Case Title: People v. Williams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83244

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1999-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
People v. Williams (Ill. S.Ct.)
Docket No. 83244-Agenda 4-November 
1998.
Opinion filed February 19, 
1999.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the 
court:
The defendant, Frank Williams, appeals from a 
Cook County circuit court order dismissing his amended post-conviction petition 
without an evidentiary hearing. Because defendant was sentenced to death, this 
court has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
651(a). 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a). For the following reasons, we now affirm the 
circuit court.
BACKGROUND
The facts in this case are adequately set forth 
in this court's opinion on defendant's direct appeal, and only a brief summary 
of the facts is necessary here. Anthony Cole and Michelle Brueckmann, 
defendant's former fiancée, were leaving Brueckmann's home when defendant 
emerged from behind a van and screamed, "I told you I was going to kill you when 
I saw you together." Defendant shot Cole, and Cole fell to the ground. Defendant 
then shot Brueckmann in the head, and shot Cole again as Cole tried to flee. The 
police arrested defendant at his sister's home and recovered a .38-caliber 
revolver from defendant's jacket. Subsequent testing revealed that this gun 
fired the bullet removed from Cole's body. While in custody, defendant gave an 
oral statement in which he admitted he shot Cole and Brueckmann because he was 
upset after seeing them together at a shopping mall.
A jury in the circuit court of Cook County 
convicted defendant of, inter alia, the murder of Michelle Brueckmann 
and the attempted murder of Anthony Cole. Defendant waived a jury for 
sentencing. The trial court found defendant eligible for the death penalty based 
on the cold, calculated and premeditated manner of the murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1991, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(11)), and sentenced defendant to death. This court 
affirmed defendant's conviction and death sentence on direct appeal (People 
v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48 (1996)), and the United States Supreme Court 
denied defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. Williams v. 
Illinois, 520 U.S. 1122, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339, 117 S. Ct. 1260 
(1997).
Defendant subsequently filed a pro se 
post-conviction petition in which he alleged: (1) his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to obtain the assistance of a blood-type expert to type 
the blood on Brueckmann's clothing; (2) his trial and appellate counsel were 
ineffective for failing to challenge the chain of custody of the bullet removed 
from Cole's body; and (3) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge on direct appeal the prosecutor's comment during closing argument that 
certain blood spatters were inconsistent with defendant's version of events. The 
circuit court appointed Ernest DiBenedetto as defendant's post-conviction 
counsel. DiBenedetto filed an amended post-conviction petition which included a 
fourth claim: defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to "retain 
the services of a mitigation specialist in ample time to allow for a full and 
complete investigation and presentation of factors in mitigation." No affidavits 
were attached to the amended post-conviction petition.
The circuit court granted the State's motion to 
dismiss the amended post-conviction petition, holding the allegations in the 
petition were frivolous and technically without merit. The circuit court also 
held that defendant's claim regarding the mitigation specialist was barred by 
res judicata.
ANALYSIS
Defendant raises only one argument on appeal. 
Defendant argues his post-conviction counsel failed to comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 651(c) by not supporting the claims in the amended post-conviction petition 
with affidavits or other evidence.(1) 
This court reviews the dismissal of a post-conviction petition without an 
evidentiary hearing de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378 (1998).
It is well established that a defendant has no 
constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. People v. 
Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 237 (1993); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539, 546, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1993 (1987). Counsel for 
indigent capital defendants who file pro se post-conviction petitions, 
however, is provided by statute. 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 1996); see also 134 Ill. 
2d R. 651(c). Rule 651(c) establishes the level of assistance appointed counsel 
must provide to post-conviction petitioners. Rule 651(c) provides in relevant 
part:
Rule 651(c) does not require that defendants 
receive the same level of assistance of counsel that the Constitution guarantees 
to defendants at trial, but it does require counsel to provide a "reasonable 
level of assistance" in post-conviction proceedings. (Emphasis omitted.) 
People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 364 (1990).
In People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 
(1993), this court held that post-conviction counsel has no obligation under 
Rule 651(c) to locate witnesses not specifically identified by the petitioner or 
to conduct an investigation to discover the identity of witnesses who would 
provide evidence to support a claim in the post-conviction petition. 
Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d  at 247-48. In Johnson, we 
noted:
Applying these principles to the instant appeal, 
defendant's post-conviction counsel clearly had no obligation to seek out a 
blood-type expert or to conduct a fishing expedition for evidence regarding the 
chain of custody of the bullet removed from Anthony Cole's body. Defendant, not 
his appointed post-conviction counsel, was responsible for providing this 
information, and the record is devoid of any indication that defendant provided 
this information to his post-conviction counsel. Similarly, defendant provided 
little if any evidence in his affidavit accompanying his pro se 
post-conviction petition to support his claim regarding the prosecutor's 
comments on blood spatters during closing arguments. Defendant merely averred in 
his affidavit that the blood spatter argument was more prejudicial than the 
record revealed because he observed several jurors nod in agreement when the 
prosecutor made this comment. This information, however, was not necessary for 
an adequate presentation of petitioner's contention, and post-conviction 
counsel's failure to include it in the post-conviction petition was not 
unreasonable. Therefore we hold the failure of defendant's appointed 
post-conviction counsel to support the first three claims in the amended 
post-conviction petition with affidavits or other evidence did not fall below 
the reasonable level of assistance required by Rule 651(c).
We need not address whether defendant's 
post-conviction counsel had an obligation to procure affidavits from additional 
mitigation witnesses to support the fourth claim in the amended post-conviction 
petition because defendant's underlying claim regarding the retention of the 
mitigation specialist is barred by res judicata. A post-conviction 
petition "represents a collateral attack on a prior judgment; it is not an 
appeal from the underlying conviction and sentence." People v. Ruiz, 
132 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1989). As a result, in post-conviction proceedings the 
"[d]eterminations of the reviewing court on the prior direct appeal are res 
judicata as to issues actually decided." People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 73 (1997). A post-conviction petitioner may not avoid the bar of 
res judicata simply by rephrasing issues previously addressed on direct 
appeal. See People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (1995); People v. 
Emerson, 153 Ill. 2d 100, 106-07 (1992) (where defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is addressed on direct appeal, similar 
argument with "changed phraseology" may not be relitigated in post-conviction 
proceedings). On direct appeal, defendant argued that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it denied defendant's request for a continuance to allow the 
mitigation specialist to complete his investigation and that defense counsel was 
ineffective for failing to renew his request for a continuance after filing an 
affidavit in which the mitigation specialist averred that his investigation was 
incomplete. This court rejected both arguments. People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 91-93 (1996). Despite the mitigation specialist's claim that his 
investigation was incomplete, this court observed, "the record reveals that Dr. 
Savarese evaluated defendant's childhood, family history, health history, 
educational history, employment history, criminal and prison records." 
Williams, 173 Ill. 2d  at 92. Based on this information, the mitigation 
specialist was able to present his expert opinion at sentencing regarding the 
cause of defendant's actions. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d  at 92. Several 
other mitigation witnesses testified for defendant at sentencing, including 
defendant's neighbor, defendant's former girlfriend, two of defendant's sisters, 
and defendant's mother. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d  at 92-93. In light of all 
this evidence, the court concluded on direct appeal,"[a]ny further evidence 
would likely have been cumulative." Williams, 173 Ill. 2d  at 
93.
Defendant's claim in the post-conviction 
petition that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain the 
mitigation specialist early enough to give him sufficient time to complete his 
investigation is simply a rephrasing of the claim he presented on direct appeal. 
On direct appeal, defendant argued his trial counsel quit too soon, but now in 
these post-conviction proceedings defendant argues his trial counsel did not 
initiate the mitigation investigation soon enough. Both claims address the same 
alleged deficiency in trial counsel's performance, namely, trial counsel's 
failure to give the mitigation specialist sufficient time to complete his 
investigation. Therefore, we hold defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim is barred by res judicata.
Defendant argues that the doctrine of res 
judicata should be relaxed in this case, but the cases cited by defendant 
are easily distinguishable. In all three cases, defense counsel failed to 
present any meaningful mitigating evidence at sentencing. See People v. 
Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138 (1995) (no mitigation witnesses); People v. 
Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d 148 (1994) (defendant's wife only mitigation 
witness); People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1 (1989) (police officer who 
interrogated defendant only mitigation witness). In all three cases, defendants 
included substantial mitigating evidence in their post-conviction petitions 
which was not part of the record on direct appeal and did not duplicate evidence 
previously presented at sentencing. See Thompkins, 161 Ill. 2d  
at 166 (mitigating evidence presented in post-conviction petition not 
cumulative); Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d  at 26 (same). (No such analysis was 
necessary in Orange because no mitigation had been presented at 
sentencing in the first place.) In this case, however, defendant's trial counsel 
presented a substantial amount of mitigating evidence, and this court determined 
on direct appeal that, based on this record, any additional mitigating evidence 
would have been cumulative. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d  at 93.
Unlike most capital cases, there was evidence in 
the record on direct appeal in this case which identified the witnesses who were 
not called at sentencing. At trial, defendant filed an affidavit from his 
mitigation specialist which identified a number of potential mitigation 
witnesses whom the mitigation specialist did not have time to interview. Based 
on this affidavit, and the substantial mitigating evidence defendant presented 
at trial, this court held defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to seek additional time to enable the mitigation specialist to complete 
his investigation. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d  at 91-93. Defendant insists 
that the testimony of the additional uninterviewed witnesses identified in the 
mitigation specialist's affidavit would not have been cumulative,(2) 
but this holding is precisely what the doctrine of res judicata bars 
defendant from challenging in his post-conviction petition. Thus, defendant's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this case most closely resembles an 
ineffective assistance of counsel argument raised in successive post-conviction 
petitions. In such cases, this court has not hesitated to hold that relitigation 
of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is barred by res 
judicata. See People v. Erickson, 183 Ill. 2d 213, 224-26 (1998) 
(holding ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised in second 
post-conviction petition is barred by res judicata where defendant 
raised similar claim supported by different evidence in first post-conviction 
petition).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the 
circuit court of Cook County dismissing defendant's amended post-conviction 
petition without an evidentiary hearing is affirmed. The clerk of this court is 
directed to enter an order setting Wednesday, May 12, 1999, as the date on which 
the sentence of death entered in the circuit court of Cook County is to be 
carried out. The defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law (725 
ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996)). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy 
of the mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of 
Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution where the 
defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE RATHJE took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part:
I fully agree with the court's conclusion that 
the circuit court properly dismissed defendant's post-conviction petition 
without an evidentiary hearing. I do so without, however, departing from my view 
that the death penalty in this case is excessive, as pointed out in my dissent 
on direct appeal. See People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 95-100 (1996) 
(Freeman, J., dissenting.). Because I am still of the opinion that a sentence 
other than death is appropriate in this case, I do not join in that portion of 
today's opinion which directs the clerk of the court to set a date of 
execution.
JUSTICE HARRISON, also concurring in part and 
dissenting in part:
Williams was convicted of first degree murder, 
attempted murder, and aggravated battery. I agree with the majority that 
Williams has no basis for challenging those convictions under the 
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1996)). I 
also believe that we should not disturb the sentences imposed on Williams for 
attempted murder and aggravated battery. In my view, however, Williams' death 
sentence should not be allowed to stand. For the reasons set forth in my dissent 
in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), this state's present death 
penalty law does not meet the requirements of the eighth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) or 
article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 
§2). Accordingly, we should vacate Williams' death sentence and remand the cause 
to the circuit court for imposition of a sentence other than 
death.
Footnotes:
1. Defendant also contends his appointed counsel 
failed to file a proper affidavit certifying his compliance with Rule 651(c). 
Unlike other supreme court rules, however, the certificate requirement in Rule 
651(c) is not a rule of strict compliance. Counsel's failure to file an 
affidavit certifying compliance with Rule 651(c) is harmless error if "the 
record demonstrates that counsel adequately fulfilled his duties as 
post-conviction counsel." People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 238 
(1993), citing People v. Szabo, 144 Ill. 2d 525 (1991). Therefore, the 
paramount consideration in this appeal is whether defendant's post-conviction 
counsel failed to provide the level of assistance required by Rule 651(c).
2. Defendant's argument that the uninterviewed witnesses 
would not have presented cumulative testimony belies his own contention that no 
determination can be made regarding whether their testimony would have been 
cumulative.