Case Title: Abbott v. Vavala, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 60, 2022

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2022-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RICHARD L. ABBOTT,  
§  
 
§ No. 60, 2022 
          Plaintiff Below, 
§  
          Appellant,     
 
 
     § Court Below—Court of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     § Chancery of the State of 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
     § Delaware 
 
 
 
 
 
      
     § 
KATHLEEN M. VAVALA, DAVID      § C.A. No. 2021-0409 
A. WHITE, COLLINS J. SEITZ, JR.,  
     § 
JAMES T. VAUGHN, JR., TAMIKA      § 
 
R. MONTGOMERY-REEVES, 
 
     § 
GARY F. TRAYNOR, and KAREN      § 
L. VALIHURA, 
 
 
 
     § 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     § 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
     § 
 
Appellees.  
 
 
     § 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 7, 2022 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
August 22, 2022 
 
Before RIDGELY, Justice;* NEWELL and DANBERG, Chief Judges,** 
 
PER CURIAM: 
ORDER 
 
(1) 
On May 10, 2021, Plaintiff-Appellant Richard L. Abbott filed a 
complaint in the Court of Chancery against the Chief Disciplinary Counsel and 
Disciplinary Counsel of the Delaware Office of Disciplinary Counsel (the “ODC 
Defendants”) and the Chief Justice and Justices of the Delaware Supreme Court (the 
 
* Sitting by designation pursuant to DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 38, 29 Del. C. § 5610(a)(2), and 
Supreme Court Rule 2(a). 
** Sitting by designation pursuant to DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 12 and Supreme Court Rule 2(a). 
2 
 
“Supreme Court Defendants” and, together with the ODC Defendants, the 
“Appellees”).  The complaint alleged that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
(“ODC”) “has been harassing and attacking Abbott in bad faith based upon false 
allegations” by pursuing lawyer disciplinary proceedings against Abbott arising 
from a Vice Chancellor’s referral to ODC in mid-2015 alleging, in essence, that 
Abbott had advised a client to enter into a sham transaction in order to avoid 
enforcement of a court order.1  The complaint further alleged that the Supreme Court 
Defendants “declined to take any action or intervene in order to stop” the alleged 
wrongdoing by the ODC Defendants.2  It also alleged that Delaware’s lawyer 
disciplinary system targets sole practitioners and fails to discipline “big firm and big 
government” lawyers for ethical violations.3 
(2) 
The complaint asserted that the Appellees violated Abbott’s 
constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution, entitling Abbott to declaratory and injunctive relief. Abbott also 
 
1 Abbott v. Vavala, C.A. No. 2021-0409, Docket Entry No. 1, Complaint ¶¶ 24-37 and exhibits 
cited therein (Del. Ch. filed May 10, 2021) [hereinafter Complaint].  See also Abbott v. Vavala, 
2022 WL 453609, at *2 n.2 & accompanying text (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2022) (explaining court’s 
understanding of the status of the disciplinary proceedings and noting Abbott’s disclosure of the 
nature of the proceedings); id. at *4 (“The impetus of the complaint against Mr. Abbot[t] stemmed 
from a Delaware judicial officer’s report to ODC that Mr. Abbott engaged in unethical litigation 
tactics.  Those allegations included his alleged advice to a client regarding how to circumvent a 
court judgment.” (citations omitted)). 
2 Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 42. 
3 Id. ¶¶ 42-43. 
3 
 
asserted that the Appellees violated the Federal RICO statute,4 the Federal Civil 
Rights Act;5 and the Delaware State RICO statute.6  In addition to a temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction, the complaint sought three forms of 
relief.  First, the complaint sought a declaratory judgment holding that “the 
Defendants must cease further harassment, attacks, and prosecution of Abbott;” the 
Appellees had violated federal and state racketeering laws and Section 1983; and the 
attorney disciplinary system generally, and the proceeding against Abbott 
specifically, were invalid and unenforceable.7  Second, the complaint sought a 
permanent injunction prohibiting current and future disciplinary proceedings against 
Abbott and preventing future unconstitutional conduct of the attorney disciplinary 
system.8  Third, the complaint asked the court to appoint a receiver “to take over 
control and management” of ODC.9  The Appellees moved to dismiss the complaint 
on the grounds that (i) the Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction over Abbott’s 
claims because this Court has sole and exclusive authority over attorney discipline; 
(ii) the Supreme Court Defendants were protected by judicial immunity; (iii) the 
claims against the ODC Defendants were barred by quasi-judicial immunity and 
prosecutorial immunity; and (iv) the complaint failed to state a claim. 
 
4 18 U.S.C. ch. 96. 
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
6 11 Del. C. ch. 15. 
7 Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 135-36. 
8 Id. ¶ 148. 
9 Id. ¶ 153. 
4 
 
(3) 
On June 3, 2021, after briefing and a hearing, the Court of Chancery 
denied Abbott’s motions for a temporary restraining order and to expedite portions 
of the proceedings.  Abbott filed a notice of appeal from those interlocutory orders.  
The Chief Justice designated former Justice Henry duPont Ridgely, Chief Judge 
Michael K. Newell of the Family Court, and Chief Judge Carl C. Danberg of the 
Court of Common Pleas to fill the quorum.  The Court refused the interlocutory 
appeal.10  
(4) 
On February 15, 2022, the Court of Chancery, after briefing and a 
hearing, entered an opinion and order granting the Appellees’ motion to dismiss.  
The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant Abbott the relief that 
he sought.11 The court determined that it need not address the Appellees’ immunity 
defenses or the Rule 12(b)(6) component of their motion to dismiss.  Abbott filed a 
motion for correction of the February 15, 2022 order, which the Court of Chancery 
denied.12  Abbott then filed this appeal. 
(5) 
On February 28, 2022, the Chief Justice entered an order stating that a 
three-Justice panel was not available to consider this appeal and designating retired 
Justice Ridgely, Chief Judge Newell, and Chief Judge Danberg (collectively, the 
 
10 Abbott v. Vavala, 2021 WL 2935349 (Del. July 12, 2021). 
11 Abbott v. Vavala, 2022 WL 453609 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2022). 
12 Abbott v. Vavala, 2022 WL 563048 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2022). 
5 
 
“Merits Panel”) to make up the quorum required by Article IV, Section 12 of the 
Delaware Constitution.13  
(6) 
Abbott filed a motion for disqualification of former Justice Ridgely, 
which the Merits Panel denied by order dated March 15, 2022.  Abbott filed a timely 
motion for reargument.  On April 5, 2022, the Court entered an order granting 
reargument, withdrawing the March 15, 2022 order, and directing that the original 
motion to disqualify shall be heard anew and affording Abbott the opportunity to 
submit full briefing on the motion for disqualification. The order granting 
reargument also stated that former Justice Ridgely had decided not to participate in 
the Court’s decision on the motion to disqualify.  On April 29, 2022, the Chief 
Justice entered a second order designating Judge Peter B. Jones of the Family Court 
to serve on the panel with Chief Judge Newell and Chief Judge Danberg 
(collectively, the “Disqualification Panel”) to consider the motion for 
disqualification.14  The Order also provided that Chief Judge Newell would serve as 
the head of the Disqualification Panel.15 
(7) 
The Disqualification Panel denied the motion for disqualification of 
former Justice Ridgely on July 7, 2022.16  Abbott did not move for reargument. 
 
13 Abbott v. Vavala, 60, 2022, Docket Entry No. 3 (Del. Feb. 28, 2022); see DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 
12 (“A quorum of the Supreme Court shall consist of not less than three Justices.”). 
14 Abbott v. Vavala, 60, 2022, Docket Entry No. 18 (Del. Apr. 29, 2022). 
15 Id. 
16 Abbott v. Vavala, 60, 2022, Docket Entry No. 27 (Del. July 7, 2022). 
6 
 
Therefore, Judge Jones’s designated service was complete.17  The motion for 
disqualification having been denied and briefing of the appeal having been finished 
on June 22, 2022, the appeal was ready for submission for decision by the Merits 
Panel.  We turn now to the merits of the issues raised in this appeal.  For the reasons 
which follow, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Chancery dismissing the 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
(8) 
The Court of Chancery held that “[n]o trial court in Delaware has 
jurisdiction over attorney discipline or governance matters.  Based upon that 
premise, it follows that the Court has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive or 
declaratory relief against the individuals who are part and parcel of a higher Court 
that holds exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.”18  Abbott argues that the Court of 
Chancery’s general equitable jurisdiction,19 including its jurisdiction over matters 
involving requests for equitable relief,20 provided it with jurisdiction over his claims.  
 
17 See Abbott v. Vavala, 60, 2022, Docket Entry No. 18 (Del. Apr. 29, 2022) (“[A] quorum of the 
Supreme Court not being available to sit as a three-justice panel to consider the Appellant’s motion 
for disqualification of retired Justice Henry duPont Ridgely from the panel to consider his appeal, 
Judge Peter B. Jones of the Family Court is designated pursuant to art. IV § 12 of the Delaware 
Constitution and Supreme Court Rule 2(a), to make up the quorum required by art. IV § 12 of the 
Delaware Constitution.”) (emphasis added). 
18 Abbott v. Vavala, 2022 WL 453609, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2022). 
19 See 10 Del. C. § 341 (“The Court of Chancery shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all 
matters and causes in equity.”); id. § 342 (“The Court of Chancery shall not have jurisdiction to 
determine any matter wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before 
any other court or jurisdiction of this State.”). 
20 See Nat’l Indus. Group (Holding) v. Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C., 67 A.3d 373, 382 (Del. 2013) 
(“It is well-established that the Court of Chancery has subject matter jurisdiction where (among 
other things) a party:  1) seeks an equitable remedy, such as specific performance or an injunction, 
and 2) lacks an adequate remedy at law.”). 
7 
 
More specifically, he contends that the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to enjoin 
administrative proceedings and bad faith criminal prosecutions, and he argues that 
lawyer disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal, professional regulatory 
proceedings that the Court of Chancery may enjoin.  We review de novo the issue 
whether the Court of Chancery has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.21  
(9) 
“As Delaware’s Constitutional court of equity, the Court of Chancery 
can acquire subject matter jurisdiction over a cause in only three ways, namely, if:  
(1) one or more of the plaintiff’s claims for relief is equitable in character, (2) the 
plaintiff requests relief that is equitable in nature, or (3) subject matter jurisdiction 
is conferred by statute.”22  Abbott does not point to any statute that expressly confers 
jurisdiction on the Court of Chancery over Federal RICO, State RICO, or Section 
1983 actions.23  Rather, he claims the Court of Chancery’s equity jurisdiction 
 
21 Candlewood Timber Group, LLC v. Pan Am. Energy, LLC, 859 A.2d 989, 997 (Del. 2004). 
22 Id. (citations omitted). 
23 We note that the Delaware Code expressly confers jurisdiction on the Superior Court over State 
RICO claims.  See 11 Del. C. § 1505(a) (“The Superior Court of this State shall have jurisdiction 
to prevent and restrain violations of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including but not 
limited to:  Ordering any person to divest any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing 
reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person including, but not 
limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise 
engaged in; or ordering the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision 
of the rights of innocent persons.”).  As to jurisdiction over actions under Section 1983, this Court 
has observed that “[w]hile concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims may lie in either the Superior 
Court or the Court of Chancery, the selection of the forum is dictated by the relief sought.”  Kerns 
v. Dukes, 707 A.2d 363, 368 (Del. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Scion Breckenridge 
Managing Member, LLC v. ASB Allegiance Real Estate Fund, 68 A.3d 665, 685 & n.94 (Del. 
2013).  
8 
 
permitted the court to grant him injunctive relief based upon his claims under those 
statutes. 
(10) 
The Court of Chancery is a court of limited jurisdiction that hears 
matters in equity, not attorney disciplinary proceedings. At bottom, Abbott’s 
constitutional claims which he seeks to assert through the above statutes are matters 
that he may raise in the pending disciplinary proceeding.  The Court of Chancery’s 
general power to provide injunctive relief does not confer subject matter jurisdiction 
on that court to enjoin the Supreme Court, the members of the Supreme Court, or 
the ODC attorneys from performing their respective functions under the Delaware 
Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.  As this Court has repeatedly stated, it 
has “the ‘inherent and exclusive authority to discipline members of the Delaware 
Bar.’”24  This Court has established a process for exercising that authority that 
includes substantial procedural protections for an attorney who is accused of 
misconduct.25  The injunction that Abbott seeks would halt ongoing disciplinary 
 
24 In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 484 (Del. 2007) (quoting In re Froelich, 838 A.2d 1117, 1120 (Del. 
2003)); see also, e.g., State ex rel. Abbott v. Aaronson, 2019 WL 925856, at *1-2 (Del. Feb. 25, 
2019) (stating that the “Superior Court, of course, does not have the power to command this Court 
or its employees to carry out their official duties” and that “[t]his result is also consistent with this 
Court’s inherent and exclusive authority to discipline members of the Delaware Bar” (citations 
and internal quotations omitted)); In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215, 220 (Del. 
1990) (“In Delaware there is the fundamental constitutional principle that this Court, alone, has 
sole and exclusive responsibility over all matters affecting governance of the Bar.”). 
25 See In re Kelly, 2022 WL 3270230, at *8 (Del. Aug. 10, 2022) (stating that “[p]roceedings to 
determine attorney incapacity” are “conducted in the same manner as disciplinary proceedings” 
and “contain extensive procedural due process protections for respondents,” and reciting some of 
those protections); Abbott v. State Public Integrity Comm’n, 2019 WL 937184, at *5 (Del. Feb. 
25, 2019) (recognizing that the “process for attorney discipline has extensive procedural due 
9 
 
proceedings against him, prohibit future disciplinary proceedings against him, and 
place control of the entire lawyer disciplinary system outside the control of this 
Court.  Regardless of Abbott’s attempt to frame his claims as asserting violations of 
Federal or State RICO or Section 1983, the Court of Chancery lacks jurisdiction to 
grant the relief that Abbott seeks.  Indeed, this Court has reversed, on the basis of 
the Court’s exclusive authority to govern the Bar, trial courts’ much more 
circumscribed forays into the attorney-discipline arena.26 
(11) 
Like the Court of Chancery we are not persuaded by Abbott’s 
argument that case law addressing the Court of Chancery’s authority to enjoin 
administrative proceedings or bad faith prosecutions applies.  None of the cases on 
 
process protections”); see also, e.g., DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 64 (establishing the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel and setting forth the powers and duties of disciplinary counsel); DEL. LAWYERS’ R. 
DISCIPLINARY P. 9, 15 (providing for various procedural protections, including but not limited to 
preliminary review of alleged misconduct, notice to respondent, respondent’s opportunity to 
respond to allegations and present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, a burden on ODC to 
establish misconduct by “clear and convincing evidence,” and the opportunity to submit objections 
to the Supreme Court). 
26 See, e.g., Hunt v. Court of Chancery, 2021 WL 2418984 (Del. June 10, 2021) (reversing sanction 
imposed by the Court of Chancery on a Texas attorney admitted pro hac vice for uncivil email, 
based in part on the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction over attorney discipline); Crumplar v. 
Superior Court, 56 A.3d 1000, 1009-10 (Del. 2012) (“If a trial judge believes an attorney has 
committed misconduct, referral to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, not Rule 11 sanctions, is the 
proper recourse in the absence of prejudicial disruption of the proceeding.  . . .  Referral to the 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, an agency of this Court, is consistent with the principle that this 
Court alone has inherent and exclusive responsibility for disciplining members of the Delaware 
Bar.”); Infotechnology, 582 A.2d at 216-17 (holding that Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction to 
disqualify plaintiff’s counsel, which had previously represented defendants’ investment banker in 
unrelated matters, because “[u]nless the challenged conduct prejudices the fairness of the 
proceedings, such that it adversely affects the fair and efficient administration of justice, only this 
Court has the power and responsibility to govern the Bar”). 
10 
 
which Abbott relies—including Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,27 In re 
Ruffalo,28 Delaware River & Bay Authority v. Carello,29 and Hayward v. Gaston30—
addresses whether, let alone holds that, a trial court of limited jurisdiction may enjoin 
a higher court with exclusive jurisdiction over a matter and an arm of that court from 
carrying out their official functions as to that matter.  To the extent that case law 
from other states reaches a different conclusion regarding the supervision of lawyers 
in those states,31 we decline to follow it because that case law is inconsistent with 
Delaware law.  Moreover, contrary to Abbott’s contentions,32 “the admission and 
the removal of attorneys are judicial acts”33 and attorney disciplinary proceedings 
 
27 425 A.2d 156, 160 (Del. Ch. 1980). 
28 390 U.S. 544 (1968). 
29 222 A.2d 794 (Del. Ch. 1966). 
30 542 A.2d 760 (Del. 1988). 
31 See, e.g., Eugster v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 397 P.3d 131 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that 
trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over attorney’s claims under Section 1983, but that res 
judicata barred the lawsuit); State Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (“The 
Court’s inherent powers, such as the power to regulate the practice of law, are 
not jurisdictional powers.  These powers are administrative powers, necessary to the preservation 
of the judiciary’s independence and integrity.” (citation omitted)); id. at 246 (“This is not to say 
that all remedies bearing upon the regulation of the legal profession would be unacceptable 
infringements on the inherent powers of the Court.  Had this Court actually promulgated rules 
establishing a pro bono program and had Gomez challenged the constitutionality of such rules, the 
district court would have jurisdiction to decide, in the first instance, whether such rules met 
constitutional standards.”); Clary v. Mathews, 160 S.E.2d 338, 339 (Ga. 1968) (“Upon reviewing 
the rules of the State Bar of Georgia, we find that the intent therein was to afford the member 
complained against a hearing before an impartial tribunal at all stages of the proceedings; however, 
no provisions for entering such challenge is provided at the probable cause hearing.  Therefore, 
petitioner does not have a complete and adequate remedy at law and may resort to a court of equity 
to restrain a member from serving on such grievance tribunal when he is as alleged prejudiced 
against him in the cause.” (citation omitted)). 
32 See Opening Brief at 26-27 (arguing that attorney disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal 
or administrative in nature). 
33 Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 535 (1868).   
11 
 
are “judicial in nature.”34  Abbott correctly observes that in 1984 this Court 
characterized the Board on Professional Responsibility (“BPR”) as “an agency of 
this Court” and proceedings before the BPR as “administrative in nature.”35  But 
nothing in Kennedy suggested or held that a Delaware trial court has jurisdiction to 
enjoin this Court or its “arms” or “agencies” from carrying out their respective roles 
in assisting this Court in governing the Bar.  The Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of 
Disciplinary Procedure adopted by this Court in 2000 confirm that the Delaware 
attorney disciplinary process at issue here is judicial in nature.  They provide in Rule 
1(a) that this Court is responsible for “dispos[ing] of individual cases of lawyer 
discipline” and “administer[ing] the lawyer disciplinary system.”36 
(12) 
Finally, we agree with the Court of Chancery’s conclusion that Abbott 
has an adequate alternative remedy to the injunctive relief that he sought, namely 
raising “his federal and state contentions that the process is unfair or 
unconstitutional” in the disciplinary proceedings.37  The United States Court of 
 
34 See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 433-34 
(1982) (stating that New Jersey attorney disciplinary proceedings are judicial in nature); Abbott v. 
Mette, 2021 WL 5906146, at *2 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2021) (determining that Delaware attorney 
disciplinary proceedings constitute “judicial proceedings” for purposes of Younger abstention, and 
that the judicial proceedings begin even before formal charges are brought); Murphy v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, 2019 WL 4752059, at *14 & n.19 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2019) (recognizing 
that Pennsylvania attorney disciplinary proceedings are “a unitary process that is judicial in 
nature”). 
35 In re Kennedy, 472 A.2d 1317, 1329 (Del. 1984). 
36 DEL. LAWYERS’ R. DISCIPLINARY P. 1(a). 
37 Abbott, 2022 WL 453609, at *11; see also In re Kelly, 2022 WL 3270230, at *8-10 (Del. Aug. 
10, 2022) (noting that attorney incapacity proceedings are conducted in the same manner as 
disciplinary proceedings and addressing attorney’s Due Process, Equal Protection, and First 
12 
 
Appeals for the Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Abbott v. Mette.38  In 
January of 2020, Abbott filed suit against ODC attorneys and the Supreme Court 
Defendants in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware asserting, 
as in this case, Federal and State RICO claims and violations of Section 1983.  He 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief.39  The Third Circuit affirmed the District 
Court’s dismissal of the case based on the Younger40 abstention doctrine, holding 
that Abbott had an “adequate opportunity in the Delaware disciplinary proceedings” 
to raise his federal claims.41 
(13) 
Because Abbott’s request for injunctive relief did not confer 
jurisdiction on the Court of Chancery in this case, the court also lacked jurisdiction 
 
Amendment objections to incapacity proceedings); Candlewood Timber Group, 859 A.2d at 997 
(“The fact that a complaint contains a prayer for an equitable remedy, without more, does not 
conclude the jurisdictional analysis.  In deciding whether or not equitable jurisdiction exists, the 
Court must look beyond the remedies nominally being sought, and focus upon the allegations of 
the complaint in light of what the plaintiff really seeks to gain by bringing his or her claim.  To 
say it differently, the appropriate analysis requires a ‘realistic assessment of the nature of the wrong 
alleged and the remedy available in order to determine whether a legal remedy is available and 
fully adequate.’”).  We express no opinion about the legal or factual merit of Abbott’s claims, nor 
has Abbott disclosed in this appeal whether he has timely and properly asserted them in the 
disciplinary proceedings. 
38 2021 WL 5906146. 
39 Abbott v. Mette, 2021 WL 327375, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 31, 2021) (magistrate’s report and 
recommendation). 
40 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
41 Abbott v. Mette, 2021 WL 5906146, at *2.  At this point, we pause to comment on one statement 
that the trial court did not need to make.  The trial court stated in dicta that “in proper 
circumstances, the Court of Chancery may have jurisdiction to entertain . . . civil racketeering 
claims that seek equitable relief.”  Abbott, 2022 WL 453609, at *6.  We conclude that this 
particular comment is of no precedential value because the comment suggesting that the Court of 
Chancery may have jurisdiction in other cases was unnecessary to decide the question of subject 
matter jurisdiction in this case.  
13 
 
over Abbott’s request for a declaratory judgment.  The Court of Chancery has 
jurisdiction to provide declaratory relief if it otherwise has jurisdiction over the 
matter.  Title 10, Section 6501 of the Delaware Code provides, in part:  “Except 
where the Constitution of this State provides otherwise, courts of record within their 
respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status and other legal 
relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.”42  Thus, the Court of 
Chancery has jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action if there is an “underlying 
basis for equity jurisdiction measured by traditional standards.”43  Because Abbott’s 
request for injunctive relief did not confer jurisdiction on the Court of Chancery in 
this case, the court also lacked jurisdiction to issue the declaratory relief that Abbott 
sought. 
(14) 
We next address Abbott’s claim that the trial court erred when it 
concluded that a May 2021 Order of this Court independently divested it of 
jurisdiction. Following the referral to ODC in 2015, Abbott filed multiple 
complaints, actions, and appeals relating to his disciplinary proceedings.44  As a 
result, “[i]n the exercise of [the Delaware Supreme Court’s] exclusive authority to 
 
42 10 Del. C. § 6501 (emphasis added). 
43 Diebold Computer Leasing, Inc. v. Commercial Credit Corp., 267 A.2d 586, 591 (Del. 1970); 
see also Kerns v. Dukes, 707 A.2d 363, 368 (Del. 1998) (explaining that the Court of Chancery 
may award declaratory relief “where there is otherwise a basis for equitable jurisdiction”), 
overruled on other grounds by Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLC v. ASB Allegiance 
Real Estate Fund, 68 A.3d 665 (Del. 2013). 
44 See In re Abbott, 2021 WL 1996927, at *1 (Del. May 19, 2021) (listing various complaints and 
lawsuits). 
14 
 
supervise and discipline members of the Delaware Bar, and to protect the effective 
functioning of the disciplinary process,” on May 18, 2021, this Court entered an 
order (the “May 2021 Order”) that (i) stayed “[a]ll disciplinary complaints filed by 
Abbott against present or former ODC attorneys” until the final disposition by the 
BPR and the Court of the disciplinary charges against Abbott; (ii) provided that the 
proceedings against Abbott would continue before the same BPR Panel; (iii) stated 
that the Court would consider any objections to the conduct of the ODC attorneys or 
the BPR Panel, or their continued participation in the disciplinary proceedings, upon 
review of the Panel’s recommendation; and (iv) enjoined Abbott, as of May 18, 
2021, from “serving or filing any new complaints or actions in state court or with 
the Court on the Judiciary, ODC, or any state administrative board, arising out of or 
relating to the pending disciplinary proceedings against him.”45 
(15) 
In this appeal, Abbott contends that the Court of Chancery erroneously 
held that the May 2021 Order divested it of jurisdiction over Abbott’s claims.  We 
agree with Abbott that the terms of the May 2021 Order did not apply to this case. 
 
45 Id. at *2 (citations omitted).  Contrary to Abbott’s contentions, the May 2021 Order does not 
indicate that “at least 3 members of the Supreme Court have already made up their mind that 
Abbott is wrong.”  Reply Brief at 14; see also id. at 6-7 (asserting that the May 2021 Order 
“evidences a conscious intent on behalf of at least 3 of the Appellees to summarily deny Abbott 
his Constitutional rights and presume him guilty”).  Rather, the May 2021 Order by its terms stated 
the purpose of “protect[ing] the effective functioning of the disciplinary process” and further 
provided that “[a]ny objections to the conduct of the ODC attorneys or the BPR Panel, or their 
continued participation will be considered by the Court upon review of the Panel’s 
recommendation.”  In re Abbott, 2021 WL 1996927. 
15 
 
Instead, the Order enjoined Abbott from filing only new complaints or actions.46 
Abbott filed his Court of Chancery complaint in this action before this Court entered 
the May 2021 Order.  Nevertheless, our conclusion does not warrant reversal 
because the Court of Chancery’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction was an 
independent basis for dismissal. 
(16) 
Abbott next argues that the Court of Chancery erred by denying his 
motions for expedition and a temporary restraining order.  The court based its 
decision, in part, on this Court’s “sole and exclusive jurisdiction to regulate attorney 
conduct” and the court’s determination that “there is no colorable claim to enjoin the 
Defendants from taking action that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court 
and appended agency which the individual Defendants together comprise.”47  We 
review the Court of Chancery’s denial of the motions for expedition and a temporary 
restraining order for abuse of discretion, “without deference to the embedded legal 
conclusions of the trial court.”48 
(17) 
A court will issue a temporary restraining order only where the movant 
demonstrates (i) a colorable claim on the merits; (ii) a likelihood of imminent, 
irreparable injury if the relief is not granted; and (iii) that the balance of equities tips 
 
46 In re Abbott, 2021 WL 1996927, at *2. 
47 Appendix to Opening Brief at A-123-24. 
48 Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 394 (Del. 1996). 
16 
 
in favor of the issuance of the requested relief.49  As a general matter, a court “may 
hold proceedings to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a given action and, 
while doing so, impose orders to preserve the status quo pending the outcome of the 
proceedings.”50  In this case, however, the Court of Chancery did not hold that it did 
not have power to issue interim relief while it examined its jurisdiction in the matter.  
Rather, at the hearing on the motions for expedition and a temporary restraining 
order, the court considered the parties’ arguments regarding subject matter 
jurisdiction and ruled that Abbott had not demonstrated a colorable claim that the 
court had jurisdiction. The Court of Chancery also noted that the 
investigative/disciplinary process afforded adequate due process.  Thus, there was 
not likely irreparable harm under factor two.  We find no error in the court’s denial 
of the motions, nor would any purpose be served by the remand that Abbott seeks, 
in light of our determination that the Court of Chancery correctly determined that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
(18) 
Abbott’s final argument on appeal is that the Court of Chancery 
erroneously denied his motion seeking to correct certain purported errors in the 
Court of Chancery’s opinion.  He contends that the opinion (i) “falsely averred that 
 
49 Arkema Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 2010 WL 2334386, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 25, 2010). 
50 Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1241 (Del. 2018); see also id. at 1241 
n.208 (citing sources regarding the issuance of temporary restraining orders or temporary 
injunctions pending jurisdictional determinations). 
17 
 
Abbott was acting as a lawyer in this action,” when he was actually proceeding pro 
se and not in his capacity as an attorney; (ii) “inaccurately asserted that the 
Preliminary Review Committee ‘screened [Abbott’s] case and found probable cause 
to believe he committed misconduct;’” (iii) “incorrectly  alleged that ‘the Supreme 
Court’s decision . . . rejected [Abbott’s] earlier attempt to compel ODC to file a 
disciplinary complaint against an ODC attorney,’” when “the fact is that Abbott 
sought to compel the ODC to take action (one way or another) on a disciplinary 
complaint against another attorney not employed by the ODC;” and (iv) “misstated 
the scope of the Third Circuit’s holding in Abbott v. Mette.”51   
(19) 
We review the Court of Chancery’s decision to deny Abbott’s motion 
for correction for abuse of discretion.52  “‘To find an abuse of discretion, there must 
be a showing that the trial court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.’”53  We 
conclude that it did not. 
(20) 
In its order denying Abbott’s motion for correction, the Court of 
Chancery wrote: 
Plaintiff’s motion requests that the Court rephrase portions of its 
Opinion to satisfy Plaintiff’s (1) preferences in phrasing, (2) his 
interpretations of controlling precedent, and (3) his interpretation of 
 
51 Opening Brief at 44-45 (alterations in original). 
52 See Monnat v. Sparks, 2007 WL 914200 (Del. Mar. 28, 2007) (holding that appellant did not 
demonstrate “any error or abuse of discretion” in trial court’s order on motion for clarification); 
McElroy v. Shell Petroleum, Inc., 1992 WL 397468 (Del. Nov. 24, 1992) (“A decision on a motion 
for reargument will be affirmed unless it involves an abuse of discretion.”). 
53 Tumlinson v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 81 A.3d 1264, 1268 (Del. 2013) (quoting Spencer 
v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 930 A.2d 881, 887 (Del. 2007)). 
18 
 
persuasive authority.  Furthermore, Plaintiff has acted as his own 
attorney throughout this litigation.  As to whether his participation 
constitutes a pro se appearance, the record and his actions will speak 
for themselves.  In any event, the distinction regarding his status, in the 
Court’s eyes, is immaterial.  Accordingly, neither a correction of the 
opinion’s cover page, nor a correction in phrasing to adopt Plaintiff's 
theories of the case are warranted.  Plaintiff’s motion is Denied.54 
 
The Court of Chancery clearly articulated its bases for denial, namely that Abbott’s 
desired corrections would have no material effect.  We find no reversible error in the 
court’s ruling. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of 
Chancery is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
54 Abbott v. Vavala, 2022 WL 563048 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2022).