Case Title: Spencer v. Civil Service Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12326

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12326 
 
LUIS S. SPENCER  vs.  CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & another.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 4, 2017. - March 27, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Commissioner of Correction.  Public Employment, Resignation.  
Civil Service, Decision of Civil Service Commission, 
Termination of employment, Findings by commission.  
Jurisdiction, Civil Service Commission.  Words, 
"Termination of his service." 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
December 8, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Robert N. Tochka, J., on motions for 
judgment on the pleadings. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
David A. Russcol (Monica R. Shah also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
Jesse M. Boodoo, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendants. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Department of Correction. 
2 
 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  The issue presented is whether Luis S. Spencer, 
who resigned under pressure as Commissioner of Correction 
(commissioner) in the midst of a public investigation of his 
oversight of Bridgewater State Hospital, has a right, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 30, § 46D, to revert to a tenured civil service 
correction officer II position he last held in 1992.  Upon his 
resignation and the denial of his request to revert, Spencer 
filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (commission).  
The commission concluded that the right to revert to a civil 
service position applies only to involuntary terminations, not 
voluntary resignations, and because Spencer voluntarily 
resigned, no "termination of his service" had occurred within 
the meaning of G. L. c. 30, § 46D.  Spencer brought a complaint 
against the commission and the Department of Correction 
(department), seeking judicial review of the commission's 
decision.  A judge in the Superior Court affirmed the 
commission's decision.  Spencer appealed, and we transferred his 
appeal to this court on our own motion.  We conclude that § 46D 
does not provide a right to revert in these circumstances and 
that the commission's interpretation of this ambiguous statutory 
language is reasonable, as it applies the same rules for 
reversion to managers as it does to all other civil service 
employees and avoids the type of manipulation of retirement 
3 
 
 
benefits at issue here.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of 
the commission. 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Statutory framework.  Under the 
Commonwealth's civil service statutory scheme, a number of rank 
and file and lower level management positions, particularly in 
public safety, are covered by the civil service laws.  A tenured 
civil service employee cannot be demoted, discharged, or 
suspended from such positions without just cause.  See G. L. 
c. 31, §§ 1, 41.  Rather, the appointing authority must follow 
specific procedures to terminate a tenured civil service 
employee, and the employee is entitled to a full hearing before 
such termination takes effect.  G. L. c. 31, § 41.  Where a 
tenured civil service employee is terminated for "lack of work 
or lack of money or abolition of positions," the employee may 
opt to be demoted to his or her next lowest title, instead of 
being terminated, "if in such next lower title or titles there 
is an employee junior to him in length of service."  See G. L. 
c. 31, § 39.  This practice is known as "bumping."  See Andrews 
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 446 Mass. 611, 619 (2006).  By contrast, 
if an employee resigns, there is no provision granting him or 
her the right to request his or her prior position.  See G. L. 
c. 31, § 39. 
 
The civil service laws do not apply to middle and upper 
level management positions in public service.  See G. L. c. 30, 
4 
 
 
§§ 46D, 46E, 46F.  However, under G. L. c. 30, § 46D, a middle 
or upper level manager may revert or "bump" back to the tenured 
civil service position from which he or she has been promoted 
upon "termination of his [or her] service."2  For middle and 
upper level managers who were "terminated for cause," the right 
to revert is more limited and must be determined by a hearing 
                     
 
2 General Laws c. 30, § 46D, provides: 
 
"Whenever it is deemed practicable in the judgment of 
the appointing authority and with concurrence with the 
secretary, where applicable, appointments to positions 
allocated to job groups M–I through M–IV, inclusive, of the 
management salary schedule shall be made by promoting 
employees of the [C]ommonwealth serving in positions 
assigned to the general salary schedule; and appointments 
to positions allocated to job groups M–V through M–XII, 
inclusive, in the management salary schedule shall be made 
by promoting managers of the [C]ommonwealth serving in 
positions allocated to job groups M–I through M–IV, 
inclusive, in the management salary schedule. 
 
"In every instance of a manager or employee so 
promoted from a position classified under [G. L. c. 31] or 
from a position in which at the time of promotion he shall 
have tenure by reason of [G. L. c. 30, § 9A], upon 
termination of his service in the position to which he was 
so promoted, the manager or employee shall, if he so 
requests, be restored to the position from which he shall 
have been promoted, or to a position in the same [S]tate 
agency, without impairment of his civil service status or 
his tenure by reason of said [§ 9A] or loss of the 
seniority, retirement and other rights to which 
uninterrupted service in such position would have entitled 
him; provided, however, that if his service in the position 
to which he was promoted shall have been terminated for 
cause, his right to be restored shall be determined by the 
civil service commission, in accordance with the standards 
applied by said commissioner in administering [G. L. 
c. 31]." 
5 
 
 
before the commission, in accordance with the standards set out 
in G. L. c. 31.  See G. L. c. 30, § 46D. 
 
b.  Facts.  We summarize the facts as recited in the 
commission's statement of undisputed facts.  Spencer was first 
appointed to a civil service position in 1980 when he became a 
Correction Officer I (CO-I).  In 1991, he was appointed captain, 
the first in a string of appointments to nontenured management 
positions.  In 1992, he received a one-day permanent appointment 
to Correction Officer II (CO-II), the highest tenured civil 
service position he would ever hold.  He was granted a permanent 
leave of absence from this position3 and continued up the ranks 
of nontenured management positions, being appointed director of 
security in 1993, deputy administrator in 1995, superintendent 
in 1997, and assistant deputy commissioner in 2008. 
 
In 2011, Spencer was appointed as commissioner by the 
Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety & Security 
(Secretary).  His appointment was approved by the Governor.  In 
2014, Spencer came under intense public scrutiny for his 
handling of the investigation into an inmate's death at 
Bridgewater State Hospital.  In March, 2014, Spencer received a 
written letter of reprimand from the Secretary for his failure 
                     
 
3 Although Spencer's appointment to Correction Officer II 
(CO-II) was only for one day, his request for a permanent leave 
of absence from that position was not officially granted until 
2003, over eleven years after he left the position. 
6 
 
 
to track the results of the investigation vigilantly.  The 
letter ordered Spencer to "revisit the investigation and place 
the officers involved on administrative leave, pending renewed 
inquiry into the matter." 
 
In July, 2014, details emerged of another incident at 
Bridgewater State Hospital that took place in May, 2014, this 
time involving the alleged abuse of a mental health patient by a 
correction officer.  On July 22, 2014, the Secretary spoke with 
Spencer by telephone, and informed him that the Governor had 
requested Spencer's resignation.  The Secretary requested that 
Spencer send her two letters of resignation, one dated July 23, 
2014, and one dated July 28, 2014, in the event that it took a 
few days for the department to transition to a new commissioner. 
 
On July 23, Spencer contacted the acting assistant deputy 
commissioner for human resources.  Spencer asked her to confirm 
department practice on reverting to a prior civil service 
position, and to send the sample language for requesting to 
revert.  After receiving the sample language, Spencer sent the 
Secretary two copies of his resignation letter, one dated July 
23, 2014, and the other dated July 28, 2014.  The resignation 
letter highlighted Spencer's accomplishments as commissioner, 
and concluded with the following statement:  "I ask that you 
respectfully accept my resignation from my appointed position as 
the [commissioner] and accept my request to revert back to my 
7 
 
 
last uniformed position, which was [c]aptain for the 
[department]."4  Later the same day, Spencer also sent the 
Secretary an additional letter specifically requesting to revert 
to his captain position and a second, amended reversion letter, 
with additional salary information.  Spencer stated in his 
reversion letter that "[i]f this request is approved . . . I 
would then be able to retire within a year at [eighty per cent].  
If I retire from the [department] on this date I would only be 
eligible for 50.4 [per cent]."  Spencer also sent the Secretary 
a page from the "Benefit Guide for the Massachusetts Employee's 
Retirement System," and highlighted the criteria for "certain 
correction officers" to be classified in "Group Four" for 
retirement purposes.  One such requirement is that the employee 
be "actively performing the duties of the [Group Four] position" 
for twelve consecutive months immediately preceding retirement.  
If Spencer retired as commissioner, he would be classified in 
the less lucrative "Group One." 
                     
 
4 Spencer's prior position as CO-II, not captain, was the 
last permanent civil service position he held.  If he was 
permitted to revert to a position in which he previously had 
tenure, he would be reverted to his CO-II position, which he 
last held twenty-two years prior, in 1992.  The statute does 
provide that "the manager or employee shall, if he so requests, 
be restored to the position from which he shall have been 
promoted, or to a position in the same [S]tate agency."  G. L. 
c. 30, § 46D.  However, the Civil Service Commission 
(commission) has limited the entitlement to reversion to apply 
only to prior permanent positions, not any other prior position.  
O'Donnell v. Registry of Motor Vehicles, 22 Mass. Civ. Serv. 
Rep. 638, 642 (2009). 
8 
 
 
 
The next day, the Secretary spoke with Spencer about his 
resignation by telephone.  The Secretary said that the Governor 
would accept Spencer's resignation only if it was unconditional, 
and that the terms of the resignation would not be negotiated.  
Therefore, Spencer could not include the request to revert in 
his resignation letter.  According to Spencer, the Secretary 
told him that "if [he] did not allow that request to be removed, 
[his] employment would be terminated."  The Secretary also 
indicated to Spencer that his request to revert from 
commissioner to a correction officer was "unprecedented" and 
voiced her concerns about his continued presence in the 
department.  She did tell him that "she would consider [his] 
request to be reinstated." 
 
After their conversation, the Secretary sent Spencer a 
revised copy of Spencer's resignation letter.  The letter was 
identical to the resignation letter Spencer had sent the day 
before, except that the Secretary had removed the request to 
revert.  Spencer acknowledged receipt of the revised resignation 
letter.  Internal department paperwork stated that the reason 
for Spencer's termination was "Resigned from Mgmt position 
7/24/14." 
 
Four days later, the Secretary verbally informed Spencer 
that his request to revert was denied.  On July 30, 2014, 
Spencer sent a new request for reversion to the acting assistant 
9 
 
 
deputy commissioner.  On August 7, 2014, Spencer was informed 
that this request had been denied.  Spencer sent a second 
request for reversion to the acting assistant deputy 
commissioner that same day.  In a letter dated August 15, 2014, 
Spencer was informed his second request had also been denied. 
 
On August 28, 2014, Spencer filed an appeal with the 
commission.  The department filed a motion to dismiss, and the 
commission permitted both parties to submit evidence as to the 
factual issues.5  After conducting a hearing on the motion, the 
commission granted the department's motion and dismissed the 
case.  Spencer thereafter sought judicial review of the 
commission's decision. 
 
3.  Discussion.  We may set aside the commission's decision 
only if "'the substantial rights of any party may have been 
prejudiced' [because the commission decision] is based on an 
error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, or otherwise 
not in accordance with the law."  Police Dep't of Boston v. 
Kavaleski, 463 Mass. 680, 689 (2012) (Kavaleski), quoting G. L. 
c. 30A, § 14 (7).  The party appealing bears a heavy burden 
because "we give 'due weight to the experience, technical 
                     
 
5 Motions to dismiss before the commission differ somewhat 
from such motions under Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 
as they may be made after the presentation of evidence.  Compare 
801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(7)(g) (1998) with Mass. R. Civ. P. 
12, 365 Mass. 754 (1974). 
10 
 
 
competence, and specialized knowledge of the commission.'"  
Kavaleski, supra, quoting G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). 
 
a.  Right to reversion.  The primary issue raised on appeal 
is the meaning of "termination of his service" within G. L. 
c. 30, § 46D.  Spencer argues that his resignation was a 
"termination of his service" under the statute.  He claims that 
"termination of his service" applies to voluntary as well as 
involuntary separations from employment, and that even if it 
applied only to involuntary separations, his resignation was 
coerced by the Governor and the Secretary.  The commission 
disagreed, finding "termination of his service" does not apply 
to voluntary resignations, regardless of the reasons for 
resigning.  Spencer contends that the commission's 
interpretation of G. L. c. 30, § 46D, is owed no substantial 
deference because the commission is responsible only for 
administering the civil service laws, not G. L. c. 30. 
 
