Case Title: Wren v. Richardson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP000880-W

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 110 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP880-W 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Joshua M. Wren, 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Reed Richardson Warden, 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS   
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 26, 2019   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 6, 2019   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Carolina Stark   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the court, in 
which 
ROGGENSACK, 
C.J., 
ZIEGLER 
and 
KELLY, 
JJ., 
joined.  
BRADLEY, ANN WALSH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-petitioner, there were briefs filed by 
John T. Wasielewski and Wasielewski & Erickson, Milwaukee. There 
was an oral argument by John T. Wasielewki. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Sara Lynn Shaeffer, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Sara Lynn Shaeffer. 
 
 
2019 WI 110 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2017AP880-W   
(L.C. No. 
2006CF2518) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Joshua M. Wren, 
 
          Petitioner-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Reed Richardson Warden, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 26, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., and ZIEGLER and KELLY, JJ., joined.  
BRADLEY, ANN WALSH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
BRADLEY, REBECCA GRASSL and DALLET, JJ., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   After his conviction in 2007 for 
reckless homicide, Joshua M. Wren alleges his counsel failed to 
file a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief as 
promised, causing Wren to lose his direct appeal rights.  Wren 
knew this, however, by sometime in 2010 or 2011.  Over the next 
several years, Wren filed four pro se motions relating to his 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
2 
 
conviction, none of which raised his counsel's alleged blunders.  
Then, in 2017, Wren filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
asserting ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 
appeal, and seeking to reinstate his direct appeal rights.  In 
defense, the State pled laches, resting its case on the fact 
that the attorney who made the alleged missteps passed away in 
2014, and no case files or notes remained.  The court of appeals 
agreed with the State, imposed laches, and denied the petition.1 
¶2 
Before us, Wren asserts that our adoption of laches as 
an available defense to a habeas petition was ill-considered and 
should be reexamined.  But even if laches can bar his claim, 
Wren maintains that the State failed to prove the elements, and 
that the court of appeals erroneously exercised its discretion 
in applying laches here. 
¶3 
We disagree.  This court held just a few months ago 
that the State may assert laches as a defense to a habeas 
petition.  See State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, 2019 
WI 58, ¶10, 387 Wis. 2d 50, 928 N.W.2d 480.  We decline to 
revisit that ruling today.  On the merits, we agree with the 
court of appeals that the State established unreasonable delay 
and prejudice, the two laches elements Wren challenges.  We 
further conclude that the court of appeals did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion by applying laches and barring relief. 
 
                                                 
1 State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson, No. 2017AP880-W, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2018). 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
3 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶4 
In early 2006, 15-year-old Joshua Wren shot and killed 
a man.2  He pled guilty to first-degree reckless homicide, and in 
March 2007 was sentenced to 21 years of initial confinement and 
nine years of extended supervision——considerably more than 
Wren's counsel suggested and longer than was recommended in the 
presentence investigation report (PSI).3 
¶5 
On the day of sentencing, Wren's attorney, Nikola 
Kostich, filed the "Notice of Right to Seek Postconviction 
Relief"; this form contained a checked box indicating Wren was 
undecided about pursuing postconviction relief.  No notice of 
intent to seek postconviction relief was ever filed. 
¶6 
During the next ten years, Wren filed and litigated 
four pro se motions related to his conviction. 
 In 2010, he unsuccessfully moved to vacate his DNA 
surcharge.  The circuit court denied his 2011 motion for 
reconsideration. 
 In 2013, Wren again challenged the DNA surcharge and also 
sought to amend the judgment of conviction regarding his 
                                                 
2 The State charged Wren with one count of first-degree 
reckless homicide.  The complaint alleged that, in an interview 
conducted by a Milwaukee police detective, Wren admitted he 
"took out a revolver from his left sweatshirt pocket and pointed 
the gun up in the air and fired a shot."  In the same interview, 
Wren stated that "he shot this man on accident." 
3 The PSI recommended 13 years of initial confinement and 
five to six years of extended supervision.  In exchange for 
Wren's guilty plea, the State agreed not to seek a specific 
sentence. 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
4 
 
restitution obligations.  The circuit court denied the DNA 
surcharge challenge once again, but did amend the judgment 
of conviction to clarify his restitution requirements.4 
 In 2015, he sought a copy of the PSI.  This motion was also 
denied, in part on the grounds that Wren previously had an 
opportunity to review the report and "the direct appeal 
deadline ha[d] long since expired." 
 In 2016, Wren sought sentence modification, arguing that 
the circuit court relied on improper facts (an alleged 
beating by Wren of a fellow prisoner).  The motion was 
denied as untimely filed. 
¶7 
Finally, in 2017, more than a decade after sentencing, 
Wren filed a Knight petition5 in the court of appeals seeking to 
reinstate his direct appeal rights on the grounds of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In Wren's telling, he and his family 
wanted to appeal and made multiple attempts to communicate this 
to Kostich.  Yet they heard nothing back.  The petition 
described Kostich's disciplinary history to substantiate his 
non-responsiveness.6  The long and short of it, according to 
                                                 
4 Specifically, the circuit court amended the judgment "to 
reflect that restitution shall be paid from up to 25% of the 
defendant's prison earnings (rather than funds)." 
5 "Habeas petitions to the court of appeals alleging 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are often referred 
to as 'Knight petitions.'"  State ex rel. Kyles v. Pollard, 2014 
WI 38, ¶27 n.11, 354 Wis. 2d 626, 847 N.W.2d 805; see also State 
v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992). 
6 The petition notes that Wren's family discovered Kostich's 
"license to practice law in Wisconsin was suspended for 60 days 
in November 2012"; that he "was reprimanded in 1986 for a 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
5 
 
Wren's petition, is that Kostich promised to appeal, did not do 
so, and never responded to multiple inquiries by Wren and his 
family.  Wren insists he was left entirely without counsel in 
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights, and should therefore 
have his direct appeal rights reinstated. 
¶8 
The court of appeals remanded the matter to the 
circuit court for an evidentiary hearing.  However, Kostich 
passed away in 2014, so the State had no witnesses, nor were any 
of Kostich's case files located.  Nonetheless, the circuit court 
heard from Wren and three of his family members, and rendered 
factual findings based on the evidence presented. 
¶9 
Relevant circuit court findings include the following:  
Wren signed the Notice of Right to Seek Postconviction Relief 
six days before sentencing, he did not personally check the box 
indicating he was undecided about pursuing postconviction 
relief, and Wren was unaware which box would end up being 
checked.  Wren contacted Kostich in a timely manner, and Kostich 
told Wren that he would appeal.  Several of Wren's family 
members spoke with Kostich immediately after the original 
sentencing hearing, and Kostich told them an appeal would be 
forthcoming.  After the deadline to appeal had passed, Wren 
wrote Kostich regarding the status of the appeal and never heard 
back.  Wren's mother, father, and sister made similar efforts to 
                                                                                                                                                             
criminal conviction of failing to file tax returns"; and that 
"in 2010 he was reprimanded for representing a person on a 
criminal charge, in which he had previously consulted with the 
victim in the criminal case about potential civil action against 
the person ultimately represented in the criminal matter." 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
6 
 
reach Kostich before and after the appeal deadline passed, all 
to no avail.  Kostich "intentionally led" Wren and his family to 
believe he was going to timely file postconviction relief, but 
he failed to do so and notified no one.  Kostich failed to 
contact Wren or his family after sentencing, despite their 
persistent efforts. 
¶10 In accordance with Wren's testimony, the circuit court 
additionally found that sometime in 2010 or 2011, Wren knew no 
appeal had been filed.  Though he sought relief of various kinds 
through four other pro se motions, Wren was unaware that he 
could petition to reinstate his direct appeal rights.  He 
"wanted to seek postconviction relief regarding ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel and the sentence, but he did not 
know how to do so."  Wren eventually learned what to do and how 
to do it after communicating with an incarcerated uncle, and he 
filed the present habeas petition within three to four months. 
¶11 Following the evidentiary hearing, the court of 
appeals entertained briefing based on the circuit court's 
findings.  The State did not challenge the facts found as 
clearly erroneous, nor did it address the merits of Wren's 
ineffective assistance of counsel argument because it could not; 
the State had no evidence or witnesses to present regarding what 
happened and why.  Rather, it raised the defense of laches, 
essentially arguing that its hands were tied due to Wren's delay 
and his former counsel's intervening death.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the State proved the requisite legal 
elements 
of 
laches, 
and 
exercising 
its 
own 
discretion, 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
7 
 
determined it was equitable to apply laches in this case.  We 
granted Wren's petition for review. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶12 Wren raises three arguments against the application of 
laches to his case.7  First, he contends the doctrine of laches 
should not apply to habeas petitions at all.  Second, he asserts 
the State failed to prove two of the three elements of laches——
unreasonable delay and prejudice.  Finally, Wren maintains the 
court of appeals erroneously exercised its discretion in 
choosing to apply laches to his petition. 
 
A.  Laches Is a Defense to a Habeas Petition 
¶13 Wren begins with a request that we reexamine our 
adoption of the laches defense to habeas petitions.  His 
principal argument is that we incorporated laches into our 
habeas corpus jurisprudence somewhat thoughtlessly in two court 
of appeals opinions.8  Whatever merit those criticisms may have, 
                                                 
7 Wren also argues the merits of his habeas petition and 
asks us to reinstate his direct appeal rights.  However, because 
we affirm the court of appeals' application of laches, we need 
not address this argument. 
8 Laches was first explicitly mentioned as a defense against 
a habeas petition in Wisconsin in 1986.  State ex rel. McMillian 
v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 281, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986) 
("While we recognize that a habeas proceeding may be dismissed 
under the equitable doctrine of laches, the delay on the part of 
the petitioner must be unreasonable."), abrogated on other 
grounds by State ex rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, 290 
Wis. 2d 352, 714 N.W.2d 900.  A later court of appeals decision 
cited McMillian for the proposition that "[a]s an equitable 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
8 
 
however, we had occasion to directly answer this question last 
term.  In Lopez-Quintero, we made clear that the State may raise 
laches as an affirmative defense to a habeas petition.  387 
Wis. 2d 50, ¶16.  Moreover, Wren did not raise and brief this 
issue below, nor was it presented in Wren's petition for review.  
Having just considered the matter, we decline Wren's invitation 
to reconsider it. 
 
B.  Laches Was Properly Applied to Wren's Habeas Petition 
¶14 "Laches is founded on the notion that equity aids the 
vigilant, and not those who sleep on their rights to the 
detriment of the opposing party . . . ."  27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity 
§ 108.9  It is, at root, an equitable defense to an equitable 
claim.10  Though different jurisdictions structure the analytical 
                                                                                                                                                             
doctrine, habeas corpus is subject to the doctrine of laches."  
State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 Wis. 2d 795, 800, 565 
N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997), overruled on other grounds by State 
ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. Dittmann, 2019 WI 58, 387 Wis. 2d 50, 
928 N.W.2d 480. 
Outside the context of habeas corpus, laches is a well-
established equitable principle in Wisconsin jurisprudence.  As 
early as 1859, this court stated that "[u]nreasonable delay, and 
mere lapse of time, independently of any statute of limitations, 
constitute a defense in a court of equity."  Sheldon v. 
Rockwell, 9 Wis. 158 (*166), 162 (*181) (1859). 
9 See also Kenosha County v. Town of Paris, 148 Wis. 2d 175, 
188, 434 N.W.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1988) ("equity aids the vigilant, 
not those who sleep on their rights"). 
10 A habeas petition is an equitable claim, so application 
of an equitable defense like laches makes sense, especially 
where habeas petitions can be filed years after the conviction.  
See State ex rel. Dowe v. Circuit Court for Waukesha Cty., 184 
Wis. 2d 724, 728-29, 516 N.W.2d 714 (1994) ("As an equitable 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
9 
 
framework somewhat differently, the doctrine is consistent in 
concept:  did a party delay without good reason in asserting its 
rights, and did the delay prejudice the party seeking to defend 
that claim. 
¶15 In 
Wisconsin, 
application 
of 
laches 
to 
habeas 
petitions proceeds in two steps.  First, the party asserting the 
defense——the State in this instance——must prove the following 
three elements:  "(1) unreasonable delay in filing the habeas 
petition, (2) lack of knowledge on the part of the State that 
the petitioner would be asserting the habeas claim, and (3) 
prejudice to the State."  Lopez-Quintero, 387 Wis. 2d 50, ¶16.  
Second, even if the State proves all three elements, the court 
may——in its discretion——choose not to apply laches if it 
determines that application of the defense is not appropriate 
and equitable.  See State ex rel. Washington v. State, 2012 
WI App 74, ¶26, 343 Wis. 2d 434, 819 N.W.2d 305. 
¶16 Whether the State proved all three elements under step 
one is a legal question we review de novo.  State ex rel. 
Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, ¶17, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 
N.W.2d 900.  Assuming step one is satisfied, we review the 
decision to apply laches under step two for an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  Id. 
                                                                                                                                                             
doctrine . . . habeas corpus is confined to situations in which 
there is a pressing need for relief or where the process or 
judgment upon which a prisoner is held is void."). 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
10 
 
¶17 Wren asserts that the State failed to prove two of the 
three elements——unreasonable delay and prejudice.11  And even if 
the State did meet its burden, Wren maintains the court of 
appeals erroneously chose to apply laches in his case.   
 
1.  The State Proved Unreasonable Delay 
¶18 Whether a delay is reasonable is case specific; we 
look at the totality of circumstances.  State ex rel. McMillian 
v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 281, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986) 
("What is reasonable varies from case to case and involves the 
totality of the circumstances."), abrogated on other grounds by 
Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352; see also 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 131 
("Whether a party's delay is unreasonable depends on the 
circumstances of the particular case."). 
¶19 In rendering its conclusion, the court of appeals 
zeroed in on two factual findings.  First, Wren was aware no 
appeal had been filed by 2010 or 2011.  And during the 
intervening time period, he filed four separate pro se motions, 
none of which raised the issue presented in this habeas 
petition.  The court of appeals held that the six-year delay 
from the time he knew no appeal had been filed——a full ten years 
after 
the 
deadline 
to 
seek 
postconviction 
relief——was 
unreasonably long. 
                                                 
11 Wren concedes the second element, i.e., the State lacked 
knowledge that he would be asserting the habeas claim. 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
11 
 
¶20 As an initial matter, unreasonable delay in laches is 
based not on what litigants know, but what they might have known 
with the exercise of reasonable diligence.  This underlying 
constructive knowledge requirement arises from the general rule 
that "ignorance of one's legal rights is not a reasonable excuse 
in a laches case."  27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 138.12  "Where the 
question of laches is in issue, the plaintiff is chargeable with 
such knowledge as he might have obtained upon inquiry, provided 
the facts already known by him were such as to put a man of 
ordinary prudence upon inquiry."  Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 
Wis. 153, 174, 66 N.W. 518 (1896) (citations omitted).  To be 
sure, what we expect will vary from case to case and litigant to 
litigant.  But the expectation of reasonable diligence is firm 
nonetheless.13 
¶21 Thus, the question is when Wren either knew or should 
have known he had a potential claim.  We agree with the court of 
appeals that the delay clock started running no later than 2010 
or 2011 when Wren, by his own admission, learned no appeal had 
been filed and had long since heard nothing from his attorney.  
                                                 
12 See also Jones v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 531, 533 
(1984) ("Where laches is raised, knowledge of the law is imputed 
to all plaintiffs.  Consequently, professed ignorance of one's 
legal rights does not justify delay in filing suit."). 
13 See also 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 139 ("The correct 
inquiry in determining whether a claimant's conduct resulted in 
a want of due diligence requires focus not upon what the 
plaintiff knows, but what he or she might have known, by the use 
of the means of information within his or her reach, as the law 
requires a party to discover those facts that were discoverable 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence."). 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
12 
 
After obtaining this knowledge, Wren researched and leveraged 
his available resources to craft four separate pro se motions 
relating to his conviction and sentence——none even hinting at 
the claims raised before us.14  After four attempts to seek 
various kinds of other postconviction relief, we agree with the 
court of appeals that a habeas petition coming ten years after 
his conviction and six years after he knew his attorney didn't 
file the appeal he was allegedly promised is a delay without 
good reason. 
¶22 Wren raises two principal objections in response.  
First, he didn't know he could make such a claim and didn't know 
how to do so; and when he did discover this possible claim, he 
timely brought it within three to four months.  Second, Wren 
proffers that any delay is actually the State's fault, and 
that's why he was supposed to have counsel in the first place. 
¶23 Wren's first objection, echoed by the dissent, is 
really an effort to except Wren from the constructive knowledge 
requirement we apply to all other litigants.  The not-so-silent 
argument being made is that Wren is less capable than others and 
should be held to a lower standard.  However, we regularly 
                                                 
14 His first two motions dealt with the DNA surcharge and 
restitution award.  It was not until his third motion in 2015 
that he turned his attention to his sentence, the issue he 
states he would like to challenge if his direct appeal rights 
are reinstated.  But even his 2016 motion for sentence 
modification was based on the circuit court's purported reliance 
on an improper fact——again, nothing suggesting a broader 
challenge to his conviction or sentence, or to his trial 
counsel's effectiveness. 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
13 
 
require legally untrained litigants to assert their rights in a 
timely manner.15  Nothing prevented Wren from contacting another 
attorney.  Nothing prevented Wren from researching available 
options to ensure he took advantage of every possible legal 
argument he could make.  It surely cannot be that 20-year-olds 
(Wren's approximate age when he found out no appeal was 
forthcoming) are deemed incompetent.  And while the PSI noted 
Wren had a second grade reading level at the time of sentencing, 
that detail alone does not mean he cannot research, consult 
others, and find out what needs to be done.  In fact, Wren did 
just this when he filed four pro se motions regarding other 
matters prior to filing his habeas petition.  This reflects 
someone who is more than capable of being resourceful.16 
¶24 Wren's paramount objection seems to be that as a pro 
se litigant whose postconviction attorney abandoned him, any 
delay is the State's fault, not his.  Incorrect.  As we explain 
                                                 
15 See infra, ¶25.  Courts have long recognized that a 
violation of constitutional rights——and ineffective assistance 
of counsel is a violation of the Sixth Amendment——must be timely 
asserted even in criminal cases.  See Yakus v. United States, 
321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) ("No procedural principle is more 
familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be 
forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to 
make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having 
jurisdiction to determine it."). 
16 For example, Wren noted in his habeas petition that his 
family discovered Kostich's disciplinary history.  Moreover, the 
circuit court made no findings suggesting that Wren had the kind 
of severe mental limitations that might call for even broader 
latitude than we normally give pro se litigants. 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
14 
 
below, we have long required pro se litigants, just like those 
with an attorney, to act reasonably in defense of their rights. 
¶25 Pro se litigants are generally granted "a degree of 
leeway" in recognition of the fact that they are ordinarily 
unfamiliar with the procedural rules and substantive law that 
might govern their appeal.  Rutherford v. LIRC, 2008 WI App 66, 
¶27, 309 Wis. 2d 498, 752 N.W.2d 897.  But by definition, "a 
degree of leeway" means the additional leniency will run out at 
some point.  Thus, for example, while we construe pro se 
petitions, motions, and briefs to make the most intelligible 
argument we can discern, we do not impute to pro se litigants 
the best argument they could have, but did not, make.17  And 
while pro se litigants are given leeway in the style of a 
motion, we ordinarily hold them to strict deadlines, whether 
they know about them or not.18  In other words, we generally do 
not hold pro se litigants only to deadlines or arguments that 
                                                 
17 See State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶69, 360 
Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668 ("Although we liberally construe 
filings by pro se litigants, . . . there is a limit to our 
lenience.  A reviewing court might avert its eyes from the flaws 
on 
the 
peripheries, 
but 
it 
will 
not 
ignore 
obvious 
insufficiencies at the center of a motion." (internal citation 
omitted)). 
18 See Waushara County v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 452, 480 
N.W.2d 16 (1992) ("Pro se appellants must satisfy all procedural 
requirements, unless those requirements are waived by the court.  
They are bound by the same rules that apply to attorneys on 
appeal.  The right to self-representation is '[not] a license 
not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive 
law.'" (quoting Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 
(1975))). 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
15 
 
they know; we hold them to deadlines and arguments we expect 
them to discover with reasonable diligence.  This means that 
once Wren no longer had a lawyer representing him, he was not 
free to do nothing to address the claims he raised in his habeas 
petition.  Rather, he had an independent obligation to act——the 
same standard we apply to all pro se litigants. 
¶26 The postconviction relief process is instructive on 
this point.  Following a direct appeal, defendants seeking to 
attack their criminal convictions may do so through a motion 
under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2017-18).19  But this form of relief 
comes with a significant restriction.  Under subsection (4), 
unless a "sufficient reason" is given, any legal issues that 
could have been raised in a prior motion may not be brought in a 
subsequent § 974.06 motion.  § 974.06(4).  And in 1994, this 
court made clear that if the issue could have been raised on 
direct appeal, the litigant has lost the opportunity to bring it 
under § 974.06.  State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 
173, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994).20 
                                                 
19 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2017-18 version. 
20 This is no outlier; State v. Escalona-Naranjo has been 
cited thousands of times in Wisconsin courts.  185 Wis. 2d 168, 
517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
16 
 
¶27 The vast majority of motions under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 
are filed by pro se litigants.21  The statute's strictures are 
not ignored or relaxed for pro se litigants; we apply the same 
rules to everyone.  This means that even a potentially 
meritorious 
constitutional 
claim 
on 
a 
petitioner's 
third 
§ 974.06 motion——a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, 
for example——is a nonstarter if it could have been brought on 
direct appeal or in the prior § 974.06 motions.22  These pro se 
litigants, no less than Wren here, are almost uniformly 
untrained in the law.  Yet we expect them to exercise reasonable 
diligence to learn all potentially meritorious claims and to 
raise them in their first § 974.06 motion.  If they don't, the 
claim is procedurally barred, whatever its merits may be.23 
                                                 
21 This is in large part because there is no constitutional 
right to counsel on a collateral attack.  Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) ("We have never held that 
prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting 
collateral attacks upon their convictions, . . . and we decline 
to so hold today.  Our cases establish that the right to 
appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no 
further." (internal citation omitted)). 
22 See, 
e.g., 
Escalona-Naranjo, 
185 
Wis. 2d at 
186 
("[Escalona-Naranjo] has not alleged a sufficient reason as to 
why his allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
could not have been raised when he filed his [Wis. Stat. 
§] 974.02 motion for a new trial."); Romero-Georgana, 360 
Wis. 2d 522, ¶5 ("[T]he defendant has not offered a sufficient 
reason in his third postconviction motion for failing to raise 
his [Wis. Stat.] § 974.06 claim [for ineffective assistance of 
counsel] 
in 
his 
second 
postconviction 
motion. . . .  
Consequently, the defendant's claim is barred."). 
23 Unless, of course, an exception in Wis. Stat. § 974.06 is 
triggered. 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
17 
 
¶28 Wren appears to believe——as does the dissent——that 
ineffective assistance of counsel is an exception to these 
principles.  Yet no authority to this effect is cited, nor are 
we aware of any.  Without question, if Wren told Kostich to file 
an appeal and Kostich failed to do so, that failure would 
establish constitutionally deficient performance, and prejudice 
is presumed.  See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744 (2019) 
("[P]rejudice 
is 
presumed 
'when 
counsel's 
constitutionally 
deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he 
otherwise would have taken.'" (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. 470, 484 (2000))).  The law is clear that Wren is not 
liable for the faults of his constitutionally deficient counsel.  
See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991). 
¶29 But Wren and the dissent take this proposition far 
afield from its more modest foundations.  They argue that when a 
defendant alleges he has been denied his Sixth Amendment right 
to effective assistance of counsel, any subsequent delay must be 
attributed to the State due to its failure to provide adequate 
counsel in the first instance.  Or said another way, if his 
counsel failed, Wren is relieved of any further obligation to 
assert his own rights.  Or maybe more charitably, because he 
didn't know what actions to take, Wren was absolved from taking 
any action at all.24  There are two problems with this line of 
argument. 
                                                 
24 Wren also argues he did not know he should file a habeas 
petition in the court of appeals until our 2014 decision in 
Kyles, 354 Wis. 2d 626.  But this decision only clarified where 
such a claim should be filed.  Nothing in Kyles announced 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
18 
 
¶30 First, it assumes Wren's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel was denied.  But that is the very claim Wren wishes to 
maintain if this habeas petition is successful.  One cannot 
assume his ultimate claim will be successful in order to assess 
whether he delayed in bringing that very claim. 
¶31 Second, and more to the point, Wren's argument that 
laches cannot apply when counsel fails to appeal as promised is 
without any legal support in Wisconsin.  The issue before us is 
not, did Wren, with counsel, miss the deadline.  The question 
is, knowing counsel did not file an appeal, did Wren himself 
unreasonably delay in seeking relief.  If the dissent is correct 
that any delay of the sort alleged here is attributable to the 
State, then Wren could wait ten, twenty, or even thirty years to 
raise his claim, regardless of any impact on the State's ability 
to address the merits of an alleged ineffective assistance 
claim.  This cannot be correct.  Pro se litigants, including 
those who claim their trial counsel did not serve them by filing 
an appeal, still have an independent obligation to timely raise 
these issues with the court on their own.  A pro se litigant has 
no license to "lay in the weeds and wait to raise an issue of 
                                                                                                                                                             
anything new related to the substance or timing of a petition to 
reinstate direct appeal rights because of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel.  The issue here is not that Wren timely raised 
the claim in the wrong court.  It is that he untimely raised the 
claim. 
This argument is also unpersuasive in light of the fact 
that, notwithstanding his filing of several postconviction 
motions in the interim, Wren did not file his habeas petition 
until three years after Kyles was decided. 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
19 
 
potential merit."  Washington, 343 Wis. 2d 434, ¶23.  After 
knowing no appeal had been filed, and after knowing his counsel 
had not responded to him, Wren had an obligation to exercise 
reasonable diligence and raise the issues in a timely manner.  
Wren's delay of six to seven years from the time he knew this is 
not attributable to the State; it is on Wren.  Put simply, Wren 
had some time to figure this out, but not unlimited time.  Here, 
his delay was unreasonable. 
 
2.  The State Proved Prejudice 
¶32 Wren's unreasonable delay alone is not sufficient to 
support the application of laches.  The State also must prove 
that the unreasonable delay prejudiced its defense against the 
habeas petition.25  Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352, ¶19.  "What amounts 
                                                 
25 Many jurisdictions include in their prejudice analysis 
whether the delay prejudices the state's ability to address the 
underlying merits should the petition be granted.  The State has 
made no such argument in this case, but it is a common position 
around the country.  See, e.g., United States v. Darnell, 716 
F.2d 479, 480 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The government's ability to meet 
successfully the allegations of the motion or to present a case 
against the defendant if he is granted a new trial may be 
greatly diminished by the passage of time." (footnote omitted)); 
Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1994) 
("In making a determination of prejudice, the effect of the 
delay on both the government's ability to respond to the 
petition and the government's ability to mount a retrial are 
relevant." (citing Darnell, 716 F.2d at 480)); In re Douglas, 
200 Cal. App. 4th 236, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ("[T]he People 
have been prejudiced both with regard to retrying Defendant and 
to responding to issues raised in Defendant's petition."); 
Armstrong v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 (Ind. 2001) ("For 
post-conviction laches purposes, prejudice exists when the 
unreasonable delay operates to materially diminish a reasonable 
likelihood of successful re-prosecution." (citation omitted)); 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
20 
 
to prejudice, such as will bar the right to assert a claim after 
the passage of time pursuant to laches, depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case, but it is generally held to be 
anything that places the party in a less favorable position."  
27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 143. 
¶33 Courts commonly describe two types of prejudice:  
evidentiary and economic.26  The State here claims evidentiary 
                                                                                                                                                             
Woodberry v. State, 101 P.3d 727, 731 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) ("The 
length of th[e] delay is unreasonable, and the State would 
undoubtedly 
be 
prejudiced 
if 
forced 
to 
retry 
[the 
petitioner]."); Jones v. State, 126 A.3d 1162, 1182 (Md. 2015) 
("[W]e conclude that, for purposes of determining whether laches 
bars an individual's ability to seek coram nobis relief, 
prejudice involves not only the State's ability to defend 
against the coram nobis petition, but also the State's ability 
to reprosecute."); Johnson v. State, 714 N.W.2d 832, 838 (N.D. 
2006) ("[P]rejudice exists when the unreasonable delay operates 
to materially diminish a reasonable likelihood of successful re-
prosecution." (quoting Kirby v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005))); Ex Parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 215 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ("[We] expand the definition of prejudice 
under the existing laches doctrine to permit consideration of 
anything that places the State in a less favorable position, 
including 
prejudice 
to 
the 
State's 
ability 
to 
retry 
a 
defendant . . . ."). 
26 See ABB Robotics, Inc. v. GMFanuc Robotics Corp., 828 
F. Supp. 1386, 1393 (E.D. Wis. 1993) ("Material Prejudice 'may 
be either economic or evidentiary.'" (quoted source omitted)).  
American 
Jurisprudence, 
using 
slightly 
different 
terms, 
describes it this way:   
Generally, there are two main types of prejudice 
arising from delay by plaintiffs in bringing their 
claims that support the laches defense:  (1) "defense 
prejudice," whereby the defendant is impaired from 
successfully defending itself from suit given the 
passage of time; and (2) "economic prejudice," whereby 
the 
costs 
to 
the 
defendant 
have 
significantly 
increased due to the delay. 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
21 
 
prejudice.  "Evidentiary prejudice . . . may arise where a 
plaintiff's delay in bringing an action has curtailed the 
defendant's ability to present a full and fair defense on the 
merits due to the loss of evidence, the death of a witness, or 
the unreliability of memories."  30A C.J.S. Equity § 158. 
¶34 The loss of key records and the unavailability of 
essential witnesses are "classic elements" of prejudice in a 
laches defense.  Id.  The death of key witnesses is precisely 
the kind of thing laches is aimed at, particularly where the 
"the 
decedent's 
knowledge 
is 
crucial 
to 
a 
party's 
defense . . . ."  27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 152.  American 
Jurisprudence explains:   
The doctrine of laches is peculiarly applicable where 
the difficulty of doing justice arises through the 
death of the principal participants in transactions 
complained of, or of witnesses to transactions . . . .  
For example, documents may have been misplaced or 
destroyed, or it may be difficult or impossible for 
the party to defend a claim if essential witnesses are 
deceased . . . . 
Id. § 149.27 
                                                                                                                                                             
27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 144. 
27 The Wisconsin Practice Series offers draft forms for 
practitioners.  One of its sample laches forms addresses 
precisely this type of scenario as an archetypal issue.  The 
form reads:   
The plaintiff had knowledge of all of the facts set 
forth in the complaint at least _______ years before 
commencement of this action.  During that interval, 
all persons who would be material witnesses have died, 
the defendant's position has substantially changed as 
a result, and the defendant is materially prejudiced.  
The 
plaintiff 
should 
be 
barred 
by 
laches 
from 
obtaining relief in this action. 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
22 
 
¶35 Wren asserts that the State has not proven prejudice.  
He rests his argument largely on the fact that the State's claim 
of prejudice relies on the unavailability of Attorney Kostich.  
And in that vein, Wren points specifically to the circuit 
court's factual findings that he believed Kostich would file an 
appeal on his behalf and subsequently failed to respond to Wren 
or his family, despite their attempts to contact him.  If these 
findings 
are 
accepted, 
Wren 
maintains, 
that 
establishes 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel, 
and 
no 
contradictory 
hypothetical evidence could matter. 
¶36 Wren's argument on this point is superficially strong, 
but it rests on a faulty foundation.  To be sure, the State does 
not contest the circuit court's factual findings.  But fairly 
understood, the State advanced something even more fundamental:  
it had no tools and no evidence to defend the habeas claim at 
all because its necessary evidence——the files and testimony of 
Kostich——were unavailable due to Wren's unreasonable delay in 
raising the issue.  The State made this point most poignantly at 
oral argument when it said it did not challenge the factual 
findings because——due to Wren's delay——it had nothing with which 
to challenge them.  Even the evidentiary hearing at which the 
circuit court made its factual findings was a one-sided story.  
This is the very definition of prejudice. 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Wisconsin Practice Series:  Civil Procedure Forms § 40:433 (3d 
ed. 2019). 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
23 
 
¶37 It is no excuse to say that we do not know what 
testimony Kostich would have offered, or what evidence his case 
files 
may 
have 
contained. 
 
Zizzo 
v. 
Lakeside 
Steel 
& 
Manufacturing Co. is instructive on this point.  2008 WI App 69, 
312 Wis. 2d 463, 752 N.W.2d 889.  There, a son who inherited 
property sought to discharge the mortgage obligations on the 
property in part on the grounds of laches.  Id., ¶1.  His 
deceased parents received a loan in 1989 and were supposed to 
pay off the property in 1993, but no payments were ever made, 
nor were efforts made to collect or foreclose on the mortgage.  
Id.  The mortgage holder responded that no prejudice was shown, 
essentially arguing the claim was "speculative because he does 
not know exactly what information his [deceased] parents 
possessed . . . ."  Id., ¶20.  The court's response there is 
true here as well:  "Of course he does not know that 
information——and that is exactly how he is prejudiced."  Id. 
¶38 It is important to stress that prejudice to a party 
for purposes of laches does not mean a party is so disadvantaged 
that it cannot prosecute its case.  The prerequisite under our 
law is prejudice due to the delay, i.e., disadvantage to a 
party.  Thus, the legal element is met by showing the State's 
defense of the habeas petition was meaningfully disadvantaged.  
The death of the essential witness to the events at issue, along 
with the loss of his documentary files, unquestionably satisfies 
this standard. 
 
 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
24 
 
3.  The Court of Appeals Appropriately Exercised  
Its Discretion in Applying Laches 
¶39 Though we agree that the State proved all three 
elements of laches as a matter of law, the court of appeals 
still had the duty and authority to decide whether to apply 
laches in this case.  As noted above, we review this decision 
for 
an 
erroneous 
exercise 
of 
discretion. 
 
Coleman, 
290 
Wis. 2d 352, ¶17.  Therefore, as long as the court applied a 
proper standard of law and employed a demonstrated, rational 
process to reach a conclusion that a reasonable court could 
reach, the decision should be affirmed.  State v. Cooper, 2019 
WI 73, ¶13, 387 Wis. 2d 439, 929 N.W.2d 192.  When we review a 
discretionary decision, we look for reasons to affirm the lower 
court's decision, even if its reasoning could have been 
explained more fully.  See State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, ¶29, 361 
Wis. 2d 529, 861 N.W.2d 174. 
¶40 The court of appeals properly acknowledged it needed 
to exercise its discretion whether to apply laches to Wren's 
case.  In deciding to do so, the court reasoned that application 
was appropriate because "Wren waited over ten years to raise 
concerns about the lack of appointment of postconviction counsel 
and a direct appeal, despite the fact that he sought relief 
numerous times from the trial court."  State ex rel. Wren v. 
Richardson, No. 2017AP880-W, unpublished slip op. at 9 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Nov. 12, 2018).  The court relied significantly on the 
reasoning of Washington, 343 Wis. 2d 434, where the petitioner 
waited five years to seek reinstatement of his appellate rights. 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
25 
 
¶41 Wren's objections to the court's decision to apply 
laches are predominantly echoes of his previous arguments:  he 
shouldn't be faulted for the State's failure to ensure he had 
constitutionally adequate counsel; he didn't know he could do 
this; and he wasn't familiar with the court system. 
¶42 All of these assertions, however, are aimed at a 
rebalancing of the equities in this court.  That is not how we 
review discretionary decisions.  The court of appeals' decision 
is sufficient to satisfy our standard of review.  It was 
reasonable for the court to conclude that even if the State 
failed to provide him with constitutionally adequate counsel, 
any subsequent delays by Wren should not be attributed to the 
State.28  It was reasonable to conclude that the State's 
                                                 
28 Furthermore, while failure to file an appeal is deficient 
performance 
for 
which 
prejudice 
is 
presumed, 
claims 
of 
ineffective assistance of counsel generally fail absent some 
form of corroboration of the attorney's actions. 
A defendant on a post-conviction motion may bring a 
claim of ineffective counsel.  If the counsel in 
question cannot appear to explain or rebut the 
defendant's contentions because of death . . . then 
the 
defendant 
should 
not, 
by 
uncorroborated 
allegations, 
be 
allowed 
to 
make 
a 
case 
for 
ineffectiveness.  The defendant must support his 
allegations 
with 
corroborating 
evidence. 
 
Such 
evidence could be letters from the attorney to the 
client, transcripts of statements made by the attorney 
or any other tangible evidence which would show the 
attorney's ineffective representation. . . . In other 
words, we will presume that counsel had a reasonable 
basis for his actions, and the defendant cannot by his 
own words rebut this presumption.  Such a burden will 
assure that post-conviction proceedings will not be 
brought solely on the basis of ineffective counsel 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
26 
 
inability to mount a defense due to Wren's delay should outweigh 
Wren's interest in further challenging his conviction.29  The 
question before us is not whether we would have made the same 
decision, but whether the court of appeals applied a proper 
standard of law and employed a demonstrated, rational process to 
reach a conclusion that a reasonable court could reach.30  The 
answer is yes it did. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶43 We 
decline 
Wren's 
invitation 
to 
reconsider 
our 
decisions holding that laches is an available defense to a 
habeas petition.  The State raised the defense in response to 
Wren's petition and proved all three elements of laches, in 
particular, unreasonable delay and prejudice.  We also affirm 
the court of appeals' exercise of discretion in applying laches 
                                                                                                                                                             
when counsel dies or for some other reason becomes 
unavailable to explain his or her prior actions. 
State v. Lukasik, 115 Wis. 2d 134, 140, 340 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 
1983). 
29 The dissent would balance the equities differently, 
giving more weight to the prejudice to Wren.  Dissent, ¶75.  
That is the very definition of rebalancing the scales in 
violation of our standard of review. 
30 See Burkes v. Hales, 165 Wis. 2d 585, 590, 478 N.W.2d 37 
(Ct. App. 1991) ("And where the record shows that the court 
looked to and considered the facts of the case and reasoned its 
way to a conclusion that is (a) one a reasonable judge could 
reach and (b) consistent with applicable law, we will affirm the 
decision even if it is not one with which we ourselves would 
agree." (footnote omitted)). 
No.  2017AP880-W 
 
27 
 
to Wren's petition.  Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals' 
denial of Wren's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No.  2017AP880-W.awb 
 
1 
 
¶44 ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
"It 
is 
incongruous to state that a defendant was denied the right to 
counsel and then preclude the defendant from raising a claim 
because of errors made due to the absence of counsel."  State ex 
rel. Kyles v. Pollard, 2014 WI 38, ¶56, 354 Wis. 2d 626, 847 
N.W.2d 805.  Yet the majority opinion does just that.  
¶45 In doing so, the majority endorses a significant 
failure in our system of justice.  Abandoned by counsel and 
hampered by a second grade reading level, Wren was left to fend 
for himself.  Not surprisingly, he spent several years adrift in 
a sea of pro se motions.  Once he learned that the correct 
mechanism to seek reinstatement of the appeal rights he had lost 
due to his counsel's abandonment was to file a habeas petition, 
he did so promptly.   
¶46 I agree with the majority that laches is a defense 
available to the State in response to a petition for habeas 
corpus.  See majority op., ¶3.  Our case law is well established 
on this point.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Lopez-Quintero v. 
Dittman, 2019 WI 58, ¶10, 387 Wis. 2d 50, 928 N.W.2d 480. 
¶47 However, I part ways with the majority's application 
of the doctrine of laches to the facts of this case.  In my 
view, the majority errs in its determination that Wren's delay 
was unreasonable.  The majority further errs in refusing to 
disturb the court of appeals' conclusion that the application of 
laches in this case was equitable. 
No.  2017AP880-W.awb 
 
2 
 
¶48 Because 
I 
determine 
that 
Wren's 
delay 
was 
not 
unreasonable, and the application of laches to bar his claim is 
hardly equitable, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶49 At the age of 15, Wren was charged with first-degree 
reckless homicide.  The next year, in 2007, he pleaded guilty as 
charged in exchange for the State's agreement not to seek a 
specific sentence.  As the majority acknowledges, the sentence 
he received was "considerably more than Wren's counsel suggested 
and longer than was recommended in the presentence investigation 
report (PSI)."  Majority op., ¶4. 
¶50 Wren told his attorney, Nikola Kostich, that he 
disagreed with the sentence.1  Attorney Kostich responded that 
Wren should not worry because they would appeal.  Immediately 
after the sentencing hearing, members of Wren's family also 
spoke with Attorney Kostich, and Attorney Kostich also assured 
them that he would file an appeal on Wren's behalf. 
¶51 Such an appeal never came.  Wren and members of his 
family attempted to contact Attorney Kostich over a period of 
                                                 
1 The facts as set forth in this dissent are largely taken 
from the circuit court's findings of fact.  The State has not 
challenged these facts as clearly erroneous.  Majority op., ¶11. 
No.  2017AP880-W.awb 
 
3 
 
several years, but they received no response.2  Accordingly, the 
circuit 
court 
found 
as 
a 
fact 
that 
"Attorney 
Kostich 
intentionally led Wren and third parties acting on his behalf to 
believe that he would timely complete the requirements necessary 
for the defendant to seek postconviction relief, and then he 
failed to do so without notifying Wren or third parties acting 
on his behalf."  Attorney Kostich passed away in 2014. 
¶52 The circuit court additionally found as a fact that 
"[s]ometime in 2010 or 2011, Wren concluded that Attorney 
Kostich had not filed an appeal on his behalf.  After reaching 
this conclusion, Wren still wanted to seek postconviction relief 
regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the 
sentence, but he did not know how to do so."  Consistent with 
such an intent, Wren filed various motions in the circuit court 
from 2010 to 2016.  Id., ¶6.  However, Wren did not know that he 
could file a habeas petition that could reinstate his appeal 
rights. 
                                                 
2 Attorney Kostich was brought before this court for 
professional discipline on four prior occasions, including 
during the relevant period here.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Kostich (Kostich IV), 2012 WI 118, 344 
Wis. 2d 534, 824 N.W.2d 799; In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Kostich (Kostich III), 2010 WI 136, 330 Wis. 2d 378, 793 
N.W.2d 494; In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kostich 
(Kostich II), 2005 WI 90, 282 Wis. 2d 206, 700 N.W.2d 763; 
Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kostich (Kostich I), 
132 Wis. 2d 227, 391 N.W.2d 208 (1986).  In two of these 
instances, Attorney Kostich was disciplined for failing to 
communicate with a client or a client's family member or failing 
to act with reasonable diligence as are the allegations in this 
case.  Kostich IV, 344 Wis. 2d 534; Kostich II, 282 Wis. 2d 206. 
No.  2017AP880-W.awb 
 
4 
 
¶53 Wren testified that he eventually learned of the 
mechanism of a habeas petition from his uncle, who was 
incarcerated in another institution.  He further testified that 
within "three to four months" of learning this information, he 
filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus that is the subject 
of this case, seeking to reinstate his right to pursue the 
postconviction relief he thought he would be seeking through 
Attorney Kostich.  Specifically, Wren argued that he was denied 
the right to a direct appeal and the right to the assistance of 
counsel on that appeal, because he was abandoned by his 
attorney. 
II 
A 
¶54 The majority's first error lies in its determination 
that Wren's delay in seeking to reinstate his appeal rights was 
unreasonable. 
¶55 In the majority's view, "the delay clock started 
running no later than 2010 or 2011 when Wren, by his own 
admission, learned no appeal had been filed . . . ."  Id., ¶21.  
After he learned no appeal had been filed, the majority reasons, 
"Wren researched and leveraged his available resources to craft 
four separate pro se motions relating to his conviction——none 
even hinting at the claims raised before us."  Id. 
¶56 While the majority places the delay at Wren's feet, it 
glosses over the underlying reason that an appeal was never 
filed——that 
Wren 
was 
abandoned 
by 
his 
counsel 
and 
thus 
completely denied the right to counsel on direct appeal in 
No.  2017AP880-W.awb 
 
5 
 
violation of the Sixth Amendment.  See State ex rel. Seibert v. 
Macht, 2001 WI 67, ¶10, 244 Wis. 2d 378, 627 N.W.2d 881 
(recognizing a constitutional right to counsel on appeal); Page 
v. Frank, 343 F.3d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 2003) ("It is well 
established that a criminal defendant possesses the right to 
effective assistance of counsel through his first appeal of 
right."); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). 
¶57 Indeed, such abandonment by counsel has been described 
by the Seventh Circuit as a "per se violation of the sixth 
amendment."  Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717, 718 (7th 
Cir. 1994).  "If the defendant told his lawyer to appeal, and 
the lawyer dropped the ball, then the defendant has been 
deprived, not of effective assistance of counsel, but of any 
assistance of counsel on appeal."  Id.   
¶58 United States Supreme Court precedent dictates that, 
as a constitutional matter, the responsibility for the denial of 
counsel on direct appeal is imputed to the State.  And it is the 
State which must bear the cost——dare I say the burden——of the 
resulting default.  In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 
(1991), the Court wrote: 
Where a petitioner defaults a claim as a result of the 
denial of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, the State, which is responsible for the 
denial as a constitutional matter, must bear the cost 
of any resulting default and the harm to state 
interests that federal habeas review entails. 
In other words, "if the procedural default is the result of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself 
requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the 
No.  2017AP880-W.awb 
 
6 
 
State."  Id. (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 
(1986)).  
¶59 These principles certainly apply here.  It is the 
State's responsibility to provide Wren with counsel, and it 
utterly 
failed 
in 
that 
endeavor. 
 
To 
say 
that 
Wren 
"unreasonably" delayed when the delay must be imputed to the 
State turns Supreme Court precedent on its head. 
¶60 Nevertheless, the majority seems unfazed by the Sixth 
Amendment mandate that the responsibility for the delay be 
imputed to the State.  According to the majority it is the pro 
se defendant, with a second grade reading ability who was 
abandoned by counsel, that we hold responsible instead. 
¶61 The majority admonishes that:  "Nothing prevented Wren 
from contacting another attorney.  Nothing prevented Wren from 
researching available options to ensure he took advantage of 
every possible legal argument he could make."  Majority op., 
¶23.  Really?  First of all, such statements have no record 
support.  But more importantly, is this really the high bar that 
we are requiring of pro se litigants like Wren——"to take 
advantage of every possible legal argument he could make?" 
¶62 It is the rare member of the public who even knows of 
the existence of a writ of habeas corpus, let alone what it 
means and how and when to file such a writ.  Recall that even 
experienced lawyers and courts were unsure how to proceed.  This 
court did not clarify the proper forum for filing a habeas 
petition until 2014,3 but the majority curiously expects a non-
                                                 
3 See State ex rel. Kyles v. Pollard, 2014 WI 38, ¶3, 354 
Wis. 2d 626, 847 N.W.2d 805. 
No.  2017AP880-W.awb 
 
7 
 
lawyer abandoned by counsel to have figured it all out before 
then. 
¶63 Further, the majority wrongly holds Wren's filings 
prior to this habeas proceeding against him.  It relies on the 
assertion that "Wren researched and leveraged his available 
resources to craft four separate pro se motions relating to his 
conviction——none even hinting at the claims raised before us" to 
support the proposition that Wren sat on his rights.  Id., ¶21. 
¶64 But Wren is not trained in the law, and he was a mere 
15 years old at the time of his crime.  The record indicates 
that he read at a second grade level.  He was completely 
abandoned by counsel and left to fend for himself through no 
fault of his own.   
¶65 The majority asserts that it is simply holding Wren to 
"the same standard we apply to all pro se litigants."  Id., ¶25.  
Citing to secondary sources, the majority declares that Wren's 
ignorance of his legal rights does not absolve him of any 
obligation.  Id., ¶20.  It cites general maxims regarding pro se 
litigants, but its platitudes fail to address a defendant who 
has been denied his constitutional right to direct appeal due to 
the complete desertion of his counsel.  See id., ¶25.      
¶66 Indeed, the majority conflates a willing pro se 
litigant with a criminal defendant blamelessly abandoned by 
counsel.4  If the justice system worked as it should have, Wren 
                                                 
4 The majority further conflates the denial of the right to 
counsel on direct appeal with a postconviction motion where the 
defendant already had the benefit of a direct appeal with the 
assistance of counsel.  See majority op., ¶27. 
No.  2017AP880-W.awb 
 
8 
 
would not have been pro se in the first place.  He was not pro 
se by choice, but was forced into an untenable position by his 
counsel's complete abandonment.5   
¶67 In the majority's view, "once Wren no longer had a 
lawyer representing him, he was not free to do nothing to 
address the claims he raised in his habeas petition."  Id., ¶25.  
However, Wren did not "do nothing."  He did what he could with 
the resources and knowledge he had.6  The fact that Wren filed 
other pro se motions on unrelated issues with the assistance of 
other inmates indicates that Wren remained engaged in his case, 
not that he had abandoned his quest to reinstate his appeal 
rights.   
¶68 Once Wren learned about petitions for a writ of habeas 
corpus, he filed one straight away.  Indeed, he testified that 
he filed his habeas petition "three to four months" after 
learning that such a petition was an option available to him.  
Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, these facts do not 
paint a picture of a litigant "lay[ing] in the weeds and 
                                                 
5 The United States Supreme Court has "long held that a 
lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant 
to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is 
professionally unreasonable."  Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 
470, 477 (2000) (citations omitted).  "This is so because a 
defendant who instructs counsel to initiate an appeal reasonably 
relies upon counsel to file the necessary notice."  Id. 
6 See Kyles, 354 Wis. 2d 626, ¶57 (rejecting the State's 
argument that Kyles' prior unsuccessful pro se attempts to seek 
relief that "were thwarted due to his lack of legal knowledge 
and the lower courts' confusion over where and how he should 
file his claims" barred a subsequent petition for habeas 
corpus). 
No.  2017AP880-W.awb 
 
9 
 
wait[ing] to raise an issue of potential merit."  See State ex 
rel. Washington v. State, 2012 WI App 74, ¶23, 343 Wis. 2d 434, 
819 N.W.2d 305; Betts v. Litscher, 241 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 
2001) ("The Constitution does not permit a state to ensnare an 
unrepresented defendant in his own errors and thus foreclose 
access to counsel.").  
¶69 I therefore conclude that Wren's delay was not 
unreasonable.  Wren acted promptly upon learning the correct 
mechanism for seeking to reinstate his appeal rights and, in any 
event, as a constitutional matter, such a delay is properly 
imputed to the State in the first instance.7  
B 
¶70 The majority also errs in upholding the court of 
appeals' determination that the equities favor the State.  
Cautioning 
against 
"rebalancing . . . the 
equities 
in 
this 
court[,]" the majority concludes that the court of appeals 
"applied a proper standard of law and employed a demonstrated, 
rational process to reach a conclusion that a reasonable court 
could reach."  Majority op., ¶42. 
¶71 As a starting point, I do not dispute that the State 
is prejudiced by the delay that resulted from Attorney Kostich's 
                                                 
7 The majority posits that this dissent stands for a rule 
that "Wren could wait ten, twenty, or even thirty years to raise 
his claim, regardless of any impact on the State's ability to 
address the merits of an alleged ineffective assistance claim."  
Majority op., ¶31.  Nonsense.  Contrary to this suggestion, this 
dissent addresses only the facts before us, and does not 
speculate as to what the result would have been if Wren had 
waited a longer period of time before filing his habeas 
petition. 
No.  2017AP880-W.awb 
 
10 
 
abandonment 
of 
his 
client. 
 
If 
an 
attorney's 
lack 
of 
recollection of events coupled with the destruction of the 
attorney's files is enough to establish prejudice to the State, 
then the unavailability of an attorney for testimony due to the 
attorney's death must also be sufficient.  See Washington, 343 
Wis. 2d 434, ¶25. 
¶72 However, the analysis cannot end there.  Even if all 
elements of laches are proven, a court still must determine, in 
its discretion, whether to apply laches and deny the petition.  
Id., ¶20.  Laches is, after all, an equitable defense.  Sawyer 
v. Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 159, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999). 
¶73 In my view, the court of appeals erroneously exercised 
its discretion by giving short shrift to the competing prejudice 
suffered by Wren.  Although it is true that the State suffers 
prejudice by not being able to question Kostich, the State is 
not the only party prejudiced by Kostich's absence.  See Garza 
v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744 (2019) (explaining that prejudice 
is presumed when a defendant is "left entirely without the 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
on 
appeal" 
or 
"when 
counsel's 
constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of 
an appeal that he otherwise would have taken") (citations and 
internal quotations omitted).  Certainly Wren would have liked 
to have Kostich on the stand just as much, if not more, than the 
State.   
¶74 Given the record indicating a complete lack of 
response from Attorney Kostich to Wren or his family members, 
Wren would have likely benefited from having Attorney Kostich on 
No.  2017AP880-W.awb 
 
11 
 
the stand to confirm that the attorney did nothing to pursue 
Wren's appeal.  Indeed, the circuit court found as a fact that 
"Attorney Kostich intentionally led Wren and third parties 
acting on his behalf to believe that he would timely complete 
the 
requirements 
necessary 
for 
the 
defendant 
to 
seek 
postconviction relief, and then he failed to do so without 
notifying Wren or third parties acting on his behalf."  If 
Kostich's testimony would confirm the finding that Wren asked 
Attorney Kostich to file an appeal and he simply didn't do it, 
then Wren is prejudiced to a far greater extent than is the 
State. 
¶75 Giving proper weight to the prejudice to Wren, the 
equities clearly favor Wren and militate against the application 
of laches.8  Further, it was the State that denied Wren counsel 
on appeal, and it would be inequitable to now hold Wren 
accountable for the State's failing.  I therefore conclude that 
the court of appeals erroneously exercised its discretion 
because it did not give the competing prejudice suffered by Wren 
the weight it is due. 
¶76 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶77 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent. 
 
                                                 
8 In the majority's estimation, this conclusion represents 
an impermissible "rebalancing" of the equities.  Majority op., 
¶42 n.29.  Rather than "rebalancing" the scale, this dissent 
seeks to make sure that all considerations are properly on the 
scale in the first place.  
No.  2017AP880-W.awb 
 
 
 
2