Case Title: STATE EX REL IRVIN v ANDERSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1974-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12762 I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1974 THE STATE OF M O N T A N A , ex rel. DICK IRVIN, I N C , , a Montana Corporation; Keller Transport, Inc . , a Montana Corporation et al., Relators, H. J. ANDERSON, a s Director of Highways of the State of Montana; and GEORGE VUCANOVICH, WILLIAM M. KESSNER et al., Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record : For Relator: Scribner and Huss, Helena, Montana William A. Scribner argued, Helena, Montana Robert L. Stephens appeared, Billings, Montana For Respondents : N. A. Rotering, Helena, Montana Harry Alley argued, Helena, Montana Amicus Curiae Risken and O ' ~ e a r y , Helena, Montana John Risken argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: May 21, 1974 Decided : A#f2m'r4 Filed: SUN2 6 1 9 B M r . Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an original proceeding brought by certain trucking corpor- ations, the Montana Motor Transport Association, Inc., a Montana corporation, and the National Independent Truckers Assoc. of Montana, a Montana corporation, seeking a declaratory judgment determining their rights as holders of restricted route permits issued by the State Highway Commission authorizing transportation w i t h i n the weight 1 imitations set forth i n section 32-1123(5)(c), R.C.M. 1947, upon Montana's interstate highway system. The specific legal issues sought t o be determined are: 1. Can this Court adjudge and declare under the laws of the state of Montana i n existence on July 1, 1956, that the State Highway Comnission, its officers and agents are empowered, in appropriate cases, t o issue restricted route permits authorizing the movement of vehicles over the s t a t e highways w i t h i n the weight limitations set forth i n section 32-1123(5)(c), R.C.M. 1947, without regard t o the limitations imposed by section 32-1127, R.C.M. 1947. 2. That the action proposed t o be taken by the Highway Commission on the basis of any other or contrary interpretation of law as i t existed on July 1 , 1956, is arbitrary , capricious and i 1 legal . Relators herein are truckers who presently hold restricted route per- mits issued by the State Highway Commission and this action is brought t o pre- vent the Highway Commission from canceling these permits, as t o their use on the interstate highways after midnight June 30, 1974. On December 11, 1973, the Highway Commission amended its regulations t o a1 1 o w restricted route-load permits to use the interstate highway w i t h i n the state. See Montana Admin- istrative Code 18-2.10(14)-S10140. Re1 ators argue that thereafter various individual re1 ators applied for and received from the Highway Commission restricted route permits pur- suant t o the new regulation, authorizing travel w i t h i n such increased weight limitations, paid the license fee for such permits, and i n reliance thereon invested substantial amounts of capital for additional and heavier equipment t o accomodate such loads. On April 1 , 1974, respondent Highway Commission reversed i t s action of December 11, 1973, declaring that such permits as issued would not be recognized a f t e r June 30, 1974. W e note the reasons given by the Commission: "THE F.H.W.A FINDS THE A C T I O N CONTRARY TO INTERPRETATION OF MONTANA STATUTES R E G U L A T I N G WEIGHT, TANDEM AXLE WEIGHT, G R O S S W E I G H T OF G R O U P S OF AXELS, VEHICLE OR COMBINATION OF VEHICLES, AND M A X I M U M W I D T H OF 96 INCHES, J U L Y 1, 1956. "THE MONTANA H I G H W A Y C O M M I S S I O N RESCINDED THEIR A C T I O N OF DECEMBER 11, 1973 ON APRIL 1 , 1974 IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE A L L O C A T I O N OF FEDERAL H I G H W A Y F U N D S TO MONTANA FOR FUTURE C O N S T R U C T I O N FROM CANCELLATION. THE MONTANA H I G H W A Y COMMISSION, BY THEIR ACTION, HAVE STOPPED THE ISSUANCE OF RESTRICTED ROUTE-LOAD PERMITS FOR U S E ON THE INTERSTATE H I G H W A Y S Y S T E M (I .15, I 90, & 1 94) EFFECTIVE APRIL 1 , 1974. "RESTRICTED ROUTE-LOAD PERMITS ISSUED PRIOR TO APRIL 1 , 1974 W I L L BE R E C O G N I Z E D FOR INTERSTATE H I G H W A Y S Y S T E M T R A V E L UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, BUT UNDER NO C I R C U M S T A N C E S AFTER MIDNIGHT J U N E 30, 1974. I ' (Emphasis supplied. ) A s underlined above, the Highway Comnission gives two reasons f o r the proposed retraction of the permits (1) i t i s contrary to an interpretation of Montana law by employees of a federal bureau (FHWA), and (2) Montana might lose federal highway construction funds i f i t does not comply with the federal directive. Yet the Court was informed by relators during oral argument, and not denied by respondents, that the U . S. Department of Transportation i s sponsoring 1 egi s l a t i on before Congress a1 1 owing what was done here by the Highway Comnission in December 1973. Some 4,000 t o 5,000 permits were issued on the basis of the action taken in December. I t i s alleged that the reason for the change in December, permitting the use of the interstate, came about due t o the existing energy shortage and a request by the Governor of Montana t o federal authorities who on the basis of emergency conservation approved the request t o make the change. I t i s conceded there is no practical reason why the interstate highway system should be the subject of weight limitations which are less than those author- ized upon the other highways of the state. The real crux of the matter here, as noted by counsel for respondents, i s that the respondent Comnission has since 1956 operated on either i t s own interpretation of Montana statutes sections 32-1123 and 32-1 127, R.C.M. 1947, or that made by federal employees. The Highway Commission has never had or requested i n any case before this Court a definitive opinion to guide i t . The question of whether or not this Court can take original juris- diction of this matter and enter a declaratory judgment has long been decided i n Montana. Under the circumstances the Court clearly has power to accept original jurisdiction and to enter a declaratory judgment. W e quote from 42nd Legis- lative Assembly v. Lennon, 156 Mont. 416, 421, 481 P.2d 330: " * * * Montana case law i s replete with authority sus- taining the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court i n declaratory judgment actions in a variety of situa- tions. State ex re1 . Schul tz-Lindsay v. Board of Equalization, 145 Mont. 380, 403 P.2d 635; Carey, State Treas. v. McFatridge, 115 Mont. 278, 142 P.2d 229; Gullick- son v. Mitchell, 113 Mont. 359, 126 P.2d 1106; Bottomly v. Meagher County, 114 Mont. 220, 133 P.2d 770. The foregoing cases establish the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a declaratory judgment action where legal ques- tions of an emergency nature are presented and ordinary legal procedures will not afford timely or adequate relief." Although the question involved in this case can be simply stated, much background information is needed before its significance can be appreciated. W e must first go back to the federal law establishing the interstate highway system for an understanding of why the dispute hasarisen. On August 27, 1958, the Congress of the United States enacted public law 85-767, which as amended i s codified as Title 23, Section 127 of the United States Code. The section reads as follows: "No funds authorized to be appropriated for any fiscal year under section 108(b) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 shall be apportioned to any State w i t h i n the bound- aries of which the Interstate System may lawfully be used by vehicles w i t h weight i n excess of eighteen thousand pounds carried on any one axle, o r w i t h a tandem-axle weight in excess of thi rty-two thousand pounds, or w i t h an over-all gross weight i n excess of seventy-three thousand two hundred and eighty pounds, or w i t h a width in excess of ninety-six inches, or the corresponding maximum weights or maximum widths permitted for vehicles using the public highways of such State under laws or regulations established by appropriate State authority in effect on July 1, 1956, whichever i s the greater. Any amount which i s withheld from apportion- ment to any State pursuant to the foregoing provisions shall lapse. T h i s section shall not be construed t o deny apportion- ment to any State allowing the operation w i t h i n such State of any vehicles or combinations thereof that could be lawfully operated w i t h i n such State on July 1, 1956. With respect to the State of Hawaii, laws or regulations i n effect on February 1, 1960, shall be applicable for the purposes of this section, i n 1 ieu of those i n effect on July 1, 1956. Ii The foregoing section prescribes the limitations which must be ob- served by the states i n order for them to qualify for their annual apportion- ment of federal funds for highway purposes. The section reveals the following criteria for determining permitted sizes and weights on the interstate system: a. The state laws in effect on July 1 , 1956, must be examined for the purpose of determining whether the maximums prescribed in the federal code or the maximums prescribed by state law apply. If the state law per- mitted greater maximums as of July 1 , 1956, these are controlling, otherwise, the federal maximum prevails. b. If the state law in effect on July 1, 1956, authorized variations from the maximums, by special permit or otherwise, such variations are also permitted by the federal statutes to be authorized over the interstate system. Furthermore, a state statute passed after July 1, 1956, setting forth procedures or limitations w i t h respect to such variations may also apply t o the inter- state system, i f the state statutes in effect on July 1 , 1956, were broad enough to allow such operations. This is made clear by the following provision of Title 23, Section 127, U.S.C.: "This section shall not be construed to deny apportionment t o any State allowing the operation within such State of any vehicles or combinations thereof that could be law- fully operated within such State on July 1, 1956.'' I t thus becomes necessary for us t o examine the Montana laws i n effect on July 1, 1956 t o determine, f i r s t , the weight limitations having general applicability a t that time, and second, the extent to which variations from these weight limitations were authorized by special permit a t that time. I t is also important for us to examine the amendments to these provisions enacted by the legislature after July 1, 1956, for the purpose of determining whether the operation of vehicles or combinations thereof in accordance w i t h such amendments was permitted by the Montana law i n existence on July 1, 1956. On July 1, 1956, section 32-1123, R.C.M. 1947, contained tables of maximum weights which varied i n accordance w i t h the distance between axles of the vehicle or combination, up to a maximum of 76,800 pounds for the maximum distance. Another portion of the same section, sub-paragraph 5 ( f ) , provided as follows: " ( f ) The operation of vehicles or combinations of vehicles having dimensions or weights in excess of the max- imum limits herein recomnended shall be permitted only i f and when authorized by special permit issued by the state highway commission or its officers, supervisors or agents acting pursuant to duly delegated authority from said commission, including the state highway patrol ." The aforementioned statutory provi sions , considered without ref- erence to other statutes, lead us to the conclusion that not only are the general weight limitations s e t forth i n the statute greater than those prescrib- ed by federal law, and therefore applicable, but also that on the controlling date the State Highway Comnission and i t s agents had authority t o issue special permits for weights i n excess of those granted, without limitation except as contained i n the above quotation. From this i t would follow that the Comnission and i t s agents have the same authority to issue special permits for operation over the interstate system. However, another statute in effect on July 1 , 1956, must also be considered. On that date section 32-1127, R.C.M. 1947, provided in part as fol 1 ows : "The state highway commission, and local authorities in their respective jurisdiction, may, i n their discretion, upon application i n writing and good cause being shown therefor, issue a special permit i n writing, authorizing the applicant to operate or move a vehicle of a size or weight exceeding the maximum specified i n this act upon any highway under the jurisdiction of and for the mainten- ance of which the body granting the permit i s responsible; provided, however, that no permits are to be issued for movement of vehicles carrying built-up or reducible loads i n excess of nine (9) feet i n width or exceeding the length, height, or weight specified in this act; provided, however, that no permits are t o be issued for the moving of loads for any considerable distances over such highways when the loads i n question are of such excess width that all traffic lanes upon the highway concerned would be blocked to the serious inconvenience of normal traffic; and further pro- vided that no permits are to be granted for the moving of loads of such excess width that a hazard to traffic would be involved for any considerable distances over the high- ways concerned except t o those applicants who carry public l i a b i l i t y and property damage insurance for the protection of the traveling public as a whole. N o permit shall be issued for a period of more than nine (9) months." From this i t will be observed that as of July 1 , 1956, there were two separate statutory provisions authorizing the issuance of special permits for weights i n excess of the maximums prescribed by law. Sub-paragraph 5 ( f ) of 32-1123, applicable only to the State Highway Commission and i t s agents, contained no significant limitations upon the authority therein granted. Section 32-1127 appears t o be applicable t o the State Highway Commission and t o local authorities within their respective jurisdictions, and carries the limitation that no such permits may be granted for vehicles carrying built- up or reducible loads. I t should be noted a t t h i s point that each of these statutory provisions is s t i l l on the books. Sub-paragraph (5) ( f ) of section 32-1 123 has been reenacted with identical language in amendments to the sec- tion in the years 1959, 1961, 1967, and 1973. Section 32-1 127 was amended i n 1961, 1965, 1969, and 1971. The 1961 amendment t o section 32-1127 revised the language regarding built-up or reducible loads t o read as follows: " * * * provided, however, that only the s t a t e highway commission shall have the discretion t o issue permits for movement of vehicles carrying built-up or reducible loads i n excess of nine (9) feet in width or exceeding the length, height or weight specified i n this act * * *." More about t h i s amendment later. In 1967, the legislature amended section 32-1123 by adding a provision which authorized the State Highway Commission to issue special permits for weights in excess of the table of maximums therein prescribed, in accordance w i t h an increased table of weights, commonly referred to as "Table B" up t o a maximum of 105,500 pounds. This added provision contained the following state ment . "This subdivision shall have no appl i cation t o highways which are a part of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways (as referred t o i n section 127 of t i t l e 23, United States Codes) when such application would prevent this s t a t e from receiving any federal funds for highway purposes. " A t the time of this amendment and the other amendments to this (5) statute, the legislature reenacted into law sub-paragraph /(f) giving the State Highway Commission exclusive authority to issue permits for excess weights. Prior to i t s reconsideration of this question in December 1973, the State Highway Commission recognized its right t o grant restricted route permits for excess weights on the interstate system, b u t only w i t h respect to nonreducible loads. Shortly after the legislature amended section 