i.  Meaning of termination of his service.  "Our primary 
duty in interpreting a statute is 'to effectuate the intent of 
the Legislature in enacting it.'"  Campatelli v. Chief Justice 
of the Trial Court, 468 Mass. 455, 464 (2014), quoting Water 
Dep't of Fairhaven v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 455 Mass. 
740, 744 (2010).  "Ordinarily, if the language of a statute is 
plain and unambiguous it is conclusive as to legislative 
intent. . . .  However, time and again we have stated that we 
11 
 
 
should not accept the literal meaning of the words of a statute 
without regard for that statute's purpose and history" 
(citations omitted).  Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 
397 Mass. 837, 839 (1986).  Moreover, "substantial deference" is 
owed "to a reasonable interpretation of a statute by the 
administrative agency charged with its administration [and] 
enforcement."  Commerce Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 447 
Mass. 478, 481 (2006).  However, "[a]n incorrect interpretation 
of a statute . . . is not entitled to deference."  Kszepka's 
Case, 408 Mass. 843, 847 (1990). 
"[T]ermination of his service" is not a well-understood 
term of art such as "termination for cause."  While at least ten 
other statutes contain very similar wording,6 it appears that we 
have not previously been tasked with interpreting the meaning of 
"termination of his service" in any of those provisions.  Even 
when read in context, the plain meaning of "termination of his 
                     
 
6 See G. L. c. 6, § 75 (Massachusetts Rehabilitation 
Commission); G. L. c. 6A, § 7 (Secretaries of executive 
offices); G. L. c. 6C, § 39 (administrative offices of division 
of highways); G. L. c. 7, § 4D (Executive Office of 
Administration and Finance); G. L. c. 7, § 4J (Human Resources 
Division); G. L. c. 10, § 26 (director of the State lottery); 
G. L. c. 14, § 4 (Department of Revenue); G. L. c. 19A, § 10 
(Department of Elder Affairs); G. L. c. 21A, § 6 (Executive 
Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs); G. L. c. 25A, § 4 
(Division of Energy Resources).  In very different contexts see 
also G. L. c. 30, § 32 (annual reports filed by State officers); 
G. L. c. 32, § 10 (retirement allowance for civil service 
employees); G. L. c. 41, § 127 (tenure for certain appointed 
offices in cities, towns and districts); G. L. c. 151D, § 13 
(vested benefits). 
12 
 
 
service" in G. L. c. 30, § 46D, remains somewhat ambiguous.  The 
term is not expressly defined in the statute.  The civil service 
statute, G. L. c. 31, which is cross-referenced in § 46D, also 
does not employ or define this exact term, although it does 
distinguish between involuntary discharges and voluntary 
resignations.  See G. L. c. 31, § 1 (defining "discharge" as 
"permanent, involuntary separation," and "resignation" as 
"permanent voluntary separation").  Although the phrase 
"termination of his service" is used only once in § 46D, there 
is a subsequent reference to employees "terminated for cause."  
As terminations for cause are a subset of involuntary 
terminations, the use of the phrase "terminated for cause" in 
the same paragraph supports an interpretation that the reference 
to "termination of his service" is similarly limited to 
involuntary separations from employment.  See Booma v. Bigelow-
Sanford Carpet Co., 330 Mass. 79, 82 (1953) ("It is a familiar 
canon of construction, that when similar words are used in 
different parts of a statute, the meaning is presumed to be the 
same throughout"); Eaton v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 
569, 583 (2012).  For further guidance, however, we turn to the 
legislative history and purpose.  See Sterilite Corp., 397 Mass. 
at 839. 
Where, as here, the statutory language remains ambiguous, 
"we consider 'the cause of its enactment, the mischief or 
13 
 
 
imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, [such that] the purpose of its framers maybe 
effectuated.'"  Water Dep't of Fairhaven, 455 Mass. at 744 
(2010), quoting DiFiore v. American Airlines, Inc., 454 Mass. 
486, 490 (2009).  Prior to 1981, middle and upper managers were 
eligible to receive civil service status and tenure.  See 1981 
House Doc. No. 6279 at 2.  However, in 1981, the Governor 
proposed a comprehensive overhaul of the Massachusetts civil 
service system to the Legislature, accompanied by a letter and a 
document explaining the details of the legislation.  Id. at 1.  
The legislation accomplished multiple, related purposes.  
Notably, it removed upper and middle level managers from the 
civil service system and increased their pay.  See id. at 1-2; 
St. 1981, c. 699, § 73.  It thereby provided much greater 
flexibility in the hiring, promotion, and removal of managers.  
See 1981 House Doc. No. 6279.  In his letter accompanying the 
proposed bill, the Governor stated:  "[T]he implementation of 
this plan is essential if we are to encourage more 
responsibility and accountability in our managers and if we are 
to motivate such managers to assist in the achievement of the 
state's objectives in a more economical and efficient manner."  
Id. at 1.  The summary of the legislation further indicated that 
a modern personnel system required that "managers be recognized 
as such -- a group separate and apart from employees; a group, 
14 
 
 
in fact, responsible for the supervision of those same 
employees."  Id. at 4. 
The legislation also recognized the "demoralizing" effect 
of having employees face limited opportunities for advancement.  
Id. at 17.  Accordingly, it strongly encouraged the promotion of 
lower level managers into middle and upper level management 
positions.  Id.  See G. L. c. 30, § 46D ("Whenever it is deemed 
practicable . . . appointments to positions allocated to job 
groups M-V through M-XII . . . shall be made by promoting 
managers of the [C]ommonwealth serving in positions allocated to 
job groups M-I through M-IV").  Because lower level managers 
would lose their civil service status if promoted to a middle or 
upper level management position, the bill further provided 
limited protections against the termination of service of anyone 
so promoted.  1981 House Doc. No. 6279 at 18.  According to the 
Governor, "[A]nyone promoted from such a position to a middle or 
upper level position could retain such status or tenure and 
could return to the position from which he or she was promoted."  
Id.  This would incentivize lower level managers to seek 
promotion, despite the lack of civil service protections for 
middle and upper management, by ensuring that, once promoted, 
they still had a means of returning to their prior civil service 
position if their service in a management position was 
terminated.  In essence, managers who had been promoted from the 
15 
 
 
ranks of civil service employees retained the right to bump back 
to their former positions.  This right to bump back or revert 
is, as explained above, an important component of the civil 
service laws.  See G. L. c. 31, § 39. 
 
We also look to the commission's interpretation of the 
statutory language.  See Commerce Ins. Co., 447 Mass. at 481.  
Although the commission is not explicitly charged with 
administering G. L. c. 30, this chapter is integrated into the 
civil service laws that the commission is required to interpret 
and enforce.  Contrast Springfield v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 469 
Mass. 370, 380 (2014) (no special deference owed to commission's 
interpretation of G. L. c. 268A, § 25, which makes no mention of 
commission and relates to criminal misconduct).  The entire 
system must function in a coherent manner as manager reversion 
rights ripple through the entire system, directly impacting the 
rights of other civil service employees, who may be required to 
bump each other.  Cf. Malloch v. Hanover, 472 Mass. 783, 791 
(2015) ("We interpret separate sections of statutes as a whole, 
to produce internal consistency . . . and to give a 'rational 
and workable effect'" [citations omitted]).  Additionally, G. L. 
c. 30, § 46D, specifically tasks the commission with 
administering the provision's for cause hearings.  Accordingly, 
the commission's interpretation of the statute warrants some 
deference if it is reasonable. 
16 
 
 
 
The commission recognized that this case involves an 
"unprecedented" request from a former commissioner, the highest 
ranking position in the organization, to be reinstated to his 
last "uniformed" position in the department after resigning his 
post at the request of the Governor.  As the commission 
explained, it has a long-standing practice of not treating civil 
service resignations as terminations, and § 46D "rationally must 
be construed to preserve, not abolish, the traditional, well-
recognized distinction in civil service law between involuntary 
'termination' and voluntary resignation,' with involuntary 
termination . . . being the sole trigger for any 'right' of an 
employee to revert to a lower-level tenured position." 
 
The commission's consistent enforcement of this distinction 
provides important protections for all employees, those bumping 
others as well as those being bumped.  The system is designed to 
provide a priority of protection against involuntary loss of 
employment, rather than to allow one set of employees to 
displace another at will.  The commission's adoption of this 
important principle in this context is persuasive.  To do 
otherwise would create an unfair advantage for upper level 
managers over lower level managers and civil service employees.  
It would extend the right to "bump" another civil service 
employee upon voluntary resignation, whereas under the civil 
service laws tenured civil service employees may only "bump" 
17 
 
 
into a lower level position upon involuntary separation from 
service.  See G. L. c. 31, § 39; Andrews, 446 Mass. at 612 n.3, 
619. 
The commission's interpretation also is fully consistent 
with the statutory language and purpose.  The references to 
termination in § 46D, as explained above, appear to refer to 
involuntary loss of employment.  The statutory purpose also 
suggests that managerial bumping rights be limited to those who 
have been terminated from their managerial positions rather than 
those who have decided for other reasons, such as pension 
enhancement, to return voluntarily to the civil service ranks, 
and thereby potentially force the involuntary termination of 
another employee.  The statutory scheme recognizes that promoted 
managers are much more vulnerable to terminations, including 
terminations for reasons related to changes in administrations 
after elections, and § 46D was designed to protect such managers 
from job loss for those reasons.  There is nothing in the 
legislative history suggesting that it also was intended to 
allow managers who were not terminated to use reversion rights 
to combine the benefits of both their managerial position and 
their former civil service position to the detriment of rank and 
file employees. 
Spencer places heavy reliance on the fact that the 
department previously allowed other upper level managers to 
18 
 
 
revert to their prior civil service position upon resignation.  
Based on the record before us, there were indeed a number of 
voluntary resignations in the department wherein employees were 
allowed to resign and return to their former positions.  To the 
extent that we can determine the reasons for these requests from 
the record, it appears that the employees were permitted to 
revert to their former positions shortly before retirement in 
order to retire from a position that would place them in Group 
4. 
Retirement benefits for public employees are calculated on 
the basis of whichever "Group" an employee belongs to when he or 
she retires.  See G. L. c. 32, § 3 (2) (g).  As commissioner, 
Spencer belonged to Group 1.  By contrast, certain uniformed 
positions, including CO-II, fall within Group 4.  Group 4 
employees receive higher pensions at an earlier age than Group 1 
because such positions entail significantly more hazardous 
duties than positions in Group 1.  Cf. Pysz v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeal Bd., 403 Mass. 514, 518 (1988).  "Providing 
early retirement incentive to employees with hazardous 
duties . . . has the effect of making room for younger employees 
better able to perform that type of work."  Id.  See Gaw v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 250, 253-
254 (1976).  Attaining Group 4 status, and the greater 
19 
 
 
retirement benefits it provides, was expressly referenced in 
Spencer's communications with the Secretary. 
Although we may consider departmental practice, we turn to 
the statutory language, legislative history, and administrative 
interpretation to determine if there is a statutory basis for 
the practice.  See Sterilite Corp., 397 Mass. at 839.  Our own 
views are informed by the thoughtful discussion of this practice 
in the commission's decision.  As explained by the commission, 
prior to 2012, a practice known as "King for a Day" was commonly 
employed to allow employees to revert to a uniformed position 
for a single day to allow them to retire in Group 4.  Effective 
in 2012, the State pension law was changed to prevent these 
single-day reversions, but even before this legislative reform, 
such contrived or "sham" retirements had been deemed illegal.  
See Pysz, 403 Mass. at 518; St. 2011, c. 176, § 8.  Yet, as the 
commission further explained: 
"There is no dispute that, over the years, [the 
department] has consented to similar requests of a 
significant number of [department] managers, all below the 
[department] [c]ommissioner level, to be demoted to 
'uniformed-level' positions immediately prior to retirement 
solely to qualify for such an enhanced pension that the law 
arguably allowed.  Assuming the law still permits the 
practice, absent further legislative changes, the 
[c]ommission has no power to prevent [the department] (or 
others) from voluntarily choosing to enable its top 
managers to accept demotions to lower level positions 
(tenured or not) and take advantage of the law, although 
the only motivation is to qualify the managers for enhanced 
Group 4 benefits.  It is another matter, however, to ask 
the [c]ommission to put its imprimatur on such a 
20 
 
 
questionable practice by asking it . . . to mandate that 
result in this, and, by implication, in every other similar 
case, as a matter of law and public policy." 
 
We agree with the commission.  Although the department may 
have a practice of permitting upper level managers to resign and 
revert to their prior civil service positions for public pension 
benefits, this does not mean that upper level managers have a 
right to such reversion.  We conclude that G. L. c. 30, § 46D, 
was not designed to permit a high-level manager to voluntarily 
resign and revert, particularly when he does so for the purpose 
of attaining enhanced retirement benefits designed for a 
hazardous employment position he has not occupied in twenty-five 
years.  Instead, § 46D is designed to provide managers 
involuntarily terminated the right to revert to continue their 
public service. 
 
ii.  Voluntariness of Spencer's resignation.  Spencer 
separately argues that his resignation was involuntary, because 
he was misled or compelled to resign under the threat of 
termination.  As we have previously held in the context of 
employee benefits under G. L. c. 41, § 111F, an employee's 
resignation is voluntary absent a showing of fraud, coercion, or 
duress.  See Jones v. Wayland, 374 Mass. 249, 259-260 (1978), 
S.C., 380 Mass. 110 (1980).  Neither contention by Spencer rises 
to this level.  Nor has Spencer established that his resignation 
was made "in reasonable reliance on misinformation received from 
21 
 
 
his employer."  Commissioner of the Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n v. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 573, 576 (1988). 
 
Spencer does not allege that the Secretary promised to 
reinstate him as a CO-II, merely that she said she would 
"consider" it.  He received no guarantee that he could revert, 
and he was informed of the "unprecedented" nature of his 
request, given his position as commissioner.  He also was aware 
of the intense public scrutiny, the Governor's and the 
Secretary's insistence that he resign or be terminated, and that 
there be no strings attached to his resignation.  No 
misinformation or fraud has been alleged here. 
 
Spencer's claims also do not rise to the level of coercion 
or duress.  The commission has consistently ruled that mere 
evidence that a resignation was made under threat of discharge 
or discipline is not enough.  See, e.g., Forrest v. Weymouth 
Fire Dep't, 28 Mass. Civ. Serv. Rep. 480, 482 (2015).  Although 
we recognize that Spencer was faced with a difficult choice when 
he was told that his resignation would be accepted only if it 
was unconditional, it was still a choice he freely made.  See 
Monahan v. Romney, 625 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 563 U.S. 976 (2011) ("Because [the head of the 
commission] resigned [albeit under pressure from the Governor 
and the Governor's staff], his claim that defendants deprived 
him of a property interest within the meaning of the Due Process 
22 
 
 
Clause necessarily fails"); Worcester v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 18 
Mass. App. Ct. 278, 283 (1984) ("We do not imply that the choice 
put to the employee [under the civil service laws] is an easy 
one.  However,  . . . it is not our function to ignore the plain 
language of the statutes to avoid putting the employees to a 
difficult decision").  As the commission explained, "Mr. 
Spencer, an experienced senior manager, consciously chose the 
resignation route that afforded him the opportunity to write his 
own favorably-couched letter highlighting his career, rather 
than face a difficult and costly process that would have likely 
raised issues better left undisturbed."  The decision to resign 
allowed Spencer to leave the department on his own terms and 
avoid further intense public scrutiny of his performance during 
a high profile investigation of Bridgewater State Hospital.  
Choosing to resign allowed Spencer to avoid the termination 
process altogether, but in so doing, Spencer lost whatever 
statutory entitlement he had to revert to his prior tenured 
position. 
 
b.  Jurisdiction.  Spencer contends that the commission 
erroneously granted the department's motion to dismiss on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction.  The commission did mention that 
"this case does not invoke the [c]ommission's jurisdiction to 
conduct . . . a 'just cause' hearing under the proviso of 
[§] 46D," but that assertion is not the rationale for the 
23 
 
 
commission's decision.  Rather, as discussed, the commission 
evaluated whether Spencer fell within the plain language of the 
"termination of his service" provision in G. L. c. 30, § 46D.  
Spencer is apparently referencing his argument below that if the 
commission chose not to restore his position on the basis of 
G. L. c. 30, § 46D, in the alternative, it could do so under 
G. L. c. 31 or St. 1993, c. 310, § 1. 
 
As discussed, G. L. c. 31, § 41, prohibits discharging, 
removing, or laying off a tenured civil service employee without 
just cause.  Where the appointing authority does not comply with 
G. L. c. 31, § 41, and "the rights of [the tenured civil service 
employee] have been prejudiced thereby," the employee is 
entitled to have his or her employment restored.  G. L. c. 31, 
§ 42.  Similarly, under St. 1993, c. 310, § 1, where a person's 
civil service rights "have been prejudiced through no fault of 
[his or her] own, the [commission] may take such action as will 
restore or protect such rights."  Because Spencer resigned, and 
did so voluntarily, his rights were not prejudiced, and there is 
no basis for relief under either provision. 
 
c.  Propriety of commission's factual findings.  Finally, 
Spencer also argues that the commission improperly made a 
finding of fact adverse to Spencer, despite ruling on a motion 
24 
 
 
to dismiss.7  In its decision, the commission stated that "for at 
least four days (July 24 to July 28), Mr. Spencer, while still 
occupying this position of [department] [c]ommissioner, knew 
that his resignation had been explicitly made unconditional but 
took no action to protest, rescind or dispute that decision, 
either before or after knowing those facts."  The commission 
later restated that in making the choice whether to resign or 
fight, Spencer "[knew] the consequences of both choices."  
Spencer contends that this constituted a finding of fact that 
was both clearly erroneous and unsupported by substantial 
evidence.  We disagree. 
 
According to Spencer's own affidavit, the Secretary 
informed Spencer that "[his] request to revert to [c]aptain 
could not be in [his] letter of resignation, and that if [he] 
did not allow that request to be removed, [his] employment would 
be terminated."  Thus, by Spencer's own account, he was informed 
that his resignation letter could not include the condition that 
he be allowed to revert.  In other words, he knew that the 
resignation letter had to be unconditional.  Yet, Spencer argues 
                     
 
7 Spencer also argues that the commission improperly cited 
and applied the standard of review for motions for summary 
decision.  The commission contends that it has a long-standing 
practice of deciding motions to dismiss under the same standard 
as motions for summary disposition, as both are presumptively 
evidentiary motions.  See 801 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.01(7)(g)(1), 
(h).  We do not address this issue, as we conclude that the 
commission did not make improper findings of material fact. 
25 
 
 
that his resignation was not unconditional, because even after 
his conversation with the Secretary, he "fully believed and 
understood that, by legal right and past practice, he would be 
restored to a uniformed position, but that request could not be 
in the resignation letter itself."  This too is undermined by 
Spencer's own affidavit, which states that the Secretary said 
that "she would consider [his] request to be reinstated" 
(emphasis added), not that she would grant it. 
Ultimately, Spencer takes issue with the commission's 
determination that Spencer's resignation was voluntary.  He 
believes the commission "resolved a contested issue of material 
fact" against him by doing so.  However, the voluntariness of 
his resignation was not simply a factual finding, but a legal 
one.  For the reasons discussed above, the commission correctly 
concluded that Spencer's resignation was voluntary.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                     
 
8 Spencer also argues that the commission was incorrect to 
find he was still commissioner from July 24 to July 28, because 
the Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety & 
Security forwarded him the revised letter on July 24, and a 
Boston Globe article was published the same day indicating he 
had resigned.  To the extent there is a factual dispute as to 
Spencer's effective resignation date, it is not material.  The 
commission's analysis, although bolstered by the four-day 
timeline, was not contingent upon it.