Case Title: State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State

Citation: 2018-Ohio-555

Docket Number: 2016-1015

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2018-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-555.] 
 
*Reporter’s Note: This cause was decided on January 24, 2018, but was released to the public on 
February 14, 2018, subsequent to the resignation of Justice William M. O’Neill, who participated 
in the decision. 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-555 
THE STATE EX REL. FOOD AND WATER WATCH; FRESHWATER 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF OHIO ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State, Slip Opinion No. 
2018-Ohio-555.] 
Mandamus sought to compel public officials to promulgate rules under R.C. 
1509.03 and 1509.22—Relators lacked standing to bring action—Court of 
appeals’ denial of writ affirmed. 
(No. 2016-1015—Submitted May 16, 2017—Decided January 24, 2018.*) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 14AP-958, 
2016-Ohio-3135. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Food and Water Watch (“FWW”) and relator-appellant, FreshWater 
Accountability Project (“FWAP”), filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to 
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compel respondents-appellees Rick Simmers, the chief of the oil-and-gas-
resources-management division of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources 
(“ODNR”), and James Zehringer, the director of ODNR (collectively, “the ODNR 
appellees”) to promulgate rules relating to the storage, recycling, treatment, 
processing, and disposal of waste substances associated with oil and gas drilling.  
The state of Ohio and the governor of Ohio (collectively, “the state appellees”) were 
also named as respondents in the complaint and are also appellees in this court.  The 
Tenth District Court of Appeals granted summary judgment to appellees on the 
grounds that FWW and FWAP lack standing.  We affirm the court of appeals’ 
judgment. 
I. Background 
{¶ 2} R.C. 1509.03(A) states that the chief of the oil-and-gas-resources-
management division of ODNR “shall adopt” rules, in accordance with R.C. 
Chapter 119, for the operation of oil and gas wells and production facilities.  The 
Revised Code identifies specific matters the rules must address, including safety in 
well drilling and operations, protection of the public water supply, and containment 
and disposal of drilling and production waste.  R.C. 1509.03(A)(1), (2), and (4). 
{¶ 3} The division chief is also required to adopt rules regarding the storage, 
recycling, treatment, processing, and disposal of brine and other waste substances.  
R.C. 1509.22(C).  Those rules must establish procedures and requirements 
governing permits for the handling of brine and other waste substances.  Id.  
Without such a permit, “no person shall store, recycle, treat, process, or dispose of 
in this state brine or other waste substances associated with the exploration, 
development, well stimulation, production operations, or plugging of oil and gas 
resources” after January 1, 2014.  R.C. 1509.22(B)(2). 
{¶ 4} FWW and FWAP alleged in their complaint that the ODNR appellees 
have not issued rules governing the permitting process for handling and treating 
waste from oil and gas operations.  Instead, the ODNR appellees have allowed 
January Term, 2018 
 
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facilities to operate pursuant to “temporary authorization” from Division Chief 
Simmers. 
{¶ 5} For example, on March 6, 2014, Simmers issued an order granting 
“temporary authorization” for Industrial Waste Control/Ground Tech., Inc. 
(“IWC”) to operate a facility in Youngstown, Ohio, at which “radiological waste 
characterization, tank cleaning and decontamination, waste solidification, brine 
storage, and preparation for disposal operations” would occur.  The only conditions 
imposed upon IWC were that the company conduct all operations in compliance 
with the law and not dispose of brine unlawfully.  The temporary authorization to 
operate is to remain in effect until the division chief promulgates rules under R.C. 
1509.22(C) and either IWC receives a permit under the new rules, IWC is denied a 
permit, or six months elapses from the effective date of the rules. 
{¶ 6} Similarly, on January 3, 2014, Simmers granted temporary authority, 
subject to the same terms and conditions, to the EnerGreen 360 Holding Company, 
L.L.C., a treatment facility in Belmont County.  In total, the complaint in this case 
lists 23 separate facilities (including IWC and EnerGreen) allegedly operating in 
Ohio pursuant to temporary authorization orders issued by Simmers. 
{¶ 7} FWW and FWAP, two nonprofit organizations, filed a complaint, 
naming the ODNR appellees and the state appellees as respondents, for a writ of 
mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals to compel the ODNR appellees 
to promulgate rules as required by R.C. 1509.03 and 1509.22.  Two facility 
operators, appellees Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., and Antero Resources 
Corporation, sought leave to intervene, which the magistrate granted. 
{¶ 8} On December 23, 2014, the state appellees and the ODNR appellees 
moved to dismiss FWW and FWAP’s action for lack of jurisdiction and for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  In their motion, the state 
appellees and the ODNR appellees asserted that FWW and FWAP lacked standing 
to assert their claims.  FWW and FWAP filed a memorandum contra respondents’ 
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motion to dismiss and, in support of their memorandum, filed affidavits of four of 
their members: David and Bobbie Castle, Hattie Wilkins, and Cheryl Mshar. 
{¶ 9} On February 27, 2015, FWW and FWAP filed a “motion for summary 
judgment and/or for peremptory writ of mandamus.”  On March 12, 2015, the 
intervenors filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that FWW and FWAP 
lacked standing to assert their claims.  On April 28, 2015, two more motions were 
filed seeking summary judgment based on lack of standing: one on behalf of the 
state appellees and the other on behalf of the ODNR appellees.  The state appellees 
also argued that they had no clear legal duty relevant to the claims in the case. 
{¶ 10} On January 14, 2016, a magistrate recommended granting summary 
judgment in favor of the respondents and the intervenors.  The magistrate 
considered whether FWW and FWAP (through their individual members) could 
establish traditional standing (i.e., could establish that the respondents’ allegedly 
unlawful conduct caused their members injuries that are likely to be redressed by 
the requested relief), public-right-doctrine exception to standing, or taxpayer 
standing to bring suit, and concluded that they could not.  The magistrate 
determined that they had failed to establish traditional standing because they could 
not establish injury. 
{¶ 11} FWW and FWAP filed objections to the magistrate’s decision.  
Relators, summarizing their objections, argued that they have traditional standing 
as associations whose members claimed personal standing to sue.  Relators relied 
on the affidavits of the Castles, Wilkins, and Mshar, arguing that they “demonstrate 
harm or threats of harm in the form of possible environmental damage and damage 
to human health” as a consequence of Simmers’s failure to promulgate rules 
pursuant to R.C. 1509.22.  In the alternative, FWW and FWAP also argued that the 
ODNR appellees’ failure to promulgate rules pursuant to R.C. 1509.22 is sufficient 
to establish a public-right-doctrine exception to standing in this case. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 12} The Tenth District Court of Appeals, overruling FWW and FWAP’s 
objections, adopted the magistrate’s decision and granted summary judgment based 
on lack of standing.  Presiding Judge Dorrian, concurring for different reasons, 
found that FWW and FWAP demonstrated sufficient harm to at least one of their 
members to satisfy one of the requirements of traditional standing but failed to 
demonstrate the redressability requirement—that the relief sought would alleviate 
the harm alleged.  FWAP timely appealed and presents three propositions of law to 
argue that it has standing to bring this action:   
 
Proposition of Law No. 1: Appellant has standing pursuant to 
R.C. 2731.02 as a beneficially interested party commanding the 
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins. 
 
Proposition of Law No. 2: By having members who are 
injured by the deprivation of their rights under R.C. 1509.22 and the 
Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, and by Facilities Operating 
Pursuant to Chief’s Orders, appellant meets the traditional standing 
requirements to pursue a writ of mandamus action. 
  
Proposition of Law No. 3: The appellant has standing to file 
a mandamus action to procure enforcement or protection of a public 
right, and need not show any special individual interest or injury 
where the appellant is properly interested in the execution of the 
laws of the state. 
 
II. FWAP waived standing under R.C. 2731.02 and as a taxpayer 
{¶ 13} FWAP argues that R.C. 2731.02 “provides a ‘beneficially interested’ 
party with statutory standing in a writ of mandamus action under the statute.”  As 
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FWAP notes, “the ‘party beneficially interested’ standard is completely absent 
from the Magistrate’s Decision.”  FWAP, however, failed to raise such an objection 
to the magistrate’s decision. 
{¶ 14} Additionally, FWAP appears to argue that it has taxpayer standing.  
The magistrate held that FWAP’s failure to pursue the argument resulted in waiver 
of the argument.  FWAP did not object the magistrate’s conclusion that FWW and 
FWAP had waived the taxpayer-standing argument. 
{¶ 15} “The Rules of Civil Procedure are generally applicable in original 
actions for extraordinary writs.”  State ex rel. Sautter v. Grey, 117 Ohio St.3d 465, 
2008-Ohio-1444, 884 N.E.2d 1062, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel. Ahmed v. Costine, 99 
Ohio St.3d 212, 2003-Ohio-3080, 790 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 5, fn. 1, and Gaskins v. 
Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 150, 656 N.E.2d 1282 (1995).  Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) 
provides, “An objection to a magistrate’s decision shall be specific and state with 
particularity all grounds for objection.”  A party shall not assign as error on appeal 
the court’s adoption of any legal conclusion unless the party has objected to that 
conclusion.  Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). 
{¶ 16} Here, because FWAP and FWW did not raise an argument relating 
to standing under R.C. 2731.02 or standing as a taxpayer in their objections to the 
magistrate’s decision, the arguments have been waived on appeal.  See State ex rel. 
Schmidt v. School Emps. Retirement Sys., 100 Ohio St.3d 317, 2003-Ohio-6086, 
798 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 6; Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv);  ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 
139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101 ¶ 16; State ex rel. Taylor v. 
Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-803, 2006-Ohio-4781, ¶ 3. 
III. FWAP members do not meet traditional standing requirements 
{¶ 17} FWAP argues that it has met the requirements for standing as an 
association because it has demonstrated that its members, the Castles, Wilkins, and 
Mshar, have met the traditional standing requirements to pursue these claims.  We 
disagree. 
January Term, 2018 
 
7
{¶ 18} As an association, FWAP has standing to bring a lawsuit on behalf 
of its members when (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right, (2) the interests FWAP seeks to protect are germane to FWAP’s purpose, 
and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation 
of individual members in the lawsuit.  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Kasich, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-639, 2012-Ohio-947, ¶ 19; see Ohio Contrs. 
Assn. v. Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088 (1994).  At issue is 
whether FWAP’s members have standing to sue in their own right. 
{¶ 19} To establish traditional standing, a party must show that the party 
has “suffered (1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly 
unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”  Moore v. 
Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 22, citing 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 
351 (1992).  “These three factors—injury, causation, and redressability—constitute 
‘the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.’ ”  Moore at ¶ 22, quoting 
Lujan at 560.  FWAP’s members do not meet this burden. 
{¶ 20} FWAP asserts that the affidavits of its members, the Castles, 
Wilkins, and Mshar, demonstrate that each member has suffered an injury sufficient 
to confer standing.  However, this court has held that “the injury must be concrete 
and not simply abstract or suspected” to be compensable.  Ohio Contrs. Assn. at 
320.  Wilkins states in her affidavit that she “believe[s]” that she and her friends 
and family are breathing polluted air as a result of IWC’s routine operations and 
that they may be exposed to radioactive contamination in the event of a waste spill.  
The Castles, in their affidavit, express concern for their health and that of their 
family members in the Barnesville area due to EnerGreen’s oil-and-gas-drilling-
waste-treatment facility.  The health problems that the Castles and Wilkins identify 
are speculative and are therefore insufficient to establish standing.  Thus, FWAP 
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cannot demonstrate that the Castles or Wilkins would have standing to sue in their 
own right. 
{¶ 21} Mshar’s affidavit, however, addresses a specific concern beyond the 
speculative health issues presented by the Castles and Wilkins.  Mshar claims, “I 
can smell hydrocarbon stenches from the plant, a smell which I first noticed in 2014 
after the company received its Chief’s Order.”  Assuming arguendo only that 
Mshar’s affidavit presents sufficient evidence that she has suffered an injury that is 
traceable to the ODNR appellees’ allegedly unlawful conduct, she nevertheless 
lacks standing because FWAP has not demonstrated that the promulgation of rules 
pursuant to R.C. 1509.22 will likely redress her injury. 
{¶ 22} In addition to FWAP’s request for injunctive relief, which courts of 
appeals do not have jurisdiction to order pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(1) of 
the Ohio Constitution, FWAP sought an order compelling the promulgation of rules 
under R.C. 1509.22(C), which provides: 
 
The chief shall adopt rules regarding storage, recycling, treatment, 
processing, and disposal of brine and other waste substances.  The 
rules shall establish procedures and requirements in accordance with 
which a person shall apply for a permit or order for the storage, 
recycling, treatment, processing, or disposal of brine and other waste 
substances that are not subject to a permit issued under section 
1509.06 or 1509.21 of the Revised Code and in accordance with 
which the chief may issue such a permit or order. 
 
