Case Title: Fitzgerald v. Congleton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1988-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.



                                No. 86-558


Judy W. Fitzgerald                           Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             Chittenden Superior Court

William G. Congleton                         May Term, 1988


Hilton H. Dier, Jr., J.

Jane Watson, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellant

Paradis, Coombs & Fitzpatrick, Essex Junction, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley, JJ., and Barney, C.J. (Ret.),
          Specially Assigned


     GIBSON, J.   Plaintiff, Judy W. Fitzgerald, appeals from a decision of
the trial court that her claim for legal malpractice was barred by 12 V.S.A.
{ 512(4).  We hold that plaintiff's claim is not barred in its entirety,
and, accordingly, reverse.
                                    I.
     On September 28, 1981, attorney William G. Congleton, defendant, was
paid a retainer to represent plaintiff and her husband in a juvenile pro-
ceeding in which the State alleged that their son was a child in need of
care and supervision.  The proceeding was held that same date, and on behalf
of his clients, defendant admitted certain allegations of the petition at
the hearing.  Plaintiff asserts that those admissions resulted in the loss
of custody of her son.  On October 1, 1981, plaintiff and her husband
discharged defendant as their attorney.  They retained new counsel, who
succeeded in having the juvenile proceeding dismissed in March of 1982.
     In January of 1984, plaintiff and her husband retained yet another
attorney to represent them in various claims arising from the juvenile
proceeding.  This attorney corresponded with defendant regarding a potential
legal malpractice claim against defendant.  On September 20, 1984, defendant
agreed to toll the statute of limitations for sixty days in order to attempt
a resolution of the dispute prior to the filing of a formal complaint.  The
waiver, however, only addressed claims by plaintiff's husband against
defendant; it did not include a waiver of the statute of limitations
regarding any claim by plaintiff.(FN1)  On November 18, 1984, plaintiff and her
husband initiated a lawsuit against defendant, alleging legal malpractice.
The complaint claimed a "breach of contract, negligence and violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility."  Plaintiff and her husband sought
damages for "emotional distress, . . . personal humiliation and lost
custody of their son."  They also set out a claim for punitive damages.
     Defendant moved to dismiss on the basis that the cause of action was
barred by the three-year statute of limitations, 12 V.S.A. { 512(4). (FN2)
Plaintiff and her husband argued that the statute had been tolled by
defendant's agreement to extend the limitations period by sixty days, and
that, in any event, the applicable statute of limitations was not 12 V.S.A.
{ 512(4), but rather, the six-year statute of limitations, 12 V.S.A. { 511.(FN3)
The trial court initially denied defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis
that the statute of limitations had been waived, and declined to decide
which statute applied to the facts of the instant case.
     Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that the waiver
of the statute applied only to plaintiff's husband and not to plaintiff.
The court granted defendant's motion for reconsideration, elected to treat
the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment, and entered summary
judgment against plaintiff, finding that her claim was barred by { 512(4).(FN4)
Plaintiff, however, had been given no notice of the motion for reconsid-
eration.  Upon being informed of the entry of summary judgment against her,
plaintiff immediately objected, and the trial court allowed her additional
time in which to respond to defendant's motion.  After plaintiff's response,
which included her affidavit, several other documents and a brief on the
issue, the court reaffirmed its decision to grant summary judgment to
defendant, and severed plaintiff's claim from her husband's claim so that an
appeal of the order could be taken to this Court.
     Plaintiff raises four issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred when
it failed to apply the six-year statute of limitations, { 511; (2) the court
erred in granting summary judgment without notice or hearing on the
question; (3) there exist genuine issues of material fact which make the
grant of summary judgment improper; and (4) the application of { 512(4) to
her case violates plaintiff's rights to an open court and a remedy at law as
guaranteed by the Vermont Constitution.  We hold that the trial court erred
in failing to apply the six-year statute of limitations to those claims that
were for other than personal injuries.
                                    II.
     While this Court has not previously considered which statute of
limitations should apply to attorney malpractice claims, it is not the first
time the Court has grappled with the differences between { 512(4) and the
more general provisions of { 511.  Section 512 enumerates five types of
actions covered by the three-year statute -- assault and battery, false
imprisonment, slander and libel, injury to the person, and damage to
personal property -- whereas { 511 is a catchall statute that applies to
civil actions generally, "except as otherwise provided."  Because { 511
applies to both tort and contract causes of action, it is not possible to
decide which limitations period to apply to a malpractice action solely on
the basis of whether the action sounds in tort or contract.  See, e.g.,
Union School Dist. No. 20 v. Lench, 134 Vt. 424, 425,