Case Title: PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Property Management, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-1507

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC01-1507
____________
PNR, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
BEACON PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., et al., 
Respondents.
[March 13, 2003]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review Beacon Property Management, Inc. v. PNR, Inc., 785
So. 2d 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), which expressly and directly conflicts with the
decisions in Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMC-Truck, 693 So. 2d 602 (Fla.
2d DCA 1997), Suris v. Gilmore Liquidating, Inc., 651 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA
1995), and Rollins, Inc. v. Heller, 454 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated herein, we
quash the district court’s decision and remand with instructions to the district court
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to reconsider the judgment on Petitioner’s statutory cause of action.
BACKGROUND AND FACTS
While our decision in the instant case is directed solely to the district court’s
interpretation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, § 501.201-
.213, Fla. Stat. (2002) (“FDUTPA” or the “Act”), we provide a brief discussion of
the salient facts.  The instant action arises from a business dispute involving the
tenancy of PNR, Inc., in a building owned by Ocean One North, Inc. (“Ocean
One”).  In September of 1994, PNR purchased a restaurant and was assigned a
lease to the restaurant’s facility which was located on the third floor of a building
owned by Ocean One.  At the time of purchase, approximately eight years
remained on the lease, and the lease contained a clause which provided an option to
extend for an additional ten years.  Ocean One is equally owned by Matt
Giacomino, Ernest W. Willis, and their respective spouses.  Willis and his spouse
also jointly own Beacon Property Management, Inc. (“Beacon”).
Prior to PNR’s purchase of the restaurant, Beacon served as the property
manager of the building in which the restaurant was located.  The terms of the
property management agreement between Beacon and Ocean One required Beacon
to collect rents from tenants, pay bills on the property, provide an accounting to the
owners, and act as a liason between the owners and tenants.  The written agreement
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did not require Beacon to maintain the premises, and actually expired by its own
terms two months prior to PNR’s purchase of the restaurant.  Under the provisions
of the lease assigned to PNR, Ocean One was responsible for keeping the major
structural components of the building in good repair.
Contractual obligations notwithstanding, Giacomino continuously referred
PNR to Beacon for maintenance requests.  The president of PNR testified at trial
that Giacomino led him to believe that Beacon was responsible for maintenance
issues such as roof leaks, tar leaks through the air conditioning system, and other
adverse conditions that PNR experienced with increasing frequency from the time
of purchase and possession of the real property.  Giacomino testified during these
proceedings that he indeed believed Beacon to be responsible for this type of
maintenance on the premises.
PNR’s requests for maintenance were unattended, resulting in numerous
building code violations, and, eventually, even the north wall of the building
collapsed on July 1, 1995.  The collapse forced PNR to cease restaurant operations
for a period of seven months.  The restaurant was eventually evicted from the
premises and it terminated operations.  Evidence adduced at trial showed that
contemporaneous with the events of this case, Willis and Giacomino were
embroiled in their own business dispute in which Giacomino accused Willis and
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Beacon of intentionally neglecting the building as part of a plan to extinguish his
interest in Ocean One.
Following an eight-day trial, the jury returned a verdict against Willis and
Beacon on all but one of PNR’s causes of action, including PNR’s claim that the
methods employed in the failure of Ocean One, Willis, and Beacon to properly
maintain the premises constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices under the
FDUTPA.  The jury awarded $1.2 million in damages, including $500,000 in
punitive damages, against Willis, individually, and $540,000 in damages, including
$140,000 in punitive damages, against Beacon.  The Fourth District reversed, in
pertinent part, the judgments based on the FDUTPA.  See Beacon, 785 So. 2d at
568.  This review followed.
ANALYSIS
The only issue we address is whether the FDUTPA may be applied in a
private cause of action arising from unfair or deceptive acts involving a single party
in a single transaction or directed to a single contract.  The Beacon court
concluded that it cannot as a matter of law.  According to the court below, the
FDUTPA does not embrace single acts of iniquity or deception because the
“operative words of section 501.204(1) are methods and practices,” which are
defined as “‘a regular and systematic way of accomplishing something,’” and a
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“‘habitual or customary action or way of doing something,’” respectively.  Beacon,
785 So. 2d at 568 (quoting American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
1135, 1422 (3rd ed.)) (emphasis supplied).  Thus, the district court set aside the
judgements based on the FDUTPA, concluding that because the evidence in the
instant case was limited to a single lease in question, and a single tenant, it did not
imply the existence of a method or practice with regard to other leases and other
tenants.  See id.
The district court’s interpretation contravenes the plain meaning of the
language of the FDUTPA.  See St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414
So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982) (“While legislative intent controls construction of
statutes in Florida, that intent is determined primarily from the language of the
statute.  The plain meaning of the statutory language is the first consideration.”)
(citations omitted).  Here, the district court simply excised the word “acts” from its
rendition of the “operative words” of the FDUTPA.  See § 501.204(1), Fla. Stat.
(2002) (prohibiting “[u]nfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce”) (emphasis supplied). 
In so doing, the district court focused its analysis solely on the words “method”
and “practice.”  However, when each of the terms designating proscribed conduct
is afforded operation, the Florida Legislature’s intent to protect against misdeeds
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directed to a single party, as well as behavior directed to multiple parties, clearly
emerges.
In rendering this analysis, we acknowledge that section 501.204(1) utilizes the
word “acts”—plural.  However, when considered with the other provisions of the
FDUTPA, it is clear that the prohibition is broad enough to protect against
instances of unfair or deceptive conduct as to a single party or under a single
transaction or contract.  See § 1.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2002) (providing that the plural
includes the singular where the context of the statutory provision allows).  Here
there were “acts” which allegedly caused harm to a single claimant.  The very
provisions that outline the parameters for individual remedies under the FDUTPA
are triggered by the commission of a single act.  See § 501.211(1), Fla. Stat. (2002)
(“[A]nyone aggrieved by a violation of this part may bring an action to obtain a
declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this part and to enjoin a person
who has violated . . . this part.”) (emphasis supplied); see also § 501.211(2), Fla.
Stat. (2002) (“[A] person who has suffered a loss as a result of a violation of this
part . . . may recover actual damages . . . .”) (emphasis supplied).  Indeed, the
FDUTPA is replete with references to “an act”—singular.  See also §§ 501.2075
(providing civil penalties for the willful use of an unlawful “method, act, or
practice”); 501.2077(2) (providing the same for violations involving senior citizens
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or handicapped persons); 501.2105(1) (governing attorney’s fees in “any civil
litigation resulting from an act or practice involving a violation”); 501.212(1), Fla.
Stat. (2002) (excepting “an act or practice” required or specifically permitted by
law).
While we need not resort to extrinsic aids in construing the unambiguous
provisions of the FDUTPA, see A.R. Douglass, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157,
159 (Fla. 1931), our conclusion is bolstered by contrasting the language of the Act
against other statutory provisions in which the Florida Legislature has conditioned
relief on the existence of a pattern of conduct.  Specifically, to state a cause of
action for certain unfair settlement practices in the insurance context, a complainant
must show that the defendant committed or performed the act with “such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice.”  § 626.9541(1)(i)(3), Fla. Stat.
(2002).  No such language qualifies the private right of action provided under the
FDUTPA.
The district court’s conclusion that the FDUTPA’s private right of action is
only available to plaintiffs able to demonstrate multiple, violative acts against
multiple parties or in multiple transactions runs contrary to the interpretation of the
Act that has been applied in every appellate district in this State.  In Delgado v.
J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMC-Truck, 693 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), the
1.  See Samuels v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 782 So. 2d 489, 499
(Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (reversing trial court’s dismissal of a FDUTPA claim
stemming from a single automobile purchase);  Davich v. Norman Bros. Nissan,
Inc., 739 So. 2d 138, 141 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (vacating summary judgment on a
FDUTPA claim based on a single transaction in which an automobile dealer
allegedly concealed damage to the paint finish of a car purchased by the plaintiff); 
Suris v. Gilmore Liquidating, Inc., 651 So. 2d 1282, 1283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
(reversing a directed verdict on a FDUTPA claim stemming from a single
transaction in which the dealer allegedly misrepresented the price of the car being
sold and the value of the consumer’s trade-in);  Urling v. Helms Exterminators,
Inc., 468 So. 2d 451, 453-54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (reversing a directed verdict on a
FDUTPA claim based on a single transaction in which a termite inspector allegedly
phoned in a single false inspection report).
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Second District reversed a trial court’s judgment on the pleadings in an action
based upon the FDUTPA which involved a single party and a single transaction—
the purchase of one automobile.  See id. at 603-04.  In its analysis of the case, the
Delgado court stated that in passing the FDUTPA, the Florida Legislature intended
to create a simplified statutory cause of action to provide additional substantive
remedies to the citizens of this state to recover economic damages related to
products or services purchased in a transaction infected with unfair or deceptive
trade practices or acts.  See id. at 606.  The decision in Delgado is not an anomaly. 
District courts in the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts have likewise
determined that a single act or transaction constitutes a sufficient basis for a
FDUTPA action.1  We also acknowledge that while there may not be a consensus
among the other states, numerous courts have determined that their trade practice
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statutes apply to single instances of unfair or deceptive conduct.  See, e.g.,
Drybrough v. Acxiom Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 366, 369 (D. Conn. 2001)
(determining that a single act may be the basis for a claim under state trade practice
law); Catrett v. Landmark Dodge, Inc., 560 S.E.2d 101, 105 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)
(same); Breckenridge v. Cambridge Homes, Inc., 616 N.E.2d 615, 623 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993) (same).
The dissents would simply discharge jurisdiction in the instant matter and
permit the incorrect statement of the principle of law to be perpetuated directly
contrary to decisions of other district courts of appeal.  As discussed above, the
point of law announced by the district court in Beacon cannot coexist with
decisions from courts in other Florida appellate districts.  Our constitutional
responsibility to resolve this interdistrict conflict, and ensure the consistent
application of the law throughout this state, see Florida Star v. B.J.F., 530 So. 2d
286, 288 (Fla. 1988), dictates that we address the very real and direct conflict
created by the Beacon court’s pronouncement of a novel statutory interpretation
that directly contravenes the interpretation undergirding numerous decisions in other
districts.  Discharge of jurisdiction in the instant matter would permit the further
advancement of an incorrect principle of law—a troubling prospect when one
considers that the Beacon court’s erroneous interpretation of the FDUTPA has
2.  Contrary to the position articulated in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Wells, this opinion does not operate to convert every breach of contract or breach
of lease case into a claim under the Act.  Indeed, such a construction would be
precluded by the FDUTPA, which only reaches conduct that is unfair or deceptive
as judged by controlling case law.  To the extent an action giving rise to a breach of
contract or breach of lease may also constitute an unfair or deceptive act, such a
claim is and has always been cognizable under the FDUTPA.  Our holding today
merely remands the case to the district court for consideration under appropriate
law and changes nothing with regard to such issue.
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already been cited as direct authority by another district court in Keech v. Yousef,
815 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002).  See id. at 719 (following the Fourth
District’s statement that the FDUTPA requires more than an isolated act of
misconduct and observing that the plaintiff had proved “only one act that fell under
DUTPA rather than showing . . . a pattern of prohibited practices, as required”).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the FDUTPA applies to private
causes of action arising from single unfair or deceptive acts in the conduct of any
trade or commerce, even if it involves only a single party, a single transaction, or a
single contract.2  An unfair practice is “one that ‘offends established public policy’
and one that is ‘immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially
injurious to consumers.’”  Samuels, 782 So. 2d at 499 (quoting Spiegel, Inc. v.
Fed. Trade Comm’n, 540 F.2d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 1976)); see Millennium
Communications & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Office of the Attorney Gen., 761 So. 2d
1256, 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (stating that deception occurs if there is a
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“‘representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting
reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.’”) (quoting
Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 785 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir.
1986)).  We quash the decision of the district court and remand the case for further
consideration consistent with the principles set forth herein.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., and SHAW, Senior Justice,
concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion.
HARDING, Senior Justice, dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS, J.,
concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., dissenting.
My first preference in this case would be to exercise our discretion and
discharge jurisdiction since the factual circumstances of this case and the conflict
cases are so different that the cases can be plainly distinguished.
Since the majority keeps this case, however, I dissent from quashing the
decision of the Fourth District.  This is a breach of contract case, and I agree with
the Fourth District that the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act
(FDUTPA) is not intended to convert every lease breach into a claim under the Act.
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I have seriously considered the majority’s footnote 2 in light of the facts
alleged in this case.  I continue to conclude that what is set forth in the majority
opinion as the facts of this case are, in sum, a breach of a lease contract.  I do not
see how the district courts or the trial courts are to differentiate between which
breach of lease cases state a claim under FDUTPA and which do not.  I continue
my concern that the practical effect of this decision will be to convert every breach
of lease claim into a claim under FDUTPA, though I read footnote 2 to mean that
this is not what the majority intends.
HARDING, Senior Justice, dissenting.
I would discharge jurisdiction as having been improvidently granted.  I do
not find any conflict which would sustain this court’s retaining jurisdiction.
WELLS, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict
Fourth District - Case No. 4D99-627
(Palm Beach County)
C. Vincent LoCurto of Brown, LoCurto & Robert, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, Florida;
and Brian F. LaBovick, Jupiter, Florida, 
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for Petitioner
David J. Maher and Lance A. Harke of Harke & Clasby LLP, Miami, Florida; and
Law Offices of Harry J. Ross, Boca Raton, Florida,
for Respondents
William C. Bielecky, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; Raymond G. Ingalsbe, P.A., Palm
Beach Gardens, Florida; and Mark S. Fistos of James, Hoyer, Newcomer &
Smiljanich, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida,
for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae