Case Title: Pinti v. Emigrant Mortgage Co., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11742

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11742 
 
LINDA PINTI & another1  vs.  EMIGRANT MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC., & 
another.2 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     January 8, 2015. - July 17, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Mortgage, Foreclosure, Real estate.  Real Property, Mortgage, 
Sale.  Sale, Real estate.  Notice, Foreclosure of mortgage.  
Declaratory Relief.  Practice, Civil, Declaratory 
proceeding, Summary judgment. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 31, 2013. 
 
 
The case was heard by Maureen B. Hogan, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Richard M.W. Bauer (Stefanie A. Balandis, Amanda B. Loring, 
& Geoffry Walsh with him) for the plaintiffs. 
 
Howard M. Brown (Sarah Ann Smegal, Tom Looney, & Lauren 
Solar with him) for Harold Wilion. 
 
Michael P. Robinson for Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc. 
                     
 
1 Lesley Phillips. 
 
 
2 Harold Wilion. 
2 
 
 
 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
 
James P. Long, pro se. 
 
Daniel D. Bahls & Courtney Clemente for Community Legal 
Aid. 
 
Grace C. Ross, pro se. 
 
 
 
BOTSFORD, J.  In 2012, the defendant Emigrant Mortgage 
Company, Inc. (Emigrant), foreclosed on the mortgage of the 
plaintiffs Lesley Phillips and Linda Pinti by exercise of the 
power of sale contained in the mortgage.  Thereafter, the 
plaintiffs filed this action in the Superior Court against 
Emigrant and the defendant Harold Wilion, the purchaser of the 
property at the foreclosure sale, seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the sale was void because Emigrant failed to comply with 
paragraph 22 of the mortgage, which concerns the mortgagee's 
provision of notice to the mortgagor of default and the right to 
cure, and also the remedies available to the mortgagee upon the 
mortgagor's failure to cure the default, including the power of 
sale (notice of default provisions).  We agree with the 
plaintiffs that strict compliance with the notice of default 
provisions in paragraph 22 of the mortgage was required as a 
condition of a valid foreclosure sale, and that Emigrant failed 
to meet the strict compliance requirement.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the allowance of the defendant Emigrant's motion to 
3 
 
dismiss and of the defendant Wilion's motion for summary 
judgment.3 
 
Background.4  Phillips purchased a condominium unit 
(property) in Cambridge in 1982.  In 2005, she transferred title 
to the property by quitclaim deed to herself and her spouse, 
Pinti, as tenants by the entirety.  On March 13, 2008, Pinti and 
Phillips granted a mortgage on the property to Emigrant to 
secure a $160,000 loan.5  Paragraph 22 of the mortgage provides 
that, prior to acceleration of the loan following any breach of 
the mortgage by the plaintiffs, Emigrant is required to notify 
the plaintiffs of "(a) the default; (b) the action required to 
cure the default; (c) a date, not less than [thirty] days from 
the date the notice is given to [the plaintiffs], by which the 
default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default 
on or before the date specified in the notice may result in 
acceleration of the sums secured by [the mortgage]."  Paragraph 
22 further provides that such notice must inform the plaintiffs 
"of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to 
bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default or 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by James P. 
Long, Community Legal Aid, and Grace C. Ross. 
 
4 The facts are drawn from the summary judgment materials 
before the motion judge. 
 
 
5 Linda Pinti was a party to the note underlying the 
mortgage, but Lesley Phillips was not. 
 
4 
 
any other defense of [the plaintiffs] to acceleration and sale" 
(emphasis added), and adds that upon failure to cure the 
default, Emigrant may invoke "the statutory power of sale."6 
                     
 
6 Paragraph 22 of the mortgage provides in full: 
 
"Acceleration; Remedies.  Lender shall give notice to 
Borrower prior to acceleration following Borrower's breach 
of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument 
. . . .  The notice shall specify:  (a) the default; (b) 
the action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not 
less than [thirty] days from the date the notice is given 
to Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) 
that failure to cure the default on or before the date 
specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the 
sums secured by this Security Instrument and sale of the 
Property.  The notice shall further inform Borrower of the 
right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to 
bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a 
default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration 
and sale.  If the default is not cured on or before the 
date specified in the notice, Lender at its option may 
require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by 
this Security Instrument without further demand and may 
invoke the STATUTORY POWER OF SALE and any other remedies 
permitted by Applicable Law.  Lender shall be entitled to 
collect all expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies 
provided in this Section 22, including, but not limited to, 
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title evidence. 
 
 
"If Lender invokes the STATUTORY POWER OF SALE, Lender 
shall mail a copy of a notice of sale to Borrower, and to 
other persons prescribed by Applicable Law, in the manner 
provided by Applicable Law.  Lender shall publish the 
notice of sale, and the Property shall be sold in the 
manner prescribed by Applicable Law.  Lender or its 
designee may purchase the Property at any sale.  The 
proceeds of the sale shall be applied in the following 
order:  (a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not 
limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees; (b) to all sums 
secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to 
the person or persons legally entitled to it." 
 
5 
 
 
In August and September of 2009, the plaintiffs failed to 
make the monthly mortgage payments that were due.  On 
September 29, 2009, Emigrant sent a notice of default to the 
plaintiffs pursuant to paragraph 22.  The notice stated that the 
plaintiffs had failed to make monthly mortgage payments, 
demanded payment of a sum sufficient to satisfy the outstanding 
amount by December 28, 2009, and noted that the mortgagee could 
invoke the statutory power of sale if the plaintiffs failed to 
cure the default in the time allowed.  Finally, the notice 
stated that "notice is hereby given that [the plaintiffs] have 
the right to assert in any lawsuit for foreclosure and sale the 
nonexistence of a default or any other defense [they] may have 
to acceleration and foreclosure and sale" (emphasis added). 
 
In 2011, Pinti sent Emigrant a "qualified written request" 
(QWR) that asked Emigrant to identify the holder of the 
plaintiffs' mortgage and the owner of Pinti's loan.7  The letter 
also requested copies of any assignment of the plaintiffs' 
mortgage, and of Pinti's promissory note "in its current 
condition showing all endorsements and/or allonges."  Emigrant's 
                     
 
7 A "qualified written request" (QWR) is "a written 
correspondence" that "includes . . . the name and account of the 
borrower" and "a statement of the reasons for the belief of the 
borrower, to the extent applicable, that the account is in error 
or provides sufficient detail to the servicer regarding other 
information sought by the borrower."  12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(B) 
(2012). 
 
6 
 
response to the QWR, dated August 22, 2011, indicated that ESB-
MH Holdings, LLC (ESB-MH), owned the loan, but that Emigrant 
held and serviced the loan.  The response enclosed a copy of 
Emigrant's assignment of the plaintiffs' mortgage and note to 
ESB-MH; the assignment was signed by Filippo Ruggiero, "Vice 
President" of Emigrant.  It appears on the face of the 
assignment that Ruggiero executed it on November 30, 2009, but 
Emigrant's response to the QWR asserts that "the assignment 
transferring ownership of the note and mortgage to [ESB-MH] has 
not been recorded and the original note and mortgage, as well as 
the assignment of the mortgage[,] are in the possession of 
[Emigrant,] which is prosecuting the foreclosure action as the 
holder and servicer of the loan."  Emigrant's response to the 
QWR also enclosed Pinti's note with an allonge indicating that 
the note had been paid to the order of ESB-MH without recourse 
by Emigrant, and then endorsed in blank without recourse by ESB-
MH. 
 
Emigrant published a notice of foreclosure sale regarding 
the plaintiffs' property in the Boston Herald on June 12, 19, 
and 26, 2012.  Wilion purchased the property at the foreclosure 
sale held on August 9, 2012, and obtained a foreclosure deed 
from Emigrant dated September 10, 2012.  Wilion then initiated a 
summary process action against the plaintiffs in the District 
Court. 
7 
 
 
On January 31, 2013, the plaintiffs filed the present 
action against the defendants in the Superior Court.  The 
plaintiffs' complaint sought a judgment declaring that the 
foreclosure sale was void, and asserted multiple theories 
supporting this claim, two of which are relevant to this appeal:  
(1) Emigrant's September 29, 2009, notice of default did not 
comply with paragraph 22 because it did not explicitly inform 
the plaintiffs of "the right to bring a court action to assert 
the non-existence of a default or any other defense of [the 
plaintiffs] to acceleration and sale," as required by the 
paragraph; and (2) Emigrant did not hold the relevant mortgage 
and promissory note when it foreclosed on the property.  In 
addition, the complaint sought a judgment declaring that Wilion 
failed to comply with the prerequisites for initiating a summary 
process action on the ground that Wilion, to whom Emigrant sold 
the property, did not have superior title to the property 
because Emigrant did not lawfully foreclose.8 
 
Emigrant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' 
complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (1) and (6), 365 Mass. 
754 (1974).  Separately, Wilion filed a counterclaim seeking a 
judgment declaring that the foreclosure and foreclosure sale 
                     
8 The complaint also sought injunctive relief against Wilion 
to preclude him from pursuing a summary process action against 
the plaintiffs or from offering the property for sale.  The 
plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction was denied. 
 
8 
 
were valid and, consequently, that Wilion possessed superior 
title to the property by virtue of the foreclosure deed.  
Shortly thereafter, Wilion filed a motion for summary judgment 
with respect to the plaintiffs' complaint and his counterclaim, 
and the plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment in 
their favor on both their complaint and Wilion's counterclaim. 
 
After a hearing, a judge in the Superior Court allowed 
Wilion's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' 
cross-motion.  The judge rejected the plaintiffs' argument that 
Emigrant's notice of default rendered the foreclosure void, 
reasoning that Emigrant was not required strictly to comply with 
a term of the mortgage, such as the notice of default and right-
to-cure provisions of paragraph 22, that had no direct 
relationship to the power of sale.  The judge also determined 
there was no genuine factual dispute that Emigrant validly held 
the mortgage and the note at the time of the foreclosure sale.  
In accordance with her decision, a judgment entered in favor of 
Wilion on his counterclaim that declared the foreclosure of the 
mortgage and the foreclosure sale were valid and, therefore, 
that Wilion held good title to the property.  In a separate 
decision, the judge also allowed Emigrant's motion to dismiss 
for reasons substantially similar to those in her summary 
judgment decision.  The plaintiffs timely appealed, and we 
transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion. 
9 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  "We review a grant of 
summary judgment de novo to determine 'whether, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all 
material facts have been established and the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'"  Juliano v. 
Simpson, 461 Mass. 527, 529-530 (2012), quoting Augat, Inc. v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991).  "Because our 
review is de novo, we accord no deference to the decision of the 
motion judge."  DeWolfe v. Hingham Centre, Ltd., 464 Mass. 795, 
799 (2013).  De novo review also applies to the judge's 
dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 
(b) (1) and (6).  See Curtis v. Herb Chambers 1-95, Inc., 458 
Mass. 674, 676 (2011).  See also Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 
451 Mass. 623, 636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007). 
 
2.  Compliance with paragraph 22.  The plaintiffs argue 
that Emigrant was required to conduct the foreclosure sale in 
strict compliance with paragraph 22.  They reason that under 
this court's decisions, compliance with the terms of the 
mortgage describing the steps that lead up to foreclosure, 
beginning with the notice of default provision spelled out in 
paragraph 22, is a necessary component of the power of sale 
provided in the mortgage as well as of the statutory power of 
10 
 
sale set out in G. L. c. 183, § 21 (§ 21).9  Conversely, the 
defendants contend that this court's decision in U.S. Bank Nat'l 
Ass'n v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421, 422 (2014) (Schumacher), 
concerning the notice of default and right-to-cure notice 
provisions of G. L. c. 244, § 35A (§ 35A), and the relationship 
between § 35A and the power of sale in § 21, dictates that 
strict compliance with the analogous contractual notice of 
default provision of paragraph 22 was not required because like 
§ 35A, paragraph 22 is not part of the power of sale.  Agreeing 
                     
 
9 General Laws c. 183, § 21 (§ 21), provides: 
 
 
"The following 'power' shall be known as the 
'Statutory Power of Sale', and may be incorporated in any 
mortgage by reference: 
 
"(POWER.) 
 
 
"But upon any default in the performance or observance 
of the foregoing or other condition, the mortgagee or his 
executors, administrators, successors or assigns may sell 
the mortgaged premises or such portion thereof as may 
remain subject to the mortgage in case of any partial 
release thereof, either as a whole or in parcels, together 
with all improvements that may be thereon, by public 
auction on or near the premises then subject to the 
mortgage, or, if more than one parcel is then subject 
thereto, on or near one of said parcels, or at such place 
as may be designated for that purpose in the mortgage, 
first complying with the terms of the mortgage and with the 
statutes relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the 
exercise of a power of sale, and may convey the same by 
proper deed or deeds to the purchaser or purchasers 
absolutely and in fee simple; and such sale shall forever 
bar the mortgagor and all persons claiming under him from 
all right and interest in the mortgaged premises, whether 
at law or in equity" (emphasis added). 
 
11 
 
with the motion judge, they argue that Emigrant's notice of 
default was required only to comply with paragraph 22 
substantially, not strictly, and that the notice sent by 
Emigrant to the plaintiffs met this standard.  Even if we were 
to assume that Emigrant's notice did qualify as "substantial 
compliance" with the notice of default provisions of paragraph 
22, we disagree that such compliance was sufficient for a valid 
foreclosure sale in this case; strict adherence to the notice of 
default provisions in the paragraph was required. 
 
"Massachusetts does not require a [mortgagee] to obtain 
judicial authorization to foreclose on a mortgaged property."  
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 645-646 (2011) 
(Ibanez).   Accordingly, a mortgagee may conduct a foreclosure 
by exercise of the statutory power of sale set out in § 21, 
where, as here, the mortgage itself gives the mortgagee a power 
of sale and includes by reference the statutory power.  See 
Ibanez, supra at 646.  Under the terms of the statutory power of 
sale, the power may be exercised "upon any default in the 
performance" of a condition of the mortgage, such as the 
mortgagor's failure to pay the note underlying the mortgage.  
G. L. c. 183, § 21.  Exercise of the power entitles a mortgagee 
to sell the mortgaged property at public auction, convey the 
property to the purchaser in fee simple, "and such sale shall 
forever bar the mortgagor and all persons claiming under him 
12 
 
from all right and interest in the mortgaged premises, whether 
at law or in equity."  Id.  See Ibanez, supra.  Section 21 
expressly requires, however, that to effectuate a valid 
foreclosure sale pursuant to a power of sale, the mortgagee must 
"first comply[] with the terms of the mortgage and with the 
statutes relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the 
exercise of a power of sale." 
 
This court has recently reemphasized the point that in 
light of "the substantial power that the statutory scheme 
affords to a [mortgagee] to foreclose without immediate judicial 
oversight, we adhere to the familiar rule that 'one who sells 
under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its terms'"; the 
failure to do so results in "no valid execution of the power, 
and the sale is wholly void."  Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 646, quoting 
Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 207, 211 (1905).  See Pryor v. Baker, 
133 Mass. 459, 460 (1882) ("The exercise of a power to sell by a 
mortgagee is always carefully watched, and is to be exercised 
with careful regard to the interests of the mortgagor").  This 
is true with respect to terms that are connected to the power of 
sale contained in the mortgage instrument itself,10 and to terms 
                     
 
10 Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 207, 210-212 (1905), quoted in 
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637, 646 (2011) 
(Ibanez), was such a case.  Others include, e.g., McGreevey v. 
Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank, 294 Mass. 480, 483-484 (1936); 
Smith v. Provin, 4 Allen 516, 518 (1862); Roarty v. Mitchell, 7 
Gray 243, 244 (1856). 
13 
 
contained in § 21, the statutory power of sale, or in one of 
"the statutes relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the 
exercise of a power of sale" to which § 21 refers.11 
 
Wilion asserts, correctly, that in a number of our 
foreclosure cases requiring strict compliance with mortgage 
terms relating to a power of sale, the terms at issue were 
connected to the foreclosure sale itself.  See McGreevey v. 
Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank, 294 Mass. 480, 481, 484 (1936) 
(although mortgaged property was located in Medford, in 
Middlesex County, mortgage required foreclosure sale to be 
advertised and held in Suffolk County; advertisement in Medford 
newspaper complied with statutory requirement in G. L. [Ter. 
Ed.] c. 244, § 14, but did not comply with terms of mortgage, 
rendering foreclosure sale void); Moore, 187 Mass. at 210-212 
(noncompliance with mortgage term identifying newspaper in which 
foreclosure sale was to be advertised rendered foreclosure sale 
void).  But none of these cases indicates or even suggests that 
the court's holding turned on the fact that the terms of the 
mortgage with which the mortgagee failed to comply related 
                                                                  
 
11 See, e.g., Eaton v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 
569, 580-581 (2012); Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 647-648.  See also 
Tamburello v. Monahan, 321 Mass. 445, 446-447 (1947) (power of 
sale referenced in mortgage was statutory power of sale; lack of 
compliance with requirement in G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 183, § 21, 
that sale be on or near mortgaged premises rendered foreclosure 
sale void). 
 
14 
 
directly to the foreclosure sale.  Rather, the point was the 
more general one that the terms of the power of sale, whatever 
they might be, demanded strict compliance.  Indeed, our cases 
have indicated consistently that the mortgagee, to effect a 
valid foreclosure sale, must strictly comply not only with the 
terms of the actual power of sale in the mortgage, but also with 
any conditions precedent to the exercise of the power that the 
mortgage might contain.  See Roarty v. Mitchell, 7 Gray 243, 
243-244 (1856) (where mortgage provided that upon default of 
payment by mortgagor, mortgagee "may enter and take possession 
of said premises immediately, and may sell and dispose of the 
same, on giving two weeks' notice thereof publicly," entry and 
possession by mortgagee were conditions precedent to exercise of 
power of sale; absence of entry and possession by mortgagee 
prior to foreclosure sale rendered it void); Smith v. Provin, 4 
Allen 516, 516, 518 (1862) (mortgage contained power of sale to 
be exercised upon default by mortgagor, plus certain "conditions 
annexed to the power of sale," including requirement that within 
one year following foreclosure sale, mortgagee was to make and 
record affidavit of compliance with requirements of deed; 
mortgagee's failure to comply with this "annexed" condition 
rendered foreclosure sale void); Rogers v. Barnes, 169 Mass. 
179, 184 (1897) ("Still the general rule is that conditions 
precedent to the execution of a power of sale must be strictly 
15 
 
complied with"); McGreevey, 294 Mass. at 484 ("This court has 
said that the general rule is that conditions precedent to the 
execution of a power of sale must be strictly complied with"  
[quotation and citation omitted]).  See also Foster, Hall & 
Adams Co. v. Sayles, 213 Mass. 319, 321-324 (1913).12 
 
Emigrant contends that cases such as Foster, Hall & Adams 
Co., supra; Moore, supra; and Smith, supra, are inapplicable 
here because they predate the enactment of the statutory power 
of sale set forth in § 21, which was enacted in 1912.  See St. 
1912, c. 502, § 6.  The argument is unavailing.  "Mortgages 
containing a power of sale existed at least as early as one 
hundred years before enactment of the statutory power."  Eaton 
                     
 
12 The court's decision in Foster, Hall & Adams Co. v. 
Sayles, 213 Mass. 319 (1913), illustrates the principle 
articulated in the cases cited in this paragraph.  The defendant 
in Foster, Hall & Adams obtained title to the mortgage property 
at issue through a foreclosure sale conducted pursuant to a 
power of sale in the mortgage.  Id. at 321-322.  The question 
before the court was whether the defendant's title could be 
proved valid where the provisions of the mortgage properly could 
be read to permit the power of sale to be exercised only after 
thirty days' notice of default had been given to the mortgagor, 
and there was no evidence presented that such notice had been 
given.  See id. at 322-323.  The court answered that the failure 
to provide the notice of default -- a requirement that was 
actually set out in an article of the mortgage separate from the 
article defining the power of sale -- provided a sufficient 
basis on which to conclude that the foreclosure sale probably 
was invalid.  Id. at 322-324.  In other words, although the 
court did not use the term "condition precedent," the court 
essentially treated the particular mortgage's provision for 
thirty days' notice of default to be given as such a condition -
- that is, a prerequisite to a valid exercise of the power of 
sale. 
 
16 
 
v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 580 n.16 (2012).  
As reflected in the title of the act that established the 
statutory power of sale, "An Act to shorten the forms of deeds, 
mortgages and other instruments relating to real property,"13 
§ 21 was enacted to give the power of sale "statutory form to 
shorten the length of mortgage instruments."  Eaton, supra.  
Nothing in the language or history of § 21 suggests that the 
Legislature intended the statute to disavow or alter this 
court's rulings that mortgage terms associated with the power of 
sale must be followed strictly.  Indeed, § 21 by its terms 
offers explicit support for this conclusion, in expressly 
directing that one who seeks to conduct a foreclosure sale 
pursuant to the statutory power of sale must first comply with 
"the terms of the mortgage" and "the statutes relating to the 
foreclosure of mortgages by the exercise of a power of sale," 
and taking care to list these two requirements separately.  See 
note 9, supra. 
 
In advancing their argument, the plaintiffs correctly do 
not contend that to effectuate a valid exercise of a power of 
sale contained in a mortgage, a mortgagee must demonstrate 
punctilious performance of every single mortgage term.  As 
illustrated by the cases previously discussed, our decisions 
                     
 
13 See St. 1912, c. 502. 
 
17 
 
suggest that the mortgage terms requiring strict compliance are 
limited to (1) terms directly concerned with the foreclosure 
sale authorized by the power of sale in the mortgage, and (2) 
those prescribing actions the mortgagee must take in connection 
with the foreclosure sale -- whether before or after the sale 
takes place.14  Insofar as the plaintiffs' mortgage is concerned, 
paragraph 22 begins by requiring notice of default to be given 
prior to any acceleration of the sums secured by the mortgage; 
then specifically prescribes the contents of the notice of 
default; and then provides that, if the default is not cured 
before the date specified in the notice, the mortgagee may 
invoke the statutory power of sale (as well as pursue other 
remedies).  As the paragraph is written, therefore, the sending 
of the prescribed notice of default is essentially a 
prerequisite to use of the mortgage's power of sale, because the 
                     
 
14 As indicated previously in the text, this court in Rogers 
v. Barnes, 169 Mass. 179, 184 (1897), used the phrase, 
"conditions precedent to the execution of a power of sale" to 
describe the type of mortgage provision with which strict 
compliance is required, and the cases cited in support of that 
phrase included conditions that were not directly related to the 
foreclosure sale itself, but were to be performed by the 
mortgagee either before or after the sale.  See id., citing 
Smith v. Provin, 4 Allen 516 (1862) ("condition" requiring 
strict compliance was recording of affidavit of sale within one 
year after foreclosure sale); Roarty v. Mitchell, 7 Gray 243 
(1856) (strict compliance required by "condition" that mortgagee 
enter and take possession of land before foreclosure sale); and 
Foster v. Boston, 133 Mass. 143 (1882) (similar to Roarty v. 
Mitchell, supra). 
 
18 
 
power of sale may be invoked only if the default is not cured 
within the time specified in the notice of default.  In this 
regard, we agree with the plaintiffs that the "terms of the 
mortgage" with which strict compliance is required -- both as a 
matter of common law under this court's decisions and under 
§ 2115 -- include not only the provisions in paragraph 22 
relating to the foreclosure sale itself, but also the provisions 
requiring and prescribing the preforeclosure notice of default.  
See Foster, Hall & Adams Co., 213 Mass. at 322-324.16 
                     
 
15 Wilion argues that the plaintiffs waived any claim that 
§ 21 requires strict compliance with certain terms of a mortgage 
as a condition precedent to a valid foreclosure sale by failing 
to raise this issue in their opening appellate brief.  We 
disagree.  The defendants themselves put § 21 in play through 
their contention that the court's reading of § 21 in U.S. Bank 
Nat'l Ass'n v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421 (2014) (Schumacher), 
signifies that strict compliance by Emigrant with the notice of 
default provision in paragraph 22 was unnecessary.  At the very 
least, the plaintiffs were entitled to respond to this argument.  
We discuss the Schumacher case, infra. 
 
 
16 Strict compliance with paragraph 22 is especially 
important given the origins of the paragraph's provisions and 
the fact that Massachusetts is a nonjudicial foreclosure State.  
The plaintiffs' mortgage with Emigrant is documented by the 
standard form mortgage provided by the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac).  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
government-sponsored enterprises that purchase and securitize 
residential mortgage loans, see Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie 
Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments:  The Forgotten Benefit to 
Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1077, 1078, 1082 (2007), and 
"together [they] provide the largest source of home mortgage 
financing in the nation."  Id. at 1082.  Because both 
enterprises "require that loans they purchase be documented on 
their forms," the use of their standard mortgage form is 
"widespread."  Id. at 1085-1086.  The standard form mortgage 
19 
 
 
Because the plaintiffs entered into their mortgage with 
Emigrant in Massachusetts, a nonjudicial foreclosure State, the 
default provision in paragraph 22 of their mortgage provided 
that Emigrant's notice regarding the plaintiffs' default and 
right to cure had to inform the plaintiffs of "the right to 
bring a court action to assert the non-existence of a default or 
any other defense of [the plaintiffs] to acceleration and sale" 
(emphasis added).  See Beaton v. Land Court, 367 Mass. 385, 392-
393 (1975) (discussing mortgagor's avenues of relief from 
foreclosure through court actions).  The language that Emigrant 
used in the default notice that it actually sent to the 
plaintiffs -- that the plaintiffs "have the right to assert in 
any lawsuit for foreclosure and sale the nonexistence of a 
default or any other defense [they] may have to acceleration and 
                                                                  
contains several uniform covenants that are applicable in every 
State, as well as nonuniform covenants "designed to fit the 
requirements and procedure in each of the [S]tates."  See 
Jensen, Mortgage Standardization:  History of Interaction of 
Economics, Consumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7 Real Prop. 
Prob. & Tr. J. 397, 400 (1972).  Paragraph 22 qualifies as a 
nonuniform covenant because some States have judicial 
foreclosure systems while others, including Massachusetts, offer 
a nonjudicial foreclosure procedure.  Paragraph 22 was added to 
the standard form mortgage at the urging of consumer advocates 
for borrowers.  See id. at 410, 414.  Its provisions were 
intended specifically to give homeowners increased protection 
from acceleration and foreclosure sale without prior notice in 
both judicial foreclosure and nonjudicial foreclosure States.  
See id. at 402-403, 409, 414.  Declining to require strict 
compliance with paragraph 22 would weaken if not defeat the 
consumer protection purpose of the paragraph's provisions. 
 
20 
 
foreclosure and sale" (emphasis added) -- presumably would 
comply with the requirements of paragraph 22 in a judicial 
foreclosure State,17 but not in Massachusetts.  If, as the 
defendants argue, "substantial compliance" with paragraph 22 
were sufficient, and if the erroneous information sent to the 
plaintiffs constituted substantial compliance, it is obvious 
that Massachusetts mortgagors, including the plaintiffs, could 
be misled into thinking that they had no need to initiate a 
preforeclosure action against the mortgagee but could wait to 
advance a challenge or defense to foreclosure as a response to a 
lawsuit initiated by the mortgagee -- even though, as a 
practical matter, such a lawsuit would never be brought.18,19  It 
                     
17 For example, the nonuniform covenant in paragraph 22 of 
the standard form mortgage for mortgages executed in Florida, a 
judicial foreclosure State, provides that a lender's right-to-
cure notice must inform the borrower of "the right to assert in 
the foreclosure proceeding the non-existence of a default or any 
other defense of Borrower to acceleration and foreclosure" 
(emphasis added).  Florida -- Single Family -- Fannie 
Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Instrument, Form 3010.  See Orlando 
Hyatt Assocs., Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 629 So. 2d 
975, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 
18 Under this court's decisions to date, the action that a 
mortgagee in Massachusetts must file to determine whether the 
mortgagor is protected by the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act is 
not considered part of mortgage foreclosure proceedings, and a 
mortgagor has no right to challenge the validity of a 
foreclosure sale as a response to such an action.  See, e.g., 
Eaton, 462 Mass. at 580 n.14; Beaton v. Land Court, 367 Mass. 
385, 390 (1975). 
 
 
19 See Sullivan vs. Bank of New York Mellon Corp., U.S. 
Dist. Ct., No. 14-14074-MGM (D. Mass. Mar. 19, 2015), in which 
21 
 
is hardly unfair or burdensome to require a mortgagee such as 
Emigrant to comply with the provisions of paragraph 22 in one of 
its own mortgages by sending a notice that conforms to the 
language of the paragraph.  Given this, we find no compelling 
reason to bless a notice of default that fails accurately to 
notify Massachusetts mortgagors of their right, and need, to 
initiate a legal action if they seek to challenge the validity 
of the foreclosure.20 
 
Nevertheless, the defendants argue that our decision in 
Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421, controls the result in this case and 
signifies that strict compliance with paragraph 22 is not 
                                                                  
the court concluded, for essentially the same reasons as just 
stated in the text, that a notice of default stating that a 
Massachusetts mortgagor "will have an opportunity to assert a 
defense to acceleration or foreclosure 'in the foreclosure 
proceeding'" did not constitute substantial compliance with 
paragraph 22. 
 
 
20 The defendants' assertion that the plaintiffs in this 
case were not prejudiced by any failure to comply with the 
provisions of paragraph 22 misses the point.  Paragraph 22 
demands strict compliance, regardless of the existence, or not, 
of prejudice to a particular mortgagor.  See Foster, Hall & 
Adams Co., 213 Mass. at 323 ("The fact, if it was a fact, that 
the written notice which by the terms of the power of sale had 
to be given, would not have served any useful purpose is not an 
answer to the objection that the power [of sale] was not duly 
complied with").  Cf. Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 655 (Cordy, J., 
concurring) (lack of "actual unfairness" to mortgagors resulting 
from foreclosing banks' failure to establish status as assignee 
of mortgages "is not the point," because "[f]oreclosure is a 
powerful act with significant consequences, and Massachusetts 
law has always required that it proceed strictly in accord with 
the statutes that govern it"). 
 
22 
 
required as a condition of a valid foreclosure sale.21  In 
Schumacher, the mortgagor, who was in default, received a notice 
of default from a mortgage servicer that inaccurately identified 
the current mortgagee, id. at 423-424; the mortgagor argued that 
this false identification resulted in a failure to satisfy the 
requirements of G. L. c. 244, § 35A, and invalidated the 
subsequent foreclosure sale of his property.22  Id. at 427-428.  
The legal issue presented on appeal was "whether § 35A is part 
of the foreclosure process itself and, if so, whether a 
mortgagee's failure to comply strictly with its provisions, 
particularly the notice requirements, renders a foreclosure sale 
void."  Id. at 422.  Resolution of this issue required 
consideration of § 35A in relation to the statutory power of 
sale in § 21, and in particular § 21's provision that upon 
                     
21 The dissent agrees with the defendants that Schumacher 
controls the outcome here, but for reasons different from those 
that the defendants advance.  Post at    ,    .  We discuss the 
points raised by the dissent, infra. 
 
 
22 General Laws c. 244, § 35A (§ 35A), enacted by St. 2007, 
c. 206, § 11, prohibited acceleration of a residential property 
mortgage obligation or enforcement of such a mortgage due to a 
default "until at least [ninety] days after the date a written 
notice is given by the mortgagee to the mortgagor."  G. L. 
c. 244, § 35A (b).  The statute was amended and substantially 
rewritten in 2010, at which time the notice period before 
acceleration could occur was enlarged to 150 days, and a 
provision was added requiring, among other things, that the 
mortgagee (creditor) "engage[] in a good faith effort to 
negotiate a commercially reasonable alternative to foreclosure."  
G. L. c. 244, § 35A (b), (g), as amended by St. 2010, c. 258, 
§ 7. 
 
23 
 
default a mortgagee may sell the mortgaged premises, but only 
after first complying "with the terms of the mortgage and with 
the statutes relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the 
exercise of a power of sale" (emphasis in original).  
Schumacher, 467 Mass. at 430, quoting G. L. c. 183, § 21.  The 
mortgagor in Schumacher contended that § 35A was such a statute 
and, accordingly, that the mortgagee was obligated to comply 
fully with § 35A's provisions as a condition of a valid 
foreclosure sale.  Schumacher, supra.  We disagreed.  We noted 
the statutes that have been identified as governing the power of 
sale, see id. at 429, but concluded that § 35A had a different 
purpose.  Id. at 431.  In particular, § 35A was specifically 
designed to protect existing and new homeowners by giving them a 
reasonably generous period of time to cure a default without 
loan acceleration and the threat of foreclosure.  See id. at 
430-431.  As such, we held, § 35A was "not one of the statutes 
'relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the exercise of a 
power of sale.'"  Id. at 431, quoting G. L. c. 183, § 21.  We 
concluded, therefore, that strict or exact compliance with all 
the provisions of § 35A was not a prerequisite of a valid 
foreclosure.  Schumacher, supra at 430-431. 
 
We recognize, as the defendants argue, that there are 
substantive similarities between § 35A and paragraph 22:  both 
require notice of default, of the right to cure, of the deadline 
24 
 
by which the default must be cured, and that failure to cure the 
default may result in acceleration and foreclosure by sale.  But 
we disagree that Schumacher controls in this case, and signifies 
that a mortgagee need not comply strictly with paragraph 22.  
This is so because the notice provisions in paragraph 22 are 
"terms of the mortgage," not terms of a statute "relating to the 
foreclosure of mortgages by the exercise of a power of sale."  
G. L. c. 183, § 21.  See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cook, 87 
Mass. App. Ct. 382, 389-390 (2015) (Schumacher does not control 
where issue is whether mortgagee must comply with certain terms 
of mortgage as opposed to statute relating to foreclosure). 
As Schumacher, 467 Mass. at 429, suggests, there is a well-
established set of statutes relating to mortgage foreclosures 
effected pursuant to a power of sale:  § 21 and G. L. c. 244, 
§§ 11–17C.  See Eaton, 462 Mass. at 581 ("In addition to G. L. 
c. 183, § 21, itself, the 'statutes relating to the foreclosure 
of mortgages by the exercise of a power of sale,' id., are set 
out in G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C"); Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 646 
(power of sale in mortgage includes reference to G. L. c. 183, 
§ 21, and is "further regulated by G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C").  
Each of the statutes included within G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-17C, 
pertains to the process and mechanics of the foreclosure sale 
itself.  But as the discussion supra reflects, our cases 
concerned with mortgage terms requiring strict compliance have 
25 
 
never identified a specific set of such terms, and have not 
limited the need for strict compliance to terms concerned 
directly with the foreclosure sale itself.  Rather, they have 
taken a more flexible approach.  Accordingly, although § 21 
requires in the same sentence a foreclosing mortgagee to comply 
with both "the terms of the mortgage" and with "the statutes 
relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the exercise of a 
power of sale," we read each of these requirements as being 
separately grounded and having an independent meaning.  The fact 
that § 21 does not incorporate § 35A into the fixed set of 
foreclosure sale statutes demanding strict compliance does not 
mean that strict compliance with the notice provisions in 
paragraph 22 is not required.  In sum, Schumacher does not alter 
our conclusion that, in the Emigrant mortgage instrument 
executed by the plaintiffs, the provisions of paragraph 22 
constitute "terms of the mortgage" governing the power of sale, 
and that, in order to conduct a valid foreclosure, Emigrant was 
obligated to comply strictly with paragraph 22's notice of 
default provisions. 
Given our conclusion, the question presents itself whether 
Emigrant's failure to comply strictly with the default notice 
provisions of paragraph 22 renders the title obtained by Wilion 
as a result of the subsequent foreclosure sale voidable rather 
26 
 
than void.23  See Chace v. Morse, 189 Mass. 559, 561-562 (1905), 
and cases cited.  As the court observed in Chace, this is not 
always an easy question to answer: 
"The distinction between the two classes of cases 
[void and voidable] has not been very clearly defined, and 
the decisions in the different jurisdictions do not 
entirely agree.  It has repeatedly been said that in order 
to make a valid sale under a power in a mortgage, the terms 
of the power must be strictly complied with.  Roarty v. 
Mitchell, 7 Gray, 243 [(1856)]; Smith v. Provin, 4 Allen, 
516 [(1862]) . . . .  Where the sale is to foreclose a 
mortgage for a breach of the condition, there is no 
authority to sell unless there is a breach, and an 
attempted sale would be without effect upon the right of 
redemption.  So, where a certain notice is prescribed, a 
sale without any notice, or upon a notice, lacking the 
essential requirements of the written power, would be void 
as a proceeding for foreclosure.  Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 
207 [(1905)].  But if everything is done upon which 
jurisdiction and authority to make a sale depend, 
irregularities in the manner of doing it, or in the 
subsequent proceedings, which may affect injuriously the 
rights of the mortgagor, do not necessarily render the sale 
a nullity.  The sale will be invalid so far as to enable 
the mortgagor, or perhaps the purchaser, to avoid it, and 
still be effectual if all the parties interested desire to 
have it stand." 
 
Id.  See Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 Mass. 762, 778 (2011) 
("Generally, the key question in this regard is whether the 
transaction is void, in which case it is a nullity such that 
title never left possession of the original owner, or merely 
                     
23 The defendants do not address the question, presumably 
because their position is that the foreclosure sale was not 
flawed in any respect, and that therefore Wilion holds valid 
title to the property.  The question, however, is the focus of 
the dissent. 
 
27 
 
voidable, in which case a bona fide purchaser may take good 
title"). 
As the quoted passage from Chace, supra, suggests, a bona 
fide purchaser's "title is not to be affected by mere 
irregularities in executing a power of sale contained in a 
mortgage, of which irregularities he has no knowledge, actual or 
constructive."  Rogers, 169 Mass. at 183-184.  As applied to 
this case, therefore, the question of void versus voidable may 
be reframed to ask whether the failure of Emigrant, as the 
mortgagee, to send the plaintiffs a notice of default providing 
the actual information required by the terms of the mortgage 
concerning the plaintiffs' right "to bring a court action" in 
order to raise any defense to the foreclosure sale is a "mere 
irregularity" that does not affect the validity of the 
property's title.  As previously discussed, in a nonjudicial 
foreclosure jurisdiction like Massachusetts, misstating this 
information in a way to suggest that a mortgagor with a defense 
does not need to initiate a lawsuit but may wait to respond to a 
foreclosure lawsuit filed by the mortgagee can have disastrous 
consequences for the mortgagor:  if the mortgagor has a valid 
defense to the foreclosure sale going forward, but is not made 
aware that he or she must initiate an action in court against 
the mortgagee to raise that defense, the sale may well proceed 
and result in title passing to a bona fide purchaser without 
28 
 
knowledge of the issue -- at which point, and depending on the 
nature of the defense, the mortgagor's right to redeem his or 
her home may well be lost.  See Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 777-
778.24  Emigrant's failure to provide the required and correct 
information on this point in the notice of default cannot fairly 
be described as a "mere irregularit[y] in executing a power of 
sale contained in a mortgage."  Rogers, supra.  Contrast Chace, 
189 Mass. at 562.  The failure renders the subsequent 
foreclosure sale to Wilion void. 
                     
 
24 The statutory requirement that the mortgagee provide 
advance notice of default and the right to cure to the 
mortgagor, and include in the notice the offer to negotiate and 
agree "upon a commercially reasonable alternative to 
foreclosure," see G. L. c. 244, § 35A, as amended by St. 2010, 
c. 258, § 7, offers a good example of this point.  This court's 
decision in Schumacher, 467 Mass. 421, establishes that § 35A is 
not one of the foreclosure statutes "relating to the foreclosure 
of mortgages by the exercise of a power of sale," G. L. c. 183, 
§ 21, and therefore something other than strict compliance with 
§ 35A will not render a foreclosure sale void, but merely 
voidable.  See Schumacher, supra at 422, 430-431.  If a 
mortgagor were not aware that he or she was required to bring an 
independent equity action in court before a foreclosure sale in 
order to challenge a mortgagee's compliance with § 35A and 
thereby stop the sale, the mortgagor might wait to assert the 
defense.  In such a case, however, if the foreclosure sale 
proceeds and the property is purchased in good faith by another 
person, as the dissent in this case explains, see post at    ,    
, the mortgagor would be limited to a contract action against 
the mortgagee, but will have completely lost the ability to keep 
his or her home, no matter how egregious the noncompliance with 
§ 35A might have been; even if the mortgagee itself purchased 
the mortgage property at the foreclosure sale, the mortgagor's 
ability to "unwind" the sale is very limited.  See Schumacher, 
supra at 433 (Gants, J., concurring). 
 
29 
 
The position taken by the dissent is that strict compliance 
by Emigrant with the notice of default provisions in paragraph 
22 was required, but that Emigrant's failure to do so did not 
render the foreclosure sale void.  See post at    .  In the 
dissent's view, the result in this case is essentially 
controlled by our decision in Schumacher.  See post at    .  The 
dissent reasons that § 35A, the subject of Schumacher, and the 
notice of default provisions in paragraph 22 are birds of a 
feather in terms of purpose and operation; that for the same 
reasons Schumacher concludes § 35A was not a statute relating to 
the foreclosure by sale, so paragraph 22 is not a term of the 
mortgage concerned with foreclosure by sale; and, consequently, 
as was the case in Schumacher, Emigrant's defective notice of 
default rendered the foreclosure sale only voidable, not void. 
We disagree.  The dissent fails to take into account the 
distinction –- reflected in our cases and in the language of 
§ 21 -- between the "terms of the mortgage" instrument relating 
to foreclosure by exercise of the power of sale, and "statutes" 
relating to foreclosure by the power of sale.  But this 
distinction is a critical one.  As discussed previously, that 
§ 35A is not one of the statutes relating to foreclosure by the 
power of sale to which § 21 refers does not answer whether the 
provisions of paragraph 22 qualify as "terms of the mortgage" 
relating and integrally connected to the power of sale under 
30 
 
§ 21.  And as to that question, this court's decisions about 
mortgage terms indicate that by structure and content, the 
notice of default required to be given under paragraph 22 is 
integrally connected, and operates as a prerequisite, to the 
proper exercise of the mortgage instrument's power of sale.  
Emigrant's strict compliance with the notice of default required 
by paragraph 22 was necessary in order for the foreclosure sale 
to be valid; Emigrant's failure to strictly comply rendered the 
sale void. 
We turn to the question whether our decision in this case 
should be given prospective effect only, because the failure of 
a mortgagee to provide the mortgagor with the notice of default 
required by the mortgage is not a matter of record and, 
therefore, where there is a foreclosure sale in a title chain, 
ascertaining whether clear record title exists may not be 
possible.  We confronted the same issue in Eaton, 462 Mass. at 
586-587.  As Eaton also indicates, in the property law context, 
we have been more willing to apply our decisions prospectively 
than in other contexts.  See id. at 588.  We conclude that in 
this case, because of the possible impact that our decision may 
have on the validity of titles, it is appropriate to give our 
decision prospective effect only:  it will apply to mortgage 
foreclosure sales of properties that are the subject of a 
mortgage containing paragraph 22 or its equivalent and for which 
31 
 
the notice of default required by paragraph 22 is sent after the 
date of this opinion.  As in Eaton, however, and for the reasons 
stated there, we will apply our ruling to the parties in the 
present case.  See id. at 589, and cases cited.25 
 
The dissent questions the efficacy of prospective relief to 
alleviate the consequences of this decision for future 
purchasers because there is no requirement that in the case of a 
standard mortgage instrument containing paragraph 22 (see note 
16, supra), a foreclosing mortgagee record the notice of default 
sent to the mortgagor pursuant to that paragraph.  Post at    .  
There may not be a statutory requirement at this time, but a 
mortgagee remains free to execute and then record an affidavit 
of compliance with the notice provisions of paragraph 22 that 
includes a copy of the notice that was sent to the mortgagor 
pursuant to that paragraph, and we presume that going forward, 
as a general matter, mortgagees will do so.  See G. L. c. 183, 
§ 5B.26 
                     
 
25 The parties have not argued, and we do not reach, the 
question whether our holding in this case should be applied to 
any other class of cases pending on appeal.  See Galiastro v. 
Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 467 Mass. 160, 167-170 
(2014). 
 
 
26 General Laws c. 183, § 5B, provides in relevant part: 
 
"[A]n affidavit made by a person claiming to have personal 
knowledge of the facts therein stated and containing a 
certificate by an attorney at law that the facts stated in 
the affidavit are relevant to the title to certain land and 
32 
 
 
3.  Mortgage and note.  Given our conclusion that the 
foreclosure sale was void, we need not decide the plaintiffs' 
alternative claim that the motion judge erred in allowing 
Wilion's motion for summary judgment because there was a genuine 
issue of material fact in dispute concerning whether Emigrant 
was actually the mortgagee at the time of the foreclosure sale 
or had previously assigned the mortgage to ESB-MH. 
 
Conclusion.  The declaratory judgment of the Superior Court 
and the orders allowing Wilion's motion for summary judgment and 
dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint are reversed.  The case is 
remanded to the Superior Court for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
                                                                  
will be of benefit and assistance in clarifying the chain 
of title may be filed for record and shall be recorded in 
the registry of deeds where the land or any part thereof 
lies." 
 
It bears noting that G. L. c. 244, § 35A, has required since 
2010 that a foreclosing creditor in certain circumstances file 
an affidavit of compliance with that section in the Land Court, 
see § 35A (f), as inserted by St. 2010, c. 258, § 7; and that as 
of January 1, 2016, § 35A will require a foreclosing mortgagee 
to file a copy of the notice mandated by § 35A and "an affidavit 
demonstrating compliance" with § 35A, and also file a copy of 
the § 35A notice with the Commissioner of Banks.  See G. L. 
c. 244, § 35A (e) & (f), as amended by St. 2010, c. 258, § 8. 
 
 
 
 
CORDY, J. (dissenting, with whom Gants, C.J., and Spina, 
J., join).  In U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 
421, 431 (2014) (Schumacher), we explained that the fact "[t]hat 
a mortgagee is prohibited from accelerating the maturity of the 
unpaid balance of the mortgage during the ninety-day cure period 
is a clear indication that foreclosure proceedings do not 
commence with the issuance of the written notice [required by 
G. L. c. 244, § 35A (§ 35A)]."  Today the court reaches the 
opposite conclusion regarding a substantially similar notice 
required by a mortgage instrument.  Because there is no sound 
basis for this distinction, which will have disruptive and 
unfair consequences for innocent third-party purchasers for 
years to come, I would conclude that the notice required by 
paragraph 22 of the mortgage instrument was not a component of 
the power of sale and, as a result, the defect therein rendered 
the foreclosure sale voidable rather than void. 
 
The distinction between void and voidable foreclosure sales 
is one of profound significance for mortgagors, mortgagees, and 
subsequent purchasers of foreclosed property.  Where a 
foreclosure sale is void, no title passes to the purchaser or 
the purchaser's successors.  Rogers v. Barnes, 169 Mass. 179, 
184 (1897).  Such a result is particularly concerning where, as 
here, the defect is contained in a notice that is not required 
2 
 
to be recorded.  Practically speaking, this means that a 
mortgagor may successfully unwind sales to innocent third 
parties years after the foreclosure, when the property has been 
conveyed to bona fide purchasers two, three, or four times 
removed from the foreclosure sale.  See, e.g., Moore v. Dick, 
187 Mass. 207, 212-213 (1905) (mortgagor redeemed property 
nineteen years after void foreclosure sale). 
 
Conversely, where a foreclosure sale is voidable, legal 
title passes to the purchaser, Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 460 
Mass. 762, 777-778 (2011), and a mortgagor may unwind the sale 
only by showing that the defect "rendered the foreclosure so 
fundamentally unfair that she is entitled to affirmative 
equitable relief."  Schumacher, 467 Mass. at 433 (Gants, J., 
concurring).  The mortgagor may obtain such relief against the 
mortgagee and purchasers having notice of the defect, but she 
will not prevail in equity against a bona fide purchaser.  See 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 3.2 comment g 
(1997) ("a bona fide purchaser of legal title terminates 
equitable rights").  "The question in such cases [involving bona 
fide purchasers] is which of two innocent persons should suffer 
a loss which must be borne by one of them.  The principle which 
is applied in courts of equity is that they will not throw the 
loss upon a person who has innocently acquired title to property 
for value.  The bona fide purchaser is not only entitled to 
3 
 
retain the property free of trust, but he is under no personal 
liability for its value."  Restatement (First) of Restitution 
§ 172 comment a (1937). 
 
In discerning whether a foreclosure sale is void or 
voidable, "we adhere to the familiar rule that 'one who sells 
under a power [of sale] must follow strictly its terms.  If he 
fails to do so, there is no valid execution of the power, and 
the sale is wholly void.'"  U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 
Mass. 637, 646 (2011) (Ibanez), quoting Moore, 187 Mass. at 211.  
The terms integral to the power of sale include the existence of 
a default or breach of the mortgage, Rogers, 169 Mass. at 184; 
assignment of the mortgage at the time of foreclosure, Ibanez, 
supra at 648; assignment of the note or authority to act on 
behalf of the note holder at the time of foreclosure, Eaton v. 
Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 584-586 (2012); proper 
advertisement of the foreclosure sale, McGreevey v. Charlestown 
Five Cents Sav. Bank, 294 Mass. 480, 483-484 (1936); and 
execution of the foreclosure sale on or near the premises, 
Tamburello v. Monahan, 321 Mass. 445, 446-447 (1947). 
If, on the other hand, "there has been a literal compliance 
with the power, so that the legal title to the land passed to 
the purchaser, but for some reason as, for instance, a failure 
to act with due fidelity to the trust imposed by the power, 
there are equitable reasons why the sale should be set aside[,] 
4 
 
. . . the sale, being in law valid, is voidable only in equity, 
and the owner of the right to redeem must apply for relief in 
equity within a reasonable time."  Moore, 187 Mass. at 212.  
Another circumstance in which a foreclosure sale may be deemed 
voidable in equity, rather than void ab initio, arises where a 
mortgagee fails to comply with a term of the mortgage that is 
not part of the power of sale.  See Wayne Inv. Corp. v. Abbott, 
350 Mass. 775, 775 (1966) ("Legal title is established in 
summary process by proof that the title was acquired strictly 
according to the power of sale provided in the mortgage; and 
that alone is subject to challenge.  If there are other grounds 
to set aside the foreclosure the defendants must seek 
affirmative relief in equity").  One such term is a 
preacceleration notice of default.  Cf. Schumacher, 467 Mass. at 
432-433 (Gants, J., concurring) (defect in statutory notice of 
default not related to exercise of power of sale rendered 
foreclosure sale voidable in equity). 
 
In Schumacher, we explained that a "homeowner's right to 
cure a default is a preforeclosure undertaking that, when 
satisfied, eliminates the default and wholly precludes the 
initiation of foreclosure proceedings in the first instance, 
thereby protecting and preserving home ownership."  Id. at 431.  
Accordingly, we observed that the notice required by § 35A was 
"designed to give a mortgagor a fair opportunity to cure a 
5 
 
default before the debt is accelerated and before the 
foreclosure process is commenced through invocation of the power 
of sale."  Id.  In light of this purpose, we concluded that 
§ 35A was "not one of the statutes 'relating to the foreclosure 
of mortgages by the exercise of a power of sale,'" id., quoting 
G. L. c. 183, § 21, and, thus, the failure to strictly comply 
with § 35A rendered the foreclosure sale voidable rather than 
void.  Schumacher, supra at 433 (Gants, J., concurring). 
 
Here, paragraph 22 fulfils the same purpose and operates in 
the same manner as § 35A.  As the court recognizes, the purpose 
of paragraph 22 is to give homeowners increased protection from 
acceleration and foreclosure without prior notice.  See 
generally Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage 
Instruments:  The Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. 
Rev. 1077, 1090 (2007); Jensen, Mortgage Standardization:  
History of Interaction of Economics, Consumerism and 
Governmental Pressure, 7 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 397, 409, 414 
(1972).  In view of the similarities in purpose and effect, it 
would defy logic to hold that, on the one hand, the notice 
required by § 35A is not related to the exercise of the power of 
sale, but, on the other hand, the notice required by paragraph 
6 
 
22 is related to the exercise of the power of sale.1  Yet, that 
is precisely what the court holds in this case. 
 
The court reaches this holding by advancing a new and 
expansive interpretation of our decision in Foster, Hall & Adams 
Co. v. Sayles, 213 Mass. 319 (1913).  The question in Foster, 
Hall & Adams Co. was not, however, whether the foreclosure sale 
was void, but whether there was reasonable doubt as to the title 
offered by the defendant.  Id. at 322.  A doubt as to title is 
reasonable if it "would cause a prudent man to pause and 
                     
 
1 The court suggests that this observation fails to grapple 
with the distinction between the terms of the mortgage 
instrument and the statutes relating to foreclosure by the power 
of sale.  That is simply not true.  On the one hand, the court 
recognizes that the valid exercise of the power of sale does not 
depend on the mortgagee's "punctilious performance of every 
single mortgage term," but only those "integrally connected" to 
the power of sale.  See ante at    ,    .  On the other hand, 
however, the court explains that the proof that the paragraph 22 
notice is integrally connected to the power of sale is that -- 
unlike the notice required by G. L. c. 244, § 35A, as amended by 
St. 2010, c. 258, § 7 (§ 35A) -- it is contained in the mortgage 
instrument.  See ante at    .  These positions cannot be 
squared.  A notice of default and the right to cure is either 
connected to the power of sale or it is not.  If placement in 
the mortgage is not dispositive of this connection, see ante at    
, treating these notices differently requires some other 
rationale.  The inquiry into the purpose and operation of each 
notice confirms that such a rationale does not exist.  Section 
35A provides, in relevant part, that the "mortgagee, or anyone 
holding thereunder, shall not . . . enforce the mortgage because 
of a default . . . until at least 150 days after the date a 
written notice is given by the mortgagee to the mortgagor."  If 
that language does not create a condition precedent or integral 
connection to the valid exercise of the power of sale -- and it 
does not, see U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Schumacher, 467 Mass. 
421, 431 (2014) (Schumacher) -- the substantially similar 
language of paragraph 22 does not either. 
 
7 
 
hesitate before investing his money."  Id. at 321, quoting First 
African Methodist Episcopal Soc'y v. Brown, 147 Mass. 296, 298 
(1888).  The court concluded that the mortgagee's complete 
failure to provide a notice of default created such a doubt.  
Foster, Hall & Adams Co., supra at 324. 
 
It is important to appreciate the context in which the 
Foster, Hall & Adams Co. case arose, particularly the fact that 
the plaintiff was a buyer with notice of a potential title 
defect.  Id. at 321-322.  We have long said that "[t]he law goes 
a great way in protecting the title of a purchaser for value 
without notice or knowledge of any defect in the power of the 
vendor to sell."  Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 777, quoting Rogers, 
169 Mass. at 183.  The law does not go a great way, however, in 
protecting the title of those who do have notice of defects in 
the seller's title.  See Bevilacqua, supra at 778 ("a factual 
prerequisite -- purchase by [the plaintiff] without notice of 
the defects in [the mortgagee's] title -- does not exist"). 
 
The upshot is that, had the plaintiff in Foster, Hall & 
Adams Co. gone forward with the transaction, it would have been 
unprotected by bona fide status had the foreclosure sale later 
been set aside as a result of the defect.  It was unnecessary to 
decide whether the foreclosure sale was void or voidable 
because, in either circumstance, the complete failure to provide 
a notice of default and the right to cure would have created a 
8 
 
reasonable doubt as to the title being taken by the plaintiff.  
We have never interpreted this century-old case to mean that any 
defect in a notice of default required by a mortgage instrument 
renders a foreclosure sale void ab initio, cf. Costello v. 
Tasker, 227 Mass. 220, 223 (1917), citing Foster, Hall & Adams 
Co., supra at 321 ("plaintiffs having failed to prove that the 
title tendered by the bill will not expose the defendants to 
litigation, the decree dismissing the bill should be affirmed"), 
and in light of the harsh consequences that such an 
interpretation would have for bona fide purchasers, the court 
should decline to do so here. 
 
The prospective character of the court's ruling does little 
to alleviate these consequences for future purchasers because 
the paragraph 22 notice is not required to be recorded.  
Consequently, the notice ordinarily will not be discovered 
during an examination of the record title.  Although some 
prospective purchasers may be able to obtain copies of the 
notice by scouring the documents filed in the Land Court in 
connection with Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) 
proceedings, an SCRA action is not part of the mortgage 
foreclosure proceedings and does not create a basis for a 
mortgagor to challenge the validity of foreclosure sale.  See 
Eaton, 462 Mass. at 580 n.14.  See also Beaton v. Land Court, 
367 Mass. 385, 390 (1975).  Moreover, requiring purchasers to 
9 
 
engage in such a treasure hunt is contrary to the purposes of 
the recording system, which was intended to be "self-operative 
and to notify purchasers of existing claims . . . [through] a 
public record from which prospective purchasers of interests in 
real property may ascertain the existence of prior claims that 
might affect their interests."  Selectmen of Hanson v. Lindsay, 
444 Mass. 502, 507 (2005), quoting 14 R. Powell, Real Property 
§ 82.01[3], at 82–14 (M. Wolf ed. 2000). 
 
Although holding that a paragraph 22 notice defect renders 
the sale voidable would mean that a mortgagor could not defeat a 
bona fide purchaser by virtue of the defect, the mortgagor would 
nonetheless retain the ability to defeat a bona fide purchaser 
(and the mortgagee) on any of the substantive grounds relating 
to the exercise of the power of sale.  For example, in this 
case, the plaintiffs argue that Emigrant Mortgage Company, Inc. 
(Emigrant), transferred the mortgage and note prior to the 
foreclosure and therefore lacked the authority to foreclose.  
The court does not reach this argument, but if the plaintiffs 
were to prevail on it, they would defeat Harold Wilion's summary 
process action because the foreclosure sale would be void as a 
matter of law -- irrespective of the paragraph 22 issue.2  See 
                     
 
2 Indeed, the plaintiffs' delay in asserting their claims is 
better attributed to the five bankruptcy petitions they filed 
between September, 2010, and July, 2012, the most recent of 
which was dismissed after a judge in the United States 
10 
 
Eaton, 462 Mass. at 584-586; Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 647-648.  In 
other words, the fact that the plaintiffs did not receive notice 
that they had to initiate an action to assert this substantive 
claim did not undermine their ability to do so successfully.3 
This is not to say, however, that the notice sent by 
Emigrant in this case was sufficient to fulfil its obligations 
under the mortgage instrument.  Our cases have required strict 
compliance with contractual provisions that call for notice of 
important rights adverse to the person required to provide the 
notice.  See, e.g., Sweeney v. Morey & Co., 279 Mass. 495, 500 
(1932) ("There must be strict compliance with requirements . . . 
[that] relate to matters where the essential facts to be 
embodied in the notice are known to the person required to give 
the notice, and the notice is designed to draw the attention of 
                                                                  
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts concluded 
that it was filed as "part of a scheme by [one of the plaintiffs 
in the instant action] to delay Emigrant and was filed without a 
reasonable prospect of saving the property from foreclosure."  
In re Leslie Phillips, U.S. Bankr. Ct., No. 12-15749-FJB, slip 
op. at 1, 3 (Bankr. D. Mass. Aug. 8, 2012). 
 
 
3 The court suggests that mortgagors would be prejudiced if, 
for example, the underlying substantive claim were a failure to 
give notice pursuant to § 35A.  The court reasons that if the 
mortgagor is not aware that she has to initiate an independent 
action to assert the § 35A defect, the sale to a bona fide 
purchaser would forever foreclose her from doing so because a 
§ 35A defect renders the sale voidable rather than void.  Under 
this reasoning, however, holding that the paragraph 22 notice 
renders the sale void essentially creates a backdoor for the 
mortgagor to a defeat bona fide purchaser on § 35A grounds -- a 
result that is plainly at odds with the Schumacher case. 
 
11 
 
his adversary to those facts").  As the court points out, 
because the plaintiffs entered into their mortgage with Emigrant 
in Massachusetts, a nonjudicial foreclosure State, the language 
in paragraph 22 requiring Emigrant to inform the plaintiffs of 
"the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence 
of a default or any other defense of [the plaintiffs] to 
acceleration and sale" was particularly important.  Therefore, I 
agree with the court that Emigrant was required to strictly 
comply with the provisions of paragraph 22. 
Nonetheless, because, in my view, the notice required by 
paragraph 22 -- like the notice required by § 35A -- is not a 
component of the power of sale, a mortgagor who has received a 
defective notice should be required to establish that he or she 
was prejudiced by the defect.  Schumacher, 467 Mass. at 433 
(Gants, J., concurring).  Once the property has been conveyed to 
a bona fide purchaser, however, the mortgagor is limited to 
either an action for breach of contract against the mortgagee or 
an action establishing that the foreclosure sale is void on some 
ground actually related to the exercise of the power of sale.  
See Bevilacqua, 460 Mass. at 778.  See also Beaton, 367 Mass. at 
392-393 (discussing mortgagor's avenues of relief from 
foreclosure through court actions).  Because Wilion was a bona 
fide purchaser insulated from the voidable character of the 
foreclosure sale, I would conclude that the defect in the 
12 
 
paragraph 22 notice was insufficient to defeat his interest in 
the property.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.