Case Title: Gibson v. Merit Employee Relations Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: 422, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CHRISTOPHER GIBSON,  
 
Claimant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
MERIT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
BOARD,1  
 
          Respondent Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 422, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. No. 09A-05-001 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: February 11, 2011 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: April 12, 2011 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 12th day of April 2011, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties 
and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The claimant-appellant, Christopher Gibson, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s June 17, 2010 order affirming the April 2, 2009 decision of the 
Merit Employee Relations Board (the “Board”), which found that Gibson’s 
employer, the Violent Crimes Compensation Board (the “VCCB”), had just cause 
to terminate Gibson.  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
                                                 
1 Although the appellant named the Merit Employee Relations Board as the appellee in this 
appeal, the real party in interest is the Violent Crimes Compensation Board, the appellant’s 
former employer and the respondent below. 
 
2
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Gibson was employed as an Investigator II 
with the VCCB from May 2, 2005 until July 22, 2008, when his employment was 
terminated.  As an Investigator II, Gibson’s job was to investigate claims by 
violent crime victims for lost wages, living expenses and relocation expenses.  In 
2008, Gibson was assigned the case of Lakeshia Truitt.  Truitt, the victim of a 
shooting by her drug dealer ex-boyfriend, was a witness on behalf of the State at 
his murder trial.  In January 2008, after a witness reported that Truitt’s ex-
boyfriend had contracted to have her killed, Truitt was placed in protective custody 
under a material witness warrant and a witness protection agreement with the 
Delaware Department of Justice (“DOJ”).  She was placed under constant police 
supervision and was living in a confidential location. 
 
(3) 
In April 2008, following her ex-boyfriend’s murder trial, Truitt was 
no longer subject to the material witness warrant.  However, she continued to be 
subject to the agreement with the DOJ, continued to live in a confidential location, 
and was working with the DOJ on relocating to another state.  Stephanie Hamilton, 
the Domestic Violence Coordinator for the Wilmington Police Department, was in 
charge of providing services to Truitt during this period.  On January 30 and June 
2, 2008, Hamilton confirmed with Gibson that Truitt continued to be subject to the 
witness protection agreement with the DOJ.  On February 27, 2008, Andrea Lewis, 
 
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the Support Services Administrator for the VCCB, also confirmed Truitt’s status 
with Gibson. 
 
(4) 
On June 9, 2008, Gibson and other VCCB staff were scheduled to 
present a workshop at a domestic violence conference in Rehoboth Beach.  Gibson 
asked Truitt to speak at the conference.  Subsequently, Marianne Kenville-Moore, 
the Director of Victim Services for the DOJ and a conference participant, visited 
Truitt to discuss her relocation plan.  Truitt mentioned that Gibson had asked her to 
participate in the conference, but agreed with Kenville-Moore, at least at that point, 
that it would be unwise to do so.  At that time, Truitt’s ex-boyfriend had been 
convicted of first degree murder and was awaiting sentencing.  Gibson did not 
inform VCCB’s Executive Director, Barbara Brown, that he had contacted Truitt 
about appearing at the conference. 
 
(5) 
When Kenville-Moore arrived at the conference location, she learned 
that Gibson had brought Truitt with him.  Believing that it was inappropriate and 
dangerous for Truitt to appear in public at the conference, Kenville-Moore escorted 
Truitt back to the hotel where Truitt remained until the workshop was concluded.  
GPS records from Gibson’s State-owned vehicle revealed that Gibson had been in 
the vicinity of Truitt’s confidential residence without authorization on the day of 
the conference. 
 
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(6) 
On June 13, 2008, Brown and a human resource representative from 
VCCB met with Gibson to discuss the incident with Truitt.  Gibson confirmed that 
he had never told Brown about his plan to bring Truitt to the conference.  When 
asked where he had met Truitt to take her to the conference, Gibson replied that he 
had met her in the VCCB parking lot.  He was shown the GPS records, which 
directly contradicted his statement.  The GPS records also revealed that Gibson had 
used the State-owned vehicle for his own personal business during the week of the 
conference in violation of the policy applicable to State-owned vehicles. 
 
(7) 
On July 22, 2008, following a pre-termination meeting at the VCCB, 
Gibson was terminated from his employment.  In her termination letter, Brown 
listed the following grounds for Gibson’s termination from employment with the 
VCCB: jeopardizing the safety of a VCCB client; jeopardizing the safety of the 
attendees of a VCCB event; failing to obtain approval from a supervisor to bring a 
client to a VCCB event; providing false statements to a supervisor regarding the 
pick-up location of the client; transporting a non-State employee in a State vehicle; 
utilizing a State vehicle for personal business; and failing to return a State vehicle 
in a timely fashion. 
 
(8) 
In July 2008, Gibson filed a merit system grievance appeal with both 
the Office of Management and Budget (the “OMB”) and the Merit Employee 
Relations Board (the “Board”).  The OMB denied the appeal on August 19, 2008.  
 
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The Board, following a two-day hearing, issued its written decision denying the 
appeal on April 2, 2009.  Gibson then appealed to the Superior Court, which 
affirmed the Board’s decision by order dated June 17, 2010. 
 
(9) 
Under Rule 12.1 of the Board’s Merit Rules,2 an employee may be 
terminated for “just cause.” “Just cause” requires a showing that a) the employee 
has committed the charged offense; b) the employee has been afforded the due 
process specified in the Merit Rules; and c) the penalty is appropriate to the 
circumstances.3  In an appeal to the Superior Court from a decision of the Board, 
the Superior Court’s function is to correct any errors of law as well as determine 
whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings of 
fact and conclusions of law.4 
 
(10) This Court utilizes the same standard of review on appeal from the 
Superior Court’s affirmance of a decision of the Board.  Specifically, this Court 
reviews decisions of the Board “to determine whether [it] acted within its statutory 
authority, whether it properly interpreted and applied the applicable law, whether it 
conducted a fair hearing and whether its decision is based on sufficient substantial 
                                                 
2 The purpose of the Merit Rules is to “establish for this State a system of personnel 
administration based on merit principles . . . .”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, §5902. 
3 See Avallone v. State/Dep’t of Health and Soc. Servs., --- A.3d ----, 2011 WL 250994, at *2 
(Del. Jan. 27, 2011). 
4 Delaware Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n. v. Newsome, 690 A.2d 906, 910 (Del. 1996). 
 
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evidence and is not arbitrary.”5  Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as 
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”6  Questions 
of law are reviewed de novo.7 
 
(11) In this appeal, Gibson claims that the Board’s decision should have 
been reversed by the Superior Court because a) the Board erred by not issuing 
subpoenas for witnesses and documents as requested by Gibson; b) the Board’s 
decision was not supported by substantial evidence; c) the Board erred by 
considering testimony by the Chairman of the VCCB that Gibson had “violated 
client trust” because that charge was not among the original charges supporting his 
termination; and d) the Board erred by imposing a penalty that was not appropriate 
in the circumstances.  To the extent that Gibson fails to present other grounds to 
support his appeal that were raised previously, those grounds are deemed to be 
waived and will not be addressed by the Court.8 
 
(12)  We have carefully reviewed the transcript of the hearing before the 
Board, the Board’s decision, and the Superior Court’s order affirming the decision 
of the Board.  Because Gibson’s claim that the Board erred by not issuing 
subpoenas for witnesses and documents was not raised below, we decline to 
                                                 
5 Avallone, 2011 WL 250994, at *3 (quoting Hopson v. McGinnes, 391 A.2d 187, 189 (Del. 
1978)). 
6 Id. (quoting Person-Gaines v. Pepco Holdings, Inc., 981 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Del. 2009)). 
7 Id. 
8 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
 
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consider it for the first time in this appeal.9  As for Gibson’s remaining claims, we 
find that the Board acted within its statutory authority, properly interpreted and 
applied the applicable law, conducted a fair hearing and based its decision that 
Gibson had been terminated for “just cause” on sufficient substantial evidence.  
Gibson’s claim that the VCCB Chairman’s testimony added a basis for termination 
that was not included in the original charges is not supported by the record.  We, 
therefore, conclude that the Superior Court’s affirmance of the Board’s decision 
must, itself, be affirmed. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
9 Supr. Ct. R. 8.