Case Title: Thomas Hass v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Citation: 2001 WI 128

Docket Number: 2001AP000240-W

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 128 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0240-W 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Thomas Hass,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Mark A. Ramsden, 
Raelynn Ramsden and Milton R. Ramsden, d/b/a 
Ramsden Dairy,  
 
Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
PETITION FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 4, 2001   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 14, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
SYKES, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner a petition was filed by Patricia M. 
Gibeault, Michael J. Modl and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, and 
oral argument by Patricia M. Gibeault. 
 
For the respondent, Wisconsin Court of Appeals, a response 
was filed by David C. Rice, assistant attorney general. 
 
For the respondents, Milton, Mark and Raelynn Ramdsen, a 
response was filed by Robert J. Kasieta and Kasieta Legal Group, 
LLC, Madison, and oral argument by Robert J. Kasieta. 
 
 
2001 WI 128 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound volume of the official 
reports.   
No.  01-0240-W  
(L.C. No. 
97 CV 30) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Thomas Hass,   
 
 
Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, Mark A. Ramsden, 
Raelynn Ramsden and Milton R. Ramsden, d/b/a 
Ramsden Dairy,   
 
 
Respondents.   
FILED 
 
DEC 4, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
PETITION for supervisory writ.  Denied.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Petitioner Thomas E. Hass 
(Hass) seeks an order from this court, pursuant to our 
constitutional superintending and administrative authority over 
all lower courts, directing the court of appeals to grant every 
petition for interlocutory appeal from a circuit court order in 
which the court denied a motion asserting that a final federal 
court judgment bars the state court proceeding on issue and 
claim preclusion grounds.  Currently, the court of appeals is 
afforded discretion in granting such petitions, limited by the 
criteria 
for 
granting 
review 
enumerated 
under 
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2)(1999-2000).1  Hass argues, however, that 
mandatory review of this and similar petitions is necessary to 
ensure respect for final federal court judgments, to avoid 
unnecessary litigation, and to discourage successful federal 
court 
litigants 
from 
seeking 
an 
immediate 
postjudgment 
injunction in federal court enjoining the state court from 
hearing adjudicated issues or claims.   
¶2 
Although Hass has identified valid policy concerns, we 
conclude that mandatory review of such interlocutory appeals is 
not required in this case.  We are confident that the court of 
appeals considers, and will continue to consider, these policy 
concerns in deciding whether to grant such interlocutory 
appeals.   
I 
¶3 
In this case, it is the procedural history that is of 
particular importance for our review, not the underlying facts 
or causes of action.  For this reason, our discussion of the 
facts and claims is limited.  
¶4 
In February 1997, the Ramsdens filed an action in 
Portage County Circuit Court against AgriBank, Hass, and Farm 
Credit Services of North Central Wisconsin alleging 13 different 
claims surrounding the Ramsdens' purchase of a dairy farm from 
AgriBank.  Hass was an employee of AgriBank and was involved in 
the sale of the property.  The Ramsdens' complaint alleged that 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
3 
 
the property was environmentally contaminated at the time of 
purchase.  The circuit court later dismissed Hass from the 
action on the ground that, as an agent of AgriBank, he could not 
be held liable under a negligence theory.  The Ramsdens then 
dismissed their complaint against the remaining defendants 
without prejudice and appealed Hass's dismissal to the court of 
appeals. 
¶5 
While the appeal was pending, the Ramsdens filed a 
second complaint against AgriBank in the St. Croix County 
Circuit Court.  This complaint alleged seven causes of action, 
including 
that AgriBank 
made misrepresentations 
about the 
conditions of the farm.  AgriBank removed the case to the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.  
After significant discovery was conducted, AgriBank filed a 
motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.  The 
federal district court concluded that the testimony of the 
Ramsdens' expert lacked scientific reliability and validity and 
therefore was not admissible as evidence.  Without this 
testimony, the Ramsdens were left without any way of proving 
their case through expert testimony, and thus, the court 
dismissed the Ramsdens' action with prejudice.  The Ramsdens 
appealed this judgment to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, but later voluntarily dismissed this appeal in exchange 
for a waiver by AgriBank of recovery of its costs.   
¶6 
While this federal action was pending, the state court 
of appeals reversed the Portage County Circuit Court's dismissal 
of Hass and remanded for further proceedings.  See Ramsden v. 
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
4 
 
Farm Credit Servs., 223 Wis. 2d 704, 590 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 
1998).  On remand, after the federal district court's judgment, 
Hass moved for summary judgment based on claim and issue 
preclusion, among other grounds.  The motion was denied.  The 
court found that the elements were present for claim preclusion, 
but concluded that fairness considerations led to the conclusion 
that the Ramsdens' claims should not be barred.  The court also 
held that issue preclusion would not apply because Wisconsin has 
a different standard for the admissibility of expert testimony 
than does the federal court.  Hass appealed this decision to the 
state court of appeals.  
¶7 
AgriBank then filed a motion for injunctive relief in 
the federal district court asking the court to permanently 
enjoin the state circuit court from further addressing any 
issues between the Ramsdens and Hass or AgriBank arising from 
the purchase of the farm property.  The federal district court 
granted the injunction.  The court held that the injunction was 
necessary to protect or effectuate the federal court's judgment.  
See Ramsden v. AgriBank, 63 F. Supp. 2d 958, 960 (W.D. Wis. 
1999).  The Ramsdens appealed, and the Seventh Circuit vacated 
the district court's injunction.   
¶8 
In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit examined 
the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which generally 
prohibits federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings.  
The court noted that "[t]he Act is designed to prevent friction 
between state and federal courts and to protect state court 
proceedings from federal interference."  Ramsden v. AgriBank, 
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
5 
 
214 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2000).  However, an exception to the 
Act——the 
relitigation 
exception——allows 
"a 
party 
with 
a 
favorable federal judgment to protect that judgment by enjoining 
repetitive state court proceedings instead of relying on a claim 
or issue preclusion defense."  Id.  Nevertheless, the court held 
that a federal court should not interfere with a state court 
proceeding where the litigants had first sought a decision in 
the state court on the preclusive effect of the federal court 
judgment except in the most extraordinary circumstances.  Id. at 
871.  The court, however, did not find that such circumstances 
existed.  Id. at 872.   
¶9 
After the Seventh Circuit's decision, the state court 
of appeals denied Hass's petition for interlocutory appeal.  
Hass then filed a petition for supervisory writ in this court.  
He seeks an order from this court directing the court of appeals 
to grant every petition for interlocutory appeal where the issue 
on appeal is whether a federal court judgment bars a state court 
proceeding 
on 
issue 
or 
claim 
preclusion 
grounds. 
 
The 
correctness of the circuit court's ruling is not before this 
court, and therefore, we will not discuss the merits of the 
circuit court's decision on issue and claim preclusion. 
II 
¶10 The issue presented in this case is whether this court 
should 
exercise 
its 
constitutional 
superintending 
and 
administrative authority to direct the court of appeals to 
accept all petitions for interlocutory appeal where the circuit 
court has denied a claim that the state court action is barred 
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
6 
 
by a final federal court judgment on issue and claim preclusion 
grounds.  We decline to extend our authority to mandate review 
in such instances.  Instead, based in part on concerns of comity 
between the state and federal courts, we urge the court of 
appeals to carefully review such future petitions.   
¶11 Article 
VII, 
Section 
3(1) 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution provides that "[t]he supreme court shall have 
superintending and administrative authority over all courts."  
Under this power, we may control the course of ordinary 
litigation in the lower courts of Wisconsin.  Arneson v. 
Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 226, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996).  Our 
application of this power may be as broad and as flexible as 
necessary to maintain the administration of justice in the 
courts of this state; however, we do not use such power lightly.  
Id. at 226.  "'This court will not exercise its superintending 
power where there is another adequate remedy, by appeal or 
otherwise, for the conduct of the trial court, or where the 
conduct of the trial court does not threaten seriously to impose 
a significant hardship upon a citizen.'"  Id. (quoting McEwen v. 
Pierce County, 90 Wis. 2d 256, 269-70, 279 N.W.2d 469 (1979)).   
¶12 The question of whether the court will exercise its 
superintending authority is one of policy, not power.  In re 
Phelan, 225 Wis. 314, 320, 274 N.W. 411 (1937).  "'The inherent 
power of this court is shaped, not by prior usage, but by the 
continuing necessity that this court carry out its function as a 
supreme court.'"  Arneson, 206 Wis. 2d at 231 (quoting In re 
Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 519, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975)).   
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
7 
 
¶13 Hass 
asks 
that 
we 
use 
our 
superintending 
and 
administrative power to require the court of appeals to accept 
petitions for interlocutory appeal, like his, involving a 
nonfinal order that denies granting a motion asserting that the 
state court proceeding is barred on issue and claim preclusion 
grounds in light of a final federal court judgment.  Such orders 
are not appealable as of right, but are appealable by permission 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2), which states: 
 
(2) Appeals by permission.  A judgment or order not 
appealable as a matter of right under sub. (1) may be 
appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a final 
judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if 
it determines that an appeal will: 
 
(a) Materially advance the termination of the 
litigation or clarify further proceedings in the 
litigation; 
 
(b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or 
irreparable injury; or 
 
(c) Clarify an issue of general importance in the 
administration of justice. 
In reviewing such appeals, the court must also examine whether 
the defendant has a substantial likelihood of success on the 
merits.  State v. Webb, 160 Wis. 2d 622, 632, 467 N.W.2d 108 
(1991).  
¶14 In 
Arneson, 
206 
Wis. 2d 217, 
we 
exercised 
our 
superintending and administrative authority to require the court 
of appeals to grant petitions for interlocutory appeal in which 
the circuit court had denied a claim of qualified immunity from 
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but only if the denial turned 
on an issue of law.  Id. at 219-20.  We based our decision on 
three primary factors.  First, we noted that, without mandatory 
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
8 
 
review, a state official would be left with no other adequate 
remedy on appeal.  Id. at 226-27.  That is, because qualified 
immunity is immunity from suit, even if the official won on 
appeal, the official loses the primary benefit of qualified 
immunity, which is to avoid the burden of litigation.  The 
official cannot be reimmunized on appeal.  Second, we noted that 
a plaintiff may suffer harm if the case proceeds to trial and 
appeal and it is then determined that the defendant official is 
not liable for damages because of qualified immunity.  Id. at 
227.  In short, the plaintiff may incur the expense and hardship 
of full trial and appeal.  Third and finally, we held that, if 
mandatory review is not available, society as a whole incurs 
social costs associated with such litigation.  Id.  These costs 
included "'distraction of officials from their governmental 
duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deterrence of 
able people from public service.'"  Id. (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982)).   
¶15 After citing these reasons, we determined that such 
orders 
denying 
a 
claim 
of 
qualified 
immunity 
should 
be 
immediately appealable because they would always meet the 
criteria enumerated under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2)(a) and (b).  
Id. at 229.  We stated: 
 
[W]e determine that immediate interlocutory appeal 
will protect state officials from the substantial or 
irreparable injury that will result if the suit is 
erroneously allowed to proceed.  In addition, we 
conclude that determination of this issue at the early 
stages of litigation will clarify the proceedings for 
all parties involved, as well as the public, by 
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
9 
 
resolving it "before extensive measures are taken to 
defend the public officials." 
Id. (citations omitted).  We also noted that requiring review of 
such orders was in accordance with a majority of jurisdictions 
and with Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).  Id. at 229-
230.   
¶16 Indeed, as Hass argues, there are some policy concerns 
that are implicated by both interlocutory appeals involving a 
claim of qualified immunity and interlocutory appeals involving 
preclusive effect of a final federal judgment.  Specifically, in 
both instances, denial of the petition may result in unnecessary 
litigation if the court of appeals later overturns the circuit 
court's decision on postjudgment appeal.  Further, in both 
instances, if the petition is denied, the defendant may lose the 
benefit of the claim.  The benefit and underlying purpose of 
both issue and claim preclusion is ensuring finality (that is, 
enforcing repose) and foreclosing relitigation.  See Sopha v. 
Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas 
Corp., 
230 
Wis. 2d 212, 
235, 
601 
N.W.2d 627 (1999); Lindas v. Cady, 183 Wis. 2d 547, 553-54, 515 
N.W.2d 458 (1994).  This benefit is lost if the petition for 
interlocutory appeal is denied and the matter proceeds to trial, 
even if the circuit court's decision is later reversed on 
postjudgment appeal.  
¶17 Despite these similarities, however, key differences 
exist.  To begin with, as we noted in Arneson, the failure to 
grant interlocutory appeals on a claim of qualified immunity 
invokes important social costs.  Such costs are often absent in 
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
10 
 
interlocutory appeals involving issue and claim preclusion 
because private litigants, not public officials, are often 
involved.  Thus, costs to society are not presented; only costs 
associated with the expense and burden of litigation are 
involved.  Indeed, such private litigants often must incur such 
costs when the court denies an interlocutory appeal of a 
nonfinal order (for example, motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment), even though this nonfinal order may be overturned 
later on appeal.  Such costs, although significant, are less 
substantial than costs to society.  In addition, unlike the 
interlocutory 
appeals 
at 
issue 
in 
Arneson, 
there 
is 
no 
persuasive authority from the United States Supreme Court or any 
other jurisdiction to support the conclusion that such appeals 
require mandatory review.  For these reasons, our holding in 
Arneson is distinguishable and does not require use of our 
superintending and administrative authority in this case. 
¶18 Instead, Hass's case more closely resembles State v. 
Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d 74, 288 N.W.2d 114, modified per curiam, 94 
Wis. 2d 97a, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980).  In that case, we declined 
to use our superintending and administrative authority to 
require the court of appeals to grant every nonfinal order 
denying a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy.  Id. at 
97a n.1.  Instead, we concluded that the review of such orders 
was appropriately left to the discretion of the court of appeals 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2). 
 
Id. 
 
Despite 
this 
conclusion, we nevertheless urged the court of appeals to be 
careful in exercising that discretion.  Id. at 97a-97b.  We 
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
11 
 
stated that "[g]iven the serious constitutional questions raised 
by claims of double jeopardy, review of such orders will often 
be necessary to protect the accused from 'substantial or 
irreparable injury,'——one of the three criteria for testing the 
appropriateness of review under sec. 808.03(2)."  Id. at 97b.  
¶19 Indeed, 
claim 
preclusion 
is 
similar 
to 
double 
jeopardy.  Both serve to preserve the finality of judgments and 
to protect defendants from subsequent litigation or prosecution.  
See State v. Canon, 2001 WI 11, ¶8, 241 Wis. 2d 164, 622 
N.W.2d 270; Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 233, 235.  Issue preclusion 
has also been regarded as embodied in the constitutional 
guarantees of double jeopardy.  See Canon, 2001 WI 11, ¶¶11-13; 
State v. Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 330, 342, 579 N.W.2d 35 (1998).  In 
light of these similarities, we conclude that Jenich provides a 
basis for our decision in this case. 
¶20 We 
declined 
to 
exercise 
our 
superintending 
and 
administrative authority in Jenich.  We did so even though, as 
in this case, denials of such petitions for interlocutory appeal 
present concerns of both unnecessary litigation and the loss of 
any benefit of the claim.  Certainly, double jeopardy, because 
of its basis in the Constitution, presents a more compelling 
basis for exercising our superintending and administrative 
authority than issue and claim preclusion.  See 5 Wayne R. 
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure, § 25.1(b) (2d ed. 1999) 
(noting 
that 
the 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause 
was 
established 
primarily to protect defendants from prosecutorial oppression).  
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
12 
 
Following Jenich, we conclude that use of our superintending and 
administrative authority is not required in this case.  
¶21 Hass argues, however, that concerns of comity between 
the state and federal court also support the use of our 
superintending 
and 
administrative authority 
in 
this 
case.  
Comity is harmed, he contends, because, under the current law, a 
state court litigant who prevails in federal court will not seek 
dismissal of any subsequent state court action on grounds of 
issue or claim preclusion in the state court.  Instead, such 
litigants will seek an injunction in federal court to enjoin the 
state court action.  Hass argues that the end result will be 
federal court interference into state court proceedings and such 
interference will be lessened only if federal courts are assured 
that the state court of appeals will automatically review any 
circuit court decision denying preclusive effect to a final 
federal judgment.   
¶22 In Ramsden, 214 F.3d at 872, the Seventh Circuit 
determined that the ruling in Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First 
Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986), created this potential for 
conflict between the state and federal courts.  The Ramsden 
court noted that, according to Parsons, once a litigant raises a 
claim preclusion defense in state court and the state court 
rules on it, the federal courts are bound by that determination.  
Id. at 868-69.  Thus, in light of the deference that federal 
courts give to state 
court 
rulings 
on issue 
and 
claim 
preclusion, litigants who obtain a favorable federal court 
judgment will no longer wait for the state court ruling; 
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
13 
 
instead, they will rush back to federal court for an injunction 
to prevent the state court ruling.  Id. at 872.   
¶23 We recognize that friction between the state and 
federal courts may occur under such circumstances.  However, 
requiring 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
to 
review 
every 
appeal 
confronting this issue will not eliminate such friction.  
Indeed, despite mandatory review, state court litigants who have 
obtained a favorable final judgment in federal court may still 
seek a federal court injunction to prevent any state court 
action.  Thus, mandatory review serves comity only to the extent 
that it provides an additional determination on the preclusion 
claim.  Therefore, such review would not promote comity to the 
same extent as the action taken by the court in Ramsden, 214 
F.3d 865, where the court avoided direct friction between the 
courts by limiting the federal court's ability to permanently 
enjoin state court action.  Certainly, we recognize that federal 
court judgments should be given their full effect in state 
courts.  We are confident, however, that our state circuit 
courts will adequately provide full and fair resolution of such 
claims of issue and claim preclusion.  Litigants may then seek 
appeal of such nonfinal orders under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2).   
¶24 Further, any concerns of comity are outweighed by our 
concerns of maintaining a proper working relationship between 
this court and the court of appeals.  The parties and the court 
of appeals have not provided us with determinative information 
on the potential effects of such mandatory review on the court's 
docket.  However, we are mindful that such automatic grants of 
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
14 
 
interlocutory appeals are generally disfavored because they 
cause delay in litigation and increase the burden of the court 
of appeals.   
¶25 At the same time, however, we are not unmindful of the 
advantages of granting such petitions for interlocutory appeals.  
Indeed, if review is granted, unnecessary litigation may be 
avoided; issues affecting the ultimate determination of the 
action may be decided early on; and comity may be promoted.  In 
previous cases, Jenich in particular, we have urged the court of 
appeals to be careful in exercising discretion when reviewing 
these petitions.  See Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d at 97a-97b; see also 
State ex rel. A.E. v. Green Lake County Cir. Ct., 94 Wis. 2d 98, 
288 N.W.2d 125, modified per curiam, 94 Wis. 2d 105d, 292 
N.W.2d 114 (1980) (encouraging the granting of leave to appeal 
in cases where juvenile court jurisdiction is waived).  We have 
done so while noting that granting such appeals will often be 
necessary 
to 
protect 
the 
claimant 
from 
substantial 
or 
irreparable injury.  See Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d at 97b (also citing 
serious constitutional concerns); State ex rel. A.E., 94 
Wis. 2d at 105d.  As previously stated, we are confident that 
the court of appeals considers, and will continue to consider, 
the valid policy concerns raised by Hass in this case in 
deciding whether to grant such interlocutory appeals.  
III 
¶26 In sum, Hass's request for an order is denied.  
Following Jenich, we will not exercise our superintending and 
administrative authority in this case to require the court of 
No. 
01-0240-W   
 
15 
 
appeals to accept all petitions for interlocutory appeal in 
which the circuit court denied a motion asserting that a final 
federal judgment bars the state court proceeding based on issue 
or claim preclusion grounds.   
By the Court.—The petition for supervisory writ is denied. 
 
No.  01-0240-W.dss 
 
 
 
1
¶27 DIANE S. SYKES, J.   (dissenting).  I respectfully 
dissent.  I agree with the majority that our superintending 
authority over the lower courts under Article VII, Section 
(3)(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution is not invoked lightly.  
Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 226, 556 N.W.2d 721 
(1996).  However, considerations of federal-state court comity 
weigh heavily in favor of its exercise in this instance. 
¶28 I would direct that the court of appeals grant 
interlocutory review of all nonfinal circuit court orders 
declining to give preclusive effect to federal court judgments.  
Federalism and the orderly functioning of our dual court system 
would be best served by this gesture of procedural respect in 
the state courts for federal court judgments. 
¶29 As noted by the majority, in Ramsden v. AgriBank, 214 
F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2000), the federal court litigation related 
to this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit held that a federal court generally should not issue an 
injunction against state court proceedings to protect a prior 
federal court judgment under the Relitigation Exception to the 
Anti-Injunction Act2 where a state court has expressly declined 
to give the federal court judgment preclusive effect.  Relying 
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Parsons Steel, 
Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518 (1986), the federal 
appellate court noted that "[b]ecause the relitigation exception 
bears on the delicate relationship between state and federal 
                                                 
2 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1999).   
No.  01-0240-W.dss 
 
 
 
2
courts, strict timing 
requirements 
cabin its 
invocation."  
Ramsden, 214 F.3d at 868. 
¶30 The court then considered the federal court's interest 
in finality and protection of its own judgments against concerns 
of "comity[] and federalism that must restrain a federal court 
when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding."  Id. at 869 
(quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972)).  The 
court concluded that once a state court has explicitly rejected 
a preclusion defense premised on a prior federal court judgment, 
"the affront of federal court intervention stripping the state 
court of power to continue is greatly magnified."  Ramsden, 214 
F.3d at 870.  Under these circumstances, the court held, "the 
interests in preventing possible relitigation [embodied in the 
Relitigation 
Exception 
to 
the 
Anti-Injunction 
Act] 
are . . . generally outweighed by the heightened comity concerns 
except in the most extraordinary circumstances."  Id. at 871. 
¶31 The same concerns for federalism and comity animate 
the question presented in this court.  What measure of 
procedural respect do the state courts owe to federal court 
judgments?  Without commenting on the substantive merits of the 
preclusion defense in this case, I conclude that federal-state 
comity and the "delicate relationship between state and federal 
courts" require that all nonfinal circuit court orders declining 
to give preclusive effect to federal court judgments be 
immediately appealable. 
¶32 As noted by the majority, in Arneson, this court held 
that the court of appeals must always grant interlocutory review 
No.  01-0240-W.dss 
 
 
 
3
of nonfinal circuit court orders denying qualified immunity to 
government officials.  Arneson, 206 Wis. 2d at 229.  The court 
concluded that a circuit court order rejecting a qualified 
immunity defense will always satisfy the first and second 
statutory criteria for discretionary review, viz, that immediate 
appeal will materially advance the termination of the litigation 
or clarify further proceedings, or protect the appealing party 
from 
substantial 
or 
irreparable 
injury. 
Id.; 
Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2)(a) 
and 
(b). 
 
As 
discussed 
by 
the 
majority, this conclusion was based on the fact that the 
individual and societal benefits of qualified immunity would 
largely be lost if immediate appeal were unavailable.  Id. at 
225-227. 
¶33 The same is true in this context.  The private 
litigant and the public at large share an interest in the 
finality of judgments, the avoidance of repetitive litigation in 
different courts (with the possibility of conflicting results), 
and the prevention of friction between state and federal courts.  
These interests would be seriously compromised if state court 
orders declining to give preclusive effect to federal court 
judgments were not immediately appealable. 
¶34 The value of a federal court judgment would be 
substantially diminished if the individual holding that judgment 
is forced to undergo relitigation in state court before being 
allowed to appeal an allegedly erroneous rejection of a 
preclusion defense based upon the federal court judgment.  
Unnecessary, repetitive litigation may be avoided by immediate 
No.  01-0240-W.dss 
 
 
 
4
interlocutory appeal.  For these reasons, circuit court orders 
declining to give preclusive effect to federal court judgments——
like orders denying qualified governmental immunity——will always 
satisfy the first two statutory criteria for interlocutory 
appeal. 
¶35 But the individual judgment-holder's interests are not 
the only interests at stake.  Broader systemic concerns are 
implicated here.  A policy that provides the procedural 
protection of immediate interlocutory appeal would advance the 
reciprocal respect owed by state and federal courts to each 
other's judgments and help avoid conflict between the state and 
federal judicial systems. 
¶36 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Ramsden was premised 
on a policy of restraint and sensitivity to considerations of 
federal-state court comity.  It established a rule of non-
interference in ongoing state court proceedings——even where the 
law would otherwise allow an injunction to protect a federal 
court judgment——in deference to the judgments of the state 
courts where those courts have expressly ruled on preclusion 
issues. 
¶37 Relying again on Parsons Steel, the Ramsden court said 
that, absent extraordinary circumstances, "[c]hallenges to the 
correctness 
of 
a 
state 
court's 
determination 
as 
to 
the 
conclusive effect of a federal judgment must be pursued by way 
of appeal through the state-court system."  Ramsden, 214 F.3d at 
872, quoting Parsons Steel, 474 U.S. at 525.  The court 
specifically noted the availability of interlocutory review 
No.  01-0240-W.dss 
 
 
 
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under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2) as a means of correcting a mistaken 
rejection of a preclusion defense based upon a federal court 
judgment.  Id. at n.3. 
¶38 We 
should 
demonstrate 
similar 
restraint 
and 
sensitivity to considerations of federal-state court comity by 
allowing 
automatic 
interlocutory 
appeal 
under 
these 
circumstances.  In declining to do so, the majority cites State 
v. Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d 74, 288 N.W.2d 114, modified per curiam, 
94 Wis. 2d 97A, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980), a double jeopardy case.  
Jenich, however, provides little illumination of the issue 
presented in this case. 
¶39 The court's original opinion in Jenich was split: 
three members of the court concluded that an order denying a 
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was a final order 
immediately appealable; two members of the court concluded it 
was a nonfinal order that invariably met the criteria for 
discretionary review, and, therefore, the court of appeals 
should always grant review as a matter of course; and two 
members of the court concluded that it was a nonfinal order 
subject only to review at the court of appeals' discretion.  Id. 
at 81-82. 
¶40 That opinion was later reconsidered, and the per 
curiam opinion on reconsideration modified the split opinion and 
held that a denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy 
grounds was a nonfinal order subject only to discretionary 
interlocutory review. Id. at 97A-B.  The court cautioned, 
however, that the court of appeals should "be careful in 
No.  01-0240-W.dss 
 
 
 
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exercising 
that 
discretion" 
because 
of 
the 
"serious 
constitutional questions raised by claims of double jeopardy."  
Id. 
¶41 In 
a 
footnote 
to 
the 
per 
curiam 
opinion 
on 
reconsideration, the court declined, without explanation, to 
invoke its superintending authority to require the court of 
appeals to hear all permissive appeals from orders rejecting 
double jeopardy defenses.  Id.  There was no discussion of the 
matter whatsoever, except in a concurrence to the per curiam 
opinion.  Id. at 97D-98 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).  As such, 
Jenich provides little analytical support for the majority's 
conclusion in this case, except perhaps by way of extrapolation 
from the court's non-discussion of the issue in a footnote. 
¶42 In my judgment, considerations of federal-state court 
comity are enough to tip the scales in favor of exercising our 
constitutional superintending authority to require interlocutory 
review of nonfinal circuit court orders declining to give 
preclusive effect to federal court judgments.  It does no damage 
to the relationship between this court and the court of appeals 
to do so, as there is no evidence that it will cause a 
significant increase in the court of appeals' docket. 
¶43 It is, however, 
detrimental 
to the 
relationship 
between the state and federal courts to deny the procedural 
protection of interlocutory appeal when a circuit court has 
declined, perhaps erroneously, to give preclusive effect to a 
federal court judgment.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
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¶44 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
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