Case Title: State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2000-Ohio-328

Docket Number: 19981714

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm., 88 Ohio St.3d 284, 2000-Ohio-328.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. LTV STEEL COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 284.] 
Workers’ compensation — Court of appeals’ denial of writ of mandamus 
ordering Industrial Commission to vacate its decisions that denied 
relator’s motion for relief under R.C. 4123.522 affirmed. 
(No. 98-1714 — Submitted February 22, 2000 — Decided April 5, 2000.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD06-859. 
 
LTV Steel Company, appellant, seeks a writ of mandamus ordering appellee 
Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission”) to vacate its decisions that deny 
LTV Steel’s motion for relief under R.C. 4123.522 (savings provision for a party’s 
failure to receive notice of a commission order).  The Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County found that the commission did not abuse its discretion and denied 
the writ.  The court held that (1) R.C. 4123.522 precludes relief if the moving party 
had prior actual notice of the commission order, and (2) the commission had some 
evidence for concluding that LTV Steel had such knowledge of the order in this 
dispute.  LTV Steel appeals as of right. 
 
Appellee Jesse Sheppard’s workers’ compensation claim was initially 
allowed for “acute cervical strain.”  Later, a commission district hearing officer 
 
 
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(“DHO”) allowed other additional conditions, and LTV Steel failed to timely 
appeal the DHO’s order.  LTV Steel requested permission to appeal out-of-time 
pursuant to the savings provision in R.C. 4123.522, alleging that it had not 
received written notice of the order as required by the statute.  Sheppard 
acquiesced in this motion, and the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation granted R.C. 
4123.522 relief. 
 
On LTV Steel’s belated appeal, a staff hearing officer (“SHO”) affirmed the 
additional allowances granted by the DHO.  LTV Steel appealed again, but on June 
20, 1995, the commission refused the appeal.  LTV Steel asserts that it also did not 
receive timely written notice of this order and, therefore, that it could not timely 
appeal to common pleas court under R.C. 4123.512. 
 
LTV Steel applied again for R.C. 4123.522 relief before the commission, 
this time alleging that it had no notice of the June 20, 1995 order until October 16, 
1995, when it learned of the order independently of the commission’s notice 
procedures.  An SHO refused to give LTV Steel the benefit of the savings 
provision for a second time.  The SHO found that Sheppard had provided LTV 
Steel actual notice of the commission’s order on July 21, 1995, when he had given 
the June 20, 1995 order to his employer himself.  The SHO relied on Sheppard’s 
testimony to the effect that he had given the order to LTV Steel’s workers’ 
compensation administration, that the document had been stamped as received, and 
 
 
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that a copy of the stamped order had been returned to him.  Sheppard also 
submitted this document as evidence at the SHO hearing. 
 
LTV Steel moved for rehearing and reconsideration of the order denying 
R.C. 4123.522 relief.  Along with its brief and other evidence, LTV Steel 
submitted the affidavit of its workers’ compensation administrator, who swore that 
he had never received any order from Sheppard and had no notice of the June 20 
1995 order before October 16, 1995.  The commission denied rehearing and 
reconsideration, prompting LTV Steel to file this action in the court of appeals. 
__________________ 
 
Manos, Pappas & Stefanski Co., L.P.A., Leonard J. Pappas and James A. 
Neff, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Miltina Gavia and Craigg E. 
Gould, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Sammon & Bolmeyer Co., L.P.A., and David J. Briggs, for appellee 
Sheppard. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  R.C. 4123.522 provides: 
 
“The employee, employer, and their respective representatives are entitled to 
written notice of any * * * determination, order * * * or decision under this chapter 
and the administrator of workers’ compensation and his representative are entitled 
 
 
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to like notice for * * * [R.C. 4123.511 DHO and SHO orders] and [R.C. 4123.512 
right to participate appeals].  An employee, employer, or the administrator is 
deemed not to have received notice until the notice is received from the industrial 
commission or its district or staff hearing officers, the administrator, or the bureau 
of workers’ compensation by both the employee and his representative of record, 
both the employer and his representative of record, and by both the administrator 
and his representative. 
 
“If any person to whom notice is mailed fails to receive the notice and the 
commission, upon hearing, determines that the failure was due to cause beyond the 
control and without the fault or neglect of such person or his representative and 
that such person or his representative did not have actual knowledge of the import 
of the information contained in the notice, such person may take the action 
afforded to such person within twenty-one days after receipt of the notice of such 
determination of the commission.  Delivery of the notice to the address of the 
person or his representative is prima-facie evidence of receipt of the notice by the 
person.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
LTV Steel relies on the emphasized portion in the first paragraph of R.C. 
4123.522, arguing that notice of an order, when not received from the commission, 
is no notice at all.  The commission and Sheppard rely on the emphasis in the 
second paragraph to argue that LTV Steel has not rebutted the presumption of 
 
 
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notice receipt arising under the “mailbox rule.”  We agree with the court of 
appeals’ reasoning and, therefore, affirm. 
 
Employers and their representatives are entitled to receive notice from the 
commission under R.C. 4123.522, but that right is not self-executing.  As the court 
of appeals found, the party alleging the failure to receive notice must first prove 
that (1) the failure of notice was due to circumstances beyond the party’s or the 
party’s representative’s control, (2) the failure of notice was not due to the party’s 
or the party’s representative’s fault or neglect, and (3) neither the party nor the 
party’s representative had prior actual knowledge of the information contained in 
the notice.  Weiss v. Ferro Corp. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 178, 180, 542 N.E.2d 340, 
342.  Only if the commission makes these findings does the moving party become 
unconditionally entitled to what amounts to a second notice of a commission order.  
This second “reconstituted” notice actually comes from the commission upon the 
determination that the moving party has rebutted the mailbox-rule presumption and 
that it is the one from which the new twenty-one-day appeal time is activated.  
Thus, when the moving party sustains its burden of proof, the effect is that the 
party is not “deemed” to have received notice until the commission makes the 
determination that the party did not receive notice of the order initially and the 
party receives notice of this determination.  Id. at 182-183, 542 N.E.2d at 343-344. 
 
 
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The next question is whether LTV Steel sustained its burden of proof.  
Admittedly, some evidence in this record suggests that Sheppard might have 
fabricated the stamped order that the commission cited as evidence of LTV Steel’s 
actual knowledge prior to October 16, 1995.  On the other hand, Sheppard 
explained that he had taken the order to his employer because LTV Steel had 
previously alleged a failure of notice, and the commission evidently believed his 
explanation. 
 
The commission is the exclusive evaluator of weight and credibility, and as 
long as some evidence supports the commission’s decision, reviewing courts must 
defer to its judgment.  State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co. (1996), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 373, 376, 658 N.E.2d 1055, 1058.  Here, the commission credited Sheppard’s 
evidence, which is all that is necessary to sustain its decision.  State ex rel. Burley 
v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals properly found no abuse of discretion and denied 
a writ of mandamus to vacate the commission’s denial of R.C. 4123.522 relief. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.