Case Title: JACK E. GOGGINS AND MARY ELLEN GOGGINS, HUSBAND AND WIFE v. ED HARWOOD AND HARWOOD ENTERPRISES, A WYOMING CORPORATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-10

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
JACK E. GOGGINS AND MARY ELLEN GOGGINS, HUSBAND AND WIFE v. ED HARWOOD AND HARWOOD ENTERPRISES, A WYOMING CORPORATION1985 WY 109704 P.2d 1282Case Number: 85-10Decided: 08/13/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
JACK E. GOGGINS AND MARY 
ELLEN GOGGINS, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

ED HARWOOD AND HARWOOD 
ENTERPRISES, A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, Big HornCounty, John T. Dixon, 
J.

 
 
C.S. Hinckley of 
Hinckley & Hinckley, Basin, for 
appellants.

Jeffrey J. Gonda 
of Lonabaugh and Riggs, Sheridan, for 
appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., 
ROSE, ROONEY and CARDINE, JJ., and LANGDON, District 
Judge.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal grows out 
of a judgment entered upon a jury's verdict which finds that even though 
appellee Ed Harwood committed an assault and battery upon appellant Jack Goggins 
on September 14, 1981, the assault and the battery were not "a proximate cause 
of the injuries sustained" by appellant, and the jury's further finding that 
"[w]ithout considering" its answer to other questions on the verdict form, the 
amount which it believed would "fairly compensate the Plaintiff, Jack E. 
Goggins, for his alleged injuries" was "One Hundred Thousand $100,000.00."1

FACTS

[¶2.]     Plaintiff-appellant 
Goggins alleged but defendant-appellee Harwood denied that Harwood committed an 
assault and battery upon Goggins by striking him on the head with his fist while 
he, Goggins, was sitting in his pickup truck. The jury decided this issue in 
Goggins' favor and, for purposes of this opinion, we are bound by that finding. 
The evidence is, however, in conflict with respect to the extent of the injury. 
Appellant's doctors testified that, as a consequence of the striking, and in 
addition to minor abrasions, contusions and a headache, Goggins suffered 
epilepsy, post-traumatic brain damage resulting in intelligence-quotient 
reduction and a serious ear injury. The appellee's doctors denied that these 
serious and permanent injuries or conditions resulted from the blow. Since we 
are bound to accept the testimony most favorable to the successful party and 
disregard the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith,2 it will be our assumption 
throughout these considerations that the assault did not cause the appellant's 
alleged epilepsy, post-traumatic brain damage and permanent ear 
injury.

[¶3.]     There is, however, 
competent and uncontradicted medical 
testimony that some injury resulted 
from the blow. The doctor who saw appellant the day after the incident in 
question - a Dr. Willson - testified that Goggins had

"[s]welling, contusion, 
some ecchymosis, which is black and blue areas, a small amount of abrasion, 
puncture type thing around the ear."

He described the 
"puncture type thing" as:

"Break, small break in 
the skin. It's a scrape or puncture from the obvious blow of some 
sort."

A request for a 
further description of the ear area brought this response:

"Well, they were scrapes 
and pin point punctures, whatever you want to call them, small breaks in the 
skin and some minor abrasions around the ear, abrasions just being a break on 
the skin as a pin prick being a small break in the skin or puncture 
wound."

Dr. Willson also 
reported that Goggins had a vascular headache due to a blow on the 
head.

[¶4.]     Dr. Schwidde, a 
neurologist, to whom Dr. Willson referred Goggins, wrote to Willson after 
examining the appellant on September 15, 1981, that Goggins had "sustained a 
blow to the left ear" at 6:00 p.m. on September 14, 1981, and "he developed a 
right frontal headache." He said that he had received a "cranial cerebral 
trauma, blow to left ear" and that he had developed a "severe headache and neck 
and left pectoral pain" as a result of the blow and that Goggins was "dazed" 
after the blow but not rendered unconscious. The doctor prescribed some "Talwin 
Compound" to treat the headache.

[¶5.]     It is to be further 
observed that both Dr. Willson and Dr. Schwidde submitted bills for services 
rendered to appellant, which services were necessitated by the assault and 
battery in issue here, and the appellant incurred medical prescription expense 
that was occasioned by the doctor's ordering medicine relief for the 
headaches.

The Appellant's 
Position

[¶6.]     The appellant 
represents that "the primary basis for this appeal" is the "Special Verdict 
Form." For clarity of the issues and the discussion which follows, we herewith 
publish the relevant part of that document:

"SPECIAL VERDICT 
FORM

"We, the jury, duly 
empaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled cause, do find as 
follows:

"QUESTION 1. Did the 
Defendant, Ed Harwood, commit an assault and battery upon the Plaintiff, Jack E. 
Goggins? 

"ANSWER Yes X 

        No 
____

"(If your answer to 
Question 1 is `Yes' then you will answer Question 1A. If your answer to Question 
1 is `No', then you should proceed to sign the jury verdict form and return it 
to the Bailiff.)

"QUESTION 1.A. Was the 
assault and battery of Ed Hardwood upon Jack E. Goggins a proximate cause of the 
injuries sustained by Jack E. Goggins?

"ANSWER Yes ____ 

        No X 

"QUESTION 3. Without 
considering your answers to the Questions above, what total amount of damages do 
you award to fairly compensate the Plaintiff, Jack E. Goggins, for his alleged 
injuries:

"One Hundred 
Thousand

"ANSWER 
$100,000.00

"QUESTION 4. Was Ed 
Harwood guilty of willful and wanton misconduct under the circumstances of this 
case?

"ANSWER Yes ____ 

        No X 

"/s/ Jessie M. 
Pryde                
_   

      
FOREMAN/FOREWOMAN"

[¶7.]     The appellant argues 
that the trial court's instructions having to do with the allegations of the 
parties, causation, burden of proof, disability, and damages, when considered 
together with the special-verdict form, caused the jury to become confused, 
resulting in the return of a fatally inconsistent and faulty verdict. The 
questioned instructions pertaining to allegations of the parties, proximate 
cause, burden of proof, disability, and damages are the following:3

Allegations of the 
Parties

[¶8.]     Instruction No. 3 
provided:

"This law suit arises as 
the result of an incident on September 14, 1981, involving Jack E. Goggins and 
Ed Harwood. On that particular day, on the road from Basin to Otto, Wyoming, Mr. Goggins and 
Mr. Harwood had a discussion concerning a water well easement which Mr. Goggins 
wanted to obtain on the property of Mr. Harwood.

"Mr. Goggins alleges that 
during this conversation, Mr. Harwood committed an assault and battery upon him. 
He furthermore alleges that as a result 
of this alleged assault and battery, he has suffered personal injuries and he 
requests that he be awarded damages for these 
injuries.

"Mr. Harwood denies ever 
assaulting or battering Mr. Goggins. He denies that he inflicted any bodily harm 
on Mr. Goggins and therefore denies that Mr. Goggins should be awarded any 
damages in this case.

"The Plaintiff, Jack E. 
Goggins, has the burden of proving his claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence.

"The Defendant, Ed 
Harwood, has the duty of proving the elements of his defense by a preponderance 
of the evidence." (Emphasis added.)

Burden of 
Proof

[¶9.]     Instruction No. 6 
provided: 

"The Plaintiff has the 
burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence the 
following:

"(1) That the Defendant 
committed an assault and battery upon him as is defined in Instruction No. 
5.

"(2) That the assault and battery of the 
Defendant was the proximate cause of the injury and damage to the 
Plaintiff.

"(3) The nature and 
extent of the injuries claimed to have been so suffered, the elements of the 
Plaintiff's damage and the amount thereof.[4]

"The Defendant has the 
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence all of the facts 
necessary to prove the following:

"(1) That he did not 
assault and batter the Plaintiff as those terms are defined in Instruction No. 
5.

"(2) That the Plaintiff's injuries and damages 
were not caused by any actions of the Defendant and that the injuries and 
damages of the Plaintiff were pre-existing or other wise arose from causes other 
than the actions of the Defendant.

"In determining whether 
an issue has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you should consider 
all of the evidence bearing upon that issue regardless of who produced it. The 
existence of such proposition must be more probable than its non-existence." 
(Emphasis added.)

Proximate 
Cause

[¶10.]  Instruction No. 11 
provided:

"A proximate cause of an injury is a cause 
which in direct, unbroken sequence produces the injury. It is one without which 
the injury would not have occurred."5 (Emphasis 
added.)

Mental 
Anguish

[¶11.]  Instruction No. 12 
provided:

"You are further instructed that mental 
anguish and suffering arising proximately from said injuries, is a proper 
element of damages, which with reasonable certainty can be expected to 
hereafter endure, arising from the decrease of the ability of any part of the 
body to function." (Emphasis added.)

Disability

[¶12.]  Instruction No. 13 
provided:

"A person who has a 
condition or disability at the time of an injury is not entitled to recover 
damages therefore. However, he is 
entitled to recover damages for any aggravation of such preexisting condition or 
disability proximately resulting from the injury.

"This is true even if the 
person's condition or disability made him more susceptible to the possibility of 
ill effects than a normally healthy person would have been, and even if a 
normally healthy person probably would not have suffered any substantial 
injury.

"When preexisting 
condition or disability is so aggravated, the damages as to such condition or 
disability are limited to the additional injury caused by the aggravation."6 (Emphasis 
added.)

Damages

[¶13.]  Instruction No. 9 
provided:

"If you decide for the 
Plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then fix the amount of money 
which will reasonably and fairly compensate him for those elements of damage 
proved by the evidence to have been caused by the action of the Defendant, 
taking into consideration the nature, extent and duration of the 
injury.

"(1) The claimed elements 
of damages are:

"(a) The pain of 
suffering experienced as a result of the injuries and those reasonably certain 
to be experienced in the future.

"(b) 
Disability.

"(c) Loss of enjoyment of 
life. The award for this specific element should not duplicate the award given 
for any other element of damage.

"(d) Loss of earnings. 
The value of earnings lost to this date and the present cash value of any 
earnings reasonably certain to be lost in the future.

"(e) Medical expenses. 
The reasonable expense of necessary medical care, treatment and services 
received to date, and any medical expense reasonably certain to be incurred in 
the future.

"Whether any of these 
elements have been proven is for you to determine."7

[¶14.]  We do not understand the appellant's 
principal claim to be that the instructions are - in and of themselves - 
inherently erroneous8 - only that, when considered with the verdict form, 
the jury was forced to become confused and, for this reason, returned a verdict 
which was substantively so defective as to constitute prejudicial error. For 
example, the appellant is particularly concerned with the effect that the 
verdict form had upon the proximate-cause instructions, and says in his 
brief:

"It is Appellant's 
contention that the lower court erred in permitting the `special verdict form' 
to be submitted to the jury. The form was 
confusing and misleading when considered in the light of the other instructions 
concerning `proximate cause'. It is the Court's responsibility to see to it 
that the law of the case is clearly set forth in the instructions. It is 
axiomatic and fundamental that a jury cannot be confused or misled on a subject 
so vital as `proximate cause'. The Court should not be allowed to relieve itself 
from its vital and essential role as the `legal supervisor' by citing the rule 
that any objections not raised by the attorneys are waived. Ultimately, the 
court must have some responsibility to protect clients and lawyers from 
themselves. There are even times when it must be the responsibility of the trial 
court to protect clients from their lawyers." (Emphasis 
added.)

Again, in his 
brief, the appellant argues:

"The `Special Verdict 
Form' given to the Jury by the lower court was confusing and misleading on the 
matter of `cause'. In truth, the form actually contradicted the law incorrectly 
spelled out[9] by the court in Instruction No. 6 
and other instructions relating to the question of cause."

[¶15.]  It stands without contest that neither 
the form of the special verdict nor any of the given instructions were objected 
to by appellant, and the appellant did not submit substitute instructions or 
verdict form in their stead. Further, when the jury returned its verdict to the 
court, appellant lodged no objection to the verdict prior to the jury's 
discharge.

[¶16.]  With respect to his failure to object or 
offer substitute instructions, the appellant describes his position as 
follows:

"The primary basis for 
this appeal is the `Special Verdict Form' given to the jury by the District 
Judge below. * * * The Verdict Form was prepared and submitted by Appellee. 
Appellant knew about the Special Verdict Form and raised no objections to it 
prior to its submission to the Jury, and raised no objections when the Verdict 
Form was completed and signed by the Jury Foreman. Even though there were no 
objections raised by Appellant it shall be his position in his brief that it was 
the first and primary responsibility of the District Judge to see to it that 
proper instructions were submitted to the Jury. Appellant shall argue here that 
the lower court committed fundamental and prejudicial error by submitting 
contradictory, confusing, and misleading instructions to the Jury."10

Appellee's 
Position

[¶17.]  In response, it is the appellee's 
position that there is no error in the special-verdict form as submitted and the 
other instructions were proper, but if there was error in submission of the 
special-verdict form and the questioned instructions, it was waived and they 
became the law of the case. The appellee also contends that the verdict as 
returned is not inconsistent either on its face or as it is compared to the 
evidence in the case, and, finally, that any error which this court might find 
to be present does not, in any event, reach plain-error 
proportions.

The 
Issues

[¶18.]  The appellant identifies the issues for 
decision as follows:

1. "The district court 
committed fundamental and prejudicial error in submitting contradictory, 
confusing, and misleading instructions and verdict form to the 
jury."

2. "The lower court's 
finding that the evidence was conflicting on the matter of `cause' is erroneous. 
Since the jury was confused by the court's instruction and verdict form on the 
subject of cause, and since the evidence that some of the injury was caused by 
the assault and battery was uncontradicted, the jury could very easily have 
found in favor of Goggins on `cause' had they not been confused and misled by 
the court."

[¶19.]  We see the issues as being 
these:

1. Were the instructions 
erroneous?

2. If they were, were the 
errors waived by defendant's failure to object or offer instructions in their 
stead?

3. If the instructions 
constituted error and the error was waived, was it nonetheless plain 
error?

4. Was the proffered 
special-verdict form erroneous as submitted?

5. Was the returned 
verdict inconsistent on its face and inconsistent when compared to the 
uncontroverted evidence and thus an irregular and improper 
verdict?

6. If the verdict as 
submitted and returned constituted error that was waived, did the error 
nevertheless call for reversal under the plain-error 
doctrine?

Decision

Instructions - Failure to 
Object

Was it error to fail to 
object to proffered instructions prior to their submission to the jury?11

[¶20.]  Rule 51, W.R.C.P., states in part: 

"* * * No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection."

[¶21.]  The rule was applied in Cates v. Eddy, Wyo., 669 P.2d 912 
(1983); Tadday v. National Aviation 
Underwriters, Wyo., 660 P.2d 1148 (1983); Harries v. State, Wyo., 650 P.2d 273 
(1982); Dorador v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 839 (1978); Hurst v. State, 
Wyo., 519 P.2d 971 (1974); and Logan v. 
Pacific Intermountain Express, Wyo., 400 P.2d 488 
(1965).

[¶22.]  The spirit and purpose of the rule is 
designed to appraise and inform the trial court of the purpose of the 
instruction in order that the judge may make such corrections as he deems 
necessary before submitting the instructions to the jury. Alberts v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 447 (1982); Runnion v. Kitts, Wyo., 531 P.2d 1307 (1975); Schwager v. State, 
Wyo., 589 P.2d 1303 (1979).

[¶23.]  We hold that failure to object to 
instructions in the trial court which appellant now contends were erroneous 
precludes appellate review, and, unless plain or fundamental error12 can be shown to prevail, became 
the law of the case. Mora v. Husky Oil 
Company, Wyo., 611 P.2d 842 (1980); Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. Cook, 
Wyo., 526 P.2d 986 (1974); Joly v. Safeway Stores, Inc., Wyo., 502 P.2d 362 (1972); DeWitty v. Decker, Wyo., 383 P.2d 734 
(1963).

Failure to Object to 
Submitted Verdict Form And Returned Verdict

Was it Error to Fail to 
Object To the Verdict as Submitted and Returned?

[¶24.]  The appellant urges that the trial court 
committed prejudicial error in two separate respects as regards the special 
verdict. He says that the form of verdict was fatally defective, which, when 
read with the instructions, led to confusion, and that the verdict, as returned, 
was irregular and improper on its face and erroneous when compared to the 
uncontroverted testimony, all of which resulted in prejudicial 
error.

[¶25.]  Without deciding at this juncture 
whether, when read with the instructions, the verdict form was fatally defective 
as submitted or as returned, we ask and answer this 
question:

Was it error to fail to 
object to the special verdict form before 
submission to the jury?

[¶26.]  A special-verdict form such as that in 
issue here will - for the purposes with which we are concerned - be regarded as 
an instruction. That is, failure to object to a proffered verdict form or to 
submit a purported proper form carries with it the same penalties as does the 
failure to object to an instruction or submit a substitute instruction on the 
law. The failure is governed by Rule 51, W.R.C.P., supra. In DeWitty v. Decker, 383 P.2d  at 739-740, 
we observed that, where the appellants failed to take exception to the 
instructions "or the form of verdict" 
(emphasis added), consideration of those matters would be forever foreclosed 
under the mandate of Rule 51, W.R.C.P., unless plain error will come to the 
rescue of the erring party. We therefore hold that the defendant waived any 
alleged error which he perceived the special-verdict form to contain when, 
having been given ample opportunity to object, he failed to do so and failed to 
submit a substitute, unless the oversight can be saved by the doctrine of plain 
error - a subject which we consider infra.

Were purported 
inconsistencies which the defendant perceived the returned verdict to contain waived 
when the defendant failed to object when the verdict was returned to the trial 
court?

[¶27.]  It would appear that this question was 
settled in DeWitty v. Decker, supra. 
In the case at bar, the jury returned the verdict to the trial court with the 
blanks filled in as required by the form which is published supra. When the jury 
returned to the courtroom and the verdict was read, plaintiff's counsel made no 
objection to the verdict, did not ask to poll the jury, and made no attempt to 
seek clarification of the jury's verdict. Subsequently, and long after the jury 
had been dismissed, the appellant moved that the trial court reimpanel the jury 
so that the alleged inconsistencies of which he complains in this appeal could 
be addressed. The trial court denied the motion under and by authority of 
DeWitty and § 1-11-213, W.S. 1977, which statute provides:

"If a jury disagrees, or 
if when the jury is polled a juror answers in the negative, or if the verdict is 
defective in substance, the jury shall be sent out again for further 
deliberation and either party may require the jury to be polled by the clerk or 
court asking each juror if it is his verdict."

[¶28.]  In DeWitty v. Decker, supra, where the jury 
awarded substantial special damages but no general damages in a personal-injury 
suit, we recognized the verdict as irregular and improper but held that the 
plaintiff was foreclosed from raising the issue once the jury had been released. 
We interpreted § 1-11-213 as requiring a party to object to the verdict before 
the jury is discharged. In the DeWitty opinion we said:

"* * * When the jury 
returned its verdict in open court it was as evident then, as it is now, that it 
was an irregular and improper verdict. But under our practice, that was not 
necessarily fatal to the proceedings. Under the provisions of § 1-132, W.S. 1957 
[now § 1-11-213, W.S. 1977], a verdict that is `defective in matter of 
substance' (which the verdict here was) may be corrected by the jury itself on 
further deliberation. If necessary, the court may assist the jury by submitting 
additional instructions. See 89 C.J.S. Trial § 567b, p. 337. Such procedure, 
like other rules of procedure, is designed for orderly and expeditious conduct 
of litigation and is particularly directed at minimizing the necessity for 
additional trials.

* * * * * 
*

"Some authority is found 
to the contrary * * *, but having in mind the plain purpose of our statute to 
afford a jury the right to correct its own mistakes, our previous pronouncement 
in the Innes case [Innes v. Hay, 28 Wyo. 274, 203 P. 1091 (1922)], and the 
convincing authority from other jurisdictions, we do not think it harsh or 
unreasonable to require a litigant, when an opportunity is afforded during the 
trial, timely to bring a matter such as here to the attention of the trial court 
in order that it might be corrected, and failing in this that he shall not be 
heard here to complain. To hold otherwise would seem unfair to the jury, to the 
trial court, and to the other litigants, to say nothing of the unnecessary loss 
of time and expense." 383 P.2d  at 738-740.

Accord: Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Donahue, 
Wyo., 674 P.2d 1276 (1983); Energy 
Transportation Systems, Inc. v. Mackey, Wyo., 650 P.2d 1152 (1982); Crown Cork & Seal Company v. Admiral 
Beverage Corp., Wyo., 638 P.2d 1272 (1982); Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. Cook, 
Wyo., 526 P.2d 986 (1974).

[¶29.]  As recently as Anderson v. Foothill Industrial Bank, 
Wyo., 674 P.2d 232 (1984), we reiterated the rule of DeWitty when we 
said:

"Appellants argue that 
the award of damages to them was inconsistent with a jury finding that the loan 
was not a consumer loan. Before appellate relief can be sought on this basis, 
the contentions must be brought to the attention of the trial court before the 
jury is discharged. Appellants did not do so. It is a well established 
proposition in this state that any objection to a claimed inconsistency of a 
jury verdict must be objected to before the jury is discharged, so that the jury 
can be further instructed and can correct any deficiencies. Crown Cork & Seal Company, Inc. v. 
Admiral Beverage Corp., Wyo., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274 (1982); Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. Cook, 
Wyo., 526 P.2d 986, 988-989 (1974); Smith 
v. Blair, Wyo., 521 P.2d 581 (1974); DeWitty v. Decker, Wyo., 383 P.2d 734, 
738-740 (1963)." 674 P.2d  at 236.

[¶30.]  There can be no doubt but that the 
appellant's failure to seek to correct any substantive defect in the special 
verdict when it was returned to the trial court was a waiver of his right to do 
so and that he may not now be heard to complain unless the doctrine of plain 
error will come to appellant's rescue - a subject we discuss infra. DeWitty v. Decker, supra. See also Innes v. Hay, 28 Wyo. 274, 203 P.2d 1091, 1093 (1922); and see Neal v. Wailes, Wyo., 
346 P.2d 132, 135 (1959).

Plain Error and the 
Instructions, Including the Special Verdict And the Verdict as 
Returned

[¶31.]  Rule 7.05, W.R.A.P. states the 
plain-error doctrine:

"Plain errors or defects 
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to 
the attention of the court."

In order to 
invoke the plain-error rule, it is necessary to show

"* * * (1) that the 
record reflects clear and unequivocally the fact complained of; (2) that the 
facts prove a transgression of a clear rule of law; (3) that the error affects a 
substantial right of the accused; and (4) that the defendant has been materially 
prejudiced by that violation." Westmark 
v. State, Wyo., 693 P.2d 220, 224 
(1984).

[¶32.]  Notwithstanding the fact that the 
appellant failed to object to instructions (including the verdict form), or, in 
the alternative, to offer substitutes therefor, and even though he failed to 
call to the court's attention perceived substantive defects in the returned 
verdict prior to the jury's discharge, it is Mr. Goggins' contention that the 
trial court committed fundamental and prejudicial error in submitting confusing 
instructions and a faulty special-verdict form, and in receiving an irregular 
and inconsistent verdict.13

[¶33.]  We have, in the past, recognized our 
authority under the plain-error doctrine to set aside an improper verdict which 
resulted from the issuance of defective instructions to which no objections were 
lodged. Gore v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1384, 1387-1389 (1981); Cullin v. State, Wyo., 565 P.2d 445, 454 
(1977). In Gore v. State, we 
discussed the reason for adhering to this rule:

"One important reason for 
invoking the plain-error doctrine when reviewing jury instructions which were 
not objected to during the trial, is that jury instructions are written with the 
particular facts and theories of each case in mind. The judge, with the advice 
and assistance of the attorneys in the case, attempts to tailor the instructions 
so that they help the jury develop a clear understanding of how the facts are to 
be determined under the applicable law of the case. The problems the jury may 
have with the applicable law will differ from case to case and therefore the 
instructions appropriate to each case may also differ. In many cases, any one of 
several instructions may be legally correct. It is the duty of the attorneys in 
each case to determine which legally acceptable instruction best presents the 
client's case. Neither the judge, nor the appellate court, has the appropriate 
perspective to make such a decision. Even if they did understand the case better 
than the attorney presenting it, their role prohibits them from urging one 
instruction over another providing both are legally sound. Thus, unless an instruction can be said to 
have plainly caused a fundamental prejudice to the defendant's legal rights, we 
will not overturn it on appeal unless it was objected to during the trial and a 
proper instruction was offered in its place." (Emphasis added.) 627 P.2d  at 
1388-1389.

 

[¶34.]  In DeWitty v. Decker, supra, where jury 
misconduct was alleged, we held that in a situation where the complaining party 
failed to take exception to either the instructions or the form of verdict 
tendered or returned, review would ordinarily be foreclosed by Rule 51, W.R.C.P. 
However, we noted this following exception:

"* * * However, where as 
here, a charge of misconduct on the part of the jury is made on the issue of 
damages and it is apparent that the instructions bear a direct relationship to 
the charge, it is appropriate that cognizance be taken of the entire matter." 
383 P.2d  at 737.

"* * * [W]e are not 
convinced that such irregularity and impropriety in the verdict confer just 
cause to set it aside * *." 383 P.2d  at 736.

[¶35.]  In Borzea v. Anselmi, 71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796, 
806 (1952), we said:

"* * * It is the general 
rule that a party cannot complain of an instruction to which no exception is 
taken. * * * That rule should apply in 
this case, unless perchance the error complained of is vital." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶36.]  In Cervelli v. Graves, Wyo., 
661 P.2d 1032, 1036 (1983), where proper objections to the instructions were 
lodged, we held that the giving of confusing and misleading instructions on 
applicable principles of law constitutes prejudicial error warranting reversal, 
when we said:

"In reviewing alleged 
errors in jury instructions, a finding of error is not alone sufficient to 
reverse; prejudicial error must be found. Walton v. Texasgulf, Inc., Wyo., 634 P.2d 908 
(1981). Prejudicial error is never presumed; it must be established by the 
parties. Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. 
Cook, supra. If it is established that an instruction or instructions had a 
tendency to confuse or mislead the jury with respect to the applicable 
principles of law, reversal is proper. 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil § 2558, p. 668 (1971); see also, Marken v. Empire Drilling Company, 75 
Wyo. 121, 293 P.2d 406 (1956)."

[¶37.]  We seek, then, to discover whether the 
instructions together with the special verdict as given and returned constitute 
plain error warranting reversal.

There is an Inconsistent 
Verdict In This Case And One Which is Impossible to Reconcile With Uncontested 
Witness Testimony

[¶38.]  At the outset, it is very difficult for 
this court to see how Goggins could be assaulted by a blow to the head which is 
not a proximate cause of any of the injuries of which he 
complains. Perhaps some sort of ethereal, hypothetical fantasy could be 
structured whereby it could be envisioned that a person could receive a blow and 
no injury, but it is hard for us to 
imagine. Therefore, as in DeWitty, 
the verdict of the jury may, for our purposes, be regarded as inconsistent and 
improper on its face. Furthermore, it is impossible for us to reconcile the 
jury's findings that there was an assault and battery committed by Harwood 
against Goggins and that the assault was not "a proximate cause of the 
injuries," with the testimony of the treating doctors who testified without conflict that Goggins in fact 
received injury - i.e., abrasions, minor ear lacerations and headache resulting 
in the necessity to prescribe and purchase medication. In other words, logic 
does not permit a conclusion that the jury could find the fact of the assault 
but no injury when the record stands uncontradicted for the proposition that 
injury did in fact result from the assault and battery. This caused the verdict 
to be "improper and irregular" on its face in the sense that it was incompatible 
and irreconcilable with the evidence in the case.

The Effect of an 
Inconsistent And Irregular Verdict

[¶39.]  This leaves us with these final two 
questions for resolution:

1. Assuming, arguendo, 
that the jury verdict was improper and irregular, was the impropriety brought on 
by erroneous instructions interacting with an erroneous jury-verdict form in a 
way which amounted to plain error?

2. If the answer to 
question No. 1 is in the negative, does the concept of plain error come to the 
rescue of appellant even if it is assumed - as was the situation in DeWitty - 
that the verdict, when returned, was improper and 
irregular?

