Case Title: State v. Twyford

Citation: 2005-Ohio-4380

Docket Number: 20050291

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Twyford, 106 Ohio St.3d 176, 2005-Ohio-4380.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. TWYFORD, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Twyford, 106 Ohio St.3d 176, 2005-Ohio-4380.] 
App.R. 26(B) — Reopening direct appeal from criminal conviction — There is no 
right to file successive applications to reopen direct appeals. 
(No. 2005-0291 — Submitted July 26, 2005 — Decided September 7, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Jefferson County, No. 93-J-13. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Raymond A. Twyford III, challenges the denial of his 
application to reopen his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B). 
{¶ 2} Twyford was tried and convicted in Jefferson County for the 1992 
kidnapping and murder of Richard Franks.  Twyford was sentenced to death for 
the murder, and the court of appeals affirmed his convictions and death sentence 
in 1995.  State v. Twyford (Oct. 6, 1995), Jefferson App. No. 93-J-13, 1995 WL 
591905. 
{¶ 3} Twyford then filed an application to reopen his appeal in the court 
of appeals under App.R. 26(B), alleging that he did not receive effective 
assistance of appellate counsel in that court.  The court of appeals granted the 
application in December 1996, and Twyford presented 25 new assignments of 
error in the court of appeals.  After fully reviewing the parties’ appellate briefs in 
the reopened appeal, the court of appeals again affirmed Twyford’s convictions 
and death sentence.  State v. Twyford (Sept. 25, 1998), Jefferson App. No. 93-J-
13, 1998 WL 671382.  We affirmed the appellate court’s judgment.  State v. 
Twyford (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 340, 763 N.E.2d 122. 
{¶ 4} On June 28, 2004, Twyford filed a second application to reopen his 
appeal in the court of appeals under App.R. 26(B), again alleging that he did not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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receive effective assistance of appellate counsel in that court.  The court of 
appeals denied the application in December 2004, explaining that Twyford was 
not entitled to file a second application for reopening under App.R. 26(B). 
{¶ 5} Twyford has now filed a timely appeal as of right. 
{¶ 6} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  First, “there is no 
right to file successive applications for reopening” under App.R. 26(B).  State v. 
Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 179, 2003-Ohio-3079, 790 N.E.2d 299, ¶ 12.  Twyford 
filed an App.R. 26(B) application in the court of appeals in 1996.  He has no right 
under the rule to raise his ineffective-assistance claim again now.  “ ‘Once 
ineffective assistance of counsel has been raised and adjudicated, res judicata bars 
its relitigation.’ ”  Id., 99 Ohio St.3d 179, 2003-Ohio-3079, 790 N.E.2d 299, at ¶ 
10, quoting State v. Cheren (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 137, 138, 652 N.E.2d 707.  See, 
also, State v. Cooey, 99 Ohio St.3d 345, 2003-Ohio-3914, 792 N.E.2d 720, ¶ 5, 
quoting Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 179, 2003-Ohio-3079, 790 N.E.2d 299, ¶ 10 (“ 
‘Neither App.R. 26(B) nor State v. Murnahan (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 
N.E.2d 1204, provides a criminal defendant the right to file second or successive 
applications for reopening’ ”). 
{¶ 7} Second, Twyford has not complied with App.R. 26(B)(1), which 
states, “An application for reopening shall be filed in the court of appeals where 
the appeal was decided within ninety days from journalization of the appellate 
judgment unless the applicant shows good cause for filing at a later time.”  
Twyford waited more than five years before filing his application. 
{¶ 8} Twyford argues that he had good cause for missing the 90-day 
deadline set by the rule, claiming that he had a “constitutional right to appointed 
counsel to prepare and file” an application for reopening, and none was appointed 
for him in the court of appeals.  Yet as we have explained, an App.R. 26(B) 
application for reopening is a “collateral postconviction remedy,” and the state 
“has no constitutional obligation * * * to provide counsel to those defendants who 
January Term, 2005 
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file applications under that rule.”  Morgan v. Eads, 104 Ohio St.3d 142, 2004-
Ohio-6110, 818 N.E.2d 1157, ¶ 25, ¶ 22.  We therefore reject Twyford’s claim 
that his inability to secure further appellate representation in the court of appeals 
gave him good cause to miss the 90-day deadline in App.R. 26(B) after the court 
of appeals issued its second decision in September 1998. 
{¶ 9} And Twyford himself cannot rely on his own alleged lack of legal 
training to excuse his failure to comply with the deadline.  “Lack of effort or 
imagination, and ignorance of the law * * * do not automatically establish good 
cause for failure to seek timely relief” under App.R. 26(B).  State v. Reddick 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 88, 91, 647 N.E.2d 784.  The 90-day requirement in the 
rule is “applicable to all appellants,” State v. Winstead (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 277, 
278, 658 N.E.2d 722, and Twyford offers no sound reason why he could not 
comply with that fundamental aspect of the rule. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Thomas R. Straus, Jefferson County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Raymond A. Twyford, pro se. 
______________________