Case Title: Lynch, et al. v. City of Rehoboth Beach, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 424, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ELLEN B. LYNCH, CHARLOTTE  
) 
McDANIEL, BETTY NAILOR, 
 
)  No. 424, 2005 
BOB S. BURTON, JOHN S. BURTON, 
) 
FRED S. BURTON, LESTER LEE 
 
)  Court Below:  Chancery Court 
NAILOR, MARY LOU JACKSON,  
)  of the State of Delaware in 
JUANITA WATKINS, LAURA NAILOR, )  and for Sussex County 
GREG NAILOR, DAVID NAILOR,  
) 
SAMUEL SIMPSON, AND AMELIA 
)  C.A. No. 2266 
A. BURTON, BY ELLEN B. LYNCH, 
) 
her attorney-in-fact, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiffs Below,  
 
) 
 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
THE CITY OF REHOBOTH BEACH, a 
) 
Municipal corporation of the 
 
 
) 
State of Delaware, THE COMMISSIONERS) 
OF REHOBOTH BEACH, the governing 
) 
Body of The City of Rehoboth Beach,  
) 
SAMUEL R. COOPER, et al,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
) 
 
 
Appellee, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
And  
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
GREGORY L. KUNDINGER, et al,  
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Additional Defendants Below, ) 
 
 
Appellees.  
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  February 1, 2006 
Decided:  March 7, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
2
O R D E R 
 
 
This 7th day of March 2006, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
This appeal arises from the rezoning of plaintiffs’/appellants’1 
property in the City of Rehoboth Beach from commercial to residential.  
Appellants assert that the Chancellor committed several errors, namely:  (1) by 
holding that the City, as the proponent of the rezoning, did not have an affirmative 
burden of proof; and, (2) by finding that the decision to rezone appellants’ lots was 
consistent with the City’s 1996 Comprehensive Plan.  We conclude that even if the 
City had the burden of proof, the record demonstrates that the City met its burden.  
Further, because the City presented substantial evidence that the rezoning 
conformed to the 1996 Comprehensive Plan, we AFFIRM.    
 
2. 
On December 2, 2002, the Commissioners of Rehoboth Beach 
resolved to hold a public hearing to consider rezoning ten lots in the City from a 
zoning classification of C-3 commercial to R-2 residential.2  Appellants own five 
                                          
 
1 
Plaintiffs/Appellants in this matter are Ellen B. Lynch, Charlotte McDaniel, Betty Nailor, 
Bob S. Burton, John S. Burton, Fred S. Burton, Lester Lee Nailor, Mary Lou Jackson, Juanita 
Watkins, Laura Nailor, Greg Nailor, David Nailor, Samuel Simpson, and Amelia A. Burton, by 
Ellen B. Lynch, her attorney-in-fact (collectively, the “appellants”).   
 
2 
The resolution passed following two hearings (on November 14 and 16, 2002) on a new 
Comprehensive Plan(“2002 Comprehensive Plan”).  The 2002 Comprehensive Plan also called 
for the rezoning of the same properties from commercial to residential and called the initiative 
“the most pressing current land use issue.”  Several of the appellants or their representatives 
attended the November hearings, and one appellant, Lynch, wrote to the Planning Commission 
opposing the plan.  Ninety percent of the comments received by the Planning Commission on the 
draft Comprehensive Plan supported the reclassification of the lots.  However, the 2002 
Comprehensive Plan itself is not an issue here because the City decided to adopt the challenged 
 
3
of those ten lots.  On January 18, 2003, the Commissioners heard seven hours of 
testimony on the proposed rezoning from members of the Planning Commission, 
neighbors in support of and against the proposal, and several of the appellants.    
 
3. 
On February 18, 2003, the Commissioners reconvened to consider and 
vote on the rezoning.  Before the Commission voted, the following exchange 
between Commissioner Derrickson and City Solicitor Speakman took place: 
Commissioner Derrickson:  “The rezoning of the property to me is an 
uphill.  The person asking for the rezoning has the burden, to me.” 
 
Solicitor Speakman: “In rezoning law, the legislative body is 
presumed to be valid unless it’s clearly shown the rezoning was not 
reasonably related to the public health and welfare.  And so the 
burden is on those protesting the rezoning to show that the 
Commissioners’ decision was arbitrary and capricious.  So legally the 
burden is on – I understand you may be meaning something else, but I 
wanted to just – it gave me an opening, and I wanted to make sure I 
said that.”  3 
 
 
4. 
After debating the issue and making additional factual findings, the 
Commissioners voted 6 to 1 to rezone the property to conform to the 
Comprehensive Plan of 1996.  Appellants filed for injunctive relief against the 
                                                                                                                                        
zoning ordinance before the 2002 Plan took effect.  Thus, the 1996 Comprehensive Plan was in 
effect at the time the ordinance rezoned the properties.  Therefore, we review the ordinance 
under the 1996 Comprehensive Plan. 
 
3 
We find the City Solicitor’s statement, at least as recorded, to be virtually 
incomprehensible.  We understand it to mean that the legislative act establishing the 1996 
Comprehensive Plan is presumed to be valid.  We interpret his statement to be:  that in order to 
challenge the proposed rezoning of the 5 lots, the appellants below would have to show that the 
Commissioner’s original decision adopting the Comprehensive Plan with which the current 
zoning is inconsistent was arbitrary and capricious and that the pending “down” zoning of their 
lots to conform to that Plan would therefore be improper.   
 
4
rezoning in the Court of Chancery.  The Master in Chancery issued his final Report 
on April 21, 2005, based on cross motions for summary judgment, and found in 
favor of the appellees.4  Appellants filed three exceptions to the Report.  The 
Chancellor denied all three exceptions and affirmed the Master’s final Report.5  
Appellants have appealed the Chancellor’s ruling.   
 
5. 
Appellants first claim that the City Solicitor incorrectly instructed the 
Commissioners on the law when stating that the party opposing the rezoning had 
the burden of proof.  Appellants argue that because that incorrect instruction 
improperly influenced the Commissioners’ votes, we must reverse the decision 
below.  Whether the City, as the proponent of the rezoning, had any affirmative 
burden of proof is a question of law that we review de novo.6   
 
6. 
A city council has no “inherent power to regulate land use in the 
[city].  That power is part of the sovereign power of the State which is delegated by 
statute.”7  The statute, subject to conditions stated within the chapter, provides that 
                                          
 
4 
Lynch v. City of Rehoboth, 2005 WL 1074341 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 2005).  
  
5 
Lynch v. City of Rehoboth, 2005 WL 2000774 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2005).   
 
6 
Merrill v. Crothall-American Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 100 (Del. 1992).  
 
7  
Lawson v. Sussex County, 1995 WL 405733 at *4 (Del. Ch. Jun. 14 1995)(citing County 
Council v. Green, 516 A.2d 480 (Del. 1986)(“County Council does not have a free hand to grant 
rezoning upon request. It must conform with standards established by the General Assembly.”)). 
 
The State grants zoning power to the counties through 9 Del.C. Ch. 26, 48 & 69.  That 
same zoning power is delegated to other municipalities (i.e., cities and towns) by 22 Del.C. Ch. 
3.See also O'Neill v. Town of Middletown, 2006 WL 205071 at *31 n.270 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 
2006). 
 
5
the legislative body of cities and incorporated towns may regulate land use.8  
Among the conditions are the requirements that "regulations shall be made in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to… promote the health and 
general welfare….”9  
 
7. 
Appellants do not challenge the validity of the process for or adoption 
of the 1996 Comprehensive Plan.  What appellants contend is that when the 
proposed ordinance rezoning their property came before the Commissioners for 
action, the City had “an affirmative burden of proof.”  Appellants do not clearly 
articulate what that “affirmative burden of proof” was.  We understand their 
position to be that the City had the “affirmative burden” to demonstrate that the 
new ordinance that would “down” zone their property was consistent with the 1996 
Comprehensive Plan and would promote the health and general welfare of the 
citizens of Rehoboth.  Further, appellants argue that the only relevant presumption 
of validity would be a presumption that attaches to the current zoning classification 
or the 1996 Comprehensive Plan, but not to the proposed rezoning initiated by the 
City. 
                                                                                                                                        
