Case Title: Shannon v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 46/19

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Teddy Shannon v. State of Maryland  
No. 46, September Term 2019 
 
 
Criminal Procedure – Charging Document – Firearms Offense – Effect of Drafting 
Error.  A count of the indictment alleged a violation of Maryland Code, Public Safety 
Article (“PS”), §5-133(c), which prohibits a person from possessing a regulated firearm 
after having been convicted of certain enumerated crimes – a list that is tabulated in three 
subparts.  In describing a predicate conviction, that count of the indictment provided 
specific identifying information concerning the defendant’s prior conviction for possession 
with intent to distribute a controlled substance, one of the enumerated offenses under PS 
§5-133(c)(1)(ii), but also included the phrase “crime of violence,” a collective phrase that 
includes 19 other enumerated offenses under PS §5-133(c)(1)(i) but not possession with 
intent to distribute a controlled substance.  At trial, the defendant stipulated that he had 
been previously convicted of an offense that prohibited him from possessing a regulated 
firearm and, accordingly, that element of the offense was not at issue before the jury.  The 
drafting error in that count of the indictment did not mean that the count failed to allege a 
cognizable offense or to show jurisdiction in the circuit court.  Neither Article 21 of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights nor Maryland Rule 4-202(a) concerning the content of 
charging documents in criminal cases required reversal of the defendant’s conviction.  Nor 
was it necessary to amend the indictment with the consent of the defendant pursuant to 
Maryland Rule 4-204.  To the extent that the defendant otherwise objected to the drafting 
error in the indictment, that objection was waived because the defendant failed to raise it 
in the trial court.   
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 46 
 
September Term, 2019 
______________________________________ 
 
TEDDY SHANNON 
 
V. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
McDonald 
 
 
 
Watts 
 
 
 
Hotten 
 
 
 
Getty 
 
 
 
Booth 
 
 
 
Biran 
Greene, Jr., Clayton   
(Senior Judge, Specially 
Assigned), 
 
 
 
 
JJ. 
 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by McDonald, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed:  April 24, 2020 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No.  117013002 
Argument:  February 7, 2020 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act  
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document 
is authentic.
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk  
Suzanne Johnson
2020-08-20 09:25-04:00
A charging document in a criminal case establishes the field of play.  Among other 
things, it must provide adequate notice of the offense charged.  That requirement functions 
both prospectively – allowing a defendant to understand what must be defended, to 
challenge the legal sufficiency of the charges, and to prepare for trial – and retrospectively 
– to allow a court to impose an appropriate sentence upon conviction and to protect the 
defendant from a second prosecution for the same offense.  A charging document that fails 
to give adequate notice can be akin to moving the goal posts after the game has begun. 
This case is about whether a drafting error in an indictment resulted in inadequate 
notice of the alleged offense that deprived the trial court of jurisdiction.  Petitioner Teddy 
Shannon was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with, among other offenses, 
unlawful possession of a regulated firearm by a person who had previously been convicted 
of a predicate offense.  While the pertinent count of the indictment accurately stated 
detailed information about a prior conviction that prohibited Mr. Shannon from possessing 
a firearm – namely, the specific offense (possession with intent to distribute a controlled 
substance), the case number, and the date of that conviction – it also inaccurately referred 
to that conviction as a “crime of violence.”  That error went unnoticed in the Circuit Court, 
perhaps because Mr. Shannon stipulated before the jury that he was prohibited by a prior 
conviction from possessing a regulated firearm and disputed only whether he had possessed 
the firearm specified in the indictment.  The jury found Mr. Shannon guilty of the firearms 
offense. 
2 
 
On appeal, Mr. Shannon has sought to overturn his conviction on the firearms count, 
arguing that the additional language in that count meant that the count failed to charge him 
with a crime and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate that count.  The Court 
of Special Appeals declined to vacate his firearms conviction on that basis – and so do we, 
although with somewhat different reasoning. 
I 
Background 
A. 
Content and Amendment of a Charging Document 
Standards for Charging Documents 
Under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, a defendant in a criminal 
case is entitled to be informed in the charging document of the offenses that the defendant 
allegedly committed.1  This requirement serves several purposes:  (1) to notify the 
defendant as to what is to be defended; (2) to enable the defendant to prepare for trial; (3) 
to allow the court to consider the legal sufficiency of the charging document; (4) upon a 
conviction, to allow the court to impose an appropriate sentence; and (5) to protect the 
defendant against multiple prosecutions for the same offense and thereby vindicate the 
proscription against double jeopardy.  Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155, 163 (1981).  To carry 
out these purposes, a charging document must (1) adequately characterize the crime 
                                              
 
1 Article 21 states “[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be 
informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in 
due time (if required) to prepare for his defence ….” 
3 
 
charged and (2) describe the specific conduct on which that charge is based.  Id. at 163-64; 
see also Counts v. State, 444 Md. 52, 57-58 (2015).   
To further the constitutional guarantee, the Maryland Rules set standards for the 
content and amendment of a charging document.  In particular, Maryland Rule 4-202(a) 
requires, among other things, that a charging document “contain a concise and definite 
statement of the essential facts of the offense with which the defendant is charged and, with 
reasonable particularity, the time and place the offense occurred.”  See, e.g., Edmund v. 
State, 398 Md. 562, 575-76 (2007) (charging document that complied with Rule 4-202(a) 
satisfied purpose of Article 21); State v. Mulkey, 316 Md. 475, 480-82 (1989) (analyzing 
“reasonable particularity” standard of Rule 4-202(a) in relation to Article 21).   
The Rules allow for amendment of a charging document as follows: 
On motion of a party or on its own initiative, the court at any time 
before verdict may permit a charging document to be amended except 
that if the amendment changes the character of the offense charged, the 
consent of the parties is required.  If amendment of a charging 
document reasonably so requires, the court shall grant the defendant an 
extension of time or continuance.  
Maryland Rule 4-204 (emphasis added).  As is evident, an amendment that is a matter of 
form can be accomplished by the State with the permission of the trial court.  In contrast, 
if an amendment affects a matter of substance and would “change the character of the 
offense charged” – for example, a substantive change to an element of the crime charged 
in an indictment – the amendment may be made only with the defendant’s consent.  See 
Johnson v. State, 358 Md. 384, 387-92 (2000) (tracing history of Rule 4-204); see also 
Thompson v. State, 412 Md. 497, 516-17 (2010) (holding that amendment that corrected 
4 
 
precise date and location of the charged offense did not change character of the offense); 
Counts, 444 Md. at 65-66 (listing examples of cases in which an amendment changed the 
character of the offense charged).  This rule allows only for “changes, alterations, or 
modifications to an existing charge”; if the State intends to charge a defendant with 
additional offenses, it must file a new or additional charging document.  Johnson v. State, 
427 Md. 356, 375 (2012) (emphasis in original; citation and quotation marks omitted).   
 
Challenges to Sufficiency of Charging Document 
As a general rule, if a defendant wishes to raise a defect in the charging document, 
the defendant must file a motion based on that defect “within 30 days after the earlier of 
the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court”; 
otherwise, the defect is waived.  Maryland Rule 4-252(a)(2), (b).  There is an exception to 
this requirement if, as a result of the defect, the charging document fails “to show 
jurisdiction in the court or … to charge an offense”; in that case, the defect may be raised 
“at any time.”  Maryland Rule 4-252(a)(2), (d).  To a certain extent, these two exceptions 
amount to the same thing, for if a charging document fails to charge a cognizable crime, a 
court “lacks fundamental subject matter jurisdiction to render a judgment of conviction….”  
Williams v. State, 302 Md. 787, 792 (1985); see also Townes v. State, 314 Md. 71, 74 
(1988).   
B. 
The Offense of Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person 
Title 5 of the Public Safety Article defines a category of “regulated firearms” – 
essentially handguns and certain assault weapons – and regulates the possession, sale, and 
transfer of such firearms.  Maryland Code, Public Safety Article (“PS”), §5-101 et seq.  
5 
 
The statute prohibits the possession of a regulated firearm by various categories of 
individuals.  PS §5-133(b).2  It is a criminal offense for an individual who has previously 
been convicted of certain crimes to violate that prohibition.  PS §5-133(c).  As a shorthand, 
we will refer to an individual subject to that prohibition as a “prohibited person.” 
The statute groups predicate convictions into three categories.  Those categories are 
as follows:   
(1) Conviction of a “crime of violence,” defined to include 19 offenses under State 
law.3  PS §5-133(c)(1)(i).  
                                              
2 The history of these provisions, as well as certain other firearms laws, is recounted 
in some detail in Oglesby v. State, 441 Md. 673, 689-94 (2015).   
 
 
3 Section 5-101 defines “crime of violence” as:  
 
(1) abduction; 
(2) arson in the first degree; 
(3) assault in the first or second degree; 
(4) burglary in the first, second, or third degree; 
(5) carjacking and armed carjacking; 
(6) escape in the first degree; 
(7) kidnapping; 
(8) voluntary manslaughter; 
(9) maiming as previously proscribed under former Article 27, §386 of 
the Code; 
(10) mayhem as previously proscribed under former Article 27, §384 
of the Code; 
(11) murder in the first or second degree; 
(12) rape in the first or second degree; 
(13) robbery; 
(14) robbery with a dangerous weapon; 
(15) sexual offense in the first, second, or third degree; 
(16) home invasion under §6-202(b) of the Criminal Law Article; 
(17) a felony offense under Title 3, Subtitle 11 of the Criminal Law 
Article; 
6 
 
(2) Conviction of certain drug offenses.  PS §5-133(c)(1)(ii).  Nine offenses are 
listed in the statute.4  Pertinent to this case, possession with intent to distribute a controlled 
substance, in violation of Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article (“CR”), §5-602, is among 
those offenses. 
(3) Conviction of an out-of-state or federal offense equivalent to an offense in the 
first two categories.  PS §5-133(c)(1)(iii).  
The gravamen of the offense defined in PS §5-133(c)(1) is the possession of a 
regulated firearm.  The unit of prosecution is the firearm.  Thus, a prohibited person may 
be charged with a separate count of that offense for each regulated firearm that the person 
possesses, even if the person has only one predicate conviction.  See Snyder v. State, 210 
Md. App. 370, 395-98 (2013), cert. denied, 432 Md. 470 (2013).  On the other hand, if the 
prohibited person possesses only one regulated firearm, he or she has committed only one 
violation of the statute, regardless of whether the prohibited person was previously 
convicted of one predicate offense or a dozen predicate offenses.  See Melton v. State, 379 
Md. 471, 484-502 (2004). 
                                              
(18) an attempt to commit any of the crimes listed in items (1) through 
(17) of this subsection; or 
(19) assault with intent to commit any of the crimes listed in items (1) 
through (17) of this subsection or a crime punishable by imprisonment 
for more than 1 year. 
 
4 At the time of the offense alleged in the indictment in this case, PS §5-133(c)(1)(ii) 
listed seven offenses.  A 2018 amendment of the statute added two others.  Chapter 143, 
Laws of Maryland 2018.  That amendment does not affect the issues before us or our 
analysis of those issues. 
7 
 
A person who possesses a regulated firearm following a conviction of any of the 
offenses listed in PS §5-133(c)(1) is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to up to 15 
years’ imprisonment and may be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years’ 
imprisonment.  PS §5-133(c)(2)-(3). 
C. 
The Prosecution of Mr. Shannon  
At a trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Mr. Shannon was convicted of two 
offenses – threatening arson and a firearms offense – related to an altercation near his 
residence on December 10, 2016.  The issue in this appeal concerns an undisputed error in 
the drafting of the firearms count and does not depend on the sufficiency of the evidence 
or the particular facts of the case.  The underlying facts, as established at trial, are 
summarized in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals and there is no need to repeat 
that discussion here.  See Shannon v. State, 241 Md. App. 233, 238-40 (2019).   
 
