Case Title: LITTLE v STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 79-44 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1980 LESTER D. LITTLE, Claimant and Respondent, STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS, Employer, U. S. F. & G . and INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY I Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court Honorable William E. Hunt, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana Larry Riley argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Goldman and Goldman, Missoula, Montana Bernard Goldman argued, Missoula, Montana Marra, Wenz, Iwen and Johnson, Great Falls, Montana David A. Hopkins argued, Great Falls, Montana Filed: Submitted: April 17, 1980 Decided: dL(t I 7 lgp~n " c Honorable Joseph B. Gary, D i s t r i c t Judge, delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. claimant, who had had trouble with a knee s i n c e 1941, i n j u r e d h i s knee on two separate occasions i n 1978 while working f o r S t r u c t u r a l Systems, Inc. The f i r s t i n j u r y occurred on April 4 , 1978, when t h e claimant slipped on a roof of t h e Craighead Apartments a t t h e University of Montana i n Missoula, Montana. A t t h a t time, S t r u c t u r a l Systems was insured f o r workers' compensation purposes by U.S.F.&G. Claimant's second i n j u r y occurred on June 6, 1978, when claimant was carrying i r o n b a r s while working on t h e Reserve S t r e e t Bridge i n Missoula. A t t h e t i m e of t h e second accident, I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity Co. was S t r u c t u r a l Systems' i n s u r e r f o r workers' compensation purposes. Both i n j u r i e s w e r e i n f l i c t e d upon claimant's r i g h t knee. Claimant d i d n o t c o n s u l t a doctor a f t e r t h e f i r s t accident and was a b l e t o continue working although he con- tinued t o experience severe d i f f i c u l t i e s and pain with t h e knee. Claimant a l s o continued t o work f o r a month a f t e r t h e second accident u n t i l he w a s l a i d o f f . A t t h a t t i m e , he sought medical a t t e n t i o n . It w a s determined t h a t claimant was temporarily t o t a l l y disabled pending a f i n a l determina- t i o n by t h e Workers' Compensation Court. Claimant f i l e d a p e t i t i o n i n t h e Workers' Compensation Court on November 15, 1978, a g a i n s t U.S.F.&G. and I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity. A p r e t r i a l conference was held, and a f u l l hearing began on A p r i l 10, 1979. The c o u r t entered an i n t e r i m order on A p r i l 23, 1979, i n which U.S.F.&G. and I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity were ordered t o reimburse claimant f o r a l l accrued temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s and medical expenses on an equal s h a r e b a s i s . On September 28, 1979, t h e c o u r t entered i t s findings of f a c t and conclusions of law holding t h a t U.S.F.&G. was t o reimburse I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity f o r any and a l l b e n e f i t s t h a t had been paid pur- suant t o t h e c o u r t ' s interim order. The c o u r t held t h a t claimant's b e n e f i t s stemmed primarily from one i n j u r y which occurred on April 4 , 1978, and which was reinjured and aggravated on June 6, 1978. Since t h e second i n j u r y w a s merely an aggravation of a preexisting condition, t h e c o u r t took t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t U.S.F.&G. was l i a b l e f o r claimant's b e n e f i t s because, according t o Montana law, it w a s improper t o apportion the l i a b i l i t y f o r workerst compensation bene- f i t s between successive insurers. From t h i s judgment, U.S.F.&G. appeals and r a i s e s t h e following issue: Whether the claimant suffered an aggravation of a preexisting condition on June 6 , 1978; i f so, whether t h e i n s u r e r on the r i s k a t t h e time of the l a s t i n j u r i o u s exposure i s l i a b l e f o r t h e r e s u l t i n g d i s a b i l i t y ? U.S.F.&G. submits t h a t there i s no d i s p u t e by the p a r t i e s t h a t claimant d i d i n f a c t s u f f e r an aggravation of a preexisting condition on June 6, 1978. I t f u r t h e r submits t h a t claimant had a h i s t o r y of knee trouble and t h a t t h e April 4 , 1978, accident was a l s o an aggravation of a pre- e x i s t i n g i n j u r y which would have e n t i t l e d him t o b e n e f i t s had he incurred medical expenses o r l o s t wages. I t con- tends, however, t h a t on June 6 claimant suffered a new and compensable i n d u s t r i a l accident and t h a t s i n c e t h i s was t h e disabling i n j u r y causing him t o seek medical a t t e n t i o n , I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity Co. i s s o l e l y responsible f o r compen- s a t i n g claimant. U.S.F.&G. premises i t s argument on t h e well-established d o c t r i n e i n Montana t h a t an employer takes an employee a s he f i n d s him. It contends t h a t t h e Workers' Compensation C o u r t ' s r u l i n g w a s c o n t r a r y t o t h e above d o c t r i n e and t h a t t h e " l a s t i n j u r i o u s exposure" r u l e should operate here, placing t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c l a i m a n t ' s compensation on I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity. I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity argues t h a t under H a r t l v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc. (1978), 176 Mont. 540, 579 P.2d 1239, 35 St.Rep. 806, it i s improper t o apportion workers' compensa- t i o n b e n e f i t s between successive i n s u r e r s . I t submits t h a t t h e workers' compensation c o u r t c o r r e c t l y followed t h e d i c t a t e s of H a r t l i n holding U.S.F.&G. l i a b l e f o r compensa- t i n g claimant. I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity a l s o cites Newman v. Kamp (1962) , 1 4 0 Mont. 487, 374 P.2d 100, f o r t h e proposi- t i o n t h a t where a second i n j u r y occurs before t h e f i r s t i n j u r y i s healed, t h e f i r s t c a r r i e r i s l i a b l e f o r a l l com- pensation, and t h e second c a r r i e r i s r e l i e v e d of l i a b i l i t y . It contends t h a t i n t h e i n s t a n t case t h e r e i s a plethora of medical and l a y testimony i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e i n j u r y r e s u l t - i n g from claimant's f i r s t accident had n o t completely healed a t t h e t i m e of t h e second accident. Therefore, I n d u s t r i a l Indemnity contends t h a t both H a r t l and Newman provide ample a u t h o r i t y f o r holding U.S.F.&G. l i a b l e f o r claimant's com- pensa t i o n . Claimant i n t h i s c a s e b a s i c a l l y agrees with t h e Workers' Compensation Court's d e c i s i o n holding U.S.F.&G. l i a b l e f o r h i s compensation. F i r s t of a l l , i n examining t h e contentions by t h e p a r t i e s t o t h i s appeal, it should be pointed o u t t h a t t h i s Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h e t e s t of s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence t o be whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t . See Stamatis v. Bechtel Power Co. (1979), - Mont. , 601 P.2d 403, 36 St.Rep. 1866; Head v. Larson (1979), Mont. - , 592 P.2d 507, 36 St.Rep. 571; Strandberg v. Reber Company (1978), - Mont. , 587 P.2d 18, 35 St.Rep. 1742; Jensen v. Zook Brothers Construction Company (1978) , - Mont. , 582 P.2d 1191, 35 St.Rep. 1066. I n Stamatis and Jensen, t h i s Court f u r t h e r held t h a t where t h e f i n d i n g s a r e based on c o n f l i c t i n g evidence, t h i s Court's function on review i s confined t o determining whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e f i n d i n g s and n o t t o determine whether t h e r e i s s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support c o n t r a r y findings. With t h a t as t h e b a s i c premise, w e w i l l then examine t h e f a c t s and t h e law applicable t h e r e t o . It i s undisputed i n Montana t h a t an employer takes h i s employee s u b j e c t t o t h e employee's physical condition a t t h e t i m e of employment. It i s a l s o undisputed t h a t an aggrava- t i o n of a p r e e x i s t i n g condition i s a compensable i n j u r y under t h e Workers' Compensation Act. Robins v. Anaconda Aluminum Co. (1978), 175 Mont. 514, 575 P.2d 67, 35 St.Rep. 213; Schumacher v. Empire S t e e l Mfg. Co. (1977), 175 Mont. 4 1 1 , 574 P.2d 9871 34 St-Rep. 1 1 1 2 . Where t h e r e have been two accidents, each occurring under a d i f f e r e n t i n s u r e r , and t h e second happens before t h e f i r s t i n j u r y i s completely healed, t h e second accident i s i n c i d e n t t o t h e f i r s t and t h e f i r s t i n s u r e r i s required t o pay a l l compensation. Newrnan v. Kamp, supra. This i s s o because i n Montana t h e r e i s no apportionment of workers' compensation b e n e f i t s between successive i n s u r e r s . Hart1 v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc., supra. There i s no question t h a t claimant here suffered a compensable i n d u s t r i a l injury. The main f a c t u a l i s s u e before the Workers' Compensation Court was which c a r r i e r was responsible f o r compensating claimant. Resolution of t h i s i s s u e r e s t s on a determination of whether t h e second i n j u r y was separate and d i s t i n c t o r merely an aggravation of a preexisting condition. I n essence, then, r e s o l u t i o n of l i a b i l i t y i s dependent on a determination of which particu- l a r i n j u r y w a s t h e proximate cause of t h e present condition f o r which claimant seeks compensation. The Workers' Compensation Court, i n e f f e c t , held t h a t t h e second i n j u r y , s i n c e it occurred before the f i r s t had completely healed, was merely an aggravation of a preexist- i n g condition and, therefore, the f i r s t i n j u r y was t h e proximate cause of claimant's d i s a b i l i t y . U.S.F.&G. con- tends t h a t t h i s determination is not supported by the record and t h a t t h e second i n j u r y was separate and d i s t i n c t from t h e f i r s t . U.S.F.&G. bases i t s argument on t h e f a c t t h a t claimant continued t o work a f t e r t h e f i r s t accident and d i d n o t seek medical help; however, it argues, he did see a doctor and q u i t working a f t e r the second accident. I t contends t h a t under our holding i n H a r t l , I n d u s t r i a l Indem- n i t y should be l i a b l e . This i s not, however, a completely accurate statement of the f a c t s of e i t h e r t h i s case o r of Hartl. The testimony of D r . C. G. Cragg, an orthopedic sur- geon, indicated t h a t claimant had had knee problems s i n c e 1941. Both accidents, i n h i s opinion, were aggravations of t h a t preexisting condition. He a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e of t h e June 6 accident, claimant had n o t recovered from t h e April 4 accident. The record showed t h a t claimant was somewhat s t o i c a l and had a high tolerance f o r pain. I t a l s o showed t h a t claimant a t t i m e s had continued t o work even though he w a s i n pain. I n f a c t , claimant continued working a f t e r t h e June 6 accident u n t i l he was l a i d o f f . H e apparently sought medical help then because t h e pain had become too much and because he was a f r a i d of doing steelwork above the ground f o r f e a r of h i s knee collapsing. I n H a r t l , t h e claimant a l s o suffered from a preexisting condition. The physician t h e r e t e s t i f i e d t h a t a l l of t h e claimant's back i n j u r i e s contributed t o h i s present condi- t i o n , and it w a s impossible t o separate t h e accidents as t o t h e cause of claimant's d i s a b i l i t y . The physician i n H a r t l , unlike D r . Cragg here, t e s t i f i e d t h a t claimant's most r e c e n t i n j u r y w a s a separate and d i s t i n c t one and h i s present impairment was g r e a t e r a s a r e s u l t of it. A s pointed o u t above, D r . Cragg t e s t i f i e d t h a t the June 6 i n j u r y here was n o t a separate and d i s t i n c t i n j u r y b u t merely an aggravation of t h e preexisting one. I n cases l i k e t h i s , it i s incumbent on t h e i n s u r e r seeking t o be relieved from l i a b i l i t y t o e s t a b l i s h by a preponderance of the evidence t h a t t h e claimant's present condition was caused by an accident occurring when the other i n s u r e r was on r i s k . Newman v. Karnp, supra, 374 P.2d a t 1 0 4 . A review of t h e record i n d i c a t e s t h a t U.S.F.&G. has f a i l e d t o do t h i s and t h a t there i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e decision of the Workers' Compensation Court. U.S.F.&G. contends w e should apply the " l a s t i n j u r i o u s exposure" r u l e , as s t a t e d i n 4 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation S95.12 a t 17-71. This Court has, however, previously held t h i s r u l e t o be inapplicable i n Montana because we are committed to the doctrine that the particular injury must be the proximate cause of the present condition for which the claimant seeks compensation. Newman, 374 P.2d at 104. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding of the Workers' Compensation Court. Its deci- sion is therefore affirmed. One further matter merits discussion. This appeal essentially involves only a question of liability between the two insurers, with both U.S.F.&G. and Industrial Indem- nity agreeing that claimant had suffered a compensable injury. Claimant's attorney, however, filed a brief and made an appearance at oral argument. He now requests attor- ney fees and costs for that appearance. In a case such as this, where the claimant is assured of compensation, it is unnecessary for him to make an appearance other than the filing of a short brief stating his position and that he will not appear. As the appearance was unnecessary, claim- ant's request for attorney fees and costs on appeal is denied. A£ f irmed. tdio-< Judge, sitting in &lace o%;r~r. Justice Gene B. Daly We concur: Chief Justice