Case Title: State v. Campbell

Citation: 2022-Ohio-3626

Docket Number: 2020-1187

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Campbell, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3626.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3626 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. CAMPBELL, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Campbell, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3626.] 
Criminal law—Fourth Amendment—R.C. 2951.02(A)—Exclusionary rule—
Community-control conditions—Probation officer’s suspicionless search of 
probationer’s cell phone did not violate Fourth Amendment when 
probationer had consented to warrantless searches of his property as a 
condition of his community control—Probation officer’s suspicionless 
search did violate statute requiring probation officers to have reasonable 
grounds that probationer was violating the law or conditions of community 
control before conducting search—Incriminating evidence collected from 
cell phone not subject to exclusionary rule when search violated statute but 
not Fourth Amendment—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed. 
(No. 2020-1187—Submitted October 26, 2021—Decided October 13, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Fairfield County, 
No. 2019 CA 00055, 2020-Ohio-4119. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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_________________ 
 
DEWINE, J. 
{¶ 1} A probation officer conducted a random home-check on an individual 
subject to community control, searched his cell phone, and discovered child 
pornography.  We are called on to answer one, and possibly two, questions.  First, 
was the probation officer’s search lawful?  Second, if it was not, does the 
exclusionary rule apply to prohibit the use of the evidence from the search in a 
criminal prosecution?   
{¶ 2} Central to our inquiry are several sources of legal authority.  We begin 
with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.  
We also must consider an Ohio statute, R.C. 2951.02(A), which authorizes a 
probation officer to search a probationer if there are “reasonable grounds to 
believe” that the probationer is violating the law or the terms of his community 
control.  Finally, the probationer signed terms and conditions of probation at the 
start of his community-control period, by which he consented to “searches of my 
person, my property, my vehicle, and my residence at any time without a warrant.” 
{¶ 3} So how does all this play out?  We conclude that there was no 
violation of the Fourth Amendment: under established caselaw, probationers who 
sign a consent-to-search agreement as a condition of community control may be 
subjected to random searches.  But there was a violation of the Ohio statute—the 
officer had no “reasonable grounds” to believe that the probationer was violating 
the law or the terms of his community control.  The consent provision doesn’t help 
the state here—we conclude that regardless of the consent condition, the probation 
officer’s authority to conduct the search was limited by the statute.  Nonetheless, 
there is no basis to exclude the evidence that was discovered in the search.  The 
exclusionary rule applies to constitutional violations, not statutory ones. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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{¶ 4} In the proceeding below, the court of appeals determined that the 
evidence should have been suppressed based on the statutory violation.  We reverse 
its judgment. 
I. After his early release from prison, Daniel Campbell is randomly searched 
by his probation officer 
{¶ 5} Daniel Campbell was sentenced to prison for robbery.  Prior to 
completing his prison term, he was granted judicial release and ordered to serve 
community control for the remainder of his sentence.  As a condition of his release, 
Campbell was required to agree to terms and conditions of community control.  
Among other things, Campbell agreed as follows: “I consent to searches of my 
person, my property, my vehicle, and my residence at any time without a warrant.  
I understand this includes common areas and areas that are exclusive to me.” 
{¶ 6} Relying on this consent-to-search provision, Campbell’s probation 
officer conducted a random search of his home.  The officer did not suspect that 
Campbell had violated the conditions of community control or any other laws.  
Rather, she was training new probation officers and planned to reduce Campbell’s 
level of supervision if all went well with the search.  But during the search of his 
home, the officer discovered Campbell’s cell phone and decided to go through its 
contents.  It contained child pornography.  This discovery led to the seizure of 
numerous other electronic devices, and ultimately, to Campbell being charged with 
nine felony offenses. 
{¶ 7} Campbell moved to suppress the evidence that was uncovered, 
arguing that the suspicionless search violated the Fourth Amendment.  The trial 
court denied the motion, concluding that the search was constitutional because 
Campbell had consented when he agreed to warrantless searches of his property as 
a condition of his community control.  The court further held that even if the search 
had violated the Fourth Amendment, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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rule would apply.  After his suppression motion was denied, Campbell entered a 
no-contest plea to eight felony charges and the trial court imposed a prison term. 
{¶ 8} The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of 
Campbell’s motion to suppress.  It agreed that there was no constitutional violation 
but held that the search violated R.C. 2951.02(A)’s requirement that a probation 
officer may conduct a search only when there are “reasonable grounds to believe” 
that a probationer is in violation of the law or the conditions of community control.  
2020-Ohio-4119, 157 N.E.3d 373, ¶ 25-28, 46.  The court of appeals further 
concluded that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply.  Id. 
at ¶ 50.  We accepted jurisdiction over the state’s discretionary appeal. 
II. Analysis 
A. There was no Fourth Amendment Violation 
{¶ 9} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”  Accord 
Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14.1  In determining whether a search is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has 
applied an approach that assesses “ ‘on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes 
upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for 
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ”  Samson v. California, 547 
U.S. 843, 848, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006), quoting United States v. 
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). 
{¶ 10} In Samson, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a 
suspicionless search of a parolee did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 857.  
A California statute required parolees to consent to searches “ ‘with or without 
cause’ ” as a condition of their parole.  Id. at 846, quoting former Cal.Penal Code 
 
1.  Campbell has not developed an argument under Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, 
and thus we have no occasion to consider that provision’s application under the facts of this case. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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3067.  An officer conducted a suspicionless search of a parolee and found narcotics.  
Id. at 846-847.  Balancing the privacy interests of the parolee against the state’s 
substantial penological interest in supervising parolees, the court concluded that the 
suspicionless search was constitutional.  Id. at 852-853, 857. 
{¶ 11} This court had reached the same conclusion in State v. Benton, 82 
Ohio St.3d 316, 317, 695 N.E.2d 757 (1998), a case decided almost a decade before 
Samson.  There, we held that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit “a random 
search of the residence of a parolee who, as a condition of parole, consented to 
warrantless searches by parole officers at any time.”  Id. at 317. 
{¶ 12} Although Samson and Benton involved searches of parolees, “there 
is no material difference between probationers and parolees in the context of 
constitutional guarantees.”  Benton at 319, fn. 1, citing State v. Roberts, 32 Ohio 
St.3d 225, 229, 513 N.E.2d 720 (1987).  As we have explained, “An individual 
sentenced to probation—or community control—does not possess the absolute 
liberty enjoyed by the general population, but rather finds his liberty dependent 
upon the conditions and restrictions of his probation.”  State v. Chapman, 163 Ohio 
St.3d 290, 2020-Ohio-6730, 170 N.E.3d 6, ¶ 12.  Thus, we have little difficulty 
finding that there is no Fourth Amendment violation when a probation officer 
conducts a suspicionless search pursuant to a consent-to-search provision agreed to 
as a condition of community control. 
{¶ 13} Campbell contends that the consent-to-search provision that he 
signed does not encompass his cell phone.  We disagree.  He consented to “searches 
of my person, my property, my vehicle, and my residence at any time without a 
warrant.” Plainly, Campbell’s “property” encompasses his cell phone. 
{¶ 14} In arguing that the search violated the Fourth Amendment, Campbell 
relies on United States v. Fletcher, a case in which the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals applied the Fourth Amendment balancing approach and concluded that a 
search of a probationer’s cell phone was unreasonable.  978 F.3d 1009, 1019 (6th 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Cir.2020).  But that case is different from ours.  There, the consent-to-search 
condition of supervision covered the probationer’s “person,” “motor vehicle,” and 
“residence,” but it made no mention of other property.  Id.  Central to the court’s 
analysis was the fact that the consent agreement did not “clearly or unambiguously” 
extend to a search of the probationer’s cell phone.  Id.  In contrast, Campbell 
explicitly consented to a search of his property, something that inarguably 
encompasses his cell phone.  Thus, by virtue of his status as a probationer, including 
the plain terms of the consent-to-search form, Campbell “did not have an 
expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate,” Samson, 547 
U.S. at 852, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250; see also United States v. Tessier, 
814 F.3d 432, 433, 435 (6th Cir.2016) (upholding suspicionless search of the 
computer of a probationer who had consented to searches of his “person, vehicle, 
property, or place of residence” as a condition of probation). 
B. There was a violation of R.C. 2951.02(A) 
{¶ 15} The constitutional inquiry is not the end of the matter.  We also must 
grapple with R.C. 2951.02(A), which provides:  
 
[D]uring the period of a felony offender’s nonresidential sanction, 
authorized probation officers who are engaged within the scope of 
their supervisory duties or responsibilities may search, with or 
without a warrant, the person of the offender, the place of residence 
of the offender, and a motor vehicle, another item of tangible or 
intangible personal property, or other real property in which the 
offender has a right, title, or interest * * * if the probation officers 
have reasonable grounds to believe that the offender is not abiding 
by the law or otherwise is not complying with the conditions of  
* * * the felony offender’s nonresidential sanction. 
 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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{¶ 16} Because probation officers are statutory creations, see R.C. 2301.27, 
they “have no more authority than that conferred upon them by statute, or what is 
clearly implied therefrom.”  Hall v. Lakeview Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 63 
Ohio St.3d 380, 383, 588 N.E.2d 785 (1992).  R.C. 2951.02(A) authorizes 
warrantless searches of probationers, so long as the probation officer has 
“reasonable grounds” to believe that the probationer is violating the law or 
conditions of community control.  Because Campbell’s probation officer lacked the 
necessary reasonable grounds to search Campbell’s cell phone, her search was not 
authorized by R.C. 2951.02(A). 
{¶ 17} The question then becomes, may the state, by requiring a probationer 
to enter into a consent-to-search agreement as a condition of community control, 
authorize probation officers to conduct searches in situations beyond those 
described in R.C. 2951.02(A)?  We think not.  In enacting R.C. 2951.02(A), the 
legislature specifically defined the level of suspicion (“reasonable grounds”) 
required to authorize a probation officer to search a probationer.  Implicit in this 
authorization was the denial of authority to search a probationer without reasonable 
grounds.  If that were not so, and probation officers were nonetheless authorized to 
conduct searches without reasonable grounds for doing so, then R.C. 2951.02(A) 
would be nothing more than advice. 
{¶ 18} It does not matter that Campbell had been required to consent to the 
search as a condition of his community control, because the probation officer was 
still constrained by the statutory limits of her authority.  Consent and authority are 
not the same.  If Campbell had given his consent for the probation officer to take 
his wallet, he might then expect his wallet to be taken, but that would not mean that 
the probation officer was authorized to take it.  So too here.  Campbell’s consent to 
random searches as a condition of his community-control sanctions limited his 
legitimate expectation of privacy but did not grant the probation officer additional 
authority. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 19} When the probation officer searched Campbell’s cell phone without 
reasonable grounds to believe that he had violated the law or the conditions of 
probation, she exceeded the scope of her authority. 
C. Should the evidence be excluded? 
{¶ 20} There remains one final question: whether excluding the evidence 
obtained through the cell-phone search is an appropriate remedy for this statutory 
violation.  Applying established precedent, we find that excluding the evidence is 
not appropriate. 
{¶ 21} Because this case does not involve a Fourth Amendment violation, 
the exclusionary rule associated with the Fourth Amendment does not apply.  As 
the United States Supreme Court explained in Virginia v. Moore, “it is not the 
province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law,” and thus, the Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not apply when there has been no 
constitutional violation.  553 U.S. 164, 178, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 
(2008). 
{¶ 22} Similarly, this court has long held that the exclusionary rule applies 
“to violations of a constitutional nature only.”  Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 
232, 234, 416 N.E.2d 598 (1980).  Accord State v. Emerson, 134 Ohio St.3d 191, 
2012-Ohio-5047, 981 N.E.2d 787, ¶ 32; State v. Jones, 121 Ohio St.3d 103, 2009-
Ohio-316, 902 N.E.2d 464, ¶ 21; State v. Myers, 26 Ohio St.2d 190, 196-197, 271 
N.E.2d 245 (1971).  Thus, we will not apply the exclusionary rule “to statutory 
violations falling short of constitutional violations, absent a legislative mandate 
requiring the application of the exclusionary rule.”  Kettering at 234; see also State 
v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446, 449, 650 N.E.2d 887 (1995).  A plain reading of R.C. 
2951.02(A) reveals no such legislative mandate to impose an exclusionary remedy 
for a violation of the statute’s reasonable-grounds requirement.  Compare R.C. 
2933.63(A) (authorizing, among other things, the suppression of evidence derived 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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from an unlawful wiretap).  Absent such a legislative mandate, this court is without 
authority to write an exclusionary remedy into the statute. 
{¶ 23} Because there is no basis in either the statute or the United States 
Constitution to apply the exclusionary rule to violations of R.C. 2951.02(A), the 
court of appeals erred by concluding that Campbell’s motion to suppress should 
have been granted and reversing the contrary decision of the trial court.  Our 
conclusion that the exclusionary rule does not apply makes it unnecessary to 
address whether the probation officer’s search would have fallen under the good-
faith exception to that rule. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 24} There was no constitutional violation in this case—only a statutory 
one.  The Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the suspicionless search of 
Campbell’s cell phone.  Because we are confronted with a statutory violation only, 
there is no basis to exclude the evidence obtained as a result of the search.  We 
reverse the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals and reinstate Campbell’s 
conviction. 
 Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. 
BRUNNER, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 
STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
 
BRUNNER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 25} Based on existing precedent and appellee Daniel Campbell’s not 
challenging or distinguishing that precedent, I agree with the majority that the trial 
court ruled consistently with the applicable law when it refused to suppress the 
fruits of the search of Campbell’s residence and cellular phones.  However, insofar 
as the majority finds a violation of R.C. 2951.02(A), relating to a probation officer’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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authorization to search an offender, I would not find that the statute applied in 
Campbell’s situation. 
{¶ 26} Campbell executed a blanket consent related to community-control 
supervision after judicial release.  This written consent included a provision that 
said, “I consent to searches of my person, my property, my vehicle, and my 
residence at any time without a warrant.”  Though cellular phones are private 
property requiring a warrant to search in most circumstances, see Riley v. 
California, 573 U.S. 373, 401, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 439 (2014), they are 
nevertheless “property,” and a warrant is not needed when consent is given.  See 
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228-229, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 
(1973).  Here, Campbell consented in writing to warrantless searches of his 
“property,” and he thus consented to the search of his cellular phone.  And though 
R.C. 2951.02(A) permits probation officers to search the homes, automobiles, 
personal property, and the person of offenders under community-control 
supervision “with or without a warrant” if the officers “have reasonable grounds” 
to believe the offender is violating the law or conditions of his community control, 
no part of R.C. 2951.02 suggests that officers may not also search based on consent 
if consent has been given by the offender. 
{¶ 27} While “consent” may be questionable when a prison inmate who is 
granted judicial release faces a choice between providing blanket consent to 
warrantless searches at any time or most likely returning to prison if he does not 
give his consent, the language Campbell signed was that he consented.  Both this 
court and the United States Supreme Court seem to have accepted the 
constitutionality of this Fourth Amendment tradeoff for community supervision, 
and Campbell has not asked us to distinguish his case from that precedent or to 
overrule it, see Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 
L.Ed.2d 250 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S.Ct. 587, 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
11 
151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001); State v. Benton, 82 Ohio St.3d 316, 321, 695 N.E.2d 757 
(1998); nor has he asked that we hold that the circumstances of his consent violate 
the Ohio Constitution, see Article I, Section 14, Ohio Constitution.  For these 
reasons, despite my concerns about the manner and circumstances by which 
Campbell’s consent was obtained, I concur in the judgment of the majority. 
_________________ 
STEWART, dissenting. 
{¶ 28} I agree with the majority opinion that there was a violation of R.C. 
2951.02(A) when a probation officer conducted a suspicionless search of appellee 
Daniel Campbell’s home and property.  I likewise agree that the exclusionary rule 
does not apply to bar evidence obtained as the result of a search that violated R.C. 
2951.02(A).  Nonetheless, the evidence in this case should have been excluded 
because Campbell’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the probation 
officer searched his cell phone.  Because the majority opinion finds otherwise, I 
dissent. 
{¶ 29} The majority concludes that there is no violation of the Fourth 
Amendment when a probation officer conducts a suspicionless search of a 
probationer’s cell phone pursuant to a consent-to-search provision agreed to as a 
condition of the person’s community control.  I would reach the same conclusion 
if the consent-to-search provision contained language that clearly and 
unambiguously applied to the search of a cell phone.  But the consent-to-search 
provision here did not clearly and unambiguously apply to Campbell’s cell phone. 
{¶ 30} The majority points to the fact that Campbell signed a form that 
outlined the terms and conditions of his community control, which included 
Campbell’s consent to search his “property * * * at any time without a warrant.”  
The majority states, “Plainly, Campbell’s ‘property’ encompasses his cell phone.”  
(Emphasis sic.) Majority opinion, ¶ 13.  And it bases its decision solely on its 
interpretation of the word “property.”  Although not entirely unreasonable, in the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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context of this case, the majority’s reliance on this broad interpretation and basic 
understanding of the word “property” is misplaced.  This is because the law has 
routinely treated searches of cell phones differently than searches of personal 
property in general. 
{¶ 31} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” See also Article I, Section 14, Ohio 
Constitution.  “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the 
reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree 
to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’ ”  United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-119, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001), 
quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 
408 (1999).  Courts “ ‘examin[e] the totality of the circumstances’ to determine 
whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”  
(Brackets sic.)  Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 
L.Ed.2d 250 (2006), quoting Knights at 118. 
{¶ 32} Consent-to-search provisions that are included as part of probation 
conditions are valid if they are clear and unambiguous.  See Knights at 119-120 
(probationer’s reasonable expectation of privacy was “significantly diminished” 
when the “probation order clearly expressed the search condition” and probationer 
“was unambiguously informed” of that condition).  If the consent-to-search 
condition is clear and unambiguous, then the person does not “have an expectation 
of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.”  Samson at 852. 
{¶ 33} Regarding the consent-to-search provision here, the majority 
observes that Campbell consented to “searches of [his] person, [his] property, [his] 
vehicle, and [his] residence at any time without a warrant,” and thus “Campbell’s 
‘property’ ” “[p]lainly” and “inarguably” encompassed his cell phone, so there was 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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no Fourth Amendment violation.  (Emphasis sic.)  Majority opinion at ¶ 13, 14.  
However, because courts recognize that searching the contents of a cell phone is 
different from searching other property, the issue is not as plain or clear as the 
majority views it.  Due to the unique nature of a cell phone, Campbell’s generic 
consent to a search of his “property” did not clearly and unambiguously include an 
agreement to allow the search of the contents of his cell phone.  Without such a 
clear consent-to-search condition, Campbell still retained an expectation of privacy 
in the contents of his cell phone that society recognizes as legitimate. 
{¶ 34} In State v. Smith, this court described the “unique nature” of cell 
phones “as multifunctional tools” that “defy easy categorization.”  124 Ohio St.3d 
163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949, ¶ 22.  We explained that cell phones “have 
the ability to transmit large amounts of data in various forms, likening them to 
laptop computers, which are entitled to a higher expectation of privacy.”  Id.  We 
then held that “because a person has a high expectation of privacy in a cell phone’s 
contents, police must then obtain a warrant before intruding into the phone’s 
contents.”  Id. at 23. 
{¶ 35} In Riley v. California, the United States Supreme Court unanimously 
held that with respect to “data on cell phones,” police “must generally secure a 
warrant before conducting a search” incident to a lawful arrest.  573 U.S. 373, 386, 
134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014).  The Riley court stated that modern cell 
phones “are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial 
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human 
anatomy.”  Id. at 385.  The court explained that it “generally determine[s] whether 
to exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on 
the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on 
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests.’ ”  Id., quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 
143 L.Ed.2d 408. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 36} In Riley, the court discussed United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 
218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), which held that an officer’s search 
of a suspect incident to a lawful arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  But 
the court explained, “The fact that an arrestee has diminished privacy interests does 
not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely.”  Riley at 392.  
“To the contrary, when ‘privacy-related concerns are weighty enough’ a ‘search 
may require a warrant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy of 
the arrestee.’ ”  Id., quoting Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 463, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 
186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013).  The court compared searches incident to an arrest with 
warrantless searches of cell phones, stating: 
 
[W]hile Robinson’s categorical rule strikes the appropriate balance 
in the context of physical objects, neither of its rationales has much 
force with respect to digital content on cell phones.  On the 
government interest side, Robinson concluded that the two risks 
identified in Chimel [v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 
L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)]—harm to officers and destruction of 
evidence—are present in all custodial arrests.  There are no 
comparable risks when the search is of digital data.  In addition, 
Robinson regarded any privacy interests retained by an individual 
after arrest as significantly diminished by the fact of the arrest itself.  
Cell phones, however, place vast quantities of personal information 
literally in the hands of individuals.  A search of the information on 
a cell phone bears little resemblance to the type of brief physical 
search considered in Robinson. 
 
Id. at 386. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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{¶ 37} The Riley court went on to describe the unique characteristics of cell 
phones, which of course, are numerous.  The court discussed the storage capacity 
of smart phones, which “translates to millions of pages of text, thousands of 
pictures, or hundreds of videos.”  Id. at 394.  The court further explained: 
 
The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through 
a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and 
descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two * * * 
tucked into a wallet.  * * * [T]he data on a phone can date back to 
the purchase of the phone, or even earlier.  A person might carry in 
his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he would 
not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the 
past several months, as would routinely be kept on a phone. 
 
Id. at 394-395. 
{¶ 38} The Riley court also discussed how cell phones differ from other 
personal items—not only because cell phones contain a vast amount of private 
information—but because of how pervasive they are in society, with more than 90 
percent of American adults owning one.  573 U.S. at 395, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 
L.Ed.2d 430.  Because cell phones are ubiquitous, allowing law-enforcement 
officers to scrutinize the “sensitive personal information” contained within them 
“is quite different from allowing [officers] to search a personal item or two in the 
occasional case.”  Id. 
{¶ 39} Similarly to one who has been arrested, a person who is serving 
probation likewise has diminished privacy interests.  But also relevant is the fact 
that searching the contents of a cell phone bears little to no resemblance to the types 
of general searches contemplated by the boilerplate language of the consent-to-
search condition in this case.  Particularly, as the majority opinion acknowledges, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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the probation officer in this case had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 
conduct a search in the first place. 
{¶ 40} The majority disagrees with Campbell that a recent Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals case, United States v. Fletcher, 978 F.3d 1009 (6th Cir.2020), 
supports Campbell’s argument that the search of his cell phone violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  See majority opinion at ¶ 14.  While Fletcher is not entirely on point, 
it is instructive.  In Fletcher, the defendant had been convicted in an Ohio court of 
importuning a minor and was sentenced to five years of community-control 
sanctions (the federal court improperly referred to it as probation).  Id. at 1013.  
“The terms of [community control] prohibited him from contacting the victim of 
his offense, contacting any minors unsupervised, and possessing any kind of 
pornography.”  Id.  An additional condition provided that Fletcher “ ‘[a]greed to a 
search without warrant of [his] person, [his] motor vehicle or [his] place of 
residence by a Probation Officer at any time.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  Id. 
{¶ 41} “During a routine visit with his probation officer, the officer noticed 
that Fletcher had two phones.”  Id.  The officer searched one of the phones and saw 
child pornography.  He then turned off the phone and contacted a detective, who 
obtained a warrant to search the phone.  The detective then discovered “child 
pornography that had been downloaded from the internet and that had been filmed 
by the phone itself.”  Id.  Fletcher was charged in state court with multiple counts 
of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor.  Fletcher was also charged 
in federal court with conspiracy to produce child pornography and production of 
child pornography.  In Fletcher’s federal case, “[h]e filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence recovered from his cell phone, which the district court denied.”  Id. at 
1014.  The district court found Fletcher guilty of both child-pornography offenses.  
Fletcher appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. 
{¶ 42} The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the 
government’s legitimate interests, “ensuring that Fletcher successfully complete[d] 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
17 
probation and refrain[ed] from engaging in criminal activity,” did not outweigh 
Fletcher’s expectation of privacy.  Id. at 1019.  Although Fletcher had agreed to a 
warrantless search of his person, motor vehicle, and residence as part of his 
community control, the Sixth Circuit explained that “[n]one of these terms clearly 
or unambiguously includes a cell phone.”  Id., citing United States v. Lara, 815 
F.3d 605, 610 (9th Cir.2016).  In Lara, a probationer agreed to a search of, among 
other things, his “property.”  Lara at 607.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that this term did not “clearly or unambiguously encompass[] his cell phone and 
the information contained therein.”  Id. at 610. 
{¶ 43} Here, the majority opinion distinguishes Fletcher from the present 
case because the consent-to-search condition in Fletcher “covered the probationer’s 
‘person,’ ‘motor vehicle,’ and ‘residence,’ but it made no mention of other 
property.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 14, quoting Fletcher, 978 F.3d at 1019.  The 
majority concludes that because “Campbell explicitly consented to a search of his 
property, something that inarguably encompasses his cell phone,” he “ ‘did not 
have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.’ ”  
Majority opinion at ¶ 14, quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 852, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 
L.Ed.2d 250.  The Sixth Circuit, however, did not state anywhere in its opinion that 
Fletcher’s cell phone should be excluded because the consent-to-search condition 
did not include an agreement to search his “property.”  And more importantly, in 
support of its holding, the Sixth Circuit cited to Lara, a case in which the consent-
to-search agreement, like Campbell’s, allowed for a warrantless search of 
“property” in general, which the Lara court determined did not include a cell phone.  
Fletcher at 1018-1019, citing Lara at 610-611. 
{¶ 44} Because courts have recognized the unique nature of cell phones, I 
would conclude that a consent-to-search condition included as part of a person’s 
community-control sanctions must clearly and unambiguously include cell phones 
before a probation officer may search the person’s cell phone without a warrant.  I 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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would therefore conclude that Campbell retained a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the contents of his cell phone and that his Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated when the probation officer searched the phone without first obtaining a 
warrant. 
{¶ 45} I would also conclude that the evidence should have been excluded 
under the exclusionary rule because Campbell’s Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated.  I further agree with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply under these circumstances.  As 
the court explained in Fletcher: 
 
Application of the exclusionary rule here will deter suspicionless 
searches of a probationer’s cell phone post-Riley where the terms of 
a probation agreement do not authorize such a search [of a 
probationer’s cell phone].  Application of the rule would also 
encourage the future inclusion in probation agreements of clear and 
unambiguous terms regarding the distinct category of cell phones. 
 
Id. at 1020.  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 46} I would therefore affirm the Fifth District’s decision reversing the 
trial court’s denial of Campbell’s motion to suppress, albeit for different reasons.  
The search of Campbell’s cell phone was unlawful, and the exclusionary rule 
should bar the admission of the evidence that was the fruit of that unlawful search.  
Further, the evidence from the subsequent search of Campbell’s other electronic 
devices should be excluded because the subsequent search was itself the product of 
the initial unlawful cell-phone search.  Because the majority opinion concludes 
otherwise, I respectfully dissent. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
19 
 
R. Kyle Witt, Fairfield County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christopher A. 
Reamer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Conrad & Wood, L.L.C., and Scott P. Wood, for appellee. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and 
Zachery P. Keller and John Rockenbach, Deputy Solicitors General, urging reversal 
for amicus curiae Attorney General Dave Yost. 
G. Gary Tyack, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, 
Chief Counsel, Appeals Division, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
_________________