Case Title: Ex parte William T. Harrington.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1171174

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: April 5, 2019
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2018-2019
____________________
1171174
____________________
Ex parte William T. Harrington
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: William T. Harrington
v.
Big Sky Environmental, LLC, Gabriel Kim, and Clayton "Lanny"
Young)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-16-904776;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2170566)
BOLIN, Justice.
William 
T. 
Harrington 
petitioned 
this 
Court 
for
certiorari review of the Court of Civil Appeals' order
dismissing his appeal as untimely.  
1171174
Procedural History
On 
December 
23, 
2016, 
Harrington 
sued 
Big 
Sky
Environmental, LLC, Gabriel Kim, and Clayton "Lanny" Young,
seeking compensatory and punitive damages resulting from a
dispute over an employment agreement.  Harrington alleged
breach 
of 
contract, 
negligence, 
wantonness, 
fraud,
suppression, and deceit.  On March 10, 2017, Big Sky and Kim
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R.
Civ. P.  
On April 5, 2017, Harrington filed an amended complaint. 
Harrington again named Big Sky, Kim, and Young as defendants. 
He added as defendants Exoro Global, LLC ("Exoro Global"), and
Exoro Global Capital, LLC ("Exoro Capital").  He once again
alleged breach of contract, negligence, wantonness, fraud,
suppression, and deceit.  Harrington listed Kim as the "agent
for service" of process for both Exoro Global and Exoro
Capital.  Harrington filed a notice to serve Exoro Global and
Exoro Capital by certified mail.  It appears that Exoro Global
and Exoro Capital have a business interest in Big Sky.  On
April 10, 2017, Big Sky and Kim filed a motion to dismiss the
amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. 
2
1171174
In their motion to dismiss, Big Sky and Kim stated in a
footnote that neither Exoro Global nor Exoro Capital had been
served.
On April 28, 2017, Harrington filed a second amended
complaint in which he named Big Sky, Kim, Young, Exoro Global,
and Exoro Capital as defendants, again alleging breach of
contract, negligence, wantonness, fraud, suppression, and
deceit.  Kim was again listed as the "agent for service" for
Exoro Global and Exoro Capital.  On May 12, 2017, Big Sky and
Kim filed a motion to dismiss Harrington's second amended
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).1    
On September 28, 2017, the trial court entered an order 
dismissing the claims against Big Sky and Kim with prejudice
on the ground that there was no valid employment contract. 
The trial court then set the case for a status review on
November 7, 2017.  On October 26, 2017, Harrington filed a
motion purportedly seeking to "alter, amend, or vacate the
judgment," arguing that a valid employment contract existed. 
1In their motion, Big Sky and Kim stated that Big Sky was
Harrington's sole employer and that Harrington had not been
employed by Kim, Exoro Global, or Exoro Capital.
3
1171174
On December 20, 2017, the trial court denied Harrington's
motion.  
On January 26, 2018, the trial court entered the
following order:
"The Court has been made aware that the parties
are in disagreement over whether or not its order of
September 28, 2017 is final and in accordance with
Rule 54(b) of the Ala. R. Civ. P.
"After reviewing the Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint and the aforementioned order, the Court
finds that the granting of the Defendants' [Rule]
12(b)(6) motion dismissed any and all claims
asserted by the Defendant.[2]
"It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and decreed
that this Court's order dated September 28, 2017 is
hereby made FINAL. Any and all claims against the
Defendant(s) 
are 
hereby 
DISMISSED, 
without
prejudice."
(Capitalization in original.)
On March 7, 2018, Harrington filed a notice of appeal. 
On March 15, 2018, this Court transferred the case to the
Court of Civil Appeals pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala. Code
1975.  On July 19, 2018, the Court of Civil Appeals entered an
order requesting that the parties file letter briefs
addressing whether there was a final judgment from which to
2Presumably the trial court meant to state "claims
asserted by the Plaintiff." 
4
1171174
appeal and, if so, whether the appeal was timely filed.  The
parties responded, and on July 31, 2018, the Court of Civil
Appeals, by order, dismissed Harrington's appeal as untimely. 
Harrington sought rehearing of the dismissal, but his
application for rehearing was overruled.  On September 19,
2018, Harrington petitioned this Court for certiorari review
of the Court of Civil Appeals' decision.
Discussion
At the outset of our discussion, we recognize that 
"'[t]he filing of a timely notice of appeal is
a jurisdictional act.'  Painter v. McWane Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 987 So. 2d 522, 529 (Ala. 2007)(citing
Lewis v. State, 463 So. 2d 154, 155 (Ala. 1985)).
'An appeal shall be dismissed if the notice of
appeal 
was 
not 
timely 
filed 
to 
invoke 
the
jurisdiction of the appellate court.'  Rule 2(a)(1),
Ala. R. App. P. See also Ex parte Alabama Dep't of
Human Res., 999 So. 2d [891] at 895 [(Ala. 2008)]
('[W]e are obligated to dismiss an appeal if, for
any reason, [subject-matter] jurisdiction does not
exist.' (citing Ex parte Smith, 438 So. 2d 766, 768
(Ala. 1983)))."
Williamson v. Fourth Ave. Supermarket, Inc., 12 So. 3d 1200,
1202 (Ala. 2009).  However, in the present case, we must first
address whether there is a final judgment from which an appeal
can properly be taken.
5
1171174
"The general rule is that a trial court's order is not
final unless it disposes of all claims as to all parties."
Dickerson v. Alabama State Univ., 852 So. 2d 704, 705 (Ala.
2002)(citing Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.). "For a judgment to
be final, it must put an end to the proceedings and leave
nothing for further adjudication. Ex parte Wharfhouse Rest. &
Oyster Bar, Inc., 796 So. 2d 316, 320 (Ala. 2001). '[W]ithout
a final judgment, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear
an appeal.'  Cates v. Bush, 293 Ala. 535, 537, 307 So. 2d 6,
8 (1975)." Hamilton v. Connally, 959 So. 2d 640, 642 (Ala.
2006).
The trial court's September 28, 2017, order dismissed
Harrington's claims against Big Sky and Kim with prejudice. 
However, that order was not a final, appealable order. 
Harrington's claims against Young (who was served with notice)
had not been adjudicated, nor had he been dismissed from the
case.  In its order, the trial court set the case for a status
hearing in November.  This indicates that the trial court did
not consider the order to be a final judgment. Except as
otherwise provided by law, appeals lie only from final
judgments. Gilbert v. Nicholson, 845 So. 2d 785, 790 (Ala.
6
1171174
2002)("It is well settled that '[a]n appeal will not lie from
an order or judgment which is not final.'" (quoting Robinson
v. Computer Servicenters, Inc., 360 So. 2d 299, 302 (Ala.
1978))).  Accordingly, the trial court's order of September
28, 2017, was not appealable.3  
An exception to the rule of finality of judgments, for
purposes of appellate review, occurs when a trial court
directs the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b),
Ala. R. Civ. P.  Rule 54(b) provides:
"(b) Judgment upon multiple claims or involving
multiple parties. When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an
3The Rule 54(b) certification in the January 26, 2018, 
order was timely brought within the jurisdiction of this Court
when the underlying judgment upon which it purported to
operate was appealed to this Court in a timely manner.  Fuller
v. Birmingham-Jefferson Cty. Transit Auth., 147 So. 3d 907,
914 (Ala. 2013)(Murdock, J., concurring specially).  See also
Wallace v. Belleview, 120 So. 3d 485 (Ala. 2012)("When the
trial court enters a Rule 54(b) certification, there is a
facially valid order from which the time for filing a notice
of appeal starts to run.").  Nevertheless, not every Rule
54(b) certification is valid. The trial court may make an
erroneous Rule 54(b) certification leading to 
the 
dismissal of
an appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment.  
7
1171174
express direction for the entry of judgment. Except
where judgment is entered as to defendants who have
been served pursuant to Rule 4(f), [Ala. R. Civ.
P.,] in the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision,
however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties shall not terminate the action
as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or
other form of decision is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties."
  This Court looks with some disfavor upon certifications
under Rule 54(b): 
"It 
bears 
repeating, 
here, 
that
'"[c]ertifications under Rule 54(b) should be
entered only in exceptional cases and should not be
entered routinely."' State v. Lawhorn, 830 So. 2d
720, 725 (Ala. 2002)(quoting Baker v. Bennett, 644
So. 2d 901, 903 (Ala. 1994), citing in turn Branch
v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373
(Ala. 1987)). '"'Appellate review in a piecemeal
fashion is not favored.'"' Goldome Credit Corp. [v.
Player, 869 So. 2d 1146, 1148 (Ala. Civ. App.
2003)](quoting Harper Sales Co. v. Brown, Stagner,
Richardson, Inc., 742 So. 2d 190, 192 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1999), quoting in turn Brown v. Whitaker
Contracting Corp., 681 So. 2d 226, 229 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1996))(emphasis added)." 
Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892 So. 2d 354, 363
(Ala. 2004). 
A Rule 54(b) certification should not be entered if the
issues in the claim being certified and a claim that will
8
1171174
remain pending in the trial court "'are so closely intertwined
that separate adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of
inconsistent results.'"  Clarke–Mobile Ctys. Gas Dist. v.
Prior Energy Corp., 834 So. 2d 88, 95 (Ala. 2002)(quoting
Branch v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373,
1374 (Ala. 1987)).  See also Banyan Corp. v. Leithead, 41 So.
3d 51 (Ala. 2009)(holding that the trial court's partial-
summary-judgment order determining that subsidiary was a mere
instrumentality or alter ego of parent corporation, that any
liability attributable to subsidiary would also be borne by 
parent corporation, and that parent corporation was a party to
employee's employment contract could not be 
certified as final
under Rule 54(b) when order did not dispose of all claims as
to at least one party); Smith v. Slack Alost Dev. Servs. of
Alabama, LLC, 32 So. 3d 556 (Ala. 2009)(holding that the trial
court exceeded its discretion in certifying as final a summary
judgment against a prospective condominium purchaser in the
seller's action for failing to complete purchase because the
court had not entered judgment on a similar claim the seller
was asserting against another purchaser in the same action,
9
1171174
which claim was based upon essentially the same facts and
raised many of the same issues).
A trial court's order certifying a judgment as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b) must clearly indicate an intent to do
so. In Brown v. Whitaker Contracting Corp., 681 So. 2d 226
(Ala. Civ. App. 1996), the Court of Civil Appeals determined
that the trial court certifying a judgment as final pursuant
to Rule 54(b) had to state its reason for finding no just
reason for delay.  In Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v.
Tinney, 776 So. 2d 753, 754 (Ala. 2000), this Court overruled
Brown.  In Schneider, this Court held that the trial court had
validly certified a judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
by stating that the judgment was "'expressly made a final
judgment'" and citing Rule 54(b).  The Court held that,
although it generally did not approve of the omission of the
Rule 54(b) language, the trial court had made "'an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay,' because
Rule 54(b) explicitly calls for such a determination" and to
say that the  determination was absent would exalt form over
substance.  776 So. 2d at 755.     
10
1171174
In Hanner v. Metro Bank & Protective Life Insurance Co.,
952 So. 2d 1056, 1061 (Ala. 2006), this Court concluded that,
although the trial court had stated that the judgment
"'resolves all controversies pending in this case with
prejudice and is final in accordance with the Alabama Rules of
Civil Procedure,'" the trial court's failure either to cite
Rule 54(b) or to quote the language of that rule rendered the
purported Rule 54(b) certification invalid. Id.  The Court
also stated that the trial court failed to recognize in its
order that the action in which it was entered had previously
been consolidated with a related action.4    
In the present case, the trial court's January 26, 2018,
order states that the parties were unclear as to whether its 
September 28, 2017, order was final under Rule 54(b). 
However, we note that there is nothing in the trial court's
September 28, 2017, order indicating an intent to certify that
order as a final order in accordance with Rule 54(b). 
4In Nettles v. Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell P.C., [Ms.
1170162, August 31, 2018]     So. 3d     (Ala. 2018), this
Court overruled its rule established in Hanner to hold that
once a final judgment has been entered in a case, it is
immediately appealable, regardless of whether the case has
been consolidated with another case that remains pending.
11
1171174
Presumably, the parties' concern regarding finality was
because Harrington's claims against Young had not been
adjudicated.5   The trial court's January 26, 2018, order then
states that its order of September 28, 2017, dismissed any and
all claims against Big Sky and Kim, because the court granted
their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  Next, the trial court
states that its September 28, 2017, order is now final,6 but
the trial court then takes a different action than it did in
its September 28, 2017, order in that it dismisses
Harrington's claims against Big Sky and Kim without
5It does not appear that Exoro Global and Exoro Capital
were served with notice of Harrington's second amended
complaint.  Rule 54(b) references Rule 4(f), Ala. R. Civ. P.,
in regard to a judgment against one or more defendants when
other defendants have not been served with process.  A
judgment that disposes of fewer than all the defendants is
final when the defendants as to whom there has been no
judgment have not yet been served with notice.  See Owens v.
National Sec. of Alabama, Inc., 454 So. 2d 1387 (Ala.
1984)(denying the motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that the case below was still pending as to other defendants
when service had been attempted but not completed and, under
Rule 4(f), service on the other defendants must be completed
before it can be said that the pending action involves other
active defendants).   
6Although the trial court refers to "Defendant[s]" in the
last paragraph, it is unclear to which defendants the court is
referring, because the court never references Young anywhere
in the order.  
12
1171174
prejudice.7  Without sufficient clarity, the trial court's
purported 
certification 
under 
Rule 
54(b) 
is 
invalid;
therefore, the September 28, 2017, judgment is not final.  A
nonfinal judgment will not support an appeal.  Schlarb v. Lee,
955 So. 2d 418 (Ala. 2006).    Accordingly, although we agree
with the Court of Civil Appeals that this appeal is due to be
dismissed, it is due to be dismissed as being from a nonfinal
judgment, not because the appeal was untimely filed.  For that
reason, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals
and instruct that court to dismiss the appeal, not based on
timeliness, but as being from a nonfinal judgment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Stewart, and Mitchell,
JJ., concur.
Shaw, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.
7A dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is with
prejudice to plaintiff's right to file another action against
that defendant.
13