Case Title: BLACKHAWK DEVELOPMENT CORP V VILLAGE OF DEXTER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 126036

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 13, 2005 
BLACKHAWK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
and DEXTER CROSSING, L.L.C., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v 
No. 126036 
VILLAGE OF DEXTER and DEXTER DEVELOPMENT, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CAVANAGH, J.   
Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal from the Court of 
Appeals decision affirming the trial court’s grant of 
summary disposition to defendants village of Dexter and 
Dexter Development. 
Rather than grant leave to appeal, we 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand 
this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case requires us to examine the scope of an 
easement granted by a private party to a public entity. 
Specifically, we must determine whether allowing a private 
 
 
 
property owner to construct access roads and related 
amenities on property subject to an easement that was 
granted to a municipality for the express purpose of 
relocating and improving a public road is within the scope 
of that easement. 
Because there is no evidence in the 
record that the proposed developments fall within the scope 
of the express easement, we hold that the trial court erred 
by holding otherwise. Thus, we reverse the decision of the 
Court 
proceedings. 
of 
Appeals 
and 
remand 
this 
case 
for 
II. BACKGROUND 
further 
In 
1990, 
defendant 
village 
of 
Dexter 
ordered 
approximately one acre of a portion of land owned by the 
Kingsley Trust, which was administered by John Kingsley, 
condemned. The village intended to use the land to improve 
Dan Hoey Road, which was, at the time, a gravel road that 
intersected with Dexter-Ann Arbor Road in an unsafe manner. 
The village planned to pave and widen Dan Hoey Road, as 
well as move it slightly south. 
In lieu of condemning the land, the village and the 
Kingsley Trust entered into a settlement agreement through 
which the trust granted the village an easement to a 
portion of approximately one acre in size. 
The settlement 
agreement stated that the trust would transfer “an easement 
2  
 
 
 
                                                 
for public roadway purposes . . . .” 
The easement grant 
read that the trust granted “an easement for the purposes 
of relocating, establishing, opening and improving Dan Hoey 
Road . . . .” 
The village relocated Dan Hoey Road and completed its 
project, but the project did not consume the entire area 
subject to the easement. 
Eventually, the trust sold the 
burdened 
parcel 
to 
plaintiff 
Blackhawk 
Development 
Corporation, which then developed a commercial complex, 
plaintiff Dexter Crossing, L.L.C., on a portion of the 
property.1
 The portion subject to the easement was not 
developed. 
Thereafter, John Kingsley, through his corporation, 
defendant Dexter Development, purchased additional land 
that adjoined the old Dan Hoey Road but was separated from 
the new Dan Hoey Road by land subject to the easement. 
Kingsley then submitted a proposal for developing his land 
to the village. 
However, Kingsley’s plan included using 
portions that were subject to the village’s easement for 
the purpose of constructing access drives, building a pond, 
and making other developments on that parcel. 
1 For convenience, the singular “plaintiff” will refer
to Blackhawk Development Corporation. 
3  
 
 
 
 
The village informed Kingsley that he would have to 
buy 
the 
affected 
land 
before 
it 
would 
approve 
the 
development, but plaintiff rejected Kingsley’s purchase 
offers. Consequently, Kingsley’s attorney advised Kingsley 
to revise his proposal by removing from the plans affecting 
plaintiff’s parcel anything that could be construed as a 
“private” development, but leaving developments such as 
utilities, 
sidewalks, 
and 
access 
roads. 
Kingsley 
resubmitted his revised plan and proposed to “dedicate” the 
developments on the affected parcel to the village for 
public use. 
In other words, Kingsley proposed to create 
purportedly “public” developments on plaintiff’s land, 
which the village could then justify by way of its 
easement. 
The village authorized the proposal, giving Kingsley 
permission 
to 
construct 
developments 
on 
the 
subject 
property, including two access roads, light poles, trees, 
landscaping, pond grading, sidewalks, pipes, conduit, sewer 
lines, and water lines. 
The access roads would use the 
land subject to the easement to transect plaintiff’s 
property and connect Kingsley’s property to the new Dan 
Hoey 
Road. 
As 
part 
of 
their 
agreement, 
Kingsley 
indemnified the village against legal action. 
4  
 
 
 
 
Neither the village nor Kingsley informed plaintiff of 
their arrangement, leaving plaintiff to discover it when 
construction began. 
After plaintiff’s objections to the 
village and to Kingsley proved unsuccessful, plaintiff sued 
for injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and trespass. 
Among the facts that emerged during discovery were the 
following. 
In a memorandum addressing the matter, village 
zoning officer Janet Keller wrote that because Kingsley’s 
land was “landlocked,” the village might be “in jeopardy” 
if it did not approve the access road. 
Kingsley, however, 
acknowledged that his land was not landlocked because of 
two ingress and egress points at Dexter-Ann Arbor Road. 
Further, Kingsley testified that he could have built his 
commercial development without using the land covered by 
the easement, but that he never submitted plans that did 
not include land covered by the easement. 
He also 
testified that the access drives served no other purpose 
than access to the commercial development and that he only 
built the west driveway because he believed the village 
required it. 
Zoning officer Keller testified that the village did 
not request either road, but after reviewing where Kingsley 
proposed to place the roads, the village asked Kingsley to 
align the center road with an opposing road to form a four­
5  
 
 
 
                                                 
way intersection. Keller stated that the village was never 
presented with a plan that did not include the roads and 
that she did not know why the development could not proceed 
without them. 
Keller testified that the access roads were 
not an “improvement” to Dan Hoey Road. 
However, both she 
and other village officials agreed that the access roads 
contributed to the safety of the area and that Kingsley’s 
development as a whole contributed to the general public 
good. 
Evidence from the village planner showed that the 
access roads did not meet public road standards and that 
the entrances were designed to meet commercial standards. 
Moreover, the village attorney testified that when Dan Hoey 
Road was realigned in 1990, all four of the purposes stated 
in the easement grant, “relocating, establishing, opening, 
and improving Dan Hoey Road,” were fulfilled. According to 
the testimony, village officials had no intention to 
further utilize the easement in the foreseeable future. 
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 
2.116(C)(10),2 arguing that the proposed developments were 
within the scope of the village’s easement because the 
2 Defendant Dexter Development filed the initial motion
and supporting brief, and defendant village of Dexter filed
a concurring statement. 
6  
 
 
 
 
access 
roads 
promoted 
public 
safety 
and 
welfare. 
Defendants also argued that the utilities were permissible 
because the permissible uses of a public road easement 
encompass 
more 
than 
mere 
surface 
travel. 
Further, 
defendants contended that the use of the land covered by 
the easement would serve primarily public, rather than 
private, purposes. 
The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary 
disposition, ruling that the terms “roadway purposes” in 
the settlement agreement and “improvement” in the actual 
easement grant were ambiguous. 
However, it found that the 
developments benefited the public and were thus within the 
scope of the easement. 
Plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s ruling. 
In a 
split decision, the Court of Appeals majority held that the 
trial court reached the correct result, albeit for the 
wrong reason. 
Blackhawk Dev Corp v Village of Dexter, 
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, 
issued January 27, 2004 (Docket No. 240790). 
The majority 
held that the language at issue was not ambiguous, but that 
the proposed developments were within the scope of the 
easement because they benefited the public. 
Notably, the 
Court of Appeals examined the language of both the easement 
grant and the settlement agreement. 
The dissenting judge 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
agreed that there was no ambiguity in the language, but he 
believed that the changes were not “improvements” to Dan 
Hoey Road and, thus, were outside the scope of the 
easement. 
Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was 
denied, and plaintiffs sought leave to appeal in this 
Court. 
In lieu of granting plaintiffs’ application for 
leave 
to 
appeal, 
we 
ordered 
oral 
argument 
on 
the 
application. 471 Mich 905 (2004). 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The extent of a party’s rights under an easement is a 
question of fact, and a trial court’s determination of 
those facts is reviewed for clear error. 
Unverzagt v 
Miller, 306 Mich 260, 266; 10 NW2d 849 (1943), citing 
Harvey v Crane, 85 Mich 316, 322; 48 NW 582 (1891). 
A 
trial court’s dispositional ruling on equitable matters, 
however, is subject to review de novo. 
Stachnik v Winkel, 
394 Mich 375, 383; 230 NW2d 529 (1975). 
The decision to 
grant or deny summary disposition is also reviewed de novo. 
Stewart v Michigan, 471 Mich 692, 696; 692 NW2d 376 (2004). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This 
case 
presents 
the 
straightforward 
question 
whether Dexter Development’s desired developments fall 
within the scope of the village of Dexter’s easement. 
The 
inquiry does not center, as defendants seem to suggest, on 
8  
 
 
whether defendants’ proposed developments afford the public 
at large some general benefit. 
Further, the analysis of 
this issue is not affected by the fact that a private 
developer instituted the proposed developments. 
Rather, 
this Court must analyze simply whether the developments are 
within the scope of the granted easement. 
The existence of an easement necessitates a thoughtful 
balancing 
of 
the 
grantor’s 
property 
rights 
and 
the 
grantee’s privilege to burden the grantor’s estate. 
And 
while 
the 
easement 
holder’s 
rights 
are 
ultimately 
“‘“paramount . . . to those of the owner of the soil,”’” 
the latter’s rights are subordinate only to the extent 
stated in the easement grant. 
Cantieny v Friebe, 341 Mich 
143, 146; 67 NW2d 102 (1954), quoting Hasselbring v Koepke, 
263 Mich 466, 475; 248 NW 869 (1933), quoting Harvey, supra 
at 322. 
Consequently, “[t]he use of an easement must be 
confined strictly to the purposes for which it was granted 
or reserved.” 
Delaney v Pond, 350 Mich 685, 687; 86 NW2d 
816 (1957). 
A fundamental principle of easement law is that the 
easement holder—here, the village—cannot “make improvements 
to the servient estate if such improvements are unnecessary 
for the effective use of the easement or they unreasonably 
burden the servient tenement.” Little v Kin, 468 Mich 699, 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
701; 664 NW2d 749 (2003), citing Crew’s Die Casting Corp v 
Davidow, 369 Mich 541; 120 NW2d 238 (1963), Unverzagt, 
supra at 265, and Mumrow v Riddle, 67 Mich App 693, 700; 
242 NW2d 489 (1976). 
Stated differently, “‘It is an 
established principle that the conveyance of an easement 
gives to the grantee all such rights as are incident or 
necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the 
easement.’” Unverzagt, supra at 265, quoting 9 RCL, p 784. 
And “[t]he use exercised by the holders of the easement 
must be reasonably necessary and convenient to the proper 
enjoyment of the easement, with as little burden as 
possible to the fee owner of the land.” Id. 
From these principles evolves a two-step inquiry: 
whether the proposed developments are necessary for the 
village’s effective use of its easement and, if the 
developments 
are 
necessary, 
whether 
they 
unreasonably 
burden plaintiffs’ servient estate. 
Id.
 Of course, the 
need to answer the second question is obviated where the 
first question is answered in the negative. 
The answers to these inquiries originate in the 
language or express reservations of the grant. 
See id. at 
266-267. 
The task of determining the parties’ intent and 
interpreting the limiting language is strictly confined to 
the “four corners of the instrument” granting the easement. 
10  
 
 
 
                                                 
Hasselbring, supra at 477. 
Only where the language in the 
granting instrument is ambiguous may this Court examine 
evidence extrinsic to the document to determine the meaning 
within it. Little, supra at 700. 
Thus, our first task is to determine whether the 
language of the granting instrument is ambiguous. 
The 
instrument states that the grantor grants to the village of 
Dexter “an easement for the purposes of relocating, 
establishing, opening and improving Dan Hoey Road in the 
Village of Dexter, Washtenaw County, Michigan . . . .” The 
only document incorporated by reference is the document 
that sets forth the legal description of the land subject 
to the easement. 
As such, our interpretation focuses on 
the 
language, 
“relocating, 
establishing, 
opening 
and 
improving Dan Hoey Road . . . .” The parties seem to agree 
that out of the four terms, the term “improving” is of 
paramount relevance.3 
There is nothing technical or unique about the word 
“improving” in this context that would require us to rely 
on anything other than its common sense meaning. 
But the 
question 
is 
not 
so 
much 
whether 
defendant 
Dexter 
3 
Notably, 
defendants 
do 
not 
argue 
that 
the 
developments purport to “open” Dan Hoey Road, which 
undermines the dissent’s attempt to argue otherwise. 
11  
 
 
                                                 
 
Development has proposed “improvements” in the sense of 
developments that help “improve” something, for certainly 
these developments could be considered “improvements” in 
the general sense of the word. 
The more refined question 
is whether the developments “improve” Dan Hoey Road.4
 A 
close examination of the record reveals no evidence 
supporting defendants’ claim that the proposed developments 
are within the scope of the express easement. 
According to zoning officer Keller, Kingsley’s revised 
development plan included two access roads across the land 
covered by the easement, and sidewalks, utilities, trees, 
and “general public improvements” on that land. 
Clearly, 
the access roads served to connect the commercial complex 
to Dan Hoey Road rather than to complement Dan Hoey Road 
itself. 
The utility, water, and sewer lines served to 
connect Kingsley’s development to main utility, water, and 
4 The dissent reads too much into the comment that the 
installations could, on some general level, be considered
“improvements.” See post at 5-6. If the debate were truly
over 
whether 
roads, 
sidewalks, 
and 
grading 
are 
“improvements,” certainly there would be as many countering
views as supportive ones. 
But our task is not simply to
determine 
whether 
the 
proposed 
installations 
are 
“improvements,” but whether, as we clearly state, the 
installations improve Dan Hoey Road. 
Likewise, dictionary
definitions of “improvement” do nothing to resolve whether
sidewalks, utilities, and lighting improve Dan Hoey Road,
so the dissent’s citation of the dictionary is ineffective.
See post at 5. 
12  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
sewer lines. 
The sidewalks and lighting on the land 
covered by the easement were not sidewalks and lighting for 
Dan Hoey Road, but sidewalks and lighting for the private 
commerce center and surrounding area. 
Not one of these 
developments could be said to be for the purpose of 
improving Dan Hoey Road.5
 Without question, Kingsley’s 
planned use of the land covered by the easement served the 
5 Kingsley claims he believed that the village
“required” one of the access roads on his site plan, but
the evidence shows only that the village asked Kingsley to
align the road–which appeared on Kingsley’s original site
plan and every one thereafter–with an opposing road so as
to create a four-way intersection. 
Indeed, village zoning
officer Keller could point to nothing that required the
road, and she testified that Kingsley’s two other access
roads by way of Dexter-Ann Arbor Road were sufficient for
ingress and egress purposes. 
As such, to the extent
defendant Dexter Development argues that public safety 
reasons compelled its use of the land subject to the
easement, we find that argument unpersuasive. 
Moreover, the fact that Kingsley offered to dedicate
the developments to the public does not change the 
analysis. 
See post at 3 n 1. 
While it is of course true 
that the village can open streets, install sidewalks, and
landscape, see post at 10, that says nothing about whether
a village can undertake those projects under an easement it
holds. 
Regardless of who initiates the project, the 
analysis is the same. 
For example, had the village
endeavored to construct these developments, we would 
conduct the same analysis conducted in this case to 
determine whether the proposed developments are within the
easement’s scope. 
It is unclear why the dissent insists
that our analysis hinges on who proposed the developments
and on subjective motivations. See post at 9-11. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
exclusive purpose of furthering and enhancing his private 
complex.6 
6 The dissent proffers that Unverzagt, supra, supports
its conclusion that consistent with the parties’ intent, 
the proposed developments here are reasonably necessary to
improve and open Dan Hoey Road. 
Post at 6-8. 
In 
Unverzagt, 
this 
Court 
resolved 
the 
question 
of 
reasonableness of use against the grantor of an easement
where the question was whether the grantor could preclude
the easement holders’ invitees from using the easement to
deliver goods to the easement holders. 
This Court held 
that use by the invitees was incidental and necessary.
Unverzagt, supra at 265-266. 
The dissent’s simplistic comparison disregards several
critical differences between Unverzagt and the case at 
hand. 
First and foremost, the village holds the easement
in question here, not Dexter Development. 
Thus, the 
commercial traffic will not serve the easement holder as 
the delivery traffic did in Unverzagt. 
In that sense 
alone, the commercial traffic is not “incidental” to the
easement. 
Moreover, this Court crafted its opinion in
Unverzagt restrictively: 
This does not mean that any and all invitees
of a cottage owner may have the right to use the
streets. 
To so hold, would mean that a cottage
owner might invite the use of the streets by
conventions, 
picnics, 
assemblies 
in 
general.
Such use would defeat the purpose as well as the
desires of all parties. 
Nor do we go to the
extent of holding that hawkers and peddlers of 
goods, wares and merchandise may use the private
streets in the park for their own purposes, even
at the invitation of cottage owners. 
[Id. at 
266.] 
Thus, this Court clearly recognized, as we must here,
that permitted easement use is not unlimited but must
conform to the purposes set forth by the parties in the
easement grant. 
14  
 
 
                                                 
  
Critical to our analysis is that village agents 
testified 
that 
the 
proposed 
access 
roads 
were 
not 
“improvements” to Dan Hoey Road and that none of the 
proposed developments was necessary with regard to Dan Hoey 
Road. 
Village zoning officer Keller testified that the 
village had no reason to construct any of Kingsley’s 
proposed developments. 
Clearly, the evidence fails to 
establish that the proposed developments fell within the 
scope 
of 
the 
village’s 
limited 
property 
interest—an 
easement for the express purpose of improving Dan Hoey 
Road. 
In fact, the developments are so clearly unrelated 
to “improving” Dan Hoey Road–in both concept and physical 
proximity–that they cannot be said to fall within the scope 
of the village’s easement, which was secured to improve not 
Further, the dissent cursorily concludes, without 
record support or analysis, that “landscaping and drainage
ponds reasonably could improve Dan Hoey Road . . . ,” and
“[a]ccess drives and sidewalks would ‘improve’ and ‘open’
the road . . . .” Post at 6, 7 n 5. We disagree. First,
Dan Hoey Road was already “opened,” according to the 
village. 
Second, the dissent asserts that landscaping and
drainage 
ponds 
“control[] 
rainwater 
runoff, 
thereby
enhancing the safety and life of the road.” 
Post at 6. 
Limiting the amount of vehicles on Dan Hoey Road might
enhance the safety and life of the road as well, but not
every conceivable effect on Dan Hoey Road renders it an
“improvement.” 
We decline to read the word “improve” that
broadly. 
15  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
   
the general surrounding area and corporate development, but 
Dan Hoey Road itself.7 
Where the rights to an easement are conveyed by grant, 
neither party can alter the easement without the other 
party’s consent.8 
Douglas v Jordan, 232 Mich 283, 287; 205 
7 Despite defendant Dexter Development’s heavy emphasis
on its theory that the two access roads across the land
covered by the easement are necessary for the general
safety of the area, we need not address that contention.
Officer Keller testified that having only one access point
into Kingsley’s development created additional traffic 
concerns on Dexter-Ann Arbor Road. 
However, the need to
alleviate traffic or congestion concerns on Dexter-Ann 
Arbor Road does not broaden the scope of the village’s
easement. 
Further, the mere fact that the village asked
Kingsley to alter his plan to align one of the access roads
with an opposing road does not speak to whether the access
road was for the purpose of improving Dan Hoey Road. Thus,
the public safety arguments advanced by Dexter Development
are misplaced. 
8 We have no quarrel with the proposition that an
easement is a permanent interest in land, see post at 13,
and we do not hold otherwise. 
But the permanency of the
grant does not control or even speak to the way in which 
the easement may be used. 
The dissent states that 
plaintiffs “may not be heard to complain that Dexter 
Development’s proposed uses involve more land than was in
service.” 
Id.
 But again, the dissent misses a finer
point. 
Plaintiff complains not about geography, but about
purpose. 
The dissent finds that the easement “contains no 
language preventing use of an increased amount of the land
encompassed within it.” Id.  As such, it concludes that it
can “infer that the parties intended to allow the area used
in the easement to expand to maintain the easement’s 
utility.” Id. 
The dissent reads its cited Restatement passage too 
loosely. 
See post at 13-14. 
The Restatement does not 
allow for haphazard inferences of parties’ intent. 
It 
states, “The determination [of an easement’s scope] is 
16  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
NW 52 (1925), citing Powers v Harlow, 53 Mich 507; 19 NW 
257 (1884). 
When the village, as the dominant estate, 
authorized developments on the servient land for the 
benefit of another parcel of land, the village improperly 
altered the easement without plaintiff’s consent. 
By so 
doing, the village materially increased the burden on 
plaintiff’s servient estate by imposing new burdens that 
were not contemplated at the time of the easement grant, 
contrary to general easement principles.9
 See Delaney, 
primarily one of fact, based on inferences that may be
drawn from the language and circumstances, but the outcome
in any particular case may be affected by the level of
generality 
with 
which 
the 
purpose 
is 
defined.” 
1 
Restatement of Property, 3d, § 4.10, comment d, p 595. The 
comment goes on to explain that, for instance, if an
easement 
grants 
“access,” 
the 
word 
“access” 
may 
be 
interpreted more broadly than if the words “ingress and
egress to people and vehicles” had been used. Thus, rather
than permitting a court to guess, the Restatement advises
that where words are more general, the intent will be
determined accordingly. 
Here, the task is made simpler by
the fact that we need not determine what the parties meant
by the general word “improve,” but rather what they meant
by the more specific parameter “improve Dan Hoey Road.”
The phrase “improve Dan Hoey Road” is self-limiting and
must be given its ordinary meaning. 
We disagree that the
fact that the phrase was not further elaborated on permits
unlimited use of the burdened land. 
9 The dissent somewhat puzzlingly concludes that the
developments fall within the scope of the easement because
where there were once four residential driveways, there
would now be “only” two commercial access roads. 
Post at 
12. 
Ignoring for a moment that the proposed access road
across the parcel subject to the easement does nothing to
improve Dan Hoey Road, it is difficult to understand how
one would conclude that a burden lessens, rather than 
17  
 
 
                                                 
 
supra at 687; Barbaresos v Casaszar, 325 Mich 1; 37 NW2d 
689 (1949). 
The easement was not procured for the benefit 
of 
Kingsley’s 
property, 
nor 
was 
it 
procured 
for 
developments unrelated to Dan Hoey Road that may arise in 
the future. 
This is not to say that once the village 
relocated Dan Hoey Road, it had no further rights to impose 
further developments in relation to the road. 
But while 
the village’s easement is unlimited in duration, it is not 
unlimited in scope. 
Thus, the village was and remains 
obliged to ensure that any use of the land covered by the 
easement strictly comports with the purpose of the easement 
as originally granted: 
relocating, establishing, opening, 
and improving Dan Hoey Road. 
Defendants argue that our inquiry regarding the scope 
of the easement should extend to the language found in the 
increases, when in lieu of four residential driveways,
there are instead two roads to a large commercial complex.
Not only is the dissent’s conclusion odd, it is also devoid
of record support. 
Another strange conclusion by the
dissent is that because plaintiff was unable to build on
the parcel, “Blackhawk’s quiet enjoyment of the parcel
would not be impermissibly disturbed by increased traffic
whether on the new access drives or on several lanes of 
through traffic.” 
Post at 12 
The fact that plaintiff
could not develop its parcel seems to us to doubly support
a conclusion that where that parcel is commercially
developed by a commercial neighbor, quiet enjoyment is
vastly disturbed. 
And the fact that plaintiffs did not
“question” the easement when they purchased their land does
not extinguish their right to contest improper uses of the
easement. 
18  
 
 
settlement agreement that was reached between Kingsley, as 
a predecessor in interest to the servient estate, and the 
village. The settlement agreement referred to the easement 
as one for “public roadway purposes.” 
Defendants argue 
that this language broadens the scope of the easement 
beyond general private easement principles because it 
references a “public roadway.” 
The effect, according to 
defendants, is essentially that the land subject to the 
easement can be used for any purpose the village desires as 
long as the purpose can be said to confer some general 
benefit to the public. Thus, defendants argue, because the 
access roads, utilities, sidewalks, and commerce center 
generally 
benefit 
the 
public 
as 
a 
whole, 
they 
are 
permissible uses of the land covered by the easement. 
It is true that “[i]f the text of the easement is 
ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be considered by the 
trial court in order to determine the scope of the 
easement.” 
Little, supra at 700. 
It is also true that 
where an ambiguity exists, “the courts will try to arrive 
at the intention of the parties and in accordance therewith 
. . . .” Farabaugh v Rhode, 305 Mich 234, 240; 9 NW2d 562 
(1943). 
However, considering extrinsic evidence in the 
absence of ambiguous language is “clearly inconsistent with 
the well-established principles of legal interpretation 
19  
 
 
 
 
. . . and is thus incorrect.”  Little, supra at 700 n 2. 
We find nothing ambiguous about the easement grant’s 
limiting language. 
Thus, the trial court erred by 
considering language extrinsic to the express easement 
grant. 
As a corollary, defendants further argue that because 
a 
public 
entity 
holds 
the 
easement, 
the 
scope 
of 
permissible uses is broader, and the easement can be used 
for any public purpose. 
For this proposition, defendants 
rely on Eyde Bros Dev Co v Eaton Co Drain Comm’r, 427 Mich 
271; 398 NW2d 297 (1986), and Village of Grosse Pointe 
Shores v Ayres, 254 Mich 58; 235 NW 829 (1931). We held in 
Eyde that “a public easement in a highway dedicated by user 
is not limited to surface travel, but includes those uses, 
such as the installation of sewers, contemplated to be in 
the public interest and for the public benefit.” 
Eyde, 
supra at 286. 
But as correctly noted by the dissenting 
Court of Appeals judge in this case, neither Eyde nor 
Grosse Pointe Shores involved “a situation where the 
proposed improvements ran across or under land that was 
owned in fee simple by a private party and was not 
established as, or being used as, a public roadway.” 
Slip 
op at 2. 
Rather, those cases, at most, stand for the 
proposition that an easement for roadway purposes includes 
20  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
all appropriate purposes to which roads and streets are 
actually devoted, provided that they occur on or under the 
surface of the roadway itself.10
 This comports with the 
statutory grant for the laying of utilities “upon, over, 
across, or under” public roads. See MCL 247.183(1). 
However, as the dissenting Court of Appeals judge 
stated 
in 
this 
case, 
“the 
‘improvements’ 
sought 
by 
defendants do not merely affect the surface or subsurface 
of Dan Hoey Road,” but they also affect the unimproved 
portion of plaintiff’s property that was subject to the 
easement. Slip op at 2. Plaintiffs have not dedicated fee 
simple property to a public entity for a public road. 
Rather, the village holds a more limited property interest— 
an express easement for the express purpose of improving 
Dan Hoey Road, and nothing else. 
That a public entity 
10 In Grosse Pointe Shores, supra at 64, we first
rejected, as a matter of public policy, certain conditions
that the defendants had attached to their dedication of 
land 
for 
roadway 
purposes 
that 
would 
have 
placed
restrictions on the installation of sidewalks, utilities,
and sewer lines and on paving or widening the road. 
After 
finding the conditions invalid, we outlined what types of
improvements 
to 
a 
highway 
dedicated 
by 
user 
were 
permissible. 
We noted that the improvements at issue were
“in territory which had been and continued to be part of 
the street.” 
(Emphasis added.) 
In Eyde, supra at 296, we
addressed the “issue of compensation for new uses of public
easements within streets dedicated by statute.” 
(Emphasis
added.) 
Thus, improvements made pursuant to a public
easement are limited to those uses that fall within the 
right-of-way of the roadway itself. 
21  
 
 
 
 
holds an easement and the easement is for a public road 
transforms neither the nature nor the scope of the granted 
easement, contrary to the dissent’s attempt to do so. 
See 
post at 5-6. 
“Public interest” and “public benefit” are 
not valid reasons to allow the municipality to obtain more 
property rights than were granted. 
Thus, both Eyde and 
Grosse Pointe Shores are inapplicable. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The express language of the easement grant in this 
case is not ambiguous, and there is no evidence in the 
record that the proposed developments were within the scope 
of 
the 
easement. 
As 
such, 
the 
village 
improperly 
authorized the use of its easement for purposes that were 
unrelated to the improvement of Dan Hoey Road. 
For these 
reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
and remand this case for further proceedings. 
On remand, 
the trial court should enter a declaratory judgment and 
grant injunctive relief in plaintiffs’ favor and conduct 
further proceedings on plaintiffs’ claim for trespass 
damages. We do not retain jurisdiction. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
BLACKHAWK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
and DEXTER CROSSING, L.L.C.,
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 126036 
VILLAGE OF DEXTER and DEXTER DEVELOPMENT, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
YOUNG, J. (concurring). 
I fully concur with the majority opinion. I write 
separately, however, in response to the dissent’s contrary 
assertion, to emphasize that the majority opinion does not 
suggest that John Kingsley’s motivations are dispositive of 
the village’s motivations. The majority opinion merely 
provides 
a 
complete 
recitation 
of 
the 
background 
information 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
providing 
a 
full 
understanding of the transaction. Because he is a third 
party who enjoys no cognizable interest in the property 
burdened by the easement, Kingsley’s purposes in proposing, 
initiating, designing, or financing the improvements to the 
easement are absolutely irrelevant in determining whether 
 
 
 
 
 
the 
easement 
holder 
may 
lawfully 
make 
the 
proposed 
developments to the easement. 
Thus, as a threshold matter, the easement holder must 
assert that the proposed improvements to the easement are 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
the 
easement. 
Secondly, 
the 
developments to the easement must be objectively congruent 
with the purpose permitted in the easement. In this case, 
the scope of the easement is to “improv[e] Dan Hoey Road 
. . . .” The village does not maintain that the purpose 
behind the proposed developments is to “improve Dan Hoey 
Road.” Because the village failed to make the initial 
showing that the developments were initiated for the 
purpose of improving Dan Hoey Road, there is no basis to 
conclude that the desired developments are objectively 
within the scope of the easement. Thus, the proposed 
developments are outside the scope of the easement as a 
matter of law. 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
BLACKHAWK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
a Michigan corporation, and
DEXTER CROSSING, LLC, a Michigan
limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
No. 126036 
VILLAGE OF DEXTER and 
DEXTER DEVELOPMENT, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
KELLY, J. (dissenting). 
Defendant village of Dexter obtained the easement that 
is under scrutiny in this case to improve Dan Hoey Road. 
Defendant Dexter Development proposed to install utility 
lines, street lighting, sidewalks, and landscaping on the 
property subject to the easement and dedicate them to the 
village. 
It also proposed to widen one private access 
drive on the property and consolidate into one three other 
private access drives that connect Dan Hoey Road with the 
adjacent private parcel. 
The majority holds that these projects are not within 
the scope of the easement. 
To reach this conclusion, it 
erroneously relies on the subjective motivation for the 
projects. 
But the motivation should be irrelevant in 
 
 
 
 
determining whether a proposed use lies within the scope of 
an easement. 
Because I believe that the projects in question open 
and improve Dan Hoey Road, they fall within the scope of 
the easement. 
Hence, I would affirm the decisions of the 
trial court and the Court of Appeals in favor of 
defendants. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The village obtained an “easement for the purposes of 
relocating, establishing, opening and improving Dan Hoey 
Road” from Dexter Development, which owned the land. 
The 
village used the easement to relocate the road to the south 
and to widen it. 
The property to the north of the road had been divided 
into four parcels. Each had direct access to the old road. 
To create access for them to the new Dan Hoey Road, the 
village installed four new access drives. 
The old and the 
new roads together with the old and new access drives are 
on the land that is subject to the easement. 
Dexter 
Development did not object. 
Moreover, plaintiff Blackhawk 
Development had not objected to continued use of the drives 
when it bought the land over which the easement runs. 
Dexter Development later acquired the four parcels to 
the north of the road in the hope of developing them.  It 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
wished to have three of the four access roads consolidated 
into 
one, 
the 
fourth 
widened, 
and 
street 
lighting, 
landscaping, sidewalks, and underground utilities installed 
on the easement property. 
Eventually, it obtained a 
license from the village to make the improvements on the 
easement property itself. In its brief, Dexter Development 
indicated that it promised to dedicate the improvements to 
public use.1 
Plaintiff Blackhawk Development, which had refused to 
sell to Dexter Development the parcel over which the 
easement runs, filed suit to enjoin construction of the 
improvements. 
Plaintiffs contended that the projects were 
not to improve Dan Hoey Road. 
ANY PROPOSED USE OF AN EASEMENT IS REQURIED TO BE
WITHIN THE EASEMENT’S SCOPE 
The purpose of an easement is determined by the 
parties and ascertained by applying principles similar to 
those used when contracts are construed. 
1 Restatement 
Property, 3d, § 4.1, comment d, p 499 (2000). The terms of 
the easement conveyance are given their ordinary meaning in 
light of the surrounding circumstances. 
Newaygo Mfg Co v 
1 I do not represent that Dexter Development or its
owner acted as the village’s agent. 
Ante at 13 n 5. 
Rather, Dexter Development attempted to do what the village
could have done with the intention of dedicating the 
improvements to the public. 
3  
 
 
 
                                                 
Chicago & W M R Co, 64 Mich 114, 122-123; 30 NW 910 (1887); 
25 Am Jur 2d, § 18, p 516, § 73, p 571; 1 Restatement 
Property, 3d, § 4.1, comment d, p 499. 
If a specific use 
is 
not 
enumerated 
in 
the 
easement 
conveyance, 
the 
surrounding circumstances may be considered to ascertain 
the intent of the parties. 
Newaygo at 122-123, 1 
Restatement Property, 3d, § 4.10, comment a, p 592, and 
comment d, p 595. See also Thies v Howland, 424 Mich 282, 
293; 380 NW2d 463 (1985). 
The majority agrees with the principle enunciated by 
this Court in Unverzagt v Miller2 that “‘[t]he use exercised 
by the holders of the easement must be reasonably necessary 
and convenient to the proper enjoyment of the easement, 
with as little burden as possible to the fee owner of the 
land.’” Ante at 10, quoting Unverzagt at 265. 
In Unverzagt, the defendant granted the plaintiffs an 
easement to use the private streets of the subdivision to 
gain access to their cottages. The plaintiffs wanted local 
merchants to be able to deliver goods to them. 
The 
defendant claimed that the easement did not permit others, 
not social guests of the plaintiffs, to use the streets 
without the defendant’s permission. 
2 306 Mich 260; 10 NW2d 849 (1943). 
4  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
This Court held that the condition laid down by the 
defendant 
unreasonably 
restricted 
the 
right 
of 
the 
plaintiffs. 
The proper test, we ruled, is whether it was 
reasonably necessary for the use and enjoyment of the 
easement that plaintiffs could invite nonsocial guests to 
use the private streets. 
We held that holders of the 
easement had the right to use it limited only by what was 
necessary to and reasonable in its use. 
This included 
allowing nonsocial guests to make deliveries over it. 
It 
did not include use by the general public. 
Unverzagt at 
265-267. 
In this case, the easement is “for . . . opening and 
improving Dan Hoey Road.” 
Sidewalks, utilities and 
lighting systems are improvements to highways. Black’s Law 
Dictionary (6th ed), p 757. 
Despite implications to the 
contrary,3 
the 
majority 
opinion 
concedes 
that 
Dexter 
Development’s proposed projects are improvements. 
Ante at 
12.4 
3 Ante at 13 n 5, 15 n 6. 
4 See also Warren v Grand Haven, 30 Mich 24, 27-28
(1874) 
(dedication 
of 
land 
to 
a 
roadway 
includes 
constructing sewers), Village of Grosse Pointe Shores v
Ayres, 254 Mich 58, 64; 235 NW 829 (1931) (sewer, water,
gas, 
lighting, 
and 
telephone 
systems 
are 
highway
improvements). 
5  
 
 
 
It is readily apparent that landscaping and drainage 
ponds reasonably could improve Dan Hoey Road by controlling 
rainwater runoff, thereby enhancing the safety and life of 
the road. 
Access drives and sidewalks would “improve” and 
“open” the road by facilitating public access to and from 
it by vehicles and pedestrians on the north. 
By granting 
Dexter 
Development 
permission 
to 
install 
these 
improvements, the village authorized the improvement and 
opening of Dan Hoey Road. 
The majority opinion’s factual comparison of this case 
with Unverzagt shows that there are limits to Unverzagt’s 
application here. 
Ante at 14 n 6. 
The easement in that 
case was private and the issue concerned use of an easement 
by invited guests of the easement holders. 
Here, the 
easement is held by a government entity and is for a road 
used by the general public. 
An easement to improve and 
open a public road is by its terms more expansive than an 
easement to access a private road. 
The Court’s decision in Unverzagt to prohibit general 
public use was necessary to fulfill the parties’ intentions 
to create a private easement to allow access to certain 
cottages. 
The ruling disallowed use of the easement for 
purposes other than access, such as picnics, because they 
would defeat the purpose of the easement. 
6  
 
 
   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
In the case before us, the property owner granted an 
easement for public purposes to a governmental entity. The 
parties intended to create an easement that inherently 
encompassed broader uses than those allowed in Unverzagt.5 
The surrounding circumstances confirm that the parties 
who created the easement intended that it could be used for 
projects such as those proposed by Dexter Development. The 
grantor’s view of the scope of the easement is more 
persuasive of the scope than the view of a later purchaser 
of the burdened estate. Crew’s Die Casting Corp v Davidow, 
369 Mich 541, 546; 120 NW2d 238 (1963).6  A party may not 
unilaterally change the scope of an easement once conveyed. 
5 The majority’s discussion of Eyde Bros Dev Co v Eaton
Co Drain Comm’r, 427 Mich 271; 398 NW2d 297 (1986), and
Ayres, supra, does not support its determination of the
scope of this easement. 
Ayres involved an express grant
and Eyde Bros involved a highway created for public use.
Both easements were geographically limited to the roadways
involved. 
In this case, there is no requirement that the 
proposed improvements be on or under the existing roadway.
This easement explicitly encompasses a much larger area. 
As in Ayres, the improvements would be on the portion
subject to the easement, and they would directly affect the
road. They would open it in the case of the access drives
and improve it in the case of the lighting, sidewalks,
driveways, and landscaping. 
6 See also Schumacher v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 256
Mich App 103, 107; 663 NW2d 921 (2003), citing Tobias v 
Dailey, 196 Ariz 418, 421; 998 P2d 1091 (Ariz App, 2000);
Tungsten Holdings, Inc v Kimberlin, 298 Mont 176, 182; 994
P2d 1114 (2000); Thompson v Whinnery, 895 P2d 537, 541-542
& n 8 (Colo, 1995). 
7  
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Schadewald v Brulé, 225 Mich App 26, 36; 570 NW2d 788 
(1997), citing Douglas v Jordan, 232 Mich 283, 287; 205 NW 
52 (1925). 
See also Schumacher v Dep’t of Natural 
Resources, 256 Mich App 103, 106; 663 NW2d 921 (2003). 
The village obtained an easement over the whole parcel 
rather than merely over the new roadbed. 
The Court of 
Appeals wrote that the village’s attorney testified 
the crescent-shaped piece of land . . . was meant
to be used to provide rights of way to the north
residences that were separated from the road.
[Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of
Appeals, issued January 27, 2004 (Docket No. 
240790).] 
Dexter Development was owned by the grantor of the 
easement. 
His failure to object to the access drives when 
he granted the easement suggests that the parties who 
created it understood that opening the road included 
building access roads. 
The majority opinion fails to take proper account of 
the factual circumstances of this case. I would hold that, 
because Dexter Development’s activities will improve and 
open Dan Hoey Road, they are within the scope of the 
easement. 
THE SUBJECTIVE MOTIVATION TO USE AN EASEMENT IS 
IRRELEVANT 
Motive, in the strict sense, is distinct from purpose. 
Motive has been described as the desire that prompts a 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
person to act, whereas purpose is the result to be 
obtained. 
Hudson v American Oil Co, 152 F Supp 757, 770 
(ED Va, 1957). 
Courts do not normally inquire into the 
motive behind the exercise of a right. 
Burke v Smith, 69 
Mich 380, 388; 37 NW 838 (1888). 
The majority opinion asserts that its analysis does 
not consider that these improvements were initiated by a 
private developer.  Ante at 9. 
But the majority’s 
subsequent focus on the fact that the improvements in 
question are being proposed at the behest of a private 
developer belies this assertion. 
The opinion states, 
“[Dexter Development’s] planned use of the land covered by 
the easement served the exclusive purpose of furthering and 
enhancing [its] private complex.” 
Ante at 13-14. 
The 
majority asserts that defendant Dexter Development sought 
to use the village’s easement to accomplish something it 
could not accomplish otherwise. Ante at 4. 
These considerations are improper. 
The Court’s 
examination of the terms of the conveyance and the 
surrounding circumstances should be an objective inquiry. 
The subjective motivations of the interested parties are 
irrelevant. 
The 
pertinent 
question 
is 
whether 
the 
improvements fulfill the easement’s purpose to improve and 
open Dan Hoey Road. 
The village is not obligated to 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
justify its motives, as the majority and concurrence seem 
to require. 
Also, the fact that Dexter Development rather than the 
village is arguing for the improvements is not remarkable. 
Dexter Development agreed to indemnify the village against 
legal action arising from the proposed improvements. 
Hence, it is to be expected that Dexter Development would 
advance 
the 
legal 
arguments 
supporting 
the 
proposed 
improvements in place of the village. 
When 
viewed 
objectively, 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
improvements is to open and improve the road. 
The fact 
that a developer seeks to implement them rather than the 
village has no legal relevance. 
The improvements could be 
undertaken by the village directly, at its discretion. 
Villages may open streets. 
MCL 67.12. 
They may install 
sidewalks or require property owners to install them. 
MCL 
67.8. They may also landscape. MCL 67.21. 
Moreover, the village was not required to have made a 
decision to further improve and open Dan Hoey Road before a 
developer requested it, as the majority implies. 
Ante at 
6. 
It could decide to install landscaping and sidewalks 
for aesthetic reasons at any time. 
Also, it could decide 
at any time to install the improvements in question to 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
enhance the road’s safety, longevity, and utility as a 
transportation artery. 
Justice Young in his concurrence asserts without 
reference to authority that the village has an initial 
burden to show that the proposed improvements are within 
the scope of the easement. 
Such a burden contradicts 
standard practice that puts the onus on the party making a 
claim 
to 
articulate 
and 
substantiate 
it. 
See 
MCR 
2.116(c)(8). 
In this case, the burden rightfully is on 
plaintiffs 
to 
assert 
and 
show 
that 
the 
proposed 
improvements exceed the scope of the easement. 
Stewart v 
Hunt, 303 Mich 161, 163; 5 NW2d 737 (1942). 
Justice Young appears to be suggesting as well that 
the village has the initial burden of showing that the 
underlying motivation for the improvements is consistent 
with the scope of the easement. This is inaccurate, and it 
belies 
his 
concurring 
argument 
that 
the 
parties’ 
motivations are irrelevant to the disposition of the case. 
THE PROPOSED USES DO NOT 
UNREASONABLY BURDEN THE SERVIENT ESTATE 
This Court has held that, where broad language in an 
easement permits uses not stated, those uses must not 
impose an additional or increased burden on the servient 
estate. 
Crew’s Die Casting Corp, supra at 546, quoting 
11  
 
 
 
 
Delaney v Pond, 350 Mich 685, 687; 86 NW2d 816 (1957). In 
this case, the access drives and related improvements do 
not increase the burden. 
They fit squarely within the 
scope of what the parties intended. 
Where there were four 
access drives, there would be only two. 
They would 
consolidate the traffic running over the access drives. 
Plaintiffs’ burden would not increase by virtue of the 
fact that the access drives would service a commercial 
development rather than four residences. 
This Court has 
held that, generally speaking, a mere increase in the 
number of persons using an unlimited right-of-way to which 
land is subject is not an unlawful additional burden. 
Henkle v Goldenson, 263 Mich 140, 143; 248 NW 574 (1933). 
In theory, Dan Hoey Road could be opened to encompass 
several lanes of through traffic over the entire parcel. 
If so opened, the increased traffic would not necessarily 
exceed the scope of this unlimited easement to open the 
road. 
Under the village’s zoning requirements, Blackhawk 
could not build on the parcel. Blackhawk’s quiet enjoyment 
of the parcel would not be impermissibly disturbed by 
increased traffic whether on the new access drives or on 
several lanes of through traffic. 
12  
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs may not be heard to complain that Dexter 
Development’s 
proposed 
uses 
involve 
more 
land 
than 
previously was in service. 
An easement is normally a 
permanent interest in land. 
1 Restatement Property, 3d, § 
4.1, comment b, p 498. 
This one contains no language 
preventing 
use 
of 
an 
increased 
amount 
of 
the 
land 
encompassed within it. 
Thus, I infer that the parties 
intended to allow the area used in the easement to expand 
over 
time 
to 
maintain 
the 
easement’s 
utility. 
1 
Restatement Property, 3d, § 4.10, p 592. 
Plaintiffs should have expected that improvements of 
the kind contemplated here could be installed at some 
future day. 
They may not be heard to complain that that 
day has come. They have no grounds to assert that they did 
not understand the broad intention of the parties who 
created the easement. 
They had record notice that the 
easement was in part to open and improve the road. 
Plaintiffs had inquiry notice of access drives for the 
use of the property owners to the north, and they never 
questioned their propriety when they acquired the property. 
Although there were no distinct easements in the record for 
each driveway, plaintiffs had to know that the easement 
included access drives. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effect of the proposed improvements on the 
servient estate in this case can be compared with the 
situation in Delaney, supra. 
There, the easement was 
between private parties for lake access. 
The Court 
correctly held that 
[a] principle which underlies the use of all
easements is that the owner of an easement cannot 
materially increase the burden of it upon the
servient estate or impose thereon a new and 
additional burden. See 17A Am Jur, Easements, §
115, p 723. [Delaney at 687.] 
Mooring boats and sunbathing were not inherent in providing 
access to the lake, and they increased the burden on the 
servient estates. Id. 
By contrast, here the proposed 
improvements open Dan Hoey Road and improve it, and they do 
not increase the burden on the servient estate. 
CONCLUSION 
It is irrelevant in this case that Dexter Development 
is a private developer. 
Its proposed projects are 
compatible with the purpose of and fall within the scope of 
the easement, which is to open and improve Dan Hoey Road. 
The actions of the parties who created the easement confirm 
this. Moreover, Dexter Development’s proposed improvements 
do not unreasonably burden plaintiffs’ estate. 
14  
 
 
 
 
I would affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals 
and of the trial court. 
Dexter Development’s proposed 
projects are within the scope of the easement. 
Marilyn Kelly 
15