Case Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Rus

Citation: 2005-Ohio-5520

Docket Number: 20050752

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Rus, 106 Ohio St.3d 467, 2005-Ohio-5520.] 
 
 
CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. RUS. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Rus, 106 Ohio St.3d 467, 2005-Ohio-5520.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Indefinite suspension — Conduct involving moral 
turpitude — Conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, and deceit — Conduct  
prejudicial to administration of justice — Conduct adversely reflecting on 
fitness to practice law — Failure to promptly deliver funds to client — 
Failure to cooperate in investigation of misconduct. 
(No. 2005-0752 — Submitted June 28, 2005 — Decided November 2, 2005.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 04-058. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Vladimir Michael Rus, of Lakewood, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0023776, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1981. 
{¶ 2} On January 12, 2005, relator, Cleveland Bar Association, filed an 
amended complaint charging respondent with professional misconduct.  A panel 
of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline held a hearing and 
issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended sanction, all of 
which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} In 1997, the water pipes in the Cleveland home of Rose A. 
Huffman burst while she was asleep.  When Huffman awoke and stepped out of 
bed, her feet landed in hot water. 
{¶ 4} Huffman then hired respondent to represent her, and he filed a 
personal-injury lawsuit on her behalf in 1999.  The case was removed to federal 
court, and respondent reached a settlement with the defendant’s counsel in May 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
2001.  In connection with that settlement, a “Full and Final Release” was 
purportedly signed by Huffman in June 2001.  Respondent himself signed that 
release twice, both as a witness and as a notary for Huffman’s signature, and then 
returned the signed release to the defendant’s counsel.  Consistent with the 
lawyers’ settlement discussions, an $85,000 settlement check payable to “Rose 
Huffman & Vladimir M. Rus, her attorney” was sent to respondent, was 
purportedly endorsed by Huffman and respondent, and was deposited into 
respondent’s trust account on June 21, 2001. 
{¶ 5} Huffman, however, was unaware that her case had been settled, 
had not signed the release that bears her purported signature, and had not 
endorsed the settlement check that was payable to her.  In fact, she first learned 
about the settlement two years later, when her aunt checked with the federal court 
and discovered that the case had been settled in May 2001.  Huffman then made a 
number of telephone calls to respondent’s office, and after some delay, 
respondent agreed to meet with her.  When they met in 2003, respondent still did 
not tell Huffman that he had settled her case and did not pay her any of the 
proceeds from the settlement. 
{¶ 6} Then, in October 2003, Huffman met with the attorney who had 
represented the defendant in her lawsuit, and he showed her the signed documents 
confirming that the case had in fact been settled in 2001.  Armed with that proof, 
Huffman again called respondent and left a voicemail message telling him that 
she had met with the defendant’s lawyer, had seen the settlement papers, and 
wanted her share of the settlement proceeds.  Respondent returned the call and 
told Huffman that he would send her a check.  In November 2003, Huffman 
received a $57,000 check drawn on respondent’s trust account and made payable 
to Huffman; however, it was not signed by the respondent, and Huffman’s bank 
refused to accept it.  Finally, several days later, respondent sent a valid $57,000 
check to Huffman. 
January Term, 2005 
3 
{¶ 7} When questioned by relator, respondent offered little explanation 
for his conduct.  He claimed that he could not recall the circumstances 
surrounding the signing of the settlement documents in 2001, but denied that he 
had signed Huffman’s name to the release or the settlement check, both of which 
bear her purported signature.  As for the delay between his receipt of the 
settlement proceeds in June 2001 and his issuance of a check to Huffman for her 
share of those proceeds in November 2003, respondent said, “There certainly was 
that delay and I have no explanation for it.” 
{¶ 8} Respondent also testified that the settlement proceeds were in his 
trust account throughout the two-year period between his receipt of the settlement 
check from the defendant in 2001 and his payment to Huffman of her share in 
2003.  That was not true, however.  During the 14-month period after he 
deposited the $85,000 check into his trust account in June 2001, respondent wrote 
several checks to “cash,” to himself, and to credit-card companies.  By July 2002, 
the balance in respondent’s trust account had been reduced to $1,544.82, and 
there was no further activity in the account until November 2003, when 
