Case Title: State v. Ruth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 79074-4

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 17–0270 
 
Filed March 29, 2019 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
vs. 
 
TYSON J. RUTH, 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.   
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Greene County, Adria A.D. 
Kester, District Associate Judge. 
 
 
Defendant convicted of theft in the second degree appeals from the 
provision of a sentencing order relating to the taxation of court courts.  
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN 
PART, AND REMANDED.   
 
 
 
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender (until withdrawal), and 
Brenda J. Gohr, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant 
Attorney General, and Nicola Martino, County Attorney, for appellee. 
 
 
 
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CADY, Chief Justice. 
 
In this appeal from a judgment and sentence on conviction of the 
crime of theft in the second degree, the defendant claims the district 
court imposed an illegal sentence by requiring him to pay the total court 
costs in the case.  We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, affirm 
the district court in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for 
resentencing on the taxation of court costs.   
 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings.   
 
The State charged Tyson Ruth by an eight-count trial information 
with multiple crimes of burglary, theft, possession of illegal drugs, and a 
single count of ongoing criminal conduct.  The crimes involved multiple 
victims.  A portion of the evidence supporting the charges was a product 
of a search of Ruth’s home by police pursuant to a warrant.   
 
Counsel was appointed to represent Ruth in the case, and he filed 
a motion to suppress the evidence.  On the day of the hearing on the 
motion, the State and Ruth reached a plea agreement.  Under the 
agreement, Ruth would plead guilty to one count of theft in the second 
degree, and the remaining counts of the trial information would be 
dismissed.  The count of conviction involved a theft from a victim named 
Michael Strautman.  The prosecutor and Ruth agreed victim restitution 
would be limited to the count of conviction.  The prosecutor also 
informed the court that the State would be asking that Ruth pay court 
costs, but no agreement between the parties was identified.  The plea 
agreement was subsequently memorialized during the plea hearing.  In 
explaining the sentence and punishment Ruth faced by pleading guilty, 
the district court informed him that he “would be required to pay court 
costs of ‘[the] action, including costs of your court-appointed attorney.’ ”   
 
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At the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a sentence for 
the crime of theft in the second degree.  In doing so, it ordered that Ruth 
pay the “court costs of [the] action.”  The judgment and sentence also 
dismissed the remaining counts in the case, adding that the “costs are 
taxed to the defendant.”  A docket report subsequently generated by the 
clerk of court in the case identified court costs of $482.20.  These costs 
included a $100 filing fee for the trial information; eight sheriff fees 
ranging from $21.50 to $43.76 for serving subpoenas to various 
individuals, including Michael Strautman; a $40 court reporter fee of a 
plea hearing; a $40 court reporter fee for the sentencing; and a sheriff’s 
fee of $69.98 to transport Ruth to serve his sentence of incarceration.  
The district court determined Ruth was not able to pay the court-
appointed attorney fees.   
 
Ruth appealed from the judgment and sentence.  He claimed the 
district court should have apportioned the court costs to limit his 
responsibility to pay only those costs associated with the single count 
that resulted in the conviction.  He claimed no agreement existed for him 
to pay the costs associated with the dismissed counts.  Ruth also raised 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.   
 
We transferred the case to the court of appeals.  It found Ruth 
failed to show that the total bill of costs he was ordered to pay included 
costs associated with the dismissed counts.  The court of appeals further 
found the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be resolved 
by postconviction relief.  Ruth sought, and we granted, further review.   
 
II.  Standard of Review.   
 
Our review of restitution orders is for correction of errors at law.  
State v. Klawonn, 688 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Iowa 2004).  “When reviewing 
the restitution order, we determine whether the court’s findings lack 
 
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substantial evidentiary support, or whether the court has not properly 
applied the law.”  State v. Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Iowa 2001).   
 
III.  Disposition.   
 
In State v. McMurry, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2019) (filed today), 
we modified and explained our holding in State v. Petrie, 478 N.W.2d 620 
(Iowa 1991).  We reiterated that a sentencing court may only order an 
offender in a multicount criminal case to pay restitution for court costs 
attributable to those counts for which the offender was convicted.  In 
Petrie, we clarified this rule in three ways.  We said (1) restitution for 
costs was limited to the costs attributed to the count or counts of 
conviction, (2) restitution could not be ordered for costs attributed to 
dismissed counts, and (3) restitution for court costs not associated with 
any single count is assessed proportionally between the dismissed 
counts and the counts of conviction.  Id. at 622.   
 
In McMurry, we modified the third portion of the Petrie rule to hold 
that court costs not associated with any single count must be taxed to 
the offender, not apportioned.1  Thus, the only costs that are not now 
part of the court costs assessed against the offender in a multicount 
criminal case are those clearly attributed to the dismissed counts.   
 
In this case, the district court sentencing order specifically 
provided that Ruth pay the court costs associated with the dismissed 
counts.  Importantly, there was no agreement between the parties for 
Ruth to pay these costs.  Thus, the sentencing order was correct only if 
                                      
 
1This holding is consistent with Iowa Code section 602.8106(1)(a), that sets a 
flat $100 fee “for filing and docketing a criminal case,” and Iowa Code section 625.8(2), 
that establishes a fixed cost of $40 per day for the services of a court reporter.  These 
fees are applied to each case and are not affected by the number of charges within any 
given case.   
 
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none of the itemized bills of cost were attributed to the dismissed counts 
in the case.   
Under the modified rule in McMurry, the record in this case 
supports an assessment of all the court costs against Ruth, except the 
service fees relating to the subpoenas.  The filing fee, court reporter fees, 
and sheriff transportation fee were clearly either attributed to the count 
of conviction or were not associated with a single count.  Yet, the record 
does not reveal which sheriff’s service fees were attributed to the count of 
conviction, the counts dismissed, or no single count.  We, therefore, 
remand the case to the district court to determine how the service fees 
should be apportioned consistent with our decision in McMurry.   
We understand the time constraints for the district court and the 
complexity of sentencing, as well as the absence of information that 
frequently makes the final determination of all of the issues surrounding 
sentencing difficult.  However, the potential for apportionment of court 
costs in multicount criminal cases that result in both counts of 
conviction and counts dismissed means sentencing courts can no longer 
routinely order the defendant to pay the court costs in a criminal case, 
unless supported by an agreement between the parties or a record 
showing no court costs are attributed to the dismissed counts.  
Consequently, the district court should encourage counsel to consider 
the issue of court costs before sentencing and be prepared to assist in 
resolving the issue at sentencing.  Without an agreement, sentencing 
courts must either apply the apportionment rule at the time of 
sentencing to determine the amount of court costs to be paid by the 
defendant or include a provision in the sentencing order that directs the 
defendant to pay the court costs identified in the docket report other 
than those attributed to a dismissed count.   
 
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Until a final order is entered, an appeal is not the only remedy for 
the failure to apportion court costs at sentencing.  In the event the 
sentencing court does not identify the amount of court costs in the 
sentencing order, a supplemental order will be needed to identify the 
amount of court costs.  The State, the defendant, or the clerk of court 
can request the supplemental order.   
 
IV.  Conclusion.   
 
We vacate the decision of the court of appeals, affirm the judgment 
and sentence of the district court in part, reverse in part, and remand for 
a determination of court costs.   
 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 
COURT 
JUDGMENT 
AND 
SENTENCE 
AFFIRMED 
IN 
PART, 
REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.   
 
All justices concur except McDonald, J., who takes no part.