Case Title: MATTHEW KYLE ENDRIS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0188

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
MATTHEW KYLE ENDRIS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 73Case Number: S-09-0188, S-09-0189Decided: 06/03/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
MATTHEW 
KYLE ENDRIS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Matthew 
Endris pleaded guilty to a charge of driving while under the influence of 
alcohol.  Consistent with the plea 
agreement between Mr. Endris and the prosecution, the district court imposed a 
sentence 
that allowed Mr. Endris to be released from jail to participate in an alcohol 
treatment program.  The district 
court informed Mr. Endris that, during his release, he would be considered 
both on probation and in official detention.  Mr. 
Endris was released, but he failed to enroll in the treatment program.  His probation was revoked, and in a 
separate case, he was convicted of escaping from official detention.  In these consolidated cases, he 
appeals 
both the revocation of his probation and the conviction on the escape 
charge.  He contends that the 
sentence he received on the charge of driving while under the influence is 
illegal because it subjected him to both probation and incarceration at the same 
time.  

 
 

[¶2]        
We 
agree that the sentence is not authorized under the applicable Wyoming 
statutes.  We will therefore reverse 
both the revocation of his probation and his conviction for escape.  We will also vacate the illegal sentence 
on the underlying charge of driving while under the influence, and remand this 
case to the district court for resentencing.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶3]        
Mr. 
Endris states the dispositive issues1 this way:

 
 

1.            
Did 
the trial court err as a matter of law in finding that Mr. Endris escaped 
from official detention when the underlying sentence under W.S. § 7-13-107 
was an illegal sentence, and therefore null and void?

 
 

2.            
Did 
the trial court err in revoking Mr. Endris's probation, as Wyoming law does not 
provide probation to be served concurrently with incarceration for the same 
offense?

 
 
The 
State combines the two issues into one:

 
 

1.            
Was 
Appellant in official detention, in effect serving the custodial portion of his 
split sentence, when he escaped, such that his escape conviction must be 
affirmed but his probation revocation must be vacated?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4]        
Mr. 
Endris was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol, a 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233 (LexisNexis 2007).  Because of prior convictions on 
similar charges, Mr. Endris was charged with a felony.  He pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea 
agreement, in which the prosecution agreed to recommend a sentence of eighteen 
to twenty-four months in prison, suspended in favor of a "split" sentence 
requiring Mr. Endris to spend one year in the county jail and one year on 
supervised probation.  The agreement 
also provided that Mr. Endris would be released from jail to attend an 
in-patient alcohol treatment program.

 
 

[¶5]        
The 
district court accepted the guilty plea.  
Despite concerns that the recommended sentence seemed too "favorable" in 
light of Mr. Endris's criminal record, the district court also accepted the 
recommended sentence with this explanation:

 
 
However, 
since the county attorney was willing to go along with this and give you an 
opportunity . . . certainly the Court does not want to interfere with the 
opportunity for you to rehabilitate yourself.

 
 
So 
the Court will, with some reservations, accept the plea agreement and sentence 
the defendant to not less than eighteen nor more than twenty-four months in 
prison.  That will be suspended in 
lieu of a one year split sentence, and one year of supervised 
probation.

 
 

[¶6]        
Also 
in accordance with the plea agreement, the district court announced that 
Mr. Endris could be released from jail in order to attend an in-patient 
alcohol treatment program.  The 
district court explained the terms of release as follows:

 
 

That 
probation is to begin upon his release from jail and initiation of any treatment 
pursued.  This will apparently be next 
week.

 
 
Mr. 
Endris, I want you to pay particular attention to the 
terms of your probation. . . .

 
 
You 
are to enroll in and complete an acceptable drug and alcohol treatment 
program.  This will begin 
immediately upon your release from jail. . . .  And 
you will be considered in detention while you are at that program, so if you 
decide to leave you will be potentially charged with escape, which is a felony 
in Wyoming. . . .

 
 
He 
will report to the treatment facility no later than four hours from his release 
from jail. . . .  And 
any deviation from that travel plan will be considered a deviation [from] a 
condition of your probation, as well as a deviation from your official 
detention.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶7]        
The 
district court followed its oral sentencing with a written Judgment and 
Sentence.  It confirmed that 
Mr. Endris would be released to participate in a treatment program.  It also confirmed that if Mr. Endris 
left the program without authorization, he would be "charged with felony escape 
from official detention."  Unlike 
the oral sentence, however, the written judgment did not provide that 
Mr. Endris would also be on probation while in the treatment program.  It provided instead that Mr. Endris 
would be eligible for probation after serving one year in jail.  

 
 

[¶8]        
Mr. 
Endris was released from jail on September 29, 2008.  He had been accepted into an alcohol 
treatment program in Cody, about a three hour drive from Sheridan where he was 
in jail.  Mr. Endris thought he had 
arranged for a ride to Cody, but his plan fell through because the driver had to 
have knee surgery.  Mr. Endris asked 
several other people, but they were unable or unwilling to give him a ride.  He went to the bus station, but learned 
that the bus did not go to Cody.  He 
finally found someone willing to drive him to Cody for $200, but he did not have 
that much money.  He continued 
trying to find a ride to Cody or to borrow $200.

 
 

[¶9]        
After 
a couple of days without success, Mr. Endris decided to turn himself in at 
the jail.  On the way there, he 
stopped to see an acquaintance who was working on repairs and remodeling at a 
motel next door to the jail.  This 
person offered Mr. Endris a job helping with that work, and said that Mr. 
Endris could live in the motel while working there.  Mr. Endris decided to take the job 
instead of turning himself in, hoping to earn enough money to pay for a ride to 
Cody.

 
 

[¶10]     
When 
Mr. Endris failed to enroll in the treatment program as required, the district 
court issued a warrant for his arrest.  
That warrant was issued on October 1, 2008.  Mr. Endris was arrested on November 
6, 2008, at the motel next door to the jail.  

 
 

[¶11]     
In 
a hearing held soon after the arrest, the prosecution told the district court 
that it had intended to file a motion to revoke Mr. Endris's probation, but 
upon reviewing the written Judgment and Sentence, the prosecutor found that it 
did not place Mr. Endris on probation when he was released for 
treatment.  The prosecutor believed 
that the oral sentence had placed Mr. Endris both on probation and in detention 
upon his release.  When that belief 
was confirmed by the transcript of the sentencing hearing, the prosecution filed 
a Motion for Order Nunc Pro Tunc, asking the district court to amend the written 
Judgment and Sentence to conform to the oral sentence.  

 
 

[¶12]     
The 
district court granted the motion, reconfirming that Mr. Endris was both on 
probation and in official detention when he was released to seek treatment.  The prosecution then petitioned to 
revoke Mr. Endris's probation.  
Granting the petition, the district court imposed the original sentence 
of eighteen to twenty-four months in prison.  Meanwhile, in a separate proceeding, Mr. 
Endris was charged with escaping from official detention, a violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206(a)(i).  He 
was found guilty by a jury.  He was 
sentenced to four to seven years in prison, to be served consecutive to the 
sentence for driving while under the influence.  Mr. Endris filed timely appeals in 
both cases, and his appeals were consolidated.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶13]     
In 
reviewing claims that a criminal sentence is illegal, we have established this 
standard of review:

 
 
Sentencing 
decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial court.  Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 2003).  "Such 
discretion is limited, however, inasmuch as a court may not enter an illegal 
sentence.  A sentence is illegal if 
it violates the constitution or other law."  In re CT, 2006 WY 101, ¶ 8, 140 P.3d 643, 646 (Wyo. 2006) (internal case citation omitted).  Whether a sentence is illegal is a 
question of law, which we review de 
novo.  Manes v. State, 2007 WY 6, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 179, 181 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 

Jackson 
v. State, 
2009 WY 82, ¶ 6, 209 P.3d 897, 898-99 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶14]     
After 
Mr. Endris pleaded guilty to the charge of driving while under the influence, 
the district court initially imposed a sentence of eighteen to twenty-four 
months in prison.  It suspended that 
sentence and instead imposed a "split sentence," which required Mr. Endris 
to spend one year in the county jail and one year on supervised probation.  "Split sentences" are authorized under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107(a), which provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
Following 
a defendant's conviction of, or his plea of guilty to any felony, other than a 
felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may impose any 
sentence of imprisonment authorized by law and . . . may in addition 
provide:

 
 
(i)  That the defendant be confined in the 
county jail for a period of not more than one (1) year; and 

 
 
(ii)  That the execution of the remainder of 
the sentence be suspended and the defendant placed on 
probation.

 
 

[¶15]     
The 
district court also allowed Mr. Endris to be released from jail to participate 
in an in-patient alcohol treatment program.  As quoted above, the district court 
announced that Mr. Endris would be considered both on probation and in 
detention during his release.  Mr. 
Endris contends that the applicable Wyoming statutes do not allow a court to 
sentence a person to both probation and detention at the same time.  Because the sentence is contrary to the 
statutes, Mr. Endris claims that it is illegal.  "A sentence 
that imposes a punishment not authorized by the legislature . . . is 
illegal."  Apodaca v. State, 891 P.2d 83, 85 (Wyo. 
1995).

 
 

[¶16]     
Mr. 
Endris cites Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-201(a)(ii), which defines the term 
"official detention" to include "detention in any manner and in any place for 
law enforcement purposes."  In 
addition, this definition explicitly states that official detention "does 
not include supervision on probation or parole or constraint incidental 
to release on bail."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Mr. Endris also cites 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-401(a)(x), which defines the term "probation" as "a 
sentence not involving confinement which 
imposes conditions and retains authority in the sentencing court to modify the 
conditions of the sentence or to resentence the offender if he violates the 
conditions."  (Emphasis added.)  Applying this statutory definition in 
other circumstances, we observed that "jail 
time cannot be considered as a probation condition because the word probation' 
is defined . . . as being a sentence not involving confinement.'"  Kidd v. State, 937 P.2d 1334, 1336 (Wyo. 
1997), overruled on other grounds by 
Daugherty v. State, 2002 WY 52, 44 P.3d 28 (Wyo. 2002).  We 
agree with Mr. Endris that these two statutory provisions, taken together, 
establish a general rule that probation and detention are incompatible and 
mutually exclusive.2

 
 

[¶17]     
The 
legislature can make exceptions to this general rule, and provide that a person 
may be subject to both probation and detention in specified circumstances.  For example, under the Wyoming 
Adult 
Community Corrections Act, "the sentencing court may, as a 
condition of probation, order that [an eligible] offender participate in 
a residential or nonresidential adult community correctional program."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-108(a) 
(emphasis added).  But the 
legislature also provided that a person in a community correctional program is 
in official detention, and may be charged with escape from the program.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-112.  Based on these explicit statutory 
provisions, we have recognized that a person participating in a community 
corrections program may be treated as both on probation and in detention.  Peper 
v. State, 
768 P.2d 26, 29 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 

[¶18]     
There 
are no similar provisions in the "split sentence" statute under which 
Mr. Endris was sentenced.  To 
the contrary, that statute provides that a court "may impose a split sentence of 
incarceration followed by probation."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-107(c) 
(emphasis added).  If probation must 
follow incarceration, then a district court imposing a "split sentence" under 
this statute may not impose probation and detention at the same time.  The State has not cited any other 
statutory provision that would authorize the district court to impose both 
probation and detention.  The 
sentence imposed on Mr. Endris is illegal because it subjected him to 
probation 
and detention at the same time for the same crime.

 
 

[¶19]     
The 
State attempts to rely on the district court's written Judgment and Sentence, 
which provided that Mr. Endris was in detention when he was released for 
treatment, but did not state that he would also be on probation.  The State relies on Williams v. State, 949 P.2d 878, 880 (Wyo. 1997) for the proposition that a 
written judgment and sentence may be used to clarify an ambiguous oral 
sentence.  Consistent with the 
written judgment and sentence, the State admits that we must reverse the 
revocation of Mr. Endris's probation, but urges us to affirm Mr. Endris's 
conviction on the escape charge.

 
 

[¶20]     
The 
State's position on appeal is inconsistent with the prosecution's actions in the 
district court.  There, the 
prosecutor insisted that the written order was wrong, and moved to correct the 
written order to conform to the oral sentence.  Now the State takes the contrary 
position that the written sentence was correct and the oral sentence should be 
ignored.  Additionally, the State's 
reliance on Williams is 
misplaced.  Williams says that a written order can 
serve to clarify an ambiguous oral order, but there is nothing ambiguous about 
the oral sentence pronounced by the district court in this case.  The transcript of the sentencing 
hearing, quoted above, leaves no doubt that the district court was sentencing 
Mr. Endris to both probation and detention when he was released for 
treatment.  An unambiguous oral 
pronouncement from the bench prevails over a contrary provision in a written 
order.  See, e.g., Britton v. State, 2009 WY 91, ¶ 24, 
211 P.3d 514, 519 (Wyo. 2009); Cubba v. 
State, 2009 WY 87, ¶ 9, 210 P.3d 1086, 1088 (Wyo. 2009).  We cannot ignore the unambiguous oral 
sentence imposed on Mr. Endris.

 
 

[¶21]     
The 
State also points out that Mr. Endris did not file a timely appeal of that 
sentence, but attacks it for the first time on appeal.  Facing a similar situation in the past, 
we made this observation:

 
 
Our 
rules of criminal procedure authorize a trial court to correct an illegal 
sentence at any time.  W.R.Cr.P. 
35(a).  A motion to correct an 
illegal sentence is properly addressed to the trial court in the first 
instance.  Kahlsdorf v. State, 823 P.2d 1184, 1189 
(Wyo. 1991).  For reasons of 
judicial economy, however, we have considered illegal sentence claims when the 
issue was raised for the first time on appeal, Price v. State, 716 P.2d 324, 328 (Wyo. 
1986), and when the issue, although mentioned in the trial court, was not 
pursued until appeal.  Kahlsdorf, 823 P.3d  at 
1189.

 
 

Sarr 
v. State, 
2007 WY 140, ¶ 12, 166 P.3d 891, 895 (Wyo. 2007).  We are not precluded from considering 
the legality of Mr. Endris's sentence for the first time on 
appeal.

 
 

[¶22]     
Mr. 
Endris's sentence is illegal because it placed him on probation and in detention 
at the same time for the same crime.  
That illegal sentence cannot serve as a proper basis for revoking his 
probation, and so we reverse that decision.  In addition, the illegal sentence cannot 
serve as a proper basis for convicting him of escape from official detention, 
and so we reverse that conviction.  
Finally, we vacate the illegal sentence on the underlying conviction of 
driving while under the influence of alcohol, and remand the case to the 
district court for resentencing.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. Endris also 
presents an issue regarding an instruction given to the jury during his trial on 
the charge of escaping from official detention.  In light of our resolution of his other 
issues, there is no need to consider the jury instruction 
issue.

 
 

2We note that this 
general rule applies in several other states.  See Joseph v. State, 752 So. 2d 656, 656 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) ("It is well settled that probation cannot be imposed 
concurrently with a sentence of incarceration."); State v. Harris, 251 N.W.2d 483, 483 
(Iowa 1977) ("Granting probation and imposing confinement constitute a 
contradiction."); State v. Huftile, 
367 N.W.2d 193, 196 (S.D. 1985) ("Probation and incarceration are . . . mutually 
exclusive."), superseded by statute on 
other grounds, S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15A-1 
(1996).