Case Title: State ex rel. Salim v. Ayed

Citation: 2014-Ohio-4736

Docket Number: 2013-1946

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Salim v. Ayed, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4736.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-4736 
THE STATE EX REL. SALIM ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. AYED ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Salim v. Ayed, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4736.] 
Quo warranto—Private individuals have no standing to institute an action in quo 
warranto to oust officers of a private, not-for-profit corporation—Court of 
appeals’ judgment denying petition affirmed. 
(No. 2013-1946—Submitted July 8, 2014—Decided October 29, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 12AP-356, 
2013-Ohio-4880. 
_____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We affirm the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ denial of a petition 
for a writ of quo warranto to oust certain individuals from the board of directors 
of the Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc. (“Omar Mosque” or “the mosque”).  
The court of appeals correctly denied the petition because private individuals have 
no standing to institute an action in quo warranto to oust officers of a private, not-
for-profit corporation.  State ex rel. Hawthorn v. Russell, 107 Ohio St.3d 269, 
2005-Ohio-6431, 838 N.E.2d 666. 
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Facts 
{¶ 2} The Omar Mosque was created in 2007, when the Islamic Society 
of Greater Columbus (“ISGC”) was restructured.  At that time, Omar Mosque was 
created as an entity separate from the ISGC under an agreement titled 
Referendum on Reorganizing and Restructuring ISGC (“referendum”), and 
respondents-appellees, Mounir Ayed, Ghassan Bin Hammam, Nasser Kashou, 
Qussai Mareshdeh, and Noorgul Dada, were named as members of the board of 
directors for the mosque (“Old Board”).  According to the referendum creating 
Omar Mosque, the initial board was to be an interim board, with the members’ 
term ending after two years, and during those two years, the board was to create a 
mechanism for renewing memberships and for adding new members and to 
prepare a constitution and bylaws to be ratified by the Omar Mosque members. 
{¶ 3} According to relators-appellants, Hamid Salim, Khaled Khamees, 
Nihad Al Khalidi, Fouad ElFaour, Dina Y. Ali, and Mihammed Allouche, the 
members of the Old Board never did any of the tasks expected of them in the 
referendum.  They never presented bylaws or a constitution to the members for 
ratification, and they never created a membership mechanism; moreover, they 
refused to provide a list of members of Omar Mosque.  They did not step down in 
2009 as expected, but continued to act as the board of directors of the mosque. 
{¶ 4} After a series of disputes, some violent, between some of the 
mosque members and the members of the Old Board, some of the dissatisfied 
mosque members organized a meeting for all mosque members.  Attorney 
Geoffrey P. Scott attended the meeting by request to ensure that any election was 
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Revised Code.  At the 
meeting, a membership list was created, nominations for a new board of directors 
were opened, and 14 people were nominated.  Elections were held, and a “New 
Board” was elected.  Relators-appellants are six members of the New Board. 
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{¶ 5} The New Board immediately held a meeting to appoint officers.  
Attorney Scott accompanied the New Board’s president and treasurer to the 
mosque’s bank.  Upon presentation of their credentials as officers, the bank added 
them as signatories to the mosque’s bank account. 
{¶ 6} When the members of the Old Board learned of the new 
signatories on the account, they froze the mosque’s account.  The Omar Mosque, 
at the instigation of the members of the Old Board then filed suit against the 
members of the New Board in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and 
the money belonging to the mosque was deposited with the Franklin County Clerk 
of Courts.  The Old Board held an election shortly after completing a 
membership-registration process, and yet another board was elected. 
{¶ 7} Appellants then filed this case in quo warranto in the Tenth District 
Court of Appeals.  The court of common pleas dismissed the case before it, 
holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action because it was in 
effect a quo warranto action, see Masjid Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque v. Salim, 
10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-807, 2013-Ohio-2746, ¶ 13, 21, but the Franklin 
County Clerk of Courts continues to retain the mosque’s funds pending the 
outcome of this case.  Id. at ¶ 29.  The mosque, through the members of the Old 
Board, appealed the dismissal, but the Franklin County Court of Appeals 
affirmed, holding that the core issue—the validity of the election of the New 
Board—had to be resolved through a quo warranto action.  Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 8} In the quo warranto case, the members of the Old Board filed a 
motion for summary judgment, arguing that appellants lack standing to bring such 
an action against the officers of a not-for-profit corporation. 
{¶ 9} The court of appeals assigned the case to a magistrate, who 
recommended that the Old Board’s motion for summary judgment be granted on 
the authority of State ex rel. Hawthorn v. Russell, 107 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-
Ohio-6431, 838 N.E.2d 666.  Appellants filed objections, and a panel of the court 
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of appeals sustained some of the objections to the magistrate’s findings of fact, 
but ultimately adopted the magistrate’s conclusions of law and dismissed the 
complaint.  Appellants appealed as of right to this court. 
{¶ 10} Appellants filed a merit brief with a supplement, but appellees 
failed to file a timely brief. 
Analysis 
{¶ 11} The question here is whether appellants have standing to bring an 
action in quo warranto to oust the members of the Old Board.  Ordinarily, an 
action in quo warranto must be brought by the Attorney General or a prosecuting 
attorney.  R.C. 2733.05.  An exception is provided for “[a] person claiming to be 
entitled to a public office unlawfully held and exercised by another,” who may 
“bring an action therefor by himself or an attorney at law.”  R.C. 2733.06.  A 
private person cannot maintain an action in quo warranto except under the 
authority of R.C. 2733.06, and “ ‘he must show not only that he is entitled to the 
office, but also that it is unlawfully held and exercised by the defendant in the 
action.’ ”  State ex rel. Halak v. Cebula, 49 Ohio St.2d 291, 292, 361 N.E.2d 244, 
246 (1977), quoting State ex rel. Heer v. Butterfield, 92 Ohio St. 428, 111 N.E. 
279 (1915), paragraph one of the syllabus; State ex rel. Smith v. Nazor, 135 Ohio 
St. 364, 21 N.E.2d 124 (1939);   State ex rel. Lindley v. The Maccabees, 109 Ohio 
St. 454, 142 N.E. 888 (1924). 
{¶ 12} In a case decided less than ten years ago, we held that a private 
person cannot sustain a quo warranto action against the officers of a private 
corporation.  State ex rel. Hawthorn v. Russell, 107 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio-
6431, 838 N.E.2d 666.  Specifically, Hawthorn involved two ministers who filed 
a complaint in quo warranto to remove directors of the Barberton Rescue Mission, 
Inc., a church and nonprofit corporation.  The ministers claimed that they were the 
lawful directors of the church.  The Hawthorn court held that a person other than 
the attorney general or a prosecuting attorney may bring an action in quo warranto 
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“ ‘ “only when he personally is claiming title to a public office.” ’ ”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id. at ¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. E. Cleveland Fire Fighters’ Assn., Local 
500, Internatl. Assn. of Fire Fighters, 96 Ohio St.3d 68, 2002-Ohio-3527, 771 
N.E.2d 251, ¶ 10, quoting State ex rel. Annable v. Stokes, 24 Ohio St.2d 32, 262 
N.E.2d 863 (1970), and also citing R.C. 2733.05 and 2733.06. 
{¶ 13} Thus, according to Hawthorn, private persons claiming to be 
lawful directors of a religious not-for-profit corporation lack standing to oust 
others claiming to be the lawful directors by way of an action in quo warranto.  
The court of appeals was therefore correct under Hawthorn in dismissing the 
action. 
{¶ 14} Moreover, appellants’ arguments to the contrary do not hold up to 
scrutiny.  In their first proposition of law, they claim that the silence of R.C. 
2733.01 regarding who may bring a quo warranto action must be construed to 
allow them to bring this action.  Their first argument misconstrues the case law on 
this point.  They claim a distinction between standing to challenge a corporation’s 
franchise and standing to challenge whether one of a corporation’s officers is 
entitled to his or her office.  Appellants contend, for example, that Lindley, 109 
Ohio St. 454, 142 N.E. 888, supports their position, but that case clearly holds that 
a private person may bring a quo warranto action only when he or she claims 
entitlement to a public office.  Id. at 457-458.  Similarly, in State ex rel. 
Macdonald v. Shawnee Country Club, 2 Ohio St.2d 176, 207 N.E.2d 658, 659 
(1965), the court held that a quo warranto case may be brought by a citizen in his 
or her private capacity only when the person claims a personal right to a public 
office. 
{¶ 15} Appellants claim that an “extensive body” of Ohio case law allows 
citizens to bring quo warranto actions in their private capacity to oust corporate 
officers.  However, many of the cases they cite are inapposite.  First, all but one of 
the cited cases were decided before Hawthorn, which was issued in 2005.  
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Second, with only one exception, the cited cases were issued by courts of appeals 
or courts of common pleas, and not this court.  And finally, many of the cases do 
not hold what appellants claim. 
{¶ 16} Most of the cases assert that a quo warranto action is the proper 
and exclusive remedy for ousting a corporate officer.  However, they do not hold 
that an action may be brought by a person acting in his or her private capacity in 
such a case, only that quo warranto is the proper remedy.  Unirea Societatilor 
Romane Carpatina of Cleveland v. Suba, 130 Ohio App.3d 538, 541, 720 N.E.2d 
594 (8th Dist.1998); Carlson v. Rabkin, 152 Ohio App.3d 672, 2003-Ohio-2071, 
789 N.E.2d 1122, ¶ 35; PEACE-U.S.A. v. Abbott, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 89AP-
1334, 1990 WL 75405 (June 7, 1990); Veterans of World War I v. Levy, 70 Ohio 
Law Abs. 49, 57, 118 N.E.2d 670 (8th Dist.1954); Dayton Bldg. & Savs. Assn. v. 
Kroeger, 24 Ohio Law Abs. 145, 146 (2d Dist.1936); Global Launch, Inc. v. 
Wisehart, 156 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 2010-Ohio-1457, 925 N.E.2d 698, ¶ 6. Only one 
cited case was decided by this court, and it also falls into this category. Hullman 
v. Honcomp, 5 Ohio St. 237, 242 (1855). 
{¶ 17} One case holds only that “a court of common pleas does not have 
the authority to hear actions in quo warranto; only the Supreme Court and 
appellate courts can issue such a writ.” Strah v. Lake Cty. Humane Soc., 90 Ohio 
App.3d 822, 828, 631 N.E.2d 165 (11th Dist.1993), citing State ex rel. Battin v. 
Bush, 40 Ohio St.3d 236, 238, 533 N.E.2d 301 (1988). 
{¶ 18} To the extent that some of the cited cases allow (or appear to 
allow) a private citizen to bring an action in quo warranto against corporate 
officers, they have been overruled by Hawthorn, 107 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio-
6431, 838 N.E.2d 666.  State ex rel. Babione v. Martin, 97 Ohio App.3d 539, 544, 
647 N.E.2d 169 (6th Dist.1994); State ex rel. E. Cleveland Democratic Club, Inc. 
v. Bibb, 14 Ohio App.3d 85, 87, 470 N.E.2d 257 (8th Dist.1984); State ex rel. 
January Term, 2014 
 
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Northeast Property Owners Civic Assn. v. Kennedy, 117 Ohio App. 79, 84, 181 
N.E.2d 495 (8th Dist.1962). 
{¶ 19} Finally, one cited case rejected quo warranto on the basis that the 
corporations involved were not incorporated in Ohio.  State ex rel. Corrigan v. 
Great Northern-Chan Restaurant, Inc., 3 Ohio App.3d 355, 357, 445 N.E.2d 732, 
733 (8th Dist.1982). 
{¶ 20} Appellants also argue that the statutes do not explicitly prevent a 
person from bringing a quo warranto action in his or her private capacity against 
the officer of a corporation and therefore the court should interpret it to allow 
them to bring suit. R.C. 2733.01 lists the types of quo warranto cases that may be 
brought and does not mention who may bring them. However, R.C. 2733.04 and 
2733.05 are the general provisions setting out who may bring a quo warranto 
case, and they list only the attorney general and a prosecuting attorney, with no 
mention of a private person: 
 
When directed by the governor, supreme court, secretary of 
state, or general assembly, the attorney general, or a prosecuting 
attorney, shall commence an action in quo warranto. When, upon 
complaint or otherwise, either of such officers has good reason to 
believe that any case specified in section 2733.02 of the Revised 
Code can be established by proof, he shall commence such action. 
 
R.C. 2733.04. 
 
The attorney general or a prosecuting attorney may bring 
an action in quo warranto upon his own relation, or, on leave of the 
court, or of a judge thereof in vacation, he may bring the action 
upon the relation of another person. If the action is brought under 
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division (A) of section 2733.01 of the Revised Code, he may 
require security for costs to be given as in other cases. 
 
R.C. 2733.05.  The only exception to this general rule is R.C. 2733.06, which 
allows a private person claiming to be entitled to a public office unlawfully held 
by another, to bring a quo warranto action on his own behalf: 
 
A person claiming to be entitled to a public office 
unlawfully held and exercised by another may bring an action 
therefor by himself or an attorney at law, upon giving security for 
costs. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2733.06. 
{¶ 21} Appellants argue that the statutes do not preclude another 
exception, but under the general rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, “the expression of one or more items of a class implies that 
those not identified are to be excluded.”  State v. Droste, 83 Ohio St.3d 36, 39, 
697 N.E.2d 620 (1998).  Here, standing in quo warranto is given exclusively to 
the attorney general and county prosecutors with a single exception: persons who 
claim entitlement to a public office.  That exception, under traditional 
construction, indicates that other exceptions do not exist. 
{¶ 22} Therefore, appellants’ convoluted statutory arguments to the 
contrary, for a person to have standing to bring a quo warranto action in a private 
capacity, he or she must be claiming to be entitled to a public office. 
{¶ 23} Appellants argue in the alternative that the term “public office” 
should encompass the directors of a nonprofit corporation.  They cite in particular 
State ex rel. Cain v. Kay, 38 Ohio St.2d 15, 309 N.E.2d 860 (1974), which states 
that “R.C. 2733.06 does not define ‘public office,’ and the definitions developed 
January Term, 2014 
 
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in this court and others are numerous, varied, and not wholly consistent.”  Id. at 
17.  However, Cain also quotes the following passage from State ex rel. Atty. 
Gen. v. Jennings, 57 Ohio St. 415, 49 N.E. 404 (1898), as the best articulation of 
the general principle that should guide the determination of “public office” in the 
quo warranto context: “ ‘the most general distinction of a public office is that it 
embraces the performance by the incumbent of a public function delegated to him 
as a part of the sovereignty of the state.’ ”  Cain at 18, quoting Jennings at 424.  
Jennings goes on to state that “ ‘[t]he most important characteristic which 
distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and 
conferring of an office involve a delegation to the individual of some of the 
sovereign functions of government * * *.’ ”  Jennings at 424, quoting Mechem, 
The Law of Public Offices and Officers, Section 4 (1890). 
{¶ 24} An officer of a private corporation cannot be said to be performing 
any function that is “part of the sovereignty of the state” no matter how beneficial 
to the public the corporation may be. 
{¶ 25} Finally, appellants argue that even if they cannot bring a quo 
warranto action on their own behalf, the court should exercise its power under 
R.C. 2733.04 to direct the attorney general to commence an action in quo 
warranto on their behalf.  However, the only case in which we explored this 
question held that “the power of the court under this section should, as a general 
rule, be exercised only when something relating to the court, or its business, 
renders it necessary or advisable.”  Thompson v. Watson, 48 Ohio St. 552, 553, 31 
N.E. 742 (1891). 
{¶ 26} Appellants argue that the matter does pertain to the courts, because 
the mosque’s money is still being held by the Franklin County Clerk of Courts.  
This connection is too thin a reed.  The court is holding the mosque’s money not 
for itself or because of an issue regarding court functions.  It is holding the money 
pending resolution of the dispute between the factions at the mosque.  Following 
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the holding in Thompson, we refuse to direct the attorney general to bring a quo 
warranto action on behalf of appellants against the members of the Old Board. 
{¶ 27} Appellants argue that unless the court allows them to bring a quo 
warranto case, or directs the attorney general to bring such an action, they are 
without a remedy.  The court of appeals correctly analyzed this issue: 
 
Relators aver that, so far, neither the attorney general nor the 
prosecuting attorney has agreed to proceed on their behalf.  While 
we recognize that the statutory requirements of R.C. Chapter 2733 
place relators in a difficult position, relators’ plight is not a reason 
to allow them to proceed with this action.  Masjid Omar Ibn El 
Khattab Mosque v. Salim, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-807, 2013-Ohio-
2746, ¶ 24. 
 
10th Dist. No. 12AP-356, 2013-Ohio-4880, ¶ 23. 
{¶ 28} Thus, despite the fact that appellants and similarly situated litigants 
may have no remedy if they cannot persuade the attorney general or a prosecutor 
to initiate a case, the statutes allow no other outcome.  This fact may raise an issue 
for the legislature to address, but it is not a reason to allow appellants to proceed.  
We therefore affirm. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_____________________ 
 
Rosenberg & Ball Co., L.P.A., and David T. Ball; Blaugrund, Herbert, 
Kessler, Miller, Myers & Postalakis, Inc., and Fazeel S. Khan, for appellants. 
_____________________