Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner

Citation: 2016-Ohio-359

Docket Number: 2014-1404

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-359.] 
 
 
 
 NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-359 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CORNER. 
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. CORNER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner, Slip Opinion No.  
2016-Ohio-359.] 
Attorney misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including 
multiple trust-account violations and failing to act with reasonable 
diligence in representing a client—Two-year suspension, with second year 
stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2014-1404—Submitted May 20, 2015—Decided February 3, 2016.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, Nos. 2013-059 and 2014-022. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Beverly J. Corner of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0042725, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1989. 
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{¶ 2} In October 2014, relator disciplinary counsel submitted a three-count 
complaint to the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline1 (“BCGD” 
or “board”) alleging, among other things, that Corner had mishandled and failed to 
keep required records of the client funds entrusted to her; shared fees with another 
lawyer without making required disclosures to her client; and engaged in 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  BCGD case No. 2013-059.  On 
November 14, 2014, a panel of the board found probable cause and directed that 
the complaint be accepted for filing.  Approximately six weeks later, relator 
Columbus Bar Association (“CBA”) submitted a separate complaint, alleging that 
Corner committed additional trust-account violations and failed to provide 
competent and diligent representation to a bankruptcy client.  BCGD case No. 
2014-022.  On the joint motion of relators and with Corner’s consent, the board 
consolidated the two cases for hearing in BCGD case No. 2013-059. 
{¶ 3} The parties stipulated to the facts and many of the alleged violations—
although Corner contested the violations alleged in Count Three of disciplinary 
counsel’s complaint—as well as aggravating and mitigating factors.  After a 
hearing, the panel adopted the parties’ stipulations and unanimously dismissed 
several alleged violations.  The panel also found that Corner had committed both 
of the contested violations in Count Three of disciplinary counsel’s complaint.  
Weighing the charged misconduct and the applicable aggravating and mitigating 
factors and considering the sanctions imposed for comparable misconduct, the 
panel recommended that Corner be suspended from the practice of law for two 
years with the second year stayed on conditions.  The board adopted the findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation of the panel. 
{¶ 4} After the board report was filed in this court, we granted disciplinary 
counsel’s motion to remand the matter to the board to address the issue of restitution 
                                                 
1 Effective January 1, 2015, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has been 
renamed the Board of Professional Conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A), 140 Ohio St.3d CII.   
January Term, 2016 
 
3
regarding the violations found by the board in Count Three of his complaint.  On 
remand, the panel issued a supplemental report stating that it had erroneously found 
that Corner had committed the violations alleged in Count Three of disciplinary 
counsel’s complaint when it should have dismissed them based on the insufficiency 
of the evidence.  The board adopted that supplemental report and submitted it to 
the court. 
{¶ 5} Disciplinary counsel objects and argues that the board exceeded the 
scope of this court’s remand order when it recommended the dismissal of two 
alleged violations that it previously found Corner to have committed and that he 
proved by clear and convincing evidence Corner had committed.  He also argues 
that Corner’s conduct warrants a two-year actual suspension from the practice of 
law. 
{¶ 6} For the reasons that follow, we overrule disciplinary counsel’s 
objections, adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct as modified by the 
board’s supplemental report, and suspend Corner from the practice of law for two 
years with the second year stayed on conditions. 
Misconduct 
CBA Complaint—The Packer Matter 
{¶ 7} Corner filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition for Tonya Packer in 
March 2011.  The Chapter 13 trustee objected to confirmation of the bankruptcy 
plan and outlined numerous deficiencies in the case, including the use of an 
incorrect social security number.  Although Corner corrected the social security 
number, the trustee noted that other deficiencies had not been addressed, and in 
July, the court denied confirmation of the plan and dismissed Packer’s bankruptcy 
petition. 
{¶ 8} After the bankruptcy court denied Corner’s two motions for 
reconsideration, she filed a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on Packer’s 
behalf.  But she did not prepare and tender an order to extend the bankruptcy stay 
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as directed by the court.  Consequently, the stay expired and, in the words of the 
judge, rendered the bankruptcy “pointless.”  When the judge confronted Corner 
about her inaction, she stated that she “forgot” to prepare the order. 
{¶ 9} In July 2011, the court ordered Corner to disgorge all fees that she had 
received in connection with Packer’s bankruptcy proceeding, but she did not 
comply with that order or a second disgorgement order.  In November 2011, Corner 
filed an amended disclosure of compensation stating that she had received no 
payments from Packer.  A January 2011 invoice, however, reflected that she had 
received three payments totaling $1,800.  Following a show-cause hearing, the 
court granted Packer a judgment of $1,806.65 against Corner.  In a separate order, 
the court suspended Corner’s electronic-filing privileges and found that she had 
failed to adequately represent Packer and that she did “not have sufficient skills to 
adequately represent debtors.” 
{¶ 10} The parties stipulated that Corner did not maintain Packer’s retainer 
in her Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (“IOLTA”) account and that she is 
obligated to pay Packer the $1,806.65 specified in the disgorgement order.  At the 
hearing, Corner submitted evidence demonstrating that she remitted payment to 
Packer in April 2014. 
{¶ 11} The parties have stipulated and the board found that Corner’s 
conduct in the Packer matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring a lawyer to 
provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with 
reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold 
the property of clients in an interest-bearing client trust account, separate from the 
lawyer’s own property), 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to deposit into a client trust 
account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance), 1.15(d) (requiring 
a lawyer to promptly deliver funds or other property that the client or a third party 
is entitled to receive), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
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that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).  We adopt the board’s findings 
of fact and misconduct with respect to the CBA’s complaint. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) Count One—Trust-Account Violations 
{¶ 12} Prior to November 15, 2010, Corner was under the mistaken 
impression that the bank account in which she held client funds was an IOLTA 
account.  But she did not treat that account as a client trust account; instead, she 
deposited earned fees into the account, thereby commingling personal and client 
funds, and used it to pay her personal and business expenses.  She opened an 
IOLTA account on November 15, 2010, but in March 2011, she overdrew that 
account.  As a result of that overdraft, disciplinary counsel initiated an investigation 
and discovered issues with Corner’s management of the account. 
{¶ 13} At the conclusion of a seven-month investigation, Corner assured 
disciplinary counsel that she understood her obligation to maintain her IOLTA 
account in compliance with the professional conduct rules and agreed that she and 
her bookkeeper would attend a continuing-legal-education seminar regarding the 
“nuts and bolts” of IOLTA account management on November 30, 2011.  Based on 
these assurances, disciplinary counsel terminated its investigation on November 29, 
2011. 
{¶ 14} Despite having attended the seminar on trust-account management, 
Corner overdrew her IOLTA account twice in July 2012, triggering a second 
investigation by disciplinary counsel.  The parties have stipulated that between 
January 2012 and May 2013, Corner (1) failed to maintain client ledgers or a 
general ledger of client funds in her possession, (2) withdrew funds from her 
IOLTA account on an as-needed basis rather than an as-earned basis, often leaving 
earned fees in her IOLTA account or causing a shortage of client funds in the 
account, (3) used funds from her IOLTA account to pay expenses on behalf of 
clients without first receiving or depositing funds from her clients into the account, 
and (4) failed to reconcile her IOLTA account on a monthly basis. 
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{¶ 15} The parties have stipulated and the board has found that this conduct 
violates Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a), 1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a detailed 
record for each client on whose behalf funds are held), 1.15(a)(3) (requiring a 
lawyer to maintain a detailed record for the lawyer’s client trust account), and 
1.15(a)(5) (requiring a lawyer to perform and retain a monthly reconciliation of the 
funds held in the lawyer’s client trust account).  We adopt the board’s findings of 
fact and misconduct with respect to this count. 
ODC Count Two—Misappropriation of Client Funds 
{¶ 16} The parties entered into detailed stipulations regarding Corner’s 
misappropriation of client funds in her representation of William and Allene 
McCoy, Shannon Smoot, Donna Denney, Meredith Rogan, Marvin Dennis, 
Demetra Canon, Alida Powell, and Antonio Sledge.  Corner’s misconduct in those 
cases consists largely of (1) depositing some settlement checks and retainers into 
her business account rather than her IOLTA account, (2) using client funds to pay 
her personal and business expenses (including payments to or on behalf of other 
clients), (3) failing to promptly pay client expenses out of settlement proceeds , (4) 
failing to promptly distribute settlement proceeds to her clients, (5) issuing 
incorrect settlement statements that resulted in the inflation of her fee, (6) 
withdrawing client retainers before they were earned, and (7) leaving her earned 
fees in her IOLTA account and withdrawing them a bit at a time.  Corner also 
stipulated that she failed to obtain the written consent of a client to share her legal 
fees with another attorney and that she falsely advised a client that she could not 
promptly distribute settlement funds because her IOLTA account had been 
compromised and the bank needed to correct the problem. 
{¶ 17} The parties have stipulated that Corner’s conduct violated Prof.Cond 
R. 1.5(e) (permitting attorneys who are not in the same firm to divide fees only if 
the fee division is proportional to the work performed, the client consents to the 
arrangement in writing after full disclosure, and a written closing statement is 
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prepared and signed by the client and each lawyer), 1.15(d), and 8.4(c) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation).  The board adopted the parties’ stipulations of fact and 
misconduct with respect to this count, and we adopt them as our own. 
ODC Count Three—The Evans Matter 
{¶ 18} Disciplinary counsel charged Corner with violating Prof.Cond.R. 
1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement for, charging, or collecting 
an illegal or clearly excessive fee) and 1.15(d) in connection with her representation 
of Floyd Evans in a personal-injury matter.2  While the parties submitted stipulated 
findings of fact with regard to this count, Corner maintained that her conduct did 
not violate the rules as charged in the complaint. 
{¶ 19} The board adopted the parties’ stipulated facts, which reflect that 
Evans was injured in an automobile accident while working as a driving instructor 
on July 1, 2010.  The next day, he retained attorney Michael Gertner to represent 
him in exchange for a 30 percent contingent fee.  Evans later terminated Gertner’s 
representation and signed a 30 percent contingent-fee agreement with Corner.  
Gertner informed Corner that he was asserting an $11,133.49 lien on Evans’s 
settlement proceeds for his services.  Corner disputed the value of Gertner’s 
services but ultimately agreed to pay him $9,333.49 for the services he had rendered 
to Evans. 
{¶ 20} Evans agreed to settle his personal-injury matter for $145,000—
$65,000 from his employer and $80,000 from the tortfeasor.  Corner deposited a 
$65,000 settlement check on December 26, 2011.  That same day, she distributed 
$45,500 to Evans and his wife, wrote herself a check for $19,000, and left the 
remaining $500 in her IOLTA account. 
                                                 
2 Relator also charged Corner with a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law), but the parties 
agreed to dismiss that alleged violation. 
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{¶ 21} On February 1, 2013, Corner deposited a $70,666.51 check into her 
IOLTA.  That check represented the tortfeasor’s portion of the Evans settlement, 
less $9,333.49 that Corner had agreed the insurer could pay directly to Gertner for 
his services. 
{¶ 22} When disbursing the remaining settlement proceeds, Corner treated 
Gertner’s attorney fee like any other litigation expense and deducted it from 
Evans’s share of the proceeds rather than from her 30 percent contingent fee.  She 
paid herself $24,000 in attorney fees plus $100 in expenses and paid Evans 
$14,215.56 because she had erroneously omitted an additional $2,505 medical bill 
from her settlement-disbursement sheet.  All told, Evans paid $52,833.49 in 
attorney fees to Corner and Gertner out of his $145,000 settlement. 
{¶ 23} In their initial reports, the panel and board found that Corner had 
charged an illegal or clearly excessive fee and that she had failed to promptly 
deliver funds or other property that a client or third party was entitled to receive in 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) and 1.15(d).  But after we remanded the matter to 
the board to address the issue of restitution, the panel and board issued a 
supplemental report stating that the alleged violations in this count should have 
been dismissed due to the insufficiency of the evidence. 
Discussion 
The Board Did Not Exceed the Scope of Our Remand 
{¶ 24} In his first objection, disciplinary counsel argues that the board 
exceeded the scope of our remand by recommending that we dismiss the alleged 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) and 1.15(d) instead of recommending the amount 
that Corner should be ordered to pay Evans in restitution.  He argues that the board 
should not have revised its previous recommendation, because the decision of a 
reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal questions 
involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing 
levels. 
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{¶ 25} We acknowledge that the law-of-the-case doctrine plays an 
important role in our jurisprudence, imparting finality and consistency of result to 
the rule of law.  Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984).  But 
there was no law of the case in this matter when we remanded it to the board 
because the board’s report was a nonbinding recommendation and we had yet to 
decide any of the issues presented.  See Gov.Bar R. V(2)(B)(1) (granting the board 
the authority to receive evidence, preserve the record, make findings, and submit 
recommendations to this court concerning complaints of misconduct that are 
alleged to have been committed by a judicial officer or an attorney); Ohio State Bar 
Assn. v. Reid, 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 708 N.E.2d 193, paragraph one of the syllabus 
(1999) (holding that in disciplinary cases, the Supreme Court renders the final 
determination of the facts and conclusions of law and is not bound by the findings 
of the board). 
{¶ 26} Thus, to the extent that the board may have exceeded the scope of 
our remand by correcting what it determined to be erroneous findings of 
misconduct, it answered our question by stating that in its view, there was no 
misconduct in the Evans matter and the issue of restitution was moot.  Therefore, 
we find no fault with the board’s actions in this case and overrule disciplinary 
counsel’s first objection. 
Insufficient Evidence Was Presented to Establish that 
Corner Charged a Clearly Excessive Fee 
{¶ 27} In his second objection, disciplinary counsel contends that Corner 
charged a clearly excessive fee because she deducted the fees paid to Evans’s 
former attorney from Evans’s share of the settlement proceeds, while she collected 
the full 30 percent contingent fee set forth in her own fee contract.  Disciplinary 
counsel concedes that the total attorney fees that Evans paid—$52,833.49 or 36.4 
percent of his $145,000 settlement—is not, in and of itself, clearly excessive.  But 
he contends that when viewed against the two contingent-fee agreements, in which 
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Evans agreed to pay just 30 percent of any settlement to his respective attorney, this 
36.4 percent fee is clearly excessive.  In support of this argument, disciplinary 
counsel relies on the following holding of the Indiana Supreme Court:  “ ‘[O]nly 
one contingency fee should be paid by the client, the amount of the fee to be 
determined according to the highest ethical contingency percentage to which the 
client contractually agreed [and] * * * that fee should in turn be allocated between 
or among the various attorneys involved in handling the claim in question.’ ”  
(Brackets and ellipsis sic.)  Galanis v. Lyons & Truitt, 715 N.E.2d 858, 863 
(Ind.1999), quoting Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Prods., Inc., 373 So.2d 102, 118 
(La.1979). 
{¶ 28} Galanis established a default rule that in the state of Indiana, clients 
who enter into contingent-fee agreements with successive attorneys should pay 
only one contingent fee and that that fee should be “apportioned according to the 
respective services and contributions of the lawyers based on the work each 
performed.”  Id. at 863.  But the Indiana Supreme Court clearly stated that that rule 
should apply only “in the absence of express written fee arrangements providing 
otherwise,” and it anticipated that the vast majority of such fee arrangements would 
be resolved by agreement between the client and the affected lawyers.  Id. at 858, 
864.  Here, we have such a writing. 
{¶ 29} Shortly after Evans retained Corner to handle his personal-injury 
matter, she wrote to Gertner to request the file and offer to protect his attorney fees.  
Gertner claimed to have an $11,133.49 lien on any settlement obtained in the case, 
but when Evans disputed that amount, Corner negotiated the bill down to 
$9,333.49, and she testified that Evans agreed to pay that amount.  Although it does 
not appear that their agreement was immediately reduced to writing, Evans signed 
the settlement-disbursement sheet, which plainly reflected the payment of Corner’s 
30 percent contingent fee, plus other expenses, including Evans’s medical expenses 
and Gertner’s attorney fees of $9,333.49.  This undisputed writing, signed by 
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Evans—who did not testify at the hearing—reflects that he agreed to pay Gertner’s 
fee out of his share of the settlement proceeds.  Thus, it is not necessary for us to 
adopt the default rule advanced by disciplinary counsel to resolve this case. 
{¶ 30} Based on the evidence before us, and having considered the factors 
set forth in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)3 for determining the reasonableness of an attorney 
fee, we cannot find that an attorney of ordinary prudence would be left with a 
definite and firm conviction that the fees Evans agreed to pay—$52,833.49 or 36.4 
percent of his $145,000 personal-injury settlement—are in excess of a reasonable 
fee.  See Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) (“[a] fee is clearly excessive, when after a review of 
the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm 
conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee” [emphasis deleted]).  We 
therefore overrule disciplinary counsel’s second objection and dismiss the alleged 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a). 
Corner’s Distribution in the Evans Matter Did Not Violate Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) 
{¶ 31} In his third objection, disciplinary counsel argues that he has proven 
by clear and convincing evidence that Corner violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) by 
tendering to Grant Medical Center a check for $2,505 less than it was owed for 
Evans’s medical treatment.  The undisputed evidence shows that Corner took that 
                                                 
3 The eight factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: 
 
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; 
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services; and 
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a). 
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action upon discovering that she had mistakenly omitted another $2,505 medical 
bill from the settlement-disbursement sheet and had consequently distributed an 
extra $2,505 to Evans in error.  Although Corner sent Evans a letter informing him 
that it was his responsibility to make an additional $2,505 payment to Grant 
Medical Center as a result of her error, the hospital ultimately accepted the reduced 
payment as complete satisfaction of the debt. 
{¶ 32} While we do not condone Corner’s lax accounting procedures, we 
find that the net effect of her actions, coupled with those of the hospital, was to 
settle her client’s liability for less than he owed, leaving him in possession of an 
additional $2,505.  Based on the unique facts of this case and the evidence before 
us, we cannot find that Corner’s error and subsequent actions to correct it violated 
the rules of professional conduct.  Therefore, we overrule disciplinary counsel’s 
third objection and dismiss Count Three of his complaint in its entirety. 
Sanction 
{¶ 33} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties the lawyer violated and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 
2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final determination, we also 
weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B).4  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 
875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 34} As aggravating factors, the parties have stipulated and the board 
found that Corner engaged in a pattern of misconduct that involved multiple 
offenses.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c) and (d). 
{¶ 35} In mitigation, the board adopted the parties’ stipulations that Corner 
has no prior disciplinary record and has cooperated with the investigations 
                                                 
4 Effective January 1, 2015, the aggravating and mitigating factors previously set forth in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B) are codified in Gov.Bar R. V(13), 140 Ohio St.3d CXXIV. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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conducted by disciplinary counsel and the Columbus Bar Association.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (d).  The panel also heard testimony from Jason Coale, 
a licensed independent social worker who diagnosed and began treating Corner for 
a depressive disorder in July 2013.  Based on information Coale obtained from 
Corner during her treatment, he testified that her depression reached deep into her 
past and that it contributed to her misconduct.  He reported that her condition was 
improving with treatment, and he opined that with ongoing treatment and systems 
in place to keep her current with her ethical obligations, she is able to return to the 
competent, ethical, and professional practice of law.  Although the board expressed 
some reservations about Coale’s credibility, it nonetheless found that Corner’s 
mental disability qualified as a mitigating factor pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g).  And we find that on July 17, 2013, Corner entered into a four-year 
mental-health contract with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program, Inc. (“OLAP”), 
requiring her to continue her individual counseling and follow up with certain 
medical professionals. 
{¶ 36} In determining the appropriate sanction for Corner’s misconduct, the 
board found that we imposed two-year suspensions, with the second year stayed on 
conditions, for comparable misconduct in Disciplinary Counsel v. Talikka, 135 
Ohio St.3d 323, 2013-Ohio-1012, 986 N.E.2d 954, and Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Folwell, 129 Ohio St.3d 297, 2011-Ohio-3181, 951 N.E.2d 775. 
{¶ 37} Talikka, an attorney with more than 40 years of experience, failed to 
act with reasonable diligence in three separate client matters, failed to inform two 
clients that their cases had been dismissed, failed to refund the unearned portion of 
his retainers, failed to properly administer client funds that he should have held in 
trust, and failed to maintain records regarding the funds that were required to be 
held in a client trust account.  Talikka at ¶ 6-7.  He also failed to have three personal-
injury clients sign closing statements detailing the distribution of their settlement 
proceeds, failed to promptly distribute all of the funds that his clients were entitled 
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to receive, and stipulated that he had engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation in five client matters.  Id. at ¶ 8, 9.   
 
{¶ 38} Similarly, Folwell, an attorney with 20 years of experience, engaged 
in a pattern of misconduct involving seven separate client matters in which he failed 
to provide competent representation, failed to act with reasonable diligence, failed 
to maintain required records for his client trust account, improperly used client 
funds for his own purposes, and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation.  Folwell at ¶ 5-31.  He also accepted retainers from 
clients and failed to perform their work, unreasonably delayed performing work, 
led a client to believe that his case had been filed when it had not, and made empty 
promises to refund the unearned portions of his fees.  Id. at ¶ 13, 15-28. 
{¶ 39} Having considered Corner’s conduct and the applicable aggravating 
and mitigating factors, the board found that the sanction imposed in Talikka and 
Folwell was appropriate here.  Therefore, the board recommended that Corner be 
suspended from the practice of law for two years with the second year stayed.  The 
board further recommended that Corner’s reinstatement be conditioned on her 
continued treatment for her depression, compliance with her OLAP contract, and 
her submission of documentation from OLAP or a qualified medical professional 
stating that she is competent to return to the practice of law. 
{¶ 40} Disciplinary counsel objects to the recommended sanction, arguing 
that it is too lenient given Corner’s misconduct and her propensity to place her own 
interests above those of her clients.  He attempts to distinguish the sanctions 
imposed in Talikka and Folwell on the ground that they were stipulated sanctions, 
while the sanction in this case is contested.  Disciplinary counsel notes that three 
members of this court believed that Talikka’s misconduct warranted an indefinite 
suspension from the practice of law.  See Talikka at ¶ 101 (O’Connor, C.J., joined 
by Lanzinger and French, JJ., dissenting).  Moreover, disciplinary counsel contends 
that while Talikka practiced for more than 40 years without incident, Corner 
January Term, 2016 
 
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continued to engage in the misconduct here during an earlier disciplinary 
investigation that did not result in disciplinary charges against her.  But Corner also 
practiced law without incident for more than 20 years before disciplinary counsel 
initiated its first investigation into her misconduct—an investigation that was 
dismissed without any formal charges being filed.  And Talikka stipulated that he 
owed nearly $49,000 in restitution to three clients, Talikka at ¶ 15—more than two 
and a half times the amount that Corner is claimed to have misappropriated. 
{¶ 41} Disciplinary counsel notes that in Disciplinary Counsel v. Leksan, 
136 Ohio St.3d 85, 2013-Ohio-2415, 990 N.E.2d 591, ¶ 29, 33, 35, his predecessor 
recommended a two-year actual suspension for misconduct that included 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; the improper handling of client 
funds; the failure to maintain adequate records of client funds in his possession; and 
the misappropriation of client funds for personal and business expenses.  Although 
we acknowledged multiple mitigating factors in that case—including Leksan’s 
cooperation in the disciplinary process; his diagnosed depression, alcohol, and 
gambling addictions that were causally related to his conduct; his aggressive 
treatment for those conditions; and his voluntary restoration of most of the 
misappropriated funds before his misconduct was discovered—we indefinitely 
suspended Leksan on the board’s recommendation.  Id. at ¶ 26-35. 
{¶ 42} Recognizing that Corner misappropriated far less than Leksan, but 
arguing that her conduct is more egregious than that of both Talikka and Folwell, 
disciplinary counsel urges us to impose a two-year actual suspension from the 
practice of law in this case.  We do not find disciplinary counsel’s arguments to be 
persuasive. 
{¶ 43} Balancing all the relevant factors, we find the sanction imposed in 
Talikka and Folwell to be most instructive.  Given Corner’s cooperation in the 
disciplinary process, her mitigating mental-health diagnosis, her ongoing mental-
health treatment, and her four-year OLAP contract, we believe that the board’s 
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recommended sanction is appropriate in this case.  Therefore, we overrule 
disciplinary counsel’s fourth objection and adopt the findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and recommendation of the board. 
{¶ 44} Accordingly, Beverly J. Corner is suspended from the practice of 
law in Ohio for two years, with the second year stayed on the conditions that she 
engage in no further misconduct, continue to participate in appropriate mental-
health treatment with a licensed professional, and remain in full compliance with 
her July 17, 2013 OLAP contract.  If Corner fails to comply with these conditions, 
the stay will be lifted and she will serve the full two-year suspension.  Upon 
applying for reinstatement, Corner shall be required to submit documentation from 
a qualified mental-health professional to demonstrate that she is capable of 
returning to the competent, ethical, and professional practice of law.  Costs are 
taxed to Corner. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., dissents and would indefinitely suspend the respondent. 
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Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond and Stacy 
Solochek Beckman, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator Disciplinary 
Counsel. 
Judith McInturff, Robert J. Morje, Lori J. Brown, Bar Counsel, and A. 
Alysha Clous, Assistant Bar Counsel, for relator Columbus Bar Association. 
James E. Arnold & Associates, L.P.A., and Alvin E. Matthews Jr., for 
respondent. 
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