Case Title: The People v. Vincent Fiammegta

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2010-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 19  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
Vincent Fiammegta,
            Appellant.
Lynn W. L. Fahey, for appellant.
Morgan J. Dennehy, for respondent.
READ, J.:
In January 2006, defendant Vincent Fiammegta was
arrested and charged with two counts each of second-degree
burglary, third-degree burglary, second-degree criminal trespass,
third-degree criminal trespass, fourth-degree criminal mischief,
fifth-degree criminal possession of stolen property, and petit
larceny.  The charges were based on allegations that he broke
into two apartment buildings in Brooklyn and stole items from one
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of them.  According to the pre-sentence report, defendant
admitted his guilt and explained that he had been "high on
[xanax], ambien[] and crack cocaine" at the time.
On May 10, 2006, the judge was informed that the
prosecutor had approved defendant to participate in the Kings
County District Attorney's Drug Treatment Alternative-to-Prison
Program (DTAP), which offers substance abuse treatment in lieu of
prison to nonviolent, drug-addicted felons who face a mandatory
prison sentence under New York's second felony offender law. 
That same day, defendant was adjudicated a predicate felon, and
pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree burglary.  In
return, the People agreed to dismissal of the indictment once
defendant successfully completed an 18-24 month residential drug
treatment program and aftercare, to be followed by reentry into
the community.  The judge advised defendant that if he did not
satisfactorily finish the program, he would be sentenced to eight
years in prison and five years of postrelease supervision.
Defendant entered a residential drug treatment program
soon thereafter.  By letter dated September 13, 2006, however,
the program's Assistant Director of Clinical Services informed
Supreme Court that defendant was at risk of discharge,
essentially for violating conduct rules and displaying an
uncooperative attitude.  Consequently, at defendant's court
appearance the same day, the judge warned that "[t]his is not
working," referring to defendant's participation in DTAP.  When
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defense counsel asked the judge to give her client a second
chance, he agreed to consider the request, and adjourned the case
until September 27, 2006.  At that time, a representative of
Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC) informed
Supreme Court that defendant had been cleared to enter a
residential drug treatment program at another facility later that
day.  TASC, a federally funded statewide agency that operates
under the auspices of the Division of Probation and Correctional
Alternatives and works in conjunction with DTAP, places
defendants in treatment programs, monitors their progress, and
acts as a liaison between the programs and the court.  The judge
advised defendant that he would "take another chance" on him, and
give him this one "last chance."  
On March 15, 2007, the TASC Program Director wrote to
the judge to report that defendant had been discharged from the
program he entered the previous September on account of "non-
compliance, thus violating the terms of his release and plea." 
She enclosed a letter dated March 14, 2007 from the program's
Facility Director, who alleged that "[a]s a result of an
extensive and thorough investigation," defendant had been tagged
for thefts from vocational counselors at a school that the
program used.
The Director's letter explained that 21 residents were
initially under suspicion for these thefts, and that security at
the school was very lax.  Yet, the evidence "clearly pointed to"
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defendant as the thief for several reasons.  First, another
resident claimed to have seen defendant using keys to open doors
to the vocational counselors' offices, and defendant asked this
resident not to mention what he had observed.  Second, defendant
was involved in an unauthorized "scheme to collect money for
weights in the gym," which netted $90 subsequently stolen from a
locker.  Third, defendant was found to possess $167, which he
claimed to have saved.  According to the Director, defendant
"admitted that the evidence point[ed] to him," but had "not
officially taken responsibility for the thefts."  
On March 16, 2007, defendant appeared before the judge,
who adjourned the case to "[s]ee if [the program] [would] take
[defendant] back."  When defendant next appeared on March 27,
2007, the prosecutor asked the judge to sentence him.  Defense
counsel countered that defendant had been "very successful" in
treatment, and had been "clean" for 14 months.  She complained
that the March 14th letter was "very circumstantial," and failed
to indicate that any "type of proceeding" had been held to
establish her client's responsibility for the thefts.  She
requested that another program be found for defendant if the
program he had been participating in refused to take him back.  
The TASC representative stated that DTAP would have to
approve any other treatment opportunity for defendant and was
"not inclined" to do so.  Further, a DTAP representative said
that she was "clear" that DTAP was not about to offer defendant a
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third program.  Supreme Court recessed the case so defense
counsel could speak to a DTAP supervisor, but predicted that this
was "not going to work."  When the case was called again later
that day, the prosecutor announced that the DTAP supervisor was
unwilling to afford defendant another chance in treatment.  
Defense counsel requested a hearing because defendant
insisted on his innocence of the thefts.  Calling the Director's
letter "speculation," she asserted that the program's legal
department considered the charges too flimsy to investigate.  She
also stated that defendant's family and girlfriend had sent him
money, and that he received "a stipend for being involved in a
substance abuse program."  Defense counsel told the judge that
defendant's mother was present in the courtroom and willing to
confirm that she had sent money to her son.
