Case Title: Ex parte Michael Wade Hogeland, Robert Miller, Vanna Trott.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1180360, 1171028

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel:   December 20, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2019-2020
____________________
1171028
____________________
Ex parte Avan Baggett and Michael Wade Hogeland
____________________
1180360
____________________
Ex parte Michael Wade Hogeland, Robert Miller, and Vanna
Trott
PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: State of Alabama ex rel. Steve Marshall, Attorney
General, Alabama Department of Environmental Management, and
Mobile Baykeeper, Inc.
v.
Utilities Board of the City of Daphne)
(Baldwin Circuit Court, CV-17-901319)
1171028; 1180360
MITCHELL, Justice.
These consolidated petitions for the writ of mandamus
require us to consider the objections of four nonparty
witnesses to subpoenas issued by the Utilities Board of the
City of Daphne ("Daphne Utilities").  In case no. 1171028, two
of the witnesses ask us to vacate an order entered by the
trial court requiring them to produce certain electronic
information.  In case no. 1180360, three of the witnesses ask
us to vacate an order entered by the trial court allowing
subpoenas for their past employment records to be issued to
their current employers.  For reasons explained in this
opinion, we deny the petition in case no. 1171028 and grant
the petition and issue a writ of mandamus in case no. 1180360.
Facts and Procedural History
On November 16, 2017, the State of Alabama and the
Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM")
(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the State") sued
Daphne Utilities alleging that Daphne Utilities, as operator
of the Daphne Water Reclamation Facility, exceeded permitted
discharge allowances on various occasions between November
2012 and October 2017 and, in some of those instances, did not
2
1171028; 1180360
comply with ADEM's reporting requirements.  The State
requested, among other things, that the trial court "[o]rder
[Daphne Utilities] to take action to ensure that similar
violations of the ADEM [Administrative] Code, [Daphne
Utilities'] [p]ermit, 
and 
the 
[Alabama 
Water 
Pollution Control
Act] will not [occur] in the future." 
Petitioners Michael Wade Hogeland, Avan Baggett, Robert
Miller, and Vanna Trott are nonparty whistleblowers who were
employees of Daphne Utilities at all times relevant to the
complaint.  All of those individuals reported to citizens'
group Mobile Baykeeper, Inc., a plaintiff-intervenor in the
underlying case, what they characterize as "data evidencing a
pattern of under reporting of sewage spills by Daphne
Utilities and its managers."  Hogeland, Miller, and Trott
("the 
whistleblowers") 
claim 
that 
Daphne 
Utilities
constructively terminated their employment in March 2018, and
they have filed complaints with the United States Department
of Labor related to Daphne Utilities' alleged discrimination
and retaliatory discharge.
A.
Subpoenas to Baggett and Hogeland
On April 5, 2018, Daphne Utilities issued separate
nonparty subpoenas to Baggett and Hogeland, under Rule 45,
3
1171028; 1180360
Ala. R. Civ. P., ordering Baggett and Hogeland to appear for
depositions and to produce certain documents and items. 
Baggett and Hogeland moved on April 25, 2018, for a protective
order relating to the requests for certain electronic
information, asserting that such information was private,
personal, and irrelevant to the underlying action and that the
requests were issued as retaliation for Baggett's and
Hogeland's whistleblower activities.  On May 14, 2018, the
trial court entered a protective order that set out ground
rules for the production of the requested items but ultimately
required Baggett and Hogeland to produce the electronic
information. 
 
Neither 
Baggett 
nor 
Hogeland 
sought
interlocutory review of that protective order.
On June 22, 2018, Daphne Utilities issued new subpoenas
to Baggett and Hogeland seeking production of the same items
requested by the April 5, 2018, subpoenas, including the
electronic information that the trial court had already
ordered Baggett and Hogeland to produce.  Baggett and Hogeland
renewed their April 25, 2018, motion for a protective order. 
The trial court denied that motion on July 20, 2018.  In case
4
1171028; 1180360
no. 1171028, Baggett and Hogeland ask us to issue a writ
directing that the July 20, 2018, order be vacated. 1
B.
Subpoenas to Employers of Hogeland, Trott, and
Miller
On January 23, 2019, Daphne Utilities issued notices of
intent to serve subpoenas on Hogeland's and Trott's current
employer, The Water Works & Sewer Board of the City of
Prichard, and on 
Miller's current employer, Saraland Water and
Sewer Services.  The subpoenas that were attached to each
notice directed each employer to produce, with regard to each
whistleblower:
"Any and all documents which in any way relate to
the employment of [the respective whistleblower] ...
including but not limited to, applications, offers,
rejections, employment contracts, payroll records,
job 
assignments, 
personnel 
file, 
disciplinary
actions, reprimands, advancements, terminations,
reasons for termination, or any other written
material whatsoever, made at any time."
(These documents are hereinafter referred to as "the
employment records.")
1Baggett and Hogeland refer to the July 20, 2018, order
as the "July 19, 2018," order.  Although the materials before
us indicate that the order was entered on July 20, 2018,
whether it was issued on July 19, 2018, or July 20, 2018, is
immaterial to the issue presented.
5
1171028; 1180360
On January 24, 2019, the whistleblowers filed a motion
for a protective order or, in the alternative, a motion to
quash the subpoenas ("motion to quash").  On February 4, 2019,
the trial court granted the whistleblowers' motion to quash in
part and denied it in part.2  Specifically, the trial court
denied the request to quash the subpoenas but ordered that the
parties take steps to protect certain personal information
contained in the employment records.  In case no. 1180360, the
whistleblowers seek mandamus relief from the trial court's
order.
Standard of Review
Both petitions ask this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
to the trial court directing it to vacate discovery orders
issued to nonparties.
"It is well established that mandamus is a
drastic and extraordinary writ to be issued only
2It appears from the materials before us that the trial
court initially denied the motion to quash and that the denial
prompted the whistleblowers to file a motion to reconsider. 
That motion to reconsider references a January 31, 2019, order
denying the motion to quash.  That order is not included in
the materials before us, but it appears not to matter for
present purposes.  The February 4, 2019, order, which is
included in the materials before us, expressly applies to the
motion to quash, not the motion to reconsider (which the trial
court denied), and thus supersedes any prior order denying the
motion to quash. 
6
1171028; 1180360
when there is (1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative
duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by
a refusal to do so; (3) the c
lk
a of another adequate
remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the
court."
Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991).  
Case No. 1171028
We deny Baggett and Hogeland's petition.  The July 20,
2018, order denying Baggett and Hogeland's renewed motion for
a protective order is not the only order compelling them to
produce the electronic information.  The May 14, 2018, order
–– 
from 
which 
neither 
Baggett 
nor 
Hogeland 
sought
interlocutory review and which is not before us –– imposes the
same requirements.  Moreover, nothing in the July 20, 2018,
order expands Baggett's or Hogeland's discovery obligations
beyond what the May 14, 2018, order imposes.  Therefore,
vacating the July 20, 2018, order would have no effect on
Baggett's or Hogeland's obligations.  We decline to issue a
writ of mandamus under such circumstances.
Case No. 1180360
To obtain mandamus relief, the whistleblowers must
establish, among other things, that they have a "clear legal
right" to the order they seek.  Because discovery matters are
7
1171028; 1180360
within a trial court's discretion, the success of the
whistleblowers' petition is dependent upon a conclusion that
the trial court clearly exceeded that discretion when it
entered its February 4, 2019, order refusing to quash the
subpoenas that Daphne Utilities intended to serve upon the
whistleblowers' employers.  Ex parte Crawford Broad. Co., 904
So. 2d 221, 224 (Ala. 2004).  
A trial court's discretion in discovery matters, though
wide, is not boundless.  Rule 26, Ala. R. Civ. P., places
limits on what is discoverable.  Discovery must be "relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action,"
"proportional to the needs of the case," and  "reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 
Rule 26(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P.  When (1) proposed discovery
does not meet these criteria; (2) the discovery sought is
"unreasonably 
cumulative 
or 
duplicative, or 
is 
obtainable 
from
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive"; or (3) "the party seeking discovery has had
ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the
information sought," the trial court must limit the 
"frequency
8
1171028; 1180360
or extent of use of the discovery methods."  Rule 26(b)(2)(B),
Ala. R. Civ. P. 
In its response to the whistleblowers' motion to quash in
the trial court, Daphne Utilities attempted to justify its
requests for the employment records by stating that, "[u]pon
information and belief, although [the whistleblowers] were
employed by Daphne Utilities during the time frames referenced
in 
the 
complaints, 
[the 
whistleblowers], unbeknownst to 
Daphne
Utilit[ies], also were employed or working for [sic] other
entities."  The information requested by the subpoenas,
according to Daphne Utilities, was "needed to properly
investigate potential for 
bias, 
issues 
related 
to 
credibility,
and other issues related to the testimony of the same." 
Daphne Utilities did not provide any evidence to the trial
court suggesting that any of the whistleblowers worked
elsewhere while they were employed by Daphne Utilities; nor
has 
Daphne 
Utilities 
explained 
why 
the 
whistleblowers' alleged
"moonlighting" speaks to their credibility. 
Daphne Utilities also relies on a justification that it
did not raise in the trial court.  While Daphne Utilities
continues to maintain that its requests for the employment
9
1171028; 1180360
records are justified by concerns of potential witness bias,
it now also claims that its requests are justified by the
State's requests for relief, namely, that Daphne Utilities be
ordered "to take action to ensure that similar violations ...
will not [occur] in the future."  Daphne Utilities explains:
"Daphne Utilities (and ADEM) need[] to understand if
moonlighting contributed to 
the alleged violations, or not, in
order to determine whether Daphne Utilities' current policy
and procedures are sufficient, and if not, in order to revise
its policies and procedures to prevent any future issues." 
Daphne Utilities' brief at 4. 
We will consider only whether the subpoena requests were
a legitimate vehicle by which to determine potential witness
bias.  Almost nothing in the materials before us suggests that
the employment records sought by Daphne Utilities are relevant
to the merits of the underlying action.3  Additionally, Daphne
3Although not argued before the trial court, Daphne
Utilities makes fleeting arguments in its brief that the
employment records are relevant to the merits of the
underlying action because, to the extent they show that the
whistleblowers 
were 
moonlighting, 
such 
moonlighting 
could 
have
affected their work and caused some of the alleged violations. 
At the time the trial court issued its February 4, 2019,
order, a Daphne Utilities' brief from May 4, 2018, in an
unrelated case alleged that Hogeland had been involved in 1 of
the 59 unpermitted discharges alleged in the complaint. 
10
1171028; 1180360
Utilities' new argument that it needs the employment records
to comply with the relief requested by the State is due to be
rejected.  That argument is premature because the relief
requested by the State, which Daphne Utilities invokes in
support of its subpoena request, has not been awarded.  And
even assuming such relief is eventually awarded, Daphne
Utilities has provided no reason to support its assertion that
the employment records will be necessary to comply with such
relief.  Importantly, the parties requesting such relief have
given no indication that the employment records will be needed
to obtain the relief they seek.  Evidence that provides
insight into witness credibility or bias, however, is
admissible.  See Rules 607 and 616, Ala. R. Evid.  We will
therefore consider whether the trial court was within its
discretion to permit Daphne Utilities to subpoena the
Daphne Utilities does not tie Miller or Trott to any of the
alleged discharges.  Nothing in this opinion prevents Daphne
Utilities from seeking testimony or documents from the
whistleblowers concerning their respective roles in any of the
alleged discharge or reporting violations. To the extent,
however, that the trial court based its February 4, 2019,
order on a finding that Hogeland's alleged involvement in an
unpermitted discharge justified access to the employment
records, it exceeded its discretion. 
11
1171028; 1180360
employment records in 
an effort to determine potential witness
bias.
In assessing the propriety of the trial court's order, we
first consider the whistleblowers' request that we apply the
test for discovery of records similar to the employment
records that was adopted by the Court of Civil Appeals in Ex
parte Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 92 So. 3d 90, 102 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2012),4 and applied in a plurality opinion in
HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Gadsden, LLC v. Honts,
276 So. 3d 185, 199 (Ala. 2018).  That test recognizes a
presumption against the 
disclosure of such records and imposes
a burden on parties seeking their production to make a
specific showing of why the material sought is discoverable. 
In HealthSouth, Justice Sellers, the author of the opinion, in
which Chief Justice Stuart concurred, articulated this test as
follows:
"'"There exists a strong public policy against
disclosure of personnel files."'  Ex parte Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 92 So. 3d 90, 102 (Ala. Civ. App.
2012) (quoting In re One Bancorp Sec. Litig., 134
F.R.D. 4, 12 (D. Me. 1991)).  For that reason,
4The 
Liberty 
Mutual 
court 
expressly adopted 
this 
test 
from
In re One Bancorp Securities Litigation, 134 F.R.D. 4, 12 (D.
Me. 1991), but the bulk of it can be traced back to In re
Hawaii Corp., 88 F.R.D. 518, 524 (D. Haw. 1980). 
12
1171028; 1180360
'"[d]iscovery of such files is permissible"' only if
(1) '"'the material sought is "clearly relevant,"'"'
and (2) '"'the need for discovery is compelling
because the information sought is not otherwise
readily obtainable.'"'  Id.  A plaintiff '"must
first make an initial fact-specific showing,"' and
'"[g]eneral allegations ... do not suffice to render
[personnel] records discoverable."' Id."
276 So. 3d at 199 (ellipses and brackets in original).  Daphne
Utilities has only generally alleged that the employment
records would provide insight into the whistleblowers'
credibility and has not made a "fact-specific showing" in
support of those allegations.  Therefore, an application of
the test set out in Liberty Mutual would lead us to conclude
that the trial court exceeded its discretion when it refused
to quash the subpoenas.  For present purposes, however, we
need not decide whether it is appropriate to adopt the Liberty
Mutual test, because Daphne Utilities' subpoenas are due to be
quashed under our traditional discovery rules. 
The subpoenas at issue here are neither proportional to
the needs of this case nor reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.  
Daphne Utilities states
its interest in the employment records as follows: "[The
employment records] will aid in evidencing whether [the
whistleblowers], all intimately involved in the violations
13
1171028; 1180360
alleged against Daphne Utilities, were working for Daphne
Utilities, which is not only relevant to ADEM's claims 
against Daphne Utilities, but [the whistleblowers'] biases
against Daphne Utilities."  Although Daphne Utilities has
provided the Court with a reasonably detailed list of what it
anticipates the employment records will reveal, that list does
not explain how any portion of the employment records may
reveal the whistleblowers' bias.  Instead, Daphne Utilities
asserts that the requested employment records will help it
determine whether the whistleblowers were employed by their
current employers at the same time they were employed by
Daphne Utilities and will help Daphne Utilities create "an
employment timeline."  Daphne Utilities' brief at 11.  
Subpoenaing employers for employment records of their
employees is a highly disproportional method of establishing
"employment timelines."  The whistleblowers claim that Daphne
Utilities is using the subpoenas as a tool for harassment.
Regardless 
of 
Daphne 
Utilities' 
intentions, 
the
whistleblowers' concerns about the impression those subpoenas
may leave on their employers are understandable.  See Warnke
v. CVS Corp., 265 F.R.D. 64, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) ("'[B]ecause
14
1171028; 1180360
of the direct negative effect that disclosures of disputes
with past employers can have on present employment, subpoenas
in this context, if warranted at all, should only be used as
a last resort.'" (quoting Conrod v. Bank of N.Y., No. 97 Civ.
6347, July 30, 1998 (S.D.N.Y.) (not selected for publication
in F. Supp. 2d))); Graham v. Casey's Gen. Stores, 206 F.R.D.
251, 256 (S.D. Ind. 2002) ("[Plaintiff] has a legitimate
concern that a subpoena sent to her current employer under the
guise of a discovery request could be a tool for harassment
and result in difficulties for her in her new job.").  The
potential for a subpoena issued to a nonparty employer to be
used as a tool for harassment increases when that subpoena
demands sensitive materials such as the employment records
here.  See Burch v. P.J. Cheese, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-1640-SLB,
Aug. 20, 2010 (N.D. Ala.) (not selected for publication in F.
Supp. 2d) (finding that a plaintiff had a "legitimate privacy
interest in his employment records held by his current
employer" that had been subpoenaed by the defendant and
concluding that, because the requested records were mostly
irrelevant, the subpoena appeared to constitute "'a fishing
15
1171028; 1180360
expedition' or 'tool for harassment,' [rather] than a
reasonably calculated discovery request").
The case for proportionality becomes even weaker when one
considers that Daphne Utilities could obtain the "employment
timeline" information it seeks from the whistleblowers
themselves rather than through the employment records.  The
whistleblowers argued before the trial court that any
discoverable information Daphne Utilities requested was
available through less intrusive means and now suggest that
they themselves would be able to provide any relevant
employment information through depositions or document
requests.  
Daphne Utilities balks at the whistleblowers' offer to
provide Daphne Utilities what it claims to be seeking.  First,
Daphne Utilities argues that, because it is seeking
information to show that the whistleblowers violated Daphne
Utilities' company policy, the whistleblowers will not be a
"reliable source of the information."  Daphne Utilities' brief
at 24.  Thus, Daphne Utilities asks us to assume, without
evidence, that the whistleblowers will simply refuse to 
comply
with any valid subpoena request.  We will not make that
16
1171028; 1180360
assumption.  Second, Daphne Utilities argues that directing
their requests to the  whistleblowers would be futile because
the whistleblowers "do not likely have copies of their own
employment files." Id. Although the whistleblowers may not
have copies of all the employment records sought by Daphne
Utilities, it is likely that the whistleblowers would be able
to provide Daphne Utilities with the periods during which each
of them worked for his or her current employer.  And this,
after all, is the information Daphne Utilities claims to be
searching for in the employment records.  For these reasons,
the 
subpoena 
requests 
to 
the 
whistleblowers' current 
employers
for the employment records are disproportional to Daphne
Utilities' stated need to establish an "employment timeline."
In addition, Daphne Utilities' subpoenas are not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of witness
bias.  Daphne Utilities claims that it will be able to search
out witness bias in the employment records by discovering the
days on which the whistleblowers supposedly "moonlighted." 
But the subpoena requests are not limited to the time frame
during which the whistleblowers were employed by Daphne
Utilities. Instead, the subpoenas seek "[a]ny and all
17
1171028; 1180360
documents ... made at any time."  Daphne Utilities offers no
basis for why the employment records created after the
whistleblowers stopped working for Daphne Utilities would be
relevant. Most 
importantly, 
however, 
Daphne 
Utilities 
fails 
to
offer any cogent reasoning for why the "employment timeline"
that it hopes to develop through employment records would
offer any admissible evidence of witness bias.  
It is clear that the whistleblowers are entitled to a
writ of mandamus.  The subpoenas noticed by Daphne Utilities
to be served on the whistleblowers' current employers are
neither proportional to the needs of the case nor reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
For those reasons, the whistleblowers have a clear right to
the relief they requested from the trial court.  Because the
whistleblowers are not parties to the underlying action, they
have no right of appeal or adequate remedy other than a writ
of mandamus.  See Mars Hill Baptist Church of Anniston,
Alabama, Inc. v. Mars Hill Missionary Baptist Church, 761 So.
2d 975, 980 (Ala. 1999) ("One must have been a party to the
judgment below in order to have standing to appeal any issue
arising out of that judgment.").  The trial court failed to
18
1171028; 1180360
grant the relief to which the whistleblowers were entitled,
and the whistleblowers have properly invoked this Court's
jurisdiction.  The whistleblowers are entitled to have their
petition for a writ of mandamus granted.  
Finally, it is important to emphasize that this decision
does not impose a categorical prohibition against inquiries
into potential moonlighting by the whistleblowers, especially
inquiries directed to the whistleblowers themselves.  We hold
only that, based on the materials before this Court, the trial
court exceeded its discretion in permitting the subpoenas to
be issued to the whistleblowers' current employers.
Conclusion
Because a favorable decision resulting from a review of
Baggett and Hogeland's petition for a writ of mandamus would
not actually alter Baggett and Hogeland's already existing
discovery obligations, we deny the petition for the writ of
mandamus in case no. 1171028.  We grant the whistleblowers'
petition in case no. 1180360, however, because Daphne
Utilities' subpoenas demanding employment records from the
whistleblowers' employers are not proportional to the needs of
the case and are not reasonably calculated to lead to the
19
1171028; 1180360
discovery of admissible evidence.  We therefore vacate the
trial court's February 4, 2019, order and direct the trial
court to issue an order quashing those subpoenas.
1171028 –- PETITION DENIED.
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers,
Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur. 
1180360 –- PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Shaw, Wise, and Stewart, JJ., concur. 
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Bryan, Sellers, and Mendheim,
JJ., concur in the result.
20