Case Title: Reliable Copy Serv., Inc. v. Liberty

Citation: 

Docket Number: Cum-11-217

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
 
 
 
     
    Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2011 ME 127 
Docket: 
Cum-11-217 
Submitted 
  On Briefs: 
October 27, 2011  
Decided: 
December 15, 2011 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
 
RELIABLE COPY SERVICE, INC. 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL LIBERTY AND LIBERTY GROUP, INC. 
 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
 [¶1]  Michael Liberty and Liberty Group, Inc. (Liberty) appeal from a 
judgment entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) denying 
their M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from a default judgment that Reliable 
Copy Service, Inc. (Reliable) obtained in Pennsylvania and sought to enforce in 
Maine pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 14 M.R.S. 
§§ 8001-8008 (2010).  Liberty argues that the Pennsylvania default judgment is not 
enforceable in Maine because the Pennsylvania default judgment was, and 
remains, void.  See M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).  We disagree and affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  In 2006, Liberty retained Reliable to provide photocopy, optical 
character recognition, and coding services in connection with litigation then 
 
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pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
Three years later, on April 8, 2009, Reliable filed a “Complaint with Notice to 
Defend within 20 days” in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas 
(Pennsylvania Court) in an effort to collect on the sums owed for the services 
Reliable rendered to Liberty as part of the suit in federal court.  Reliable served 
Liberty with the Pennsylvania complaint by certified mail, return receipt requested, 
pursuant to Pennsylvania service of process rules.  See Pa. R. Civ. P. 403, 404(2).  
On April 10, 2009, Liberty signed the return receipts, but at no point did Liberty 
answer or formally respond to the Pennsylvania complaint.  On May 4, 2009, 
Reliable served Liberty by certified mail, return receipt requested, with a “Notice 
of Intention to Take Default.”  Liberty signed the return receipts for the default 
notice on May 6, 2009, which gave it ten days to respond to the default notice, but 
again made no effort to answer or formally respond to the default notice. 
[¶3]  On May 27, 2009, more than twenty-one days after Liberty had been 
served the notice of intention to take default, Reliable filed a “Praecipe to Enter 
Default Judgment,” and the Pennsylvania Court entered a default judgment against 
Liberty in the amount of $93,869.70.  This amount apparently included accrued 
interest on the damages at a rate of six percent.  Subsequently, on June 8, 2009, 
without providing notice to Liberty, Reliable moved to vacate the original 
judgment, but not the default, and filed an “Amended Praecipe to Enter Default 
 
3 
Judgment” requesting the Pennsylvania Court to enter another judgment in the 
amount of $136,761.38—to reflect a contractual interest rate of 18% on the 
damages (allegedly understated as 6% in Reliable’s May 2009 “Praecipe for Entry 
of Default Judgment”) and its contractual attorney fees, which Reliable calculated 
to be $20,424.61.  On June 9, 2009, the Pennsylvania Court granted Reliable’s 
motion and the prothonotary delivered to Liberty notice of the amended default 
judgment. 
[¶4]  On June 26, 2009, Liberty, through counsel, filed a “Petition to Open 
Default Judgment” in the Pennsylvania Court.  See Pa. R. Civ. P. 237.3.  The 
Pennsylvania Court denied the petition on September 3, 2009.  On September 14, 
2009, Liberty filed a motion requesting that the Pennsylvania Court reconsider its 
initial denial of Liberty’s petition to open.  While the Pennsylvania Court’s 
decision on Liberty’s motion to reconsider was pending, Liberty filed an appeal 
with the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which was dismissed as moot on October 2, 
2009.  See Pa. R. App. P. 1925(a)(1) (requiring Pennsylvania trial judges to issue a 
“brief opinion” that explains the reasoning behind an order before an appeal may 
proceed). 
[¶5]  On January 8, 2010, the Pennsylvania Court issued a written opinion 
explaining the reasoning behind the denial of Liberty’s petition to open.  The 
Pennsylvania Court reasoned that Liberty’s admittedly mistaken belief that 
 
4 
Reliable could not effect service of the Pennsylvania complaint by certified mail 
pursuant to Pa. R. Civ. P. 403 and 402(2) did not constitute the type of justifiable 
error that would excuse a failure to answer or defend against the lawsuit.  The 
Pennsylvania Court concluded that Liberty “attempted to avoid [its] legal 
responsibilities by choosing to ignore both the complaint and the Notice of Intent 
to Take Default.”  On February 24, 2010, the Pennsylvania judgment became final 
when Liberty voluntarily withdrew an appeal filed with the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court. 
[¶6]  On March 18, 2010, following the end of the litigation in the 
Pennsylvania Court, Reliable filed a “Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment” 
pursuant to Maine’s Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 
(Enforcement Act), 14 M.R.S. §§ 8001-8010, in the Superior Court in Cumberland 
County.  On May 25, 2010, the Superior Court entered a judgment in favor of 
Reliable in the amount of $136,761.38 and the clerk attempted to deliver notice of 
the judgment to Liberty.1  On July 8, 2011, the Superior Court Clerk’s Office 
issued a writ of execution at Reliable’s request.  Approximately seven months after 
the Pennsylvania default judgment was entered in Superior Court, Liberty filed a 
motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 55(c) and 60(b).  The 
                                         
1  The Superior Court docket record indicates that copy of the notice was returned undeliverable on 
June 2, 2010.  
 
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Superior Court denied the motion.  The court concluded that service of process by 
certified mail under Pennsylvania’s service of process rules did not offend 
Liberty’s due process rights; that the method of mail service used by Reliable 
established personal jurisdiction over Liberty in the Pennsylvania Court; and that 
Liberty had not carried its burden of proving that its procedural due process rights 
were violated when Reliable moved, without notice, to vacate the initial May 2009 
“Praecipe for Entry Default Judgment” and seek, in the June 2009 “Amended 
Praecipe to Enter Default Judgment,” a judgment in the greater amount of  
$136,761.38.  Liberty then filed this timely appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  Liberty maintains that the Pennsylvania default judgment is not 
enforceable in Maine, by operation of the Enforcement Act,2 because service of the 
Pennsylvania complaint by certified mail pursuant to Pennsylvania service of 
process rules was ineffective to vest the Pennsylvania Court with personal 
jurisdiction over it.  Liberty also contends that its procedural due process rights 
were violated when Reliable requested and received from the Pennsylvania Court 
an increased damages award of $136,761.38 without providing Liberty with notice 
and an opportunity to be heard. 
                                         
2  “The Enforcement Act creates an expedited procedure for enforcing federal and state judgments 
that are entitled to full faith and credit in Maine.”  GENUJO LOK Beteiligungs GmbH v. Zorn, 
2008 ME 50, ¶ 9, 943 A.2d 573 (citing 14 M.R.S. § 8002 (2007)). 
 
6 
[¶8]  A Maine trial court’s ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion is ordinarily 
subject to the deferential abuse of discretion standard on appeal.  Foley v. Adam, 
638 A.2d 718, 719 (Me. 1994). The standard differs, however, in circumstances 
where a party seeking relief from a judgment alleges a jurisdictional defect or other 
due process violation pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) that would render the 
judgment void.  Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 290 A.2d 362, 365-66 
(Me. 1972); accord Land Use Regulation Comm’n v. Tuck, 490 A.2d 649, 652 
(Me. 1985).  “If the judgment is void, ‘there is no room . . . for the court to exercise 
discretion’—the judgment must be set aside.”  Foley, 638 A.2d at 719 (quoting 
Warren, 290 A.2d at 365). 
A. 
Personal Jurisdiction 
[¶9]  We find no merit to Liberty’s argument that the Pennsylvania Court did 
not acquire personal jurisdiction over it by virtue of Reliable’s purported failure to 
serve the Pennsylvania complaint in accordance with the Maine Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The fact that the Enforcement Act subjects foreign judgments sought to 
be enforced in Maine to the “procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, 
vacating or staying the judgment” as would be available in the Maine trial courts, 
14 M.R.S. § 8003, does not dictate that Reliable was required to employ Maine 
service of process rules for the Pennsylvania Court to obtain personal jurisdiction 
over Liberty individually, or over his corporate namesake.  See Lewien v. Cohen, 
 
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432 A.2d 800, 804-05 (Me. 1981) (“Under Maine law and federal constitutional 
dictates of due process, service of process effected in a manner most reasonably 
calculated to apprise the defendant in fact of the proceeding is necessary to insure 
that the court in which an action is initiated gains personal jurisdiction over the 
parties.” (emphasis added)). 
[¶10]  By their express terms, the Pennsylvania service of process rules 
authorize out-of-state defendants to be served by certified mail.  Pennsylvania Rule 
of Civil Procedure 403 provides that “[i]f a rule of civil procedure authorizes 
original process to be served by mail, a copy of the process shall be mailed to the 
defendant by any form of mail requiring a receipt signed by the defendant or his 
authorized agent.”  Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 404, which covers 
“Service Outside the Commonwealth,” provides that “[o]riginal process shall be 
served outside the Commonwealth within ninety days of . . . the filing of the 
complaint . . . (2) by mail in the manner provided by Rule 403.”   
[¶11]  There is no question that the method of service employed by Reliable 
was not only “reasonably calculated to give [Liberty] notice of the pendency of the 
[Pennsylvania] action” within the technical requirements of the Pennsylvania rules, 
Gaeth v. Deacon, 2009 ME 9, ¶ 23, 964 A.2d 621 (citing Schroeder v. City of New 
York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962)), but also gave Liberty actual notice of the 
Pennsylvania suit.  Cf. Vargelis v. Minieri, 620 A.2d 275, 276 (Me. 1993) (“If the 
 
8 
defendant received actual notice by the method of service used, the court should 
hesitate in finding the service insufficient for some technical noncompliance [with 
Maine personal service rules].” (quotation marks omitted)).  Having executed the 
return receipts, both for the Pennsylvania complaint and the “Notice of Intention to 
Take Default,” and then having failed to answer or dutifully defend against the 
Pennsylvania suit, Liberty can have no qualms with the method of service used or 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it in the Pennsylvania Court, and neither 
do we. 
B. 
Procedural Due Process 
[¶12]  Liberty also argues that its procedural due process rights were 
violated at the point when Reliable, without providing additional notice, moved to 
vacate the original judgment of $93,869.70 and filed an “Amended Praecipe to 
Enter a Default Judgment” in the increased amount of $136,761.38.  Liberty 
maintains that once Reliable sought a judgment significantly greater than the one 
found in the original default judgment, due process would require that it be 
provided an opportunity to contest the amended default judgment at a hearing.  A 
claim that the Pennsylvania default judgment was obtained in a manner that 
patently offends due process triggers the same type of nondiscretionary review on 
appeal as the purported jurisdictional defect discussed above.  See Tuck, 490 A.2d 
at 652 (“[A] party may move to set aside a judgment for voidness under Rule 
 
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60(b)(4) if the court which rendered it . . . acts in a manner inconsistent with due 
process.” (citation omitted)); United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, --- U.S.   
---, 176 L. Ed. 2d 158, 169-70 (citing United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 
F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990)) (construing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) to afford relief 
not only for jurisdictional defects, but also for “a violation of due process that 
deprives a party of a notice or the opportunity to be heard”).  We must therefore 
determine whether the increased default judgment that Reliable requested, and the 
Pennsylvania Court ultimately entered, is void for want of some incursion on 
Liberty’s claimed right to contest the amended default amount at a hearing.3  In 
seeking relief from the amended Pennsylvania default judgment before the 
Superior Court of this state, Liberty “bore the burden of producing competent 
evidence to support [its] motion.”  Foley, 638 A.2d at 719 (citing New Me. Nat’l 
Bank v. Nemon, 588 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Me. 1991)). 
[¶13]  Liberty’s procedural due process claim fails on the merits for want of 
some discernable proof that Reliable was not entitled to seek the substantially 
higher damage award in the first place.  Liberty’s argument hinges entirely on the 
                                         
3  Prior to filing the M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion in the Superior Court of this State, Liberty made no 
effort to pursue its due process claim by prosecuting an appeal with Pennsylvania Superior Court.  See 
Reville v. Reville, 370 A.2d 249, 253-54 (Me. 1977).  Because Liberty’s due process claim fails on the 
merits, the court exercised proper judicial restraint by not expressly deciding whether Liberty’s due 
process arguments should otherwise be barred by principles of res judicata.  The court aptly concluded 
that “whether the Pennsylvania proceedings would be entitled to res judicata effect may depend on 
whether those proceedings complied with due process”—an issue the Pennsylvania Superior Court never 
had the opportunity to address on account of Liberty’s voluntary withdrawal of the Pennsylvania appeal. 
 
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premise that Reliable was not entitled to seek damages, according to the original 
Pennsylvania complaint, in the amended amount of $136,761.38.  Liberty did not 
provide the Superior Court with a copy of the Pennsylvania complaint or any other 
evidence that might have exposed whether the amended damages award, granted 
without notice, was above and beyond what Reliable was entitled to receive 
pursuant to its original pleading.  Liberty provided no evidence to support the bare 
assertion that the amended judgment had “the substantive effect” of amending the 
Pennsylvania complaint.  See 3 Charles Harvey, Maine Civil Practice § 60:1 at 294 
(3d. ed. 2011) (“Mere oral argument or allegation of fact in the [M.R. Civ. P. 
60(b)] motion cannot be substituted for proof.”).  Liberty thus failed to carry its 
burden of proving that its due process rights were in fact “denied when the 
judgment amount was changed.”  Absent that showing, Liberty similarly failed to 
rebut the presumptive validity of the Pennsylvania default judgment.  Warren, 
290 A.2d at 366. 
[¶14]  The Pennsylvania judgment suffers from no jurisdictional defect or 
due process impediment that would render it void pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(4).  The amended damages calculation contained in Reliable’s “Amended 
Praecipe to Enter Default Judgment,” which was granted by the Pennsylvania 
Court, is properly enforceable in Maine pursuant to the Enforcement Act.   
 
 
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The entry is: 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the briefs: 
 
Russel B. Pierce, Jr., Esq., and Darya I. Haag, Esq., Norman, Hanson & 
DeTroy, LLC, Portland, for appellants Michael Liberty and Liberty Group, 
Inc. 
 
Aaron P. Burns, Esq., Pearce & Dow, LLC, Portland, for appellee Reliable 
Copy Service, Inc. 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2010-125 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY