record to determine whether there is 
any reasonable basis upon which we may uphold the circuit 
court's discretionary decision.  State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, 
¶53, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606. 
III 
¶12 As noted, the issue before this court is whether the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by denying 
Dumler's motion for modification of his child support order 
under the circumstances presented.  We point out that the 
question is not whether we agree with the circuit court's 
ruling, but rather, whether the circuit court acted within the 
realm of its discretion.  We hold that it did. 
¶13 Dumler argues that the court erred in rejecting his 
motion for modification because incarceration has reduced his 
income to approximately $45 per month and he has no other assets 
that may be used to pay child support.  Dumler claims that the 
circuit court erroneously focused upon the "voluntariness" of 
Dumler's criminal actions and ignored the economic realities 
faced by incarcerated parents.  The State agrees that courts may 
consider incarceration in determining a motion for modification, 
but asserts that incarceration should only be one factor in the 
court's exercise of discretion.   
No. 
01-2213   
 
8 
 
¶14 We find that no per se rule applies to incarceration.  
We generally agree with the approach taken by the court of 
appeals.  We find that incarceration is a factor that gives a 
court competence to review a child support order and, further, 
that it is an appropriate factor for courts to consider as they 
decide whether they "should exercise [] discretion to modify 
child support."  Voecks, 171 Wis. 2d at 188 (emphasis added).  
However, the fact of incarceration should not, in and of itself, 
be determinative.  The totality of circumstances surrounding the 
incarceration deserves examination. 
¶15 In divorce actions, circuit courts are required to 
provide for the support of children in the family.  Section 
767.25(1)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides that whenever a 
court enters a judgment of divorce, the court shall "[o]rder 
either or both parents to pay an amount reasonable or necessary 
to fulfill a duty to support a child."  The order may be 
expressed as a percentage, a fixed sum, or a combination 
thereof.5  Id.  Section 49.22(9) of the Wisconsin Statutes 
requires the Department of Workforce Development (DWD) to adopt 
standards for courts to use in determining child support orders.  
See Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 40 (Preface)(Jan. 2003).  The purpose 
behind these standards is to ensure "that a child's standard of 
                                                 
5 Effective September 1, 2001, this rule has changed.  2001 
Wis. Act 16, § 3786f.  Under Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1)(a) (2001-
2002), "The support order must be expressed as a fixed sum 
unless the parties have stipulated to expressing the amount as a 
percentage 
of 
the 
payer's 
income 
and 
the 
requirements 
under § 767.10(2)(am) 1. to 3. are satisfied." 
No. 
01-2213   
 
9 
 
living should, to the degree possible, not be adversely affected 
because his or her parents are not living together."  Id.   
¶16 Under Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1j), courts are generally 
supposed to determine child support payments by applying the 
percentage guidelines set out by the DWD.6  However, a party may 
request a court to modify the amount of child support due under 
the percentage guidelines.  Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m).  A court is 
allowed to modify the amount under Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1m) if it 
finds "by the greater weight of the credible evidence that use 
of the percentage standard is unfair to the child or to any of 
the parties."  The statute then provides a variety of factors to 
consider, including:  the financial resources of the child and 
the parents; maintenance; the needs of each party to support 
himself or herself; the child's educational needs; the best 
interests of the child; "[t]he earning capacity of each parent, 
based on each parent's education, training and work experience 
and the availability of work in or near the parent's community"; 
and any other factors which the court finds to be relevant.  Id.  
Thus, the judge has broad discretion in setting appropriate 
child support.  If the circuit court does decide to modify child 
support 
from 
the 
applicable 
guideline 
percentage, 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.25(1n), it must state the amount that would be 
due under the guidelines, the difference between that amount and 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DWD 40.03 (Jan., 2003) provides 
that the child support order for three children using the 
percentage standard shall be 29 percent of the payer's adjusted 
base income, as defined by the guidelines. 
No. 
01-2213   
 
10 
 
the amount awarded, and the reasons supporting modification from 
the percentage.   
¶17 Section 767.32 of the Wisconsin Statutes governs 
revision of child support orders.  As we have noted, a court may 
only revise a child support order where there has been a 
"substantial 
change 
in 
circumstances."  
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(a). 
 
Under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(b), 
several circumstances give rise to a rebuttable presumption of 
substantial change, including:  commencement of participation in 
one of two listed statutory public assistance programs; passage 
of 33 months since the last child support order or revision was 
entered, unless the amount is expressed as a percentage; 
"[f]ailure of the payer to furnish a timely disclosure under s. 
767.27(2m)"; and a difference between the amount ordered and the 
amount the payer would have been required to pay under the 
percentage standard, if the court did not use the standard to 
set child support.  None of these circumstances are applicable 
in this case. 
¶18 Other 
circumstances 
listed 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(c) "may constitute a substantial change 
of circumstances sufficient to justify revision of the judgment 
or order."  (Emphasis added.)  Under this section, factors in a 
court's determination include changes related to the payer's 
income, the needs of the child, and the payer's earning 
capacity.  Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(c).  A court may also consider 
"[a]ny other factor [it] determines is relevant."  Id.  Also, 
when the court is called upon to reevaluate a previously set 
No. 
01-2213   
 
11 
 
child support order, the factors outlined in Wis. Stat. § 767.25 
may once again come into play. 
¶19 Although this court has not previously had the 
opportunity to consider the effect of incarceration upon child 
support obligations, the court of appeals has handled this type 
of case on several occasions.  In Parker, 152 Wis. 2d at 2-3, 6, 
the court of appeals upheld a circuit court's determination that 
a father's incarceration for felony theft was not a substantial 
change in circumstances warranting modification of his child 
support obligation.  Parker had a child support obligation of 
$40 per week for his two children.  Id. at 3.  Years after his 
divorce, Parker was convicted of theft and received a stayed 
five-year sentence.  Id.  While he was on probation, he was 
found in contempt for failure to pay child support.  Id.  He was 
over $22,000 in arrears.  Id.  A year after his conviction for 
theft, Parker's probation was revoked and he was sent to prison.  
Id.  Parker did not work at the prison, but he received a 
stipend of eight cents an hour for 40 hours a week.  Id.  He had 
no other assets.  Id.  The court of appeals, in affirming the 
denial of Parker's motion for modification, held that "child 
support need not automatically terminate during incarceration."  
Id. at 6.  The court of appeals noted that Parker "need not be 
excused of his child support obligation because of a willful act 
that resulted in his imprisonment."  Id. at 5.  Under Parker, 
several factors are relevant in determining whether the court 
should exercise its discretion to modify child support in the 
situation where a payer is incarcerated.  As stated by the court 
No. 
01-2213   
 
12 
 
of appeals, these factors are:  "the intentional nature of the 
crime involved, the likelihood of future income, and other 
relevant evidence."  Id. at 6. 
¶20 In Voecks, 171 Wis. 2d at 186, the court of appeals 
upheld a circuit court determination in favor of modifying a 
child support order during incarceration.  The court found that 
the circuit court had the authority to modify the order and 
properly exercised its discretion to do so.  Id.  William Voecks 
was convicted of being party to the crime of cocaine delivery 
and was sentenced to seven years in federal prison.  Id.  Prior 
to his incarceration, Voecks had a $55 per week child support 
obligation.  Id.  At the time of his motion for modification, 
Voecks had almost $10,000 in arrearage. Id. at 187.  He would be 
incarcerated until after his daughter reached the age of 18.  
Id.  Voecks earned $65 per month in prison.  Id.  The circuit 
court modified his child support order to $25 per month.  Id.  
¶21 In affirming the circuit court's decision, the court 
of appeals rejected the argument that the incarceration at issue 
was analogous to "shirking" cases.  "Shirking" cases arise where 
a payer voluntarily fails to exercise his or her full capacity 
to earn in order to avoid the obligation to pay child support. 
Id. at 188; see also Sellers v. Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d 578, 587, 
549 N.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting more broadly that 
shirking may also exist where a payer makes a voluntary and 
unreasonable decision about his or her employment).  The court 
of appeals noted that while Voecks' incarceration was the result 
of intentional criminal activity, there was no evidence that he 
No. 
01-2213   
 
13 
 
acted with the intent to reduce his child support.  Noting its 
decision in Parker, the court held:  "Parker does not preclude 
the modification of child support obligations resulting from 
imprisonment any more than it compels such a result."  Voecks, 
171 Wis. 2d at 189. The court found that incarceration is a 
change of circumstances that gives a circuit court competence to 
review the child support order and is a factor a court may 
consider as it determines whether it should exercise its 
discretion to modify a set child support order.  Id. at 188. 
¶22 These cases show the great amount of discretion given 
to the circuit court in setting and modifying child support.  As 
shown by the court of appeals' decisions, in these situations, 
the circuit court is in the best position to examine the 
relevant circumstances and determine whether a modification is 
appropriate. 
 
See 
Sellers, 
201 
Wis. 2d at 
594-95 
("[W]e 
ultimately must trust the sound judgment of the trial court 
because the outcome in divorce cases is intensively fact 
specific for each case."). 
¶23 In the context of the determination of an initial 
child support order, the court of appeals has had an opportunity 
to review its approach to the situation of incarceration it 
enunciated in Parker and Voecks.  See Modrow v. Modrow, 2001 WI 
App 200, 247 Wis. 2d 889, 634 N.W.2d 852.  In Modrow, the court 
of appeals found that incarceration was an appropriate factor to 
consider in setting child support.  Id., ¶17.  Since the payer 
was incarcerated, the court of appeals deemed it appropriate to 
use earning capacity to set child support.  Id., ¶¶18-21.  The 
No. 
01-2213   
 
14 
 
court of appeals held that the court should consider "whether 
the crime was of an intentional nature, its potential effect on 
the pay[e]r's future income, the assets of the pay[e]r, how the 
needs of the children will be met during the pay[e]r's 
incarceration and any other factors which the court deems 
relevant."  Id., ¶17.  Like Mr. Dumler, the payer in Modrow was 
incarcerated for a fifth offense OWI.  See id., ¶21.  There the 
court of appeals found: 
In 
light 
of 
[the 
payer's] 
OWI 
history, 
he 
is 
reasonably held to have anticipated that further OWI 
conduct 
would 
result 
in 
his 
incarceration 
and 
interfere with the ability to support his children.  A 
parent remains obligated to make reasonable choices 
that will not deprive his or her children of the 
support to which they are entitled. 
Id.   
¶24 Not surprisingly, many other states have dealt with 
the issue of incarceration as it relates to child support 
obligations, and the outcomes have varied greatly.  State courts 
are significantly divided over the effect of incarceration upon 
a person's child support obligations.  Like Wisconsin, most 
states are reluctant to grant modification of child support 
obligations where the payer has purposely attempted to avoid 
paying child support or voluntarily and unreasonably decided to 
reduce his or her income.  For example, the Supreme Court of 
Oregon has held that a motion for modification of child support 
can be denied when the payer is incarcerated, if it is also 
shown that the criminal action was "'not taken in good faith but 
was 
for 
the 
primary 
purpose 
of 
avoiding 
the 
support 
No. 
01-2213   
 
15 
 
obligation.'"  Willis v. Willis, 840 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. 1992) 
(emphasis in original omitted).  As we have noted, in Wisconsin, 
cases involving this type of behavior are known as "shirking" 
cases.  See, e.g., Roellig v. Roellig, 146 Wis. 2d 652, 431 
N.W.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1988).  In Foster v. Foster, 471 N.Y.S.2d 
867 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, held that even where the parent had equity in the 
family home, he was entitled to have his support obligation 
suspended during incarceration. 
¶25 Some courts have determined that, at least where there 
is no evidence of intentional avoidance of child support, an 
incarcerated parent is entitled to a reduction of his or her 
child support obligation.  See Bendixen v. Bendixen, 962 
P.2d 170 (Alaska 1998) (finding that incarceration is not the 
equivalent of voluntary unemployment); Nab v. Nab, 757 P.2d 1231 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1988); In re Marriage of Barker, 600 N.W.2d 321 
(Iowa 1999) (establishing a blanket rule that inability to meet 
an existing support obligation during incarceration entitles a 
prisoner to a reduction during incarceration); Wills v. Jones, 
667 A.2d 331 (Md. 1995) (holding that unless there is evidence 
that the crime committed was for the purpose of becoming 
incarcerated 
or 
impoverished, 
a 
prisoner 
is 
entitled 
to 
modification of a support order); Pierce v. Pierce, 412 
N.W.2d 291 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that where an 
incarcerated person has no assets or income with which to pay 
child support or arrears, leaving a judgment in place benefits 
no one and constitutes additional punishment, and as such, a 
No. 
01-2213   
 
16 
 
reduction is appropriate); Johnson v. O'Neill, 461 N.W.2d 507 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Leasure v. Leasure, 549 A.2d 225 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1988) (finding that incarceration is not analogous to 
a voluntary decrease in income and that where a prisoner lacks 
assets with which to pay child support, the support order may be 
suspended).  
¶26 Numerous courts, however, have held that incarceration 
does not necessarily excuse a parent from his or her child 
support obligations.  In Noddin v. Noddin, 455 A.2d 1051, 1053, 
(N.H. 1983), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that 
modification was inappropriate because the parent "engaged in 
criminal activity at his own peril, and his reduced financial 
ability was due to his own fault."  That court reasoned:  
"Although unemployment or diminution of earnings is a common 
ground for modification, a petition for modification will be 
denied if the change in financial condition is due to fault or 
voluntary wastage or dissipation of one's talents and assets."  
Id.  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals employed this statement of 
reasoning in Parker, 152 Wis. 2d at 5.  In In re Marriage of 
Burbridge, 738 N.E.2d 979, 982 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000), the 
Illinois Court of Appeals found that incarceration did not 
necessarily require a court to reduce or suspend child support 
obligations.  Rather, that court found that "all relevant 
factors" should be considered, including the payer's assets, the 
length of incarceration, the reason for incarceration, and the 
possibility of work release.  Id.  In State v. Ayala, 916 
P.2d 504, 508 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996), the Arizona Court of 
No. 
01-2213   
 
17 
 
Appeals 
held 
that 
"incarceration 
alone 
does 
not 
justify 
suspending a support obligation."  Arizona has guidelines which 
impute at least a minimum wage income to a parent who is 
unemployed or working below his or her full earning capacity.  
Id. at 506.  Thus, before deviating from the guidelines, the 
court held that a court must, at a minimum, examine the assets 
and possible income of an incarcerated parent.  Id. at 507.  
Finally, in Thomasson v. Johnson, 903 P.2d 254, 257 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1995), a New Mexico appellate court held that where a 
father's criminal act was "deliberate" and "carried with it 
known consequences which included incarceration," the obligation 
was only for a short period of time, and the father had 
marketable skills and assets, it was appropriate for the support 
payments to accrue during incarceration.  Id. at 257. 
¶27 As can be seen from some of the cases noted above, 
state 
courts 
have 
also 
differed 
about 
what 
constitutes 
"voluntary" unemployment or reduction in income.  For instance, 
in Furman v. Barnes, 739 N.Y.S.2d 655, 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2002), a New York court held:  "Dismissal [of the petition for 
modification of a child support order] was entirely proper since 
petitioner's incarceration and loss of employment was occasioned 
solely by his wrongful conduct and resultant felony conviction."  
The Supreme Court of Montana agrees:  "'Father should not be 
able to escape his financial obligation to his children simply 
because his misdeeds have placed him behind bars.  The meter 
should continue to run.'"  Mooney v. Brennan, 848 P.2d 1020, 
1023 (Mont. 1993) (internal citation omitted).  In Richardson v. 
No. 
01-2213   
 
18 
 
Ballard, 681 N.E.2d 507, 508 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996), the Ohio 
Court of Appeals reconsidered its previous precedents to hold 
that incarceration for criminal conduct is voluntary.  Citing 
another Ohio Court of Appeals case, the Richardson court stated: 
A parent cannot, by intentional conduct or mere 
irresponsibility, seek 
relief 
from 
this 
duty of 
support.  Defendant, who by his own wrongful conduct 
placed himself in a position that he is no longer 
available for gainful employment, is not entitled to 
relief from his obligation to support his child.  
Incarceration was a foreseeable result of his criminal 
conduct and is thus deemed a voluntary act in and of 
itself. 
Richardson, 681 N.E.2d at 508 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted).7  
¶28 Some courts have refused to reduce child support 
orders on the basis of the clean hands doctrine.  For example, 
in Koch v. Williams, 456 N.W.2d 299, 301 (N.D. 1990), the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that incarceration was 
voluntary and that "no modification is warranted because the 
obligor, by voluntarily placing herself or himself in a less 
                                                 
7 Other courts have held similarly.  For example, in Davis 
v. Vance, 574 N.E.2d 330, 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), an Indiana 
court noted that even incarcerated parents without income have 
been required to pay support at some minimal level.  The court 
further 
held: 
 
"[The 
incarcerated 
parent] 
must 
take 
responsibility 
for 
the 
crimes 
he 
committed 
and 
all 
the 
repercussions which come with breaking the law.  To eliminate 
the 
accumulation 
of 
his 
support 
obligation 
while 
he 
is 
incarcerated would 
serve 
to 
free 
him 
of 
some 
of 
those 
repercussions."  Id.; see also Proctor v. Proctor, 773 P.2d 
1389, 1391 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[A]ppellant's inability to 
provide for his children from an income, instead of from his 
only asset, is a direct consequence of his own misconduct.")   
No. 
01-2213   
 
19 
 
financially 
secure 
position, 
is 
without 
clean 
hands 
and 
precluded from seeking equity." 
¶29 In contrast to the cases above, the Supreme Court of 
Alaska has held: 
Although 
incarceration 
is 
often 
a 
foreseeable 
consequence of criminal misconduct and all criminal 
acts 
are 
in 
some sense 
voluntary, non-custodial 
parents who engage in criminal misconduct seldom 
desire the enforced unemployment that accompanies 
incarceration; nor can they alter their situation; 
and, in stark contrast to parents who consciously 
choose to remain unemployed, jailed parents rarely 
have any actual job prospects or potential income. 
Bendixen, 962 P.2d at 173.  Similarly, the Washington Court of 
Appeals rejected an argument that incarceration could be equated 
with voluntary unemployment, noting that other jurisdictions 
agreed with its result.  Marriage of Blickenstaff, 859 P.2d 646, 
650 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); see also Leasure, 549 A.2d at 227 
("Incarceration is usually an involuntary situation."). 
IV 
¶30 We agree with the court of appeals and the line of 
cases from other states that find parents with child support 
obligations should not automatically be rewarded with a payment 
reduction as a result of incarceration.  While we acknowledge 
the financial effects of incarceration, the preceding discussion 
persuades us there are strong reasons why parents should not 
necessarily be excused from their child support obligations.  
This section addresses the reasons for this conclusion and the 
balance we believe is appropriate.  Incarceration is an 
appropriate factor for courts to consider in reviewing a motion 
No. 
01-2213   
 
20 
 
for modification, but the fact of incarceration alone is 
insufficient for a court to modify, or refuse to modify, a child 
support order.  The court of appeals has laid appropriate 
groundwork for these types of cases.  We now clarify the 
appropriate factors to consider relating to incarceration.  We 
conclude that the circuit court here properly exercised its 
discretion and, as such, we affirm. 
¶31 As the Wisconsin Statutes make clear, parents have a 
duty to support their children.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 767.25 
(requiring courts to set child support orders).  The primary 
goals of child support statutes are to "promote the best 
interests of the child" and "avoid financial hardship for 
children of divorced parents."  Ondrasek v. Tenneson, 158 
Wis. 2d 690, 695, 462 N.W.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1990).  This court, 
too, has recognized the duty taken on by a parent:  "The 
obligation to support one's children is a basic one."  Luciani 
v. Montemurro-Luciani, 199 Wis. 2d 280, 309, 544 N.W.2d 561 
(1996). 
¶32 By having a child, a parent takes on a long-term 
responsibility——one that cannot be traded in or negated by 
bankruptcy.  See Mascola v. Lusskin, 727 So.2d 328, 332 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1999).  Children's fundamental needs for survival 
exist whatever choices parents may make in life.  Historically, 
there have been problems with enforcement of child support 
orders.  See Parker, 152 Wis. 2d at 4 ("The failure of the 
current child support payment system is well documented.").  As 
of 1999, slightly over half of custodial parents nationwide that 
No. 
01-2213   
 
21 
 
had child support awards received none or only part of the child 
support payments that were due them.  See Timothy Grail, 
Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support, Current 
Population Reports, United States Census Bureau, 5 (October 
2002).  Recent statistics show that over 26.1 percent of 
custodial parents live at poverty status.  Id. at 3.  These 
considerations 
show 
the 
importance 
of 
maintaining 
public 
policies that emphasize parental responsibility and promote 
payment of child support. 
¶33 Dumler argues that 
enforcing his 
existing 
child 
support order and allowing arrears to accumulate essentially 
constitutes punishment.  We disagree.   In Parker, 152 
Wis. 2d at 5, the court of appeals stated:  "[T]he issue is not 
whether Parker can be punished for failing to pay support.  The 
issue is whether he is entitled to eliminate the accumulation of 
support obligation while he is incarcerated."  The Florida Court 
of Appeals has stated:  "[C]hild support is not a form of 
punishment at all but is instead a duty resulting from 
procreating children."  See Mascola, 727 So.2d at 332.  We 
agree.  Leaving a child support obligation in place that was set 
before incarceration does not constitute additional punishment, 
but rather, leaves intact a responsibility taken on by the 
defendant in having children.   
¶34 Child support is supposed to be among a parent's top 
priorities.  A person who is incarcerated is not excused from 
his or her car payments, house payments, or credit card bills.  
While it is true that under Wis. Stat. § 767.32, child support 
No. 
01-2213   
 
22 
 
arrears cannot be retroactively reduced, to allow for automatic 
reduction in child support obligations where a parent is 
incarcerated and has no outside assets would suggest that child 
support is near the bottom of the list of a parent's priorities.  
Such a policy would directly conflict with the legislature's 
intent in creating strict guidelines providing for child support 
and 
enforcement 
of 
child 
support 
laws. 
 
To 
find 
that 
incarceration automatically entitles a payer to a reduction in 
child support promotes the wrong incentives.  It would allow a 
parent a "break" from child support, a reward for criminal 
behavior.   
¶35 Further, child support is supposed to reflect what is 
in the best interests of the child.  Dumler asserts that 
allowing arrearages to accumulate during incarceration should 
not be allowed because it is of no benefit to the child.  We 
disagree with that argument in that arrearages represent money 
to which the child is entitled.  While a parent is incarcerated, 
the child is forced to do without that money.  A child should 
not necessarily have to forego that monetary support forever 
simply because the parent was incarcerated.  As one court has 
stated:   
[T]he only person to benefit if support is suspended 
would be [the incarcerated parent].  The purpose of 
the child support system is to protect the child and 
his best interest.  Depriving a child of financial 
support solely because his or her parent committed a 
criminal act does not serve that interest. 
Richardson, 681 N.E.2d at 508 (emphasis in original, internal 
citation omitted). 
No. 
01-2213   
 
23 
 
¶36 However, this court also recognizes the financial 
difficulties incarceration can create.  We agree with Dumler 
that 
allowing 
arrearages 
to 
accumulate 
endlessly 
would 
discourage a parent from even attempting to pay down the debt.  
However, we do not agree that Dumler's case necessarily fits 
that paradigm.  Admittedly, $25,000 is a great deal of money, 
but it is not such an exorbitant or insurmountable amount that a 
judge would have to find it beyond Dumler's ability to pay over 
time.  Child support payments are to be held to a reasonable 
standard.  Wisconsin Stat. § 767.32 specifically allows for 
revision when circumstances have substantially changed.  Judges 
are allowed great discretion in setting child support and 
determining when a modification should be made.  Upon release 
from prison, Dumler may well have grounds for again seeking a 
revision under Wis. Stat. § 767.32.8  We agree with the answer 
provided by the North Dakota Supreme Court:  "To the argument 
                                                 
8 We disagree with the dissent's argument that a circuit 
court's refusal to grant modification during incarceration and 
then grant modification after incarceration necessarily means 
"that the decision to modify is based on the underlying criminal 
behavior, not on the ability to pay or any other factors that 
remain the same, such as the needs of the children."  Dissent, 
¶63 n.13.  The dissent misconstrues the decision in this case.  
In ¶1, we have explicitly stated that incarceration is to be one 
factor for consideration, but that a judge is to make the 
determination whether or not to modify child support payments by 
looking at all of the relevant circumstances.  Therefore, the 
decision to modify cannot be based solely on underlying criminal 
behavior.  As we discuss, we find that the judge in this case 
adequately considered the appropriate circumstances and made a 
ruling that was within his discretion.  Whether this court would 
rule the same way the circuit court did in this case is 
essentially irrelevant.   
No. 
01-2213   
 
24 
 
that the debt will hinder his rehabilitation upon his release, 
our response is that the amount to be paid each month can be 
adjusted as his financial condition then requires."  Koch, 456 
N.W.2d at 302 (citing Parker, 152 Wis. 2d 1).   
¶37 Dumler has also asserted that he will likely face the 
threat of enforcement by the child support agency and potential 
prosecution for unpaid child support once he is released because 
of the accumulated arrearages.  He noted to the circuit court 
that he already had a lien.  While we agree that unpaid child 
support may lead to enforcement action, we are not persuaded 
that such a result is inevitable.  Again, Dumler may seek 
modification based on the circumstances following his release.  
Also, Dumler can and should cooperate with the child support 
agency 
in 
negotiating 
a 
payment 
plan 
to 
avoid 
further 
administrative 
enforcement 
and 
to 
begin 
paying 
down 
the 
arrearages.9 
¶38 We agree with the court of appeals' finding in Voecks 
that situations involving incarceration are not necessarily 
                                                 
9 Wisconsin 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DWD 
43.11(1) 
(Jan., 
2003) 
provides: 
Applicability of alternative payment plans.  When the 
department or a child support agency enforces a lien 
through seizure of real property or personal property, 
seizure of financial accounts, or denial, nonrenewal, 
restriction, or suspension of licenses, the payer may 
negotiate an alternative payment plan with the child 
support agency. 
Under Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 43.03(4) (Jan., 2003), it also 
appears that courts may participate in the creation of such a 
plan. 
No. 
01-2213   
 
25 
 
analogous to "shirking" cases.  Unless there is evidence that a 
person is incarcerated for reasons related to the avoidance of 
paying child support, we find that "shirking" cases are 
inapplicable.  That said, however, we do find that there is some 
element of voluntariness involved with incarceration.  We agree 
with sentiments expressed by the court of appeals in Parker and 
Modrow.  In both these cases, the court of appeals found that 
incarceration was a result of intentional and unreasonable 
behavior. 
 
See 
Parker, 
152 
Wis. 2d at 
5-6; 
Modrow, 
247 
Wis. 2d 889, ¶21.  The same is true in most cases where criminal 
activity is involved.  Aside from cases involving purposeful 
avoidance of child support, however, criminal behavior is not 
the same as shirking.  In such cases, the unreasonable decision 
is to commit a crime, not to reduce income or avoid child 
support.  Thus, while we agree with the court of appeals and 
various other jurisdictions that have found incarceration to be 
a foreseeable result of unreasonable behavior and, as such, 
"voluntary," we do not find that such a finding should be 
determinative of whether modification of child support is 
appropriate.   
¶39 As discussed, circuit courts have a great deal of 
discretion in setting and modifying child support orders.  This 
discretion serves the purpose of allowing a court to set an 
appropriate award based on a particular set of circumstances.  
What is right for one family may not be right for another.  
Based on the language of Wis. Stat. § 767.32, a court is 
encouraged to examine any factor it deems relevant.  Although we 
No. 
01-2213   
 
26 
 
find that incarceration is one factor a circuit court should 
consider, its weight in the balance should be left to the 
circuit court examining the particular circumstances.   
¶40 Dumler asserts that unless the offense relates to 
avoidance of child support, the nature of the offense is 
irrelevant.  We strongly disagree.  We believe that a parent's 
behavior, or course of conduct over a period of time, may be 
very relevant to child support determinations.  Modrow provides 
a good example, particularly in light of the circumstances 
raised here.  In Modrow, as here, the court noted that the 
defendant was incarcerated for his fifth OWI offense.  There, 
the court of appeals set child support based on earning 
capacity, finding that although alcoholism is a disease, the 
incarcerated parent made the choice to drive while intoxicated.  
Modrow, 247 Wis. 2d 889, ¶21.  Given the parent's history of 
offenses, the court of appeals found that incarceration and 
interference with ability to pay child support were foreseeable 
results.  Id.  We agree.  In the case before us, Dumler had been 
incarcerated for the same offense on previous occasions.  Dumler 
had accumulated arrearages from those previous periods of 
incarceration.  He was well aware of the impact incarceration 
had on his ability to pay, yet he continued to behave in the 
same manner.  This pattern of offenses at least shows disregard 
for the welfare of his children and a lack of responsibility.  
Additionally, Dumler's incarceration this time stemmed, in part, 
from possession of cocaine and revocation of his probation.  
No. 
01-2213   
 
27 
 
Such facts are certainly relevant to the determination of child 
support.   
¶41 On the other hand, incarceration does affect a 
person's present economic situation.  The court of appeals and 
courts in other jurisdictions have devised factors for courts to 
consider in dealing with incarceration.  We believe such factors 
are appropriate.  For example, one court found: 
In 
exercising 
its 
discretion 
to 
determine 
the 
appropriate amount of child support applicable to an 
incarcerated parent who lacks assets, the trial court 
must consider a variety of factors, including (1) the 
length of incarceration experienced for the current 
conviction and the anticipated remaining period of 
incarceration, 
(2) the 
earning potential 
of the 
incarcerated parent following release, (3) the amount 
of the existing child support award, and (4) the total 
amount of child support that will accumulate upon the 
incarcerated parent's discharge. 
Oberg v. Oberg, 869 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).  In 
Parker, 152 Wis. 2d at 6, the court of appeals found that a 
court "may consider the intentional nature of the crime 
involved, the likelihood of future income, and other relevant 
evidence."  In Modrow, 247 Wis. 2d 889, ¶17, the court of 
appeals reiterated these factors and added to them, stating that 
a court should also consider incarceration's "potential effect 
on the pay[e]r's future income" and "how the needs of the 
children will be met during the pay[e]r's incarceration."  We 
agree with these courts.  In dealing with incarceration, we hold 
that a court should examine factors including:  the length of 
incarceration, the nature of the offense and the relevant course 
of conduct leading to incarceration, the payer's assets, the 
No. 
01-2213   
 
28 
 
payer's employability and the likelihood of future income upon 
release, the possibility of work release during incarceration, 
the amount of arrearages that will accumulate during the 
incarceration, and the needs of the children.10  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 767.32(1)(c) expressly states that a court may consider 
changes in earning capacity in determining the appropriateness 
of modification.  As such, a court's determination that earning 
capacity has not changed is also a relevant consideration.  This 
list, of course, is not exhaustive.  Courts should evaluate all 
relevant circumstances.   
¶42 In both setting and reevaluating child support orders, 
courts are called upon to examine the particular circumstances 
arising in the case to make determinations.  As we have 
discussed, incarceration is an appropriate factor for a court to 
consider.   We believe the approach taken by the court of 
appeals is correct.  Incarceration is a change in circumstance 
sufficient to give a court competence to review a child support 
order.  See Voecks, 171 Wis. 2d at 188.  However, incarceration 
is only one factor to be considered by a court as it determines 
                                                 
10 The dissent suggests that consideration of the nature of 
the offense and the "relevant course of conduct leading to 
incarceration" is tantamount to a shirking analysis.  Dissent, 
¶54.  We disagree and point out again that we have distinguished 
the shirking cases by noting that the unreasonable decision 
involved in those cases relates to reducing income or avoiding 
child support as opposed to committing a crime.  Given this 
difference, we have described consideration of the nature of the 
crime and the course of conduct as a relevant factor, but have 
stated that incarceration, in and of itself, should not be 
determinative one way or the other. 
No. 
01-2213   
 
29 
 
whether or not it should exercise its power to modify an award.  
See id.  Wisconsin Stat. § 767.32 states that a court may modify 
an award.  Consideration of the fact of incarceration is 
appropriate, but should not be the sole determinative factor.  
Also, consideration of the nature of the criminal conduct is 
appropriate, not for purposes of analogy to "shirking," but 
rather, for an overall evaluation of the parent's behavior as it 
relates to his ability and attitude toward paying child support. 
¶43 In applying the relevant factors to this case, we find 
that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion.  As we 
have 
already 
discussed, 
circuit 
courts 
may 
consider 
the 
circumstances surrounding incarceration, including the nature of 
the offense.  The circuit court appropriately did so here.  
Dumler acknowledged to the circuit court that he had been 
previously incarcerated for OWI offenses.  In fact, Dumler 
agreed with the circuit court that he had been involved in 11 
criminal court cases since 1986.11  We have discussed the 
reasonable implications of such a continued course of criminal 
conduct.  The circuit court was within its discretion to 
consider this behavior as a factor. 
¶44 In response to the court's questioning regarding 
whether he knew the consequences of his criminal actions, Dumler 
agreed that he did, and specifically added that, in the past, 
when he has been released from incarceration, he has "always 
                                                 
11 We note, as the circuit court did, that Dumler was not 
necessarily convicted in all of these cases. 
No. 
01-2213   
 
30 
 
gotten out and paid my child support."  He admitted he was 
sometimes slow, but he nonetheless made the payments.  Based on 
such testimony and the defendant's background, it is perfectly 
reasonable for a circuit court to find, as the court did here, 
that Dumler will have no greater difficulty finding gainful 
employment upon his release from prison this time than he has on 
previous occasions.  His occupation is not such that his 
incarceration will prohibit his reentry into the workforce.  
Whereas an attorney or doctor could lose their license to 
practice, Dumler is a roofer or construction worker by trade.  
There is little reason to believe he may not continue to 
practice his trade upon release.  In fact, as found by the 
circuit court, Dumler was receiving treatment for his alcohol 
problems.  If anything, such treatment and the elimination of 
his problems with alcohol and drugs should improve Dumler's 
employment prospects.  At the very least, it is within reason 
for a circuit court to find that Dumler's job prospects upon 
release are not significantly different than they have been in 
the past.  If, in fact, Dumler is unable to find work following 
his release, Dumler may again request a modification. 
¶45 Dumler informed the court that if he were not granted 
relief, his arrearages would accumulate to over $25,000 by the 
time of his release.  We agree that this is a significant amount 
of money.  The record also indicates that Dumler has no assets 
that 
could 
be 
used 
to 
pay 
child 
support 
while 
he 
is 
incarcerated.  There was no evidence in the record regarding 
Dumler's eligibility for work release, but, as the circuit court 
No. 
01-2213   
 
31 
 
was aware, Dumler made approximately $45 per month from his work 
at the prison.  According to the record, Dumler's child support 
obligations, other than existing arrearages and interest, will 
be diminishing and then ending within the next seven years. 
¶46 The circuit court specifically discussed Dumler's 
sentence with him during the modification hearing.  Dumler's 
period of incarceration is relatively short.  At the time he 
petitioned for modification of the child support order, the time 
remaining upon his sentence for the OWI and cocaine charges was 
well under two years.  He indicated in an affidavit to the court 
that his mandatory release date was February 2003.12  
¶47 The circuit court found that there was no indication 
that the needs of Dumler's children had changed during his 
incarceration.  The child support agency pointed out to the 
court that it appeared Rottscheit would have to pick up the 
additional economic burden of supporting the children caused by 
Dumler's incarceration. 
¶48 Finally, we note that in setting the child support 
order in place at the time Dumler requested modification, the 
                                                 
12 Although the facts of this case present a defendant with 
a relatively short period of incarceration, we note that a 
longer period of incarceration may well tip the balance in favor 
of modification and make the refusal to modify payments an 
erroneous exercise of discretion on the part of the circuit 
court.  Courts should carefully consider such circumstances in 
reviewing requests for modification from incarcerated parents.  
However, those facts are not before us.  Dumler did not face a 
period of incarceration of ten, or even five, years.  Dumler's 
short period of incarceration was properly factored in to the 
circuit court's analysis. 
No. 
01-2213   
 
32 
 
circuit court followed the general rule of applying the 
percentage guidelines.  As such, to modify an award the court 
would again be called upon to consider the fairness of 
modification to the parent and the children.  Under these 
circumstances, a circuit court may appropriately find that 
fairness weighs in favor of the child. 
¶49 For the foregoing reasons, we find, as did the court 
of appeals, that the circuit court properly exercised its 
discretion in denying Dumler's motion for modification of his 
child support order.  We do not pretend that this is a clear-cut 
case.  We recognize that there are factors weighing both ways in 
this case.  Nonetheless, given our "erroneous exercise of 
discretion" standard of review, we find that the circuit court 
adequately considered the appropriate factors and was within its 
discretion to deny the motion for modification. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  01-2213.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶50 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that a parent's 
incarceration is a factor for circuit courts to consider in 
deciding whether there has been "a substantial change of 
circumstances sufficient to justify revision of the judgment or 
order."13  I also agree with the majority opinion that an 
incarcerated parent is not automatically entitled to a reduction 
in child support.  Rather, as the majority opinion properly 
explains, a circuit court must consider the totality of the 
circumstances in any given case. 
¶51 I disagree with the majority opinion, however, when it 
concludes that a circuit court may refuse to modify an 
incarcerated parent's child support order based on the nature of 
the underlying offense and the parent's moral culpability in 
committing the offense that led to incarceration. 
¶52 A parent's moral culpability in the events that lead 
to a change in circumstances is relevant when considering a 
request to modify 
child 
support 
to 
the 
extent that it 
demonstrates an intent to reduce available income or assets to 
avoid paying child support.  These cases are known as "shirking" 
cases, because a parent is found to have engaged in a course of 
                                                 
13 Wis. Stat. § 767.32(1)(c) (1999-2000). 
No.  01-2213.ssa 
 
2 
 
conduct designed to "shirk" his or her responsibility to provide 
child support.14 
¶53 The majority opinion is correct when it rejects the 
argument that incarceration is analogous to shirking.15  Aside 
from parents who are incarcerated for failing to pay child 
support, parents do not commit criminal acts leading to 
incarceration in order to avoid having to pay child support.  
Prison 
is 
a 
devastating 
and 
dangerous 
place, 
and 
the 
consequences 
of 
a 
criminal 
conviction 
and 
a 
term 
of 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 177 Wis. 2d 128, 136-37, 501 
N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1993); Van Offeren v. Van Offeren, 173 
Wis. 2d 482, 492, 496 N.W.2d 660 (Ct. App. 1992); In re 
Paternity of R.L.M., 143 Wis. 2d 849, 852, 422 N.W.2d 890 (Ct. 
App. 1988). 
15 Majority op., ¶42.  See, e.g., Voecks v. Voecks, 171 
Wis. 2d 184, 187-87, 491 N.W.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1992) ("We 
conclude 
that 
the 
'shirking' 
cases 
are 
inapplicable.  
 . . . While we do not wish to reward criminal conduct, we 
cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that criminal conduct must 
be treated as deliberate conduct designed to reduce income to 
avoid paying child support.  Therefore, we conclude that even 
though incarceration results from intentional criminal conduct, 
it is a change in circumstances that gives a trial court 
competence to review a child support order.  We also conclude 
that incarceration is a factor that the court may consider when 
determining whether it should exercise its discretion to modify 
child support."); Wills v. Jones, 667 A.2d 331, 339 (Md. App. 
1995) ("The contention that [the father's] incarceration and 
subsequent 
impoverishment 
should 
be 
considered 
'voluntary' 
because he made the free and conscious choice to commit a crime 
stretches the meaning of the word beyond its acceptable 
boundaries."); Johnson v. O'Neill, 461 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 
App. 1990) ("Intention to commit a crime does not automatically 
translate into intention to limit income.").  
No.  01-2213.ssa 
 
3 
 
incarceration extend well beyond a temporary loss of income.16  
There is certainly no evidence in the present case that the 
father drove drunk while possessing cocaine so that his 
probation would be revoked, he would be incarcerated, his income 
would be reduced, and his child support obligations modified. 
¶54 Nevertheless, 
the 
majority 
opinion 
condones 
the 
circuit 
court's 
conclusion 
that 
the 
father 
intentionally 
committed his crime, knowing that prison and a reduction in 
income would be the consequence, and its consequent refusal to 
modify his child support order.  While expressly rejecting the 
idea that incarceration is analogous to shirking, the majority 
opinion adopts a shirking analysis in order to uphold the 
circuit court's decision in the present case when it writes that 
circuit courts may consider "the intentional nature of the 
crime" and the "nature of the offense and the relevant course of 
conduct leading to incarceration."17   
¶55 The vast majority of crimes, by definition, require 
that the offender act voluntarily and with the intent to commit 
the crime.  Moreover, it is always foreseeable that criminal 
activity will have consequences, including incarceration and 
loss of income.  Permitting these factors to be considered in 
                                                 
16 See generally Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal 
Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing 
Consequences, 11 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 153 (2000); see also 
Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a 
Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 
Years Later, Fed. Probation, Sept. 1996, at 10. 
17 Majority op., ¶41. 
No.  01-2213.ssa 
 
4 
 
all cases will necessarily tip the balance against modifying 
child support for incarcerated parents. 
¶56 Once 
a 
court 
determines 
that 
a 
parent 
is 
not 
incarcerated because of his or her failure to pay child support, 
the courts should direct its attention to the standard measures 
of a parent's ability to support his or her children and how 
those 
measures 
are 
affected 
by 
incarceration.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 767.31(1)(c)3. directs that a change in a 
payer's earning capacity may constitute a substantial change in 
circumstances sufficient to justify revision of a support order.  
Clearly 
incarceration 
affects 
earning 
capacity. 
 
As 
the 
defendant's brief aptly states, "[I]t is difficult to imagine 
anything having a more profound effect on a parent's ability to 
provide financial support to his or her children than a period 
of incarceration."18  
¶57 Section 767.32(1)(c)4. also includes an opportunity 
for the court to consider "any other factor that the court 
determines is relevant."19  In the context of an incarcerated 
parent, "any other factor" should include, but is not limited 
to, such matters as how much the parent can pay from prison 
earnings, whether the parent has assets or other available means 
to continue paying child support while incarcerated, how long 
the parent will be incarcerated, the parent's past earnings, the 
future earning capacity and assets of the incarcerated parent, 
the impact of incarceration on the parent's employability and 
                                                 
18 Defendant's Brief and Appendix at 25.  
19 Wis. Stat. § 767.31(1)(c)4. (1999-2000). 
No.  01-2213.ssa 
 
5 
 
future earning capacity, the total amount of arrearages that 
will accumulate by the time of discharge, and the amount of the 
existing child support award.   
¶58 That a parent cannot pay the full support order while 
in prison and will accumulate arrearages is not determinative of 
modifying the support order.  In some cases, the parent might 
reasonably be able to pay the arrearages after release.  In 
other cases, maintaining a pre-incarceration support order and 
forcing a parent to accumulate substantial arrearages beyond 
what seems to be any ability to pay is unreasonable.  It 
certainly does not help a child, since the child faces hardship 
due to the loss of the support money when the parent is 
incarcerated, regardless of whether the circuit court modifies 
the support order.  Moreover, it imposes a burden on a parent 
that the parent cannot bear.   
¶59 The factors set forth herein reflect a fair and 
equitable 
approach 
to 
the 
real 
circumstances 
facing 
an 
incarcerated parent and are the factors that a court should 
consider in cases where a parent seeks to modify a child support 
order due to incarceration.  Cases in other jurisdictions 
support this approach.20 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hamilton, 857 P.2d 542, 544 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993); Wills v. Jones, 667 A.2d 331, 334-36 (Md. 
Ct. App. 1995); Oberg v. Oberg, 869 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1993); Thomasson v. Johnson, 903 P.2d 254, 256-58 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1995); Willis v. Willis, 840 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. 1992); see 
also Lewis Becker, Spousal and Child Support and the "Voluntary 
Reduction of Income" Doctrine, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 647, 713-19 
(1997) (proposing a factor-oriented test in deciding whether to 
grant an incarcerated parent's request for modification of a 
child support order). 
No.  01-2213.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶60 Using this approach, I conclude that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in the present case when it 
failed to give reasoned consideration to the individual facts 
presented in this case.21  The circuit court focused almost 
exclusively on the prisoner's criminal conduct.  It did not 
consider any of the other relevant factors.  See the circuit 
court reasoning quoted at majority opinion, ¶9.  
¶61 Prior to his incarceration, the father reported an 
annual income over $22,000, almost $2,000 per month.  He earns 
about $45 per month while incarcerated.  He has no assets or 
non-prison 
income 
from 
which 
to 
meet 
his 
child 
support 
obligations.  His child support order was set at $543 per month 
based upon his pre-incarceration income.  Maintaining the 
current child support order will increase his arrearages to 
$25,000 by the end of his three-year sentence.  While he does 
not have a professional license that will be revoked because of 
his conviction, the consequences of his conviction for future 
employment and income, as is true for substantially all 
offenders, are significant.  There is little likelihood in the 
present case that the father can pay off this large amount of 
arrearages within a reasonable time after his release even 
assuming that he earns what he did before imprisonment.  In 
short, there has been a substantial change of circumstances 
sufficient to justify revision of the child support order in the 
present case. 
                                                 
21 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 
(1981). 
No.  01-2213.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶62 There are also strong public policy reasons for 
modifying the order in this case.  Child support amounts are 
set, as the majority opinion points out, to ensure that a 
child's standard of living should, to the degree possible, not 
be adversely affected because his or her parents are not living 
together.22  While modifying the father's child support order 
here will undermine this goal in the short term, failing to 
modify the order will undermine this goal in both the short term 
and the long term, and will certainly not benefit his children. 
¶63 Regardless of the child support order, the father here 
earns only $45 per month.  Maintaining the support order at $543 
per month while he is incarcerated does not change the fact that 
his children will not receive any more than $45 per month.  
Moreover, maintaining the support order will result in his 
release from prison with an insurmountable amount of arrearages 
that would likely discourage him from making payments or 
engaging in honest work with paychecks from which a court could 
order garnishment of his wages.23  It is absurd to suggest, as 
the majority opinion does, that a parent's redress in the face 
of arrearages is to request a modification at the time of 
                                                 
22 Majority op., ¶15 (quoting Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 40.01). 
23 As the father explained to the circuit court in the 
present case: 
There is no way I can pay that [$25,000] off.  
 . . . [T]o have this kind of debt to come out, that's 
just saying that I'm probably going to relapse, or 
just go to work and find a small job, and that's just 
pushing me away.  You've got no incentive to do 
anything. 
No.  01-2213.ssa 
 
8 
 
release.24 
 
What 
circumstance 
would 
be 
different 
post-
incarceration than existed during incarceration that would alter 
a circuit court's decision?25  Both during and after release it 
was the parent's criminal behavior that led to the reduction of 
income.  
¶64 In contrast, ordering payments in amounts that can be 
made while the father is incarcerated will allow him to 
establish a habit of making payments.  Moreover, it allows him 
to be released from prison without additional insurmountable 
arrearages hanging over his head, making it more likely that he 
will continue to make payments, reducing the arrearages and 
supporting his children.   
¶65 Recent 
studies, 
as 
the 
majority 
opinion 
notes, 
demonstrate the importance of maintaining public policies that 
                                                 
24 Majority op., ¶36.  In some states a trial court can hold 
a petition for modification in abeyance until the prisoner is 
released.  The trial court can then determine whether the 
support order should be modified.  During the time the petition 
is held open, support installments do not accrue as an 
obligation that cannot be altered.  See, e.g., Halliwell v. 
Halliwell, 741 A.2d 638, 642 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) 
(plurality opinion). 
25 The majority is apparently saying that a circuit court 
may determine that a parent is eligible for modification of a 
support order once the parent is released from prison if he has 
no job or his earnings are reduced, even though the circuit 
court would not modify the support order while the parent was in 
prison without a job and no opportunity for greater earnings.  
To not grant modification to a parent while in prison but to 
grant modification to the same parent at release makes apparent 
that the circuit court's decision to modify is based on the 
underlying criminal behavior, not on the ability to pay or any 
other factors that remain the same, such as the needs of the 
children. 
No.  01-2213.ssa 
 
9 
 
emphasize parental responsibility and promote payment of child 
support.26  Reasonable support orders, that is, orders within the 
ability of the parent to pay, foster these public policies.  
Unreasonably high or low support orders do not.  I agree with 
the arguments in the amicus brief of the Center on Fathers, 
Families and Public Policy and the Wisconsin Council on Children 
and Families, concluding that child support orders that are 
beyond a noncustodial parent's ability to pay are not in the 
best interests of the child.27   
¶66 For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the 
circuit court to apply the proper standards to determine whether 
the support order should be reduced. 
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Majority op., ¶32. 
27 Amicus Brief of Center on Fathers, Families and Public 
Policy and the Wisconsin Council on Children and Families, 
passim. 
No.  01-2213.ssa 
 
 
 
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