Case Title: Downs v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 397, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
PHILLIP DOWNS,                      
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 397, 2003 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for Kent County  
   Cr. A. Nos. IK98-09-0046;  
                            0049; 0053
 
Submitted:  January 30, 2004 
   Decided:  March 2, 2004   
 
Before BERGER, STEELE and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 2nd day of March 2004, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and 
the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Phillip Downs, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s July 28, 2003 order denying his motion for correction of sentence 
pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).  We find no merit to the appeal.  
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.   
 
(2) 
In November 1998, the grand jury indicted Downs on 13 separate 
drug charges.  In January 1999, Downs, who was represented by counsel, pleaded 
guilty to two counts of Delivery of Cocaine and one count of Possession With 
 
 
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Intent to Deliver Cocaine.1  Downs did not file a direct appeal of his convictions 
and sentences.  He subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief, which the 
Superior Court denied.  Downs’ appeal of the Superior Court’s denial of his 
postconviction motion was dismissed as untimely by this Court.2  
 
(3) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Downs was sentenced to 30 years 
incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after a mandatory 10 years at Level V for 
probation.  At the time of the plea agreement, Downs already had a 1989 
conviction for Trafficking in Cocaine.3  As a result, Downs was subject to 
mandatory minimum sentences totaling 10 years at Level V on his 1999 
convictions for Delivery of Cocaine.4  Both the plea agreement and the guilty plea 
form explicitly state that the 10 years at Level V is a mandatory term.  Moreover, 
the transcript of the guilty plea colloquy reflects that Downs agreed to be sentenced 
immediately to a mandatory term of 10 years at Level V pursuant to Del. Code 
Ann., tit. 11, § 4204(k).5  
                                                 
1 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e) (1) (c). 
2 Downs v. State, Del. Supr., No. 428, 2001, Walsh, J. (Oct. 15, 2001). 
3 Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142 (Del. 1990). 
4 Del. Code Ann., tit. 16, § 4763(a) (2) b. 
5 That subsection states that “. . . the court may direct as a condition to a sentence of 
imprisonment to be served at Level V or otherwise that all or a specified portion of said sentence 
shall be served without benefit of any form of early release, good time, furlough, work release, 
supervised custody or any other form of reduction or diminution of sentence.” 
 
 
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(4) 
In this appeal, Downs claims that he is entitled to have his mandatory 
10-year Level V term reduced by 348 days of meritorious good time credit and 
96.5 days of additional credit for participation in employment and educational 
programs.  He contends that his plea agreement did not necessarily exclude the 
possibility of a reduction of his sentence through the application of good time, and 
other, credits. 
 
(5) 
We do not find Downs’ argument to be persuasive.  The transcript of 
Downs’ guilty plea colloquy clearly reflects that he voluntarily agreed to 
immediate sentencing to a mandatory 10-year Level V term.  We are satisfied on 
the basis of the plea agreement, the guilty plea form and the guilty plea colloquy 
that Downs knew at the time his plea was entered that he was agreeing to a 10-year 
Level V term of imprisonment that would not be subject to reduction for good time 
or any other reason.  In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary, Downs is bound by the representations he made at the time he entered his 
plea.6  We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in denying 
Downs’ motion under such circumstances.   
 
 
                                                 
6 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice