Case Title: State v. Fulton

Citation: 337 So. 2d 866

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
337 So. 2d 866 (1976) STATE of Louisiana v. Mose Milton FULTON. No. 57763. Supreme Court of Louisiana. September 13, 1976. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Parkerson, Dist. Atty., John R. Harrison, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellant. Bruce B. McKeithen, McKinley, Lacroix & McKeithen, Monroe, for defendant-appellee. DIXON, Justice. The defendant, Mose Milton Fulton, was charged by bill of information with having violated R.S. 18:1531 in causing to be published and distributed written material concerning a candidate for public office without identifying himself thereon. The defendant filed a motion to quash, contending that R.S. 18:1531 is unconstitutional, abridging the rights of freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Louisiana Constitution Article 1, § 7 (1974). The trial judge sustained the motion to quash, finding the statute overbroad, imposing an unwarranted restriction on the freedom of expression. From the ruling granting the motion to quash, the State appeals, pursuant to Louisiana Constitution Article 5, § 5(D) (1974).[1] R.S. 18:1531 provides: The defendant is charged with having caused to be printed and distributed, approximately one week before the Monroe election for Commissioner of Finance, handbills containing derogatory accusations directed at Gerald Womack, a candidate for that office. The handbills did not contain any identification of the person responsible for their printing and/or distribution. In Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 80 S. Ct. 536, 4 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1960), the defendant was convicted of violating a Los Angeles ordinance that made criminal the distribution of any handbill in any place under any circumstances which did not have printed on the cover or face thereof the name and address of the person or persons responsible for the printing and distribution of the handbills. In finding this statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court stated: This court, in City of Bogalusa v. May, 252 La. 629, 212 So. 2d 408 (1968), declared a Bogalusa city ordinance forbidding the distribution of circulars unless they contained the identification of the distributor unconstitutional, relying on the Talley case, supra. The only difference between the Los Angeles ordinance declared unconstitutional in Talley and the statute in this case is that R.S. 18:1531 is limited to handbills "relative to or concerning any candidate for election or nomination." We are of the opinion that such a limitation does not save the statute *868 from the constitutional infirmities found in the Talley and Bogalusa cases, supra. In the case of People v. Bongiorni, 205 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 856, 23 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1962), the California court rejected a contention that Talley did not govern a statute that was limited to handbills concerning elections only: In Commonwealth v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass.1975), the defendant was convicted of violating a statute which made it a crime to write, distribute, print or post anonymous circulars and posters designed to aid or defeat any candidate for nomination or election to public office. In finding that the statute was unconstitutional, the court noted, at 329 N.E.2d 706, 708: In People v. Duryea, 76 Misc.2d 948, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (1974), aff'd 44 A.D.2d 663, 354 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1974), the defendants were charged with violating a statute that made it criminal to print, publish or distribute, or to order the printing, publishing or distributing of handbills, circulars, pamphlets and the like concerning political parties, candidates, etc., whether in favor or against such, in connection with any election, without reproducing thereon the name and address of the printer and/or distributor and the person ordering the printing and/or distribution. In finding the law unconstitutional, the court stated: Lower federal courts have considered statutes very similar to Louisiana's and found them to be unconstitutional. In Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244, 252 (E.D.N.Y.1968), vacated on other grounds,[2]*870 394 U.S. 103, 89 S. Ct. 956, 22 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1969), the district court struck down the predecessor of the law subsequently struck down in People v. Duryea, supra (the laws had identical language), stating: In Printing Industries of Gulf Coast v. Hill, 382 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.Tex.1974), vacated 422 U.S. 937, 95 S. Ct. 2670, 45 L. Ed. 2d 664,[3] a Texas statute stating that any printed or published political advertising shall also have printed on it the name and address of the printer or publisher and the person paying for the advertising was declared unconstitutional, the court stating at page 811: In order to justify a restraint on protected expression, such as compulsory disclosure of the source of a political leaflet, the State must demonstrate that there is a compelling State interest in such restraint. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 83 S. Ct. 889, 9 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1963). Moreover, the limitation must be no greater than is necessary to protect that compelling interest. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S. Ct. 247, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 94 S. Ct. 303, 38 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1973); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S. Ct. 1800, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974). In Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976), the United States Supreme Court upheld the financial disclosure requirement of the Federal Election Campaign Act. However, in doing so, the court noted 96 S.Ct. at page 664: R.S. 18:1531 is not narrowly limited to those situations where the information sought has a substantial connection with the governmental interests sought to be advanced. Rather, it forbids the distribution of any pamphlets and the like relating to a candidate for election unless the pamphlet discloses the name of the person responsible for its publication. As the trial judge pointed out, even a bumper sticker saying "Elect Smith" could be the basis for prosecution. R.S. 18:1531 is incompatible with basic constitutional guarantees. We are cited to no cases where such a statute has been upheld. No substantial reason has been advanced for ignoring the uniform jurisprudence and clear constitutional provisions reprobating such statutes. Therefore, for the reasons expressed in the authorities here cited, R.S. 18:1531 must be declared unconstitutional. The judgment of the trial court sustaining the motion to quash is affirmed. [1] La.Const. art. 5, § 5(D) provides: "In addition to other appeals provided by this constitution, a case shall be appealable to the supreme court if (1) a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional; (2) the defendant has been convicted of a felony or a fine exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment exceeding six months actually has been imposed." [2] Zwickler v. Koota was a declaratory judgment action. Zwickler had been convicted of violating the law by distributing anonymous handbills in connection with the 1964 congressional elections. His conviction was reversed on state law grounds. People v. Zwickler, 16 N.Y.2d 1069, 266 N.Y.S.2d 140, 213 N.E.2d 467. Afterward, Zwickler brought this suit to have the law declared unconstitutional. In the interval, the particular congressman Zwickler intended to criticize had left Congress to accept a position on the New York Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held this development precluded the issuance of a declaratory judgment, and vacated the judgment of the district court, noting "we accordingly intimate no view upon the correctness of the District Court's holding as to the constitutionality of the New York statute." [3] After the district court decision in this case, the Texas legislature enacted the Political Funds Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1975, which substantially amended the statute in issue in the case. The Supreme Court therefore remanded the case for consideration in light of the new amendments.