Case Title: Bush v. Reyes, Red Clay Consolidated School District, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 67, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
CRYSTAL BUSH,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellant,
v.
VICTOR REYES, RED CLAY
CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL
DISTRICT and ALEXIS I.
DUPONT HIGH SCHOOL,
Defendants Below-
Appellees.
§
§  No. 67, 2001
§
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  C.A. No. 98C-02-005
§
§
§
§
§
Submitted: April 17, 2001
  Decided:
May 25, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices.
O R D E R
This 25th day of May 2001, upon consideration of the appellees’ motion
to dismiss and the appellant's response thereto, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The plaintiff-appellant, Crystal Bush, filed this appeal from a
decision of the Superior Court dismissing Bush’s complaint against the
defendants-appellees, Red Clay Consolidated School District (“the District”)
and Alexis I. Dupont High School (“the School”), for failure to comply with a
prior discovery order.  Bush previously had obtained a default judgment against
defendant-appellant, Victor Reyes, on June 9, 1999. 
-2-
(2)
The District and the School have filed a motion to dismiss Bush’s
appeal on the grounds that the Superior Court’s order dismissing Bush’s claims
against them is interlocutory and that Bush has not complied with Supreme
Court Rule 42, which governs appeals from interlocutory orders.  The District
and the School contend that, although Bush has obtained a default judgment
against Reyes, the judgment against Reyes is not final because it has not been
reduced to a liquidated amount.  Accordingly, until the amount due from Reyes
is fixed, Bush may not pursue an appeal absent compliance with Rule 42. 
(3)
In her response to the motion to dismiss, Bush concedes that the
amount of her judgment against Reyes was never established by the Superior
Court at an inquisition hearing.  Bush further concedes that she has not
complied with the requirements of Rule 42 for taking an interlocutory appeal.
 Bush nonetheless appears to contend that the Superior Court’s order dismissing
her claims against the District and the School is a final order because Reyes is
judgment-proof and, presumably, that establishing a liquidated amount in
damages against Reyes would be futile. 
(4)
An order is deemed final and appealable if the trial court has
clearly declared its intention that the order be the court's “final act” in disposing
-3-
of all justiciable matters within its jurisdiction.1  In a suit for money damages,
“settlement of the amount due is a condition precedent to the finality of a
judgment.”2  An appeal from a determination of liability only, where damages
have not been fixed, constitutes an impermissible interlocutory appeal if the
provisions of Rule 42 have not been observed.  Bush has not attempted to
comply with this Rule.3 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the appellees’ motion to
dismiss is granted.  This appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Randy J. Holland
Justice
                                                          
1 J.I. Kislak Mortgage Corp. v. William Matthews, Builder, Inc., Del. Supr., 303 A.2d 648,
650 (1973). 
2 Id. 
3 American Reliance Insur. Co. v. Meyer, Del. Supr., No. 185, 1991, Walsh, J. (July 26,
1991) (ORDER).