Case Title: Yung v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-39

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-11-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Yung v. State1995 WY 182906 P.2d 1028Case Number: 94-39Decided: 11/07/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
 

Leland Geoffrey 
YUNG,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

 Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender; and Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel, for 
Appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Attorney General; Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Attorney General; and Barbara L. 
Boyer, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for 
Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant 
contests his second-degree murder conviction. He raises a speedy trial issue; 
challenges the admissibility of his confession; the treatment of his affirmative 
defense; the sufficiency of the evidence; the jury's review of an exhibit; and 
the district court's refusal to admit expert testimony.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I.                    
ISSUES

 

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the following issues:

ISSUE 
I

Did the trial court err 
when it failed to dismiss for lack of speedy trial?

ISSUE 
II

Did the court below err 
when it failed to suppress inculpatory statements which were obtained in 
violation of Appellant's constitutional rights?

ISSUE 
III

Did the trial court err 
when it improperly instructed the jury on the law applicable to this 
case?

ISSUE 
IV

Did the trial court 
commit reversible error by upon request, providing jurors with unlimited review 
of testimony without notifying defense of the request or 
response?

ISSUE 
V

Was there sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction of second degree murder?

ISSUE 
VI

Did the trial court 
den[y] Appellant his right to a fair trial when it ruled that it was 
inadmissible vouching for the credibility of a witness if experts testified that 
the Appellant fit the profile of a rape victim?

[¶4]      The State 
presents the following issues:

I.          
Did the State provide Appellant with a speedy 
trial?

II.          
Was Appellant properly mirandized and did he voluntarily confess to 
murdering Stephen Bennett?

III.         Was 
the jury properly instructed on the law of the case?

IV.        Did 
the district court err when it provided the jury access to a tape recorder so it 
could review an exhibit during deliberations?

V.        Was 
the evidence produced at trial sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Appellant was guilty of second degree murder?

VI.        Did the 
trial court properly refuse testimony that either vouched for the credibility of 
Appellant or invaded the province of the jury?

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      On July 20, 1992, 
appellant, Leland Yung (Yung), was hitchhiking from Montana to Louisiana. 
Stephen Bennett (Bennett), returning to his home in Casper, Wyoming, picked Yung 
up in Montana at approximately 4:00 p.m. The two stayed the night in a motel in 
Gillette, Wyoming. Yung claims that Bennett sexually assaulted him that night at 
gunpoint.

[¶6]      The next day, 
Yung and Bennett met several of Bennett's friends for drinks at two different 
bars and a private residence. The two eventually left Gillette and started for 
Casper with Bennett driving. Bennett was very intoxicated and Yung asked to 
drive. The two switched sides and Bennett placed his pistol on the dash of the 
car.

[¶7]      On the way to 
Casper, the two turned off onto a secondary road. At that point, according to 
Yung, Bennett reached over and placed his hand on Yung's crotch. A struggle 
ensued and Yung gained control of Bennett's pistol. Yung ordered Bennett out of 
the car. When Bennett walked to the rear of the car, Yung shot him in the back 
of the head. After shooting Bennett, Yung dragged the body off the side of the 
road behind a bush. Yung then left the scene.

[¶8]      On July 23, 1992, 
Yung was stopped for speeding in Little Rock, Arkansas. When asked for 
identification, Yung produced a wallet which contained Bennett's credit cards 
and social security card. He then told the officer that his name was Darrell 
Huffer. No records were found when Darrell Huffer's name was entered in the 
police computer. When informed of this, Yung stated that his name was Leland 
Yung and said he was seventeen years old.

[¶9]      The officer 
arrested Yung at approximately 10:35 a.m. for criminal impersonation. Yung was 
read his Miranda rights and indicated that he understood those rights. 
Yung was then taken to police headquarters in Little Rock and placed in an 
interview room. Near the end of a fifty-three minute interview which began at 
approximately 3:00 p.m., Yung confessed to killing Bennett. He said, "Okay, 
okay, I killed him. I shot him. I left him at the side of the 
road."

[¶10]   Yung was returned to Wyoming where 
he was charged with first-degree murder. A jury convicted him of the lesser 
included offense of second-degree murder. Yung appeals his conviction of 
second-degree murder.

III. 
DISCUSSION

A. SPEEDY 
TRIAL

[¶11]   Yung argues he did not receive a 
speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial is grounded in the constitutions of 
the United States and the State of Wyoming. However, constitutional analysis 
must be delayed until we have addressed the application of W.R.Cr.P. 48. This 
rule is a procedural mechanism by which a criminal defendant may enforce his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial. We have held that this rule is 
mandatory. McDermott v. State, 897 P.2d 1295, 1299 (Wyo. 1995). The mandatory 
nature of W.R.Cr.P. 48 demands that counsel and the district courts be attentive 
to the requirements of the rule. It is the responsibility of the district court, 
counsel and the defendant to see that these requirements are fulfilled. 
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(1). It is the responsibility of this court when reviewing a 
conviction to ensure that the mandates of this rule and the constitutional 
guarantee of a speedy trial have been met.

[¶12]   Constitutional analysis of a speedy 
trial claim requires that we consider the four factors articulated in Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), and 
adopted by this court in Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 (Wyo. 1972), cert. 
denied, 411 U.S. 971, 93 S. Ct. 2164, 36 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1973). This test requires 
us to consider: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the 
defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. 
Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 542 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Osborne v. State, 806 P.2d 272, 277 (Wyo. 1991)). These four factors are weighed and balanced in light 
of all the relevant circumstances. Id.

[¶13]   The speedy trial clock, which for 
constitutional purposes began to run when Yung was arrested on July 23, 1992, 
ran for a total of 171 days before Yung's trial began on January 11, 1993. This 
delay is not presumptively prejudicial. Osborne, 806 P.2d  at 277 (holding 244 
days is not presumptively prejudicial, but requiring further analysis). Thus, 
the first factor, length of delay, neither mandates nor prohibits 
reversal.

[¶14]   The second factor requires us to 
consider the reasons for the delay. We accord less weight to delays not 
attributable to the prosecution. Id. at 278. Many delays in this case were 
attributable to the district court's schedule and the timetable under which the 
state crime lab was forced to process the forensic evidence. Defense counsel 
initially insisted on receiving scientific evidence from the crime lab at least 
thirty days prior to trial, but later withdrew this demand. After reviewing all 
the options with the parties, the district court set the trial for January 11, 
1993. Because the delays in this case were caused by neutral factors, beyond the 
prosecution's control, we find no speedy trial violation under our delay 
analysis.

[¶15]   Although a defendant need not 
demand a speedy trial in order to establish a violation of the right, the 
question of whether he did so, and if so when, is relevant to our inquiry. Id. 
at 278. Yung's counsel did not demand a speedy trial until December 3, 1992. At 
that time, a January 25, 1993 trial date had been set for over a month, however, 
the district court agreed to reschedule the trial for January 11, 1993. Less 
than vigorous assertions of the right to a speedy trial are given little weight. 
Robinson v. State, 627 P.2d 168, 171 (Wyo. 1981). Because Yung failed to assert 
his right to a speedy trial in a vigorous and timely manner, we accord this 
factor little weight.

[¶16]   The final factor considered in our 
analysis is the degree of prejudice suffered by the defendant. "Prejudice to the 
defendant may consist of (1) lengthy pretrial incarceration, (2) pretrial 
anxiety, or (3) impairment of the defense." Osborne, 806 P.2d  at 278. Yung 
argues that he suffered pretrial anxiety while "the State's witnesses wanted to 
go on vacation * * *." He also asserts that his age and lack of emotional 
maturity contributed to his pretrial anxiety. Of the three prejudice factors we 
identified in Osborne, we find pretrial anxiety the least significant. Every 
criminal defendant will, as a matter of course, suffer some pretrial anxiety. A 
conviction need not be reversed simply because a seventeen-year-old defendant 
was incarcerated during the holidays, regardless of how the State's witnesses 
spend their time.

[¶17]   When these factors are weighed and 
balanced against all the relevant circumstances, it is clear that Yung was not 
denied his right to a speedy trial. The length of the delay was not excessive 
and was attributable to neutral factors beyond the prosecution's control. 
Further, Yung failed to assert his right to a speedy trial in a vigorous and 
timely manner. Finally, there is no indication in the record that Yung was 
prejudiced by the delay.

B. 
CONFESSION

[¶18]   Yung also argues that his 
confession should have been suppressed. In support of this contention, he argues 
that the officer who arrested him for criminal impersonation in Arkansas did not 
have probable cause to make the arrest; that he should have been re-advised of 
his rights pursuant to Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 
16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) when he was questioned at police headquarters; that his 
confession was involuntary; and that his second confession is tainted by the 
first involuntary confession and must, therefore, be suppressed as fruit of the 
poisonous tree.

[¶19]   Yung was arrested in Arkansas for 
criminal impersonation. He claims that the arrest was not supported by probable 
cause. An officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect if, at the moment of 
the arrest, the officer is aware of trustworthy facts and circumstances that 
would lead a reasonable person to believe the suspect is committing or has 
committed a crime. Rodarte v. City of Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245, 1253 (Wyo. 1976) 
(quoting Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964)).

[¶20]   Assumption of a false identity is 
an element of the crime of criminal impersonation in Arkansas. Ark. Code Ann. § 
5-37-208 (Michie 1993). The officer who arrested Yung for criminal impersonation 
knew, when he made the arrest, that Yung was driving without a license; that he 
had lied about who he was; that he was carrying Bennett's wallet; and that he 
was driving Bennett's car. Thus, the officer was aware of circumstances that 
would lead a reasonable person to believe that Yung had assumed a false identity 
when he claimed to be Darrell Huffer. Therefore, the arrest for criminal 
impersonation was supported by probable cause.

[¶21]   When he was arrested, Yung was 
advised of his Miranda rights. Yung argues that because he was not 
re-advised of his Miranda rights at the police station, his confession 
must be suppressed. We disagree. A criminal suspect who knowingly and 
voluntarily waives his Miranda rights need not be re-advised of those 
rights during subsequent interrogations, so long as the initial waiver retains 
its efficacy. Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1031 (Wyo. 1983); United States v. 
Nordling, 804 F.2d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); Stumes v. Solem, 752 F.2d 317, 
320 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1067, 105 S. Ct. 2145, 85 L. Ed. 2d 502 
(1985); State v. Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 577, 863 P.2d 861, 869 (1993). The 
question of whether a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights retains its 
efficacy requires analysis of, inter alia, the time lapse between the warning 
and the interrogation, the subject matter discussed and whether other 
circumstances have diluted the efficacy of the original warnings. United States 
v. Smith, 679 F. Supp. 410, 412 (D.Del. 1988).

[¶22]   On July 23, 1992, Yung was stopped 
for speeding at approximately 10:30 a.m. and was arrested for criminal 
impersonation a few minutes later. The arresting officer read him his 
Miranda rights and Yung indicated he understood those rights. Later that 
day, near the end of a fifty-three minute interview which began at approximately 
3:00 p.m., Yung admitted killing Bennett. He said, "Okay, okay, I killed him. I 
shot him. I left him at the side of the road." This statement was made in 
response to officers' claims that they would eventually find Bennett with or 
without Yung's assistance. The statement was made just over five hours after 
Yung was given his Miranda warnings. Absent some indication that Yung was 
not aware of his rights, further warnings were not required before the 3:00 p.m. 
interview began. Henry, 863 P.2d  at 869 (further warnings not required following 
a six-hour delay).

[¶23]   The second consideration is whether 
the focus of the investigation changed so drastically between the time the 
warnings were given and the interrogation at issue was conducted that new 
warnings were required. Smith, 679 F. Supp.  at 412. The focus of Yung's 
interrogation did not change until Yung revealed that he had killed Bennett. The 
initial inquiry was intended to determine who Yung was, how he came into 
possession of Bennett's car and where Bennett was. The same basic information 
was sought during the 3:00 p.m. interview which culminated in Yung's confession. 
Because the scope of the inquiry did not drastically change between 10:35 a.m. 
and 3:00 p.m., there was no need to re-advise Yung of his Miranda rights 
prior to beginning that interview.

[¶24]   We next consider whether the 
passage of five hours diluted the efficacy of the Miranda warnings. In 
Brown, we identified a number of factors to be considered in making this 
determination:

Among them are the 
interval of time since the accused had been advised properly of his rights; 
whether the interviews were part of a continuing interrogation; whether the same 
officer who had furnished the earlier advice to the accused of his 
constitutional rights also was conducting the subsequent interview; the physical 
circumstances surrounding the furnishing of advice as to rights and the 
subsequent interrogations; and the apparent intellectual and emotional state of 
the accused at the time he was informed of his rights and during the subsequent 
interrogations.

Brown, 661 P.2d  
at 1031.

[¶25]   The time lapse in Yung's case has 
already been shown not to be excessive and the scope of the interrogation did 
not change significantly. The fact that different officers interrogated Yung 
does not, standing alone, establish that the initial Miranda warnings had 
lost their efficacy. Nordling, 804 F.2d  at 1471 (admitting a statement made to 
NTF agents, although local police gave the initial Miranda warnings). 
Yung was under no physical stress when he was arrested; nor was he under any 
physical stress when the 3:00 p.m. interview began. In fact, he was allowed to 
drink, eat and rest. There was no physical stress, at any time, that could have 
undermined the adequacy of the Miranda warnings given five hours earlier. 
Nor is there any evidence in the record of emotional or intellectual immaturity 
that would detract from the efficacy of the original Miranda warnings. We 
can find no basis on which the officers interrogating Yung should have been 
required to re-advise Yung of his Miranda rights before the 3:00 p.m. 
interview.

[¶26]   Next, Yung argues that his 
confession was not given knowingly or voluntarily. We review the voluntariness 
of a confession under a totality of the circumstances test. Roderick, 858 P.2d  
at 546. A confession offends due process if the suspect's will was overborne by 
the police and the suspect's capacity for self-determination was seriously 
impaired. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S. Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (1961). In Wyoming, coercive police tactics violate Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 6, and statements elicited pursuant to these tactics may be 
suppressed. Black v. State, 820 P.2d 969, 972 (Wyo. 1991).

[¶27]   This case does not require 
application of the rule articulated in Black. Yung has presented no evidence of 
coercion; nor has he presented any evidence that his will was overborne. Under 
the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that Yung's confession was 
involuntary. He knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and 
his confession need not be suppressed.

[¶28]   Yung also argues that his 
subsequent recorded confession must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous 
tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963). The central premise in Yung's argument is that the 
subsequent confession is "burdened with the same constitutional infirmities as 
the first[.]" Since we find no constitutional infirmities in the first 
confession, we need not consider this argument.

C. JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS

[¶29]   Yung challenges the propriety of 
several jury instructions. Yung claims the jury instructions improperly shifted 
the burden of proof from the prosecution to him and the district court erred 
when it refused to give Yung's heat of passion instruction. Jury instructions 
will not be ruled defective absent a showing that the instructions confused or 
misled the jury as to the proper principles of law and prejudiced the defendant. 
Lowseth v. State, 875 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 186 (Wyo. 1986)).

[¶30]   Yung argues that when a defendant 
is charged with second-degree murder and raises heat of passion as an 
affirmative defense, the State must prove that the killing was not 
accomplished in the heat of passion. In support of this argument, Yung cites, 
among other cases, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975). We begin our analysis by noting that heat of passion is not normally 
referred to as an affirmative defense. See Black's Law Dictionary at 60 (6th ed. 
1990). In fact, in Wyoming, heat of passion is an element of the crime of 
voluntary manslaughter. State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1137 (Wyo. 1993). Yung's 
apparent theory of the case is that he killed Bennett in the heat of passion and 
is, therefore, guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than second-degree 
murder. We will refer to Yung's heat of passion defense as a defense theory 
rather than as an affirmative defense.

[¶31]   In Mullaney, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court could not presume 
implied malice aforethought and require a defendant to prove, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that he acted in a heat of passion in order to reduce a murder 
charge to manslaughter. Mullaney, 421 U.S.  at 688, 703, 95 S. Ct.  at 1884, 1892. 
Under this scheme, the defendant was essentially required to disprove an element 
of the crime. Id. at 702-03 n. 31, 95 S. Ct.  at 1891 n. 31.

[¶32]   Mullaney does not apply here 
because in Wyoming, the prosecution is required to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant acted with malice before the defendant can be 
convicted of second-degree murder. Reeder v. State, 515 P.2d 969, 971 (Wyo. 
1973). The prosecution must, of course, prove every element of a crime to garner 
a conviction. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970).

[¶33]   Malice is an element of 
second-degree murder, but heat of passion is not. Keffer, 860 P.2d  at 1137. If a 
defendant maliciously kills another human being, he may be convicted of 
second-degree murder. Id. at 1137-38. If, however, the defendant kills in a heat 
of passion, the crime is voluntary manslaughter, not second-degree murder. Id. 
at 1138. Thus, the two elements, malice and heat of passion, constitute the 
distinguishing factors that allow us to differentiate between second-degree 
murder and voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 1138-39. Proof of one negates the 
existence of the other.

