Case Title: Erdman v. Sowle

Citation: 207 Kan. 488, 485 P.2d 1392

Docket Number: 46,004

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1971-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
207 Kan. 488 (1971)
485 P.2d 1392
BELLE ERDMAN, Appellee,
v.
ODA V. SOWLE, RANDALL D. SOWLE, LEOTA E. SOWLE and TECHNOLOGY FUND, INC., a Corporation, Appellant.
No. 46,004

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 12, 1971.
William H. Stowell, of Phillipsburg, argued the cause, and Doris Dixon Stowell, of Phillipsburg, was with him on the brief for appellants.
Terry E. Relihan, of Smith Center, argued the cause, and A. W. Relihan and T.D. Relihan, of Smith Center, were with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FATZER, J.:
This was an action to cancel a certificate of stock representing 1556 shares of Technology Fund, Inc., registered in the names of the plaintiff, Belle Erdman, and the defendants, Oda V. Sowle, Randall D. Sowle and Leota E. Sowle, as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
The certificate of stock in question had been purchased by the plaintiff from her own funds. It was issued to the plaintiff as a joint tenant owner with Randall D. Sowle and Leota E. Sowle pursuant to the promise and agreement of the Sowles to remain in the home with the plaintiff and care and look after her and her brother as long as they lived.
The plaintiff alleged the Sowles repudiated their agreement to care for her and her brother, and continued to claim an interest *489 in the stock certificate. The case was tried by the district court which made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and rendered judgment cancelling the stock certificate and vesting title to 1556 shares in the plaintiff.
The facts involved in this litigation are succinctly stated in the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which judgment was rendered. The findings of fact best tell the story of this controversy, and we quote those findings and the district court's conclusions of law in full:
"FINDINGS OF FACT
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This was basically a fact case. The district court was sitting as a court of equity at the trial. It had the opportunity of observing the attitude and demeanor of the parties while testifying in their own behalf as witnesses, and to determine the existing equities as between them. In that respect, the district court was in a better position to determine the equities than an appellate court reading the cold printed pages of the record. No useful purpose would be served by detailing the evidence concerning the transaction. We have carefully read the record containing the testimony of the witnesses for both sides, and conclude the findings are amply supported by the evidence. We adhere to the rule that where the district court has made findings of fact based upon substantial evidence, such findings will not be disturbed on appellate review, notwithstanding the record may reflect evidence, which if believed, would support a contrary or different finding.
The question of law involved has been before this court in numerous cases, and the controlling principle was fully discussed in Chapman v. Warmbrodt, 175 Kan. 125, 259 P.2d 158, where it was held:
See, also, Bennett v. LaDoux, 194 Kan. 216, 398 P.2d 590, and cases cited.
*492 A district court, sitting as a court of equity, is not required to render the specific decree prayed for, but may render a decree in accordance with its own judgment or discretion as to what justice between the parties demands, in view of the pleadings, the pretrial order, and the evidence. (Eberhardt Lumber Co. v. Lecuyer, 153 Kan. 386, 110 P.2d 757.) In Garnes v. Barber, 180 Kan. 793, 308 P.2d 76, it was held:
The defendants contend for the first time the plaintiff is not entitled to recission by reason of her failure to place them in status quo. The issue is not to be found in the defendants' statement of points, and for this reason it may not be considered on appeal. Rule No. 6 of this court, relating to Appellate Practice provides, in part:
The defendants make the final claim the joint tenancy ownership of the stock was severed by the plaintiff when she filed this action. They refer to 64 A.L.R.2d 944, 956, Anno: Joint Tenancy-Termination, and argue they are now the owners of three-fourths interest in the property. The district court rejected the claim and entered judgment vesting the plaintiff with the sole ownership of the shares of stock in question. This was within the power of a court of equity to determine, and the claim here made lacks merit. Neither Randall D. Sowle, nor his wife, Leota, had invested any money or funds in the stock, and they lost nothing. But the court's decree was not a one-way street. Judgment was entered in favor of Randall D. Sowle in the sum of $750 for certain furnishings and personal property his mother, Oda V. Sowle, contributed to the plaintiff's home in her lifetime.
Under all the facts in this case, the district court's decree was in accordance with the demands of justice, and that decree is affirmed.