Case Title: Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry

Citation: 913 S.W.2d 446

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1995-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

                             AT NASHVILLE

HAROLD RICHARDSON,                )    FOR PUBLICATION
                                  )
      Petitioner/Appellee,        )    Filed: December 28. 1995
                                  )
vs.                               )    Davidson Chancery
                                  )
TENNESSEE BOARD OF                )    Hon. C. Allen High, Chancellor
DENTISTRY,                        )
                                  )    No. 01S01-9502-CH-00027
      Respondent/Appellant.       )

For Appellant:                         For Appellee:

Charles W. Burson                      Michael M. Castellarin
Attorney General & Reporter            Moody, Whitfield &
                                            Castellarin
Michael E. Moore                       Nashville, TN
Solicitor General

Sue A. Shelton
Assistant Attorney General
Nashville, TN

                              OPINION

JUDGMENT OF COURT OF APPEALS                       WHITE, J.
REVERSED & CASE REMANDED
TO TENNESSEE BOARD OF DENTISTRY
             At issue in this appeal by the Board of Dentistry is the validity

and constitutionality of a proposed civil penalty against Harold Richardson

for practicing dentistry and operating a dental clinic without a license. Also

called into question is the authority of the Davidson County Chancery Court

to resolve, on judicial review of an administrative order, constitutional

issues that were not addressed in the administrative order. For the reasons

that follow, we hold that the Chancery Court has jurisdiction to consider

constitutional issues not addressed in the administrative proceeding. As a

result, the Chancery Court's resolution of those issues in the first Chancery

Court proceeding from which Richardson did not appeal, bars consideration

of those issues. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore,

reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Board of Dentistry for further

proceedings.

                                       I

             In 1989, the General Assembly enacted Tennessee Code

Annotated Section 63-1-134 authorizing health related boards to assess civil

penalties against unlicensed practitioners in health related professions. The

legislation required each board to establish minimum and maximum civil

penalties which could be assessed. The Tennessee Board of Dentistry, a

state administrative board responsible for licensing, regulating, and

disciplining dentistry practitioners in Tennessee under Tennessee Code

Annotated Sections 63-5-101, et seq., established a "Schedule of Civil

Penalties" which became effective on March 15, 1990. See Rules 0460-14-

1-.01, -.02. -.03, Rules of Tennessee Board of Dentistry, Chapter 0460-14-

1, "Civil Penalties."
                                      2
               On June 26, 1990, the Board served Richardson with a Notice

of Charges and Memorandum of Civil Penalty Assessment charging him

with practicing dentistry and with operating a dental clinic without a license

in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 63-5-107 and 63-5-121.1

 The notice alleged that Richardson, who did not hold a license to practice

dentistry in Tennessee, had since 1986, owned and operated the Budget

Dental Laboratory and the Madison Dental Center in Nashville, Tennessee.

The notice charged fifty-seven consecutive violations of owning and

operating a dental practice occurring between March 15, 1990 and June 8,

1990 and at least ten acts of practicing dentistry. For ownership of the

dental practice for fifty-seven days and for the ten incidents of practicing

dentistry without a license, the Board sought to impose the maximum

penalty of $38,500.2 The Board of Dentistry set a contested case hearing for

September 21, 1990.

               On August 6, 1990, Richardson filed a Petition for Declaratory

Order with the Board raising numerous state and federal constitutional

1
 63-5-107. License requirement. -- (a) It is unlawful for any person to practice
dentistry, a specialty in dentistry or dental hygiene in this state, except those who are now
licensed or certified as such pursuant to law and those who may hereafter be licensed or
 certified and registered pursuant to this chapter. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-5-107(a) (1995
Supp.)

  63-5-121. Dental practice to be owned by dentist. -- Except where dental services are
regularly made available to employees by their employer, or where dental services are
being provided by an official agency of the state government, or any subdivision, any
nonprofit organization, hospital or any health maintenance organization, it is unlawful:
        ...
        (2) For an owner of an active dental practice to be other than a dentist duly
 licensed to practice in this state. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-5-121(2) (1990 Repl.).
2
 The maximum penalty for owning the dental practice was $500 per day. The maximum
 penalty for practicing without license was $1,000 per day.

                                             3
       challenges.3 See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-223 – -24 (1991 Repl.) . He

       attacked the constitutionality of Section 63-1-134, the civil penalty

       assessment statute, on several grounds.4 Since the statute punished by civil

       penalty the same acts made criminal by the criminal code, Richardson

       challenged the authority of the Board, a part of the executive rather than the

       judicial branch, to hear the case, alleging that the procedure would violate

       the separation of powers doctrine. He challenged the statute on its face as

       being violative of due process in its vagueness and its denial of a jury trial

       since it assessed a fine in excess of $50. He also questioned whether the

       statute authorized the Board to fine or punish a private citizen who is not

       and has never been a license holder.

       3
           Richardson also filed a Motion to Dismiss which was answered, but not ruled upon at
this           juncture.
       4
          63-1-134. Penalty for violation of statute, rule or order. -- Recovery. -- (a) With
          respect to any person required to be licensed, permitted or authorized by any board,
           commission or agency attached to the division of health related boards, each respective
           board, commission or agency may assess a civil penalty against such person in an
amount               not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) for each separate violation of a
statute, rule             or order pertaining to such board, commission or agency. Each day of
continued                      violation constitutes a separate violation.
                  (b) Each board, commission or agency shall by rule establish a schedule
          designating the minimum and maximum civil penalties which may be assessed under this
            section. In assessing civil penalties, the following factors may be considered:
                          (1) Whether the amount imposed will be a substantial economic deterrent
                               to the violator;
                          (2) The circumstances leading to the violation;
                          (3) The severity of the violation and the risk of harm to the public;
                          (4) The economic benefits gained by the violator as a result of
                               noncompliance; and
                          (5) The interest of the public.
                  (c)     (1) Civil penalties assessed pursuant to this section shall become final
         thirty (30) days after the date a final order of assessment is served.
                          (2) If the violator fails to pay an assessment when it becomes final, the
         division may apply to the appropriate court for a judgment and seek execution of such
         judgment.
                          (3) Jurisdiction for recovery of such penalties shall be in the chancery
         court of Davidson County, or the chancery court of the county in which all or part of the
         violations occurred.
                  (d) All sums recovered pursuant to this section shall be paid into the state
         treasury.

       Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-134 (1990 Repl.)

                                                     4
             On November 28, 1990, the Board convened a hearing to

consider Richardson's Petition for a Declaratory Order. The Secretary of

State assigned an Administrative Law Judge to make procedural and

evidentiary rulings and to resolve questions of law. The judge ruled that the

Board was not authorized to consider the arguments on the constitutionality

of the statute or the arguments that the statute as applied was

unconstitutional, but was to consider a single issue: whether the statute

authorized the assessment of a civil penalty against persons that are required

to be, but are not, licensed.

             In its Declaratory Order filed on December 28, 1990, the Board

answered the question affirmatively. Specifically, the Board held that (1) it

was without jurisdiction to consider federal or state constitutional

challenges to the statute or its application; (2) the statute applies to persons

required to be licensed by the Board to practice dentistry, regardless of

whether they are licensed; and (3) in the event the allegations against

Richardson were established, civil penalties could be assessed.

             Richardson sought judicial review of the Declaratory Order in

the Davidson County Chancery Court. His Petition for Review raised the

constitutional challenges to the statute and its application and questioned

the authority of the Board to assess a civil penalty against an unlicensed

citizen. Additionally, the petition attacked the administrative law judge's

ruling prohibiting the Board from considering the constitutional issues as

arbitrary, capricious, and illegal.

                                       5
              After allowing briefing and oral argument, the chancellor

issued an order affirming the Board action. The chancellor defined the issue

before the court as "whether the order of the Board is in violation of

constitutional provisions, arbitrary, capricious, illegal or in excess of

statutory authority." The chancellor found that the statute authorized

criminal and civil sanctions and that, in this case, the Board was pursuing a

civil rather than a criminal remedy. Therefore, there were no constitutional

violations. Additionally, the chancellor found that the Board was

authorized to assess a civil penalty against an unlicensed person. Finally,

the chancellor found no basis for Richardson's claim that the Board action

was arbitrary, capricious, illegal, or in excess of statutory authority.

              Richardson sought first an interlocutory appeal. The chancellor

denied the motion finding his order to be a final order, not an interlocutory

order. Next, Richardson sought an extraordinary appeal which was denied

by the Court of Appeals.

              After filing his Petition for a Declaratory Order, but prior to the

resolution of those issues in the Davidson County Chancery Court,

Richardson filed a Motion to Dismiss with the Board restating his

constitutional challenges.5 This motion was still pending when the assistant

general counsel for the State of Tennessee served a Request for Admissions.

The request sought admissions which would have established that

5
 On October 7, 1992, Richardson amended his Motion to Dismiss based on State ex rel.
Town of South Carthage v. Barrett,