Case Title: RONALD G SWEATT V DEPT OF CORRECTIONS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 120220

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 13, 2003  
RONALD G. SWEATT,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 120220  
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider  
whether defendant must pay plaintiff differential worker’s  
compensation benefits, i.e., partial-disability benefits,  
under 
subsection 
361(1) 
of 
the 
Worker’s 
Disability  
Compensation 
Act 
(WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq., where defendant,  
by law, cannot rehire plaintiff because of plaintiff’s  
“commission 
of 
a 
crime.”  The worker’s compensation magistrate  
concluded that the fact that plaintiff is no longer able to  
work for defendant as a result of plaintiff’s “commission of  
 
  
a crime” does not relieve defendant of its responsibility to  
pay 
plaintiff 
differential 
benefits. 
The 
Worker’s  
Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) and the Court of  
Appeals affirmed. In our judgment, although defendant must  
pay a percentage of the difference between what plaintiff was  
earning while working for defendant and what plaintiff was  
earning at the time of the hearing (plaintiff’s loss of wage­
earning capacity) to the extent that this difference is  
attributable to plaintiff’s work-related injury, defendant is  
not required to pay a percentage of the difference that is  
attributable to plaintiff’s “commission of a crime.”  
We conclude that the language of MCL 418.361(1) makes  
clear that the Legislature intended that employees no longer  
be able to receive worker’s compensation benefits for a loss  
of 
wage-earning 
capacity that is attributable to an employee’s  
“imprisonment or commission of a crime.”1  The dissent fails,  
in our judgement, to give effect to this intent, and would  
allow benefits to be paid to employees because of a loss of  
wage-earning capacity attributable to “imprisonment or  
commission of a crime.” We reverse the judgment of the Court  
1 
 Before the amendment of this statute in 1985, an 
employer 
was 
obligated to pay an imprisoned employee benefits. 
Sims v R D Brooks, Inc, 389 Mich 91, 93; 204 NW2d 139 (1973). 
Manifestly, in our judgment, it was the intent of the 
Legislature in 1985 to alter this situation.  Yet, the dissent 
appears unwilling to permit this legislative judgment to 
prevail.  
2  
 
of Appeals and remand this case to the magistrate to determine  
to what extent, if any, plaintiff’s loss of wage-earning  
capacity is attributable to his work-related injury and to  
what 
extent, 
if 
any, 
plaintiff’s loss of wage-earning capacity  
is attributable to his “commission of a crime.”  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
In 1986, plaintiff began working for defendant as a  
corrections officer.  In 1989, plaintiff injured his knee when  
he intervened in a fight between prisoners.  Defendant  
voluntarily paid worker’s compensation benefits to plaintiff  
because it had a policy of not rehiring anybody who was not  
one hundred percent fit for duty.2  In 1995, plaintiff was  
convicted of delivery of heroin, a felony, and, as a result,  
was imprisoned.  Once plaintiff was convicted and imprisoned,  
defendant stopped paying benefits to plaintiff.  Also in 1995,  
defendant discontinued its policy of not rehiring anybody who  
was not one hundred percent fit for duty and began offering  
favored work to which plaintiff would have been eligible if he  
were not imprisoned.  Defendant took part in a work-release  
program while he was imprisoned.  
In 1996, MCL 791.205a became effective, which forbids  
defendant from hiring and subsequently employing persons who  
2 In other words, defendant had a policy of not offering 
favored work.  
3  
have been convicted of a felony.  Also in 1996, plaintiff was  
paroled.  It is undisputed that plaintiff continues to have a  
work-related injury.  In 1998, plaintiff began working for  
Pressure Vessel, Inc., earning less than he had while working  
for defendant.  
Plaintiff 
petitioned 
for 
differential 
worker’s  
compensation  benefits.  Defendant denied plaintiff’s request  
on the basis that it was not required to pay plaintiff  
differential benefits because plaintiff was convicted of a  
felony and MCL 791.205a(1) precludes the department from  
hiring someone convicted of a felony and MCL 418.361(1)  
relieves 
it 
of 
its 
responsibility to pay differential benefits  
to an employee who is unable to work for defendant because of  
the “commission of a crime.”  
The magistrate concluded that defendant is required to  
pay plaintiff differential benefits and the fact that  
defendant is precluded from rehiring plaintiff does not at all  
relieve defendant of this requirement.  In a four-to-three  
decision, the WCAC affirmed.  The majority concluded that, in  
order for it to be relieved of its responsibility to pay  
plaintiff differential benefits, the department must prove,  
and it had not, that, were it not for the statutory  
prohibition on hiring an ex-felon, it would have made an offer  
4  
of reasonable employment to plaintiff.3  The dissenting  
commissioners disagreed, stating that the majority erred in  
placing “an artificially-created burden on defendant to prove  
it would have done the very thing the ex-felon statute  
prohibits 
defendant 
from 
doing, 
namely, 
offering 
employment 
to  
an ex-felon . . . .”  
In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  
While the concurring opinion author concluded that the WCAC  
reached the right result for the right reasons, the lead  
opinion writer concluded that the WCAC reached the right  
result for the wrong reasons.  Specifically, the lead opinion  
writer concluded that defendant was not relieved of its  
responsibility for paying plaintiff differential benefits  
because plaintiff was not “unable to perform or obtain work”  
as the result of the “commission of a crime,” MCL 418.361(1),  
as evidenced by the fact that plaintiff was working at the  
time of the hearing.  The dissenting judge, on the other hand,  
3 The WCAC first remanded to the magistrate for the 
magistrate to determine whether “defendant Department of 
Corrections would have made an offer of reasonable employment 
to plaintiff were it not for the statutory prohibition against 
employment of any individual who had been convicted of a 
felony.”  On remand, the magistrate found that “there would 
not have been an offer of reasonable employment to plaintiff 
were it not for the statutory prohibition.  To find otherwise  
would be pure speculation, something not permitted under 
Michigan law.”  The WCAC concluded that this finding was 
“supported 
by 
competent, 
material, 
and 
substantial 
evidence 
on 
the whole record.”  
5  
  
  
 
concluded that because plaintiff was unable to work for  
defendant because of the “commission of a crime,” defendant  
was relieved of its responsibility to pay plaintiff any  
differential benefits.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
Whether defendant must pay differential benefits to  
plaintiff under MCL 418.361(1) is a question of statutory  
interpretation.
 Questions of statutory interpretation are  
questions of law that are reviewed de novo by this Court.  
Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 739; 641 NW2d  
567 (2002).  
III. ANALYSIS  
That defendant cannot employ plaintiff because of his  
“commission of a crime” is undisputed.  MCL 791.205a(1)  
provides:  
Beginning on the effective date of this  
section, an individual who has been convicted of a 
felony, or who is subject to any pending felony 
charges, shall not be employed or appointed to a 
position in the department [of corrections].  
Plaintiff has been convicted of a felony; thus, defendant  
cannot reemploy plaintiff.  A part of the Worker’s Disability  
Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.361(1), provides:  
While the incapacity for work resulting from a 
personal injury is partial, the employer shall pay, 
or cause to be paid to the injured employee weekly 
compensation equal to 80% of the difference between  
the injured employee’s after-tax average weekly 
wage before the personal injury and the after-tax  
6  
 
average weekly wage which the injured employee is 
able to earn after the personal injury, but not 
more than the maximum weekly rate of compensation, 
as determined under section 355. 
Compensation 
shall be paid for the duration of the disability. 
However, an employer shall not be liable for 
compensation under section 351, 371(1), or this 
subsection for such periods of time that the 
employee is unable to obtain or perform work  
because of imprisonment or commission of a crime. 
[Emphasis added.]  
This provision is known as the differential worker’s  
compensation or partial-disability provision.  Under this  
provision, an employer must pay an employee a percentage of  
the difference between what the employee was earning while  
working for the employer before the employee was injured and  
what the employee is able to earn after the work-related  
injury. However, the employer is not liable to the employee  
to the extent that “the employee is unable to obtain or  
perform work because of imprisonment or commission of a  
crime.”  
Defendant argues that it does not have to pay plaintiff  
anything because plaintiff is “unable to obtain or perform  
work” with defendant because of plaintiff’s “commission of a  
crime.” Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that defendant  
must 
pay 
plaintiff 
the total difference between what plaintiff  
was earning while working for defendant and what plaintiff was  
earning at the time of the hearing because plaintiff was not  
“unable to obtain or perform work” as evidenced by the fact  
7  
 
  
 
that plaintiff was, in fact, working at the time of the  
hearing.  
The language “unable to obtain or perform work” does not  
stand alone, and thus it cannot be read in a vacuum.  Instead,  
“[i]t exists and must be read in context with the entire act,  
and the words and phrases used there must be assigned such  
meanings as are in harmony with the whole of the statute,  
construed in the light of history and common sense.”  
Arrowhead Dev Co v Livingston Co Rd Comm, 413 Mich 505, 516;  
322 NW2d 702 (1982).4 
When interpreting a statute, we must  
“consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or  
phrase as well as ‘its placement and purpose in the statutory  
scheme.’”  Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 237; 596  
NW2d 
119 
(1999) 
(citation 
omitted). 
 
“Contextual 
understanding  
of statutes is generally grounded in the doctrine of noscitur  
a sociis: ‘it is known from its associates,’ see Black’s Law  
Dictionary (6th ed), p 1060.  This doctrine stands for the  
principle [of interpretation] that a word or phrase is given  
meaning by its context or setting.”  Tyler v Livonia Pub  
Schools, 459 Mich 382, 390-391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999). Although  
4 “[W]ords in a statute should not be construed in the 
void, but should be read together to harmonize the meaning, 
giving effect to the act as a whole.”  Gen Motors Corp v Erves  
(On Rehearing), 399 Mich 241, 255; 249 NW2d 41 (1976)(opinion  
by COLEMAN, J.).  
8  
 
 
a phrase or a statement may mean one thing when read in  
isolation, it may mean something substantially different when  
read in context.  McCarthy v Bronson, 500 US 136; 111 S Ct  
1737; 114 L Ed 2d 194 (1991); Mastro Plastics Corp v Nat’l  
Labor Relations Bd, 350 US 270; 76 S Ct 349; 100 L Ed 309  
(1956); Hagen v Dep’t of Ed, 431 Mich 118, 130-131; 427 NW2d  
879 (1988); Fowler v Bd of Registration in Chiropody, 374 Mich  
254, 257-258; 132 NW2d 82 (1965).5  Therefore, “[a] statute  
must be read in its entirety . . . .”  State Bd of Ed v  
Houghton Lake Community Schools, 430 Mich 658, 671; 425 NW2d  
5 In McCarthy, supra at 139, the United States Supreme  
Court stated:  
We do not quarrel with petitioner’s claim that 
the most natural reading of the phrase “challenging 
conditions 
of 
confinement,” 
when 
viewed 
in  
isolation, would not include suits seeking relief 
from isolated episodes of unconstitutional conduct. 
However, statutory language must always be read in 
its proper context.  “In ascertaining the plain 
meaning of [a] statute, the court must look to the 
particular statutory language at issue, as well as 
the language and design of the statute as a whole.” 
[Citation omitted.]  
Similarly, in Mastro Plastics, supra at 285, the United States  
Supreme Court stated:  
[I]f the above words are read in complete 
isolation from their context in the Act, such an 
interpretation 
is 
possible. 
However, 
“In  
expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a 
single sentence or member of a sentence, but look 
to the provisions of the whole law, and to its 
object and policy.” [Citation omitted.]  
9  
80 (1988).  
When the statutory provision that is at issue here is  
read in its entirety, and, in particular, when the language  
“unable to obtain or perform work” is read in context, it  
becomes clear that neither defendant nor plaintiff (nor the  
dissent, which is in agreement with plaintiff) is entirely  
correct in its construction of MCL 418.361(1).  The first  
sentence 
of 
this 
provision states that “[w]hile the incapacity  
for work resulting from a personal injury is partial, the  
employer shall pay . . . .”  Thus, it is clear that this  
provision applies only to employees who suffer from a partial  
incapacity for work.  If an employee has a partial incapacity  
for work, that employee must necessarily have a partial  
capacity for work. Accordingly, this provision only applies  
to employees who are able to work in some capacity.  
MCL 418.361(1) further provides that employers must pay  
such employees “80% of the difference between the injured  
employee’s after-tax average weekly wage before the personal  
injury and the after-tax average weekly wage which the injured  
employee is able to earn after the personal injury . . . .”  
(Emphasis added.)  From this language it becomes even more  
clear that this provision applies only to employees who are  
able to work in some capacity. 
The phrase means that  
10  
 
employers must pay employees a percentage of the difference  
between what they earned before the injury and what they are  
able to earn after the injury.  Accordingly, this provision  
only applies to employees who are injured, but who,  
nevertheless, are able to work in some capacity.  
MCL 418.361(1) first states that an employer must pay an  
employee a percentage of the difference between what the  
employee earned before the injury and what the employee is  
able to earn after the injury. It then states, “However, an  
employer shall not be liable for compensation under . . . this  
subsection for such periods of time that the employee is  
unable to obtain or perform work because of imprisonment or  
commission of a crime.”  Accordingly, this provision first  
creates a liability, and then creates an exception to this  
liability. The dissent contends that this exception applies  
only to unemployed employees, and that it does not apply to  
employed employees.  However, if that were the case, this  
exception would never apply to any partially disabled  
employees, and thus it would be rendered nugatory with regard  
to these employees.6  That is, if this exception were  
6 This exception applies to both partial disabilities and 
total disabilities.  “[A]n employer shall not be liable for 
compensation under section 351 . . . or this subsection . . . 
.”  MCL 418.361(1). “[S]ection 351” is the section pertaining 
to total disabilities and “this subsection” is the subsection  
pertaining to partial disabilities.  However, under the  
11  
 
 
approach of the dissent, this exception would only apply to 
total disabilities; it would never apply to partial 
disabilities.  That this exception is to be applied to partial 
disabilities is obvious.  First, the exception is found in the 
partial-disabilities provision. 
Second, this provision 
specifically states, “an employer shall not be liable for 
compensation under . . . this subsection [i.e., the partial­
disabilities subsection] . . . .”  MCL 418.361(1).  In sum, 
contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we recognize that the 
dissent’s approach would not render this exception nugatory 
with respect to total disabilities; however, the dissent’s  
approach would render this exception nugatory with respect to 
partial disabilities, although it is manifestly obvious that 
the Legislature intended this exception to apply to the latter 
as well.  
The dissent attempts to accord this exception some 
meaning 
with 
respect 
to partial disabilities by observing that 
it would apply where an employee who is partially disabled 
because of a work-related injury becomes totally disabled 
because of his own “commission of a crime.” 
The dissent  
concludes that “the employer would not be liable for benefits 
to this employee under the exception.”  Post at 11. 
The  
dissent posits a hypothetical example in which a partially 
disabled robber becomes fully disabled as a result of slipping 
and falling during the course of the robbery.  However, the 
dissent itself concludes that the exception would only apply 
to 
the 
totally 
disabled, not the partially disabled, employee. 
As explained above, we recognize that the dissent’s approach 
would give meaning to this exception with regard to totally 
disabled employees. However, our quarrel with the dissent’s 
approach is that it fails to accord any meaning to the 
exception with regard to partially disabled employees.  The  
dissent somehow draws from its hypothetical example, in which 
it concludes that the exception is applicable to a totally 
disabled employee, that meaning has also been given to the 
exception in the context of a partially disabled employee. 
Further, we do not agree with the dissent that the employer in 
its hypothetical example would necessarily escape all  
liability. Rather, the employer of the dissent’s “partially 
disabled robber” would remain liable for the employee’s loss 
of wage-earning capacity that is attributable to the  
employee’s work-related injury, but the employer would not be 
liable for the employee’s loss of wage-earning capacity that 
is attributable to the employee’s “commission of a crime.”  
12  
  
construed, as the dissent construes it, to only exclude  
unemployed employees, this exception will be rendered  
meaningless regarding partially disabled employees because  
employers are not liable to unemployed, partially disabled  
employees under this provision in the first place. Why would  
the Legislature create a liability that only extends to  
employed employees and then create an exception to this  
liability that only extends to unemployed employees?  It  
simply would not make any sense to exempt unemployed employees  
from liability where employers are not liable to unemployed  
employees under this provision to begin with.  
It is well established that this Court should avoid  
construing a statute in such a way that renders any part of it  
nugatory. Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 466 Mich 524, 528; 647  
NW2d 493 (2002).  “It is our duty to read the statute as a  
whole and to avoid a construction which renders meaningless  
provisions that clearly were to have effect.” Apportionment  
of Wayne Co Bd of Comm’rs–1982, 413 Mich 224, 259-260; 321  
NW2d 615 (1982).  
A reading of this statute in its entirety evidences an  
According to the dissent, on the other hand, an unemployed, 
totally disabled employee is not entitled to any benefits 
regardless of whether the employee still suffers from a loss 
of wage-earning capacity that is attributable to the work­
related injury because that employee is unable to work because 
of the “commission of a crime.”  
13  
 
intent to obligate employers to provide employees with  
partial-disability benefits when an employee is still able to  
work, but is unable to earn as much money as before the work­
related injury. 
Accordingly, as explained above, this  
provision only addresses those situations in which the  
employee still has a wage-earning capacity, but a reduced  
wage-earning capacity.  That is, it only addresses those  
situations in which the employee is employed, but earning less  
money than before the work-related injury.  
In this context, it becomes quite clear that the language  
“unable to obtain or perform work” is referring to a loss of  
wage-earning capacity, rather than the inability to work at  
all.  Therefore, employers must compensate employees for a  
loss of wage-earning capacity that resulted from a work­
related injury.  However, the statute provides an exception to  
this obligation when the reason that the employee is unable to  
earn as much money is attributable, not to the work-related  
injury, but to the employee’s “imprisonment or commission of  
a crime.”7  Accordingly, if the difference in pay is because  
7 Defendant suggests, and the dissenting Court of Appeals 
judge agreed, that this exception to an employer’s obligation 
to pay partial-disability benefits applies whenever the 
employee is “unable to obtain or perform work” for that 
particular employer.  In other words, defendant contends that 
this exception is employer-specific.  However, there is no 
indication in the statute itself to suggest that this  
exception is employer-specific. Therefore, we conclude that 
this provision is not employer-specific, and thus that  
14  
 
  
of “imprisonment or commission of a crime,” the employee is  
not entitled to differential benefits. If the difference in  
pay is a result, not of “imprisonment or commission of a  
crime,” but of a work-related injury, the employee is entitled  
to benefits.8  
defendant’s interpretation of this provision is mistaken.  
Further, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
dissenting 
worker’s  
compensation commissioners that the WCAC majority placed “an 
artificially-created burden on defendant to prove it would 
have done the very thing the ex-felon statute prohibits 
defendant from doing, namely, offering employment to an ex­
felon . . . .”  To require defendant to prove that it would 
have hired plaintiff if it were not for his “commission of a  
crime” is an impossible burden.  In this case, plaintiff’s 
“commission 
of 
a 
crime” bars defendant from offering plaintiff 
a position, and thus whether defendant would have offered 
plaintiff such a position if defendant was not so barred is 
simply not possible to know because once defendant determined 
that it could not rehire plaintiff because of his commission 
of a felony, the employment inquiry stopped.  The WCAC’s  
approach, however, would require the inquiry to continue. 
That is, it would require defendant to make a needless 
determination, i.e., whether it would have hired plaintiff if 
plaintiff had not committed this felony.  The statute does not  
require that futile inquiry, and thus the WCAC erred in 
requiring it. 
The dissent criticizes us for “merely 
recharacteriz[ing] 
the question posed to the magistrate by the 
WCAC on remand.”  Post at 9. 
We do not agree with this  
portrayal of our position.  We are not remanding this case to 
the magistrate to determine whether defendant proved that it 
would have hired plaintiff had it not been for his “commission 
of a crime.”  Instead, we are remanding to determine what 
portion 
of 
plaintiff’s loss of wage-earning capacity is fairly 
attributable to his work-related injury or to his “commission 
of a crime.”  
8 Note that it could be possible for the reduction in pay 
to be partly because of an “imprisonment or commission of a 
crime” and partly because of a work-related injury. In such  
a situation, as may well be the case here, the employer would  
15  
 
  
This interpretation is not only in accord with the  
language of MCL 418.361(1), but it better comports with other  
provisions of the WDCA and decisions of this Court.  Under the  
WDCA, MCL 418.101 et seq., injured employees are not entitled  
to benefits if the injury is “by reason of his intentional and  
wilful misconduct,” MCL 418.305; the “injury [is] incurred in  
the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is  
social or recreational,” MCL 418.301(3); the employee  
unjustifiably 
refuses 
to 
rehabilitate 
himself, 
MCL 
418.319(1);  
the employee refuses without good and reasonable cause a bona  
fide offer of reasonable employment, MCL 418.301(5)(a); the  
employee unreasonably refuses surgery, Kricinovich v American  
Car & Foundry Co, 192 Mich 687, 690; 159 NW 362 (1916); or the  
employee refuses to undertake exercises designed to hasten  
recovery, Bower v Whitehall Leather Co, 412 Mich 172, 184; 312  
NW2d 640 (1981), citing Brown v Premier Mfg Co, 77 Mich App  
573, 578-579; 259 NW2d 143 (1977).  These propositions adhere  
because there must be a linkage between the disabling work­
related injury and the reduction in pay. Sington v Chrysler  
Corp, 467 Mich 144, 155; 648 NW2d 624 (2002).9  
be liable for the reduction in pay attributable to the work­
related injury.  The employer would not be liable for the 
reduction in pay attributable to the “imprisonment or  
commission of a crime.”  
9 
 “[T]he WCAC should consider whether the injury has  
actually resulted in a loss of wage earning capacity in work  
suitable to the employee’s training and qualifications in the  
16  
In this case, there would be no such linkage if  
plaintiff’s pay were reduced, not because of his work-related  
injury, but because of his commission of a felony.  After  
plaintiff committed this felony, defendant, as a matter of  
law, could not reemploy plaintiff, and thus plaintiff began  
working somewhere else where he was unable to earn as much  
money as he had earned while working for defendant.  
Therefore, it is at least arguably because of his “commission  
of a crime” that plaintiff is earning less money, not because  
of the work-related injury.  Worker’s compensation was not  
designed to compensate employees whose unemployment is not  
attributable to a work-related injury, but rather to some  
nonemployment-related reason such as the “commission of a  
crime.”  As the writer of the lead Court of Appeals opinion  
recognized, “The purpose of the worker’s compensation act is  
to compensate a claimant for lost earning capacity caused by  
a work-related injury . . . .”  247 Mich App 555, 566; 637  
NW2d 811 (2001).10  In this case, the lost earning capacity was  
ordinary job market.” Id. at 158 (emphasis added).  
10 In our judgment, the construction of MCL 791.205a(1) 
set forth in this opinion is more in accord with this purpose 
than the dissent’s construction.  Under our construction, 
while employers will not be able to escape liability for an 
employee’s loss of wage-earning capacity that is attributable 
to the employee’s work-related injury, the employer will not 
be held liable for an employee’s loss of wage-earning capacity 
that is attributable to the employee’s “imprisonment or 
commission of a crime.”  Under the dissent’s approach, 
although the employer will not be able to escape liability for  
17  
 
  
arguably caused, not by a work-related injury, but by the  
commission of a felony.11  
an employee’s work-related injury, the employer will also be  
held liable for an employee’s loss of wage-earning capacity 
that is attributable to the employee’s “imprisonment or 
commission of a crime.”  That is, what divides these opinions 
is the eligibility of employees for worker’s compensation 
benefits related to their own “imprisonment or commission of 
a crime.” This opinion interprets the statute in accordance 
with the manifest intent of the Legislature to deny such 
benefits to employees, while the dissent would allow such 
benefits.  Notwithstanding that employees were entitled to 
such 
benefits 
before 
the 
1985 
worker’s 
compensation 
amendments 
and that the Legislature clearly intended that the situation 
be altered, the dissent refuses to give effect to the 
Legislature’s intent that employers will not be liable for an 
employee’s loss of wage-earning capacity that is attributable 
to “imprisonment or commission of a crime.” Apparently, there 
is little that the people of Michigan can do through their 
Legislature to disallow such benefits in light of the 
dissent’s determination that they be maintained.  
11 The dissent states: “Although [plaintiff was] earning 
less than he had earned while he worked for defendant because  
of 
the 
physical 
limitations caused by his work-related injury, 
plaintiff was working.”  Post at 3 (emphasis added). If it is  
true that plaintiff is earning less because of his work­
related injury, we would agree with the dissent that defendant 
must pay plaintiff a percentage of this difference. However, 
if plaintiff is earning less because of his “commission of a 
crime,” defendant is not obligated to pay plaintiff a 
percentage of this difference.  That is, we agree with the 
dissent 
that 
“[d]efendant must still pay benefits to plaintiff 
as compensation for his loss of wage-earning capacity 
attributable to plaintiff’s work-related injury,” assuming 
that some or all of plaintiff’s loss of wage-earning capacity 
is attributable to plaintiff’s work-related injury. Post at  
5.  Accordingly, this case must be remanded to the magistrate 
to determine to what extent, if any, plaintiff’s loss of wage­
earning capacity is attributable to his work-related injury 
and to what extent, if any, plaintiff’s loss of wage-earning 
capacity is attributable to his “commission of a crime.”  
The 
dissent 
criticizes 
us 
for 
“provid[ing] 
the 
magistrate  
18  
 
  
 
 
Reading this provision as the dissent does would  
anomalously require employers to pay employees partial­
disability benefits because the employees are imprisoned or  
with absolutely no guidance for making this determination.” 
Post at 9. However, we are not asking the magistrate to do 
anything other than what magistrates have been required to do 
since the enactment of the WDCA, that is, to determine 
whether, and to what extent, there is a linkage between 
plaintiff’s work-related injury and his loss of wage-earning 
capacity.  See Sington, supra at 155. 
To the extent that  
there is such a linkage, plaintiff is entitled to benefits. 
However, to the extent that plaintiff’s loss of wage-earning 
capacity is attributable, not to his work-related injury, but 
to his “commission of a crime,” plaintiff is not entitled to 
benefits.  
The dissent repeatedly states that “the magistrate has 
already determined that plaintiff’s work-related injury . . . 
is the only thing preventing plaintiff from returning to other 
types of work.” Post at 7. However, that is not the test to 
be applied to determine eligibility for worker’s compensation 
benefits.  As this Court recently explained in Sington, supra 
at 158, the test is not whether plaintiff suffers from a work­
related injury that prevents him from returning to other types 
of work; rather, the test is whether plaintiff suffers from a 
work-related injury that results in a loss of wage-earning 
capacity.  Accordingly, the magistrate must now determine why 
plaintiff is suffering a loss of wage-earning capacity.  Is it  
because of his work-related injury?  That is, would plaintiff 
not be suffering a loss of wage-earning capacity if he were 
not injured?  Or, is it because of his “commission of a  
crime?” That is, would plaintiff not be suffering a loss of 
wage-earning capacity if he had not been convicted of a felony 
and subsequently incarcerated?  The dissent states that  
because “[f]indings of disability and wage-earning capacity 
have been established and are not disputed” there is no need 
to remand this case to the magistrate.  Post at 10. However, 
although the plaintiff has indeed suffered a work-related 
injury, as well as a loss of wage-earning capacity, what has 
not yet been established, in our judgment, is whether 
plaintiff’s work-related injury caused his loss of wage­
earning capacity. See 22 n 13.  
19  
 
 
have committed a crime, where such employers would not have to  
pay partial-disability benefits if the employees were not  
imprisoned or had not committed a crime.  In other words,  
employers would be required to pay benefits to employees  
solely because they are imprisoned or because they committed  
a crime.  For example, if an employee is injured, but this  
injury does not affect his ability to earn the same amount of  
money as he did before he was injured, that employee would not  
be entitled to partial-disability benefits.  However, under  
the dissent’s reading of MCL 791.205a(1), if the employee were  
then imprisoned, yet able to “obtain and perform work,” but  
not earn as much money, he would be entitled to partial­
disability benefits.12
 As we have already observed, the  
12 In the present case, plaintiff was able to “obtain and 
perform work” while he was imprisoned through a work-release 
program.  Although plaintiff does not seek partial-disability 
benefits for the time that he was imprisoned, under the 
dissent’s analysis, plaintiff would certainly be entitled to 
such benefits.  As Judge Griffin in dissent stated in response 
to the lead opinion, which, like the dissent here, concluded 
that the exception only applies to unemployed employees:  
The parties, magistrate, WCAC majority, WCAC 
dissenters, my colleagues, and I all agree that 
subsection 361(1) operates to exclude defendant 
from liability for worker’s compensation benefits 
for the period that plaintiff was imprisoned. 
However, if the “test” proposed by the lead opinion 
for subsection 361(1) were applied to the present 
circumstances, plaintiff would also be entitled to 
worker’s compensation benefits during his period of 
imprisonment.  This is because plaintiff was able 
to obtain and perform work during his imprisonment 
and thus “plaintiff is not unable to obtain or  
20  
 
purpose of the WDCA is to compensate employees for work­
related injuries.  It is not intended to compensate employees  
for committing crimes and becoming imprisoned.  
The dissent accuses us of “ignor[ing] the plain language  
of the statute” and of not respecting the Legislature’s choice  
of words in MCL 418.361(1).  Post at 8.  Yet, it is the  
dissent’s interpretation that gives absolutely no meaning to  
the entire last sentence of this provision in which these  
words are contained. That is, while the dissent purports to  
define this sentence, it does so by defining it into  
meaninglessness.  It gives meaning to discrete words within  
this sentence at the cost of giving coherent meaning to the  
sentence 
itself. 
The 
dissent 
would 
award 
worker’s  
compensation benefits under MCL 418.361(1) as if the last  
sentence of this provision were absent.  We would address the  
following questions to the dissent: What meaning does the  
dissent give to this sentence?  And if, as we suggest, the  
dissent gives it no meaning, how can this conceivably comport  
with the intention of the Legislature?  Under the dissent’s  
interpretation, it is as if, when the Legislature enacted this  
provision, it decided that the last sentence should have no  
perform work for that reason.”  (Opinion by Neff,  
J., ante at [565].)  Judge Neff’s construction of § 
361 and its test for application fails because its 
results, as applied to plaintiff, are simply 
illogical. [247 Mich App 577 (citation omitted).]  
21  
 
  
meaning or that the Legislature should appear to be saying  
something while saying nothing.  We do not believe that we can  
presume such folly and, instead, that we must give the most  
reasonable meaning possible to the words of the Legislature.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
The WDCA, MCL 418.361(1), provides that an employer is  
liable to an employee for a percentage of the employee’s loss  
of wage-earning capacity, except when this loss of wage­
earning capacity is because of the “commission of a crime.”  
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals  
and remand this case to the magistrate to determine to what  
extent, if any, plaintiff’s loss of wage-earning capacity is  
because of a work-related injury, and, to what extent, if any,  
plaintiff’s loss of wage-earning capacity is because of the  
“commission of a crime.”13  
13 The dissent repeatedly states that the magistrate has 
already determined that plaintiff is disabled. However, the 
magistrate originally found plaintiff to be disabled as 
defined in Haske v Transport Leasing, Inc, 455 Mich 628, 634; 
566 NW2d 896 (1997).  This Court has since overruled Haske.  
See Sington, supra at 161. 
Accordingly, on remand, the 
magistrate is to determine whether plaintiff is disabled as 
defined in Sington, supra at 158. That is, if the magistrate 
determines that plaintiff’s loss of wage-earning capacity is 
wholly attributable to his “commission of a crime,” the 
magistrate must conclude that plaintiff is not disabled 
because, under Sington, supra at 158, there must be a link 
between the work-related injury and the loss of wage-earning 
capacity.  If the magistrate, however, determines that  
plaintiff’s 
loss 
of 
wage-earning 
capacity 
is 
wholly 
attributable to his work-related injury, the magistrate must 
conclude that plaintiff is disabled and entitled to benefits.  
22  
 
Stephen J. Markman 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Clifford W. Taylor  
YOUNG, J.  
I concur in the result only.  
Robert P. Young, Jr.  
Finally, 
if 
the 
magistrate determines that plaintiff’s loss of 
wage-earning capacity is partly attributable to his work­
related injury and partly attributable to his “commission of 
a crime,” the magistrate must conclude that plaintiff is 
disabled and entitled to benefits for the portion of his loss 
of wage-earning capacity that is attributable to his work­
related injury, but is not entitled to benefits for the 
portion of his loss of wage-earning capacity that is  
attributable to his “commission of a crime.”  
The dissent states that it is inappropriate to remand 
this case for a redetermination of disability under Sington 
because defendant has never contested plaintiff’s disability. 
Post at 4 n 2. 
Although defendant has not specifically 
contested plaintiff’s disability, defendant has specifically 
contested its duty to pay plaintiff differential benefits in 
light of plaintiff’s “commission of a crime.”  As explained 
above, if plaintiff’s loss of wage-earning capacity is wholly 
attributable to his “commission of a crime,” plaintiff is not 
disabled under Sington. 
In other words, whether defendant 
must pay plaintiff differential benefits in light of  
plaintiff’s “commission of a crime,” and whether plaintiff is 
disabled, are two interrelated questions that must be  
addressed on remand.  
23  
 
 
______________________________ 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
RONALD G. SWEATT,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 120220  
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s construction  
of MCL 418.361(1).  While plaintiff is unable to work for  
defendant because of his commission of a crime, plaintiff is  
not unable to work. Because I would affirm the decisions of  
the Court of Appeals and Worker’s Compensation Appellate  
Commission (WCAC) reinstating plaintiff’s benefits, I must  
dissent.  
I. Plaintiff is not “unable to perform or obtain work.”  
In this case, we are called upon to determine whether MCL  
418.361(1) and MCL 791.205a operate in conjunction to relieve  
defendant of liability for any payment to plaintiff because of  
 
his commission of a crime.  
MCL 418.361(1) provides:  
While the incapacity for work resulting from a 
personal injury is partial, the employer shall pay, 
or cause to be paid to the injured employee weekly 
compensation equal to 80% of the difference between 
the injured employee’s after-tax average weekly 
wage before the personal injury and the after-tax 
average weekly wage which the injured employee is 
able to earn after the personal injury, but not 
more than the maximum weekly rate of compensation, 
as determined under section 355. 
Compensation 
shall be paid for the duration of the disability. 
However, an employer shall not be liable for  
compensation under section 351, 371(1), or this 
subsection for such periods of time that the  
employee is unable to obtain or perform work 
because of imprisonment or commission of a crime.  
MCL 
791.205a 
forbids 
defendant 
from 
hiring 
and  
subsequently employing persons who, inter alia, have been  
convicted of a felony or who were subject to pending felony  
charges.
 Defendant would have this Court conclude that  
because defendant is forbidden from reemploying plaintiff,  
plaintiff is unable to work because of his commission of a  
crime.  I would conclude that the statutes, when read  
together, do not relieve defendant of liability.  
When plaintiff was released from prison and sought  
reinstatement of his benefits, he was able to work and had  
been working within his limitations while he was incarcerated  
and on parole. 
In fact, plaintiff was employed at the time  
of trial.  Defendant would have us believe that because  
plaintiff was unable to work for defendant because of his  
2  
commission of a crime, defendant is relieved from paying  
benefits. However, this requires us to read into subsection  
361(1) that the employee must be unable to work for this  
particular employer. I cannot do so. Subsection 361(1) is  
not employer-specific.  The statute provides that if the  
employee is unable to work for stated reasons, the employer is  
relieved from paying benefits.  In this case, it cannot be  
stressed enough that plaintiff was able to work.  Although  
earning less than he had earned while he worked for defendant  
because 
of 
the 
physical limitations caused by his work-related  
injury, plaintiff was working.  
The magistrate correctly decided this case when it was  
first before her.  She recognized that there is no case law  
authorizing defendant to terminate plaintiff’s benefits just  
because plaintiff is no longer able to work for defendant.  
Further, the only thing preventing plaintiff from engaging in  
other types of work is his disability, which was incurred as  
a result of his employment with defendant.1
 The statute  
simply cannot be read as authorizing defendant to terminate  
benefits.  
1See the magistrate’s November 18, 1998, opinion, page 6, 
where 
the 
magistrate 
stated: “Furthermore, there is nothing to 
prevent plaintiff from returning to other types of work except 
his disability which was incurred as a result of his 
employment with defendant.”  
3  
 
