Case Title: Commonwealth v. Lougee

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12949; 12950; 12955

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12949 
SJC-12950 
SJC-12955 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CAMERON LOUGEE. 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SHAMUS HORTON. 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  SCOTT SMITH. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     June 3, 2020. - June 22, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Pretrial Detention.  Due Process of Law, Pretrial detainees.  
Bail.  Constitutional Law, Speedy trial.  Practice, 
Criminal, Speedy trial. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 8, 2020. 
 
 
The case was reported by Cypher, J. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 8, 2020. 
 
 
The case was reported by Cypher, J. 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on May 12, 2020. 
 
 
The case was reported by Cypher, J. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Shoshana E. Stern & Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant 
District Attorneys, & Andrea C. Harrington, District Attorney 
(Tara B. Ganguly, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
Cameron Lougee. 
 
Brian J. Anderson for Shamus Horton. 
 
Joseph N. Schneiderman for Scott Smith. 
 
Michael W. Morrissey, District Attorney, & Pamela Alford, 
Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for the 
Norfolk district, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Reyna M. Ramirez & Christine Sunnerberg, pro se, amici 
curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In response to the community spread of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in the Commonwealth, this court exercised its 
rule-making and superintendence authority to issue a series of 
emergency orders designed to protect the public health and 
reduce the spread of disease by minimizing the need for in-
person proceedings at court houses.  On March 13, 2020, we 
continued all criminal jury trials scheduled to commence in 
Massachusetts State courts to a date no earlier than April 21, 
and subsequent orders extended the continuance to a date no 
earlier than September 8, 2020.1  We declared in each of these 
orders that the trial continuances serve the ends of justice and 
outweigh the best interests of the public and the criminal 
defendant in a speedy trial and that, therefore, the time 
                                                          
 
1 On April 1, 2020, we also continued all criminal bench 
trials to a date no earlier than May 4, and subsequent orders 
extended the continuance to a date no earlier than July 1, 
unless the case could be tried virtually by agreement of the 
parties and the trial judge. 
3 
 
 
periods of such continuances shall be excluded from speedy trial 
computations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, 378 Mass. 909 (1979). 
 
The issue presented in the three cases before us is whether 
the periods of delay resulting from continuances pursuant to our 
emergency orders should be excluded from the computation of 
statutory time limits on pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A, which authorizes detention of a defendant found to be 
dangerous, or under G. L. c. 276, § 58B, which authorizes 
detention of a defendant who has violated a condition of 
pretrial release.  In these three cases, judges in the trial 
court did not exclude such periods of delay from the computation 
of time limits under §§ 58A and 58B, and therefore concluded 
that these time limits had expired.  As a result, defendant 
Cameron Lougee was released from pretrial detention under § 58A 
but held on bail; youthful offender Shamus Horton was released 
from pretrial detention under § 58A, subject to house arrest, a 
global positioning system (GPS) bracelet, and other conditions; 
and defendant Scott Smith was released from pretrial detention 
under § 58B.  The Commonwealth challenged these rulings in 
petitions filed with a single justice of this court pursuant to 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, and the single justice reported the cases for 
consideration by the full court. 
We hold that the periods of delay resulting from 
continuances in these cases, pursuant to our emergency orders, 
4 
 
 
should have been excluded from the computation of the time 
limits on pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, §§ 58A and 58B.  
Both statutes provide that their respective time limits on 
pretrial detention must be computed "excluding any period of 
delay as defined in Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 36(b)(2)."  Rule 36 (b) (2), in turn, lists certain periods 
of delay that must be excluded from speedy trial computations 
under that rule, including "[a]ny period of delay resulting from 
a continuance granted by a judge . . . , if the judge granted 
the continuance on the basis of his [or her] findings that the 
ends of justice served by taking such action outweighed the best 
interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial."  
Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (F). 
Ordinarily, it is a trial judge who orders a continuance, 
who determines whether the delay will be excluded from the 
speedy trial computation, and who makes the required findings 
under rule 36 (b) (2) (F).  But here, immediate and uniform 
action across the entire court system was needed to prevent the 
spread of the coronavirus and to avoid the inefficiencies and 
inconsistencies that would have resulted if trial judges had to 
make a separate decision and findings in each case as to whether 
a trial should be continued due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  It 
was therefore necessary and appropriate for this court to order 
that all trials be continued, to determine that the resulting 
5 
 
 
delay should be excluded from the speedy trial computation, and 
to make the required findings applicable to all cases.  Because 
we determined that the time periods of these continuances are 
excludable for purposes of speedy trial computations under Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (F), and because periods of delay that 
are excluded for purposes of speedy trial computations under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) must also be excluded from the 
computation of time limits on pretrial detention under G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 58A and 58B, the time periods of these continuances 
must be excluded in computing the time limits on pretrial 
detention under §§ 58A and 58B.2 
Background.  1.  Supreme Judicial Court emergency orders.  
On March 13, 2020, this court issued an order regarding 
empanelment of juries (March 13 order) directing that, "to 
protect the public health by reducing the risk of exposure to 
the virus and slowing the spread of the disease . . . all jury 
trials, in both criminal and civil cases, scheduled to commence 
in Massachusetts state courts between the date of this order and 
April 17, 2020, are hereby continued to a date no earlier than 
April 21, 2020."  The March 13 order further provided that 
"[t]he continuances occasioned by this Order serve the ends of 
                                                          
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus letters submitted by the 
district attorney for the Norfolk district and by attorneys 
Reyna M. Ramirez and Christine Sunnerberg. 
6 
 
 
justice and outweigh the best interests of the public and the 
defendant in a speedy trial.  Therefore, the time periods of 
such continuances shall be excluded from speedy trial 
computations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36." 
 
Since that March 13 order, we have issued three additional 
orders –- on April 1 (April 1 order), April 27 (April 27 order), 
and May 26 (May 26 order) –- that have further continued all 
criminal trials, including both jury and bench trials.  Most 
recently, the May 26 order continued all criminal jury trials 
scheduled to commence at any time from March 14 through 
September 4, 2020, to a date no earlier than September 8, 2020, 
and continued all criminal bench trials scheduled to commence at 
any time from March 14 through June 30, 2020, to a date no 
earlier than July 1, 2020, unless the trial could be conducted 
virtually by agreement of the parties and the trial judge. 
Like the March 13 order, the April 1 order, April 27 order, 
and May 26 order each stated that the continuances occasioned by 
these orders serve the ends of justice and outweigh the best 
interests of the public and criminal defendants in a speedy 
trial, and that, consequently, the time periods of these 
continuances should be excluded from speedy trial computations 
under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36. 
2.  Cameron Lougee.  Cameron Lougee was arraigned in the 
District Court on March 27, 2019, on charges of forcible rape of 
7 
 
 
a child, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22A; rape of a child 
aggravated by a ten-year age difference, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 23A; and indecent assault and battery on a child under 
the age of fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B.  The 
Commonwealth moved to have him held in pretrial detention due to 
dangerousness pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, and Lougee was 
held pending that hearing.  After a § 58A hearing on April 18, 
2019, a District Court judge found Lougee to be dangerous but 
determined that he could be released on $25,000 cash bail, with 
other conditions.  Lougee was unable to post that amount and 
remained in pretrial detention. 
 
Lougee was subsequently indicted for the same offenses by a 
grand jury on July 18, 2019, and arraigned in the Superior Court 
on September 5, 2019.  After another § 58A hearing on September 
9, 2019, a Superior Court judge found Lougee to be dangerous and 
ordered that he be held without bail. 
 
Trial was scheduled for March 23, 2020.  On March 6, 2020, 
Lougee filed a motion to continue the trial due to the 
unavailability of his expert witness.  The motion was allowed 
over the Commonwealth's objection, and a new trial date was set 
for May 11, 2020.3 
                                                          
 
3 The motion judge also ordered that the resulting period of 
delay should be excluded from the calculation of Lougee's speedy 
trial time under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, 378 Mass. 909 (1979), and 
8 
 
 
 
On May 4, 2020, Lougee filed a "Motion to Release the 
Defendant from 58A Hold and Remit to Bail," which the 
Commonwealth opposed.  At the hearing on this motion, which was 
conducted remotely, the judge calculated that the 180-day limit 
on Lougee's pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, would 
expire on May 15, 2020, unless the additional delay resulting 
from the continuance of Lougee's trial pursuant to this court's 
emergency orders was also excluded from that calculation.  
Following the hearing, the judge granted Lougee's motion, 
concluding that this court's emergency orders did not toll or 
extend the 180-day limit on Lougee's pretrial detention.  The 
judge scheduled a bail hearing for May 15, when the pretrial 
detention under § 58A would end. 
On May 8, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a petition with a 
single justice of this court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
seeking to vacate the Superior Court order.  The single justice 
reserved and reported the case to the full court, but allowed 
the bail hearing to proceed.  On May 15, a Superior Court judge 
set bail for Lougee at $75,000, with other conditions.  Lougee 
was unable to post this amount, and he remains in pretrial 
detention. 
                                                          
 
from the calculation of the 180-day limit on his pretrial 
detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3). 
9 
 
 
 
3.  Shamus Horton.  Shamus Horton was indicted as a 
youthful offender for carrying a firearm without a license, 
G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), and subsequently arraigned on the 
indicted charge on January 6, 2020.  The Commonwealth moved for 
Horton to be held in pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, 
§ 58A, and after a § 58A hearing on January 9, he was found to 
be dangerous and ordered held without bail for 120 days. 
 
On May 4, 2020, a Juvenile Court judge conducted a bail 
review hearing.  The judge ruled that this court's emergency 
orders did not toll the time limits for pretrial detention under 
§ 58A, and concluded that the 120-day limit on Horton's 
detention had expired.  The judge then set bail in the amount of 
$500 and ordered other conditions of release, including house 
arrest and a GPS bracelet.  On May 6, Horton was released after 
posting bail and being fitted with a GPS bracelet, and went to 
live with his grandfather under house arrest. 
 
On May 8, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a petition with a 
single justice of this court under G. L. c. 211, § 3, claiming 
that the judge erred by finding that the emergency orders did 
not toll the time limits for pretrial detention.  The single 
justice reserved and reported the case to the full court. 
4.  Scott Smith.  On August 5, 2019, Scott Smith was 
arraigned in the District Court on charges of assault and 
battery on a household or family member, in violation of G. L. 
10 
 
 
c. 265, § 13M (a); and vandalism, in violation of G. L. c. 266, 
§ 126A.  After a hearing under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, he was found 
to be dangerous and ordered held without bail for 120 days.  On 
December 2, 2019, after the period of pretrial detention had 
expired, Smith was released on conditions, including an order to 
stay away from the victim and her children and to wear a GPS 
bracelet. 
On February 12, 2020, while Smith was awaiting trial, he 
was arraigned on a new charge that he allegedly committed while 
on bail release -- possession of a class B drug with intent to 
distribute, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a).  Due to 
this new charge, the judge revoked Smith's bail on the pending 
assault and battery and vandalism charges, and trial on those 
charges was scheduled for April 27, 2020. 
On May 11, 2020, a judge found that the ninety-day limit on 
Smith's pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58B, had 
expired, and the judge released Smith from custody.  The 
following day, the Commonwealth filed a petition with a single 
justice of this court under G. L. c. 211, § 3, challenging the 
judge's finding that the ninety-day limit was not extended by 
the continuances arising from this court's emergency orders.  
The single justice reserved and reported the case to the full 
court. 
11 
 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Computation of time limits on pretrial 
detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A.  General Laws c. 276, 
§ 58A, provides that, where a defendant has been charged with 
certain serious offenses, the Commonwealth may move to detain 
the defendant before trial due to his or her alleged 
dangerousness.  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (1).  If, after an 
evidentiary hearing, the judge finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that no conditions of release imposed on the defendant 
will reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the 
community, the judge must order the detention of the person 
prior to trial.  G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3). 
Section 58A (3) provides that a person detained under the 
statute "shall be brought to a trial as soon as reasonably 
possible, but in [the] absence of good cause, the person so held 
shall not be detained for a period exceeding 120 days by the 
district court or for a period exceeding 180 days by the 
superior court excluding any period of delay as defined in 
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 36(b)(2)."  This 
single sentence makes four important statements that are the 
crux of these appeals.  First, by stating in this sentence that 
persons held in pretrial detention "shall be brought to a trial 
as soon as reasonably possible," the Legislature declared its 
intent that pretrial detainees be given priority when there is a 
queue of criminal cases awaiting trial.  See Abbott A. v. 
12 
 
 
Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 36-37 (2010) ("Section 58A requires 
a speedy trial for a defendant or juvenile who is detained based 
on a finding of dangerousness . . .").  Second, this sentence 
sets a presumptive time limit for such cases to be brought to 
trial -- 120 days for cases in the District Court4 and 180 days 
for cases in the Superior Court.  Third, this sentence declares 
that the presumptive time limit may not necessarily be the 
actual time limit in any particular case, because the time limit 
excludes any period of delay listed in rule 36 (b) (2).  Fourth, 
this sentence provides that, even when this time limit is 
reached, the Commonwealth still has the opportunity to forestall 
the defendant's release from pretrial detention if the 
Commonwealth can meet its burden of showing good cause for 
continued detention. 
The periods of delay in Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, which 
§ 58A (3) incorporates by reference, are the periods of delay 
                                                          
 
4 The 120-day limit on pretrial detention under G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (3), in District Court cases also applies to cases 
in the Juvenile Court.  See Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 
24, 36-37 (2010) (applying former ninety-day limit for pretrial 
detention under § 58A in District Court cases to juvenile in 
Juvenile Court case); G. L. c. 218, § 59 ("Except as otherwise 
provided by law, the divisions of the juvenile court department 
shall have and exercise, within their respective jurisdictions, 
the same powers, duties, and procedure as the divisions of the 
district court department; and all laws relating to district 
courts or municipal courts in their respective counties or 
officials thereof or proceedings therein, shall, so far as 
applicable, apply to said divisions of the juvenile court 
department"). 
13 
 
 
that are excluded from the computation of time by which a 
defendant must be brought to trial, known as our speedy trial 
rule.  Rule 36 generally requires that a criminal defendant must 
be brought to trial within one year of arraignment.  See Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (1) (C), (D); Commonwealth v. Graham, 480 
Mass. 516, 522 (2018).  But rule 36 (b) (2) lists certain 
periods of delay that "shall be excluded in computing the time 
within which the trial of any offense must commence."  These 
periods of excludable delay include, among others, delay 
resulting from the physical examination of a defendant for 
mental competency or physical incapacity, delay arising from 
hearing and deciding pretrial motions or resolving interlocutory 
appeals, and delay arising from the absence or unavailability of 
the defendant or an essential witness.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 
36 (b) (2) (A), (B), (C).  The period of permissible delay most 
relevant to these appeals, set forth in rule 36 (b) (2) (F), 
provides for exclusion of "[a]ny period of delay resulting from 
a continuance granted by a judge on his [or her] own motion or 
at the request of the defendant or . . . the prosecutor, if the 
judge granted the continuance on the basis of his [or her] 
findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action 
outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendant in 
a speedy trial." 
14 
 
 
 
Ordinarily, it is the trial judge who grants a continuance 
and who makes the findings required by rule 36 (b) (2) (F) to 
exclude the period of delay from the speedy trial computation 
and, where the defendant is detained awaiting trial, from the 
§ 58A (3) computation.  However, in our emergency orders, it was 
this court, not the trial judge, that ordered the continuance of 
trial under our superintendence authority, and it was we who 
made the global finding, applicable to all pending criminal 
cases in which defendants were awaiting trial, that the 
imperative need to protect the public health justified the 
continuances required by our emergency orders and outweighed the 
interests of the public and criminal defendants in a speedy 
trial.  We therefore declared in our emergency orders that "the 
time periods of such continuances shall be excluded from speedy 
trial computations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36."  The reasons for 
these findings are set out in the prefatory language in our 
emergency orders, where we declared that we were acting "to 
protect the public health by reducing the risk of exposure to 
the virus and slowing the spread of the disease," March 13 
order; "to reduce the number of people coming to Massachusetts 
State courthouses," April 1 order; and "[t]o safeguard the 
health and safety of the public and court personnel during the 
COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic," April 27 order and May 26 
order. 
15 
 
