Case Title: Bartlow v. Costigan (Amended Opinion)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 115152

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2014-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 IL 115152 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
(Docket No. 115152) 
 
 
RHONDA BARTLOW et al., Appellants, v. JOSEPH COSTIGAN, as Director  
of the Illinois Department of Labor, Appellee. 
 
Opinion filed February 21, 2014—Modified upon denial of rehearing 
May 27, 2014. 
 
 
JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Karmeier, Burke, and Theis 
concurred in the judgment and opinion. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to the Employee Classification Act 
(820 ILCS 185/1 et seq. (West 2010)). Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the circuit court of 
Franklin County seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against 
defendant, Joseph Costigan, in his capacity as the Director of the Illinois Department of 
Labor.1 In relevant part, the plaintiffs alleged a number of facial constitutional defects 
in the Act. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and 
the appellate court affirmed. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and vacate in 
part the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court. 
                                                 
 
1Joseph Costigan, the current Director of the Illinois Department of Labor, was substituted as a party 
in place of Catherine M. Shannon, the originally named defendant and Costigan’s predecessor. 735 ILCS 
5/2-1008(d) (West 2010).  
 
 
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¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
Because this case presents purely legal questions, we detail only the procedural and 
factual background necessary to provide context for our analysis. The Act is directed at 
the classification of employees in Illinois’s construction industry, and the Illinois 
Department of Labor (the Department) is responsible for enforcing its provisions. 820 
ILCS 185/3, 25 (West 2010). 
¶ 4 
 
Plaintiffs Rhonda and Jack Bartlow are general partners in a construction-related 
business called Jack’s Roofing that installs siding, windows, seamless gutters, and 
roofs. The remaining named plaintiffs, Ryan Towle and Charles Eric Modglin, are 
involved in siding, window, and roof installation for Jack’s Roofing.  
¶ 5 
 
In September 2008, the Department sent Jack’s Roofing a notice of investigation, 
explaining that the Department had received a complaint that Jack’s Roofing was 
violating the Act by misclassifying its employees as independent contractors. In 
connection with that investigation, the Department requested related contracts, work 
records, payroll, and payment records.  
¶ 6 
 
Jack’s Roofing provided the Department with over 750 documents, including 
related bids, contracts, and payments. In April 2009, a Department conciliator 
conducted a telephone interview with Rhonda Bartlow and various individuals who 
had contracted with Jack’s Roofing. 
¶ 7 
 
In February 2010, the Department sent Jack’s Roofing a notice of its “preliminary 
determination,” concluding that Jack’s Roofing had misclassified ten individuals, 
including plaintiffs Towle and Modglin for between 8 and 160 days in 2008. The 
Department calculated a “potential penalty” of $1,683,000. The Department also 
requested a response within 30 days for consideration before making its “final 
determination.”  
¶ 8 
 
On March 1, 2010, the Department sent Jack’s Roofing notice of a second 
investigation and requested additional information. 
¶ 9 
 
In response, plaintiffs filed an action against the Department in the circuit court on 
March 12, 2010, seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. 
 
 
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¶ 10 
 
In their five-count complaint, plaintiffs asserted that the Department’s actions 
caused uncertainty on “how to continue in their business in compliance with [the Act]” 
and requested a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining the 
Department from enforcing the Act or interfering with their business during the 
litigation. Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional because it 
violates: (1) the special legislation clause of the Illinois Constitution because it subjects 
the construction industry to more stringent employment standards than other industries; 
(2) the due process clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions because it 
does not provide an opportunity to be heard and is impermissibly vague; (3) the 
prohibition against bills of attainder in the United States Constitution because it is a 
legislative act that inflicts punishment without a judicial trial; and (4) the equal 
protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions because no other 
industry is subjected to the same standards when seeking to hire independent 
contractors. 
¶ 11 
 
Following a hearing, the circuit court denied plaintiffs’ request for a temporary 
restraining order. On interlocutory appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded, 
reasoning that plaintiffs had raised a “fair question” about whether the Act authorizes 
the Department to adjudicate alleged violations of the Act without a meaningful 
hearing. Bartlow v. Shannon, 399 Ill. App. 3d 560 (2000), appeal denied, 237 Ill. 2d 
552 (2010) (table). 
¶ 12 
 
