Case Title: In re Verburg

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-196


 In re Jacob and Harmke Verburg               Supreme Court
 and Wesco, Inc.
                                              On Appeal from
                                              Agency of Natural Resources

                                              March Term, 1992


 Anne F. Whiteley, Hearing Officer

 Craig Weatherly and Charles T. Shea of Gravel and Shea, Burlington, for
   appellants

 William E. Roper of Neuse, Smith, Roper & Venman, Middlebury, for appellee
   Richmond Land Trust

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, John H. Hansen, Assistant Attorney
   General, and John Beiswenger, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Montpelier, for
   Department of Environmental Conservation


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Petitioners, Wesco, Inc. and Jacob and Harmke Verburg,
 appeal from a declaratory ruling by the Commissioner of Environmental
 Conservation.  That ruling makes it impossible for Wesco to build a gas
 station and convenience store on two lots owned by the Verburgs because the
 land lies in a flood plain.  We affirm in part and reverse in part.
      The two lots lie at the Richmond exit of Interstate 89 and were
 subdivided by the Verburgs under a deferral of permit issued by the
 Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC).  The deferral requires that,
 for the lots in question, a permit be obtained before the erection of any
 structure needing the installation of plumbing and sewage treatment
 facilities.  Wesco proposes to place such a building on one of the lots and
 a sewage disposal system to service the structure on the other lot.
      Both lots lie within the 100-year flood plain of the Winooski River.
 DEC regulations require that an on-site sewage disposal system be located at
 least one foot above the 100-year flood plain.  The flood plain elevation
 for the lot on which the sewerage system would be constructed lies at 304
 feet.  The actual elevation of the lot varies between 302 feet and 304.25
 feet.  The 100-year flood plain elevation for the lot on which the building
 would be constructed lies at 305 feet.  Part of that lot has an actual
 elevation under 306 feet.  In order to meet the DEC requirement, Wesco
 proposes to place one foot or more of fill on the area where the sewage
 disposal system would be located.
      Petitioners' application for a subdivision permit was rejected by the
 DEC regional office because of the flood plain restriction.  Thereafter,
 petitioners brought this petition for a declaratory ruling that they could
 meet the regulatory requirements by adding fill to the site.  After a
 hearing, (FN1) a hearing officer appointed by the Commissioner ruled that
 petitioners could not meet the elevation requirements by adding fill.
      This case involves the interaction of a number of DEC regulations.  The
 DEC requires that sewage "be safely and effectively disposed of through
 lawful and proper means."  Department of Environmental Conservation,
 Environmental Protection Rules { 3.09B ("DEC Rules").  Where sewage is
 disposed of on site, each lot must contain "a minimum required area of
 suitable soil sufficient for the building site[]" and for the sewerage
 system, separate from other features that might adversely affect the
 functioning of the sewage disposal system or be polluted by it.  Id. {
 3.09B(1).  The size of the minimum area depends on the percolation rate of
 the soil and whether a public water system will be used.  Id.  Ninety
 percent of the minimum required area must lie at least one foot above the
 flood plain of any stream.  Id. { 3.09B(2)a.  As a separate requirement, the
 lot must contain a continuous area equal to twenty percent of the required
 minimum area, and the sewage disposal system must be located in the
 continuous area.  Id. { 3.09B(4).  The continuous area must be at least one
 foot above the flood plain.  Id. { 3.09B(4)a.
      Chapter 7 of the DEC Rules deals specifically with sewage disposal
 systems.  Section 7-14 is titled "Site Modifications" and states that "it
 may be possible to convert marginal or unsuitable sites to sites which
 comply with the specific requirements of these regulations."  Id. { 7-14A.
 It goes on to state that "[s]ite conditions which may be improved by some
 degree of site modification are shallow depth to impervious layer, seasonal
 high ground water level, shallow depth to bedrock and excessive slope."  Id.
 The section does not mention the addition of fill to a site to bring the
 elevation above that of the flood plain.
      In reaching her decision, the hearing officer appears to have relied
 upon the absence of mention in { 7-14A of adding fill to comply with the
 flood plain requirements of { 3.09B.  She also emphasized, however, that the
 DEC Rules were intended to implement policies in addition to the prevention
 of pollution.  She reasoned:
         The state should not take a position which either
         encourages or tacitly allows residential or commercial
         development in a flood plain area.  This position would
         not only be bad public policy but also an unwarranted
         increased risk to public health and the environment in
         the event of a flood.  This is particularly true when
         the development in question is not only a subdivision
         but also a public building selling food and gas to the
         public at large as well as storing gasoline and other
         hazardous materials.

 Petitioners attack both this policy statement and the hearing officer's
 conclusion that they cannot meet the flood plain requirements by adding
 fill.  They also challenge the officer's conclusion that they must meet the
 minimum area requirement on both lots.
      The first issue is whether the regulations allow petitioners to place
 fill on the property in order to bring the elevation at least one foot above
 the flood plain.  In construing a statute or regulation, our overall goal is
 to discern the intent of the Legislature or administrative agency.  Muzzy v.
 Chevrolet Division, General Motors Corp., 153 Vt. 179, 187, 571 A.2d 609,
 614 (1989).  We must look to the "'subject matter, its effects and
 consequences, and the reason and spirit of the law.'"  Nash v. Warren Zoning
 Board of Adjustment, 153 Vt. 108, 112, 569 A.2d 447, 450 (1989) (quoting In
 re R.S. Audley, Inc., 151 Vt. 513, 517, 562 A.2d 1046, 1049 (1989)).
 Ordinarily, however, we employ a deferential standard of review for an
 agency's interpretations of its own regulations.  See In re Denio, ___ Vt.
 ___, ___, 608 A.2d 1166, 1171 (1992) (decisions within the expertise of an
 administrative agency "are presumed to be correct, valid and reasonable,"
 and generally receive deference).  Even so, we must endeavor to ensure that
 such deference does not result in "unjust, unreasonable or absurd"
 consequences.  O'Brien v. Island Corp., 157 Vt. ___, ___, 596 A.2d 1295,
 1297 (1991).  Therefore, the presumption of validity for an agency's
 interpretations of its regulations may be overcome by the existence of
 "compelling indications of error" in such interpretations.  See Rogers v.
 Watson, 156 Vt. 483, 489, 594 A.2d 409, 412 (1991) (such compelling
 indications justify the rejection of administrative regulatory
 interpretations).
      The decision in question here was made by a lawyer, serving as the
 hearing officer in this case, who apparently had no prior involvement with
 the issues.  The decision was based, however, on the testimony of the DEC
 Chief of Engineering Services.  For this reason, we will accord the decision
 of the hearing officer the deference ordinarily accorded to interpretations
 of regulations by the administrative agency responsible for their
 implementation.
      To support its interpretation of the rule, DEC relies primarily on the
 precept of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."  See Grenafege v.
 Department  of Employment Security, 134 Vt. 288, 290,