Case Title: Sanderson v. City of Willmar

Citation: 162 N.W.2d 494

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1968-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
162 N.W.2d 494 (1968) Edith M. SANDERSON, et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF WILLMAR, Appellant. No. 40858. Supreme Court of Minnesota. November 1, 1968. *495 Ronald C. Anderson, City Atty., Willmar, for appellant. Willette, Zeug & Kraft, Olivia, for respondents. NELSON, Justice. Edith Sanderson and others instituted an action against the city of Willmar, a municipal corporation, to permanently enjoin it from rezoning their property located in block 50 of said city from "business and commercial" to "automobile parking." After trial without a jury, the proposed ordinance was held invalid, and defendant city was permanently enjoined from the third reading, publication, and adoption of the ordinance. Defendant appeals from the judgment entered. The record discloses that the city of Willmar on January 27, 1960, adopted Ordinance No. 2.015, providing for basic land uses and zoning and including by reference the "City of Willmar Zoning Map." Section VII of the ordinance provided in part as follows: On August 18 and September 1, 1965, proposed amendments to this ordinance were read which provided for removal and transfer of lots 4 through 13 in block 50 from the business and commercial district to the automobile parking district. Section IX of Ordinance No. 2.015 relates to automobile parking district, and subdivision 3 thereof reads: Plaintiffs contend that the rezoning of their property would substantially decrease its value; that the rezoning was not only unreasonable but confiscatory and an unlawful invasion of the owners' property rights, causing the value of the property to be substantially diminished without its adoption offering any great or substantial benefit to the general public. They point out, furthermore, that the right of condemnation is available to the city should it seek to acquire any of this property for the purpose of establishing a public parking district in that locality. *497 The testimony in the case, which appears to be uncontradicted, shows that the rezoning to automobile parking will seriously affect the value of the land by elimination of all competitive bidding on the land resulting in elimination of all commercial buyers. The testimony further indicated that automobile parking zones have no commercial value. Plaintiffs contend that defendant city cannot under the guise of the proposed zoning regulation confiscate the property of a private individual or inflict substantial injury on the owners of the property without just compensation, and that the ordinance violates Minn.Const. art, 1, § 13, and U.S.Const. Amends. V and XIV. See, 16 Am.Jur.(2d) Constitutional Law, § 361. Minn.Const. art. 1, § 13, provides: 1. The trial court found that the reclassification of the land would substantially decrease its value. The evidence herein supports the court's finding. See, 16 Am.Jur.(2d) Constitutional Law, § 366. 2. The power to regulate by zoning may not be applied to appease the city's desire to restrain the natural operation of the laws of economics. A zoning reclassification cannot be used as a tool to depress the market value of the property so as to defeat the payment of a just price when the land is taken. See, 101 C.J.S., Zoning, § 29. 3. It is well settled that the right to sell one's property to anyone at any time for any price is a property right. See, 16A C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 599; 16 Am.Jur. (2d) Constitutional Law, § 335. Defendant city concedes that the ordinance would assure to it the first opportunity to purchase, and if no settlement is reached, then, and then only, will it take by condemnation. This court supports the policy that an amendment to a comprehensive zoning plan under the police powers which results in a total destruction or substantial diminution of value of the property affected thereby without just compensation therefor constitutes a taking of the property without due process. Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 267 Minn. 155, 125 N.W.2d 583. See, also, Olsen v. City of Minneapolis, 263 Minn. 1, 115 N.W.2d 734; Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 118 N.W.2d 659. Defendant cannot by ordinance remove from plaintiffs the right to sell to anyone for any price they may see fit. Under the provisions of the proposed ordinance, should plaintiffs wish to selland this whether they have a prospective buyer or notthey must notify the city in writing and it would have the first chance to buy. This invades a property right which an owner has to sell his property. 4. Zoning ordinances are constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power when reasonably related to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016; Kiges v. City of St. Paul, 240 Minn. 522, 62 N.W.2d 363. Zoning ordinances are, of course, subject to the usual legal and constitutional limitations and requirements affecting other police measures, including those of reasonableness and freedom from arbitrariness or discrimination. Kiges v. City of St. Paul, supra; State ex rel. Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 204 N.W. 569, 54 A.L.R. 1012. Briefly, a zoning ordinance must be reasonably within the city's scope of authority, must be reasonable and free from unlawful discrimination, *498 and must be enforced in a reasonable manner. Rhyne, Municipal Law, § 32-2, p. 814. In Minnesota the authority to adopt and amend comprehensive municipal planning ordinances is found in Minn.St. 462.351 to 462.364. The ordinance in question was adopted under Minn.St.1961, § 462.01, which has since been repealed (L.1965, c. 670, § 14) but was similar to the statutory authority now in effect. 5. Clearly, the proposed ordinance herein restricts the use of property by the property owners.[1] The United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S. Ct. 158, 160, 67 L. Ed. 322, 326, stated the general rule as follows: The trial court in its memorandum stated: This determination by the court below must be sustained. Affirmed. [1] Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517; Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976, 18 L.R.A. 543; Arverne Bay Const. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587, 117 A.L.R. 1110.