Case Title: Michigan v. Earl (Opinion - Leave Granted)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 145677

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
PEOPLE v EARL 
 
 
Docket No. 145677.  Argued October 8, 2013 (Calendar No. 3).  Decided March 26, 2014. 
 
 
Ronald L. Earl was convicted by a jury in the Oakland Circuit Court of bank robbery and 
two counts of possession of less than 25 grams of a controlled substance.  At the time defendant 
committed the offenses, MCL 780.905 required that all defendants convicted of a felony pay a 
$60 crime victim’s rights assessment.  The statute was amended effective December 16, 2010, to 
raise the assessment for convicted felons to $130.  At defendant’s sentencing on February 15, 
2011, the court, Leo Bowman, J., ordered defendant to pay the $130 crime victim’s rights 
assessment under MCL 780.905(1)(a).  Defendant appealed.  The Court of Appeals, K. F. KELLY, 
P.J., and SAWYER and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ., affirmed.  297 Mich App 104 (2012).  The 
Supreme Court granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal.  493 Mich 945 (2013). 
 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice CAVANAGH, the Supreme Court held: 
 
 
The Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions bar 
retroactive application of a law if the law (1) punishes an act that was innocent when the act was 
committed, (2) makes an act a more serious criminal offense, (3) increases the punishment for a 
crime, or (4) allows the prosecution to convict on less evidence.  Determining whether 
application of a law violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses by increasing the punishment for a crime 
is a two-step inquiry.  The court must begin by determining whether the Legislature intended the 
statute as a criminal punishment or a civil remedy.  If the Legislature’s intent was to impose a 
criminal punishment, retroactive application of the law violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses and 
the analysis is over.  If the Legislature intended to enact a civil remedy, the court must ascertain 
whether the statutory scheme is so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature’s 
intent to deem it civil.  The crime victim’s rights assessment is a civil remedy.  The Legislature’s 
use of the term “assess” in MCL 780.905 indicates a nonpunitive intent.  That intent is 
underscored by the fact that the statute imposes a flat fee that is not dependent on the facts of the 
case.  The fee also has a nonpunitive purpose: funding crime victim’s services, thereby 
promoting public safety and welfare.  Nor is the assessment so punitive in purpose or effect as to 
negate the Legislature’s intent to deem it a civil remedy: the sanction does not impose an 
affirmative disability or restraint, imposition of the assessment has not historically been deemed 
a form of criminal punishment, imposition of the assessment does not promote the traditional 
aims of punishment, the assessment has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, and the 
assessment is not excessive with respect to that purpose.  Accordingly, imposition of the 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Corbin R. Davis 
increased crime victim’s rights assessment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the 
United States and Michigan Constitutions.   
 
 
Affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2014 State of Michigan 
 
FILED MARCH 26, 2014 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v   
No. 145677 
 
RONALD LEE EARL, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
 
CAVANAGH, J. 
This case requires us to determine whether the imposition of an increased Crime 
Victim’s Rights Fund assessment violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Michigan and 
United States Constitutions.  US Const, art I, § 10; Const 1963, art 1, § 10.  We hold that 
it does not.  Specifically, we hold that the trial court’s order requiring defendant to pay a 
$130 crime victim’s rights assessment does not violate the bar on ex post facto laws.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Stephen J. Markman 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
 
 
 
2
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 18, 2010, defendant robbed a bank in Southfield, Michigan.  He was 
arrested six days later, and heroin and crack cocaine were found on his person at the time 
of the arrest.  Defendant was charged with and convicted of bank robbery and two counts 
of possessing less than 25 grams of a controlled substance.  At the time defendant 
committed the offenses, MCL 780.905 required that all defendants found guilty of a 
felony pay a $60 crime victim’s rights assessment.  1996 PA 344.  The statute was 
amended effective December 16, 2010, however, to raise the crime victim’s rights 
assessment for convicted felons to $130.  2010 PA 281.  Defendant was sentenced on 
February 15, 2011, and was ordered to pay $130 for the crime victim’s rights assessment.  
Defendant appealed and claimed, among other things, that the increased assessment was 
an increased punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Michigan and 
United States Constitutions.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the $130 assessment, 
holding that it is not punitive, and, therefore, does not violate the bar on ex post facto 
laws.  People v Earl, 297 Mich App 104, 114; 822 NW2d 271 (2012).  Defendant sought 
leave to appeal in this Court, which we granted.  People v Earl, 493 Mich 945 (2013). 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“Whether a statutory scheme is civil or criminal is . . . a question of statutory 
construction.”  Smith v Doe, 538 US 84, 92; 123 S Ct 1140; 155 L Ed 2d 164 (2003) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  The interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
that this Court reviews de novo.  Herman v Berrien Co, 481 Mich 352, 358; 750 NW2d 
570 (2008). 
 
