Case Title: Gayler v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-56

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gayler v. State1998 WY 57957 P.2d 855Case Number: 97-56, 97-57Decided: 04/24/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Pamela D. GAYLER, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). (Two 
Cases.)

 

Appeal from the District Court, Lincoln County, John 
D. Troughton, J.

 

Sylvia L. Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane M. Lozano, 
Assistant Appellate Counsel, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Kimberly A. Baker-Musick, Assistant Attorney 
General, for Appellee.

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

MACY, Justice.

 

[¶1] Appellant Pamela Gayler 
appeals from the judgment and sentence and the probation revocation which the 
trial court entered after a jury found that she was guilty of delivering a 
controlled substance.

 

[¶2] We reverse and 
remand.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] Gayler presents four 
issues for our review:

 

          
Issue I

 

The trial court erred by failing to declare a 
mistrial or take any immediate action to mitigate the undue prejudice caused by 
the State's improper attack on [the] appellant's character in violation of 
W.R.E. 404(b).

 

          
Issue II

 

Prosecutorial misconduct denied the appellant a fair 
trial when the State's attorney 1) made an improper community outrage appeal in 
closing argument; and 2) intentionally and improperly elicited inadmissible 
testimony from a key State witness.

 

          
Issue III

 

Reversible error was committed when Officer Clark 
vouched for the credibility of the State's main witness.

 

          
Issue IV

 

The cumulative effect of the errors discussed above 
was such as to deny the appellant her right to a fair trial and substantial 
justice.

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶4] The Cokeville school 
principal contacted Kim Clark, an officer with the Lincoln County sheriff's 
department, to report that he had been told that Gayler might be selling drugs 
at her home. Deputy Clark subsequently decided to attempt to make a controlled 
buy from Gayler, and he contacted an informant who knew her. The informant was 
facing charges for disorderly conduct at the time.  Deputy Clark told the informant that, if 
he made two drug buys, the deputy would speak on the informant's behalf when he 
appeared in court on the pending charges. The informant was later charged with 
delivering drugs to several teenagers. Consequently, at the time of this trial, 
he was facing a possibility of having to serve up to seventy-one years in the 
penitentiary.

 

[¶5] The first attempted 
buy, on April 25, 1995, was unsuccessful. On May 5, 1995, the informant went to 
Gayler's home for a second attempt at making a buy. The informant and his car 
had been searched, he had been given money, and he had been wired with an 
electronic transmitter. The informant entered Gayler's house and purchased a 
small amount of methamphetamine for ten dollars.  After he left Gayler's house, the 
informant gave a small baggie containing the methamphetamine to Deputy 
Clark.

 

[¶6] Gayler was arrested and 
subsequently convicted of delivering a controlled substance. She was sentenced 
to serve a prison term of not less than one year nor more than two years. As a 
result of this conviction, the trial court revoked Gayler's probation in a 
separate case and sentenced her to serve a one-to two-year prison sentence 
concurrently with her sentence for delivering a controlled substance. Gayler 
appeals from her conviction for delivering a controlled substance and from the 
probation revocation.

 

                                 
          DISCUSSION

 

A. Other Bad Acts 
Evidence

 

[¶7] In Gayler's first claim 
of error, she asserts that the trial court erred by failing to declare a 
mistrial or take immediate action to mitigate the undue prejudice caused when 
the prosecutor improperly attacked her character in violation of W.R.E. 404(b). 
The State argues that Gayler opened the door to the challenged evidence and that 
the evidence was not offered pursuant to, nor was it violative of, W.R.E. 
404(b).

 

[¶8]The decision to grant a 
mistrial rests within the trial court's sound discretion, and we will not 
reverse that decision unless an abuse of discretion has been shown which 
prejudiced the defendant. Craver v. State, 942 P.2d 1110, 1115 (Wyo. 1997). An 
abuse of discretion has been described as a ruling which " 'exceeds the bounds 
of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an 
abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could 
reasonably conclude as it did.' " Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 351 (Wyo. 1995) 
(quoting Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754, 757-58 (Wyo. 
1986)).

 

[¶9] During the trial, 
Deputy Clark explained to the jury how the police proceed when they are setting 
up an undercover buy operation:

 

Q. 
Okay. How do you go about choosing who you [are] going to attempt to buy 
from?

 

A. You don't just pick someone out of the air. It's 
someone that you have to have some previous knowledge that they are involved 
with drugs. Someone - Normally, a citizen will report some activity. At that 
point, you might do some surveillance on that particular individual for a period 
of time to establish that they may be involved in - in drugs. It might be during 
an interview from another drug dealer that they'll give this name. There's - 
there's several ways like that.

 

Q. Okay. When you suspect an individual, what else do 
you do to check that individual out, the individual that might be selling 
drugs?

 

A. Initially, you'll take the name and do a 
background check and see if they have ever been arrested for drugs before.  Again, you - you ask around. To work 
drugs, you have to have informants, people who give you information. And you'll 
ask all of your informants and come up with the 
information.

 

          
. . . .

 

Q. 
Okay. Deputy Clark, I would like to draw your attention squarely back to this 
case.

 

          
Who did you decide you were going to attempt to buy drugs 
from?

 

          
A. One of the people was Pamela Gayler.

 

          
Q. Okay. How long had you known Pamela Gayler?

 

          
A. Since August of '94.

 

          Q. 
How long has she been in the Cokeville area?

 

          
A. That entire time.

 

          
Q. Okay.

 

          
A. From then until now.

 

          
Q. How many times have you spoken with her?

 

          
A. At least twenty.

 

          
Q. Do you know where she came from?

 

          
A. Idaho.

 

          
Q. And how do you know that?

 

          
A. I did some checking.

 

Q. 
Okay. What were the factors - some of the factors that you can talk about that 
made you decide to attempt to buy from Ms. Gayler?

 

A. I had done some background checks on Ms. Gayler. 
And I had gotten some information from the high school principal in Cokeville. 
Actually, the - the whole school principal. He's the principal of the entire 
school.

 

[¶10] On cross-examination, 
the defense attempted to provide other reasons why Deputy Clark had checked into 
Gayler's background.  In doing so, 
the defense elicited testimony from Deputy Clark which revealed that he went to 
Gayler's house regarding a domestic dispute, that Gayler told him she knew where 
drugs could be bought in Kemmerer, and that Gayler reported to Deputy Clark that 
two individuals who possessed cocaine had visited her house and wanted her to 
set up a methamphetamine lab. Gayler offered to work with Deputy Clark to 
apprehend these individuals. On redirect, the prosecutor had the following 
discussion with Deputy Clark:

 

Q. 
[The defense attorney] asked you a couple of questions about Ms. Gayler asking 
you about setting up a meth lab?

 

          
A. Yes.

 

          
Q. And you indicated that she did and that you denied 
that?

 

          
A. Yes.

 

          
Q. Why did you deny that?

 

A. Primarily, for two reasons. Well, three reasons. I 
had checked her background. And she had a couple of felonies on her background 
-

 

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: I'm going to object, your Honor. 
May I approach the bench?

 

          
THE COURT: Just continue on. I'll talk to you about it 
later.

 

[¶11] At the next recess, 
the defense moved for a mistrial on the basis of Deputy Clark's testimony about 
Gayler's prior felonies or, in the alternative, for a limiting instruction. The 
prosecution argued that the testimony regarding the two prior felony convictions 
was proper because the defense had opened the door to such evidence by 
"suggesting that Mr. Clark was aberrant in his duties by not pursuing Ms. 
Gayler's request." The trial court reserved ruling on the defense's 
requests.

 

[¶12] At the end of the 
trial, the trial court considered Gayler's motion for a mistrial. Instead of 
issuing a decision at that time, the trial court allowed the parties to submit 
additional briefing on the issue. After receiving the briefs, the trial court 
sent a letter to the parties, announcing its decision to deny the motion for a 
mistrial.

 

[¶13] This Court has 
recognized that a defendant may open the door to otherwise inadmissible 
testimony when he inquires about a particular subject.

 

"Succinctly stated, the 'opening the door' rule is 
that a party who in some way permits the trial judge to let down the gates to a 
field of inquiry that is not competent but relevant cannot complain if his 
adversary is also allowed to avail himself of the opening within its 
scope."

 

Fortner v. State, 843 P.2d 1139, 1148 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Wyo. 
1979)).

 

[¶14] When the defense 
counsel cross-examined Deputy Clark, he pursued a line of questioning which 
implied that Gayler was a law-abiding citizen who was willing to help law 
enforcement personnel in their drug investigations by aiding with the 
apprehension of drug dealers. By pursuing this line of questioning, the defense 
opened the door to the subject of Gayler's lawfulness, and the prosecution was 
entitled to elicit testimony which showed that Gayler was not such a lawful 
citizen.

 

[¶15] We recognize that 
limits to the open-door rule exist, especially "when testimony as prejudicial as 
that usually excluded by W.R.E. 404(b) is involved." Id. We, therefore, will not 
allow a prosecutor to engage in overkill which is only moderately justified by 
the defendant's opening of the door to a certain subject. Id. The line between 
permissible inquiry and prosecutorial overkill, however, was not crossed in this 
case. The prosecution was entitled to tell the jury that the reason Deputy Clark 
did not accept Gayler's offers to help apprehend other drug dealers was because 
she had prior felonies. The prosecution thereafter steered away from the subject 
of Gayler's prior felonies without eliciting further testimony on the subject. 
We hold that the testimony about Gayler's prior felonies was admissible once 
Gayler opened the door to the subject through the cross-examination of Deputy 
Clark. Although the testimony informed the jury that Gayler had committed other 
crimes, such evidence was admissible as "a consequence of the reciprocal nature 
of the 'open the door' rule." 843 P.2d  at 1148-49.

 

[¶16] Gayler also challenges 
comments which Deputy Clark made while he was explaining how he decided from 
whom he would attempt to make a buy. Specifically, Gayler complains about Deputy 
Clark's statements that he usually picked people who he knew were involved with 
drugs, that he checked their backgrounds to see whether they had ever been 
arrested on drug-related charges, and that he chose Gayler because he had 
received information on her and he had checked her 
background.

 

[¶17] Gayler did not object 
to these statements. This Court must, therefore, determine whether any of the 
statements was so prejudicial as to constitute plain 
error.

 

A 
three-part test has been established for determining whether an error may 
achieve the status of plain error. First, the record must be clear as to the 
incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party claiming that the error 
amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a substantial right has 
been denied him and as a result he has been materially 
prejudiced.

 

Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Wyo. 1981). See also Beintema v. State, 936 P.2d 1221, 1224 (Wyo. 
1997). The purpose of Deputy Clark's testimony was to explain in general how an 
individual was selected for an attempted buy. That testimony, coupled with 
Deputy Clark's statement that he had received a report that Gayler was selling 
drugs, helped the jury to understand that Deputy Clark did not randomly target 
her as the defense had intimated in its opening statement. The challenged 
statements completed the history of the transaction and aided in the natural 
development of the facts. Id. The admission of the evidence, therefore, did not 
violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law.

 

B. Witness 
Credibility

 

[¶18] Gayler complains that 
the following exchange between the prosecutor and Deputy Clark constituted error 
per se under Wyoming jurisprudence:

 

Q. 
Through your work with [the informant] had you formed an opinion as to whether 
or not he was honest with you?

 

          
A. I did.

 

          
Q. What was that opinion?

 

          
A. I felt like he was.

 

[¶19] "Rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the district 
court and are not subject to appellate second guessing absent an abuse of 
discretion." Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 373 (Wyo. 1995). Opinions that vouch 
for the credibility of witnesses are improper if those opinions have the 
capacity to decide the case for the jury. 898 P.2d  at 374. This is because 
jurors are deemed to be experts in determining the credibility of the witnesses. 
Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶20] Two rules flow from 
the Wyoming cases that have addressed this issue. First, the prosecution may not 
elicit opinion testimony from a witness, lay or expert, concerning the guilt of 
the accused. Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo. 1990); Stephens, 774 P.2d  
at 66. Second, the prosecution may not elicit an expert witness' opinion with 
regard to another witness' credibility. Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 68. These rules 
ensure that it is the jury which resolves the factual issues, judges the 
credibility of the witnesses, and ultimately determines the guilt or innocence 
of the accused. Wells v. State, 846 P.2d 589, 596 (Wyo. 1992), denial of habeas 
corpus aff'd, 37 F.3d 1510 (10th Cir. 1994).

 

[¶21] Gayler's failure to 
object to the challenged testimony requires that we review her claim under the 
plain error analysis which we defined earlier in our discussion. "Testimony 
which helps illuminate some other aspect of the case will not be labeled plain 
error simply because it has the collateral effect of bolstering the credibility 
of another witness." Curl, 898 P.2d  at 374.

 

[¶22] Deputy Clark did not 
express an opinion with regard to Gayler's guilt or innocence. Nor did he offer 
an expert opinion regarding whether the informant was a truthful witness. Deputy 
Clark merely stated that he thought the informant was honest with him when they 
worked together. Although Deputy Clark's testimony did not rise to the level of 
plain error, we recommend that these types of inquiries be avoided because the 
determination of whether a statement which refers to a witness' honesty 
constitutes error hinges so largely on how artfully the question and response 
are phrased.

 

C. Closing 
Argument

 

[¶23] Gayler claims that the 
prosecutor made an improper community outrage appeal in his closing argument. 
The State maintains that Gayler has failed to establish that she was 
substantially prejudiced by any misconduct.

 

[¶24] We review claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct by using the following standard of 
review:

 

Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are settled by 
reference to the entire record and hinge on whether a defendant's case has been 
so prejudiced as to constitute denial of a fair trial. Similarly, the propriety 
of any comment within a closing argument is measured in the context of the 
entire argument. A trial court's rulings as to the scope of permissible argument 
will not be disturbed absent a "clear or patent" abuse of discretion. Even then, 
reversal is not warranted unless a reasonable probability exists, absent the 
error, that the appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable 
verdict.

 

Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1997) (citations omitted).

 

[¶25] In the prosecutor's 
closing argument, he discussed the government's war against drugs and appealed 
to the jury to join the government's war by finding Gayler guilty of delivering 
a controlled substance:

 

Drugs, Ladies and Gentleman, is there a more 
insidious or terrible disease that affects our society today? It tears families 
apart; steals away our youth. It's ripping the seams of our nation. Costs the 
taxpayers millions of dollars.

 

You heard Deputy Clark and Deputy Hansen testify 
right there on that witness stand. They're both in the courtroom here today. And 
they are good, honest, decent, family men. And they are on the front line of the 
war on drugs in Lincoln County. Unfortunately, the battle is being fought here, 
too. It's just not in the bigger areas, it's in our small 
county.

 

They told you that there is a problem here in our 
county. And they told you that there is a problem with methamphetamine in our 
county. Methamphetamine appears to be the drug of choice these days. And they 
gave you some reasons for that. It's cheap. It's readily available. It's what 
the children seem to choose these days when they use 
drugs.

 

          
. . . .

 

Ladies and Gentleman, Lincoln County Law Enforcement 
is taking the war on drugs dead serious. They are not going to tolerate the 
delivery of methamphetamine or any drugs in this county. It doesn't matter if 
it's a small amount, like what we had here, or a large amount. We are not going 
to tolerate it. Absolutely not. . . .

 

This is your opportunity, as a jury, to take a stand 
with Lincoln County Law Enforcement and say that we will not tolerate drug 
dealers in our county. We will not tolerate it.

 

[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: I'm going to object, your Honor. 
That places a different standard before the Jury than the Jury's standard of 
proof in this case. It also argues that they should look at something other than 
the evidence in this case in making the decision. I think that's improper 
argument in closing. (Pause.)

 

          THE 
COURT: The objection is sustained.

 

[THE PROSECUTOR]: Ladies and Gentleman, in closing, I 
will just ask you to take a stand with law enforcement, take a zero tolerance 
approach -

 

          
[DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Objection, your Honor. It's the same 
objection.

 

[THE PROSECUTOR]: It's an argument, your Honor. It's 
closing argument. That's why it's called closing argument. I'm arguing the 
case.

 

THE COURT: You're asking them to do something besides 
consider the evidence. . . . The objection is sustained.

 

[THE PROSECUTOR]: Ladies and Gentleman, in closing, 
I'll just ask you to send the message, find the Defendant, Pamela D. Gayler, 
guilty of delivering methamphetamine to [the informant]. Send that message to 
the citizens of Lincoln County. Send it to . . . Ms. Gayler. Find her guilty of 
the crime.

 

          
Thank you.

 

[¶26] During closing 
arguments, counsel may assist the jury by reflecting upon the evidence and 
drawing reasonable inferences which logically flow from that evidence. Armstrong 
v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1116 (Wyo. 1992); Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 145 
(Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 
(1982).

 

The prosecutor is not only entitled, he is encouraged 
to advocate strongly, even vehemently, for conviction. But while he may strike 
hard blows, the prosecutor is not at liberty to strike foul 
ones.

 

State v. Draughn, 76 Ohio 
App.3d 664, 602 N.E.2d 790, 793-94 (1992).

 

[¶27] Arguments which are 
designed to appeal to the jury's prejudice or passion are improper. Armstrong, 
826 P.2d  at 1116; Hopkinson, 632 P.2d  at 145. The fear in allowing such appeals 
is that the accused will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to her guilt 
or innocence. United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085, 105 S. Ct. 1847, 85 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1985). "Jurors may 
be persuaded by such appeals to believe that, by convicting a defendant, they 
will assist in the solution of some pressing social problem. The amelioration of 
society's woes is far too heavy a burden for the individual criminal defendant 
to bear." Id.

 

[¶28] The prosecutor's 
argument was obviously an appeal to the jury's sense of duty to help local law 
enforcement by convicting Gayler. The argument was improper because it appealed 
to the jury's passion and prejudice against drug-related crimes. Although a 
prosecutor is permitted a certain degree of latitude during closing arguments, 
he is not allowed to urge the jury to convict an accused on any basis other than 
that the evidence shows guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. 
Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1025 (6th Cir. 
1977).

 

[¶29] Given our 
determination that the argument was improper, we must next decide whether the 
argument was so prejudicial that it warrants reversal. We conclude that the 
prosecutor's repeated remarks, in the face of sustained objections, were a 
blatant invitation to the jurors to convict Gayler not on the evidence but 
because of their fear and disapproval of drug dealers in general. The statements 
undermine our confidence in the verdict, and we hold that a substantial 
likelihood exists that Gayler may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict had the 
statements not been made.

 

[¶30] Reversed and 
remanded.

 

THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which 
GOLDEN, J., joined.

 

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, 
Justice, joins.

 [¶31] I agree with the views expressed in the 
majority opinion that no reversible error exists with respect to any of the 
issues argued by Gayler in her appeal, other than the issue of prosecutorial 
misconduct in the closing argument. Confronted by an anomaly, that may well be 
unique in the annals of Wyoming jurisprudence, however, I am compelled to 
dissent from the reversal of Gayler's conviction based upon the claim of error 
in the closing argument of the prosecuting attorney.

 

[¶32] That anomaly is found 
in the fact that the claimed overreaching by the prosecuting attorney in closing 
argument was objected to by counsel for Gayler, and the objections were 
sustained by the trial court with an admonition to the prosecuting attorney. 
Gayler's counsel did not follow up the favorable rulings on the objections with 
a motion for a mistrial or any other form of post conviction relief.  This despite the fact that a motion for 
a mistrial on an evidentiary issue was briefed for the trial court after the 
trial, and the trial judge obviously was less than enthralled with the 
prosecution of Gayler. What the majority opinion accepts is not only a right of 
appeal from a favorable ruling, but a right to reversal even though there is no 
error in the proceedings.

 

[¶33] The record is clear 
that the prosecuting attorney began his closing argument with a theme of a war 
on drugs in Lincoln County.  No 
objection was initially lodged to this line of argument, but when the jury was 
invited to join with the law enforcement authorities, defense counsel 
interjected a vigorous objection in which he persisted:

 

MR. CORPENING: Drugs, Ladies and Gentleman, is there 
a more insidious or terrible disease that affects our society today? It tears 
families apart; steals away our youth. It's ripping the seams of our nation. 
Costs the taxpayers millions of dollars.

 

You heard Deputy Clark and Deputy Hansen testify 
right there on that witness stand. They're both in the courtroom here today. And 
they are good, honest, decent, family men. And they are on the front line of the 
war on drugs in Lincoln County. Unfortunately, the battle is being fought here, 
too. It's just not in the bigger areas, it's in our small 
county.

 

They told you that there is a problem here in our 
county. And they told you that there is a problem with methamphetamine in our 
county. Methamphetamine appears to be the drug of choice these days. And they 
gave you some reasons for that. It's cheap. It's readily available. It's what 
the children seem to choose these days when they use 
drugs.

 

          
* * *

 

And if it gets to that, Ladies and Gentleman, this 
case isn't entrapment. Absolutely not entrapment. She knew exactly what she was 
doing. You can hear it and you can hear it from the witnesses on the stand. She 
knew what she was doing. She knew she could get in trouble. She has experience 
in this area. She knew it. She could get in trouble. She was merely presented 
with the opportunity to commit the crime. And that, absolutely, is not 
entrapment. These type of cases are not entrapment cases. 
(Pause.)

 

Ladies and Gentleman, Lincoln County Law Enforcement 
is taking the war on drugs dead serious. They are not going to tolerate the 
delivery of methamphetamine or any drugs in this county. It doesn't matter if 
it's a small amount, like what we had here, or a large amount. We are not going 
to tolerate it. Absolutely not. Part of that war on drugs is using individuals 
like Glen Prows. You don't have to like Glen Prows. But people you like and 
people that I like can't go up to a drug dealer and make a buy from that drug 
dealer. If you're going to put drug dealers out of business, you have to use 
people like Glen Prows.

 

This is your opportunity, as a jury, to take a stand 
with Lincoln County Law Enforcement and say that we will not tolerate drug 
dealers in our county. We will not tolerate it.

 

MR. CARROLL: I'm going to object, your Honor. That 
places a different standard before the Jury than the Jury's standard of proof in 
this case. It also argues that they should look at something other than the 
evidence in this case in making the decision. I think that's improper argument 
in closing. (Pause.)

 

          
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

 

MR. CORPENING: Ladies and Gentleman, in closing, I 
will just ask you to take a stand with law enforcement, take a zero tolerance 
approach -

 

          
MR. CARROLL: Objection, your Honor. It's the same 
objection.

 

MR. CORPENING: It's an argument, your Honor. It's 
closing argument. That's why it's called closing argument. I'm arguing the 
case.

 

THE COURT: You're asking them to do something besides 
consider the evidence, Mr. Corpening. The objection is 
sustained.

 

MR. CORPENING: Ladies and Gentleman, in closing, I'll 
just ask you to send the message, find the Defendant, Pamela D. Gayler, guilty 
of delivering methamphetamine to Glen Prows. Send that message to the citizens 
of Lincoln County. Send it to Ms. Prows - or Ms. Gayler. Find her guilty of the 
crime.

 

[¶34] This Court has 
addressed similar or analogous situations contextually, philosophically, and as 
a matter of policy. This is the only case disclosed by my research in which a 
convicted felon has achieved a reversal by objecting, having the objection 
sustained, seeking no further relief in the trial court, and then successfully 
raising the circumstance as error on appeal. I invite attention to the following 
pronouncements from this Court:

 

[¶35] Finally, while we 
agree the comment was improper as a misstatement of the facts, we find no 
prejudice in the prosecutor's statement that appellant had spent four years 
corrupting the victim. The trial court sustained appellant's objection to the 
comment and immediately declared it a misstatement of the facts. Finding no 
prejudice in the statement, we find no reversible error. See Tennant [v. State, 
786 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 1990)], 786 P.2d  at 346.

 

James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 208 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶36] In the present case, 
the prosecutor began his closing argument by carefully informing the jury that 
one of its duties was to weigh and consider the evidence and the credibility of 
the witnesses. He emphasized that it was the jury's function to decide whom to 
believe. He then asked the jury to keep in mind that nothing said by counsel was 
evidence. After appellant's objection to the prosecutor's statement that he did 
not think the State's witnesses lied, the court ruled that the remark was 
improper. However, in light of other remarks in both opening and closing 
arguments, the trial court did not find that the remark required a mistrial. The 
court, instead, cautioned the prosecutor that if any further expressions of 
personal belief were made during closing arguments, a directed verdict would be 
entered in favor of appellant. Thereafter, the prosecutor's comments were 
entirely proper.

 

[¶37] The scope of 
permissible argument, as well as the injury caused by improper argument, is best 
left to the trial court. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. 
denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982). We will not reverse 
the trial court's determination absent a showing that it was without legitimate 
basis. Hopkinson v. State, supra. Under the circumstances presented here, we 
find that the trial court's determination to not grant appellant's motion for a 
mistrial was legitimate, and we, therefore, find no abuse of 
discretion.

 

Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579, 584 (Wyo. 1986).

 

[¶38] Appellant's position 
in this area hangs upon a tenuous thread. Although he argues that immaterial and 
prejudicial evidence was introduced which inflamed the passion and prejudice of 
the jury, it is notable that all objections were sustained thereto. The brief of 
appellant further does not allege or make any statement or assertion that 
defendant did not know of these photographs or the matters of the drugs about 
which complaint was made the drugs having been taken, by the way, from the 
billfold of defendant at the time of his 
arrest, and the film from the camera.

 

[¶39] The questioning which 
appellant now alleges was prejudicial is contained in the testimony of Edward R. 
McAuslin, an investigator with the Riverton Police Department, that at the time 
of the arrest there was found among appellant's possessions a package of 
amphetamines. No objection or motion to strike this testimony was made. The only 
objection made to a following question was aimed at the witness's identification 
of these as being based upon the analysis by Jim Bonnel and that it was 
hearsay.  Appellant did move and ask 
that this evidence be stricken and that the jury be advised to disregard it 
because the opinion was based upon hearsay. The court sustained this motion and 
directed the jury to disregard this testimony. No further motion was made with 
regard to the preceding testimony, nor was a mistrial requested. We must assume 
that in absence of further objection this admonition satisfied counsel, Oldham 
v. State, Wyo., 534 P.2d 107, 111.

 

Brown v. State, 581 P.2d 189, 190-91 (Wyo. 1978).

 

[¶40] Appellant points out 
and criticizes a number of passages from the closing argument of the State as 
prejudicial error. Before addressing ourselves to the merits of these criticisms 
we must consider whether defendant is in a position to complain. No formal 
objection was made except one at a point immediately before the close of the 
argument in chief when the speaker referred to the jury as being those who 
determine the standards of the community and spoke of the growing crime rate in 
the Nation. The court sustained the objection, but there was no motion to have 
the statement stricken or to instruct the jury to disregard it. Earlier in the 
opinion, when we alluded to the prosecuting attorney's opening statement, we 
noted the necessity of preserving objection to any error relied upon as 
prejudicial and reversible, and we at that time called attention to Murdock v. 
State, supra, 351 P.2d  at 679, discussing a similar problem but applying 
specifically to the taking of testimony. On the same rationale, the necessity of 
an objection to a closing argument is a point which has often been separately 
discussed by the court. Perhaps the first time was in Horn v. State, 12 Wyo. 80, 
73 P. 705, 727, where it was said that 'to entitle such a matter as improper 
remarks of counsel to consideration in an appellate court, the record must show 
that proper objection thereto was made at the time, and overruled * * *.' The 
ruling was reiterated in Bennett v. State, Wyo., 377 P.2d 634, 639; Cavaness v. 
State, Wyo., 358 P.2d 355, 358-359; and State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551, 562. Its basis is well known, i.e., the chance for mistrial ought not to be 
encouraged by permitting counsel to remain silent in the face of what he 
considers to be prejudicial misconduct of an adversary. We are not unaware of 
the difficulty attendant to any objection in open court, but we think that this 
can be minimized perhaps by prearrangement with the court for a recess and 
discussion outside the jury's hearing of any violation which may occur. Of 
course, there may be cases where the misconduct of a prosecuting attorney is so 
flagrant that an appellate court would be warranted in reversing even in the 
absence of such objection, as was noted in State v. Wilson, 32 Wyo. 37, 228 P. 803, 809. We have, however, carefully read and reread the closing argument of 
the prosecuting attorney and find no such flagrant violation or fundamental 
error and from the rejection of the motion for new trial evidently neither did 
the trial court.

 

Elmer v. State, 463 P.2d 14, 
22 (Wyo. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 845, 91 S. Ct. 90, 27 L. Ed. 2d 82 
(1970).

 

[¶41] The policy reason for 
refusing to consider such contentions of error is perhaps best summarized in the 
following statement by this Court:

 

The trial judge is in a far superior position to 
assess the effect of any such occurrence upon the jury, as is the defendant's 
counsel. We must infer that the defendant's counsel considered the admonishment 
sufficient, Duran v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 434, 435; Oldham v. State, Wyo., 534 P.2d 107, 111. We have repeatedly held that after the verdict it is too late to 
raise objection, which must be made at the time of the trial, Wright v. State, 
Wyo., 466 P.2d 1014, 1017.

 

An earlier case enunciated a general rule applicable 
to disturbances by the audience, which is applicable in this case. In that case 
we said the trial judge is responsible for the maintenance of decorum in the 
courtroom, but has 'A large measure of discretion * * * and its exercise will 
not be reviewed or disturbed on appeal unless it appears that prejudice resulted 
from the denial of a legal right,' State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P.2d 551, 
560, citing 53 Am.Jur., Trial, § 42, p. 55. The trial judge having observed 
these proceedings and having determined an admonition was sufficient, we would 
be forced to speculate if we found this constituted prejudicial error, State v. 
Spears, supra. We have further repeatedly held it was necessary to raise such 
objections contemporaneously, Wright, supra. When defendant's counsel did not 
ask for further admonition or a mistrial, we cannot notice the same because to 
allow an attorney to sit silent and preserve a briefcase error for presentation 
at the appellate level is improper, Booth v. Hackney, Wyo., 516 P.2d 180, 184. 
We have examined many of the authorities cited by appellant, which in most cases 
are based upon a denial of a motion for mistrial, not a failure to grant a 
mistrial sua sponte. We cannot allow defendant or his counsel to place the 
burden of the defense upon a trial judge.

 

Gallup v. State, 559 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Wyo. 1977). To the same effect are Tryon v. State, 567 P.2d 290 
(Wyo. 1977), and Matter of Town of Greybull, 560 P.2d 1172 (Wyo. 
1977).

 

[¶42] I would affirm 
Gayler's conviction simply on the basis that I can identify no error upon which 
to premise a reversal.