Case Title: P. v. Barnwell

Citation: 

Docket Number: S055528

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 7/26/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S055528 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
LAMAR BARNWELL, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA069048 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Lamar Barnwell was sentenced to death after a jury found him guilty of 
three counts of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder.  The 
multiple murder convictions constituted the special circumstance required for 
imposition of the death penalty.1  The jury found he personally used a firearm in 
committing the offenses.2  This appeal is automatic. 
We affirm the judgment as modified to reflect that defendant’s sentence on 
the second degree murder count is 15 years to life in prison, not the sentence of 
life imprisonment without possibility of parole erroneously imposed.  (See post, at 
pp. 8-9, fn. 7.) 
                                              
1  
Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3).  Statutory references are to 
the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
2  
Sections 1203.06, subdivision (a)(1)(A) and 12022.5, subdivision (a). 
 
2
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A.  
Guilt Phase 
 
1. 
Prosecution evidence 
Defendant’s case is somewhat remarkable in that a policeman saw him 
shoot two of the murder victims.  One night in 1992 Los Angeles Police Officers 
Brad Wise and Greg Smiley were on patrol.  As they drove toward a tire shop,  
Officer Wise heard a shot.  A woman screamed and another shot was fired.  Wise 
ran up to a high fence surrounding the shop yard and looked through a hole in the 
gate.  He saw defendant, some 20-25 feet away, standing above two men lying 
facedown on the ground.3  Defendant held a large-caliber, semiautomatic, blue 
steel pistol in his hand.  The men were begging for their lives.  Defendant bent 
down and put the pistol to the back of one man’s head.  Officer Wise heard two 
shots.  Defendant then fired two more shots into the back of the other man’s head. 
Defendant ran but the officers intercepted him as he emerged from another 
gate, still holding the pistol.4  Officer Wise told defendant to drop the gun.  
Defendant protested, “It wasn’t me.”  He ran back toward the gate, but then 
stopped and turned toward the officers.  Wise thought defendant was going to 
shoot them, so he fired four shots at defendant.   
Defendant ran back into the yard, where he was found by other officers.  He 
had been shot three times.  When his clothes were cut away by paramedics, a .45-
caliber bullet fell out of his trousers.  A .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol, a Colt 
                                              
3  
The scene was lit by street lights and, inside the yard, by a large bonfire 
inside a barrel.   
4  
There was no question in Officer Wise’s mind as to whether it was the 
same man.  He described the suspect as a Black male with bushy hair and a goatee, 
25 to 30 years old, five feet eight inches to five feet nine inches tall, weighing 180 
to 190 pounds, and wearing blue jeans and a dark blue sweatshirt with white 
writing on the front.  The officer testified:  “Everything is the same.” 
 
3
Gold Cup model, was found on the ground inside the gate defendant had 
reentered.  Expended cartridge casings found at the scene had been fired by the 
Colt. 
In addition to the two men Officer Wise had seen defendant shoot, the 
bodies of a woman and another man were also found.  All four victims had been 
shot in the head.  Eural Johnson was the night watchman and Kenneth Newman 
was a friend of his.  Jessie Dwight Bingham sometimes slept in a truck parked in 
the yard.  Sandra Ann Green was his girlfriend.  Bullets recovered from the bodies 
of Johnson and Green had been fired by the Colt.  The record is silent as to 
whether slugs were recovered from Bingham and Newman.  
Defendant waived his rights and spoke to the police.  He said he had ridden 
a bicycle to the tire shop to sell cocaine to a man whose name he did not know.  
The victims were already on the ground when he arrived.  As he left the scene he 
was confronted by the police.  He put up his hands and said, “I didn’t do it.”  He 
was shot by the police when he fled. 
 
2. 
Defense evidence 
Though they were called by the defense, the testimony of Felicia Rich and 
Deanna Nolan differed significantly from defendant’s statement.  They testified 
they were with defendant at a party that night.  A tire on Rich’s car was slashed, 
and defendant used his car to push hers to the tire shop.  Defendant remained at 
the shop when Rich and Nolan left.  As they drove away, Rich and Nolan heard 
shots.  Neither of them saw defendant with a weapon that night.5 
On rebuttal, Los Angeles Police Officer Vivian Flores testified that, a year 
before the murders, she had seen defendant pull a handgun from his waistband and 
                                              
5  
In his statement defendant said nothing about a party, Rich, Nolan, or a 
slashed tire.   
 
4
lunge into the backseat of a parked car.  Flores found a stainless steel, .45-caliber 
Colt Gold Cup model handgun in the backseat.  The Colt Gold Cup model was a 
fairly expensive handgun, favored by sportsmen for target shooting.  It had been in 
production for 30 years.  There was no suggestion that the pistol found by Officer 
Flores was the weapon involved in this case, which had a blue steel finish.   
B. 
Penalty Phase 
 
 
1. 
Prosecution evidence 
 
 
The prosecution introduced evidence that in the four years preceding this 
trial defendant had committed two murders, an assault and robbery, and another 
assault.  None of these crimes had been previously adjudicated. 
 
 
 
a. 
The murder of Samuel Graham 
 
The morning of September 1, 1988, in an area of Los Angeles County then 
given over to horse stables, Samuel Graham was found dead from multiple 
gunshot wounds.  Earlier that morning a woman who spent the night at one of the 
stables heard what may have been the shots and, seconds later, the screeching of 
tires.  According to prosecution witnesses, defendant abducted Graham, apparently 
twice, the day before he was murdered. 
 
Dean Drake testified that on the afternoon of August 31, he and Graham 
were standing on a sidewalk in Oceanside talking when a white truck pulled up.   
Defendant jumped out and ordered Graham to accompany him.  When Graham did 
not respond, defendant struck him hard in the face with a jacket.  Frightened, 
Graham put his head down and got into the truck with defendant and the driver, a 
Black man with a bald head. 6  That was the last time Drake saw Graham alive.  
Evidence established that Drake suffered from substantially diminished 
                                              
6  
Drake was also frightened of defendant.  Defendant had once broken his 
nose, to force him to join defendant’s gang.  On another occasion defendant had 
shot him in the leg for no apparent reason.   
 
 
5
intelligence and a faulty memory.  He admitted he was a drug dealer and 
repeatedly contradicted himself during his testimony. 
 
Carol Leonard testified that in the early evening of August 31, she spoke to 
Graham at an Oceanside convenience store.  Defendant and a bald-headed Black 
man were standing at the door.  Graham was almost in tears and could barely talk.  
He told Leonard, “They’re gonna kill me.”  The two men walked Graham out of 
the store and drove off with him in a white truck.  Leonard never saw Graham 
alive again. 
 
 
 
b. 
The murder of Johnnie Cox 
 
 
One evening in July 1989, James Rankins was in Stockton, sitting on a park 
bench with his friend Johnnie Cox.  Rankins was a member of the Conway Crips 
gang; Cox was not a gang member.  They were accosted by defendant and several 
other members of the L.A. Boys gang.  One of the L.A. Boys hit Cox.  As Cox 
fled, defendant shot him.  Rankins was under the influence of drugs at the time.  
However, “it didn’t stop me from seeing what was going on.  I was alert.”  There 
was no doubt in his mind that defendant was the man who shot Cox.  Rankins 
admitted he had been interviewed by the police on several occasions before the 
trial and had denied knowing who shot Cox. 
 
Tina Coit was in the Stockton park and saw defendant shoot a man running 
from him.  Coit admitted she was “pretty loaded” on crack cocaine when the 
shooting occurred.  Questioned at the time, she told police she did not witness the 
shooting.  She initially maintained that story when questioned by the officers 
preparing for this prosecution.  When told they would inform her parole officer if 
she did not cooperate, she agreed to talk to them.  They showed her an album and 
repeatedly pointed at defendant’s photograph, saying, “That’s him, isn’t it?”  At 
trial, Coit maintained that her testimony was not affected by concern over her 
previous parole status. 
 
6
 
A pathologist testified that Cox died of gunshot wounds, one of which was 
consistent with his having been shot while running away from his assailant. 
 
 
 
c. 
The assault on Hattie Louise Heath 
 
Heath had known defendant for a long time; he and her son had been good 
friends since elementary school.  In 1987, she purchased rock cocaine from him 
and, despite his repeated demands, failed to pay him $5 of the purchase price.  
Encountering defendant on the street, Heath fled.  When she took refuge in an 
apartment building, he shot at her twice through the door.  He also shot a man who 
tried to assist her.  Heath identified defendant to the police, but later dropped the 
charges because she feared for her life. 
 
 
 
d.  
The robbery and assault of Michael Oliver 
 
Oliver was a rock cocaine dealer in Stockton.  One evening in 1991, three 
men assaulted him, demanding drugs and money.  The lower half of one of the 
men’s faces was covered by a cloth.  Nevertheless, Oliver knew defendant and 
recognized him by sight and by his distinctive voice.  The men took Oliver’s 
money and jewelry.  Defendant beat him with a pistol and shot him in the arm.  
Because defendant had a reputation as a killer, Oliver did not identify him to the 
police. 
 
 
2. 
Defense evidence  
 
Defendant’s paternal grandmother, Bertha Barnwell, testified that defendant 
was born out of wedlock.  His mother Susan was 16 and his father James was 20.  
Although they later married, James had numerous affairs and abandoned his 
family when defendant was six.  Susan abused drugs and alcohol.  She stabbed 
James and another boyfriend.  One weekend, when defendant was 15, Susan 
brought him to Ms. Barnwell’s house and said she would be back on Monday.  
Three months later her body was found in a deserted building.  Always a quiet 
child, after his mother’s death defendant became even more withdrawn.  His 
 
7
grades suffered.  During the two or three years he lived with Ms. Barnwell 
defendant had no troubles with the law. 
 
Defendant’s maternal grandmother, Ola Pork, described him as a good 
child who “didn’t smoke, didn’t drink, didn’t run the streets.”  He was a good 
father to his six children. 
 
Defendant’s father, James Lamar Barnwell, was allowed to testify although 
he reeked of alcohol.  Mr. Barnwell testified that he began selling drugs when he 
was 12 or 13 to support his mother Bertha.  He was incarcerated in Soledad State 
Penitentiary when defendant was born.  When defendant was 12 or 13, Mr. 
Barnwell abandoned his family and fled to Georgia because he had violated the 
terms of his California probation.   
 
Defendant’s paternal aunt, Margaret Benita Robinson, testified that 
defendant’s father was an alcoholic all of defendant’s life.  Defendant’s mother 
also abused drugs and alcohol, even when she was pregnant.  Defendant’s parents 
fought, sometimes physically.  Angered over one of her husband’s affairs, 
defendant’s mother cut up all of his clothes.  She was sometimes incarcerated 
when her children were small.   
 
Another paternal aunt, Clementene Adams, described defendant’s father as 
an ineffective parent who abused alcohol.  Defendant’s mother also drank and 
used drugs.  Once, when defendant was 10, he had to drive her home because she 
was so intoxicated.  Defendant was a quiet, withdrawn child. 
 
The mother of defendant’s two sons said he was a good father who saw his 
children on a daily basis before he was arrested.  A former neighbor who had 
known defendant since he was a child, described him as an “all around good guy” 
who was always respectful.  A childhood friend said defendant was a nice person 
who was close to her children and helpful to neighbors. 
 
8
 
Clyde Terry, a deputy sheriff in charge of defendant’s jail module, testified 
that his dealings with defendant were always positive.  Defendant told Deputy 
Terry he was a member of the Main Street Crips.  Loy McBride, another deputy 
assigned to the jail, had known defendant for two years and found him quiet and 
polite. 
 
Dr. William Vicary, a psychiatrist, interviewed defendant for seven hours.  
He also reviewed reports of the interviews defense investigators conducted with 
defendant’s family members, defendant’s school and medical records, and the 
police reports of this case and of defendant’s prior unadjudicated offenses.  Dr. 
Vicary concluded that defendant reacted to his traumatic childhood by treating his 
gang as a family.  Defendant’s school records indicated difficulty with attention 
and concentration, poor self-control, hyperactivity, and poor memory.  He was 
thought to have a learning disability and his IQ tested in the borderline range of 
mental retardation.  His hyperactivity was untreated.  However, based on his own 
evaluation, Dr. Vicary concluded that defendant was sane, competent to stand 
trial, of average intelligence, and not psychotic.  He had no brain damage.   
 
On cross-examination, Dr. Vicary expressed the opinion that if defendant 
“was still on the streets, there would probably be more dead bodies.”  Defendant 
was also involved in “serious fights” while in jail.  As a gang member, he could 
become a “real threat” in prison.  “He could get involved in the drug 
trafficking . . . and extortions . . . and homicides that take place in prison.”  
Defendant had never expressed any remorse for these crimes or for any of his 
other crimes. 
 
C. 
Judgment 
 
The jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murders of Eural 
Johnson, Kenneth Newman, and Sandra Ann Green, as well as the second degree 
murder of Jesse Dwight Bingham.  The trial court sentenced him to death on the 
 
9
first degree murder counts and to life imprisonment without possibility of parole 
on the second degree murder count.  As the People concede, the second degree 
murder sentence is error.7  We affirm the judgment as to the first degree murder 
counts, but modify it as to the second degree murder count to reflect the fact that 
the correct sentence for that count is a state prison term of 15 years to life. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
Discharge of Juror R.D. 
 
The trial court discharged Juror R.D. for failing to deliberate.  Specifically, 
it found his refusal to deliberate was “based upon his disbelief of police officers’ 
testimony.”  Accordingly, our review is focused on the question whether the 
record demonstrates8 that Juror R.D. exhibited a general bias against police 
officers that prevented him from fairly weighing police testimony in this case. 
 
On the second day of deliberations, the jury sent two notes to the court 
stating that “[w]e need assistance in deliberating” and that “this one juror is not 
deliberating as [he] should be.”  In response, the court reread CALJIC No. 17.40 
on the duty to deliberate.  Juror R.D. identified himself as the subject of the jury’s 
notes.  In a sidebar conversation, he denied he had refused to deliberate and 
promised he would follow the court’s instructions.  The court directed the jury to 
resume deliberations.   
                                              
7  
Defendant filed a supplemental brief arguing that the judgment should be 
modified to reflect that his sentence on the second degree murder count (count IV) 
is 15 years to life.  Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, that is the 
sentence provided for second degree murder.  (§ 190, subd. (a).)  A claim that a 
sentence is unauthorized may be raised for the first time on appeal, and is subject 
to correction whenever the error comes to the attention of the reviewing court.  
(People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6.)   
8  
See the discussion of the appropriate standard of review post, at pages 14-
16. 
 
10
 
After lunch the jury sent out another note to the court stating that the 
problem juror seemed to have a bias against law enforcement officers.  It read in 
pertinent part:  “Since [the beginning of deliberations] we have been trying to 
reason and discuss the situation [but] to no avail.  Now we’re at a standstill and 
don’t know what to do.  There was a question asked to [Juror R.D.] about whether 
or not he believes what Sgt. Montgomery or Sgt. Woodhead said, and the response 
was would you believe them, their [sic] going to back up what the other cops say, 
so it seems to be some bias against the cops.  We ask the juror if he is willing to 
deliberate.  He said “ ‘yes, but I will never change my opinion.’ ” 
 
In response to this third note, the court conducted a hearing and took 
testimony from all 12 jurors.  Juror R.D. claimed he was not biased against all law 
enforcement officers, but simply disbelieved the officers in this case.  However, 
nine of the 11 other jurors testified that R.D. had expressed or exhibited a general 
bias against law enforcement officers.  The testimony of the remaining two jurors 
was inconclusive. 
 
Juror R.D. testified, “it’s not all the police officers that I have a concern 
with.  It’s just a few, and I think [they] are the relevant ones in the case.  And I 
don’t consider their testimony.”  The court asked R.D. whether there had been any 
discussion among the jurors “about disbelieving police officers’ testimony simply 
because they are police officers.”  R.D. responded, “Yes.  Two people, I believe, 
feel that that’s my problem, but that’s absolutely not true.” 
 
Jurors C.T., M.B., R.W., and S.C. contradicted R.D.’s assertions.  They 
specifically quoted statements by R.D. expressing a bias against police officer 
testimony.9  According to C.T., R.D. had made up his mind before deliberations 
                                              
9  
R.D.’s fellow jurors did not mention him by name.  However, as we have 
stated, R.D. identified himself as the juror of concern. 
 
11
began and when the other jurors tried to discuss the case with him, R.D. stated that 
nothing anyone could say would change his mind.  That prompted the jury to send 
its first note to the court.  When the court again instructed the jury on the duty to 
deliberate, “[W]e came to another problem.  He stated that he feels that all law 
enforcement will always back each other up regardless of [whether] it is right or 
wrong. . . .  All law enforcement will back each other up.  And he will not change 
that.  He says that all witnesses that have been brought to the stand . . . that are 
involved in law enforcement in any way have lied.”  (Italics added.)  The other 
jurors appealed to R.D. to consider “all evidence, not just the fact that law 
enforcement is involved.”  R.D. responded, “I don’t care.  I can sit here all  day, 
and there’s nothing, nothing that anybody could say.  Law enforcement lies.” 
 
Juror R.W. testified:  “We have one gentleman who says he has . . . an open 
mind towards deliberation but really does not.  He’s convinced that . . . a 
policeman has lied, and there was a conspiracy to maintain that aspect of things.  
He thinks that all, all policemen lie, and that’s what’s been said.”  The court asked 
R.W. whether R.D. had conveyed to the other members of the jury a belief that all 
policemen lie.  R.W. responded, “That was what came out of his mouth at one 
point.” 
 
The court had the following colloquy with Juror M.B.  “The Court:  Is there 
any aspect of the evidence or testimony that this jur[or] appears to be dogmatic in?  
[¶]   [M.B.]: Yes.  [¶]  The Court:  And what type of testimony is that?  [¶]  
[M.B.]:  Well, it’s like he’s got a thing against cops.  He’s very negative toward 
them.  [¶]  The Court:  Okay.  What do you mean by ‘very negative.’  [¶]  [M.B.]:  
Well, I asked him a question.  I said do you believe the testimony of two of the 
sergeant[s].  He was, like, ‘Would you believe them?  They are there to back up 
the other cops.’  So I feel that’s a dead-end situation.” 
 
12
 
Juror S.C. was the foreperson.  According to S.C., R.D. was “prejudiced” 
against the Los Angeles Police Department.  The court inquired whether that was 
what R.D. had said.  S.C. responded, “Not in those words but close.”  The court 
asked what words R.D. did use.  S.C. replied,  “If one does something wrong that 
they will all back him up.”  The colloquy continued.  “The Court:  I notice in your 
statement it says, ‘There was a question asked to the same juror about whether or 
not he believes what Sergeant Montgomery or Sergeant Woodhead said,’ and the 
response was ‘Would you believe them?  They are going to back up what the other 
cops say.’  So it seems to be some bias against the cops?  [¶]  [S.C.]:  Yes.”  
 
The other five jurors whose testimony supported the trial court’s finding of 
bias did not quote R.D. directly, but instead summarized his attitude toward police 
officer testimony based on their observations of his behavior.  Juror M.L. testified 
that R.D. seemed to have a “bias against the Los Angeles Police Department, and 
that’s about it.”  Juror M.V. reported that R.D. “just flat out has disbelief in 
police.”  Juror S.G. told the court that R.D. seemed to have “a bias towards police 
officers.”  “He hasn’t said it directly, but in a roundabout way that’s the 
impression that I’m getting.”  Juror S.H. stated, “I have an impression that [R.D.] 
has some biases towards law enforcement, but . . . that’s just an impression.”  
According to Juror R.M., R.D. was “close[]-minded” toward police officer 
testimony.  On the other hand, R.D. did discuss the evidence with the other jurors 
and he disbelieved defense as well as prosecution witnesses. 
 