[¶34]   Thus, proof of malice negates a 
heat of passion theory. We hold that the prosecution need not disprove a heat of 
passion theory in a second-degree murder case because proof that the defendant 
acted maliciously nullifies that theory. Id. Further, we find no constitutional 
infirmity in requiring a defendant charged with murder to establish a heat of 
passion theory. Amin v. State, 811 P.2d 255, 260 (Wyo. 1991). The burden of 
proof was never shifted in this case. Jury Instruction Nos. 3 and 4 clearly 
demonstrated that the prosecution bore the burden of proving guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Yung's argument to the contrary must be 
rejected.

[¶35]   Yung argues that the district court 
improperly defined heat of passion. The district court instructed the 
jury:

"Heat of passion" means 
such passion as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily 
reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances as those in question 
which would cause him to act rashly, without reflection and deliberation, and 
from passion rather than from judgment.

[¶36]   Yung submitted Jury Instruction No. 
X, which was refused:

YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that 
the term "heat of passion" is not limited to rage, anger or resentment, by [sic] 
may be fear, terror, or even excitement or nervousness.

[¶37]   Yung cites State v. Sorrentino, 31 
Wyo. 129, 140, 224 P. 420, 423 (1924) in support of this instruction. 
Sorrentino, however, is easily distinguished. In Sorrentino, the court held that 
the defendant was guilty of no more than manslaughter when he killed a 
flashlight-wielding intruder who had broken into the defendant's house and was 
standing in the doorway leading to the defendant's bedroom. Id. 224 P.  at 424. 
The court concluded that the defendant in Sorrentino may have been frightened, 
confused, or unnerved and that the jury had no right to convict him of more than 
manslaughter. Id.

[¶38]   The facts in Sorrentino have no 
bearing, however, on Yung's case. Yung was in control of the situation when he 
shot and killed Bennett. Yung was not huddled in a dark bedroom awaiting the 
entry of unknown intruders. He had marched Bennett to the back of the car when 
he shot him. Any excitement, confusion, fright or terror that Yung may have 
experienced in the car will not necessarily justify or mitigate the killing that 
occurred outside the car while Bennett's back was turned. We hold that the 
standard heat of passion instruction given by the district court was a correct 
statement of the law and it did not confuse or mislead the 
jury.

[¶39]   When viewed in light of the 
foregoing analysis, the jury instructions in this case accurately stated the 
law. The jury instructions were neither prejudicial to Yung nor confusing to the 
jury. Lowseth, 875 P.2d  at 729. We find no reversible 
error.

D. JURY REVIEW OF TAPED 
CONFESSION

[¶40]   Yung argues that the district court 
improperly allowed the jury unlimited review of his taped confession. He claims 
that the taped confession was testimony which cannot be reviewed by the jury 
absent court supervision. Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269, 1276 (Wyo. 1986) 
(holding, unequivocally, that testimonial videotape may never go to a jury for 
unsupervised review during jury deliberations). We reject Yung's claim because 
the taped confession the jury reviewed was a non-testimonial 
exhibit.

[¶41]   The submission of non-testimonial 
exhibits rests within the sound discretion of the district court. Id. at 1275. 
We hold that a defendant's tape recorded confession is a non-testimonial exhibit 
which the jury may review during deliberations. Stone v. State, 745 P.2d 1344, 
1349-50 (Wyo. 1987). The thrust of Yung's argument is that the district court 
abused its discretion by not allowing Yung to argue against the jury's review of 
the tape. The logic of this position escapes us. Any arguments Yung could 
marshall against the admissibility of his confession were exhausted when his 
motion to suppress the confession was denied.

[¶42]   After losing the motion to 
suppress, defense counsel made a tactical decision to rely on the taped 
confession when he argued Yung's heat of passion theory in closing argument. 
This is precisely what happened in Stone. Id. at 1350. Just as we found no 
reversible error in Stone, we find none here.

E. SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE

[¶43]   Yung argues that there was 
insufficient evidence to support a second-degree murder conviction. Evidence is 
sufficient to support a conviction if, when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the state, that evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Suliber v. State, 866 P.2d 85, 91 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Taul v. 
State, 862 P.2d 649, 657 (Wyo. 1993)). To convict Yung of second-degree murder, 
the prosecution was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Yung 
purposely and maliciously killed Bennett. Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-104 
(1988).

[¶44]   Yung argues that the jury 
erroneously equated his anger at the time of the shooting with malice rather 
than passion. He further argues there is no evidence that he acted either 
purposely or maliciously. We disagree and see no reason why a rational and 
reasonable jury could not interpret the anger Yung experienced as malice. Nor do 
we see why that same jury could not conclude that Yung purposefully shot Bennett 
in the back of the head.

[¶45]   The question of whether a homicide 
was committed in the heat of passion or purposely and with malice is a question 
of fact reserved for the fact finder. Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Wyo. 
1977) (quoting State v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 118-19, 300 P.2d 551, 566 (1956)). 
So long as there is evidence from which to infer guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, we will not invade the province of the jury and reach a conclusion 
contrary to the jury's verdict. Suliber, 866 P.2d  at 91. Here, Yung marched 
Bennett to the back of the car at gun point. Yung was in control of the 
situation and could have driven away. However, he shot Bennett in the back of 
the head. We cannot say that the jury, after considering this evidence, acted 
unreasonably in concluding that Yung purposefully and maliciously killed 
Bennett. The evidence is sufficient to support the second-degree murder 
conviction.

F. EXPERT 
TESTIMONY

[¶46]   One theory that Yung advanced at 
trial was that he matched the profile of a homosexual rape victim. In his final 
argument, Yung insists that the district court erred when it refused to allow 
expert witnesses to testify that "Yung fit the profiles of a homosexually raped 
adolescent." This argument is not supported by the record.

[¶47]   Two different witnesses detailed 
the characteristics of a homosexual rape victim for the jury. Those same 
witnesses also testified that Yung exhibited at least some of those 
characteristics. Thus, Yung had every opportunity to present his theory of the 
case.

[¶48]   The district court did not, 
however, allow expert opinion testimony that vouched for Yung's credibility. 
That decision was proper. Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 365 (Wyo. 1991). The 
admission or exclusion of expert testimony is a decision which lies within the 
sound discretion of the district court. Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1022 
(Wyo. 1993). These rulings will not be reversed absent a showing of clear and 
prejudicial abuse. Id. Yung has failed to demonstrate either. Therefore, we find 
no reversible error.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶49]   The second-degree murder conviction 
is affirmed. Yung was not denied his right to a speedy trial. His voluntary 
confession was properly admitted and the jury had every right to request a tape 
recorder with which to review that non-testimonial confession. The district 
court properly instructed the jury and did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
certain expert testimony. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the 
second-degree murder conviction and the jury verdict is, hereby, 
affirmed.

MACY, 
J., 
files a specially concurring opinion.

MACY, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶50]   I agree with the result reached by 
the majority opinion, but I disagree with the legal analysis used in the speedy 
trial portion. I believe that W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) should be the exclusive framework 
we use in determining whether a defendant's right to have a speedy trial has 
been violated.

[¶51]   Instead of examining whether Yung's 
right to have a speedy trial was violated under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b), the majority 
opinion presents an extensive analysis of the four factors which we utilized to 
consider claimed violations of the speedy trial right when Rule 204 of the 
Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming was in effect. 
When the United States Supreme Court adopted this analysis in Barker v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), it 
stated:

We do not establish 
procedural rules for the States, except when mandated by the Constitution. We 
find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be 
quantified into a specified number of days or months. The States, of course, 
are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional 
standards, but our approach must be less precise.

407 U.S.  at 523, 
92 S. Ct.  at 2188 (emphasis added). Consistent with the suggestion in Barker, 
this Court adopted W.R.Cr.P. 48.

[¶52]   We have held that W.R.Cr.P. 48 is 
mandatory and that it provides the exclusive framework for our speedy trial 
analysis. McDermott v. State, 897 P.2d 1295, 1299-1300 (Wyo. 1995). In my 
opinion, we should no longer conduct a Barker analysis since W.R.Cr.P. 
48(b) is mandatory. Any constitutional challenge made after the adoption of the 
rule should be made against the rule itself as the constitutional guarantees 
addressed in the Barker analysis are included within and superseded by 
the rule.

[¶53]   In the case at bar, Yung was 
arraigned on August 21, 1992. His trial was tentatively scheduled for December 
14, 1992, but it was continued until January 11, 1993 - 143 days following his 
arraignment.

[¶54]   W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) provides in 
pertinent part:

(b) Speedy 
trial.

. . . 
.

(4) Continuances not to 
exceed six months from the date of arraignment may be granted by the trial court 
as follows:

(A) On motion of 
defendant supported by affidavit;

(B) On motion of the 
attorney for the state or the court if:

(i) The defendant 
expressly consents;

(ii) The state's evidence 
is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; 
or

(iii) Required in the due 
administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially 
prejudiced; and

(C) If a continuance is 
proposed by the state or the court, the defendant shall be notified. If the 
defendant objects, the defendant must show in writing how the delay may 
prejudice the defense.

[¶55]   In conducting a W.R.Cr.P. 48 
analysis in this case, we must determine the reason for the continuance. During 
an October 26th hearing on various motions, Yung's counsel inquired about the 
trial setting. The State remarked that December or early January were realistic 
times. Yung's counsel did not object to the suggested time period, but he 
mentioned that he hoped the trial would be scheduled for the middle of December. 
He also stated that he wanted to have at least thirty days to review the results 
from the crime lab and have his own tests performed.

[¶56]   The trial court heard more motions 
on November 4th and 5th, at which time the parties discussed Yung's motion for a 
date certain. Taking into account that the results were not available from the 
crime lab and that the scientific evidence should be provided thirty days prior 
to the trial date, the State suggested that the trial be held in early January. 
Yung's counsel requested that the trial be scheduled for December 14, 1992, but 
the State countered that there would not be enough time before December 14th to 
provide the scientific evidence. Furthermore, the trial court had a three-week 
trial which had been scheduled to commence in early December. The trial court, 
therefore, set the case for January 25, 1993. Yung's counsel did not object at 
that time to the trial setting.

[¶57]   Yung subsequently filed a demand on 
December 3, 1992, for a speedy trial. At a December 4th hearing, he objected to 
the January 25, 1993, trial date, asserting that the 120-day time period 
provided for in W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(2) would expire on December 21st, and requested 
that the trial be scheduled for December 14, 1992. The State argued that Yung's 
right to have a speedy trial was not being violated by the January trial date 
because W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4) permitted the extra time in this case. In support of 
that argument, the State claimed that another case was scheduled to go to trial 
that week; that Yung's counsel did not object when the January date was 
scheduled; that the crime lab had arranged the testing so that it would coincide 
with the January 25, 1993, trial date and, thus, had not planned to have the 
tests finished until December 25, 1992; and that the out-of-town witnesses had 
made plans according to the January 25th trial date. Because the trial court was 
concerned about a possible speedy trial violation, it agreed that it would allow 
Yung's case to begin on December 14, 1992, in the event the case which was 
already scheduled for that date did not commence.

[¶58]   On December 7, 1992, the State 
filed a letter and a motion in which it detailed the unavailability of critical 
evidence which was necessary for the presentation of its case. The State 
reemphasized that, because of the trial court's prior trial setting of January 
25th, the crime lab and out-of-town witnesses had made all their plans 
accordingly and that much of the State's evidence would be unavailable if it 
were required to go to trial on December 14th. The trial court concluded that, 
"in order to allow a level field for both sides," the State should be allowed to 
go beyond the 120 days and ordered that the trial would remain scheduled for 
January 25, 1993. After more discussion, the trial was rescheduled for January 
11th.

[¶59]   I conclude that the continuance of 
Yung's trial fell within the specified types of continuances which are permitted 
by W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4). The parties did not object to the January 25th trial 
setting, and the State and its witnesses made their plans accordingly. When Yung 
subsequently claimed that such a delay would violate his right to have a speedy 
trial and that the trial setting should be moved up, the State's evidence was 
not available and would not be available before January 25, 
1993.

[¶60]   I also conclude that Yung's defense 
was not prejudiced as a result of the continuance. Yung claimed that he was 
prejudiced because he suffered from pretrial anxiety. He did not, however, show 
that any witness became unavailable, that evidence was not produced, or that any 
witness's memory was impaired by the delay. Nor did Yung show that the 
prosecutor was using the continuance in order to gain a tactical advantage over 
him. The trial court decided on the January trial date in an effort to assure 
that all the evidence and witnesses would be available for the trial and that 
Yung would have a fair opportunity to thoroughly review the State's 
evidence.

[¶61]   The continuance did not exceed six 
months from the date of the arraignment, it was granted for reasons which are 
permitted by W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4), and Yung's defense was not prejudiced by the 
continuance. Yung's right to have a speedy trial, therefore, was not 
violated.