Case Title: Hash v. Director

Citation: 

Docket Number: 081837

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
MICHAEL WAYNE HASH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 081837 
  JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  November 5, 2009 
DIRECTOR OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CULPEPER COUNTY 
John R. Cullen, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Circuit Court of 
Culpeper County erred in denying a writ of habeas corpus to 
Michael Wayne Hash.  
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
A. 
Procedural History 
In February 2001, Hash was found guilty in a jury trial 
of the capital murder of Thelma B. Scroggins (“Scroggins” or 
“the victim”).  He was sentenced to life imprisonment without 
the possibility of parole.  At the time of Scroggins’ murder 
in July 1996, she was seventy-four years old.  Hash was 
fifteen years old.  Hash was not charged with the murder until 
2000 when he was nineteen years old. 
Hash appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, 
which affirmed the trial court’s judgment in an unpublished 
opinion.  Hash v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1290-01-4 (Sept. 3, 
2002).  We denied his petition for appeal and petition for 
rehearing in this Court. 
Hash filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Circuit 
Court of Culpeper County on April 19, 2004, in which he raised 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial 
misconduct.  The circuit court1 held that Hash’s attorneys’ 
performance was deficient, but Hash failed to prove prejudice 
as required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984).  The circuit court further held that there was 
insufficient proof of prosecutorial misconduct.  Hash appeals 
the judgment of the circuit court.  Gene M. Johnson, Director 
of the Department of Corrections (“Director” or 
“Commonwealth”) did not appeal the holding that Hash’s 
attorneys’ performance was deficient. 
B.  Hash’s Criminal Trial 
 
Evidence presented at trial revealed that Scroggins was 
found dead in her home, having suffered four gunshot wounds to 
the head at close range.  Three of the wounds were to the left 
side of her head and one was to the back of her head.  
Investigator Scott H. Jenkins from the Culpeper County 
Sheriff’s Office testified that the only DNA recovered from 
the scene was from the victim and that while five fingerprints 
were recovered from the storm door, no match was ever made.  
Furthermore, no firearm was recovered that matched the bullets 
                     
1 References to the underlying criminal trial will utilize 
the phrase “trial court.”  References to the habeas corpus 
proceedings will utilize the phrase “circuit court.” 
 
2
recovered from the victim’s body.  The bullets were identified 
as .22 caliber. 
The evidence against Hash at trial included testimony 
from “an eyewitness,” Eric Weakley (“Weakley”), testimony from 
Hash’s cousin, Alesia Shelton (“Shelton”), Hash’s statements 
to the police and his own testimony in which he admitted that 
he, Weakley, and Jason Kloby (“Kloby”) discussed robbing an 
“old lady” in the area, and testimony from Paul Carter 
(“Carter”) that Hash confessed to him while they were in jail 
together.  There was no physical evidence that connected Hash 
to the murder. 
Shelton testified that on the night Scroggins was 
murdered she overheard Hash and Kloby at Hash’s house talking 
about Scroggins and how “they were going to do it tonight” and 
that Hash said “they should make her suffer.”  Shelton also 
testified that after she left Hash’s house that night, she saw 
“the blue car from [Hash’s] house” parked near the victim’s 
house. 
Shelton also stated that on a later occasion she, Kloby, 
and Hash rode their bicycles to a church across from 
Scroggins’ house, where Kloby told her how he and Hash had 
gained entry to Scroggins’ house and shot her.  Shelton 
testified that she looked at Hash and he “nodded his head and 
said yes--yeah.”  Shelton testified that Hash “said to 
 
3
[Kloby], he said you couldn’t do nothing like that, could you, 
man, and [Kloby] was like no, man, not me, you know I couldn’t 
do nothing like that, and then laughed” in a sarcastic manner. 
Weakley testified that he, Kloby, and Hash gained entry 
into Scroggins’ house and attacked her.  Weakley stated that 
Hash shot the victim first, “[t]wice in the side of the head 
. . . [t]he left side.”  Weakley also stated that Kloby shot 
her again “around the same place,” then fired the last shot 
into the back of her head. 
Carter testified that while he and Hash were being held 
in the Charlottesville-Albemarle Regional Jail, they spoke 
with each other.  Carter said that Hash revealed that he was 
charged with murder.  Carter stated that he told Hash that his 
cousin was in jail on a “murder case, same thing, capital 
murder.”  Carter testified that Hash then asked him if he 
could “get convicted without a gun.”  Carter testified that in 
the course of this dialogue Hash confessed to the murder, 
saying he “shot the lady twice” and that he used a .22 caliber 
gun and that he “got away in a vehicle, her truck or whatever 
she had, the vehicle, that’s all.  He said vehicle.”  Carter 
said that Hash confessed “it was him and two other dudes while 
he was doing it.”  Carter also testified that Hash told him 
“he had a cousin that was trying to tell on him what happened 
about the whole case and everything.” 
 
4
Hash testified at his trial on his own behalf that in the 
beginning to middle part of 1995 he talked with Kloby and 
Weakley about robbing somebody in the area.  Hash said that 
Kloby and Weakley wanted to rob somebody who was not going to 
put up much of a fight, and Hash assumed they were talking 
about an old lady.  Hash believed that the proposed robbery 
was to get money for drugs because “[o]ver the course of time 
there was a time when Jason [Kloby], Eric [Weakley] and myself 
did do drugs.”  Hash assumed “they were planning this months 
in advance to get some money for drugs.”  According to Hash, 
Kloby mentioned the robbery a second time in a telephone 
conversation two to four weeks after the first conversation, 
and a final time “several months down the road to a year later 
in the mall.”  At his trial, Hash testified that he told Kloby 
he did not “want to have anything to do with it,” but admitted 
originally planning on participating.  According to Hash, 
“[i]t’s not something [he] really wanted to be involved in, 
but [he] was saying [he] was going to be involved in.”  Hash 
denied to the jury any participation in the murder. 
C.  The Habeas Corpus Proceeding 
 
In his habeas corpus proceeding, Hash alleged that his 
attorneys were deficient in failing to discover letters that 
Carter wrote to a federal district court judge and others 
seeking assistance in obtaining a reduction of his sentence in 
 
5
a federal case because of his testimony in Hash’s trial.  Hash 
further alleged that his attorneys’ deficiencies prejudiced 
his case and, had these communications been revealed to the 
jury, it would have undermined Carter’s credibility and 
created a reasonable doubt concerning Hash’s guilt. 
A hearing on Hash’s habeas corpus petition was held on 
October 16 and 17, 2007.  According to Carter, Hash confessed 
to him in “April, May, around that area” of 2000.  Evidence 
revealed that on May 24, 2000 Hash was transferred to the jail 
where Carter was held.  Carter first contacted Investigators 
Jenkins and Mack on June 26, 2000. 
Investigator Mack testified that Carter was a 
“substantial witness” and agreed that once Carter became a 
witness it “change[d] the way he looked at the case.”  
Investigator Mack characterized the case as “iffy” with just 
Shelton and Weakley as witnesses.  When asked to evaluate the 
value of Carter’s testimony, he replied, on a “[s]cale of one 
to ten, I would say eight.” 
Richard Davis (“Davis”), one of Hash’s attorneys for 
Hash’s murder trial, testified that the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney told him about Carter before trial, that Davis had 
written a note in Hash’s case file that Carter was involved 
with a federal drug case, and that he was aware that Carter 
had “testified before the feds.”  Davis stated that “[l]ooking 
 
6
at [Carter’s] file you could learn some things perhaps” and 
admitted that having Carter’s letters would have been “very 
helpful.” 
Michael T. Hemenway (“Hemenway”), Hash’s other attorney 
at trial, testified that he had information about Carter 
before trial, including the fact that Carter “was a big drug 
dealer and that he had cooperated before and that he had 
reduced his sentence based on that cooperation.”  As between 
the two attorneys, Hemenway was responsible for the 
investigation of Carter.  Hemenway admitted he did not obtain 
or review Carter’s file in the federal district court before 
Hash’s trial for capital murder.  Hemenway acknowledged that 
looking into Carter’s federal file would have been a “good 
idea” and stated that Carter’s letters were “potentially 
useful.”  However, Hemenway did not believe that in cross-
examining Carter he needed to use even the documents he did 
possess, which included Carter’s federal indictment and 
conviction order, because Carter freely admitted his 
conviction.  In addition, Hemenway testified that Carter 
talked freely about his motion under § 5K1.1 of the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2000) for favorable sentencing 
consideration in light of his substantial assistance and Rule 
 
7
35(b)2  motion for reduction of sentence and “certainly didn’t 
deny it that he had reduced his sentence.” 
Both parties stipulated to Hash’s exhibits in the habeas 
proceeding, which included copies of the letters that Carter 
had written to the federal district court judge and others 
concerning a sentence reduction.  In total, Carter wrote 25 
letters to the federal district court judge and others, all 
concerning his request for assistance in obtaining a “35(b) 
motion” in federal court to have his federal sentence reduced 
in recognition of his testimony in Hash’s trial.  Of those 
                     
2 At the time of Hash’s trial, Rule 35(b), entitled 
“Reduction of sentence for substantial assistance,” provided: 
 
If the Government so moves within one year 
after the sentence is imposed, the court may 
reduce a sentence to reflect a defendant’s 
subsequent substantial assistance in 
investigating or prosecuting another person, in 
accordance with the guidelines and policy 
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission 
under 28 U.S.C. § 994.  The court may consider 
a government motion to reduce a sentence made 
one year or more after the sentence is imposed 
if the defendant’s substantial assistance 
involves information or evidence not known by 
the defendant until one year or more after 
sentence is imposed.  In evaluating whether 
substantial assistance has been rendered, the 
court may consider the defendant’s pre-sentence 
assistance.  In applying this subdivision, the 
court may reduce the sentence to a level below 
that established by statute as a minimum 
sentence. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) (superseded by amendment 2002). 
 
 
8
letters, five were written before Carter testified at Hash’s 
February 2001 capital murder trial. 
The circuit court held that Hash’s attorneys were 
deficient in failing to examine Carter’s federal file but that 
their deficiency did not prejudice Hash’s defense.  
Additionally, the circuit court held that there was no 
prosecutorial misconduct in Hash’s trial.  The circuit court 
dismissed Hash’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Hash 
timely appealed the circuit court’s judgment, and we awarded 
Hash an appeal limited to two assignments of error: 
1. The circuit court erred in denying habeas relief on 
Claim A regarding “snitch” testimony from Paul Carter 
and ruling that, although counsel’s performance was 
constitutionally deficient, there was no reasonable 
probability of a different result. 
 
2. The court erred in failing to grant habeas relief 
specifically on Claim A(4), when the prosecution used 
the perjured testimony of Paul Carter. 
 
The Commonwealth did not appeal the circuit court’s holding 
that the performance of Hash’s attorneys at trial was 
deficient under Strickland. 
II.  Analysis 
 
A. 
Standard of Review 
We have held that 
“[o]ne attacking a judgment of conviction in a 
habeas corpus proceeding has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of evidence the 
allegations contained in [the] petition.”  
Nolan v. Peyton, 208 Va. 109, 112, 155 S.E.2d 
 
9
318, 321 (1967).  Because entitlement to habeas 
relief is a mixed question of law and fact, the 
circuit court’s findings and conclusions are 
not binding upon this Court, but are subject to 
review to determine whether the circuit court 
correctly applied the law to the facts.  
Williams v. Warden of Mecklenburg Correctional 
Ctr., 254 Va. 16, 24, 487 S.E.2d 194, 198 
(1997). 
 
Curo v. Becker, 254 Va. 486, 489, 493 S.E.2d 368, 369 (1997). 
B. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland established 
a two-prong test to determine whether an attorney was 
ineffective such that a new trial is warranted.  466 U.S. at 
687.  In the first prong, “the defendant must show that 
counsel’s performance was deficient.  This requires showing 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment.”  Id.  In the second prong, “the defendant 
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable.”  Id.  The Supreme Court held that 
“[u]nless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said 
that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the 
adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”  Id. 
Here, the Commonwealth did not assign error to the 
circuit court’s finding that Hash’s defense attorneys were 
 
10
deficient in not fully examining Carter’s federal case file.  
Therefore, the only issue on appeal before us is the second 
prong of the Strickland analysis – whether Hash’s attorneys’ 
deficiencies prejudiced his defense. 
“The question whether a prisoner is entitled to habeas 
relief is a mixed question of law and fact.  Consequently, a 
circuit court’s conclusions of law are not binding on this 
Court but are subject to review to ascertain whether the 
circuit court correctly applied the law to the facts.”  Green 
v. Young, 264 Va. 604, 608-09, 571 S.E.2d 135, 138 (2002) 
(citations omitted).  In analyzing the “prejudice prong” of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we must consider the 
totality of the evidence.  Id. at 113, 645 S.E.2d at 504.  
However, “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally 
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a 
criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the 
judgment.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  In seeking to prove 
that the judgment was affected by an error of the defendant’s 
counsel, 
[t]he defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome. . . . [T]he question is whether there 
is a reasonable probability that, absent the 
 
11
errors, the factfinder would have had a 
reasonable doubt respecting guilt. 
 
Id. at 694-95. 
Hash argues that because his attorneys were deficient in 
not discovering and using the letters Carter wrote to the 
federal district court judge sentencing Carter, his attorneys 
could not properly impeach Carter and could not counter 
Carter’s portrayal by the Commonwealth as a trustworthy 
witness.  According to Hash, other than Carter’s testimony, 
the evidence against him at trial primarily consisted of the 
testimony of Weakley and Shelton, both of whom admitted lying 
to police officers and whose testimony was not consistent with 
their previous statements or with each other’s testimony.  
Hash emphasizes Investigator Jenkins’ testimony that he 
interviewed Shelton and Weakley “repeatedly,” that Shelton 
told him “two different stories,” and that Weakley “repeatedly 
lied and gave different versions of the truth.”  Finally, Hash 
argues that because co-defendant Kloby was found not guilty in 
a separate trial despite the testimony of Weakley and Shelton, 
Carter’s testimony must have been the crucial distinction 
between the two trials and that the projected effect of 
available additional impeachment of Carter’s motivation to 
testify raises a reasonable probability of a different result. 
 
12
The Commonwealth counters that Carter’s credibility was 
established by his knowledge of critical facts about the 
murder that had not been in the public domain, namely the 
caliber of the weapon that had been used and the fact that 
Hash’s cousin, Shelton, was cooperating with investigators.  
Accordingly, the Commonwealth argues that because only the 
killers could have known such details, Carter’s testimony was 
credible and cross-examination about his motive to testify 
would not have influenced the outcome of the case. 
In response to this contention, Hash argues that Carter 
could have “used the entire month (from the time he met [Hash] 
to the time he contacted law enforcement) to collect 
information from any number of sources, or that Paul Carter 
was intentionally or inadvertently provided information about 
the case by law enforcement.”  Hash contends the fact that he, 
Shelton, Kloby, and Weakley had been incarcerated in various 
places during the same period is consistent with this 
argument. 
We hold that because Carter’s credibility was 
sufficiently impeached by Hash’s attorneys regarding his 
motivation for testifying and because the letters did not 
provide additional impeachment information, Hash has not shown 
that there is a reasonable probability of a different result 
had Hash’s attorneys impeached Carter with his letters. 
 
13
According to Carter’s testimony at trial, Hash told 
Carter about his involvement in the Scroggins murder a few 
months before Carter’s July 3, 2000 sentencing in federal 
district court before Senior United States District Judge 
James H. Michael, Jr.  Seeking to get a reduced sentence, 
Carter contacted Culpeper County investigators and gave them 
an oral and a written statement concerning what Hash had told 
him.  After speaking with the investigators, Carter asked them 
to speak on his behalf to federal prosecutors prior to 
Carter’s sentencing about his assistance in the Scroggins 
case.  The investigators advised Carter that nothing could be 
done in exchange for his testimony.  Carter said that he 
understood; however, at Carter’s request, the investigators 
agreed to advise the Culpeper County Commonwealth’s Attorney 
about Carter’s assistance. 
After his sentencing but before Hash’s trial, Carter 
wrote five letters to Judge Michael.  In the letters, Carter 
expressed his concern regarding his inability to contact his 
lawyers about his Rule 35(b) motion.  While Carter made 
references in the letters regarding assisting state 
authorities by providing information in the Scroggins case, 
Carter’s primary purpose in writing the letters was to urge 
Judge Michael to contact Carter’s lawyers or to appoint Carter 
a new lawyer to aid with his potential Rule 35(b) motion.  In 
 
14
responding to Carter’s letters, on August 28, 2000 Judge 
Michael entered an order, which he provided to Carter, denying 
Carter’s pro se motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b).  The order also 
stated, “[T]he defendant may also wish to discuss the matter 
with the prosecuting Assistant United States Attorney; 
however, the United States not having made such a motion, the 
court is without authority at this time to correct or reduce 
the defendant’s sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b).” 
Hash’s argument that without using Carter’s five letters 
to Judge Michael, his attorneys could not effectively impeach 
Carter, is belied by the trial record demonstrating the 
impeachment of Carter’s credibility.  The following exchange 
took place during cross-examination of Carter: 
[Defense counsel:] You called the 
investigators, and 
after you gave them 
information, did you 
ask them that if it 
was possible, for them 
to speak on your 
behalf to the U.S. 
Attorney? 
 
[Carter:]  
 
Yeah, I did. 
 
. . . . 
 
[Defense Counsel:] And you specifically 
asked them to speak on 
your behalf to the 
U.S. prosecutor . . . 
[o]n July 3rd of 2000? 
 
15
 
[Carter:]  
 
Yes. 
 
. . . . 
 
[Defense counsel:] And isn’t it true that 
during those two years 
what you’ve been doing 
is testifying against 
other people in an 
attempt to get what’s 
a 5K motion, a motion 
for substantial 
assistance? 
 
[Carter:] 
Right, testify against 
one dude. 
 
. . . . 
 
[Defense counsel:] Okay.  Now under the 
federal rules, you 
know what a Rule 35B 
is, don’t you? 
 
[Carter:]  
 
Yes, I do. 
 
[Defense counsel:] And why don’t you tell 
the jury what that is? 
 
[Carter:] 
It’s when you come 
back within a year to 
get your time cut. 
 
[Defense counsel:] Okay.  So you can 
further reduce your 
sentence if you 
testify within twelve 
(12) months of July 
3rd of 2000, is that 
right? 
 
[Carter:] 
I don’t know if the 
state applies to the 
fed. 
 
 
16
[Defense counsel:] Well, when you called 
the – when you talked 
to the investigators, 
that’s what your – 
that’s what you called 
them about, right? 
 
[Carter:] 
When I called the 
investigators? 
 
[Defense counsel:] When you called Mr. 
Close and when you 
talked to the 
investigators, wasn’t 
that for the purpose 
of reducing your 
sentence potentially? 
 
