Case Title: Burger Drilling Co., Inc. v. Bauman

Citation: 241 Neb. 869, 492 N.W.2d 5

Docket Number: 

State: nebraska

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Date: 1992-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
492 N.W.2d 5 (1992) 241 Neb. 869 BURGER DRILLING COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. Ralph BAUMAN, Individually and doing business as Bauman Oil & Gas Properties, et al., Appellees. No. S-90-120. Supreme Court of Nebraska. November 6, 1992. John D. Hartigan and Michael A. Harsh, of Kennedy, Holland, DeLacy & Svoboda, Omaha, for appellant. Michael R. Dunn and Richard L. Halbert, of Halbert & Dunn, Falls City, for appellees. HASTINGS, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and FAHRNBRUCH, JJ. GRANT, Justice. Plaintiff-appellant, Burger Drilling Company, Inc. (Burger), a Texas corporation, filed an amended petition in the district court for Richardson County, Nebraska, seeking a declaratory judgment determining the rights of plaintiff and defendants to certain real estate in Richardson County and setting aside a deed to that real estate from defendants-appellees Ralph Bauman and his wife to defendants-appellees Marvin Bauman (Ralph's brother) and his wife, on the ground that the transaction was intended to defraud Burger in its capacity as a judgment creditor. The district court tried the case as one in equity, and after trial, held that the conveyance by defendant Ralph Bauman and his wife to Marvin Bauman and his wife was not a fraudulent conveyance. The court further found that the judgment lien held by Burger had become dormant. Plaintiff timely appealed and in this court contends that the district court erred *6 in certain respects. We do not reach the assignments of error presented by appellant, however. As required by the Nebraska Supreme Court rules, this action should have been stayed by the district court until a showing was made that the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) did not apply or that the automatic stay had been terminated, annulled, modified, or conditioned so as to allow the case to proceed. Accordingly, we remand the cause to the district court, where the action will be stayed until such a showing is made. Rule 1 of the Bankruptcy Rules for Nebraska District and County Courts (rev. 1992) was in effect at the time of the filing of plaintiff's petition herein. That rule is entitled "Civil Cases in Which a Party has been Named as a Debtor in a Voluntary or Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition" and provides: A similar rule, Neb.Ct.R. of Prac. 11G (rev.1992), is set out in the procedural rules of the Nebraska appellate courts. In part, § 362 provides: The record before us does not show that the requirements of the applicable procedural rule of the district court were met by either party in the instant case. Burger pled, in its amended petition, in part: While it was asserted by Burger that Ralph Bauman filed for bankruptcy on October 26, 1982, no suggestion of bankruptcy petition was filed, and no copy of the bankruptcy petition was submitted to the court by either party to this action. In their answer to this amended petition, Baumans generally denied everything that was contained in the cause of action referring to the bankruptcy "except those allegations *7 which constitute admissions against the interest of [Burger]." As to the automatic stay imposed by § 362, Ralph Bauman testified, under oath, that he had never received an order "terminating the automatic stay" from the bankruptcy court or from the "Federal Court down in Texas", that he did not know if his bankruptcy proceedings had been dismissed or terminated, and that he never received an order from the bankruptcy court discharging him from his debts. In answers to plaintiff's "Request for Admission of Fact," Ralph Bauman denied that his bankruptcy proceeding had been dismissed because "Defendant does not have sufficient knowledge at this time to admit the allegation." Burger contends that it sought to revive its judgment only as a precautionary measure and is not sure if or when the bankruptcy proceedings ended. In an affidavit, plaintiff's attorney alleged, "Upon your [plaintiff's] best information and belief, [Ralph Bauman's] bankruptcy proceedings have been dismissed." In this state of the record, it is not possible for the trial court or this court to know anything definitive about the bankruptcy proceedings. The proceedings might be pending or might have been dismissed, or Ralph Bauman might have been discharged from certain debts. All that the record shows is that there was a bankruptcy proceeding, and no party has informed the trial court as to the present posture of that proceeding. Under bankruptcy rule 1, the district court should have stayed the action until one of the parties showed that relief from the automatic stay imposed by § 362 had been granted. Since this procedure was not followed, this action is remanded to the district court for Richardson County, where the matter will be stayed until such time as proof of the termination of the automatic stay in the bankruptcy proceedings of Ralph Bauman is provided and a showing made as to what bankruptcy orders, if any, have been made concerning the debt between Ralph Bauman and plaintiff. REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.