Case Title: State v. Neal Murray

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-75-98

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). COLEMAN, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The primary issue in this case is whether defendant's allegation of his trial attorney's conflict of interest converts his custodial term into an illegal sentence within the meaning of Rule 3:22-12, thereby removing the five year time limit for filing a post-conviction relief (PCR) application. Defendant and his co-defendant were indicted for robbing a Pizza Hut restaurant while armed with guns and committing aggravated sexual assault on the assistant manager. The co-defendant pled guilty to first-degree robbery. Defendant went to trial and was convicted of aggravated assault and two counts of first-degree robbery. Defendant was sentenced on March 4, 1988, to concurrent twenty-year terms of imprisonment with ten years of parole ineligibility. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and the Supreme Court denied certification. Defendant filed the present PCR application on December 10, 1995, some seven years and nine months after the judgment of conviction was entered. He argued, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The basis for that claim was an alleged potential attorney conflict of interest arising from the fact that defendant's counsel and the attorney for the co-defendant shared office space and a telephone number during defendant's trial. The trial court dismissed the PCR petition because it had been filed more than thirty-three months beyond the five-year time limit delineated in Rule 3:22-12. It found unpersuasive the assertion of excusable neglect based on defendant's lack of education. The trial court addressed the merits of defendant's claim of attorney conflict, finding that defendant failed to show that the attorneys were sufficiently connected to support the claimed conflict under State v. Bellucci, 81 N.J. 531 (1980). In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed. 315 N.J. Super. 535 (App. Div. 1998). The panel agreed with the trial court that defendant had not established excusable neglect. It disagreed, however, with the finding that a potential attorney conflict of interest did not exist. The Appellate Division concluded that the potential conflict made the sentence illegal, and that Rule 3:22-12 permitted a petition to correct an illegal sentence to be filed at any time. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification. HELD: A claim of attorney conflict falls outside the definition of an illegal sentence. Nonetheless, Murray is entitled to a hearing where the court should determine whether to apply the injustice exception to overcome the five year time limit. 1. There are two exceptions to the five-year time limit for filing a PCR petition: an illegal sentence or a showing that the delay was due to excusable neglect. Rule 3:22-12. Defendant sought to satisfy both exceptions. The determination below that defendant did not satisfy the excusable neglect exception is supported by the record. (pp. 5-6) 2. According to the Court Rules, an illegal sentence is a sentence that is in excess of or otherwise not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law. The first category covers sentences that exceed the maximum penalties authorized by statute for a specific offense. The second category involves other sentences that, although not in excess of the Code, are not authorized by the Code. These include sentences that do not satisfy required presentencing conditions or that fail to include a mandated term of parole ineligibility. An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time before it is completed. (pp. 6-9) 4. The Court agrees, however, that defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was an attorney conflict. Prejudice can be presumed only in those cases where there is a classic conflict of interest, such as when the same attorney or partnership represents two defendants and no waiver is obtained. Based on the record here, the two attorneys in question were not partners and did not claim to be associated. The record does not reveal whether other indicia of affiliation existed, such as the status of their finances, files, secretaries, bank accounts, and contracts. Thus, there has been a prima facie showing that requires an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a conflict existed that may create a presumption of prejudice. If on the remand the trial court is convinced that an attorney conflict existed that created a presumption of prejudice, the court should apply the injustice exception in Rule 1:1-2 and Rule 3:22-4(b) to overcome the five-year time limit. Because the conviction is now more than eleven years old, the trial court must weigh the purposes advanced by the five-year rule against the nature of defendant's claim and the potential harm presumed or realized in determining what, if any, relief should be granted. (pp. 11-14) The judgment of the Appellate Division is MODIFIED and AFFIRMED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, LONG, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 75 September Term 1998 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEAL MURRAY, Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 12, 1999-- Decided January 25, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 315 N.J. Super. 535 (1998). Catherine A. Foddai, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Kevin G. Byrnes, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for respondent (Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. This appeal involves a belated post-conviction relief (PCR) petition. The primary issue raised is whether an alleged attorney conflict of interest converts a defendant's custodial confinement into an illegal sentence within the meaning of Rule 3:22-12, thereby removing the five-year time limit for filing a PCR application. The trial court held that the PCR petition should be dismissed as time-barred because the issues were, or should have been, raised and decided in the direct appeal. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that the potential conflict of interest of defendant's attorney made the sentence illegal, thereby justifying a waiver of the five-year time limit. We disagree and hold that a potential conflict of interest by a defense attorney does not affect the legality of a sentence. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, LONG, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. NO. A-75 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEAL MURRAY, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED January 25, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz