Case Title: JEREMIAH LEE ROGERS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0115

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
JEREMIAH LEE ROGERS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 90189 P.3d 265Case Number: S-07-0115Decided: 07/31/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
JEREMIAH LEE 
ROGERS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Certified 
Question from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane M. Lozano, State 
Public Defender; Ryan R. Roden, Deputy Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate 
Counsel; Kirk Allan Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel; Scott Mitchel Guthrie, 
Senior Assistant Public Defender.  
Argument by Mr. Morgan.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dana Jill Lent, Assistant Attorney 
General.  Argument by Ms. Lent.

Before VOIGT, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]         
Jeremiah Rogers was 
charged by the State of Wyoming with third degree sexual assault. 
 His wife, LR, is the alleged victim 
of that assault.1  Prior to trial, the State 
expressed its intent to call LR as a witness to testify against her 
husband.  Mr. Rogers contended that LR was entitled to assert a marital 
privilege and could not be compelled to testify.  The district court 
certified this question:

Can an alleged victim 
spouse be compelled by the State of Wyoming to testify against his or her spouse 
or does the witness-spouse alone have a privilege to refuse to testify adversely 
and that the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from 
testifying?

[¶2]         
We 
conclude that a victim spouse may be compelled by the State of Wyoming to testify 
against his or her spouse when that spouse is charged with a crime against the 
victim spouse.  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. ­§ 1-12-104 (LexisNexis 
2007), no marital privilege exists in such a situation.

FACTS

[¶3]           
On January 22, 2007, 
an Information was filed charging Mr. Rogers with one count of third degree 
sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(i).2  The allegations against Mr. 
Rogers stem from his relationship with LR.  On June 30, 2006, a child was 
born of this relationship.  Genetic testing confirmed that Mr. Rogers is 
the father of the child.  At the 
time of conception, LR was 15 years old3, and Mr. Rogers was 25.  After 
the birth of the child, LR and Mr. Rogers married.  

[¶4]         
Prior to 
trial, the State identified LR as a potential witness.  According to the 
district court, "The Defendant's wife has expressed an intention to exercise 
spousal immunity and indicates that she does not intend to testify against her 
husband."  Mr. Rogers, in a 
motion in limine, asserted that LR could not be compelled by the State to 
testify against him.  The State contended that LR could be compelled to 
testify.  The district court did not resolve the issue.  Instead, it 
certified the question to this Court.

Standard 
of Review

[¶5]         
In order 
to answer the certified question, we must interpret Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-12-104.  Statutory interpretation 
is a question of law.  Qwest Corp. v. Public Svc. Comm'n of 
Wyo., 2007 
WY 97, ¶ 3, 161 P.3d 495, 497 (Wyo. 2007).  
If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we follow its plain 
meaning.  If it is ambiguous, we 
attempt to discern legislative intent by applying principles of statutory 
construction.  Roden v. State, 2007 WY 200, ¶ 5, 173 P.3d 369, 371 (Wyo. 2007).

DISCUSSION

[¶6]         
Wyoming's marital privilege 
has been codified by statute.  Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 275 
(Wyo. 
1994).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-12-101(a) states, in part:

(a)  The following persons shall not testify 
in certain respects:

. . 
.

(iii)  Husband or wife, except as provided in 
W.S. 1-12-104;

Section 1-12-104 
states:

No husband or wife 
shall be a witness against the other except in criminal proceedings for a crime 
committed by one against the other, or in a civil action or proceeding by one 
against the other.  They may in all 
civil and criminal cases be witnesses for each other the same as though the 
marital relation did not exist.

[¶7]         
In order to resolve 
the issue presented in the certified question, we must focus upon one specific 
clause from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-104: "No husband or wife shall be a witness 
against the other except in criminal proceedings for a crime committed by one 
against the other."  The State 
contends that the "crime against a spouse" exception permits it to compel the 
testimony of LR because the crime was alleged to have been committed by Mr. 
Rogers against his spouse.  Mr. 
Rogers concedes that his spouse is the victim of the alleged crime.  Nevertheless, he contends that she 
cannot be compelled to testify against him against her will.  Stated differently, he appears to argue 
that, in situations such as the one presented here, the victim spouse retains a 
privilege that allows her to refuse to testify against her spouse if she elects 
to exercise the privilege.  We are 
unable to find any support for Mr. Rogers' position in the language of the 
statute.  The statute is clear and 
unambiguous.  No marital privilege 
exists for either spouse when the crime is alleged to have been committed by one 
spouse against the other.

