Case Title: State v. Gustafson

Citation: 1996-Ohio-299

Docket Number: 19951377

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State of Ohio, Appellant, v. Gustafson, Appellee. 
The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Miller et al., Appellants. 
[Cite as State v. Gustafson (1996), ________ Ohio St.3d _______.] 
Motor vehicles -- Driving while intoxicated -- License suspended 
administratively, pursuant to R.C. 4511.191, subsequent to arrest 
for violation of R.C. 4511.19 -- Subsequent prosecution of criminal 
drunk driving not precluded by Double Jepardy Clauses of Ohio and 
United States Constitutions. 
1.  The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United   
States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution do not preclude criminal prosecution and 
trial of motorists for driving in violation of R.C. 4511.19 
based upon, and subsequent to, the imposition of an 
administrative license suspension pursuant to R.C. 
4511.191. 
2. 
An administrative license suspension imposed pursuant to R.C.  
 
 
2
4511.191, and a criminal driving-under-the-influence 
prosecution for violation of R.C. 4511.19, arising out of 
the same arrest, constitute separate proceedings for 
double jeopardy purposes. 
3. 
For purposes of determining the protection afforded by the Double  
Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions, an administrative license suspension 
imposed pursuant to R.C. 4511.191 ceases to be  
remedial and becomes punitive in nature to the extent 
the suspension continues subsequent to adjudication 
and sentencing for violation of R.C. 4511.19.    
4. 
Because an administrative license suspension loses its remedial  
character upon judicial adjudication and sentencing for 
violation of R.C. 4511.19, the Double Jeopardy Clauses 
of the United States and Ohio Constitutions preclude 
continued recognition of an administrative license 
 
 
3
suspension following judicial imposition of criminal 
penalties for driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating drugs, including alcohol.  
5. 
A court has judicial power pursuant to Sections 1 and 4, Article IV of 
the Ohio Constitution to order the termination of an 
administrative license suspension at the time of criminal 
sentencing for violation of R.C. 4511.19, in that 
continued recognition of the administrative license 
suspension 
would 
result 
in 
an 
unconstitutional 
application of R.C. 4511.191 to the criminal offender. 
 
(Nos. 95-1377 and 95-1466 -- Submitted February 7, 1996 -- Decided 
July 30, 1996.) 
 
Certified by and Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning  
County, No. 94 C.A. 232. 
 
(Nos. 95-1271, 95-1303, 95-1304, 95-1305 and 95-1307 --  
 
 Submitted February 7, 1996 -- Decided  _____, 1996.). 
 
 
4
 
Appeals from the Court of Appeals for Auglaize County, Nos.  
2-94-32, 2-95-3, 2-95-6, 2-95-4, 2-95-7. 
 
 
Before the court are consolidated causes presenting issues 
concerning application of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the 
Ohio Constitution to proceedings instituted following the arrest of drivers for 
alleged violation of Ohio's criminal drunk driving law, R.C. 4511.19.  A 
summary of the facts of these causes follows:  
 
Case No. 95-1377. 
At 12:15 a.m. on November 27, 1993, Robert 
D. Gustafson Jr. was arrested and charged with a speeding violation and 
violations of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) and (3), which prohibits the driving of 
vehicles upon Ohio's public highways while under the influence of 
intoxicating substances, including alcohol ("DUI").  The DUI charge was 
Gustafson's first alcohol- or drug-related driving offense during the preceding 
five-year period.   
 
 
5
 
Gustafson consented to a breath-alcohol test, and tested above 
statutory DUI limits at .115.  Pursuant to R.C. 4511.191, the arresting officer 
immediately seized Gustafson's driver’s license, and processed the 
necessary report to complete the administrative license suspension ("ALS") 
of Gustafson's license.  By law, the duration of Gustafson's ALS, as a first 
offender who had failed a breath-alcohol test at the time of arrest, was ninety 
days.  R.C. 4511.191(F)(1).   At his arraignment on November 30, 1993, 
Gustafson waived the right to appeal the ALS provided him by R.C. 
4511.191(H)(I).  Gustafson further waived application of Ohio's speedy trial 
statutes to his criminal charges. 
 
 Although the ninety-day ALS period presumably expired at the end of 
February 1994, the record before us fails to disclose whether Gustafson 
subsequently secured his license, and if so, when.  Nevertheless, on 
October 14, 1994 Gustafson filed a motion to dismiss the criminal DUI 
charge which remained, claiming that continued prosecution of that criminal 
charge would violate his constitutional right pursuant to the Eighth 
 
 
6
Amendment to be free from twice being placed in jeopardy.  The trial court 
granted the motion.  The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed 
dismissal of the criminal DUI charge on double jeopardy grounds. 
 
Case No. 95-1271. 
At 1:08 a.m. on March 26, 1994, Fred W. 
Miller, Sr. was arrested and issued three traffic tickets.  Miller was charged 
with a speeding violation, a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) (DUI), and 
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(3) (driving with a prohibited level of alcohol as 
measured by breath).  Miller consented to a breath-alcohol test, and tested 
at .166.  Miller had twice before during the preceding five-year period been 
convicted of a DUI offense.  The arresting officer imposed an ALS pursuant 
to R.C. 4511.191, and seized Miller's license.  By law, the duration of Miller's 
ALS, as a third-time offender who had failed a breath-alcohol test at the time 
of arrest, was two years, i.e., until March 25, 1996.  R.C. 4511.191(F)(3).  
 
At his arraignment on March 31, 1994, Miller appealed the ALS 
pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(H)(1).  On April 1, 1994, Miller requested 
continuance of the ALS hearing. 
 
 
7
 
On July 14, 1994, Miller entered a plea of no contest to the charge of 
violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(3), and a judgment of conviction was entered on 
that charge.  The speeding charge and the R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) DUI charge 
were dismissed. 
  
On September 13, 1994 Miller filed a motion seeking to reverse the 
judgment of conviction and to bar the imposition of criminal penalties, 
claiming further sentencing would violate double jeopardy principles.  The 
trial court overruled the motion.   
 
Miller was thereafter sentenced to one year in jail and a fine of $500.  
The court ordered all but thirty days of the jail sentence to be suspended 
conditioned on compliance with imposed terms of probation.  In addition, 
Miller's vehicle was ordered immobilized for one hundred eighty days 
retroactive to the date of arrest.  The ALS was ordered terminated, and, in 
consequence of his conviction, the court ordered Miller's license suspended 
for ten years, retroactive to the date of arrest, as authorized by R.C. 
4507.16.    
 
 
8
 
The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and 
sentence imposed by the trial court. 
 
Case No. 95-1303. 
At 12:45 a.m. on September 10, 1994, Michael 
T. Smith was arrested and issued three traffic tickets.  Smith was charged 
with a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) (DUI), violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(3) 
(driving with a prohibited level of breath-alcohol), and violation of R.C. 
4511.19(A)(4) (driving with a prohibited level of urine-alcohol).  Smith's 
breath-alcohol test registered .146.  The DUI charge was Smith's first 
offense within the preceding five-year period.  The arresting officer imposed 
an ALS pursuant to R.C. 4511.191, and seized Smith's license.  By law, the 
duration of Smith's ALS, as a first offender who had failed a breath-alcohol 
test at the time of arrest, was ninety days.  R.C. 4511.191(F)(1).  
  
At his arraignment Smith appealed the ALS.  Thereafter, Smith 
requested continuance of the ALS hearing.  Smith was granted limited 
driving privileges enabling him to drive to and from work and for household 
needs.   
 
 
9
 
On January 18, 1995, defendant moved to dismiss the criminal DUI 
charges pending against him on double jeopardy grounds.  Upon denial of 
his motion, Smith entered a plea of no contest to the charge of violation of 
R.C. 4511.19(A)(3), and a judgment of conviction was entered on that 
charge.  The remaining charges were dismissed.  
 
Smith was sentenced to three days in jail and a fine of $500. The court 
ordered the jail sentence and $300 of the fine to be suspended conditioned 
on compliance with imposed terms of probation.  The ALS was ordered 
terminated, but the court, pursuant to R.C. 4507.16, ordered Smith's driver's 
license suspended for six months retroactive to the date of arrest.  Work and 
household-need -driving privileges were continued. 
 
The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and 
sentence imposed by the trial court. 
 
Case No. 95-1304. 
On May 3, 1994, James L. Brown was arrested 
and issued two traffic tickets.  Brown was charged with violations of R.C. 
4511.19(A)(1) (DUI) and 4511.19(A)(3) (driving with a prohibited level of 
 
 
10
breath alcohol).  Brown's breath-alcohol tests registered .186.  The DUI 
charge was Brown's third offense within the preceding five-year period.  The 
arresting officer seized Brown’s license pursuant to R.C. 4511.191.  By law, 
the duration of Brown's ALS, as a third-time offender who had failed a 
breath-alcohol test at the time of arrest, was two years, i.e., until May 2, 
1996.  R.C. 4511.191(F)(3).  
 
Brown appealed the ALS, and requested a continuance of the ALS 
hearing.  
 
Brown filed a motion to dismiss the criminal DUI charges pending 
against him on double jeopardy grounds, which was denied.  Upon denial of 
his motion, Brown entered a plea of no contest to the charge of violation of 
R.C. 4511.19(A)(3), and a judgment of conviction was entered on that 
charge.  The remaining charge was dismissed.  
 
 Brown was sentenced to one year in jail and a fine of $500.  His 
driver's license was judicially suspended for ten years, retroactive to the date 
of arrest.   His vehicle was ordered immobilized for six months, retroactive to 
 
 
11
the date of arrest.  The ALS was ordered terminated.  Matters of probation 
were taken under advisement. 
 
The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and 
sentence imposed by the trial court. 
 
Case No. 95-1305. 
 On June 17, 1994, Kenneth L. Roth was 
arrested and issued two traffic tickets.  Roth was charged with violations of 
R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) (DUI) and 4511.19(A)(2) (driving with a prohibited level 
of blood alcohol).  It appears Roth refused to take a chemical breath test of 
his breath.  The arresting officer imposed an ALS pursuant to R.C. 
4511.191, and seized Roth's license. 
 
The DUI charge was Roth's third DUI-related offense within the 
preceding five-year period.  The record does not show, however, whether 
Roth had refused chemical testing in connection with his previous 
convictions. By law, the duration of Roth's ALS, had he in fact refused on 
two prior occasions to take a chemical test at the time of the DUI arrest, 
would be three years, i.e., until June 16, 1997.  R.C. 4511.191(E)(1)(c).  If, 
 
 
12
however, his prior DUI offenses had not been associated with chemical- test 
refusals, the duration of his ALS, by law, would be one year.  R.C. 
4511.191(E)(1)(a).  In addition, Roth's vehicle was impounded by the 
arresting officer.   
 
Roth appealed the ALS, and sought a continuance of the ALS hearing. 
 In addition, Roth filed a motion to dismiss the criminal DUI charges pending 
against him on double jeopardy grounds.  Upon denial of his motion, Roth 
entered a plea of no contest to the charge of violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1), 
and a judgment of conviction was entered on that charge.  The remaining 
charge was dismissed.  
 
 Roth was sentenced to one year in jail and a fine of $1,000.  His 
driver's license was judicially suspended for ten years, retroactive to the date 
of arrest, as authorized by R.C. 4507.16.  His vehicle was ordered 
immobilized for six months, retroactive to the date of arrest.  The court 
ordered termination of the ALS, which had been imposed based on Roth's 
 
 
13
refusal to take a chemical test.  Matters of probation were taken under 
advisement. 
 
The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and 
sentence imposed by the trial court. 
 
Case No. 95-1307. 
On September 4, 1994, Sally A. Bayman was 
arrested and charged with violations of R.C. 4511.19(A)(I) (DUI) and 
4507.02(D)(2) 
(driving 
while 
under 
a previously imposed license 
suspension).  Bayman refused to take a chemical test of her breath.  The 
DUI charge was Bayman's third offense within the preceding five-year 
period.  Her vehicle was impounded by the arresting officer.  The arresting 
officer imposed an ALS pursuant to R.C. 4511.191, and seized Bayman’s 
license.  Depending on whether her prior DUI offenses had been associated 
with a chemical-test refusal, the ALS would have been for either one year or 
three years. R.C. 4511.191(E)(1)(a); 4511.191(E)(1)(c).   
 
At her arraignment Bayman appealed the ALS.  Later, Bayman 
requested a continuance of the ALS hearing.  Thereafter, Bayman filed a 
 
 
14
motion to dismiss the criminal DUI charges pending against her on double 
jeopardy grounds, which was denied.  Upon denial of her motion, Bayman 
entered a plea of no contest to both charges, and judgments of conviction 
were entered.   
 
For the DUI violation, Bayman was sentenced one year in jail and a 
fine of $500.  Her vehicle was ordered immobilized for six months, 
retroactive to the date of arrest. The court ordered all but fifteen days of the 
jail sentence to be suspended, conditioned on compliance with imposed 
terms of probation.  For driving while under a previous OMVI license 
suspension, Bayman was sentenced to six months in jail, concurrent with 
the jail sentence imposed for the DUI violation, and an additional $250 fine.  
The court further order Bayman's driver's license suspended for ten years, 
retroactive to the date of arrest, as authorized by R.C. 4507.16.  The court 
issued no further order purporting to affect the ALS.   
 
The Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and 
sentence imposed by the trial court. 
 
 
15
 
The above causes are now before this court on consolidated appeals 
as of right.  In addition, the Seventh District Court of Appeals found its 
judgment in Gustafson to conflict with the decision in the Miller case, and 
entered an order certifying a conflict.  That cause is now also before this 
court upon our determination that a conflict exists (case No. 95-1377). 
 
James A. Philomena, Mahoning County Prosecuting Attorney, Michele 
G. Cerni, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney 
General, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, Susan E. Ashbrook and Andrew 
S. Bergman, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant in case Nos. 95-
1377 and 95-1466. 
 
Newman, Olson & Kerr and Martin S. Delahunty III, for appellee in 
case Nos. 95-1377 and 95-1466. 
 
W. Andrew Hasselbach, urging affirmance for amicus curiae,  Ohio 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, in case Nos. 95-1377 and 95-
1466. 
 
 
16
 
Henry M. Jasny, pro hac vice, urging reversal for amici curiae, 
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, and Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving, National Headquarters, in case Nos. 95-1377 and 95-1466. 
 
Baker & Hostetler and Richard W. Siehl, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, State of Ohio, in case Nos. 95-1377 
and 95-1466. 
 
Baker & Hostetler and William W. Falsgraf, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae, American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities, in case Nos. 95-
1377 and 95-1466.    
 
Michele McDowell Fields, pro hac vice, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, in case Nos. 95-1377 and 95-
1466. 
 
Wilson Law, Eric J. Wilson and Gregory Wilson, for appellants in case 
Nos. 95-1271, 95-1303, 95-1304, 95-1305 and 95-1307.  
 
Garrett T. Gall, Auglaize County Prosecuting Attorney, and David M. 
Busick, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney 
 
 
17
General, Jeffrey S. Sutton and Susan E. Ashbrook, Assistant Attorneys 
General, for appellee in case Nos. 95-1271, 95-1303, 95-1304, 95-1305, 
and 95-1307. 
 
Moyer, C.J.  Before this court stand six Ohio drivers whose licenses 
were suspended administratively, pursuant to R.C. 4511.191, subsequent to 
arrest for violation of R.C. 4511.19.   The legal issue presented by their 
appeals is whether the administrative suspension of their licenses under 
R.C. 4511.191 precludes subsequent prosecution of criminal drunk driving 
charges pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Ohio and United 
States Constitutions.  Of these six drivers, four (Gustafson, Miller, Brown 
and Smith) submitted to chemical tests upon the request of the arresting 
officer, while two (Roth and Bayman) refused to take such a test. 
 
We begin our analysis by setting forth a simplified statement of the 
procedures now governing administrative license suspensions in Ohio.  In 
1993 the Ohio General Assembly enacted comprehensive legislation1 
designed to combat the devastating problems associated with drunk driving 
 
 
18
on Ohio highways.  Included in the legislation were revisions to Ohio’s 
implied consent statute, R.C. 4511.191, authorizing, for the first time, 
immediate "on-the-spot" suspensions of driving privileges at the time of a 
DUI arrest.   R.C. 4511.191(D).   Acting "[o]n behalf of the registrar” of the 
bureau of motor vehicles (“BMV”), an arresting officer now is required to 
implement an administrative license suspension as to a motorist who either 
(1) refuses, upon the officer's request, to submit to a chemical test to 
determine blood, breath or urine alcohol content, or (2) takes the test, but 
"fails" it, i.e., registers a blood-, breath- or urine-alcohol content exceeding 
statutory limits.  Id.  Duration of the ALS is established by R.C. 4511.191(E) 
and (F), and ranges from ninety days (imposed upon a first offender who 
"fails" a chemical test) to five years (imposed upon an arrestee who refuses 
testing, and has refused chemical testing on three or more prior occasions in 
the preceding five years).   
 
A driver may appeal the administrative license suspension at an initial 
appearance before the criminal court hearing the DUI charge, which, unless 
 
 
19
continued, occurs within five days of arrest.  R.C. 4511.191(G).  Appeal of 
an ALS does not, however, stay or otherwise affect the running of the 
suspension.  R.C. 4511.191(H).  
 
Following the prescribed term of the suspension, the driver may 
request the BMV to return or reissue the suspended license, which the BMV 
must do upon payment of a $250 reinstatement fee and proof of compliance 
with Ohio’s financial responsibility requirements.   R.C. 4511.191(L). 
I 
Double Jeopardy Analysis 
 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall *** be subject for the 
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb," and is applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Benton v. Maryland (1969), 
395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707; State v. Tolbert (1991), 60 
Ohio St.3d 89, 90, 573 N.E.2d 617, 619.  Similarly, Section 10, Article I of 
the Ohio Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be twice put in 
 
 
20
jeopardy for the same offense.”   Ohio courts have historically treated the 
protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Ohio 
Constitution and the United States Constitution as coextensive.  See State v. 
Konicek (1984) 16 Ohio App.3d 17, 17-18, 16 OBR 18, 18-19, 474 N.E.2d 
363, 364; State v. Moss (1982), 69 Ohio St. 2d 515, 517, 23 O.O.3d 447, 
448, 433 N.E.2d 181, 184; State v. Royster (1982), 3 Ohio App. 3d 442, 
443, 3 OBR 521, 522, 446 N.E.2d 190, 192.  We therefore proceed based 
on the premise that the Double Jeopardy Clause of each Constitution 
prohibits (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple 
punishments for the same offense.  United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 
435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496, citing North Carolina 
v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 
644-665. 
 
Prior to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Halper, 
courts uniformly accepted the principle that sanctions imposed pursuant to 
 
 
21
"civil" or "administrative" proceedings did not trigger the Double Jeopardy 
Clause so as to preclude either subsequent criminal prosecutions or criminal 
punishments. Helvering v. Mitchell (1938), 303 U.S. 391, 82 L. Ed. 917, 58 
S. Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917; United States v. Ward (1980), 448 U.S. 242, 248, 
100 S. Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742, 749.  In Halper, however, the court 
recognized that a line could be crossed at which civil damage recoveries 
could become "punishments" for double jeopardy purposes.  
 
In Halper, the manager of a medical laboratory Medicaid provider was 
indicted, convicted, and sentenced on sixty-five criminal fraud counts.  
Subsequently, the federal government brought suit pursuant to the False 
Claims Act (Sections 3729-2731, Title 31, U.S. Code), claiming it was 
entitled to judgment for more than $130,000 in "civil penalties," that sum 
representing the statutorily established maximum penalty of $2,000 on each 
of the sixty-five counts.  The government's actual losses, however, totaled 
only $580, plus the costs of investigating and prosecuting the case.    
 
 
22
 
 The Halper court recognized that both criminal and civil proceedings 
may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and held that "in 
determining whether a particular civil sanction constitutes criminal 
punishment, it is the purposes actually served by the sanction in question, 
not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the sanction, that 
must be evaluated."  Id. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901, 104 L.Ed.2d at 501, fn. 7. 
 The court cited Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963), 372 U.S. 144, 168, 
83 S.Ct. 554, 567, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, 660-661, in recognizing that a sanction 
appearing excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purpose might well be 
deemed "punishment."  This implied that disproportionality between the 
magnitude of the sanction and the harm caused by the underlying conduct 
was critical.  The court remanded the case for the trial court to determine the 
maximum fine which could be imposed consistent with a remedial, rather 
than punitive, purpose, holding that "under the Double Jeopardy Clause a 
defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not 
be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second 
 
 
23
sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent 
or retribution."  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 448-449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 
L.Ed.2d at 502.  While recognizing that the trial court's inquiry on remand 
would “not be an exact pursuit,"  the court left it to the lower court to 
determine "the size of the civil sanction the Government may receive without 
crossing the line between remedy and punishment."  Id. at 449-450, 109 
S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502-503. 
    
More recently, the United States Supreme Court again considered the 
issue of "criminal punishment" vis-a-vis "civil sanction" in Austin v. United 
States (1993), 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488.  Austin did 
not involve alleged violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, but rather 
presented a challenge to drug-related forfeitures of property based on the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Nevertheless, the court found its prior analysis in Halper to be 
helpful in determining whether the forfeiture of property constituted 
"punishment" for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause.  The Austin court 
 
 
24
concluded that forfeiture proceedings "historically have been understood, at 
least in part, as punishment," id. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 2810, 125 L.Ed.2d at 
503, and that forfeitures constituted fines, i.e., "‘payment to a sovereign as 
punishment for some offense,’"  id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2812, 125 L.Ed.2d at 
505.  The case was remanded to the trial court for determination of whether 
the forfeiture at issue was excessive in relation to the offense committed, or, 
alternatively, 
represented 
a 
fine 
which 
fell 
within 
constitutional, 
nonexcessive, limits.  Id. 
 
In Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch (1994), 511 
U.S._____, 114 S.Ct.1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767, the court again, as in Halper, 
was called upon to determine whether a particular sanction constituted a 
"punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
so as to preclude subsequent imposition of additional “punishment.”  At 
issue in Kurth Ranch was a Montana tax assessed on the possession and 
storage of dangerous drugs.  Members of the Kurth family were convicted of 
criminal drug law violations and sentenced to prison terms.  The state of 
Montana then separately assessed a tax of nearly $900,000 on the Kurth 
family, and thereafter pursued its claim in federal bankruptcy proceedings. 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed lower court findings denying 
recognition of Montana’s claim, noting that "‘there comes a time in the 
extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its 
character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of 
regulation and punishment.’"  Id., 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1946, 128 
L.Ed.2d at 778.  It therefore held that collection from the Kurths of the 
assessed tax of nearly $900,000 was precluded as violative of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause’s prohibition against imposition of successive punishments 
in separate proceedings. 
 
 
26
 
To summarize the holdings of the Halper-Austin-Kurth Ranch trilogy, in 
Halper the Supreme Court held that "civil" damage assessments can cross a 
line beyond which the assessments become nonremedial and a punishment 
for double jeopardy purposes; in Austin the court held that "civil" forfeitures 
can cross a line beyond which that sanction becomes nonremedial and a 
punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes; and in Kurth Ranch the court 
held that "civil" taxes can cross a line beyond which they lose their character 
as true taxes and become a punishment for double jeopardy purposes.  2   
 
We proceed in accordance with established double jeopardy principles 
to analyze Ohio’s statutory administrative license suspension framework to 
determine (1) whether an administrative license suspension and a criminal 
DUI prosecution constitute “multiple prosecutions,” (2) whether an ALS and 
a criminal prosecution for driving under the influence of intoxicants constitute 
separate proceedings based on the same conduct, and (3) whether “multiple 
punishments” are imposed where judicial sentencing following conviction of 
 
 
27
driving while under the influence as well as a statutory license suspension 
are imposed. 
 
A 
 
"Multiple Prosecution" Analysis 
 
“The risk to which the [Double Jeopardy] Clause refers is not present 
in proceedings that are not ‘essentially criminal.’"  Breed v. Jones (1975), 
421 U.S. 519, 528, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 1785, 44 L.Ed.2d 346, 354-355.  Nor 
does the Double Jeopardy Clause preclude criminal prosecution based on 
the fact that civil administrative proceedings based on the same conduct 
have previously been initiated.  Helvering, supra;  Ward, supra;  United 
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms (1984), 465 U.S. 354, 359, 104 S. 
Ct. 1099, 1103, 79 L.Ed.2d 361, 366; Dept. of Natural Resources v. 
Prescott, (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 65, 68, 537 N.E.2d 204, 207. See, also, 
State v. Casalicchio (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 178, 569 N.E.2d 916; 3 LaFave & 
Israel, Criminal Procedure, (1984), 61-62, Section 24.1(b).   
 
 
28
 
Jeopardy 
attaches, 
so 
as 
to 
preclude 
subsequent criminal 
proceedings, at different points in time depending on the nature of the 
proceeding in question.  Where a criminal defendant has invoked the right to 
trial by jury, jeopardy does not attach so as to preclude subsequent criminal 
proceedings until the jury is impaneled and sworn.  Crist v. Bretz (1978), 437 
U.S. 28, 57 L. Ed. 2d 24, 98 S. Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24.  Similarly, jeopardy 
does not attach in a criminal bench trial until the court begins to hear 
evidence.  Serfass v. United States (1975), 420 U.S. 377, 95 S. Ct. 1055, 43 
L.Ed.2d 265.  In other  situations, jeopardy based on having undergone an 
initial criminal trial attaches after acquittal or conviction.  Brown v. Ohio 
(1977), 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187, 194.   
 
In sum, insofar as the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes successive 
criminal prosecutions, the proscription is against a second criminal trial after 
jeopardy has attached in a first criminal trial. 
 
We do not read the Halper-Austin-Kurth Ranch trilogy as altering these 
well-settled principles, nor do we believe that an administrative license 
 
 
29
suspension constitutes a proceeding to which jeopardy attaches so as to 
preclude subsequent criminal prosecution for drunk driving.   
 
Criminal prosecution after an immediate ALS does not result in the 
defendant being subjected to a second "trial," because he has not 
undergone a first "trial.”  The immediate deprivation of a driver's license 
through an automatic license suspension as provided by R.C. 4511.191 is 
accomplished through administrative proceedings of a summary nature 
conducted by the arresting law enforcement officer.  It does not result in 
either a "conviction" or an "acquittal,” nor can it reasonably be construed as 
having subjected the motorist to the stresses, embarrassment, and expense 
associated with a criminal trial.  Cf. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. 
(1977), 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S. Ct. 1349, 1353, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642, 649, 
quoting Green v. United States (1957), 355 U.S. 184, 187-188, 78 S. Ct. 
221, 223, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199, 204.  The administrative suspension of one’s 
driver’s license is simply not the type of proceeding to which double jeopardy 
protection attaches so as to preclude a subsequent criminal prosecution.  
 
 
30
Accord State v. Toyomura (1995), 80 Hawaii 8, ___, 904 P.2d 893, 901, 
907-908 (A proceeding similar in nature to an ALS appeal "does not bar a 
subsequent criminal prosecution, whether the *** proceeding ‘ended in [the 
motorist's] favor' or resulted in an ‘acquittal.'"); State v. Jones (1995), 340 
Md. 235, 242, 666 A.2d 128, 131 ("since neither party contends that the 
administrative suspension of Jones's license constituted a ‘prosecution,' the 
imposition of criminal sanctions against Jones for driving while intoxicated 
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause only if it constitutes a second 
punishment."); Taylor v. Sherrill (1991), 169 Ariz. 335, 819 P.2d 921, (civil 
traffic infraction proceedings did not bar subsequent criminal prosecution); 
Purcell v. United States (D.C. App. 1991), 594 A.2d 527.  See, also, LaFave 
& Israel,  supra, at Section 24.1(b).    
   
We agree with the analyses and conclusions of those courts.  Double 
jeopardy prohibitions do not preclude the state from trying a defendant 
criminally for violation of R.C. 4511.19 after an administrative license 
 
 
31
suspension imposed pursuant to R.C. 4511.191. The state retains its right to 
seek criminal conviction through criminal prosecution.  
  
Our conclusion is supported by the United States Supreme Court’s 
ultimate disposition of Halper.  Although recognizing that prior criminal 
actions had resulted in convictions, the Halper court found no fault with the 
initiation of subsequent civil proceedings or with the imposition of both civil 
and criminal sanctions.  Rather, the court remanded the cause for further 
proceedings to assess a civil sanction which did not "cross the line" to 
punishment.  Similarly, in Austin, the court acknowledged the legitimacy of 
civil forfeiture proceedings brought subsequent to a prior criminal conviction 
obtained in state court, and remanded the case for lower court analysis as to 
whether punitive fines imposed in the civil proceedings were excessive, 
thereby violating the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  
Halper and its progeny are instructive not regarding the prohibition of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause against multiple prosecutions, but rather as to its 
prohibition against multiple punishments.  As one commentator has noted:  
 
 
32
 
"[U]nder the Supreme Court's holding in Halper, the government is 
entitled to convict and punish an individual in a criminal prosecution and also 
impose a penalty upon her in a separate civil proceeding, even though both 
sanctions are based upon the same conduct. ***  [I]f a civil penalty that 
constitutes ‘punishment' for double jeopardy purposes is held to bar the 
government from subsequently prosecuting the individual criminally for the 
same conduct, the government will be deprived of the opportunity to obtain a 
criminal conviction and to impose the full range of permissible sanctions, 
both criminal and civil, upon the individual.  Such a result appears to be 
inconsistent with Halper."  Rudstein, Civil Penalties and Multiple Punishment 
Under the Double Jeopardy Clause: Some Unanswered Questions (1993), 
46 Okla.L.Rev. 587, 602-603. 
 
We therefore hold that, where an administrative license suspension 
occurs at the time of arrest, subsequent motions to dismiss criminal DUI 
proceedings based on double jeopardy principles should be overruled. The 
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
 
 
33
Constitution and Section 10, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution do not 
preclude criminal prosecution and trial of motorists for driving in violation of 
R.C. 4511.19 based upon, and subsequent to, the imposition of an 
administrative license suspension pursuant to R.C. 4511.191. 
B 
 
"Separate Proceedings" Analysis 
 
The Double Jeopardy Clause affords protection not only from multiple 
prosecutions, but also from imposition of multiple punishments in separate 
and successive proceedings.   If pursued in a single proceeding, however, 
multiple punishment may constitutionally be imposed, and the state may 
obtain the full range of both civil and criminal penalties. Kurth Ranch, 511 
U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1945, 128 L.Ed.2d at 778; Halper, 490 U.S. at 450, 
109 S.Ct. at 1903, 104 L.Ed.2d at 503.  The state argues that the double 
jeopardy arguments made by the motorists before us should be resolved 
against them in that an ALS and a criminal prosecution occur in the  same, 
rather than separate, proceedings.  The state contends that it is irrelevant 
 
 
34
whether an ALS constitutes “punishment,” as subsequent criminal 
punishment could nevertheless be imposed, because it is imposed in the 
same proceeding.  We do not agree. 
 
By the express terms of R.C. 4511.191, an immediate and automatic 
license suspension is accomplished through “administrative proceedings” of 
a summary nature, i.e., the arresting officer, acting as the agent of the BMV, 
demands and confiscates the license "on the spot."  These proceedings are 
not conducted in the criminal court which thereafter determines matters of 
criminal guilt or innocence of the DUI charge.  Rather, these proceedings 
are conducted initially by an arresting officer at public roadsides or in police 
stations, and processed thereafter not in any judicial forum, but within the 
bureaucracy of the BMV.  They are intended to remove from the highway 
those motorists who are a threat to themselves and to others, as determined 
by their refusal to expose themselves to a test for alcohol content, or as 
indicated by their tested alcohol level.  By law, the suspension of the driver's 
 
 
35
license becomes an administrative fait accompli at the time the license is 
physically seized by the officer. 
 
The fact that the General Assembly has provided an opportunity for a 
post-suspension administrative appeal of the ALS in the court in which the 
DUI charges are filed does not change this conclusion.  Although the 
administrative appeal of the ALS may (but need not) be presided over by the 
same judicial officer as presides over the criminal DUI case, that 
circumstance does not consolidate the administrative license suspension 
and the DUI prosecution into the "same proceeding" for double jeopardy 
purposes.   
 
 Both the Third and the Seventh District Courts of Appeals held in the 
causes sub judice that the ALS and the criminal proceedings take place 
separately for double jeopardy purposes.  We concur in their analyses of this 
issue.  We hold that an ALS imposed pursuant to R.C. 4511.191, and a 
criminal DUI prosecution for violation of R.C. 4511.19 arising out of the 
same arrest constitute separate proceedings for double jeopardy purposes. 
 
 
36
 
C 
 
"Multiple Punishment" Analysis 
 
Because we hold (1) that the state may criminally prosecute DUI 
charges subsequent to an ALS, and (2) that the administrative license 
suspension is imposed in proceedings separate from the criminal 
prosecution, the Double Jeopardy Clause is applicable in Ohio ALS cases, if 
at all, based on the third prohibition described in Halper, i.e. the prohibition 
against multiple punishments for the same offense.   
 
We first determine that an administrative license suspension, whether 
based on a test failure or a test refusal, is a sanction based on the same 
offense or conduct as is subsequent prosecution of a charge of violating 
R.C. 4511.19, i.e., driving while intoxicated.   
 
We reject the argument that a refusal ALS is based on a different 
offense from that at issue in a subsequent DUI prosecution alleging violation 
of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1).  Whether a driver ultimately is charged with R.C. 
4511.19 (A)(1) (which requires proof of impairment) or 4511.19(A)(2), (3), or 
 
 
37
(4) (which require proof of driving with blood-, breath-, or urine-alcohol 
content higher than allowed by law), the conduct or offense that all 
administrative license suspensions and all R.C. 4511.19 prosecutions are 
intended to combat is drunken driving.   
 
A person arrested for DUI may be proved guilty of criminal drunken 
driving in either of two ways: he may be convicted based upon proof that his 
driving had become actually impaired as demonstrated by his conduct, or he 
may be convicted simply upon introduction of chemical test failures.  R.C. 
4511.19(A).   Where an arrestee refuses to take a chemical test, the state's 
prosecution may hinge solely on the testimony of the arresting officer or 
other witnesses, thereby limiting the range of means by which the state may 
obtain an conviction.    
 
However, the act of refusing a chemical test for alcohol, standing 
alone, does not constitute a criminal "offense" of any kind.  Ohio police 
officers are not statutorily authorized to randomly demand chemical alcohol 
testing of Ohio drivers in the absence of an arrest for DUI, and there is no 
 
 
38
criminal charge which can be lodged for the act of refusing a chemical test.  
Nor does R.C. 4511.191 authorize imposition of an ALS based solely on a 
driver's refusal to take a chemical test.  Rather, the implied consent statute 
authorizes a police officer to ask a driver to undergo a chemical test for 
alcohol only where the officer has first determined that probable cause 
exists for arrest for the offense of driving while intoxicated.    
 
Were it the refusal itself which constituted the conduct for which an 
ALS is imposed, there would be no logical justification for the statute to 
authorize termination of a refusal ALS upon the entry of a guilty or not 
contest plea to DUI.  Yet R.C. 4511.191(K) provides for such a termination 
"if the offense for which the plea is entered arose from the same incident 
that led to the suspension or denial," i.e., a valid, probable cause arrest for 
DUI.  (Emphasis added.)    
 
In short, an R. C. 4511.191 administrative license suspension is 
inextricably intertwined with, and dependent upon, an arrest for violation of 
Ohio’s DUI statute, R.C. 4511.19.  This conclusion results regardless of 
 
 
39
whether the ALS was issued in connection with a test refusal, or in 
connection with a test failure.  We conclude that both an administrative 
license suspension and criminal punishments imposed in consequence of a 
DUI conviction are imposed based on the same conduct or offense,  i.e., 
driving while intoxicated.   See, generally, Kravitz, Ohio’s Administrative 
License Suspension: A Double Jeopardy and Due Process Analysis(1996), 
29  Akron Law Review 123. 
 
Pursuant to Halper and its progeny, we therefore must determine 
whether an ALS constitutes a first "punishment" for double jeopardy 
purposes, so as to preclude imposition of subsequent criminal punishment 
for violation of Ohio's DUI law, or conversely, may "fairly be characterized as 
remedial."  Halper, supra, at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502. 
 
This court has historically and repeatedly characterized driver's license 
suspensions imposed pursuant to Ohio's implied consent statutes as being 
civil in nature and remedial in purpose.  State v. Starnes (1970), 21 Ohio 
St.2d 38, 50 O.O.2d 84, 254 N.E.2d 675; Hoban v. Rice (1971), 25 Ohio 
 
 
40
St.2d 111, 54 O.O.3d 254, 267 N.E.2d 311;  Andrews v. Turner (1977), 52 
Ohio St.2d 31, 6 O.O.3d 149, 368 N.E.2d 1253.  Our prior law is thus 
consistent with that in the overwhelming majority of states. See Luk v. 
Commonwealth (1995), 421 Mass. 415, 425, 658 N.E.2d 664, 671-672, at 
fn. 16 (containing a lengthy compilation of recent ALS double-jeopardy 
cases finding administrative license suspensions to be non-punitive and 
remedial in purpose).  See, also, e.g., State v. Savard (Me. 1995), 659 A.2d 
1265; State v. Maryland (1995), 666 A.2d 128, 340 Md. 235; State v. 
Talavera (1995), 127 Idaho 700, 905 P.2d 633.  Similarly, the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that states possess a compelling interest in 
promptly removing drunken drivers from the road in order to protect public 
safety.  Mackey v. Montrym (1978) 443 U.S. 1, 17-18, 61 L.Ed.2d 321, 99 
S.Ct. 2612, 2620-2621, 61 L.Ed.2d 321, 334. 
 
Nevertheless, we remain cognizant of the underlying theme of Halper-
Austin-Kurth Ranch that sanctions which may initially be justified as remedial 
can simply go too far, to the point that they must be deemed "punishment" 
 
 
41
for double jeopardy purposes.  Our precedent, as well as that of the majority 
of other states, supports the conclusion that administrative license 
suspensions are, at least in their initial application, remedial in purpose and 
thus do not ab initio constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.  
Short-term suspensions of a reasonable duration of time may “fairly be 
characterized as remedial” within the  double jeopardy framework 
established by Halper.  Such a suspension serves the remedial purpose of 
providing interim protection of the public during the period of time required to 
obtain full and fair adjudication of the driver’s guilt or innocence of criminal 
drunk driving.   
 
However, the 1993 amendments to R.C. 4511.191 extended the 
duration of administrative license suspensions in particular cases beyond 
the time within which disposition of an underlying criminal DUI charge could 
reasonably be expected.  For example,  the statute provides for an ALS to 
continue beyond a “not guilty” adjudication on the criminal charge in cases 
where a suspension is imposed based upon refusal to submit to a chemical 
 
 
42
test upon the request of an officer.  In such cases, "any subsequent finding 
that the person is not guilty of the [DUI] charge *** does not terminate or 
otherwise affect the suspension."  R.C. 4511.191(H)(2).  Similarly, a motorist 
arrested for DUI who "fails" a chemical test, but later pleads not guilty to the 
DUI charge, but who is nevertheless convicted, is not entitled to termination 
of the ALS.  In contrast, conviction subsequent to a guilty or no contest plea 
does entitle the defendant to termination of the ALS.  See R.C. 
4511.191(G)(1) read in pari materia with R.C. 4511.191(H)(2) and (K).  
These aspects of R.C. 4511.191 weigh in favor of a conclusion that, while 
the statute in its initial application serves the goal of remediation, it may be 
applied so as to primarily serve goals of punishment. 
 
Our interpretation of Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch causes us to 
conclude that R.C. 4511.191 may, in its application to particular cases, 
"cross the line" and become excessive in relation to the legitimate 
nonpunitive, remedial purpose of removing dangerous drivers from the 
public highways.  We observe that an arrest for DUI does not require the 
 
 
43
conclusion that continued driving by an arrestee, upon obtaining sobriety, 
constitutes a threat to highway safety.  Nevertheless, the General Assembly 
has determined that error, if any, in the application of such a presumption as 
to arrestees must be made on the side of removing potentially dangerous 
drivers from the highways.  A short-term automatic administrative license 
suspension legitimately serves that remedial goal.  However, the need for 
administrative remedial suspension ends at the point where a criminal 
conviction of drunk driving is obtained, at which time a court has authority to 
judicially impose a license suspension in accordance with law and the 
individual circumstances of the defendant before it.  R.C. 4507.16.   
 
We have reviewed numerous cases from other jurisdictions in which 
defendants have challenged drunk driving prosecutions on double jeopardy 
grounds subsequent to administrative license suspension.  Those 
jurisdictions are nearly uniform in finding the imposed suspensions before 
them to be “remedial” in nature, so as to satisfy a Halper double-jeopardy 
analysis. However, our review does not disclose a case in which an 
 
 
44
administrative license suspension statute imposing sanctions as severe as 
R.C. 4511.191 has withstood a double-jeopardy “punishment” analysis.  
Rather in the cases we have reviewed,3 the statutes under consideration 
have authorized maximum suspension periods of significantly shorter 
duration than does R.C. 4511.191, generally not exceeding a maximum 
ALS period of one year. 
 
In contrast, R.C. 4511.191 authorizes administrative license 
suspensions for as long as five years, while failing to provide for mandatory 
rehabilitative training for offenders, and, in some circumstances, 
irrespective of the ultimate determination of the driver’s guilt or innocence 
of the underlying criminal DUI charge.  
 
We conclude that an automatic and immediate administrative license 
suspension "crosses the line," transforming an initially remedial license 
suspension into a punishment for double jeopardy purposes, at the point of 
criminal sentencing after a DUI conviction for violation of R.C. 4511.19.  At 
that point, continued recognition or enforcement of the ALS would result in 
 
 
45
cumulative "punishment" being imposed upon the criminal offender, which is 
precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and the 
Ohio Constitutions.   
 
Accordingly, a sentencing court has judicial power pursuant to 
Sections 1 and 4, Article IV of the Ohio Constitution to order the termination 
of an administrative license suspension at the time of sentencing, as 
continuation of the ALS would result in unconstitutional application of R.C. 
4511.191 to the criminal offender.  To "fairly be characterized as remedial" 
rather than punishment for double jeopardy purposes, an ALS must 
terminate upon sentencing for violation of R.C. 4511.191, if the ALS has not 
already expired by operation of law. 
 
Some defendants argue that R.C. 4511.191 appears to have been 
enacted, at least in part, to "make an example" of arrested drivers and to 
deter others from driving while drunk.  Assuming the validity of the argument, 
it does not follow that every ALS imposed pursuant to R.C. 4511.191 
constitutes a "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.  In Kurth Ranch 
 
 
46
the court noted that "while a high tax rate and deterrent purpose lend 
support to the characterization of the drug tax as punishment, these 
features, in and of themselves do not necessarily render the tax punitive."  
(Emphasis added.)  Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1947, 128 
L.Ed.2d at 779.   In addition, we concur with Justice Kennedy's admonition in 
Halper that courts should not be required to conduct a "broad inquiry into the 
subjective purposes that may be thought to lie behind a given judicial 
proceeding."  Id., 490 U.S. at 453, 109 S.Ct. at 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d at 504 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  As noted by Justice Kennedy, "[s]uch an inquiry 
would be amorphous and speculative, and would mire the courts in the 
quagmire of differentiating among the multiple purposes that underlie every 
proceeding, whether it be civil or criminal in name."  Id. at 453, 109 S.Ct. at 
1904, 104 L.Ed.2d at 505. 
 
We therefore hold that an administrative license suspension ceases to 
be remedial and becomes punitive in nature to the extent it is deemed to 
continue subsequent to conviction and sentencing for violation of R.C. 
 
 
47
4511.19.   Because an ALS loses its remedial character upon judicial 
adjudication of guilt and sentencing for the DUI charge, the Double Jeopardy 
Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions preclude continued 
recognition of an ALS following judicial imposition of criminal penalties. 
 
II 
 
Dispositions 
 
Gustafson has not yet stood criminal trial to adjudicate the DUI charge 
against him, and our conclusion that the lower court erred in precluding 
further prosecution requires a reversal and remand of his case for further 
proceedings to resolve the criminal charge of violation of R.C. 4511.19.   
 
Upon remand, the ultimate disposition of Gustafson’s criminal case is 
a matter for determination in the first instance by the trial court.  However, 
this court takes judicial notice of the fact that numerous cases presenting 
double jeopardy challenges similar to Gustafson’s are currently pending in 
 
 
48
the courts of Ohio.  We therefore include several additional observations 
which may prove useful to trial courts in determining those cases. 
 
On remand, Gustafson presumably will be adjudicated either “guilty” or 
“not guilty” of the criminal DUI charge against him.  Presumably Gustafson’s 
ninety-day ALS has expired by its own terms, as more than two years have 
passed since his ALS was imposed.  If Gustafson is found guilty of the DUI 
charge, the trial court will thus not likely be called upon to order termination 
of an ALS.  The question may instead arise whether Gustafson’s completion 
of the full ninety-day suspension imposed pursuant to R.C. 4511.191 
requires a different resolution of his double jeopardy challenge.  
 
We have concluded that a short-term administrative license 
suspension may “fairly be characterized as remedial” in purpose insofar as it 
provides for interim protection of the public pending judicial determination of 
the driver’s guilt or innocence of drunk driving.  A first-time defendant 
charged with that crime has a statutory right to obtain a speedy trial of the 
DUI charge within ninety days.  R.C.  2945.71 et seq.   In many cases, as in 
 
 
49
Gustafson’s case, expiration of an administrative license suspension before 
trial will occur, if at all, as a result of the defendant’s own waiver of speedy 
trial protections.  In such a situation, a trial court may well find that the 
administrative license suspension continued to be of a remedial nature 
throughout its full statutory duration.  
 
If, alternatively, Gustafson is adjudicated not guilty of the DUI charge, 
his double jeopardy arguments necessarily fail.  A “not guilty” adjudication 
precludes imposition of criminal punishment.  A court need not engage in a 
Halper analysis to determine whether a sanction was “remedial” or 
constitutes “punishment” when a single sanction has been imposed.  In such 
a circumstance, double jeopardy considerations do not arise. 
 
The remaining cases pending before this court are cases in which DUI 
prosecutions have proceeded to judgment of conviction and sentencing 
following the overruling of motions to dismiss the DUI charges.  We thus are 
called upon to determine whether the decisions of the lower courts in those 
cases are consistent with our holdings herein.  
 
 
50
 
We first examine the cases of Sally Bayman and Kenneth Roth, both 
of whom refused chemical testing at the time of arrest, and later entered 
pleas of no contest to the DUI charges filed against them.  Having 
determined that the imposition of administrative license suspensions at the 
time of their arrests did not justify dismissal of the criminal proceedings 
against them based on the Double Jeopardy Clause, we find that the 
express terms of R.C. 4511.191 mandate the disposition of their appeals.  
R.C. 4511.191(K) provides: 
 
"A suspension of the driver's *** license *** for refusal to submit to a 
chemical test to determine the alcohol, drug, or alcohol and drug content of 
the person's blood, breath, or urine pursuant to division (E) of this section, 
shall be terminated by the registrar upon receipt of notice of *** conviction 
after entering a plea of no contest under Criminal Rule 11 to, operating a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, *** if the offense for which the 
plea is entered arose from the same incident that led to the suspension or 
denial." 
 
 
51
 
Because the statute expressly authorizes termination of an ALS upon 
a chemical-test refusal followed by a "no contest" plea, Bayman and Roth's 
causes are affirmed for the reasons discussed herein and remanded, with 
instructions that the trial court issue an order to BMV to terminate their 
respective ALSs, retroactive to the date of sentencing on the DUI 
convictions.   
 
We affirm the judgments of the lower court as to appellants Miller, 
Brown and Smith, who consented to breath-alcohol testing, but failed the 
chemical test.  Upon entry of conviction and sentencing, their administrative 
license suspensions were properly ordered terminated, as at that point in 
time their ALSs ceased to be “remedial” in purpose as that term is used in 
the double-jeopardy context.  Continued recognition of each defendant's 
ALS subsequent to conviction and criminal sentencing would therefore result 
in these appellants being punished twice in separate proceedings based on 
the same conduct of drunk driving.  Thus, R.C. 4511.191 would be applied 
unconstitutionally to them. 
 
 
52
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and KARPINSKI, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs separately. 
 
PATTON and COOK, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
JOHN T. PATTON, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for WRIGHT, 
J. 
 
DIANE KARPINSKI, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for PFEIFER, 
J. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1  See 144 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1566 (effective Sept. 1, 1993); 145 Ohio 
Laws Part I, 479 (effective Sept. 1, 1993). 
 
2  Subsequent to oral argument and submission of these causes for 
our determination,  the United States Supreme Court decided United States 
v. Ursery (1996), 518 U.S.___, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed. 2d 249, 64 
U.S.L.W. 4565, 1996 WL 340815.  In Ursery, the court discussed Halper 
and its progeny, Austin, supra,  and Kurth Ranch, supra.  
 
 
53
 
In Ursery, eight members of the court agreed that, prior to Halper, 
statutory civil in rem forfeitures had not been deemed to implicate Double 
Jeopardy Clause protection, such forfeitures having historically been 
characterized as “remedial civil sanction[s], distinct from potentially punitive 
in personam civil penalties such as fines.”  Id. at ____, 116 S.Ct. at 2142, 
135 L.Ed.2d at 562.  The Ursery court rejected the contention that forfeiture 
to the government of property used in connection with criminal activities 
necessarily constitutes a punishment of the former owner for Double 
Jeopardy Clause purposes.  Although the court recognized that civil 
forfeitures are not per se exempt from the scope of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, id., at 116 S.Ct. at 2148, 135 L.Ed.2d at 569, fn. 3,  it nevertheless 
held that the civil forfeitures in the cases before it did not constitute 
punishments for double jeopardy purposes.  Id. 
 
Ursery does not control disposition of the causes before us, which do 
not involve in rem civil forfeitures, but rather administrative suspensions of 
drivers’ licenses.    It remains to be seen whether the United States 
 
 
54
Supreme Court will,  in future cases, confine application of Ursery solely to 
civil in rem forfeiture proceedings, or may, conversely, apply it more broadly, 
thereby minimizing the importance of Halper and its progeny as precedent.   
 In either event, we deem our  resolution of the causes before us to be 
independently supported by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
 
3  See Leduc v. Commonwealth (1995), 421 Mass. 433, 657 N.E.2d 
755, citing Mass. G.L.c. 90,  Section 24(1)(f); State v. Jones (1995), 340 
Md. 235, 240-241, 666 A.2d 128, 130, citing Section 16-205.1 of the 
Maryland Transportation Article; State v. Talavera (1995), 127 Idaho 700, 
___, 905 P. 2d 633, 635, citing I.C. Section 18-8002A; State ex rel. 
Schwartz v. Kennedy (1995), 120 N.M. 619, ___, 904 P.2d 1044, 1055, 
citing N.M.S.A. 1978, Section 66-8-111; State v. Mertz (1995), 258 Kan. 
745, 749, 907 P.2d 847, 851, citing K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 8-1014; Tench v. 
Commonwealth (1995), 21 Va.App. 200, 462 S.E.2d 922, citing Va. Code 
Section 46.2-391.2; Nebraska v. Hansen (1996), 249 Neb. 177, 181, 542 
 
 
55
N.W.2d 424, 428, citing Neb. R.S. Section 60-6,205(1). Cf. United States 
v. Imngren (D.C. Va. 1995), 914 F.Supp. 1326 (imposition of one-year 
suspension of driving privileges on military installation pursuant to Army 
Regulation 190-5 held to constitute “punishment” for double jeopardy 
purposes); Murphy v. Commonwealth (D.C. Va. 1995), 896 F.Supp. 577, 
583 (Driver who had been issued a seven-day suspension presented “a 
double jeopardy claim that is colorable, if not compelling.”). 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.     I concur in the 
majority’s 
comprehensive 
and 
well-reasoned 
opinion 
holding that the initiation of separate criminal 
proceedings after the imposition of an administrative 
license suspension does not violate the protections 
afforded individuals by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of 
the United States and Ohio Constitutions.  I write 
separately only to state my reasons for concurring in 
the majority opinion and to summarize what I believe to 
be some of the findings of the majority.  Further, I 
 
 
56
believe that our holding in State v. Hochhausler 
(1996), ___ Ohio St.3d ___, ___ N.E.2d ___, paragraph 
two of the syllabus, will clarify further any future 
double jeopardy or due process claims that may arise 
with respect to administrative license suspensions. 
 
The 
Fifth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution prevent an individual from twice being 
prosecuted for the same offense.  State v. Delfino 
(1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 270, 272-273, 22 OBR 443, 445, 
490 N.E.2d 884, 887.  We have also held that the 
suspension of a driver’s license pursuant to R.C. 
4511.191 is a separate administrative action unrelated 
to the criminal case in which the defendant is charged. 
 Hoban v. Rice (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 111, 116, 54 
O.O.2d 254, 257, 267 N.E.2d 311, 315, and State v. 
Starnes (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 38, 45-46, 50 O.O.2d 84, 
88, 254 N.E.2d 675, 679-680.  In addition, we have 
 
 
57
repeatedly stated that driver’s license suspension 
proceedings are civil and administrative in nature and 
are not criminal proceedings.  See, e.g.,  Andrews v. 
Turner (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 31, 36, 6 O.O.3d 149, 151, 
368 N.E.2d 1253, 1256.  Thus, none of the defendants in 
the cases before us were prosecuted as a result of 
their R.C. 4511.191 administrative license suspensions. 
 The state therefore does not implicate the Double 
Jeopardy 
Clauses 
of 
the 
United 
States 
and 
Ohio 
Constitutions by merely subjecting individuals to an 
administrative license suspension and also subjecting 
them to criminal prosecutions pursuant to R.C. 4511.19. 
 
With respect to the underlying purpose of R.C. 
4511.191, we have emphasized that the aim of the 
statute is not to punish individuals who refuse to take 
a sobriety test or punish those who test over the legal 
limit, but to protect the public.  See, e.g., Hoban, 
supra, 25 Ohio St.2d at 114, 54 O.O.2d at 256, 267 
 
 
58
N.E.2d at 314 (“R.C. 4511.191 * * * was enacted to 
protect innocent motorists and pedestrians from injury 
and death caused by irresponsible acts of unsafe 
drivers on Ohio streets and highways.  The broad 
purpose of the implied-consent statute is to clear the 
highways of and to protect the public from unsafe 
drivers.”).  Indeed, R.C. 4511.191 is remedial in 
nature. 
 
Accordingly, 
if 
proper 
protections 
are 
accorded, an administrative license suspension does not 
violate any prohibition against multiple punishments. 
 
Further, the right to drive a motor vehicle in Ohio 
is not constitutionally guaranteed.  In fact, the right 
to possess a driver’s license is not a substantial 
private interest but a state regulated privilege.  
Maumee v. Gabriel (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 518 
N.E.2d 558, 561.  Clearly, the right to operate motor 
vehicles on public roadways of this state may be 
regulated by the lawful exercise of the police power 
 
 
59
for the benefit of public safety and welfare.  In this 
regard, a sanction which involves the suspension of a 
privilege that was voluntarily granted supports a 
finding that it is “characteristically free of the 
punitive criminal element.”  Helvering v. Mitchell 
(1938), 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L.Ed. 
917, 922. 
 
Moreover, in Hochhausler, we severed the “no stay” 
provision from R.C. 4511.191(H)(1), concluding that the 
provision is unconstitutional as violative of the 
separation of powers doctrine.  Clearly, inherent 
within a court’s jurisdiction is the right to grant or 
deny stays.  The practical effect of our holding in 
Hochhausler is that during the initial appearance 
resulting from the OMVI charge, a trial court now has 
the discretion to stay (or continue) the driver’s 
license suspension pending further appeal, or pending 
the outcome of the OMVI charge.  However, to facilitate 
 
 
60
our holding in Hochhausler, and to avoid triggering a 
double jeopardy claim, the initial appearance must be 
held within five days of the individual’s arrest.  Such 
a requirement is mandated by statute.  See, e.g., R.C. 
4511.191(C)(2)(b), 
(D)(1)(a), 
(G)(2) 
and 
(H)(1), 
effective July 1, 1996.  The five-day time frame is 
crucial to a determination that a R.C. 4511.191 
administrative license suspension remains remedial and 
not punitive.  As such, any continuance of the initial 
appearance, that was not requested or waived by the 
defendant, would, in my opinion, punish the defendant 
and trigger double jeopardy protection. 
 
The ability of a trial court to stay or continue an 
administrative 
license 
suspension 
at 
the 
initial 
appearance further supports the conclusion that R.C. 
4511.191 is truly a remedial statute, rather than 
punitive in nature.  During the initial appearance, a 
trial court can make an individualized assessment and 
 
 
61
determine if a stay of the suspension is or is not 
warranted.  As one distinguished commentator has noted: 
 “Double 
jeopardy 
and 
due 
process 
arguments 
are 
seriously undermined when the decision to continue the 
ALS is based on an individualized assessment of whether 
the motorist is a threat to public safety.  Drivers 
with a history of impaired or reckless driving, or who 
have displayed other indicia of dangerousness, can be 
prohibited 
from 
driving 
until 
a 
court 
has 
the 
opportunity to hear their ALS appeal.  As to those 
drivers that present a lesser risk to public safety, a 
court can stay the ALS or tailor conditions to any 
occupational driving privileges granted.”  Kravitz, 
Ohio’s Administrative License Suspension: A Double 
Jeopardy and Due Process Analysis, 29 Akron Law Review 
(1996) 123, 201. 
 
The number of instances of individuals driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating substances 
 
 
62
continues 
to 
be 
alarming. 
 
To 
obtain 
a 
true 
understanding of the magnitude of the problem, one need 
only observe the number of OMVI cases that have flooded 
the courts in this state.  Recognizing the problem, the 
General Assembly has taken strong action to stem the 
tide.  Its efforts to improve public safety should be 
applauded.  I believe that our recent decisions in this 
area have achieved a proper balance -- protecting 
innocent motorists and pedestrians from individuals who 
chose to drink and drive, while also recognizing 
constitutional safeguards that are afforded to all 
citizens. 
 
PATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part.  I join with paragraphs one and two of the 
syllabus, but dissent from paragraphs three, four and 
five of the syllabus.  Like Justice Cook, I believe 
double jeopardy is not implicated by the ALS statute, 
but wish to add some additional thoughts. 
 
 
63
 
I agree with Justice Cook’s analysis that R.C. 
4511.191 does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause 
because the in rem forfeiture of a driver’s license is 
neither punishment nor tied to criminal behavior.  In 
my view, R.C. 4511.191 serves primarily the purpose of 
assisting the state in proving a drunk driving offense 
by enforcing a driver’s implied consent to chemical 
testing.  Viewed in this light, the refusal to take a 
chemical test is grounded on conduct wholly different 
from the drunk driving offense and therefore is not the 
same criminal activity. 
 
Just this term in Dobbins v. Ohio Bur. of Motor 
Vehicles (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 533, 537, 664 N.E.2d 
908, 911, we stated that R.C. 4511.191(C)(1) is 
“constitutional and all proceedings thereunder are 
civil in nature and solely administrative.”  This view 
comports with our long-standing precedent to that same 
effect.  See, e.g., Hoban v. Rice (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 
 
 
64
111, 54 O.O.2d 254, 267 N.E.2d 311, paragraph one of 
the syllabus; State v. Starnes (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 
38, 50 O.O.2d 84, 254 N.E.2d 675, paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
 
Driving while intoxicated and refusing to take a 
chemical test are separate actions for purposes of 
double jeopardy analysis.  The majority’s view that 
these 
separate 
actions 
are 
so 
“inextricably 
intertwined” 
as 
to 
constitute 
the 
same 
offense 
overlooks 
the 
underlying 
purpose 
of 
the 
refusal 
statute. 
 
The General Assembly instituted the ALS as a means 
of facilitating the state’s interest in proving drunk 
driving offenses; hence, the ALS simply enforces the 
driver’s implied consent to chemical testing.  This 
implied consent to chemical testing is a condition of 
securing the privilege to drive a motor vehicle.  We 
said as much in Dobbins, when we found that the implied 
 
 
65
consent statute is “‘designed to discourage any person 
from refusing to take the tests when he is arrested for 
driving while under the influence.’”  Id. at 539, 664 
N.E.2d at 912. 
 
Nearly every component of R.C. 4511.191 is geared 
to effectuate the state’s interest in proving the drunk 
driving offense.  For example, the suspensions imposed 
on drivers who refuse to take a chemical test are 
greater than those imposed for drivers who take the 
chemical test and fail.  Compare R.C. 4511.191(E)(1)(a) 
through (d) (refusing to take the test) with R.C. 
4511.191(F)(1)(a) through (d) (failing the test).  The 
statute specifically provides that a suspension for 
refusing to take the chemical test continues despite a 
not guilty verdict, while the suspension imposed for 
failing the chemical test terminates upon a not guilty 
finding.  See R.C. 4511.191(H)(2).  Finally, the only 
time a refusal suspension is terminated is if the 
 
 
66
driver either pleads guilty or no contest to the charge 
under Crim.R. 11.  See R.C. 4511.191(K).  Hence, if the 
driver belatedly lives up to the preconditions for 
obtaining a license, it obviates the state’s need to go 
forward with proof at trial.  It is therefore perfectly 
logical for the General Assembly to implement the 
statutory framework it has devised. 
 
This framework is entirely in keeping with the 
legislature’s intent to enforce the implied consent 
provisions.  The refusal to take the chemical test is 
not criminal conduct, but it is a sanction for failing 
to live up to the conditions prescribed for obtaining 
and holding a driver’s license.  We have upheld the 
implied consent statute on numerous occasions, and in 
other contexts relating to licensing, stated, “Clearly 
the 
license 
is 
a 
personal 
privilege 
subject 
to 
reasonable restrictions and revocation by the issuing 
authority.”  Ohio State Med. Bd. v. Miller (1989), 44 
 
 
67
Ohio St.3d. 136, 140, 541 N.E.2d 602, 605, citing Lap 
v. Axelrod (1983), 95 App.Div. 457, 467 N.Y. S.2d 920. 
 By imposing an administrative license suspension for 
refusing to take a chemical test, the state does no 
more than enforce a condition of obtaining a license. 
 
I also believe United States v. Ursery (1996), 518 
U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549, 1996 WL 
340815, has a far broader reach.  though Ursery limited 
its discussion to in rem forfeitures, there can be no 
doubt that decision disavows the reasoning of the 
Halper-Auston-Kurth 
Ranch 
trilogy 
utilized 
by 
the 
majority. 
 
Crucial to the majority’s analysis is the notion 
that under Halper, R.C. 4511.191 violates double 
jeopardy because its remedial aspects somehow “cross 
the line” and become punishment.  Ursery, however, put 
the Halper line of analysis to a stop.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the court, expressly rejected 
 
 
68
any application of Halper that would impose a general 
rule whereby courts could consider whether a sanction 
is punitive in character.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
labeled that discussion in Halper “dictum,” and noted 
the court’s own holding in that case did not support 
such a conclusion: 
 
“Whether a particular sanction ‘cannot fairly be 
said solely to serve a remedial purpose’ is an inquiry 
radically different from that we have traditionally 
employed 
in 
order 
to 
determine 
whether, 
as 
a 
categorical matter, a civil sanction is subject to the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  Yet nowhere in Halper does the 
Court purport to make such a sweeping change in the 
law, instead emphasizing repeatedly the narrow scope of 
the decision.  Halper, supra, at 449 [109 S.Ct. at 
1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502] (announcing rule for ‘the 
rare case’).  If the ‘general rule’ of Justice Stevens 
were applied literally, then virtually every sanction 
 
 
69
would be declared to be a punishment:  it is hard to 
imagine 
a 
sanction 
that 
has 
no 
punitive 
aspect 
whatsoever.  Justice Stevens’ interpretation of Halper 
is both contrary to the decision itself and would 
create an unworkable rule inconsistent with well-
established precedent.”  (Emphasis added in part.)  
Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2146, 135 L.Ed.2d 
at 566, fn. 2. 
 
The majority does not apply this interpretation of 
Halper, but instead tries to distinguish it by noting 
Halper involved in rem forfeiture while this case does 
not.  This is a distinction without a meaning.  The 
United States Supreme Court forcefully limited Halper, 
finding an in rem forfeiture would be subject to the 
Double Jeopardy Clause when the “‘clearest proof’” 
showed that an in rem forfeiture is “‘so punitive 
either in purpose or effect’” that it became the 
 
 
70
equivalent of a criminal proceeding.  Id. at ___ , 116 
S.Ct. at 2148, 135 L.E.2d at 569, fn. 3. 
 
There may be a punitive element to the ALS, but 
that consequence comes only as a result of enforcing 
the implied consent provisions, not as a matter of 
driving while intoxicated.  Ursery held a remedial 
sanction can carry with it an unavoidable component of 
retribution or punishment, but that fact alone is not 
sufficient to show a punitive purpose behind the 
statute.  The majority must show by the “clearest 
proof” that the license suspension is so punitive 
either in purpose or effect that it becomes criminal 
punishment.  Yet, we have consistently found the ALS 
statute is civil and remedial in purpose, a finding the 
majority reaffirms today. 
 
The majority’s view that the short suspension 
periods set forth in R.C. 4511.191 “cross the line” 
from 
remediation 
to 
punishment 
at 
the 
time 
of 
 
 
71
conviction creates a double jeopardy exception where 
the United States Supreme Court has said that none 
exists.  It should be recognized the initial ninety-day 
suspension 
period 
is 
actually 
shorter 
than 
the 
suspension periods of other states that have upheld the 
constitutionality of their suspension statutes.  See, 
e.g., Fla.Stat.Ann. Section 322.2615(1)(b)(1.a.) (one-
year 
suspension 
for 
first 
refusal); 
Mass.Ann.Laws 
Chapter 90, Section 24(1)(f)(1) (at least one-hundred-
twenty-day suspension, but not more than one year for 
first 
refusal); 
Ariz.Rev.Stat. 
Section 
28-691(B) 
(twelve-month 
suspension 
for 
first 
refusal); 
Ind.Ann.Code 
Section 
9-30-6-9(a)(1) 
(one-year 
suspension for first refusal). 
 
Of 
course, 
the 
suspension 
periods 
in 
R.C. 
4511.191(E)(1)(a) through (d) increase dramatically for 
drivers with prior refusals (topping out at five years 
for a third refusal to consent to testing within five 
 
 
72
years), but those increased suspension periods are 
directly related to the number of prior refusals.  As 
the majority recognizes, Ohio police are not authorized 
to demand chemical testing absent probable cause to 
believe the driver is intoxicated.  Probable cause to 
believe 
a 
driver 
is 
operating 
a 
vehicle 
while 
intoxicated arises from readily discernable indicia 
under the totality of the circumstances.  See, e.g., 
State v. Bycznski (1994), 98 Ohio App.3d 625, 649 
N.E.2d 285, (bloodshot eyes and slurred speech); 
Wickliffe v. Gutauckas (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 224, 607 
N.E.2d 54 (collecting cases).  Therefore, repeated 
refusals to take requested chemical tests demonstrate a 
level of recidivism meriting the additionally lengthy 
suspension periods imposed by the General Assembly. 
 
Finally, even if the majority correctly uses Halper 
as the basis of its double jeopardy analysis, R.C. 
4511.191 would still pass muster as a matter of 
 
 
73
constitutional law.  The courts have repeatedly upheld 
remedial sanctions imposed following a related criminal 
conviction.  For example, in State ex rel. Celebrezze 
v. Hughes (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 273, 569 N.E.2d 1059, 
this court relied on Halper and held in the syllabus 
that R.C. 1345.07(D) and 4549.48(B) were intended to 
impose civil penalties without regard to the procedural 
protections and restrictions available in criminal 
prosecutions. 
 
Under somewhat closer facts, the courts have held 
that 
a 
prisoner’s 
forty-five-day 
disciplinary 
segregation following a conviction for institutional 
assault 
sufficiently 
related 
to 
the 
government’s 
remedial interest in maintaining prison order that it 
did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes.  See, e.g., United States v. Hernadez-Fundora 
(C.A.2, 1995), 58 F.3d 802; see, also, State v. Keller 
 
 
74
(1976), 52 Ohio App.2d 217, 6 O.O.3d 235, 369 N.E.2d 
798. 
 
And, in United States v. Stoller (C.A.1, 1996), 78 
F.3d 710, the court found an administrative debarment 
imposed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
did not constitute a punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes so as to bar a subsequent criminal prosecution 
under federal banking laws.  See, also, United States 
v. Hudson (C.A.10, 1994), 14 F.3d 536 (same); cf. 
Manoccio v. Kusserow (C.A.11, 1992), 961 F.2d 1539 
(physician’s five-year debarment from federal Medicare 
program not barred by physician’s prior conviction on 
Medicare fraud stemming from the same events). 
 
The General Assembly intended R.C. 4511.191 to have 
a 
strong 
bite, 
but 
today’s 
decision, 
read 
in 
conjunction with State v. Hochhausler (1996), ___ Ohio 
St.3d ___, ___ N.E.2d ___, extracts the teeth from the 
statute. 
 
 
75
 
By enacting the “no stay” provisions of R.C. 
4511.191(H)(1), the General Assembly intended to force 
courts to impose consistently the mandated license 
suspensions.  Severing the “no stay” provision gives 
trial courts unlimited discretion to allow drunk 
drivers back on the highways while they await the 
protracted delays occasioned by their appeals as they 
wind their way through the judicial system. 
 
R.C. 
4511.191(H)(1) 
does 
not 
grant 
courts 
discretion to refuse to impose a suspension -- if the 
state establishes the four criteria set forth in R.C. 
4511.191(H)(1), the suspension must be imposed, in 
increasing severity to the number of prior refusals to 
take the test.  Nevertheless, lower courts can now 
exercise unlimited discretion to stay execution of the 
mandatory suspension.  The logical conclusion is that a 
stay could be entered pending either the outcome of the 
criminal charge or further appeal of the license 
 
 
76
suspension.  That discretion would be unfettered 
because the state would have no opportunity to appeal 
the stay, there being no final order (unlike the 
defendant 
appealing 
a 
license 
suspension). 
 
Cf. 
Bellaire City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Paxton (1979), 59 
Ohio St.2d 65, 391 N.E.2d 1021, syllabus. 
 
The obvious question, then, is why would a driver 
take the breath test?  Suppose a driver receives an ALS 
for a third refusal to take a test in the previous five 
years.  The driver appeals the suspension at an initial 
hearing held one day following the arrest.  The trial 
court upholds the ALS, but stays execution of the ALS 
pending the outcome of the drunk driving charge.  
Regardless of the outcome of that drunk driving charge, 
the ALS now terminates upon either acquittal or 
judgment of conviction.  As a practical matter, the 
driver has suffered only a one-day loss in driving 
privileges, a minor inconvenience, in exchange for 
 
 
77
depriving the state of conclusive proof from the 
results of a chemical test. 
 
This result is contrary to the obvious intent and 
sound policy which prompted the General Assembly to 
enact the statute.  If R.C. 4511.191 is to have any 
meaningful remedial purpose, the statute must be upheld 
in 
its 
entirety. 
 
I 
would 
find 
R.C. 
4511.191 
constitutional 
in 
all 
respects; 
therefore, 
I 
respectfully dissent.4 
 
COOK, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
 
                     
4  
The court’s holding today may have other unintended 
ramifications.  The governing bodies of most professional 
organizations are permitted to discipline members who commit 
felonies or crimes by suspending or revoking those members’ 
professional licenses.  See, e.g., R.C. 4701.16 (accountants); 
R.C. 4731.22(B) (physicians).  Pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A)(3), 
this court has upheld the suspension or disbarment of attorneys 
for criminal convictions.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Mullen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 295, 652 N.E.2d 978; Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Ostheimer (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 304, 649 N.E.2d 1217. 
 Presumably, a license to practice one’s livelihood would be 
considered at least as important as a license to drive, so the 
court’s holding today raises serious double jeopardy implications 
with such suspensions or disbarments. 
 
 
 
78
 
Cook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. I concur in paragraphs one and two of the 
syllabus. 
 
However, 
I 
respectfully 
dissent 
from 
paragraphs three, four and five.   I disagree with the 
majority’s 
conclusion 
that 
the 
Halper-Austin-Kurth 
Ranch “trilogy” mandates a finding that the ALS 
constitutes 
punishment. 
The 
recent 
United 
States 
Supreme Court pronouncement in United States v. Ursery 
(1996), 518 U.S. __, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549, 
64 USLW 4565, so limits the applicability of those 
cases to their individual facts as to render discussion 
of them as a group inapposite.     
 
Unless the ALS sanction is intended as punishment, 
such that the proceeding is essentially criminal in 
character, 
the 
Double 
Jeopardy 
Clause 
is 
not 
applicable. United States v. One Assortment of 89 
Firearms (1984), 465 U.S. 354, 362, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 
1105, 79 L.Ed.2d 361, 368.  In Ursery, the Supreme 
 
 
79
Court employed the two-part analysis articulated in 89 
Firearms, supra, to determine whether an in rem civil 
forfeiture 
proceeding 
constituted 
punishment. 
518 
U.S.at __, 116 S.Ct. at 2146-2148, 135 L.Ed.2d at 566-
569, 64 USLW at 4571.  In reaching its conclusion, the 
Ursery court rejected the notion that the Halper-
Austin-Kurth Ranch trilogy accomplished a “radical 
jurisprudential shift” in double jeopardy analysis. Id. 
at __, 116 S.Ct. at 2143-2144, 135 L.Ed.2d at 562-564, 
64 USLW at 4569.  Rather, the court limited application 
of the “trilogy” to the facts presented in them.  For 
example, the court limited the Halper proportionality 
test to in personam civil penalties, the Kurth Ranch 
analysis to tax proceedings, and Austin to civil 
forfeitures under the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 
__, 116 S.Ct. at 2146-2148, 135 L.Ed.2d at 566-569, 64 
USLW at 4571.   The court stressed that “[n]one of 
those cases dealt with the subject of this case: in rem 
 
 
80
civil forfeitures for purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.” Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2147, 135 L.Ed.2d at 
568. 
 
Clearly, the ALS is not a tax proceeding; nor does 
Gustafson challenge the ALS under the Excessive Fines 
Clause.  Thus, we must consider whether the ALS is more 
in the nature of an in rem civil forfeiture or an in 
personam 
civil 
penalty 
to 
determine 
the 
proper 
punishment analysis to apply in this case.  
 
In discussing the differences between in rem civil 
forfeitures and in personam civil penalties, the Ursery 
court stated:  
 
“[W]e have distinguished civil penalties such as 
fines from civil forfeiture proceedings that are in 
rem.  While a ‘civil action to recover. . . penalties, 
is punitive in character,’ and much like a criminal 
prosecution in that ‘it is the wrongdoer in person who 
is proceeded against . . .and punished,’ in an in rem 
 
 
81
forfeiture proceeding, ‘it is the property which is 
proceeded against, and by resort to a legal fiction, 
held guilty and condemned.’ 
 
“* * * Civil penalties are designed as a rough form 
of ‘liquidated damages’ for the harms suffered by the 
Government as a result of a defendant’s conduct. * * * 
Civil forfeitures, in contrast to civil penalties, are 
designed 
to 
do 
more 
than 
simply 
compensate 
the 
Government.  Forfeitures serve a variety of purposes, 
but are designed primarily to confiscate property used 
in violation of the law, and to require disgorgement of 
the fruits of illegal conduct.” Id. at ___ - ___, 116 
S.Ct. at 2144-2145, 135 L.Ed.2d at 565, 64 USLW at 
4570. 
 
A driver’s license is a property right, and not a 
liberty interest. See State v. Williams (1996), __ Ohio 
St.3d __, __ N.E.2d __; see, also, Doyle v. Ohio Bur. 
of Motor Vehicles (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 46, 554 N.E.2d 
 
 
82
97, paragraph two of the syllabus (“In Ohio, a license 
to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege, and not an 
absolute property right.”).  The ALS also serves a 
variety of purposes, but is designed primarily to 
remove 
intoxicated 
drivers 
from 
the 
highways 
by 
temporarily confiscating the licenses of those drivers 
when they have been used to violate the law. See 
Dobbins v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1996), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 533, 539, 664 N.E.2d 908, 912.    For these 
reasons, I conclude that the ALS is more in the nature 
of an in rem civil forfeiture rather than an in 
personam civil penalty and, accordingly, apply the 89 
Firearms two-part analysis to determine whether the ALS 
is civil and remedial or criminal and punitive in 
nature. 
 
Under the first prong of the 89 Firearms test, this 
court should ask whether the General Assembly intended 
the proceedings under R.C. 4511.191 to be criminal or 
 
 
83
civil. 465 U.S. at 362, 104 S.Ct. at 1105, 79 L.Ed.2d 
at 368. The General Assembly’s intent is most clearly 
demonstrated 
by 
the 
procedural 
mechanisms 
it 
established to enforce the ALS.  See Ursery, 518 U.S. 
at ___ - ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2146-2148, 135 L.Ed.2d at 
566-569, 64 USLW at 4571.  As noted by the majority, 
the 
ALS 
is 
accomplished 
through 
“administrative 
proceedings” of a summary nature.  The proceedings are 
not conducted in the criminal court, but rather are 
conducted initially by the arresting officer and 
processed 
within 
the 
bureaucracy 
of 
the 
BMV.  
Thereafter, a judicial officer presides over the 
administrative appeal of the ALS.  At the appeal, the 
defendant 
carries 
the 
burden 
of 
proving 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence that one of the specified 
conditions 
for 
the 
ALS 
has 
not 
been met. R.C. 
4511.191(H)(2). 
 
By 
creating 
these 
distinctly 
administrative and civil proceedings to enforce the 
 
 
84
ALS, the General Assembly has indicated that it 
intended a civil and not a criminal sanction. 
 
Under the second part of the 89 Firearms test, a 
court considers whether the proceedings are so punitive 
in fact as to “persuade us that the forfeiture 
proceeding[s] may not legitimately be viewed as civil 
in nature,” despite the General Assembly’s intent. 465 
U.S. at 366, 104 S.Ct. at 1107, 79 L.Ed.2d at 371.  
“‘“Only the clearest proof”’ that the purpose and 
effect of [the ALS] are punitive will suffice to 
override [the General Assembly’s] manifest preference 
for a civil sanction. * * * ” (Citations omitted.) Id. 
at 365, 104 S.Ct. at 1106, 79 L.Ed.2d at 370.  In 
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963), 372 U.S. 144, 168-
169, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-568, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, 661, the 
court set forth a list of considerations that are 
helpful in making this determination, although this 
list is “neither exhaustive nor dispositive.” United 
 
 
85
States v. Ward (1980), 448 U.S. 242, 249, 100 S.Ct. 
2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742, 750.5 
 
As was the case in Ursery, most significant among 
the considerations is that despite having certain 
punitive aspects, the ALS serves important nonpunitive 
goals. 518 U.S. at ___-___, 116 S.Ct. at 2148-2149, 135 
L.Ed.2d at 570, 64 USLW at 4572.   The goal and 
corresponding purpose of the ALS are to remove drunk 
drivers from our highways in order to protect the 
public.  Although the terms of the suspension may 
extend beyond the time period necessary to achieve this 
immediate goal, the length of the suspension directly 
correlates to the number of OMVI convictions within the 
preceding five years and is not excessive.  Scaling the 
terms of the suspension reflects the level of danger 
repeat offenders are presumed to present to the public 
and the overriding remedial nature of the suspension.  
 The 1993 amendments to the ALS statute also support 
 
 
86
the conclusion that the suspension is remedial.  Under 
the older provisions of the ALS statute, the suspension 
did not become effective until processed by the BMV. 
See State v. Sims (Aug. 21, 1995), Butler App. No. 
CA94-12-215, 
unreported. 
 
Under 
the 
current 
ALS 
statute, 
however, 
the 
suspension 
is 
immediately 
effective. R.C. 4511.191(D)(1).  This change indicates 
the legislative intent to pass remedial legislation 
accelerating the time for the removal of allegedly 
intoxicated drivers from the road.  Though the ALS may 
be said to serve the purpose of deterrence, this 
purpose may serve criminal as well as civil goals. 
Ursery, 518 U.S. at ___-___, 116 S.Ct. at 2148-2149, 
135 L.Ed.2d at 570, 64 USLW at 4572.   
 
Other considerations relevant to the question of 
whether a proceeding is criminal support a conclusion 
that 
R.C. 
4511.191 
is 
a 
civil 
proceeding.  As 
acknowledged 
by 
the 
majority, 
these 
proceedings 
 
 
87
historically and repeatedly have been considered civil 
in nature and remedial in purpose. Dobbins, 75 Ohio 
St.3d at 537, 664 N.E.2d at 911; Andrews v. Turner 
(1977), 52 Ohio St.3d 31, 6 O.O.3d 149, 368 N.E.2d 
1253; Hoban v. Rice (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 111, 54 
O.O.2d 254, 267 N.E.2d 311; State v. Starnes (1970), 21 
Ohio St.2d 38, 50 O.O.2d 84, 254 N.E.2d 675.   This 
court has previously labeled the temporary license 
suspension 
an 
“inconvenience,” 
Columbus 
v. 
Adams 
(1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 57, 60, 10 OBR 348, 350, 461 
N.E.2d 887, 890, and the granting of a license a 
privilege and not an absolute property right.  Dobbins, 
75 Ohio St.3d at 538, 664 N.E.2d at 912; Doyle, 51 Ohio 
St.3d at 51, 554 N.E.2d at 102. Thus, under our 
precedent, the temporary revocation of a driver’s 
license does not establish an affirmative restraint or 
disability.  In addition, there is no requirement that 
the government establish scienter in order to establish 
 
 
88
that the license is subject to suspension.  Although 
the ALS is tied to criminal activity, I find, as did 
the Ursery court, that by itself, this fact does not 
constitute the “clearest proof” necessary to show that 
the proceeding is criminal. 
 
Accordingly, I would hold that the ALS is not 
punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
and 
therefore, 
does 
not 
preclude 
a 
later 
OMVI 
conviction. 
 
PATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
FOOTNOTES 
5 
 
The 
Mendoza-Martinez 
considerations 
include 
“[w]hether 
the 
sanction 
involves 
an 
affirmative 
disability or restraint, whether it has historically 
been regarded as punishment, whether it comes into play 
only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation 
will promote the traditional aims of punishment -- 
retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to 
 
 
89
which it applies is already a crime, whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose 
assigned * * *.” (Footnotes omitted.) 372 U.S. at 168-
169, 83 S.Ct. at 567-568, 9 L.Ed.2d at 661.