Case Title: P. v. Chatman

Citation: 

Docket Number: S032509

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
 
Filed 5/8/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S032509 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
ERIK SANFORD CHATMAN, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 143749 
___________________________________ ) 
 
A jury convicted Erik Sanford Chatman of first degree murder under the 
special circumstance of torture murder and with use of a knife.1  The jury 
acquitted him of robbery and rejected a related robbery-murder special-
circumstance allegation.2  It did find defendant guilty of the lesser offense of 
grand theft.  After the jury returned a death verdict, the court denied defendant’s 
motion to modify the verdict3 and imposed sentence.  In this automatic appeal, we 
affirm the judgment.4   
                                              
 
1  Penal Code sections 187, 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), 12022, 
subdivision (b).  All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 
Code. 
 
2  Sections 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), 211. 
 
3  Section 190.4. 
 
4  Section 1239, subdivision (b). 
 
 
2
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Overview 
On October 7, 1987, defendant stabbed Rosellina Lo Bue to death at a Photo 
Drive-Up store in San Jose.  He stabbed Lo Bue 51 times and took cash from the 
store.  The only eyewitness was defendant’s son, Mario, then two and a half years 
old. 
These facts are undisputed.  Contested at trial was what specific crimes 
defendant had committed.  While the prosecution alleged first degree murder, 
robbery, and attendant special circumstances, defendant contended he was guilty 
only of manslaughter or second degree murder and innocent of robbery.   
2.  Prosecution Evidence 
Lo Bue worked at the store along with defendant’s wife, Yvonne Chatman.5  
Yvonne usually worked from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., while Lo Bue worked from 
2:00 or 3:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m.  On the day of the killing, Yvonne opened the 
store but falsely told her supervisor that she had to leave because her husband and 
son had been in an automobile accident.  Yvonne returned home, and Lo Bue was 
called to take her place.  Yvonne testified that around 3:00 p.m., defendant left 
their apartment with their son, Mario.  Defendant said they were going to the park, 
but instead took the boy to the store.  Independent witnesses saw defendant there 
with Lo Bue until the 6:00 p.m. closing time.  Lo Bue did not appear to be afraid 
of defendant. 
Mario was seven years old at the time of trial, and testified he saw his father 
stab the victim.  Mario remembered that the knife came from a yellow box, but did 
                                              
 
5  Because defendant and his wife share a common surname, we refer to 
Ms. Chatman by her given name to avoid confusion. 
 
 
3
not recall when he first saw it.  Defendant was the only person Mario saw handle 
the knife.  After the stabbing, defendant ran home with Mario.  Mario could not 
remember whether defendant carried him.  At home, both defendant and Mario 
took a shower.  Mario said he thought he took the shower because Mario had 
blood on his hands. 
Around 7:15 p.m., passerby Curtis Jones saw the store apparently unattended 
with the door ajar.  On closer inspection, Jones saw Lo Bue’s body and called the 
police. 
The crime scene was in disarray, the walls spattered in blood.  Most of the 
blood was less than three feet from the floor, indicating the victim had been 
stabbed while crouching or reclining.  Carpeting behind the main counter was 
soaked with blood.  The cash drawer lay empty on the counter.  There was no 
blood on the cash register.  A safe under the side counter was open.  An envelope 
unmarked by blood and containing over $100 in cash, along with checks and 
deposit slips, remained in the safe.  According to a  notation on the envelope, it 
contained the store proceeds from October 6, minus $150.  October 7 proceeds 
were missing.  It appeared the safe had been opened after the stabbing, because the 
door was spattered with blood but the interior was not.  The victim’s purse was 
found under the counter.  It was covered in blood but still contained a wallet with 
about $27 in cash.  An envelope containing less than $2 was recovered from one 
of the countertops.  A telephone receiver had been torn from the wall.  
Defendant’s fingerprint was found on a photocopy machine. 
The store video surveillance camera was inoperable on the day of the 
stabbing.  Yvonne knew the camera did not work.  She may have told defendant 
this, but she could not recall. 
Yvonne heard defendant come home that evening.  Shortly thereafter she saw 
her husband and son standing in bloody water in the tub.  Defendant was flustered 
 
 
4
and had scratches on his chest.  Something he said caused her to go to the store, 
where she saw paramedics removing Lo Bue’s body.  When she returned home, 
defendant was excited.  She saw cash and checks in a moneybag like one used at 
the photo shop.  Defendant’s finger was badly cut.  He told Yvonne’s mother, 
Mary Irving, that he had gotten cut while either fighting or robbing someone.  
Later the same evening, at defendant’s insistence, defendant, Yvonne, Mario, and 
Irving went to East Palo Alto, where they purchased crack cocaine, using money 
defendant had taken from the store.  The three adults smoked the drugs in a motel 
room. 
The next day, when police came to the apartment, Yvonne spoke to them 
while defendant hid in the bathroom.  Yvonne reported that she had not been to 
work because her “boyfriend” and son had been in an automobile accident, and 
she had spent the previous night at the boyfriend’s home.  After the police left, 
defendant told Yvonne that if she “told that he did it, he would . . .  get me and my 
family, he would drag us all into it.”  Yvonne and defendant separated shortly 
thereafter. 
Defendant lived with Tina Whaley for several months in 1988.  She testified 
defendant told her he had killed a woman at the Photo Drive-Up.  He said the 
victim was acting as if she were high on drugs, and while they spoke she pulled a 
knife on him.  Defendant disarmed the victim, and stabbed her “quite a few times” 
because “she kept coming back.  He said she wouldn’t die.”  He stabbed her “all 
over from the neck down, chest, stomach, everywhere.”  The victim “went for the 
phone and he pulled it out of the wall.”  After the stabbing he took about $500 
from the cash register, ran home with his son, and showered.  He also burned his 
clothes.  He told his wife what happened, and threatened to kill her if she told 
anyone.  That evening, along with his wife, son, and mother-in-law, defendant 
 
 
5
used money he took from the store to buy crack cocaine, which they smoked in a 
motel. 
Rosalind Wathel was defendant’s girlfriend in Houston, Texas, for about 
eight months in 1989.  She testified that defendant described the incident and 
seemed to be bragging.  He told Wathel he had gone there with his son to collect 
some photographs.   “[H]e wasn’t happy with the photos, and . . .  he had stabbed 
the girl that was there” repeatedly.  After he stabbed her, “he robbed her to go get 
some more crack cocaine and alcohol.”  He said the girl begged him to stop, and 
that “the more she asked him to stop the more he kept stabbing,” because “[i]t felt 
good.”  He said that “[i]t just start[ed] feeling good and he just kept doing it even 
after she had got quiet.”  He told his wife and “made her promise not to tell. . . . 
[S]he got afraid and left, and took the baby.” 
William Speed testified defendant told him that he had stabbed someone in a 
fight and he “kind of” seemed to be bragging.  He said he stabbed the person in the 
neck and “the person was gurgling, kind of choking on his own blood.” 
The murder weapon was never found.  According to witnesses, no knives 
were kept in the store.  Lo Bue’s sister testified that the victim never carried one.  
Shortly after the killing, Yvonne and her mother, Mary Irving, noticed that a 
distinctive kitchen knife was missing from their home.  Yvonne last saw the knife 
a couple of days before the killing.  Its handle was about four inches long with a 
blade between seven and a half and 10 inches long.  The blade was about an inch 
and a half at the hilt and narrowed to a point.  It was the only sharp knife the 
family owned. 
Yvonne’s sister, Denise Taylor, also testified Mary Irving told her that 
defendant said he stabbed the victim, who was gasping and gagging for air.  At 
trial, Irving denied that defendant had said this to her or that she had repeated such 
a statement to anyone. 
 
 
6
An autopsy revealed that Lo Bue died from exsanguination and asphyxiation 
due to a collapsed lung.  Of the 51 separate knife wounds she sustained, seven 
were defensive wounds to the hands and forearms.  On the front of the body, there 
were two life-threatening neck wounds.  One severed the jugular vein; the other 
cut through the esophagus and trachea.  While not immediately fatal, the latter 
wound would have caused labored breathing, accompanied by a gurgling sound.  
The frontal wounds cut through all layers of the skin and into the underlying 
tissue.  They would have bled extensively. 
Three of the back wounds were quite serious.  They penetrated the chest 
cavity and completely pierced through the right lung.  They caused significant 
bleeding, collapsing the lung and resulting in an inability to breathe.  Eight other 
back wounds cut through the skin, fatty tissue, and perhaps into underlying 
muscle, but did not enter the chest cavity.  Thus wounded, Lo Bue would have 
died after the lapse of several minutes. 
The injuries were inflicted by a single-bladed knife of undetermined length 
and width.  The wounds did not seem to follow a pattern and were inflicted from 
varying angles, with the assailant in varying positions.  The victim had no alcohol 
or drugs in her system. 
The police arrested defendant in Houston, Texas, on April 24, 1990.  He was 
found hiding in a closet. 
3.  Defense Evidence 
Defendant admitted stabbing Lo Bue.  He testified that he went to the store 
around 3:00 p.m. to talk with her about his troubled marriage.  He did not have a 
knife.  After the store closed, Lo Bue told him that “Yvonne had confided in her 
that she wasn’t happy with the relationship as far as me not having a full-time 
job.”  Lo Bue said that “she told [Yvonne] that she should go ahead and separate 
 
 
7
from me and find somebody . . . that she could be happy with.”  These words “hit 
me like a ton of bricks and I became very upset, because at that time I didn’t know 
she was giving my wife advice.”  He “started talking loud and said some things 
that I shouldn’t have said.”  Lo Bue appeared frightened.  At this point, Mario said 
something and defendant turned toward the boy.  When he turned back toward Lo 
Bue, she had a knife in her hand and ordered him to leave.  He took the knife from 
her, cutting his finger in the process.  Once armed, “I guess you would say in a 
blind rage I started stabbing her with it.”  He stabbed Lo Bue until she was dead. 
When Mario said something like, “Daddy, I want to go home,” defendant 
stopped stabbing Lo Bue.  He left the store, taking the knife, some money, and a 
telephone with him.  He “yanked [the phone] out of the wall.”  He was 
“panicking,” and took the knife and phone because they contained his finger 
prints.  He did not decide to take any money until after the stabbing.  He did so as 
an “afterthought” to give the appearance of robbery.  He took the money from a 
counter and put it in a store bag with everything else.  He ran home with his son as 
fast as he could.  He went straight into the shower with his son, who had blood on 
him from being carried by defendant.  He told Yvonne what had happened and she 
left the bathroom, taking the items he had brought from the business.  Yvonne 
later burned checks taken from the business.  She told him that she had thrown 
some of the other items away, including the knife and phone, but not the money.  
Defendant also told Mary Irving what had happened.  Later they went to East Palo 
Alto, where they spent the night in a motel.  Yvonne and Irving bought drugs.  He 
did not go with them to make the purchase, but all three smoked the drugs. 
Defendant denied threatening Yvonne initially.  Later, when she threatened 
to tell the police, he said that if she did, he would tell the police about her 
involvement.  He told Tina Whaley what had happened, but denied saying he had 
threatened to kill Yvonne.  He did not tell her that the stabbing took a long time, 
 
 
8
saying instead that “it happened all so fast.”  Defendant denied telling Rosalind 
Wathel anything about the stabbing.  They “never talked about it period.  I left all 
that behind me when I went to Texas.”  Although he admitted telling William 
Speed about the stabbing, he denied bragging or saying anything about a gurgling 
sound.  Defendant knew the store had a camera, but denied that Yvonne told him it 
did not work. 
Defendant presented several other witnesses, some in an attempt to impeach 
Rosalind Wathel.  Regina Pickens-West was Wathel’s friend.  Although Wathel 
had testified that Pickens-West was present when defendant told her about the 
incident, Pickens-West testified she never heard defendant mention stabbing 
anyone.  Wathel had testified that she reported defendant’s statements to a 
Houston police officer named Chris.  Houston Police Officer A.G. Christal, known 
as Officer Chris, testified that he sometimes spoke with Wathel, but she never 
reported that her boyfriend confessed to a stabbing.  Other witnesses testified that 
Wathel voluntarily submitted to a day of psychological testing in Houston. 
Additional defense evidence included testimony from an astronomer 
regarding the available light on the evening of the stabbing.  Photos of the crime 
scene came in through the testimony of a defense investigator.  A paramedic 
described the appearance of Lo Bue’s body.  Tina Whaley testified she had been 
convicted of embezzlement in 1988.  Candy Howard testified that once around 
October 8, 1987, when she lived in East Palo Alto, Yvonne Chatman and her sister 
came to her home in the middle of the night to buy crack cocaine.  No man was 
with them.  Yvonne paid with a $100 bill.  San Jose Police Sergeant George 
Padilla testified about previous statements some prosecution witnesses had made. 
 
 
9
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
Yvonne testified that about three weeks after the stabbing, defendant choked 
her into unconsciousness.  Tina Whaley testified that defendant told her that he 
had once “started strangling [Yvonne], and that she passed out.”  He thought she 
had died. 
Whaley and others testified that in late December 1988, about two months 
after Whaley and defendant separated, defendant burned Whaley’s apartment after 
discovering her there with another man.  The arson investigator testified that six 
separate fires were set throughout the apartment.  According to Rosalind Wathel, 
defendant told her that he had found a former girlfriend in bed with someone else, 
and that “he set the place on fire.”  He watched from a distance while firefighters 
fought the blaze. 
Wathel also testified that she and defendant once argued because she wanted 
to use food stamps to buy food while defendant wanted to “cash” them and buy 
crack cocaine.  He struck her face with his fists and cut her forehead with a 
kitchen knife, leaving a scar.  After she fell to the floor, “he literally took his boots 
and kicked me in the vagina constantly until I passed out.”  When she regained 
consciousness, defendant was smoking cocaine.  He told her that if she had not 
“come to, he wanted to know what he was going to do to dispose of my body.” 
A witness testified that around 1981, defendant assaulted him and another 
custodian at a high school.  A police officer testified that in February 1981, 
defendant also assaulted him at the high school while the officer was off duty.6 
Salvador Lo Bue, the victim’s father, testified about the killing’s impact on 
himself and his family. 
                                              
 
6  Testimony regarding the high school assaults was presented in rebuttal, 
as part of a reopened case-in-chief. 
 
 
10
2.  Defense Evidence 
Defendant testified at length about his life, including his unhappy childhood.  
His father was African-American and his mother Caucasian.  His father, an 
alcoholic, beat him with a belt throughout his childhood.  Other than the beatings, 
he had little interaction with his father.  He testified about meeting Yvonne and the 
birth of his son.  The day Mario was born was “the happiest day of my life.”  One 
day, when defendant and Yvonne took Mario to meet defendant’s father, his three 
younger siblings told him their father had been beating them.  The father appeared 
and started beating his sister with a belt.  The father saw defendant, went into the 
bedroom and got a gun.  He had pointed a gun at defendant once before.  
Defendant called the police and never saw his father again. 
Regarding the choking of Yvonne, defendant said he simply grabbed her by 
the coat collar and she passed out.  He said she “had the look of smoking crack,”  
and denied squeezing her neck.  He admitted the incident to Tina Whaley, but 
insisted he described it just as he had done at trial.  He admitted the arson at Tina’s 
apartment.  He had been drinking, and intended to leave her with nothing, “like I 
was being left with nothing.”  As to the Rosalind Wathel assault, he maintained 
that certain injuries she attributed to him preexisted their acquaintance.  He said 
she would drink a great deal and would sometimes pass out in the apartment. 
Defendant said he could not ask for forgiveness because what he had done 
was so terrible, but he hoped the jury could understand why he did it.  “Violence 
became a part of my life and as I grew older I used violence to solve problems 
which wasn’t right, but that’s what I did.”  He said he wanted to live. 
There was testimony about defendant’s family, school record, and 
employment history.  Witnesses included two of his boyhood neighbors, two 
teachers, and several employers at various jobs, predating and following the 
murder.  He was generally a good worker.  Defendant’s younger brother, Jason, 
 
 
11
testified about living with their father and about the time their father pulled a gun.  
A former Palo Alto police officer also testified about that event. 
One of defendant’s high school friends and two of his cousins testified about 
the high school incidents, largely exonerating defendant. 
3.  Rebuttal and Surrebuttal 
In rebuttal, one of defendant’s former employers testified that once, when he 
confronted defendant with complaints, defendant tried to punch him in the face.  A 
juvenile probation officer impeached portions of defendant’s testimony.  He 
testified that while defendant was living with his mother in 1980, a petition against 
him was sustained in juvenile court and he was placed on formal probation. 
In surrebuttal, a boy’s ranch counselor testified about defendant’s good 
behavior there.  A juvenile probation officer testified about his report regarding 
the assault on the off-duty officer. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Denial of Motions to Disqualify Trial Judge and Related 
Misconduct Claim 
Defendant twice moved to disqualify the trial judge, John T. Ball.  Both 
times, another superior court judge heard and denied the motion under Code of 
Civil Procedure sections 170.1 and 170.3.  Defendant challenges these rulings as 
erroneous, and contends the facts underlying the second motion demonstrate 
judicial misconduct.  We disagree. 
1.  Facts 
Before jury selection began, Judge Ball told the parties that 14 or 15 years 
previously, his daughter had been robbed at knifepoint while working at a photo 
shop.  The judge accompanied his daughter to a live lineup and to the preliminary 
hearing where she testified and identified the robber.  Defendant moved for Judge 
Ball’s disqualification.  The judge filed an answer reaffirming these facts and 
 
 
12
adding that the “incident in question is dim and distant in my mind.”  His daughter 
was an adult at the time, had not lived with him for about five or six years, and had 
not been injured.  They had not discussed the incident in over 10 years.  He went 
on to attest, “I did not make nor do I presently have the slightest connection with 
the event occurring to my daughter and the pending matter before me.  I in no way 
feel bias, prejudice regarding the defendant nor for that matter any person charged 
with a crime as a result of my daughter’s victimization.”  The motion was assigned 
by stipulation to another judge and denied. 
After return of the penalty verdict but before rulings on post-verdict motions, 
defendant again moved to disqualify Judge Ball.  In his motion he cited the 
previous grounds, and added allegations that:  “[O]n December 14, 1992, after the 
death verdict, Judge Ball approached the rail dividing the well of the courtroom 
from the spectators and spoke to the victim’s father [who had testified at the 
penalty phase].  The Judge mentioned how he (the Judge) knew it has been very 
hard.  Mr. Lo Bue responded about the fact that he (the Defendant) took his baby’s 
life, and that his (the defendant’s) life should be taken.”  Defendant supplied a 
supporting declaration by John Aaron, who had been in the courtroom.  Aaron said 
that he could not “remember what was said verbatim or what else was said but the 
encounter lasted about forty seconds.  I do not recall who spoke first.” 
In Judge Ball’s answer, he stated:  “During the trial there were various times 
wherein Mrs. Lo Bue, mother of the victim, would lose her composure and speak 
out.  Concern was expressed on the occasions and, upon request and I believe 
without request, admonishments were given to the jury.  On these occasions, when 
present, Mr. Lo Bue, father of the victim, would attempt to control and console his 
wife.  On December 14, 1992, . . . after the jury reached its verdict, Mr. Lo Bue 
accosted me in the courtroom when I returned to the courtroom to deliver items to 
my clerk, and attempted to apologize for his wife’s conduct.  My best recollection 
 
 
13
is that I merely acknowledged his concern and indicated it was understandable and 
that he should not concern himself with the matter.  I extended the same courtesy 
to him that I would have extended to anyone expressing anxiety.  I specifically cut 
short his statements, and by my conduct indicated my inability to discuss the 
matter further with him.  The comments regarding the Defendant’s punishment 
and the loss of his daughter were addressed to my Deputy and not to me.  The only 
comment I heard related to the apology for his wife’s conduct.”  He denied that his 
daughter’s experience or his feelings or statements to the victim’s father affected 
his feelings toward defendant or the charges. 
By stipulation, the motion was assigned to a different judge from the one 
who had heard the first disqualification motion.  The second motion was denied.  
The judge concluded an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary:  “[T]he second 
incident was handled appropriately by Judge Ball . . . [H]e still maintains and 
maintained throughout that incident the appearance of impartiality.” 
2.  Analysis 
Defendant asserts the motions to disqualify should have been granted.  At 
trial, he relied primarily on Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision 
(a)(6)(C), which provided that a judge is disqualified if “a person aware of the 
facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be 
impartial. . . .”7  He also argued that “[a] biased decision maker is constitutionally 
unacceptable,” citing Withrow v. Larkin (1975) 421 U.S. 35.  That case stated that 
“ ‘a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’ ”  (Id. at p. 
46.) 
                                              
 
7  Although section 170.1 has since been renumbered and amended, the 
current substantive provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, 
subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii), are identical.   
 
 
14
a.  Preservation of the Claim 
The Attorney General urges defendant did not challenge these rulings by a 
pretrial writ, thus forfeiting the right to complain on appeal.  He is partially 
correct.  Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d), provides:  “The 
determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable 
order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court 
of appeal sought within 10 days of notice to the parties of the decision and only by 
the parties to the proceeding.”  This provision governs both peremptory 
challenges8 and those made for cause.9  (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 272-
275.)  In People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 335 (Brown), we held a claim 
based on the statute was barred, but that a constitutionally based challenge 
asserting judicial bias could be raised on appeal. 
In Brown, the defendant did file a pretrial writ.  We noted that a defendant 
“may, and should, seek to resolve such issues by statutory means, and that his 
negligent failure to do so may constitute a forfeiture of his constitutional claim.”  
(Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 336.)  We have subsequently indicated, however, 
that a defendant who raised the claim at trial may always “assert on appeal a claim 
of denial of the due process right to an impartial judge.”  (People v. Mayfield 
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 811 (Mayfield).)10  While defendant may not raise the 
statutory claim on appeal, he may assert a constitutionally based challenge of 
judicial bias.  (Brown, at p. 335.) 
                                              
 
8  Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. 
 
9  Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. 
 
10  See also People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 652 and footnote 5 
(issue forfeited because defendant agreed at trial to have the judge hear the case; 
moreover, statutory, but not constitutional, claim would have been forfeited 
because of failure to bring a pretrial writ proceeding).   
 
 
15
b.  Merits of the Constitutional Claim 
As noted, the statute requires the disqualification of a judge whenever “a 
person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would 
be able to be impartial . . . .”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, former subd. (a)(6)(C), 
see now subd. (a)(6)(A)(iii).)  The Attorney General argues the constitutional 
standard is narrower.  He cites Bracy v. Gramley (1997) 520 U.S. 899, where the 
high court explained that “most questions concerning a judge’s qualifications to 
hear a case are not constitutional ones, because the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, not a uniform standard.  
[Citation.]  Instead, these questions are, in most cases, answered by common law, 
statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar.  [Citations.]  But the 
floor established by the Due Process Clause clearly requires a ‘fair trial in a fair 
tribunal,’ [citation], before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or 
interest in the outcome of his particular case.”  (Id. at pp. 904-905, italics added.)  
Accordingly, the Attorney General argues that the due process claim requires a 
showing of actual bias, whereas the statute requires only the appearance of bias.  
We need not further address the distinction because defendant has failed to show 
even the appearance of bias. 
Potential bias and prejudice must clearly be established by an objective 
standard.  (In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 817.)  “Courts must apply with 
restraint statutes authorizing disqualification of a judge due to bias.”  (Ibid.) 
Under this standard, there was no error.  Defendant’s allegations in support 
of his disqualification motions “simply do not support a doubt regarding [the trial 
judge’s] ability to remain impartial.”  (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 1, 50, fn. omitted.)  The mere fact that Judge Ball’s daughter had been the 
victim of a knifepoint robbery at a photograph store many years before does not 
disqualify him.  Judges, like all human beings, have widely varying experiences 
 
 
16
and backgrounds.  Except perhaps in extreme circumstances, those not directly 
related to the case or the parties do not disqualify them.11   In this case, the judge 
stated unequivocally that he made no connection between the earlier robbery and 
the present case.  “ ‘[W]e of course presume the honesty and integrity of those 
serving as judges.’ ”  (Mann v. Thalacker, supra, 246 F.3d at p. 1097.) 
The judge’s brief encounter with the victim’s father shortly after the jury’s 
penalty verdict likewise did not require his disqualification.  Judge Ball did not 
seek out the encounter.  The victim’s father approached him to apologize for his 
wife’s behavior.  The judge merely listened briefly and expressed sympathy, 
extending “the same courtesy to him that I would have extended to anyone 
expressing anxiety.”  While a judge in any case must ensure that every litigant 
receives a fair trial, no rule precludes a judge from treating members of the public 
with courtesy.  To require that the judge here simply turn his back on the father 
would do nothing to make the proceedings fairer to defendant.  The entitlement of 
a criminal defendant to a fair trial must never be compromised.  Yet the criminal 
justice system does not exist for the benefit of criminal defendants alone.  Parents 
of murder victims also have a stake in the criminal justice system.  Courts may 
also consider, and be sensitive to, the needs and concerns of crime victims and 
their families. 
Defendant contends the judge ruling on the second motion should have taken 
testimony to resolve asserted factual discrepancies between Judge Ball’s account 
and that of the witness, John Aaron.  A hearing was unnecessary.  Judge Ball’s 
account was more complete than Aaron’s, but it was not inconsistent.  Aaron 
acknowledged he was recounting only part of the conversation, and could not 
                                              
 
11  See Mann v. Thalacker (8th Cir. 2001) 246 F.3d 1092, 1096-1097 (fact 
that trial judge had personally been the victim of sexual abuse many years earlier 
did not disqualify him in a sex abuse case).   
 
 
17
remember who spoke first.  Thus, Aaron’s observations were fragmentary, and 
contained nothing to cast doubt on Judge Ball’s more inclusive statement.  Given 
the circumstances, Judge Ball handled the impromptu incident with the victim’s 
father appropriately.   
Defendant argues that, standing alone, the father’s statement that defendant’s 
life should be taken requires the judge’s disqualification.  The argument fails.  It is 
immaterial whether the comment was directed to the bailiff or the judge, and 
whether the judge heard it directly, through staff, or in connection with 
defendant’s motion.  It is clear that the judge did not solicit the comment.   
During a trial any number of things come to a judge’s attention beyond the 
strict confines of the written record.  Among these are the reactions of spectators 
manifested by their facial expressions and other behavior, before, during, and after 
court sessions.  Indeed, judges must be aware of these things as part of their 
diligent trial management and their responsibility to ensure that jurors remain 
unaffected by them.  Likewise, judges are often asked to rule on the admissibility 
of evidence they ultimately exclude.  Judges are required to set this information 
aside, just as jurors are instructed to do when evidence is stricken. 
In this case, given the father’s testimony during the penalty phase, it was 
hardly a revelation that he favored the death penalty.  Certainly the father should 
not have approached the judge.  Such conduct is inappropriate, as would be a plea 
from a defendant’s family to spare their loved one.  Yet events of this nature do 
happen.  Capital cases unfold in a crucible of strong emotions.  Courts cannot 
expect that families will always conform their behavior to the standards of trained 
professionals.  However, the court system must function in the face of 
occasionally imperfect behavior from the public.  The record contains no evidence 
that the father’s comment influenced the court’s rulings.  No reasonable person 
 
 
18
would doubt that a judge could remain impartial merely because of a brief 
encounter that the murder victim’s father initiated after the penalty verdict.12 
B.  Jury Selection 
Defendant contends the court erred in excluding two prospective jurors 
because of their views on the death penalty.  “The applicable law is settled.  The 
trial court may excuse for cause a prospective juror whose views on the death 
penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of that juror’s 
duties.  (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 727.)  ‘On appeal, we will 
uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as 
binding the trial court’s determination as to the prospective juror’s true state of 
mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or 
ambiguous.’  (Ibid.)”  (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 601-602 (Smith); 
see also Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412.)  This record reveals no basis to 
overturn the court’s rulings. 
The first prospective juror responded to the jury questionnaire that she 
opposed the death penalty.  During voir dire, she was equivocal whether her views 
would affect her ability to perform her duties, and was questioned extensively.  
When asked whether she could impose the death penalty, she vacillated, and often 
expressed considerable uncertainty.  Ultimately, she said she could not honestly 
say whether she could consider voting for a death sentence.  In excusing her, the 
court explained, “I think in grasping the totality of her responses, I think it’s clear 
to the court that her views would prevent or substantially impair her performance 
[of] her duty as a juror . . . .  I think she had a clear and adequate opportunity to 
express the ability to state she could choose and her inability to state that choice is 
                                              
 
12  Defendant also argues the trial judge committed prejudicial misconduct 
during this encounter with the victim’s father.  We reject the argument for the 
same reasons. 
 
 
19
highly probative to the court, and I’m going to excuse her on that basis.”  Under 
these circumstances, we defer to the trial court’s determination. 
The second prospective juror stated in the questionnaire that he strongly 
opposed the death penalty, and would not set aside his personal feelings to follow 
the law as the court explained it.  During voir dire, he agreed that his views would 
substantially impair his ability to make the sentencing choice.  He said it would be 
“incredibly” hard for him not to have a reasonable doubt if the death penalty were 
involved.  When asked whether he still felt that he could not set aside his feelings 
and follow the law, he responded, “I would certainly try to, but in something like 
that it’s very difficult how I feel about it would not enter into my decisions.”  
These statements support the trial court’s ruling. 
C.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Alleged Misconduct By the Victim’s Mother 
Defendant contends that certain actions by the victim’s mother require 
reversal. 
a.  Facts 
During jury selection, defense counsel stated that Mrs. Lo Bue was speaking 
loudly and emotionally to the prosecutor’s wife in the presence of some 
prospective jurors.  At defense counsel’s request, the wife was sworn and testified 
in limine.  She related that Mrs. Lo Bue had said “this was very difficult for her,” 
but said nothing about the case.  Defense counsel stated he did not want any of the 
prospective jurors who might have heard Mrs. Lo Bue to be excused.  He also 
withdrew an earlier request that the prospective jurors be questioned about what 
they may have heard.  The court admonished Mrs. Lo Bue to keep her voice “well 
modulated.” 
 
