Case Title: State v. Beattie

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 90-121


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 1, Bennington Circuit

Wendell Beattie, Sr.                         March Term, 1991


Arthur J. O'Dea, J.

Theresa St. Helaire, Bennington County Deputy State's Attorney, Bennington,
  for plaintiff-appellee

David G. Reid, Public Defender, Brattleboro, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant appeals from his conviction of actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
in violation of 23 V.S.A. { 1201(a)(2).  We affirm.
     Deputy Sheriff Edward Smith testified that at 1 A.M. on April 24, 1989,
he was alerted to defendant's van parked in a grocery store parking lot by a
passing motorist, who stated that the person in the van was either asleep,
passed out, or dead.  Officer Smith approached the van, which had its engine
running.  Observing defendant slumped over the wheel, Officer Smith banged
on the door.  Defendant awoke and stepped on the gas pedal for three to five
seconds before releasing it.  When defendant rolled down the window, Officer
Smith smelled a strong odor of liquor and observed that defendant's eyes
were bloodshot and watery and his speech mumbled and confused.  Upon getting
out of the van, defendant had trouble with his balance.  Officer Smith had
defendant perform three dexterity tests, two of which he performed poorly.
A breath sample was taken at 2:12 A.M. and was analyzed as indicating a
.168 % blood-alcohol content (BAC).
     Defendant testified that he had worked until 10 P.M. on April 23
installing a heating system.  He consumed three beers between 2:30 and 9:45.
After work he returned home and then went to the store to get dinner for his
son.  Upon arriving, he lay his head on the wheel and rested his eyes
because of exhaustion. He left the car running because it was cold.  He
refuted much of the officer's testimony concerning his speech, his balance
problems, and his performance on the dexterity tests.  He denied that he was
under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
     Defendant asserts five grounds for reversal.  Because we find each to
be without merit, we affirm.
                                    I.
     Defendant's arrest by Windham County Deputy Sheriff Smith occurred in
the Town of Winhall, located in Bennington County.  Defendant filed a motion
to dismiss below on the basis that Deputy Sheriff Smith did not have
jurisdiction to make the out-of-county arrest.  The court held that Deputy
Sheriff Smith had statewide jurisdiction, and defendant contests this
holding on appeal.
     The statutory provisions granting statewide jurisdiction to law
enforcement officers were enacted by 1987, No. 122 (Adj. Sess.). (FN1) Section 1
of the Act added 24 V.S.A. { 307(c), which reads:  "The powers of deputy
sheriffs and special deputy sheriffs with respect to criminal matters and
the enforcement of the law may be exercised statewide."  Section 2 of the
Act added 24 V.S.A. { 312, entitled "Jurisdiction of sheriffs," which
provides:
           (a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, the
         powers of sheriffs with respect to criminal matters and
         the enforcement of the law may be exercised statewide.

           (b) A sheriff may exercise law enforcement powers
         statewide only if the sheriff has completed the training
         requirements established for full-time law enforcement
         officers under section 2358 of Title 20.

Defendant's contention is that even though Deputy Sheriff Smith had
completed the training requirements established for deputy sheriffs in 24
V.S.A. { 311, because he had not completed the training requirements
established for full-time law enforcement officers he lacked jurisdiction by
force of { 312(b).  He argues that the term "sheriff" in { 312(b) is meant
to encompass deputy sheriffs.
     We disagree.  Defendant's reading of the statutory provisions renders {
307(c)'s distinct grant of statewide jurisdiction to deputy sheriffs wholly
superfluous.  If the legislature intended for { 312 to apply to deputy
sheriffs as well as sheriffs, there was no reason for them to enact {
307(c).  We decline to interpret the Act in a way that renders a significant
part of it pure surplusage.  See State v. Kreth, 150 Vt. 406, 409,