Case Title: McCray v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 421, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CYRIL D. MCCRAY, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 421, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0308014517 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  February 21, 2007 
Decided:  March 27, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 27th day of March 2007, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Cyril McCray, filed this appeal from 
his sentence on a charge of violation of probation (VOP).  The Superior 
Court sentenced McCray on the VOP to two years at Level V incarceration.  
This is McCray’s appeal from that sentence. 
(2) 
McCray's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  McCray's counsel asserts that, based upon 
a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
 
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appealable issues.  By letter, McCray's attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided McCray with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  McCray also was informed of his 
right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  McCray has raised one issue 
for this Court's consideration.  The State has responded to the position taken 
by McCray's counsel, as well as the issue argued by McCray, and has moved 
to affirm the Superior Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
(4) 
The record reflects that, on October 21, 2004, McCray pled 
guilty to one count each of possession of a controlled substance within 1000 
feet of a school, possession of a weapon with a removed, obliterated or 
altered serial number, and driving with a suspended license.  On the drug 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
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charge, the Superior Court sentenced McCray to three years at Level V 
incarceration, to be suspended immediately for three years at Level IV work 
release or home confinement, to be suspended after serving six months at 
Level IV for eighteen months at Level III probation.  On the other two 
charges, the Superior Court sentenced McCray to a total period of two years 
at Level V incarceration, to be suspended for one year at Level III, and a fine 
of $500. 
(5) 
McCray was again arrested on February 5, 2006 and charged 
with possession with intent to deliver cocaine, maintaining a vehicle for 
keeping controlled substances, criminal impersonation, resisting arrest, 
possession of marijuana, failure to obey a police officer’s instruction, 
reckless driving, failure to stop at a stop sign, and driving with a suspended 
license.  He pled guilty to several of the offenses on March 21, 2006 and was 
sentenced on July 7, 2006.  As a result of the new convictions, McCray also 
was found in violation of the terms of his 2004 probation.  The Superior 
Court sentenced him on the probation violation to two years at Level V 
incarceration.  This appeal followed. 
 
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(6) 
McCray argues that his 2006 VOP sentence is illegal because 
his original 2004 sentence violated Senate Bill 50,2 which, among things, 
amended 11 Del. C § 4333 to provide that “any period of probation or 
suspension of sentence” for a violent felony shall be limited to 2 years.3  
McCray contends that his three-year sentence for possession of a controlled 
substance within 1000 feet of a school was illegal because it was suspended 
for three years at Level IV.  McCray fails to recognize, however, that 
Section 4333(g)(2) specifically provides that “the phrase ‘period of 
probation of suspension of sentence’ shall not include any period of a 
sentence that is designated to be served at Supervision Accountability Level 
IV….”  Accordingly, there was nothing illegal about his original sentence or 
his subsequent sentence for violating probation. 
(7) 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that McCray’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that McCray's counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that McCray could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
                                                 
2 Former Senate Bill 50, which is found at 74 Del. Laws c.27, was enacted in 
2003 prior to McCray’s original sentencing. 
3 11 Del. C. § 4333(b)(1) (Supp. 2006). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice