Case Title: In re R.R.N.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 186PA14

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA13-1289 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed:  2 September 2014 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Wilkes County 
Nos. 09 CRS 54801, 10 CRS 405 
JAMES DOUGLAS TRIPLETT 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 18 February 2013 
by Judge Edgar B. Gregory in Wilkes County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 April 2014. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 
General John H. Watters, for the State. 
 
Appellate 
Defender 
Staples 
S. 
Hughes, 
by 
Assistant 
Appellate 
Defender 
David 
W. 
Andrews, 
for 
defendant-
appellant. 
 
 
McCULLOUGH, Judge. 
 
 
James Douglas Triplett (“defendant”) appeals from the 
judgment entered upon his conviction for first degree felony 
murder.  For the following reasons, we grant a new trial.  
I. Background 
On 19 April 2010, a Wilkes County Grand Jury indicted 
defendant on charges of first degree murder, robbery with a 
dangerous weapon, and first degree burglary.  Following various 
pretrial motions by defendant, defendant’s case came on for jury 
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trial in Wilkes County Superior Court on 4 February 2013, the 
Honorable Edgar B. Gregory, Judge presiding. 
The evidence at trial tended to show that after a day of 
drinking and drug use, defendant, his brother Eddie Triplett, 
and two other men, Ben Watson and Dillon Walsh, went to the 
residence of Bruce Barnes (“victim”) on the evening of 9 
December 2009 in search of drugs.  While present at victim’s 
residence, the men got into a skirmish with victim, during which 
defendant fatally stabbed victim. 
At trial, the State prosecuted the case on the theory that 
defendant, Eddie, Ben, and Dillon had planned to rob victim of 
his drugs and defendant killed victim in perpetration of the 
robbery.  Defendant, on the other hand, maintained throughout 
trial that he was ignorant of any plan to rob victim.  Defendant 
testified that he agreed to go to victim’s house to get high and 
passed out on the way to victim’s house.  Defendant did not 
recall anything from the ride to victim’s house.  Defendant 
testified he woke up and came to when he heard Dillon holler 
“He’s got a gun.  He’s got a gun.”  At that point, defendant 
realized Eddie and Dillon were in a fight with victim and he 
entered the fight.  Defendant testified he did not intend to 
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kill victim but stabbed victim to protect Eddie, Dillon, and 
himself. 
On 18 February 2013, the jury returned verdicts finding 
defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon, second 
degree burglary, and first degree murder under the first degree 
felony murder rule.  The trial court then arrested judgment on 
defendant’s convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon and 
second degree burglary and entered judgment on defendant’s 
conviction for first degree felony murder.  Defendant was 
sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.  
Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court following 
sentencing. 
II. Discussion 
Now on appeal, defendant raises the following two issues:  
whether the trial court erred by:  (1) preventing defendant from 
cross-examining his sister, Teresa Ogle, with a recording of a 
voicemail message she left for defendant’s other sister in order 
to attack Ogle’s credibility; and (2) allowing the State to use 
defendant’s silence against him. 
Voicemail Message 
At trial, defendant’s sister Teresa Ogle testified as a 
witness for the State.  During her testimony, Ogle explained 
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that defendant lived with her in a single wide mobile home on 
family land at the time of the incident in early December 2009.  
Although Ogle owned the mobile home, another of defendant’s 
sisters, Connie Jennings, owned the land. 
In 
response 
to 
questioning 
by 
the 
State 
on 
direct 
examination, Ogle described what happened the night of 9 
December 
2009 
when 
defendant 
returned 
home 
after 
the 
altercation.  On the whole, Ogle’s testimony was damaging to 
defendant. 
Specifically, Ogle testified that she worked third shift 
security and was getting ready for work when defendant came home 
on 9 December 2009 at approximately 10:40 p.m.  Defendant 
entered the mobile home alone, but Eddie, Ben, and Dillon 
followed closely behind.  Ogle recalled that Eddie had been 
stabbed in the leg and defendant’s clothes were bloody.  At 
first, defendant claimed he shot a deer and, while trying to cut 
the deer’s throat, had stabbed Eddie in the leg.  Defendant, 
however, quickly changed his story, admitting he killed a man 
and stating he was no different than Jack Keller, defendant’s 
grandfather who killed defendant’s grandmother.  As the men 
discussed what they should do with their clothes, Ogle overheard 
defendant tell the other men they were going to burn their 
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clothes in a barrel.  Yet, Ogle did not see the men dispose of 
their clothes because she left for work.  Ogle testified that as 
she was leaving, defendant gave her two intertwined pot holders.  
Ogle claimed she did not know what was inside of the pot 
holders, but admitted she disposed of them over the side of a 
bridge on her way to work. 
Ogle testified that defendant later told her that he knew 
Ben had planned to rob victim and that he took a knife from her 
kitchen before they went to victim’s residence because he knew 
victim had a gun.  Ogle confirmed that a large knife was in fact 
missing from her kitchen knife set. 
Ogle additionally testified that sometime after defendant 
was arrested and charged with victim’s murder, she received a 
phone call from defendant.  Ogle recalled that during their 
conversation, defendant indicated he did not want her to testify 
against him.  When Ogle said she would tell the truth, defendant 
began cussing, indicated that he wanted her to lie, and hung up. 
On cross-examination, the defense sought to attack Ogle’s 
credibility with questions concerning statements made by Ogle to 
family members that were inconsistent with her trial testimony.  
The defense’s questions tended to suggest that Ogle played a 
larger role in destroying evidence following victim’s death but 
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that Ogle was lying on the witness stand to protect herself.  
The defense also inquired into Ogle’s mental health, drug use, 
and past sexual activity.  When the defense asked Ogle if she 
remembered engaging in risky sexual behavior, the State objected 
and the jury was excused while voir dire was conducted. 
Prior to the jury’s return following voir dire and a 
morning break, the defense informed the court that it also 
intended to cross-examine Ogle with a recording of a voicemail 
message she left for Shay Waddell, another of defendant’s 
sisters.  With the jury still out, the court instructed the 
defense to play the recording of the message.  In the message, 
Ogle made hostile statements toward Shay, calling her names, 
denouncing her relationship with her family, and threatening to 
call “the law” and the D.A. 
Upon inquiry by the court, the defense explained the 
message was left on 5 December 2011, after the charges were 
brought against defendant and around the time Ogle made 
allegations that other members of defendant’s family were 
threatening her to keep her from testifying.  The defense 
contended the message suggested Ogle had something to hold over 
the rest of defendant’s family’s head through her testimony in 
defendant’s case and argued it should be able to cross-examine 
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Ogle with the message to demonstrate Ogle’s animus and bias 
towards defendant and their family. 
In response to the defense’s argument, the State explained 
that it believed the message was left in response to the 
family’s eviction of Ogle from the family land and was not 
related to the charges against defendant.  The State further 
explained that as a result of the eviction and surrounding 
events, Connie Jennings, the sister who owned the land, had been 
charged with interfering and intimidating a State’s witness for 
her actions against Ogle.  The State then objected to the 
introduction of the message, contending it was “unrelated to the 
charges [in the present case] and more related to the charges of 
intimidating the State’s witness as well as the eviction 
process.” 
In explaining his opinion that the evidence should not come 
in under Rule 403, the trial judge indicated that evidence 
regarding what the family has done would be prejudicial to 
defendant, who was not responsible for the eviction or message.  
The court explained that introducing the message would invite 
evidence of the eviction that is not relevant and could mislead 
and confuse the jury.  The trial judge then issued the following 
ruling: 
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I rule that this tape may not be played 
before the jury; that I really have problems 
with Rule 402 and whether it’s relevant.  I 
rule under 403 that the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the confusion of 
the issues involving her eviction and the 
problems that she might have had with her 
sisters; that there is no -- it’s not fair 
to tie whatever problem she had with her 
sisters to the defendant; that may be 
prejudicial to the defendant.  He may be 
prejudiced 
by 
allowing 
that 
kind 
of 
evidence. 
 
I think the same kind of things can be asked 
of her, whether she has hard feelings and 
all of that sort of thing.  But I rule -- 
and I sustain the objection to the tape.  
And the tape will be made part of the 
record, if you would like for it be, but it 
may not be played before the jury. 
In response to the trial court’s ruling, the defense again 
requested that it at least be able to play the last portion of 
the message where Ogle threatened “to call the law and to go to 
the District Attorney if they keep messing with her[.]”  The 
defense reiterated its argument that this threat was relevant 
for impeachment purposes because it showed Ogle’s bias and 
Ogle’s willingness to do whatever it takes to hurt defendant and 
his family. 
Yet, the trial court stood firm, stating: 
I decline that request for the same reasons, 
that I think it would open up an area that 
would be confusing to the jury; that you may 
ask her about any problems, if you desire, 
about her feelings about her family.  But 
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anything about an eviction, it seems to me 
that that are things that don’t relate to 
the defendant necessarily, and it’s possible 
that the jury could be prejudiced towards 
the defendant by something that his sisters 
did that he didn’t even know about. 
 
. . . . 
 
It opens up areas that are not necessary and 
are confusing.  And under Rule 403 and the 
balancing test, I’m going to keep it out as 
the gatekeeper of the evidence. 
 
Despite the court’s ruling, defendant made it clear that 
“it [was his] wish that [the message] be played, notwithstanding 
whatever prejudice may be possible, and that it is his request 
that it be done and that he desires that it be played at his 
murder trial.” 
Thereafter, in response to questions concerning Ogle’s 
relationship with her family, Ogle testified that she had no 
hard feelings towards defendant or her family for supporting 
defendant.  Ogle stated she loved her family and they loved her 
too. 
Now on appeal, defendant contends Ogle was a key witness 
and the trial court erred in refusing to allow his defense to 
cross-examine her with the message in order to show her bias and 
attack her credibility.  Upon review, we agree with defendant. 
As our Supreme Court has explained, 
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North 
Carolina 
Rule 
of 
Evidence 
611(b) 
provides that “[a] witness may be cross-
examined on any matter relevant to any issue 
in the case, including credibility.”  Id., 
Rule 611(b) (2005).  However, such evidence 
may nonetheless be excluded under Rule 403 
if the trial court determines “its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.”  Id., Rule 403.  We review a 
trial court's decision to exclude evidence 
under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion.  
State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 602-03, 652 
S.E.2d 216, 227 (2007) (citing State v. Al-
Bayyinah, 359 N.C. 741, 747-48, 616 S.E.2d 
500, 506-07 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 
1076, 126 S.Ct. 1784, 164 L.Ed.2d 528 
(2006)).  An abuse of discretion results 
when 
“the 
court's 
ruling 
is 
manifestly 
unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary 
that it could not have been the result of a 
reasoned decision. 
 
In our review, we 
consider not whether we might disagree with 
the trial court, but whether the trial 
court's actions are fairly supported by the 
record.” 
 
Id. 
(citations 
and 
internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
State v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 156, 159-60, 655 S.E.2d 388, 390 
(2008).  We are, however, mindful that “criminal defendants . . 
. must be afforded wide latitude to cross-examine witnesses as 
to matters related to their credibility.”  Id. at 161, 655 
S.E.2d at 391. 
As detailed above, in this case the trial court indicated 
it had serious doubts as to whether the message was relevant 
-11- 
 
 
and, thus, admissible under Rule 402.  The trial court then 
excluded the evidence under Rule 403, finding the probative 
value of the message was substantially outweighed by confusion 
of the issues and unfair prejudice to defendant. 
First, relevant evidence is defined as “evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”  N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2013).  Upon review in this case, we 
hold the message relevant to attack Ogle’s credibility and show 
Ogle’s bias towards defendant and defendant’s family. 
As the parties explained, the message arose as a result of 
the family’s efforts to persuade Ogle from testifying against 
defendant, including Ogle’s eviction from the family land.  
Although the message would certainly be relevant in the case of 
intimidating a State’s witness and the foreclosure proceedings, 
as argued by the State, the message is also relevant in the 
present action to show possible bias by Ogle against defendant.  
Moreover, the message is clearly relevant to attack Ogle’s 
credibility as it calls Ogle’s testimony that she held no hard 
feelings against her family into doubt. 
-12- 
 
 
Second, Rule 403 requires the trial court to weigh the 
probative value of the evidence against “the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury[.]”  
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2013).  In this case, because 
the trial court questioned the relevance of the message, the 
trial court could not have properly weighed the probative value 
of the message against the dangers of unfair prejudice and 
confusion. 
Moreover, defendant requested for a second and third time 
that the message be allowed into evidence despite the potential 
prejudice to his case.  We find it within defendant’s right to 
bear the risk of prejudice and cross-examine Ogle with the 
message.  As our Supreme Court explained in State v. Lewis, 365 
N.C. 488, 496, 724 S.E.2d 492, 498 (2012), 
[g]enerally, 
the 
trial 
court 
has 
broad 
discretion in determining whether to admit 
or exclude evidence, and we are sympathetic 
to the trial court's legitimate worry that 
the evidence could complicate the case to 
defendant's detriment . . . .  However, we 
have long held that “[c]ross-examination of 
an opposing witness for the purpose of 
showing . . . bias or interest is a 
substantial legal right, which the trial 
judge can neither abrogate nor abridge to 
the prejudice of the cross-examining party.” 
Id. at 496, 724 S.E.2d at 498 (quoting State v. Hart, 239 N.C. 
709, 711, 80 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1954) (citations omitted)).  Where 
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the defense believes the risk of informing the jury of 
potentially prejudicial evidence is worth taking, any error that 
results would be invited by defendant.  Id. at 496, 724 S.E.2d 
at 498-99 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(c)).  Thus, as our 
Supreme Court held in Lewis, “[g]iven the importance this Court 
places on a party’s right to cross-examine an opposing witness 
for bias,” Id. at 496-97, 724 S.E.2d at 499, we hold it was the 
defense’s decision to chance the risk of prejudice and the trial 
court erred by excluding the evidence. 
We further hold defendant was prejudiced by the trial 
court’s error.  Ogle was a key witness for the State and the 
only witness that testified defendant was aware of the plan to 
rob victim.  Without evidence that defendant was aware of the 
plan to rob victim, it is likely the jury would not have found 
defendant 
guilty 
of 
robbery 
and 
burglary, 
the 
felonies 
underlying defendant’s conviction 
for first degree felony 
murder. 
In arguing the trial court did not err by excluding the 
message, the State cites this Court’s decision in State v. 
Withers, 111 N.C. App. 340, 432 S.E.2d 692 (1993).  This Court 
described the situation in Withers as follows, 
[D]efendant[, who was charged with larceny 
and 
possession 
of 
stolen 
property,] 
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attempted to introduce a tape recording to 
impeach the testimony of Rita Jones and to 
show her motive to testify against him.  On 
direct examination, Ms. Jones testified that 
she did not threaten her husband or anyone 
at the Stanley Rescue Squad.  Defendant, 
however, 
offered 
a 
telephone 
answering 
machine tape recording [from her husband’s 
voicemail] in which Ms. Jones profanely 
threatened to go to the authorities in 
Lincolnton and report her husband, who had 
been present when the property had been 
taken and when it had been divided. 
Id. at 346-47, 432 S.E.2d at 696-97.  This Court then affirmed 
the trial court’s decision to exclude the recording, explaining 
that 
[w]hile 
the 
tape 
in 
question 
directly 
contradicts Ms. Jones' earlier testimony 
denying making threats to “get back” at her 
husband, the tape does not tend to prove or 
disprove any of the essential elements of 
either crime charged.  Furthermore, the 
threats made on the tape are not directed at 
defendant. 
 
On 
direct 
examination, 
defendant's witness, Joyce Jones, testified 
to the threat which Ms. Jones made, so that 
the impeaching evidence was disclosed to the 
jury.  Considering these factors and the 
extreme profanity contained on the tape, we 
believe 
the 
tape 
posed 
a 
danger 
of 
misleading the jury, causing undue delay and 
being cumulative. 
Id. at 348, 432 S.E.2d at 697. 
While both cases involve the exclusion of a recorded 
message under Rule 403 that a defendant sought to introduce to 
attack the credibility of a key witness, we find the present 
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case distinguishable in one key respect.  Among the factors 
considered in Withers, this Court noted the exclusion of the 
evidence was not error because the impeachment evidence came in 
through the testimony of another witness.  See id.  In the 
present case, however, the evidence defendant sought to admit 
was never introduced.  Although the State is correct in 
asserting the evidence tended to show that defendant’s family 
was “mad” at Ogle, there was no evidence that Ogle reciprocated 
those feelings.  In fact, Ogle testified she loved her family 
and had no hard feelings towards them. 
Right to Remain Silent 
During the State’s cross-examination of defendant, the 
State questioned defendant on his failure to mention self-
defense to investigators early in the investigation.  The State 
then argued to the jury during closing that defendant “waited 
till he heard the State’s case and then concocted his story to 
try and navigate the waters to see if he could come up with some 
story that [the jury] might buy and spare justice for him.” 
Now, in defendant’s second issue on appeal, defendant 
contends the trial court improperly allowed the State to use his 
silence against him.  Having already determined defendant is 
entitled to a new trial based on the trial court’s refusal to 
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allow defendant to cross-examine Ogle with the recorded message, 
we do not address the merits of this second issue as it is 
unclear from the record before this Court whether the statements 
were made before or after defendant was in custody and 
Mirandized.  We leave this issue for the trial court to resolve 
in defendant’s retrial. 
III. Conclusion 
For the reasons discussed above, we hold defendant is 
entitled to a new trial. 
New trial. 
Judges ELMORE and DAVIS concur.