Case Title: Smedley v. Dept. of Mental Retardation

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC16985

State: connecticut

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
******************************************************
The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the
beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will
be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the
date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative
date for the beginning of all time periods for filing
postopinion motions and petitions for certification is
the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.
In no event will any such motions be accepted before
the ‘‘officially released’’ date.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the
event of discrepancies between the electronic version
of an opinion and the print version appearing in the
Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Con-
necticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the
latest print version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official
Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service
and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes
of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of
the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be repro-
duced and distributed without the express written per-
mission
of
the
Commission
on
Official
Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
******************************************************
EILEEN SMEDLEY v. DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL
RETARDATION ET AL.
(SC 16985)
Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js.
Argued December 2, 2003—officially released July 6, 2004
Edward T. Dodd, Jr., with whom, on the brief, was
Laura Ondrush, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Michael J. Belzer, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney
general, and William J. McCullough, assistant attorney
general, for the appellee (defendant).
Robin S. Schwartz and Christine Hughes, pro hac
vice, filed a brief for the Connecticut Business and
Industry Association et al. as amici curiae.
Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and William
J. McCullough, assistant attorney general, filed a brief
for the state employees retirement commission.1
Opinion
KATZ, J. As in the companion case of Starks v. Uni-
versity of Connecticut, 270 Conn.
,
A.2d
(2004), which we also have decided today, this appeal
requires us to determine whether the receipt of state
disability retirement benefits by the plaintiff, Eileen
Smedley, must be considered in determining her discre-
tionary benefits awarded pursuant to General Statutes
(Rev. to 1987) § 31-308a2 of the Workers’ Compensation
Act, contained in chapter 568 of the General Statutes.3
The plaintiff appeals4 from the decision of the compen-
sation review board (review board) affirming the deci-
sion of the workers’ compensation commissioner for
the fifth district (commissioner) that ordered that any
§ 31-308a benefit awarded to her be reduced by the
amount she received in state disability retirement bene-
fits. The named defendant,5 the department of mental
retardation, argues that the decision of the review board
was proper, and further argues that any other outcome
would result in a double recovery for the plaintiff. For
the reasons set forth in Starks v. University of Connect-
icut, supra,
, we conclude that, because the State
Employees Retirement Act, contained in chapter 66 of
the General Statutes,6 already provides for a statutory
offset of certain workers’ compensation benefits; see
General Statutes §§ 5-169 (g) and 5-192p (d); see foot-
notes 12 and 13 of this opinion; the calculation of the
plaintiff’s § 31-308a benefits should not have considered
any amounts received as state disability retirement ben-
efits. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the
review board.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts
and procedural history. On August 8, 1987, the plaintiff
was employed by the defendant as a cook at the South-
bury Training School, when she suffered a compensable
injury that left her with a 25 percent permanent partial
disability of her back. At the time of the injury, the
plaintiff earned an average weekly wage of $297. She
was awarded 130 weeks of permanent partial disability
benefits pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1987)
§ 31-308,7 which entitles an employee suffering a perma-
nent disability to a specified body part to payment of
a fixed amount of benefits. Her compensation rate was
$198.57 per week. Due to her injury, the plaintiff was
unable to return to her position as a cook at the South-
bury Training School. Consequently, she completed
vocational rehabilitation and, since approximately
March 1, 1998, she has been employed privately on a
light duty basis, earning less than what she had earned
at her former state position with the defendant. After
her specific indemnity benefits expired, on approxi-
mately January 23, 1997, the plaintiff was awarded 165
weeks of benefits pursuant to General Statutes (Rev.
to 1987) § 31-308a, which permits the commissioner,
on a discretionary basis, to grant additional benefits
‘‘equal to two-thirds of the difference between the
wages currently earned by an employee in a position
comparable to the position held by such injured
employee prior to his injury and the weekly amount
which such employee will probably be able to earn
thereafter
.
.
.
.’’8 These supplemental benefits
expired on approximately February 7, 1999. Subse-
quently, the plaintiff requested another § 31-308a award
retrospective to February 7, 1999.
In 1999, the plaintiff was awarded a state disability
retirement pension, retrospective to January 1, 1997,
and began receiving benefits of approximately $275 per
week. The defendant refused the plaintiff’s request for
additional § 31-308a benefits on the basis that the com-
missioner should take into consideration the benefits
she received from her state disability retirement pen-
sion. The parties stipulated that, if the plaintiff’s state
disability retirement benefits were added to the amount
she received in wages from her employment in a light
duty position, she would not be entitled to receive any
§ 31-308a benefits.9
In proceedings before the commissioner, the defen-
dant argued that the plaintiff’s disability retirement pen-
sion should be considered in determining her § 31-308a
benefit and that such benefit should be reduced accord-
ingly. The commissioner agreed and, as a result, fac-
tored that amount in the calculation, thereby deciding
not to award a § 31-308a benefit.
The plaintiff filed a petition for review on November
21, 2001, disagreeing with the commissioner’s determi-
nation that the receipt of state disability retirement
benefits should be included in the calculation of § 31-
308a benefits. In an opinion issued October 25, 2002, the
review board rejected the plaintiff’s appeal, determining
that the offset of disability retirement benefits was
appropriate under its prior ruling in Iannarone v. Dept.
of Mental Retardation, 4138 CRB-7-99-10 (June 15,
2001), in which the review board held that a state dis-
ability pension should be included in the amount a
claimant is ‘‘able to earn thereafter’’ for purposes of
§ 31-308a. In further support of its decision, the review
board stated that General Statutes § 31-31410 mandates
such an offset because it requires that ‘‘due allowance
shall be made for any sum which the employer has
paid to any injured employee or to his dependents on
account of the injury . . . .’’ The review board noted
that the application of § 31-314 to the plaintiff’s receipt
of state disability retirement benefits was consistent
with the general rule prohibiting a double recovery.
‘‘As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of
review applicable to workers’ compensation appeals.
. . . It is well established that [a]lthough not disposi-
tive, we accord great weight to the construction given
to the workers’ compensation statutes by the commis-
sioner and [the review] board.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Kuehl v. Z-Loda Systems Engineering,
Inc., 265 Conn. 525, 532, 829 A.2d 818 (2003). ‘‘It is well
settled that we do not defer to the [review] board’s
construction of a statute—a question of law—when, as
in the present case, the provisions at issue previously
have not been subjected to judicial scrutiny or when
the [review] board’s interpretation has not been time
tested.’’ Rayhall v. Akim Co., 263 Conn. 328, 354, 819
A.2d 803 (2003). Accordingly, because this issue is one
of first impression for our courts, our review is plenary.
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the review board’s
decision in Iannarone v. Dept. of Mental Retardation,
supra, 4138 CRB-7-99-10, was incorrect when the review
board concluded that benefits received under the state
disability retirement plan should be considered part of
‘‘the weekly amount which such employee will probably
be able to earn thereafter’’ under § 31-308a. Instead, the
plaintiff contends that because the statute expressly
provides that benefits are ‘‘to be determined . . .
based upon the nature and extent of the injury, the
training, education and experience of the employee,
[and] the availability of work for persons with such
physical condition and at the employee’s age’’; General
Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 31-308a; the commissioner’s
award determination is confined to the consideration
of such enumerated factors. The plaintiff further argues
that disability retirement benefits should not be consid-
ered toward a claimant’s ‘‘ ‘earnings’ ’’ or their ‘‘ ‘earning
power,’ ’’ and thus, should not be taken into consider-
ation in calculating a § 31-308a award.
The defendant relies on the review board’s decision
in Iannarone v. Dept. of Mental Retardation, supra,
4138 CRB-7-99-10, as well as its decision in the compan-
ion case, Starks v. University of Connecticut, 4467
CRB-2-02-12 (February 13, 2003), in which the review
board determined that a claimant’s § 31-308a award
should take into consideration any state disability
retirement benefits the claimant is receiving in order
to avoid a double recovery. The defendant contends
that the review board’s interpretation of § 31-308a was
proper, particularly in light of the instruction of § 31-
314 to make ‘‘due allowance . . . for any sum which
the employer has paid to any injured employee . . . .’’
The defendant also argues that, because § 31-308a bene-
fits are purely discretionary; see General Statues (Rev.
to 1987) § 31-308a (‘‘the commissioner . . . may award
additional compensation benefits’’ [emphasis added]);
a commissioner has very broad discretion in determin-
ing a § 31-308a award, and is therefore not confined
solely to the enumerated factors set forth in the
statute.11
Our decision in Starks v. University of Connecticut,
supra, 270 Conn.
