Case Title: Girard v. Youngstown Belt Ry. Co.

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5370

Docket Number: 2011-1850

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Girard v. Youngstown Belt Ry. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5370.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5370 
THE CITY OF GIRARD, APPELLANT, v. YOUNGSTOWN BELT RAILWAY  
COMPANY ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Girard v. Youngstown Belt Ry. Co.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5370.] 
Federal preemption—Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act—49 
U.S.C. 10101 et seq.—Eminent domain. 
(No. 2011-1850—Submitted June 19, 2012—Decided November 21, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, 
No. 2010-T-0079, 196 Ohio App.3d 271, 2011-Ohio-4699. 
__________________ 
MCGEE BROWN, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are called upon to determine the extent to which 
the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”), 49 U.S.C. 
10101 et seq., preempts a state’s eminent-domain action over a parcel of property 
owned by a railway company.  Based on our interpretation of the legislation at 
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issue and its application to the unique facts of this case, we find no preemption, 
and we therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} Since 1997, Youngstown Belt Railway Company (“Youngstown 
Railway”) has been the owner of a 55-acre parcel of land, called Mosier Yard.  
Youngstown Railway operates an active track that runs along the outside of the 
eastern border of Mosier Yard.  The remainder of the parcel is vacant, though 
Youngstown Railway uses three to four acres for temporary staging and storage 
approximately once or twice per year. 
{¶ 3} In July 2004, Youngstown Railway entered an initial purchase 
agreement with Total Waste Logistics of Girard, L.L.C., for the purchase of 
Mosier Yard in fee simple at the rate of $5,000 per acre.  In April 2005, the 
parties entered into a more comprehensive purchase agreement for the purchase of 
Mosier Yard for a total of $275,000.  The sale was contingent upon Total Waste 
Logistics’ attainment of appropriate permits to use the property as a construction-
and-demolition debris landfill.  The purchase agreements make no mention of any 
future intent by Total Waste Logistics to grant easements to Youngstown Railway 
or any future intent to enter into a debris-hauling service agreement with 
Youngstown Railway.  The sale to Total Waste was never consummated. 
{¶ 4} In April 2006, the city of Girard passed a resolution declaring its 
intent to appropriate a portion of Mosier Yard, covering approximately 41.5 acres.  
The 13.5 acres to be retained by Youngstown Railway included the existing track 
and right-of-way as well as additional space for the staging and storing of 
materials or for the potential future construction of an additional track.  In June 
2006, the city passed an additional resolution, declaring the value of the property 
to be $41,500.  After the city and Youngstown Railway were unable to reach any 
agreement, the city commenced an appropriation action at the Trumbull County 
Court of Common Pleas in November 2006. 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
{¶ 5} Youngstown Railway filed a motion for summary judgment, 
asserting that the appropriation proceedings were preempted by the ICCTA and 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) 
because the intended appropriation would have the effect of burdening or 
interfering with railway transportation.  Youngstown Railway pointed out that its 
current location for storing materials is outside the 13.5-acre area and further 
asserted that it had planned since purchasing the property in 1997 to develop the 
property for “industrial, transloading, and/or warehousing purposes to be serviced 
by rail,” as evidenced by its current purchase agreement with Total Waste 
Logistics. 
{¶ 6} The city opposed Youngstown Railway’s motion and filed its own 
motion for summary judgment, arguing that the appropriation would have no 
effect on Youngstown Railway’s operation of its railway.  The city pointed out 
that the appropriated 41.5 acres did not contain any existing or abandoned rail 
lines or approach the right-of-way of any neighboring rail lines, and that 
Youngstown Railway’s chief engineering officer agreed that the 13.5 acres to be 
retained by Youngstown Railway would accommodate its need for storage space.  
The city further asserted that Youngstown Railway’s plan to sell the entire 55-
acre parcel in fee simple to a landfill company undermined Youngstown 
Railway’s stance that the land would be used for railway transportation. 
{¶ 7} Youngstown Railway’s response to the city’s motion pointed to the 
affidavit of Youngstown Railway’s president, in which he averred that in addition 
to the parties’ written contract, Youngstown Railway and Total Waste Logistics 
“entered a verbal agreement regarding future business relations” between the two 
companies.  The president as well as the director of operations for Total Waste 
Logistics averred that once Total Waste Logistics obtained the necessary permits 
to create the landfill, Total Waste Logistics planned to grant easements to 
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Youngstown Railway so that Youngstown Railway could transport landfill debris 
into the landfill by rail. 
{¶ 8} In its May 2010 judgment entry, the trial court held that the city’s 
appropriations proceedings were preempted by the ICCTA.  However, the court 
ordered the parties to apply to the STB “for a determination as to whether it 
chooses to exercise its right of preemption” under the ICCTA and held that it was 
temporarily retaining jurisdiction pending the STB’s response.  The Eleventh 
District Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s order was not appealable and 
remanded the matter for a definitive ruling whether preemption applied. 
{¶ 9} Upon remand, the trial court held that when a railway company 
uses land on an annual basis for storing and staging materials, an appropriation 
action for that land would be preempted by the ICCTA both expressly, under a 
per se analysis, and impliedly, under an as-applied analysis.  The trial court held 
that it would be inappropriate to consider Youngstown Railway’s potential sale to 
Total Waste Logistics or any other “futuristic intention,” but determined that 
Youngstown Railway’s use of a portion of the appropriated land for storage 
caused the city’s action to be preempted by the ICCTA.  The trial court therefore 
committed jurisdiction to the STB. 
{¶ 10} A majority of the panel from the Eleventh District affirmed the 
trial court’s decision, though not without rejecting a large portion of the trial 
court’s underlying reasoning.  Girard v. Youngstown Belt Ry. Co., 196 Ohio 
App.3d 271, 2011-Ohio-4699, 963 N.E.2d 193.  Contrary to the trial court’s 
conclusion, the Eleventh District held that the city’s appropriation action was not 
expressly preempted by the ICCTA, because its “remote” and “incidental” effect 
“would not function to regulate railroad transportation.”  Id. at ¶ 41.  Under the 
as-applied analysis, the Eleventh District held that Youngstown Railway’s use of 
a small portion of the appropriated land for storage was not enough, by itself, to 
trigger implied preemption.  The appellate court further held that it was not 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
inappropriate to consider Youngstown Railway’s future plans within the federal-
preemption analysis.  The Eleventh District then determined that Youngstown 
Railway’s role in its future plans with Total Waste Logistics fell within the 
definition of railway transportation and held that the city’s appropriation action 
was impliedly preempted by the ICCTA because it would unreasonably interfere 
with such railway transportation.  Alternatively, the Eleventh District held that the 
city’s appropriation action would be preempted even if Youngstown Railway’s 
plans with Total Waste Logistics were not realized, because the appropriation 
action would interfere with Youngstown Railway’s unspecified future plans to 
expand railway operations.  The Eleventh District further held that Youngstown 
Railway’s unspecified plans could have an effect on interstate commerce, that 
future plans related to the “economic realm” of a railway fall within the purview 
of the ICCTA, id. at ¶ 54, and that the city’s prevention of the development of 
such plans would have a negative economic impact on the railway, requiring 
preemption. 
{¶ 11} A dissenting judge would have found that federal preemption did 
not apply to the city’s action because Youngstown Railway would have been able 
to continue its present railway operations and store its materials on the 13.5 acres 
that it would retain after the appropriation, because Youngstown Railway did not 
meet its burden of proving that the appropriation would interfere with future 
operations, and because Youngstown Railway’s hypothetical services to Total 
Waste Logistics does not fall within the definition of railway transportation. 
{¶ 12} We accepted discretionary jurisdiction to hear the city’s appeal, 
131 Ohio St.3d 1437, 2012-Ohio-331, 960 N.E.2d 986, which addresses two main 
issues: first, the extent to which a state court of common pleas may exercise 
jurisdiction to determine whether ICCTA preemption applies, and second, 
whether preemption under the ICCTA applies to the particular appropriation 
action in this case. 
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Analysis 
Federal Preemption of State Law 
{¶ 13} The doctrine of federal preemption originates from the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that “the Laws of the 
United States * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. Constitution, Article VI, cl. 2.  Pursuant to 
the Supremacy Clause, the United States Congress has the power to preempt state 
laws.  In re Miamisburg Train Derailment Litigation, 68 Ohio St.3d 255, 259, 626 
N.E.2d 85 (1994). 
{¶ 14} Preemption may be either expressed or implied.  Gade v. Natl. 
Solid Wastes Mgt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992).  
Express preemption occurs when Congress explicitly defines “the extent to which 
its enactments pre-empt state law.”  English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78, 
110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990).  Implied preemption of state law may 
occur when Congress has created a “ ‘scheme of federal regulation * * * so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it,’ or where an Act of Congress ‘touch[es] a field in which 
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to 
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’ ”  Id. at 79, quoting Rice 
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 
(1947). 
{¶ 15} Preemption is fundamentally a question of congressional intent.  
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 
407 (1992).  However, in all preemption cases, we start with the presumption that 
the states’ historic police powers shall not be superseded by federal law unless 
that is shown to be the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.  Rice at 230.  See 
also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
(1996) (“because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we 
have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes 
of action”).  The party seeking to overcome the presumption against preemption 
bears a heavy burden.  De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 
U.S. 806, 814, 117 S.Ct. 1747, 138 L.Ed.2d 21 (1997).  Further, the scope of 
preemption, if any, is to be determined while keeping this presumption in mind. 
Medtronic at 485.  Accordingly, “[t]he applicable preemption provision must be 
read narrowly ‘in light of the presumption against pre-emption of state police 
power regulations.’ ”  In re Miamisburg at 264, quoting Cipollone at 518. 
State Court Jurisdiction to Determine Preemption 
{¶ 16} As an initial matter, we note that the Trumbull County Court of 
Common Pleas correctly exercised jurisdiction to entertain the city’s action and to 
consider the merits of Youngstown Railway’s preemption claim under the 
ICCTA.  In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court 
of general subject-matter jurisdiction has the ability to determine the bounds of its 
own jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Enyart v. O’Neill, 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 646 N.E.2d 
1110 (1995).  In determining the scope of its jurisdiction under a federal statute, a 
state court of general subject-matter jurisdiction possesses a “ ‘deeply rooted 
presumption in favor of concurrent’ ” state and federal jurisdiction.  Mims v. 
Arrow Fin. Servs., L.L.C., ___ U.S.___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 740, 748, 181 L.Ed.2d 881 
(2012), quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 
887 (1990); see also Herbst v. Resolution Trust Corp., 66 Ohio St.3d 8, 10, 607 
N.E.2d 440 (1993).  The presumption of concurrent jurisdiction can be overcome 
only if (1) the federal statute expressly vests jurisdiction exclusively in the federal 
courts, (2) the legislative history unmistakably implies that jurisdiction was to be 
vested exclusively in the federal courts, or (3) state jurisdiction is clearly 
incompatible with concurrent federal jurisdiction.  Elek v. Huntington Natl. Bank, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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60 Ohio St.3d 135, 138, 573 N.E.2d 1056 (1991), quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. 
Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981). 
{¶ 17} State courts across the nation regularly evaluate preemption under 
the ICCTA.  See, e.g., Wolf v. Cent. Oregon & Pacific RR., Inc., 230 Or.App. 269, 
216 P.3d 316 (2009) (the ICCTA did not preempt state jurisdiction over grade 
crossings); Seattle v. Burlington N. RR. Co., 145 Wash.2d 661, 669, 41 P.3d 1169 
(2002) (the ICCTA preempted regulations regarding signaling at railroad 
crossings); In re Vermont Ry., 171 Vt. 496, 503, 769 A.2d 648 (2000) (the ICCTA 
did not preempt a city’s zoning conditions for a railway’s salt-shed facility).  
Because the ICCTA does not explicitly deny concurrent jurisdiction to state 
courts and state courts routinely adjudicate matters regarding the ICCTA, the 
Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas did not exceed its authority in 
evaluating whether the ICCTA preempted the city of Girard’s ability to institute 
eminent-domain proceedings against Youngstown Railway.  Consequently, this 
court possesses the authority to review the decisions of the trial and appellate 
courts and offer final judgment. 
Application of the ICCTA 
{¶ 18} The federal law at issue in this case is the ICCTA, which abolished 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, created the STB, and granted the STB 
exclusive jurisdiction over certain aspects of interstate rail activity.  49 U.S.C. 
10101 et seq.  The ICCTA was enacted to encourage competitive rates for rail 
transportation, to minimize regulatory control, and to promote efficiency as well 
as public health and safety.  49 U.S.C. 10101. 
{¶ 19} The ICCTA grants exclusive jurisdiction to the STB over 
 
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies 
provided in this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
(including car service, interchange, and other operating rules), 
practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and 
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, 
or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side 
tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be 
located, entirely in one State. 
 
49 U.S.C. 10501(b)(1) and (2). 
{¶ 20} The ICCTA defines “transportation” to include  
 
(A) a locomotive, car, vehicle, vessel, warehouse, wharf, 
pier, dock, yard, property, facility, instrumentality, or equipment of 
any kind related to the movement of passengers or property, or 
both, by rail, regardless of ownership or an agreement concerning 
use; and  
(B) services related to that movement, including receipt, 
delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, refrigeration, icing, 
ventilation, storage, handling, and interchange of passengers and 
property. 
 
49 U.S.C. 10102(9)(A) and (B). 
{¶ 21} The ICCTA contains an express preemption clause, which 
provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under 
this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt 
the remedies provided under Federal or State law.”  49 U.S.C. 10501(b). 
{¶ 22} In shorter form, the ICCTA provides the STB with exclusive 
jurisdiction over all physical instrumentalities possessed and all services provided 
by rail carriers that are related to the movement of passengers and/or property.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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This broad, sweeping language shows Congress’s intent to preempt any state 
effort to regulate rail transportation.  However, although the ICCTA’s wording is 
expansive, the ICCTA’s legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend 
to preempt any and all state laws that might touch upon or indirectly affect 
railway property.  Emerson v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 503 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th 
Cir.2007), quoting H.R.Rep. No. 104-422, at 167 (1995), reprinted in 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 850, 852 (“the exclusivity [of 49 U.S.C. 10501(b)] is limited to 
remedies with respect to rail regulation-not State and Federal law generally. * * * 
[State and federal laws] remain fully applicable unless specifically displaced, 
because they do not generally collide with the scheme of economic regulation 
(and deregulation) of rail transportation”). 
{¶ 23} Further, various federal circuit courts have adopted the position 
that “Congress narrowly tailored the ICCTA pre-emption provision to displace 
only ‘regulation,’ i.e., those state laws that may reasonably be said to have the 
effect of ‘manag[ing]’ or ‘govern[ing]’ rail transportation, Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1286 (6th Ed.1990), while permitting the continued application of laws 
having a more remote or incidental effect on rail transportation.”  Florida E. 
Coast Ry. Co. v. W. Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir.2001).  See also 
Franks Invest. Co., L.L.C. v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 593 F.3d 404, 410 (5th 
Cir.2010); PCS Phosphate Co., Inc. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 212, 218 (4th 
Cir.2009); Adrian & Blissfield RR. Co. v. Blissfield, 550 F.3d 533, 539 (6th 
Cir.2008); New York Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 252 
(3d Cir.2007).  We therefore adopt this interpretation of the ICCTA. 
Categorical Preemption 
{¶ 24} The preemption analysis regularly employed by the STB 
distinguishes between express and implied preemption by classifying actions as 
“per se preempted,” or “categorically preempted,” versus “preempted as applied.”  
Adrian & Blissfield R. Co., 550 F.3d at 539-540.  Turning first to the issue of 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
categorical preemption, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals held, and we 
agree, that the city’s eminent-domain action against a portion of Mosier Yard is 
not categorically preempted by the ICCTA. 
{¶ 25} The STB has recognized that categorical preemption applies to two 
main categories of state or local actions: 
 
The first is any form of state or local permitting or 
preclearance that, by its nature, could be used to deny a railroad the 
ability to conduct some part of its operations or to proceed with 
activities that the Board has authorized. * * *  
Second, there can be no state or local regulation of matters 
directly regulated by the Board–such as the construction, 
operation, and abandonment of rail lines (see 49 U.S.C. 10901-
10907); railroad mergers, line acquisitions, and other forms of 
consolidation (see 49 U.S.C. 11321-11328); and railroad rates and 
service (see 49 U.S.C. 10501(b), 10701-10747, 11101-11124). 
 
CSX Transp., Inc.—Petition for Declaratory Order, STB Finance Docket No. 
34662, 2005 WL 1024490, at *2 (May 3, 2005). 
{¶ 26} Clear-cut examples of categorically preempted state actions 
include state and local permitting laws and zoning regulations.  See Auburn v. 
United States Govt., 154 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir.1998) (attempt to impose local 
environmental-permitting laws on improvements and repairs to a rail line that had 
been approved by the STB); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Austell, N.D.Ga. No. 
CIVA1:97-CV-1018-RLV, 1997 WL 1113647 (Aug. 18, 1997) (attempt to 
impose land-use-permitting requirement pursuant to local zoning ordinance).  
Courts also generally recognize that eminent-domain actions that seek to take 
property containing active rail lines are categorically preempted by the ICCTA.  
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See Union Pacific RR. Co. v. Chicago Transit Auth., N.D.Ill. No. 07-cv-229, 2009 
WL 448897, at *6-7 (Feb. 23, 2009) (a city’s attempted condemnation of a 95-
foot, 2.8-mile strip of rail line’s right-of-way, including multiple active tracks, 
was categorically preempted by the ICCTA); Wisconsin Cent. Ltd. v. Marshfield, 
160 F.Supp.2d 1009 (W.D.Wis.2000) (holding that the city’s attempted 
condemnation of a portion of a railroad’s track was categorically preempted by 
the ICCTA). 
{¶ 27} However, neither the federal circuit courts nor the STB have held 
that there is any “blanket rule that any condemnation action against railroad 
property is impermissible.”  Lincoln Lumber Co.—Petition for Declaratory 
Order, STB Finance Docket No. 34915, 2007 WL 2299735 (Aug. 10, 2007).  
Instead, because eminent-domain actions are specific to the unique parcel of land 
the state seeks to control, they cannot necessarily be categorized as laws or 
regulations of general applicability that seek to manage or govern rail 
transportation in general.  Union Pacific RR. Co. v. Chicago Transit Auth., 647 
F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir.2011).  Because eminent-domain actions are unique, and 
because this case does not involve more extreme circumstances such as an 
attempted taking of an active rail line, we hold that the categorical-preemption 
analysis is inapplicable here. 
As-Applied Preemption 
{¶ 28} When a proposed state action against a rail carrier is not 
categorically preempted pursuant to the foregoing analysis, courts have generally 
applied the STB’s standards to determine if the action is preempted as applied.  
See Franks Invest. Co., L.L.C., 593 F.3d at 413-414; PCS Phosphate Co., Inc., 
559 F.3d at 220-221; Adrian & Blissfield RR. Co., 550 F.3d at 540-541; Emerson 
v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 503 F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir.2007).  The STB has 
articulated the standard for as-applied ICCTA preemption as follows: “For state 
or local actions that are not facially preempted, the section 10501(b) preemption 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
analysis requires a factual assessment of whether [the] action would have the 
effect of preventing or unreasonably interfering with railroad transportation.”  
CSX Transp., Inc., 2005 WL 1024490, at *3.  Thus we are required to conduct a 
fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the city’s action is preempted by the 
ICCTA in this case.  Because it is Youngstown Railway who is seeking ICCTA 
preemption, and because of our general presumption against preemption, 
Youngstown Railway bears the burden of persuasion here.  See Elam v. Kansas 
City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 802 (5th Cir.2011). 
{¶ 29} Our analysis at this point risks becoming tenuous, because the 
parties have presented us not with the mere present reality of Youngstown 
Railway’s operations at Mosier Yard, but with multiple hypothetical future 
scenarios.  Under normal circumstances, we decline to address hypothetical 
questions.  In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 128 Ohio St.3d 512, 
2011-Ohio-1788, 947 N.E.2d 655, ¶ 48; Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 
257 N.E.2d 371 (1970).  However, some courts have found it appropriate to 
examine a railway company’s future intentions when determining whether a state 
action will unreasonably interfere with railway transportation.  See Lincoln v. 
Surface Transp. Bd., 414 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir.2005); Union Pacific RR. Co., 
647 F.3d at 681; Reading Blue Mountain & N. RR. Co. v. UGI Util., Inc., 
M.D.Penn. No. 3:11-CV-2182, 2012 WL 251960 (Jan. 25, 2012).  We therefore 
find it appropriate to entertain Youngstown Railway’s hypothetical scenarios only 
in the specific context of our as-applied ICCTA preemption. 
Present Use of Property Does Not Call For Preemption 
{¶ 30} Starting with the present status of Mosier Yard, we hold that there 
is no preemption under the ICCTA.  It is undisputed that the portion of Mosier 
Yard sought to be appropriated by the city contains no active or abandoned tracks, 
contains no portion of rights-of-way of any rail lines, contains no permanent 
structures, and is undeveloped as a whole.  These facts make Youngstown 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Railway’s situation completely distinguishable from many cases finding 
preemption as applied under the ICCTA.  See, e.g., Lincoln, 414 F.3d 858 
(preemption based on interference with right-of-way); Soo Line RR. Co. v. St. 
Paul, 827 F.Supp.2d 1017 (D.C.Minn.2010) (preemption based on interference 
with right-of-way); Wisconsin Cent. Ltd. v. Marshfield, 160 F.Supp.2d 1009 
(W.D.Wisc.2000) (preemption based on attempted taking of rail line); Union 
Pacific RR. Co., N.D.Ill. No. 07-cv-229, 2009 WL 448897 (preemption based on 
interference with right-of-way). 
{¶ 31} The sole factor that could potentially support a finding of 
unreasonable interference with railway transportation is the fact that Youngstown 
Railway uses “three to four random acres” of Mosier Yard annually for staging 
and storing materials.  Girard, 196 Ohio App.3d 271, 2011-Ohio-4699, 963 
N.E.2d 193, at ¶ 15.  However, Youngstown Railway’s agents have admitted that 
their need for the staging and storage of materials is not married to one specific 
area of Mosier Yard and that the remaining land after the taking would 
accommodate the storage of materials.  Compare Lincoln, 414 F.3d at 861 
(storage and loading area, located in right-of-way, could not be accommodated 
elsewhere).  There is no permanent structure or any other impediment that 
prevents Youngstown Railway from storing materials in one area versus another 
on the property; the only requirement is a general need for three to four acres near 
the rail line, which Youngstown Railway would still have after the taking.  
Accordingly, under the present scenario, Youngstown Railway has not established 
that the proposed taking would interfere with railway transportation, and 
preemption under the ICCTA would not be called for. 
Future Operations by Total Waste Logistics Do Not Constitute  
Transportation by a Railway Carrier 
{¶ 32} As for Youngstown Railway’s proposed future scenario of selling 
Mosier Yard to Total Waste Logistics, we hold that there is also no preemption 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
under the ICCTA.  Based on the plain and straightforward language of the written 
contract between Total Waste Logistics and Youngstown Railway, Total Waste 
Logistics will become the owner in fee simple of the entirety of Mosier Yard, 
including the area sought to be appropriated by the city.  Despite this finalized 
written instrument, agents of both Total Waste Logistics and Youngstown 
Railway averred that the parties entered into contemporaneous oral agreements 
that Total Waste Logistics would grant easements and enter into service contracts 
with Youngstown Railway in order to transport waste into Total Waste Logistics 
landfill.  Even if we were to give credence to this parol evidence, the future 
activities that would take place on Total Waste Logistics property would not 
constitute railway transportation. 
{¶ 33} It is true that the loading and unloading of transported materials, 
including waste materials, may fit within the broader definition of 
“transportation” as defined by the ICCTA.  49 U.S.C. 10102(9).  However, 
satisfaction of the term “transportation” does not end the analysis.  In order for 
transportation to constitute railway transportation under the ICCTA, the activity 
must be “ ‘performed by, or under the auspices of, a “rail carrier.” ’ ”  New York 
& Atlantic Ry. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 635 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir.2011), 
quoting Babylon—Petition for Declaratory Order, STB Finance Docket No. 
35057, 2008 WL 4377804 (Sept. 24, 2008).  A “rail carrier” is defined as an 
entity “providing common carrier railroad transportation for compensation.”  49 
U.S.C. 10102(5).  “The fundamental test of common carriage is whether there is a 
public profession or holding out to serve the public.”  New England Transrail, 
L.L.C.—Construction, Acquisition, and Operation Exemption, STB Finance 
Docket No. 34797, 2007 WL 1989841, *6 (June 29, 2007). 
{¶ 34} When the loading, unloading, or transloading of materials is 
performed by a rail carrier, on property owned by the rail carrier, through services 
rendered as a common carrier to the public, such activity has been found to fall 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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under the purview of the ICCTA.  See, e.g., New England Transrail at *8-10 
(transloading and storage of various commodities and waste materials, but not 
processing of waste, would constitute rail transportation if the owner and operator 
of the facility were authorized as a rail carrier); Green Mountain RR. Corp. v. 
Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir.2005) (transloading and temporary storage of 
commodities by a rail carrier constituted rail transportation and was governed by 
the ICCTA); Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 1997 WL 1113647, at *6 (operation of 
intermodal facility by rail carrier constituted rail transportation and was governed 
by the ICCTA). 
{¶ 35} However, when a transloading, shipping, or receiving facility is 
operated by an entity that is not a rail carrier, the facility’s activities are not 
considered to fall under the ICCTA, regardless of whether railway transportation 
is used up to the point that the materials arrive or depart from the facility.  See, 
e.g., Babylon, 2008 WL 4377804 (transloading of construction and demolition 
debris by non-rail-carrier tenant of railway property did not constitute rail 
transportation and was not governed by the ICCTA); New York & Atlantic Ry. 
Co., 635 F.3d at 73 (waste-transfer facility, operated by a nonrail carrier that was 
not acting as an agent for any rail carrier, did not constitute rail transportation and 
was not governed by the ICCTA); Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 266 F.3d at 1332-
1336 (construction-aggregate distribution center, operated by a non-rail-carrier 
lessee of railway property, did not constitute rail transportation and was not 
governed by the ICCTA); Milford, Mass.—Petition for Declaratory Order, STB 
Finance Docket No. 34444, 2004 WL 1802301 (Aug. 11, 2004) (despite 
contractual agreement with a rail carrier, the transloading of steel by a nonrail 
carrier in a manner that was not being offered as part of common-carrier services 
for the public did not constitute rail transportation and was not governed by the 
ICCTA); Hi Tech Trans, L.L.C. v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295, 308-309 (3d 
Cir.2004) (bulk-waste transloading facility, operated by a nonrail carrier on rail 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
carrier’s property, did not constitute rail transportation and was not governed by 
the ICCTA).  The proposed ownership and operation of Mosier Yard by Total 
Waste Logistics would fall squarely within this latter category. 
{¶ 36} The Hi Tech decision in particular informs our decision today.  In 
that case, a nonrail carrier, Hi Tech, and a rail carrier, Canadian Pacific Railroad, 
contracted for Hi Tech to build and operate a solid-waste facility on the railroad’s 
property.  Id. at 298-299.  Construction and demolition waste was to be delivered 
to Hi Tech’s facility by truck, and after processing the waste at Hi Tech’s facility, 
the waste was loaded into rail cars to be transported out of the property by 
Canadian Pacific Railroad.  Id.  The Third Circuit determined that Hi Tech’s 
facility 
 
does not involve “transportation by rail carrier.”  The most it 
involves is transportation “to rail carrier.”  * * *  The mere fact 
that the [Canadian Pacific Railroad] ultimately uses rail cars to 
transport the [construction and demolition] debris Hi Tech loads 
does not morph Hi Tech's activities into “transportation by rail 
carrier.” Indeed, if Hi Tech's reasoning is accepted, any nonrail 
carrier's operations would come under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the STB if, at some point in a chain of distribution, it handles 
products that are eventually shipped by rail by a railcarrier [sic]. 
The district court could not accept the argument that Congress 
intended the exclusive jurisdiction of the STB to sweep that 
broadly, and neither can we. 
 
Id. at 308-309. 
{¶ 37} The facts here are strikingly similar to those in Hi Tech, with a few 
exceptions: Youngstown Railway will be delivering rather than receiving 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
construction and demolition debris, and Total Waste Logistics will have 
ownership and control of both the waste facility and the property as a whole.  
Thus, unlike in Hi Tech, what we have here is “transportation from rail carrier” 
rather than “transportation by rail carrier.”  We cannot conclude that the activities 
on Mosier Yard would constitute railway transportation from the mere fact that 
waste materials are delivered into the property through the use of railway 
transportation. 
{¶ 38} Accordingly, under this primary hypothetical scenario, the 
activities in Mosier Yard would not constitute rail transportation.  The city’s 
eminent-domain action would therefore not be preempted by the ICCTA under 
the as-applied analysis. 
Future Unspecified Use Is Too Vague To Be Considered 
{¶ 39} Under Youngstown Railway’s secondary hypothetical scenario, we 
also hold that there is no preemption under the ICCTA.  Youngstown Railway 
claims that it wants to use Mosier Yard in the future for expansion and 
development in order to accommodate the growing interstate railway business in 
the area.  However, Youngstown Railway has no concrete plans to put these 
hypothetical plans into execution and in fact is selling the property to Mosier 
Yard. Without anything more specific, Youngstown Railway’s evidence of a 
general desire for future development is not enough to establish that the property 
will be used for railway transportation. 
{¶ 40} While it is acceptable and sometimes necessary to consider a 
railway company’s future plans when determining if the ICCTA applies to an 
eminent-domain action, it is also necessary to consider whether it is likely that the 
railway company’s plans “will come to fruition.”  Lincoln, 414 F.3d at 862.  
Keeping in mind that Youngstown Railway bears the burden of demonstrating 
that the city’s action is preempted by the ICCTA, mere “conclusory allegations 
are not sufficient to support removal.”  Bayou DeChene Reservoir Comm. v. 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
Union Pacific RR. Corp., W.D.La. No. 09-0429, 2009 WL 1604658, at *3-4 (June 
8, 2009); see also Texas Cent. Business Lines Corp. v. Midlothian, 669 F.3d 525, 
535 (5th Cir.2012) (“The mere prospect that there will be less space going 
forward, on this extensive tract, without definite plans to develop, and without an 
explanation of how future projects would be affected does not amount to an 
unreasonable burden [on rail transportation]”). 
{¶ 41} It is true that in some cases it has been appropriate to look to a 
railway company’s future intentions, even without concrete plans, in order to 
determine whether a taking would eventually unreasonably interfere with railway 
transportation.  Lincoln at 862; Norfolk S. Ry.—Petition for Declaratory Order, 
STB Finance Docket No. 35196, 2010 WL 691256 (Feb. 26, 2010).  However, 
those cases are distinguishable from the one at hand because they involved 
already existing tracks or rights-of-way.  Both Lincoln and Norfolk S. stand for 
the principle that a locality cannot justify an eminent-domain action over a rail 
line or right-of-way merely because the line is not currently being used.  This 
principle does not extend to an undeveloped parcel of land containing no rail line 
and no right-of-way. 
{¶ 42} Here, Youngstown Railway is not being asked to justify the 
continued existence of an already developed rail line.  Instead, the property sought 
to be acquired is vacant land, with which Youngstown Railway has done nothing 
in terms of development from its purchase of the land in 1997 up to the present 
day.  It is far from evident that Youngstown Railway’s alleged intentions for the 
future will ever actually be executed.  We are therefore not confronted with a 
situation in which the city’s eminent-domain action could forever close off the use 
of a previously constructed rail line. 
{¶ 43} Youngstown Railway’s alternative future plans are too vague and 
speculative to allow us to conclude that the city’s eminent-domain action would 
unreasonably interfere with railway transportation.  Consequently, Youngstown 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
Railway has failed to establish that the city’s eminent-domain action would be 
preempted by the ICCTA. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 44} We hold that the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas had 
jurisdiction to determine the question of ICCTA preemption.  Applying the 
generally accepted fact-intensive test for as-applied preemption under the ICCTA, 
we hold that the city’s proposed eminent-domain action against an undeveloped 
portion of Youngstown Railway’s property, which does not contain any tracks or 
rights-of-way and does not have any concrete projected use that would constitute 
rail transportation by a rail carrier, is not preempted under the ICCTA. 
{¶ 45} For these reasons, we reverse the appellate court’s decision finding 
preemption by the ICCTA and committing the matter to the STB, and we remand 
the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
 and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Frank R. Bodor; and Brian C. Kren, Girard City Law Director, for 
appellant. 
Manchester, Bennett, Powers & Ullman, L.P.A., C. Scott Lanz, and 
Thomas J. Lipka, for appellee Youngstown Belt Railway Company. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, and Michael L. Stokes, Assistant Attorney General, for amicus curiae, 
state of Ohio. 
______________________