Case Title: Harper v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 417, 2008

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ERROLL HARPER, 
 
§ 
 
 
§ 
No. 417, 2008 
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below: Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. No. 0611017713 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
Submitted:  February 25, 2009 
 
 
Decided:     April 14, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon Appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Robert M. Goff, Jr., Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware; for Appellant. 
 
 
Paul R. Wallace, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware; for 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
JACOBS, Justice. 
 
Erroll Harper, the defendant below, appeals from a Superior Court 
judgment convicting Harper of multiple counts of various sex-related offenses.  On 
appeal, Harper claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion by permitting 
the State to cross-examine him about his use of a false name in an unrelated 
incident.  We find no abuse of discretion and affirm. 
FACTS 
George Baine is a single father with three young daughters: ten-year old J.S, 
nine-year old P.R., and four-year old S.E.1  During December 2004 and January 
2005, Harper lived with the Baines, sleeping on their couch.  Harper moved back 
in with the Baines in June 2005.  Because Mr. Baine was having difficulty locating 
a babysitter for his daughters, Harper baby-sat the girls full-time.  Harper stayed 
with Baine until November of 2005.  At that time, the two older Baine girls were 
friends with two girls of similar age, R.C. and R.H., and the four girls would often 
have sleepovers at the Baine home. 
In late November of 2005, the Baines moved to Mississippi, after which 
R.H. told her mother that Harper had sexually abused her.  R.H.’s mother 
contacted the other girls’ parents and notified the police.  J.S., P.R., R.C., and R.H. 
were interviewed at Child Advocacy Centers in Mississippi and Delaware.  They 
all claimed that Harper had molested them. 
                                                 
1 The Court, sua sponte, has assigned pseudonyms to the parties under SUPR. CT. R. 7(d). 
 
2 
Before trial, Harper gave notice that he would testify on his own behalf.  
Harper also moved in limine to exclude certain evidence.  First, Harper sought to 
bar the admission of his prior convictions.  Second, he sought to bar the 
introduction of his use of a false name while questioned, in November of 2005, by 
the police regarding a shoplifting charge that never resulted in a conviction.  The 
trial court ruled that certain of Harper’s recent convictions could be used to 
impeach him, but that the convictions that occurred over ten years before could not 
be.2  The trial court also ruled that Harper’s use of a false name could be used to 
impeach him if he testified.   
 
Harper’s trial began on April 15, 2007.3  At trial the four girls testified to 
Harper’s alleged sexual misconduct.  After Harper testified on direct, he admitted 
on cross-examination by the prosecutor that his prior convictions were for crimes 
of dishonesty.  The prosecutor also asked Harper the following questions, to which 
Harper gave the following answers:  
Q: Okay. And your birth name is Erroll Harper?  
A: Yes, it is.  
Q: Okay. Yes you have used the name Gregory Porter? 
A: That is correct.  
Q: And that’s not your real name? 
                                                 
2 The convictions that the trial court ruled admissible were: Impersonation of a Civil Servant 
(Fire Inspector), Attempted Theft by Deception, Theft by Unlawful Taking, and Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property. 
 
3 Harper was charged with, inter alia, multiple counts of Second Degree Rape, Continuous 
Sexual Abuse of a Child, Second Degree Unlawful Sexual Contact, Sexual Solicitation of a 
Child, First Degree Indecent Exposure and Endangering the Welfare of a Child. 
 
3 
A: No, it’s not.  
Q: And you used the name Gregory Porter in November of 2005, 
correct? 
A: Yes, ma’am.  
Q: And that would have been during the same time period that the 
girls alleged all this stuff happened, right? They are alleging these 
offenses occurred against them between June and November of 2005? 
A: Yes.  
Q: And you used the name of Gregory Porter in November of ’05?  
A: Yes, ma’am.  
Harper was convicted and sentenced to twenty-two years imprisonment.  This 
appeal followed.  
ANALYSIS 
 
The Superior Court ruled that the State could impeach Harper by inquiring  
 
about his use of a false name: 
 
I am going to let it in, because I anticipate that the defendant will 
argue that the State’s [witnesses] are not credible because they told 
falsehoods to police officers during the course of the investigation and 
it simply would not be fair that the defendant wouldn’t be subject to 
the same sort of scrutiny if he takes the stand. 
On appeal, Harper claims that the trial court abused its discretion, in violation of 
D.R.E. 608, by allowing the State to cross-examine him about his use of a false 
name in a case that was unrelated to the charges against him.  The State responds 
that the trial court properly applied Rule 608 in ruling that the State could cross-
examine Harper on his use of a false name.   
 
The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the 
State to cross-examine Harper on his use of a false name.  We review a trial court’s 
 
4 
decision to admit impeachment evidence for abuse of discretion.4  “An abuse of 
discretion occurs when a court has exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the 
circumstances or so ignored recognized rules of law or practice to produce 
injustice.”5  If we find that the Superior Court abused its discretion, “we then 
determine whether the error rises to the level of significant prejudice which would 
act to deny the defendant a fair trial.”6  Because we are reviewing an evidentiary 
ruling for abuse of discretion, Harper must establish a “clear abuse of discretion” 
to be entitled to a reversal.7 
 
Both Harper and the State agree that D.R.E. 608(b) is the controlling 
evidentiary rule.  Rule 608(b), in relevant part, provides:  
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction 
of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic 
evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character 
the witness being cross-examined has testified.8 
                                                 
4 Hicks v. State, 913 A.2d 1189, 1197 (Del. 2006).  
 
5 Culp v. State, 766 A.2d 486, 489 (Del. 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
 
6 Manna v. State, 945 A.2d 1149, 1153 (Del. 2008) (internal citations omitted).  
 
7 Kiser v. State, 769 A.2d 736, 739 (Del. 2001). 
 
8 D.R.E 608(b).  
 
 
5 
Rule 608(b) governs how and when the “credibility of a witness may be attacked 
or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation.”9  “As a general 
[matter], the decision to permit or deny [impeachment by cross-examination under 
Rule 608(b)] is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.”10  There are 
four factors a trial court should consider when making that determination: (1) 
whether the testimony of the witness being impeached is crucial; (2) the logical 
relevance of the specific impeachment evidence to the question at bar; (3) the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues and undue delay; and (4) 
whether the evidence is cumulative.11 
 
Harper presents a series of disjointed and conclusory arguments to support 
his claim that the trial court abused its discretion.  He argues that: (1) the false 
name testimony was highly prejudicial and of little probative value; and (2) his use 
of a false name was unrelated to the rape investigation and too remote in time from 
                                                 
9 Manna v. State, 945 A.2d at 1156.  
 
10 Garden v. Sutton, 683 A.2d 1041, 1043 (Del. 1996) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
673, 679 (1986)).  
 
11 Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1025 (Del. 1996); Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 681 (Del. 
1983).  
 
 
6 
that investigation.  Harper relies on two cases: Hicks v. State12 and Trump v. 
State.13 
 
The State argues that under the four Snowden v. State14 factors, the trial 
judge properly admitted the false name impeachment evidence.  First, Harper’s 
testimony was crucial to the case, because aside from the victims, Harper was the 
only witness to the alleged abuse and his account was totally inconsistent with that 
of the victims.  Second (the State argues) the false name was logically relevant to 
the issues before the jury, because of the conflict between the girls’ testimony and 
Harper’s, the risk the jury would ascribe greater weight to testimony from an adult, 
and the case law holding that the use of false names is proper subject-matter for 
cross-examination.15  Third, the State urges that there was no risk of unfair 
prejudice, because any prejudice to Harper was outweighed by the probative value 
of the false name evidence.  Finally, the State contends that the false name 
evidence was not cumulative because the Superior Court had limited the use of 
several of Harper’s prior convictions because of their age.  As a result, the false 
name testimony was some of the only impeachment evidence available to the State.   
                                                 
12 913 A.2d 1189 (Del. 2006). 
 
13 753 A.2d 963 (Del. 2000). 
 
14 672 A.2d  at 1025. 
 
15 See, e.g., United States v. Ojeda, 23 F.3d 1473, 1477 (8th Cir. 1994) People v. Walker, 633 
N.E.2d 472, 476-77 (N.Y. 1994); State v. Martinez, 621 N.W.2d 689, 695-96 (Iowa Ct. App. 
2000). 
 
7 
 
Although Harper does not fully address the Snowden factors, we discuss 
them for the sake of completeness.  The first factor, the importance of the 
testimony of the witness being impeached, heavily favors the State, because 
Harper’s testimony was crucial to his claim of innocence.  The second factor, the 
logical relevance of the impeachment evidence to the question at bar, slightly 
favors Harper, because his lie to the police during a prior shoplifting investigation 
was not directly related to charges of child molestation.   
 
The third factor, the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues and 
undue delay, weighs strongly in favor of the State.  The prosecutor’s questions 
were very brief and did not cause delay or risk confusing the jury about the key 
issues in this child molestation case.  The reference to Harper’s use of a false name 
did prejudice Harper, but he has not demonstrated how that reference caused him 
substantial prejudice.   
 
The fourth factor, whether the evidence is cumulative, is either neutral or 
slightly favors Harper.  Harper argues that the introduction of certain of his prior 
crimes renders cumulative any reference to his use of a false name.  The State 
argues that because Harper’s testimony was key to his claim of innocence, 
establishing a pattern of deceit by Harper is probative of his untruthful character.  
Harper’s use of a false name is cumulative of his deceitful character given the prior 
crimes introduced into evidence (e.g., impersonation and theft).  To the extent the 
 
8 
false name impeachment was cumulative, however, it could not have resulted in 
substantial prejudice.  Considering all these factors together, two favor both the 
State and Harper, but those that favor the State merit heavier weight.  Even if the 
factors were weighed equally, Harper has failed to establish a clear abuse of 
discretion by the trial court.  
Harper’s other arguments, in reliance on Hicks and Trump, are without legal 
merit.  Harper argues that: (i) Hicks prohibits impeachment on collateral and 
unrelated matters and (ii) Trump requires that impeachment testimony be squarely 
related to the witness’ reputation for character and truthfulness.  Those arguments 
lack merit, because Harper reads the holdings of those cases too broadly, and 
because both cases are factually and procedurally distinguishable. 
In Hicks, a witness who was frustrated by having to wait an entire day to 
testify, used profane language before the prosecutor and bailiff.16  When 
questioned about his inappropriate behavior, the witness lied to the trial judge.17  
The witness later admitted his lie and apologized.18  Analogizing the witness’ lie to 
a finding of contempt, the defendant sought to use that lie to impeach the witness’ 
testimony under D.R.E 609(a), arguing that it was like a conviction of a prior 
                                                 
16 Hicks, 913 A.2d at 1192. 
 
17 Id. 
 
18 Id. 
 
 
9 
offense involving a false statement.19  The trial court rejected that argument, 
because there was no finding of contempt and because the witness’ lack of candor 
was collateral.20  Hicks is also distinguishable because it turned on Rule 609(a), not 
than 608(b).  Rule 609 requires a prior conviction.  Because there was no 
conviction in Hicks, the trial court properly refused to permit introduction of the 
witness’ lie under Rule 609.  Harper also overstates the Hicks holding.  Aside from 
a conclusory statement that Hicks is controlling, Harper presents no argument 
articulating, or otherwise establishing, any substantive abuse of discretion.21 
Harper has offered no compelling argument that the Superior Court 
committed an abuse of discretion, let alone a clear abuse of discretion, in making 
this evidentiary ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
                                                 
19 Id. at 1193. 
 
20 Id. 
 
21 Trump is also distinguishable.  In Trump, we upheld a Superior Court ruling that a defendant 
who lied in Family Court could be cross-examined about that lie.  In Trump, the defendant 
claimed, in an unrelated Family Court proceeding, that he was the father of his girlfriend’s child.  
In fact he was not, but had lied because he wanted to adopt that child.  Affirming the trial court, 
we held that even though the defendant did not consider himself to be lying (because he was 
seeking to accomplish a good purpose), the lie squarely related to his “character for 
truthfulness.”  Trump is procedurally and substantively distinguishable.  In Trump we ruled only 
that the admission of impeachment evidence was not an abuse of discretion, but nowhere 
suggested that the Superior Court would have abused its discretion by admitting impeachment 
evidence had the witness lacked Trump’s idiosyncratic view of lying.  Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 
963, 973 (Del. 2000).