Case Title: State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-221

Docket Number: 19961328

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Grady, Appellant, v. State Employment Relations Board, 
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Appellee. 
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[Cite as State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1997),  Ohio St.3d   .] 
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Mandamus to compel State Employment Relations Board either to find 
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that relator’s unfair labor practice charge was timely filed and 
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proceed with a hearing or consider the facts concerning the 
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timeliness question and issue an explanation setting forth its 
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rationale -- Writ denied, when. 
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(No. 96-1328 -- Submitted February 18, 1997 -- Decided April 16, 1997.) 
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Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 95APD11-
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1445. 
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In 1994, the city of Cleveland employed appellant, Norman Grady, as a 
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waste collection foreman. In April 1994, the city suspended Grady pending 
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dismissal for fighting with a subordinate co-worker.   
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The collective bargaining agreement between the city and Grady’s 
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collective bargaining representative, Laborers’ International Union of North 
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America Local 1099 (“local union”), provided a four-step grievance procedure, 
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which constituted the “sole and exclusive method for the resolution of grievances” 
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under the agreement.  Grady filed a grievance through the local union protesting 
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the city’s suspension of him pending dismissal.  The city denied Grady’s grievance 
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through the first three steps of the grievance procedure.   
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By letter dated January 27, 1995, the local union advised Grady that it 
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would not advance his grievance to arbitration, which is the final step of the 
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collectively bargained grievance procedure, because it had concluded that his 
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grievance lacked merit.  According to Grady, he did not receive the local union’s 
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letter until February 27, 1995.  In a letter dated March 6, 1995, the city notified 
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Grady of his dismissal from employment: 
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“Please be advised that you are hereby dismissed from your position as a 
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Waste Collection Foreman for the Division of Waste Collection and Disposal for 
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violating rule 9.10 of the rules of Civil Service.  Mr. Grady your union (local 
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1099) will not advance your grievance dated April 14, 1994 to arbitration. 
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“Specifically, Mr. Grady, you have exhausted your rights to appeal through 
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all City of Cleveland processes[;] therefore, your termination from the position of 
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Waste Collection foreman, for the City of Cleveland, Department of Public 
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Service, Division of Waste Collection and Disposal is effective April 14, 1994.” 
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In April 1995, Grady wrote to the president of Laborers’ International 
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Union of North America (“national union”) seeking administrative relief from the 
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local union’s failure to submit his grievance to arbitration.  In May 1995, the 
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national union informed Grady that “collective bargaining matters, including 
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matters related to contract administration, are handled through the Local Union, 
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which by law serves as the exclusive collective bargaining agent.”   
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On June 23, 1995, Grady filed an unfair labor practice charge against the 
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local union with appellee, the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”).    
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Grady claimed that the local union had breached its duty of fair representation.    
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The local union moved to dismiss the charge on the basis that it had not been 
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timely filed.  After reviewing an investigative memorandum prepared by a SERB 
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Labor Relations Specialist and the arguments of Grady and the local union, SERB 
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dismissed the unfair labor practice charge.  SERB determined that “[t]he events 
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giving rise to the charge occurred more than ninety (90) days prior to the filing of 
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the charge with the Board and there are no mitigating circumstances warranting 
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equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.”   
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In November 1995, Grady filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 
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Franklin County for a writ of mandamus to compel SERB either to find that 
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Grady’s unfair labor practice charge was timely filed and proceed with a hearing 
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on the charge or consider the facts and circumstances concerning the timeliness 
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question and issue an explanation setting forth its rationale. The parties filed 
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cross-motions for summary judgment.  In May 1996, the court of appeals granted 
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SERB’s motion and denied the writ.   
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The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
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____________________ 
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Law Offices of Lester S. Potash and Lester S. Potash, for appellant. 
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Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Daniel P. Jones and Joseph D. 
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Rubino, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
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____________________ 
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Per Curiam. 
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Standard of Review 
 
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Grady asserts in his propositions of law that the court of appeals erred in 
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granting SERB’s summary judgment motion and denying the writ.  Civ.R. 56(C) 
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provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined 
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that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the 
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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the 
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evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such 
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evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse 
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to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.  Temple v. 
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Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 
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267, 274. 
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R.C. 4117.12(B) governs the filing of unfair labor practice charges with 
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SERB and provides: 
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 “When anyone files a charge with the board alleging that an unfair labor 
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practice has been committed, the board or its designated agent shall investigate the 
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charge.  If the board has probable cause for believing that a violation has occurred, 
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the board shall issue a complaint and shall conduct a hearing concerning the 
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charge.  ***”  
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A determination by SERB whether to issue a complaint in an unfair labor 
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practice case is not reviewable by direct appeal.  See Ohio Assn. of Pub. School 
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Emp., Chapter 643, AFSCME/AFL-CIO v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. 
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(1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 159, 572 N.E.2d 80, syllabus.  Nevertheless, mandamus will 
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issue to correct an abuse of discretion by SERB in dismissing unfair labor practice 
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charges.  State ex rel. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp./AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State 
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Emp. Relations Bd. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 149, 151-152, 593 N.E.2d 288, 290-291.  
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An abuse of discretion connotes an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable 
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attitude.  State ex rel. Richard v. Seidner (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 666 
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N.E.2d 1134, 1136.  In addition, courts must defer to SERB’s interpretation of 
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R.C. Chapter 4117.  State Emp. Relations Bd. v. Miami Univ. (1994), 71 Ohio 
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St.3d 351, 353, 643 N.E.2d 1113, 1115.   
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Consequently, in order to be entitled to the requested writ of mandamus 
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compelling SERB to issue a complaint and hold a hearing on the unfair labor 
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practice charge, Grady must establish that SERB abused its discretion by 
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dismissing the unfair labor practice charge. 
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Timeliness; Equitable Tolling     
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SERB dismissed Grady’s unfair labor practice charge because the events 
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giving rise to the charge occurred more than ninety days before Grady filed the 
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charge with SERB and no mitigating circumstances warranted equitable tolling of 
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the statute of limitations.  R.C. 4117.12(B) provides that “[t]he board may not 
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issue a notice of hearing based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than 
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ninety days prior to the filing of the charge with the board ***.”  By enacting a 
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ninety-day statute of limitations, the General Assembly intended employees to 
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seek redress for unfair labor practices promptly.  State Emp. Relations Bd. v. Ohio 
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State Univ. (1987), 36 Ohio App.3d 1, 3, 520 N.E.2d 597, 599.  The ninety-day 
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time period does not commence until the charging party knew or should have 
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known of the conduct which constituted the improper conduct and actual damage 
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ensued.  Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Hubbard Twp. 
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Trustees (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 843, 847, 589 N.E.2d 1386, 1389.  
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In his first proposition of law, Grady asserts that SERB abused its discretion 
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in dismissing his unfair labor practice charge as untimely.  Grady contends that 
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actual damage from the local union’s decision not to pursue his grievance to 
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arbitration did not occur until after he had exhausted his attempt to secure relief 
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from the national union in May 1995. 
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Grady’s contention is meritless.  Grady knew of the events underlying his 
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unfair labor practice charge by February 27, 1995, when he admits he received the 
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local union’s letter notifying him that it would not advance his grievance to 
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arbitration.  Any damage to Grady would have occurred by March 6, 1995, the 
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date the city notified Grady of his termination from employment and the 
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exhaustion of the collectively bargained grievance procedure due to his local 
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union’s refusal to submit his grievance to arbitration.  The national union could 
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not have submitted a timely request for arbitration because the national union was 
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not a party to the collective bargaining agreement.  Because the March 6, 1995 
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date was more than ninety days before Grady filed his unfair labor practice charge 
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with SERB, SERB did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charge as 
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untimely.   
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Grady next asserts in his second proposition of law that SERB abused its 
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discretion by failing to consider and provide reasons for rejecting his argument 
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that the ninety-day period in R.C. 4117.12(B) was equitably tolled by his request 
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for internal administrative remedies from the national union. 
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R.C. 4117.12(B) does not require SERB to issue findings of fact to support 
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its dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge prior to issuing a notice of hearing 
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on the complaint.  State ex rel. Alben v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1996), 76 Ohio 
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St.3d 133, 138, 666 N.E.2d 1119, 1124; cf. R.C. 4117.12(B)(3), requiring SERB 
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to state findings of fact in any decision following the issuance of a complaint and 
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evidentiary hearing on unfair labor practice charges.  But the court will issue a 
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limited writ of mandamus to compel SERB to consider all facts and circumstances 
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relevant to the question of timeliness and to issue an explanation where a genuine 
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controversy exists.  Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp./AFSCME, AFL-CIO, supra, 
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64 Ohio St.3d at 152-153, 593 N.E.2d at 292. 
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Unlike Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp./AFSCME, AFL-CIO, the record 
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here reflects that SERB considered the timeliness issue, including Grady’s 
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assertion of equitable tolling.  The record further indicates no abuse of discretion 
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by SERB in finding that the ninety-day period in R.C. 4117.12(B) was not 
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equitably tolled by Grady’s request for relief from the national union.  The 
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collective bargaining agreement between the city and the local union contained the 
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exclusive grievance procedure, and the national union was not a party to that 
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agreement.  Grady introduced no evidence of any representation on the part of the 
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city or the local union that he could obtain relief from the national union.  Finally, 
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as previously noted, by the time Grady requested relief from the national union, he 
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had already been notified that he had exhausted his remedies under the collectively 
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bargained grievance procedure.  Accordingly, no genuine controversy as to 
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equitable tolling or timeliness existed.  Alben, supra, 76 Ohio St.3d at 138, 666 
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N.E.2d at 1124-1125; State ex rel. Leigh v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1996), 76 
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Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 666 N.E.2d 1128, 1131. 
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Those cases in which SERB has permitted equitable tolling of the R.C. 
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4117.12(B) ninety-day period for filing an unfair labor practice charge are 
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inapposite.  See, e.g., In re Cent. State Univ. (July 6, 1989), SERB No. 89-027, 
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unreported (charge filed one hundred thirteen days after the dismissal of an 
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employee may be deemed timely where employee was possibly misled by union or 
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employer about his status as a bargaining unit member); cf. Noble v. Chrysler 
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Motors Corp., Jeep Div.  (C.A.6, 1994), 32 F.3d 997, 1001 (“In order to support 
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an equitable tolling [of the six-month statute-of-limitations period for filing claims 
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under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act], plaintiffs must prove 
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that the defendants [employer and union] fraudulently concealed the fact that their 
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seniority dispute was no longer being pursued.”).  Since there existed no genuine 
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controversy on the issue of timeliness, Grady was not entitled to a limited writ of 
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mandamus pursuant to Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp./AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
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supra.   
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Conclusion 
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
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Civ.R. 56, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations of the 
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pleading, but must respond by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, 
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setting forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine triable issue.  
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Mootispaw v. Eckstein (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 383, 385, 667 N.E.2d 1197, 1199; 
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Civ.R. 56(E).  SERB supported its summary judgment motion with evidence  
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establishing that it did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Grady’s unfair labor 
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practice as untimely.  Grady failed to introduce sufficient Civ.R. 56 evidence 
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setting forth specific facts to establish a genuine triable issue on whether SERB 
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abused its discretion. 
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Based on the foregoing, we find that the court of appeals did not err in 
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granting SERB’s motion and denying the writ of mandamus.  The judgment of the 
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court of appeals is affirmed. 
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Judgment affirmed. 
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MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and 
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
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COOK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
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