[Carter:] 
Somewhat, yes, but if 
somebody--that could 
have been my 
grandmother, your 
grandmother or 
somebody else.  I 
would feel somebody 
else would do the same 
thing for me. 
 
. . . . 
 
[Defense Counsel:] And the Rule 35B began 
running for twelve 
(12) months, began 
running on July 3rd of 
2000, is that right? 
 
[Carter:] 
Yes. 
 
. . . . 
 
[Defense counsel:] Your understanding of 
the substantial 
assistance motion as 
well as the 35B is 
that you just help the 
prosecutor in a case 
and you will get 
 
17
credit for it, is that 
right? 
 
[Carter:] 
Say that again, 
please, repeat it. 
 
[Defense counsel:] Either the motion for 
substantial assistance 
or the Rule 35B is 
just helping the 
prosecutor with the 
case? 
 
[Carter:] 
Yeah, that’s a federal 
case.  It don’t say 
nothing about state 
case. 
 
[Defense counsel:] That’s your 
understanding of it, 
is that what you’re 
saying? 
 
[Carter:] 
No, that’s my – yeah, 
that’s my 
understanding. 
 
[Defense counsel:] And you could be wrong 
about that? 
 
[Carter:] 
Yeah. 
 
As a result of Carter’s responses, his credibility as a 
witness was impeached by demonstrating that his motivation to 
testify was, in part, to seek a sentence reduction in his 
federal case.  Moreover, counsel for Hash, in opening and 
closing statements, discussed Rule 35(b) motions in the 
federal system and Carter’s motivation to testify in Hash’s 
trial, and provided the jury both the context for Carter’s 
 
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impeachment and subsequent argument attacking Carter’s 
credibility as a witness.  During opening statements, counsel 
for Hash told the jury: 
[I]n the federal system he [Carter] is able to 
reduce his sentence by testifying for the 
government in some capacity as long as it’s 
testifying against somebody else, helping them 
bring a new case. . . .  [I]f he can’t testify 
in court against somebody, he doesn’t get his 
motion for substantial assistance. . . .  And 
also you’ll hear evidence in the federal system 
he has another twelve months under what’s 
called a Rule 35B to produce more evidence, and 
as long as he keeps testifying against other 
people, he gets to further reduce his 
sentence. . . .  Maybe he’ll convince you he’s 
telling the truth.  But he has an incredible, 
incredible motive to tell you that Michael Hash 
said something to him . . . 
 
Additionally, in closing argument, counsel for Hash urged 
the jury to consider Carter’s motivation for testifying: 
[H]e also still has his Rule 35 and he knows 
about it.  He’s not a stupid guy. . . .  He 
knows the system, he knows how it’s done.  And 
ask yourself this question.  Can I trust this 
guy not to lie?  Can I trust him, would I make 
a decision, would I make any decision based on 
his word, particularly where his self-interest 
is an issue. 
 
Considering Carter’s testimony, especially in light of 
Hash’s counsel’s opening and closing statements regarding 
Carter’s motivation to testify and the availability to Carter 
of the Rule 35(b) motion, information in the letters would not 
have provided any additional impeachment evidence for the 
defense.  Although Carter was equivocal on the issue of 
 
19
whether providing assistance to the Culpeper County 
Commonwealth’s Attorney would qualify as the kind of 
assistance required for a Rule 35(b) motion, there is nothing 
in the letters that would have further impeached him on that 
specific point.  The letters were only additional indications 
of Carter’s interest in pursuing a Rule 35(b) motion. 
The real issue, however, was not whether assisting in a 
state prosecution would qualify for a Rule 35(b) reduction in 
sentence, but rather whether Carter thought that assisting in 
Hash’s prosecution might help him gain such a reduction.  
Despite Carter’s protestation that he did not know whether 
helping a state prosecution would qualify for Rule 35(b) 
treatment, it was clear from his responses to Hash’s 
attorneys’ cross-examination that he had sought to assist 
himself in reducing his sentence.  The letters did not further 
impeach Carter because even though the letters repeated his 
interest in obtaining a Rule 35(b) reduction, the letters also 
clearly acknowledged Carter’s understanding that he had to ask 
the United States Attorney to bring the Rule 35(b) motion.  
Nothing in the letters clarified whether Carter knew he could 
rely on assisting a state prosecution as a basis for a Rule 
35(b) motion or whether the assistance had to be in connection 
with a federal prosecution.  Therefore, the letters did not 
provide additional impeachment to what Hash’s attorneys had 
 
20
accomplished through eliciting testimony from Carter about the 
relationship between his testimony against Hash and a 
reduction of Carter’s sentence. 
The evidence presented at trial was such that any 
potential further impeachment of Carter by use of his letters 
would not have yielded a reasonable probability of a different 
result at trial.  “[A] court hearing an ineffectiveness claim 
must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or 
jury.”  Strickland, at 695.  See also Lester v. Ayers, 267 
Fed. Appx. 725, 727 (9th Cir. 2008) (given the degree of 
successful impeachment, additional impeachment urged by 
defendant would not have changed the result of the 
proceedings); Aldridge v. Dugger, 925 F.2d 1320, 1326 (11th 
Cir. 1991) (because defendant had already been severely 
impeached, any additional impeachment would have been merely 
cumulative and would not have changed the result of the 
trial). 
In Hash’s argument that the possibility of additional 
impeachment of Carter about his motive to testify establishes 
a reasonable probability of a different result, Hash attempts 
to minimize the significance of his own statements to the 
police and trial testimony.  Hash admitted that he spoke with 
Weakley and Kloby about robbing someone in the area who would 
not put up much of a fight.  Hash testified that he assumed 
 
21
they were talking about an old lady.  Hash also testified that 
he spoke with Kloby on two other occasions about robbing 
someone in the area.  Furthermore, Hash admitted that he 
planned on participating in the robbery, but claimed he only 
later changed his mind after having “second thoughts about 
it.”  At the habeas hearing Hash’s attorneys testified that 
they considered Hash’s pretrial statements to the police and 
his trial testimony to be the biggest distinction between 
Hash’s conviction and co-defendant Kloby’s acquittal.  
According to Davis, “the biggest piece that we thought that 
was different from our case and Kloby’s case was not Mr. 
Carter but Mr. Hash’s statement.”  Davis emphasized that since 
Kloby had not made a statement to the police, “that’s one of 
the reasons why he [Kloby] didn’t testify.”  Additionally, 
Davis testified that Kloby’s alibi held up better than Hash’s. 
Thus, the jury had the opportunity to observe Hash and to 
weigh his credibility on this critical issue.  The trial 
judge, who presided over Hash’s trial and also conducted an 
exhaustive habeas proceeding over two days which resulted in a 
detailed 22 page opinion letter and an equally detailed 19 
page order, also distinguished Hash’s conviction from Kloby’s 
acquittal in part because of Hash’s statement to the 
investigators and his trial testimony. 
 
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Considering the totality of the evidence, we conclude 
that Hash has not met the burden of showing a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsels’ error in failing to 
investigate the federal file and use the letters to further 
impeach Carter, the trial would have had a different result.  
Hash has not established that his attorneys’ failure to use 
the potential limited impeachment benefit from his attorneys’ 
use of Carter’s letters to the federal district court judge – 
when Carter’s motivation in testifying had already been 
clearly demonstrated – constituted a breakdown in the 
adversary process that renders Hash’s conviction unreliable.  
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
C.  Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Hash argues that there is no doubt that Carter’s 
testimony regarding his motivation to testify and whether his 
assistance in Hash’s trial would aid his Rule 35(b) motion was 
perjured, and the Commonwealth knew or should have known that 
Carter was committing perjury.  Hash also contends the 
Commonwealth failed to correct Carter’s erroneous and perjured 
testimony. 
The Commonwealth responds that it did not have knowledge 
whether Carter’s testimony was untrue.  The Commonwealth also 
notes that at the evidentiary hearing in the circuit court, 
Hash presented no evidence of the Commonwealth’s knowledge of 
 
23
Hash’s letters to Judge Michael or the mechanics of federal 
Rule 35(b) proceedings.  Moreover, the Commonwealth contends 
that at the beginning of Hash’s trial the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney told Hash’s counsel that Carter had previously 
assisted the federal government.  The Commonwealth argues 
there was no attempt to hide Carter’s motivation in reducing 
his federal sentence, but merely to emphasize that Carter had 
not been promised anything by the Commonwealth in exchange for 
his testimony against Hash. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a 
conviction must be reversed if the state knowingly used false 
testimony in securing a conviction where the “false testimony 
. . . may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial.”  
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959).  The Supreme 
Court also noted that this rule applies even where the 
perjured testimony only relates to a witness’ credibility: 
The principle that a State may not knowingly 
use false evidence, including false testimony, 
to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any 
concept of ordered liberty, does not cease to 
apply merely because the false testimony goes 
only to the credibility of the witness.  The 
jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and 
reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is 
upon such subtle factors as the possible 
interest of the witness in testifying falsely 
that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend. 
 
Id. at 269. 
 
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“In order to find that a violation of Napue [v. Illinois] 
occurred in this case, we must determine first that the 
testimony [at issue] was false, second that the prosecution 
knew of the falsity, and finally that the falsity affected the 
jury’s judgment.”  Teleguz v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 458, 492, 
643 S.E.2d 708, 729 (2007).  Hash claims that Carter committed 
perjury in testifying regarding his motivation to testify and 
regarding whether his assistance in Hash’s trial would aid in 
his Rule 35(b) motion.  Hash’s argument that Carter committed 
perjury concerning his motivation for testifying is not 
supported by the record.  Carter clearly admitted testifying 
in a federal case to get his sentence reduced and acknowledged 
his desire to have the Commonwealth talk to the United States 
Attorney on his behalf.  Despite his comment about testifying 
because of the victim, there is no doubt that at least part of 
his motivation was to exchange his testimony for consideration 
as to the reduction of his sentence, a clarification that was 
explicitly brought to the jury’s attention by Hash’s 
attorneys. 
Whether Carter or the Commonwealth knew that Carter’s 
testimony in a state court proceeding could qualify as 
assistance for a Rule 35(b) motion is not clear.  Although the 
record does reveal that Carter’s testimony at Hash’s trial 
resulted in a reduction in his federal sentence following the 
 
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United States Attorney’s Rule 35(b) motion, there is no 
evidence that anyone knew at the time that Carter testified 
that his assistance in the state prosecution would qualify for 
federal relief.  Furthermore, there is no evidence whatsoever 
of a pre-arranged agreement with the federal prosecutor to 
make a Rule 35(b) motion.  In fact, the only evidence is that 
no promises were made to Carter in exchange for his testimony.  
In his closing argument, the Commonwealth’s Attorney, instead 
of improperly vouching that Carter’s assistance could not be 
the basis of a Rule 35(b) motion for sentence reduction, 
clarified that there simply was no agreement with Carter in 
exchange for his testimony. 
Since Hash has failed to establish that Carter’s 
testimony was false, there can be no way to establish that the 
prosecution knew of any alleged falsity.  Consequently, we 
need not consider any impact that Carter’s testimony about his 
motivation and the benefit of his assistance might have had 
upon the jury’s judgment.  Therefore, we hold that the circuit 
court did not err in denying Hash habeas relief on his Claim 
A(4), asserting entitlement to relief based upon prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
III. Conclusion 
 
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For these reasons, we find the circuit court did not err 
in denying Hash a writ of habeas corpus.  We affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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