Case Title: Newton Carlton Slawson v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC90-045

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC90045
____________
NEWTON CARLTON SLAWSON,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[July 5, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review an order from the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial
Circuit which finds that Newton Carlton Slawson, a person under four sentences of
death, is competent to waive his rights to collateral counsel and collateral
proceedings.  The circuit court also determined that Slawson’s waiver was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  By order dated November 7, 2000, we
requested the office of the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle Region
(CCRC-M), the State of Florida (the State), and Slawson to submit briefs to this
2
Court directed to the issue of the circuit court’s competency determination and the
validity of Slawson’s waiver of collateral counsel and collateral proceedings.  We
have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed
below, we affirm the order of the circuit court.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A jury found Slawson guilty on four counts of first-degree premeditated
murder and one count of manslaughter with a firearm for killing an unborn child by
injuring the mother.  The facts from the direct appeal of the case show that on April
11, 1989, Peggy Wood, her husband Gerald, and their two children, Jennifer (age
four) and Glendon (age three) were murdered in their home.  Also lost was the fetus
Peggy Wood was carrying, which was eight and one-half months old.  Peggy
Wood lived with her family in a garage apartment that was adjacent to her parents’
home in Hillsborough County.  At approximately 10 p.m. on April 11, Peggy
Wood was found lying on the back porch of her parents’ home, having been shot
once in the abdomen and once in the back, while also having been cut with a knife
from the base of the sternum to the pelvic area.  She also had several cuts on her
right thigh.  Shortly before dying, Peggy Wood told her mother that Slawson had
“killed [her husband] Gerry and the kids.”  Slawson v. State, 619 So. 2d 255 (Fla.
1993). Gerald Wood and the two children died as a result of gunshot wounds. 
3
Gerald had also been stabbed in the back.  The Woods’ unborn baby was found
lying near Gerald’s body, having sustained two gunshot wounds and multiple
lacerations that resulted from the appellant’s attack on Peggy.  Slawson claimed
that he cut the unborn fetus out of Peggy’s body, in an attempt to save it, after
determining that both Gerald and Peggy were dead.  See id. at 257.  
The facts from the direct appeal also described the events preceeding the
murders:
After his arrest [on the night of the killings], Slawson told detectives 
that he went to the Woods' residence on the day of the murders. He took a 
six inch knife and a .357 revolver. At Gerald's request, Slawson put the gun 
in the bathroom so the children would not get it. He gave the knife to Gerald 
Wood to use to cut rock cocaine. Gerald Wood offered to sell Slawson
some of the cocaine but Slawson refused the offer. When Peggy said Slawson 
might be the police, Slawson went to the bathroom to get his gun so he 
could leave. When Slawson returned, Gerald Wood got up with the knife in 
his hand. According to his statement, Slawson shot Gerald and may have 
shot Peggy at that time. As Slawson proceeded to the children's bedroom 
and shot them, Peggy Wood was screaming. After shooting the children he 
returned to the living room and shot Peggy again. Slawson then inserted his 
knife into Peggy Wood's abdomen and cut upward, causing the fetus to be 
expelled.
Slawson, 619 So. 2d at 257.  Slawson also testified at trial that he believed Gerald
had placed drugs in his beer, which caused him to feel odd and to believe he was
locked in the apartment.  See id.
Slawson was found guilty of four counts of first-degree murder and one
1 The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eight to four with regard
to the murder of Gerald Wood, the father.  As to the murder of Jennifer and Glendon
Wood, the children, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of seven to
five.  Finally, the jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of nine to three on the
conviction related to the murder of Peggy Wood, the mother.
4
count of killing an unborn child by injury to the mother.  He received death
sentences for each of the first-degree murders, along with a thirty-year sentence for
manslaughter of the unborn child.  
 After conducting a penalty phase hearing, the circuit court sentenced
Slawson to thirty years in prison on the manslaughter with a firearm count and,
consistent with the jury’s recommendation, sentenced Slawson to death on all four
first-degree murder counts.1  In imposing the death sentence, the trial court found
as an aggravating factor as to each of the four murders that Slawson had been
convicted of  three other contemporaneous capital felonies.  See id. at 257. 
Additionally, the court found the murder of Peggy Wood to be especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  See id.  In statutory mitigation, the court found (1) no
significant history of prior criminal activity, although according to Slawson’s
admissions and statements to mental health experts, he used illegal drugs habitually
for years; (2) in the opinion of a defense expert, Slawson’s capacity to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and (3) in the
opinion of a defense expert, the murders were committed while Slawson was under
5
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  See id.  In non-statutory
mitigation, the court found that Slawson was abused as a child and he was capable
of acts of kindness and could be a friendly person.  See id.  This Court affirmed
Slawson’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal, see id. at 256, and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on June 27, 1994.  See
Slawson v. Florida, 512 So. 2d 1246 (1994).
On September 12, 1995, collateral counsel (CCR, now CCRC-M) petitioned
this Court for a writ of mandamus and moved for an extension of time to initiate
postconviction proceedings on Slawson’s behalf.  The petition alleged that
collateral counsel had been unable to meet with Slawson based on the revocation of
Slawson’s front cuff pass.  Specifically, the petition alleged that due to a medical
condition, Slawson would not leave his cell because he could not have his hands
cuffed behind his back without experiencing pain.  The petition requested relief in
the form of the re-issuance of a front cuff pass and an extension of time to file a
motion for postconviction relief.  The State filed a response, collateral counsel
replied, and this Court denied relief on February 22, 1996.  See Slawson v.
Singletary, 670 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 1996).
On September 15, 1995, while the above petition was pending in this Court,
CCRC-M filed an unverified rule 3.850 motion in the circuit court with special
2 Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
3 The amended rule 3.850 raised the following claims [restated]: (1) Slawson is
incompetent under the standard set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402
(1960), to proceed with postconviction matters; (2) Slawson has been deprived access
to judicial records in violation of article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution, and
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.051; (3) rule 3.851 of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure is unconstitutional; (4) Slawson’s trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to Dr. Samenow’s testimony and failing to litigate other guilt phase
issues; (5) Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 4-3.5(d)(4) unconstitutionally prohibits
collateral counsel from interviewing Slawson’s jury to discover any misconduct; (6)
6
request for leave to amend.  CCRC-M asserted in the motion that the motion was
incomplete and unverified based primarily on the revocation of Slawson’s front
cuff pass.  A Huff2 hearing was scheduled for May 31, 1996, but before that
hearing could be held, CCRC-M moved for a continuance and to compel the
chapter 119 disclosure of records from several entities, including Dr. Mark
Montgomery and the Tampa Police Department.  The hearing was continued until
July 24, 1996, at which time the court set a date for the filing of an amended rule
3.850 motion and determined that the information sought from Dr. Montgomery
was not subject to chapter 119 disclosure.  On August 22, 1996, the court ordered
the Tampa Police Department to provide CCRC-M with certain public records
within 10 days.
On November 1, 1996, collateral counsel raised 28 claims in an amended,
unverified rule 3.850 motion.3  Along with the amended motion, CCRC-M 
Slawson is innocent of first-degree murder and has been denied an adversarial testing;
(7) the trial court unconstitutionally denied Slawson his right to a fair trial by denying
his change of venue requests; (8) Slawson did not receive adequate mental health
assistance at trial as required by Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); (9) the trial
court improperly instructed Slawson’s jury regarding the vote required for imposition
of the death sentence, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this
error; (10) the trial court improperly considered nonstatutory aggravating factors and
the prosecutor presented the jury with inflammatory and improper comments and
arguments; (11) Slawson was deprived of an adversarial testing and effective
assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial due to counsel’s failure to
object to Dr. Samenow’s testimony, counsel’s failure to present available mitigating
evidence and provide adequate background information to mental health experts, and
counsel’s failure to object to erroneous jury instructions; (12) Slawson’s death
sentences are unconstitutional because the penalty phase jury instructions erroneously
forced Slawson to prove that death was improper; (13) newly discovered evidence
shows that Slawson’s convictions and sentences are constitutionally unreliable; (14)
trial counsel was ineffective during voir dire; (15) Slawson’s death sentences are
fundamentally unfair and unreliable due to the prosecutor’s inflammatory comments
and introduction of victim impact evidence; (16) the prosecution unconstitutionally
withheld material, exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963); (17) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme denies Slawson due process of
law and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment; (18)
the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the HAC aggravator, and this Court’s
harmless error analysis of the issue on Slawson’s direct appeal was not meaningful in
light of new case law; (19) the trial court violated Slawson’s Eighth Amendment rights
by refusing to find and weigh the mitigating circumstances established in the record,
and trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to litigate this issue at trial or
on direct appeal; (20) Slawson’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
Slawson’s good behavior while awaiting trial as mitigating evidence, and appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal; (21) the
prosecution’s introduction of prejudicial crime scene photographs rendered Slawson’s
convictions and sentences fundamentally unreliable, trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to object or effectively argue against the admission of the photographs, and
appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to adequately litigate the issue; (22)
Slawson was denied appropriate appellate review because no reliable transcript of his
trial exists; (23) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the standard by which
7
they were to judge expert testimony; (24)  the trial court and prosecutor
unconstitutionally suggested to the jury that the law required a recommendation of
death; (25) section 921.141(5), Florida Statutes (1989), defining the CCP and HAC
aggravators, was vague and overbroad at the time of Slawson’s sentencing, and the
trial court did not provide an adequate narrowing instruction to cure the statute’s
unconstitutionality; (26) the cumulative weight of the errors which occurred during all
phases of Slawson’s trial render his convictions and sentences unreliable; (27)
Slawson was incompetent under the Dusky standard to proceed at trial, trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to file a motion for a competency determination, and the trial
court failed to conduct a competency hearing on its own motion as provided by rule
3.210(b) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (28) the court erred in finding
at the July 24, 1996, hearing that the records created by Dr. Mark Montgomery were
not public records subject to chapter 119 disclosure.
