Case Title: Burnett v. First Commercial Trust Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jeanne W. BURNETT v. FIRST COMMERCIAL TRUST
COMPANY

96-994                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered March 3, 1997


1.   Wills -- interpretation of -- when extrinsic evidence received
     on issue of testator's intent. -- Ordinarily, the intention of
     the testator is to be gathered from the four corners of the
     instrument itself; extrinsic evidence may be received on the
     issue of the testator's intent, but only where the terms of
     the will are ambiguous.

2.   Wills -- "ambiguity" defined -- oral evidence should not be
     used to supply terms in writing that are wholly absent. -- An
     ambiguity is an indistinctness or uncertainty of meaning of an
     expression used in a written instrument; such a definition
     contemplates the need for interpretation of terms actually
     used in the will; it does not encompass the situation in which
     a testatrix does not dispose of a portion of her estate; oral
     evidence should not be used to supply terms in a writing which
     are wholly absent.   

3.   Wills -- strong presumption exists against intestacy --
     intention of testatrix as expressed by language of will is
     proper basis for court's finding. -- A court may not rewrite
     a will or add provisions under the guise of construction of
     the language of the will in order to reflect some presumed
     intention of the testatrix; even though there is a strong
     presumption against intestacy, the presumption does not arise
     when the testatrix fails, through design or otherwise, to make
     a complete disposition of her property; the paramount
     objective in interpreting a will is the intention of the
     testatrix as expressed in the language of the will, and it is
     presumed that a testatrix knows the contents of the will she
     executes. 

4.   Wills -- presumption exists that person who takes time to make
     will does not desire partial intestacy -- rules of
     construction inapplicable unless intent of testator as
     expressed in will is in doubt. -- There is a presumption in
     the rules of construction that "a person who takes the time
     and effort to make a will does not desire partial intestacy";
     however, a probate court should not resort to the rules of
     construction unless the intent of the testator, as shown by
     his express words, is in doubt.

5.   Wills -- express language of testamentary disposition
     unambiguous -- chancellor erred in receiving parol evidence on
     question of testatrix's intent. -- Where the express language
     of the testatrix's testamentary disposition reflected the
     unambiguous intention that, upon the death of her friend, the
     land, and no other property contained in the trust corpus,
     should pass under the will, the supreme court determined that
     the chancellor erred in receiving parol evidence on the
     question of the testatrix's intent; the case was reversed and
     remanded. 


     Appeal from Garland Chancery Court; David B. Switzer,
Chancellor; reversed and remanded.
     Dan McGraw, for appellant.
     Richard Slagle, for appellee, First Commercial Trust Co., N.A.

     W.H."Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
     This is a case involving a testamentary trust.  The issue is
whether the will containing the trust is ambiguous in its
disposition of the testatrix's property.  We hold that the will is
not ambiguous, and that the chancellor erred in receiving parol
evidence on the question of the testatrix's intent.  We therefore
reverse and remand.    
     The testatrix, Lois E. Burnett, died on June 10, 1994.  At the
time of her death, her family consisted of her brother, James
Burnett, her nephew, William Spencer, Jr., and Spencer's six
children.  Mrs. Burnett's will provided for her funeral expenses
and made several small, specific bequests.  The will then disposed
of the remainder of her estate as follows:

     I give, devise, and bequeath all the rest and residue of
     my estate, whether real, personal, or mixed, and of
     whatever kind or nature, wheresoever located and whenever
     acquired to Arkansas Bank and Trust [now First Commercial
     Trust Company] in Trust for my friend, Flournoy Adkins,
     during his lifetime.
     The terms of said trust being as follows:
     1. Flournoy Adkins is to receive my automobile at the time of 
        my death for his use and benefit.
     2. Flournoy Adkins has the right and use of my home located as 
       follows:
     [description of the property]

     Upon the death of Flournoy Adkins, the Trustee shall
     distribute the above described land as follows:  one-half
     interest to my nephew, William Spencer, Jr., and one-half
     interest to his six children...in equal shares, share and
     share alike.

     As can be seen, the will instructs the trustee that the realty
contained in the trust corpus is to be distributed upon the death
of Flournoy Adkins.  However, it makes no provision for the
distribution of the personalty contained in the trust corpus.  The
distinction is important.  At the time of Mrs. Burnett's death, the
real property in the trust was valued at $25,000.00; the personal
property was valued at $194,702.14.
     On May 3, 1995, First Commercial brought an action for
declaratory judgment seeking instructions on how to distribute the
personalty in the trust upon Flournoy Adkins's death.  First
Commercial claimed that the trust's failure to expressly provide
for such distribution was the result of a clerical error.  The
complaint asked that the personalty be distributed in the same
manner as the realty:  one-half to William Spencer, Jr., and one-
half to the Spencer children.  James Burnett, who had received no
bequest in the will, answered the complaint.  He contended that any
part of the trust corpus lacking specific directions for
distribution should pass through the laws of intestate succession. 
The chancellor found that the silence of the will regarding the
distribution of the personalty created an ambiguity.  He thus
allowed the use of parol evidence to explain the omission.  
     Bruce Garrett, the attorney who prepared Mrs. Burnett's will,
testified that Mrs. Burnett came to him in 1992 to change her will. 
Garrett testified that the will's failure to provide for the
disposition of the trust's personal property was the result of a
clerical error.  The provision which read, "upon the death of
Flournoy Adkins, the Trustee shall distribute the above described
land" should have read, "shall distribute the above described land
and personalty".  Garrett further testified that Mrs. Burnett had
decided to cut James out of the will and to provide for her friend,
Flournoy Adkins.  The previous will, which Mrs. Burnett executed in
1990, had bequeathed the bulk of her estate to James Burnett and
William Spencer, Jr.  A copy of Mrs. Burnett's old will reflecting
the deletions, additions, and handwritten notes of Garrett and his
secretary, was introduced into evidence.  The exhibit shows that
the provisions which were made for James Burnett in 1990 were
marked through.  A witness who was experienced in the use of
shorthand testified that some of the secretary's notes on the will
could be translated as directing the personal property to be
distributed to the residual beneficiaries upon Adkins's death.  
     The chancellor, after hearing the evidence, found that the   
testatrix intended to bequeath all trust property, including
personal property, to William Spencer, Jr., and his six children,
upon the death of Flournoy Adkins.  Jeanne Burnett, as special
administratrix of her late husband's estate, brings this appeal.
     Ordinarily, the intention of the testator is to be gathered
from the four corners of the instrument itself.  Armstrong v.
Butler, 262 Ark. 31,