Case Title: Aikens v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 63, 2016

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2016-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GERALD AIKENS, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 63, 2016 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID 1501012505 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: June 20, 2016 
Decided: 
August 29, 2016 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
This 29th day of August 2016, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In October 2015, the defendant-appellant, Gerald Aikens, was 
convicted following a Superior Court bench trial of Possession of a Firearm 
by a Person Prohibited (“PFPP”), Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon 
(“CCDW”), and Driving While Suspended.  Following a presentence 
investigation, the Superior Court sentenced Aikens to a total period of 
thirteen years at Level V incarceration to be suspended after serving five 
years in prison for a period of probation.  This is Aikens’ direct appeal. 
 
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(2) 
Aikens’ counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw under Rule 26(c).  Aikens’ counsel asserts that, based upon a 
complete and careful examination of the record, there are no arguably 
appealable issues.  By letter, Aikens’ attorney informed him of the 
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Aikens with a copy of the motion to 
withdraw and the accompanying brief.  Aikens also was informed of his 
right to supplement his attorney's presentation.  
(3) 
In response to his counsel’s Rule 26(c) brief, Aikens filed four 
different documents raising many overlapping issues.  His distinct 
arguments are that: (i) the trial court improperly considered hearsay 
evidence regarding statements made by Aikens at his videophone 
arraignment; (ii) the State engaged in misconduct and committed Brady and 
Deberry violations by failing to preserve and test a partial fingerprint 
obtained from the gun found in his car; (iii) the State erred in admitting 
testimony concerning marijuana found in Aikens’ car at the time of his arrest 
because those drugs were not properly authenticated and because the State 
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed marijuana; (iv) 
the police stop of his vehicle was pretextual and the resulting search violated 
his constitutional rights; (v) he was never given Miranda warnings; (vi) the 
testifying officer committed perjury; (vii) the trial judge improperly engaged 
 
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in an unrecorded sidebar with counsel; (viii) he was not driving without a 
license; (ix) his waiver of a jury trial was not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary; and (x) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions.  
(4) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
 (5) 
The State’s evidence at trial fairly established the following 
version of events.  On January 21, 2015, a Delaware State police officer was 
sitting in his patrol car at the intersection of Harmony Road and Route 273 
in New Castle County.  He saw a green Monte Carlo exit a gas station 
parking lot and drive northbound in the southbound lane of Harmony Road.  
The officer pulled his car behind the vehicle.  He checked the vehicle’s 
registration and determined that one of the vehicle’s owners, Aikens, had a 
suspended driver’s license.  The officer pulled the vehicle over.  Aikens was 
the driver, and Khalif Samuels was his front seat passenger.  The officer 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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smelled freshly burned marijuana and saw, in plain view, a plastic bag 
containing vials filled with a green leafy substance, which later field tested 
positive for marijuana. 
(6) 
The officer asked both men to exit the vehicle.  The officer 
searched the car and found a loaded handgun in the closed center console.  
Both men were arrested.  The gun was later tested for fingerprints, but no 
usable prints were recovered.  During his videophone arraignment, Aikens 
twice said to the Justice of the Peace that the gun belonged to him and that 
the police should not have arrested Samuels.  After the magistrate reminded 
him of his right to remain silent, Aikens again stated that the gun was his.  It 
was undisputed that Aikens was prohibited from possessing a gun.  Aikens 
did not testify at trial.  During closing, defense counsel argued that without 
fingerprints to connect him to the gun, there was reasonable doubt that 
Aikens, and not Samuels, was in possession of the gun.  The Superior Court 
convicted Aikens of all three charges. 
 (7) 
Aikens’ first point on appeal is that the Superior Court 
improperly considered hearsay evidence of statements that Aikens made 
during his videophone arraignment.  Aikens’ characterization of his 
statements as hearsay, however, is simply incorrect.  Under Delaware Rule 
 
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of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A), a party’s own statements are not hearsay.2  This 
argument has no merit. 
(8) 
Aikens next contends that the State violated his rights by failing 
to preserve and test fingerprint evidence recovered from the gun.  Aikens is 
incorrect.  Through the testimony of the arresting officer, the State presented 
the laboratory test results of the fingerprint evidence that was recovered 
from the gun.  The report concluded that “latent prints are of no value to the 
comparison.”  The report was admitted without any objection by Aikens, and 
Aikens’ trial counsel argued in closing that the lack of fingerprint evidence 
linking Aikens’ to the gun created reasonable doubt that the gun had been in 
Aikens’ possession.  There is no factual basis for Aikens’ contention that the 
State failed to preserve evidence or violated any discovery requirements. 
(9) 
Aikens’ next two issues are intertwined.  He argues that the 
police officer’s stop of his vehicle was pretextual and the resulting search 
violated his constitutional rights.  He also contends that the Superior Court 
erred in admitting testimony concerning marijuana seen in plain view in his 
car at the time of the traffic stop because the evidence was not properly 
authenticated and because the State did not prove that he possessed 
marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt.  Because the State did not charge him 
                                                 
2 D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A) provides that any statement that is offered against a party and is 
the party’s own statement is not hearsay. 
 
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with any drug offense, Aikens asserts that the marijuana also was a pretext 
for the resulting search of his vehicle, which was unconstitutional, and that 
the evidence seized as a result of that search (i.e., the gun) should have been 
deemed inadmissible. 
(10) Aikens, however, did not file a motion to suppress the evidence 
seized as a result of the search of his vehicle, nor did he raise any objections 
at trial to the testimony concerning his possession of marijuana.  Thus, we 
review these claims for plain error.3  Plain error exists when the error 
complained of is apparent on the face of the record and is so prejudicial to a 
defendant’s substantial rights as to jeopardize the integrity and fairness of 
the trial.4     
(11) We find no plain error in this case.  The arresting officer 
testified at trial that he saw Aikens’ vehicle driving northbound in a 
southbound lane.  The officer also ran a check and discovered that one of the 
vehicle’s registered owners, Aikens, had a suspended license.  Given this 
testimony, we reject Aikens’ belated contention that the stop was pretextual 
and unjustified.5   
                                                 
3 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2016). 
4 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
5 Harrison v. State, ___ A.3d ___, 2016 WL 3678292 (Del. July 8, 2016). 
 
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(12) Moreover, at Aikens’ bench trial, the trial judge, sua sponte, 
raised the issue of the justification for the officer’s search of Aikens’ 
vehicle.  Only then did the prosecutor proffer the officer’s testimony 
concerning the smell of freshly-burned marijuana and the bag of marijuana 
in plain view in Aikens’ car.  Aikens did not object to this testimony, and we 
find no plain error in its admission.6  Contrary to Aikens’ suggestion, the 
State was not required to establish a chain of custody of the marijuana 
because the marijuana itself was not admitted into evidence.  Moreover, 
because the possession of marijuana charge was dismissed before trial, the 
State was not required to prove that Aikens possessed marijuana beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The presence of marijuana in plain view in Aikens’ 
vehicle was sufficient justification to arrest Aikens and to conduct a search 
of the vehicle beyond the purpose of the initial traffic stop.7  We find no 
plain error with respect to the admission of the gun seized from Aikens’ 
vehicle as a result of the officer’s search. 
(13) Aikens also appears to argue that the arresting officer’s 
testimony concerning the marijuana he found in Aikens’ car was perjured.  
The sole basis for Aikens’ allegation is that the State did not offer this 
testimony until the trial judge, sua sponte, raised the question about the 
                                                 
6 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8. 
7 Jenkins v. State, 970 A.2d 154, 158-59 (Del. 2009). 
 
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justification for the search of Aikens’ vehicle.  As already noted, however, 
Aikens did not challenge the admission of this testimony.  There is no 
support in the record for Aikens’ conclusory allegation that the arresting 
officer gave false testimony. 
(14) Aikens next asserts that he was never advised of his Miranda 
rights.  To the extent that Aikens suggests that he made statements to the 
police that should have been suppressed, he does not identify what those 
statements were.  Moreover, in the absence of plain error (which we do not 
find), his failure to raise this issue below constitutes a waiver of the claim on 
appeal.8 
(15) Aikens also contends that his waiver of his right to a jury trial 
and his waiver of his right to testify were not knowing and intelligent 
because he was under the influence of drugs.  The trial transcript, however, 
belies these assertions.  The record reflects that the Superior Court judge 
engaged in appropriate colloquies with Aikens regarding his waiver of both 
of these trial rights.  Aikens responded to the judge intelligibly, and there is 
no evidence in the record to suggest that Aikens was not competent to waive 
these rights.  Thus, we find no merit to this belated claim. 
                                                 
8 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8.  
 
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(16) Aikens’ next claim—that the Superior Court improperly 
engaged in an unrecorded sidebar during trial—is also unsupported by the 
trial transcript.  The transcript reflects that during the course of trial, the 
judge held only one sidebar with counsel regarding the justification for the 
search of Aikens’ vehicle.  That sidebar was recorded and is part of the trial 
record.  There is no factual basis for Aikens’ claim to the contrary. 
(17) Finally, Aikens contends that he was not driving without a 
license and that the evidence was insufficient to support any of his 
convictions.  In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Court 
must determine, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.9  In this case, Aikens’ counsel 
conceded at trial that Aikens was driving and that his license was suspended.  
Accordingly, the State’s evidence was sufficient to prove Aikens guilty of 
that charge.  Moreover, with respect to the weapon offenses, the evidence at 
trial reflected that Aikens was prohibited from possession a firearm, that a 
gun was found in the center console of Aikens’ car while Aikens was driving 
it, and that Aikens admitted during his arraignment that the gun belonged to 
                                                 
9 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 
 
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him.  Under the circumstances, the evidence was sufficient to prove Aikens’ 
guilty of PFPP and CCDW.10 
(18) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Aikens’ appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Aikens’ counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Aikens could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Justice 
                                                 
10 Lecates v. State, 987 A.3d 413, 426 (Del. 2009).