Case Title: LYNDES v SCOFIELD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1979-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 14398 I N THE S U P - CCURT O F ' THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 HXKGG 0. LYNDES and R f l - LYNDES , Plaintiffs a r d Respondents, Deferdant and Appellant. Appeal frm: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Honorable Edward Dussault, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: George, W i l l i a m s and Benn, Missoula, mntana For Respordent: Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, )untana ,Wmitted on briefs: Mvember 3, 1975 Decided: JAN 2 .. . ~ q - - , , jc.;" Filed : M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. p l a i n t i f f s Kellogg and Rosemary Lyndes (Lyndes) f i l e d t h i s action against defendant Ruthanne Scofield (Scofield) on October 7, 1977, i n the D i s t r i c t Court of the Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Missoula County, t o recover damages a r i s i n g out of an automobile collision. Lyndes alleged t h a t Scofield negligently and carelessly operated her vehicle causing it t o c o l l i d e with the Lyndes' vehicle and t h a t a s a d i r e c t and proximate r e s u l t of Sco- f i e l d ' s negligence, Rosemary Lyndes was injured and the vehicle damaged. The cause was t r i e d before a jury on April 1 7 , 1978, t h e Honorable Edward T. Dussault presiding. The jury re- turned a v e r d i c t i n favor of Scofield and against Lyndes. O n April 27, the court entered judgment f o r defendant. Lyndes thereafter moved the court f o r a new t r i a l . O n May 11, 1978, the D i s t r i c t Court granted a new t r i a l and from t h i s order Scofield appeals. O n the morning of January 5, 1 9 7 6 , a t about 7:45 a.m., the p a r t i e s were traveling i n opposite directions on 39th S t r e e t i n Missoula, Montana. The Lyndes, Kellogg Lyndes driving and h i s wife Rosemary a passenger, were eastbound and Scofield was westbound when the two vehicles collided. A t the time of the c o l l i s i o n some snow was f a l l i n g and the roads i n the v i c i n i t y were slippery. Kellogg ~ y n d e s de- scribed t h e roads a s "solid ice" with the p r e c i p i t a t i o n putting a watery g l a r e over the i c e . Scofield's vehicle had new t i r e s and had sandbags placed i n its r e a r t o improve i t s traction. Scofield had experienced driving i n snowy winters and had her windshield wipers and l i g h t s on. There was a steady stream of c a r s traveling i n both directions. Because of t h e weather and road conditions, the t r a f f i c , including ~ c o f i e l d , was cautiously going about 25 m.p.h., although the posted speed l i m i t was 35 m.p.h., when the r i g h t f r o n t wheel of Scofield's c a r struck a chuckhole. This caused the r e a r end t o swing out toward the oncoming t r a f f i c . Scofield a t - tempted t o correct her skid but before she could do so the r e a r end of her car was clipped by an oncoming vehicle driven by Dora Mosher. This caused Scofield's car t o swing first violently t o the r i g h t and then t o come back across t h e center l i n e i n t o the oncoming Lyndes vehicle. Kellogg Lyndes, seeing Scofield's d i f f i c u l t i e s , had almost brought h i s vehicle t o a stop. The impact was between Scofield's d r i v e r ' s door and the l e f t f r o n t fender and g r i l l of Lyndes' car. Neither c a r could be driven away from the scene. A t t r i a l Scofield, an elementary school teacher, t e s t i - f i e d t h a t she drove the 39th S t r e e t route once a week on her way t o her job. ( A t an e a r l i e r deposition, she had t e s t i - f i e d she drove it daily.) She further t e s t i f i e d , however, t h a t the morning of the accident, January 5, was the f i r s t time she had driven over t h i s route since December 24 be- cause she had gone t o S e a t t l e f o r a vacation during the school's Christmas holiday. She s t a t e d a t t r i a l she had not previously noticed t h a t p a r t i c u l a r chuckhole i n the roadway although she did admit she knew t h a t chuckholes were a common occurrence during Montana winters. The general i s s u e is whether the D i s t r i c t Court erred i n granting p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r a new t r i a l a f t e r a jury v e r d i c t had been returned i n favor of defendant. ~ a s e d on the reasons f o r the D i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order granting a new t r i a l , t h i s general i s s u e breaks down i n t o the following s p e c i f i c questions: 1. Was t h e evidence i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a v e r d i c t f o r S c o f i e l d on t h e i s s u e of l i a b i l i t y ? 2. Was defendant negligent a s a matter of law f o r v i o l a t i n g s e c t i o n 32-2144, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r i n g d r i v e r s t o d r i v e a t a reasonable r a t e of speed f o r t h e conditions of t h e road where t h e only evidence of unreasonableness is t h a t she h i t a chuckhole and was thrown i n t o a s k i d on an i c y road? 3. Was S c o f i e l d negligent as a matter of law by reason of v i o l a t i n g s e c t i o n 32-2151, R.C.M. 1947, r e q u i r i n g d r i v e r s t o d r i v e on t h e r i g h t s i d e of t h e road, when t h e reason f o r her v i o l a t i o n was t h a t her c a r w a s skidding on an i c y road a f t e r h i t t i n g a chuckhole? A D i s t r i c t Court has broad a u t h o r i t y t o g r a n t o r deny motions f o r a new trial. Brothers v. Town of V i r g i n i a City (1976), 171 Mont. 352, 558 P.2d 464, 467, 33 St.Rep. 1250, 1254. This d i s c r e t i o n is n o t without l i m i t s , however. Thus, " t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n is exhausted when it f i n d s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e v e r d i c t . " Kincheloe v. Rygg (1968), 152 Mont. 187, 191, 448 P.2d 1 4 0 , 142. Neither may a D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t a new t r i a l only on t h e b a s i s t h a t it chose t o b e l i e v e one l i n e of testimony d i f f e r e n t from t h a t which t h e jury believed. Yerkich v. Opsta (1978), Mont. , 577 P.2d 857, 859, 35 St.Rep. 465, 467; I n re E s t a t e of Hardy (1958), 133 Mont. 536, 547-48, 326 P.2d 692, 698. I n Campeau v. L e w i s (1965), 1 4 4 Mont. 543, 549, 398 P.2d 960, 963, w e made t h e following statement which i s p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p o s i t e t o t h e i n s t a n t case: "When t h e t r i a l c o u r t denies a motion f o r a new t r i a l and thereby i n d i c a t e s f a i t h i n t h e jury v e r d i c t w e are more a p t t o r e f r a i n from d i s t u r b i n g t h a t o r d e r than where t h e t r i a l judge sets aside the jury's findings and re- quires t h a t t h e f a c t s be decided again. Where t h e t r i a l judge i s presented with evidence i n favor of the v e r d i c t , but proceeds t o grant a new t r i a l , w e f e e l it i s our duty t o t e s t the evidence against the verdict." The preceding principles r e l a t e d i r e c t l y t o the f i r s t two issues presented f o r review. A s t o the f i r s t issue, t h e D i s t r i c t Court s t a t e s i n its order granting the new t r i a l : ". . . The only apparent basis f o r the jury v e r d i c t is t h e f a c t t h a t the jury must have f e l t h i t t i n g t h e chuckhole j u s t i f i e d the De- fendant losing control of her vehicle. There i s no other evidence which would explain o r j u s t i f y the Defendant losing control of her car. " The D i s t r i c t Court then s t a t e s t h a t h i t t i n g a chuckhole and losing control of a vehicle is a v i o l a t i o n of section 32-2144, R.C.M. 1947, which provides i n part: "A person operating o r driving a vehicle of any character on a public highway of t h i s s t a t e s h a l l drive it i n a careful and prudent manner, and ---- a t a r a t e of speed no g r e a t e r than is reasonable and proper under t h e conditions - - - existing -- a t t h e point of operation, taking i n t o account t h e amountand character of t r a f - f i c , condition of brakes, weight of vehicle, grade - and width of highway, condition of -- sur- face. and freedomof obstruction t o view ahead, ~. and he s h a l l d r i v e it so as not t o unduly or unreasonably endanger t h e l i f e , limb, property, o r other r i g h t s of a person e n t i t l e d t o the use of the s t r e e t or highway." (Emphasis by D i s t r i c t Court. ) The t r i a l court concluded t h a t the chuckhole h i t by Scofield was a "condition of the surface" which Scofield was bound t o take i n t o account i n operating her vehicle. While a chuckhole undoubtedly i s a condition of the surface whose presence should be taken i n t o account, w e disagree under the f a c t s of t h i s case t h a t Scofield was negligent a s a matter of law. Our conclusion i s based on the standard f o r judging speed imposed by the s t a t u t e of "reasonable and proper under t h e conditions existing a t the point of operation." What is reasonable and proper under t h e conditions is c l e a r l y a question of f a c t t o be determined by t h e jury. Nissen v. Johnson (1959), 135 Mont. 329, 331-33, 339 P.2d 651, 652-53. "Whether under t h e circumstances p r e s e n t t h e defendant was negligent appears t o be a f a c t question and f a c t questions must be submitted t o a jury under a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s . " Nissen, 135 Mont. a t 333-34, 339 P.2d a t 653; Heen v. Tiddy (1968), 151 Mont. 265, 269, 4 4 2 P.2d 434, 436. While t h e r e i s c o n f l i c t i n some p a r t s of t h e evidence, t h e jury d i d hear unrefuted testimony t h a t t h e road on which t h e a c c i d e n t occurred w a s very s l i p p e r y and t h a t snow was f a l l i n g . Both S c o f i e l d and t h e d r i v e r preceding her testi- f i e d a s t o t h e s i z e and depth of t h e chuckhole. S c o f i e l d t e s t i f i e d a s t o her r a t e of speed, t h e condition of her c a r , and t h e care with which she drove. The jury f u r t h e r heard Scofield t e s t i f y t h a t she had almost succeeded i n c o n t r o l l i n g her car's s k i d when her l e f t r e a r fender was "clipped" by t h e oncoming c a r driven by Dora Mosher causing her c a r t o once again start skidding a c r o s s t h e roadway where it eventually c o l l i d e d with Lyndes' c a r . The jury w a s e n t i t l e d t o b e l i e v e t h i s evidence. A s t h i s Court s t a t e d i n Staggers v. United S t a t e s F i d e l i t y and Guaranty Co. (1972), 159 Mont. 254, 258-59, 496 P,2d 1161, "This Court has on s e v e r a l occasions reviewed t h e r u l e s on s u f f i c i e n c y of evidence. I n Cam- peau v. L e w i s , 1 4 4 Mont. 543, 547, 398 P.2d 960, 962 (1965), w e s t a t e d : "'The c o u r t has c o n s i s t e n t l y held t h a t t h e evidence i s n o t i n s u f f i c i e n t i f it is substan- t i a l . Adami v. Murphy, 118 Mont, 172, 164 P.2d 150. I n t h e Adami case, t h e c o u r t , quoting from Morton v, Mooney, 97 Mont. 1, 33 P.2d 262, held t h a t " s u b s t a n t i a l evidence" could be de- f i n e d as such " a s w i l l convince reasonable men and on which such men may n o t reasonably d i f f e r a s t o whether it e s t a b l i s h e s t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s case, and, i f a l l reasonable men must conclude t h a t t h e evidence does not e s t a b l i s h such case, then it is n o t s u b s t a n t i a l evidence." 118 Mont. 172, a t page 179, 164 P.2d a t page 153. The evidence may be i n h e r e n t l y weak and s t i l l be deemed " s u b s t a n t i a l " , and- one - witness m a y be s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e preponderance of a case. ~ a t c h o f f v. Craney, 119 Mont. 157, 1 6 1 ; 172 P.2d 308. Also, s u b s t a n t i a l evidence m a y c o n f l i c t with o t h e r evidence presented. Win D e l Ranches, Inc. v. Rolfe and Wood, I n c . , 137 Mont. 44, 49, 350 P.2d 581. . . I It (Empha- sis added.) F i n a l l y t h e jury was i n s t r u c t e d properly under t h e circumstances. Section 32-2144, quoted above, was given a s an i n s t r u c t i o n as w e r e standard i n s t r u c t i o n s on negligence. The jury, i n r e t u r n i n g its v e r d i c t f o r defendant, neces- s a r i l y decided t h a t , taking i n t o consideration t h e condi- t i o n s of t h e s u r f a c e and a l l t h e surrounding circumstances, Scofield w a s not negligent. A s w e have s t a t e d numerous t i m e s : t h e mere happening of an accident is n o t evidence of negligence. Fries v. Shaughnessy (1972), 159 Mont. 307, 310, 496 P.2d 1159, 1160; Flansberg v. Montana Power Co. (1969), 154 Mont. 53, 58, 460 P.2d 263, 266; Stocking v. Johnson Flying Service (1963), 143 Mont. 61, 65, 387 P.2d 312, 314; Nissen v. Johnson (1959), 135 Mont. 329, 332, 339 P.2d 651, 653. The Montana case most s i m i l a r f a c t u a l l y t o t h e i n s t a n t case is Rodoni v. Hoskin (1960), 138 Mont. 164, 355 P.2d 296. I n t h a t case t h e defendant's v e h i c l e a l s o h i t a chuck- h o l e on an i c y street causing it t o s k i d i n t o an oncoming c a r . There a r e , however, s e v e r a l c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e s be- tween t h a t accident and t h e Scofield-Lyndes c o l l i s i o n , a l l of which weigh i n favor of Scofield. For example, i n Rodoni t h e defendant t e s t i f i e d he had d r i v e n t h e r o u t e which he w a s d r i v i n g a t t h e t i m e of t h e accident every day f o r f o u r y e a r s and t h a t he knew of t h e approximate l o c a t i o n of t h e chuckhole and was watching f o r it because he knew it could throw h i s c a r i f he h i t it. I n c o n t r a s t Scofield, although she £re- quently drove over 39th S t r e e t , had not driven it a t l e a s t f o r some two weeks p r i o r t o t h e accident and did not know of t h e existence of t h e chuckhole. A s the Lyndes note, chuck- holes a r e a common occurrence but they tend t o appear sud- denly and a t t i m e s a r e repaired quickly. (The chuckhole struck by Scofield here was apparently repaired within four hours of the accident.) N o evidence was presented t o show t h a t t h e chuckhole had been present two weeks p r i o r t o t h e accident when Scofield l a s t could have driven over t h i s route. I n f a c t Kellogg Lyndes, who drove over 39th S t r e e t t w i c e a day, "had n o t noticed any severe chuckholes i n t h a t area. " Lyndes' r e l i a n c e of t h e case of Huey v. Stephens (Okla. 1954), 275 P.2d 254, overruled on o t h e r grounds, Hayward v. Ginn (Okla. 1957), 306 P.2d 320, i s misplaced. The Oklahoma Court recognized t h a t t h e presence of i c e on a road may lead t o an accident with no negligence on t h e p a r t of any d r i v e r . Erickson v. P e r r e t t (1976), 169 Mont. 167, 545 P.2d 1074, a l s o r e l i e d on by Lyndes, is distinguishable. I n Perrett, t h e defendant's vehicle skidded i n t o another c a r a s he approached an intersection. The defendant claimed t h a t a t h i r d vehicle suddenly changing lanes was an intervening cause of t h e accident. However, i n t h a t case a s the t h i r d v e h i c l e ' s d r i v e r could not be found f o r t r i a l , w e held t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support defendant's contention. 169 Mont. a t 173, 545 P.2d a t 1078. W e conclude t h e D i s t r i c t Court erred i n basing its order granting Lyndes a new t r i a l on insufficiency of t h e evidence and v i o l a t i o n of section 32-2144. The t h i r d b a s i s f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s order con- cerned S c o f i e l d ' s v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 32-2151, R.C.M. 1947. I n its order g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l , t h e District Court con- cluded : " F i n a l l y , it should be noted t h a t t h e accident r e s u l t e d from t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Defendant's v e h i c l e went o u t of c o n t r o l and crossed t h e c e n t e r l i n e . R.C.M. 1947, Section 32-2151 re- q u i r e s t h a t a v e h i c l e s h a l l be operated on t h e r i g h t half of t h e roadway. While t h e Court recognizes t h a t t h e r e are exceptions t o t h i s s t a t u t o r y duty, none of those exceptions was a p p l i c a b l e under t h e f a c t s presented i n t h i s case. The Defendant v i o l a t e d t h e provisions of R.C.M. 1947, Section 32-2151. Such conduct would be negligence a s a matter of law and, as set f o r t h earlier i n t h e Court's opinion, t h e e x i s t e n c e of a chuckhole would n o t alter t h e Defendant's duty t o operate her v e h i c l e on t h e r i g h t s i d e of t h e road." Section 32-2151, R.C.M. 1947, reads: " ( a ) Upon a l l roadways of s u f f i c i e n t width a v e h i c l e s h a l l be driven upon t h e r i g h t half of t h e roadway except a s follows: " (1) When overtaking and passing another v e h i c l e proceeding i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n under t h e r u l e s governing such movement; " ( 2 ) When t h e r i g h t half of a roadway is closed t o t r a f f i c while under construction o r r e p a i r ; " (3) Upon a roadway divided i n t o t h r e e (3) marked l a n e s f o r t r a f f i c under t h e r u l e s a p p l i c a b l e thereon; o r " ( 4 ) Upon a roadway designated and signposted f o r one-way t r a f f i c . " It i s undisputed t h a t a t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t , S c o f i e l d ' s v e h i c l e was skidding down t h e road i n t h e l e f t - hand l a n e and t h a t a t t h e p o i n t of c o l l i s i o n , t h e Lyndes' v e h i c l e w a s w e l l w i t h i n i t s proper l a n e of t r a f f i c . The question simply is, does t h i s mean S c o f i e l d w a s n e g l i g e n t a s a m a t t e r of law? W e conclude it does n o t and r e v e r s e t h e conclusion of t h e D i s t r i c t Court on t h i s p o i n t . I n Lamb v. Page (1969), 153 Mont. 171, 181, 455 P.2d 337, 342, t h i s Court held, " [ i l t is c l e a r t h a t i n Montana