Case Title: Board of Education v. Bradford

Citation: 387 Md. 353

Docket Number: 85/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case Nos. 94340058/CE189672 and 95258055/CL202151
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 85
September Term, 2004
______________________________________
MARYLAND STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION, ET AL.
v.
KEITH A. BRADFORD, ET AL.
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specially         
             Assigned),
           JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:     June 9, 2005
This appeal constitutes the latest skirmish in a decades-long battle by Baltimore City
and others to force the General Assembly, in carrying out its mandate under Article VIII of
the Maryland Constitution to “establish throughout the State a thorough and efficient System
of Free Public Schools [and] provide by taxation, or otherwise, for their maintenance,” to
increase substantially its funding support for the Baltimore City Public School System.  The
appeal now before us, by the State, questions, on jurisdictional, procedural, and substantive
grounds, the validity of an order entered by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in August,
2004.  We shall conclude that (1) the validity of much that is now being challenged by the
State is not properly before us at present, but (2) one aspect of the court’s order is before us
and is invalid.
BACKGROUND  
In Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983), which,
in a sense, was a precursor to the present litigation, we traced in some detail the historical
development of the public school system in Maryland and the method of funding it; we need
not repeat that history here.  Suffice it to say that, through legislative enactments by the
General Assembly, in furtherance of the mandate of Article VIII, § 1 of the Constitution, the
operation and funding of the public school system is, and since its inception in 1864 has
been, a joint effort by the State and local governments.  The State Board of Education and
the State Superintendent of Schools set the overall educational policy of the State and
provide general direction and supervisory authority over the system, but, subject to that State
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direction and authority, it is predominantly the school boards and school superintendents in
each of the 23 counties and Baltimore City that operate the public schools.  Those
subdivisions constitute the school districts of the State. 
The funding of the system has also been, and remains, a joint effort between the State
and its political subdivisions.  In 1979, Baltimore City and three counties filed suit in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking a declaratory judgment that the then-existing system
for financing the public schools, which required the counties and Baltimore City to shoulder
approximately 46% of the current expenses needed to operate the public schools, violated
both Article VIII of the Maryland Constitution and the equal protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights.  That was the Hornbeck case.  The gravamen of the attack in that case was that,
because of significant disparities in the wealth of the various political subdivisions, there was
an unequal ability to provide the necessary local funding, which resulted in substantial
differences among the subdivisions in overall per pupil expenditures.  The effect, it was
alleged, was to underfund education in some subdivisions and possibly overfund it in others,
and that, in turn, created disparities in the quality of the educational program in the
subdivisions.  
The Circuit Court, believing itself bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed.2d 16 (1973),
found no violation of equal protection under the Federal Constitution but declared the
-3-
financing scheme unconstitutional under Article VIII of the Maryland Constitution and
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  This Court vacated the Circuit Court
decree.  With respect to Article VIII, we held that the Constitutional provision did not require
uniformity in funding and did not preclude the political subdivisions from providing local
funds, in the amounts they deemed adequate, to supplement the level of basic State funding.
We said in that regard:
“The development of the statewide system under § 1 [of Art.
VIII] is a matter for legislative determination; at most, the
legislature is commanded by § 1 to establish such a system,
effective in all school districts, as will provide the State’s youth
with a basic public school education.  To the extent that § 1
encompasses any equality component, it is so limited.
Compliance by the legislature with this duty is compliance with
§ 1 of Article VIII of the 1867 Constitution.”
Hornbeck, supra, 295 Md. at 632, 458 A.2d at 776-77.
We agreed with the Circuit Court that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in San
Antonio School District, there was no Federal equal protection violation.  As to State equal
protection, we concluded that neither Article VIII nor Article III, § 52 of the Maryland
Constitution established a fundamental right for equal protection purposes, that the equal
protection issue was therefore to be judged under the rational basis test, and that “the
legislative objective of preserving and promoting local control over education is both a
legitimate state interest and one to which the present financing system is reasonably related.”
Id. at 654, 458 A.2d at 788.  Accordingly, we held that the then-current system of public
education financing satisfied the rational basis test.
1 The actual defendants were the State Board of Education, the State
Superintendent of Schools, the Governor, and the Comptroller.  The Governor and the
Comptroller were later dismissed as defendants.  For convenience, we shall refer to the
State defendants in this action and in the action by Baltimore City, discussed later,
collectively as the State.  Pursuant to a stipulation, it was agreed that the plaintiffs’
proposed class would not be certified in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-231 but that
the plaintiffs would be deemed “representative plaintiffs.”
-4-
Our Opinion in Hornbeck was filed in April, 1983.  This case began in December,
1994, when the parents of several students in the Baltimore City School System filed a class
action lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the State.  The action was
allegedly on behalf of “present and future students in the Baltimore City Public Schools who
are at risk of educational failure.”1  We shall refer to that case as the Bradford case, after the
name of the lead plaintiff.  At-risk students were defined in the complaint as those “who
experience circumstances of economic, social, and/or educational disadvantage that
substantially increase the likelihood that they will fail to obtain an adequate education in
public school.”  The term was further defined as including students who live in poverty,
attend schools with a high proportion of students living in poverty, live with fewer than two
parents, have parents who did not graduate from high school, live with parents who are
unemployed, are homeless, are themselves parents or pregnant, live under the threat of
violence at home, have been retained in grade on at least one occasion, score more than one
year below grade level on standardized tests, or have otherwise been determined to be in need
of remedial education.  The complaint alleged that the “vast majority” of students in the
Baltimore City Public Schools – more than 70,000 – were in that category and that the
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percentage of at-risk students in the City was far higher than in any other subdivision of the
State.
Although three counts were pled – failure of the State to discharge its obligation under
Article VIII of the State Constitution, denial of equal treatment under Article 24 of the
Declaration of Rights, and denial of a property interest in an adequate public education under
Article 24 – the heart of the complaint was that the State had failed to provide resources
sufficient to enable the Baltimore City Public Schools (BCPS) to meet, or even make
meaningful progress in meeting, contemporary education standards, especially with respect
to at-risk students, as measured by the level of student outcomes and the availability of
educational resources.  As relief, the plaintiffs asked, among other things, that the court (1)
declare that the State had failed to fulfill its obligation to provide a system of public schools
adequate to meet the needs of the schoolchildren in Baltimore City and had violated their
right to an adequate education, equal treatment, and due process of law under Articles VIII
and 24, (2) order the defendants to work with the plaintiffs and Baltimore City to develop a
plan to improve the public schools in the City and to take all steps necessary to implement
that plan, and (3) retain jurisdiction to monitor and ensure compliance with any injunctive
provisions in its judgment.
In September, 1995, the City filed a separate three-count action against the State.
Although it charged that, based on the results of standardized testing, the State had failed to
provide an adequate public education anywhere in the State, its principal focus was on
2 The City did not explain how, as a political subdivision of the State, it was
entitled to due process of law from the State.