 
20
During defendant’s guilt phase testimony, Mrs. Lo Bue stated, “Excuse me, 
can you put the microphone close, please?”  A short time later, when defendant 
testified that he had repeatedly stabbed the victim “in a blind rage,” Mrs. Lo Bue 
interrupted by saying, “Are you satisfied now?”  The prosecutor asked the court 
whether it wanted to take a recess.  At that point, Mrs. Lo Bue said, “No, no I 
promise.  I’m sorry.”  The court told her, “I’m going to have to admonish you . . . 
that you have to refrain from speaking in any way or you will have to leave the 
courtroom,” and “Any more outbursts and I’ll have to ask you to leave.”  She 
repeated that she was “sorry.” 
Defense counsel submitted a proposed instruction telling the jury it “must 
decide this case solely on the evidence presented here in the courtroom” and 
“completely disregard any display of emotion, words spoken, or feelings received 
from the presence of spectators including the mother of Ms. Lo Bue.”  Not 
wanting to single out any individual, the court agreed to give the requested 
instruction omitting the reference to Mrs. Lo Bue.  Defense counsel sought no 
further admonition.  Before the guilt phase argument, at defense counsel’s request 
and outside the presence of the jury, the court “admonish[ed] all individuals 
present in the courtroom that during these proceedings any type of conduct that 
can be noticed by the jury, any sounds or motions or direction is entirely 
inappropriate and would cause serious concern by the Court.  And I certainly don’t 
want to exercise my authority in excluding any individual from the proceedings, 
but if there’s any form of outburst or disruption, conduct that is inappropriate, I 
will be forced to take that action.” 
During a break in defense counsel’s argument, outside the presence of the 
jury, defense counsel stated that two or three times during his argument, Mrs. Lo 
Bue had made some “sounds,” and at least one or two jurors looked at her each 
time.  He requested that the court “ask her not to whisper or make any sounds until 
 
 
21
we’re finished.”  The district attorney, who sat between her and the jury, expressed 
the opinion that she had spoken only very softly, and that “her conduct has been 
appropriate and exemplary at this point.”  Defense counsel said that he merely 
wanted the court to restate the admonition.  The court stated that it had “informally 
asked my staff at the break, my deputy, clerk and reporter, and each have indicated 
to me, and the Court will indicate that it has not noticed any commotion or 
conduct that I would consider justifying exclusion or further restraint by the 
Court.”  Nevertheless, at defense counsel’s request, it admonished Mrs. Lo Bue 
“to try and contain yourself as much as humanly possible during these 
proceedings.”  She said,  “I’ll try.” 
During guilt phase instructions, the court told the jury, at defendant’s request, 
that it “must decide this case solely on the evidence presented here in the 
courtroom” and “must also completely disregard any display of emotion, words 
spoken, or feelings received from the presence of spectators.” 
During Mr. Lo Bue’s penalty phase testimony he described going to the 
morgue and seeing his daughter’s body.  Mrs. Lo Bue spoke up and said, “I do too.  
I did too.”  Later, outside the jury’s presence, defense counsel claimed that before 
and during Mr. Lo Bue’s testimony, counsel had also heard “some audible sobbing 
from that area where the Lo Bue family” was sitting.  He moved for a penalty 
mistrial.  The prosecutor agreed that “the fact that she was tearful is apparent,” but 
he argued that “even if she weren’t here, every juror would assume that she would 
be acting precisely in that fashion.”  The court denied the mistrial motion.  It did 
not “believe the jury is unduly prejudiced as a result of the conduct as it would be 
something that would be assumed by the jury, and I believe the instructions are 
sufficient to cure any prejudice occurring.”  It readmonished the jury that it “must 
decide this case solely upon the evidence presented here in the courtroom” and 
“must also completely disregard any display of emotion, words spoken or feelings 
 
 
22
received from the presence of spectators.  And you’re reminded of this instruction 
and admonished to follow it closely.” 
The trial then proceeded without further interruptions. 
b.  Analysis 
Defendant contends Mrs. Lo Bue’s behavior requires reversal.  The Attorney 
General initially responds that this claim is not cognizable on appeal.  He is 
partially correct.  At the guilt phase, the court did everything defendant asked of it 
regarding Mrs. Lo Bue’s behavior.  It investigated the facts and admonished 
Mrs. Lo Bue both upon request and sua sponte.  It gave defendant’s requested jury 
admonitions.  Defendant did not move for a guilt phase mistrial.  “A defendant’s 
failure to object to and request a curative admonition for alleged spectator 
misconduct waives the issue for appeal if the objection and admonition would 
have cured the misconduct.”  (People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1000 (Hill).)  
Similarly, a defendant who receives a curative admonition, but who makes no 
other objection and seeks no other action, may not complain on appeal.  Defendant 
may not argue that the court should have granted a mistrial he did not request, and 
the strictures of double jeopardy could, in any event, severely restrict such an 
action.  (See generally People v. Upshaw (1974) 13 Cal.3d 29, 33.)   
At the penalty phase defendant unsuccessfully sought a mistrial, and his 
challenge to the denial of that motion is therefore cognizable.  (See Hill, supra, 3 
Cal.4th at p. 1000, and cases cited therein.) 
There are no grounds for reversal here.  The trial court intervened correctly to 
demand appropriate behavior and to cure any impropriety.  Spectator misconduct 
is a ground for mistrial if it is “of such a character as to prejudice the defendant or 
influence the verdict.”  (People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1022 (Lucero).)  
In Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 572, the Supreme Court framed the 
 
 
23
federal constitutional question as whether what the jury “saw was so inherently 
prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant’s right to a fair trial . . .”  
The trial court is entrusted with broad discretion to determine whether spectator 
conduct is prejudicial.  (Lucero, at p. 1022.) 
Here, several incidents cited as misconduct are easily disposed of.  Having 
investigated defendant’s complaints of loud speech or other sounds, the court 
essentially found no conduct perceptible to the jury.  The remaining challenges 
involve two incidents:  (1)  Mrs. Lo Bue’s interruption of defendant’s testimony to 
say, “Are you satisfied now?” and (2) her interjection that she too had viewed her 
daughter’s body.   
A trial is the recreation of a human event.  When the event involves life and 
death, the aftermath for all those affected is profound and emotions run high.  
Courts must be vigilant to ensure that the proper legal resolution is untainted by 
extraneous influence.  Anticipatory rulings and directions are appropriate, as are 
curative admonitions.  Different people manage grief, anger, loving support, and 
other human feelings in different ways.  Surely, we would not say that the mother 
of either the victim or of the accused should be excluded from the courtroom 
simply because she might act beyond the strictures of accepted legal deportment.  
Courts have a responsibility to manage this reality but they cannot ignore it. 
“[B]ecause a spectator does not wear the same cloak of official authority as a 
prosecutor, most instances of spectator misconduct will likely be more easily 
curable than those of a prosecutor.”  (Hill, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1000.)  Mrs. Lo 
Bue’s outbursts “were unrelated to defendant’s guilt or innocence . . . .”  (Id. at p. 
999; cf. Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1022-1023 [no prejudice even though the 
outburst at issue “may have informed the jury of facts outside the record”].)  They 
provided the jury with no significant information it did not already know or might 
not readily surmise.  Even without observing Mrs. Lo Bue in person, any 
 
 
24
reasonable juror would know that the crime had caused the victim’s family 
anguish.  Under the circumstances, “ ‘prejudice is not presumed.  Indeed, it is 
generally assumed that such errors are cured by admonition, unless the record 
demonstrates the misconduct resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ ”  (Hill, at p. 
1002, quoting Lucero, at p. 1023, fn. 9.)  This particular record establishes no 
prejudice. 
The trial court acted within its discretion in denying the mistrial motion.  
(Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1024.)  Whether a particular incident is incurably 
prejudicial requires a nuanced, fact-based analysis.  The trial court is entrusted 
with broad discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.  (People v. Haskett (1982) 30 
Cal.3d 841, 854.)  Here, there was no abuse of discretion, and no unmet “special 
‘ “need for reliability” ’ ” in the penalty decision.  (Johnson v. Mississippi (1988) 
486 U.S. 578, 584.)  We are confident that these outbursts did not yield a verdict 
based on caprice, or on impermissible or irrelevant factors.  (Id. at pp. 584-584.) 
2.  Admission of Prosecution Evidence 
Defendant contends the court erroneously admitted three items of evidence. 
a.  The Victim’s Purse 
The victim’s purse was recovered at the crime scene.  Defendant objected to 
admission of its contents, which included personal items he considered irrelevant 
and unduly prejudicial.  The prosecutor argued the contents were relevant in light 
of defendant’s theory.  In opening statement, his counsel urged that defendant did 
not take money from the purse, thus indicating that robbery was not a motive.  The 
prosecutor argued that the large number of other items in the purse might have 
deterred defendant from taking the time to rifle through it for money.  The court 
initially overruled the objection.  Defense counsel then argued that the record did 
not indicate exactly where the money had been kept in the purse.  At that point, the 
 
 
25
court withheld a final ruling pending any further testimony on the question.  There 
was no additional evidence.  The purse and contents were admitted. 
Defendant particularly challenges admission of various items, including the 
victim’s driver’s license and picture as well as other photographs with personal 
messages written on the back.  The Attorney General concedes that the court erred 
in admitting the contents, and we accept that concession without further comment.  
We conclude that the conceded error, if any, was harmless.  There is no indication 
that the jurors searched through the purse’s contents.  Even had they done so, there 
is no reasonable probability that the presence of some personal items in the purse 
affected the guilt verdict.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  The jury 
acquitted defendant of robbery and rejected the related robbery-murder special-
circumstance allegation, demonstrating that it “considered the evidence 
dispassionately in reaching its verdict.”  (Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 613.)  The 
jury quite properly received extensive evidence that a young woman was 
repeatedly and fatally stabbed.  It viewed her autopsy photographs.  The admission 
of her driver’s license and a few personally annotated pictures could not 
conceivably have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.  (See People v. Partida 
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.)   
b.  Defendant’s Drug Use 
Before trial, defendant moved to exclude evidence that he used crack 
cocaine.  The court ruled that the prosecution could not present generalized 
evidence that defendant used drugs.  It did allow testimony that defendant used 
money stolen from the store to buy and use drugs in order to show that he had a 
motive for robbery.  Relying on People v. Holt (1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 449-450, 
and People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 906-907, defendant assigns error.  
There was none.  The rule from those cases “is that evidence of an accused’s 
 
 
26
narcotics addiction is inadmissible where it ‘tends only remotely or to an 
insignificant degree to prove a material fact in the case . . . .’ ”  (Cardenas, at p. 
906.)  Whether defendant went to the store intending to steal or only decided to 
take the money after the murder was an issue hotly contested.  Evidence that, 
shortly after the incident, defendant wanted to acquire and consume cocaine was 
directly relevant on the question of whether he had a preexisting motive to steal.  
The court properly admitted this limited evidence of drug use while excluding 
more generalized evidence not directly connected with the crime.  (See also 
People v. Felix (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1392-1396 [holding evidence of 
heroin use admissible to show burglary motive].) 
c.  Mario’s Nightmares 
Over defense objection, the court permitted Yvonne Chatman to testify that 
after the stabbing, Mario had nightmares and would wake up screaming.  
Defendant contends the evidence was irrelevant.  The contention fails.  The trial 
court has wide discretion in determining relevance.  (People v. Green (1980) 27 
Cal.3d 1, 19.)  The very brief testimony was not the lynchpin of the case, but did 
have a “tendency in reason to prove . . . any disputed fact . . . of consequence to 
the determination of the action.”  (Evid. Code, § 210.)  Mario, who was two and a 
half years old at the time of the crime, testified at trial.  The jury might well have 
considered whether he saw and understood the events in question when 
determining what weight to give his testimony.  The nightmare evidence was 
germane to the evaluation of Mario’s testimony. 
3.  Exclusion of Impeachment Evidence 
Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses by 
excluding proffered impeachment of his wife and sister-in-law. 
 
 
27
The applicable law is settled.  “ ‘[A] criminal defendant states a violation of 
the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in 
otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of 
bias on the part of the witness, and thereby, “to expose to the jury the facts from 
which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of 
the witness.” ’  (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680 (Van Arsdall), 
quoting Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 318.)  However, not every 
restriction on a defendant’s desired method of cross-examination is a 
constitutional violation.  Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the trial 
court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, 
prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance.  (Van Arsdall, supra, 
475 U.S. at pp. 678-679 . . . .)  California law is in accord.  (See People v. 
Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 780.)  Thus, unless the defendant can show that 
the prohibited cross-examination would have produced ‘a significantly different 
impression of [the witnesses’] credibility’ (Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680), 
the trial court’s exercise of its discretion in this regard does not violate the Sixth 
Amendment.”  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 946 (Frye).)  We examine 
defendant’s specific contentions in this legal context. 
a.  Yvonne’s Welfare History 
Based on Yvonne’s welfare records, defendant asserted that she had 
committed perjury.  She received welfare while working and living with 
defendant, but falsely represented under oath to the contrary.  Although Yvonne 
had never been charged with such an offense, he sought to confront her with this 
evidence.  The court excluded the inquiry to the extent defendant offered it as 
general impeachment.  It indicated, however, that the evidence might be 
admissible if defendant could show that when talking to police Yvonne might have 
 
 
28
been concerned about being prosecuted for welfare fraud.  It offered to hold an in 
limine hearing, but none was requested.  Evidence Code section 352 “empowers 
courts to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition 
over collateral credibility issues.”  (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 296 
(Wheeler).)   
Yvonne did not come before the court as a model of rectitude.  The jury 
learned, among other things, that she lied to her employer and to the police.  
Coming home to find her husband and son washing off blood in the family tub, 
she went to her place of employment to find a coworker’s body being removed by 
the coroner.  She returned to find cash and checks, apparently from the store, in 
her apartment.  She did not report these facts to authorities.  Instead she 
accompanied her mother, husband, and child on an excursion to purchase 
narcotics.  While additional evidence of any welfare malfeasance may have been 
relevant, it is most unlikely to have cast Yvonne in a much more negative light.   
“[I]mpeachment evidence other than felony convictions entails problems of 
proof, unfair surprise, and moral turpitude evaluation which felony convictions do 
not present.  Hence, courts may and should consider with particular care whether 
the admission of such evidence might involve undue time, confusion, or prejudice 
which outweighs its probative value.”  (Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 296-297, 
fn. omitted.)  The court acted within its discretion by refusing to permit defendant, 
in effect, to prosecute Yvonne for welfare fraud, particularly in the absence of any 
evidence directly connecting the alleged fraud with her testimony. 
b.  Taylor’s Misdemeanor Conviction 
Defendant sought to impeach Denise Taylor with a misdemeanor conviction 
for giving false information to a peace officer.  The court excluded the evidence 
“after weighing [its] probative versus [its] prejudicial value.”  Misdemeanor 
 
 
29
convictions themselves are not admissible for impeachment, although evidence of 
the underlying conduct may be admissible subject to the court’s exercise of 
discretion.  (Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 297-300.)  The court’s ruling was 
proper. 
Although defendant argues here that the court should have admitted evidence 
of the underlying conduct, he made no such argument at trial, did not ask to 
present any such evidence, and made no offer of proof.  Accordingly, we do not 
know what the underlying conduct was, whether or how it would have been 
significant, how defendant would have attempted to prove it, or whether he could 
have done so.  Normally, this circumstance would make the claim noncognizable.  
(Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a); People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 108 
(Valdez).)  Interestingly, the Attorney General concedes cognizability, and we 
accept the concession.  (See People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6 
(Champion).) 
Turning to the merits, it is difficult to judge the correctness of a ruling the 
court was never asked to make.  However, the Attorney General’s concession of 
cognizability, which defendant joins, assumes that the court would have excluded 
the evidence, so we will operate on that assumption.  It is also difficult to judge 
whether the court would have erred in excluding the evidence when the record 
does not disclose what that evidence would have been—other than involving a 
false statement to a peace officer under unknown circumstances for an unknown 
purpose.  However, the record presents no basis to conclude that excluding the 
evidence would have been an abuse of the court’s broad discretion.  (See Wheeler, 
supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 296-297.)   
 
 
30
c.  Taylor’s Probation Status 
During recross-examination, defendant sought to impeach Taylor with a 
felony conviction for welfare fraud and evidence that “a couple of weeks ago,” she 
had been placed on probation for drug possession in Santa Clara County.  He 
argued that her probation status was relevant because of differences between her 
redirect testimony and her previous statements.  The prosecutor responded that 
there was no evidence Taylor was attempting to curry favor with the prosecution.  
Until he questioned Taylor at trial, he had not spoken with her since the 
preliminary hearing.  The court admitted Taylor’s conviction but excluded her 
probation status as more prejudicial than probative.   
The ruling was within the court’s discretion.  There was neither evidence nor 
offer of proof that Taylor had spoken with anyone in law enforcement about the 
case around the time of her placement on probation or thereafter.  The court did 
not bar defendant from seeking to show that Taylor had received benefits or 
promises for her testimony; it only prohibited evidence of her probationary status 
untethered to any specific showing that it could have affected her testimony.  (See 
People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1050-1051.)  In short, defendant has 
failed to demonstrate that “the prohibited cross-examination would have produced 
‘a significantly different impression of [the witness’s] credibility . . . .’  [Citation.]  
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.”  (Id. at p. 1051.) 
4.  Exclusion of Expert Testimony 
Prosecution witness Rosalind Wathel, a resident of Houston, Texas, testified 
on October 20, 1992.  Five days earlier, she had submitted to psychological testing 
at the Houston office of defense psychologist Dr. Kit Harrison.  Wathel testified 
that the day before the testing, two defense investigators “came and told me that 
the following day I had to take a psychological test.”  The investigators picked her 
up the next day and took her to Dr. Harrison’s office, where, according to Wathel, 
 
 
31
they “gave me all types of psychological tests.”  These included “playing with 
blocks, looking at these plat tests,” and two written tests, one with about 600 
questions.  The testing lasted all day.  Dr. Harrison and three defense investigators 
testified that Wathel voluntarily agreed to the testing. 
Over the prosecutor’s objection, defendant sought admission of the test 
results along with Dr. Harrison’s expert opinion to impeach Wathel’s credibility.  
As an offer of proof, Dr. Harrison testified in limine.  Under his supervision, his 
staff administered a battery of psychological tests.  Some evaluated “brain 
function,” while others were “more psychological.”  Dr. Harrison said the testing 
showed that Wathel is “moderately impaired” in a variety of ways, including 
“intellectual memory, language, learning, sensory perceptual and motor areas.”  
“She has memory problems primarily with visual memory as opposed to auditory 
or visual memory.  Visual memory was markedly impaired.”  “Her actual auditory 
processing of information was okay,” but she “demonstrates confabulations in her 
memory and she perseverates.”  “Confabulation is filling in of details when you 
have a memory disease.”  “Perseveration means you keep applying . . . the same 
solution to a different problem.”  She is moderately impaired “in terms of 
understanding speech.”  “She basically demonstrated signs of a character disorder, 
chemical dependency, marked inability to cope with life, some not lucid touch 
with reality, particularly under stress, where it’s moderately out of touch with 
reality.” 
After hearing argument and consulting existing case law, the court excluded 
the test results and Dr. Harrison’s opinion, but permitted him to testify that he 
administered the tests.  The court noted that the authorities have generally not 
permitted witness impeachment by psychiatric testimony, at least in cases not 
involving sex offenses.  The court found that “most of what Dr. Harrison testifies 
[to] is clearly within the province of proper cross-examination which could 
 
 
32
demonstrate all of these characteristics for the jury so that they could be able to 
determine the credibility of this witness.”  It also found that any probative value 
the evidence might have was outweighed by its prejudicial effect “in terms of what 
would be involved if we were to in effect enter into expert testimony as to the 
various components of this alleged impairment or her ability to recall the specific 
probative parts of her testimony.  And I believe it is . . . appropriate for the jury to 
determine her credibility, not any expert witness.” 
Defendant assigns error.  Similar issues have been raised in the context of a 
defense motion for an order of psychiatric examination.  In that context, we have 
explained that there is a “judicial policy disfavoring attempts to impeach witnesses 
by means of psychiatric testimony.  [Citations.]  California courts have viewed 
such examinations with disfavor because ‘ “[a] psychiatrist’s testimony on the 
credibility of a witness may involve many dangers:  the psychiatrist’s testimony 
may not be relevant; the techniques used and theories advanced may not be 
generally accepted; the psychiatrist may not be in any better position to evaluate 
credibility than the juror; difficulties may arise in communication between the 
psychiatrist and the jury; too much reliance may be placed upon the testimony of 
the psychiatrist; partisan psychiatrists may cloud rather than clarify the issues; the 
testimony may be distracting, time-consuming and costly.” ’ ”  (People v. Alcala 
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 781; see also People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 
137 [“The nature of the charges in this case is such that psychiatric testimony for 
purposes of impeachment would be extraordinary.”].) 
These concerns are magnified here, where a defense psychologist simply 
undertook the examination without notice, involvement, or even awareness, on the 
part of the court or opposing counsel.  Here there were no “partisan psychiatrists” 
who might cloud the issues, but a single psychologist hired for the sole purpose of 
seeking impeaching evidence.  Moreover, permitting evidence of this nature, 
 
 
33
generated only because defense investigators induced the witness to submit to a 
day’s worth of testing, raises substantial concerns about protecting witness 
privacy.  Wathel testified that the two investigators who spoke with her the day 
before the testing told her she “had to” submit to the testing.  Three investigators 
were involved in getting her to the testing site.  They and Dr. Harrison all said she 
submitted voluntarily.  We take this testimony at face value, and assume that they 
did nothing improper in this case, and that Wathel voluntarily submitted to the 
testing.   
Nonetheless, encouraging litigants to engage in this kind of trial preparation 
is fraught with the potential for abuse.  We are most hesitant to suggest that 
witnesses, without notice or any opportunity to seek advice, could properly be 
subject to assertions that they “have to” submit to psychological testing.  In this 
case, Wathel was subjected to full cross-examination and impeachment by other, 
more traditional, methods.  The trial court’s ruling was fully consistent with the 
general judicial policy disfavoring testimony of this nature. 
Defendant argues that the 1982 adoption of California Constitution, article I, 
section 28, subdivision (d), which generally provides that “relevant evidence shall 
not be excluded in any criminal proceeding,” has changed previous law and 
mandates admission of this evidence.  However, that constitutional provision also 
expressly “preserve[s] the trial court’s discretion to exclude evidence whose 
probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice, 
confusion, or undue consumption of time.  (Evid. Code, § 352.)”  (Wheeler, supra, 
4 Cal.4th at p. 295.)  Accordingly, that provision does not affect the general policy 
against admitting this kind of evidence, based on the principles of Evidence Code 
section 352. 
Defendant cites some cases in which he asserts the prosecution was allowed 
to present similar evidence, and suggests that the rules be equally applied.  The 
 
 
34
argument fails on its presupposition.  The cases he cites bear no similarity to this 
one.  Some involve general expert testimony regarding typical responses of sex 
crime victims and their relatives.  (E.g., People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 
1300-1302.)  Others do involve expert evidence regarding the mental state of 
prosecution witnesses, but in wholly different contexts and for different purposes.  
In People v. Herring (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1066, the reviewing court upheld the 
admission of evidence that a sexual assault victim was mentally retarded.  The 
evidence was relevant to the issue of the victim’s lack of consent.  (Id. at pp. 1071-
1073.)  The Court of Appeal noted the general policy against impeaching 
witnesses by expert psychiatric testimony, but found no abuse of discretion in that 
case, partly because the expert did not opine that the mental retardation affected 
the witness’s credibility.  (Id. at pp. 1072-1073.)  In People v. Stark (1989) 213 
Cal.App.3d 107, a school psychologist testified that one witness had a “learning 
disability that affects his ability to sequence events and put events in chronological 
order.”  (Id. at p. 112.)  There, the witness’s physical appearance could have 
caused the jury to exaggerate his learning disability, and the psychologist’s 
testimony was helpful to “ward off potential preconceived notions about 
retardation based on physical appearance in the minds of lay jurors.”  (Id. at p. 
114, fn. 4.)  Nothing in these cases compels the admission of the evidence 
proffered here. 
Defendant also argues that because the prosecution elicited testimony from 
Wathel on direct examination that she had submitted to the examination under 
coercion, he had to be allowed to present the results to prevent the jury from 
speculating that the testing might have shown that she was credible.  In response 
to this argument at trial, the court permitted Dr. Harrison to testify about “how 
long she was there, [and] what tests he administered.”  Defendant could 
 
 
35
additionally have asked the court to admonish the jury not to speculate what the 
results might have been, but he did not do so.  There was no abuse of discretion. 
5.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during cross-
examination and argument. 
a.  Cross-examination of Defendant with “Were They Lying” 
Questions 
Defendant challenges the following portions of the prosecutor’s cross- 
examination: 
Over defense counsel’s objection the question was “argumentative,” the 
prosecutor asked defendant why Tina Whaley and Rosalind Wathel, “who live in 
two different states in the United States, 1500, 2,000 miles apart, both claim that 
you said to them that you drove a brown Seville?”  Defendant responded that he 
did not know.  The prosecutor asked whether he thought the women were lying.  
He responded, “My opinion, yes.”  Then the prosecutor asked, “Do you think that 
these women bear a grudge against you?”  Defendant said, “Yes.” 
Without objection, the prosecutor asked if defendant “had any idea how 
Rosalind is able to come into Court and tell us these things about a Photo Drive-up 
when she’s been living for the last eight years in Harris County, Houston, Texas?”  
Defendant responded, “Yeah, somebody obviously had to tell her.” 
Over defense counsel’s objection that “speculation about somebody else is 
irrelevant,” the prosecutor asked, “Do you think [Wathel] dislikes you now?”  
Defendant answered, “Yes.”  The prosecutor asked, “Do you think based upon that 
she’s willing to come out to California several times to lie about you?”  Defendant 
answered, “Yes.”  Defense counsel objected and moved to strike the answer on the 
basis that “it’s irrelevant what he thinks.”  The prosecutor responded, “I’m trying 
to understand, because he knows her better than anyone else in this courtroom.  
 
 
36
And he said what she says is not true, so I’m trying to understand why he thinks 
she’s lying.”  
Without objection, the prosecutor asked, “You don’t know how this woman 
[Wathel] . . . knows that you went to a Photo Drive-Up booth with your son and 
murdered a young girl?”  Defendant answered, “Yes, because me and her never 
had that conversation.”  The prosecutor asked, “Just one of those awful 
coincidence[s] that she knows those things?”  Defendant answered, “Somebody 
told her what had happened.  Me and her never had that conversation whatsoever.” 
Defendant denied that he was bragging about the killing despite Whaley and 
Wathel’s testimony to the contrary.  The prosecutor then asked whether Whaley 
was “lying” in this regard.  When he answered, “Yes,” the prosecutor asked why 
she was lying.  He answered, “That I can’t say.  Maybe they took it as the way I 
was telling them.  Maybe to them I was bragging, I don’t know.  To me I wasn’t 
bragging because I had a serious look on my face, and I was basically crying about 
it.  So I don’t see how they could take it as bragging.”  The prosecutor asked, “Did 
something happen in your relationship with Tina Whaley that perhaps might cause 
her to feel poorly about you?”  Defendant answered, “It may have.”  The 
prosecutor asked, “Do you think that’s why she’s lying about you?”  He answered, 
“Could be.”  The prosecutor asked,  “Mr. Chatman, you seem to have a lot of 
people who are lying about you.  Why do you think that is?”  He answered, “That 
I can’t really say.”  The prosecutor asked, “Do you think perhaps that you’re the 
cause of these people, that that’s why they’re saying these things about you?”  
Defense counsel objected “under 1101” (i.e., Evidence Code section 1101) and 
also “speculation.”  The court overruled the objection, and defendant answered, “I 
would say no.” 
Without objection, the prosecutor questioned defendant about William 
Speed’s testimony:  “There’s another person who’s come and lied about you?”  
 
 
37
“Was there a reason why, that you know of, why he is coming in and lying about 
you?” and “Well, why do you think?”  Defendant said he could not “speculate, I 
don’t know.”  The prosecutor asked, “Why do these people keep coming in and 
saying these things about you?”  Defendant answered, “I cannot say why they 
would say them things.  They have their reasons for what they’re doing,” but he 
did not know what they were. 
Without objection, the prosecutor three times asked whether a particular item 
of evidence was another example of someone lying.13  Each time, defendant 
answered, “Yes.” 
Without objection, the prosecutor asked how the safe was opened.  Defendant 
said he could not say; he never touched the safe.  The prosecutor asked, “Well, is 
the safe lying about you?”  Again, defendant said he did not know, and that he 
could “only say I never touched it.” 
Defendant argues the “prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly 
asking [him] to comment on the veracity of other witnesses.”  He claims that the 
                                              
 
13  First, the prosecutor asked, “[I]t’s alleged that Mary Irving told Denise 
Speed that you had described to her again a certain gurgling noise that [the victim] 
made . . . . [W]as that something that you did say?”  Defendant said, “No.”  The 
prosecutor asked, “Again, it’s another example of someone saying these lies about 
you?”  Defendant replied, “Yes.”   
 
Second, the prosecutor asked defendant about Tina Whaley’s testimony that 
defendant had said he threatened to harm Yvonne if she revealed his participation 
in the capital crime.  The prosecutor asked, “[I]s it true that . . . you told Tina 
that?”  Defendant said, “No.”  The prosecutor said, “So, again, it’s another lie, 
somebody saying something false about you?”  Defendant replied, “Yes.”   
 
Finally, the prosecutor mentioned Rosalind Wathel’s testimony that 
defendant told her he had threatened his wife if she revealed his participation 
presumably in the capital crime.  The prosecutor asked, “Is that true that you told 
Rosalind Wathel about that?”  Defendant answered, “No.”  The prosecutor asked, 
“And, again, it’s another example of someone saying something false about you?”  
Defendant replied, “Yes.”  The prosecutor said, “It seems like it’s sort of you 
against everyone else, doesn’t it?”  Defendant said, “Yes.”   
 
 
38
questions “invaded the province of the jury,” elicited improper lay opinion about 
the veracity of witnesses, and constituted misconduct by intentionally eliciting 
inadmissible testimony. 
At the outset, we question whether this issue is properly considered one of 
misconduct.  “Although it is misconduct for a prosecutor intentionally to elicit 
inadmissible testimony (People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 689), merely 
eliciting evidence is not misconduct.  Defendant’s real argument is that the 
evidence was inadmissible.”  (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1218.)  
Although the prosecutor in this case certainly asked the questions intentionally, 
nothing in the record suggests he sought to present evidence he knew was 
inadmissible, especially given that the court overruled defendant’s objections and, 
as discussed below, the applicable law was unsettled at the time of trial.  But 
whether we label the issue misconduct or the erroneous admission of evidence 
does not greatly matter, for defendant’s argument is essentially identical under 
either characterization.  Because the cases generally discuss the issue under the 
rubric of misconduct, we will do so also. 
The Attorney General argues first that the claim is not cognizable because 
defendant did not properly object.  “As a general rule a defendant may not 
complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion—and 
on the same ground—the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and 
requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety.”  (People v. 
Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841 (Samayoa).)  Defense counsel did object to a 
number of “were they lying” questions as argumentative, speculative, and 
irrelevant.  The court overruled these objections, indicating generally that it would 
 
 
39
permit this line of questioning.  Thus, with one exception,14 we conclude a request 
for a jury admonition or the lodging of further objections would have been futile.  
Additional objections were not necessary to preserve the claim.  (People v. Hill 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.)  Defendant may argue on appeal that the questions 
were improper for the reasons asserted at trial; that they were irrelevant, 
speculative, or argumentative. 
Before turning to those grounds, we address defendant’s argument that the 
questions “invaded the province of the jury.”  It is a truism that it is for the jury to 
determine credibility.  Questions that legitimately assist the jurors in discharging 
that obligation are proper.  The “legal cliché used by many courts, [that evidence] 
would ‘invade the province’ or ‘usurp the function’ of the jury” is, as Dean 
Wigmore has said, “ ‘so misleading, as well as so unsound, that it should be 
entirely repudiated.  It is a mere bit of empty rhetoric,’ and ‘remains simply one of 
those impracticable and misconceived utterances which lack any justification in 
principle.’ ”  (People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal. 3d 351, 370, quoting 7 
Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourne rev. ed.) 1978, §§ 1920, 1921, pp. 18, 22.)   
Defendant cites to such cases as People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal. 3d 713, 
744, for the proposition that “[l]ay opinion about the veracity of particular 
statements by another is inadmissible on that issue.”  Melton and similar cases 
involved lay opinion from those who had no personal knowledge of the facts.  
Such opinions are of little assistance in deciding the credibility of testimony by 
percipient witnesses who do have personal knowledge.  There is a difference 
between asking a witness whether, in his opinion, another is lying and asking that 
witness whether he knows of a reason why another would be motivated to lie. 
                                              
 
14  As subsequently discussed, defendant’s failure to object to the 
prosecutor’s question regarding the safe forfeits the issue on appeal.  (See post, at 
pp. 43-44.)   
 
 
40
We now turn to defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s questions were 
argumentative, or called for irrelevant or speculative testimony.  People v. 
Zambrano (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 228, 238 (Zambrano) was the first California 
case to determine the propriety of such questions,15 and provides an example of 
improper were they lying questions.  Zambrano was arrested for selling cocaine to 
two undercover officers.  At trial, both officers testified to the circumstances of the 
transaction.  Zambrano testified that he had been working at the business where 
the sale allegedly took place, but denied involvement in any drug transaction.  
Instead, he testified that one of the officers approached, “put a gun to his neck, 
threw him on the ground and handcuffed him.”  (Id. at p. 233.)  On cross-
examination, the prosecutor repeatedly asked defendant if the officers were lying 
and whether “ ‘everybody is lying except for you?’ ”  (Id. at p. 235.)   
As the Zambrano court held, the district attorney’s questions called for 
irrelevant and speculative testimony.  It was clear that the defendant was testifying 
to a diametrically different set of circumstances from that recounted by the 
officers.  The differences could not have been attributed to mistake or faulty recall.  
Defendant, a stranger to the officers, had no basis for insight into their bias, 
interest, or motive to be untruthful.  Had the prosecutor asked why they might lie, 
which she did not, it would have been apparent that any answer would have been 
speculative.  Under these circumstances, the questions did not develop facts 
regarding defendant’s own testimony.  They “merely forced defendant to opine 
without foundation, that the officers were liars.”  (Zambrano, supra, 124 Cal. App. 
4th at p. 241.) 
                                              
 
15  People v. Foster (2003) 111 Cal. App. 4th 379 had discussed but not 
resolved the issue.  Defendant’s reliance on federal cases is misplaced.  Those 
cases involve application of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  They interpret a 
similar statutory framework but they do not establish constitutional principles 
binding on the states. 
 
 
41
Courts from various jurisdictions have treated were they lying questions 
differently.  One line of cases concludes they are always improper, while another 
concludes they are never so.  (People v. Foster, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 384.)  
Zambrano joins a third line of cases that counsels a trial court to consider these 
questions in context.  (Zambrano, supra, 124 Cal. App. 4th at p. 239.) 
If a defendant has no relevant personal knowledge of the events, or of a 
reason that a witness may be lying or mistaken, he might have no relevant 
testimony to provide.  No witness may give testimony based on conjecture or 
speculation.  (See Evid. Code, § 702.)  Such evidence is irrelevant because it has 
no tendency in reason to resolve questions in dispute.  (Evid. Code, § 210.)   
In challenging a witness’s testimony, a party implicitly or explicitly urges 
that because a witness is lying, mistaken, or incompetent, the witness should not 
be believed.  A party who testifies to a set of facts contrary to the testimony of 
others may be asked to clarify what his position is and give, if he is able, a reason 
for the jury to accept his testimony as more reliable.   
The permissible scope of cross-examination of a defendant is generally 
broad.  “When a defendant voluntarily testifies, the district attorney may fully 
amplify his testimony by inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding 
his assertions, or by introducing evidence through cross-examination which 
explains or refutes his statements or the inferences which may necessarily be 
drawn from them.  [Citation.]  A defendant cannot, by testifying to a state of 
things contrary to and inconsistent with the evidence of the prosecution, thus 
indirectly denying the testimony against him, but without testifying expressly with 
relation to the same facts, limit the cross-examination to the precise facts 
concerning which he testifies.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 
771, 822 (Cooper).) 
 
 
42
A defendant who is a percipient witness to the events at issue has personal 
knowledge whether other witnesses who describe those events are testifying 
truthfully and accurately.  As a result, he might also be able to provide insight on 
whether witnesses whose testimony differs from his own are intentionally lying or 
are merely mistaken.  When, as here, the defendant knows the other witnesses 
well, he might know of reasons those witnesses might lie.  Any of this testimony 
could be relevant to the credibility of both the defendant and the other witnesses.  
There is no reason to categorically exclude all such questions.  Were a defendant 
to testify on direct examination that a witness against him lied, and go on to give 
reasons for this deception, surely that testimony would not be excluded merely 
because credibility determinations fall squarely within the jury’s province.  
Similarly, cross-examination along this line should not be categorically prohibited. 
Here defendant took the stand and put his own veracity in issue.  He urged 
that a number of witnesses should not be believed, but that he should be.  The jury 
had to determine whose testimony to credit.  It is one thing for a witness to assert 
that he had a better vantage point from which to observe an event, or that his 
memory is superior to one who was inattentive or has given inconsistent accounts.  
It is another thing entirely for a witness to claim that witness after opposing 
witness has lied.  Defendant was not asked to opine on whether other witnesses 
should be believed.  He was asked to clarify his own position and whether he had 
any information about whether other witnesses had a bias, interest, or motive to be 
untruthful. 
It was permissible for the prosecutor to clarify defendant’s own position in 
this regard.  It was also permissible to ask whether he knew of facts that would 
show a witness’s testimony might be inaccurate or mistaken, or whether he knew 
of any bias, interest, or motive for a witness to be untruthful.  The cross-
examination was legitimate inquiry to clarify defendant’s position.  The questions 
 
 
43
sought to elicit testimony that would properly assist the trier of fact in ascertaining 
whom to believe. 
Defendant had personal knowledge of the conversations he had with the other 
witnesses, and they were all friends or relatives.  He could provide relevant, 
nonspeculative testimony as to the accuracy of their information and any motive 
for dishonesty.  If he provided a reason for one of them to have testified 
inaccurately, the jury could consider that reason for whatever value it believed it 
had.  If he provided no reason, the jury might also consider the fact that not even 
defendant, who, as the prosecutor pointed out knew the witnesses better than 
anyone else in the courtroom, could think of any reason why their testimony 
should not be credited. 
The were they lying questions regarding other witnesses generally called for 
and received an actual answer.  For example, in answering a question regarding 
the witnesses’ testimony that defendant was bragging, he provided an alternative 
reason for the discrepancy.  He said that he was not bragging, but because of his 
demeanor, someone may have erroneously thought he was.  Moreover, the were 
they lying questions were brief and generally precursors to follow-up questions as 
to whether defendant knew of any reason the witnesses had to lie.  At least when, 
as here, the defendant knows the witnesses well, we think questions regarding any 
basis for bias on the part of a key witness are clearly proper. 
The prosecutor’s question about whether the safe was “lying” requires a 
different analysis.  The question was argumentative.16  An argumentative question 
is a speech to the jury masquerading as a question.  The questioner is not seeking 
                                              
 
16  Defendant did not object to this question.  The trial court’s rulings 
regarding questions as to whether a witness was lying did not make futile an 
objection to the qualitatively different question whether an inanimate object was 
lying.  Accordingly, defendant’s failure to object to this question precludes him 
from challenging it on appeal.  (Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841.)   
 
 
44
to elicit relevant testimony.  Often it is apparent that the questioner does not even 
expect an answer.  The question may, indeed, be unanswerable.  The prosecutor’s 
question whether “the safe [was] lying” is an example.  An inanimate object 
cannot “lie.”  Professor Wigmore has called cross-examination the “greatest legal 
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”  (5 Wigmore on Evidence 
(Chadbourne rev. ed. 1974) § 1367, p. 32.)  The engine should be allowed to run, 
but it cannot be allowed to run amok.  An argumentative question that essentially 
talks past the witness, and makes an argument to the jury, is improper because it 
does not seek to elicit relevant, competent testimony, or often any testimony at all.  
Defendant had already explained he had no explanation for the safe being open.  
Asking whether the safe was “lying” could add nothing to this testimony.   
Defendant claims his attorney was incompetent for not objecting to this 
question.  “However, deciding whether to object is inherently tactical, and the 
failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance.”  (People v. Hillhouse 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502 (Hillhouse).)  Deficient performance has not been 
shown.  Further, it is not reasonably probable that “a determination more favorable 
to defendant would have resulted” had the question been objected to and 
disallowed, particularly since the jury acquitted defendant of robbery.  (People v. 
Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 1060, 1126 (Rodrigues).) 
In sum, courts should carefully scrutinize were they lying questions in 
context.  They should not be permitted when argumentative, or when designed to 
elicit testimony that is irrelevant or speculative.  However, in its discretion, a court 
may permit such questions if the witness to whom they are addressed has personal 
knowledge that allows him to provide competent testimony that may legitimately 
assist the trier of fact in resolving credibility questions.  
 
 
45
b.  Argument to the Jury 
While defendant now complains of several prosecution arguments, only once 
did he object below.  Because an admonition could easily have cured any harm, 
his contentions, with the one exception, are not cognizable.  (Hillhouse, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 501.)  Defendant claims his attorney was incompetent for not 
objecting, but this is not one of those rare cases in which the failure to object 
establishes ineffective assistance of counsel.  (Id. at p. 502.)  In any event, as to 
each claim, there was either no misconduct or no prejudice. 
 
1)  Discrepancy Between Opening Statement and Defendant’s 
Testimony 
The prosecutor argued that a discrepancy between defense counsel’s opening 
statement and defendant’s testimony demonstrated that defense counsel “does not 
fully accept and believe his client’s testimony.”  The court sustained a defense 
objection.  When asked to give an admonition, the court told the jury that 
“counsel’s statements are not to be construed as evidence in this matter.  And I 
think that you may proceed along that basis, [the prosecutor], without references to 
what [defense counsel] may believe.”  Without further objection, the prosecutor 
continued to point out discrepancies between defense counsel’s statements and 
defendant’s actual testimony.  During the rebuttal argument, the prosecutor said,  
“I ask you why was there no argument suggesting to you that his statement was in 
fact believable?  Why was there no attempt to explain to you meaningfully why 
this person should be believed when we have him lying boldface already on the 
tape recorder?  And how can we say disregard that but believe this?” 
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly argued that defense counsel 
did not believe his client.  It is “improper for the prosecutor to argue to the jury 
that defense counsel does not believe in his client’s [case].”  (People v. Thompson 
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 112.)  But the court sustained defendant’s objection and, at 
 
 
46
defense counsel’s request, admonished the jury.  Any prejudice was cured.  
(People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 168 (Jones).)  Defendant contends the 
admonition was inadequate.  However, he did not seek any additional admonition.  
The admonition, including the court’s pointed comment that the prosecutor may 
proceed without reference to what defense counsel may believe, adequately 
informed the jury that such reference was improper and should be ignored.  
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor repeated his misconduct in his later 
argument in rebuttal.  Because he did not object, this claim is not cognizable.  In 
any event, the prosecutor never again argued that defense counsel disbelieved his 
client.  He merely commented on discrepancies between defense counsel’s 
opening statement and defendant’s actual testimony, and pointed out gaps in 
defense counsel’s argument.  “It is no misconduct to pointedly highlight, as the 
prosecutor did here, the contradictions in a defendant’s case.”  (People v. Welch 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 753.) 
 
2)  Comment on Dr. Harrison’s Testimony 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in both his 
opening and rebuttal argument in connection with Dr. Harrison’s testimony 
regarding Rosalind Wathel.  (See ante, pt. II.C.4.) 
In opening argument, the prosecutor said, “Can anyone . . . tell us why the 
defense chose to, and I’ll use the expression, shanghai Rosalind Wathel on 
October 15th, 1992. . . .  She testified on the 19th.  Four days before her testimony 
they drag her to a psychologist in Houston.  Chatman was arrested two years and 
four months ago.  Were they that desperate that they would drag her to a 
psychologist so she could play with blocks and look at ink blots?  Do any of you 
find this somewhat revolting that a witness, not a prosecution witness or a defense 
witness, but just a witness, was taken without a Court order in another city to be 
 
 
47
examined by a psychologist.  Do any of you find this wrongfully intrusive?  These 
are very private things.  And it also should be noted that the psychologist’s 
testimony, which cost $4,500, did not alter by one iota the information available to 
you to decide this case.”  The prosecutor then discussed in detail the testimony by 
Officer Christal and Regina Pickens-West that defendant offered to impeach 
Wathel.  He concluded this discussion by saying, “Instead of wild goose chases, 
there should be real evidence presented on behalf of the defense which validly 
attacked her.  Such was not the case.  This is what’s important.” 
Defendant contends this argument was an improper comment on the absence 
of evidence of Wathel’s alleged mental impairment.  He argues that the prosecutor 
may not argue that the defense has failed to prove something when the defense 
was precluded from doing so because of the prosecutor’s objection.  (See People 
v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 430-431.)  It is not reasonably likely that the jury 
interpreted the comments this way.  (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 
(Clair).)  The first portion of these comments focused on the alleged impropriety 
of the defense investigators’ subjecting Wathel to psychological testing.  It did not 
imply what the results of that testing might have been.  The second part, referring 
to “wild goose chases,” came after lengthy discussion of matters unconnected to 
the psychological evaluation.  It is not reasonably likely the jury would associate 
that comment with the earlier discussion of the testing. 
Defendant’s challenges to rebuttal must be evaluated in light of the defense 
argument to which it replied.  Defense counsel discussed Wathel’s testimony in 
detail, then argued, “Where she got all these ideas I don’t know.  We didn’t get 
into all of that as far as the brain function, but what does she say, what’s the core?  
. . .  She’s just adding, confabulating.  She’s filling in all these details from a core 
that she got somewhere . . . .”  The prosecutor then argued on rebuttal, “The 
discussion of Rosalind Wathel this morning was fascinating. . . .  We had Rosalind 
 
 
48
going to a shrink, a psychologist, and then all of a sudden within a sentence we 
have Rosalind has mental problems.  Well, I’m sorry, there is no evidence of that.  
He was here.  There was no evidence of that.  You can reread his testimony, albeit 
so very short, there was no evidence of that.  You evaluate Rosalind’s testimony 
based upon what you saw and what she said.”  Later, the prosecutor said of 
Wathel’s testimony, “If you can find a reason to discredit that testimony, then 
work with it.  But all their horses, all their men and all their sources and all their 
shrinks have been incapable of discrediting this testimony.” 
Had the prosecutor made these latter comments in his opening argument, the 
trial court might well have sustained an objection, and admonished the jury that no 
evidence was presented regarding the results of Dr. Harrison’s examination.  
Instead, the comments responded to defense argument that could be interpreted as 
suggesting that Dr. Harrison did find mental problems.  As such, they were 
intended to neutralize the defense argument.  Taken in this light, they were 
reasonable rebuttal.  Under the circumstances, defense counsel may reasonably 
have chosen not to object.  In any event, there was no prejudice under any 
standard.  The jury knew Dr. Harrison had expressed no opinion regarding 
Wathel’s mental state.   
 
3)  Alleged Denigration of Counsel 
Defendant claims the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense counsel.  We 
have reviewed each of defendant’s claims and conclude they lack merit.  The 
district attorney sometimes denigrated the defense case, including the defense 
evidence, but he did not denigrate defense counsel personally.  “Because the focus 
of [his] comment was on the evidence adduced at trial, rather than on the integrity 
of defense counsel, it was proper.”  (Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 978.) 
 
 
49
 
4)  Comments About Defendant 
The prosecutor said, at various times, that defendant lied at trial; that he was 
unwilling to accept or admit responsibility for what he had done; that he lacked 
remorse or emotion; that he was dangerous; that he bragged about the murder; that 
defendant lacked humanity; that defendant was frightening; and that the jury had 
“before you a man, and I use that term ‘man’ in this context very broadly.  We 
have a man who’s going down for the third time.”  Defendant now claims these 
comments improperly denigrated him.  The unobjected-to comments were all 
based on the evidence and came within the broad scope of permissible argument.  
(People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 567.) 
Defendant relies on two cases, neither of which cause us to find misconduct 
here.  In Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 180, the United States 
Supreme Court stated in general that various prosecutorial jury arguments 
“undoubtedly were improper,” although it found no prejudice.  Among the many 
comments the high court cited was the prosecutor’s referring to the defendant as 
an “animal.”  (Id. at p. 179.)  The court did not specifically single out use of the 
word “animal” as improper.  (Id. At p. 180.)  
The prosecutor here commented on evidence that defendant tortured a 
woman to death in the presence of his two-year-old son.  The argument was 
forceful but supported by the evidence.  We see no similarity between the remarks 
here and the overall argument condemned in Darden.  In Dubria v. Smith (9th Cir. 
1999) 197 F.3d 390, the court condemned the prosecutor’s argument that the 
defendant, who he described as a “(piece of garbage,)” was fabricating his 
defense.  (Id. at p. 402.)  The argument implied that the prosecutor had personal 
knowledge that the jury did not.  The court concluded that the prosecutor both 
expressed an improper personal opinion in the defendant’s guilt and improperly 
“denigrat[ed] the defense as a sham.”  (Ibid.)  It did not state that referring to the 
 
 
50
defendant as a “(piece of garbage,)” (ibid.) by itself, would have been improper if 
the reference had been based solely on the evidence.  The argument made here 
was qualitatively different and permissible.   
 
5)  Appeal for Sympathy 
One disputed issue was whether the torture-murder special circumstance was 
true.  Regarding this issue, the prosecutor argued, “I want you to think for a 
moment, go back in time if you can . . . to that night October 7th, 1987, and to 
think about how that violence started.  And clearly at the time that that knife was 
pulled on Rosellina, how it was brought out, how desperate she must have been, 
she was willing to grab on to the blade of an open knife in order to defend herself.  
And I want you to also think about the pain that that must cause to have your flesh 
sliced open to the bone, not one time, but multiple times.  And I’m sorry that this 
is the difficult things we have to discuss, but I held off.  I think it is time we do so 
now because the defense has raised the issue of torture . . . .  And I want you to 
think then what it’s like then to be down on the ground.  Your hands have been 
slashed open.  How useless.  How helpful are they now?  And you are slashed 
repeatedly.  And what are you thinking?  When is it going to end?  Am I going to 
die?  Is this it?  And if I’m going to die, why doesn’t he just cut my throat?  Why 
doesn’t he knock me out?  That doesn’t happen.” 
Defendant claims this argument was an improper appeal to the jury’s 
sympathy for the victim.  Although generally “an appeal for sympathy for the 
victim is out of place during an objective determination of guilt” (People v. 
Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057), the argument was specifically directed to 
the torture issue.  While the victim’s awareness of pain is not an element of the 
torture-murder special circumstance (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1228 
(Cole)), it is not irrelevant.  Asking the jury to consider the victim’s pain was 
 
 
51
directly relevant to a disputed issue.  We agree, however, that the rhetorical 
questions at the end of this discussion might have moved from appropriate 
argument regarding torture to an improper attempt to invoke sympathy.  The trial 
court might well have sustained an objection to this part of the argument had 
defendant made one.  But the main thrust of this argument, that defendant tortured 
his victim, was permissible; any impropriety in the latter comments was harmless. 
6.  Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Torture 
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of 
first degree murder and the finding of the torture-murder special circumstance.  In 
determining evidentiary sufficiency, the court reviews the entire record, in the 
light most favorable to the judgment, for the presence of substantial evidence.  
Substantial evidence is evidence sufficiently reasonable, credible, and of such 
solid value “that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)  The same 
standard of review applies in considering circumstantial evidence and the support 
for special-circumstance findings.  (Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 104-105.)  
Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict. 
The court instructed on four theories of first degree murder:  (1) deliberate 
and premeditated murder, (2) robbery felony murder, (3) torture-murder, and 
(4) murder by lying-in-wait.  The jury apparently rejected the felony-murder 
theory, acquitting defendant of robbery and finding not true the related robbery-
murder special circumstance allegation.  The prosecutor’s deliberate and 
premeditated murder and lying in wait theories rested in part on defendant’s 
having gone to the store intending to rob.  Accordingly, it is not clear that the jury 
relied on either of these theories.  Because the jury found true the torture-murder 
 
 
52
special circumstance and because murder by torture constitutes murder in the first 
degree (§ 189), we focus on that theory. 
Murder by torture requires a killing committed with a willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain for the purpose of 
revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any other sadistic purpose.  It need not be 
proven that the victim actually suffered pain.  However, there must be a causal 
relationship between the torturous act and death.  (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 453, 466-467 (Elliot).)  The jury may infer the intent to inflict extreme 
pain from the circumstances of the crime, the nature of the killing, and the 
condition of the body.  We have, however, cautioned against giving undue weight 
to the severity of the wounds.  Horrible wounds may be as consistent with a killing 
in the heat of passion or an explosion of violence, as with the intent to inflict cruel 
suffering.  (Id. at p. 467.) 
Here defendant stabbed Lo Bue over four dozen times.  Six life-threatening 
wounds to the neck, back, and chest, while quite serious, were not immediately 
fatal.  The location of most of the blood spatters supports a conclusion that the 
young woman was on or near the floor when the majority of the wounds were 
inflicted.  Because her trachea was slashed, she would have experienced labored 
breathing and made gurgling sounds as she struggled to bring air into a lung 
ultimately pierced through several times.  Blood flowing around the lung finally 
prevented it from expanding with air.  It would have taken a number of minutes 
for Lo Bue to expire. 
During the attack, defendant inflicted scores of wounds, many on an 
unresisting victim.  They were distributed over the victim’s face, head, neck, and 
both the front and back of her torso.  In contrast to life-threatening wounds that 
injured major organs or penetrated into the chest cavity, the autopsy surgeon 
described many of the wounds as “superficial.”  He clarified, however, that they 
 
 
53
were not mere scratches.  They severed all layers of the skin and went into the 
underlying tissue, to various depths, producing gaping injuries.  They would have 
caused significant bleeding.  Some of the wounds were in clusters; others were 
widely separated.   
Defendant told Rosalind Wathel that his victim begged him to stop but he 
persisted because it “felt good,” and that “he just kept doing it even after she got 
quiet.”  He told Tina Whaley that the victim “kept coming back” and that she “just 
wouldn’t die.”  Both Wathel and William Speed described defendant as bragging 
about the killing. 
Defendant testified that he committed the act in a frenzy but the evidence 
supports a different conclusion.  There were no knives at the shop and the victim 
did not carry one.  There was, however, a distinctive knife missing from the family 
home.  From this testimony the jury could have found that he took the knife with 
him and lied at trial about taking the knife from the victim.   
Hilt marks are left when an attacker plunges a knife so forcefully into a body 
that the blade penetrates all the way to the hilt and the impact causes bruising.  A 
frenzied attack might involve such injuries.  No hilt marks were found in 
connection with any of the 51 wounds. 
By his own account, as Lo Bue lay dead or dying, defendant put money and 
checks from the store, along with the murder weapon and a telephone receiver 
bearing his fingerprints, into a bag and left the scene with his child.  Once home, 
he washed blood from himself and his son.  Later that night, he took his family 
with him and bought cocaine, which he shared with his wife and mother-in-law at 
a rented motel room. 
Considering the totality of these facts, the jury had more than ample support 
for its conclusion that defendant acted with the willful, deliberate, and 
 
 
54
premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain for a sadistic purpose.17  
It was not required to accept, and was justified in rejecting, defendant’s testimony 
to the contrary.   
Defendant challenges Wathel’s credibility, as he did at trial, but her 
credibility was for the jury, not a reviewing court, to determine.  (People v. Barnes 
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303-304.)  Her testimony was consistent with the physical 
evidence. 
Defendant also argues that he did not bind the victim.  Binding may take 
place in some instances of torture, but is not required to prove it.  (Elliot, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 468, fn. 4.)  Based on the circumstances here it appears that defendant 
did not need to resort to binding to overpower and control his victim. 
The evidence also supports the true finding as to the torture-murder special 
circumstance.  “To find the torture-murder special circumstance true, the jury had 
to find that ‘[t]he murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.’  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18).)”  (Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 469.)  At the time of the 
crime, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), also provided that torture required 
“proof of the infliction of extreme physical pain no matter how long its duration.”  
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18) as approved by vote, Prop. 7, § 6, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 
1978); see People v. Wade (1988) 44 Cal.3d 975, 993; see also People v. 
Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 140, fn. 14 [noting statute has been amended in 
this regard].)  Here, as we have explained, the nature of the victim’s many wounds 
and the circumstances surrounding the killing support the conclusion that 
                                              
 
17 See, e.g., People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 839-844 (Bemore) 
(upholding torture-murder special circumstance where most of the 37 knife 
wounds were superficial, and where eight shallow cuts were grouped on the 
victim’s flank, away from vital organs.) 
 
 
55
defendant intended to kill her, that the murder involved torture, and that defendant 
inflicted extreme physical pain. 
7.  Instructional Issues 
a.  Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses 
The court gave instructions on second degree murder and voluntary 
manslaughter as lesser included offenses.  Defendant claims the instructions could 
have informed the jury that convictions for the lesser crimes of second degree 
murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter required an intent 
to kill.  His theory as to all of these contentions is essentially the same—the jury 
might have found he did not intend to kill his victim and, in that event, it would 
have had no choice but either to convict him of first degree murder or to acquit 
him entirely.   
We need not decide whether the court should have instructed differently, 
because the jury found that the torture-murder special circumstance was true.  
“Error in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is harmless when 
the jury necessarily decides the factual questions posed by the omitted instructions 
adversely to defendant under other properly given instructions.”  (People v. Lewis 
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 646.)  The court instructed that a torture-murder special 
circumstance requires the intent to kill.  (See § 190.2, subd. (a)(18); Elliot, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 469.)  When the jury found this special circumstance true, it found 
defendant intended to kill under other properly given instructions.  That being the 
case, it could have found defendant guilty of either second degree murder or 
voluntary manslaughter, even under defendant’s interpretation of the court’s 
instructions, had it doubted that the remaining elements of first degree murder 
were proven.  The special circumstance finding also shows the jury rejected any 
possible theory supporting involuntary manslaughter. 
 
 
56
b.  Causation  
First degree torture murder requires a causal relationship between the 
torturous act and the death.  (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1207.)  The trial court 
concluded the evidence raised no question of causation and did not directly 
instruct the jury on this requirement.  Instead, it gave instructions identical to those 
given in Cole, at pages 1207-1208.  As in Cole, defendant ascribes error.  We 
reject the contention as in Cole.  The court told the jury that “murder which is 
perpetrated by torture is murder of the first degree.”  (Italics added.)  The 
italicized words signify a causal connection.  Accordingly, “there is no reasonable 
likelihood that [the jury] understood there need be no such causal 
relationship . . . .”  (Id. at p. 1208.) 
Any error would also have been harmless.  Here there was no question of 
causation and defendant did not raise one.  He did not dispute that Lo Bue died at 
his hands or that he alone inflicted the fatal wounds.  His defense involved state of 
mind, not causation.  “The finding of murder-by-torture encompasses the totality 
of the brutal acts and the circumstances which led to the victim’s death.  
[Citations.]  The acts of torture may not be segregated into their constituent 
elements in order to determine whether any single act by itself caused the death; 
rather, it is the continuum of sadistic violence that constitutes the torture.”  
(People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 530-531.)  The multiple stab wounds 
both constituted the torture and were the cause of death.  “Accordingly we find 
that even if the trial court’s failure to instruct expressly on the causal relationship 
had been erroneous, it would have been harmless under any standard.”  (Cole, 
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1209.) 
c.  Provocation 
Defendant contends the court “erred in failing to instruct that evidence of 
provocation could be considered in determining whether any intent to inflict 
 
 
57
extreme and prolonged pain was deliberate and premeditated.”  The court did 
instruct that the jury could consider any provocation “for such bearing as . . . it 
may have on whether the defendant killed with or without deliberation and 
premeditation.”  Defendant argues that the jury would infer from this instruction 
that it could not consider provocation in deciding whether he deliberately and 
premeditatedly inflicted torture.  However, defendant did not ask the court to 
clarify or amplify this instruction and, accordingly, he may not complain on appeal 
that it was incomplete.  (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1211.)  Moreover, we find 
no reasonable likelihood the jury would parse this instruction so finely as to find a 
negative inference that it could not consider provocation regarding defendant’s 
mental state in inflicting torture.  Logically, whatever relevance any provocation 
had on the mental state with which defendant killed would apply to his mental 
state regarding infliction of torture.  Accordingly, “[t]here is no reasonable 
likelihood that the jury would have understood these instructions to foreclose them 
from considering evidence of provocation, if any, in connection with murder by 
torture.”  (Id. at p. 1212.) 
d.  Unanimity 
Defendant contends the court erred in not instructing the jury that it had to 
agree unanimously on the theory by which he was guilty of first degree murder.  
We have repeatedly rejected the claim and continue to do so.  (Cole, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 1221; see also Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624.)  Further, the 
jury’s finding that the torture-murder special circumstance was true shows that it 
unanimously agreed on that theory.  The only requirement for torture murder not 
included in the special circumstance finding is that, for the special circumstance, 
the acts of torture need not have caused the death.  (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 
 
 
58
Cal.4th 809, 842-843 (Bemore).)  However, as noted above, in this case there was 
no issue of causation. 
e.  Torture-murder Special Circumstance 
Defendant also contends the court erred in instructing on the torture-murder 
special circumstance.  He argues the instruction was deficient because:  (1) it did 
not require a premeditated intent to inflict torture; (2) it did not say that the pain 
inflicted must be in addition to the pain of death; and (3) it confused the jury by 
saying that defendant must have inflicted pain but the victim’s awareness of pain 
was not required.  We rejected each contention in Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pages 
1226-1228, and continue to do so.  (See also Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 476-
479.) 
8.  Validity of Torture-murder Special Circumstance 
Defendant contends the torture-murder special circumstance is vague and 
overbroad in two ways.  First, he claims it “fails to satisfy the nexus that must 
exist between the alleged torture and the victim’s death.”  We have rejected this 
claim previously and do so now.  (Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 843.)  
Moreover, whatever might be the “outer limits” of the statute in this regard, the act 
of torture, here the stabbing, was also the cause of death.  (Id. at pp. 843-844.) 
Second, defendant claims that the requirement of “extreme physical pain,” in 
effect at the time of this crime, is too vague.  He claims this phrase is no more 
precise than language such as “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” which the 
United States Supreme Court has found void for vagueness.  (Maynard v. 
Cartwright (1988) 486 U.S. 356, 363-364.)  We have already effectively rejected 
this contention.  “The narrowing construction absent in Maynard is present here.  
In People v. Davenport [(1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271], this court construed the 
torture special circumstance as requiring proof that the defendant intended to kill 
 
 
59
and torture the victim, and inflicted extreme pain upon a living victim.  Thus, 
unlike the vaguely worded aggravating circumstances of ‘especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel’ (Maynard, supra, 486 U.S. 356), the torture special 
circumstance involved here has been construed narrowly by this court and its 
constitutionality has been upheld.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 
Cal.4th 408, 454.)  Defendant asserts that his current contention is different, 
because now he claims the word “extreme” is itself vague, a claim not specifically 
considered in our previous cases.  To the extent this is so, this new challenge is no 
more convincing than the ones already rejected.  The word “extreme” has a 
“commonsense meaning[] which the jury may be expected to apply.”  (People v. 
Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 189 [noting that, in the context of the torture-murder 
special circumstance, “we used the word ‘extreme’ to narrow and clarify the 
meaning of a special circumstance”].) 
D.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Admission of Prosecution Evidence 
a.  Alleged Late Notice of Aggravating Evidence 
The district attorney’s original notice of aggravating evidence pursuant to 
section 190.3 listed defendant’s assault on his wife, his arson of Tina Whaley’s 
apartment, and his assault on Rosalind Wathel, but included nothing about his 
juvenile behavior.  On November 19, 1992, the day the defense began presenting 
its penalty phase evidence, the prosecutor served on defense counsel a petition for 
disclosure of defendant’s juvenile court records in Santa Clara County.  On the 
next court date, November 23, 1992, the court granted the petition over 
defendant’s objection.  During cross-examination the same day, defendant 
admitted he was sent to a boy’s ranch when he was about 15 years old for 
 
 
60
assaulting two school janitors and an off-duty police officer.  No details of these 
incidents were mentioned. 
On November 30, 1992, after defendant finished testifying, the prosecutor 
moved to present evidence of defendant’s juvenile crimes as either rebuttal or 
evidence in his case-in-chief.  He said he had not given earlier notice because he 
had only recently become aware of defendant’s juvenile record.  Defense counsel 
objected, and stated that he had informed the prosecutor of defendant’s juvenile 
record much earlier.  The prosecutor responded that he did not remember.  
Counsel argued that defendant would be prejudiced by a late presentation of this 
evidence because he had already testified.  The court ruled that the juvenile crimes 
were not admissible in rebuttal but, after reviewing then-recent authority, ruled 
“that the evidence is admissible on the basis of newly discovered evidence by the 
prosecution.”  It permitted the prosecutor to reopen his case-in-chief to present the 
evidence.  Regarding defendant’s claim of prejudice, it stated, “The only prejudice 
the Court perceives is the necessity or the opportunity of the defendant being 
recalled in some form of surrebuttal or additional evidence taken by way of other 
witnesses to rebut the evidence that the People are now offering.”  Defense 
counsel requested a three-week continuance to meet the new evidence.  After 
further discussion, the court granted a week’s continuance with the understanding 
that defendant could ask for another week if needed. 
At a status conference on December 3, 1992, defendant unsuccessfully 
renewed his objection.  On December 7, 1992, the prosecutor presented the 
evidence.  Defendant then produced three witnesses who testified in mitigation 
about those incidents. 
Defendant contends that he received untimely notice and that the court erred 
in allowing the prosecution to present the evidence.  We recently summarized the 
applicable law.  “Section 190.3 provides that, with exceptions not relevant here, 
 
 
61
‘no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of 
the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable 
period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial.’  The purpose of this 
provision ‘is to advise an accused of the evidence against him so that he may have 
a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense at the penalty trial.’  (People v. 
Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 96.)  ‘[W]here the prosecution learns of evidence it 
intends to use in aggravation at the penalty phase for the first time after trial has 
commenced, exclusion of this evidence under section 190.3 is not necessarily 
compelled.  [Citation.]  Under such circumstances, the defendant is entitled to 
prompt notice of the newly discovered evidence, and, if necessary, to a reasonable 
continuance to enable him or her to prepare to meet that evidence.  If the 
prosecutor’s delay in affording notice is unreasonable or unexcused, or if the delay 
would prejudice the defense, the court must exclude the evidence.’ ”  (Smith, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 619.) 
The prosecutor stated he gave notice of the newly discovered evidence as 
soon as he knew of it, and the trial court did not find to the contrary.  Defendant 
argues the prosecutor could have, and should have, discovered his juvenile records 
sooner than he did.  “[I]n the absence of prejudice to defendant, the notice, given 
promptly after the prosecution actually learned of the incident, was adequate.”  
(Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 620.) 
Defendant argues he was prejudiced by the late notice, but fails to 
substantiate that claim.  “In the absence of any indication that the delay in notice 
had in some fashion affected the manner in which defense counsel handled the 
prior proceedings, the appropriate remedy for a violation would ordinarily be to 
grant a continuance as needed to allow defendant to develop a response.”  (People 
v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 334; accord, Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at 
p. 1153.)  Here, defendant was given a one-week continuance, with the possibility 
 
 
62
of additional time if needed.  He presented three witnesses who testified about the 
incidents.  Accordingly, he was fully allowed to develop a response.  Defendant 
claims prejudice because with earlier notice, he “could have told the jury about his 
involvement in the assaults during direct examination.”  He claims the “manner in 
which the assault evidence was presented undoubtedly raised the question, in the 
minds of the jurors, of why [he] did not mention these incidents when discussing 
his life history in direct examination.” 
Defendant could have testified about the incidents after the prosecution 
presented the evidence, just as he called other witnesses to address the events.  
These witnesses largely absolved defendant from wrongdoing.  If the jury believed 
this testimony, it would readily have understood why defendant felt no need to 
mention the incidents on direct examination.   
Because prejudice has not been shown, we need not consider the Attorney 
General’s alternate argument that the evidence of the juvenile incidents would 
have been admissible on rebuttal.  (See People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 
1071.) 
b.  Other Items of Evidence 
One witness testified that he observed defendant kick a high school custodian 
four or five times.  The prosecutor asked whether defendant “seemed to be 
enjoying it.”  The witness responded, “Yeah.”  Defense counsel objected that the 
answer was speculation, irrelevant, and inadmissible under Evidence Code section 
352.  The court overruled the objection. 
Although defendant contends the court erred in overruling the objection, the 
court acted within its discretion.  (Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1124-1125.)  
The witness testified that defendant seemed to enjoy kicking the custodian.  
Because the witness was a percipient witness, he spoke from personal observation.  
 
 
63
He was competent to testify that defendant’s behavior and demeanor were 
consistent with enjoyment.  A history of enjoyment in the infliction of pain is 
relevant at the penalty phase.  Defendant also argues the question called for 
improper opinion evidence.  He did not object on that basis at trial, and he may not 
make that argument on appeal.  (People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 302.)  
Such an objection would have failed.  Generally, a lay witness may not give an 
opinion about another’s state of mind.  However, a witness may testify about 
objective behavior and describe behavior as being consistent with a state of mind. 
Defendant objected to the evidence that he set fire to Tina Whaley’s 
apartment, arguing it was a crime against property, not a crime of violence under 
section 190.3, factor (b).  (See People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776.)  The 
court found that it involved “the use or attempted use of force or violence to 
persons,” and properly overruled the objection.  The arson of Whaley’s home 
could reasonably be considered an attempt to intimidate her by an implied threat 
of violence.  (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 824 [admitting evidence of 
car arson].)  Moreover, the structure involved was an apartment building.  
Defendant’s conduct put other residents and firefighters in physical danger.  
(People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 392.) 
2.  Denial of Motion to Disclose Personnel Records of a Police Officer 
After the trial court ruled that the prosecution could present evidence of 
defendant’s assault on an off-duty police officer, counsel sought discovery of the 
officer’s personnel records.  (See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 
531.)  The court conducted an in camera review of the records and denied the 
motion.  At defendant’s request we have independently reviewed the records and 
conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion in not ordering the records 
disclosed.  (Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 827.) 
 
 
64
3.  Cross-examination of Defendant 
Defendant contends the court erred in permitting the prosecutor to cross-
examine him in various ways. 
On direct examination, defendant testified his parents separated when he was 
13 or 14 years old.  His mother got a job and a new boyfriend, which meant he had 
more responsibility around the house, becoming “a mother and father to my 
brother and sisters.”  He also described an incident when he was 15 years old in 
which his father “got mad at my mother and started to knock her down to the 
ground.  And I jumped him to stop him from beating on her.” 
On cross-examination, defendant was asked whether he had also assaulted his 
mother when he was 15 years old.  Defendant denied doing so, but later admitted 
he had been arrested and referred to the juvenile probation authorities that year 
because his mother had said he had assaulted her.  He again denied committing the 
assault.  Defense counsel did not object to this questioning.  Later, over defense 
counsel’s objection on relevance and hearsay grounds, the court permitted the 
prosecutor to ask defendant whether his mother had reported to the police that he 
had assaulted her.  Defendant said yes, but he also said the charges were “dropped 
after they did the investigation and found out that is not true.”  Later still, over 
defense counsel’s objection as irrelevant and beyond the scope of direct 
examination, the court permitted the prosecutor to ask whether defendant was 
returned to juvenile hall “because you were a failure and living with your aunt.”  
Defendant said yes.  Over a relevance objection, the court permitted the prosecutor 
to ask defendant whether, when he was 15 years old, he had been reported for 
assaulting two janitors and an off-duty police officer at school and sent to a boys 
ranch.  Defendant said he had been but could not remember his age at the time. 
Defendant contends this cross-examination about his juvenile record was 
irrelevant.  He notes that neither he nor any other defense witness had mentioned 
 
 
65
his juvenile record, so it was not proper rebuttal.  The contention lacks merit.18  
When defendant testified he had assumed increased responsibilities at home, had 
become a mother and father to his siblings, and had protected his mother from his 
father, evidence that he had a juvenile record for acts of violence during that time 
period became relevant in rebuttal.  (People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 191-
192.)  “[T]he purpose of rebuttal in this context is to present a more balanced 
picture of the defendant’s personality.”  (In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 208 
(Ross).)  As did the petitioner in Ross, defendant argues that evidence of his 
juvenile record, “as distinct from the criminal behavior itself, was not admissible.  
The argument fails because this evidence was to be used as rebuttal.  ‘. . . The 
rebuttal evidence was not necessarily offered to establish past criminal activity on 
defendant’s part but rather to rebut defendant’s claim of good character.  
[Citation.]  The prosecution’s evidence was highly probative of defendant’s 
character as a juvenile . . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 209.) 
Evidence that defendant’s own mother, whom he claimed to have protected 
from his father, and to have helped so much when she got a job, reported him to 
the police for assault was highly probative of his character regardless of the truth 
of the report.  Moreover, Bob Creamer, defendant’s juvenile probation officer, 
testified that in 1980, defendant had a sustained juvenile petition.  The jury could 
reasonably infer that this sustained petition related to the assault.  Evidence of the 
sustained petition would both rebut defendant’s claim that the charges had been 
dropped and his testimony about his good character.  Under the circumstances, the 
prosecution was not required to relitigate the allegations of the sustained petition 
in order to use it in rebuttal.  (See People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 367-369 
                                              
 
18  Also, the claim regarding the first part of the cross-examination is not 
cognizable because defendant did not object.  (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 
p. 822.)   
 
 
66
(conc. opn. of George, C. J.) [rejecting a hearsay objection to use of convictions to 
show prior criminal activity for sentencing purposes]; People v. Frierson (1991) 
53 Cal.3d 730, 747 [upholding admission of juvenile court adjudication as 
evidence of criminal activity].) 
On direct examination, defendant testified that he had unexpectedly been 
released from jail at midnight on the night of the Whaley arson.  On cross-
examination, the prosecutor established that defendant had “entered into a special 
program,” and signed a “contract” that required him to return to jail.  He was 
supposed to have returned to jail at the time he set the fire.  He did not return, but 
instead went to Texas.  In doing so he committed a crime to which he later pled 
guilty.   
Defendant claims the question regarding whether failing to return to jail was 
a crime was irrelevant, and that the court erroneously overruled his objection 
below.  The testimony was relevant.  It directly rebutted the clear implication in 
defendant’s direct examination that he had been unconditionally released from jail 
at that time.  It was proper to “fully amplify his testimony by inquiring into the 
facts and circumstances surrounding his assertions . . . .”  (Cooper, supra, 53 
Cal.3d at p. 822.)  Moreover, some of his witnesses had testified that, around this 
time, defendant was a good employee, thus implying that he was a responsible 
person.  This rebuttal evidence was admissible “to present a more balanced picture 
of the defendant’s personality.”  (Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 208.) 
Defendant also claims the question whether a crime had been committed was 
improper opinion evidence.  He did not object on this basis; the claim is not 
cognizable.  (Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 822.)  Further, defendant 
subsequently pleaded guilty to a crime in connection with his absconding.  He 
knew the facts; no opinion was required. 
 
 
67
The prosecutor asked defendant whether it was true that he did not “know a 
single person who could come into this courtroom and speak on your behalf.”  The 
court overruled defense counsel’s objection on relevance and vagueness grounds.  
Defendant said that two childhood friends, “the only friends that I ever had,” could 
speak for him.  In response to further questioning, he said that no one who knew 
him well could testify about his character.  He agreed that the witnesses who did 
testify on his behalf did not know him well, and that the persons who knew him 
best are his parents, Yvonne Chatman, Tina Whaley, and Rosalind Wathel.  
Defendant argues that his “knowledge of whether any persons could testify as a 
character witness on his behalf was irrelevant.”  On the contrary, these questions 
established that defendant’s character witnesses did not know him well, and that 
those who knew him best did not speak on his behalf.  The point was relevant to 
the jury’s evaluation of the case in mitigation.   
4.  Admission of Rebuttal Evidence 
Defendant’s juvenile probation officer, Bob Creamer, testified in rebuttal.  
Defendant challenges portions of that testimony. 
Creamer testified that he had frequent contact with defendant’s father, 
usually in “response to a complaint by his father about [defendant’s] behavior.”  
The court overruled defendant’s objection and motion to strike this testimony.  
Creamer also testified that during his supervision, defendant never reported that 
his father was abusing him.  On redirect examination, over defendant’s foundation 
objection, Creamer testified that the father’s complaints were “very inconsistent 
with someone who’s abusing their child,” because a person would not “want to 
have contact with probation or police or any kind of an investigative organization 
to complain about things that are irritating you if you’re dealing with them by 
abusing your child.”  Defense counsel then elicited Creamer’s testimony that a 
 
 
68
child abuser might think he was acting appropriately and not consider his conduct 
abusive.  Creamer also could not say whether defendant’s father hit defendant with 
a belt as defendant had testified. 
Defendant’s contention that Creamer’s testimony about the father’s 
complaints was irrelevant fails.  Creamer did not go into detail regarding the 
complaints, so the testimony was rather innocuous.  The mere fact that the jury 
heard that defendant’s father complained about him could hardly have prejudiced 
defendant.  The testimony was relevant to the jury’s evaluation of defendant’s own 
claim that his father had abused him.  Defendant also contends that “the 
prosecution did not establish that the juvenile probation officer had sufficient 
expertise to render an opinion that the conduct of [defendant’s] father was 
inconsistent with his being a child abuser.”  Assuming defendant’s foundation 
objection was sufficient to preserve this issue (Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 
908, fn. 6), there was no error.  The prosecution established that Creamer had 
substantial expertise.  He had been a probation officer for 22 years, part of which 
he spent investigating child abuse cases.  He held a college degree and a teaching 
credential, as well as a year and a half of graduate study in psychology and 
physiology.  
Creamer also testified over objection that in his opinion, defendant “was not 
particularly truthful when it wasn’t to his advantage,” and  “impressed [him] as 
being violent.”  He was “volatile” and like a “ticking time bomb.”  The testimony 
was proper rebuttal.  Defendant testified that he had become like a mother and 
father to his siblings and had protected his mother.  Creamer’s testimony was 
relevant to defendant’s credibility and to present a more balanced picture of his 
personality.  “The admission of rebuttal evidence is a matter for the sound 
discretion of the trial court,” which was properly exercised here.  (People v. Raley 
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 912.) 
 
 
69
5.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed various acts of misconduct.  
Again, to complain of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, defendant must have 
objected and requested a jury admonition.  (Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841.) 
Defendant contends the prosecutor twice referred to evidence outside the 
record while arguing objections in front of the jury.  Defendant presented evidence 
that his father was arrested for abusing his siblings.  During the arresting officer’s 
testimony, the prosecutor objected to a statement by one of defendant’s sisters on 
hearsay grounds.  Discussing whether the statement was a spontaneous 
declaration, the prosecutor argued that the witness was “describing an event that 
didn’t happen that day.”  A bit later, he stated, “Your honor, . . . you’re putting me 
in a very uncomfortable situation, but I’ve got a transcript of what took place 
because the children were deposed at a preliminary examination and they said 
clearly there was nothing of that type that happened that day.  And you keep 
making—I don’t know how you want me to—.”  Defense counsel objected to the 
prosecutor “testifying.”  The prosecutor said, “I’ve been trying to do it out of the 
presence of the jury, but you keep forcing me to enunciate it, so I will.  Nothing 
happened of that sort that day, and I have the testimony of the children to that 
effect.  And there’s a misunderstanding here.”  He also said, “There’s two distinct 
events going on here.  And he, in answer to the question by counsel, was 
immediately supplying information relating that something happened on a 
different date.  And that’s not a spontaneous statement.”  At this point, the witness 
said he had had contact with the family on two occasions, and he was able to 
distinguish between the two.  Later, the prosecutor objected again and a hearing 
was held outside the presence of the jury.  Eventually, the court overruled the 
prosecutor’s hearsay objection, and the testimony continued. 
 
 
70
Defendant contends the prosecutor’s reference to the preliminary hearing 
transcript was improper.  However, he did not request the jury be admonished to 
disregard the comments.  The issue is not cognizable.  An admonition could have 
cured any harm.  The prosecutor never said that the alleged events did not happen, 
but only that they occurred on different days.  The prosecutor’s statement that 
there were two different incidents was not prejudicial.  Indeed, the fact that police 
were called on two separate days would have added weight to defendant’s claim 
that his father was a violent man. 
On cross-examination, defendant was asked whether any of his father’s 
siblings “live[d] locally while you were growing up.”  In response to a relevance 
objection, the prosecutor argued “any of these brothers and sisters who live locally 
would have some knowledge of the extent of the treatment that this defendant 
received and what it was like for him growing up, and I’m curious if any of these 
people are going to come in and testify to it.”  The court permitted the question for 
that “limited purpose,” and defendant testified that some of them did live locally.  
Defendant contends the prosecutor also referred to evidence outside the record in 
his response to the relevance objection.  Again, his failure to object or request an 
admonition renders the issue not cognizable.  In any event, the prosecutor did not 
inform the jury of anything.  Instead, to show that the question was relevant, he 
merely argued an inference the jury could draw from an answer that some siblings 
lived locally.  There was no misconduct. 
The prosecutor asked defendant whether his father, mother, aunts and uncles 
were going to testify.  Each time the court sustained a relevance objection.  Once, 
when defendant answered that he did not know, the answer was stricken and the 
jury directed to disregard it.  Defendant claims the prosecutor’s questions were 
misconduct.  Beyond sustained objections and a stricken answer, defense counsel 
sought no further admonition.  These questions sought legitimate testimony to 
 
 
71
support the proper argument that defendant failed to call logical witnesses who 
could have corroborated some of his testimony.  (People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
215, 262-263 (Wash).)  The fact that these witnesses did not testify was relevant.  
The questions may have been premature and unnecessary.  Their nonappearance 
would eventually be evident, but the questions caused no prejudice. 
On cross-examination, defendant insisted he could not remember actually 
stabbing his victim.  He also denied telling William Speed, Tina Whaley, and 
Rosalind Wathel anything to the contrary and, in response to questions, said they 
were lying.  In a contention similar to his guilt phase argument, defendant 
contends the “were they lying” questions were improper.  The contention lacks 
merit for the reasons given in the guilt phase discussion.  (Ante, pt. II.C.5.a.) 
One of defendant’s high school teachers testified that defendant did not relate 
much with other students but was “more of a loner.”  He was “quiet,” 
“cooperative,” “pleasant,” and “not a problem of any kind.”  On cross 
examination, the prosecutor asked whether she had heard about the defendant’s 
assault on the two school janitors.  Defendant objected on the basis that it was 
improper cross-examination and unduly prejudicial.  The court sustained the 
objection, finding that the question did not impeach the witness’s testimony and 
that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. 
Another defense witness who worked for a church in Houston, testified that 
defendant was hard working and reliable, “a model employee.”  On cross 
examination, the witness testified that defendant never stole from him or the 
church even though he had the opportunity to do so.  At this point, the prosecutor 
asked, “But had you heard at the time he was working for you he’s committing 
burglaries on the outside?”  Defendant objected.  The court effectively sustained 
the objection, stating it did not “think there’s any evidence that this witness has 
testified to his character.”  Over objection, the court permitted the prosecutor to 
 
 
72
ask the witness whether defendant had told him “about a time that he worked . . . 
on another job drunk and took a swing at his boss.”  The witness answered, “No.” 
Defendant unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial based on these questions.  The 
court clarified its view that if a witness limited his testimony to “merely 
employment, employer, non-personal testimony, I think I will rule under 
[Evidence Code section] 352 that any other have-you-heard questions as to 
character is inappropriate and will be excluded.”  The prosecutor assured the court 
that he had a good-faith belief that the questions were factually based. 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in asking the 
“have you heard” questions regarding the school assault and the burglaries.  The 
claim is not cognizable because defense counsel did not request an admonition.  
When he moved for a mistrial, counsel argued that an admonition would have 
been unavailing.  As discussed below, we discern neither misconduct nor 
prejudice. 
Within the sound exercise of its discretion the court could have allowed the 
questions.  Penalty phase rebuttal evidence is proper if it relates directly to a 
particular character trait defendant offers in his own behalf.  (Ross, supra, 10 
Cal.4th at p. 207.)  Here, the first of the witnesses testified that defendant was 
“quiet,” “cooperative,” “pleasant,” and “not a problem of any kind.”  The second 
witness testified that defendant was a “model employee” and never stole from him 
even though he had the opportunity to do so.  This testimony made it reasonable 
for the prosecutor to ask defendant’s teacher about defendant’s assault on the 
janitors and his employer about the burglaries.  The prosecutor could reasonably 
have asked these questions in good faith.  In general, “have you heard” questions 
regarding acts or conduct inconsistent with the witness’s testimony are 
appropriate, so long as the prosecutor has a good faith belief that the acts actually 
occurred.  (People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1066-1067.)  Although bad 
 
 
73
faith is not a prerequisite to  misconduct (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 
822-823), the record here establishes no reprehensible conduct of any kind.  It is 
not misconduct to ask a question in good faith even if the court exercises its 
discretion by sustaining an objection. 
We also see no prejudice.  Later, the prosecutor did present evidence 
regarding the assault on the custodians, so asking about it could not itself have 
caused prejudice.  He did not prove any burglary.  But the court instructed the 
jury, “Statements made by the attorneys during the trial are not evidence . . . .  If 
an objection was sustained to a question, do not guess what the answer might have 
been.  Do not speculate as to the reason for the objection.  Do not assume to be 
true any insinuation suggested by a question asked a witness.  A question is not 
evidence and may be considered only as it enables you to understand the answer.”  
It also instructed, “Where on cross-examination a witness is asked if he or she has 
heard of reports of certain conduct of a defendant inconsistent with the traits of 
good character to which the witness has testified, such questions and the witness’s 
answers thereto may be considered only for the purpose of determining the weight 
to be given to the opinion of the witness or to his or her testimony as to the good 
reputation of the defendant.  Such questions and answers are not evidence that the 
reports are true, and you must not assume from them that the defendant did in fact 
himself or herself consistently conduct himself or herself inconsistently with such 
traits of character.”  We assume the jury followed these instructions, and that any 
prejudice from the brief reference to burglaries was thus avoided.  (Jones, supra, 
15 Cal.4th at p. 168.) 
One of defendant’s cousins testified about the assault on the off-duty police 
officer.  The prosecutor asked on cross-examination whether the witness had told 
his mother about the incident.  Defense counsel objected as irrelevant.  The 
prosecutor replied that the question went to credibility.  Defense counsel asked, 
 
 
74
“Why is that credibility?”  The prosecutor responded, “Because none of this is the 
truth.”  Defense counsel objected “to that improper statement and move[d] for 
assignment of misconduct that the prosecutor [is] stating his personal opinion.”  
The court overruled the original objection, but also “instruct[ed] the jury to 
disregard all statements of counsel as I’ve previously done.  They’re not to be 
construed in any manner, shape or form.  I instruct counsel to refrain from future 
banter.”  Outside the jury’s presence counsel moved that the prosecutor be cited 
for contempt and requested a further admonition.  The prosecutor responded that 
he had not expressed a personal opinion but merely argued the question was 
relevant to show that the witness was lying.  After having the record reread, the 
court ruled its admonition was sufficient. 
It is misconduct for a prosecutor to argue his personal opinion of the 
evidence if the jury might infer that the opinion is based on information or 
evidence outside the record.  (Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 781-782.)  Given 
the context in which the comment was made and the court’s prompt admonition, it 
is unlikely that the jury drew any improper conclusion from the prosecutor’s 
comment, let alone the conclusion that the comment reflected information outside 
the record.  It is hardly a revelation to learn that an opposing lawyer considers a 
witness’s testimony untrue.  No factual information was provided and the court’s 
prompt admonition cured any potential prejudice. 
During  penalty phase argument, the prosecutor noted defendant’s evidence 
of abuse as a child but also the lack of expert testimony connecting any such abuse 
with defendant’s adult crimes.  He argued that without that testimony, the jury 
should not rely on the evidence for any purpose but sympathy.  He then argued, 
“Before the defense explains the value of this evidence, as abuse must have, they 
should first explain to you why they spent a preposterous amount of money—”  At 
this point, defense counsel objected to the argument as an “appeal to passion and 
 
 
75
impact of whatever the case might cost and—per any side, as improper.”  The 
prosecutor responded, “What I’m trying to do is explain how shaky the defense is, 
because it fails to present a competent expert to explain it and what I’m asking is if 
they were willing to examine one witness, why didn’t they spend the same amount 
of money to examine their own client.”  The court overruled the objection and, 
“[o]nce again, instruct[ed] the jury that statements of counsel are not to be 
construed as evidence.”  The prosecutor then continued to argue, “What I was 
saying to you is that before the defense suggests any additional value to this 
evidence they should first explain to you why they spent a preposterous amount of 
money for a psychologist to examine the witness Rosalind Wathel, and yet, did not 
present the testimony of any expert who examined Erik Chatman.  Very simply, 
why didn’t they call a psychologist?  Why didn’t they call a psychiatrist who had 
something meaningful to say about Chatman?  I would suggest to you that there 
was no one.  There was no one who could corroborate this testimony.” 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the passion of 
the jurors, denigrated defense counsel, and referred to evidence outside the record.  
The prosecutor’s overall point, which the jury could readily understand, was that 
the defense had presented no expert evidence connecting the claimed abuse with 
defendant’s crimes and that, had such evidence existed, the defense would have 
presented it.  Comment on the failure to call logical witnesses is legitimate.  
(Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 262-263.)  The fact that the defense went to great 
lengths to examine the witness Wathel strengthened this argument.  It is true that 
neither the jury nor the prosecutor knew whether defense counsel had spent money 
examining defendant, but the court again admonished the jury that statements of 
counsel were not evidence, and the point was unimportant.  There was no 
reasonable likelihood the jury gave the comments any improper meaning, and no 
prejudice occurred.  (Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663.) 
 
 
76
Occasionally and without objection, the prosecutor referred to defendant as a 
“monster” in his argument.  Defendant now contends the references were 
improper, but because he did not object, the claim is not cognizable.  An 
admonition could have cured any harm.  Moreover, if the crime was committed as 
the prosecutor urged, it was not misconduct for him to label it as monstrous.  The 
comment was permissible.  (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 1002-
1003, and cases cited.) 
Defendant contends that the prosecutor misstated the law governing the  
evidence in mitigation, by arguing that the jury could not consider certain 
evidence as a matter of law.  (See Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4-
8.)  The issue is not cognizable.  Defendant failed to object and an admonition 
would have cured any harm.  Moreover, we have reviewed the comments 
defendant cites and find no impropriety.  The prosecutor never argued that the jury 
was not legally allowed to consider any mitigating evidence.  He only argued that 
factually some of the evidence did not mitigate the crimes.  “Although a jury may 
not be prevented from considering mitigating evidence, the prosecutor may argue 
that the evidence does not, in fact, support a particular mitigating factor.”  (People 
v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 764 (Cleveland).)  The prosecutor here did no 
more. 
6.  Instructional Issues 
Defendant contends the jury was misinstructed. 
The trial court correctly instructed that before a juror could consider any 
criminal act in aggravation that “juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did in fact commit such criminal acts.”  (See People v. 
Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-54.)  It did not define reasonable doubt as part 
of its penalty instructions, although it had done so at the guilt phase.  Defendant 
 
 
77
contends the court erred in not defining reasonable doubt again.  He notes that the 
court also instructed the jury at the penalty phase to “[d]isregard all other 
instructions given to you in other phases of this trial” and argues that these 
instructions left the penalty jury uninformed as to the definition of reasonable 
doubt. 
The court should have redefined reasonable doubt at the penalty phase.  
However, as in People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 685, “[a]ny possible error 
arising from the court’s failure to [do so] was harmless.”  Absent any suggestion 
to the contrary, the jury would likely have assumed the reasonable doubt the court 
referred to at the penalty phase had the same meaning as the term had during the 
guilt phase.  There is no reasonable likelihood (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 
495, 525) the jury would have believed the reasonable doubt analysis it was 
required to engage in at the penalty phase was somehow different than the 
reasonable doubt analysis it had already engaged in at the guilt phase.  That the 
court would not have changed the meaning of such an important term without 
saying so is a “commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all 
that has taken place at the trial [that is] likely to prevail over technical 
hairsplitting.”  (Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 381.)  Additionally, “the 
jury did not request a further explanation of the reasonable doubt standard, as it 
surely would have done had it been confused as to the meaning of reasonable 
doubt.”  (Holt, at p. 685.) 
Defendant relies primarily on People v. Elguera (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1214, 
which found prejudicial error for failure to instruct on the reasonable doubt 
standard.  The case is distinguishable.  The Elguera trial court did not mention 
reasonable doubt at all in its instructions, not even to say the defendant had to be 
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Although it had discussed reasonable 
doubt during jury selection, “the instruction was not given to actual jurors, but to 
 
 
78
prospective jurors who at the time did not know whether they would ultimately 
serve in the case.  As a result, the members of the panel could well have viewed 
the court’s remarks as hypothetical and thus have failed to give the instruction the 
same focused attention they would have had they been impaneled and sworn.”  
(Id. at p. 1222.)  Here, by contrast, the court instructed that the jurors had to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had committed another crime before 
they could consider it in aggravation.  Further, the jury had actually applied the 
reasonable doubt standard at the guilt phase, and found in defendant’s favor 
regarding some allegations. 
The trial court refused defendant’s request to instruct the jury that it “must 
not consider as an aggravating factor the existence of any special circumstance if 
you have already considered the facts of the special circumstance as a 
circumstance of the crime for which the defendant has been convicted.  [¶]  In 
other words, do not consider the same facts more than once in determining the 
presence of aggravating factors.”  We rejected the identical claim of error in 
People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 288-290.  In the absence of misleading 
argument, not present here, there is no “reasonable likelihood that the jury applied 
the instructions given it in a legally improper manner.”  (Id. at p. 290.) 
Defendant challenges the court’s refusal to instruct that the jury could 
consider in mitigation any mental or emotional disturbance he has suffered.  He 
argues that because the court instructed the jury in terms of section 190.3, factor 
(d), which requires the jury to consider whether the defendant “was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” when he committed the 
offense, the jury was precluded from considering a disturbance that was less than 
extreme.  The argument fails.  The court also told the jury to consider “any other 
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a 
legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s 
 
 
79
character or background that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less 
than death whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.”  This 
“catchall” instruction allowed consideration of any nonextreme mental or 
emotional disturbance.  (Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 190.) 
Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 8.88, the standard penalty phase 
concluding instruction, is constitutionally flawed in various respects.  We have 
repeatedly upheld this instruction and continue to do so.  Use of the words “so 
substantial” does not render the instruction impermissibly vague.  (People v. Crew 
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 858.)  Use of the term “warrants” does not render the 
instruction overbroad and permissive.  (Ibid.)  The instruction need not state that 
the prosecution has the burden of proof with respect to the appropriate 
punishment.  (Ibid.)  The jury need not make written findings or achieve 
unanimity as to specific aggravating circumstances.  Except as to other crimes, it 
need not find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances are true.  
(People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1233 (Young).)  Nor need the jury find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
ones, or that the death penalty is appropriate.  (Ibid.)  The instruction need not 
relate that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole means 
the defendant will never be paroled.  (Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 635-636.)  
The instruction does not improperly omit that the jury must return a verdict of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole if it finds that the mitigating factors 
outweigh the aggravating factors, or that it may return a sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole even in the complete absence of 
any mitigating evidence.  (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 600, fn. 20; 
People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1231.)  The jury may 
constitutionally consider unadjudicated criminal activity in aggravation.  (Smith, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 642.)  Contrary to defendant’s contention, Ring v. Arizona 
 
 
80
(2002) 536 U.S. 584, and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 do not 
affect these conclusions.  (Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 642.) 
E.  Cumulative Error 
Defendant’s contention that the cumulative effect of the asserted errors was 
prejudicial, fails.  There was no significant error to accumulate.  Defendant 
received a fair trial.   
F.  Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty Law 
Defendant challenges California’s death penalty law on grounds we have 
repeatedly rejected.  Given the catchall factor (k) of section 190.3, the wording of 
some of the other factors listed in that section does not prevent full consideration 
of mitigation.  (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 439.)  The statute does not 
unconstitutionally fail to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.  
(Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1233.)  Prosecutorial discretion in charging special 
circumstances or seeking the death penalty is not unconstitutional.  (Ibid.)  
Intercase proportionality review is not required.  (Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 
p. 768.) 
“We do undertake intracase proportionality review on request to determine 
whether the penalty is disproportionate to the defendant’s personal culpability 
. . . .”  (Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 768.)  Defendant does not specifically 
request intracase proportionality review, but the death penalty he faces is not 
disproportionate to his conduct.  Defendant acted alone when he stabbed his 
victim to death.  The jury found, on proper and substantial evidence, that the 
killing involved torture.  Defendant committed other crimes of violence, both 
before and after he murdered Rosellina Lo Bue.  The death sentence does not 
shock the conscience.  (Id. at p. 769, fn. 11.)  
 
 
81
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
  
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
*GEMELLO, J.  
 
 
 
 
                                              
  *  Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division 5, 
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the California 
Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Chatman 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S032509 
Date Filed: May 8, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: John T. Ball 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Mark Goldrosen, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, 
Assistant Attorney General, Ronald S. Matthias and Jeremy Friedlander, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark Goldrosen 
139 Townsend St., Suite 201 
San Francisco, CA  94107 
(415) 495-0112 
 
Jeremy Friedlander 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5974