 
 
3
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  THE CRIME VICTIM’S RIGHTS FUND 
The Crime Victim’s Rights Fund is contained within the Crime Victim’s Rights 
Act, MCL 780.751 et seq.  The Crime Victim’s Rights Act was enacted in response to the 
growing recognition of the concerns regarding disproportionate treatment of crime 
victims and a perceived insensitivity to their plight.  People v Grant, 455 Mich 221, 239-
240; 565 NW2d 389 (1997).  In 1989, the Crime Victim Services Commission was 
established as part of the Crime Victim’s Rights Act and was given the following duties: 
(a) Investigate and determine the amount of revenue needed to pay 
for crime victim’s rights services. 
(b) Investigate and determine an appropriate assessment amount to 
be imposed against convicted criminal defendants and juveniles for whom 
the probate court or the family division of circuit court enters orders of 
disposition for juvenile offenses to pay for crime victim’s rights services. 
(c) By December 31 of each year, report to the governor, the 
secretary of the senate, the clerk of the house of representatives, and the 
department the commission’s findings and recommendations under this 
section.  [MCL 780.903.] 
The Legislature established the Crime Victim’s Rights Fund to pay for crime victim’s 
rights services.  MCL 780.904(1).  The Crime Victim’s Rights Fund is funded by the 
crime victim’s rights assessment.  MCL 780.904.  Currently, a convicted felon is assessed 
$130, those convicted of misdemeanors are assessed $75, and juveniles are assessed $25 
when the court enters an order of disposition for a juvenile offense.  MCL 780.905(1) and 
(3).  Money remaining in the Crime Victim’s Rights Fund after victim’s services have 
been paid for may be used for crime victim compensation.  MCL 780.904(2).  See, also, 
MCL 18.351 to MCL 18.368.  Excess revenue that has not been used for crime victim 
 
 
 
4
compensation may be used to establish and maintain a statewide trauma system.  MCL 
780.904(2). 
B.  EX POST FACTO CLAUSE1 
The Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions bar  
the retroactive application of a law if the law: (1) punishes an act that was innocent when 
the act was committed; (2) makes an act a more serious criminal offense; (3) increases 
the punishment for a crime; or (4) allows the prosecution to convict on less evidence.  
Calder v Bull, 3 US (3 Dall) 386, 390; 1 L Ed 648 (1798).  At issue in this case is 
whether an increase in the crime victim’s rights assessment increases the punishment for 
a crime.   
Determining whether a law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause is a two-step inquiry.  
Smith, 538 US at 92.  The court must begin by determining whether the Legislature 
intended the statute as a criminal punishment or a civil remedy.  Id.  If the Legislature’s 
intention was to impose a criminal punishment, retroactive application of the law violates 
the Ex Post Facto Clause and the analysis is over.  Id.  However, if the Legislature 
intended to enact a civil remedy, the court must also ascertain whether “the statutory 
                                              
1 The language contained in the Michigan Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause, Const 
1963, art 1, § 10, is nearly identical to the language contained in the federal constitution, 
US Const, art I, § 10.  Neither party addressed whether our Ex Post Facto Clause 
provides greater protections than its federal counterpart.  See Wortman v R L Coolsaet 
Constr Co, 305 Mich 176, 179; 9 NW2d 50 (1943) (stating that if an issue is not briefed, 
it is generally considered abandoned).  In any event, decisions of our Court of Appeals 
indicate that “Michigan’s Ex Post Facto Clause is not interpreted more expansively than 
its federal counterpart,” In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 682; 765 NW2d 44 
(2009), citing People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 317; 662 NW2d 501 (2003), and, 
thus, for purposes of this case, we treat the two provisions as coextensive.  
 