{¶ 23} While the statute requires that the rules “establish procedures and 
requirements” for the permit process, R.C. 1509.22(C) does not mandate that the 
rules address odors.  Thus, while it is possible that the rules promulgated under R.C. 
1509.22(C) could eliminate Mshar’s concerns regarding odors, a plain reading of 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
the statute does not support, and FWAP has not shown, that the writ sought—one 
that would mandate the promulgation of rules—will likely redress the purported 
injury.  See Moore, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, at ¶ 22.  
This analysis is not to be construed as this court’s excusing public officials from 
carrying out mandatory duties; simply, FWAP has failed to show that Mshar’s 
alleged injury—the odor—will likely be redressed by the promulgation of rules. 
{¶ 24} Similar to Presiding Judge Dorrian’s conclusion in her separate 
opinion in the court of appeals, we conclude that Mshar did not establish that the 
ODNR division chief’s regulations would likely remediate the alleged harm.  See 
2016-Ohio-3135, ¶ 10 (Dorrian, P.J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
{¶ 25} Because FWAP cannot demonstrate that the Castles or Wilkins have 
been injured and because FWAP cannot demonstrate that the promulgation of rules 
will likely redress Mshar’s alleged injury, FWAP has not demonstrated that any of 
its members have traditional standing and thus cannot establish associational 
standing. 
IV. The  public-right doctrine does not apply to FWAP 
{¶ 26} FWAP asserts that it may pursue its claims in this mandamus action 
pursuant to the public-right doctrine.  FWAP argues that in determining the 
application of the public-right doctrine, this court should not apply the “rare and 
extraordinary” requirement from State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. 
Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999), because unlike the relators 
in Sheward, it is not challenging the constitutionality of the statute, but rather is 
seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the ODNR appellees “to comply with [R.C.] 
1509.22(C) by promulgating rules and regulations.”  (Emphasis sic.)    
{¶ 27} It has long been held and is well established that before an Ohio court 
can consider the merits of a legal claim, the party seeking relief must establish 
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standing to sue.  Ohio Contrs. Assn., 71 Ohio St.3d at 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088.  
However, in Sheward, a deeply divided, four-to-three decision, this court held: 
 
Where the object of an action in mandamus and/or prohibition is to 
procure the enforcement or protection of a public right, the relator 
need not show any legal or special individual interest in the result, 
it being sufficient that the relator is an Ohio citizen and, as such, 
interested in the execution of the laws of this state. 
 
Sheward at paragraph one of the syllabus.  However, Sheward also provided that 
“this court will entertain a public action only ‘in the rare and extraordinary case’ 
where the challenged statute operates, ‘directly and broadly, to divest the courts of 
judicial power.’ ” (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 504.  “The public-right doctrine represents 
‘an exception to the personal-injury requirement of standing.’ ”  JobsOhio, 139 
Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, at ¶ 9, quoting Sheward at 503. 
{¶ 28} Since its announcement, Sheward has been heavily criticized.  See, 
e.g., State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 97 Ohio St.3d 
504, 2002-Ohio-6717, 780 N.E.2d 981, ¶ 62 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (citing law-
review articles criticizing Sheward); see also JobsOhio at ¶ 13.  The position that 
when issues sought to be litigated are “of great importance and interest to the 
public” they may be resolved by a court without requiring that the parties 
demonstrate standing to proceed, as identified in Sheward at 471, however, can 
unfortunately result in “ ‘political opportunism, allowing the majority to invalidate 
a disfavored law using a questionable approach.’  ”  Ohio AFL-CIO at ¶ 62 (Moyer, 
C.J., dissenting), quoting Tracy, Ohio ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. 
Sheward: The End Must Justify the Means, 27 N.Ky.L.Rev. 883, 885 (2000). 
{¶ 29} Further, and perhaps a more egregious and problematic abuse, this 
position permits this court to issue opinions in cases in which there has been no 
January Term, 2018 
 
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injury, resulting in advisory opinions, which long-standing Ohio law prohibits this 
court from issuing, Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 257 N.E.2d 371 
(1970) (“It has become settled judicial responsibility for courts to refrain from 
giving opinions on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition by judgment 
of premature declarations or advice upon potential controversies”); N. Canton v. 
Hutchinson, 75 Ohio St.3d 112, 114, 661 N.E.2d 1000 (1996) (“It is, of course, well 
settled that this court will not indulge in advisory opinions”); State ex rel. Keyes v. 
Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 123 Ohio St.3d 29, 2009-Ohio-4052, 913 N.E.2d 
972, ¶ 29; see Newark, Somerset & Straitsville RR. Co. v. Perry Cty. Commrs., 30 
Ohio St. 120, 126 (1876) (When no judgment can be rendered, “a consideration and 
determination of the question of law submitted and argued would be an idle 
ceremony” and the case must be dismissed). 
{¶ 30} Sheward essentially allows this court to engage in policy-making by 
ruling on the legislation of the General Assembly in cases that lack an injured party, 
i.e., a party that can establish traditional standing.  Thus, any authority provided by 
Sheward is, at best, questionable.  For these reasons, we reject FWAP’s argument 
that this court should broaden the holding announced in Sheward. 
{¶ 31} This court has not granted a public-right-doctrine exception to 
standing pursuant to Sheward in the past 15 years, and we decline to do so today.  
Even assuming that this court would still grant a party a public-right-doctrine 
exception to standing in the appropriate “rare and extraordinary case,” FWAP has 
not met its burden to demonstrate that this case is a “rare and extraordinary case” 
worthy of the exception.  FWAP argues that the division chief’s failure to 
promulgate rules is “of great importance and the public injury is serious.”  FWAP 
also contends that the division chief “acted unlawfully and unreasonably approved 
the orders without following the direction, criteria, or standards from the Ohio 
General Assembly.”  However, FWAP has presented this court with no evidence to 
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support its assertions.  Therefore, we reject FWAP’s arguments that the public-right 
doctrine should apply in this case. 
V. Conclusion 
{¶ 32} Accordingly, because FWAP did not demonstrate that its individual 
members would have standing in their own right, its claim for associational 
standing fails.  Further, we decline to extend Sheward in this case.  Because FWAP 
has waived other arguments regarding standing and has not otherwise demonstrated 
that it has standing to proceed in this mandamus action, we affirm the judgment of 
the Tenth District Court of Appeals denying FWW and FWAP’s motion for 
summary judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of the state appellees, the 
ODNR appellees, and the intervenors, and denying the requested writ of 
mandamus. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., 
concur. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 
O’NEILL, J., dissents. 
_________________ 
O’DONNELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 33} I concur in the judgment of the majority in denying a writ of 
mandamus as to Governor Kasich and the state of Ohio because they have no legal 
duty to perform acts which would justify issuing a writ of mandamus.  I dissent, 
however, from the decision of the majority to deny mandamus as to Rick Simmers, 
the chief of the oil-and-gas-resources-management division of the Ohio 
Department of Natural Resources (“ODNR”), and James Zehringer, the director of 
ODNR (“collectively, the ODNR appellees”) because in my view FreshWater 
Accountability Project (“FWAP”), and Food and Water Watch (“FWW”), did in 
fact establish standing and each has a statutory duty pursuant to R.C. 1509.03(A) 
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and 1509.22(C) to adopt rules for the operation of oil and gas wells and production 
facilities and to adopt rules regarding the storage, recycling, treatment, processing, 
and disposal of brine and other waste substances, and those duties can be compelled 
by the issuance of a writ of mandamus. 
{¶ 34} Standing to bring an action is a question of law, which this court 
reviews de novo.  Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 
N.E.2d 977, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 35} Before a court can consider the merits of a legal claim, a litigant must 
prove that it has standing to sue.  ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio 
St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, ¶ 7.  To establish standing, a litigant 
must show that it has “suffered (1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the 
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the 
requested relief.”  Moore at ¶ 22, citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560-561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).  An association has 
standing to sue on behalf of its members when its members would otherwise have 
standing to sue in their own right (assuming other requirements, not at issue here, 
are met).  Ohio Contrs. Assn. v. Bicking, 71 Ohio St.3d 318, 320, 643 N.E.2d 1088 
(1994).  The ODNR appellees dispute whether FWAP proved any of the three 
requirements. 
{¶ 36} The analysis is slightly different in a suit challenging the legality of 
the government’s action or inaction toward a third party.  When a plaintiff’s 
claimed injury arises out of the government’s allegedly unlawful failure to regulate 
someone else, the plaintiff must “ ‘adduce facts showing that [the exercise of 
discretion by the third party that has not been regulated has] been or will be made 
in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.’ ”  
(Brackets added.)  Clifton v. Blanchester, 131 Ohio St.3d 287, 2012-Ohio-780, 964 
N.E.2d 414, ¶ 16, quoting Lujan at 562. 
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{¶ 37} FWAP submitted three affidavits in support of its complaint—one 
from Cheryl Mshar, one from Hattie Wilkins, and one from David Barton Castle 
and Bobbie Sue Castle.  In its memorandum opposing the motions for summary 
judgment, FWAP pointed to the Mshar, Wilkins, and Castle affidavits as evidence 
to support FWAP’s organizational standing. 
{¶ 38} A Tenth District Court of Appeals magistrate concluded that the 
Mshar, Wilkins, and Castle affidavits did not establish standing, because they failed 
to show “an injury that is concrete and not speculative [or] different from that 
suffered by the public in general.”  2016-Ohio-3135, ¶ 68.  Two judges on the three-
judge court of appeals panel adopted the magistrate’s decision; in dissent, Judge 
Dorrian, determined that FWAP had proved harm to a member but had failed to 
prove redressability. 
{¶ 39} I disagree with both conclusions because in my opinion, the affidavit 
of Cheryl Mshar contained sufficient facts to establish standing.  According to her 
affidavit, Mshar is a member of both FWW and FWAP.  The house she owns and 
lives in is .82 miles from the plant operated by Industrial Waste Control/Ground 
Tech., Inc. (“IWC”).  Mshar attests that she “can smell hydrocarbon stenches from 
the plant, a smell which [she] first noticed in 2014 after the company received” 
temporary authorization to operate its facility from Simmers, the chief of ODNR’s 
oil-and-gas-resources-management division.  She is “routinely forced to breathe 
polluted air” and believes that she and her family “are being involuntarily exposed 
to, and are breathing, chemically-polluted and radon-polluted air emitted from 
fracking waste delivered to or held at the facility as part of routine operations,” 
which is exposing them to “unnecessary risks to personal health.” 
{¶ 40} The court of appeals considered Mshar’s fears of exposure to toxic 
substances to be “speculation that is not evidence of an injury or harm.”  2016-
Ohio-3135 at ¶ 92.  But medical harm was not the only injury she alleged. 
January Term, 2018 
 
15 
{¶ 41} An offensive odor alone can constitute injury.  Banford v. Aldrich 
Chem. Co., Inc., 126 Ohio St.3d 210, 2010-Ohio-2470, 932 N.E.2d 313, ¶ 26.  The 
ODNR appellees distinguish Banford and similar cases as nuisance actions, arguing 
that even if Mshar’s allegations regarding the smells emanating from the IWC plant 
constitute a concrete injury for purposes of a nuisance suit, those allegations are 
“not sufficient to establish injury for purposes of traditional standing.”  But the 
ODNR appellees cite no authority for the proposition that the nature of the direct 
injury necessary to establish standing varies depending on the relief sought 
(injunction, mandamus, or money damages). 
{¶ 42} On its face, Mshar’s affidavit alleges a sufficient injury to satisfy the 
first element of the standing analysis. 
{¶ 43} The next step in the analysis is whether the litigant has shown that 
the alleged injury is fairly traceable to the allegedly unlawful conduct.  The court 
of appeals deemed Mshar’s affidavit inadequate because “there is no expert opinion 
or evidence to support the inference that the so-called ‘hydrocarbon stenches’ that 
she allegedly has smelled since 2014 are in fact causing her harm or injury.”  2016-
Ohio-3135 at ¶ 90. 
{¶ 44} Once again, the court of appeals failed to appreciate that Mshar was 
alleging two categories of harm, one medical, the other aesthetic.  The offensive 
odor is itself an injury irrespective of whether it is affecting people’s health.  And 
Mshar satisfied the causation requirement by presenting evidence that the smell 
began just after IWC received authorization from the ODNR division chief and 
began operations.  Whether or not the odor is also causing her medical harm would 
be relevant if this were a suit for compensatory damages, but it is not. 
{¶ 45} In her concurring opinion, Judge Dorrian wrote that Mshar had failed 
to establish redressability, the third prong of the standing analysis, because she “did 
not allege how administrative rules, rather than the existing Chief’s orders, would 
redress her injury.”  2016-Ohio-3135 at ¶ 10 (Dorrian, P.J., concurring in part and 
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concurring in judgment).  In fact, the complaint did contain an allegation of 
redressability: 
 
