Case Title: State v. Pierce

Citation: 163 Vt 192, 657 A.2d 192

Docket Number: 93-328

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_PIERCE.93-328; 163 Vt 192; 657 A.2d 192

[Filed 20-Jan-1995]

      NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont
Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any
errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to
press. 


                                 No. 93-328


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

Arthur Pierce                                     November Term, 1994



Amy M. Davenport, J.

Gary S. Kessler, Supervising Appellate Prosecutor, and Robert L. Sand, Staff
 Attorney, State's Attorneys Department, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee 

David C. Sleigh of Sleigh & Williams, St. Johnsbury, for defendant-appellant

Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Defender,
 Montpelier, for amicus curiae Vermont Defender General 


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     MORSE, J.   The principal issue before us is whether 13 V.S.A.  7041
violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by conditioning the trial court's
deferral of a criminal sentence upon the concurrence of the state's attorney.
 Defendant was convicted by jury of delivering more than one-half ounce of
marijuana, in violation of 18 V.S.A.  4230(b)(2).   The trial judge stated
that the facts and circumstances of this case warranted a deferred sentence,
but ruled that she could not carry out this alternative because the state's
attorney refused to agree to it.  The court also denied defendant's request
that it postpone sentencing and then dismiss the case under V.R.Cr.P. 48(b). 
We hold that  7041 does not violate the Vermont Constitution's
separation-of- powers clause, and affirm. 

                                I.

     In late 1991, defendant's roommate purchased four ounces of marijuana in
Connecticut 

 

for resale in Vermont.  Defendant agreed to sell the marijuana so
that the roommate could repair his car with the profit from the sale.  On
December 4, 1991, defendant sold the four ounces to an undercover police
officer.  Eventually, defendant was charged with delivering marijuana, and
his roommate was charged with conspiring to sell marijuana.  The prosecutor
agreed to recommend a deferred sentence for the roommate but not for
defendant.  The roommate pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana,
and the court granted a three-year deferred sentence on the felony charge. 
Defendant's case went to trial, and he was convicted by a jury of delivering
more than one-half ounce of marijuana, a felony. 

     At the sentencing hearing, much of the testimony concerned the State's
disparate treatment of defendant and his roommate.  The probation officer who
wrote the presentence investigation report defended his statement that it was
grossly unfair for the prosecutor to offer a deferred sentence to the more
culpable roommate, but not to defendant.  Defendant pointed out that (1) like
his roommate, he had no criminal record; (2) unlike his roommate, he made no
profit on the transaction; and (3) unlike his roommate, the police could not
link him to any other drug sales, despite efforts by undercover police to
consummate another sale.  The prosecutor stated that he was unwilling to
offer defendant a deferred sentence because (1) the facts and circumstances
surrounding the sale and defendant's connection with former roommates who had
been charged with drug offenses suggested that this was not an isolated
transaction, and (2) defendant had declined to cooperate with a police
investigation of his former roommate. According to the prosecutor, he offered
a deferred sentence to the roommate because the admissibility of the
principal evidence against the roommate had been put in doubt by a motion to
suppress in that case. 

     In the court's view, the evidence indicated that this was a one-time
transaction for defendant, and that the roommate was at least as culpable as
defendant.  The court opined that the fairest alternative would be to defer
defendant's sentence, as it had done in the roommate's case.  The court
ruled, however, that  7041 required the consent of the prosecutor before it

 

could grant a deferred sentence, and that the statute does not violate the
separation-of-powers doctrine.  The court also rejected defendant's
suggestion that it put off sentencing for two years and then consider
dismissing the case under V.R.Cr.P 48(b), stating that to do so would be
inconsistent with the fair administration of justice. 

                                II.

     Section 7041(a) of Title 13 provides that, upon an adjudication of
guilt, the court may defer sentencing and place the defendant on probation
for a period not to exceed five years "if a written agreement concerning the
deferring of sentence is entered into between the state's attorney and the
[defendant]."  If the defendant violates the conditions of the
deferred-sentence agreement during the probationary period, the court must
impose sentence.  Id.  7041(b).  On the other hand, if the defendant abides
by the terms of the agreement, the court must then strike the adjudication of
guilt, discharge the defendant, and expunge the record of the criminal
proceedings.  Id.  In effect,  7041 conditions the court's power to expunge
a criminal conviction on the agreement of the prosecutor.  Defendant and
amicus curiae Defender General argue this violates the Vermont Constitution's
separation-of-powers clause. 

     The Vermont Constitution provides that the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches of government "shall be separate and distinct, so that
neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the others."  Vt. Const.
ch. II,  5.  An absolute separation of government functions among the
coequal branches, however, is not required or even desirable to achieve the
Constitution's ultimate goal of effective and efficient government.  See
Chioffi v. Winooski Zoning Bd., 151 Vt. 9, 11, 556 A.2d 103, 105 (1989)
(powers exercised by different branches necessarily overlap); Trybulski v.
Bellows Falls Hydro-Elec. Corp., 112 Vt. 1, 6-7, 20 A.2d 117, 119-20 (1941)
(certain amount of overlapping of powers is inevitable; many powers are of
doubtful classification both analytically and historically); cf. Mistretta v.
United States,