Case Title: Crouse v. Wallace Manufacturing Co.

Citation: 207 Kan. 826, 486 P.2d 1335

Docket Number: 46,397

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1971-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
207 Kan. 826 (1971)
486 P.2d 1335
VERNON GEORGE CROUSE, Appellant,
v.
WALLACE MANUFACTURING COMPANY (Respondent) and TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, (Insurance Carrier), Appellees.
No. 46,397

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 16, 1971.
Simeon Webb, of Pittsburg, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
Robert L. White, of Pittsburg, argued the cause, and J. Curtis Nettels, of Pittsburg, was with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHROEDER, J.:
This is an appeal by the claimant in a workmen's compensation case. The workmen's compensation examiner and the trial court awarded compensation to the claimant based upon a 65 percent loss of use of the right arm.
The claimant contends the award should be 50 percent permanent partial general disability to the body as a whole.
*827 At issue on this appeal is the method for determining compensation due the claimant on the facts presented. It involves the interpretation to be given K.S.A. 1969 Supp. 44-510.
On the 16th day of January, 1970, the claimant sustained a personal injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. The injury was limited to the right arm which resulted in permanent partial disability of the right arm of 65 percent according to the finding of both the workmen's compensation examiner and the trial court. (No review by the director was requested and an order was entered approving the examiner's award.)
Prior to the accidental injury to the right arm, the claimant on September 5, 1963, sustained a nonindustrial injury to his left hand which resulted in a permanent partial disability of 60 percent to the left hand. The claimant's left hand was not injured in the accident with which we are here concerned.
Prior to the accidental injury to the right arm on January 16, 1970, the claimant was regularly and fully employed with the respondent herein, and on March 30, 1970, ten weeks and two days after the injury here in question, the claimant returned to his regular work. He testified:
"A. Yes, sir.
"A. Yes, sir, whatever they asked me to do."
The claimant's examining physician rated the disability to the right arm at 45 to 50 percent, and rated the prior injury at 60 percent disability of the left hand. He concluded by combining the two disabilities into a general bodily rating of 40 percent to the body as a whole.
The respondent's examining physician rated the disability to the right arm at 65 percent, and rated the prior injury to the left hand at 60 percent disability of the left hand, and concluded by combining the two disabilities into a general bodily rating of 50 percent to the body as a whole.
*828 The trial court specifically found the prior injury resulted in a 60 percent loss of use of the left hand, and a 65 percent loss of use of the right arm as a result of the accidental injury on January 16, 1970, and that as a result of both of these injuries the claimant has a permanent partial general bodily disability of 50 percent. It is to be noted the trial court did not find total disability from the two injuries.
The trial court further found that as a result of the accidental injury on January 16, 1970, the claimant was temporarily totally disabled from January 16, 1970, to March 30, 1970, and thereafter the claimant continued to suffer a 65 percent permanent partial disability of the right arm.
The examiner and the trial court awarded compensation of 9.29 weeks for temporary total compensation from January 23, 1970, to March 30, 1970, payable at the rate of $49 per week, and adopted the respondent's disability rating of 65 percent permanent partial disability of the right arm and awarded future benefits of 130.46 weeks at $49 per week plus medical expenses, and plus some future medical expense.
The temporary total disability benefits and medical expense allowances are not in controversy.
The trial court awarded compensation for injury to the right arm based upon the schedule applicable to one arm. (K.S.A. 1969 Supp. 44-510d [13].)
The claimant contends compensation should have been computed on the basis of 50 percent permanent partial general disability pursuant to K.S.A. 1969 Supp. 44-510e, formerly the proviso in K.S.A. 44-510 (3) (c) (24).
The substance of the provisions of the workmen's compensation act material to the point here under consideration has not been changed by the legislature since 1963, although in the amending process the provisions were made more difficult to find in the 1969 Supplement. For clarification we shall therefore refer to the sections of K.S.A. 44-510 as they appeared in the statute book following the 1963 amendment. Reference will be made to the 1968 amendment as it appears in the 1969 Supplement which is applicable to this case.
K.S.A. 44-510 (3) (a) provides in part:
The foregoing section was applied in Honn v. Elliot, 132 Kan. 454, 295 Pac. 719, where the claimant injured both feet in one accident. In the opinion the court pointed out that at no place in the schedule does it attempt to provide compensation for both members when they are in pairs as "both hands," "both feet," "both eyes," except as to loss of hearing in one or both ears. Since only permanent partial disability was sustained by the claimant the court said R.S. Supp. 1930, 44-510 (3) (c) (22) "provides the rule for computation for temporary or permanent partial disability not covered by schedule." (p. 458.)
The section of the workmen's compensation act covering injuries which result in disability, partial in character but permanent in quality, is K.S.A. 44-510 (3) (c). The provisions with which we are here concerned read:
Both the examiner and the trial court applied subsection 13 and subsection 23 to determine the claimant's award of compensation. They concluded subsection 26 was not applicable to this case because the claimant became only partially disabled, and not totally disabled, after the second accident. Under such circumstances the injury and disability resulting from the accident with which we are here concerned fall within the provision for scheduled injuries, and subsection 23 is controlling to require benefits to be computed as a scheduled injury.
Piper v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 202 Kan. 771, 451 P.2d 152, and the authorities discussed therein clearly hold that where a workman has suffered a previous disability and received a later injury, the workman is entitled to compensation under subsection 26 only where the effects of the two injuries result in total permanent disability. (See, also, Stevens v. Kelly-Carter Coal Co., 140 Kan. 441, 37 P.2d 48.)
The claimant argues the trial court treated subsection 26 as a statute of limitation, whereas it extends the benefits where total permanent general disability is involved. The claimant calls our attention to the language above quoted from 44-510 (3) (a), supra, and contends the meaning of subsection 26 is determined by referring back to that language. He argues:
We fail to see merit in the claimant's argument. The claimant relies on the proposition that the workmen's compensation act establishes no standard of health necessary to bring a workman under the act, and accidental injuries are compensable thereunder where the accident only serves to aggravate or accelerate an existing disease or intensifies the affliction, citing Gilliland v. Cement Co., 104 Kan. 771, 180 Pac. 793; and Johnson v. Skelly Oil Co., 181 Kan. 655, 312 P.2d 1076.
These cases have no application where the benefits to which a workman is entitled under the act involve a scheduled injury. Other cases cited by the claimant do not support his contentions because the second injury when combined with the prior disability resulted in total permanent disability of the workman. The claimant relies upon Honn v. Elliott, supra, involving permanent partial disability, and criticizes Piper v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, supra, for not giving the reasoning in the Honn case adequate consideration in deciding the Piper case.
The provisions of the workmen's compensation act are clear and limit benefits in instances of partial disability to scheduled members of the body to the amount provided by the schedule. When a specific injury and disability is a scheduled injury under the workmen's compensation act, the benefits provided under the schedule are exclusive of any other compensation. (Riggan v. Coleman Co., 166 Kan. 234, 200 P. 2nd 271; and Wammack v. Root Manufacturing Co., 184 Kan. 367, 336 P.2d 441.)
The court in Wammack discussed scheduled injuries, and held where the workman lost the permanent use of a thumb and also lost the permanent partial use of the other thumb, the provisions of the act did not limit recovery to a single thumb, but where the workman while engaged in the performance of his duties suffered injuries in an accident which resulted in the sustaining of separate and distinct injuries to both thumbs, he was entitled to compensation for each of the injuries so received as scheduled injuries. In the opinion the court distinguished Honn v. Elliott, supra.
*832 On the facts in this case the injury and disability clearly fall within the rules relating to scheduled injuries, and since the second injury and disability did not result in total disability, the trial court properly awarded compensation under the schedule.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.