 
 
5
scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention to 
deem it civil.”  Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).  Stated another way, even if 
the text of the statute indicates the Legislature’s intent to impose a civil remedy, we must 
determine whether the statute nevertheless functions as a criminal punishment in 
application.  Because we conclude that the Legislature did not intend the crime victim’s 
rights assessment to be a criminal punishment, we will address both issues. 
C.  WHETHER THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED THE CRIME VICTIM’S 
RIGHTS ASSESSMENT TO BE PUNITIVE 
When determining whether the Legislature intended for a statutory scheme to 
impose a civil remedy or a criminal punishment, a court must first consider the statute’s 
text and its structure.  Smith, 538 US at 92.  Specifically, a court must ask whether the 
Legislature, “indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the 
other.”  Hudson v United States, 522 US 93, 99; 118 S Ct 488; 139 L Ed 2d 450 (1997) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  In considering whether a law is a criminal 
punishment, a court “generally bases its determination on the purpose of the statute.”  
Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86, 96; 78 S Ct 590; 2 L Ed 2d 630 (1958).  “If the statute imposes 
a disability for the purposes of punishment—that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter 
others, etc., it has been considered penal.”  Id.  However, a statute is intended as a civil 
remedy if it imposes a disability to further a legitimate governmental purpose.  Id.  “The 
Court has recognized that any statute decreeing some adversity as a consequence of 
certain conduct may have both a penal and a nonpenal effect.  The controlling nature of 
such statutes normally depends on the evident purpose of the legislature.”  Id.  When 
giving effect to the Legislature’s intent, we first focus on the statute’s plain language.  
 
 
 
6
People v Cole, 491 Mich 324, 330; 817 NW2d 497 (2012) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
Cole, 491 Mich at 336-337, concluded that imposing lifetime electronic 
monitoring for a conviction of first or second-degree criminal sexual conduct constituted 
a criminal punishment.2  In support of that conclusion, Cole noted that the Legislature 
included monitoring as part of the sentence.  Id. at 336 (“The use of the directive ‘shall 
sentence’ indicated that the Legislature intended to make lifetime electronic monitoring 
part of the sentence itself.”) (emphasis added).  While the crime victim’s rights 
assessment is imposed at the time of sentencing, MCL 769.1k(1)(iv), in contrast to Cole, 
the Legislature did not expressly manifest an explicit intent to make the assessment part 
of the sentence itself.  Rather, the Crime Victim’s Rights Act statutory scheme leads to 
the opposite conclusion—that the crime victim’s rights assessment does not have a label, 
function, or purpose that is consistent with a criminal sentence or penalty. 
Specifically, nothing on the face of the Crime Victim’s Rights Act expressly 
indicates that the Legislature intended the crime victim’s rights assessment to be a 
criminal punishment.  However, the use of the label “assessment,” as opposed to “fine” 
or “penalty,” is instructive.  The Legislature is aware that a fine is generally a criminal 
punishment.  Indeed, the Michigan Penal Code defines “crime” as an act or omission 
                                              
2 While Cole was not an ex post facto case, and instead considered whether due process 
mandates that a criminal defendant is informed of the lifetime electronic monitoring 
requirement before pleading guilty or no contest for criminal sexual conduct, Cole, 491 
Mich at 327, Cole’s analysis is relevant to this case because the analysis used to 
determine whether the law imposes a criminal penalty is the same.  Id. at 334, citing 
Smith, 538 US at 92. 
 
 
 
7
forbidden by law that is punishable upon conviction by a “[f]ine not designated a civil 
fine.”  MCL 750.5.  Accordingly the Legislature’s decision to use the term “assess” as 
opposed to “fine” or another similar term within the Crime Victim’s Rights Act implies a 
nonpunitive intent. 
While labels alone do not determine whether a statutory provision is a criminal 
punishment or civil remedy, Smith, 538 US at 94 (“[t]he location and labels of a statutory 
provision do not by themselves transform a civil remedy into a criminal one”), the 
function of the crime victim’s rights assessment is true to its label as an assessment.  
“Assessment” is defined as “the action or instance of assessing,” and “assess” is defined 
as “to impose according to an established rate.”  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary (8th ed).  On the other hand, a criminal fine is generally imposed as a 
punishment in response to criminal conduct.  See Southern Union Co v United States, 567 
US ___, ___; 132 S Ct 2344, 2350; 183 L Ed 2d 318 (2012) (explaining that “[c]riminal 
fines . . . are penalties inflicted by the sovereign for the commission of offenses”) 
(emphasis added).  Therefore, the terms “fine” and “assessment” have different and 
distinct meanings: criminal fines are generally responsive to the conduct which they 
intend to punish, while assessments are imposed in accordance with a predetermined flat 
rate. 
Specifically, the crime victim’s rights assessment levies a flat fee against a 
convicted criminal defendant, irrespective of the number or severity of the charges.  The 
monetary value of the assessment depends only on whether the crimes constituted a 
misdemeanor or a felony, and whether the defendant is a juvenile.  MCL 780.905.  
Moreover, MCL 780.905(2) imposes only one assessment per criminal case, contrary to 
 
 
 
8
the manner in which punitive fines are usually imposed, i.e., where the amount of the fine 
generally depends on the specific facts of the case.  Southern Union Co, 567 US at ___; 
132 S Ct at 2350.  Therefore the crime victim’s rights assessment does not have the label 
of, nor does it function like, a criminal punishment. 
Additionally, the crime victim’s rights assessment has a nonpunitive purpose: to 
provide funding for crime victim’s services.  The Legislature made it clear that funding 
crime victim’s services is the primary goal of the Crime Victim’s Rights Act.  
Specifically, MCL 780.907(2), which governs the disbursement of the Crime Victim’s 
Rights Fund monies, states that the Department of Community Health “shall make the 
implementation of crime victim’s rights” a priority.  Further, MCL 780.908, which 
governs the use of disbursed funds, requires a court, department, or local agency 
receiving a distribution under the act to use the distribution to “maintain or enhance crime 
victim’s rights services.”  Only after the crime victim’s rights services have been paid for 
may money from the fund be used for other purposes under the Crime Victim’s Rights 
Act.  See MCL 780.904(2) (implying that the fund first must disburse the amount that the 
Crime Victims’ Services Commission determined was necessary to fund crime victim’s 
services).   
Although the crime victim’s rights assessment places a burden on convicted 
criminal defendants, the assessment’s purpose is not to punish but to fund programs that 
support crime victims.  See Trop, 356 US at 96 (explaining that while a statute may have 
both penal and nonpenal attributes, the “controlling nature” depends on the Legislature’s 
purpose).  As the Legislature envisioned, the crime victim’s rights assessment primarily 
provides funding for crime victim’s services.  Included among the services supported by 
 
 
 
9
the fund are “comprehensive mandatory rights of crime victims to participate in and be 
notified of all pertinent proceedings in the criminal justice process, compensation for 
crime related losses, and training of advocates to better assist victims.”  Michigan 
Department of Community Health, Crime Victims Services Commission Annual Report 
FY 2012 (2012), p 5.  The crime victim’s rights assessment, therefore, funds a variety of 
programs that benefit the health and safety of crime victims and other community 
members. 
Finally, more generally, the crime victim’s rights assessment is an exercise of the 
Legislature’s power to protect the health and safety of Michigan citizens, indicating that 
it is a civil remedy.  In this regard we find the facts of Smith instructive.  Smith, 538 US 
at 93, considered whether the Alaskan Sex Offender Registry Act imposes a criminal 
punishment or a civil remedy.  The United States Supreme Court held that the Alaskan 
Legislature expressed a civil objective in the act itself, explaining that “ ‘[n]othing on the 
face of the statute suggests that the legislature sought to create anything other than a 
civil . . . scheme designed to protect the public from harm.’ ”  Id., citing Kansas v 
Hendricks, 521 US 346, 361; 117 S Ct 2072; 138 L Ed 2d 501 (1997).  The Court further 
explained that “where a legislative restriction ‘is an incident of the State’s power to 
protect the health and safety of its citizens,’ it will be considered as ‘evidencing an intent 
to exercise that regulatory power, and not a purpose to add to the punishment.’ ”  Smith, 
538 US at 93-94, quoting Flemming v Nestor, 363 US 603, 616; 80 S Ct 1367; 4 L Ed 2d 
1435 (1960).  The Court also determined that the goal was “plainly more remedial than 
punitive” and “even if the objective of the Act is consistent with the purposes of the 
Alaska criminal justice system, the State’s pursuit of it in a regulatory scheme does not 
 
 
 
10
make the objective punitive.”  Smith, 538 US at 94 (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).   
Like Smith’s consideration of the Alaskan Legislature’s purpose, we conclude that 
the Michigan Legislature’s goal in crafting the Crime Victim’s Rights Act was to 
promote public safety and welfare by providing notification and support services to crime 
victims.  And, even if the assessment in some ways resembles a criminal fine, as Smith 
explained, the Crime Victim’s Rights Act’s regulatory purpose to protect the health and 
safety of Michigan crime victims controls over any punitive effect the act may otherwise 
have.  Therefore, we hold that the Legislature intended the crime victim’s rights 
assessment to be a civil remedy. 
D.  WHETHER THE CRIME VICTIM’S RIGHTS ASSESSMENT IS PUNITIVE IN 
PURPOSE OR EFFECT 
Because we conclude that the Legislature intended that the crime victim’s rights 
assessment be civil in nature, we must determine whether it is nevertheless “so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.”  Smith, 538 
US at 92 (citations and quotation marks omitted).  When analyzing whether an act has the 
purpose or effect of being punitive, courts consider seven factors noted in Kennedy v 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US 144, 168-169; 83 S Ct 554; 9 L Ed 2d 664 (1963).  Smith, 
538 US at 97.  The factors as considered in Mendoza-Martinez are: 
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] 
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its 
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and 
deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, 
[6] whether an alternative  purpose to which it may rationally be connected 
 
 
 
11
is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned.  [Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US at 168-169.]   
The factors are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive . . . but useful guideposts.”  Id. 
(citations and quotation marks omitted).  Further, courts will “reject the legislature’s 
manifest intent [to impose a civil remedy] only where a party challenging the statute 
provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or 
effect to negate the . . . intention to deem it civil.”  Hendricks, 521 US at 361 (citations 
and quotation marks omitted).  See, also, Smith, 538 US at 105. 
 
Turning to the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the first factor weighs against finding a 
punitive purpose or effect because the crime victim’s rights assessment does not impose 
an affirmative disability or restraint.  The relevant inquiry when determining whether a 
law imposes an affirmative disability or restraint is “how the effects of the [a]ct are felt 
by those subject to it.”  Smith, 538 US at 99-100.  “If the disability or restraint is minor 
and indirect, its effects are unlikely to be punitive.”  Id. at 100.  The assessment—a 
maximum of $130—is “ ‘certainly nothing approaching the “infamous punishment” of 
imprisonment.’ ”  Hudson, 522 US at 104, quoting Flemming, 363 US at 617.  See, also, 
Smith, 538 US at 100 (“The act imposes no physical restraint, and so does not resemble 
the punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or 
restraint.”) (citation omitted).  Although the crime victim’s rights assessment might have 
some punitive effects on defendants, to hold that any governmental regulation that has 
indirect punitive effects constitutes a punishment would undermine the government’s 
ability to engage in effective regulation.  Smith, 538 US at 102, quoting Hudson, 522 US 
at 105 (stating that “[t]o hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such 
 
 
 
12
sanctions ‘criminal’ . . . would severely undermine the Government’s ability to engage in 
effective regulation,” and explaining that many government programs may deter crimes 
without imposing a punishment). 
Likewise, the second factor does not weigh in favor of the crime victim’s rights 
assessment being punitive in purpose or effect because the crime victim’s rights 
assessment has not been regarded in our history and traditions as a form of criminal 
punishment.  While, as explained earlier, criminal fines have been regarded as 
punishment, the crime victim’s rights assessment does not share the characteristics of 
punitive fines because it imposes a flat fee irrespective of the underlying criminal 
conduct.  Additionally, charging convicted criminal defendants a fee in order to pay for 
victim’s services is a relatively new concept that was first introduced by 1989 PA 196, 
which created the Criminal Assessments Commission, the predecessor of the Crime 
Victim Services Commission, MCL 780.901 to MCL 780.911.  The general nature of the 
assessment’s legislative scheme has not changed and the aim of the assessment has 
always been to provide crime victim’s services.  Therefore, the assessment is not now, 
nor has it ever been, regarded as a punishment. 
 
The fourth factor also fails to indicate a punitive purpose or effect because the 
crime victim’s rights assessment does not promote the traditional aims of punishment: 
retribution and deterrence.  Hendricks, 521 US at 361-362.  The assessment is not 
retributive because it does not consider the underlying factual nature of the crimes 
committed nor the number of convictions in determining the fee assessed.  And, while the 
fees assessed under the act depend on the type of conviction or adjudication—i.e., felony, 
misdemeanor, or juvenile—that distinction is reasonably related to the goal of requiring 
 
 
 
13
convicted criminal defendants to bear the cost of crime victim’s services.  Cf. Smith, 538 
US at 102 (explaining that “[t]he broad categories [used to distinguish classes of 
offenders in Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act] and the corresponding length of the 
reporting requirement, are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this is 
consistent with the regulatory objective”).  Nor can the act be said to promote the aims of 
deterrence, given that any deterrent effect is minimal.  The small fee imposed by the 
assessment is unlikely to have a significant deterrent effect in light of the other potential 
consequences of criminal punishment, such as additional and greater fines and costs and 
incarceration. 
The sixth factor also does not imply a punitive purpose or effect because the crime 
victim’s rights assessment has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose.  It is “most 
significant” that while the assessment might have some punitive aspects, it serves 
“important nonpunitive goals.” United States v Ursery, 518 US 267, 290; 116 S Ct 2135; 
135 L Ed 2d 549 (1996).  The notion of crime victim’s rights is of such importance that it 
is mandated by the Michigan Constitution.  Const 1963, art 1, § 24.  As previously 
discussed, the goal of the Crime Victim’s Rights Fund, and, therefore, of the crime 
victim’s rights assessment, is to fund crime victim’s services to help protect crime 
victim’s rights.  Indeed, the Crime Victim’s Rights Fund provides funding for mandatory 
services required by art 1, § 24 of the Michigan Constitution and other services mandated 
by crime victim’s rights legislation.3  Any punitive effects are incidental to the goal of 
                                              
3 The Crime Victim’s Rights Fund provides funding to implement and support services 
required by the Crime Victim’s Rights Act, 1985 PA 87, for costs associated with 
supporting the Michigan Crime Victim Notification Network and its automated victim 
 
 
 
 
14
funding crime victim’s services, which is rationally connected to the assessment itself.  
The decision to place the burden of funding the Crime Victim’s Rights Fund on those 
who are convicted of a crime or adjudicated and on those juveniles who are responsible 
for a crime is simply a rational policy decision. 
Finally, the seventh factor also fails to show a punitive purpose or effect because 
the crime victim’s rights assessment is not excessive with respect to its purpose.  As 
noted, each criminal defendant is subject to the assessment, irrespective of the number of 
convictions, and the cost imposed is relatively low in relation to other fines imposed 
within the criminal process.  Although the increase in the assessment amount may impose 
a hardship on some, the assessment is set at the rate that the Crime Victims’ Services 
Commission determines is necessary to adequately fund the crime victim’s services 
programs.  MCL 780.903(b).  Because of the operation of inflation and other unavoidable 
cost increases, it is necessary that the amount of the crime victim’s rights assessment be 
periodically increased in order to fund the same level of services.  The increased 
assessment, therefore, was not the result of a policy choice to impose a harsher 
punishment on defendants for their conduct, but instead was necessary in order to provide 
the services mandated under the Crime Victim’s Rights Act.  The amount imposed 
ensures that there is adequate funding to provide the services required by law.  There is 
no evidence that the assessment is excessive in relation to its purpose. 
                                              
notification system, fulfilling the notification requirements of Const 1963, art 1, § 24, and 
crime victim compensation pursuant to 1976 PA 223.  See Crime Victims Services 
Commission Annual Report FY 2012, pp 3-8. 
 
 
 
15
Smith found the remaining two Mendoza-Martinez factors—the third, whether the 
crime victim’s rights assessment only comes into play on a finding of scienter and the 
fifth, whether the behavior the crime victim’s rights fund applies to is already a crime—
generally unhelpful in its ex post facto analysis, and we agree.4  The underlying conduct 
of the defendant will always constitute a crime, but, as explained, the assessment is not 
responsive to that specific conduct.  Instead, the assessment only applies a flat fee 
determined by the level of criminal conduct—i.e., whether the underlying conviction 
constitutes a misdemeanor or felony.  Likewise, a finding of scienter is unhelpful because 
regardless whether the underlying conduct constitutes a strict liability felony (requiring 
no criminal intent) or a crime requiring the most depraved criminal intent (such as 
premeditated murder) the assessment treats the conduct exactly the same by imposing a 
flat fee.   Therefore, both of these factors carry little weight in our analysis. 
Overall, when considering the Mendoza-Martinez factors as analyzed in Smith, 
there is not the “clearest proof” that the crime victim’s rights assessment is “so punitive 
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it civil.”  Smith, 538 
US at 92 (citations and quotation marks omitted).5 
                                              
4 Smith found the factors unhelpful because Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act was 
designed to address criminal recidivism, and, therefore, the underlying conduct must 
always be a crime and involve scienter.  Smith, 538 US at 94. 
5 We acknowledge that several federal courts of appeal have concluded that a retroactive 
assessment of an increased “special assessment” similar to the crime victim’s rights 
assessment at issue in this case constitutes a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.  See, 
e.g., United States v Prather, 205 F3d 1265, 1272 (CA 11, 2000); United States v 
Labeille-Soto, 163 F3d 93, 101-102 (CA 2, 1998).  We decline to follow those cases 
because the parties in those cases agreed that imposition of the increased assessment 
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Prather, 205 F3d at 1272 (stating that both parties 
 
 
 
 
16
IV.  CONCLUSION 
We conclude that an increase in the crime victim’s rights assessment does not 
violate the bar on ex post facto laws because the Legislature’s intent in enacting the 
assessment was civil in nature.  Additionally, the purpose and effect of the assessment is 
not so punitive as to negate the Legislature’s civil intent.  Therefore, we affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals that the increase in the crime victim’s rights assessment 
does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Michigan and United States 
Constitutions. 
 
 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
David F. Viviano 
                                              
agreed that the district court had erred by levying a special assessment of $100 per count 
against Prather because the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution forbids retroactive 
application of criminal sanctions); Labeille-Soto, 163 F3d at 101-102 (“The government, 
which sat mute when the court imposed the $100 assessment at the sentencing hearing, 
concedes the correctness of this [Ex Post Facto] challenge.”).   
Later cases reaching the same conclusion simply cite Prather and Labeille-Soto 
for the proposition that retroactively applying the increased assessment would violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause without engaging in any analysis.  See, e.g., United States v Jones, 
489 F3d 243, 254 n 5 (CA 6, 2007).  Likewise, state courts addressing similar issues as 
those presented in this case that have found ex post facto violations have relied on 
concessions or simply stated that conclusion with little supporting analysis.  See, e.g., 
People v Sullivan, 6 AD3d 1175, 1175-1176; 775 NYS2d 696 (2004); Taylor v State, 586 
So 2d 964, 965 (Ala Crim App, 1991).  Accordingly, we find these cases unpersuasive 
and unhelpful.