Case Title: Gehnert v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gehnert v. State1998 WY 48956 P.2d 359Case Number: 97-175Decided: 04/02/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Susan Phyllis GEHNERT, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Bert T. 
Ahlstrom, Jr., Cheyenne, for appellant (defendant).

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Robin Sessions Cooley, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Susan 
Gehnert appeals from the denial of her motion to suppress evidence which was 
seized from her automobile.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Gehnert presents 
these issues for our review:

A. Whether or 
not there was a valid consent to search the motor vehicle in 
question:

1. By the 
possessor-defendant; or

2. By any other 
person.

B. If a valid 
consent existed, whether or not the police exceeded the scope of the 
search.

C. Whether or 
not there existed exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless 
search.

FACTS

[¶4]      At around five 
o'clock in the morning on August 11, 1996, Gehnert, who was employed as a shift 
manager, arrived at Taco John's to open it for business. She called the manager 
at around 6:25 or 6:30 a.m. and reported that the safe did not have money in it. 
At approximately 6:33 a.m., Gehnert called the sheriff's department to report 
the theft. John Phillips, a deputy with the Laramie County sheriff's department, 
was dispatched to Taco John's to investigate the report. The manager, the 
assistant manager, and the night manager also arrived at Taco 
John's.

[¶5]      Deputy Phillips 
recalled that about a week earlier a similar incident had been reported from 
this particular Taco John's and that approximately $1,700 had been taken. He 
learned that Gehnert was also the person who had discovered and reported that 
theft. When he arrived at Taco John's, he talked with Gehnert. She told him that 
she discovered the money was missing when she arrived that morning and that she 
did not see signs of a forced entry.

[¶6]      Only the manager 
and Gehnert had keys to the building, and only they, the assistant manager, the 
night manager, and one other employee had access to the safe. The safe had a 
combination lock on the exterior and two compartments on the inside. One of the 
compartments required a key for access. The manager informed Deputy Phillips 
that only three keys existed to the key portion of the safe. One key was hidden 
in the office at Taco John's; one key was on the manager's key ring; and one 
key, which was usually at the manager's home in her china cabinet, was 
missing.

[¶7]      Deputy Phillips 
asked for permission to search the vehicles which were present. Gehnert stated 
that the car she was driving was not hers and that she was worried the person 
she and her fiancé were buying the car from might have drugs in it. When Deputy 
Phillips told her that he was not worried about drugs which might be in the car, 
Gehnert consented to the search. After Deputy Phillips searched the passenger 
compartment, he asked Gehnert for the trunk key. She told him that she did not 
have a key and again stated that the car was not hers and that she did not want 
to be held responsible for anything which might be in the trunk. The manager 
offered to pay for a locksmith to open the truck, but Gehnert refused, 
reiterating that she did not want to be held responsible for what was in the 
trunk.

[¶8]      Deputy Phillips 
asked Gehnert for proof of insurance or documentation, such as a registration, 
which showed proof of ownership. When Gehnert could not produce any such 
documentation, Deputy Phillips informed her that she could not legally drive the 
car and that it would have to remain parked until she could provide 
documentation showing ownership or proof of insurance.

[¶9]      After speaking 
with some of her superiors, Gehnert quit her job and walked home. She returned 
to Taco John's a short time later and turned in her uniform. She then got into 
the car and sat there for approximately thirty to forty minutes. Despite being 
warned a second time by Deputy Phillips that she could not legally drive the 
vehicle, Gehnert drove off in the car. Deputy Phillips followed Gehnert and 
pulled her over. At that time, Deputy Phillips called for assistance. Linda 
Renner, a detective with the Laramie County sheriff's department, arrived and 
took over the traffic stop while Deputy Phillips returned to Taco 
John's.

[¶10]   After some discussion, Gehnert 
agreed to accompany Detective Renner to the sheriff's department for an 
interview in exchange for the detective's promise not to have the car towed. At 
the sheriff's department, Gehnert repeatedly claimed that she did not own the 
car, explaining that her fiancé had actually purchased it. She requested an 
attorney and, at that point, the interview was terminated. Detective Renner gave 
Gehnert a ride home.

[¶11]   Gehnert's fiancé was at her 
residence when she and Detective Renner arrived. The fiancé told Detective 
Renner that he had bought the car for $500 and that, although he was buying it 
for Gehnert, he was "technically" the owner of the car because no documents had 
been issued in Gehnert's name. He explained that the money had been paid and 
possession of the car had transferred but that the formal documents evidencing 
the sale had not been finalized.

[¶12]   Detective Renner asked the fiancé
for his permission to search the trunk of the car. He agreed to the search and 
signed a consent form. He accompanied Detective Renner to where the car was 
parked and was present when she conducted the search. Detective Renner testified 
that, after the locksmith opened the trunk, she observed a lot of "junk." Before 
moving anything, she saw money sticking out of a plastic grocery bag. She then 
moved a blue cloth under which she found the two missing money bags. The bags 
were numbered and were labeled Taco John's. Detective Renner also found a key 
which she later discovered was the key that was missing from the manager's china 
cabinet.

[¶13]   Gehnert was arrested for grand 
larceny. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence which had been seized from 
the car, and the district court denied her motion. Pursuant to a negotiated plea 
agreement, Gehnert pleaded nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal from 
the district court's denial of her motion to suppress. She also agreed to pay 
restitution to Taco John's for both thefts. Gehnert was sentenced to serve a 
prison term of not less than three years nor more than five years. She appeals 
to this Court from the denial of her motion to suppress.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶14]   We do not disturb the findings on 
factual issues which the district court has made in considering a motion to 
suppress unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Southworth v. State, 913 P.2d 444, 447 (Wyo. 1996). Because the district court conducts the hearing on 
the motion to suppress and has the opportunity to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, 
and conclusions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
district court's determination. Id. The constitutionality of a particular search 
or seizure is a question of law which we review de novo. 
Id.

DISCUSSION

[¶15]   In this appeal, Gehnert claims that 
she owned the car and that the search of the trunk was illegal because neither 
she nor anyone with the authority to do so consented to the search. She also 
contends that, if a valid consent was given, the fruits of the search should 
have been suppressed because the police exceeded the scope of the consent and 
because exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search did not exist. The 
State argues that Detective Renner obtained a valid consent from Gehnert's 
fiancé. 

[¶16]   Subject to certain exceptions, 
warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable under both the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution. Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 564 (Wyo. 1996). Among the 
recognized exceptions are searches and/or seizures conducted pursuant to a valid 
consent. Id. "Whether an exception exists in a particular case is a question of 
fact that may be properly resolved by a preponderance of the evidence standard 
in the light of all attendant circumstances." City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203 (Wyo. 1991). When this Court reviews questions of fact, we view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. The burden 
of proving that the circumstances of a particular case fit within an exception 
is with the State. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 1972, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1970).

[¶17]   The United States Supreme Court 
decided a case in which the police entered an apartment and seized various drug 
paraphernalia with the consent of an individual who, as it turned out, did not 
possess actual authority to consent to a search of the premises. Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990). The Supreme 
Court held that a warrantless search will not be held illegal when consent is 
obtained from a person who the police reasonably believe possesses authority to 
provide such consent:

As with other 
factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent 
to enter must "be judged against an objective standard: would the facts 
available to the officer at the moment . . . 'warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief' " that the consenting party had authority over the 
premises? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
(1968). If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful 
unless authority actually exists. But if so, the search is 
valid.

497 U.S.  at 
188-89, 110 S. Ct.  at 2801.

[¶18]   Even though Gehnert now maintains 
that she owned the car and was the only person who had authority to consent to 
its search, during the investigation, she led Detective Renner to believe that 
her fiancé owned the car and that she did not possess authority to consent to a 
search of the trunk. When Detective Renner spoke with the fiancé, he told her 
that, although he was buying the car for Gehnert, he thought he was technically 
the owner because he had paid for it and Gehnert's name was not yet on the 
title. Detective Renner asked the fiancé if she could search the vehicle, and he 
consented and signed a permission to search form which 
provided:

I, [Fiance,] 
have been informed by Sgt. Linda K. Renner and Detective Bruce Dexter who made 
proper identification as (an) authorized law enforcement officer(s) of the 
Laramie Co. Sheriff's Dept[.] of my CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS not to have a search 
made of the premises and property owned by me and/or under my care, custody, and 
control, without a search warrant.

Knowing of my 
lawful right to refuse to consent to such a search, I willingly give my 
permission to the above named officer(s) to conduct a complete search of the 
premises and property, including all buildings and vehicles, both inside and 
outside, of the property located at Fox Farm & Medicine Bow Ave. The above 
said officer(s) further has(have) my permission to take from my premises and 
property, any letters, papers, materials, or any other property or things which 
they desire as evidence for criminal prosecution in the case or cases under 
investigation. This written permission to search without a search warrant is 
given by me to the above officer(s) voluntarily and without any threats or 
promises of any kind, at 1312 hrs/1:12 p.m. on this 11 day of August 1996, at 
Fox Farm & Medicine Bow Ave.

These facts gave 
Detective Renner the reasonable belief that the fiancé had authority to consent 
to the search. She, therefore, was not required to obtain a warrant before she 
conducted a complete search of the trunk of the vehicle.

[¶19]   Viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude that the State satisfied its 
burden of proving that the search of the automobile was justified under the 
consent exception to the warrant requirement. The district court's denial of 
Gehnert's motion to suppress the fruits of the search is, 
therefore,

[¶20]   Affirmed.