Case Title: In re Estate of Gonzales

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Estate of Gonzales1999 WY 60977 P.2d 1284Case Number: 97-268Decided: 05/18/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF FLORA O. GONZALES, IN THE MATTER

 

OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN H. GONZALES, RUBY DEGNER and 
STEVE GONZALES, Personal Representatives of the Estates of Flora O. Gonzales 
and

John H. Gonzales, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

MARY LOU YAUNICK and JAMES M. 
YAUNICK, Appellees (Defendants).

 

                                

Appeal from the District Court 
of Laramie County, Nicholas E.

Kalokathis, J.

   

 

Walter Urbigkit of Frontier 
Law Center, of Cheyenne, WY, Representing 
Appellants.

 G. Kevin Keller, Cheyenne, WY, Representing 
Appellees.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and 
TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of expedited case conference; 
retired November 2, 1998.

 

     LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

    
[¶1]     In a protracted dispute among siblings 
over their parents' estates, a sister moved for revocation of letters of 
administration issued to the personal representatives. The district court 
granted the motion, finding that the  
parties' hostility, evidenced by their litigiousness and antagonism, 
threatened to hamper the administration of the estates.  Because the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in revoking the letters of administration, we 
affirm.

 

                                ISSUES

 

   [¶2]     The appellants, Ruby Degner and Steve 
Gonzales, co-personal representatives of the estates of Flora O. Gonzales and 
John H. Gonzales, present one issue for our review, which they summarize as 
follows:

 

In simplest context the issue on appeal is whether 
cause for revocation of letters of administration is created by the Personal 
Representatives' rejection of a creditor's claim following a continuing course 
of legal actions directed to achieve an 
equal division of the estates involved for all heirs in contest with a 
sister.

 

   [¶3]     The appellees, Mary Lou Yaunick and 
James M. Yaunick, restate the issue as:

 

Whether the district court acted within its 
discretion in revoking the Letters of Administration.

 

                                 
FACTS

 

   [¶4]     The decedents, John H. Gonzales (Mr. 
Gonzales) and Flora A. Gonzales (Mrs. Gonzales) were husband and wife. In 
January of 1980, they acquired the home that is the subject of this 
dispute.  Although the couple 
resided together in the home, Mrs. Gonzales was the lone grantee of the deed 
transferring the property. In April of 1985, Mrs. Gonzales executed a power of 
attorney which appointed two of the nine Gonzales children, Mary Lou Golding 
(now Yaunick) and Ramona Allen, as her attorneys in fact. Utilizing this power 
of attorney, Mary Lou and Ramona executed a warranty deed conveying the home to 
themselves, reserving a life estate for Mr. Gonzales. The deed, which was also 
signed by Mr. Gonzales, was filed for record in May of 1985. Mrs. Gonzales 
departed this life, intestate, on October 24, 1985. Mr. Gonzales was 
subsequently placed in a nursing home, and the home was 
rented.

 

   [¶5]   Litigation among the children began 
in June of 1994, when Ramona Allen and Mr. Gonzales filed an action to quiet 
title and for an accounting of rents from Mary Lou Yaunick. When the other 
children failed to appear or defend the action, Ramona and Mary Lou agreed that 
each would receive a one-half interest in the home, to the exclusion of the 
other children. On April 11, 1995, a default judgment was entered quieting title 
in Ramona and Mary Lou, with reservation of a life estate for Mr. Gonzales. Mr. 
Gonzales died intestate September 6, 1995.

 

   [¶6]     On November 9, 1995, five Gonzales 
children, including appellant Ruby Degner, brought an action to set aside the 
default judgment.  On December 1, 
1995, the default judgment was set aside because the five children had not been 
properly served with notice of the action. Next, an action was instituted to 
invalidate the deed issued under the power of attorney. By an August 14, 1996 
order, the district court voided the deed, as that conveyance exceeded the scope 
of the power of attorney. No appeal has been taken from any of these 
rulings.

 

   [¶7]     With the deed invalidated, the home will 
pass by intestacy.  On October 29, 
1996, Ruby Degner and her brother Steve Gonzales petitioned for letters of 
administration and were duly qualified.  
Acting as co-personal representatives of their parents' estates, they 
made demand on the Yaunicks to deliver possession of the home for 
administration. The personal representatives also requested an accounting of 
rents. Response by the Yaunicks came in the form of creditor claims against the 
estates of Mrs. Gonzales ($13,766.88) and Mr. Gonzales ($10,582.70) for support 
and property maintenance.  The 
personal representatives rejected the Yaunicks' claims, prompting the Yaunicks 
to file suit based on the claims. Besides these claims, the personal 
representatives have also rejected a claim submitted by the State of Wyoming, 
which is seeking to recoup expenses for Mr. Gonzales' medical care. If all of 
these claims are allowed, claims and fees would surpass the value of the 
estates, the sole asset of which is the home valued at approximately 
$50,000.

 

   [¶8]     On April 24, 1997, the Yaunicks moved to 
revoke the letters of administration issued to the personal representatives. In 
their motion, the Yaunicks alleged that, due to personal animosity and a 
conflict of interest, the personal representatives were wasting estate assets. 
As a replacement, the Yaunicks recommended a local attorney who was willing to 
act as personal representative. After hearing argument from counsel, the 
district court granted the Yaunicks' motion. In its order revoking the letters 
of administration, the district court wrote:

 

The parties in these cases have shown actual 
hostility to each other. The litigiousness and antagonism between the parties 
has dreached the point that it will hamper the expedient, efficient resolution 
of the probate estates, as well as the civil cases.

 

The ousted personal representatives timely appeal the 
district court's order.

 

                          
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

   [¶9]     In reviewing a district court's refusal 
to revoke letters of administration, this court applies its abuse of discretion 
standard of review:

 

Whether the cause shown be good or bad is a matter 
largely within the discretion of the trial court; and, when that court has 
investigated the question and adjudicated upon it, it will only be where a gross 
abuse of discretion has occurred that this court will 
interfere.

 

In re Haddenham's Estate, 
358 P.2d 706, 707 (Wyo. 1961) (quoting In re Graber's Estate, 111 Cal. 432, 55 P. 165, 166 (1896)). See also In re Mayne's Estate, 345 P.2d 790, 795 (Wyo. 
1959).

 

   [¶10]  In the recent case of Vaughn v. State, 
962 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 1998), we took occasion to revisit and refine our abuse of 
discretion standard of review. There, we settled on the following 
definition:

 

Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, 
among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and             without 
doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.

 

Id. at 151 (quoting Martin 
v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986)). In this case, this standard requires 
that a reason stated by the trial court justify the manner in which it exercised 
its discretion. Matter of Baird's Estate, 408 N.E.2d 1323, 1328 (Ind. App. 
1980).

 

If the reason given by the court is not a valid basis 
for a particular exercise of discretion, it can be no more than conjecture on 
our part that once the court recognizes the invalidity of its original reason it 
will reach precisely the same exercise of discretion for other 
reasons.

 

   In re Marriage of Miles, 173 Ind. 
App. 5, 362 N.E.2d 171, 174.

 

                              
DISCUSSION

 

   [¶11]  In its order revoking the letters of 
administration, the district court indicated that the hostility, specifically 
litigiousness and antagonism, between the personal representatives and the 
Yaunicks had Areached the point that it will hamper the expedient, efficient 
resolution of the probate estates, as well as the civil cases. " Revocation of 
letters of administration is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-3-125 (Michie 
1997), which provides in pertinent part:

 

If by reason of any delays in such settlement and 
delivery of the estate or for any other cause the circumstances of the estate 
or the rights of those interested therein require it, the court may, before 
settlement of accounts and delivering up of the estate is completed, revoke the 
letters of the personal representative, and appoint another personal 
representative, either special or general, in the same manner as for original 
letters of administration.1

 

   (Emphasis 
supplied.)

 

   [¶12]  As a general matter, a personal 
representative should be removed where his personal interests conflict with his 
official duties.  However, mere 
hostile feelings toward persons interested in the estate is not ground for 
removal unless it prevents proper management of the estate. In re Hartt's 
Estate, 75 Wyo. 305, 362, 295 P.2d 985, 1006 (Wyo. 1956). In 
addition,

 

[w]e must bear in mind that the aim of probate 
procedure is the speedy settlement and adjudication of rights in the property of 
a decedent to the end that those entitled to share may have the fullest benefit 
of the right which the law gives them at the earliest moment consonant with due 
process and orderly procedure.

 

   In re Haddenham's Estate, 358 P.2d  
at 708.

 

   [¶13]  The hostility of the Gonzales children 
is evident from their clearly established adversarial relationship. As a result 
of the warranty deed issued under the power of attorney, the children are 
divided into two warring factions. The first faction consists of Mary Lou 
Yaunick and Ramona Allen, who, relying on the deed, earlier maintained that each 
was entitled to a one-half interest in the Gonzales home. The second faction is 
comprised of the other children (including the personal representatives) who 
believe the home should be divided equally among the children.  The litigation among the Gonzales 
children began with the quiet title action, which resulted in a default judgment 
that was later set aside. Next, the district court voided the warranty deed 
issued under the power of attorney. However, invalidation of the deed has not 
ended this dispute because the Yaunicks now claim an interest in the home by 
virtue of the father's signature on the warranty deed.

 

   [¶14]  In addition, peripheral disputes among 
the children continue.  Funeral 
expenses and rents from the home are both at issue.  Although the record is unclear, it also 
appears the Yaunicks have refused to turn over the home for administration. 
Given this history, it is clear that the parties' conflicting positions have 
led, and will continue to lead, to litigation at every turn.  This was confirmed by the personal 
representatives' attorney who, in refusing to refer the estates to alternative 
dispute resolution, stated: AI'm opposed to mediation because it is going to add more complexity and not go 
anywhere. " As the preceding establishes, the parties' hostility threatens to 
make the administration of the estates long and difficult.

 

   [¶15]  The personal representatives contend 
that they were removed because they demanded that the Yaunicks turn over the 
home to the estate and then later rejected Yaunicks' creditor claims. They argue 
that these actions are not evidence of hostility, but are actions required by 
their roles as personal representatives.  
There are two problems with the personal representatives' contentions. 
First, they ignore the hostility created by the litigation that took place prior 
to issuance of the letters of administration. Second, even if the personal 
representatives were properly performing the duties of their post, the Yaunicks 
did not have to show that the personal representatives had been derelict to 
prevail. In fact, a removal of a personal administrator may be based upon "any 
other ground for believing that his continuance in office will be likely to 
render the * * * administration of the estate difficult, inefficient or unduly 
protracted. Actual dereliction in duty need not be shown."  Quincy Trust Co. v. Taylor, 317 Mass. 
195, 57 N.E.2d 573, 574 (Mass. 1944) (emphasis supplied).

 

   [¶16]  This case is reminiscent of an early 
Iowa case in which two groups of heirs battled over an uncle's estate. In 
affirming the trial court's refusal to appoint a husband of one of the heirs as 
personal representative, the Iowa Supreme Court wrote:

 

It must have been obvious to the trial court, as it 
is to us, that the just, fair, and equitable administration of this estate will 
require a firm and impartial hand, acting under the immediate direction of the 
court, to conserve said estate and promote the best interests of all parties 
concerned.

 

   In re Tracy's Estate, 214 Iowa 
881, 243 N.W. 309, 310 (Iowa 1932).

 

   [¶17]  Although we affirm the district court's 
order, we do not mean to reward the Yaunicks for their role in the 
disagreements.  Nor do we mean to 
give interested persons free reign to remove personal  representatives.2 We admit concern that neither party 
presented witnesses or exhibits in the hearing on the motion for revocation. However, we are satisfied that 
the prior litigation between the parties has created a hostile, adversarial 
atmosphere that threatens to interfere with the orderly administration of the 
estates. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
revoking the letters.

 

   [¶18]  Finally, we reject the personal 
representatives' contention that the motion to revoke the letters of 
administration was not made within a reasonable time, as required by In re 
Johnson's Estate, 379 P.2d 824, 825 (Wyo. 1963). This case is not like Johnson, 
where the petition for revocation came after the probate had been substantially completed. Id. In this case, 
the administration was just beginning. We, therefore, reject the personal 
representatives' contention.

 

                              
CONCLUSION

 

   [¶19]  It is unfortunate that the Gonzales 
children cannot amicably settle their differences. Their hostility, evidenced by 
their history of litigation, threatens to hinder administration of their 
parents' estates. The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking 
the letters of administration.

 

   [¶20]  Affirmed.

   

      

 

FOOTNOTES

1 33 
C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 95(b) (1998) notes the distinction between 
revocation of letters of administration and removal of a personal 
representative:

 While 
the distinction is not observed to any great extent, revocation is ordinarily 
proper when it is made to appear that the letters should not have been issued or 
were improperly issued, while removal is proper where facts occurring since the 
appointment render it inadvisable to continue the representative in 
office.

 Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 2-3-125 does not draw this distinction, as the grounds for 
revocation therein would more properly be considered grounds for removal. As 
such, we will use the terms revocation and removal 
interchangeably.

  

2 We are 
mindful of the warning put forth by a dissenting justice in an early Oregon 
case:

 I am 
apprehensive that, if executors and administrators were allowed to be removed 
for slight cause, it might often encourage a class of persons to undertake to 
procure their removal in order to enable themselves to carry out some selfish 
purpose. The desire to rob the estate of  
a dead man seems to be very prevalent.

    In re Holladay Estate, 18 Or. 168, 
22 P. 750, 753 (Or. 1889) (Thayer, C.J., dissenting).