Case Title: Evans v. Shannon

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92238

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 92238-Agenda 15-March 2002.
ROSS WAYNE EVANS et al., Indiv. and Co-Adm'rs of the 
Estate of Timothy Michael Evans, Deceased, Appellees, v. 
DERRICK SHANNON et al. (Vogler Motor Company, Inc.,
Appellant).
Opinion filed August 29, 2002.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the
court:
	Timothy Evans died as a result of injuries he sustained when
his vehicle collided with a car negligently driven by defendant
Derrick Shannon. The car Shannon was driving at the time of the
accident, a Mercury Sable station wagon, was owned by defendant
Vogler Motor Company and had been entrusted the previous day
to defendant Robert Margrum, doing business as Bob's Clean Up
Shop, for detailing and cleaning services. Shannon, acting in his
capacity as Margrum's employee, had taken possession of the
Vogler vehicle and had driven it to Margrum's place of business,
wherein the car was locked up for the night. At some point that
evening, after regular business hours, Shannon returned to the
shop and, without authority, took the car for his own use. He was
intoxicated and driving the vehicle when he crossed the centerline
of the highway and collided with Timothy Evans' car. Shannon
did not have a valid driver's license at the time of the collision.
	The parents of Timothy Evans brought wrongful-death and
survivor actions, as co-administrators of the estate of Timothy
Evans and individually. Plaintiffs' action against Vogler was based
in pertinent part on a theory of negligent entrustment of Vogler's
car to Derrick Shannon, Margrum's employee. A jury ultimately
found all three defendants liable, but found Vogler only 9% liable.
Initially, the circuit court entered judgment on the verdict and
granted several liability as to Vogler, based upon the percentage
of negligence attributed to Vogler by the jury. However, after a
motion for reconsideration, the circuit court entered joint liability
as to all defendants. Noting that this court in Best v. Taylor
Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997), had held section 2-1117
of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West
1996) (amended by Public Act 89-7, eff. March 9, 1995))
unconstitutional, the circuit court ruled that the prior version of
the statute (735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1994) (providing for several
liability if degree of fault is determined to be less than 25% and
joint and several liability if the degree of fault is determined to be
25% or more)) was unconstitutional as well, finding that it
arbitrarily establishes "different types of liability solely dependent
upon the percentage of fault," attributed to individual defendants
and "is contrary to the common law of this state as interpreted by
the Supreme Court of Illinois."
	From the circuit court's ruling, Vogler brought this direct
appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R.
302(a)(1)). Because we find that Vogler's motions for directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were improperly
denied, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court as it pertains
to Vogler and remand this cause for assessment of damages
against only Shannon and Margrum. Thus, we need not reach the
constitutional issue in this case. We set forth below a brief
statement of the applicable standards of review and the pertinent
facts.
	A denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, like an adverse ruling on a motion for directed verdict, is
reviewed under the de novo standard. Donaldson v. Central
Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 89 (2002); Edwards v.
Paddock Publications, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 3d 553, 562 (2001).
"[V]erdicts ought to be directed and judgments n.o.v. entered only
in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its
aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors
movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever
stand." Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510
(1967). See also Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d  at 89; Maple v. Gustafson,
151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 (1992).
	Following is a comprehensive summary of the trial testimony
we consider pertinent to the issue of negligent entrustment.
Consistent with applicable standards of review, we have taken care
to include even marginal evidence favorable to the plaintiffs, and
that which is arguably relevant.
	Dennis Rathjen, vice-president and sales manager of Vogler,
testified that Vogler had utilized the services of Margrum's
business for a number of years and had never had any problems
with his work. Prior to the March 5, 1996, collision, Rathjen had
perceived Margrum as a reputable business owner who hired only
reputable employees. Before March of 1996, Vogler had never had
a car stolen while in Margrum's possession, nor had a Vogler
vehicle been involved in a collision. Based upon their relationship
up to that point in time, Vogler's management trusted Margrum.
	Rathjen testified that, as a matter of policy, Vogler allowed
only licensed drivers to operate its cars. Rathjen assumed that
Margrum had performed background checks on his employees and
had verified that they had driver's licenses. Rathjen considered
that Margrum's responsibility. Vogler personnel did not ask to see
the licenses of Margrum's employees when they came to pick up
Vogler's cars. Had Rathjen known Margrum was using unlicensed
drivers, it would have been cause to terminate their business
relationship. Rathjen conceded it would have taken "about five
seconds" to verify that Margrum's drivers were licensed when they
came to get Vogler's cars. Rathjen supposed Vogler would have
had the authority to ask for verification of a valid license had it
chosen to do so. The procedure in place, however, merely required
that an inventory sheet show which Vogler employee had provided
Margrum's employee the keys for the car to be detailed.
	Rathjen was aware of one instance when a Margrum
employee (Jerome Wooley) was seen in a Vogler car at the drive-up window of the ABC Liquor Store in Carbondale, Illinois (the
municipality in which both businesses were located); however,
Rathjen said he would not have complained to Margrum, as the
detour was at most 50 yards off the route from Vogler to
Margrum's business and the employee in question was purportedly
only buying cigarettes.
	Frank Black, Vogler's president and majority stockholder,
testified there was no policy in place to check Margrum's
employees for driver's licenses. He felt that was Margrum's
responsibility. Black said he expected Margrum to check out his
employees, "[s]ame as any other contractor I do business with." In
that respect, Black rejected plaintiffs' counsel's attempt to
differentiate between a large business, like K mart, and a small
business, like Margrum's. Before the accident that gave rise to this
case, Black had never heard of any cars having been stolen from
Margrum's shop, nor of any cars in his possession having been
involved in a collision or having been driven recklessly. Black
testified that a log sheet would have noted the location of a Vogler
vehicle and would have indicated who was in possession of it.
Vogler on occasion used other detailers, and Margrum performed
services for individuals and businesses other than Vogler.
	Black denied knowing about "detours" that might have been
taken with Vogler's cars while in Margrum's possession. Asked,
hypothetically, what action he might have taken had he known
about detours, Black responded that he probably would have said
something to Margrum about it, and he might even have
terminated the business relationship with Margrum if the detours
were "severe enough."
	John Barnes, a salesman for Vogler, testified that he recalled
someone at Vogler had arranged for detailing the Sable station
wagon through Bob's Clean Up Shop. On March 4, 1996,
someone from Bob's arrived to pick up the car. Barnes recalled
hearing someone say that "Bob's" was there to get the car. Barnes
did not see Bob personally come into Vogler's building or pull up
outside. Barnes handed the keys to a man he did not know and
subsequently learned was Margrum's employee Derrick Shannon.
Barnes did not really look at the man's face or speak to him.
Barnes simply handed him the keys and pointed to the car. The
man had what appeared to be dealer plates under his arm. The man
did not offer identification and Barnes did not ask for any. Prior to
March of 1996, according to his own estimate, Barnes had handed
over keys more than 100 times to Margrum's employees without
ever having asked to see a driver's license.
	Barnes admitted it would have violated Vogler's unwritten
policy for Shannon to have driven the car without a valid driver's
license. He conceded he would not have handed the keys to
Shannon had he known Shannon did not have a driver's license.
He stated his belief that he lacked the authority to ask Margrum's
employees for license verification.
	Barnes testified that he had been instructed by Rathjen to
investigate the ABC Liquor Store incident. He spoke with
Margrum, who informed Barnes that the employee in question was
"no longer with him." Barnes testified that he did not trust
Margrum or his employees completely after that incident. In fact,
Barnes subsequently took it upon himself to check odometer
readings on Vogler cars returned by Margrum; however, prior to
the accident, he did not find excess miles on cars that had been
sent to Margrum for detailing.
	Jerry Bankhead testified that he was working for Margrum in
March of 1996. When he was hired, he was not required to
produce a driver's license or fill out a job application. He was
aware of no background check undertaken by Margrum in his case.
	Margrum had a rule that only an employee with a valid
driver's license could drive dealer cars. He told his employees that
the car dealers with whom he dealt required a driver's license.
Margrum also warned employees about putting excess miles on
cars. Bankhead stated that one employee, Singletary Johnson, had
been fired because he violated the latter rule. Bankhead said that
Jerome Wooley was fired as a result of the ABC Liquor Store
incident, but was later rehired.
	Bankhead was a friend of Derrick Shannon, with whom he
worked for approximately 2½ months. Bankhead testified that
Shannon had a key to the front door of Margrum's shop because
Shannon usually got to work early. Margrum's shop held about
eight cars. Sometimes cars were parked outside overnight, but the
keys to those cars were locked up inside. As for vehicles parked
inside overnight, their keys were sometimes locked away, and
sometimes they were not. During the years that Bankhead worked
for Margrum, at least prior to March of 1996, no cars were ever
stolen from Margrum's shop.
	According to Bankhead, on the afternoon of March 4, 1996,
Bankhead, Margrum and Shannon went to Vogler's place of
business to pick up a Mercury Sable station wagon. Margrum
drove; Shannon went inside and came out with the keys. Margrum
and Bankhead then followed Shannon back to Margrum's shop,
with Shannon driving the Sable. When they got to the shop, they
moved a couple of cars so they could put the station wagon inside.
Margrum then told Shannon to lock up, and Bankhead saw the
doors coming down as he and Margrum drove away. As far as
Bankhead knew, Margrum had not assigned anyone to work on the
Sable.
	Bankhead testified that he had been with Shannon several
times before when they had walked into Vogler's building to pick
up a car. John Barnes had always handed them the keys and had
never asked to see a driver's license. Bankhead believed that
people at Vogler recognized them as Margrum's employees.
	Jerome Wooley testified that he worked for Margrum,
detailing cars, between 1992 and February of 1996. Wooley is
Margrum's second cousin. As far as Wooley was aware, when he
was hired, Margrum never checked his references or inquired
about any criminal history.
	There was a period of time when he worked for Margrum that
Wooley's driver's license had expired. Margrum was aware of his
license status, yet Wooley still picked up cars from Vogler. No one
at Vogler ever asked to see his driver's license. Like Shannon,
Wooley had keys to the shop. Wooley denied involvement in the
ABC Liquor Store incident.
	Defendant Robert Margrum was called by the plaintiffs to
testify. Margrum stated that he thought Vogler had a sign-out sheet
that his employees would sign when they picked up the keys to a
car. Responding to a series of hypothetical questions from
plaintiffs' counsel, Margrum affirmed that he would have secured
keys to Vogler vehicles inside the shop if Vogler had asked him to,
he would have done background checks on his employees if
Vogler had asked, and he would have checked driver's licenses of
employees who drove Vogler cars. As far as Margrum was aware,
Vogler never checked the license status of his employees before
they drove Vogler cars. Margrum did not know, prior to March of
1996, that Shannon had a criminal history and a record of traffic
violations, because Margrum had not conducted a background
check on Shannon before he hired him.
	Margrum at first testified that he knew Shannon did not have
a valid driver's license; consequently, Shannon was not allowed
to pick up and drive dealership cars. He claimed he would not
have hired Shannon had he initially known about his license
status. Even though Shannon did not have a valid driver's license,
Margrum gave him a key to the shop.
	Margrum testified that March 4, 1996, was the first time that
Shannon had gone to Vogler to pick up a car. Margrum maintained
that Shannon should not have gone to Vogler's dealership to pick
up the Sable station wagon. Shortly after giving that testimony,
Margrum admitted that he probably had driven Shannon to Vogler
to pick up the car, as Bankhead had earlier testified. He conceded
that he really did not remember, but would not disagree with
Bankhead's testimony.
	Addressing the ABC Liquor Store incident, Margrum testified
that he fired Wooley after Barnes complained, even though
Wooley claimed he was only getting a pack of cigarettes and the
deviation from the normal route was slight. Margrum said he later
rehired Wooley. He was unaware that Wooley did not have a valid
driver's license.
	On cross-examination, Margrum testified he gave a garage
key to any employee who wanted to come in early for work. Keys
to the vehicles were readily available inside the shop so that cars
could be moved around during the course of the day. Although
Margrum did not remember taking Shannon to pick up the Sable
on the day in question, he did recall checking the shop later that
evening around 7 p.m. The Sable was there and the door to the
shop was locked. Margrum noticed the Sable was missing the next
morning when he opened up.
	According to Margrum, in the 10 years he was in business,
employees deviated from a direct route perhaps six or seven times.
Before March 4, 1996, he had never had a car stolen. As far as
Margrum was aware, no one at Vogler knew that Shannon was
unlicensed or that Margrum did not conduct background checks on
his employees.
	We find the foregoing evidence insufficient to support a
verdict in favor of plaintiffs on their negligent-entrustment claim
against Vogler. The verdict against Vogler cannot stand.
	In order to prove negligent entrustment, plaintiffs must show
that Vogler gave another express or implied permission to use or
possess a dangerous article or instrumentality which Vogler knew,
or should have known, would likely be used in a manner involving
an unreasonable risk of harm to others. See Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 84-85 (2001); Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill. 2d 181, 186
(1995); see Restatement (Second) of Torts §308 (1965). Although
an automobile is not a dangerous instrumentality per se, it may
become one if it is operated by someone who is incompetent,
inexperienced or reckless. Eyrich v. Estate of Waldemar, 327 Ill.
App. 3d 1095, 1098 (2002).
	There are two primary considerations in negligent-entrustment
analysis: (1) whether the owner of the vehicle entrusted the car to
an incompetent or unfit driver, and (2) whether the incompetency
was a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury. Taitt v. Robinson,
266 Ill. App. 3d 130, 132 (1994). In turn, proximate cause consists
of two distinct elements: cause in fact and legal cause. First
Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257-58
(1999); see Watson v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 325 Ill. App. 3d
914, 922 (2001). As this court stated in First Springfield Bank &
Trust:
		"Cause in fact exists where there is a reasonable certainty
that a defendant's acts caused the injury or damage.
[Citation.] A defendant's conduct is a cause in fact of the
plaintiff's injury only if that conduct is a material element
and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.
[Citation.] A defendant's conduct is a material element
and a substantial factor in bringing about an injury if,
absent that conduct, the injury would not have occurred.
[Citation.] 'Legal cause,' by contrast, is essentially a
question of foreseeability. [Citation.] The relevant inquiry
here is whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable
person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct."
First Springfield Bank & Trust, 188 Ill. 2d  at 258.
	With these precepts in mind, we first address the contention
that Vogler personnel knew, or should have known, that Shannon
was an unlicensed or incompetent driver when Barnes handed him
the keys to the Sable. Vogler may be charged with knowledge of
six or seven "detours" with its vehicles while they were in
Margrum's possession, over a period of several years. One of
those detours, the ABC Liquor Store incident, involved a detour
off the appointed path of perhaps 50 yards for the stated purpose
of purchasing cigarettes. Vogler employees may also have known
of significant turnover of employees at Margrum's business. These
facts fall far short of establishing that, on March 4, 1996, Vogler
either knew, or had reason to know, that any of Margrum's drivers
were unlicensed, incompetent or reckless. The incidents upon
which plaintiffs rely have no bearing whatsoever upon the safe
operation of a motor vehicle.
	All of the information at Vogler's disposal indicated that
Vogler vehicles were safe while in Margrum's possession. During
the years that Vogler had utilized Margrum's services, Vogler had
never had a vehicle stolen or involved in a collision. Moreover,
Vogler management was aware that other dealerships also used
Margrum to detail and clean up their cars, evincing their trust in
Margrum.
	Plaintiffs, however, suggest that Vogler had an additional duty
to check Shannon's driver's license status, relying principally
upon Small v. St. Francis Hospital, 220 Ill. App. 3d 537 (1991).
In Small, the defendant dealership sold a car to Alexander
Shlepakov, a 15-year-old boy who did not possess a driver's
license. Less than a month after the sale, Shlepakov struck and
killed Rene Roughny with the car he had purchased from
defendant. The executor of Roughny's estate brought suit against
the defendant dealership under a negligent entrustment theory,
alleging that defendant had sold the car to Shlepakov without
inquiring as to his identification, age, or training to operate a
vehicle. The circuit court granted defendant's motion to dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate court reversed
and remanded, concluding, "when a car seller has reason to know
that a prospective buyer is underage, unlicensed, or otherwise
incompetent, a cause of action for negligent entrustment exists."
(Emphasis added.) Small, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 542. The Small court
emphasized:
		"[O]ur holding does not require that a seller of a car,
whether commercial or private, must ask for a driver's
license or investigate driving proficiency in every case
***." Small, 220 Ill. App. 3d at 542.
	Although we do not question the holding in Small, we see no
reason to extend it to this context given the facts of the instant
case. This was a service transaction between two business entities
and Vogler neither knew nor had reason to know that Shannon was
unlicensed or otherwise incompetent to operate a motor vehicle.
In Small, the car dealer sold a vehicle to 15-year-old whose
appearance alone might have put the dealer on notice that he was
inexperienced and unlicensed. In this case, there was nothing
which would have red-flagged Shannon as an unlicensed,
incompetent or reckless driver. Quite the contrary, Bankhead
testified that he and Shannon had been to Vogler's place of
business several times to pick up vehicles. Those vehicles were
apparently returned to Vogler without incident. Moreover,
Shannon was employed by Margrum, with whom Vogler had dealt
for many years without experiencing any safety-related problems.
In handing the keys to Shannon, Barnes, on behalf of Vogler,
entrusted the car to Margrum and the business that he operated. In
so doing, Vogler entrusted its car to an independent contractor,
much the same as the car dealer in Jones v. Beker, 260 Ill. App. 3d
481 (1994), entrusted its cars to an independent contractor for
repossession, much the same as millions of people do every year
when they take their cars to auto service facilities or dealerships
for servicing and repairs. Although an unknown mechanic may
drive away in the customer's vehicle, he or she would not think of
asking the mechanic to produce a driver's license. Customers
assume that the responsibility to see that the mechanic-employee
is licensed lies with his or her employer, the independent
contractor they have retained to perform the service. They are
entrusting the vehicle to the contractor. We hold, unless a
customer knows, or has reason to know, that an employee of the
contractor is unlicensed, incompetent or reckless, the customer has
no duty of further inquiry.
	In Washington v. City of Chicago, 188 Ill. 2d 235 (1999), we
discussed the criteria for determining whether a duty exists:
		"In resolving whether a duty exists, a court must
determine whether there is a relationship between the
parties requiring that a legal obligation be imposed upon
one for the benefit of the other. Rhodes v. Illinois Central
Gulf R.R., 172 Ill. 2d 213, 227 (1996). The factors
relevant to the courts' imposition of a duty include the
reasonable foreseeability of injury, the likelihood of such
injury, the magnitude of guarding against the injury, and
the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.
Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc., 185 Ill. 2d 418, 425
(1998)." Washington, 188 Ill. 2d  at 239.
	Having considered all of the above factors, and in particular
the consequences of imposing this additional burden of inquiry
upon the entrustor of an automobile, we hold that the relationship
between these parties does not require the imposition of a general
legal obligation to check the driver's license of an employee of an
independent contractor to whom one entrusts one's vehicle,
barring some reason to know that the employee may be
incompetent to operate that vehicle. A duty so imposed would
have far-reaching consequences, logically extending to every
person who takes his or her vehicle for repair or servicing, and
requiring that commercial and private car owners alike police the
hiring practices of businesses with whom they deal, whether or not
there is reason to know that the independent contractor's employee
is incompetent to operate a vehicle. We believe that employers,
under most circumstances, have adequate incentives to investigate
and police their own employees, and the duty to do so should
generally be left to them.
	We reject plaintiffs' contention that Vogler's driver's license
policy constituted a self-imposed duty to check the license status
of employees of independent contractors with whom it dealt. In
support of this argument, counsel for plaintiffs cites this court's
opinion in Snyder v. Curran Township, 167 Ill. 2d 466 (1995), for
the proposition that "when a self-imposed duty is voluntarily
undertaken it must be carried out in a non-negligent manner."
Since counsel has not supplied us with specific page references to
Snyder, we assume that counsel refers to pages 474 through 475
of that opinion, wherein we stated:
			"We are also mindful of the long-standing common law
principle that, although a governmental agency has
discretion in determining whether to perform a public
work or make an improvement, once the decision to
perform the work is made, it must be done with
reasonable care and in a nonnegligent manner." Snyder,
167 Ill. 2d  at 474-75.
In this case, there was no evidence that Vogler ever undertook a
duty to check the license status of employees who worked for
other businesses. Counsel for plaintiffs fails to appreciate the
difference between mere formulation of policy and affirmative
measures taken to implement that policy. A duty undertaken falls
into the latter category, not the former.
	Finally, in order for Vogler to be liable under a negligent-
entrustment theory, Vogler must have given express or implied
permission to Shannon to drive the Sable at the time the accident
occurred. In Pelczynski v. J.W. Peters & Sons, Inc., 178 Ill. App.
3d 882 (1989), the appellate court held that an entrustor is liable
for permitting a poor driver to use the entrustor's vehicle
notwithstanding any restrictive directions given to the incompetent
driver; however, as the appellate court observed in Rainey v.
Pitera, 273 Ill. App. 3d 234, 239 (1995), the existence of
permission to use the vehicle is an entirely different issue.
	In this case, Vogler implicitly gave Margrum, through his
employee, Shannon, permission to take the Sable across town to
Margrum's shop for detailing and cleaning, and to return it after
the work was completed. That was the parties' longstanding
custom and practice. Margrum knew the extent of his permission
to operate the cars, and he communicated those rules to his
employees. Thus, permission to drive the car terminated when the
Sable reached Margrum's shop, which was locked up for the night.
Entrustment of the car for the evening of March 4, 1996, was to
Margrum, not Shannon. To the extent that Shannon may have had
individualized permission to drive the Sable, his permission most
certainly terminated when the Sable reached Margrum's shop, he
relinquished possession of the vehicle, and the shop was closed for
the day. The fact that the keys to the car may have been available
to any employee with access to the shop does not change the
parties' intent as to entrustment or the extent of permission granted
to drive the car. See Rainey, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 239 (leaving keys
available does not necessarily create a factual question as to
implied permission (citing Taitt v. Robinson, 266 Ill. App. 3d 130,
134-35 (1994) (Rarick, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(concluding that son's express permission to use father's truck on
the farm had expired several hours before he took the truck onto
the highway without his father's permission and knowledge, and
that leaving keys in the ignition did not constitute implied
permission to take the truck onto the highway)). The limits of
permission to drive the Sable were strictly circumscribed by rules
that everyone involved understood. There is no doubt that
Shannon's permission to operate the car did not extend into the
late evening hours of March 4 and the early morning hours of
March 5, when Margrum's business was closed. Shannon had
neither Vogler's nor Margrum's permission to use Vogler's
vehicle on the night of the collision. In fact, Shannon essentially
committed a criminal act-criminal trespass to the vehicle (720
ILCS 5/21-2 (West 1996) (knowingly and without authority
operated the vehicle))-when he took the car from Margrum's
shop, an act unequivocally beyond the purview of the initial
permission granted.
	Because we find that Vogler neither knew, nor should have
known, that the Sable would likely be used in a manner involving
an unreasonable risk of harm to others, we would reverse on that
basis alone. We hold that Vogler had no duty to inquire as to
Shannon's driver's license status under the circumstances.
Moreover, there was no express or implied permission granted to
Shannon to use the vehicle at the time the collision occurred; thus,
there was no entrustment.
	Given our disposition, we find that the circuit court
unnecessarily reached plaintiff's constitutional challenge and that
it is unnecessary for us to address that issue. See Flynn v. Ryan,
199 Ill. 2d 430, 438 (2002); Hearne v. Illinois State Board of
Education, 185 Ill. 2d 443, 445 (1999). This court will not address
constitutional issues that are unnecessary for the disposition of the
case under review even though the court acquires jurisdiction of
the case because a constitutional question is involved. People v.
Nash, 173 Ill. 2d 423, 432 (1996); People ex rel. Sklodowski v.
State of Illinois, 162 Ill. 2d 117, 131 (1994).
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is
reversed as it pertains to Vogler and we remand this cause for
assessment of damages against only Shannon and Margrum.
Reversed and remanded with directions.