Case Title: Weaver v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 58, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
HOWARD S. WEAVER, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 58, 2006 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN81-03-0131 
§                    IN81-03-1258 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 12, 2006 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: July 10, 2006 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 10th day of July 2006, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Howard S. Weaver, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s January 19, 2006 order denying his motion for 
correction of illegal sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 
35(a).  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the 
judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of Weaver’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and 
AFFIRM. 
 
2
 
(2) 
In July 1981, Weaver was found guilty by a Superior Court jury 
of Rape in the First Degree and Kidnapping in the First Degree.  He was 
sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, with the possibly 
of parole.  Weaver’s convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court 
on direct appeal.1 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Weaver claims that the Superior Court erred 
when it denied his motion for correction of illegal sentence.  He argues that, 
under Crosby v. State, 824 A.2d 894 (Del. 2003), his life terms should be 
converted to 45-year terms and a conditional release date should be set by 
the Department of Correction.   
 
(4) 
Weaver’s argument is incorrect as a matter of law.  Under 
Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539 (Del. 2005), Weaver is not eligible for 
conditional release and must remain incarcerated until his death, unless he is 
granted parole.  Moreover, good time credit may be applied to Weaver’s 
sentence only to accelerate his parole eligibility date, not to shorten his 
sentence.  Weaver’s attempt to argue that Crosby is a binding precedent, 
while Evans is not, is unavailing.  The factual situation presented in Crosby 
is simply different from that presented in Evans.  It is clear that Evans 
represents the relevant precedent governing Weaver’s sentence.     
                                                 
1 Weaver v. State, Del. Supr., No. 308, 1981, McNeilly, J. (June 22, 1982). 
 
3
 
(5) 
It is manifest on the face of Weaver’s opening brief that the 
appeal is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled 
by settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is 
implicated, clearly there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  
The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice