Case Title: Conway v. Guernsey Cable TV

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Conway v. Guernsey Cable TV1986 WY 33713 P.2d 786Case Number: 85-195Decided: 02/05/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
KEITH CONWAY, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF), 

 
 
v. 

 
 

GUERNSEY CABLE TV, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, PlatteCounty, J.T. Langdon, 
J.

 
 
 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Robert T. Moxley, 
Wheatland.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Stephen N. Sherard, 
Wheatland.

 
 
Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

 
 

MACY, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a summary judgment entered in a negligence action. We must decide whether or not 
the trial court properly granted the motion. We affirm.

 
 

[¶2.]     On November 5, 1984, 
Keith Conway, the appellant, and Marion Conway filed a complaint in justice 
court against Guernsey Community Cable Television, the appellee. The Conways alleged that 
appellee negligently installed a cable television line at their home, which 
negligent installation was the cause of the damage to their television set and 
other property during an electrical storm. Specifically, the Conways claimed that 
appellee failed to ground the cable properly, thus making it possible for 
lightning to pass through the cable line.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellee filed its 
answer generally denying the Conways' claim and 
affirmatively pleading that any damage to the Conways' property from lightning could not have 
been prevented by appellee and that the damage was caused by an act of God. On 
December 17, 1984, appellee also filed a motion for summary judgment and a 
supporting affidavit which stated that there was no way of preventing lightning 
from damaging a television set other than by unhooking the cable and pulling the 
plug; that regardless of the groundings made, lightning could still pass through 
the cable and damage the television set; and that any damage done was beyond the 
control of appellee.

 
 

[¶4.]     The Conways did not file 
opposing affidavits. The justice of the peace granted appellee's motion for 
summary judgment at a hearing held on February 19, 1985.

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellant appealed to 
the district court on March 1, 1985. In affirming the judgment of the justice of 
the peace court, the district court noted:

 
 
"* * * [T]he justice of 
the peace concluded that there was no genuine issue of fact. The affidavit of 
defendant sets forth a legitimate defense to the allegation of negligence; it 
was not traversed; there was nothing left for the justice of the peace to 
consider. 

 
 
"The court is unable to 
supply an issue of fact based simply upon the complaint or oral arguments at 
this level; therefore, the judgment of the justice court is 
affirmed."

 
 

[¶6.]     Appellant now contends 
the summary judgment was improper in that (1) the affidavit supporting 
appellee's motion failed to show there was no genuine issue of material fact; 
(2) the trial court should not grant a motion based on expert testimony, 
particularly in a negligence action; and (3) the affiant was not qualified to 
give an expert opinion.

 
 

[¶7.]     We have repeated the 
general standards governing appellate review of summary judgments countless 
times. Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, 
Inc., Wyo., 685 P.2d 25 (1984); Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 
665 P.2d 504 (1983). We see no reason to reiterate all of them again in this 
opinion. We do, however, find one such standard worthy of repeating for the 
purposes of this case. Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., provides in 
part:

 
 
"* * * When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not 
so respond summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him."

 
 
Although under this rule 
appellant was not required to respond by affidavit, it is clear that he cannot 
rely on mere allegations and pleadings, but must affirmatively set forth 
material opposing facts. Murray First 
Thrift & Loan Company v. N-C Paving, Wyo., 576 P.2d 455 (1978). All appellant had 
to do was file an opposing affidavit alleging the procedure appellee should have 
followed in order to prevent the lightning from passing through the cable 
television line. Because he failed to submit any material indicating the 
existence of potential evidence contrary to that presented by appellee, summary 
judgment was proper. Board of County 
Commissioners of Fremont County, Wyoming v. Memorial Hospital of Natrona County, 
Wyoming, Wyo., 682 P.2d 334 (1984).

 
 

[¶8.]     In support of 
appellant's claim that the trial court should not have considered expert 
testimony, he cites Mealey v. City of 
Laramie, Wyo., 472 P.2d 787 (1970). We are unable to see how that case 
supports his position. In Mealey, we expressly noted that although summary 
judgment is not usually appropriate when the court must rely on expert 
testimony, it is proper when the showing made by the movant is sufficient and 
uncontroverted. As indicated above, in the present case appellant made no 
attempt to respond to appellee's motion, by affidavit or otherwise. We find 
appellant's argument unpersuasive and, therefore, summary judgment was 
appropriate.

 
 

[¶9.]     We agree with appellant 
that issues of negligence are not ordinarily appropriate for summary 
adjudication. Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253 (1976); Gilliland v. Steinhoefel, Wyo., 521 P.2d 1350 (1974); Forbes Company v. 
MacNeel, Wyo., 
382 P.2d 56 (1963). However, where the record fails to establish an issue of 
material fact, the entry of summary judgment is proper, even in a negligence 
case. Keller v. Anderson, supra. Having reviewed the record, we find 
summary judgment appropriate in this case, there being no controverted issue of 
material fact.

 
 

[¶10.]  Appellant's final contention that the 
trial court should not have considered appellee's affidavit because it did not 
show that the affiant was qualified to give an expert opinion and, therefore, 
violated Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P.,1 is also without merit. It is well 
established that a party must move to strike an affidavit which violates Rule 
56(e); if he fails to do so, he will waive his objection, and, in the absence of 
a gross miscarriage of justice, the court may consider the defective affidavit. 
10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2738 
(1983). The record in the present case is devoid of any objection or motion to 
strike the affidavit on the ground that it violated Rule 56(e). Clearly, such an 
objection or motion to strike presented for the first time on appeal comes too 
late. Wright, Miller & Kane, supra. For these reasons and because we do not 
find a gross miscarriage of justice under the facts of this case, we hold that 
the trial court did not err in considering the affidavit.

 
 

[¶11.]  Appellee having carried the burden of 
demonstrating that there is no material issue of fact, it was entitled to 
summary judgment.

 
 

[¶12.]  Affirmed.

 
 

1 Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., 
provides in part:

 
 

"Form of affidavits; 
further testimony; defense required. - Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. * * *"