Case Title: Commonwealth v. Montarvo

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12905

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12905 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RICARDO MONTARVO. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     November 2, 2020. - December 29, 2020. 
 
Present:  Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Habitual Offender.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Probation.  
Statute, Construction. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 19, 2014. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard T. Tucker, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Ines de Crombrugghe McGillion for the defendant. 
 
Shayna L. Woodard, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  Colloquially referred to as the "three strikes" 
law, the habitual offender statute, G. L. c. 279, § 25, enhances 
the penalty for a defendant who, after two prior convictions 
                     
 
1 Justice Lenk participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
resulting in State or Federal prison sentences of three or more 
years, receives a third felony conviction.  This case requires 
us to determine whether § 25 (a) of the law allows sentencing 
judges to impose probation on defendants who fall within its 
ambit.  We conclude that it does. 
 
Background.  In August 2017, the defendant, Ricardo 
Montarvo, was convicted by a jury of assault and battery with a 
dangerous weapon in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b), and 
armed assault with intent to murder in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 18 (b).  Both convictions carried the possibility of 
habitual criminal sentencing enhancements under G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25 (a).  A jury-waived trial followed on whether the defendant 
had committed the predicate offenses for the enhancements to 
apply.  The judge found that the defendant had twice previously 
been convicted of offenses for which he was sentenced to more 
than three years, and thus, § 25 (a)'s enhancements applied to 
him. 
 
At sentencing, the defendant contended that § 25 (a) 
allowed the judge to impose probation.  The judge disagreed with 
the defendant's interpretation of the statute and sentenced him 
to twenty years in prison for the conviction of armed assault 
with intent to murder and ten years to run concurrently for the 
conviction of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.  The 
3 
 
 
defendant appealed.  We granted his application for direct 
appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  Because the issue whether a sentencing judge 
has discretion to impose probation under § 25 (a) is a matter of 
statutory interpretation, we review it de novo.  Commonwealth v. 
Ruiz, 480 Mass. 683, 685 (2018).  As will become apparent, the 
question admits no easy answers. 
 
1. Section 25's text.  The Commonwealth and the defendant 
appear to agree that § 25 (a)'s text is unambiguous.  They 
disagree about what the text unambiguously says; the 
Commonwealth argues that § 25 (a) clearly bars a judge from 
imposing probation, and the defendant argues the opposite.  We 
disagree with both -- the statute's text is ambiguous. 
 
Legislative intent controls our interpretation of statutes.  
International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Woods Hole, 
Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 392 Mass. 811, 813 
(1984).  "To determine the Legislature's intent, we look to the 
words of the statute, construed by the ordinary and approved 
usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause 
of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied 
and the main object to be accomplished" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 61 (2017).  "We 
derive the words' usual and accepted meaning from sources 
presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in 
4 
 
 
other legal contexts and dictionary definitions" (citation 
omitted).  Id. at 61-62.  "Where the statutory language is clear 
and unambiguous, our inquiry ends."  Id. at 62. 
 
a. Plain language.  At first glance, G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25 (a), seems to be unequivocal on the issue of sentencing 
discretion.  The subsection reads: 
"Whoever is convicted of a felony and has been previously 
twice convicted and sentenced to state prison or state 
correctional facility or a federal corrections facility for 
a term not less than [three] years by the commonwealth, 
another state or the United States, and who does not show 
that the person has been pardoned for either crime on the 
ground that the person was innocent, shall be considered a 
habitual criminal and shall be punished by imprisonment in 
state prison or state correctional facility for such felony 
for the maximum term provided by law" (emphasis added). 
 
Standing alone, the emphasized language (maximum term language) 
is clear:  judges must sentence defendants convicted under 
§ 25 (a) to the maximum term provided by the underlying offense.  
See Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 813 (1985) (construing 
phrase "the maximum term provided by law" found in § 25 [a]'s 
predecessor to "preclude[] the possibility that the judge could 
have suspended all or any portion of the defendant's life 
sentence").  Probation appears to be unavailable. 
 
