Case Title: State v. LENOX

Citation: 237 N.E.2d 248, 250 Ind. 482

Docket Number: 31,126

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1968-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
250 Ind. 482 (1968)
237 N.E.2d 248
STATE OF INDIANA
v.
LENOX ET AL.
No. 31,126.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed June 4, 1968.
*483 John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Charles J. Deiter, Deputy Attorney General, for appellant.
W.H. Parr, Jr., Thomas H. Pedersen, of Lebanon, and Henry J. Price, of Indianapolis, for appellees.
JACKSON, J.
On January 9, 1958, appellant filed its complaint in condemnation seeking the appropriation of approximately three and one-half acres out of a tract of land of approximately eight and one-half acres owned by appellees Richard M. and Mary Herr Lenox, husband and wife. The land sought to be appropriated was sought for the improvement of a public highway in Boone County, Indiana, known as State Road No. 52. The property condemned included a gasoline service station leased by appellee Shell Oil Company and sub-leased by appellee Richard E. Cook, the legal description of the land so appropriated is hereinafter set forth in the judgment.
Thereafter, on February 15, 1958, the court found appellant was entitled to appropriate and condemn the real estate described, entered its order to that effect, and appointed three disinterested resident freeholders of the county as appraisers. The appraisers on March 8, 1958, made and filed their report and appraisal in the total sum of one hundred twenty thousand five hundred dollars. Exceptions to the report of the appraisers were filed by all parties.
Thereafter the matter came on for trial by jury resulting in the return on November 12, 1965, of the following verdict:
On December 8, 1965, appellant filed its Motion For New Trial.
*484 Appellant's Motion for New Trial was overruled on December 12, 1966.
Appellant's Assignment of Errors and Transcript were filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court March 10, 1967. The assigned error is the single specification that,
On April 12, 1967, the court below rendered judgment on the verdict of the jury, which judgment in pertinent part reads as follows:
Appellant next argues the trial court erred in refusing to withdraw the submission of the cause from the jury when one of appellees' witnesses volunteered testimony on cross examination that the State had paid $57,000.00 for ten (10) acres of land just across the road from the land here being condemned. This alleged error was also waived by appellant's failure to provide the court the page and line of the transcript where such testimony may be found. Notwithstanding, in the interest of justice we will decide the question on the merits.
On direct examination appellees' witness, Joseph Ford, was asked if he had used comparables in his appraisal of the land in question. When Ford started to describe the ten (10) acres across the road from the land in question, appellant's attorneys objected on the ground that it was not a proper comparable. Appellees' attorney then substituted a question. The ten (10) acres were not mentioned again until appellant's *488 attorney asked Mr. Ford the following question on cross examination:
Mr. Ford answered:
Appellant's attorney then said:
Appellee objected to the ruling. Thereupon appellant's counsel, out of the hearing of the jury, moved the court to withdraw the submission of the cause from the jury. Appellant's motion was overruled, to which ruling appellant objected.
When a motion to strike testimony is sustained and the jury is instructed to disregard an answer, any objection or error is ordinarily cured. The trial court is in better position to determine the effect of such testimony than this Court. The trial court has a wide field of discretion as to withdrawing the case from the jury. This Court will interfere only where, notwithstanding the efforts of the trial court to correct the abuse, the irregularity appears to be such as to prevent a fair trial. N.Y. Central Ry. Co. v. Milhiser (1952), 231 Ind. 180, 106 N.E.2d 453, 108 N.E.2d 57.
Appellant has failed to show how it was prejudiced by not having the case withdrawn from the jury. Furthermore, on this ground, any possible error was cured when the trial court gave Defendants' (Lenox and Cook) Instruction No. 15, which reads as follows:
Appellant next contends the trial court erred in refusing to give appellant's tendered interrogatories to the jury. The giving of interrogatories is provided for by Acts 1897, ch. 85, § 1, p. 128, as amended, being § 2-2022, Burns' 1968 Repl., which reads in pertinent part as follows:
Appellant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to submit the interrogatories to the jury and that the finding of ultimate fact would have been decisive or controlling of a material issue or even to identify that material issue.
Appellant next urges that the trial court erred in refusing to give State's Tendered Instruction No. 14 which reads as follows:
In support of the above instruction appellant cites City of Evansville v. Bartlett (1962), 243 Ind. 464, 186 N.E.2d 10, 186 N.E.2d 799. But in that case this Court at page 470 said, "The allocation of that sum by the court between the appellees might well be a matter of controversy *490 between the appellees, but certainly the allocation between them would be of no concern to the appellant." The appellant was not prejudiced by the refusal to give its Instruction No. 14.
Appellant finally argues the trial court erred in refusing to give State's Tendered Instruction No. 17 which reads as follows:
We have already pointed out that the allocation of compensation between lessor and lessee is of no concern to the State. It was not necessary for the jury to consider or determine the lessees' damages separately. The fact that property taken under the power of eminent domain is subject to a leasehold interest ordinarily has no effect on the valuation of such property insofar as such valuation is based on multiple ownership. The award stands in place of the land, and the owners of each interest may recover out of the award the same proportionate interest which they had in the land condemned. 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 12.42.
Appellees assert Instruction No. 17 was further properly refused as there was no evidence introduced as to the fair rental value of the lease for the remainder of its term or the actual rental remaining to be paid; thus, the jury would have had no facts to which to apply the formula set out in the instruction. Appellant has not attempted to refute appellees' assertion.
Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
*491 Lewis, C.J., and Arterburn and Hunter, JJ., concur; Mote, J., not participating.
NOTE.  Reported in 237 N.E.2d 248.