Case Title: C.M. v. Commissioner of Department of Children & Families

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13015

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13015 
 
C.M.  vs.  COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 
FAMILIES & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 5, 2021. - June 11, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Department of Children & Families.  Minor, Care and protection.  
Parent and Child, Care and protection of minor.  Social 
Worker.  Immunity from Suit.  Civil Rights, Immunity of 
public official.  Federal Civil Rights Act.  Practice, 
Civil, Care and protection proceeding, Affidavit, Civil 
rights. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 16, 2014. 
 
The case was heard by Rosemary Connolly, J., on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, and entry of separate and final 
judgment was ordered by Paul D. Wilson, J. 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
Eric Tennen for the plaintiff. 
Jesse M. Boodoo, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
defendants. 
Andrew Cohen & Amy Karp, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, & Melanie L. Todman, Kate J. Bergeron, Jennifer G. 
 
 
1 Candice Gemski and Marcie Plouffe. 
2 
 
Roma, & Kelly C. Hogan, for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  At issue in this case is the scope of immunity 
afforded to social workers in the Department of Children and 
Families (department) who attest to facts in sworn affidavits as 
part of care and protection proceedings commenced by the 
department in the Juvenile Court pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 24 
(§ 24).  The plaintiff, C.M., brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (§ 1983) in the Superior Court against the defendant 
Marcie Plouffe, a department social worker, alleging that she 
intentionally misrepresented facts in a sworn affidavit filed in 
the Juvenile Court in support of a care and protection petition 
(petition).  C.M.'s complaint further alleged that Plouffe's 
area supervisor, the defendant Candice Gemski, also was liable 
because she had approved Plouffe's actions. 
Plouffe and Gemski (collectively, defendants) sought 
judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 
365 Mass. 754 (1974).  They argued that Plouffe's conduct was 
protected by absolute immunity, and that the immunity afforded 
to Plouffe also extended to Gemski as Plouffe's superior.  In 
opposing the defendants' motion, C.M. maintained that social 
workers are not afforded such immunity at common law, because 
the act of misrepresenting facts to a court is "never afforded 
absolute immunity."  After a hearing, a Superior Court judge 
3 
 
allowed the defendants' motion, and C.M. appealed from the 
judgment to the Appeals Court.  The Appeals Court reversed, in 
part, concluding that the defendants were not absolutely immune 
from liability under § 1983 for the averments in Plouffe's 
affidavit.  C.M. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Children & 
Families, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 355 (2020). 
We granted the defendants' application for further 
appellate review, limited to the question of the scope of 
immunity afforded to department social workers, and their 
approving supervisors, for the averments contained in affidavits 
accompanying, and filed with, petitions under § 24.2  For the 
reasons that follow, we conclude that department social workers, 
and their approving supervisors, are entitled to absolute 
immunity in these circumstances.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment entered in the Superior Court.3 
 
2 In her brief filed in this court, C.M. also raises a 
number of substantive issues related to the allowance by the 
Superior Court judge of a separate motion for summary judgment 
filed by the commissioner of the department (commissioner), who 
also was named as a defendant in the underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
action.  Because those issues fall outside the scope of our 
limited further appellate review, the decision of the Appeals 
Court affirming the order granting summary judgment in favor of 
the commissioner stands.  C.M. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of 
Children & Families, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 355-356 (2020). 
 
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services. 
4 
 
 
Background.  We first provide a brief overview of how § 24 
petitions are initiated.  We then summarize the relevant and 
undisputed facts, reserving the development of certain facts for 
later discussion. 
1.  Section 24 proceedings.  "The purpose of G. L. c. 119 
is to protect children 'against the harmful effects resulting 
from the absence, inability, inadequacy or destructive behavior 
of parents or parent substitutes.'"  Care & Protection of 
Lillian, 445 Mass. 333, 335 (2005), quoting G. L. c. 119, § 1.  
Care and protection proceedings under § 24 are initiated in the 
Juvenile Court upon the filing of a petition, which must 
establish that a child's well-being requires his or her removal 
from the household due to at least one of the four concerns 
enumerated in the statute.  Specifically, the petitioner must 
allege "under oath" that a child "(a) is without necessary and 
proper physical or educational care and discipline; (b) is 
growing up under conditions or circumstances damaging to the 
child's sound character development; (c) lacks proper attention 
of the parent, guardian with care and custody or custodian; or 
(d) has a parent, guardian or custodian who is unwilling, 
incompetent or unavailable to provide any such care, discipline 
or attention."  G. L. c. 119, § 24. 
While the statute provides that any "person" may file a 
petition, see G. L. c. 119, § 24, in practice, petitions "are 
5 
 
usually filed by [the department] or by another health or 
welfare agency involved with children."  See 1 S.M. Limon, 
Massachusetts Juvenile Court Bench Book § 15.2.1(a), at 15-2 
(Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 3d ed. 2011 & Supp. 2014).  To comply 
with the requirements of § 24, petitioners customarily file "an 
affidavit or other report under oath outlining the alleged 
factual basis for the petition."  See id. at 15-3.  See Care & 
Protection of Lillian, 445 Mass. at 337 (petition sufficiently 
pleaded "if it alleges specific facts, based on personal 
knowledge or on information and belief, that, if true, fall 
within at least one of those four enumerated concerns [in 
§ 24]").  Taken together, § 24 petitions are customarily 
(although not exclusively) filed by department social workers, 
and the petition -- including the factual bases for the petition 
-- statutorily must be filed under oath. 
After the petition is filed, and both parents receive a 
summons and notice, a Juvenile Court judge holds an initial 
hearing, which may be held ex parte, in order to determine 
whether there is "reasonable cause" for a Juvenile Court judge 
to order the temporary removal of the child from his or her 
parents.  See G. L. c. 119, § 24.  If the judge makes such a 
finding and authorizes temporary removal of the child from the 
household, then "[§ 24] mandates a temporary custody hearing 
within seventy-two hours to determine whether temporary custody 
6 
 
shall continue until a hearing on the merits of the petition for 
care and protection."4  Care & Protection of Zita, 455 Mass. 272, 
276 (2009), citing G. L. c. 119, § 24.5 
2.  Care and protection of the child.6  On three occasions 
between 2004 and 2011, the department received reports 
indicating that C.M. had left the child alone with the child's 
father, a registered level three sex offender.  On the first two 
occasions, in 2004 and 2009, the department investigated the 
reports and imposed safety plans to mitigate possible risks to 
the child going forward.  The safety plans included prohibiting 
unsupervised contact between the child and the father.  
 
 
4 The relevant portion of § 24 provides: 
 
"Upon entry of the order [granting the department temporary 
custody of the child at the ex parte hearing], notice to 
appear before the court shall be given to either parents, 
both parents, a guardian with care and custody or another 
custodian.  At that time, the court shall determine whether 
temporary custody shall continue beyond [seventy-two] hours 
until a hearing on the merits of the petition for care and 
protection is concluded before the court." 
 
5 We acknowledge that similar proceedings may be commenced 
in the Probate and Family Court, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, 
§ 23 (a) (3), which may also result in the court granting the 
department emergency custody of a child, followed by a seventy-
two hour hearing, see Custody of Lori, 444 Mass. 316, 322 
(2005).  However, because those proceedings may be initiated sua 
sponte by a judge of the Probate and Family Court, see id., we 
confine our analysis to petitions and corresponding affidavits 
filed pursuant to § 24. 
 
6 The Appeals Court's opinion in this case sets out a more 
detailed summary of the factual background.  See C.M., 97 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 345-348. 
7 
 
Following a third report of unsupervised contact in 2011, 
Plouffe became involved with the family for the first time. 
Between August and September 2011, Plouffe met with and 
interviewed C.M., the child, and the father several times.  
During these meetings, she discussed the importance of the 
father's discontinuing unsupervised contact with the child.  In 
October of 2011, Plouffe proposed a safety plan providing that 
the father would not have unsupervised contact with the child in 
any circumstances, and that the family would engage in 
department services.  C.M. refused to agree to the proposed 
safety plan; she maintained that the father posed no risk to the 
child's physical well-being. 
Based on their conclusion that C.M. either did not 
understand, or was unwilling to take, the necessary steps to 
obviate the risk that the father posed to the child, the 
defendants then determined that the child was at risk.  In 
response, the defendants decided to petition the Juvenile Court 
to remove the child from the home.  When Plouffe informed C.M. 
of the department's intention to file a petition under § 24, 
Plouffe believed, based on C.M.'s behavior during their 
interaction, which was markedly different from the tone of all 
8 
 
of their earlier interactions, that C.M. intended to flee with 
the child, or to harm herself or the child.7 
 