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Baltimore City’s “unique status.”  In that regard, the complaint noted that the City had the
lowest tax capacity among the 24 subdivisions but yet the highest property tax rate, that the
burden of local funding was disproportionately hard on the City, and that the State’s failure
to provide adequate funding to the City impacted its ability to recruit, support, and retain
teachers and to maintain its physical facilities.  The City averred that it was unable to meet
contemporary Statewide qualitative educational standards because the State had failed to
provide it with adequate resources and assistance, that such failure deprived the children in
the City of their right to receive a basic public school education, and that such deprivation,
in turn, infringed on the children’s right to free speech and to vote under Articles 40 and 7
of the Declaration of Rights.  All of that was under Count I, alleging a violation of Article
VIII.
In Count II, the City asserted that, because the State had failed to assess the needs of
the City’s “discrete student populations (minority, impoverished, and disabled) to ensure that
BCPS has the necessary resources to provide a basic public school education to all of its
students,” the State was “engaging in discriminatory conduct.”  Count III alleged that the
State’s process of “reconstituting” schools that failed to meet State standards violates due
process because it “fail[s] to provide local school districts with any process to challenge the
arbitrary findings and actions of the State Superintendent or the State Board.” 2  
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In October, 1995, the State filed a third-party claim against the City, in which it
averred that the City had “totally failed to manage adequately the Baltimore City Public
School system” and that “[a]ny inadequacies in the education received by the children of
Baltimore City are a direct result of that failure and can only be remedied by a total
restructuring of the management of BCPS.”  The State contended that the City had failed to
implement a legislatively-endorsed series of recommendations made in 1992 by a consulting
firm, that it had failed to use nearly $12 million in Federal and State resources that had been
made available to it in FY 1992-1995, that due to lack of planning and management, it had
failed to access millions of dollars of additional Federal funds that could have become
available, and that it failed to use $20 million of State capital improvement funds because of
delays in design work and in signing contracts.  The State alleged further that the City had
failed to develop and implement a uniform curriculum, an effective personnel training and
evaluation system, an adequate management information system, an adequate procurement
system, effective testing protocols, effective grants administration and monitoring, a
comprehensive plan to reduce school crime, and an adequate plan to comply with the
mandates of the U.S. District Court with respect to special education programs then under
Federal court scrutiny.  As relief, the State asked that the City be held liable for the plaintiffs’
claims should they prevail and that the City school system be restructured.
The court consolidated the two cases, dismissed the Governor and Comptroller as
party defendants in the Bradford case, and dismissed Count III of the City’s complaint.  On
3 As noted briefly above, a parallel action, in which the City had been sued for not
providing adequate special education programs to children in need of them, was pending
in Federal Court. Vaughn G. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (Civ. Action No.
MJG-84-1911).  Judge Garbis, who presided over that case in the U.S. District Court, and
Judge Kaplan, who presided over the consolidated cases in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, had held some joint hearings in the respective cases, and, to a limited
extent, the Federal and State cases presented similar issues and were proceeding in
tandem. Because the provisions of the Consent Decree in the State actions would impact
on issues pending in the Federal action, the parties in the parallel Federal action
(continued...)
-8-
October 18, 1996, the court entered a partial summary judgment in the consolidated cases.
It found that there was “no genuine dispute of material fact in these cases as to whether the
public school children in Baltimore City are being provided with an education that is
adequate when measured by contemporary educational standards” and declared, based on the
evidence submitted on the partial summary judgment motions, that “the public school
children in Baltimore City are not being provided with an education that is adequate when
measured by contemporary educational standards.”  It concluded further, however, that there
was a genuine dispute regarding the cause of the inadequate education provided to the City
students and the liability therefor.  Those issues were reserved for trial.
On November 26, 1996, about a month after the entry of the partial summary
judgment, the parties in both cases entered into a Consent Decree that provided, essentially,
for five things – a significant restructuring of the governance of the City Public School
System, the provision of certain additional funding by the State for FY 1998-2002, the
development of a plan to increase student achievement, interim and final review and
evaluation of progress, and the continuance of jurisdiction by the court.3  The decree looked
3(...continued)
contemporaneously entered into a Consent Decree in that action.  Each Consent Decree
was incorporated by reference into the other.
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toward a partnership arrangement between the City and the State and recognized that the
implementation of many of its provisions would require legislative approval by the General
Assembly.  It therefore provided that the decree would not become fully effective until (1)
the Governor signed “partnership legislation” in a form that did not affect the substantive
rights of the parties established by the decree, and (2) the State Budget for FY 1998 was
approved with the additional funds for FY 1998 provided for in ¶ 47 of the decree.  
With respect to the restructuring, the parties agreed and the court ordered, through ¶¶
2 and 8 through 20 of the decree, that the current City Board of School Commissioners be
replaced by a new Board of School Commissioners consisting of nine voting members and
one non-voting student member.  We shall refer to the new board hereafter as “the Board.”
The nine voting members were to be appointed jointly by the Governor and the Mayor of
Baltimore from a list submitted by the Maryland State Board of Education (MSBE). The
decree set forth certain qualifications for the voting members, provided a staggered three-
year term for them, and established quorum requirements.  The new Board was to be vested
with full control of all functions relating to BCPS in accordance with the partnership
legislation and over all personnel and procurement involving the schools, and was to be
“directly accountable for improving the academic achievement of Baltimore City school
children as measured by the Maryland School Performance Program” (MSPP).  The Board
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was required to appoint a Chief Executive Officer to serve at its pleasure, who was to be
responsible for the overall administration of the BCPS.  Provisions were made for other
executive officials and for a Parent and Community Advisory Board.
By September, 1997, the Board was to adopt a transition plan to guide the operation
of the school system in the 1997-98 school year.  By January 1, 1998, the CEO was to present
to the Board a Master Plan to increase student achievement, and, after review and public
hearings, the Board was required to adopt a Master Plan by March 1, 1998.  The Master Plan
was to include “a comprehensive design for improvement of school management and
accountability of all personnel” as well as implementation of the key recommendations made
in three identified consultant reports.  It was to address ten enumerated topics and identify
the actions necessary to improve student performance.  Paragraph 40 required the Board and
MSBE, by July 1, 1999, to select an independent consultant to evaluate the interim progress
of reform.  The consultant was to report the results of its evaluation by April 30, 2000.
Paragraph 42 required the Board and MSBE, by January 1, 2001, to select an independent
consultant to conduct a final comprehensive review and evaluation of BCPS.  The final
report was to examine the extent of progress made in improving the schools, cover all of the
topics examined in the interim evaluation, and was to be made by December 1, 2001.
The financing provisions were contained in ¶¶ 43-54.  Paragraphs 43, 47, and 48
obligated the State to provide additional funding to the City public school system, subject to
appropriation by the General Assembly, as follows: (1) for operating expenses, $30 million
4 The decree actually referenced ¶¶ 38 and 39, but the interim evaluation was
provided for in ¶ 40.  Paragraphs 38 and 39 do not provide for or even mention that
evaluation.  We assume that the reference to those paragraphs was a typographical error.
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for FY 1998 and $50 million for each of FY 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002; and (2) through the
State School Construction Program, at least $10 million in each of FY 1998 through 2002,
subject to a 10% match by the City.  The additional operating funds required under ¶ 47 were
to be used (1) to improve educational performance in schools having a high percentage of
students living in poverty, in reconstitution-eligible schools, and in other schools that failed
to meet MSPP standards, (2) to make progress in meeting teacher salary parity with
Baltimore County, and (3) to implement certain other enumerated improvements.
Paragraph 52 of the decree permitted the Board, for FY 1999 through 2002, to request
from the State, through the State Budget process, funds in excess of those required under ¶
47 if the Board presented a detailed plan showing why the additional funds were needed and
how they would be spent.  The State agreed to use its best efforts to satisfy such a request,
subject to availability of the funds.  Paragraph 53 provided, in addition, that, for FY 2001 and
2002, the Board could request funds in excess of those required under ¶ 47 after completion
of the interim evaluation described in ¶ 40.4  (Emphasis added).  If such a request was made,
the Bradford and Vaughn plaintiffs were to have an opportunity to present their views to the
Board and the State and the State and the Board were given from April 30, 2000 to June 1,
2000 to negotiate regarding the request.  If no agreement was reached, the Board was
authorized to seek relief from the Circuit Court.  In that event, the matter was to be placed
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on an expedited schedule, with a hearing commencing no later than 15 days after the filing
of a motion for relief.  The State expressly reserved “all of its defenses as to any Court order
for such funds in amounts greater than those provided in paragraph 47.”  Paragraph 53
concluded, in relevant part, with the provision that:
“Any party may appeal the Circuit Court’s ruling to the
Court of Appeals, but the Bradford Plaintiffs may appeal only
if the Board appeals.  The Circuit Court shall stay any order
pending appeal, and the parties shall jointly request expedited
consideration of the matter by the Court of Appeals.  The
partnership legislation shall include statutory authority providing
for direct review by the Court of Appeals of Maryland and
requesting that the Court of Appeals of Maryland issue a
decision within 60 days after briefing is completed.”
Paragraph 68 provided that the decree would remain in effect through June 30, 2002,
unless the court extended the term on timely motion of a party and a showing of good cause.
Paragraph 69 provided that the court would retain continuing jurisdiction during the term of
the decree to monitor and enforce compliance with it and that any party could seek to enforce
its terms.  That paragraph also stated that, notwithstanding termination of the decree, the
court retained jurisdiction to resolve any disputes that arose during the term of the decree.
In its next session, the General Assembly enacted 1997 Md. Laws, ch. 105, that,
although not entirely consistent with the terms of the Consent Decree, the parties agreed was
sufficiently consistent to make the decree effective.  The statute did not provide for any direct
appeal to the Court of Appeals.  Two years later, by 1999 Md. Laws, ch. 601, the Legislature
created a Commission on Education, Finance, Equity, and Excellence to review the current
5 The $265 million was broken down into $62.3 million to increase instructional
time; $16.7 million to expand the instructional curriculum in the areas of art, music,
physical education, and foreign language; $4.8 million to supplement library resources;
$3.5 million to increase allocations for materials and supplies; $0.15 million to expand
extra-curricular activities; $43 million to expand kindergarten and pre-kindergarten
(continued...)
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education financing formulas and accountability measures and make recommendations with
respect to certain enumerated subjects.  The Commission, which has become known as the
Thornton Commission after its chairman, Alvin Thornton, was to make an interim report by
January 1, 2000 and a final report by October 15, 2000.
At some point, apparently in the spring of 1999, the Board and MSBE jointly selected
Metis Associates, Inc. as the consultant to prepare an interim report, pursuant to ¶ 40 of the
Consent Decree.  That interim report was rendered on February 1, 2000.  Long before that
report was filed – even before Metis began any substantial work – the Bradford plaintiffs and
the Board began working on a proposal for additional funding.  That process began in May,
1999 and continued throughout the summer and fall. On December 9, 1999, the Board
presented “Building on Success:  A Remedy Plan to Address Continuing Funding Needs of
the Baltimore City Public School System,” in which it concluded that an additional $265
million was required annually for instructional programs and an additional $133 million was
required annually for capital improvements.  Apparently recognizing that an infusion of that
magnitude was not likely to happen all at once, the Board created certain priorities and asked,
for FY 2001, for an additional $49.7 million for instructional programs and an additional $40
million for capital improvements.5
5(...continued)
programs; $36.3 million to create smaller learning environments; $20 million to enhance
instructional technology; $22.4 million to expand offerings for disruptive students; $4.9
million to develop twilight schools to reduce the number of dropouts; $11.3 million to
increase student support services; $44.8 million to enhance professional development;
$12.3 million to expand teacher recruitment and retention efforts; and unspecified
amounts to enhance high school and middle school reform.  The $49.7 million consisted
of $4.2 million to recruit and retain teachers; $3.2 million for professional development;
$12 million for summer remedial programs; $5 million for kindergarten and pre-
kindergarten programs; $5.4 million to prepare high school students to pass the State
standardized tests; $3.6 million to prepare middle school students for “rigorous high
school pursuits”; $4.5 million for additional psychologists, social workers, and
counselors; $0.95 million for instructional leadership; $6.75 million for enriched
instructional curriculum; and the balance for instructional technology.
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On February 1, 2000, Metis Associates, Inc., the consultant jointly selected by the
Board and MSBE, submitted a lengthy interim evaluation of BCPS, for the 1998-99 school
year.  The evaluation reported meaningful progress in some areas, less progress in others.
Of particular importance here is that, based on a January, 2000 study of BCPS by the Council
of the Great City Schools, which compared the funding of BCPS to that in other major cities
and in other Maryland subdivisions, Metis concluded that an “adequate” per pupil
expenditure was “approximately $10,274.”  That amount, it said, “represents the amount per
pupil [BCPS] would need [in order] to have resources equivalent to the highest performing
school districts in the State, after adjusting for student needs.”  Metis found that the average
per pupil expenditure in Baltimore City in 1998-99 was $7,576, and that, to reach the optimal
$10,274, an additional $2,698 was necessary.  The consultant recommended that the Board
seek that additional funding.  
After negotiations proved unsuccessful, the Board, in June, 2000, filed a petition
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pursuant to ¶ 53 of the Consent Decree, in which it asked the court to declare that “the
Baltimore City public schools need additional funding of approximately $260 million for
educational operating expenses each school year, as well as approximately $600 million in
additional capital funding over a reasonable period of time to correct serious deficiencies in
the school system’s facilities . . . .”     
