Case Title: Fuentes v. Clarke

Citation: 

Docket Number: 141890

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2015-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
BETTY BUSTILLO FUENTES 
 
 
   OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 141890    
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
  October 29, 2015 
HAROLD CLARKE, DIRECTOR, 
  VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
  
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a lawful permanent resident of the United States 
received ineffective assistance of counsel when advised about a plea agreement pertaining to a 
charge of grand larceny, a crime involving moral turpitude rendering her deportable under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). 
I.  BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Betty Bustillo Fuentes, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was indicted on 
a single count of grand larceny, in violation of Code § 18.2-95.  In March 2012, Fuentes pled 
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement under Rule 3A:8(c)(1)(C).  In the plea agreement, Fuentes 
admitted that she was guilty of the crime and acknowledged that her plea “may place [her] at risk 
for deportation if [she was] not a citizen of the United States.”  She also stated in it that she was 
represented by counsel, was satisfied with the representation, had read the plea agreement and 
reviewed it with counsel, and was entering the plea voluntarily.  She and the Commonwealth 
agreed to a sentence of 3 years’ incarceration, with all 3 years suspended subject to specified 
conditions. 
At her plea hearing, Fuentes reaffirmed that she had read the agreement in her native 
language, that she understood it, and that she had the opportunity to discuss it with counsel.  She 
said that she discussed with counsel the Commonwealth’s evidence and her possible defenses.  
 
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She reaffirmed that she had chosen to plead guilty to the charge because she was in fact guilty of 
the crime.  She reaffirmed that her plea was voluntary.  She reaffirmed that she was satisfied 
with her counsel’s representation.  The circuit court thereafter found that her plea was “freely, 
voluntarily, and intelligently entered with an understanding of the . . . consequences of entering a 
plea.”  The court then accepted her plea, found her guilty of the crime, and imposed the sentence 
agreed by the parties in the plea agreement. 
In March 2014, Fuentes filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that her trial 
counsel failed to advise her of the immigration consequences of her plea.  She asserted that she 
first learned of the immigration consequences in June 2012 when she was served with a notice to 
appear for removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).  She asserted that her trial 
counsel had provided ineffective assistance because he failed to advise her that her plea would 
result in removal. 
The Director of the Department of Corrections filed a motion to dismiss Fuentes’ 
petition, asserting that she had indicated her satisfaction with the representation provided by her 
trial counsel both in the plea agreement and at the plea hearing.  The Director argued that 
Fuentes had not satisfied the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim because she failed 
to show that she would have rejected the plea agreement and gone to trial if she had received 
competent advice, as required by Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).  Further, the evidence 
against her was overwhelming and she had no defense.  Thus, if she had gone to trial, she would 
have been convicted and would still have faced removal.  By accepting the plea agreement and 
pleading guilty, she avoided incarceration before removal.  However, she would have been 
subject to removal upon conviction whether she pled guilty or went to trial. 
Fuentes filed a reply in which she argued that the strength of the prosecution’s evidence 
is insufficient to show lack of prejudice because courts must consider the individual alien’s risk-
 
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reward calculation.  Her primary interest in entering the plea was to avoid separation from her 
three minor children; however, her removal from the United States will result in precisely such a 
separation.  She therefore did not benefit from her bargain and it would have been rational for 
her to prefer standing trial to pleading guilty.  Further, rejecting the plea agreement would likely 
have led to a different agreement requiring her to serve some incarceration but permitting her to 
plead guilty to a non-removable offense. 
At an evidentiary hearing on Fuentes’ petition, the circuit court heard evidence from 
Fuentes, her trial counsel, and two witnesses who testified about Fuentes’ guilt of the underlying 
grand larceny charge.1  Fuentes’ trial counsel testified that he was familiar with the substance of 
the witnesses’ testimony and had discussed it with Fuentes before her preliminary hearing.  He 
also testified that he was aware of a video recording showing her shoplifting, which he also 
discussed with Fuentes.  He testified that he met with Fuentes once or twice at his office and four 
or five times at the courthouse.  He testified that she never offered a defense to the charge. 
Fuentes’ trial counsel also testified that she told him through a Spanish-speaking 
associate of his firm that she was present in the country unlawfully and “had no papers.”  He 
testified that he had no idea that she was a permanent resident until the day of the evidentiary 
hearing.  He testified that he discussed the risk of deportation with her each time they met 
because that was her principal concern.  He testified that he advised her that “her guilty plea 
would have consequences--immigration consequences to include the likelihood of deportation 
                                                 
1 These witnesses included an employee of the store from which Fuentes was caught 
shoplifting and the arresting police officer.  The employee testified that she personally observed 
Fuentes putting merchandise in her bag before exiting the store.  The employee also testified that 
when she confronted Fuentes outside the store, Fuentes admitted taking the merchandise. The 
arresting officer likewise testified that Fuentes admitted taking the merchandise. The Director 
also introduced an exhibit listing 35 separate items of stolen merchandise recovered from 
Fuentes at the scene, with prices totaling $1540.11. 
 
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unless she was able to find some remedy through immigration.”  He also testified that the risk of 
deportation would be the same whether she was present lawfully or unlawfully.  He testified that 
he advised her to consult with an immigration attorney because he did not specialize in 
immigration issues. 
The circuit court thereafter entered a final order in which it found, based on the evidence 
adduced at the hearing, that “trial counsel adequately advised [Fuentes] of the immigration 
consequences of her guilty plea,” and dismissed her petition for failure to satisfy the performance 
prong of the ineffective assistance test under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984).  Alternatively, the court found that she failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of the test 
because she did not show that she would have pled not guilty and proceeded to trial if she had 
received competent advice.  The evidence against her was overwhelming, especially in light of 
her admissions to the store employee and arresting officer that she had stolen the merchandise 
recovered from her at the scene.  Thus, the record suggested that even if she had pled not guilty 
and gone to trial, she would have been convicted of the offense and the immigration 
consequences would have been the same.  The court therefore denied the petition. 
We awarded Fuentes this appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
In her first assignment of error, Fuentes asserts that the circuit court erred by finding that 
her trial counsel provided competent representation.  She argues that while immigration law is so 
complex it is essentially a legal specialty in itself, there was no uncertainty that her conviction 
would make her removable.  Therefore, the language in the plea agreement that her plea “may 
place her at risk for deportation” and her trial counsel’s advice that there was a “likelihood of 
deportation” were insufficient under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010) and United 
 
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States v. Akinsade, 686 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2012) to inform her of the true consequences of 
the plea. 
She further argues that her trial counsel’s advice could not have been competent because 
he did not even know her correct immigration status.  As a result, the advice he provided was 
relevant to an alien unlawfully present rather than to a permanent resident.  She also argues that 
his testimony that the immigration consequences of her plea would be the same whether she was 
present lawfully or unlawfully is incorrect because those unlawfully present may be eligible for a 
petty offense exception under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), which is unavailable to those 
lawfully present. 
Whether a circuit court properly granted or denied a petition for habeas corpus is a mixed 
question of law and fact.  Dominguez v. Pruett, 287 Va. 434, 440, 756 S.E.2d 911, 914 (2014).  
The habeas court’s findings of historical fact “are entitled to deference and are binding upon this 
Court unless those findings are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  In other words, when a court rules that an attorney did or 
did not advise his or her client of a particular point, it is a finding of fact that will not be 
disturbed if it is supported by evidence in the record.  However, the court’s legal conclusions are 
reviewed de novo.  Id.  Thus, this Court does not defer to the circuit court’s determination of 
whether the advice the court found (as a matter of historical fact) that counsel gave the petitioner 
is constitutionally adequate. 
In this case, the circuit court ruled that “trial counsel adequately advised [Fuentes] of the 
immigration consequences of her guilty plea.”  This ruling is a legal conclusion that is not 
entitled to deference upon appellate review.  However, the court stated that it based its ruling on 
the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing, so we review that evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party below and give that party the benefit of all reasonable 
 
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inferences fairly drawn therefrom.  Ryland v. Manor Care, Inc., 266 Va. 503, 509, 587 S.E.2d 
515, 519 (2003). 
 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must show both 
deficient performance by counsel and prejudice. . . . 
To establish deficient performance, a person . . . must show that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  A court 
considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption that 
counsel’s representation was within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance.  The challenger’s burden is to show that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. 
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 121-22 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Fuentes has not met this burden.  Her trial counsel’s testimony establishes that he met 
with her multiple times, discussed the immigration consequences of the plea on each occasion 
because it was her principal concern, informed her that deportation was the likely consequence 
of the plea, and advised her to consult with an immigration attorney because he did not specialize 
in immigration. 
This case therefore is clearly distinguishable from Padilla, where the petitioner’s trial 
counsel affirmatively misadvised his client by telling him he didn’t have to worry about any 
immigration consequences of his plea “since he had been in the country so long.”  559 U.S. at 
359 (internal quotation marks omitted).  It is likewise distinguishable from Akinsade, where the 
petitioner had been charged with one count of embezzlement by a bank employee, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 656, and trial counsel affirmatively misadvised him that he could not be deported for 
a single conviction.  686 F.3d at 250.  Unlike those cases, Fuentes’ trial counsel did not 
affirmatively misadvise her by assuring her that she would not be deported. 
Fuentes’ argument that the equivocation in counsel’s advice (i.e., that there was a 
“likelihood of deportation”) and in the plea agreement (i.e., that her plea “may place [her] at risk 
 
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for deportation”) made the advice constitutionally inadequate is without merit.  Akinsade, the 
case she cites, does not support this argument.  The Unites States district court considering 
Akinsade’s petition found that his trial counsel’s performance had been constitutionally 
insufficient, and the prosecution agreed.  686 F.3d at 251 & n.3.  Thus, only the prejudice prong 
of the ineffective assistance claim was at issue on appeal. 
In any event, as Fuentes acknowledges on brief, although her conviction made her 
eligibility for deportation absolutely certain, there was no such certainty that she would actually 
be deported because the Attorney General retained discretion over her removal.  8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a) describes classes of deportable aliens.  It provides that any such alien shall be removed 
“upon the order of the Attorney General.”  Therefore, to the extent that the words “likelihood” 
and “may” in counsel’s advice and in the plea agreement were equivocal, those words did not 
“show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” or “show 
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment.”  Premo, 562 U.S. at 121-22 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374 (holding “that counsel must inform her client whether 
his plea carries a risk of deportation” (emphasis added)).  To the contrary, those words were 
entirely accurate. 
Fuentes’ argument that trial counsel’s advice was constitutionally inadequate because it 
was irrecoverably tainted by his belief that she was unlawfully present is also without merit.  His 
belief arose directly from her statement that she was present unlawfully and “had no papers.”  It 
was not unreasonable for him to rely on her representation of her own immigration status and to 
provide immigration advice based on it. 
Furthermore, a grand larceny conviction would make her equally deportable whether she 
was present lawfully or unlawfully.  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (rendering an alien 
 
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inadmissable after conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude) with 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (rendering admitted alien removable after conviction of a crime involving moral 
turpitude if committed within 5 years of admission and the offense is subject to a sentence of 1 
year or longer).  Although the petty offense exception available for an unlawfully present alien 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) may not have been available to a lawfully present alien, 
her trial counsel did not purport to be an expert versed in such subtleties.  To the contrary, he 
expressly informed her that he was not a specialist in immigration, advised her that she would be 
deportable unless she found a remedy within the immigration system, and advised her to consult 
with an immigration attorney.  Again, this advice does not fall below the constitutional standard 
of reasonableness articulated in Premo. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Padilla, immigration law is its own complex specialty.  
559 U.S. at 369.  However, the Court did not require that members of the criminal bar undertake 
the burden to become immigration specialists.  Id.; see also id. at 377 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(noting that many criminal defense attorneys have little understanding of immigration law).  
Rather, when the Court required defense counsel to give correct advice about the deportation 
consequences of a conviction, it also acknowledged that the opacity of immigration law for those 
who do not regularly practice in the field “will affect the scope and nature of [defense] counsel’s 
advice.”  Id. at 369 & n.10. 
In this case, Fuentes’ trial counsel correctly advised her that her conviction would likely 
result in her deportation, unless she found an exemption within the immigration system.  That 
advice was correct regardless of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of her presence.  He further 
 
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admitted that he was not an immigration attorney and advised her to consult one.  On the facts of 
this case, his performance satisfied the constitutional standard of reasonableness.2 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the circuit court’s judgment. 
Affirmed.   
                                                 
2 Because we determine that Fuentes has not established that her trial counsel’s 
performance was deficient, we need not reach her second assignment of error, in which she 
challenges the circuit court’s alternative ruling that she did not establish prejudice.  Premo, 562 
U.S. at 121.