Case Title: Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Clyde

Citation: 2008-Ohio-4605

Docket Number: 20070960

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Clyde, 120 Ohio St.3d 96, 2008-Ohio-4605.] 
 
 
OHIOANS FOR CONCEALED CARRY, INC. ET AL., APPELLEES, v. CITY OF  
CLYDE ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Clyde, 
 120 Ohio St.3d 96, 2008-Ohio-4605.] 
Constitutional law—Municipal home rule—State regulation of right to carry 
handguns preempts conflicting ordinance—R.C. 2923.126 upheld. 
(No. 2007-0960 – Submitted April 9, 2008 – Decided September 18, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Sandusky County,  
Nos. S-06-039 and S-06-040, 2007-Ohio-1733. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The issue presented in this case concerns whether Clyde Ordinance 
2004-41, which prohibits licensed handgun owners from carrying concealed 
handguns in Clyde city parks, is a valid exercise of the municipality’s home-rule 
power according to Section 3, Article XVIII, of the Ohio Constitution.  Because 
the ordinance is an exercise of the municipality’s police power that conflicts with 
a general law, the ordinance is unconstitutional.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
H.B. 12 
{¶ 2} In January 2004, the General Assembly enacted Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
12.  Effective in April 2004, the bill created a licensing procedure for handgun 
owners in Ohio.  See R.C. 2923.125.  This case does not implicate the licensing 
procedure itself, but instead involves a municipality’s ability to regulate handgun 
possession on its own property by persons possessing a valid permit to carry a 
concealed handgun. 
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{¶ 3} Specifically, this matter requires review of R.C. 2923.126(A), 
which provides that a licensed handgun owner “may carry a concealed handgun 
anywhere in this state,” except as provided in R.C. 2923.126(B) and (C). 
{¶ 4} R.C. 2923.126(B) contains a list of exceptions to this right and sets 
forth specific locations where a licensed handgun owner may not carry a 
concealed handgun: 
{¶ 5} “(B) A valid license issued under section 2923.125 or 2923.1213 
of the Revised Code does not authorize the licensee to carry a concealed handgun 
in any manner prohibited under division (B) of section 2923.12 of the Revised 
Code or in any manner prohibited under section 2923.16 of the Revised Code. A 
valid license does not authorize the licensee to carry a concealed handgun into 
any of the following places: 
{¶ 6} “(1) A police station, sheriff's office, or state highway patrol 
station, premises controlled by the bureau of criminal identification and 
investigation, a state correctional institution, jail, workhouse, or other detention 
facility, an airport passenger terminal, or an institution that is maintained, 
operated, managed, and governed pursuant to division (A) of section 5119.02 of 
the Revised Code or division (A)(1) of section 5123.03 of the Revised Code; 
{¶ 7} “(2) A school safety zone, in violation of section 2923.122 of the 
Revised Code; 
{¶ 8} “(3) A courthouse or another building or structure in which a 
courtroom is located, in violation of section 2923.123 of the Revised Code; 
{¶ 9} “(4) Any room or open air arena in which liquor is being dispensed 
in premises for which a D permit has been issued under Chapter 4303. of the 
Revised Code, in violation of section 2923.121 of the Revised Code; 
{¶ 10} “(5) Any premises owned or leased by any public or private 
college, university, or other institution of higher education, unless the handgun is 
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in a locked motor vehicle or the licensee is in the immediate process of placing 
the handgun in a locked motor vehicle; 
{¶ 11} “(6) Any church, synagogue, mosque, or other place of worship, 
unless the church, synagogue, mosque, or other place of worship posts or permits 
otherwise; 
{¶ 12} “(7) A child day-care center, a type A family day-care home, a 
type B family day-care home, or a type C family day-care home, except that this 
division does not prohibit a licensee who resides in a type A family day-care 
home, a type B family day-care home, or a type C family day-care home from 
carrying a concealed handgun at any time in any part of the home that is not 
dedicated or used for day-care purposes, or from carrying a concealed handgun in 
a part of the home that is dedicated or used for day-care purposes at any time 
during which no children, other than children of that licensee, are in the home; 
{¶ 13} “(8) An aircraft that is in, or intended for operation in, foreign air 
transportation, interstate air transportation, intrastate air transportation, or the 
transportation of mail by aircraft; 
{¶ 14} “(9) Any building that is owned by this state or any political 
subdivision of this state, and all portions of any building that is not owned by any 
governmental entity listed in this division but that is leased by such a 
governmental entity listed in this division; 
{¶ 15} “(10) A place in which federal law prohibits the carrying of 
handguns.” 
{¶ 16} Furthermore, R.C. 2923.126(C)(1) and (C)(3) allow private 
employers and landowners to prohibit gun possession on their property as they 
deem fit.  Thus, the law provides a right for license holders to carry concealed 
handguns anywhere in the state subject to several express exceptions that apply 
universally throughout the state, and further subject to the directives of private 
employers and property owners, who are authorized to prohibit handguns. 
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{¶ 17} The General Assembly went even further, however, providing in 
an uncodified portion of H.B. 12 that “[n]o municipal corporation may adopt or 
continue in existence any ordinance * * * that attempts to restrict the places where 
a person possessing a valid license to carry a concealed handgun may carry a 
handgun concealed.”  H.B. 12, Section 9, 150 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3390. 
{¶ 18} Shortly after H.B. 12 took effect, the city of Clyde passed 
Ordinance 2004-41.  That ordinance provides:  “No person located within the 
confines of any City Park shall knowingly carry or have, on or about his person or 
readily to hand, any deadly weapon, irrespective of whether such person has been 
issued a license to carry a concealed handgun pursuant to Ohio R.C. 2923.125 or 
pursuant to a comparable provision of the law of any other state.”  Clyde Codified 
Ordinance 923.10(a).  The ordinance further provides that a violation of the 
prohibition is a misdemeanor offense of the first degree. 
{¶ 19} Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. filed an action in August 2004 
seeking an order striking down the ordinance and, further, seeking injunctive 
relief prohibiting Clyde from curtailing gun owners’ rights.  Both Ohioans for 
Concealed Carry, Inc. and Clyde moved for summary judgment.  The trial court 
granted judgment in favor of Clyde, relying on the Sixth District Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Toledo v. Beatty, 169 Ohio App.3d 502, 2006-Ohio-4638, 
863 N.E.2d 1051.  In Beatty, the Sixth District confronted a Toledo ordinance 
strikingly similar to the Clyde ordinance and held that R.C. 2923.126 was not a 
general law for home-rule purposes and therefore that the ordinance did not run 
afoul of Section 3 of the Home Rule Amendment, Article XVIII of the Ohio 
Constitution.  The trial court, in applying the analysis in Beatty to the Clyde 
ordinance, reached the same conclusion and entered judgment accordingly. 
{¶ 20} Ohioans for Concealed Carry appealed that determination to the 
Sandusky County Court of Appeals.  While the case was on appellate review, the 
General Assembly enacted 2006 Sub.H.B. No. 347, creating R.C. 9.68, which 
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emphasized the “fundamental individual right” to “keep and bear arms” and 
expressed the legislature’s further desire “to provide uniform laws throughout the 
state regulating the ownership [and] possession * * * of firearms.”  R.C. 9.68(A).  
But the bill did more than merely restate the need for uniformity; R.C. 9.68(A) 
also provides that “[e]xcept as specifically provided by the United States 
Constitution, Ohio Constitution, state law, or federal law, a person, without 
further license, * * * may own, possess, purchase, * * * or keep any firearm * * * 
.”  Simply put, the General Assembly, by enacting R.C. 9.68(A), gave persons in 
Ohio the right to carry a handgun unless federal or state law prohibits them from 
doing so.  A municipal ordinance cannot infringe on that broad statutory right. 
{¶ 21} The court of appeals used R.C. 9.68 to distinguish Beatty, which 
had been decided prior to the legislature’s enactment of H.B. 347.  R.C. 9.68(A), 
the court reasoned, “indicates the Ohio Legislature’s clear intent that the 
concealed carry laws have general and uniform operation throughout Ohio.”  
Ohioans for Concealed Carry Inc. v. Clyde, Sandusky App. Nos. S-06-039 and S-
06-040, 2007-Ohio-1733, ¶ 12.  Because R.C. 9.68(A) precluded any law other 
than state or federal law from infringing on the right to carry arms, the law 
preempted Clyde Ordinance 2004-41.  In accordance with its analysis, the 
appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the matter 
for entry of summary judgment in favor of Ohioans for Concealed Carry.  Id. at ¶ 
12-13. 
{¶ 22} Clyde appealed that determination to this court, and we accepted 
the discretionary appeal.  115 Ohio St.3d 1408, 2007-Ohio-4884, 873 N.E.2d 
1314.    
Article XVIII – The Home Rule Amendment 
{¶ 23} The Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, Article 
XVIII, permits municipalities “to exercise all powers of local self-government 
and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other 
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similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”  Section 3, Article 
XVIII. 
{¶ 24} A home-rule analysis presents a three-step process.  Am. Fin. 
Servs. Assn. v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, 
¶ 23-24; see also Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 
N.E.2d 255, ¶ 17.  The first step is to determine whether the ordinance at issue “ 
‘involves an exercise of local self-government or an exercise of local police 
power.’ ”  Am. Fin. Servs. at ¶ 23, quoting Twinsburg v. State Emp. Relations Bd. 
(1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 226, 228, 530 N.E.2d 26, overruled on other grounds, 
Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 20, 539 N.E.2d 
103.  If the ordinance is one relating solely to matters of self-government, “the 
analysis stops, because the Constitution authorizes a municipality to exercise all 
powers of local self-government within its jurisdiction.”  Id. 
{¶ 25} The second step, which becomes necessary if the local ordinance is 
an exercise of police power, requires a review of the statute to determine whether 
it is a general law under our four-part test announced in Canton v. State, 95 Ohio 
St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, syllabus.  See also Mendenhall, 117 
Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 18.  If the statute qualifies as a 
general law under this test, the local ordinance must give way if it conflicts with 
the general law.  Id. 
{¶ 26} The final step in the analysis, therefore, is to determine whether the 
ordinance conflicts with the statute, i.e., “whether the ordinance permits or 
licenses that which the statute forbids * * *, and vice versa.”  Struthers v. Sokol 
(1923), 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519, at paragraph two of the syllabus; see also 
Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 553, 2008-Ohio-92, 880 
N.E.2d 906, ¶ 30. 
{¶ 27} Clyde makes two separate arguments in support of its position that 
the ordinance is a constitutional exercise of its home-rule power.  First, Clyde 
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argues that regulation of its city parks is purely a matter of local self-government 
and, therefore, that the city is within its power to enact the legislation regardless 
of the applicable state statute.  Second, Clyde argues that even if the ordinance is 
an exercise of its police power, R.C. 2923.126 is not a general law according to 
our Canton test, because it does not apply uniformly throughout the state.  
According to Clyde, the concealed-handgun law’s multiple exceptions render 
uniform application impossible. 
{¶ 28} Ohioans for Concealed Carry, on the other hand, maintains that the 
very language of the ordinance supports the conclusion that it is one of police 
power and that the regulation of firearm possession is a prime example of the 
exercise of that power.  Ohioans for Concealed Carry also contends that the 
exceptions, though numerous, apply uniformly throughout the state and do not 
affect uniform application or enforcement, meaning that the statute constitutes a 
general law.  Because the arguments presented require examination of multiple 
aspects of the home-rule analysis, we will conduct a complete examination of 
each facet of that test. 
{¶ 29} Before beginning our analysis, however, we note that the appellate 
court held that R.C. 9.68 and 2923.126 preempted the Clyde ordinance.  Ohioans 
for Concealed Carry Inc., 2007-Ohio-1733, ¶ 12.  But as we stated in Am. Fin., 
“[a] statement by the General Assembly of its intent to preempt a field of 
legislation is a statement of legislative intent” that may be considered in a home-
rule analysis but does not dispose of the issue.  Am. Fin. Servs. Assn., 112 Ohio 
St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 31.  Accordingly, although R.C. 
9.68 and 2923.126 embody the General Assembly’s intent to occupy the field of 
handgun possession in Ohio, that intent “does not trump the constitutional 
authority of municipalities to enact legislation pursuant to the Home Rule 
Amendment, provided that the local legislation is not in conflict with general 
laws.”  Id.  We therefore proceed to apply the test established in Canton. 
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Local Self-Government v. Local Police Power 
{¶ 30} The first step of the home-rule analysis, as noted, is to determine 
whether the ordinance is an exercise of police power or of local self-government.  
As this court recently noted, “[a]n ordinance created under the power of local self-
government must relate ‘solely to the government and administration of the 
internal affairs of the municipality.’ ”  Marich, 116 Ohio St.3d 553, 2008-Ohio-
92, 880 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 11, quoting Beachwood v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections  
(1958), 167 Ohio St. 369, 5 O.O.2d 6, 148 N.E.2d 921, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  Police-power ordinances, however, “protect the public health, safety, or 
morals, or the general welfare of the public.”  Id., citing Downing v. Cook (1982), 
69 Ohio St.2d 149, 150, 23 O.O.3d 186, 431 N.E.2d 995. 
{¶ 31} In Marich, we examined Norton Codified Ordinance 440.01, 
which “regulat[ed] the traffic that pass[ed] through the municipality by placing 
size requirements on the vehicles that may be driven there.”  Id. at ¶ 15.  
Emphasizing that the ordinance served “to protect drivers and pedestrians who 
might be traveling on those roads,” we held that it embodied an exercise of the 
municipality’s police power.  Id.  In reaching this holding, we reiterated that 
traffic ordinances “in general” constitute exercises of a municipality’s police 
power because they operate to protect the public.  Id. at ¶ 14; see also 
Mendenhall, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 32} In Ohio Assn. of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. Olmsted 
(1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 242, 602 N.E.2d 1147, we considered North Olmsted 
Ordinance No. 79-27, which required security officers, private policemen, and 
similar workers to register with the local police department before commencing 
employment.  There, we held that the ordinance constituted an exercise of the 
city’s police power, reasoning that the ordinance imposed a penalty for 
noncompliance and that it could “hardly be argued to be a matter involving the 
structure or operation of a charter municipality.”  Id. at 244. 
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{¶ 33} Furthermore, though we have never spoken directly on the subject 
of firearm regulation as an exercise of police power in the home-rule context, we 
stated in Klein v. Leis, 99 Ohio St.3d 537, 2003-Ohio-4779, 795 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 13, 
that concealed-weapon laws regulate “the manner in which weapons can be 
carried” and “involve[] the police power” of the enacting authority.  The issue in 
Klein focused on the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.12 – as opposed to a 
municipal ordinance – but the character of the law is the same regardless of the 
enacting entity. 
{¶ 34} Several appellate courts, consistent with Klein, have held that local 
ordinances regulating firearm possession are police-power regulations.  In 
Cincinnati v. Baskin, 158 Ohio App.3d 539, 2004-Ohio-5055, 817 N.E.2d 433, ¶ 
8, overruled on other grounds, Cincinnati v. Baskin, 112 Ohio St.3d 279, 2006-
Ohio-6422, 859 N.E.2d 514, the Hamilton County Court of Appeals reaffirmed its 
earlier holding that Cincinnati Municipal Code 708-37, prohibiting the possession 
of certain semiautomatic firearms, was “ ‘a reasonable exercise of the city's police 
power to protect its citizens from violence stemming from the use of 
semiautomatic weapons.’ ”  ¶ 8, quoting Cincinnati v. Langan (1994), 94 Ohio 
App.3d 22, 30, 640 N.E.2d 200.  See also Toledo v. Beatty, 169 Ohio App.3d 502, 
2006-Ohio-4638, 863 N.E.2d 1051, ¶ 45. 
{¶ 35} The ordinance at issue here is an exercise of Clyde’s police power.  
First, the ordinance does not “relate ‘solely to the government and administration 
of the internal affairs of the municipality.’ ”  Marich, 116 Ohio St.3d 553, 2008-
Ohio-92, 880 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 11, quoting Beachwood, 167 Ohio St. 369, 5 O.O.2d 
6, 148 N.E.2d 921, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Like the traffic ordinances at 
issue in Marich, or the registration ordinance in Ohio Assn. of Private Detective 
Agencies, the Clyde ordinance “relates to public health and safety as well as the 
general welfare of the public.”  Id. at ¶ 14. 
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{¶ 36} Second, the ordinance imposes a penalty just as the ordinances 
presented in Marich, Baskin, Mendenhall, and Ohio Assn. of Private Detective 
Agencies.  Here, violation of the Clyde ordinance results in a first-degree 
misdemeanor.  But whether criminal or civil, an ordinance’s penalty is aimed at 
curbing the regulated behavior for the general welfare of a municipality’s citizens. 
{¶ 37} Finally, the plain language of the ordinance undermines any 
argument that it is one relating to local self-government.  Section 2 of the 
ordinance, for example, declares that it is “an emergency measure necessary for 
the preservation of the public peace, health and safety.”  While a municipality’s 
description or classification of its enactments is not dispositive, Section 2 clearly 
supports our determination and provides further support for the nature of the 
ordinance.  The ordinance is therefore an exercise of Clyde’s police power, and 
we proceed to the next step in our analysis. 
General-Law Analysis 
{¶ 38} We next consider whether R.C. 2923.126 is a general law.  As we 
have stated, to be a general law, “ ‘a statute must (1) be part of a statewide and 
comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and 
operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar 
regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a 
municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) 
prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.’ ”  Am. Fin. Servs. Assn., 112 
Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 32, quoting Canton, 95 Ohio 
St. 3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, syllabus. 
{¶ 39} We proceed to evaluate the statute under each prong of the test. 
Statewide Comprehensive Legislative Enactment 
{¶ 40} We look first to the language of the statute to determine whether it 
creates a statewide comprehensive legislative enactment.  R.C. 2923.126(A), as a 
complement to the licensing statute, R.C. 2923.125, creates a right subject to 
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specifically enumerated exceptions and, where selected by an owner, exceptions 
based on private property and employment.  The General Assembly, in crafting 
the statute, indicated that it “wish[ed] to ensure uniformity throughout the state 
regarding * * * the authority granted to a person holding a license of that nature.”  
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 12, Section 9, 150 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3390.  The General 
Assembly reiterated the need for uniformity in R.C. 9.68(A), which represents an 
attempt by that body to nullify all municipal laws impeding uniform application 
of the state statute.  “[T]he general assembly finds the need to provide uniform 
laws throughout the state regulating the ownership, possession, * * * transport, 
storage, carrying, * * * or other transfer of firearms.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
9.68(A). 
{¶ 41} The General Assembly could not have been more direct in 
expressing its intent for statewide comprehensive handgun-possession laws.  We 
therefore hold that R.C. 2923.126, which regulates handgun possession as part of 
the licensing procedure, is a statewide comprehensive legislative enactment. 
Uniform Application of the Statute 
{¶ 42} R.C. 2923.126, as noted, creates a right to carry concealed 
handguns if the carrier has obtained a state-issued permit.  The statute also creates 
multiple, specific exceptions to this right, R.C. 2923.126(B), and it grants private 
property owners the right to preclude licensed firearm carriers from privately 
owned property through the use of posted signs, R.C. 2923.126(C).  Clyde 
contends that this system “creates a patchwork of inconsistent application within 
and beyond municipal boundaries throughout Ohio that completely defeats the 
stated purpose of providing uniformity with respect to where concealed carry 
licensees” may carry handguns. 
{¶ 43} We rejected a similar argument in Marich.  There, the Bob Bennett 
Construction Company argued that by granting power to cities over the regulation 
of street permits, “the General Assembly established a system that will inherently 
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vary to some degree from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”  Marich, 116 Ohio St.3d 
553, 2008-Ohio-92, 880 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 22.  Our decision reasoned, however, that 
“[t]his statutory framework applies to all parts of the state without exception, and 
the basic process is a uniform one.”  Id. at ¶ 24.  We concluded in Marich by 
reasoning that notwithstanding different applications or outcomes in varying 
jurisdictions, “mere differences in the interpretation and application of the 
statutory language are not enough to prevent a statute from applying to all parts of 
the state and operating uniformly throughout it.”  Id. at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 44} Clyde relies on our decision in Canton, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-
Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, in support of its position, but this reliance is 
misplaced.  In Canton, we held that the statute did not constitute a general law, 
because it “effectively appl[ied] only in older areas of the state, i.e., cities where 
residential areas no longer have effective deed restrictions or no longer have 
active homeowner associations.”  Id. at ¶ 30. 
{¶ 45} The statute at issue here, however, has no similar differential 
application.  See Marich, 116 Ohio St.3d 553, 2008-Ohio-92, 880 N.E.2d 906, ¶ 
23.  It applies to all municipalities in the same fashion, subject to the same 
exceptions.  None is singled out or treated differently, and the statute does not 
operate differently based on different locations in our state. 
{¶ 46} Furthermore, the statute is not arbitrary in its differentiation 
between private and public property.  See R.C. 2923.126(C).  The distinction 
between private and public property merely reflects that private landowners can 
restrict access to their property in many ways public owners cannot.  See, e.g., 
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972), 407 U.S. 551, 568, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 
(owners may regulate “general rights,” including free speech, “on property 
privately owned and used nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only”).  Some 
owners will permit licensed handgun carriers access to their premises.  Some will 
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not.  That the law offers a choice to private landowners while offering none to 
municipalities does not render the statute arbitrary. 
