Case Title: Industrial Com'n v. Wallace Village for Children

Citation: 437 P.2d 62

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1968-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
437 P.2d 62 (1968) INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Colorado, Plaintiff in Error, v. The WALLACE VILLAGE FOR CHILDREN, a non-profit corporation, Defendant in Error. No. 22692. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. February 5, 1968. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff in error. Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Robert H. Harry, L. Richard Freese, Jr., Denver, for defendant in error. Robinson, Tilton & Robinson, Denver, amici curiae. HODGES, Justice. The sole issue involved on this writ of error is whether the Wallace Village for Children, a non-profit Colorado corporation, employing approximately 58 persons, is amenable to the collective bargaining provisions of the Colorado Labor Peace Act, namely, C.R.S. 1963, 80-4-1 to 80-4-22. This Act, pursuant to C.R.S.1963, 80-4-3(1), specifies that the Industrial Commission of Colorado shall enforce and administer its provisions. A group of teacher-therapists, employees of Wallace Village, complained to the Industrial Commission that their employer had committed an unfair labor practice in violation of the Labor Peace Act by refusing to bargain collectively with their union representatives. Wallace Village challenged the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction claiming that the provisions of the Labor Peace Act do not extend to a private nonprofit corporation such as Wallace Village. After a hearing, the Industrial Commission Referee made a finding that the Commission had jurisdiction and recommended that *63 it proceed to enforce the provisions of the Labor Peace Act against Wallace Village. This was followed by a Commission order adopting this finding and asserting jurisdiction. Wallace Village then filed its complaint in the trial court seeking review of the Industrial Commission's order and a declaration that the Industrial Commission has no jurisdiction. The lower court reviewed the record before the Industrial Commission and after a hearing, entered its findings in favor of Wallace Village and decreed that the Industrial Commission is without jurisdiction over Wallace Village. The trial court thereupon declared null and void the Industrial Commission's order. This writ of error is brought by the Industrial Commission which claims that the lower court erred in its findings and that its judgment should be reversed. In its findings the lower court leaned heavily on the precedent of St. Luke's Hospital v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 142 Colo. 28, 349 P.2d 995. The single question resolved in that case as stated in the opening paragraph of the opinion is as follows: This question was resolved in the negative. The trial court stated in its findings that the Wallace Village comes very close to being a hospital as defined in St. Luke's, supra, and therefore, not subject to the provisions of the Labor Peace Act. We do not agree with this conclusion. Wallace Village, as clearly shown from the testimony before the referee of the Industrial Commission, is not a hospital, but rather, in its dedicated purposes, is a school which instructs and teaches children who have minimal brain damage. It hires teacher-therapists and counselors for this purpose. It does not provide surgical or medical services, nor does it employ or have in attendance doctors or nurses. It is a school for special children who require specialized training, instruction, therapy, and care not available in regular schools. Nevertheless, it is urged on behalf of Wallace Village that the rationale of St. Luke's, supra, is just as applicable to a private school as it is to a private hospital, and therefore, the ruling of the lower court is correct when it held that Wallace Village was not subject to the provisions of the Labor Peace Act, and that the Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction to enforce its provisions against Wallace Village. In St. Luke's, supra, it was reasoned that the Labor Peace Act was intended by the legislature to apply only to employers engaged in an industrial activity, and that since the conduct of a hospital is not an industrial activity, it is not subject to the provisions of the Labor Peace Act. As stated in St. Luke's, supra, this rationale and statutory interpretation was adopted from St. Luke's Hospital v. Labor Relations Commission, 320 Mass. 467, 70 N.E.2d 10, in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a private hospital by the nature of its activity is not engaged in industry and trade and is therefore not subject to the Massachusetts "State Labor Relations Law", M.G.L.A. Chapter 150A §§ 1 to 12. The Massachusetts St. Luke's case, it must be emphasized, was interpreting the provisions of its own law, which in many respects, is quite different from our Colorado Labor Peace Act, particularly with respect to its scope. The Massachusetts labor relations law appears clearly, by its wording, to limit the scope of its provisions to industry and trade. To demonstrate this, the following pertinent portion of M.G. L.A. Chapter 150A § 1 is set forth: * * * * * * Furthermore, in the Massachusetts St. Luke's case, supra, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts specifically stated: Upon reanalysis of the Colorado Labor Peace Act, we find that because of the lack of reference to industry and trade in any of its provisions, it is not subject to the same interpretation as was applied to the Massachusetts Labor Relations law in the Massachusetts St. Luke's case, supra. C.R.S.1963, 80-4-1 is partially quoted as follows: We do not believe the isolated use of the term "industrial peace" as in the above declaration of public policy was meant to limit the application of the Colorado Labor Peace Act only to industry and trade, because the sentence involved goes on to itemize other conditions which the act is designed to promote, including the "uninterrupted production of goods and services." To ascertain the clear meaning of this last phrase, it must be viewed in the disjunctive thereby indicating two separate conditions, to wit: uninterrupted production of goods and uninterrupted services. In considering whether the legislature intended to include or exclude all activity classified as nonindustrial or not involving industry or trade, it is of importance to look at one other portion of the act wherein use is made of the word "industries". The pertinent portion of C.R.S.1963, 80-4-11(2) is as follows: The above statutory reference to employees in all other industries or occupations is so clear and so unambiguous as to the intention of the legislature not to restrict the Labor Peace Act to only industry and trade, that it is unnecessary to even consider or discuss the usual rules of construction where ambiguities and uncertainties are found in statutory provisions. Our Labor Peace Act, in defining the terms "person", "employer", and "employee", (C.R.S.1963, 80-4-2(1)-(3)) does not exclude an employer such as Wallace Village, nor its employees. Furthermore, none of the phraseology of its provisions premise an interpretation of exclusion of non-industrial employers and employees. At this time, therefore, we are unwilling to hold that the Colorado Labor Peace Act is restricted in its application to industry and trade only. We hold, therefore, that insofar as the Colorado St. Luke's case, supra, may be considered precedent for such an interpretation, we reject it. It is our view that the Colorado St. Luke's case, supra, stands for and remains precedent for one proposition only, and that is that a charitable private hospital is not amenable to the collective bargaining provisions of the Colorado Labor Peace Act. Accordingly, we hold that the defendant in error, The Wallace Village for Children, a non-profit corporation, is subject to the provisions of the Labor Peace Act, and that the Industrial Commission of Colorado has jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this act as against the defendant in error. The trial court's findings and judgment were erroneous, and are therefore reversed. Judgment reversed. MOORE, C. J., and PRINGLE, J., concur in the result. McWILLIAMS and KELLEY, JJ., dissent.