Case Title: Rogers v. Mallory

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Larry R. ROGERS and Elizabeth H. Snipan v.
Don MALLORY

96-1359                                            ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 14, 1997


1.   Limitation of actions -- five-year limitation on actions for damages caused
     by deficiencies in construction -- applicable to claim for breach of
     warranty of habitability. -- The supreme court held that with
     respect to claims for breach of warranty of habitability of a
     dwelling, the trial court correctly applied Ark. Code Ann. 
     16-56-112(a) (1987), which provides for a five-year limitation
     on actions in contract to recover damages caused by any
     deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or
     observation of construction or the construction and repair of
     any improvement to real property or for injury to real or
     personal property caused by the deficiency; although the
     supreme court has made an exception, as does Ark. Code Ann. 
     16-56-112(d), on the basis of fraudulent concealment to
     statutes of limitations, no fraud argument was made here; 
     according to  16-56-112(a), an action in contract must be
     brought no more than five years after substantial completion
     of the home; the statute neither provides an exception for
     residential property nor gives a purchaser a "reasonable
     length of time" in which to bring suit.

2.   Limitation of actions -- Ark. Code Ann.  16-56-112(a) is more accurately
     described as statute of repose rather than of limitations. -- The effect
     of Ark. Code Ann.  16-56-112(a) and statutes similar to it is
     to cut off entirely an injured person's right of action before
     it accrues, even if it does not arise until after the
     statutory period has elapsed; thus,  16-56-112(a) is more
     accurately described as a "statute of repose" rather than a
     "statute of limitations."

3.   Limitation of actions -- General Assembly's purpose in enacting Ark. Code
     Ann.  16-56-112(a). -- The General Assembly's purpose in enacting
     Ark. Code Ann.  16-56-112(a) was to provide a comprehensive
     statute of limitations protecting persons engaged in the
     construction industry from being subject to litigation arising
     from work performed many years prior to the initiation of the
     lawsuit.

4.   Limitation of actions -- Ark. Code Ann.  16-56-112(a) did not conflict
     with implied-warranty-of-habitability cases -- must be followed. -- Where
     Ark. Code Ann.  1656-112(a) was clear and did not conflict
     with the holding of any case dealing with the implied warranty
     of habitability, the supreme court held that it must be
     followed.

     Appeal from Faulkner Circuit Court; Karen R. Baker, Judge;
affirmed.
     David H. Williams, for appellants.
     Mark S. Cambiano, for appellee.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     Arkansas Code Ann.  16-56-112(a) (1987) provides:

          No action in contract, whether oral or written, sealed or
     unsealed, to recover damages caused by any deficiency in the
     design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction
     or the construction and repair of any improvement to real
     property or for injury to real or personal property caused by
     such deficiency, shall be brought against any person
     performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, or
     observation of construction or the construction or repair of
     the improvement more than five (5) years after substantial
     completion of the improvement.

The question to be answered in this appeal is whether the five-year
limit imposed by the statute applies to claims for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability of a dwelling.  The Trial Court
held the statute applicable, and we affirm.
     Larry R. Rogers and Elizabeth H. Snipan, husband and wife,
purchased the home in question from Ron and Kay Dobie in May 1992. 
Although the buyers had the home inspected for defects, and had
some defects repaired by the Dobies prior to closing, they were
unaware that the fill on which the house was built had been
composed of wet pond dirt that was slowly drying and causing the
underlying concrete slab to collapse.  
     By the time Mr. Rogers and Ms. Snipan filed their complaint in
August 1994, the home was a disaster area.  The flooring had
crushed drain pipes below.  Doors and cabinets were ajar.  Sewage
was oozing through the exterior brick walls.  Mr. Rogers and Ms.
Snipan were washing dishes and clothes over buckets and had only
one bathing area that drained suitably.  Estimates of repairs
ranged from $132,000, which would not buy a guarantee of completely
solving the problem, to $193,000, which would purchase repairs with
a guarantee that no further settlement would occur.
     The complaint named a number of defendants.  All were
dismissed except the Dobies, Bob Kordsmeier (individually and as
agent for Conway Home Inspection Service, Inc.), and appellee Don
Mallory, a general building contractor who allegedly built the home
through the process of subcontracting with members of building
trades.  
     In his amended answer, Mr. Mallory asserted as an affirmative
defense, among others, that the action was barred by  16-56-
112(a).  He moved to dismiss.  The Trial Court said she was
treating the motion as one for summary judgment, but she held a
hearing at which some testimony was taken and ruled in favor of Mr.
Mallory.  She then certified the case for appeal pursuant to Ark.
R. Civ. P. 54(b), holding the claims against the Dobies and Mr.
Kordsmeier in abeyance until the appeal of her decision with
respect to Mr. Mallory has been decided.
     The only argument presented in the brief of Mr. Rogers and Ms.
Snipan is that  16-56-112(a) does not apply to a cause of action
alleging that a general contractor, in constructing a residence,
breached the implied warranty of habitability.  They argue that
when we recognized the implied warranty in cases such as Wawak v.
Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093,