Case Title: Teresa Louise Griffin v. Mark L. Anderson - Appeal from the district courts entry of judgment quieting title in favor of Griffin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 32617

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2007-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 32617 
 
TERESA LOUISE GRIFFIN, and PETER F. 
KUENZINGER and JUANITA L. 
KUENZINGER, husband and wife,            
                                                     
           Plaintiffs-Respondents,                   
                                                     
 v.                                                  
                                                     
MARK L. ANDERSON and JUDY D. 
ANDERSON, husband and wife, and DOES 1 
through 10, inclusive,             
                                                     
           Defendants-Appellants.                    
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2007 Opinion No. 91 
 
Coeur d’Alene, April 2007 Term 
 
Filed: June 27, 2007  
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk  
 
 
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Kootenai 
County.  Hon. John P. Luster, District Judge. 
The decision of the district court quieting title in favor of respondents is: affirmed.  
Amaro Law Office, Coeur d’Alene, for appellants.  Rami Amaro argued.   
Dean & Kolts, Coeur d’Alene, for respondents. Charles R. Dean, Jr. argued.  
______________________________________ 
 
TROUT, Justice 
Mark and Judy Anderson (the Andersons) appeal from the district court’s entry of 
judgment quieting title in favor of Teresa Louise Griffin and her parents, Peter and Juanita 
Kuenzinger (collectively, Griffin).   
 
 
I. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Andersons purchased a parcel of land in 1977, relying on land markers placed by a 
survey conducted in 1975 (the Booth Survey).  At the time, the neighboring parcel of land was 
owned by the Henneseys.  With the objective of containing their livestock, the Andersons 
constructed a fence along what they believed to be the edge of their property as delineated by the 
Booth Survey.  The Andersons did not consult the Hennesseys, and the Henneseys did not object.  
Seven years later, in 1984, the Hennesseys conveyed their property to the Avalons, who took the 
property with notice of the fence. 
 
In 1991, neighbors of the Avalons and the Andersons commissioned a land survey that 
indicated potential problems in the boundary descriptions.  The Avalons then commissioned a 
survey of their own property in 1995 (the Rasor Survey).  The Rasor Survey confirmed that a 
discrepancy existed between the line created by the Andersons’ fence and the property line 
described in the Andersons’ and Avalons’ deeds, and in fact showed that the property lines 
throughout the area were slightly off of where they had been previously surveyed.  The 
discrepancy between the fence and the actual boundary between the Andersons’ and Avalons’ 
land amounted to approximately an acre measuring roughly 17 by 70 feet.  The Avalons notified 
the Andersons of this discrepancy in 1995.  While the other landowners included in the survey 
agreed to shift their respective property lines in accordance with the Rasor Survey, the 
Andersons refused.  Still, the Avalons made no objection to the Andersons’ fence until 
September 2001.  At that time, the Avalons sent the Andersons a letter stating that they believed 
they owned the property in dispute, but that the Andersons had their permission to use it until the 
Andersons sold their land, at which time the fence line could be corrected.  The following month, 
in October of 2001, the Avalons conveyed their property to Griffin.1   
After unsuccessful attempts to communicate with the Andersons regarding the boundary 
dispute, Griffin filed this action in May of 2004, seeking to quiet title in the strip of land between 
the two properties.  The Andersons asserted the affirmative defenses of adverse possession and 
boundary by agreement.  Both parties moved for summary judgment, with Griffin seeking partial 
summary judgment on the issue of adverse possession.  The district court granted Griffin’s 
motion on adverse possession and denied the Andersons’ motion, save for granting the 
Andersons the single issue that an uncertain boundary line existed at the time the fence was 
constructed.   
                                                 
1 Griffin’s parents, Juanita and Peter Kuenzinger, originally purchased the property in 2001, but 
later transferred an interest to Griffin.  Griffin and the Kuenzingers are listed on the deed as the 
owners, but only Griffin and her husband reside on the property.   
 
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The district court held a court trial in July 2005.  The court found that Griffin’s deed 
contained the disputed strip of land and denied the Andersons’ claim of boundary by agreement.  
Consequently, the court quieted title in favor of Griffin and further found that the Andersons had 
no rights in the disputed property.  The Andersons brought a motion for reconsideration, which 
the court denied.  The Andersons timely appealed.   
II. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court will set aside a trial court’s findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous.  
I.R.C.P. 52(a); Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 P.3d 525, 528 (2003).  In deciding 
whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court determines whether the findings are 
supported by substantial, competent evidence.  Id., citing In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 
Idaho 452, 454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 (2001).  Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact 
would accept it and rely on it.  Id.  Findings based on substantial, competent evidence, although 
conflicting, will not be disturbed on appeal.  Id., citing Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 
P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002).  A trial court’s findings of fact in a court-tried case will be liberally 
construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court’s role as trier of 
fact.  Johnson v. Newport, 131 Idaho 521, 523, 960 P.2d 742, 744 (1998).  Over questions of 
law, in contrast, this Court exercises free review.  Neider, 138 Idaho at 506, 65 P.3d at 528. 
III. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The doctrine of boundary by agreement consists of two elements: (1) an uncertain or 
disputed boundary, and (2) an express or implied agreement subsequently fixing the boundary.  
Johnson 131 Idaho at 523, 960 P.2d at 744.  Such an agreement does not effect a conveyance of 
land from one party to the other.  Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37, 41, 794 P.2d 626, 630 
(1990).  Instead, it establishes “the location of the respective existing estates and the common 
boundary of each of the parties.”  Id.  As a result, “[o]nce there is an agreed upon boundary, the 
parties to the agreement are no longer entitled to the amount of property provided for in their 
deeds and must absorb the effect of any increase or decrease in the amount of their property as a 
result of the new boundary.” Stafford v. Weaver, 136 Idaho 223, 225, 31 P.3d 245, 247 (2001). 
 
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The district court found that the boundary in this case was uncertain and therefore satisfied the 
first element of boundary by agreement.  Thus, this appeal centers on the second element of the 
test: agreement fixing the boundary. 
 
The parties in this case do not dispute that no express agreement was formed between the 
Andersons and the Hennesseys to fix a boundary line when the Andersons constructed their 
fence.  Under the doctrine of boundary by agreement, however, “[t]he agreement need not be 
express, but may be implied by the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties.”  
Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 900, 950 P.2d 1237, 1240 (1997).  Therefore, if the doctrine of 
boundary by agreement is to apply, a court must imply an agreement based on the behavior of 
the parties.  An implied agreement between adjoining landowners may arise where property 
rights have been defined by the erection of a fence, followed by treatment of the fence by the 
adjoining owners as the boundary.  Id.  We explained in Cameron, “[f]urther, the long existence 
and recognition of a fence as a boundary, in the absence of any evidence as to the manner or 
circumstances of its original location, strongly suggests that the fence was located as a boundary 
by agreement.”  Id.   
The facts in this case are similar to those in Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492, 50 P.3d 987 
(2002).  In Cox, the defendant’s predecessor in interest erected a fence to contain cattle and the 
parties thereafter believed the fence was the boundary.  The parties treated the fence as the 
boundary between their properties until a survey revealed that the fence did not follow the 
correct property line.  Regardless of the parties’ treatment of the fence as the boundary, the Court 
determined there was no boundary by agreement.  While the actual boundary was uncertain in 
Cox, the evidence directly contradicted the contention that the location of the fence was based on 
an agreement or acquiescence to the demarcation of a boundary.  Id. At 495, 50 P.3d at 990.   
As Cox demonstrates, a period of long acquiescence is not sufficient to overcome clear 
evidence of a lack of agreement.  Like Cox, this case does not suffer from an absence of evidence 
as to how the fence came to be located in the first place.  The trial court heard evidence on the 
circumstances of the fence’s construction; indeed, the Andersons constructed the fence 
themselves, and testified that they were prompted to erect their fence as a barrier for their 
livestock and not to mark the boundary of their land.  While the evidence suggests that the fence 
acted as both a barrier and a boundary, there is substantial and competent evidence to support the 
district court’s finding that the fence served as a barrier first and foremost.  Consequently, we 
 
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agree with the district court that the parties did not form an agreement by acquiescence and that 
the doctrine of boundary by agreement does not apply.   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
We find that the district court acted within its discretion as the trier of fact, and correctly 
applied Idaho law in rejecting the Anderson’s claim of boundary by agreement.  The district 
court’s decision quieting title in favor of Griffin is affirmed.  We award costs on appeal to the 
Respondent. 
 
Chief Justice SCHROEDER, and Justices EISMANN, BURDICK and JONES 
CONCUR. 
 
 
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