Case Title: State v. Jeffrey Negran

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-75-02

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2003-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JEFFREY NEGRAN, Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 21, 2003 Decided November 25, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. James L. McConnell, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Wayne J. Forrest, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; Robert C. Lang, Jr., Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). James R. Wronko argued the cause for respondent (Wronko & Loewen, attorneys). Justice LaVECCHIA delivered the opinion of the Court. A Somerset County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging defendant Jeffery Negran with third-degree eluding. He applied for and was denied admission to pretrial intervention (PTI) by the Somerset County Prosecutor. The issue in this appeal is whether the prosecutor committed an abuse of discretion by basing his denial on defendant s past driving history. It is clear a past motor vehicle offense is not a criminal event for purposes of PTI evaluation. We recognize, however, that a driving history can have some limited relevance to a PTI application if there is a strong substantive and temporal relationship between the past motor vehicle offenses and the offense with which a PTI applicant has been charged. In such settings, a driving record could demonstrate that a defendant has engaged in a pattern of anti-social behavior as contemplated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12e(8). Because there is no close temporal connection between defendant s past motor vehicle offenses and his present eluding charge, we affirm the Appellate Division s determination that the prosecutor s denial here constituted a patent and gross abuse of discretion. I. The facts pertinent to defendant s appeal are not in dispute. Shortly after midnight on August 1, 2001, the Franklin Township Police Department received citizen information that a car had entered a parking lot, struck two parked cars, and then was driven back onto the streets of Franklin Township. Based on the description received, Sergeant Recine spotted the vehicle in the vicinity in which it was reported. Joined by another responding police cruiser, Sergeant Recine positioned his vehicle immediately behind defendant s automobile. Despite the fact that both marked vehicles had sirens and patrol lights activated, defendant ignored the officers signals to pull over. Defendant proceeded down Franklin Boulevard through cross-streets, veering off the roadway and up onto the curb on three occasions. After proceeding a few blocks further, defendant again veered into the curb and punctured his tire, causing his vehicle to come to a stop. While placing defendant under arrest, the officers detected a strong odor of alcohol. Also, defendant s eyes were bloodshot and his speech was slurred. A Breathalyzer test was administered and twice it measured defendant s blood alcohol content at .19 percent. Following his arrest, defendant voluntarily entered a program of alcohol dependency rehabilitation. He completed the twenty-three session Intensive Outpatient Program administered by Princeton House of North Brunswick. His involvement with the Alcoholics Anonymous portion of that program is ongoing. As noted, a Somerset County Grand Jury issued an indictment charging defendant with third-degree eluding, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2b. Application was made for admission into the Somerset County PTI program. The vicinage criminal division manager, who serves as its PTI Director, informed defendant that he was an appropriate candidate for the program. He had no prior contact with the criminal justice system, was charged with a nonviolent crime of the third degree (one that was not an offense for which the guidelines express a presumption against admission), and he successfully had completed intensive outpatient rehabilitation and was continuing his participation in Alcoholics Anonymous. The Director conditioned his favorable recommendation on defendant s continuation in aftercare as recommended by the Princeton House, submission to drug and alcohol testing and treatment as recommended by the Somerset Probation Department, and participation and completion of fifty hours of community service. Notwithstanding the Director s recommendation, the State refused consent to defendant s entry into PTI. In a January 10, 2002 letter, the Somerset County Prosecutor cited defendant s extensive driving record and a prior DWI conviction as the basis for the denial. In the letter, the Prosecutor states that [t]he defendant is 36 years of age. Although this is defendant s first arrest for a crime of an indictable nature, the State submits that he is an unacceptable candidate for the Pretrial Intervention Program. Defendant s driving history, dating back to 1985, indicates that his driver s license has been suspended twice. He has been convicted of speeding six times between 1984 and 1992. In addition, the defendant was also convicted of driving the wrong way on a one-way street in 1985. More importantly, defendant has a prior conviction for driving while intoxicated in 1989. According to the Prosecutor, defendant s entire driving history demonstrates a flagrant disobedience for the laws of the State of New Jersey and a complete disregard for the safety of others. The Prosecutor states that [i]t does not appear likely that the defendant s crime is related to a situation that would be conducive to change, and, further characterizes defendant s crime as part of a continuing pattern of anti-social behavior. He concludes that defendant s crime was of such a nature that the value of supervisory treatment [was] clearly outweighed by the public need for prosecution. Defendant s motion to appeal pursuant to Rule 3:28(h) was granted. The motion court found a patent and gross abuse of discretion because the State s rejection was based on inappropriate factors. The court observed that although an applicant s past criminal convictions may be considered when determining whether a defendant would be a successful PTI candidate, the guidelines governing PTI admission contain no authorization for the use of past motor vehicle offenses as a basis for denial. Acknowledging the undesirable nature of defendant s driving history, the court nonetheless concluded that that was an insufficient reason for denying admission into PTI. Defendant s driving infractions spanned a period of seventeen