Case Title: Daniels v. Industrial Comm'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90318

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90318-Agenda 23-May 2001.
PERVIS DANIELS, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION et al. (Archibald Candy Company, Appellee).
	Claimant, Pervis Daniels, filed an application for adjustment
of claim pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820
ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1992)), alleging that while in the employ
of respondent, Archibald Candy Company, he injured his back
while lifting a kiln. An arbitrator awarded claimant $593.11 per
week in temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for a period of
57 6/7 weeks (see 820 ILCS 305/8(b) (West 1992)), $7,828.25 in
medical expenses (see 820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 1992)), and
additional compensation pursuant to sections 16, 19(k), and 19(l)
of the Act (see 820 ILCS 305/16, 19(k), (l) (West 1992)). On
review, the Industrial Commission (Commission) determined that
claimant was entitled to TTD benefits for a period of only 14 5/7
weeks. The Commission also vacated the awards of additional
compensation and medical expenses. The circuit court of Cook
County confirmed the Commission's decision.
	Daniels then appealed to the Industrial Commission division
of the appellate court, contending that the Commission's decision
was void because the panel that rendered it was illegally
constituted. Daniels also argued, in the alternative, that the
Commission's findings as to causal connection, TTD benefits,
medical expenses and additional compensation were against the
manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court rejected both
of Daniels' arguments and affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court over the dissent of two judges. 315 Ill. App. 3d 580. Three
of the five members of the appellate court panel which heard the
case subsequently certified that it involved a substantial question
warranting review by this court. We then granted Daniels' petition
for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For the reasons that
follow, we now reverse and remand.
	When Archibald Candy, Daniels' employer, sought review of
the arbitrator's award by the Commission, the case was assigned
to panel "B," consisting of Commissioners John Hallock, Jr.,
Barry Ketter and Linzey Jones. Before the matter was heard and
decided, however, Commissioner Hallock was elevated to the post
of acting Commission chairman, then Commission chairman, and
Commissioner Jones resigned following a medical leave of
absence.
	The promotion of Hallock and the resignation of Jones left
two vacancies in the office of commissioner. Under section 13 of
the Act (820 ILCS 305/13 (West 1992)), responsibility for
appointing commissioners and for filling vacancies in the office of
commissioner is vested in the Governor "by and with the consent
of the Senate." Where the vacancy occurs while the Senate is in
recess, the Governor is empowered to make a temporary
appointment until the next meeting of the Senate, at which time he
is to nominate some person to fill the position. 820 ILCS 305/13
(West 1992).
	Those procedures were not followed here. The Governor
neither appointed nor nominated replacements for Hallock and
Jones as specified in the Act. Instead, Hallock, in his capacity as
the new Commission chairman, appointed a succession of
arbitrators to temporarily fill his old Commission post and to fill
the post formerly occupied by Jones. Arbitrator Kathleen Hagan
took Hallock's post on panel "B," serving as acting commissioner
during the initial six-month period following his promotion.
Arbitrator David Kane then succeeded her as acting commissioner
during the subsequent six-month period.
	When Commissioner Jones first went on medical leave and
then resigned his office, the chairman designated arbitrator Calvin
Tansor to serve as acting commissioner on panel "B" in his place.
Tansor served for six months and was then replaced by arbitrator
Joseph Reichart, who was designated to serve as acting
commissioner for the following six-month period.
	There is authority under section 13 of the Act (820 ILCS
305/13 (West 1992)) for the chairman to designate an arbitrator to
serve as an acting commissioner for up to six months, but that
authority is reserved for situations where the sitting commissioner
remains in office but "is or will be unavailable to fulfill [his or
her] responsibilities." Accordingly, it was inapplicable to the
appointments of Hagan and Kane, because Hallock, the
commissioner in whose stead they were appointed, was never
"unable to fulfill the responsibilities of his *** office." He vacated
his office completely upon being named acting chairman and then
chairman.
	Section 13 did apply to the designation of Calvin Tansor to
serve for Linzey Jones because Jones' initial absence from work
was due to a medical leave. Once Jones resigned, however, his
post became vacant too. Since he was now out of office, rather
than being temporarily "unavailable" to work, his responsibilities
could no longer be performed by an arbitrator acting in his place.
Tansor's authority to serve as acting commissioner came to an
end, and the chairman had no power to designate Reichart as a
successor acting commissioner. Instead, it was up to the Governor
to appoint a replacement for Jones by and with the consent of the
Senate.
	Such a conclusion is the only one consistent with the purposes
of the Act. The law is carefully designed to insure that the
Industrial Commission represents a balance of interests. Under the
law the Governor is required to make his appointments to the
Commission in such a way that two members represent employers,
two represent employees, and three are representative of citizens
"not identified with either the employing or employee classes."
820 ILCS 305/13 (West 1992). In addition, not more than four of
the members may be of the same political party. Arbitrators
designated to serve as acting commissioners are not subject to this
partisanship restriction and are deemed to be representative of
citizens "not identified with either the employing or employee
classes." 820 ILCS 305/13 (West 1992). Accordingly, if arbitrators
could be designated as acting commissioners even after the
commissioners whose workload they were handling left office,
there would be no mechanism to insure that the balance of
interests contemplated by the Act would be preserved. Through
contrived designations and inaction by the Governor, the departure
from office of sitting commissioners could be exploited to pack
the Commission with members of the Governor's political party
or representatives of whatever economic class the Governor
favored. Such a result would be directly contrary to the Act's
objectives.
	The present case was reviewed by the Commission during a
time when arbitrators Reichart and Kane were both serving as
acting commissioners on panel "B" through appointment by the
chairman. Their votes were necessary to the decision in this case.
The question we must therefore now address is what effect the
absence of statutory authority for Kane's and Reichart's
appointments had on the validity of their decision.
	Central to resolution of that question is the Industrial
Commission's status as an administrative agency. Because it is an
administrative agency, the Commission has no general or common
law powers. The only powers it possesses are those granted to it by
the legislature. Any action it takes must be specifically authorized
by statute. Business & Professional People for the Public Interest
v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243-44 (1989).
	Where an administrative agency acts outside its specific
statutory authority, as the Commission did when it appointed Kane
and Reichart, it acts without jurisdiction. Its actions are void, a
nullity from their inception. See Siddens v. Industrial Comm'n,
304 Ill. App. 3d 506, 510-11 (1999). The appointment of Kane and
Reichart therefore had no legal effect.
	Our appellate court recently considered a similar situation in
Gilchrist v. Human Rights Comm'n, 312 Ill. App. 3d 597 (2000).
In Gilchrist, the Commission rendered a decision based on the
recommended order and decision of an administrative law judge.
On reviewing the record, the appellate court discovered that the
administrative law judge who had authored the recommended
order and decision had not presided over the public hearing, as the
Illinois Human Rights Act required. Because that administrative
law judge had not presided, the Commission had no statutory
authority to assign him to the case. Because his assignment
exceeded the Commission's authority, the decision based on his
recommended order and decision was likewise unauthorized. The
court therefore declared it to be void.
	The qualifications of Kane and Reichart were not challenged
prior to the appeal to the appellate court. That, however, is of no
consequence. Because agency action for which there is no
statutory authority is void, it is subject to attack at any time in any
court, either directly or collaterally. Business & Professional
People, 136 Ill. 2d  at 243-44. Even if the parties themselves do not
raise the question, courts have an independent duty to vacate and
expunge void orders and thus may sua sponte declare an order
void. See Siddens, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 511. That is precisely what
occurred in Gilchrist.
	Finally, we reject the Commission's claim that the decision in
this case can be validated on the grounds that Kane and Reichart
were de facto officers. The doctrine recognizing de facto public
officers prevents third parties or members of the public from
raising collateral challenges to a public officer's qualifications to
hold office if considerations of public policy require the officer's
acts to be considered valid. See People ex rel. Rusch v. Wortman,
334 Ill. 298, 301-02 (1928). No considerations of public policy
militate in favor of preventing workers' compensation claimants
from challenging the legal status of the commissioners who passed
on their claims where, as here, the challenge is raised on direct
review of the workers' compensation award and the
commissioners were appointed in a manner that threatens the
Act's basic objectives.
	For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commission at
issue in this case is vacated, the judgments of the appellate and
circuit courts are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the
Commission for a decision by a legally constituted panel.
Reversed and remanded.
	JUSTICE McMORROW, specially concurring:
	This case began when Daniels filed an application for
adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act.
820 ILCS 305/19 (West 1992). An arbitrator issued a decision,
awarding certain benefits to Daniels. A three-member panel of the
Industrial Commission reduced the arbitrator's award and Daniels
sought administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County.
After the circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision,
appeal was taken to the Industrial Commission division of the
appellate court. There, for the first time, Daniels argued that the
decision of the Industrial Commission was void because two
members of the panel which considered and decided his case
(Kane and Reichart) were appointed acting commissioners in
violation of the Workers' Compensation Act. In support of this
contention, Daniels submitted to the appellate court an affidavit,
signed by his attorney, attesting to the composition of panel "B"
of the Industrial Commission, which reviewed his case. The
Industrial Commission, in response, filed with the appellate court
an affidavit by Kathryn A. Kelley, chief legal counsel for the
Industrial Commission, verifying the history of the designation of
acting commissioners.
	Based on all of the information submitted, the appellate court
considered and rejected Daniels' claim that Kane and Reichart had
been improperly appointed and then affirmed the judgment of the
circuit court. Two justices dissented, agreeing with Daniels that
the appointments of Kane and Reichart were not made in
accordance with statutory procedures, their appointments were
invalid, and, thus, the Industrial Commission's decision was
rendered void. Upon denying Daniels' petition for rehearing, three
of the five appellate justices certified that the case presented a
"substantial question which warrants consideration by the supreme
court." We granted Daniels' petition for leave to appeal.(1)
	Justice Thomas' dissent lodges criticisms against this court
for the court's consideration of the certified question. The dissent
contends that this court should not address the issue of first
impression presented in this case, i.e., whether section 13 of the
Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/13 (West 1992))
authorizes the chairman to designate a certified arbitrator to serve
as an acting commissioner when a permanent vacancy occurs in
the office of the commissioner or whether that vacancy must be
filled by the Governor. In the dissent's view, this court need not
examine the statutory provision to determine the proper method
for appointing commissioners because the question of whether the
panel of commissioners was validly constituted is not properly
before this court. The dissent believes this issue is procedurally
defaulted or "waived," based on the fact that Daniels first
challenged the Commission's validity in the appellate court. The
dissent states, "I am genuinely troubled by the fact that the court
inflicts such a broadside in the obvious absence of jurisdiction
over this case." (Emphasis added.) Slip op. at 16 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and Garman, JJ.). Thus, the
dissenting justices believe that the alleged procedural default or
"waiver" not only makes it unnecessary to consider the matter, it
deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider whether the
Industrial Commission was validly constituted. Further, Justice
Thomas, citing to Newkirk v. Bigard, 109 Ill. 2d 28 (1985),
contends that this court need not address Daniels' claim that the
illegal appointment of commissioners rendered their decision void.
According to the dissent, pursuant to Newkirk, we can summarily
reject Daniels' voidness argument because the case at bar presents 
a collateral attack on the judgment and nothing on the face of the
order indicates that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the
parties, jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the inherent power
to make or enter the particular order involved. Slip op. at 18
(Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and Garman, JJ.).
	Newkirk, however, does not support Justice Thomas' position.
In Newkirk, plaintiffs never sought administrative review of the
mining board order at issue. Instead, two years after the order was
entered, plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking
to have the mining board's order declared void ab initio because
it did not contain certain provisions. We first examined the statute,
which provided that integration orders "shall" contain election
provisions and equitable alternatives. Newkirk, 109 Ill. 2d  at 32-33. Then, after discussing the distinction between an action for
judicial review and a collateral attack, this court held that the
mining board's failure to include the provisions in its order was
error which made the order voidable, but not void. The fact that
the order contained errors did not cause the agency to lose
jurisdiction. Newkirk, 109 Ill. 2d  at 37.
	I note that, in the present case, unlike the situation in Newkirk,
Daniels is seeking judicial review of an Industrial Commission's
decision. Although Daniels did not question the validity of the
panel of commissioners when he appeared before that tribunal, he
did so when the case was in the appellate court. Thus, while
Daniels may have been untimely in raising the issue, that fact does
not convert this case into a collateral proceeding.
	 More importantly, I point out that, in Newkirk, this court did
not summarily dispose of the voidness argument. We found it
necessary to examine the pertinent statutory provision to determine
whether the mining board's order contained error before deciding
whether the order was void. It was only after we had examined the
statute and found that the order contained error-the failure to
include certain provisions and equitable alternatives-that we were
able to determine that, because of the nature of the error,
jurisdiction was unaffected. Having made that assessment, we
were able to conclude that the error did not render the order void.
Further, in that case, because the order was being attacked
collaterally, no remedy was available.
	I believe that this court is similarly bound, in the present case,
to examine the pertinent statutory provisions to determine
whether, as Daniels contends, two of the commissioners on his
panel were illegally appointed. The Industrial Commission is an
administrative body created by legislative enactment, which can
only enter such orders as are within its statutorily granted powers.
See Michelson v. Industrial Comm'n, 375 Ill. 462 (1941); Central
Illinois Public Service Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 36 Ill. App.
3d 397 (1976) (it is a commanding tenet of administrative law that
an administrative agency and its officers may exercise only those
powers conferred upon them by statute). Daniels is arguing that,
because two of the commissioners who reviewed his claim were
not appointed in conformity with the statute, the "Commission"
which reviewed his claim did not legally exist and, therefore, it
had no inherent power to act and could exercise no personal or
subject matter jurisdiction over him. Lacking jurisdiction, the
decisions rendered by the Commission would be void.
	It is true that, as a general proposition, issues not raised before
an administrative agency will be deemed "waived" for purposes of
review. Voidness, however, is a fundamental defect that cannot be
waived by a failure to object. Whether there is a lack of
jurisdiction which renders a judgment void is a matter which can
be raised at any time (City of Chicago v. Fair Employment
Practices Comm'n, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 112 (1976)), either on direct
review or collaterally, as in Newkirk. Thus, Daniels' argument that
the Industrial Commission's decision is void must be addressed.
Here, as in Newkirk, it is only after this court determines whether
the appointments constituted error that this court can consider
whether the error is serious enough to constitute a jurisdictional
defect. In other words, this court can make no reasoned decision
on Daniels' voidness claim unless this court first determines
whether there was error in the appointment procedures followed
and whether the error was of such a nature that it affected the
Commission's jurisdiction.
	Finally, even if there were a reasoned means to summarily
dispose of Daniels' voidness argument, procedural default or
"waiver" would pose no barrier to our consideration of Daniels'
claim that the Industrial Commission panel which reviewed his
case was illegally constituted. The fact that Daniels' attack on the
validity of the commissioners' appointments may have been
untimely and, thus, subject to procedural default does not mean
that this court is without jurisdiction to consider the matter. The
general rule that issues or defenses not raised before an
administrative agency will be deemed waived and will not be
considered for the first time on administrative review is an
admonition to the parties, not a limitation on the court's
jurisdiction. Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 278-79 (1998). It has long been recognized that the waiver
rule may be relaxed in order to maintain a uniform body of
precedent or may be relaxed where the interests of justice so
require. Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223 (1967); Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Doherty, 299 Ill. App. 3d 338 (1998). As stated in Wadlington v.
Mindes, 45 Ill. 2d 447, 453 (1970), the waiver rule "is not a rigid
or inflexible one, and, where injustice might otherwise result, a
reviewing court may consider questions of law not passed upon by
an administrative agency." See also American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. County of Cook,
145 Ill. 2d 475, 480 (1991).
	Here, in the course of seeking judicial review of the
Commission's ruling, Daniels called into question the legitimacy
of the appointment procedures being followed by that
administrative body. The matter presented a question of statutory
construction-a legal question-which could readily be answered by
a reviewing court. Moreover, a decision on whether the
appointment procedures were in conformance with statutory
requirements is a matter of significant importance. As Chief
Justice Harrison notes in his plurality opinion, if commissioners
are not appointed in conformity with the statute, there exists the
potential for undermining "the balance of interests contemplated
by the Act." See slip op. at 3. Under these circumstances, I believe
the interests of justice require that the matter be addressed.
	Turning now to the merits, I fully concur with Chief Justice
Harrison's interpretation of the Worker's Compensation Act.(2) I
agree that the statute, properly construed, mandates a finding that
two of the three commissioners who sat on the panel reviewing
Daniels' case (Kane and Reichart) were not appointed in
conformity with statutory requirements. However, I do not agree
with Chief Justice Harrison as to the consequences which must
follow from this conclusion. Although the chairman of the
Industrial Commission did not have the statutory authority to
appoint Kane and Reichart to "permanent" vacancies on the
Commission, Kane and Reichart were appointed to the office of
commissioner and exercised the duties of the office under color of
law. The decisions in which they participated are not void. The
common law de facto officer doctrine operates to prevent
invalidation of those decisions. See People ex rel. Hicks v. Lycan,
314 Ill. 590, 593 (1924) ("Whether the board of review was legally
constituted or not, the persons acting as such board members were
performing the duties of the board with apparent right under color
of office, and their acts were valid as to the public and persons
having an interest in them"). In this respect, I agree with Justice
Fitzgerald's separate dissent.
	The definition of a de facto officer, set forth in State v.
Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 471-72 (1871), and adopted by this court
in People ex rel. Rusch v. Wortman, 334 Ill. 298, 301 (1928), is as
follows:
		"An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those
of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and
justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interests
of the public and third persons, where the duties of the
office were exercised *** under color of a known election
or appointment [which was] void because the officer was
not eligible or because there was a want of power in the
electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect
or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of
power or defect being unknown to the public."
	Although the common law de facto officer doctrine has its
roots in antiquity, it has retained its vitality through the years
because of its practicality. See In re Fichner, 144 N.J. 459, 677 A.2d 201 (1996); K. Clokey, Note, The De Facto Officer
Doctrine: The Case for Continued Application, 85 Colum. L. Rev.
1121 (1985). The United States Supreme Court in Ryder v. United
States, 515 U.S. 177, 180-81, 132 L. Ed. 2d 136, 142, 115 S. Ct. 2031, 2034 (1995), quoting 63A. Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers &
Employees §578, at 1080-81 (1984), states:
		" 'The de facto doctrine springs from the fear of the chaos
that would result from multiple and repetitious suits
challenging every action taken by every official whose
claim to office could be open to question, and seeks to
protect the public by insuring the orderly functioning of
the government despite technical defects in title to office.' "
	Pursuant to the de facto officer doctrine, a litigant may be
prevented from contesting the legality of the acts of an officer by
calling into question the validity of the officer's title to office. This
doctrine, however, like any other equitable doctrine, must not be
applied mechanically. As noted in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 535-36, 8 L. Ed. 2d 671, 678-79, 82 S. Ct. 1459, 1465
(1962), "[t]he rule does not obtain, of course, when the alleged
defect of authority operates also as a limitation on this Court's
appellate jurisdiction *** [or] when the statute claimed to restrict
authority is not merely technical but embodies a strong policy
concerning the proper administration of judicial business, [so that]
this Court has treated the alleged defect as 'jurisdictional' and
agreed to consider it on direct review even though not raised at the
earliest practicable opportunity *** [or] when the challenge is
based upon nonfrivolous constitutional grounds." It also has been
held that the de facto officer doctrine should not be invoked when
an officer's appointment is in violation of a statute and the officer
lacks certain qualifications which were statutorily required for the
benefit and protection of the individual subject to the officer's
authority. See, e.g., United States v. Beltran, 306 F. Supp. 385
(N.D. Cal. 1969) (statutory requirement that draft status be
determined by "neighbors" was held sufficiently important to
allow draft resister to challenge qualifications of draft board
members).
	In the present case, the error in the composition of the panel
of commissioners who reviewed Daniels' claim stemmed from a
statutory, not a constitutional, violation. Moreover, it has never
been alleged that the commissioners who were not validly
appointed were otherwise unqualified to hold their positions. Nor
has it been claimed that these commissioners' appointments were
the result of malfeasance or a deliberate attempt to subvert the
goals of the Act. Kane and Reichart exercised the duties of their
office under color of lawful appointment, which only now has
been found to be defective. For this reason, I would hold that the
decisions rendered by Kane and Reichart may be afforded de facto
validity. Applying the de facto officer doctrine to uphold the many
decisions of the duly-appointed commissioners, despite defects in
their appointments, serves the public's interest in promoting the
orderly functioning of the Commission. See Ryder v. United
States, 515 U.S. 177, 180-81, 132 L. Ed. 2d 136, 142, 115 S. Ct. 2031, 2034 (1995).
	Applying the de facto doctrine to the plaintiff's case at bar,
however, would, in my view, run counter to a competing public
interest-uncovering illegal appointment procedures, thereby
ensuring that administrative agencies comply with the statutory
mandates which govern them. Accordingly, I believe that the
equities, on balance, militate against application of the de facto
officer doctrine in the case at bar, to deny Daniels review by a
properly constituted panel of commissioners.
	If it were the established law of this state that the de facto
officer doctrine always applied to validate all decisions of the
Commission, there would be little or no incentive for claimants,
such as Daniels, to bring illegalities in the appointment of
commissioners before the judiciary for review. Claimants would
have no reason to bring irregularities, such as those in the case at
bar, to the attention of the courts if it were the rule that they could
never obtain relief. In my view, the de facto officer doctrine
should not be employed in such a way that it forecloses judicial
review of matters, such as irregularities in appointment
procedures, when brought to the attention of the judiciary as a
matter of first impression. The public clearly has an interest in
having illegal actions uncovered, reported and addressed by the
courts. Therefore, it is not in the public's interest to implement a
rule of equity so broadly that it eliminates the incentive to bring
illegal actions to light.
	The position I take in this opinion-permitting Daniels, but no
others, to have a new hearing-strikes an equitable balance between
the identified competing interests. By permitting the claimant who
brought the illegal appointments to light to receive a new hearing,
the incentive to discover and pursue such illegality is maintained.
Once the matter has been litigated and decided by the courts,
however, the public interest in uncovering and addressing
illegality is served. At that juncture, the public interest in
preserving the validity of a large multitude of commission
decisions takes precedence. Public policy and competing public
interests often require courts to draw equitable lines. That line is
best drawn in this case by permitting Daniels a new hearing, but
by applying the de facto officer doctrine to maintain the validity of
the decisions rendered by the illegally composed commission in
other cases. This is precisely the result that was reached by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Fichner, 144 N.J. 459, 677 A.2d 201 (1996).
	In Fichner, the respondent appealed after he was sanctioned
by the Board of Examiners of Master Plumbers. Eighteen months
after the appeal was filed, respondent moved to amend the appeal
to add a claim that the board was illegally constituted because
three members of the seven-member board, though duly appointed,
lacked certain qualifications. The appellate court refused to apply
the de facto officer doctrine and examined the qualifications of the
board members. Finding that three members were ineligible, the
appellate court remanded for a new hearing. The New Jersey
Supreme Court, however, concluded that the board's decisions
were valid by application of the de facto officer doctrine, yet "was
satisfied" to let the appellate court's disposition stand. In re
Fichner, 144 N.J. at 471, 677 A.2d  at 207. The supreme court
stated:
		"We believe that a remand for reconsideration of the
matter by a properly composed board will serve the
interests of the public and the licensee in this case." In re
Fichner, 144 N.J. at 471, 677 A.2d  at 207.
	Here, too, I am persuaded that, under the particular
circumstances of this case, Daniels should be granted a remand so
that a properly constituted panel of commissioners can review the
arbitrator's award on his workers' compensation claim. In sum, I
find that Daniels' claim that the improper appointment of
Commissioners Kane and Reichart rendered the Commission's
decision void in this case is a matter properly addressed by this
court. Although there was a procedural default because Daniels
failed to challenge the validity of the appointments before the
Board, the claim of voidness, like a claim of plain error, had to be
examined substantively before it could be disposed of. Having
examined the statute, I find, like Chief Justice Harrison, that the
Chairman of the Industrial Commission did not have the authority
to appoint commissioners to fill "permanent" vacancies. For this
reason, the appointments of Kane and Reichart were not valid.
	Nevertheless, faced with the possibility of upheaval-of
invalidating the hundreds of decisions rendered by the illegally
constituted panel-I would opt to preserve the integrity of those
decisions. The invalid appointments of Kane and Reichart did not
render void every decision of the Commission in which Kane and
Reichart participated. Kane and Reichart were appointed under
color of law and, according to the common law de facto officer
doctrine, their decisions are given de facto validity.
	At the same time, I believe providing Daniels with an
opportunity to have his worker's compensation award reviewed by
a properly constituted panel of commissioners promotes the
public's interest in having illegalities brought to the court's
attention for review. This court would not be ruling favorably or
unfavorably on the merits of Daniels' claim, but merely be
providing him with a hearing on his substantive claim. Again, I
emphasize that I reach this conclusion, not for the court to show
favoritism to Daniels, but because granting him a hearing before
a duly constituted panel best serves the public interests. For this
reason, I join Chief Justice Harrison in concluding that this matter
should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this special concurrence.
	I agree with the view expressed in Justice Thomas'
dissent-the record in this case precludes consideration of whether
Commissioners Kane and Reichert were appointed in conformity
with the Act. Therefore, I join in his dissent. I write separately,
however, to express an additional basis for dissenting-my
disagreement with Chief Justice Harrison's conclusion that the
acts of Kane and Reichert are not valid under the de facto officer
doctrine. I would hold that Kane and Reichert were at least de
facto commissioners with authority to act.
	Under the de facto officer doctrine, "[a] person actually
performing the duties of an office under color of title is an officer
de facto, and his acts as such officer are valid so far as the public
or third parties who have an interest in them are concerned."
People ex rel. Chillicothe Township v. Board of Review, 19 Ill. 2d 424, 426 (1960). On grounds of public policy and justice, the acts
of a de facto officer are as valid as the acts of an officer de jure.
People ex rel. Rusch v. Wortman, 334 Ill. 298, 302 (1928); see also
63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers & Employees §23 (1997)
(purpose of the de facto officer doctrine is to "protect the public's
reliance on an officer's authority and to ensure the orderly
administration of government"). Importantly, an officeholder's
eligibility to appointment and the validity of his or her official acts
may be challenged only in a proceeding brought directly for that
purpose. Wortman, 334 Ill.  at 301; see also People v. Woodruff, 9 Ill. 2d 429, 437 (1956); Cleary v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 4 Ill. 2d 57, 58-59 (1954) (title to a public office cannot be questioned
in a mere collateral proceeding).
	In Chillicothe Township, we applied the de facto officer
doctrine and held valid the actions of a county board of review
increasing the assessed valuation of the plaintiffs' property. It was
stipulated that, based upon the results of the immediately prior
general election, the county board of review should have been
composed of two Republicans and one Democrat. The board,
however, was composed of two Democrats and one Republican.
The plaintiffs argued that because the board was improperly
constituted, its actions increasing the assessments were
unconstitutional and void. We rejected the plaintiffs' argument:
		"Whether the Board of Review was legally constituted or
not, the persons acting as such board were performing the
duties of the board with apparent right under color of
office, and their acts were thus valid as to the public and
persons having an interest in them. [Citation.] The Board
of Review was thus composed of, at least, de facto
officers, and from a review of the record and the
authorities presented, its acts were apparently valid."
Chillicothe Township, 19 Ill. 2d  at 426-27.
	We reached a similar conclusion in People v. O'Neill, 33 Ill. 2d 184 (1965). In O'Neill, the State brought an action against the
defendant taxpayer for delinquent personal property taxes. The
defendant argued that the county board of supervisors was not
validly constituted because each township had one supervisor on
the board without regard to population, thus violating the "one
man, one vote" rule. According to the defendant, because the
composition of the board was unconstitutional, its act of levying
the personal property tax was illegal. We rejected the defendant's
argument:
			"We think it is clear beyond question that the members
of the Peoria County board of supervisors were at least de
facto officers within the traditional definition ***. Their
acts in levying, extending and collecting taxes cannot
therefore be attacked because of some alleged defect in
the apportionment of their membership." O'Neill, 33 Ill. 2d  at 187.
See also People ex rel. Engle v. Kerner, 32 Ill. 2d 212, 222-23
(1965) (holding that state senators, although elected from
unconstitutionally apportioned districts, were de facto
officeholders with authority to act); Cleary, 4 Ill. 2d  at 59 (holding
that, even assuming the invalidity of the appointment of appellate
court justices, such appointment still conferred color of office, and
judgments rendered thereunder were valid); Wortman, 334 Ill.  at
303-04 (affirming judgment holding election judge and clerk in
contempt for malfeasance in their offices where, although their
appointments were contrary to statute, they were de facto election
officers); Lavin v. Board of Commissioners, 245 Ill. 496, 505-06
(1910) (holding that, without regard to whether the court had
authority to appoint defendant a special State's Attorney,
defendant was at least a de facto special State's Attorney and
entitled to compensation).
	Here, Daniels' challenge to the appointments of Kane and
Reichert, raised for the first time in the appellate court, amounts
to an improper collateral attack on their office. Even assuming that
Kane and Reichert were not appointed in accordance with the
governing statute, they were at least de facto commissioners with
authority to act. Accordingly, I dissent.
	While the plurality purports to invalidate only "the decision
of the Commission at issue in this case" (slip op. at 5), the
plurality in fact invalidates this and every other decision of the
Commission in which Commissioners Kane and Reichart
participated. Indeed, if, as the plurality insists, Commissioners
Kane and Reichart were not lawfully appointed, the consequence
of their unlawful appointments cannot, on any principled basis, be
confined to this case. As sobering as I find the catastrophic sweep
of today's decision, I am genuinely troubled by the fact that the
court inflicts such a broadside in the obvious absence of
jurisdiction over this case. Faced with such gratuitous
overreaching, I have no choice but to dissent.
	Understandably, the plurality's discussion of the procedural
posture of this case is incomplete. After reading the plurality
opinion, the uninformed reader might justifiably assume that the
issue addressed by the plurality (i.e., whether Commissioners
Kane and Reichart were lawfully appointed) was litigated below
and properly preserved for review. In fact, nothing could be further
from the truth. Daniels did not contest the appointments of Kane
and Reichart before the Commission, and he did not contest their
appointments on administrative review. Instead, Daniels waited
until he was before the appellate court to first raise the issue
addressed in the plurality opinion. Even worse, the factual basis
for Daniels' claim is found not in the record on appeal but in an
affidavit from Daniels' counsel that was attached without leave of
court as an appendix to Daniels' appellate court brief.
	Of course, it is well established that, in reviewing a decision
of the Commission, a court may consider only the record and
arguments that were before the Commission. Fitts v. Industrial
Comm'n, 172 Ill. 2d 303, 308 (1996). Arguments raised for the
first time on appeal are waived. Thomas v. Industrial Comm'n, 78 Ill. 2d 327, 336 (1980). Here, neither the Commission nor even the
circuit court considered the legality of the acting commissioners'
appointments, as Daniels raised this issue for the first time in the
appellate court. And the factual basis for that claim was never
litigated and is found nowhere in the record on appeal. The issue
therefore is waived, plain and simple.
	But no. Eager to dismantle countless Commission decisions,
the plurality ignores the obvious waiver in this case and simply
proclaims every action taken by Commissioners Kane and
Reichart "void." Slip op. at 4. What the plurality must have in
mind is that, if they call the panel's decision "void," then that
decision is open to collateral attack. See, e.g., Weingart v.
Department of Labor, 122 Ill. 2d 1, 17-18 (1988). But this cannot
be, as "a party cannot collaterally attack an agency order ***
unless the order is void on its face as being unauthorized by
statute." (Emphasis added.) Newkirk v. Bigard, 109 Ill. 2d 28, 39
(1985); John O. Schofield, Inc. v. Nikkel, 314 Ill. App. 3d 771,
779-80 (2000). And while Daniels' attack is surely collateral,
nothing on the face of the Commission's order renders it void. 
	On the distinction between a direct and collateral attack, this
court has explained:
		"A direct attack may be based upon infirmities in the
judgment which render the judgment void as well as those
defects which make it merely voidable. On the other hand,
a collateral attack is limited to those defects which are of
a character to render the judgment void on jurisdictional
grounds. A direct attack on a judgment is a proceeding
instituted for the very purpose of avoiding or correcting a
judgment in some particular and is brought in the same
action and in the same court. *** 'The judgment of a
court is collaterally assailed when it is sought to be
impeached in an action other than that in which it was
rendered.' [Citations.] A direct attack may be made by
motion or petition *** filed in the same cause in which
the original judgment was entered." (Emphases added.)
City of Des Plaines v. Boeckenhauer, 383 Ill. 475, 480-81
(1943).
Similarly, this court has explained the distinction between a direct
and collateral attack as follows:
		"An application to vacate a judgment or decree, made to
the court that rendered it within thirty days after its entry,
is a direct attack upon the judgment or decree, but if made
after the expiration of thirty days it is a collateral attack."
(Emphases added.) Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135
(1945).
See also People v. O'Keefe, 18 Ill. 2d 386, 391 (1960).
	Thus, under this court's established precedent, a direct attack
on a judgment is one that is brought (1) by motion or petition, (2)
in the same court that rendered the judgment, (3) in the same cause
in which the judgment was rendered, and (4) within 30 days after
the judgment's entry. All other attacks (i.e., attempts to vacate a
judgment as void) are collateral. Here, the Commission entered its
order on June 25, 1997. Daniels first attacked that order 632 days
later on March 19, 1999, and he did so not before the Commission,
which rendered the order, but in the appellate court. Clearly, under
Newkirk, Barnard, and O'Keefe, Daniels' attack is collateral.
	The special concurrence posits that "while Daniels may have
been untimely in raising the issue, that fact does not convert this
case into a collateral proceeding." Slip op. at 8 (McMorrow, J.,
specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.) No, it does not. This
undeniably remains a direct appeal. But such untimeliness does
render collateral Daniels' attack on the judgment. What the special
concurrence misses is that whether the Commission's order is on
direct review has nothing to do with whether an attack leveled
against that judgment is direct or collateral. Again, a direct attack
on a judgment is one that is brought (1) by motion or petition, (2)
in the same court that rendered the judgment, (3) in the same cause
in which the judgment was rendered, and (4) within 30 days after
the judgment's entry. All other attacks (i.e., attempts to vacate a
judgment as void) are collateral. Thus, as this court defines it, a
direct attack may be brought only before a direct appeal is taken.
Once a direct appeal is taken, any new attack is, by definition,
collateral. Admittedly, some confusion is bound to creep in
whenever the same adjective precedes two distinct legal concepts.
Nevertheless, "direct appeal" and "direct attack" remain distinct.(3)
	Given that Daniels' attack is collateral, that attack is
permissible only if the Commission's order is void on its face.
Newkirk, 109 Ill. 2d  at 39. An agency's order is void if the agency
lacks (1) jurisdiction over the parties, (2) jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or (3) the inherent power to make or enter the
particular order involved. Newkirk, 109 Ill. 2d  at 36. Here, nothing
on the face of the order renders the Commission's decision void.
On its face, the order poses no problems concerning personal
jurisdiction, as both Daniels and Archibald participated freely and
fully throughout the Commission proceedings. Likewise, on its
face, the order poses no problems concerning subject matter
jurisdiction, which this court defines as an agency's power to
"hear and determine causes of the general class of cases to which
the particular case belongs." Newkirk, 109 Ill. 2d  at 36. The
Commission's subject matter jurisdiction includes the power to
hear and determine all disputed questions arising under the Act
(820 ILCS 305/18 (West 1998)), and the order is confined to such
questions. Finally, on its face, the order is one that the
Commission possesses the inherent power to enter. Indeed, the
Commission's order is confined to settling disputed questions
specifically arising under the Act, including Daniels' claims for
temporary total disability benefits (820 ILCS 305/8(b) (West
1998)), medical expenses (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 1998)),
attorney fees (820 ILCS 305/16 (West 1998)), penalties (820 ILCS
305/19(k) (West 1998)), and additional compensation (820 ILCS
305/19(l) (West 1998)). The Commission's decision therefore is
neither void on its face nor subject to collateral attack.
	This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the factual basis
for Daniels' collateral attack-i.e., the manner in which acting
Commissioners Kane and Reichart were appointed-appears
nowhere in the record on appeal, least of all on the face of the
contested order. Again, Daniels' entire argument before this court
is based upon two affidavits, one from Daniels' attorney that was
attached to Daniels' appellate court brief and one from the
Commission's attorney that was attached to the Commission's
appellate court brief. Yet Daniels concedes that neither he nor the
Commission sought or received leave from the appellate court to
supplement the record on appeal with these affidavits, and this
court likewise extended no such leave. Given that Newkirk
authorizes a collateral attack only where an agency order is void
on its face, an obvious question arises: How can an order be void
on its face where the "facts" that allegedly render the order void
appear nowhere on the face of the order but only in unauthorized
affidavits wholly outside the record? The answer-like the
question-is obvious: such an order cannot be void on its face and
therefore, under Newkirk, cannot be collaterally attacked.(4)
	In conclusion, I note only that, unlike the appellate court, this
court cannot issue nonprecedential orders under Supreme Court
Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23). On the contrary, every decision of this
court establishes law for the State of Illinois. The tragedy of
today's decision is that, in an effort to do justice in this particular
case, the plurality not only upsets countless decisions of the
Industrial Commission but also turns appellate procedure on its
head for all future cases.
	I dissent.
	JUSTICES FITZGERALD and GARMAN join in this dissent.
	 
	 
1.      1In a brief submitted to this court, the Industrial Commission sets
forth a detailed factual statement concerning the composition of the
Industrial Commission and appointment procedures followed. The
Industrial Commission does not contest in this court the propriety of
considering the supplemental evidence submitted by affidavit. Rather,
citing to this court's decision in Ziegler v. Industrial Comm'n, 51 Ill. 2d 137, 142 (1972), the Commission states in its brief that the affidavits
"were presented to the appellate court *** on the grounds that
additional information may be provided to the court to aid in
determining whether or not the acts of the Commission and Chairman
were authorized."

2.      2It should be emphasized that four members of this court, Chief
Justice Harrison, Justice Freeman, Justice Kilbride and I, agree  with the
Chief Justice's interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act. Thus,
there is a binding opinion of the court on this issue.

3.      3To its credit, the special concurrence draws the line at arguing that
Daniels' attack-which was raised for the first time in the appellate court
some 632 after entry of the Commission's order-was in fact raised for
the first time before the Commission and within 30 days of the order's
entry. 

4.      4While the special concurrence insists that this court has the
power-indeed, the duty-to consider whether Commissioners Kane and
Reichart were properly appointed (slip op. at 10 (McMorrow, J.,
specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.)), the special concurrence
nowhere explains how, on direct appeal, this court can consider factual
matters that are wholly outside the record. Of course, the simple
explanation for this oversight is that we can't.