Case Title: In Re Estate of Grady

Citation: 483 P.2d 114, 79 Wash. 2d 41

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1971-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
79 Wn.2d 41 (1971) 483 P.2d 114 In the Matter of the Estate of JENNIE GRADY, Deceased. HORACE B. BUTTERFIELD, as Executor, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent. No. 41534. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. April 1, 1971. Barokas, Martin, Richey & Schaefer, by Dale R. Martin, for appellant. Slade Gorton, Attorney General, Henry W. Wager and Timothy R. Malone, Assistants, for respondent. WRIGHT, J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the superior court, confirming the findings of the supervisor of inheritance tax. The question presented is whether the State of Washington can impose an inheritance tax upon property which passed under a power of appointment created in the will of a Maryland resident who gave legal ownership of the personal property to a trustee, a bank, in Maryland. The donee of the power was a resident of this state at the time of her death and exercised the power in her will. Jennie Grady died testate on December 7, 1963, and was donee of a power of appointment created by the will of *42 George Armistead, a resident of Maryland. She was, at the time of the death of Armistead, also a resident of Maryland, but later moved to Washington where she lived until her death. The power of appointment was exercised in her will by naming a Washington resident, Charles Butterfield, as appointee. The property subject to the power of appointment was a trust estate consisting of intangible personal property valued at $28,114.29, legal title to which was at all times from the death of George Armistead to the death of Jennie Grady vested in the trustee, Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, Maryland. The State of Washington imposed an inheritance tax of $7,028.57. The clause of the Armistead will creating the power of appointment reads: Respondent claims the right to tax under RCW 83.04.080 which reads: The common law regarded property subject to a power of appointment as passing under the will of the donor, creator of the power. The statute, RCW 83.04.080, however, changed the rule. By the terms of the statute, if the donee of the power is a resident of this state, the property subject to the power is treated as a part of donee's estate for tax purposes. [1] Personal property has its situs at the domicile of the owner. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1, 72 L. Ed. 749, 48 S. Ct. 410 (1927); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 83 L. Ed. 1339, 59 S. Ct. 900, 123 A.L.R. 162 (1939); In re Estate of Plasterer, 49 Wn.2d 339, 301 P.2d 539 (1956). [2] Appellant contends the property involved is not subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Washington. Such contention is contrary to RCW 83.04.080 and to the cases above cited. Personal property owned by a resident of this state is subject to the jurisdiction of this state, and is taxable under RCW 83.04.010 and RCW 83.04.030. This court passed upon a similar case in In re Estate of Simonds, 188 Wash. 211, 61 P.2d 1302 (1936). In speaking of the statute which is now RCW 83.04.080, we said, in part: Appellant's last contention is in effect that the property subject to the power of appointment forms a different and separate estate from other property of deceased, and is hence taxable at a lower rate. RCW 83.04.080 does not support such a contention. The judgment is affirmed. HAMILTON, C.J., FINLEY, ROSELLINI, HUNTER, HALE, NEILL, and STAFFORD, JJ., and RYAN, J. Pro Tem., concur.