Case Title: DUSTY LEE MORRIS V. MICHELLE LYNN MORRIS

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0035

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
DUSTY LEE MORRIS V. MICHELLE LYNN MORRIS2007 WY 174170 P.3d 86Case Number: S-07-0035Decided: 11/02/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

DUSTY 
LEE MORRIS,Appellant(Defendant),v.MICHELLE LYNN 
MORRIS,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, II, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

DaNece 
Day of Lubnau & Bailey, PC, Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Matthew 
R. Sorenson and Rebecca L. Falk of Daly Law Associates, LLC, Gillette, Wyoming.    

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Dusty Morris 
(Father) appeals from the district court's order denying his petition to modify 
the child custody provisions of the decree divorcing him from Michelle Morris 
(Mother).  We conclude the district 
court did not abuse its discretion and, consequently, affirm.  

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Father states 
the following issue on appeal:

 
 
            
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding that the changes that 
had occurred following the parties divorce were not material pursuant to W.S. § 
20-2-204(c)?

 
 
Mother's 
statement of the issue is not significantly different.   

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mother and Father 
divorced in the fall of 2003.  They 
stipulated that Mother would have primary custody of the couple's two sons, 
subject to reasonable visitation by Father.  In 2005, the younger son developed some 
behavioral issues, including displaying aggressive and violent tendencies.  Mother and Father discussed the younger 
son's problems and decided that, following summer visitation in 2005, he would 
stay with Father.  Mother filled out 
a pro se modification petition and 
signed it.  She sent it to Father 
for him to complete and file with the district court.  However, before the petition was filed, 
Mother changed her mind.  Although 
she informed Father of her change of heart, he filed the petition (on behalf of 
Mother), accepted service of it, and filed an answer and counterclaim, seeking 
custody of both boys.  Mother moved 
to dismiss the petition and objected to Father's counterclaim.  

  

[¶4]      The district 
court held an evidentiary hearing on Father's request to be awarded primary 
custody of both boys.  After hearing 
from several witnesses on both sides, the district court issued a decision 
letter and ruled that, although circumstances had changed since the original 
decree was entered, those changes were not material and did not warrant a change 
in custody.  The district court 
entered an order denying Father's petition, and he appealed.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      On appeal, we 
"will not interfere with the trial court's decision regarding modification of 
custody absent a procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion."  Fergusson v. Fergusson, 2002 WY 66, ¶ 9, 
45 P.3d 641, 644 (Wyo. 2002).    

                                                      

Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria.'  Mintle v. Mintle, 764 P.2d 255, 257 
(Wyo. 1988) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 
(Wyo. 
1986)).  In determining whether 
there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court 
could reasonably have concluded as it did.'  Matter of Adoption of BGH, 930 P.2d  at 
377-78 (quoting Matter of Adoption of 
CCT, 640 P.2d 73, 76 (Wyo.1982)).  
In the context of alleged abuse of discretion, the assessment of the 
circumstances in the case 

 
 
is 
tantamount to an evaluation of whether the evidence is sufficient to support the 
decision of the district court.  In 
review of the evidence, we accept the successful party's submissions, granting 
them every favorable inference fairly to be drawn and leaving out of 
consideration conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party.  

 
 

[In re: 
Adoption of TLC, TOC v. TND, 
2002 WY 76, ¶ 9, 46 P.3d 863, 867-68 (Wyo. 2002)] (quoting Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 353 
(Wyo.1995)).

 
 

CJ v. 
SA, 2006 WY 
49, ¶ 5, 132 P.3d 196, 199 (Wyo. 2006).  

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
[¶6]      The district 
court's authority to modify the custody provisions of a divorce decree is found 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (LexisNexis 2007).  That provision states, in relevant 
part:

 
 
            
A court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, 
custody and visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of 
a material change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and 
that the modification would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to 
W.S. 20-2-201(a).  In any proceeding 
in which a parent seeks to modify an order concerning child custody or 
visitation, proof of repeated, unreasonable failure by the custodial parent to 
allow visitation to the other parent in violation of an order may be considered 
as evidence of a material change of circumstances.

 
 
Under 
the statute, the party seeking modification of the child custody provisions of a 
decree has the burden of establishing that a material change in circumstances 
which affects the children's welfare has occurred since the decree was entered, 
the change justifies modification of the decree and modification would be in the 
children's best interests.  
Jackson v. Jackson, 2004 WY 99, ¶ 8, 96 P.3d 21, 24 (Wyo. 2004); Fergusson, ¶ 9, 
45 P.3d  at 644.  

 
 
[¶7]      Father claims the 
district court abused its discretion by ruling the changes of circumstances 
which occurred after the divorce were not material and did not justify a change 
of custody.   In its decision 
letter, the district court explained:

 
 
            
The court finds that although there have been change[s] of circumstances 
since the most recent order in this case, the changes do not warrant 
modification of the decree as to child custody and visitation.                       

In 
determining whether or not a material change of circumstances has occurred since 
the original decree, we must evaluate "the current circumstances of the parties 
in relation to their circumstances at the time the prior custody order was 
entered."  CLH v. MMJ, 2006 WY 28, ¶ 10, 129 P.3d 874, 877 (Wyo. 2006).  "A district 
court's finding concerning a material change in circumstances is principally a 
factual determination to which we accord great deference."  Id., ¶ 11, 129 P.3d  at 877, 
citing Yates v. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252, 
1256-57 (Wyo. 
1985).  Our task is simply to 
determine whether, examining the record in the light most favorable to the 
successful party, the district court could have reasonably concluded as it 
did.  Id.  

 
 
[¶8]      Father claims 
a material change of circumstances occurred because Mother failed to comply with 
the "Mandatory Provisions" of the divorce decree.  In general, the provisions required 
cooperation between the parties and specifically required the parties to inform 
one another of significant events in the children's lives.  Father points to evidence that Mother 
did not inform him in a timely manner of some moves, the children's change of 
school, her telephone number, the elder son's allergies and how to treat them, 
the elder son's counseling, certain illnesses and accidents or the fact that she 
had taken the children to the dentist. 

 
 
[¶9]      After examining 
the entire record, we note that Mother did, at times, fail to communicate with 
Father as required by the decree.  
While we do not condone her failures, significant evidence was presented 
that she informed Father of many events affecting the children, including 
illnesses and injuries.  She also 
discussed issues involving the children with Father, including the elder son's 
need for counseling (although she did not inform him when she had actually 
placed him in counseling) and the younger son's behavioral problems.  In addition, the boys told Father about 
significant events during weekly telephone calls, which it is fair to say Mother 
allowed and facilitated.  While this 
mode of communication is not ideal, Father was still made aware of those matters 
and, presumably, could have contacted Mother if he needed or wanted further 
information.   

 
 
[¶10]   The district court did not believe 
Mother's failures to communicate constituted a material change of circumstances 
and, instead, faulted both parties for the break down in communication. The 
court included the following admonition in its decision 
letter:

 
 
The 
court is concerned about the parties' lack of communication.  In addition, much of the communication 
attempted is rather poor.  Suffice 
it to say that both parties need substantial work in this area.  Should this not change, the parties are 
likely to be back in court on other requests to change custody.  * * * *  This is also a place for the court to 
clearly indicate that the lack of communication and poor communication is not 
just an issue caused by Mother.  

 
 
The 
district court's appraisal is a reasonable assessment of the evidence in this 
case; consequently, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by refusing to find that Mother's communication failures constituted a material 
change of circumstances.

 
 
[¶11]   Father also claims Mother's 
violation of the visitation provisions of the decree amounted to a material 
change of circumstances.  Under the 
divorce decree, Father had the right to weekly visitation from Tuesday nights 
through Friday mornings, summer visitation, and certain holidays.  This schedule, obviously, assumed the 
parties would live in close proximity to one another.  Father conceded that, because of the 
distance between the parties' residences, weekly and holiday visits were not 
practicable.   

 
 
[¶12]   Nevertheless, Father consistently 
sought to exercise his right to summer visitation.  In 2004, Mother refused to allow Father 
to take the boys when he showed up to collect them for summer visitation.  In a prior proceeding, the court found 
her in contempt of court for those actions.  Immediately after the trial in this 
case, there was apparently another disagreement over Father's right to visit 
with the children.  In its decision 
letter, the district court stated the following about the 2004 and post-trial 
incidents:

 
 
Mother 
was at fault in denying Father's visitation during the summer of 2004.  This was determined . . .  in the contempt hearing on October 14, 
2004.  Since that situation, Mother 
has not denied Father any visitation.    Post hearing, Father filed 
an affidavit.1 . . . Father delineates the lack of 
visitation after trial and before his return to the UK.  The court notes that Father had 
testified at trial that he was receiving great visitation with his children 
while he was in Gillette for the hearing.  
He had received the prior weekend but was not expecting as much in the 
coming weekend as Mother's father was in town.  Although Mother again mishandled this 
visitation opportunity for Father, neither of these additional facts changes the 
decision of the court. . . .  Since 
the only item of major concern against Mother was dealt with [in the contempt 
proceeding], the court will find that these items do not justify a change of 
custody. 

 
 
[¶13]   Proof of "repeated, unreasonable 
failure[s] by the custodial parent to allow visitation to the other parent in 
violation of an order may be considered as evidence of a material change of 
circumstances."  Section 
20-2-204(c); Jackson v. Jackson, 
961 P.2d 393, 395 (Wyo. 1998); Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 1354 
(Wyo. 
1997).  The record, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to Mother, does not establish that she repeatedly 
violated the visitation provisions of the decree.  In fact, Father testified at trial that 
she had only interfered with his visitation rights the one time in 2004.  Notwithstanding the post-trial incident 
mentioned above, Mother allowed Father to visit with the boys whenever he 
visited the area during the school year and he enjoyed visitation in the 
summers.  Faced with this evidence, 
the district court did not deem the 2004 or post-trial incidents to be a 
material change in circumstances.  
That was not an abuse of discretion.

  

[¶14]   Father also claims that the 
children's emotional issues constituted a material change in circumstances.  As described above, the younger son 
developed behavioral problems in 2005.  
In addition, the elder son had an anxiety issue that manifested itself in 
tics and stuttering.  Children's 
changes in behavior are legitimate considerations in the material change in 
circumstances inquiry.  Fergusson, ¶ 18, 45 P.3d  at 646.  The district court made the following 
findings regarding the younger son's behavior:  

 
 
            
The mother was having trouble with [the younger son].  Sometime prior to July, 2005, Mother 
called Father and they discussed problems Mother was having with [the younger 
son].  It appeared that [he] was 
getting out of control of Mother and she sought Father's help.  They agreed that [he] would go and live 
with Father.  To accomplish this 
end, Mother obtained a packet of pro se forms to permit the custody change.  Mother filled in a Petition to Modify 
Decree Regarding Custody and signed it on July 8, 2005 in the State of 
Washington.  She sent this to Father.  Father had summer visitation of both 
children in 2005.  After the 
visitation, Mother informed Father that she had changed her mind.  She based this upon [the younger son's] 
improved conduct and demeanor.

 
 
[¶15]   At the time of the trial, the 
younger son's behavioral problems had resolved.  Mother attributed that change to 
Father's influence during the 2005 summer visit and her efforts to improve the 
family's living situation.  Father 
testified the younger son's behavior improved during the summer visit and he 
believed Mother had impacted the children's conduct in a positive way.   

 
 
[¶16]   The elder son's anxiety problems 
had also improved at the time of trial.  
Mother attributed that improvement to the counseling she had arranged. 
Considering the record in the light most favorable to Mother, it is clear she 
sought help for the children's problems and the efforts of both Father and 
Mother were effective in resolving those problems.  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion by failing to consider the children's emotional issues as a material 
change of circumstances to justify a custody modification.    

 
 
[¶17]   The fact that Mother moved 
frequently after the divorce is another circumstance to which Father directs our 
attention.  The district court 
acknowledged Mother's and the boys' lives after the divorce were unstable.  With regard to her frequent moves, the 
district court stated:

 
 
Much of 
Father's evidence dealt with Mother's changes of cities of residence and some 
changes of residences within the cities.  
Mother lived in Gillette, then Kentucky, 
then Washington, and finally Gillette.  Mother also testified that she and her 
fiancé were seriously considering a move to Iowa.  
In Kentucky, Washington and now 
Gillette, Mother lived in at least two locations in each city. 

 
 
The 
district court noted that, although other aspects of Father's life had 
stabilized since the divorce, he had also moved frequently.  The court stated:

 
 
As noted 
above, Father has lived in California, 
Texas, and now the UK.  These moves do not necessarily show 
stability except that he has been married and the moves have been mandated by 
his wife's employment.   
Father's employment situation was anything but stable.  He changed jobs with every move and in 
one situation had at least two jobs.  

 
 
Commenting 
on the parties' moves, the district court noted:

 
 
[B]oth 
parties have experienced numerous moves from city to city.  Although it is expected for a military 
person to move more frequently, the instability is still there.  Mother's moves within each city were 
somewhat caused by Father's failure to keep current on his child 
support.

 
 
[¶18]   The effect of the custodial party's 
relocation on the custody modification analysis has been the subject of 
substantial litigation.  See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 798 P.2d 321 
(Wyo. 1990); Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52 
(Wyo. 1995); Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999); Love v. 
Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1993); Harshberger v. Harshberger, 2005 WY 99, 
117 P.3d 1244 (Wyo. 2005).  In Love and Gurney we said, in cases where the 
custodial parent's motivation is legitimate, sincere, and in good faith and 
reasonable visitation by the other parent is still possible, relocation, alone, 
will not be considered a material or substantial change of circumstances to 
justify a change in custody.  Love, 851 P.2d at 1288-89; Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 55.  In Watt, 971 P.2d  at 616-17, we stated that the right to intrastate 
relocation by the custodial parent is protected by the constitutional right to 
travel and cannot, by itself, be considered a substantial or material change in 
circumstances.   However, our 
Harshberger decision reinforced the 
statements in Gurney and Love that, in order to avoid scrutiny by 
the court, the relocation must be made with proper motivations and not to 
undermine the relationship between the noncustodial parent and the 
children.  Harshberger,  ¶ 12, 117 P.3d. at 1251.  

 
 
[¶19]   Here, we are not concerned with the 
effect Mother's relocations had on Father's ability to exercise visitation with 
the children because he also relocated to places far enough away to make regular 
visitation impractical.  In 
considering Mother's motivations for the moves, we note there is no indication 
that she moved in order to undermine the relationship between Father and the 
children.  She moved to secure 
better employment and/or to be closer to family and friends, who often helped 
her care for the children.  In 
addition, Father's failure to regularly pay his child support contributed to her 
reasons for moving.  Thus, her moves 
were not made in bad faith, and we cannot say that the district court abused its 
discretion when it refused to find a material change of circumstances on that 
basis. 

 
 
[¶20]   Father also points to Mother's 
numerous romantic relationships as evidence of her instability as a parent.  The district court found in this 
regard:

 
 
Mother 
has been in several relationships.  
The only one that has been fairly long-term and stable is the last 
one.  She plans to be married in 
March, 2007.  Mother's situation has 
stabilized as she has become a stay-at-home mom. 

 
 
[¶21]   There were significant 
discrepancies in the evidence presented regarding Mother's romantic 
relationships after the divorce.  
Father's evidence painted her dating behavior as somewhat sordid; while, 
her testimony simply suggested that she dated several persons, but only a few 
seriously.  She also testified that 
she tried to shelter the children from some of the persons she dated and she did 
not display affection in the presence of the children.  It was the district court's 
responsibility to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the 
witnesses.  The district court's 
interpretation of the evidence and reliance on the recent stabilization of 
Mother's personal situation in concluding her past romantic relationships did 
not amount to a material change of circumstances was not an abuse of 
discretion.  

 
 
[¶22]   Father presents several ancillary 
arguments to support his position that he successfully established a material 
change of circumstances.  He claims 
that  Mother did not give enough 
attention to the children's hygiene and left them with others too often; the 
district court did not give enough consideration to the fact that he had 
recently been awarded custody of a daughter from a previous relationship; and 
his new wife had a better relationship with the children than Mother's 
fiancé.  

 
 
[¶23]   The evidence on Father's allegation 
that Mother did not pay enough attention to the boys' personal hygiene was quite 
sparse.  The boys had contracted 
ringworm while they were in Mother's care and they had only visited the dentist 
one time in their lives.  Those 
facts do not, however, advance his argument that Mother was inattentive to the 
boys' personal needs.  Father does 
not direct us to any evidence that the boys became infected with ringworm 
because they were unclean.  
Moreover, Mother had sought medical attention for the boys' 
condition.  Similarly, Father does 
not point to any evidence that the boys had significant dental problems which 
were ignored by Mother.    

 
 
[¶24]   Father also argues that Mother left 
the children with sitters too much.  
Considered in the light most favorable to Mother, the evidence 
demonstrated that she usually arranged for family members or friends to care for 
the children when she was not there to care for them.  Father does not direct us to any 
evidence indicating Mother left the children in unsafe circumstances and, when 
asked about specific safety concerns he had about the children, he testified 
that he could not "really think of any . . . ."  Moreover, as recognized by the district 
court, at the time of trial she was not working and, consequently, was able to 
personally care for the children when they were not in school.    

 
 
[¶25]   With regard to two other 
circumstancesthe presence of a half sister in Father's household and the 
relative merits of the parties' significant others, the decision letter clearly 
shows the district court took these matters into account and still determined 
Father had not established a material change of circumstances.  The court noted both parents had other 
children living in the householdFather had recently gained custody of his ten 
year old daughter from a prior relationship and Mother and her fiancé had a 
two-month old baby.  The court also 
remarked that "the fact that both parties have either remarried or are about to 
remarry is simply a factor to be expected."  Father has failed to show that the 
district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider these matters as a 
material change of circumstances.     

 
 
[¶26]   Finally, Father claims that the 
cumulative effect of these circumstances justifies a finding of a material 
change in circumstances and relies on Jackson as authority for his position.  In Jackson, we held the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by considering several factors together in determining 
there was a material change of circumstances to justify a change of 
custody.  Jackson, ¶ 12, 96 P.3d  at 26.  In this case, the district court did not 
believe all of the factors together justified a finding that a material change 
of circumstances had occurred.  We 
cannot fault that ruling.  
Ultimately, the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to 
Mother, established that, despite having experienced a great deal of instability 
in their lives since the divorce, at the time of the trial the boys were 
healthy, well-behaved children who were generally doing well in school and 
living in a stable home with their mother, her fiancé and their new baby.    

 
 
[¶27]   Much of Father's case focused on 
proving he was a better parent than Mother.  His arguments would have been 
appropriate in an initial custody determination.  However, the standard is different in a 
modification proceeding because changes in custody are not favored and should 
not be granted except in clear cases.  
See, e.g., Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 
718-19 (Wyo. 
1965).  As we said in CLH, ¶ 9, 129 P.3d at 877: "Under the 
principles of res judicata, a court does not have the discretion to reopen a 
custody order simply because, looking at the best interests of the child, it 
believes it can make a better decision than was made in the prior custody 
order."  Father, thus, had the 
burden of establishing a material change of circumstances before the best 
interest analysis was appropriate.  
Id., ¶ 11, 129 P.3d  at 877.  
See also, Selvey v. Selvey, 2004 WY 166, ¶ 16, 102 P.3d 210, 214-15 
(Wyo. 2004).  On this record, we 
hold the district court could have reasonably concluded Father failed to 
establish a material change of circumstances.  Consequently, it did not abuse its 
discretion by denying Father's request for a change of custody.  

  

[¶28]   Affirmed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Father filed 
this affidavit pursuant to a statute which had been repealed at the time of the 
filing.  Mother objected to the 
post-trial filing of "evidence" and asked that it be struck from the record or, 
in the alternative, the court consider her affidavit which she filed 
contemporaneously.  The district 
court, apparently, considered both affidavits.  We make no ruling on the propriety of 
this unusual procedure but note that, since neither party contests these filings 
on appeal, we will consider the affidavits and the district court's acceptance 
of them as the "law of the case." See 
generally, Hicks v. Dowd, 2007 WY 
74, ¶ 33, 157 P.3d 914, 921 (Wyo. 2007); Bruns v. TW Services, Inc., 2001 WY 127, 
¶ 20, 36 P.3d 608, 614-15 (Wyo. 2001).