Case Title: State v. Pennington

Citation: 162 Vt. 621, 649 A.2d 513

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
ENTRY_ORDER.93-083; 162 Vt. 621; 649 A.2d 513

 [Filed 22-Aug-1994]


                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 93-083

                             OCTOBER TERM, 1993


 State of Vermont                  }          APPEALED FROM:
                                   }
                                   }
      v.                           }          District Court of Vermont,
                                   }          Unit No. 3, Essex Circuit
                                   }
 Chad Pennington                   }
                                   }          DOCKET NO. 32-3-92Ecr


              In the above entitled cause the Clerk will enter: 

     Defendant Chad Pennington appeals from a district court order revoking
 his probation under a deferred-sentence agreement on a charge of felony
 unlawful mischief.  The district court found that defendant had violated the
 following probation conditions: (1) the defendant "shall report to [his]
 probation officer in the manner and at such time and place as he/she may
 require," and (2) the defendant "shall notify [his] probation officer within
 twenty-four hours of any change of address or employment." 
 
      Defendant claims on appeal that (1) the court improperly relied on
 hearsay evidence in concluding that defendant had violated the condition of
 probation that he report a change of address, and (2) introduction of
 hearsay evidence at a probation revocation hearing, without a good faith
 effort to produce the first-hand witnesses or an explanation of why they
 could not appear, violated defendant's right to confront his accusers.(FN1)
 We affirm because, even without the hearsay evidence, there was sufficient
 evidence for the district court's findings. 
 
      The State presented three witnesses at the probation revocation
 hearing. Probation officer Michael Cusumano testified that in April 1992 he
 signed defendant up for probation and explained the conditions to him.  Mr.
 Cusumano also testified that defendant, who is a Pennsylvania resident, com-
 pleted forms for his case to be supervised through the Interstate Compact by
 Pennsylvania.  He agreed to "make his home at 19 East Ogden St.,
 Girardville, Pennsylvania until a change of residence is duly authorized by
 the proper authorities of Pennsylvania" and to contact Mr. Cusumano if there

 

 were any problems.  Barbara Walker, who is also a Vermont probation officer,
 testified that defendant's case was returned to Vermont in June and that she
 "received notice back from [the Pennsylvania probation authorities] that
 they refused to accept the case because the individual was not there, and
 people at the residence said he wasn't there, and they didn't know where he
 was."  Finally, a deputy sheriff testified that he extradited defendant from
 Utah in December 1992.  The only documentary evidence was the Deferred
 Sentence Agreement & Probation Warrant; the State did not introduce into
 evidence any communications from the Pennsylvania probation authorities. 
 
      The evidence that defendant argues was improperly offered and
 considered was Barbara Walker's testimony that Pennsylvania refused to
 accept supervision of defendant because an officer had attempted to locate
 defendant at the given address and had been told by people there that
 defendant did not reside there.  Defendant argues that this testimony should
 have been excluded as hearsay. 
 
      Hearsay includes only those statements "offered in evidence to prove
 the truth of the matter asserted."  V.R.E. 801(c).  Defendant is correct
 that the reason Pennsylvania gave for refusing the case, defendant's absence
 from the stated address, is hearsay if used to prove defendant was in fact
 absent from that address.  But the fact that Pennsylvania refused to accept
 the case for supervision is not hearsay -- it is direct testimony about an
 act performed by the State of Pennsylvania and admissible.  Henein v. Saudi
 Arabian Parsons Ltd., 818 F.2d 1508, 1512 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1009 (1988) (testimony that Saudi Arabian official ordered employer to
 terminate plain- tiff's employment for possession of illegal drugs might be
 hearsay if offered to prove plaintiff possessed such drugs, but fact that
 employer was ordered to discharge plaintiff is not hearsay, it is direct
 evidence of act performed by Saudi government); see also Curreri v.
 International Bhd. of Teamsters, 722 F.2d 6, 11 (lst Cir. 1983) (statements
 can be introduced to show fact that certain things were said even though
 same statements could not be introduced to prove truth of matter asserted);
 see generally 6 J.Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, {{ 1766, 1770 (Chadbourn
 rev. 1976). 
 
      Given the admissible evidence that Pennsylvania refused to accept
 supervision of defendant, the State offered sufficient evidence of the
 violations.  In regard to the failure-to-report complaint, the State
 introduced the non-hearsay evidence that defendant was instructed by
 probation officer Cusumano to contact him if there were problems
 establishing probation in Pennsylvania.  In addition, Ms. Walker testified
 that Pennsylvania probation authorities did not accept supervision and
 defendant never contacted Vermont's probation office.  Thus the court's
 finding that defendant violated the failure-to-report condition by "his
 voluntary absence from the State of Pennsylvania and" the address defendant
 had given was amply supported by the admissible evidence. 
 
      In regard to the failure to notify of a change of address, the State
 introduced non-hearsay evidence that defendant was to remain at the address
 he gave in Pennsylvania until contacted by Pennsylvania authorities,
 defendant was arrested in Utah several months later, Pennsylvania rejected

 

 defendant's supervision, and defendant had not informed Vermont that he
 would be in Utah. Defendant contends that evidence that he was arrested in
 Utah sometime before Christmas of 1992 cannot be considered to determine
 that he violated a residence requirement on or before June 29, 1992, as
 alleged in the probation violation complaint.  We disagree.  Defendant's
 failure to inform his probation officer of his change of address was an
 ongoing act, beginning in April and ending with his arrest in Utah.  See
 State v. Burns, 151 Vt. 621, 623, 564 A.2d 593, 595 (1989) (escape is a
 continuing offense). Taken together, this evidence was sufficient to
 establish that it was more likely than not that defendant had violated the
 failure to report a change of address condition. 
 
      Because the non-hearsay evidence was sufficient to prove by a
 preponderance of the evidence that defendant failed to notify his probation
 officer of a change of address within twenty-four hours and failed to
 report, we affirm without reaching the merits of defendant's arguments.  See
 State v. Emery, 156 Vt. 364, 371, 593 A.2d 77, 81 (1991) (where contested
 hearsay at probation violation hearing is cumulative, introduction of this
 evidence is harmless). 
 
      Affirmed. 


                                   BY THE COURT:



                                   Frederic W. Allen, Chief Justice


                                   Ernest W. Gibson III, Associate Justice


[x]  Publish                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

[ ]  Do Not Publish
                                   James L. Morse, Associate Justice


                                   Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice


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                              Footnotes

FN1.         At argument, defense counsel stated that the confrontation clause
 issue was not preserved.  The record reveals, however, that defendant did
 object on confrontation clause grounds when the State, through the testimony
 of Barbara Walker, offered the evidence at issue.