Case Title: State v. James D. Crochiere

Citation: 2004 WI 78

Docket Number: 2002AP001809-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 78 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1809-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
James D. Crochiere,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 266 Wis. 2d 692, 667 N.W.2d 377 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 16, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 13, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marathon   
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick M. Brady   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Steven P. Weiss, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sarah 
K. Larson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Walter Dickey, David E. 
Schultz and Michael E. Smith, Madison, on behalf of the 
University of Wisconsin Law School, and oral argument by Michael 
E. Smith. 
 
2004 WI 78 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1809-CR  
(L.C. No. 
00 CF 538) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
James D. Crochiere,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 16, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J.   James D. Crochiere seeks 
review of an unpublished court of appeals decision affirming a 
Marathon County Circuit Court order, denying Crochiere's motion 
for sentence modification.  Crochiere argues that the circuit 
court should have considered his prison classification, his 
rehabilitative progress and his child support obligations as new 
factors that require sentence modification.  While acknowledging 
that these facts may have been insufficient for sentence 
modification of an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence, 
Crochiere claims that "new factor" jurisprudence must be changed 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
2 
 
for those sentenced under Truth-in-Sentencing I.  He asserts 
that the courts should exercise their inherent power to do so. 
¶2 
We 
reaffirm 
that 
circuit 
courts 
have 
inherent 
authority to modify sentences on the basis of a new factor.  
Additionally, we continue to employ existing "new factor" 
jurisprudence for TIS-I sentences, while noting there may be 
additional new factors unique to TIS-I that we have not 
previously identified.  However, we conclude, as did the court 
of appeals, that Crochiere has presented no information that 
constitutes a new factor supportive of sentence modification and 
that the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion 
when it identified and applied the correct law in denying his 
motion.  Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Crochiere pled no contest to reckless endangerment, 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, third offense, and 
battery to a prisoner.  The first two charges arose from an 
incident in November 2000 when Crochiere was stopped for 
speeding.  The officer believed Crochiere was intoxicated and 
returned 
to 
his 
squad 
car 
to 
determine 
what 
additional 
information might be available on Crochiere.  When Crochiere 
began to rev the engine of his truck, the officer told him to 
turn it off.  Because he did not do so, the officer returned to 
Crochiere's vehicle and reached into it in an attempt to remove 
the keys from the ignition.  Instead of permitting the officer 
to take the keys, Crochiere pressed on the accelerator and began 
to drive away.  The officer's arm was stuck in the steering 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
3 
 
wheel area and as a result, Crochiere dragged the officer for 
some distance before the officer was able to free himself and 
fall to the ground.  Crochiere was apprehended after he drove 
his truck into a ditch.  The circuit court, Judge Patrick M. 
Brady presiding, sentenced him to three years of initial 
confinement and five years of extended supervision for the 
reckless endangerment conviction.1 
¶4 
After serving approximately eighteen months, Crochiere 
moved 
to 
modify 
his 
sentence. 
 
He 
alleged 
that 
his 
classification by the Department of Corrections as a minimum 
security prisoner, his approval to do off-ground maintenance 
work 
for 
the 
Department 
of 
Natural 
Resources 
and 
his 
rehabilitative 
progress 
while 
imprisoned 
are 
new 
factors 
warranting sentence modification.  He also asked the circuit 
court to consider that he is paid only 24 cents per hour for his 
work, when he could return to his former job where he would earn 
ten dollars per hour, thereby improving his ability to make 
child support and restitution payments.  Crochiere contends that 
because 
TIS 
eliminated 
parole, 
"new 
factor" 
sentence 
modification 
jurisprudence 
should 
be 
changed 
to 
permit 
consideration of those circumstances formerly taken into account 
by the parole board.  The circuit court denied his motion; the 
court of appeals affirmed; and we accepted Crochiere's petition 
for review. 
                                                 
1 He received lesser terms for the other two convictions, 
which ran concurrently, so that the sentence for reckless 
endangerment controlled his time in confinement.  
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
4 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Impact of Truth-in-Sentencing 
¶5 
On December 31, 1999, the effect of sentencing on the 
amount of time a convicted defendant actually serves in prison 
changed dramatically, as 1997 Wis. Act 283, commonly referred to 
as Truth-in-Sentencing I (TIS-I), became effective.  This 
legislation was the first of two truth-in-sentencing acts.  The 
second, 
2001 
Wis. 
Act 
109 
or 
TIS-II, 
became 
effective 
February 1, 2003, and modified TIS-I.  See State v. Cole, 2003 
WI 59, ¶4, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700.  Crochiere was 
sentenced under TIS-I.  He has not argued that any aspect of 
TIS-II is at issue in this appeal. 
¶6 
Prior 
to 
TIS-I, 
Wisconsin 
used 
indeterminate 
sentencing, whereby a convicted defendant was sentenced to serve 
up to a stated number of years.   Generally, an inmate was 
eligible for parole after serving the greater of six months or 
one-quarter of the sentence.  Wis. Stat. § 304.06(1)(b) (1999-
2000); Michael B. Brennan & Donald V. Latorraca, Truth-in-
Sentencing Comes to Wisconsin, Wis. Law., May 2000, at 14 
[hereinafter TIS Comes to Wisconsin].  An inmate's time in 
confinement could be reduced due to his or her good behavior.  
Wis. Stat. § 302.43 (1999-2000).  The parole commission decided 
when an eligible inmate would be released on parole.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 304.01, et seq. (1999-2000); TIS Comes to Wisconsin, supra, at 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
5 
 
14.2  Additionally, unless there were extenuating circumstances, 
an inmate reached his or her mandatory release date after 
serving two-thirds of the stated sentence.3  Wis. Stat. 
§ 302.11(1) (1999-2000); TIS Comes to Wisconsin, supra, at 14.     
¶7 
TIS-I 
eliminated 
indeterminate 
sentencing 
and 
established determinate sentencing whereby a convicted defendant 
serves each day of the sentence imposed.  Wis. Stat. § 973.01(4) 
and (6) (2001-02);4 see TIS Comes to Wisconsin, supra, at 14.  
Under TIS-I, all felony sentences except life imprisonment are 
bifurcated, with at least one year of confinement in prison 
followed by a term of extended supervision in the community.  
Sections 973.01(1) and (2)(b).5  TIS-I eliminated reduction in 
                                                 
2 See McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 288-89 n.4, 182 
N.W.2d 
512 
(1971), 
where 
Justice 
Heffernan 
opined 
that 
indeterminate sentencing, as imposed by Wisconsin courts, was 
not truly indeterminate because the public generally was not 
aware that "the actual term of incarceration is a matter of 
legislative prerogative to be exercised through the probation 
and parole agents."   
3 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 302.11(1m) and (1z) (1999-2000), 
certain inmates serving life terms were not subject to the 
mandatory release provisions of § 302.11(1). 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.01(1) provides:  
BIFURCATED SENTENCE REQUIRED.  Except [for crimes that are 
punishable 
by 
life 
sentences], whenever 
a 
court 
sentences a person to imprisonment in the Wisconsin 
state prisons for a felony committed on or after 
December 31, 1999, the court shall impose a bifurcated 
sentence that consists of a term of confinement in 
prison followed by a term of extended supervision 
under s. 302.113. 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
6 
 
confinement time based on an inmate's good behavior, and it 
abolished parole.  Sections 973.01(4) and (6);6 see also TIS 
Comes to Wisconsin, supra, at 17 (noting that in addition to the 
elimination of "good time," TIS-I provides that "'bad time' in 
the form of extra days in confinement before release to 
[extended supervision]" can be assessed).   
¶8 
A related change brought about by TIS-I was to 
increase the role of the judicial branch in sentencing.  Prior 
to TIS-I, sentencing was a responsibility shared by all three 
branches of government:  the legislature, in setting the maximum 
penalties for crimes; the courts, in imposing indeterminate 
terms on individual convicted defendants; and the executive 
branch, through the parole commission, in deciding how much of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.01(2)(b) states in relevant 
part: 
Imprisonment portion of bifurcated sentence.  The 
portion of the bifurcated sentence that imposes a term 
of confinement in prison may not be less than one 
year, subject to any minimum sentence prescribed for 
the felony . . . . 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.01(4) states in relevant part:   
NO GOOD TIME; EXTENSION OR REDUCTION OF TERM OF IMPRISONMENT.  A 
person sentenced to a bifurcated sentence under sub. 
(1) shall serve the term of confinement in prison 
portion of the sentence without reduction for good 
behavior . . . . 
Wisconsin Stat. § 973.01(6) states:   
NO PAROLE.  A person serving a bifurcated sentence 
imposed under sub. (1) is not eligible for release on 
parole. 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
7 
 
the term imposed an inmate actually would serve.  State v. 
Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶28, __ Wis. 2d __, 678 N.W.2d 197.  After 
TIS-I, where the legislature opted for more certainty in 
sentencing through the elimination of parole, Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.01(6), the executive branch's participation in sentencing 
was significantly diminished.  Gallion, ¶28.  The overriding 
theme became certainty in sentencing:  a convicted defendant 
sentenced to one year in confinement will serve precisely one 
year in prison.  See TIS Comes to Wisconsin, supra, at 16 
(explaining that TIS-I "establishes an informationally accurate 
system of sentencing.  A sentence to one-year confinement in 
prison means the offender will be incarcerated for exactly 365 
days before being released to a term of extended supervision")7.  
The shift away from executive branch participation in sentencing 
placed more responsibility on the courts because of the removal 
of the safety valve provided by the parole commission that once 
                                                 
7 Testifying 
before 
the 
Assembly 
Criminal 
Justice 
& 
Corrections Committee on May 8, 1997, Representative Tom Sykora 
said, "When criminals are sentenced [under TIS] to 20 years they 
will serve 20 years——not a minute less . . . ."  State v. 
Champion, 2002 WI App 267, ¶16, 258 Wis. 2d 781, 654 N.W.2d 242 
(citing Truth-in-Sentencing:  Testimony on A.B. 351 before the 
Assembly Criminal Justice & Corrections Comm., 1997 Reg. Sess., 
May 8, 1997 (testimony of Representatives Scott Walker and Tom 
Sykora, available in Legislative Council's drafting notes to 
1997 A.B. 351)).     
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
8 
 
could have corrected a sentence that proved to be longer than 
was necessary to achieve the sentencing court's objectives.8 
¶9 
Crochiere bases his argument for sentence reduction, 
in part, on this shift away from the executive branch's 
participation due to the legislature's elimination of parole.  
He contends that this change brought about through TIS-I 
requires courts to examine rehabilitative progress and to 
conclude that since there is no longer any other way to review 
it, rehabilitation must become a new factor upon which a circuit 
court may base sentence modification.  The State contends that 
to hold that Crochiere's conduct after incarceration is a new 
factor would strike at the very heart of TIS——certainty in 
sentencing.  It would give courts the discretion to modify 
sentences based on post-incarceration conduct of inmates, which 
is the same discretion the legislature took from the executive 
branch by enacting TIS-I.  It is within this framework that we 
review Crochiere's and the State's contentions. 
                                                 
8 Many cases have addressed facts that were held to be 
within the scope of a parole hearing.  See, e.g., State v. 
Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 1, 7-8, 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997) (explaining 
that the courts view rehabilitation as information "more 
properly considered by the parole system"); State v. Wuensch, 69 
Wis. 2d 467, 478, 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975) (stating that whether a 
"defendant's change in attitude and progress or rehabilitation 
[affects his sentence], favorable consideration for such factors 
lies solely within the province of the department of health & 
social services"); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 105-06, 175 
N.W.2d 625 (1970) (noting that under indeterminate sentencing, 
"[t]he place of detention, amount of security, length of 
incarceration 
and 
parole 
are 
matters 
within 
the 
primary 
jurisdiction of the Department of Health & Social Services"). 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
9 
 
B. 
Standard of Review 
¶10 Whether a fact or set of facts constitutes a new 
factor is a question of law that we decide de novo.  State v. 
Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 424, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998).  However, 
whether a sentence should be modified based upon a new factor is 
a decision committed to the circuit court's discretion, which we 
will not disturb unless it was erroneously exercised.  Id. 
C. 
Inherent Power of the Courts 
¶11 Courts have those inherent powers that are necessary 
"to enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally or 
legislatively mandated functions."  State ex rel. Friedrich v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 192 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 531 N.W.2d 32 
(1995).  The power to modify a sentence is one of the 
judiciary's inherent powers.  Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 
101, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970).9  This power is exercised to prevent 
the continuation of unjust sentences.  State v. Franklin, 148 
Wis. 2d 1, 9, 434 N.W.2d 609 (1989).   
¶12 However, a circuit court's inherent authority to 
modify a sentence is a discretionary power that is exercised 
within defined parameters.  For example, "a court has the power 
to correct formal or clerical errors or an illegal or a void 
sentence at any time," Hayes, 46 Wis. 2d at 101-02.  Also, a 
court has the inherent authority to modify a sentence if a new 
factor is presented, id. at 103, or if the sentence is "unduly 
                                                 
9 Hayes was overruled in part by State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 
506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973), regarding an issue that is not 
relevant to the court's inherent authority to modify sentences.   
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
10 
 
harsh or unconscionable."  Cresci v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 495, 504, 
278 N.W.2d 850 (1979); State v. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106, 
¶21, 255 Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507.  However, there must be 
some finality to the imposition of a sentence.  See State v. 
Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 467, 480, 230 N.W.2d 665 (1975).  Therefore, 
we have held that it would be an erroneous exercise of 
discretion to modify a sentence simply because upon reflection 
the court may have chosen a different one.  Scott v. State, 64 
Wis. 2d 54, 59, 218 N.W.2d 350 (1974).  Similarly, a court 
cannot set a harsh sentence to "shock" the defendant, while 
intending to reduce the sentence after the defendant has fully 
realized the loss of liberty he faces.  See Wuensch, 69 Wis. 2d 
at 480 (stating, "[t]he trial court cannot change the sentence 
upon mere reflection or indulge in 'shock treatment'").   
D. 
"New Factor" 
¶13 As set out above, one of the parameters in which a 
circuit court has the inherent power to modify a sentence is 
through the showing of a new factor, if that new factor is one 
that warrants sentence modification.  Hayes, 46 Wis. 2d at 103.  
It is within this area of the court's inherent authority that 
Crochiere claims that his sentence should be modified.   
¶14 In order to obtain sentence modification based on a 
new factor, an inmate must show that:  (1) a new factor exists; 
and (2) the new factor warrants modification of his or her 
sentence.  Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d at 8.  A new factor is not just 
any change in circumstances subsequent to sentencing.  Rather, 
it is: 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
11 
 
a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the 
imposition of sentence, but not known to the trial 
judge at the time of original sentencing, either 
because it was not then in existence or because, even 
though it was then in existence, it was unknowingly 
overlooked by all of the parties. 
Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 Wis. 2d 69 (1975).  A 
new factor has been further defined as "an event or development 
which frustrates the purpose of the original sentence."  State 
v. Champion, 2002 WI App 267, ¶4, 258 Wis. 2d 781, 654 N.W.2d 
242; see also State v. Michels, 150 Wis. 2d 94, 99, 441 N.W.2d 
278 (Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that the new factor standard has 
been further refined since Rosado as those factors that 
frustrate the purpose of the original sentence). A defendant 
must prove a new factor by clear and convincing evidence.  
Champion, 258 Wis. 2d 781, ¶4. 
¶15 New factor analysis has been applied to a multitude of 
factual circumstances, with appellate courts often reaching the 
conclusion that the facts presented were insufficient to 
establish a new factor.  For example, a new factor has been held 
not to include any of the following:  an inmate's desire to 
testify at a post-conviction hearing regarding his side of the 
story, Rosado, 70 Wis. 2d at 288; the introduction of sentencing 
guidelines recommending a different sentence than the one a 
convicted defendant received, State v. Macemon, 113 Wis. 2d 662, 
669, 335 N.W.2d 402 (1983); disparity in sentencing between co-
defendants, State v. Toliver, 187 Wis. 2d 346, 361-62, 523 
N.W.2d 
113 
(Ct. 
App. 
1994); 
an 
inmate's 
progress 
or 
rehabilitation while incarcerated, State v. Kluck, 210 Wis. 2d 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
12 
 
1, 7-8, 563 N.W.2d 468 (1997) and State v. Krueger, 119 Wis. 2d 
327, 335, 351 N.W.2d 738 (Ct. App. 1984); an inmate's response 
to treatment while incarcerated, State v. Prince, 147 Wis. 2d 
134, 136-37, 432 N.W.2d 646 (Ct. App. 1988); an inmate's 
shorter-than-normal life expectancy, State v. Ramuta, 2003 WI 
App 80, ¶21, 261 Wis. 2d 784, 661 N.W.2d 483; or an inmate's 
post-sentencing declining health, Michels, 150 Wis. 2d at 99-
100.10   
¶16 On the other hand, new factors have been identified 
where the untreatable nature of an inmate's mental condition is 
such that it "frustrated" a primary condition of his sentence, 
State v. Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d 546, 560-61, 350 N.W.2d 96 
(1984); a potential conflict of interest of the mental health 
professional who conducted the psychological assessment of a 
convicted defendant for the sentencing court, State v. Stafford, 
2003 WI App 138, ¶17, 265 Wis. 2d 886, 667 N.W.2d 370; and a 
convicted defendant's post-sentencing voluntary submission to 
revocation of his parole based on erroneous advice from his 
probation agent, State v. Norton, 2001 WI App 245, ¶16, 248 
Wis. 2d 162, 635 N.W.2d 656. 
¶17 Crochiere claims he has shown a new factor by his 
rehabilitation and the court's lack of knowledge of his child 
support obligation.  Of those new factor published appellate 
cases in which sentences were imposed under TIS-I, only Champion 
                                                 
10 This compilation is not meant to be inclusive, but 
illustrative. 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
13 
 
involved 
an 
alleged 
new 
factor 
based 
on 
rehabilitation 
subsequent to sentencing,11 where the lack of the parole 
commission and its potential effect on new factor analysis was 
at issue.  
¶18 Champion pled guilty to causing great bodily harm by 
the intoxicated use of a motor vehicle.  Champion, 258 Wis. 2d 
781, ¶2.  When sentencing her to three years in prison, the 
court commented on her need for a period of confinement 
sufficient to receive treatment for her problems with alcohol.  
Id.  After fourteen months of confinement, Champion moved to 
modify her sentence from three to two years of confinement 
because she had met the rehabilitative purpose in less time than 
the court had anticipated.  Id., ¶3.  She contended that 
although this would not have been a new factor if she had been 
sentenced under indeterminate sentencing, it was a new factor 
under TIS-I because she did not have the opportunity to have the 
parole commission consider her rehabilitation.  Id., ¶6. 
¶19 In a well-reasoned decision, the court of appeals 
concluded that to do as Champion requested would undercut the 
                                                 
11 The other new factor cases in which the inmate was 
sentenced under TIS did not focus on rehabilitative efforts.  
For examples:  see State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 
663 N.W.2d 700 (deciding the effect of the circuit court's use 
of the phrase "presumptive minimum" on Cole's sentence under 
TIS); State v. Ramuta, 2003 WI App 80, 261 Wis. 2d 784, 661 
N.W.2d 483 (examining whether an inmate's shorter-than-normal 
life 
expectancy 
is 
a 
new 
factor 
warranting 
sentence 
modification); and State v. Torres, 2003 WI App 199, 267 Wis. 2d 
213, 670 N.W.2d 400 (discussing a change in classification for 
the crime of conviction). 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
14 
 
clear intent of the legislature in enacting TIS.  Id., ¶17.  It 
explained that the legislature enacted laws that would cause a 
sentence of one year of incarceration to result in one year of 
incarceration and that the legislature eliminated parole to 
assure that an inmate's conduct while incarcerated would not 
change the certainty of the sentences imposed.  Id.  
¶20 Crochiere contends that we should reject the reasoning 
in Champion because Champion was grounded solely on the inmate's 
rehabilitation during incarceration.  While by comparison, 
Crochiere also has a child support obligation, which was not 
known to the circuit court at sentencing and is linked to his 
rehabilitation.12  Crochiere points out that his rehabilitative 
efforts, which have resulted in his classification as a minimum 
security prisoner with off-site work approval by the Department 
of Corrections, demonstrate that he should be released early so 
he can resume the job he had before he was imprisoned and earn 
approximately ten dollars per hour, thereby increasing his 
ability to help support his child. 
¶21 The circuit court held a hearing to permit Crochiere 
to develop all the facts relevant to his child support 
obligation.  The court then reviewed the factors on which it 
based Crochiere's sentence and concluded that its lack of 
knowledge that Crochiere had a son to help support would not 
have affected the sentence it imposed.  The court said, 
                                                 
12 Apparently his child support obligation was omitted from 
the presentence investigation report, and Crochiere did not 
mention it to the court. 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
15 
 
And the question, in my mind, looking at all the 
factors 
that 
I 
went 
through 
in 
sentencing 
the 
defendant, 
would 
that 
information 
[regarding 
the 
defendant's child support obligations and the child's 
mother's dependence on that child support] have made a 
difference in the sentence that I came up with?  And I 
have to say that it would not have. 
Therefore, even though the circuit court initially was unaware 
of Crochiere's obligation to support his son, that fact was not 
one that frustrated the purpose of the sentence imposed. 
¶22 Additionally, Crochiere's rehabilitation is not a 
circumstance that frustrates the purpose of the sentence.  The 
record shows that the circuit court was most concerned about 
Crochiere's 
repeated 
operation 
of 
a 
motor 
vehicle 
while 
intoxicated (OMVWI), his two previous convictions for OMVWI, the 
reckless conduct that resulted in an injury to the officer who 
stopped him for speeding, his assaulting another inmate while 
incarcerated and the lengthy list of his prior misdemeanor 
convictions as evidence that Crochiere had little remorse for 
his past criminal conduct.  The court was of the opinion that 
Crochiere was a danger to the community.  Deterrence and 
punishment were the major factors upon which the court focused.  
And, as has been noted, rehabilitation while incarcerated is not 
a circumstance that will frustrate the purpose of a sentence, 
Champion, 258 Wis. 2d 781, ¶13, as we conclude it is likely that 
circuit courts sentence with the hope that rehabilitation will 
occur. 
¶23 Furthermore, Crochiere's early release would undercut 
the seriousness of the offense, the court's concern about the 
victim's injuries and its efforts at protecting the public.  
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
16 
 
And, as Champion pointed out when interpreting TIS-I, the 
legislature intended that conduct subsequent to incarceration 
would not reduce an inmate's sentence.13  In sum, we conclude 
Crochiere has failed to persuade us, just as he failed to 
persuade the circuit court and the court of appeals, that the 
facts he presents constitute a new factor that could be used to 
modify his sentence. 
¶24 And finally, a decision on whether to modify a 
sentence is within the circuit court's discretion.  See Lechner, 
217 Wis. 2d at 424; Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d at 8; Champion, 258 
Wis. 2d 781, ¶4; Michels, 150 Wis. 2d at 97.  In order to 
succeed on a claim for sentence modification based on a new 
factor, an inmate must prevail in both steps of new factor 
analysis by proving the existence of a new factor and that it is 
one which should cause the circuit court to modify the original 
sentence.  Franklin, 148 Wis. 2d at 8.  Accordingly, we point 
out that if a circuit court concludes that the facts shown are 
insufficient to constitute a new factor, as a matter of law, it 
need go no further in its analysis to decide the inmate's 
motion.  Or, in the alternative, a circuit court may assume that 
a new factor does exist, without articulating the first step of 
new factor analysis, if the court concludes that in the exercise 
                                                 
13 To do what Crochiere asks of us would turn circuit courts 
into parole boards, a result that would change the role of the 
circuit courts and be inconsistent with the legislature's intent 
in TIS-I. 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
17 
 
of its discretion, the alleged new factor is insufficient to 
warrant sentence modification.   
¶25 Here, 
when 
the 
circuit 
court 
became 
aware 
of 
Crochiere's child support obligation, it held a hearing to take 
additional testimony to determine whether that fact would have 
caused it to select a sentence different from that which it 
imposed and concluded it would not.  It also concluded that 
Crochiere's rehabilitation was insufficient to constitute a new 
factor.  In so doing, the circuit court correctly identified and 
applied the law.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit 
court appropriately exercised its discretion in refusing to 
modify Crochiere's sentence.14 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶26 In conclusion, we reaffirm that circuit courts have 
inherent authority to modify sentences on the basis of a new 
factor.  Additionally, we continue to employ existing "new 
factor" jurisprudence for TIS-I sentences, while noting there 
may be additional new factors unique to TIS-I that we have not 
previously identified.  However, we conclude, as did the court 
of appeals, that Crochiere has presented no information that 
constitutes a new factor supportive of sentence modification and 
that the circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion 
when it identified and applied the correct law in denying his 
motion.  Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals. 
                                                 
14 In order to properly exercise its discretion, a circuit 
court must apply the correct law.  See State v. Robinson, 146 
Wis. 2d 315, 330, 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988). 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
18 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
02-1809-CR   
 
 
 
1