Case Title: State v. LaDouceur

Citation: 366 N.W.2d 174

Docket Number: 83-823

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1985-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
366 N.W.2d 174 (1985) STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. James David LaDOUCEUR, Appellee. No. 83-823. Supreme Court of Iowa. April 17, 1985. G. Wylie Pillers III, County Attorney, and Craig Ament, Asst. County Atty., for appellant. Charles L. Harrington, Appellate Defender, and Deborah A. Goins, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellee. Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., and McCORMICK, SCHULTZ, CARTER, and WOLLE, JJ. UHLENHOPP, Justice. The single issue before us in our further review of a decision by the court of appeals is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant James David LaDouceur a new trial following his conviction by a jury of third-degree sexual abuse. The court of appeals by an equally divided vote upheld the trial court's order. I. On May 28, 1982, Veronica Sue Doyle was babysitting for defendant and his wife, Brenda LaDouceur. Brenda arrived at home first, and told Veronica she could leave. Veronica arranged a ride with a friend, Pam Rannfeldt. As those two were driving out of the driveway, defendant arrived and convinced the girls to go to a party at a friend's house. The girls first went into the LaDouceur house, and then the three of them went to the party. At the party they had "quite a bit to drink." Veronica eventually asked Pam to take her home, but defendant decided that he should see her home. On the way he stopped by Oxbow Lake, claiming that he needed to check his fishing lines. He got Veronica out of the car, placed her on the ground, and sexually abused her. He then drove off leaving her afoot. As Veronica walked along the road, an acquaintance saw her and noted her disheveled appearance and emotional upset. When Veronica arrived home, she told her mother what had happened; her mother testified that Veronica was hysterical. The two called the police who, after going to the Oxbow area, took Veronica to Dr. Richard Nelson for a physical examination. Deputy John Whitsell investigated at the scene and made notes of his investigation. The next morning Deputy Larry Greenwalt interrogated defendant on tape. Defendant admitted sexual intercourse with Veronica but claimed it was consensual. According to Greenwalt, defendant then asked him to turn off the tape, which he did, and defendant stated he forcibly raped the girl; Greenwalt thereupon went into the hallway and had Deputy Whitsell come *175 into the interrogation room; and defendant repeated the confession. Whitsell later testified he made supplemental notes regarding this occurrence. Whitsell was on vacation just before the trial. Shortly after his return his deposition was taken, including the following: Whitsell was unable to find his supplemental notes. He so informed an assistant county attorney but stated he had refreshed his memory by other officers' notes and discussions. The assistant county attorney did not report these facts to defense counsel. At trial, Greenwalt testified forcefully for the State, but the State did not call Whitsell as a witness. The jury found defendant guilty of third-degree sexual abuse. Defendant moved for a new trial. Paragraph 6 of the motion stated: *176 Paragraph 20 of the motion stated that defendant was denied a fair trial. Prior to hearing on the motion, Whitsell prepared and executed the following statement: At the hearing on the motion, Whitsell testified along similar lines, although his testimony shows some confusion and contradiction. The trial court thoroughly reviewed the facts, the testimony, and the law; held that in fairness the prosecutor should have revealed Whitsell's inability to find his supplemental notes; and concluded that defendant was denied a fair trial. The court's final remarks, which are well within the record, were these: In effect by asking for the deposition of Mr. Whitsell the defense had asked for information concerning the circumstances and nature of the alleged confession of the defendant. At the deposition he in effect was told that Mr. Whitsell would be refreshing his memory from his notes. Rules of Criminal Procedure 12-1 and 13-2-a(1) and 13-5 and Rule of Civil Procedure 125 are set out at pages 10 and 11 of this opinion. By virtue of those rules the State had a duty to inform defense counsel that Mr. Whitsell did not in fact have notes relating to the alleged confession. The prosecutor did not perform that duty. The reasons for not calling Mr. Whitsell and inferentially *177 for not telling defense counsel of the missing notes have been variously and not consistantly stated by the prosecutor as set out previously in this opinion. II. We need not decide whether we would have affirmed if the trial court had overruled defendant's motion for new trial. Neither do we need to say whether defendant was deprived of due process under *178 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976). Rule 23(2) of the rules of criminal procedure, after enumerating various grounds, states in paragraph (9) that the court may grant a new trial "When from any other cause the defendant has not received a fair and impartial trial." Trial courts, which are closer to the actual trial than the appellate courts are, have discretion in granting or denying new trials based on fair trial considerations. State v. Wright, 309 N.W.2d 891 (Iowa 1981); State v. Washington, 308 N.W.2d 422 (Iowa 1981); State v. Mayes, 286 N.W.2d 387 (Iowa 1979); State v. Campiano, 261 Iowa 509, 154 N.W.2d 845 (1967); State v. Sanders, 260 Iowa 327, 149 N.W.2d 159 (1967); State v. Benson, 247 Iowa 406, 72 N.W.2d 438 (1956); State v. Thompson, 241 Iowa 16, 39 N.W.2d 637 (1949); Bletzer v. Wilson, 224 Iowa 887, 276 N.W. 836 (1937); 58 Am.Jur.2d New Trial § 212, at 432-33 (1971) ("Ordinarily a motion for a new trial is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and on appeal from an order entered by the trial court in the exercise of discretion the presumption is that the trial court properly exercised its discretion."); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1422, at 12 (1961) ("Since the consequences of refusing a new trial are serious and not fully corrected by a reversal, the trial courts have been admonished to be more liberal as to such grant where the ends of justice so demand."); see also Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(3) ("In ruling upon motions for new trial the trial court has a broad but not unlimited discretion in determining whether the verdict effectuates substantial justice between the parties."), (4) ("The court is slower to interfere with the grant of a new trial than with its denial."). We will reverse a ruling only on a showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Pletka, 310 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Iowa 1981). We hold that an abuse of discretion does not appear here. We thus uphold the order of the trial court granting a new trial. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.