Case Title: J.C.C. v. State of Indiana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49S02-0803-JV-143

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Katherine A. Cornelius 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steve Carter 
Marion County Public Defender Agency 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Appellate Division 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zachary J. Stock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
No. 49S02-0803-JV-143 
 
J.C.C., 
 
Appellant (Respondent below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
Appellee (Petitioner below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Marion County Superior Court, Nos. 49D09-0101-JD-379,  
49D09-0101-JD-380, 49D09-0101-JD-389 
The Honorable Christopher Piazza, Magistrate 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0403-JV-266 
_________________________________ 
 
December 16, 2008 
 
Sullivan, Justice. 
 
 
During a year’s incarceration at Boys’ School for an episode of child molesting offenses, 
J.C.C. successfully completed a sex offender treatment program.  We hold that the court was 
required to evaluate whether J.C.C. was rehabilitated while in the treatment program before it 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Dec 16 2008, 2:21 pm
 
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could find by “clear and convincing evidence” that J.C.C. was “likely to repeat” a sex offense 
and order him to register as a sex offender.   
 
Background 
 
 
J.C.C. was adjudicated delinquent for nine acts of child molesting, which would be Class 
B felonies if committed by an adult.  J.C.C. was 14-years-old at the time of the offenses.  The 
nine counts of child molesting related to one incident involving three juvenile victims, and 
generally involved J.C.C. compelling the victims to engage in oral and anal sex with him and 
with each other.   
 
 
Following the disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered J.C.C. committed to the 
Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) for two years for placement at the Indiana Boys’ 
School.  J.C.C. did not appeal.  While committed, J.C.C. successfully completed a treatment 
program for sexual offenders in one year and was released.   
 
 
Following J.C.C.’s release from DOC custody, the State petitioned to have J.C.C. register 
as a sex offender.  At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court ordered J.C.C. 
to register as a sex offender.  J.C.C. appealed.  The Court of Appeals stayed J.C.C.’s registration 
as a sex offender pending the appeal.  The Court of Appeals also allowed J.C.C. to pursue relief 
under Ind. Trial Rule 60(B).  The juvenile court denied the T.R. 60(B) motion.   
 
 
On appeal, J.C.C. raised two claims: first, that the State did not present clear and 
convincing evidence showing that he is likely to re-offend, and second, that the juvenile court 
abused its discretion when it denied his T.R. 60(B) motion.  In an unpublished decision, a 
unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s decision.  J.C.C. v. State, 
No. 49A02-0403-JV-266, slip. op., 878 N.E.2d 544 (Ind. Ct. App. December 28, 2007).  J.C.C. 
then sought, and we granted, transfer.  In re J.C.C., 891 N.E.2d 42 (Ind. 2008) (table).  We now 
address J.C.C.’s first claim.1  
                                                 
1 In his brief to the Court of Appeals, J.C.C. also contended that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion 
for relief under T.R. 60(B).  J.C.C., slip op. at 7.  Specifically, J.C.C. alleged that his attorney was ineffective and 
 
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Discussion 
 
 
I 
 
At the time relevant to this case, Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act required an 
“offender” to register with local law enforcement authorities in the area where the offender 
resided.  Ind. Code § 5-2-12-5 (Supp. 2002).2  Indiana Code § 5-2-12-4(b) (Supp. 2002) 3 
provided that a child is an “offender” if the child: (1) is at least 14-years-old; (2) is on probation, 
parole, or is discharged from a facility by the DOC, is discharged from a “secure private 
facility,”4 or is discharged from a juvenile detention facility as a result of an adjudication as a 
delinquent child for an act that would be a sex offense if committed by an adult; and (3) is found 
by a court by clear and convincing evidence to be likely to repeat an act that would be a sex 
offense if committed by an adult.   
 
J.C.C. maintains that the State failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
he was likely to be a repeat sex offender, as required by I.C. § 5-2-12-4(b)(3).   
 
At the evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court relied exclusively on the testimony of the 
State’s expert witness, Michael Johnson.  At the time of the hearing, Johnson was a Ph.D. 
candidate in clinical psychology with eleven years of experience working with juvenile sex 
offenders.   
 
Johnson did not interview J.C.C. prior to testifying.  (On cross-examination, Johnson said 
that “if I had data from the last six months, if I had assessed [J.C.C.] myself and got information 
about the last six months, that would [have] give[n] me more information that I could’ve used.”  
                                                                                                                                                             
that the problems with the trial were sufficient to raise a question as to whether the trial was fundamentally fair.  Id. 
at 7-8.  We summarily affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals as to this issue.  Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2).   
 
2 I.C. § 5-2-12-5 was repealed by Pub. L. Nos. 140-2006 and 173-2006 (codified at I.C. § 11-8-8-7 (Supp. 2006)).   
 
3 I.C. § 5-2-12-4 was repealed by Pub. L. Nos. 140-2006 and 173-2006 (codified at I.C. § 11-8-8-5(b) (Supp. 2006)).   
 
4 A secure private facility means a facility licensed under Indiana law to operate as a secure private facility, or a 
private facility licensed in another state to provide residential care and treatment to one or more children in a secure 
facility other than a detention center, prison, jail, or similar correctional facility.  I.C. § 31-9-2-115. 
 
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(Tr. 458.))  Nor did Johnson consider any information about J.C.C.’s detention, his successful 
completion of the DOC treatment program for sexual offenders, or his behavior in the 
community following release.  Instead, Johnson relied exclusively on his application of risk 
assessment criteria called the “Estimate of Risk of Adolescent Sexual Offense Recidivism” 
(commonly referred to as “ERASOR”) and his clinical experience to conclude that J.C.C. 
presented a moderately high risk to repeat a sex offense. 
 
The ERASOR instrument utilizes “static and dynamic factors” to assess the level of risk 
of re-offending for a juvenile sex offender.  (Tr. 444.)  The dynamic factors are those 
considerations that change over time; static factors are those that do not.  Johnson testified that 
he placed J.C.C. in the “moderate range of the high risk category” for re-offending because the 
static factors – J.C.C.’s charged offenses – were “on the extreme end of, [] sexual offenses, that 
lead to re-offending.”5  (Tr. 448-49.)  Johnson assumed all dynamic factors in J.C.C.’s favor.  
That is, Johnson assumed that no dynamic factors existed that would increase J.C.C.’s risk of re-
offending.  Johnson also testified that, in his opinion, J.C.C.’s successful completion of the DOC 
treatment program for sexual offenders did not reduce his likelihood to re-offend.   
 
In sum, Johnson concluded that J.C.C.’s offenses were so serious in and of themselves 
that nothing else – not the fact of his incarceration, nor his successful completion of the 
treatment program, nor his behavior in the community following release – could lower his risk of 
committing another sex offense.  The trial court entered judgment on this basis. 
 
II 
 
 
We find the evidence insufficient to conclude that J.C.C. is likely to repeat an act that 
would be a sex offense if committed by an adult.  Our analysis is grounded in the specific 
provisions of the juvenile sex offender registry statute and the general purpose of the juvenile 
code. 
 
                                                 
5 The static factors Johnson identified which would increase J.C.C.’s risk for re-offending included J.C.C.’s diverse 
sexual pattern during the offenses, the multiple offenses, and the multiple victims.   
 
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The sex offender registry statute requires the court to hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether the juvenile is likely to be a repeat sex offender.  I.C. § 5-2-12-4(b); In re 
G.B., 709 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).  When a juvenile is placed in a DOC facility, a 
secure private facility, or a juvenile detention facility, the sex offender registry hearing cannot be 
held until after the juvenile is released from the facility.  I.C. § 5-2-12-4(b)(2).  We believe that 
the legislative intent here is to hold the sex offender registration determination in abeyance so 
that the juvenile has the opportunity to be rehabilitated during detention. 
 
In this case, the State never addressed the possibility that J.C.C.’s successful completion 
of the DOC treatment program for sex offenders reduced his likelihood to re-offend.  The only 
evidence the State presented in support of its request for the “likely-to-repeat” finding was 
Johnson’s evaluation of J.C.C.’s behavior prior to his commitment to the DOC.  By way of 
contrast, in R.G. v. State, 793 N.E.2d 238, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied, the State 
presented the discharge report of the residential treatment facility to which the juvenile had been 
committed.   
 
In addition to the statute’s mandate that the hearing on likelihood to repeat await the 
juvenile’s discharge from secure detention, the Legislature has dictated that the State must prove 
the juvenile’s likelihood to repeat by “clear and convincing” evidence.  The “clear and 
convincing” standard is an intermediate standard of proof that: 
 
lies between a preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt 
which is required to find guilty in criminal prosecutions.  The burden of proof by 
clear and convincing evidence is not a burden of convincing you that the facts 
which are asserted are certainly true or that they are almost certainly true or are 
true beyond a reasonable doubt.  It is, however, greater than a burden of 
convincing you that the facts are more probably true than not true. 
 
Lazarus Dept. Store v. Sutherlin, 544 N.E.2d 513, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied.  Our 
court has observed that the clear and convincing standard is employed in cases “where the 
wisdom of experience has demonstrated the need for greater certainty, and where this high 
standard is required to sustain claims which have serious social consequences or harsh or far 
reaching effects on individuals to prove willful, wrongful and unlawful acts to justify an 
 
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exceptional judicial remedy….”  Estate of Reasor v. Putnam County, 635 N.E.2d 153, 159-60 
(Ind. 1994) (quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 360-61 (Ind. 1982)).  
We believe the Legislature has dictated this heightened burden of proof here in recognition of the 
serious social consequences of sex offender registration, including loss of employment 
opportunities, housing discrimination, threats, and violence.  See B.J.B. v. State, 805 N.E.2d 870, 
873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
 
 
In this regard, the Court of Appeals has held that:  
 
the focus of the inquiry, with respect to a juvenile who has been released from a 
secure facility, is whether the treatment received in that facility has resulted in the 
juvenile’s rehabilitation.  If that is the case, there cannot be clear and convincing 
evidence that the juvenile is likely to re-offend and the juvenile cannot be placed 
on the sex offender registry.   
 
Id. at 874.  In B.J.B., the Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court’s finding that the juvenile 
was likely to repeat.  The juvenile court had relied primarily on psychological examinations of 
the juvenile conducted prior to his dispositions for child molesting and other charges and prior to 
his rehabilitative treatment.  Id.  The juvenile was committed to a long-term, secure facility to 
address his psychological problems.  Id.  Judge Barnes concluded that after discharge “there 
needed to be an evaluation of whether that period of treatment sufficiently rehabilitated [the 
juvenile] and whether he was likely to commit another sex offense.”  Id.  Absent “a full 
evidentiary hearing on this issue,” he wrote, “it [is] impossible for us to conclude that there is 
clear and convincing evidence [that the juvenile was] likely to re-offend.”  Id. 
 
In addition to the specific provisions of the statute we have been exploring, we also find 
it highly relevant (as did the Court of Appeals in B.J.B.) that the Legislature has articulated that 
the guiding policy of this State and the purpose behind Indiana’s juvenile justice system is to 
“ensure that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as persons in need of care, 
protection, treatment, and rehabilitation.”  I.C. § 31-10-2-1(5).  This policy is grounded in the 
Progressive Movement of the 19th and 20th centuries when American society rejected treating 
juvenile law violators and adult criminals the same, favoring individualized diagnosis and 
treatment for juveniles.  N.D.F. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1085, 1088-89 (Ind. 2002) (citing State ex 
 
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rel. Camden v. Gibson Cir. Ct., 640 N.E.2d 696, 697 (Ind. 1994)).  As such, the statutory scheme 
for dealing with minors who commit crimes is vastly different from the statutory scheme directed 
to adults who commit crimes.  B.J.B., 805 N.E.2d at 873.  This policy is consistent with the 
State’s primary interest in rehabilitation, rather than the punishment of juvenile delinquents.  
G.B., 709 N.E.2d at 354 (quoting B.L. v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1311, 1314 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).  
 
Given the overarching rehabilitative thrust of Indiana’s juvenile justice system, id., and 
the statute’s specific requirements that any finding of a juvenile’s likelihood to repeat must await 
discharge from secure detention, G.B., 709 N.E.2d at 353, and must be based on clear and 
convincing evidence, I.C. § 5-2-12-4(b)(3), we hold (as did the Court of Appeals in B.J.B., 805 
N.E.2d at 8746) that an evaluation of whether a juvenile has been rehabilitated while in detention 
is a prerequisite to finding clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile is likely to repeat. 
 
In this case, the trial court relied on the expert testimony of Johnson.  We do not suggest 
that expert testimony cannot establish clear and convincing evidence of likelihood to repeat.  
Indeed, a 2007 amendment to the statute appears to require expert testimony in this regard .7  But 
here the expert based his opinion solely on the pre-dispositional acts of J.C.C.  He did not 
interview J.C.C. after his completion of the treatment program.  Cf. K. J. P. v. State, 724 N.E.2d 
612, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied (all of the expert witnesses interviewed K.J.P.).  
Though such an interview is not required, the expert’s testimony or other evidence must analyze 
whether the juvenile has been rehabilitated subsequent to disposition.  That did not occur in this 
case.  Without such evidence, we cannot conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence 
that J.C.C. is likely to commit another sex offense.   
                                                 
6 The State did not seek transfer from the decision of the Court of Appeals against it in B.J.B. 
 
7 “In making a determination under [I.C. § 11-8-8-5](b)(2)(C), the court shall consider expert testimony concerning 
whether a child is likely to repeat an act that would be an offense described in subsection (a) if committed by an 
adult.”  I.C. § 11-8-8-5(c) (Supp. 2007).  (I.C. § 11-8-8-5(b)(2)(C) is the proviso concerning the court finding 
likelihood to repeat by clear and convincing evidence.) 
 
 
 
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Conclusion 
 
We reverse the order requiring J.C.C. to register as a sex offender.    The opinion of the 
Court of Appeals is vacated except for that portion addressing J.C.C.’s T.R. 60(B) claim, which 
is summarily affirmed.  App. R. 58(A)(2).   
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.