Case Title: State v. Talley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2013AP000950

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 21 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP950 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In re the commitment of Thornon F. Talley: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Thornon F. Talley, 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 9, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 10, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Sarah B. O’Brien 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
Abrahamson, J. joined by Bradley, A. W. J., 
concurring (Opinion filed);  
Zieger, J. joined by Gableman, J., concurring 
(Opinion filed) 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there was a brief 
by David R. Karpe, Elliot M. Fink and Karpe Law Office, Madison, 
and oral  argument by David R. Karpe 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by 
Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 21
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP950 
(L.C. No. 
2004CI01) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the commitment of Thornon F. Talley: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Thornon F. Talley, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 9, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   In this review of a 
Chapter 
980 
petition 
for 
discharge, 
we 
consider 
whether 
"socializing more with peers," "join[ing] a fitness group," and 
increased communication from family members are changes from 
which a factfinder could determine Thornon F. Talley is no 
longer a sexually violent person.  We conclude that these facts, 
which resulted in no change to the evaluating psychologist's 
ultimate conclusion or overall risk assessment, are not enough 
to satisfy the  statutory threshold for a discharge hearing set 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
2 
 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) (2011-12).1  We affirm the 
unpublished court of appeals decision,2 which affirmed the 
circuit court order3 denying Talley's petition for a discharge 
hearing. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Initial Commitment and Early Discharge Petitions 
¶2 
Talley has been adjudicated delinquent or convicted of 
sexually 
violent 
offenses 
three 
times, 
resulting 
in 
his 
incarceration.  As Talley's release date approached on his last 
offense, the State filed a petition for Chapter 980 commitment.  
Talley did not contest the petition, and in 2005, the circuit 
court ordered Talley committed "to the Department of Health and 
Family Services for control, care and treatment until such time 
as [he] is no longer a sexually violent person." 
¶3 
Since 
being 
committed, 
Talley 
received 
annual 
reexaminations under Wis. Stat. § 980.07, and he filed several 
petitions seeking discharge.  Talley's 2005 and 2006 discharge 
petitions were dismissed at Talley's request.  The circuit court 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated.  Although both 
parties refer to revisions to Wis. Stat. § 980.09 effective 
December 14, 2013, see 2013 Wis. Act. 84, neither party asks the 
court to decide whether the new version of § 980.09 should be 
applied retroactively here.  Thus, we apply the 2011-12 version 
of the statutes, which was in effect both when Talley filed this 
petition and when the circuit court summarily denied it. 
2 See State v. Talley, No. 2013AP950, unpublished order, 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2015). 
3 The Honorable Sarah B. O'Brien of Dane County presided. 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
3 
 
terminated his 2007 discharge petition because the psychologist 
who conducted the reexamination of Talley never filed a report. 
B.  The 2008 Discharge Petition 
¶4 
Talley's 2008 discharge petition was tried to a court 
in May 2009.  At trial, the State's expert, Dr. William Schmitt, 
testified that Talley did not satisfy the criteria for discharge 
because:  (1) Talley had Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified 
(NOS), Exhibitionism,4 and Antisocial Personality Disorder, each 
of which is a mental disorder that affected his emotional or 
volitional capacity and predisposed Talley to commit sexually 
violent acts; and (2) Talley fell into the risk category of 
being more likely than not to commit another sexually violent 
offense if discharged.  Dr. Schmitt explained that, as recently 
as February 2009, Talley exposed his erections and talked about 
them with female staff; those exhibitionistic actions amounted, 
in essence, to "engaging in sexual behavior with a nonconsenting 
person." 
 
By 
"continu[ing] 
to 
expose 
himself 
within 
an 
institution," Talley showed ongoing "difficulty managing his 
sexual urges and behaviors."  Dr. Schmitt opined that Talley's 
high 
psychopathy 
and 
sexual 
deviance, 
evidenced 
by 
his 
                                                 
4 The Exhibitionism related to Talley's repeated acts of 
exposing his erect penis, openly masturbating, attempting to 
have female staff or treatment providers notice he had an 
erection, and attempting to engage women in discussions about 
his erections.  His Exhibitionism during confinement resulted in 
repeated misconduct reports and multiple convictions for lewd 
and lascivious behavior. 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
4 
 
behaviors, made him more likely than not to commit a sexually 
violent offense if discharged. 
¶5 
Talley's expert, Dr. Hollida Wakefield, agreed that 
Talley had Antisocial Personality Disorder and Exhibitionism, 
but she opined that neither disorder predisposed Talley to acts 
of sexual violence.  She testified that Exhibitionism is not a 
sexually violent act, and although Antisocial Personality 
Disorder may cause an individual to be sexually violent, it 
requires the presence of both high psychopathy and sexual 
deviance.  Dr. Wakefield agreed Talley had high psychopathy, but 
she did not find sexual deviance; therefore, she concluded, 
Talley was not more likely than not to commit a sexually violent 
offense. 
¶6 
At the end of the trial, the circuit court determined 
"the evidence clearly and convincingly show[ed] that Mr. Talley 
[was] still a sexually violent person."  The circuit court made 
several findings about Talley:  (1) he had been convicted three 
times of sexually violent offenses; (2) he had a mental disorder 
that predisposed him to committing sexually violent acts; (3) 
his Exhibitionism replaced sexual violence because of his 
confinement; (4) he "clearly enjoy[ed] exposing himself to 
others"; (5) he had not completed treatment; and (6) he remained 
a danger to others because his mental disorder made "it more 
likely than not that he will engage in future acts of sexual 
violence."  Although the circuit court agreed with Dr. Wakefield 
that Talley's Exhibitionism is not a violent sexual act, it 
accepted the explanation that Exhibitionism likely replaced 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
5 
 
sexual assault because Talley "ha[d] not had an opportunity to 
sexually assault" while confined.  Ultimately, the circuit court 
placed greater weight on Talley's history of sexual violence and 
his "antisocial conduct in custody," which was "largely sexual 
in nature." 
C.  The 2010 Discharge Petition 
¶7 
In 2010, Dr. Richard Elwood conducted Talley's annual 
reexamination and concluded Talley was not a sexually violent 
person and not more likely than not to re-offend.  He diagnosed 
Talley with Antisocial Personality Disorder and Borderline 
Personality 
Disorder 
but 
did 
not 
find 
Exhibitionism 
or 
Paraphilia NOS.  In Dr. Elwood's opinion, Exhibitionism required 
exposure to strangers, and Talley's exposures were to treatment 
center workers, who were not strangers to him.  Dr. Elwood also 
expressed doubt about Talley's continued predisposition to 
sexual violence, noting the record lacked sufficient evidence to 
prove Talley engaged in the Exhibitionism for sexual arousal 
purposes.  Observing that Exhibitionism is not a sexually 
violent offense, Dr. Elwood added that Talley's exposures to 
women he knew "may not even have been sexually motivated."  
Despite Talley's "moderate to very-high range" of psychopathy, 
Dr. 
Elwood 
could 
not 
conclude 
that 
Talley's 
"offenses . . . clearly establish sexual deviance."  In his 
static risk assessment, Dr. Elwood concluded that, "Talley poses 
a high risk of committing another sex offense but not that he 
poses a high risk of committing a sexually violent offense."  
The doctor's dynamic risk assessment did not alter that 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
6 
 
conclusion.  His report acknowledged that Talley had not made 
significant progress in treatment, but Dr. Elwood nevertheless 
concluded "Talley is not a sexually violent person" because 
"Talley would not more likely than not commit another sexually 
violent offense if he were released and given the opportunity." 
¶8 
Talley's 2010 discharge petition based on Dr. Elwood's 
report asserted a "significant change in diagnoses," which 
Talley contended warranted a discharge hearing.  Based on a 
comprehensive review of the court record, the circuit court 
rejected Talley's request and denied the petition without a 
hearing.  The court's review included the "dozen" evaluations 
dating back to Talley's initial confinement.  Given Talley's 
consistent diagnosis "with antisocial personality disorder and 
borderline 
personality 
disorder," 
the 
court 
assigned 
significance to the fact that most experts found Talley 
predisposed to "future acts of sexual violence." 
¶9 
Also important to the circuit court was the fact that 
Dr. Elwood, like Dr. Wakefield, agreed that Talley had both 
personality disorders, and the circuit court had already 
rejected Dr. Elwood's opinion that the disorders do not make 
Talley a likely violent re-offender.  As the court explained: 
All experts agree that when there is a combination of 
high psychopathy and sexual deviance, the risk of 
future acts of sexual violence is increased.  At the 
2009 trial Dr. Schmitt opined that Mr. Talley had both 
high psychopathy and sexual deviance; Dr. Wakefield 
was not sure that sexual deviance was present.  I 
concluded that this combination is present in Mr. 
Talley, thus increasing his risk of re-offense.  In 
the present report Dr. Elwood disagrees, concluding 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
7 
 
that 
Mr. 
Talley's 
sex 
offenses 
do 
not 
clearly 
establish sexual deviance.  However this is the same 
evidence I rejected at the discharge trial. 
Because Dr. Elwood's report "contain[ed] no new evidence" and 
the circuit court had already "considered and rejected" the 
opinion that Talley's "personality disorders do not predispose 
him to violent sexual offending," the circuit court denied 
Talley's petition on the grounds that it did "not allege facts 
from which the court or jury might conclude that Mr. Talley's 
condition has changed since the date of his initial commitment 
so that he no longer meets the criteria for commitment." 
D.  The 2011 Discharge Petition 
¶10 In 2011, Talley filed another petition for discharge 
based on Dr. Elwood's 2011 reexamination report.  Dr. Elwood's 
risk assessment and conclusion were unchanged from his 2010 
report.  The circuit court nevertheless decided to hold a 
discharge hearing because it had been two years since Talley's 
last hearing, it appeared from Dr. Elwood's report that Talley 
had stopped publicly masturbating, and the "'science' of 
predicting risk has continued to evolve." 
¶11 At the jury trial in January 2012, Lloyd Sinclair, the 
program director for the detention center where Talley resided, 
described the treatment program available to Talley, who was 
assigned to the program for patients with normal or high 
intelligence who have high psychopathy.  The program consists of 
three phases.  Phase One addresses self-management and how to 
live a responsible life in day-to-day functioning.  Once a 
patient completes Phase One, he moves to Phase Two, which 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
8 
 
focuses on the specific sex offense component of treatment.  
When a patient completes Phase Two, he moves to Phase Three, 
which combines lessons from the first two phases to ensure the 
patient will not re-offend when released.  Sinclair testified 
that Talley remained in Phase One, and at times refused 
treatment 
altogether. 
 
Talley's 
"continue[d] . . . sexual 
misbehavior" "raise[d] alarms" at the treatment center.  For 
example, Talley had repeatedly exposed his erect penis to female 
staff, and "if a male [came] into the room, Mr. Talley cover[ed] 
up."  Sinclair explained that if Talley wants to be discharged 
he needs "to make progress [in treatment] and show that he's 
managing himself better." 
¶12 Dr. Anthony Jurek testified for the State.  He told 
the jury that Talley had Exhibitionism, Paraphilia NOS, and 
Antisocial Personality disorder with Borderline features.  He 
testified: 
 Talley has three mental disorders that impair his 
emotional or volitional capacity and predispose him to 
commit acts of sexual violence. 
 "[A] person's history of sexual offenses is important 
because if an individual is caught for the sexual 
behavior and they're sanctioned for it, they should learn 
from that experience.  It should be less likely that they 
engage in behavior that can cause them sanctions in the 
future." 
 When a person "continues to offend over and over again" 
it indicates the person is unable "to change that 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
9 
 
behavior, and it's a critical element of the diagnostic 
formulation but also plays into the risk assessment."  
Successful participation in treatment, in contrast, can 
suggest a reduced risk of re-offending.  But Talley had 
not successfully participated in treatment, and he 
committed dozens of sexual misconduct offenses while 
confined. 
 Talley's exhibitionistic behavior has a sexual overtone 
to it.  He exposes himself for sexual gratification. 
 "[T]he deviance underl[ying] the Exhibitionism is the 
same deviance that underlies the earlier sexual offenses 
of record." 
¶13 Moreover, Dr. Jurek expected that, if no longer 
confined, Talley would go beyond Exhibitionism and return to 
committing sexually violent offenses.  According to actuarial 
risk instruments, Talley was more likely than not to commit acts 
of sexual violence if discharged.  In response to Dr. Elwood's 
opinion that Exhibitionism is inapplicable because Talley's 
exposures are not to strangers, Dr. Jurek explained the only 
reason Talley is not exposing to strangers is because he is 
confined:  "So if he has the opportunity to expose himself to 
strangers, he certainly will. But where no strangers are 
available, he will expose himself to unsuspecting staff." 
¶14 Dr. 
Elwood 
testified 
for 
Talley. 
 
On 
direct 
examination, 
he 
indicated 
that 
he 
diagnosed 
Talley 
with 
Antisocial 
Personality 
Disorder 
and 
Borderline 
Personality 
Disorder, but unlike Dr. Jurek, did not diagnose Talley with 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
10 
 
Paraphilia NOS or Exhibitionism.  Although Dr. Elwood explained 
his 
strict 
application 
of 
the 
DSM-IV 
definition 
for 
Exhibitionism 
as 
"expos[ing] 
one's 
self 
to 
unsuspecting 
strangers," he also acknowledged that, in light of Talley's 
"difficulty with sexual activities and sexual urges," "Dr. Jurek 
ma[d]e a good point that it may be better to make a broader 
interpretation of [Exhibitionism] in penal situations or when 
they're incarcerated" because when an individual is confined, 
"all of the residential staff are known to you, so there can't 
be a stranger." 
¶15 When asked about Dr. Jurek's opinion that Talley 
exposed himself for sexual gratification, Dr. Elwood answered, 
"I just don't think I have sufficient evidence to determine" 
whether Talley's arousal was tied to the exposure or his self-
manipulation.  Dr. Elwood could not "say for sure that [Talley] 
was being aroused specifically by the exposing itself."  When 
asked whether Talley was sexually deviant, Dr. Elwood responded: 
I couldn't say.  I'm not saying he's not sexually 
deviant.  I don't have evidence to say that.  But I do 
not think I have sufficient evidence to say that he 
meets the usual criteria for sexual deviance as 
identified in the literature. . . . He certainly has 
some evidence of something. 
¶16 Talley's attorney then asked Dr. Elwood to assess 
Talley's risk of engaging in future sexually violent acts:  "So 
without that deviance finding and what you found in the 
actuarial tables, do you feel Mr. Talley presents a risk of 
sexual violence in the future?  I guess [to] what degree do you 
feel he presents a sexual risk—a risk of sexual violence?"  Dr. 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
11 
 
Elwood answered, "I think I can best say I don't know."  When 
Talley's lawyer asked, "And why is that?", Dr. Elwood responded, 
"I just don't think that the evidence to me is clear enough to 
say that."  Dr. Elwood talked about Talley's risk of re-
offending being "well over 51 percent."  Talley's lawyer then 
tried to clarify: 
Q [Talley's attorney:] So clearly there's a risk of 
reoffense, but the risk of deviance is not more 
likely than not in your opinion? 
A [Dr. Elwood:] I think it's important to distinguish 
between my saying that it's not over 51 percent and 
saying I do not have enough evidence to say that it 
is over 51 percent. 
Q [Talley's attorney:]  Okay. 
A [Dr. Elwood:]  At this point I'm saying that I 
cannot say to a degree of professional confidence 
that it exceeds 51 percent likelihood of committing 
another sexually violent act. 
Dr. Elwood further explained that, in the absence of evidence to 
"support a reasonable conclusion that the person meets the 
criteria, then the conclusion is they do not meet the criteria."  
When asked whether he thought Talley's commitment should 
continue, Dr. Elwood testified, "I would only say that he does 
not meet, in my opinion, the definition of a sexually violent 
person in Chapter 980." 
¶17 On 
cross-examination, 
Dr. 
Elwood 
made 
several 
concessions.  He acknowledged that Talley (1) has a mental 
disorder that predisposes him to commit acts of sexual violence; 
(2) falls into the "extremely high" category "on the actuarial 
tools for future risk to reoffend;" (3) has not completed sex 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
12 
 
offender treatment; and (4) fondled himself when appearing by 
phone for a court proceeding, an incident that led another 
psychologist to opine that Talley had "extraordinarily pressing 
sexual urges and deficient impulse control."  Importantly, Dr. 
Elwood confirmed he was not testifying that Talley would not 
commit sexually violent acts if released; rather, he simply did 
not believe there was "enough evidence to opine that" he would. 
¶18 The jury found Talley was "still a sexually violent 
person," and the circuit court denied his 2011 discharge 
petition.  Talley's motion for postcommitment relief was denied 
in February 2013, and the court of appeals rejected Talley's 
appeal in a published decision in December 2014.  See State v. 
Talley, 2015 WI App 4, 359 Wis. 2d 522, 859 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. 
2014). 
E.  The 2012 Discharge Petition 
¶19 In July 2012, Talley filed the discharge petition 
underlying our current review.  The 2012 petition relied on Dr. 
Elwood's annual reexamination of Talley and his report dated 
July 3, 2012.  Dr. Elwood's 2012 report reached the same 
ultimate conclusion and overall risk assessment as his 2011 
report:  "Mr. Talley would more likely than not commit another 
sex offense but would not more likely than not commit another 
sexually violent offense"; thus, "Mr. Talley is not a sexually 
violent person." 
¶20 There was no change between the 2011 and 2012 reports 
as to the facts underlying the "Static (historical) Risk 
Factors."  Both the 2011 and 2012 reports disclose that Talley 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
13 
 
scored in "the very high risk range" on the Static-99R test, 
putting him at "a 68% chance" of being "charged with another sex 
offense within 10 years of release from custody." 
¶21 With respect to the "Dynamic Risk Factors," there was 
no change in Elwood's 2011 and 2012 reports concerning Talley's 
ability to self-regulate his behavior and act with regard for 
the consequences of his actions.  Likewise, there was no change 
with respect to treatment completion because Talley had not 
completed treatment. 
¶22 The only change in the 2012 report fell under the 
"Social & Emotional Functioning" subset of the dynamic risk 
factors.  The note identified three particular changes:  (1) 
Talley "socialize[d] more with peers in his treatment group"; 
(2) he "joined a fitness group"; and (3) "more members of his 
family" have been "communicating with him."  Based on those 
changed facts, Dr. Elwood "concluded that Mr. Talley has made 
recent progress to reduce his risk" on the social and emotional 
subset of the dynamic risk factors.  Talley's reported progress 
did not, however, change Dr. Elwood's overall risk assessment or 
ultimate conclusion, which remained identical to the 2011 
report. 
¶23 The circuit court denied Talley's petition seeking a 
discharge hearing because Dr. Elwood reached the same ultimate 
conclusion in his two previous reports——the very conclusion a 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
14 
 
jury rejected just six months earlier.5  Talley appealed, and the 
court of appeals affirmed in a summary disposition order, which 
concluded that the changes in the 2012 report did "not 
constitute a significant change from the facts that the jury 
rejected in the 2011 petition."  We granted Talley's petition 
for review. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶24 This case involves the interpretation and application 
of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2), which is a question of law we review 
independently, although we benefit from the decisions by the 
court of appeals and circuit court.  See State v. Arends, 2010 
WI 46, ¶13, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 784 N.W.2d 513. 
B.  Analysis 
¶25 Talley contends his petition alleged enough facts to 
warrant a discharge hearing.6  He expresses concern that the 
court of appeals erroneously measured Talley's facts against a 
"significant" 
fact 
standard 
not 
found 
in 
the 
applicable 
statutory language.  We hold that Talley's petition for 
discharge failed to satisfy the statutory threshold for a 
                                                 
5 Our reference to six months shall not be construed to set 
any type of time parameter; rather, it is noted solely to show 
that, very recently, a jury rejected the same opinion Dr. Elwood 
gives here. 
6 A discharge hearing is "a trial on the merits of the 
discharge petition."  State v. Arends, 2010 WI 46, ¶1, 325 
Wis. 2d 1, 784 N.W.2d 513. 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
15 
 
discharge hearing.  We also hold the court of appeals' use of 
the word "significant" does not alter the outcome. 
1.  Statutory Standard for Discharge Hearing Not Satisfied 
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09 provides, as material: 
(1) 
A 
committed 
person 
may 
petition 
the 
committing court for discharge at any time.  The court 
shall deny the petition under this section without a 
hearing unless the petition alleges facts from which 
the court or jury may conclude the person's condition 
has changed since the date of his or her initial 
commitment order so that the person does not meet the 
criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. 
(2) The court shall review the petition within 30 
days and may hold a hearing to determine if it 
contains facts from which the court or jury may 
conclude that the person does not meet the criteria 
for commitment as a sexually violent person.  In 
determining under this subsection whether facts exist 
that might warrant such a conclusion, the court shall 
consider any current or past reports filed under 
s. 980.07, relevant facts in the petition and in the 
state's written response, arguments of counsel, and 
any supporting documentation provided by the person or 
the state.  If the court determines that the petition 
does not contain facts from which a court or jury may 
conclude that the person does not meet the criteria 
for commitment, the court shall deny the petition.  If 
the court determines that facts exist from which a 
court or jury could conclude the person does not meet 
criteria for commitment the court shall set the matter 
for hearing. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶27 In State v. Arends, this court described the "two-step 
process" for determining whether a person committed under Wis. 
Stat. ch. 980 (2005-06) is entitled to a discharge hearing on a 
petition.  Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶3-5.  The first step is a 
"paper review of the petition only, including its attachments" 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
16 
 
under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(1), and if the circuit court concludes 
the petition sufficiently "alleges facts from which a reasonable 
trier of fact could conclude that the petitioner does not meet 
the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person" the 
circuit court proceeds to the second step, a review under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(2).  Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶3-5.  The second 
step involves an expanded review of the petition, with "all past 
and current reports filed under [Wis. Stat.] § 980.07," and 
other supporting documentation in the record, to determine if 
these materials "contain any facts from which a reasonable trier 
of fact could conclude that the petitioner does not meet the 
criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person."7  Arends, 
325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶5. 
¶28 Here, the record suggests, and the parties concede, 
the circuit court's decision denying Talley a discharge hearing 
involved a review under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2), rather than 
§ 980.09(1).  The standard the legislature pronounced in 
§ 980.09(2) is straightforward:  After considering all of the 
materials in the record, the court "shall deny the petition" if 
it "determines that the petition does not contain facts from 
which a court or jury may conclude that the person does not meet 
the criteria for commitment."  The circuit court held that 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2) uses the terms "could" and 
"may" interchangeably.  See Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶37 n.20, 
41, 43.  As pointed out in Arends, the "slightly different 
iterations" are "non-substantive word-choice variances."  Id., 
¶37 n.20. 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
17 
 
Talley's 2012 petition did not warrant a discharge hearing 
because it contained the same ultimate conclusion and overall 
risk assessment rejected by a jury six months earlier.  The 
court found Talley's three self-reported changes would not lead 
a factfinder to conclude Talley is no longer sexually violent.  
We agree with the circuit court's assessment.8 
¶29 The only new facts in Talley's 2012 petition are 
located under the "Social & Emotional Functioning" subset of the 
dynamic risk factors section of Dr. Elwood's report.  Talley 
reported that he was "socializing more with peers," he "joined a 
fitness group," and "more members of his family [] recently 
began communicating with him."  Dr. Elwood labeled these facts 
"recent progress to reduce risk" specifically on the social and 
emotional functioning component, but Dr. Elwood's overall risk 
assessment and ultimate conclusion remained unchanged since his 
2011 report.  As noted, a jury already rejected that conclusion 
in January 2012. 
¶30 Our review thus focuses on whether the 2012 petition's 
three new facts, when considered together with our comprehensive 
review of the entire record——including every psychological 
examination report, every treatment report, and the transcripts 
                                                 
8 Talley argues the circuit court failed to review all the 
past and current reports in the record and asks us to remand so 
the circuit court may do so.  Although the record is not 
entirely clear in this regard, there is no need for the remand 
Talley requests.  We conducted a comprehensive review of the 
evidence, which we may do, see Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶48, and 
reached the same conclusion as the circuit court. 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
18 
 
from Talley's 2009 bench trial and 2012 jury trial——lead to a 
determination that a reasonable factfinder "may [or could] 
conclude" Talley is no longer a sexually violent person.  We 
conclude these three facts in the 2012 reexamination report do 
not satisfy the statutory standard because no reasonable jury 
could find that they may mean Talley is no longer a sexually 
violent person——particularly when these facts did not alter Dr. 
Elwood's prior ultimate conclusion or overall risk assessment, 
and where a jury just six months earlier rejected Talley's claim 
that he is no longer a sexually violent person. 
¶31 These facts do not impact any of the three criteria 
for commitment, which require proof that:  (1) Talley was 
convicted of a sexually violent offense; (2) he currently 
suffers from a mental disorder that affects his emotional or 
volitional capacity, making him predisposed to commit acts of 
sexual violence; and (3) the mental disorder makes it more 
likely than not that Talley will engage in more acts of sexual 
violence.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 980.01(7), 980.02(2), 980.05(3)(a); 
see also Wis. JI—Civil 2506 (2015).  Criteria (1) and (2) are 
undisputed; the only disagreement centers on criterion (3). 
¶32 Nothing in the record suggests that the advent of the 
three facts proffered here may (or could) cause a factfinder to 
now conclude that Talley's mental illness will no longer make it 
more likely than not that he will commit a sexually violent 
offense.  At the 2012 trial, Dr. Elwood explained that he 
resolved the third factor in favor of Talley only because he did 
not have enough information to decide one way or the other; 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
19 
 
unsurprisingly, this testimony failed to convince the jury that 
Talley overcame his predisposition to commit sexually violent 
acts.  Since the jury's verdict, Talley reported that he is 
"socializing more with peers," he "joined a fitness group," and 
"more members of his family [] recently began communicating with 
him."  Critically, these facts did not alter Dr. Elwood's 
recently rejected assessment of Talley's risk of re-offending. 
¶33 We are not convinced that Talley's three reported 
facts——which do not relate to his propensity to commit sexually 
violent acts——may result in a jury or court making a different 
determination, absent any change in diagnosis, overall risk 
assessment, or ultimate conclusion.  In eleven years, Talley has 
not successfully completed treatment; he has not even begun 
sexual-offender-specific treatment because he has not progressed 
beyond the first phase of the treatment program.  He continues 
to engage in sexual misbehavior and Exhibitionism, which all but 
two of the psychologists involved here opined reflects a 
confined person's substitute for sexually violent acts. 
¶34 Finally, case law supports the conclusion that a 
person committed under Chapter 980 is not entitled to a 
discharge hearing where the current petition contains the same 
ultimate conclusion and overall risk assessment a trier of fact 
previously rejected.  See State v. Schulpius, 2012 WI App 134, 
¶4, ¶¶34-35, 345 Wis. 2d 351, 825 N.W.2d 311 ("[T]he petitioner 
must also produce some new evidence, not previously considered 
by a trier of fact, which demonstrates that he does not meet the 
criteria for commitment under Wis. Stat. ch. 980."); State v. 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
20 
 
Kruse, 2006 WI App 179, ¶35, 296 Wis. 2d 130, 722 N.W.2d 742 
("[A]n expert's opinion must depend upon something more than 
facts, professional knowledge, or research that was considered 
by an expert testifying in a prior proceeding that determined 
the person to be sexually violent." (quoting State v. Combs, 
2006 WI App 137, ¶¶32-33, 295 Wis. 2d 457, 720 N.W.2d 684)).  
"An expert's opinion that is not based on some new fact, new 
professional knowledge, or new research is not sufficient for a 
new discharge hearing under § 980.09(2)."  Schulpius, 345 
Wis. 2d 351, ¶35.  The court of appeals reached this conclusion 
in Schulpius, Kruse, and Combs because "it serves the purpose of 
ensuring that a person who is not sexually violent does not 
continue in commitment, while avoiding continual re-litigation 
of issues."  Combs, 295 Wis. 2d 457, ¶33. 
¶35 Talley's 
2012 
petition 
is 
based 
on 
the 
same 
information that a jury previously rejected, plus three new 
social facts that did not move Dr. Elwood to alter his opinion 
and are not the type of facts that would demonstrate Talley is 
no longer a sexually violent person.  The three new facts 
presented in Talley's petition, therefore, do not merit a 
discharge hearing.  Dr. Elwood's ultimate conclusion and overall 
risk assessment are exactly the same as those the jury 
considered in finding Talley remains a sexually violent person.  
Talley's increased socialization, family communication, and 
fitness pursuits do not elevate the petition to one "from which 
a court or jury may [or could] conclude that the person does not 
meet the criteria for commitment."  See Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2).  
No. 
2013AP950 
 
21 
 
When new facts do not change the doctor's ultimate conclusion or 
overall risk assessment and that doctor's conclusion has already 
been rejected by a jury, we are not convinced the three 
additional facts asserted here could result in a jury finding in 
the 
petitioner's 
favor. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
circuit 
court 
correctly complied with the statute's directive that it "shall 
deny" the petition without a hearing. 
2.  Court of Appeals' Use of "Significant" 
¶36 Talley expresses concern about the court of appeals' 
use of the word "significant" in its opinion.  The word 
"significant" is not used in the statute, but it is a term 
frequently used throughout the record in this case.  Talley used 
it in submitting his 2010 Petition, asserting that Dr. Elwood's 
report contained a "significant change in diagnoses."  The term 
was used by the psychologists and treatment providers in 
describing Talley's progress in treatment.  For example, "Talley 
is 
not 
considered 
to 
have 
made 
significant 
progress 
in 
treatment."  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09 does not use the term 
"significant" in setting the standard required to warrant a 
discharge hearing. 
¶37 Preferably, the court of appeals should have measured 
Talley's petition against the actual text of the statute.  The 
court of appeals' use of the term "significant," however, does 
not alter the outcome of this case because our application of 
the language of the statutory standard results in the same 
conclusion reached by the court of appeals.  The facts contained 
in Talley's 2012 petition based on Dr. Elwood's report do not 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
22 
 
satisfy the statutory standard because "socializing more with 
peers," "join[ing] a fitness group," and increased communication 
from family members are not "facts from which a court or jury 
may conclude that the person does not meet the criteria for 
commitment." 
3.  Adding Adjectives to Statutory Standard 
¶38 At oral argument in this case, the parties discussed 
whether the "facts" under the statute must be "material" or "of 
consequence" in order to trigger a discharge hearing.  The 
legislature did not use these terms, and we will not modify the 
2011-12 Wisconsin Statutes to insert them.9  Adding adjectives to 
the statute is unnecessary to resolve this case.  We simply 
apply the statutory language the legislature chose and conclude 
that the facts proffered here are not "facts from which a court 
or jury may conclude that the person does not meet the criteria 
for commitment."  Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2).  Therefore, the 
statutory standard was not satisfied and no discharge hearing 
was required. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶39 Talley's 2012 petition for discharge differed in only 
one respect from his 2011 petition: Dr. Elwood noted some 
"progress to reduce risk" under the "Social & Emotional 
                                                 
9 As explained supra, note 1, in 2013 the legislature 
revised several portions of Chapter 980.  Those changes included 
an adjustment to the standard in Wis. Stat. § 980.09.  The new 
statutory language in subsection (2) allows the court to assess 
whether the person's condition has "sufficiently changed." 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
23 
 
Functioning" component of the dynamic risk factors because 
Talley reported he was "socializing more with peers," he had 
"join[ed] a fitness group," and "more members of his family [] 
recently began communicating with him."  Despite these changes, 
Dr. Elwood's overall risk assessment and ultimate conclusion 
remained unchanged since his 2011 report, which the jury 
rejected six months earlier when it found that Talley was still 
a sexually violent person. 
¶40 We conclude that a factfinder could not determine, 
based on these three facts, that Talley no longer met the 
criteria for a sexually violent person.  Thus, Talley's 2012 
petition does not satisfy the statutory standard needed to 
obtain a discharge hearing.  Further, although the term 
"significant" does not appear in the language of that statute, 
its use by the court of appeals in the summary disposition order 
does not alter the outcome of this case.  Both the court of 
appeals and the circuit court correctly ruled that Talley's 2012 
petition did not "contain facts from which a court or jury may 
conclude 
that" 
Talley 
"does 
not 
meet 
the 
criteria 
for 
commitment," Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2); therefore, the circuit 
No. 
2013AP950 
 
24 
 
court appropriately denied Talley's 2012 petition without 
holding a discharge hearing.10 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
                                                 
10 This opinion cannot and should not be interpreted as the 
concurrences speculate.  The opinion does not foreclose Talley 
from satisfying the statutory threshold required for a discharge 
hearing in a future petition where a psychologist finds he is no 
longer a sexually violent person so long as his petition 
satisfies 
the 
new 
statutory 
threshold 
contained 
in 
§ 980.09(2)(2013-14).  See supra n.9.  In our current review, as 
required by the 2011-12 version of § 980.09(2), we considered 
whether Talley's three new facts and all of the psychological 
reports in the record may lead a jury to conclude Talley was no 
longer sexually violent.  We concluded the three new facts, 
which do not impact the three criteria for commitment, see 
supra, ¶31, together with Dr. Elwood's report (that was 
essentially identical to the previous year's report which a jury 
recently rejected), could not lead a jury to find in Talley's 
favor.  Thus, Talley's petition did not warrant a discharge 
hearing. 
Also, the opinion does not weigh evidence; it considers 
whether all the materials in this record, listed in Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09(2), may lead a jury to find Talley is no longer a 
sexually violent person.  That is what the 2011-12 version of 
§ 980.09(2) required us to do. 
No.  2013AP950.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶41 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  I too would 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals.  I do not, however, 
join the opinion of the court because it strays too far from the 
text of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) and fails to provide a practical, 
sound interpretation and application of the statutory language 
"facts from which a circuit court could conclude that the 
petitioner does not meet the criteria for commitment as a 
sexually violent person."  (Emphasis added.)  Unlike the 
majority, I conclude that the "facts" must be relevant facts of 
consequence to the issue at hand.  Not just any old facts will 
do. 
¶42 Here are the words of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) (2011-12) 
(emphasis added):  
(2) The court shall review the petition within 30 days 
and may hold a hearing to determine if it contains 
facts from which the court or jury may conclude that 
the person does not meet the criteria for commitment 
as a sexually violent person.  In determining under 
this subsection whether facts exist that might warrant 
such a conclusion, the court shall consider any 
current or past reports filed under s. 980.07, 
relevant facts in the petition and in the state's 
written response, arguments of counsel, and any 
supporting documentation provided by the person or the 
state.  If the court determines that the petition does 
not contain facts from which a court or jury may 
conclude that the person does not meet the criteria 
for commitment, the court shall deny the petition.  If 
the court determines that facts exist from which a 
court or jury could conclude the person does not meet 
criteria for commitment the court shall set the matter 
for hearing.  
¶43 It 
is 
important 
to 
recognize 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.09(2) (2011-12) was revised in 2013 (effective Dec. 14, 
No.  2013AP950.ssa 
 
2 
 
2013).1  Because of the revision, the majority opinion is limited 
to interpreting and applying the pre-2013 statute.  See majority 
op., ¶1 n.1.  The majority opinion interprets the 2011-12 
version of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) and does not govern the 
interpretation and application of the revised 2013 statute.  I 
address the 2011-12 version of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2), as does 
the majority opinion.  
                                                 
1 The statute was amended in 2013 to read as follows 
(emphasis added): 
(2) In reviewing the petition, the court may hold a 
hearing to determine if the person's condition has 
sufficiently changed such that a court or jury would 
likely conclude the person no longer meets the 
criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person.  
In determining under this subsection whether the 
person's condition has sufficiently changed such that 
a court or jury would likely conclude that the person 
no longer meets the criteria for commitment, the court 
may consider the record, including evidence introduced 
at the initial commitment trial or the most recent 
trial on a petition for discharge, any current or past 
reports filed under s. 980.07, relevant facts in the 
petition 
and 
in 
the 
state's 
written 
response, 
arguments of counsel, and any supporting documentation 
provided by the person or the state.  If the court 
determines that the record does not contain facts from 
which a court or jury would likely conclude that the 
person no longer meets the criteria for commitment, 
the court shall deny the petition.  If the court 
determines that the record contains facts from which a 
court or jury would likely conclude the person no 
longer meets the criteria for commitment, the court 
shall set the matter for trial. 
For two recent court of appeals cases applying the amended 
statute, see In re Commitment of David Hager, Jr., No.2015AP330, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2017) (recommended 
for publication); In re Commitment of Howard Carter, 2015AP1311, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2017) (recommended 
for publication).   
No.  2013AP950.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶44 Under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2), the court decides as a 
matter of law, independently of the circuit court and court of 
appeals, whether facts exist from which a reasonable fact-finder 
may conclude that the petitioner does or does not meet the 
criteria for commitment.2      
¶45 The majority opinion too often ties the "facts" in the 
instant petition to the psychologist's ultimate conclusion or 
overall risk assessment, which remained the same since the 
psychologist's last report, or to a jury's recent denial of 
Talley's prior petition.  See majority op., ¶¶1, 29, 30, 32-35, 
39.   
¶46 A fact-finder is not bound by the psychologist's 
ultimate conclusion or overall risk assessment or the last 
jury's verdict; a fact-finder is bound by the "facts."  True, 
the psychologist's unchanged conclusion may be probative of 
whether the petitioner still meets the commitment criteria.  
But, to the extent that the majority opinion can be interpreted 
as requiring a change in the psychologist's conclusions in order 
for a court to rule in favor of a discharge hearing, the opinion 
goes too far.3   
                                                 
2 The facts alleged are accepted as true.  The question of 
law 
presented 
to 
this 
court 
is 
the 
interpretation 
and 
application of Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) to undisputed facts.  
State v. Arends, 2010 WI 46, ¶13, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 784 N.W.2d 513.   
3 "[T]he presence of evidence unfavorable to the petitioner—
—a 
re-examination 
report 
reaching 
a 
conclusion 
that 
the 
petitioner was still more likely than not to sexually reoffend, 
for example——does not negate the favorable facts upon which a 
trier of fact might reasonably rely."  Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶40.   
No.  2013AP950.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶47 In addition to this misstep, the majority makes no 
attempt to interpret and apply the statutory word "facts." 
¶48 Unfortunately, the majority opinion refuses to limit 
the facts required in the petition under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2) 
to "significant" facts or "material" facts.  According to the 
majority, "[a]dding adjectives to the statute is unnecessary to 
resolve this case."  Majority op., ¶38. 
¶49 This refusal is disingenuous.  The majority opinion 
readily accepts prior case law adding the word "new" to Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(2).  See majority op., ¶¶29, 30, 34, 35.  Also, 
the majority opinion seems to dismiss as "facts" Talley's self-
reported facts.  See majority op., ¶¶28, 32-33.  The majority 
opinion explains that it could not determine on the basis of the 
facts that Talley was no longer a sexually violent person.  See 
majority op., ¶¶36, 37, 40.  The majority reaches this 
conclusion without an explanation.  Are readers supposed to 
infer that Talley's self-reported facts are to be ignored?     
¶50 In contrast to the majority opinion, the court of 
appeals 
examined 
the 
petition 
for 
"significant" 
facts.  
Similarly, the State asserts that the facts in the petition must 
be "material" facts and facts "of consequence."  See majority 
op., ¶¶36, 38.  But the majority opinion refuses to read the 
word "facts" as meaning "significant" or "material" facts 
because, according to the majority opinion, the legislature did 
not use the words "significant" or "material."  See majority 
op., ¶38.    
No.  2013AP950.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶51 The majority opinion's reasoning for refusing to 
interpret the statutory word "facts" as "significant" or 
"material" is specious.  The applicable statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09(2), explicitly requires the court to consider "relevant 
facts in the petition."4  Thus, the very text of § 980.09(2) 
requires the facts in the petition to be "relevant" to the 
contested issue, that is, facts that relate to whether the 
petitioner does or does not meet the criteria for commitment as 
a sexually violent person.    
¶52 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2)'s use of the word 
"facts" integrally incorporates the concept of relevancy.5  The 
Wisconsin 
Rules 
of 
Evidence 
define 
"facts" 
as 
facts 
of 
consequence to the determination of the action.6  "'Relevant 
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence 
of 
any 
fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination of the action more or less probable than it would 
be without the evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.01.        
                                                 
4 See also Arends, 325 Wis. 2d 1, ¶32 ("the court . . . is 
required to examine . . . relevant facts in the petition and in 
the State's written response."). 
5 "[A]ny fact which tends to prove a material issue is 
relevant, even though it is only a link in the chain of facts 
which must be proved to make the proposition at issue appear 
more or less probable.  Relevancy is not determined by 
resemblance to, but by the connection with, other facts."  
Oseman v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 523, 526, 145 N.W.2d 766 (1966) 
(quoting 1 Ronald A. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Evidence 
§ 148, at 284-87 (12th ed. 1955) (quoted in Judicial Council 
Committee's Note, 1974, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 904.01 (West 2000). 
6 "Chapters 901 to 911 govern proceedings in the courts of 
the state of Wisconsin except as provided in ss. 911.01 and 
972.11."  Wis. Stat. § 901.01.  
No.  2013AP950.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶53 The State uses the words "material" and "facts of 
consequence" rather than the word "relevant" to describe the 
statutory word "facts."  These words, "relevant" and "material," 
have historically been used interchangeably.7  The following 
definitions 
of 
"relevant" 
and 
"material," 
appearing 
in 
McCormick, Evidence (hornbook series), § 152, at 315-16, were 
adopted by the court in State v. Becker, 51 Wis. 2d 659, 666-67, 
188 N.W.2d 449 (1971):  
In the courtroom the terms relevancy and materiality 
are often used interchangeably, but materiality in its 
more precise meaning looks to the relation between the 
propositions for which the evidence is offered and the 
issues in the case.  If the evidence is offered to 
prove a proposition which is not a matter in issue nor 
probative of a matter in issue, the evidence is 
properly said to be immaterial. * * * Relevancy in 
logic is the tendency of evidence to establish a 
proposition which it is offered to prove.  Relevancy, 
as employed by judges and lawyers, is the tendency of 
the evidence to establish a material proposition.8  
                                                 
7 See 10 Ted M. Warshafsky & Frank T. Crivello II, Wisconsin 
Practice Series:  Trial Handbook for Wisconsin Lawyers § 13.02 
(3d ed. 2016) ("[A]lthough the distinction [between relevance 
and materiality] is one of traditional logic and historical 
interest, it has little substantive meaning in modern trial 
practice.").  
8 The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence do not refer to the 
concept of materiality except in the Comment to Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.01.  See Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R67; 
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 904.01 (West 2000) (the Judicial Council Committee's Note 
states 
that 
McCormick's 
view 
of 
the 
distinction 
between 
materiality and relevancy is imported into Wis. Stat. § 904.01 
by the phrase "that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action."). 
(continued) 
No.  2013AP950.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶54 I agree with the State that the word "facts" in Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(2) means "material facts," or if the reader 
prefers, "relevant facts."   
¶55 I conclude as a matter of law that the "facts" upon 
which Talley relies are on the whole short-lived (the facts 
occurred within the last six months), and considering the entire 
record appear at this time minimal and inconsequential, and are 
not facts from which a reasonable fact-finder may conclude that 
Talley does not meet the criteria for commitment. 
¶56 The majority opinion will take litigants and circuit 
courts off course.  It overlooks the meaning of the statutory 
word "facts" and fails to provide a practical, sound meaning of 
the word "facts" used in Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2).   
¶57 For the reasons set forth, I agree that the decision 
of the court of appeals should be affirmed, but I do not join 
the majority opinion. 
¶58 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurring opinion. 
                                                                                                                                                             
For a more recent discussion of relevancy and materiality, 
see 1 McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 994-95 (Kenneth S. Broun 
ed., 7th ed. 2013) ("There are two components to relevant 
evidence: materiality and probative value.  Materiality concerns 
the fit between the evidence and the case.  It looks to the 
relation between the propositions that the evidence is offered 
to prove and the issues in the case. . . . The second aspect of 
relevance is probative value, the tendency of evidence to 
establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.")  
No.  2013AP950.akz 
 
1 
 
 
¶59 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  Like 
the court, I conclude that Talley is not entitled to a discharge 
hearing.  While I agree with much of the court's analysis, I 
write to clarify the opinion and join the opinion only if it is 
interpreted 
consistent 
with 
this 
concurrence. 
 
In 
this 
concurrence, I will point out two concerns that I have with the 
court's writing and why certain language of the opinion ought 
not be misinterpreted. 
¶60 First, the court's opinion could be read to suggest 
that when a committed person relies in a petition for discharge 
on the opinion of an evaluating psychologist that has already 
been rejected by a trier of fact, only an appropriate change to 
the evaluating psychologist's "ultimate conclusion or overall 
risk assessment" can entitle that person to a discharge hearing 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.09. 
 
I 
cannot 
accept 
such 
an 
interpretation because doing so would be to write a limitation 
in the statute.  To be clear, the plain language of the relevant 
statute can entitle a person to a discharge hearing if the 
petition presents "facts from which the court or jury may 
conclude that the person does not meet the criteria for 
commitment 
as 
a 
sexually 
violent 
person." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.09(2).   
¶61 If the court's opinion were read to require what it 
might seem to suggest, committed persons like Talley would be 
required to show more than the statute requires.  Dr. Elwood has 
already concluded that Talley would not more likely than not 
No.  2013AP950.akz 
 
2 
 
commit another sexually violent offense and is not a sexually 
violent person.  In the future, new facts strongly suggesting 
that Talley does not meet the criteria for commitment may 
develop.  These facts, logically, might not change Dr. Elwood's 
conclusion that Talley would not more likely than not commit 
another sexually violent offense and is not a sexually violent 
person.  I am concerned that the court's opinion could be read 
to preclude a discharge hearing under those circumstances, 
merely because Dr. Elwood's "ultimate conclusion or overall risk 
assessment" had not changed.  While a change to an evaluating 
psychologist's "ultimate conclusion or overall risk assessment" 
is certainly relevant to the question of whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.09(2) has been met, such a change is not a necessary 
condition of fulfillment of the statutory threshold.  
¶62 Second, the court's opinion ought not be read to weigh 
evidence unfavorable to Talley as part of its inquiry into 
whether Talley is entitled to a discharge hearing under Wis. 
Stat. § 980.09(2), contrary to case law.  Our discussion in 
Arends explains the proper analysis: 
We reject the State's argument that the circuit 
court may weigh evidence favoring the petitioner 
directly against evidence disfavoring the petitioner.  
This is impermissible because the standard is not 
whether 
the 
evidence 
more 
heavily 
favors 
the 
petitioner, but whether the enumerated items contain 
facts that would allow a factfinder to grant relief 
for the petitioner.  If the enumerated items do 
contain 
such 
facts, 
the 
presence 
of 
evidence 
unfavorable to the petitioner——a re-examination report 
reaching a conclusion that the petitioner was still 
more likely than not to sexually reoffend, for 
example——does not negate the favorable facts upon 
which a trier of fact might reasonably rely. 
No.  2013AP950.akz 
 
3 
 
State v. Arends, 2010 WI 46, ¶40, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 784 N.W.2d 513 
(footnote omitted).  
¶63 I doubt the court intends either of the potential 
defects I have identified.  However, the possibility of 
confusion 
remains. 
 
Thus, 
for 
the 
foregoing 
reasons, 
I 
respectfully concur and write to clarify these areas of concern 
so that the opinion of the court is not misinterpreted. 
¶64 I am authorized to state the Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2013AP950.akz 
 
 
 
1