Case Title: Perry v. Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: S189476

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 11/17/11 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
KRISTIN M. PERRY et al., 
) 
 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
)  
S189476 
 
) 
EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., as Governor, etc., et al., )  9th Cir. No. 10-16696 
 
Defendants; 
) 
 
) 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, 
)  
N.D. Cal. No. 
 
Intervener and Respondent; 
)  3:09-cv-02292-VRW 
 
) 
DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH et al., 
) 
 
Interveners and Appellants. 
) 
____________________________________________) 
 
At the request of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
we agreed to decide a question of California law that is relevant to the underlying 
lawsuit in this matter now pending in that federal appellate court.  (Perry v. Brown 
(9th Cir. No. 10-16696); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548.)  As posed by the 
Ninth Circuit, the question to be decided is ―[w]hether under article II, section 8 of 
the California Constitution, or otherwise under California law, the official 
proponents of an initiative measure possess either a particularized interest in the 
initiative‘s validity or the authority to assert the State‘s interest in the initiative‘s 
validity, which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the initiative 
upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public 
officials charged with that duty refuse to do so.‖ 
In addressing this issue, we emphasize at the outset that although in this 
case the question posed by the Ninth Circuit happens to arise in litigation 
2 
challenging the validity, under the United States Constitution, of the initiative 
measure (Proposition 8) that added a section to the California Constitution 
providing that ―[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or 
recognized in California‖ (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.5), the state law issue that has 
been submitted to this court is totally unrelated to the substantive question of the 
constitutional validity of Proposition 8.  Instead, the question before us involves a 
fundamental procedural issue that may arise with respect to any initiative measure, 
without regard to its subject matter.  The same procedural issue regarding an 
official initiative proponent‘s standing to appear as a party in a judicial proceeding 
to defend the validity of a voter-approved initiative or to appeal a judgment 
invalidating it when the public officials who ordinarily provide such a defense or 
file such an appeal decline to do so, could arise with regard to an initiative 
measure that, for example, (1) limited campaign contributions that may be 
collected by elected legislative or executive officials, or (2) imposed term limits 
for legislative and executive offices, or (3) prohibited government officials from 
accepting employment after leaving office with companies or individuals that have 
benefited from the officials‘ discretionary governmental decisions while in office.  
(Cf., e.g., Prop. 73 (Primary Elec. (June 7, 1988)), invalidated in part in Kopp v. 
Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607 [campaign contribution limits]; 
Prop. 140 (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1990)), upheld in Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 492 [term limits]; City of Santa Monica‘s ballot measure Prop. LL 
(Consolidated Gen. Mun. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2000)), upheld in City of Santa Monica v. 
Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43 [postgovernment employment limits].)  The 
resolution of this procedural question does not turn on the substance of the 
particular initiative measure at issue, but rather on the purpose and integrity of the 
initiative process itself. 
3 
As we discuss more fully below, in the past official proponents of initiative 
measures in California have uniformly been permitted to participate as parties — 
either as interveners or as real parties in interest — in numerous lawsuits in 
California courts challenging the validity of the initiative measure the proponents 
sponsored.  Such participation has routinely been permitted (1) without any 
inquiry into or showing that the proponents‘ own property, liberty, or other 
personal legally protected interests would be specially affected by invalidation of 
the measure, and (2) whether or not the government officials who ordinarily 
defend a challenged enactment were also defending the measure in the proceeding.  
This court, however, has not previously had occasion fully to explain the basis 
upon which an official initiative proponent‘s ability to participate as a party in 
such litigation rests. 
As we shall explain, because the initiative process is specifically intended 
to enable the people to amend the state Constitution or to enact statutes when 
current government officials have declined to adopt (and often have publicly 
opposed) the measure in question, the voters who have successfully adopted an 
initiative measure may reasonably harbor a legitimate concern that the public 
officials who ordinarily defend a challenged state law in court may not, in the case 
of an initiative measure, always undertake such a defense with vigor or with the 
objectives and interests of those voters paramount in mind.  As a consequence, 
California courts have routinely permitted the official proponents of an initiative 
to intervene or appear as real parties in interest to defend a challenged voter-
approved initiative measure in order ―to guard the people‘s right to exercise 
initiative power‖ (Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 
810, 822 (Building Industry Assn.)) or, in other words, to enable such proponents 
to assert the people’s, and hence the state’s, interest in defending the validity of 
the initiative measure.  Allowing official proponents to assert the state‘s interest in 
4 
the validity of the initiative measure in such litigation (along with any public 
officials who may also be defending the measure) (1) assures voters who 
supported the measure and enacted it into law that any residual hostility or 
indifference of current public officials to the substance of the initiative measure 
will not prevent a full and robust defense of the measure to be mounted in court on 
the people‘s behalf, and (2) ensures a court faced with the responsibility of 
reviewing and resolving a legal challenge to an initiative measure that it is aware 
of and addresses the full range of legal arguments that reasonably may be 
proffered in the measure‘s defense.  In this manner, the official proponents‘ 
general ability to appear and defend the state‘s interest in the validity of the 
initiative measure and to appeal a lower court judgment invalidating the measure 
serves to enhance both the fairness of the judicial process and the appearance of 
fairness of that process. 
We have cautioned that in most instances it may well be an abuse of 
discretion for a court to fail to permit the official proponents of an initiative to 
intervene in a judicial proceeding to protect the people‘s right to exercise their 
initiative power even when one or more government defendants are defending the 
initiative‘s validity in the proceeding.  (See Building Industry Assn., supra, 41 
Cal.3d at p. 822.)  Thus, in an instance — like that identified in the question 
submitted by the Ninth Circuit — in which the public officials have totally 
declined to defend the initiative‘s validity at all, we conclude that, in light of the 
nature and purpose of the initiative process embodied in article II, section 8 of the 
California Constitution (hereafter article II, section 8) and the unique role of 
initiative proponents in the constitutional initiative process as recognized by 
numerous provisions of the Elections Code, it would clearly constitute an abuse of 
discretion for a court to deny the official proponents of an initiative the 
opportunity to participate as formal parties in the proceeding, either as interveners 
5 
or as real parties in interest, in order to assert the people‘s and hence the state‘s 
interest in the validity of the measure and to appeal a judgment invalidating the 
measure.  In other words, because it is essential to the integrity of the initiative 
process embodied in article II, section 8 that there be someone to assert the state‘s 
interest in an initiative‘s validity on behalf of the people when the public officials 
who normally assert that interest decline to do so, and because the official 
proponents of an initiative (in light of their unique relationship to the initiative 
measure under art. II, § 8 and the relevant provisions of the Elec. Code) are the 
most obvious and logical persons to assert the state‘s interest in the initiative‘s 
validity on behalf of the voters who enacted the measure, we conclude that 
California law authorizes the official proponents, under such circumstances, to 
appear in the proceeding to assert the state‘s interest in the initiative‘s validity and 
to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure.  Neither the Governor, the 
Attorney General, nor any other executive or legislative official has the authority 
to veto or invalidate an initiative measure that has been approved by the voters.  It 
would exalt form over substance to interpret California law in a manner that would 
permit these public officials to indirectly achieve such a result by denying the 
official initiative proponents the authority to step in to assert the state‘s interest in 
the validity of the measure or to appeal a lower court judgment invalidating the 
measure when those public officials decline to assert that interest or to appeal an 
adverse judgment.   
Accordingly, we respond to the question posed by the Ninth Circuit in the 
affirmative.  In a postelection challenge to a voter-approved initiative measure, the 
official proponents of the initiative are authorized under California law to appear 
and assert the state‘s interest in the initiative‘s validity and to appeal a judgment 
invalidating the measure when the public officials who ordinarily defend the 
measure or appeal such a judgment decline to do so. 
6 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
We begin with a brief summary of the factual and procedural background 
of the current proceeding. 
In May 2008, a majority of this court concluded that the California statutes 
limiting the designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the right of 
same-sex couples to the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the then-
governing provisions of the California Constitution.  (In re Marriage Cases (2008) 
43 Cal.4th 757.)  Thereafter, in the general election held in California in 
November 2008, a majority of voters approved Proposition 8, an initiative 
measure that amended the California Constitution by adding a new section — 
section 7.5 — to article I of the California Constitution.  Section 7.5 of article I of 
the California Constitution provides in full:  ―Only marriage between a man and a 
woman is valid or recognized in California.‖ 
Proposition 8 was submitted to the Attorney General, circulated for 
signature, and formally filed with the Secretary of State for submission to the 
voters by five California electors — Dennis Hollingsworth, Gail J. Knight, Martin 
F. Gutierrez, Hak-Shing William Tam, and Mark A. Jansson — who are the 
official proponents of the initiative measure under California law.  (Elec. Code, 
§§ 342, 9001.)  Shortly after commencing the initiative petition process, the 
proponents established ProtectMarriage.com — Yes on 8, a Project of California 
Renewal (hereafter ProtectMarriage.com) as a ―ballot measure committee‖ (see 
Gov. Code, § 84107) to supervise all aspects of the campaign to qualify the 
measure for the ballot and to seek to obtain its adoption at the ensuing election. 
One day after the November 2008 election at which Proposition 8 was 
approved by a majority of voters, opponents of the measure filed three petitions 
for an original writ of mandate in this court, challenging the validity of 
Proposition 8 under the California Constitution.  (The three petitions were 
7 
ultimately consolidated and decided together in Strauss v. Horton (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 364 (Strauss).)  The petitions contended primarily that Proposition 8 
constituted a constitutional revision, which under the California Constitution could 
not properly be adopted through the initiative process, rather than a constitutional 
amendment, which could be adopted by initiative; one petition also contended that 
Proposition 8 violated the separation of powers doctrine embodied in the 
California Constitution. 
While those petitions were pending, and before this court decided whether 
to accept the matters for decision, the official proponents of Proposition 8 filed 
motions to intervene in each of the proceedings, to defend the validity of 
Proposition 8.  Shortly thereafter, this court agreed to hear and decide the petitions 
and, in the same order, granted the official proponents‘ motions to intervene in the 
proceedings.1 
After briefing and oral argument, this court, on May 26, 2009, handed 
down its decision in Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th 364, concluding (1) that, under the 
California Constitution, Proposition 8 was a constitutional amendment, rather than 
a constitutional revision, and thus could be adopted through the initiative process, 
and (2) that the measure did not violate the separation of powers doctrine 
embodied in the California Constitution. 
On May 22, 2009, just a few days before the decision in Strauss, supra, 46 
Cal.4th 364, was filed, plaintiffs Kristin M. Perry, Sandra B. Stier, Paul T. Katami, 
and Jeffrey J. Zarrillo — two same-sex couples who, after the adoption of 
                                              
1  
The order in Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th 364, while granting the motion to 
intervene filed by the official proponents of Proposition 8, simultaneously denied a 
motion to intervene that had been filed by a separate pro-Proposition 8 advocacy 
organization, Campaign for California Families, that was not an official proponent 
of the challenged initiative measure. 
8 
Proposition 8, had sought but had been denied marriage licenses in Alameda 
County and Los Angeles County respectively — filed the underlying action in the 
current matter in federal district court in San  Francisco.  (Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger (N.D.Cal. No. 3:09-cv-02292-VRW.)2  Plaintiffs‘ complaint in 
Perry named as defendants in their official capacities the Governor of California, 
the Attorney General of California, the Director and the Deputy Director of the 
State Department of Public Health, the Alameda County Clerk-Recorder, and the 
Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk.  The complaint alleged 
that Proposition 8 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
federal Constitution and sought injunctive and declaratory relief.3 
On May 28, 2009, the proponents of Proposition 8 and 
ProtectMarriage.com (hereafter Proponents) filed a motion to intervene in the 
Perry proceeding, maintaining that the existing parties in the action would not 
adequately represent the interests of those who wished to defend the measure.  
                                              
2  
The decision rendered by the federal district court after trial was published 
as Perry v. Schwarzenegger (N.D.Cal. 2010) 704 F.Supp.2d 921 and, for 
convenience, will hereafter be referred to in this opinion as Perry I.  The Ninth 
Circuit order submitting the question of standing to this court was published as 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. 2011) 628 F.3d 1191, and will hereafter be 
referred to in this opinion as Perry II.  After the Ninth Circuit filed its order, a new 
Governor of California took office and the matter was subsequently retitled Perry 
v. Brown, the current title of the proceeding in this court. 
 
Hereafter, except when specifically referring to either the district court‘s 
decision or the Ninth Circuit‘s order, this opinion will refer to the federal lawsuit 
simply as the Perry action.   
3  
In the Strauss litigation filed in this court, the petitioners challenged the 
validity of Proposition 8 only on state constitutional grounds, and did not raise the 
question of the constitutional validity of the measure under the federal 
Constitution.  (See Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 412, fn. 11.)  Our opinion in 
Strauss did not address the federal constitutional issue. 
9 
On June 12, 2009, all named defendants filed answers to the complaint.  In 
their answers, the named defendants other than the Attorney General refused to 
take a position on the merits of plaintiffs‘ constitutional challenge and declined to 
defend the validity of Proposition 8.  The answer filed by the Attorney General 
also declined to defend the initiative, but went further and affirmatively took the 
position that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional.   
On July 2, 2009, the district court held a hearing on a number of matters, 
including the motion to intervene filed by Proponents.  At that hearing, the district 
court observed that ―under California law, as I understand it, proponents of 
initiative measures have standing to represent proponents and to defend an 
enactment that is brought into law by the initiative process‖ and suggested that 
such intervention by the official initiative proponents was particularly appropriate 
―where the authorities, the defendants who ordinarily would defend the 
proposition or the enactment that is being challenged here, are taking the position 
that, in fact, it is constitutionally infirm[].‖  Neither plaintiffs nor any of the named 
defendants objected to Proponents‘ motion to intervene and the district court 
granted the motion.4 
                                              
4  
The relevant portion of the transcript of the July 2, 2009 hearing reads: 
―[W]ith respect to the motion to intervene, that basically is unopposed and, it does 
seem to me, substantially justified in this case, particularly where the authorities, 
the defendants who ordinarily would defend the proposition or the enactment that 
is being challenged here, are taking the position that, in fact, it is constitutionally 
infirm[].  And so, it seems to me, both for practical reasons and reasons of 
proceeding in this case in an orderly and judicial fashion that intervention is 
appropriate.  [¶]  Certainly, under California law, as I understand it, proponents of 
initiative measures have the standing to represent proponents and to defend an 
enactment that is brought into law by the initiative process.  [¶] . . . [A]re there any 
objections to granting the motion to intervene?  (No response.)  Hearing none, that 
motion will be granted.‖ 
10 
Thereafter, Proponents participated as interveners in the district court trial 
in Perry.  Indeed, Proponents were the only party in the district court to present 
witnesses and legal argument in defense of the challenged initiative measure.5 
At the conclusion of the trial, the district court issued a lengthy opinion, 
setting forth numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law and determining 
that Proposition 8 violates both the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
federal Constitution.  (Perry I, supra, 704 F.Supp.2d 921.)  The district court 
issued an order enjoining defendants in their official capacities, and all persons 
                                              
5  
The district court in Perry also granted a motion filed by the City and 
County of San Francisco (San Francisco) to intervene in the action on behalf of 
plaintiffs.  As an intervener, San Francisco has participated as a party in these 
proceedings in the district court, in the Ninth Circuit, and in this court.  Although 
plaintiffs and San Francisco have filed separate briefs in this court, the legal 
arguments raised by these parties largely overlap and for convenience we shall 
refer to the arguments presented by either of these parties as plaintiffs‘ arguments. 
 
At a later stage of the district court proceedings, the County of Imperial, the 
Imperial County Board of Supervisors, and the Imperial County Deputy County 
Clerk/Recorder moved to intervene in the action to defend the validity of 
Proposition 8.  The district court did not rule on the Imperial County motion to 
intervene until after the trial was completed and the court had handed down its 
ruling on the merits.  At that point, the district court denied the intervention 
motion.  Thereafter, Imperial County, its board of supervisors and its deputy 
county clerk/recorder appealed the denial of their motion to intervene to the Ninth 
Circuit.  On the same day the Ninth Circuit filed its order submitting the question 
of Proponents‘ standing to this court, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion affirming 
the district court‘s denial of intervention by Imperial County, its board of 
supervisors and its deputy county clerk/recorder.  In affirming the denial of 
intervention, the Ninth Circuit opinion relied in part on the fact that intervention 
had been sought by the deputy county clerk/recorder rather than the county 
clerk/recorder herself; the opinion left open the question whether a county 
clerk/recorder would have standing to intervene.  On February 25, 2011, the newly 
elected County Clerk/Recorder of Imperial County filed a motion in the Ninth 
Circuit seeking to intervene in the action.  That motion is currently pending in the 
Ninth Circuit.   
11 
under their supervision or control, from applying or enforcing Proposition 8.  (704 
F.Supp.2d at p. 1003.)  The Ninth Circuit subsequently issued an order staying the 
district court‘s judgment pending appeal, and as a result Proposition 8 remains in 
effect at the present time. 
Proponents, as interveners in the district court, filed in the Ninth Circuit a 
timely appeal of the district court judgment invalidating Proposition 8.6  None of 
the named defendants at whom the district court‘s injunction was directed 
appealed from the district court judgment, however, and, in an early order 
establishing a schedule for considering the appeal, the Ninth Circuit specifically 
requested the parties to brief the question whether Proponents have standing to 
appeal the district court‘s ruling.7 
                                              
6  
Initially, all five of the individual proponents of Proposition 8 moved to 
intervene in the Perry litigation.  In the course of the district court litigation, one 
of the individual proponents — Hak-shing William Tam (Tam) — moved to 
withdraw as a defendant intervener.  The district court did not rule on Tam‘s 
motion to withdraw until after it issued its decision on the merits, and at that point 
the district court denied the motion to withdraw as moot. 
 
Tam did not join in the appeal from the district court judgment that was 
filed in the Ninth Circuit by the other four individual proponents and 
ProtectMarriage.com.  For convenience, further references to ―Proponents‖ refer 
collectively to the four individual proponents and ProtectMarriage.com who filed 
the appeal in the Ninth Circuit and have participated in the present proceeding in 
this court. 
7  
Under federal law, a party who has been permitted to intervene in a lower 
court proceeding is entitled to appeal a judgment in the absence of the party on 
whose side intervention was permitted only upon a showing that the intervener 
independently fulfills the case or controversy requirements of article III of the 
federal Constitution.  (See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles (1986) 476 U.S. 54, 68.)  
Under California law, by contrast, a party who has been permitted to intervene in a 
lower court proceeding to defend an action may appeal from an adverse judgment 
despite the failure of the original defendant to file an appeal.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Perris Irrigation District (1901) 132 Cal. 289, 290-291.) 
12 
In the briefs filed in the Ninth Circuit on that issue, plaintiffs argued that 
Proponents lacked standing to appeal and that, as a consequence, the appeal in 
Perry should be dismissed.  Proponents vigorously contested plaintiffs‘ 
contention, pointing out that they had been permitted to intervene and participate 
as parties in defense of Proposition 8 both by this court in Strauss, supra, 46 
Cal.4th 364, and by the district court in Perry, and asserting that they possessed 
the requisite standing under both California and federal law.8 
After conducting oral argument, the three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit 
assigned to this case issued an order on January 4, 2011, requesting this court to 
answer the question of California law set forth above; namely, whether, under 
California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure that has been 
approved by the voters possess either ―a particularized interest in the initiative‘s 
validity‖ or ―the authority to assert the State‘s interest in the initiative‘s validity‖ 
so as to afford the proponents standing to defend the constitutionality of the 
initiative or to appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative when the public 
officials who ordinarily would provide such a defense or file such an appeal 
decline to do so.  (Perry II, supra, 628 F.3d at p. 1193.)  In its order, the Ninth 
                                              
8  
In addition to disagreeing as to whether Proponents have standing to 
appeal, in their briefs and oral argument before the Ninth Circuit plaintiffs and 
Proponents disagreed on the consequences that would flow from a determination 
by the Ninth Circuit that Proponents lack standing to appeal and the dismissal of 
their appeal.  Plaintiffs contended that a dismissal of the appeal would leave the 
district court judgment in effect and that the district court ruling would be binding 
on the named state officers and on the two named county clerks.  Proponents 
contended, by contrast, that if the Ninth Circuit determines they lack standing to 
appeal, that court would be required not only to dismiss the appeal but also to 
vacate the district court judgment.  (See Perry II, supra, 628 F.3d at p. 1195 & 
fn. 2.)  Because it submitted the question of Proponents‘ standing under state law 
to this court, the Ninth Circuit did not indicate its view as to the effect on the 
district court judgment of a determination that Proponents lack standing to appeal.  
13 
Circuit indicated that the answer to this question of California law may well be 
determinative of the issue of standing for federal law purposes.  (Id. at p. 1196.)   
In explaining its reason for submitting this question to this court, the Ninth 
Circuit stated in part:  ―Although the Governor has chosen not to defend 
Proposition 8 in these proceedings, it is not clear whether he may, consistent with 
the California Constitution, achieve through a refusal to litigate what he may not 
do directly:  effectively veto the initiative by refusing to defend it or appeal a 
judgment invalidating it, if no one else — including the initiative‘s proponents — 
is qualified to do so.  Proponents argue that such a harsh result is avoided if the 
balance of power provided in the California Constitution establishes that 
proponents of an initiative are authorized to defend that initiative, as agents of the 
People, in lieu of public officials who refuse to do so.  Similarly, under California 
law, the proponents of an initiative may possess a particularized interest in 
defending the constitutionality of their initiative upon its enactment; the 
Constitution‘s purpose in reserving the initiative power to the People would 
appear to be ill-served by allowing elected officials to nullify either proponents‘ 
efforts to ‗propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution‘ or the People‘s 
right ‗to adopt or reject‘ such propositions.  Cal. Const., art. II, § 8(a).  Rather than 
rely on our own understanding of this balance of power under the California 
Constitution, however, we certify the question so that the [California Supreme] 
Court may provide an authoritative answer as to the rights, interests, and authority 
under California law of the official proponents of an initiative measure to defend 
its validity upon its enactment in the case of a challenge to its constitutionality, 
where the state officials charged with that duty refuse to execute it.‖  (Perry II, 
supra, 628 F.3d at p. 1197.)   
On February 16, 2011, we agreed to decide the question of California law 
as requested by the Ninth Circuit and established an expedited briefing schedule 
14 
that would permit this court to conduct oral argument in this matter as early as 
September 2011.  All parties and numerous amici curiae timely filed briefs in this 
matter, and oral argument was held on September 6, 2011. 
II.  Relevance of State Law to Standing Under Federal Law 
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court establish that the 
determination whether an individual or entity seeking to participate as a party in a 
federal court proceeding or to appeal from an adverse judgment entered in such a 
proceeding possesses the requisite standing to satisfy the ―case or controversy‖ 
provisions of article III of the United States Constitution is ultimately a question 
of federal law upon which the federal courts have the final say.  (See, e.g., Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts (1985) 472 U.S. 797, 804.)  As a consequence, many 
readers of this opinion may reasonably be uncertain why the Ninth Circuit has 
asked this court to advise it whether initiative proponents possess authority under 
California law to defend the validity of an initiative measure in a court proceeding 
in which the measure is challenged and, if so, the basis of such authority.  In light 
of this potential confusion, we believe that it is useful and appropriate briefly to 
set forth, at the outset, our understanding of the federal decisions that discuss the 
role that state law plays in determining whether, under federal law, an individual 
or entity possesses standing to participate as a party in a federal proceeding.  We 
emphasize that our discussion of federal decisions is not intended to, and does not 
purport to, decide any issue of federal law, and we fully recognize that the effect 
that this opinion‘s clarification of the authority official proponents possess under 
California law may have on the question of standing under federal law is a matter 
that ultimately will be decided by the federal courts.   
As the question posed by the Ninth Circuit indicates, in the present case 
two potential bases for standing are implicated:  (1) The official proponents of a 
successful initiative measure may have authority to appear in court to assert the 
15 
state’s interest in defending the validity of a duly enacted state law,9 or (2) the 
official proponents may have their own personal “particularized” interest in the 
initiative‘s validity.  We briefly discuss the federal decisions that analyze the 
effect of state law on each of these potential bases for standing in federal court. 
A. Standing to Assert the State’s Interest in an Initiative’s Validity 
With respect to the question of who possesses standing to assert the state‘s 
interest in defending the validity of a state constitutional provision or statute when 
the state measure is challenged in a federal proceeding, we believe the United 
States Supreme Court‘s decision in Karcher v. May (1987) 484 U.S. 72 (Karcher) 
strongly indicates that a federal court will look to state law to determine whom the 
state has authorized to assert the state’s interest in the validity of the challenged 
measure. 
In Karcher, a lawsuit was filed in federal district court contending that a 
recently enacted New Jersey statute that required primary and secondary public 
schools in that state to observe a minute of silence at the start of each school day 
was unconstitutional as a violation of the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment of the federal Constitution.  When it became apparent at the outset of 
the litigation that neither the current New Jersey Attorney General nor any of the 
named government defendants — the New Jersey Department of Education, the 
department‘s commissioner, and two local boards of education — would defend 
the validity of the challenged statute, the then Speaker of the New Jersey General 
Assembly (Karcher) and the then President of the New Jersey Senate (Orechio) 
                                              
9  
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court clearly establish that ―a State 
has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute.‖  (Diamond v. Charles, 
supra, 476 U.S. 54, 62; see also Maine v. Taylor (1986) 477 U.S. 131, 136-137 [―a 
State clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own 
statutes‖].) 
16 
sought and were granted the right to intervene as defendants to defend the 
challenged statute on behalf of the state legislature.  In the proceedings in district 
court, the legislature, through its presiding officers, carried the entire burden of 
defending the statute.  The district court ultimately concluded that the statute was 
unconstitutional and entered judgment invalidating the statute. 
Karcher and Orechio, acting in their official capacities as Speaker of the 
New Jersey General Assembly and President of the New Jersey Senate, appealed 
the district court judgment to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  The 
Third Circuit heard the appeal on the merits and ultimately affirmed the district 
court decision invalidating the statute. 
After the Third Circuit handed down its decision, Karcher and Orechio lost 
their posts as presiding legislative officers and were replaced by other legislators 
in those legislative posts.  Despite this change in status, Karcher and Orechio filed 
an appeal of the Third Circuit decision in the United States Supreme Court.  The 
new state legislative presiding officers who had replaced Karcher and Orechio 
notified the United States Supreme Court that they were withdrawing the 
legislature‘s appeal, but at the same time informed the court that Karcher wanted 
to continue his appeal of the Third Circuit decision in the Supreme Court.  Karcher 
confirmed that position. 
The United States Supreme Court postponed consideration of the 
jurisdictional issue pending its hearing of the case, and, after oral argument, the 
high court issued its decision, concluding that because Karcher and Orechio were 
no longer the legislative leaders of the respective houses of the New Jersey 
Legislature, they lacked standing to appeal.  The court explained:  ―Karcher and 
Orechio intervened in this lawsuit in their official capacities as presiding officers 
on behalf of the New Jersey Legislature.  They do not appeal the judgment in 
those capacities.  Indeed, they could not, for they no longer hold those offices.  
17 
The authority to pursue the lawsuit on behalf of the legislature belongs to those 
who succeeded Karcher and Orechio in office.‖  (Karcher, supra, 484 U.S. at 
p. 77.) 
Karcher and Orechio further argued that if, as the high court concluded, 
their appeal was to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the court should also 
vacate the judgments of the district court and the Third Circuit that had invalidated 
the statute at issue.  In rejecting this claim, the Supreme Court relied explicitly on 
the fact that New Jersey law permitted the current presiding legislative officers, 
acting on behalf of the state legislature, to represent the state‘s interest in 
defending a challenged state law.  The court observed:  ―The New Jersey Supreme 
Court has granted applications of the Speaker of the General Assembly and the 
President of the Senate to intervene as parties-respondent on behalf of the 
legislature in defense of a legislative enactment.  In re Forsythe, 91 N.J. 141, 144, 
450 A.2d 499, 500 (1982).  Since the New Jersey Legislature had authority under 
state law to represent the State’s interests in both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeals, we need not vacate the judgments below for lack of a proper 
defendant-appellant.‖  (Karcher, supra, 484 U.S. at p. 82, italics added.)10 
                                              
10  
In In re Forsythe (N.J. 1982) 450 A.2d 499 — the decision of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court that was cited and relied upon in Karcher for the 
proposition that under New Jersey law the legislature, through the Speaker of the 
General Assembly and the President of the Senate, had authority to represent the 
state‘s interests in defending a challenged state law — the New Jersey Supreme 
Court very briefly explained the participation of the Speaker of the General 
Assembly and the President of the Senate in that litigation, stating:  ―The initial 
adversary parties in the case were the petitioners and the Attorney General.  In 
addition, the Court granted the applications of the Speaker of the General 
Assembly and the General Assembly, and the President of the Senate and the 
Senate to intervene as parties-respondent, all of whom, with the Attorney General, 
defend the validity of the enactment.‖  (450 A.2d at p. 500.) 
(footnote continued on next page) 
18 
As the foregoing emphasized passage demonstrates, in Karcher the 
Supreme Court looked to state law to determine whether a prospective litigant had 
authority to assert the state‘s interest in defending a challenged state measure in 
federal court.  Upon reflection this result is not surprising, inasmuch as logic 
suggests that a state should have the power to determine who is authorized to 
assert the state’s own interest in defending a challenged state law. 
As plaintiffs accurately point out, Karcher, supra, 484 U.S. 72, did not 
involve a challenge to an initiative measure and did not address the question 
whether the official proponents of an initiative could properly assert the state‘s 
interest in defending the validity of such an initiative.  Plaintiffs also note that in 
its subsequent decision in Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona (1997) 520 U.S. 43 
(Arizonans for Official English), which did involve the question of official 
initiative proponents‘ standing under federal law to appeal a judgment invalidating 
an initiative measure, the United States Supreme Court expressed ―grave doubts‖ 
(id. at p. 66) whether the initiative proponents in that case possessed the requisite 
standing and distinguished its earlier decision in Karcher.  A close review of the 
relevant portion of the opinion in Arizonans for Official English, however, 
indicates that the doubts expressed by the high court in that case apparently arose 
out of the court‘s uncertainty concerning the authority of official initiative 
proponents to defend the validity of a challenged initiative under Arizona law.  
The relevant passage does not suggest that if a state‘s law does authorize the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Thus, in Forsythe, the parties who the United States Supreme Court in 
Karcher subsequently concluded had authority under state law to represent the 
state‘s interest in defending a challenged statute were permitted to intervene in a 
New Jersey Supreme Court case to defend the validity of a challenged statute 
alongside the New Jersey Attorney General who was also defending the statute. 
19 
official proponents of an initiative to assert the state‘s interest in the initiative 
measure‘s validity when public officials have declined to defend the measure, the 
proponents would lack standing to assert that interest in a federal proceeding. 
In addressing the standing issue in Arizonans for Official English, supra, 
520 U.S. 43, the high court stated in relevant part:  ―Petitioners argue primarily 
that, as initiative proponents, they have a quasi-legislative interest in defending the 
constitutionality of the measure they successfully sponsored.  [The initiative 
proponents] stress the funds and effort they expended to achieve adoption of [the 
initiative].  We have recognized that state legislators have standing to contest a 
decision holding a state statute unconstitutional if state law authorizes legislators 
to represent the State‘s interests.  See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987).  
[The initiative proponents], however, are not elected representatives, and we are 
aware of no Arizona law appointing initiative sponsors as agents of the people of 
Arizona to defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives 
made law of the State.  Nor has this Court ever identified initiative proponents as 
Article-III-qualified defenders of the measures they advocated.  Cf. Don’t 
Bankrupt Washington Committee v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of 
Chicago, 460 U.S. 1077 (1983) (summarily dismissing for lack of standing appeal 
by an initiative proponent from a decision holding the initiative unconstitutional).‖  
(520 U.S. at p. 65, italics added, fn. omitted.) 
Although for the foregoing reasons the court expressed ―grave doubts‖ 
whether the initiative proponents in question had standing under article III to 
pursue appellate review (Arizonans for Official English, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 66), 
the court went on conclude that ―we need not definitely resolve the issue‖ of the 
initiative proponents‘ standing (ibid.) because it concluded that, in any event, a 
change in the status of the plaintiff in that case rendered the litigation moot and 
20 
justified vacating the lower federal court rulings that had invalidated the initiative 
measure.  (See id. at pp. 67-80.) 
As the emphasized portion of the passage from Arizonans for Official 
English quoted above indicates, the high court‘s doubts as to the official initiative 
proponents‘ standing in that case were based, at least in substantial part, on the 
fact that the court was not aware of any ―Arizona law appointing initiative 
sponsors as agents of the people of Arizona to defend . . . the constitutionality of 
initiatives made law of the State.‖  (Arizonans for Official English, supra, 520 
U.S. at p. 65.)  In our view, nothing in that decision indicates that if a state‘s law 
does authorize the official proponents of an initiative to assert the state‘s interest 
in the validity of a challenged state initiative when the public officials who 
ordinarily assert that interest have declined to do so, the proponents would not 
have standing to assert the state‘s interest in the initiative‘s validity in a federal 
lawsuit in which state officials have declined to provide such a defense.11 
                                              
11  
We note that unlike in Karcher, supra, 484 U.S. 72, in Arizonans for 
Official English the government officials named as defendants in the federal 
lawsuit did defend the constitutional validity of the challenged state provision in 
the district court proceedings.  (Arizonans for Official English, supra, 520 U.S. at 
pp. 51-53.)  And, again unlike in Karcher, in Arizonans for Official English the 
official initiative proponents did not seek to intervene in the litigation until after 
the district court already had issued its judgment striking down the initiative 
measure on constitutional grounds.  (520 U.S. at p. 56.) 
 
As the passage from Arizonans for Official English quoted above (ante, at 
p. 19) indicates, the high court in that case also cited Don’t Bankrupt Washington 
Committee v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, supra, 460 U.S. 
1077, a summary order that dismissed an appeal from a Ninth Circuit decision for 
lack of standing.  As in Arizonans for Official Language, in Don’t Bankrupt 
Washington Committee the named government defendants defended the 
challenged initiative on behalf of the state in the lower courts (see Continental Ill. 
Nat. Bank, etc. v. State of Wash. (9th Cir. 1983) 696 F.2d 692, 697-702), and there 
is no indication that the official initiative proponents in that matter established 
that, under the applicable state law (there, the law of the State of Washington), an 
(footnote continued on next page) 
21 
We note in this regard that in its order submitting the present question to 
this court, the Ninth Circuit stated explicitly that, in its view, if the official 
proponents of an initiative have authority under California law to assert the state‘s 
interest in the initiative measure‘s validity in such a case, then, under federal law, 
the proponents would have standing in a federal proceeding to assert the state‘s 
interest in defending the challenged initiative and to appeal a judgment 
invalidating the initiative.  (Perry II, supra, 628 F.3d at p. 1196.)  Furthermore, 
although the parties before us emphatically disagree as to whether California law 
authorizes the official proponents of an initiative to assert the state‘s interest in the 
validity of a voter-approved initiative measure, in the briefs filed both in the Ninth 
Circuit and in this court all parties agree with the Ninth Circuit‘s statement that if 
the official proponents do have authority under California law to assert the state‘s 
interest in such a case, then under federal law the proponents would have standing 
in a federal proceeding to defend the initiative and to appeal a judgment 
invalidating it. 
B. Standing Based on “Particularized Interest” 
Under the controlling federal authorities, the role that state law plays in 
determining whether an official proponent of a successful initiative measure has a 
sufficient personal ―particularized interest‖ in the validity of the measure to 
support the proponent‘s standing under federal law appears to be more complex 
than the role played by state law when the official proponent is authorized by state 
law to assert the state‘s interest in the validity of the initiative. 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
initiative measure‘s official proponents have standing to defend the measure when 
the named state defendants in the litigation have undertaken such a defense. 
22 
Under the particularized interest standard, federal decisions establish that a 
federal court considers whether a prospective party is able to demonstrate ―an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, . . . 
and (b) ‗actual or imminent, not ―conjectural‖ or ―hypothetical.‖ ‘ ‖  (Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife (1992) 504 U.S. 555, 560.)  In Lujan, the high court further 
explained that ―[b]y particularized, we mean that the injury must affect the 
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.‖  (Id. at p. 560, fn. 1.)  Although the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that a state ―has the power to create 
new interests, the invasion of which may confer standing‖ under federal law 
(Diamond v. Charles, supra, 476 U.S. 54, 65, fn. 17), not every interest that state 
law recognizes as conferring standing on an individual or entity to institute or to 
defend a particular kind of lawsuit in state court will be sufficient to establish that 
the individual or entity has a particularized interest to bring or defend an 
analogous lawsuit in federal court.  (Compare Code Civ. Proc., § 526a [state law 
recognizing standing of taxpayer to challenge illegal expenditure of public funds 
in state court] with DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno (2006) 547 U.S. 332, 342-346 
[state taxpayer lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of state tax credit 
in federal court].)  Under the governing federal cases, whether a right created by 
state law is sufficient to support federal standing under the particularized interest 
test necessarily depends upon the nature of the right conferred by the state and the  
nature of the injury that may be suffered by the would-be litigant.  (Cf. Warth v. 
Seldin (1975) 422 U.S. 490, 500.) 
In the present case, the parties disagree as to whether an official initiative 
proponent possesses a special or distinct interest in the validity of an initiative 
measure the proponent has sponsored once the initiative has been approved by the 
voters and adopted as state law, and, even if so, whether the nature of that interest 
and of the injury the proponent would suffer if the initiative measure is invalidated 
23 
are sufficient to accord the proponent standing for federal law purposes under the 
particularized interest standard. 
Proponents maintain that because they possess a fundamental right under 
the California Constitution to propose statutory or constitutional changes through 
the initiative process (see, e.g., Costa v. Superior Court (2006) 37 Cal.4th 986, 
1007), they possess a personal, particularized interest in the validity of an initiative 
measure that they have proposed and that has been approved by the voters, an 
interest that would go undefended if they are not permitted to provide such a 
defense when the public officials who ordinarily defend a challenged state law 
decline to do so.  Proponents argue that their personal, fundamental right 
guaranteed by the initiative provision would be nullified if a voter-approved 
measure they have sponsored is improperly and incorrectly invalidated because 
public officials who are hostile to the measure have failed to mount a defense or to 
appeal a lower court judgment striking down the initiative. 
Plaintiffs, by contrast, assert that although the official proponents of an 
initiative may possess a personal, particularized interest under the California 
Constitution and the applicable statutory provisions in having an initiative measure 
they have proposed submitted to the voters, once an initiative measure has been 
approved by the voters the official proponents have no greater personal legally 
protected interest in the measure‘s validity than any other member of the public.  
Accordingly, plaintiffs argue that once an initiative measure has been enacted into 
law, its official proponents do not possess a distinct, particularized interest in the 
initiative‘s validity. 
As we explain, we need not decide whether the official proponents of an 
initiative measure possess a particularized interest in the initiative‘s validity once 
the measure has been approved by the voters.  For the reasons discussed below, we 
conclude that when public officials decline to defend a voter-approved initiative or 
24 
assert the state‘s interest in the initiative‘s validity, under California law the 
official proponents of an initiative measure are authorized to assert the state‘s 
interest in the validity of the initiative and to appeal a judgment invalidating the 
measure.  Because that conclusion is sufficient to support an affirmative response 
to the question posed by the Ninth Circuit, we need not decide whether, under 
California law, the official proponents also possess a particularized interest in a 
voter-approved initiative‘s validity.  
 
III.  Analysis of Initiative Proponents’ Standing Under California Law 
A.  Basis of Initiative Proponents’ Standing 
Article II, section 1 of the California Constitution proclaims:  ―All political 
power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for their protection, 
security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public 
good may require.‖  As this court noted in Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th 364, 412-
413:  ―This provision originated in one of the initial sections of the Declaration of 
Rights contained in California‘s first Constitution (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. I, § 2), 
and reflects a basic precept of our governmental system:  that the people have the 
constitutional right to alter or reform their government.‖  (Fn. omitted.) 
Although California‘s original 1849 Constitution declared that ―[a]ll 
political power is inherent in the people,‖ it was not until 60 years later — in 
1911 — that the California Constitution was amended to afford the voters of 
California the authority to directly propose and adopt state constitutional 
amendments and statutory provisions through the initiative power.  In Associated 
Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591 
(Associated Home Builders), we briefly described the history, significance, and 
consistent judicial interpretation of the constitutionally based initiative power in 
California:  ―The amendment of the California Constitution in 1911 to provide for 
the initiative and referendum signifies one of the outstanding achievements of the 
25 
progressive movement of the early 1900‘s.  Drafted in light of the theory that all 
power of government ultimately resides in the people, the amendment speaks of 
the initiative and referendum, not as a right granted the people, but as a power 
reserved by them.  Declaring it ‗the duty of the courts to jealously guard this right 
of the people‘ . . . , the courts have described the initiative and referendum as 
articulating ‗one of the most precious rights of our democratic process. . . .‘  ‗[I]t 
has long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power 
wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled.  If 
doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts 
will preserve it.‘ ‖  (Italics added, citations & fns. omitted.) 
As a number of our past decisions have explained, the progressive 
movement in California that introduced the initiative power into our state 
Constitution grew out of dissatisfaction with the then-governing public officials 
and a widespread belief that the people had lost control of the political process. 
(See, e.g., Independent Energy Producers Assn. v. McPherson  (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
1020, 1041-1043; Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th 364, 420-421.)  In this setting, ―[t]he 
initiative was viewed as one means of restoring the people‘s rightful control over 
their government, by providing a method that would permit the people to propose 
and adopt statutory provisions and constitutional amendments.‖  (Strauss, supra, 
at p. 421.)  The primary purpose of the initiative was to afford the people the 
ability to propose and to adopt constitutional amendments or statutory provisions 
that their elected public officials had refused or declined to adopt.  The 1911 ballot 
pamphlet argument in favor of the measure described the initiative as ―that 
safeguard which the people should retain for themselves, to supplement the work 
of the legislature by initiating those measures which the legislature either viciously 
or negligently fails or refuses to enact . . . .‖  (Sect. of State, Proposed Amends. to 
26 
Const. with Legis. Reasons, Gen. Elec. (Oct. 10, 1911) Reasons why Sen. Const. 
Amend. No. 22 should be adopted, italics added.) 
The California constitutional provisions setting forth the initiative power  
do not explicitly refer to or fully prescribe the authority or responsibilities of the 
official proponents of an initiative measure,12 but the Legislature, in adopting 
                                              
12  
The constitutional provisions relating to the initiative power are currently 
set forth in article II, sections 8 and 10, article IV, section 1, and article XVIII, 
sections 3 and 4 of the California Constitution. 
 
Article II, section 8, provides in relevant part:  ―(a) The initiative is the 
power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and 
to adopt or reject them. 
 
―(b)  An initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary 
of State a petition that sets forth the text of the proposed statute or amendment to 
the Constitution and is certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to 
5 percent in the case of a statute, and 8 percent in the case of an amendment to the 
Constitution, of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial 
election. 
 
―(c) The Secretary of State shall then submit the measure at the next general 
election held at least 131 days after it qualifies or at any special statewide election 
held prior to that general election.  The Governor may call a special statewide 
election for the measure.‖ 
 
Article II, section 10 provides in relevant part:  ―(a) An initiative statute . . . 
approved by a majority of votes thereon takes effect the day after the election 
unless the measure provides otherwise.  [¶] . . . [¶]  
 
―(c)  The Legislature . . . may amend or repeal an initiative statute by 
another statute that become effective only when approved by the electors unless 
the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval. 
 
―(d)  Prior to circulation of an initiative . . . petition for signatures, a copy 
shall be submitted to the Attorney General who shall prepare a title and summary 
of the measure as provided by law. 
 
―(e)  The Legislature shall provide the manner in which petitions shall be 
circulated, presented, and certified, and measures submitted to the electors.‖ 
 
Article IV, section 1 provides in full:  ―The legislative power of this State is 
vested in the California Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, 
but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.‖ 
 
Article XVIII, section 3 provides in full:  ―The electors may amend the 
Constitution by initiative.‖ 
(footnote continued on next page) 
27 
statutes to formalize and facilitate the initiative process, has enacted a number of 
provisions that explicitly identify who the official proponents of an initiative 
measure are and describe their authority and duties.   
Elections Code section 342 defines the proponent of an initiative measure 
as ―the elector or electors who submit the text of a proposed initiative or 
referendum to the Attorney General with a request that he or she prepare a 
circulating title and summary of the chief purpose and points of the proposed 
measure . . . .‖  Similarly, Elections Code section 9001 states that ―[t]he electors 
presenting the request [to the Attorney General] shall be known as the 
‗proponents‘ ‖ and requires that prior to the circulation of an initiative petition for 
signature the text of the proposed measure must be submitted to the Attorney 
General with a request that ―a circulating title and summary of the chief purpose 
and points of the proposed measure be prepared.‖13  Elections Code sections 9607, 
9608, and 9609 place an obligation upon the official proponents of an initiative 
measure to manage and supervise the process by which signatures for the initiative 
petition are obtained, and Elections Code section 9032 specifies that, after 
signatures have been collected, ―[t]he right to file the petition [with the designated 
election officials] shall be reserved to its proponents, and any section thereof 
presented for filing by any person or persons other than the proponents of a 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Article XVIII, section 4 provides in relevant part: ―A proposed amendment 
. . . shall be submitted to the electors and if approved by a majority of votes 
thereon takes effect the day after the election unless the measure provides 
otherwise.‖ 
13  
Elections Code section 9001 also requires the proponents of an initiative 
measure, in submitting their request for a title and summary, to pay a fee which is 
to be refunded to the proponents if the measure qualifies for the ballot within two 
years from the date the summary is furnished to the proponents. 
28 
measure or by persons duly authorized in writing by one or more of the proponents 
shall be disregarded by the elections official.‖  (Italics added.) 
Once an initiative measure has qualified for the ballot, several provisions of 
the Elections Code vest proponents with the power to control the arguments in 
favor of an initiative measure.  Although any voter can file with the Secretary of 
State an argument for or against the initiative (Elec. Code, § 9064), a ballot 
argument shall not be accepted unless it has been ―authorized by the proponent‖ 
(Elec. Code, § 9065, subd. (d)).  If more than one argument is filed, Elections 
Code section 9067 provides that in preparing the ballot pamphlet ―preference and 
priority‖ shall be given to the ballot argument submitted by the official proponents 
of the initiative measure.  Proponents similarly control the rebuttal arguments in 
favor of an initiative.  (See Elec. Code, § 9069.)  Moreover, proponents retain the 
power to withdraw a ballot argument at any time before the deadline for filing 
arguments.  (See Elec. Code, § 9601.) 
Under these and related statutory provisions (see, e.g., Elec. Code, §§ 9002, 
9004, 9604), the official proponents of an initiative measure are recognized as 
having a distinct role — involving both authority and responsibilities that differ 
from other supporters of the measure — with regard to the initiative measure the 
proponents have sponsored. 
Neither the state constitutional provisions relating to the initiative power, 
nor the statutory provisions relating to the official proponents of an initiative 
measure, expressly address the question whether, or in what circumstances, the 
official proponents are authorized to appear in court to defend the validity of an 
initiative measure the proponents have sponsored.  Nonetheless, since the adoption 
of the initiative power a century ago, decisions of both this court and the Courts of 
Appeal have repeatedly and uniformly permitted the official proponents of 
initiative measures to participate as parties — either as interveners or as real 
29 
parties in interest — in both preelection and postelection litigation challenging the 
initiative measure they have sponsored.  Furthermore, the participation by official 
initiative proponents as formal parties in such litigation has routinely been 
permitted whether or not the Attorney General or other public officials were also 
defending the challenged initiative measure in the judicial proceeding in question. 
The decisions in which official initiative proponents (or organizations that 
have been directly involved in drafting and sponsoring the initiative measure) have 
been permitted to participate as parties in California proceedings involving 
challenges to an initiative measure are legion.  (See, e.g., Strauss, supra, 46 
Cal.4th 364, 399 [postelection challenge]; Independent Energy Producers Assn. v. 
McPherson, supra, 38 Cal.4th 1020 (Independent Energy Producers) [preelection 
challenge]; Costa v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.4th 986, 1001 (Costa) 
[preelection challenge]; Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 
1142, 1146 [preelection challenge]; Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees 
Internat. Union v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585, 590 (Hotel Employees Union) 
[postelection challenge]; Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 
1250 (Amwest) [postelection challenge]; 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi 
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 216, 241 (20th Century Ins. Co.) [postelection challenge]; 
Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d 492, 500 [postelection challenge]; Calfarm Ins. 
Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 812 [postelection challenge]; People ex 
rel. Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino (1984) 36 Cal.3d 476, 480 & fn. 1 
[postelection challenge]; Legislature v. Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658, 663 
[preelection challenge]; Brosnahan v. Eu (1982) 31 Cal.3d 1, 3 [preelection 
challenge]; City of Santa Monica v. Stewart, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 53 
[postelection challenge]; Citizens for Jobs & the Economy v. County of Orange 
(2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1316 & fn. 2 [postelection challenge]; City of 
Westminster v. County of Orange (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 623, 626 [postelection 
30 
challenge]; Community Health Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1983) 146 
Cal.App.3d 990, 992 [postelection challenge]; Simac Design Inc. v. Alciati (1979) 
92 Cal.App.3d 146, 153 [postelection challenge]; see also Assembly v. Deukmejian 
(1982) 30 Cal.3d 638, 644-645 [referendum proponent permitted to participate as 
real party in interest in preelection challenge to a proposed referendum].)14  
                                              
14  
Past decisions have frequently drawn a distinction, for purposes of 
intervention, between, on the one hand, the official proponents of an initiative 
measure or organizations that were directly involved in drafting and sponsoring 
the measure, and, on the other hand, other advocacy groups that ideologically 
support the measure. 
 
As noted above (ante, at p. 7, fn. 1), in the Strauss litigation our court 
granted the motion filed by the official proponents of Proposition 8 to intervene as 
formal parties in defending the initiative measure, but at the same time denied a 
motion to intervene that had been filed by another pro-Proposition 8 advocacy 
group.  (See also Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1178-
1179 [contrasting the status of an amicus curiae advocacy group with that of 
official proponents of a ballot measure in concluding that the amicus curiae could 
not properly be held liable for attorney fees awarded under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1021.5].) 
 
In light of this distinction, plaintiffs‘ reliance upon the Court of Appeal 
decision in City and County of San Francisco v. State of California (2005) 128 
Cal.App.4th 1030 lacks merit.  In that case, the Court of Appeal affirmed a trial 
court order denying a motion filed by an advocacy organization — the Proposition 
22 Legal Defense and Education Fund — seeking to intervene in an action 
challenging the validity of Proposition 22.  In upholding the trial court order 
denying intervention, however, the Court of Appeal explicitly stated that ―the 
Fund itself played no role in sponsoring Proposition 22 because the organization 
was not even created until one year after voters passed the initiative‖ (128 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1038), and explained that ―this case does not present the 
question of whether an official proponent of an initiative (Elec. Code, § 342) has a 
sufficiently direct and immediate interest to permit intervention in litigation 
challenging the validity of the law enacted‖ (128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1038).  Thus, 
contrary to plaintiffs‘ contention, that decision is not inconsistent with the 
numerous decisions both of this court and the Courts of Appeal that have 
permitted the official proponents of an initiative measure to intervene in actions 
challenging the validity of the initiative measure.  For the same reason, this court‘s 
subsequent determination in In re Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th 757, 789-
(footnote continued on next page) 
31 
Moreover, the cases have not only permitted official initiative proponents to 
appear as formal parties but have also permitted the proponents to appeal from an 
adverse judgment.  (See, e.g., Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1250; 20th Century 
Ins. Co., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 269; People ex rel. Deukmejian v. County of 
Mendocino, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 480; Simac Design, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 153.)   
Although in most of these cases the official initiative proponent‘s 
participation as a formal party — either as an intervener or as a real party in 
interest — was not challenged and, as a consequence, this court‘s prior decisions 
(with the exception of the Building Industry Assn. decision discussed below) have 
not had occasion to analyze the question of the official proponent‘s authority to so 
participate, the prevalence and uniformity of this court‘s practice of permitting 
official proponents to appear as formal parties to defend the initiative measure 
they have sponsored nonetheless is significant.  As Chief Justice Marshall 
explained in an early decision of the United States Supreme Court, the existence of 
numerous decisions that have permitted a judicial procedure without explicitly 
discussing the procedure‘s validity are properly viewed to ―have much weight, as 
they show that [the asserted flaw in the procedure] neither occurred to the bar or 
the bench.‖  (Bank of the United States v. Deveaux (1809) 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 
88; see also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States (1962) 370 U.S. 294, 307.) 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
791, that the same advocacy group — the Proposition 22 Legal Defense and 
Education Fund — lacked standing to maintain a lawsuit to obtain a declaratory 
judgment upholding the validity of Proposition 22 does not support plaintiffs‘ 
claims regarding the nature and scope of the authority possessed by the official 
proponents of an initiative measure.   
32 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that California trial and appellate courts have 
repeatedly and consistently permitted the official proponents of an initiative to 
appear as formal parties to defend the initiative measure they have sponsored.  
Plaintiffs maintain, however, that in all of the prior cases the official proponents 
were permitted to intervene or to appear as real parties in interest only by virtue of  
a liberal exercise of judicial discretion and then only to represent the proponents‘ 
own personal interest rather than to assert the state‘s interest in the validity of the 
measure. 
Plaintiffs‘ characterization of the precedents, however, is not based on the 
text of those decisions.  As already noted, in all but one of this court‘s prior 
decisions we have not been called upon to address the basis of our uniform 
practice of permitting official initiative proponents to intervene or to appear as real 
parties in interest in such litigation, and, in particular, to explain whether the 
proponents‘ participation was to assert the state‘s interest in the validity of the 
measure or to defend the proponents‘ own particularized personal interest in the 
validity of the measure (or perhaps in both capacities).15  The  
                                              
15  
Neither the statutory provision relating to intervention nor the provision 
pertaining to the status of a real party in interest addresses the question whether a 
would-be party‘s proposed participation is to assert its own interest or to assert the 
state‘s interest. 
 
Code of Civil Procedure section 387 — the intervention statute — provides 
in relevant part:  ―(a) Upon timely application, any person, who has an interest in 
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest 
against both, may intervene in the action or proceeding. . . .  [¶]  (b) If any 
provision of law confers an unconditional right to intervene or if the person 
seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition 
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede that person‘s ability to 
protect that interest, unless that person‘s interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties, the court shall, upon timely application, permit that person to 
intervene.‖ 
(footnote continued on next page) 
33 
present proceeding affords us the opportunity to address this point.16 
In analyzing the legal basis upon which an official initiative proponent‘s 
authority to participate in such litigation rests, we believe it is useful to draw a 
distinction between legal challenges to an initiative measure that precede the 
voters‘ approval of an initiative measure and legal challenges to an initiative 
measure that are brought after the initiative has been approved by the voters and 
adopted into law.  (For convenience, we refer to the former category as 
―preelection‖ cases and the latter category as ―postelection‖ cases.) 
Prior to an election, litigation involving an initiative measure may arise 
with regard to a wide variety of  issues, including, for example, (1) whether the 
proposed measure may not be submitted to the voters through the initiative process 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Code of Civil Procedure section 367 — the real party in interest statute — 
provides simply:  ―Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party 
in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.‖  
16  
Although past California decisions have generally not had occasion to 
explicitly address the rationale or basis underlying the authority of official 
initiative proponents to participate as interveners or real parties in interest, the 
Ninth Circuit‘s question to this court demonstrates that the underlying basis for 
proponents‘ participation under California law is potentially determinative of the 
question whether the proponents have standing under federal law to appeal a lower 
federal court judgment invalidating a California voter-approved initiative when the 
public officials who ordinarily would pursue such an appeal have declined to do 
so.  Because, as we have seen, it is well established that California courts have an 
obligation to liberally construe the provisions of the California Constitution 
relating to the initiative power to assure that the initiative process is not directly or 
indirectly annulled (see Associated Home Builders, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591), 
and because the California initiative process may be undermined if a California 
initiative goes undefended in a federal proceeding because federal courts lack a 
proper understanding of the basis of the authority possessed by an initiative 
measure‘s official proponents under California law, it is entirely appropriate that 
we resolve the issue posed by the Ninth Circuit. 
34 
in light of its subject matter (see Independent Energy Producers, supra, 38 Cal.4th 
1020) or because it embodies more than one subject (see Senate of the State of 
Cal. v. Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1142), (2) whether there have been prejudicial 
procedural irregularities in the process of submitting the matter to the Attorney 
General or gathering signatures on the initiative petition (see Costa, supra, 37 
Cal.4th 986), or (3) whether a sufficient number of valid signatures has been 
obtained to qualify the matter for the ballot (see Brosnahan v. Eu, supra, 31 Cal.3d 
1).  In the preelection setting, when a proposed initiative measure has not yet been 
adopted as state law, the official proponents of an initiative measure who intervene 
or appear as real parties in interest are properly viewed as asserting their own 
personal right and interest— under article II, section 8 of the California 
Constitution and the California statutes relating to initiative proponents — to 
propose an initiative measure and have the measure submitted to the voters for 
approval or rejection.  In preelection cases, the official initiative proponents 
possess a distinct interest in defending the proposed initiative because they are 
acting to vindicate their own right under the relevant California constitutional and 
statutory provisions to have their proposed measure — a measure they have 
submitted to the Attorney General, have circulated for signature, and have the 
exclusive right to submit to the Secretary of State after signatures have been 
collected — put to a vote of the people.  Because in the preelection context the 
initiative measure has not been approved and enacted into law, the state‘s interest 
in defending the validity of an enacted state law does not come into play.17  
                                              
17  
This does not mean that state officials cannot participate in such litigation 
and take a position on whether the preelection challenge has merit.  (See, e.g., 
Schmitz v. Younger (1978) 21 Cal.3d 90, 93.)  Because the measure has not yet 
been adopted, however, public officials would not be representing the state‘s 
interest in defending a duly enacted law. 
35 
Once an initiative measure has been approved by the requisite vote of 
electors in an election, however, the measure becomes a duly enacted 
constitutional amendment or statute.  At that point, in the absence of a showing 
that the particular initiative in question will differentially affect the official 
proponents‘ own property, liberty or other individually possessed legal right or 
legally protected interest, it is arguably less clear that the official proponents 
possess a personal legally protected stake in the initiative‘s validity that differs 
from that of each individual who voted for the measure or, indeed, from that of the 
people of the state as a whole.  Although the matter is subject to reasonable 
debate, one may question whether the official proponents of a successful initiative 
measure, any more than legislators who have introduced and successfully 
shepherded a bill through the legislative process, can properly claim any distinct 
or personal legally protected stake in the measure once it is enacted into law.  
 
Nonetheless, as we have seen, the decisions of this court and the Courts of 
Appeal in postelection challenges to voter-approved initiative measures have 
uniformly permitted the official proponents of an initiative measure to intervene, 
or to appear as real parties in interest, to defend the validity of the challenged 
initiative measure.  In the postelection setting, the ability of official initiative 
proponents to intervene or to appear as a real parties in interest has never been 
contingent upon the proponents‘ demonstration that their own personal property, 
liberty, reputation, or other individually possessed, legally protected interests 
would be adversely or differentially affected by a judicial decision invalidating the 
initiative measure.  (See, e.g., Legislature v. Eu, supra, 31 Cal.3d 1 [initiative 
measure imposing legislative term limits and limiting legislative budget]; City of 
Santa Monica v. Stewart, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th 43 [initiative measure limiting 
employment by public officials after leaving public service].)  Plaintiffs have not 
cited, and our research has not disclosed, any decision in which the official 
36 
proponents of an initiative measure were precluded from intervening or appearing 
as real parties in interest in a postelection case challenging the measure‘s validity, 
even when they did not have the type of distinct personal, legally protected interest 
in the subject matter of the initiative measure that would ordinarily support 
intervention or real party in interest status on a particularized interest basis.  
Instead, they have been permitted to participate as parties in such litigation simply 
by virtue of their status as official proponents of the challenged measure. 
As already noted, although most of our prior cases have not had occasion to 
discuss or analyze the source of the authority possessed by the official proponents 
of an initiative to intervene in a postelection challenge to defend the initiative 
measure the proponents have sponsored, one case — Building Industry Assn., 
supra, 41 Cal.3d 810 — does illuminate this court‘s uniform practice of permitting 
official initiative proponents to participate as parties in such postelection cases. 
In Building Industry Assn., supra, 41 Cal.3d 810, the issue before the court 
concerned the validity and proper interpretation of a then recently enacted 
statutory provision — Evidence Code section 669.5 — that, among other things, 
placed the burden of proof on any city, county, or city and county that adopted an 
ordinance limiting future residential development to show, in any proceeding 
challenging the validity of the ordinance, that the ordinance ―is necessary for the 
protection of the [municipality‘s] public health, safety, or welfare‖ (Evid. Code, 
§ 669.5, subd. (b)).  The specific question before the court was whether the new 
provision — shifting to the municipality the burden of proof on this issue — 
applied to a growth control ordinance that had been adopted through the initiative 
process or whether the new provision applied only to ordinances enacted by the 
local legislative body. 
In the course of its opinion, the court in Building Industry Assn., supra, 41 
Cal.3d 810, addressed a legal argument advanced by an amicus curiae to support 
37 
the position that the statute could not properly be interpreted to apply to an 
ordinance adopted through the initiative process.  The court stated:  ―Amicus 
[curiae] . . . argues that section 669.5 substantially impairs the ability of the people 
to exercise initiative power because the proponents of the initiative would not have 
an effective way to defend it.  Despite the fact that the city or county would have a 
duty to defend the ordinance, a city or county might not do so with vigor if it has 
underlying opposition to the ordinance.  Furthermore, the proponents of the 
initiative have no guarantee of being permitted to intervene in the action, a matter 
which is discretionary with the trial court.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 387.)  This 
argument would have merit if intervention was unavailable.  But when a city or 
county is required to defend an initiative ordinance and, because of Evidence Code 
section 669.5, must shoulder the burden of proving reasonable relationship to 
public health, safety or welfare, we believe the trial court in most instances should 
allow intervention by proponents of the initiative.  To fail to do so may well be an 
abuse of discretion.  Permitting intervention by the initiative proponents under 
these circumstances would serve to guard the people‘s right to exercise initiative 
power, a right that must be jealously defended by the courts.‖  (41 Cal.3d at 
p. 822.) 
Although this passage in Building Industry Assn., supra, 41 Cal.3d 810, 
was directed at the specific context at issue in that case — involving the burden-
shifting provision of Evidence Code section 669.5 — in our view the passage is 
properly understood as more broadly instructive in a number of respects. 
First, the passage recognizes that although public officials ordinarily have 
the responsibility of defending a challenged law, in instances in which the 
challenged law has been adopted through the initiative process there is a realistic 
risk that the public officials may not defend the approved initiative measure ―with 
vigor.‖  (Building Industry Assn., supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 822.)  This enhanced risk 
38 
is attributable to the unique nature and purpose of the initiative power, which gives 
the people the right to adopt into law measures that their elected officials have not 
adopted and may often oppose. 
Second, the passage explains that because of the risk that public officials 
may not defend an initiative‘s validity with vigor, a court should ordinarily permit 
the official proponents of an initiative measure to intervene in an action 
challenging the validity of the measure in order ―to guard the people‘s right to 
exercise initiative power.‖  (Building Industry Assn., supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 822.)  
Because official initiative proponents are permitted to intervene in order to 
supplement the efforts of public officials who may not defend the measure with 
vigor, it is appropriate to view the proponents as acting in an analogous and 
complementary capacity to those public officials, namely as asserting the people‘s 
interest (or, in other words, the state‘s interest) in the validity of a duly enacted 
law.  And because the passage clearly states that ―[p]ermitting intervention by the 
initiative proponents . . . would serve to guard the people’s right to exercise 
initiative power‖ (ibid., italics added), it is apparent that the official proponents of 
the initiative are participating on behalf of the people‘s interest, and not solely on 
behalf of the proponents‘ own personal interest. 
Third, contrary to plaintiffs‘ contention that the numerous decisions 
permitting initiative proponents to intervene or to appear as real parties in interest 
in postelection litigation challenging an initiative measure simply reflect 
unfettered discretionary judgments in favor of the proponents‘ participation, the 
passage in Building Industry Assn., supra, 41 Cal.3d 810, states that even when 
public officials are defending a challenged initiative in pending litigation, ―the trial 
court in most instances should allow intervention by proponents of the initiative‖ 
(id. at p. 822), and that ―[t]o fail to do so may well be an abuse of discretion.‖  
(Ibid.)  Because Building Industry Assn. indicates that in most instances it would 
39 
be an abuse of discretion for a court to preclude intervention by the official 
initiative proponents even in instances in which the named government defendants 
are defending the measure, in our view there can be no question but that it would 
be an abuse of discretion for a court to preclude the official proponents from 
intervening to defend a challenged initiative measure when the named government 
defendants have declined to defend the initiative measure.  In the latter setting, the 
official proponents‘ ability to intervene indisputably is necessary ―to guard the 
people‘s right to exercise initiative power.‖  (Ibid.) 
Plaintiffs argue that the passage in Building Industry Assn., supra, 41 
Cal.3d 810, we have been analyzing should properly be considered dictum and 
should not be followed.  Plaintiffs apparently rely on the fact there is no indication 
in the Building Industry Assn. decision that the official proponents who had 
sponsored the initiative ordinance at issue in that case had sought and been denied 
the right to intervene in the underlying action challenging the ordinance.  
Proponents take issue with plaintiffs‘ characterization of this passage as dictum, 
pointing out that the passage explicitly states that the argument advanced by the 
amicus curiae — that is, that Evidence Code section 669.5 could not 
constitutionally be interpreted to apply to ordinances enacted through the initiative 
process because such application would substantially impair the initiative process 
— ―would have merit if intervention was unavailable.‖  (41 Cal.3d at p. 822.)  
Proponents maintain that this statement demonstrates that the discussion of the 
ability of official initiative proponents to intervene in such actions was essential to 
the court‘s conclusion that the statute could constitutionally be applied to 
ordinances enacted through the initiative process. 
In our view, there is no need to decide whether the passage in Building 
Industry Assn. is properly considered a holding or dictum, because in any event we 
believe that the passage accurately describes at least one fundamental basis of this 
40 
court‘s uniform practice of permitting the official proponents of an initiative to 
intervene or to appear as real parties in interest in cases challenging the validity of 
a voter-approved initiative measure.  The statement in Building Industry Assn. that 
permitting intervention by such proponents serves to guard the people‘s right to 
exercise the initiative power finds support in numerous cases in which official 
initiative proponents advanced many of the most substantial legal theories that 
were raised in support of the challenged measure and were discussed in this 
court‘s opinion.  (See, e.g., Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th 364, 465-469; Hotel 
Employees Union, supra, 21 Cal.4th 585, 605-612; Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th 
1243, 1256-1265; Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, supra, 48 Cal.3d 805, 819-821; 
see also Citizens for Jobs & the Economy v. County of Orange, supra, 94 
Cal.App.4th 1311, 1316-1323; Community Health Assn. v. Board of Supervisors, 
supra, 146 Cal.App.3d 990, 991-993.)  These decisions highlight the different 
perspectives regarding the validity or proper interpretation of a voter-approved 
initiative measure often held by the official proponents of the initiative measure 
and by the voters who enacted the measure into law, as contrasted with those held 
by the elected officials who ordinarily defend challenged state laws, and 
demonstrate that the role played by the proponents in such litigation is comparable 
to the role ordinarily played by the Attorney General or other public officials in 
vigorously defending a duly enacted state law and raising all arguable legal 
theories upon which a challenged provision may be sustained. 
The experience of California courts in reviewing challenges to voter-
approved initiative measures over many years thus teaches that permitting the 
official proponents of an initiative to participate as parties in postelection cases, 
even when public officials are also defending the initiative measure, often is 
essential to ensure that the interests and perspective of the voters who approved 
the measure are not consciously or unconsciously subordinated to other public 
41 
interests that may be championed by elected officials, and that all viable legal 
arguments in favor of the initiative‘s validity are brought to the court‘s attention.  
Although the legal arguments advanced by the official proponents of an initiative 
are not always the strongest or most persuasive arguments regarding the validity or 
proper interpretation of the initiative measure that are brought to a court‘s 
attention, past decisions demonstrate the importance of affording such proponents 
the opportunity to participate, along with elected officials, in asserting the state‘s 
interest in the validity of a challenged initiative measure.  Such participation by 
the official initiative proponents enhances both the substantive fairness and 
completeness of the judicial evaluation of the initiative‘s validity and the 
appearance of procedural fairness that is essential if a court decision adjudicating 
the validity of a voter-approved initiative measure is to be perceived as legitimate 
by the initiative‘s supporters. 
Moreover, although our past decisions have not had occasion to discuss or 
identify the specific source of the authority possessed by the official proponents of 
an initiative measure to assert the state‘s interest in the initiative‘s validity, we 
conclude that at least in those circumstances in which the government officials 
who ordinarily defend a challenged statute or constitutional amendment have 
declined to provide such a defense or to appeal a lower court decision striking 
down the measure, the authority of the official proponents of the initiative to assert 
the state‘s interest in the validity of the initiative is properly understood as arising 
out of article II, section 8 of the California Constitution and the provisions of the 
Elections Code relating to the role of initiative proponents.  The initiative power 
would be significantly impaired if there were no one to assert the state‘s interest in 
the validity of the measure when elected officials decline to defend it in court or to 
42 
appeal a judgment invalidating the measure.18  Under article II, section 8 and the 
Elections Code, the official proponents of an initiative measure have a unique 
relationship to the voter-approved measure that makes them especially likely to be 
reliable and vigorous advocates for the measure and to be so viewed by those 
whose votes secured the initiative‘s enactment into law.  As we have seen, the 
Legislature has recognized the unique role played by official proponents in the 
initiative process embodied in article II, section 8, by enacting numerous 
provisions placing upon the proponents the direct responsibility to manage and 
control the ballot-qualifying and petition-filing process, as well as authorizing 
proponents to control the arguments in favor of the initiative that appear in the 
official voter information guide published by the Secretary of State.  (See, e.g., 
Elec. Code, §§ 9607, 9608, 9609, 9032, 9064, 9065, subd. (d), 9069, 9601.)  Thus, 
regardless of the initiative‘s effect on their personal and particularized legally 
protected interests, the official proponents are the most logical and appropriate 
                                              
18  
Plaintiffs point out that the invalidation of Proposition 8 in the underlying 
federal litigation did not result from any action or inaction by the Governor or 
Attorney General but from a decision by the federal district court after a contested 
trial.  Ordinarily, however, public officials who are defending a state law against a 
constitutional challenge can be expected to appeal an adverse trial court judgment 
to an appellate court.  Indeed, from the outset of the federal district court 
proceedings in the underlying case, the district court itself emphasized its 
expectation that its decision would constitute only the first stage of proceedings 
that would lead to an appellate court determination of the significant constitutional 
question at issue in the proceeding.  The inability of the official proponents of an 
initiative measure to appeal a trial court judgment invalidating the measure, when 
the public officials who ordinarily would file such an appeal decline to do so, 
would significantly undermine the initiative power. 
43 
choice to assert the state‘s interest in the validity of the initiative measure on 
behalf of the electors who voted in favor of the measure.19   
Accordingly, we conclude that when the public officials who ordinarily 
defend a challenged measure decline to do so, article II, section 8 of the California 
Constitution and the applicable provisions of the Elections Code authorize the 
official proponents of an initiative measure to intervene or to participate as real 
parties in interest in a judicial proceeding to assert the state‘s interest in the 
initiative‘s validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure. 
B.  Plaintiffs’ Objections to Official Initiative Proponents’ Authority to  
Assert the State’s Interest in the Validity of a Voter-approved Initiative 
Plaintiffs advance a number of objections to a determination that the 
official proponents of an initiative are authorized to assert the state‘s interest in the 
validity of a voter-approved initiative when the public officials who ordinarily 
defend a challenged state law decline to do so.  For the reasons discussed below, 
we conclude that none of the objections has merit. 
1. 
Plaintiffs initially rely upon the provisions of the California Constitution 
setting forth the authority and obligation of the Governor and the Attorney General 
                                              
