Case Title: State v. Leonard J. Harvey

Citation: 2002 WI 93

Docket Number: 2000AP000541-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 93 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-0541-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Leonard J. Harvey,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 59 
Reported at:  242 Wis. 2d 189, 625 N.W.2d 892 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 9, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 4, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Stuart A. Schwartz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX, J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Margaret A. Maroney, assistant state public defender, and oral 
argument by Stephen P. Weiss, assistant state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Lara 
M. Herman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 93 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official 
reports.   
No.  00-0541-CR  
(L.C. No. 
98 CF 1274) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Leonard J. Harvey,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.     
 
¶1 
DIANE 
S. 
SYKES, 
J.  This 
case 
presents 
a 
constitutional challenge to the jury instruction provision of 
Wisconsin's 
judicial 
notice 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 902.01(7) 
(1997-98),1 as applied to an element of a penalty enhancer in a 
criminal case. 
¶2 
The 
defendant, Leonard Harvey, was 
charged 
with 
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, within 1,000 feet 
of Penn Park in the City of Madison.  The base offense of 
                                                 
1 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be 
to the 1997-1998 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
2 
 
possession of cocaine with intent to deliver was punishable by 
up to ten years in prison.  The penalty enhancer, applicable 
when the offense is committed within 1,000 feet of certain 
protected places (including city parks), increased the potential 
maximum imprisonment by five years. 
¶3 
At trial, over the defendant's objection, the circuit 
court took judicial notice that Penn Park was a city park for 
purposes of the penalty enhancer, and instructed the jury 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 902.01(7) that it was to accept the 
judicially-noticed fact as true.  The defendant was convicted of 
the enhanced offense. 
¶4 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
affirmed 
the 
conviction, 
concluding that Harvey's due process and jury trial rights had 
not been violated by the jury instruction regarding the 
judicially-noticed fact.  We accepted review, and now affirm, 
although on different grounds. 
¶5 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), held that 
the elements of a penalty enhancer (other than a prior 
conviction) are elements of the offense, which, pursuant to the 
constitutional guarantees of due process and trial by jury, must 
be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
A jury instruction that directs a jury to accept as true a 
judicially-noticed fact that constitutes an element of the crime 
is indistinguishable from a mandatory conclusive presumption on 
an elemental fact, which is unconstitutional under Sandstrom v. 
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979), and State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 
2d 722, 737, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991). 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
3 
 
¶6 
However, under Kuntz and Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 4 (1999), this type of constitutional instructional 
error is subject to application of the harmless error rule.  
Accordingly, although we conclude that the judicial notice 
instruction as applied to the "city park" element of the 
enhanced drug offense in this case was constitutional error, we 
nevertheless affirm.  The error was harmless, because it cannot 
be and is not disputed that the park in question in this case is 
a city park. 
I 
¶7 
Leonard Harvey was charged with three criminal counts: 
possession of five grams or less of cocaine with intent to 
deliver, within 1,000 feet of "Penn Park, a state park," 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(1m)(cm)1 
(the 
base 
drug 
offense) and 161.492 (the penalty enhancer); possession of 
marijuana 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e); 
and 
obstructing an officer contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1). 
¶8 
The case was tried to a jury.  At trial, City of 
Madison Police Officer Michelle Riesterer testified that on June 
22, 1998, while patrolling in her squad, she observed Harvey 
leaning up against the side of an apartment building where "No 
                                                 
2 The statute was renumbered by 1995 Wisconsin Act 448, 
effective July 9, 1996.  Although the charged offense occurred 
after the renumbering and relocation of the controlled substance 
laws from Chapter 161 to Chapter 961, the information in this 
case cited the penalty enhancer previously appearing at Wis. 
Stat. § 161.49 instead of Wis. Stat. § 961.49.  This apparently 
was a clerical error.  The judgment of conviction cites the 
correct statute. 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
4 
 
Trespassing" signs had been posted.  She stopped her squad, 
approached Harvey, and smelled the odor of marijuana.  She told 
Harvey that he was under arrest for trespassing, and he 
attempted to leave the scene.  During the ensuing foot pursuit, 
the officer saw Harvey make a motion with his left hand toward 
some bushes.  After Harvey was arrested, the officer searched 
the bushes and found two plastic baggies, each containing six 
corner cuts of crack cocaine.  A trace amount of marijuana was 
found in Harvey's pocket. 
¶9 
Riesterer 
also 
testified 
that 
she 
measured 
the 
distance between Harvey's location and Penn Park, and that the 
distance was less than 1,000 feet.  The State rested its case 
without eliciting evidence that Penn Park was the type of park 
specified in the penalty enhancer, that is, a "state, county, 
city, village or town park."  Wis. Stat. § 961.49(1)(b)1. 
¶10 At the close of the evidence, during the jury 
instruction conference, the State moved to amend the information 
"to include the statement county, city, village or town park 
rather than state park."  Harvey objected, claiming prejudice.  
Harvey also moved for a directed verdict on the penalty enhancer 
because the State had not put in evidence regarding the status 
of Penn Park as a "state, county, city, village or town park."  
¶11 In response to Harvey's motion, the State asked for 
leave to reopen the proof in order to introduce testimony that 
Penn Park was, in fact, a city park.  The Dane County Circuit 
Court, the Honorable Stuart A. Schwartz, denied the State's 
request and instead took judicial notice that Penn Park was a 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
5 
 
city park.  The defense objected.  The court denied the defense 
motion for a directed verdict on the penalty enhancer. 
¶12 When the jury was returned to the courtroom for 
closing arguments and instructions, the State was allowed to 
reopen the proof for the limited purpose of informing the jury 
that the court had taken judicial notice that Penn Park is "a 
city park located in the City of Madison."  The court then 
instructed the jury that "[t]he Court has taken judicial notice 
of certain facts and you are directed to accept the following as 
true: Penn Park is a city park located in the City of Madison, 
Dane County, Wisconsin."  The jury returned a verdict of guilty 
on all three counts. 
¶13 At sentencing, Harvey renewed his objection to the 
court having taken judicial notice that Penn Park is a city park 
within the meaning of the penalty enhancer.  The circuit court 
noted the objection, considered it preserved for appeal, but 
declined to revisit the prior ruling.  Harvey faced a maximum of 
15 years in prison on the enhanced cocaine count (ten years for 
the base drug offense plus five years as provided in the penalty 
enhancer); six months on the marijuana count; and nine months on 
the obstructing count.  In addition, on the enhanced cocaine 
count, pursuant to a separate provision in the penalty enhancer, 
Wis. Stat. § 961.49(2)(am), Harvey was subject to a presumptive 
minimum sentence of three years without parole.3 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Statute § 961.49(2)(am) 
provides 
in 
relevant 
part:  
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
6 
 
¶14 The circuit court sentenced Harvey to 42 months on the 
enhanced cocaine count, plus four and six months, respectively, 
on the marijuana and obstructing counts, to run consecutively, 
for a total of 52 months in prison.  By operation of the 
presumptive minimum provisions of the penalty enhancer, Harvey 
is ineligible for parole until he has served at least three 
years in prison.    
¶15 Harvey appealed on the issue of the penalty enhancer, 
and the court of appeals affirmed.  The court concluded that 
judicial notice in a criminal case was not constitutionally 
improper.  See State v. Harvey, 2001 WI App 59, ¶15, 242 Wis. 2d 
189, 625 N.W.2d 892.  
¶16 The court of appeals held that Penn Park's status as a 
city park was an adjudicative fact appropriate for judicial 
notice under Wis. Stat. § 902.01(1) and (2), and that pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 902.01(7), the judge was required to instruct 
the jury to accept the judicially-noticed fact as established.  
The court did not view the use of the judicial notice 
instruction on an elemental fact as tantamount to a mandatory 
conclusive presumption on an elemental fact, which operates to 
                                                                                                                                                             
The court shall sentence a person to whom par. (a) 
applies to at least 3 years in prison, but otherwise 
the penalties for the crime apply.  Except as provided 
in s. 961.438, the court shall not place the person on 
probation.  Except as provided in s. 973.01(6), the 
person is not eligible for parole until he or she has 
served at least 3 years, with no modification by the 
calculation under s. 302.11(1).  
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
7 
 
unconstitutionally relieve the State of its burden of proving 
every element of the offense.  See id. at ¶¶18, 20. 
¶17 The court of appeals held that "because a criminal 
defendant's right to trial by jury extends only to contestable 
issues 
of 
fact, 
the 
taking 
of 
judicial 
notice 
of 
an 
incontestable fact does not violate that right."  Id. at ¶19.  
The court concluded that the State had in fact carried its 
burden of proving Penn Park's status as a city park, albeit "via 
the evidentiary device of judicial notice instead of by 
introducing testimony or other evidence of the undisputed fact."  
Id. at ¶20.  We accepted review. 
II 
¶18 The question in this case is the constitutionality of 
the jury instruction provision of the judicial notice statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 902.01(7), as applied to an element of a penalty 
enhancer in a criminal case.  This is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  See State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 277, 564 
N.W.2d 753 (1997).   
¶19 The Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee,4 applied 
to the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment,5 protects 
                                                 
4 The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall be held to 
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . .; nor be deprived 
of 
life, 
liberty, 
or 
property, 
without 
due 
process 
of 
law . . . ." 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
8 
 
"the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which he is charged."  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970); see also Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 
(1989); Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d at 736.  States may not "deprive the 
accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt 
every 
element 
of 
the 
charged 
offense."  
Carella, 491 U.S. at 265. 
¶20 The Sixth Amendment6 right of trial by jury in criminal 
cases includes, "as its most important element, the right to 
have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite 
finding of 'guilty.'"  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 
(1993); see also State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 19, 517 N.W.2d 
149 (1994) ("where the finder of fact is a jury, proof of all 
essential elements must be tendered to the jury").  This means, 
of course, that a judge "may not direct a verdict for the State, 
no matter how overwhelming the evidence."  Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 
277; see also Howard, 211 Wis. 2d at 279; State v. McAllister, 
107 Wis. 2d 532, 533, 319 N.W.2d 865 (1982). 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." 
6 The 
Sixth 
Amendment 
provides: 
"In 
all 
criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ." 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
9 
 
¶21 The United States Supreme Court has recently held that 
these principles extend to the elements of penalty enhancers.  
In Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of New Jersey's "hate crimes" law, which 
provided for an increased penalty when the judge found, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the 
charged crime for the purpose of intimidation based on race, 
gender, or another of several additional enumerated improper 
purposes.  The Court rejected New Jersey's argument that its 
"hate crimes" law constituted a mere "sentencing factor," and 
held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt."  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.  
¶22 The Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and the 
Fifth Amendment due process requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt are obviously interrelated.7  See Sullivan, 508 
U.S. at 278.  "It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have 
a jury determine that the defendant is probably guilty, and then 
leave it up to the judge to determine (as Winship requires) 
                                                 
7 The Wisconsin Constitution's parallel provisions are 
Article I, section 8 ("No person may be held to answer for a 
criminal offense without due process of law . . .") and Article 
I, section 7 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
enjoy the right to . . . a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district wherein the offense shall have 
been committed").   
 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
10 
 
whether he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  In other words, 
the jury verdict required by the Sixth Amendment is a jury 
verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
¶23 Accordingly, jury instructions that have the effect of 
relieving the State of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt every element of the offense charged are unconstitutional 
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 
at 521 (instruction that the law presumes that persons intend 
the 
ordinary 
consequences 
of 
their 
voluntary 
acts 
is 
unconstitutional); 
see 
also 
Carella, 
491 
U.S. 
at 
365 
(instructions 
containing 
conclusive 
presumptions 
are 
unconstitutional); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 
(1985)(instruction containing rebuttable presumption to same 
effect is unconstitutional).  Criminal jury instructions that 
contain or operate as mandatory conclusive presumptions on 
elements of the offense "subvert the presumption of innocence 
accorded to accused persons and also invade the truth-finding 
task assigned solely to juries in criminal cases."  Carella, 491 
U.S. at 265; Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d at 737 (mandatory conclusive 
presumptions on elemental facts violate due process and the 
right to trial by jury). 
¶24 Harvey does not claim that judicial notice is always 
constitutionally improper in criminal cases, nor does he argue 
that the circuit court's application of judicial notice to Penn 
Park's status as a city park violated his constitutional rights.  
The focus of his constitutional challenge is on the jury 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
11 
 
instruction regarding the judicially-noticed fact.  Harvey 
argues that the circuit court's instruction to the jury that it 
must accept as true the judicially-noticed fact regarding Penn 
Park's status as a city park operated as a mandatory conclusive 
presumption on an elemental fact of the enhanced offense in 
violation of his due process and jury trial rights.8 
¶25 The jury instruction derives from the judicial notice 
statute, which provides: 
 
902.01 Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. (1) 
SCOPE.  This section governs only judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts. 
 
(2) KINDS OF FACTS.  A judicially noticed fact 
must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that 
it 
is 
either 
(a) 
generally 
known 
within 
the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (b) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 
to 
sources 
whose 
accuracy 
cannot 
reasonably 
be 
questioned.   
 
(3) WHEN DISCRETIONARY.  A judge or court may 
take judicial notice, whether requested or not. 
 
(4) WHEN MANDATORY.  A judge or court shall take 
judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied 
with the necessary information. 
 
(5) OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.  A party is 
entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be 
                                                 
8 Harvey is not entirely clear about whether this is a 
facial challenge to Wis. Stat. § 902.01(7) or a challenge to the 
statute as applied here.  On the one hand, he argues broadly 
that we should sever all criminal cases from the operation of 
Wis. Stat. § 902.01(7); on the other hand, he emphasizes that his 
challenge is only to the application of the statute's jury 
instruction requirement to the "city park" element of the 
enhanced offense in this case.  We view the case as presenting 
an "as applied" challenge, and decline to consider any broader 
argument of facial unconstitutionality. 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
12 
 
heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice 
and the tenor of the matter noticed.  In the absence 
of prior notification, the request may be made after 
judicial notice has been taken. 
 
(6) TIMING OF TAKING NOTICE.  Judicial notice 
may be taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
 
(7) INSTRUCTING THE JURY.  The judge shall 
instruct the jury to accept as established any facts 
judicially noticed. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 902.01 (emphasis added). 
¶26 For its part, the State agrees, as it must, that the 
elemental facts necessary to convict Harvey of the enhanced 
offense (the base drug offense and the penalty enhancer) must be 
submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
penalty enhancer provides: 
 
If any person violates s. 961.41(1)(cm), (d), 
(e), (f), (g), or (h) by delivering or distributing, 
or violates s. 961.41(1m)(cm), (d), (e), (f), (g) or 
(h) 
by 
possessing 
with 
intent 
to 
deliver 
or 
distribute, 
cocaine, 
cocaine 
base, . . . and 
the 
delivery, distribution or possession takes place under 
any of the following circumstances, the maximum term 
of imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may 
be increased by 5 years:  . . .  
 
 
(b) While the person is in or on or otherwise 
within 1,000 feet of any of the following:   
 
 
1.  A state, county, city, village or town park.   
Wis. Stat. § 961.49(1)(b)1 (emphasis added).  Because the 
statute increases the prescribed maximum penalty for the 
underlying drug offense, Apprendi requires that its elements be 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
13 
 
submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.9  
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.  
¶27 The State considers the penalty enhancer as a whole to 
be the elemental fact for purposes of Apprendi——it characterizes 
the park's status as merely a "sub-part of an element"——although 
it concedes that both the statute's distance requirement and the 
park's status must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The language of the statute plainly requires 
proof of two distinct facts: proximity ("within 1,000 feet") and 
a particular protected place ("a state, county, city, village or 
town 
park"). 
Proof 
of 
one 
without 
the 
other 
would 
be 
insufficient for conviction.  We read the statute as containing 
not one element with a sub-part, but two elemental facts——a 
distance requirement and a particularized protected place——both 
of which must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
¶28 The question, then, is whether the jury instruction 
required by Wis. Stat. § 902.01(7), as applied to the protected 
place element of the penalty enhancer in this case, had the 
effect of relieving the State of its burden of proof or invading 
the province of the jury on that element, in violation of 
Harvey's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  The court of appeals 
held that it did not, because the penalty enhancer was in fact 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that even before Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), penalty enhancers in this state——
other than repeater penalty enhancers based upon a defendant's 
prior 
conviction(s)——have 
been 
considered 
to 
constitute 
additional elemental facts that must be submitted to the jury.  
See Comment, Wis JI——Criminal 6004.  
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
14 
 
submitted to the jury for decision, and the State carried its 
burden of proving its elements, although by way of the 
"evidentiary device" of judicial notice rather than testimony or 
other 
evidence. 
 
Harvey, 
2001 
WI 
App 
59, 
¶20. 
 
More 
specifically, the court held that the jury trial right "extends 
only to contestable issues of fact," and the defendant's "right 
to require the State to prove criminal charges beyond a 
reasonable doubt is protected by the opportunity to challenge a 
proffered fact as not being 'incontestable,' or otherwise not 
meeting the requirements for judicial notice under Wis. Stat. 
§ 902.01."  Id. at ¶¶19, 20. 
¶29 We 
disagree. 
 
The 
court 
of 
appeals' 
rationale 
conflicts with the well-established principle that a defendant's 
due process and jury trial rights encompass the right to have 
the jury, rather than the judge, decide every element of the 
offense, to the requisite degree of beyond a reasonable doubt 
certainty.  Here, the status of the alleged protected place as a 
"state, county, city, village or town park" is an element of the 
enhanced offense.  The jury instruction directed the jury to 
accept as true the judicially-noticed fact that the alleged 
protected place, Penn Park, is a city park; in other words, it 
directed the jury to find an element of the enhanced offense.  
The instruction, therefore, had the same effect as a mandatory 
conclusive presumption on an element of the offense, which is 
unconstitutional under Sandstrom and Kuntz. 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
15 
 
¶30 Wisconsin's statute on presumptions in criminal cases 
requires the circuit court to instruct the jury that it may, but 
is not required to, accept the presumed fact: 
 
903.03 Presumptions in criminal cases.  . . .  
 
(2) SUBMISSION TO JURY.  The judge is not 
authorized to find a presumed fact against the 
accused. . . .  
 
(3) INSTRUCTING THE JURY.  Whenever the existence 
of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to 
the jury, the judge shall give an instruction that the 
law declares that the jury may regard the basic facts 
as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact, but does 
not require it to do so. 
Wis. Stat. § 903.03 (emphasis added). 
¶31 It has been noted that a constitutionally valid 
"'criminal presumption' is not a presumption at all but simply a 
permissive inference, that is, a finding of fact that may be 
grounded upon circumstantial evidence.  Thus, a permissive 
inference is judicially-approved logic that endorses evidence of 
a basic fact as circumstantially sufficient to permit, but not 
compel, an inferred fact . . . ."  Genova v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 
595, 607, 283 N.W.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1979) (footnote omitted). 
¶32 The constitutionality of any particular application of 
the 
"evidentiary 
device" 
of 
judicial 
notice 
(including, 
necessarily, the constitutionality of any particular application 
of the judicial notice jury instruction) is measured by the same 
standards as the constitutionality of evidentiary presumptions: 
 
Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our 
adversarial system of fact-finding.  It is often 
necessary for the trier of fact to determine the 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
16 
 
existence of an element of the crime——that is, an 
"ultimate" or "elemental" fact——from the existence of 
one or more "evidentiary" or "basic" facts.  The value 
of these evidentiary devices, and their validity under 
the Due Process Clause, vary from case to case, 
however, depending on the strength of the connection 
between the particular basic and elemental facts 
involved and on the degree to which the device 
curtails the fact-finder's freedom to assess the 
evidence independently.  Nonetheless, in criminal 
cases, 
the 
ultimate 
test 
of 
any 
device's 
constitutional 
validity 
in a given case 
remains 
constant: the device must not undermine the fact-
finder's responsibility at trial, based on evidence 
adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 364; Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702-
703, n.31. [Ulster County at 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d at 791-
2]. 
Id. at 610-11 (emphasis in original). 
¶33 Here, judicial notice——or, more particularly, the jury 
instruction directing the jury to accept the judicially-noticed 
fact as true——was applied to an element of the enhanced offense.  
This had the effect of not merely undermining but eliminating 
the jury's opportunity to reach an independent, beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt decision on that element, and was therefore 
constitutional error.  The incontestability of Penn Park's 
status as a city park goes to whether the error was harmless, 
not whether there was constitutional instructional error in the 
first place.  
¶34 The federal rule governing judicial notice in criminal 
cases requires that the jury be instructed that "it may, but is 
not required to, accept as conclusive any judicially noticed 
fact."  Fed. R. Evid. 201(g).  Harvey invites us to exercise our 
rule-making authority in the context of this case to modify Wis. 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
17 
 
Stat. § 902.01(7) to conform to the federal judicial notice rule 
in criminal cases.  We decline to do so.  Our rule-making 
authority as it applies to statutory rules of pleading and 
practice 
is 
procedurally 
distinct 
from 
our 
case-deciding 
function, and is subject to certain statutory requirements 
regarding an opportunity for public comment and hearing.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 751.12. 
III 
¶35 Our 
conclusion 
that 
the 
judicial 
notice 
jury 
instruction as applied in this case was constitutional error 
does not end the matter.  This type of instructional error is 
not per se prejudicial, but, rather, is subject to application 
of the harmless error rule.10  See Neder, 527 U.S. at 4; Kuntz, 
160 Wis. 2d at 738. 
¶36 In 
Neder, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
held 
that 
a 
jury 
instruction that improperly omitted an element of the offense 
(there, because the trial judge decided it, contrary to the 
defendant's due process and jury trial rights) is subject to 
harmless error analysis.  Neder, 527 U.S. at 15.  The Court 
noted that the federal harmless error rule, Rule 52(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that errors not 
affecting substantial rights shall be disregarded, and applies 
to all properly preserved errors, including constitutional ones.  
See id. at 7. 
                                                 
10 State v. Leist, 141 Wis. 2d 34, 39, 414 N.W.2d 45 (Ct. 
App. 1987), incorrectly stated that there is a per se rule of 
automatic reversal ("[e]rrors of this type can never be 
considered harmless"), and to that limited extent is overruled. 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
18 
 
¶37 The 
Court 
acknowledged 
that 
certain 
fundamental 
constitutional errors are not amenable to harmless error 
analysis——errors 
"so 
intrinsically 
harmful 
as 
to 
require 
automatic reversal (i.e., 'affect substantial rights') without 
regard to their effect on the outcome"——but said this comprised 
"a limited class" of errors.  Id.  All other constitutional 
errors——including 
an 
erroneous 
jury 
instruction 
completely 
omitting an element of the offense——are subject to the harmless 
error rule:    
 
 
We have recognized that "most constitutional 
errors can be harmless."  Fulminante, supra, at 306.  
"If the defendant had counsel and was tried by an 
impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption 
that any other constitutional errors that may have 
occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis."  
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579, 92 L. Ed. 2d 460, 
106 S. Ct. 3101 (1986).  Indeed, we have found an 
error 
to 
be 
"structural," 
and 
thus 
subject 
to 
automatic reversal, only in a "very limited class of 
cases."  Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 
137 L. Ed. 2d 718, 117 S. Ct. 1544 (1997) (citing 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 
83 S. Ct. 792 (1963) (complete denial of counsel); 
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 71 L. Ed. 749, 47 S. Ct. 
437 (1927) (biased trial judge); Vasquez v. Hillery, 
474 U.S. 254, 88 L. Ed. 2d 598, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986) 
(racial discrimination in selection of grand jury); 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122, 
104 S. Ct. 944 (1984) (denial of self-representation 
at trial); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 81 L. Ed. 
2d 31, 104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984) (denial of public 
trial); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 124 L. 
Ed. 2d 182, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993) (defective 
reasonable-doubt instruction)).   
 
 
The error at issue here——a jury instruction that 
omits an element of the offense——differs markedly from 
the constitutional violations we have found to defy 
harmless-error 
review. 
 
Those 
cases, 
we 
have 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
19 
 
explained, contain a "defect affecting the framework 
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an 
error in the trial process itself."  Fulminante, 
supra, at 310.  Such errors "infect the entire trial 
process," Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630, 123 
L. 
Ed. 
2d 
353, 
113 
S. 
Ct. 
1710 
(1993), 
and 
"necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair," 
Rose, 478 U.S. at 577.  Put another way, these errors 
deprive defendants of "basic protections" without 
which" a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its 
function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or 
innocence . . . and no criminal punishment may be 
regarded as fundamentally fair."  Id. at 577-78.   
 
 
Unlike such defects as the complete deprivation 
of counsel or trial before a biased judge, an 
instruction that omits an element of the offense does 
not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally 
unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt 
or innocence.     
 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (emphasis in original).   
¶38 The Court analogized the improper omission of an 
element to the improper inclusion of a conclusive presumption on 
an element or an instruction that misstates an element, both of 
which are non-structural errors subject to application of 
harmless error analysis: 
 
We have often applied harmless-error analysis to 
cases involving improper instructions on a single 
element of the offense.  See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt, 
500 U.S. 391, 114 L. Ed. 2d 432, 111 S. Ct. 1884 
(1991) (mandatory rebuttable presumption); Carella v. 
California, 491 U.S. 263, 105 L. Ed. 2d 218, 109 S. 
Ct. 2419 (1989) (per curiam) (mandatory conclusive 
presumption); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 95 L. 
Ed. 2d 439, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987) (misstatement of 
element); 
Rose, 
supra 
(mandatory 
rebuttable 
presumption).  In other cases, we have recognized that 
improperly omitting an element from the jury can 
"easily be analogized to improperly instructing the 
jury on an element of the offense, an error which is 
subject to harmless-error analysis."  Johnson, supra, 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
20 
 
at 469 (citations omitted); see also California v. 
Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5, 136 L. Ed. 2d 266, 117 S. Ct. 337 
(1996) (per curiam) ("The specific error at issue 
here——an error in the instruction that defined the 
crime——is . . . as 
easily 
characterized 
as 
a 
'misdescription of an element' of the crime, as it is 
characterized as an error of 'omission'"). 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 9-10. 
¶39 Although the Supreme Court in Neder was applying 
principles of federal constitutional law to the federal harmless 
error rule, Wisconsin, of course, has its own statutory harmless 
error rule that is almost identical to the federal rule.  
Wisconsin Statute § 805.18, made applicable to criminal cases by 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(1), prohibits reversal for error not 
affecting a party's substantial rights.11  See State v. Dyess, 
124 Wis. 2d 525, 547, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985); see also State v. 
Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶69, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223; 
State v. Armstrong, 223 Wis. 2d 331, 368, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999). 
¶40 Dyess, our seminal 
harmless 
error case, applied 
federal constitutional 
principles to 
determine 
the 
proper 
standard for determining prejudice in criminal cases.  Dyess, 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Statute § 805.18(2) provides: 
 
No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of selection or misdirection of the jury, or 
the improper admission of evidence, or for error as to 
any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the 
opinion of the court to which application is made, 
after 
an 
examination 
of 
the 
entire 
action 
or 
proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained 
of has affected the substantial rights of the party 
seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to 
secure a new trial. 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
21 
 
124 Wis. 2d at 544.  Dyess itself concerned a jury instruction 
that contained an erroneous conclusive presumption; the court, 
however, concluded that the instruction violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 903.03(3), 
and 
specifically 
declined 
to 
reach 
the 
constitutional question under Sandstrom.  Id. at 533-34.  In any 
event, the court emphasized that the standard for evaluating an 
error's 
harmlessness 
is 
the 
same 
whether 
the 
error 
is 
constitutional, statutory, or otherwise: 
 
We conclude that, in view of the gradual merger 
of this court's collective thinking in respect to 
harmless versus prejudicial error, whether of omission 
or commission, whether of constitutional proportions 
or not, the test should be whether there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to 
the conviction.  If it did, reversal and a new trial 
must result.  The burden of proving no prejudice is on 
the beneficiary of the error, here the state.  The 
state's burden, then, is to establish that there is no 
reasonable possibility that the error contributed to 
the conviction. 
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 543 (citation and footnote omitted).  
¶41 The court considered this test for harmless error to 
be essentially consistent with the test for prejudice in an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544.  
The court did, however, note a distinction in the burden of 
proof: ordinarily, the one who benefits from the error must 
prove harmlessness, but in an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, the defendant must prove prejudice.  See id. at 544 n.11.  
The court also made reference to Strickland's use of the phrase 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
22 
 
"reasonable probability" rather than "reasonable possibility," 
but said the two had the same meaning: 
 
Although the Court [in Strickland] uses the 
words, 
"reasonable 
probability" 
of 
a 
different 
outcome, in contrast to our use of "reasonable 
possibility," it is clear from the Strickland opinion 
that the Supreme Court's test is substantively the 
same as ours.  The Supreme Court uses the word 
"probability," in the sense of likelihood.  It 
explains 
that 
for 
a 
different 
outcome 
to 
be 
"reasonably probable" it need not be "more likely than 
not"; a reasonable probability of a different outcome 
is one that raises a reasonable doubt about guilt, a 
"probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome" of the proceeding.  
Dyess, 124 at 544-45 (citations omitted). 
¶42 Kuntz went a step further, and, consistent with the 
broad holding of Dyess, applied harmless error analysis to 
instructional error of constitutional dimension.  In Kuntz, this 
court held that the use of a jury instruction containing a 
mandatory conclusive presumption on an elemental fact was 
constitutional error, but the error nevertheless was subject to 
application of the harmless error rule.  Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d at 
738. 
¶43 In Kuntz, the trial court had instructed the jury that 
"a mobile home is a building" for purposes of the charged 
offense of arson of a building.  Id. at 734.  This court viewed 
the instruction as an unconstitutional mandatory conclusive 
presumption on an element of the offense, but concluded that it 
was harmless, applying the framework of the concurring opinion 
in Carella, which advocated a more restrictive approach to 
harmless 
error 
analysis 
in 
the 
context 
of 
conclusive 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
23 
 
presumptions.  See id. at 738-40; see also Carella, 491 U.S. at 
267-73 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
¶44 In Neder, however, the United States Supreme Court 
specifically rejected the more restrictive approach of the 
Carella concurrence, 527 U.S. at 13-14, opting instead for the 
harmless error analysis of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 
(1967): 
 
Having concluded that the omission of an element 
is an error that is subject to the harmless-error 
analysis, 
the 
question 
remains 
whether 
Neder's 
conviction can stand because the error was harmless.  
In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 
705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967), we set forth the test for 
determining 
whether 
a 
constitutional 
error 
is 
harmless.  That test, we said, is whether it appears 
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained 
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."  386 
U.S. at 24; see Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 
681, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986) ("An 
otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if 
the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole 
record, that the constitutional error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt").  
Neder, 527 U.S. at 15-16. 
¶45 Accordingly, while the Kuntz test for harmless error 
in the context of unconstitutional conclusive presumptions 
(based as it was on the now-rejected approach of the Carella 
concurrence) 
has 
been 
called 
into 
question, 
the 
basic 
proposition of the case——that this type of constitutional 
instructional 
error 
is 
indeed 
subject 
to 
harmless 
error 
analysis——has been validated by Neder. 
¶46 The Supreme Court majority in Neder canvassed the 
harmless error rule as applied to a variety of constitutionally-
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
24 
 
based errors, ultimately concluding that the same, Chapman-based 
test controlled, although it stated the test in somewhat 
different language: 
 
We think, therefore, that the harmless-error inquiry 
must be essentially the same: Is it clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found 
the defendant guilty absent the error?  To set a 
barrier so high that it could never be surmounted 
would justify the very criticism that spawned the 
harmless-error doctrine in the first place: "Reversal 
for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, 
encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and 
bestirs the public to ridicule it." 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 18. 
¶47 Applying 
Neder 
here, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
constitutional instructional error in this case was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.12  The error consisted of an 
instruction that the jury must accept the judicially-noticed 
elemental fact as true, which operated as a mandatory conclusive 
presumption in violation of Harvey's due process and jury trial 
rights.  Had the jury been instructed that it may, but need not, 
accept the judicially-noticed elemental fact as true, there 
would have been no constitutional violation, because the 
                                                 
12 The dissent correctly notes that at oral argument, the 
State was ambivalent about harmless error analysis, and that no 
one cited Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).  Dissent at 
¶68.  The harmless error rule, however, is an injunction on the 
courts, which, if applicable, the courts are required to address 
regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
parties 
do. 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2)(specifying that no judgment shall be 
reversed unless the court determines, after examining the entire 
record, 
that 
the 
error 
complained 
of 
has 
affected 
the 
substantial rights of a party). 
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
25 
 
instruction would have operated as a permissive inference rather 
than a conclusive presumption. 
¶48 The elemental fact on which the jury was improperly 
instructed is undisputed and indisputable: Penn Park is a city 
park, and no one says otherwise.13  Accordingly, it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed, rational 
jury would have found the defendant guilty of the enhanced 
offense.14  Under these circumstances, the error cannot have 
contributed to the verdict. 
¶49 Therefore, while we conclude that the judicial notice 
jury instruction, as applied to the "city park" element of the 
enhanced drug offense in this case, operated as a mandatory 
conclusive presumption in violation of Harvey's Fifth and Sixth 
                                                 
13 As the court of appeals noted, "[t]hat Penn Park is a 
city park may be readily verified by contacting the City of 
Madison Parks Division, consulting its publications, or even by 
visiting its website (http://www.ci.madison.wi.us/parks)."  State 
v. Harvey, 2001 WI App 59, ¶8, 242 Wis. 2d 189, 625 N.W.2d 892.  
We reject Harvey's alternative argument that the circuit court 
abused its discretion by failing to state for the record the 
basis upon which it was taking judicial notice that Penn Park is 
a city park.  Penn Park's status as a city park is independently 
and readily verifiable, and in any event, is not disputed. 
 
14 It is odd that the dissent would assert that this opinion 
"views Neder as abandoning the Chapman harmless-error test."  
Dissent at ¶57.  We do not.  Neder reaffirmed and refined the 
Chapman harmless error test, it did not abandon it.  The Court's 
use of somewhat different language in restating the test can be 
viewed as a further clarification of what it takes to meet the 
test; that is, that in order to conclude that an error "did not 
contribute to the verdict" within the meaning of Chapman, a 
court must be able to conclude "beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error."  Neder, 527 U.S. at 18.  
No. 
00-0541-CR   
 
26 
 
Amendment rights, we nevertheless affirm his conviction.  A 
constitutional or other error is harmless if it is "clear beyond 
a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error."  Neder, 527 U.S. at 18.   By 
this standard, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
No.  00-0541-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶50 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority's decision today and write separately only to 
comment on the harmless error analysis.  For at least the past 
38 years, this court has wrestled with formulating a standard 
for harmless error.  See, e.g., State v. Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 45, 
406 N.W.2d 744 (1987); Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356-57, 
204 N.W.2d 482 (1973); State v. Spring, 48 Wis. 2d 333, 339-40, 
179 N.W.2d 841 (1970); Pulaski v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 450, 456-57, 
129 N.W.2d 204 (1964).  The previous standard, applied in 
several recent decisions, see, e.g., Green v. Smith, 2001 WI 
109, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727; Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 
2001 WI 111, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201; Evelyn C.R. v. 
Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768; 
Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698; 
Nommensen v. American Cont'l Ins. Co., 2001 WI 112, 246 Wis. 2d 
132, 629 N.W.2d 301, was whether there existed a reasonable 
possibility that the error contributed to the outcome, and that 
a 
reasonable 
possibility 
is 
one 
sufficient 
to 
undermine 
confidence in the outcome.  See State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 
543-545, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).  I have written dissents or 
concurrences in those recent decisions urging the court to 
clarify that Dyess' use of the term "reasonable possibility" was 
intended to require "reasonable probability."  The majority 
opinion recognizes, at ¶41, that in Dyess we stated that those 
two terms had the same meaning.   
No.  00-0541-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
¶51 I write, then, only to note that the harmless error 
dispute is finally put to rest in Wisconsin, at least in 
criminal cases, both by the majority opinion here and in State 
v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ___ Wis. 2d  ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ .  By 
establishing that an error is harmless if "it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the 
defendant guilty absent the error," Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1, 18 (1999), this court has finally corrected the 
confusion 
by 
no 
longer 
relying 
on 
the 
term 
"reasonable 
possibility."  The majority, in ¶46, has set forth the language 
from Neder that explains the reason why the United States 
Supreme Court stated the harmless error rule in the manner it 
did. 
 
To set a barrier so high that it could never be 
surmounted would justify the very criticism that 
spawned the harmless-error doctrine in the first 
place: "Reversal for error, regardless of its effect 
on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the 
judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule 
it."   
Neder, 527 U.S. at 18.  (quoting Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of 
Harmless Error 50 (1970)). 
¶52 I wholeheartedly agree with this articulation of the 
justification for a common sense harmless error rule——one that 
looks at whether it is clear, beyond a reasonable doubt that 
No.  00-0541-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
absent the error, a rational jury would have reached the same 
verdict.15 
¶53 For these reasons, I respectfully concur.  
¶54 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this concurrence. 
 
                                                 
15 I respectfully disagree with the dissenting opinion's 
position that this test, adopted by the majority here and in 
State v. 
Tomlinson, 2002 
WI 
91, 
___ 
Wis. 2d  
___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___, "ignore[s] the Chapman approach" and "misstates the 
U.S. Supreme Court's harmless-error test."  Dissent, ¶21.   
No.  00-0541-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶55 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
The circuit court instructed the jury in the present case that 
it had taken judicial notice of the fact that Penn Park is a 
city park and explicitly "directed" the jury to accept that fact 
as true.  That the area in question is a city park is a penalty-
enhancing element of this drug offense.  
¶56 The majority opinion concludes that the mandatory 
nature of the instruction on this element of the enhanced drug 
offense was constitutional error.  I agree. 
¶57 The 
majority 
opinion 
then 
concludes 
that 
the 
constitutional error was harmless error.  I agree with the 
majority opinion that a harmless-error analysis may be applied 
to an instructional error of constitutional dimension.  This 
court so held in State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 735, 467 
N.W.2d 531 (1991).   
¶58 I disagree with the majority opinion, however, when it 
abandons Kuntz and adopts Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 
(1999), the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent twist and turn in 
this area of the law.  I also disagree with the majority opinion 
when it views Neder as abandoning the Chapman16 harmless-error 
test. 
 
I 
¶59 I would not abandon Kuntz.  In Kuntz, this court 
adopted 
the 
reasoning 
of 
Justice 
Antonin 
Scalia 
in 
his 
concurring opinion in Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 
                                                 
16 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
No.  00-0541-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
(1989): 
 
The 
harmless-error 
rule 
applies 
in 
limited 
circumstances when a trial court uses a mandatory conclusive 
presumption regarding an element of a crime.  
¶60 The present case does not fall within one of the 
limited circumstances specified by Kuntz and it does not fall 
within Justice Scalia's concurrence in Carella.  Nor does the 
Neder case fall within one of those limited exceptions in which 
Justice Scalia and Kuntz would apply the harmless-error rule. 
¶61 Neder 
narrowly 
holds 
that 
an 
erroneous 
jury 
instruction that omitted an element of an offense is subject to 
a harmless-error analysis when evidence of the omitted element 
is overwhelming and uncontested.  One commentator quipped that 
Neder has "elevated the 'no harm, no foul' policy over reasoned 
analysis"17 and is "a bad call."18 
¶62 The majority opinion applies Neder to the present case 
in which, by contrast, the circuit court, over the objection of 
the defendant, instructed the jury that an element was satisfied 
by the court taking judicial notice of the element, even though 
no evidence regarding the element had been admitted and the 
circuit court did not state the basis for taking judicial 
notice.  
¶63 Justice Scalia disagrees with the Court's expanded use 
of the harmless-error rule in Neder.  Justice Scalia reasons 
                                                 
17 Linda A. Carter, The Sporting Approach to Harmless Error 
in Criminal Cases: The Supreme Court's "No Harm, No Foul" 
Debacle in Neder v. United States, 28 Am. J. Crim. L. 229, 239 
(2001). 
18 Id. 
No.  00-0541-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
that a court cannot direct a guilty verdict no matter how clear 
the defendant's culpability, because a directed verdict denies 
an accused the right to a trial by jury and presents a 
structural 
error 
that 
is 
not 
subject 
to 
harmless-error 
analysis.19  Why then, Justice Scalia asks, should "taking one of 
the elements of the crime away from the jury . . . be treated 
differently from taking all of them away——since failure to prove 
one, no less than failure to prove all, utterly prevents 
conviction"?20  For Justice Scalia, allowing an appellate court 
to decide guilt or innocence on an element of a crime allows 
"appellate courts to trample over the jury's function."21   
¶64 We are bound by the decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in interpreting the U.S. Constitution.  But we are not 
bound by the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  
                                                 
19 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  According to 
Justice Scalia, "[t]he very premise of structural-error review 
is that even convictions reflecting the 'right' result are 
reversed for the sake of protecting a basic right."  Id. at 34. 
20 Id. at 33.   
21 Id. at 36.  
Justice Scalia concluded in Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 
263 (1989), that the use of mandatory conclusive presumptions is 
impermissible 
because 
in 
addition 
to 
"overriding 
[the] 
presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused," 
it "invade[s] [the] fact-finding function which in a criminal 
case the law assigns solely to the jury."  Carella, 491 U.S. at 
268 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal citations 
omitted). 
No.  00-0541-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶65 Wisconsin 
jurisprudence 
supports 
interpreting 
the 
Wisconsin Constitution in accordance with the Kuntz decision.  
The 
drafters 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
placed 
great 
importance on the right to a trial by jury.  In Article I, 
Section 7, the Wisconsin Constitution guarantees an accused in a 
criminal action the right to a jury trial, stating in part that 
in "all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury."22   
¶66 To determine guilt, the fact-finder must first decide 
each element of a crime.  The right to a jury trial, therefore, 
means the right to a jury determination on every element of the 
crime charged.  Because the people reserved in the constitution 
the "function of determining criminal guilt to themselves, 
sitting as jurors,"23 then it is not within the power of the 
courts to cancel that reservation. 
                                                 
22 Wis. Const. art. I, § 7. 
For a discussion of the history of this provision, see 
State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 234-240, 580 N.W.2d 171 
(1998).  
Debate regarding the guarantee of a jury trial, as opposed 
to a bench trial, can be found in a speech to the members of the 
1847-48 Wisconsin constitutional convention by Charles H. Lakin, 
who stated in part: "By the proposed amendment, if adopted, will 
be distinctly drawn between the bench and the jury box . . . .  
I wish to reinstate the ancient trial by jury, assigning to it 
its original prerogative and opening a great gulf between it and 
the bench . . . ."  Journal of the Convention to Form a 
Constitution for the State of Wisconsin, 122 (1948).  See also 
Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d at 235 n.12. 
23 Neder, 527 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).   
No.  00-0541-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶67 Justice Scalia's conclusion in his dissent in Neder, 
drawing upon Blackstone's admonition about making inroads on the 
powers of juries, should guide this court in interpreting the 
jury guarantee in the Wisconsin Constitution:  
 
And as for the ingredient of pragmatism (if the 
defendant is unquestionably guilty, why go through the 
trouble of trying him again?), it suffices to quote 
Blackstone once again:  
 
"[H]owever convenient [intrusions on the jury right] 
may appear at first, (as, doubtless, all arbitrary 
powers, well executed, are the most convenient,) yet 
let it be again remembered that delays and little 
inconveniences in the forms of justice are the price 
that all free nations must pay for their liberty in 
more substantial matters; that these inroads upon this 
sacred 
bulwark 
of 
the 
nation 
are 
fundamentally 
opposite to the spirit of our constitution; and that, 
though begun in trifles, the precedent may gradually 
increase and spread to the utter disuse of juries in 
questions 
of 
the 
most 
momentous 
concern." 
4 
Blackstone, Commentaries 350.  See also Bollenbach v. 
United States, 326 U.S. 607, 615 (1946).   
 
Formal requirements are often scorned when they stand 
in the way of expediency.  This Court, however, has an 
obligation to take a longer view. 
 
Neder, 527 U.S. at 39-40. 
 
II 
¶68 I would not abandon the Chapman harmless-error test.  
A second issue raised in the majority opinion relates to how the 
federal constitutional harmless-error test should be stated.  
The harmless-error doctrine has inspired several decades of 
No.  00-0541-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
commentary, criticism, skepticism, and attempted clarification.24  
Just a year ago this court debated harmless error in several 
cases.25  Our cases and scholarly commentary reveal that the 
doctrine of harmless error is a work in progress.26  Indeed there 
may be several harmless-error tests depending on the nature of 
the error.27 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Roger J. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 
(1970) (proposing several different variations of the harmless-
error standard depending on the nature of the error); Harry T. 
Edwards, Madison Lecture: To Err Is Human, But Not Always 
Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1167, 1199 (1995) (expressing skepticism that "in practical 
application we can ever solve the riddle of harmless error").  
See also James Edward Wicht III, There Is No Such Thing as 
a Harmless Constitutional Error: Returning to a Rule of 
Automatic Reversal, 12 B.Y.U. Pub. L. 73 (1997); Gregory 
Mitchell, 
Against 
"Overwhelming" 
Appellate 
Activism: 
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 1335 
(1994); Vilija Bilaisis, Harmless Error: Abettor of Courtroom 
Misconduct, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 457 (1983); Kent A. 
Tess-Mattner, Confusion in the Court: Wisconsin's Harmless Error 
Rule in Criminal Appeals, 63 Marq. L. Rev. 643 (1980).  For a 
discussion of reversible error and the review function, and a 
critique of Wisconsin case law, see Ruggero J. Aldisert, The 
Judicial Process: Readings, Materials and Cases 706-42 (1976). 
25 See, e.g., In re Termination of Parental Rights to Jayton 
S., 2001 WI 110, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768; Nommensen v. 
American Continental Ins. Co., 2001 WI 112, 246 Wis. 2d 132, 629 
N.W.2d 301; Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 
N.W.2d 698.  
26 See, e.g., 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure 
§ 27.6(b), at 938-39 (2d ed. 1999) ("Few areas of doctrinal 
development have been marked by greater twisting and turning 
than the development of standards for applying the harmless 
error rule."). 
27 Jayton 
S., 
246 
Wis. 2d 
at 
25 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring). 
No.  00-0541-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶69 The State did not argue the issue of harmless error in 
its brief in the present case.  When the court raised the issue 
of harmless error at oral argument, the State explained that it 
was unsure how harmless error applied in the present case.  The 
State asserted that the error in the present case might be 
viewed as harmless because the defendant did not challenge the 
status of the park at trial or on appeal.  Nevertheless, the 
State acknowledged that the error could be viewed as significant 
because the wrong entity, the judge, had made the finding of 
fact.  Neither party referred to the Neder case. 
¶70 As I have written previously,28 I do not think it is 
prudent that this court apply or modify our statement of the 
harmless-error doctrine without the benefit of briefing by both 
parties, oral argument on the issue, and an exploration of the 
federal and state cases and the historical development of the 
law.29  The decision regarding harmless error is the court's, but 
a fundamental premise of our adversary system is that advocates 
will present useful information and arguments that a court might 
not uncover.30   
¶71 The majority opinion recognizes that the U.S. Supreme 
Court takes two different approaches to harmless error in Neder.  
See majority op. at ¶46.  The first approach asks whether it 
                                                 
28 Id. at 23-26. 
29 See also State v. Grant, 139 Wis. 2d 45, 88, 406 N.W.2d 
744 (1987) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
30 Adam A. Milani and Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A 
Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 
Tenn. L. Rev. 245 (2002). 
No.  00-0541-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained" and comes from 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  See Neder, 527 
U.S. at 15, 17, 18, 19; majority op. at ¶44.   
¶72 The second approach, which is set forth without 
citation in Neder, asks whether it is "clear beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty 
absent the error."  Neder, 527 U.S. at 18; majority op. at ¶46.  
The majority opinion then uses this second approach to assess 
harmless error.  Majority op. at ¶47. 
¶73 There is a different emphasis in the two approaches.  
The first inquires whether the constitutional error contributed 
to the conviction, while the second inquires whether the 
untainted 
evidence 
provides 
overwhelming 
support 
for 
the 
conviction. Professor LaFave analyzes the various U.S. Supreme 
Court cases discussing these two approaches and concludes that 
"the Court has appeared to move back and forth between relying 
heavily upon the presence of proof of guilt in its harmless 
error analysis, and considering that proof as less central to 
the inquiry."31   
¶74 The "presence of proof of guilt analysis" embodied in 
the second approach has been criticized as usurping the fact-
finding function that the Sixth Amendment entrusts to a jury, 
particularly when applying harmless-error review to conclusive 
                                                 
31 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 27.6(e), at 958-
59 (2d ed. 1999).  See also State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 
489-90, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).  
No.  00-0541-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
mandatory 
presumptions.32 
 
Courts 
should 
refrain 
from 
"interposing themselves into the process as some sort of 'super-
jury.'"33 
¶75 The majority and concurring opinions apparently prefer 
to ignore the Chapman approach entirely and adopt only the 
second approach.  The opinions thus misstate the U.S. Supreme 
Court's harmless-error test and turn a blind eye to the fluid 
nature and nuances of the U.S. Supreme Court constitutional 
harmless-error case law. 
¶76 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶77 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
                                                 
32 John M.M. Greabe, Spelling Guilt Out of a Record?  
Harmless-Error Review of Conclusive Mandatory Presumptions and 
Elemental Misdescriptions, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 819 (1994).   
33 Id. 
No.  00-0541-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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