Case Title: Bowie v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 340, 2022

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2023-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
JUSTIN BOWIE,  
 
   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
No. 340, 2022 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 2003005778 (N) 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  July 26, 2023 
Decided:      October 17, 2023 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and GRIFFITHS, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
This 17th day of October 2023, after careful consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
On March 10, 2020, Justin Bowie and a companion were driving 
southbound on I-95 near Marsh Road at approximately 1:15 a.m.  Delaware State 
Police Corporal Andrew Pietlock observed Bowie driving 20 miles over the posted 
speed limit.  Corporal Pietlock followed Bowie for a few miles and then engaged his 
emergency lights.  Bowie took an exceedingly long time to pull over his vehicle.  
(2) 
As Corporal Pietlock approached Bowie’s vehicle he noticed the smell 
of alcohol emanating from the car.  While speaking with the occupants of the vehicle, 
Corporal Pietlock saw that Bowie had glassy and bloodshot eyes.  Corporal Pietlock 
 
 
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asked Bowie and his passenger if they had been drinking.  Bowie admitted to 
drinking.  Corporal Pietlock then asked Bowie to get out of his car and walk to the 
rear of the vehicle.  Bowie made his way to the rear of the vehicle without incident.   
(3) 
At the rear of the vehicle, Corporal Pietlock engaged Bowie in 
conversation.  During the conversation, the officer noticed the smell of alcohol on 
Bowie’s breath.  Bowie also mumbled something Corporal Pietlock could not 
understand.  He then asked Bowie to participate in field sobriety tests.  Bowie 
refused.  Bowie cited safety issues with performing the tests roadside.  Corporal 
Pietlock then arrested Bowie for suspicion of driving under the influence and 
transported him to Delaware State Police Troop 1.   
(4) 
At the Troop, Corporal Pietlock prepared and obtained a search warrant 
to draw a sample of Bowie’s blood.  The warrant contained the details leading to 
Bowie’s arrest, as well as information that Corporal Pietlock learned after the arrest, 
including the fact that Bowie had two prior convictions for alcohol-related traffic 
offenses.   
(5) 
A phlebotomist drew Bowie’s blood at 3:33 a.m.  Corporal Pietlock 
witnessed the phlebotomist invert a test tube—containing a preservative powder, an 
anticoagulant powder and Bowie’s blood—at least once to mix the substances 
together.  The sample was transported to the Delaware State Police Crime Lab where 
it was tested by Julie Willey, the lab’s director.  The results showed that Bowie’s 
 
 
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blood alcohol concentration was 0.16.  As a result, Bowie was charged with driving 
under the influence of alcohol.  
(6) 
In November 2021, Bowie moved to suppress the evidence from his 
arrest and blood draw.  In January 2022, Bowie amended his motion to suppress. 
The Superior Court denied the motion and subsequently denied a motion for 
reargument in April 2022.  The case proceeded to trial.  
(7) 
At trial, Willey testified about the State’s blood draw protocol.  Willey 
testified that when she first started working at the lab, the operative protocol required 
that the test tube be slowly and completely inverted at least five times.  She explained 
that this protocol was authored before computers were in widespread use and that 
there was no documentation or proof that tubes were being inverted five times.  
When she became the director of the lab in 2014, Willey revised the protocol to the 
following:  “immediately after blood collection, assure proper mixing of 
anticoagulant/preservative powder [by] slowly and complete[ly] inverting the blood 
tube.”1  She noted that other law enforcement agencies used a similar protocol.        
(8) 
At the end of the state’s case-in-chief, Bowie moved for a judgment of 
acquittal under Superior Court Criminal Rule 29.  The court denied the motion.  At 
the end of trial, the court did not provide the jury with an expert witness jury 
instruction pertaining to Willey but did provide a general witness credibility 
 
1 App. to Opening Br. at A59. 
 
 
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instruction.  Neither party raised an objection.  During deliberations, the jury sent 
the trial judge the following note:  “the State is required to establish the proper 
protocols.  Do we have to determine whether the State protocols were proper?  Or 
just that the State protocols were followed?”2  The trial judge responded that “[y]ou 
are to determine whether the State protocols were followed.”3   
(9) 
The jury found Bowie guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol.  
On May 9, 2022, Bowie filed another motion for judgment of acquittal, which he 
later amended and expanded to include, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial.4  
The Superior Court denied the motions in September 2022.5  This appeal followed.   
(10) Bowie raises four issues on appeal:  (1) whether the Superior Court 
abused its discretion in denying his motions to suppress on the grounds that his arrest 
for DUI and the search warrant for his blood were supported by probable cause; (2) 
whether the Superior Court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; 
(3) whether the Superior Court committed plain error by failing to provide the jury 
with an expert witness jury instruction; and (4) whether the Superior Court erred in 
 
2 State v. Bowie, 2022 WL 4004005, at *1 (Del. Super. Sept. 1, 2022); see also App. to Opening 
Br. at A72.  
3 Id. 
4 Bowie filed the motion to amend and expand his previously filed motion seeking a judgment of 
acquittal on July 12, 2022. On August 2, 2022, he filed a motion seeking, in the alternative, a 
dismissal of the State’s case.  See App. to Opening Br. at A7.  
5 Below, we address only Bowie’s first motion for judgment of acquittal, as his subsequent motions 
for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial were untimely.  The Superior Court 
appropriately denied them on this ground.  See Bowie, 2022 WL 4004005, at *2. 
 
 
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providing the supplemental jury instruction that the jury should determine only 
whether the State’s revised blood draw protocol was followed.  
(11) First, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bowie’s 
motions to suppress the evidence from his arrest because there was probable cause 
to arrest him for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.6  Probable cause to 
arrest for a DUI offense exists when an officer possesses “information which would 
warrant a reasonable [person] in believing that a crime ha[s] been committed.”7  
Corporal Pietlock observed indicia of impairment—including speeding, failing to 
pull over, bloodshot and glassy eyes, an admission of drinking coupled with a smell 
of alcohol emanating from Bowie and the vehicle, mumbled speech, and a refusal to 
perform field sobriety tests—that, under the totality of the circumstances, provided 
him with probable cause to arrest Bowie for DUI.8   
 
6 The Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress after an evidentiary hearing for 
abuse of discretion.  Rivera v. State, 7 A3d 961, 966 (Del. 2010).  Factual findings are reviewed 
“for whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion in determining whether sufficient evidence 
supported the findings and whether those findings were clearly erroneous.”  Miller v. State, 4 A.3d 
371, 373 (Del. 2010).   
7 Lefebvre v. State, 19 A.3d 287, 292 (Del. 2011).  Police must present facts “which suggest, when 
those facts are viewed under the totality of the circumstances, that there is a fair probability” that 
the defendant has committed a DUI offense.  Id. at 292–93.  Where the underlying facts are not in 
dispute, a finding of probable cause to arrest for a DUI offense “constitutes a legal determination 
that is subject to de novo review.”  Rybicki v. State, 119 A.3d 663, 670 (Del. 2015) (citations 
omitted).  “In the specific context of DUI arrests, probable cause is generally based on the arresting 
officer’s observations of the arrestee, which may include field sobriety tests.”  Id. at 671.  
8  See, e.g., Bease v. State, 884 A.2d 495, 499–500 (Del. 2005) (holding that evidence of a traffic 
violation, odor of alcohol, rapid speech, admission to drinking, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and a 
failed alphabet test constituted probable cause to arrest the driver for a DUI offense); see also 
Rybicki v. State, 119 A.3d at 671 (observing that refusal to submit to field sobriety tests, breath 
 
 
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(12) Similarly, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Bowie’s motions to suppress the evidence obtained from his blood sample because 
there was probable cause to draw his blood.9  In determining whether probable cause 
exists, the judicial officer must likewise apply a totality of the circumstances test “to 
decide if there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place.”10  Given the above facts, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the Superior Court did not err in finding that probable cause existed 
to issue the search warrant.  Bowie’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.  First, 
Bowie contends that the search warrant affidavit required foundational evidence of 
Corporal Pietlock’s law enforcement training and experience and that its omission 
precluded the magistrate from weighing the credibility of his observations and 
 
tests, or other types of testing in the field are other indicia of impairment that can lend to a finding 
of probable cause under the totality of the circumstances).   
9 Under both the United States Constitution and the Delaware Constitution, a search warrant may 
issue only upon the showing of probable cause.  LeGrande v. State, 947 A.2d 1103, 1107–08 (Del. 
2008) (internal citations omitted).  “An affidavit in support of a search warrant must, within the 
four-corners of the affidavit, set forth facts adequate for a judicial officer to form a reasonable 
belief that an offense has been committed and the property to be seized will be found in a particular 
place.”  Rivera v. State, 7 A.3d at 966 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  “Where the facts 
are not disputed and only a constitutional claim of probable cause is at issue, we will review the 
Superior Court’s application of the law of probable cause de novo.”  Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 
296 (Del. 2006) (citations omitted).   
10 Rivera v. State, 7 A.3d at 966–967 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Rybicki v. 
State, at 668–69; Lambert v. State, 110 A.3d 1253, 1255 (Del. 2015).  The judicial officer may 
draw reasonable inferences from the affidavit’s factual allegations.  Id. at 967.  We are to accord 
a magistrate’s determination of probable cause great deference, and our role is to “ensure that the 
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.”  Sisson, 903 A.2d 
at 296 (citations omitted).  That said, it is not our job to “rubber stamp” a judicial officer’s 
determination.  Id. (citations omitted).  
 
 
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conclusions.  This is without merit because evidence of an officer’s training can be 
inferred.11  Second, Bowie argues that Corporal Pietlock inappropriately included 
two previous convictions for alcohol-related traffic offenses when seeking the 
warrant and that he did so to increase the probability of obtaining the warrant.12  On 
this point, the trial court agreed with Bowie that his prior convictions cannot be used 
to establish the “substantial basis” of the search warrant. 13  We too agree, but 
conclude that even apart from Bowie’s prior convictions, Corporal Pietlock observed 
sufficient indicia of impairment to support the magistrate’s finding of probable cause 
to obtain a warrant for Bowie’s blood.  
(13) Second, the Superior Court did not err in denying Bowie’s initial 
motion for judgment of acquittal, which he made at trial after the State closed its 
case-in-chief.14  On appeal from the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we 
decide de novo “whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the State, could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
 
11 See Rivera v. State, 7 A.3d at 967 (“[T]he magistrate may draw reasonable inferences from the 
affidavit’s factual allegations.”). 
12 To the extent this was error, it was harmless, and did not render the warrant fatally defective.    
13 See App. to Opening Br. at A12–13. 
14 As noted above, the Superior Court properly denied Bowie’s subsequent motions for judgment 
of acquittal, or in the alternative, for a new trial due to their untimeliness.  See Bowie, 2022 WL 
4004005, at *2.  Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 45(b), the trial court may not extend the time 
for any action under Criminal Rules 29 and 33, unless they allow for certain extensions of time, 
none of which are applicable here.  Id.  Accordingly, we need only address Bowie’s initial motion 
for judgment of acquittal on its merits.   
 
 
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of all of the elements of the crime.”15  Bowie contends that due to the “profound 
unreliability of the [blood] collection protocol,” there was insufficient evidence to 
support a finding that his blood alcohol content was .08 or more within four hours 
of driving.16  We find that Bowie waived this argument.  At no point before or during 
trial did Bowie object to Willey’s testimony or his blood draw results on  the grounds 
that they were unreliable.17  And in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the State, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence that would allow the 
jury to find Bowie guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the elements of driving 
under the influence of alcohol, including that his blood alcohol content was .08 or 
more within four hours of driving.  
(14) Third, the Superior Court’s failure to provide the jury with an expert 
witness jury instruction does not constitute plain error. 18  It is a general rule that a 
 
15 Cline v. State, 720 A.2d 891, 892 (Del. 1998) (footnote omitted).  Here, to convict Bowie of 
driving under the influence, the State was charged with proving beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(1) Bowie was driving; and (2) “his alcohol concentration was, within four hours after the time of 
driving .08 or more—the registered alcohol concentration resulted from an amount of alcohol 
present in, or consumed by [Bowie] when he was driving.”  Selby v. State, 2019 WL 3454087, at 
*3 (Del. Super. July 31, 2019).   
16 App. to Opening Br. at 14.   
17 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 625 A.2d 278 (Del. 1993) (“The failure to object at trial constitutes a 
waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal unless the error is plain.”).  
18 See Dougherty v. State, 21 A.3d 1, 3 (Del. 2011).  “Under the plain error standard of review, the 
error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness 
and integrity of the trial process.”  Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).  “Furthermore, 
the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; 
which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused 
of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”  Id. (internal quotations and 
citations omitted).   
 