{¶ 47} There is a distinction between public and private property.  A 
private landowner is the sole possessor of private property.  Eastwood Mall, Inc. 
v. Slanco (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 221, 626 N.E.2d 59; Bresnik v. Beulah Park Ltd. 
Partnership, Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 302, 617 N.E.2d 1096.  See also 
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins (1980), 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 
L.Ed.2d 741 (private property does not lose its private nature because it is open to 
the public).  On the other hand, public property is owned by the taxpayers and is 
accessible to all.  If there were no distinction made between public and private 
property as the dissent suggests, then a municipality could in the future choose to 
expand the prohibition from public parks to public sidewalks and roadways, and 
eventually to all public property. 
{¶ 48} We therefore conclude that the public/private distinction does not 
affect the uniform application of this statute. 
Police, Sanitary, or Similar Regulation 
{¶ 49} The third prong of the general-law test is whether the statute 
“set[s] forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport[s] only to 
grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, 
sanitary, or similar regulations.”  Am. Fin. Servs. Assn., 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 
2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 32, quoting Canton, 95 Ohio St. 3d 149, 
2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, syllabus. 
{¶ 50} R.C. 2923.126, like the Clyde ordinance, is an exercise of police 
power, because it “relates to public health and safety as well as the general 
welfare of the public.”  Marich, 116 Ohio St.3d 553, 2008-Ohio-92, 880 N.E.2d 
906, ¶ 14.  The statute, however, does more than merely prevent municipalities 
from enacting inconsistent handgun laws.  It provides a program to foster proper, 
legal handgun ownership in this state.  The statute therefore represents both an 
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exercise of the state’s police power and an attempt to limit legislative power of a 
municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations. 
Prescription of a Rule of Conduct for Citizens 
{¶ 51} This inquiry requires little discussion.  R.C. 2923.126 prescribes a 
rule of conduct for any citizen seeking to carry a concealed handgun.  The right to 
keep and bear arms is a “fundamental individual right that predates the United 
States Constitution and Ohio Constitution,” R.C. 9.68, but any citizen seeking to 
exercise this right must comply with the requirements of R.C. 2923.126. 
{¶ 52} Accordingly, R.C. 2923.126 is a general law because it is “part of a 
statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) appl[ies] to all parts of the 
state alike and operate[s] uniformly throughout the state, (3) set[s] forth police, 
sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport[s] only to grant or limit 
legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or 
similar regulations, and (4) prescribe[s] a rule of conduct upon citizens 
generally.”  Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 
963, syllabus. 
Conflict Analysis 
{¶ 53} The final step in a home-rule analysis is the conflict test, which 
asks whether the ordinance prohibits that which the statute permits, or vice versa.  
See Struthers, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519, at paragraph two of the syllabus.  
Here, the statute creates a right subject to specific exceptions that do not include 
public parks.  Thus, the statute permits a licensed gun owner to carry a concealed 
handgun in a Clyde city park – indeed, in any municipal park across the state – 
the very conduct prohibited by the Clyde city ordinance.  We therefore hold that 
the Clyde ordinance is in conflict with R.C. 2923.126. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 54} Clyde City Ordinance No. 2004-41 is an exercise of the 
municipality’s police power that conflicts with R.C. 2923.126, a general law.  The 
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ordinance is therefore unconstitutional.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 55} The General Assembly’s stated purpose in enacting R.C. 2923.126 
was “to ensure uniformity throughout the state regarding * * * the authority 
granted to a person holding a [concealed-handgun] license.”  2004 Am.Sub.H.B. 
No. 12, Section 9, 150 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3390.  To effectuate this intent, R.C. 
2923.126(A) offers the general rule that persons holding concealed-handgun 
licenses “may carry a concealed handgun anywhere in this state,” subject to the 
numerous exceptions in subsections (B) and (C) of the statute. 
{¶ 56} However, these exceptions generally treat private property owners 
(as well as private persons leasing public land) as a separate class, giving them the 
authority to decide in most circumstances whether concealed handguns will be 
allowed on their property.  R.C. 2923.126(C)(3).  This distinction creates arbitrary 
and unreasonable results, such that the statute does not operate uniformly 
throughout the state.  I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision 
to allow R.C. 2923.126 to take precedence over Clyde Ordinance 2004-41, which 
prohibits carrying a concealed handgun in Clyde city parks. 
{¶ 57} Pursuant to Section 3 of the Home Rule Amendment, Article 
XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, a state statute will take precedence over a local 
ordinance only if “(1) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute, (2) the 
ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, 
and (3) the statute is a general law.”  Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-
Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, ¶ 9.  To qualify as a general law, “a statute must (1) 
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be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all 
parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth 
police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit 
legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or 
similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.”  
Id. at syllabus.  I agree that the first, third, and fourth factors apply to R.C. 
2923.126 and do not dispute that it applies to all parts of the state alike. 
{¶ 58} However, I do not agree that R.C. 2923.126 operates uniformly 
throughout the state.  Given the exception for private property owners, the general 
rules on where a person may carry a concealed handgun fluctuate depending on 
who owns the property at issue; R.C. 2923.126 divides the state by creating 
different rules for public and private property.  A statute that makes such a 
nonuniform classification can still qualify as a general law under the home-rule 
analysis, so long as the classification is not “ ‘arbitrary, unreasonable or 
capricious,’ ” but R.C. 2923.126 does not meet that standard.  Canton, 95 Ohio 
St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, ¶ 30, quoting Garcia v. Siffrin 
Residential Assn. (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 259, 272, 17 O.O.3d 167, 407 N.E.2d 
1369. 
{¶ 59} In fact, this case provides a prime example of the types of arbitrary 
and unreasonable conduct discussed in Canton.  Suppose that there are two parks 
in Clyde on opposite sides of the street; Park A is owned by the city, and Park B 
is owned by a private corporation.1  At Park A, a person with the requisite license 
could carry a concealed handgun at the park, as the statute does not prohibit the 
carrying of a concealed handgun in public parks.  The city is powerless to change 
this fact; concealed handguns must be allowed in the park, unless one of the 
                                                          
 
1. 
Appellant Clyde notes in its brief that the Whirlpool Corporation owns a private park in 
Clyde, with facilities similar to those in municipal parks, such as a swimming pool, tennis courts, 
and ball fields. 
January Term, 2008 
17 
limited exceptions applies (e.g., a school holds an event at the park, thereby 
invoking the exception for school safety zones in R.C. 2923.126(B)(2)).  At Park 
B, a person’s right to carry a concealed handgun depends on whether the owner of 
the park posts a sign forbidding the carrying of a concealed handgun.  R.C. 
2923.126(C)(3).  The owner of the park can decide to forbid concealed handguns 
for any reason or no reason, and anyone who violates that decision could be 
charged with criminal trespass, a fourth-degree misdemeanor.  If there are other 
privately owned parks in the area, the owners could each set his own rules. 
{¶ 60} The single fact that Park A is publicly owned and Park B is 
privately owned changes the rules for whether concealed handguns will be 
allowed in the parks.  The statute completely regulates public property while 
having essentially no effect on most forms of private property (with rare 
exceptions like R.C. 2923.126(B)(4), which prohibits concealed handguns when 
the private property has a liquor permit). 
{¶ 61} This different treatment of public and private property is patently 
arbitrary and unreasonable; it affects one class of land solely on the basis of 
ownership, which has little to do with the relative safety of allowing concealed 
handguns on a particular type of property.2  We held that a similarly selective 
                                                          
 
2. 
{¶ a} Although not a reason under our case law for concluding that R.C. 2923.126(A) 
violates the Ohio Constitution, one can only speculate about, indeed wonder, what statewide 
interest is served by a statute that nullifies and prohibits a reasoned conclusion by the elected 
representatives of local government that the presence of any number of handguns in a city park 
may be a threat to the security and safety of those using the park.  Implementation of the state 
statute strikes a severe blow to the underlying principles of local self-government. 
{¶ b} It is unfortunate that the passion of those who believe in the right of virtually any 
adult to carry a concealed weapon (subject to the statutory exceptions) has pushed aside the 
fundamental belief in Ohio that matters that directly affect the safety of a community may be 
determined by local government, where the voices of those citizens most directly affected may be 
heard and considered.  No one outside the city of Clyde, or perhaps the county of Sandusky, has 
any legitimate interest in the regulations placed upon the use of a city park in the municipality of 
Clyde.  We can only hope that those who believe that dogs should run unleashed in city parks or 
those who believe that alcohol should be consumed in city parks are not able to convince a 
majority of the General Assembly of the merits of their cause. 
 
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enactment was not a general law in Canton.  95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 
766 N.E.2d 963, ¶ 30 (determining that a statute was not a general law because it 
would in effect apply only in older areas of the state).  I would come to the same 
result in this case, because the rules in R.C. 29231.26 for when and where 
concealed handguns can be carried apply only (and arbitrarily) to public property. 
{¶ 62} The majority tries to sidestep these problems by citing our decision 
in Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 553, 2008-Ohio-92, 880 
N.E.2d 906.  In Marich, we resolved a challenge to a statutory system that 
generally limited vehicles traveling on public roads to a certain width but allowed 
persons wishing to operate a wider vehicle within a municipality to apply for a 
permit from that municipality.  Id. at ¶ 3.  The permit statute, R.C. 4513.34(A), 
said that the municipality could issue a permit “upon application in writing and 
for good cause shown.”  The appellant there argued that different municipalities 
might interpret “good cause shown” in different ways and thus the statute would 
not operate uniformly throughout the state.  Marich at ¶ 25. 
{¶ 63} We answered this concern by holding that a statutory system that 
varies “to some degree from jurisdiction to jurisdiction” can still be a general law, 
as “mere differences in the interpretation and application of the statutory language 
are not enough to prevent a statute from applying to all parts of the state and 
operating uniformly throughout it.”  Id. at ¶ 22, 25.  We acknowledged that 
different municipalities might interpret “good cause shown” to mean different 
things, but held that the basic process for receiving a permit was the same 
throughout the state.  Id. at ¶ 25, 26. 
{¶ 64} With R.C. 2923.126, though, the basic process for determining 
where concealed handguns may be carried varies greatly throughout the state 
because rulemaking for private property is generally left to the discretion of 
private landowners.  By separating public and private property and leaving largely 
unfettered the discretion of private property owners to determine what limitations 
January Term, 2008 
19 
to place on their property, the General Assembly has created a system of 
restrictions that fluctuates much more dramatically across jurisdictions than the 
statutory scheme in Marich, which left open the possibility that the words “good 
cause shown” could have slightly different meanings in different parts of the state. 
{¶ 65} Given the arbitrary and unreasonable distinction between public 
and private landowners, the fact that the law is subject to the will of private 
landowners, and the fact that the statute fails to meet its stated objective of 
establishing uniformity in its designation of those places in which persons may 
carry concealed handguns, I would hold that R.C. 2923.126 is not a general law 
and that it therefore does not take precedence over Clyde Ordinance 2004-41. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 66} In E. Liverpool v. Columbiana Cty. Budget Comm., 114 Ohio St.3d 
133, 2007-Ohio-3759, 870 N.E.2d 705, this court recognized that a municipality 
may assert that a state statute violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio 
and United States Constitutions.  I would hold that 2004 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 12 
violates those Equal Protection Clauses.  There is no rational basis to distinguish 
between private and public property owners in regard to their statutory ability to 
prevent persons from carrying firearms onto their property.  Clyde owns its 
municipal park.  Is there any reason why the owner of this property, where 
families gather and children play, should be forced to allow people with guns to 
enter, while the private owner of a public space such as a shopping mall can bar 
from entry any gun-carrying citizens? 
__________________ 
Lydy & Moan, Daniel T. Ellis, and Frederick E. Kalmbach; and Firestone, 
Brehm, Hanson, Wolf & Young, L.L.P., and L. Kenneth Hanson III, for appellee 
Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., John C. McDonald, Stephen J. 
Smith, and Matthew T. Green; and Barry W. Bova, for appellant. 
Nancy Hardin Rogers, Attorney General, William P. Marshall, Solicitor 
General, Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor, and Todd A. Nist, Assistant 
Solicitor, for intervening appellee Ohio Attorney General Nancy Hardin Rogers. 
John F. Kostyo and Stephen P. Halbrook, urging affirmance for amicus 
curiae National Rifle Association of America, Inc. 
Robert Triozzi, Director of Law, and Gary S. Singletary, Assistant 
Director of Law, urging reversal for amicus curiae the city of Cleveland. 
Byron & Byron Co., L.P.A., and Stephen L. Byron; and John Gotherman, 
urging reversal for amici curiae Ohio Municipal League and the municipalities of 
Beachwood, Cincinnati, Dublin, Kettering, New Albany, Orange, Shaker Heights, 
and Toledo. 
______________________