Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren

Citation: 2007-Ohio-5251

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251.] 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. BROEREN. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 
 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251.] 
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or 
misrepresentation—Neglect of an entrusted legal matter—Failure to 
promptly deliver property of a client—Six-month suspension. 
(No. 2007-0333 – Submitted July 10, 2007 — Decided October 10, 2007.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 06-057. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, P. Robert Broeren Jr. of Mount Vernon, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0069166, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1998. 
{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
recommends that we now suspend respondent’s license to practice for six months 
based on findings that he neglected a client’s case, attempted to cover up the 
neglect, failed to return the client’s file on request, and failed to cooperate in the 
ensuing disciplinary investigation.  Respondent objects to the board’s report, 
disputing the findings of neglect and dishonesty, urging us to give mitigating 
effect to the fact that he suffers from attention deficit disorder, and arguing for a 
stay of the six-month suspension.  On review, we overrule respondent’s 
objections, agree that he committed professional misconduct as found by the 
board, and hold that a six-month suspension is appropriate. 
{¶ 3} Relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent in a two-count 
complaint with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, including 
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DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or 
misrepresentation), 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting the neglect of an entrusted legal 
matter), and 9-102(B)(4) (requiring a lawyer to promptly deliver requested 
property that the client is entitled to receive), and with a violation of Gov.Bar R. 
V(4)(G) (requiring a lawyer to cooperate in an investigation of misconduct).  A 
panel of the board heard the cause and, based on the parties’ extensive stipulations 
and other evidence, found the cited misconduct and recommended a six-month 
suspension.  The board adopted the panel’s findings and recommendation. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} Respondent graduated from law school in 1994 and has since been 
admitted to the practice of law in Virginia and the District of Columbia in 
addition to Ohio.  He has been in practice in Knox County, Ohio, since 2002, first 
practicing privately and later also as a part-time assistant county prosecutor.  
Since 2005, respondent has been a full-time assistant county prosecutor. 
The Lawsuit Underlying the Charges of Misconduct 
{¶ 5} In September 2003, Selective Med Components (“Selective Med”) 
sued PMR Products, Inc. (“PMR”), a medical-device distributor in Albany, New 
York, for $2,097.78 worth of electronic components that PMR had ordered and 
received but not paid for.  In November 2003, after having already filed an answer 
and a counterclaim on his company’s behalf, PMR President William Lubin hired 
respondent to defend the company against Selective Med’s suit.  Lubin instructed 
respondent to contain the costs of PMR’s defense in view of the small amount at 
stake. 
{¶ 6} In February 2004, the Mount Vernon Municipal Court granted 
Selective Med’s motion to compel discovery, which respondent had not opposed.  
Selective Med and PMR thereafter continued to pursue discovery; however, 
Selective Med still maintained that respondent was not responding completely.  
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Selective Med moved for sanctions, and on April 21, 2004, the municipal court 
granted $500 in sanctions against PMR. 
{¶ 7} Lubin testified that respondent did not tell him of the order for 
sanctions.  Lubin also claimed that respondent did not notify him about a June 11, 
2004 trial until the day before, when Lubin could not make arrangements in time 
to attend.  Lubin also insisted that respondent did not tell him of the $2,097.78 
judgment entered against him when, despite respondent’s motion for a 
continuance, the trial went forward without Lubin and respondent appeared but 
lost the case.  Finally, Lubin complained that respondent did not tell him of a July 
15, 2004 court order scheduling a judgment-debtor examination for August 20, 
2004. 
{¶ 8} Lubin did not appear at the August 20 debtor examination, and the 
municipal court issued an order for him to show cause on September 17, 2004, 
why he should not be held in contempt.  Lubin received notice of this order from 
the court and wrote to the municipal judge, asking him to set aside the judgment 
against PMR and to continue the date of the contempt hearing.  The judge 
nevertheless held the September 17 hearing as scheduled, and when Lubin did not 
appear, the judge found him in contempt and ordered him to pay Selective Med 
another $500. 
Respondent’s Response to the Disciplinary Investigation 
{¶ 9} Lubin complained to relator about respondent’s representation.  In 
December 2004, relator sent respondent a letter of inquiry about the grievance, 
which respondent received but to which he did not reply in the time requested.  
He also did not reply to a second letter or appear in response to a subpoena in 
March 2005.  Respondent did, however, eventually respond to Lubin’s claims of 
neglect and participate in the disciplinary proceedings. 
{¶ 10} Respondent did not deny having failed to alert Lubin about the first 
order for sanctions.  He insisted, however, that he had notified Lubin of various 
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other proceedings.  He presented copies of a letter that he claimed to have sent to 
Lubin on May 7, 2004, to advise of the June 11 trial date and another letter, which 
he claimed to have sent on June 11, 2004, to advise about the loss at trial.  In 
addition, he presented two more letters: one as proof that he sent Lubin a copy of 
the June 11 judgment entry against Lubin, the other as proof that he sent Lubin 
notice of the August 20 debtor exam.  The body of a letter dated June 16, 2004 
reads: 
{¶ 11} “Enclosed is a copy of the Court’s Final Order in regards to this 
matter, which I received in the mail today.  Under Ohio Rules, you will have 28 
days from the date of the entry to file an appeal.  I will be in Ireland from June 30, 
2004 – July 11, 2004, so please contact me before June 30 to discuss this. 
{¶ 12} “Enclosed is an invoice for service rendered through today.  Please 
note that I have not yet received payment for the January and March 2004 
invoices.” 
{¶ 13} The body of the next letter, dated June 18, 2004, reads: 
{¶ 14} “Enclosed is a copy of a Judgment Debtor exam which Selective 
Med has scheduled on August 20, 2004, which I received in the mail today.  As I 
noted in my letter of June 16, 2004, I will be in Ireland from June 30, 2004 – July 
11, 2004, so please contact me before June 30, 2004, or after July 11, 2004 to 
discuss this.” 
{¶ 15} Respondent produced these letters in a facsimile to Lubin on 
September 17, 2004, in response to Lubin’s expressed dissatisfaction with his 
representation.  The board, however, concluded that neither letter had been 
written at the time asserted, mainly because of its suspicions over the June 18 
letter.  The June 18 letter that supposedly notified Lubin of the August 20 debtor 
exam was dated nearly one month before July 15, 2004 — the date on which the 
court ordered the debtor exam.  Respondent tried to explain this inconsistency at 
the hearing, proposing that he must have mistakenly placed a June 18 date on the 
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letter when he wrote the letter in July.  The reference to his “June 30, 2004 – July 
11, 2004” vacation in the letter, however, makes this explanation incredible. 
{¶ 16} To refute the implication that he had fabricated the June 18 letter, 
respondent also claimed that the information about his vacation was simply 
another mistake.  He suggested that he must have inadvertently failed to delete 
that sentence in haste after using the June 16 letter as an electronic template from 
which he had “cut and pasted.”  We also reject this explanation. 
{¶ 17} Respondent’s story about misdating the June 18 letter is 
inconsistent, and we do not believe that he would also have been as careless as to 
leave in the reference to his already-completed vacation when he managed to take 
out of the June 16 template the two-sentence paragraph that followed it.  Indeed, 
respondent actually changed the sentence about his vacation by adding to the June 
18 letter the italicized text: “As I noted in my letter of June 16, 2004, I will be in 
Ireland from June 30, 2004 – July 11, 2004, so please contact me before June 30, 
2004 or after July 11, 2004 to discuss this.”  These additions, for which 
respondent admitted he did not “have a good answer” at the panel hearing, are 
proof that respondent did not draft the June 18 letter and, by implication, the June 
16 letter at the times he has asserted. 
Respondent’s Response to Successor Counsel 
{¶ 18} Lubin obtained new counsel, New York attorney Richard Doling, 
after the show-cause order.  Doling wrote to respondent five times beginning in 
October 2004 and ending in January 2005, each time asking for information on 
the case and in November, demanding the PMR file.  Respondent did not reply to 
any of Doling’s letters or forward the file.  Respondent explained at the hearing 
that PMR had paid only $135 of his legal bill and he thought he was justified in 
keeping the file until PMR paid him in full. 
{¶ 19} Respondent concedes that he violated DR 9-102(B)(4) by failing to 
deliver PMR’s file and that he violated Gov.Bar V(4)(G) by failing to timely 
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respond to relator’s investigative inquiries.  We accept these concessions and find 
that respondent committed this misconduct. 
{¶ 20} We reject, however, respondent’s arguments that relator failed to 
prove the violations of DR 6-101(A)(3) and 1-102(A)(4) with clear and 
convincing evidence, as required by Gov.Bar R. V(6)(J).  As we have just 
discussed, the record amply justifies the board’s conclusions that respondent 
neglected to appropriately advise his client of the proceedings in the PMR case 
and then fabricated one or more letters to conceal his neglect.  In addition to the 
obvious discrepancies in timing and content of the June 16 and 18 letters, we infer 
from respondent’s repeated failure to answer Doling’s letters that he simply 
refused at times to attend to professional responsibilities having anything to do 
with Lubin, whom he regarded as a contentious client, and then tried to avoid the 
consequences.  We thus overrule these two objections and find that respondent 
also violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and 6-101(A)(3). 
Sanction 
{¶ 21} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider the 
duties violated, the actual or potential injury caused, the attorney's mental state, 
and sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 
Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  Before making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Glatki (2000), 88 Ohio 
St.3d 381, 384, 726 N.E.2d 993. 
{¶ 22} Respondent violated duties to his client by failing to 
conscientiously represent PMR and to return the PMR case file, to the legal 
profession by failing to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation, and to the 
public by failing to exhibit the highest standards of honesty and integrity.  At a 
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minimum, respondent’s misconduct caused his client unnecessary consternation.  
It may have irreparably compromised PMR’s legal defenses and been integral to 
the contempt citations against his client.  Furthermore, we generally impose a six-
month license suspension when a lawyer engages in this type of neglect and 
dishonesty.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Stollings, 111 Ohio St.3d 155, 2006-Ohio-
5345, 855 N.E.2d 479 (six-month suspension imposed on an attorney who misled 
a client about the dismissal of the client’s case and the neglect that had caused the 
dismissal); Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Florez, 98 Ohio St.3d 448, 2003-Ohio-1730, 
786 N.E.2d 875 (six-month suspension imposed on an attorney who neglected his 
client's case and provided fabricated evidence to an investigator); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Wallace (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 113, 729 N.E.2d 343 (six-month 
suspension imposed for an attorney's neglect of a client's case and his repeated 
attempts to mislead the client about it); Columbus Bar Assn. v. Bowen (1999), 87 
Ohio St.3d 126, 717 N.E.2d 708 (six-month suspension imposed on an attorney 
who failed to tell his client that her personal-injury lawsuit had been dismissed 
with prejudice for want of prosecution). 
{¶ 23} As mitigating and aggravating factors, the board found that 
respondent did not cooperate in the disciplinary proceedings at first but eventually 
did cooperate, that he acknowledged some of his misconduct but not all of it, and 
that his client suffered some financial harm but was not particularly vulnerable.  
See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(e), (g), and (h), and (2)(d).  To the extent these 
factors exist in this case, they offset one another.  The other mitigating factors are 
that respondent has no prior disciplinary record and has established his good 
character and excellent professional reputation apart from his misconduct.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (e).  These factors, however, do not outweigh 
the aggravating effect of respondent’s having submitted false evidence and having 
acted out of self-interest in trying to cover up his misconduct.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b) and (f). 
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{¶ 24} Respondent argues that the balance is nonetheless tipped in his 
favor by BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g), which recognizes the mitigating effect of 
proof that (1) a lawyer has been diagnosed with a mental disability by a qualified 
health-care professional, (2) the mental disability contributed to cause the 
misconduct, (3) the lawyer has undergone a sustained period of successful 
treatment, and (4) a qualified health-care professional has released the lawyer to 
return, under specified conditions if necessary, to the competent, ethical, and 
professional practice of law.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i) through (iv).  
Respondent has not met this burden. 
{¶ 25} Respondent presented a report from Gideon L. King, M.D., who 
diagnosed respondent with attention deficit disorder (“ADD”) in April 2006, 
prescribed medication for him, and has since observed favorable results.  This 
disorder causes the afflicted person to be inattentive to detail and predisposed to 
making careless mistakes. According to Dr. King, the condition probably 
compromised respondent’s ability to practice law.  In a second report, Associate 
Director of the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) Stephanie Krznarich 
confirmed the diagnosis and also advised that respondent had entered into an 
OLAP recovery contract, with which he was in compliance. 
{¶ 26} Neither of these medical reports, however, specifically established 
that respondent’s ADD contributed to cause his neglect of the PMR case in 2004.  
Moreover, neither report suggested that ADD prompts acts of duplicity such as 
those that respondent perpetuated that year.  Respondent has thus failed to satisfy 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(ii), and we need attribute no mitigating effect to the 
fact that he has ADD.  This objection is also overruled. 
{¶ 27} In his final objection, respondent argues that because he did not 
violate DR 1-102(A)(4) or 6-101(A)(3) and has ADD, we should temper the 
disposition recommended by the board and stay the six-month suspension.  We 
have already dispensed with his claims that he did not commit the cited 
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misconduct and that his mental disability qualifies as a mitigating factor.  We thus 
impose the sanction warranted for respondent’s misconduct – a six-month 
suspension. 
{¶ 28} Respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio 
for six months.  We further order that respondent pay $1,000, plus interest at the 
judgment rate, as restitution for the monetary sanctions that his client incurred as 
a result of his misconduct.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Stacy Solochek 
Beckman and Joseph M. Caligiuri, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Phillip D. Lehmkuhl, for respondent. 
______________________