Case Title: State v. Palmer

Citation: 169 Vt. 639, 740 A.2d 356

Docket Number: 98-415

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Palmer (98-415); 169 Vt. 639; 740 A.2d 356

[Filed 24-Aug-1999]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-415

                               MAY TERM, 1999

State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
	                               }
	                               }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont,
	                               }	Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
Shelley D. Palmer	               }
	                               }	DOCKET NO. 4632-9-97Cncr

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant Shelley Palmer appeals from a conviction entered in the
  Chittenden District  Court on a charge of simple assault in violation of 13
  V.S.A. § 1023(a)(3) (attempting by  physical menace to put another in fear
  of imminent serious bodily injury).  His contentions on  appeal are that
  the trial court improperly denied him an opportunity to depose the
  complaining  witness, that he should have been granted a new trial when
  certain information came to light  about this witness and that the trial
  court committed reversible error by admitting evidence of an  association
  between defendant, who is a bail bondsman, and a person defendant
  characterizes as  a notorious murder suspect.  We affirm the conviction.

       The case concerns an incident that took place at defendant's home in
  Williston on the  evening of August 11, 1997.  It is undisputed that on
  that occasion defendant drew a gun in the  presence of Robert Gero, who had
  posted bond with defendant in the amount of $6,000 to secure  the release
  of Gero's nephew.  Also undisputed is that the nephew had fled the
  jurisdiction,  leaving Gero potentially liable for the sum posted.  The
  incident giving rise to this case occurred  when Gero went to defendant's
  house to provide evidence that his nephew had been arrested in  Florida. 
  At trial, the disputed issues were whether defendant actually pointed the
  gun at Gero  and whether defendant had the requisite wrongful intent to
  sustain an assault conviction.  When  the case went before the jury, it was
  essentially defendant's word against Gero's on these two  issues.

       During the pretrial phase of the proceedings, defendant moved pursuant
  to V.R.Cr.P. 15  to take Gero's deposition.  Defendant also moved to
  dismiss the proceeding under V.R.Cr.P.  12(d) for lack of a prima facie
  case.  The court convened a hearing on November 24, 1997, and  indicated on
  the record that it was taking up the dismissal motion.  Defense counsel
  raised the  issue of the deposition request, indicating that Gero had
  refused to speak with defendant's  attorney.  The prosecutor responded that
  the proceeding was an unexceptional assault case that  could be "tried in
  half an hour," and that the State did not "see setting aside an hour to do 
  depositions of Mr. Gero."  The prosecutor then advised the court that
  "[w]e're here to go ahead  on the 12(d) motion today."  The court
  responded: "All right.  This is what we're going to do.   We'll do a 12(d)
  motion.  I'll have you call Mr. Gero.  We'll do it all right now. . . . . 
  That  will give you the opportunity to hear his testimony so call Mr.
  Gero."  Gero was then examined  under oath, first by the State and then by
  the defense.  At the conclusion of the hearing the court 

 

  denied the dismissal motion and scheduled a trial date.

       Defendant argues that the court either failed to rule on the
  deposition request or  improperly denied it.  We believe that it is clear
  that the court intended to rule on the deposition  request.  Its ruling can
  be characterized either as a denial or a grant of a deposition in open
  court  as part of the Rule 12(d) hearing.  Although we have significant
  doubt that there was an adverse  decision we can review, we will assume for
  purposes of this decision that the deposition request  was denied.

       Defendant could take a deposition in this misdemeanor case only "after
  approval of the  court for good cause shown."  V.R.Cr.P. 15(e)(4).  One of
  the factors the court must consider is  the "other opportunities available
  to the defendant to discover the information sought by the  deposition." 
  Id.  The trial court has discretion in ruling on defendant's request to
  depose the  victim.  Thus, defendant must show that the trial court abused
  its discretion -- that is, that the  decision was untenable or clearly
  unreasonable.  See State v. Sims, 158 Vt. 173, 186, 608 A.2d 1149, 1156
  (1992).  Moreover, to prevail on appeal, defendant must also show prejudice
  from  the ruling.  See State v. Streich, 163 Vt. 331, 349,