To initiate the proceedings, Plouffe submitted to the 
Juvenile Court, inter alia, a report containing a five-page 
affidavit detailing the factual bases for the petition, and the 
department's request for emergency custody.8  On the same day 
that the petition was filed, a Juvenile Court judge held an ex 
parte hearing in which Plouffe testified under oath.  At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the judge ordered that the department 
receive temporary custody of the child.  The matter then was 
scheduled for a "seventy-two hour hearing," as required under 
§ 24, in which C.M., through her attorney, initially 
participated, but she then waived her rights to prior to its 
completion.9 
 
In December of 2011, after an independent physician 
certified that C.M. understood the risks posed by the father, 
 
 
7 Among other things, Plouffe noted that C.M. was being 
"eerily quiet and appeared extremely relaxed," as opposed to 
what Plouffe characterized as her usual "angry and defensive" 
demeanor. 
 
 
8 The five-page affidavit contained in Plouffe's report came 
to be referred to over the course of this litigation simply as 
"the affidavit."  See C.M., 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 351.  For 
brevity and consistency, we also employ this designation. 
 
9 The record is unclear as to the extent of C.M.'s initial 
involvement in the seventy-two hour hearing.  C.M.'s eventual 
waiver of her rights to a seventy-two hour hearing, however, was 
stipulated to by the defendants. 
9 
 
the judge ordered that physical custody of the child be returned 
to C.M., but that legal custody of the child remain with the 
department pending final disposition of the matter.  In April 
2012, an investigator appointed by the Juvenile Court submitted 
a report recommending that the custody proceedings against C.M. 
be dismissed, provided that the family agreed to a new safety 
plan addressing safe contact between the father and the child.  
C.M. agreed to the new safety plan that was based on the 
investigator's recommendation, and the judge dismissed the case 
in May 2012. 
 
3.  Procedural history.  Over two years later, in September 
of 2014, C.M. commenced the present action in the Superior Court 
against Plouffe, Gemski, the department itself, and other 
department personnel.  As is relevant to our analysis, the first 
count of the amended complaint alleged, pursuant to § 1983,10 
that the defendants had violated C.M.'s substantive due process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
 
 
10 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part: 
 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or 
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . ." 
10 
 
Constitution by "unjustifiably removing [the child] from her 
care, custody and control."  Specifically, C.M. asserted that 
Plouffe, with Gemski's approval, had wrongly initiated the care 
and protection proceedings, and that Plouffe had made false 
statements in her affidavit initiating the same. 
 
The defendants then filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, which C.M. opposed.11  Subsequently, a judge in the 
Superior Court issued an order allowing the defendants' motion.  
The judge concluded that the defendants were absolutely immune 
from liability under the § 1983 claim because Plouffe's act of 
swearing to the facts in her affidavit had been necessary to 
initiate the care and protection proceedings.  Relying on 
decisions from a number of Federal Courts of Appeals, the judge 
determined that the defendants had been "engaged in conduct in 
their capacity as legal advocates for the Commonwealth [in] 
initiating and prosecuting a child custody proceeding in the 
Juvenile Court," and accordingly were shielded by absolute 
immunity for this "quasi prosecutorial" conduct.  The judge also 
concluded that when Plouffe testified at the Juvenile Court ex 
parte hearing on the petition, she was entitled to absolute 
 
11 The commissioner separately moved for summary judgment as 
to the counts that pertained to her; the judge allowed the 
commissioner's motion, and the Appeals Court affirmed that 
order.  See C.M., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 355-356. 
11 
 
immunity as a witness in a judicial proceeding.  C.M. timely 
appealed. 
 
The Appeals Court affirmed the judgment in part and vacated 
it in part.  See C.M., 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 344.  To the extent 
that C.M. challenged the defendants' "filing" of the petition, 
the Appeals Court held that Plouffe and Gemski were entitled to 
absolute immunity because the function of their actions was 
"analogous to that of a prosecutor" in initiating a criminal 
proceeding.  See id. at 351-352, quoting Minor v. State, 819 
N.W.2d 383, 398 (Iowa), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 980 (2012).  
Likewise, the Appeals Court agreed with the Superior Court judge 
that the defendants were entitled to absolute witness immunity 
with respect to Plouffe's in-court testimony at the initial ex 
parte hearing in the Juvenile Court.  See C.M., supra at 354-
355. 
 
With respect to C.M.'s claim that Plouffe, with Gemski's 
approval, had made false statements in her affidavit as part of 
the initiation of care and protection proceedings, however, the 
Appeals Court held that Plouffe was not entitled to absolute 
immunity because she was acting as a "complaining witness."  See 
id. at 352.  The Appeals Court reasoned that the appropriate 
equivalent of Plouffe's conduct in making particular averments 
was that of a prosecutor attesting to facts in support of an 
arrest warrant, which the United States Supreme Court has held 
12 
 
is conduct that is not protected by absolute immunity.  See id. 
at 351-352, citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 130-131 
(1997).  Accordingly, the Appeals Court concluded that Plouffe 
was entitled only to qualified immunity with respect to the 
averments in her affidavit, not absolute immunity.  See C.M., 
supra at 355.  With respect to its immunity analysis, the 
Appeals Court generally concluded that "Gemski's immunity for 
approving Plouffe's actions is the same as Plouffe's immunity."  
See id. at 352 n.9.  The Appeals Court vacated the Superior 
Court judge's order "to the extent that [C.M.] alleged 
violations of § 1983 based on Plouffe's conduct of allegedly 
making false factual assertions in support of the care and 
protection petition and Gemski's alleged approval of that 
conduct."  Id. at 356-357. 
 
We granted the defendants' application for further 
appellate review, limited to the issue of "the scope of a social 
worker's immunity in attesting to facts contained in an 
affidavit accompanying and filed with a care and protection 
petition, and her supervisor's immunity for approving those 
acts."  C.M. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Children & 
Families, 485 Mass. 1107 (2020). 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "We review the 
allowance of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Mass. 
R. Civ. P. 12 (c) . . . de novo."  Marchese v. Boston Redev. 
13 
 
Auth., 483 Mass. 149, 156 (2019), citing Perullo v. Advisory 
Comm. on Personnel Standards, 476 Mass. 829, 834 (2017). 
In addition, "[t]he question of the availability of § 1983 
immunity is one of Federal law."  Jordan v. Sinsheimer, 403 
Mass. 586, 588 (1988).  "[A]lthough we give respectful 
consideration to such lower Federal court decisions as seem 
persuasive," Commonwealth v. Pon, 469 Mass. 296, 308 (2014), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Hill, 377 Mass. 59, 61 (1979), "we are 
not bound by decisions of Federal courts except the decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court on questions of Federal law," 
Commonwealth v. Montanez, 388 Mass. 603, 604 (1983).  The United 
States Supreme Court has yet to address the question whether 
social workers are entitled to absolute immunity in child 
removal proceedings.  See Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060, 1061 
(1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
Therefore, there is no binding Federal case law on the specific 
issues before us. 
 
2.  Absolute immunity.  Section 1983 provides a civil cause 
of action against any person who, acting under color of State 
law, deprives another of constitutional rights, privileges, or 
immunities.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Although the language of 
§ 1983 does not expressly provide for any immunities, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that "some officials perform 
'special functions' which, because of their similarity to 
14 
 
functions that would have been immune when Congress enacted 
§ 1983, deserve absolute protection from damages liability."  
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–269 (1993), quoting 
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).  "[T]he official 
seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such 
immunity is justified for the function in question."  Buckley, 
supra at 269, quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991). 
In determining whether the actions of a governmental 
official fit within the common-law tradition of absolute 
immunity, the Supreme Court "looks to 'the nature of the 
function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed 
it.'"  Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269, quoting Forrester v. White, 484 
U.S. 219, 229 (1988).  This "functional approach" ensures that 
"those governmental functions that were historically viewed as 
so important and vulnerable to interference by means of 
litigation" are shielded from civil liability, so that those 
functions "are performed with independence and without fear of 
consequences" (quotation and citation omitted).  Rehberg v. 
Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363 (2012). 
 
Under this framework, the United States Supreme Court has 
held that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from 
civil liability under § 1983 when "initiating a prosecution" and 
"presenting the State's case."  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 
409, 431 (1976).  This absolute prosecutorial immunity is 
15 
 
premised on the concern that "harassment by unfounded litigation 
would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his 
public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his 
decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment 
required by his public trust."  Id. at 423. 
In the same vein, the United States Supreme Court also has 
recognized absolute immunity for State agency officials who 
perform certain functions analogous to those of prosecutors 
initiating criminal proceedings on behalf of the State.  Butz, 
438 U.S. at 515.  The Court has explained that "[t]he decision 
to initiate administrative proceedings against an individual or 
corporation is very much like the prosecutor's decision to 
initiate or move forward with a criminal prosecution."  Id.  
Nonetheless, the Court has "been quite sparing in [its] 
recognition of absolute immunity" and has "refused to extend it 
any further than its justification would warrant" (quotations 
and citations omitted).  Burns, 500 U.S. at 487.  The general 
presumption is that "qualified rather than absolute immunity is 
sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of 
their duties."  Id. at 486-487. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has distinguished between conduct 
that is within the prosecutor's role as an advocate, which is 
entitled to absolute immunity under Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, and 
conduct that is investigative or administrative in nature, which 
16 
 
is not entitled to absolute immunity, see Buckley, 509 U.S. at 
274-275 (prosecutor not absolutely immune for fabricating 
evidence during preliminary investigation); id. at 276-278 
(prosecutor not absolutely immune for statements made at press 
conference announcing indictment); Burns, 500 U.S. at 494-496 
(prosecutor not absolutely immune for providing legal advice to 
police).  Similarly, the Court has held that a prosecutor who 
attests to facts in an affidavit in support of an arrest warrant 
acts as a "complaining witness" rather than as an advocate 
initiating judicial proceedings, and therefore is not entitled 
to absolute immunity for such conduct.  Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130-
131.  On this lattermost point, the Court has reasoned that "the 
only function that [a prosecutor] performs in giving sworn 
testimony is that of a witness," and such actions do not involve 
"the exercise of the judgment of the advocate."  Id. 
 
In sum, the touchstone for absolute immunity for 
prosecutorial functions is conduct that is "intimately 
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process."  
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.  Prosecutors, and similarly situated 
State actors who initiate judicial proceedings, are afforded 
absolute immunity "not from an exaggerated esteem for those who 
perform these functions, and certainly not from a desire to 
shield abuses of office, but because any lesser degree of 
immunity could impair the judicial process itself."  Malley v. 
17 
 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986), citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 
U.S. 325, 334–335 (1983).  With these principles as a guide, we 
turn to the parties' arguments. 
 
3.  Whether Plouffe had absolute immunity.  C.M. argues 
that Plouffe is not entitled to absolute immunity because, 
historically, "social workers" were not afforded such immunities 
under the common law when § 1983 was enacted.  That argument, 
however, misconstrues the jurisprudence regarding absolute 
immunity in this context.  A State official who performs a quasi 
prosecutorial function may be entitled to absolute immunity.  
See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 ("We have not retreated, however, 
from the principle that acts undertaken . . . in the course of 
[one's] role as an advocate for the State . . . are entitled to 
the protections of absolute immunity").  This is so because 
absolute immunity protects specific actions rather than broad 
titles or offices.  See id.  Accordingly, the dispositive 
question is whether Plouffe's actions in swearing to the facts 
within her affidavit can be separated from her act of initiating 
the care and protection proceeding under § 24.  We conclude that 
they cannot be separated, and thus Plouffe is entitled to 
absolute immunity for this "quasi prosecutorial" conduct. 
 
On this point, we are persuaded by guidance from the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  In Barber v. 
Miller, 809 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 2015), the court held that a 
18 
 
social worker was entitled to absolute immunity against 
allegations that he "included false and misleading statements of 
fact in [a] protective-custody petition."  As could be said of 
Plouffe, the court concluded that the social worker "offered his 
factual assessment in his capacity as a legal advocate 
initiating a child-custody proceeding in family court."  Id.  
Three years later, in Brent v. Wayne County Dep't of Human 
Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 685 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 1551 (2019), the Sixth Circuit extended this absolute 
immunity analysis to the context of temporary child removal 
petitions.  Noting that the filing of a petition to remove a 
child from the home under an analogous Michigan court rule 
triggers a subsequent judicial hearing,12 the court concluded 
 
 
12 Rule 3.963(B)(1) of the Michigan Court Rules states, in 
pertinent part, 
 
"The court may issue a written order . . . authorizing a 
child protective services worker, an officer, or other 
person deemed suitable by the court to immediately take a 
child into protective custody when, after presentment of a 
petition or affidavit of facts to the court, the court has 
reasonable cause to believe that all the following 
conditions exist, together with specific findings of fact: 
 
". . . 
 
"(b) The circumstances warrant issuing an order pending a 
hearing in accordance with: 
 
"(i) [Michigan Court Rule 3.965 (Preliminary Hearing)] for 
a child who is not yet under the jurisdiction of the court 
. . . ." 
19 
 
that the conduct of a social worker vouching for the truth of 
facts asserted in a removal petition is "more analogous to a 
prosecutor's decision to prosecute than a police officer's 
testifying by affidavit in support of probable cause."  Id., 
quoting Bauch v. Richland County Children Servs., 733 Fed. Appx. 
292, 297 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 594 (2018).  
Accordingly, the court concluded that the social worker was 
entitled to absolute immunity.  Brent, supra at 683-684.  See 
Bauch, supra (social worker's affidavit in support of removal 
petition "undeniable part of the judicial process because the 
[affidavit] initiated the [removal] action and subsequent 
hearing" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
 
Most Federal Courts of Appeals that have considered this 
issue agree that social workers are entitled to absolute 
immunity with respect to conduct that initiates judicial child 
custody, removal, or dependency proceedings.  See Pittman v. 
Cuyahoga County Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 
724 (6th Cir. 2011) (social worker who filed complaint and 
affidavit in support of motion for permanent custody acted "in 
her capacity as a legal advocate, and she is therefore entitled 
to absolute immunity with regard to these actions"); Ernst v. 
Child & Youth Servs. of Chester County, 108 F.3d 486, 495 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 (1997) (child welfare case 
workers "entitled to absolute immunity for their actions on 
20 
 
behalf of the state in preparing for, initiating, and 
prosecuting dependency proceedings"); Vosburg v. Department of 
Social Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1989) ("Under 
Virginia law, the filing of a removal petition is, in essence, 
the start of judicial proceedings against the parent or guardian 
of a minor child, and the duties of the social worker at that 
point are those of an advocate in that process").13 
 
 
13 To the extent that certain Federal Courts of Appeals have 
reached a different conclusion, in our view, those cases are 
either unpersuasive or inapposite.  For instance, in Beltran v. 
Santa Clara County, 514 F.3d 906, 908-909 (9th Cir. 2008), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a 
social worker was not entitled to absolute immunity for 
allegedly fabricating statements in a sworn child dependency 
petition.  In reaching its decision, however, the Ninth Circuit 
conflated the social worker's sworn child dependency petition 
with her preliminary investigations that already had occurred.  
See id. ("[A]s prosecutors and others investigating criminal 
matters have no absolute immunity for their investigatory 
conduct, a fortiori, social workers conducting investigations 
have no such immunity").  Here, however, Plouffe's act of 
swearing to the facts in her affidavit was not an instance of 
nondiscretionary "investigatory conduct," but, rather, was a 
statutorily required act within her function as an advocate 
initiating care and protection proceedings in the Juvenile 
Court.  See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2003) 
("[T]he initiation and pursuit of child-dependency proceedings 
[are] prosecutorial in nature and [warrant] absolute immunity," 
where social worker's activities "[are] performed as an advocate 
within the judicial decision-making process"). 
 
 
Similarly, in Austin v. Borel, 830 F.2d 1356, 1363 (5th 
Cir. 1987), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit held that child protection workers were not entitled to 
absolute immunity for allegedly filing a false verified 
complaint seeking the removal of two children from their 
household.  The Fifth Circuit noted, however that there was a 
distinction under Louisiana law between a "verified complaint" 
and a separate petition for adjudication of the child's custody.  
21 
 
 
At oral argument, C.M. maintained that, to the extent that 
Plouffe's conduct has a historical analog at common law, the 
comparison is to that of a "complaining witness" testifying in 
support of probable cause for an arrest warrant, who the Supreme 
Court has held is not entitled to absolute immunity.  In Kalina, 
522 U.S. at 120-122, the Court considered immunity in the 
context of a motion for an arrest warrant that was accompanied 
by an affidavit, both of which were executed by a prosecutor.  
Employing its "functional approach" analysis, the Court held 
that the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity with 
respect to preparing and filing the motion and affidavit, but 
was not entitled to absolute immunity for swearing to the facts 
contained within the affidavit itself.  Id. at 122, 129-131.  
Critically, the Court based its holding on the fact that, 
although the affidavit was required to be sworn under oath, 
neither Federal nor State law required that the prosecutor be 
the individual personally to certify the affidavit.  Id. at 129-
130.  Otherwise put, there was no need for the prosecutor to 
 
Id. at 1360-1361.  Specifically, it is the petition, and not a 
verified complaint, that initiates adjudicatory proceedings in 
Louisiana courts, and the petition may be filed only by a 
prosecutor.  Id.  Unlike Louisiana's statute, G. L. c. 119, 
§ 24, does not make any such distinction.  Plouffe was empowered 
to file the care and protection petition and corresponding 
affidavit herself, and, as discussed, she was required to do so 
in order to initiate the care and protection proceedings 
pursuant to § 24. 
22 
 
certify the specific affidavit at issue in order to function as 
an advocate for the State.  Therefore, when she did so, the 
prosecutor ceased performing her advocacy functions and began 
"giving sworn testimony [as] that of a witness."  Id. at 131. 
 
Kalina is distinguishable for several reasons.  First, the 
prosecutor in Kalina made averments in support of a finding of 
probable cause, which is a precursor to potentially commencing 
criminal proceedings.  It was not assured that the prosecutor's 
averments would have any connection to future judicial 
proceedings, because the proceedings were contingent not on the 
prosecutor's averments, but on the trial court judge's finding 
that there was probable cause to issue the arrest warrant.  
Here, however, Plouffe's averments were essential to her 
initiation of the care and protection proceeding in the Juvenile 
Court, which commenced upon her filing the petition and 
supporting affidavit. 
Second, and more importantly, the language of § 24 makes 
clear that, unlike the prosecutor in Kalina, Plouffe was 
required to attest to the facts contained within her affidavit 
in order to initiate the care and protection proceedings.  Given 
that the petition must be filed "under oath" and must 
sufficiently allege that the child meets one of the four 
enumerated statutory concerns, see G. L. c. 119, § 24, Plouffe 
could not act as an advocate in initiating the care and 
23 
 
protection proceedings without also acting as an affiant with 
respect to the underlying factual basis for the petition.  Taken 
together, we are persuaded that Plouffe was not acting as a 
"complaining witness" providing testimony as contemplated by 
Kalina, but rather was exercising her quasi prosecutorial 
function of initiating care and protection proceedings in the 
Juvenile Court.14 
 
Last, C.M. argues that the defendants are not entitled to 
absolute immunity because the act of misrepresenting facts to a 
court is "never afforded absolute immunity."  We disagree, 
because this argument misconstrues how absolute immunity 
operates as applied to prosecutorial and quasi prosecutorial 
functions.  As the Supreme Court has explained, absolute 
immunity for prosecutors has operated at common law to mean that 
they are absolutely immune "from damages liability . . . for 
making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings 
(at least so long as the statements [are] related to the 
proceeding)."  See Burns, 500 U.S. at 489-490.  Absolute 
immunity represents a "balance between . . . evils," meaning 
 
14 The defendants request that we address language in the 
Appeals Court's decision regarding the scope of immunity that 
department social workers are entitled to "in investigations 
they conduct."  C.M., 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 355.  The defendants 
acknowledge, however, that this issue falls outside the scope of 
our limited further appellate review.  Accordingly, we decline 
to address it. 
24 
 
that "it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed 
the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who 
try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation."  
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428, quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 
579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). 
 
The same public policy concerns that undergird absolute 
immunity for prosecutors apply with equal force in the context 
of child removal proceedings.  Without absolute immunity, "we 
would expect suits in retaliation for the initiation of 
dependency proceedings to occur with even greater frequency than 
suits against prosecutors," as "[p]arents involved in seemingly 
unjustified dependency proceedings are likely to be even more 
resentful of state interference in the usually sacrosanct 
parent-child relationship than are defendants of criminal 
prosecution."  Ernst, 108 F.3d at 496–497. 
As noted by the judge, social workers "walk a tightrope" in 
trying to do what is in a child's best interests.  When those 
interests are in direct conflict with a parent's desire to 
retain custody of his or her child, the circumstances are bound 
to be emotionally fraught.  Were we to hold otherwise, there is 
a risk that social workers would act "so overly cautious[ly], 
out of fear of personal liability, that they fail to intervene 
in situations in which children are in danger."  Ernst, 108 F.3d 
at 496.  For these reasons, it is vital that social workers are 
25 
 
afforded absolute immunity for conduct that initiates care and 
protection proceedings under § 24, which, as the provision is 
written, necessarily includes swearing to facts contained in an 
affidavit in support of a petition. 
 