32-1127, R.C.M. 1947, to remove the reducible load feature, comnunications were ex- changed between the bureau of public roads and the Highway Commission re- garding the effect this amendment would have on the s t a t e ' s eligibility for federal highway funds. B y l e t t e r dated March 28, 1961 , the bureau quoted a ruling from i t s legal division concluding that the amendments to the law would enlarge the exemptions in effect on July 1, 1956, and would t h u s place Montana i n a position of jeopardy. The Highway Commission replied stating that i t would adhere t o a policy of not allowing permits for movement of reducible loads exceeding the statutory weight specifications, and thereafter, on June 21, 1962, i t certified to the bureau that by reason of i t s pol icy statement no changes had been effected by the state w i t h respect t o the granting of permits. Apparently, neither the bureau of public roads nor the (5) Highway Commission considered the provisions of sub-paragraph/ ( f ) of section 32-1123 when these conclusions were reached. When the energy c r i s i s was announced by the President l a s t f a l l , and when the extent of the fuel shortage became known, the Montana Highway C o m m - ission reconsidered i t s position and directed i t s legal department to review the applicable law to determine whether the Commission did in fact have authority to issue restricted route permits within the Table B maximums on July 1, 1956. Similar movements were under way in other western states. In Montana, i t was concluded the power t o issue such permits was always vested i n the Highway Comission, by virtue of the provisions of sub-paragraph (5) ( f ) , section 32-1123, R.C.M. 1947. In arriving a t this conclusion, the Commission considered also the provisions of section 32-1127, but concluded the only harmonious construction of the two sections was that the nonreducible load restriction i n the l a t t e r section was applicable only t o the local author- i t i e s therein referred to. W e find the interpretations placed upon these Montana statutes by the federal highway administration, and since acquiesced i n by respondents, i f concurred i n by this Court, would constitute a repeal of the provisions of sub-paragraph (5) ( f ) of section 32-1 123, R.C.M. 1947. This sub-paragraph, which was i n effect July 1 , 1956, and which has been repeatedly reenacted into law each time other provisions of the section were changed, clearly provides the authority which i s now denied by the Commission and further grants such authority exclusively t o the State Highway Commission and i t s agents. W e find the only reasonable resolution of the conflict between t h i s sub-paragraph and section 32-1127, R.C.M. 1947, i s by a construction of these statutes together, to the effect that sub-paragraph ( 5 ) ( f ) of section 32-1123 i s an expansion of the powers granted i n section 32-1127. A contrary interpretation would necessarily lead t o the following conclusions: that sub-paragraph ( 5 ) ( f ) is a nullity; that the legislature did not mean what i t said when i t granted exclusive powers t o the State Highway Commis- sion; and, that each time the sub-paragraph was reenacted the legislature was performing an idle act. T h i s strained interpretation would also violate established principles of statutory construction. Some of these principles are as follows: The court will presume that the legislature would not pass useless or meaningless legislation. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 150 Mont. 182, 433 P.2d 795. In the construction of a statutory provision i t will be presumed that the legislature, i n adopting i t , intended to make some change i n the existing law, and the courts will endeavor to give some effect t o the enact- ment. Nichols v. School District No. 3, 87 Mont. 181, 287 P. 624; State v. Swanberg, 130 Mont. 202, 299 P.2d 446; V a n Tighem v. Linnane, 136 Mont. 547, 349 P.2d 569; State ex re1 . Special Road Dist. v. Millis, 81 Mont. 86, 261 P. 885; In re McLurels Estate, 68 Mont. 556, 220 P. 527; 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, 5 253, p * 424. The court must harmonize statutes relating t o the same subject, i f possible, and give effect to each. State ex r e l . Riley v. District Court, 103 Mont. 576, 64 P.2d 115; State ex rel. Patterson v. Lentz, 50 Mont. 322, 146 P. 932; 82 C.J.S. Statutes $ 366, p. 810. In conclusion, w e observe that no useful purpose i s served by the Highway Comnission's cancel lation of these restricted route permits. Fuel costs have skyrocketed since l a s t f a l l when the restricted route permits were authorized, and the energy shortage i s s t i l l c r i t i c a l . N o responsible authority would contend that our system of interstate highways will not w i t h - stand the Table B weights, which have been utilized since 1967 on the primary highways i n the state, and which the department of transportation has recom- mended for adoption on a l l interstate highways. W e hold the State Highway Commission had the authority t o issue such permi t s on July 1, 1956, for either nonreduci ble or reducible loads and, accord- ingly, i t has the power to do so now, without jeopardizing the right of the State of Montana t o receive federal funds for highway purposes. This opinion shall constitute a declaratory judgment and i s hereby entered i n accordance w i t h the foregoing opinion. W e concur: ---------- Justices