Case Title: People v. Crespo

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86556

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 86556-Agenda 9-November 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								HECTOR CRESPO, Appellant.
	Defendant, Hector Crespo, was convicted of the first degree
murder of Maria Garcia in a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook
County. The jury also convicted him of one count of armed
violence, one count of aggravated battery based on intentionally or
knowingly causing great bodily harm, and one count of aggravated
battery using a deadly weapon, all in connection with the stabbing
of Garcia's daughter, Arlene. The circuit court sentenced
defendant to a 75-year term of imprisonment for the murder and
to a 30-year term for armed violence. The court also imposed a
five-year term for aggravated battery after stating that the two
aggravated batteries were merged. All of the prison terms were to
be served concurrently.
	Defendant appealed his convictions. He maintained that his
conviction for aggravated battery could not stand because it was
based on the same single act as the armed violence charge. He also
argued that the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury an
instruction on second degree murder. The appellate court affirmed
defendant's convictions and ordered the circuit clerk to amend the
mittimus to reflect that defendant was convicted of first degree
murder, armed violence, and one count of aggravated battery. No.
1-97-3057 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
Defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal, arguing only that his
conviction for aggravated battery should be vacated because it
stemmed from the same physical act as the armed violence charge.
We allowed defendant's petition (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now
reverse, in part, the judgment of the appellate court.

Background
	The facts giving rise to defendant's convictions are not in
dispute. Defendant and the murder victim, Maria Garcia, lived
together with their infant son and Garcia's daughters. On June 25,
1995, defendant, after consuming alcohol and cocaine throughout
the day, returned home at around 9:15 p.m. According to Garcia's
daughter, Arlene, shortly after defendant's arrival home, he and
her mother began to argue over money and the fact that defendant
was wearing a gold necklace that belonged to Garcia. As the
argument intensified, Garcia asked defendant to leave the house.
Defendant refused, and Garcia told Arlene to call the police.
Arlene called 911 and told the dispatcher that she wanted her
stepfather escorted from the home because he was getting violent.
After the 911 call was made, defendant locked himself in a
bedroom.
	Defendant eventually began to leave the house through a back
door. At that time, Garcia told him "don't leave you coward."
Garcia told defendant that she wanted police to "escort him out."
Defendant replied that he was not afraid of police and that he was
not "a coward." The two then argued more, and moved into the
kitchen near some drawers. Defendant attempted to reach into a
drawer where knives were kept, but Garcia closed it. A few
minutes later, defendant pulled out a knife about eight inches long.
Garcia again tried to shut the drawer, but defendant hit her in the
head with his fist. The two began to fight. When Arlene tried to
intercede, defendant stabbed her three times in rapid succession.,
once in the right arm, and twice in the left thigh. After defendant
stabbed Arlene, defendant turned to Garcia and grabbed her by the
hair. He then stabbed her. As defendant stabbed Garcia, Arlene ran
out of the house, calling for help.
	According to neighbors, Arlene ran from her house screaming
for help. Police officers responded to the scene and found Arlene
hysterical. She told them that her stepfather had stabbed her and
that her mother and younger brother were still in the house. Police
found Garcia lying on the kitchen floor in a pool of blood.
Witnesses told police that defendant had fled the scene.
	Garcia died as a result of the injuries inflicted by defendant.
The autopsy revealed that she had sustained multiple stab wounds
to the neck, chest, and abdomen. Arlene was treated for her
wounds at the hospital, where approximately 20 staples were
needed to close the three stab wounds.
	Police arrested defendant in July 1995, and a grand jury
returned an indictment against him several weeks later.
Specifically, the indictment charged defendant with two counts of
first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder,
two counts of aggravated battery (one count based on battery with
a deadly weapon, and one count based on great bodily harm), and
one count of armed violence. The armed violence charge was
predicated upon the great bodily harm aggravated battery charge.
Defendant was also indicted on one count of theft, which the State
later agreed to nol-pros. The jury returned verdicts finding
defendant (i) guilty of first degree murder, (ii) guilty of armed
violence, (iii) guilty of aggravated battery based on great bodily
harm, (iv) guilty of aggravated battery based on a deadly weapon,
and (v) not guilty of attempted murder.
	As noted previously, defendant maintained in the appellate
court that his aggravated battery conviction must be vacated
because it was based on the same physical act as his armed
violence conviction, or, alternatively, that the mittimus, which
reflected two aggravated battery convictions, should be corrected
to reflect the fact that the trial court merged defendant's two
aggravated battery convictions into one aggravated battery
conviction. The appellate court rejected defendant's "same
physical act" argument, but amended the mittimus to reflect one,
as opposed to two, aggravated battery convictions.(1)

Discussion
	Defendant maintains that the remaining aggravated battery
conviction must be vacated because the aggravated battery charge
stemmed from the same physical act which formed the basis of the
armed violence charge. According to defendant, the three stab
wounds to Arlene did not constitute "different offenses" such that
multiple convictions can be sustained.
	The State responds that the appellate court, in rejecting
defendant's contention, properly applied the precedent of this
court. The State maintains that defendant stabbed Arlene three
times and that each act of stabbing properly constitutes a separate
offense. As framed by the State, the issue before this court is
whether these three different stabbings were three "separate and
distinct acts" each capable of independently sustaining a complete
criminal conviction.
	The seminal case in this area is People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551
(1977). There, this court explained:
			"Prejudice results to the defendant only in those
instances where more than one offense is carved from the
same physical act. Prejudice, with regard to multiple acts,
exists only when the defendant is convicted of more than
one offense, some of which are, by definition, lesser
included offenses. Multiple convictions and concurrent
sentences should be permitted in all other cases where a
defendant has committed several acts, despite the
interrelationship of those acts. 'Act,' when used in this
sense, is intended to mean any overt or outward
manifestation which will support a different offense. We
hold, therefore, that when more than one offense arises
from a series of incidental or closely related acts and the
offenses are not, by definition, lesser included offenses,
convictions with concurrent sentences can be entered."
King, 66 Ill. 2d  at 566.
Based on this reasoning, the court in King upheld the defendant's
convictions for rape and burglary because the offenses were based
on separate acts, each requiring proof of a different element.
	Both defendant and the State ask this court to revisit King,
albeit for different reasons. Defendant urges us to reconsider the
definition of an "act" in King and specifically asks us to consider
a six-part test that has developed in the appellate court. The State,
on the other hand, argues that the "multiple acts/lesser included
offense" portion of the King rule has caused confusion over the
years and asks us to clarify it.
	The State correctly notes that, in King, this court defined an
"act" as any overt or outward manifestation that will support a
separate offense. King, 66 Ill. 2d  at 566. This court has
consistently used the King definition of an "act." For example, in
People v. Myers, 85 Ill. 2d 281 (1981), we considered a situation
in which the defendant stabbed one victim in the throat, removed
the knife briefly to cut a second victim, then again stabbed the first
victim in the throat. In determining that the defendant committed
two physical acts with respect to the first victim, this court
accorded significance to the fact that there was a distinct,
intervening act separating the successively inflicted stab wounds.
See Myers, 85 Ill. 2d  at 288-89. One year later, in People v. Dixon,
91 Ill. 2d 346 (1982), this court again looked to King, interpreting
the definition of an "act" narrowly. There, we rejected the
argument that striking the victim several times with a club
constituted a continuous beating and therefore a single physical
act. Rather, we held that the separate blows, although closely
related, constituted separate acts which could properly support
multiple convictions with concurrent sentences.
	As noted, defendant invites this court to apply a six-factor test
that has developed in our appellate court in cases that postdate
Dixon. See, e.g., People v. Crum, 183 Ill. App. 3d 473, 490-91
(1989); People v. Williams, 143 Ill. App. 3d 658, 665-66 (1986),
People v. Horne, 129 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1074-75 (1984). The test
is a culmination of points gleaned from various Illinois cases. See
People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183, 188 (1996) (discussing test).
This court in Rodriguez acknowledged the existence of the
appellate court test, but declined to address its merits. We
cautioned, however, that "a court must not lose sight of the forest
for the trees. The definition of an 'act' under the King doctrine
remains simply what this court stated in King: 'any overt or
outward manifestation which will support a different offense.' "
Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d  at 188.
	After examining the record in the instant case, we believe that
the adoption of the six-factor test is unnecessary to the disposition
of this appeal. Under Dixon, each of Arlene's stab wounds could
support a separate offense; however, this is not the theory under
which the State charged defendant, nor does it conform to the way
the State presented and argued the case to the jury.
	A careful review of the indictment in this case reveals that the
counts charging defendant with armed violence and aggravated
battery do not differentiate between the separate stab wounds.
Rather these counts charge defendant with the same conduct under
different theories of criminal culpability. The armed violence
count of the indictment charged defendant with committing
aggravated battery against Arlene while he was armed with a knife
that had a blade of over three inches. The aggravated battery
counts charged defendant as follows:
			"He, intentionally or knowingly without legal
justification caused bodily harm to Arlene Guerrero while
using a deadly weapon, to wit: A knife by stabbing Arlene
Guerrero with said knife, in violation, of Chapter 720, Act
5, Section 12-4-B(1), of the Illinois Compiled Statutes
1992, as amended, and
			He, in committing a battery on Arlene Guerrero
intentionally or knowingly without legal justification
caused great bodily harm to said Arlene Guerrero he
stabbed Arlene Guerrero with a knife, in violation, of
Chapter 720, Act 5, Section 12-4-A of the Illinois
Compiled Statutes, as amended."
Nowhere in these charges does the State attempt to apportion these
offenses among the various stab wounds.
	We believe that to apportion the crimes among the various
stab wounds for the first time on appeal would be profoundly
unfair. When the State originally charged defendant with
aggravated battery (great bodily harm), the State alleged that the
great bodily harm was stabbing the victim with a knife. The
State's original aggravated battery (deadly weapon) charge was
predicated on allegations that defendant stabbed Arlene with a
knife. The State's closing argument, with respect to both charges
of aggravated battery, consisted on the following remarks:
		"To sustain the charge of aggravated battery, the State
must prove the following propositions: first, the defendant
knowingly and intentionally caused bodily harm to Arlene
Guerrero. We know he stabbed her three times. Second
that he used a deadly weapon other than the discharge of
[a] firearm. Ladies and gentlemen, this knife is a deadly
weapon."
Then, when the prosecutor addressed armed violence, which was
predicated on the offense of aggravated battery (great bodily
harm), the assistant State's Attorney read the elements of the
offense and said, "We know that he stabbed Arlene Guerrero three
times." After addressing all of the elements, the prosecutor stated,
"each of these propositions has been proved." Thus, the State's
theory at trial, as shown by its argument to the jury, amply
supports the conclusion that the intent of the prosecution was to
portray defendant's conduct as a single attack.
	It has been held that what constitutes "great bodily harm" to
support a charge of aggravated battery is a question of fact to be
determined by the finder of fact. See People v. Hadley, 20 Ill. App.
3d 1072, 1077 (1974). Here, the State specifically argued to the
jury that the three stab wounds constituted great bodily harm. The
State never argued that only one of the stab wounds would be
sufficient to sustain this charge. Again, it must be pointed out that
the State could have, under our case law, charged the crime that
way, and could have argued the case to the jury that way. The
State chose not to do so, and this court cannot allow the State to
change its theory of the case on appeal. It is possible that, although
the jury found that all three stab wounds together constituted great
bodily harm, the jury would not have considered any one of the
stab wounds individually to constitute great bodily harm. This
court will not invade the province of the jury and decide this
question of fact.
	In both People v. Crum, 183 Ill. App. 3d 473, and People v.
Ellis, 143 Ill. App. 3d 892 (1986), the appellate court found that
the charging instruments evinced the State's intent to treat the
conduct of the defendants as single acts. Similarly, in this case, the
charging instruments reveal that the State intended to treat the
conduct of the defendant as a single act. In order to convict
defendant, the State charged him with stabbing in four different
ways, based on four different theories. Apart from the attempted
murder charge, the State charged that defendant (i) committed
aggravated battery because he caused the victim great bodily harm,
(ii) committed aggravated battery because he used a deadly
weapon, and (iii) committed armed violence because he
committed an aggravated battery while armed with a dangerous
weapon. The State made no attempt, however, to apportion these
crimes among the stab wounds, and it is improper for this court to
do so now on appeal.
	Moreover, we believe that today's decision avoids several
constitutional problems that might arise were we to agree with the
State that multiple convictions are proper under these
circumstances. We note that the United States and Illinois
Constitutions both require that a defendant in a criminal
prosecution be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8. Under Illinois
law, a defendant has a fundamental right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the criminal accusations against him so that he
may prepare a defense and so that the charged offense may serve
as a bar to subsequent prosecution arising out of the same conduct.
People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 51 (1994). If we were to agree
with the State, defendant would not have known until the cause
was on appeal that the State considered each of the separate stabs
to be separate offenses, and therefore he would not have been able
to defend the case accordingly.
	We emphasize that in Dixon, this court held that each separate
blow of a mop handle could support a separate conviction and that
this remains a valid proposition of law. Today's decision merely
holds that in cases such as the one at bar, the indictment must
indicate that the State intended to treat the conduct of defendant as
multiple acts in order for multiple convictions to be sustained.
	Due to our disposition of this appeal, we do not reach the
State's argument regarding lesser-included offenses.

