Case Title: People v. Mertz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96288

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 96288-Agenda 1-May 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 							
ANTHONY B. MERTZ, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 17, 2005.
	JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Coles County,
defendant, Anthony B. Mertz, was convicted of first degree murder
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2000)), home invasion (720 ILCS
5/12-11(a) (West 2000)), and aggravated criminal sexual assault (720
ILCS 5/12-14(a) (West 2000)). At a subsequent death penalty
hearing, the same jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty,
and thereafter concluded there were no mitigating factors sufficient to
preclude the imposition of a death sentence. Accordingly, the circuit
court sentenced defendant to death on the first degree murder
conviction. The court also sentenced defendant to 60 years'
imprisonment on the home invasion conviction. No sentence was
imposed for aggravated criminal sexual assault. Because defendant
was sentenced to death, his appeal was brought directly to this court.
Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d R. 603.
	At the outset, we note that defendant's guilt is not in question.
He does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence in that regard. He
raises no issue pertaining to the guilt/innocence phase of his trial. All
issues defendant advances in this appeal relate to the propriety of his
death sentence.
	Specifically, defendant contends (1) evidence of his "political
statements, books, guns, tattoos, photos of girlfriends, internet
articles, and sexually explicit sites" was either irrelevant or unreliable
aggravation and was admitted in violation of the United States and
Illinois constitutions; (2) aggravation testimony by a criminal
"profiler" was improper as it was irrelevant and unreliable; (3) the use
of "unreliable jailhouse informants and unreliable, uncharged crimes"
in aggravation denied defendant a fair sentencing hearing; (4) "the
death penalty is 'fundamentally unjust' under section 9-1(i) of the
Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(i) (West 2000)), when
recently adopted legislative reforms in death penalty proceedings were
unavailable; the aggravation relied on uncharged, unproven crimes;
and the death sentence is disproportionate to lesser sentences for
similar crimes"; (5) the imposition of a death sentence is excessive "in
light of the influence of prescription drugs on defendant, defendant's
inherited alcoholism, military service, employment, attending college,
minor criminal conviction, church attendance, low risk of future
dangerousness, and dysfunctional family"; (6) Illinois' death penalty
statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, because the
State is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are
no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a death sentence; and (7)
Illinois' death penalty is arbitrarily applied, "based on race, geography,
procedural evolution, discretion, and mistakes of fact, in violation of
the federal and Illinois constitutions' due process and sentencing
rights."
	We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case. As the basis
for our decision is dependent to a significant extent upon specific facts
adduced at trial, the relationship of proper evidence to challenged
evidence, and the weight of evidence in aggravation and mitigation,
we set forth, hereafter, a comprehensive summary of pertinent
evidence from defendant's lengthy trial.


BACKGROUND
	On June 12, 2001, Shannon McNamara was found murdered in
her apartment near the campus of Eastern Illinois University in
Charleston, Illinois. The primary cause of McNamara's death was
subsequently determined to have been "asphyxia due to choking, due
to a wash rag virtually stuffed into her mouth." The wash cloth had
been so tightly packed into McNamara's mouth that it had to be
removed "forcibly" during the autopsy. The pathologist who
performed the autopsy on McNamara described contributing causes
of her death as follows: "manual strangulation, smothering by placing
of the hand or hands over the mouth; hemoperitoneum, that is the
presence of a large quantity of blood in the peritoneum cavity due to
lacerations of the liver; and *** stab cutting wound to the abdomen."
	The pathologist noted one incise wound to the left side of the
victim's chin, five incise wounds to her neck, one long incise wound
to her abdomen-running from the base of her sternum to the top of
her pubis, exposing a portion of her bowel-one incise wound between
the thumb and forefinger of her left hand, another to the base of her
ear, an incise wound of the vagina, an incise wound extending from
the sacral area of the victim's back to her anus, three parallel incise
wounds across the breadth of the victim's back, and one incise wound
running the length of her back.
	In addition to incise wounds, the victim had multiple bruises and
contusions over various parts of her body. Bruises were so numerous
they were not assigned numbers during the autopsy. McNamara had
multiple contusions to her neck which, in the pathologist's opinion,
might have been self-inflicted, the result of her attempts to extricate
hands or other objects from around her neck. The pathologist noted
bruising on the left side of the victim's neck and jaw, as well as
multiple bruises and abrasions of her right elbow. Bruising was evident
on the right and left sides of her mouth, on her lips, and just below her
chin. The frenulum of her upper lip was torn, and bleeding was
observed inside her mouth. Multiple bruises about the neck were
indicative of manual or ligature strangulation. A large bruise was
noted in the left hip region, and there were scattered bruises in the
lower chest and upper abdominal area. Broad surface, blunt force
impact had caused multiple lacerations of the liver, and significant
internal bleeding. The pathologist testified that "a severe or large
amount of force" is required to lacerate the liver, and such a blow
would have caused the victim "a great deal" of pain. The victim had
also suffered blows to the head that had resulted in "subarachnoid and
subdural hemorrhage overlying the brain."
	Crime scene investigation revealed that entry into the victim's
apartment had been accomplished by cutting a window screen and
opening an unlocked window. The victim was apparently attacked as
she slept. The condition of the victim's bedroom and bathroom
suggested that a struggle had begun in the victim's bedroom and
continued in the bathroom, where the victim was eventually
overcome. The dead or dying victim was then moved to the living
room of her apartment where, in the opinion of crime scene
investigator Richard Caudell, she was posed or "put on display." The
victim was laid out on her back, naked, except for a bra and a T-shirt,
which had been pulled up to expose her breasts. Her arms had been
extended over her head, and she had been mutilated with a butcher
knife after she was beyond the point of resistance. That knife was later
discovered in a dumpster behind the victim's apartment building. A
torn latex glove was discovered near the victim's body. The handle of
a box cutter, a pair of panties, and the defendant's bent credit card
were found on the hallway floor adjacent to the bedrooms and
bathroom.
	Defendant was subsequently questioned and denied that he knew
the victim or anyone living in her apartment. He admitted he knew
two females lived in the apartment because he had seen them
sunbathing. Defendant said he had never been in the victim's
apartment. Defendant was arrested and charged with McNamara's
murder and related offenses.
	At the guilt phase of defendant's trial, the State adduced
compelling evidence of defendant's guilt. As noted, his credit card was
found on the floor of the victim's apartment in the area where the
struggle had taken place. Moreover, scrapings from the victim's
fingernails were analyzed and were found to be consistent with
defendant's DNA profile. Testimony indicated that profile could be
expected to occur in "one in 1.8 billion white unrelated individuals."
Furthermore, shortly after the murder, investigating police officers
observed marks on defendant's face, scratches on his neck, abrasions
on his knees, and bruises on his arms and elsewhere on his body. In
addition, a search of defendant's apartment revealed latex gloves
secreted in a cloth bag. A box cutter was missing from defendant's
place of employment.
	Various witnesses testified that defendant frequently entered
locked apartments-with and without authority-using credit cards to
compromise the locks. One of defendant's friends testified that he had
visited defendant a month before the murder and heard defendant
mention the victim's name. The witness testified: "[H]e was on a
website and he was looking at sports teams that I think that she was
involved with and there were bios on all of the girls and he mentioned
her name." Another witness testified that she overheard defendant tell
someone, during the initial stage of the police investigation, that there
had been a "brutal knife murder" across the street from his apartment
building. One of the police officers supervising the investigation
testified that no one had been told there was a knife involved in the
murder. Finally, two witnesses who were incarcerated with defendant
at the Coles County Safety and Detention Center pending trial
testified that defendant made admissions and other incriminating
statements to them.
	Defendant presented the testimony of another Coles County
inmate who stated that the other inmate witnesses had fabricated their
testimony to gain favorable treatment.
	Defendant's former girlfriend, Tara Hofer, also testified on
defendant's behalf. Hofer stated that she and defendant stayed at
defendant's grandmother's house sometime prior to McNamara's
murder. According to Hofer, she and defendant had sex that evening,
and she noticed "rug burns" on defendant's knees when they got up
the next morning. Hofer acknowledged she had been interviewed by
police "on multiple occasions" following defendant's arrest. She could
not recall whether she had ever told them about the "rug burns."
Hofer also stated it was a common practice for students to use credit
cards to open doors. Hofer further testified that defendant gave people
permission to enter his apartment and access his computer equipment
and belongings when he was not present.
	Hofer stated on direct examination: "The police tried to get me
to say that [defendant] had [a] problem with women and that he was
violent." She said that was not true. On cross-examination, Hofer
admitted defendant had come home drunk one evening, pulled her
hair, and threatened to kill her. The following colloquy ensued
between the prosecutor and Hofer:
			"Q. And did you tell Master Sergeant Bernardini that
Mertz threatened to kill [you], break [your] neck, and threw
you on the bed?
			A. Yes.
			Q. You told him that?
			A. Yes.
			Q. That was true, wasn't it?
			A. Yes.
			Q. And he placed his forearm across your throat and
choked you?
			A. Yes.
			Q. And he doesn't have a problem with violence with
women?
			A. No."
Hofer denied that she had told police officers, three months after the
murder, that she would love defendant even if he had murdered
McNamara. She said the police tried to get her to say that.
	Jack Smith, a licensed private investigator, also testified for the
defense. In support of defendant's contention that he had cut his hand
on a broken shot glass, Smith testified that he did in fact recover a
broken shot glass from a trash can in defendant's apartment.
	Defendant was advised of his right to testify, and declined the
opportunity. Following closing arguments, the jury was instructed on
the applicable law, and subsequently returned verdicts finding
defendant guilty of first degree murder, home invasion and aggravated
criminal sexual assault.
	The jury subsequently found defendant eligible for the death
penalty in that defendant was at least 18 years old and had committed
the murder in the course of another felony, i.e., aggravated criminal
sexual assault or home invasion. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West
2000). The matter proceeded to the aggravation/mitigation phase of
sentencing.
	The State first called Cathy Boyer. Boyer testified that she
resided in defendant's apartment building in September of 2000 and,
on one occasion, awoke to find defendant sitting in a chair in her
apartment, watching television. She had not invited defendant into her
apartment, and he did not have permission to be there. He appeared
to be drunk. Boyer stated that defendant had previously opened doors
in the building with a credit card and a knife. She knew him to be
violent when he drank.
	Roger Hudson, a foreman at Eastern Illinois University's building
services department, testified that defendant was a student worker
under his supervision. Hudson said that defendant expressed an
interest in female athletes. In the summer of 2000, Hudson was
present when defendant said something to the basketball coach's
daughter. When she walked on without replying, defendant
commented that he "ought to slap the tan off her face." Hudson said
he was aware that another building service worker had sold defendant
a 9-millimeter pistol. Finally, Hudson testified that defendant had
come to work one day in 2001 and commented that he had gone to
Terre Haute, Indiana, "to the McVeigh execution[,] around through
there." Defendant referred to the scene as a circus. After a few
minutes, defendant stood up and said-apparently in reference to the
McVeigh execution-"We the people, of the people, killing our own
people." Defendant then walked out of the room.
	Bobby Livingston, a building service worker with the university,
testified that defendant had expressed sympathy for the "folks" in
"Waco" and "Weaver Ridge." According to Livingston, other
employees were afraid of defendant. After defendant was arrested for
McNamara's murder, Lacie McDaniel, a student worker, told
Livingston she had opened a closet door and had seen defendant
"standing on the sink, doing something up high." Livingston and
McDaniel went down to the janitor's closet. Livingston lifted a ceiling
tile and observed the "butt of a gun."
	John Blevins, a Charleston police officer, testified that Lacie
McDaniel had advised him that on June 12, 2001, at approximately
5:30 p.m., she observed defendant standing on a sink in a janitor's
closet with his hands above his head. When McDaniel told other
building workers, they went to the closet and discovered a weapon.
Blevins subsequently removed a .22-caliber revolver from ceiling tiles
in the closet.
	Blevins also testified that on April 12, 2001, at approximately
3:45 a.m., he was dispatched to 1128 Fourth Street in Charleston to
investigate a report of two men fighting. Upon his arrival, Blevins
heard a woman scream and observed defendant struggling with a man
later identified as Brian Catt. The woman, Amy Joyner, pointed out
defendant, and Blevins grabbed defendant, only then noticing that
defendant had a knife at his side. Joyner later informed Blevins that
she and Catt had been walking by defendant's building when
defendant asked them if they wanted to come up to his apartment and
"party." Joyner and Catt went up to defendant's apartment and had a
few drinks. When defendant started flirting with Joyner, Catt and
Joyner started to leave. Defendant then called Joyner a "narc" and
pushed her down. Joyner got up and again tried to leave, and
defendant again pushed her to the floor. Joyner told Blevins when she
looked up she saw that defendant had "a dagger" in his hand. At that
point, Catt and defendant started fighting. Catt's version of events
was consistent with Joyner's. Defendant said he could not remember
what had happened. Joyner suffered an abrasion on her forehead and
abrasions on her knuckles. As a result of the incident, defendant was
charged with aggravated assault, a charge that was still pending when
defendant was tried on these charges.
	Defendant had previously been convicted of battery in 2000. A
certified copy of that conviction was introduced as evidence. The
attendant probation order, which was signed in January of 2001,
indicated that defendant was on probation at the time of the incident
involving Joyner in April of 2001, and at the time of the McNamara
murder in June of 2001. Paragraph eight of that order states that
defendant "shall not possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon."
	Michael Jordan, the jail inmate who had previously testified
against defendant, was called as a witness at the
aggravation/mitigation phase of sentencing. According to Jordan,
defendant said he had secreted a gun over at the college, where he
worked, and had one at his house as well. Jordan said defendant told
him he did not intend to spend the rest of his life in prison if things
went badly at trial. Jordan stated that defendant had a wire and could
pick handcuffs. If convicted, defendant planned to pick his handcuffs
in the tunnel between the courthouse and the jail, and go for a guard's
weapon. Defendant also indicated he wanted to "get even" with Mark
Stabler for testifying against him. Jordan said that defendant had saved
articles about himself while incarcerated and awaiting trial.
	Douglas Paul testified that he was one of defendant's good
friends prior to June 12, 2001. When Paul was in defendant's
apartment, prior to that date, he noticed an article pertaining to the
June 1999 murder of Amy Warner in Charleston, Illinois. Defendant
had the article posted on his wall. Defendant told Paul he had killed
Warner. He referred to Warner as "white trash." Paul testified that,
when he broke up with a woman in January of 2000, defendant asked
him if he wanted defendant to "get rid of her." Paul stated he had seen
defendant slashing the tires and seats of a Jeep after a party in July of
2000. Paul also remembered defendant yelling a racial epithet at an
African-American in their apartment building's parking lot. Paul said
defendant called the other person a "stupid nigger," and defendant's
action incited a physical confrontation. Defendant also told Paul that
he had burned down an apartment building under construction across
the street from his residence.
	Brian Beavers, another friend of defendant, testified that he had
observed defendant use a credit card to enter other people's
apartments. Defendant also told Beavers, without prompting, that he
had burned down the apartment building across the street. On another
occasion, defendant told Beavers he had murdered a girl in 1999,
though Beavers did not think he was serious at the time.
	Kristi Dewitt testified that she was a part-time police officer for
Rossville, Illinois, in December of 1997. Her husband was also a
Rossville police officer. Defendant came to her residence one evening
at 5:30 p.m. in December of that year, asking to speak with her
husband. Dewitt told defendant her husband was busy and could speak
to defendant when he went on duty at 6 p.m. Dewitt's husband was
in the bathroom getting ready for work. Defendant said he "needed to
speak with him now." After several verbal exchanges, Dewitt asked
defendant to leave. Defendant then stepped toward her aggressively,
and Dewitt positioned her eight-year-old son (who was present at the
door during the exchange) safely behind her. Dewitt stepped forward
and told defendant if he did not leave she was going to arrest him for
trespassing. Dewitt said she felt threatened by defendant. Dewitt's
husband heard the argument and came out to speak to defendant.
Dewitt's husband had to tell defendant to leave more than once before
defendant finally departed. Dewitt said defendant was very loud and
demanding with her. When defendant left, he spun his tires and threw
gravel.
	Lisle Farnum testified that he and defendant were "roommates
and best friends" in the Marine Corp. Farnum went to Charleston to
visit defendant after he entered college and saw, on a "billboard above
the computer," an article about a girl who had been murdered in
Charleston.
	Jeremy Deck, Tara Hofer's cousin, testified that he socialized
with defendant and Hofer for a time and often observed defendant
enter locked apartments using a credit card. Deck saw a "poster" in
defendant's apartment, mentioning Amy Warner.
	James Rankin, a Coles County court security officer, testified that
he had worked as a jailer in May of 2002 at the Coles County Safety
and Detention Center. On May 28, 2002, defendant and another
inmate were involved in an altercation. Defendant initially had the
other inmate in a "bear hug," and the incident quickly developed into
a "full out fight." Rankin ordered all the inmates to lock down, and
everyone did except those two. By that time, the other inmate had
gotten defendant in a head lock and was punching him in the head.
Rankin yelled at them to break it up, and the other inmate put his
hands back to give up. Defendant then put his arm around the other
inmate's neck and hit him twice. Rankin called for backup and tried to
stop the fight. Rankin told defendant to back off several times, to no
avail. Defendant, who had the other inmate up against the bars of a
door, asked Rankin if he wanted to take the other inmate's place.
	Terry Tillis testified that he was assigned to the Coles County
Safety and Detention Center on May 16, 2002, when another officer
contacted him about a verbal altercation in one of the cellblocks.
Inmates were yelling at correctional officers and throwing trays of
food. The inmates were also cursing at the officers and refusing to
deadlock. Defendant, who was involved in the incident, was
subsequently moved to a high security cellblock and was disciplined
as a result. Thereafter, on January 16, 2003, officers attempted to put
an inmate who was considered a flight risk into a cell with defendant.
Defendant refused to allow the inmate in his cell. Defendant told the
officers there would be an altercation by the afternoon if they put the
other inmate into the cell. Defendant's threats agitated the other
inmate, so the other inmate was placed elsewhere. During the verbal
exchange, a different inmate became "mouthy," and that inmate was
moved to another cellblock as a result. Tillis felt that defendant's
actions instigated the conduct of the offending inmate, something that
had happened on prior occasions as well.
	Anthony Lauletta testified that he returned to Charleston in
February of 2000, after having been away for the weekend, and he
saw that the structure across the street from his apartment building
had burned to the ground. Defendant, who broached the subject in a
joking manner, stated that he had burned it down. Lauletta noted that
none of his other friends joked about burning down the building.
Lauletta said defendant had stated he had been in all of the apartments
in the building during Christmas break of 1999. Defendant also told
Lauletta he had known Amy Warner personally. Lauletta knew
defendant owned a handgun.
	Christopher Howard was called as a witness and testified that he
lived in defendant's apartment building. Howard said defendant was
verbally abusive to his girlfriend, Tara Hofer, calling her a "bitch" and
a "cunt." Sometimes, after they argued, Hofer would come to
Howard's apartment to cry and complain. On occasion, her neck
would be red. Howard also testified that defendant had admitted
setting the fire at the apartment building across the street. Finally,
Howard stated that defendant owned a 9-millimeter handgun, which
he kept in his apartment.
	Hillary Spitz, a correctional officer with the Coles County
sheriff's department, testified that she was on duty on May 31, 2002,
when defendant told her she "needed to come in his cell and scrub the
walls." She replied that was not one of her duties. Later, defendant
told her she needed to "sweep and mop the floors in the hallway." She
replied she was not "his maid, his mother, or his nurse." Defendant
began to respond, "But will you be my -," when Spitz cut him off and
said, "Over my dead body." Defendant then stated, "That's okay as
long as your body is still warm."
	Kris Phipps, the assistant fire chief for the Charleston fire
department, testified that, on February 13, 2000, he responded to a
fire at an apartment building under construction in the 1100 block of
Fourth Street in Charleston. Phipps said the fire was later determined
to have been the result of arson. Damage to the structure itself was
estimated at $3.1 million. Eleven other structures were damaged as a
result of the fire, two of which were damaged so badly they had to be
demolished. There were approximately 20 vehicle exposures, and
several vehicles were destroyed. A backhoe, two forklifts, and a
construction trailer were also destroyed.
	Patricia Winborn testified that she lived in Charleston, in June of
1999 and worked with Amy Warner. Winborn was also acquainted
with Tara Hofer. Hofer worked at the day-care facility where
Warner's children attended. Through Hofer, Winborn met defendant.
Warner had two children: a four-year-old girl and a seven-month-old
boy. Winborn baby-sat for Warner's children three weeks prior to the
murder. Winborn cared for the children at Warner's house, and she
invited Hofer and defendant over to watch movies. There were
photographs of Warner in the house.
	Winborn also testified that she had gone to a local tavern with
Hofer and defendant one evening and, while Hofer was away in the
restroom, defendant grabbed Winborn's shirt and lifted it up to expose
her breasts. Winborn was "pretty offended."
	Adam Rhoads, a correctional officer with the Coles County
sheriff's department, testified that on November 11, 2001, he
responded to a fight in one of the cellblocks of the Coles County
Safety and Detention Center. An inmate informed Rhoads that he had
been in an altercation with defendant. The inmate had a scratch on his
neck and a red, swollen left eye. The inmate told Rhoads he had taken
exception to defendant ordering him around and defendant responded
by punching him in the eye.
	Sam Gaines, a correctional officer with the Coles County sheriff's
department, testified that he was on duty on May 16, 2002, when
defendant asked him what time it was. Gaines estimated the time
because he did not have a watch. Defendant responded, "That figures,
you're all fucking worthless." After defendant made that remark,
another inmate also made an "uncomplimentary" remark. Then
defendant and the other inmate used additional obscene language and
began rattling the bars of their cells. Gaines turned off their television
and said they could have their television privileges back when they
calmed down. Defendant, in an "impolite manner," escalated his tone
and things started to get out of control. Gaines had to summon help
to quell the disturbance.
	Jeff Marlow, an investigator with the Illinois State Police,
testified that he met with Darsann Barker on February 4, 2002. Barker
told him she had been the victim of a sexual assault that occurred
when defendant was in the Marine Corps and stationed in California.
Barker, an airline stewardess, had met defendant in 1996, and a
relationship developed which continued for several weeks. That
relationship eventually resulted in consensual sex on March 16, 1996.
Barker stated she had been a virgin prior to that encounter. She
described the episode as "rough sex." Barker said defendant was mean
to her afterward and told her she "wasn't any good." Nonetheless,
defendant later asked her to meet him at Camp Pendleton, where he
was stationed. When she arrived, defendant was there with two of his
friends. He asked her to go into a bedroom, where he had placed a
blanket on the floor. He then forced her down on the floor, removed
her tampon, and forced her to have sex against her will. Barker related
that she cried throughout the attack. After defendant was finished, he
went back into the other room with his friends. He then referred to her
as "white trash." Barker said she reported the assault to the authorities
at Camp Pendleton, but she did not pursue charges against defendant.
	Kimberly Lille testified that she lived in defendant's apartment
building in May of 2001. Lille stated she woke up one night in May of
2001 and heard sounds coming from defendant's apartment. Then she
heard "footsteps down the stairs" and "thumping, like chasing." Lille
got up to see what was going on. When she looked out the window,
she saw Randi Morris, with whom defendant had a relationship, sitting
in a car. Morris was crying and disheveled. Defendant was standing by
the car, holding the door open.
	Randi Morris testified that she dated defendant in May of 2001.
The relationship lasted two weeks. Morris ended the brief relationship
on May 26, 2001. Morris had consensual sex with defendant twice.
During those encounters, defendant bit her on the neck, which left a
"very massive bruise," and on her leg and under her buttocks, which
also left a large bruise. On the evening of May 25, 2001, Morris went
to defendant's apartment, where a group of people had gathered. At
one point in the evening, defendant and a female started wrestling.
Defendant threw the woman down on his coffee table, breaking it.
Defendant was also pulling the woman's hair. Eventually, everyone
left and she was alone with defendant. They engaged in foreplay.
Morris stated she was naked, except for high heels. Defendant placed
Morris on her stomach and positioned himself as if he were going to
penetrate her anally. Morris told defendant she did not want to do
that. Notwithstanding, defendant penetrated her anally. Morris stated
she had previously told defendant unequivocally that she would not
engage in anal sex. When defendant penetrated her, she experienced
"extreme pain" and was frightened because defendant was forcing
himself on her. Morris screamed "no" and kicked at defendant.
Defendant responded by placing his hand over her mouth and shoving
his fingers up so they covered her nose. Morris testified she could not
breathe. When Morris opened her mouth, defendant got his finger into
her mouth, and Morris bit him, trying to get him to stop. Morris said
she was yelling at defendant to get off of her. Defendant grabbed her
head and forcefully turned it as far as he could to the right. Morris
heard her neck cracking. She stated, "It was like he was trying to
break my neck." Morris screamed, and defendant quickly turned her
head the other way forcefully. Morris heard her neck crack again. She
testified, "And I-all I could think of was praying so hard, Lord, please
don't let me die this way, he's trying to kill me. I knew he was trying
to kill me. I mean, he was trying to break my neck." Morris eventually
turned on her back and pleaded with defendant not to kill her. He then
relaxed his hold on her. Morris testified, "[A]ll I could think of was to
get out of there because he had tried to kill me and I just wanted to
get out of there and get safe."
	She tried to be nice to defendant, making excuses that she had to
go to work early, but defendant told her, "You're not going
anywhere." Morris told defendant she had to go to the bathroom.
While she was inside, defendant stood outside the bathroom door.
Morris determined that the bathroom window was too small for her
to escape through it, and she realized that defendant's apartment was
on the second floor anyway, so she wiped the blood from her anus,
came out of the bathroom, and got dressed. Defendant still insisted
that Morris could not leave, so Morris sat down in a chair. Defendant
then grabbed her by the legs, pulled her onto the floor, and again tried
to have sex with her. When she resisted, he finally gave up. Morris
kept insisting that she had to go. Defendant then said he had to go to
the bathroom, and he grabbed Morris by the wrist and made her go
into the bathroom with him. When he finished, he asked Morris to lie
down with him and sleep.
	Morris waited until defendant was asleep, then she jumped up and
opened the door. Defendant woke up and tried to stop her from
leaving, but she eluded him and ran down the steps to the front door,
with defendant in pursuit. Morris got in her car and tried to shut the
door, but defendant prevented her from doing so. He tried,
unsuccessfully, to take her keys, then he reclined her seat and tried to
get on top of her. Eventually, Morris succeeded in raising the seat,
closing the door, and starting the car. Defendant jumped into the back
seat, and then crawled into the front passenger seat. He said he was
sorry, that he could not remember what he had done. He refused to
get out of the car, so Morris drove to her apartment with defendant
in the vehicle. When she arrived at her apartment building, defendant
followed Morris to her apartment and forced his way inside. He laid
down on her bed and pulled her down beside him. She waited until
defendant fell asleep, then she left for work. Defendant was gone
when she returned.
	Morris stated she was very sore after the incident. Her anus was
painful from the sexual assault, and her back and neck hurt as if she
had been in a car accident. She did not contact the police because she
was afraid they would not believe her and she felt humiliated. After
defendant was arrested for McNamara's murder, Morris contacted the
police and told them what had happened to her. Following the sexual
assault, Morris saw defendant at social gatherings, but she made sure
she was never alone with him again.
	Morris said defendant told her the Marines taught him to kill
without remorse. At the time, Morris thought the comment odd, and
she was not sure what defendant meant. Morris noticed that defendant
had books about Hitler and Nazism. Defendant possessed books
entitled, "Pipe and Fire Bomb Designs," "The Anarchist's Cookbook,"
"SS: Blood Soaked Soil," "Hitler's Enforcers," "Mein Kampf," as
well as Marine Corp training manuals. Defendant told Morris he
respected Hitler for trying to "purify his race."
	The State next called Keri Guillory. Guillory knew defendant
through her boyfriend, Brad Adams. Adams had been in the Marines
with defendant. Adams resided with Guillory in Louisiana, and
defendant would come to visit during the Christmas holidays. When
he did, defendant stayed at Guillory's residence. On his second visit,
defendant brought his girlfriend, Tara Hofer. Guillory said that
defendant treated Hofer badly and would talk down to everyone.
When he got drunk, he got mean. She did not want him to come back
after his second visit.
	When he returned for Christmas of 2000, defendant was drunk
every day. Defendant kidney punched her twice in a bar.
Circumstances dictated that she take him to a family friend's home
while Adams was at work. Guillory testified, "[The] next thing you
know he is whispering in my sister's ear." Guillory's sister was 15 or
16 years old at the time. Guillory testified she had to pull defendant
away from her sister. Later, defendant put his hand on the inner thigh
of an older woman of the household. When she got up, defendant
spilled his drink on the carpet.
	When Guillory got defendant back to her house, defendant fell
going into the house and bloodied his eye. Guillory tried to attend to
his eye, and defendant began screaming at her. Defendant shouted,
"Don't you know how much Brad loves you," and he pushed her
away. Guillory tried to get out of the house, but defendant tackled her
and forced her to the kitchen floor. Guillory testified defendant put her
in "some kind of a hold." He put his fist in her mouth and, in doing so,
scratched her mouth and face. Her gums were torn and the back of her
throat was scratched and raw. Guillory escaped from defendant when
her dog distracted him. She ran out the door and called the police
from a neighbor's house. The police arrived, as did Adams. Defendant
was arrested, but Guillory dropped charges at Adams' request and
upon his assurance that she would never have to see defendant again.
	The State presented testimony that defendant's computer was
seized, pursuant to a search warrant, on the day of his arrest for the
McNamara murder. Computer data analysis revealed that defendant
had logged off his computer at 3:29 a.m. on June 12, 2001, the
morning of Shannon McNamara's murder. Defendant's Yahoo
identification name was "Cereal Kilr 2000."
	On defendant's computer, an Illinois State Police analyst found
images of adult females posing nude or involved in sexual activity.
Some images depicted adult females engaged in sexual activity with
a dog and a horse. There were also images of nude children and
sexually explicit cartoons. On June 11, 2000, someone accessed
information on date rape. On June 11, 2001, someone went to a
website and read articles about Timothy McVeigh's trial and activities,
and examined articles pertaining to the manufacture of
methamphetamine.
	Sergeant Kevin Paddock of the Charleston police department
testified that he executed a search warrant at defendant's apartment
and observed various books defendant possessed. Paddock stated that
defendant had books entitled, "Pipe and Fire Bomb Designs," "The
Anarchist's Cookbook," "SS: Blood Soaked Soil," "Hitler's
Enforcers," "Mein Kampf," as well as Marine Corps training manuals. 	Paddock was also involved in the investigation of the murder of
Amy Warner in Charleston on June 29, 1999. Warner was found dead
in her apartment, her throat slashed, her children in an adjacent
bedroom. At the time of the murder, defendant lived less than a mile
from Warner's house.
	Joe Siefferman, a field supervisor for the Illinois State Police,
testified as an expert in crime scene reconstruction. Siefferman was
involved in both the McNamara murder investigation and the
investigation of the Warner homicide two years earlier. Siefferman
described the scene of the Warner murder and identified photographs
depicting the crime scene. Siefferman noted that Warner was found
lying partially on her couch and partially off. Her feet and torso were
on the couch; her head was off the couch on a cushion on the floor.
Her arms were outstretched above her head. She was wearing a pink
T-shirt, but was otherwise naked. She had what Siefferman described
as a "very large cut on her throat" that resulted in a significant loss of
blood. Indeed, photographs show that Warner's throat had been
slashed from one side to the other. Warner had defensive wounds on
her left hand. The physical evidence indicated that Warner was
positioned face down when her throat was cut. Her body was turned
over after her throat had been cut so that her wounds and the front of
her body would be exposed. In Siefferman's opinion, Warner's injuries
were intentionally exposed for effect.
	Siefferman noted several similarities between the Warner and
McNamara murders. First, both victims appear to have been posed. In
each instance, photographs reveal a victim lying on her back with her
arms extended above her head. In each instance, the victim was naked
from the waist down. Both were attacked in their sleep. Both victims
sustained injuries from sharp objects. In neither instance, were
identifiable fingerprints found.
	On cross-examination, Siefferman acknowledged that McNamara
died from strangulation and suffocation, whereas Warner was killed
by slashing her throat. He also acknowledged that the wash cloth
found near Warner's body may have gotten there when her four-year-old daughter attempted to wipe the blood off of her mother and wake
her up.
	Mike Nichols, the coroner of Coles County, testified that Warner
died of "massive blood loss" as a result of a "massive incise wound"
of the neck. Autopsy results indicated there were recent contusions to
the victim's vagina, which, the autopsy report concluded, may have
been the result of nonconsensual vaginal penetration.
	Patrick Callaghan testified that he was previously employed with
the Illinois State Police and had been involved in both the McNamara
and Warner murder investigations. He noted similarities in the two
murders and began looking for connections between defendant and
Amy Warner. He first learned that Doug Paul had indicated defendant
had admitted murdering Warner. Investigators then learned from
Patricia Winborn that defendant had been in Warner's house
approximately two weeks before the murder. Tara Hofer was
interviewed and told investigators she had to go to bed early on the
night of the murder and defendant had stayed up late. She said she
remembered the date because Warner's children went to the day-care
facility where she worked and the murder was "all of the talk the next
day." Callaghan testified, when he interviewed Hofer in August of
2001, Hofer told him she would love defendant even if he had
murdered McNamara and Warner.
	James Wright was called by the State to testify as an expert in the
field of crime scene investigation. Wright stated that he was employed
by Threat Assessment Group as a consultant on violent crime. He had
previously worked 30 years for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and of that, 25 years as a special agent. Wright testified he had
investigated homicides, rapes and arsons. As part of his duties, Wright
reviewed crime scene and autopsy photos, reviewed police reports,
and interviewed witnesses. He interviewed admitted murderers and
rapists, and he consulted with experts in the fields of psychiatry,
psychology, and medicine. At one point in his career, he was
transferred to the behavioral science unit of the FBI. While there, he
began a research project pertaining to serial rapists. As a part of that
project, Wright conducted interviews of serial rapists in sessions
lasting from 8 to 16 hours. The in-depth interviews focused upon the
subjects' social histories and behaviors. After the interviews, he and
other researchers reviewed the subjects' records to corroborate
information they had gathered. Wright testified he had been with
Threat Assessment Group for 4½ years. During that period, he had
been called upon for consultation in murder cases.
	In the instant case, Wright was asked to review autopsy photos,
crime scene photos, police reports, and witness statements, pertaining
to the murders of Shannon McNamara and Amy Warner. With respect
to the apartment building fire, Wright was provided with police
reports, photos, and reports of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, and the Charleston fire department. Wright
was asked to make comparisons and look for similarities in the two
murders and the arson. Wright was also provided with a criminal
history of defendant, a record of his contacts with police, as well as
his military and educational records.
	Wright said what he does is not a science. Rather, it is assessment
and analysis based solely on years of training and experience. The
State tendered Wright as an "expert in the area of criminal
investigation, particularly with regard to crime scenes."
	Under cross-examination, Wright stated he had been initially
asked in this case to compare the crimes and say "whatever [he] could
about the individual that committed the three crimes or if they could
possibly be connected." Wright was later requested to evaluate the
crimes, evaluate defendant, and render his opinion as to whether
defendant was responsible. Wright testified there were approximately
25 or 26 doctors, psychiatrists, and psychologists who work with his
company as consultants on their cases.
	At the conclusion of defense counsel's questioning, counsel
objected to Wright being qualified to testify as an expert. The trial
court overruled defendant's objection, and the State proceeded with
direct examination.
	Wright testified that crimes can be categorized as "organized" or
"disorganized." In an organized crime there is evidence of
preplanning, such as selecting a target and bringing a weapon. In a
disorganized crime there is no indication of preplanning, and the crime
scene "looks a lot sloppier." Wright stated that a crime might start out
organized and become disorganized if the perpetrator meets
unexpected resistance or is interrupted.
	Wright characterized the McNamara murder as a "mixed crime
scene." There was evidence of organization and preplanning in that
latex gloves were used to keep from leaving fingerprints, and there
was reason to believe an effort was initially made to enter the
apartment by "slipping" the door lock with a credit card that was
found at the scene. When that plan was thwarted by a deadbolt, an
alternative plan was utilized, i.e., cutting the window screen with a
box cutter to gain entry. Wright believed that was a sign of a fairly
organized person who, when confronted with something unexpected,
can recover and alter the original plan or use an alternate plan.
Moreover, there was evidence that defendant had been watching the
people who lived in that apartment, which was, again, a sign of
preplanning and organization.
	However, when defendant encountered unexpected resistance,
the crime became disorganized, and defendant left evidence behind.
Wright testified there were "indications of anger" in the commission
of the offense, particularly, "the probable stomping [of] the body to
lacerate the liver." Defense counsel objected on the ground that
Wright had "no psychological training or background" to make "those
kind of assessments." The court overruled the objection, and Wright
continued:
		"[A]nger can be *** caused by a lot of different things. But
certainly somebody resisting robs somebody of control and
tends to make people who like to have control very angry at
the person that takes that control from them."
Wright testified it appeared defendant regained his composure after
the struggle was over. He disposed of the murder weapon in a
dumpster and was later seen putting a handgun in the ceiling of a
janitor's closet in the gymnasium where he worked.
	Wright noted that the Warner murder appeared to have been
much more organized. There was a lesser degree of resistance.
Warner was apparently caught totally by surprise and quickly
overwhelmed. Wright noted there were wounds to the neck of both
victims. Similarly, Wright observed, reports from other young women
who had violent encounters with defendant indicated the throat had
been a point of attack. Wright pointed out another similarity between
the McNamara and Warner murder scenes: in each instance, the
victim's arms were extended over her head.
	Speaking of the attributes of arsonists, Wright noted that studies
indicate arsonists experience a "sense of power and control" in setting
a fire, particularly a large fire. Wright observed that, in defendant's
interaction with police, he was commonly uncooperative, belligerent
and combative. Wright stated defendant's history of activities with law
enforcement officers demonstrated a lack of respect for authority.
	Wright also commented on the newspaper article on the Warner
murder that defendant had posted in his apartment. Wright went on to
testify that serial killers and serial rapists tend to keep articles about
the crimes they commit.
	Wright testified, over objection, that defendant's history showed
a lot of anger toward women. He stated his belief that past behavior
is the best indicator of future behavior.
	Wright noted that the consumption of alcohol was often a factor
when defendant engaged in inappropriate behavior; however, his
violent and aggressive conduct continued even after he was
incarcerated. Moreover, Wright noted both the McNamara and
Warner murders exhibited preplanning. The preplanning of the
McNamara murder in particular shows that defendant was "thinking
fairly straightly" when he committed it. He was not in a drunken
stupor.
	Wright testified that he was familiar with the Anarchist's
Cookbook, which explains "how to make bombs, how to kill people,
how to disrupt government, how to be an anarchist."
	On cross-examination, Wright admitted there were dissimilarities
between the two murders. For example, Warner's body was not
mutilated to the extent that McNamara's was. Moreover, there was no
evidence of forced entry in the Warner murder. Wright maintained
that defendant was likely to repeat his conduct in the future since he
was "seemingly unable to learn from his mistakes."
	On redirect examination, Wright again acknowledged there were
differences in the Warner and McNamara murders, one being the
postmortem mutilation of McNamara's body. Wright insisted that
postmortem mutilation of a body is an expression of anger. Wright
testified a killer may display or pose the body of a murder victim to
shock, to show disrespect for the victim, or for a "few different
reasons." As to defense counsel's suggestion that defendant's violent
behavior may have resulted solely from his consumption of alcohol,
Wright observed that "drugs and alcohol are available in prison."
	After the victim's mother, Cindy McNamara, presented victim
impact testimony, the State rested, and the defense commenced its
case in mitigation.
	The defense first called Allen Mertz, defendant's father. Mertz
testified that he separated from defendant's mother around the time of
defendant's birth. He soon got custody of defendant and his siblings,
and the children initially went to live at his mother's house. After
Mertz acquired a suitable house, and he met the woman he would
eventually marry, the children moved in with him. Defendant was not
quite five years old. Mertz stated that defendant attended Rossville
Methodist Church as he grew up. Mertz thought he had a "fantastic
relationship" with defendant. The family would go fishing together,
and though he worked long hours, Mertz would occasionally make it
to defendant's football games. Mertz stated, for defendant's
eighteenth birthday, he got defendant a tattoo.
	Defendant's paternal grandmother, Dorothy French, testified that
defendant came to live with her when he was still in diapers. After
that, defendant's natural mother essentially had no contact with him
aside from sending him an occasional birthday card. French stated that
defendant lived with her until he was in the "third or fourth grade." He
stayed with her two or three years after his sisters went to live with
their father. Even after defendant went to live with his father, she still
saw defendant on weekends. She attended defendant's school
functions. She described defendant as: "Just like any boy, out playing,
digging in the dirt, and riding bicycles." Defendant's grandmother
identified various family photos, including one of defendant and his
father when defendant graduated from high school, and one of
defendant with a birthday cake when he was 16 or 17 years old.
	French testified that defendant attended Sunday school regularly,
and had a perfect attendance for 12 or 13 years. French took
defendant to church, and defendant's father would attend church
programs in which defendant was involved. French described
defendant as a "good boy" in high school. He got good grades and
participated in football. He left Rossville after graduation, when he
joined the Marines. After that, she saw him when he came home on
leave, as he would usually stay at her home. He often wrote her letters
and called her. After the Marines, defendant attended college at
Eastern Illinois University, and visited her on the weekends. She
stated, "To him, I'm his mom." French did not believe that defendant
was changed by his experience in the Marines.
	Brandy Mertz, defendant's youngest sister, initially testified that
she had "trouble remembering things at times." Asked why, she stated,
"I believe it's because of my stepmother hitting my head into the
wall." Defense counsel then asked her: "You don't know that but you
think that?" Brandy responded affirmatively.
	Despite her problems with recall, Brandy testified that she,
defendant, and their older sister, Christina, did not get along well with
their stepmother when they were children. Brandy testified: "She was
mean to us. She abused us." Brandy said that their sister, Christina,
was good to her and to defendant, she took care of them, and she
acted as their mother. According to Brandy, their stepsister, Rose,
was also mean to them, and sexually abused her. Brandy said she did
not tell her father because he would not have believed her. She stated
that her father and stepmother had a sign on their bedroom door
prohibiting entry. According to Brandy, her stepbrother, Bruce, also
tried to sexually abuse her. She acknowledged the first time she ever
told anyone about having been sexually abused was a month before
trial, when she "overheard [defendant] and Christina talking about it,
about them being sexually abused by Rose."
	On cross-examination, Brandy admitted that, despite the alleged
abuse she had suffered, she had never been arrested and had never
committed violent crimes against another person.
	Michael Mahorney, defendant's uncle, was called to testify, and
was initially questioned about the details of Mahorney's alcohol
consumption. Mahorney stated, earlier in his life, he had consumed
between one and two cases of beer a day. He claimed, later in life, he
drank "three to four fifths a night plus a six-pack or twelve pack of
beer and three or four shots of tequila. And that was seven nights a
week." Mahorney said, at the time of trial, he consumed perhaps one
beer every two months. Mahorney testified that defendant's father
usually drank brandy or beer, and Mahorney had only seen defendant's
father drunk on one occasion. Mahorney acknowledged, despite heavy
drinking during a portion of his life, he had only been arrested on one
occasion, for illegal consumption of alcohol, and his drinking never
resulted in violent behavior.
	Speaking of defendant, Mahorney described his nephew as a
"typical boy," who engaged in normal activities. Mahorney saw
defendant frequently when he was growing up-every weekend or
every other weekend-and Mahorney attended birthday or anniversary
parties where defendant was present.
	Lisa Masengale testified that she attended church with defendant
when she was growing up, and they were friends in high school.
Defendant was interested in history in high school, and he loved to
read. He was protective of underclassmen, and was himself picked on
to some extent. He was "not the most popular guy." After high
school, she corresponded with defendant while he was in the Marines,
and saw him occasionally when he was in college. In college, he
attended Bible classes for a while. He always had a strong connection
to church and family. Though she had seen him drunk, and had seen
him use drugs, she had never seen him angry. She had always seen
defendant treat his girlfriend, Tara Hofer, with respect.
	Darlene Edwards testified that defendant is her step-grandson and
she "knew him from his first two or three years" when he was "with
his mom." According to Edwards, when defendant cried, instead of
picking him up and feeding him, his mother screamed at him and let
him cry. Defendant's mother was a "very messy housekeeper" and did
not keep her children clean. Edwards testified to occasional and
moderate drinking by two members of defendant's maternal lineage.
	Myron Ward testified that he had been defendant's high school
history teacher. He remembered defendant as an average to slightly
below average student, and one who was, perhaps, indifferent to, or
not interested in, history. Ward said defendant was not exceptional as
a disciplinary problem, but he did share the details of one incident
when defendant shot a rubber band at him and defendant, when
confronted by Ward, made an inappropriate remark. Ward said, after
defendant got out of the service, he came to visit Ward in the
classroom, and defendant said "something to the effect that he was
sorry about some of his less than disciplinary manner in high school."
Ward explained, upon cross-examination, "I don't know if he
apologized so much as he expressed that he wished he had done
better." David McDonald, defendant's physical education teacher and
football coach in high school also testified regarding defendant's
participation in those programs.
	Ian Tuggle testified that he and defendant were friends as
children. They fished and played together. Tuggle visited in
defendant's home "just about every day" and knew defendant's sisters
and stepsiblings. On one occasion, when Tuggle stayed overnight at
defendant's house, Tuggle waited until defendant and his stepbrother,
Bruce, were asleep, then went into the bedroom of defendant's
stepsister, Rose, and had sex with her. Tuggle was 10 or 11 years old
at the time, and Rose was five years older. Tuggle testified he did not
feel the experience with Rose was "anything negative at all." He had
not experienced any problems later in life because of it. Tuggle stated
that he and defendant had always been friends, and defendant had not
had any problems with anyone in high school. He was just an "average
kid."
	Jennifer Walker tutored defendant in Spanish at Eastern Illinois
University. She also saw defendant when he went to church at the
Wesley Foundation in Charleston. Defendant told her a little about his
life and indicated his parents "weren't very involved with him." He
reminded her of someone who had had a difficult life. There was a
barrier that made it difficult to get to know defendant. On cross-examination, Walker acknowledged that she had not regularly
socialized with defendant; she had only visited with him twice after
services.
	Kathy and Jerry Douglas testified on defendant's behalf. They
met defendant when his grandmother first brought him to church. He
was one year old. Kathy Douglas described defendant, in his early
years, as "cute and ornery, funny," but not a discipline problem. She
described defendant's grandmother as "giving and caring," someone
who worked hard and lived for her family." Kathy Douglas stated that
defendant was very devoted to his grandmother; there was a special
bond between them. Jerry Douglas agreed that defendant was very
affectionate toward his grandmother. Kathy Douglas said that
defendant seemed to know where he was going and what he wanted
to do after he came back from the Marines. After defendant returned
from the Marines, Jerry Douglas hired defendant as a farm laborer.
Although defendant missed some days at the end of his term of
employment, Douglas considered him one of the best workers he had,
someone Douglas could trust to do as he was told.
	Michael Shirley, defendant's undergraduate advisor and history
professor at Eastern Illinois University, testified that defendant was a
"little above average" in academic ability. Shirley did not notice
anything out of the ordinary in defendant's interactions with other
students. Shirley recalled an occasion, when he had asked defendant
about a paper defendant had neglected to turn in, that defendant said
he was an alcoholic and was "having some problems." Shirley asked
defendant if he had ever been to Alcoholics Anonymous, and
defendant replied that he had. Shirley told defendant he should
probably start going again. Defendant, who normally smiled and
laughed when he spoke with Shirley, was initially impassive during
their discussion, but later started crying.
	Tara Hofer testified that she used to live with defendant and, on
one occasion, in 1999, he was physically abusive to her. Hofer recalled
a shopping trip to Terre Haute, Indiana, when she and defendant
passed the federal prison where Timothy McVeigh was housed. Hofer
said defendant made no comment about McVeigh. Hofer testified that
defendant had nightmares and his mood was "up and down" during
the year that she lived with him. He was sometimes verbally abusive.
He drank, heavily, three or four times a week. Sometimes, his attitude
toward her changed when he drank. He was kind to her when he was
sober. On occasion, after defendant drank, he could not remember
what he had done the night before. She told him he needed help, but
Hofer said she "couldn't force him to do it." Defendant did go to
Hour House, which Hofer "guessed" was a rehabilitation center. In
addition, defendant occasionally went to the Veterans Administration
hospital, where defendant was given Prozac and Paxil for depression.
	Hofer said she had visited with defendant's family. Defendant got
along well with his father, but there was tension between defendant
and his stepmother. Defendant called his grandmother, "Mom."
	Hofer testified that defendant came to bed at 2 a.m. on the night
of the Warner murder, and he was not drinking that night. Hofer said
she would have awakened if he had gotten out of bed after that. Hofer
stated she did not notice defendant get out of bed on the evening of
the fire either. Under cross-examination, Hofer admitted she had not
told Agent Callaghan that defendant had been in bed with her all
evening the night of the Warner murder. Hofer said the articles
concerning date rape on defendant's computer were ones she had
downloaded for a class presentation. She testified that other people
also used defendant's computer.
	Lisle Farnum, a friend of defendant's from the Marine Corps,
testified that defendant achieved the rank of lance corporal in the
Marines. Farnum generally described their duties and activities while
in the Marines. He described defendant as an excellent Marine. He
said defendant was disciplined, fair and honest. He had strong
leadership skills and "a good mind for organization." Farnum also
testified that they were given shots and pills prior to overseas
deployments to prevent, among other things, malaria. Farnum said the
regimen of drugs they were required to take made him "really sick."
Farnum also testified that the Marines had a suggested reading list,
and Mein Kampf was one of the books on that list. Farnum said they
drank a lot in their spare time, and fought a lot.
	Under cross-examination, Farnum stated they had last received
shots and pills in 1997. Farnum did not experience any lasting
problems as a result of the medication given him in the Marines.
Moreover, he acknowledged that his Marine experiences did not cause
him to fight with women.
	Rosella Ray testified that she had known defendant since he was
a little boy. She was his Sunday school teacher and his "faith partner"
for confirmation. Ray said defendant treated his grandmother with
great love and respect. Under cross-examination, Ray acknowledged
that defendant had the support of his church and a loving grandmother
as he grew up and throughout his years in high school.
	Summer Jacobsen Summers testified that she met defendant in
August of 1996 and they dated for several months. They had a sexual
relationship, which Summers described as "emotional." At that time,
defendant was not aggressive sexually. Defendant helped her with her
young daughter, and she considered the three of them a family unit.
Summers had seen defendant drunk, but never violent. She ended the
relationship when he went overseas, but she kept in contact with him.
She described defendant as "intelligent, hard working, organized,
supportive, caring."
	Lisa Hislop met defendant in a bar in 1999. They later dated and
the relationship eventually evolved into a sexual one. She described
defendant as "affectionate, cuddly, passionate." Hislop saw defendant
drunk, but never violent. Even after the relationship ended, she kept
in touch with defendant. She visited defendant after the Keri Guillory
incident. Defendant said he could not remember what had happened.
	Under cross-examination, Hislop admitted she met defendant
while he was still dating Summer Jacobsen Summers, but defendant
did not tell her about Summers. Hislop e-mailed defendant at "Cereal
Kilr 2000." Defendant told her the e-mail address "was something he
read or saw on TV."
	Brad Adams met defendant in the Marines and they remained
friends thereafter. Adams was defendant's roommate in Camp
Pendleton. After their first deployment to Okinawa, they began to
drink "excessive amounts." At one point, defendant would drink a
fifth of whiskey and a case of beer during a single session of drinking.
Defendant became violent when he drank. Once, defendant got into
a fight with a sergeant and Adams had to physically restrain defendant,
punching him a couple of times in order to subdue him. The next day,
defendant did not remember what had happened. He later spoke with
the sergeant, who did not ultimately file charges. Adams said there
were many occasions when defendant could not remember what had
happened the night before. When drinking, defendant could be
obnoxious, irritating, and hard to control. Adams said he knew
Darsann Baker. According to defendant, it was Baker who was out of
control at Camp Pendleton. Adams said the military police had to
subdue her. Adams admitted he and defendant got into trouble for
methamphetamine use while in the Marines.
	After he got out of the Marines, Adams lived in Louisiana with
Keri Guillory. After defendant's second visit with them, Guillory
complained that defendant was irritating and disrespectful. During
defendant's third visit, defendant became violent. He hit Guillory in
the kidneys at a bar, and later attacked her in her home.
	Adams said defendant had headaches frequently, and he took a
lot of prescription drugs. Defendant talked about militia groups in the
news. Asked what he said about them, Adams responded, "[I]t wasn't
anything abnormal."
	Summing up defendant as a Marine, Adams stated: "You could
trust [defendant]. You knew he had your back. You knew he could
carry his own. He wasn't going to drop the ball and you could depend
on him."
	Under cross-examination, Adams acknowledged he took the
same medication for malaria that defendant took before his overseas
deployment, yet Adams had not been charged with violent crimes and
had adjusted well to civilian life after his time in the military. Adams
admitted defendant had been demoted in rank as a result of his
methamphetamine use. Adams further acknowledged that defendant
had been ordered into rehabilitation, against his will, and that he
continued to drink afterward. Defendant was violent when he drank.
Adams conceded that defendant was disrespectful to his girlfriend,
Tara Hofer. Adams said he asked Guillory to drop the charges against
defendant, which resulted from defendant's attack on Guillory. Adams
tried, unsuccessfully, to get defendant to apologize to Guillory.
	Daniel Cavallini testified that he owned Cyber Data, a business
specializing in computer evidence and data recovery. Cavallini noted,
under certain circumstances, an Internet user would not need to have
a password. If, for example, a computer is already logged on to the
Internet, no password would be necessary. Cavallini also testified that
a person engaged in data recovery could not tell who was responsible
for the temporary Internet files on defendant's computer. Although
pornography was viewed on the computer, no pornography was saved
in a separate file. Cavallini acknowledged that he found articles on the
computer concerning the manufacture of methamphetamine and
racism. He found multiple pictures of Nazi war flags and symbols, as
well as files pertaining to "White Pride Worldwide." Cavallini
admitted that the Illinois State Police had "followed sound forensic
principles" in their analysis of defendant's computer files.
	Christina Mertz, defendant's older sister, testified that she,
defendant, and their sister lived with their natural mother prior to
moving in with their grandmother. She stated that her mother's house
was dirty, insect-ridden, and cold. She felt wanted and loved when
they lived with her grandmother.
	When their father remarried, they moved in with him. He worked
long hours and they really only saw him on weekends. Their
stepmother was prone to mood swings and rarely came out of her
bedroom. The children were not allowed in their parents' bedroom.
The children stayed away from their stepmother as much as possible.
Christina described an incident in her youth when her stepmother
made her take off an outfit-which her stepmother deemed
unacceptable-in front of her stepbrother and his friend. She was
wearing only a bra and panties underneath the outfit. Christina
testified that their stepmother punished them by spanking them with
a "switch from a tree." Christina said she tried to take the blame
whenever possible to protect defendant and Brandy.
	When defendant was in the Marines, he told Christina he thought
he had a drinking problem, and would try to quit, but he just
continued to drink. She tried to get defendant to participate in a
residential program with the Veteran's Administration before he went
to college, but defendant refused. Christina said her uncle Mike also
had problems with alcohol, as did two cousins, though she did not
provide details.
	Christina described her family as the "epitome of dysfunctional."
She claimed, a few years prior to her testimony, defendant told her he
had had a sexual encounter with their stepsister, Rose. Although
Christina had never seen defendant with their natural mother, she
acknowledged that defendant was very close to their grandmother.
She remembered defendant as a "goofy little boy who was always
happy up until *** around junior high school."
	Under cross-examination, Christina admitted that
she-notwithstanding her difficult childhood-has had a successful
career in, and associated with, the Air Force. Moreover, she noted
that defendant was able to control his drinking, or even abstain, when
he visited her.
	Barry Hargan, a forensic consultant focusing on substance abuse
evaluations, testified that he rendered opinions on "addictive
disorders," and he conducted a study of defendant. As a part of that
study, Hargan spoke with defendant and his sister, and reviewed
defendant's "records." Hargan determined that defendant satisfied the
criteria for alcohol dependence. Moreover, Hargan believed
defendant's dependence was genetically influenced. He stated there
was "a family history on both sides of the family including his father,
his uncle, his grandfather, and there was also suspicion that his mother
was also involved in alcohol abuse too." Hargan concluded, "[T]he
family history was quite significant from a hereditary or genetic
perspective that Mr. Mertz's alcoholism was genetically influenced."
Hargan also addressed the phenomenon known as an "alcoholic
blackout." Hargan testified that a "blackout" refers to a state of mind
during which the intoxicated person is unable to form memories of
what he or she is doing during the period of intoxication.
	Under cross-examination, Hargan acknowledged that he had
considered information contained in the reports of Dr. Park
Dietz-who had examined defendant in order to address a possible
voluntary intoxication defense-and Dr. Jerry Boyd-who had evaluated
defendant for fitness prior to trial-as well as that of James Wright. He
cited the report of Dr. Boyd. He had not been provided a transcript or
the tape recording of Dr. Dietz's interview with defendant. Upon
further questioning by the prosecutor, Hargan explained that an
"alcoholic blackout" refers only to the failure of the mind to
permanently record memory; it says nothing about a person's ability
to think, act, plan and organize while intoxicated. Moreover, Hargan
acknowledged that defendant, in his interview with Dr. Boyd, had
stated he "only rarely" had blackouts. Hargan responded that
defendant may have been minimizing his history in that regard.
	Jack Smith, a private investigator retained by defendant's
attorneys, testified that he went to defendant's apartment in July of
2001. He noted that some of the books and compact discs removed
from defendant's apartment bore innocuous titles. It was stipulated
that there were no compact discs by a band called Serial Killer.
Michael Dennis, a mitigation investigator for the defense, testified that
he received a letter from defendant's mother in which she stated that
she had no contact with defendant because his father would not permit
it.
	Defendant took the stand to testify in his own behalf. Defendant
testified that he could not remember his natural mother. His first
memory was living with his grandmother. Speaking of his time with
his grandmother, defendant stated, "Everything was perfect." He
considered his grandmother his mother, and his grandfather his father.
He went to church and Sunday school with his grandmother every
Sunday. He had perfect attendance for 13 years. Defendant said he
attended church from the time he started going with his grandmother
until the week before he was arrested.
	Defendant testified that he went to live with his father when he
was five or six years old. The house was rundown and disorganized
inside. He shared a room with his stepbrother, Bruce, with whom he
did not get along. Defendant said he and his sisters were not treated
as well as his stepsiblings. Bruce constantly picked on him, and he and
his sisters were punished for things they did not do. Defendant said he
was sexually molested by his stepsister, Rose, a year or two after he
moved in. Defendant testified he was around eight or nine years old
at the time. According to defendant, Rose asked him to come to her
room, where she undressed him and fondled him. Defendant said she
then got on top of him and tried to insert his penis into her vagina.
Defendant testified that happened several times.
	Defendant claimed that his father had struck him several times.
However, he also stated he did not see his father much. He said he
saw his father strike his stepmother a few times as well. His
stepmother usually stayed in her bedroom and kept a sign on the door
advising the children to keep out. His sister, Christina, was basically
his mother until he graduated from high school.
	Recalling his years in high school, defendant identified his favorite
class as history. He acknowledged the incident in history class when
he shot rubber bands at the teacher and then made an "untoward
remark" when confronted by the teacher. Defendant said he went back
and spoke to his teacher about that incident six years later. Although
defendant's father did not attend his football games, his stepmother
attended one. His father and stepmother did attend his high school
graduation. Defendant stated his goal upon graduation was to get out
of his parents' house. His father got him a tattoo for his eighteenth
birthday, and defendant got drunk to celebrate.
	Defendant joined the Marines upon graduation, and he testified
he enjoyed the regimented lifestyle. However, after a few months he
and his friends began to drink heavily. Defendant said they would get
"falling-down drunk" on weekends, and they would occasionally
experience blackouts. Defendant testified at length about the drinking
and fighting of his days in the Marines. Defendant also testified
regarding his use of methamphetamine. Defendant said he had already
been cited three times for drinking when he tested positive for
methamphetamine. He had already been reduced in rank from corporal
to lance corporal for drinking. After the positive test for
methamphetamine, he was court-martialed and reduced in rank from
lance corporal to private, and was sent to the brig for 30 days. After
that, defendant was discharged from the Marines. Defendant
attributed his demotions solely to his inability to cope with alcohol.
Notwithstanding his disciplinary problems in the Marine Corps,
defendant said he did receive various commendations and certificates
as well.
	Defendant stated there were periods of time in the military when
his drinking was somewhat in check. According to defendant, Summer
Jacobsen Summers and Lisa Hislop helped him to stay sober.
Defendant said he dated Summers after his first overseas deployment,
and he was "madly and deeply in love with her." Defendant stated they
"pushed each other apart" shortly before his second deployment, and
he was heartbroken at the breakup.
	Defendant participated in counseling and an in-patient treatment
program during his time in the Marines. He was given Antabuse, and
he said he stayed sober for three months thereafter. Defendant
supplied exhaustive details of his drinking habits in college. Defendant
said he went to the university's counseling center for his drinking, and
was told to go to the Veteran's Administration facility in Danville. A
doctor there prescribed various medications, including clonazepam,
oxazepam, trazadone, and paroxetine. Defendant claimed he got no
counseling, just medication.
	Defendant acknowledged he had been arrested for drunk driving
on four occasions and he had violated a city ordinance when he was
found passed out, drunk, and naked in front of his apartment building.
Defendant said he could not recall some of his more egregious
conduct. He stated he had been in a couple of fights he did not
remember; someone told him about them afterward. He claimed he
could not recall pushing Joyner to the ground. Defendant also claimed
he did not remember the Keri Guillory incident. He testified he did not
know if he killed Shannon McNamara, but he admitted the evidence
pointed to him.
	Defendant denied that he had admitted to fellow inmates that he
had killed McNamara, or that he intended to make such an admission
in the event he was acquitted. Defendant denied burning down the
apartment building across from his residence. He said he slept with
Hofer the night the fire was set. He admitted stating that he had
burned down the building, but claimed he was just joking. Defendant
also denied killing Amy Warner. He stated he was not drinking that
night, so he could not have blacked out. He acknowledged he had
been to Warner's residence three weeks before her murder. He
conceded that he had told people he had killed Warner, but he
attributed his comments to "a poor sense of humor."
	Defendant stated that other people had access to, and used, his
computer; however, he admitted that he had visited some of the
pornographic sites recorded in his temporary files. Defendant also
admitted his computer password was "Cereal Kilr," which he claimed
came from a song by the band Insane Clown Posse and from
columnist Dave Barry. Defendant denied that he had hidden a gun in
the janitor's supply room where he worked.
	Defendant testified that Marines were given shots for a variety of
diseases-including malaria-prior to overseas deployments. Defendant
admitted he did not know what drugs they were given.
	In his testimony, defendant implied that certain books in his
library might have been on the Marine Corps' suggested reading list.
Defendant said he saved his Marine Corps manuals for the knowledge
contained therein. He said he was not an admirer of Timothy McVeigh
or David Koresh. He stated he does not support the overthrow of the
government.
	Under cross-examination, defendant admitted he started out in
the Marines as a private, and he ended up as a private. He denied that
he had visited all of the pornographic sites on his computer. He did
not specify which sites he had visited. He said he did have nude
pictures of former girlfriends in sexual poses. Defendant
acknowledged he had denied anal intercourse with Randi Morris when
he was interviewed by Dr. Park Dietz. Thus, he admitted he
remembered the incident. Defendant told Dietz, "It slipped. It poked
her and she freaks out and that is it. *** I did put my hand over her
mouth, like, shut up man. What are you freaking out about?" When
defendant was interviewed by the police after McNamara's murder, he
told them he recalled he had gotten scratches on his hand from a
broken shot glass the night of McNamara's murder. In February of
2000, during a visit to the Veterans Administration hospital, defendant
reported to Dr. Kahlon that he did not have any problems with his
memory. Although defendant maintained, under cross-examination,
that the medications he received from the Veterans Administration
hospital did not help him, he acknowledged that, during a return visit
in January of 2001, he had reported he was feeling a lot better.
Contrary to his trial testimony, in his interview with Dr. Boyd,
defendant had reported he rarely experienced memory blackouts.
	Under further questioning, defendant admitted he was asked, on
a Marine screening questionnaire, if he had ever been sexually abused
as a child or an adolescent. He indicated he had not. He conceded he
did not tell anyone at the university counseling center about the
alleged abuse, he did not tell anyone at the Veterans Administration,
and he could not recall telling Dr. Boyd. The first person he told was
Dr. Mark Cunningham, the expert retained by the defense, in an
interview one month before trial.
	Finally, defendant conceded he may have told a counselor at the
university that he had tried to commit suicide, but would not try again;
rather, he would "kill others to force the police to kill him." Defendant
acknowledged he had two tattoos of the Grim Reaper and, on his
back, a large tattoo of a cross with skulls around it. As a follow-up to
defendant's extensive testimony regarding his religious beliefs and
participation in church activities, the prosecutor asked defendant to
explain what he meant when he referred to himself as an "agnostic
Methodist." Dependent responded, "I can't honestly tell you."
Defendant admitted that he resented organized religion and had
referred to it as a scam and a crutch for the weak.
	Defendant's final witness was Dr. Mark Cunningham, a clinical
and forensic psychologist, who testified regarding defendant's
"damaging developmental factors and experiences." Cunningham said
his opinions were based upon information obtained from relatives and
others who knew defendant, as well as from school records, military
records, and offense records.
	Cunningham first found that defendant had a genetic
predisposition to alcohol dependence and mood disorder. According
to Cunningham, there was a significant incidence of alcoholism and
depression in defendant's family tree. He cited case studies indicating
that alcohol and drug abuse have a strong hereditary risk factor. He
testified that family behavioral patterns also affect the predisposition.
	Cunningham also testified regarding the concepts, effects and
consequences of "sequential damage," "modeling," and "scripting." In
essence, Cunningham espoused a form of behavioral determinism in
which a child who is subjected to emotional depravation is forever
damaged, the child will invariably adopt the behavioral patterns of
parents and perpetuate them in rearing the next generation, and the
child will follow a "story line." Cunningham described "scripting" as
"what is supposed to happen in your life."
	Applying those principles to defendant, Cunningham testified that
defendant was abandoned physically and emotionally as a child, and,
as a result, his "primary attachments" were disrupted. Defendant
began his life living with his mother in "a situation that can only be
described as pretty much neglect." Cunningham concluded that
defendant's mother had not responded to defendant in a "maternal
way." Moreover, when defendant's father got custody, he did not
make up for the maternal void. Cunningham stated that a good and
caring mother in the first year or two of life is critical. Cunningham
stated that defendant had also reported childhood sexual abuse at the
hands of his stepsister and stepbrother when defendant was 10 or 11
years old. Cunningham cited studies of sexual homicides conducted by
the FBI's behavioral science unit. He noted, "[A]t the core of those
homicides, they found disturbed attachments to the parents or to other
members of the family during the childhood of these offenders."
	Cunningham opined that the influence of family environment on
a child's social development lasts a lifetime, and a child who is
neglected during his early years has increased risks for psychological
disorders, behavioral problems, and violent offending. Cunningham
testified that the family characteristics of a sexual homicide offender
include poor attachment, neglect, instability of home structure, poor
relationships with parents, abandonment, physical and psychological
abuse, family sex problems, and sexual abuse. Cunningham said he
saw many of those factors in defendant's history. Notwithstanding
those risk factors, defendant's inhibitions seemed to work well when
he was sober. Cunningham believed they were insufficient when he
became intoxicated, and defendant then tended to engage in
aggressive behavior.
	Although Cunningham had no expertise in either psychiatry or
pharmacology, he testified regarding the possible side effects of the
drug Lariam, providing the jury with information he got from a
pharmacological flyer. Cunningham assumed Lariam had been given
to defendant because it is the antimalarial drug of choice for the
United States military. Cunningham testified that Lariam may cause
anxiety, paranoia, psychotic behavior, headaches and sleep disorders.
Cunningham also testified regarding the possible side effects of Paxil.
	Cunningham conceded that most people who have risk factors
and histories similar to defendant's do not commit an offense like the
McNamara murder. He admitted that defendant had a choice in the
matter and there was "some moral culpability." However,
Cunningham considered it "a function of degree."
	Cunningham also offered risk assessment testimony. He stated it
is incorrect to assume that a defendant sentenced to natural life would
be more violent because he has nothing to lose, or that violent
offenders are more likely to be violent in prison. Cunningham testified
that the security, structure, and consequences of incarceration are
significant curbs. He stated that inmates have no access to highly
lethal weapons and, though there is access to drugs and alcohol, it is
"much reduced compared to what somebody can maintain in the
community." Cunningham said that inmates with long prison sentences
have lower rates of disciplinary infractions and, as inmates get older,
their rates decrease as well. Cunningham assessed defendant's risk of
further serious violence at between 9.2% and 14.8%.
	Under cross-examination, Cunningham acknowledged that
alcohol and drugs are available in prison. He admitted he knew of no
case in which the ingestion of Lariam had been connected to the
commission of a murder. Although he conceded that most Marines get
out of the service and do not commit murder, he said he believed the
use of Lariam, "several years" prior to the murder, might have been
"a potential contributor." He admitted he could not "draw a *** direct
certain nexus" between Lariam and murder. Cunningham also
suggested that Paxil "could have some contributory role."
Cunningham agreed that he, as a psychologist, is not in a position to
sit in judgment of a physician's decision to prescribe medication for
his patient.
	Cunningham acknowledged that he had reviewed the transcript
of defendant's interview with Dr. Dietz. Cunningham said he had in
fact relied on it as a primary source of information in drawing his own
conclusions. In a series of questions, the prosecutor then asked
Cunningham if he was aware of certain responses defendant had given
in his interview with Dietz, and Cunningham responded affirmatively.
In that interview, defendant had described his father as "kind," not
"cold," "generous," not "miserly," "peaceful," not "violent," "hard
working," not "lazy," a "teetotaler," not a "drunk," "law abiding," not
"criminal." Defendant was asked if he respected his father, to which
he replied, "Yeah." Defendant was asked if he had looked up to his
father, to which he replied, "Still do." In his interview with Dietz,
defendant denied that anyone had ever abused him, physically or
sexually. Defendant denied that he felt emotionally abused or
neglected as a child. Defendant in fact told Dietz: "I was extremely
happy as a youngster." Defendant stated he had a good childhood.
Defendant admitted he had a loving grandmother who cared for him
and was interested in his activities. Cunningham conceded that
defendant's grandmother was a good influence on him, and that she
and the church provided defendant with solid underpinnings.
Cunningham admitted that most people with backgrounds similar to
defendant's do not commit murder.
	Although Cunningham acknowledged the answers defendant had
given in his interview with Dietz, Cunningham later testified that
defendant, in that interview, "seemed to be trying to protect his family
and not blame them for the situation that he was in." Cunningham
suggested that capital defendants typically do not report things that
happened to them as they grew up. Cunningham said he was not
surprised that "the truth is inconsistent with Anthony's answers on
that date."
	With respect to the issue of defendant's future dangerousness,
Cunningham did concede that a pattern of violence while incarcerated
"is far more predictive than the group statistical rate."
	At the conclusion of Cunningham's testimony, the jury heard
closing arguments, was given applicable instruction, and retired to
consider its verdict. In just under three hours, the jury unanimously
returned a verdict. That verdict read: "We, the jury, unanimously find
that there is no mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the imposition
of a death sentence. The court shall sentence the Defendant, Anthony
B. Mertz, to death." The jury was polled and each juror affirmed that
was his or her verdict. Pursuant to defendant's earlier jury waiver, the
court subsequently found all three offenses-first degree murder, home
invasion, and aggravated criminal sexual assault-were accompanied
by exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of Shannon
McNamara, and to 60 years' imprisonment for home invasion.


ANALYSIS
	We begin our analysis by reaffirming certain general principles
that apply to our review of capital sentencing proceedings. We do so
with a full appreciation of the laudable death penalty reforms recently
enacted by the legislature, reforms meant to ensure that only the guilty
are convicted, and only those deserving of the ultimate penalty are so
sentenced. In reiterating the following, well-established principles, we
are cognizant of the responsibility we have been given to override a
jury's sentencing verdict-absent any trial error-if we believe the
imposition of a death penalty is "fundamentally unfair" in a given case.
See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(i) (West 2004). Although we are prepared to
exercise that authority in appropriate cases, we will not lightly
disregard the decision of a jury, where a defendant has exercised his
right to sentencing by a jury of his peers, and that jury has spoken.
	With these precepts in mind, we note that the decision made at
the second stage of a death penalty hearing is, and always has been, a
process of evidentiary balancing. Compare 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g), (h)
(West 2004), with People v. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d 151, 188 (2002) ("A
balancing process of the aggravation and mitigation evidence
presented is required of the sentencing authority"), and People v.
Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d 109, 145 (1991). As Justice Harrison wrote in
People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414, 432 (1995):
		"The decision made at the second stage of a death penalty
hearing[,] when factors in mitigation and in aggravation are
considered[,] is a process of balancing in which evidence in
aggravation is measured against that in mitigation. [Citation.]
The decision of a capital sentencing jury will not be
overturned lightly, particularly where that decision is amply
supported by the record."
However, when requested to do so, this court reviews the evidence
adduced in capital sentencing proceedings, irrespective of claims of
error, to determine whether death is the appropriate penalty. As we
stated in Ballard:
			"In determining whether a sentence of death is proper, we
must consider 'the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense.'
People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d 353, 388 (1990), citing
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976). '[E]ach capital case
is unique and must be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on
whether the circumstances of the crime and the character of
the defendant are such that the deterrent and retributive
functions of the ultimate sanction will be served by imposing
the death penalty.' People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 280
(1989). 'A death sentence is appropriate if the sentence is
commensurate with the seriousness of the offenses and gives
adequate consideration to relevant mitigating circumstances.'
Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d  at 388." Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 179.
	Once a jury finds a defendant eligible for the death penalty, the
jury is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death
is the appropriate punishment. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 142, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2193 (1994);
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1171, 1185,
103 S. Ct. 3446, 3457 (1983). A defendant's character, prior criminal
history, mental capacity, background, age, and future dangerousness
are just a few of the factors that a jury may consider in fixing the
appropriate punishment. Simmons, 512 U.S.  at 163, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at
142, 114 S. Ct.  at 2193-94. "Both a backward-looking and a forward-looking inquiry are a permissible part of the sentencing process ***."
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 977, 129 L. Ed. 2d 750, 762,
114 S. Ct. 2630, 2637 (1994). In Simmons, the Supreme Court noted,
"This Court has approved the jury's consideration of future
dangerousness during the penalty phase of a capital trial, recognizing
that a defendant's future dangerousness bears on all sentencing
determinations made in our criminal justice system." Simmons, 512 U.S.  at 162, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 141-42, 114 S. Ct.  at 2193. The fact
that a defendant is parole ineligible does not prevent the State from
arguing that the defendant poses a future danger, as the State may
reasonably argue that defendant will pose a danger to others in prison
and that executing him is the only means of eliminating the threat to
the safety of other inmates or prison staff. Simmons, 512 U.S.  at 165
n.5, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 143 n.5, 114 S. Ct.  at 2194 n.5.
	In assessing the weight of the evidence, and the effect of any
error in sentencing proceedings, the doctrine of harmless error applies
in appropriate cases. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 194; People v. Williams,
193 Ill. 2d 306, 369-71 (2000); People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 19
(2000).


I. Admission of Evidence Pertaining to Uncharged Offenses
	We first consider defendant's argument that "the aggravation as
to both the Warner murder and the suspected arson raise a significant
risk the jury imposed the death penalty based on a crime, or crimes,
defendant didn't commit." Defendant notes that he was never
prosecuted for those crimes. He suggests "the standard of reliability
for admission of an uncharged crime should be at least a
preponderance of the evidence."
	As this court noted in People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 125
(2001), the ordinary rules of evidence are relaxed at the second stage
of a capital sentencing hearing so that the sentencer may "possess the
fullest information possible with respect to the defendant's life,
character, criminal record, and the circumstances of the particular
offense." Section 9-1(e) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS
5/9-1(e) (West 2000)) provides: "Any information relevant to any
additional aggravating factors or any mitigating factors indicated in
subsection (c) may be presented by the State or defendant regardless
of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence
at criminal trials. The State and the defendant shall be given fair
opportunity to rebut any information received at the hearing." It is the
opportunity to test and rebut that is critical to an assessment of
reliability, as was indicated by the Supreme Court in Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 63, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 199, 200, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1370, 1371 (2004) (the confrontation clause "commands,
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination."
"Reliability [itself] is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective,
concept").
	Our precedents establish that the only requirement for the
admissibility of evidence at this stage of a capital sentencing hearing
is that the evidence be relevant and reliable (Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d at
125), and it matters not that the crime in question was never
prosecuted. People v. Simms, 168 Ill. 2d 176, 192 (1995). The
determination as to relevance and reliability rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d  at 125. The trial
court-which did a commendable job during the course of defendant's
trial-did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence relating to the
Warner murder and the burning of the apartment building across the
street from defendant's residence.
	It is, to say the least, unusual for a defendant to tell his friends he
committed two heinous crimes, and later acknowledge his own
statements, but argue they are unreliable, the result of a "poor sense
of humor." Although we are aware of no similar situation in our case
precedent, our decision in People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 29 (1996), is
instructive.
	In Kidd, the defendant argued that the trial judge had erred in
allowing the State to introduce as evidence-during the guilt/innocence
phase of his trial-his testimony from LeRoy Orange's trial on the same
charges, and his testimony from his own previous sentencing hearing.
The defendant contended that both excerpts of his earlier testimony
required exclusion because the evidence was false. Defendant
submitted that admission of the statements violated the rule forbidding
the prosecution from knowingly presenting perjured testimony. In
support of that theory, defendant noted, when he had testified at
Orange's trial, the prosecution had impeached him with statements he
made to the police following his arrest. The defendant suggested that
the State had thus conceded the falsity of statements made in the
course of his prior testimony, in which he had admitted his
involvement in the charged offenses. See Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 28-29.
	This court rejected defendant's argument, stating:
		"The statements at issue were all made by the defendant and,
so long as they were relevant to the case, could be introduced
against him as admissions of a party opponent. [Citations.] If
the defendant has given various accounts of his activities on
the night of the offenses, then, as the trial judge noted in
refusing to exclude the prior testimony, 'that's his problem,
and he has to live with it.' We do not believe that the State
must now be disabled from presenting the defendant's earlier
inculpatory statements simply because there are discrepancies
in what the defendant has said at different times on different
occasions." Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d  at 29.
	Like the defendant in Kidd, the defendant in this case clearly
made the statements in question, stating that he had murdered Warner
and had burned down the apartment building. He acknowledges that
he made the statements. However, he now suggests that the
statements are untrue and attributes his unsolicited statements to "a
poor sense of humor." There is no suggestion in the record that
defendant was delusional when he made the statements, or that he was
prompted or goaded into making them.
	As Kidd suggests, evidence is not necessarily unreliable simply
because defendant chooses to present testimony controverting it, or
attempts to explain away the statement by reference to the context in
which it is made. We believe it is highly unlikely that anyone would
make such comments in jest, and, given the totality of the evidence
before the jury, it was certainly reasonable for the jury to doubt
defendant's explanation. The statements are relevant, and they are
reliable in the sense that there is no question that they were made, and
made voluntarily and without prompting. Beyond that, defendant's
motive for making them was a matter for the jury.
	Moreover, with respect to the Warner murder, there was
substantial evidence to corroborate defendant's admissions that he had
killed Warner. For instance, when defendant told his friend, Douglas
Paul, that he had killed Warner, defendant referred to Warner as
"white trash," the very same term he had used to refer to Darsann
Barker after he sexually assaulted her. The use of that disparaging
epithet suggests a malice inconsistent with intended "humor."
Moreover, the jury not only heard testimony from defendant's friends
about his admissions, but also learned that defendant had been in
Warner's residence only two or three weeks prior to the murder, and
he had kept an article about Warner's murder pinned up on his wall,
indicating that the murder held some special significance for him. In
his testimony, defendant denied that he even knew Warner. There
were also obvious similarities between the McNamara murder-which
defendant does not dispute he committed-and the Warner murder.
There were sexual components to both murders, both victims had
large incise wounds to their necks, and both victims were found
"posed" in a nearly identical fashion, with their arms outstretched
above their heads, as crime scene photos clearly indicate. Finally,
Warner's neck was the primary point of attack-her throat having been
slashed-and the same was true in defendant's known attacks on other
women: manual strangulation was one of the causes of McNamara's
death; defendant forcefully twisted the neck of Randi Morris during
his sexual assault of her; and defendant even choked his own
girlfriend, Tara Hofer, during one of many episodes of violence. Thus,
there was substantial evidence corroborating defendant's statements
that he committed the Warner murder.
	In our opinion, there is no question about the reliability and
admissibility of defendant's statements implicating himself in the
Warner murder and the arson. While there was substantial
corroboration of defendant's statements admitting the murder of Amy
Warner, we hold defendant's unsolicited and acknowledged
admissions to his friends, were admissible, standing alone, even
without corroboration. Again, the ordinary rules of evidence are
relaxed at the second stage of a capital sentencing hearing. Caffey,
205 Ill. 2d  at 125. The statements at issue were voluntary. They were
not made to police officers in a custodial setting or to jailhouse
informants. They were made to defendant's friends, with no
prompting whatsoever. Defendant's friends testified that he made the
statements, and he acknowledges he made them. It was for the jury to
ultimately decide whether the statements were the product of a "poor
sense of humor," as defendant suggested, or genuine admissions of
responsibility. In either case, the statements qualify for second-stage
admission under the standards of relevance and reliability. See
generally People v. Milka, 211 Ill. 2d 150, 180 (2004) (where
defendant unquestionably made the statements at issue, the
circumstances under which defendant's statements were made, and his
motive in making them, were held to be matters for the jury to
consider, rather than issues of reliability).



II. First and Second Amendment Issues
	We turn now to defendant's contention that the admission of
certain other types of evidence violated his rights under the first and
second amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as
similar provisions of the Illinois Constitution, and violated his right to
a fair sentencing hearing, in that the evidence was irrelevant or
unreliable. Specifically, defendant asserts that his rights were violated
when the State introduced evidence of his Internet viewing of sexually
explicit sites, nude photos of his girlfriends, his e-mail address, his
tattoos, the books he possessed, his possession of guns, and his
"political" statements.
	In support of his argument, defendant relies primarily upon the
Supreme Court's opinion in Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 117 L. Ed. 2d 309, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992). We believe defendant reads
Dawson much too broadly.
	The defendant in Dawson was a member of a prison gang called
the "Aryan Brotherhood." During the penalty phase of Dawson's trial,
the following stipulation was entered into evidence. " 'The Aryan
Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the
1960's in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities.
Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist
in many state prisons including Delaware.' " Dawson, 503 U.S.  at
162, 117 L. Ed. 2d  at 315, 112 S. Ct.  at 1096. The defendant in
Dawson later claimed the stipulation violated his constitutional rights.
Dawson cited the Supreme Court's decision in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983), wherein the
Court had held that an aggravating circumstance is invalid if "it
authorizes a jury to draw adverse inferences from conduct that is
constitutionally protected." Zant, 462 U.S.  at 885, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at
255, 103 S. Ct.  at 2747. Relying upon Zant, Dawson argued that "the
Constitution forbids the consideration in sentencing of any evidence
concerning beliefs or activities that are protected under the First
Amendment." Dawson, 503 U.S.  at 164, 117 L. Ed. 2d  at 316, 112 S. Ct.  at 1097.
	The Supreme Court rejected such a broad reading of Zant,
stating, "the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the
admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs and associations at
sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected
by the First Amendment." Dawson, 503 U.S.  at 165, 117 L. Ed. 2d  at
317, 112 S. Ct.  at 1097. The Court, nonetheless, held that the
stipulation violated defendant's constitutional rights, and explained
why:
		"Before the penalty hearing, the prosecution claimed that its
expert witness would show that the Aryan Brotherhood is a
white racist prison gang that is associated with drugs and
violent escape attempts at prisons, and that advocates the
murder of fellow inmates. If credible and otherwise
admissible evidence to that effect had been presented, we
would have a much different case. But, after reaching an
agreement with Dawson, the prosecution limited its proof
regarding the Aryan Brotherhood to the stipulation. The brief
stipulation proved only that an Aryan Brotherhood prison
gang originated in California in the 1960's, that it entertains
white racist beliefs, and that a separate gang in the Delaware
prison system calls itself the Aryan Brotherhood. We
conclude that the narrowness of the stipulation left the Aryan
Brotherhood evidence totally without relevance to Dawson's
sentencing proceeding." Dawson, 503 U.S.  at 165, 117 L. Ed. 2d  at 317, 112 S. Ct.  at 1097.
The Court's concluding comments provide guidance as to the kind of
evidence that would be admissible:
			"Because the prosecution did not prove that the Aryan
Brotherhood had committed any unlawful or violent acts, or
had even endorsed such acts, the Aryan Brotherhood
evidence was also not relevant to help prove any aggravating
circumstance. In many cases, for example, associational
evidence might serve a legitimate purpose in showing that a
defendant represents a future danger to society. A
defendant's membership in an organization that endorses the
killing of any identifiable group, for example, might be
relevant to a jury's inquiry into whether the defendant will be
dangerous in the future. Other evidence concerning a
defendant's associations might be relevant in proving other
aggravating circumstances. But the inference which the jury
was invited to draw in this case tended to prove nothing more
than the abstract beliefs of the Delaware chapter." Dawson,
503 U.S.  at 166, 117 L. Ed. 2d  at 318, 112 S. Ct.  at 1098.
	We find that most, if not all, of the evidence at issue in this case
is admissible under the principles enunciated in Dawson. To the extent
that some of this evidence may have been improperly admitted, its
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of
overwhelming aggravating evidence.
	We first find that all evidence of a sexual nature was properly
admitted, including Internet images of women engaging in sexual acts
with a dog and a horse, women in sexually explicit positions, nude
children, sexually explicit cartoons, and the articles on date rape.
Although the defense presented testimony that other people had
access to defendant's computer, and that Tara Hofer was responsible
for the date rape articles, defendant admitted that he had visited some
pornographic sites, without specifying which ones. The images and the
articles were found on defendant's computer. They were properly
admitted, as were the nude photos of defendant's girlfriends. The
plausibility of the defense testimony was for the jury to decide,
considering it in conjunction with other evidence of defendant's sexual
conduct. The relevance of this evidence is obvious.
	Evidence of defendant's obsession with sex was properly
admitted because both the McNamara and Warner murders had sexual
components, there was evidence that defendant had used violence or
force in other sexual encounters, and defendant had, in other ways,
demeaned and denigrated some of the women with whom he had had
relationships. Thus, evidence of this nature bore upon the issue of
defendant's future dangerousness. We note that similar evidence was
held to have been properly admitted in Boyle v. Johnson, 93 F.3d 180,
184-85 (5th Cir. 1996). As the court of appeals stated in Boyle:
		"Here the state put on evidence that Boyle was obsessed with
sex, and that his sexual expression had a violent component.
Unlike the situation in Dawson, where there was no
connection between the evidence presented and the crime
committed, Boyle was convicted for a murder which had a
sexual component. *** Evidence of Boyle's sexual obsession
was thus relevant to the issue of Boyle's future
dangerousness ***." Boyle, 93 F.3d  at 184-85.
In this case, defendant's sexual obsession, and its relevance to his
future dangerousness, is amply demonstrated by his lewd and morbid
sexual overture to a female correctional officer while awaiting trial for
Shannon McNamara's murder, a comment suggesting that he would
have sex with the officer's dead body. That statement underscores the
relevance and extent of defendant's sexual obsession, and shows that
defendant is incorrigible and remains a danger to society whether he
is drunk or sober, incarcerated or not. We conclude that all evidence
bearing upon defendant's sexual obsession was relevant aggravating
evidence and was properly admitted.
	Similarly, we find no error in the admission of evidence regarding
defendant's tattoos and his e-mail address, "Cereal Kilr 2000." As
previously mentioned, defendant had two tattoos of the Grim Reaper
and another of a cross surrounded by skulls. In light of the
overwhelming evidence that defendant brutally murdered Shannon
McNamara in June of 2001, the substantial evidence that he had done
the same to Amy Warner in June of 1999, the graphic testimony of
Randi Morris, which suggested that she too might have met her end
at defendant's hands, but for her plea to defendant to spare her life,
defendant's statement to her that the Marines had taught him to kill
without remorse, and his statement to a university counselor that he
would kill others to force the police to kill him, we believe the
challenged evidence provides additional, inferential insight into the
defendant's state of mind, then, and now. Defendant's state of mind
during the commission of the charged offenses is a relevant
consideration in capital sentencing. See People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 334 (1998); People v. Turner, 156 Ill. 2d 354, 367 (1993).
Defendant might well consider himself a "serial killer," or the "Grim
Reaper," remorselessly snuffing out life when and where he chooses.
The tattoos and e-mail address were thus relevant and sufficiently
related to defendant's conduct to pass muster under Dawson. It was
for the jury to decide whether these were other manifestations of
defendant's "poor sense of humor"-like his "joking" statements that
he killed Warner, and his "joking" statement that he had burned down
an apartment building-or windows into the mind of a serial killer, who
was fixated upon violence, death and killing, and who thus represents
a continuing threat to those around him.
	Even assuming, arguendo, the admission of brief testimony
regarding defendant's tattoos and e-mail address was error, we find
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the
overwhelming aggravating evidence presented in this case. See People
v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133, 156 (1996) (holding that the erroneous
introduction of such evidence is subject to harmless error analysis).
Given the extensive evidence of defendant's sexual obsession, violent
acts and threatening behavior, the notion that the exclusion of this
evidence would have made a difference in the jury's verdict is simply
not plausible.
	We next consider defendant's contention that the trial court erred
in allowing testimony regarding the books he possessed. The State
presented testimony that defendant had books entitled "Pipe and Fire
Bomb Designs," "The Anarchist's Cookbook," "SS: Blood Soaked
Soil," "Hitler's Enforcers," "Mein Kampf," as well as Marine Corps
training manuals. Defendant argues that the books on "Hitler, Nazism,
anarchism, and Marine training were irrelevant aggravation protected
by the First Amendment." We disagree.
	In Dawson, the Supreme Court made clear that, had the State
presented "credible and otherwise admissible evidence" that the Aryan
Brotherhood was "associated with drugs and violent escape attempts
at prisons," and advocated "the murder of fellow inmates," the Court
would have been confronted with a "much different case." Dawson,
503 U.S.  at 165, 117 L. Ed. 2d  at 317, 112 S. Ct.  at 1097. The Court
also provided guidelines for admission of evidence that would
otherwise be subject to first amendment protection. The court
suggested that evidence of defendant's membership in the gang might
have been proper had the State proven that the Aryan Brotherhood
"had committed any unlawful or violent acts, or had even endorsed
such acts." Dawson, 503 U.S.  at 166, 117 L. Ed. 2d  at 318, 112 S. Ct. 
at 1098. The Court noted: "A defendant's membership in an
organization that endorses the killing of any identifiable group, for
example, might be relevant to a jury's inquiry into whether the
defendant will be dangerous in the future." Dawson, 503 U.S.  at 166,
117 L. Ed. 2d  at 318, 112 S. Ct.  at 1098.
	Given the facts of this case, the exclusionary principles of
Dawson do not apply. We have a "much different case" here.
Defendant admitted to friends that he had burned down an apartment
building. He effectively endorsed Hitler's extermination of millions of
human beings when he told Randi Morris he respected Hitler for
trying to "purify his race." On one occasion, defendant shouted a
racial epithet at an African-American and provoked a physical
confrontation. As previously mentioned, he told Morris the Marines
taught him to kill without remorse. The description of defendant's
actions in his assaults on women-routinely trying to cut off the
victim's air supply or attack the victim's neck-suggests maneuvers
learned in military training. In light of this evidence, we believe
testimony regarding these books was properly admitted. The
defendant's possession of "Pipe and Fire Bomb Designs" and "The
Anarchist's Cookbook" is sufficiently related to defendant's act of
arson to support admission. Defendant's possession of copies of "SS:
Blood Soaked Soil," Hitler's Enforcers," and "Mein Kampf" was a
proper subject of testimony given defendant's endorsement of
genocide, his readiness to hurl provocative racial epithets, and
persistent aggressive and violent behavior. Indeed, in light of
defendant's aggressive and violent actions, it would be absurd to
prohibit a sentencing jury from considering how such beliefs might
impact defendant's future dangerousness in a mixed racial prison
population. Finally, although we consider defendant's possession of
the Marine Corps training manuals of only marginal relevance, we
nonetheless believe they were relevant and admissible given
defendant's assertion that he had been trained in the Marines to be a
remorseless killer, and the techniques he employed in assaulting
women.
	Defendant notes that he and others testified that he wanted to be
a history teacher and implied that the books might have been on a
suggested reading list for the Marines as well. Defendant points to
such evidence in arguing that the State's evidence lacked relevancy.
In this respect, defendant makes the same analytical error he makes in
his previous arguments. Simply because defendant can offer an
alternative explanation for certain evidence does not mean that
evidence is automatically rendered unreliable. If that were so, the trier
of fact would have no function. We hold no error occurred in this
respect.
	Moreover, we find no reversible error in superfluous evidence of
defendant's possession of a nine-millimeter handgun and a shotgun. In
defendant's original brief, defense counsel concedes that "testimony
defendant hid a .22-caliber gun at his work may have been aggravating
as to that weapon," but submits "defendant's ownership of a nine
millimeter Baretta handgun and a shotgun were legal and irrelevant for
purposes of aggravation." In his reply brief, defendant continues with
this argument:
		"The State lumps together defendant's illegal possession of
guns with his legal possession of guns. The State argues that
a condition of defendant's probation was no possession of
guns after 2001. The flaw in this is the absence of evidence
as to when he bought one of the guns. Supplementing illegal
possession of guns with legal possession of guns serves only
to exaggerate and unfairly prejudice when none of
defendant's alleged crimes involved a gun."
The point of the State's evidence was that possession of the guns in
2001 constituted a violation of the terms of defendant's probation, a
point of which the jury was well aware. Although defendant denied
that he had hidden a .22-caliber gun at his place of employment, the
State's evidence was sufficient to prove that he did. After the
McNamara murder, but prior to his arrest, defendant was observed
standing on a sink in a closet, "doing something up high." The .22-caliber gun was later recovered from that location. Although the
State's evidence was somewhat vague as to whether defendant
possessed the other weapons within the period of probation, we are
confident that evidence was not a factor in the jury's verdict. The
evidence was cumulative and did not unfairly prejudice defendant.
	Finally, we tend to agree with defendant that testimony regarding
defendant's alleged sympathies for Timothy McVeigh, and other
antigovernment factions, and his opposition to the death penalty was
irrelevant and improperly admitted. In our view, those beliefs were not
sufficiently related to relevant considerations in this case.
Notwithstanding, the admission of this evidence, which proportionally
occupies a minuscule part of the trial transcript, was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming aggravating evidence
against defendant.


III. "Profiler" Testimony
	Defendant next contends that the testimony of James Wright,
which the State used to "link defendant to other crimes, was irrelevant
and unreliable." Defendant's specific concern is that Wright's
testimony prejudiced defendant by "linking" him to the Warner murder
and the burning of the apartment building. Defendant submits,
generally, that "profiler" testimony has not been shown to be reliable,
it in effect entails a "subjective" comparison of crimes, and, in this
case, the profiler lacked the psychiatric and psychological expertise to
render certain opinions as to the state of mind of the person who
committed the offenses.
	The record indicates that the State tendered Wright as "an expert
in the area of criminal investigation, particularly with regard to crime
scenes." Under preliminary cross-examination by defense counsel,
however, it became clear that Wright had been asked to render
opinions that are commonly and popularly associated with the practice
of "profiling." He had been asked to compare the McNamara murder,
the Warner murder, and the arson, and say "whatever [he] could about
the individual that committed the three crimes or if they could possibly
be connected." In that respect, Wright was asked to use the profile
derived from the police investigation and engage in the process known
as "profile-crime correspondence (P-CC), in which the profiler
provides evidence to assert whether two or more crimes are likely (or
not likely) to have been committed by the same offender." See L.
Alison, A. West & A. Goodwill, Pragmatists' Views of Offender
Profiling, 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 71, 79 (March-June 2004).
Wright said he was also asked to evaluate the crimes, evaluate the
defendant, and render an opinion as to whether defendant was
responsible. In that regard, Wright was asked to engage in the process
known as profile-defendant correspondence (P-DC), in which the
profiler, using the criteria set out in the crime profile, adduces
evidence as to defendant's guilt or innocence. 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y
& L. at 79. "P-DC is more controversial than P-CC, because of
prejudice (the former necessitates direct commentary about the
defendant, whereas the latter considers the similarity between
offenses.)" 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. at 79. In any event, at the
close of defense counsel's preliminary questioning, counsel objected
to Wright's being qualified to testify as an expert. The trial court
overruled the objection, and Wright proceeded to testify.
	Based upon his review of relevant source materials, Wright
compared the McNamara murder, the Warner murder, and the
suspected arson of the apartment building in terms of the offender's
organization, preplanning, anger, control, and sense of power. He did
not, however, testify that defendant committed the Warner murder or
burned down the apartment building.
	Wright noted that the McNamara crime scene revealed elements
of organization and planning initially, but the crime became
disorganized because of unexpected resistance, resulting in certain
evidentiary items being left behind, i.e., defendant's credit card, a box
cutter, and a torn piece of a latex glove. He noted evidence that
defendant had been watching the apartment prior to the murder,
indicating a degree of planning. Wright offered his opinion that the
severe and mutilating injuries to McNamara's body indicated
excessive, intense anger on the part of the perpetrator, caused by the
victim's resistance and defendant's loss of control.
	Wright found the Warner murder much more organized and
noted minimal resistance on the part of the victim, a fact he attributed
to the element of surprise and the perpetrator's employment of
overwhelming force or intimidation. He said the two biggest
similarities in the murders were attacks to the throat and the way the
perpetrator had displayed the victims' bodies: naked from the waist
down; arms outstretched above their heads. Wright observed that both
victims had knife wounds to their necks. Wright said in defendant's
previous, violent encounters with women, the neck was normally the
point of attack.
	As for the suspected arson, Wright noted that studies indicate
arsonists experience a "sense of power and control" in setting a fire,
particularly a large fire. Wright observed, in reports of defendant's
interaction with police, he was commonly uncooperative, belligerent
and combative. Wright stated that defendant's history of activities
with law enforcement officers demonstrated a lack of respect for
authority. Wright also commented on the newspaper article on the
Warner murder that defendant had posted in his apartment. He then
stated that serial killers and serial rapists tend to keep articles about
the crimes they commit. Wright testified, over objection, that
defendant's history showed a lot of anger toward women. He stated
that the mutilation of McNamara's body was an expression of anger.
Wright conceded that there were differences in the three crimes and
that reports he had reviewed indicated the cause of the apartment
building fire could not be determined. As noted, in his testimony,
Wright never explicitly rendered an opinion as to whether defendant
committed the other two offenses.
	Initially, we note that this court has held that an individual will be
permitted to testify as an expert if that person's experience and
qualifications afford him or her knowledge that is not common to
laypersons, and where such testimony will aid the fact finder in
reaching its conclusion. People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 104 (1994);
People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 208 (1984). As this court stated in
Novak:
		"The indicia of expertise is not an assigned level of academic
qualifications. Rather, the test is whether the expert has
knowledge and experience beyond the average citizen that
would assist the jury in evaluating the evidence. [Citation.]
The expert may gain his or her knowledge through practical
experience rather than scientific study, training, or research.
There is no precise requirement as to how the expert acquires
skill or experience. [Citation.] Regardless of how specialized
knowledge is acquired, whether through education, training,
experience, or a combination of each, if the witness possesses
such knowledge, he or she may testify as an expert." Novak,
163 Ill. 2d  at 104.
An expert's testimony will assist the jury when his or her testimony
offers knowledge and application of principles beyond the ken of the
average juror. Compton v. Ubilluz, 353 Ill. App. 3d 863, 867 (2004).
Evidence is beyond the ken of the average juror when the evidence
involves knowledge or experience that a juror generally lacks.
Compton, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 867.
	The question of admissibility of profiler testimony in criminal
cases has been a matter of some controversy; however, recent
decisions by state supreme courts seem to come down on the side of
exclusion, at least where the evaluative testimony of the profiler is not
supported by evidence of reliable databases and methodologies. See
State v. Fortin, 178 N.J. 540, 587-90, 843 A.2d 974, 1000-02 (2004)
(finding reversible error where a retired FBI profiler was permitted to
testify on violent sexual crimes without producing a reliable database
of violent sexual assault cases he had investigated, studied and
analyzed); State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 836 (Tenn. 2002)
(rejecting an ex-FBI profiler's testimony because of insufficient
evidence of methodology and inadequate indicia of reliability). Indeed,
there appears to be an implicit recognition in some professional circles
that the development of supporting databases of systematic and
rigorous case studies will be necessary in order to "enhance the
credibility of profiling as a discipline in the legal profession and
enhance the prospects of profiles being admissible as evidence." 10
Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. at 80. Several years ago, the FBI itself
conceded that there had been few systematic efforts to validate its
profile-derived classifications. 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. at 73.
Although it has been acknowledged that the coding of information for
such a database is "not a straightforward process," those practicing in
the field obviously believe it can be done. See D. Canter, L. Alison, E.
Alison & N. Wentink, The Organized/Disorganized Typology of
Serial Murder, Myth or Model?, 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 293,
303-04 (September 2004).
	It would be helpful to see supporting statistics when profiling
testimony is proffered in future cases. In this case, however, we need
not decide whether its absence renders Wright's testimony
inadmissible. We need not determine whether Wright's "profiler"
testimony was properly before the jury because any error in its
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v.
Hart, 214 Ill. 2d 490, 517 (2005) (unnecessary to address merits of
argument where error, if any, is harmless); People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 442 (2001) (same); People v. Hooper, 172 Ill. 2d 64, 79-80
(1996) (same). The testimony of Wright was, for the most part,
cumulative of testimony given by other witnesses, and any inferences
drawn by Wright were commonsense ones that the jurors no doubt
had already drawn for themselves.
	For example, both Joe Siefferman and Patrick Callaghan also
testified to readily observable similarities between the McNamara and
Warner murders. Siefferman, for instance, testified that both victims
appear to have been posed. He noted, in each instance, photographs
reveal a victim lying on her back with her arms extended above her
head. In each instance, the victim was naked from the waist down.
Both were apparently attacked in their sleep. Both victims sustained
injuries from sharp objects. In neither instance were identifiable
fingerprints found. Richard Caudell also testified that defendant had
posed or displayed McNamara's body. Patrick Callaghan testified that
he started looking for connections between defendant and Amy
Warner after he noted the similarities between the two murders. He
then learned that Douglas Paul had indicated that defendant had
admitted murdering Warner. Indeed, two people-not counting
defendant-eventually testified that defendant had said he killed
Warner; four people eventually testified that defendant had admitted
burning down the building across the street from his apartment. We
note that voluntary statements by a defendant are generally believed
to have a "high degree of reliability." See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 327, 107 L. Ed. 2d 676, 693, 110 S. Ct. 648, 659 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor and
Scalia, JJ.). We have already discussed the evidence corroborating the
Warner admission. Given this evidence, Wright's testimony was, in
our opinion, cumulative and essentially superfluous on the issue of the
defendant's commission of the Warner murder and the arson. Other
evidence sufficiently linked defendant to those offenses.
	As far as Wright's "psychiatric or psychological"
pronouncements are concerned, we view them-with no disrespect
intended-as observations that anyone off the street would have made
when presented with the same evidence. Defendant complains that
Wright was allowed to testify that defendant had "a lot of anger
toward women," and that the mutilation of McNamara's body was an
expression of anger. In light of the extensive evidence the jurors heard
about defendant's aggressive and disrespectful behavior toward
women, and his vicious attacks on multiple women, the jurors could
readily ascertain that defendant had "a lot of anger toward women"
without Wright's testimony. Moreover, the jurors undoubtedly divined
that a killer who takes the time to mutilate his victim's body is angry
or frustrated. They did not need Wright to tell them that.
	Further, we believe the jurors also understood, without any
enlightenment from Wright, that the need for power and control was
an integral feature of defendant's personality. As the evidence
indicates, in defendant's encounters with women, he became angry,
and often violent, if they did not respond to his advances or submit to
his will. When the basketball coach's daughter did not respond to
defendant, he said he "ought to slap the tan off her face." When Amy
Joyner did not respond to defendant's flirting, and she tried to leave
his apartment, defendant pushed her to the floor twice before her
companion intervened. When Randi Morris did not willingly submit to
anal penetration, defendant became angry and, in her words, tried to
"break my neck." Thereafter, defendant would not allow her to leave
his apartment, and he attempted to control her every movement, to the
extent of forcing her to accompany him to the bathroom. The
evidence adduced as to the McNamara and Warner murders suggests
that both were intended victims of sexual assault and some degree of
resistance culminated in the vicious murder of the victim. Even when
incarcerated, awaiting trial on these charges, defendant had to exert
control to the extent possible in the setting of the county jail.
Defendant's refusal to allow jailers to house another inmate in his cell
is just one example. This is just some of the evidence evincing
defendant's need for control and power. We believe that characteristic
of defendant's personality was obvious to the jury; it was firmly
established through incidents related by other witnesses.
	Defendant also complains about Wright's reference to studies
conducted by the Behavioral Science Unit of the FBI, as well as other
studies he had read, indicating that arsonists experience a "sense of
power and control in setting a fire." Obviously, that comment might
apply to some arsonists, but not others. For example, an arsonist who
burns down a building to collect insurance proceeds does not do so
for the sense of power or control; he burns the building for the money.
It seems that anger might also be a possible motive. Wright's
testimony related one factor that might motivate an arsonist to burn
a building, but there are obviously others as well. In this respect, the
State's attempt to link defendant to the arson is rather weak. We
believe defendant's four statements admitting he had set the fire
provided far more compelling linkage at trial. We find this testimony
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
	Moreover, it seems to us that defendant is in an awkward
position challenging Wright's specific reference to studies of the
Behavioral Science Unit when his own expert, Mark Cunningham,
relied upon that unit's studies in his own testimony. Cunningham
testified that the Behavioral Science Unit had investigated
approximately 31 sexual homicides and "at the core of those
homicides, they found disturbed attachments to the parents or to other
members of the family during the childhood of these offenders."
Defendant apparently takes the position that conclusions of the
Behavioral Science Unit were reliable enough to support the
testimony of his expert, but when Wright tried to use conclusions
drawn by the same unit, the findings are inadequate.
	We next address defendant's contention that it was error for
Wright to testify that serial killers and serial rapists tend to keep
articles about the crimes they commit. We hold that this testimony
was also harmless in light of other evidence adduced at trial. As we
have indicated, we believe there was substantial evidence linking
defendant to the Warner murder. One piece of that evidence was
defendant's posting of an article about the Warner murder on the wall
near his computer. Although defendant now suggests the article may
have been posted there because of defendant's "interest in local
crime," there was no evidence that other articles about "local crime"
were similarly posted. The article about Warner's murder obviously
had some special significance to defendant, such that he wanted to see
it whenever he was at his computer, the same computer that bore the
e-mail address "Cereal Kilr 2000." We find the jury's verdict would
have been the same irrespective of Wright's testimony.
	The jurors did not need Wright to draw obvious conclusions for
them; yet, for the most part, that is what he did in his testimony. In
sum, we hold the admission of Wright's testimony was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt in that the testimony was cumulative of
testimony given by other witnesses, and any inferences drawn by
Wright were commonsense ones that the jurors would have already
drawn for themselves.


IV. Testimony of Jailhouse Informants
	Defendant next contends the use of "unreliable jailhouse
informants" in aggravation denied him a fair sentencing hearing. Two
jail inmate informants testified for the prosecution at trial and one of
them testified again during the second phase of sentencing. A third jail
inmate testified for the defense, stating that the two prosecution
witnesses had fabricated defendant's alleged incriminating statements.
Prosecution witness Mark Stabler testified, at the guilt/innocence
phase of the trial, that defendant admitted struggling with and choking
the victim after Stabler and defendant had seen a television news story
about the murder. Stabler denied having an agreement with the State
for leniency, but said he had received immunity for assisting an
investigation in another case. Michael Jordan testified, at the
guilt/innocence phase of the trial, that defendant had given him a
rather detailed description of the murder, which coincided with the
police theory of how the crime had been committed. At the second
stage of sentencing proceedings, Jordan testified that defendant had
threatened Stabler and a journalist, as well as spoken of an escape
attempt if convicted. Jordan also denied any agreement with the
prosecution for his testimony. The third inmate, Clifford Baugh,
testified that Stabler and Jordan had fabricated their testimony from
news accounts in the hopes of obtaining leniency in their own cases.
	Defendant argues that Stabler's and Jordan's testimony, at the
guilt/innocence phase of the trial, "particularly Jordan's recounting of
defendant's alleged description of the crime which, although the likely
fabricated product of information obtained from the news and law
enforcement authorities, gave the prosecutors and jurors the most
detailed and inflammatory account of the murder." Defendant also
submits that Jordan's testimony at the death penalty hearing "further
prejudiced defendant as the only evidence defendant threatened a
journalist and an escape attempt." Defendant characterizes Stabler's
and Jordan's testimony as unreliable based solely upon the testimony
of another jail inmate, Baugh. Defendant refers to the "well-known
general unreliability of prison informants."
	We fail to discern any basis for concluding that these prosecution
witnesses were so unreliable that their testimony should have been
excluded. The fact that Baugh, another jail inmate, testified that they
had fabricated their testimony does not, alone, warrant exclusion.
Cross-examination is the best way to ensure reliability (Crawford, 541 U.S.  at 61, 158 L. Ed. 2d  at 199, 124 S. Ct. at 1371), and defendant
was afforded that right. No testimony was developed that either
witness received or was promised favorable treatment in exchange for
testimony in this case. No other evidence rendered their testimony
inherently unbelievable.
	In fact, we do not find it all hard to believe that defendant would
make the inculpatory statements attributed to him by Stabler and
Jordan. After all, prior to murdering Shannon McNamara, defendant
had admitted on four occasions that he had committed arson, and on
two occasions that he had murdered Amy Warner. While awaiting trial
for the sexual homicide of Shannon McNamara, defendant suggested,
in a verbal exchange with a female correctional officer, that he would
have sex with her dead body, so long as her body was "still warm." In
light of those statements, it is entirely plausible that defendant would
make the statements attributed to him by Stabler and Jordan.
Furthermore, Stabler's testimony, which was adduced at the
guilt/innocence phase of trial, related only to the details of the
McNamara murder. Defendant raises no issue as to his guilt of that
crime. The contention that Stabler's testimony supplied the jurors with
an inflammatory and prejudicial account of the murder is, for all
practical purposes, at most an argument that Stabler provided
cumulative testimony, because one need only examine the graphic
crime scene photos that were admitted into evidence, and consider the
testimony of crime scene investigators who testified, to fully
appreciate the brutality defendant visited upon McNamara and the
horrible end she met. In sum, there was no showing that Stabler's
testimony was so unreliable as to be inadmissible, and defendant was
not prejudiced in any event.
	The same is true of Jordan's second-stage sentencing testimony.
Although that testimony was not cumulative of other testimony, the
testimony bore upon the issue of defendant's future dangerousness,
and there was certainly a plethora of evidence on that score, more
than enough to inspire confidence that the jury's verdict would not
have been otherwise, even without Jordan's testimony.


V. Excessive Sentence Argument
Defendant contends that his death sentence is excessive given "the
influence of prescription drugs on defendant, defendant's inherited
alcoholism, military service, employment, attending college, minor
prior criminal conviction, church attendance, low risk of future
dangerousness, and dysfunctional family." We find that defendant's
death sentence was not excessive or in any sense "fundamentally
unfair." As we have stated, the aggravating evidence against defendant
was overwhelming; the mitigating evidence was, in our opinion,
meager by comparison. The fact that the jury returned a death verdict
in less than three hours is testament to the state of the evidence. We
will address the elements of defendant's argument individually.
	First, we note that defendant failed to demonstrate a connection
between his violent behavior and the ingestion of either prescription
drugs or the antimalarial drug Lariam. Defendant's contention that his
behavior "may have been influenced by antidepressant medications"
and "anti-malaria medication given to him in the Marines" is little
more than speculation. The sole testimony concerning the possible
side effects of Lariam and the prescription drugs defendant was taking
came not from a psychiatrist or pharmacologist, but from a
psychologist, Mark Cunningham, who possessed no particular
expertise in the effects of prescription drugs. Cunningham's only
knowledge of the medication's possible side effects came from
pharmacological flyers. Cunningham's deficiencies aside, we note that
defendant did not even establish that he was given Lariam, though
Cunningham suggested that Lariam is the antimalarial drug of choice
in the military. Even assuming defendant was given Lariam,
Cunningham admitted he knew of no case in which the ingestion of
Lariam had been connected to the commission of a murder. He
conceded he could not "draw a *** direct certain nexus" between
Lariam and murder. Nevertheless, he maintained-without reference to
supporting data or studies-that the possible use of Lariam, "several
years" prior to the murder, might have been a "potential contributor."
Cunningham also claimed that Paxil "could have some contributing
role," without offering any meaningful substantiation. The fact that
defendant may have reported occasional symptoms which matched the
side effects Cunningham gleaned from pharmacological flyers does
not, in our opinion, qualify as meaningful substantiation. The
testimony defendant presented did not affirmatively link his violent
behavior to prescription drugs or Lariam.
	Next, we note that defendant's claim of "inherited" alcoholism is
highly questionable in terms of credibility and, in our opinion, did little
to help defendant at sentencing. Apparently, defendant believed he
would be less blameworthy in the eyes of the jurors for his failure to
seek help with his drinking problems, and his failure to earnestly try
to overcome them, if he attributed the problems to genetics and family
models. We believe defendant was mistaken in this respect. Moreover,
the case defendant made for "inheriting" alcoholism is not convincing.
	For example, the incredible amounts of alcohol purportedly
imbibed by defendant's uncle on a daily basis, quite frankly, taxes
credibility. Defendant's uncle, Michael Mahorney, testified that he, at
one point in his life, consumed "three to four fifths a night plus a six-pack or twelve-pack of beer and three or four shots of tequila. And
that was seven nights a week." Even if someone were to believe this
implausible testimony, other aspects of Mahorney's testimony actually
undercut defendant's claim. Mahorney testified that defendant's father
drank, but Mahorney had only seen him drunk once in his life.
Moreover, Mahorney testified that, despite heavy drinking during a
portion of his life, he had only been arrested on one occasion for
illegal consumption of alcohol, and his drinking never resulted in
violent behavior. Mahorney's testimony thus points up the fact that
violent behavior is not a feature of alcoholism so much as a
component of character. Finally, Mahorney testified that, at the time
of trial, he consumed perhaps one beer every two months. Thus,
Mahorney's testimony highlighted the fact that he had eventually
faced his problem, he had taken responsibility for it, and he had
overcome it.
	Other evidence presented to establish an "inherited" aspect to
defendant's drinking problems was weak at best. In addition to their
uncle, Michael Mahorney, defendant's sister, Christina, suggested that
a cousin, Jonathon, also had problems with alcohol. She provided no
further details. Defendant's stepgrandmother, Darlene Edwards,
testified to only occasional and moderate drinking by two members of
defendant's maternal lineage. A defense consultant, Barry Hargan,
testified that defendant's alcohol dependence was genetically
influenced, noting there was "a family history on both sides of the
family including his father, his uncle, his grandfather, and there was
also suspicion that his mother was also involved in alcohol abuse too."
Hargan supplied no specific details as to the source of his
information-though he identified family members as a primary
source-or the extent of any alleged alcohol abuse.
	The record suggests, if defendant's mother abused alcohol at all,
that abuse was restricted to a fairly limited period of time. Obviously,
Mahorney's testimony, and defendant's own statements to Dr. Dietz,
contradict any suggestion that defendant's father was an alcoholic. In
his interview with Dietz, defendant described his father as a
"teetotaler," not a "drunk." Mahorney's testimony actually
underscored the fact that defendant's violent behavior was a
component of his character, not an inherent feature of alcoholism.
	This court has recognized that a history of substance abuse is a
double-edged sword at the aggravation/mitigation phase of a penalty
hearing. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 189, quoting People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 138 (1997). Simply because the defendant views his substance
abuse history as mitigating does not require the sentencer to do so.
Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 190, quoting Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 138. Indeed,
the jury was free to conclude that defendant's dependencies were
aggravating and simply had no mitigating value. Moreover, any
psychological or social maladjustments defendant may have developed
are not inherently mitigating either. See Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 190;
People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 66 (1998); Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 138.
A sentencing jury might well consider such evidence as either
aggravating or mitigating, depending on whether the individual jury
finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future
dangerousness. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 190; People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 382 (1997). Even if a defendant's alleged psychological
impairments are considered as mitigating factors, they do not preclude
imposition of a death sentence when they are outweighed by
aggravating evidence. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 190; Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 
at 139-40.
	We believe the effort to blame defendant's drinking problems
upon an alleged genetic or family predisposition was little more than
a thinly veiled effort to divert responsibility from defendant for his
failure to address his problems and take responsibility for them. To the
extent that credible evidence was adduced on this subject, and that
evidence might be considered mitigating, we find the weight of that
evidence was insignificant.
	Defendant also suggests that his military service was a significant
mitigating factor. While defendant's friend, Brad Adams, did describe
him as a good soldier, we also note that defendant was apparently
reprimanded three times for drinking and was subsequently court-marshaled for use of methamphetamine. He ended his military career
as he had begun it, as a private. Significantly, according to his own
testimony, he concluded that career serving 30 days in the brig.
	Defendant points to his employment record and his college
attendance as mitigating factors. The record indicates that defendant
worked a few weeks as a farm hand and was a student worker while
he attended college. Defendant's employment record is unremarkable.
It appears that defendant received benefits to attend college and the
most that can be said of his academic career is that he failed to
distinguish himself. Defendant's professed love of history was not
reflected in his grades. If the record before us is an accurate indicator,
he spent a great deal of his time in various sexual exploits, drinking or
using drugs, entering the apartments of others without permission,
surfing the Internet, fighting, and committing crimes of greater or
lesser degrees.
	We agree with defendant's observation that his prior criminal
record was minor, and that is an appropriate mitigating factor to
consider. See People v. Davis, 205 Ill. 2d 349, 365-69 (2002).
However, reliable evidence of serious uncharged offenses is also a
proper, nonstatutory aggravating factor that must be taken in account
in determining the appropriate sentence. See Davis, 205 Ill. 2d  at 369.
	Defendant suggests that his "church attendance" should be
considered as one mitigating factor militating against a sentence of
death. Whether mere "attendance" should be considered mitigating is
questionable. To the extent that attendance says something positive
about defendant's character or values, we would be inclined to agree.
However, we see little credible evidence in that regard, and even less
in defendant's conduct to indicate that he shares those beliefs and
values, though he had the advantage of having been exposed to them
in his youth. Although, just prior to the jury's deliberations on the
appropriateness of a death sentence, defendant offered extensive
testimony about his religious beliefs and participation in church
activities, upon cross-examination he admitted that he resented
organized religion and had referred to it as a scam and a crutch for the
weak. In light of that testimony, and a dearth of testimony indicating
that defendant translated any positive beliefs into actions, any weight
properly assigned to defendant's church attendance would be de
minimis.
	Next, we note that a significant portion of defendant's evidence
and argument at the second stage of capital sentencing was devoted
to convincing the jury that defendant was the product of a
dysfunctional family. As we have previously acknowledged, a
defendant's family history, including abuse and exposure to violence
during childhood, has long been considered a potential mitigating
factor at sentencing. See Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 543-44. The statutory
reforms recently enacted by the legislature include a provision which
specifically states that a defendant's background of extreme emotional
distress or physical abuse may be considered as mitigating evidence.
720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(6) (West 2004). The jury in this case was well
aware that it could consider defendant's family history as a mitigating
factor.
	In assessing the propriety of defendant's death sentence, we
considered, inter alia, the following questions: How mitigating was
the evidence defendant presented? Was that evidence, together with
other mitigating evidence, sufficient to outweigh the evidence in
aggravation and preclude imposition of the death penalty?
	We have concluded that there were likely instances of neglect
early in defendant's life, and defendant's sexual experience with his
stepsister qualifies as abuse; however, in many respects, the dynamics
of defendant's upbringing were not so unusual. Considering
defendant's childhood and adolescence in its entirety, we could not,
for example, conclude that defendant suffered extreme emotional
distress or physical abuse over any significant period of time. Many
families might be considered "dysfunctional" in one respect or
another. "Dysfunctional" is not necessarily synonymous with
"abusive."
	Certainly, in describing defendant as a child and adolescent, the
testimony of defendant's own witnesses was conflicting. Defendant's
father, Allen Mertz, thought he had a "fantastic relationship" with
defendant. Although he spent long hours working to provide for his
family, it appears that he engaged in activities with his children to the
extent that he could. Defendant's grandmother, whom everyone
acknowledged was a positive and loving influence throughout
defendant's life, described defendant as: "Just like any boy, out
playing, digging in the dirt, and riding bicycles." Defendant's uncle
described him as a "typical boy." Ian Tuggle, defendant's friend
through childhood and high school, visited "just about every day" in
defendant's house when they were children, and reported nothing
remarkable. Tuggle described defendant as an "average kid." Rosella
Ray, defendant's "faith partner" for confirmation, acknowledged that
defendant had the support of his church and a loving grandmother as
he grew up and throughout his years in high school. Defendant
testified that his first memory was living with his grandmother.
Defendant stated, during that time, "Everything was perfect."
Defendant's "expert," Mark Cunningham, acknowledged in his
testimony that defendant, in a prior interview with Dr. Dietz, had
described his father as "kind," "generous," "peaceful," and "hard
working." In that interview, defendant acknowledged that he
respected his father and looked up to him. In the same interview,
defendant denied that anyone had ever abused him, physically or
sexually. He also denied that he felt emotionally abused or neglected
as a child. Cunningham conceded defendant had told Dietz he had
been "extremely happy as a youngster."
	While it is true that Cunningham later testified that defendant, in
that interview, "seemed to be trying to protect his family and not
blame them for the situation that he was in," defendant had apparently
overcome any such inclination by the time he testified at the second
stage of capital sentencing proceedings. Defendant then testified that
his father struck him several times, that he saw his father strike his
stepmother a few times, and that he did not see his father much. At the
sentencing hearing, defendant testified that he had been sexually
abused by his older stepsister and neglected by his stepmother.
Defendant's sisters also testified that they were treated badly by their
stepmother. Brandy Mertz testified that her stepmother was mean and
abused them. Defendant's older sister, Christina, testified that their
stepmother punished them by spanking them with a "switch from a
tree." Christina said she tried to take the blame whenever possible to
protect defendant and Brandy. Indeed, Brandy confirmed that
Christina acted as their mother. Although Christina described her
family as the "epitome of dysfunctional," she admitted she had gone
on to have a successful career, and apparently a normal life. Christina
acknowledged that defendant was very close to their grandmother.
She remembered defendant as a "goofy little boy who was always
happy up until *** around junior high school."
	Despite the contradictory nature of some of the evidence
defendant presented on this issue, we find that defendant's
"dysfunctional" upbringing is, to some extent, mitigating. However,
that evidence, together with other mitigating evidence, is insufficient
to outweigh the evidence in aggravation and preclude the imposition
of the death penalty. In this respect, we note a final consideration, and
defendant's final point in this argument.
	Defendant contends that his "low risk of future dangerousness"
should be considered as a mitigating factor. The suggestion that
defendant poses a "low risk of future dangerousness" is refuted by
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. There is no question that
defendant brutally murdered and mutilated Shannon McNamara.
There is substantial, convincing evidence, including defendant's own
admissions, that he did the same to Amy Warner two years before.
Defendant might well have killed Randi Morris, but for her pleas for
mercy and quick thinking. There was evidence indicating that
defendant had sexually assaulted at least four women, two of whom
(Morris and Darsann Barker) survived to relate the details of the
assaults. There was also testimony that defendant had attacked two
other women, Guillory and Joyner, who fortuitously escaped from him
through the intervention of a dog and a male companion, respectively.
Defendant's propensity for fighting was so pronounced that the
witnesses who mentioned it did not even bother to elaborate on
specific instances.
	Defendant would have us believe that his violent and aggressive
behavior is inextricably linked to his use of alcohol; yet the evidence
indicates otherwise. There is no evidence indicating that defendant
was intoxicated when he aggressively confronted Kristi DeWitt and
her husband at their home. There is no evidence that defendant was
intoxicated when he offered to "get rid of" Douglas Paul's ex-girlfriend in January of 2000. There is no evidence indicating that
defendant was intoxicated when he caused disturbances and got into
fights while in jail awaiting trial on these charges. There is no evidence
that defendant was intoxicated when he suggested to Hillary Spitz that
he was prepared to have sex with her dead body, so long as her body
was "still warm." In fact, there is no evidence that defendant was
intoxicated when he killed Shannon McNamara or on the night that
Amy Warner was killed. In short, defendant cannot blame what
appears to be a feature of his character on the ingestion of alcohol.
	Even if defendant's dangerous propensities were solely related to
the use of alcohol, as we have previously noted, we need not consider
them mitigating. See Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 190-91. Defendant had
opportunities to address his problems, and he was urged by others to
do so; yet there is little in the way of evidence indicating that he took
personal responsibility for his problems and earnestly endeavored to
confront his abuse of alcohol. So far as the record indicates, the
problem has not been addressed. Even defendant's expert, Mark
Cunningham, acknowledged that inmates of correctional facilities may
have access to drugs and alcohol, though he considered that access
"much reduced compared to what somebody can maintain in the
community." Thus, defendant remains a danger to others in this
respect.
	However, whether or not defendant has access to alcohol, he
remains a danger to others because violence and aggressive behavior
are clearly a part of his character. He is a man who can "kill without
remorse." He is a man who would "kill others to force the
[authorities] to kill him." He is a man who, while awaiting trial after
brutally murdering and sexually mutilating Shannon McNamara,
suggested to a female correctional officer that he would have sex with
her dead body, so long as her body was "still warm." He is a man who
readily hurls racial epithets and is more than willing to fight with other
inmates. He is a man who disregards the orders and authority of
correctional officers, who challenges even them to fight him, who tells
them they are "fucking worthless."
	In Ballard, this court noted that a defendant arrested for a capital
crime has every incentive to behave flawlessly while incarcerated since
good behavior might cause the sentencing authority to spare his life.
Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 189. Given that incentive, an inmate, like
defendant, who nonetheless violates facility rules and engages in acts
of aggression and violence, demonstrates, through his conduct, a
unique inability to control his conduct and function acceptably within
any setting. It is clear that defendant places a low value on the lives of
others. The jury could well have concluded that defendant would
remain a serious danger to others, even in a prison setting, and that
executing him is the only means of eliminating the threat to the safety
of other inmates or prison staff. See Simmons, 512 U.S.  at 165 n.5,
129 L. Ed. 2d  at 143 n.5, 114 S. Ct.  at 2194 n.5.
	Given the totality of the evidence presented, defendant's death
sentence is not excessive. Defendant does not suggest that any
mitigating evidence was improperly excluded. Thus, the jury had
before it everything which might conceivably have convinced the jury
to show defendant mercy. The decision to impose the death penalty
was clearly the result of overwhelming aggravating evidence.


VI. Statutory Reforms to Death Penalty Proceedings
	Defendant notes that recently enacted statutory reforms in death
penalty proceedings were unavailable when his sentencing took place.
Defendant points to new statutes providing for discovery and
reliability hearings on informant testimony (725 ILCS 5/115-21 (West
2004)), a new statutory mitigating factor concerning a defendant's
background of extreme emotional distress or physical abuse (720
ILCS 5/9-1(c)(6) (West 2004)), and a new standard for weighing
aggravating and mitigating evidence in order to determine an
appropriate sentence (720 ILCS 5/9-1(g) (West 2004) (statute
specifically provides that the sentencing authority is to weigh "the
factors in aggravation and mitigation")). Defendant offers no analysis
and cites no authority in support of retroactive application. In fact, in
defendant's reply brief, he states he is "relying on this Court's power
to override fundamentally unjust death sentences rather than asserting
that new law is constitutionally required to be applied retroactively."
Thus, defendant has waived the issue of retroactive application. See
People v. Davis, 213 Ill. 2d 459, 470 (2004) ("a party is required to
raise its arguments and provide citation to legal authority in its
appellate brief *** to avoid waiver"); People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247, 278 (2001) ("Our rules provide that an appellant's brief must
contain '[a]rgument, which shall contain contentions of the appellant
and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities ***' and
'[p]oints not argued are waived' "), quoting 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7).
Morever, implicit in this portion of defendant's argument is the
suggestion that the new provisions would have made a difference in
his case, an implication that we flatly reject.
	Defendant contends the prosecution could not have proved by a
preponderance of the evidence-as required by section 115-21(d) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963-that the testimony of the
prosecution's informant witnesses was reliable. We believe the
testimony bore sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant admission
and, as we have already determined, the testimony was harmless in
any event when considered against overwhelming evidence in
aggravation.
	With respect to the new statutory mitigating factor set forth in
section 9-1(c)(6) of the Code, we note that it is new only in the sense
that it is now statutory. Our decisions have long recognized that a
defendant's family history, including abuse and exposure to violence
during childhood, can be a mitigating factor at sentencing. See People
v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 543-44 (1999). The jury in this case fully
understood that defendant's childhood experiences could be
mitigating; indeed, the defense devoted much of its case at sentencing
to the presentation of such evidence. Moreover, the jury was
instructed that it could consider "[a]ny other reason supported by the
evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death."
Defendant's attempt to cast his childhood as one of extreme abuse and
neglect was simply not convincing, and certainly did not outweigh, as
a mitigating consideration, defendant's violent conduct later in life,
and his future dangerousness.
	As for defendant's reliance upon the new language employed in
amended section 9-1(g) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/9-1(g) (West
2004)), we note that we have previously upheld the instruction which
utilized the former statutory language (see People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 161 (1998)), and the new standard is really nothing more
than a refined codification of the balancing process sentencing
authorities already used in determining whether the death penalty
should be imposed. See Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 188; Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 
at 432; Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d  at 145. Defendant's rights were not
violated by use of an instruction employing the former statutory
language, and his prospects of a different sentencing outcome would
not be enhanced by use of the new language.


VII. Apprendi Issue
	Defendant also argues that the Illinois death penalty statute
violates due process under the principles espoused by the United
States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), in that the State is not
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the death sentence. We
rejected this argument in Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 202-05, and we see no
need to revisit the issue. As this court noted in Ballard:
			"[I]n terms of Apprendi analysis, it is not beyond question
that the finding at issue in the instant case-'that there are no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the
death sentence' (720 ILCS 5/9-1(g), (h) (West 1998))-is
properly characterized as 'factual.' The second stage of
Illinois capital sentencing proceedings clearly bears a marked
resemblance to the balancing of factors in which trial courts
traditionally engage in determining what sentence to impose
within a statutory range, a practice of which Apprendi
explicitly approved. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 481, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 449-50, 120 S. Ct.  at 2358." Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at
204.
If the weighing of factors in the second stage of capital sentencing
were to be considered a factual finding, one would logically have to
conclude that standard sentencing procedures undertaken daily by
hundreds of courts across this state also partake of fact-finding which
would fall within the purview of Apprendi. We reject that notion. See
also Davis, 205 Ill. 2d  at 375 (Apprendi does not apply to the
consideration of mitigating and nonstatutory aggravating factors at the
second stage of capital sentencing, because consideration of those
factors "cannot increase the penalty for the crime" beyond the
statutory maximum of death established at the conclusion of the
eligibility phase).


VIII. Comparative Proportionality and Related Issues
	Citing Recommendations 70 and 84 of the Report of the
Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment (Report of the
Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, Recommendations
70, 84 (April 2002)), defendant further contends that this court should
implement proportionality comparisons on direct appeal in capital
cases and suggests that a statewide data base should be compiled for
this purpose. Defendant notes that some states have instituted
intercase proportionality review in capital cases. We note that others,
like California, have declined to do so, holding that such review is not
constitutionally required. See People v. Blair, 36 Cal. 4th 686, 115 P.3d 1145, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 485 (2005); People v. Lewis, 26 Cal. 4th 334, 394-95, 28 P.3d 34, 76, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 322 (2001).
	We have repeatedly rejected arguments for proportionality
comparisons in unrelated cases, capital or otherwise. As we stated in
People v. Johnson, 206 Ill. 2d 348, 379 (2002), with respect to capital
cases:
			"Our constitutional duty is to determine whether the death
penalty has been imposed arbitrarily or capriciously, or is
unduly severe, considering the circumstances of the offense
and the character and rehabilitative potential of the individual
defendant. People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 576 (2000).
Comparative proportionality review in capital cases is not
required by either the United States Constitution or the
Illinois death penalty statute. Thus, we do not compare the
sentence received by one individual to sentences received by
other individuals convicted of similar crimes. Only when one
defendant is sentenced to death while his codefendant or
accomplice, convicted of the same crime, receives a lesser
sentence will we engage in a comparative review of disparate
sentences."
This court has consistently held that each capital case " 'is unique and
must be evaluated on its own facts.' " Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 179,
quoting People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 280 (1989). We see no
reason to overturn existing precedent on this point. Further, we note
that provisions calling for comparative proportionality review were
not among the reforms the legislature chose to enact.
	In any event, we note that the facts of the cases cited by
defendant for purposes of comparison do not mirror the facts adduced
in this case. The facts in those cases are "similar" only in the broadest
sense of the word. Given the sheer volume of evidence-aggravating
and mitigating-presented in the second stage of most capital cases, we
would not expect to see identity of facts such as would allow for
meaningful comparison. That is true in this case.
	Defendant's final argument is that "Illinois' death penalty is
arbitrarily applied, based on race, geography, procedural evolution,
discretion, and mistakes of fact." Defendant contends: "Illinois death
sentences result significantly from unguided discretion of prosecutors,
racial bias, geographic influences, and inconsistent subjective, or
mistaken, conclusions by jurors and judges."
	We must reject defendant's argument, as it pertains to race,
geography, procedural evolution, and discretion, based on the analysis
of the United States Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987), and our own decision
in People v. Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d 93 (1988).
	In McCleskey, the defendant, relying upon a complex statistical
study, alleged that the Georgia death penalty statute was administered
in a constitutionally impermissible fashion because of the likelihood
that racial considerations played a part in determining whether a
particular defendant received the death penalty. According to the
study, after controlling for nonracial variables, defendants accused of
murdering white victims were 4.3 times more likely to receive the
death penalty than those accused of murdering African-Americans.
The Court, assuming the validity of the study, concluded that it did
"not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias
affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process." McCleskey, 481 U.S.  at 313, 95 L. Ed. 2d  at 292, 107 S. Ct.  at 1778. The Court
further held that the defendant in that case had to prove that "the
decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose," and
that "racial considerations played a part in his sentence." (Emphasis
in original.) McCleskey, 481 U.S.  at 292-93, 95 L. Ed. 2d  at 278, 107 S. Ct.  at 1767.
	In Stewart, this court applied the McCleskey rationale in a
postconviction context. The defendant in Stewart, like the defendant
in McCleskey, argued that Illinois' death penalty statute "is being
applied in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the United
States and Illinois Constitutions." In support of that claim, defendant
proffered a statistical study which purportedly showed that a
defendant accused of murdering a white victim was four times more
likely to receive the death penalty than a defendant accused of
murdering a black victim. The study also purportedly showed that a
black defendant accused of murdering a white victim was more likely
to receive the death penalty than a white defendant accused of
murdering a white victim. See Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d  at 106-07. Applying
the rationale of McCleskey, this court rejected defendant's contention
that he was entitled to any relief on the basis of that study, noting that,
as in McCleskey, "defendant made no attempt to prove that he
received the death penalty because the decisionmakers in his case were
motivated by racial bias. Moreover, in each of defendant's cases,
constitutionally permissible factors clearly existed upon which the
death penalty could be imposed." (Emphasis omitted.) Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d  at 108.
	The Stewart court also rejected another argument based upon a
survey offered by defendant. Based on that survey, the defendant
claimed that "the death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it
leads to arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty
insofar as it *** delegates to prosecutors, without sufficient
guidelines, the discretion to determine in which cases the death
penalty will be sought." Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d  at 109. This court first
noted, as to the survey cited by defendant, there was "virtually no
suggestion as to the reasons why the death penalty was or was not
sought in any given case." (Emphasis omitted.) Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d  at
111. Moreover, this court observed:
		"[D]efendant does not claim that the prosecutors in his cases
acted arbitrarily in seeking the death sentence. See
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), 481 U.S. 279, 296 n.17, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 281 n.17, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1768 n.17
('Requiring a prosecutor to rebut a study that analyzes the
past conduct of scores of prosecutors is quite different from
requiring a prosecutor to rebut a contemporaneous challenge
to his own acts')." (Emphasis added.) Stewart, 121 Ill. 2d  at
112.
Finally, in Stewart, this court pointed out that " 'a prosecutor cannot
arbitrarily impose the death penalty' since imposition of that penalty
is the province and responsibility of the sentencing body." Stewart,
121 Ill. 2d  at 112, quoting People v. Lewis, 105 Ill. 2d 226, 252
(1984).
	Defendant does not argue that race, prosecutorial discretion,
procedural evolution, or geography played a part in the decision to
seek the death penalty in his case, or in the jury's decision to impose
it on him. The rationale of McCleskey and Stewart thus applies. We
note, in passing, defendant's observation that the Governor's
Commission recommended revision of the death penalty statute to
provide for mandatory review of prosecutorial decisions to seek the
death penalty, a review to be undertaken by a statewide review
committee. Report of the Governor's Commission on Capital
Punishment, Recommendation 30 (April 2002). That is one of many
recommendations the legislature chose to omit from recent statutory
reforms. For our part, we believe the reasoning of McCleskey and
Stewart demonstrates that judicial review of such decisions is not
constitutionally required.
	Finally, defendant argues that death penalty proceedings are
"unavoidably arbitrary" because they involve "discretionary decision
making." He adds that factual error at the second stage of sentencing
proceedings "contributes to arbitrary death penalty sentencing."
	In the latter respect, defendant points to no additional allegations
of error. We believe we have adequately addressed those previously
raised. We are confident those alleged errors did not contribute to
arbitrary death penalty sentencing in defendant's case. As for the
former contention, this court has repeatedly rejected claims that the
Illinois death penalty statute fails to sufficiently minimize the risk of
arbitrarily and capriciously imposed death sentences. See People v.
Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 559 (2000). This court has held that "the
requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any aggravating
factor and automatic appellate review direct and limit the discretion
of the sentencing body so as to minimize the risk of completely
arbitrary and capricious action." Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 199.
Moreover, the second phase of capital sentencing necessarily involves
a process of weighing relevant aggravating and mitigating factors.
Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d  at 197. The process is inherently discretionary.
Defendant chose to have 12 of his fellow citizens engage in this
process. In less than three hours, they unanimously concluded that
death was the appropriate sentence. We have thoroughly reviewed the
voluminous record in this matter, and we agree with the jury's
assessment. We are confident that the discretion exercised in
defendant's case was not exercised in an arbitrary or capricious
manner.
	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and
death sentence. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order
setting Monday, January 9, 2006, as the date on which the sentence
of death, entered by the circuit court of Coles County, shall be carried
out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law. 725
ILCS 5/119-5 (West 2004). The clerk of this court shall send a
certified copy of the mandate in this case to the Director of
Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and the
warden of the institution where defendant is confined.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
	As I expressed in my dissent in People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585,
637 (2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), the State of Illinois has reached
a watershed in its approach to criminal procedure in capital cases.
First, this court instituted new rules providing much needed
procedural safeguards in capital cases to improve the reliability and
accuracy of these trials. See 188 Ill. 2d Rs. 43, 411, 412(c), 416, 417,
701(b), 714. Next, the legislature adopted comprehensive statutory
protections designed to improve the capital punishment system and
reduce errors. These legislative reforms came too late, however, for
the defendant in this case, who argues he should have the benefit of
four of these new safeguards.
	The statutory measures cited by defendant state that: (1) the jury
must receive instructions that the mitigating factors to be considered
include evidence that "the defendant's background includes a history
of extreme emotional or physical abuse" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(6) (West
2004)); (2) the jury must determine unanimously, "after weighing the
factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate
sentence" before the death penalty may be imposed (720 ILCS
5/9-1(g) (West 2004)); (3) the trial court must "conduct a hearing to
determine whether the testimony of [a jailhouse] informant is reliable,
unless the defendant waives such a hearing" and the prosecution must
timely disclose material relevant to the reliability and credibility of the
informant's testimony (725 ILCS 5/115-21 (West 2004)); and (4) this
court may overturn a death sentence and impose a prison term if it
"finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the
particular case" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(i) (West 2004)).
	In this case, none of these measures were available to defendant.
First, the jury was not specifically instructed to consider evidence of
defendant's allegedly abusive background as a mitigating factor. The
jury's consideration of this factor was simply relegated to the broad,
undefined category of unspecified potential mitigation material.
Second, the jury was instructed to apply a different balancing test,
whereby the default sentence was death unless the jury determined
that the mitigation evidence was sufficiently strong to preclude
imposition of the death penalty. Third, defendant did not waive a
separate hearing on the reliability of the jailhouse informants'
testimony, and no such hearing was held. Finally, defendant argues
that this court is entitled to use its newly acquired statutory authority
to overturn his death sentence and impose a prison term based on the
fundamental injustice of that sentence due to the prior unavailability
of the other legislative reforms.
	Defendant asserts that here, unlike Hickey, retroactive application
of the additional legislative protections would affect fewer than a
handful of cases. He maintains that this court should overturn his
death sentence as fundamentally unjust because it was imposed in the
absence of the new statutory protections. To address this argument,
we must consider whether the measures are to be applied retroactively
or only prospectively.
	Under the most recent analytical approach adopted by this court
on the issue of retroactivity, we must look first to the express
temporal reach of the amendment. Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82,
92 (2003). See also People v. Atkins, No. 98257, slip op. at 4-5
(October 20, 2005) (restating the Caveney test). Here, only one of the
four provisions cited by defendant includes an express statement of its
intended temporal reach. Section 115-21, requiring a separate hearing
on the reliability of jailhouse informant testimony, states: "[t]his
Section applies to all death penalty prosecutions initiated on or after
the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 93rd General
Assembly." 725 ILCS 5/115-21(f) (2004). The effective date of the
amendment was November 19, 2003. Thus, under the Caveney test,
standing alone, section 115-21 is not retroactively applicable to this
case. None of the other three cited provisions, however, contain a
similar expression of legislative intent. Thus, to determine whether
they should be applied retroactively, we must consider whether the
amendments are procedural or substantive in nature. If they are
procedural, they may be retroactively applied, but if they are
substantive, they may not. Caveney, 207 Ill. 2d  at 92.
	While the boundary separating "procedure" and "substance" is
not always clear, "procedure" generally prescribes the means for
enforcing rights or receiving remedies through a lawsuit. Atkins, slip
op. at 5, quoting Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No.
2, 122 Ill. 2d 303, 310-11 (1988). Procedure encompasses
" ' "pleading, evidence and practice. Practice means those legal rules
which direct the course of proceedings to bring parties into court and
the course of the court after they are brought in." [Citation.]' " Atkins,
slip op. at 5, quoting Rivard, 122 Ill. 2d  at 310-11. In contrast,
"substantive law" involves the rights underlying the lawsuit. Atkins,
slip op. at 5, quoting Rivard, 122 Ill. 2d  at 310-11.
	Here, the three remaining legislative protections cited by
defendant are purely procedural in nature, concerning: (1) the contents
of the jury instructions on mitigation (720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(6) (West
2004)); (2) the jury's standard for reviewing the factors offered in
aggravation and mitigation (720 ILCS 5/9-1(g) (West 2004)); and (3)
this court's authority to vacate a particular death sentence and impose
a term of years if the death sentence is "fundamentally unjust" (720
ILCS 5/9-1(i) (West 2004)). These matters focus on "the course of
the court" after the start of the proceedings, not on the rights
underlying those proceedings. Therefore, under this court's analysis
in Caveney, these legislative safeguards are subject to retroactive
application.
	I also find it telling that in enacting its death penalty reforms, the
legislature did, in fact, choose to limit the new requirement of
jailhouse informant reliability hearings to future cases. Even though
the other provisions at issue in this appeal were enacted as part of the
same package of reforms in the same public act, they did not bear the
same temporal limitation. Given the immense gravity of capital
proceedings, I believe fundamental fairness and the reliability of the
capital punishment system require us to apply these other legislative
protections retroactively. See Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d  at 639 (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that "[i]f we are to err, we should err on the side
of caution").
	"The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do
not like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense that
the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result. And
so great is our commitment to the process that, except in the rare
case, we do not pause to express distaste for the result, perhaps for
fear of undermining a valued principle that dictates the decision."
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342, 364, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2548 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Here, despite the
despicable nature of the crime committed, this court must apply our
retroactivity precedent evenhandedly. The same body of law protects
both the innocent and the guilty from manifest injustice. To optimize
the overall reliability of the capital punishment system in this state, this
court should implement the latest legislative reforms retroactively in
all applicable cases, including the one currently before us.
Accordingly, I would remand this cause for a new sentencing hearing
incorporating these protections. For these reasons, I respectfully
dissent from the majority opinion.