The Statement of Charges 
A Statement of Charges, including a statement of probable cause in support of the 
charges, was filed in the District Court on December 11, 2016 in connection with Mr. 
Shannon’s arrest as a result of the altercation.  Among other things, the Statement of 
Charges alleged that Mr. Shannon possessed a regulated firearm in violation of PS §5-
133(c) and referred to two prior convictions:  a conviction for second degree assault, which 
is a “crime of violence” for purposes of PS §5-133(c) and a conviction for violation of CR 
§5-602 (possession with intent to distribute).  Either of those convictions would have 
supported the firearms charge under PS §5-133(c). 
 
 
8 
 
 
The Firearms Count of the Indictment  
On January 13, 2017, Mr. Shannon was charged in a six-count indictment with 
various offenses related to the altercation.  Two counts of the indictment charged Mr. 
Shannon with illegal possession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person; each count 
referred to a different firearm.  The count of which he was ultimately convicted read, in 
pertinent part, as follows:  
FIFTH COUNT 
 
. . . DEFENDANT, Teddy SHANNON . . . on or about December 10, 
2016, in the 1700 block of East 30th Street, in the City of Baltimore, 
State of Maryland, having been convicted of a crime of violence, as 
defined in Public Safety Article, Section 5-101(c), to wit: 05/09/2008, 
Possession with Intent to Distribute, Case No.: 107312013, did possess 
a regulated firearm, to wit: Ruger P90DC, .45 Caliber Handgun, in 
violation of Public Safety Article, Section 5-133(c) of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland; against the peace, government and dignity of the 
State. 
Indictment at 2 (underlining in original; italicized emphasis added).   
As is evident, this count alleged that Mr. Shannon had possessed a particular 
regulated firearm on a particular date in 2016 in a particular place, after having been 
convicted in 2008 in a specified case of the crime of possession with intent to distribute a 
controlled dangerous substance (a violation of CR §5-602).  As outlined above, that 
conviction, pursuant to PS §5-133(c)(1)(ii), disqualified him from possessing a regulated 
firearm.  However, the count also refers to the predicate conviction more generally as “a 
crime of violence.”  As also outlined above, a conviction for a “crime of violence” also 
disqualifies a person from possessing a regulated firearm pursuant to PS §5-133(c)(1)(i), 
but “crime of violence” is a defined term that does not include the drug offense specified 
9 
 
in the Fifth Count.  This was clearly a drafting error, but apparently went unnoticed by the 
parties while the case was in the Circuit Court.5  
The Trial 
At trial, the parties entered into a written “Stipulation of Fact” with respect to the 
predicate conviction element of the firearms charges.  That stipulation, which was read to 
the jury, stated that Mr. Shannon had previously “been convicted of a crime for which he 
is prohibited from possessing a regulated firearm under Public Safety Article 5-133(c).”  
The stipulation also made clear that, while Mr. Shannon conceded that he was prohibited 
from possessing a regulated firearm by a prior conviction, he did not concede that he had 
possessed such a firearm, which remained a factual issue for the jury.6   
When the trial court instructed the jury concerning the firearms charges, it reminded 
the jury of the stipulation that Mr. Shannon was prohibited from possessing a firearm as a 
result of a previous conviction.  In his closing argument, the prosecutor also alluded to the 
fact that Mr. Shannon was a prohibited person with respect to the firearms charges, without 
elaborating on why he was prohibited from possessing a regulated firearm.  At no time 
                                              
 
5 The Sixth Count of the indictment charged Mr. Shannon with a separate violation 
of PS §5-133(c) involving a “black handgun” and contained the same drafting error in the 
specification of the disqualifying conviction.  However, Mr. Shannon was acquitted of that 
charge and it is therefore not at issue in this appeal.   
 