t h e r e are exceptions t o t h e r u l e t h a t one must t r a v e l upon t h e r i g h t s i d e of t h e highway." The reason f o r t h e defen- d a n t ' s v e h i c l e being on t h e wrong s i d e of t h e road i n t h a t case w a s t h a t it had h i t a patch of black i c e . See a l s o Harrington v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co. (1934), 97 Mont. 40, 33 P.2d 553. I n t h i s connection, ~ o d o n i v. Hoskin (1960), 138 Mont. 164, 355 P.2d 296, is again important because of i t s f a c t u a l s i m i l a r i t y t o t h e i n s t a n t case. I n t h a t c a s e , where defendant's v e h i c l e skidded i n t o t h e left-hand l a n e and c o l l i d e d with p l a i n t i f f ' s v e h i c l e we c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t whether t h e f a i l u r e t o s t a y on t h e r i g h t s i d e of t h e road was negligence w a s a question of f a c t f o r t h e jury. The District Court e r r e d . i n concluding t h a t v i o l a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e c o n s t i t u t e d negligence a s a m a t t e r of law. It is w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t involuntary v i o l a t i o n of a s t a t u t e i n an emergency due t o circumstances beyond t h e a c t o r ' s c o n t r o l does n o t c o n s t i t u t e negligence -- per se. Duchesneau v. Mack Truck, Inc. (1969), 158 Mont. 369, 377, 492 P.2d 926, 930. Rather, S c o f i e l d ' s presence i n t h e i n c o r r e c t lane i s only prima f a c i e evidence of negligence which may be rebutted. McGinnis v. P h i l l i p s (1922), 62 Mont. 223, 228, 205 P. 215, 216. This r a i s e s a f a c t u a l i s s u e which must be l e f t t o t h e jury t o decide. Duchesneau, supra. The Michigan Supreme Court i n Martiniano v. Booth (1960), 359 ~ i c h . 680, 103 N.W.2d\ 502, 506, summed up our p o s i t i o n very w e l l : ". . . t h e m e r e f a c t t h a t an automobile i s on t h e wrong s i d e of t h e highway a t t h e t i m e of c o l l i s i o n does n o t of i t s e l f make t h e d r i v e r thereof g u i l t y of negligence a s a m a t t e r of law. The f a c t t h a t an automobile s k i d s a c r o s s t h e highway a s a r e s u l t of s t r i k i n g a r u t o r a patch of ice, o r because of a s l i p p e r y pavement, through no f a u l t of t h e d r i v e r , has been held t o excuse f a i l u r e t o comply with t h e requirement of t h e s t a t u t e t h a t t h e d r i v e r of a c a r must keep on t h e r i g h t s i d e of a street o r highway . . . The i s s u e s involved i n how defendant struck t h e r u t and t h e distance of p l a i n t i f f ' s d r i v e r ' s c a r from defendant's c a r a t t h e time defendant skid- ded onto t h e north half of t h e highway w e r e fac- t u a l and w e r e properly submitted t o t h e jury i n a charge t h a t , taken i n its e n t i r e t y , c a r e f u l l y protected t h e r i g h t s of p l a i n t i f f a s w e l l a s those of defendant. The weight t o be given t o t h e testimony of t h e d i f f e r e n t witnesses and t h e inferences t o be drawn from such testimony r e s t e d i n t h e good judgment and common sense of t h e jurors." (Citations omitted.) Thus, t h e t h i r d i s s u e a l s o ultimately resolves i t s e l f i n t o a f a c t question f o r t h e jury t o decide. Its decision, which i s supported by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence, may n o t be overturned by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Scofield presented s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o prove t h a t a s she was driving i n a reasonable and prudent manner t h e r i g h t f r o n t wheel of her vehicle h i t an unusually l a r g e chuckhole concealed by new snow and t h a t a s a r e s u l t her vehicle was s e n t skidding down t h e highway and eventually collided with t h e Lyndes vehicle. The jury heard t h i s evidence together with evidence t o t h e contrary presented by t h e Lyndes and concluded t h a t Scofield was n o t negligent. There being s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support t h e v e r d i c t and t h e r e being no e r r o r of law, t h i s v e r d i c t could n o t be overturned by t h e D i s t r i c t Court on a motion f o r a new t r i a l . The order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court granting Lyndes a new t r i a l i s reversed. The cause is remanded t o the District Court with d i r e c t i o n s t o r e i n s t a t e t h e v e r d i c t of t h e jury. I ,/ J u s t i c e We concur: