Case Title: State ex rel. Leigh v. State Emp. Relations Bd.

Citation: 1996-Ohio-416

Docket Number: 19952423

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
[The State ex rel.] Leigh, Appellant, v. State Employment Relations Board, 
Appellee. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Leigh v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1996),  Ohio St.3d   .] 
Mandamus to compel State Employment Relations Board to properly 
investigate dismissed unfair labor  practice charge, issue a 
complaint finding probable cause to believe that an unfair labor 
practice was committed, and hold a hearing on the charge -- Writ 
denied, when. 
 
(No. 95-2423 -- Submitted May 21, 1996 -- Decided July 24, 1996.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 95APD07-931. 
 
The Ohio Department of Administrative Services (“ODAS”) employed 
appellant, Larry G. Leigh, as a custodian.  In June 1991, Leigh was laid off due to 
lack of work.  In August 1991, the union, through its local president, Leonard T. 
Woods, initiated a grievance on behalf of Leigh and other displaced workers.    
The grievance was submitted to arbitration in August 1993.  In April 1994, the 
union informed Leigh of an unfavorable arbitration decision.  According to Leigh, 
he did not receive a copy of the arbitration decision until June 3, 1994.     
 
On June 13, 1994, Leigh filed unfair labor practice charges against ODAS 
and the union.  Leigh claimed, inter alia, that (1) ODAS had laid him off in 1991 
 
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“in violation of its contractual obligations” and (2) ODAS had acted in concert 
with the union to deny his right to fair representation on his grievance.  Leigh 
alleged that Woods, who had represented him in the grievance process, was 
actually a supervisor who was exempt from his bargaining unit.   
 
Anton J. Naess, a labor relations specialist for appellee, State Employment 
Relations Board (“SERB”), conducted an investigation of Leigh’s charges and 
prepared a memorandum for SERB that recommended dismissal of the charges 
based on a lack of probable cause to believe that any unfair labor practice had 
been committed.  Naess concluded that information supplied by the union 
indicated that Woods was a bargaining unit member at all pertinent times, 
although there was a brief period of time prior to the grievance when Woods 
served in a supervisory capacity.   
 
In November 1994, SERB dismissed the unfair labor practice charge that 
pertained to ODAS for the following reasons: 
 
“Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 4117.12, the Board conducted an 
investigation of this charge.  The investigation reveals that there is no probable 
cause to believe that [ODAS] has violated Ohio Revised Code Section 4117.11.  
Many of the events giving rise to this case occurred more than ninety (90) days 
 
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prior to the filing of the charge.  Additionally, the information gathered during the 
investigation failed to establish the probability of any unlawful motivation or 
conduct behind the manner in which [ODAS] addressed [Leigh’s] concerns.  
Accordingly, the charge is dismissed.”  
 
Leigh then instituted an action in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County 
for a writ of mandamus to compel SERB to properly investigate the dismissed 
unfair labor practice charge, issue a complaint finding probable cause to believe 
that an unfair labor practice was committed, and hold a hearing on the charge.    
The court of appeals granted SERB’s motion for summary judgment and denied 
the writ.   
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
___________________ 
 
Renny J. Tyson Co., L.P.A., and Renny J. Tyson, for appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Daniel P. Jones, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Leigh asserts in his sole proposition of law that the court of 
appeals erred in entering summary judgment, where there was sufficient evidence 
 
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to raise a genuine issue of material fact whether SERB had abused its discretion in 
failing to properly investigate the unfair labor practice charge against ODAS.   
 
Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it 
must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be 
litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it 
appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, 
and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that 
conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment 
is made.  State ex rel. Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 628 
N.E.2d 1377, 1379, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 
327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274. 
 
R.C. 4117.12(B) provides that “[w]hen anyone files a charge with the board 
alleging that an unfair labor practice has been committed, the board or its 
designated agent shall investigate the charge.  If the board has probable cause for 
believing that a violation has occurred, the board shall issue a complaint and shall 
conduct a hearing concerning the charge.  *** ” 
 
Probable cause determinations by SERB under R.C. 4117.12(B) are not 
reviewable by direct appeal.  Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp., Chapter 643, 
 
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AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 
159, 572 N.E.2d 80, syllabus.  However, mandamus is an appropriate remedy 
where no statutory right of appeal is available to correct an abuse of discretion by 
SERB.  State ex rel. Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Internatl. 
Union, Local 333, AFL-CIO, CLC v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio 
St.3d 157, 159, 609 N.E.2d 1266, 1267.  A writ of mandamus will issue to correct 
an abuse of discretion by SERB to dismiss unfair labor practice charges.  State ex 
rel. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp./AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State Emp. Relations 
Bd. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 149, 151-152, 593 N.E.2d 288, 290-291.  An abuse of 
discretion implies an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.  
State ex rel. Brenders v. Hall (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 632, 637, 646 N.E.2d 822, 
826. 
 