33. The Chief acted unlawfully and unreasonably in 
approving the orders by failing to incorporate into them enforceable 
requirements for the operation of the facilities covered, and by 
failing to govern the potential final products of the various treatment 
processes.  Consequently, ODNR is allowing unregulated 
contamination of the environment and endangerment of human 
health. 
34. By approving Chief’s Orders as “temporary approvals”  
* * * without any but ad hoc regulatory criteria, the Chief cannot 
reasonably and lawfully conclude that the facilities he is allowing to 
operate will not cause adverse effects to public health and safety by 
contamination of water and air in the vicinity of the approved 
facilities. 
 
{¶ 46} The case was decided on summary judgment, so the question was 
not whether the complaint alleged redressability but whether FWAP came forward 
with evidence to establish that issuing an order to compel the ODNR division chief 
to engage in rulemaking would alleviate the harm. 
{¶ 47} R.C. 1509.03(A) mandates that the chief of the oil-and-gas-
resources-management division of ODNR adopt rules for the operation of oil and 
gas wells and production facilities that address safety in well drilling and 
operations, protection of the public water supply, and containment and disposal of 
drilling and production waste.  Also, R.C. 1509.22(C) directs the division chief to 
adopt rules regarding the storage, recycling, treatment, processing, and disposal of 
brine and other waste substances and to establish procedures and requirements 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
governing permits for the handling of brine and other waste substances.  Without 
such a permit, “no person shall store, recycle, treat, process, or dispose of in this 
state brine or other waste substances associated with the exploration, development, 
well stimulation, production operations, or plugging of oil and gas resources” after 
January 1, 2014.  R.C. 1509.22(B)(2).  Yet here, the division chief is systematically 
licensing facilities without issuing regulations to protect the public, in violation of 
a clear statutory duty.  Thus, the injury in this case is redressable because absent 
promulgation of rules, the facilities will never be required to comply with any 
specific protections aimed at their operation, such as safeguarding the public water 
supply and containing drilling and production waste, which the statutes require the 
rules to address. 
{¶ 48} As for redressability, the ODNR appellees argue that we cannot 
know for certain what regulations will result if the ODNR division chief engages 
in rulemaking—which necessarily means that we cannot know whether the 
regulations will remediate the odors and potentially hazardous condition.  By that 
logic, the remediation element becomes an insurmountable obstacle to anyone 
seeking to compel a public official to act.  If a public official has a mandatory duty 
to perform a task but discretion in how to perform that task, the ultimate form and 
effect of the official’s action will always be unknown in advance, but that should 
not excuse the official’s failure to carry out the duty. 
{¶ 49} A redressability objection seems especially inappropriate in this 
case—one in which the ODNR appellees failed to meet their Civ.R. 56 burden.  If 
they had come forward with evidence that the objectionable odors are endemic to 
the process and cannot or will not be lessened by proper regulations, then FWAP’s 
claims might have trouble going forward.  But there is no such evidence in the 
record. 
{¶ 50} Given this conclusion, the sufficiency of the other two affidavits is 
moot. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
{¶ 51} Accordingly, I would affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment 
of the court of the appeals and remand the cause for further proceedings. 
_________________ 
James Yskamp, and Emily A. Collins, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Brett A. Kravitz and Daniel J. 
Martin, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees James Zehringer and Rick 
Simmers. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Ryan L. Richardson and Sarah E. 
Pierce, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees state of Ohio and Governor John 
R. Kasich. 
Steptoe & Johnson, P.L.L.C., J. Kevin West, and Lyle B. Brown, for 
appellees Chesapeake Explorations, L.L.C., and Antero Resources Corporation. 
_________________