Case Title: STATE EX REL LEMIEUX v DIST COUR

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Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-02-03T00:00:00Z

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No. 12934 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1975 T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A ex re1 ALLEN LEMIEUX, County Attorney i n and f o r t h e County of Jefferson, Rela t o r , THE DISTRICT C O U R T O F T H E FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A , i n and f o r t h e County of Jefferson, and t h e HON. F R A N K E. BLAIR, Judge thereof, Respondents. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Counsel of Record: For Rela t o r : Allen LeMieux, County Attorney, argued, Boulder, Montana Richard J. Llewellyn, Boulder, Montana For Respondents: James H. Goetz argued, Bozeman, Montana Submitted: January 7, 1975 Decided : FEB - 3 1975 F i l e d : FEB -3 197'5 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. Original Proceeding. This is an application for a writ of supervisory control by the Jefferson County Attorney to set aside a ruling of the district court of the Fifth Judicial District holding that section 54-132, R.C.M. 1947, is unconstitutional. The pertinent facts are not in dispute, they are: On August 8, 1974, leave to file an Information was granted by the district court of the Fifth Judicial District charging defendants, Penny Mitchell and Richard Mitchell with the criminal sale of dangerous drugs as specified in section 54-132, R.C.M. 1947. On December 16, 1974, a jury trial was commenced and the state presented evidence that defendants had cultivated approximately 30 marijuana plants in their vegetable garden and that a quantity of marijuana seeds and processed marijuana had been seized from defendants' resident pursuant to a search warrant. No evidence was offered that defendants had ever sold in the ordinary sense of the word, any of the marijuana in question. At the close of the state's case, defendants entered a motion to dismiss the charge of criminal sale of dangerous drugs for the reason that section 54-132, R.C.M. 1947, was unconstitutional. On December 18, 1974, the district court ruled the statute was unconsi- tutional because it created an irrebuttable presumption that a defend- ant who manufactured, prepared, cultivated,compounded or processed any dangerous drug was guilty of selling the same. Thereupon the criminal proceeding against defendants was con- tinued and the county attorney petitioned this Court for a writ of supervisory control to set aside the action of the district court in declaring the statute unconstitutional. Section 54-132, R.C.M. 1947, provides in pertinent part: "Criminal s a l e of dangerous drugs. (a) A person commits the offense of a criminal s a l e of dan- gerous drugs i f he s e l l s , b a r t e r s , exchanges, gives away, o r o f f e r s t o s e l l , b a r t e r , exchange or give away, manufactures, prepares, c u l t i v a t e s , compounds o r processes any dangerous drug a s defined i n t h i s a c t . I I Defendants argue t h a t section 54-132 offends due process requirements because by i t s terms, an i r r e b u t t a b l e presumption i s created t h a t one who c u l t i v a t e s a dangerous drug a s defined i n the Act i s g u i l t y of s e l l i n g the same. I n support of t h i s contention defendants r e l y principally upon Tot v. United States, 319 U.S.' 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L ed 1519, 1524. In - Tot the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the Federal Firearms Act, 52 Stat. 1250, Ch. 850, 15 U.S.C. ! j 902(f), was successfully attacked by the defendant. This Act provided t h a t it was a crime f o r any person who had previously been convicted of a crime of violence t o receive any firearm o r ammunition t h a t had been shipped through i n t e r s t a t e commerce. Section 2(f) of t h a t s t a t u t e contains t h i s e x p l i c i t presumption: If* * * and the possession of a firearm o r ammunition by any such person s h a l l be presumptive evidence t h a t such firearm o r ammunition was shipped o r transported o r received, a s the case may be, by such person i n violation of t h i s chapter. 11 The United States Supreme Court i n Tot declared the s t a t u t e - unconstitutional and s e t f o r t h t h i s t e s t : "Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained i f there be no r a t i o n a l connec- tion between the f a c t proved and the ultimate f a c t presumed, i f the inference of the one from proof of the other i s a r b i t r a r y because of lack of connec- t i o n between the two i n common experience. ;I Under t h i s t e s t , defendants argue, there i s no r a t i o n a l connection between the f a c t of c u l t i v a t i o n of marijuana and the s a l e of marijuana. W e decline t o speculate whether such a r a t i o n a l connection e x i s t s because we do not agree t h a t section 54-132, R.C.M. 1947, creates a presumption. According t o the terms of section 54-132, one i s g u i l t y of the offense of s a l e of dangerous drugs i f any of the following prohibited criminal a c t i v i t i e s a r e committed: 1) Selling, bartering, exchanging, o r giving away any dangerous drug a s defined i n the a c t . 2) Offering t o s e l l , b a r t e r , exchange o r give away any dangerous drug a s defined i n the a c t . 3) Preparing, c u l t i v a t i n g , compounding, o r processing any dangerous drug a s defined i n the a c t . A reading of t h i s s t a t u t e compels the conclusion t h a t the l e g i s l a t u r e broadly defined the term "sale" t o include the enum- erated a c t i v i t i e s s e t out by the terms of the s t a t u t e . Stated i n another fashion, the l e g i s l a t u r e s e t f o r t h c e r t a i n a c t i v i t i e s which a r e adverse t o the public welfare and has broadly labeled these prohibited a c t i v i t i e s a s the "sale" of dangerous drugs. Defendants argue t h a t there a r e constitutional limitations on the power of the l e g i s l a t u r e t o "stretch" ordinary meanings i n defining words f o r s t a t u t o r y purposes. To support t h i s contention they r e l y on Calvert v. Zanes-Ewalt Warehouse, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 1973, 492 S.W.2d 638. The Texas l e g i s l a t u r e enacted a taxation s t a t u t e t h a t defined t h e term "sale" t o include a t h e f t . I n Calvert the Texas Court of Appeals declared the s t a t u t e unconsti- t u t i o n a l and stated t h a t the statutory d e f i n i t i o n of the term was strained, contrary t o i t s ordinary meaning, and so a r b i t r a r y t h a t due process had been denied. However, the Texas Supreme Court l a t e r reversed t h i s decision i n Calvert v. Zanes-Ewalt Warehouse, Inc., (Texas 1973), 502 S.P.2d 689, and upheld the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the s t a t u t e despite the f a c t t h a t the term "sale" was defined i n a way t h a t was a t odds with i t s ordinary meaning. The reviewing court found no abuse of due process. Research on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of criminal s t a t u t e s t h a t define terms contrary t o t h e i r ordinary, accepted meanings led t o People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175, 217 P.2d 1, 4, cert.den. 340 U.S. 879, 71 S.Ct. 117, 95 L ed 639. In Knowles, the California Penal Code 5 209, was discussed. It defined the crime of kidnapping i n these terms:: 1 1 Every person who seizes, confines, inveigles, e n t i c e s , decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps o r c a r r i e s away any individual by any means whatsoever with i n t e n t t o hold o r detain, o r who holds o r detains, such individual f o r ransom, reward o r t o commit extortion or robbery % Jc * ' I * It i s c l e a r from the terms of t h i s s t a t u t e t h a t the California l e g i s l a t u r e had redefined the crime of kidnapping t o include situa- tions where an asportation of the victim was lacking. I n so doing, the crime of kidnapping had been defined contrary t o i t s commonly accepted meaning. Consequently, a defendant could be convicted of kidnapping even though the same offense would have only constituted an armed robbery i n other jurisdictions. I n Knowles, the defendant and an accomplice had entered a clothing s t o r e and compelled the proprietor and a c l e r k t o enter a stockroom i n the r e a r of the store. While momentarily confined i n the stockroom, the c l e r k and the proprietor were robbed. One of defendants was convicted of kidnapping despite the f a c t t h a t there had been no asportation of the victim; a c r u c i a l element under the common law d e f i n i t i o n of the crime. J u s t i c e Traynor, writing f o r the majority of the California court, upheld the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the s t a t u t e and stated: here is no question t h a t the Legislature has the power t o define kidnapping broadly enough t o include the offense here committed and t o prescribe the punish- ment specified i n section 209. Subject t o the consti- t u t i o n a l prohibition of c r u e l and unusual punishment, the Legislature may define and punish offenses as it sees f i t . [Citing cases] It may define and punish a s kidnapping an offense t h a t other s t a t e s regard only a s armed robbery. Section 209 establishes t h a t d e f i n i t i o n a s the law of California. [Case c i t e d ] The s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of the proscribed offenses i s not rendered uncertain o r ambiguous because some of the prohibited a c t s a r e not ordinarily re- garded a s kidnapping. I I W e agree with the r a t i o n a l e of Knowles. The Montana l e g i s l a t u r e could have s e t f o r t h a separate s t a t u t e prohibiting the c u l t i v a t i o n of marijuana and could have labeled i t accordingly. W e see no reason f o r declaring t h e s t a t u t e unconstitutional because the legis- l a t u r e defined a criminal offense i n terms of several types of conduct which may c o n s t i t u t e t h a t single offense. W e recognize t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e defined t h e s a l e of dangerous drugs t o include offenses t h a t o t h e r s t a t e s have labeled llpossessionl' o r llcultivation". The w r i t of supervisory c o n t r o l s h a l l i s s u e and t h i s cause i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t court with d i r e c t i o n s t o proceed t o a f i n a l d i s p o s i t i o n c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s opinion. W e Concur: Chief J u s t i c e .................................... J u s t i c e s . M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d i s s e n t i n g : I d i s s e n t . Section 54-132, R.C.M. 1947, d e c l a r e s t h a t a person who c u l t i v a t e s marihuana commits t h e o f f e n s e of a c r i m i n a l s a l e t h e r e o f . The v i c e of t h i s s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n l i e s i n pre- c l u d i n g proof t h a t t h e accused d i d n o t sell o r t r a n s f e r marihuana t o o t h e r s , b u t o n l y grew it f o r h i s own u s e . Proof o f c u l t i v a - t i o n is s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n v i c t without r e g a r d t o proof of a s a l e or t r a n s f e r t o a n o t h e r . C l a s s i f y i n g c u l t i v a t i o n as a s a l e and p r o h i b i t i n g proof t o t h e c o n t r a r y c r e a t e s a c o n c l u s i v e presumption t h a t one who grows marihuana sells it c r i m i n a l l y . A presumption i s "a deduc- t i o n which t h e law e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s t o be made from p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s " , h e r e a c r i m i n a l s a l e from proof of c u l t i v a t i o n . S e c t i o n 93-1301-3, R.C.M. 1947. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , t h e presumption i s made c o n c l u s i v e by d e f i n i t i o n of t h e crime: "A person commits t h e o f f e n s e of a c r i m i n a l s a l e of dangerous drugs if he * * * c u l t i v a t e s * * * any dangerous drug * * *." The United S t a t e s Supreme Court has expressed t h e test of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of such s t a t u t o r y presumptions i n Tot v. United S t a t e s , 319 U.S. 403, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.ed 1519, 1524: "Under our d e c i s i o n s , a s t a t u t o r y presumption cannot be s u s t a i n e d i f t h e r e be no r a t i o n a l con- n e c t i o n between t h e f a c t proved and t h e u l t i m a t e f a c t presumed, i f t h e i n f e r e n c e of t h e one from proof of t h e o t h e r is a r b i t r a r y because of l a c k of connection between t h e two i n common experience." This t e s t of u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y f i t s l i k e a glove i n t h i s c a s e . 'there is no r a t i o n a l connection between t h e f a c t proved { c u l t i v a t i o n of marihuana) and t h e u l t i m a t e f a c t presumed ( t h e c r i m i n a l s a l e of marihuana). The i n f e r e n c e of s a l e from proof of c u l t i v a t i o n is a r b i t r a r y because of l a c k of connection between t h e two. Accordingly, I would a f f i r m t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n d e c l a r i n g t h e s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . i n my view, it d e n i e s t h e d e f e n d a n t "due p r o c e s s of l a w " by i t s a r b i t r a r y and i r r a t i o n a l c l a s s i f i - c a t i o n of a "grower" as a "pusher" w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o the f a c t s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l case. J u s t i c e M r . J u s t i c e Gene 9. Daly d i s s e n t i n g : I concur w i t h t h e d i s s e n t r. J u s t i c e Frank I. H a s w e l l .