6 It is not uncommon for a defendant in a case involving a charge of possessing a 
regulated firearm after having been convicted of a predicate offense to stipulate to the prior 
conviction and thereby avoid exposing the jury to the potential prejudicial effect that a 
description of the nature of that conviction might have.  See Carter v. State, 374 Md. 693, 
715-22 (2010) (holding that, when a defendant admits or stipulates to previous-conviction 
element of a firearms offense, the previous conviction should not be described to the jury 
with particularity).   
10 
 
before or during the trial did Mr. Shannon or his defense counsel raise the issue of the 
drafting error in the indictment.7   
After a three-day trial, the jury convicted Mr. Shannon of the Fifth Count charging 
him with possession of a regulated firearm by a disqualified person and threatening arson, 
in violation of CR §6-107.8  On January 11, 2018, the Circuit Court sentenced Mr. Shannon 
to 17 years’ incarceration – a 10-year sentence on the arson conviction and a consecutive 
seven-year sentence on the firearms conviction.  The court also ordered him to pay $2,400 
in restitution to the victims of the altercation.  
 
The Appeal 
 
Mr. Shannon appealed.  In the Court of Special Appeals, Mr. Shannon argued, for 
the first time, that the Fifth Count of the indictment was fatally defective in establishing 
the court’s jurisdiction because it failed to charge a crime.9  The intermediate appellate 
court, in a reported opinion, affirmed.  Shannon v. State, 241 Md. App. 233 (2019).  As an 
initial matter, the Court of Special Appeals reasoned that, because the Fifth Count included 
                                              
7 Following Mr. Shannon’s indictment, the Assistant Public Defender representing 
him filed a form omnibus motion that, among many other things, moved that the case “be 
dismissed because the Criminal Information and/or Indictment is defective.”  The motion 
did not elaborate and it appeared to have no more substance than another portion of the 
omnibus motion that sought a severance of co-defendants in a case in which there were no 
co-defendants.  See Tunnell v. State, 466 Md. 565, 576 n.9 (2020). 
 
8 The jury acquitted Mr. Shannon of conspiracy, two assault charges, and another 
firearms charge related to the altercation in December 2016.  
 
 
9 In his appeal, Mr. Shannon also contended that the Circuit Court erred in ordering 
him to pay restitution.  The Court of Special Appeals rejected that contention.  That issue 
is not before us. 
11 
 
the phrase “crime of violence” in addition to the specific details of Mr. Shannon’s prior 
drug conviction, it was required to treat the indictment as mistakenly charging illegal 
possession of a regulated firearm based on a prior conviction for a crime of a violence.  The 
intermediate appellate court concluded that the count contained sufficient detail to charge 
a crime, but believed that ignoring the phrase “crime of violence” would be equivalent to 
a substantive amendment of the character of the charge – requiring the assent of the 
defendant pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-204.  It further concluded that, in stipulating that 
he had committed a crime that prohibited him from possessing a firearm, Mr. Shannon had 
implicitly agreed to amend the “character of the offense charged” in the Fifth Count.10    
 
Neither party was satisfied with the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion.  Mr. 
Shannon filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, reiterating his argument that the Fifth Count 
was fatally defective as a result of the drafting error.  The State filed a conditional cross-
                                              
 
10 The Court of Special Appeals apparently concluded that there was a “constructive 
amendment” of the indictment based on Mr. Shannon’s implicit consent, although it did 
not use that phrase.  The intermediate appellate court had previously held that action (or, 
in some instances, inaction) by the prosecution, defense, or court during a criminal trial 
may result in a constructive amendment of an indictment outside the purview of Maryland 
Rule 4-204.  See Johnson v. State, 199 Md. App. 331, 347-49 (2011) (reviewing case law 
in other jurisdictions and concluding that defendant’s request for, or acquiescence in, jury 
instruction and verdict sheet constructively amended indictment), rev’d on other grounds, 
427 Md. 356 (2012).  In our consideration of that case, we rejected the notion that an 
indictment could be amended outside the purview of Maryland Rule 4-204, but left open 
the question whether it was possible to have a constructive amendment under that rule.  427 
Md. at 362, 372-76 & n.11.   
 
For its part, the State contends that, while Mr. Shannon’s actions would have 
sufficed to consent to an amendment of the Fifth Count, the drafting error did not require 
an amendment with the defendant’s consent, as correction of the drafting error would not 
have changed the character of the crime charged.  
12 
 
petition, disputing the conclusion of the intermediate appellate court that the drafting error 
required that the Fifth Count be amended with the defendant’s consent.  We granted both 
petitions.    
II 
Discussion 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
 
There are two questions before us in this appeal:  
(1) whether the Fifth Count, notwithstanding the drafting error, charged Mr. 
Shannon with a cognizable crime; and  
(2) whether an amendment pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-204, with Mr. Shannon’s 
consent, was necessary to change the character of the offense charged.   
These are both questions of law and, accordingly, we apply the non-deferential de 
novo standard of review.  Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604 (2004); Cole v. State, 378 Md. 
42, 56 (2003).  
 
We conclude that the Fifth Count charged Mr. Shannon with a cognizable crime 
under PS §5-133(c)(1) and that it was not necessary to amend that count with Mr. 
Shannon’s consent to change the character of the crime charged.11 
B. 
Whether the Fifth Count Charged Mr. Shannon with a Cognizable Offense 
 
 
Mr. Shannon did not raise any objection in the trial court to the drafting error in the 
Fifth Count.  Accordingly, his challenge to that count is only properly before us if that 
                                              
 
11 Thus, we need not address whether Maryland Rule 4-204 allows for a constructive 
amendment of an indictment.  See footnote 10 above.    
13 
 
defect in the indictment means that the Fifth Count failed to show jurisdiction or to charge 
an offense.  Maryland Rule 4-252(a)(2), (d).  To that end, he asserts that PS §5-133(c) does 
not prohibit “possession of a regulated firearm based upon a prior conviction for a crime 
of violence defined as possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous 
substance.”  He concludes that the Circuit Court therefore lacked jurisdiction “to inquire 
into the facts, to apply the law, and to declare the punishment” with respect to the Fifth 
Count.12  
 
As outlined above, not every defect in a charging document deprives a trial court of 
jurisdiction.  Only when the charging document fails to sufficiently describe the charged 
offense will it be so defective as to not charge a crime.  See Ayre, 291 Md. at 162-69 
(charging document omitted knowledge element of an obscenity offense); State v. Canova, 
278 Md. 483, 497-500 (1976) (charging documents failed to accurately describe the public 
employee status of recipients of alleged bribes).  A charging document need not be flawless 
to vest a court with jurisdiction to adjudicate the charge; rather, the charging document 
must provide the defendant with notice of the nature of the charge and of the basic facts 
supporting the elements of that charge.   
 
Here, the Fifth Count charged Mr. Shannon with unlawful possession of a regulated 
firearm, in violation of PS §5-133(c), after having already been convicted of a predicate 
offense.  As indicated above, the gravamen of this offense is the possession of a regulated 
                                              
12 Based on this conclusion, Mr. Shannon also reasons that his sentence on the Fifth 
Count was illegal under Maryland Rule 4-345.  Because we reject the premise of that 
argument, we do not discuss the application of Rule 4-345. 
14 
 
firearm.  The unit of prosecution is the firearm, regardless of the number of prior predicate 
convictions.  The Fifth Count described in detail the regulated firearm that Mr. Shannon 
allegedly possessed – a .45 caliber Ruger P90DC – as well as the time and place of 
possession. 
In describing the predicate offense, the Fifth Count stated that Mr. Shannon had 
previously been convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 
which is clearly a disqualifying conviction under PS §5-133(c)(1)(ii), and provided the date 
and case number of that conviction.  In light of the specific detail regarding Mr. Shannon’s 
predicate drug offense, the fact that the Fifth Count also inaccurately included the phrase 
“crime of violence” does not mean that the Fifth Count failed to sufficiently characterize a 
PS §5-133(c)(1) offense as to deprive the Circuit Court of jurisdiction.  Even if that count 
of the indictment had included more detail about a prior conviction of a crime of violence 
– such as Mr. Shannon’s prior assault conviction described in the original statement of 
charges – that would not have changed the nature of the offense, as Mr. Shannon would 
still have faced a single charge under PS §5-133(c)(1) of illegal possession of the Ruger 
handgun as a prohibited person.13  The phrase “crime of violence” was essentially 
                                              
13 Had the Fifth Count specified two prior disqualifying convictions, it might have 
been challenged on the grounds of duplicity – in the sense of arguably charging two 
offenses or two ways of committing one offense – in a single count.  But that does not 
mean that it failed to allege an offense, to establish the jurisdiction of the court, or to 
properly characterize the offense.  See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 44 Md. App. 59, 68 (1979) 
(while criminal information stated two underlying felonies in count alleging that defendant 
was accessory after the fact and could have been subject to attack in trial court, it did set 
forth an offense over which the trial court had jurisdiction).  The failure to file a timely 
motion challenging such a defect waives such a challenge.  Maryland Rule 4-252(a)(2); 
see also Callahan v. State, 174 Md. 47, 50 (1938). 
15 
 
surplusage that did not deprive Mr. Shannon of fair notice of the charge against him.  See 
Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 223 (1953) (“The insertion of surplus words in the 
indictment does not change the nature of the offense charged.”).   
 
The Fifth Count satisfied the underlying purposes of Article 21 and Maryland Rule 
4-202(a).  Mr. Shannon had adequate notice, for purposes of trial and any challenge he 
wished to make to the sufficiency of the charge, of the regulated firearm he allegedly 
possessed, the time and place of possession, and at least one prior conviction that prohibited 
him from possessing that regulated firearm.  That charge permitted the Circuit Court to 
impose the sentence it felt appropriate in compliance with the statute.  There is no 
suggestion that the drafting error renders Mr. Shannon vulnerable to a second prosecution 
for the same offense.14 
 
While unnecessary or inaccurate language in a charging document might create 
confusion in some cases, the proper vehicle for challenging the presence of that language 
in this case would have been a timely motion pursuant to Rule 4-252(a).  See Williams, 302 
Md. at 793.  Here, however, Mr. Shannon did not object to the drafting error in the Fifth 
Count while the case was in the Circuit Court and therefore waived any claim of error on 
that score.  See Robinson v. State, 353 Md. 683, 703 (1999); Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 
696-98 (1993).  Thus, we need not resolve whether the Stipulation of Fact amounted to a 
                                              
14 For example, if the jury had acquitted Mr. Shannon of the Fifth Count concerning 
possession of the Ruger handgun, the State could not have attempted to prosecute him 
under PS §5-133(c)(1) for possession of the same handgun by a prohibited person based 
on his prior assault conviction – or any other conviction described in PS §5-133(c)(1).  In 
such a case, he would have a valid motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds. 
16 
 
constructive amendment of the Fifth Count with his consent within the purview of 
Maryland Rule 4-204.  
III 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the Fifth Count of the indictment 
provided Mr. Shannon with sufficient notice of the crime charged in that count and 
adequately described the specific conduct on which that charge was based.  That count 
charged a cognizable crime and showed the jurisdiction of the trial court.  To the extent 
that the drafting error in the indictment otherwise could be a basis for objection, Mr. 
Shannon waived any such objection by failing to raise it in the Circuit Court.   
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY 
PETITIONER.