[¶8]         
Generally, all persons 
are competent to testify and may be compelled to do so.  E.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-103; W.R.Cr.P. 17.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-101 identifies 
several privileges4 and refers to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-12-104, for a definition of the marital privilege.  The "crime against a spouse" exception 
stated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-104 eliminates the privilege in the specific 
situation where one spouse is charged with a crime against the 
other.

[¶9]         
Although the district 
court recognized that "[t]he apparent meaning of [the statute] would lead one to 
conclude that the wife, over her objection, could be compelled by threat of 
contempt, to testify against her husband," the district court questioned whether 
application of the statute, as written, was appropriate: 

Yet, the holding in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 100 S. Ct. 906, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186, 5 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 737 (1980) certain language in Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 83 
(Wyo. 1991) and restated in Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 275 
(Wyo. 1994) 
informs the court to proceed with caution in reaching that conclusion.  It appears the phrase quoted above 
[regarding the "crime against a spouse" exception] must be narrowly construed as 
it was only intended to allow the wife to testify over the objection of her 
husband if she desired to testify.  

Ultimately, the 
district court sought our guidance.  
As stated previously, we find that the statute is clear and 
unambiguous.  Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-12-104, the privilege does not exist when one spouse is charged with a 
crime against the other.  The 
decisions referred to by the district court, and relied upon now by Mr. Rogers, 
are distinguishable and do not impact our statutory analysis.  None of the cited decisions involve the 
"crime against a spouse" exception to marital privilege.

[¶10]    
In Engberg, the defendant was accused of 
felony murder and armed robbery, neither of which were crimes against his 
wife.  820 P.2d  at 73.  After his direct appeal, he filed an 
action for post-conviction relief in the district court.  The State called the wife to testify at 
the hearing.  The wife did not wish 
to testify, and the district court allowed her to assert the privilege over Mr. 
Engberg's objection.  Id. at 81.  On appeal from the denial of 
post-conviction relief, the defendant contended that the district court erred by 
allowing his wife to assert the privilege.  
We recognized that one justification for the marital privilege rule was 
"immunity from the repugnant situation of being condemned by one's spouse or of 
becoming the instrument of a spouse's condemnation."  Id. 
at 83 (quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 
2241 at 254 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).  
Because that rationale for the privilege applied equally to the party 
spouse and the witness spouse, and because the district court's ruling was 
consistent with the statute, we concluded that no clear and unequivocal rule of 
law was violated.  Id. Because Engberg did not involve the "crime 
against the spouse" exception to the marital privilege, it is of little 
relevance in the face of the clear statutory exception to marital 
privilege.

[¶11]    Curran came to this Court as 
a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming.  886 P.2d  at 274.  Curran involved a medical malpractice 
plaintiff who brought suit against the estate of her deceased physician.  Id.  The plaintiff alleged that the 
physician, prior to his death, had made statements to his wife regarding his 
illicit drug use.  Id.  The plaintiff wished to compel the 
wife's testimony regarding these statements.  Id.  We held that the marital communication 
privilege survived the death of either spouse, and that the wife could assert 
the privilege.  Id. at 
276-77.  The issue in Curran did not involve application of 
the "crime against a spouse" exception of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-12-104.

[¶12]    Trammel involved a defendant 
and his wife who were both involved in a conspiracy to import heroin into the 
United 
States.  
445 U.S.  at 42, 100 S. Ct.  at 908.  Mr. Trammel's wife agreed to 
testify for the government in exchange for lenient treatment.  The district court permitted the wife to 
testify over her husband's objection.  
Id. at 42-43, 
100 S. Ct.  at 908.  The United States 
Supreme Court had earlier held in Hawkins 
v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 S. Ct. 136, 3 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1958), that the 
federal common law relating to marital privilege generally barred the testimony 
of the witness spouse unless both spouses consented to the testimony.  Id. 
at 46, 100 S. Ct.  at 910.  In Trammel, the Court held "that the 
existing rule [of Hawkins] should be 
modified so that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify 
adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from 
testifying."  Id. at 53, 100 S. Ct.  at 914.  Like both Engberg and Curran, Trammel did not involve a crime against 
the defendant's spouse.  Additionally, Trammel involved application of the 
federal common law marital privilege.  
No federal statute or rule defined the privilege.

