Case Title: Parsons v. South Dakota Dept. of Soc. Serv.

Citation: 314 N.W.2d 863

Docket Number: 

State: south-dakota

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1982-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
314 N.W.2d 863 (1982) Crystal PARSONS, Appellant, v. SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellee. No. 13475. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Argued November 20, 1981. Decided January 20, 1982. Mark Falk of Black Hills Legal Services, Inc., Rapid City, for appellant. *864 Janice Godtland, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for appellee; Mark V. Meierhenry, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief. WOLLMAN, Chief Justice. A final decision of the South Dakota Department of Social Services (department) found appellant ineligible for aid to families of dependent children benefits because she possessed excessive liquid assets. On appeal, the circuit court entered an order affirming the denial. Appellant raises three issues in her appeal. The first, whether she is entitled to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), SDCL ch. 1-26, is dispositive. We hold that appellant is entitled to review under the APA; consequently, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Appellee is an agency within the meaning of the APA. SDCL 1-26-1(1); State, Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Rodvik, 264 N.W.2d 898, 900 (S.D.1978). SDCL 1-26-30 provides in part that "a party who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter." SDCL 1-26-30.2 provides that "An appeal shall be allowed in the circuit court to any party in a contested case from a final decision, ruling or action of an agency." SDCL 1-26-30.3 provides that "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all appeals authorized by § 1-26-30.1 or § 1-26-30.2 shall be taken and conducted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter." Although it would appear from the foregoing that appellant clearly is entitled to appeal under the provisions of SDCL ch. 1-26, the department contends that her right to appeal is governed by the provisions of SDCL ch. 28-1. SDCL 28-1-19 provides that a person whose claim for assistance has been rejected by the Division of Social Welfare of the Department of Social Services has "the right to appeal to the circuit court ... which appeal shall be taken in the manner provided by § 28-1-20 to 28-1-24, inclusive." SDCL 28-1-22 provides: In contrast to the narrowly circumscribed scope of judicial review provided by SDCL 28-1-22, the APA sets forth six grounds for reversal or modification of a decision by an agency. SDCL 1-26-36. We conclude that by adopting SDCL 1-26-30.3 in 1975 (1975 S.D.Sess.Laws ch. 17, § 2) the legislature impliedly repealed the provisions of SDCL 28-1-19 through 28-1-23. In reaching this conclusion, we adopt the reasoning expressed by Justice Morgan in State, Dept. of Public Safety v. Cronin, 250 N.W.2d 690, 694 (S.D.1977): As we said in Matter of Sales Tax Refund Applications, 298 N.W.2d 799, 802 (S.D.1980), The language of SDCL 1-26-30.3 could hardly be clearer or more specific. Accordingly, we hold that one who is aggrieved by a final decision of the department is entitled to judicial review under the provisions of SDCL ch. 1-26. In reaching this conclusion we recognize the long-standing rule that repeals by implication are not favored and should be found only where there is a manifest and total repugnancy between the statutes and where both acts cannot be reconciled through a reasonable construction. See, e.g., State, Dept. of Public Safety v. Cronin, supra; Matter of Sales Tax Refund Applications, supra, and cases cited therein. The scope of judicial review available under SDCL 1-26-36 is so far broader than that permitted by SDCL 28-1-22 that no reasonable construction can give effect to both statutes. Appellant clearly falls within the class of persons entitled to judicial review under SDCL ch. 1-26. To relegate her to the severely attenuated judicial review provided by SDCL 28-1-22 would be to read an exception into SDCL 1-26-30.3 that the plain language of that statute does not admit of. If the legislature intends that appellant and others similarly situated should be limited to a narrower scope of judicial review, then it will be a simple enough matter to amend SDCL ch. 1-26 accordingly. We recognize that in State, Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Rodvik, supra, we stated that the provisions of SDCL 28-1-22 were applicable to cases involving rejected welfare assistance claims. The precise issue that is before us in the present case was not an issue in Rodvik, however. Accordingly, we limit the holding in Rodvik to the issue presented therein and disapprove of the gratuitous statement therein regarding the applicability of SDCL 28-1-22. The order appealed from is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court with directions to review the record in the light of the scope of review provided by SDCL 1-26-36. All the Justices concur.