 
Once we made these findings, it necessarily followed that 
the time periods of the continuances occasioned by our orders 
should also be excluded from the time limits on pretrial 
detention, because G. L. c. 276, § 58A (3), specifically 
provides that the time limits on pretrial detention are to be 
computed "excluding any period of delay as defined in [rule] 
36(b)(2)."  See Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 36-37 (where juvenile 
was incompetent to stand trial, and rule 36 [b] [2] excludes 
periods of delay resulting from defendant's incompetency from 
speedy trial computation, judge's ruling excluding that period 
of delay from computation of time limit on pretrial detention 
under § 58A [3] was "required by the language of the statute"). 
We are not persuaded by the contrary arguments of defense 
counsel.  They point out that the relevant paragraphs in our 
emergency orders do not explicitly reference pretrial detention 
under § 58A, and that these paragraphs are labeled with the 
heading "Speedy Trial Computations" in our April 1, April 27, 
and May 26 orders.  On that basis, they contend that our 
emergency orders were intended to exclude continuances required 
by these orders only for speedy trial computations under rule 
36, but not for computations of the time limits on pretrial 
detention under § 58A.  However, there was no need for us to 
reference § 58A specifically, because the statute automatically 
excludes periods of delay that are excluded from speedy trial 
16 
 
 
computations under rule 36 (b) (2).  We did not intend to limit 
the exclusion of continuances under our emergency orders only to 
speedy trial computations. 
Defense counsel also argue that the continuances occasioned 
by our emergency orders do not qualify as periods of delay as 
defined under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) because rule 
36 (b) (2) (F) requires the judge to "set[] forth in the record 
of the case, either orally or in writing, his [or her] reasons 
for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 
the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 
the defendant in a speedy trial."  They contend that this 
provision requires specific, individualized findings in each 
particular case. 
We do not believe the language of rule 36 (b) (2) (F) 
compels such a narrow interpretation under the extraordinary 
circumstances presented here.  Here, it was this court, not the 
trial judge, that ordered the trial continuances, and it was 
therefore this court that made the requisite speedy trial 
findings under rule 36 (b) (2) (F).  Requiring each judge to 
make such findings in each individual case would have been 
inappropriate, where we, not the judge, ordered the continuance 
after having determined that "the ends of justice served by the 
granting of the continuance outweigh the best interests of the 
public and [every] defendant in a speedy trial."  We conclude 
17 
 
 
that the findings requirement in rule 36 (b) (2) (F) has been 
adequately met by the statements of reasons in our emergency 
orders quoted supra, which are implicitly incorporated in each 
individual case where our emergency orders resulted in a trial 
continuance.  See Graham, 480 Mass. at 528, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Davis, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 631, 637 n.11 (2017) (rule 
32 [b] [2] [F] finding "need not be explicit, but may be implied 
from the record").5 
We therefore conclude that periods of delay resulting from 
continuances in the cases of Lougee and Horton, due to our 
emergency orders, should have been excluded from the computation 
of the time limits on their pretrial detention under § 58A.6 
2.  Computation of time limits on pretrial detention under 
G. L. c. 276, § 58B.  General Laws c. 276, § 58B, provides that 
                                                          
 
5 Defense counsel also cite Commonwealth v. Davis, 91 Mass. 
App. Ct. 631 (2017), in arguing that trial delays due to 
systemic problems should not be excluded under Mass. R. Crim. P. 
36 (b) (2) (F), unless the judge makes specific findings in a 
particular case.  But the trial delays in Davis were due to 
"court congestion," see id. at 633, and we have held that 
"normally court congestion is not a sufficient justification for 
the denial of the right to a speedy trial" unless the defendant 
has agreed to or acquiesced in the delay.  Commonwealth v. 
Spaulding, 411 Mass. 503, 507 (1992). 
 
6 Because we conclude that the trial continuances mandated 
in our emergency orders constitute excludable delay, and that 
the time limits on pretrial detention under § 58A have therefore 
yet to expire for either Lougee or Horton, we need not address 
whether the exigencies arising from the COVID-19 pandemic would 
constitute good cause for their continued detention. 
18 
 
 
where a person on pretrial release has violated a condition of 
that release, e.g., by committing a new crime, the release may 
be revoked and the person may be subject to pretrial detention.  
Specifically, a defendant's release may be revoked where, after 
hearing, a judge makes two findings:  (1) that there is probable 
cause to believe that a person on pretrial release has committed 
a new crime while on release, or clear and convincing evidence 
that the person has violated any other condition of release; and 
(2) that "there are no conditions of release that will 
reasonably assure the person will not pose a danger to the 
safety of any other person or the community" or "the person is 
unlikely to abide by any condition or combination of conditions 
of release."  G. L. c. 276, § 58B.  Section 58B further 
provides, "A person detained under this subsection . . . shall 
be brought to trial as soon as reasonably possible, but in the 
absence of good cause, a person so held shall not be detained 
for a period exceeding ninety days excluding any period of delay 
as defined in Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 
36(b)(2)."  Except for the shorter, ninety-day time limit on 
pretrial detention under § 58B, this language is virtually 
identical to the provision that we have just reviewed in G. L. 
c. 276, § 58A (3).  Our preceding analysis under § 58A (3) 
concerning the exclusion of periods of delay resulting from 
19 
 
 
continuances pursuant to our emergency orders is therefore 
equally applicable to § 58B. 
Accordingly, we conclude that periods of delay resulting 
from continuances in Smith's case due to our emergency orders 
should have been excluded from the computation of the time 
limits on his pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58B.7 
 
3.  Requests for reconsideration.  The extended length of 
pretrial detention arising from our emergency orders continuing 
all criminal and youthful offender trials, and from our 
declaration that the time periods of such continuances shall be 
deemed excludable delay, does not necessarily mean that all 
defendants will (or should) be detained for this extended time 
period.  Our emergency orders specifically recognized that, 
where our orders resulted in the postponement of a trial, "where 
appropriate, a defendant may ask the court for reconsideration 
of bail or conditions of release." 
Here, § 58A (4) specifically permits reconsideration of a 
prior detention order where there has been a material change in 
circumstances: 
                                                          
 
7 As we noted for the other cases supra, we need not address 
whether the exigencies arising from the COVID-19 pandemic would 
constitute good cause for Smith's continued detention, because 
we conclude that the trial continuances mandated in our 
emergency orders constitute excludable delay, and that the time 
limit on Smith's pretrial detention under § 58B has not yet 
expired. 
20 
 
 
"The hearing may be reopened by the judge, at any time 
before trial, or upon a motion of the commonwealth or the 
person detained if the judge finds that:  (i) information 
exists that was not known at the time of the hearing or 
that there has been a change in circumstances and (ii) that 
such information or change in circumstances has a material 
bearing on the issue of whether there are conditions of 
release that will reasonably assure the safety of any other 
person or the community." 
 
A substantial delay in the commencement of trial may constitute 
a change in circumstances, especially where the duration of 
pretrial confinement approaches or exceeds the length of 
sentence a defendant would be likely to receive if he or she 
were found guilty of the crimes charged.  Cf. Brangan v. 
Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 709-710 (2017) ("when a bail order 
comes before a judge for reconsideration or review and a 
defendant has been detained due to his [or her] inability to 
post bail, the judge must consider the length of the defendant's 
pretrial detention and the equities of the case"). 
 
A delay in trial may also result in other changed 
circumstances.  For instance, the strength of the Commonwealth's 
case may have diminished if a key witness recanted his or her 
inculpatory statement, or if laboratory findings failed to 
confirm the defendant's participation in the crime, or if 
further investigation revealed exculpatory evidence or 
identified a potential third-party culprit.  These changes in 
the strength of the evidence against the defendant are relevant 
to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, another 
21 
 
 
factor to be considered in assessing whether a defendant may be 
safely released.  See G. L. c. 276, § 58A (5). 
 
Moreover, in Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. (No. 1) v. 
Chief Justice of the Trial Court, 484 Mass. 431, 435 (2020) 
(CPCS v. Trial Court), we held that "the risks inherent in the 
COVID-19 pandemic constitute a changed circumstance within the 
meaning of G. L. c. 276, § 58, tenth par., and the provisions of 
G. L. c. 276, § 57."  We recognized that "correctional 
institutions face unique difficulties in keeping their 
populations safe during this pandemic," because, among other 
reasons, "confined, enclosed environments increase 
transmissibility," and "[m]aintaining adequate physical distance 
. . . between oneself and others . . . may be nearly 
impossible," putting detainees at increased risk of death and 
serious illness while in custody.  Id. at 436.  Consequently, we 
concluded that all who were unable to make bail under §§ 57 and 
58 could move for reconsideration.  See id. at 447. 
 
We did not state expressly that the risks inherent in the 
COVID-19 pandemic constitute a change in circumstances within 
the meaning of G. L. c. 276, § 58A (4), but we implicitly did so 
because we declared that pretrial detainees who had been found 
dangerous after a § 58A hearing were not entitled to the 
presumption of release given to those who were held on bail 
while awaiting trial on certain offenses.  See id. at 435.  Nor 
22 
 
 
were they entitled to the expedited hearing granted to those 
given a presumption of release.  See id. at 447.  By declaring 
that defendants detained under § 58A were entitled neither to 
the presumption of release nor to an expedited hearing, we 
implicitly recognized that they were equally entitled to move 
for reconsideration of their pretrial detention. 
 
In Christie v. Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 397, 401 (2020), we 
concluded that it was error for a judge "not to reconsider the 
defendant's motion to stay execution of sentence in light of the 
rapidly changing situation arising from the COVID-19 pandemic."  
We also noted that, in deciding whether to grant a stay, a judge 
in ordinary times would consider the danger to other persons and 
the community arising from the defendant's risk of reoffense.  
Id.  But "[i]n these extraordinary times, a judge deciding 
whether to grant a stay should consider not only the risk to 
others if the defendant were to be released and reoffend, but 
also the health risk to the defendant if the defendant were to 
remain in custody" (emphasis in original).  Id.  A judge ruling 
on a motion for reconsideration under § 58A (4) should similarly 
consider the health risks to the defendant in determining 
whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably 
assure the safety of any other person or the community. 
 
Unlike § 58A, § 58B does not specifically authorize 
reconsideration.  But neither does § 58B preclude 
23 
 
 
reconsideration, and therefore judges may exercise their 
inherent authority to reconsider pretrial detention orders under 
§ 58B.  See CPCS v. Trial Court, 484 Mass. at 450 ("As a general 
matter, Massachusetts courts have recognized that it is within 
the inherent authority of a trial judge to reconsider decisions 
made on the road to final judgment.  While the Massachusetts 
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly permit a judge to 
rehear a matter, no policy prohibits reconsideration of an order 
or judgment in appropriate circumstances" [quotations and 
citations omitted]).  Compare Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 
315, 317-322 & n.5, 324 (2005) (because G. L. c. 276, § 58, 
limits circumstances in which bail revocation order may be 
reviewed, District Court judge may not exercise inherent 
authority to vacate bail revocation entered by another judge 
under that statute). 
 
4.  Due process limitations.  Defense counsel contend that, 
to the extent that the time limits on pretrial detention under 
G. L. c. 276, §§ 58A and 58B, are tolled indefinitely due to 
excludable delays under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) arising 
from the COVID-19 pandemic, or whenever a defendant is held in 
custody beyond those time limits under the good cause exception, 
defendants are entitled to a hearing to consider whether their 
continued detention violates their constitutional rights to due 
process.  Before the pandemic, and before this court took the 
24 
 
 
unprecedented step of continuing all trials because of the 
pandemic, we never declared an automatic entitlement to such a 
hearing where the time limits were extended due to excludable 
delay or the good cause exception.  We see no reason to declare 
such an entitlement now, simply because the delay arises from a 
continuance ordered by this court for reasons of public health. 
 
To be sure, we have recognized that due process imposes 
limitations on the length of time a person may be held awaiting 
trial.  In upholding pretrial detention under § 58A in the face 
of a due process challenge, we emphasized that the detention is 
only "limited" and "temporary," Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 423 
Mass. 771, 783, 790 (1996), and we have observed that this 
"justification for pretrial detention erodes the longer a 
defendant has been held," Brangan, 477 Mass. at 710. 
We have also recognized in other contexts that when the 
period during which a defendant is held awaiting trial is 
indefinitely prolonged, due process may require a hearing to 
determine whether the length of pretrial detention has become 
unreasonable.  For example, in Abbott A., 458 Mass. at 24-27, 
the juvenile's pretrial detention under § 58A, which had already 
lasted more than a year, was indefinitely prolonged due to his 
incompetency to stand trial.  We held that, as a matter of due 
process, the juvenile was entitled to a hearing to determine 
whether there was a substantial probability that he would attain 
25 
 
 
competency in the foreseeable future, whether there was evidence 
that he was making progress, and whether the duration of his 
pretrial detention had become unreasonable, together with 
follow-up hearings every ninety days.  Id. at 37-42.  In 
Commonwealth v. G.F., 479 Mass. 180, 181-182 (2018), where the 
Commonwealth sought civilly to commit a convicted sex offender 
as a sexually dangerous person after his release from prison, 
the offender had been confined for nearly seven years awaiting 
final adjudication of the Commonwealth's petition because of 
three mistrials and other pretrial delay.  We held that he was 
entitled as a matter of due process to a hearing to determine 
whether he could be released under supervision and other 
conditions that would reasonably protect public safety before 
his fourth sexually dangerous person trial.  Id. at 196-201.8 
 
We have not yet reached that point in the present cases, 
and there is good reason to believe we will not in the future.  
Recent data indicate continuing downward trends in the number of 
                                                          
 
8 In an extreme case, where there is no reasonable prospect 
that the defendant's pretrial detention will come to an end, due 
process may require dismissal of the charges.  See Sharris v. 
Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 586 (2018) (due process required 
dismissal of charges, including murder in first degree, where 
defendant had been held for more than twenty-three years 
awaiting trial because he was incompetent to stand trial, and 
there was no prospect that he would ever become competent). 
 
26 
 
 
new COVID-19 cases in the Commonwealth.9  We have publicly 
declared that we hope to recommence jury trials in the fall of 
this year if we can do so safely in light of the pandemic.  If 
we were to continue all jury trials for a far greater period of 
time, and extend the time limits for pretrial detention under 
§§ 58A and 58B by declaring the continuances to be excludable 
delay, we would certainly need to address the due process 
implications of such an extension.  But we have yet to approach 
the length of delay that would trigger a due process analysis, 
and we fervently hope that we will not need to do so.  Until 
that time comes, the remedy available to a defendant whose 
length of pretrial detention has been extended by our emergency 
orders is not a due process hearing but instead the 
individualized consideration provided by the trial court judge 
who decides a defendant's motion for reconsideration. 
 
Conclusion.   We declare that periods of delay resulting 
from trial continuances pursuant to our emergency orders should 
be excluded from the computation of the time limits on pretrial 
detention under G. L. c. 276, §§ 58A and 58B.  We remand these 
cases to the single justice for entry of orders directing the 
lower courts to reconsider their prior orders releasing the 
                                                          
 
9 See Massachusetts Department of Public Health COVID-19 
Dashboard, Dashboard of Public Health Indicators (June 17, 
2020), https://www.mass.gov/doc/covid-19-dashboard-june-17-2020 
/download [https://perma.cc/Y2PA-HR7D]. 
27 
 
 
defendants from detention under G. L. c. 276, §§ 58A and 58B, in 
light of this opinion.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                          
 
10 Upon remand, the judges may return the defendants to 
pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A (for Lougee and 
Horton) or 58B (for Smith), or reconsider the earlier detention 
orders. 
 
 
 
LENK, J. (concurring).  The court's understanding of the 
relevant paragraphs in our emergency orders is sensible, as is 
its explication of those paragraphs, and I agree with the court.  
Nonetheless, we should acknowledge with some humility that our 
orders were not as clear as they might have been, insofar as 
they did not explicitly reference pretrial detention under G. L. 
c. 276, §§ 58A and 58B.  The court's analysis masterfully 
connects the dots between our emergency orders continuing 
certain trials, excluding the time periods of such continuances 
from speedy trial computations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, 378 
Mass. 909 (1979), and excluding periods of delay resulting from 
such continuances from the computation of statutory time limits 
on pretrial detention.  I had not previously considered this 
aspect of our orders, and I fully appreciate why three 
thoughtful trial court judicial colleagues concluded as they 
did.  The court's clarification is welcome and necessary 
because, at least in my view, the result is not self-evident.