Case Title: DUSTIN JOHNSON V. THE CITY OF LARAMIE

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0093

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
DUSTIN JOHNSON V. THE CITY OF LARAMIE2008 WY 73187 P.3d 355Case Number: S-07-0093Decided: 06/26/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
DUSTIN 
JOHNSON,Petitioner,v.THE CITY OF LARAMIE,Respondent.

 
 
Original 
Proceeding

Petition for Writ of 
Review

From the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The Honorable Jeffrey 
A. Donnell, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Petitioner:

R. 
Michael Vang of Brown & Hiser LLC, Laramie, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Respondent:

Ashley 
Castor, Assistant City Attorney, Laramie City Attorney's Office, Laramie, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Dustin Johnson 
was arrested in the City of Laramie, Albany County, Wyoming, for driving while under the influence 
of alcohol in violation of Laramie Municipal Ordinance 10.24.010.  He filed a motion to suppress evidence 
of his blood alcohol level as measured by a breath test on the grounds that the 
breath analysis instrument was not in compliance with the Wyoming Chemical 
Testing Program's rules and regulations.  
Specifically, the Wyoming Chemical Testing Program's rules and 
regulations require breath analysis instruments be inspected "annually."  The argument centers on Johnson's 
assertion that "annually" means once every 365 days, which had not happened on 
the particular instrument in question.  
The prosecution maintains that "annually" means once per calendar year, 
under which definition the instrument would be in compliance.  The municipal court sided with the 
prosecution and denied Johnson's motion to suppress.  Johnson then entered a conditional 
guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the municipal court's ruling on his 
motion to suppress.  Johnson 
appealed to the district court, which affirmed the municipal court's 
ruling.  This Court granted 
Johnson's petition for writ of review.  
Johnson's only issue regards the definition of the term "annually" as 
used in the rules and regulations of the Wyoming Chemical Testing Program.  We affirm the decision of the district 
court.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Johnson 
questions whether the term "annually" should have been interpreted in favor of 
lenity to him, which would result in suppression of the breath test in Mr. 
Johnson's case for failing to comply with the statutory predicate for admission 
of a chemical test.

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      According to the 
citation issued by the arresting officer, Johnson was observed making a wide 
turn at an intersection without using his turn signal.  The vehicle Johnson was driving had no 
license plates so the officer initiated a stop.  When the officer approached Johnson he 
smelled the distinct odor of alcohol.  
The officer asked Johnson how much he had had to drink, and Johnson 
replied six beers.  Johnson 
performed poorly on the field sobriety tests.  Given this situation, the officer 
arrested Johnson for driving while under the influence of alcohol.  Johnson submitted to a breath test, 
which registered a blood alcohol level of .15.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

 
 
[¶4]      The construction 
of the term "annually" as used in the Rules and Regulations of the Wyoming 
Chemical Testing Program is purely a question of law, which this Court reviews 
de novo.

 
 
Propriety 
of the conditional guilty plea

 
 
[¶5]      We must begin by 
questioning the wisdom of accepting a conditional guilty plea in this case.  Even if Johnson had ultimately prevailed 
on his challenge to the evidence from the breath test, the breath test was not 
the only evidence supporting a conviction for driving while under the influence 
of alcohol.  The arresting officer's 
observations of Johnson during his traffic stop potentially are sufficient to 
support a conviction against Johnson.  
Since a conviction potentially could be obtained even if the result from 
the breath test is suppressed, Johnson's issue will not end the case.  

 
 
[¶6]      In essence 
Johnson really seeks an unauthorized interlocutory 
appeal.  If criminal defendants are 
allowed to circumvent our rules by this method, this Court will be called upon 
to decide countless procedural and evidentiary questions on such "conditional" 
pleas.  We already have expressed 
our disapproval of this process.  See generally Bouch v. State, 2006 WY 122, ¶ 28, 143 P.3d 643, 652 (Wyo. 2006) ("a trial court should only approve a conditional plea 
if assured that the decision of the appellate court will dispose of the 
case").  However, since the district 
court, in its discretion, allowed the appeal to proceed, we will also proceed 
with our review.

 
 
Construction 
of the term "annually"

 
 
[¶7]      Properly 
promulgated rules and regulations have the same force and effect of law.  We construe them as we construe 
statutes.  Olivas v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Safety and Compensation Div., 2006 WY 29, ¶ 15, 130 P.3d 476, 484 (Wyo. 
2006); Antelope Valley Imp. v. State Bd. 
of Equalization for State of Wyo., 992 P.2d 563, 566 (Wyo. 1999).  When construing 
statutes

 
 
our 
primary consideration is to determine the legislature's intent.  All statutes must be construed in pari 
materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating 
to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and 
construed in harmony.  Statutory 
construction is a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo.  We endeavor to interpret statutes in 
accordance with the legislature's intent.  
We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning 
of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari materia.  When a 
statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory 
construction.  We must not give a 
statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of 
another interpretation.  Moreover, 
we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not 
fall within its express provisions. 

 
 

Muller 
v. Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, 
2006 WY 100, ¶ 9, 139 P.3d 1162, 1166 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Sponsel v. Park County, 2006 WY 6, ¶ 9, 
126 P.3d 105, 108 (Wyo. 2006)).

 
 
[¶8]      The pertinent 
rule of the Wyoming Chemical Testing Program, under the heading of "Analytical 
Equipment," states: "Each instrument  shall be inspected annually by the 
[Wyoming Chemical Testing Program]."  
Rules & Regulations for Chemical Analysis for Alcohol Testing ch 5, § 
2(b) (2004).  Johnson requests we 
apply the rule of lenity and construe "annually" to mean every 365 days.  For several reasons, it is doubtful the 
rule of lenity applies to the instant circumstances.  The only reason we need mention, 
however, is that the rule of lenity only applies in cases of ambiguity.  Fraternal Order of Eagles Sheridan Aerie No. 
186, Inc. v. State ex rel. Forwood, 2006 WY 4, ¶ 18, 126 P.3d 847, 855-56 
(Wyo. 2006); Amrein v. State, 836 P.2d 862, 865 (Wyo. 1992) ("the rule of lenity . . . comes into play when 
ambiguities exist").   Under 
our rules of construction, we find no ambiguity in the word "annually."  

 
 
[¶9]      Words are to be 
given their plain and ordinary meaning.  
Black's Law Dictionary defines annually as:

 
 
In 
annual order or succession; yearly, every year, year by year.  At the end of each and every year during 
a period of time.  Imposed once a 
year, computed by the year.  Yearly 
or once a year, but does not in itself signify what time of 
year.

 
 
Black's 
Law Dictionary 89 (6th ed. 1990).  The definition does not include any 
reference to 365 days.  Rather, the 
one word used consistently in this definition is "year."  In Wyoming, our legislature has provided a 
definition of the word "year."  A 
year is statutorily defined as "a calendar year."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-102(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 
2007).  

 
 
[¶10]   Johnson relies heavily on a case 
decided by the Montana Supreme Court, State v. Frickey, 136 P.3d 558 
(Mont. 2006).  In Frickey, the Montana Supreme Court was 
faced with a similar issue.  Frickey 
challenged the admissibility of the results of a breath test because the breath 
analysis instrument had not been inspected within the prior 365 days.  The Montana rule required inspection of such 
instruments on an "annual" basis.  
The Montana Supreme Court found the term "annual" to be unambiguous.  Id. 
at 562.  In construing the term 
"annual," the Montana Supreme Court relied on a dictionary definition: "The rule 
defines annual' as yearly or once a year.' . . . The plain meaning of once a 
year is once every 12 months.  The 
dictionary defines a year as a period of about 365 days.  American Heritage Dictionary, pg. 2068, 
(3rd Ed. 1992)."  Id at 561.  

 
 
[¶11]   We agree with the Montana Supreme 
Court that the term "annual" is unambiguous and that it refers to an event 
happening "yearly or once a year."  
Our divergence thereafter is based on the fact that Wyoming has statutorily 
defined the term "year."  We 
therefore need not consult a general dictionary.  Had the authors of the Wyoming Chemical 
Testing Program's rules and regulations not wanted to follow the existing 
statutory definition, they easily could have specified that testing occur at 
least once every 365 days.  The lack 
of such explicit language leads us to conclude it is the intent of the Wyoming 
Chemical Testing Program for testing of breath analyzing instruments to occur 
once every calendar year.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   We find the term "annually" as used 
in the Wyoming Chemical Testing Program's rules and regulations is 
unambiguous.  It refers to once 
every calendar year.  We understand 
that, as a practical matter, this potentially allows 729 days to expire between 
tests.  Whether this is an 
appropriate policy is for the legislature and the Wyoming Chemical Testing 
Program to determine.  The judgment 
of the district court is affirmed.