Case Title: ROBERT JAMES HAUCK v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-216

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT JAMES HAUCK v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 113162 P.3d 512Case Number: No. 06-216Decided: 07/18/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

ROBERT 
JAMES HAUCK,Petitioner,v.THE STATE OF WYOMING,Respondent.

 
 
Upon 
Petition for Writ of Review/Certiorari

 
 

Representing 
Petitioner:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Post-Conviction Counsel, State 
Public Defender Program.  Argument 
by Ms. Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Respondent:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
David L. Delicath, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Delicath.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Robert James 
Hauck seeks review of the district court's order dismissing his petition for 
post-conviction relief from a conviction for felony property destruction.  Hauck claims the district court erred in 
summarily dismissing his petition.  
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

 
 
[¶2]      The procedural 
facts in this case are not in dispute.  
On January 24, 2000, while awaiting trial on other criminal charges, 
Hauck repeatedly threw a pay telephone at a window and a door at the NatronaCountyDetentionCenter.  His actions caused damage to the 
telephone, the window, and the door in excess of $500.00.  As a result of that incident, Hauck was 
charged with felony property destruction in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-201(a) and (b)(iii).1  Following a preliminary hearing in which 
he proceeded pro se, Hauck was bound over to district court.  

 
 
[¶3]      At his 
arraignment on March 21, 2000, Hauck pled not guilty, and informed the district 
court he wanted to represent himself.  
The district court set a trial date of May 15, 2000.  The district court later vacated the 
trial date and, on June 16, 2000, ordered that Hauck be evaluated, pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-11-301 through 7-11-304, to determine his mental fitness to 
proceed.  The evaluation revealed no 
mental incapacity in terms of Hauck's ability to comprehend the charge against 
him, understand the criminal proceedings, or conduct a rational defense.  On August 31, 2000, the district court 
entered an order finding Hauck competent to proceed.  

 
 
[¶4]      The case first 
went to trial on September 5, 2000, with Hauck representing himself, and 
resulted in a hung jury.  The case 
was retried on October 10, 2000, and Hauck again represented himself.  The jury found Hauck guilty of felony 
property destruction.  The district 
court sentenced Hauck to a term of eight to ten years, to be served 
consecutively to the sentences previously imposed in another criminal case.  On February 7, 2005, Hauck filed a pro 
se notice of appeal, which this Court dismissed as untimely on May 31, 
2005.  

 
 
[¶5]      On January 27, 
2006, Hauck filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the district 
court.  In response to the State's 
motion to dismiss the petition pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), Hauck filed an 
amended petition on July 27, 2006, to which the State did not object.  The issues raised in Hauck's amended 
post-conviction petition concerned his competency to stand trial and to 
represent himself in the criminal proceedings, the waiver of his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel, the use of physical restraints during trial, prosecutorial 
misconduct, and the legality of his sentence.  During a hearing held on July 27, 2006, 
the district court granted the State's motion to dismiss, concluding that the 
petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  Specifically, the district court 
determined that Hauck's complaints did not satisfy the requirements of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-14-101(b).  The court 
also determined that Hauck's claims could have been raised in a direct appeal 
from conviction and, therefore, were procedurally barred under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-14-103(a)(i).  Hauck then filed a 
petition for writ of review, which this Court granted on October 10, 
2006.

 
 
[¶6]      After a thorough 
review of the record, we believe the district court erred in its ruling.  We do not agree that Hauck's claims are 
not cognizable in the post-conviction relief action, nor do we agree that his 
claims are procedurally barred given the facts of this 
case.

 
 

Wyoming Statute 
§ 7-14-101(b)

 
 
[¶7]      The tenets of 
post-conviction relief are well established by §§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 
(LexisNexis 2005) as construed by this Court.  Post-conviction relief is available in 
limited circumstances to redress constitutional errors occurring in the 
proceedings resulting in the defendant's conviction. § 7-14-101(b).2 Accordingly, constitutional errors 
relating to the finding of guilt are open for consideration in a post-conviction 
relief action, whereas claims of error pertaining to sentencing are not.  Harlow v. State, 2005 WY 12, ¶ 6, 105 P.3d 1049, 1056-57 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶8]        One of the issues raised by Hauck in his 
petition below was whether he had received appropriate credit on his sentence 
for time served.  The district court 
dismissed this issue as being not cognizable in a post-conviction relief 
action.  This determination by the 
district court is correct, and we affirm that decision.

 
 
[¶9]      We cannot agree, 
however, that Hauck's other claims fall outside the scope of § 7-14-101(b).  Hauck's challenges to his competency, 
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the use of restraints at trial, and 
prosecutorial misconduct all implicate constitutional protections and relate to 
the finding of guilt.  See Smith v. State, 871 P.2d 186, 190 (Wyo. 
1994) (due process prohibits trial of an incompetent defendant); Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, ¶ 57, 62 P.3d 945, 962-63 (Wyo. 2003) (courtroom restraints implicate constitutional right to 
a fair trial); Dysthe v. State, 2003 
WY 20, ¶ 31, 63 P.3d 875, 886 (Wyo. 2003) (prosecutorial misconduct implicates 
constitutional right to a fair trial).  
We therefore reverse the district court's determination on those 
challenges and remand for further consideration.

 
 

Procedural 
bar

 
 
[¶10]   The district court also ruled that 
Hauck's claims were barred from consideration in the post-conviction relief 
action because they could have been raised in a direct appeal from 
conviction.  § 7-14-103(a)(i).3  The district court's ruling generally 
would be correct in light of Hauck's failure to timely appeal his 
conviction.  In this case, however, 
we find that Hauck was effectively denied his direct appeal.  The right to appeal, if that right is 
granted by a state, as Wyoming has, is a due process right.  See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 S. Ct. 830, 
834, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1985); Farbotnik v. 
State, 850 P.2d 594, 598 (Wyo. 1993).  Because of its constitutional magnitude, 
the right must be zealously protected.  
The record shows that the district court, after imposing sentence, 
abrogated its duty to protect this right by failing to advise Hauck of his right 
to appeal his conviction as mandated by W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(3).4  The record does not otherwise reflect 
that Hauck knew of his right to appeal and the process involved to effectuate 
that right. Under these extenuating circumstances, where the district court 
undermined Hauck's ability to take a timely direct appeal, we will not allow the 
district court's mistake to prejudice Hauck.5  We conclude that, given these specific 
facts, Hauck's failure to appeal cannot be relied upon as grounds for summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.  The district court's ruling that Hauck's 
claims were procedurally barred is hereby reversed.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶11]   Hauck's claim that he should have 
received credit on his sentence for time served is not cognizable in a 
post-conviction relief action and, consequently, the district court's dismissal 
of this claim is affirmed.

 
 
[¶12]   As discussed above, the district 
court improperly dismissed Hauck's other claims.  Its rulings concerning those claims are 
reversed.  This case is remanded to 
the district court for further proceedings.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The statute 
was amended in 2004 to raise the felony amount from $500.00 to $1,000.00.  2004 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 
126.

 
 

2§ 
7-14-101(b) states in part:

(b)  Any person serving a felony sentence in 
a state penal institution who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in 
his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the 
constitution of the United 
States or of the state of Wyoming, or both, may institute proceedings 
under this act.

 
 

3§ 
7-14-103(a)(i) states:

(a)  A claim under this act is procedurally 
barred and no court has jurisdiction to decide the claim if the 
claim:

(i)  Could have been raised but was not 
raised in a direct appeal from the proceeding which resulted in the petitioner's 
conviction[.]

 
 

4Rule 
32(c)(3) provides in pertinent part:

(3)  Advisement of Right to Appeal.   After imposing sentence in a case 
which has gone to trial, the court shall advise the defendant 
of:

(A)  The defendant's right to appeal, 
including the time limits for filing a notice of appeal; 
and

(B)  The right of a person who is unable to 
pay the cost of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, to have appointed 
counsel represent the defendant on appeal, and to have the clerk of court file a 
notice of appeal.

 
 

5We decline 
the State's invitation to ignore the district court's failure simply because the 
advice required by Rule 32(c)(3) is an aspect of the sentencing proceeding.  Giving the advice is unrelated to, and 
indeed comes after, the actual sentencing.