 
The magistrate found as a fact, and plaintiff and  
defendant both agreed, that plaintiff continues to suffer a  
disability that inhibits his ability to earn wages as a result  
of the knee injury he sustained in the course of his  
employment with defendant.2  
The magistrate’s initial decision is in line with the  
purpose of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL  
418.101 et seq. 
This Court has consistently construed the  
WDCA liberally to grant rather than deny benefits.  Simkins v  
Gen Motors (After Remand), 453 Mich 703, 710-711; 556 NW2d 839  
(1996) (citing Bower v Whitehall Leather Co, 412 Mich 172,  
191; 312 NW2d 640 [1981]); see also DiBenedetto v West Shore  
Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402-403; 605 NW2d 300 (2000).  
“The primary purpose of the worker’s compensation act is  
to provide benefits to the victims of work-related injuries  
. . . .”  Simkins at 711. The worker’s compensation scheme is  
a compromise of sorts.  An employee who suffers an injury  
2The majority’s suggestion that this case should be 
remanded for a redetermination of disability under Sington v  
Chrysler Corp, 467 Mich 144; 648 NW2d 624 (2002), is 
inappropriate.  While Sington provides the current standard  
for disability determinations, defendant never contested 
plaintiff’s disability.  In fact, defendant willingly paid 
benefits 
from 
the 
date of plaintiff’s injury until plaintiff’s 
incarceration.  Defendant’s obligation to pay benefits has 
only been contested under MCL 418.361(1) in light of MCL 
791.205a.  Therefore, redetermination of disability under the  
Sington standard is unnecessary and inappropriate. The only 
issue in this case is whether defendant is relieved of its  
obligation to pay benefits because of plaintiff’s commission 
of a crime.  
4  
arising out of and in the course of his employment is eligible  
for worker’s compensation benefits regardless of whether the  
employer was at fault. In return, the employer is immunized  
from tort liability because worker’s compensation is the  
“exclusive remedy” for a qualifying work-related injury.  Id.  
See MCL 418.131.  
In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff suffered a  
partially disabling knee injury in the course of his  
employment with defendant. While it is clear that plaintiff  
is unable to work for defendant pursuant to MCL 791.205a,  
because of plaintiff’s commission of a crime, plaintiff is not  
unable to work for another employer.  Defendant must still pay  
benefits to plaintiff as compensation for his loss of wage­
earning capacity attributable to plaintiff’s work-related  
injury.  
The reasonable-employment statute is helpful to this  
analysis.  Reasonable employment is defined in MCL 418.301(9)  
as  
work that is within the employee’s capacity to 
perform that poses no clear and proximate threat to 
that employee’s health and safety, and that is 
within a reasonable distance from that employee’s 
residence.
 The employee’s capacity to perform 
shall not be limited to jobs in work suitable to 
his or her qualifications and training.  
5  
 
 
MCL 418.301(5) provides that when disability is established,3  
weekly wage-loss benefits are determined in part as follows:  
(a) If an employee receives a bona fide offer  
of 
reasonable 
employment 
from 
the 
previous 
employer, another employer, or through the Michigan 
employment security commission and the employee 
refuses that employment without good and reasonable 
cause, the employee shall be considered to have 
voluntarily removed himself or herself from the 
work force and is no longer entitled to any wage­
loss benefits under this act during the period of 
such refusal. [Emphasis added.]  
While subsection 301(5)(a) focuses on an employee’s  
refusal 
of 
reasonable employment, it provides three methods by  
which an employee can receive an offer of reasonable  
employment——his previous employer, another employer, or the  
Michigan Employment Security Commission.  In this case, the  
previous employer, defendant, could not offer plaintiff  
reasonable employment because of MCL 791.205a. However, two  
avenues remain by which the employee can receive an offer of  
reasonable employment——another employer or the Michigan  
Employment 
Security 
Commission. 
 Defendant’s 
argument 
ignores  
these 
remaining 
two 
avenues.  Plaintiff was offered reasonable  
employment 
by 
Elco, 
which involved making air conditioners for  
automobiles.
 Plaintiff obviously accepted this reasonable  
employment, because he was employed there on the date of  
trial. That the employment was “reasonable,” i.e., within  
3Disability was established by the magistrate, and 
defendant does not challenge this.  
6  
plaintiff’s 
physical 
limitations, 
is 
established 
by  
plaintiff’s testimony that the parts he worked with were  
“quite light” and he could “handle it pretty good.”  
Again, it must follow that because plaintiff was engaged  
in reasonable employment, he was not unable to work.  
Therefore, defendant is not relieved from paying worker’s  
compensation benefits to plaintiff.  
The 
majority 
criticizes my approach as suggesting that an  
employer will also be held liable for an employee’s inability  
to work that is attributable to the employee’s “imprisonment  
or commission of a crime.”  Ante at 17 n 10. 
This is not  
true.  In this case, plaintiff is working, thus he is not  
“unable to work” because of his commission of a crime.  
Additionally, the magistrate has already determined that  
plaintiff’s 
work-related 
injury, 
not 
plaintiff’s 
commission 
of  
a crime, is the only thing preventing plaintiff from returning  
to other types of work.  This will not be true in every case,  
but it has been established in this case.  Because it has  
already been established that the exception to an employer’s  
liability contained in MCL 418.361(1) does not apply in this  
case, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and WCAC  
reinstating plaintiff’s benefits must be affirmed.  
II.  The majority’s “loss of wage-earning capacity” analysis 
and remand direction is flawed.  
The majority holds that defendant must pay only the  
7  
difference in wages between what plaintiff earned while  
working for defendant and what plaintiff was earning at the  
time of trial to the extent that the difference is caused by  
plaintiff’s injury, not by plaintiff’s commission of a crime.  
The majority remands this case to the magistrate to make this  
determination.  I respectfully disagree. As I have previously  
pointed out, the magistrate already found that there is  
nothing to prevent plaintiff from returning to other types of  
work except his disability, which was incurred as a result of  
his employment with defendant. Additionally, such a holding  
ignores the plain language of the statute.  
MCL 418.361(1) specifically states that “an employer  
shall not be liable for compensation . . . for such periods of  
time that the employee is unable to obtain or perform work  
because of imprisonment or commission of a crime.” (Emphasis  
added.)  The majority believes that the language “unable to  
obtain or perform work” refers to “a loss of wage-earning  
capacity, rather than the inability to work at all.”  Ante at  
13-14.  
I do not believe that the language of the statute can be  
construed in that manner.  The Legislature’s choice of the  
words “unable to obtain or perform work” must be respected.  
We can assume that the Legislature intended the phrase to mean  
exactly what it says—“unable to obtain or perform work,” not  
8  
 
“loss of wage-earning capacity.”  The plain language of the  
statute simply does not support the majority’s reading, or  
rewording, of the statute.  
There is also a flaw in the majority’s remand directing  
the magistrate to determine to what extent plaintiff’s loss of  
wage-earning capacity is attributable to his work-related  
injury and to what extent plaintiff’s loss of wage-earning  
capacity is attributable to plaintiff’s “commission of a  
crime.”  The majority provides the magistrate with absolutely  
no guidance for making this determination. In essence, the  
majority merely recharacterizes the question posed to the  
magistrate by the WCAC on remand.  
After the magistrate issued her first opinion, the WCAC  
remanded the case to the magistrate for a determination  
whether defendant would have offered reasonable employment to  
plaintiff were it not for the statutory prohibition.  On  
remand, the magistrate concluded that there would not have  
been an offer of reasonable employment because to find  
otherwise would be pure speculation.  The WCAC then held that  
the “mere fact” that this defendant cannot hire plaintiff  
because of the statutory prohibition does not automatically  
entitle defendant to relief from payment pursuant to MCL  
418.361(1).
 The linkage of the two statutory provisions  
requires a critical additional “finding of fact,” which was  
9  
 
the purpose of the WCAC’s remand to the magistrate.  The  
critical additional finding was whether defendant would have  
offered reasonable employment to plaintiff. Because this is  
a question of fact and because the magistrate found that  
defendant could not prove that it would have offered  
reasonable employment to plaintiff, the WCAC affirmed the  
magistrate’s award of benefits to plaintiff.  
The majority criticizes the WCAC majority for placing  
“‘an artificially-created burden on defendant to prove it  
would have done the very thing the ex-felon statute prohibits  
defendant from doing, namely, offering employment to an ex­
felon . . . .’” Ante at 14 n 7 (quoting the dissenting  
worker’s compensation commissioners).  
However, I would ask the majority: What is the magistrate  
to consider on remand?  Findings of disability and wage­
earning capacity have been established and are not disputed.  
The majority correctly holds that the exception in MCL  
418.361(1) is not employer-specific, i.e., it cannot be read  
as excluding an employee who is unable to work for this  
employer.  Because the magistrate has already determined that  
there is nothing to prevent plaintiff from returning to other  
types of work except his work-related disability, I am at a  
loss to discover what the magistrate is to consider on remand  
to 
determine 
what 
loss 
of 
wage-earning 
capacity 
is  
10  
 
attributable to the injury and what loss of wage-earning  
capacity 
is 
attributable to plaintiff’s commission of a crime.  
Obviously, plaintiff is unable to work for defendant, this  
employer, because of his commission of a crime.  Because we  
cannot read the statute as employer-specific and because  
plaintiff is able to work only in a limited capacity because  
of his work-related injury, I cannot fathom any way for the  
magistrate to determine that any portion of plaintiff’s loss  
of wage-earning capacity is attributable to anything other  
than plaintiff’s work-related injury, which she has already  
determined.  
III.  My construction would not render the crime exception 
“nugatory.”  
The majority mistakenly asserts that my construction of  
the statute would render the exception nugatory.  There are  
circumstances where an employee truly would be unable to work  
because of his commission of a crime or imprisonment.  For  
example, if an employee has a work-related knee injury that  
renders him partially disabled, he is entitled to worker’s  
compensation benefits.  If this employee robs a gas station  
and trips on his way out, aggravating his work-related injury  
to the point where he can no longer perform work, this  
employee is unable to perform work because of his commission  
of a crime.
 Thus, the employer would not be liable for  
benefits to this employee under the exception.  In this case,  
11  
plaintiff was unable to work for defendant because of MCL  
791.205a; plaintiff was not unable to obtain or perform work  
because of his commission of a crime per MCL 418.361(1).  
Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement of his  
benefits.  
The majority also supports its assertion that my  
construction of the statute would render the exception  
nugatory by stating that “to only exclude unemployed  
employees, this exception will be rendered meaningless  
regarding partially disabled employees because employers are  
not liable to unemployed, partially disabled employees under  
this provision in the first place.” 
Ante at 12.  This  
assertion 
is 
clearly 
mistaken because, while the exception may  
be found in MCL 418.361, which is the partial-disability  
statute, the statute expressly states that it applies to MCL  
418.351 as well, which is the total-disability statute. Any  
claimant who is “totally” or “totally and permanently”  
disabled is not likely to be employed.  Thus, the statute  
expressly applies to claimants who are unemployed.  
IV. Conclusion  
I would hold that when a plaintiff is not unable to work  
because he committed a crime, or stated differently, able to  
work even though he committed a crime, pursuant to MCL  
418.361(1), a defendant is not relieved of its responsibility  
12  
to pay benefits.  MCL 418.361(1) is not employer-specific; it  
cannot be read to provide that an employee must be unable to  
work for a particular employer.  While plaintiff in this case  
is barred from working for defendant by MCL 791.205a,  
plaintiff is able to work.  Thus, I would affirm the decisions  
of the Court of Appeals and the WCAC reinstating plaintiff’s  
benefits.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Marilyn Kelly  
13