Case Title: State ex rel. Anderson v. City of Vermilion

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5320

Docket Number: 2012-0943

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Anderson v. Vermilion, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5320.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5320 
THE STATE EX REL. ANDERSON, APPELLANT, v. THE CITY OF  
VERMILION, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Anderson v. Vermilion,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5320.] 
Public records—R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v)—Information on itemized attorney-billing 
statements that was not protected by the attorney-client privilege should 
have been disclosed. 
(No. 2012-0943—Submitted November 14, 2012—Decided November 21, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Erie County, 
No. E-10-040, 2012-Ohio-1868. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jean A. Anderson, appeals from a judgment denying her 
request for a writ of mandamus to compel appellee, the city of Vermilion, Ohio, 
to provide copies of certain itemized billing statements for attorney services 
rendered to the city.  Because the city did not establish that the entirety of the 
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requested statements are exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act, 
we reverse that portion of the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the 
cause for further proceedings.  We affirm the portion of the judgment denying 
Anderson’s request for an award of statutory damages and attorney fees. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} Anderson served as the mayor of Vermilion from January 2006 
through December 2009.  During her administration, the law firm of Marcie & 
Butler, L.P.A. (“Marcie & Butler”) provided legal services to the city, and the 
firm’s provision of services extended into the next mayor’s term.  The new 
mayor, Eileen Bulan, appointed Kenneth Stumphauzer as the city’s director of 
law.  Stumphauzer’s law firm, Stumphauzer, O’Toole, McLaughlin, McGlamery 
& Loughman Co., L.P.A. (“Stumphauzer & O’Toole”), billed the city over 
$27,000 for legal services provided during the first six weeks of the new mayor’s 
administration. 
{¶ 3} Because she thought that the annual legal fees expended by the 
new administration would far exceed the fees incurred during her administration, 
Anderson made several records requests to permit public scrutiny of the city’s 
expenditure of funds for legal services.  On May 25, 2010, Anderson personally 
delivered a written public-records request to the city’s finance director for copies 
of certain records, including “all itemized billing statements received from 
Kenneth Stumphauzer, Stumphauzer & O’Toole, [and] Marcie & Butler, for 
January, February, March and April 2010.” 
{¶ 4} The city acknowledged its receipt of Anderson’s request but 
denied it on the basis that the requested legal bills are exempted from disclosure 
by the attorney-client privilege: 
 
[T]he detailed billing statements, describing the specific work 
performed for and advice rendered to the City by Stumphauzer 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
O’Toole and any other lawyers rendering services to the City are 
covered by the attorney-client privilege.  In particular, bills 
submitted by Stumphauzer O’Toole to the City describe each 
matter with respect to which legal services were rendered, the 
dates on which such legal services were rendered and the specific 
tasks performed.  As a result, we cannot agree to provide you with 
those detailed itemized billing statements. 
 
{¶ 5} In September 2010, Anderson filed a petition in the court of 
appeals.  Anderson sought a writ of mandamus to compel Vermilion to provide 
copies of the nonexempt portions of the requested itemized attorney-billing 
statements.  Anderson also requested an award of statutory damages and attorney 
fees.  The court granted an alternative writ, and the city submitted an answer to 
the petition. Anderson filed a motion for summary judgment, and the city filed a 
brief in opposition.  The court of appeals granted Anderson’s motion for an in 
camera review of the requested attorney-billing statements, and the city filed the 
statements under seal. 
{¶ 6} On April 25, 2012, the court of appeals denied Anderson’s motion 
for summary judgment, granted summary judgment in favor of Vermilion, and 
denied the writ. 
{¶ 7} This cause is now before the court on Anderson’s appeal as of 
right. 
Analysis 
Summary Judgment 
{¶ 8} The court of appeals denied Anderson’s motion for summary 
judgment and, in essence, granted summary judgment in favor of Vermilion by 
determining that “there remains no genuine issue of material fact and [the city] is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  6th Dist. No. E-10-040, 2012-Ohio-
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1868, ¶ 13.  See also Todd Dev. Co., Inc. v. Morgan, 116 Ohio St.3d 461, 2008-
Ohio-87, 880 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 17 (“When a party moves for summary judgment, the 
nonmovant has an opportunity to respond, and the court has considered all the 
relevant evidence, the court may enter summary judgment against the moving 
party, despite the nonmoving party’s failure to file its own motion for summary 
judgment”). 
{¶ 9} “Summary judgment is appropriate when an examination of all 
relevant materials filed in the action reveals that ‘there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.’ ”  Smith v. McBride, 130 Ohio St.3d 51, 2011-Ohio-4674, 955 N.E.2d 954, 
¶ 12, quoting Civ.R. 56(C).  “In reviewing whether the trial court’s granting of 
summary judgment was proper, we apply a de novo review.”  Troyer v. Janis, 132 
Ohio St.3d 229, 2012-Ohio-2406, 971 N.E.2d 862, ¶ 6. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals entered summary judgment in favor of 
Vermilion on Anderson’s mandamus claim for itemized attorney-billing 
statements.  “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 
R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6.  “We construe the Public Records Act 
liberally in favor of broad access and resolve any doubt in favor of disclosure of 
public records.”  State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 126 Ohio 
St.3d 224, 2010-Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 11} Vermilion claims—and the court of appeals found—that the 
requested itemized attorney-billing statements are exempt from disclosure based 
on the attorney-client privilege.  “Exceptions to disclosure under the Public 
Records Act, R.C. 149.43, are strictly construed against the public-records 
custodian, and the custodian has the burden to establish the applicability of an 
January Term, 2012 
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exception.”  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 
2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
Attorney-Client Privilege 
{¶ 12} R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) excludes “[r]ecords the release of which is 
prohibited by state or federal law” from the definition of “public record” for 
purposes of the Public Records Act.  “The attorney-client privilege, which covers 
records of communications between attorneys and their government clients 
pertaining to the attorneys’ legal advice, is a state law prohibiting release of 
[those] records.”  State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 535, 542, 
721 N.E.2d 1044 (2000). 
{¶ 13} More specifically, we have held that the narrative portions of 
itemized attorney-billing statements containing descriptions of legal services 
performed by counsel for a client are protected by the attorney-client privilege.  
State ex rel. Dawson v. Bloom-Carroll Local School Dist., 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 
2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, ¶ 28-29; see also State ex rel. McCaffrey v. 
Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2012-Ohio-4246, 976 
N.E.2d 877, ¶ 36. 
{¶ 14} Anderson requested itemized attorney-billing statements for 
services provided to Vermilion by Stumphauzer, Stumphauzer & O’Toole, and 
Marcie & Butler for January, February, March, and April of 2010.  The 
Stumphauzer & O’Toole billing statements include the title of the matter being 
handled, e.g., the case name or general subject, a narrative description of the legal 
services provided, the hours expended, and the amount due.  The Marcie & Butler 
statements include the dates the services were rendered, a narrative description of 
the services rendered, the hours and fee rate for the services provided, and the 
amount of money billed. 
{¶ 15} Under the Public Records Act, insofar as these itemized attorney-
billing statements contain nonexempt information, e.g., the general title of the 
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matter being handled, the dates the services were performed, and the hours, rate, 
and money charged for the services, they should have been disclosed to Anderson.  
“If a public record contains information that is exempt from the duty to permit 
public inspection or to copy the public record, the public office or the person 
responsible for the public record shall make available all of the information within 
the public record that is not exempt.”  R.C. 149.43(B)(1). 
{¶ 16} The parties submitted the requested attorney-billing statements 
under seal for the court of appeals’ review.  As we have held, the nonexempt 
portions of the records submitted under seal in public-records mandamus cases 
must be disclosed: 
 
“[W]hen a governmental body asserts that public records are 
excepted from disclosure and such assertion is challenged, the 
court must make an individualized scrutiny of the records in 
question.  If the court finds that these records contain excepted 
information, this information must be redacted and any remaining 
information must be released.” 
 
(Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Master v. Cleveland, 75 Ohio St.3d 23, 31, 661 
N.E.2d 180 (1996), quoting State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. 
Cleveland, 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 N.E.2d 786 (1988), paragraph four of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 17} Consequently, in McCaffrey, ___ Ohio St.3d __, 2012-Ohio-4246, 
976 N.E.2d 877, at ¶ 35-37, we held that the respondents in a public-records 
mandamus case had complied with a records request by providing copies of civil-
case logs that had been redacted to exclude the narrative portions of the logs that 
were covered by attorney-client privilege. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
{¶ 18} The city nevertheless posits three separate arguments to support 
the court of appeals’ conclusion.  Vermilion first claims that Anderson waived her 
right to the nonexempt portions of the requested attorney-billing statements 
because after the court of appeals’ judgment, she requested summaries of the 
information in attorney bills excluding attorney-client information and the city 
satisfied that request.  It is true that providing the requested records to a relator 
generally renders moot a public-records mandamus claim.  See State ex rel. 
Striker v. Smith, 129 Ohio St.3d 168, 2011-Ohio-2878, 950 N.E.2d 952, ¶ 22.  But 
Anderson’s postjudgment records request was for records for a different period of 
time—June 2010 through May 2012—than the period at issue in this case—
January through April 2010.  Therefore, Anderson did not waive her mandamus 
claim or appeal by seeking and receiving different records than those at issue in 
this case. 
{¶ 19} The city next claims that it need not provide copies of the 
nonexempt portions of the requested attorney-billing statements because after 
redacting the narrative portions that are covered by the attorney-client privilege, 
the remainder would be “meaningless.”  But there is no indication that the city’s 
subjective belief concerning the value of this information is true.  The provision 
of information concerning the hours expended and rate charged for attorney 
services may have some value to the requester.  Nor is there any exception to the 
explicit duty in R.C. 149.43(B)(1) for public offices to make available all 
information that is not exempt after redacting the information that is exempt. 
{¶ 20} Finally, the city contends that the statements were either exempt 
from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege or so inextricably intertwined 
so as to also be privileged.  The court of appeals agreed with that assertion based 
on our decision in Dawson, 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, 
where we noted that  attorney-billing statements withheld by a school district 
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were “either covered by the attorney-client privilege or so inextricably intertwined 
with the privileged materials as to also be exempt from disclosure.”  Id. at ¶ 29. 
{¶ 21} Nevertheless, in the very same paragraph cited by the city and 
relied on by the court of appeals, we emphasized that the school district did not 
have to provide the nonexempt portions of the statements to the requester in that 
case because the district had already provided summaries containing the 
nonexempt information: 
 
Therefore, the school district properly responded to Dawson’s 
request for itemized invoices of law firms providing legal services 
to the district in matters involving Dawson and her children by 
providing her with summaries of the invoices including the 
attorney’s name, the fee total, and the general matter involved.  No 
further access to the detailed narratives contained in the itemized 
billing statements was warranted. 
 
Id. 
{¶ 22} In essence, the relator in Dawson was not entitled to the 
nonexempt portions of the requested itemized attorney-billing statements, because 
she had already been provided that information by the school district in the 
summaries.  This rendered the relator’s claim for that part of the records moot.  
Striker, 129 Ohio St.3d 168, 2011-Ohio-2878, 950 N.E.2d 952, at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 23} This is the crucial fact that distinguishes this case from Dawson.  
Vermilion did not provide Anderson with alternate records that contain the 
nonexempt information from the requested attorney-billing statements for January 
2010 through April 2010.  Therefore, her claim for these records is not moot, and 
she is entitled to that portion of the statements after they have been redacted to 
prevent disclosure of the narrative portions that are covered by the attorney-client 
January Term, 2012 
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privilege.  R.C. 149.43(B)(1); Natl. Broadcasting Co., 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 
N.E.2d 786,  at paragraph four of the syllabus.  By concluding otherwise, the 
court of appeals erred. 
{¶ 24} Therefore, the court of appeals erred in denying Anderson’s 
motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the 
city on Anderson’s public-records mandamus claim.  Anderson established her 
entitlement to a writ of mandamus to compel Vermilion to provide her with 
copies of the nonexempt portions of the requested itemized attorney-billing 
statements. 
Statutory Damages and Attorney Fees 
{¶ 25} Anderson claims that the court of appeals also erred in denying her 
request for statutory damages and attorney fees.  In assessing this claim, we 
review whether the court of appeals abused its discretion in denying the request.  
State ex rel. Patton v. Rhodes, 129 Ohio St.3d 182, 2011-Ohio-3093, 950 N.E.2d 
965, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 26} The court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Anderson’s request, because a large part of the requested statements are exempt 
from disclosure.  See State ex rel. Mahajan v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 127 Ohio 
St.3d 497, 2010-Ohio-5995, 940 N.E.2d 1280, ¶ 64 (denying request for statutory 
damages and attorney fees for reasons including that most of the public-records 
claims lacked merit).  In addition, a well-informed public office could have 
reasonably believed, based on our decision in Dawson, 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-
Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, at ¶ 29, that the nonexempt portions of the attorney-
billing statements could be withheld from disclosure.  See R.C. 149.43(C)(1) and 
(2);  see also State ex rel. Doe v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-4149, 914 
N.E.2d 159, ¶ 37 and 40. 
 
 
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Conclusion 
{¶ 27} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of the city and denying Anderson’s claim for a writ of 
mandamus.  We reverse that portion of the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We affirm 
the portion of the judgment denying Anderson’s request for statutory damages 
and attorney fees. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Seeley, Savidge, Ebert & Gourash Co., L.P.A., and Andrew D. Bemer, for 
appellant. 
 
Weston Hurd, L.L.P., Shawn W. Maestle, and Timothy R. Obringer, for 
appellee. 
______________________