19  
Because the Ninth Circuit has asked us to determine only whether the 
official proponents of an initiative measure have authority under California law to 
assert the state‘s interest in the validity of an initiative when the public officials 
who ordinarily defend the measure decline to do so, we have no occasion to 
address the hypothetical question whether in a case in which public officials have 
declined to defend the measure and the official initiative proponents are not 
available or do not seek to assert the state‘s interest in the validity of the measure, 
other individuals or entities would be entitled to intervene in the proceeding to 
assert the state‘s interest in the validity of the initiative.  We express no opinion on 
that question.   
44 
with regard to the enforcement of the law (Cal. Const., art. V, §§ 1, 13),20 and 
upon the California statutory provisions designating the Attorney General‘s role in 
court actions against the state.  (Gov. Code, §§ 12511, 12512; Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 902.1.)21  Plaintiffs maintain that these constitutional and statutory provisions 
mean that the Attorney General is the only person who can assert the state‘s 
interest in defending a challenged law and preclude initiative proponents from 
asserting the state‘s interest in the validity of a challenged law.  Plaintiffs insist 
that when the Attorney General declines to provide such a defense, the sole 
remedy of those who object to the Attorney General‘s action is ―at the ballot box.‖   
The constitutional and statutory provisions to which plaintiffs point 
establish that in a judicial proceeding in which the validity of a state law is 
challenged, the state‘s interest in the the validity of the law is ordinarily asserted 
by the state Attorney General.  These constitutional and statutory provisions, 
however, have never been interpreted to mean that the Attorney General is the 
                                              
20  
Article V, section 1 of the California Constitution provides in full:  ―The 
supreme executive power of this State is vested in the Governor.  The Governor 
shall see that the law is faithfully executed.‖ 
 
Article V, section 13 of the California Constitution provides in relevant 
part:  ―Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, the Attorney General 
shall be the chief law officer of the State.  It shall be the duty of the Attorney 
General to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced.‖ 
21 
Government Code section 12511 provides in relevant part:  ―The Attorney 
General has charge, as attorney, of all legal matters in which the State is interested 
. . . .‖ 
 
Government Code, section 12512 provides:  ―The Attorney General shall 
attend the Supreme Court and prosecute or defend all causes to which the State, or 
any State officer is a party in his or her official capacity.‖ 
 
Code of Civil Procedure, section 902.1 authorizes the Attorney General to 
intervene and participate in any appeal in any proceeding in which a state statute 
or regulation has been declared unconstitutional by a court. 
45 
only person or entity that may assert the state‘s interest in the validity of a state 
law in a proceeding in which the law‘s validity is at issue. 
The State of California, of course, is composed of three branches of 
government, a great number of elected and appointed public officials, and myriad 
state and local agencies, boards, and public entities.  In many instances the 
interests of two or more public officials or entities may conflict and give rise to 
differing official views as to the validity or proper interpretation of a challenged 
state law.  In such instances, it is not uncommon for different officials or entities 
to appear in a judicial proceeding as distinct parties and to be represented by 
separate counsel, each official or entity presenting its own perspective of the 
state‘s interest with regard to the constitutional challenge or proposed 
interpretation at issue in the case. 
The case of Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1243, provides an apt illustration.  In 
Amwest, shortly after the voters approved Proposition 103 — a broad insurance 
reform initiative measure that, among other things, required a rollback of 
insurance rates — the plaintiff insurer filed a petition for writ of mandate in 
superior court, alleging that application of the rate rollback provisions of 
Proposition 103 to surety insurers would violate the constitutional rights of such 
insurers.  The petition named the Governor, the Attorney General, the State Board 
of Equalization, and the Insurance Commissioner as defendants.  While the 
proceeding was pending in superior court, the Legislature enacted a statute — 
Insurance Code section 1861.135 — that purported to exempt surety insurers from 
the rate rollback provisions of Proposition 103.  The validity of the new statute 
was called into question in the Amwest proceeding, because there was a dispute 
whether the statute was a constitutionally impermissible attempt to revise 
Proposition 103 without submitting the revision to a vote of the people (see Cal. 
Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c)) or instead whether the statute furthered the purpose 
46 
of Proposition 103 and thus was permissible under the explicit terms of 
Proposition 103 itself.  (See Amwest, supra, at p. 1247.)  
Although Amwest is one of the many California cases, cited above, in 
which an initiative proponent was permitted to intervene as a formal party and to 
appeal an adverse decision (see ante, at pp. 29-31), Amwest is also a case in which 
the named government defendants themselves took conflicting positions regarding 
the validity of the new statute.  In that case, the Governor, the Attorney General, 
and the State Board of Equalization — all represented by the Attorney General — 
maintained that the new statute was constitutionally valid.  By contrast, the 
Insurance Commissioner — represented by separate counsel — took the position 
that the new statute did not further the purpose of Proposition 103 and was invalid.  
(See Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1251, fn. 8.)  Although some of the 
government defendants in Amwest (the Governor, the Attorney General and the 
State Board of Equalization) were defending the validity of the new statutory 
measure adopted by the Legislature whereas the remaining government defendant 
(the Insurance Commissioner) was defending the integrity of the voter-approved 
initiative measure, each government defendant could accurately be described as 
asserting the state‘s interest in the validity and proper application and 
interpretation of a duly enacted state law.  In that proceeding, the Attorney 
General was not the sole or exclusive representative of the state‘s interest in the 
validity and proper interpretation of a duly enacted state statute. 
As Amwest illustrates, it is hardly uncommon for public officials or entities 
to take different legal positions with regard to the validity or proper interpretation 
of a challenged state law.  (See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th 757 
[Prop. 22];  Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d 492, 500 [Prop. 140]; Amador 
Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 
208 [Prop. 13].)   
47 
Moreover, even when there is neither a conflict of interest nor a difference 
of opinion among the government officials or entities named in the litigation, in 
those instances in which the Attorney General or another public official declines to 
defend a state statute or constitutional provision in a court proceeding because of 
that official‘s view that the challenged provision is unconstitutional, other public 
officials or entities, represented by separate counsel, have been permitted to assert 
the state‘s interest in defending the challenged law.  (See, e.g., Connerly v. State 
Personnel Bd., supra, 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1174.)  Permitting other officials to present 
legal arguments in defense of a challenged state law when the Attorney General 
has declined to do so does not mean that the Attorney General has violated his or 
her duty or acted improperly in declining to defend the law.  Even when the 
Attorney General has discretion to decline to defend a challenged law or to appeal 
a lower court ruling invalidating the law, the Attorney General‘s decision to 
exercise discretion in that fashion does not preclude other officials or entities from 
defending the challenged law or appealing an adverse judgment.  Although the 
Attorney General‘s legal judgment may appropriately guide that official‘s own 
discretionary actions, the validity or proper interpretation of a challenged state 
constitutional provision or statute is, of course, ultimately a matter to be 
determined by the courts, not the Attorney General.  (Cf., e.g., Lockyer v. City and 
County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055.)  We are aware of no case that 
has held or suggested that the Attorney General may preclude others from 
defending a challenged state law or from appealing a judgment invalidating the 
law when the Attorney General has declined to provide such a defense or take an 
appeal.22 
                                              
22  
Plaintiffs‘ reliance on the Court of Appeal‘s ruling in Beckley v. 
Schwarzenegger (Sept. 1, 2010, No. C065920), summarily denying a petition for 
(footnote continued on next page) 
48 
Thus, the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the Attorney 
General‘s authority and responsibilities do not preclude others from asserting the 
state‘s interest in the validity of a challenged law. 
2. 
Plaintiffs next argue that appearing in court to assert the state‘s interest in 
the validity of a challenged law or to appeal a judgment invalidating the law is 
exclusively an executive branch function.  Because the authority to propose and 
adopt state constitutional amendments or statutes embodied in the initiative 
provisions of the California Constitution is essentially a legislative authority (see, 
e.g., Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 1016, 1038; AFL-CIO v. Eu (1984) 36 Cal.3d 687, 715), plaintiffs 
maintain that it would violate the separation of powers doctrine to permit the 
official proponents of an initiative to assert the state‘s interest in defending a 
challenged measure. 
Past authority, however, does not support plaintiffs‘ claim that appearing as 
a party in court to assert the state‘s interest in the validity of a challenged law is 
exclusively an executive function.  In INS v. Chadha (1983) 462 U.S. 919 
(Chadha), for example, the United States Supreme Court stated emphatically:  
―We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
writ of mandate that sought to compel the Governor and the Attorney General to 
file notices of appeal from the federal district court‘s decision in Perry, is 
misplaced.  The question whether the Governor or the Attorney General has 
discretion to decline to defend a challenged law or to appeal a lower court ruling 
invalidating the law is totally distinct from the issue whether some other official or 
individual has standing to do so, and thus the order in Beckley has no bearing on 
the determination whether the official proponents of an initiative have standing to 
file such an appeal. 
49 
statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the 
statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.‖23  
(Chadha, at p. 940.)  And, as discussed earlier in this opinion, the United States 
Supreme Court held in Karcher, supra, 484 U.S. 72, that, when authorized by state 
law, leaders of a state‘s legislative branch are permitted to appear as parties to 
assert the state‘s interest in the validity of a challenged statute when the state‘s 
executive officials decline to do so.24 
Although we are not aware of any California case in which the Legislature 
has appeared as a formal party to defend a challenged state law when the Attorney 
                                              
23  
In Chadha, a federal statutory provision that authorized either house of 
Congress, by resolution of that house alone, to invalidate a decision by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to allow a particular deportable 
alien to remain in the United States was challenged as a violation of the separation 
of powers doctrine.  In that proceeding, the INS — represented by the United 
States Attorney General — agreed with the petitioner alien‘s claim that the one-
house veto provision was unconstitutional, and Congress was permitted to 
intervene in the Court of Appeals to defend the challenged statute.  When the case 
reached the Supreme Court, the high court explicitly held that ―Congress is both a 
proper party to defend the constitutionality of [the challenged statute] and a proper 
petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).‖  (Chadha, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 939.) 
24  
The propriety of  congressional or legislative participation in court 
proceedings in defense of a challenged statute is also illustrated by the 
circumstances surrounding the United States Attorney General‘s recent decision to 
cease defending the validity of a provision of the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
(1 U.S.C. § 7) in court actions challenging that statute.  At the same time the 
Attorney General announced that he would no longer defend the statute in 
question because he and the President of the United States had concluded that the 
measure was unconstitutional, the Attorney General stated:  ―I have informed 
Members of Congress of this decision, so Members who wish to defend the statute 
may pursue that option.  The Department will also work closely with the courts to 
ensure that Congress has a full and fair opportunity to participate in pending 
litigation.‖  (Statement of the Atty. Gen. on Litigation Involving the Defense of 
Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011)  [as of Nov. 17, 2011].) 
50 
General or other public officials have declined to do so, plaintiffs have cited no 
case that supports the claim that it would violate the separation of powers doctrine 
embodied in the California Constitution for the Legislature to provide such a 
defense when other public officials decline to do so.  In a number of California 
cases, the Legislature or one of its constituent houses has appeared as a party in 
litigation challenging the validity of a proposed or adopted initiative or 
referendum measure (see, e.g., Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones, supra, 21 
Cal.4th 1142, 1156, fn. 9; Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.4th 492; Legislature v. 
Deukmejian, supra, 34 Cal.3d 658; Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 
638) — often in instances in which the Attorney General or other executive 
officials took a position contrary to the Legislature‘s regarding the validity of the 
measure (see, e.g., Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.4th 492; Legislature v. 
Deukmejian, supra, 34 Cal.3d 658; Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 
638).  These cases belie any suggestion that such action by the Legislature in any 
way usurped or interfered with the executive officials‘ performance of their 
executive function.  (See also Californians for an Open Primary v. McPherson 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 735 [Legislature, represented by separate counsel, appeared as 
real party in interest to defend validity of voter-approved constitutional 
amendments submitted to electorate by Legislature]; Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices 
Com., supra, 11 Cal.4th 607, 614 [Legislature permitted to intervene to defend the 
validity of the defendant commission‘s actions when the commission itself took a 
neutral position with respect to the challenge to its actions].) 
Accordingly, we find no merit in plaintiffs‘ claim that appearing in court to 
assert the state‘s interest in the validity of a challenged law is exclusively an 
executive function or that it would violate the separation of powers doctrine to 
permit the official proponents of an initiative to assert the state‘s interest in the 
validity of the initiative in a judicial proceeding in which the validity of the 
51 
measure is challenged.  Furthermore, because there is no reason to doubt that the 
California Legislature, like the United States Congress in Chadha, supra, 462 U.S. 
919, or the New Jersey Legislature in Karcher, supra, 484 U.S. 72, would have 
authority to step in to assert the state‘s interest in the validity of a statute enacted 
by the Legislature if the state‘s executive officials have declined to defend the 
statute‘s validity in a court proceeding, we conclude that the people are no less 
entitled to have the state‘s interest in the validity of a voter-approved initiative 
asserted on their behalf when public officials decline to defend the measure.   
3. 
Plaintiffs also raise another, somewhat related, separation of powers claim, 
contending that permitting an initiative proponent to assert the state‘s interest in 
the validity of a challenged initiative measure will interfere with the Attorney 
General‘s exercise of the powers of his or her office in representing the state‘s 
interest.  Our recognition that official initiative proponents are authorized to assert 
the state‘s interest in an initiative‘s validity when public officials have declined to 
defend the measure, however, does not mean, as plaintiffs suggest, that the 
proponents are authorized to ―override‖ the Attorney General‘s or other public 
officials‘ authority to make their own decisions regarding the defense of the 
measure.  As we have discussed, in many past cases initiative proponents have 
been permitted to participate as formal parties defending an initiative measure 
along with the public officials named as defendants, and in those instances each 
party has been permitted to proffer its own arguments and control its own actions 
in defense of the initiative. 
Similarly, the ability of official initiative proponents to defend a challenged 
initiative measure on behalf of the state is not inconsistent with the discretion the 
Attorney General may possess to decline to defend a challenged measure or to 
decline to appeal from an adverse judgment when the Attorney General is of the 
52 
view that a challenged initiative measure is unconstitutional.  (Cf. State of 
California v. Superior Court (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 394.)  As already discussed, 
even when the Attorney General has discretion to decline to defend a state 
constitutional provision or statute in a court proceeding challenging the measure, 
the Attorney General does not have authority to prevent others from mounting a 
defense on behalf of the state‘s interest in the validity of the measure.  For 
example, in the underlying proceedings in the Perry litigation, had any of the other 
public officials who were named as defendants chosen to present a substantive 
defense of the challenged measure or to appeal the adverse judgment entered by 
the trial court, the Attorney General could not have prevented that public official 
from presenting a defense or filing an appeal and could not persuasively maintain 
that the presentation of such a defense or the filing of such an appeal by another 
defendant would constitute an improper interference with the Attorney General‘s 
exercise of his or her official authority.  By the same token, the authority of 
official initiative proponents to participate as a formal party to defend a challenged 
initiative, and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure, does not improperly 
interfere with the Attorney General‘s authority and does not violate the separation 
of powers doctrine. 
4. 
Plaintiffs also contend that because the official proponents of an initiative 
measure are private individuals who have not been elected to public office, take no 
oath to uphold the California Constitution or laws, cannot be recalled or 
impeached, and are not subject to the conflict of interest rules or other ethical 
standards that apply to public officials, they cannot properly assert the state‘s 
interest in the validity of a challenged initiative measure. 
Our determination that the official proponents of an initiative are authorized 
to assert the state‘s interest in the validity of the initiative measure when public 
53 
officials have declined to defend the measure, however, does not mean that the 
proponents become de facto public officials or possess any official authority to 
enact laws or regulations or even to directly enforce the initiative measure in 
question.  Rather, the authority the proponents possess in this context is simply the 
authority to participate as a party in a court action and to assert legal arguments in 
defense of the state‘s interest in the validity of the initiative measure when the 
public officials who ordinarily would assert the state‘s interest in the validity of 
the measure have not done so.  This authority is extremely narrow and limited and 
does not imply any authority to act on behalf of the state in other respects.  
Because of the limited nature of the proponents‘ authority, they are properly 
subject to the same ethical constraints that apply to all other parties in a legal 
proceeding.  
As discussed above, we recognized in Building Industry Assn., supra, 41 
Cal.3d at page 822, that because of the fundamental purpose and unique nature of 
the initiative process — a process designed to give the people of California the 
authority to directly adopt constitutional amendments or statutes that their elected 
officials have refused or declined to adopt and may often oppose — there is an 
increased risk, even when public officials are defending a challenged initiative 
measure, that the public officials may fail to defend the measure with vigor.  As a 
consequence, we indicated in Building Industry Assn. that even in such 
circumstances a court generally should permit the official proponents of an 
initiative to intervene in the proceeding ―to guard the people‘s exercise of 
initiative power.‖  (Ibid.)  When public officials totally decline to defend a 
challenged initiative measure, the state‘s interest in the initiative‘s validity would 
go completely undefended, and the voters who enacted the initiative measure into 
law would be entirely deprived of having the state‘s interest in the initiative‘s 
validity asserted on their behalf, unless some private individual or entity is 
54 
permitted to assert that interest on the voters‘, that is to say, the people‘s, behalf.  
Because of their special relationship to the initiative measure, the official 
proponents of the measure are the most obvious and logical private individuals to 
ably and vigorously defend the validity of the challenged measure on behalf of the 
interests of the voters who adopted the initiative into law, and thus to assert the 
state‘s interest in the initiative‘s validity when public officials have declined to do 
so. 
Moreover, even outside the initiative context it is neither unprecedented nor 
particularly unusual under California law for persons other than public officials to 
be permitted to participate as formal parties in a court action to assert the public‘s 
or the state‘s interest in upholding or enforcing a duly enacted law.  For example, 
under the so-called ―public interest‖ exception in mandate actions, private citizens 
have long been authorized to bring a mandate action to enforce a public duty 
involving the protection of a public right in order to ensure that no government 
body impairs or defeats the purpose of legislation establishing such a right.  (See, 
e.g., Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 144-145; Common Cause v. Board of 
Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 439; see generally 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure 
(5th ed. 2008) Extraordinary Writs, § 84, pp. 970-973.)  Similarly, under the well-
established private attorney general doctrine, private individuals are permitted to 
act in support of the public interest by bringing lawsuits to enforce state 
constitutional or statutory provisions in circumstances in which enforcement by 
public officials may not be sufficient.  (See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 
Cal.3d 24, 42-47; Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 
Cal.3d 917, 933, 941-942.)25  Indeed, the authority of the official proponents of an 
                                              
25 
We note that in both the public interest and private attorney general 
contexts, the authority of private individuals to act on behalf of the public interest 
(footnote continued on next page) 
55 
initiative to assert the state‘s interest in the present context is a more modest 
authority than the authority exercised by private individuals under either the 
public-interest mandate exception or the private attorney general doctrine, because 
under those doctrines private individuals are authorized to act affirmatively on 
behalf of the public and institute proceedings to enforce a public right, whereas the 
authority possessed by the official initiative proponents in the present context is 
simply a passive, defensive authority to step in to assert the state‘s interest in the 
validity of a challenged measure when the initiative has been challenged by others 
in a judicial proceedings and public officials have declined to defend the measure. 
In sum, even though the official proponents of an initiative measure are not 
public officials the role they play in asserting the state‘s interest in the validity of 
an initiative measure in this judicial setting does not threaten the democratic 
process or the proper governance of the state, but, on the contrary, serves to 
safeguard the unique elements and integrity of the initiative process.   
5. 
Finally, plaintiffs suggest that a determination that the official proponents 
of an initiative are authorized to assert the state‘s interest in the validity of a 
challenged initiative in a court proceeding will result in untoward consequences in 
other contexts. 
For example, plaintiffs contend that if official initiative proponents are 
permitted to assert the state‘s interest in an initiative‘s validity and to appeal an 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
under California law was initially recognized by judicial decision notwithstanding 
the absence of any specific constitutional or statutory provision expressly granting 
such authority.  (See, e.g., Green v. Obledo, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 144-145, and 
cases cited; Serrano v. Priest, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 45-47.) 
56 
adverse judgment when the Attorney General and other public officials have 
declined to do so, the proponents‘ action in filing an appeal may subject the state 
to substantial monetary liability for attorney fees should the proponents‘ efforts in 
support of the challenged measure prove unsuccessful.  The question of who 
should bear responsibility for any attorney fee award in such circumstances, 
however, is entirely distinct from the question whether the official proponents of 
an initiative are authorized to assert the state‘s interest in the validity of a 
challenged initiative measure and is not before us in this proceeding.  Our 
conclusion that official initiative proponents are authorized to assert the state‘s 
interest in the validity of a challenged initiative measure when public officials 
decline to do so does not mean that any monetary liability incurred as a result of 
the proponents‘ actions should or must be borne by the state.  The attorney fee 
issue can properly be addressed if and when the question arises in the future.  (Cf. 
Connerly v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1178-1179 
[distinguishing status of intervener initiative proponents from that of amicus curiae 
in concluding that amicus curiae could not properly be held liable for private-
attorney-general attorney fee award].)  
Similarly, we have no occasion in this case to address other legal questions 
that may arise in future cases if there is a conflict between the positions taken by 
initiative proponents and by other defendants who are appearing on behalf of the 
state.  The issue before us is limited to the question whether official initiative 
proponents are authorized to appear as parties to assert the state‘s interest in the 
validity of an initiative measure when the public officials who ordinarily provide 
such a defense have declined to do so.  The numerous cases discussed above in 
which initiative proponents, Congress, or state legislative leaders have been 
permitted to intervene to present legal arguments regarding the validity and proper 
interpretation of a challenged law refute the claim that permitting an initiative‘s 
57 
official proponents to participate on this basis is unworkable or will inevitably 
result in detrimental consequences. 
C.  Out-of-state Decisions 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, in reaching the conclusion that the 
official proponents of an initiative are authorized under California law to defend a 
challenged initiative measure and to appeal from a judgment invalidating the 
measure when public officials decline to defend the initiative, we have relied upon 
the history and purpose of the initiative provisions of the California Constitution 
and upon the numerous California decisions that have uniformly permitted the 
official proponents of initiative measures to appear as parties and defend the 
validity of the measures they have sponsored. 
In addition, we note that in recent years each of the two other state supreme 
courts that has addressed the question whether the official proponents of an 
initiative measure have standing under state law to intervene in an action 
challenging the validity of the initiative measure has concluded that, under each 
state‘s respective law, initiative proponents generally are authorized to intervene 
as of right in such an action in state court. 
1. 
In Alaskans for a Common Language v. Kritz (Alaska 2000) 3 P.3d 906 
(Alaskans for a Common Language), the issue of standing arose in an action 
challenging the validity of a voter-approved initiative measure that — like the 
Arizona initiative involved in Arizonans for Official English, supra, 520 U.S. 43 
(see ante, at pp. 18-20) — provided that English shall be used by all public 
agencies in all government functions and actions and in the preparation of all 
official public documents and records.  Two organizations — the first, the official 
proponents of the initiative measure in Alaska, and the second, a national 
organization (U.S. English) that supported the Alaska measure — sought to 
58 
intervene as formal parties in the trial court proceedings, but the trial court denied 
both requests on the ground that the interests of the would-be interveners were 
adequately represented by the government defendants who were defending the 
initiative measure in the proceeding.  Both organizations appealed the trial court‘s 
ruling denying intervention.  On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the 
trial court‘s ruling insofar as it denied intervention by the official proponents of 
the measure but affirmed the lower court ruling insofar as it denied intervention by 
the other organization. 
In analyzing the question of the official proponents‘ right to intervene, the 
Alaska Supreme Court noted that prior to the vote on the initiative measure at 
issue in that case, the Attorney General‘s Office had raised potential questions 
regarding the constitutionality of the measure and the Governor had personally 
opposed the measure during the election campaign.  (Alaskans for a Common 
Language, supra, 3 P.3d at pp. 909-910.)  Nonetheless, observing that courts 
generally ―recognize a presumption of adequate representation when government 
entities are parties to a lawsuit because those entities are charged by law with 
representing the interests of the people‖ (id. at p. 913), the Alaska Supreme Court 
stated that ―[b]ased on the presumption of adequate government representation, we 
presume the Attorney General‘s Office would not fail to defend the 
constitutionality of the initiative energetically and capably.  Based on that same 
presumption, we also presume that the governor would not interfere.‖  (Id. at 
p. 914.) 
The court in Alaskans for a Common Language, supra, 3 P.3d 906, went on 
to explain, however, that despite the court‘s presumption that the government 
defendants would energetically and capably defend the challenged measure, 
inasmuch as the initiative proponents had ―used the process of direct legislation to 
enact a law that the executive branch questioned and opposed[,] [t]hey cannot be 
59 
faulted for wanting to guarantee that the initiative is defended zealously or for 
trying to ensure that the credibility of institutional arguments in favor of the 
initiative is not diminished by the previous comments from the executive branch.  
To them, and to the public in sympathy with the initiative, the governor‘s 
opposition and the Attorney General Office‘s questions . . . during the campaign, 
could create an appearance of adversity.  Every strategic decision made by the 
Attorney General‘s Office in defending the legislation might be publicly 
questioned and second-guessed by the initiative‘s sympathizers.  That this 
suspicion may be unfounded does not make it less inevitable.‖  (3 P.3d at p. 914.) 
The Alaska Supreme Court went on to conclude: ―Here, because of the 
nature of direct legislation through the initiative process, the possible appearance 
of adversity of interest is sufficient to overcome the presumption of adequate 
representation.  Indeed, we believe that an [initiative] sponsor’s direct interest in 
legislation enacted through the initiative process and the concomitant need to 
avoid the appearance of adversity will ordinarily preclude courts from denying 
intervention as of right to a sponsoring group.‖  (Alaskans for a Common 
Language, supra, 3 P.3d at p. 914, italics added.)26  Accordingly, the court held 
that the trial court erred in denying intervention by the official proponents of the 
initiative measure and reversed that portion of the trial court‘s ruling. 
                                              
26  
The court added a narrow qualification to its broad holding that initiative 
proponents are entitled to intervene in such litigation as a matter of right, 
explaining that ―Alaska courts should retain discretion to deny intervention in 
exceptional cases, because [the relevant Alaska statute relating to initiative 
sponsors] places no limit on the number of initiative sponsors and therefore 
potentially opens the door to an unlimited number of motions for intervention.  As 
an alternative to limiting intervention in those cases, courts may instead choose to 
reduce duplication by requiring those sponsors with substantially similar interests 
to consolidate their briefing and to participate through lead counsel.‖  (Alaskans 
for a Common Language, supra, 3 P.3d at p. 914.)  
60 
The Alaska Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion, however, with 
respect to the other organization that had sought intervention in the trial court.  
Pointing out that ―[t]he record fails to show, and U.S. English has not asserted, 
that its directors, officers, or incorporators were sponsors of the initiative in 
Alaska or were members of the initiative committee‖ (Alaskans for a Common 
Language, supra, 3 P.3d at p. 916), the court found that ―U.S. English has not 
established that its interest is any greater than a generalized interest of a political 
nature‖ (ibid.).  It held that the organization did not qualify for intervention as a 
matter of right and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
permissive intervention.  (Ibid.)  
2. 
In Sportsmen for I-143 v. Fifteenth Jud. Court (Mont. 2002) 40 P.3d 400 
(Sportsmen for I-143), the Montana Supreme Court similarly addressed the 
general issue ―whether the primary proponent of a ballot initiative has a legally 
protectable interest sufficient to allow it to intervene in a case challenging the 
resulting statute.‖  (Id. at p. 402.)  As in Alaskans for a Common Language, supra, 
3 P.3d 906, in Sportsmen for I-143 the trial court had denied a motion to intervene 
by the sponsors of the challenged initiative measure on the ground that the 
government defendant named in the proceeding — there, the Montana Department 
of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks — could adequately defend the measure.  Although in 
that instance there was little reason to suspect that the named government 
defendant would not vigorously defend the initiative measure and the resulting 
legislation the initiative had engendered, the Montana Supreme Court nonetheless 
observed that the initiative proponents ―who actively drafted and supported I-143 
may be in the best position to defend their interpretation of the resulting 
legislation‖ (40 P.3d at p. 403) and held that, as a general matter, initiative 
61 
proponents ―are entitled to intervene as a matter of right‖ in an action challenging 
the validity of the measure they have sponsored.  (Ibid., italics added.)27 
IV.  Conclusion 
In response to the question submitted by the Ninth Circuit, we conclude, for 
the reasons discussed above, that when the public officials who ordinarily defend a 
challenged state law or appeal a judgment invalidating the law decline to do so, 
under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution and the relevant provisions 
of the Elections Code, the official proponents of a voter-approved initiative 
measure are authorized to assert the state‘s interest in the initiative‘s validity, 
enabling the proponents to defend the constitutionality of the initiative and to 
appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J.
                                              
27 
We note that both Alaskans for a Common Language, supra, 3 P.3d 906, 
and Sportsmen for I-143, supra, 40 P.3d 400, were decided after the United States 
Supreme Court‘s decision in Arizonans for Official English, supra, 520 U.S. 43.  
Those decisions confirm that the federal high court‘s decision in Arizonans for 
Official English imposes no impediment to a state court‘s determination that, 
under state law, an initiative proponent has the authority to intervene as of right in 
an action in state court challenging the validity of an initiative measure. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
While joining fully in the court‘s unanimous opinion authored by the Chief 
Justice, I write separately to highlight the historical and legal events that have led 
to today‘s decision and to explain why I concur in that decision. 
I 
This case marks the fourth time in recent years that this court has addressed 
issues related to the ongoing political and legal struggle about whether same-sex 
marriages should be recognized as valid in California.  In 2004, this court held that 
San Francisco public officials exceeded their authority when they issued marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples without a prior judicial determination of the 
constitutionality of a California statute restricting marriage to heterosexual 
couples.  (Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055 
(Lockyer).)  Agreeing with the majority that, within our state government, 
determining the constitutional validity of state statutes is a task reserved to the 
judicial branch, I joined in that decision, except insofar as it declared void some 
4,000 same-sex marriages performed in reliance on licenses issued in San 
Francisco.  (Id. at p. 1125 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  My separate 
opinion in Lockyer explained that because the persons whose marriages were at 
issue were not before this court, and because judicial proceedings to determine the 
constitutionality of California laws barring same-sex marriage were then pending 
 
2 
in other California courts, I would have refrained from determining the validity of 
those marriages.  (Ibid.) 
Thereafter, in May 2008, this court held that California‘s statutory law 
denying same-sex couples the right to marry violated the privacy, due process, and 
equal protection provisions of our state Constitution as it then read.  (In re 
Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757 (Marriage Cases).)  In addition to signing 
the majority opinion there, I wrote separately to explain in my own words why I 
rejected the argument that whether same-sex couples should be allowed to marry 
presented essentially ―a social or political issue inappropriate for judicial 
consideration.‖  (Id. at p. 859 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  I wrote that ―courts 
alone must decide whether excluding individuals from marriage because of sexual 
orientation can be reconciled with our state Constitution‘s equal protection 
guarantee.‖  (Id. at p. 860.) 
Six months later, in November 2008, California‘s voters approved 
Proposition 8, an initiative that amended California‘s Constitution by adding a 
new provision expressly limiting marriage to heterosexual couples.  (Cal. Const., 
art. I, § 7.5.)  In May 2009, this court rejected state constitutional challenges to 
Proposition 8, determining that it had been validly enacted by the procedures 
prescribed for constitutional amendments, rather than the more rigorous 
procedures prescribed for constitutional revisions, and determining also that 
Proposition 8 did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.  (Strauss v. Horton 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 364 (Strauss).)  This court in that case also decided that 
Proposition 8 did not invalidate any marriages performed before its effective date.  
(Strauss, at p. 474.)  I signed the court‘s opinion and wrote a concurring opinion in 
which I explained that although interpreting existing state constitutional provisions 
is a judicial responsibility, the voters retain legislative authority to alter the 
California Constitution‘s language and thereby to ―enlarge or reduce the personal 
 
3 
rights that the state Constitution as so amended will thereafter guarantee and 
protect.‖  (Id. at p. 476 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  
In May 2009, shortly before this court issued its opinion rejecting the state-
law challenges to Proposition 8 (Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th 364), four individuals 
brought an action in federal district court challenging Proposition 8 on federal 
constitutional grounds.  Named as defendants were the Governor, California‘s 
Attorney General, and California‘s Director of Public Health.  None of those state 
public officials, however, litigated in defense of Proposition 8.  The Governor and 
the Director of Public Health declined to take any position on the merits, while the 
Attorney General took the position that Proposition 8 violates the United States 
Constitution.  The federal district court permitted Proposition 8‘s official 
proponents to intervene, and it was they, and they alone, who defended the 
measure during the ensuing nonjury trial.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 7-10.) 
After the trial, the federal district court issued an opinion concluding that 
Proposition 8 violates both the due process and the equal protection clauses of the 
federal Constitution.  Only the initiative proponents appealed, to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which issued an order asking this court to 
decide, as a matter of state law, whether proponents of an initiative that the voters 
approved have either a ―particularized interest‖ in the initiative‘s validity or the 
authority to ―assert the state‘s interest‖ in defending the initiative.  (See maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 10-13.)  Without deciding whether initiative proponents have a 
―particularized interest‖ in the initiative‘s validity, this court‘s unanimous opinion 
holds that under California law the official proponents of a voter-approved 
initiative have authority to ―assert the state‘s interest‖ in the validity of that 
initiative, and to appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when state officials 
have declined to do so.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 5, 61.) 
 
4 
II 
I agree with today‘s holding and with the reasoning of the court‘s 
unanimous opinion.  I briefly explain why. 
As the majority opinion in Strauss pointed out, this court‘s decisions in the 
three earlier same-sex marriage cases illustrate the proper roles of, and the 
limitations imposed upon, each branch of California‘s government — the 
executive, the legislative, and the judicial — under our state Constitution.  
(Strauss, supra, 46 Cal.4th 364, 385.)  Lockyer shows that the role of California‘s 
executive branch officials is to enforce statutory laws, which they must treat as 
valid, regardless of their personal views, unless and until the judiciary has 
determined otherwise.  (Lockyer, supra, 33 Cal.4th 1055, 1068.)  Marriage Cases 
shows that the role of California‘s legislative branch is to enact statutes that are 
consistent with California‘s Constitution, which among other things guarantees the 
rights to privacy, due process, and equal protection of the laws.  (Marriage Cases, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th 757, 779-785, 855-856.)  Strauss shows that the role of 
California‘s judicial branch is to interpret existing state statutory and constitutional 
provisions, a power and responsibility that is subject to the limitation that the 
electorate, through the power of the initiative, can amend the state Constitution to 
override, from that time forward, the court‘s ruling.  (Strauss, supra, at pp. 385, 
391-392.) 
This case raises an issue of similar importance to a proper understanding of 
our state governmental structure under California‘s Constitution:  When the 
voters, through the exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed initiative power, 
have enacted a new statute or have amended the state Constitution, and the validity 
of that initiative is challenged in a judicial proceeding, who may appear in court to 
defend the initiative? 
 
5 
California‘s state trial and appellate courts have routinely permitted 
initiative proponents to defend an initiative‘s validity, and to appeal from a 
judgment holding an initiative invalid, particularly when state officials have 
declined to do so.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 28-31.)  The two main reasons for 
this standard practice are easily stated. 
First, the validity of a duly enacted state initiative measure (particularly one 
that amends the state Constitution, as Proposition 8 does) is a matter of great 
public importance that can be determined only through judicial proceedings.  Such 
proceedings are most likely to produce a result that will be reliable, and that the 
public will find acceptable, if the issues are thoroughly and vigorously litigated.  
As the court‘s opinion notes (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 40-43), initiative proponents 
generally have the motivation and the resources to litigate thoroughly and 
vigorously in defense of initiative measures they have sponsored (particularly 
when state officials have declined to do so), and thereby to assist the courts in a 
way that is vital to the integrity of the entire process. 
Second, the initiative power was added to the state Constitution in 1911 
(Cal. Const., art. II, §§ 8, 10) because of the view, widely held among California‘s 
voters, that the Legislature and state officials had become so dependent on special 
interests that they were unable or unwilling to take actions that the public interest 
required.  To give those same state officials sole authority to decide whether or not 
a duly enacted initiative will be defended in court would be inconsistent with the 
purpose and rationale of the initiative power, because it would allow public 
officials, through inaction, effectively to annul initiatives that they dislike.1  (See 
Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810, 822.) 
                                              
1  
At this point a note of caution is in order.  When the named defendant in a 
lawsuit brought in a California state court declines to present a defense, and no 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
6 
Is this explanation sufficient to answer the question that the Ninth Circuit 
posed to this court, which is whether proponents of an initiative that the voters 
approved have either a ―particularized interest‖ in the initiative‘s validity or the 
authority to ―assert the state‘s interest‖ in defending the initiative?  More 
specifically, does it show, as this court‘s opinion holds, that initiative proponents 
have authority to ―assert the state‘s interest‖ in the initiative‘s validity?  The 
answer is ―Yes.‖ 
The word ―authority‖ implies that initiative proponents have a right to 
defend an initiative in court.  Although California‘s state courts generally have 
discretion to grant or deny intervention, it would be an abuse of discretion for a 
court to deny an initiative proponent‘s motion to intervene when the validity of the 
initiative measure is being challenged and California state officials are not actively 
defending it.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 39.)  In that situation at least, it is accurate 
to state that initiative proponents have authority to intervene so that the integrity of 
the initiative process may be preserved and the validity of the initiative measure 
may be reliably determined through vigorous litigation at both the trial and 
appellate levels of California‘s judicial system. 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
party intervenes to assert a defense to the plaintiff‘s claim, two different and 
opposite results are possible, depending on the particular circumstances.  The 
plaintiff may win by default, resulting in entry of a default judgment or stipulated 
judgment granting the requested relief.  (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 585 et seq., 
664.6.)  But the trial court may decide instead that without a genuine dispute 
between the parties, judicial action is unnecessary and inappropriate, resulting in a 
dismissal of the action without entry of any judgment.  (See id., § 1061; Common 
Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 439; Pacific Legal 
Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170-171.)  Because 
the present matter concerns only the narrowly framed question posed by the Ninth 
Circuit, which of these two approaches should apply in any particular case is an 
issue not before this court here. 
 
7 
III 
The authority possessed by the official proponents of an initiative measure 
to assert the state‘s interest in that initiative‘s validity complements the judiciary‘s 
authority to make the final decision on whether the initiative is valid.  As I have 
stressed in my separate opinions in the earlier same-sex marriages cases, 
interpreting state statutes and state constitutional provisions, and determining their 
validity, are the responsibility of the government‘s judicial branch.  (Strauss, 
supra, 46 Cal.4th 364, 476 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.); Marriage Cases, supra, 43 
Cal.4th 757, 860 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.); Lockyer, supra, 33 Cal.4th 1055, 
1125 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) 
The judicial system is designed to operate through public proceedings in 
which adversaries litigate factual and legal issues thoroughly and vigorously.  
When an initiative measure is challenged in court, the integrity and effectiveness 
of the judicial process require that a competent and spirited defense be presented.  
If public officials refuse to provide that defense, the ability of the initiative 
proponents to intervene in the pending litigation, and to appeal an adverse 
judgment, is inherent in, and essential to the effective exercise of, the 
constitutional initiative power.  To hold otherwise not only would undermine that 
constitutional power, it also would allow state executive branch officials to 
effectively annul voter-approved initiatives simply by declining to defend them, 
thereby permitting those officials to exceed their proper role in our state 
government‘s constitutional structure. 
 
8 
 
For these reasons, I agree that, when state officials refuse to defend a voter-
approved initiative measure in court, or to appeal a judgment invalidating that 
initiative, its official proponents have authority, as a matter of state law, to assert 
the state‘s interest in the initiative‘s validity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
 
 
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Perry et al. v. Brown 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX – on request pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal.Rules of Court 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S189476 
Date Filed: November 17, 2011 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Law Offices of Andrew P. Pugno, Andrew P. Pugno; Alliance Defense Fund, Brian W. Raum, James A. 
Campbell; Cooper and Kirk, Charles J. Cooper, David H. Thompson, Howard C. Neilson, Jr., Nicole J. 
Moss and Peter A. Patterson for Interveners and Appellants. 
 
Edwin Meese III; John C. Eastman and Karen J. Lugo for Center of Constitutional Jurisprudence as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Interveners and Appellants. 
 
Sharon L. Browne, Harold E. Johnson and Damien M. Schiff for Pacific Legal Foundation, Ward Connerly, 
Glynn Custred, Ron Unz and The Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Interveners and Appellants. 
 
Pacific Justice Institute, Kevin T. Snider, Matthew B. McReynolds and Kelly A. Way for Dr. Joshua 
Beckley as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Interveners and Appellants. 
 
James Joseph Lynch, Jr., for Margie Reilly as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Interveners and Appellants. 
 
Julie B. Axelrod for Judicial Watch, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Interveners and Appellants. 
 
Boise, Schiler & Flexner, David Boies, Jeremy M. Goldman, Theodore H. Uno; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, 
Theodore B. Olson, Matthew D. McGill, Amir C. Tayrani, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Christopher D. 
Dussealt and Enrique A. Monagas for Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Kendall Brill & Klieger, Laura W. Brill, Nicholas F. Daum, Clifford S. Davidson and Ashlee R. Lynn for 
Jon B. Eisenberg and Professor Laurie L. Levenson as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and 
Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 2 – S189476 - counsel continued 
 
 
 
Miguel Márquez, County Counsel (Santa Clara), Lori E. Pegg, Assistant County Counsel, Juniper L. 
Downs, Acting Lead Deputy County Counsel, Jenny S. Yelin, Impact Litigation Fellow; Atchison, 
Barisone, Condotti & Kovacevich, John G. Barisone, City Attorney (Santa Cruz); John A. Russo, City 
Attorney (Oakland), Barbara J. Parker, Chief Assistant City Attorney; John C. Beiers, County Counsel 
(Orange), Glenn M. Levy, Deputy County Counsel; Eric Danly; Dana McRae, County Counsel (Santa 
Cruz); and Bruce D. Goldstein County Counsel (Sonoma), for County of Santa Clara, County of Santa 
Cruz, City of Oakland, City of Cloverdale, County of San Mateo, City of Santa Cruz and County of 
Sonoma as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
 
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Therese M. Stewart, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Danny Chou, Chief of 
Complex and Special Litigation, Vince Chhabria, Mollie M. Lee and Christine Van Aken, Deputy City 
Attorneys, for Intervener and Respondent. 
 
Caldwell, Leslie & Proctor, David C. Codell, Albert Giang, Alastair Agcaoili; Sharon P. Minter; and Jon 
W. Davidson for Equality California, National Center for Lesbian Rights and Lambda Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, Inc., as Amici Curiae on behalf of Intervener and Respondent. 
 
Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robin Meadow and Cynthia E. Tobisman for League of California 
Women Voters of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Intervener and Respondent. 
 
Eric Alan Isaacson; Susan Kay Weaver; Stacey M. Kaplan; and Rev. Silvo Nardoni for California Faith for 
Equality, California Council of Churches, General Synod of the United Church of Christ, Universal 
Fellowship of Metropolitan Community Churches, The Episcopal Bishops of California and Los Angeles, 
Progressive Jewish Alliance, Pacific Association of Reform Rabbis, Unitarian Universalist Association and 
Unitarian Universalist Legislative Ministry California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Intervener and 
Respondent. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, David Chaney, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Douglas J. Woods, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael Troncoso, 
Senior Counsel, Constance L. LeLouis and Tamar Pachter, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici Curiae. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Charles J. Cooper 
Cooper and Kirk 
1523 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C.  20036 
(202) 220-9600 
 
Theodore B. Olson 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher 
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C.  20036 
(202) 955-8500