After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the court, on June 30, 2000, filed a
Memorandum Opinion and accompanying Order.  In its Order, the court, after referencing
its 1996 determination that the State was not providing the children of Baltimore with a
Constitutionally adequate education when measured by contemporary educational standards,
declared that still to be the case.  It declared as well that the State had “failed to make the
statutorily mandated best efforts to provide even a reasonable downpayment on the additional
approximately $2,000 to $2,600 per pupil that is needed to provide the children of the
[BCPS] with a Constitutionally Adequate Education when measured by Contemporary
Educational Standards.”  In furtherance of that finding, the court declared that “the State’s
allocation of $19.9 million for 2001 and the allocation of $23.9 million for 2002 out of a
$940 million budget surplus in Fiscal Year 2001 is not making a ‘best effort’ out of the
available funds” and would not enable the Board to provide the City’s school children with
a constitutionally adequate education.  The final provision in the Order was essentially
hortatory.  The court declared that, having found that the State was not fulfilling its
obligation under Article VIII, “the Court trusts that the State will act to bring itself into
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compliance with its constitutional and contractual obligations under the Consent Decree for
Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002 without the need for Plaintiffs to take further action.”
The State noted an appeal from that Order, and we granted certiorari prior to
proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals.  In its brief, the State argued that (1) the Circuit
Court had no authority to determine either the liability for the Constitutional inadequacy of
the City school children’s education or the amount of funds required from the State, under
either the Consent Decree or under the doctrine of separation of powers, and (2) the court’s
order was clearly erroneous.  In its first argument, the State contended that the court
exceeded the scope of the Consent Decree when it determined that the State was obliged to
increase its annual funding of the City school system by $200 to $260 million ($2,000 to
$2,600/pupil times an estimated 100,000 pupils) and that the effect of its ruling was an order
to the Governor and General Assembly to appropriate the necessary funds, which the court
had no Constitutional authority to do.  In its second argument, the State complained that the
court ignored the evidence and argument it presented and that the court’s finding that the
State did not use its best efforts to obtain the additional funding requested by the plaintiffs
was erroneous.  A week before oral argument, the parties jointly requested that the argument
be postponed.  We denied that request, whereupon the State dismissed its appeal.  
In December, 2001, Westat, the consultant selected pursuant to ¶ 42 of the Consent
Decree to render a final evaluation, made its report.  In contradiction to findings later made
by other panels, Westat found significant improvement in almost all categories.  It concluded
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that the Board was providing strong leadership in improving “what, by all criteria, was an
educational system beyond the brink of failure” and had begun to establish a coherent
administrative and management structure.  It found that many new initiatives had been put
in place, “although few could be considered fully tested or established.”  With respect to
funding, Westat found that per pupil expenditures in BCPS “are now approaching $10,000”
– the amount that Metis had determined would be adequate – of which about 25% was from
local sources.  In comparison with other similar cities, Baltimore ranked about in the middle
– ahead of Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Indianapolis, but behind Pittsburgh and Newark.
Westat noted the difficulty in attempting to define “adequacy” or “sufficiency” in education
funding.  The meanings of those words, it said, keep changing and were “buffeted about by
three dynamic processes: the efforts of advocacy groups to establish a use of the term
favorable to their interests; the efforts of technicians to construct workable quantitative
measures for the terms with available data and analytic techniques; and a growing number
of court cases with judges struggling to find workable legal definitions.”
The next significant event occurred a month later, in January, 2002, when the
Thornton Commission issued its final report on statewide education funding in Maryland.
Employing two methodologies to determine the amount of additional funding that would be
necessary to fill each school district’s “adequacy gap” – the difference between actual
funding and needed funding –  the Commission found that BCPS required additional funding
of between $ 2,938 to $4,250 per pupil, translating to an aggregate sum of between $290
6 The annual increases over FY 2002 funding for BCPS were estimated as follows:
FY 2003 $18.7 million; FY 2004 $28.1 million; FY 2005 $68.9 million; FY 2006 $125.5
million; FY 2007 $187.6 million; and FY 2008 $258.6 million.
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million and $420 million.  The Commission also made several recommendations for
improving school funding statewide.  
The Legislature considered the Commission’s findings and recommendations in its
2002 Session and, through the enactment of 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 288, which it named the
“Bridge to Excellence in Public Schools Act,” it provided for the eventual implementation
of many of those recommendations.  The 87-page Act restructured many of the State aid
formulas and programs and provided for a phased increase in State educational funding for
all 24 subdivisions from FY 2003 to FY 2008. According to the Fiscal Note that
accompanied the bill, State aid to the local school systems would increase by nearly $148
million in FY 2004, $364 million in FY 2005, $639 million in FY 2006, $948 million in FY
2007, and $1.3 billion in FY 2008.  For the six-year phase-in period, Baltimore City would
receive $375.2 million more than it received in FY 2002, an increase of 64%.6
In May, 2002, following the enactment of ch. 288, the Board and the Bradford
plaintiffs filed a joint motion asking the court to continue its judicial supervision “until such
time as the constitutional inadequacy of the education provided by [BCPS] has been
remedied.”  They noted that the judicial supervision provided in the 1996 Consent Decree
was due to terminate on June 30, 2002, that the Constitutional deficiency found in 1996 and
2000 still existed, and that, because the General Assembly had not identified a revenue
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source for a large share of the increases provided for in ch. 288, there was some uncertainty
as to whether those increases would, in fact, be fully funded.  Finding that to be the case, the
court, by order entered June 25, 2002, determined that it would retain jurisdiction and
continue judicial supervision “until such time as the State has complied with this Court’s
June 2000 order.”  No complaint was made at that time about the validity of the phase-in
approach.
The next relevant event occurred in March, 2004, when Judges Kaplan and Garbis
signed an order in their respective cases directing the City, the Board, and the State
defendants to provide the court, by April 7, 2004, with their plans for the funding and fiscal
management of BCPS.  The plans were to address certain specific topics, including the
amount of the BCPS deficit and projected cash flow gaps, cuts in program and personnel
reductions, source of funds, including loans, for current operations and loan repayments, and
anticipated cash flow problems and planned solutions.
In response to that directive, the City and the Board informed the two judges that
BCPS had ended FY 2002 with a deficit of $21 million, it ended FY 2003 with a $37 million
deficit, and that the cumulative deficit was therefore $58 million.  They noted that the Board
had anticipated a $21.6 million surplus for FY 2004, which it planned to use to reduce the
deficit, but that, for the first quarter of FY 2004, it overspent its budget for personnel costs
by $24 million, and that, if immediate action was not taken, the cumulative deficit could
grow by that amount.  The City and Board advised the judges of their plan to adopt a budget
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for FY 2005 that would reduce the accumulated deficit by 60% ($35 million) and to adopt
a budget for FY 2006 that would eliminate the remaining 40% ($23 million).
Apart from this “structural” deficit, the Board also faced a cash flow shortfall for FY
2004 of $42 million.  On March 17, 2004, they said, the Board and the City entered into a
City Funding Agreement under which the City lent the Board $42 million to deal with the
cash flow deficit, $34 million of which was to be repaid in August, 2004 and the balance of
$8 million in June, 2006.  The Board was expecting an $85.6 million payment from the State
on July 31, 2004, and it intended to use some of those funds to make the $34 million partial
repayment.
In the funding agreement, the parties agreed that a three-person Fiscal Operating
Committee, appointed by the Mayor, would be created to develop and implement a financial
recovery plan by May 30, 2004.  That plan was to include, among other things, a new internal
budgetary process, a schedule for reducing the structural deficit, further cost-savings
measures, and “an affordable, downsized staffing model for [BCPS].”  
The Fiscal Operating Committee made its Report to the Board on May 30, 2004.  It
attributed the accumulated deficit to budgeted personnel vacancies that never materialized,
reduced class sizes, expanded summer school, enhanced classroom assistance, and
transportation contract cost overruns.  It noted that the FY 2004 plan to reduce the deficit not
only could not be implemented but that an additional deficit was looming because (1)
budgeted personnel costs were based on estimated salaries that did not reflect actual salaries,
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(2) previously promised re-engineering efforts were never completed, (3) temporary
employees were not laid off when projected, (4) staff initially paid through grants were
absorbed by general funds when the grants expired, and (5) monthly cost reporting lagged
months behind.  To meet the problem, various cost-saving efforts were immediately put into
place, mostly involving a reduction in staff, including what appeared to be non-essential staff
–  “non-essential temporary employees” and “surplus teachers and administrators.”  In what
it termed “A Roadmap to Financial Recovery,” the Committee observed that , “[p]ut simply,
[BCPS] must not only continue to cut and contain costs in the remaining months of FY2004
and plan to live within its means, it must also produce future year surpluses that will equal
or exceed the cumulative deficit that it will carry forward at the end of the current fiscal
year.”
In July, 2004, a separate panel appointed by MSBE to investigate the BCPS deficit
made its report.  The panel noted several erroneous assumptions on the part of the General
Assembly in the enactment of ch. 288 itself, including an overestimate of what BCPS could
do on its own, an underestimate of what the City would continue to do to assist BCPS, failure
to focus on the development of oversight by the State Department of Education, and failure
to maintain any meaningful follow-up or initiate corrective action when deficiencies were
identified.  The “makings of a disaster,” it said, were there from the beginning, including no
continuity of leadership in BCPS (four CEOs, three CFOs, and at least two CAOs in six
years), no system of internal communication, no discipline, no meaningful oversight, a sense
7 There was general agreement among all of the groups that studied the fiscal
affairs of BCPS that there were serious and systemic management deficiencies, some of
long standing, that were simply never addressed.  Programs were put into place without
regard to the lack of available funding; funds that were, or could have been made
available were never used because of mismanagement and inattention.  Painful but
necessary decisions – layoffs, etc. – were either deferred or simply not implemented.
Some of the problems arose when the new board assumed control pursuant to ch. 288. 
Prior to that time, the City Government handled some of the fiscal matters for the school
system, but that ended when the new board was appointed.  The management staff
appointed by the new board seemed incapable of discharging those responsibilities. 
-22-
in middle management that new initiatives need not be followed because senior management
would change, no accountability, and no sanctions for failure to perform.  There was strong
pressure to increase academic achievement without anyone focusing on the entire system and
its budget issues.  The panel concluded that, “[i]n a system with almost a complete lack of
consequence for overspending, the surprise is that the deficit is not even larger.”  A similar
critique of BCPS management, along with positive recommendations for improvement, was
rendered by The Greater Baltimore Committee and The Presidents’ Roundtable, which had
been requested by the Mayor of Baltimore and the president of the Board to review BCPS’s
budget process and fiscal management practices.7
While the City’s Fiscal Operating Committee, the MSBE panel, and the Greater
Baltimore Committee were analyzing and attempting to deal with the BCPS deficit and
management deficiencies, the General Assembly, obviously concerned about school budget
deficits, enacted 2004 Md. Laws, ch. 148, which it called the Education Fiscal Accountability
and Oversight Act of 2004.  Part of that Act was a new § 5-114 added to the Education
-23-
Article, which required each local school superintendent to file a biannual report on the
financial status of the local school system and required the State Superintendent of Schools
to monitor the financial status of each local school system and to make a biannual report to
the Governor and Legislature.  
Section 5-114(e) provided that a local school system may not carry a deficit as
reported in the annual audit of its financial transactions and accounts required under § 5-109
of the Education Article.  The term “deficit” was defined as “a negative fund balance in the
General Fund of 1% or more of General Fund revenue at the end of the fiscal year.”  If a
deficit was reported, the State Superintendent was required (1) to notify the Governor, the
General Assembly, and the appropriate county government, and (2) among other things, to
require the local school system to develop and submit for approval a corrective action cost
containment plan within 15 days and to file monthly status reports demonstrating action taken
to close the deficit.  If the local school system failed to comply with those requirements, the
State Superintendent, with the approval of the State Board of Education, was to notify the
State Comptroller who, in turn, was to withhold 10% of each installment of State funds
payable to the local school system until compliance was effected.  
Apparently recognizing that it would be impracticable to immediately apply the
prohibition against deficits to Baltimore City, which then was reporting at least a $58 million
deficit, the Legislature provided, in an uncodified § 4 of the Act, that “[n]otwithstanding §
5-114(e) of the Education Article, the Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners shall
-24-
eliminate the general fund deficit as reported in the annual audit required by § 5-109 of the
Education Article by no later than the fiscal year ending June 30, 2006.”  That provision,
which was consistent with the plan adopted by the Mayor’s Fiscal Operating Committee and
with the City/Board’s April 7, 2004 representation to Judges Kaplan and Garbis, effectively
gave Baltimore City one year more than was given to the 23 other local school systems to
eliminate any deficit it might be carrying.  Ch. 148 took effect July 1, 2004.
A week later, on July 8, the Bradford plaintiffs filed a motion complaining that the
BCPS plan to eliminate the deficit and repay the loan obtained from the City would reduce
the educational opportunities available to the City students.  They noted that, to obtain the
funds needed to reduce the deficit, BCPS planned to eliminate systemic summer school for
at-risk children in elementary and middle schools, increase class size, eliminate guidance
counselors and other specialists, and encourage the retirement of skilled teachers.
Accordingly, they asked the court to direct the State, the City, and BCPS to “revisit their
plans to address the fiscal crisis to make certain that the funds available to educate students
in the 2004-05 school year are sufficient to ensure continued progress in the direction of that
remedy.”  In an accompanying memorandum, they disclaimed any notion that the court
should “directly involve itself in finding solutions to the fiscal problems, rewriting the
budget, or directing specific programs to which funds should be channeled,” but suggested
a number of ways in which sufficient funds would become available.  Among the suggestions
were that the State accelerate the phase-in of additional funding under ch. 288 (the Thornton
-25-
funding), that the City “relax” the requirement that the Board repay $34 million of the $42
million loan in August, 2004, and that the parties “alter” BCPS’s plan to eliminate its
structural deficit within two years.  The Board endorsed that motion.
The State responded with a motion seeking a declaration that State aid, as provided
in ch. 288 “satisfies the constitutional standard of adequacy” and that the court order such
additional restructuring of BCPS “in order for the system to function efficiently and
effectively.”  In furtherance of its first request, the State noted that the February, 2000 Metis
Report concluded that BCPS needed an additional $2,000 - $2,600 per pupil over what it
received in FY 1999, and it advised that, for FY 2005, State aid alone had increased over the
FY 1999 level between $2,360 and $2,478 per pupil.  If increases in local and Federal
funding were considered, BCPS would receive in FY 2005 approximately $3,400/pupil more
than it received in FY 1999.
The State argued that the funding formula adopted in ch. 288, when coupled with
other sources of funding, would lead to Constitutional adequacy throughout the State and that
the court was not authorized to direct a specific funding level.  It pointed to a 2004 report by
Ernst & Young indicating that systemic management deficiencies still existed in BCPS and
that, for the period 2001-2004, it had failed to avail itself of over $13 million of available
State and Federal funds.  The State defended BCPS’s plans to repay the City loan in
accordance with its agreement and to eliminate the structural deficit by 2006.  It argued that
§ 4 of ch. 148 had a rational basis and was Constitutionally valid.
-26-
Following a four-day evidentiary hearing, the parties submitted proposed findings of
fact to the court.  On August 20, 2004, the court filed a lengthy memorandum opinion and
accompanying order.  In the memorandum opinion, the court adopted most of the proposed
findings submitted by the plaintiffs and virtually none of those proposed by the State.   After
reciting much of the history of the case and the various orders it had entered, the court found,
among other things, that:
 (1) the estimates that undergirded the Thornton Commission recommendations,
largely adopted in ch. 288, were too low;
 (2) the increases actually received by BCPS under ch. 288 were less than those
projected when the law was enacted;
 (3) full funding under ch. 288 would not occur until FY 2008;
 (4) BCPS needs substantial additional resources;
 (5) the State had “not yet come close to complying with the Court’s June 2000
direction that an additional $2,000 to $2,600 per pupil be provided”;
 (6) the additional $2,000 to $2,600 was to be on top of what was provided in FY 2001
and FY 2002, not FY 1999, and on top of mandated increases, and the additional funding
since FY 2002 was only $1,353/pupil;
 (7) for FY 2001 through 2004, the State underfunded BCPS by $439.4 million to
$834.7 million (depending on whether $2,000 or $2,600 was used);
8 Among the facts found in this regard were that 2003 scores on the Maryland
School Assessment Test show that nearly two-thirds of Baltimore City tenth grade
students did not adequately read or comprehend grade level reading material and that
from 58% to 89% of City students, depending on grade, were functioning at an
unsatisfactory level in mathematics; City pupils’ performance on high school assessment
tests “also demonstrate a substantial failure to meet state standards” – only 20.7% passed
the algebra exam and only 26% passed the biology exam; City pupils’ dropout rate
hovered close to 11% and thus substantially exceeded the State standard (3%);
absenteeism remained a large problem – on any given day, one out of five students was
not in class; and City suspension and expulsion rates were the highest in the State.
-27-
(8) academic achievement among City students remained grossly unsatisfactory; 8
(9) consistent with its obligations under both § 4 of ch. 148 and its own commitment
to Judges Kaplan and Garbis, the Board determined to institute cost savings sufficient to
retire 60% of the $58 million deficit in FY 2005 and the remaining 40% in FY 2006; and
(10) to achieve that result, the Board instituted certain cuts to educational programs
and services which the court described in some detail and which it concluded “will
immediately and adversely affect the quality of education being provided to children in
Baltimore City” and “create[] significant morale issues both within the system and among
the parents and students it served.”
In announcing its conclusions of law, the court said that it was “gravely concerned”
that the measures taken by the State, the City, and the Board to address the structural deficit
“have compromised the quality of education being provided to Baltimore City’s
schoolchildren” and that this was compounded by the State’s unwillingness to provide
“immediate funding in accord with this Court’s final 2000 order and will not arguably
9 We are unable to find any requirement in the City Funding Agreement, which the
court referred to as an MOU, directing that the deficit be eliminated by 2006.  The
Agreement required the financial recovery plan adopted by the Fiscal Operating
Committee – a committee appointed by the Mayor – to include a schedule for the
reduction of the structural deficit.  The plan to eliminate 60% of the deficit in FY 2005
(continued...)
-28-
comply with that order until 2008 when full funding under the Bridge to Excellence Act is
received.”  To that end, the court, in its accompanying order:
(1) Declared that the Constitutional violation that the court found to exist in 1996 and
2000 “is still continuing” and that full compliance with the 2000 declaration and funding
sufficient for BCPS to achieve Constitutional adequacy will not occur until BCPS receives
at least $225 million in additional State funding under ch. 288, at the latest by FY 2008.
(2) Declared that the City children should not have to wait another three years for
adequate funding and that “[g]iven the substantial underfunding of [BCPS], the Court
declares that it would be appropriate for the State to accelerate increases in full Thornton
funding to [BCPS].  The Court will not, in any event, tolerate any delays in full Thornton
funding for [BCPS] beyond FY 2008.” 
(3) Declared that, “[t]o ensure that the necessary funding is available for [BCPS] to
provide the basic educational programs that have been reduced,” the requirement in § 4 of
ch. 148 “that the [BCPS] deficit must be eliminated by the end of fiscal year 2006 is
unconstitutional as applied to [BCPS]” and that the comparable provision in the City Funding
Agreement that the BCPS deficit be eliminated by the end of FY 2006 “is null and void as
against public policy.”9  Coupled with that declaration, the court directed that
9(...continued)
and the remaining 40% in FY 2006 was part of that plan.
10 Notwithstanding the dire circumstances found by the court, the Board repaid the
first installment of $34 million on the $42 million loan in August, 2004, as it had agreed
to do.  The court seemed to have no problem with that repayment or with the Board’s plan
to repay the remaining $8 million in June, 2006.
-29-
“Absent additional funding from the State of Maryland,
[BCPS] shall not retire the deficit before fiscal year 2008 and
[BCPS] shall not dedicate more than $5 million per year toward
the creation of a $20 million cash reserve.”
(4) Declared that, notwithstanding the court’s abrogation of the requirement that the
deficit be eliminated by 2006, “the City shall be repaid the remaining $8 million of its $42
million loan as scheduled.”10
(5) Noted that a number of steps taken to address the financial crisis – elimination of
a systemic summer school program, increases in class size, reduction of experienced
teachers, mentors, and coaches, and elimination of guidance counselors – reduced
educational opportunities and impermissibly interfered with progress toward providing a
Constitutionally adequate education, and declared, in light of that circumstance that
“[T]he parties should ensure that educational opportunities for
the school children are not reduced, by making available to the
children of Baltimore City at least the amount of funding
representing the savings achieved from those reduced
educational opportunities described above, to be spent solely on
programs and services that benefit at-risk children.  The Court
further declares that that amount constitutes at least an
additional $30-45 million in operating funding this fiscal year.
*     *      *
-30-
The Court believes that the best way to accomplish this
goal would be for the parties with revenue raising capacity (the
State or City) to increase the funding available to [BCPS] for the
upcoming year.”
(6) Declared that the court would retain jurisdiction to ensure compliance with its
orders and mandates and continue monitoring funding and management issues until full
funding is received, at which time the court would revisit the issue of its continuing
jurisdiction and determine whether the Consent Decree “should then be extended for good
cause.”
(7) Ordered the City to continue monitoring BCPS financing and accounting and
ensure that expenditures do not exceed revenues, but enjoined the City not to impose any
budget cuts or to restrict program funding.  
(8) Having issued those declarations, expressed the trust that the parties would “act
in good faith and with all deliberate speed to ensure compliance without the necessity of
further action by the court.”
The State appealed, and we granted certiorari prior to proceedings in the Court of
Special Appeals.  The State has raised four issues and the plaintiffs have raised three.  They
can be restated as follows:
(1) Is the August, 2004 order, or any part of it, presently appealable and, if so, on what
basis;
(2) If the order is appealable, in whole or in part, what issues are properly before us
at this point; and
-31-
(3) To the extent one or more issues are properly before us, did the Circuit Court err?
DISCUSSION
Appealability
We have, on a number of occasions, articulated and confirmed the rule that the right
to seek appellate review of a trial court’s ruling ordinarily must await the entry of a final
judgment that disposes of all claims against all parties, and that there are only three
exceptions to that rule: appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute,
predominantly those kinds of orders enumerated in Maryland Code, § 12-303 of the Cts. &
Jud. Proc. Article; immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602(b); and appeals
from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine.  See
Smith v. Lead Industries Assoc., Inc., 386 Md. 12, 21, 871 A.2d 545, 550-51 (2005); Frase
v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100, 109-10, 840 A.2d 114, 119 (2003); Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md.
143, 165, 725 A.2d 549, 560-61 (1999).
The State initially sought to treat the question of appealability, which, of course, is a
critical, threshold one, in a brief footnote:
“The circuit court’s order is appealable because it is a
final declaratory judgment on the matters presented to it in
August 2004.  Declaratory judgments are final judgments.  Md.
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-411.  Further, to the extent that the
court’s order is in the nature of an injunction, it is immediately
appealable.  See Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann., § 12-303;
Funger v. Mayer, 244 Md. 141, 149 (1966).”
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In response to the Bradford plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the appeal, the State decided
to pay somewhat more attention to the question.  In its reply brief, it urges that the Circuit
Court’s attempt to enforce the Consent Decree “far exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction”
in that “[i]t had no authority to summon parties to court to address the [BCPS] budget deficit,
to direct the parties, including the defendants, to file pleadings; or to craft an order that went
far beyond anything the Consent Decree contemplated or authorized.”  Relying upon Waters
v. Smith, 277 Md. 189, 196, 352 A.2d 793, 797 (1976) and Cohen v. Willett, 269 Md. 194,
195, 304 A.2d 824, 825 (1973), it avers that “[a]n appeal lies immediately from an order
which exceeds the jurisdiction of the trial court.”  The State also supplemented its footnote
with the assertion that “[b]ecause the parties only requested declaratory relief and because
. . . the declaratory judgment issued in August 2004 addressed all requests for such relief, it
is a final appealable judgment.”
Although, for reasons to be explained, we shall conclude that one aspect of the court’s
order was in the nature of an injunction that was immediately appealable under § 12-303 of
the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article, we find no merit whatever in the alternative bases urged by the
State.
There is a line of cases, commencing with Gottshalk v. Mercantile Trust Co., 102 Md.
521, 62 A. 810 (1906), and Eastern States Corp. v. Eisler, 181 Md. 526, 30 A.2d 867 (1943)
and extending through 
Montgomery Co. Coun. v. Kaslow, 235 Md. 45, 51, 200 A.2d 184, 187
(1964), Cohen v. Willett, and Waters v. Smith, both supra, in which this Court has indeed
-33-
indicated that an immediate appeal may lie from an order that is jurisdictionally deficient. 
That view has long been discarded.  In more recent times, as noted above, we have
made clear that there are only three exceptions to the final judgment rule, and a mere
allegation that an interlocutory order exceeded the subject matter jurisdiction of the court is
not one of them.  In Gruber v. Gruber, 369 Md. 540, 547, 801 A.2d 1013, 1017 (2002), we
held flatly that “a trial court’s order denying a challenge to its jurisdiction is a nonappealable
interlocutory order.”  We have similarly discarded the once-held view that an immediate
appeal would lie from an order denying a Constitutional right.  Compare Smith v.
Fredericktown Bank, 258 Md. 141, 142, 265 A.2d 236, 237 (1970) with Parrott v. State, 301
Md. 411, 483 A.2d 68 (1984); see also Old Cedar v. Parker Construction, 320 Md. 626, 631-
32, 579 A.2d 275, 278 (1990).  
A contrary approach would be wholly inconsistent with the very purpose of the final
judgment rule, which is to avoid piecemeal appeals that create inefficiencies in both the
appellate and trial courts.  The mere allegation that a clearly interlocutory order is
jurisdictionally deficient should not serve to halt proceedings in the trial court while an
appellate court considers whether the allegation has merit.  Moreover, there is no need for
a fourth exception to the final judgment rule.  In some instances, an order that is
jurisdictionally deficient may, for other reasons, be immediately appealable as a final
judgment, under the collateral order doctrine, or under § 12-303, but if it is not, it can
11 The appeal in Cohen v. Willett, for example, was from an order, in a judicial
review action, remanding the case to the administrative agency for further proceedings,
the challenge being that the court had no power to enter such an order.  In subsequent
cases, we have held that such an order is appealable as a final judgment.  See Department
of Public Safety v. LeVan, 288 Md. 533, 542-43, 419 A.2d 1052, 1057 (1980); Schultz v.
Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 5-6, 432 A.2d 1319, 1322 (1981); Md. Comm’n on Human Rel. v.
B.G.& E. Co., 296 Md. 46, 52-3, 459 A.2d 205, 210 (1983).  
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certainly be reviewed in an appeal from the final judgment.11
The State’s assertion that any declaration by a court constitutes a final judgment is
patently without merit.  It is true that when, in a declaratory judgment action, the court enters
a judgment declaring the rights of the parties and that judgment resolves all of the issues in
the case, it is appealable, but that is because it constitutes a final judgment in the case.  The
fact that, as here, a court, in the course of its continuing jurisdiction in a case, makes
pronouncements or declarations of one kind or another does not, of itself, imbue those
pronouncements or declarations with the status of final judgments.  
There clearly has been no final judgment in this case.  The case is very much alive in
the Circuit Court.  Indeed, in its August 20, 2004 order, the court has actually done very little
of any immediate effect.  It declared that the school children in Baltimore City, as of August,
2004, were being deprived of their right to a thorough and efficient education.  That
determination is certainly subject to challenge if and when a final judgment is entered, if it
is still relevant at that time.  The court declared that the Constitutional violation would exist
until BCPS receives at least $225 million in additional annual aid from the State.  That, too,
can be challenged, either when a final judgment is entered or at such time as the court
-35-
attempts to implement that finding by an order that is properly appealable on an interlocutory
basis.  The court declared that “it would be appropriate” for the State to accelerate the phase-
in of additional funding provided in ch. 288.  That is hardly an appealable order.  The court
decided to retain jurisdiction to continue monitoring funding and management issues.  Until
the court does something in the exercise of that jurisdiction that is otherwise appealable,
however, there is clearly nothing final about that provision.
In ¶¶ 8 and 9 of the order, the court declared that the parties “should ensure continued
progress towards constitutional adequacy” by making available to the children of Baltimore
City at least $30 million to $45 million from the savings achieved from earlier reductions in
programs and that “the best way to accomplish this goal would be for [the State and the City]
to increase funding available to [BCPS] for the upcoming year.”  It is not clear to us whether
the State or the City have done anything in response to that suggestion, but those statements
by the court do not order anyone to do anything.  The directive that the City continue to
monitor the BCPS finances may be considered injunctive in nature, but the City has not
appealed from that directive and it does not obligate the State to do anything.
As we view the August, 2004 order, only two aspects of it are appealable at this time.
Paragraph 12 orders that the City be repaid the $8 million balance of its loan as scheduled.
In both form and substance, that constitutes an order for the payment of money, which is
appealable under § 12-303(3)(v), and although that directive seems facially incompatible
with the court’s ruling regarding the elimination of the $58 million deficit, the State has not
-36-
complained in this appeal about that directive.  
The second aspect, about which the State does complain, are (1) the declaration in ¶
10 of the order that § 4 of ch. 148 is unconstitutional, (2) the associated declaration in ¶ 11
that the contractual obligation of BCPS to eliminate the deficit by FY2006 is null and void
as against public policy, and (3) the implementing directive, found in ¶ 13 of the order, that,
absent additional funding from the State,  BCPS “shall not retire the deficit before fiscal year
2008 and [BCPS] shall not dedicate more than $5 million per year toward the creation of a
$20 million case reserve.”  That directive, which proceeds from the declaration of
unconstitutionality and contravention of public policy, is injunctive in nature, in that it
forbids BCPS from taking action that, by public general law, the General Assembly has
required BCPS to take and that, by contract freely entered into with the City, it agreed to
take.  That directive is immediately appealable under § 12-303(3)(i), and, along with its
underpinnings in ¶¶ 10 and 11, are the only aspects of the August 20, 2004 order that are
properly before us at this point.
Validity of That Directive
Declaring a statute enacted by the General Assembly to be unconstitutional and
therefore unenforceable is an extraordinary act.  Statutes are generally presumed to be
Constitutional and are not to be held otherwise unless the Constitutional impediment is clear.
We have said many times that “since every presumption favors the validity of a statute, it
-37-
cannot be stricken down as void, unless it plainly contravenes a provision of the
Constitution.”  McGlaughlin v. Warfield, 180 Md. 75, 78, 23 A.2d 12, 13 (1941) and cases
cited there; see also Atkinson v. Sapperstein, 191 Md. 301, 315, 60 A.2d 737, 742 (1948);
Edgewood Nursing Home v. Maxwell, 282 Md. 422, 427, 384 A.2d 748, 751 (1978); State
v. Wyand, 304 Md. 721, 727-28, 501 A.2d 43, 46-47 (1985); Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599,
610-11, 781 A.2d 851, 857-58 (2001).  Similar principles apply with respect to striking down
otherwise valid contractual provisions as being against public policy.  See Bausch & Lomb
v. Utica Mutual, 330 Md. 758, 790, 625 A.2d 1021, 1037 (1993) (“Maryland courts are
reluctant to obviate voluntary bargains on public policy grounds, and to diminish the public
interest in having individuals and corporations exercise broad powers as they structure their
own affairs”); see also Finci v. American Casualty, 323 Md. 358, 378-79, 593 A.2d 1069,
1079 (1991).
The apparent theory upon which the court declared § 4 of ch. 288 unconstitutional is
that, if BCPS is required to eliminate its $58 million deficit by FY 2006, as the law mandates,
it would have to divert funds for that purpose from educational programs and that would
exacerbate the Constitutional deficiency found by the court. That was the presumed basis,
as well, for declaring the contractual commitment null and void.   The same, no doubt, could
be said for a hundred other obligations of BCPS, including repayment of the $8 million
balance of the loan from the City, which the court expressly required be repaid when due. 
What the court overlooked is that § 4 of ch. 288 has an equivalent Constitutional basis
12 Given the importance of this case and the fact that it has been pending already
for nearly eleven years with no end in sight, at least until 2008, we caution the court to be
careful in the kinds of declarations and orders it issues.
-38-
under Article VIII of the Constitution.  As part of its responsibility for establishing
throughout the State a thorough and efficient system of free public schools, the General
Assembly has at least the authority, if not an obligation, to ensure that appropriations for
educational purposes are managed wisely and, in furtherance of that authority or obligation,
to prohibit local school systems from running deficits and, if they do run such deficits, to
insist that they be promptly eliminated.  Indeed, to continue to permit school systems, through
deliberate or negligent conduct, to become fiscally irresponsible and insolvent, as BCPS
became, would be a breach of its solemn responsibility to both the children and the taxpayers
of the State.  As we have observed, BCPS was given a break by the Legislature – a
dispensation not given to any other subdivision.  Whether any other subdivision might have
cause of complaint, there is nothing remotely unconstitutional about §4 of ch. 288 from
BCPS’s point of view.  The part of the court’s order directing BCPS not to comply with that
mandate is invalid and void, as is the associated declaration regarding the City Financing
Agreement.  Because no other aspect of the August, 2004 order, or any other order entered
by the Circuit Court to date, is properly before us, we express no opinion with respect to
them.12
PARAGRAPHS 10, 11, AND 13 OF ORDER
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OF AUGUST 20, 2004 ENTERED BY
CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
VACATED; COSTS TO BE PAID 3/4 BY
APPELLANTS, 1/4 BY APPELLEES.