The following colloquy ensued:
"COURT: Well, I'm not here to dispute this.  In fact,
you were supposed to finish the program.  You didn't
finish the program.  You had an opportunity.  You got
kicked out of that program.  That's it.
"DEFENSE COUNSEL: But it's based on allegations that .
. . [are] unfounded . . .
"COURT: Let's say that I agree with you that it was
unfounded.  They kicked him out of the program. 
They're not giving him another chance.  What am I going
to do?
"DEFENSE COUNSEL: . . . [H]e was one week away from
outpatient status.
"COURT: This is not an illegal program.  This is the
D.A.'s program.  The D.A. is not offering him any more
programs."
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When defense counsel suggested that the judge could offer
defendant another program, he responded, "My program is eight
years in jail.  I have no alternative.  I can't do it.  To
dismiss the case is up to the D.A."  
Defense counsel reiterated her request for a hearing,
to which Supreme Court responded, "Assuming I find in your favor
at the hearing . . . what do I do then?"  Counsel suggested that
the information obtained at a hearing might persuade the DTAP
supervisor to relent; if it did not, the Legal Aid Society should
be allowed to seek out another program for defendant, or the
judge might sentence defendant to a reduced prison term.  Supreme
Court adjourned the case until April 2, 2007, so defense counsel
could "speak to the people at [the program]" and "be comfortable
in what they have done."  The judge stated that he did not intend
to hold a hearing because "[t]hese are not issues [for which] a
hearing is held.  If he flunks out of the program for whatever
reason, he flunk[s] out of the program."  
On April 2, 2007, defense counsel reported to the judge
that the Director now believed that defendant had been "set up,"
and was willing to take him back; that the person who claimed to
have seen defendant with keys had "a history," including "several
reprimands"; and that theft was a common occurrence at the
program.  Defense counsel mentioned that defendant's mother and
girlfriend were both present in court, and that she had letters
documenting the funds they had sent him.  
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The prosecutor countered that DTAP was unwilling to
give defendant another chance, and that the program was, in any
event, not prepared to readmit him.  The judge suggested that the
DTAP supervisor might call the Director and confirm the program's
stance, but the prosecutor took the position that "[r]egardless
whether the program or any program is willing to take the
defendant back, the D.A.'s office is not willing" because the
case was "very serious." 
Defense counsel continued to ask for a hearing, and
Supreme Court reiterated that a hearing would not resolve
anything, remarking that "[t]he program kicked him out.  The
People aren't willing to give him another program.  And we're
stuck with that situation here . . .  Let's say I . . . find he
didn't violate.  What am I going to do?  Sue the program?  Sue
the D.A.'s office?"  The judge did, however, adjourn the case so
that he could talk to the Director.  When defendant appeared in
court again on April 4, 2007, Supreme Court described his
conversation with the Director as follows:
"I spoke at length with [the Director] from the
program.  It is clear that they firmly believe [that
defendant] was responsible for the theft, and they do
not want him back, so I have nothing more to do but to
sentence the defendant pursuant to our agreement." 
Defense counsel replied that she had also spoken to the
Director, and had asked him "why the change of heart."  She
recounted that he was "very vague," but said "once again [that]
he believes that [defendant] was set up due to the conditions of
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the program."  She also informed the judge that the Director told
defendant's girlfriend that whether to take defendant back was
"not his decision."  Defense counsel asked to be allowed to speak
to the person who had actually decided to discharge defendant
from the program, and again complained that defendant was the
victim of conjecture.  She suggested that the judge might
consider placing defendant in a different program, or sentencing
him to the minimum available prison term of five years.  The
prosecutor responded that she had spoken with someone from the
program, who had reviewed defendant's file.  This individual
expressed the "firm" belief that defendant was the thief, and
confirmed that he would not be readmitted.
Supreme Court next asked defendant if he wished to say
anything, to which he responded, "Your Honor, there's so much,
but I -- no."
 The judge then sentenced him to eight years in
prison and five years of postrelease supervision.  Defendant
subsequently appealed.  
 On December 30, 2008, the Appellate Division affirmed,
concluding that Supreme Court's "inquiry regarding the
circumstances concerning the defendant's discharge from a drug
treatment program was sufficient to determine that [he] violated
the plea agreement" (People v Fiammegta, 57 AD3d 1003, 1003 [2d
Dept 2008]).  A Judge of this Court granted defendant permission
to appeal (12 NY3d 853 [2009]), and we now reverse.
Supreme Court has broad discretion when supervising a
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defendant subject to DTAP, and deciding whether the conditions of
a DTAP plea agreement have been met (see People v Jenkins, 11
NY3d 282, 289 [2008]).  And although DTAP is not the same as the
judicial diversion program, the Legislature has endorsed judicial
flexibility in CPL 216.05 (9) (b), effective October 7, 2009,
which provides that "[i]n determining whether a defendant
violated a condition of his or her release under the judicial
diversion program [for substance abuse or dependence], the court
may conduct a summary hearing consistent with due process and
sufficient to satisfy the court that the defendant has, in fact,
violated the condition" (emphasis added).
This provision is consistent with our decision in
People v Outley (80 NY2d 702, 712 [1993] [internal quotation
marks omitted]), where we adverted to the settled rule that
"sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding and
that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause."  And in
order "[t]o comply with due process, . . . the sentencing court
must assure itself that the information upon which it bases the
sentence is reliable and accurate" (id.).
  
In Outley, we considered what process was due when a
defendant "breached a no-arrest condition [of a plea bargain] by
being arrested but denies any complicity in the underlying crime"
(id.).  In each of the three cases consolidated for decision in
Outley, the defendants maintained that "when a defendant denies
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the postplea criminal conduct, the court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing to satisfy itself by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant has, in fact, committed the crime for
which he was arrested" (id.).  We rejected that notion because it
changed the condition of the plea from not being arrested for a
crime to not actually committing a crime.  
But we recognized in Outley that in order for a court
to impose the enhanced sentence, "the mere fact of the arrest,
without more, is not enough.  A no-arrest condition could
certainly not be held to have been breached by arrests which are
malicious or merely baseless" (id. at 713).  We therefore held
that
"[w]hen an issue is raised concerning the validity of
the postplea charge or there is a denial of any
involvement in the underlying crime, the court must
conduct an inquiry at which the defendant has an
opportunity to show that the arrest is without
foundation . . .  The nature and extent of the inquiry
-- whether through a summary hearing pursuant to CPL
400.10 or some other fair means -- is within the
court's discretion.  The inquiry must be of sufficient
depth, however, so that the court can be satisfied --
not of defendant's guilt of the new criminal charge but
of the existence of a legitimate basis for the arrest
on that charge" (id.).
Defendant asks us to reject Outley in favor of Torres v
Berbary (340 F3d 63, 71 [2d Cir 2003]), and to hold that a
defendant who faces termination from a drug treatment program on
account of contested allegations of wrongdoing is entitled to a
hearing akin to that afforded a defendant subject to probation or
parole revocation because "due process in sentencing requires at
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least a showing by a preponderance of evidence to resolve
disputed factual issues" (but see Janick v Superintendent,
Franklin Corr. Facility (253 Fed Appx 65, 66 [2d Cir 2007]
[acknowledging that the United States Supreme Court has "not shed
much light on the minimum burden of proof that must be met when
factual contentions are subject to dispute at sentencing"]). 
That is, defendant contends that he should have been provided the
opportunity to testify and present evidence; to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the court found good
cause for not allowing this; to have the accusations proven by a
preponderance of the evidence; and to a resolution of the
relevant facts by the court.
In our view, though, the Outley rule is better-suited
for those circumstances where a defendant is expelled from a drug
treatment program for misconduct.  As an initial matter, DTAP is
a diversion program; a defendant must successfully complete drug
treatment in order to escape otherwise mandatory incarceration. 
This is not the same as the situation where the court changes the
defendant's sentence by revoking a sentence of probation or
parole at the request of the government.  Moreover, it is not
practical to require an evidentiary hearing every time a
defendant disputes discharge from a drug treatment program for
reasons unrelated to making satisfactory progress in treatment. 
Faced with a prison term, many -- if not most -- defendants will
challenge their dismissal.  Analogizing to Outley, the condition
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of a DTAP plea is that the defendant satisfactorily finish a drug
treatment program.  Accordingly, when a program discharges a
defendant for misconduct, the court must carry out an inquiry of
sufficient depth to satisfy itself that there was a legitimate
basis for the program's decision, and must explain, on the
record, the nature of its inquiry, its conclusions, and the basis
for them.
Accordingly, Supreme Court was not required to conduct
an evidentiary hearing in this case, or to determine by a
preponderance of the evidence that defendant was guilty of the
thefts of which he was accused.  But the judge should have
considered defendant's argument that he was kicked out of the
program based on thin evidence of wrongdoing after inadequate
investigation; and he should have allowed defendant to submit
letters and testimony or affidavits from his mother and
girlfriend about the money they claimed to have sent him.   
Supreme Court understandably felt hamstrung by the
District Attorney's refusal to endorse any further treatment
opportunity for defendant.  Nonetheless, in his supervision of
this DTAP plea and as a measure of the due process owed
defendant, the judge was obligated to make the requisite inquiry
into the merits of defendant's discharge.  Concededly, the
judge's options would have been limited in the event that he
concluded that the program, in fact, did not possess a legitimate
basis for expelling defendant, and the District Attorney remained
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unwilling to approve defendant's participation in another
program.  Under those circumstances, however, Supreme Court could
at least offer defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea
before imposing sentence.
       
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed, and the case remitted to Supreme Court for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order reversed and case remitted to Supreme Court, Kings County,
for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein. 
Opinion by Judge Read.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided February 16, 2010