Case Title: State v. Daniel Arends

Citation: 2010 WI 46

Docket Number: 2008AP000052

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 46 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP52 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the commitment of Daniel Arends: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Daniel Arends, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2008 WI App 184 
Reported at: 315 Wis. 2d 162, 762 N.W.2d 422 
(Ct. App. 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 15, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 11, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington   
 
JUDGE: 
John A. Fiorenza   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ZIEGLER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner the cause was 
argued by Christine A. Remington, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief by Leonard 
D. Kachinsky and Sisson & Kachinsky Law Offices, Appleton, and 
oral argument by Leonard D. Kachinsky. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 46
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP52  
(L.C. No. 
2004CI1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the commitment of Daniel Arends: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel Arends, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 15, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
Review of a decision of the court of appeals.  Modified and 
affirmed, and as modified, cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   This case involves the 
discharge procedure for a person civilly committed as a sexually 
violent person under Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (2005-06).1  Daniel 
Arends was civilly committed in 2005 as a sexually violent 
person, and he petitioned for discharge under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09 in 2007.  The circuit court reviewed the petition for 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
2 
 
discharge and three reports discussing Arends' propensity for 
sexual violence and his treatment.  The circuit court denied the 
petition, stating in a written order that "[t]he court does not 
find probable cause exists" to conduct a discharge hearing (a 
trial on the merits of the discharge petition).  In a published 
opinion,2 the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the 
circuit court applied the wrong standard and that Arends had 
produced facts entitling him to a discharge hearing on his 
petition. 
¶2 
The dispute in this case centers on the procedures a 
circuit court must follow under § 980.09——as amended in 2006——
when determining whether to hold a discharge hearing, and 
whether the circuit court followed those procedures here. 
¶3 
We conclude that § 980.09 requires the circuit court 
to follow a two-step process in determining whether to hold a 
discharge hearing. 
¶4 
Under § 980.09(1), the circuit court engages in a 
paper review of the petition only, including its attachments, to 
determine whether it alleges facts from which a reasonable trier 
of fact could conclude that the petitioner does not meet the 
criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person.  This 
review is a limited one aimed at assessing the sufficiency of 
the allegations in the petition.  If the petition does allege 
                                                 
2 State v. Arends, 2008 WI App 184, 315 Wis. 2d 162, 762 
N.W.2d 422. 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
3 
 
sufficient facts, the circuit court proceeds to a review under 
§ 980.09(2). 
¶5 
Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2) requires the circuit court 
to 
review 
specific 
items 
enumerated 
in 
that 
subsection, 
including all past and current reports filed under § 980.07.3  
The circuit court need not, however, seek out these items if 
they are not already within the record.  Nevertheless, it may 
request additional enumerated items not previously submitted, 
and also has the discretion to conduct a hearing to aid in its 
determination.  The circuit court's task is to determine whether 
the petition and the additional supporting materials before the 
court contain any facts from which a reasonable trier of fact 
could conclude that the petitioner does not meet the criteria 
for commitment as a sexually violent person. 
¶6 
In this case, the circuit court reviewed the three 
most current reports in the record, and therefore its denial of 
the petition appears to have been via review under § 980.09(2).  
The court did not, however, review all prior reports in the 
record as required by the statute.  Additionally, the court 
denied Arends' petition on the grounds that it found no 
"probable cause" to conduct a discharge hearing, but offered no 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.07(6) requires the Department of 
Health Services to submit an annual re-examination and treatment 
progress report to the court.  In addition to reviewing these 
reports, § 980.09(2) requires the court to review relevant facts 
in the petition and in the State's written response, arguments 
of counsel, and any other supporting documents provided by the 
petitioner or the State. 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
4 
 
explanation of its rationale.  Probable cause is not the 
standard required by the statute.  We remand to the circuit 
court to make a determination under § 980.09(2) of whether to 
grant a discharge hearing on Arends' petition.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals' reversal of the circuit court, but 
modify its instructions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶7 
While a minor, Daniel Arends committed multiple sexual 
assaults and other unlawful acts.  As a result, he spent the 
years between ages 13 and 18 in juvenile treatment and 
correctional facilities.  As he approached his 18th birthday and 
his consequent release, the State petitioned to commit him as a 
"sexually violent person" under Wis. Stat. § 980.02.  A jury 
concluded that Arends met the criteria for commitment as a 
sexually violent person, and the Washington County Circuit 
Court, 
Annette 
Kingsland 
Ziegler, 
Judge, 
ordered 
Arends 
committed to the custody of the Department of Health Services 
("Department") in January 2005.  The Department then committed 
him to institutional care at Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center 
("Sand Ridge").4 
¶8 
Upon Arends' request, on June 27, 2007, then-Judge 
Ziegler appointed counsel as well as a psychologist——Dr. Sheila 
Fields——to examine him.  On August 27, 2007, Arends used the 
                                                 