Conclusion
	As noted, the appellate court ordered the circuit court to
amend the mittimus in this matter to reflect one, not two,
aggravated battery convictions and also affirmed the defendant's
convictions for first degree murder and armed violence. However,
for the reasons stated, the defendant's remaining aggravated
battery conviction should have been reversed. Therefore, the
judgment of the appellate court is affirmed in part and reversed in
part and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
Appellate court judgment affirmed
in part and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
	 
	JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Supplemental Opinion Upon Denial of Rehearing
	On rehearing, defendant requests that this court vacate his 75-year extended-term sentence because the procedures followed by
the circuit court in imposing that sentence upon him did not
comply with the mandates of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). He contends that
the sentencing range for first degree murder is 20 to 60 years and
that imposition of a sentence in excess of that range requires proof
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of any factors upon which
such sentence is based. Since, in his case, the extended-term
sentence was based upon a post-trial finding by the circuit court
that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner,
indicative of wanton cruelty (see 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West
1994)), defendant contends that his sentence must be vacated and
the cause reversed for resentencing.
	The State concedes that in People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378
(2002), this court held that the sentencing range for first degree
murder was 20 to 60 years' imprisonment. The State accordingly
further concedes that, because defendant's 75-year sentence was
based on the circuit court's finding that the crime was brutal and
heinous, "defendant's sentence violates Apprendi." Nevertheless,
the State contends that defendant's sentence should stand, because
in this case the Apprendi violation was harmless error. The State
delineates the details of the crime and argues that no reasonable
jury could have failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner, indicative
of wanton cruelty.
	In reply, defendant argues solely that an Apprendi violation
falls within that narrow category of errors deemed "structural,"
such that harmless-error review is inappropriate and instead
reversal should be automatic. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States,
520 U.S. 461, 468-69, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718, 728, 117 S. Ct. 1544,
1549-50 (1997) (summarizing cases). However, we recently
addressed this precise question and concluded that Apprendi
violations are not structural error, but rather are susceptible to
harmless-error analysis. See People v. Thurow, No. 90911
(February 6, 2003).
	We note, however, that although the parties have framed this
argument in terms of whether the error was "harmless," the proper
inquiry in this case is whether the Apprendi violation constituted
"plain error," because defendant did not object at the time of trial.
See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002) (applying plain-error test because of
defendant's failure to object at trial, even though Apprendi had not
been decided until after defendant was convicted). An "important
difference" between the two analyses lies in the burden of proof:
in harmless-error analysis, the State must prove that the jury
verdict would have been the same absent the error to avoid
reversal, whereas under plain-error analysis, a defendant's
conviction and sentence will stand unless the defendant shows the
error was prejudicial. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
734, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508, 520, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1778 (1993);
Thurow, slip op. at 8.
	In Cotton, the Court noted that " 'before an appellate court
can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) "error," (2)
that is "plain", and (3) that "affect[s] substantial rights." '
[Citation.] If all 'three conditions are met, an appellate court may
then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if
(4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Cotton, 535 U.S. at ___, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 868, 122 S. Ct.  at 1785, quoting Johnson, 520 U.S.  at
467, 137 L. Ed. 2d  at 727, 117 S. Ct.  at 1549. The Court held that
"even assuming respondents' substantial rights were affected, the
error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings." Cotton, 535 U.S. at ___, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 868, 122 S. Ct.  at 1786. The Court reached this
conclusion based on the overwhelming evidence adduced.
	In this case, we reach the same conclusion by the same
reasoning. The undisputed forensic evidence established that
defendant attacked his victim with a kitchen knife with an eight-inch-long blade. He stabbed her repeatedly about the head, neck,
and body, inflicting a total of 24 stab wounds. He used such force
that after his assault the knife blade was bent at a 90-degree angle.
While he was stabbing her, defendant held his victim by her hair,
yanking it with sufficient severity to rip out a large clump of hair
with the scalp still attached. On the basis of this overwhelming
evidence that the crime was brutal and heinous, there is no basis
for concluding that the Apprendi violation "seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." We
have no doubt that a jury, presented with these facts, would have
found that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous
manner, indicative of wanton cruelty. Accordingly, defendant has
failed to show that the error was prejudicial.
	As our appellate court observed, in a case involving
retroactive application of Apprendi,
			"there is no basis for concluding that any error seriously
affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the
judicial proceedings. Indeed, it would be the vacatur of
petitioner's sentence that would have such an effect. 
Prisoners should not be misled into believing that every
sentencing issue, already substantially decided a
generation ago by previous fact finders, can be altered
through some magic door such as Apprendi. Talbott v.
Indiana, 226 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). As the
Supreme Court noted in Cotton, 'the fairness and integrity
of the criminal justice system depends on meting out to
those inflicting the greatest harm on society the most
severe punishments.' Cotton, 535 U.S. at ___, 152 L. Ed. 2d  at 869, 122 S. Ct.  at 1787. ' "Reversal for error,
regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages
litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the
public to ridicule it." ' Johnson, 520 U.S.  at 470, 137 L. Ed. 2d  at 729, 117 S. Ct.  at 1550, quoting R. Traynor, The
Riddle of Harmless Error 50 (1970)." People v. Gholston,
332 Ill. App. 3d 179, 188 (2002).
	Although the procedure followed by the circuit court in
sentencing defendant did violate Apprendi, we conclude that the
error did not rise to the level of plain error. Accordingly,
defendant's argument on rehearing does not persuade us to alter
our disposition of this case.





Dissenting Opinion Upon Denial of Rehearing
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:
	Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), was rendered a dead letter in this state by a
majority of this court in People v. Thurow, No. 90911 (February
6, 2003). In that case, the majority wrongly held that Apprendi
violations are subject to harmless error analysis. See Thurow, slip
op. at 20 (Kilbride, J., dissenting). By so holding, the majority
essentially renders unassailable most illegally imposed extended-term sentences where a trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the existence of an aggravating factor in violation of the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g.,
People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378, 392 (2002) (finding that
defendant's crime was brutal and heinous unconstitutionally made
by a trial judge).
	Curiously, the majority in this case has not relied on Thurow
in addressing the Apprendi violation that occurred below, despite
harmless error being the only argument urged by the State. Instead,
the majority, sua sponte, raises and decides this case on an issue
neither briefed nor argued by the parties: plain error. Perhaps the
majority is hesitant to apply Thurow because doing so is
essentially the same as affirming a directed verdict for the State.
See Thurow, slip op. at 20 (Kilbride, J., dissenting).
	An equally troubling concern presented by this case is its
remarkable similarity to People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378 (2002),
decided a mere four months ago. Swift is precisely on point and
requires vacatur of defendant's sentence. In Swift, as here, the
defendant failed to argue an Apprendi error before the trial court.
The Apprendi violation that occurred in Swift was the very same
that occurred here: a "brutal and heinous" finding made by a trial
judge by a preponderance of the evidence. The Swift appellate
court recognized the error, even though the defendant failed to
raise the issue before the circuit court, called the error one that
"affect[ed] a fundamental right," and vacated the defendant's
extended sentence, remanding for a new sentencing hearing.
People v. Swift, 322 Ill. App. 3d 127, 128-31 (2001). This court
affirmed. We unambiguously held that "for purposes of Apprendi
analysis, the 'sentencing range' for first degree murder in Illinois
is 20 to 60 years' imprisonment." Swift, 202 Ill. 2d  at 392. Any
higher sentence based on additional factual findings "must be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Swift, 202 Ill. 2d  at
392. 
	Defendant in this case received a 75-year sentence, 15 years
above the prescribed maximum, based on the trial judge's finding
by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime was brutal and
heinous. The evidence showed the victim had been stabbed 24
times. The defendant in Swift received an 80-year sentence, 20
years above the prescribed maximum, also based on a trial judge's
brutal and heinous finding. The victim in Swift had been stabbed
21 times. Neither defendant raised an Apprendi argument before
the circuit court. Yet, the defendant's sentence in Swift was
vacated by this court in light of Apprendi, while defendant's
sentence in the controversy at hand is allowed to stand in spite of
Apprendi. For some reason, the majority is now willing to
speculate as to what the jury might have found based on the
evidence adduced at defendant's trial, when this court was
unequivocally unwilling to do so for an almost identically situated
defendant in Swift. We were right in Swift. The majority is wrong
here. Nothing justifies these diametrically opposed holdings.
Apprendi errors are now, in the view of the majority, either
harmless or not "plain." As a result, defendants who have had their
constitutional rights nullified by such errors will now look in vain
to the sixth amendment for protection. The majority's opinion in
the instant case, as in Thurow, marks a significant abrogation of
our basic civil liberties and I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
	 
	 
	 
1.      1The State, in the appellate court, conceded that one of the
convictions should merge. In its brief in this court, the State asserts that
it improperly conceded this argument at the appellate court level.
Although the State now believes that the merger was not proper, it
accepts "the fact that it has already been conceded."