Case Title: Maine v. Poole

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2012-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2012 ME  
92 
Docket: 
And-11-541 
Argued:  
June 14, 2012 
Decided: 
July 12, 2012 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and 
JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
JACKLYNE S. POOLE 
 
LEVY, J. 
[¶1]  Jacklyne S. Poole appeals from a judgment of conviction of domestic 
violence assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(A) (2011), entered in the 
District Court (Lewiston, Beliveau, J.) following a bench trial.  Poole’s charge 
arose from an incident in which she assaulted her boyfriend.  She was sentenced to 
180 days in jail, all suspended, and one year of probation.  Poole argues that 
(A) the court (Stanfill, J.) erred by denying her motion to enlarge time to file a jury 
trial request after the twenty-one-day deadline imposed by M.R. Crim. P. 22 
because she did not knowingly and intelligently waive her right to a jury trial at 
arraignment, and (B) the application of different procedural rules for accessing the 
jury trial right in courts with and without Unified Criminal Dockets violates the 
federal and Maine constitutional guarantees of equal protection.  We affirm the 
judgment. 
 
 
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A. 
Waiver of Jury Trial Right 
[¶2]  When reviewing whether a defendant has effectively waived the jury 
trial right, we review the court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal 
conclusions de novo.  State v. Ouellette, 2006 ME 81, ¶ 21, 901 A.2d 800.   
[¶3]  The record shows that at Poole’s arraignment, she watched an 
instructional video that included information about the jury trial right and the need 
to request a jury trial within twenty-one days, and that cautioned that the failure to 
request a jury trial within that time would result in loss of the right.  Next, as part 
of her arraignment, Poole was individually questioned by the court (Driscoll, J.).  
Poole stated that she understood both the charge against her and her rights as 
explained in the video, and she entered a not guilty plea.  The court informed Poole 
about her right to be considered for appointed counsel, and it told her, “[I]f you 
want a jury trial, you need to file your jury trial request form within twenty-one 
days.”  Poole stated that she understood the instructions and had no questions for 
the court.  She failed to file a request for a jury trial within the twenty-one-day 
deadline. 
[¶4]  Based on this record, the court (Stanfill, J.) found that Poole was 
adequately advised of and understood both the jury trial right and the need to 
timely file her request if she desired a jury trial.  The court concluded that Poole 
waived her right to a jury trial.  Neither the court’s findings nor its legal conclusion 
 
 
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are in error.  See M.R. Crim. P. 22(a) (requiring that defendants prosecuted in 
District Court demand a jury trial within twenty-one days after arraignment or “be 
deemed to have waived the right to trial by jury”); Ouellette, 2006 ME 81, ¶¶ 14, 
19, 901 A.2d 800; State v. Holmes, 2003 ME 42, ¶ 9, 818 A.2d 1054.  Poole’s 
motion to enlarge the time for filing her jury trial request was properly denied. 
B. 
Equal Protection 
[¶5]  We turn now to Poole’s constitutional challenge.  Poole contends that 
the application of different procedural rules for accessing the right to a jury trial in 
courts with Unified Criminal Dockets and those without—such as the District 
Court in Lewiston where Poole was arraigned and tried—violates the equal 
protection guarantees of the United States and Maine Constitutions.  See U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A.1  We review constitutional 
challenges de novo.  State v. Elliott, 2010 ME 3, ¶ 17, 987 A.2d 513. 
 
[¶6]  The rule that applied to Poole as a result of her prosecution for a Class 
D crime in the District Court in Lewiston was M.R. Crim. P. 22(a), which requires 
defendants to file a jury trial request within twenty-one days of arraignment or be 
deemed to have waived the jury trial right.  Poole acknowledges that this rule, 
standing alone, is constitutionally sound, as we have previously held.  
                                               
 
1  The United States Constitution provides: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Maine Constitution 
provides: “No person shall . . . be denied the equal protection of the laws.”  Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A. 
 
 
 
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See Ouellette, 2006 ME 81, ¶ 14, 901 A.2d 800; State v. Lenfestey, 557 A.2d 1327, 
1328 (Me. 1989).  She argues, however, that because the rule is less protective of 
the jury trial right than the rules now applicable in the Unified Criminal Dockets 
(UCDs) in Bangor and Cumberland County, the resulting discrepancy is 
unconstitutionally unequal.2 
 
[¶7]  In all criminal cases prosecuted in the Bangor and Cumberland County 
UCDs, the applicable procedural rules provide for jury trials unless a plea 
agreement is reached or unless the defendant, with the court’s approval, 
affirmatively waives the right to a jury trial.  U.C.D.R.P.-Bangor 18(e), 23(a); 
U.C.D.R.P.-Cumberland County 18(e), 23(a).  Thus, defendants like Poole who are 
                                               
 
2  The administrative order establishing the Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket describes 
the goals of this pilot project: 
 
The goals of the UCD are (1) to promote the prompt and fair resolution of cases through 
early information sharing, early access to appointed counsel for indigent defendants, and 
judicial attention to the case resolution process; and (2) to promote efficiency by 
eliminating the duplicative clerical workload created by the current system of case 
transfer between the District Court and the Superior Court and by reducing the number of 
court appearances required to process individual cases. 
 
Establishment of the Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket, Me. Admin. Order JB-08-2 (effective 
Jan. 1, 2009).  The order contains a number of procedural rules and states: 
 
The UCD shall be governed by the Unified Criminal Docket Rules of Procedure 
(U.C.D.R.P.), promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court as part of this Order and 
attached hereto as Exhibit A.  The U.C.D.R.P. differ generally from the Maine Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in that they eliminate the distinctions between the functions of the 
District and Superior Courts in their handling of criminal matters and civil violations.  
For the duration of this project, all of those matters will be handled by the Unified 
Criminal Docket in the Cumberland County Superior Court. 
 
Id.; see also Establishment of the Bangor Unified Criminal Docket, Me. Admin. Order JB-10-1 (effective 
Jan. 4, 2010) (describing similar goals and procedural rules for the Bangor UCD). 
 
 
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prosecuted in courts without Unified Criminal Dockets may lose their right to a 
jury trial through inaction, whereas a defendant’s inaction in the UCDs preserves 
the right to a jury trial. 
 
[¶8]  To determine whether the application of these different procedural 
mechanisms constitutes an equal protection violation, we apply a two-step 
analysis.  Friends of Lincoln Lakes v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2010 ME 18, ¶ 26, 
989 A.2d 1128.  The first step is to “show that similarly situated persons are not 
treated equally under the law.”  Id.  If that step is met, we next “determine what 
level of scrutiny to apply.”  Id.  We recognize that three different sets of procedural 
rules apply to criminal defendants in different areas of the state—the 
U.C.D.R.P.-Bangor, the U.C.D.R.P.-Cumberland County, and the standard Maine 
Rules of Criminal Procedure for all regions not currently included within the 
jurisdiction of a Unified Criminal Docket.  Thus, today, similarly situated people 
are treated differently for purposes of preserving their jury trial right in Maine’s 
courts. 
 
[¶9]  Turning to the second step of the equal protection analysis, we apply 
rational basis review to Poole’s challenge.  Pursuant to the rational basis test, the 
procedural rules challenged by Poole need only be rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest to survive constitutional scrutiny.  See id. ¶ 26.  Contrary to Poole’s 
argument, although strict scrutiny review generally applies to the infringement of a 
 
 
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fundamental right—and the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right, Ouellette, 
2006 ME 81, ¶ 11, 901 A.2d 800—because the procedural rules at issue here do 
not impinge on that right, strict scrutiny does not apply in this case.  
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38-40 (1973) (noting 
that strict scrutiny applies only to legislation that “deprive[s], infringe[s], or 
interfere[s] with the free exercise of” a fundamental right (quotation marks 
omitted)); Lambert v. Wentworth, 423 A.2d 527, 531-32 & n.2 (Me. 1980).   
 
[¶10]  As noted above, we have held that M.R. Crim. P. 22—the procedural 
rule that applied to Poole’s prosecution—is constitutional as long as it is 
administered in conjunction with adequate arraignment procedures.  See Ouellette, 
2006 ME 81, ¶ 14, 901 A.2d 800.  This rule does not become unconstitutional 
simply because a state actor—here, the judiciary—takes steps to reform and 
improve the process by which defendants receive jury trials.  “[R]eform may take 
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most 
acute.”  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 39 (quotation marks omitted).  The Maine Judicial 
Branch is actively engaged in planning for the implementation of Unified Criminal 
Dockets throughout the state, and the creation and launch of the Bangor and 
Cumberland County UCDs, with their associated procedural rules, are the first 
phase in this statewide reform effort.  See, e.g., Establishment of the Bangor 
Unified Criminal Docket, Me. Admin. Order JB-10-1 (effective Jan. 4, 2010) 
 
 
7 
(describing the Bangor UCD as a “pilot project implementing a new model for 
processing criminal actions”).  
[¶11]  There is a strong rationale for making these changes to criminal 
procedure incrementally.  A gradual and deliberate expansion of the Unified 
Criminal Docket system permits the judiciary to plan for and address regional 
differences and to tailor the transition to each UCD accordingly.  A phased 
transition is best suited to achieve the goals of the UCDs, including the “prompt 
and fair resolution of cases” and the efficient administration of the courts’ 
caseload.  See, e.g., Establishment of the Cumberland County Unified Criminal 
Docket, Me. Admin. Order JB-08-2 (effective Jan. 1, 2009).  The UCD rule 
providing for jury trials except where affirmatively waived, rather than the 
traditional Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure requiring a jury trial request within 
twenty-one days, advances these goals because it promotes efficiency and better 
protects the fundamental constitutional right to trial by jury. 
[¶12]  The fact that UCDs have not yet been implemented statewide does 
not, however, render the otherwise constitutionally compliant procedural rules 
applied by the non-UCD courts constitutionally infirm.  A reform measure “is not 
invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did.”  
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 39 (quotation marks omitted).  Because there is a sound and 
rational basis for implementing UCDs in phases, the constitutional guarantee of 
 
 
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equal protection is not violated by the continued use of M.R. Crim. P. 22(a)—
requiring defendants to file a jury trial request within twenty-one days of 
arraignment—in those courts that have not yet made the transition to a UCD.     
The entry is: 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Jeffrey S. Dolley, Esq., Lewiston, for appellant Jacklyne S. Poole 
 
Norman R. Croteau, District Attorney, and Andrew P. Matulis, Asst. Dist. 
Atty., Office of the District Attorney, Auburn, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
Jeffrey S. Dolley, Esq., for appellant Jacklyne S. Poole 
 
Andrew P. Matulis, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number CR-2010-3561 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY