Case Title: Dang v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 130553

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2014-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
LAM DANG 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 130553 
JUSTICE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 
 
 
 
     JANUARY 10, 2014 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
A jury convicted Lam Dang of one count each of murder and 
violation of a protective order.  Relying on Code § 19.2-169.1, 
Dang argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in failing to 
order a second competency evaluation after his counsel 
discovered new information regarding Dang's life history and 
physical trauma he suffered as a child.  We reject Dang's 
argument and will affirm his convictions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. 
Competency Evaluation Report 
 
After Dang was charged with murder and felony protective 
order violation for the death of Nguyet Lu, the Fairfax County 
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court granted Dang's motion for 
a competency evaluation pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.1.  On 
January 12, 2011, Dr. Kristen A. Hudacek, a court-appointed 
psychologist, submitted an evaluation of competency report in 
which she found Dang competent to stand trial.  Her evaluation 
was based on the background information provided to her by Dang 
and his counsel as well as her own clinical observations.  
 
2 
Because Dang's preferred speaking language is Vietnamese, an 
interpreter assisted in translation during Dr. Hudacek's 
evaluation.  Dang, who was 40 years old at the time of the 
evaluation, informed Dr. Hudacek that he was born in South 
Vietnam and moved to Philadelphia at the age of 17.  He denied 
having any prior psychological problems or history of 
hospitalization for mental health related issues.  Dr. Hudacek 
noted that despite her inability to gain additional information 
from collateral sources, she "believes the information is an 
accurate portrayal of [Dang's] current functioning as it relates 
to the question of competency to stand trial." 
 
In evaluating whether Dang was competent to stand trial, 
Dr. Hudacek considered Dang's understanding of the legal 
process, appreciation of the legal process as it applied to his 
case, capacity to communicate with his counsel, and capacity to 
make decisions.  According to Dr. Hudacek, Dang understood he 
was charged with "[m]urder, killing someone, second degree" and 
could receive "up to 40 years in jail."1  He also understood the 
roles of the jury, the judge, his lawyer and the Commonwealth's 
Attorney.  Dang understood his attorney was "working on his 
behalf" and "the importance of relaying information about the 
                     
 
1 Although the Commonwealth ultimately pursued a conviction 
for murder in the first degree, Dang gave the correct sentence 
for murder of the second degree.  See Code § 18.2-32. 
 
3 
facts of his case."  Dang stated "he would speak to his attorney 
if he wanted to relay information about any concerns he had 
during a hearing or trial."  Although "Dang was mostly able to 
provide a rational, logical, coherent explanation of facts that 
would aid his attorney in defending him," Dr. Hudacek noted that 
he "does become very focused on providing information that may 
paint him in a favorable light."  According to Dr. Hudacek, Dang 
"was able to discuss his legal situation in a manner that 
demonstrated weighing his options and basing decisions upon the 
potential best outcome given the circumstances and after 
conferring with counsel." 
 
Dr. Hudacek stated that while Dang's speech was coherent, 
"he frequently shifted topics to the time of the offense and 
facts related to his relationship with the alleged victim."  For 
example, prior to the start of the interview, Dang "immediately 
began speaking about his case after [Dr. Hudacek] introduced 
herself" and "was asked three times to stop talking until his 
interpreter arrived."  The information Dang related to Dr. 
Hudacek "included facts about the case that would have been best 
kept for discussion with his attorney or following full 
disclosure of the nature and purpose of the interview."  Finding 
it necessary to repeatedly re-direct Dang to the questions 
posed, Dr. Hudacek noted Dang "seemed highly focused on 
 
4 
providing 'his side of the story'" and/or "worried about his 
situation." 
 
Dr. Hudacek reported that Dang "was highly concerned about 
going to trial, as he believed [his life] would be over."  He 
presented "in a manner that appear[ed] related to anxiety about 
the alleged charges and potential sentence he is facing."  Dr. 
Hudacek explained that his situational anxiety "does not suggest 
that [he] suffers from a major mental illness that would affect 
abilities relevant to competency to stand trial."  Although she 
noted that Dang tended to "become anxious and excitable" in 
persisting to relay facts regarding his case, his impulse in 
this regard "is consistent with most defendants who face legal 
charges." 
 
In determining that Dang was competent to stand trial, Dr. 
Hudacek stated that "it does not appear that [Dang] currently 
suffers from a mental illness and/or cognitive or intellectual 
impairment."  Furthermore, Dr. Hudacek did not believe that 
"Dang's capacity to communicate with counsel is impaired by 
mental illness."  Based on Dr. Hudacek's evaluation and the 
information available to her, she concluded that "Dang has 
sufficient, present ability to consult with his attorney with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding," "possesses a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
 
5 
against him," and "is able to assist in preparing for his own 
defense." 
B. 
 Motion for Second Competency Evaluation Before Trial 
 
Dang's counsel moved for a second competency evaluation on 
December 1, 2011, eleven months after the first evaluation and 
four days prior to his trial, which was scheduled to begin on 
December 5.2  According to the motion, on November 30, 2011, 
Dang's counsel learned "extensive information about Mr. Dang's 
history, family, and childhood which dramatically differs from 
the versions previously provided by Mr. Dang" giving counsel 
reason to believe that Dang "has over a 30 year history of 
suffering from developmental disabilities, cognitive functioning 
difficulties, effects of traumatic brain injury, and mental 
illness including but not limited to post-traumatic stress 
disorder." 
 
At the hearing on the motion, counsel stated that the new 
information regarding Dang's history was discovered when plans 
were being made for Dang's family to travel from Pennsylvania 
for the trial.  In particular, Mrs. Hoa Pham, who identified 
                     
 
2 The motion was filed on Thursday and noticed for hearing 
on the Friday before the trial's commencement on the ensuing 
Monday.  The motion also included a request for a second 
evaluation of sanity at the time of the offense.  The request 
for the evaluation of sanity at the time of the offense is not 
before us on appeal. 
 
6 
herself as Dang's biological mother, told defense counsel that 
beginning at the approximate age of 6 years, Dang was subjected 
to repeated physical assaults from teenagers and young adults as 
a result of "his appearance as someone who was American."3  Mrs. 
Pham said she found Dang "beaten in the head with rocks," and 
"there were times when she was afraid his brain was going to 
come through his skull."  By Mrs. Pham's account, the beatings 
continued until Dang was in sixth or seventh grade at which 
point he stopped going to school.  She believed the history of 
physical trauma to Dang adversely affected his mental health and 
potentially caused traumatic brain injury impairing his 
cognitive functioning.  Counsel also informed the court that 
Dang's sister "confirmed that she saw Mr. Dang exhibiting 
symptoms of mental illness or similar trauma as well." 
                     
 
3 Defense counsel explained that Dang had informed counsel 
he lived with an adoptive family and had never met his 
biological mother.  While he had been reluctant to share names 
and contact information of any family members, he eventually 
provided counsel with the name of a family member from whom 
counsel obtained contact information for Mrs. Pham.  Counsel 
initially relied upon a family member to relay information from 
Mrs. Pham, who resides in Philadelphia and speaks only 
Vietnamese.  However, when the defense team sentencing advocate 
spoke directly to Mrs. Pham, by telephone through an 
interpreter, she provided new information.  According to Mrs. 
Pham, Dang's father was an American serviceman, and when Dang 
began attending school, he "began to appear to be more American 
physically." 
 
7 
 
As a result of the information learned from Mrs. Pham and 
Dang's sister, counsel spoke with the mental health professional 
who conducted the evaluation of Dang's sanity at the time of the 
offense.  According to counsel, this individual indicated that 
such trauma could support a potential diagnosis of post-
traumatic stress disorder and, in a severe case, it would not be 
uncommon for the patient to develop delusions of his life to 
replace the actual traumatic life history.  Counsel also 
informed the court that communications with Dang had been 
difficult during the three months defense counsel had been 
working with him, that Dang was repeatedly confused and unable 
to recall recent discussions, and unable to focus conversations 
on issues that are relevant.  Based on the newly reported 
history of head trauma and counsel's concern that Dang might be 
"operating under some delusion," counsel asked for an evaluation 
to determine "whether [Dang] is able to effectively communicate 
with us and assist us in preparing his defense." 
 
Finding no probable cause to believe that Dang "lacks 
substantial capacity to understand the proceedings against him 
or to assist his attorney in his own defense," the circuit court 
denied the motion.  The court explained that the report of the 
competency evaluation previously conducted indicated that Dang 
understood the proceedings against him and was able to assist 
his attorney in his own defense.  According to the court, while 
 
8 
there appeared to be "an element of a lack of candor," it found 
no basis in the record to grant the motion. 
C. 
Plea Colloquy4 
 
On the morning of trial, the circuit court conducted a plea 
colloquy with Dang, in which Dang pled not guilty to the charges 
of murder and violation of a protective order.5  During the 
colloquy, Dang provided his name and date of birth, denied being 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, stated that he 
understood the charges against him and had discussed these 
charges with his counsel.  Dang told the court he had given his 
attorneys the names of any witnesses who could testify on his 
behalf, that he was satisfied with the services provided by his 
attorneys, and that he voluntarily made the decision to plead 
not guilty. 
 
Dang also stated that he understood he had a right not to 
testify on his own behalf or to testify if he so chose, and that 
his counsel had discussed with and advised him regarding the 
question of whether he should testify or not.  In response to 
the court's inquiry as to his decision to have his case tried by 
a jury or judge, Dang expressed his desire to be tried by a 
                     
 
4 Interpreters were present throughout the trial 
proceedings. 
 
5 Prior to conducting the plea colloquy, defense counsel 
renewed the motion for a competency evaluation, which the 
circuit court denied for the reasons given at the hearing. 
 
9 
jury.  Dang acknowledged that if the jury found him guilty, the 
jury would also determine the appropriate punishment.  Dang 
confirmed that he understood all of the questions from the court 
and had no questions of his own for the court. 
 
During the plea colloquy, there were instances in which 
Dang responded to the court's questions by providing facts or 
explanation regarding the murder. For example, when asked if 
Dang had given his counsel the names of witnesses, Dang 
initially replied that he had and that he "was drunk."  The 
court interrupted Dang and explained that Dang was not being 
asked for his defense but whether he had given the names of 
witnesses to his counsel and whether they were present.  A 
discussion then ensued between the court and Dang as to the 
witnesses that might testify on Dang's behalf.  Additionally, in 
response to the court's inquiry as to whether Dang's plea of not 
guilty was voluntarily made, Dang stated that he saw "the 
video," referring to a security camera recording of the murder.  
He added, "I don't believe that I killed her," "I did not intend 
[to kill her]," and "She hit me."  Upon being redirected by the 
court to the question asked, Dang responded appropriately. 
THE COURT:  Mr. Dang, that's not what I'm asking 
you.  The question I'm asking you is this:  You 
are pleading not guilty; is that correct? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
 
10 
THE COURT:  Are you pleading not guilty because 
you think that's what you ought to do and it's a 
voluntary decision on your part? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
 
Following the colloquy, the circuit court accepted Dang's 
plea of not guilty, finding it had been made freely and 
voluntarily.  Because Dang told the court there was information 
he still would like to share with his counsel, the circuit court 
took a recess at the conclusion of the colloquy to afford Dang 
an opportunity to meet with counsel and "see if there's anything 
else he wants to tell you." 
D. 
Renewed Motion for Competency Evaluation and Second 
Colloquy 
 
Upon returning from the recess, Dang's counsel renewed, 
again, the motion for an evaluation of Dang's competency to 
stand trial.  According to counsel, Dang expressed feeling that 
"he is not normal right now," is "forgetting things," and "only 
understands a little bit about what is happening."  In addition, 
counsel told the court that Dang expressed "for the first time 
ever in our communications with him that he believes he is 
facing capital punishment."  Counsel believed that Dang's 
"mental status is deteriorating, which is not unusual for people 
who suffer from mental illness."  Counsel stated that "as of 
just a few minutes ago – during this recess – in counsel's 
opinion, there's probable cause to believe that Mr. Dang both 
 
11 
does not understand the nature of the proceedings against him 
and is unable to effectively communicate with counsel in order 
to assist in his defense and is, in fact, unable to participate 
in his defense in several critical ways." 
In response to counsel's motion, the circuit court stated: 
But I also have the advantage of additional 
information now [than at the hearing], and that 
is that I've done the not-guilty colloquy with 
your client, and what strikes me is that he 
certainly was able to understand my questions – 
in some cases I had to explain them, but that's 
not unusual – and his responses were intelligent.  
And, it is true, he wanted to tell me more than I 
was asking him, but that's also not unusual. 
 
 
So, I also have the benefit of having now 
heard from your client directly for the first 
time, and what strikes me is that he came across 
to me as entirely rational.  There was something 
he wanted to tell you, which I gave him the 
opportunity to do, so you could talk with him. 
 
 
At defense counsel's request,6 the circuit court conducted 
an additional colloquy with Dang: 
THE COURT:  Do you understand who I am? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Why? 
 
THE COURT:  No.  Do you understand who the judge 
is? 
 
                     
 
6 Before the circuit court conducted the colloquy, it 
expressed concern to Dang's counsel regarding the risk that 
statements made by Dang could be used by the Commonwealth during 
trial.  While acknowledging that risk, Dang's counsel confirmed 
the request for an inquiry "into Mr. Dang's appropriateness for 
an evaluation of his competency to stand trial." 
 
12 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I do. 
 
THE COURT:  And what role does the judge play in 
the case? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  To listen to the case. 
 
THE COURT:  And what do I do after I listen to 
the case? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  I don't know. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you understand that you're on 
trial today? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I know. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you know what you're charged with? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  Murder. 
 
THE COURT:  And do you know what else you're 
charged with? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  No. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you know what the sentence is that 
if you're found guilty that a jury might impose 
in this case or might decide was the appropriate 
sentence for murder? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, but it was not my intention 
– 
 
THE COURT:  No, but I'm asking you, what is the 
most sentence that a jury could impose in this 
case?  Do you know? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes.  My lawyer did mention to me 
that maybe thirty years. 
 
THE COURT:  Who are your lawyers? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Right here next to me. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you know their names? 
 
 
13 
THE DEFENDANT:  Sarah. 
 
THE COURT:  And what about the other attorney? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Robert.7 
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  And do you know that there is 
also a prosecutor in the courtroom who is 
involved in the case? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  I have never heard the word 
"prosecutor." 
 
THE COURT:  What about the Commonwealth Attorney?  
Have you ever heard that phrase? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  No. 
 
THE COURT:  Now, how are you feeling today? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  I feel okay, but since I've been 
here I haven't been normal.  I feel kind of 
weird.  I feel sometimes I'm okay, but I'm not 
crazy.  But my mind sometimes is not here in some 
situations.  It doesn't seem right to me. 
 
     I just want you to know that I do kind of 
understand, but I just don't feel okay today.  
I've never known about the law or anything.  I 
just know I go to work, I go home to my family 
and take care of myself.  Other than that, I 
never, like, know anything about the law. 
 
THE COURT: Do you know that the maximum penalty 
for murder is life in prison if the Commonwealth 
is not seeking the death penalty? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  I don't know.  I don't know why I 
even kill people. 
 
THE COURT:  You don't know what? 
 
                     
 
7 Dang's trial attorneys were Lysandra Pachuta and Robert 
Frank. 
 
14 
THE DEFENDANT:  I don't know why I even kill.  I 
don't know why. 
 
THE COURT:  Do you know that you're also charged 
with violating a protective order? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  I don't know.  I didn't know. 
 
THE COURT:  Well, when I asked you questions a 
little while ago, you said you were aware of the 
fact that you were charged with violating a 
protective order.  You pled not guilty to it. 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  I know I killed someone, but I 
plead not guilty because it was not my intention 
– because they hit me, they attacked me, and I 
couldn't take it no more.  And I have evidence – 
I have the work from the doctor, that I had stab 
wounds. 
 
     And I was drunk, and then I had a knife and 
I just went after her.  And I stabbed and I threw 
the knife away.  I put the knife down, and I 
don't know what else happened.  And then the 
police took me to the hospital, and then the next 
day is when I realized that I killed someone.  
 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Have a seat. 
 
 
Following the colloquy, the circuit court denied the 
renewed motion for a second competency evaluation, explaining, 
certainly the answers the Defendant gave were not 
by any means a showing of perfect clarity, but I 
believe he understands why he's here today and he 
understands what we're doing. 
 
     He certainly has a – he articulates a 
defense to the offenses – the principal offense 
with which he's charged, which is the first-
degree murder.  In the colloquy he both pled not 
guilty and confirmed that he was the person 
charged with that event. 
 
     And when I combine everything I've heard 
today from the Defendant, I do not see a basis to 
 
15 
order the competency exam – in other words, to 
change the decision that I made last Friday – and 
that will remain my decision. 
 
 
At trial, the evidence proved Dang entered into a 
restaurant in Fairfax County where Nguyet Lu was eating with her 
boyfriend and another individual.  Dang approached Lu and 
stabbed her with a knife.  Lu died from stab wounds to her neck 
and abdomen, and was pronounced dead at the scene.  Upon 
completion of the three-day trial, the jury found Dang guilty of 
first-degree murder and violation of the protective order.  In 
accordance with the verdict, the circuit court imposed sentences 
of life and five years' imprisonment on the two convictions.  
Dang appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, which 
denied his petition for appeal by per curiam order and again by 
a three-judge panel. 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Dang argues the Court of Appeals erred in 
denying his appeal because there was probable cause to believe 
he was incompetent to stand trial under Code § 19.2-169.1(A). 
A. 
Code § 19.2-169.1(A) 
 
"It is well established that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of a 
defendant who is not competent to stand trial."  Medina v. 
California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992); see also Drope v. 
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 
 
16 
U.S. 375, 385(1966).  Therefore, due process requires that 
states provide criminal defendants "access to procedures for  
making a competency evaluation."  Medina, 505 U.S. at 449.8 
 
The General Assembly has provided criminal defendants 
access to such procedures in Code § 19.2-169.1.  Pursuant to 
this statute, "the court shall order that a competency 
evaluation" of the defendant be performed by a mental health 
expert if "there is probable cause to believe that the defendant 
. . . lacks substantial capacity to understand the proceedings 
against him or to assist his attorney in his own defense."  Code 
§ 19.2-169.1(A).  This language reflects the standard for 
competency articulated by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, which is "whether the defendant has 'sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding' and has 'a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him.'"  Godinez v. 
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 
362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).  See Orndorff v. Commonwealth, 271 
                     
 
8 The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a 
state procedure requiring a hearing on competency where the 
evidence raises a "bona fide doubt" as to the defendant's 
competency is constitutionally adequate, as is a state procedure 
requiring an examination where there is "reasonable cause" to 
believe that the defendant is incompetent.  Drope, 420 U.S. at 
172-73. 
 
 
17 
Va. 486, 500, 628 S.E.2d 344, 351 (2006) (discussing ultimate 
determination of whether defendant is competent pursuant to Code 
§ 19.2-169.1(E) in light of constitutional standard of 
competency). 
 
When the defendant has already been afforded a competency 
evaluation in which he is found competent, the circuit court 
need not order a second evaluation unless it is presented with a 
substantial change in circumstances.  See Drope, 420 U.S. at 181 
(trial court required to order competency examination when there 
were "circumstances suggesting a change that would render the 
accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand 
trial"); Senna v. Patrissi, 5 F.3d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1993) (no 
constitutional requirement for additional competency hearing 
where there is "no substantial change" in defendant's 
condition); People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385, 412 (Cal. 1992) 
(where defendant has already been found competent, it is 
unnecessary to conduct a second hearing on competency unless the 
court is presented with a "substantial change of circumstances" 
or new evidence "casting a serious doubt on the validity of that 
finding"); State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 360 (Utah 2001) 
(same); State v. Sanders, 549 S.E.2d 40, 52 (W. Va. 2001)(same). 
B. 
Standard of Review 
 
The statutory mandate, that an evaluation be ordered if 
there is "probable cause to believe" that the defendant is 
 
18 
incompetent to stand trial, Code § 19.2-169.1(A), involves the 
exercise of discretion by the circuit court in weighing the 
facts presented on the question of competency.  See Orndorff, 
271 Va. at 500, 628 S.E.2d at 351 (determination of competency 
is a question of fact that will not be disturbed on appeal 
unless plainly wrong); see also Johnson v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. 
App. 79, 93, 669 S.E.2d 368, 375 (2008) ("We review a circuit 
court's decision not to order a competency evaluation only for 
abuse of discretion.").  This is so because the circuit court 
"will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental 
capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances 
of a particular defendant."  Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 
177 (2008); see also United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 
(4th Cir. 1995) (whether "reasonable cause" to believe a 
defendant may be incompetent exists under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) is 
a question left to the discretion of the trial court).9 
                     
 
9 See also Denes v. State, 508 N.E.2d 6, 9-10 (Ind. 1987) 
(decision of whether to order competency hearing reviewed for 
abuse of discretion); State v. Barnes, 262 P.3d 297, 309 (Kan. 
2011) (decision of whether to order competency evaluation 
reviewed for abuse of discretion); State v. Hewett, 538 A.2d 
268, 269 (Me. 1988) (decision of whether to order competency 
hearing reviewed for abuse of discretion); Morales v. State, 992 
P.2d 252, 254 (Nev. 2000) (decision of whether to order 
competency evaluation reviewed for abuse of discretion); People 
v. Morgan, 662 N.E.2d 260, 261 (N.Y. 1995) (same); State v. 
Drayton, 243 S.E.2d 458, 459 (S.C. 1978) (same); Garza v. State, 
522 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (decision of whether 
to order competency hearing reviewed for abuse of discretion); 
 
19 
 
We have held that a circuit court abuses its discretion 
"when a relevant factor that should have been given significant 
weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor 
is considered and given significant weight; and when all proper 
factors, and no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in 
weighing those factors, commits a clear error of judgment."  
Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., 282 Va. 346, 
352, 717 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2011) (quoting Kern v. TXO Production 
Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984)); see also Drope, 420 
U.S. at 179 (reviewing whether state courts failed "to give 
proper weight" to evidence regarding competency to stand 
trial).10 
C. 
Circuit Court's Finding of No Probable Cause 
                                                                  
In re Fleming, 16 P.3d 610, 615 (Wash. 2001) (decision of 
whether to order competency evaluation reviewed for abuse of 
discretion); United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 
1995) (decision of whether to order competency hearing under 18 
U.S.C. § 4241 reviewed for abuse of discretion); Zapata v. 
Estelle, 588 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1979) (decision by 
state court of whether to order competency hearing reviewed for 
abuse of discretion); United States v. Andrews, 469 F.3d 1113, 
1121 (7th Cir. 2006) (decision to hold hearing or order 
examination under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 reviewed for abuse of 
discretion). 
 
 
10 Although the dissent agrees that a circuit court's 
finding that probable cause did not exist to order a competency 
evaluation should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, it 
seems to review the circuit court's decision here de novo. Under 
an abuse of discretion standard of review, it is neither our 
function to “consider” the evidence, nor to determine that “the 
facts here are sufficient to meet the probable cause standard 
fixed by Code § 19.2-169.1(A).” 
 
20 
 
Applying these principles, we do not believe the circuit 
court abused its discretion in finding that there was no 
probable cause to believe that Dang "lack[ed] substantial 
capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist 
his attorney in his own defense."  Code § 19.2-169.1(A). 
1. 
Family Information and Past Trauma 
 
First, Dang argues that the circuit court failed to give 
due weight to the information regarding Dang's family history 
that came to light shortly before trial. 
 
According to Dang, "[t]he most significant factor in this 
case that established probable cause for a competency evaluation 
was that Mr. Dang appeared to have constructed a completely 
false life history, or at least one that significantly deviated 
from his mother's recollection as expressed to defense counsel."  
Because Dang failed to disclose the history of serious head 
trauma suffered during his childhood in Vietnam and the 
existence of his biological family in Philadelphia, defense 
counsel suggests Dang may have constructed "an entire delusion 
about his past life to replace his real, traumatic life."  
Relying on defense counsel's conversation with the evaluator who 
performed Dang's sanity at the time of the offense evaluation, 
Dang contends that such a delusion would not be unusual if he 
had suffered post-traumatic stress disorder, and the trauma 
 
21 
reportedly experienced by him could support such a potential 
diagnosis. 
 
Furthermore, citing treatises discussing the relationship 
between traumatic brain injury and violent criminal behavior, 
Dang argues this information may have "substantiated an 
evaluation" of Dang for traumatic brain injury or another form 
of organic brain injury.  Thus, according to Dang, while his 
failure to communicate about his life history could have been 
characterized as a lack of candor, it could also have been "a 
symptom of an underlying mental illness or organic brain injury 
that was affecting his competence." 
 
We disagree that the circuit court failed to give proper 
weight to the information learned by defense counsel from Mrs. 
Pham and Dang's sister.  In response to defense counsel's 
argument that Dr. Hudacek made note of the fact that she did not 
have access to collateral sources, the circuit court pointed to 
Dr. Hudacek's conclusion that despite her inability to gain 
additional information from collateral sources, she "believes 
the information is an accurate portrayal of [Dang's] current 
functioning as it relates to the question of competency to stand 
trial."  As the circuit court explained at the hearing, it 
reviewed Dr. Hudacek's report, noting that the evaluation was 
"thorough" and the report "goes into great detail as to the 
 
22 
defendant's understanding of the proceedings against him and his 
ability to assist his attorney in his own defense." 
 
As the circuit court properly recognized, the issue before 
it was Dang's present ability to understand the proceedings and 
assist his counsel as was addressed in Dr. Hudacek's report.  A 
history of mental illness does not necessarily render a 
defendant incompetent to stand trial.  See Bramblett v. 
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263, 273, 513 S.E.2d 400, 407 
(1999)(defendant diagnosed as presently suffering from 
delusional disorder competent to stand trial).  As the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, "neither low 
intelligence, mental deficiency, nor bizarre, volatile, and 
irrational behavior can be equated with mental incompetence to 
stand trial."  Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442, 460 (4th Cir. 
2003) (citation omitted).  Rather, as noted above, the legal 
test for competency is "whether the defendant has 'sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding' and has 'a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'"  
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396 (quoting Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402) 
(emphasis added).  Therefore, the evidence supporting probable 
cause must be directed to the question of defendant's competency 
at the time of trial. 
 
23 
    Thus, even if Dang's failure to disclose an accurate history 
to his counsel and his evaluator was, as he posits, an 
indication of an underlying mental illness or brain injury, 
there was no information before the circuit court to relate any 
possible mental illness or injury to Dang's present competence.  
In light of Dr. Hudacek's opinion that was addressed to Dang's 
"current functioning," the circuit court appropriately inquired: 
Focusing on his competency today, is it not fair 
to say that what you're identifying is that your 
client has not been candid with you, which does 
not seem to me to be a competency issue, and then 
beyond that, you're just speculating about what 
effect it could – it might have? 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The circuit court was properly focused on the issue of 
Dang's present competence.  The information gained from Mrs. 
Pham related to injuries reportedly sustained by Dang decades 
prior to the murder and did not provide evidence of a 
substantial change in Dang's competence.  With nothing more than 
counsel's speculation that the information from Mrs. Pham and 
Dang's sister could potentially change Dr. Hudacek's opinion or 
otherwise bear on Dang's present ability to understand the 
proceedings or assist in his defense, we do not believe the 
circuit court failed to give proper weight to such information. 
2. 
Dang's Responses at Trial 
 
24 
 
Dang also contends the circuit court neglected to afford 
due weight to the answers given by him during the colloquies 
conducted by the court on the morning of trial.  According to 
Dang, throughout the plea colloquy and the subsequent colloquy 
conducted by the court at defense counsel's request, Dang gave 
nonresponsive answers indicating his lack of comprehension of 
the criminal proceedings against him. 
 
While many of Dang's responses to the circuit court's 
questions were indeed nonresponsive, as the circuit court 
recognized, Dang's tendency to shift focus to the facts 
regarding the murder and explain "his side of the story" was 
addressed extensively by Dr. Hudacek in her report.  According 
to Dr. Hudacek, Dang's behavior in this regard was "related to 
anxiety about the alleged charges and potential sentence he is 
facing," "does not suggest that [he] suffers from a major mental 
illness that would affect abilities relevant to competency to 
stand trial," and "is consistent with most defendants who face 
legal charges."  In other words, the responses Dang gave to the 
circuit court were consistent with the behavior he exhibited 
during his evaluation.  Despite this behavior, Dr. Hudacek 
concluded that "Dang has sufficient, present ability to consult 
with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding," "possesses a rational as well as factual 
 
25 
understanding of the proceedings against him," and "is able to 
assist in preparing for his own defense." 
 
During the plea colloquy, Dang certainly gave appropriate 
and rational answers to the court's initial inquiry regarding 
his understanding of the charges against him, the role of 
defense counsel, his discussions with counsel regarding possible 
witnesses on his behalf, his right to testify and be tried by a 
jury, and the voluntariness of his plea.  Although Dang 
attempted to interpose his explanation for the murder, when 
redirected to the question, he gave appropriate responses. 
 
During the subsequent colloquy, Dang's propensity to 
interject and explain his actions became more pronounced.  This 
was entirely in accord with Dr. Hudacek's opinion that Dang's 
inclination toward nonresponsive answers reflected apprehension 
"about going to trial" and the "potential sentence he is 
facing."  As Dang told the court during the second colloquy, "I 
feel okay, but since I've been here I haven't been normal."  
Dang also stated, "I just want you to know that I do kind of 
understand, but I just don't feel okay today."  Dang's increase 
in anxiety after the plea colloquy was evidenced by defense 
counsel's observation that Dang's mental status had deteriorated 
"as of just a few minutes ago – during this recess."  It was 
reasonable, therefore, to conclude that Dang's responses during 
the second colloquy were a reflection of heightened apprehension 
 
26 
of going to trial, rather than a sudden deterioration in his 
understanding of the nature of the proceedings on the morning of 
trial.11  In fact, as the circuit court remarked, Dang was 
sufficiently competent to "articulate[] a defense" to the murder 
charge. 
 
Recognizing that circuit courts "are in the best position 
to make competency determinations, which at bottom rely not only 
on a defendant's behavioral history and relevant medical 
opinions, but also on the [circuit] court's first-hand 
interactions with, and observations of, the defendant and the 
attorneys at bar, we appropriately afford them wide latitude."  
United States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2013).  In 
light of Dr. Hudacek's opinion that Dang's inclination to shift 
focus represented situational anxiety regarding the proceedings 
and potential punishment, we do not believe the circuit court 
                     
 
11 Given Dang's difficulty with the English language, it is 
not surprising that he referred to his counsel, Lysandra 
Pachuta, as "Sarah."  Likewise, we do not find it remarkable 
that Dang was unable to articulate the charge of violation of a 
protective order or was unfamiliar with the terms "prosecutor" 
and "Commonwealth Attorney."  Based on Dang's responses during 
the plea colloquy, he knew he was charged with murder and 
violation of a protective order, understood he was in court to 
be tried for those charges, and was well aware that he faced 
substantial punishment if found guilty by the jury.  It is also 
evident from the record that Dang knew his defense counsel and 
their role in assisting him with his defense. 
 
27 
failed to properly consider and weigh Dang's responses to the 
court. 
3. 
Defense Counsel's Concerns 
 
Dang also argues that the circuit court failed to give 
sufficient weight to defense counsel's concerns regarding his 
competency. 
 
As the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized, 
due process does not require courts to "accept without 
question[ing] a lawyer's representations concerning the 
competence of his client."  Drope, 420 U.S. at 177 n.13.  "[A]n 
expressed doubt" by defense counsel "is unquestionably a factor 
which should be considered."  Id.  While "counsel's 
representations deserve serious consideration" by the circuit 
court, they "cannot, however, assume an importance not merited 
by their content, particularly in those situations in which the 
[circuit] court has had an opportunity to make its own 
observations."  People v. Morino, 743 P.2d 49, 52 (Colo. App. 
1987).  "We must also bear in mind the [circuit] court's 
institutional advantage over [this Court] in evaluating the 
demeanor of the defendant and the statements of counsel about 
the defendant's mental state."  United States v. Rickert, 685 
F.3d 760, 767 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 
Based on our review of the record, we believe the circuit 
court gave defense counsel's concerns serious consideration.  
 
28 
During the hearing on the motion for a second evaluation, 
defense counsel told the court that communications with Dang had 
been "extremely difficult," that Dang was "repeatedly confused," 
and was "unable to focus conversations on the issues that are 
relevant at the moment."  After hearing argument, the circuit 
court acknowledged its consideration of the "representations 
made by [defense counsel]," but noted it did not have "any 
evidence" or "any testimony" before it to find probable cause in 
light of Dr. Hudacek's report that "goes into great detail as to 
the defendant's understanding of the proceedings against him and 
his ability to assist his attorney in his own defense." 
 
On the morning of trial, when counsel requested that the 
court conduct a colloquy with Dang to inquire into his 
competency, the circuit court did not dismiss counsel's concerns 
but granted counsel's request.  In fact, seeking direction as to 
counsel's specific concerns, the circuit court inquired of 
counsel as to "what questions you want [the court] to ask him," 
commenting that "[i]t may strike you as obvious, but it doesn't 
strike me as obvious."  After defense counsel supplied the court 
with suggested questions, the court conducted the colloquy in 
accord with defense counsel's suggestions. 
 
Furthermore, the concerns advanced by defense counsel at 
the hearing and trial were the same concerns dating back to 
previous counsel's representation and were, therefore, present 
 
29 
when Dr. Hudacek performed her evaluation.  In Dang's initial 
motion for a competency evaluation, which was granted, defense 
counsel asserted that Dang spoke and understood "limited 
English" and communicated to defense counsel with assistance of 
an interpreter.  According to the motion, Dang "was unable to 
express an understanding of important aspects of the proceedings 
against him and his rights related thereto, notwithstanding 
defense counsel's efforts to inform him."  Dr. Hudacek's report 
addressed Dang's tendency to shift focus and give nonresponsive 
answers, but concluded his behavior was a symptom of situational 
anxiety not incompetence. 
 
In sum, the record reflects that the circuit court 
carefully considered the representations made by counsel both at 
the hearing and at trial.  However, the circuit court also had 
the benefit of Dr. Hudacek's report addressing the issues of 
concern to counsel and the opportunity to observe Dang and his 
interaction with defense counsel.  We cannot conclude that the 
circuit court committed an abuse of discretion in weighing the 
significance of these factors. 
4. 
Timing of Dang's Motion 
 
Finally, Dang argues that the circuit court erred in 
placing significant weight on the timing of the motion for the 
second competency evaluation. 
 
30 
 
At the December 2 hearing, when defense counsel explained 
that the new information from Mrs. Pham was gained when counsel 
used an interpreter to speak with her rather than relying on 
family, the circuit court asked whether an interpreter could 
have been used earlier.  Specifically, the circuit court stated: 
"[T]his matter has been continued several times and here we are, 
literally on the eve of trial – trial is set for Monday – and 
you're bringing things to my attention that there's just no 
reason that I can see why they weren't raised in September or 
October."  Again, the circuit court asked, "If you had problems 
communicating with your client back in October or September, why 
were you not back in court then seeking a new competency 
evaluation? Why now?"  In response to the court's comments, 
defense counsel explained that while it might have been possible 
to discover the information earlier, counsel had not, and the 
information learned from Mrs. Pham indicated potential causes 
for counsel's concerns regarding Dang's mental health.  This 
discussion between the circuit court and counsel continued 
intermittently throughout the hearing. 
 
After defense counsel concluded argument in support of the 
motion for a second competency evaluation, the circuit court 
noted that it had "focused considerably on the fact that this is  
occurring on the eve of trial" and "whether the information that 
was brought to my attention yesterday could have been available 
 
31 
months ago."  Nevertheless, the circuit court acknowledged that 
defense counsel was "correct that the focus is on whether or not 
there's probable cause at this time, regardless of whether it 
could have been produced to the [c]ourt at an earlier point in 
time."(Emphasis added.)  The circuit court then proceeded to 
discuss the standard set forth in Code § 19.2-169.1 and, in 
particular, whether there was probable cause to conclude that 
Dang lacked substantial capacity to understand the proceedings 
or assist his counsel. 
 
It is clear, then, that while the circuit court was 
understandably concerned about the timing of the motion and why 
counsel had not obtained the information at an earlier time if 
communications had, in fact, been difficult, it was properly 
focused on the question of Dang's competency as of the date of 
trial.  Furthermore, the circuit court made no comment regarding 
the timing of the motion when it was renewed at trial.  
Therefore, we reject Dang's underlying premise that the circuit 
court placed significant weight on the timing of his motion. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, we conclude the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding there was no probable cause to order a 
second competency evaluation.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE MIMS, dissenting. 
The majority determines that the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion when it failed to order a second competency 
evaluation for a defendant with possible organic brain injury 
who displayed signs of confusion and incoherence at trial.  In 
my view, that conclusion does not comport with the evidence in 
the record and the controlling precedent in Drope v. Missouri, 
420 U.S. 162 (1975).  I therefore must dissent. 
A court is required to order a competency evaluation if it 
finds “at any time after the attorney for the defendant has been 
retained or appointed and before the end of trial . . . that 
there is probable cause to believe that the defendant . . . 
lacks substantial capacity to understand the proceedings against 
him or to assist his attorney in his own defense.”  Code § 19.2-
169.1(A) (emphasis added).* 
                     
* The statutory mandate coincides with defendants’ Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights.  See Medina v. California, 505 
U.S. 437, 439 (1992); compare Code § 19.2-169.1(A) with Godinez 
v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (stating the inquiry for 
competency “is whether the defendant has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding and has a rational as well as a factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
33 
We review a trial court’s ruling whether such probable 
cause exists for abuse of discretion.  Johnson v. Commonwealth, 
53 Va. App. 79, 93, 669 S.E.2d 368, 375 (2008).  A court abuses 
its discretion in three principal ways:  “when a relevant factor 
that should have been given significant weight is not 
considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered 
and given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and 
no improper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing 
those factors, commits a clear error of judgment.”  Lawlor v. 
Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 213, 738 S.E.2d 847, 861 (2013) 
(quoting Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., 282 Va. 
346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2011)), cert. denied ___ U.S. 
___, 134 S. Ct. 427 (2013). 
In Drope, the Supreme Court of the United States set forth 
the factors relevant to a court’s consideration of whether an 
inquiry into a defendant’s competency is necessary.  They 
include “evidence of [his] irrational behavior, his demeanor at 
trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand 
trial.”  420 U.S. at 180.  “[E]ven one of these factors standing 
alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient.”  Id.  The 
Court also made clear that when the signs of incompetency 
manifest themselves is not an appropriate factor for 
 
34 
consideration.  See id. at 181 (“Even when a defendant is 
competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial court must 
always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would 
render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to 
stand trial.”). 
The majority determines that the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion when it declined to order a second 
competency evaluation because the report following the first 
evaluation concluded that Dang was competent.  It holds that a 
new evaluation was necessary only if there was a substantial 
change in circumstances after the initial evaluation.  In my 
view, there was a substantial change in circumstances and the 
circuit court therefore abused its discretion in its application 
of the Drope factors. 
  On the surface, the circuit court’s consideration of the 
report corresponds to the third Drope factor.  However, the 
value of the report was substantially undermined by the 
subsequent revelation that Lang had endured physical abuse 
during childhood, which may have resulted in organic brain 
injury.  This information was not known at the time of the 
evaluation.  Thus, the report could not take it into account.  
Moreover, the fact that Dang was unable or unwilling to disclose 
 
35 
it to the evaluator may itself have been symptomatic of an 
underlying disorder impacting his competence to stand trial.  
Similarly, the discovery that Dang had misrepresented his family 
history and relationships may have been clinically significant. 
Courts commonly have no mental health training and 
consequently are ill-prepared to reach competency conclusions 
without the assistance of professional mental health clinicians.  
Code § 19.2-169.1(A) requires a competency evaluation precisely 
for the purpose of providing such assistance.  In sum, we simply 
do not know the clinical relevance of this new information.  
However, the record establishes that Dang’s possible brain 
injury and his failure to disclose both it and his true family 
history and relationships were sufficient to give at least one 
mental health practitioner pause. 
Accordingly, in my view, these new facts amounted to a 
substantial change in circumstances by calling into question the 
accuracy of the conclusions in the competency evaluation report.  
Therefore, the value of the report’s conclusions to satisfy the 
third Drope factor was diminished. 
Dang’s failure to disclose his possible brain injury and 
his family history and relationships also may constitute 
evidence of irrational behavior under the first Drope factor.  
 
36 
We again do not know whether the behavior was symptomatic of an 
underlying disorder and, if so, whether that disorder may have 
affected his competency to stand trial. 
Perhaps most compelling, however, is Dang’s behavior during 
the circuit court’s colloquy, which goes to the second Drope 
factor.  As the majority emphasizes, the competency inquiry 
turns on the defendant’s “present ability to consult with his 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.”  
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Dang’s behavior during the 
colloquy is possibly the best indicator of his “present 
ability.”  Yet, in addition to being generally nonresponsive 
when his answers did not correspond to the court’s questions, 
his answers revealed that he did not understand the charges 
against him, did not understand the potential sentences that 
would follow from conviction, did not understand what a 
prosecutor was, and did not know the names of his attorneys.  
Dang’s failure to understand this information during the 
colloquy calls into question his competency at that time. 
The circuit court and the majority dismiss this behavior as 
being consistent with the evaluation report’s findings.  But, 
again, that report was predicated on incomplete and inaccurate 
 
37 
information.  In the absence of professional guidance, neither 
we nor the circuit court can ascertain whether the report’s 
conclusions would have been the same if the evaluator had known 
all the relevant facts.  Similarly, we cannot know whether 
Dang’s behavior during the colloquy was consistent with what the 
report described as anxiety, or whether it was consistent with, 
for example, an irrational panic or some other underlying mental 
disturbance which may or may not have affected his legal 
competence. 
In short, the majority considers the first report in 
isolation, without considering the information Dang failed, for 
whatever reason, to disclose.  It similarly considers Dang’s 
behavior during the colloquy to be consistent with the flawed 
report.  But under Drope, neither the report nor Dang’s behavior 
can be considered in isolation.  Rather, the circuit court, and 
this Court on review, is obligated to consider all the facts to 
determine whether probable cause existed to justify a second 
competency evaluation.  In my view, the facts here are 
sufficient to meet the probable cause standard fixed by Code § 
19.2-169.1(A). 
Finally, the circuit court was improperly influenced by the 
fact that the deficiencies in the report were not known until 
 
38 
“the eve of trial.”  Although the majority attempts to minimize 
the effect of this influence, the court itself admitted that it 
“focused considerably on the fact that this is occurring on the 
eve of trial . . . and whether the information that was brought 
to my attention yesterday could have been available months ago.”  
Both Drope and Code § 19.2-169.1(A) make clear that information 
calling the defendant’s competence into question is to be 
considered without regard to when or how the information is made 
known to the trial court.  The question was not whether the 
information could have been presented earlier, or even whether 
it was withheld for tactical advantage (an assertion made by 
neither the Commonwealth nor the circuit court).  The 
defendant’s constitutional right to due process and the 
statutory procedure that safeguards it are preeminent.  Rather, 
the question is whether the information, whenever made known to 
the trial court, calls into doubt the defendant’s competence at 
that time. 
I therefore must conclude that the circuit court abused its 
discretion.  It gave improper weight to the flawed competency 
report, the third Drope factor.  It failed to consider possible 
evidence of Dang’s irrational behavior, namely his failure to 
disclose possible brain injury and his family history and 
 
39 
relationships during the competency evaluation, the first Drope 
factor.  It failed to consider the possible deficiencies in the 
competency report when it concluded that Dang’s behavior during 
the colloquy was consistent with the report, the second Drope 
factor.  It improperly considered the timing of the information 
raising new questions about Dang’s competence.  Accordingly, I 
must dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming its judgment.