Case Title: Noland v. Noland

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
William R. NOLAND v. Olivia L. NOLAND

96-430                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 18, 1996


1.   Judges -- recusal -- when judge must disqualify. --  A
     chancellor shall not sit on the determination of any cause or
     proceeding in which he or she is interested, or is related to
     either party within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
     affinity, or shall have been of counsel; the interest that is
     disqualifying is a personal proprietary or pecuniary interest
     or one affecting the individual rights of the judge; the
     liability, gain, or relief to the judge must turn on the
     outcome of the suit. 

2.   Judges -- bias discussed -- when judge's decision will be
     reversed on disqualification. -- Where a judge exhibits bias
     or the appearance of bias, the court will reverse; the proper
     administration of the law requires not only that judges
     refrain from actual bias but also that they avoid all
     appearances of unfairness; the fact a judge may have, or
     develop during the trial, an opinion or a bias or prejudice
     does not make the trial judge so biased and prejudiced as to
     require his or her disqualification; whether a judge has
     become biased to the point that he or she should disqualify is
     a matter to be confined to the conscience of the judge,
     because bias is a subjective matter peculiarly within the
     knowledge of the trial judge; absent some objective
     demonstration of prejudice, it is a communication of bias that
     will cause the appellate court to reverse a judge's decision
     on disqualification.  

3.   Judges -- chancellor's explanation adequate -- chancellor
     absolved herself of actual or statutory bias that would
     mandate recusal. -- Where the chancellor explained the
     circumstances surrounding appellee's counsel having
     represented her on her personal-injury claim, which had been
     settled three years earlier, and she said that the attorney's
     prior representation of her would not prevent her from
     rendering a fair decision in the case, the chancellor absolved
     herself of any actual or statutory bias that would mandate
     recusal.

4.   Judges -- recusal -- failure to show actual bias resulted in
     appellant's having burden to show some objective demonstration
     of prejudice. -- Because appellant failed to show any actual
     bias that mandated the chancellor's recusal, it was then his
     burden to show some objective demonstration of prejudice that
     compelled disqualification. 

5.   Judges -- chancellor's questions of witness were needed for
     clarification -- no prejudice shown. -- Appellant's argument
     that the chancellor demonstrated prejudice when she questioned
     the appellee during the trial was meritless where it was
     evident that either the chancellor or the appellee was
     confused when discussing the mortgage payments, utility bills,
     and need for spousal support, and it was clearly appropriate
     for the chancellor to ask questions that touched on that
     issue.  

6.   Judges -- chancellor's award did not demonstrate any need for
     recusal -- trial court affirmed. -- Where the chancellor's
     award did not demonstrate any prejudice or reason for her
     recusal, the trial court's award was affirmed.


     Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; Alice Gray, Chancellor;
affirmed.
     Montgomery & Wyatt, by:  Orin Eddy Montgomery, for appellant.
     Mays & Crutcher, P.A., by:  Arkie Byrd, for appellee.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     This appeal is from a divorce case between appellant William
Noland and appellee Olivia Noland, but the sole issue is whether
the chancery judge erred in denying William's motion for the
chancellor to recuse.  We affirm the chancery judge's decision.
     The Nolands had been married for twenty-six years, but had
lived separately during most of their marriage.  The parties agreed
William would take the divorce as an uncontested matter, and their
home would be sold, but William contested the award of any alimony
and Olivia's proposed division of marital debts and property,
including his retirement pay.  
     Prior to trial, on October 16, 1995, William had learned that
Olivia's attorney, Arkie Byrd, had previously represented the
chancellor involving a personal injury claim in 1992.  He stated
Byrd's representation reflected an actual conflict of interest and
an appearance of impropriety which required the chancellor's
recusal.  A telephone-conference hearing was conducted on William's
motion, and immediately following that hearing, the chancery judge
denied William's request.  On October 25, 1995, the parties tried
the remaining alimony and property issues and the chancellor
entered her decree on all matters on December 4, 1995.  In
William's appeal from that December 4, 1995 decree, William raises
no points for reversal regarding the divorce decree, but instead
only argues the chancellor erred in failing to recuse.
     Arkansas law is clear that a chancellor shall not sit on the
determination of any cause or proceeding in which he or she is
interested, or related to either party within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or shall have been of counsel.  See Ark.
Code Ann.  16-13-312 (1987); Ark. Const. art. 7,  20.  The
interest which is disqualifying under these provisions is a
personal proprietary or pecuniary interest or one affecting the
individual rights of the judge.  The liability, gain, or relief to
the judge must turn on the outcome of the suit.  Mears, Co.
Judge v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827,