Case Title: In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of John R. Van Orden, consolidated with In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Richard Wheeler, a/k/a Richard D. Wheeler, a/k/a Richard Dale Wheeler

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC89224, SC89408

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
IN THE MATTER OF THE CARE  
 
) 
AND TREATMENT OF   
 
 
) 
JOHN R. VAN ORDEN  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89224 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WEBSTER COUNTY 
The Honorable Kenneth F. Thompson, Judge 
(consolidated with) 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE CARE  
 
) 
AND TREATMENT OF   
 
 
) 
RICHARD WHEELER,   
 
 
) 
A/K/A RICHARD D. WHEELER, 
 
)  
A/K/A RICHARD DALE WHEELER  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89408 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ADAIR COUNTY 
The Honorable Kristie J. Swaim, Judge 
 
 
Richard Wheeler and John Van Orden previously were convicted of 
sexually violent offenses.  Because of their previous convictions, the state filed a 
petition for civil commitment of Van Orden and Wheeler as sexually violent 
predators pursuant to section 632.480 et seq.1  The court, in the case of Wheeler, 
and the jury, in the case of Van Orden, found that they met the definition of a 
                                                 
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise noted. 
 
"sexually violent predator" by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to section 
632.495, and judgment was entered ordering their commitment. 
Van Orden and Wheeler appeal their respective judgments on several 
grounds.  They both argue that section 632.4952 is unconstitutional because due 
process requires that the state prove that a person meets the definition of a 
"sexually violent predator" beyond a reasonable doubt.   They also both argue, 
although for different reasons, that the state failed to strictly comply with the terms 
of section 632.483.13 in the civil commitment proceedings.   Van Orden argues 
separately that the trial court erred in failing to define "clear and convincing 
evidence" in the jury instructions as well as in admitting testimony about the 
results of the Static-99 actuarial instrument.   
Because Wheeler and Van Orden challenge the validity of section 632.495, 
this Court has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3, of the 
Missouri Constitution. 
                                                 
2 Section 632.495(1) states in pertinent part: 
The court or jury shall determine whether, by clear and convincing evidence, the person is a 
sexually violent predator.  If such determination that the person is a sexually violent predator is 
made by a jury, such determination shall be by unanimous verdict of such jury.  Any 
determination as to whether a person is a sexually violent predator may be appealed.  
3 Section 632.483.1 provides: 
When it appears that a person may meet the criteria of a sexually violent predator, the agency with 
jurisdiction shall give written notice of such to the attorney general and the multidisciplinary team 
established in subsection 4 of this section. Written notice shall be given: 
(1) Within three hundred sixty days prior to the anticipated release from a correctional 
center of the department of corrections of a person who has been convicted of a sexually 
violent offense, except that in the case of persons who are returned to prison for no more 
than one hundred eighty days as a result of revocation of postrelease supervision, written 
notice shall be given as soon as practicable following the person's readmission to prison; 
(2) At any time prior to the release of a person who has been found not guilty by reason 
of mental disease or defect of a sexually violent offense; or 
(3) At any time prior to the release of a person who was committed as a criminal sexual 
psychopath pursuant to section 632.475 and statutes in effect before August 13, 1980. 
 
2 
 
The provision requiring the burden of proof of clear and convincing 
evidence in section 632.495 is constitutional, and the phrase "clear and convincing 
evidence" is not required to be defined in the jury instructions. Van Orden and 
Wheeler fail to show that the state did not comply with section 632.483.1 or that 
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony on the Static-99.  
The judgments are affirmed.   
I. FACTS  
A. Richard Wheeler 
Richard Wheeler was born in 1947.  Wheeler has a history of sexually 
violent behavior, usually involving children.  In 1967, Wheeler was charged with 
sodomy for allegedly molesting his nine-year-old male cousin and was admitted to 
Fulton State Hospital.  Four years later, in 1971, he was charged with molesting a 
minor child, a four-year-old female who lived in his neighborhood, and was 
sentenced to one year in jail.  In 1981, Wheeler was convicted of first-degree 
sexual abuse of an adult woman and was sentenced to two years in prison with 
five years probation.  Wheeler's wife subsequently filed for dissolution of 
marriage, asserting as a basis that Wheeler sexually abused their son.  
In 1996, Wheeler pleaded guilty to first-degree sexual misconduct 
involving an eleven-year-old boy and received two years probation.  A year later, 
in April 1997, Wheeler was convicted of first-degree statutory sodomy involving a 
four-year-old boy and was sentenced to ten years.  During this period of 
incarceration, Wheeler continually refused sex offender treatment and continued to 
3 
 
engage in sexually offending behaviors.  Prior to his release, the psychologist for 
the department of corrections conducted an end of confinement review to 
determine if Wheeler met the definition of a "sexually violent predator." During 
the review process, the psychologist requested and received information from the 
attorney general.  After determining that Wheeler may meet the criteria, she sent 
notice to the attorney general, and he filed a petition for commitment. 
At the probable cause hearing, Wheeler filed a motion to dismiss based on 
the state’s failure to strictly comply with the statutory procedure in section 
632.483.1 because the psychologist contacted the attorney general prior to 
completing the end of confinement review.  The court overruled the motion and 
ordered a psychiatric evaluation.  Prior to trial, Wheeler filed a motion to declare 
the 2006 amendment to section 632.495 unconstitutional because it reduced the 
burden of proof from beyond a reasonable doubt to clear and convincing evidence. 
The court overruled the motion and a bench trial was held.  The court found that 
Wheeler met the definition of a "sexually violent predator" and ordered 
commitment.   
B. John Van Orden 
John Van Orden was born in 1962.  In 1987, Van Orden pleaded guilty to 
sexual misconduct for his sexual contact with his sixteen-year-old niece and 
received two years unsupervised probation.  In 1992, Van Orden was convicted of 
first-degree sexual abuse for the abuse of his five-year-old daughter.  He was 
sentenced to four years, and his parental rights were terminated based upon this 
4 
 
abuse and the abuse of his four-year-old son.  While incarcerated, Van Orden 
attended a sex offender treatment program but terminated treatment in the second 
phase.   
In 1998, he was convicted of first-degree child molestation for abuse of a 
four-year-old female and was sentenced to seven years.  Van Orden completed the 
first two phases of sex offender treatment and was released on parole in 2004, at 
which time he stopped attending treatment.  Van Orden violated the conditions of 
his parole and was returned to prison.  He was released on parole a second time 
and was arrested on September 6, 2005 for violating its conditions, including 
consuming alcohol and receiving unsuccessful termination from sex offender 
treatment.  Van Orden was transported to the Fulton Reception and Diagnostic 
Center.   
On October 5, 2005, the department of corrections sent written notice to the 
attorney general that Van Orden may meet the definition of a "sexually violent 
predator."  The state filed its petition for Van Orden’s commitment on October 14, 
2005.  The board of probation and parole issued an order of revocation on October 
20, 2005. 
The court found probable cause and ordered a formal hearing.  Van Orden 
filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that the state failed to strictly 
comply with section 632.483.1 because the petition was filed prior to the 
revocation of parole.  The trial court overruled the motion and ordered a 
psychiatric evaluation.  Van Orden, similarly to Wheeler, filed a motion to declare 
5 
 
the 2006 amendment to section 632.495 unconstitutional because it reduced the 
burden of proof from beyond a reasonable doubt to clear and convincing evidence.  
The trial court overruled the motion. 
A jury trial was held in May 2007.  The state’s evidence included the 
testimony of Dr. Mandracchia, a psychologist, who diagnosed Van Orden with 
pedophilia and anti-social personality disorder and found that he was more likely 
than not to reoffend if not committed.  He based this assessment on the results of 
the Static-99 actuarial test, which measures a person’s likelihood of reoffending, 
as well as his own assessment of Van Orden’s risk factors, including anti-social 
personality disorder, alcoholism, offense pattern of sexually deviant behavior, and 
the fact that he offended while under supervision. 
At the instruction conference, Van Orden objected to the burden of proof 
on the basis that "clear and convincing evidence" should be defined.  Specifically, 
Van Orden argued that the instruction should include: 
Clear and convincing evidence means that you are clearly convinced of the 
affirmative of the proposition to be proved.  This does not mean that there 
may not be contrary evidence…For evidence to be clear and convincing it 
must instantly tilt the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the 
evidence in opposition and your mind is left with unabiding conviction that 
the evidence is true. 
 
 The trial court overruled the objection and submitted the instructions to the 
jury without the additional language.  The jury found that Van Orden was a 
sexually violent predator.  Judgment of commitment was entered.  
6 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. The Sexually Violent Predator Commitment Proceedings 
Section 632.480 et seq. provides the procedure for civil commitment of 
sexually violent predators.  To qualify for commitment as a sexually violent 
predator, the person must have either pleaded guilty or been found guilty by 
reason of a mental disease or defect of a sexually violent offense or have been 
committed as a criminal psychopath pursuant to section 632.475.  Section 
632.480(5).  The person also must be found to suffer from "a mental abnormality 
which makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts of sexual 
violence if not confined in a secure facility."  Id.  
If the person is currently in the custody of the department of mental health 
or the department of corrections, the proceedings for commitment begin prior to 
the person's release.  Section 632.483.  The psychologist completes an end of 
confinement review and sends written notice to the attorney general and the 
multidisciplinary team if the person may meet the definition of a "sexually violent 
predator."  Id.   If the multidisciplinary team and the prosecutorial review 
committee confirm that finding, the attorney general files a petition for 
commitment.  Section 632.486. 
The court will determine if probable cause exists and hold a formal hearing.  
Section 632.489.  If the probable cause determination is made, the court orders a 
psychiatric evaluation and holds a trial sixty days after the evaluation.  Section 
7 
 
632.489.4.  The person may request a jury trial and has a right to counsel at all 
stages of the proceeding.  Section 632.492. 
Section 632.495(1) provides that the court or jury "shall determine whether, 
by clear and convincing evidence, the person is a sexually violent predator."  Prior 
to the 2006 amendment, the court or jury was required to find that the person is a 
sexually violent predator beyond a reasonable doubt.   
B. Constitutionality of Section 632.495 
Van Orden and Wheeler argue that section 632.495 is unconstitutional 
because due process requires the state to prove they are subject to commitment 
beyond a reasonable doubt.4  They argue that the proceedings affect a fundamental 
liberty interest because the proceedings may subject them to indefinite 
commitment.  Further, they argue that it is feasible for the state to meet this burden 
of proof because many other states with similar commitment proceedings require 
it.  
Due process requires the use of a burden of proof that "reflects not only the 
weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment 
about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants."  Jamison 
v. State, Dept. of Social Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 411 (Mo. banc 2007).  In the 
usual civil litigation, the burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence because 
                                                 
4 The state argues that Van Orden did not properly preserve the constitutional challenge for appeal because 
he did not object to the burden of proof in the jury instructions on a constitutional basis; therefore, he failed 
to preserve the issue continually throughout for appellate review.  However, because there is no challenge 
to Wheeler's preservation of the constitutional issue and Wheeler and Van Orden present the same 
argument, the Court will address the constitutionality of section 632.495. 
8 
 
private interests predominate; therefore, the litigants share the risk of error 
equally.  See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).  In civil cases that 
involve a fundamental right or liberty, due process lessens the risk of an erroneous 
decision by requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. at 424.  In 
criminal proceedings, because of the implication on the defendant’s liberty 
interest, the state has the burden of persuading the factfinder of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, a burden that imposes almost the entire risk of error on the state.  
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).   
The Supreme Court of the United States found that clear and convincing 
evidence was an appropriate burden of proof in civil commitment proceedings.  
Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33.  The Court specifically found that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt was not constitutionally required because the state was not 
exercising its power in a punitive sense and the continuing opportunities for 
review minimized the risk of error.  Id. at 427-31.  The Court also questioned the 
feasibility of meeting the higher burden because of the uncertainties of psychiatric 
diagnosis.  Id.  The Court found that the precise burden, whether clear and 
convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt, was a matter of state law.  Id. 
at 433.  
Whether a beyond a reasonable doubt or clear and convincing evidence 
burden of proof is utilized to commit sexually violent predators is a matter of 
legislative prerogative.  See Addington, 441 U.S. at 433.  Although the 
proceedings involve a liberty interest, they are civil proceedings.  The purpose of 
9 
 
the proceedings is to determine whether the person suffers from a mental 
abnormality that makes the person more likely than not to engage in predatory acts 
if not confined.  The commitment of those who meet these criteria not only 
furthers the state interest of protecting society, but also provides them with 
necessary treatment.  The statutory requirements and procedures effectively 
minimize the risk of an erroneous commitment by requiring the person to have a 
previous conviction of a sexually violent offense and to undergo psychiatric 
evaluations.  The person is afforded many of the same rights of a criminal 
defendant, including a formal probable cause hearing, the right to a jury trial, the 
right to an attorney, and the right to appeal.   
Further, if commitment is ordered, the term of commitment is not 
indefinite.  A person committed as a sexually violent predator receives an annual 
review to determine if the person's mental abnormality has so changed that 
commitment is no longer necessary.  Section 632.498.  The court reviews this 
report, and even if release is not recommended, the person may file a petition for 
release with the court at any time.  Id. 
Missouri’s law for the civil commitment of sexually violent predators 
constitutionally may utilize the clear and convincing evidence burden of proof.   
Section 632.495, as amended, is constitutional.5
                                                 
5 The concurring and dissenting opinions seriously question whether the SVP statute could be considered to 
be a civil commitment statute, rather than a criminal statute, as applied to a person who has been 
conditionally released and as to whom the court or jury finds that the person's mental abnormality has so 
changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released, if the statute is 
determined to mean that such a person is ineligible to ever receive an unconditional release.  That issue is 
10 
 
C. Jury Instructions 
Van Orden also argues that the burden of proof of clear and convincing 
evidence must be defined in the jury instructions and that the trial court abused its 
discretion in rejecting his proposed jury instructions.  The decision to submit a 
definitional instruction is in the sound discretion of the trial court.  See DeWitt v. 
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 700, 711 (Mo. banc 1984).  Rule 70.02(b) 
provides that the instructions should be "simple, brief, impartial, free from 
argument, and shall not submit to the jury or require findings of detailed 
evidentiary facts."  Legal or technical words occurring in the instructions should 
be defined, but the meaning of ordinary words used in their usual or conventional 
sense need not be defined.  See Huff v. Union Elec. Co., 598 S.W.2d 503, 510 
(Mo. App. 1980).  Further, a short, simple instruction on the burden of proof is 
preferred.  See Mochar Sales Co. v. Meyer, 373 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Mo. 1964). 
"Clear and convincing evidence" requires no further defining.  The words 
are commonly used and readily understandable, and the phrase provides the jury 
with sufficient instruction on the applicable burden of proof.  The additional 
phrases offered by Van Orden only would increase the possibility of confusion and 
complicate the instructions.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting 
Van Orden’s proposed jury instructions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
not before the Court in this case as Van Orden and Wheeler have failed to show that they would be entitled 
to unconditional releases. 
11 
 
D. Compliance with Section 632.483.1 
Van Orden and Wheeler argue that the trial court erred in each case in 
overruling their motions to dismiss because the state failed to strictly comply with 
section 632.483.1.  
Van Orden argues that the state filed its petition prematurely because 
section 632.483.1 only permits the state to file the petition if parole is formally 
revoked.    
Section 632.483.1 says nothing about the timing for filing the petition 
for commitment.  Instead, it addresses when the agency in jurisdiction must send 
written notice to the attorney general that a person in its custody may meet the 
criteria for a sexually violent predator.  This section indirectly affects the filing of 
the petition only because the attorney general's office cannot file until it receives 
notice from the agency in jurisdiction.  
 
Section 632.483.1 provides that if the person has been previously convicted 
of a sexually violent offense, written notice should be sent to the attorney general 
360 days prior to the person's release.  Id.  However, a separate notice procedure is 
followed for those who committed sexually violent offenses but have been 
released on parole, providing that 
. . . in the case of persons who are returned to prison for no more than one 
hundred eighty days as a result of revocation of postrelease supervision, 
written notice shall be given as soon as practicable following the person’s 
readmission to prison . . . 
 
12 
 
The plain language of the statute does not state that parole must be formally 
revoked before the agency in jurisdiction can begin the review process for civil 
commitment.  Rather, it is the person’s "readmission to prison" that triggers the 
agency’s duty to begin the determination if the person may meet the requirements 
of the statute and send written notice to the attorney general.   
The purpose of this provision is to ensure timely notice is given to the 
attorney general and the multidisciplinary team to determine if civil commitment 
proceedings should be initiated.  Allowing the agency in jurisdiction to begin their 
assessment at the earliest opportunity gives the most effect to this purpose.  
Van Orden has shown no prejudice resulting from the date of filing of the 
petition or from the written notice requirements.  Van Orden's point is denied. 
Wheeler argues that the state violated section 632.483.1 because the 
psychologist for the department of corrections contacted the attorney general 
before completing the end of confinement evaluation.  The psychologist requested 
information from the attorney general's office and received additional police 
records pertaining to Wheeler’s sexual assault of the eleven-year-old boy. 
The plain language of the statute does not restrict the contact between the 
attorney general and the agency with jurisdiction prior to the completion of the 
assessment and recommendation.  Section 632.483.1 only provides the time limits 
for when the agency in jurisdiction must send written notice to the attorney 
general to begin the civil commitment process.   
13 
 
The record reveals no impropriety concerning the contact between the 
psychologist and the attorney general or any prejudice resulting from it.  The 
psychologist could have received this information from many other sources, and 
the information was cumulative and consistent with the other records reviewed to 
complete the report.  Wheeler’s point is denied. 
E. Admissibility of Static-99 
Lastly, Van Orden argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting, over his objection, testimony about the results of the Static-99 actuarial 
instrument because the instrument only predicts group risk, not individual risk, 
and this will confuse the jury. 
The trial court’s decision to allow evidence at trial is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion.  See In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Murrell, 215 S.W.3d 
96, 109 (Mo. banc 2007). The Court addressed the same argument regarding the 
admissibility of testimony as to the results of the Static-99 in Murrell.  The Court 
found that the testimony was admissible pursuant to section 490.065.3 in cases 
involving the civil commitment of a sexually violent predator so long as the 
instrument is used in conjunction with a full clinical evaluation.  Id. at 110-114. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the results of the 
Static-99.  Dr. Mandracchia did not rely solely on the instrument to support the 
belief that Van Orden has a high risk of reconviction of a sexually violent offense, 
but conducted an independent review of his risk factors, including anti-social 
14 
 
personality disorder, alcoholism, offense pattern of sexually deviant behavior, and 
the fact that he offended while under supervision. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The judgments are affirmed.   
 
 
_____________________________ 
           William Ray Price, Jr., Judge 
 
 
Stith, C.J., Russell and Breckenridge, JJ., concur; Cook, Sp.J., concurs in separate 
opinion filed; Wolff, J., concurs in opinion of Cook, Sp.J.; Teitelman, J., dissents 
in separate opinion filed. Fischer, J., not participating.  
 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
IN THE MATTER OF THE CARE  
 
) 
AND TREATMENT OF   
 
 
) 
JOHN R. VAN ORDEN  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89224 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
(consolidated with) 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE CARE  
 
) 
AND TREATMENT OF   
 
 
) 
RICHARD WHEELER,   
 
 
) 
A/K/A RICHARD D. WHEELER, 
 
)  
A/K/A RICHARD DALE WHEELER  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89408 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Concurring Opinion 
 
 
I join the opinion of the Court, in full, and add these additional comments.  I write 
separately to highlight concerns about the constitutionality of sec. 632.5051 and the 
sexually violent predator (SVP) statutory scheme following its 2006 amendments.  The 
concerns are not raised directly but may require resolution in future cases. 
                                                 
1 All statutory references are to RSMO 2000, unless otherwise noted. 
 
Both appellants argue before this Court that sec. 632.495 is unconstitutional 
because due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for an indefinite 
involuntary civil commitment.  Sec. 632.495 was amended by the legislature in 2006 by 
changing the burden of proof necessary to find that an individual is a sexually violent 
predator from beyond a reasonable doubt to clear and convincing evidence.   
The question of whether an indefinite involuntary civil commitment may be 
premised on a finding of clear and convincing evidence was addressed in Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).  The Court concluded that proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt was not required, but proof by preponderance of the evidence fell short of 
satisfying that burden.  The Court, therefore, held that a clear and convincing standard of 
proof met the constitutional requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment in a civil 
proceeding brought under state law to commit an individual involuntarily for an 
indefinite period to a state mental hospital.  Id. at 430-433.  See, e.g., Murrell v. State, 
215 S.W.3d 96, 104 (Mo. banc 2007) 
 
In the body of both appellants' arguments as to the constitutionality of sec. 
632.495, they argue that the creation of sec. 632.505 – the section discussing the 
conditional release of sexual violent predators – implicates the constitutionality of sec. 
632.495 because conditional release may mean a loss of liberty for a lifetime.  However, 
the appellants do not raise the constitutionality of sec. 632.505 or the constitutionally 
problematic nature of the entire SVP statutory scheme.  This Court, of course, should 
only address the issues presented in the points relied on.  State v. Brookshire, 325 S.W.2d 
497, 500 (Mo. banc 1959).  A party cannot expand the issues presented before a court for 
 
2
review simply by discussing issues within the body of the argument.  Pruellage v. De 
Seaton Corp., 380 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo. banc 1964).  The appellants sought review of 
the constitutionality of the clear and convincing standard of proof for an indefinite civil 
commitment.  That question is resolved by this Court's principal opinion.   
 
This Court previously has found that the legislature intended the SVP statutes to 
be civil in nature.  Elliott v. State, 215 S.W. 3d 88, 93 (Mo. banc 2007).  A court will 
reject the legislature's manifest intent only where a party challenging the act provides the 
clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to 
negate the state's intention.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997).   
In the cases presently before the Court, the appellants fail to address the legislative 
history of the SVP act or other factors necessary to evaluate the civil or criminal nature of 
the statutes.  See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997); Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).  The appellants, therefore,  do not meet the 
"clearest proof" standard necessary for this Court to find that the SVP statutory scheme 
was so punitive in nature as to warrant the burden of proof required in criminal cases – 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
While the constitutionality of sec. 632.505 and the constitutionality of the entire 
statutory scheme of the SVP statutes may not be properly before the Court today, the 
concerns raised by appellants regarding the 2006 amendments, alluded to both in their 
briefs and in their arguments, may require future review by this Court when squarely 
presented.  
 
3
 
A state may enact SVP statutes providing for the involuntary civil commitment of 
dangerous persons "provided the commitment takes place pursuant to proper procedures 
and evidentiary standards."  Murrell, 215 S.W.3d at 103-104, (citing Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357; Foucha v, Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).  In O'Connor 
v. Donaldson, the Supreme Court held that a finding of mental illness alone will not 
justify locking up a person against his will for an indefinite period of time.  422 U.S. 563, 
575 (1975).  "Rather due process requires that a person be both mentally ill and 
dangerous in order to be civilly committed; the absence of either characteristic renders 
involuntary confinement unconstitutional."  Murrell, 215 S.W.3d at 104 (citing Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. at 77; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).  "The individual must 
not only be dangerous at the time of, but also during, commitment, for 'if his involuntary 
confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue after a basis 
no longer existed.'"  Murrell, 215 S.W.3d at 104 (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 
U.S. at 575). 
Appellants contend that sec. 632.505, the conditional release section, provides for 
loss of liberty and as such violates due process.  In fact, loss of liberty may be 
permissible if the person has a mental illness or mental abnormality and poses a danger.  
See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 261-262 (2001) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
at 366  (no federal constitutional bar to civil commitment of individuals with untreatable 
conditions because the state has an interest in protecting the public from dangerous 
individuals with treatable as well as untreatable conditions)).  However, while loss of 
liberty may be permissible, sec. 632.505 may pose due process concerns because: (1) the 
 
4
statute provides for a form of commitment or confinement, albeit conditional, without the 
requisite finding of dangerousness; and (2) it fails to provide sufficient procedural due 
process protections. 
 
Sec. 632.505.1 provides that: 
Upon determination by a court or jury that the person's mental 
abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to 
commit acts of sexual violence if released, the court shall 
place the person on conditional release pursuant to the terms 
of this section.  The primary purpose of conditional release is 
to provide outpatient treatment and monitoring to prevent the 
person's condition from deteriorating to the degree that the 
person would need to be returned to a secure facility 
designated by the director of the department of mental health. 
 
Section 632.505.5 states that a person conditionally released "remains under the control, 
care and treatment of the department of mental health."  A restraint of liberty, continued 
without opportunity of review or the possibility of unconditional release or discharge, 
would raise serious due process concerns.  Jones v. United States, 436 U.S. 354, 361 
(1983)  ("It is clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation 
of liberty that requires due process protections").  Conditional release, which mandates 
that an individual still is committed to the department of mental health, constitutes a 
restraint of liberty that requires due process protections. 
Missouri's SVP statute requires a finding that, to be committed, the individual: (1) 
has a history of past sexually violent behavior; (2) a mental abnormality; and (3) the 
abnormality creates a danger to others if the person is not incapacitated.  Sec. 632.480(5); 
Murrell, 215 S.W.2d at 105.  Section 632.505 describes the requirements for conditional 
release from that commitment: Once a court or jury determines that "the person is not 
 
5
likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released," the court shall place the person on 
conditional release pursuant to the terms of the statute.  However, the finding that a 
person no longer poses a danger does not result in complete restoration of that person's 
liberty.  Once the person no longer poses a danger, the person shall be conditionally 
released.  Those conditions, which include "outpatient treatment and monitoring," are, in 
fact, a form of moderated commitment.  If commitment is predicated on a finding of 
dangerousness, once the person is found to be no longer dangerous, due process requires 
that the person be released – fully released – from commitment.  After a finding that the 
person is not dangerous, such commitment, even if it is under a less restrictive setting, 
violates due process.  Murrell, 215 S.W. 3d at 104; Care and Treatment of Coffman, 225 
S.W.3d 439, 446 (Mo. banc 2007); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 371 (J. 
Kennedy, concurring) (noting that if civil confinement becomes a mechanism for general 
deterrence, its constitutionality may be invalidated); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 
574 (mere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation 
of a person's physical liberty). 
This Court previously has found, reviewing the SVP statutory scheme prior to 
2006 amendments, that a person is not committed as an SVP indefinitely because the 
SVP statutory scheme provided for "a current examination of the person's mental 
condition made once every year by the director of the department of mental health or 
designee."  Sec. 632.498.  If the director found that the person's mental abnormality had 
so changed that the person was not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released, 
the committed person could petition the court for release.  Even if the director did not 
 
6
determine that the person qualified for release, the person committed still could petition 
the court for discharge.  Schottel v. State, 159 S.W. 3d 836, 839 (Mo. banc 2005); sec. 
632.498, 632.501, RSMo 2000.  Specifically, sec. 632.498.1, RSMo 2000, required that 
the court shall conduct an annual review of the status of the committed person.  This 
Court, citing Kansas v. Hendricks, has noted that the duration of confinement is linked to 
the stated purposes of commitment, namely to hold the person until his mental 
abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others, Murrell, 215 S.W.3d at 105; 
that the annual review mechanism "ensures involuntary confinement that was initially 
permissible will no longer continue after the basis for it no longer exists."  Id.  
The 2006 amendments to the statutory scheme, however, do away with the annual 
review when conditional release is implemented.  Sec. 632.498.1 now states that "[t]he 
court shall conduct an annual review of the status of the committed person.  The court 
shall not conduct an annual review of a person's status if he or she has been conditionally 
released pursuant to sec. 632.505."  Further statutory safeguards to ensure that a person is 
no longer involuntarily committed if the requirements of mental illness or abnormality 
and dangerousness do not exist have been removed.  Prior to the 2006 amendments, the 
committed person was provided an annual written notice of the person's right to petition 
the court for release over the director's objection.  Sec. 632.498, RSMo 2000.  The 2006 
amendment specifically eliminated from the notice requirements the committed person 
who has been conditionally released.  Sec. 632.498.2.   
Prior to the 2006 amendments, a person confined under the SVP statutes could be 
discharged from confinement altogether.  Sec. 632.498, RSMo 2000.  The 2006 
 
7
amendments provide that even if the court or jury finds that the person's mental 
abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence 
if released, the person "shall be conditionally released as provided in sec. 632.505."  A 
review of the statutory scheme following the 2006 amendments casts doubts on whether 
an unconditional release or discharge is ever available to a person confined under the 
SVP statutes.  The failure to provide a person committed under the SVP statutes a 
procedure by which to seek unconditional release or discharge may very well violate the 
Due Process Clause.  Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (the right to procedural 
due process is absolute); Cf., Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. at 255 (State of Washington SVP 
statutory scheme, which included conditional release as a less restrictive alternative to 
secured confinement, upheld when conditional release was subject to annual review until 
person unconditionally released and where person still had right to seek discharge from 
commitment); Kansas v.  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366 (Kansas SVP Act constitutional 
when a confined person may be immediately released from confinement if adjudged to be 
safe at large); Care and Treatment of Coffman, 225 S.W.3d at 466 (if committed person 
can demonstrate he is no longer likely to commit sexually violent offenses, he is entitled 
to release).   
 
Lastly, if called to consider the impact the indefinite conditional release statute has 
had on the entire SVP statutory scheme, this Court may be compelled to find that such an 
indefinite restraint of liberty has made the SVP act so punitive in purpose or effect that it 
no longer can be considered civil in nature – requiring a higher burden of proof. 
 
8
 
While I concur with the Court's decision based upon the question squarely placed 
before it, I believe that a specific challenge to the constitutionality of sec. 632.505, which 
appears to provide for an indefinite restraint of liberty without a finding of dangerousness 
or a procedure by which to challenge such indefinite restraint of liberty, may require a 
different result.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jacqueline Cook, Special Judge 
 
9
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc  
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE CARE  
 
) 
AND TREATMENT OF   
 
 
) 
JOHN R. VAN ORDEN 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89224 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 (consolidated with) 
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE CARE  
 
) 
AND TREATMENT OF   
 
 
) 
RICHARD WHEELER,  
 
 
 
) 
A/K/A RICHARD D. WHEELER, 
 
)  
A/K/A RICHARD DALE WHEELER 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89408 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Dissenting Opinion  
I respectfully dissent.  In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the United States 
Supreme Court determined that the gradual transition of juvenile delinquency 
proceedings into a process that was tantamount to a traditional criminal proceeding 
warranted the application of criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts.  Id. at 
365-366.  The same transition that occurred in juvenile delinquency proceedings now has 
occurred in Missouri’s SVP law.  Regardless of the state’s characterization of the SVP 
law as a civil commitment proceeding, the text of the law and the reality of its application 
reveal a process whereby the state exercises the power to impose a permanent, punitive 
restraint on individual liberty.  Consequently, I would hold that due process requires the 
exercise of this power to be conditioned upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of 
the statutory prerequisites for commitment.   
As stated in the majority opinion, the United States Supreme Court held in 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979), that a clear and convincing burden of 
proof constitutionally was permissible in a civil proceeding to commit an individual 
indefinitely and involuntarily to a state mental hospital.  The Court, however, did not 
hold that the clear and convincing burden of proof would be sufficient in every civil 
commitment proceeding.  Instead, the Court’s holding was premised on the following 
propositions: (1) civil commitment is not punitive; (2) the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard historically has been reserved for criminal cases; (3) ongoing review of an 
individual’s condition provides continuous opportunities to correct an erroneous 
commitment decision; and (4) the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is not workable in 
the civil commitment context.  These propositions applied to the facts of Addington but 
do not apply to the text of the SVP law or the reality of its application.   
The first and primary proposition in Addington was that the civil commitment 
statute at issue was remedial, not punitive.  Id. at 428.  The same cannot be said of 
Missouri’s SVP law.   
Section 632.505.1 provides for conditional release “[u]pon determination by a 
court or jury that the person’s mental abnormality has so changed that the person is not 
likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released….”  Section 632.505.5 provides that a 
 
2
conditionally released person “remains under the control, care and treatment of the 
department of mental health.”  The net result of these provisions is that an individual who 
is rehabilitated successfully is committed permanently to the department of mental health.  
If the purpose of the SVP law is purely remedial, then successful remediation of the 
mental condition that caused the commitment should result in an opportunity for an 
unconditional release.  Once the remedial purpose has been fulfilled, the continued 
deprivation of individual liberty amounts to nothing but a punitive sanction.  Unlike 
Addington, the appellants in this case forever will be subject to state oversight, even if the 
state determines that neither man poses a danger to others.  
The second proposition in Addington was that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard historically has been reserved for criminal cases.  However, in the three decades 
since Addington was decided, a number of states have chosen to employ the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard in SVP statutes.  Prior to the enactment of section 632.505 in 
2006, Missouri also required proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The relatively recent 
advent of SVP statutes throughout the nation has rendered the historical observation of 
Addington less true today than it was when the case was decided in 1979.      
The third proposition in Addington was the Court’s recognition that there would be 
ongoing review of the individual’s mental condition.  Id. at 428.   If the committed 
individual recovered, he was entitled to immediate release.   Id. at 422.  Like the 
commitment statute in Addington, the SVP law provides opportunities for ongoing review 
of an individual’s condition.  Unlike the statute in Addington, section 632.505 does not 
permit an unconditional release upon proof of successful treatment of the mental 
 
3
condition that caused the commitment in the first place.  Moreover, as the state admitted 
in oral argument, only a miniscule percentage of those committed pursuant to the SVP 
law ever have been released as a result of the ongoing treatment and evaluation process.  
Both the plain language and actual administration of the SVP law lead to the inescapable 
conclusion that the initial commitment decision under the SVP law is effectively final.  
The state should not be able to deprive forever the individual liberty of its citizens 
without proving beyond a reasonable doubt the necessity of doing so.   
 
The final proposition underlying Addington was the Court’s concern that 
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof would prove unworkable in civil 
commitment proceedings because of the “lack of certainty and fallibility” of diagnosing 
mental illnesses.  Id. at 429.  Experience has shown this concern to be unfounded.  From 
1999 through 2006, Missouri successfully proved beyond-a-reasonable-doubt the 
necessity of committing a number of individuals under the SVP act.  See In re Care and 
Treatment of Cokes v. State, 183 S.W.3d 281 (Mo. App. 2005); In re Care and Treatment 
of Spencer, 171 S.W.3d 813 (Mo. App. 2005); In re Care and Treatment of Collins, 140 
S.W.3d 121 (Mo. App. 2004).  Actual practice in Missouri and other states has 
demonstrated that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard does not impose an 
unreasonable barrier to the civil commitment of dangerous individuals.   
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the propositions underlying the holding 
in Addington do not apply to Missouri’s SVP law.   Addington is distinguishable and does 
 
4
not foreclose appellants’ arguments.1  More importantly, both the text and administration 
of the SVP law reveals a process that is, in substantial part, punitive in nature. Given the 
punitive aspects of the SVP law and the significant distinctions between this case and 
Addington, I would hold that the SVP law is unconstitutional insofar as it permits the 
state to commit an individual permanently to the care, custody and control of the 
department of mental health without having to prove the prerequisites to commitment 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge 
                                                 
1 In remanding the case to the state court, the Addington court specifically left the 
“determination of the precise burden equal to or greater than the clear and convincing 
standard … to the Texas Supreme Court.”  Id. at 433.  This language specifically 
indicates that the particulars of a civil commitment statute may require some burden of 
proof that is more stringent than clear and convincing.   
 
5