Case Title: State v. George C. Lohmeier

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP002187-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
1
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 94-2187-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :               
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
George C. Lohmeier, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 29, 1996 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  
Reversed. 
 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  The State of Wisconsin 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals,
1 which reversed a judgment of the circuit court for 
Walworth County, the Honorable James L. Carlson presiding, 
convicting George C. Lohmeier of two counts of homicide by 
operation of a vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) (1991-92).
2  
The State argues that the circuit court judge did not 
                                                          
 
1  State v. Lohmeier, 196 Wis. 2d 432, 538 N.W.2d 821 
(Ct. App. 1995). 
 
2  All further references are to the 1991-92 Statutes 
unless otherwise noted.   
 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
2
effectively deny Lohmeier a meaningful opportunity for 
consideration by the jury of his statutory affirmative 
defense under Wis. Stat. § 940.09(2), by instructing the 
jury that “[i]t is no defense to a prosecution for a crime 
that the victim may have been contributorily negligent.”  We 
conclude that in light of the entire proceedings, there does 
not exist a reasonable likelihood that the contributory 
negligence instruction, in combination with Wis JICriminal 
1185, 1186, and 1188, misled the jury into believing it 
could not consider the conduct of the two young women who 
were killed in relation to the affirmative defense.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
I. 
On June 10, 1993, George C. Lohmeier struck Renee 
Belair and Stacie Rogers with his car as they were walking 
on Willis Bay Road in Walworth County.  Lohmeier left the 
scene of the collision, but later returned and admitted to 
police that the vehicle he was driving struck the young 
women.  Police arrested Lohmeier at the scene after he 
failed a field sobriety test.  Lohmeier was subsequently 
charged with six counts, including two counts of homicide by 
operation of a vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a),  two 
counts of homicide by operation of a vehicle with a 
prohibited alcohol concentration contrary to Wis. Stat. 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
3
§ 940.09(1)(b), and two counts of hit and run causing death 
contrary to Wis. Stats. §§ 346.67, 346.74(5). 
A jury trial was held November 1 through November 4, 
1993.  Evidence at the trial indicated Lohmeier’s blood 
alcohol content was 0.186% at the time of the accident.  
Michael Sugrue testified that as he passed the young women, 
they were walking toward him on the other side of the road, 
one on the edge of the road and the other toward the ditch.  
Three to five seconds after this, Sugrue passed Lohmeier, 
who was driving in the opposite direction.  Sugrue testified 
that Lohmeier’s car was “far over on the edge of the road” 
toward the ditch line. (R. 51 at 172.) Sugrue watched 
Lohmeier’s car in his rear-view mirror, and said he was 
surprised Lohmeier was not “getting over” as he approached 
the young women.  (R. 51 at 172-73.)  After seeing a white 
object fly over Lohmeier’s car, Sugrue turned around and 
drove to the site, where he found one of the young women 
lying in the road.  Both young women died as a result of the 
collision. 
At the trial, Lohmeier attempted to establish the 
statutory affirmative defense of Wis. Stat. § 940.09(2)
3 to 
the four vehicular homicide counts.  In particular, he 
                                                          
 
3  Section 940.09(2) provides, “The defendant has a 
defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the death would have occurred even if he or 
she had been exercising due care and he or she had not been 
under the influence of an intoxicant or did not have a blood 
alcohol concentration described under sub. (1)(b) or (bm) or 
(1g)(b).” 
 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
4
presented evidence that the young women were walking on the 
right side of the road as prohibited by statute.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 346.28(1).  Lohmeier further argued that the young 
women had moved from the side of the road into the traffic 
lane, and supported this with evidence that they were hit on 
the roadway.  Lohmeier also presented evidence of similar 
behavior by the young women on other occasions.  In 
addition, Lohmeier presented the opinion of an expert in 
accident reconstruction.  The expert testified that most 
people would not have been able to avoid the accident even 
if they were exercising due care and were not under the 
influence of an intoxicant.  On rebuttal, the State 
presented expert testimony that a sober person exercising 
due care could have stopped and avoided striking the young 
women. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the court read Wis 
JICriminal 
1185,
4 
which 
provided 
with 
respect 
to 
Lohmeier’s § 940.09(2) defense: 
 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant caused the death of Stacie 
Rogers and Renee L. Belair by operating a vehicle 
while the defendant was under the influence of an 
intoxicant, 
you 
must 
determine 
whether 
the 
defendant 
has 
a 
defense 
to 
this 
crime 
by 
considering the following:  Would the death of 
Stacie Rogers and Renee L. Belair have occurred 
even if the defendant had been exercising due care 
and had not been under the influence?  Wisconsin 
law provides that it is a defense to the crime 
charged in this case if you are satisfied to a 
reasonable certainty by a greater weight of the 
                                                          
 
4   The court substituted Wis JICriminal 1188 for the 
last two paragraphs of Wis JICriminal 1185 and 1886. 
 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
5
credible evidence that the death would have 
occurred even if the defendant would have been 
exercising due care and had not been under the 
influence . . . . If you are satisfied to a 
reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the 
credible evidence that the death of Stacie Rogers 
and Renee L. Belair would have occurred even if 
the defendant had been exercising due care and had 
not been under the influence, then you must find 
the defendant not guilty . . . .  
(R. 51 at 634-35.)  Similarly, the court read Wis 
JICriminal 
1186, which 
relates to 
the 
homicide 
by 
prohibited alcohol concentration charge, and corresponds in 
substance with Wis JICriminal 1185 regarding Lohmeier’s 
affirmative defense.  Immediately following this, the court 
read the following special instruction
5 over Lohmeier’s 
objection: “You are further instructed as to these four 
counts that it is no defense to a prosecution for a crime 
that the victim may have been contributorily negligent.” (R. 
51 at 639.)  The State requested this instruction based on 
Wis. Stat. § 939.14.
6  
The jury subsequently found Lohmeier guilty on all 
counts.  Consistent with Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1m),
7 the court 
                                                          
 
5  The Criminal Jury Instruction Committee has not 
adopted 
a 
pattern 
jury 
instruction 
for 
contributory 
negligence, and recommends that no instruction be given.  
See Wis JI—Criminal 926 and comments.  
 
6  Section 939.14 provides: “It is no defense to a 
prosecution for a crime that the victim also was guilty of a 
crime or was contributorily negligent.” 
 
The State requested the instruction for the purpose of 
informing the jury that Lohmeier was not immune from 
criminal liability simply because the young women were 
contributorily negligent by walking on the wrong side of the 
road. 
 
7  Section 940.09(1m) provides:  “If [a] person is 
found guilty of both sub. (1)(a) and (b) . . . for acts 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
6
entered a judgment of conviction and sentence for two counts 
of 
homicide 
by 
intoxicated 
use 
of 
a 
vehicle 
under 
§ 940.09(1)(a), as well as two counts of hit and run causing 
death under §§ 346.67, 346.74(5).
8 The court of appeals 
reversed in part and remanded, holding that the contributory 
negligence instruction deprived Lohmeier of a meaningful 
opportunity for consideration by the jury of his affirmative 
defense 
under 
§ 940.09(2), 
because 
there 
existed 
a 
“probability” that the jury was misled and therefore did not 
consider the young women’s conduct in regard to Lohmeier’s 
statutory affirmative defense.  Lohmeier, 196 Wis. 2d at 
444. 
II. 
Initially, we consider the applicable standard of 
review.  Lohmeier’s claim is essentially based on due 
process, because he contends that the circuit court denied 
him a meaningful opportunity for consideration by the jury 
of his defense.  See State v. Heft, 185 Wis. 2d 288, 302-03, 
517 N.W.2d 494 (1994).  This is a question of constitutional 
fact, which we review de novo.  See id. at 296. 
In 
addition, in 
cases 
involving challenged 
jury 
instructions, appellate courts generally apply harmless 
error analysis to determine whether reversal is required.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall 
be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing . . . .” 
 
8  The convictions for the two counts of hit and run 
causing death contrary to §§ 346.67, 346.74(5) are not 
before this court. 
 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
7
See, e.g., State v. Zelenka, 130 Wis. 2d 34, 387 N.W.2d 55 
(1986); State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 370 N.W.2d 222 
(1985); State v. Paulson, 106 Wis. 2d 96, 315 N.W.2d 350 
(1982).  However, harmless error analysis is not applicable 
in this case, because Lohmeier is not contending that the 
contributory negligence instruction is an erroneous legal 
statement. 
 
Instead, 
Lohmeier 
is 
arguing 
that 
the 
instruction, when coupled with Wis JICriminal 1185, 1186, 
and 
1188, 
was 
confusing 
and 
therefore 
subject 
to 
misinterpretation by the jury.  Accordingly, the focus in 
this case is not whether there was error, and if so, whether 
it is harmless, because the instruction concededly is not 
erroneous.  
We therefore must determine the proper inquiry for 
appellate courts to apply when considering whether the 
interplay of challenged 
jury instructions 
violated a 
defendant’s constitutional rights by misleading the jury.  
Admittedly, the applicable standard is not clear from our 
previous cases.  For example, in State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 
2d 423, 307 N.W.2d 151 (1981), we stated, “When a jury 
charge is given in a manner such that a reasonable juror 
could have misinterpreted the instructions to the detriment 
of a defendant’s due process rights, then the determination 
of the jury is tainted.”  Id. at 427 (emphasis added).  On 
the other hand, we have also determined that where a 
defendant argues a challenged jury instruction misled the 
jury into imposing a lesser burden than reasonable doubt 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
8
upon the state in a criminal case, the proper standard is 
whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury was 
misled.  State v. Avila, 192 Wis. 2d 870, 889, 532 N.W.2d 
423 (1995) (emphasis added). 
We conclude that the proper standard for Wisconsin 
courts to apply when a defendant contends that the interplay 
of legally correct instructions impermissibly misled the 
jury is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
jury applied the challenged instructions in a manner that 
violates the constitution.  In so doing, we are following 
the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in 
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 378-81 (1990), and in 
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72-73 (1991).  See also 
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994); Williams v. Chrans, 
945 F.2d 926, 938 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 
1208 (1992);  Avila, 192 Wis. 2d at 889.  We find the Boyde 
Court’s rationale persuasive, in particular: 
 
This “reasonable likelihood” standard, we think, 
better accommodates the concerns of finality and 
accuracy than does a standard which makes the 
inquiry dependent on how a single hypothetical 
“reasonable” juror could or might have interpreted 
the instruction . . . . Jurors do not sit in 
solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for 
subtle shades of meaning in the same way that 
lawyers 
might. 
 
Differences 
among 
them 
in 
interpretation of instructions may be thrashed out 
in the deliberative process, with commonsense 
understanding of the instructions in light of all 
that has taken place at the trial likely to 
prevail over technical hairsplitting. 
Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380-81.  Thus, Wisconsin courts should 
not reverse a conviction simply because the jury possibly 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
9
could have been misled; rather, a new trial should be 
ordered only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
jury was misled and therefore applied potentially confusing 
instructions in an unconstitutional manner.  Furthermore, in 
making this determination, appellate courts should view the 
jury instructions in light of the proceedings as a whole, 
instead of viewing a single instruction in artificial 
isolation.  See id. at 378, 383. 
 
III. 
Before applying the reasonable likelihood standard to 
the case at hand, we consider the relationship between the 
§ 940.09 affirmative defense and the contributory negligence 
rule of § 939.14, because this issue understandably caused 
confusion during the trial.  Throughout the proceedings, the 
parties disputed whether the young women’s conduct could 
constitute the basis for Lohmeier’s § 940.09(2) affirmative 
defense, in light of § 939.14.  Likewise, the circuit court 
indicated it was troubled by this issue, although it 
ultimately allowed Lohmeier to try to establish the defense 
based on the young women’s actions, and instructed the jury 
on it.   
In State v. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d 587, 596, 363 
N.W.2d 574 (1985), this court stated that § 940.09(2) 
“provide[s] a defense for the situation where there is an 
intervening cause between the intoxicated operation of the 
automobile and the death of an individual.”  Although it is 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
10
correct that § 940.09(2) provides an affirmative defense 
where there is an intervening cause, this defense can also 
be understood by focusing on the language of the statute 
itself, which makes no reference to an intervening cause.  
Under § 940.09(2), “A defendant has a defense if he or she 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the death 
would have occurred even if he or she had been exercising 
due care and he or she had not been under the influence of 
an intoxicant . . . .”  With this in mind, we conclude that 
a victim’s conduct can be the basis of the § 940.09(2) 
affirmative defense.  Clearly, situations can arise where, 
because of the victim’s conduct, an accident would have been 
unavoidable even if the defendant had been driving with due 
care and had not been under the influence.
9   
Moreover, the § 940.09 affirmative defense is not 
inconsistent with the contributory negligence rule of 
§ 939.14. 
It 
is 
widely 
recognized 
that 
contributory 
negligence is not a defense in a criminal prosecution.  See 
People v. Tims, 534 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Mich. 1995) (citing 
several cases following this “universal rule”).  Yet, it is 
important to recognize that this rule has a specific legal 
                                                          
 
9  The “dart-out” fact pattern is an illustrative 
example of when the defense could be established through the 
victim’s conduct. However, it is worth noting that the 
affirmative defense would not be applicable simply because a 
victim did not take a precautionary measure, like wearing a 
seat belt.  In such a case, it cannot be said that the 
accident would have been unavoidable, even if the defendant 
was sober and driving with due care.  See State v. Turk, 154 
Wis. 2d 294, 453 N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
11
meaning.  Section 939.14 “makes it clear that the rule 
sometimes prevailing in civil actions to the effect that a 
person injured by wrongful conduct has no standing in court 
if he was in pari delicto or contributorily negligent does 
not apply to criminal actions.” V WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE CRIMINAL CODE, at 9 (quoted in Wis 
JI—Criminal 926 cmt.);
10 see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. 
SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 5.11(c), at 692-93 
(1986).  In other words, § 939.14 provides that a defendant 
is not immune from criminal liability simply because the 
victim may have been negligent as well. 
However, this rule does not mean that evidence of a 
victim’s negligence is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding.  
It was relevant here to the affirmative defense, and it is 
often relevant on the issue of causation.  See, e.g., Tims, 
534 N.W.2d at 681; State v. Crace, 289 N.W.2d 54, 59-60 
(Minn. 1979); see also LaFave & Scott, supra, at 692-93.  In 
fact, we implicitly recognized this in Hart v. State, 75 
Wis. 2d 371, 249 N.W.2d 810 (1977), when we noted the 
general rule that contributory negligence is no defense, but 
                                                          
 
10  During the criminal code revision process of the 
1950’s, the Wisconsin Legislative Council drafted 1953 
Assembly Bill No. 100.  The preceding quotation is taken 
from the comment to proposed § 393.13 of that bill, which 
provided, “It is no defense to a prosecution for a crime 
that the victim also was guilty of a crime or was 
contributorily negligent.”  This proposed section was 
adopted verbatim by the legislature in 1955 Wis. Laws 696, 
and renumbered § 939.14.  Accordingly, the comment to 
proposed § 393.13 is persuasive authority regarding the 
legislature’s intent in enacting § 939.14.  
 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
12
went on to indicate that the victim’s negligence was 
relevant to determining whether the defendant’s intoxicated 
driving was a substantial factor in causing the victim’s 
death.  Id. at 398.  Thus, the contributory negligence rule 
of § 939.14 and the § 940.09 affirmative defense are not 
inconsistent concepts. 
Nevertheless, we recognize that this legal distinction 
is complex.  Accordingly, it would have been better practice 
for the circuit court judge to have given a bridging 
instruction, 
explaining 
the 
relationship 
between 
contributory negligence and the § 940.09(2) affirmative 
defense.  In fact, without a bridging instruction, the 
contributory 
negligence 
instruction 
was 
potentially 
confusing when coupled with Wis JICriminal 1185, 1186, and 
1188.
11   
We nonetheless find that it is not reasonably likely 
that the challenged instructions misled the jury into 
thinking it could not consider the young women’s actions in 
relation to Lohmeier’s affirmative defense, in light of the 
context of the entire proceedings.  Specifically, the jurors 
sat through a four day trial.  Nearly all of the evidence 
presented by Lohmeier related to his affirmative defense.  
                                                          
 
11  As we stated in State v. Dix, 86 Wis. 2d 474, 486, 
273 N.W.2d 250, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898 (1979), “A jury 
should not be required to guess at the meaning of technical 
words . . . .”  86 Wis. 2d at 487.  Accordingly, in part V, 
we recommend that the Criminal Jury Instruction Committee 
adopt a bridging instruction explaining the relationship 
between 
contributory 
negligence and 
the 
§  
940.09(2) 
affirmative defense.  
 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
13
Lohmeier’s attorney emphasized in his opening statement and 
closing 
argument 
that 
the 
accident 
would 
have 
been 
unavoidable even if Lohmeier had not been intoxicated and 
had been driving with due care.  Moreover, Lohmeier’s 
attorney never referred to the young women’s conduct as 
contributory negligence, or even negligence for that matter.  
Furthermore, even the State extensively addressed Lohmeier’s 
affirmative defense in its closing and rebuttal arguments.
12  
The court then instructed the jury.  Initially, the 
court told the jury, “In applying these instructions, keep 
in mind the following:  First, you should consider all 
instructions.  Second, you should consider the instructions 
as a whole and apply them to the evidence.”  (R. 51 at 630; 
see Wis JICriminal 100.)  The court went on to instruct 
the jury twice on Lohmeier’s affirmative defense.  The court 
specifically told the jury two times, “If you are satisfied 
to a reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the 
credible evidence that the death of Stacie Rogers and Renee 
L. Belair would have occurred even if the defendant had been 
exercising due care and had not been under the influence, 
then you must find the defendant not guilty.”
13  (R. 51 at 
634-35, 638-39.)   
                                                          
 
12  
The dissent points to a passing reference in the 
lengthy arguments of the district attorney, wherein he 
mentions the contributory negligence instruction.  His 
closing and rebuttal arguments focused, extensively, on 
Lohmeier’s affirmative defense, not on the instruction. 
 
13   The second time, the court substituted the phrase 
“had not had a prohibited alcohol concentration” for “had 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
14
After all of this, the court instructed the jury, “[I]t 
is no defense to a prosecution for a crime that the victim 
may have been contributorily negligent.” (R. 51 at 639.)  We 
find it is not reasonably likely that the jurors would 
believe this single instruction transformed all of the prior 
proceedings into a “virtual charade.”  See Boyde, 494 U.S. 
at 383 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 
(1987)).  Thus, we conclude that a reasonable likelihood 
does not exist that the contributory negligence instruction, 
in combination with Wis JICriminal 1185, 1186, and 1188, 
misled the jury into believing it could not consider the 
young women’s conduct in regard to Lohmeier’s statutory 
affirmative defense.   
 IV. 
Finally, although we also conclude that a new trial is 
not warranted because it is not reasonably likely that the 
jury was misled, we nonetheless acknowledge that the 
contributory negligence instruction is potentially confusing 
when coupled with Wis JI—Criminal 1185, 1186, and 1188.  
Therefore, we recommend that the Criminal Jury Instruction 
Committee adopt a jury instruction that sets forth the law 
as contained in § 939.14, to the effect that it is no 
defense to a prosecution for a crime that the victim was 
contributorily negligent.  The instruction also should 
contain an explanation of this rule, in particular that it 
                                                                                                                                                                             
not been under the influence of an intoxicant.” (R. 51 at 
638.) 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
15
means the defendant is not immune from criminal liability 
merely because the victim may have been negligent as well.  
See Hart, 75 Wis. 2d at 398.   
In addition, we recommend that the Committee adopt a 
bridging instruction to be given when a court gives a 
contributory 
negligence 
instruction 
along 
with 
Wis 
JICriminal 1188, 1185, and/or 1186.  The instruction 
should explain to the jury that although the victim’s 
contributory negligence is not a defense, the jury may 
consider the acts of the victim in relation to the 
defendant’s § 940.09(2) defense.   
It is further recommended that the Committee in its 
comments caution circuit court judges so that they will not, 
without clear justification, give a contributory negligence 
instruction in a criminal case.  We conclude that these 
instructions 
will 
clarify 
the 
relationship 
between 
contributory 
negligence 
and 
the 
§ 940.09(2) 
defense, 
preventing possible confusion on this issue in future cases.   
 
In summary, we find that in light of the entire 
proceedings, there does not exist a reasonable likelihood 
that the contributory negligence instruction, in combination 
with Wis JI—Criminal 1185, 1186, and 1188, misled the jury 
into thinking it could not consider the young women’s 
conduct in relation to Lohmeier’s statutory affirmative 
defense.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court 
did not, by its instructions to the jury, violate Lohmeier’s 
due process rights by denying him a meaningful opportunity 
 
 
No.  94-2187-CR 
 
 
16
for consideration by the jury of his § 940.09(2) affirmative 
defense.  Nonetheless, we recognize that the contributory 
negligence instruction is potentially confusing when coupled 
with Wis JICriminal 1185, 1186, and 1188.  Thus, we 
recommend that the Criminal Jury Instruction Committee adopt 
a contributory negligence instruction that explains the 
general rule, as well as a bridging instruction detailing 
the relationship between contributory negligence and the 
§ 940.09(2) affirmative defense. 
 
By the Court.The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.    
 
 
94-2187-CR JPG 
 
17
 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   (dissenting).   
I dissent because I believe that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the contributory negligence instruction, in 
combination with Wis. JICriminal 1185 and 1186, misled the 
jury into believing it could not consider the young women's 
conduct in regard to Lohmeier's statutory affirmative 
defense.  I would affirm the court of appeals and hold that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the contributory 
negligence instruction misled the jury, for several reasons. 
First, the defense essentially conceded these elements 
of the charges under Wis. Stat. § 940.09(1)(a) and Wis. 
Stat. § 940.09(1)(b): intoxication, driving, and death.
14  
Therefore, the only real jury question was one of causation.  
The question posed by the affirmative defense instruction 
was whether the victims' deaths would have occurred even if 
the defendant had been exercising due care and was not under 
the influence of intoxicants.  Lohmeier's affirmative 
defense went directly to causation. 
Second, the circuit court never defined the concepts 
"negligence" and "contributory negligence" for the jury.  
The jury was told "In weighing the evidence, you may take 
                                                          
 
14  The jury instruction for Wis JICriminal 1185, 
Homicide by Operation of Vehicle While Under the Influence – 
Sec. 940.09(1)(a) reads in part: "The second element 
requires that the defendant's operation of a vehicle caused 
the death of Stacie Rogers and Renee L. Belair.  'Cause' 
means that the defendant's operation of a vehicle was a 
substantial factor in producing the death.  It is not 
required that the  death was caused by any drinking of 
alcohol or by any negligent or improper operation of the 
 
 
94-2187-CR JPG 
 
18
into account matters of your common knowledge and your 
observations and experiences in the affairs of life."  Wis 
JICriminal 195 Juror's Knowledge.  A layperson's view of 
negligence could be characterized as the careless action of 
a person, including that of a victim. 
Third, 
the 
circuit 
court 
gave 
no 
explanatory 
instruction to the jury to clarify the relationship between 
the affirmative defense instruction and the instruction that 
contributory negligence is not a defense.  Without such an 
explanation, the probability is great that the jurors were 
misled into disregarding Lohmeier's affirmative defense. 
 
Proper jury instruction is a crucial component of the 
fact-finding process.  State v. Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 423, 
426, 307 N.W.2d 151 (1981).  The jury must determine guilt 
or guiltlessness in light of the jury charge, and the 
validity of that determination is dependent upon the 
correctness of the instructions given.  Schulz, 102 Wis. 2d 
at 426-27.  In the Schulz case, the taint of the faulty jury 
instruction was critical because there, intoxication was the 
major, if not the only, defense the defendant had to the 
charge of first-degree murder.  Id. at 431.  The charge 
given was not a standard instruction but emphasized, 
incorrectly, that the defendant had the burden of proof on 
the defense of intoxication.  Id. at 432-33.  We found in 
Schulz that the jury instructions could have reasonably been 
                                                                                                                                                                             
vehicle.  What is required is that the death was caused by 
the defendant's operation of the vehicle." 
 
 
94-2187-CR JPG 
 
19
misunderstood by the jury to place the burden of proof of 
intoxication on the wrong party.  Id. at 435.  Such an error 
violated the defendant's right to a presumption of innocence 
and to have the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt every 
essential element of the crime charged against him.  Id. at 
435-36. 
I agree with the court of appeals that as long as the 
given jury instruction fully and fairly informs the jury of 
the applicable law, the circuit court has discretion in 
choosing which instruction to give.  State v. Lohmeier, 196 
Wis. 2d 432, 441, 538 N.W.2d 821 (Ct. App. 1995). I also 
agree with the majority that we consider jury instructions 
in light of the proceedings as a whole.  But the circuit 
court does not have discretion to give an instruction which 
clouds or even nullifies the applicable law.  And it is 
precisely by looking at the instructions in context that the 
harm to the defendant is demonstrated.  The pertinent 
instructions were given in the following order:   
-1185 Homicide by Operation of Vehicle While Under the 
Influence – Sec. 940.09(1)(a). 
-1186 Homicide by Operation of Vehicle While Blood 
Alcohol Content is 0.10% or More – Sec. 940.09(1)(b).  (Both 
jury instructions 1185 and 1186 described the defendant's 
affirmative defense as set out in Wis JI1188 Homicide by 
Intoxicated User of Vehicle, Firearm, or Airgun: Affirmative 
Defense Under § 940.09(2).) 
 
 
94-2187-CR JPG 
 
20
-A contributory negligence instruction based on Wis. 
Stat. § 939.14.
15  
The 
circuit 
court 
instructed 
the 
jury 
on 
the 
affirmative defense and immediately thereafter instructed 
the jury that contributory negligence of the victims was not 
a defense.  Unfortunately, the judge did not give any 
explanation of the relationship between the contributory 
negligence instruction and Lohmeier's affirmative defense.  
Based partly on sequence, and primarily on the actual 
instruction language, it is reasonably likely that the 
cumulative effect of those instructions was to mislead the 
jurors.  The jurors were misled into believing that the law 
forbade them to consider the acts of the victims, which may 
or may not have legally constituted contributory negligence, 
when they assessed causation. 
In Hart v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 371, 249 N.W.2d 810 
(1977), where the negligence of the victim was undisputed, 
we stated that the question for the jury was whether, 
                                                          
 
15  The majority acknowledges that the Criminal Jury 
Instruction 
Committee 
recommends 
that 
no 
contributory 
negligence instruction be given.  Majority op. at 5, n.5.  
The Committee recognized the very problem present in this 
case: "The rule as stated is an accurate statement of the 
law, but can create problems if literally applied.  That is, 
evidence that may indicate negligence on the part of a 
victim may be relevant to an element of the crime - 
especially the cause element - or to a defense.  In such a 
situation, the evidence is admissible despite § 939.14."  
Wis JICriminal 926 Comment.  Here, of course, the harm to 
Lohmeier arose not from an evidentiary ruling, but from the 
confusing 
juxtaposition 
of 
the 
affirmative 
defense 
instructions with the instruction precluding contributory 
negligence as a defense. 
 
 
 
94-2187-CR JPG 
 
21
considering the negligence of the victim along with the 
other circumstances of the case, the negligence of the 
defendant was nevertheless an operative factor having a 
substantial effect in producing the victim's death.  Hart, 
75 Wis. 2d at 399.  The circuit court below could have said 
as much in its instructions, but did not. 
The very essence of Lohmeier's defense was that it was 
not his intoxication, but the victims' carelessness in 
walking in or stepping out into the roadway that was the 
cause of the accident.  As Lohmeier's counsel told the 
circuit court at the instructions conference, 
"[T]his is not a matter where we are attempting to 
establish contributory negligence as a defense.  
What we are saying is that the intervening fact is 
this movement of the girls.  My problem with the 
instruction is that the legislature gives us the 
defense (in Wis. Stat. § 940.09(2)) and then if 
you 
give 
that 
(contributory 
negligence) 
instruction you are in essence telling the jury, 
don't listen to what the Defense has presented." 
 
Mr. Lohmeier’s defense did not hinge on whether the girls' 
actions legally constituted contributory negligence, but 
rather asserted that their movement onto the roadway was an 
intervening event. 
The record demonstrates that the circuit court itself 
had doubts as to the clarity of the instructions proposed.
16  
                                                          
 
16  At the instruction conference the court commented on 
the proposed contributory negligence instruction, "I don't 
see how you can say that it couldn't be something that the 
victim did.  I don't know.  I mean that argument could be 
made, but I'm not sure I want to inject that in there."  
Later, "Because I just don't think – I don't think that 
this defense was suppose[d] to come up, at least I don’t 
think so anyway.  
It's 
not clear 
to 
just 
general 
contributory negligence of a victim.  If that would apply, 
 
 
94-2187-CR JPG 
 
22
Lohmeier argued at the instructions conference that the two 
statutes, and the instructions based on them, were not 
consistent.  The circuit court eventually agreed to give the 
contributory negligence instruction after the affirmative 
defense 
instructions, 
because 
the 
affirmative 
defense 
concerned causation: 
"I don't really see any error in giving this 
instruction we are talking about because we are 
not talking about negligence or contributory 
negligence, we are talking about cause, nothing to 
do with negligence.  So what has to be established 
is this independent.  You can argue your cause and 
even if the Court gives this instruction because 
it releases what I fear to be a problem in 
assessing the jury, assessing relative wrong here 
which is not their duty or function, not at all.  
They must be satisfied that there was some type of 
cause that excuses responsibility for drinking and 
causing death.  Those are given facts when you 
give an affirmative defense and may not take 
simple contributory negligence of a victim.  What 
they have to have is an intervening cause and I 
think you can argue to that very simply your 
theories about movement without talking about 
contributory negligence or being in any way 
deterred by that.  So I think I will give this 
instruction.  
 
Despite 
the 
circuit 
court's 
recognition 
of 
inconsistency, it failed to instruct the jury that the 
independent causation defense was not a question of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
then that would apply if a drunk driver went off the road 
and the other driver was going over the speed limit.  I 
don't think that would apply." 
After further discussion with counsel the court said, 
"I really have no doubt that this would be appropriate other 
than the little specter of a doubt that I have that it's a 
possibility it could be inconsistent with a defense and the 
use of the wording in Caibaiosai that says the intervening 
fact 
may 
be 
independent 
or 
it 
may 
be 
dependent."  
Additionally, "I think the cautious thing would be quitely 
(sic) frankly to not give the instruction and let the 
attorneys argue it.  I think you can argue it."  
 
 
94-2187-CR JPG 
 
23
contributory 
negligence. 
 
Although 
Lohmeier's 
counsel 
objected to the contributory negligence instruction, neither 
counsel offered an explanatory, or bridging, instruction to 
resolve the inconsistency.  The jury was left on its own to 
sort out these undefined legal terms. 
Argument of counsel further clouded the relationship 
between 
the 
affirmative 
defense 
and 
the 
contributory 
negligence instruction.  The majority notes that Lohmeier's 
attorney never referred to the young women's conduct as 
contributory negligence. Majority op. at 12.  However, the  
district 
attorney's 
closing 
argument 
included 
these 
statements: 
Well I guess something that might come to mind is, 
well, hold it, this is a real world Mr. Koss and 
we have got girls walking the wrong way on the 
highway.  I imagine everybody knows you don't do 
that.  I agree, but first there's an instruction 
that says you are not to consider contributory 
negligence of a victim.  It's not a defense.  
That's by law in Wisconsin.  Moreover, and this is 
crucial, walking facing traffic or not facing 
traffic, that law is not for the benefit of the 
driver.  That law is not for the benefit of the 
driver." 
 
In sum, the circuit court gave the contributory 
negligence instruction without a proper explanation of the 
relationship between that instruction and the instruction 
regarding the affirmative defense.  Because I conclude that 
such an omission was erroneous, and created a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury was misled into disregarding 
Lohmeier's affirmative defense, I respectfully dissent.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
The circuit court ultimately gave the contributory 
negligence instruction.   
 
 
94-2187-CR JPG 
 
24
Lohmeier should be granted a new trial.  "It may well be 
that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged against 
him, but he is entitled to a fair trial according to the 
established rules of procedure and principles of law."  
Boldt v. State, 72 Wis. 7, 17, 38 N.W. 177 (1888), cited in 
Hart v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 371, 395, 249 N.W.2d 810 
(1977)(footnote omitted). 
 
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice 
Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice William A. Bablitch join 
this dissenting opinion.  
 
 
94-2187-CR JPG 
 
25
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.:  
94-2187-CR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case:  
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
George C. Lohmeier, 
 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  196 Wis. 2d 432, 538 N.W.2d 821  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed:  
November 29, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
September 10, 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
James L. Carlson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTICES:  
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
GESKE, J. dissents, opinion filed 
 
 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BABLITCH, J.,  
 
 
 
 
join 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the 
cause was argued by William C. Wolford, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney 
general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Dennis 
P. Coffey and Coffey, Coffey & Geraghty, Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Dennis P. Coffey. 
 
 
 
94-2187-CR JPG 
 
26
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Edward F. Thompson, James P. 
Martin and Clair Law Offices, S.C., Delavan for Rosanne 
Belair, The Victim's Mother.