Case Title: ESTRADA v. PORT CITY PROPERTIES, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 107552

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
ESTRADA v. PORT CITY PROPERTIES, INC.  ESTRADA v. PORT CITY PROPERTIES, INC. 2011 OK 30 Case Number: 107552 Decided: 04/19/2011 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. PHILIP ESTRADA, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. PORT CITY PROPERTIES, INC., d/b/a, HODGES WAREHOUSE, Defendant/Appellant. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKMULGEE COUNTY Honorable H. Michael Claver, Trial Judge ¶0 The plaintiff/employee was injured in an on-the-job accident. After the employee received treatment and hired an attorney, his employer no longer needed him. The employee brought a retaliatory discharge proceeding under the Workers' Compensation Act against his employer. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee, the employer appealed, alleging numerous issues of error. We retained the cause and hold that: 1) because no evidence was presented which would warrant a punitive damages award, the trial court erred in submitting the issue to the jury; 2) the collateral source rule applies to retaliatory discharge proceedings regardless of whether financial hardship is alleged; and 3) the actual damages awarded were not excessive under the evidence presented. TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD TO BE STRICKEN. Robert V. Seacat, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee. Kenneth L. Brune, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant. KAUGER, J: ¶1 The dispositive issues presented FACTS ¶2 The plaintiff, Phillip Estrada (employee/Estrada), began working for the defendant, Port City Properties, Inc. d/b/a Hodges Warehouse (Hodges/employer), in Okmulgee, Oklahoma, on June 13, 2001. His job was to unload freight coming into the warehouse, and then separate shipping pallets into "good" and "bad" piles before sending them out to two different destinations. After approximately one year and a couple of months, Estrada moved to another division of Hodges called Kelco where he also unloaded freight. ¶3 On January 16, 2003, the employee was walking to the time clock when a coworker called his name to get his attention and he tripped over what appeared to be a steel beam or "some kind of debris." The employee fell back, heard a pop, and fell to the ground, twisting his ankle. At the time of the fall, Estrada thought he had just twisted his ankle, but by the next morning he could not walk on it. Estrada called his supervisor, Sam Thomas (supervisor), and asked what he should do. The supervisor recommended that Estrada go to the local emergency room. He did, and at the emergency room, the employee's ankle was x-rayed, he was given pain medication and crutches, and then referred to a specialist, Dr. Therron Nichols. ¶4 The employee filled out an accident report at Hodges on January 20, 2003, and went to an appointment with the specialist the next day. The employee returned to work on Monday, March 10, 2003, and started unloading trucks as usual. Estrada talked to an insurance adjuster of Hodge's insurance carrier, Compsource, over his lunch break, who inquired how his ankle was doing. He told the adjuster that his ankle was starting to hurt and swell again, just like it did the first day he injured it. The adjuster arranged for Estrada to see another orthopedic specialist, Dr. Hawkins, on March 12, 2003. Dr. Hawkins again restricted the employee from going to back to work. ¶5 According to Estrada, he told his supervisor about the appointment and he also informed the supervisor afterwards that Dr. Hawkins had restricted him from work, and ordered him to attend physical therapy. Estrada hired a lawyer to represent him in filing a Form 3 for a Workers' Compensation Claim and on April 11, 2003, the lawyer filed the claim on behalf of the employee. ¶6 During the course of his treatment the employee was sent to a third doctor, a Dr. Lewis, who after administering an M.R.I. discovered internal damage ¶7 According to the employee, when he showed up for work on the 23rd, he was sent to the shipping office where he was told that they no longer had any work for him. Estrada went home confused about what exactly had happened. On September 30, 2003, he filed for unemployment benefits stating that he was terminated because he was told he was no longer needed. ¶8 On November 12, 2003, Estrada filed an action in the District Court of Okmulgee County. He alleged that he was fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim and for retaining a lawyer to represent him regarding the claim in violation of ¶9 A two-day trial occurred in October of 2005, and upon presentation of the employee's case, the employer interposed a demurrer to the evidence and motion for directed verdict which the trial court granted and which was reversed on appeal. ¶10 The employer insisted that the employee had not been "fired," but that he instead "abandoned" his employment in March, 2003. Hodges also explained that the financial manager did not "correctly describe the situation" when she sent in the unemployment report stating that Estrada was turned away because they no longer had any work for him. The evidence at trial indicated that Hodges gave inconsistent versions as to how the events unfolded. ¶11 Both parties moved for directed verdicts which were denied. However, the trial court made a preliminary determination that there was not any evidence of any reckless discharge or wilful or intentional discharge or firing which would support an award of punitive damages. Nevertheless, the trial court also determined that, collectively, pursuant to ¶12 On March 4, 2009, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee and awarded him $76,730.00. ¶13 On September 17, 2009, the employer appealed, raising sixteen issues of error all of which concern whether a new trial should be required. On February 22, 2010, the employer filed a motion to retain the cause in this Court. We retained the cause on April 20, 2010, and the briefing was completed on May 20, 2010. The cause was assigned on June 1, 2010. However, it became apparent that portions of the record were unintentionally omitted. I. ¶14 BECAUSE NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED WHICH WOULD WARRANT THE IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES, THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE ISSUE TO THE JURY. ¶15 The employer argues that the trial court erred when it determined that, collectively, pursuant to ¶16 While an employer is not obligated in an employment-at-will contract to prove good faith or fair dealing when its employee is terminated, ¶17 Prior to 1995, the statutory framework for awarding punitive damages was found at ¶18 Both of these threshold rulings presented issues of law for the trial judge. ¶19 Title ¶20 Nothing in the current statutory framework changes the trial court's responsibility to determine whether any competent evidence exists which would warrant submission the question of punitive damages to the jury. Once this determination is made, the statute guides the jury as to the many factors of conduct to consider, the level of conduct, and the degree of proof necessary to make an award of punitive damages, if any. ¶21 Here, the trial court determined that there was no evidence to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury, but submitted it anyway. ¶22 Because employers seldom admit to any wrongdoing, evidence is often mostly circumstantial but it must at least be sufficient to support a legal inference that the discharge was significantly motivated by retaliation. ¶23 An employee must offer evidence to warrant an instruction on punitive damages. ¶24 In examining the entire record, we conclude that there was not any evidence of such disregard of the employee's rights which would support a claim of punitive damages. The evidence showed that the employee never experienced any adverse injury-related absence when he returned in March, but after he hired an attorney and after his temporary total disability was adjusted, he was terminated. Although the employer offered evidence that the termination was due to a decline in business and the needs of the department, it also offered differing reasons such as that the employee abandoned his job and/or refused employment in a different department. ¶25 The testimony and evidence at trial establishes direct, inferred, and circumstantial evidence which taken together could have led the trier of fact to legally infer that the discharge was significantly motivated by retaliation for exercising a statutory right and that the employer's reasons for terminating the employee were pretextual. II. ¶26 THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE APPLIES TO RETALIATORY DISCHARGE PROCEEDINGS REGARDLESS OF WHETHER FINANCIAL HARDSHIP IS ALLEGED. ¶27 Under the collateral source rule, benefits received by the plaintiff from any source other than the tortfeasor will not reduce the quantum of recoverable damages. ¶28 In Denco Bus Lines v. Hargis, Upon commission of a tort it is the duty of the wrongdoer to answer for the damages wrought by his wrongful act, and that is measured by the whole loss so caused and the receipt of compensation by the injured party from a collateral source wholly independent of the wrongdoer does not operate to lessen the damages recoverable from the person causing the injury. ¶29 In Blythe v. University of Oklahoma, ¶30 We held that: 1) the common law collateral source rule was codified in ¶31 Nevertheless, the employer relies on cases from other jurisdictions which have carved out a limited exception to the collateral source rule. In those cases, when the plaintiff is seeking damages for financial hardship caused by the defendant's conduct, evidence of collateral sources of money or income may be used for the limited purpose of impeaching the plaintiff's testimony regarding the extent of the financial hardship, but not to reduce damages. ¶32 Had the Legislature intended this exception to apply to workers compensation retaliatory discharge actions it could have easily incorporated this exception into III. ¶33 THE ACTUAL DAMAGES AWARDED WERE NOT EXCESSIVE UNDER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED. ¶34 The employee argues that the jury's award of $76,730.00 was supported by the evidence and was not excessive. The employer insists that the damages, if any, were minimal and that the jury's verdict was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. Under the evidence presented, we disagree with the employer. ¶35 Damages are a remedy for compensation for a legal wrong or injury. ¶36 The evidence showed that the employee was discharged on September 30, 2003, and regained employment by November 23, 2003. The employee provided some evidence of his weekly wages and the length of time he was off work. ¶37 Estrada testified that he suffered from mental anguish in that he felt like a "loser" and that it made him feel "sad" and it bothered him a lot because he was unable to provide for his family. His ex-wife, whom he was married to at the time, testified that Estrada was upset. There was competent evidence on which the jury could award $76,730.00. We are not convinced that, with the evidence presented, the jury was obviously influenced by passion or prejudice. CONCLUSION ¶38 Title ¶39 The common law collateral source rule has long been incorporated into Workers' Compensation proceedings pursuant to TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD TO BE STRICKEN. TAYLOR, C.J., KAUGER, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, COMBS, GURICH, JJ., concur. REIF, J., with whom COLBERT, V.C.J., and WATT, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. FOOT