4 According to the Department, "Sand Ridge is a secure 
treatment 
facility 
in 
Mauston, 
W[isconsin], 
providing 
specialized treatment services for persons committed under 
Wisconsin's sexually violent persons law."  Sand Ridge Index, 
http://dhs.wisconsin.gov/SandRidge/ (last visited June 8, 2010). 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
5 
 
standardized form petition provided by the Department5 to file a 
petition for discharge from his commitment.  On the form, Arends 
checked the box that states "I am no longer 'more likely than 
not' to commit an act of sexual violence."6  Below that, in the 
space designated for explanation, he typed: "See the attached 
report of Dr. Shiela [sic] Fields."  No other documents or facts 
were included or alleged in support of his petition. 
¶9 
The Washington County Circuit Court, with John A. 
Fiorenza, Judge, now presiding, reviewed the three most current 
reports in its consideration of Arends' petition.  It reviewed 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.075(1m) requires the Department to 
develop and make available a "standardized petition form for 
discharge."  The standardized form states, "I request discharge 
from my commitment pursuant to § 980.075 and § 980.09 because my 
condition has changed since my initial commitment and I no 
longer meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent 
person."  After this, it provides, "The following facts support 
my petition," and petitioners are provided two boxes they can 
check, along with space under each for additional information.  
The first box states, "I no longer have a mental disorder or my 
mental disorder has changed because (attach additional sheet if 
needed)."  The second box states, "I am no longer 'more likely 
than not' to commit an act of sexual violence because (attach 
additional sheet if needed)." 
6 In order for a person to be and remain committed as a 
sexually violent person, the State must prove three things: (1) 
the person has been adjudicated to have committed a sexually 
violent offense; (2) the person has a mental disorder that 
predisposes the person to acts of sexual violence; and (3) the 
person is more likely than not to commit another violent sexual 
offense.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 980.01(7), 980.02(2), 980.05(3)(a).  
A person initially committed will ordinarily not be able to 
challenge 
requirement 
one, 
which 
is 
presumably 
why 
the 
standardized discharge petition allows the petitioner seeking 
discharge to challenge requirements two and three. 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
6 
 
Dr. Fields' report,7 a 2007 annual Re-examination Report8 by Dr. 
William Schmitt, and a 2007 annual Treatment Progress Report9 
from Sand Ridge. 
¶10 In her report, Dr. Fields concluded "to a reasonable 
degree of professional certainty" that Arends was "not more 
likely than not to sexually reoffend."  Dr. Schmitt indicated in 
his Re-examination Report that he could not confidently offer an 
opinion as to whether Arends posed a low, medium, or high risk 
of reoffense.  Thus, he was unable to offer an opinion to a 
reasonable degree of professional certainty "as to whether Mr. 
Arends [was] 'more likely than not' to commit another sexually 
violent offense."  The Treatment Progress Report from Sand Ridge 
was, as its title suggests, a treatment report, not an 
examination of Arends' current propensity to sexually reoffend.  
Therefore, it contained no opinion as to whether Arends was more 
likely than not to sexually reoffend.10 
                                                 
7 Whenever re-examined by the Department's examiner, a 
committed person has the right to retain, or have the court 
appoint, an independent examiner.  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1). 
8 Re-examination 
reports 
are 
prepared 
by 
an 
examiner 
appointed by the Department "at least once each 12 months."  
Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1). 
9 Treatment progress reports are prepared concurrently with 
the yearly re-examination reports by the professional who treats 
a committed person.  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(4). 
10 While it is possible that such a report might contain 
conclusions regarding the petitioner's current propensity to 
commit a sexually violent act, in this case no such conclusion 
was contained in the report. 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
7 
 
¶11 On September 26, 2007, the circuit court issued a 
written order denying Arends' petition.  The order, in its 
entirety, stated as follows: 
The court, [sic] has reviewed [Arends'] petition for 
discharge filed on August 27, 2007 in the above 
matter, as well as a Treatment Progress Report from 
Sand Ridge Treatment Center, a Re-examination Report 
from Dr. William Schmitt, Ph.D. both filed on August 
9, 2007, as well as a report from Dr. Sheila Fields 
filed August 27, 2007. 
The court does not find probable cause exists to 
conduct a hearing on the Petition.  Therefore, the 
Petition for Discharge is hereby denied, without 
hearing. 
¶12 Arends appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
State v. Arends, 2008 WI App 184, ¶1, 315 Wis. 2d 162, 762 
N.W.2d 422.  The court of appeals first noted that Chapter 980 
was "extensively revised" in 2006, replacing a mandatory 
"probable cause" hearing on each discharge petition with a 
hearing at the court's discretion using a new standard.  Id., 
¶¶8, 13-14.  The court of appeals concluded that removal of the 
"probable cause" language did not create a higher standard or 
shift the burden to the petitioner to prove he or she is no 
longer a sexually violent person, as suggested by the State.  
Id., ¶22.  Rather, the court of appeals focused on the language 
of the statute and concluded that Arends' petition, and Dr. 
Fields' report in particular, contained "facts from which a 
judge or jury may conclude his condition is changed."  Id., ¶26.  
Thus, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
8 
 
the circuit court should have granted Arends an evidentiary 
hearing on his discharge petition.  Id.11 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 This case requires us to interpret and apply Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09.  The interpretation and application of a statute 
is a question of law that we review de novo, but benefitting 
from the analysis of the previous courts.  Star Direct, Inc. v. 
Dal Pra, 2009 WI 76, ¶18, 319 Wis. 2d 274, 767 N.W.2d 898. 
III. DISCUSSION 
 ¶14 Our task is to identify the procedures established by 
the legislature for courts to determine whether to grant a 
discharge hearing on a petition for discharge under Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.0912 as amended in 2006.  Our analysis, therefore, centers 
                                                 
11 The court of appeals stated that it was remanding for an 
evidentiary hearing under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2).  Arends, 315 
Wis. 2d 162, ¶1.  Given that it later concluded that the 
petition alleged facts "sufficient for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09(1) and (2)," id., ¶25, we assume the court meant a 
hearing under § 980.09(3) (what this opinion refers to as a 
"discharge hearing"). 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09 provides as follows: 
980.09 Petition for discharge. A committed person may 
petition the committing court for discharge at any 
time. The court shall deny the petition under this 
section without a hearing unless the petition alleges 
facts from which the court or jury may conclude the 
person's condition has changed since the date of his 
or her initial commitment order so that the person 
does not meet the criteria for commitment as a 
sexually violent person. 
(2) The court shall review the petition within 30 days 
and may hold a hearing to determine if it contains 
facts from which the court or jury may conclude that 
the person does not meet the criteria for commitment 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
9 
 
on the text of the statute.  See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 
N.W.2d 110.  We begin by briefly discussing the general 
statutory scheme in Chapter 980 for the civil commitment of 
sexually violent persons.  We then give an overview of the prior 
and current versions of the statutory provisions governing 
petitions for discharge.  After this, we analyze the specific 
                                                                                                                                                             
as a sexually violent person. In determining under 
this subsection whether facts exist that might warrant 
such a conclusion, the court shall consider any 
current or past reports filed under s. 980.07, 
relevant facts in the petition and in the state's 
written response, arguments of counsel, and any 
supporting documentation provided by the person or the 
state. If the court determines that the petition does 
not contain facts from which a court or jury may 
conclude that the person does not meet the criteria 
for commitment, the court shall deny the petition. If 
the court determines that facts exist from which a 
court or jury could conclude the person does not meet 
criteria for commitment the court shall set the matter 
for hearing. 
(3) The court shall hold a hearing within 90 days of 
the determination that the petition contains facts 
from which the court or jury may conclude that the 
person does not meet the criteria for commitment as a 
sexually violent person. The state has the burden of 
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
person meets the criteria for commitment as a sexually 
violent person. 
(4) If the court or jury is satisfied that the state 
has not met its burden of proof under sub. (3), the 
petitioner shall be discharged from the custody of the 
department. If the court or jury is satisfied that the 
state has met its burden of proof under sub. (3), the 
court may proceed under s. 980.08 (4) to determine 
whether to modify the petitioner's existing commitment 
order by authorizing supervised release. 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
10 
 
procedures 
established 
by 
§ 980.09(1) 
and 
§ 980.09(2), 
respectively.  Finally, we examine the circuit court's actions 
in this case, concluding that the circuit court did not follow 
the proper procedures or apply the proper standard of law in its 
denial of Arends' petition. 
A. Civil Commitment Under Chapter 980 Generally 
¶15 If the State wishes to commit a sexually violent 
offender, it must file a petition alleging that the person is a 
"sexually violent person."  At trial, the State has the burden 
of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person: (1) has 
been adjudicated to have committed a sexually violent offense;13 
(2) has a mental disorder that predisposes the person to acts of 
sexual violence; and (3) is more likely than not to commit 
another violent sexual offense.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 980.01(7), 
980.02(2), 980.05(3)(a).  If the trier of fact so finds, the 
court must commit the person to the custody of the Department, 
which in turn must place the person into institutional care 
until the person is no longer a sexually violent person.  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.06. 
¶16 A committed person must be re-examined by a mental 
health professional "at least once each 12 months," at which 
                                                 
13 By referring to adjudication that one has committed a 
sexually violent offense, we mean to summarize the statute's 
requirements that the person has been "convicted of a sexually 
violent offense, . . . adjudicated delinquent for a sexually 
violent offense, or . . . found not guilty of or not responsible 
for a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or mental 
disease, defect, or illness . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7). 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
11 
 
time the person has the right to also be examined by an 
independent examiner.  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1). 
¶17 A committed person wishing to secure his or her 
release has two options.  The person may file a petition for 
supervised release, which he or she may do no more frequently 
than every 12 months.  Wis. Stat. § 980.08.  Alternatively, a 
committed person may file a petition for discharge, which he or 
she may do at any time.  Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1).  The latter is 
what Arends did in this case. 
B. Petitions for Discharge Generally 
¶18 Chapter 980 was amended in 2006,14 and among the 
changes were revisions to the provisions governing discharge 
petitions.  The prior version of the statute allowed a committed 
person to petition for discharge in three ways. 
¶19 First, a committed person could file a discharge 
petition at any time with the secretary of the Department's 
authorization.  Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1)(a) (2003-04).  If 
proceeding in this fashion, the court was required to hold a 
discharge hearing.  Id. 
¶20 A second avenue for securing discharge was a petition 
over the objections of the secretary of the Department.  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(2)(a) (2003-04).  Committed persons were given 
this option during their annual examination under § 980.07, and 
were deemed to file a petition for discharge unless they 
                                                 
14 2005 Wis. Act 434 created the revised statute, which 
became effective August 1, 2006. 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
12 
 
affirmatively waived their right to do so.  Id.  Once the 
petition was filed, the court was required to conduct "a 
probable cause hearing to determine whether facts exist that 
warrant a hearing on whether the person is still a sexually 
violent person."  Id.  If probable cause did exist, the court 
was required to conduct a discharge hearing.  § 980.09(2)(b) 
(2003-04). 
¶21 Finally, a committed person could file for discharge 
apart from the secretary of the Department's approval or 
disapproval at any time.  Wis. Stat. § 980.10 (2003-04).15  If 
the person had previously filed an unsuccessful petition over 
the secretary's objections, the court could deny the petition 
                                                 
15 The language in Wis. Stat. § 980.10 (2003-04) is very 
similar to the language in the current statute.  It provided: 
In addition to the procedures under s. 980.09, a 
committed person may petition the committing court for 
discharge at any time, but if a person has previously 
filed a petition for discharge without the secretary's 
approval and the court determined, either upon review 
of the petition or following a hearing, that the 
person's petition was frivolous or that the person was 
still a sexually violent person, then the court shall 
deny 
any 
subsequent petition under this section 
without a hearing unless the petition contains facts 
upon which a court could find that the condition of 
the 
person 
had 
so 
changed 
that 
a 
hearing 
was 
warranted.  If the court finds that a hearing is 
warranted, the court shall set a probable cause 
hearing 
in 
accordance 
with 
s. 
980.09(2)(a) 
and 
continue 
proceedings 
under 
s. 
980.09(2)(b), 
if 
appropriate.  If the person has not previously filed a 
petition 
for 
discharge 
without 
the 
secretary's 
approval, the court shall set a probable cause hearing 
in accordance 
with s. 980.09(2)(a) and continue 
proceedings under s. 980.09(2)(b), if appropriate. 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
13 
 
"unless the petition contain[ed] facts upon which a court could 
find that the condition of the person had so changed that a 
hearing was warranted."  Id.  If the court found that the 
petition contained such facts, it ordered a probable cause 
hearing to determine whether a discharge hearing was warranted.  
Id.  If the person had not previously filed an unsuccessful 
petition over the secretary's objections, the court was required 
to conduct a probable cause hearing to determine whether a 
discharge hearing was warranted.  Id. 
¶22 The 
legislature made substantial changes to the 
discharge procedures in 2006.  One significant change was the 
elimination of petitions filed with or without approval of the 
secretary of the Department.  Under the current statute, a 
committed person may simply petition for discharge at any time, 
and a standard procedure now applies to every petition.  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(1).  A second notable change was the elimination 
of the language requiring a "probable cause hearing."  Instead, 
as we discuss below, the legislature replaced a mandatory 
probable cause hearing with a two-step process similarly aimed 
at weeding out meritless and unsupported petitions, while still 
protecting a petitioner's access to a discharge hearing. 
C. Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1)——The Sufficiency of the Petition 
¶23 To examine the procedure established by § 980.09(1),16 
we begin with the text of the statute: 
                                                 
16 The first block of text in Wis. Stat. § 980.09 is not 
numbered.  However, the second block is labeled "(2)."  We thus 
refer to the first block of text as subsection "(1)." 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
14 
 
A committed person may petition the committing court 
for discharge at any time.  The court shall deny the 
petition under this section without a hearing unless 
the petition alleges facts from which the court or 
jury may conclude the person's condition has changed 
since the date of his or her initial commitment order 
so that the person does not meet the criteria for 
commitment as a sexually violent person. 
¶24 Initially, we observe that § 980.09(1) focuses only on 
denial of the petition, and not on granting a discharge hearing.  
This step, then, is an initial review of the petition; an 
additional step (described in § 980.09(2)) is required for a 
petitioner to obtain a discharge hearing. 
¶25 Review under § 980.09(1) is a paper review by the 
court only of the petition and its attachments.17  Additional 
supporting evidence or reports may not be considered at this 
stage.  The statute further specifies that the petition must 
allege facts, not just legal conclusions.  A petition which 
merely states "I am no longer a sexually violent person" without 
any supporting facts must fail.  Conclusory allegations alone 
are not enough.   
¶26 The court's task in a § 980.09(1) review is to 
determine whether the facts alleged are those "from which the 
court or jury may conclude the person's condition has changed 
since the date of his or her initial commitment order so that 
the person does not meet the criteria for commitment as a 
sexually violent person." 
                                                 
17 We understand that when this subsection says "petition," 
it necessarily includes documents attached to the petition. 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
15 
 
¶27 The standard here looks to what a court or jury "may 
conclude" from the allegations in the petition.  Thus, in order 
to pass § 980.09(1) review, the court must determine that a 
reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the facts alleged 
in the petition and its attachments that the petitioner does not 
meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person.  
Allegations sufficient to support relief for the petitioner 
would necessarily have to show that the petitioner no longer 
meets one or more of the three statutory requirements for being 
a sexually violent person under § 980.01(7).  As reflected in 
the standardized form petition, the allegations will most likely 
challenge the requirement that a committed person have a mental 
disorder that predisposes him or her to acts of sexual violence, 
and/or that the committed person is more likely than not to 
commit another violent sexual offense.  See supra notes 5-6. 
¶28 The standard under § 980.09(1), then, provides for a 
very 
limited 
review 
aimed 
at 
ensuring 
the 
petition 
is 
sufficient——that is, whether relief for the petitioner is 
possible based on the factual allegations in the petition.  The 
clear purpose of such a review is to weed out meritless and 
unsupported petitions, which is especially important in light of 
the statute's proviso that petitions for discharge may be filed 
at any time. 
¶29 This standard is similar to that used in civil cases 
to decide a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted under Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)(6).  
When reviewing such a motion, a court analogously considers only 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
16 
 
the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments, and must 
assume that all those alleged facts are true.  Peterson v. 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 2005 WI 61, ¶¶15-16, 281 Wis. 2d 39, 
697 N.W.2d 61.  A court grants such a motion only when "no 
relief can be granted under any set of facts that a plaintiff 
can prove in support of his or her allegations."  Watts v. 
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 512, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987). 
¶30 In sum, § 980.09(1) establishes a limited review of 
the sufficiency of the petition.  It requires the circuit court 
to engage in a paper review of only the petition and its 
attachments to determine whether the petition alleges facts from 
which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the petitioner 
is no longer a sexually violent person.  If it does not allege 
such facts, the court must deny the petition.  If such facts are 
alleged, the court then proceeds to a review under § 980.09(2). 
D. Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)——The Sufficiency of the Evidence 
¶31 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2) provides as follows: 
The court shall review the petition within 30 days and 
may hold a hearing to determine if it contains facts 
from which the court or jury may conclude that the 
person does not meet the criteria for commitment as a 
sexually violent person.  In determining under this 
subsection whether facts exist that might warrant such 
a conclusion, the court shall consider any current or 
past reports filed under s. 980.07, relevant facts in 
the petition and in the state's written response, 
arguments of counsel, and any supporting documentation 
provided by the person or the state.  If the court 
determines that the petition does not contain facts 
from which a court or jury may conclude that the 
person does not meet the criteria for commitment, the 
court 
shall 
deny 
the 
petition. 
 
If 
the 
court 
determines that facts exist from which a court or jury 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
17 
 
could conclude the person does not meet criteria for 
commitment the court shall set the matter for hearing. 
¶32 Section 980.09(2) contains a second level of review 
before a petitioner is entitled to a discharge hearing.  Unlike 
§ 980.09(1), where only the petition and its attachments are 
reviewed, the court in this step is required to examine all of 
the following items: 
(1) any 
current 
and 
past 
re-examination 
reports 
or 
treatment progress reports filed under Wis. Stat. § 980.07; 
(2) relevant facts in the petition and in the State's 
written response; 
(3) arguments of counsel; and 
(4) any supporting documentation provided by the person or 
the State. 
¶33 Some confusion arose at oral argument as to how the 
circuit court can fulfill its obligation to consider all these 
items when some of them may not be available or otherwise within 
the record before the court.  The most reasonable reading of 
this statute is that the court must review all the items 
enumerated in § 980.09(2) that are in the record at the time of 
review.18  The circuit court need not, therefore, seek out 
evidence not currently before it.  It may, however, order the 
production of any of the enumerated items not in the record, but 
is not required to do so.  The statute supports this 
                                                 
18 The Department must provide all § 980.07 reports to the 
court when they are created.  Wis. Stat. § 980.07(6).  The other 
items (the petition and response, arguments of counsel, and 
supplemental documents) originate from the parties. 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
18 
 
interpretation in granting the court the discretion at this 
stage to hold a separate hearing, distinct from and prior to any 
discharge hearing.19  Thus, review under § 980.09(2) is of the 
specific items listed in the statute, if available or so 
requested by the court. 
¶34 The central dispute between the parties is the 
standard established by § 980.09(2). 
¶35 The State argues that when the legislature removed the 
mandatory "probable cause hearing" from the statute, it intended 
to elevate the court's gatekeeping role and give courts more 
discretion to make limited credibility determinations (which 
courts could not do under the old probable cause standard).  The 
standard, the State reasons, must be higher than probable cause, 
but lower than clear and convincing evidence (which is the 
burden the state must meet at the discharge hearing under 
§ 980.09(3)).  It recommends a preponderance of the evidence 
standard, and maintains that it is the petitioner's burden to 
prove he or she has changed and is no longer a sexually violent 
person.   
                                                 
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09 uses the term "hearing" to 
describe two distinct events.  The first is an optional hearing 
under 
§ 980.09(2) 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
may 
hold 
when 
determining whether to grant the petitioner a discharge hearing.  
The discharge hearing under § 980.09(3)-(4) is required before a 
committed person may be discharged.  To avoid confusion, we 
refer to the hearing under § 980.09(3)-(4) as a "discharge 
hearing" and the optional hearing under § 980.09(2) as simply a 
"hearing." 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
19 
 
¶36 Arends counters that the new standard, though not 
called "probable cause," is by its terms essentially the same.  
He rejects the notion that the burden shifts to him or that the 
statute creates a preponderance of the evidence standard, 
neither of which, he argues, can be found in the statute's 
language. 
¶37 We take the standard delineated in the statute at face 
value.  It contains neither the phrase "probable cause" nor the 
phrase "preponderance of the evidence," both of which are common 
terms of art that the legislature could have employed.  The 
circuit court's task, according to the statute, is to determine 
whether the documents and arguments before the court contain 
"facts from which the court or jury may conclude that the person 
does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent 
person."20 
¶38 As with review under § 980.09(1), review here is a 
limited one.  While § 980.09(1) tests whether the allegations in 
the 
petition 
and 
its 
attachments 
could 
support 
relief, 
§ 980.09(2) tests whether the record in toto, including all 
reports, the petition and any written response, arguments of 
counsel, and any other documents submitted, contain facts that 
could support relief for the petitioner at a discharge hearing.  
                                                 
20 Section 980.09(2) actually states the standard with three 
slightly different iterations, sometimes using the phrase "could 
conclude," sometimes using "may conclude" and other such minor, 
non-substantive word-choice variances. 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
20 
 
Essentially, review under § 980.09(2) ensures that the claims in 
the petition are supported with actual facts. 
¶39 This is not to say that the court must take every 
document 
a 
party 
submits 
at 
face 
value. 
 
The 
court's 
determination that a court or jury could conclude in the 
petitioner's favor must be based on facts upon which a trier of 
fact could reasonably rely.  For example, if the evidence shows 
the 
expert 
is 
not 
qualified 
to 
make 
a 
psychological 
determination, or that the expert's report was based on a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the proper definition of a 
sexually violent person, the court must deny the petition 
without 
a 
discharge 
hearing 
despite 
the 
report's 
stated 
conclusions.21 
¶40 We reject the State's argument that the circuit court 
may weigh evidence favoring the petitioner directly against 
evidence disfavoring the petitioner.  This is impermissible 
                                                 
21 Other examples can be found in prior case law.  Although 
these cases all applied the old "probable cause" standard, their 
results would be the same under the new standard.  See State v. 
Kruse, 2006 WI App 179, 296 Wis. 2d 130, 722 N.W.2d 742 (holding 
that a report favorable to the petitioner was insufficient 
because it was based solely on evidence that had already formed 
the basis for the denial of a previous discharge petition); 
State v. Fowler, 2005 WI App 41, 279 Wis. 2d 459, 694 N.W.2d 446 
(holding 
that 
a 
report 
favorable 
to 
the 
petitioner 
was 
insufficient because, although it stated that the petitioner had 
improved, it still concluded he was a sexually violent person); 
State v. Thiel, 2004 WI App 140, 275 Wis. 2d 421, 685 N.W.2d 890 
(holding 
that 
a 
report 
favorable 
to 
the 
petitioner 
was 
insufficient because, although it concluded he would be safe to 
place on supervised release, it also concluded he was still a 
sexually violent person). 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
21 
 
because the standard is not whether the evidence more heavily 
favors the petitioner, but whether the enumerated items contain 
facts that would allow a factfinder to grant relief for the 
petitioner.22  If the enumerated items do contain such facts, the 
presence of evidence unfavorable to the petitioner——a re-
examination report reaching a conclusion that the petitioner was 
still more likely than not to sexually reoffend, for example——
does not negate the favorable facts upon which a trier of fact 
might reasonably rely. 
¶41 We also reject the notion that the burden shifts to 
the petitioner to prove he or she "no longer meets" the criteria 
for commitment.  The statute focuses on whether a trier of fact 
could conclude that the petitioner "does not meet the criteria 
for commitment."  The petitioner does not need to prove a change 
in status in order to be entitled to a discharge hearing; the 
petitioner need only provide evidence that he or she does not 
meet the requirements for commitment. 
¶42 The standard prescribed by § 980.09(2) is similar to 
that used in a civil action to decide a motion to dismiss at the 
close of evidence under Wis. Stat. § 805.14(4).  The § 805.14 
standard likewise tests whether the record contains any evidence 
that would support relief for the plaintiff.  See Am. Family 
                                                 
22 As we noted when examining § 980.09(1), to support relief 
for the petitioner, evidence would necessarily have to show that 
the petitioner does not meet one or more of the three statutory 
requirements for being a sexually violent person under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.01(7). 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
22 
 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dobrzynski, 88 Wis. 2d 617, 624-25, 277 N.W.2d 
749 (1979). 
¶43 To conclude, Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) establishes a 
limited review of the sufficiency of the evidence.  The court is 
required 
to 
review 
the 
items 
specifically 
enumerated 
if 
available, and may order those items to be produced and/or 
conduct a hearing at its discretion.  The circuit court must 
determine whether the enumerated items contain any facts from 
which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the 
petitioner does not meet the criteria for commitment as a 
sexually violent person.  If any facts support a finding in 
favor of the petitioner, the court must order a discharge 
hearing on the petition; if no such facts exist, the court must 
deny the petition. 
E. Application to Arends' Petition 
¶44 In the case at bar, the circuit court denied Arends' 
petition without a discharge hearing, and reviewed three 
documents to aid its decision: Dr. Fields' report, Dr. Schmitt's 
Re-examination Report, and the Treatment Progress Report from 
Sand Ridge.  The circuit court did not state whether it was 
denying the petition under § 980.09(1) or (2).  Because it 
considered evidence outside of the petition and its attachment 
(Dr. Fields' report), it appears that the circuit court's denial 
was issued after a § 980.09(2) analysis. 
¶45 The record indicates that the circuit court did not 
consider all of the items it was required to consider under 
§ 980.09(2).  Arends was committed in 2005, and was re-examined 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
23 
 
as required by § 980.07 in 2005, 2006, and 2007.  The record 
before us on appeal contains a Re-examination Report and 
Treatment Progress Report for each of those years.23  The circuit 
court's written order reflects that it considered only the 2007 
reports along with Dr. Fields' report.  The court, therefore, 
did not consider all current or past reports filed under 
§ 980.07 as required by § 980.09(2). 
¶46 Furthermore, the circuit court denied Arends' petition 
for discharge on the grounds that "probable cause" did not exist 
to hold a discharge hearing.  It offered no further explanation 
of its decision.  Our opinion today clarifies that probable 
cause is not the proper standard under this new statute. 
¶47 It is axiomatic that a circuit court must create a 
record of its reasoning sufficient to facilitate appellate 
review.  See In re John Doe Proceeding, 2003 WI 30, ¶57, 260 
Wis. 2d 653, 660 N.W.2d 260 ("[O]ur system of justice demands 
that there be some basis [for a judge's decision] set forth to 
facilitate review.").  Had the circuit court explained its 
reasoning, we might have been able to determine whether it 
applied the proper standard, even if under a different name.  As 
it is, we cannot. 
¶48 Though able to review the evidence in this case 
ourselves, we choose instead to remand to the circuit court so 
                                                 
23 The two reports filed in 2005 were filed under the old 
statute, which provided that a committed person's first re-
examination had to occur within six months of commitment, not 
12.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.07(1) (2003-04). 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
24 
 
that it may have an opportunity to conduct a review under 
§ 980.09(2)24 following the procedures and applying the standards 
we announce today.  See State ex rel. Skibinski v. Tadych, 31 
Wis. 2d 189, 199, 142 N.W.2d 838 (1966) (noting that when a 
circuit court fails to make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, this court may either review the evidence itself or remand 
to the circuit court to carry out that task). 
¶49 On remand, the circuit court must consider all the 
items enumerated in § 980.09(2), including all the § 980.07 
reports (Re-examination Reports and Treatment Progress Reports) 
that have been filed since the beginning of Arends' commitment.25  
The court may order additional enumerated items to be produced, 
and may hold a hearing to aid its determination.  The circuit 
court must determine whether the record before it contains facts 
                                                 
24 We are confident that § 980.09(1) is satisfied because 
Arends' petition alleges that Dr. Fields' report supports his 
assertion that he is no longer more likely than not to sexually 
reoffend, and Dr. Fields does in fact reach this conclusion in 
her report. 
Additionally, while § 980.09(1) is a separate level of 
review, we do not believe a trial court need issue an order 
explaining 
its 
rationale 
if 
a 
petitioner 
satisfies 
the 
requirements of § 980.09(1).  This would needlessly burden trial 
judges, who would, in many cases, proceed seamlessly from a 
§ 980.09(1) review to a § 980.09(2) review without notice to the 
parties.  Because any appellate court conducting a review of a 
§ 980.09(2) determination (either a grant or denial of a 
discharge hearing) would necessarily review the petition as well 
as its attachments, this approach neither hinders appellate 
review nor affects the rights of the parties. 
25 The court should also consider any such documents filed 
with the court since Arends filed this petition. 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
25 
 
from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Arends 
does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent 
person. 
¶50 If the court concludes that such facts are present, 
the court must order a discharge hearing on the petition.  If 
the court denies Arends' petition without a discharge hearing, 
it must create a record of its rationale sufficient to 
facilitate appellate review. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶51 We conclude that § 980.09 requires the circuit court 
to follow a two-step process in determining whether to hold a 
discharge hearing. 
¶52 Under § 980.09(1), the circuit court engages in a 
paper review of the petition only, including its attachments, to 
determine whether it alleges facts from which a reasonable trier 
of fact could conclude that the petitioner does not meet the 
criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person.  This 
review is a limited one aimed at assessing the sufficiency of 
the allegations in the petition.  If the petition does allege 
sufficient facts, the circuit court proceeds to a review under 
§ 980.09(2). 
¶53 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2) requires the circuit court 
to 
review 
specific 
items 
enumerated 
in 
that 
subsection, 
including all past and current reports filed under § 980.07.  
The circuit court need not, however, seek out these items if 
they are not already within the record.  Nevertheless, it may 
request additional enumerated items not previously submitted, 
No. 
2008AP52   
 
26 
 
and also has the discretion to conduct a hearing to aid in its 
determination.  The circuit court's task is to determine whether 
the petition and the additional supporting materials before the 
court contain facts from which a reasonable trier of fact could 
conclude that the petitioner does not meet the criteria for 
commitment as a sexually violent person. 
¶54 In this case, the circuit court reviewed the three 
most current reports in the record, and therefore its denial of 
the petition appears to have been via review under § 980.09(2).  
The court did not, however, review all prior reports in the 
record as required by the statute.  Additionally, the court 
denied Arends' petition on the grounds that it found no 
"probable cause" to conduct a discharge hearing, but offered no 
explanation of its rationale.  Probable cause is not the 
standard required by the statute.  We remand to the circuit 
court to make a determination under § 980.09(2) of whether to 
grant a discharge hearing on Arends' petition.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals' reversal of the circuit court, but 
modify its instructions. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and affirmed, and as modified, the cause remanded to 
the circuit court. 
¶55 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J., did not participate. 
No. 
2008AP52.dtp   
 
1 
 
 
¶56 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  I respectfully 
dissent from the majority opinion's analysis of the statute. 
¶57 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(1) reads: 
 
A committed person may petition the committing 
court for discharge at any time.  The court shall deny 
the petition under this section without a hearing 
unless the petition alleges facts from which the court 
or jury may conclude the person's condition has 
changed 
since 
the 
date 
of 
his 
or 
her 
initial 
commitment order so that the person does not meet the 
criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person.  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶58 The import of this subsection is that the petition 
must allege facts from which the court or a jury may conclude 
the person's condition has changed since his or her commitment 
so that the person does not meet the criteria for commitment any 
more.  If the petition fails to allege such facts, the petition 
must be dismissed because it is deficient on its face.  The flip 
side of this proposition is that a facially sufficient petition 
should normally lead to a discharge hearing. 
¶59 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2) reads: 
 
[1] The court shall review the petition within 30 
days and may hold a hearing to determine if it 
contains facts from which the court or jury may 
conclude that the person does not meet the criteria 
for commitment as a sexually violent person.  [2] In 
determining under this subsection whether facts exist 
that might warrant such a conclusion, the court shall 
consider any current or past reports filed under s. 
980.07, relevant facts in the petition and in the 
state's written response, arguments of counsel, and 
any supporting documentation provided by the person or 
the state.  [3] If the court determines that the 
petition does not contain facts from which a court or 
jury may conclude that the person does not meet the 
criteria for commitment, the court shall deny the 
No. 
2008AP52.dtp   
 
2 
 
petition.  [4] If the court determines that facts 
exist from which a court or jury could conclude the 
person does not meet criteria for commitment the court 
shall set the matter for hearing. 
¶60 Subsection (2) provides that the court shall review 
the petition within 30 days.  The court may be uncertain about 
the sufficiency of the petition.  In addition, the state may 
challenge the sufficiency of the petition on the facts alleged 
or on the law.  In either event, the court may hold a hearing to 
determine whether the petition contains facts "from which the 
court or jury may conclude that the person does not meet the 
criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person."  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(2).  "If the court determines that facts exist 
from which a court or jury could conclude the person does not 
meet criteria for commitment the court shall set the matter for 
hearing."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶61 Subsection (2) appears to be somewhat ambiguous.  The 
first sentence reiterates that the court shall review the 
petition and may hold a hearing to determine if it [the 
petition] contains appropriate "facts."  The third sentence of 
the subsection also refers to facts in the petition.   
¶62 In contrast, the second sentence asks "whether facts 
exist" and requires the court to examine "relevant facts in the 
petition and in the state's written response, arguments of 
counsel, and any supporting documentation provided by the person 
No. 
2008AP52.dtp   
 
3 
 
or the state."1  The fourth sentence does not specifically refer 
to the petition; it refers to "facts that exist."  In light of 
the second sentence, I read the phrase "facts that exist" to 
mean facts that come out in the court's consideration of 
submissions, testimony, and argument subsequent to the petition, 
irrespective of whether those "facts" were alleged in the 
petition. 
¶63 The optional hearing to evaluate the petition may 
strengthen the petitioner's case for a discharge hearing.  The 
consideration of items enumerated in the second sentence of (2), 
including argument, also may support the petition.   
¶64 The 
real 
question 
here 
is 
whether 
a 
facially 
sufficient petition can be successfully rebutted in the optional 
hearing or in the court's consideration of other matters, 
including argument. 
¶65 If testimony or argument at the optional hearing or 
the consideration of enumerated items outside the petition 
persuades the court to disregard a facially sufficient petition, 
                                                 
1 The second sentence also requires the court to consider 
"any current or past reports filed under s. 980.07."  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 980.07 requires that a committed person be reexamined 
"at least once each 12 months to determine whether the person 
has made sufficient progress for the court to consider whether 
the 
person 
should 
be 
placed 
on 
supervised 
release 
or 
discharged."  
Wis. 
Stat. § 980.07(1).  At the time of 
reexamination, "the person . . . may retain or have the court 
appoint an examiner as provided under s. 980.031(3)."  If the 
person is unable to reference in his petition a favorable report 
from the state's examiner or his own examiner, the petition is 
unlikely to allege "facts" from which a jury could conclude that 
the person no longer meets the criteria for commitment. 
No. 
2008AP52.dtp   
 
4 
 
the petitioner is effectively denied his statutory right to a 
jury trial. 
¶66 Thus, in my view, a facially sufficient petition 
requires a discharge hearing under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(3) unless 
the state shows that the "facts" alleged in the petition cannot 
be substantiated or the allegations in the petition are 
deficient as a matter of law. 
¶67 In this case, Arends' petition was facially sufficient 
because of the favorable report of Dr. Sheila Fields attached to 
the petition.  I see nothing in the record that negates or 
invalidates the facial sufficiency of the "fact" of Dr. Shields' 
favorable evaluation.  Thus, I perceive no legal basis for 
remanding the case for reconsideration of the sufficiency of the 
petition under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2).  Arends is entitled to a 
discharge hearing.2 
¶68 If my reading of the statute is incorrect, the 
legislature should clarify Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) so that its 
intent is clear. 
¶69 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
                                                 
2 At this point, the court would be bound to consider——at a 
reconsideration hearing under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) or a 
discharge hearing under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(3)——the most current 
information described in ¶51 of the majority opinion. 
No. 
2008AP52.dtp   
 
 
 
1