[¶13]    
The few Wyoming decisions that 
involve the "crime against a spouse" exception to spousal privilege are more 
instructive.  In Chamberlain v. State, we examined the 
scope of this exception.  348 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 
1960).  Mr. Chamberlain was charged 
with statutory rape of his 13-year-old daughter.  Id. 
at 281.  During the trial, Mr. 
Chamberlain testified that his wife convinced the daughter to make the criminal 
allegations.  Id.  The State called his wife as a witness 
in rebuttal, and Mr. Chamberlain asserted marital privilege.  The district court allowed the wife's 
testimony over his objection.  
Id.  On appeal, Mr. Chamberlain asserted 
that, because he was accused of a crime against his daughter, the exception to 
spousal immunity did not apply and his wife should not have been permitted to 
testify against him.  We noted that 
the "crime against a spouse" exception set forth by the Wyoming legislature was 
broader than existed at common law.  
Id. at 
283-84.  When viewing the statute in 
light of the legislative intent to expand the common law exceptionthat is, to 
narrow the privilegewe determined that Mr. Chamberlain's crime fell within 
the exception of a crime committed by one against the other.  Id. 
at 284.  In doing so, we endorsed 
the following passage from Justice Stewart's concurrence in Hawkins:

Any rule that impedes 
the discovery of truth in a court of law impedes as well the doing of 
justice.  When such a rule is the 
product of a conceptualism long ago discarded, is universally criticized by 
scholars, and has been qualified or abandoned in many jurisdictions, it should 
receive the most careful scrutiny.  
Surely "reason and experience" require that we do more than indulge in 
mere assumptions, perhaps na¯ve assumptions, as to the importance of this 
ancient rule to the interests of domestic tranquility.

Chamberlain, 348 P.2d  at 285 
(quoting Hawkins, 358 U.S.  at 81-82, 79 S. Ct.  at 140 
(Stewart, J., concurring)). 

[¶14]    
In Seyle v. State, the defendant was 
convicted of manslaughter involving the death of his two-year-old stepson.  584 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Wyo. 1978).  We addressed Mr. Seyle's contention 
that the prosecutor's comment on Mr. Seyle's failure to call his wife to testify 
on his behalf constituted an infringement on the exercise of spousal 
privilege.  Neither the State nor 
Mr. Seyle attempted to introduce the wife's testimony.  Mr. Seyle never formally attempted to 
invoke the privilege.  We determined 
that the wife's testimony, had the State called her as a witness, would have fit 
within the "crime against a spouse" exception pursuant to our decision in Chamberlain v. State, 348 P.2d 280 
(1960).  Seyle, 584 P.2d  at 1086.  We stated that the wife's "status was 
that of any other witness.  She was 
equally available to the defense and the prosecution."  Id.  We concluded that "there was no marital 
privilege, precluding the wife's testimony against the defendant, which could be 
infringed by the prosecutor's comments."  
Id.

[¶15]    
Simply put, our 
precedent is consistent with our statutory analysis.  Where the exception to the privilege 
applies, the witness spouse should be treated as any other witness.  Either party may compel the testimony of 
the witness spouse.

[¶16]    
Two additional points 
raised by the parties warrant our attention.  First, Mr. Rogers cites statutes from 
other states that explicitly provide that the "crime against a spouse" exception 
makes the witness spouse competent, but not compellable, to testify against the 
party spouse.  E.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-5 (2007).5  Also Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-23 (2007); N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 8-57 (2007).  Mr. Rogers 
claims that, "[a]bsent express direction from the legislature on whether a 
spouse may be forced to testify against the other spouse, [Wyo. Stat. Ann.] § 
1-12-104 is ambiguous."  We 
disagree.  The fact that Wyoming's legislature has 
defined the privilege differently than other states is of no relevance in 
determining whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-104 is ambiguous.  We determine ambiguity by reviewing the 
plain language of the statute.  See Brown v. Arp and Hammond Hardware 
Co., 2006 WY 107, ¶ 17, 141 P.3d 673, 679 (Wyo. 2006).  We look at other sources to determine a 
statute's meaning only if we find the statute ambiguous or vague.  E.g., Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Tilden, 2003 
WY 31, ¶ 6, 64 P.3d 739, 741 (Wyo. 2003).  
As previously stated, we do not find that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-104 is 
ambiguous.  Supra, ¶ 7.

[¶17]    
Second, each party has 
asserted a policy argument.  The 
State suggests that the existence of the privilege should be determined on a 
case-by-case basis by weighing the policies favoring application of the 
privilege against the policy reflected in the criminal statute.  The State contends that, in this case, 
application of that process results in a determination that the witness spouse 
should not be entitled to invoke the privilege.  The State relies upon Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 80 S. Ct. 901, 4 L. Ed. 2d 931 
(1960).  In Wyatt, the defendant was convicted of 
knowingly transporting a woman, who he later married, in interstate commerce for 
the purpose of prostitution (Mann Act).  
362 U.S.  at 525-26, 80 S. Ct.  at 902.  The Supreme Court held that the wife 
could be compelled to testify.  
Id. at 531, 80 S. Ct.  at 905.  The Court determined 
that the policy objectives reflected in the Mann Act outweighed the policy of 
marital harmony reflected in the marital privilege.  Id.  In contrast to the State's position, Mr. 
Rogers asks this Court to weigh the underlying purpose of spousal immunity 
against the State's interest in prosecuting a crime against a spouse, and claims 
that the interest in marital harmony should always 
prevail.

[¶18]    
We find neither 
approach to be appropriate.  In the 
federal system, the application of marital privilege is generally governed by 
federal common law.  E.g., F.R.E. 501; Bruce I. McDaniel, Marital Privilege Under Rule 501 of Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 46 A.L.R. Fed. 735 § 3 (2008).  Congress has not expressed a particular 
policy preference regarding marital privilege.  The Wyoming legislature, however, has implemented 
policy through legislation.  In 
choosing to provide an exception to spousal privilege, the legislature has 
decided that, in cases of a crime by one spouse against another, the State's 
interest in discerning the truth outweighs the State's interest in preserving 
marital harmony.  It is the 
legislature's function to establish public policy in this area, and we decline 
both Mr. Rogers' and the State's invitations to second guess its decision.  See Union Pac. Resources Co. v. Dolenc, 
2004 WY 36, ¶ 21, 86 P.3d 1287, 1294 (Wyo. 2004).

[¶19]    
In summary, the 
marital privilege does not apply when one spouse is charged with a crime against 
the other.  When the exception 
applies as set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-104, the witness spouse may be 
compelled to testify.

[¶20]    
We remand this case to 
the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  

FOOTNOTES

1LR was a 
minor at the time of the assault.

2Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005) has since been repealed, but it stated at 
the time: 

(a)  An actor commits sexual assault in the 
third degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the 
first or second degree:

(i)  The actor is at least four (4) years 
older than the victim and inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of 
sixteen (16) years.

See 2007 
Wyo. Sess. 
Laws 393.  This provision has been 
replaced by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(i).

3The 
statement of facts accompanying the certified question provides that LR was 15 
at the time of conception.  The 
State, in its brief, contends that LR was 14 at the time of conception.  For purposes of answering the certified 
question, it does not matter whether LR was 14 or 15.

4Among 
the other privileges recognized in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-101 are the 
doctor-patient privilege, attorney-client privilege, and the priest-penitent 
privilege.

5Miss. Code 
Ann. § 13-1-5 states: 

Husbands 
and wives may be introduced by each other as witnesses in all cases, civil or 
criminal, and shall be competent witnesses in their own behalf, as against each 
other, in all controversies between them. Either spouse is a competent witness 
and may be compelled to testify against the other in any criminal prosecution of 
either husband or wife for a criminal act against any child, for contributing to 
the neglect or delinquency of a child, or desertion or nonsupport of children 
under the age of sixteen (16) years, or abandonment of children. But in all 
other instances where either of them is a party litigant the other shall not be 
competent as a witness and shall not be required to answer interrogatories or to 
make discovery of any matters involved in any such other instances without the 
consent of both.