Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Cicero

Citation: 2014-Ohio-4639

Docket Number: 2013-1980

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Cicero, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4639.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-4639 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. CICERO. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Cicero,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4639.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—False 
statements 
to 
tribunal—Conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation—Conduct 
prejudicial 
to 
administration of justice—Conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to 
practice law—Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2013-1980—Submitted April 29, 2014—Decided October 23, 2014.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2013-002. 
____________________ 
 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Christopher Thomas Cicero of Columbus, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0039882, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1988.  Relator, disciplinary counsel, has charged Cicero with making a false 
statement of law or fact to a tribunal, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a); 
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engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, in 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c); engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d); and engaging in 
conduct that adversely reflects on Cicero’s fitness to practice law, in violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). 
{¶ 2} This is Cicero’s third time before the court on disciplinary charges.  
In 1997, we suspended Cicero from the practice of law for one year for engaging 
in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and failing to maintain a 
respectful attitude toward the courts, based on his insinuation to other attorneys, 
including his opposing counsel, that he was having a sexual relationship with a 
judge before whom he was practicing.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Cicero, 78 Ohio 
St.3d 351, 678 N.E.2d 517 (1997).  In 2012, we again suspended Cicero for one 
year for violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.18 (prohibiting a lawyer from revealing 
information learned during discussions with a prospective client) and 8.4(h), 
based on his disclosure of a potential client’s confidential communications.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Cicero, 134 Ohio St.3d 311, 2012-Ohio-5457, 982 
N.E.2d 650. 
{¶ 3} Relator’s single-count complaint here alleged that Cicero, after 
receiving a speeding ticket, obtained a blank, signed judgment entry from the 
arraignment-court judge, used the entry to unilaterally reduce his speeding charge 
to a headlight violation, and later falsely represented to the court and the 
prosecutor’s office that a prosecutor had approved the reduction.  This alleged 
conduct occurred while Cicero’s second disciplinary case was pending. 
{¶ 4} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline heard testimony, reviewed the evidence, and made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  The panel found that Cicero had violated Prof.Cond.R. 
3.3(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h) and recommended an indefinite suspension of 
Cicero’s license to practice law.  Upon review, the board amended the panel’s 
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findings to add a specific finding that Cicero’s conduct was sufficiently egregious 
to constitute a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  The board also modified the 
panel’s recommendation and recommended permanent disbarment instead of an 
indefinite suspension. 
{¶ 5} Cicero has filed an objection, challenging only the board’s 
recommendation of permanent disbarment.  For purposes of his objection, Cicero 
accepts the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, as modified by the 
board.  For the following reasons, we sustain Cicero’s objection. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 6} This case centers around Cicero’s conduct in the Franklin County 
Municipal Court after receiving a speeding ticket in Columbus. Having handled a 
large number of traffic cases and having appeared in the municipal court on 
numerous occasions, Cicero was familiar with the judges, prosecutors, and 
policies of that court. 
{¶ 7} On March 22, 2012, the day after receiving his speeding ticket, 
Cicero approached the municipal-court arraignment judge, Scott VanDerKarr.  
Cicero informed Judge VanDerKarr of his speeding ticket and obtained a blank, 
but signed, judgment entry.  There is conflicting testimony as to what Cicero told 
Judge VanDerKarr.  According to the judge, Cicero indicated that a prosecutor, 
who he identified by name, had offered him a reduction of his charge.  But Cicero 
claims that he told the judge only that he was going to talk to an unnamed 
prosecutor.  At the time, Cicero’s speeding ticket had neither been filed with the 
court nor assigned a case number, and no prosecutor had offered to amend or 
reduce Cicero’s speeding ticket. Cicero did not consult the arraignment-court 
prosecutor, Rob Levering, because he wanted to seek out a more “favorable” 
prosecutor. 
{¶ 8} Following Cicero’s instructions, his assistant, Tyler Carrell, filled 
in the blank judgment entry and filed it on April 3, 2012.  The entry amended 
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Cicero’s speeding violation to a headlight violation under R.C. 4513.04, an 
offense that carries no “points” and eliminated any danger of a license suspension.  
(Cicero had previously received approximately 50 speeding tickets, and his 
driver’s license had twice been suspended as a result.)  The amendment of a 
speeding infraction to an equipment violation was contrary to the city attorney’s 
policy that all amendments relate to the original offense. 
{¶ 9} Finding the April 3, 2012 judgment entry to be incomplete, as it 
did not include a finding of guilt, the clerk’s office contacted Judge VanDerKarr’s 
bailiff, Mike Basham. In an effort to correct the judgment entry, both Basham and 
Judge VanDerKarr contacted Cicero regarding the identity of the prosecutor who 
agreed to amend his citation, but Cicero refused to name a prosecutor.  After his 
fruitless conversation with Cicero, Judge VanDerKarr issued a warrant for 
Cicero’s arrest for contempt of court. 
{¶ 10} Following his conversation with Judge VanDerKarr, Cicero drafted 
a letter to Lara N. Baker, the city attorney’s chief prosecutor.  Cicero’s letter 
described the sequence of events as follows:  
 
I talked to one of your assistan[ts] and showed that person my 
ticket and asked whether or not I could amend it. * * *  
I then went to the [arraignment court] judge at the time 
which was Judge [VanDerKarr].  I informed him I had a speeding 
ticket that your office was willing to amend[.]  * * *  
* * * 
[T]hat agreement made by your office was the only reason why 
* * * Judge VanDerKarr agreed to the amendment. 
 
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Cicero admits that he intentionally lied regarding the sequence of events 
described in his letter and that he did not have approval from a prosecutor when 
he approached Judge VanDerKarr. 
{¶ 11} On April 5, 2012, Cicero appeared before Judge VanDerKarr on 
the arrest warrant, but refused to answer Judge VanDerKarr’s direct requests for 
the name of the prosecutor who had offered to amend his speeding citation.  
Baker, who was also present, stated that she had spoken with all but three of her 
staff and that each staff member denied offering Cicero an amendment.  One of 
the staff members Baker had not reached was former assistant prosecutor Brandon 
Shroy, whose last day of work at the city attorney’s office was March 23, 2012.  
Upon Cicero’s request for 24 hours to “talk to somebody,” Judge VanDerKarr 
recessed the contempt hearing and allowed Cicero to post a $1,000 cash bond for 
his release.  Judge VanDerKarr warned Cicero, “Tomorrow, if you don’t give me 
a name, cash bond will be forfeited and you’ll go to jail.” 
{¶ 12} Following the recess, Cicero approached Basham and identified 
Shroy as the prosecutor who made the offer.  Cicero also called Shroy.  According 
to Shroy, Cicero asked if he could use Shroy’s name in connection with a ticket 
he had received, and Shroy told him no.  Cicero, on the other hand, testified that 
he told Shroy that there was a problem with the amendment Shroy had given him 
and asked Shroy if he remembered the offer.  Cicero testified that after leaving the 
arraignment courtroom on March 22, 2012, he had a 20-second conversation with 
Shroy and that Shroy authorized Cicero to amend his speeding ticket.  Shroy 
denied that any such conversation had occurred. 
{¶ 13} On April 6, 2012, before the contempt hearing resumed, Cicero 
spoke with Basham, who relayed to Judge VanDerKarr that Cicero had admitted 
that he did not have an offer when he approached Judge VanDerKarr in 
arraignment court.  In court, Cicero denied making that statement and named 
Shroy as the prosecutor who authorized the reduction.  But he again refused to 
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explain how the alleged plea offer came about.  Judge VanDerKarr again 
continued the contempt hearing, revoked Cicero’s bond, and remanded Cicero 
into custody.  Cicero spent five days in jail. 
{¶ 14} On April 10, 2012, Cicero appeared before Judge VanDerKarr 
with counsel, withdrew his plea to the headlight violation, and pleaded no contest 
to the original speeding violation.  Cicero’s attorney stated that Cicero recognized 
the delay caused by his failure to answer Judge VanDerKarr’s questions and 
claimed that there had been a “fundamental misunderstanding” among Cicero, the 
prosecutor’s office, and the court.  Counsel relayed Cicero’s “sincere[] apolog[y] 
for the inconvenience.”  Judge VanDerKarr cited Cicero for contempt and 
sentenced him to time served. 
{¶ 15} Cicero does not challenge the board’s findings that his conduct 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). 
Sanction 
{¶ 16} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider the 
duties violated, the actual injury caused, the attorney’s mental state, and sanctions 
imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 
2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  We also weigh the evidence of the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings before the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Cleveland 
Bar Assn. v. Glatki, 88 Ohio St.3d 381, 384, 726 N.E.2d 993 (2000). 
{¶ 17} The panel noted the character testimony that Cicero offered in 
mitigation, but ultimately found a lack of mitigating factors.  On the other hand, 
the panel found several aggravating factors.  In addition to Cicero’s prior 
disciplinary record, the panel found that Cicero had acted with a dishonest or 
selfish motive to avoid a suspension of his driver’s license and, later, to protect 
his professional reputation.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a) and (b).  The panel 
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found that Cicero engaged in a pattern of misconduct, considering both the 
conduct in this case and in his previous disciplinary cases.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(c).  The panel also found that Cicero had repeatedly refused to accept 
responsibility for his actions and relay the truth.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(g). 
The panel concluded that Cicero’s conduct demonstrated disrespect for the 
judicial system and warranted an indefinite suspension. 
{¶ 18} In recommending permanent disbarment rather than the panel’s 
recommended indefinite suspension, the board cited the following factors: 
 
(1) [Cicero’s] repeated disciplinary violations; (2) the pattern of 
dishonesty and self-serving behavior that is prevalent throughout 
[Cicero’s] disciplinary cases; (3) engaging in the misconduct that 
is the subject of this proceeding while his most recent disciplinary 
case was pending; (4) the Board’s conclusion that [Cicero] is no 
longer fit to practice a profession grounded on trust, integrity, and 
candor; and (5) the Board’s conclusion that disbarment is 
necessary to ensure the protection of the public. 
  
{¶ 19} In cases involving multiple instances of misconduct, including a 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), we impose an actual suspension.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Stafford, 131 Ohio St.3d 385, 2012-Ohio-909, 965 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 67.  
Actual suspension is also warranted when an attorney exhibits a pattern of 
abusing legal procedures.  Id. at ¶ 70.  A lawyer’s material misrepresentation to a 
court “ ‘strikes at the very core of [the] lawyer’s relationship with the court and 
with the client.  Respect for our profession is diminished with every deceitful act 
of a lawyer.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 68, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio 
St.3d 187, 190, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995). 
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{¶ 20} Cicero does not address the possibility of an actual suspension.  
Instead, he urges this court to adopt the panel’s recommendation of indefinite 
suspension in lieu of permanent disbarment.  “[W]e reserve the ultimate sanction 
of permanent disbarment for the most egregious misconduct.”  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008-Ohio-3194, 891 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 92.  
We have permanently disbarred attorneys upon proof of the attorney’s “proclivity 
for lying and deceit.”  Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Farrell, 129 Ohio St.3d 223, 2011-
Ohio-2879, 951 N.E.2d 390, ¶ 34.  But the ultimate sanction is not automatic in 
such cases.  In Stafford, which involved “a course of conduct that was replete with 
dishonest, deceptive, and disrespectful acts,” including false statements 
concerning the integrity of a judicial officer, we imposed only a 12-month 
suspension.  Id. at ¶ 68-69, 80.  We have also imposed partially or fully stayed 
suspensions in some cases involving dishonest, deceitful, or fraudulent conduct.  
Id. at ¶ 71.  Cicero suggests that the misconduct in this case does not rise to the 
level of egregiousness required for permanent disbarment, and he stresses that his 
prior infractions did not involve matters affecting client relationships. 
{¶ 21} In support of its recommendation of indefinite suspension, the 
panel cited Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009-Ohio-2870, 
909 N.E.2d 1271, and Columbus Bar Assn. v. Squeo, 133 Ohio St.3d 536, 2012-
Ohio-5004, 979 N.E.2d 321.  The attorney in Frost filed false and baseless 
accusations of bias and corruption against county judges and a county prosecutor, 
leveled unfounded accusations of racial bias and other impropriety against a 
federal judge, and filed a baseless defamation action against her opposing 
counsel.  This court agreed with the board that the attorney “committed acts of 
dishonesty, engaged in a pattern of misconduct, committed multiple offenses, and 
has failed to acknowledge the wrongfulness of her conduct.”  Frost at ¶ 37.  
While noting the eroding effect on public confidence of false statements 
impugning the integrity of judicial officers, the attorney’s failure to inquire into 
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9 
 
the truth of her allegations, and the attorney’s ingrained pattern of resorting to 
improprieties, we imposed only indefinite suspension.  Id. at ¶ 37-38, 41-42.  We 
also indefinitely suspended the attorney in Squeo, who held himself out as an 
attorney while his license was suspended and did not cooperate in a disciplinary 
investigation.  Aggravating factors included prior discipline, a selfish or dishonest 
motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, failure to cooperate in the 
disciplinary process, vulnerability of and resulting harm to victims of the 
misconduct, and failure to make restitution.  Id. at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 22} In support of its recommendation of permanent disbarment here, 
the board cites Farrell, 129 Ohio St.3d 223, 2011-Ohio-2879, 951 N.E.2d 390.  
There, the Cincinnati Bar Association filed a complaint against an attorney who 
was already serving a two-year suspension for fabricating documents, forging his 
wife’s signature on a power of attorney, lying to secure notarization of the power 
of attorney, and using the forged document to obtain credit.  The bar association’s 
complaint alleged that the attorney had failed to file tax returns, failed to pay tax 
liabilities, and filed a false affidavit in his domestic-relations proceedings.  The 
attorney admitted the allegations and acknowledged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from committing an illegal act that reflects adversely 
on the lawyer's honesty or trustworthiness), (c), (d), and (h), but he objected to the 
board’s recommendation for permanent disbarment.  In overruling the objection, 
we found a lack of genuine remorse and stated that the attorney’s “pattern of lying 
and deceit strongly suggests that he lacks the ability to conform his behavior to 
the ethical standards incumbent upon attorneys in this state.”  Id. at ¶ 35. 
{¶ 23} The conduct alleged in Farrell overlapped and was intrinsically 
connected with the conduct underlying the attorney’s prior disciplinary action.  
Both cases stemmed from the attorney’s financial dishonesty in relation to his 
deteriorating relationship with his wife.  The attorney’s misconduct began in 
2002, when he stopped filing income-tax returns and ceased making regular 
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estimated payments toward his income-tax liability.  Id. at ¶ 7.  Two years later, 
the attorney again undertook a “pattern of deception” that included the dishonest 
and fraudulent conduct underlying his first disciplinary case.  Id.  The panel found 
that the attorney “had engaged in a six-year pattern of pathological lying and 
deceptive conduct, acted with a premeditated intent to deceive the domestic-
relations court, and submitted false testimony to another panel of the [b]oard.”  Id. 
at ¶ 22.  Moreover, the attorney “continued to spin his web of lies” even while 
expressing remorse in his prior case.  Id. at ¶ 33. 
{¶ 24} This case is more akin to Frost and Squeo than Farrell.  Like the 
attorneys in Frost and Squeo, Cicero has engaged in a pattern of dishonest 
conduct with selfish or dishonest motives, and, like those attorneys, he should 
face indefinite suspension.  Unlike the continued deception linking the 
disciplinary violations committed by the attorney in Farrell, however, Cicero’s 
disciplinary history involves three distinct matters.  Cicero’s prior disciplinary 
violations were not based on findings of dishonesty, misrepresentation, or fraud.  
Although a witness in Cicero’s first disciplinary action testified that contrary to 
Cicero’s testimony, Cicero’s relationship with the judge had begun before the 
judge recused herself, the board concluded that disciplinary counsel failed to raise 
that issue in the complaint.  78 Ohio St.3d at 352, 678 N.E.2d 517.  Although the 
panel in Cicero’s second disciplinary case found his testimony “ ‘at times 
disingenuous and not credible,’ ” Cicero’s violations there were not based on 
dishonest conduct, but on the revelation of confidential information from a 
prospective client.  134 Ohio St.3d 311, 2012-Ohio-5457, 982 N.E.2d 650, at 
¶ 14, quoting the panel’s report.  The longstanding pattern of deceit present in 
Farrell is not present in this case. 
{¶ 25} To be sure, Cicero’s repeated disciplinary violations are troubling.  
But the mere fact that this is Cicero’s third disciplinary sanction does not 
necessarily mean that his misconduct merits permanent disbarment.  In Columbus 
January Term, 2014 
11 
 
Bar Assn. v. Boggs, 129 Ohio St.3d 190, 2011-Ohio-2637, 951 N.E.2d 65, for 
example, this court ordered an indefinite suspension in an attorney’s third 
disciplinary case, even though both his second and third involved the attorney’s 
failure to keep accurate records of client money in his trust account and even 
though we found that the attorney had failed to rectify that unprofessional conduct 
after his second disciplinary sanction. 
{¶ 26} By no means do we condone Cicero’s dishonest, unprofessional, 
and censurable conduct, which was prejudicial to the administration of justice and 
which adversely reflects on Cicero’s fitness to practice law.  Nevertheless, in light 
of this court’s precedent and considering all of the circumstances, including the 
aggravating factors and lack of significant mitigating factors, we do not find that 
Cicero’s conduct, egregious though it may be, rises to the level for which we 
reserve the sanction of permanent disbarment.  Instead, we determine that 
indefinite suspension is appropriate for Cicero’s misconduct. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 27} For these reasons, we indefinitely suspended Christopher Thomas 
Cicero from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to Cicero. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., dissent. 
____________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 28} “[H]e who permits himself to tell a lie once, finds it much easier to 
do it a second and a third time, till at length it becomes habitual; he tells lies 
without attending to it, and truths without the world’s believing him.  This 
falsehood of the tongue leads to that of the heart, and in time depraves all its good 
dispositions.”  Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Peter Carr (Aug. 19, 1785), reprinted 
in 8 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 406 (1953). 
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{¶ 29} I must dissent.  The panel and board came to the well-founded 
conclusion that Cicero’s version of events in this matter was wholly incredible.  
Cicero expressly accepted the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
the objections he has filed with this court.  Despite this, the majority appears to 
lend credence to certain aspects of Cicero’s version of events and uses them to 
arrive at a conclusion that does not adequately recognize the insidiousness of 
Cicero’s behavior. 
{¶ 30} I must also disagree with the majority’s logic in finding any 
substantive distinction between this case and Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Farrell, 129 
Ohio St.3d 223, 2011-Ohio-2879, 951 N.E.2d 390.  Cicero’s pattern of selfishly 
motivated, deceitful conduct soundly measures up to the level of misconduct in 
Farrell and is far worse than the misconduct in Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 
Ohio St.3d 219, 2009-Ohio-2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271, Columbus Bar Assn. v. 
Squeo, 133 Ohio St.3d 536, 2012-Ohio-5004, 979 N.E.2d 321, and Columbus Bar 
Assn. v. Boggs, 129 Ohio St.3d 190, 2011-Ohio-2637, 951 N.E.2d 65.  Given the 
egregiousness of Cicero’s misconduct and the clear risk of recidivism, disbarment 
is the only appropriate sanction here.  Anything less lowers our standards of 
ethical conduct for attorneys and further erodes the public’s faith in the bar. 
{¶ 31} Although we are not bound by the findings and conclusions of the 
panel and board, “[w]e will defer to a panel's credibility determinations in our 
independent review of discipline cases unless the record weighs heavily against 
those determinations.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 
2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 39, citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 
Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8.  The panel and board in 
this case found that Cicero was deceitful throughout the underlying matter, that he 
made “misrepresentations at almost every turn,” and that his behavior during 
disciplinary proceedings was “inexcusable.” Nothing has been offered to rebut 
these determinations.  To the contrary, Cicero accepts them.  Yet the majority 
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strays from the board’s determinations, which were based on the credibility of 
Cicero and others, when determining the appropriate sanction in this case. 
{¶ 32} The panel in this case unequivocally found that Cicero “never 
received an offer from a prosecutor to amend his traffic citation.”  It did not 
happen.  Instead, Cicero strategically exploited the court system where he 
frequently worked in order to obtain a blank judgment entry.  And he attempted to 
perpetrate a fraud on the court by unilaterally modifying the entry with no 
approval or even review by a prosecutor or judge and filing the entry with the 
clerk’s office.  After a simple error in the entry brought Cicero’s fraud to light, he 
lied to Judge VanDerKarr and the entire prosecutor’s office, claiming that an 
assistant prosecutor—who Cicero somehow could not name—had given him 
permission to amend his ticket.  Cicero committed this falsehood to writing and 
submitted it to the court and the prosecutor’s office. 
{¶ 33} But the charade did not end there.  Rather than admit to the 
wrongdoing, Cicero threw out a school of red herrings, ignored by the majority, in 
a transparent attempt to avoid being caught red-handed with a nonexistent 
prosecutor.  Cicero made the following outlandish excuses for his lie while under 
oath: he could not tell Judge VanDerKarr who the assistant prosecutor was 
because (1) no one had told him what the problem was with the judgment entry, 
preventing him from understanding that he was being asked to identify the 
assistant prosecutor, (2) Cicero was only asked which name he had given to Judge 
VanDerKarr when he initially asked for the blank judgment entry, preventing 
Cicero from understanding that what the questioners actually wanted to know was 
which prosecutor had agreed to amend the ticket, (3) Judge VanDerKarr was so 
unreasonably angry that Cicero could not get a word in edgewise, (4) Cicero was 
secretly protecting the assistant prosecutor from a vindictive chief prosecutor, (5) 
he was secretly protecting Judge VanDerKarr from the chief prosecutor and 
apparently from Judge VanDerKarr himself, (6) he did not want to give Judge 
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VanDerKarr the satisfaction of having any information because the entire 
situation was Judge VanDerKarr’s fault, (7) the questions were all happening so 
fast that he did not have the wherewithal to provide the assistant prosecutor’s 
name, (8) some unnamed person or persons had asked Cicero “not to say 
anything.”  Cicero’s quiver of untruths is notable for its depth, if nothing else. 
{¶ 34} And moments after Cicero learned of information that made ex-
assistant-prosecutor Brandon Shroy a convenient scapegoat, Cicero changed his 
story to a more concrete falsehood: Shroy (or as Cicero called him, “Shroyer”) 
was the assistant prosecutor who had given permission to amend the ticket.  That 
lie crumbled when it was later explained that Shroy’s specialized “zone initiative 
attorney” position at the city prosecutor’s office did not involve traffic or criminal 
matters, Shroy was not assigned to any arraignment courtroom, and multiple 
office policies would have prohibited Shroy from agreeing to the amendment that 
Cicero had filed.  Further, at the time Cicero claimed to have spoken with Shroy 
about the ticket, Shroy was participating in an exit interview and packing up his 
office, as it was his second-to-last day working at the prosecutor’s office.  
Unfazed by the solid evidence against him, Cicero continued to impugn Shroy’s 
professional integrity by falsely claiming that he had filed the amended ticket with 
Shroy’s blessing, that Shroy was now lying, and that Cicero had done no wrong. 
{¶ 35} Cicero’s fraud and intentional interference with his traffic-court 
and contempt proceedings formed the basis of the trial court’s contempt finding 
and the city prosecutor’s motion to vacate the judgment on Cicero’s traffic 
violation on grounds that Cicero had obtained the reduced charge by means of 
fraud.  After negotiations with Cicero’s counsel, the court agreed to allow Cicero 
to withdraw his original plea instead of vacating the original entry on grounds of 
fraud.  The court then allowed Cicero to enter a new plea to the original speeding 
violation, which was the latest of over 50.  In exchange, the court required 
January Term, 2014 
15 
 
Cicero’s attorney to state on the record that Cicero recognized that he had delayed 
court proceedings and that he apologized for the inconvenience to the court. 
{¶ 36} Although a sincere-appearing apology on the record might lead 
one to infer some degree of contrition on Cicero’s part, Cicero and his attorney, 
William Ireland, made sure to dispel any possibility of that belief.  Cicero testified 
that he had nothing to do with what he called the “canned” statement, that his 
attorney presented the statement solely to appease Judge VanDerKarr, and that his 
only concession was that additional time did pass during his proceedings due to 
the “back and forth” with the judge.  Far from taking responsibility for his 
misconduct or even regretting any aspect of his role in the matter, Cicero 
continued to blame others and maintained that the proceedings against him were 
“bullshit,” that they were entirely retaliatory, that Judge VanDerKarr had 
repeatedly “lied” and was “insane,” and that Cicero “wanted to rip his Goddamn 
heart out.”  Ireland testified that the statement was Judge VanDerKarr’s creation 
and that Cicero’s actions had not in fact prejudiced the administration of justice 
because the entire proceeding was “pure hogwash.” Despite the majority’s 
attempt to distinguish Cicero’s conduct here from his prior disciplinary 
proceedings, this testimony demonstrates exactly the same kind of evasive, 
deceptive, and dishonest conduct that resulted in Cicero’s prior two suspensions. 
{¶ 37} Cicero’s refusal to acknowledge any wrongdoing and his inability 
to talk about his actions in an honest and nonevasive manner became even clearer 
during his argument before this court.  Cicero avoided many of our questions with 
feigned confusion and attempts to divert the focus to allegedly conflicting 
testimony.  Despite the record before us, which is replete with instances of 
Cicero’s dogged refusal to accept even the slightest blame, he assured us that “I’m 
taking responsibility for all of it, from day one, and I always have.”  And yet, on 
those occasions when Cicero was at least somewhat responsive to our questions, 
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he maintained that Brandon Shroy and Judge VanDerKarr were the ones who 
were in the wrong or that it was their statements that should not be believed. 
{¶ 38} There is nothing before us to suggest any genuineness in Cicero’s 
purported acceptance of responsibility for his lies and misconduct, and his 
continued willingness to assail the integrity and careers of other legal 
professionals is lamentable.  Thus, while Cicero averred to this court that “I’ve 
crucified myself more than I care to think about,” his claims of self-flagellation 
are disingenuous.  More importantly for purposes here, his implication that the 
punishment he says he has inflicted on himself is mitigating or, worse yet, that it 
is a sufficient sanction, is indefensible. 
{¶ 39} Cicero’s spectacular talent for deflecting blame and minimizing 
misbehavior reflects his inability to conduct himself in an ethical manner.  That 
inability portends great risk to his clients and endangers the public and the legal 
profession. 
{¶ 40} It is fortunate that our jurisprudence does not contain many cases 
that are similar to the one at hand.  But the scarcity of guiding examples should 
not drive us to look to less serious cases in order to determine the appropriate 
sanction here.  Although indefinite suspensions were appropriate in Boggs, Frost, 
and Squeo, the circumstances at play in those cases render them inapposite. 
{¶ 41} It is true that the respondent in Boggs was not disbarred after his 
third disciplinary proceeding, but disbarment was apparently not considered as an 
option.  Id., 129 Ohio St.3d 190, 2011-Ohio-2637, 951 N.E.2d 65, at ¶ 30-32.  In 
Boggs, the respondent’s first disciplinary case resulted in a public reprimand, and 
the second involved a fully stayed suspension, which was suggested by the parties 
in a consent-to-discipline agreement.  Id. at ¶ 1; Columbus Bar Assn. v. Boggs, 
103 Ohio St.3d 108, 2004-Ohio-4657, 814 N.E.2d 815, ¶ 1, 15.  In his third 
disciplinary case, in 2011, the respondent was truthful and cooperative during 
disciplinary proceedings, and the only question was whether a two-year 
January Term, 2014 
17 
 
suspension or an indefinite suspension would be commensurate with his 
increasing misconduct, which primarily involved failing to keep accurate records 
for client trust accounts.  Id. at ¶ 24, 30.  Although Cicero similarly has a pattern 
of increasing misconduct, his violations are far more serious, and his proceedings 
involved none of the forthrightness or cooperation found in Boggs. 
{¶ 42} The respondent in Frost, unlike Cicero, had no history of 
professional misconduct.  Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009-Ohio-2870, 909 
N.E.2d 1271, at ¶ 36.  Her baseless allegations of defamation, bias, and corruption 
against attorneys and judges appeared to stem from unaddressed mental-health 
issues and did not involve the manipulative and selfishly motivated behavior 
evident in Cicero’s cases.  Id. at ¶ 43.  This court considered disbarment as an 
option in the Frost case, but concluded that the lesser sanction of an indefinite 
suspension was more appropriate because the respondent’s behavior did not 
involve a pervasive pattern of false accusations and manipulation of the legal 
system.  Id. at ¶ 41-42.  We cannot make that same finding to temper the result in 
Cicero’s case. 
{¶ 43} The pattern of multiple offenses forming the respondent’s 
disciplinary history in Squeo involved mere administrative suspensions for failure 
to comply with registration and continuing-legal-education requirements.  
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Squeo, 133 Ohio St.3d 536, 2012-Ohio-5004, 979 N.E.2d 
321, at ¶ 1, 6.  Although the misconduct underlying Squeo’s third disciplinary 
action might be serious enough to allow comparison with some of Cicero’s 
conduct, the respondent’s misconduct was not part of the longstanding pattern of 
dishonesty and recalcitrance that is before us today. 
{¶ 44} The majority contends that Cicero’s case is not comparable with 
the disbarment case, Farrell, because the respondent in Farrell engaged in a 
years-long pattern of dishonest and fraudulent conduct, intentionally deceived a 
court, and continued to lie to the disciplinary board and to this court while 
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18 
 
claiming to be remorseful.  Majority opinion at ¶ 23, citing Farrell, 129 Ohio 
St.3d 223, 2011-Ohio-2879, 951 N.E.2d 390, at ¶ 22, 33.  But as the board 
recognized in an explicit finding, Cicero showed a “pattern of dishonesty and self-
serving behavior that is prevalent throughout [Cicero’s] disciplinary cases,” i.e., 
from 1993 to 2012.  The majority’s description of Farrell almost perfectly 
matches up to Cicero’s conduct, with the exception that Cicero’s pattern of 
dishonesty has spanned over a decade rather than a few years and has involved 
repeated affronts to the dignity of the courts and the reputations of court officials 
and other legal professionals. 
{¶ 45} In 1993, Cicero lied to clients, an assistant prosecutor, and 
colleagues by stating that he had an active sexual relationship with a judge who 
was presiding over a case of one of Cicero’s clients.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Cicero, 78 Ohio St.3d 351, 678 N.E.2d 517 (1997).  He lied that the judge was so 
interested in having sex with him that she would probably rush through the 
client’s proceedings in order to return to that pastime.  Id. at 351.  He lied about 
this to a client, who, as a result, encouraged others to retain Cicero’s services.  Id. 
{¶ 46} In 2010, he betrayed the trust of a potential client by sharing the 
client’s confidential information, in writing, with the high-profile head football 
coach at the Ohio State University.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Cicero, 134 Ohio 
St.3d 311, 2012-Ohio-5457, 982 N.E.2d 650, ¶ 4-7.  Cicero’s betrayal, which 
caused widespread harm to others, was motivated by his base desire for self-
aggrandizement.  Id. at ¶ 17.  This second disciplinary proceeding revealed that, 
like here, Cicero took no responsibility for his actions and provided disingenuous 
testimony that denied all wrongdoing in the face of overwhelming evidence.  Id. 
at ¶ 7, 14, 17. 
{¶ 47} Despite the grave misconduct at issue in Cicero’s second 
disciplinary case, we imposed the measured sanction of a one-year suspension.  
Id. at ¶ 21.  Little did we know that while that matter was pending before us, 
January Term, 2014 
19 
 
Cicero was engaging in the very misconduct at issue in this case, which arose 
from yet another pattern of wrongdoing, his failure to abide by those most basic 
rules of law, motor-vehicle speed limits. 
{¶ 48} In 2012, Cicero did not simply try to undermine a lawful citation 
issued by a police officer, which would have been bad enough.  Instead, he 
attempted to avoid the consequences of his latest of over 50 speeding tickets, 
which had already earned him two driver’s license suspensions, through lies and 
evasions.  In other words, he habitually broke the law, and rather than accept the 
consequences, he attempted to defraud a court and then tried to cover up the fraud 
with additional lies and more aspersions against the court, a judge, a bailiff, 
prosecutors, and anyone else who might put him in danger of being held 
responsible for his actions. 
{¶ 49} Contrary to the majority’s stance, I see no reason to lessen Cicero’s 
sanction simply because his misconduct was different this time.  It does not matter 
that Cicero’s three disciplinary cases did not spring from a common source.  How 
he misbehaves is not relevant here.  And even if it were relevant, there is a 
common thread running through his three cases.  Cicero’s pattern of dishonesty, 
blaming others, disrespect for the legal process and for the courts, self-serving 
behavior, and feigned remorse is unrelenting.  In fact, it is his willingness to 
defraud and impugn the court system in a great variety of unrelated circumstances 
that is the most troubling of all. 
{¶ 50} Cicero has failed to act ethically or respectfully toward the courts, 
failed to provide honest testimony to multiple disciplinary panels, and even failed 
to admit any genuine remorse to this court while claiming to take full 
responsibility for everything that has happened.  He has proven willing to 
sabotage the integrity of legal proceedings and the reputations of other legal 
professionals to advance his personal interests, and he has proven to be unwilling 
to acknowledge any actual wrongdoing in the face of overwhelming evidence.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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This certainly “ ‘suggests that he lacks the ability to conform his behavior to the 
ethical standards incumbent upon attorneys in this state.’ ”  Majority opinion at 
¶ 22, quoting Farrell, 129 Ohio St.3d 223, 2011-Ohio-2879, 951 N.E.2d 390, at 
¶ 35. 
{¶ 51} Cicero’s behavior has reinforced the worst of stereotypes about the 
legal profession.  In order to preserve the integrity of our courts, protect other 
legal professionals, and maintain the public’s confidence in the legal profession, 
disbarment is the only suitable sanction here.  I therefore dissent. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, Joseph M. Caligiuri, Chief Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, and Donald M. Scheetz, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for 
relator. 
 
Christopher T. Cicero, pro se. 
_________________________