Case Title: Costa v. Super. Ct.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S136294

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 2/16/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
EDWARD J. COSTA et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioners, 
) 
 
 
) 
S136294 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C050297 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF  
) 
SACRAMENTO COUNTY, 
) 
 
) 
Sacramento County 
 
Respondent; 
) 
Super Ct. No. 05CS00998 
 
 
) 
 
BILL LOCKYER et al.,  
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest. 
) 
 
___________________________________ ) 
 
 
This case arises from a legal challenge to Proposition 77, an initiative 
measure that was submitted to California voters at the November 8, 2005, special 
statewide election.  The underlying challenge to the measure was brought after 
circulation of the initiative petition was completed but prior to the Secretary of 
State’s submission of the ballot pamphlet materials to the State Printer, and sought 
to have the measure withheld from the ballot because of several differences 
between the version of the measure that was submitted to the Attorney General 
prior to the circulation of the initiative petition, and the version printed on the 
petition that subsequently was circulated for signature.  The trial court and the 
Court of Appeal (in a 2 to 1 decision) concluded that the discrepancies between 
the two versions warranted withholding the measure from the ballot, but this court, 
 
2
acting on an expedited basis prior to the Secretary of State’s submission of the 
ballot pamphlet materials to the printer, granted review, determined that the 
discrepancies in question did not justify withholding the measure from the ballot, 
and directed the Secretary of State to include in the ballot pamphlet and on the 
election ballot the version of the measure that had been circulated for signature 
and signed by the requisite number of qualified voters.  Our order granting review 
also stated that we would determine after the election whether to retain jurisdiction 
in this matter and resolve, by a full opinion, the issues presented.  
 
At the November 8, 2005, election, the voters rejected Proposition 77.  
Although the defeat of Proposition 77 renders moot the legal challenge to the 
measure, we nonetheless have concluded that we should retain this matter and 
issue an opinion in order to provide guidance for future cases, both with regard to 
the procedural question whether preelection review of this type of challenge to an 
initiative measure is appropriate and with regard to the substantive legal standard 
that is applicable in determining whether the type of discrepancy that was involved 
in this case warrants withholding an initiative measure from the ballot.   
 
 
I 
 
We begin with a summary of the principal features of Proposition 77, and 
then describe the events that resulted in the discrepancy between the version of the 
initiative measure that was submitted to the Attorney General and the version that 
was circulated for signature.   
 
A 
 
During 2004, petitioner Edward J. Costa, the Chief Executive Officer of 
People’s Advocate, Inc., submitted to the Attorney General, for preparation of a 
title and summary, several alternative initiative measures involving proposed 
changes in the redistricting process (that is, the procedure for adjusting the 
 
3
boundaries of election districts), including the initiative measure at issue in the 
present case.1 
 
The initiative measure here at issue — the one that, after certification, was 
designated Proposition 77 on the November 8, 2005, election ballot — proposed to 
amend the California Constitution to transfer the power to draw election districts 
from the Legislature to a three-member panel of retired federal and/or state judges, 
who would act as special masters in developing redistricting plans for elections to 
the state Senate and Assembly, the Board of Equalization, and California 
congressional districts of the United States House of Representatives.  The 
measure proposed the addition of new substantive criteria that the special masters 
would be required to follow in formulating redistricting plans, including (1) with 
regard to state legislative and Board of Equalization districts, a requirement that 
the population differences among the districts not exceed 1 percent; (2) a 
requirement that Senate districts be comprised of two adjacent Assembly districts, 
and Board of Equalization districts be comprised of 10 adjacent Senate districts; 
(3) a directive that all redistricting plans minimize the splitting of counties and 
cities into multiple districts; and (4) a limitation precluding the special masters, in 
drawing boundaries, from considering information relating to voters’ political 
party affiliation.  (Cal. Const., proposed art. XXI, § 2, subds. (a)-(i).) 
 
The measure also set forth a detailed procedure to govern the selection of 
the special masters.  It directed the Judicial Council — the constitutional entity 
charged with the administration of the judicial branch (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6) — 
                                              
1  
The record indicates that prior to the December 7, 2004, submission of the 
measure here at issue, Costa earlier in the year submitted three different proposed 
redistricting measures to the Attorney General for preparation of a title and 
summary — one on April 8, 2004, one on May 13, 2004, and one on October 5, 
2004. 
 
4
to compile a pool of retired federal and state judges eligible and willing to serve 
on the panel,2 and then randomly to select from the pool a list of 24 judges, with 
the requirement that judges affiliated with the two largest political parties be 
equally represented on the list.  Thereafter, each of the four state legislative 
leaders of the Senate and the Assembly (two from the majority party and two from 
the minority party) was to nominate (from the 24-judge list) three judges who 
were not members of the same political party as the leader making the 
nomination — creating a new list of 12 nominees.  (No retired judge could be 
nominated by more than one legislator.)  Each of the legislative leaders then was 
authorized to exercise one peremptory challenge against a judge who had been 
nominated by one of the other legislative leaders, leaving a list of at least eight 
nominees.  Ultimately, from this reduced list, three judges (including at least one 
from each of the two largest political parties) were to be chosen by lot to serve as 
the three-judge special master panel.  (Cal. Const., proposed art. XXI, § 1, subd. 
(c), par. (2), subpars. (A)–(F).)  
 
The measure also provided that in devising the redistricting plans, the 
special masters would be required to hold at least three public hearings, including 
one hearing after the special masters’ initial proposed plan had been submitted to 
the Legislature for comment.  Under the proposition, the final redistricting plans 
for the state Senate and Assembly, Board of Equalization, and the California 
                                              
2  
Under the measure, a retired judge was ineligible to serve as a special 
master if he or she had held partisan political office, changed his or her party 
affiliation after being appointed to the bench, or received income over the past 
year from specified political sources.  In addition, if selected to serve as a special 
master, the retired judge was required to pledge not to run for office in any of the 
districts created and not to accept, for at least five years, state public employment 
(other than judicial employment or a teaching position). (Cal. Const., proposed 
art. XXI, § 1, subd. (c), par. (2), subpars. (A)–(B).) 
 
5
congressional districts were to be approved by a single resolution adopted 
unanimously by the three-judge panel that would become effective immediately 
upon filing with the Secretary of State; the districts created by the special masters’ 
resolution were to be used for the next statewide primary and general elections.  
The measure also provided that the redistricting plans created by the special 
masters were to be submitted to the voters at the next general election, and, if 
approved by the voters, the districts embodied in those plans were to continue to 
be used until new redistricting plans were drawn following the next decennial 
census.  If the plans were rejected by the voters at the general election, officials 
elected under the rejected plans nonetheless were authorized to serve full terms, 
but the redistricting process was to begin again and new districts were to be 
prepared for use in subsequent elections.  (Cal. Const., proposed art. XXI, § 1, 
subds. (f)-(i).)  
 
Finally, the measure provided that the initial redistricting process under the 
new procedure was to begin immediately upon the voters’ approval of the 
measure, with the selection of the three-judge special master panel to be 
completed within 20 days of the adoption of the measure and the panel charged 
with establishing a schedule and deadlines to ensure timely adoption of new 
districts for use at the 2006 statewide primary and general elections.  (Cal. Const., 
proposed art. XXI, § 1, subd. (b).) 
 
B 
 
Both versions of the initiative measure that are at issue in this case 
contained all of the features described above.  As we shall explain, although there 
were some substantive differences in the two versions in question, the differences 
were minor in relation to the initiative measure as a whole.  Because the events 
that resulted in the discrepancy are relevant to the resolution of the issue before us, 
we set forth those events in some detail. 
 
6
 
On Friday, December 3, 2004, Daniel M. Kolkey, an attorney who had 
been retained by Costa to assist in drafting the redistricting initiative at issue, sent 
an e-mail message to Costa and others, attaching Kolkey’s then most current draft 
of the proposed initiative measure.  (For convenience, we shall refer to this draft as 
the December 3 version.)  As we subsequently observe, the December 3 version is 
the one that ultimately was set forth in the petition that was circulated for signature 
and signed by the required number of eligible voters, was printed in the ballot 
pamphlet, and was submitted to the voters at the November 8, 2005, election.   
 
On Monday, December 6, 2004, Kolkey edited the December 3 version, 
making a number of changes — both stylistic and substantive ― which are set 
forth in full in an appendix to this opinion.  (We shall refer to this version as the 
December 6 version.)  The most significant of the changes made by Kolkey on 
December 6 involved (1) a substantial revision of the wording of the introductory 
section of the initiative setting forth “Findings and Declarations of Purpose” (see 
appen., pp. A-1 to A-2), (2) a one-day reduction in the time periods in which the 
legislative leaders were to make their nominations and exercise their peremptory 
challenges in creating the final list of judges from which the special masters were 
to be chosen by lot (see appen., p. A-3), and (3) an explicit statement that, with 
regard to the redistricting process, the initiative and referendum power was to be 
used only in the manner specified in the initiative measure (see appen., p. A-5).3  
                                              
3  
Other revisions made in the December 6 version included a number of 
stylistic changes — including changing the words “nominate” to “select” (appen., 
p. A-2), “selected” to “appointed” (appen., p. A-3), and “provided for” to “as 
specified” (appen., p. A-4) — and a revision of the wording of one sentence 
dealing with the procedure to be utilized should the final drawing by lot fail to 
include at least one special master from each of the two largest political parties.  
(Appen., p. A-3.)   
 
7
On Monday evening, December 6, 2004, Kolkey sent the December 6 version of 
the initiative measure to Costa by e-mail. 
 
Emily Adams, the office manager, secretary, and receptionist for People’s 
Advocate, Inc., was responsible for organizing and keeping track of the various 
versions of the initiatives on which Costa was working that had been directed to 
her attention.  Adams’ practice was to label each version provided to her, retain it 
in electronic format, and mark all final versions as such.  On Tuesday, December 
7, 2004, Adams prepared for Costa’s signature a cover letter to accompany the 
submission to the Attorney General of the initiative measure here at issue.  When 
the letter was sent to the Attorney General on that same day, it contained the 
December 6 version of the proposed initiative.   
 
Tricia Knight, the Initiative Coordinator for the Attorney General, received 
the letter from Costa with the December 6 version of the proposed initiative on 
December 7, 2004, and replied to Costa that same day, acknowledging receipt of 
the submission and explaining that the Attorney General’s office had sent copies 
of the proposed initiative to the Legislative Analyst and the Department of Finance 
for an estimate of fiscal impact, and that these entities had 25 days in which to 
return the estimate.  Knight’s letter stated that after the estimate was returned by 
these entities, the Attorney General would supply a title and summary within 15 
days.  The letter also advised Costa that any substantive amendments to the 
submitted proposed initiative measure could be accepted by the Attorney General 
only on or before December 22, 2004 (that is, within 15 days of the proponents’ 
initial submission of the measure), and that after that date any substantive 
amendment would have to be submitted as a new measure and the process would 
have to begin anew.   
 
On January 28, 2005, the Attorney General received a letter from Costa 
adding the names of three additional persons as proponents of the proposed 
 
8
initiative measure at issue.  Like the December 7 letter from Costa, this letter also 
attached the December 6 version of the proposed initiative. 
 
On February 3, 2005, after the Attorney General’s office had completed its 
preparation of the title and summary of the measure, Knight sent copies of them 
and the December 6 version of the measure to Costa and the other proponents, and 
to the Secretary of State, the Chief Clerk of the Assembly, and the Secretary of the 
Senate. 
 
At some point after his submission of the measure to the Attorney General 
on December 7, 2004, but prior to his receipt of the Attorney General’s title and 
summary, Costa decided to have the text of the proposed initiative measure 
prepared for printing in order to expedite the commencement of the circulation of 
the initiative petitions.  In a declaration filed in the underlying proceeding, Costa 
explained that he was concerned about fitting the text of the entire initiative on the 
back of a reasonably sized petition section,4 and wanted to have the measure laid 
out as completely as possible before receiving the Attorney General’s title and 
summary.  To this end, Costa directed Adams to provide a copy of the initiative to 
Heath Norton, the People’s Advocate’s computer expert, who was to format the 
measure for submission for printing.  Adams downloaded onto a floppy disk the 
                                              
4  
A “petition section” is the document that is circulated to eligible voters for 
signature.  (Elec. Code, § 9020.)  Elections Code section 9014 provides that “[a]ny 
initiative or referendum petition may be presented in sections, but each section 
shall contain a full and correct copy of the title and text of the proposed measure.  
The text of the measure shall be printed in type not smaller than 8 point.”  
Elections Code section 9030, subdivision (a) further provides that “[e]ach section 
of the petition shall be filed with the elections official of the county or city and 
county in which it was circulated, but all sections circulated in any county or city 
and county shall be filed at the same time.”   
 
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the 
Elections Code. 
 
9
file on her computer labeled “Dec[ember] Submission Final” and gave the disk to 
Norton.  Although Adams was unaware of this circumstance at the time, the 
version that she downloaded onto the floppy disk actually was the December 3 
version of the proposed initiative, not the December 6 version.5  Norton used the 
version on the floppy disk to prepare a mockup of the petition.  
 
Once Costa received the Attorney General’s title and summary for the 
proposed initiative at the beginning of February 2005, Costa directed Norton to 
add the title and summary to the formatted petition and send it to the printer.  
Norton did so, and the petition sections were printed using the December 3 version 
of the initiative measure.  During the next three months, the petition sections were 
circulated to the public for signature, and from May 5 to May 10, 2005, signed 
sections of the petition were submitted to local election officials throughout the 
state for certification.  In all, more than 950,000 individuals signed the circulated 
petition.   
 
Sometime in mid-May 2005, after the petitions had been submitted to local 
election officials but before the measure had been certified for the ballot by the 
Secretary of State, Costa and Kolkey learned that the text of the initiative measure 
on the circulated petitions was the December 3 version of the measure and not the 
December 6 version that had been submitted to the Attorney General.  After this 
discovery, Kolkey reviewed the differences in the two measures and conducted 
legal research on the matter, but neither he, Costa, nor anyone else immediately 
                                              
5 
When Adams later learned of this circumstance, she reviewed all her 
computer files and found that she did not have the December 6 version in 
electronic format.  There is nothing in the record that further explains the 
discrepancy. 
 
10
revealed the discrepancy either to the Secretary of State or to the Attorney 
General. 
 
On June 10, 2005, the Secretary of State certified that the proposed 
initiative measure had been signed by a sufficient number of qualified voters to 
qualify for the ballot, and sent letters to the Chief Clerk of the Assembly and the 
Secretary of the Senate, pursuant to section 9034, notifying the Legislature that the 
initiative had qualified for the ballot.6  In transmitting copies of the initiative 
measure to the Senate and the Assembly as required by section 9034, the Secretary 
                                              
6  
Although neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeal questioned whether 
the measure had obtained the requisite number of signatures to qualify for the 
ballot, real party in interest Californians For Fair Representation – No on 77 
(hereafter CFFR) ― the party representing the opponents of the measure ― 
contests this point, noting that during the early stages of the certification process 
several county election officials discovered that some of the petition sections that 
were submitted in support of this measure actually were petition sections for one 
or more of the other redistricting measures that Costa earlier had submitted to the 
Attorney General for title and summary.  (See ante, at p. 3, fn. 1.)  As soon as this 
problem was discovered, however, the Secretary of State notified the local election 
official in each county to review carefully the petition sections that had been 
submitted in support of this measure before performing the raw count, and to 
return to the proponents all petition sections that did not contain the title 
(“Reapportionment. Initiative Constitutional Amendment”) that was appended to 
the initiative petition here at issue.  Nothing suggests that the county officials 
failed to follow this instruction.  Further, although CFFR additionally complains 
that there is no proof that all of the initiative petitions with the correct title actually 
contained the text of the December 3 version, CFFR did not present any evidence 
below to support a contrary conclusion, and, as noted, neither the trial court nor 
the Court of Appeal purported to base its decision to withhold the measure from 
the ballot on this ground.  Under these circumstances, we reject CFFR’s 
contention that the lower court rulings should be sustained on the theory that the 
Secretary of State erred in certifying that the measure had obtained the requisite 
number of valid signatures to qualify for the ballot or that the matter should be 
remanded to permit a further factual inquiry into this question. 
 
11
of State transmitted the December 6 version of the initiative that had been 
submitted to the Attorney General. 
 
On June 12, 2005, Kolkey asked to meet with Undersecretary of State 
William P. Wood about the initiative measure.  On June 13, 2005, Kolkey and 
Peter Siggins (who was then the Governor’s Legal Affairs Secretary) met with 
Wood and disclosed the problem concerning the two versions of the initiative 
measure.  Kolkey gave Wood a lengthy memorandum, dated June 10, 2005, 
setting forth a detailed legal argument supporting the view that, notwithstanding 
the discrepancy in the two versions, the version of the proposed initiative measure 
that had been circulated for signature and signed by the requisite number of 
qualified voters should be placed on the ballot.   
On June 23, 2005, the Attorney General received a letter from Costa asking 
the Attorney General to reissue for the ballot pamphlet the same ballot title and 
summary that he had prepared for the proposed initiative measure on February 3, 
2005.7  The June 23 letter from Costa to the Attorney General made no mention of 
the problem concerning the two versions of the text.   
On July 1, 2005, the Secretary of State delivered a letter to the Attorney 
General, advising him that “[a] situation has come to the attention of the Secretary 
of State’s office concerning an initiative . . . given the title ‘Reapportionment 
Initiative Constitutional Amendment’ by your office,” and explaining that the text 
of the initiative set forth in the circulated petition differed from the text that had 
been submitted to the Attorney General for the preparation of a title and summary.  
The letter asked for the Attorney General’s guidance “whether the Secretary of 
                                              
7 
Under section 9050, once it is determined that a measure is to be placed on 
the ballot, the Attorney General “shall provide and return to the Secretary of State 
a ballot title for each measure submitted to the voters of the whole state.”  
 
12
State has the authority to make a determination which version of the text of a 
measure should be placed before the voters.”  The Secretary of State included with 
the letter a copy of the legal memorandum that had been prepared by Kolkey and 
given to the Secretary of State on June 13. 
On July 6, 2005, the Attorney General informed the Secretary of State that 
he could not represent the Secretary of State in this matter.  On July 7, 2005, in a 
letter to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State stated that he had “the 
constitutional duty to present to the voters of California the measures that have 
qualified to appear on the ballot by the signatures of the people” and that he 
intended to do so “unless directed to do otherwise by a court.”  The next day, on 
July 8, 2005, the Attorney General filed the underlying petition for writ of 
mandate in the superior court, seeking an order prohibiting the Secretary of State 
from placing either version of the initiative measure on the November 8, 2005, 
special election ballot.   
The Attorney General took the position that because the version of the 
initiative measure circulated for signature differed from the version submitted to 
the Attorney General for title and summary, neither version properly qualified for 
the ballot.  In response, the proponents of the measure argued that the discrepancy 
was inadvertent and that the differences between the two versions were minor and 
did not affect the accuracy of the title and summary prepared by the Attorney 
General.  The proponents maintained that they should be found to have 
substantially complied with the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. 
On July 22, 2005, after expedited briefing and a hearing, the superior court 
entered judgment in favor of the Attorney General in the writ proceeding, 
directing the Secretary of State not to place any version of Proposition 77 on the 
ballot.  Although the superior court expressly found that the discrepancy between 
the two versions was “the result of an inadvertent mistake,” the court determined 
 
13
that “the purposes of the constitutional and statutory requirements at issue would 
be frustrated if the court were to apply the substantial compliance doctrine to 
excuse the clear defects in this situation.”   
On July 25, 2005, the proponents of Proposition 77 filed a petition for writ 
of mandate in the Court of Appeal, seeking to overturn the judgment rendered by 
the superior court and requesting a temporary stay to permit the Secretary of State 
to make the Proposition 77 materials available for public examination for the 
requisite period before the August 15, 2005, deadline for delivery of the ballot 
pamphlet to the State Printer.  (§ 9092.)8  The Court of Appeal that same day 
granted the requested temporary stay, and the Secretary of State’s subsequent 
public display of the ballot pamphlet included both the December 3 and December 
6 versions of the proposed initiative, with a notation that the matter was subject to 
further court order. 
On July 27, 2005, the proponents filed a supplemental petition for writ of 
mandate, stating that the Secretary of State had requested the Attorney General to 
provide a title and summary for the December 3 version of the initiative measure 
that had been circulated for signature, but that the Attorney General had taken the 
position that he would not provide a ballot label or ballot title and summary for 
that version of the measure.  The supplemental petition requested the Court of 
Appeal to direct the Attorney General to provide a ballot label and ballot title and 
summary for the December 3 version of the measure in order to avoid a claim of 
noncompliance with the requirements of section 9092 should the Court of Appeal 
                                              
8  
Section 9092 provides in relevant part:  “Not less than 20 days before he or 
she submits the copy for the ballot pamphlet to the State Printer, the Secretary of 
State shall make the copy available for public examination.” 
 
14
determine that the December 3 version of the measure should be placed on the 
ballot.9 
On Thursday, July 28, 2005, the Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ 
on the original petition, establishing an expedited briefing schedule and setting the 
matter for argument on August 5, 2005. 
On Friday, July 29, 2005, after considering opposition from the Attorney 
General and CFFR (see ante, p. 10, fn. 6), the Court of Appeal issued a further 
order, directing the Attorney General to provide a ballot label and a title and 
summary for the December 3 version of the proposed measure that had been 
circulated for signature.  Pursuant to that order, on Monday, August 1, 2005, the 
Attorney General submitted to the Court of Appeal a title and summary for the 
December 3 version.  Although the title provided by the Attorney General for the 
December 3 version substituted the word “Redistricting” for “Reapportionment,” 
the Attorney General acknowledged in the Court of Appeal that the substitution 
was made only to permit differentiation of the two versions of the title and 
summary; the summary provided by the Attorney General for the December 3 
version did not vary in any material respect from the summary of the measure that 
the Attorney General had prepared for the December 6 version of the measure.10  
                                              
9  
Earlier, on July 13, 2005, the manager of the Ballot Pamphlet and 
Initiatives Program of the Secretary of State’s Elections Division had delivered a 
letter to the Office of Legislative Counsel as part of the ballot pamphlet 
preparation process, requesting the Legislative Counsel, pursuant to her duties 
under Elections Code section 9091, to prepare and proofread the December 3 
version of the initiative measure that had been circulated for signature.  Section 
9091 provides: “The Legislative Counsel shall prepare and proofread the texts of 
all measures and the provisions which are repealed or revised.” 
10  
The title and summary prepared (on February 3, 2005) by the Attorney 
General for the December 6 version provided in full: 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
15
Although the new summary submitted by the Attorney General to the Court of 
Appeal did not include an analysis of the fiscal impact of the measure, no party 
contends that the variations between the December 6 and December 3 versions 
would affect the estimate of the fiscal impact of the measure by the Legislative 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
“REAPPORTIONMENT.  INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT.  Amends state Constitution’s process for redistricting 
California’s Senate, Assembly, Congressional and Board of Equalization districts.  
Requires three-member panel of retired judges, selected by legislative leaders, to 
adopt new redistricting plan if measure passes and again after each national 
census.  Panel must consider legislative public proposals/comments and hold 
public hearings.  Redistricting plan becomes effective immediately when adopted 
by judges’ panel and filed with Secretary of State.  If voters subsequently reject 
redistricting plan, process repeats.  Specifies time for judicial review of adopted 
redistricting plan; if plan fails to conform to requirements, court may order new 
plan.  Summary of estimate by Legislative Analyst and Director of Finance of 
fiscal impact on state and local government:  This measure would have the 
following major fiscal impact:  One-time state redistricting costs, probably totaling 
a few million dollars.  Comparable savings for each redistricting effort after 2010 
(once every ten years).”   
 
The title and summary prepared (on August 1, 2005) by the Attorney 
General for the December 3 version provided: 
 
“REDISTRICTING. INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. 
 
“•  Amends process for redistricting California’s Senate, Assembly, 
Congressional and Board of Equalization districts. 
 
“•  Requires panel of three retired judges, selected by legislative leaders, to 
adopt new redistricting plan if measure passes and after each national census. 
 
“•  Panel must consider legislative, public comments/hold public hearings. 
 
“•  Redistricting plan effective when adopted by panel and filed with 
Secretary of State; governs next statewide primary/general elections even if voters 
reject plan. 
 
“•  If voters reject redistricting plan, process repeats, but officials elected 
under rejected plan serve full terms. 
 
“•  Allows 45 days to seek judicial review of adopted redistricting plan.”   
 
16
Analyst and the Department of Finance that was included in the Attorney 
General’s initial summary.  
The Court of Appeal heard oral argument on Friday, August 5, 2005, and 
issued its opinion on Tuesday, August 9, 2005.  The majority opinion in the Court 
of Appeal, signed by two justices, concluded initially that, as a procedural matter, 
preelection resolution of the election law challenge was permissible and was 
warranted in light of the nature of the challenge at issue in this case.  Turning to 
the merits, the Court of Appeal majority concluded that in light of the 
discrepancies between the version of the proposed initiative measure submitted to 
the Attorney General and the version circulated for signature, the trial court 
correctly held that neither version should be submitted to the voters at the 
November 8, 2005, special election.  A third Court of Appeal justice dissented, 
maintaining that preelection resolution of the challenge was not warranted, and 
further concluding that on the merits, the discrepancies between the two versions 
did not justify withholding from the ballot the version of the measure circulated 
for signature and signed by the requisite number of qualified voters. 
The following day, Wednesday, August 10, 2005, the proponents of the 
proposition filed an emergency petition for review in this court, requesting 
immediate consideration and a stay of the trial court’s order that prohibited the 
Secretary of State from taking any action to place Proposition 77 on the 
November 8, 2005, special election ballot.  The petition for review noted that the 
deadline for the Secretary of State to submit the ballot pamphlet materials to the 
printer was the following Monday, August 15, and the petition urged this court to 
grant review and permit the Secretary of State to take the actions necessary to 
ensure that the voters would have the opportunity to vote on Proposition 77 at the 
November 8, 2005, election.  The Attorney General and CFFR on the following 
 
17
day, Thursday, August 11, 2005, filed separate answers to the emergency petition 
for review, and the proponents filed a reply on Friday, August 12, 2005. 
On Friday afternoon, August 12, 2005, after considering the materials filed 
with the court, and taking into account the Secretary of State’s Monday, 
August 15, 2005, 5:00 p.m. deadline for submitting the ballot pamphlet materials 
to the printer (the Secretary of State having informed the court that the deadline 
had to be met in order to permit ballot pamphlets to be printed and mailed to the 
voters within the statutorily prescribed periods), this court issued an order, signed 
by four justices, which (1) granted the petition for review, (2) stayed the judgment 
of the superior court that had directed the Secretary of State not to place any 
version of Proposition 77 on the November 8, 2005, special election ballot, 
(3) directed the Secretary of State and other public officials to proceed with all the 
steps required to place in the ballot pamphlet and on the ballot of the November 8, 
2005, election the version of Proposition 77 included in the circulated petition 
signed by the requisite number of qualified voters (that is, the December 3 
version), and (4) provided that “[a]ny public official or other person who has not 
had an opportunity to revise statements or ballot arguments that have already been 
submitted to the Secretary of State in order to reflect the version of Proposition 77 
that will appear in the election pamphlet and on the ballot shall be permitted to 
submit a revised statement or ballot argument to the Secretary of State no later 
than 3 p.m. on Monday, August 15, 2005.”  The order further stated that, after the 
election, this court would determine whether to retain jurisdiction in this matter 
and resolve the issues raised in the petition. 
After our order issued, and prior to the Secretary of State’s submission of 
the ballot pamphlet material to the State Printer, the Attorney General submitted a 
title and summary of the December 3 version that included the identical fiscal 
analysis that had been included in the Attorney General’s summary of the 
 
18
December 6 version, and the opponents of the measure added a passage both to 
their rebuttal to the argument in favor of Proposition 77 and to their argument 
against Proposition 77, stating that “two courts and three judges have already ruled 
that this measure shouldn’t even be on the ballot.”  No change was made to the 
analysis by the Legislative Analyst.  As ordered by this court, the December 3 
version of the measure — the version included in the petition circulated for 
signature and signed by the requisite number of voters — was set forth in full in 
the ballot pamphlet.   
At the November 8, 2005, election, Proposition 77 was voted upon and 
defeated.  Although the defeat of Proposition 77 renders moot the legal challenge 
to the proposition, as noted at the outset of this opinion we have concluded that it 
is appropriate that this court retain this matter and issue an opinion to clarify 
(1) whether preelection review of this type of challenge to an initiative measure is 
appropriate, and (2) the legal standard that applies in determining whether the type 
of discrepancy involved in this case warrants withholding an initiative measure 
from the ballot.   
 
 
II 
We turn first to the question whether the type of challenge to an initiative 
measure raised in this case — namely, a claim that an initiative measure should 
not be placed on the ballot because the version of the measure submitted to the 
Attorney General differs from the version circulated for signature —appropriately 
is subject to preelection judicial review or instead ordinarily should be considered 
by a court only after the measure has been submitted to the voters and the election 
has been held. 
Past California decisions have observed that, as a general rule, “it is usually 
more appropriate to review constitutional and other challenges to ballot 
propositions or initiative measures after an election rather than to disrupt the 
 
19
electoral process by preventing the exercise of the people’s franchise, in the 
absence of some clear showing of invalidity.”  (Brosnahan v. Eu (1982) 31 Cal.3d 
1, 4 (Brosnahan I).)  More recently, however, in Senate of the State of Cal. v. 
Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1142 (Senate v. Jones), we noted that decisions after 
Brosnahan I “have explained that this general rule applies primarily when a 
challenge rests upon the alleged unconstitutionality of the substance of the 
proposed initiative, and that the rule does not preclude preelection review when 
the challenge is based upon a claim, for example, that the proposed measure may 
not properly be submitted to the voters because the measure is not legislative in 
character or because it amounts to a constitutional revision rather than an 
amendment.  [Citations.]”  (21 Cal.4th at p. 1153.)11  In the Senate v. Jones 
decision itself, we held that a constitutional challenge that rests upon a claim that a 
proposed initiative measure violates the single-subject rule may, in an appropriate 
case, be considered and resolved prior to the election, emphasizing that the 
constitutional provision establishing the single-subject limitation by its explicit 
terms contemplates the possibility and propriety of preelection review in providing 
that “[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be 
submitted to the electors or have any effect.”  (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (d), 
italics added.)   
The legal challenge in the present case does not relate to the substantive 
validity of the initiative measure but rather involves a procedural claim pertaining 
                                              
11  
See generally Gordon & Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Review of 
Initiatives and Referendums (1989) 64 Notre Dame L.Rev. 298 (concluding that 
“it is generally improper for courts to adjudicate pre-election challenges to a 
measure’s substantive validity” but that “pre-election review of challenges based 
on noncompliance with procedural requirements or subject matter limitations is 
proper”).   
 
20
to the preelection petition-circulation process.  Past cases establish that, at least as 
a general matter, this type of procedural challenge — that is, a challenge based 
upon an allegation that a proposed initiative measure has failed to comply with the 
essential procedural requirements necessary to qualify an initiative measure for the 
ballot (for example, an initiative petition’s alleged failure to have obtained the 
requisite number of qualified signatures) — may be brought and resolved prior to 
an election.  (See, e.g., Assembly v. Deukmejian (1982) 30 Cal.3d 638, 646-654 
[preelection decision considering the effect of a variety of alleged defects in 
referendum petition, including claim that text of measure printed in petition varied 
from text of the enacted measure that was the subject of the referendum];  
Epperson v. Jordan (1938) 12 Cal.2d 61 (Epperson) [preelection decision 
considering challenge to initiative measure contesting the completeness and 
accuracy of the Attorney General’s summary of the measure set forth in the 
circulated petition]; Clark v. Jordan (1936) 7 Cal.2d 248 (Clark) [preelection 
decision sustaining challenge to proposed initiative measure on ground that “short 
title” set forth in circulated petitions violated statutory requirement that such title 
accurately describe the subject to which the petition relates, and finding it 
unnecessary to decide additional claim that petition was not supported by the 
required number of signatures]; Boyd v. Jordan (1934) 1 Cal.2d 468 (Boyd) 
[preelection decision sustaining challenge to proposed initiative based on 
misleading short title].)  As these and similar cases implicitly recognize, because 
the question at issue in such a case is whether the initiative measure has satisfied 
the constitutional or statutory procedural prerequisites necessary to qualify it for 
the ballot, it is logical and appropriate for a court to consider such a claim prior to 
the election, because if the threshold procedural prerequisites have not been 
satisfied the measure is not entitled to be submitted to the voters.  Unlike a 
challenge to the substantive validity of a proposed measure, it cannot properly be 
 
21
suggested that it would be premature to consider such a claim prior to the election, 
because the focus of the issue is solely upon whether the measure has qualified for 
the ballot, and not upon the validity or invalidity of the measure were it to be 
approved by the voters. 
Furthermore, once a measure has been placed on the ballot and has been 
voted upon by the electorate, California decisions have been most reluctant to 
overturn the results of an election on the basis of a procedural defect that has 
occurred at the petition-circulation stage of the process, inasmuch as such a defect 
ordinarily will have no effect on the material that is before the voters or on the 
fairness or accuracy of the election result.  (See, e.g., Lenahan v. City of Los 
Angeles (1939) 14 Cal.2d 128, 132 [challenges to form and sufficiency of recall 
petition held moot after recall election was held, emphasizing that none “of the 
alleged deficiencies or irregularities in the presentation and certification of the 
recall petition prevented a full and fair vote at the recall election”]; Mapstead v. 
Anchundo (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 246, 272-277 [challenge to sufficiency of 
signatures to qualify referendum became moot once election on referendum was 
held]; Chase v. Brooks (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 657, 659-662 [because “[t]he ballot 
measure and accompanying material adequately informed the electorate of the 
breadth and complete contents of the challenged ordinance,” “[o]nce the election 
is held and the electorate has spoken, it becomes moot whether the referendum 
petitions failed to comply with [former] section 4052,” which required that 
municipal referendum petitions contain entire text of the ordinance that is the 
subject of the referendum]; Long v. Hultberg (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 606, 608-609 
[when election has been held and fairness of the election itself is not attacked, 
challenge to sufficiency of recall petitions is moot]; see also Legislature v. 
Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658, 666 [“general rule favoring postelection review 
[of initiative or referendum measures] contemplates that no serious consequences 
 
22
will result if consideration of the validity of measure is delayed until after an 
election”]; Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, 649 [“the postelection 
context is significantly different from a preballot-qualification setting.  An election 
is a completed act, a fait accompli.  In contrast, the circulation and qualification of 
referendum petitions are part of an ongoing process that portends, at most, the 
potential of an election”].)  In light of this well-established remedial limitation 
regarding postelection challenges, it cannot be said that there is no harm in 
postponing until after the election a determination of the validity of this type of 
procedural challenge to the petition-circulation process, because after the election 
the procedural claim may well be considered moot.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the trial court and the Court of Appeal did not err in entertaining the 
procedural challenge in this case prior to the election. 
Of course, the circumstance that a challenge involves the type of claim that 
properly may be considered by a court prior to the election does not establish that 
the claim in question is valid or that it justifies withholding the challenged 
measure from the ballot.  Particularly when a preelection challenge is brought 
against an initiative measure that has been signed by the requisite number of 
voters to qualify it for the ballot, the important state interest in protecting the 
fundamental right of the people to propose statutory or constitutional changes 
through the initiative process requires that a court exercise considerable caution 
before intervening to remove or withhold the measure from an imminent election.  
Only when a court is confident that the challenge is meritorious and justifies 
withholding the measure from the ballot, should a court take the dramatic step of 
ordering the removal of a measure that ostensibly has obtained a sufficient number 
of qualified signatures.  (See, e.g., Farley v. Healey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 325, 327 
[court should order removal of an initiative measure from ballot only “on a 
compelling showing that a proper case has been established for interfering with the 
 
23
initiative power”]; Zaremberg v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 111, 116 
[“ ‘[t]he ballot box is the sword of democracy.  A court will intervene in the . . . 
process only when there are clear, compelling reasons to do so’ ”].) 
In the present case, our grant of review did not rest upon a determination 
that the legal challenge in question should not have been brought or resolved prior 
to the election, but rather upon our disagreement with the merits of the lower 
courts’ conclusion that the procedural defect in this case warranted withholding 
the initiative measure in question from the ballot.  Because we concluded that the 
discrepancies in question did not justify withholding the proposition from the 
ballot, and because time constraints precluded an adequate opportunity for 
briefing, argument, deliberation, and the preparation and filing of an opinion prior 
to the election without unduly interfering with the printing and distribution of the 
ballot pamphlet and the administration of the election, we granted review, stayed 
the judgment rendered by the trial court, directed the Secretary of State to place 
the matter on the ballot, and authorized public officials and other persons to 
submit revised statements and ballot arguments relating to the version of the 
measure that had been circulated for signature and that was to be placed on the 
ballot.  Our order permitted Proposition 77 to be placed on the ballot and 
preserved our ability to address the issues, after the election, through an opinion 
prepared with the benefit of full briefing and oral argument. 
 
 
III 
In analyzing the legal question whether the disparities between the version 
of the initiative measure circulated for signature and the version submitted to the 
Attorney General warranted withholding the initiative measure from the ballot, we 
begin with the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and then consider 
the judicial authorities that have addressed analogous claims in past cases. 
 
24
 
 
A 
Article II, section 8 of the California Constitution provides (in 
subdivision (a)) that “[t]he initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes 
and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them,” and specifies (in 
subdivision (b)) that a petition proposing such a measure must “set[] forth the text 
of the proposed statute or amendment to the Constitution” that is sought to be 
adopted.12  Article II, section 10 of the state Constitution further provides (in 
subdivision (d)) that prior to the circulation of an initiative petition, “a copy shall 
be submitted to the Attorney General who shall prepare a title and summary of the 
measure as provided by law,” and additionally (in subdivision (e)) explicitly 
authorizes the Legislature to provide “the manner in which petitions shall be 
circulated, presented, and certified, and measures submitted to the electors.”13 
The Legislature, in turn, has enacted numerous provisions in the Elections 
Code related to the initiative process.  Section 9002, implementing the directive 
                                              
12  
Article II, section 8, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide in full:  “(a) The 
initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the 
Constitution and to adopt or reject them. 
 
“(b)  An initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary 
of State a petition that sets forth the text of the proposed statute or amendment to 
the Constitution and is certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to 
5 percent in the case of a statute, and 8 percent in the case of an amendment to the 
Constitution, of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial 
election.” 
13  
Article II, section 10, subdivision (d) provides in full:  “Prior to circulation 
of an initiative or referendum petition for signatures, a copy shall be submitted to 
the Attorney General who shall prepare a title and summary of the measure as 
provided by law.” 
 
Article II, section 10, subdivision (e) provides in full:  “The Legislature 
shall provide the manner in which petitions shall be circulated, presented, and 
certified, and measures submitted to the electors.” 
 
25
embodied in article II, section 10, subdivision (d) of the Constitution, provides that 
prior to circulation of an initiative petition, “a draft of the proposed measure” shall 
be submitted to the Attorney General with a written request for the preparation of 
a title and summary of the measure; that statute further provides that the title and 
summary prepared by the Attorney General “shall not exceed . . . 100 words.”14 
Section 9004 directs the Attorney General, upon receipt of a draft of a 
petition, to prepare “a summary of the chief purposes and points of the proposed 
measure.”  In establishing a deadline for the Attorney General’s completion of the 
title and summary, section 9004 implicitly authorizes the proponents of the 
measure to submit to the Attorney General amendments to the proposed measure 
(either substantive or technical) within 15 days after the initial submission of the 
measure, and directs the Attorney General to provide a copy of the title and 
summary to the Secretary of State either within 15 days after receipt of “the final 
version of a proposed initiative measure” or, if the Attorney General determines 
(pursuant to the provisions of section 9005) that the measure if adopted would 
affect the revenues or expenditures of the state or local government, within 15 
days after the Attorney General’s receipt of the fiscal estimate or opinion that is to 
                                              
14  
Section 9002 provides in full:  “Prior to the circulation of any initiative or 
referendum petition for signatures, a draft of the proposed measure shall be 
submitted to the Attorney General with a written request that a title and summary 
of the chief purpose and points of the proposed measure be prepared.  The title and 
summary shall not exceed a total of 100 words. 
 
“The persons presenting the request shall be known as the ‘proponents.’ 
 
“The Attorney General shall preserve the written request until after the next 
general election.” 
 
26
be prepared by the Department of Finance and the Joint Legislative Budget 
Committee.15 
                                              
15  
Section 9004 provides in full:  “Upon receipt of a draft of a petition, the 
Attorney General shall prepare a summary of the chief purposes and points of the 
proposed measure.  The summary shall be prepared in the manner provided for the 
preparation of ballot titles in Article 5 (commencing with section 9050), the 
provisions of which in regard to the preparation, filing, and settlement of titles and 
summaries are hereby made applicable to the summary.  The Attorney General 
shall provide a copy of the title and summary to the Secretary of State within 15 
days after receipt of the final version of a proposed initiative measure, or if a fiscal 
estimate or opinion is to be included, within 15 days after receipt of the fiscal 
estimate or opinion prepared by the Department of Finance and the Joint 
Legislative Budget Committee pursuant to Section 9005. 
 
“If during the 15-day period, the proponents of the proposed initiative 
measure submit amendments, other than technical, nonsubstantive amendments, to 
the final version of the measure, the Attorney General shall provide a copy of the 
title and summary to the Secretary of State within 15 days after receipt of the 
amendments. 
 
“The proponents of any initiative measure, at the time of submitting the 
draft of the measure to the Attorney General, shall pay a fee of two hundred 
dollars ($200), which shall be placed in a trust fund in the office of the Treasurer 
and refunded to the proponents if the measure qualifies for the ballot within two 
years from the date the summary is furnished to the proponents.  If the measure 
does not qualify within that period, the fee shall be immediately paid into the 
General Fund of the state.” 
 
Section 9005 provides in relevant part:  “Notwithstanding Section 9004, the 
Attorney General, in preparing  a title or summary for an initiative measure, shall 
determine whether the substance thereof if adopted would affect the revenues or 
expenditures of the state or local government, and if he or she determines that it 
would, he or she shall include in the title either the estimate of the amount of any 
increase or decrease in revenues or costs to the state or local government, or an 
opinion as to whether or not a substantial net change in state or local finances 
would result if the proposed initiative is adopted. 
 
“The estimates as required by this section shall be made jointly by the 
Department of Finance and the Joint Legislative Budget Committee, who shall 
deliver them to the Attorney General so that he or she may include them in the 
titles prepared by him or her.” 
 
27
Section 9007 further requires the Attorney General, “[i]mmediately upon 
the preparation of the summary of an initiative or referendum petition,” to transmit 
copies “of the text of the measure and summary” to the Senate and the Assembly, 
and authorizes the appropriate committees to hold hearings on the subject of the 
measure.  Section 9007 further makes clear that the provision is not intended to 
grant the Legislature authority “to alter the measure or prevent it from appearing 
on the ballot.”16 
Section 9008 provides that with regard to every proposed initiative 
measure, the title and summary prepared by the Attorney General must appear in 
12-point or larger roman boldface type across the top of (1) each page of the 
petition on which signatures are to appear, and (2) upon each section of the 
petition immediately preceding the text of the measure.17  (See also § 9001 
                                              
16  
Section 9007 provides in full:  “Immediately upon the preparation of the 
summary of an initiative or referendum petition, the Attorney General shall 
forthwith transmit copies of the text of the measure and summary to the Senate 
and Assembly.  The appropriate committees of each house may hold public 
hearings on the subject of the measure.  However, nothing in this section shall be 
construed as authority for the Legislature to alter the measure or prevent it from 
appearing on the ballot.” 
17  
Section 9008 provides in full:  “Every proposed initiative measure, prior to 
circulation, shall have placed across the top of the petition in 12-point or larger 
roman boldface type, all of the following: 
 
“(a)  The summary prepared by the Attorney General upon each page of the 
petition on which signatures are to appear. 
 
“(b)  The summary prepared by the Attorney General upon each section of 
the petition preceding the text of the measure. 
 
“(c)  The summary prepared by the Attorney General as required by 
subdivision (b) shall be preceded by the following statement: ‘Initiative measure 
to be submitted directly to the voters.’ ” 
 
28
[setting forth the general format for a proposed initiative measure].)18  Section 
9014 provides that an initiative petition may be presented in sections (rather than 
in a single, statewide petition), but also establishes that “each section shall contain 
a full and correct copy of the title and text of the proposed measure” and that the 
text of the measure must be printed in at least 8-point type.19 
Finally, section 9012 provides that election officials who are authorized to 
receive or file an initiative petition shall not receive or file any petition “not in 
conformity with this article.” 
Considering these provisions as a whole, we conclude that there can be no 
question but that the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions require that 
the version of a measure submitted to the Attorney General by the measure’s 
proponents prior to circulation of the petition be the same version of the initiative 
                                              
18  
Section 9001 provides in full:  “The heading of a proposed initiative 
measure shall be in substantially the following form: 
 
“Initiative Measure to Be Submitted Directly to the Voters 
 
“The Attorney General of California has prepared the following title and 
summary of the chief purpose and points of the proposed measure: 
 
“(Here set forth the title and summary prepared by the Attorney General.  
This title and summary must also be printed across the top of each page of the 
petition whereon signatures are to appear.) 
 
“To the Honorable Secretary of State of California 
 
“We, the undersigned, registered, qualified voters of California, residents of 
________County (or City and County), hereby propose amendments to the 
Constitution of California (the ________ Code, relating to __________) and 
petition the Secretary of State to submit the same to the voters of California for 
their adoption or rejection at the next succeeding general election or at any special 
statewide election held prior to that general election or otherwise provided by law.  
The proposed constitutional (or statutory) amendments (full title and text of the 
measure) read as follows:”   
19 
Section 9014 is quoted, ante, at page 8, footnote 4.   
 
29
measure circulated for signature.  As noted, article II, section 10, subdivision (d) 
of the California Constitution provides that prior to circulation of an initiative 
petition for signature, “a copy” shall be submitted to the Attorney General, who 
shall prepare a title and summary.  Additionally, section 9004 clearly contemplates 
that the title and summary prepared by the Attorney General will be based upon a 
review of “the final version of a proposed initiative measure.” 
Indeed, no party in the present proceeding has taken the position that the 
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions do not require the proponents of 
an initiative measure to submit to the Attorney General the final version of the 
measure that the proponents intend to circulate for signature.  Furthermore, 
although the record establishes that the proponents in this case did submit to the 
Attorney General the final version of the measure they intended to circulate for 
signature, it is undisputed that, inadvertently, the version of the measure actually 
circulated by the proponents for signature differed in a number of respects from 
the version submitted to the Attorney General. 
The question in dispute here is whether the inadvertent discrepancies 
between the two versions of the initiative measure in this case warranted 
withholding the measure from the ballot, notwithstanding the circumstance that 
the initiative petition was signed by the requisite number of eligible voters to 
qualify the measure for the ballot and that the version of the measure that the 
Secretary of State proposed to submit to the voters was the version circulated for 
signature.  It is to this question that we now turn. 
 
 
B 
Although it has been suggested that the issue before us turns on whether the 
controlling decisions require “strict” or “substantial” compliance with the 
applicable election laws, in some respects such an approach presents a potentially 
misleading dichotomy.  As explained below, all of our past cases emphasize the 
 
30
utmost importance of ensuring the integrity of the electoral process and of 
interpreting and applying the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions in a 
manner that closely safeguards the integrity of that process.  In instances in which 
a departure from a statutory requirement has been found to pose a realistic threat 
to the accuracy and integrity of the process — for example, by misleading the 
potential signers of an initiative petition regarding a significant feature of the 
proposed measure through the use of a confusing or incomplete title — courts 
have not been tolerant of such departures from procedural safeguards and have 
rejected claims that those who signed the petition could have avoided confusion by 
relying upon the full text of the measure included in the petition. 
At the same time, as we shall see, the governing cases also have recognized 
that an unreasonably literal or inflexible application of constitutional or statutory 
requirements that fails to take into account the purpose underlying the particular 
requirement at issue would be inconsistent with the fundamental nature of the 
people’s constitutionally enshrined initiative power and with the well-established 
“ ‘judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is 
challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled.  If doubts can 
reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will 
preserve it.’ ”  (Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 
Cal.3d 582, 591; see also Epperson, supra, 12 Cal.2d 61, 66 [emphasizing “the 
fundamental concept that provisions relating to the initiative should be liberally 
construed to permit, if possible, the exercise by the electors of this most important 
privilege”].)  Thus, when California courts have encountered relatively minor 
defects that the court finds could not have affected the integrity of the electoral 
process as a realistic and practical matter, past decisions generally have 
concluded that it would be inappropriate to preclude the electorate from voting on 
a measure on the basis of such a discrepancy or defect.  In such cases, as long as 
 
31
the fundamental purposes underlying the applicable constitutional or statutory 
requirements have been fulfilled, the decisions have concluded that there has been 
“substantial compliance” with the applicable constitutional or statutory provisions 
and that invalidation of a petition and preclusion of a vote on the measure is not 
warranted. 
Two California Supreme Court decisions, decided within three months of 
one another in 1934, highlight the general judicial approach that long has been 
followed in this area.  In California Teachers Assn. v. Collins (1934) 1 Cal.2d 202 
(California Teachers Assn.) — decided in June 1934 — a registrar of voters had 
refused to accept and file an initiative petition based upon the petition’s ostensible 
failure to comply with the provisions of former Political Code section 1197b, 
which declared that “[a]cross the top of each page after the first page of every 
initiative . . . petition and section thereof . . . there shall be printed in eighteen-
point gothic type a short title, not to exceed twenty words, showing the nature of 
the petition and the subject to which it relates.”  (Italics added.)  The registrar in 
that case had relied upon the circumstance that the short title in the petition 
departed from the statutory requirements in two respects: (1) it was printed in 12-
point boldface type instead of the 18-point gothic type called for by the statute, 
and (2) it contained 24 words, instead of the maximum of 20 words prescribed by 
the statute. 
In analyzing the propriety of the registrar’s rejection of the petition, the 
court in California Teachers Assn., supra, 1 Cal.2d 202, began by explaining: 
“The requirements of both the Constitution and the statute are intended to and do 
give information to the electors who are asked to sign the initiative petitions.  If 
that be accomplished in any given case, little more can be asked than that a 
substantial compliance with the law and the Constitution be had, and that such 
 
32
compliance does no violence to a reasonable construction of the technical 
requirements of the law.” (1 Cal.2d at p. 204, italics added.)20 
In considering the short title’s departure from the required type size and 
style, this court in California Teachers Assn., supra, 1 Cal.2d 202, observed that 
other election-law provisions called for the use of 12-point boldface type and 
further noted that “[i]n actual size, there is a difference [between 12-point and 18-
point type] of but six-seventy-seconds of an inch.  Only one with very poor 
eyesight would be unable to read a line printed in twelve-point type as readily as 
one printed in eighteen-point type.”  (1 Cal.2d at p. 204.)  Under these 
circumstances, the court in California Teachers Assn. concluded:  “[W]e are of the 
view there has been a sufficiently substantial compliance with the statute.”  (Ibid.) 
In considering the objection based upon the number of words in the short 
title, this court indicated that this objection “presents a more serious question, but 
one which we believe should be resolved in favor of petitioners in the present 
                                              
20  
As the italicized passage indicates, the California Teachers Assn. decision 
makes it quite clear that the “substantial compliance” doctrine applies to both 
constitutional and statutory provisions that set forth procedural requirements 
relating to the initiative or referendum process.  As we discuss hereafter, during 
the more than 70 years since the opinion in California Teachers Assn., California 
decisions uniformly have recognized that the substantial compliance doctrine 
applies both to constitutional and statutory provisions relating to elections.  (See 
post, pp. 35-43.)  Although the Court of Appeal in the present case expressed 
some uncertainty on this point, relying on an earlier decision of this court (People 
v. City of San Buenaventura (1931) 213 Cal. 637) that stated that the substantial 
compliance rule does not apply to “mandatory constitutional requirements” (id. at 
p. 642), this aspect of the City of San Buenaventura decision clearly is inconsistent 
with California Teachers Assn. and subsequent decisions of this court.  (See, e.g., 
Perry v. Jordan (1949) 34 Cal.2d 87, 94-95; Fox etc. Corp. v. City of Bakersfield 
(1950) 36 Cal.2d 136, 145; Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, 652-
653.)  To avoid similar confusion in the future, we explicitly hold that People v. 
City of San Buenaventura, supra, 213 Cal. 637, has been overruled on this point.  
 
33
instance.”  (California Teachers Assn., supra, 1 Cal.2d at pp. 204-205.)  
Reasoning that “the omission in the ‘short title’ of the words ‘Constitutional 
Amendment’ and the phrase ‘Submitted Directly to the Electors’ would detract 
nothing from its descriptive feature” (id. at p. 205), this court held that 
“[t]herefore, regarding the inclusion of these words and the phrase as surplusage, 
we are of the view that the mandate of the legislature has been substantially 
complied with, and that the purpose of the ‘short title’, which is to prevent the 
deceiving of electors by the use of misleading pages and titles after the first page, 
. . . has been served.”  (Ibid.)  In addition, further demonstrating the practical 
nature of this court’s approach and its consideration of the realistic consequences 
of its action with an eye to protecting the people’s fundamental right of initiative, 
this court in California Teachers Assn. noted: “We are more strongly inclined to 
so hold in view of the fact that the present initiative petition was prepared and is 
being circulated in good faith, that many thousands of signatures thereto have 
already been secured, and the time is short within which the large number of 
required signatures can be again secured.”  (Ibid.) 
In Boyd, supra, 1 Cal.2d 468 — decided three months after California 
Teachers Assn., in September 1934 — this court again faced a claim that an 
initiative petition was invalid for failure to comply with former Political Code 
section 1197b, the same statute that had been at issue in California Teachers Assn.  
In Boyd, however, the claim was that the short title formulated by the proponents 
of the measure and set forth at the top of every page of the initiative petition after 
the first page — “Initiative Measure Providing for Adoption of Gross Receipts 
 
34
Act” — did not adequately describe “the nature of the petition and the subject to 
which it relates,” as required by the statute in question.21 
This court in Boyd initially noted that in California Teachers Assn., the 
court had held that “substantial compliance with this provision of said section of 
the code was all that was required.”  (Boyd, supra, 1 Cal.2d at p. 471.)  In 
determining whether the substantial compliance requirement was met in Boyd, this 
court, after considering the Attorney General’s summary of the measure and its 
own examination of the petition, noted that “the proposed amendment to the 
Constitution provides for a tax to be levied upon gross receipts of money from all 
sources, with certain exceptions therein specified, sufficient in amount to meet and 
pay expenses of maintaining the state government and all political subdivisions of 
the state; all existing tax laws are repealed[;] an entirely new set of officers are 
provided for the levy and assessment of the proposed tax; and the offices of 
assessor and tax collector of every county in the state are abolished.”  (1 Cal.2d at 
pp. 471-472.)  The court in Boyd then stated:  “The short title used in this petition 
makes no reference to a tax or to the fact that the proposed amendment is a 
revenue measure.  We think it is clear that the short title neither shows the nature 
of the petition, nor does it show the subject to which it relates.  There is nothing in 
this short title which informed the elector who was asked to sign it that the 
proposed measure provided for the levy of any tax whatever.  He was informed 
                                              
21  
At the time of the Boyd decision, the relevant statutory provision permitted 
the proponents of an initiative measure to compose the short title to be included on 
each page of the petition after the first page.  Shortly thereafter, the statute was 
amended to require the title and summary prepared by the Attorney General to be 
present on each page of the petition on which signatures are to appear.  (See 
Epperson, supra, 12 Cal.2d 61, 65.)  The current statutory provision retains the 
latter requirement.  (§ 9008.)   
 
35
that the petition provided for the adoption of a gross receipt act, but no 
information was given him as to the character of the proposed legislation 
regarding that subject. . . .  In our opinion, this vital defect in the short title vitiates 
the whole petition and renders it inadequate for any purpose.”  (Id. at pp. 472-
473.)   
Because the short title at issue in Boyd did not adequately reveal the nature 
of the initiative measure or the subject to which the petition related, the court 
concluded it did not “amount to even a substantial compliance with the 
requirements of section 1197b of the Political Code, and for that reason we are 
constrained to hold that the proposed measure set out in the said petition is not 
entitled to be submitted to the electors of the state.”  (Boyd, supra, 1 Cal.2d at 
pp. 474-475; see also Clark, supra, 7 Cal.2d 248, 252 [“A title which tells the 
prospective signer that certain taxes are abolished, without telling him that a 
portion of the abolished taxes are imposed on real property, is definitely 
misleading.  While we are of the opinion that statutes dealing with the initiative 
should be liberally construed to permit the exercise by the electors of this most 
important privilege, we are also of the opinion that statutes passed for the purpose 
of protecting electors from confusing or misleading situations should be 
enforced”].)  
As the contrast between the results in the California Teachers Association 
and Boyd decisions illustrates, in determining whether a departure from statutory 
requirements imposed on initiative or referendum petitions by election-law 
provisions should be viewed as invalidating a circulated petition, past California 
decisions have been most concerned with departures that affect the integrity of the 
 
36
process by misleading (or withholding vital information from) those persons 
whose signatures are solicited.22 
Nearly 50 years after the California Teachers Assn. and Boyd decisions, 
this court, in Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, considered a 
preelection challenge to a referendum measure circulated against a 
reapportionment statute that had been enacted by the Legislature and signed by the 
Governor.  After the referendum petition had been circulated and certified as 
having obtained a sufficient number of signatures to qualify for the ballot, a 
preelection judicial challenge was brought based on a variety of statutory defects 
in the referendum petitions.  After analyzing the most serious of the defects at 
issue in that case and concluding, in light of the unusual circumstances present 
there, that the court would not withhold the referendum from the ballot on the 
basis of that defect even though it went “to the very heart” of the purpose of the 
particular statutory requirement at issue (30 Cal.3d at p. 648),23 this court in 
                                              
22  
In addition to instances in which courts have found an initiative or 
referendum petition invalid because it contained a materially misleading or 
inadequate short title, the type of defect that most often has been found fatal is the 
failure of an initiative or referendum petition to comply with the statutory 
requirement of setting forth in sufficient detail the text of the proposed initiative 
measure or of the legislative act against which the referendum is brought “so that 
registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition 
and to avoid confusion.”  (Mervyn’s v. Reyes (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 93, 99; see, 
e.g., Myers v. Stringham (1925) 195 Cal. 672, 675-676; Billig v. Voges (1990) 223 
Cal.App.3d 962, 967; Creighton v. Reviczky (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1225, 1232.)   
23  
The most serious flaw in the referendum petition in Assembly v. 
Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, arose from the circumstance that the sections 
of the circulated petition failed to ask each signing voter to provide his or her 
“residence address” as required by the applicable statute (former § 3516, now 
§ 9020), but instead asked for “your address as registered to vote.”  This court in 
Assembly v. Deukmejian recognized that “[f]ar from being a mere technical 
shortcoming, real parties’ failure to comply with the requirements of section 3516, 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
37
Assembly v. Deukmejian turned its attention to a number of other challenges to 
what it described as “the technical sufficiency” of the referendum petitions. 
We began by setting forth the standard that governs the determination 
whether such defects should invalidate a referendum or initiative measure, 
observing: “This court has stressed that technical deficiencies in referendum and 
initiative petitions will not invalidate the petitions if they are in ‘substantial 
compliance’ with statutory and constitutional requirements.  (California Teachers 
Assn. v. Collins[, supra,] 1 Cal.2d 202, 204.)  A paramount concern in determining 
whether a petition is valid despite an alleged defect is whether the purpose of the 
technical requirement is frustrated by the defective form of the petition.  ‘The 
requirements of both the Constitution and the statute are intended to and do give 
information to the electors who are asked to sign the . . . petitions.  If that be 
accomplished in any given case, little more can be asked than that a substantial 
compliance with the law and the Constitution be had, and that such compliance 
does no violence to a reasonable construction of the technical requirements of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
subdivision (c), goes to the very heart of that section’s purpose — to enable the 
clerk to ensure that petitions have been signed by those entitled to do so — and 
prevents that purpose from being effectuated.”  (30 Cal.3d at p. 648.)  
Nonetheless, the court in that case concluded that it would not withhold the 
referendum from the ballot on the basis of that defect, inasmuch as numerous past 
petitions had used the same format and never had been challenged, and also 
because a former version of the Secretary of State’s handbook for petition 
circulators had provided misleading advice in this regard.  Relying upon the 
judicial policy of “liberally construing” provisions relating to the initiative and 
referendum power, this court held that “[u]nder the unusual and unique 
circumstances of this case” the defect would not be deemed to render the 
referendum petition invalid, but warned that in the future a comparable “failure to 
. . . comply [with this statutory requirement] will render [a petition] invalid per 
se.”  (Id. at p. 652.)   
 
38
law.’  (Ibid.)”  (Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 652-653, italics 
added.)24 
We then went on to discuss each of the alleged defects, concluding that 
none of the statutory deficiencies interfered with the purpose underlying the 
relevant statutory provision.  One of the deficiencies in the referendum petition in 
Assembly v. Deukmejian was somewhat similar, although not identical, to the 
defect at issue in the present case.  The applicable statute required a referendum 
petition to set forth “a full and correct copy of the title and text” of the legislative 
measure against which the referendum was brought.  (Former § 3515, now 
§ 9014.)  The referendum petition at issue in Assembly v. Deukmejian included the 
purported text of the challenged reapportionment statute, but in setting forth the 
text of that legislative measure the petition contained errors in the listing of the 
redistricting census track numbers, with the result that the text appended to the 
petition did not replicate the text of the reapportionment statute that was the 
subject of the referendum petition.  Despite the variance, we rejected this 
challenge to the referendum petition rather summarily, stating simply that “[t]he 
                                              
24  
At another passage in its opinion, this court in Assembly v. Deukmejian, 
supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, repeated a different formulation of the substantial 
compliance standard that is at least potentially misleading.  Quoting from an 
earlier decision rendered outside the context of elections, we stated that 
“ ‘[s]ubstantial compliance . . . means actual compliance in respect to the 
substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute.’ [Citation.]”  (Id. 
at p. 649, italics in original.)  This formulation is unobjectionable so long as it is 
understood to mean that each objective or purpose of a statute must be achieved in 
order to satisfy the substantial compliance standard, but this language cannot 
properly be understood to require “actual compliance” with every specific 
statutory requirement.  As we have seen, in California Teachers Assn., supra, 
1 Cal.2d 202, this court found substantial compliance despite the circumstance that 
the short title on the petition in question was not set forth in the 18-point gothic 
type specifically required by the applicable statute. 
 
39
errors were so minor as to pose no danger of misleading the signers of the 
petitions.  They, therefore, do not affect the validity of the petitions.”  (30 Cal.3d 
at p. 653.)25 
Over the years, numerous relatively minor departures from the 
constitutional and statutory requirements applicable to initiative and referendum 
measures have been found to satisfy the substantial compliance test, so long as the 
court was able to conclude that the departure in question, as a realistic and 
practical matter, did not undermine or frustrate the basic purposes served by the 
                                              
25  
This court in Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, also found 
that two additional flaws in the referendum petition did not warrant withholding 
the measure from the ballot.  First, although the court found that the proponents’ 
use of preprinted dates (utilizing a wide range of dates) on the declarations signed 
by petition circulators to show “ ‘the dates between which all signatures [on the 
petition section in question] were obtained,’ ” rather than the provision of specific 
dates filled in by individual petition circulators reflecting the dates within which 
the signatures on the particular petition section actually were obtained, impeded 
the ability of local election officials to determine whether those individuals who 
signed the petition section were registered voters at the time they signed the 
petition section, and although the court stated that petition circulators in the future 
personally should enter the actual dates between which all signatures on the 
petition section were signed, the court concluded that ⎯ because “no showing has 
been made that the more general information provided prevented the clerks from 
carrying out [their] function” ⎯ this flaw did not warrant invalidating the 
referendum petition.  (30 Cal.3d at pp. 653.)  Second, the court rejected the claim 
that the use of small type and interleaved pages in the circulated petition made the 
text of the reapportionment statute “virtually unreadable” (id. at p. 652), 
concluding:  “[T]he petitions were fully readable, despite the small size of the 
type.  The color-coded referenda packets were sufficiently labeled and 
differentiated to meet the requirements of the substantial compliance test.  Neither 
of these defects frustrated the signer’s ability to understand what he or she was 
being asked to sign.  Accordingly, neither of them renders the petitions invalid.”  
(Id. at pp. 653-654.)   
 
40
statutory requirements in ensuring the integrity of the initiative or referendum 
process.26 
Recently, in MHC Financing Limited Partnership Two v. City of Santee 
(2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1372 (MHC Financing), the Court of Appeal had occasion 
                                              
26  
See, for example, Zaremberg v. Superior Court, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th 
111, 119-120 (holding referendum petition substantially complied with Election 
Code provisions despite proponents’ failure to print short title on each page of the 
petition as required by section 9011, where pages from which short title was 
missing were continuation pages of the text of the statute in question and short title 
appeared both on the first page of the petition and on the signature page); Alliance 
for a Better Downtown Millbrae v. Wade (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 123, 131, fn. 2 
(noting that even if the initiative petition did not fully comply with Election Code 
section 9203 when the title and summary of the measure were reprinted on the 
front, but not the back, of each signature sheet, there was substantial compliance 
with the statute “because the summary statement on one side of the sheet of paper 
informs the signer of the content of the proposed initiative, thereby providing 
‘ “the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute” ’ ”); 
People v. Scott (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 514, 520 (finding substantial compliance 
with applicable Election Code provisions despite differences between the version 
of initiative measure circulated for signature and the version of measure that 
appeared in ballot pamphlet and was approved by voters, where there was no 
showing “that any of the differences in the text of the initiative were material 
deficiencies or that such purported defects ‘affected the ability of the voters to 
make an informed choice’ ”); Hayward Area Planning Assn. v. Superior Court 
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 53, 59 (finding substantial compliance despite referendum 
petition’s failure to include across the top of each page the generic language 
“Referendum Against an Ordinance Passed by the City Council” required by 
former section 4052 (now § 9238), where petition contained a statement that the 
court found was as “informative and helpful as the words” specified in the statute).  
(But cf. Ibarra v. City of Carson (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 90, 99-100 [rejecting 
claim of substantial compliance where proponents of local initiative measure 
published, but did not post, a notice of intent to circulate the petition three days 
prior to circulating the petition, even though there was no indication that the 
purpose underlying the applicable statute (former § 4003, now § 9205) was not 
adequately achieved by the timely publication of the notice of intent to circulate 
and by the inclusion in the petition of an accurate title and summary prepared by 
the city attorney].)  
 
41
to apply the substantial compliance doctrine in a factual setting quite comparable 
to the present case, in which a title and summary that was prepared on the basis of 
one version of a proposed initiative measure inadvertently was used on a 
circulated initiative petition that set forth a different version of the initiative 
measure.  Because of the similarity of the issue addressed in that case to the issue 
presented here, we discuss the MHC Financing decision in some detail. 
The initiative measure in MHC Financing proposed adoption of a local 
mobilehome rent control ordinance.  The proponents of the proposed initiative 
initially submitted a version of the measure to the city attorney on March 18, 1998 
(the March 18 version), requesting the preparation of a ballot title and summary; in 
response, the city attorney prepared a ballot title and summary and provided them 
to the proponents and to the city clerk.  On April 2, 1998, the proponents 
submitted to the city attorney a modified version of the initial measure (the April 2 
version) but failed to expressly request a ballot title and summary, and the city 
attorney did not prepare a title and summary for the April 2 version.  Thereafter, 
the proponents included the April 2 version of the measure on the petition that was 
circulated for signature, using the ballot title and summary that had been prepared 
by the city attorney on the basis of the March 18 version.  The circulated petition 
obtained the requisite number of signatures and the city council, which was 
required under the governing law either to submit the proposed ordinance to the 
voters or to adopt the proposed ordinance, opted to adopt the ordinance.  In doing 
so, however, the city council inadvertently adopted the March 18 version.  After a 
lawsuit was filed challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance, the city 
council’s mistake was discovered, and the city council, to correct its mistake, 
enacted a new ordinance containing the text of the April 2 version. 
In MHC Financing, the trial court held the ordinance adopted by the city 
invalid on a variety of grounds, including violation of the Election Code 
 
42
provisions relating to the required ballot title and summary for local initiative 
petitions,27 but the Court of Appeal reversed, concluding on this point that the trial 
court had erred in determining that the adopted ordinance was invalid “on the 
ground that a ballot title and summary was not prepared for the April 2 initiative.”  
(MHC Financing, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1388.) 
In reaching its conclusion, Justice Aaron’s opinion for the court in MHC 
Financing began its analysis by explaining: “When, as here, there is no dispute 
about the format of an initiative petition presented to the city clerk, and the issue 
on appeal is whether the petition substantially complies with the ballot title and 
summary requirements of section 9203, subdivision (b), we review the matter de 
novo.”  (MHC Financing, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1388-1389, fn. omitted.)  
After citing the relevant passage from our decision in Assembly v. Deukmejian, 
supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, regarding the crucial importance of considering the purpose 
of the relevant statutory requirement in determining whether there has been 
substantial compliance, the court in MHC Financing continued:  “The purposes 
served by the ballot title and summary requirements of section 9003, subdivision 
(b), are:  (1) to reduce the risk that voters were misled when signing the petition; 
(2) to allow verification that the signers had a neutral explanation of the proposed 
ordinance available to them when they signed; and (3) to prevent signatures from 
                                              
27  
The Election Code provisions applicable to municipal initiative measures 
(§ 9200 et seq.) largely parallel the statutes that are applicable to statewide 
initiatives.  Section 9203 provides for submission of “a copy of the proposed 
measure” to the local election official with a request for a ballot title and 
summary, and directs the election official to transmit the material to the city 
attorney for preparation of a title and summary.  After the title and summary are 
prepared, they are provided to the proponent of the measure, and the proponent is 
required to print the title and summary across the top of each page of the petition 
on which signatures are to appear. 
 
43
being submitted in support of a different measure than that for which they were 
procured.” (MHC Financing, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1389.) 
The court in MHC Financing, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th 1372, then 
explained: “Based on our own comparison of the ballot title and summary 
circulated with the April 2 initiative petition with the sections of the April 2 
initiative addressed by the summary, we are satisfied that the title and summary 
adequately reflect the substance of the April 2 initiative and therefore did not 
frustrate the purposes of the title and summary requirement of section 9203.”  (Id. 
at p. 1389.)  Although the court in MHC Financing acknowledged that the 
differences between the text of the March 18 version and the text of the April 2 
version were substantive in nature and that the April 2 version represented an 
“ ‘alteration’ ” of the March 18 version (ibid.), the court at the same time observed 
that the differences “do not go to the heart of the circulated initiative, and thus do 
not render the ballot title and summary prepared for the uncirculated March 18 
initiative misleading as to the circulated April 2 initiative.”  (Id. at pp. 1389-1390.)  
Although in MHC Financing some of the differences in the two versions involved 
provisions of the initiative measure that actually were mentioned in the city 
attorney’s summary that appeared on the petition, the Court of Appeal, after 
examining the language of the summary, found that the minor differences “did not 
create a risk that voters signing the initiative petition were misled.”  (Id. at 
p. 1390.) 
The court in MHC Financing concluded: “[W]hile the initiative petition 
technically did not comply with section 9203 because the City Attorney did not 
prepare a ballot title and summary specifically for the April 2 initiative, the 
petition substantially complied with section 9203 because the ballot title and 
summary that circulated with it accurately reflected the substance of the 
accompanying April 2 initiative and did not create a risk that voters signing the 
 
44
petition would be misled about the substance of the initiative.  The ballot 
summary’s technical noncompliance with section 9203 did not infringe the 
electors’ constitutional right of initiative.”  (MHC Financing, supra, 125 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1391, italics in original.)   
The majority opinion in the Court of Appeal in the present case 
acknowledged the decision in MHC Financing, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th 1372, but 
held that the earlier decision was distinguishable from the present case because in 
that matter (1) the city council had chosen to adopt the ordinance rather than to 
submit the measure to the voters and the city council retained the authority to 
adopt such a measure notwithstanding any potential defects in the initiative 
circulation process, and (2) the proponents in MHC Financing had submitted the 
April 2 version to the city attorney (but had not requested or obtained a title and 
summary for that version).  The Court of Appeal decision in MHC Financing, 
however, did not rely upon those circumstances or justifications in analyzing the 
asserted violation of the election statute, but instead clearly held that there was 
substantial compliance with the applicable Election Code provisions because the 
ballot title and summary that actually circulated with the initiative petition 
accurately reflected the substance of the version of the initiative measure that was 
included in the petition.  Unlike the Court of Appeal majority in the present case, 
we find the reasoning and conclusion in MHC Financing directly on point.28   
                                              
28  
Justice Kennard’s concurring and dissenting opinion suggests that our 
reliance upon the decision in MHC Financing is misplaced because that case 
addressed the issue in question in the context of what the concurring and 
dissenting opinion characterizes as a postelection, rather than preelection, 
challenge.  (See, post, conc. & dis. opn. by Kennard, J., pp. 10-11.)  As 
demonstrated by the passages from MHC Financing set forth above, however, the 
Court of Appeal decision in MHC Financing did not rely upon that circumstance 
in analyzing or resolving the relevant claim, but rather relied upon reasoning that 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
45
As described at the outset of this opinion (see ante, p. 6), the December 6 
version of the initiative measure submitted to the Attorney General differed in a 
number of respects from the December 3 version that circulated for signature, 
including most significantly (1) a substantial revision of the wording of the 
“Findings and Declarations of Purpose,” (2) a one-day reduction in the time in 
which legislative leaders were to make their nominations and exercise peremptory 
challenges in creating the final list of judges from which the special masters were 
to be chosen by lot, and (3) an explicit statement that, with regard to the 
redistricting process, the initiative and referendum power was to be used only in 
the manner specified in the initiative measure.29  Evaluating the significance of the 
differences in the two versions in light of the legal standard established and 
applied in the numerous prior California decisions reviewed above, we conclude 
that although the variance in the two versions constituted a constitutional and 
statutory defect, the inadvertent differences at issue here did not mislead the public 
or otherwise defeat or undermine the fundamental purposes underlying the 
relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and thus there was substantial 
compliance with those provisions.  Accordingly, we conclude that the 
discrepancies did not require or justify withholding the initiative measure from the 
ballot. 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
is directly applicable to the resolution of the issue before us.  Thus, the concurring 
and dissenting opinion’s ground for distinguishing MHC Financing is no more 
convincing that the distinctions relied upon by the Court of Appeal.   
29  
As noted above, the differences in the two versions are set forth in full in an 
appendix to this opinion.   
 
46
In urging this court to uphold the Court of Appeal’s contrary conclusion in 
this case, both the Attorney General and CFFR, while conceding that 
typographical or clerical differences between the version of an initiative measure 
submitted to the Attorney General and the version circulated for signature would 
not justify withholding the circulated version from the ballot, emphasize that the 
differences between the two versions in this case cannot properly be characterized 
as simply clerical or stylistic but included substantive differences as well.  We 
agree that the discrepancies between the two versions of Proposition 77 included 
some substantive differences, but as the decision in MHC Financing demonstrates, 
it does not follow that the existence of any substantive difference or any difference 
in meaning between such versions necessarily results in the frustration of the 
purposes underlying the applicable statutory requirements. 
The constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the Attorney 
General’s preparation of a ballot title and summary illustrate this point.  (Cal. 
Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (d); Elec. Code, §§ 9002, 9004.)  Past decisions 
establish that the principal purpose underlying the requirement that the proponents 
of an initiative measure submit a copy of it to the Attorney General prior to 
circulation is to enable that official to prepare an accurate and objective title and 
summary that must be prominently included in the circulated petition and that will 
provide the voters whose signatures are sought with an accurate and objective 
description of the general subject matter of the initiative and its main points.  (See, 
e.g., Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization 
(1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 243; Epperson, supra, 12 Cal.2d 61, 66-71.) 
In the present case, the proponents submitted the December 6 version of the 
proposed initiative to the Attorney General for preparation of a title and summary, 
the Attorney General prepared a title and summary on the basis of that version, 
and that ballot title and summary was included in the circulated petition along 
 
47
(inadvertently) with the text of the December 3 version.  Thus, the registered 
voters who signed the petition had before them the full text of the December 3 
version — the version that the Secretary of State proposed to place on the 
November 8, 2005, election ballot — as well as the title and summary that was 
prepared by the Attorney General on the basis of the December 6 version.  
As noted, when this matter was before the Court of Appeal, that court 
directed the Attorney General to prepare a title and summary using the 
December 3 version of the measure that was circulated with the petition, and the 
Attorney General, after review, prepared a title and summary for the December 3 
version that the Attorney General acknowledged did not differ in any material 
respect from the title and summary that had been prepared for the December 6 
version.  Under these circumstances, it is clear that the discrepancies in the two 
versions of the measures — albeit involving some substantive details rather than 
merely clerical errors — did not adversely affect the accuracy or completeness of 
the Attorney General’s ballot title and summary with regard to the version of the 
measure that was circulated with the petition and thus did not mislead the public or 
otherwise frustrate the purpose underlying the constitutional and statutory 
provisions relating to the Attorney General’s preparation of a ballot title and 
summary.   
In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeal majority did not suggest 
that the discrepancies in the two versions of the measure frustrated the purposes 
served by the statutory provisions calling for the Attorney General’s preparation of 
a ballot title and summary.  Instead, the Court of Appeal observed that the 
constitutional and statutory requirement that the version of an initiative measure 
that is circulated for signature be the same version as that submitted to the 
Attorney General serves additional purposes beyond the preparation of an accurate 
and objective title and summary to be included in the initiative petition.  As the 
 
48
Court of Appeal noted, the applicable Election Code provisions require the 
Attorney General not only to prepare a title and summary but also to provide a 
copy of the version of the measure that has been submitted by the proponents to 
(1) the Secretary of State (§ 9004), (2) the Department of Finance and the Joint 
Legislative Budget Committee (§ 9005), and (3) the Legislature (§ 9007), each of 
whom presumably will rely upon the version of the measure forwarded by the 
Attorney General in performing its own required or authorized functions.  The 
Court of Appeal concluded that the existence of different versions of the measure 
frustrated the purposes underlying these additional statutory provisions which, in 
the Court of Appeal’s terminology, are intended to ensure that all the relevant 
officials are “on the same page.”30 
                                              
30  
The Court of Appeal majority additionally stated that the version of the 
measure submitted to the Attorney General “fix[es] the text of the proposed 
initiative” for a number of other purposes, namely “proofreading [of the measure] 
by the Legislative Counsel (§ 9091), . . . the preparation of arguments for and 
against the measure if qualified (§§ 9041, 9042, 9044, 9064), and the preparation 
of an analysis of the measure by the Legislative Analyst for the ballot pamphlet 
(§§ 9091, 9086, 9087).”  Although nothing in the applicable statutes explicitly 
provides that the version of an initiative measure submitted to the Attorney 
General is intended to “fix the text” of the measure for these additional 
purposes — in this case, for example, the Secretary of State sent the December 3 
version of the measure to the Legislative Counsel for proofreading (see ante, p. 14, 
fn. 9) — we acknowledge that in many instances these officials and other 
individuals may rely upon the text of the measure submitted to the Attorney 
General in performing their functions or in drafting ballot arguments.  
Nonetheless, as is the case with regard to the public officials to whom the 
Attorney General is required by statute to provide a copy of the submitted version, 
the existence of differences between the text of an initiative measure submitted to 
the Attorney General and the text of the measure circulated for signature does not 
necessarily or invariably frustrate or undermine the work product of such 
individuals, and, for the reasons discussed hereafter, we conclude that in the 
present case the differences did not have a prejudicial effect.   
 
49
Although we agree that the applicable statutory provisions serve the 
additional purposes noted by the Court of Appeal, we do not agree that the 
existence of different versions of an initiative measure necessarily or invariably 
frustrates the purposes of these provisions.  Just as the purpose served by the 
Attorney General’s obligation to prepare an accurate and objective title and 
summary is not defeated by the existence of different versions when the 
differences in the versions would not have materially affected the content of the 
title and summary, so are the purposes underlying the additional statutory 
provisions relied upon by the Court of Appeal not frustrated when the content of 
the statements or analyses that are to be prepared by various public officials and 
other individuals would not be materially affected by the different versions of the 
measure, or when the differences are discovered in sufficient time to permit those 
officials and other affected individuals to prepare accurate reports or analyses (or 
to hold legislative hearings) directed to the version of the initiative measure that is 
to be submitted to the voters. 
In this case, because the differences in the two versions were brought to the 
attention of the relevant public officials (and to the opponents of the measure) 
before the ballot pamphlet and ballot materials were sent to the printer, and 
because, in light of the relatively minor differences in the two versions, there was 
adequate time for the public officials and opponents to make any revisions deemed 
necessary to reflect the version that was to be voted upon in the election, we 
conclude that the discrepancies did not frustrate or undermine the purposes served 
by these provisions so as to make it appropriate for a court to withhold the 
measure from the ballot.  Accordingly, just as the submission of the December 6 
version of the measure to the Attorney General constituted substantial compliance 
with the ballot title and summary provisions because it did not frustrate the 
purpose of the statutorily specified title and summary procedure, we conclude 
 
50
there was substantial compliance with respect to these additional statutory 
provisions as well.31   
Aside from the applicable statutory requirements and purposes, the Court of 
Appeal suggested that the discrepancies between the version of the measure 
submitted to the Attorney General and the version circulated for signature 
warranted withholding the measure from the ballot because the Attorney General, 
although not statutorily required to do so, posted the version that had been 
submitted to him on the Attorney General’s Web site, and some voters who signed 
the initiative petition may have done so on the assumption that the version of the 
measure included in the initiative petition was the same version as that posted on 
the Attorney General’s Web site.  Although as a theoretical matter it is possible 
that some persons who signed the petition previously had read the text of the 
measure that was posted on the Attorney General’s Web site, there is no evidence 
in the record to suggest as a realistic matter either that a significant number of 
signers directly or indirectly obtained information about the initiative measure 
from the version of the measure posted on the Attorney General’s Web site, or, in 
any event, that the minor differences in the two versions would have affected the 
decision of any person to sign or not to sign the initiative petition or to take any 
                                              
31  
We note that submission of an initiative measure to the Attorney General 
and the Attorney General’s provision of a title and summary serve a number of 
additional purposes under other Election Code provisions, including identifying 
the individuals who are to be considered the “proponents” of the measure for 
various statutory purposes (see §§ 342, 9002, 9032, 9067) and establishing the 
beginning date of the period in which signatures must be collected (§ 336).  With 
respect to these statutory purposes as well, the differences in the two versions of 
the initiative measure here at issue had no adverse effect.  
 
51
other action related to the petition.32  As is demonstrated by the past California 
decisions reviewed above, in this context courts have taken a realistic and practical 
view of the consequence of relatively minor statutory lapses, refusing, for 
example, to withhold a measure from the ballot because of the theoretical 
possibility that a smaller type size in a title might have affected potential signers 
when the actual type size utilized was not unduly small and was clearly readable 
(California Teachers Assn., supra, 1 Cal.2d 202, 204), or to invalidate a 
referendum petition because of the theoretical possibility that minor errors in the 
text of the measure attached to the petition might have been read and relied upon 
by some of the persons who signed the petition.  (Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 
30 Cal.3d 638, 653.)   
 
At oral argument, the Attorney General strenuously urged the court to adopt 
a “bright line” rule under which any difference in meaning between the version of 
an initiative measure submitted to the Attorney General and the version circulated 
                                              
32  
In response to the argument that some persons who signed the initiative 
petition may have been misled by the text of the initiative petition posted on the 
Attorney General’s Web site, the proponents of the measure asserted that because 
there were fewer than 8,000 visits to the Attorney General’s Web site to view the 
measure and because the number of qualified signatures on the petition exceeded 
the required number by many more than 8,000, the version posted on the Web site 
could not have affected the validity of the certification.  We agree with the Court 
of Appeal that the number of visits to the Attorney General’s Web site cannot 
properly be viewed as determinative, because persons or entities who read the 
Web site version may have formulated their views and spoken publicly about the 
measure on the basis of that version, potentially affecting many more persons.  
Again, however, the conclusion that the Court of Appeal drew from this 
circumstance rests solely on the theoretical possibility of widespread confusion.  
In this case, there is absolutely no evidence that the Web site version led to 
widespread publicity or confusion, or that the minor differences between the two 
versions realistically affected the view of any person who visited the Web site or 
any potential signer. 
 
52
for signature would invalidate the circulated petition, without regard to the 
significance or insignificance of the particular discrepancy in meaning or to 
whether there is any realistic possibility that the difference or differences in 
question actually affected the actions of any person or the integrity of the electoral 
process.  The Attorney General argued that because the constitutional and 
statutory provisions requiring the proponents of an initiative measure to include in 
the circulated petition the same version of the initiative measure as that submitted 
to the Attorney General are not difficult to understand or comply with, any 
departure in meaning should not be tolerated.  The Attorney General 
acknowledged that his proposed standard (requiring the invalidation of a petition if 
there is any difference in meaning in any aspect of the measure) would compel a 
court to withhold from an imminent election a universally popular and urgently 
needed “good government” constitutional initiative measure that had been signed 
by millions of voters, even if the only difference between the version submitted to 
the Attorney General and the version circulated for signature was an inadvertent 
mistake in the printing of an insignificant numeral (which by definition would 
always result in a change in meaning) that could not possibly have affected the 
decision of any signer, voter, or any other person.  The Attorney General argued 
that this concededly “harsh” result is required to effectuate the applicable 
constitutional and statutory electoral provisions.  The concurring and dissenting 
opinion of Justice Kennard embraces the Attorney General’s argument.   
 
As we have seen, however, the past decisions of this court involving similar 
challenges to initiative or referendum petitions — reaching back more than 70 
years —uniformly refute the position advanced by the Attorney General and 
endorsed by Justice Kennard’s concurring and dissenting opinion.  Rather than 
adopting a “bright line” rule mandating the invalidation of an initiative petition for 
violating an applicable election-related statute when the title on the top of each 
 
53
page of a petition was set forth in 12-point boldface type rather than 18-point 
gothic type or contained 24 rather than 20 words (see California Teachers Assn., 
supra, 1 Cal.2d 202, 204-205), or the setting aside of a referendum petition when 
the text of the statute set forth in the petition did not precisely track the actual 
legislation at issue (see Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, 653), the 
governing California decisions consistently have applied a “substantial 
compliance” rule in this context, realistically evaluating whether the particular 
defect in question frustrates the purposes of the applicable election requirement.  
Although each of the constitutional and statutory requirements at issue in these 
and similar past California cases was clear on its face and ostensibly not difficult 
to comply with, all of the decisions in this area implicitly recognize that 
inadvertent, good-faith human error cannot always be avoided and that it would be 
inconsistent with the fundamental constitutional interests of the tens or hundreds 
of thousands of persons who have signed an initiative or referendum petition to 
invalidate an otherwise qualified petition (and prohibit the matter from being 
presented to all of the voters for their approval or disapproval) when it is apparent 
that the technical defect in question, as a realistic matter, did not adversely affect 
the integrity of the electoral process or frustrate the purposes underlying the 
relevant constitutional or statutory requirements.  Under such circumstances, the 
controlling decisions establish that precluding an otherwise qualified initiative or 
referendum measure from being placed on the ballot is not an appropriate remedy.   
Furthermore, past cases also demonstrate that there is no merit to the claim 
that the any-change-in-meaning rule proposed by the Attorney General must be 
adopted in this context because courts are incapable of determining (or cannot be 
trusted to determine) objectively whether the differences between the version of a 
measure submitted to the Attorney General and the version circulated for signature 
pose a realistic danger of misleading the signers of a petition or for any other 
 
54
reason threaten the integrity of the electoral process.  In many prior California 
decisions, courts have compared the titles and summaries of initiative petitions 
with the substantive provisions of the initiative measures themselves to determine 
whether the titles and summaries are accurate or potentially misleading (see, e.g., 
Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 
Cal.3d 208, 243; Epperson, supra, 12 Cal.2d 61, 65-71; Clark, supra, 7 Cal.2d 
248, 249-252; Boyd, supra, 1 Cal.2d 468, 470-475; MHC Financing, supra, 125 
Cal.App.4th 1372, 1390-1391; Zaremberg v. Superior Court, supra, 115 
Cal.App.4th 111, 116-118), and also have considered whether differences or 
omissions in the text of measures appended to a petition or included in a ballot 
pamphlet do or do not pose a realistic danger of misleading those who signed the 
petition or voted for the measure.  (See, e.g., Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 
Cal.3d 638, 653; People v. Scott, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th 514, 519-520; Billig v. 
Voges, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 962, 966-968; Chase v. Brooks, supra, 187 
Cal.App.3d 657, 664.)  In light of these numerous authorities, there is no 
reasonable basis for maintaining that courts cannot or should not continue to 
evaluate the type of statutory defect at issue here pursuant to the legal standard 
that has been applied consistently in past California initiative and referendum 
cases for so many years.   
In sum, because we conclude that the discrepancies between the version of 
the initiative measure submitted to the Attorney General and the version circulated 
for signature did not mislead the public or otherwise frustrate or undermine the 
purposes underlying any of the applicable constitutional or statutory provisions or 
threaten the integrity of the electoral process, we find there was substantial 
compliance with these requirements.  For this reason, we conclude that 
Proposition 77 properly was submitted to the voters. 
 
55
In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that a crucial factor in our 
decision is that the proponents of the measure, in demonstrating how the 
discrepancy in this case occurred, clearly established that the discrepancy was 
inadvertent, and that no evidence was presented suggesting that the proponents 
intentionally circulated a version of the measure different from the version 
submitted to the Attorney General for preparation of a title and summary prior to 
circulation.  Very different considerations would come into play if a proponent of 
an initiative measure attempted to manipulate the initiative process by 
intentionally circulating a version different from the version submitted to the 
Attorney General.  In such a case, protection of the integrity of the electoral 
process might very well call for withholding the measure from the ballot even if a 
court viewed the differences as relatively minor, both because the proponents’ 
intent to circumvent the Attorney General’s review would suggest that the 
proponents viewed the differences as significant, and because such a sanction 
might well be necessary in order to deter such intentional misconduct.  In the 
present case, the evidence indicates — and the trial court expressly found — that 
the proponents’ circulation of a different version was inadvertent.33   
                                              
33  
The opponents of Proposition 77 suggest that the proponents should be 
viewed as having acted to manipulate the process in this case because they failed 
to disclose the discrepancies in the two versions until after the Secretary of State 
certified the measure for the ballot.  Although we believe that the proponents 
should have disclosed the discrepancy immediately upon discovering it (see 
generally Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 608-609 
[discussing failure to disclose a material fact]), we do not believe the proponents’ 
failure in this regard properly can be equated with intentionally circulating for 
signature a version that the proponents know is different from the version 
submitted to the Attorney General.  Here, there clearly was no intent to subvert or 
circumvent the provisions requiring submission of a copy of the initiative measure 
to the Attorney General.   
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
56
Finally, to avoid any misunderstanding, we emphasize that our holding in 
this case does not mean that the proponents of an initiative measure properly may 
circulate, even inadvertently, a version of the measure that differs from the version 
submitted to the Attorney General.  As discussed above (see ante, pp. 28-29), the 
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions require the proponents of an 
initiative measure to submit to the Attorney General prior to circulation of the 
petition a copy of the final version of the initiative measure that they intend to 
circulate, and require the proponents to circulate for signature that same version 
with their petition.  Although, for the reasons discussed above, we have concluded 
that the differences in the two versions in the present case did not frustrate the 
purposes underlying the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions and thus 
did not justify withholding the proposition from the ballot, a similar conclusion 
may not be warranted in other circumstances.  As past cases establish, when the 
proponents of an initiative measure properly submit to the Attorney General the 
same version of the measure that is circulated for signature, the title and summary 
prepared by the Attorney General are presumed accurate and sufficient (see, e.g., 
Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 
Cal.3d 208, 243; Vandeleur v. Jordan (1938) 12 Cal.2d 71, 73; Epperson, supra, 
12 Cal.2d 61, 66), but no similar presumption applies when the version submitted 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Further, although the proponents should have disclosed the discrepancy 
more promptly, there is no reason to conclude that the delay affected the resolution 
of this matter.  Even if the proponents’ disclosure had preceded the Secretary of 
State’s certification of the measure for the ballot and even if the Secretary of State 
had declined to certify the matter absent a judicial determination of the substantial 
compliance issue, in light of our de novo conclusion (see MHC Financing, supra, 
125 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1389) that there was substantial compliance with the 
applicable statutes, the measure would have been placed on the ballot in any event. 
 
57
to the Attorney General differs from the version circulated for signature.  
Accordingly, proponents of initiative petitions would be well advised to take all 
steps necessary to ensure that the mishap that occurred in the present case does not 
recur in the future. 
 
 
IV 
 
For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
upholding the trial court’s decision withholding Proposition 77 from the 
November 8, 2005, election ballot, is reversed.  Because Proposition 77 was 
defeated at the November 8, 2005, election, the underlying challenge to the 
submission of Proposition 77 to the voters, and the petition in this writ proceeding 
opposing that challenge, are moot.   
 
Although the conclusion we reach — that the error committed by the 
proponents of Proposition 77 did not justify the action of the lower courts in 
withholding Proposition 77 from the election ballot — renders the proponents the 
prevailing party, because the proponents’ negligence in the petition-circulation 
process created the problem that led to this controversy and to the need for its 
judicial resolution, we direct that each party bear its own costs in this and the 
underlying proceedings.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.7.)   
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded to that court with directions to dismiss this proceeding as moot.   
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
ALDRICH, J.* 
___________________ 
*  Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 
Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution.   
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
 
 
I concur in the majority’s holdings that:  (1) preelection judicial review of a 
challenge to an initiative measure is appropriate when the challenge is based on a 
claim that the measure does not comply with procedural requirements necessary to 
qualify the matter for the ballot; (2) our state Constitution and statutes require that 
the version of a proposed initiative submitted by its proponents to the state 
Attorney General be the same as the version circulated to the public for signatures 
sufficient to qualify the initiative for placement on the ballot; and (3) the doctrine 
of substantial compliance applies to procedural challenges to initiative measures. 
 
I dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that here the proponents 
of Proposition 77 substantially complied with the constitutional and statutory 
requirements that a copy of the proposed initiative be provided to the Attorney 
General before the proposal is circulated to the public for signatures.  Like the trial 
court and the Court of Appeal, I conclude that to substantially comply with the 
constitutional and statutory provisions, a party wishing to circulate a proposed 
initiative must give the Attorney General a copy that does not differ in meaning 
from the version of the initiative circulated to the public for signatures.  The 
purpose of these provisions is to furnish the Legislature, government offices and 
officials, as well as the electorate, with accurate information so they can make 
informed decisions.  When, as here, the proposed initiative has two competing 
versions that differ in meaning, the goal of the constitutional and statutory 
 
2
provisions is undermined and the integrity of the electoral process is 
compromised.   
I. 
 
Petitioners were the proponents of Proposition 77, an initiative measure that 
proposed changing the process for redistricting California’s Senate, Assembly, 
congressional, and Board of Equalization districts.  At the November 8, 2005, 
special election, the voters rejected the initiative.  The question here, however, 
does not concern the defeat of the initiative, but whether the proposition should 
have been presented to the voters at all. 
 
On December 7, 2004, the proponents started the initiative process by 
submitting to the Attorney General a version of the proposed initiative prepared on 
December 6 (the December 6 version).  (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (d); Elec. 
Code, § 9002.)  That same day, Tricia Knight, the Attorney General’s initiative 
coordinator, notified the proponents that any substantive amendments to the 
proposed initiative would have to be submitted within 15 days of the initial 
submission, that is, on or before December 22, 2004.  The proponents did not 
present any amendments.   
 
On February 3, 2005, Knight sent to the proponents, to the Secretary of 
State, and to the Chief Clerk of the Assembly, the title and summary prepared by 
the Attorney General as well as the December 6 version of the proposed initiative 
that the proponents had provided to the Attorney General.   
 
The proponents then arranged for the printing of the initiative petition for 
circulation to the electorate to try to gather enough signatures to qualify the 
measure for the ballot.  The printed petition contained the Attorney General’s title 
and summary of the proposed initiative, but the version of the proposed initiative 
in the petition was not the same as the December 6 version that the proponents had 
submitted to the Attorney General.  Instead, the petition contained an earlier draft 
of the proposed initiative, a draft dated December 3, 2004 (the December 3 
version). 
 
3
 
In mid-May 2005, the proponents learned that they had circulated to the 
electorate the wrong version of the proposed initiative.  They did not, however, 
disclose that to the Secretary of State until June 13, 2005, after he had certified 
that the proposed initiative qualified for the ballot and so notified the Legislature’s 
Assembly and Senate. 
 
On July 8, 2005, the Attorney General brought this action for a writ of 
mandate to prohibit either version of the proposed initiative from being placed on 
the ballot.  The trial court found that the error was the result of an inadvertent 
mistake.  The court acknowledged the applicability of the legal doctrine of 
substantial compliance in limited situations involving the initiative process.  It 
determined, however, that the proponents had not substantially complied with the 
constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifying a measure for the ballot.  
The differences between the proposed initiative submitted to the Attorney General 
and the version submitted to the public, the trial court said, “go to the substantive 
terms of the measure.” 
 
In a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s 
judgment.  On August 12, 2005, a majority of this court granted the proponents’ 
petition for review, stayed the judgment of the trial court, and directed the 
Secretary of State to place the December 3 version of the initiative (the version 
included in the petition signed by the public) on the ballot for the November 8, 
2005 election.  The voters rejected the initiative.   
II. 
 
The California Constitution reserves to the people the powers of initiative 
and referendum.  (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.)  “The initiative is the power of the 
electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or 
reject them.”  (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (a).)  Of particular relevance here is 
this provision in the state Constitution:  “Prior to circulation of an initiative or 
referendum petition for signatures, a copy shall be submitted to the Attorney 
General who shall prepare a title and summary of the measure as provided by 
 
4
law.”  (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (d), italics added.)  The Constitution further 
directs the Legislature to “provide the manner in which petitions shall be 
circulated, presented, and certified, and measures submitted to the electors.”  (Cal. 
Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (e).)  The Legislature has enacted a number of statutes 
implementing these provisions.  (Elec. Code, § 9000 et seq.) 
 
The constitutional and statutory requirement that the Attorney General be 
given a copy of a proposed initiative serves the objective of providing consistent, 
reliable information about the initiative to the Legislature, to certain government 
offices, to those who may want to comment on the proposal, and to the public.  
Accordingly, the Attorney General is required by law to prepare a title and 
summary of the document submitted (Elec. Code, §§ 9002, 9004); to give copies 
to the Department of Finance and Joint Legislative Budget Committee for 
preparation of cost estimates (id., § 9005); and to send copies with the Attorney 
General’s title and summary of the proposed initiative to the proponents, the 
Secretary of State, the Senate, and the Assembly (id., §§ 9004, 9007).  Based on 
the copy furnished by the Attorney General, either or both houses of the 
Legislature may hold public hearings on the measure.  (Id., § 9007.)  The Attorney 
General’s transmission of the summary of the “chief purposes and points” of the 
proposed initiative must be prepared within 15 days of the Attorney General’s 
receipt of the final version of the proposed initiative or 15 days from receipt of the 
cost estimates from the Department of Finance and Joint Legislative Budget 
Committee, whichever is later.  (Id., § 9004.)  The Attorney General’s 
transmission of the summary triggers the official notification by the Secretary of 
State to the county election officials, and it starts the time during which the 
petition is circulated to the electorate for signatures to qualify the initiative for 
placement on the ballot.  (Id., § 336.)  Each page of the petition must bear the 
Attorney General’s summary.  (Id., § 9008.)   
 
As the majority here observes, “there can be no question but that the 
relevant constitutional and statutory provisions require that the version of a 
 
5
measure submitted to the Attorney General by the measure’s proponents prior to 
circulation of the petition be the same version of the initiative measure circulated 
for signature.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 28-29, italics added.)  That the proponents 
failed to comply with this requirement is not in question.  The majority 
acknowledges that the version of the proposed initiative submitted by the 
proponents to the Attorney General was substantively different from the version 
circulated to the public for signature gathering.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 47.) 
 
Nevertheless, the majority concludes it was proper to place the initiative on 
the ballot because the proponents “substantially complied” with the purpose of the 
constitutional and statutory requirement that the Attorney General be given a copy 
of the proposed initiative.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 49-50.)  The purpose of this 
requirement, the majority says, includes ensuring “that all the relevant officials are 
‘on the same page.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 48.)  The majority reasons that 
differences between the two versions were brought to the attention of public 
officials and opponents of the measure before the ballot materials were printed for 
distribution to the electorate, and the disparities were such that the public officials 
had adequate time to make revisions necessary “to reflect the version that was to 
be voted upon in the election.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 49.)  I disagree. 
 
With respect to initiatives we measure substantial compliance by asking 
whether the failure to comply with the law frustrates the constitutional and 
statutory goal of giving the electorate pertinent information about the measure.  
(Assembly v. Deukmejian (1982) 30 Cal.3d 638, 652-653.)  In my view, there is no 
substantial compliance if the copy of the proposed initiative submitted to the 
Attorney General differs substantively from that circulated to the public for the 
gathering of signatures. 
 
The copy of the proposed initiative that the proponents submit to the 
Attorney General is accepted and treated as the official version of the proposal.  It 
is disseminated throughout the government at both the state and county levels and 
made generally available to the public as a public record.  All who receive the text 
 
6
of the initiative through this process should be entitled to rely on its accuracy.  
When, as here, the text of an initiative that appears on the ballot differs 
substantively from the text furnished to the Attorney General, to the Legislature, to 
any affected party, and to the public, each loses the opportunity to fully assess the 
measure’s impact at the time and in the manner contemplated by the state 
Constitution and the state election laws.1 
 
When, as here, the Attorney General is given a copy of a proposed initiative 
that is different in substantive respects from the version that ultimately appears on 
the ballot, the Attorney General becomes the unwitting agent of misinformation by 
disseminating the variant text throughout state and local government and to the 
public.  The effects of this misinformation are difficult to trace and quantify, but 
may well be profound.  The inaccuracies in the variant text may influence groups 
and individuals specifically interested in the subject matter of the proposed 
initiative as they decide whether or not to endorse or oppose the measure, and it 
may lead them to make inaccurate public comments about how the measure will 
operate or what its likely impact will be.  In turn, registered voters who sign 
petitions to place the measure on the ballot may be affected by the presence or 
absence of public comments endorsing or opposing the measure, or explaining its 
operation and effects.  When the process of qualifying the initiative for the ballot 
                                              
1  
At the direction of the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General prepared a 
title and summary for the December 3 version of the initiative that did not 
materially differ from the title and summary prepared for the December 6 version.  
But the purpose of the constitutional and statutory requirement that the proponents 
of an initiative give the Attorney General a copy of the proposed initiative goes far 
beyond the preparation of a title and summary.  The Attorney General’s title and 
summary may not exceed 100 words and is limited to the “chief purpose and 
points” of the proposed initiative.  (Elec. Code, § 9002.)  As the Court of Appeal 
observed:  “If the measure of substantial compliance is the adequacy of such a 
general summary to encompass both the submitted and circulated versions, an 
unlimited number of substantive changes not contained in the copy submitted to 
the Attorney General could be made to the circulating copy.”   
 
7
is thus tainted at the outset by information that is incomplete or misleading, the 
basic integrity of the electoral process is placed at risk. 
 
The Attorney General’s inadvertent dissemination of misinformation about 
the initiative was exacerbated by the proponents’ delay in notifying the Secretary 
of State of the differences between the version of the initiative that was submitted 
to the Attorney General and the one that was circulated to the public.  The 
proponents submitted the proposed initiative to the Attorney General on December 
7, 2004.  In mid-May 2005, the proponents discovered that the version circulated 
to the public for signatures was different from the version they had given to the 
Attorney General.  Yet they waited until June 13, 2005, before notifying the 
Secretary of State of their error.  Both versions were judicially enjoined from 
being placed on the ballot until August 12, 2005, just three days before the 
contents of the voter information guide had to be received by the State Printer for 
printing and distribution to all of the approximately 12 million registered voters in 
California.  When the existence of the two different versions finally became a 
matter of public knowledge, the confusion and uncertainty about which version, if 
either, would be placed on the ballot necessarily impaired the ability of interested 
parties to understand the measure and to debate its merits during a crucial 
preelection period.2 
                                              
2  
The majority concedes that the differences between the two versions are 
substantive (maj. opn., ante, at p. 47), but then attempts to characterize them as 
“relatively minor” when it concludes that public officials and others had enough 
time to comment on the version to be voted upon at the election (id. at p. 49).  
Whether opponents, public officials, and others would consider the substantive 
discrepancies significant or minor, and if so, why, is a matter for them to decide 
for themselves as they determine what information to provide or arguments to 
make to the public.  In any event, there are significant disparities between some of 
the major provisions in the two different versions involved here.  The “Findings 
and Declarations of Purpose” differed.  For example, the December 6 version 
added provisions in the findings and declarations more directly accusing 
incumbent legislators of conflicts of interest and asserting that retired judges are 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
8
 
There is no need to so jeopardize the integrity of the electoral process.  The 
constitutional and statutory mandate of providing a true copy to the Attorney 
General of what will be circulated to the electorate for signatures is readily and 
easily met.  All any proponent of any initiative measure need do to satisfy this 
mandate is to read and compare both versions, a simple matter of proofreading.  
Moreover, the proponents had, after submitting to the Attorney General a copy of 
the proposed initiative, at least 15 days in which they could make any changes to 
the submitted text.  (Elec. Code, § 9004.)  As the trial court put it:  “There is no 
good reason to put the courts in the position of having to decide what is good 
enough for qualifying an initiative measure for the ballot when actual compliance 
is easily attainable.” 
 
The Attorney General asserts that the doctrine of substantial compliance 
should apply here only if the differences between the copy of the initiative 
submitted to the Attorney General and the version circulated to the public for 
signature gathering do not effect a change in the meaning.  I agree.  The  
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
better suited to apportioning districts in California.  The difference is potentially 
significant because such findings and declarations of purpose are critical 
considerations in determining the intent of the voters in adopting an initiative and 
thus may affect how its provisions are understood and construed when disputes 
later arise.  (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (2005) 
37 Cal.4th 707, 716; California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 
Cal.3d 1, 15.)  In addition, the December 3 version of the proposed initiative stated 
that except for judicial decrees its provisions are the exclusive means of adjusting 
boundaries.  The December 6 version added to this statement language saying that 
the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people in article II of the state 
Constitution could be used only as specified in the proposed measure itself.  The 
December 3 version could well be read as allowing modification of the measure 
by future initiatives independent of the terms of the measure itself, while the 
December 6 version cannot.  In my view, a difference that may restrict the 
people’s reserved initiative and referendum powers by barring their use to modify 
a constitutional provision is not “relatively minor.” 
 
9
majority rejects that position, however, on the grounds that it would invalidate a 
circulated petition without regard to the significance or insignificance of the 
particular differences in meaning (maj. opn. at p. 52, ante); that it would not 
tolerate “any departure” in meaning (ibid.); and that it would include “an 
inadvertent mistake in the printing of an insignificant numeral” (ibid.).  The 
doctrine of substantial compliance, as urged by the Attorney General, is not as 
strict as the majority implies; it does allow insignificant differences, minor 
departures from legal requirements, and inadvertent mistakes, as long as they do 
not affect the meaning of the proposed initiative.  (See Assembly v. Deukmejian, 
supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 653; California Teachers Assn. v. Collins (1934) 1 Cal.2d 
202.)  When two versions of a proposed initiative differ in ways that change its 
meaning, however, as occurred here (see p. 7, fn. 2, ante), the doctrine of 
substantial compliance should not apply, in light of the significant risk of 
confusing or misleading the public.  (See Boyd v. Jordan (1934) 1 Cal.2d 468.)   
 
Citing prior decisions involving court comparisons of titles and summaries 
of proposed initiatives to substantive provisions of the measures, the majority 
asserts that the courts are quite capable of determining whether variances in 
different versions of a proposed initiative pose a realistic danger of misleading the 
electorate.  (Maj. opn. at pp. 53-54, ante.)  The issue here, however, does not 
involve an inaccurate title or summary; instead, it involves separate versions, 
differing in meaning, of the very text of the initiative.  Moreover, the inquiry goes 
beyond whether the voters may have been misled in the voting booths.  Also to be 
considered are the consequences of furnishing different versions of the proposed 
initiative to the Legislature and to the public.  Given the narrow time frame for a 
preelection challenge, how can a court accurately determine that differences in 
meaning in the two versions could not have affected decisions within the 
legislative branch about whether or not to hold hearings, the form and content of 
such hearings, and whether to propose or enact legislation addressing the same 
subject?  And, given the narrow time frame, how can a court reliably determine 
 
10
that the differences in meaning in the two versions were not significant to any 
organization, group, or prominent individual in taking an early stand for or against 
the proposed initiative measure, or refraining from taking a stand?  Inaccurate 
information about the meaning of a proposed initiative, widely and officially 
disseminated at an early stage of the political process, when key judgments are 
being made about whether to support or oppose the initiative, and about how to 
frame the public debate concerning it, can subtly alter the entire electoral process 
and thereby compromise its integrity.3 
 
Misplaced is the majority’s reliance on MHC Financing Limited 
Partnership Two v. City of Santee (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1372 as support for a 
contrary conclusion.  There, unlike here, the court addressed the issue in the 
context of a postelection challenge to an initiative that was never submitted to the 
electorate.  Here, we are concerned with preelection challenges and whether, when 
similar situations arise in the future, proposed initiatives should be submitted to 
the electorate for a vote.4   
                                              
3  
The majority also asserts that a rule barring submission of an initiative to 
the voters because of substantive disparities between the two versions of the 
initiative could compel a court to withhold from an election a “universally popular 
and urgently needed ‘good government’ constitutional initiative.”  (Maj. opn. at 
p. 52, ante.)  The rule could equally serve to withhold from an election a highly 
undesirable initiative measure.  The majority’s argument is unsound, because the 
rule of substantial compliance does not, and should not, depend on the court’s 
view of the desirability of the initiative.  Indeed, the majority’s comment 
highlights a major disadvantage of its approach – the risk that, with a vague and 
subjective substantial compliance standard, inappropriate considerations will 
actually influence a court’s substantial compliance determination, or that the 
public will perceive the court to be so influenced.   
4  
Although the filing of this case occurs after the November 2005 election, 
we decide this case in the context of preelection review because the issue being 
resolved is whether the Court of Appeal and trial court erred in enjoining the 
initiative from being placed on the ballot before the election.   
 
11
 
Preelection judicial review of challenges to initiative matters, as the 
majority recognizes, presents issues and concerns different from those involved in 
postelection review.  In particular, an election may render moot a challenge to an 
initiative based on failure to comply with procedural requirements of the initiative 
process.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 21-22.)  In addition, the Court of Appeal in MHC 
Financing assumed that the only purpose of the requirement of Elections Code 
section 9203 that a proposed local initiative be submitted to the local election 
official (there, the city clerk) was for preparation of a summary and title by the 
city attorney.  (125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391.)  As we have seen (ante, pp. 5-6 & fn. 
1), the constitutional directive that the proponents of a state-wide initiative submit 
a copy to the Attorney General serves many purposes in addition to preparation of 
a summary and title for the initiative.   
III. 
 
The state Constitution and the implementing statutory provisions require 
that the proponents of a proposed statewide initiative, before circulating it for 
signatures, give a copy of its text to the Attorney General, who then prepares a 
title and summary of the initiative and distributes the text of the measure to 
various government offices and officials and to interested members of the public.  
This requirement serves the crucial purpose of establishing the official text of the 
initiative so that its merits may be carefully and accurately examined and debated 
within the Legislature and in other public forums during a period of months 
leading up to the election at which the initiative will appear on the ballot.  When 
this clear and easily satisfied directive is breached, and misinformation about the 
initiative’s meaning is inadvertently disseminated at the outset of the campaign, 
the inevitable result is distortion of the public debate on the initiative and 
compromise of the electoral process.   
 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal and hold that when, as 
here, the copy of the proposed initiative submitted by its proponents to the 
 
12
Attorney General differs in meaning from the version circulated to the electorate 
for signatures, the measure should not be placed on the ballot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
I CONCUR: 
MORENO, J. 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
I concur in the judgment dismissing the case as moot.  As the majority 
acknowledges, the applicable rules of law generally do not permit us to invalidate 
an initiative measure the voters have adopted on account of procedural errors in 
the measure’s qualification that are not claimed to have affected the fairness of the 
vote.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 21-22.)  Consequently, the court’s order of 
August 12, 2005, placing Proposition 77 on the ballot—a ruling in which I did not 
participate—rendered the case moot as a practical matter even before the voters 
rejected the initiative.  Language in the August 12 order purporting to reserve 
jurisdiction to decide the case after the election could not and did not change the 
rule against granting postelection relief on preelection procedural grounds.  
Because the matter is moot, I do not join in the majority’s extensive obiter dicta on 
the question whether the court’s August 12 ruling was correct. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
 
Appendix 
A-1 
 
The following sets forth the differences between the December 6 and 
December 3 versions of the initiative measure.  The language of the December 
3 version that the December 6 version proposed to delete is set forth in double-
underlined type.  The language that the December 6 version proposed to add is 
set forth [in bold type in brackets].  The preexisting language of article XXI, 
section 1 of the California Constitution that both versions proposed to delete is 
set forth in strikethrough type.   
 
PROPOSED LAW 
 
REDISTRICTING REFORM: THE VOTER EMPOWERMENT ACT 
 
 
SECTION 1. Findings and Declarations of Purpose 
 
The People of the State of California find and declare that: 
 
(a) Our Legislature should be responsive to the demands of the citizens 
of the State of California, and not the self-interest of individual legislators or 
the partisan interests of political parties. 
 
(b) Self-interest and partisan gerrymandering have resulted in 
uncompetitive districts, ideological polarization in our institutions of 
representative democracy, and a disconnect between the interests of the People 
of California and their elected representatives. 
 
(c) The redistricting plans adopted by the California Legislature in 2001 
serve incumbents, not the People, are repugnant to the People, and are in direct 
opposition to the People's interest in fair and competitive elections. They should 
not be used again. 
 
(d) We demand that our representative system of government be fair to all, 
open to public scrutiny, free of conflicts of interest, and dedicated to the 
principle that government derives its power from the consent of the governed. 
Therefore, the People of the State of California hereby adopt the 
"Redistricting Reform: The Voter Empowerment Act.” 
 
[(a)  Our Legislature should be responsive to the demands of the voters, 
but existing law places the power to draw the very districts, in which 
legislators are elected, in the hands of incumbent state legislators, who then 
choose their voters, which is a conflict of interest. 
 
(b)  The Legislature’s self-interest in drawing its members’ districts has 
resulted in partisan gerrymandering, uncompetitive districts, ideological 
polarization, and a growing division between the interests of the People of 
California and their elected representatives. 
 
(c)  The redistricting plans adopted by the California Legislature in 
2001 produced an unprecedented number of uncompetitive districts, serve 
incumbents and not the People, and are repugnant to the People.  The 
gerrymandered districts of 2001 resulted in not a single change in the partisan 
composition of the California Legislature or the California congressional 
A-2 
delegation in the 2004 elections.  These districts should be replaced as soon as 
possible and never used again. 
 
(d)  The experience of the 1970’s and 1990’s demonstrates that 
impartial special masters, who are retired judges independent of partisan 
politics and the Legislature, can draw fair and competitive districts by virtue 
of their judicial training and judicial temperament. 
 
(e)  We demand that our representative system of government assure 
that the voters choose their representatives, rather than their representatives 
choose their voters, that it be open to public scrutiny and free of conflicts of 
interest, and that the system embody the principle that government derives its 
power from the consent of the governed.  Therefore, the People of the State of 
California hereby adopt the “Redistricting Reform: The Voter Empowerment 
Act.”] 
 
SECTION 2. Fair Redistricting 
Article XXI of the California Constitution is amended to read: 
 
 
SECTION 1. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), in the year 
following the year in which the national census is taken under the direction of 
Congress at the beginning of each decade, a panel of Special Masters composed of 
retired judges shall adjust the boundary lines of the Senatorial, Assembly, 
Congressional, and Board of Equalization districts in accordance with the 
standards and provisions of this article. 
 
(b) Within 20 days following the effective date of this section, the 
Legislature shall appoint, pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (c)(2), a panel 
of Special Masters to adopt a plan of redistricting adjusting the boundary lines of 
the Senatorial, Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization districts for 
use in the next set of statewide primary and general elections and until the next 
adjustment of boundary lines is required pursuant to subdivisions (a) or (i) [this 
article]. The panel shall establish a schedule and deadlines to ensure timely 
adoption of the plan. Except for subdivision (c)(1), all provisions of this article 
shall apply to the adoption of the plan required by this subdivision. 
 
(c)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (b), on or before January 15 of the 
year following the year in which the national census is taken, the Legislature shall 
appoint, pursuant to the provisions of subdivision (c)(2), a panel of Special Masters 
composed of retired judges to adopt a plan of redistricting adjusting the boundary 
lines of the Senatorial, Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization districts 
pursuant to this article. 
 
(2)(A) In sufficient time to allow the appointment of the Special Masters, the 
Judicial Council shall nominate [select] by lot 24 retired judges willing to serve as 
Special Masters. Only retired California state or federal judges, who have never held 
elected partisan public office or political party office, have not changed their party 
affiliation, as declared on their voter registration affidavit, since their initial 
A-3 
appointment or election to judicial office, and have not received income during the 
past 12 months from the Legislature, a committee thereof, the United States Congress, 
a committee thereof, a political party, or a partisan candidate or committee controlled 
by such candidate, are qualified to serve as Special Master [Special Masters]. Not 
more than 12 of the 24 retired judges may be of a single party affiliation, and the two 
largest political parties in California shall be equally represented among the 
nominated retired judges. 
 
(B) A retired judge selected [appointed] to serve as a Special Master shall also 
pledge, in writing, that he or she will not run for election in the Senatorial, Assembly, 
Congressional, or Board of Equalization districts adjusted by him or her pursuant to 
this article nor accept, for at least five years from the date of appointment as a Special 
Master, California state public employment or public office, other than judicial 
employment or judicial office or a teaching position. 
 
 (C) From the pool of retired judges nominated [selected] by the Judicial 
Council, the Speaker of the Assembly, the Minority Leader of the Assembly, the 
President pro Tempore of the Senate, and the Minority Leader of the Senate shall each 
nominate, no later than five [six] days before the deadline for appointment of the 
panel of Special Masters, three retired judges, who are not registered members of the 
same political party as that of the legislator making the nomination. No retired judge 
may be nominated by more than one legislator. 
 
(D) If, for any reason, any of the aforementioned legislative leadership fails to 
nominate the requisite number of retired judges within the time period specified 
herein, the Chief Clerk of the Assembly shall immediately draw, by lot, that 
legislator's remaining nominees in accordance with the requirements of subdivision 
(c)(2)(c). 
 
(E) No later than three [four] days before the deadline for appointment of the 
panel of Special Masters, each legislator authorized to nominate a retired judge shall 
also be entitled to exercise a single peremptory challenge striking the name of any 
nominee of any other legislator. 
 
(F) From the list of remaining nominees selected by said legislative leadership, 
the Chief Clerk of the Assembly shall then draw, by lot, three persons to serve as 
Special Masters. If the drawing fails to produce at least one Special Master from each 
of the two largest political parties, the drawing shall be conducted again until this 
requirement is met. If the drawing is unable to produce at least one Special Master 
from each of the two largest political parties, the drawing for the Special Master from 
the political party not represented from the list of remaining nominees shall be made 
from the original pool of 24 retired judges nominated [If said list of remaining 
nominees does not include a retired judge from each of the two largest political 
parties, the drawing for the Special Master from the absent political party or 
parties shall be made from the original pool of twenty-four retired judges 
selected] by the Judicial Council, except that no retired judge whose name was struck 
pursuant to subdivision (c)(2)(E) may be appointed. In the event of a vacancy in the 
panel of Special Masters, the Chief Clerk shall immediately thereafter draw, by lot, 
A-4 
from the list of remaining nominees selected by said legislative leadership, or the 
original pool of 24 retired judges, if necessary, except for those whose names were 
struck, a replacement who satisfies the composition requirements for the panel under 
this subdivision. 
 
(d) Each Special Master shall be compensated at the same rate for each day 
engaged in official duties and reimbursed for actual and necessary expenses, including 
travel expenses, in the same manner as a member of the California Citizens 
Compensation Commission pursuant to subdivision (j) of Section 8 of Article III. The 
Special Masters' term of office shall expire upon approval or rejection of a plan 
pursuant to subdivision (h).   
 
(e) Each Special Master shall be subject to the same restrictions on gifts as 
imposed on a retired judge of the superior court serving in the assigned judges 
program, and shall file a statement of economic interest, or any successor document, 
to the same extent and in the same manner as such a retired judge. 
 
(f))(1) Public notice shall be given of all meetings of the Special 
Masters, and the Special Masters shall be deemed a state body subject to the 
provisions of the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act (Government Code 
§§ 11120-11132), or any successor act, as amended from time to time; provided 
that all meetings and sessions of the Special Masters shall be recorded. The 
Special Masters shall establish procedures that restrict ex parte 
communications from members of the public and the Legislature concerning 
the merits of any redistricting plan. 
 
(2) The panel of Special Masters shall establish and publish a schedule 
to receive and consider proposed redistricting plans and public comment from 
any member of the Legislature or public. The panel of Special Masters shall 
hold at least three public hearings throughout the state to consider redistricting 
plans. At least one such hearing shall be held after the Special Masters have 
submitted their proposed redistricting plan pursuant to subdivision (f)(3) but 
before adoption of the final plan. 
 
(3) Before the adoption of a final redistricting plan, the Special Masters 
shall submit their plan to the Legislature for an opportunity to comment within 
the time set by the Special Masters. The Special Masters shall address in 
writing each change to their plan that is recommended by the Legislature and 
incorporated into the plan. 
 
(g) The final redistricting plan shall be approved by a single resolution 
adopted unanimously by the Special Masters and shall become effective upon 
its filing with the Secretary of State for use at the next statewide primary and 
general elections, and, if adopted by initiative pursuant to subdivision (h), [shall 
remain effective] for succeeding elections until the next adjustment of 
boundaries is required pursuant to this article. 
 
(h) The Secretary of State shall submit the final redistricting plan as if it 
were proposed as an initiative statute under Section 8 of Article II at the same 
next general election provided for [as specified] under subdivision (g) for approval 
A-5 
or rejection by the voters for use in succeeding elections until the next adjustment 
of boundaries is required. The ballot title shall read: "Shall the boundary lines of 
the Senatorial, Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization districts 
adopted by Special Masters as required by Article XXI of the California 
Constitution. and used for this election, be used until the next constitutionally 
required adjustment of the boundaries? " 
 
(i) If the redistricting plan is approved by the voters pursuant to 
subdivision (h), it shall be used in succeeding elections until the next 
adjustment of boundaries is required. If the plan is rejected by the voters 
pursuant to subdivision (h), a new panel of Special Masters shall be appointed 
within 90 days in the manner provided in subdivision (c)(2), for the purpose of 
proposing a new plan for the next statewide primary and general elections 
pursuant to this article. Any officials elected under a final redistricting plan 
shall serve out their term of office notwithstanding the voters' disapproval of the 
plan for use in succeeding primary and general elections. 
 
(j) The Legislature shall make such appropriations from the 
Legislature's operating budget, as limited by Section 7.5 of Article IV, as 
necessary to provide the panel of Special Masters with equipment, office 
space, and necessary personnel, including counsel and independent experts in 
the field of redistricting and computer technology, to assist them in their work. 
The Legislative Analyst shall determine the maximum amount of the 
appropriation, based on one-half the amount expended by the Legislature in 
creating plans in 2001, adjusted by the California Consumer Price Index. For 
purposes of the plan of redistricting under subdivision (b) only, there is hereby 
appropriated to the panel of Special Masters from the General Fund of the 
State during the fiscal year in which the panel performs its responsibilities a 
sum equal to one-half the amount expended by the Legislature in creating 
plans in 2001. The expenditure of funds under this appropriation shall be 
subject to the normal administrative review given to other state 
appropriations. For purposes of all plans of redistricting under subdivision (a), 
until appropriations are made, the Legislative Analyst's Office, or any successor 
thereto, shall furnish, from existing resources, staff and services to the panel as 
needed for the performance of its duties. 
 
(k) Except for judicial decrees, the provisions of this article are the 
exclusive means of adjusting the boundary lines of the districts specified herein[, 
and the powers under Sections 8 and 9 of Article II shall be used only in the 
manner specified in subdivisions (g) and (h) herein]. 
 
Section 2. (a) Each member of the Senate, Assembly, Congress, and the 
Board of Equalization shall be elected from a single-member district. Districts of 
each type shall be numbered consecutively commencing at the northern boundary 
of the State and ending at the southern boundary. 
 
(b) The population of all districts of a particular type shall be as nearly 
equal as practicable. For congressional districts, the maximum population 
A-6 
deviation between districts shall not exceed federal constitutional standards. For 
state legislative and Board of Equalization districts, the maximum population 
deviation between districts of the same type shall not exceed one percent or any 
stricter standard required by federal law. 
 
(c) Districts shall comply with any additional requirements of the United 
States Constitution and any applicable federal statute, including the federal Voting 
Rights Act. 
 
(d) Each Board of Equalization district shall be comprised of 10 adjacent 
Senate districts and each Senate district shall be comprised of two adjacent 
Assembly districts. 
 
(e) Every district shall be contiguous. 
 
(f) District boundaries shall conform to the geographic boundaries of a 
county, city, or city and county to the greatest extent practicable. In this regard, a 
redistricting plan shall comply with these criteria in the following order of 
importance: (1) create the most whole counties possible, (2) create the fewest 
county fragments possible, (3) create the most whole cities possible, and (4) create 
the fewest city fragments possible, except as necessary to comply with the 
requirements of the preceding subdivisions of this section. 
 
(g) Every district shall be as compact as practicable except to the extent 
necessary to comply with the requirements of the preceding subdivisions of this 
section. With regard to compactness, to the extent practicable a contiguous area of 
population shall not be bypassed to incorporate an area of population more distant. 
 
(h) No census block shall be fragmented unless required to satisfy the 
requirements of the United States Constitution. 
 
(i) No consideration shall be given as to the potential effects on incumbents 
or political parties. No data regarding the residence of an incumbent or of any 
other candidate or the party affiliation or voting history of electors may be used in 
the preparation of plans, except as required by federal law. 
 
Section 3. Any action or proceeding alleging that a plan adopted by the 
Special Masters does not conform with the requirements of this article must be 
filed within 45 days of the filing of the plan with the Secretary of State or such 
action or proceeding is forever barred. Judicial review of the conformity of any plan 
with the requirements of this article may be pursuant to a petition for extraordinary 
relief. If any court finds a plan to be in violation of this article, it may order that a new 
plan be adopted by a panel of Special Masters pursuant to this article. A court may 
order any remedy necessary to effectuate this article. 
 
In the year following the year in which the national census is taken under 
the direction of Congress at the beginning of each decade, the Legislature shall 
adjust the boundary lines of the Senatorial, Assembly, Congressional, and Board of 
Equalization districts in conformance with the following standards: 
 
(a) Each member of the Senate, Assembly, Congress, and the Board of 
Equalization shall be elected from a single-member district. 
A-7 
 
(b) The population of all districts of a particular type shall be reasonably 
equal. 
 
(c) Every district shall be contiguous. 
 
(d) Districts of each type shall be numbered consecutively commencing at 
the northern boundary of the state and ending at the southern boundary. 
 
(e) The geographical integrity of any city, county, or city and county, or of 
any geographical region shall be respected to the extent possible without violating 
the requirements of any other subdivision of this section. 
 
SECTION 3. Severability 
 
If any provision of this measure or the application thereof to any person 
or circumstance is held invalid, including, but not limited to, subdivision (b) 
of Section 1 of Article XXI, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or 
applications which can reasonably be given effect in the absence of the invalid 
provision or application. 
 
SECTION 4. Conflicting Ballot Measures 
 
(a) In the event that this measure and another measure or measures 
relating to the redistricting of Senatorial, Assembly, Congressional, or Board 
of Equalization districts is approved by a majority of voters at the same 
election, and this measure receives a greater number of affirmative votes than 
any other such measure or measures, this measure shall control in its entirety 
and said other measure or measures shall be rendered void and without any 
legal effect. If this measure is approved but does not receive a greater number 
of affirmative votes than said other measure or measures, this measure shall 
take effect to the extent permitted by law. 
 
(b) If this measure is approved by voters but superseded by law by any 
other conflicting ballot measure approved by the voters at the same election, and 
the conflicting ballot measure is later held invalid, this measure shall be self-
executing and given full force of law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Costa v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 131 Cal.App.4th 1105 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S136294 
Date Filed: February 16, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Sacramento 
Judge: Gail D. Ohanesian 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Daniel M. Kolkey, G. Charles Nierlich and Rebecca Justice Lazarus for 
Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
No appearance for Respondent. 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, James M. Humes, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Louis R. Mauro, Assistant Attorney General, Richard M. Frank, Chief Deputy 
Attorney General, Christopher E. Krueger, Leslie R. Lopez, Douglas J. Woods, Zackery P. Morazzini, 
Vickie P. Whitney and Susan K. Leach, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest Bill Lockyer. 
 
Olson, Hagel & Fishburn, Deborah B. Caplan, Lance H. Olson and Richard C. Miadich for Real Party in 
Interest Californians for Fair Representation-No on 77. 
 
Knox, Lemmon and Anapolsky, Thomas S. Knox, Angela Schrimp de La Vergne and Glen C. Hansen for 
Real Party in Interest Bruce McPherson, Secretary of State. 
 
Linda A. Cabatic for Real Party in Interest Geoff Brandt, Acting State Printer for the State of California. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Daniel M. Kolkey 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 
One Montgomery Street 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
(415) 393-8200 
 
Manuel M. Medeiros 
State Solicitor General 
1300 I Street 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 322-2217 
 
Deborah B. Caplan 
Olson, Hagel & Fishburn 
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 1425 
Sacramento, CA  95184 
(196) 442-2952