respondent deposited enough funds into the account to cover the $57,000 check 
that he sent to Huffman that month.  On the “memo” line on the face of the check 
that respondent wrote to replenish his trust account so that he could pay Huffman 
in November 2003, respondent typed the words “loan repayment.” 
{¶ 9} Relator’s investigator and assistant counsel tried repeatedly to 
contact respondent when they began their investigation of Huffman’s grievance.  
Respondent did not reply to their letters sent by certified and regular mail.  
Respondent did appear in response to relator’s deposition subpoena, but he did 
not produce any of the bank records or client files that were requested in the 
subpoena and testified that he had simply thrown away any correspondence from 
relator without opening it. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶ 10} After his deposition in 2004, respondent sent Huffman an 
additional check in the amount of $28,000.  That check together with the $57,000 
check that respondent sent to Huffman in November 2003 represented the full 
$85,000 that the defendant had paid to settle Huffman’s personal-injury suit in 
2001. 
{¶ 11} The board found that respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(3) 
(barring illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (barring conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (barring 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6) (barring conduct 
that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law), 9-102(B)(1) 
(requiring prompt notification that an attorney has received a client’s funds), 9-
102(B)(4) (requiring prompt payment of the client’s funds or other property in the 
lawyer’s possession), 9-102(A) (requiring lawyers to maintain client funds in a 
separate, identifiable bank account), and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring attorneys 
to cooperate with and assist in any disciplinary investigation). 
Sanction 
{¶ 12} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the board 
considered the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules 
and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  As 
aggravating factors, the board found that respondent had acted with a dishonest 
and selfish motive by twice forging his client’s signature and by retaining client 
funds for his own use for more than two years.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b).  
The board also found that respondent had not cooperated in the disciplinary 
process, had been evasive and had given false statements during the disciplinary 
process, had refused to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his actions, and had 
caused harm to a vulnerable former client.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(e), (f), (g), 
and (h). 
January Term, 2005 
5 
{¶ 13} On the mitigating side of the equation, the board cited respondent’s 
lack of any prior disciplinary record and his payment of full restitution to 
Huffman.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a). 
{¶ 14} Relator recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred, 
but the panel and the board instead recommended that respondent’s license to 
practice law be indefinitely suspended. 
{¶ 15} We agree that respondent violated all of the provisions explained 
above, and we also agree that an indefinite suspension is appropriate.  To be sure, 
we have disbarred some attorneys who – like respondent – misappropriated client 
funds.  See, e.g., Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Belock (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 98, 694 
N.E.2d 897 (attorney misappropriated funds from three clients and was convicted 
on federal criminal charges); Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Churilla (1997), 78 
Ohio St.3d 348, 350, 678 N.E.2d 515 (attorney engaged in a “continued pattern of 
stealing from clients”).  In this case, however, the respondent has no prior 
disciplinary record, he has made complete restitution to the one client he harmed, 
and he has indicated that he no longer practices law and indeed would like to 
resign from the Ohio bar.  He also has not been charged with or convicted of any 
criminal offenses.  In similar cases, we have imposed an indefinite suspension.  
See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Nagorny, 105 Ohio St.3d 97, 2004-Ohio-6899, 
822 N.E.2d 1233, ¶ 15 (noting several mitigating factors, including the attorney’s 
payment of restitution); Columbus Bar Assn. v. Hamilton (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 
330, 332, 725 N.E.2d 1116 (mitigating factors included the payment of restitution 
and the absence of any continuing pattern of misconduct). 
{¶ 16} Accordingly, respondent is hereby indefinitely suspended from the 
practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, 
JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
O’CONNOR and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent and would permanently disbar 
respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Michael M. Hughes and Michael M. Hughes Jr., for relator. 
 
Vladimir M. Rus, pro se. 
______________________