Case Title: State v. McNeill

Citation: 1998-Ohio-38

Docket Number: 19971974

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. MCNEILL, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. McNeill (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Appellate procedure — Application for reopening appeal from judgment and 
conviction based on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel — 
Application denied, when. 
(No. 97-1974 — Submitted February 17, 1998 — Decided October 28, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 95CA006158. 
 
Appellant, Freddie McNeill, Jr., was convicted of aggravated murder and 
sentenced to death by the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas.  The court of 
appeals affirmed his conviction and death sentence.  State v. McNeill (Apr. 1, 
1997), Lorain App. No. 95CA6158, unreported, 1997 WL 186348.  McNeill’s 
direct appeal of that judgment is now pending in this court (case No. 97-929).  The 
record of McNeill’s trial was filed in this court on June 9, 1997. 
 
On June 30, 1997, McNeill filed in the court of appeals an application to 
reopen his direct appeal pursuant to App.R. 26(B).  The application alleged 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  Although App.R. 26(B)(2)(e) requires 
an application for reopening to “contain * * * [a]ny parts of the record available to 
the applicant,” McNeill’s application did not contain any part of the record. 
 
On July 28, 1997, McNeill filed  a motion with the court of appeals 
requesting that court to “hold * * * in abeyance” its proceedings on his application 
until his direct appeal was decided by this court.  McNeill argued that, “[s]ince the 
Supreme Court of Ohio is presently in possession of the record, [the court of 
appeals] will be unable to properly review the case and determine the prejudicial 
effect appellate counsel’s deficient representation had on Mr. McNeill’s 
proceedings.” 
 
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 On August 5, 1997, the court of appeals denied McNeill’s application to 
reopen because McNeill “has failed to provide us with the portions of the record 
this Court needs to evaluate the merits of [his] application.  Because appellant’s 
case is currently on appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, we do not have access to 
the trial court record.  Therefore, we cannot determine whether appellant even 
states a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” 
 
Subsequently, the court of appeals denied McNeill’s “motion to hold 
proceeding in abeyance,” stating that an application for reopening under App.R. 
26(B) must be ruled on within forty-five days of its filing. 
 
From the court of appeals’ judgment denying his App.R. 26(B) application, 
McNeill appeals to this court as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Gregory A. White, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jonathan E. 
Rosenbaum, Chief Counsel, Criminal Division, for appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Lawrence E. Komp and Jennifer 
E. Hite, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  In his first proposition of law, McNeill contends that the court 
of appeals erred by denying his application without considering whether he made 
colorable claims of ineffective assistance.  We disagree. 
 
App.R. 26(B)(2) states in pertinent part, “An application for reopening shall 
contain * * * (e) Any parts of the record available to the applicant and all 
supplemental affidavits upon which the applicant relies.”  (Emphasis added.)  
McNeill failed to attach any part of the record to his application.  His sole excuse 
is that, when he filed the application, the record was in the custody of this court.  
 
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However, the question is not who had custody of the record, but whether it was 
“available to the applicant.” 
 
McNeill falls far short of demonstrating that the record was unavailable to 
him when he filed his application.  He evidently had access to the record of his 
trial, or a copy thereof, at that time, for his application cites the record.  Moreover, 
the brief before us in the instant case quotes the record extensively.  So does the 
brief filed on McNeill’s behalf in No. 97-929 (his direct appeal on the merits to 
this court), which demonstrates that McNeill’s counsel in No. 97-929 have also 
had access to the record. 
 
Counsel in the instant appeal could have copied the record when they had 
access to it, or obtained a copy with the cooperation of the other attorneys now 
representing McNeill in No. 97-929.  Moreover, McNeill could have requested 
further access to the record from the Clerk of this court for the purpose of making 
a copy to attach to his App.R. 26(B) application.  (We note that the state public 
defender, who represents McNeill both in the instant case and in a postconviction 
proceeding, recently requested and obtained a copy of the trial record from the 
Clerk of this court for purposes of the postconviction proceeding.) 
 
App.R. 26(B)(2)(e) places the responsibility squarely upon the applicant to 
provide the court of appeals with such portions of the record as are available to 
him.  McNeill has not shown that the record was unavailable to him; hence, he was 
required to attach a copy to his application.  As he failed to do so, his application 
was properly denied. 
 
McNeill further contends that the court of appeals should have granted his 
motion to delay its ruling on the application.  The court of appeals denied that 
motion partly on a ground that McNeill contends is incorrect — that courts of 
appeals must rule on App.R. 26(B) applications within forty-five days of filing.  
 
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We need not decide this point, however.  Since McNeill did not comply with 
App.R. 26(B)(2)(e), the denial of his application was proper whether the motion to 
hold in abeyance was granted or not.  Thus, any error in this regard was harmless. 
 
McNeill’s second proposition of law alleges that inadmissible evidence was 
admitted in the penalty phase of his trial.  This proposition does not allege 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  (In fact, appellate counsel raised this 
issue on direct appeal to the court of appeals.)  This issue therefore was not 
properly raised in an App.R. 26(B) application, and is not properly before us on an 
appeal from the denial of the application. 
 
In his third proposition of law, McNeill asserts his sole substantive claim of 
ineffective appellate counsel.  But “[t]he court of appeals never reached that claim, 
and it is not properly before us.”  State v. Wickline (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 
658 N.E.2d 1052, 1054. 
 
We overrule each of McNeill’s propositions of law.  The judgment of the 
court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs separately. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring.  I agree with the majority’s 
determination that McNeill failed to satisfy App.R. 26(B)(2)(e) because McNeill 
failed to attach any relevant portions of the record to his application and he made 
no showing that the record was unavailable.  Rather, McNeill moved to stay the  
appellate court’s determination of his application to reopen his appeal because the 
 
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record was in the possession of this court and therefore the appellate court would 
be unable to properly review his petition. 
 
The appellate court’s entry denying McNeill’s application for reopening 
reasoned: 
 
“[McNeill] has failed to provide us with the portions of the record this court 
needs to evaluate the merits of [McNeill’s] application.  Because [McNeill’s] case 
is currently on appeal as of right to the Ohio Supreme Court, we do not have 
access to the trial court record.  Therefore, we cannot determine whether 
appellant even states a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
It is the appellate court’s second conclusion that concerns me.  Availability 
of the record for appellate courts to review cases is of paramount importance to 
any court.  It is entirely possible, and in death penalty cases probable, that a 
criminal defendant will have several motions pending concurrently in different 
courts.  See R.C. 2953.21.  In light of that probability, this court proposed and 
adopted S.Ct.Prac.R. XIX(4)(D) and App.R. 11(B).1  App.R. 11(B) requires that 
on direct appeal the clerk for the appellate court shall make a duplicate record or 
make the record available to the trial court when a trial court is exercising 
concurrent jurisdiction over a motion for postconviction relief.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 
XIX(4)(D) requires that on a direct appeal of a death penalty case, the clerk of the 
trial court must make and retain a copy of the record for use in postconviction 
proceedings that run concurrently with the direct appeal to the Ohio Supreme 
Court.  See Staff Notes to Rule XIX.  These rules do not cover the situation in this 
case or in a case where proceedings are pending in all three courts.2  But the 
principle behind the rules requires that the Clerk of this court and clerks of 
appellate courts should share records (if possible) when concurrent appeals or 
 
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motions are pending in other courts.  The alternative is for clerks to make copies 
of the record, which in a death penalty case can be voluminous.  This would result 
in unnecessary labor by the courts and expense to the taxpayers, since death 
penalty defendants are usually indigent. 
 
We should encourage a system of sharing the record so that each court can 
expeditiously handle its review, the defendant is not inadvertently harmed, and the 
taxpayer does not have to fund the cost of unnecessary duplicate records. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
Neither of these rules is applicable in this case.  S.Ct.Prac.R. XIX applies 
only to offenses committed on or after January 1, 1995. McNeill was convicted of 
an aggravated murder that occurred on May 13, 1994.  App.R. 11(B) was amended 
in July 1997, after McNeill’s direct appeal had been resolved. 
2. 
Due to the new rules making the death penalty case directly appealable to 
this court, it is unlikely that such a case will have motions concurrently pending in 
all three courts.  However, the new rules do not affect other criminal cases.