Case Title: Pittman v. District Court

Citation: 369 P.2d 85

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1962-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
369 P.2d 85 (1962) Lloyd L. PITTMAN and Pittman Motors, Inc., and Darwin D. Coit and Thomas C. Chapin, Petitioners, v. The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, State of Colorado, Honorable Edward J. Keating, Judge, and William H. Kunkler and Duane O. Littell and Ronald O. Sylling, his attorneys, Respondents. No. 20155. Supreme Court of Colorado. En Banc. February 26, 1962. *86 John E. Walberg, Denver, for petitioners. Darwin D. Coit, Thomas C. Chapin, Denver, pro se. Bromley & Kingsley, Denver, for respondents. MOORE, Justice. This is an original proceeding instituted in this court by petition filed by Darwin D. Coit and Thomas C. Chapin, attorneys at law, who represented Lloyd L. Pittman and Pittman Motors, Inc. in an action pending in the district court of the City and County of Denver. In that action Pittman and Pittman Motors were defendants and William H. Kunkler was plaintiff. The action was based on a claim for damages allegedly sustained by Kunkler resulting from an automobile accident. The issues were framed by the pleadings in said cause and the matter came on for pre-trial conference before the Honorable Edward J. Keating, district judge, on December 8, 1961. Duane O. Littell appeared as counsel for Kunkler and petitioner Chapin appeared as counsel for Pittmans. At that time Littell, as counsel for Kunkler, had not prepared a written "pre-trial statement" which the respondent Judge Keating held was required by Rule 5(g) (2) of the Rules of the District Court of the Second Judicial District. Petitioners assert in their petition filed here that they, as attorneys for the defendants in said action, "did have ready to be read into the record a statement pursuant to Rule 5 of the District Court Rules." Thereupon the matter was continued to December 15, 1961, for pre-trial conference. In response to the rule to show cause issued from this court the respondent judge asserts that he, "* * * asked Mr. Chapin for the pre-trial memorandum required by Rule 5. Mr. Chapin replied that he did not have one. The court then stated that the matter could not then proceed * * *." Rule 5 referred to requires that at the pretrial conference "each attorney must submit the following: [Rule 5(g) (2)] "(a) A concise statement of the facts in the case, including: * * *" (here follows a number of items to be specifically set forth). The rule is silent as to whether this statement must be in writing. It is clear, however, that neither counsel for Kunkler, nor petitioners as counsel for the defendants, were prepared to submit a written statement on December 8 as required by said rule. The absence of such statement was the cause of the continuance. Responsibility for the delay was not attributed to the failure of counsel for one side more than the other. If a written statement was necessary before the cause could proceed, it is admitted that none was available from either side. The affidavit of Littell, filed with respondents' answer, admits that no such written statement was prepared by him. When the mattter came on for hearing December 15, 1961, Mr. Chapin, whose appearance had been formally entered as one of the attorneys for defendants, submitted a written statement which he asserts was a substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 5. That written statement is a part of the record before us. It was marked as Exhibit 1 and received by the court. The transcript of the court reporter shows that the following took place thereafter: "THE COURT: I want this record to show that what purports to be a statement of facts as marked as the Court's Exhibit No. 1, most certainly *87 does not follow the Rules of the Denver District Court, so many times referred to by counsel for this defendant in his statement as to what is required of him at one of these pre-trial conferences and in the judgment of this court, pages 7, 8, 9, and 10 most certainly explain to a man who is a member and officer of this Court what is required of him. The certification of the court reporter is, "that I reported in shorthand all of the proceedings had, the testimony taken, and evidence adduced at the aforesaid hearing," and that the prepared transcript constituted a "full, true, and correct transcript * *." We note that only one of the petitioners was before the court in person on either December 8 or December 15, 1961. The undisputed showing before us is that petitioners had no knowledge of the order of court directing the payment by them of *88 $150.00 into the court registry until an article appeared in the daily newspapers in Denver on the morning and afternoon of December 16, 1961, under bold headlines: "2 LAWYERS FINED $150 IN PRETRIAL SLIP-UP"; and "JUDGE FINES 2 DENVER LAWYERS $150 ON LACK OF PRE-TRIAL PLANS." At the time of these publications the only order of record was that some undetermined amount of expenses be paid by the defendants in the action. It is undisputed that a minute order was entered in the case December 18, 1961, which read as follows: It is admitted that no notice was given to either of the petitioners that the entry of such an order was to be made. On December 15, 1961, Mr. Littell was told, "to draw up an expense account for your services and whatever expenses you have incurred on this hearing this morning and submit it to this Court and it is going to be paid by these defendants." The only "defendants" before the court were the defendants in the action. No notice or hearing of any kind was held on any "expense account" which might have been submitted to the court by Littell on which a judgment could have been entered against the "defendants", even assuming that the court had the authority to enter such a judgment after a hearing on the claim for "expenses". The order "nunc pro tunc" was a decree directed against the attorneys who were given no notice of any kind concerning the action of the respondent judge, and first learned that they had been "fined" by the newspaper accounts above referred to. It appears that the parties to the action were close to a settlement of the controversy when the foregoing events took place. In response to the rule to show cause the respondent Judge Keating incorporates the affidavit of Mr. Littell which contains the following pertinent statements: The reporter's transcript concerning what actually happened on January 16, 1962, with relation to the settlement of the controversy is as follows: Following this action by the respondent judge, the petition for relief was filed in this court by Coit and Chapin, the prayer of which is that the respondent Judge Keating be directed to approve the stipulation for dismissal of the action and for vacation of the order on petitioners to pay into the registry of the court "$150.00 to be turned over to the attorney for plaintiff," thus terminating the entire controversy. The district court rules which give rise to the present controversy were *90 adopted by the judges of the second judicial district in February, 1961, and became effective March 16, 1961. The pre-trial conference procedures as set forth in these rules contain wide departures from the former practice. It was unquestionably the intention of the judges who adopted the rules to expedite the transaction of the judicial business before them; to cut down unnecessary delays in determining controversies; and to discourage the activities of those in the profession who "drag their feet" and unnecessarily resort to dilatory tactics in the handling of litigation. This is a highly commendable goal, and one that must be achieved if the administration of justice is to be worthy of the confidence and respect of the people. To the extent that the rules of the district courts in the several judicial districts are consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure adopted by this court, they will be upheld by us. We do not mean to infer from anything we have said that petitioners here were or were not "stalling", or employing obstructionist tactics. We only say, for the information of the bar and the judges of the trial courts, that local rules designed and intended to improve the administration of justice, and to upgrade the judicial processes in the eyes of the public at large are to be encouraged. These endeavors, however, must be within the well-established bounds of due process of law and in conformity with the Rules of Civil Procedure and adjudicated cases. "It is a fundamental principle of justice that a person shall have notice of any judicial proceeding affecting his rights." Michels v. Clemens, 140 Colo. 82, 342 P.2d 693. We can easily conceive of a situation in which conduct of attorneys for litigants in unreasonably obstructing progress in a given case would warrant appropriate action by a trial judge which might result in a judgment for contempt of court. If such conduct amounts to a direct contempt committed in the presence of the court it may be handled summarily as a contempt matter, but the record with reference to the matter allegedly constituting the contempt must show with particularity what actually happened, and if the matter is thus summarily handled it must be handled as a contempt matter. In the instant action the matter was not handled as is necessary in a contempt matter, at any stage in the proceedings. The first indication, disclosed by the record, that proceedings bordering on a judgment for contempt of court was within the contemplation of the respondent judge, appears to have been announced by the trial court on the 16th day of January, 1962a full month after the entry of the so-called "judgment" against the defendants in the action. At that time all controversy between the litigants and their attorneys had been amicably settled. The trial judge, not having conducted any appropriate proceedings which could warrant a judgment for contempt, and no judgment for contempt having been entered by him in the entire proceeding, could not thereafter make a disciplinary proceeding out of a transaction which had been conducted as something of an entirely different nature. The statement of the respondent judge, constituting the first utterance on his part remotely dealing with contempt of court, was the following from the bench on January 16, 1962: Suffice it to say that no "disciplinary action" ever was taken by the court against either Chapin or Coit. We have read the full transcript which the reporter certified to be full and complete, and have examined the exhibits and conclude that from the record before us it does not appear that a direct contempt of court was committed by Mr. Chapin. Certainly no direct contempt was *91 committed by Mr. Coit. It may be that upon a citation to show cause why some specific conduct referred to in the citation should not be held to be a contempt of court, matters which do not appear in the transcript before us would develop and justify a different result. This however is pure speculation. Contempt matters must be adjudicated in appropriate proceedings. No appropriate proceedings in contempt have been conducted in this case. The rule is made absolute and the respondent district court, and the Honorable Edward J. Keating, as judge thereof, is directed to dismiss the action in accordance with the stipulations of the parties. DAY, C. J., not participating.