Case Title: Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing

Citation: 438 P.2d 865, 73 Wash. 2d 393

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1968-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
73 Wn.2d 393 (1968) 438 P.2d 865 COOK, FLANAGAN & BERST, Respondents, v. H.P. CLAUSING et al., Appellants.[*] No. 38735. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. March 21, 1968. Kumm, Maxwell, Petersen & Lee, by F. Robert Lee, for appellants. Davies, Pearson, Anderson & Pearson, Pinckney M. Rohrback, and Wayne J. Davies, for respondents. HUNTER, J. This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict awarding attorney fees. The issue framed by the defendants' answer to the plaintiffs' complaint, and by the defendants' counterclaim and *394 plaintiffs' reply thereto, is whether the plaintiffs' attorneys negligently performed services, and if so, whether they were liable for damages resulting therefrom to the defendants. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them $4,500 for services performed, and necessarily found against the defendants on the malpractice issue. The defendants' assignments of error are directed to three instructions given by the trial court on the issue of negligence, and to the failure of the court to give an instruction proposed by the defendants. The defendants in their argument place primary emphasis upon the trial court's alleged error in giving instruction No. 16: [1] The defendants contend that the instruction is erroneous because it fails to qualify the statement, that an attorney is not liable for "a mere error of judgment if he acts in good faith and in an honest belief that his acts and advice are well founded and in the best interest of his client," with the proviso that such an error in judgment must itself fall short of negligence if the lawyer is to be protected from liability. We agree. The instruction is patently misleading and standing alone is an incorrect statement of the law. The plaintiffs argue, however, that this instruction is correct when considered with the other instructions given, particularly the trial court's instructions Nos. 12 and 13. This argument might have been tenable had those instructions been full and correct statements of the law. Instruction No. 12 reads: [2] We agree with the defendants that this instruction is also erroneous. It fails to set forth a standard for the degree of skill and knowledge that an attorney undertakes to exercise on behalf of his client. In a case based on an allegation of negligent malpractice, it is essential for the guidance of the jury that the court set forth in its instructions the applicable standard of conduct against which the actions complained of are to be measured. [3] The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 299A (1965), states the standard as follows: Prosser explains that: The standards of practice for lawyers in this jurisdiction as a qualification for the practice of law are the same throughout the state, and do not differ in its various communities. We therefore hold that the correct standard to which the plaintiff is held in the performance of his professional services is that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this jurisdiction. See Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E. *396 2d 144, 45 A.L.R.2d 1 (1954); Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 87 A.L.R.2d 986 (1961); 3 T. Shearman & A. Redfield, Negligence § 570 (rev. ed. C. Zipp 1941). The plaintiffs, however, rely on Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wn.2d 581, 328 P.2d 164 (1958). That case did not involve an instruction to a jury and is not apposite. Neither do we find that the following instruction, No. 13, corrects the errors of law we have discussed above with reference to instructions No. 16 and No. 12: The defendants contend this instruction is an incorrect statement of the law. We find the instruction in essence to be correct but incomplete in that it fails to incorporate the necessary standard for the performance of professional services, as heretofore stated. The plaintiffs, however, contend that the trial court erred in submitting the issue of negligence to the jury, since the questions relating to negligence were all questions of law. We do not agree. There are material factual issues in this case which are properly for the jury's determination under appropriate instructions. In view of our disposition of this case we need not consider the remaining contentions raised on this appeal. The judgment of the trial court upon the jury verdict for the plaintiffs is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial on all issues. Costs will abide the final determination of the cause. ROSELLINI, HAMILTON, and NEILL, JJ., and EVANS, J. Pro Tem., concur. [*] Reported in 438 P.2d 865.