8
filed a verification certificate, executed by counsel, which asserted that Slawson
was incompetent and that all matters alleged in the amended motion were true and
correct.  The amended motion contained allegations different from the original rule
3.850 motion as to why Slawson would not meet with counsel; instead of relying on
the revocation of Slawson’s front cuff pass, the motion now asserted:
Mr. Slawson has a long history of mental health
complications culminating in his current incompetence. 
Mr. Slawson refuses to leave his cell for legal visits,
medical evaluations and psychological evaluations. 
Postconviction counsel retained a mental health expert,
and he has reviewed Mr. Slawson’s psychiatric history,
background material, and conversed with postconviction
counsel concerning Mr. Slawson’s written interactions
and refusals to leave his cell.  This expert diagnosed Mr.
Slawson as paranoid schizophrenic, and determined that
he is unable to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding and lacks a rational and
factual understanding of his postconviction proceedings. 
4 Claims 1 and 3 were the only claims not containing the incompetency
qualification; claim 1 presented substantive argument concerning Slawson’s
incompetency, and claim 3 asserted the unconstitutionality of rule 3.851.  See supra
note 3.  Every claim containing the competency qualification also referred to claim 28
concerning outstanding public records, see id., implying that the claims could not be
fully investigated and pled until receipt of those records.
9
Within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, this
expert can say that Mr. Slawson has become so paranoid
and delusional that he is incapable of trusting his
attorneys, family members or anyone else who may be
considered a natural ally.
Based primarily on Slawson’s alleged incompetency, all but two of the
claims asserted in the amended rule 3.850 motion contained the qualification that
CCRC-M could not fully investigate and plead such claims until Slawson became
competent.4  The State responded to Slawson’s amended motion on November 12,
1996, requesting that the court deny claims 3, 5, and 28 on the merits, dismiss
claims 7, 9, 10, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 as procedurally barred,
and summarily deny claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 20, 26, and 27 as
insufficiently pled. Specifically regarding the competency issue raised in claim 1,
the State argued that such claim was (1) insufficiently pled due to the anonymity of
the mental health expert retained by CCRC-M and the lack of sufficient facts
supporting an incompetency finding; (2) without merit because, under Jackson v.
State, 452 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1984), Slawson was not required to be competent
10
during postconviction proceedings; and (3) refuted by the record because it was
clear that CCRC-M had met with Slawson regarding the revocation of his front cuff
pass, evidencing the fact that Slawson would meet with counsel whenever he saw
fit.
On December 20, 1996, a successor trial judge conducted a Huff hearing to
determine whether any of the claims raised by Slawson warranted an evidentiary
hearing.  The hearing focused on the competency claim.  Collateral counsel argued
that Slawson’s incompetency prevented him from providing counsel with facts
concerning his abuse as a child, his prior head injuries and the effects therefrom,
and his relationship with trial counsel.  The State argued that Slawson’s
competency claim allegations were insufficient and that, pursuant to Jackson,
Slawson was not entitled to a competency determination.  After hearing the parties’
arguments, the court permitted Slawson to proceed with his unverified motion but
denied all of his claims, including his competency claim.  On January 13, 1997, the
court issued an order memorializing its earlier ruling, stating the following, in
pertinent part:
The first claim in the Motion asserts that an
evidentiary hearing is necessary due to the Defendant’s
alleged current incompetence.  At the Huff hearing,
counsel for Defendant requested that this Court either
hold an evidentiary hearing as to the Defendant’s present
11
competency or hold this proceeding in abeyance until the
Florida Supreme Court issues an opinion in [Carter v.
State, 706 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1997) (issued November 17,
1997, rehearing denied March 12, 1998)], addressing the
competency issue.  The Court denied these requests, but
indicated the need for a competency hearing would be
readdressed if an evidentiary hearing was granted as to
any of the other claims in the Motion.  Counsel for
Defendant indicated that the remaining claims could not
be developed adequately without guidance from the
Defendant and resolution of the competency concern.
The Court hereby finds that the remaining claims
set forth in the Motion are procedurally barred, without
merit, or otherwise insufficient to warrant the granting of
an evidentiary hearing, for the reasons stated in the State's
response to the Motion.  It is, therefore, ORDERED
AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant’s Motion to
Vacate Judgments of Convictions and Sentences is
hereby DENIED.
The court did not attach any portions of the record to its order in support of its
summary denial of Slawson’s motion, and CCRC-M filed a notice of appeal on
Slawson’s behalf on February 20, 1997.
After receiving the notice of appeal, this Court scheduled Slawson’s case for
oral argument on September 1, 1998.  Prior to oral argument, however, Slawson
filed a pro se “Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction” in this Court.  Consistent with the
motion’s title, Slawson requested that we relinquish jurisdiction over his case so
that the circuit court could rule on the pro se “Motion for Withdrawal and
Termination of Appeal” that he had filed in that court.  After considering Slawson’s
12
motion, we issued an order on August 28, 1998, temporarily relinquishing
jurisdiction to the circuit court for a period of 60 days so that the trial court could
conduct a hearing on Slawson’s withdrawal motion.  We further ordered that
Slawson be present at the hearing and that the circuit court supplement the record
with any documents and transcripts resulting from the hearing.
As directed, the case was returned to the circuit court and the successor trial
judge conducted a hearing on Slawson’s withdrawal motion on September 28,
1998.  The trial judge first reviewed the procedural history in Slawson’s case, and
when she questioned Slawson concerning the rule 3.850 motion filed on his behalf,
Slawson expressed a general lack of knowledge regarding the motion or any
proceedings on his behalf, although he did state that he had “heard rumors” that
there was an appeal in his case pending before this Court.  Slawson indicated that
he understood his right to appeal the summary denial of his rule 3.850 motion and
that this Court could disagree with the circuit court’s ruling.  He also indicated that
he understood what waiving collateral counsel and proceedings would mean, and
he expressed his displeasure with CCRC-M.  On numerous occasions, the trial
judge questioned Slawson regarding whether he wanted to waive only
representation by CCRC-M, or whether he also wanted to waive his collateral
proceedings and dismiss his appeal.  Although Slawson continually expressed his
13
displeasure with CCRC-M, he also consistently indicated that he wished to dismiss
the appeal pending in this Court and forego any further collateral proceedings.
Additionally, in response to questions posed by the trial court, Slawson
elaborated on his educational and employment background.  This recitation
demonstrated that Slawson had a GED equivalency certificate and approximately
one-and-one-half years of college studies in business administration; he served in
the Navy for slightly over two years as an operations specialist and received an
honorable discharge; and he held various odd jobs after leaving the Navy, including
working as a front-end alignment technician, general vehicle mechanic, metal
building erector, miscellaneous steel erector, and iron worker.  Slawson indicated
that he was 35 at the time the murders were committed, and he was 43 at the time of
the hearing.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined that
Slawson was competent and that he had “freely, intelligently, and knowingly”
waived his right to counsel, and that he had dismissed all proceedings on his behalf. 
On October 5, 1998, Judge Allen entered a written order reflecting that
determination and then supplied this Court with the transcript and all documents
resulting from the September 1998 hearing.
After receiving such information, we considered Slawson’s case and decided
that Slawson should receive a mental health evaluation as a predicate to determining
5 Both Dr. Merin and Dr. Maher testified during the guilt phase of the trial that
Slawson did not have the capacity to form a premeditated intent to kill the Wood
family, but both doctors agreed that Slawson did not meet Florida’s test for insanity
at the time of the crime.
14
his competency to waive collateral counsel and collateral proceedings. 
