Case Title: State ex rel. R.W. Sidley, Inc. v. Crawford

Citation: 2003-Ohio-5101

Docket Number: 20030528

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. R.W. Sidley, Inc. v. Crawford, 100 Ohio St.3d 113, 2003-Ohio-5101.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. R.W. SIDLEY, INC., APPELLANT, v. CRAWFORD, JUDGE, ET 
AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. R.W. Sidley, Inc. v. Crawford, 100 Ohio St.3d 113, 2003-
Ohio-5101.] 
Prohibition — Writ sought preventing common pleas court judge from staying 
the execution of a confirmed arbitration award — Procedendo — Writ 
sought directing common pleas court judge to proceed to judgment and 
execution of his decision confirming the arbitration award — Mandamus 
— Writ sought compelling common pleas clerk of courts to journalize the 
decision confirming the arbitration award as an executable judgment — 
Court of appeals’ denial of writs of procedendo and prohibition 
reversed. 
(No. 2003-0528 — Submitted August 26, 2003 — Decided October 15, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 
No. 02AP-99, 2003-Ohio-625. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellee 
Corna/Kokosing 
Construction 
Company 
(“Corna/ 
Kokosing”) and Columbus State Community College (“Columbus State”) entered 
into a contract under which Corna/Kokosing agreed to serve as the general 
contractor on a construction project to build a parking garage for Columbus State.  
On March 18, 1997, Corna/Kokosing entered into a subcontract with appellant, 
R.W. Sidley, Inc. (“Sidley”), in which Sidley agreed to design, make, and install 
structural precast concrete for the Columbus State parking garage.  The 
subcontract required that Sidley’s work be completed by October 1997. 
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{¶2} 
Sidley did not complete its work until December 1997, and the 
products it provided were substandard. Despite these problems, Columbus State 
issued a certificate of substantial completion to Corna/Kokosing and accepted 
occupancy of the garage in January 1998.  Columbus State attached to the 
certificate a list of work that had not been completed, which included Sidley’s 
unfinished remedial work. 
{¶3} 
On February 7, 2000, after Corna/Kokosing and Sidley failed to 
resolve a dispute concerning Sidley’s compensation, Sidley filed a complaint in 
the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas seeking recovery from 
Corna/Kokosing under the subcontract and for additional work.  Corna/Kokosing 
demanded arbitration under the subcontract, and the common pleas court stayed 
Sidley’s case pending arbitration of the dispute.  The parties subsequently 
stipulated to the dismissal of Sidley’s case. 
{¶4} 
On September 10, 2001, an arbitration panel awarded Sidley 
$339,655 on its claim against Corna/Kokosing.  The panel determined that it 
lacked jurisdiction to determine Corna/Kokosing’s claim that Sidley owed it 
$740,000, i.e., $150,000 for repairs needed because of Sidley’s poor work and 
$590,000 for anticipated extraordinary future maintenance expenses caused by 
Sidley’s deficient work: 
{¶5} 
“[T]he panel finds that it is without jurisdiction to consider this 
element of [Corna/Kokosing’s] claim and expressly declines to do so, reserving 
the same for future determination by a court or other tribunal having jurisdiction 
over the subject matter and the real parties in interest.” 
{¶6} 
On September 14, 2001, Corna/Kokosing filed a complaint in the 
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.  In the complaint, Corna/Kokosing 
sought a declaratory judgment that Sidley was required to pay for currently 
needed repairs and extraordinary future maintenance, the issue that was not 
decided by the arbitrators.  On the same date and in the same case, 
January Term, 2003 
3 
Corna/Kokosing moved to vacate the arbitration award under R.C. 2711.10(D) or, 
in the alternative, stay execution of the award.  On November 8, 2001, Sidley 
applied for an order in the common pleas court case to confirm the arbitration 
award. 
{¶7} 
On November 21, 2001, appellee Judge Dale A. Crawford of the 
common pleas court issued a decision confirming the arbitration order, denying  
Corna/Kokosing’s motion to vacate the arbitration award, and granting 
Corna/Kokosing’s alternative motion to stay the execution of the arbitration 
award.  In so holding, Judge Crawford reasoned that Corna/Kokosing’s claim for 
repairs and future damages was appropriate for the court to determine and 
expressly stated that the court would not journalize the arbitration award until 
after the case had been terminated and the stay had been lifted: 
{¶8} 
“The Court finds that the arbitration panel was proper in refusing 
to consider Plaintiff’s claim for future maintenance and repairs.  However, this 
does not preclude this Court from resolving Plaintiff’s mandatory claim for future 
damages and repairs if such a claim is appropriately brought before this Court.  
Consequently, the Court will stay the execution of the arbitration award until the 
termination of this case, at which time the stay may be lifted.  Furthermore, the 
Court confirms the arbitration award, but will not journalize the arbitration 
award until the termination of this case and after the stay has been lifted.”  
(Emphasis added.)   
{¶9} 
On February 8, 2002, Judge Crawford denied Sidley’s motions to 
lift the stay of execution of the arbitration award and for judgment on the 
pleadings.  Judge Crawford relied on Civ.R. 62(E) and 54(B) to justify his stay of 
execution of the arbitration award. 
{¶10} In January 2002, Sidley filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County, naming appellees, Judge Crawford, Franklin County Court 
of Common Pleas Clerk of Courts John O’Grady, and Corna/Kokosing, as 
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respondents.  Sidley requested a writ of prohibition preventing Judge Crawford 
from staying the execution of the confirmed arbitration award, a writ of 
procedendo directing Judge Crawford to proceed to judgment and execution on 
his decision confirming the arbitration award, and a writ of mandamus to compel 
O’Grady to journalize the decision confirming the arbitration award as an 
executable judgment. 
{¶11} The parties filed stipulated evidence and briefs, and in July 2002, a 
magistrate recommended denying the writs requested by Sidley.  The magistrate 
concluded that Judge Crawford was authorized by Civ.R. 54(B) and 62(E) to stay 
execution of the arbitration award until the resolution of Corna/Kokosing’s claim 
for future maintenance and repairs. 
{¶12} In February 2003, the court of appeals overruled Sidley’s 
objections to the magistrate’s decision and denied the writs.  The court of appeals 
questioned the magistrate’s conclusion that Civ.R. 54(B) and 62(E) authorized 
Judge Crawford’s stay of the confirmed arbitration award because it appeared that 
Judge Crawford had never entered a final judgment on the arbitration award. The 
court of appeals agreed, however, with the magistrate’s  recommendation to deny 
the writs: 
{¶13} “We 
nonetheless 
agree 
with 
the 
magistrate’s 
ultimate 
recommendation that this court should deny relator’s petition for the writs of 
prohibition, procedendo and mandamus.  Specifically, if respondent Judge 
Crawford entered a judgment on the confirmed arbitration award, then Civ.R. 
62(E) in conjunction with Civ.R. 54(B) would allow the trial court to stay the 
arbitration award.  If respondent Judge Crawford did not enter a judgment on the 
arbitration award, relator has presented no authority requiring him to enter a final 
judgment, especially when the pending matters are so closely related to the 
matters addressed in the arbitration.” 
{¶14} This cause is now before the court upon Sidley’s appeal as of right. 
January Term, 2003 
5 
Procedendo and Prohibition:  R.C. 2711.09 and 2711.12 
{¶15} Sidley initially asserts that the court of appeals erred by not 
granting writs of procedendo and prohibition to compel Judge Crawford to enter 
judgment confirming the arbitration award and to prevent him from staying 
journalization of the confirmation. 
{¶16} “A writ of procedendo is appropriate when a court has either 
refused to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to 
judgment.”  State ex rel. Weiss v. Hoover (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 530, 532, 705 
N.E.2d 1227.  “Consequently, a writ of procedendo will issue to require a court to 
proceed to final judgment if the court has erroneously stayed the proceeding.”  
State ex rel. Watkins v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 532, 
535, 696 N.E.2d 1079. 
{¶17} Moreover, “[i]f a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition will issue to prevent the future 
unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of previous 
jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.”  State ex rel. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health 
v. Nadel, 98 Ohio St.3d 405, 2003-Ohio-1632, 786 N.E.2d 49, ¶ 19. 
{¶18} Under R.C. 2711.09 and 2711.12, once a court confirms an 
arbitration award, it must enter judgment.  R.C. 2711.09 provides: 
{¶19} “At any time within one year after an award in an arbitration 
proceeding is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to the court of 
common pleas for an order confirming the award.  Thereupon the court shall 
grant such an order and enter judgment thereon, unless the award is vacated, 
modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 2711.10 and 2711.11 of the 
Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.) 
{¶20} R.C. 2711.12 provides: 
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{¶21} “Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying, correcting, 
or vacating an award made in an arbitration proceeding, the court must enter 
judgment in conformity therewith.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶22} A court has no discretion under R.C. 2711.09 and 2711.12 when 
the arbitration award is not vacated, modified, or corrected.  Carden v. Miami 
Hardware & Appliance Co., Inc. (1996), 113 Ohio App.3d 220, 223, 680 N.E.2d 
717; Woods v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc. (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 389, 391, 
666 N.E.2d 283.  Once an arbitration is completed, a court has no jurisdiction 
except to confirm and enter judgment (R.C. 2711.09 and 2711.12), vacate (R.C. 
2711.10 and 2711.13), modify (R.C. 2711.11 and 2711.13), correct (R.C. 2711.11 
and 2711.13), or enforce the judgment (R.C. 2711.14).  See, generally, Weaver 
Workshop & Support Assn. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & 
Developmental Disabilities (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 560, 561, 594 N.E.2d 1093; 
Colegrove v. Handler (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 142, 146, 517 N.E.2d 979; 
Lockhart v. Am. Res. Ins. Co.  (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 99, 101, 2 OBR 112, 440 
N.E.2d 1210. 
{¶23} Based on R.C. 2711.09 and 2711.12 and applicable precedent, 
once Judge Crawford confirmed Sidley’s arbitration award, he had a manifest 
duty to enter judgment thereon.  As the court of appeals observed, however, he 
failed to enter judgment.  See Civ.R. 58(A) (“A judgment is effective only when 
entered by the clerk upon the journal”); Cleveland v. Trzebuckowski (1999), 85 
Ohio St.3d 524, 526, 709 N.E.2d 1148 (“a conclusion or statement of judgment 
must be journalized formally to become a final appealable order”).  In the absence 
of a judgment and an express determination under Civ.R. 54(B) of no just reason 
for delay, Judge Crawford could not stay journalization of the judgment pursuant 
to Civ.R. 62(E). 
{¶24} Therefore, because Judge Crawford refused to enter a judgment 
when he had a clear legal duty to do so and because he patently and 
January Term, 2003 
7 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to stay journalization of the judgment, the 
court of appeals erred in denying writs of procedendo and prohibition to compel 
him to enter judgment confirming the arbitration award and to prevent him from 
staying the journalization  of the judgment. 
Prohibition to Prevent Staying Execution of Judgment 
{¶25} Sidley next asserts that once Judge Crawford enters judgment 
confirming the arbitration award, it would be entitled to a writ of prohibition to 
prevent the judge from staying execution of the judgment pending the resolution 
of the remaining claims in the underlying case. 
{¶26} Sidley’s assertion lacks merit.  Once judgment is entered 
confirming the arbitration award and Judge Crawford makes an express 
determination of no just cause for delay, Civ.R. 62(E) confers discretion on him to 
stay enforcement of the judgment pending resolution of Corna/Kokosing’s 
declaratory-judgment and other claims in the same case: 
{¶27} “When a court has ordered a final judgment under the conditions 
stated in Civ.R. 54(B), the court may stay enforcement of that judgment until the 
entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe such 
conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the party in whose 
favor the judgment is entered.” 
{¶28} This rule “allow[s] a judge to issue execution or to stay execution 
of judgment that has been rendered final through Civ.R. 54(B).”  State ex rel. 
Myocare Nursing Home, Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (2001), 
145 Ohio App.3d 22, 26, 761 N.E.2d 1072. 
{¶29} The statutes and cases cited by Sidley do not require a contrary 
result.  R.C. 2711.14 specifies that the judgment entered in a proceeding 
confirming, modifying, correcting, or vacating an arbitration award “shall have in 
all respects the same effect as, and be subject to all laws relating to, a judgment in 
an action.”  (Emphasis added.)  One of those laws is Civ.R. 62(E). 
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{¶30} Therefore, Judge Crawford does not patently and unambiguously 
lack jurisdiction to stay execution of a judgment confirming the arbitration award.  
Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, the court can determine its 
own jurisdiction, and Sidley has an adequate legal remedy by appeal to raise its 
jurisdictional claim.  State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 99 Ohio St.3d 97, 2003-Ohio-
2476, 789 N.E.2d 195, ¶19. 
Prohibition and Mandamus:  Corna/Kokosing’s Claims 
{¶31} In its final argument, Sidley claims that the court of appeals erred 
by denying writs of prohibition and mandamus to prevent Judge Crawford from 
exercising jurisdiction over Corna/Kokosing’s declaratory-judgment action. 
{¶32} Sidley, however, waived these claims by failing to plead them in 
its complaint, amend its complaint to include them, or try them with the consent 
of the other parties.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Taxpayers Coalition v. Lakewood 
(1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 385, 391, 715 N.E.2d 179; State ex rel. BSW Dev. Group v. 
Dayton (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 344, 699 N.E.2d 1271. 
{¶33} Moreover, Judge Crawford did not patently and unambiguously 
lack jurisdiction over Corna/Kokosing’s claims, since the arbitration panel 
determined that these claims were not subject to arbitration and had to be resolved 
by a court. 
Conclusion 
{¶34} The court of appeals erred in denying Sidley’s request for writs of 
procedendo and prohibition insofar as Judge Crawford should enter judgment on 
the confirmed arbitration award and not stay journalization of the judgment.  In all 
other respects, the court of appeals correctly denied the writs. 
{¶35} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals denying 
writs of procedendo and prohibition to compel Judge Crawford to enter judgment 
on the confirmed arbitration award and to prevent him from staying the 
January Term, 2003 
9 
journalization of the judgment.  We affirm the remainder of the judgment of the 
court of appeals and remand the cause. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
McDonald Hopkins Co., L.P.A., Jerome W. Cook and Glenn D. 
Southworth, for appellant. 
 
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., John P. Gilligan and Kevin L. 
Murch, for appellee Corna/Kokosing Construction Company. 
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