Case Title: STONEKING v. WHEATLAND RURAL ELECTRIC ASSICIATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
STONEKING v. WHEATLAND RURAL ELECTRIC ASSICIATION2003 WY 8172 P.3d 272Case Number: 02-127Decided: 07/07/2003
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

JOHN 
STONEKING,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

WHEATLAND 
RURAL ELECTRIC

ASSOCIATION,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Platte County

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Tina N. Kerin,* Cheyenne, Wyoming  

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Stephen N. Sherard of Sherard Sherard & Johnson, Wheatland, 
Wyoming  

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J.; GOLDEN, LEHMAN, and KITE, JJ.; and E. JAMES BURKE, 
D.J.

 

 

*  Order entered March 6, 2003, permitted 
Ms. Kerin to withdraw as counsel for Appellant 

 

            

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      John Stoneking 
filed three pro se actions against Wheatland Rural Electric Association 
(WREA) and individual WREA employees in the justice court for Platte 
County.  All three actions were 
based on a disruption of the electrical service in January and February of 1998 
to the home in which Mr. Stoneking was living. Ultimately, Mr. Stoneking hired 
counsel and filed this action in the district court. The district court granted 
summary judgment finding Mr. Stoneking's action was precluded by the doctrine of 
res judicata.  We 
affirm.  

 

 

 

[¶2]      Mr. Stoneking 
frames two issues:

 

            
I.  Whether the trial court 
erred in dismissing Appellant's first amended complaint, based upon res 
judicata?

 

            
II.  Whether Appellant was 
denied due process of law by the trial court's dismissal of his first amended 
complaint?

 

 

 

[¶3]      In January of 
1998, Mr. Stoneking was living with his girlfriend who was renting a house in 
Wheatland from Clora Harris.  In 
what was apparently a landlord-tenant dispute, Ms. Harris disconnected the 
electrical meter and interrupted the electrical service to the property on or 
about January 27, 1998, and for some time in February 1998 as well.  Mr. Stoneking had the electrical service 
put in his name, and the power was restored.  Ms. Harris again disconnected the meter 
and padlocked the electric box. When Mr. Stoneking asked WREA to remove the 
padlock by cutting it off the box, it declined.  Mr. Stoneking claimed the interruption 
of the electrical service caused food kept in a freezer to spoil, certain other 
expenses, and mental suffering.  He 
also claimed WREA should have prosecuted Ms. Harris for her interference with 
his electrical service.

 

[¶4]      On May 5, 1998, 
Mr. Stoneking filed his first pro se action in the justice court  against WREA and Chuck Witte, a WREA 
employee, alleging damages of $1,834 caused by violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
37-12-202, 37-12-208, 37-12-401, and 37-12-402 (LexisNexis 2003).1  On June 3, 1998, the court granted 
WREA's and Mr. Witte's motions to dismiss with prejudice finding it had no 
jurisdiction, the complaint lacked properly stated allegations, and the statutes 
were inapplicable.  No appeal of 
this dismissal was filed.  

            

[¶5]      Almost 
immediately thereafter, Mr. Stoneking filed a second action pro se 
against "President of W.R.E.A. William J. Stafford," again alleging damages in 
the amount of $1,834 caused by:  (1) 
"Breach of Contract"; (2) "going on up to 3.5 days without electricity in Jan 
1998 and Feb 1998"; and (3) "no one would do anything to help till I got a third 
party involved."  This case was 
dismissed without prejudice on or about July 8, 1998, pursuant to Mr. 
Stoneking's request.

 

[¶6]      Mr. Stoneking 
filed a third action pro se in November of 1999 against Chuck Witte, 
"Manager for WREA," alleging WREA stole Mr. Stoneking's connection box breakers 
and caused him $450 in damages.  A 
hearing was held on December 14, 1999, at which testimony and exhibits were 
received. The record contains no transcript or recording of this 
proceeding.  The justice court 
issued a decision letter on December 15, 1999, finding: (1) Mr. Stoneking and 
his girlfriend signed an instrument on April 2, 1998, indicating they did not 
intend to take legal action against WREA; (2) on April 12, 1999, Mr. Stoneking 
asked WREA to remove the meter box; (3) Mr. Stoneking signed an agreement 
prepared by WREA acknowledging he would be responsible for the cost of the work 
to remove the box; (4) Mr. Stoneking hired Jack's Electric & Plumbing to 
perform the work for which he was charged $450; (5) WREA owned the equipment, 
not Mr. Stoneking, and could not have stolen its own property.  The justice court dismissed Mr. 
Stoneking's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.  Similarly, the justice 
court dismissed WREA's counterclaim which purportedly was filed because Mr. 
Stoneking "was a pain and was causing them a lot of extra work."  The record does not reflect any order 
beyond the justice court's decision letter.

 

[¶7]      Mr. Stoneking 
filed an appeal in district court which was dismissed because he failed to 
submit a brief as required by W.R.A.P. 7.06(a) and the "Complaint" filed as a 
notice of appeal attempted to reargue the facts and did not provide a statement 
of cogent reasons why, as a matter of law, the case should be reversed.  Mr. Stoneking did not appeal from the 
dismissal.

 

[¶8]      A fourth action, 
the subject of this appeal, was filed in the district court by counsel on behalf 
of Mr. Stoneking on February 2, 2000, naming only WREA as a defendant.  This action alleged WREA negligently, 
willfully, and wantonly failed and refused to promptly restore utility service 
in January and February of 1998  in 
violation of the National Electrical Code and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-12-212 
(LexisNexis 2003)2 and refused to prosecute Ms. Harris 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-12-117 (LexisNexis 2003).3  An amended complaint added breach of 
contract and fraud claims.  WREA 
filed a motion to dismiss contending this fourth lawsuit was precluded by the 
doctrine of res judicata or, alternatively, collateral estoppel.  After a hearing held on February 28, 
2002, the district court issued a four-page decision letter which converted the 
WREA motion into a motion for summary judgment and granted the same on the basis 
that the action was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata.  This appeal followed.4

 

 

 

[¶9]      When reviewing a 
grant of summary judgment, we utilize our oft-repeated standard of review.  We determine whether a genuine issue of 
material fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as 
a matter of law.  Slavens v. 
Board of County Commissioners for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 685 (Wyo. 
1993); Davidson v. Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Wyo. 1993); W.R.C.P. 
56(c).  When there is no contention 
that a genuine issue of material fact exists, our concern is strictly with the 
application of the law.  Goglio v. Star Valley Ranch 
Association, 2002 WY 94, 
¶12, 48 P.3d 1072, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002).  
"We review a grant of summary judgment deciding a question of law de 
novo and afford no deference to the district court's ruling."  Id.; see also Hirschfield v. Board of 
County Commissioners of the County of Teton, 944 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Wyo. 
1997).

 

 

 

[¶10]   The district court thoroughly 
analyzed the application of the doctrine of res judicata to the 
circumstances of the actions filed by Mr. Stoneking and determined the justice 
court order issued in the third action precluded the fourth action filed in the 
district court.  Relying on this 
Court's opinion in Swasso v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division, 751 P.2d 887 (Wyo. 1988), the district court considered the four 
factors necessary to invoke the doctrine of res judicata.  We agree the correct test was 
applied.

 

Res 
judicata 
bars the relitigation of previously litigated claims or causes of action.  Four factors are examined to determine 
whether the doctrine of res judicata applies: (1) identity in parties; 
(2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same and relate to the 
subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are identical in reference 
to both the subject matter and the issues between them.  

 

Eklund 
v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 
2001 WY 55, ¶15, 25 P.3d 511, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001) (citation omitted).  

 

[¶11]   The district court 
found:

 

The 
parties in fact need not be identical but rather in privy with the original 
parties. Roush v. Roush, 889 P.2[]d 841 (Wyo. 1979).  Clearly WREA is in privy with its 
president and its manager. Nevertheless, in the 9911-0009 suit, WREA did appear 
as a counter-claim party.  Thus, the 
first requirement of the Swasso case was met.

 

It 
is further clear that the subject matter of the suits was the same.  That was essentially admitted to by [Mr. 
Stoneking] in his deposition and his counsel at argument.  Furthermore, CV-9911-0009, through its 
incorporation of CV-9806-0009, indicate[s] that the subject matter was indeed 
the same.

 

For 
the same reason, the issues were the same and therefore the third requirement of 
the Swasso case was met.

 

Finally, 
there is no question but the capacities of the parties were identical in 
relationship to the subject matter and the issues between them.  

 

            
. . . .

 

In 
the [third justice court actionCV-9911-0009] tried before Judge Connolly, [Mr. 
Stoneking] was clearly afforded the opportunity and should have litigated all 
issues arising under the factual circumstances pertaining to WREA that have 
given rise to this dispute. . . .  

 

. . 
. . This Court finds that the verdict in that case against Mr. 
Stoneking is res judicata.  

 

This 
Court also notes that [Mr. Stoneking's] claim for fraud should have been brought 
in the earlier suit, but that it is so non-specific in this matter, it should 
nevertheless be dismissed for that reason alone.

 

We 
agree with the district court's reasoning and conclude it properly applied the 
principles of the doctrine of res judicata in dismissing Mr. Stoneking's 
claims.  The multiple suits should 
have been brought at one time in the proper judicial forum and should have 
raised all issues related to the incident.

 

In 
addition to precluding issues previously raised and litigated from being the 
subject of later challenges, the doctrine precludes issues that could have been 
raised in the first action.  Cermak v. Great West Casualty Company, 2 P.3d 1047, 1054 (Wyo. 2000).  We 
have explicitly stated that claim preclusion has "the effect of foreclosing any 
litigation of matters that never have been litigated because of a determination 
that they should have been advanced in an earlier suit."  Id. at 1053.  A full and fair opportunity to litigate 
an issue is all that is required for the doctrine to apply.  Bender v. Uinta County Assessor, 14 P.3d 906, 910 (Wyo. 2000); Wilkinson v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 991 P.2d 1228, 
1234 (Wyo. 1999).

            

Wyodak 
Resources Development Corporation v. Wyoming Department of 
Revenue, 
2002 WY 181, ¶12, 60 P.3d 129, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002).  The doctrine of res judicata 
furthers society's interest in having disputes conclusively resolved in a single 
action and minimizing the expense and difficulties of piecemeal litigation.  DLB v. DJB (Paternity of JRW), 
814 P.2d 1256, 1264 (Wyo. 1991).

 

[¶12]   Mr. Stoneking contends he was 
denied due process of law.  The 
record is clear that Mr. Stoneking was afforded plenty of due process.  Yet, he believes he is entitled to 
morepresumably until he perfects his claims and his choice of forum.  We recognize that the earlier actions 
were pursued pro se and lacked a clear and thorough articulation of the 
issues.  The fact that the prior 
cases may not have been well litigated does not permit multiple, repetitious 
actions. 

 

"One 
has the right to appear pro se; but when a person chooses to do so, he 
must be held to the same standard as if he were represented by counsel.  He cannot expect the court or the 
attorneys for other parties to present his case.  He cannot be given an advantage by 
virtue of his pro se appearance, and he cannot be placed at a 
disadvantage thereby other than whatever disadvantage results from his decision 
to proceed without the assistance of counsel."

 

RM 
v. State, Department of Family Services (Interest of KMM), 
957 P.2d 296, 298 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Johnson v. Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Company of Hartford, Connecticut, 630 P.2d 514, 517 (Wyo.), appeal 
dismissed and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1118 (1981)).  "Although a certain leniency is accorded 
to pro se litigants, the proper administration of justice requires 
reasonable adherence to the same rules of evidence, procedure and requirements 
of the court as expected of those qualified to practice law."  Dewey v. Dewey, 2001 WY 107, ¶17, 
33 P.3d 1143, ¶17 (Wyo. 2001).

  

[¶13]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1These statutes are entitled as follows:  § 37-12-202  "Public utility personnel 
violating or aiding or abetting in violations"; § 37-12-208   "Utility liable for loss or damage"; § 
37-12-401  "Definitions" under Article 4 entitled "Civil Remedies for Wrongful 
Use of Utility Facilities"; and § 37-12-402  "Civil action 
allowed."

 

  2Section 
37-12-212 provides:

 

Every public utility, all officers and agents of any public utility, and 
every person shall obey, observe and comply with every provision of this act and 
with every order made by the commission under authority of this act and duly 
served in accordance with its provisions so long as the same shall be and remain 
in force.  Any public utility or its 
officers or agents, and any other persons, who shall knowingly and willfully 
violate any of the provisions of this act is punishable as a misdemeanor or 
felony, or who fails, omits or neglects to obey, observe or comply with any 
order or any direction or requirement of the commission, shall (in addition to 
liability to the party aggrieved for all damages sustained by reason of such 
violation) forfeit to the state not to exceed the sum of one thousand dollars 
($1,000.00) for each and every violation, or in case of a violation which is 
punishable as a misdemeanor or felony, not to exceed the maximum sum fixed as a 
fine therefor, which shall be recovered in an action at law to the use of the 
state upon the complaint of the commission appearing by its attorney or the 
attorney general; but no such action shall be maintained unless brought within 
two (2) years after the date of such violation; nor shall such an action be 
maintained in the case of a person who has already been convicted for the same 
violation of this act, and recovery by civil action brought in accordance with 
this section shall not be a bar to any criminal prosecution for the same 
violation of this act.

 

3Section 37-12-117 provides:

 

Any person who willfully injures, alters or by any instrument, device or 
contrivance in any manner interferes with or obstructs the action or operation 
of any meter for measuring electricity or the amount or quantity of electricity 
passing through it without the knowledge and consent of the person or 
corporation owning said meter, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and 
punished as provided in section 4 hereof [§ 
37-12-118].

 

  4We 
decline to review or consider a Public Service Commission consumer complaint 
raised in the pleadings as yet another of the multiplicity of actions filed by 
Mr. Stoneking.  That action, which 
was dismissed, was pursued in an administrative forum and did not address claims 
of damage related to negligence, breach of contract, or fraud.  Likewise, we decline to review a 
complaint filed by counsel on behalf of Mr. Stoneking in the First Judicial 
District Court which was dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens 
as the court declined to exercise jurisdiction and no decision on the merits was 
rendered.