Accordingly, we issued an order on December 17, 1998, stating, in pertinent part:
After reviewing Slawson’s case, this Court finds it
necessary to remand to the circuit court for Slawson to
undergo a mental health evaluation to aid in determining
his competency.  After such a mental health evaluation is
conducted, Judge Allen shall once again determine
whether Slawson is competent to make a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his collateral counsel
and proceedings.  If Judge Allen finds that Slawson is
competent to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver, then she shall report that finding to this Court.  If
Judge Allen finds that Slawson is not competent to make
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, she shall
report that finding to this Court as well.
Accordingly, the present case is hereby remanded
to the Hillsborough County Circuit Court for proceedings
consistent with this order.  The proceedings on remand
are to be conducted within 60 days from the date of
issuance of this order, and the record on appeal shall be
supplemented with any documents resulting from those
proceedings.
Pursuant to our instructions, the trial court appointed Dr. Michael S. Maher
and Dr. Sidney Merin to evaluate Slawson, both of whom had testified as defense
experts during the guilt phase of Slawson’s trial. 5  Dr. Maher filed a written report
finding that Slawson was not competent to waive collateral counsel and collateral
6 This hearing was timely despite being held after the expiration of the original
60-day time limit because we issued an order on February 23, 1999, extending the time
to complete the proceedings on remand to and including April 16, 1999.
15
proceedings, while Dr. Merin filed a written report finding that Slawson was
competent to do so.  The trial court then appointed a third mental health
professional, Dr. Walter E. Afield, to evaluate Slawson, and Dr. Afield filed a
written report finding Slawson competent to represent himself.  After receiving
these reports from the mental health professionals, the trial court brought the parties
together on March 12, 1999,6 during which both the State and Slawson stipulated to
the findings in the mental health professionals’ reports.  Counsel for CCRC-M
argued that (1) this Court’s order remanding for a mental health evaluation nullified
Slawson’s prior waiver; (2) Dr. Afield’s evaluation failed to comply with Judge
Allen’s order appointing him, with the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
with this Court’s decision in Carter; and (3) none of the mental health professionals
was present at the hearing.  Slawson objected to the presence of counsel for
CCRC-M and stated that he did not recall any part of this Court’s order negating
any part of the order granting his prior written waiver motion.  On March 19, 1999,
Judge Allen entered a written order finding that Slawson “is competent to make a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to collateral counsel and
7 After Judge Allen entered her written report, Slawson filed in the circuit court
a “Motion for Injunctive Relief Against the Offices of CCR.”  In his motion, Slawson
argued that CCRC-M should be enjoined from further investigating his case in
violation of the circuit court’s orders.  The impetus for Slawson’s motion was a letter
dated March 1, 1999, from Chief Assistant CCRC Michael P. Reiter, which informed
Slawson that Mr. Reiter would be serving as interim lead attorney on Slawson’s case
and that “[y]our legal team continues to maintain and investigate your case.”  Slawson
has provided this Court with a copy of his motion for injunctive relief, as well as a
copy of the letter from CCRC-M.
16
proceedings,”7 relying exclusively upon written reports and without conducting an
evidentiary hearing.
After receiving Judge Allen’s order of March 19, 1999, we issued another
order, dated July 2, 1999, requesting that CCRC-M, the State, and Slawson file
briefs “regarding Judge Allen’s competency determination and the validity of
Slawson’s waiver of collateral counsel and collateral proceedings.”  The parties
completed such briefing, and we received oral argument in Slawson’s case on April
3, 2000.
Subsequent to receiving oral argument, we noted that Judge Allen’s
determination of Slawson’s competency to waive his rights as to both collateral
counsel and to all collateral proceedings on his behalf was made without the benefit
of live testimony from the court-appointed mental health experts or adversarial
testing.  We became convinced that Slawson should have the opportunity for an
adversarial testing that would involve the in-court testimony of the very experts who
8This evidentiary hearing and subsequent proceedings in the case became the
responsibility of Circuit Judge Rex Barbas, due to the death of Judge Allen.
9Chronologically, Drs. Merin and Afield testified before Dr. Maher.  Dr. Maher
was not available to testify on the same day as Drs. Merin and Afield.  
17
were to make recommendations to the trial court regarding Slawson’s competency
to waive his rights which would produce such significant consequences. 
Therefore, by order dated June 21, 2000, we relinquished jurisdiction in Slawson’s
case to the circuit court for the purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing “to
afford the opportunity to any participant to present the testimony of [court-
appointed mental health experts] Dr. Michael S. Maher, Dr. Sidney Merin, and Dr.
Walter Afield,” with the purpose of such hearing to be “directed exclusively to the
issue concerning whether Newton Slawson is competent to make a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary waiver of his collateral counsel and proceedings.” 
Pursuant to our order, the circuit court conducted the evidentiary hearing.8 
Both sides seized the opportunity to question the three court-appointed mental
health experts.  Drs. Merin and Afield both adhered to their previous diagnoses and
statements that Slawson was competent to make the decision to waive his rights
both to collateral counsel and to having collateral proceedings conducted on his
behalf.  They also indicated that Slawson fully understood the ramifications of
making such a waiver.9  
10The record also indicates that these records were made available to Drs. Merin
and Afield.
18
When Dr. Maher testified during the evidentiary hearing, he initially adhered
to his original diagnosis and statement that Slawson was not competent to waive his
rights to collateral counsel and collateral proceedings.  However, during the initial
phase of his testimony, Dr. Maher also stated that his opinion regarding whether
Slawson was competent to waive his rights to collateral counsel and collateral
proceedings was based in some measure on statements that Slawson had made to
him regarding disciplinary incidents in which Slawson was involved while on death
row.  Dr. Maher indicated that he had not had the opportunity to conduct a
thorough review of Slawson’s relevant prison records, and that Slawson himself
was the primary source of information regarding the occurrence of any disciplinary
incidents.  At the request of counsel for CCRC-M, Judge Barbas continued the
hearing to allow Dr. Maher and all parties in the matter to review Slawson’s
medical, psychiatric, and disciplinary records from Florida State Prison.10  
When the hearing continued, Dr. Maher stated that after conducting a careful
review of Slawson’s prison records and another interview with Slawson, he was
compelled to change his prior opinion regarding Slawson’s competency to waive
his rights to collateral counsel and proceedings.  Expecting to find indications in the
11This order was in response to this Court’s order to the circuit court dated
October 16, 2000, to report the status of the relinquishment proceedings in Slawson’s
case.
12The following findings of fact were also included in the order:  (1) Slawson
appreciates the gravity of the charges that were lodged against him; (2) Slawson
appreciates the gravity of the sentence imposed against him; (3) Slawson understands
the adversarial nature of the legal process; (4) Slawson has the ability to disclose facts
that are pertinent to the relevant legal proceedings; (5) Slawson has the ability to
19
reports to support his prior diagnosis that Slawson suffered from “delusional
beliefs” that would render him incapable of representing himself in collateral
proceedings,  Dr. Maher stated that instead he found nothing to show that Slawson
was incompetent to make the decision to waive his rights.  Specifically, as to the
disciplinary reports, Dr. Maher stated that they were “entirely mundane in the sense
that they were the kind of reports that are typical of common minor conflict with
authority between inmates and authority figures in the prison,” and that “they gave
no indication whatsoever of delusional beliefs.”    Dr. Maher concluded that not
only did Slawson understand the ramifications of waiving his right to collateral
counsel, but also that he was competent to make the decision to do so.
By order dated October 25, 2000,11 the circuit court outlined for this Court 
that because there was no dispute among Drs. Merin, Afield, and Maher regarding
the issue, it therefore found that Slawson was competent to waive his right to
collateral counsel and proceedings.12  The circuit court also conducted a Faretta13
manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and (6) Slawson has the ability to “testify
relevantly.”  We disagree with the contention of CCRC-M that these findings were
merely conclusory and were not grounded on the specific facts of Slawson’s case.
13See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
14CCRC-M in its latest brief states that it has “consistently taken the position in
[the] relinquishment proceedings that it is not representing Mr. Slawson.  Rather,
CCRC’s participation in these proceedings is authorized and delimited by the language
contained in certain Orders issued by this Court.  Also, CCRC was counsel of record
when this case was before this Court on review of the lower court’s summary denial
of Slawson’s original motion for postconviction relief, and CCRC has never filed a
motion to withdraw with this Court.” (Emphasis in original.)
20
hearing on November 9, 2000, in which it determined, after questioning Slawson,
that his waiver of his rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  By order dated
January 19, 2001, we granted the motion to supplement the record with the
transcript of the Faretta hearing; in this order we also extended to January 29, 2001,
the deadline for parties in the matter to submit briefs addressing only the issue that
was considered on relinquishment.    The parties have completed such briefing,14
and we now address the validity of the circuit court’s order finding Slawson to be
competent to waive his rights to collateral counsel and proceedings.
II. ANALYSIS
 
CCRC-M makes three assertions in its latest brief to this Court.  First,
CCRC-M asserts that we should resolve issues raised in the appeal of the trial
21
court’s summary denial of postconviction relief before we approve any waiver by
Slawson of his rights  to collateral counsel and collateral proceedings.  The next
interrelated arguments are that the circuit court erred in accepting Slawson’s waiver
of collateral counsel and proceedings, and that the circuit court erred in its finding
that Slawson was competent to waive his rights to collateral counsel and
proceedings.  
Regarding the first position, we have previously allowed competent death-
sentenced individuals, who have made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver
of their rights to collateral counsel and proceedings, to implement that waiver
without  a resolution of the collateral claims that were pending before us.  In Castro
v. State, 744 So. 2d 986, 986 (Fla. 1999), Edward Castro, a death-sentenced
individual, repeatedly indicated his desire “to waive his right to representation
through CCRC and to waive his right to file postconviction motions in [his] case.” 
After determining that the trial court engaged in the required inquiries regarding
Castro’s competency to make the decision  and  whether he made a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver, we upheld the trial court’s decision to allow him to
discharge CCRC and to withdraw his rule 3.850 motion.  See also Sanchez-
Velasco v. State, 702 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1997) (upholding trial court’s order which
discharged death-sentenced individual’s collateral counsel and dismissed pending
22
rule 3.850 petition, after determining that trial court made required competency and
Faretta inquiries).  We see no material differences on this issue among the instant
case, Castro, and Sanchez-Velasco.  Therefore, we determine that we are not
required to resolve issues pending in Slawson’s postconviction motion before we
consider the validity of the trial court’s order regarding his competency to waive his
rights to collateral counsel and proceedings. 
CCRC-M next contends that the circuit court erred in accepting Slawson’s
waiver of his rights to collateral counsel and proceedings.  In its basic form,
CCRC-M argues that because Slawson has not seen or read the 3.850 motion filed
on his behalf and has refused to discuss his case with CCRC-M attorneys, the
circuit court cannot accept his waiver because it is not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.  Moreover, CCRC-M contends that the circuit court’s actual finding that
Slawson is  competent to waive his rights is in error.  We disagree on both points.
In Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 482, 483 (Fla. 1993), we determined
that a competent capital defendant may waive collateral counsel and collateral
proceedings.  Accord Castro v. State, 744 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1999) (following
Durocher); Sanchez-Velasco v. State, 702 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 1997) (same).  We then
proceeded to explain the general procedures to be followed when a capital
defendant requests such a waiver:
23
[W]e direct the trial judge forthwith to conduct a 
Faretta-type evaluation of Durocher to determine if he
understands the consequences of waiving collateral
counsel and proceedings.  If the judge finds a proper
waiver by Durocher, he shall report that finding to this
Court and the instant petition will be dismissed.  If,
however, Durocher does not understand the
consequences of his decision, the judge shall report that
fact to this Court and CCR will be allowed to proceed on
Durocher’s behalf.  The attorney general’s office and
CCR may attend the evaluation, but may not participate
unless permitted to do so by the judge.  If the
Faretta-type hearing raises questions in the judge’s mind
about Durocher’s competency, he may order a mental
health evaluation and make a competency determination
thereafter.
Durocher, 623 So. 2d 485.  We also established that the relevant test for
competency in the context of waiving collateral counsel and collateral proceedings
in Florida is whether the person seeking waiver has the capacity to “understand[]
the consequences of waiving collateral counsel and proceedings.”  Id.  Further, we
made clear in Durocher that the party challenging the defendant’s waiver request
bears the burden of proving that the defendant is incompetent.  See id. (stating that
“a next friend has the burden ‘to establish the propriety of his status and thereby
justify the jurisdiction of the court,’ ” quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 164 (1990)).  Finally, we provided in Castro that an abuse of discretion
standard applies when reviewing the trial court’s determination regarding a capital
24
defendant’s competency to waive collateral counsel and proceedings.  See 744 So.
2d at 989.