The Commonwealth would have us stop our analysis here.  A 
juxtaposition of the habitual offender's subsections, however, 
5 
 
 
dispels the facial clarity of § 25 (a).2  See Plymouth Retirement 
Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 483 Mass. 600, 605 
(2019) ("Even clear statutory language is not read in 
isolation").  Under G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b), if a defendant has 
been convicted twice before of one or more of certain offenses, 
then the defendant 
"shall be considered a habitual offender and shall be 
imprisoned in the state prison or state correctional 
facility for the maximum term provided by law for the 
offense enumerated . . . .  No sentence imposed under this 
subsection shall be reduced or suspended nor shall such 
person so sentenced be eligible for probation, parole, work 
release or furlough or receive any deduction from such 
person's sentence for good conduct."3  (Emphasis added.) 
 
                     
 
2 The Commonwealth and the defendant suggest that our past 
cases control our interpretation of § 25 (a).  They do not.  In 
Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 480 Mass. 683, 688 (2018), and 
Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 66 (2017), we noted that 
assumptions about G. L. c. 279, § 25, prior to its amendment in 
2012, see St. 2012, c. 192, § 47, govern our interpretations of 
§ 25 (a).  Yet these assumptions were issue specific.  See Ruiz, 
supra at 688 n.9 ("the prior assumption here is that the 
Legislature did not require predicate offenses to be separately 
brought and tried"); Garvey, supra at 65-66 (assumption about 
G. L. c. 279, § 25, that prior convictions relate to distinct 
occurrences controlled interpretation of § 25 [a]).  We also 
noted in Commonwealth v. Billingslea, 484 Mass. 606, 624 n.24 
(2020), that among the habitual offender statute's subsections, 
"probation, parole, work release, or good conduct deductions 
. . . are only available under § 25 (a)."  This comment, 
however, was clearly dicta. 
 
 
3 As the two subsections' nomenclature indicates, "certain 
individuals statutorily identified as 'habitual criminals' are 
subject to the provisions of subsection (a) and certain 
individuals statutorily identified as 'habitual offenders' are 
subject to the provisions of subsection (b)."  Ruiz, 480 Mass. 
at 688 n.8. 
6 
 
 
Section 25 (a) makes no mention of disallowing probation, 
whereas § 25 (b) does.  These are not two independent statutes, 
but rather two subsections of the same statute that were enacted 
simultaneously.  When the Legislature includes a phrase in one 
subsection of a statute but not in another, this invites the 
"negative implication" that the phrase was purposefully 
excluded.  See Halebian v. Berv, 457 Mass. 620, 628 (2010) 
(maxim of negative implication teaches "that the express 
inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of another").  See 
also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75 (1995) (when "contrasting 
statutory sections [were] originally enacted simultaneously in 
relevant respects," then negative implication is "more 
apparently deliberate").  Examined in this light, the absence in 
§ 25 (a) of any prohibition on probation leads to a 
straightforward conclusion:  § 25 (b) bars a judge from imposing 
probation, whereas § 25 (a) does not. 
 
The maxim of negative implication requires cautious 
application.  See Garvey, 477 Mass. at 65 ("We have generally 
been wary of the maxim of negative implication").  See also 
Halebian, 457 Mass. at 628 (discussing maxim's limitations).  
Cautious application, however, does not mean no application.  
Mans, 516 U.S. at 75 (maxim "is not illegitimate, but merely 
limited").  Context determines the maxim's application.  A. 
Scalia & B.A. Garner, Reading Law:  The Interpretation of Legal 
7 
 
 
Texts 107 (2012) ("Context establishes the conditions for 
applying the [maxim], but where those conditions exist, the 
[maxim] . . . validly describes how people express themselves 
and understand verbal expression").  The context here is how to 
address what would otherwise appear to be surplusage in the 
statute.4  See Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407, 412 
(2009) ("A statute should be construed so as to give effect to 
each word, and no word shall be regarded as surplusage"). 
 
b. Surplusage.  We cannot ignore that the same maximum term 
language that the Commonwealth contends eliminates sentencing 
discretion in § 25 (a) also appears in § 25 (b) alongside an 
explicit prohibition on probation.  See G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b) 
("nor shall such person so sentenced be eligible for 
probation").  If the Legislature intended the maximum term 
language in § 25 (a) alone to bar probation, then it would not 
have needed anything more than this maximum term language in 
§ 25 (b) in order to prohibit probation under that subsection.5  
                     
 
4 Although we voiced hesitation over the maxim of negative 
implication in Garvey, there was no issue of surplusage in that 
case.  Section 25 (b)'s "explicit references to the need for 
separate incidences" did not render any of the other language in 
that subsection superfluous.  See Garvey, 477 Mass. at 65. 
 
 
5 Against this surplusage problem, the Commonwealth argues 
that the main difference between the subsections is that 
§ 25 (a) allows parole whereas § 25 (b) denies it.  This is 
indeed a difference between the two subsections, one recognized 
as such by the parole statute.  See G. L. c. 127, § 133B.  It 
does not, however, solve the surplusage problem.  If the 
8 
 
 
The addition of the words "nor should such person be so 
sentenced be eligible for probation" to § 25 (b) would have been 
unnecessary to achieve the intended meaning. 
 
Three additional textual indications demonstrate that the 
Legislature intended the punishment imposed on the "habitual 
violent offenders" sentenced under § 25 (b) to be both more 
limited in its application and harsher once imposed than the 
penalties imposed under § 25 (a).  Garvey, 477 Mass. at 66.  
First, whereas § 25 (b) "provides for enhanced penalties without 
parole for violent offenders who have two prior convictions from 
a list of nearly forty violent crimes," the predicate offenses 
for § 25 (a) have no violence requirement (emphasis added).6  
Garvey, supra at 65 n.7.  Second, whereas the predicate offenses 
under § 25 (b) must have been separately prosecuted, the 
                     
Legislature had not intended the maximum term language to allow 
probation, then the following word choice in § 25 (b) would have 
sufficed:  a habitual offender shall be punished "for the 
maximum term provided by law without the possibility of parole."  
Analogous constructions can be found elsewhere.  See G. L. 
c. 127, § 133 ("no prisoner sentenced to the state prison shall 
be eligible for [a parole] permit until such prisoner shall have 
served the minimum term of sentence").  Although the Legislature 
is not restricted to using the same expression to achieve the 
same result across statutes, see Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 
Mass. 772, 776 (2000), its awareness of a possible construction 
is indicative of a legislative intent not to have the 
availability of parole be the main difference between sentences 
under § 25 (a) and § 25 (b). 
 
 
6 Predicate offenses under both subsections, however, must 
"arise from separate incidents or episodes of criminal 
behavior."  Garvey, 477 Mass. at 59.  See id. at 66. 
9 
 
 
predicate offenses for § 25 (a) have no separate prosecution 
requirement.  See Ruiz, 480 Mass. at 688-689.  Third, whereas 
§ 25 (d) requires that a judge warn a defendant who is either 
pleading or sentenced to one of § 25 (b)'s predicate offenses 
that this implicates § 25 (b)'s bar on probation, § 25 (a) has 
no analogous notice requirement.7  See G. L. c. 279, § 25 (d). 
 
The defendant would have us end our inquiry here, but the 
matter is not so simple.  The question remains:  If the maximum 
term language does not bar probation in § 25 (a), then what does 
it do?  Just as the Commonwealth creates a surplusage problem in 
§ 25 (b) by insisting that the maximum term language prohibits 
probation in § 25 (a), the defendant's argument that § 25 (a) 
allows for probation also renders a different part of § 25 (b) 
superfluous.  For example, a judge may not impose a reduced 
sentence under § 25 (b).  G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b) ("No sentence 
imposed under this subsection shall be reduced or suspended 
. . .").  The maximum term language present in both § 25 (a) and 
§ 25 (b), however, already appears to prohibit reduced 
sentences.  See G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a)-(b).  See also Tuitt, 393 
Mass. at 813.  Either the maximum term language does not mean 
                     
 
7 Additionally, whereas plenary review under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, is available to a defendant sentenced under § 25 (b), it 
is not for a defendant sentenced under § 25 (a).  See 
Billingslea, 484 Mass. at 615-616, 624 n.24. 
10 
 
 
what it says, or the prohibition on reduced sentences language 
in § 25 (b) is superfluous.  Neither outcome is satisfactory. 
 
Consequently, whichever way the plain language of G. L. 
c. 279, § 25, is read, some aspect of it is superfluous.  Thus, 
we are left to conclude that the text of G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a), 
is ambiguous on the matter of probation. 
 
2. Legislative history.  Because the text of G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25, is ambiguous, we turn next to the statute's legislative 
history.  See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 433 
(2011). 
 
The relevant history begins not in the halls of the 
Legislature but within our own case law.  We held in 
Commonwealth v. Zapata, 455 Mass. 530, 535 (2009), that the 
Legislature's failure to include an express prohibition on 
probation in the home invasion statute, G. L. c. 265, § 18C, 
meant that judges retained discretion to impose probation on 
defendants sentenced under the statute.8  After surveying other 
statutes that prevent judges from imposing probation, we noted 
that "when the Legislature intends to bar probation, it knows 
how to say so explicitly."  Id. at 534. 
                     
 
8 Specifically, we noted in Zapata, 455 Mass. at 535, that 
the ambiguities created by the legislative history of G. L. 
c. 265, § 18C, compelled us to apply the rule of lenity. 
11 
 
 
 
In 2012, the Legislature amended G. L. c. 279, § 25.  See 
St. 2012, c. 192, § 47.  Prior to being amended, G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25, read in its entirety: 
"Whoever has been twice convicted of crime and sentenced 
and committed to prison in this or another state, or once 
in this and once or more in another state, for terms of not 
less than three years each, and does not show that he has 
been pardoned for either crime on the ground that he was 
innocent, shall, upon conviction of a felony, be considered 
an habitual criminal and be punished by imprisonment in the 
state prison for the maximum term provided by law as a 
penalty for the felony for which he is then to be 
sentenced." 
 
When the Legislature amended the law, it assigned, with minor 
linguistic changes, what once constituted the whole of the 
statute to § 25 (a).9  See G. L. c. 279, § 25 (a).  The 
Legislature also added three other new subsections, G. L. 
c. 279, § 25 (b)-(d).10  As already detailed, the Legislature 
                     
 
9 Additionally, the Legislature broadened the newly created 
§ 25 (a) to include Federal sentences as qualifying predicate 
offenses.  See Garvey, 477 Mass. at 66. 
 
 
10 Section (c) excludes "any offense for which such person 
was adjudicated a youthful offender, a delinquent child, or a 
like violation of the laws of another state, the United States 
or a military, territorial or Indian tribal authority for which 
a person was treated as a juvenile" from being predicate 
offenses under § 25 (b).  G. L. c. 279, § 25 (c).  Section (d), 
as noted supra, requires that a judge sentencing under one of 
§ 25 (b)'s enumerated offenses warn that "(1) the defendant may 
be imprisoned in the state prison for the maximum term provided 
by law for such third or subsequent offense; (2) no sentence may 
be reduced or suspended; and (3) the defendant may be ineligible 
for probation, parole, work release or furlough, or to receive 
any deduction in sentence for good conduct."  G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25 (d). 
12 
 
 
included in § 25 (b), but not in § 25 (a), an express 
prohibition of probation. 
 
"The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the prior state 
of the law as explicated by the decisions of this court."  
Commonwealth v. Vega, 449 Mass. 227, 231 (2007).  It is 
therefore not unreasonable to conclude that in amending the 
habitual offender statute, the Legislature added the express 
prohibition on probation and other sentencing options to 
§ 25 (b) in response to the Zapata decision.  In other words, 
despite the redundancy of including a prohibition on reduced 
sentences alongside the maximum term language in § 25 (b), the 
Legislature intended to foreclose the possibility of suspended 
sentences, probation, parole, work release, furlough, and 
deductions for good conduct under § 25 (b) while leaving these 
options available under § 25 (a).11 
 
Examination of a report from the amendment's conference 
committee further supports this conclusion.  After the bill was 
reported out of the conference committee, members noticed that 
some of the language in § 25 (b) had been "incorrectly 
reported."  The passage wrongly stated:  "No sentence imposed 
under this section shall be reduced or suspended nor shall such 
                     
 
11 Before the 2012 amendments, G. L. c. 279, § 25, barred 
probation.  See Tuitt, 393 Mass. at 813.  Nothing in our opinion 
alters that fact. 
13 
 
 
person so sentenced be eligible for probation, parole, work 
release or furlough or receive any deduction from such person's 
sentence for good conduct" (emphasis added).  The committee 
asked that "section" be changed to "subsection," which, as the 
final language of § 25 (b) shows, it was.  See G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25 (b).  Although the Legislature had an opportunity to apply 
the prohibition on probation to the entirety of G. L. c. 279, 
§ 25, the Legislature deliberately chose to limit that 
prohibition to § 25 (b).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Hines, 449 Mass. 
183, 190-191 (2007) ("By using the words 'this section,' the 
prohibition against the imposition of probation applies to the 
entire statutory provision . . .").  We are bound by this 
choice. 
 
3. Rule of lenity.  Although the legislative history of 
G. L. c. 279, § 25, supports the defendant's interpretation that 
probation is available under § 25 (a), the redundancy of adding 
all the express prohibitions to § 25 (b) remains.  We thus 
conclude that G. L. c. 279, § 25, is ambiguous, and despite our 
tools of statutory interpretation, we are unable to resolve this 
ambiguity.  "Under the rule of lenity, 'if we find that the 
statute is ambiguous or are unable to ascertain the intent of 
the Legislature, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of any 
rational doubt.'"  Commonwealth v. Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 
254 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 
14 
 
 
524 (2005).  "This principle applies to sentencing as well as 
substantive provisions."  Richardson, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569 (1982), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 815 and 464 U.S. 921 (1983).  Thus, we must read 
§ 25 (a) to provide sentencing judges with the discretion to 
impose probation. 
 
We acknowledge that this result, which has the effect of 
offering a sentencing judge in some cases a Hobson's choice 
between probation and a mandatory term of twenty years in 
prison, may appear "contrary to common sense."12  Zapata, 455 
Mass. at 535.  Yet if this choice sounds familiar, that is 
because it is.  In Zapata, we reached the same result.  See id.  
Despite the facial clarity of G. L. c. 265, § 18C, which 
proscribed that home invasion "shall be punished by imprisonment 
. . . for life or for any term of not less than twenty years," 
we held that probation was nonetheless available under the 
statute.  Zapata, supra.  We invited the Legislature to amend 
the law if we misinterpreted its intent -- an invitation that, 
                     
 
12 That said, closer inspection of the facts in this case 
indicate some sense behind the result as applied here.  The 
defendant could have been sentenced to the maximum term on the 
conviction of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon (ten 
years) and given probation on the conviction of armed assault 
with intent to murder (which carries a twenty-year maximum 
term), or vice versa.  Indeed, public safety may be well served 
by having a habitual offender on probation once released from 
his committed sentence, as he or she transitions back into the 
community. 
15 
 
 
to this date, the Legislature has declined.  Id. at 536.  Should 
the Legislature decide to do so, it may amend § 25 (a) to bar a 
judge from imposing probation.  It need not look far for how to 
accomplish this goal.  See G. L. c. 279, § 25 (b). 
 
Conclusion.  The defendant's sentence is vacated, and the 
case is remanded for resentencing in accordance with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.