Case Title: State v. Jackson

Citation: 109 Ariz. 559, 514 P.2d 480

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1973-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
109 Ariz. 559 (1973) 514 P.2d 480 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Edward Lewis JACKSON, Appellant. No. 2323. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc. September 28, 1973. *560 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by William P. Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, and Frank Galati, Law Student, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender, by Roger H. Lichty, Former Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal from jury verdicts and judgments of guilt to the crimes of rape, first degree, § 13-611 subsec. A A.R.S., and aggravated battery, § 13-241 subsec. B and § 13-245 subsec. A, par. 3 A.R.S., and sentences of not less than 20 nor more than 21 years for the rape and not less than 2 nor more than 5 years on the aggravated battery charge. We are asked to answer the following questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. On the evening of 6 October 1970, at approximately 10:00 p.m., the victim was alone at home with her five year old daughter and three year old son. Her husband was away at school. The victim was taking a bath when she heard a knock at the door. She instructed her five year old daughter to "see who it was." According to her testimony: The victim testified that he was holding what looked like a knife and also a flashlight and he told the victim, "Lady get out of the tub. Don't scream or I'll kill you." After she got out of the tub he demanded "money or pussy." She told him she didn't have any money and he hit her on the right side of the head, forced her to the floor of the bathroom, and wrapped a towel around her head. The victim was forced to lay on her stomach and at one time he choked her until as she stated "I thought I'd stopped breathing. Thought I was going to die right there and then. He let me go." The victim was forced to remain on her stomach and sexual intercourse was accomplished from the rear. After the rape he forced the victim into her bedroom where he went through her purse taking several dollars. He then pulled her by the hair back into the bathroom, placed her in the tub and left. Immediately after this the three year old boy came in crying and screaming. The victim testified: The victim immediately called her husband and upon his return the police were called. After the arrival of the police and their preliminary investigation, the victim was taken to the hospital where an examination was made revealing the presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal cavity. On the day after the rape, the victim selected a picture from a group of twelve photographs depicting a person that *561 "looked like" the defendant, and on 15 October a five-man lineup was held at which time the victim identified the defendant, Edward Lewis Jackson, as the assaultant. A preliminary hearing was held 23 October 1970. The defendant was held to answer and trial was set in the Superior Court for 15 December 1970. At that time, because of a mix-up with this case and another case in which the defendant Edward Lewis Jackson was also a defendant, the State asked for a continuance which was granted over the objections of the attorney for the defendant. Trial was held before a jury commencing 29 December 1970. At the trial the victim, the medical doctor, and two police officers testified for the State. The victim made a positive in-court identification of the defendant and testified regarding the lineup identification as follows: And: The police officer testified regarding the twelve pictures shown to the victim the day after the rape: The defendant did not testify, but three witnesses including the defendant's fiancée testified on his behalf. The defendant's fiancée testified that on the morning of 6 October the defendant had picked up his mother from work at the Arizona State Hospital and had then spent the rest of the day with her and that in the evening they had spent their time moving furniture into defendant's and his mother's new home, as well as visiting with friends. This testimony was supported by the two other defense witnesses. In rebuttal to the alibi defense, the State obtained testimony from a bookkeeper at the State Hospital to the effect that the defendant's mother did not work on the night of the 5th and the morning of the 6th of October, the day the defendant allegedly picked up his mother from work. The jury returned verdicts of guilty as to both charges and the defendant appeals. CONTINUANCE BY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY Trial in the above matter was set for 15 December 1970, some 70 days after the *563 crime had occurred, and 36 days after the information was filed in the Superior Court. The jury panel was present but there had been no attempt to select a jury at that time, and there is no question that jeopardy had not attached. State v. Mojarro Padilla, 107 Ariz. 134, 483 P.2d 549 (1971); State v. Stout, 5 Ariz. App. 271, 425 P.2d 582 (1967). Defendant vigorously opposed the continuance and over defendant's objection the matter was set for 4 January 1971, and the other charge was set for 28 December 1970. On 18 December 1970, the instant case was reset to 28 December 1970 at which time it was tried. Defendant contends on appeal that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to grant the County Attorney's motion for a continuance. The Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., applicable at that time, allow the court to grant a continuance for "good cause," but for no longer than justice requires. Rules 241 and 247, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. And Rule 236 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for a dismissal "if he is not brought to trial for the offense within sixty days after the * * * information [is] filed." A continuance to a time within the sixty day period mandated by Rule 236 is presumptively nonprejudicial, and we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in continuing the case for a time still within the sixty day trial period. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORT The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to "set aside the verdict and dismiss with prejudice" because the State concealed a police report wherein the victim is reported to have stated she believed that the defendant had not had normal sexual intercourse with her, but instead made penetration into the anal cavity and also she was dubious of her ability to recognize her attacker if she saw him again. The defendant cites Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561, 422 P.2d 125 (1967) wherein we stated: At the hearing on the motion, after the verdict, the victim testified that she had her doubts at first but that after the examination and other events she realized that penetration had been made into the vaginal cavity. The testimony of the doctor concerning the presence of spermatozoa both at the preliminary hearing and at the trial supports this conclusion. *564 Penetration of the vulva, no matter how slight, is necessary before a person can be guilty of the crime of rape, § 13-612 A.R.S.; State v. Torres, 105 Ariz. 361, 464 P.2d 953 (1970); State v. Scott, 105 Ariz. 109, 460 P.2d 3 (1969), and penetration of the anal cavity alone will not support a conviction for rape. See Reynolds v. State, 274 Ala. 171, 146 So. 2d 85 (1962) for a comprehensive citation of authority on this question as to what constitutes "carnal knowledge" and sexual intercourse. The statement made by the complaining witness to the officer to the effect that she had her doubts whether the penetration was into the vulva was material because without penetration of the vulva the defendant, irrespective of what other offenses he might have committed, did not commit the crime of rape. The failure of the State to notify the defense of this was certainly error and we do not condone the potentially prejudicial conduct of the county attorney. State v. Fowler, supra. We believe, however, under the facts in the instant case that the error was harmless. The harmless error rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967) and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S. Ct. 1726, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969), applied the doctrine of harmless error to constitutional or fundamental error in those cases wherein the error did not contribute to the verdict and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. It should be kept in mind, however, that the harmless error rule is an appellate court rule and should not be applied where the error is of the type which could deceive the appellate court into thinking that the error was harmless when in fact it was not. In the instant case, were our record limited to the facts presented at the trial, we would have no way of knowing whether the action of the State in withholding this information was prejudicial. In the present case, however, these facts are not concealed from the appellate court, for at the hearing on the motion to set aside the verdict and to dismiss the case, the victim not only testified but was cross-examined as to information contained in the withheld report. Also, the examining physician testified at this hearing and cross-examination was allowed. From the testimony of the victim at that hearing, as well as that of the examining physician, it is clear that, even though the victim had some doubts at first because of the way in which the rape was accomplished, her testimony at trial would have been consistent on this point with the verdict if cross-examined on the contents of the report. We therefore hold that, based upon the testimony adduced at the motion to set aside the verdict and dismiss, the failure to make available to the defendant the allegedly beneficial information contained in the police report was harmless and did not, beyond a reasonable doubt, contribute to the verdict. Chapman v. California, supra. As to the identification of the defendant, it is apparent from the testimony that the victim had ample opportunity to observe the defendant and was able to identify him at the lineup and at the trial. Though she may have had some doubts at the time she talked to the officer immediately after the event, once she did see the defendant again her identification was instantaneous and positive. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE The defendant in his alibi defense presented testimony by the defendant's fiancée who stated that the defendant was with her all day the day of 6 October and that she first saw the defendant that morning "after he went to pick up his mother from work." On cross-examination by the State, she said: On rebuttal testimony the State presented an employee of the Arizona State Hospital, Finance Department, Payroll Division, who testified that the time cards indicated that the defendant's mother did not work that night. The motion for new trial on newly discovered evidence was based on the testimony produced at the hearing of the Comptroller of the hospital who testified that the defendant's mother did indeed work that night before. Rule 310 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., applicable at the time this trial took place, states: Whether or not the mother was picked up at the Arizona State Hospital on the morning of 6 October is not material to the issue before this court. The rape occurred between 10 and 10:30 p.m. that night, and while the rebuttal testimony might indicate that the witness was mistaken on this point, it does not mean that the witness is necessarily mistaken on the question of the whereabouts of the defendant at the time the rape occurred. The trial judge and the jury were able to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and were able to draw their own conclusions. We have stated: *566 We agree with the minute entry which states: We find no error. Judgments affirmed. HAYS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, LOCKWOOD and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.