Case Title: Peterson v. State

Citation: 357 So. 2d 113

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1978-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
357 So. 2d 113 (1978) Jimmy PETERSON v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 50292. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 29, 1978. *114 Roy Pitts, Meridian, for appellant. A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Robert D. Findley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. Before PATTERSON, C.J., and BROOM and BOWLING, JJ. BOWLING, Justice, for the Court: Appellant was indicted, tried and convicted in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County of the crime commonly known as "fondling," and was sentenced to serve a term of four years under the Mississippi Department of Corrections. On appeal he sets out two assignments of error: Appellant was indicted under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-5-23 (1972), which reads as follows: The original indictment did not specify that appellant was "a male person" but charged that Appellant demurred to the indictment and also filed a motion to quash. Upon motion of the state, it was allowed to amend the indictment so as to add that appellant was a "male person." Code section 99-7-21 provides as follows: The question under this assignment of error is whether or not the failure to specifically charge that the appellant was a male person is a formal defect which is curable or the omission of an essential element rendering the indictment void. In the relatively short indictment the description of the charge used the word "his" in two different places. Therefore, we see that appellant was fully advised in the indictment that he was accused of being a male. In our opinion, the omission of the words "male person" was merely a formal defect which properly was added by amendment. The present case is distinguishable *115 from the prior cases advanced by appellant; these being Burchfield v. State, 277 So. 2d 623 (Miss. 1972), and Love v. State, 211 Miss. 606, 52 So. 2d 470 (1951). In the present case the indictment was amended according to statute and properly so. During the State's closing argument to the jury, the assistant district attorney made the following statement: Prompt objection was made by appellant's attorney on the ground that the argument was an improper comment on the appellant's failure to testify. The court sustained the objection and directed the jury to disregard the comments. The motion for a mistrial was overruled. All proceedings were preserved by a properly filed special bill of exceptions. It is elemental that if an accused does not testify this cannot be commented on by the State. Code section 13-1-9 provides: The question before the Court was discussed thoroughly in Lambert v. State, 199 Miss. 790, 25 So. 2d 477 (1946). In its opinion the Court set out the following discussion: The Court has reiterated the foregoing principles in the recent case of Hines v. State, 339 So. 2d 56 (1976). See also Brown v. State, 340 So. 2d 718 (Miss. 1976); Chatman v. State, 244 Miss. 659, 145 So. 2d 707 (1962). We will not go into a discussion of the evidence upon which appellant was convicted. It suffices to say that the young female involved and appellant were the only persons present when the alleged incident occurred. The young girl's testimony was sufficient to justify a conviction of appellant under the indictment. No one testified in appellant's behalf regarding the facts of the incident. The State advances a strong argument that the statement of the assistant district attorney was cured by prior instructions given the jury that they could not construe appellant's failure to testify against him in any manner whatsoever. As heretofore stated, the erroneous statement was made in the State's closing argument and the statement only served to impress on the jury the fact that appellant did not take the stand and dispute the testimony of the only direct witness against him. The State relies on the case of Barnes v. State, 230 Miss. 299, 92 So. 2d 863 (1957), in contending that appellant was not prejudiced because of the instructions to the jury. In Barnes the comment was held not to be reversible error. The comment there, however, was different from the comment now before the Court and, as said previously, each case on these types of matters has to be considered in the light of that particular case. The facts of all are different. The comment in Barnes was not directed to the guilt or innocence of the accused. The comment in the present case clearly is directed toward that part of the case. We hold that the comment of the prosecution was erroneous and constitutes reversible error. The motion for a mistrial should have been granted. Therefore, it is necessary for the cause to be reversed and remanded for a trial before another jury. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER, BROOM, LEE and COFER, JJ., concur.