Case Title: Stringer v. State

Citation: 279 So. 2d 156

Docket Number: 47119

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1973-05-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
279 So. 2d 156 (1973) Quentin STRINGER v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 47119. Supreme Court of Mississippi. May 28, 1973. Rehearing Denied June 29, 1973. *157 Hurlbert & O'Barr, Biloxi, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Edwin A. Snyder, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. SUGG, Justice: This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District of Harrison County, Mississippi, by appellant, Quentin Stringer who was jointly indicted with Leon T. Rogers, Jr., Paul H. Sanders and Thomas D. Dunn, under Section 2149 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956). Appellant was granted a severance and after a lengthy trial, was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to serve one year in the county jail, fined $25,000, together with all costs, and disbarred as an attorney. The jail sentence was suspended upon future good behavior and upon payment of fine and costs. Leon T. Rogers, Jr., one of the coindictees, was previously tried and convicted, which conviction was affirmed by this Court in Rogers v. State, 266 So. 2d 10 (Miss. 1972). Appellant first argues that his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution were violated by the introduction of Exhibit 12 which was a file containing documents, correspondence and forms filled out by persons who testified and by persons who did not testify. The file was prepared under the direction of appellant after the incidents forming the basis for the indictment occurred and contained some correspondence and data prepared by appellant. Appellant contends that he was thereby denied the right to cross-examine witnesses offered by the State in violation of his constitutional rights. Appellant is correct in his contention that an accused has a constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses offered against him and that the right of confrontation is applicable to criminal prosecutions in state courts under the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court of the United States in Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S. Ct. 748, 19 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965), and by our decision in Crapps v. State, 221 So. 2d 722 (Miss. 1969). When the parcel file (Exhibit 12) was introduced in evidence, appellant, who was an attorney, through his counsel made a general objection and then specifically objected on the ground that the witness by whom the parcel file was to be introduced did not know whether or not the file was complete. The objection to the introduction of the exhibit was properly overruled by the trial court for the specific ground assigned, but in this Court appellant presents an entirely different ground of objection to the testimony offered. In *158 Peters v. State, 158 Miss. 530, 130 So. 695 (1930), this Court stated: This rule was followed in Boring v. State, 253 So. 2d 251 (Miss. 1971), where we stated: *159 In Huff v. State, 176 Miss. 443, 169 So. 839 (1936), quoted with approval in Brewer v. State, 233 So. 2d 779 (Miss. 1970), this Court, in dealing with objections to testimony of incompetent witnesses, stated: In Brewer v. State, supra, this Court held that the right of confrontation by witnesses may be waived, citing 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1009, pages 1065-1069. We hold that appellant waived his right to confrontation because he failed to object in the trial court on the constitutional grounds relied on here as the basis for reversible error in admitting the parcel file in evidence. If the objection argued here was in the mind of appellant, it was not made known to the trial court and in effect, appellant waived the ground of objection here assigned and chose to experiment with the evidence to see if it would help or hurt him. Appellant's second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in failing to sustain defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. At the conclusion of the evidence in chief for the State, appellant moved the court for a directed verdict of acquittal. The motion was overruled and the defendant introduced his defense. After both sides rested, appellant requested a peremptory instruction of not guilty and the peremptory instruction was refused by the court. In Kearney v. State, 224 Miss. 1, 79 So. 2d 468 (1955), cited with approval in Smith v. State, 245 So. 2d 583 (Miss. 1971), the Court stated: In McLendon v. State, 187 Miss. 247, 191 So. 821 (1939), Justice Griffith, speaking for the Court, stated: Appellant was charged in the indictment with participating in a scheme to defraud the State of Mississippi of a large sum of money in connection with the purchase of property from Leon T. Rogers, Jr., one of the coindictees, to be used by the State for an interchange at the intersection of Interstate 10 and Mississippi Highway 67. The proof shows that the Rogers property was acquired for the State at a price approximately double its value and that all the *160 property was not needed for an interchange because the interchange which was initially to have been located on the Rogers property was moved to another location. The proof shows that the normal procedures of the Mississippi State Highway Department were not followed in the negotiations for and the purchase of the Rogers property. Appellant contends that his actions appertaining to the purchase of the Rogers property amount to no more than unwise action on his part, and that the proof is wholly insufficient to sustain his conviction on the charge of false pretense. Appellant suggests that the record is replete with instances of unwise action on the part of other highly placed officials in the Mississippi Highway Department and that he was not charged with acting unwisely. There is evidence to show that appellant accelerated the proceedings to purchase the property in question and without detailing the evidence in the voluminous record we hold that, under the rule as stated, the evidence was sufficient to withstand appellant's request for a peremptory instruction, and it was properly denied by the trial court. Appellant's third and final assignment of error is as follows: The record shows that the jury was quartered in the Rowntowner Motel located slightly in excess of 7 miles from the courthouse; that the jurors were transported from the courthouse to the motel and returned by taxicabs; that the jurors were properly instructed by the court and appellant made no objection to the jurors being transported by taxicab to the motel and made no objection to their staying in the motel. In Weaver v. State, 272 So. 2d 636 (Miss. 1973), this Court stated: The record does not contain any suggestion that the jurors failed to follow the instructions of the court; therefore, we reaffirm *161 the holding in Weaver "that separation of jurors, under proper instructions of the court in a criminal case less than capital, is not error." For the reasons stated, this case is affirmed. Affirmed. GILLESPIE, C.J., and SMITH, ROBERTSON and BROOM, JJ., concur. RODGERS, Presiding Justice (specially concurring). I concur in the foregoing opinion, and I would overrule the holding in Brooks v. State, 209 Miss. 150, 46 So. 2d 94 (1950) to the contrary. See Henry v. State, 253 Miss. 263, 174 So. 2d 348 (1965) and Johnson v. State, 220 Miss. 452, 70 So. 2d 926 (1954). SUGG, J., concurs.