, is dispositive of this claim. For
the reasons set forth in that case, we conclude that the
legislature explicitly has provided for an offset mecha-
nism under either under § 5-169 (g),12 which governs
Tier I retirees, or § 5-192p (d),13 which governs Tier II
retirees, and therefore benefits awarded under § 31-
308a need not be offset by a claimant’s receipt of state
disability retirement benefits.14
The decision of the review board is reversed and the
case is remanded for recalculation of the plaintiff’s § 31-
308a benefits award.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1 The brief on behalf of the state employees retirement commission was
filed in response to this court’s request. See footnote 14 of this opinion.
2 General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 31-308a provides: ‘‘In addition to the
compensation benefits provided by section 31-308 for specific loss of a
member or use of the function of a member of the body, or any personal injury
covered by this chapter, the commissioner, after such payments provided by
said section 31-308 have been paid for the period set forth in said section,
may award additional compensation benefits for such partial permanent
disability equal to two-thirds of the difference between the wages currently
earned by an employee in a position comparable to the position held by
such injured employee prior to his injury and the weekly amount which
such employee will probably be able to earn thereafter, to be determined
by the commissioner based upon the nature and extent of the injury, the
training, education and experience of the employee, the availability of work
for persons with such physical condition and at the employee’s age, but not
more than the maximum provided in section 31-309. If evidence of exact
loss of earnings is not available, such loss may be computed from the
proportionate loss of physical ability or earning power caused by the injury.
The duration of such additional compensation shall be determined upon a
similar basis by the commissioner.’’
3 General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.
4 The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the
appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice
Book § 65-1.
5 Berkley Administrators was also named as a defendant in this appeal.
For purposes of this opinion, we shall refer to the defendants in the singular.
6 General Statutes § 5-152 et seq.
7 General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 31-308 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)
If any injury for which compensation is provided under the provisions of
this chapter results in partial incapacity, there shall be paid to the injured
employee a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent
of the difference between the wages currently earned by an employee in a
position comparable to the position held by such injured employee prior
to his injury and the amount he is able to earn after such injury, except
that when (1) the physician attending an injured employee certifies that
such employee is unable to perform his usual work but is able to perform
other work, (2) such employee is ready and willing to perform such other
work in the same locality and (3) no such other work is available, such
employee shall be paid his full weekly compensation subject to the provi-
sions of this section. In either of the above cases, such compensation shall
in no case be more than the maximum weekly benefit rate set forth in
section 31-309 and shall continue during the period of partial incapacity but
no longer than seven hundred and eighty weeks. If the employer procures
for an injured employee employment suitable to his capacity, the wages
offered in such employment shall be taken as the earning capacity of the
injured employee during the period of such employment.
‘‘(b) With respect to the following-described injuries the compensation,
in addition to the usual compensation for total incapacity but in lieu of all
other payments for compensation, shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per cent
of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee, but in no case more
than the maximum weekly benefit rate set forth in section 31-309, or less
than twenty dollars weekly . . . .’’
8 Currently, General Statutes § 31-308a (a) provides that additional benefits
shall be: based upon 75 percent of the difference between preinjury and
postinjury after-tax earnings of the employee; limited in duration to the
lesser of either the span of the employee’s permanent partial disability award
or 520 weeks; and available only to claimants ‘‘who are willing and able to
perform work in [Connecticut].’’
9 The plaintiff represented to the commissioner that if she were still
employed as a cook at the Southbury Training School, she currently would
be earning at least $800 weekly, but that she currently was earning only an
average weekly wage of approximately $660.
10 General Statutes § 31-314 provides: ‘‘In fixing the amount of any compen-
sation under this chapter, due allowance shall be made for any sum which
the employer has paid to any injured employee or to his dependents on
account of the injury, except such sums as the employer has expended or
directed to be expended for medical, surgical or hospital service.’’
11 In addition, the Connecticut Business and Industry Association and the
New England Legal Foundation jointly filed an amici curiae brief in support
of the review board’s decision to offset the receipt of § 31-308a benefits by
any amounts received from a state disability retirement pension.
12 General Statutes § 5-169 (g) provides: ‘‘Twenty per cent of all outside
earned salary or wages shall be offset against the disability retirement
payments by the state during the first two years of disability. On or after
October 1, 1987, at the expiration of such period, if the total disability
benefits and outside earnings exceed one hundred per cent of the pay of
such member at the date of disability, adjusted annually by a percentage
increase equal to the cost of living allowances applied to the member’s
disability retirement benefits pursuant to this chapter, the disability payment
will be reduced by the amount such total exceeds such adjusted earnings.
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the following maxi-
mum benefit limitations shall apply if the member’s date of disability occurs
on or after January 1, 1984. Such maximum benefit limitations shall apply
coincident with the receipt of benefits under subsection (d) of section 5-
142 by any member of the Division of State Police within the Department
of Public Safety. To verify the operation of the maximums, members shall
authorize the Social Security Administration to provide the Retirement Com-
mission, on an ongoing basis, any information with regard to covered earn-
ings or Social Security benefits payable. In the event both of the maximums
indicated below apply, the lesser disability benefit shall be payable. Such
maximums shall be subject to reexamination annually, as indicated in sub-
section (h) of this section.
‘‘(1) The disability benefit provided under this section shall not exceed
one hundred per cent of the member’s base salary or the rate of salary of
the member on his date of disability, whichever is greater, less any periodic
cash benefit payments being made to a member under the Workers’ Compen-
sation Act, less any federal disability Social Security benefits, including
primary and family, paid on account of the member’s Social Security earnings
history, less all outside earned salary or wages, unless the Retirement Com-
mission determines that such salary or wages are being paid as part of the
rehabilitation of the disabled member. Any such determination that such
earned salary or wages is for rehabilitation must be reapproved by the
Retirement Commission no less frequently than every eighteen months, or
the offset shall apply. The offset for workers’ compensation and federal
Social Security disability benefits shall apply when such benefits commence
even if such benefits initially commence after the member’s disability
retirement date.
’’(2) The disability benefit provided under this section shall not exceed
eighty per cent of the member’s base salary or the rate of salary of the
member on the date of disability, whichever is greater, less any periodic
cash benefit payments being made to a member under the Workers’ Compen-
sation Act, less any federal disability Social Security benefits, including
primary and family, being paid on account of the member’s Social Security
earnings history. The offsets shall apply when such benefits commence even
if such benefits initially commence after the member’s disability retirement
date.’’ (Emphasis added.)
13 General Statutes § 5-192p (d) provides: ‘‘Notwithstanding the provisions
of subsection (c) of this section, the following maximum benefit limitation
shall apply. In order to verify the operation of the maximums, it shall be a
condition precedent to receipt of any disability benefits under this section
that a member authorize the Social Security Administration to provide the
Retirement Commission, on an ongoing basis, any information with regard
to covered earnings or Social Security benefits payable. In the event both
of the maximums indicated below apply, the lesser disability benefit shall
be payable. Such maximums shall be subject to reexamination annually, as
indicated in subsection (e) of this section.
‘‘(1) The disability benefit provided under this subsection shall not exceed
(A) one hundred per cent of the member’s final average earnings or the
rate of salary of the member on date of disability, whichever is greater, less
(B) any periodic cash benefit payments being made to a member under
the Workers’ Compensation Act, less (C) any federal disability Social Security
benefits both primary and family paid on account of the member’s Social
Security earnings history less (D) all outside earned salary or wages unless
the Retirement Commission determines that such salary or wages are being
paid as part of the rehabilitation of the disabled member. Any such determi-
nation that such earned salary or wages is for rehabilitation must be reap-
proved by the Retirement Commission no less frequently than every eighteen
months, or the offset shall apply. The offset for workers’ compensation and
federal Social Security disability benefits shall apply when such benefits
commence even if such benefits initially commence after the member’s
disability retirement date.
‘‘(2) The disability benefit provided under this subsection shall not exceed
(A) eighty per cent of the greater of the member’s final average earnings
or the rate of salary of the member on the date of disability, less (B) any
periodic cash benefit payments being made to a member under the Workers’
Compensation Act, less (C) any federal disability Social Security benefits,
both primary and family being paid on account of the member’s Social
Security earnings history. The offsets shall apply when such benefits com-
mence even if such benefits initially commence after the member’s disability
retirement date.’’ (Emphasis added.)
14 On December 15, 2003, after the present case was argued before this
court, we issued an order requesting that the state employees retirement
commission (retirement commission) advise us of its practices in reducing
state disability retirement benefits by the amount of any benefits that the
employee has been awarded pursuant to § 31-308a. On January 15, 2004,
the commission filed a brief indicating that it does not offset such benefits.
The defendant urges us to accord deference to the commission’s practice.
As we stated in Starks v. University of Connecticut, supra, 270 Conn.
,
however, ‘‘[a]lthough the commission’s current practice might be based on
sound administrative reasoning, and a change in such practice inevitably
might lead to thorny administrative concerns, we cannot condone the contin-
ued contravention of our legislature’s directive that state disability retire-
ment benefits be offset by certain types of workers’ compensation benefits,
such as those available pursuant to § 31-308a.’’