Case Title: KENNETH MITAN V MAURA CAMPBELL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 126451

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED DECEMBER 6, 2005 
KENNETH MITAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
V 
No. 126451 
MAURA CAMPBELL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
PER CURIAM. 
The question before us in this defamation case is 
whether the period of limitations1 runs from the date of the 
alleged defamatory statement made by defendant or the date 
the statement was republished by a third party. 
We 
conclude that the limitations period ran from the date of 
the original alleged defamatory statement. 
Therefore, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate 
the circuit court’s judgment of summary disposition. 
1 
Currently 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations 
is 
MCL 
600.5805(9). 
Amendments to MCL 600.5805 since the alleged
defamation occurred in this case have no effect on this 
case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
Defendant was the public relations director of the 
Department of Consumer and Industry Services. 
On February 
22, 2000, she was interviewed by a reporter from WXYZ-TV 
regarding employment claims made by plaintiff’s employees. 
During the interview, defendant stated that plaintiff was a 
“bad 
egg,” 
a 
statement 
that 
plaintiff 
claims 
was 
defamatory. 
The statement was broadcast by WXYZ-TV on 
February 25, 2000. 
Plaintiff filed a defamation complaint 
on February 26, 2001 (February 25 was a Sunday), more than 
a year after defendant made her statement but within a year 
from the date it was republished by WXYZ-TV. 
The limitations period for a defamation claim is one 
year. 
MCL 600.5805(9). 
The circuit court granted 
defendant summary disposition based on the statute of 
limitations, 
MCR 
2.116(C)(7), 
ruling 
that 
defendant’s 
statement to the reporter started the limitations period 
running, and that defendant could not be held responsible 
for the republication by WXYZ-TV. 
The Court of Appeals 
reversed and remanded.2  It concluded that defendant could 
be liable on the basis of the republication because it was 
2 Mitan v Campbell, unpublished opinion per curiam
issued May 20, 2004 (Docket No. 242486). 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
plausible that the broadcast was the natural, and possibly 
intended, result of the interview.  The Court found this 
was a factual issue to be considered on remand. 
Defendant applied for leave to appeal to this Court. 
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Court heard oral 
argument on the application for leave to appeal pursuant to 
MCR 7.302(G)(1).3 
II. Standard of Review 
We review a summary disposition ruling de novo to 
determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 
597 NW2d 817 (1999). 
Questions of statutory construction 
are also reviewed de novo. 
Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 
466 Mich 57, 62; 642 NW2d 663 (2002).  In construing a 
statute, 
courts 
are 
to 
effect 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
Legislature, and if a statute is clear and unambiguous it 
should be enforced as written. Id. at 63. 
III. Analysis 
The elements of a defamation claim are: 
(1) a false 
and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an 
unprivileged communication to a third party, (3) fault 
amounting at least to negligence on the part of the 
3 471 Mich 938 (2004). 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
publisher, and (4) either actionability of the statement 
irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the 
existence of special harm caused by publication. 
Rouch v 
Enquirer & News of Battle Creek (After Remand), 440 Mich 
238, 251; 487 NW2d 205 (1992) (libel); Ledl v Quik Pik Food 
Stores, Inc, 133 Mich App 583, 589; 349 NW2d 529 (1984) 
(defamation). 
The one-year limitations period for defamation claims 
is found in MCL 600.5805(1), (9): 
(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an
action to recover damages for injuries to persons
or property unless, after the claim first accrued 
to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the
plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within
the periods of time prescribed by this section. 
* * * 
(9) The period of limitations is 1 year for 
an action charging libel or slander. [Emphasis
added.] 
A defamation claim accrues when “the wrong upon which 
the claim is based was done regardless of the time when 
damage results.” MCL 600.5827. 
MCL 600.5805(1) and (9) are clear and unambiguous. 
Our Legislature has clearly provided that a defamation 
claim must be filed within one year from the date the claim 
first accrued. The claim first accrued when the defamatory 
statement was made on February 22, 2000. The statute does 
not contemplate extending the accrual of the claim on the 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
 
 
basis 
of 
republication, 
regardless 
of 
whether 
the 
republication was intended by the speaker.4    Because 
plaintiff filed suit against defendant more than a year 
after his claim first accrued, his cause of action is 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
The plain language of MCL 600.5805 is inconsistent 
with plaintiff’s claim that a third party’s expected 
republication of a defamatory statement affects the running 
of the limitations period for the initial statement. 
The 
statute provides a relatively short limitations period of 
one year; there is nothing in the statute suggesting that 
the 
period 
can 
effectively 
be 
lengthened 
where 
republication is anticipated. 
Rather than a rule of first 
accrual, the reasoning of the Court of Appeals changes the 
statute 
to 
a 
rule 
of 
last 
accrual. 
Such 
reasoning 
undermines the principles of finality and certainty behind 
a statute of limitations. 
See Stephens v Dixon, 449 Mich 
531; 536 NW2d 755 (1995).5 
4 The republisher of the statement, WXYZ-TV, is not a
party to this action. 
We are concerned only with 
defendant’s liability for WXYZ-TV’s republication of her
statement. 
5 The Court of Appeals relied on Tumbarella v Kroger
Co, 85 Mich App 482, 496; 271 NW2d 284 (1978), for the
proposition that the “general rule is that one who 
(continued…) 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and 
the circuit court’s judgment of summary disposition is 
reinstated.6 
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
(continued…)
publishes 
a 
defamatory 
statement 
is 
liable 
for 
the 
injurious 
consequences 
of 
its 
repetition 
where 
the 
repetition is the natural and probable result of the 
original publication.” 
We neither accept nor reject that
proposition because plaintiff neither alleged nor claimed
damages for natural and probable consequences in his 
complaint. 
His sole allegation was that an injurious,
defamatory statement was published on February 25, 2000, 
the date of the broadcast.  Further, even if we were to 
accept the natural and probable consequences rule, no case
from our jurisdiction has held that the rule extends the
one-year period of limitations. 
The Tumbarella Court held 
merely that the original publisher was liable for the
natural and probable consequences of his remarks. 
Because 
the Court of Appeals misinterpreted Tumbarella as extending
the period of limitations, its reliance on Tumbarella was 
misplaced. 
6 Our decision renders moot the remaining arguments
raised by plaintiff. 
6