Case Title: In re Honorable James Justin (Opinion)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 142076

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2012-01-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED JANUARY 27, 2012 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re Honorable JAMES M. JUSTIN 
Judge, 12th District Court. 
No. 142076 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
YOUNG, C.J.  
 
The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) has recommended that this Court remove 
respondent, 12th District Court Judge James Justin, from office for numerous instances of 
documented judicial misconduct.  Respondent’s multitudinous acts of proved misconduct 
sketch a common theme: respondent failed to follow the law, apparently believing that it 
simply did not apply to him.   
Instances of respondent’s judicial misconduct include “fixing” (personally and 
surreptitiously dismissing) traffic citations issued to himself, his spouse, and his staff; 
preventing the transmission of or altering court information that was legally required to 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
Mary Beth Kelly 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
 
 
 
 
2
have been transmitted to the Secretary of State;1 dismissing cases without conducting 
hearings or involving the prosecutor; failing to follow plea agreements; and making false 
statements under oath during the JTC hearing.   
In this case, respondent’s fixing of traffic tickets issued to himself, his family, and 
staff alone warrants the most severe of sanctions.  However, respondent’s substantiated 
misconduct is much more extensive.  The duration, scope, and sheer number of 
respondent’s substantiated acts of misconduct are without precedent in Michigan judicial 
disciplinary cases.  Respondent’s long-term pattern of judicial misconduct constitutes a 
negation of the proper exercise of judicial authority that more than justifies the sanction 
imposed.  
We order respondent’s removal from office.  Moreover, we order the JTC to 
submit a bill of costs, itemizing what portion of the costs may be attributed to the conduct 
or statements of respondent that give rise to liability for the payment of “costs, fees, and 
expenses incurred by the [JTC] in prosecuting the complaint . . . .”  MCR 9.205(B). 
I 
On November 12, 2010, the JTC filed Formal Complaint No. 87 against Judge 
Justin,2 alleging that he had committed judicial misconduct in violation of Const 1963, art 
                                              
1 Pursuant to MCL 257.732, courts are required to forward an “abstract,” or synopsis, of a 
person’s court record to the Secretary of State for violations of the Michigan Vehicle 
Code, MCL 257.1 et seq., specified statutory violations, and corresponding local 
ordinance violations.  “The failure, refusal, or neglect of a person to comply with” the 
requirements of MCL 257.732 “constitutes misconduct in office and is grounds for 
removal from office.”  MCL 257.732(14). 
2 An amended formal complaint was filed on January 24, 2011.  
 
 
 
3
6, § 30;3 MCR 9.104(1), (2), and (4)4 and MCR 9.205;5 and Canons 1,6 2(A) through 
(C),7 and 3(A)(1),8 (4), and (5)9 of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct.  The 
complaint alleged eight counts of misconduct. 
                                              
3 Const 1963, art 6, § 30(2) states in part: 
   
 
On recommendation of the judicial tenure commission, the supreme 
court may censure, suspend with or without salary, retire or remove a judge 
for . . . misconduct in office . . . or conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.  
 
4 MCR 9.104 states in part:  
 
(A) The following acts or omissions by an attorney, individually or 
in concert with another person, are misconduct and grounds for discipline, 
whether or not occurring in the course of an attorney-client relationship: 
 
(1) conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice; 
 
(2) conduct that exposes the legal profession or the courts to 
obloquy, contempt, censure, or reproach; 
 
*   *   * 
 
(4) conduct that violates the standards or rules of professional 
responsibility adopted by the Supreme Court[.] 
 
5 MCR 9.205 states in part:   
(A) Responsibility of Judge.  A judge is personally responsible for 
the judge’s own behavior and for the proper conduct and administration of 
the court in which the judge presides. 
(B) Grounds for Action.  A judge is subject to censure, suspension 
with or without pay, retirement, or removal for . . . misconduct in office . . . 
or conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice. . . . 
 
(1) Misconduct in office includes, but is not limited to: 
 
(a) persistent incompetence in the performance of judicial duties; 
 
 
 
 
4
                                              
 
(b) persistent neglect in the timely performance of judicial duties; 
 
(c) persistent failure to treat persons fairly and courteously; 
 
(d) treatment of a person unfairly or discourteously because of the 
person’s race, gender, or other protected personal characteristic; 
 
(e) misuse of judicial office for personal advantage or gain, or for the 
advantage or gain of another; and  
 
(f) failure to cooperate with a reasonable request made by the [JTC] 
in its investigation of a judge. 
 
6 Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1 states in part:  
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in 
our society.  A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and 
enforcing, and should personally observe, high standards of conduct so that 
the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.  A judge 
should always be aware that the judicial system is for the benefit of the 
litigant and the public, not the judiciary. 
7 Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2 states in part:  
 
A. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or 
improper conduct by judges.  A judge must avoid all impropriety and 
appearance of impropriety. . . . 
 
B. A judge should respect and observe the law.  At all times, the 
conduct and manner of a judge should promote public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.  Without regard to a person’s 
race, gender, or other protected personal characteristic, a judge should treat 
every person fairly, with courtesy and respect. 
 
C. A judge should not allow family, social, or other relationships to 
influence judicial conduct or judgment.  A judge should not use the prestige 
of office to advance personal business interests or those of others. 
 
 
 
 
5
A.  THE FINDINGS OF THE MASTER 
On November 29, 2010, this Court appointed the Honorable Pamela J. McCabe as 
master to hear the case.  The master’s report, filed on March 24, 2011, concluded that 
seven of the eight counts of judicial misconduct alleged in the amended complaint had 
been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  The allegations and the relevant 
findings of fact are as follows. 
COUNT 1: INAPPROPRIATE DISMISSAL OF CASES 
The first count of the complaint alleged that respondent had dismissed cases and 
inappropriately disposed of cases without holding hearings and without notice to or the 
authorization of the prosecuting attorney.  Perhaps most significant, the master found that 
this count had been proved and included respondent’s admission that he dismissed four 
                                              
8 The alleged violations of Canon 3(A)(1) included, but were expressly not limited to, 
violations of MCL 257.732; MCL 257.328; MCL 257.907; MCL 769.1(f); MCL 769.6; 
MCL 771.1(2); MCL 772.1 et seq.; and MCL 780.621.   
9 Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(A) provides in part: 
 
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional 
competence in it. . . . 
*   *   * 
(4) A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte 
communications, or consider other communications made to the judge 
outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending 
proceeding . . . . 
*   *   * 
(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.  
 
 
 
6
citations issued to himself,10 five citations issued to his wife,11 and citations issued to his 
court officer and court reporter.12  All the tickets had been dismissed “after explanation,” 
but without a hearing or advising the prosecutor.  
Beyond concluding that respondent had fixed tickets for himself, his wife, and his 
staff, the master also concluded that respondent had engaged in a pattern of favoritism 
and “conferred favored status on many who came before him.”  The master’s report cited 
two illustrations of respondent’s pattern of leniency and favoritism.13  The master also 
                                              
10 The master noted that respondent claimed to have a defense to his parking citations: 
that someone else was driving his vehicle.  Moreover, respondent “expressed no regret” 
about fixing his own tickets.  
11 Respondent’s wife had received three speeding tickets, a citation for having defective 
equipment, and a citation for disobeying a stop sign.  The five citations were issued 
between November 2000 and October 2009.     
12 Each staff member had received a citation for speeding.  
13 The first instance involved a defendant by the last name of Wilson.  In 2005, Wilson 
pleaded guilty to two counts of driving without a license and violations of child-restraint 
requirements.  When she failed to pay the fines and costs, a bench warrant was issued by 
another judge of the 12th District Court.  In February 2008, respondent set aside the 
guilty pleas and, contrary to law, removed the abstracts of conviction from the court’s 
computer system.  That same month, Wilson pleaded guilty to seven counts of driving 
without a license.  While those cases were pending, Wilson accumulated three additional 
violations of driving without a license, as well as other civil infractions and a 
misdemeanor.  The master noted that Wilson pleaded guilty to 10 counts of driving 
without a license, but respondent waived all the fines and costs and stopped all 10 
abstracts from being sent to the Secretary of State, resulting in Wilson’s avoiding the fees 
required by MCL 257.732a.  The master further noted that respondent had stopped all the 
abstracts and waived the fines and costs without notice to the prosecutor.  
 
 
The second instance of favoritism involved a defendant named Wheeler, who had 
pleaded guilty in 2009 to failing to file a 2005 tax return.  In addition to paying her tax 
liability, Wheeler paid $125 in fines and costs.  Afterward, Wheeler’s mother wrote a 
letter to respondent, complaining of the “grave injustice” done to her daughter as a result 
 
 
 
 
7
found that at the hearing, the examiner had proved “many cases” in which respondent 
dismissed charges or dismissed cases without the knowledge or approval of the 
prosecutor.  The master noted that this was often done at the arraignment, when the 
prosecutor was not present.  The master cited two examples in support of her 
conclusion.14  As one might expect when a judge refuses to allow one party to know 
about, much less participate in, a judicial proceeding, the master rejected respondent’s 
claims that he only dismissed cases if a “dismissal was inevitable” and that he only 
dismissed citations when presented “with solid evidence justifying such action.”  
COUNT 2: COURT RECORD ABSTRACTS 
The second count of the complaint, which the master concluded had been proved 
by a preponderance of the evidence, alleged that respondent had improperly altered, 
deleted, or stopped summaries of court records from being transmitted to the Secretary of 
State as required by MCL 257.732.  The master found that respondent had entered or 
caused to be entered false information into the court’s judicial information system, 
                                              
of the fines and costs.  Five months after Wheeler pleaded guilty, respondent set aside the 
guilty plea, dismissed the case, and returned the fines and costs, all without notice to the 
city of Jackson.  In correspondence sent to Wheeler and her mother, respondent indicated 
that the “file should not have been opened” and that the “city doesn’t deserve any fines 
and costs as a result of the opening of the file.” 
 
14 In the first case, a defendant named Brown had been charged with two crimes.  
Respondent dismissed one count, and Brown pleaded guilty to the other.  The township’s 
attorney “was unaware of the case and had no knowledge of the dismissed charges.”   
 
In the second case, a defendant named Ross had received two citations for having 
no proof of insurance and expired plates.  Respondent dismissed the charges outright, 
concluding that the “police were improperly stopping citizens for brake light violations.”  
The dismissal of the case was done without notice to the prosecutor or a hearing. 
 
 
 
 
8
causing the cancellation of the abstracts.15  Additionally, the master found that respondent 
had engaged in a pattern of dismissing, in violation of the law, tickets that may properly 
be dismissed under certain circumstances16 and removed court record abstracts for such 
tickets in violation of the law.17  The master rejected respondent’s claim that he “always 
saw proof of insurance” before dismissing those tickets.  In addition to the fact that most 
of the cases presented were dismissed off the record, the master identified two specific 
instances indicating that proof of insurance had not, in fact, always been provided before 
tickets were dismissed.18  
                                              
15 Respondent admitted that he would cancel an abstract properly sent to the Secretary of 
State by indicating that the previously transmitted abstract had been “sent in error.”  
However, no error existed.  Respondent simply wanted “the defendant to get his license 
turned around” and avoid the imposition of sanctions by the Secretary of State.   
16 When a motorist receives a citation for having no proof of insurance, fines and costs 
may not be assessed and an abstract may not be forwarded to the Secretary of State if, 
before the appearance date on the citation, the motorist submits proof to the court that the 
motor vehicle was insured at the time the violation occurred. MCL 257.328(3) (emphasis 
added).  When a motorist receives a citation for defective equipment, a court is required 
to waive the “fine, costs, and assessments” if it receives certification “by a law 
enforcement agency” that the defective equipment was repaired “before the appearance 
date on the citation.”  MCL 257.907(9) (emphasis added).  The allegations established 
that, contrary to law, respondent had dismissed tickets for both no proof of insurance and 
defective equipment well after the appearance date on the citation.    
17 MCL 257.328(3)(b) requires that a court “not cause an abstract of the court record to 
be forwarded to the secretary of state” if a motorist provides proof that the vehicle was 
insured at the time of the violation “before the appearance date on the citation.”  
(Emphasis added.)  The allegations established that, contrary to law, respondent caused 
court record summaries to be removed well after the appearance date on the citation.   
18 In the first case, a defendant named Smith defaulted on a citation for no proof of 
insurance in November 2006.  In July 2008, 20 months after Smith had defaulted, 
respondent “removed the abstract with no proof of insurance produced.”  In the second 
case, a defendant named Stacey defaulted on a citation for having no proof of insurance 
that had been issued in March 2009.  Respondent testified that he removed the abstract in 
 
 
 
 
9
The master also found that respondent had prevented court record abstracts from 
being transmitted to the Secretary of State or caused abstracts to be deleted in violation of 
the law.  In 2007, the chief judge of the 12th District Court became aware that respondent 
had deleted an abstract and discussed this with respondent.  Respondent admitted that he 
had mistakenly deleted the abstract.  The chief judge told respondent to discontinue this 
practice.  However, because respondent continued the practice of stopping or deleting 
court record abstracts, the chief judge removed respondent’s authority to directly access 
the relevant portion of the court’s computer system in 2009.  The master found that 
respondent, undeterred, used others to continue this practice: respondent “sent ‘stacks’ of 
notes to his court clerk” ordering her to “stop abstracts in cases which should be properly 
abstracted.”  In fact, respondent acknowledged that he had caused court record abstracts 
to be stopped in order to “avoid further suspension” of a defendant’s driving privileges.  
The master found that respondent “stopped multiple convictions for the same defendant, 
deleted abstracts years after conviction, and for cases assigned to other judges.”  
Moreover, the master concluded that respondent’s act of directly stopping abstracts and 
ordering his clerk to do the same violated the law.  
COUNT 3: EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS 
The master found that the third count of the complaint had been proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence because respondent had “engaged in ex parte 
communications with defendants that resulted in dismissal of cases” in violation of 
                                              
September 2009 and waived the fines and costs because the “vehicle was insured.”  
However, Stacey acknowledged on the record that her automobile was not insured at the 
time the citation was issued. 
 
 
 
10
Canon 3(A)(4).  The master noted several cases in support of her conclusion, including ex 
parte communications between respondent and his wife before he dismissed her five 
tickets, as well as ex parte communications between respondent and his staff members 
before dismissing their tickets.  The master also cited respondent’s communications with 
Roscina Ragland, as described later in the discussion of count seven, and respondent’s ex 
parte communications with a woman named Jaime Chapman.19  The master indicated that 
respondent admitted having dismissed cases after “discussing the matters in the hallway” 
without the involvement of the prosecuting attorney because doing so provided 
“optimum, convenient service.”  
COUNT 4: FAILURE TO FOLLOW PLEA AGREEMENTS 
The master found that the fourth count of the complaint had been proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence because respondent had failed to follow plea agreements 
between the prosecuting attorney and defendants without advising the prosecutor.  
Respondent admitted that he had dismissed or reduced charges without the prosecutor’s 
authorization after the defendant and prosecutor had reached a plea agreement.20  In other 
                                              
19 In April 2010, respondent was observed talking with Chapman about her traffic tickets 
in the hallway of the courthouse.  Subsequently, respondent went to the clerk’s office and 
asked the staff to “make amendments to the charges.”  Respondent dismissed Chapman’s 
ticket for no proof of insurance, and Chapman pleaded guilty to having expired plates.  
The staff member testified that she did not observe any proof of insurance and that 
Chapman was “very grateful” and thanked respondent several times. 
20 One illustration the master cited involved a defendant named Goolsby, who had been 
issued citations for driving with a suspended license and defective equipment. According 
to the terms of the negotiated agreement, the case was to be adjourned for eight weeks so 
that Goolsby could get his license reinstated.  If he was successful, the original charges 
would be dismissed and Goolsby would be permitted to plead guilty to two counts of 
having improper license plates and pay $50 in costs for each count.  However, respondent 
 
 
 
 
11
instances, respondent refused to order that a defendant pay the costs of prosecution after 
the defendant specifically agreed to pay those costs as part of a negotiated plea 
agreement.  The master noted that respondent did not order costs in “most of the cases” 
the examiner presented to the master.  While respondent claimed that he did not order 
payment of the costs of prosecution because “it would have been illegal to assess them,” 
the master rejected this rationalization because respondent’s pattern of cost imposition 
did not correlate to its legality.21  By respondent’s admission, he ordered costs when there 
was no statutory authority to do so and failed to order them when the law expressly 
allowed it.22  Rather than legal authority being the pivotal consideration in deciding 
whether costs would be imposed, the master found that there was “no philosophical or 
legal basis” underlying the imposition of costs.  “The standard for respondent seemed to 
be whether the defendant could pay, whether there would be any money to the court” 
after costs were paid, and whether the defendant received a favorable plea bargain from 
the prosecutor.  
                                              
accepted a guilty plea to one count of improper plates, dismissed the other count entirely, 
and did not order costs.  The master also cited a similar case involving a defendant named 
Cramer. 
21 The master also noted that several witnesses testified that, at the time costs were sought 
in conjunction with plea agreements, respondent never indicated that he believed that the 
imposition of costs was illegal.  
22 The master cited 31 cases in which respondent did not order a defendant to pay the 
costs of prosecution in drunk driving cases although the law permitted it, 35 cases in 
which respondent failed to order costs per the plea agreement, and 35 cases in which 
respondent ordered a defendant to pay costs despite the lack of legal authority to do so.   
 
 
 
12
COUNT 5: INAPPROPRIATE DELAYS 
The master found that the fifth count of the complaint had been proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence because respondent had “failed to promptly dispose of the 
business of the court,” resulting in “dozens of cases” that were “pending for years.”23  
The master also noted several cases that had been serially adjourned and left open for 
extended periods until the defendants complied with special bond conditions imposed by 
respondent, including writing book reports, getting a driver’s license restored, or getting 
an A in math.  Respondent’s continued adjournments and delays resulted in “chaos” for 
the court staff, difficulty tracking files, and larger caseloads.  The master found that after 
numerous adjournments and delays, some defendants “eventually failed to appear” to 
court and were arrested and imprisoned without bond as a consequence.24  The master 
noted that while these cases were delayed, defendants frequently committed new 
offenses, which were “oftentimes disposed of with no penalty.”  
                                              
23 One such case the master discussed involved a defendant named Wicks who was 
arraigned in 2001 for two misdemeanor offenses.  As of 2010, Wicks’s 2001 file 
remained open because he had failed to comply with the terms of his sentence.  While on 
probation, Wicks pleaded guilty to an offense in 2004.  Respondent stopped the court 
record abstract from being transmitted to the Secretary of State and adjourned the case 
“approximately 40 times” until June 2010, at which point the file was closed and fines 
and costs were waived. 
24 The master noted one example involving a minor who had been charged in June 2007 
with being in possession of alcohol, an offense that does not permit the imposition of a 
jail sentence.  See MCL 436.1703(1)(a).  The case was adjourned 37 times, requiring the 
defendant to make numerous appearances in court.  Ultimately, the defendant was jailed 
on a bench warrant for failing to appear.  The case was eventually resolved in July 2010 
by a different judge of the 12th District Court.   
 
