Case Title: State v. Shawn D. Schulpius

Citation: 2006 WI 1

Docket Number: 2002AP001056

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 1 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2002AP1056 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Shawn D. Schulpius: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Shawn D. Schulpius,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 39 
Reported at:  270 Wis. 2d 427, 678 N.W.2d 369 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 10, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 28, 2004 and October 6, 2005 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
John J. Di Motto   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Ellen Henak, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Warren D. Weinstein, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William J. Domina and 
John Jorgensen, Milwaukee, on behalf of Milwaukee County 
Corporation Counsel. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Nicholas L. Chiarkas, 
Marla J. Stephens, and Kellie M. Krake, Madison, on behalf of 
the Office of the State Public Defender. 
 
 
2
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips, 
Evan N. Claditis and Prentice & Phillips LLP, Milwaukee, on 
behalf of Wisconsin Counties Association. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Neil Gebhart, Madison, 
on behalf of Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, 
and there was oral argument by Diane Welsh. 
 
 
2006 WI 1
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2002AP1056  
(L.C. No. 
95CF954690) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Shawn D. Schulpius: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
 
Shawn D. Schulpius, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JAN 10, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Petitioner Shawn D. Schulpius 
(Schulpius) appeals from a published decision of the court of 
appeals, 
affirming 
a 
circuit 
court 
order 
which 
denied 
Schulpius's motion to enforce a previous circuit court order 
directing that he be placed on supervised release.1  We address 
three principal issues on appeal.  First, is Schulpius entitled 
to outright release from his Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (2003-04) 
commitment because the Department of Health and Family Services 
(DHFS), in conjunction with Milwaukee County, was unable to 
                                                 
1 State v. Schulpius, 2004 WI App 39, 270 Wis. 2d 427, 678 
N.W.2d 369. 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
2 
 
place him in an appropriate location for the period between the 
initial supervised release determination and the circuit court's 
ultimate determination that Schulpius is too dangerous for such 
placement?  Second, in light of our decision in State v. 
Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316, 595 N.W.2d 692 (1999), should this 
court issue an order directing the DHFS to create an appropriate 
residential facility or dwelling in Milwaukee County for persons 
presently authorized for supervised release?  Finally, is 
Schulpius or another individual committed under Chapter 980 
(2003-04), who is authorized for supervised release but not yet 
expeditiously placed, entitled to seek a remedy such as monetary 
damages?  
¶2 
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  We 
conclude that the November 2000 order granting the State of 
Wisconsin's (State's) motion for reconsideration, and finding 
Schulpius not appropriate for supervised release, was a valid, 
final, appealable order, and therefore, he is not entitled to 
outright release from his Chapter 980 commitment. Even though 
Schulpius's appeal is moot, we determine that the issues should 
be considered.   We determine that State v. Morford, 2004 WI 5, 
268 Wis. 2d 300, 674 N.W.2d 349, is inapplicable to this case, 
as Schulpius never appealed from, and therefore waived any 
objection to, the November 2000 order granting the State's 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) 
(1999-2000)2 
motion 
to 
reconsider 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
3 
 
supervised release.  We do conclude, however, that there was a 
procedural due process violation.  We also conclude that our 
decision in Sprosty is still valid, and allows a circuit court 
to order the DHFS to create an appropriate residential facility 
or dwelling to accommodate a Chapter 980 order for supervised 
release.  However, for two reasons, we conclude that issuing 
such an order is unnecessary in this case.  Such a residential 
facility or dwelling for supervised release would be meaningless 
for Schulpius at this time, as he was determined to be 
inappropriate for supervised release in November 2000, and that 
determination has not been changed.  Second, we are satisfied 
that the DHFS has made substantial attempts to establish a 
residential facility or dwelling that would enable individuals 
committed under Chapter 980 to be placed on supervised release 
in Milwaukee County.  Finally, because the order of November 
2000 declaring Schulpius inappropriate for supervised release 
remains valid, even though there was a procedural due process 
violation, we decline to determine what remedy, if any, 
Schulpius would be entitled to seek.  We further decline to 
address what might be an appropriate remedy for another 
individual, committed under Chapter 980 who, under different 
circumstances, has been authorized for supervised release but 
not yet expeditiously placed. 
I 
¶3 
Because this case is procedurally convoluted, we set 
forth an abbreviated version of the facts relevant to render a 
decision.  A more complete discussion of the facts and 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
4 
 
procedural history can be found in the court of appeals' 
decision.  See State v. Schulpius, 2004 WI App 39, ¶¶3-32, 270 
Wis. 2d. 427, 678 N.W.2d 369. 
¶4 
In December 1991 Schulpius, one week shy of his 18th 
birthday, pled guilty to, and was convicted of, first-degree 
sexual assault of a four-year-old boy for whom he had been 
babysitting.  He was sentenced as an adult to an indeterminate 
term of not more than five years in the Wisconsin prison system.   
¶5 
At the time of his conviction in 1991, Schulpius 
already had a long history of sexually assaulting minors.  
"Schulpius's 
'first 
group 
of 
sex 
offenses' 
started 
when 
Schulpius was fourteen," when he began molesting his six-year-
old step-sister.  Id., ¶4.  As a result of the assaults, 
"Schulpius 
was 
placed 
at 
a 
mental-health 
facility" 
for 
approximately three months, where he received individual therapy 
treatment.  Id.  However, six months later, "Schulpius 'began 
re-assaulting his step-sister. . . .'"  Id.  During this period, 
Schulpius also assaulted his one-year-old half-brother.  Id.   
¶6 
"When Schulpius was fifteen, he began assaulting girls 
in his neighborhood and, also, one of his biological sisters, 
who was then approximately eleven or twelve [years old].  He 
also resumed sexually assaulting his younger step-sister."  Id., 
¶6.  He was sent to another treatment facility.   At age 17, 
Schulpius left the treatment facility and entered a group home.  
Id.  "When he lost one of his two part-time jobs, he 'offered to 
babysit for a woman friend's young son.'  The child was the 
four-year-old boy whom Schulpius assaulted in the waiver-to-
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
5 
 
adult-court case that ultimately resulted in his imprisonment. . 
. ."  Id.  
¶7 
In 1995 the State filed a Chapter 980 petition just 
prior 
to 
Schulpius's 
scheduled 
release 
from 
prison, 
and 
Schulpius was adjudicated a sexually violent person.  Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, Judge John Franke, committed Schulpius to 
a secure mental facility, unless the DHFS determined that there 
was an appropriate community facility to house him. 
¶8 
On July 15, 1997, Judge Franke entered an order, nunc 
pro tunc to July 31, 1996, directing that Schulpius be placed on 
supervised release pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(c)-
(d)(1995-96).  However, the DHFS was unable to place Schulpius 
on supervised release due to the lack of appropriate facilities 
in Milwaukee County.  Despite numerous court orders directing 
the DHFS, in conjunction with Milwaukee County, to prepare an 
appropriate plan for Schulpius’s supervised release, and several 
unsuccessful attempts to place Schulpius in Milwaukee County, or 
in another Wisconsin county, such as Pepin, Schulpius remained 
in secure custody at the Wisconsin Resource Center.   
¶9 
On October 27, 1999, the circuit court entered an 
order declaring that Chapter 980 was being unconstitutionally 
applied to Schulpius.  The order directed that Schulpius be 
released from secure custody and placed on supervised release.  
In response, the State filed a motion for reconsideration under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  On November 29, 2000, Judge Franke 
granted the State’s motion for reconsideration and determined 
that Schulpius was no longer appropriate for supervised release.   
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
6 
 
¶10 After the November 2000 decision to revoke the order 
for supervised release, Judge Franke "was succeeded by the 
Honorable John J. DiMotto, pursuant to the rotation-of-judges 
plan in Milwaukee County."  Schulpius, 270 Wis. 2d 427, ¶29. 
¶11 On November 26, 2001, Schulpius moved to enforce the 
circuit court's order of October 27, 1999, and for a final order 
releasing him from secure custody.   On January 17, 2002, the 
circuit court denied Schulpius’s motion to enforce its October 
27, 1999 order.  Schulpius appealed this decision to the court 
of appeals.   
¶12 On appeal, Schulpius argued that he had been denied 
both procedural and substantive due process because the DHFS had 
failed to place him on supervised release when so ordered.  Id., 
¶33.  The court of appeals, in a majority opinion authored by 
Judge Ralph Adam Fine, rejected Schulpius’s substantive and 
procedural due process claims.  Id., ¶¶34, 40.  In rejecting 
Schulpius’s substantive due process argument, the court of 
appeals reasoned that substantive due process is violated only 
in the most egregious and outrageous of circumstances, and that 
this case did not involve such circumstances.  Id., ¶¶37-40.  
The court further concluded that the DHFS had acted in good 
faith in attempting to find an appropriate facility in the 
community in which to place Schulpius.  Id., ¶38.  Finally, the 
court of appeals determined that although Schulpius remained 
confined in violation of the circuit court’s order for more than 
four years, such confinement was ultimately justified under a 
balancing test, where the potential harm to society that 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
7 
 
Schulpius’s 
release 
might 
cause 
was 
weighed 
against 
the 
potential benefits that might flow from the cessation of 
Schulpius’s confinement in a secure facility.  Id., ¶42. 
¶13 In his dissent, court of appeals Judge Charles B. 
Schudson concluded that Schulpius’s substantive due process 
rights had indeed been violated by "more than four years of 
unlawful 
confinement. . 
. 
."  
Id., 
¶49 
(Schudson, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis in original).  As a remedy, Judge Schudson 
suggested that Schulpius be ordered to supervised release.  Id., 
¶63.  He reasoned that the status quo was unacceptable, and that 
anything short of supervised release would create future 
disincentives for officials to comply with court orders and 
would create overcrowded institutions, which would eventually 
lead to the abandonment of Chapter 980 as a viable means to deal 
with sexual predators.  Id., ¶64.   
¶14 Schulpius appealed the decision of the court of 
appeals, and this court granted his petition for review on April 
20, 2004.  
II 
¶15 Although we "generally decline to decide moot issues . 
. ." under certain circumstances we may choose to do so.  
Morford, 268 Wis. 2d 300, ¶7 (citing In re John Doe Proceeding, 
2003 WI 30, ¶19, 260 Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260).  This court 
has determined that it may decide otherwise moot issues if they 
meet at least one of four exceptions to the mootness rule, that 
is if the issue:  
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
8 
 
(1) is of great public importance; (2) occurs so 
frequently that a definitive decision is necessary to 
guide circuit courts; (3) is likely to arise again and 
a decision of the court would alleviate uncertainty; 
or (4) will likely be repeated, but evades appellate 
review because the appellate review process cannot be 
completed or even undertaken in time to have a 
practical effect on the parties.  
Id.  
¶16 The issues before us satisfy at least two of the four 
exceptions to the mootness rule.  First, this case is of great 
public importance, as it "implicates both the safety of the 
public and the rights of the detained individual."  Id., ¶9.  
Second, the issues presented "recur[] with some frequency."  
Id., ¶10.  As we noted in our November 9, 2004 order in this 
case, the DHFS has repeatedly failed to place individuals 
committed under Chapter 980 on supervised release in Milwaukee 
County when so ordered by a Milwaukee County Circuit Court.    
Because we determine that the issues raised in this appeal 
satisfy exceptions to the mootness rule, we will address them.  
Id., ¶12.   
¶17 Schulpius's assertion that the state's inability to 
place him on supervised release deprived him of both substantive 
and procedural due process, presents issues of law that we 
analyze de novo.  See State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 301, 541 
N.W.2d 115 (1995). 
III 
¶18 The first issue we consider is whether Schulpius is 
entitled to outright release from his Chapter 980 commitment, 
because the DHFS, in conjunction with Milwaukee County, was 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
9 
 
unable to place him in an appropriate residential facility or 
dwelling for the period between the initial supervised release 
determination and the circuit court's ultimate determination 
that he was and is too dangerous for such placement.  It is 
necessary, in order to resolve the issue of outright release, to 
address his claims of constitutional and statutory violations. 
¶19 We agree with the court of appeals that Schulpius is 
not entitled to outright release.  We also affirm the court of 
appeals' determination that Schulpius is not entitled to his 
alternate request for immediate release from secure custody.  
Moreover, we conclude that the November 2000 order, whereby the 
circuit court revoked its previous order for supervised release, 
was a valid, final, and appealable order.3   
¶20 The procedure surrounding the November 2000 order 
merits further explanation.  As discussed above, on October 27, 
1999, the circuit court held that Chapter 980 was being 
unconstitutionally applied to Schulpius, and it ordered that he 
be released from secure custody.  Thereafter, the State filed a 
motion for reconsideration in the circuit court, and also 
"petitioned the court of appeals for permission to appeal a 
                                                 
3 On this matter, we disagree with the court of appeals.  In 
a footnote, the court of appeals addressed several issues raised 
by the parties that it considered to be "peripheral," including 
whether the November 2000 order was a final order.  Schulpius, 
270 Wis. 2d 427, ¶33 n.8.  The court of appeals concluded that 
the November order was not, on its face, a "final order" in that 
it contemplated entry of a reifying order when it was issued.  
Id.  We address the issue more fully in our discussion at ¶¶23-
26. 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
10 
 
nonfinal order. . . ."  State v. Schulpius, 2001 WI 69, ¶4, 244 
Wis. 2d 401, 628 N.W.2d 349 (citation omitted).  The court of 
appeals granted the State's petition, after which Schulpius 
petitioned this court to bypass the court of appeals.  Id.  
Schulpius's motion was granted, and oral argument was scheduled 
for December 1, 2000.   
¶21 On November 29, 2000, the circuit court "granted the 
State's motion for reconsideration, determined that Schulpius 
was no longer suitable for supervised release, and ordered him 
committed to the Wisconsin Resource Center."  Id., ¶5.   In 
response, the "State filed a notice of voluntary dismissal in 
this court on November 30, 2000, and Schulpius responded with a 
motion for order rejecting notice of voluntary dismissal."  Id.   
¶22 This court held oral argument on December 1, 2000, and 
after receiving supplemental briefing, the court was equally 
divided on whether to accept the State's notice of voluntary 
dismissal.  Id., ¶8.  Therefore, this court denied both 
Schulpius's motion for an order rejecting the notice and the 
State's notice for voluntary dismissal.  This court then vacated 
its decision to grant bypass, and remanded the cause back to the 
court of appeals for determination of further proceedings.  Id., 
¶9.   
¶23 Schulpius never appealed the November 29, 2000 order 
based on the State's motion for reconsideration under Wis. Stat. 
§ 807.06(1)(h).4  Rather, on November 26, 2001, Schulpius filed a 
                                                 
4 The November 2000 order was somewhat confusing in the 
concluding paragraph, which stated:   
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
11 
 
motion to enforce the circuit court's decision and order of 
October 27, 1999, and for a final order to release Schulpius 
from the physical custody of the DHFS.  Schulpius, 270 Wis. 2d 
427, ¶32.   
¶24 In February 2004 this court decided Morford which held 
that when an individual committed under Chapter 980 is awaiting 
supervised release, the appropriate mechanism to revoke that 
supervised 
release 
is 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(6m), 
rather 
than 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  Morford, 268 Wis. 2d 300, ¶5. 
¶25 Based on Morford, Schulpius now maintains that the 
November 2000 order revoking the earlier order for supervised 
                                                                                                                                                             
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby ordered 
that the state's motion for reconsideration is granted 
and that the order for supervised release is vacated.  
It 
is 
further 
ordered 
that 
Shawn 
Schulpius 
be 
committed to institutional care pursuant to section 
980.06, still subject, however, to the decision and 
order requiring release entered in this case on 
October 27, 1999.  As required by SCR 70.15, a form 
order for such commitment will be separately entered.  
Therefore, although the order determined that Schulpius was 
no longer suitable for supervised release and ordered him 
committed to secure custody, someone could interpret the circuit 
court order as also reaffirming its earlier order that Schulpius 
be placed on supervised release.  Schulpius, 270 Wis. 2d 427, 
¶28.   
The two parts of the order seem somewhat inconsistent.  
However, we conclude that the purpose of the November 2000 order 
was unquestionably to vacate the earlier order for supervised 
release, and to commit Schulpius to institutional care, despite 
the reference to the earlier order.  This position is confirmed 
in Judge Franke's letter to the parties of December 1, 2000, 
indicating that no further order was necessary because Schulpius 
was already in secure custody. 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
12 
 
release was invalid, as it was brought and decided under the 
wrong statute.  It is Schulpius's position that because the 
order was invalid, he remains on supervised release.  Further, 
Schulpius argues that the November 2000 order was not a final 
order and therefore not appealable.  He maintains that he did 
appeal the only appropriate final order, that of November 2001. 
¶26 We disagree with Schulpius's characterization of the 
November 2000 order.  Even though the circuit court did not 
initially characterize it as a final order, it was clear that 
the November 2000 order was intended to resolve all litigation 
then pending between the parties, and the circuit court so 
indicated in a letter to the parties on December 1, 2000, 
stating that it would not enter any further order.5  As we 
explained in Harder v. Pfitzinger: 
We conclude that when an order or a judgment is 
entered that disposes of all of the substantive issues 
in the litigation, as to one or more parties, as a 
matter of law, the circuit court intended it to be the 
final document for purposes of appeal, notwithstanding 
the label it bears or subsequent actions taken by the 
circuit court. 
Harder v. Pfitzinger, 2004 WI 102, ¶2, 274 Wis. 2d 324, 682 
N.W.2d 398.  Therefore, when Schulpius failed to appeal timely 
from the November 2000 order, he waived his right to challenge 
the validity of that order.  We also agree with the court of 
                                                 
5 Apparently, the circuit court contemplated the use of a 
form, but the court determined that form CR-263 was not 
appropriate to the case and could not be modified.  Therefore, 
on December 1, 2000, the court contacted the parties indicating 
that the use of the form was not necessary.   
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
13 
 
appeals' majority that Morford is inapplicable in this case for 
another reason related to waiver.  See Schulpius, 270 Wis. 2d 
427, ¶33 n.8.  In the court of appeals, Schulpius did not 
challenge Judge Franke's determination that he was not suitable 
for supervised release; thus that issue is also waived. See also 
Pub. Serv. Employees' Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Bd., 246 Wis. 190, 199, 16 N.W.2d 823 (1944) (Under the well-
established rule, questions not argued will not be considered or 
decided) (citing Fisher v. Herrmann, 118 Wis. 424, 95 N.W. 392 
(1903); Kipp v. Laun, 146 Wis. 591, 131 N.W. 418 (1911)). 
¶27 Schulpius additionally asks this court to decide 
whether or not Morford should be applied retroactively.  Because 
we conclude that Schulpius waived his Morford objection by his 
failure to appeal from the November 2000 order, and also 
because, when before the court of appeals, he failed to 
challenge Judge Franke's November 2000 determination that on 
November 29 he was not suitable for supervised release, we need 
not address the issue of retroactivity.6  
                                                 
6 Schulpius urges this court to overrule its decision in 
Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 280 N.W.2d 757 
(1979), and adopt the rule of Harper v. Virginia Department of 
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993) on the retroactive application of a 
new rule of law.  We decline to do so here.  However, even if 
this court were to adopt the rule of Harper on retroactivity, we 
do not believe it would impact on this case.  Harper held that 
when the United States Supreme Court: 
applies a rule of federal law to the parties before 
it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of 
federal law and must be given full retroactive effect 
in all cases still open on direct review and as to all 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
14 
 
¶28 As noted previously, because Schulpius continues to be 
considered a sexually violent person and inappropriate for 
supervised 
release, 
the 
issues 
he 
has 
raised 
are 
moot.  
Nevertheless, we feel it is appropriate to address Schulpius's 
claims of constitutional and statutory violations for the 
reasons previously stated.   
¶29 Schulpius maintains that his continued detention in 
spite of a court order for supervised release violates both the 
substantive and procedural due process guarantees of the United 
States and Wisconsin Constitutions.7  Schulpius argues that his 
continued detention in secure custody, after numerous circuit 
court orders for supervised release, shocks the conscience.  He 
claims that because the state failed to take reasonable steps to 
provide 
Schulpius 
with 
an 
appropriate 
supervised 
release 
placement, and did nothing about his confinement in a secure 
facility, his substantive due process rights were violated.   
                                                                                                                                                             
events, regardless of whether such events predate or 
postdate our announcement of the rule. 
Id. at 97.  Because Schulpius failed to appeal the 
November, 2000 order within 90 days of entry of the order, as 
per Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1), Schulpius's case was not open on 
direct review at the time of this court's decision in Morford.  
7 Because "[w]e have determined that the due process clauses 
of Article I, § 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution are 
substantially equivalent," we generally interpret the state and 
federal constitutional provisions consistently with each other.  
See In re Paternity of John R.B., 2005 WI 6, ¶18, 277 Wis. 2d 
378, 690 N.W.2d 849 (footnotes omitted).    
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
15 
 
¶30 In addition, Schulpius argues that his continued 
detention violates procedural due process.  Schulpius maintains 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. § 980.08(6m) 
creates 
an 
expectation 
of 
supervised release.  Therefore, once a court grants a petition 
for 
supervised 
release 
under 
Chapter 
980, 
the 
committed 
individual has a clear legal entitlement to the preparation of a 
plan concerning treatment and services and a timely placement on 
supervised release, despite inadequate state or local resources.  
Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316.  Schulpius's position is that 
confining him in a secure facility for more than four years, 
when he was entitled to such relief, violated the procedures 
that were due him under Chapter 980. In other words, he contends 
Chapter 980 was unconstitutionally applied to him.   
¶31 The State maintains that Schulpius has failed to 
establish either a substantive or a procedural due process 
violation.  It is the State's position that Schulpius's 
substantive due process claim fails because denying a "least 
restrictive" 
placement 
is 
not 
contrary 
to 
society's 
understanding of ordered liberty.  Sacramento County v. Lewis, 
523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998).  In State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶66, 
254 Wis. 2d 215, 647 N.W.2d 762, this court recognized that the 
discussion in State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 313, 541 N.W.2d 
115 (1995), regarding the "least restrictive environment" did 
not 
make 
supervised 
release 
indispensable 
to 
the 
constitutionality of Chapter 980.  Rather, this court determined 
in Rachel that the statute is constitutional because confinement 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
16 
 
is directly linked to an individual's dangerousness.  Rachel, 
254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶¶65-66.   
¶32 We have consistently held that civil commitment under 
Chapter 980 "constitutes a deprivation of liberty that is 
subject to due process protection."  Id., ¶61.  We base this 
position on the well established tenet that "[f]reedom from 
physical restraint is a fundamental right protected by the due 
process clause from wrongful, arbitrary governmental action."  
Id. (citations omitted).   
¶33 The 
due 
process 
clause 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution creates a substantive protection from certain 
arbitrary, wrongful government actions.  Zinermon v. Burch, 494 
U.S. 113, 125 (1990).  The test to determine if the state 
conduct complained of violates substantive due process is if the 
conduct "'shocks the conscience . . . or interferes with rights 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"  State v. Joseph 
E.G., 2001 WI App 29, ¶13, 240 Wis. 2d 481, 623 N.W.2d 137.  In 
addition, when analyzing a substantive due process violation 
claim, we also consider "whether the government officer's 
conduct was either a 'deliberate decision[]' to 'deprive' 
Schulpius of his liberty interest, or reflected the officer's 
'deliberate indifference' to that liberty interest. . . ."  
Schulpius, 270 Wis. 2d 427, ¶37 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849-
50). 
¶34 We agree with the court of appeals that there is 
nothing in the evidentiary record that would lead us to conclude 
that the failure to place Schulpius on supervised release, as 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
17 
 
ordered by the circuit court, "was the result of anything but 
good-faith efforts that did not succeed because of things beyond 
the control of those to whom the court orders were directed. . . 
." Id., ¶38.   
¶35 We are satisfied that the DHFS made substantial 
attempts to ensure that Schulpius would be placed on supervised 
release.  It followed court orders to draw up placement plans 
and contact other counties in search of an appropriate facility.  
The fact that the DHFS's efforts were ultimately unsuccessful 
cannot be characterized as either an intentional or conscious 
disregard 
of 
Schulpius's 
constitutional 
rights. 
When 
one 
considers "Schulpius's horrendous history of predatory sexual 
violence against children," the DHFS's inability to find an 
appropriate community placement for Schulpius clearly falls 
short of the level of a substantive due process violation.  Id., 
¶40.8    
¶36 We conclude that the failure to place Schulpius on 
supervised release, during the period between the initial 
supervised 
release 
determination 
and 
the 
circuit 
court's 
ultimate determination that Schulpius was too dangerous for such 
placement, does not shock the conscience.  Therefore, Schulpius 
endured no substantive due process violation.   
                                                 
8 Furthermore, we note that the United States Supreme Court 
has twice upheld the constitutionality of a civil commitment 
scheme for sexually violent individuals that did not include a 
provision for supervised release.  Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 
(2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).   
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
18 
 
¶37 The 
State 
further 
maintains 
that 
Schulpius's 
procedural due process rights were not violated, as he was 
provided all the required procedures under Chapter 980.  The 
fact that Schulpius did not receive supervised release is not 
the result of any procedural failing, according to the State, as 
all the procedural safeguards in Chapter 980 were rigorously 
applied in this case.   
¶38 We disagree with the State and with the court of 
appeals 
that 
the 
state's 
failure 
to 
place 
Schulpius 
on 
supervised release after being so ordered by the circuit court 
did not constitute a procedural failing.  In determining the 
nature and extent of the process due, we balance the private 
interest that will be affected, the government's interest, and 
"the risk of an erroneous deprivation of those interests through 
the procedures used."  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 
(1976).  Although the state has a compelling interest in 
protecting the public from sexually violent persons,9 the private 
interests at stake, freedom from physical restraint,10 is equally 
critical.  The risk of erroneous deprivation of an individual's 
liberty is unacceptably heightened by the state's failure to 
abide by procedures established to ensure the preservation of 
fundamental rights.  
                                                 
9 State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 330, 541 N.W.2d 115 
(1995). 
10 See State v. Rachel, 2002 WI 81, ¶61, 254 Wis. 2d 215, 
647 N.W.2d 762 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 
(1992)). 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
19 
 
¶39 We 
therefore 
conclude 
that 
Schulpius's 
continued 
placement in secure confinement for an extended period after the 
circuit court had repeatedly ordered he be placed on supervised 
release, violated his right to procedural due process.  However, 
release, either outright or supervised, is not an appropriate 
remedy for Schulpius at this time, where his substantive due 
process rights were not violated, but where there was a 
violation of procedural due process.  As we explained in State 
ex rel. Marberry v. Macht:  
Release of a ch. 980 patient whose dangerousness or 
mental disorder has not abated serves neither to 
protect the public nor provide care and treatment for 
the patient.  Accordingly, release is not only 
inappropriate, it is not justifiable under the dual 
purposes of the statute: protection of the public from 
sexually violent persons likely to reoffend and care 
and treatment of the patient.   
State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, ¶30, 262 Wis. 2d 
720, 665 N.W.2d 155 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
¶40 We agree with the court of appeals that outright 
release would certainly not appear to be an appropriate remedy 
for a violation of the procedural due process rights of an 
individual committed under Chapter 980 who has been deemed 
sexually violent and inappropriate for even supervised release.  
As the court of appeals noted in regard to Schulpius: 
[A]ny judicial decision that puts the community at 
risk because of what agents of government may have 
done or not done must balance the "potential injury" 
to 
society's 
interests 
against 
the 
"potential 
benefits" that would flow from any rule designed to 
deter future conduct by those agents, even where . . . 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
20 
 
those agents might have violated rules designed to 
protect constitutional rights.   
Schulpius, 270 Wis. 2d 427, ¶42 (citing United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348-49 (1974)).  See also State v. 
Beyer, 2006 WI 2, ¶50, ___ Wis. 2d. ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 
("Discharge is not an appropriate remedy for a sexually violent 
person who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental 
disorder that makes it likely that he or she will engage in acts 
of sexual violence.").   
IV 
¶41 We turn next to the second principal issue on appeal.  
Should this court, in light of this court's decision in Sprosty, 
issue an order directing the DHFS to create an appropriate 
residential facility or dwelling in Milwaukee County for persons 
presently authorized for supervised release?   
¶42 In Sprosty, this court determined that a circuit court 
has the authority under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5) to order the DHFS 
to create appropriate services and facilities to accommodate an 
order for supervised release, and that the DHFS has the 
financial burden of paying for such programs and facilities in 
accord with Wis. Stat. § 980.12.11  Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316 at 
                                                 
11 The current version of Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5) states, in 
relevant part:   
If the court finds that the person is appropriate for 
supervised 
release, 
the 
court 
shall 
notify 
the 
department.  The department shall make its best effort 
to 
arrange 
for 
placement 
of 
the 
person 
in 
a 
residential facility or dwelling that is in the 
person's county of residence, as determined by the 
department under s. 980.105.  The department and the 
county department under s. 51.42 in the county of 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
21 
 
320, 336-37.  In Sprosty, this court stated that "a circuit 
court has the authority under Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5) to order a 
county, through DHFS, to create whatever programs or facilities 
are necessary to accommodate an order for supervised release."  
Id. at 331.  That language is not inconsistent with our holding 
here, as it is the county's responsibility to work with the DHFS 
to prepare a plan that identifies treatment and services that an 
individual on supervised release will receive in the community.  
See Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5). 
¶43 We conclude that the Sprosty decision is still valid, 
and enables a circuit court to fashion a remedy in an 
appropriate situation.  However, we determine that issuing such 
an 
order 
is 
inappropriate 
at 
this 
time, 
under 
these 
circumstances.  Such a facility for supervised release would be 
meaningless for Schulpius at this time, as he was determined to 
be inappropriate for supervised release in November 2000, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
residence of the person shall prepare a plan that 
identifies the treatment and services, if any, that 
the person will receive in the community.  The plan 
shall 
address 
the 
person's 
need, 
if 
any, 
for 
supervision, counseling, medication, community support 
services, residential services, vocational services, 
and alcohol or other drug abuse treatment. 
Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5)(2003-04). 
The current version of Wis. Stat. § 980.12 provides, in 
relevant part:  "Except as provided in ss. 980.03(4) and 
980.08(3), the department shall pay from the appropriations 
under s. 20.435(2)(a) and (bm) for all costs relating to the 
evaluation, treatment and care of persons evaluated or committed 
under this chapter."  Wis. Stat. § 980.12(1) (2003-04). 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
22 
 
that determination has not been changed.  In addition, we are 
satisfied that the DHFS has made substantial attempts to 
establish a residential facility or dwelling that would enable 
individuals committed under Chapter 980, such as Schulpius, to 
be placed on supervised release in Milwaukee County.   
¶44 As we stated in our order of November 9, 2004, in this 
case, "the repeated failure of the DHFS to place Chapter 980 
committees on supervised release in Milwaukee County when so 
ordered raises serious constitutional and rule of law issues. . 
. ."  However, we find encouragement in the efforts undertaken 
by the DHFS to resolve this issue and, hopefully, prevent it 
from recurring.  
¶45 The record includes examples of the DHFS attempting to 
address and correct the problem of placing individuals deemed 
appropriate for supervised release in appropriate community 
facilities.  As we noted earlier, the DHFS's efforts have 
included the preparation of placement plans in conjunction with 
Milwaukee County, the search for appropriate facilities, and 
work 
with 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
and 
the 
committee 
established by it, to emphasize the very real need for a 
transitional facility in Southern Wisconsin for Chapter 980 
supervised release.  At oral argument, counsel for the DHFS 
indicated that the DHFS is continuing to seek both a site for a 
transitional facility in Milwaukee County, as well as engaging 
in ongoing efforts to find individual residential placements for 
individuals 
the 
court 
has 
identified 
as 
appropriate 
for 
supervised release. 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
23 
 
¶46 The Wisconsin Legislature has also taken positive 
steps toward finding a solution.  In 2003, the legislature 
passed Wisconsin Act 187, which concerned Milwaukee County and 
established a committee "to make recommendations regarding the 
location of a facility for the treatment of sexual predators."  
2003 Wis. Act 187.  The Sexually Violent Persons Transitional 
Facility Siting Advisory Committee (Committee) met weekly from 
October 19, 2004, until May 24, 2005, pursuing its mandate to 
locate a minimum of three locations in Milwaukee County for 
consideration by the state for the housing of individuals 
committed under Chapter 980 deemed appropriate for supervised 
release.  Although the Committee was ultimately unable to 
fulfill its mandate, the Committee did report to the legislature 
with suggestions that it hoped would greatly enhance the 
possibilities of finding suitable locations within Milwaukee 
County.12   
¶47 The report of the Committee was submitted to the 
legislature, as well as to the DHFS and the Department of 
Corrections, on July 12, 2005.  The Committee chair noted: 
As a committee, we anguished over the fact that we 
could not meet our charge, yet we also understood the 
difficult charge that we were given.  As stated in the 
beginning of this report, we do believe that locations 
to house sexually violent offenders under supervision 
within Milwaukee County can be found; however, unless 
an attempt is made to address the barriers faced by 
the committee, it is not likely that locations to 
                                                 
12 See Sexually Violent Persons Transitional Facility Siting 
Advisory Committee, Final Report, July 12, 2005.  Available at 
http://dhfs.wisconsin.gov/aboutDHFS/svp/. 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
24 
 
house sexually violent offenders placed on supervision 
will ever be found within Milwaukee county.13 
It is certainly appropriate to give the State of Wisconsin the 
opportunity to act on the Committee report.  Based on that 
report, there is a reasonable expectation that the legislature 
will take further action to address the barriers the Committee 
identified, in regard to the location of an appropriate site or 
sites for a residential facility or dwelling in Milwaukee 
County.   
¶48 It is significant that the State Building Commission 
appropriated approximately $1.3 million toward the establishment 
of a residential facility or dwelling, in order to place 
individuals committed under Chapter 980 on supervised release in 
Milwaukee County.  Counsel for the DHFS stated at oral argument 
that, if necessary, the DHFS will request more money in support 
of this project.   
¶49 We conclude that, under an appropriate set of facts, a 
court may order the DHFS to create a residential facility or 
dwelling necessary to accommodate an order for supervised 
release, but for the reasons set forth, Schulpius's case is not 
an appropriate one for a Sprosty-type court order at this time.  
 
 
                                                 
13 Sexually Violent Persons Transitional Facility Siting 
Advisory Committee, Final Report, July 12, 2005.  Available at 
http://dhfs.wisconsin.gov/aboutDHFS/svp/. 
 
The 
Committee 
identified four barriers to completing its charge: (1) lack of 
public support; (2) lack of political support; (3) lack of 
resources; and (4) the vagueness of 2003 Wisconsin Act 1987. 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
25 
 
V 
¶50 Finally, we address the issue of whether Schulpius or 
another 
individual 
committed 
under 
Chapter 
980, 
who 
is 
authorized for supervised release but not yet expeditiously 
placed, is entitled to seek a remedy such as monetary damages. 
¶51 The Wisconsin Legislature made no provision for such a 
remedy in Chapter 980 for a violation of the statutory scheme.  
Because the November 2000 order denying supervised release 
remains valid, we decline to address what remedy, if any, 
Schulpius is entitled to seek.  Further, we decline to address 
the issue of whether under different circumstances, another 
individual 
committed 
under 
Chapter 
980, 
authorized 
for 
supervised release but not yet expeditiously placed, would be 
entitled to seek a remedy such as monetary damages.14   
 
                                                 
14 We note that the United States Supreme Court has limited 
the remedy available for a denial of procedural due process to 
"nominal damages without proof of actual injury."  Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).  In Farrar v. Hobby, the Court 
explained: 
The awarding of nominal damages for the 'absolute' 
right 
to 
procedural 
due 
process 
'recognizes the 
importance to organized society that [this] righ[t] be 
scrupulously observed' while 'remain[ing] true to the 
principle that substantial damages should be awarded 
only to compensate actual injury.'  Thus, Carey 
obligates a court to award nominal damages when a 
plaintiff establishes the violation of his right to 
procedural due process but cannot prove actual injury.  
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992) (quoting Carey, 
435 U.S. at 266). 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
26 
 
VI 
¶52 In sum, we conclude that the November 2000 order 
granting the State's motion for reconsideration, and finding 
Schulpius not appropriate for supervised release, was a valid, 
final, appealable order, and therefore, he is not entitled to 
outright release from his Chapter 980 commitment.  Even though 
Schulpius's appeal is moot, we determine that the issues should 
be considered.   We determine that Morford is inapplicable to 
this case, as Schulpius never appealed, and therefore waived any 
objection 
to, 
the 
order 
granting 
the 
State's 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) 
motion 
to 
reconsider 
supervised 
release.  We do conclude, however, that there was a procedural 
due process violation.  We also conclude that the Sprosty 
decision is still valid, and allows a circuit court to order the 
DHFS to create an appropriate residential facility or dwelling 
to accommodate a Chapter 980 order for supervised release.  
However, for two reasons, we conclude that issuing such an order 
is unnecessary in this case.  Such a residential facility or 
dwelling for supervised release would be meaningless for 
Schulpius at this time, as he was determined to be inappropriate 
for supervised release in November 2000 and that determination 
has not been changed.  Second, we are satisfied that the DHFS 
has made substantial attempts to establish a residential 
facility or dwelling that would enable individuals committed 
under Chapter 980 to be placed on supervised release in 
Milwaukee County.  Finally, because the order of November 2000 
declaring Schulpius inappropriate for supervised release remains 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
27 
 
valid, even though there was a procedural due process violation, 
we decline to address what remedy, if any, Schulpius would be 
entitled to seek.  We further decline to address what might be 
an appropriate remedy for another individual, committed under 
Chapter 980 who, under different circumstances, has been 
authorized for supervised release, but not yet expeditiously 
placed. 
By the Court —— The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2002AP1056   
 
 
 
1