 
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party “should submit specific written requests for jury instructions in order to present 
its contentions to the trial court and preserve these contentions for a possible 
appeal.” 19  Here, the record shows, and Bowie concedes, that the inadvertent 
omission by the trial court went unnoticed by the parties and Bowie did not object 
to the omission.  Accordingly, we find that this issue was not preserved for appeal, 
and we therefore review the Superior Court’s failure to provide the instruction for 
plain error.20 
(15) The trial court’s failure to give this specific instruction did not amount 
to plain error.  For example, in Lonergan v. State, this Court found that the trial 
court’s failure to provide an expert witness instruction as to the testimony of a police 
officer did not result in plain error because his testimony was within the scope and 
understanding of an average juror, and the general credibility instruction that the trial 
court gave the jury informed it of the weight to afford the officer’s testimony.21   
(16) Bowie argues that the failure to include an expert witness instruction 
resulted in jury confusion; namely, that the note the jury sent to the trial judge was 
 
19 Zimmerman v. State, 565 A.2d 887, 890 (Del. 1989).  
20 We may excuse a party’s waiver if we find “that the trial court committed plain error requiring 
review in the interests of justice.”  See Supr. Ct. Rule 8; see also Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 
563 (Del. 1995); see also Dougherty v. State, 21 A.3d 1, 6–7 (Del. 2011) (reviewing for plain error 
when appellant did not request a specific jury instruction at trial); Watson v. State, 2023 WL 
5030026, at *5 (Del. Aug. 8, 2023) (citation and internal quotations omitted) (“Here, because 
Watson failed to object to the alleged misconduct at trial, we review only for plain error.”).  
21 590 A.2d 502 (Del. 1991). 
 
 
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evidence that they were confused about “what role they were to play” in evaluating 
Willey’s testimony.22  We disagree.  The Superior Court gave the jury a general 
witness credibility instruction, allowing them to give appropriate weight to Willey’s 
testimony.  In other words, because the jury had a sufficient understanding of its 
role, we find that the failure to give a specific expert witness instruction, if it were 
to amount to error, would be harmless.  
(17) Fourth, the Superior Court did not err in providing a supplemental 
instruction to the jury that it should determine whether the State’s current blood draw 
protocol was followed.  On appeal, we review a challenged jury instruction to 
determine “whether the instruction correctly stated the law, and enabled the jury to 
perform its duty.”23  We review “de novo a refusal to instruct on a defense theory (in 
any form)” and we review “a refusal to give a ‘particular’ instruction (that is, an 
instruction is given but not with the exact form, content or language requested) for 
an abuse of discretion.”24   Bowie argues that the jury should have been instructed 
to determine whether the protocol was both valid and followed, not just whether it 
was followed.  Had the trial court instructed the jury in the way in which Bowie 
 
22 Opening Br. at 34; Reply Br. at 25. 
23 Brown v. State, 49 A.3d 1158, 1160 (Del. 2012) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see 
also Bullock v. State, 775 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Del. 2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted) 
(“While some inaccuracies and inaptness are to be expected in any charge, this Court will reverse 
if the alleged deficiency in the jury instructions undermined . . . the jury’s ability to intelligently 
perform its duty in returning a verdict.”).  
24 Wright v. State, 953 A.2d 144, 148 (Del. 2008).  
 
 
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wanted, it would have amounted to instructing the jury about the defense’s legal 
theory of the case.  And as the State points out, Bowie did not file a pretrial motion 
in limine to exclude Willey’s expert testimony or the blood test results on the basis 
of the blood draw protocol’s reliability, nor did he object to her testimony or the 
blood sample results at trial.25  Accordingly, we find that the instruction was not a 
misstatement of law and that the court’s supplemental instruction allowed the jury 
to perform its duty in reaching a verdict that Bowie was driving under the influence 
of alcohol.   
NOW, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
 
25 Answering Br. at 45.