Case Title: Walker v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 210, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ISAIAH J. WALKER, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 210, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 1007020527 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: October 15, 2014 
  Decided: December 4, 2014 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 4th day of December 2014, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Isaiah Walker, filed this appeal from 
the Superior Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief.  
Walker’s counsel on appeal has filed a no-merit brief and a motion to 
withdraw under Rule 26(c).  Counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and 
careful examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  
Walker filed a response to his attorney’s presentation raising one issue for 
the Court's consideration on appeal.  His sole contention is that his trial 
2 
 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal on his behalf.1  The 
State has responded to this issue and to the position taken by Walker’s 
counsel and has moved to affirm the Superior Court's judgment.  We find no 
merit to Walker’s appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that Walker broke into his adoptive father’s 
home on July 23, 2010 and bludgeoned his father and his grandmother with 
a hammer while they slept.  He fled in his father’s car.  When police arrived, 
both victims were in critical condition.  Both lived but were institutionalized 
due to their traumatic injuries.  Police later arrested Walker while he was 
driving the stolen vehicle.  He had blood on him.  He later confessed to the 
attacks.   
(3) 
On   May 11, 2011, Walker pled guilty to Attempted Murder in 
the First Degree, Assault in the First Degree, two counts of Possession of a 
Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, Burglary in the First 
Degree, and Theft of a Motor Vehicle.  The Superior Court sentenced 
Walker to life imprisonment on the attempted murder conviction plus an 
additional period of twenty-one years at Level V incarceration on his 
remaining convictions.  After his direct appeal was dismissed as untimely, 
                                                 
1 To the extent that Walker raised additional issues in the Rule 61 motion he filed in the 
Superior Court, his failure to reassert those issues in response to his appellate counsel’s 
Rule 26(c) brief constitutes a waiver of those claims on appeal.  See Murphy v. State, 632 
A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993). 
3 
 
Walker filed a motion for postconviction relief.  The Superior Court 
appointed counsel to represent him.  Counsel later moved to withdraw.  The 
Superior Court granted the motion to withdraw and denied postconviction 
relief on March 31, 2014.  This appeal followed. 
(4) 
Walker’s counsel on appeal has filed a no-merit brief and a 
motion to withdraw under Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review 
applicable to the consideration of a motion to withdraw and an 
accompanying brief under Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be 
satisfied that defense counsel has made a conscientious examination of the 
record and the law for arguable claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.2 
(5) 
Walker’s sole contention on appeal is that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal on his behalf.  To prevail on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must satisfy the familiar 
Strickland test.  That is, “[a] defendant must first show that that his counsel's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  Second, 
                                                 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
4 
 
the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense.”3 
 
(6) 
In this case, trial counsel filed an affidavit in response to 
Walker’s claim of ineffectiveness and denied that Walker had requested him 
to file an appeal.  The Superior Court accepted that representation and 
concluded that counsel did not commit any error under the circumstances.  
Moreover, the Superior Court also determined that Walker’s claim failed on 
the second prong of the Strickland standard because he could not establish 
any prejudice even assuming counsel failed to file an appeal.  We agree. 
 
(7) 
 A review of the record in this case reflects that Walker entered 
his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  Walker does not 
argue on appeal that his guilty plea was defective in any way.  Accordingly, 
the only arguable claim that counsel could have raised on direct appeal 
would have been a challenge to Walker’s sentence.  Our review of sentences 
on direct appeal, however, is limited.4  Walker’s signed plea agreement 
reflects his understanding that the maximum sentence he could have 
received was life in prison plus 100 years.  He stated under oath that no one 
had promised him what his sentence would be.  The Superior Court 
                                                 
3 Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 941-42 (Del. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). 
4 Cruz v. State, 990 A.2d 409, 416 (Del. 2010). 
5 
 
sentenced him to life imprisonment plus twenty-one years.  His sentence 
thus was within statutory limits.  Under these circumstances, we find no 
cause or prejudice from counsel’s failure to file a direct appeal. 
(8) 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Walker’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Walker’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Walker could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Karen L. Valihura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice