Case Title: Vanderhoff, Aplt v. Harleysville Insurance Co. (Dissenting Opinion)

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Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-06T00:00:00Z

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[J-43-2008] [M.O. - BAER, J.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT FORESTER VANDERHOFF, Appellant v. HARLEYSVILLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 123 MAP 2006 Appeal from Order of the Superior Court entered 03-01-2006 at No. 1984 MDA 2004 which Reversed the Order of Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division Entered 11-17-2004 at No. 5611-C-2003. ARGUED: APRIL 14, 2008 DISSENTING OPINION MR. JUSTICE EAKIN DECIDED: July 6, 2010 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding Harleysville was required to demonstrate prejudice from Appellant’s failure to provide notice of the phantom vehicle within 30 days of the accident, as required by 75 Pa.C.S. § 1702. Majority Slip Op., at 2, 11. I disagree with the majority’s reliance on Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Company, 371 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1977), which required an insurer to demonstrate prejudice before denying benefits to an insured who failed to comply with the policy’s notice requirement. Id., at 198. Rather, I would look to § 1702’s plain language and the principles governing the more recent and relevant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Foster, 889 A.2d 78 (Pa. 2005), which distinguished Brakeman, and held the MVFRL does not require a showing of prejudice when notice is not given to police. Foster, at 81-82. [J-43-2008] - 2 Section 1702 does not include a prejudice requirement, nor does it create an exception to the notice requirement in cases where the insurer cannot show prejudice from the claimant’s failure to comply with the terms of the policy. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1702; Foster, at 82. To expand the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle to include a prejudice exception in the pursuit of “fairness” is inappropriate; this necessarily includes a presumption that fairness only applies to one party to the policy, namely, the party whose failure to notify created the problem in the first place. This is an incongruous result, and such an interpretation also violates the laws of statutory construction. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) (when statute’s words are clear and free of ambiguity, its letter is not to be disregarded under pretext of pursuing its spirit). As Foster noted, Brakeman was decided before the MVFRL’s passage. Foster, at 81. Brakeman only implicated the insurer’s private interests. Brakeman, at 197. The MVFRL, however, addresses the public policy interest in controlling the spiraling cost of automobile insurance by reducing fraudulent claims. See, e.g., Foster, at 80-81; Burstein v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 809 A.2d 204, 207- 08 (Pa. 2002). Thus, Foster held the MVFRL does not require the insurer to show prejudice before denying coverage based on lack of police notification. Foster, at 82. This same principle controls here. The statute does not distinguish between the requirements for notice to the police and notice to the insurer for the purposes of an unidentified motor vehicle claim. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1702 (permitting claim only if “accident is reported to the police or proper governmental authority and the claimant notifies his insurer ….”) (emphasis added); see also Foster, at 82 (holding § 1702 requires reporting to insurer and police). Providing notice to insurers as soon as practicable serves the same public policy purposes as providing timely notice to police — preventing fraud and reducing insurance premiums for Pennsylvanians. Id., at 81 [J-43-2008] - 3 (citations omitted). The rationale of Foster, the determinative post-MVFRL case, is squarely on point. Appellant had the opportunity to notify Harleysville; he was capable of timely informing his employer about the phantom vehicle. He could have done so when he was filling out his workers’ compensation form, which required him to “describe fully just how [his] injury was sustained and state in detail just what [he was] doing at the time ….” Workers[’] Compensation Employee’s Statement, 10/24/01, R.R., at 158a. Instead, he omitted any reference to the phantom vehicle: Went to mobile station for gas[,] was then going to do delivery’s [sic][,] approaching crossroads got in left lane to turn[.] There was one car in front of me. The arrow was green [and] light was green. The car in front was just about to turn and he locked up brakes and stop [sic] instantly[.] I was in Nission [sic] truck with load of welding wire in back[.] Tried to stop but tire locked up (no anti brake). Pumped them again tr[y]ing to stop but couldn’t and hit said car in rear[.] Not much damage[;] wasn’t going that fast. Got out to check if everyone was ok[.] Seem [sic] to me he was[.] He was outside of car cursing [and] yelling. Went to phone[;] called 911[.] Police came within minutes[;] gave them same explination [sic] I’m giving you [and] work. Went back to shop explained what happen [sic]. Went right to doctor because of neck [and] head pain [and] blurred vision. Id. The police report made no mention of this phantom vehicle either. If Appellant thought Harleysville was aware of the phantom vehicle because of an erroneous belief it was mentioned in the police report, the fact is he gave the insurer no notice at all, much less adequate notice pursuant to § 1702. There is no evidence in the record indicating Harleysville was informed of a phantom vehicle until February 21, 2002, almost five months after the October 4, 2001 accident. See Vanderhoff v. Harleysville Insurance Company, No. 1984 MDA 2004, unpublished memorandum at 8 (Pa. Super. filed March 1, 2006). This was not within the statutorily required 30 days and is not claimed by either party to have been as soon as practicable after the accident. The principle in [J-43-2008] - 4 Foster thus applies here — where Appellant attempted to claim uninsured motorist benefits after failing to notify Harleysville of the phantom vehicle for five months, Harleysville should not be required to show actual prejudice before denying Appellant’s untimely claim.1 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. Mr. Justice Saylor joins this dissenting opinion. 1 The question of whether “his insurer” under § 1702 means a primary household insurer rather than Appellant’s employer’s insurer, as interpreted here, was not raised.