In Slawson’s case, the circuit court followed the procedures outlined in
Durocher and determined that Slawson was competent to make a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of collateral counsel and proceedings.  We
subsequently determined that it would be helpful for Slawson to undergo a mental
health evaluation to aid the circuit court in determining his competency, and the
circuit court properly followed our instructions, appointing three mental health
professionals to evaluate Slawson.  As stated above, the reports and conclusions
of Drs. Merin, Afield, and Maher have been properly subjected to adversarial
testing in an evidentiary hearing.  All three experts have concluded that Slawson is
competent to waive his rights to collateral counsel and proceedings.  After the
evidentiary hearing, the circuit court  once again determined that Slawson was
competent to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights to
collateral counsel and proceedings.  The trial court thereafter also conducted a
Faretta hearing.
After carefully reviewing the facts and arguments presented, we determine
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding Slawson competent to
waive collateral counsel and collateral proceedings.  The circuit court has
25
extensively questioned Slawson regarding his knowledge of his pending
proceedings, the rights he would be waiving, and the consequences of making such
a waiver.  Slawson’s responses to the questions posed by the circuit court
demonstrate that he comprehends his legal options and the consequences of a
waiver.  Although it is clear that Slawson is disenchanted with the perceived
inadequacy of the representation being provided to him by CCRC-M, that fact
alone does not negate his ability to waive both collateral counsel and collateral
proceedings.  In Sanchez-Velasco, we determined that a death-sentenced
individual’s seemingly contradictory positions in indicating the ineffectiveness of
his collateral counsel in asserting the individual’s innocence on one hand, yet also
expressing a desire to waive his rights to collateral counsel and proceedings on the
other, did not cause this Court to doubt the individual’s competency to waive his
rights to collateral counsel and proceedings.  See Sanchez-Velasco, 702 So. 2d at
228.  The agreement of all three mental health experts regarding Slawson’s
competency to waive his rights provides an appropriate foundation for the circuit
court’s order.  Based on the presumption of competency that attaches from trial,
see Durocher, 623 So. 2d at 484, the extensive colloquies in which the circuit court
engaged with Slawson pursuant to Durocher, and the reports and testimony of Drs.
Merin, Afield, and Maher, we determine that the circuit court properly accepted
15We also reject CCRC-M’s contention that Slawson’s case is factually similar
to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), in which the United States Supreme Court
determined that it was reversible error for a state trial judge to accept a defendant’s
plea of guilty without an affirmative showing that the plea was made intelligently and
voluntarily.  No plea of guilty is involved in Slawson’s case; moreover, the circuit
court determined that his waiver of rights to collateral counsel and proceedings was
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
26
Slawson’s waiver and that it did not abuse its discretion in finding Slawson
competent to waive collateral counsel and proceedings.15
Finally, we address CCRC-M’s assertion that we should recede from our
prior decision in Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1988), in which we held
that “there was no error in not appointing counsel against Hamblen’s wishes to
seek out and to present mitigating evidence and to argue against the death
sentence.”  Id. at 804.  However, the present case concerns a waiver of collateral
counsel and collateral proceedings, while Hamblen concerned waiver of a
presentation of mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial.  Cf.
Minerva v. Singletary, 830 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 n.2 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (noting that
the concerns expressed by this Court in Klokoc v. State, 589 So. 2d 219 (Fla.
1991), which addressed waiver of a direct appeal in a capital case, “do not address
the question of waiver of counsel on collateral review”).  In this case, counsel
represented Slawson throughout the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, as well as
on direct appeal to this Court.  The defense presented a case in mitigation, and the
-27-
trial court found three statutory mitigating circumstances and several nonstatutory
mitigating circumstances.  See Slawson, 619 So. 2d at 257.  Based on the
substantial differences between this case and Hamblen, and our recent discussion
of the issue in Muhammad v. State, 728 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001),
we decline to again revisit that issue here.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the above, and consistent with our prior decisions in Durocher,
Sanchez-Velasco, and Castro, we affirm the circuit court’s order finding Slawson
competent to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of collateral counsel
and collateral proceedings.  We further affirm the circuit court’s order discharging
CCRC-M from representing Slawson, and we dismiss with prejudice the appeal
currently pending in this Court from the summary denial of Slawson’s initial rule
3.850 motion.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs in result only.
QUINCE, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,
Diana Allen, Judge - Case No. 89-05619 Div. C
Chris DeBock, Assistant CCRC-Middle, and Mark S. Gruber, Assistant CCRC-
Middle, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel - Middle Region, Tampa, Florida; and
Newton C. Slawson, pro se, Raiford, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Carol M. Dittmar, Assistant Attorney
General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee