Case Title: Sand Dune Estates v. Kizzier Chevrolet Co., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90-249

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sand Dune Estates v. Kizzier Chevrolet Co., Inc.1991 WY 39808 P.2d 209Case Number: 90-249Decided: 04/01/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
SAND DUNE ESTATES, a 
Wyoming 
corporation, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

KIZZIER CHEVROLET 
COMPANY, INC., and Ronald L. Ketchum, as the NatronaCounty Sheriff, Appellees 
(Defendants).

District Court, 
NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Affirmed.

Larry W. Harrington, 
Casper, for 
appellant.

Jerry A. Yaap of Bishop, 
Bishop & Yaap, Casper, for appellee Kizzier Chevrolet Co., 
Inc.

Before THOMAS, 
CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, J. (Retired)

OPINION

MACY, Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Sand Dune 
Estates sought damages from Appellee Kizzier Chevrolet Company, Inc. for 
intentional interference with a contract and for wrongful execution by Kizzier 
upon property owned by Sand Dune. Sand Dune appeals the district court's entry 
of summary judgment in favor of Kizzier.

[¶2.]     We affirm.

[¶3.]     Sand Dune presents the 
following issues:

     1. Whether the court 
err[][]ed in finding that the filing of a lis pendens notice in accordance with 
W.S. 1-6-106 prior to property becoming delinquent for county property taxes in 
accordance with W.S. 39-3-202 prevents a tax deed from being given free and 
clear of the lis pendens encumbrance.

     2. Whether the court 
err[][]ed when it found that the modular home was not sold for delinquent taxes 
contrary to evidence that was before the court.

     3. Whether there is a 
factual issue as to whether the modular home was sold for delinquent taxes which 
should be tried by the court, and whether the court err[][]ed when it found no 
factual issue.

     4. Whether the court 
err[][]ed when it found that Kizzier Chevrolet seized property that [it] had a 
right to seize, and consequently there could be no damages for wrongful 
interference with a contract or for damage to the plaintiff[].

[¶4.]     In response, Kizzier 
states this issue:

     1. Did the trial court 
err in granting summary judgment as a matter of law dismissing Appellant's 
complaint alleging counts in wrongful interference with contract and wrongful 
execution?

 [¶5.]    The lengthy history of this 
case has contributed to the "complications" which have arisen in the instant 
appeal. Litigation began on April 10, 1981, when Kizzier filed a complaint 
seeking a judgment against Irvin Denman and Martha Jo Denman for amounts owed on 
a modular home which Kizzier delivered to the Denmans on May 31, 1979. That 
complaint noted that Kizzier had filed the security agreement as a financing 
statement with the Natrona County Clerk on June 1, 1979, and that an 
acknowledgment stating the modular home "`shall be and remain personal property 
whether attached to realty or not'" was attached to the agreement. On the same 
date, Kizzier filed a notice of lis pendens in the district court. That case was 
delayed in the courts because of numerous complicating factors, including 
divorce, allegations of wrongful appropriation of property, and bankruptcy 
proceedings. However, for purposes of deciding this appeal, we are primarily 
concerned with the fact that Kizzier was granted a judgment on August 26, 1988, 
against the Denmans for $74,476.53, plus interest. Thereafter, Kizzier sought to 
partially execute its judgment by means of a sheriff's sale of the modular home. 
On October 25, 1989, Sand Dune entered into the picture by filing a motion to 
quash the execution. The motion to quash stated that the modular home and the 
property upon which it was located had been deeded to NatronaCounty in 1986 because the owners failed 
to pay taxes and had, in turn, been conveyed by quitclaim deed to Sand Dune. 
This deed was recorded on November 19, 1986. After hearing the matters raised by 
Sand Dune's motion to quash, the district court determined that Kizzier's 
execution was proper and that its interest in the disputed property was superior 
to Sand Dune's interest. The court denied the motion to quash. All other details 
concerning the sale were completed, and on November 9, 1989, the district court 
entered an order confirming the sale. No appeal was taken from that final 
order.

[¶6.]     Sand Dune also filed a 
complaint seeking to have the sheriff's sale enjoined and to obtain damages for 
wrongful execution by Kizzier. The district court found that Kizzier's execution 
was proper and denied injunctive relief. Sand Dune appealed from that order, but 
this Court dismissed the appeal because it was not from a final order. Sand Dune 
filed an amended complaint which sought damages for wrongful interference with a 
contract1 and for wrongful execution by 
Kizzier. On August 31, 1990, the district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Kizzier. The order stated that Kizzier's lis pendens took priority over 
Sand Dune's interest; that, in any event, Sand Dune had title to the lot on 
which the modular home was located and not to the modular home itself; that 
Kizzier could not be liable for wrongful interference with a contract because it 
acted with court authorization; and that Kizzier properly executed on its 
judgment under the authority of the court which had issued that judgment. Sand 
Dune appeals this latest judgment.

[¶7.]     We note at the outset 
that we do not need to determine the issue of whether Kizzier's lis pendens had 
priority over Sand Dune's quitclaim deed because Sand Dune clearly posited the 
question of priority in its motion to quash the execution. The district court 
answered the question, finding that Kizzier's execution was proper and that it 
had priority over Sand Dune's claim. That decision became the law of the case, 
and Sand Dune did not seek to appeal the decision on any ground.

[¶8.]     We hold that the 
principle of collateral estoppel prevented Sand Dune from reviving the priority 
issue in the subsequent litigation. Absent some recognized exception to its 
application, that doctrine prevents the relitigation of issues which were 
involved in prior litigation between the same parties. Osborn v. Manning, 798 P.2d 1208 (Wyo. 1990); Waggoner v. General 
Motors Corporation, 771 P.2d 1195 (Wyo. 1989); 
Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth Theatres, Inc., 714 P.2d 328 (Wyo. 1986). Sand Dune has 
not asserted any basis for relief from the doctrine of collateral estoppel, such 
as changed facts or circumstances, and we perceive none from the record. We hold 
that Sand Dune was collaterally estopped from raising the issue of the priority 
of its claim to the modular home in its subsequent action. Waggoner, 771 P.2d 1195.

[¶9.]     In addition, Sand Dune 
cannot maintain an action for wrongful interference with a contractual right 
when, to the extent there was interference with the rental agreement between 
Sand Dune and its tenant, Kizzier did so with judicial approval and in 
conformity with controlling law. In analyzing this issue, we must apply our 
usual rules governing the review of a summary judgment. See Wagner v. First 
Wyoming Bank, N.A. Laramie, 784 P.2d 224 (Wyo. 1989). We have identified the elements 
which must be proven by a plaintiff alleging tortious interference with a 
contract: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge; (3) 
intentional and improper interference inducing or causing a breach; and (4) 
resulting damages. First Wyoming Bank, Casper v. 
Mudge, 748 P.2d 713 (Wyo. 1988). Our decision in First Wyoming 
Bank, Casper 
also iterated that one who interferes with a contract by asserting a bona fide 
claim in good faith is not liable for tortious interference with contractual 
relations. The only actions taken by Kizzier which were alleged by Sand Dune to 
be improper were those which Kizzier took after receiving judicial approval. 
Such actions constitute the assertion of a bona fide claim. We hold that there 
was no genuine issue of material fact as to this essential element of Sand 
Dune's claim and that, as a result, Kizzier was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.

[¶10.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Sand Dune had the 
property rented at the time the execution was carried out, and, as a result, its 
tenant vacated the property, damaging Sand Dune.