Case Title: Delude v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc.

Citation: 174 Vt. 74, 807 A.2d 390

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Delude v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc, (2001-090); 174 Vt. 74;
807 A.2d 390

[Filed 28-Jun-2002]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                No. 2001-090


  Sharon and Robert Dulude	                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Chittenden Superior Court

  	
  Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc.	         January Term, 2002
      
        
  Matthew I. Katz, J.
       
  Francis X. Murray, South Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
      
  Andre D. Bouffard and Steven P. Crowther of Downs Rachlin & Martin PLLC,
    Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

        
       SKOGLUND, J.   Appellant Sharon Dulude appeals a ruling of the
  Chittenden Superior Court granting Fletcher Allen Health Care's (FAHC)
  motion for summary judgment on claims of breach of contract, promissory
  estoppel, discharge in violation of public policy, intentional infliction
  of emotional distress (IIED), and defamation.  Dulude argues that there are
  genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether FAHC's communications
  and personnel manual altered her employment from at-will to just cause; (2)
  whether FAHC had just cause for discharging her; (3) whether FAHC made
  promises to Dulude for just cause employment on which Dulude reasonably
  relied; (4) whether FAHC violated public policy in terminating Dulude's
  employment; (5) whether FAHC's actions were outrageous and caused her
  extreme emotional distress and whether such claim

 

  is time-barred; and (6) whether FAHC defamed Dulude and whether such claim
  is time-barred.  We affirm.

       The material facts are as follows.  Dulude was employed as a nurse
  with FAHC (FN1)  from July 1, 1991, to April 20, 1995.  Dulude did not sign
  a contract of employment, and the duration of her employment was
  open-ended.  In the fall of 1992, FAHC terminated Dulude for allegedly
  diverting narcotics, falsifying her patient's medical records, and failing
  to meet the standard of practice regarding the administration of
  medication.  A medication and narcotic audit was performed by a committee
  comprised of the Head of Pharmacy at FAHC, the Vice President of Nursing,
  the Nurse Manager, and the Head of Human Resources.  Based on their audits,
  the committee felt there was enough evidence to substantiate the fact that
  Dulude's narcotic practice was significantly different from her coworkers'. 
  Dulude appealed her termination to FAHC's Vice President of Nursing, and
  FAHC reinstated her on November 23, 1992.   

       Dulude's letter of reinstatement noted that her pattern of medicating
  patients was distinctly different from other professional nurses on her
  unit and that she, as an individual, repeatedly signed out and documented
  the use of as many Percocet in twenty-four hours as all unit nurses
  combined.  The letter acknowledged that Dulude and FAHC had discussed
  Dulude's philosophy of pain medication and that her return to work would be
  premised on specific conditions requiring her to receive supervision and
  education in the administration of narcotic drugs. 
   
       On April 12, 1993, a patient complained that Dulude repeatedly and
  strongly urged him to accept Percocet for pain, despite his refusal, to the
  point of making him feel harassed.  The complaint 

 

  resulted in a letter of understanding (FN2) dated May 17, 1993, which
  outlined a protocol requiring Dulude to discuss patients' pain medication
  needs with a support person and gain the support person's consent prior to
  administering any controlled substance.  The letter concluded: "[f]ailure
  to comply with any aspect of this letter will result in further
  disciplinary action and may result in termination."

       On June 25, 1993, a decision-making leave (FN3) was written for
  Dulude's failure to comply with the letter of understanding of May 17,
  1993.  Dulude, who was required to seek supervision and approval when
  dispensing medications, requested a non-support person to sign both the
  controlled substance record and the patient flow sheet while Dulude
  administered the medication.  FAHC stated that continued employment was
  contingent on Dulude's compliance with the hospital policy with respect to
  controlled substances.

       On October 29, 1993, a second letter of understanding noted Dulude's
  compliance with the decision-making leave of June 1993 and her general
  improvement in pain management skills.  The letter stated that: "Any change
  in her pattern of administration which is deemed aberrant or any
  questionable issues surrounding the administration of controlled substances
  for pain will be evaluated . . . . This may lead to further investigations
  and a reinstatement of restrictions."  All restrictions were then removed.

 

       On March 23, 1994, a third letter of understanding addressed a second
  incident where Dulude, who came on duty at 11:20 p.m., administered
  Percocet to a patient at 11:30 p.m and again at 3:30 a.m.  The patient was
  extremely nauseated and exhausted the next day.  Dulude's nurse manager
  noted that these medication interventions were not appropriate.  This third
  letter of understanding also referred to another audit that was done on
  Dulude's unit, the results of which showed that Dulude consistently
  administered more Percocet than any other nurse.  The letter strongly
  suggested that she get help in understanding her method of administering
  pain medication.  Dulude agreed to consult with an outside counselor
  regarding her "reasons for" and her "method of" administering pain
  medication.  

       In September 1994, Dulude's shift supervisor stated that there was
  still concern over Dulude's aberrant controlled substance administration
  pattern and advised Dulude that all nurses on the shift, including Dulude,
  should administer no more than fifteen to thirty-five percent of the total
  pain medication administered on the unit.  In November 1994, FAHC called
  Dulude and informed her that her figures for a given week were at
  seventy-two percent and that she needed to lower her numbers. 

       On December 11, 1994, a third patient complained that his Tylenol had
  been substituted for Percocet on two occasions.  Dulude argues that she
  never substituted Tylenol for Percocet and any suggestion that she did
  would never have occurred but for the fact that her reputation had been
  ruined by false accusations in 1992.  Dulude contends that had FAHC
  conducted a competent investigation of the 1994 episode, it would have
  discovered that no substitution ever occurred. 
   
       Finally, by letter dated February 9, 1995, FAHC notified Dulude that
  her employment would be terminated effective February 15, 1995.  The letter
  outlined the several instances of patient 

 

  complaints discussed above.  The letter also referred to various audits
  performed by nurse clinicians, managers and administrators, which confirmed
  that Dulude had continually dispensed and administered more Percocet than
  any other nurse on her unit.  FAHC noted in the letter that none of their
  attempts to counsel and educate

       Dulude produced more than a temporary improvement in her narcotic
  administration practices and that Dulude's practices created a level of
  patient risk that could not be tolerated at FAHC. Dulude appeared before
  the grievance panel on March 9, 1995.  The grievance panel denied her
  grievance on March 13, 1995.  Dulude appealed this denial to the president
  and met with the president's designee on April 12, 1995.  She received a
  certified letter from the designee on April 20, 1995, informing her that
  her appeal had been denied.

       On April 17, 1998, Dulude filed a wrongful employment termination
  action and related tort claims in superior court against FAHC.  The case
  was removed to federal court because of two federal constitutional claims:
  denial of due process and equal protection.  These two claims were disposed
  of by the federal district court before the case was remanded to the
  superior court for resolution of Dulude's state claims.  The issues
  presented to the superior court for resolution included: breach of
  contract, promissory estoppel, discharge in violation of public policy,
  intentional infliction of emotion distress, defamation, and loss of
  consortium.  
   
       On January 9, 2001, the superior court granted FAHC's motion for
  summary judgment on the breach of contract, promissory estoppel and
  defamation issues.  FAHC filed a motion to amend the summary judgment
  decision, and the court made a later entry on March 8, 2001, dismissing
  Dulude's remaining claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress
  and discharge in violation of public policy.  The superior court also
  dismissed the loss of consortium claim as a derivative 

 

  claim that failed upon dismissal of the primary claims.  Dulude then
  appealed the decision granting summary judgment to FAHC, except with
  respect to the loss of consortium claim.

       In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court applies the same
  standard as the trial court.  Ross v. Times Mirror, Inc., 164 Vt. 13,
  17-18,