 
8  
22 Del. C. §301.  For a similar discussion of a county’s power to zone under title 9, See 
Lawson, 1995 WL 405733 at *4 (“The county government may, in accordance with the 
conditions and procedures specified in this subchapter regulate land use.  Among the conditions 
set forth in the subchapter is the requirement that regulations adopted by the county government  
shall be in accordance with the approved comprehensive development plan”) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted). 
 
9  
22 Del. C. §303. 
 
6
8. 
The Chancellor held that “the only ‘burden’ the Commissioners have, 
while acting in their legislative capacity, is to determine if the rezoning is in the 
interests of health, safety and welfare of the community.”10  We decline to address 
whether the City had “an affirmative burden” of a different kind because it is not 
necessary to our holding today.  For the sake of argument, we will assume that the 
City did at least have “an affirmative burden” of going forward by producing 
evidence that demonstrated that the proposed ordinance “down” zoning the 
properties was consistent with the 1996 Comprehensive Plan and promoted the 
health and general welfare of the citizens of Rehoboth.  We also will assume, for 
the sake of argument, that the City Solicitor misstated the law.11  Based on these 
assumptions, we must determine:  (1) whether the City met its assumed 
“affirmative burden;” and, (2) whether the City Solicitor’s unclear, if not 
inaccurate, statements improperly influenced the Commissioners’ votes.   
                                          
 
10 
Lynch v. City of Rehoboth, 2005 WL 2000774, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2005) (citing 
Tate v. Miles, 503 A.2d 187, 191 (Del. 1986) and Willdel Realty, Inc. v. New Castle County, 281 
A.2d 612, 614 (Del. 1971)).   
 
11  
22 Del. C. §303 requires regulations adopted by the city to be in accordance with the 
existing comprehensive plan and be designed to promote the health and general welfare of the 
community.  In other words, if these two requirements are necessary for the adoption of a zoning 
ordinance, it seems reasonable to require the proponent of the zoning, in this case the City, to 
provide evidence that these conditions are met.  In fact, in the recent case O’Neill v. Town of 
Middletown, 2006 WL 205071 at *37-36, the Vice Chancellor found a zoning ordinance invalid 
because the Town failed to provide “substantial evidence” that the ordinance was consistent with 
the comprehensive plan.  
 
 
 
7
9. 
After a seven hour hearing, the Commissioners weighed testimony 
from both sides, and ultimately voted in favor of the application to rezone, finding 
that:  
[T]he rezoning would have a beneficial impact on the health, safety 
and welfare of the City; would moderate traffic and parking 
congestion; would prevent high-density development and preserve the 
residential characteristics of the area; would prevent impedance [sic] 
of the distribution of light and air; and that commercial development 
of the parcels in question would have a negative effect on adjoining 
residential areas and that rezoning conformed to the then-effective 
1996 Comprehensive Plan.12   
 
10. 
Based on the above quoted language, it is clear that the 
Commissioners articulated findings that supported their conclusion that the 
proposal conformed to the 1996 Comprehensive Plan and promoted the health and 
general welfare of the citizens of Rehoboth Beach.  As the Master and the 
Chancellor both found, we also conclude that substantial evidence in the testimony 
supported the Commissioners’ conclusion.   
11. 
Appellants also contend that the City Solicitor’s statement improperly 
influenced the Commissioners’ votes, because it erroneously allocated the burden 
of proof to appellants to rebut a “presumption” that the proposed rezoning was 
valid.  Appellants liken the City Solicitor’s alleged misstatement of the law to a 
legally erroneous jury instruction that requires reversal where shown to have 
                                          
 
12 
Lynch v. City of Rehoboth, 2005 WL 1074341, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 2005) (reviewing 
the factual findings made by the Commission in the motion to rezone). 
 
 
8
improperly influenced the jury.  Under Delaware case law, a verdict based on an 
erroneous jury instruction must be reversed only if the instruction undermined the 
jury’s ability to perform its duty intelligently.13     
 
12. 
Applying that standard, we conclude that the appellants have failed to 
show that any alleged misstatement by the City Solicitor undermined the 
Commission’s ability to perform its duty.14  In fact, the above-cited findings by the 
Commission indicate the contrary.  The Commission appropriately considered the 
general health, safety, and welfare of the community, and as discussed in more 
detail below, also found that the new zoning ordinance conformed to the 1996 
Comprehensive Plan.  No Commissioner ever indicated confusion about or 
mentioned the City Solicitor’s statement before voting for the motion to rezone.15  
We conclude that the City met its only burden by presenting evidence that enabled 
the Commission to find facts, and reach a logical conclusion based on those facts, 
addressing the legal requirement for a rezoning.  We regard the City Solicitor’s 
statement to be no more than a reminder that the 1996 Comprehensive Plan was 
                                          
 
13 
Asbestos Litig. v. Owens-Corning, 669 A.2d 108, 113 (Del. 1995). 
 
14  
Appellants practically concede this point in their brief:  “[t]here is absolutely no way to 
know whether the Commissioners and the Mayor voted as they did because the Solicitor 
misapprehended the burden of proof issue in communicating with the Commissioners just prior 
to their vote.”   
 
 
15  
It is worth noting that the City Solicitor’s statement responded to Commissioner 
Derrickson.  Because the alleged misstatement was intended to respond to Derrickson, one could 
reasonably assume that the alleged misstatement might have affected Derrickson’s vote.  
Derrickson, however, voted against the proposed rezoning ordinance. 
 
 
9
presumed valid and that if the findings, based on the record made at the hearing 
logically supported a conclusion that the proposed rezoning conformed to the 1996 
Comprehensive Plan and promoted the health and general welfare, then the 
Commissioners would have met the legal burden necessary to adopt the ordinance 
rezoning the lots.  The City Solicitor’s statement did not undermine the 
Commission’s ability to perform that duty. 
 
13. 
Appellants’ final claim is that the Chancellor erred by finding that the 
decision to rezone these properties was consistent with the 1996 Comprehensive 
Plan.  In reviewing the Chancellor’s holding that the rezoning conforms to the 
City’s Comprehensive Plan, we replicate the role of the Chancellor, and review the 
Commissioners’ finding that the rezoning conformed to the Plan under the 
substantial evidence test.16  “Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as 
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”17  We do not 
weigh evidence, resolve questions of credibility or make our own factual 
findings.18 
 
14. 
The 1996 Comprehensive Plan stated:  “Residential areas that are 
partially commercialized, commercial areas that are zoned but not developed, and 
                                          
 
16 
See Scheers v. Indep. Newspapers, 832 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Del. 2003).   
 
17 
Id. at 1246-47.   
 
18 
Id. at 1247.  
 
 
10
commercial areas developed as residential should be examined for rezoning.”  The 
Commissioners made an express finding that the appellants’ property fell into 
those categories and was subject to review consistent with the 1996 
Comprehensive Plan.   
15. 
Although appellants presented testimony that their property has 
always been zoned as commercial property, the Commissioners also heard 
substantial testimony from others that appellants’ property was located in a 
residential area, or within a residential area that was partially commercialized, and 
that further commercial development would be harmful to that area.19  Therefore, 
the Commission’s conclusion that the rezoning was consistent with the 1996 
Comprehensive Plan was supported by substantial evidence.   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of 
Chancery is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T.Steele 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
 
19 
See, e.g., the testimony of Richard Rouf, Stephen Cochran, Nancy Marin, Tim Spiez, 
Gail Fitzgerald, Matt Gafney, Betsey Edgeworth, Peter Berkman, Greg Kundinger, Deborah 
Nerich, and Andrea Hoffman.