Case Title: Thompson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Thompson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div.1989 WY 31768 P.2d 600Case Number: 88-248Decided: 02/02/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
VARDAMAN R. 
THOMPSON, APPELLANT (EMPLOYEE-CLAIMANT),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, EX 
REL. WYOMING WORKERS' COMPENSATION DIVISION, APPELLEE (OBJECTOR), GREYHOUND BUS 
LINES, (EMPLOYER-DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court for LaramieCounty, Edward L. Grant, 
J.

 
 
Robert T. 
Moxley of Whitehead, Gage & Davidson, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

 
 
Joseph B. 
Meyer, Atty. Gen., Ron Arnold, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Josephine T. Porter, Sr. 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellee.

 
 
Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     In this worker's 
compensation case, appellant Vardaman R. Thompson appeals the district court's 
order granting additional permanent partial disability.

 
 

[¶2.]     We reverse and 
remand.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant presents the 
following issue:

 
 
     IS IT AN ERROR OF LAW 
OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO REJECT THE PARTIES' STIPULATION 
AS TO THE CLAIMANT'S DEGREE OF VOCATIONAL DISABILITY, REVERSING ITS PRIOR ORDER 
APPROVING THE STIPULATION, UNDER THE THEORY THAT THE CLAIMANT HAS THE BURDEN TO 
ESTABLISH EVERY ELEMENT OF HIS CLAIM, AND THAT THE TRIER OF FACT MUST BE SHOWN 
EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE CLAIMANT'S LOSS?

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellant injured his 
right knee on November 4, 1981, during the course of his employment with 
Greyhound Bus Lines. On October 4, 1982, appellant's doctor rated his resulting 
permanent disability at ten percent, and appellant was given a ten percent 
permanent partial disability award that was calculated from the schedule for leg 
injuries above the knee. The disability rating was increased by ten percent in 
July 1986, at which time appellant was advised by his doctor that he could not 
continue in his present occupation. On October 9, 1986, appellant applied for 
additional benefits on the basis of the second rating. He also sought a 
vocational disability over and above his entitlement to awards for physical 
impairment. An objection to appellant's application for additional benefits and 
a vocational disability was filed by appellee Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division on October 24, 1986.

 
 

[¶5.]     On March 5, 1987, the 
court entered an order which provided:

 
 
     THIS MATTER having 
come before the Court pursuant to the February 24, 1987 Stipulation of the 
parties, the Court having reviewed the same, finding it appropriate, and being 
further advised in the premises; therefore,

 
 
     IT IS ORDERED that the 
Employee-Claimant be and is hereby awarded an additional permanent partial 
disability of 10% of his right leg above the knee, in the amount of Three 
Thousand Seven Hundred and One Dollars and Eleven Cents ($3,701.11), to be paid 
out in the amount of One Thousand One Hundred and Eighty Eight Dollars and No 
Cents ($1,188.00), per month until exhausted;

 
 
     IT IS FURTHER ORDERED 
that the Employee-Claimant is in no way prevented by this Order from pursuing 
those additional benefits relating to his alleged vocational disability 
resulting from his original injury, as have been or are now claimed by the 
Employee-Claimant.

 
 
On May 20, 
1987, appellant and appellee filed an instrument entitled "STIPULATED FACTS FOR 
CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT," wherein it was stipulated in pertinent part 
that

 
 
the 
Employee-Claimant has an additional vocational disability in the amount of 35% 
of his right leg above his knee, resulting from his additional 10% increase of 
physical incapacity due solely to the original injury[.]

 
 
On that 
same date, the court filed an "ORDER APPROVING STIPULATION" which 
provided:

 
 
     THIS MATTER having 
come before this Court pursuant to stipulation entered by the parties on May 20, 
1987, the Court having reviewed the same, finding it fair, appropriate and a lawful agreement directed towards the 
ultimate resolution of the factual and legal questions raised in this contested 
proceeding; therefore,

 
 
     IT IS ORDERED that the 
parties shall file Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and supporting legal 
memorandum with this Court on or before June 12, 1987, presenting their 
respective legal positions, argument and authority concerning the following 
legal question, the resolution of which will determine the final judgment in 
this matter:

 
 
"Is an 
employee who suffers an injury to his leg resulting in a physical impairment 
rating being assigned by his treating physician, yet who does not lose his leg 
or any portion thereof, entitled as a matter of law to disability compensation 
for whatever vocational disability may also be shown to be attributable to the 
leg injury?"

 
 
Should this 
question be resolved in favor of the Employee-Claimant, the Court shall approve 
the vocational disability award deemed appropriate and stipulated to by the 
parties. Should this question be resolved in favor of the Objector-Defendant, 
the Court shall disapprove any additional vocational disability 
award.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) Appellant and appellee filed their respective motions for summary 
judgment supported by their briefs addressing the legal issue of whether or not 
the court had legal authority to award compensation for a vocational 
disability.

 
 

[¶6.]     In a decision letter 
dated March 3, 1988, the court stated:

 
 
     In sum, I do not find 
that the claimant is entitled as a matter of law to an additional award for 
vocational disability under the terms of W.S. 27-12-403(h).[1] Such determination requires the 
claimant to bear his burden of proof in an evidentiary hearing, which burden is 
not borne by the simple assertions of the claimant's treating physician nor by 
the terms of the parties' stipulation.

 
 
Appellant 
and appellee agreed, with the approval of the court, that the use of the 
deposition testimony of appellant, his wife, and his doctor would serve the 
function of an evidentiary hearing.2

 
 

[¶7.]     On June 30, 1988, the 
court filed its order entitled "ORDER FOR COMPENSATION FOR VOCATIONAL 
DISABILITY" wherein it made the finding that "there is evidentiary basis to 
support an award of an additional 10% permanent partial disability as a specific 
vocational rehabilitation component of [appellant's] ongoing permanent partial 
disability under W.S. 27-12-403(h)."3 It is from that order that this 
appeal is taken.

 
 

[¶8.]     The sum and substance 
of the court's decision letter is that appellant is not entitled to an award for 
a vocational disability as a matter of law and that he must bear the burden of 
proof to such entitlement at an evidentiary hearing. This proposition is an 
oxymoron. If an employee is not entitled to a vocational disability as a matter 
of law, no set of facts will confer jurisdiction on the court to make such an 
award.

 
 

[¶9.]     Appellee does not 
disagree with appellant's thesis that it is either an error of law or an abuse 
of discretion for a court to ignore the stipulated percentage of the vocational 
disability. Instead, appellee contends the stipulation was binding on the court 
only for the purpose of the court ruling on the cross motions for summary 
judgment. Appellee reasons that this assertion is well grounded in that the 
order approving the stipulation provided:

 
 
Should this 
question be resolved in favor of the Employee-Claimant, the Court shall approve 
the vocational disability award deemed appropriate and stipulated to by the 
parties.

 
 
We do not 
conclude from this provision that the court intended to limit the stipulation 
for use in deciding the summary judgment motions. To the contrary, the May 20, 
1987, order of the court clearly stated:

 
 
     THIS MATTER having 
come before this Court pursuant to stipulation entered by the parties on May 20, 
1987, the Court having reviewed the same, finding it fair, appropriate and a lawful 
agreement directed towards the ultimate resolution of the factual and legal 
questions raised in this contested proceeding * * *[.]

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) The court ultimately resolved the legal question in favor of appellant 
and found that ten percent was an appropriate vocational disability rather than 
the court-approved stipulated amount of thirty-five 
percent.

 
 

[¶10.]  This Court has followed the general rule 
that stipulations are binding upon trial courts in the absence of any valid 
ground or reason for refusing enforcement. 73 Am.Jur.2d, Stipulations § 8 
(1974). In Bard Ranch, Inc. v. Weber, 538 P.2d 24 (Wyo. 1975), this Court 
reversed the district court's determination regarding ownership of an irrigation 
ditch which was contrary to the stipulation of the parties and declared the 
decision to be "in error." Id. at 31. Also, in the case of Stringer v. 
Miller, 80 Wyo. 389, 343 P.2d 508, reh'g denied and opinion modified 80 Wyo. 
389, 345 P.2d 786 (1959), the district court admitted a 1949 will to probate 
contrary to a stipulation that a 1952 instrument was the actual will. This Court 
stated:

 
 

[T]he lower 
court was in error in 
admitting the 1949 will to probate as the last will and testament of the 
deceased. The court was not privileged to 
ignore the stipulation of the parties which established the 1952 instrument 
as the valid last will and testament of the testator as of the date of its 
execution.

 
 

Id., 343 P.2d  
at 512 (emphasis added). In Lea v. D & S Casing Service, Inc., 707 P.2d 754 
(Wyo. 1985), this Court also followed the general rule that claims for 
compensable injuries under worker's compensation statutes may be compromised and 
settled as in other cases. 82 Am.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation § 459 
(1976).

 
 

[¶11.]  Accordingly, we hold that the district 
court was in error for failing to honor the court-approved stipulated award of 
thirty-five percent upon ultimately determining that appellant was entitled to 
an award for vocational disability as a matter of law.

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellee also contends that appellant 
waived his right to object to the court's error by requesting an evidentiary 
hearing and that such action "could be interpreted to be a mutual consent to 
modification of prior stipulated facts." In addition to failing to cite any 
cogent authority for its assertions, appellee has failed to recognize that 
appellant could not appeal from the denial of his motion for summary judgment. 
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Albany 
County School District No. 1, 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1988); Kimbley v. City of Green 
River, 663 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 1983). Appellant had no choice but to 
proceed with his claim until a final order was entered. It was not until then 
that he had an appealable issue.

 
 

[¶13.]  Reversed and remanded with the direction 
to the trial court to award appellant the thirty-five percent vocational 
disability pursuant to the court-approved stipulation.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 Repealed and 
recreated as Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-405(b)(xvi) (1977) effective May 22, 
1987.

 
 

2 Although an order was 
not entered granting or denying either of the motions for summary judgment, it 
was apparently understood that both of them were denied.

 
 

3 See supra note 
1.