On remand, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In ruling on 
these motions, the circuit court entered a memorandum of decision in October 2011, 
denying plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court recognized 
that the Act did not provide for any type of administrative hearing but concluded that 
“the Department is not precluded from giving [p]laintiffs notice and a hearing if it so 
chooses.” After construing plaintiffs’ constitutional claims as presenting a “facial 
challenge only,” the court rejected all of plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges and found 
the Act to be valid and enforceable.  
¶ 13 
 
In November 2011, the circuit court entered a final order based on its memorandum 
of decision. The court granted summary judgment on all counts in favor of the 
Department. Subsequently, however, the court granted plaintiffs a stay pending appeal. 
¶ 14 
 
On direct appeal, the appellate court affirmed, rejecting plaintiffs’ facial challenges 
to the constitutionality of the Act. 2012 IL App (5th) 110519, ¶ 77. In reaching its 
decision, the appellate court adopted a construction of the Act, advanced by the 
 
 
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Department, that limited the Department to a “no consequences” investigative role. 
According to the appellate court, if the Department, through its investigations, 
determined that the Act had been violated, enforcement would require a de novo 
proceeding in the circuit court. 
¶ 15 
 
This court allowed plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 
26, 2010). 
 
¶ 16 
 
 
 
 
 
II. ANALYSIS 
¶ 17 
 
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the appellate court improperly rejected their facial 
constitutional challenges to the Act and erred by affirming the circuit court’s order in 
favor of the Department. We review de novo rulings on summary judgment. Lazenby v. 
Mark’s Construction, Inc., 236 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (2010). Our review of the constitutionality 
of the Act, and its proper statutory construction, is similarly subject to de novo review. 
Citizens Opposing Pollution v. Exxon Mobil Coal U.S.A., 2012 IL 111286, ¶ 23; 
Lazenby, 236 Ill. 2d at 93.  
¶ 18 
 
Reviewing courts have a duty to construe a statute to preserve its constitutionality 
whenever reasonably possible. People v. Masterson, 2011 IL 110072, ¶ 23. Indeed, 
statutes are presumed constitutional, and the challenging party has the burden to prove 
the statute is unconstitutional. Masterson, 2011 IL 110072, ¶ 23. As this court has 
explained, this burden is particularly heavy when, as here, a facial constitutional 
challenge is presented.2 Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 2013 IL 112673, ¶ 33. 
When construing a statute, our goal is to determine and effectuate the legislature’s 
intent, best indicated by giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. 
Innovative Modular Solutions v. Hazel Crest School District 152.5, 2012 IL 112052, 
¶ 22. 
 
 
                                                 
 
2 To the extent that plaintiffs ask this court to determine “alternatively” that the Act is 
unconstitutional as applied or that “as-applied relief” is appropriate, we agree with the lower courts that 
plaintiffs’ claims constitute facial challenges. Here, plaintiffs effectively argue that the Act is 
unconstitutional in all circumstances. See Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 442 (2006) (facial challenge 
requires a showing that under no circumstances would the challenged act be valid). We, therefore, limit 
our constitutional analysis to plaintiffs’ facial challenges to the Act. 
 
 
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¶ 19 
 
 
 
 
 
A. The Act 
¶ 20 
 
Initially, we generally outline the Act’s provisions. Effective January 1, 2008, the 
Act was enacted by the General Assembly with the express purpose to “address the 
practice of misclassifying employees as independent contractors” in the construction 
industry. 820 ILCS 185/3 (West 2010). Consistent with this purpose, the Act broadly 
provides that any individual “performing services” for a construction contractor is 
“deemed to be an employee of the employer.” 820 ILCS 185/10(a) (West 2010). 
¶ 21 
 
In turn, the statutory term “performing services” is extensively defined as follows: 
“[T]he performance of any constructing, altering, reconstructing, repairing, 
rehabilitating, refinishing, refurbishing, remodeling, remediating, renovating, 
custom fabricating, maintenance, landscaping, improving, wrecking, painting, 
decorating, demolishing, and adding to or subtracting from any building, 
structure, highway, roadway, street, bridge, alley, sewer, ditch, sewage disposal 
plant, water works, parking facility, railroad, excavation or other structure, 
project, development, real property or improvement, or to do any part thereof, 
whether or not the performance of the work herein described involves the 
addition to, or fabrication into, any structure, project, development, real 
property or improvement herein described of any material or article of 
merchandise. Construction shall also include moving construction related 
materials on the job site to or from the job site.” 820 ILCS 185/5 (West 2010).  
Thus, the Act creates a broad presumption that any individual “performing services,” 
as statutorily defined, for a construction contractor is an employee of that contractor. 
The Act, however, exempts independent contractors, sole proprietors, or partnerships 
who can satisfy specific statutory criteria showing that they effectively operate 
independently from the construction contractor. 820 ILCS 185/10(b), (c) (West 2010). 
¶ 22 
 
Any interested party may file a complaint with the Department against a 
construction entity or employer if there is a reasonable belief that the entity or 
employer is violating the Act by misclassifying its employees. 820 ILCS 185/125(a) 
(West 2010). The Department is empowered to conduct investigations in connection 
with its administration of the Act. The Department is authorized to visit and inspect, at 
all reasonable times, any places covered by the Act and to inspect any documentation 
necessary to determine whether an individual should be considered an employee under 
the Act. 820 ILCS 185/25(a) (West 2010). 
 
 
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¶ 23 
 
Following the investigation, if the Department believes the Act has been violated 
the Department may: (1) issue and cause to be served on any party an order to “cease 
and desist” from further violation of the Act; (2) take affirmative or other action as 
deemed reasonable to eliminate the effect of the violation; (3) collect the amount of any 
wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to the 
individual; and (4) assess any civil penalty allowed by the Act. 820 ILCS 185/25(b) 
(West 2010). For a first violation, the Act imposes a civil penalty of $1,500 for each 
day that a contractor improperly classifies an employee, with the penalty increasing to 
$2,500 per day for repeat violations. 820 ILCS 185/40 (West 2010). The Department 
can also impose debarment on any construction contractor for second or subsequent 
violations within a five-year period by identifying the contractor on the Department’s 
website and prohibiting them from receiving state contracts for a period of four years 
after the date of the last violation. 820 ILCS 185/42 (West 2010).  
¶ 24 
 
Willful violations of the Act, or obstruction of a Department investigation, result in 
civil penalties up to double the typical amount. 820 ILCS 185/45(a)-(c) (West 2010). 
Willful violations of the Act constitute a Class C misdemeanor, and a second or 
subsequent violation within a five-year period constitutes a Class 4 felony. 820 ILCS 
185/45(d) (West 2010).  
¶ 25 
 
The Act prohibits construction employers or entities from retaliatory discharge of 
employees for exercising their rights under the Act and authorizes the imposition of 
penalties for any retaliation. 820 ILCS 185/55 (West 2010). The Act also prohibits the 
waiver of any of its provisions and makes it a Class C misdemeanor for an employer to 
attempt to induce any individual to waive any provision of the Act. 820 ILCS 185/70 
(West 2010). 
¶ 26 
 
The Act also creates a private right of action, permitting any individual aggrieved 
by a construction contractor’s violation of the Act to file an action in the circuit court to 
recover lost wages and benefits, be awarded compensatory damages and an amount up 
to $500 for each violation, 10% of any civil penalty imposed, and attorney’s fees and 
costs. 820 ILCS 185/60, 40 (West 2010). A private action must be commenced within 
three years from the final date of performing services, but the limitations period is 
tolled if the employer deterred the individual’s exercise of rights under the Act. 820 
ILCS 185/60 (West 2010).  
  
¶ 27 
 
Finally, we note that during the pendency of this appeal, the Act was substantively 
amended to require the Department to provide notice and conduct formal 
 
 
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administrative hearings subject to the Administrative Review Law. See Pub. Act 
98-106 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (the amendments). 
¶ 28 
 
Effective January 1, 2014, within 120 days of a complaint filed under the Act, the 
Department must notify the employer of the nature of the allegations, the location and 
approximate date of the project or projects, and affected contractors. Pub. Act 98-106 
(eff. Jan. 1, 2014) (to be codified at 820 ILCS 185/25(a)).  
¶ 29 
 
The amendments also add the following three provisions to the enforcement 
provisions found in Section 25 of the Act: 
 
“(c) If, upon investigation, the Department finds cause to believe that 
Section 20 or Section 55 of this Act has been violated, the Department shall 
notify the employer, in writing, of its finding and any proposed relief due and 
penalties assessed and that the matter will be referred to an Administrative Law 
Judge to schedule a formal hearing in accordance with the Illinois 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
 
(d) The employer has 28 days from the date of the Department’s findings to 
answer the allegations contained in the Department’s findings. If an employer 
fails to answer all allegations contained in the Department’s findings, any 
unanswered allegations or findings shall be deemed admitted to be true and 
shall be found true in the final decision issued by the Administrative Law 
Judge. If, within 30 calendar days of the final decision issued by the 
Administrative Law Judge, the employer files a motion to vacate the 
Administrative Law Judge’s final decision and demonstrates good cause for 
failing to answer the Department’s allegations, and the Administrative Law 
Judge grants the motion, the employer shall be afforded an opportunity to 
answer and the matter shall proceed as if an original answer to the Department’s 
findings had been filed. 
 
(e) A final decision of an Administrative Law Judge issued pursuant to this 
Section is subject to the provisions of the Administrative Review Law and shall 
be enforceable in an action brought in the name of the people of the State of 
Illinois by the Attorney General.” Pub. Act 98-106 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014). 
The amendments also reduced civil penalties under the Act to $1,000 per day for an 
employee misclassification, and $2,000 per day for repeat violations. Pub. Act 98-106 
(eff. Jan. 1, 2014). 
 
 
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¶ 30 
 
Following oral argument, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefing on 
whether the new amended statute should be applied to this case and, if so, whether the 
constitutional challenges have been rendered moot. In their supplemental brief, 
plaintiffs argued that the amended Act should not be applied “retroactively” to this case 
and, therefore, none of their constitutional claims are moot. The Department disagrees. 
Noting that this matter has never advanced beyond the investigatory stage to final 
judgment or enforcement, the Department argues that, going forward, any enforcement 
of the Act against plaintiffs must proceed in accordance with the amendments. Thus, 
because the amended Act must apply to any enforcement proceeding against plaintiffs, 
plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim has been rendered moot.  
¶ 31 
 
We agree with the Department that the amended Act must be applied in this case. 
When plaintiffs brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, there was 
no final determination regarding plaintiffs’ violation of the Act and no penalties 
assessed. Thus, as the Department acknowledges, its ability to enforce the Act against 
plaintiffs depends on its future compliance with the Act’s new enforcement 
requirements in the amendments. Having determined that the amendments apply to any 
proceedings against plaintiffs, we now consider whether any of plaintiffs’ 
constitutional challenges have been rendered moot. 
 
¶ 32 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Procedural Due Process 
¶ 33 
 
We first address plaintiffs’ argument that the Act is unconstitutional under the due 
process clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions because it violates their 
rights to procedural due process. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the Act 
improperly authorizes the Department to perform “a judicial function” without 
providing a proper hearing and other procedural safeguards.  
¶ 34 
 
Before reviewing the merits of plaintiffs’ claim, however, we must address the 
parties’ disagreement on whether the recent amendments to the Act have rendered 
plaintiffs’ due process challenge moot. Generally, an appeal is rendered moot if an 
event occurs that “foreclose[s] the reviewing court from granting effectual relief to the 
complaining party.” In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 15. Accordingly, this court 
recognizes that when a challenged statute is amended to remove or to alter the 
ostensibly unconstitutional language while the cause is pending, the constitutional 
challenge to the statute becomes moot. Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 511 (1997); 
see also Forest Preserve District v. City of Aurora, 151 Ill. 2d 90, 94-95 (1992) 
 
 
- 9 - 
 
(concluding that it is unnecessary to review the constitutionality of a statute that is 
amended during a pending appeal).  
¶ 35 
 
Here, the Act’s enforcement procedures underlying plaintiffs’ procedural due 
process challenge have been substantively replaced during the pendency of this appeal. 
Specifically, effective January 1, 2014, the Act has been amended to require written 
notice of the Department’s findings, provide a formal hearing under the Illinois 
Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq. (West 2012)), and subject a final 
decision to judicial review under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et 
seq. (West 2012)). See Pub. Act 98-106 (eff. Jan. 1, 2014). Thus, the Act’s 
pre-amendment enforcement provisions, challenged by plaintiffs here, have been 
completely replaced with a new enforcement process that includes notice, a formal 
hearing, and administrative review. Consequently, we conclude that plaintiffs’ 
procedural due process claim is moot. See Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 511 (constitutional 
challenge to a statute rendered moot when alleged unconstitutional provisions are 
amended while appeal is pending).  
¶ 36 
 
Moreover, 
declaring 
the 
pre-amendment 
Act’s 
enforcement 
system 
unconstitutional and entering an injunction against its use, as plaintiffs seek here, 
would have no practical effect because the Department lost the ability to use that 
system on January 1, 2014. Indeed, as we noted above, no final judgment based on a 
finding that plaintiffs violated the Act has been entered. Instead, in February 2010, the 
Department sent Jack’s Roofing a notice of its “preliminary determination,” 
concluding that Jack’s Roofing had misclassified ten individuals, including plaintiffs 
Towle and Modglin, for between 8 and 160 days in 2008. The Department calculated a 
“potential penalty” of $1,683,000. Following a subsequent notice of another 
investigation, plaintiffs filed the instant declaratory judgment action, challenging the 
Act’s constitutionality and seeking injunctive relief. The Department has never 
attempted to enforce the Act or to collect the “potential penalty,” nor has a final adverse 
judgment been entered against the plaintiffs under the pre-amended version of Act. 
Under these circumstances, this court cannot grant plaintiffs effectual relief on their 
procedural due process challenge to the pre-amendment Act’s enforcement system, 
rendering it moot. In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
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¶ 37 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Vagueness Challenge 
¶ 38 
 
Plaintiffs next argue that section 10 of the Act, providing statutory exemptions 
from the Act, is unconstitutionally vague under the due process clauses of the United 
States and Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. 
Because the January 1, 2014, amendments to the Act do not alter the language of 
section 10, we agree with the parties that the amendments do not render plaintiffs’ 
vagueness challenge moot. 
¶ 39 
 
Plaintiffs contend that a person of ordinary intelligence cannot determine from the 
language of section 10 whether a contractor has complied with the Act, or whether an 
individual qualifies for exemption under section 10. Plaintiffs posit that “impossibility 
of compliance means the Act provides no standard of conduct at all.” 
¶ 40 
 
A vagueness challenge arises from the notice requirement of the due process 
clause. Wilson v. County of Cook, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 21. As this court recognizes, “[a] 
statute can be impermissibly vague for either of two independent reasons: (1) if it fails 
to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what 
conduct it prohibits, or (2) if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.” City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d 
390, 441 (2006) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000)).  
¶ 41 
 
Although vagueness claims that implicate the First Amendment require a greater 
degree of specificity, “ ‘perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been 
required’ ” of statutes challenged as unconstitutionally vague. (Internal quotation 
marks omitted.) Wilson, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 22 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 
U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). The test for determining vagueness varies with the nature and 
context of the legislative enactment, but the Constitution requires more specificity in 
statutes with criminal penalties, particularly statutes that lack a scienter requirement. 
Wilson, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 23. In contrast, statutes with civil penalties that regulate 
economic matters are subject to a “less strict” vagueness test because they typically 
involve more narrow subject matter, and business interests are better placed to address, 
and possibly shape, regulations that will impact them. Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982).  
¶ 42 
 
When reviewing a statute for vagueness, we apply familiar rules of statutory 
construction to examine the plain statutory language in light of its common 
understanding and practice. Wilson, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 24 (citing Pooh-Bah 
Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463, 492 (2009)). If the plain language 
 
 
- 11 - 
 
of the statute sets forth clearly perceived boundaries, the vagueness challenge fails, and 
our inquiry ends. Wilson, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 24. 
¶ 43 
 
Because plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge focuses on the Act’s exemptions in section 
10 for independent contractors and sole proprietorships or partnerships, we detail those 
exemptions. Under section 10(b), an individual performing services for a construction 
contractor is exempted from the Act’s coverage if it can be shown that: 
 
“(1) the individual has been and will continue to be free from control or 
direction over the performance of the service for the contractor, both under the 
individual’s contract of service and in fact; 
 
(2) the service performed by the individual is outside the usual course of 
services performed by the contractor; and 
 
(3) the individual is engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, profession or business; or 
 
(4) the individual is deemed a legitimate sole proprietor or partnership 
under subsection (c) of this Section.” 820 ILCS 185/10(b) (West 2010). 
When determining whether the individual is free from the contractor’s direction or 
control under subsection (b), the Department considers the totality of the circumstances 
using twelve factors, including how the individual is paid, who sets the prices for the 
services, and who arranges the work schedule. No one factor, however, is dispositive. 
56 Ill. Adm. Code 240.320 (2008). 
¶ 44 
 
The second exemption from the Act is contained in subsection (c) of section 10. 
Under this exemption, the Act deems “legitimate” and exempts from the Act’s 
provisions any sole proprietorship or partnership performing services for a construction 
contractor as a subcontractor if it is shown that: 
 
“(1) the sole proprietor or partnership is performing the service free from 
the direction or control over the means and manner of providing the service, 
subject only to the right of the contractor for whom the service is provided to 
specify the desired result; 
 
(2) the sole proprietor or partnership is not subject to cancellation or 
destruction upon severance of the relationship with the contractor; 
 
 
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(3) the sole proprietor or partnership has a substantial investment of capital 
in the sole proprietorship or partnership beyond ordinary tools and equipment 
and a personal vehicle; 
 
(4) the sole proprietor or partnership owns the capital goods and gains the 
profits and bears the losses of the sole proprietorship or partnership; 
 
(5) the sole proprietor or partnership makes its services available to the 
general public or the business community on a continuing basis; 
 
(6) the sole proprietor or partnership includes services rendered on a 
Federal Income Tax Schedule as an independent business or profession; 
 
(7) the sole proprietor or partnership performs services for the contractor 
under the sole proprietorship’s or partnership’s name; 
 
(8) when the services being provided require a license or permit, the sole 
proprietor or partnership obtains and pays for the license or permit in the sole 
proprietorship’s or partnership’s name; 
 
(9) the sole proprietor or partnership furnishes the tools and equipment 
necessary to provide the service; 
 
(10) if necessary, the sole proprietor or partnership hires its own employees 
without contractor approval, pays the employees without reimbursement from 
the contractor and reports the employees’ income to the Internal Revenue 
Service; 
 
(11) the contractor does not represent the sole proprietorship or partnership 
as an employee of the contractor to its customers; and 
 
(12) the sole proprietor or partnership has the right to perform similar 
services for others on whatever basis and whenever it chooses.” 820 ILCS 
185/10(c) (West 2010).  
¶ 45 
 
A careful review of the plain meaning of section 10 demonstrates that its provisions 
provide a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what 
conduct the Act prohibits. Specifically, the provisions explaining what will constitute 
an independent contractor, sole proprietor, or partnership are highly detailed and 
specific, resulting in a reasonably intelligent person understanding how to qualify for 
 
 
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an exemption under either subsection (b) or (c). Likewise, the provisions are 
sufficiently detailed and specific to preclude arbitrary enforcement. 
¶ 46 
 
We also note that the Act’s criminal penalties contain a scienter requirement of 
willfulness. 820 ILCS 185/45(d) (West 2010). Thus, the Act comports with this court’s 
recognition that “[t]he Constitution tolerates a lesser degree of vagueness in 
enactments with criminal rather than civil penalties and specifically those without a 
scienter requirement because the consequences of imprecision are more severe.” 
Wilson, 2012 IL 112026, ¶ 23.  
¶ 47 
 
We disagree with plaintiffs’ assertions that it is impossible to know how to comply 
with the Act’s exemptions. As noted above, the exemptions contained in subsections 
(b) and (c) of section 10 unambiguously demonstrate how and when an independent 
contractor, sole proprietor, or partnership will be considered exempt from the Act’s 
application. Notably, before this court, plaintiffs strenuously assert that their 
subcontractors satisfied the elements of section 10, thus qualifying for an exemption 
from the Act. Implicitly, then, plaintiffs concede that they understand what is required 
under the exemptions for independent contractors, sole proprietors, or partnerships in 
subsections (b) and (c).  
¶ 48 
 
Moreover, plaintiffs’ fundamental disagreement with the Department concerns 
whether the individuals who have performed services for them are exempt under the 
Act. But this is a factual matter, not relevant to our constitutional analysis. A party’s 
burden in making a facial constitutional challenge does not include specific allegations 
of statutory compliance under the facts of the particular case. Instead, the party 
challenging the statute’s facial constitutionality must show that the statute is 
“impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” People v. Taylor, 138 Ill. 2d 204, 211 
(1990). 
 
¶ 49 
 
Plaintiffs also argue that section 10 requires them to obtain, prior to any hiring 
decisions, financial and scheduling information about potential subcontractors that is in 
exclusive control of the subcontractor, rendering compliance with the Act’s 
exemptions impossible. As the appellate court rightly observed, however, “plaintiffs do 
not explain why a contractor cannot require the subcontractor to furnish the 
information before entering into the subcontract to ensure that he or she is properly 
classified as either an independent contractor or an employee.” 2012 IL App (5th) 
110519, ¶ 63. Even if this proves inconvenient for construction contractors, it does not 
render section 10 of the Act unconstitutionally vague on its face.  
 
 
- 14 - 
 
¶ 50 
 
Accordingly, because section 10 of the Act provides a person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct the Act prohibits, and 
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, we reject plaintiffs’ 
vagueness challenge. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 224 Ill. 2d at 441. 
 
¶ 51 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Other Constitutional Challenges 
¶ 52 
 
Plaintiffs also assert that the Act violates the Illinois Constitution’s prohibition 
against special legislation and the federal and state constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection. These constitutional claims are made in the last two pages of plaintiffs’ 
appellant brief. None of the claims contain the applicable standards of review, let alone 
a complete analysis of each independent constitutional claim. To the contrary, 
plaintiffs’ challenges are raised in a cursory fashion. This court, however, will consider 
only fully briefed and argued issues. See Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 370 (2010) 
(noting that an issue “merely listed or included in a vague allegation of error is not 
‘argued’ ” and does not satisfy Supreme Court Rule 341(h)). As our appellate court has 
repeatedly recognized, a reviewing court is “entitled to have issues clearly defined with 
pertinent authority cited and cohesive arguments presented.” (Internal quotation marks 
omitted.) Velocity Investments, LLC v. Alston, 397 Ill. App. 3d 296, 297 (2010). 
Accordingly, we find that plaintiffs have forfeited these claims by failing to brief them 
fully in this court, and we do not consider them. 
 
¶ 53 
 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSION  
¶ 54 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reject plaintiffs’ facial constitutional challenges to 
the Act. Plaintiffs’ procedural due process challenge to the pre-amended Act’s 
enforcement provisions has been rendered moot by the recent amendments to the Act. 
Because we do not address plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim on its merits, we 
cannot evaluate the correctness of the appellate court and the circuit court on that issue. 
Accordingly, we vacate the part of the appellate court’s judgment and the part of the 
circuit court’s judgment that rejected plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim without 
expressing our opinion of the merits of that claim. See Felzak v. Hruby, 226 Ill. 2d 382, 
394 (2007) (vacating lower courts’ judgments after finding the legal issue was moot 
and declining to evaluate the propriety of those judgments). 
 
 
- 15 - 
 
¶ 55 
 
We affirm the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court finding that 
section 10 of the Act is not unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiffs’ remaining 
constitutional challenges to the Act have been forfeited. Finally, as the Department 
acknowledges, any subsequent proceedings against plaintiffs under the Act must be 
conducted in accord with the amended provisions that became effective January 1, 
2014, including the provisions providing for notice, a formal hearing, administrative 
review, and reduced civil penalties. 
 
¶ 56 
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
¶ 57 
 
Circuit court judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part.