Case Title: Weaver v. Georg Karl Geka Bush

Citation: 166 Vt. 98, 689 A.2d 439

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Weaver v. Georg Karl Geka Brush (94-444); 166 Vt. 98; 689 A.2d 439

[Filed 20-Dec-1996]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 94-444

Linda A. Weaver, David P. Weaver                  Supreme Court
and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                           Windham Superior Court
          
Georg Karl Geka Brush, GmbH and                   May Term, 1996
Otto Schell

Richard W. Norton, J.

       Thomas W. Costello, John C. Mabie and Joel T. Faxon, of Costello &
  Mabie, and Jesse M. Corum, IV, of Gale, Corum & Stern, Brattleboro, for
  plaintiffs-appellants  Linda and David Weaver

       Robert P. Gerety, Jr., White River Junction, for plaintiff-appellee
  Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.

       Joseph C. Galanes of Kristensen, Cummings, Phillips, Carroll &
  Melendy, P.C., Brattleboro, for defendant-appellee

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiffs Linda and David Weaver brought a personal
  injury suit against defendant Georg Karl Geka Brush, GmbH, a German
  corporation, and its employee Otto Schell,(FN1) claiming that Linda Weaver
  was injured as a result of Schell's design of a machine and Georg Karl Geka
  Brush, GmbH, was vicariously liable.  Plaintiffs also attempted to join
  Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as a party plaintiff alleging that it was
  a real party in interest because it had made workers' compensation payments
  to Linda Weaver and claimed a lien on any recovery.  The jury found that
  defendant was not negligent.  On appeal, plaintiffs raise three arguments: 
  (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant their motion for judgment
  notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) because defendant Georg Karl Geka
  Brush, GmbH failed to show that Otto

 

  Schell had become the borrowed servant of Geka Brush Manufacturing
  Corporation, its local subsidiary; (2) the jury charge on the
  borrowed-servant doctrine was misleading and prejudicial; and (3) Liberty
  Mutual Insurance Company is a real party in interest and should have been
  joined in the litigation.  We affirm.

       On August 30, 1989, plaintiff suffered an injury while operating a
  disposable brush-welding machine at the Geka Brush Manufacturing
  Corporation (Geka Vermont) plant in Brattleboro, Vermont.  Because of a jam
  in the machine, plaintiff was required to access a feeder bowl, which was
  above her head.  To do so, she was supplied with a milk crate positioned
  next to the machine.  She fell off the milk crate and suffered a sprained
  ankle.  Her medical evidence was that as a result of the fall, she now
  suffers from permanent lower back injuries.

       Geka Vermont is a Vermont corporation that manufactures component
  parts for the cosmetics industry and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Geka
  Corporation, a Delaware corporation.  Geka Corporation is, in turn, wholly
  owned by Georg Karl Geka Brush, GmbH, a German limited liability
  corporation (Geka Germany).

       It was the practice of Geka Germany to send its employees to its
  subsidiary corporations. Geka Vermont requested that Geka Germany send one
  of its employees to conduct training sessions, assist in the operation of
  the mascara dispensing machines, and to make any necessary repairs to the
  machines.  Geka Germany complied with Geka Vermont's request, and sent Otto
  Schell, a mechanical engineer, to the Vermont plant.  It was standard
  practice for the subsidiary corporations to reimburse the parent
  corporation for the services of the employee although the employee remained
  on the payroll of the parent corporation.  This arrangement was used for
  Otto Schell.

       At the Vermont plant, without informing or seeking the consent of Geka
  Germany, the president of Geka Vermont asked Schell to design and construct
  a new mascara dispensing machine to fill a special order.  Schell agreed to
  do the job and went ahead and designed and built the machine.  No one at
  Geka Germany had any knowledge of the agreement between

 

  Schell and Geka Vermont.  In fact, to design and build the machine, Schell
  stayed with Geka Vermont longer than originally planned.  Geka Germany did
  not approve of Schell's extended stay in Vermont.

       Plaintiffs brought a personal injury suit against Geka Germany,
  contending that Schell's negligent construction of the machine was the
  proximate cause of Linda Weaver's injury. Plaintiffs argued that Geka
  Germany, as Schell's employer, was vicariously liable for her injuries.

       In December 1994, the matter was tried before a jury.  Geka Germany
  denied any liability on its part, arguing that although Schell was its
  employee, he had become the borrowed servant of Geka Vermont.  Defendant
  also argued that Schell was not negligent in designing and constructing the
  machine, and that any negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs'
  injury.  The jury found that defendant Geka Germany was not negligent.

       Defendant sought a directed verdict and j.n.o.v. on liability, arguing
  that Schell was negligent as a matter of law and that he remained the
  servant of Geka Germany, also as a matter of law.  The court denied these
  motions.

       We first address plaintiffs' argument that they should have been
  granted a directed verdict on liability.  Their argument has two steps: 
  Otto Schell was guilty of negligence as a matter of law by designing a
  machine that relied upon an unsafe milk crate for access to a part of the
  machine; and defendant was vicariously liable for Schell's negligence
  because it was his master, Geka Vermont did not become his master, and he
  was acting within the scope of his employment.

       In considering a motion for a directed verdict or j.n.o.v., we must
  evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
  excluding the effect of any modifying evidence.  See Nadeau v. Hilgert, ___
  Vt. ___, ___,