Case Title: State v. Adamson

Citation: 1998-Ohio-284

Docket Number: 19971022

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. ADAMSON, APPELLEE 
AND CROSS-APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Adamson (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 248.] 
Criminal law — Trial — Witnesses — Immunity of witness turning state’s evidence 
— Immunity that has been granted pursuant to R.C. 2945.44 continues when 
the person receiving immunity refuses to testify at a retrial. 
(No. 97-1022 — Submitted April 7, 1998 — Decided September 30, 1998.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Brown County, No. 
CA96-05-012. 
 
In 1992, Darryl Adamson was convicted of the aggravated murder of H.C. 
Freeman.  During the trial, the prosecution called Dianne Adamson (“Adamson”), 
Darryl’s wife, as a witness.  She refused to testify, asserting her Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination.  Upon a proper request by the prosecution, the trial 
court granted transactional immunity to Adamson  and compelled her to testify, all 
pursuant to R.C. 2945.44. 
 
On appeal, the court of appeals determined that Adamson was an 
incompetent witness under Evid.R. 601(B)(1) and that the trial court had failed to 
inform Adamson that she could not be compelled to testify against her husband.  
Evid.R. 601(B)(2).  A new trial was ordered. 
 
During the retrial, Adamson was called to testify.  She asserted her Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to testify.  The court 
excused Adamson as a witness based on the court of appeals’ judgment that 
Adamson’s testimony could not be compelled. 
 
Following the retrial, Adamson was indicted for her role in the aggravated 
murder of Freeman.  She filed a motion to dismiss based on the grant of 
transactional immunity she had received at Darryl Adamson’s first trial.  The state 
argued that it should be able to prosecute Adamson because her refusal to testify at 
 
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the retrial obviated the grant of immunity.  On May 1, 1996, the trial court granted 
Adamson’s motion to dismiss. 
 
On May 10, 1996, the state filed a notice of appeal.  Adamson moved to 
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal was not timely.  The court of 
appeals denied the motion and allowed the appeal, and ruled that the trial court had 
properly dismissed the charge of aggravated murder against Adamson. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal and cross-appeal. 
__________________ 
 
Susan Laker Tolbert, Special Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant and cross-
appellee. 
  
David A. Sams, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  The principal issue before us is whether immunity that has been 
granted pursuant to R.C. 2945.44 continues when the person receiving immunity 
refuses to testify at a retrial.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that it does. 
 
First, we address Adamson’s cross-appeal.  She argues that when Crim.R. 
12(J) was amended on July 1, 1995, it was intended “to encompass all appeals 
taken by the state of Ohio.”  According to that argument, the state filed its appeal 
outside the seven-day period provided by Crim.R. 12(J) and the appeal should have 
been denied. 
 
The court of appeals stated, and we agree, that “[d]espite the amendment of 
Crim.R. 12(J), the court finds no indication either in case law or committee 
comments to the amendment which would indicate that the purpose of the 
amendment was to require all appeals by the state to be filed within seven (7) 
days.”  The Staff Note provides a clear indication that the amendment was not 
supposed to affect the period of time within which appeals must be filed.  See 
 
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Crim.R. 12 Staff Note, July 1, 1995 Amendment (“The 1995 amendments to 
Crim.R. 12 make three changes:  (1) they encourage the state and the defendants to 
seek pretrial resolution of critical evidentiary and constitutional issues; (2) they set 
forth the procedure a trial court is to follow in the event of a mid-trial appeal; and 
(3) they clarify the certification requirement.”). 
 
Prior to the 1995 amendment, Crim.R. 12(J) explicitly addressed 
interlocutory appeals, primarily of motions to suppress evidence, not final appeals.  
Final appeals of right were and are the province of App.R. 3 and 4.  Nothing in the 
1995 amendment of Crim.R. 12(J) suggests otherwise.  For instance, Crim.R. 12(J) 
requires the state to certify that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and 
that the ruling on the motion has rendered the state’s proof with respect to the 
pending charge so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of 
prosecution has been destroyed.  These requirements have no application once 
final judgment has been entered.  We are convinced that the 1995 amendment to 
Crim.R. 12(J) did not change the thirty-day period within which appeals of right 
must be filed by the state in a criminal case. 
 
The court of appeals exercised discretion in denying Adamson’s motion to 
dismiss.  See, generally, State v. Fisher (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 22, 517 N.E.2d 911.  
Accordingly, its judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.  We 
see nothing in the record to suggest that the court’s attitude was unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or unconscionable. Quonset Hut v. Ford Motor Co. (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 46, 47, 684 N.E.2d 319, 321; Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc. (1985), 19 Ohio 
St.3d 83, 87, 19 OBR 123, 126, 482 N.E.2d 1248, 1252.  We affirm the court’s 
denial of Adamson’s motion to dismiss the appeal. 
 
R.C. 2945.44(A) states: 
 
“In any criminal proceeding in this state  * * * if a witness refuses to answer 
or produce information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, the 
 
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court of common pleas of the county in which the proceeding is being held, unless 
it finds that to do so would not further the administration of justice, shall compel 
the witness to answer or produce the information, if both of the following apply: 
 
“(1)  The prosecuting attorney of the county in which the proceedings are 
being held makes a written request to the court of common pleas to order the 
witness to answer or produce the information, notwithstanding his claim of 
privilege; 
 
“(2)  The court of common pleas informs the witness that by answering, or 
producing the information he will receive immunity under division (B) of this 
section.” 
 
Findings under R.C. 2945.44 (A)(1) and (A)(2) were not appealed to this 
court and are therefore not at issue. 
 
R.C. 2945.44(B) states: 
 
“If, but for this section, the witness would have been privileged to withhold 
an answer or any information given in any criminal proceeding, and he complies 
with an order under division (A) of this section compelling him to give an answer 
or produce any information, he shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any criminal 
penalty in the courts of this state for or on account of any transaction or matter 
concerning which, in compliance with the order, he gave an answer or produced 
any information.” 
 
Adamson invites us to construe R.C. 2945.44 strictly against the state.  R.C. 
2901.04(A) states that “[s]ections of the Revised Code defining offenses or 
penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in 
favor of the accused.”  As R.C. 2945.44 defines neither offenses nor penalties, we 
decline the invitation. 
 
Adamson also invites us to rule that R.C. 2945.44(C) provides an exclusive 
list of remedies for failure to comply with an R.C. 2945.44(A) order.  As it is not 
 
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necessary for us to rule on this matter to resolve the case before us, we decline the 
invitation. 
 
Adamson complied with the R.C. 2945.44(A) order in the first trial of Darryl 
Adamson.  At the second trial, Adamson asserted her Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination and refused to testify. Thus, the issue devolves to how 
much compliance is enough to satisfy R.C. 2945.44(B), which simply states that 
when a person “complies” with an R.C. 2945.44(A) order, that person shall not be 
prosecuted. 
 
The few cases that have dealt with similar issues are not particularly helpful 
to resolving the issue at hand. 
 
In State v. Small (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 252, 535 N.E.2d 352, paragraph 
one of the syllabus, the court stated that “where an agreement not to prosecute is 
conditioned upon the defendant’s agreement to ‘fully cooperate’ or otherwise 
provide truthful information, but it is later discovered that the defendant has not 
fulfilled the terms of the agreement, then the defendant’s failure to comply with his 
obligation nullifies the government’s promise not to prosecute.”  See Ricketts v. 
Adamson (1987), 483 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1.  The state argues that 
Small stands for the proposition that a witness must fully comply to receive 
immunity pursuant to R.C. 2945.44. 
 
Small is readily distinguishable from the case before us.  It did not address 
R.C. 2945.44; instead, it focused on an agreement concerning immunity between 
the defendant and the prosecution.  The immunity granted Adamson was statutory 
and her testimony was compelled, not the result of a bargain.  We conclude that 
whether a defendant fully cooperated pursuant to an agreement not to prosecute 
has no relevance on whether a defendant complied with a court order to testify 
pursuant to R.C. 2945.44. 
 
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In State ex rel. Gray v. Leis (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 102, 16 O.O.3d 106, 403 
N.E.2d 977, a witness received a grant of immunity.  The offer was withdrawn 
within two hours because the witness was uncooperative.  The specific issue was 
whether a writ of prohibition could issue to prevent the trial judge from proceeding 
with a case against the witness who had lost his immunity.  See State ex rel. Koren 
v. Grogan (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 590, 629 N.E.2d 446.  This court held that a writ 
should not issue because the defendant had an adequate remedy at law, an appeal. 
 
In Leis, the grant of immunity was withdrawn the same day it was offered.  
In this case, Adamson testified at trial and even the state does not dispute that her 
testimony was damaging to Darryl Adamson.  Because of the factual dissimilarity 
between the cases, we find no principles that help us rule on the issue before us. 
 
The state’s primary argument is that the statute requires full compliance and 
that for this court to hold otherwise would weaken the state’s ability to obtain 
testimony.  However, the statute does not explicitly require full compliance, it 
requires compliance.  Further, the statute makes no mention of whether and under 
what conditions immunity that has been granted may be revoked. 
 
We conclude that Adamson complied with the court’s order compelling her 
“to give an answer or produce any information” when she testified during the first 
trial of Darryl Adamson.  We also conclude that immunity attached upon 
compliance with the R.C. 2945.44(A) order.  We affirm the judgment of the court 
of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS and RESNICK, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
__________________ 
 
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I 
concur with the majority’s disposition of Adamson’s cross-appeal.  However, I 
dissent from its conclusion that Adamson complied with the R.C. 2945.44(A) order 
when she testified only during the first trial of Darryl Adamson. 
 
Once Darryl Adamson’s conviction was reversed on appeal and he was 
granted a new trial, it was as though there had been no other criminal proceeding 
conducted with respect to Darryl Adamson.  See R.C. 2945.82.  In order for 
Adamson to preserve the immunity granted her, she had a duty to testify upon 
retrial.  Her compliance with the R.C. 2945.44(A) order did not end after the first 
trial. 
 
Merely because the statute does not expressly state whether and when 
immunity may be revoked, this does not mean that, as long as the witness answers 
or produces information on one occasion, immunity, once attached, cannot be 
revoked.  There is no limiting language in the statute that partial compliance, or 
anything less than absolute compliance, is sufficient to obtain immunity.  There is 
no statutory language that would indicate that compliance by testifying or giving 
information on merely one occasion in a criminal matter is sufficient to invoke 
continuing immunity if the witness subsequently changes her mind and no longer 
wants to cooperate should additional testimony be necessary. 
 
The General Assembly intended that the immunity granted by R.C. 2945.44 
be a prosecutorial tool to assist the government’s need for testimony.  State ex rel. 
Leis v. Outcalt (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 147, 149, 1 OBR 181, 183, 438 N.E.2d 443, 
446.  It would be illogical to grant a witness complete transactional immunity for 
testifying in a trial, who later refuses to cooperate in subsequent proceedings 
arising from the same criminal indictment.  Under this interpretation, the witness 
enjoys continuing immunity from prosecution, while the government’s hands are 
tied because it no longer has the means necessary to secure testimony from an 
 
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uncooperative witness.  This interpretation does not advance the underlying intent 
of the statute.  The duty to comply under an R.C. 2945.44 order should apply to all 
proceedings related to a particular criminal indictment. 
 
The benefit of statutory immunity comes with a price.  Adamson had to 
comply with the R.C. 2945.44(A) order and testify in the prosecution of Darryl 
Adamson for the grant of transactional immunity.  It was not the fault of the state 
or of Adamson that the prosecution required two trials.  Upon retrial, Adamson’s 
immunity remains, while the prosecution, without Adamson’s continued 
cooperation, no longer has the advantage of Adamson’s testimony.  Fairness and 
logic dictate that Adamson’s immunity be revoked once she refused to testify in 
the retrial.