 
 
13
The master rejected respondent’s claim that the excessive delays were proper 
because he had the authority to delay sentencing for one year25 and could place a 
defendant on probation for up to two years.26  Respondent claimed that he had the 
authority to delay a defendant’s sentencing for as long as four years.  The master found 
that respondent’s claim was “disingenuous” and “appear[ed] to be made up after the 
fact.”27  The master also rejected respondent’s claim that extended delays were 
comparable to a specialty court and that cases were delayed for “prolonged periods” for 
“salutary purposes.”  Rather, the master concluded that “[i]t was respondent’s practice to 
hold defendants for unspecified periods of time, unsentenced, for completion of tasks that 
did not necessarily address the offense for which the defendants were being sentenced.” 
COUNT 6: PEACE BONDS 
The master found that the sixth count of the complaint, which alleged that 
respondent did not follow the proper procedures when imposing peace bonds, had not 
been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  While respondent “lacked due 
                                              
25 See MCL 771.1(2) (“In an action in which the court may place the defendant on 
probation, the court may delay sentencing the defendant for not more than 1 year to give 
the defendant an opportunity to prove to the court his or her eligibility for probation or 
other 
leniency 
compatible with the ends of justice 
and 
the 
defendant’s 
rehabilitation . . . .”).  
26 MCL 771.2(1) provides that, with narrow exceptions, “if the defendant is convicted for 
an offense that is not a felony, the probation period shall not exceed 2 years.” 
27 The master’s conclusion was based on the fact that the court files did not indicate that 
respondent was imposing a delayed sentence, none of the defendants were advised they 
were receiving a delayed sentence, and many of the delays occurred either before the 
guilty plea was tendered or after the defendant was sentenced. 
 
 
 
14
diligence in not knowing the law” regarding peace bonds, there was no evidence of 
misconduct.   
COUNT 7: INTERFERENCE WITH A CASE 
The master found that the seventh count of the complaint, which alleged that 
respondent had improperly interfered with a case assigned to another judge, had been 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  Respondent had a conversation with Roscina 
Ragland regarding her landlord-tenant case before 12th District Court Judge Michael J. 
Klaeren.  Ragland, described by respondent as a “frequent flyer,” showed respondent an 
order of eviction issued by Judge Klaeren.  The previous day, Judge Klaeren had declined 
to stay the order of eviction as Ragland’s counsel requested.  Believing that Ragland was 
being “abused,” respondent approached Judge Klaeren and spent 30 to 45 minutes 
attempting to persuade him to stay the order of eviction.  When that effort was 
unsuccessful, respondent contacted the court’s process server, Emmanuel Morales.  
Respondent told Morales that both Morales and the plaintiff’s attorney “could be sued” if 
the writ were executed.  Judge Klaeren held a hearing and issued a second writ because 
Mr. Morales was “afraid to execute the writ.”  The master rejected respondent’s claim 
that his activities were indistinguishable from the actions determined not to constitute 
judicial misconduct in In re Hultgren.28 
                                              
28 In re Hultgren, 482 Mich 358; 758 NW2d 258 (2008).  The master noted that, in 
contrast to Hultgren, respondent contacted the assigned judge directly for the purposes of 
advocating for Ragland.  Additionally, Ragland was represented by an attorney, whereas 
the defendant in Hultgren was an “immigrant with limited language skills.”  Lastly, in 
contrast to Hultgren, respondent “used the power of his office to stop the writ of eviction 
by calling the court officer” and telling the officer that he “could be sued if he executed 
it.” 
 
 
 
15
COUNT 8: MISREPRESENTATIONS 
The master found that the eighth count of the complaint, which alleged that 
respondent had made misrepresentations to the JTC, had been proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence.29  Specifically, in respondent’s response to the 28-day notice provided by 
the JTC,30 respondent admitted dismissing tickets without hearings or without 
authorization from the prosecutor, but stated that the dismissals were “without objection 
in the end.”  This statement, according to the master, falsely implied that the dismissals 
had been done with prosecutorial knowledge and approval.  Additionally, respondent’s 
response to the 28-day letter stated that he only dismissed cases “when a dismissal was 
inevitable” and only when “presented with solid evidence” justifying dismissal.  These 
statements were found to be false because the prosecutors had no knowledge that cases 
were being dismissed, they would not have consented to dismissal, and the 
“overwhelming evidence” established that respondent dismissed tickets “with no 
evidence shown whatsoever.”31 
Similarly, respondent was found to have made false statements in his response to 
the 28-day letter and his answer regarding abstracts required to be sent to the Secretary of 
State.  Respondent stated that he never altered or deleted an abstract and that court staff, 
rather than respondent, sent the relevant information to the Secretary of State.  This was 
                                              
29 The master also found that two instances of misrepresentation had not been proved by 
a preponderance of the evidence. 
30 See MCR 9.207(D)(1).  
31 These cases included “those of his wife, court staff and himself.”  
 
 
 
16
found to be a false statement, as respondent acknowledged having the ability to directly 
access the relevant portion of the court’s computer system until his access was revoked 
because of his misuse.  Respondent’s response also stated that he merely informed “the 
[Secretary of State] of changes in the status of a case” and that the reasons given by 
respondent for the correction of abstracts “have been accurate.”  These assertions were 
determined to be false.  Respondent admitted at the hearing that the code “sent in error” 
had been entered “in order to cancel an abstract” that had otherwise properly been 
transmitted to the Secretary of State.  Moreover, there was “abundant proof” that, after 
defendants pleaded guilty, respondent “stopped, or had stopped, abstracts which were 
statutorily required to be sent to the [Secretary of State].”  The master also noted that 
respondent “removed or deleted abstracts” sometimes “years after conviction” when, in 
fact, there had been no change in the status of a case.  Indeed, the master found “abundant 
evidence” showing that respondent “routinely and frequently directly stopped, or had a 
clerk stop, abstracts for the sole purpose of avoiding negative consequences from the 
Secretary of State.”32   
Further, at the hearing before the master and in his response to the 28-day letter, 
respondent stated that he did not order defendants to pay the costs of prosecution because 
it was illegal and that “most of the cases which included [costs of prosecution] as part of 
the plea bargain did not qualify.”  This assertion was found to be false because the “facts 
admitted at the hearing” showed that respondent ordered costs in cases that did not 
qualify under the statute and failed to order costs when it was statutorily permissible.  
                                              
32 The master noted that “[r]espondent acknowledged this repeatedly.”   
 
 
 
17
Rather, the master held that respondent’s reasons for not ordering costs “had to do with 
what the defendant could afford and whether the court would get any money” after the 
costs were paid.  
B.  THE DECISION AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE JTC 
After hearing oral argument, the JTC issued its decision and recommendation for 
discipline.  The JTC adopted the master’s findings of fact “in their entirety,” concluding 
that counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of the amended complaint had been proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  The JTC determined that respondent’s misconduct 
warranted removal from office and “highlight[ed] five particular factual findings”33 as 
well as respondent’s misleading statements to the commission as providing the basis for 
the JTC’s “conclusion regarding the appropriate sanction.”  The JTC discussed at length 
the highlighted findings, but reiterated that it “adopt[ed] and incorporate[d]” the “balance 
of the master’s factual findings” to the extent “not already set forth” in the JTC’s 
decision.  The JTC concluded that respondent’s misconduct violated Const 1963, art 6, 
§ 30; MCR 9.104(A)(1), (2), and (4); MCR 9.205 and 9.208(B); Canons 1, 2(A), 2(B), 
2(C), 3(A)(1), 3(A)(4), and 3(A)(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct; MCL 257.328(3); 
MCL 257.907(9); and MCL 257.732.  Additionally, the JTC concluded that respondent 
                                              
33 The five “highlighted” factual findings were (1) respondent’s dismissing his four 
parking tickets without notice to the prosecutor or chief judge, (2) respondent’s 
dismissing the tickets of his wife, staff, and an acquaintance of his wife without notice to 
the prosecutor or chief judge, (3) respondent’s pattern of improper dismissals without 
hearings or notice to the prosecutor,  (4) respondent’s pattern of interfering with abstracts 
sent to the Secretary of State’s office, and (5) respondent’s direct interference with a case 
pending before a different judge. 
 
 
 
18
violated the disqualification rules in MCR 2.003(C) and Canon 3(C) in failing to recuse 
himself from cases involving himself and his wife.   
In determining the appropriate sanction, the JTC assessed the factors set forth in In 
re Brown.34  Finding that respondent’s misconduct implicated six of the seven Brown 
factors, the JTC concluded that a severe sanction was warranted.  In addition to the 
Brown factors, the JTC noted that respondent had a prior history of judicial misconduct.  
In 1998, respondent received a public censure for misconduct wherein he “intentionally 
manipulated fines and costs in an effort to punish the City of Jackson for its actions 
involving the pensions of certain city employees.”35  The JTC noted that the present case 
was similar to the prior case of misconduct in that “respondent kept engaging in wrongful 
behavior after the Chief Judge directed him to stop.”  Given respondent’s “deliberate and 
repeated decisions to circumvent the judicial process,” the JTC concluded that respondent 
was “unfit to sit as a judge” and therefore recommended his removal.  The JTC also 
asked that respondent be assessed costs in the amount of $24,934.19 for his intentional 
misrepresentations.    
II 
 
The power to discipline a judge resides exclusively in this Court, but it is 
exercised on recommendation of the JTC.36  This Court reviews de novo the factual 
                                              
34 In re Brown, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293 (1999).  
35 See In re Justin, 456 Mich 1220 (1998).  In that matter, respondent entered into a 
consent agreement with the JTC for a public censure.     
36 Const 1963, art 6, § 30. 
 
 
 
19
findings and the recommendations of the JTC.37  The proper standard of proof to be used 
in judicial tenure cases is a preponderance of the evidence.38 
 
On review of the entire record, we agree with and adopt in full the factual findings 
of the master and the JTC.  Furthermore, we adopt the disciplinary recommendation of 
the JTC.  It is fair to say that the common themes running throughout respondent’s 
substantiated acts of misconduct are a calculated disregard for the law and an intentional 
effort to undermine the judicial process, as deemed warranted or expedient by the 
respondent.  Such misconduct evinces an unacceptable disregard for the role of judge as 
well as disdain for due process and the right of parties to a fair hearing.  
Respondent’s actions are completely antithetical to the privilege of being a judge 
and more than adequately justify his removal from office.    
To begin with, respondent’s misconduct in fixing his own tickets and the tickets of 
his wife and staff, standing alone, is more than sufficient to justify his removal from 
office.  Respondent used the authority of his office to bypass the normal adjudicatory 
process and permit wrongdoers to evade responsibility for violating the law.  Respondent 
summarily dismissed four tickets issued to himself, five tickets issued to his wife, and 
two tickets issued to members of his staff.  Respondent acknowledged that he dismissed 
these tickets, but claimed that the only misconduct he committed when doing so was 
failing to recuse himself from the cases.  Respondent’s assertion presumes that, apart 
from respondent’s failure to recuse himself, the cases were otherwise properly resolved 
                                              
37 MCR 9.225; In re Somers, 384 Mich 320, 323; 182 NW2d 341 (1971). 
38 MCR 9.211(A); In re Loyd, 424 Mich 514, 521; 384 NW2d 9 (1986). 
 
 
 
20
through the judicial process and the dismissals were conducted in accordance with 
Michigan rules and procedures, as one would ordinarily expect when resolving a legal 
dispute.  This presumption is, quite simply, false.   
In 1859, this Court described “judicial power” as “the power to hear and determine 
controversies between adverse parties, and questions in litigation.”39  The fundamental 
purpose in resolving such controversies is quite simple: the fair ascertainment of the 
truth.40  While it is axiomatic that respondent could not sit as a neutral arbiter over his 
own cases, the simple fact of the matter is that respondent’s actions were deliberately 
calculated to ensure that no court proceedings would ever be held.  When respondent 
fixed his own tickets, for example, he apparently provided an “explanation”41 to himself 
and, having found his own explanation credible, simply dismissed his tickets.42  The 
                                              
39 Daniels v People, 6 Mich 381, 388 (1859). 
40 People v Johnson, 356 Mich 619, 621; 97 NW2d 739 (1959) (noting that a criminal 
trial is “an inquiry primarily directed toward the fair ascertainment of truth”). 
41 There is absolutely no statutory authority permitting a judge to dismiss a case “after 
explanation.”  Respondent cites MCL 600.8715(3), MCL 600.8809(2)(b), MCL 
600.8811, and MCL 600.8815 in support of his claimed authority.  However, each of 
these statutory provisions concerns a defendant’s ability to admit responsibility for his 
civil infraction “with explanation.”  While a defendant’s explanation may serve to 
mitigate the sanction imposed, see MCL 600.8715(4) and MCL 600.8815(4), a wholesale 
dismissal of the case after a defendant has admitted responsibility for the violation does 
not appear to be included among the available “sanctions.”  See MCL 600.8727(2); MCL 
600.8827(2).  
42 Ostensibly, the “explanation” respondent provided to himself was that he was not 
responsible for his parking tickets because someone else was driving his automobile at 
the time each ticket was issued.  However, even this portion of respondent’s excuse is 
without legal merit.  Under Michigan law, the owner of the vehicle “is prima facie 
responsible” for civil parking infractions, MCL 257.675c(1), and may only assert an 
“affirmative defense” if the vehicle was “in the possession of a person whom the owner 
 
 
 
 
21
entire judicial process was consciously sidestepped.  There was no public hearing, no 
opposing party present, no evidence presented, no cross-examination of witnesses, and 
none of the other mechanisms that provide a fair ascertainment of the truth.43  In short, 
respondent deliberately abused the judicial power with which he was entrusted to prevent 
the truth of his own wrongdoing from being discovered.  While respondent claimed that 
dismissing his own tickets “provided the least expensive way of handling the situation for 
the court,” it is patently obvious that dismissing his own tickets provided respondent the 
least expensive resolution for himself.  
Respondent’s intentional abuses of judicial power to benefit himself, his spouse, 
and his staff are inconsistent with his oath of office and deleterious to the integrity and 
honor of the judiciary.44  Respondent’s belief that he is above the law, and not “as subject 
to the law as those that appear before” him, renders him unworthy of holding judicial 
office.45 
                                              
had not knowingly permitted to operate the vehicle,” MCL 257.675c(2).  The statute 
applies to both statutory violations and violations of “a local ordinance prohibiting or 
restricting the stopping, standing, or parking of a vehicle . . . .”  MCL 257.675c(1). 
43 At the end of his testimony before the JTC, respondent acknowledged that he “should 
have” presented his defense to a visiting judge.  
44 The oath of office respondent took requires him to “solemnly swear” to support the 
Constitution and to “faithfully discharge the duties of” a district court judge.  See MCL 
168.467j; Const 1963, art 11, § 1. 
45 In re Noecker, 472 Mich 1, 13; 691 NW2d 440 (2005) (holding that a judge’s conduct 
“seriously undermined the public’s faith that judges are as subject to the law as those who 
appear before them” and justified removal from office). 
 
 
 
22
While respondent’s misconduct in fixing his tickets and the tickets of his wife and 
staff warrants removal from office, respondent’s misconduct was regrettably not so 
limited.  The record shows that on numerous occasions, respondent dismissed citations 
and misdemeanor charges for select defendants without a hearing or notice to the 
prosecutor.46  Respondent admits dismissing cases after “discussing the matters in the 
hallway” with a defendant and without advising the prosecuting attorney because he 
believed this manner of case resolution provided “optimum, convenient service.”47  
Respondent provides no authority for this provision of “optimum, convenient service” 
because, quite obviously, none exists.  As discussed, the core of “judicial power” 
involves the power to hear and determine controversies between adverse parties.  
Respondent’s method of dismissing cases after having a discussion with only one side of 
a controversy is not a valid exercise of the judicial power; rather, it is a perversion of 
judicial power.  Apparently, respondent believed that providing what he considered 
“optimum, convenient service” trumped the law and the canons of judicial ethics and 
gave him license to do away with the truth-finding process entirely.48   
                                              
46 While the citations and charges were mostly dismissed “after explanation,” in two 
instances respondent ordered cases “dismissed in the interest of justice.”  Respondent 
provided no rationalization for this alternative means of dismissing criminal charges.  
47 Respondent also testified that he dismissed charges in one case so that he would not 
have to set the case for “pretrial and trial.”  In another case, respondent dismissed a 
charge because despite the fact that the defendant readily admitted his guilt to the 
offense, “the township prosecutor had already departed from the building.” 
48 Interestingly, while some citizens received the “optimum, convenient service” of 
having their tickets and charges summarily dismissed, other citizens were forced to 
endure the inconvenience and burden of countless adjournments and delays, requiring 
 
 
 
 
23
Additionally, respondent felt compelled to “improve upon” validly entered plea 
agreements between the prosecutor and defendants, even going so far as to dismiss cases 
or counts after a defendant had tendered a guilty plea to the charges.  Respondent has 
identified no authority that would permit him to dismiss criminal charges in this manner.  
Indeed, such actions implicate the separation of powers principles49 articulated in Const 
1963, art 3, § 2.50  Also, without informing the prosecutor, respondent failed to follow 
                                              
frequent court appearances.  It is unclear how this latter group fit into respondent’s theory 
of providing “optimum, convenient service.” 
Moreover, respondent’s belief that expediency could trump the rule of law had 
repercussions for the entire 12th District Court.  When citizens who had received 
“optimum, convenient service” in respondent’s courtroom later found themselves in 
another judge’s courtroom, where the rule of law, not “optimum, convenient service,” 
was the guiding principle, these citizens sometimes became confused and angry.  As the 
chief judge of the court explained: 
These people were indignant with us when we imposed a sentence, 
because [respondent] didn’t do this.  Why are you doing this to me?  Why 
are you sentencing me?  Because [respondent] didn’t do this.  It was a 
different kind of justice in that courtroom than the justice that was received 
by or administrated by the other three judges.  And, yes, there were 
repercussions; there were people that were extremely angry, people who 
questioned our authority for doing what we were doing. 
49 As this Court has explained, 
[t]he power to determine whether to charge a defendant and what charge 
should be brought is an executive power, which vests exclusively in the 
prosecutor.  The exercise of judicial power over the discharge of the 
prosecutor’s duties “is limited to those activities or decisions by the 
prosecutor that are unconstitutional, illegal, or ultra vires.”  [People v 
Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 141 n 19; 712 NW2d 419 (2006) (citations omitted).] 
 
50 That section provides: “The powers of government are divided into three branches: 
legislative, executive and judicial.  No person exercising powers of one branch shall 
 
 
 
 
24
plea agreements that required the payment of costs.  While respondent claims that the 
imposition of such costs was illegal, we agree with the master that the veracity of 
respondent’s claimed belief is belied by his inconsistent pattern of ordering costs.  
Respondent’s acts of failing to order costs as part of the plea agreement in some cases in 
which they were explicitly permitted by law and ordering costs in other cases in the 
complete absence of statutory authority undercut any claim that respondent legitimately 
believed that the imposition of costs was illegal.51  
Respondent’s multitudinous acts of deleting or altering the abstracts of court 
records to be sent to the Secretary of State as MCL 257.732 requires or stopping them 
from being sent also provides a basis for removing respondent from office.  By 
respondent’s own admission, he ordered that abstracts required by law to be sent not be 
sent, removed or deleted validly entered abstracts, and entered false information into the 
system to accomplish the removal.52  However, the law is absolutely clear regarding 
respondent’s actions: they are utterly and categorically prohibited.  The Legislature has 
indicated that the “failure, refusal, or neglect of a person to comply” with the reporting 
requirements of MCL 257.732 “constitutes misconduct in office and is grounds for 
                                              
exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in 
this constitution.” 
51 Moreover, if respondent believed that a term in the plea agreement was illegal, he 
should have declined to accept the plea agreement, permitting the prosecutor and 
defendant to return to the negotiating table.  See MCR 6.302(A).    
52 Because each abstract is “entered upon the master driving record of the person to 
whom it pertains,” MCL 257.732(15), respondent’s acts had the effect of clearing or 
improving the master driving record of the lucky beneficiaries of respondent’s 
munificence.   
 
 
 
25
removal from office.”53  Moreover, subject to exceptions not applicable here, “a court 
shall not order expunction of any violation reportable to the secretary of state . . . .”54 
Respondent argues that because MCL 257.732 imposes the duty to forward court 
record abstracts on “municipal judge[s] and each clerk of a court of record,” the statute is 
“not applicable to him” because he is neither a municipal judge nor a court clerk.  
However, while MCL 257.732(1) does indicate that “the municipal judge or clerk of the 
court of record” must forward the court record abstracts to the Secretary of State, the 
scope of MCL 257.732(14) is not so circumscribed: it applies to “a person,” a category 
that undeniably includes respondent.55  Moreover, the testimony of the chief judge of the 
12th District Court indicated that respondent was the only judge in that court to make 
entries into the court’s computer system.56  The evidence also established that respondent 
had ordered his staff to stop the entry of abstracts in violation of MCL 257.732.  It simply 
provides no defense that respondent elected to access the system instead of court staff or 
ordered court staff to violate the law on his behalf.  Respondent’s unabashed and willful 
                                              
53 MCL 257.732(14). 
54 MCL 257.732(22).  
55 Even if we were to conclude that MCL 257.732 was not directly applicable to 
respondent, there is no reason this Court could not take notice of the statute and consider 
the Legislature’s pronouncement regarding conduct constituting “misconduct in office” 
in determining whether respondent committed judicial misconduct as well as the 
appropriate sanction.   
56 The chief judge also testified that respondent was the only judge who had access to the 
“[Secretary of State] systems” and could send information to the Secretary of State 
asking that “abstracts be removed.” 
 
 
 
26
violation of the statutory requirements provides further support for the sanction of 
removal.   
Finally, respondent has been determined to have lied under oath during the JTC 
proceedings.  This is entirely incompatible with judicial office and warrants removal.  We 
summarize three instances of respondent’s lying under oath. 
During respondent’s testimony, he reiterated that the reason he did not order a 
defendant to pay the costs of prosecution as part of a plea bargain was that such costs 
were “not authorized” by MCL 769.1f.  The evidence adduced at the hearing established 
that this statement was a falsehood and that statutory authority was not respondent’s 
motivating consideration in determining whether to order costs.   
The assistant city attorney for the city of Jackson testified that when his office 
became aware that respondent was not abiding by plea agreements, it began monitoring 
respondent’s compliance with the city’s plea agreements by tracking approximately 130 
cases between 2008 and 2009.  The result of the monitoring revealed that of the cases 
surveyed in which there was no statutory authority to order the payment of costs, 
respondent ordered costs in 55 percent of them.  The act of ordering costs in a majority of 
the cases for which there was no statutory authority to do so belies any claim that 
statutory authorization was respondent’s foremost consideration.    
Furthermore, in describing why he did not impose the costs as part of a plea 
agreement, respondent stated: 
 
 
And part of my problem is that, you know, I can only assess [a] total 
amount of so much, and if 50 or . . . 100 or $200 goes into costs of 
prosecution, that means, with what’s going to the state, that there is not a 
whole lot that is going to go to the county, and, of course, the county is the 
 
 
 
27
one that supports the court.  And it seems a challenge to me, particularly in 
this economic climate with a number of people that we deal with and their 
financial situation that I can—especially since these costs of prosecution 
are not related very much to the actual costs to the municipality. 
During the hearing, respondent was serially impeached with dozens of cases in 
which he ordered the payment of costs despite the glaring absence of statutory authority.  
While respondent testified that he did not remember the specific details of the cases, he 
did acknowledge that he ordered the payment of costs without statutory authority because 
(1) “there was substantial negotiation between the township prosecutor and the defense 
attorney,” (2) he “went along” with the imposition of costs since “the defendant was 
willing to pay money in order to have the matter dismissed,” and (3) ordering the costs of 
prosecution was “justified” by the “benefits” a defendant received by a favorable plea 
bargain.  Respondent testified that there were “times” when it was “easier” to charge both 
court costs and the costs of prosecution, while in other cases it was “very hard to do 
that.”  The record reveals the following colloquy:  
 
The Master: So if I understand what you’re saying, it didn’t have to 
do with the philosophical belief or the legal standard, but it had to do with 
the defendant’s ability to pay?    
 
Respondent: That was—that was a way—that was a situation where 
it was easier for me to go along with my fellow judges. 
 
The Master: Because the defendant couldn’t pay? 
 
Respondent: Because of the fact that the defendant, if the defendant 
had been convicted of all of the charges and had to pay fines and costs on 
all of the charges, they probably would have ended up paying more than 
they would have paid being assessed for one count and also having to pay 
some costs of prosecution. 
 
*   *   * 
 
 
 
28
 
[The Examiner]: . . .  So if I understand your answer to the judge, 
despite the fact you say it’s illegal on these cases, economic factors caused 
you to violate what you say is the law; is that correct? 
 
Respondent: Certainly my concern about where fines and costs 
ultimately ended up affected my—my determination, and certainly was not 
authorized. 
 
Additionally, there were many cases in which respondent did not order payment 
of the costs of prosecution as part of a plea agreement, even though MCL 769.1f 
specifically authorizes it.  Respondent testified under oath that he did not order costs in 
these cases because the amounts were “excessive” and therefore not “appropriate” for 
him to authorize.  Respondent further testified that the costs of prosecution had to be 
“justified and documented.”  We conclude that these statements were also false.  
Respondent both ordered and failed to order costs as part of a plea agreement when the 
agreed-upon amounts were identical and failed to order the costs of prosecution when the 
amount contained in the plea agreement was substantially less than the amount in 
another.  Additionally, respondent ordered costs in the complete absence of justification 
or documentation, contradicting any claim that costs had to be “justified and 
documented.” 
Respondent acknowledged that the Jackson city attorney would generally permit a 
defendant charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated to plead guilty of 
operating a motor vehicle while visibly impaired.  As part of those agreements, 
defendants often agreed to pay $200 for the costs of prosecution.  The assistant city 
attorney testified that respondent failed to order costs in 78 percent of the drunk driving 
cases in which costs were part of the plea agreement during the relevant tracking period.  
 
 
 
29
Most of those cases involved costs in the amount of $200.  However, in addition to 
failing to order costs in the amount of $200, respondent also failed to order costs when 
the amount in the plea agreement was much lower, such as $100 or $50.  In each case in 
which respondent ordered costs as part of an agreement reducing the charges from 
operating while intoxicated to operating while visibly impaired, respondent uniformly 
assessed costs of $200—an amount respondent’s testimony indicated was “excessive.”  
Moreover, respondent acknowledged at the hearing that he did not require any type of 
documentation or proof on those occasions when he ordered costs pursuant to a plea 
agreement.  
Lastly, while under oath, respondent indicated that his practice of “talking to 
people” and dismissing their cases depended on defendants’ “having actual proof that 
their position was right[.]”  However, this was a blatantly false statement, and one need 
look no further than respondent’s actions dismissing the tickets of his court staff, who 
received citations for speeding, and his spouse, who received three citations for speeding 
and a citation for disobeying a stop sign.  Respondent’s spouse and staff did not, in fact, 
provide “actual proof” justifying dismissal of their tickets, and respondent, by dismissing 
the tickets himself without a hearing, “conveniently” precluded the officers who issued 
the tickets and the prosecutor from offering proof of the violations.  Moreover, 
respondent dismissed a wide variety of cases that are simply not amenable to a 
defendant’s providing “actual proof” of innocence, including, for example, speeding or 
driving with a suspended license.  It is unclear what “actual proof” could be provided 
under these circumstances.  Even for those cases in which it was possible to provide 
 
 
 
30
“actual proof,” respondent was impeached by court transcripts establishing that he 
dismissed cases without seeing “actual proof” of insurance.  
Because the record fully supports the finding that respondent lied under oath, the 
appropriate sanction is removal from office.  Respondent’s act of lying under oath 
categorically renders him unfit for office.  As this Court has noted, 
  
 
[o]ur judicial system has long recognized the sanctity and importance of the 
oath.  An oath is a significant act, establishing that the oath taker promises 
to be truthful.  As the “focal point of the administration of justice,” a judge 
is entrusted by the public and has the responsibility to seek truth and justice 
by evaluating the testimony given under oath.  When a judge lies under 
oath, he or she has failed to internalize one of the central standards of 
justice and becomes unfit to sit in judgment of others. 
 
Certainly, Judicial Tenure Commission proceedings are intended to 
be remedial, not penal.  The vast majority of misconduct found by the 
Judicial Tenure Commission is not fatal; rather, it reflects oversight or poor 
judgment on the part of a fallible human being who is a judge.  However, 
some misconduct, such as lying under oath, goes to the very core of judicial 
duty and demonstrates the lack of character of such a person to be 
entrusted with judicial privilege.  
 
. . . Lying under oath, as the respondent has been adjudged to have 
done, makes him unfit for judicial office.[57] 
 
Finally, we note that respondent’s other acts of substantiated judicial misconduct, 
while quite serious, might not warrant removal from office if taken in isolation.  
However, the inescapable truth is that respondent’s other substantiated acts of 
misconduct, as well as his previous disciplinary history, are not isolated, but are part and 
                                              
57 Noecker, 472 Mich at 17-18 (YOUNG, J., concurring) (emphasis added; citations 
omitted). 
 
 
 
31
parcel of respondent’s pervasive pattern of misconduct and his calculated disregard for 
the law.  As the master succinctly concluded, “[r]espondent has repeatedly and 
intentionally demonstrated a defiant lack of respect for the rule of law and the separations 
of powers.”  Respondent’s clear disregard for the rule of law is incompatible with a 
judge’s duty to uphold the law and renders him unfit for judicial office. 
We order that respondent be removed from office.  Additionally, pursuant to MCR 
9.205(B), we order the JTC to submit a bill of costs, itemizing what costs may be 
attributed to the conduct or statements of respondent that permit this Court to impose 
“costs, fees, and expenses incurred by the [JTC] in prosecuting the complaint.”  Pursuant 
to MCR 7.317(C)(3), the clerk is directed to issue the judgment order forthwith. 
 
 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Mary Beth Kelly 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
 
CAVANAGH, MARILYN KELLY, and HATHAWAY, JJ.  We concur in the result only.