Case Title: Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes and Doves v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources

Citation: 2004 WI 40

Docket Number: 2002AP001166

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 40 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1166 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes  
and Doves, John Wieneke and Pat Fisher,  
          Plaintiffs-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Natural  
Resources,  
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance Foundation  
f/k/a Wildlife Legislative Fund of  
America,  
          Defendant-Intervenor-Co- 
          Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 76 
Reported at: 263 Wis. 2d 370, 661 N.W.2d 858 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 6, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 15, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel R. Moeser   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by George B. Strother, IV and Krekeler Strother, S.C., 
Madison, and oral argument by George B. Strother, IV. 
 
For the defendant-appellant the cause was argued by Philip 
Peterson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2
For the defendant-intervenor-co-appellant there was a brief 
by Beth Ermatinger Hanan and Reinhart, Boerner, VanDeuren, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and William P. Horn, Gretchen L. Gaston and Birch, 
Horton, Bittner and Cherot, Washington, D.C., and oral argument 
by Beth Ermatinger Hanan. 
 
 
 
2004 WI 40 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1166  
(L.C. No. 
01 CV 1616) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes  
and Doves, John Wieneke and Pat Fisher,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Natural  
Resources,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance Foundation  
f/k/a Wildlife Legislative Fund of  
America,  
 
          Defendant-Intervenor-Co- 
          Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
APR 6, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
I 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is an appeal of a 
published 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision, 
Wisconsin 
Citizens 
Concerned for Cranes and Doves v. DNR, 2003 WI App 76, 263 
Wis. 2d 370, 661 N.W.2d 858, reversing an order of the Dane 
No. 
02-1166   
 
2 
 
County Circuit Court, Daniel R. Moeser, Judge, which declared 
Wis. Admin. Code § NR 10.01(1)(h) (Sept., 2000)1 invalid and 
enjoined 
the 
Department 
of 
Natural 
Resources 
(DNR) 
from 
promulgating a rule authorizing a hunting season for mourning 
doves in Wisconsin.   
¶2 
The issue on appeal is whether the legislature has 
granted the DNR authority to set an open season for mourning 
doves.  We have also asked the parties to address what impact, 
if any, the recently adopted "Right to Hunt" amendment to the 
Wisconsin Constitution has on the outcome of this case.  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 26.  For the reasons discussed below, we affirm 
the court of appeals' decision.  We hold that the DNR has 
express authority under Wis. Stat. § 29.014(1) (1999-2000)2 to 
adopt § NR 10.01(1)(h) because the legislature has granted broad 
authority to the DNR to set open and closed seasons for "game" 
under § 29.014(1) and mourning doves fall within the unambiguous 
definition of "game" contained therein.   
II 
                                                 
1 The dove hunting rule first appeared in the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code in September of 2000.  Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
10.01(1)(h) (Sept., 2000).  It took effect May 1, 2001.   
2 The DNR adopted the dove hunting rule on May 1, 2001.  As 
discussed infra, by virtue of 2001 Wis. Act 56, which took 
effect in April of 2002, several changes were made to pertinent 
provisions of chapter 29 that are reflected in the 2001-02 
version of the Wisconsin Statutes.  See 2001 Wis. Act 56, §§ 19-
20.  Therefore, unless otherwise noted, all subsequent statutory 
references are to the 1999-2000 version. 
No. 
02-1166   
 
3 
 
¶3 
The facts of this case are few and undisputed.  On May 
1, 
2001, 
pursuant 
to 
§ 29.014(1), 
the 
DNR 
adopted 
§ NR 
10.01(1)(h), which established an open season for mourning doves 
in Wisconsin from September 1 through October 30 and set daily 
bag and possession limits.3  On June 19, 2001, Wisconsin Citizens 
Concerned for Cranes and Doves, John Wieneke, and Pat Fisher 
(collectively 
"WCCCD") 
commenced 
an 
action 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 227.40, seeking a declaration that the DNR exceeded 
its authority in promulgating the dove hunting rule and an 
injunction prohibiting the DNR from enforcing the rule.  The 
U.S. Sportsmen's Alliance Foundation (Alliance) intervened on 
behalf of the DNR.4   
¶4 
On April 16, 2002, the circuit court granted WCCCD's 
request for declaratory and injunctive relief, concluding that 
§ 29.014(1) is ambiguous and that the legislature has not 
clearly authorized the DNR to set a hunting season for mourning 
doves, 
a 
"nongame 
species" 
regulated 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 29.039(1).  In a split decision, the court of 
appeals reversed, concluding that § 29.014(1) is unambiguous and 
expressly authorizes the DNR to establish a hunting season for 
                                                 
3 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 15.34, the Natural Resources 
Board supervises and directs the DNR.  Technically, the Natural 
Resources Board adopted the dove hunting rule.  However, for 
simplicity, this opinion will refer to the DNR, as the Natural 
Resources Board is not a party to this action. 
4 As the Alliance makes substantially the same arguments as 
the DNR in this case, the opinion shall refer to the two 
collectively as the DNR when discussing their positions.   
No. 
02-1166   
 
4 
 
mourning doves because they are "game" within the meaning of 
that subsection.  Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes and Doves, 
263 Wis. 2d 370, ¶19.  The court of appeals also concluded that 
even if mourning doves are a "nongame species," § 29.039(1) 
permits the DNR to regulate when "nongame species" may be 
hunted.  Id.  
III 
¶5 
The central issue in this case is the validity of § NR 
10.01(1)(h).5  A court may declare an administrative rule invalid 
"if it finds that it violates constitutional provisions or 
exceeds the statutory authority of the agency or was promulgated 
without 
compliance 
with 
statutory 
rule-making 
procedures."  
Wis. Stat. § 227.40(4)(a).  WCCCD alleges that § NR 10.01(1)(h) 
exceeds the statutory authority of the DNR.   
¶6 
The nature and scope of an agency's powers are issues 
of statutory interpretation.  GTE North Inc. v. PSC, 176 
Wis. 2d 559, 564, 500 N.W.2d 284 (1993).  When interpreting a 
statute, our goal is to discern the intent of the legislature, 
which we derive primarily by looking at the plain meaning of the 
statute.  Kitten v. DWD, 2002 WI 54, 252 Wis. 2d 561, ¶33, 644 
N.W.2d 649.  See also, Columbus Park Hous. Corp. v. City of 
Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, ¶10, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 671 N.W.2d 633.  The 
language of a statute is read in the context in which it appears 
                                                 
5 "Administrative 
rules 
enacted 
pursuant 
to 
statutory 
rulemaking authority have the force and effect of law in 
Wisconsin."  Staples v. DHSS, 115 Wis. 2d 363, 367, 340 
N.W.2d 194 (1983). 
No. 
02-1166   
 
5 
 
in relation to the entire statute so as to avoid an absurd 
result.  Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 86, ¶16, 
245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893.  Words and phrases are generally 
accorded their common everyday meaning, while technical terms or 
legal terms of art are given their accepted legal or technical 
definitions.  Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).  Words that are defined in 
the statute are given the definition that the legislature has 
provided.  Beard v. Lee Enters., 225 Wis. 2d 1, 23, 591 
N.W.2d 156 (1999).  "If this process of analysis yields a plain, 
clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the 
statute is applied according to this ascertainment of its 
meaning."  Bruno v. Milwaukee, 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 
660 N.W.2d 656.  Thus, if the statute is unambiguous, we do not 
consult extrinsic sources such as legislative history to 
ascertain its meaning; we simply apply its plain meaning.  
Lincoln Sav. Bank v. DOR, 215 Wis. 2d 430, 441, 573 N.W.2d 522 
(1998).  See also, UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 281-82, 
548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).   
¶7 
A statute is not ambiguous merely because the parties 
disagree as to its meaning, or because the circuit court and 
court of appeals reached different conclusions; rather, a 
statute is ambiguous when it is readily susceptible to two or 
more meanings by reasonably well-informed individuals.  Lincoln 
Sav. Bank, 215 Wis. 2d at 441-42.  The test for ambiguity 
therefore examines the language of the statute "to determine 
whether 'well-informed persons should have become confused,' 
that is, whether the statutory . . . language reasonably gives 
No. 
02-1166   
 
6 
 
rise to different meanings."  Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶21 
(citation omitted)(emphasis in original).  Only if the statute 
is ambiguous must we turn to extrinsic sources such as 
legislative history to aid our interpretation.  Seider v. 
O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶¶50-52, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.   
¶8 
Thus, "[t]he well established tenets of the plain 
meaning rule preclude courts from resorting to legislative 
history to uncover ambiguities in a statute otherwise clear on 
its face."  State ex rel. Cramer v. Schwarz, 2000 WI 86, ¶37, 
236 Wis. 2d 473, 613 N.W.2d 591.  Indeed, "[t]he plain meaning 
of a statute takes precedence over all extrinsic sources and 
rules of construction, including agency interpretations."  UFE, 
201 Wis. 2d at 282 n.2.  However, when a statute's plain meaning 
unambiguously evinces the legislative intent, we may consult 
legislative history to support our reading of the plain meaning 
of the statute.  Columbus Park Hous. Corp., 267 Wis. 2d 59, ¶36.  
See also Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶52.   
¶9 
The parties dispute whether WCCCD carries any burden 
in demonstrating the rule to be invalid and whether this court 
should give deference to the DNR's interpretation of the 
relevant statutes.  The court of appeals concluded that while 
the standard of review is de novo, it could "benefit" from the 
interpretation of the DNR.  Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes 
and Doves, 263 Wis. 2d 370, ¶5.  The court of appeals also 
determined that WCCCD had the burden to convince the court that 
§ NR 10.01(1)(h) was invalid.  Id., ¶6.  The DNR argues that 
WCCCD should bear such a burden and that this court should 
No. 
02-1166   
 
7 
 
accord great weight deference to its interpretation of its rule- 
making authority.  WCCCD maintains that it bears no burden and 
that 
this 
court 
should 
give 
no 
weight 
to 
the 
DNR's 
interpretation.   
¶10 We first address whether WCCCD has any burden in this 
matter.  The court of appeals relied on League of Wis. 
Municipalities v. DOC, 2002 WI App 137, ¶10, 256 Wis. 2d 183, 
647 N.W.2d 301, for the proposition that a party challenging an 
administrative rule bears the burden of convincing the court 
that the rule is invalid.  Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes 
and Doves, 263 Wis. 2d 370, ¶6.  The court in League of Wis. 
Municipalities, 256 Wis. 2d 183, ¶10, in turn, relied upon 
Citizens' Utility Board v. PSC, 211 Wis. 2d 537, 552-53, 565 
N.W.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1997), for this proposition.  However, 
Citizens' Utility Board applied this burden in the context of 
reviewing an agency's application of legal standard to a set of 
facts.  Id. at 552-53.  The present controversy involves the 
construction of a statute, which is a purely legal question, 
subject to de novo review.  Hutson v. State Pers. Comm'n, 2003 
WI 97, ¶31, 263 Wis. 2d 612, 665 N.W.2d 212.  Unlike factual 
questions, or questions where legal issues are intertwined with 
factual determinations, neither party bears any burden when the 
No. 
02-1166   
 
8 
 
issue before this court is whether an administrative agency 
exceeded the scope of its powers in promulgating a rule.6     
¶11 Next, we must determine whether this court owes any 
deference to the DNR's interpretation of § 29.014(1).  This 
court has stated that we are not bound by an agency's decision 
that concerns the scope of its own power.  Wis. Envtl. Decade, 
Inc. v. PSC, 81 Wis. 2d 344, 351, 260 N.W.2d 712 (1978).  The 
court of appeals concluded that while it applied a de novo 
standard of review, it could "derive 'benefit' from the 
experience and analysis of an administrative agency which the 
legislature has empowered to administer a law it has enacted."  
Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes and Doves, 263 Wis. 2d 370, 
¶5 (citing Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶¶25-27).  The DNR asks this 
                                                 
6 Nor does the present case involve the constitutionality of 
an administrative rule.  "[L]ike statutes enacted by the 
legislature, regulations adopted by administrative agencies 
'carry 
a 
heavy 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality 
and 
the 
challenger has the burden of proving unconstitutionality beyond 
a reasonable doubt.'"  LeClair v. Natural Res. Bd., 168 
Wis. 2d 227, 236, 483 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1992)(quoting Skow v. 
Goodrich, 162 Wis. 2d 448, 450, 469 N.W.2d 888 (Ct. App. 1991)).   
One commentator has described this difference as follows: 
While 
a 
constitutional 
challenge 
entails 
presumptions and burdens in support of the rule, a 
statutory authority challenge favors the challenger.  
The principle is that where no explicit authorizing 
statute exists, any reasonable doubt of the existence 
of implied power in an agency is resolved against its 
existence. 
Steve Levine, How to Review an Administrative Rule, Wisconsin 
Bar Bulletin 56, Oct. 1983, at 40, 42.   
No. 
02-1166   
 
9 
 
court to go further and give "great weight" deference to its 
interpretation of its rule-making authority. 
¶12 Our decision in Seider cannot be read as according any 
level of deference to an administrative agency when the question 
before the court is whether the agency exceeded its authority.  
When we stated that we may "benefit" from an agency's analysis 
in Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶27, we meant the same thing as when 
we declare that we benefit from the analyses of the circuit 
court and court of appeals when deciding questions of law.  See 
id.  In both cases, we mean only that while we apply a de novo 
standard of review, it is useful to have before us the analysis 
of another learned body concerning the issue presented.   
¶13 In Seider, we clearly stated that we apply a de novo 
standard 
in 
"'exceeds 
statutory 
authority' 
cases 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 227.40(4)(a)."  Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶25.7  
Therefore, we will not defer to an agency's interpretation on 
                                                 
7 We articulated the basis of this rule as follows: 
Independent review is the appropriate standard in 
these circumstances because it preserves the ultimate 
authority of the judiciary to determine questions of 
law, seeking to discern and fulfill the intent of the 
legislature.  Our first duty is to the legislature, 
not the agency. . . . Even if we accorded the agency 
that promulgated a rule great weight deference, we 
would not uphold a rule that directly contravenes the 
words of a statute. 
Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶26, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 
N.W.2d 659 (internal citations omitted). 
No. 
02-1166   
 
10 
 
questions concerning the scope of the agency's power.8  In 
addition, we need not defer to the interpretations of the 
circuit court or court of appeals on such matters.  GTE North, 
176 Wis. 2d at 564.9 
IV 
                                                 
8 Grafft v. DNR, 2000 WI App 187, ¶4, 238 Wis. 2d 750, 618 
N.W.2d 897 ("Where, as here, we are construing a statute 
involving the scope of an agency's power, we give no deference 
to the agency's opinion, but rather, interpret the statute de 
novo."); Amsoil, Inc. v. LIRC, 173 Wis. 2d 154, 165, 496 
N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1992)("Because this is a novel issue that 
involves an agency defining its own power, we owe no deference 
to LIRC's interpretation of its power . . . ."); State ex rel. 
St. 
Michael's 
Evangelical 
Lutheran 
Church 
v. 
DOA, 
137 
Wis. 2d 326, 335, 404 N.W.2d 114 (Ct. App. 1987)("[W]e agree, 
that [the circuit court] owed no deference to the agency's 
construction of the statute, since the statute affects the power 
of the agency to proceed.")(citing Wis. Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. 
PSC, 81 Wis. 2d 344, 351, 260 N.W.2d 712 (1978)).   
The cases cited by the DNR that give great weight deference 
to an agency's interpretation of a statute are inapplicable.  
For instance, in Trinwith v. LIRC, 149 Wis. 2d 634, 640, 439 
N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1989), the court of appeals recited the 
familiar circumstances in which courts apply the "great weight" 
standard. 
 
However, 
the 
issue 
in 
Trinwith 
involved 
the 
application of a statute to a set of undisputed facts, not a 
question of an agency's power.  Id. 
9 As one commentator has explained:   
[M]ost challenges on the basis of lack of agency 
authority are questions of statutory construction——
legal rather than factual issues.  With no facts or 
factual presumptions to justify the rule, the issue 
becomes a legal one for the appellate court, not the 
agency and not the trial court. 
Levine, supra at 42 (citing Big Foot Country Club v. DOR, 70 
Wis. 2d 871, 875, 235 N.W.2d 696 (1975)).   
No. 
02-1166   
 
11 
 
¶14 In 
determining 
whether 
an 
administrative 
agency 
exceeded the scope of its authority in promulgating a rule, we 
must examine the enabling statute to ascertain whether the 
statute grants express or implied authorization for the rule.  
Wis. Hosp. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Bd., 156 Wis. 2d 688, 705, 457 
N.W.2d 879 (Ct. App. 1990).  It is axiomatic that because the 
legislature creates administrative agencies as part of the 
executive branch, such agencies have "only those powers which 
are expressly conferred or which are necessarily implied by the 
statutes under which it operates."  Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. PSC, 
110 Wis. 2d 455, 461-62, 329 N.W.2d 143 (1983).  See also DOR v. 
Hogan, 198 Wis. 2d 792, 816, 543 N.W.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1995).  
Therefore, an agency's enabling statute is to be strictly 
construed.  Id.  We resolve any reasonable doubt pertaining to 
an agency's implied powers against the agency.  Kimberly-Clark 
Corp., 
110 
Wis. 2d at 
462. 
 
Wisconsin 
has 
adopted 
the 
"elemental" 
approach 
to 
determining 
the 
validity 
of 
an 
administrative rule, comparing the elements of the rule to the 
elements of the enabling statute, such that the statute need not 
supply every detail of the rule.  Wis. Hosp. Ass'n, 156 
Wis. 2d at 705-06 (citing Kimberly-Clark Corp., 110 Wis. 2d at 
461-62).  If the rule matches the elements contained in the 
statute, then the statute expressly authorizes the rule.  Grafft 
v. DNR, 2000 WI App 187, ¶7, 238 Wis. 2d 750, 618 N.W.2d 897.  
However, if an administrative rule conflicts with an unambiguous 
statute or a clear expression of legislative intent, the rule is 
invalid.  Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶¶72-73. 
No. 
02-1166   
 
12 
 
¶15 It is well established that "wild animals, including 
migratory birds, within the state, so far as it can be said such 
animals and birds are the subject of ownership, are owned by the 
state in its sovereign capacity in trust for the benefit of the 
people of the state[.]"  State v. Herwig, 17 Wis. 2d 442, 446, 
117 N.W.2d 335 (1962).  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(d), 
"an agency may promulgate rules implementing or interpreting a 
statute that it will enforce or administer . . . ."  The DNR 
claims authority under § 29.014(1) 
to 
promulgate 
the 
dove 
hunting rule.  
¶16 Section 29.014(1) provides:  
The department shall establish and maintain open 
and closed seasons for fish and game and any bag 
limits, 
size 
limits, 
rest 
days 
and 
conditions 
governing the taking of fish and game that will 
conserve the fish and game supply and ensure the 
citizens of this state continued opportunities for 
good fishing, hunting and trapping.  
Wis. Stat. § 29.014(1).10  As noted supra, § NR 10.01(1)(h) 
established an open season for mourning doves in Wisconsin from 
September 1 through October 30 and set daily bag and possession 
limits.   
¶17 Following the "elemental" approach to agency authority 
explained supra, this case turns on whether mourning doves are 
"game" within the purview of § 29.014(1).  Section 29.001(33) 
defines "game" as follows:  "'Game' includes all varieties of 
                                                 
10  Wisconsin Stat. § 29.014(2)(b) provides that "[a]ll of the 
rules promulgated under this chapter are prima facie reasonable 
and lawful until found to be otherwise in a final determination 
by a court." 
No. 
02-1166   
 
13 
 
wild mammals or birds."11  The DNR argues that mourning doves 
clearly fall within the unambiguous definition of the term 
"game" in § 29.001(33), such that § 29.014(1) confers authority 
on the DNR to sanction an open hunting season for mourning 
doves.   
¶18 In contrast, WCCCD argues that the term "game" is 
ambiguous when it is considered within the entire context of 
chapter 29.  Specifically, WCCCD argues that "game" is readily 
susceptible to more than one meaning when read in conjunction 
                                                 
11 Generally, the word "includes" is to be given an 
expansive meaning, indicating that which follows is but a part 
of the whole.  Milwaukee Gas Light Co. v. Dept. of Taxation, 23 
Wis. 2d 195, 203 & n.2, 127 N.W.2d 64 (1964).  However, under 
the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius——"the 
expression of one thing excludes another"——courts may read 
"includes" as a term of limitation or enumeration, so that a 
statute 
encompasses 
only 
those 
provisions 
or 
exceptions 
specifically listed.  State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶22, 259 
Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416.  See also State v. Engler, 80 
Wis. 2d 402, 408, 259 N.W.2d 97 (1977); Harris v. Larson, 64 
Wis. 2d 521, 527, 219 N.W.2d 335 (1974).  This rule may be 
applied only where there is some evidence that the legislature 
intended it to apply.  Pritchard v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 
2001 WI App 62, ¶13, 242 Wis. 2d 301, 625 N.W.2d 613.  Here, 
many of the terms contained in Wis. Stat. § 29.001 are not 
defined by a general definition, but rather are defined by the 
use of the word "includes" followed by a list of certain 
species. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. Stat. §§ 29.001(30)-(41). 
 
As 
discussed infra, the mourning doves were once on the list of 
"game birds" contained in § 29.001(39), but were later removed 
by the legislature.  Had the legislature intended that the 
doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius was not to 
apply, there would be no point in removing a single species from 
the definition of a term.  Examining Wis. Stat. § 29.001 as a 
whole, we believe the legislature intended the narrow meaning of 
"includes," such that the doctrine of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius is applicable.   
No. 
02-1166   
 
14 
 
with the terms "game birds" and "nongame species."12  WCCCD 
argues, and the DNR concedes, that mourning doves are not "game 
birds," but do fall under the category "nongame species."13   
¶19 WCCCD asserts that a reasonable mind could conclude 
that mourning doves cannot be "game" and at the same time not 
fall under the definition of "game birds," such that they are a 
"nongame species."  Thus, utilizing various canons of statutory 
construction, WCCCD argues that the term "game" in § 29.014(1) 
encompasses 
only 
what 
it 
characterizes 
as 
the 
defined 
subcategories of "game birds," "game fish," or "game animals," 
such that under § 29.014(1), the DNR may authorize open seasons 
                                                 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 29.001(39) 
defines 
"game 
birds" 
as 
follows:  "'Game birds' includes wild geese, brant, wild ducks, 
wild swan, rails, coots, gallinules, snipe, woodcock, plovers, 
sandpipers, ruffed grouse, prairie chicken, sharp-tailed grouse, 
pheasants, Hungarian partridge, Chukar partridge, bobwhite, 
quail, crows and wild turkey."  Wisconsin Stat. § 29.001(60) 
defines "nongame species" as follows:  "'Nongame species' means 
any species of wild animal not classified as a game fish, game 
animal, game bird or fur-bearing animal."   
13 Pursuant 
to 
2001 
Wis. 
Act 
56, 
§ 19, 
Wis. Stat. § 29.001(39) (2001-02) currently defines "game birds" 
as follows:  "'Game birds' means birds that are in the wild and 
includes wild geese, brant, wild ducks, wild swan, rails, coots, 
gallinules, snipe, woodcock, plovers, sandpipers, ruffed grouse, 
prairie chicken, sharp-tailed grouse, pheasants, gray partridge, 
chukar partridge, bobwhite, quail, crows and wild turkey." 
(Emphasis indicates change from 1999-2000 version.)  Likewise, 
pursuant to 2001 Wis. Act 56, § 20, Wisconsin Stat. § 29.001(60) 
(2001-02) now defines "nongame species" as follows:  '"Nongame 
species' means any species of wild animal that is living in the 
wild and that is not classified as a game fish, game animal, 
game bird or fur-bearing animal." (Emphasis indicates change 
from 1999-2000 version.)  The parties have not briefed and 
therefore we do not discuss what impact, if any, these changes 
have on the present controversy.   
No. 
02-1166   
 
15 
 
only for those defined subcategories and may not authorize the 
hunting of "nongame species."  WCCCD claims that as "nongame 
species," mourning doves fall under the more specific statutory 
provision, Wis. Stat. § 29.039(1), which according to WCCCD, 
does not authorize the DNR to allow hunting of "nongame 
species." 
¶20 WCCCD 
emphasizes 
that 
in 
1971 
the 
legislature 
designated the mourning dove as the state symbol of peace and 
removed mourning doves from the definition of "game birds."  Ch. 
129, 
Laws 
of 
1971 
(amending 
Wis. Stat. § 1.10 
and 
Wis. Stat. § 29.01(3)(d)).  WCCCD argues that this enactment 
indicates the intent of the legislature "that the symbol of 
peace not be subjected to destruction by the hunter's gun."  
Pet'r Br. at 26.  WCCCD zealously proclaims:  
The mourning dove is an official state symbol that 
reflects a philosophical concept, the pursuit of 
peace, and which was recognized officially in the 
context of an acrimonious and unpopular war.  That 
this state symbol represents such a philosophical 
concept differentiates and distinguishes the dove from 
various 
other 
state 
symbols, 
and 
supports 
the 
contention that the Legislature intended that this 
gentle bird be accorded special status. 
Pet'r Br. at 27-28. 
¶21 Despite WCCCD's impassioned argument, we find several 
flaws 
with 
its 
reasoning. 
 
First, 
the 
legislature 
has 
specifically chosen to provide a definition for the terms 
"game," "nongame species," and "game birds."  "Game" is defined 
in § 29.001(33) to include "all varieties of wild mammals or 
birds."  Mourning doves clearly fall within the definition of 
No. 
02-1166   
 
16 
 
"game" that the legislature provided.  The legislature has also 
specifically chosen to define the term "nongame species":  
"'Nongame species' means any species of wild animal not 
classified as a game fish, game animal, game bird or fur-bearing 
animal."  Wis. Stat. § 29.001(60).  Mourning doves clearly fall 
within this definition as well because they are not "game 
birds," as defined in Wis. Stat. § 29.001(39).  Wisconsin courts 
have long followed the rule that "[w]here a word or phrase is 
specifically defined in a statute, its meaning is as defined in 
the statute, and no other rule of statutory construction need be 
applied."  Beard, 225 Wis. 2d at 23 (citing Fredricks v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 4 Wis. 2d 519, 522, 91 N.W.2d 93 (1958)).14  Therefore, 
the definition the legislature has provided for a term controls 
the plain meaning of that term in the statute.  State ex rel. 
Girouard v. Cir. Ct. for Jackson County, 155 Wis. 2d 148, 156, 
454 N.W.2d 792 (1990). 
¶22 WCCCD's argument that mourning doves cannot logically 
be both "game" and a "nongame species" fails because it 
erroneously relies on the ordinary meaning of these terms and 
their supposed contextual ambiguity, ignoring the definition the 
legislature has specifically chosen to provide for those terms 
in chapter 29.  See id.  Notably, the legislature defined 
"nongame species" in relation to "game birds," specifically 
excluding the latter from the definition of the former.  
                                                 
14 See also Republic Airlines, Inc. v. DOR, 159 Wis. 2d 247, 
253, 464 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1990); Britton v. DOT, 123 
Wis. 2d 226, 229, 365 N.W.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1985).  
No. 
02-1166   
 
17 
 
Wis. Stat. § 29.001(60).  However, the legislature chose to 
define "game" broadly in § 29.001(33).  WCCCD would essentially 
have us define "game" as "all varieties of wild mammals or birds 
except those that have been designated as 'nongame species.'"  
We decline to rewrite the statute in such a fashion, as the 
legislature did not define "game" and "nongame species" as 
mutually exclusive terms.  The legislature could have defined 
"game" as composed of "game birds," "game fish," and "game 
animals," for purposes of § 29.014(1), but chose not to do so.15  
The provided legislative definition of "game" is clear and 
unambiguous:  "all varieties of wild mammals or birds."  The 
presence of the terms "nongame species" and "game birds" within 
chapter 29 does not render the term "game" ambiguous. 
¶23 This court has previously recognized that the DNR has 
broad authority as custodian of Wisconsin's wildlife to enact 
regulations that maintain a balance between conserving and 
exploiting 
the 
state's 
wildlife. 
 
Barnes 
v. 
DNR, 
184 
Wis. 2d 645, 660, 516 N.W.2d 730 (1994).16  The legislature has 
                                                 
15 See 
Wis. Stat. § 29.047(1)(a)2. 
(defining 
"game" 
for 
purposes of this subsection as "any wild animal, wild bird or 
game fish"). 
16 The Legislative Council Note to 1997 Wis. Act 248, § 77 
provides, in pertinent part: 
Note:  Under s. 227.11(2), state agencies are 
authorized 
to 
"promulgate 
rules 
interpreting 
the 
provisions of any statute enforced or administered by 
it . . . ."  The DNR therefore clearly has authority 
to promulgate rules under all provisions of ch. 29, 
subject only to the specific limitations on its rule-
making authority set forth in ch. 29 . . . . 
No. 
02-1166   
 
18 
 
expressly 
granted 
the 
DNR 
broad 
regulatory 
authority 
to 
"establish and maintain open and closed seasons for fish and 
game . . . and conditions governing the taking of fish and game 
that will conserve the fish and game supply and ensure the 
citizens of this state continued opportunities for good fishing, 
hunting, and trapping."  Wis. Stat. § 29.014(1).   
¶24 The legislature did not limit that authority to set 
open seasons only for "game birds," "game fish," and "game 
animals" under § 29.014(1).  Likewise, § 29.014(1) does not 
prohibit the DNR from authorizing an open season for "nongame 
species."  Indeed, the only limitation upon the DNR's authority 
contained within § 29.014(1) is that any open season for "game" 
and the conditions therefor must conserve the game supply and 
provide continued opportunities for the citizens of this state 
to hunt.  Regardless of the fact that mourning doves are no 
longer on the list of "game birds," § 29.014(1) does not refer 
to "game birds"; it refers to "game."   
                                                                                                                                                             
 . . . . 
Note:  One of the disadvantages, for the purposes 
of statutory interpretation, of individual examples of 
permissive rule-making authority, is the potential for 
an implication that by granting permissive rule-making 
authority 
for 
some 
provisions 
of 
ch. 
29, 
the 
legislature did not 
intend to 
grant 
rule-making 
authority for other provisions of the chapter.  This 
is clearly not the case, and such an implication would 
in fact be contrary to the legislature's broad grant 
of authority to the DNR under ch. 29 to regulate fish 
and game. 
No. 
02-1166   
 
19 
 
¶25 However, that does not mean that the DNR's authority 
to regulate "game" vis-à-vis birds is unfettered or unaffected 
by other provisions outside of § 29.014(1).  As the DNR aptly 
notes, Wisconsin is subject to the restrictions contained in the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (2000).17  
Further, the legislature may object to any proposed rule 
authorizing an open season of any given species pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 227.19. 
 
After 
a 
rule 
is 
promulgated, 
the 
legislature 
may 
suspend 
operation 
of 
the 
rule.  
Wis. Stat. § 227.26.  Despite these limitations, we have found 
no provision in chapter 29 that prohibits the DNR from 
authorizing an open season under § 29.014(1) for "nongame 
species," much less mourning doves.   
¶26 Further, the context in which the terms "game," "game 
birds," and "nongame species" are used in chapter 29 refutes 
WCCCD's arguments.  An examination of the use of the terms "game 
birds" and "nongame species" within chapter 29 belies any 
argument that the term "game birds" is a specific and exclusive 
subcategory of "game" that are birds, or that "game" and 
"nongame species" are mutually exclusive terms.   
                                                 
17 A list of migratory birds protected by the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act is contained in 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (Oct., 2000).  See 
50 C.F.R. § 20.1 et seq. (providing specific regulations 
relating to the taking of migratory birds).  The Wisconsin 
Administrative 
Code 
recognizes 
that 
migratory 
birds 
are 
protected under federal law and delineates certain actions that 
must be taken to implement an adequate protection program for 
migratory birds.  Wis. Admin. Code § NR 1.12 (Apr., 2002).  
No. 
02-1166   
 
20 
 
¶27 Section 29.039(1) is the only substantive provision 
concerning "nongame species" contained in chapter 29.  The term 
"nongame species" does not occur anywhere else in Wis. Stat. ch. 
29.  As discussed infra, § 29.039(1) relates to the conservation 
of "nongame species."  There is no provision in chapter 29 that 
indicates a "nongame species" cannot nonetheless constitute 
"game." 
¶28 Similarly, chapter 29 uses the term "game birds" in 
provisions that provide specific regulations governing those 
species listed as such.  The first substantive occurrence of the 
term "game birds" is found in Wis. Stat. § 29.091, which 
concerns the taking of predatory game birds in a wildlife 
refuge. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 29.364(1) 
applies 
certain 
restrictions on the transportation of "game birds."  See also 
Wis. Stat. § 29.741(2) (prohibiting taking plants that furnish 
food for game birds from the public waters); Wis. Stat. § 29.867 
(providing for the establishment of and regulations pertaining 
to 
game 
bird 
farms); 
Wis. Stat. § 29.921(7)(empowering 
DNR 
wardens to kill dogs that destroy game birds).  These provisions 
apply special protections to "game birds" and limit certain 
activities with respect thereto.  Again, there is no provision 
in chapter 29 that states a bird that is not listed as a "game 
bird" may not nonetheless constitute "game."   
¶29 While it may seem odd, considering these terms in 
their normal, everyday usage, that a bird which is not a "game 
bird" may nevertheless be a bird that is "game," we are not 
applying the ordinary meaning of words.  Rather, we are 
No. 
02-1166   
 
21 
 
interpreting statutory provisions containing terms that the 
legislature has elected to define.  While WCCCD's distinctions 
between "game," "game birds," and "nongame species" may be 
logical considering the ordinary meaning of these terms, we must 
utilize and apply the definitions the legislature has provided 
for these terms.   
¶30 We conclude that the legislative scheme contained in 
Wis. Stat. ch. 29 uses the terms "game," "nongame species," and 
"game birds" at different times for different purposes, and does 
not demonstrate that the terms "game" and "nongame species" are 
mutually exclusive; nor does it indicate an intent to treat 
"game birds" as an exclusive subset of "game" in relation to 
birds that may be hunted.18  Because the legislature has provided 
a clear definition for the term "game" in chapter 29, that 
definition controls the plain meaning of that term in the 
                                                 
18 Moreover, chapter 29 explicitly contemplates that birds 
that 
are 
not 
"game 
birds" 
may 
be 
hunted. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 29.341 describes the duties of a hunter when an 
accidental shooting occurs, requiring:   
Any person who, while hunting any wild animal or 
bird, discharges a firearm or arrow, and by that 
discharge injures or kills another person, shall 
immediately give his or her name and address to the 
injured person, render assistance to the injured 
person and obtain immediate medical or hospital care 
for the injured person, and immediately report the 
injury or death to the sheriff or police of the 
locality in which the shooting took place.   
Wis. Stat. § 29.341 (emphasis added).  The language "wild animal 
or 
bird" 
parallels 
the 
definition 
of 
"game." 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 29.001(33).   
No. 
02-1166   
 
22 
 
statute.  Girouard, 155 Wis. 2d at 156.  The legislature defined 
"game" 
as 
"all 
varieties 
of 
wild 
mammals 
or 
birds."  
Wis. Stat. § 29.001(33).  Mourning doves plainly fall within 
this definition.  Neither the definition the legislature 
provided for the term "game" nor the context within which "game" 
is used throughout chapter 29 render its meaning ambiguous.  
Therefore, we conclude that mourning doves fall within the 
unambiguous definition of the term "game," such that the DNR has 
express authority under § 29.014(1) to adopt § NR 10.01(1)(h).  
¶31 However, WCCCD argues that § 29.014(1) conflicts with 
§ 29.039(1).  Section 29.039(1) provides: 
The department may conduct investigations of 
nongame species to develop scientific information 
relating to population, distribution, habitat needs, 
and other biological data to determine necessary 
conservation measures.  The department may develop 
conservation programs to ensure the perpetuation of 
nongame species.  The department may require harvest 
information and may establish limitations relating to 
taking, possession, transportation, processing and 
sale or offer for sale, of nongame species. 
Wis. Stat. § 29.039(1) (emphasis added). 
¶32 WCCCD asserts that as a "nongame species," mourning 
doves are regulated under § 29.039(1), which is more specific 
than § 29.014(1), and therefore should control.  See Lindsey v. 
Lindsey, 140 Wis. 2d 684, 693, 412 N.W.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1987).  
As § 29.039(1), according to WCCCD, does not permit the DNR to 
allow hunting of "nongame species," § 29.039(1) rather than 
§ 29.014(1) should govern the existence of the DNR's authority 
in this case.  The DNR counters that § 29.014(1) is the more 
No. 
02-1166   
 
23 
 
specific statute because it specifically relates to hunting, 
whereas § 29.039(1) relates to conservation.  In any event, the 
DNR argues that it is authorized to set seasons for "nongame 
species" 
under 
§ 29.039(1), 
as 
that 
section 
specifically 
authorizes the DNR to establish limits for the "taking" of 
"nongame species."  We need not determine which provision of 
chapter 29 is more specific because that principle of statutory 
construction applies only where the two statutes are in 
conflict.  State v. Maxey, 2003 WI App 94, ¶22, 264 Wis. 2d 878, 
663 N.W.2d 811.  We conclude that the statutes are not in 
conflict because § 29.039(1) implicitly empowers the DNR to set 
open seasons for "nongame species."   
¶33 Although section 29.039(1) does not explicitly empower 
the DNR to set open seasons for "nongame species," it may 
nonetheless implicitly empower the DNR to do so because 
§ 29.039(1) permits the DNR to regulate the "taking" of "nongame 
species."  Whether § 29.039(1) implicitly empowers the DNR to 
set seasons for "nongame species" depends on whether "taking" is 
synonymous as "hunting," such that the power to regulate 
"taking" would necessarily imply establishing regulations for 
"hunting."  No definition for the word "taking" is provided in 
§ 29.001.  However, "taking" is included in the definition of 
"hunting" 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 29.001(42), 
which 
provides 
that 
"'hunt' or 'hunting' includes shooting, shooting at, pursuing, 
taking, capturing or killing or attempting to capture or kill 
any wild animal."  Wis. Stat. § 29.001(42).  The DNR argues that 
"taking" is synonymous with "hunting," whereas WCCCD asserts 
No. 
02-1166   
 
24 
 
that while "taking" may be part of the activities included in 
the definition of "hunting," "taking" is separate and distinct 
from such concepts as shooting or killing.  WCCCD argues that 
"taking" 
merely 
means 
taking 
into 
possession, 
and 
that 
§ 29.039(1) contemplates only taking a species into possession 
for the purposes of scientific study or conservation.   
¶34 As the term "taking" is not specifically defined in 
chapter 29, we must resort to its common, ordinary meaning.  
Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1); 
Weber 
v. 
Town 
of 
Saukville, 
209 
Wis. 2d 214, 224, 562 N.W.2d 412 (1997).19  The word "take" 
contains over 32 primary entries in the dictionary.  More than 
one of these various definitions is arguably applicable to the 
statute.  For example, entry 1.a. defines "take" as follows:  
"To capture physically; seize."  American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 1829 (3d ed. 1992).  However, entry 1.c. 
defines "take" as follows:  "To kill, snare, or trap (fish or 
game, for example)."  Id.  Therefore, the word "take" is 
                                                 
19 WCCCD 
directs 
our 
attention 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 169.01(34)(2001-02), which provides that "'[t]ake' 
means to capture, but does not include killing."  Wisconsin 
Stat. ch. 169, relating to captive wildlife, was created by 2001 
Wis. Act 56.  See 2001 Wis. Act 56, § 224.  We note, however, 
that this definition is specific to Wis. Stat. ch. 169.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 169.01 (2001-2002).  While the legislature may have 
chosen to define "take" in this fashion in chapter 169, it did 
not so define "take" in chapter 29.  Furthermore, the inclusion 
of this definition of the word "take" in chapter 169 and the 
absence of such a definition in chapter 29 actually bolsters the 
DNR's position, as it is a strong indication that the term 
"take" in chapter 29 must have a different meaning than that 
term as it appears in chapter 169.  See State v. Welkos, 14 
Wis. 2d 186, 190, 192, 109 N.W.2d 889 (1961).  
No. 
02-1166   
 
25 
 
reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.  As the 
legislature has not provided a definition for the word "take" 
and its use in § 29.039(1) is ambiguous, we must resort to 
canons of construction to determine whether § 29.039(1) allows 
the DNR to set open seasons for "nongame species."  
¶35 A cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that 
statutes must be construed so as to avoid absurd results.  
Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶32; Wis. Hosp. Ass'n, 156 Wis. 2d at 
709.  Also, when interpreting a statute, statutes governing 
similar subjects should be considered together, such that where 
a statute governing one subject contains a given provision, the 
omission of that same provision from a statute governing a 
related subject is evidence that a different intention existed.  
State v. Welkos, 14 Wis. 2d 186, 190, 192, 109 N.W.2d 889 
(1961).20  
¶36 First, we note that WCCCD's suggestion——that each of 
the delineated words contained in the definition of "hunt" must 
encompass separate and distinct concepts from the other terms, 
such that "taking" cannot mean the same as killing——would render 
absurd the meaning of the other terms enumerated in the 
definition 
of 
"hunting." 
 
If, 
for 
example, 
"taking" 
is 
conceptually distinct from "killing," then "shooting at" must be 
conceptually distinct from "shooting."  Wis. Stat. § 29.001(42).  
Furthermore, if WCCCD's argument were correct, then "attempting 
                                                 
20 See also Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. PSC, 110 Wis. 2d 455, 
463, 329 N.W.2d 143 (1983)(accord). 
No. 
02-1166   
 
26 
 
to capture" a wild animal could not encompass "pursuing" a wild 
animal.  Wis. Stat. § 29.001(42).   
¶37 Second, the provision in chapter 29 empowering the DNR 
to set open and closed seasons uses the term "taking" and not 
"hunting":  "The department shall establish and maintain open 
and closed seasons . . . and conditions governing the taking of 
fish and game . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 29.014(1)(emphasis added).  
If "taking" did not involve killing, trapping, or shooting, the 
DNR would be authorized to regulate the taking into physical 
possession of "game" but would not be authorized to regulate 
shooting, shooting at, trapping, pursuing or killing "game" 
within open and closed seasons.  It would be absurd to construe 
the word "taking" as encompassing only the act of taking 
possession of "game" and not the concomitant acts of killing, 
shooting, shooting at, pursuing, or trapping "game."   
¶38 Third, the portion of chapter 29 regulating endangered 
and 
threatened 
species 
provides: 
 
"No 
person 
may 
take, 
transport, possess, process or sell within this state any wild 
animal specified by the department's endangered and threatened 
species list."  Wis. Stat. § 29.604(4)(a) (emphasis added).  If 
the word "take" is given the construction the WCCCD suggests, 
then a resident of this state would be prohibited from taking an 
endangered or threatened species into possession, but would not 
be barred from shooting, shooting at, or killing an endangered 
or threatened species.  This would constitute an absurd result 
and would defeat the entire purpose of the endangered and 
threatened species provision.  State ex rel. Cramer, 236 
No. 
02-1166   
 
27 
 
Wis. 2d 473, 
¶18 
("This 
court 
attempts 
to 
resolve 
any 
ambiguities in a manner that advances the legislature's purpose 
in enacting the statute.").   
¶39 Several other provisions of chapter 29 would also be 
rendered 
nonsensical 
if 
"taking" 
did 
not 
include 
other 
activities contained within the definition of "hunting," such as 
killing or shooting.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 29.091 ("The 
taking of predatory game birds and animals shall be done as the 
department 
directs.")(emphasis 
added); 
Wis. Stat. § 29.192(4) 
("If the department decides to limit the number of hunters or 
trappers taking Canada geese, sharp-tailed grouse, fishers, 
otters, 
bobcats 
or 
sturgeon 
by 
issuing 
permits . . . the 
department shall issue the permits . . . .")(emphasis added).   
¶40 Thus, an analysis of the use of the word "take" in 
chapter 29 compels us to conclude that "take" or "taking" 
includes those activities delineated under the definition of 
"hunting" in § 29.001(42), such as killing, shooting, shooting 
at, trapping, and pursuing.  This interpretation is consistent 
with the canon of construction noscitur a sociis——"it is known 
by its associates"——which provides that an unclear statutory 
term should be understood in the same sense as the words 
immediately surrounding or coupled with it.  See In re Estate of 
Nottingham v. Danielson, 46 Wis. 2d 580, 589-90, 175 N.W.2d 640 
No. 
02-1166   
 
28 
 
(1970); Black's Law Dictionary 1084 (7th ed. 1999).21  Under 
§ 29.039(1), the DNR is authorized to regulate the "taking" of 
"nongame species."   
¶41 However, WCCCD insists that the legislature intended 
to accord the same protection to "nongame species" as it did to 
endangered and threatened species.  WCCCD directs our attention 
to chapter 370, Laws of 1977.  This enactment created the 
specific statutory section relating to "nongame species."  § 5, 
ch. 370, Laws of 1977.  WCCCD notes that this law also created a 
specific fund for the conservation of nongame, endangered, and 
threatened species.  § 1, ch. 370, Laws of 1977.  WCCCD argues 
that this evinces a legislative intent to accord the same type 
of protection to these categories of species.  However, given 
the fact that the legislature chose to create two separate and 
distinct regulatory schemes for "nongame species" and endangered 
or threatened species, § 29.039(1) and § 29.604 respectively, 
WCCCD's reliance on this budget enactment is dubious.  While the 
legislature prohibited "taking" endangered or threatened species 
in § 29.604(4)(a), it failed to set forth a similar prohibition 
for "nongame species" and specifically empowered the DNR to 
regulate the "taking" of "nongame species" in § 29.039(1).   
                                                 
21 See also Citizens' Util. Bd. v. PSC, 2003 WI App 206, ¶8, 
267 Wis. 2d 414, 671 N.W.2d 11 (noting that "[u]nder noscitur a 
sociis, ordinarily the coupling of words denotes an intention 
that they be understood in the same general sense")(citing State 
v. Johnson, 171 Wis. 2d 175, 181, 491 N.W.2d 110 (Ct. App. 
1992)).  
No. 
02-1166   
 
29 
 
¶42 While WCCCD argues that mourning doves should be 
accorded the same protections as endangered or threatened 
species, mourning doves are not on the endangered or threatened 
species list.  See Wis. Admin. Code § NR 27.03(1)-(2) (Nov., 
2001).22  As much as WCCCD would like them to be, the mourning 
doves are simply not listed as an endangered or threatened 
species.23  Therefore, the prohibition against "taking" contained 
in § 29.604(4)(a) does not apply to mourning doves.  We note 
that mourning doves were listed in Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
10.02(5) (May, 2000) as a protected species, subject to the 
prohibition against "taking" contained in that section, but were 
removed from this list the same time § NR 10.01(1)(h) was 
adopted.  See Wis. Admin. Code § NR 10.02 (Sept., 2000).    
¶43 Therefore, we conclude that there is no conflict 
between § 29.014(1) and § 29.039(1) relating to the DNR's 
authority over mourning doves.  The power to authorize open 
seasons for the "taking" of "game" under § 29.014(1) is not 
inconsistent with the authority to ensure the conservation of a 
"nongame species" under § 29.039(1).  Under § 29.014(1), the DNR 
may set open and closed seasons for "taking" mourning doves, as 
                                                 
22 The list of engendered or threatened species has not been 
amended since September 1999. 
23 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 29.604(3), the legislature has 
delegated authority to the DNR to establish a list of endangered 
and threatened species in Wisconsin.  Whether a particular 
species appears on the endangered or threatened species list is 
subject 
to 
the 
DNR's 
discretion. 
 
Barnes 
v. 
DNR, 
184 
Wis. 2d 645, 662, 516 N.W.2d 730 (1994). 
No. 
02-1166   
 
30 
 
they constitute "game" for the purposes of that section.  In 
addition, 
the 
DNR 
may 
conduct 
investigations, 
develop 
conservation programs, require harvest information, and limit 
the "taking" of mourning doves in order to ensure their 
perpetration because mourning doves are a "nongame species" for 
the purposes of § 29.039(1).  These statutory sections are not 
inconsistent in relation to the DNR's authority over mourning 
doves.  Indeed, at times it may be necessary to authorize the 
"taking of a "nongame species" if disease, overpopulation, or 
other factors jeopardize the perpetuation of the species.   
¶44 Having determined that § 29.014(1) confers upon the 
DNR express authority to establish an open season for mourning 
doves, we next examine whether that authority is in any way 
affected by the newly enacted "Right to Hunt" amendment to the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Article I, Section 26 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, as adopted by the citizens of this state in April 
of 2003, provides:  "The people have the right to fish, hunt, 
trap, and take game subject only to reasonable restrictions as 
prescribed by law."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 26.  We interpret 
provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution de novo, examining 
three primary sources to determine a provision's meaning: 
the plain meaning of the words in the context used; 
the 
constitutional debates and the practices in 
existence 
at 
the 
time 
of 
the 
writing 
of 
the 
constitution; and the earliest interpretation of the 
provision by the legislature as manifested in the 
first law passed following adoption.  
No. 
02-1166   
 
31 
 
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶10, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328 
(quoting 
Thompson 
v. 
Craney, 
199 
Wis. 2d 674, 
680, 
546 
N.W.2d 123 (1996)). 
¶45 An examination of the plain language of Article I, 
Section 26 of the Wisconsin Constitution reveals that the 2003 
constitution amendment was intended to codify the common law 
right to hunt that existed prior to its adoption.  In State v. 
Nergaard, 124 Wis. 414, 420, 102 N.W. 889 (1905), this court 
declared that the citizens of the state have a common law right 
to hunt and fish game as they see fit in the absence of state 
regulations, so long as they do not infringe private rights.  
This court described the right as follows:   
[T]he state has the right, in the exercise of its 
police power, to make all reasonable regulations for 
the preservation of fish and game within its limits.  
It may ordain closed seasons; it may prescribe the 
manner of taking, the times of taking, and the amount 
to be taken within a given time, as it may deem best 
for the purpose of preserving and perpetuating the 
general stock.  In the absence of legislation the 
citizen may doubtless pursue, take, and dispose of 
fish and game as he sees fit and without restraint, so 
long as he violates no private rights; but when the 
state steps in and makes proper police regulations, 
the citizen takes his right of fishing or fowling 
hampered by such regulations; in other words, his 
right is the right which the state leaves to him, no 
more and no less.   
Id.  
¶46 The language of the 2003 constitutional amendment 
closely parallels the language in Nergaard, providing that the 
people of this state have the right to take game, subject to 
reasonable regulations.  The 2003 amendment does not impose any 
No. 
02-1166   
 
32 
 
limitation upon the power of the state or DNR to regulate 
hunting, other than that any restrictions on hunting must be 
reasonable.  However, the WCCCD has not alleged that § NR 
10.01(1)(h) is unreasonable.  Therefore, the 2003 constitutional 
amendment does not affect our analysis of the DNR's authority in 
this case.   
¶47 However, we do note that the fact that citizens of 
this state enjoy the right to hunt in the absence of reasonable 
regulations does not necessarily mean that it is "open season" 
on any species of birds not regulated by the DNR.  Wisconsin 
Admin. 
Code 
§ NR 
10.02 
currently 
provides 
that 
certain 
enumerated species are protected and may not be taken without 
authorization by the DNR.  Specifically, Wis. Admin. Code § NR 
10.02(8) (Nov., 2003) provides that "[a]ny other wild bird not 
specified in this chapter[]" may not be taken absent express 
authorization by the DNR.  Therefore, under § NR 10.02(8), the 
DNR must engage in rule-making and expressly authorize the 
taking of any species of wild bird that is not currently 
regulated.  If the DNR elects to do so, it is obviously 
restrained by its own rule-making procedures, federal law 
governing migratory birds, and federal and state law relating to 
endangered or threatened species.   
V 
¶48 In summation, we hold that the DNR has express 
authority under § 29.014(1) to adopt § NR 10.01(1)(h) because 
the legislature has granted broad authority to the DNR to set 
open and closed seasons for "game" under § 29.014(1) and 
No. 
02-1166   
 
33 
 
mourning doves fall within the unambiguous definition of "game" 
contained therein.  We further hold that there is no conflict 
between § 29.014(1) and § 29.039(1) because mourning doves 
constitute "game" within the meaning of the former provision and 
qualify as a "nongame species" under the latter.  Section 
29.014(1) authorizes the DNR to set open season for the "taking" 
of "game," and § 29.039(1) empowers the DNR to set limits on the 
"taking" 
of 
"nongame 
species" 
to 
further 
the 
goal 
of 
conservation.  The word "take" within relevant statutory 
provisions encompasses more than the act of mere possession and 
includes the other activities listed in § 29.001(42) under the 
definition 
of 
"hunting," 
including 
killing 
and 
shooting.  
Therefore, we conclude that the DNR had express authority under 
§ 29.014(1) to adopt Wis. Admin. Code § NR 10.01(1)(h).  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
No. 
02-1166   
 
 
 
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