years, and ten years had elapsed since defendant s last motor vehicle offense. The prior DWI had occurred more than thirteen years before. Those considerations, coupled with 1) defendant s voluntary participation in recent intensive and ongoing alcohol dependency rehabilitation, 2) the fact that defendant had never been convicted of an indictable offense or any disorderly persons offense, and 3) that defendant s present charge was third, not second, degree eluding and, therefore, did not involve endangering anyone else, led the court to conclude that the State committed a patent and gross abuse of discretion by denying PTI admission to defendant. The court stayed its decision to allow the State time to appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed in an unpublished opinion, also finding that the State s rejection represented a clear error in judgment and a patent and gross abuse of discretion. The court concluded that prior motor vehicle convictions did not comport with the prior criminal offense criterion in the statute and guidelines governing admission to PTI. If analyzed as part of an alleged pattern of anti-social behavior that may be considered pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12e(8), the long passage of time since defendant s last offense rendered his driving history incapable of establishing a continuing pattern. Hence, the court believed reliance on that history to be misplaced. We granted the State s petition for certification, State v. Negran, 176 N.J. 73 (2003), and now affirm. (1) The nature of the offense; (2) The facts of the case; (3) The motivation and age of the defendant; (4) The desire of the complainant or victim to forego prosecution; (5) The existence of personal problems and character traits which may be related to the applicant s crime and for which services are unavailable within the criminal justice system, or which may be provided more effectively through supervisory treatment and the probability that the causes of criminal behavior can be controlled by proper treatment; (6) The likelihood that the applicant s crime is related to a condition or situation that would be conducive to change through his participation in supervisory treatment; (7) The needs and interests of the victim and society; (8) The extent to which the applicant s crime constitutes part of a continuing pattern of anti-social behavior; (9) The applicant s record of criminal and penal violations and the extent to which he may present a substantial danger to others; (10) Whether or not the crime is of an assaultive or violent nature, whether in the criminal act itself or in the possible injurious consequences of such behavior; (11) Consideration of whether or not prosecution would exacerbate the social problem that led to the applicant s criminal act; (12) The history of the use of physical violence towards others; (13) Any involvement of the applicant with organized crime; (14) Whether or not the crime is of such a nature that the value of supervisory treatment would be outweighed by the public need for prosecution; (15) Whether or not the applicant s involvement with other people in the crime charged or in other crime is such that the interest of the State would be best served by processing his case through traditional criminal justice system procedures; (16) Whether or not the applicant s participation in pretrial intervention will adversely affect the prosecution of codefendants; and (17) Whether or not the harm done to society by abandoning criminal prosecution would outweigh the benefits to society from channeling an offender into a supervisory treatment program. In respect of the close relationship of the PTI program to the prosecutor s charging authority, courts allow prosecutors wide latitude in deciding whom to divert into the PTI program and whom to prosecute through a traditional trial. Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 246. The deference has been categorized as enhanced or extra in nature. State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434, 443-44 (1997) (citations omitted). Thus, the scope of review is severely limited. Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 246; State v. Hermann, 80 N.J. 122, 128 (1979); State v. Kraft, 265 N.J. Super. 106, 111 (App. Div. 1993). Judicial review serves to check only the most egregious examples of injustice and unfairness. State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 384 (1977); accord Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 246; State v. DeMarco, 107 N.J. 562, 566 (1987). A prosecutor s discretion in respect of a PTI application is not without its limits, however. Brooks, supra, 175 N.J. at 225. A rejected applicant must be provided with a clear statement of reasons for the denial. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12f; Guideline 8. That writing requirement is intended to facilitate judicial review, assist in evaluating the success of the PTI program, afford to defendants an opportunity to respond, and dispel suspicions of arbitrariness. State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 584 (1996); Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 249. The requirement also enables a defendant to challenge erroneous or unfounded justifications for denial of admission. Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 249. A defendant attempting to overcome a prosecutorial veto must clearly and convincingly establish that the prosecutor s refusal to sanction admission into a PTI program was based on a patent and gross abuse of his discretion before a court can suspend criminal proceedings under Rule 3:28 without prosecutorial consent. Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 246 (quoting Kraft, supra, 265 N.J. Super. at 112) (emphasis deleted). That standard, which governs our review here, requires the following showing: Ordinarily, an abuse of discretion will be manifest if defendant can show that a prosecutorial veto (a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgment. In order for such an abuse of discretion to rise to the level of patent and gross, it must further be shown that the prosecutorial error complained of will clearly subvert the goals underlying Pretrial Intervention. [State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979) (citation omitted).] STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JEFFREY NEGRAN, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED November 25, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice LaVecchia CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY