Case Title: State v. Brooks

Citation: 1996-Ohio-134

Docket Number: 19941871

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Brooks, Appellant. 
[Cite as State v. Brooks (1996),        Ohio St.3d       .] 
Criminal law -- Aggravated murder -- Death penalty upheld, when. 
 
(No. 94-1871-- Submitted July 26, 1995-- Decided March 4, 1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. C.A. 16192. 
 
On August 26, 1992, defendant-appellant Antonio Brooks, accompanied 
by several other men, left Detroit, Michigan with the intent to sell drugs in 
Akron, Ohio.  They departed Detroit in two cars at approximately 9:00 p.m. 
and arrived in Akron at about 1:15 a.m. on August 27.  One of the men who 
traveled to Akron with Brooks was Collin Boatright (“Rabbit”). 
 
Upon arriving in Akron, some of the men established a base of 
operations at the apartment of Toni Massingill.  Toni’s brother, Vernon 
Massingill (“Buster”), and Buster’s girlfriend also lived in Toni’s apartment.  
Brooks and Rabbit stayed at Toni’s apartment after the other men left.  Toni 
agreed to allow Rabbit and Brooks to sell drugs from her apartment in 
exchange for $40 to $50 per day plus a quantity of free drugs. 
 
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While Rabbit sold the drugs, Brooks’s role was to keep track of the 
money and to act as a lookout.  Between 4:30 and 5:00 a.m. on August 27, 
Brooks and Rabbit purchased a .38 caliber revolver from a man identified only 
as Byron.  Later, the two men obtained a box of bullets for the gun. 
 
That evening, Rabbit was relaxing in the ground floor apartment of April 
Griffin, who lived close by Toni Massingill, at 695 Westerly.  Victoria Wilson 
and Sheeba Mosley were also in the apartment, and they were later joined by 
Brooks. 
 
At about 3:15 a.m. on August 28, Emanuel McMillan arrived at the 
apartment.  McMillan, who was dating Mosley, had come in a taxi in order to 
take Mosley and her young child home.  Rabbit and McMillan became 
embroiled in an argument, and Rabbit followed McMillan when he left the 
apartment.  The argument continued outside, and in the midst of it, Rabbit shot 
McMillan once in the chest.  McMillan was able to stagger into the waiting 
taxi, and the driver sped the wounded McMillan to a nearby hospital.  Along 
 
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the way, the taxi driver notified his dispatcher and a passing police officer of 
the shooting. 
 
Before fleeing, Rabbit told Brooks to kill the witnesses to the shooting.  
Brooks went to Toni’s apartment, retrieved the box of bullets, and loaded the 
.38 caliber revolver.  Brooks told Toni, “I am getting ready to kill the bitches.” 
Brooks then returned to Griffin’s apartment and proceeded to shoot Griffin, 
Wilson, and Mosley. 
 
After leaving the apartment, Brooks gave the murder weapon to Buster 
and told him to dispose of it.  Brooks then walked back to Toni’s apartment and 
said, “I just killed them bitches.  Y’all ain’t got nothing to worry about.”  
Afterwards, Brooks went to the residence of April Woods, who also lived at 
695 Westerly, in a second floor apartment. 
 
At approximately 3:30 a.m., Sergeant Robert Bennett of the Akron 
Police Department arrived at the scene and entered Griffin’s apartment.  There, 
he found Wilson and Mosley dead in the living room and Griffin dead in a 
bedroom.  He also found five children alive, ranging from twenty months to 
 
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five years of age.  Each of the three victims had suffered a gunshot wound to 
the head, and Griffin had also suffered gunshot wounds to her hand, arm, and 
chest.  One of the children was lying awake next to Griffin’s body in the 
bedroom. 
 
When police backup units arrived, they secured the area.  The police had 
a description of the shooter’s clothes: black, knee-length shorts and a black 
jacket with a distinctive emblem bearing the words “Public Enemy.”  The 
police also received information that the gunman might be in April Woods’s 
apartment. 
 
Police found Brooks and a pair of black, knee-length shorts in Woods’s 
apartment.  On the landing outside of Woods’s apartment, another officer found 
the distinctive “Public Enemy” jacket.  Brooks carried no identification and 
originally gave police a false name when they asked his identity.  As a result, 
police asked Brooks to accompany them to the station to determine his identity 
and to question him about the shootings.   
 
5
 
Buster was also taken in for questioning.  Based on information provided 
by Buster, the police found the .38 caliber revolver, five empty .38 caliber 
shells, and a box of unused .38 caliber bullets.  Forensic experts subsequently 
matched the empty shells to the revolver and also verified that the gun had fired 
several bullets recovered from the victims’ bodies.  Later in the day, Brooks 
waived his Miranda rights and gave a complete taped confession to the murders 
of Griffin, Wilson, and Mosley. 
 
On September 11, 1992, Brooks was charged with three counts of 
aggravated murder pursuant to R.C. 2903.01(A).  Each aggravated murder 
count included two death penalty specifications.  The first specification alleged 
multiple murders as a course of conduct in violation of R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), 
while the second death specification alleged that the murder victim “was 
purposely killed to prevent testimony” in a criminal proceeding in violation of 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(8).  On January 11, 1993, Brooks proceeded to a jury trial.  
During the guilt phase, Brooks denied ever shooting anyone.  He testified that 
Buster agreed to shoot the women after Rabbit had given Buster the gun and 
 
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told Buster, “Do what you got to do.”  Despite Brooks’s testimony, on January 
23, 1993, the jury convicted Brooks as charged on all three aggravated murder 
counts with death penalty specifications. 
Sentencing Phase Evidence 
 
Brooks was born on April 27, 1973.  In an unsworn statement, Brooks 
described his troubled childhood.  His mother was only thirteen years old when 
Brooks was born.  She was a drug addict who supported her habit by stealing.  
Whenever Brooks’s mother became upset, she beat him with belts, 
broomsticks, and extension cords.  Brooks went to a variety of schools when he 
was young because his mother moved frequently.  At age twelve, Brooks first 
learned that his father was alive and that Brooks had twelve brothers and six 
sisters.  Brooks left home at age thirteen and lived at various times with 
relatives, his girlfriend, or alone.  He joined a gang, quit school, and supported 
himself by working for a restaurant and by selling marijuana. 
 
Psychologist Dr. John Graham testified that Brooks had a personality 
disorder with antisocial, passive/aggressive, and paranoid characteristics.  His 
 
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unstable and negative upbringing helped form this disorder.  As a result of his 
personality disorder, Brooks had terrible judgment, a poorly developed 
conscience, and disregard for social standards and values, and did not accept 
responsibility for his own acts.  Yet Brooks, of low average intelligence, 
understood right from wrong, exhibited no confused thinking or gross 
distortion of reality, and displayed no psychotic symptoms. 
 
In its instructions to the jury at the conclusion of the sentencing phase of 
the trial, the court stated: “You are now required to determine unanimously that 
the death penalty is inappropriate before you can consider a life sentence.”  The 
jury charge, therefore, indicated that the jury could consider life imprisonment 
only if there was unanimity in determining that Brooks should not be sentenced 
to death. 
 
The trial court held the mitigation hearing on February 9, 1993. On the 
same day, after considering the evidence, the jury recommended the death 
penalty on all three aggravated murder counts.  The trial court agreed and 
 
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sentenced Brooks to death on each murder count.  The court of appeals 
affirmed Brooks’s convictions and death penalty. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________ 
 
Maureen O’Connor, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and William 
D. Wellemeyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.  
 
Annette L. Powers and Irving B. Sugerman, for appellant. 
__________ 
 
Pfeifer, J.   Appellant has raised eighteen propositions of law.  We have 
reviewed each and have determined that none justifies the reversal of 
appellant’s convictions for aggravated murder.  However, appellant’s 
proposition of law regarding faulty jury instructions in the sentencing phase 
does have merit.   
 
Particularly, the trial judge’s instruction that the jury was required to 
determine unanimously that the death penalty was inappropriate before it could 
 
9
consider a life sentence was plain error.  We therefore affirm appellant’s 
convictions but reverse the sentence of death. 
Evidentiary Issues 
 
Appellant’s propositions of law four, five, six, nine and ten raise  
evidentiary issues.  In proposition four, Brooks argues that prejudicial hearsay 
was admitted over objection.  At trial, the first police officer at the scene, 
Bennett, described finding a child next to Griffin’s body.  Bennett testified that 
the child stated,  “They hurt my mommy,” and that the child put his finger into 
the victim’s nose and head wound.   
 
The child’s statement was not hearsay because it was not offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted.  Bennett was merely describing the 
circumstances of how he discovered Griffin’s slain body.  The child’s 
statement was not offered to prove that Griffin had been injured, but was a part 
of Bennett’s description of the crime scene.  Thus, proposition four lacks merit. 
 
In his fifth proposition of law, Brooks argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion by refusing to permit Brooks to cross-examine Buster Massingill 
 
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about the fact that Buster had originally been charged with complicity in the 
murders.  As appellant points out, Evid.R. 609 is not relevant.  Evid.R. 609 
deals only with evidence of criminal convictions.  In this case, Buster was 
never convicted of complicity.  Appellant argues that the cross-examination 
should have been allowed under Evid.R. 608(B).  Evid.R. 608(B) vests a trial 
court with discretion to allow cross-examination about specific instances of 
conduct of a witness “if clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.”  
The rule reads, in part: 
 
“Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting the witness’s character for truthfulness, other than 
conviction of a crime as provided in Evid.R. 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence.  They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if clearly 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’s character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness * * * .” (Emphasis added.) 
 
11
 
The fact that police originally charged Buster with complicity was not 
probative of Buster’s truthfulness and is not conduct by Buster.  Evid.R. 608 
therefore is not relevant.  However, the cross-examination should have been 
allowed under Evid.R. 616, which reads: 
 
“Bias, prejudice, interest, or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to 
impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by extrinsic 
evidence.” 
 
Although the original charge of complicity was not evidence of Buster’s 
character for truthfulness, it was evidence of a motive for him to be untruthful 
and attempt to foist blame onto appellant.  Still, the error in denying the cross-
examination was harmless for the following reasons. 
 
The jury was privy to a bevy of examples of conduct probative of 
Buster’s truthfulness.  The trial court allowed Brooks free rein to cross-
examine Buster about all aspects of his involvement with Rabbit, Brooks, and 
the murders.  Brooks cross-examined Buster about his use of drugs, his hiding 
or losing the murder weapon, the shells, and the bullets, and all his 
 
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conversations with police.  The jury knew that Buster, with three burglary 
convictions, was on parole when the murders occurred.  The jury also knew 
that Buster, indicted for tampering with evidence and obstruction of justice in 
the murders, had pled guilty and was in prison for tampering.  The jury knew 
that Buster had plea-bargained and agreed to testify against Brooks.  In short, 
the jury had concrete examples of Buster’s truthfulness, or lack thereof, and 
also knew of the motivations which might have influenced his testimony.  
Proposition five thus lacks merit. 
 
In his sixth proposition of law, Brooks challenges the admission of 
certain brief portions of his taped confession.  The transcript of the confession 
heard by the jury reads as follows: 
 
“Q. You don’t really show much remorse here, is there a reason for that, 
what do you think wrong place, wrong time or are you just protecting yourself? 
 
“A. (inaudible) 
 
“Q. How do you feel about killing those three girls? 
 
“A.  Real bad, I just did it to protect myself. 
 
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“Q. Do you belong to any organized gangs, street gangs? 
 
“A. Yeah. 
 
“Q. What gang is that? 
 
“A. Gangster Disciples, it’s a Chicago based gang. 
 
“Q Chicago based gang, Gangster Disciples, do they have a group in 
Detroit? 
 
“A. No. 
 
“Q. This is just a gang that you belong to? 
 
“A. Yes. 
 
“Q. Anything else you can think of, Sgt. Hammond? 
 
“Q.  Have you ever killed anyone before? 
 
“A. No, sir. 
 
“Q. Have you ever been in jail? 
 
“A.  On Drugs.” 
 
As to most of this material, Brooks did not object at trial and waived all 
but plain error.  Brooks only objected to the detective’s remark that Brooks did 
 
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not show remorse.  The trial court did not order the detective’s remark deleted 
because it would be “kind of hard” to edit the tape.  Inconvenience, however, is 
not a sufficient reason to allow inadmissible evidence to go to the jury.  
Nevertheless, the detective’s offhand remark did not materially prejudice 
Brooks.  We find the error in admitting it to be harmless. 
 
As to the other statements and comments, neither plain error nor material 
prejudice resulted.  By the time the confession was played, the jury was well 
aware of Brooks’s criminal past.  In his counsel’s opening statement in the 
trial’s guilt phase, Brooks admitted that at age fourteen, he “got associated with 
gangs” as “a way of self-protection.”  As a result, his life “was filled with 
violence, street violence, fights.”  He supported himself in part by selling 
marijuana. His way of life was to “live on the street, deal drugs, make ends 
meet.”  In his testimony, Brooks elaborated on his background and admitted 
that he had come to Akron to sell cocaine.  Thus, Brooks now objects to parts 
of the taped confession that mirrored his trial strategy and evidence.  We reject 
Brooks’s sixth proposition of law. 
 
15
 
In his ninth proposition of law, Brooks argues that the trial court erred in 
admitting, over objection, four gruesome photographs.  Three crime scene 
photographs each depict a victim’s head and gunshot wound, although in two 
photographs the wound is obscured.  A coroner’s slide depicts Griffin’s head 
and torso injuries. 
 
Pursuant to Evid.R. 403 the admission of photographs is left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 107, 121, 
559 N.E.2d 710, 726; State v. Maurer (1984) 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 5 OBR 379, 
473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the syllabus; State v. Morales (1987), 32 
Ohio St.3d 252, 257, 513 N.E.2d 267, 273. 
 
The two challenged photographs of Griffin are cumulative to each other.  
Error in admitting them, however, was harmless.  Otherwise, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in regard to the photographs.  The photos are not 
inflammatory.  Each crime scene photograph illustrates the testimony of police 
officers and has probative value in showing the injury and the killer’s intention.  
See State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 281, 528 N.E.2d 542, 551.  The 
 
16
slide illustrates the coroner’s testimony, shows Griffin’s head and torso 
injuries, and demonstrates the killer’s intention.  No prejudicial error occurred.  
See State v. Slagle (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 597, 602, 605 N.E.2d 916, 923; State 
v. Franklin (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 125, 580 N.E.2d 1, 7. 
 
In his tenth proposition, Brooks argues that his confession was 
involuntary.  A court, in determining whether a confession is involuntary, 
“should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, 
and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and 
frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or 
mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.” State v. Edwards 
(1976), 49 Ohio St.2d 31, 3 O.O.3d 18, 358 N.E.2d 1051, paragraph two of the 
syllabus; see, also, State v. Brewer (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 50, 57, 549 N.E.2d 
491, 499. 
 
Here, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the confession 
was voluntary.  During a pretrial suppression hearing, two police officers 
testified that the confession was voluntary, and Brooks presented no evidence.  
 
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At trial, Brooks testified that he had confessed because police told him that if 
he did so, he would get just fifteen to eighteen years and would be on parole in 
six or seven years.  No other evidence supports that claim.  At a suppression 
hearing, the evaluation of evidence and the credibility of witnesses are issues 
for the trier of fact.  See State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 1 OBR 
57, 58, 437 N.E.2d 583, 584. 
 
The evidence in this case supports the trial court’s finding that the 
confession was voluntary.  Police took Brooks into custody at around 6:30 
a.m., and he remained in custody for approximately ten hours before he 
confessed.  Until midafternoon, police did not question him at the station 
except as to his identity and to secure his consent to an atomic absorption test 
of his hands.  Brooks claims that he was not fed prior to his confession, but a 
police officer testified that he brought Brooks a tuna sandwich and a cola at 
around 1:00 p.m.  Brooks told the officer that he did not like tuna.  Brooks 
testified at trial that he had told the officer that he was a vegetarian and allergic 
 
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to tuna.  Still, there is no evidence that Brooks asked for other food, or suffered 
deprivation, mistreatment, or threats. 
 
By 3:30 p.m., having interviewed Buster and others, police strongly 
suspected Brooks and then questioned him.  Before doing so, police advised 
Brooks of his Miranda rights, and he waived those rights and agreed to talk.  
Brooks initially denied some or all of the murders, but when confronted with 
the evidence, he confessed to all.  Around 4:40 p.m., police readvised him of 
his rights and secured a taped confession.  After the confession, he also told a 
detective, “It was kill or be killed.” 
 
Early on in his taped confession, when being asked whether promises, 
threats, pressure, or coercion had been used against him to secure the 
confession, Brooks stated that he did not understand what the word “coercion” 
meant.  A detective explained that it meant that Brooks was not being forced 
into the confession.  Simply because Brooks was unsure of the definition of 
“coercion” does not mean that the confession was involuntary.  In fact, Brooks 
said he understood and waived his rights.  The tape confirmed this.  The police 
 
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interviewed him for less than two hours, and Brooks appeared to be in full 
control of his mental faculties.  He did not appear to be under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs, the police were not overzealous, and Brooks completely 
understood what he was doing.  We thus reject Brooks’s tenth proposition of 
law. 
Constitutionality 
 
In his seventh proposition of law, Brooks argues that R.C. 2929.04(A)(5)  
and R.C. 2929.04(A)(8), which make killing two or more persons and killing 
witnesses to a crime death penalty offenses, are unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad.  To challenge a statute, the challenger must overcome a strong 
presumption of constitutionality. State v. Warner (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 31, 43, 
564 N.E.2d 18, 30-31.  Overbreadth claims relate only to First Amendment 
issues, absent here. New York v. Ferber (1982), 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 
73 L.Ed.2d 1113.  This court has already determined that “R.C. 2929.04(A)(5) 
is not void for vagueness under either the Eighth Amendment to the United 
 
20
States Constitution or Section 9, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” State v. 
Benner (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 301, 533 N.E.2d 701, syllabus. 
 
Similarly, R.C. 2929.04(A)(8) clearly defines the situations to which it 
applies.  It states one of the eight situations in which the death penalty is 
allowed: 
 
“The victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense who 
was purposely killed to prevent his testimony in any criminal proceeding and 
the aggravated murder was not committed during the commission, attempted 
commission, or flight immediately after the commission or attempted 
commission of the offense to which the victim was a witness, or the victim of 
the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense and was purposely killed in 
retaliation for his testimony in any criminal proceeding.” 
 
The statute’s applicability is sharply defined to include aggravated 
murders committed to silence a witness to a crime or in retaliation for 
testimony.  The language of R.C. 2929.04(A)(8) “is definitive and is 
circumscribed to cover only those situations which it fairly describes.” Benner, 
 
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supra, 40 Ohio St.3d at 305, 533 N.E.2d at 707.  Brooks’s seventh proposition 
of law thus lacks merit. 
 
Brooks’s eighth, thirteenth and fourteenth propositions of law also raise 
constitutionality arguments.  Since this court previously has considered and 
decided the issues raised in those propositions of law, we summarily reject 
them. State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 568, syllabus. 
Jury Issues 
 
Brooks argues in his eleventh proposition of law that the trial court erred 
when it overruled his motion to prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to 
exclude jurors who expressed concerns about capital punishment.  In State v. 
Esparza (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 8, 529 N.E.2d 192, this court held that the use of 
peremptory strikes against prospective jurors opposed to the death penalty was 
proper.  Apart from excluding jurors based on race or gender, prosecutors can 
exercise a peremptory challenge for any reason, without inquiry, and without a 
court’s control.  State v. Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 13, 564 N.E.2d 408, 
419.  We therefore reject Brooks’s eleventh proposition of law. 
 
22
 
In his twelfth proposition of law, Brooks argues that the trial court erred 
in allowing individual voir dire only of those jurors who expressed reservations 
about the death penalty.  After preliminary questions and instructions, the court 
divided potential jurors into groups of five, six or seven.  The court and counsel 
then questioned the members of each subgroup regarding their death penalty 
views and whether they were exposed to any pretrial publicity.  Those potential 
jurors who expressed reservations about the death penalty or who indicated a 
familiarity with the facts of the case were later individually questioned by 
counsel.  Finally, all the potential jurors were called as one group to answer the 
court’s and counsel’s more general questions. 
 
At trial, Brooks did not object to the trial court’s voir dire procedure, and 
thus waived the issue but for plain error. State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio 
St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph one of the syllabus.  No 
plain error exists.  Also, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  
“Determination of issues raised in voir dire in criminal cases has long been 
held to be within the discretion of the trial judge.” State v. Beuke (1988), 38 
 
23
Ohio St.3d 29, 39, 526 N.E.2d 274, 285.  The trial judge also has the discretion 
to determine “whether a voir dire in a capital case should be conducted in 
sequestration.” State v. Brown (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 528 N.E.2d 523, 
paragraph two of the syllabus.   
 
No basis exists to find that the trial judge abused his discretion.  Nothing 
suggests that the procedure affected the trial result or materially prejudiced 
Brooks.  We accordingly reject Brooks’s twelfth proposition of law. 
Effective Assistance of Counsel 
 
In his fifteenth proposition of law, Brooks argues that the trial court 
erred in appointing his original counsel to represent him on appeal without first 
securing a waiver from Brooks of any issues of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  First, whether that is even the job of the court, rather than Brooks’s 
lawyer, is debatable.  Second, Brooks cannot demonstrate that any prejudice 
resulted from the trial court’s not instructing him that he had a right to different 
appellate counsel, since he now has different counsel, and because this court 
 
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will consider all of the claimed ineffective-assistance issues his counsel did not 
raise before the court of appeals. 
 
Brooks does raise those issues here in his sixteenth proposition of law, 
asserting that his counsel’s performance was deficient in four primary instances 
in the penalty phase of the trial.  Reversal of a conviction on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel requires that the defendant show that 
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense, that is, deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland 
v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. 
Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. 
 
Brooks claims that counsel’s first error was to allow Brooks to take the 
stand for an unsworn statement in the mitigation phase of the trial.  Actually, 
Brooks, not counsel, had the choice whether to testify or give an unsworn 
statement.  See State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 27, 553 N.E.2d 576, 
583.  In any event, the decision to give an unsworn statement is a tactical one, a 
call best made by those at the trial who can judge the tenor of the trial and the 
 
25
mood of the jury.  By giving an unsworn statement, a defendant trades 
immunity from cross-examination for a limiting jury instruction.  While subject 
to debate, that decision largely is a matter of style, and is a tactical decision that 
does not form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance. 
 
Brooks next claims that his counsel erred in permitting an expert witness 
to testify in mitigation.  Counsel’s choice to call the psychologist, Dr. John 
Graham, as a witness also fit within the “wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.” Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 
694.  Graham confirmed that the deprived upbringing of Brooks had caused his 
personality disorder, which supported a legitimate mitigation strategy.  Graham 
never blamed Brooks’s personality defect on Brooks himself, but rather saw it 
as a natural outgrowth of the way he had been raised.  Counsel, with little to 
work with, did the best he could under the circumstances to present mitigating 
factors for the jury’s consideration. See State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 
380, 388, 513 N.E.2d 754, 762-763. 
 
26
 
Brooks also claims that counsel erred by failing to argue residual doubt 
in mitigation.  Again, this is a tactical matter that deserves wide latitude.  The 
merits of arguing residual doubt to a jury which has just unanimously 
determined that a defendant has committed the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt are dubious.  When arguing for mercy for a client based upon a terrible 
upbringing, it was probably best for Brooks’s counsel to avoid issues that could 
offend or alienate jurors. 
 
Finally, Brooks argues that his counsel erred by failing to object to a 
comment made by the prosecutor in closing argument.  In his closing, the 
prosecutor asked the jury to consider the effect of the murders on the children 
and families of the victims.  Brooks points out that no evidence was presented 
regarding the effect of the murder on the victims’ families and argues that the 
prosecutor’s comments were designed to arouse passion and prejudice against 
Brooks.  However, the jury had already heard the worst, that the victims’ 
children were present when they were killed, so hearing the prosecutor’s talk of 
the victims’ families could hardly have been inflammatory.  Also, counsel may 
 
27
well have thought that objecting might unduly emphasize the brief remarks or 
that the jury might find him, and by extension Brooks, unfeeling. 
 
We find that none of Brooks’s counsel’s alleged deficiencies made any 
difference in the outcome of the case.  Brooks did not demonstrate “a 
reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the 
trial would have been different.” State v. Bradley, supra, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 
538 N.E.2d 373, at paragraph three of the syllabus.  Brooks’s sixteenth 
proposition of law thus lacks merit. 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
In part of his first and in his seventeenth proposition of law, Brooks 
argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by asking the jury to consider 
the children and families of the victims and the effect of the murders on them in 
deciding the punishment, when no evidence supported this argument.  Brooks 
did not object, and no prejudicial error occurred. 
 
28
 
“[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 
prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips (1982), 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947, 
71 L.Ed.2d 78, 87.  We find that the prosecutor’s argument that the jury 
consider the victims’ families was misconduct, but harmless. See State v. 
Combs (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 283, 581 N.E.2d 1071, 1077.  Also, the 
prosecutor’s comment did not infringe any constitutional rights against victim 
impact evidence. Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 
115 L.Ed.2d 720; State v. Evans (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 238, 586 N.E.2d 
1042, 1050.  We therefore reject the seventeenth proposition of law and the 
relevant part of the first proposition of law. 
Amendment of Indictment 
 
In his third proposition of law, Brooks argues that the trial court erred by 
allowing at trial an amendment to the indictment.  After the jury retired to 
deliberate on guilt, the parties noted a defect in the R.C. 2929.04(A)(8) death 
penalty specification common to each aggravated murder count.  The 
 
29
specification charged that Brooks had “committed the offense of aggravated 
murder as a part of a course of conduct in which the victim of the aggravated 
murder was a witness to an offense who was purposely killed to prevent 
testimony in any criminal proceeding.” 
 
The deficiency was the omission of the language narrowing the offense 
so as to exclude the murder of a witness killed at the same time the witness 
observed an offense.  Thus, the court amended the indictment’s language to 
conform to R.C. 2929.04(A)(8).  The trial court added to each (A)(8) 
specification the further words “and the aggravated murder was not committed 
during the commission, attempted commission, or flight immediately after the 
commission or attempted commission of the offense to which the victim was a 
witness.” 
 
When the amendment was offered, defense counsel said he did not know 
whether to object or not, so he simply asked the record to reflect what occurred.  
The record so reflects.  The court’s verdict forms and final instructions, given 
without objection, conformed to the amendment.  Arguably, the failure of 
 
30
Brooks to object to the indictment before trial, or even enter a precise objection 
at trial, waived the issue. Crim.R. 12(B)(2) and (G). 
 
Also, under Crim.R. 7(D), the court “may at any time before, during, or 
after a trial amend the indictment * * *, provided no change is made in the 
name or identity of the crime charged.”  See, also, R.C. 2941.30.  In State v. 
O’Brien (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 122, 30 OBR 436, 508 N.E.2d 144, at paragraph 
two of the syllabus, the court recognized that an indictment could be amended 
to include a missing element of the offense “if the name or the identity of the 
crime is not changed, and the accused has not been misled or prejudiced by the 
omission of such element from the indictment.” 
 
In this case, the amendment did not expand, but rather narrowed, the 
death penalty specification.  The amendment did not change the specification’s 
name, identity, nature, or the applicable code section.  Brooks was neither 
misled nor prejudiced by the original inadvertent omission of this narrowing 
language from the indictment.  Thus, under Crim.R. 7(D) and State v. O’Brien, 
proposition three lacks merit. 
 
31
Sentencing Phase Jury Instructions 
 
In its sentencing phase jury instructions, the trial court instructed the jury 
as follows: “You are now required to determine unanimously that the death 
penalty is inappropriate before you can consider a life sentence.”  The 
instruction was plainly incorrect and contrary to R.C. 2929.03(D)(2), which 
provides: 
 
“If the jury unanimously finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing 
outweigh the mitigating factors, the trial jury shall recommend to the court that 
the sentence of death be imposed on the offender.  Absent such a finding, the 
jury shall recommend that the offender be sentenced to life imprisonment with 
parole eligibility after serving twenty full years of imprisonment or to life 
imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of 
imprisonment.” 
 
32
 
R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) contains no limiting language as to when a jury may 
contemplate a life sentence.  The jury instruction given by the trial court would 
require unanimity that the death penalty was inappropriate before the jury could 
even consider a life sentence.  Instead of requiring the unanimity of a death 
sentence, this instruction required the jury to issue a death sentence unless each 
juror was convinced that the death penalty was inappropriate. 
 
The instruction is also contrary to the rationale of this court’s holding in 
State v. Thomas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 213, 533 N.E.2d 286, which allows 
jurors to consider a lesser included offense without first unanimously 
determining that the defendant is not guilty of the more serious charge.  This 
court wrote: 
 
“If a jury is unable to agree unanimously that a defendant is guilty of a 
particular offense, it may proceed to consider a lesser included offense upon 
which evidence has been presented.  The jury is not required to determine 
unanimously that the defendant is not guilty of the crime charged before it may 
consider a lesser included offense.” Id. 
 
33
 
Analogously, the jury in this case did not have to rule out the death 
penalty unanimously before considering a life sentence.  Unfortunately, they 
were instructed exactly otherwise. 
 
The faulty jury instruction was error.  Brooks’s counsel did not object to 
that error at trial.  That failure to object, however, does not constitute a waiver 
in this case.  As this court held in State v. Wolons (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 
541 N.E.2d 443, paragraph one of the syllabus: 
 
“A party does not waive his objections to the court's charge by failing to 
formally object thereto (1) where the record affirmatively shows that a trial 
court has been fully apprised of the correct law governing a material issue in 
dispute, and (2) the requesting party has been unsuccessful in obtaining the 
inclusion of that law in the trial court's charge to the jury.  (Crim.R. 30[A], 
construed.)” 
 
The record reflects that Brooks’s counsel requested a proper jury 
instruction before the judge read the faulty one.  The requested instruction read: 
 
34
“You are not required to determine unanimously that the death sentence is 
inappropriate before you consider the life sentences.” (Emphasis added.)  Thus, 
pursuant to Wolons, counsel did not waive his objection by failing to object 
after the instruction was given.  The question remains as to whether the error 
deprived Brooks of a fair trial. 
 
In Mills v. Maryland (1988), 486 U.S. 367, 376-377, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 
1866, 100 L.Ed.2d 384, 395, the United States Supreme Court held that jury 
instructions that prevent one or more jurors from giving due consideration to 
“factors which may call for a less severe penalty” than death violate the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.”  Determining 
that the jury instructions in that case had created a risk of “erroneous 
imposition of the death sentence,” the court vacated the sentence of death. Id. 
at 375, 108 S.Ct. at 1866, 100 L.Ed.2d at 394. 
 
In Kubat v. Thieret (C.A.7, 1989), 867 F.2d 351, the court, applying 
Mills, found that jury instructions similar to those used in the present case 
violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and vacated the defendant’s 
 
35
death sentence.  Kubat involved Illinois’s death penalty statute, which 
explicitly provides that the death penalty cannot be imposed if one or more 
jurors believes that there are mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the death 
penalty.  The trial court in Kubat gave the following instruction, without 
objection: “If, after your deliberations, you unanimously conclude that there is 
a sufficiently mitigating factor or factors to preclude imposition of the death 
sentence, you should sign the form which so indicates.  If you sign that verdict 
form, the Court will sentence the defendant to imprisonment.” Id. at 369. 
 
The Kubat court reasoned that even if one juror was confused by the jury 
instructions, the reliability of the verdict was undermined.  If a juror believed 
his one vote could not affect the ultimate result, he might acquiesce in the death 
sentence.  Since that possibility “risks erroneous imposition of the death 
sentence,” Mills, supra, 486 U.S. at 375, 108 S.Ct. at 1866, 100 L.Ed.2d at 394, 
the court found that the jury instruction violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Kubat, 867 F.2d at 373-374. 
 
36
 
In regard to the present case, R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) facially seems to 
require the jury to recommend a life sentence even if only one juror finds the 
death penalty inappropriate.  There is some dispute in the case law, however,  
as to how much power a solitary juror has to nullify a death sentence.  In State 
v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph 
ten of the syllabus, this court held that in returning a sentence of life 
imprisonment under R.C. 2929.03(D), the jury’s verdict must be unanimous.  In 
State v. Springer (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 167, 586 N.E.2d 96, syllabus, this court 
held that “[w]hen a jury becomes irreconcilably deadlocked during its 
sentencing deliberations in the penalty phase of a capital murder trial and is 
unable to reach a unanimous verdict to recommend any sentence authorized by 
R.C. 2929.03(C)(2), the trial court is required to sentence the offender to life 
imprisonment * * *.”  Thus, practically speaking, a lone juror could prevent the 
imposition of the death penalty. 
 
Jenkins defines what the jury’s job is -- to render a unanimous verdict.  
Springer simply explains what a trial court must do if a jury is deadlocked, that 
 
37
is, when the jury does not properly do its job.  We believe that Jenkins and 
Stringer may be harmonized, and made consistent with the policy behind R.C. 
2929.03(D), through a jury instruction which requires the jury, when it cannot 
unanimously agree on a death sentence, to move on in their deliberations to a 
consideration of which life sentence is appropriate, with that determination to 
be unanimous.  That instruction would reflect the policy behind the statute 
noted by this court in Springer: 
 
“We believe that the requirement of Ohio’s death penalty statute that a 
life sentence be recommended and imposed under circumstances where the 
death penalty cannot be recommended or imposed represents a clear statement 
of policy that an offender be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment where the 
trial jury is unable to unanimously agree that the penalty of death is 
appropriate.” Springer, 63 Ohio St. 3d at 172, 586 N.E.2d at 100. 
 
In Ohio, a solitary juror may prevent a death penalty recommendation by 
finding that the aggravating circumstances in the case do not outweigh the 
mitigating factors.  Jurors from this point forward should be so instructed. 
 
38
 
We cannot know what was going on in the minds of the jurors when they 
were given the duty of deciding Brooks’s fate, and we thus cannot say for 
certain whether one of the jurors would have been moved enough by the 
mitigating factors in Brooks’s favor, his youth and harrowing childhood, to 
have recommended a life sentence.  The record reflects that the jury in this case 
was instructed in a manner completely contrary to law, making it less likely for 
Brooks to benefit from the opinion of one juror that the death penalty was 
inappropriate.  As the Kubat court noted, if a juror believed his one vote could 
not affect the ultimate result, he might acquiesce in the death sentence.  In this 
case, the jury instruction undermined the reliability of the jury verdict and 
risked erroneous imposition of the death sentence, thereby materially 
prejudicing Brooks’s right to a fair trial. 
 
We therefore affirm defendant’s convictions for aggravated murder, but 
remand his case for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, 
and cause remanded. 
 
39
 
 
MOYER, C.J., WRIGHT, TYACK and GRADY, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
G. GARY TYACK, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, 
J. 
 
THOMAS J. GRADY, J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for COOK, 
J. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.     I concur in the 
judgment of the majority affirming the judgment of the court of appeals which 
affirmed appellant’s convictions.  I dissent from the majority’s judgment to 
reverse the court of appeals with regard to appellant’s sentence of death.  I 
believe that the judgment of the court of appeals, both as to conviction and the 
sentence of death as a penalty, was proper and should be affirmed. 
 
F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.