Case Title: Attorney Grievance v. Hill

Citation: 398 Md. 95

Docket Number: 77ag/05

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG)
No. 77
September Term, 2005
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OF MARYLAND
v. 
JOHN LYSTER HILL
Bell, C.J.
Raker
          *Wilner
Cathell
Battaglia
Greene
Bloom, Theodore G. (Retired,
specially assigned),
JJ.
  Opinion by Bell, C.J.
File: March 21, 2007
*Wilner, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conferencing of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article
IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the
decision and adoption of this opinion.
1Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides:
“(a)  Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approval 
of Commission.  Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall
file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals.”
See also Rule 16-743, which specifically provides, in the context of the Peer Review
Committee recommendation, that “[t]he Commission may (1) approve the filing of a
Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action[.]”
2Rule 1.3 requires “[a] lawyer [to] act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.”
3Rule 1.4, as relevant, provides:
“(a) A lawyer shall: 
*     *     *     *
“(2) keep [a] client reasonably informed about the status of [a] matter; [and]
“(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
*     *     *     *
“(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”
4Rule 8.1 provides, as relevant:
“An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
disciplinary matter, shall not:
*     *     *     *
“(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by
the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, by Bar
Counsel, acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 filed a Petition for Disciplinary or
Remedial Action against John Lyster Hill, the respondent.   The petition charged that, in
representing two clients, the respondent violated Rules 1.3, Diligence,2 1.4, Communication,3
8.1, Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters,4 and 8.4, Misconduct,5 of the Maryland Rules
lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6.”  
5Rule 8.4, as relevant, provides:
“It is professional  misconduct for  a lawyer to: 
*     *     *     *
“(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]”
*     *     *     *
6Rule 16-752 (a) provides:
“(a)  Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial
Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any
circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the
record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation
with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the
extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing
of motions, and hearing.”  
7Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides:
“(c)  Findings and conclusions. The judge shall prepare and file or dictate
into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings
as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and conclusions of law. If
dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless
the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed
statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later
than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy
of the statement to each party.” 
2
of Professional Conduct, as adopted by Maryland Rule 16-812.   
We referred the case, pursuant to Rule 16-752 (a),6 to the Honorable Dennis M.
Sweeney, of the Circuit Court for Howard County, for hearing pursuant to Rule 16-757 (c).7
Following a hearing, at which the respondent appeared and participated, the hearing court
found facts by the clear and convincing standard and drew conclusions of law, as follows.
8One month earlier, Mr. Beier purported to pay the balance; however, the check
tendered for that purpose was returned for insufficient funds. 
3
The respondent was retained by Edward Beier “to prepare and obtain an Eligible
Domestic Relations Order (‘EDRO’),” necessary to enable him to obtain half of his ex-wife’s
State employee’s retirement benefit.   In his engagement letter to Mr. Beier, the respondent
conditioned the commencement of work on the matter on the payment by Mr. Beier of a
minimum fee of $500.00.  Although $200.00 of that amount was paid on the date of
retention, the balance was not paid until more than three months later.8   At that time, the
respondent’s obligation to prepare the EDRO began.  Despite Mr. Beier’s numerous requests
that he do so, the respondent did not prepare the EDRO or cause it to be executed prior to
Mr. Beier’s remarriage and consequent ineligibility to share in his ex-wife’s pension.  While
admitting that he did not prepare the EDRO and conceding that there was “no good reason
for failing to do the work required in Mr. Beier’s case,” the respondent disputed Mr. Beier’s
testimony only insofar as it indicated that the respondent falsely had told Mr. Beier that he
had prepared the order.
Mr. Beier filed a complaint with the petitioner, which Bar Counsel forwarded to the
respondent with the request that he provide a response.   He followed up that letter with three
others and three telephone calls.   The respondent did not answer any of the letters or
telephone calls or contact bar counsel in connection with the complaint for almost four
months.  At that time, he provided Bar Counsel with a written response.   Prior to submitting
4
the written response, he “refunded Mr. Beier’s entire fee ..., admitting that he had done no
work on Mr. Beier’s case.”   The respondent subsequently consented to be, and was,
interviewed by an investigator for the petitioner.
In the second matter, the respondent was retained to represent Mr. John W. Wilson
“in connection with a domestic relations case involving visitation and access issues
concerning Mr. Wilson’s daughter.”   He was paid a retainer of $2,000.00.   He attended,
with his client, his client’s ex-wife and her counsel, a pre-trial conference in the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County before a Master, at which an agreement was reached.  That
agreement was placed on the record and the respondent “agreed to prepare and submit a
written consent order within two weeks of that date.”  He did not do so.  Nor had he done so
after six months, despite calls from the Master’s office “inquiring about the status of the
order” and calls and two letters from Mr. Wilson.
When the order had not been filed after more than six months, a judge of the Circuit
Court issued an Order for the respondent to appear in court and “explain the reason for his
failure to submit the order and show cause why sanctions and costs should not be imposed.”
Without informing his client that the show cause order had been issued or that the parties had
been ordered to appear in court, the respondent prepared a Consent Order, apparently sent
it to opposing counsel for signature and submitted it, signed by both counsel, to the court on
the date scheduled for the show cause hearing.   The respondent did not send the Consent
Order to his client for review, nor even inform his client that he had prepared one, which had
9This was significant to Mr. Wilson because he maintained that the respondent
agreed to let him review the draft of the Consent Order and sign off on it prior to
submitting it to the court.   After reviewing the Consent Order that the respondent
submitted to the court and which the court signed, Mr. Wilson stated that the order did not
reflect the agreement placed on the record, a contention that the respondent disputes.  
The hearing court did not resolve the dispute.
10The other things to which the respondent was alluding were, as found by the
hearing court, his arrest, shortly after the pre-trial conference in the Wilson matter, and
subsequent placement on probation, for driving under the influence of alcohol; the
hospitalization, and subsequent death, of his mother-in-law, with the consequent grieving
of his wife; and the behavioral problems - truancy, smoking and theft - of the
respondent’s eldest daughter.  The hospitalization and death of his mother-in-law
coincided with the Master’s attempt to discover the status of the Consent Order.    These
matters, in combination, the hearing court found, were disruptive of the respondent’s law
practice.  
5
been submitted to and signed by the court.9 
Bar counsel made two requests of the respondent to produce his file in the Wilson
matter.   Although they were received, the respondent did not comply.   His only explanation
for not having done so was: “I knew I messed up with Beier and Wilson, so, I guess I just
didn’t really want to face it in addition to all the other things that were going on.” [10]
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the hearing court concluded that the
respondent, by failing to act expeditiously in both cases, by not timely preparing the EDRO
in the Beier case, and by his delay in preparing the Consent Order in the Wilson case,
violated Rule 1.3.   The inaction in the Beier case was, in addition, it opined, a violation of
Rule 8.4 (d).    The hearing court further concluded that in each case, the respondent violated
Rule 1.4.  In the Beier case, it consisted of “failing to keep Mr. Beier reasonably informed
11Although of the belief that “[o]n a few occasions when Mr. Beier called in the
autumn of 2004, [the respondent] led Mr. Beier to believe that a draft EDRO was being
prepared,” it found that “[t]here is not clear and convincing evidence that [the respondent]
affirmatively misrepresented to Mr. Beier that the EDRO had been prepared and
presented to the counsel for the retirement system.”
6
of the status of the matter and by failing to respond to his inquiries.11    Its gravamen, in
Wilson, was the respondent’s failure:  to respond to his client’s letters and telephone
messages; to notify him of the show cause order, for, “as a party, [he was required] to be
present in court for a hearing;” and to notify his client that the Consent Order had been
submitted and entered.
Rule 8.1 was violated as to Beier, the hearing court concluded, when the respondent
did not timely respond to Bar Counsel’s request for a response to the Beier complaint. 
Moreover, it characterized the delay as “wilful and without excuse.”   With respect to Wilson,
the hearing court found that the respondent did respond timely; however, the failure to
produce the file, as requested, was reprehensible and, thus, a violation of Rule 8.1 (b).
The hearing court determined that the respondent violated Rule 8.4 (d).    It reasoned:
“[The respondent]’s failure to file the consent order within 15 days, as ordered
by the Court, his failure to respond to inquiries by Master Muskin’s office, and
his continued failure to submit the Consent Order led to Judge Silkworth
ordering him to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed.   [The
respondent] then took an additional two months to submit the order, waiting
until the date set for the show cause hearing to do so.   Respondent’s actions
and inattention to the requirements set by the Court constitute conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4 (d) of the
Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.”
Having found the rules violations charged, the hearing court also offered findings of
7
mitigation:
“The Court finds that [the respondent]’s inattention to these cases was caused
in part by his dealing with his alcohol abuse problem and DUI arrest, and then
dealing with additional family responsibilities caused by the illness and death
of his mother-in-law.   [The respondent]’s daughter’s behavioral problems in
2005 also distracted him from his practice.   Master Muskin’s administrative
assistant ... noted in her affidavit that [the respondent]’s failure to act promptly
was not his typical behavior.   In the period from the summer of 2004 through
spring of 2005, and continuing to the present, [the respondent]’s only support
staff has been a receptionist.   [The respondent] has not added any support
staff.   Since the end of his probationary period, [the respondent] has not
continued to engage in any therapy, treatment or support group activity to
ensure that he remains sober.   There is no evidence presented that [the
respondent] has relapsed into excessive use of alcohol.”
Neither the petitioner nor the respondent filed exceptions to the hearing court’s
findings of fact or conclusions of law.   While both appeared at oral argument and offered
their respective recommendations orally, only the petitioner submitted a written
recommendation.   In that  recommendation, notwithstanding the hearing court’s finding that
the misconduct was mitigated, in part, by the respondent’s alcoholism, his mother-in-law’s
illness and subsequent death and his daughter’s behavioral problems and despite its
concession that no harm was done, the petitioner urged the respondent’s suspension for a one
year period.   In so doing, it emphasized the respondent’s dereliction in not preparing the
EDRO, as he had been paid to do, his dilatoriness in preparing a consent order that he agreed
to complete within fifteen days of the agreement it would reflect, the fact that the two
instances of misconduct occurred at the same time and both involved rather simple and
straightforward matters and the failure “to respond to Bar Counsel in a timely and complete
8
manner.”  
The respondent, like the petitioner, expressly did not except to the hearing court’s
factual finding or conclusions of law, stating that he had no quarrel with them and that they
accurately reflect what took place, his action or inaction, as the case may be, the mitigating
factors present and the remorse that he felt.   He added that he was ashamed of what took
place and was not proud of having let his clients down, for which he stated he had already
apologized to them.   Emphasizing the mitigating factors the hearing court found and relying
on Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Tolar, 357 Md. 569, 745 A.2d 1045 (2000), the
respondent urged a reprimand.
We have said so often, that it is now well settled, that the purpose of attorney
discipline is not to punish the erring attorney but to protect the unsuspecting public.   Most
recently, we elucidated the point in Attorney Grievance Comm'n  v. Rees, 396 Md. 248, 254,
913 A.2d 68, 72 (2006).   This purpose is achieved when the sanction imposed is
commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they
were committed.  Attorney Grievance Comm'n  v. Kovacic, 389 Md. 233, 238, 884 A.2d 673,
676 (2005).   Of significance to the sanction decision is, inter alia,   “whether the attorney has
remorse for the misconduct, whether the conduct is likely to be repeated and whether the
attorney has a ‘prior grievance history.’” Id. at 238, 884 A.2d at 676., quoting Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Post, 379 Md. 60, 71, 839 A.2d 718, 724-25 (2003); Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Wyatt, 323 Md. 36, 38, 591 A.2d 467, 468 (1991).
12We also noted, as a factor in imposing a reprimand, Tolar’s history of rendering
assistance to the Director of the Lawyers Assistance Program of the Maryland State Bar
Association.
9
As the petitioner recognizes, this case is reminiscent of Kovacic and the case against
which it, and the sanction we imposed in that case, was compared, Tolar, supra, 357 Md. 569,
745 A.2d 1045.  In Tolar and in Kovacic, each of the  respondent attorneys was found to have
violated the same Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 8.1(b), by  failing to
complete a QDRO, failing to communicate with her client and failing to respond timely to
Bar Counsel's inquiries.  We imposed a reprimand in Tolar and an indefinite suspension in
Kovacic.   We addressed the difference in sanction, and the reasons therefore, in Kovacic,
explaining:
“The reprimand in [Tolar] was based largely on the respondent's remorse, a
factor that could have been, and apparently was, explored in that case, and that
sanction was imposed despite prior unreported reprimands on the responding
attorney's record. From the respondent's remorse, another factor, that a repeat
of the misconduct was unlikely, admittedly not mentioned, could have been
inferred,”
389 Md. at 239, 884 A.2d at 676,12 and 
“Unlike Tolar, [Kovacic] has no prior attorney grievance history, a factor that
supports a disposition similar to the one Tolar received. More important,
however, also unlike in Tolar, there is neither a finding, nor any basis for
mitigating the respondent's misconduct.”
Id.  See also Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Lee, 393 Md. 546, 564-66, 903
A.2d 895, 906 -07 (2006) (discussing and contrasting Kovacic and  Tolar). 
The respondent's misconduct closely resembles the misconduct found  in Kovacic and
13The petitioner, at oral argument, distinguished this case from Tolar on the basis
of the extent of the involvement of the attorney in that case in the work of the Maryland
State Bar Association’s Lawyer Assistance Program and on the degree of cooperation she
displayed, once she decided to cooperate.  It noted that Tolar was dubbed “[his] man in
Havana” on the Eastern Shore by Richard Vincent, the Director of the Lawyer Assistance
Program.    It characterized Tolar as being  “extremely cooperative.”    
10
Tolar.   It is, however, more extensive from the perspective of the number of rules violated
and the number of clients affected.  In addition to Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 8.1 (b), the rules
violated by Kovacic and Tolar, the respondent also was found to have violated Rule 8.4 (d).
Moreover, rather than one client being affected by the misconduct, as was the case with those
attorneys, here the respondent’s misconduct affected two clients.  
As between Tolar and Kovacic, this case is most like Tolar.13   Like Tolar, the
respondent has a prior grievance history, two dismissals with a warning, as opposed to
unreported reprimands.   Moreover, he presented evidence, and the hearing court found the
existence, of mitigating factors, which, it concluded, were responsible, at least in part, for the
respondent’s misconduct.   Additionally, the respondent has expressed remorse, appearing
in this Court and stating that he is ashamed of his misconduct, suggesting, at least by
inference, that these matters are not reflective of how he practices law.  And, consistently,
there was testimony, in the form of the affidavit of Master Muskin’s administrative aide, that
the respondent’s behavior during this period was out of character for the respondent.   Taken
together, it further may be inferred that the respondent’s misconduct is not likely to be
repeated.  
11
Accordingly, although more serious than in Tolar, and therefore demanding a more
substantial sanction, this case is a far cry from Kovacic.    We believe that the public will be
protected if a thirty-day suspension from the practice of law is imposed.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL
PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK
OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, 
PURSUANT 
TO
MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH
SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
OF 
THE 
ATTORN E Y  
G RIEVANCE
COMMISSION AGAINST JOHN LYSTER
HILL.