Case Title: Wis. Fed’n of Nurses and Health Prof’ls v. Milwaukee County

Citation: 2015 WI 12

Docket Number: 2012AP002490

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 WI 12 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2490   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Susan Schwegel and Susan Jaskulski, 
          Plaintiffs, 
Wisconsin Federation of Nurses and Health 
Professionals ,  
Local 5001, AFT, AFL-CIO and Association of 
Milwaukee  
County Attorneys, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Milwaukee County, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 351 Wis. 2d 421, 839 N.W.2d 869) 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No: 2013 WI App 134  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 12, 2015 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 1, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Christopher R. Foley 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., dissents. 
(Opinion filed.) 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Jeffrey P. Sweetland and Hawks Quindel, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Jeffrey P. Sweetland. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Alan M. 
Levy and Lindner & Marsack, S.C., Milwaukee. Oral argument by 
Alan M. Levy. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
2015 WI 12
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2490 
(L.C. No. 
2012CV1528) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Susan Schwegel and Susan Jaskulski, 
 
          Plaintiffs, 
 
Wisconsin Federation of Nurses and Health 
Professionals, Local 5001, AFT, AFL-CIO and 
Association of Milwaukee County Attorneys, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Milwaukee County, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 12, 2015 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed; 
cause remanded to the circuit court to dismiss the complaint.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   We review a published 
decision of the court of appeals1 reversing an order of the 
circuit court2 that granted summary judgment to the Wisconsin 
                                                 
1 Wis. Fed'n of Nurses & Health Prof'ls, Local 5001 v. 
Milwaukee Cnty., 2013 WI App 134, 351 Wis. 2d 421, 839 N.W.2d 
869. 
2 The Honorable Christopher R. Foley of Milwaukee County 
presided. 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
2 
 
Federation 
of 
Nurses 
and 
Health 
Professionals 
(Wisconsin 
Federation), the Association of Milwaukee County Attorneys 
(County Attorneys), Wisconsin Federation member Susan Schwegel, 
and County Attorneys member Susan Jaskulski.  Our review focuses 
on the interpretation of a Milwaukee County General Ordinance 
(MCGO), § 17.14(7)(ee)(1) (2011), that prospectively eliminated 
Medicare Part B premium reimbursement upon retirement for 
employees who did not retire before retirement dates established 
by Milwaukee County.  
¶2 
Plaintiffs 
claim 
a 
vested 
contract 
right 
to 
reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums upon retirement, even 
though they have not yet retired.3  We conclude that Milwaukee 
County did not abrogate a vested contract right when it 
prospectively modified a health insurance benefit it offered for 
employees who had not yet retired.  We further conclude that 
County employees have a vested contract right to Medicare Part B 
premium reimbursement when they fulfill all three criteria for 
its payment:  (1) reaching retirement age; (2) providing 15 or 
more years of credited county service; and (3) retiring before 
                                                 
3 In 
their 
complaint, 
plaintiffs 
claim 
that 
MCGO 
§ 17.14(7)(ee)(1) (2011) is unconstitutional as applied to them 
because it impairs a vested contract right, contrary to Article 
I, 
Section 12 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, 
and 
is 
a 
deprivation of property without just compensation, contrary to 
Article I, Section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  However, 
before us, plaintiffs contend they have a vested contract right, 
without 
continuing 
that 
contention 
in 
the 
context 
of 
a 
constitutional claim.  Therefore, we too limit our discussion to 
whether plaintiffs have a vested contract right to reimbursement 
of Medicare Part B premiums when they retire. 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
3 
 
the dates established by Milwaukee County.  Employees who do not 
meet all three criteria have not fulfilled the requirements 
necessary to establish a vested contract right to reimbursement.  
Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals that 
granted summary judgment to Milwaukee County. 
I.  BACKGROUND4 
¶3 
Plaintiffs claim that MCGO § 17.14(7)(ee)(1) (2011) 
impairs their vested contract right to reimbursement of Medicare 
Part B premiums when they retire.5  Accordingly, we must decide 
whether § 17.14(7)(ee)(1) (2011)'s prospective modification of 
the County's obligation to reimburse Medicare Part B premiums at 
retirement for Susan Schwegel, Susan Jaskulski, members of 
Wisconsin Federation and members of County Attorneys who were of 
retirement age, had 15 years of credited service to the County, 
but 
who 
did 
not 
retire 
by 
the 
dates 
established 
in 
§ 17.14(7)(ee)(1) (2011), breached a vested contract right.   
¶4 
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment enjoining the 
application of MCGO § 17.14(7)(ee)(1) (2011) and requiring the 
County to continue to reimburse Medicare Part B premiums for 
affected plaintiffs when they retire and become Medicare-
                                                 
4 The parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts for 
purposes of summary judgment.  Facts employed herein were taken 
from that stipulation. 
5 A vested contractual right is one that cannot be abrogated 
without breaching the contract from which it arises.  See 
Society Ins. v. LIRC, 2010 WI 68, ¶69, 326 Wis. 2d 444, 786 
N.W.2d 385.   
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
4 
 
eligible.  The County moved for summary judgment dismissing the 
plaintiffs' action.   
¶5 
The facts relevant to the parties' cross-motions for 
summary judgment are not in dispute.6  In 1937, the legislature 
instructed counties with populations of 500,000 or more to 
establish retirement systems for their employees.  Ch. 201, Laws 
of 1937. 
¶6 
Effective January 1, 1938, Milwaukee County created 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Employees 
Retirement 
System 
(MCERS) 
pursuant to Chapter 201 of the Laws of 1937.  Although MCERS was 
created by the County, it was then controlled by the State.  The 
Laws of 1945 again addressed the State-controlled MCERS.  Ch. 
138, Laws of 1945.  Those laws provided in relevant part: 
(2) CONTRACTS TO ASSURE BENEFITS.  The benefits 
of members . . . and of beneficiaries of deceased 
members . . . shall be assured by benefit contracts as 
herein provided: 
(a) . . . [E]ach member and beneficiary having 
such a benefit contract shall have a vested right to 
such annuities and other benefits and they shall not 
be diminished or impaired by subsequent legislation or 
by any other means without his consent.   
¶7 
Effective January 1, 1955, Milwaukee County first 
participated in health insurance for its employees.  The County 
did so under Chapter 17 of the Milwaukee County General 
Ordinances.  MCGO § 17.14(8) (1955).  In the years following, 
§ 17.14 was amended many, many times.  We relate only those 
amendments that bear on the dispute before us.  One such 
                                                 
6 See note 4 above. 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
5 
 
amendment 
occurred 
in 
1967, 
when 
Milwaukee 
County 
began 
providing health insurance for retired employees.  § 17.14(7) 
(1967). 
¶8 
In 1965, the legislature granted home rule authority 
over MCERS to Milwaukee County.  Ch. 405, Laws of 1965.7  The 
1965 shift to home rule empowered Milwaukee County "to make any 
changes in such retirement system which hereafter may be deemed 
necessary or desirable for the continued operation of such 
retirement system."  Id. at § 2.  Chapter 405 of the session 
laws also provided that "no such change shall operate to 
diminish or impair the annuities, benefits or other rights of 
any person who is a member of such retirement system prior to 
the effective date of any such change."  Id.   
                                                 
7 Section 2 of Chapter 405, Laws of 1965, provides: 
For the purpose of best protecting the employes 
subject to this act by granting supervisory authority 
over each retirement system created hereunder to the 
governmental unit most involved therewith, it is 
declared to be the legislative policy that the future 
operation of each such retirement system is a matter 
of local affair and government and shall not be 
construed to be a matter of state-wide concern.  Each 
county which is required to establish and maintain a 
retirement system pursuant to this act is hereby 
empowered, by county ordinance, to make any changes in 
such retirement system which hereafter may be deemed 
necessary or desirable for the continued operation of 
such retirement system, but no such change shall 
operate to diminish or impair the annuities, benefits 
or other rights of any person who is a member of such 
retirement system prior to the effective date of any 
such change. 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
6 
 
¶9 
In 1989, the County limited those employees who 
qualify for continuation of health insurance benefits upon 
retirement at County expense:  "The County shall pay the full 
monthly cost of providing such coverage for employes who 
commenced their employment with Milwaukee County prior to 
July 31, 1989."  MCGO § 17.14(7)(a) (1989).  The County also 
limited the continuation of retiree health insurance benefits at 
County expense through a years-of-service requirement:  "[t]he 
provisions of (a) shall apply to retired members of [MCERS] with 
15 or more years of creditable pension service as a County 
employe."  § 17.14(7)(h) (1989).  At the time both individual 
plaintiffs began employment with Milwaukee County, the County's 
retirement health insurance benefits included Medicare Part B 
premium reimbursement for those employees who had met the 
criteria set out in § 17.14(7)(h) (1989).8   
¶10 In 1996, MCGO § 17.14(7)(h) was again amended.  The 
amendment provided:  "The provisions of this subsection are 
                                                 
8 Susan Jaskulski began County employment on June 15, 1989.  
Susan Schwegel began County employment March 19, 1990.  Although 
MCGO 
§ 17.14(7)(h) 
(1989) 
internally 
references 
a 
date 
limitation for continuation of health insurance at County 
expense, by 2011, this start-of-employment limitation was no 
longer present in Chapter 17.  Instead, in 2011, § 17.14(7)(dd) 
(2010), provided the conditions required for continuation of 
health insurance benefits at County expense.  
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
7 
 
considered a part of an employee's vested benefit contract as 
more fully set forth in 201.24(5.91)."9   
¶11 In 
2011, 
an 
amendment 
adding 
language 
to 
MCGO 
§ 17.14(7)(ee)(1) 
(2010) 
restricted 
the 
applicability 
of 
paragraph (ee) that addressed payment of Medicare Part B 
premiums for retired employees.  After the 2011 revision, 
§ 17.14(7)(ee)(1) read:  
The provisions of section (ee) shall not apply to 
members not represented by a collective bargaining 
unit who retired and began receiving benefits from the 
Milwaukee County Employees Retirement System after 
April 1, 2011, nor to members represented by the . . . 
Association of Milwaukee County Attorneys . . . who 
retired 
and 
began 
receiving 
benefits 
from 
the 
Milwaukee County Employees Retirement System after 
December 31, 2011, nor to members represented by the 
Federation of Nurses and Health Professionals who 
retired 
and 
began 
receiving 
benefits 
from 
the 
                                                 
9 Plaintiffs note the reference to "201.24(5.91)" appears to 
have been a drafting error and should have been "201.24(5.10)."  
The County does not dispute plaintiffs' contention; accordingly, 
hereinafter, 
we 
refer 
to 
§ 201.24(5.10), 
rather 
than 
§ 201.24(5.91). 
MCGO § 201.24(5.10) (1996), provided:  "Members who retire 
with sufficient pension service credit as noted in chapter 17 of 
the Code, or the appropriate labor agreement, shall be provided 
with paid health insurance as noted in chapter 17 of the Code, 
however such benefit shall not be funded via the pension fund." 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
8 
 
Milwaukee County Employees Retirement System after 
December 31, 2012.10 
¶12 In 
summary, 
after 
the 
2011 
amendment 
to 
MCGO 
§ 17.14(7)(ee)(1), 
the 
Medicare 
Part 
B 
reimbursement 
modification required that members of County Attorneys had to 
retire on or before December 31, 2011, and members of Wisconsin 
Federation had to retire on or before December 31, 2012, in 
order to secure County reimbursement for Medicare Part B 
premiums upon retirement.   
¶13 Both parties moved for summary judgment.  The circuit 
court granted plaintiffs' motion, concluding that qualifying 
employees have a vested benefit contract requiring Medicare Part 
B premium reimbursement, and the County's refusal to reimburse 
premiums upon those employees' retirements would constitute a 
material breach of their vested rights.  The circuit court noted 
that it relied on Welter v. City of Milwaukee, 214 Wis. 2d 485, 
571 N.W.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1997), and Rehrauer v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 151, 246 Wis. 2d 863, 631 N.W.2d 644, 
which may have conflicted with Loth v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 
WI 129, 315 Wis. 2d 35, 758 N.W.2d 766. 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Federation and the County were parties to a 
collective bargaining agreement covering Wisconsin Federation's 
wages, hours, and conditions of employment, including coverage 
under the County's group health insurance program.  The 
Wisconsin 
Federation-County 
collective 
bargaining 
agreement 
expired December 31, 2012.  County Attorneys and the County were 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement covering County 
Attorneys' wages, hours, and conditions of employment, including 
coverage under the County's group health insurance program.  The 
County Attorneys-County collective bargaining agreement expired 
December 31, 2011. 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
9 
 
¶14 The court of appeals reversed and granted summary 
judgment to Milwaukee County.  Wis. Fed'n of Nurses & Health 
Prof'ls, Local 5001 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2013 WI App 134, ¶16, 
351 Wis. 2d 421, 839 N.W.2d 869.  The court of appeals reasoned 
that it was bound by Loth.  Id., ¶11.  The court of appeals 
agreed with the circuit court "that Loth appears at odds with 
both Welter . . . and Rehrauer . . ., and that Loth discussed 
neither decision."  Id.  The court of appeals, however, declined 
to "discuss or distinguish either Welter or Rehrauer."  Id.  
Rather, applying Loth, the court of appeals concluded that 
employees were merely eligible for vested benefits until they 
had completed all prerequisites, including actually retiring, 
and that the County was not restricted from modifying Medicare 
Part B premium reimbursement until employees' eligibility 
matured into entitlement by employees fulfilling all the 
conditions necessary to receipt of the benefit.11  Id., ¶14.   
¶15 We granted plaintiffs' petition for review and now 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶16 Plaintiffs claim that MCGO § 17.14(7)(ee)(1) (2011), 
which 
prospectively 
modifies 
the 
County's 
obligation 
to 
reimburse 
Medicare 
Part 
B 
premiums 
upon 
retirement 
for 
plaintiffs who were of retirement age, had 15 years of credited 
                                                 
11 The court of appeals did note "It is true, of course, 
that once eligibility matures into entitlement, a benefit may 
not be retroactively modified or eliminated."  Wis. Fed'n, 351 
Wis. 2d 421, ¶14.  The County does not dispute the court of 
appeals' conclusion. 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
10 
 
service to the County, but who had not retired by the dates 
established in § 17.14(7)(ee)(1) (2011), impairs their vested 
contract right to be reimbursed for Medicare Part B premiums 
when they retire.  This contention requires us to focus on 
legislative enactments and County ordinances. 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶17 Plaintiffs claim their vested contract right arises 
from their employment by Milwaukee County.  They rely on laws 
that 
they 
assert 
preclude 
the 
enactment 
of 
MCGO 
§ 17.14(7)(ee)(1) (2011) and on their interpretations of prior 
ordinances, which they claim Milwaukee County was not free to 
amend.  
¶18 The interpretation and application of session laws or 
statutes present questions of law that we independently review, 
while benefitting from previous court discussions.  Spiegelberg 
v. State, 2006 WI 75, ¶8, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641.  
Likewise, construction of an ordinance under undisputed facts is 
a question of law for our independent review.  Browndale Int'l, 
Ltd. v. Bd. of Adjustment for Dane Cnty., 60 Wis. 2d 182, 200, 
208 N.W.2d 121 (1973).  
¶19 The court of appeals granted summary judgment to 
Milwaukee 
County. 
 
When 
we 
review 
summary 
judgment, 
we 
independently apply the same methodology as the court of appeals 
and the circuit court, benefitting from their discussions.  
Loth, 315 Wis. 2d 35, ¶9; Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 
WI 52, ¶14, 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581.   
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
11 
 
¶20 We begin with the complaint to determine whether it 
arguably states a claim; if it does, we then review the answer 
to see whether issues of material fact or law have been joined.  
Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶16, 291 Wis. 2d 
283, 717 N.W.2d 17.  If we conclude that the complaint and 
answer are sufficient to join issue, we examine the moving 
party's affidavits to support the motion and the affidavits that 
oppose the motion.  Id.  Summary judgment is appropriate when 
there are no genuine disputes of material fact.  Admanco, Inc. 
v. 700 Stanton Drive, LLC, 2010 WI 76, ¶28, 326 Wis. 2d 586, 786 
N.W.2d 759.  The parties do not dispute material facts giving 
rise to plaintiffs' claims.12   
B.  Contractual Rights 
¶21 Plaintiffs 
claim 
MCGO 
§ 17.14(7)(ee)(1) 
(2011) 
abrogated a vested contractual right.  Section 17.14(7)(dd) and 
(ee)(1) (2011) are relevant to plaintiffs' claims.  They 
provide: 
(dd) The county shall pay the full monthly cost 
of providing such coverage to retired members of the 
county retirement system with fifteen (15) or more 
years of creditable pension service as a county 
employe. . . . 
(ee) Retired members of the county retirement 
system who are eligible for continuing their health 
insurance 
benefits 
at 
county 
expense 
under 
the 
provision of this section shall be eligible for 
reimbursement of the cost of their Medicare Part B 
premiums, as well as the Medicare Part B premiums of 
their eligible spouse and dependents. 
                                                 
12 See note 4 above. 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
12 
 
(1) The provisions of section (ee) shall not 
apply to members not represented by a collective 
bargaining unit who retired and began receiving 
benefits from the [MCERS] after April 1, 2011, nor to 
members represented by . . . 
the Association of 
Milwaukee County Attorneys . . . who retired and began 
receiving benefits from [MCERS] after December 31, 
2011, nor to members represented by the Federation of 
Nurses and Health Professionals who retired and began 
receiving benefits from [MCERS] after December 31, 
2012.  
The question we must decide is whether earlier versions of 
§ 17.14(7), 
in 
combination 
with 
certain 
session 
laws 
or 
statutes, vested a contractual right to reimbursement of 
Medicare Part B premiums at retirement such that the County was 
not free to modify it prospectively for employees who had not 
yet retired.13   
¶22 Plaintiffs rely on laws and ordinances that apply to 
MCERS; we consider them as well.  We apply rules of statutory 
interpretation to the interpretation of ordinances.  Marris v. 
City of Cedarburg, 176 Wis. 2d 14, 32, 498 N.W.2d 842 (1993).  
"[T]he purpose of statutory [and ordinance] interpretation is to 
determine what the statute [or ordinance] means so that it may 
be given its full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. 
Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  If a statute's [or ordinance's] 
                                                 
13 Although plaintiffs do not allege abrogation of their 
rights because of other modifications of health insurance under 
MCGO § 17.14(7), we note that in 2010, (7)(d) increased the 
amount of employees' part-payment of premiums; (7)(n) increased 
employees' deductibles; (7)(o) increased employees' co-pays for 
office 
visits; 
(7)(q) 
increased 
employees' 
out-of-pocket 
payments; and (7)(r)-(u) increased employees' co-pays for many 
other services such as visits to the emergency room. 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
13 
 
meaning is plain, "we ordinarily stop the inquiry."  Id., ¶45 
(quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 
612 N.W.2d 659).  "Statutory [and ordinance] language is given 
its 
common, 
ordinary, 
and 
accepted 
meaning, 
except 
that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.   
¶23 Plaintiffs contend that their vested contract right 
arises in MCGO § 17.14(7)(h) (1996) that provides:  "The 
provisions of this subsection are considered a part of an 
employee's vested benefit contract as more fully set forth in 
201.24(5.[10])."  Plaintiffs refer to MCGO Chapter 201, which 
contains MCERS, to employ earlier statutory language that 
applies to pension and death benefits addressed in MCGO Chapter 
201, which they now contend applies to health insurance.  
Plaintiffs attempt to engraft the MCGO pension and death benefit 
restrictions onto § 17.14(7) (1996) to prevent the County from 
prospectively modifying health insurance benefits contained in 
§ 17.14(7) (1996).   
¶24 An understanding of the history underlying both MCERS 
and County paid health insurance is helpful in resolving the 
claim plaintiffs propose.  In that regard, we note that Chapter 
201 of the Laws of 1937 is the starting point from which MCERS 
was developed. It provided for the establishment of pension and 
death benefits for county employees in counties with populations 
of 500,000 or more: 
Retirement 
System 
in 
Populous 
Counties; 
Definitions.  In each county having a population of 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
14 
 
five hundred thousand or more a retirement system 
shall be established and maintained for the payment of 
benefits to the employes of such county and to the 
widows and children of such employes, except employes 
who 
are 
contributory 
to, 
participants 
in, 
or 
beneficiaries of a pension fund in operation in the 
state, or any municipal subdivision thereof.  The 
funds of the retirement system shall be derived, 
administered and disbursed in accordance with the 
provisions of this act.   
§ 1, ch. 201, Laws of 1937.  In 1938, in accord with the Laws of 
1937, Chapter 201, Milwaukee County created MCERS, which was 
then controlled by the State. 
¶25 Laws promulgated in 1945, specifically Chapter 138 of 
the Laws of 1945, again addressed the State-controlled MCERS.  
Chapter 138 described retirement annuities and death benefits as 
being "benefit contracts."  Those laws provided in relevant 
part:  
(2) CONTRACTS TO ASSURE BENEFITS.  The benefits 
of members . . . and of beneficiaries of deceased 
members . . . shall be assured by benefit contracts as 
herein provided: 
(a) . . . [E]ach member and beneficiary having 
such a benefit contract shall have a vested right to 
such annuities and other benefits and they shall not 
be diminished or impaired by subsequent legislation or 
by any other means without his consent. 
Ch. 138, Laws of 1945.   
¶26 Plaintiffs rely heavily on the legislative statement 
that in MCERS, members "shall have a vested right to such 
annuities and other benefits and they shall not be diminished or 
impaired by subsequent legislation or by any other means without 
his consent."  Their reliance is misplaced because the quoted 
legislative language of Chapter 138, Laws of 1945 set forth 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
15 
 
above referred solely to pension and death benefits.  The cited 
legislative language could not have referred to health insurance 
because in 1945 Milwaukee County did not pay health insurance 
for its employees or for its retired employees.  Therefore, the 
"vested right" referred to by the legislature in (2)(a) above 
and relied on by plaintiffs referred only to pension and death 
benefits, which Milwaukee County then set out in Chapter 201 
(1945).   
¶27 In Chapter 405 of the Laws of 1965, the legislature 
granted Milwaukee County specific home rule authority over 
MCERS.  It provided in relevant part:  
(2) . . . Each county . . . is hereby empowered, 
by county ordinance, to make any changes in such 
retirement system which hereafter may be deemed 
necessary or desirable for the continued operation of 
such retirement system, but no such change shall 
operate to diminish or impair the annuities, benefits 
or other rights of any person who is a member of such 
retirement system prior to the effective date of any 
such change. 
§ 2, ch. 405, Laws of 1965.  
¶28 Plaintiffs 
rely 
on 
the 
restrictive 
legislative 
language, "no such change shall operate to diminish or impair 
the annuities, benefits or other rights of any person who is a 
member of such retirement system prior to the effective date of 
any such change."  Id.  They contend that although the home rule 
statute granted Milwaukee County authority to change benefits, 
Milwaukee 
County 
could 
not 
eliminate 
or 
reduce 
benefits 
subsequent to an employee's membership in MCERS because of the 
1965 legislative restriction.   
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
16 
 
¶29 However, at the time of the home rule delegation, 
MCERS had nothing to do with health insurance.  MCERS was 
contained solely within MCGO Chapter 201.  The 1967 MCGO that 
set out Milwaukee County's rights and responsibilities under 
home rule powers of MCERS contains not one word about health 
insurance.  MCGO ch. 201 (1967).  Therefore, the statutory 
admonishment that plaintiffs contend prevented Milwaukee County 
from changing its employee health insurance actually had no 
application to health insurance.  Stated otherwise, the home 
rule statute does not support plaintiffs' contention that the 
County violated a vested contract right when reimbursement of 
Medicare Part B premiums for retired employees was prospectively 
eliminated.  
Backing up just a bit in our chronologic 
consideration of ordinances will help further to explain why 
that is so.   
¶30 Effective January 1, 1955, Milwaukee County first 
began to provide health insurance to employees.  MCGO § 17.14(8) 
(1955).  The provision of health insurance was not part of 
MCERS, which was enacted in 1938.  In 1955, MCERS was still 
controlled by the State.  However, Milwaukee County health 
insurance was an independent action by the County, not one 
controlled by the State, and it did not apply to retired 
employees as MCERS did.  Stated otherwise, County health 
insurance was on a totally separate and independent track from 
MCERS.  Health insurance was provided in MCGO Chapter 17, the 
"Classification 
and 
Salary 
Standardization 
Ordinance," 
not 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
17 
 
through the "Milwaukee County Employees Retirement System" 
ordinance, MCGO Chapter 201.   
¶31 Furthermore, as is apparent from the dates, in 1955, 
Milwaukee County independently began providing health insurance 
to its employees before the State granted Milwaukee County home 
rule powers over MCERS in 1965.  In addition, as the County 
points out in its brief, the home rule amendment was "passed 
years before the County had any retiree health insurance 
program."  
¶32 The County's assertion is correct because it was not 
until 1967 that Milwaukee County first began including retired 
employees in its health insurance program.  MCGO § 17.14(7) 
(1967).  Milwaukee County explained that its 1967 ordinance was, 
"To repeal and recreate section 17.14(7) of the General 
Ordinances of Milwaukee County, as amended . . . relating to the 
Blue Cross-Medicare Programs so as to make such programs fully 
paid for both employes and persons on the retirement rolls."   
¶33 Once again, the County's provision of health insurance 
was not part of MCERS, which was set out in MCGO Chapter 201.  
Health insurance, controlled by the County, was on a separate 
and independent track from pension and death benefits addressed 
in MCERS.  Stated otherwise, the State never controlled health 
insurance as it once controlled the pension and death benefits 
found in MCGO Chapter 201; therefore, the home rule amendment 
had no effect on whether the County could alter the terms under 
which it would reimburse working employees for Medicare Part B 
premiums when they retire.  
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
18 
 
¶34 Terms on which Milwaukee County has provided health 
insurance to its employees and retired employees have been 
modified many, many times since 1967.14  As we earlier mentioned, 
plaintiffs 
rely 
heavily 
on 
the 
1996 
amendment 
to 
MCGO 
§ 17.14(7)(h).  We now consider that amendment. 
¶35 The 1996 amendment to MCGO § 17.14(7)(h) provides:  
"The provisions of this subsection are considered a part of an 
employee's vested benefit contract as more fully set forth in 
201.24(5.[10])."  MCGO § 201.24(5.10) (1996) provides: 
Members 
who 
retire 
with 
sufficient 
pension 
service credit as noted in chapter 17 of the Code, or 
the appropriate labor agreement, shall be provided 
with paid health insurance as noted in chapter 17 of 
the Code, however such benefit shall not be funded via 
the pension fund.   
¶36 We are unpersuaded that MCGO § 17.14(7)(h) (1996) 
accords plaintiffs a vested contract right requiring Milwaukee 
County to pay Medicare Part B premiums upon plaintiffs' 
retirement for a number of reasons.   
¶37 First, although MCGO § 201.24(5.10) is part of MCERS, 
it does not cause health insurance to become part of MCERS as 
pension and death benefits are.  Rather, § 201.24(5.10) confirms 
and maintains the separate tracks of MCERS and health insurance 
that they have always had.  Section 201.24(5.10) plainly states 
that health insurance is controlled by MCGO Chapter 17.  It 
explains that health insurance is "as noted in chapter 17 of the 
Code."  Section 201.24(5.10) does not provide that health 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., note 13. 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
19 
 
insurance comes within the restrictions of MCERS, but rather it 
comes within the restrictions of "chapter 17 of the Code."  In 
addition, § 201.24(5.10) affirms that Milwaukee County's funding 
of health insurance will not be an obligation of the MCERS 
pension fund, again separating the provision of health insurance 
from pension and death benefits accorded in MCERS.   
¶38 Second, prior to amending MCGO § 17.14(7)(h) in 1996, 
the director of human resources for Milwaukee County summarized 
the proposed ordinance revisions in a memorandum provided to 
members of the personnel committee.  The summary explained that 
the "revisions related to the provision of health insurance 
after retirement to retirees with 15 or more years of pension 
service credit is being proposed only to clarify the fact that 
the benefit is a vested benefit."  (Emphasis added).  Stated 
otherwise, the revision's reference to "an employee's vested 
benefit contract" related only to retired employees, because 
once employees retired with the requisite years of pension 
service credit, health insurance was a vested benefit for them.    
¶39 Third, the County unilaterally offered to continue to 
reimburse retired employees for Medicare Part B premiums after 
they retire if they:  (1) reached retirement age; (2) provided 
15 or more years of credited county service; and (3) retired 
before the dates established by Milwaukee County in its offer.  
The plaintiffs did not convert this offer into a bilateral 
contract by accepting the County's terms. 
¶40 To explain:  When one party makes a promise to provide 
a benefit and only that party is subject to a legal obligation 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
20 
 
arising from the promise, no bilateral contract is made.  
Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 517 n.6, 319 
N.W.2d 855 (1982).  A bilateral contract arises when the 
promisee accepts the offer by performing the acts requested by 
the promisor.  Loth, 315 Wis. 2d 35, ¶28.   
¶41 As we have explained, "the terms of an employer's 
unilateral offer are important in determining how an employee 
may accept the offer and give rise to a binding contract."  Id., 
¶31.  Stated otherwise, upon an employer's conditional promise 
of a benefit, an employee becomes eligible for the benefit.  The 
eligibility for the benefit vests as a contract right when the 
employee meets all the conditions the employer established to 
confer the benefit.  Id., ¶47.  
¶42 Plaintiffs had an opportunity to receive Medicare Part 
B reimbursement upon retirement, but they chose not to avail 
themselves of that opportunity.  In this regard, we concur with 
the conclusion of the court of appeals that plaintiffs were 
required to take three steps in order to secure the opportunity 
of MCGO § 17.14(7)(dd):  (1) reach retirement age; (2) provide 
15 or more years of credited county service; and (3) retire 
before the dates established by Milwaukee County.  Simply 
stated, plaintiffs were eligible for the benefit they seek; 
however, they chose not to satisfy the necessary conditions to 
cause the opportunity Milwaukee County provided to ripen into a 
vested contract right during the period of time the opportunity 
was available.     
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
21 
 
¶43 Our conclusion in this regard is consistent with our 
opinion in Loth, wherein we held that in order to receive the 
health insurance Loth sought, he had to reach retirement age, 
provide 15 years or more of credited City service, and retire.  
Id., ¶6.   
¶44 Fourth, County payment for health insurance premiums 
is not defined in a fixed way such that a County payment is tied 
to a specified benefit that always will follow.  For example, an 
employee could not understand that the dollar amount of County-
paid premiums will accord the same benefits to employees, or 
retired employees, year after year.  Rather, by their nature, 
health insurance benefits have always been fluid opportunities 
available for a limited period of time, which an employee may 
realize if he or she takes all actions necessary to convert the 
opportunity into an entitlement during the period in which it is 
available.  Id. (explaining that Loth had to meet the conditions 
necessary to obtaining the health insurance plan he sought 
before the plan was amended).  Accordingly, health insurance 
benefits and the premiums necessary to achieve them can be 
changed prospectively, as they have many, many times through the 
health insurance that Milwaukee County has offered to both 
employees and retirees since 1967.   
¶45 Fifth, County health insurance payments are not earned 
in increments as employees continue their employment.  Rather, 
the insurance provides opportunities that the County makes 
available for limited periods of time.  Id.  
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
22 
 
¶46 Plaintiffs have attempted to distinguish Loth by 
arguing that entitlement to retiree reimbursement for Medicare 
Part B premiums vests immediately upon commencing employment in 
three primary ways:  (1) applicability of session laws; (2) 
characterizing health insurance as a vested contract right that 
the County is not free to abrogate; and (3) offering alternative 
theories found in Rehrauer and Welter.  We have addressed the 
effect of the session laws and the nature of the contractual 
opportunity for reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums for 
retirees in regard to plaintiffs' claim.  We now take up 
plaintiffs' remaining argument.  
C.  Welter and Rehrauer 
¶47 Plaintiffs argue that instead of Loth, Welter and 
Rehrauer control.  The court of appeals declined to discuss or 
distinguish these cases, except to agree with the circuit court 
"that Loth appears at odds with both Welter . . . and Rehrauer, 
and that Loth discussed neither decision."  Wis. Fed'n, 351 
Wis. 2d 421, ¶11.  Welter reasoned that statutory provisions 
that created duty disability pension rights for police officers 
vested those pension rights immediately upon an employee's 
membership in the City of Milwaukee's retirement system.  
Welter, 214 Wis. 2d at 488.  Rehrauer concluded that the 
firefighters acquired vested duty disability pension rights that 
were contractually established during the course of their 
employment.  Rehrauer, 246 Wis. 2d 863, ¶1.   
¶48 In 
Welter, 
police 
officers 
eligible 
for 
duty 
disability 
pensions 
claimed 
that 
the 
applicable 
service 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
23 
 
retirement allowance conversion age was the age that was in 
effect when they began employment.  Welter, 214 Wis. 2d at 488.  
They argued that application of a lower conversion age, enacted 
by municipal ordinance after the officers began employment, was 
a breach of the vested contract right to the higher conversion 
age.  Id. at 488.  The court of appeals rejected the City's 
argument that an officer's right to a disability pension does 
not vest until he or she becomes disabled and agreed with the 
police officers.  Id. at 494-95. 
¶49 In Rehrauer, a contract in effect from 1972 to 1977 
established 
lifetime 
duty 
disability 
pensions, 
allowing 
firefighters to avoid an eventual conversion to the lesser 
service retirement allowance.  Rehrauer, 246 Wis. 2d 863, ¶¶2, 3 
n.3.  After that period, duty disability pensions were again 
converted to service retirement allowances.  Id., ¶3 n.3.  
Firefighters hired before the 1972 contract period and beginning 
receipt of duty disability pension after 1977 claimed vested 
rights in the lifetime duty disability pension, which was the 
highest level of pension benefits contractually established at 
any time during the course of plaintiffs' active duty.  Id., 
¶¶2-3 n.3, 5, 7.  The court of appeals held the firefighters 
gained "vested rights in subsequently-negotiated benefits, at 
the highest level contractually established at any time during 
the course of active duty."  Id., ¶11. 
¶50 Before us, plaintiffs characterize Welter and Rehrauer 
as directly supporting the immediate vesting of rights to health 
insurance terms and conditions upon hiring, asserting that they 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
24 
 
involved bilateral contracts founded on statutory language 
substantially identical to chs. 138 and 405 that plaintiffs 
claim is applicable here.  Although we could draw many 
distinctions between plaintiffs' claims and those presented in 
Welter and Rehrauer, it is sufficient to say, as the County has 
argued, that both Welter and Rehrauer are pension cases, rather 
than health insurance cases and the rights asserted in Welter 
and Rehrauer arose from the City of Milwaukee's pension plan, 
not a Milwaukee County health insurance plan.  Stated otherwise, 
neither Welter nor Rehrauer involves health insurance, the 
nature of which as we have explained, is a fluid opportunity for 
a limited period of time.   
¶51 Health insurance, found in MCGO § 17.14 is on a 
separate and independent track from pension rights established 
in MCERS.  As we have detailed above, the laws relied on by 
plaintiffs that arguably could be applicable to MCERS do not 
apply to or affect Milwaukee County's provision of health 
insurance.   
III. CONCLUSION 
¶52 We conclude that Milwaukee County did not abrogate a 
vested contract right when it prospectively modified a health 
insurance benefit it offered for employees who had not yet 
retired.  We further conclude that County employees have a 
vested contract right to Medicare Part B premium reimbursement 
when they fulfill all three criteria for its payment:  (1) 
reaching retirement age; (2) providing 15 or more years of 
credited county service; and (3) retiring before the dates 
No. 
2012AP2490   
 
25 
 
established by Milwaukee County.  Employees who did not meet all 
three criteria have not fulfilled the requirements necessary to 
establish a vested contract right to reimbursement.  Therefore, 
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals that granted 
summary judgment to Milwaukee County. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause remanded to the circuit court to dismiss 
the complaint. 
 
 
No.  2012AP2490.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶53 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  This case is 
more difficult than Loth v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 129, 315 
Wis. 2d 35, 758 N.W.2d 766, and Stoker v. Milwaukee County, 2014 
WI 130, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 857 N.W.2d 102.  Because the result 
here appears to be unfair, I have attempted to find some 
reasonable ground to distinguish this case from Loth and Stoker 
in order to preserve a right——at least for some county 
employees——to receive the promised benefit of Medicare Part B 
premium reimbursement sometime in the future. 
¶54 This good faith effort has failed.  Without resort to 
the surrounding statutes and ordinances, this case is governed 
by Loth.  Turning to those statutes and ordinances, there is a 
disconnect between the language of the statutes and ordinances 
and the reality of the situation.  It is not possible to 
conclude that county employees like Schwegel and Jaskulski have 
vested rights to Medicare Part B premium reimbursement before 
they retire——indeed from the time they were hired——without 
gravely impairing a county government's ability to manage its 
fiscal affairs. 
¶55 In 1945 the legislature approved Chapter 138, Laws of 
1945.  The statement of LEGISLATIVE POLICY in the act reads as 
follows: 
Employes have been attracted to and have remained 
in the public service in counties of more than 500,000 
population despite the prevailing higher wages in 
other employments because of the deferred compensation 
for their services promised to them in the form of 
retirement 
annuities 
and 
death 
benefits 
in 
the 
retirement system to which they have been admitted as 
contributing members.  The purpose of this act is to 
strengthen the public service in the most populous 
No.  2012AP2490.dtp 
 
2 
 
counties of the state by establishing the security of 
such retirement and death benefits. 
¶56 Some of the premises in this statement of policy are 
no longer accurate.  Prevailing wages in other employments are 
not always higher than in county service.  Public employee 
benefits are no longer limited to retirement and death benefits 
and may reach very substantial amounts.  Some more modern 
benefits, like those in question here, might be obtained only 
after 15 or more years of service.  Thus, the protections 
outlined in 1945 may not square with the reality of contemporary 
benefits, as those protections do not fully contemplate modern 
benefit innovations.  As a result, the legislature's policy of 
providing security to public employee benefits——declared some 
seven decades ago——appears to have been greatly complicated and 
undermined by modern developments. 
¶57 What is so frustrating today is that there appears to 
be no middle ground for courts between jeopardizing the public 
fisc by expansive, unreasonable interpretations of outdated 
statutes and permitting counties to break faith with many public 
employees by relying strictly upon technical rules. 
¶58 Years ago, Congress passed the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) to protect private employees who 
participate in pension plans.  Something similar may be 
necessary in Wisconsin so that we can step back from the 
immediacy of the fiscal crises faced by public employers and 
develop a strategy to protect public finances without betraying 
the trust owed to loyal public employees. 
¶59 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶60 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  When the 
plaintiffs in the present case began their employment with 
Milwaukee County, they became members of the Milwaukee County 
Employees' Retirement System (MCERS).1  MCERS is governed by 
Chapter 201 of the Milwaukee County General Ordinances (MCGO). 
¶61 The language of the state session laws and the 
Milwaukee County ordinances governing MCERS assures that County 
employees' right to receive MCERS benefits becomes vested when 
the employees are hired.  "Vested" means the County cannot 
renege on its promises. 
¶62 Since at least 1989, MCGO § 17.14(7)(c) has provided 
certain employees with no-premium-cost coverage under Medicare 
Part B when they retire.2  
¶63 In 1996, MCGO § 17.14(7)(h) was amended to provide 
explicitly that "[t]he provisions of this subsection are 
considered a part of an employee's vested benefit contract as 
more fully set forth in 201.25(5.91) [sic]."3  Section 201.25 is 
part of MCGO ch. 201, which governs MCERS.  
                                                 
1 See § 2(c), ch. 138, Laws of 1945. 
2 The majority opinion explains that provisions in MCGO 
§ 17.14(7) have been renumbered since 1989.  For ease of 
reading, I refer to the numbering used at the time the relevant 
provisions were adopted. 
3 As the majority opinion notes, the reference in MCGO 
§ 17.14(7) to MCGO § 201.24(5.91) appears to be a drafting 
error.  See majority op., ¶10 n.9.  There is no MCGO 
§ 201.24(5.91).  The reference in MCGO § 17.14(7) should be to 
MCGO § 201.24(5.10). 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶64 The "vested benefit contract" referred to in MCGO 
§ 17.14(7)(h) is the MCERS benefit contract that Milwaukee 
County enters with its employees at the time of their initial 
hire. 
¶65 In 2011, the County changed its position and amended 
MCGO § 17.14(7) to provide that certain categories of Milwaukee 
County employees (including the plaintiffs4) will be ineligible 
for reimbursement of their post-retirement Medicare Part B 
premiums upon their retirement in or after 2011 or 2012. 
¶66 The instant case revolves around the parties' dispute 
about the effect and validity of the 2011 amendment.  The issue 
presented is whether County employees who began working for the 
County after it agreed to reimburse employees for their post-
retirement Medicare Part B premiums and before it changed its 
position have the right to reimbursement of their post-
retirement Medicare Part B premiums.  The circuit court decided 
that they do.  I agree. 
¶67 The majority opinion rules that the County need not 
keep its promise to employees. 
¶68 Justice David T. Prosser concurs in the majority 
opinion, stating that a determination that the plaintiffs have a 
vested right to reimbursement of their post-retirement Medicare 
                                                                                                                                                             
MCGO § 201.24(5.10) provides:  "Members who retire with 
sufficient pension service as noted in chapter 17 of the Code, 
or the appropriate labor agreement, shall be provided with paid 
health insurance as noted in chapter 17 of the Code, however 
such benefit shall not be funded via the pension fund." 
4 The plaintiffs were hired by Milwaukee County in 1989 and 
1990. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
3 
 
Part B premiums would "gravely impair[] a county government's 
ability to manage its fiscal affairs."5 
¶69 For the County (or anyone) to pay expenses, including 
employee benefits, is burdensome.  But despite Justice Prosser's 
opining 
without 
any 
financial 
data 
that 
upholding 
the 
plaintiffs' vested right to the benefits at issue in the instant 
case would gravely impair Milwaukee County's ability to manage 
its finances, the fact is that Milwaukee County does not defend 
the disputed 2011 amendment to MCGO § 17.14(7) on the grounds of 
"public 
economic 
emergency,"6 
"great 
public 
calamity,"7 
"extraordinary conditions,"8 or "urgent public need."9  The 
instant case therefore differs from Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 420 (1934), in which the United States 
Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota statute that allowed for the 
                                                 
5 Concurrence, ¶54. 
6 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 
420 (1934). 
7 See id. at 439. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. at 440. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
4 
 
retroactive impairment of mortgage contracts due to "public 
economic emergency."10 
¶70 Milwaukee County does not rely on a Blaisdell defense. 
Rather, Milwaukee County defends the 2011 amendment on the 
grounds that the benefits it affects were not vested.  The 
majority opinion errs in accepting this argument.  It undermines 
the state legislature's recognition of the hardship imposed on 
County employees unless the employees can make retirement plans 
with certainty about the retirement benefits they will receive 
from the County.  To give employees certainty and to avoid 
imposing unnecessary hardship on them are the reasons the state 
legislature vested County employees' retirement benefits in the 
first place.  See § 1, ch. 138, Laws of 1945 ("The purpose of 
this act is to strengthen the public service by establishing the 
security of such retirement and death benefits" (emphasis 
added)). 
                                                 
10 The Blaisdell Court determined that while the Contract 
Clause of the federal constitution generally prohibits states 
from enacting laws that retroactively impair contracts, "the 
prohibition is not an absolute one."  Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 
428.  The Court declared that the police power indisputably 
enables 
states 
to 
interfere 
with 
contracts 
when 
such 
interference is "made necessary by a great public calamity such 
as fire, flood, or earthquake."  Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 439 
(emphasis added).  The Court further declared that "[t]he 
reservation of state power appropriate to such extraordinary 
conditions" 
is 
necessarily 
"a 
part 
of 
all 
contracts."  
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added).  Finally, the Court 
concluded that "if state power exists to give temporary relief 
from the enforcement of contracts in the presence of [natural] 
disasters . . . [then] 
that 
power 
cannot 
be 
said 
to 
be 
nonexistent when the urgent public need demanding such relief is 
produced by [] economic causes."  Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 439-40 
(emphasis added). 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶71 The majority opinion is wrong on the law in three 
primary respects. 
¶72 First, instead of focusing on the state session laws 
and the Milwaukee County ordinances that govern the benefits 
provided 
by 
the 
County's 
retirement 
system 
(including 
reimbursement for retirees' Medicare Part B premiums), the 
majority 
opinion 
digresses 
and 
emphasizes 
an 
unsupported 
distinction 
between 
health 
benefits 
and 
other 
forms 
of 
retirement benefits. 
¶73 The majority opines that the County's retirement 
system and its system of providing health benefits are on two 
completely separate tracks.11  The majority comes to this 
sweeping but unconvincing conclusion without any support in the 
governing state session laws, Milwaukee County ordinances, or 
cases (and ignoring contrary language within them) and without 
the benefit of adversarial briefs or argument.  Milwaukee 
County's argument in the instant case centers on a trilogy of 
cases described in Part III of this opinion. 
¶74 Try as it might, the majority opinion is not credible 
in its attempt at separating reimbursement of Medicare Part B 
premiums from the other benefits provided by MCERS or in its 
attempt at circumventing the text of the governing state session 
laws and Milwaukee County ordinances. 
¶75 Second, the majority opinion disregards the clear 
language of the governing state session laws and Milwaukee 
                                                 
11 See majority op., ¶¶23-37, 44, 45.   
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
6 
 
County ordinances.  The text of these laws and ordinances is 
dispositive of the instant case. 
¶76 The language of the state session laws makes it 
abundantly clear that upon becoming County employees, the 
plaintiffs gained a vested right to the annuities and "all other 
benefits" provided by MCERS.12  This broad language does not 
exclude 
reimbursement 
of 
post-retirement 
Medicare 
Part 
B 
premiums. 
 
The 
Milwaukee 
County 
ordinances 
incorporated 
reimbursement of post-retirement Medicare Part B premiums into 
MCERS. 
¶77 The state session laws and the Milwaukee County 
ordinances say what they mean and mean what they say.  They 
explicitly 
grant 
the 
plaintiffs 
a 
vested 
right 
at 
the 
commencement of their employment to reimbursement at retirement 
of their Medicare Part B premiums. 
¶78 Third, the majority opinion fails to reconcile three 
decisions regarding the vesting of employee benefits that the 
circuit court and the court of appeals found confusing and 
inconsistent: Welter v. City of Milwaukee, 214 Wis. 2d 485, 571 
N.W.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1997); Rehrauer v. City of Milwaukee, 2001 
WI App 151, 246 Wis. 2d 863, 631 N.W.2d 644; and Loth v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2008 WI 129, 315 Wis. 2d 35, 758 N.W.2d 766.13  
                                                 
12 § 2(c), ch. 138, Laws of 1945. 
13 While the majority opinion focuses on distinguishing 
health insurance from pension and death benefits (tackling Loth 
v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 129, 315 Wis. 2d 35, 758 
N.W.2d 766, as a mere afterthought), the County's brief focuses 
primarily on these three employee benefit cases. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶79 A careful reading of the three cases demonstrates that 
each turns on the language of the provisions governing the 
particular employee benefits at issue and that the provisions in 
Loth are significantly different from the provisions in Welter, 
Rehrauer, and the instant case. 
¶80 The language of the laws and ordinances protecting 
reimbursement of the plaintiffs' post-retirement Medicare Part B 
premiums from diminishment by the County in the instant case is 
substantially the same as the language of the state session law 
protecting the employees' disability benefits from diminishment 
by the City in Welter and Rehrauer.  The disability benefits in 
Welter and Rehrauer were part of the City of Milwaukee's 
retirement system and were governed by a state session law and 
City enactments, just as reimbursement of Medicare Part B 
premiums in the instant case is part of the County's retirement 
system and is governed by state session laws and County 
enactments. 
¶81 In contrast, the language of the City of Milwaukee 
enactment governing the employee health benefits at issue in 
Loth is entirely different.  In Loth, the health benefits at 
issue were not governed by state session laws and were not part 
of the City's retirement system; the City enactment at issue in 
Loth made no reference to the City's retirement system or to the 
vesting of benefits. 
¶82 Thus, the Loth opinion and the Loth briefs do not cite 
Welter or Rehrauer because the provisions governing the benefits 
at 
issue 
in 
Loth 
were 
significantly 
different 
from 
the 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
8 
 
provisions governing the benefits at issue in Welter and 
Rehrauer. 
¶83 The state session law at issue in Welter and Rehrauer 
(governing the City's retirement system) is substantially the 
same as the state session laws governing Milwaukee County's 
retirement system in the instant case.  Both Welter and 
Rehrauer, relying on the language of the governing state session 
law, held that the City police officers and firefighters had a 
vested right to the disability benefits at issue that could not 
be diminished by city enactment.  Welter and Rehrauer govern the 
instant case; Loth does not. 
¶84 By declaring that it will not reimburse the post-
retirement Medicare Part B premiums of future retirees, the 
County has, in my opinion, breached the plaintiffs' vested 
benefit contracts in violation of state session laws, Milwaukee 
County ordinances, and case law precedent. 
¶85 Accordingly, I dissent. 
I 
¶86 To reach its desired result, the majority opinion has 
concocted an unsupported distinction between health benefits and 
other forms of retirement benefits provided by MCERS.  It raises 
this alleged distinction sua sponte and addresses it without the 
benefit of briefs or argument by the parties.  It cites no 
authority in the governing state session laws, Milwaukee County 
ordinances, or case law to support its position, and it 
overlooks language in the governing state session laws, the 
Milwaukee County ordinances, and the cases that contradicts its 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
9 
 
position.  Finally, it speaks in overly broad terms that are 
likely to have unanticipated consequences. 
¶87 The majority opinion raises, analyzes, and adopts this 
"discreteness" theory sua sponte, without giving the parties an 
opportunity to participate in the discussion.  When a court 
raises an issue sua sponte, "fairness requires that the parties 
have the opportunity to develop the relevant facts and to 
present legal arguments on the issue."14  The majority apparently 
sees no reason to provide such an opportunity in the instant 
case. 
¶88 Thus, once again, I write to decry the court's failure 
to give counsel the opportunity to represent their clients 
before this court.  The majority's position shows disrespect for 
the litigants and counsel. 
¶89 I recognize that some justices prefer to reach 
decisions without the benefit of arguments or briefs by the 
parties and apparently perceive that the rule of law is advanced 
by the court's sua sponte approach.  I do not.  I prefer greater 
restraint by the court and greater respect for litigants and 
their counsel.  As I have stated in the past: 
[T]he rule of law is generally best developed when 
matters are tested by the fire of adversarial briefs 
and oral argument.   
. . . . 
Indeed, a court's sua sponte determination of an issue 
may raise due process considerations: A court may 
                                                 
14 Hydrite Chem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 220 
Wis. 2d 26, 49, 582 N.W.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1998) (Roggensack, J., 
dissenting). 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
10 
 
be depriving parties of their right to a meaningful 
appeal, to due process notice, and to adversary 
counsel.15 
¶90 I agree with Justice Ann Walsh Bradley that this 
court's role is to weigh the arguments of counsel, not to make 
arguments as counsel: 
By 
raising 
sua 
sponte 
a 
brand 
new 
outcome-
determinative issue, an appellate court tends to blur 
the lines between the role of the lawyer as advocate 
and the role of the judge as impartial decision maker. 
In contrast to the other branches of government, the 
judicial branch's role seems better fitted to respond 
to issues presented rather than creating issues to 
present.16 
                                                 
15 Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶¶119-121, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 
682 N.W.2d 866 (Abrahamson, C.J. & Crooks, J., concurring), 
overruled on other grounds by Bartholomew v. Wis. Patients Comp. 
Fund, 2006 WI 91, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216.  In Maurin, 
Justice Crooks and I criticized the majority opinion for 
deciding the case on the basis of a "novel interpretation of the 
statutes" without first requesting supplemental briefs or 
reargument.  Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶120 (Abrahamson, C.J., & 
Crooks, J., concurring).  Our concurrence stated:  "We are at a 
loss to understand why the majority refuses to call for 
additional briefs."  Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶121 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., & Crooks, J., concurring). 
16 Attorney's Title Guar. Fund, Inc. v. Town Bank, 2014 WI 
63, 
¶56, 
355 
Wis. 2d 229, 
850 
N.W.2d 28 
(Bradley, 
J., 
dissenting). 
See also Bartus v. DHSS, 176 Wis. 2d 1063, 1073, 501 
N.W.2d 419 (1993) ("We therefore urge the courts to exercise 
caution when determining an issue sua sponte without the 
assistance of supplemental briefs and to ask for briefs unless 
the matter is quite clear."); Cemetery Servs., Inc. v. Wis. 
Dep't of Regulation & Licensing, 221 Wis. 2d 817, 831, 586 
N.W.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1998) ("We cannot serve as both advocate 
and court.  For this reason, we generally choose not to decide 
issues that are not adequately developed by the parties in their 
briefs.").  Accord Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006) 
("Of course, before acting on its own initiative, a court must 
accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present 
their positions."). 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶91 The 
majority 
opinion's 
sua 
sponte 
approach 
is 
especially galling considering the lack of support for the 
distinction the majority opinion draws within MCERS between 
health insurance and pension and death benefits. 
¶92 The infirmity of the majority opinion's distinction is 
readily 
apparent 
in 
the 
many 
gratuitous, 
hollow-sounding 
comments it offers without any citation or explanation of their 
relevance to the parties' dispute.  See, e.g., majority op., ¶44 
("County payment for health insurance premiums is not defined in 
a fixed way such that a County payment is tied to a specified 
benefit that always will follow. . . . [B]y their nature, health 
insurance 
benefits 
have 
always 
been 
fluid 
opportunities 
available for a limited period of time . . . ."); majority op., 
¶45 
("[H]ealth 
insurance 
payments 
are 
not 
earned 
in 
increments . . . ."); 
majority 
op., 
¶50 
("[P]ension 
cases 
[differ from cases involving] health insurance, the nature of 
which . . . is a fluid opportunity for a limited period of 
time."). 
¶93 The majority 
opinion's detour from the parties' 
arguments distorts the text of the 1996 amendment to MCGO 
§ 17.14(7)(h) and the language of § 2, ch. 138, Laws of 1945, 
one of the state session laws governing the County's retirement 
system. 
¶94 The 1996 amendment contradicts the majority opinion's 
assertion that health insurance for Milwaukee County employees 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
12 
 
has been "on a separate and independent track from pension and 
death benefits . . . ."17 
¶95 Both before and after the 1996 amendment, MCGO 
§ 17.14(7)(h) provided that the "County shall pay the full 
monthly cost of providing such coverage to retired members of 
the County Retirement System with 15 or more years of creditable 
pension service as a County employee . . . ."   
¶96 The text added to MCGO § 17.14(7)(h) by the 1996 
amendment, 
which 
remains 
in 
the 
current 
version 
of 
the 
ordinance, reads as follows: "The provisions of this subsection 
are considered a part of an employee's vested benefit contract 
as more fully set forth in 201.24(5.91) [sic]."18 
¶97 The "vested benefit contract" to which the 1996 
amendment refers is the vested benefit contract the County must 
enter with each employee when the employee is hired.  See § 2, 
ch. 138, Laws of 1945.  These contracts assure County employees 
a vested right to all benefits provided by MCERS at the 
employees' time of hire, rather than at the time of the 
employees' retirement.19 
¶98 Thus, 
the 
1996 
amendment 
expressly 
puts 
health 
insurance and pension and death benefits on the same track by 
explicitly stating that the health insurance provided by MCGO 
§ 17.14(7) is part of the "vested benefit contract" MCERS 
members enter at the commencement of their employment with the 
                                                 
17 Majority op., ¶33. 
18 MCGO § 17.14(7)(h) (1996) (emphasis added).   
19 § 2(c), ch. 138, Laws of 1945. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
13 
 
County.20  MCGO § 17.14(7)(h) affirms that the particular health 
benefit at issue in the instant case comes within the 
restrictions of MCERS.  The majority opinion's conclusion at ¶37 
that the 1996 amendment means that health insurance is part of 
MCERS but not subject to the restrictions imposed on MCERS is 
specious. 
¶99 The director of human resources' summary of the 1996 
amendment (cited in ¶38 of the majority opinion to support its 
position) states: 
The revisions related to the provisions of health 
insurance after retirement to retirees with 15 or more 
years of pension service credit is being proposed only 
to clarify the fact that the benefit is a vested 
benefit.      
¶100 The majority opinion emphasizes the word "retirees" 
and misinterprets the sentence to give employees vested rights 
to the health benefits at issue only at retirement.  Read 
rationally in the context of MCGO § 17.14(7)(h) and in the 
broader context of MCERS, the 1996 amendment and the director's 
comment can mean only one thing for the plaintiffs: They gained 
a vested right to reimbursement of their post-retirement 
Medicare Part B premiums when they began their employment; to 
take advantage of this benefit, they must meet the enumerated 
prerequisites at retirement. 
¶101 The majority opinion also garbles the language of 
§ 2(c), ch. 138, Laws of 1945.  This state session law, which 
governs MCERS, explicitly states that future MCERS members 
                                                 
20 MCGO § 17.14(7)(h) (1996). 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
14 
 
"shall have a . . . vested right in the annuities and all other 
benefits . . . as provided in the law under which [MCERS] was 
established as such law shall have been amended and be in effect 
at the date of commencement of his [or her] membership."21 
¶102 The broad and inclusive reference in Chapter 138, Laws 
of 1945, to "all other benefits" and the broad language in 
Chapter 138 acknowledging that the benefits provided by MCERS 
will change over time demonstrate clearly that the benefits 
provided by MCERS can include newly adopted health benefits.  
The majority opinion's contrary conclusion at ¶26 is unsupported 
by the governing state session laws.22 
¶103 In 2011, MCGO § 17.14(7) was again amended.  The 
instant case revolves around the parties' dispute about the 
effect and validity of this 2011 amendment.  The 2011 amendment 
states, among other things, that certain categories of County 
employees (including the plaintiffs) will be ineligible for 
reimbursement of their post-retirement Medicare Part B premiums 
upon their retirement in or after 2011 or 2012. 
¶104 The majority opinion upholds the 2011 amendment 
without a convincing analysis of the applicable state session 
laws 
and 
the 
Milwaukee 
County 
ordinances 
protecting 
the 
plaintiffs. 
                                                 
21 § 2(c), ch. 138, Laws of 1945 (emphasis added). 
22 See also ch. 405, Laws of 1965, granting Milwaukee County 
home rule and empowering it to make changes to the retirement 
system "by county ordinance" so long as no change "diminish[es] 
or impair[s] the annuities, benefits or other rights of any 
person who is a member of such retirement system prior to the 
effective date of such change."   
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶105 Finally, reimbursement of qualified retirees' Medicare 
Part B premiums is not the only health benefit granted by 
Milwaukee County to retirees.  The majority opinion is broadly 
written.  Such a broad opinion is apt to have unanticipated 
ramifications. 
¶106 In 
sum, 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
attempt 
at 
distinguishing health benefits at retirement from other kinds of 
benefits at retirement falls flat.  The majority opinion's 
failure to give the parties an opportunity to address this 
alleged distinction, the lack of support for its position in the 
governing state session laws and Milwaukee County ordinances, 
its failure to acknowledge contradictory language in those laws 
and ordinances, and its sweeping characterization of health 
insurance as separate and distinct from MCERS render the 
majority opinion wholly unconvincing. 
II 
¶107 The 
majority 
opinion's 
disregard 
for 
the 
clear 
language of the governing state session laws and Milwaukee 
County 
ordinances 
extends 
beyond 
its 
discussion 
of 
the 
supposedly inherent difference between health insurance and 
pension and death benefits.  The laws and ordinances governing 
reimbursement for retired County employees' Medicare Part B 
premiums are in fact dispositive of the instant case. 
¶108 The governing state session laws and the Milwaukee 
County ordinances make it abundantly clear that upon joining the 
County's retirement system, the plaintiffs gained a vested right 
to reimbursement of their post-retirement Medicare Part B 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
16 
 
premiums.  Further, under the clear language of the laws and 
ordinances, Milwaukee County may change MCERS so long as no 
change diminishes or impairs the vested rights of MCERS members. 
¶109 The 2011 Milwaukee County ordinance amendment at issue 
in the instant case states, among other things, that certain 
categories of County employees (including the plaintiffs) will 
be 
ineligible 
for 
reimbursement 
of 
their 
post-retirement 
Medicare Part B premiums upon their retirement in or after 2011 
or 2012.  The 2011 amendment diminishes or impairs the vested 
rights of then active MCERS members (including the plaintiffs) 
and is therefore invalid as applied to them.  
¶110 The texts of the governing state session laws and 
Milwaukee County ordinances are dispositive.  I first summarize 
the state session laws and Milwaukee County ordinances in 
chronological order and then discuss them more fully.  The 
Milwaukee 
County 
ordinances 
govern 
MCERS 
and 
have 
made 
reimbursement of Medicare Part B premiums part of MCERS (see E, 
below), but the ordinances must comport with the state session 
laws 
dating 
back 
to 
1937 
that 
protect 
Milwaukee 
County 
employees' vested contract rights (see A-D, below). 
A. Chapter 201, Laws of 1937, required Milwaukee County 
to develop a retirement system for its employees.  
Pursuant to this law, Milwaukee County created 
MCERS.23 
                                                 
23 Stoker v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2014 WI 130, 
¶5, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, 857 N.W.2d 102. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
17 
 
B. Chapter 
138, 
Laws 
of 
1945, 
declared 
that 
the 
legislative policy underlying MCERS is to recruit and 
retain County employees by establishing the security 
of their retirement and death benefits.24  "[T]he 
legislature required employee benefits under MCERS to 
'be assured by benefit contracts.'"25  Chapter 138 
also provided that at the commencement of their 
employment with the County, County employees become 
members of MCERS and have a "vested right in the 
annuities and all other benefits . . . [provided by] 
the law under which [MCERS] was established as such 
law shall have been amended and be in effect at the 
date of commencement of [their] membership [in 
MCERS]."26 
C. Chapter 326, Laws of 1957, provided that "a member of 
MCERS has a 'vested right . . . to all increases in 
benefits covered by amendments subsequent to the date 
his [or her] membership [in MCERS] is effective.'"27 
D. Chapter 405, Laws of 1965, granted "home rule" 
authority to Milwaukee County over MCERS and provided 
that "the future operation of each [county] benefit 
fund 
is 
a 
matter 
of 
local 
affair 
and 
                                                 
24 See id., ¶5 n.7. 
25 Id., ¶5 (quoting and citing ch. 138, Laws of 1945). 
26 Id. (quoting and citing ch. 138, Laws of 1945). 
27 Id., ¶6 (quoting and citing § 6, ch. 326, Laws of 1957). 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
18 
 
government . . . ."  It also "empowered Milwaukee 
County 'to make any changes in [its employee] benefit 
fund which hereafter may be deemed necessary or 
desirable for the continued operation of [MCERS]," 
but limited the County's authority by providing that 
"no such change shall operate to diminish or impair 
the annuities, benefits or other rights of any person 
who is a member of [MCERS] prior to the effective 
date of any such change."28 
E. MCERS 
is 
also 
governed 
by 
Milwaukee 
County 
ordinances.  As I discussed previously, the 1996 
amendment 
to 
MCGO 
§ 17.14(7)(h) 
incorporated 
reimbursement of the premium costs of Medicare Part B 
into MCERS by clarifying that such health benefits 
are "part of an employee's vested benefit contract."  
As part of MCERS, the benefits provided by MCGO 
§ 17.14(7)(c) and (h) are subject to the vesting 
provision in Chapter 138, Laws of 1945; Chapter 326, 
Laws of 1957; and the home rule limiting provision in 
Chapter 405, Laws of 1965. 
A 
¶111 Chapter 201, Laws of 1937, required Milwaukee County 
to develop a retirement system for its employees for payment of 
benefits.  Pursuant to this law, Milwaukee County created the 
Milwaukee County Employees' Retirement System (MCERS).29 
                                                 
28 Id., ¶7 (quoting and citing § 6, ch. 405, Laws of 1965). 
29 See id., ¶5.   
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
19 
 
B 
¶112 I turn to the vesting provisions in Chapter 138, Laws 
of 1945.  This state session law provides that Milwaukee County 
employees become members of MCERS at the commencement of their 
employment with the County and gain a vested right at that time 
in "the annuities and all other benefits . . . as provided in 
the law under which [MCERS] was established as such law shall 
have been amended and be in effect at the date of commencement 
of [their] membership [in MCERS]."30 
¶113 The most important aspects of Chapter 138, Laws of 
1945, for the instant case are its use of the phrase "vested 
rights" and its recognition that MCERS will change over time 
with future benefits inuring to employees. 
¶114 The phrase "vested rights" has a common usage in the 
law; it is a technical legal phrase.  Under the general rules of 
statutory interpretation adopted by the legislature, the phrase 
is interpreted in conformance with its common usage (here, in 
                                                                                                                                                             
The relevant text of Chapter 201 is as follows: 
In each county having a population of five hundred 
thousand 
or 
more 
a 
retirement 
system 
shall 
be 
established and maintained for the payment of benefits 
to the employes of such county and to the widows and 
children of such employes . . . . The funds of the 
retirement system shall be derived, administered and 
disbursed in accordance with the provisions of this 
act. 
30 Stoker, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶5 (quoting and citing ch. 138, 
Laws of 1945).  See also id., ¶22. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
20 
 
the law) and is given its technical legal meaning.31  The 
majority opinion offers a legal meaning, stating that "[a] 
vested contractual right is one that cannot be abrogated without 
breaching the contract from which it arises."32  The majority 
opinion fails, however, to apply the definition it provides.   
¶115 Despite the clear language in Chapter 138 providing 
the plaintiffs with a vested right to the benefits provided by 
MCERS at the commencement of their employment, the majority 
opinion concludes that the plaintiffs' right to reimbursement of 
their post-retirement Medicare Part B premiums never vested. 
¶116 The relevant text of Chapter 138, Laws of 1945, is as 
follows (emphasis added): 
(2) CONTRACTS TO ASSURE BENEFITS.  The benefits of 
members, whether employes in service or retired as 
beneficiaries, 
and 
of 
beneficiaries 
of 
deceased 
members in the retirement system created by ch. 201, 
Laws of 1937, as amended, shall be assured by benefit 
contracts as herein provided: 
                                                 
31 See Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) (2011-12) ("All words and 
phrases shall be construed according to common and approved 
usage; but technical words and phrases and others that have a 
peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed according to such 
meaning.").  All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes 
are to the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.  See also 
Volvo Trucks N. Am. v. DOT, 2010 WI 15, ¶36, 323 Wis. 2d 294, 
779 N.W.2d 423 ("Technical words or phrases in a statute should 
be given their technical or specialized meaning."). 
32 See majority op., ¶3, n.5.  According to Black's Law 
Dictionary, a vested right is also one that is "complete and 
consummated, and of such character that it cannot be divested 
without the consent of the person to whom it belongs."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 1564 (6th ed. 1990).  The 1999 edition of Black's 
Law Dictionary defines vested as "a completed, consummated right 
for present or future enjoyment; not contingent, unconditional; 
absolute." 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
21 
 
(a) . . . The 
annuities 
and 
all 
other 
benefits . . . shall be obligations of such benefit 
contract on the part of the county . . . and each 
member and beneficiary having such a benefit contract 
shall have a vested right to such annuities and other 
benefits and they shall not be diminished or impaired 
by subsequent legislation or by any other means 
without his [or her] consent. 
. . . . 
(c) Every future entrant who shall become a member of 
this retirement system after the effective date of 
this act shall have a similar benefit contract and 
vested 
right 
in 
the 
annuities 
and 
all 
other 
benefits . . . as provided in the law under which the 
retirement system was established as such law shall 
have been amended and be in effect at the date of 
commencement of his [or her] membership. 
C 
¶117 In 1957, the legislature again affirmed Milwaukee 
County employees' vested right to MCERS benefits.  Chapter 326, 
Laws of 1957, provides that a member of MCERS has a "vested 
right . . . to all increases in benefits covered by amendments 
subsequent to the date his [or her] membership [in MCERS] is 
effective."33 
D 
¶118 Chapter 
405, 
Laws 
of 
1965, 
grants 
"home 
rule" 
authority to Milwaukee County over MCERS and empowers Milwaukee 
County "to make any changes [by county ordinances] in [its 
employee] benefit fund which hereafter may be deemed necessary 
or desirable for the continued operation of [MCERS]."  Chapter 
405 of the 1965 Laws limits this grant of home rule authority by 
                                                 
33 Stoker, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶6 (quoting and citing § 6, ch. 
326, Laws of 1957).  See also id., ¶22. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
22 
 
providing that "no such change shall operate to diminish or 
impair the annuities, benefits or other rights of any person who 
is a member of [MCERS] prior to the effective date of any such 
change."34 
¶119 In other words, Milwaukee County has authority to 
reduce the benefits provided to future employees but not to 
reduce the vested benefits of persons in the County's employ 
prior to the effective date of the reduction.  This court held 
in Stoker v. Milwaukee County, 2014 WI 130, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 857 
N.W.2d 102, that the limit on Milwaukee County's home rule 
authority allows it to reduce a benefit that has not vested but 
does not allow the County to reduce a benefit that has vested.35 
¶120 The relevant text of Chapter 405, Laws of 1965, is as 
follows: 
Each county which is required to establish and 
maintain a benefit fund pursuant to this act is hereby 
empowered by county ordinance, to make any changes in 
such benefit fund which hereafter may be deemed 
necessary or desirable for the continued operation of 
such benefit fund, but no such change shall operate to 
diminish or impair the annuities, benefits or other 
rights of any person who is a member of such benefit 
fund prior to the effective date of any such change.36 
E 
                                                 
34 Stoker, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶7 (quoting and citing § 6, ch. 
405, Laws of 1965).  See also id., ¶22. 
35 Id., ¶¶24, 25, 27, 28, 29. 
36 § 1, ch. 405, Laws of 1965 (emphasis added). 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
23 
 
¶121 In addition to the aforementioned state session laws, 
Milwaukee County ordinances govern MCERS.37 
¶122 The significant ordinance is MCGO § 17.14(7).  As I 
explained previously, in 1996, MCGO § 17.14(7)(h) was amended to 
clarify that the health benefits provided by subsection (7) 
(including MCGO § 17.14(7)(c) governing reimbursement of post-
retirement Medicare Part B premiums) are part of the "vested 
benefit contract" MCERS members enter upon commencing their 
employment with the County, "as more fully set forth in 
201.25(5.91) [sic]." 
¶123 In sum, the laws and ordinances at issue in the 
present case could not be clearer: The plaintiffs' right to 
reimbursement of their post-retirement Medicare Part B premiums 
vested at the commencement of their employment with the County.  
Chapter 138, Laws of 1945, and Chapter 405, Laws of 1965, 
prohibit Milwaukee County from diminishing or impairing vested 
rights.  Yet the 2011 amendment to MCGO § 17.14(7) does just 
that.  Consequently, the 2011 amendment breached the plaintiffs' 
vested benefit contracts, violated the governing laws and 
ordinances, and is invalid. 
¶124 As in Stoker, the majority opinion in the instant case 
is able to reach its conclusion that no breach of contract or 
violation of law exists only "by repeatedly ignoring the 
language of the governing session laws."38 
                                                 
37 See Stoker, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶8, 10, 11, 12 (discussing 
Milwaukee County ordinances relating to MCERS). 
38 Stoker, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶48 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
24 
 
III 
¶125 The third significant legal error in the majority 
opinion is its failure to reconcile three precedential opinions 
regarding the vesting of employee benefits.  The circuit court 
and the court of appeals characterized the following three 
opinions as confusing and inconsistent: Loth v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2008 WI 129, 315 Wis. 2d 35, 758 N.W.2d 766; Welter 
v. City of Milwaukee, 214 Wis. 2d 485, 571 N.W.2d 459 (Ct. App. 
1997); and Rehrauer v. City of Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 151, 246 
Wis. 2d 863, 631 N.W.2d 644. 
¶126 The County's position and argument in this court 
revolve around these three cases. 
¶127 A careful examination of this trilogy demonstrates 
that the three opinions are consistent with each other, support 
the position I espouse, and govern the instant case.   
¶128 The majority opinion claims it is following Loth, but 
it is in fact inconsistent with Loth.  The majority opinion is 
also inconsistent with Welter and Rehrauer.  The majority 
opinion in the instant case errs when it concludes that the 
plaintiffs' rights under MCGO § 17.14(7) do not vest until the 
plaintiffs reach retirement age, provide 15 years or more of 
credited County service, and retire.39 
¶129 I begin by examining Loth, the only case the majority 
views as controlling.  Loth is instructive and supports my 
position. 
                                                 
39 See majority op., ¶¶42-43. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
25 
 
¶130 Loth turns on the language of a City of Milwaukee 
resolution that governs the particular employee health benefits 
at issue in that case.  Loth correctly insists that "the terms 
of an employer's . . . offer are important in determining how an 
employee may accept the offer and give rise to a binding 
contract."40 
¶131 In Loth, a city resolution extended paid retiree 
health insurance coverage to employees who fulfilled enumerated 
prerequisites.  The City never incorporated its retiree health 
insurance program into vested benefit contracts or otherwise 
indicated at any time or in any other way during Loth's 
employment that he had a contractual (let alone vested) right to 
paid 
retiree 
health 
insurance 
before 
he 
fulfilled 
the 
prerequisites set forth in the resolution. 
¶132 The Loth court interpreted the City resolution as 
dictating that the City's offer of paid retiree health insurance 
could be accepted only by an employee's retiring at the 
appropriate age with the requisite years of service.  The court 
stated:  "The City and Loth never formed a contract obligating 
the City to provide Loth with no-premium-cost retirement health 
insurance benefits before Loth retired."41 
¶133 The majority opinion proclaims its consistency with 
Loth and concludes that because the plaintiffs in the instant 
case had not retired at the time of the 2011 amendment to MCGO 
                                                 
40 Loth v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 129, ¶31, 315 
Wis. 2d 64, 758 N.W.2d 766. 
41 Id., ¶43. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
26 
 
§ 17.14(7), the County's offer to reimburse the plaintiffs' 
post-retirement Medicare Part B premiums could still be revoked 
(as the offer of paid retiree health insurance was in Loth).42 
¶134 The majority opinion overlooks the differences between 
Loth and the instant case and misreads Loth.  Loth turns on the 
specific language used by the City employer to offer the 
particular health benefits at issue in that case.  Loth 
correctly insists that "the terms of an employer's . . . offer 
are important in determining how an employee may accept the 
offer and give rise to a binding contract."43 
¶135 Loth is relevant to the instant case, but not because 
it involves health benefits and not because the employee in Loth 
was 
required 
to 
fulfill 
enumerated 
prerequisites 
before 
receiving those health benefits at retirement.  Rather, Loth is 
relevant because of the contrast between the language used by 
the City to offer the benefits at issue in that case and the 
language used by the County to offer the benefits at issue in 
the instant case. 
¶136 In 
the 
instant 
case, 
Milwaukee 
County 
offered 
employment to the plaintiffs according to the terms set forth in 
the state session laws and the Milwaukee County ordinances 
governing MCERS.  As I explained previously, these laws and 
ordinances provide that by accepting County employment, the 
plaintiffs enter into a vested benefit contract with the County.  
In the instant case, unlike in Loth, a binding bilateral 
                                                 
42 Majority op., ¶¶42-43. 
43 Loth, 315 Wis. 2d 64, ¶31. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
27 
 
agreement was created when the plaintiffs were hired by the 
County. 
¶137 I turn to the other two cases in the trilogy: Welter 
and Rehrauer.  These opinions of the court of appeals have 
statewide precedential effect under Wis. Stat. § 752.41(2), 
which provides that "[o]fficially published opinions of the 
court of appeals shall have statewide precedential effect."  
These two opinions played no role in the Loth case.  They were 
not cited or argued and are not referenced in the Loth decision. 
¶138 In Welter,44 the court of appeals considered a state 
session law and provisions of Chapter 36 of the Milwaukee City 
Charter relating to the City of Milwaukee Employees' Retirement 
System.  The issue presented was whether City police officers 
were entitled to the disability benefits provided by the City's 
retirement system when they were hired, that is, whether their 
right to post-retirement disability benefits vested at hire or 
could be reduced by the City prior to the police officers' 
retiring.45 
¶139 The language of the governing state session law, 
Chapter 441, Laws of 1947, is substantially similar to the 
                                                 
44 For additional discussion of Welter v. City of Milwaukee, 
214 Wis. 2d 485, 489, n.2, 13 N.W.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1997), see 
Justice Bradley's dissent in Stoker, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶51-52, 
61. 
45 The precise benefit at issue in Welter was the police 
officers' right to the conversion age in effect when they were 
hired.  The conversion age is the age at which a disabled police 
officer's 
retirement 
allowance 
is 
reduced 
from 
the 
more 
favorable Duty Disability Retirement Allowance level to the less 
favorable Service Retirement Allowance level. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
28 
 
language of the state session laws at issue in the instant case.  
Chapter 441, Laws of 1947 provides: 
Every such member . . . shall thereby have a benefit 
contract in said retirement system of which he [or 
she] is such member or beneficiary as of the effective 
date of this act . . . . Each member and beneficiary 
having such a [retirement system] benefit contract 
shall have a vested right to such annuities and other 
benefits and they shall not be diminished or impaired 
by subsequent legislation or by other means without 
[the officer's] consent. . . . Every future entrant 
who shall become a member of this retirement system 
after the effective date of this act shall have a 
similar benefit contract and vested right in the 
annuities and all other benefits . . . .46 
¶140 After considering the text of Chapter 441, Laws of 
1947, the court of appeals in Welter determined that the 
disability benefits at issue vested when the plaintiff police 
officers became employees.  Thus, the City could not amend 
Chapter 36 of the Milwaukee City Charter to deprive the police 
officers of those vested benefits. 
¶141 The Welter court reasoned that the language of the 
governing state session law "[is] not ambiguous; [its] meaning 
is plain."47  The same can be said of the state session laws 
governing the instant case.  The Welter court went on to say: 
"Under [Chapter 441], retirement-plan benefits in effect when a 
Milwaukee police officer becomes a member of the retirement 
system are vested as to that officer unless the officer agrees 
to a change."48 
                                                 
46 See Welter, 214 Wis. 2d at 489 n.2 (emphasis added). 
47 Id. at 491. 
48 Id. 
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¶142 The court of appeals rejected the City's argument that 
the employees' right to the disability benefits at issue vested 
at some later date, stating that "[t]his argument . . . ignores 
the legislative command that the critical date is not that of 
the duty-related disability but the date the officer becomes a 
member of the retirement system——the date he or she was first 
employed by the City as a police officer."49 
¶143 Rehrauer, involving disability benefits for City of 
Milwaukee firefighters,50 presented substantially similar issues 
as Welter.  As in Welter, the benefits at issue were post-
retirement disability benefits.  As in Welter, the beneficiaries 
were City of Milwaukee employees.  The same state session law 
(Chapter 441, Laws of 1947) and the same chapter of the 
Milwaukee City Charter (Chapter 36) governed the benefits at 
issue in Rehrauer as in Welter.  The Rehrauer court concluded, 
as did the Welter court, that the City employees' benefits 
vested at the date of hire. 
¶144 The terms of employment in the instant case are set 
forth in the state session laws and Milwaukee County ordinances 
discussed above, just as the terms of employment in Welter and 
Rehrauer were set forth in the state session law and City 
Charter provisions at issue in those cases.  The language of the 
state session law at issue in Welter and Rehrauer is in all 
                                                 
49 Id. at 494-95. 
50 The precise benefit at issue in Rehrauer was the 
firefighters' right to receive the Duty Disability Retirement 
Allowance for life rather than for a limited time. 
No. 2012AP2490.ssa 
 
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material respects the same as the language of the state session 
laws governing the instant case. 
¶145 Welter and Rehrauer are directly on point and should 
guide this court's decision in the instant case.  The majority 
opinion is dismissive of Welter and Rehrauer, characterizing 
them as disability pension cases and the instant case and Loth 
as health benefit cases.  Without further explanation or 
citation to any authority, the majority opinion simply asserts 
that pension benefits are a different type of benefit than 
health insurance, which is "a fluid opportunity for a limited 
period of time."51 
¶146 Contrary to the majority opinion's assertion, health 
insurance, like a pension, can be a retirement benefit.  The 
instant case is not a Loth case; it is a Welter/Rehrauer case.  
Unlike in Loth, Milwaukee County's offer to reimburse its 
employees' post-retirement Medicare Part B premiums in the 
instant case was not a unilateral offer.  Unlike in Loth, the 
benefits at issue in the instant case are part of the County's 
retirement system.  
¶147 Of course, the plaintiffs could not receive post-
retirement benefits upon commencing their employment with the 
County.  They first had to retire, complying with any enumerated 
prerequisites.  But not immediately receiving post-retirement 
benefits 
simply 
does 
not 
mean 
the 
plaintiffs' 
right 
to 
reimbursement of their post-retirement Medicare Part B premiums 
                                                 
51 Majority op., ¶50. 
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did not vest when they commenced their employment with the 
County. 
¶148 In sum, the majority opinion is unpersuasive in its 
attempt at circumventing the language of the governing state 
session laws and the Milwaukee County ordinances.  That language 
is clear:  The plaintiffs have a vested right to reimbursement 
of their post-retirement Medicare Part B premiums.  The 2011 
amendment to MCGO § 17.14(7) constituted a breach of the 
plaintiffs' vested benefit contracts and a violation of the 
governing state session laws and Milwaukee County ordinances.  
The circuit court properly granted the plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment, and the court of appeals decision reversing 
the circuit court's order should be reversed. 
¶149 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
¶150 I am authorized to state the Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY 
joins this opinion. 
 
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