The remaining jurors were A.B. and M.F.  Juror A.B. reported that R.D. 
said he did not believe the officers’ testimony in this case, that they were liars.  
However, she did not characterize Juror R.D.’s attitude as a general bias against 
police officer testimony.  “The Court:  Did [R.D.] indicate to you that he wouldn’t 
believe any of the police officers?  [¶]  [A.B.]:  No.  [¶]  The Court:  So he just 
didn’t believe what the police officers were saying.  [¶]  [A.B.]  That’s right.  Or 
 
13
what they said as far as this case was concern[ed].”  Juror M.F. was asked by the 
court whether any of the jurors indicated they would not believe police officer 
testimony.  M.F.’s response was not a model of clarity, but it could not be fairly 
characterized as affirmative.  His answer was as follows:  “Um, it would be, like, 
somewhat like that.  But to actually say that for every part of—for every part of 
everyday life, they wouldn’t say that.  But in some cases they would.” 
 
After the hearing and receiving the arguments of counsel, the court excused 
R.D.  “[I]n my opinion, . . . in deliberating this one juror, [R.D.], is not following 
the court’s instructions.  I feel that his lack of participation is based upon his 
disbelief of police officers’ testimony.” 
 
Defendant contends the discharge was without good cause, violating his 
right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and article 1, section 16 of the California Constitution, as well as his right to due 
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The contention fails on this record. 
When a court is informed of allegations which, if proven true, would 
constitute good cause for a juror’s removal, a hearing is required.  (People v. 
Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 878 (Burgener); People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 
Cal.4th 466, 478 (Cleveland).) 
 
A juror who is actually biased is unable to perform the duty to fairly 
deliberate and thus is subject to discharge.  (People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 
243, 272 (Ayala); People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 581 (lead opn.) 
(Nesler).)  Specifically, a bias against law enforcement officers that renders a juror 
unable to fairly weigh police testimony is grounds for the juror’s replacement.  
(People v. Feagin (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1437; People v. Thomas (1990) 
218 Cal.App.3d 1477, 1485 (Thomas); see Nesler, at p. 588 [citing Thomas with 
 
14
approval].)  Bias may be established by the testimony of other jurors.  (Ayala, at p. 
272; Nesler, at p. 581.) 
 
A distinction must be made, of course, between a juror who cannot fairly 
deliberate because of bias and one who, in good faith, disagrees with the others 
and holds his or her ground.  “The circumstance that a juror does not deliberate 
well or relies upon faulty logic or analysis does not constitute a refusal to 
deliberate and is not a ground for discharge.  Similarly, the circumstance that a 
juror disagrees with the majority of the jury as to what the evidence shows, or how 
the law should be applied to the facts, or the manner in which deliberations should 
be conducted does not constitute a refusal to deliberate and is not a ground for 
discharge.  A juror who has participated in deliberations for a reasonable period of 
time may not be discharged for refusing to deliberate, simply because the juror 
expresses the belief that further discussion will not alter his or her views.  
[Citation.]”  (Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 485.) 
 
Removing a juror is, of course, a serious matter, implicating the 
constitutional protections defendant invokes.  While a trial court has broad 
discretion to remove a juror for cause,10 it should exercise that discretion with 
great care. 
 
We have given two different formulations of the applicable standard on 
review.  On the one hand, we have stated that a court’s decision to remove a juror 
is to be upheld if supported by “substantial evidence.”  (See, e.g., People v. 
Williams (2001) 25 Cal.4th 441, 448.)  “Substantial evidence” has been 
characterized as a “deferential” standard.  (See, e.g., People v. Carter (2005) 36 
                                              
10 
See, e.g., People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 462, fn. 19 (Boyette). 
 
15
Cal.4th 1114, 1140.)11  On the other hand, we have stated, often in the same 
opinion, that a juror’s disqualification must appear on the record as a 
“ ‘ “ ‘demonstrable reality.’ ” ’ ”  (E.g., Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 474; See 
People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 843; see also Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 
381.)  The demonstrable reality standard traces back to Justice Mosk’s majority 
opinion in People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 60.  This standard “indicates 
that a stronger evidentiary showing than mere substantial evidence is required to 
support a trial court’s decision to discharge a sitting juror.”  (Cleveland, supra, at 
p. 488 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) 
 
To dispel any lingering uncertainty, we explicitly hold that the more 
stringent demonstrable reality standard is to be applied in review of juror removal 
cases.  That heightened standard more fully reflects an appellate court’s obligation 
to protect a defendant’s fundamental rights to due process and to a fair trial by an 
unbiased jury. 
 
A substantial evidence inquiry examines the record in the light most 
favorable to the judgment and upholds it if the record contains reasonable, credible 
evidence of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied in 
reaching the conclusion in question.  Once such evidence is found, the substantial 
evidence test is satisfied. (See People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)  
Even when there is a significant amount of countervailing evidence, the testimony 
of a single witness that satisfies the standard is sufficient to uphold the finding. 
 
The demonstrable reality test entails a more comprehensive and less 
deferential review.  It requires a showing that the court as trier of fact did rely on 
evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that bias was 
                                              
11  
“Although ‘substantial’ evidence is not synonymous with ‘any’ 
evidence . . . , the standard is easily satisfied.”  (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 
1997) Appeal, § 363, p. 413, citation omitted.) 
 
16
established.  It is important to make clear that a reviewing court does not reweigh 
the evidence under either test.  Under the demonstrable reality standard, however, 
the reviewing court must be confident that the trial court’s conclusion is 
manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually relied. 
 
In reaching that conclusion, the reviewing panel will consider not just the 
evidence itself, but the record of reasons the court provides.  A trial court 
facilitates review when it expressly sets out its analysis of the evidence, why it 
reposed greater weight on some part of it and less on another, and the basis of its 
ultimate conclusion that a juror was failing to follow the oath.  In taking the 
serious step of removing a deliberating juror the court must be mindful of its duty 
to provide a record that supports its decision by a demonstrable reality. 
 
The evidence bearing on the question whether a juror has exhibited a 
disqualifying bias during deliberations may be in conflict.  Often, the identified 
juror will deny it and other jurors will testify to examples of how he has revealed 
it.  (See, e.g., Thomas, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d 1477, 1482-1485 [bias against 
police officers].)  In such a case the trial court must weigh the credibility of those 
whose testimony it receives, taking into account the nuances attendant upon live 
testimony.  The trial court may also draw upon the observations it has made of the 
jurors during voir dire and the trial itself.  Naturally, in such circumstances, we 
afford deference to the trial court’s factual determinations, based, as they are, on 
first-hand observations unavailable to us on appeal.   
Here, the trial court stated its reason for removing R.D.:  “disbelief of 
police officers’ testimony.”  The court did not expressly state that it did not 
believe R.D.’s disclaimer of a general bias preventing him from fairly weighing 
the testimony of the officers in this case.  However, the clear thrust of the court’s 
ruling is that it did find the testimony of the nine jurors who stated that R.D. 
expressed or exhibited such a bias to be credible, and based its decision on that 
 
17
finding.  Based on this record we are satisfied that R.D.’s disqualifying bias was 
established to a “demonstrable reality.”  The totality of the evidence here supports 
the trial court’s evident conclusion that, more than simply disbelieving the 
testimony as given by these particular witnesses, R.D. judged their testimony by a 
different standard because the witnesses were police officers.  Applying such 
different standards to the evaluation of different witnesses is, of course, contrary to 
the court’s instructions and violative of the juror’s oath of impartiality.  (See, e.g., 
Judicial Council of Cal. Crim. Jury Instns. (2006), CALCRIM No. 105, 
Witnesses.)   
Finally, defendant contends that the court’s inquiry into R.D.’s alleged bias 
unnecessarily intruded upon the sanctity of the jury’s deliberations, in violation of 
his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. 
“[A] trial court’s inquiry into possible grounds for discharge of a 
deliberating juror should be as limited in scope as possible, to avoid intruding 
unnecessarily upon the sanctity of the jury’s deliberations.  The inquiry should 
focus upon the conduct of the jurors, rather than upon the content of the 
deliberations.  Additionally, the inquiry should cease once the court is satisfied 
that the juror at issue is participating in deliberations and has not expressed an 
intention to disregard the court's instructions or otherwise committed misconduct, 
and that no other proper ground for discharge exists.”  (Cleveland, supra, 25 
Cal.4th at p. 485.) 
The inquiry here was appropriately limited.  The final note from the jury 
raised the concern of bias against police officer testimony.  It bears repeating that 
the court was required to conduct a hearing to resolve that concern.  (Burgener, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 878; Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 478.)   The first 
juror called was C.T.  The court admonished her:  “Miss [T.], we received 
 
18
questions from the jury panel regarding the deliberative process.  Now, be very 
careful, and do not volunteer any information about the determination of guilt or 
innocence in this case.  That’s not why you’re here.  What the court is trying to 
find out is what is the problem as far as deliberation in this case.”12  Without 
further questions from the court, C.T. testified that R.D. had directly expressed a 
general bias against police officer testimony:  “ ‘Law enforcement lies.’ ”  Given 
C.T.’s testimony, the court was clearly required to examine the other jurors.  As it 
did so, it focused narrowly on the matter at issue.  We find no error.  
B.  
Application of People v. Engelman   
In People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436 (Engelman), this court 
considered “whether trial courts should advise juries in the terms of CALJIC No. 
17.41.1, a recently drafted pattern jury instruction given in criminal cases.  This 
instruction informs jurors at the outset of jury deliberations that ‘should . . . any 
juror refuse[] to deliberate or express[] an intention to disregard the law or to 
decide the case based on penalty or punishment, or any other improper basis, it is 
the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the Court of the situation.’ 
(CALJIC No. 17.41.1 (1998 new) (6th ed. 1996).)”  (Engelman, at p. 439.) 
We concluded that “the instruction does not infringe upon defendant’s 
federal or state constitutional right to trial by jury or his state constitutional right to 
a unanimous verdict,” and upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision affirming the 
judgment of conviction.  (Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 439-440.)  However, 
in the exercise of our supervisory power, we directed that the instruction not be 
given in future trials.  (Id. at p. 449.)  “Although jurors have no right to refuse to 
deliberate or to disregard the law in reaching their decision, we believe the 
instruction has the potential to intrude unnecessarily on the deliberative process 
                                              
12  
The court gave much the same admonition to the other jurors. 
 
19
and affect it adversely―both with respect to the freedom of jurors to express their 
differing views during deliberations, and the proper receptivity they should accord 
the views of their fellow jurors.”  (Id. at p. 440.) 
Because this trial occurred before CALJIC No. 17.41.1 was adopted, it was 
not given here.  However, defendant contends that remarks made by the court and 
prosecutor during voir dire were objectionable on the same grounds.   
During voir dire, while instructing the prospective jurors on their duty to 
deliberate, the court asked one panel:  “Now, if such a thing were to happen that a 
juror refused to deliberate, would you be strong [enough] to remind that juror that 
they were violating their oath?”  The jurors answered yes.  The court continued:  
“Would you be strong enough to bring it to my attention if that behavior 
persisted?”  The jurors again answered yes.  Essentially the same exchange 
occurred with another panel.  In his voir dire, the prosecutor gave examples of 
juror misconduct, such as discussing the case with a nonjuror, and asked some of 
the prospective jurors whether they would bring such misconduct to the attention 
of the court. 
As we made clear in Engelman, even the giving of a formal jury instruction 
on these topics would not have infringed upon defendant’s federal or state 
constitutional rights to trial by jury or his state constitutional right to a unanimous 
verdict.  (Engelman, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 439-440.)  Moreover,  the remarks 
made by the court and prosecutor did not invite the jurors to act as though they had 
“a license to scrutinize other jurors for some ill-defined misconduct rather than to 
remain receptive to the views of others.”  (Id. at p. 447.)   
C. 
Defendant’s Earlier Handgun Possession 
On rebuttal, and over the objection of defendant, the trial court admitted the 
testimony of Officer Vivian Flores, which tended to show that a year before the 
 
20
murders defendant possessed another handgun similar to the murder weapon.  
(Ante, at pp. 3-4.) 
The trial court ruled that Officer Flores’s testimony was relevant to 
defendant’s identity as the murderer because the “relatively unique” characteristics 
of the pistol she found in his possession demonstrated his “propensity to own or 
carry that type of weapon.”  (Italics added.)  The court concluded that the 
probative value of the evidence outweighed any resulting prejudice. 
When the prosecution relies on evidence regarding a specific type of 
weapon, it is error to admit evidence that other weapons were found in the 
defendant’s possession, for such evidence tends to show not that he committed the 
crime, but only that he is the sort of person who carries deadly weapons.  (People 
v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 956; People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 577.)  
Because the prosecution did not claim the weapon found by Officer Flores was the 
murder weapon, its admission was error.  
Moreover, as defendant correctly contends, the trial court erred under 
Evidence Code section 1101 in two respects.  First, under section 1101, 
subdivision (a), “propensity” evidence is generally inadmissible.13  Second, 
Officer Flores’s testimony was also inadmissible under subdivision (b).14   
                                              
13 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) provides:  “Except as 
provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, 1108, and 1109, evidence of a 
person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an 
opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her 
conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified 
occasion.”  
14  
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) provides:  “Nothing in this 
section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil 
wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or 
whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted 
unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim 
consented) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.”   
 
21
To be admissible on the issue of identity, an uncharged crime must be 
highly similar to the charged offenses, so similar as to serve as a signature or 
fingerprint.  (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 203; People v. Kipp (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 349, 369-370; People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403.) 
Defendant’s previous possession of a weapon, even of a similar weapon, is 
not so distinctive on these facts as to serve as a signature or a fingerprint 
supporting a conclusion that because he had committed the earlier offense he must 
have committed the one for which he was on trial.  We also note that even 
evidence properly admitted under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) 
cannot be relied upon to prove propensity or disposition. 
 Defendant contends the erroneous admission of Officer Flores’s testimony 
denied him due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
undermined his right to reliable guilt and penalty determinations under the Eighth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution.  However, admission of the testimony was 
clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (See People v. Hughes (2002) 27 
Cal.4th 287, 333.)  Here, Officer Wise saw defendant shoot two of the victims.  
Wise precisely described defendant and the .45-caliber pistol he used.  Defendant 
was still holding the pistol when he ran out of the gate.  Thereafter, a .45-caliber 
bullet was found in defendant’s pocket, the pistol was found nearby, and the 
bullets recovered from the victims’ bodies had been fired from it.  (Ante, at pp. 2-
3.) 
D. 
Consciousness of Guilt Instruction 
Defendant’s statement to the police and the story he presented at trial 
through his witnesses Rich and Nolan gave two entirely different accounts of why 
he went to the crime scene, how he got there, and what he found when he arrived.  
Defendant told the police he had ridden a bicycle to the tire shop to sell rock 
cocaine to some unnamed person.  The gate was open and the victims were on the 
 
22
ground when he arrived.  However, Rich and Nolan testified he had used his car to 
push Rich’s car to the shop to repair a slashed tire.  The locked gate was opened 
by an employee, who fixed Rich’s tire.   
In light of these discrepancies, the court instructed the jury, over 
defendant’s objection, that it could consider any false statements made by 
defendant as evidence of his consciousness of guilt of the charged offenses, 
although such conduct alone is insufficient to prove guilt, and its weight and 
significance, if any, are matters for the jury. (See CALJIC No. 2.03.)   
Defendant contends the instruction was impermissibly argumentative and 
encouraged the jury to make an irrational inference, thereby violating his federal 
and state constitutional rights to due process, a jury trial before a properly 
instructed jury, and a fair and reliable capital trial.  (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th & 14th 
Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 16 & 17.)  The instruction was properly 
given here.  The jury could rationally infer that defendant made a false statement 
to deflect suspicion from himself.  (People v. Rankin (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 430, 
436.)  We have repeatedly rejected arguments attacking the instruction (People v. 
Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 713, and cases cited) and defendant offers no 
persuasive reason to reconsider our views. 
E.  
Prior Unadjudicated Offenses 
 
Contrary to defendant’s assertions, introduction of evidence concerning his 
unadjudicated offenses (ante, at pp. 4-6), under section 190.3, factor (b), did not 
offend the federal Constitution.  (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 590;  
People v. Elliott (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 488 (Elliott); People v. Barnett (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 1044, 1178.)  The expiration of the statute of limitations for some of the 
unadjudicated offenses affected the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.  
(People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1088; People v. Medina (1995) 11 
 
23
Cal.4th 694, 772; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1161.)  Johnson v. 
Mississippi (1988) 486 U.S. 578 is inapposite.15      
F. 
Constitutionality of California’s Death Penalty Statute 
Defendant mounts a number of challenges to California’s death penalty 
statute that we have often considered and repeatedly rejected.  Our views remain 
the same. 
The death penalty law adequately narrows the class of death-eligible 
offenders.  (See, e.g., People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 931 (Dickey).) 
Consideration of the circumstances of the crime under section 190.3, factor 
(a) does not result in arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401 (Brown).) 
The death penalty is not unconstitutional for failing to impose a specific 
burden of proof as to the existence of aggravating circumstances, the greater 
weight of aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances, or the 
appropriateness of a death  sentence.  (See, e.g., Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th 382, 
401.)  Nor do the high court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 
U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, or Blakely v. Washington (2004) 
542 U.S. 296 alter this conclusion, either with respect to the existence of an 
                                              
15  
“Defendant cites Johnson v. Mississippi, [supra,] 486 U.S. 578 as holding 
that the procedures for considering aggravating evidence of other crimes must 
conform in all respects to the constitutional standards governing proof of charged 
offenses.  But Johnson does not so hold.  In that decision, the high court reversed a 
death judgment because the prosecution had been allowed to prove a prior 
conviction with nothing more than the record of a judgment that had been reversed 
on appeal; ‘the prosecutor did not introduce any evidence concerning the alleged 
assault itself . . . .’  (Johnson v. Mississippi, supra, at p. 585.)  Here, in contrast, 
the People did not seek to prove a prior conviction for rape.  Instead, they merely  
proved other violent criminal conduct by defendant (§ 190.3, factor (b)) through 
properly admitted evidence.  About this, Johnson has nothing to say.”  (People v. 
Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 137-138.) 
 
24
aggravating factor or as to the determination whether aggravating factors outweigh 
mitigating factors.  (See, e.g., People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 104.) 
The jury need not make written findings, or achieve unanimity as to 
specific aggravating circumstances, or find beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
aggravating circumstance is proved (except for other crimes).  (See, e.g., People v. 
Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730.) 
Intercase proportionality review is not constitutionally required.  (Dickey, 
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 931.) 
A penalty phase jury may consider prior unadjudicated criminal conduct 
under section 190.3, factor (b), and the jury need not make a unanimous finding 
that the defendant was guilty of the unadjudicated crimes.  (See, e.g., Elliot, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 488.) 
Section 190.3’s use of adjectives such as “extreme” (id., factors (d), (g)) 
and “substantial” (id., factor (g)) in describing mitigating circumstances does not 
impermissibly limit consideration of such factors.  (See, e.g., Elliot, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 488.) 
A penalty phase jury need not be instructed that section 190.3, factors (d), 
(e), (f), (g), (h), and (j) can only mitigate, and not aggravate, the crime.  (See, e.g., 
Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 488.) 
The death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection 
because it provides a different method of determining the sentence than is used in 
noncapital cases.  (See, e.g., People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 374.) 
The death penalty as applied in this state is not rendered unconstitutional 
through operation of international law and treaties.  (See, e.g., Elliot, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 488.) 
 
25
III.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment as modified to reflect that defendant’s sentence on 
count IV is imprisonment for 15 years to life . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Barnwell 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S055528 
Date Filed: July 26, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Morris Bruce Jones 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Jay Colangelo, 
Assistant State Public Defender, Jessica K. McGuire and Carolyn R. Lange, Deputy State Public 
Defenders, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, John R. Gorey, Catherine Okawa Kohm and 
Steven Mercer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jessica K. McGuire 
Deputy State Public Defender 
801 K Street, Suite 1100 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 322-2676 
 
Steven Mercer 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-4915