We emphasize that our recognition of absolute immunity here 
only removes the possibility of civil tort liability under 
§ 1983 for the initiation of care and protection proceedings by 
State-employed social workers; it does not foreclose other means 
by which the public is protected against the kind of misconduct 
that C.M. alleges in her complaint.  First, the decision to 
grant the department emergency, temporary custody of a child in 
response to the filing of a § 24 petition rests solely with the 
Juvenile Court.  See G. L. c. 119, § 29C.15  Thus, the court has 
the authority to decline to order temporary custody to the 
department if a motion judge perceives that the social worker 
has failed to adequately substantiate, or even has 
 
 
15 General Laws c. 119, § 29C, states in relevant part: 
 
"If a court of competent jurisdiction commits, grants 
custody or transfers responsibility for a child to the 
department or its agent, the court shall certify that the 
continuation of the child in his home is contrary to his 
best interests and shall determine whether the department 
or its agent, as appropriate, has made reasonable efforts 
prior to the placement of a child with the department to 
prevent or eliminate the need for removal from the home 
. . . ." 
26 
 
misrepresented, his or her statements in the affidavit or at the 
initial hearing. 
Furthermore, to guard against the risk that a child's 
temporary removal from the home may have been ordered 
erroneously, § 24 mandates that a subsequent hearing be held 
within seventy-two hours to determine whether the emergency, 
temporary custody of the child will continue pending a 
resolution of the case.  "A 'primary function' of the seventy-
two hour hearing is 'to discover and correct any errors that may 
have occurred during the initial hearing, which, in the interest 
of expediency, most likely cannot be exhaustive.'"  Care & 
Protection of Zita, 455 Mass. at 276, quoting Custody of Lori, 
444 Mass. 316, 321 (2005).16 
Additionally, apart from the process prescribed by § 24, 
the Juvenile Court may address misrepresentations in sworn 
 
 
16 Indeed, C.M.'s most immediate opportunity to challenge 
the statements in Plouffe's affidavit was at the seventy-two 
hour hearing, but she voluntarily waived the hearing prior to 
its completion.  See Note to Rule 9 of the Juvenile Court Rules 
for the Care and Protection of Children (2018) ("By waiving the 
temporary custody hearing, the parent, guardian, custodian or 
child is relinquishing his/her right to be heard, to object to 
the court's orders and to appeal the orders").  C.M. then waited 
two years after the child had been released from department 
custody before initiating this § 1983 action.  These facts 
underscore our conclusion that absolute immunity is necessary to 
protect social workers against the threat of civil liability 
hanging over their heads, which risks interfering with the full 
and independent exercise of their duties on behalf of at-risk 
children in the Commonwealth. 
27 
 
affidavits or in-court testimony through other mechanisms both 
internal and external to the judiciary, including through the 
imposition of sanctions or contempt, Rule 17 of the Juvenile 
Court Rules for the Care and Protection of Children (2018); 
seeking perjury charges, G. L. c. 268, § 4; or filing a 
professional complaint with the Board of Registration of Social 
Workers, 258 Code Mass. Regs. § 30.01 (2004).  In short, a 
variety of mechanisms remain in place to protect the public from 
the risk that a social worker may intentionally misrepresent 
facts to the court or otherwise improperly initiate care and 
protection proceedings under § 24.17 
 
4.  Whether Gemski had absolute immunity.  The parties do 
not dispute that because Gemski acted as Plouffe's supervisor in 
approving her conduct, any immunities afforded to Plouffe also 
apply to Gemski.  See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 
345 (2009) (supervisory prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity 
for approving advocacy conduct of trial prosecutor).  We agree.  
Because we conclude that Plouffe was entitled to absolute 
immunity for attesting to the facts in her affidavit, we also 
 
17 We emphasize that our immunity analysis is limited to 
care and protection proceedings initiated pursuant to § 24, and 
does not apply to other authorities, such as G. L. c. 119, 
§ 51B, that permit the ex parte removal of a child prior to the 
initiation of judicial proceedings.  The absence of judicial 
imprimatur in the removal of a child from the home would present 
a substantially different set of circumstances that, in turn, 
would require a different analysis. 
28 
 
conclude that Gemski, as her superior at the department, 
similarly was entitled to absolute immunity for approving 
Plouffe's conduct. 
Judgment affirmed.