Case Title: Lewis v. C.J. Langenfelder & Son

Citation: 

Docket Number: 022543

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
GERRY R. LEWIS, ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIE 
BENJAMIN LEWIS, DECEASED 
 
v.  Record No. 022543  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   October 31, 2003 
C.J. LANGENFELDER & SON, JR., INC. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE 
V. Thomas Forehand, Jr., Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal, the dispositive issue is whether this 
Court has jurisdiction over the case in light of the 
removal of the action to a federal district court.  The 
removal occurred after the state trial court dismissed a 
claim filed under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688.  Because 
removal of an action from state court to federal court 
effects a transfer of the entire case, this Court has no 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  For that reason, we will 
dismiss the appeal without prejudice. 
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Gerry R. Lewis (“Lewis”), administrator of the estate 
of Willie Benjamin Lewis (“the Decedent”), filed a motion 
for judgment against C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Jr., Inc. 
(”Langenfelder”),1 seeking damages for the wrongful death of 
                                                          
 
 
1 There is a discrepancy in the record regarding 
whether Langenfelder’s corporate name is C.J. Langenfelder 
& Son, Jr., Inc. or C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc. 
the Decedent.2  Lewis alleged that, at the time of the 
accident resulting in her husband’s death, he was working 
as a seaman aboard Langenfelder’s tugboat and that the boat 
was “in navigation on navigable waters.”  Lewis sought 
recovery under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and general 
maritime law. 
 
Langenfelder moved for entry of partial summary 
judgment striking the Jones Act claim.  Langenfelder 
contended that no employer/employee relationship existed 
between the Decedent and Langenfelder at the time of the 
accident at issue.  The circuit court agreed and granted 
the motion, thereby dismissing with prejudice the claim 
asserted pursuant to the Jones Act. 
 
After the circuit court dismissed that claim, 
Langenfelder filed a notice of removal of the action to the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.3  This Court 
subsequently awarded Lewis an appeal from the judgment of 
the circuit court dismissing her Jones Act claim.  The 
federal district court has stayed the removed action 
                                                          
 
2 Lewis filed the motion for judgment in the Circuit 
Court of the City of Norfolk.  That court transferred the 
case to the Circuit Court of the City of Chesapeake. 
 
3 Four days after filing the notice of removal, 
Langenfelder filed an amended notice of removal. 
 
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pending there until this Court decides Lewis’ appeal.  The 
federal district court, however, has not entered an order 
remanding this case.  Lewis v. C.J. Langenfelder & Son, 
Inc., No. 2:01, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Va. May 2, 2003). 
ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal, Lewis challenges the circuit court’s 
dismissal of the Jones Act claim.  However, there is a 
threshold issue we must decide: whether this Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal in light of the removal of 
the action to the federal district court.  A court always 
has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.  See 
Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 170, 387 S.E.2d 753, 755 
(1990). 
 
With regard to this issue, Langenfelder argues that, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), this Court lost 
jurisdiction over all claims asserted by Lewis, including 
the Jones Act claim, upon removal of the case to the 
federal district court.  Although Langenfelder acknowledges 
that the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a), as incorporated 
by 46 U.S.C. § 688, prohibit the removal of a Jones Act 
claim from state court to federal court, it asserts that 
the improper removal of such a claim is a procedural defect 
that can be challenged only in federal court by timely 
filing a motion for remand.  Thus, Langenfelder contends 
 
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that this Court, absent a remand by the federal district 
court, has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
Lewis agrees that removal of a case to federal court 
ordinarily suspends a state court’s jurisdiction over the 
case.  However, Lewis contends that this general rule is 
not applicable here because the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1445(a) prohibit removal of a Jones Act claim.  In Lewis’ 
view, the circuit court’s dismissal of that claim was a 
“condition precedent” to the removal of the maritime 
claims.  Citing Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 
863 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1988), Lewis argues that a 
reversal by this Court of the circuit court’s judgment 
dismissing the Jones Act claim would destroy the federal 
district court’s jurisdiction over the case.  She also 
points out that the federal district court stated that it 
would remand the case if this Court reverses the circuit 
court’s judgment.  See Lewis, slip op. at 9. 
A seaman may file a claim under the Jones Act in 
either state or federal court.4  American Dredging Co. v. 
                                                          
 
4 In pertinent part, the Jones Act states: 
 
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in 
the course of his employment may, at his election, 
maintain an action for damages at law, with the right 
of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of 
the United States modifying or extending the common-
law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to 
railway employees shall apply[.] 
 
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Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 445 (1994); Engel v. Davenport, 271 
U.S. 33, 37 (1926).  However, when the seaman brings such 
an action in state court, the case is not removable to 
federal court.  Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 
U.S. 438, 455 (2001); Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 
F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 1952); Keegan v. Sterling, 610 F. 
Supp. 789, 790 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Stokes v. Victory 
Carriers, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 9, 11 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Moltke 
v. Intercontinental Shipping Corp., 86 F. Supp. 662, 663 
(S.D.N.Y. 1949).  This is so because the Jones Act 
expressly incorporates and makes applicable to seamen all 
the “statutes of the United States modifying or extending 
the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury 
to railway employees[.]”  46 U.S.C. § 688.  One of those 
statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a), prohibits removal from state 
court to federal court of cases brought under the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act.  Pate, 193 F.2d at 500; Keegan, 
610 F. Supp. at 790. 
However, the bar against removing a Jones Act claim is 
waived if a plaintiff does not file a motion to remand 
within the 30-day deadline set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(c).  Lirette v. N.L. Sperry Sun, Inc., 820 F.2d 116, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
46 U.S.C. § 688(a). 
 
 
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117 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Albarado v. Southern Pac. 
Transp. Co., 199 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 1999) (“if a 
defendant removes an action arising under an act covered by 
[28 U.S.C.] § 1445(a), then wrongful removal is a 
procedural defect, which may be waived”); Cades v. H & R 
Block, Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 873 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[a] motion 
to remand the case because of a defect in removal procedure 
must be made within 30 days”); In re Digicon Marine, Inc., 
966 F.2d 158, 160 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a “remand 
based on a lack of ‘removal jurisdiction’ is not considered 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction but is instead a defect 
in removal procedure”).  Only a federal court may determine 
whether a case has been improperly removed.  State ex rel. 
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Boone Circuit Court, 86 N.E.2d 
74, 78 (Ind. 1949); State ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 90 
So.2d 884, 886-87 (La. Ct. App. 1956). 
The removal of a case from state court to federal 
court effects a transfer of the entire action, including 
all the parties and all the claims, to the federal court.  
City of Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Investment Co., 277 
U.S. 54, 60 (1928); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 
621 F.2d 1371, 1376 (5th Cir. 1980); Murphy v. Kodz, 351 
F.2d 163, 167 (9th Cir. 1965); Hartlein v. Illinois Power 
Co., 601 N.E.2d 720, 726 (Ill. 1992).  A defendant, upon 
 
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filing a notice of removal, “shall give written notice 
thereof to all adverse parties and shall file a copy of the 
notice with the clerk” of the state court, which effects 
the removal.  28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).  At that point, “the 
[s]tate court shall proceed no further unless and until the 
case is remanded.”  Id. 
“After compliance with the removal statute[,] the 
jurisdiction of the [s]tate court is suspended until there 
has been a remand.”  Levine v. Lacy, 204 Va. 297, 300, 130 
S.E.2d 443, 445 (1963); accord Yarnevic v. Brink’s, Inc., 
102 F.3d 753, 754 (4th Cir. 1996); Maseda v. Honda Motor 
Co., 861 F.2d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 1988); Allman v. 
Hanley, 302 F.2d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1962).  “Any subsequent 
proceedings in state court on the case are void ab initio.”  
Maseda, 861 F.2d at 1254-55 (citing Steamship Co. v. 
Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 122 (1882)); accord South Carolina v. 
Moore, 447 F.2d 1067, 1073 (4th Cir. 1971).  A later 
determination that the removal petition was not proper does 
not change that outcome.  See Maseda, 861 F.2d at 1254 
n.11; Moore, 447 F.2d at 1073; United States v. 
Silberglitt, 441 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir. 1971); Lowe v. 
Jacobs, 243 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1957). 
Based on these well-established principles, we 
conclude that we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal.  
 
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When Langenfelder effected the removal of this action by 
complying with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), the 
entire case, including the Jones Act claim, was transferred 
to the federal district court.  See Hartlein, 601 N.W.2d at 
726.  We are not persuaded otherwise by the observation of 
the court in Higgins that the diversity jurisdiction of a 
federal court could be destroyed if a state appellate court 
reversed the dismissal of a non-diverse party.  863 F.2d at 
1166.  Unless and until there is a remand of this case from 
the federal district court, neither the circuit court nor 
this Court can proceed any further with the action.  28 
U.S.C. § 1446(d). 
The removal of this action from state court to federal 
court did not, however, vacate the actions taken by the 
circuit court prior to removal.  “All injunctions, orders, 
and other proceedings had in such action prior to its 
removal shall remain in full force and effect until 
dissolved or modified by the district court.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1450.  The federal court “takes the case up where the 
[s]tate court left it off.”  Duncan v. Gegan, 101 U.S. 810, 
812 (1880); accord Resolution Trust Corp. v. Nernberg, 3 
F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
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Accordingly, this appeal will be dismissed without 
prejudice.5
Dismissed. 
                                                          
 
 
5  In light of our decision, we do not reach the merits 
of Lewis’ assignments of error, nor is it necessary to 
summarize the facts relevant to those alleged errors. 
 
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