Therefore, in order to be entitled to the requested writ of mandamus 
compelling SERB to investigate the unfair labor practice charge, issue a 
complaint, and hold a hearing, Leigh must establish that SERB abused its 
discretion in dismissing the unfair labor practice charge. 
 
Leigh alleged that ODAS committed an unfair labor practice by laying him 
off in 1991 in violation of “contractual obligations.”  Under R.C. 4117.12(B), 
 
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“[t]he board may not issue a notice of hearing based upon any unfair labor practice 
occurring more than ninety days prior to the filing of the charge with the board 
***.”  The 1991 layoff was well over ninety days prior to his 1994 filing of the 
charge with SERB.  The uncontroverted evidence thus establishes that SERB did 
not abuse its discretion in dismissing this claim based on untimeliness.  Unlike 
State ex rel. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp./AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. State Emp. 
Relations Bd. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 149, 152-153, 593 N.E.2d 288, 291, there is 
no genuine controversy as to when the alleged unfair labor practice occurred so as 
to require a limited writ of mandamus to compel SERB to investigate the 
timeliness issue and provide some explanation setting forth its rationale. 
 
Leigh further alleged that ODAS committed an unfair labor practice by 
acting in concert with the union to deprive him of fair representation in the 
grievance and arbitration procedure.  SERB determined that based on its 
investigation, there was no probable cause to believe that there had been any 
unlawful conduct or motivation in the manner in which ODAS addressed Leigh’s 
concerns.    
 
Leigh claims that SERB was not entitled to summary judgment on the 
foregoing charge because the evidence indicated that his union representative, 
 
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Woods, was acting as a supervisor during the periods relevant to Leigh’s 
grievance and arbitration.  The summary judgment evidence indicates that Woods 
served in a supervisory capacity for ten months in 1990, prior to the events which 
are the subject of Leigh’s charge.  Woods filed a grievance in 1992 in which he 
alleged that although he was classified as an “Air Quality Technician I,” he was 
performing duties outside his classification, including duties that were supervisory 
in nature.  Woods asked to be reclassified as an “Air Quality Technician II.”   An 
arbitrator granted Woods’s grievance.  Both Air Quality Technicians I and II are 
within the bargaining unit.  Leigh filed an affidavit in which he stated that Woods 
continued to fulfill supervisory duties when he represented Leigh on his grievance 
concerning the layoff and that Leigh did not believe that the grievance could have 
been fairly presented by Woods because of Woods’s connection with management 
as a supervisory employee.     
 
   Although the foregoing indicates that Leigh’s union representative may 
have performed certain supervisory duties, Woods was still classified as being 
within the bargaining unit.  Woods was not an exempt supervisory employee.  In 
addition, the mere fact that Woods performed certain supervisory duties did not 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Woods acted in concert with 
 
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management in depriving Leigh of his right to fair representation during the 
grievance and arbitration procedure.  SERB did not abuse its broad discretion in 
dismissing Leigh’s charge based on lack of probable cause. 
 
As the movant for summary judgment, SERB had the initial burden of 
demonstrating, with Civ.R. 56(C) evidentiary materials, that there were no genuine 
issues of material fact concerning whether SERB abused its discretion in 
dismissing Leigh’s unfair labor practice charge.  Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio 
St.3d 280, 292-293,  662 N.E.2d 264, 273, limiting Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of 
Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570 N.E.2d 1095, paragraph three of the 
syllabus; see, also, Stewart v. B.F. Goodrich Co. (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 35, 40-
41, 623 N.E.2d 591, 594-595, detailing the problems encountered by appellate 
courts in interpreting paragraph three of the Wing syllabus.   
 
SERB supported its motion for summary judgment with Civ.R. 56(C) 
summary judgment evidence.  That evidence established that SERB conducted a 
thorough investigation and that SERB did not abuse its broad discretion in 
dismissing Leigh’s unfair labor practice charge.  Leigh failed to introduce 
summary judgment evidence setting forth specific facts showing that any genuine 
issue of material fact remained.  See Dresher, supra, 75 Ohio St.3d at 293, 662 
 
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N.E.2d at 273, quoting Civ.R. 56(E). As the court of appeals concluded, “[t]he 
evidentiary material before the court does not demonstrate a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the quality of the investigation done by SERB or the correctness 
of the decision to dismiss the unfair labor practice charges filed by Mr. Leigh.”   
 
The court of appeals properly granted summary judgment in favor of SERB 
and denied the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  Accordingly, the 
judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
STRATTON, JJ., concur.