Question No. 1 
Resolved

[¶40.]  As we have said, standing by themselves, 
we do not find instructions 3, 6, 11, 12, 13 or 9 to misstate the law. Mostly, 
they are taken from the Wyoming Pattern Jury Instructions, where they are found 
to be accurate and well fortified with relevant and forceful authority. The 
question is whether they conspire to constitute plain error when read with the 
special jury form and, precisely, the problem has to do with whether they 
violate a clear, unequivocal rule of law upon the issue of proximate 
cause.

[¶41.]  In this respect, the jury found (1) 
Harwood committed an assault and battery, and (2) the assault and battery was 
not a proximate cause of the injuries sustained by 
Goggins.

[¶42.]  Up to this point, the verdict form, taken 
together with the other instructions and particularly the ones having to do with 
proximate cause, could not be said to be misleading or confusing. Granting the 
returned verdict to be inconsistent and irregular for purposes of this decision, 
nevertheless the verdict form and the instructions, as offered, to this juncture 
at least, are not misleading or confusing and therefore cannot be said to have 
brought on the irregular verdict.

[¶43.]  Appellant argues that the jury should 
have been told that if they answered in the negative to either interrogatory No. 
1 (Was there an assault and battery?) or interrogatory No. 1A (Was the assault 
and battery a proximate cause of injury?), this was the end of the matter and 
damages could not be awarded. But counsel for appellant does not point out why 
this failure to so instruct in any way misled or confused the jury, and we are 
unable to see how it did.

[¶44.]  We come, then, to interrogatory No. 3 as 
contained in the verdict form:14

"Without considering your 
answers to the Questions above, what total amount of damages do you award to 
fairly compensate the Plaintiff, Jack E. Goggins, for his alleged 
injuries:

"One Hundred 
Thousand

"ANSWER 
$100,000.00"

[¶45.]  The appellant frames his objection to 
this interrogatory as follows:

"To make matters even 
worse, the Court advised the jury in Question 3: `Without considering your answers to the 
questions above, what total amount of damages do you award to fairly 
compensate the plaintiff, Jack E. Goggins, for his injuries.' This directive 
gave the jury the clear impression that the questions concerning whether or not 
there was an assault and battery, and whether or not there was `proximate 
cause', was not to be considered by the jury in determining the question of 
damages.

"On the other hand, the 
lower court told the jury in Instruction No. 6 * * * that Goggins had the burden 
of proving that there was an assault and battery, that the assault and battery 
by the defendant was the `proximate cause' of the injury and damage to the 
plaintiff, and that the plaintiff suffered damages. The matter of `cause' was 
referred to in various ways throughout the court's instruction as being a 
necessary element. But on the other hand, the lower court advised the jury in 
the verdict form that it need not consider the question of `cause' in deciding 
to award damages. What other interpretation can one give to the `Special Verdict 
Form'? * * *

"The `Special Verdict 
Form' given to the Jury by the lower court was confusing and misleading on the 
matter of `cause'. In truth, the form actually contradicted the law incorrectly 
spelled out by the court in Instruction No. 6[15] and other instructions relating 
to the question of cause." (Emphasis added.)

[¶46.]  We cannot find that interrogatory No. 3 
conflicts or is materially inconsistent with the proximate-cause instructions in 
a way which constitutes plain error.

[¶47.]  For us, interrogatory No. 3 does not 
mislead the jury concerning the law of proximate cause and the burden of proving 
it. Instruction No. 6 tells the jury that, in order for plaintiff to recover, he 
must prove the fact of the assault and battery and that it was the proximate 
cause of injury and damage. The interrogatory in question simply asks the jury 
to focus on damages without taking into consideration whether they believed 
there was in fact an assault and whether, if there was, it was a proximate cause 
of the injuries complained of.

[¶48.]  It is relevant to observe here that, 
besides the minor abrasions and modest medical bills evolving from the assault 
and battery, with respect to which the proof was not in conflict, the plaintiff alleged 
extensive permanent injury the proof of which was in conflict. We need not 
second-guess the jury to deduct that it might well have believed that the 
battery took place but that the "alleged" (as that word appears in interrogatory 
No. 3) injuries did not result therefrom - at least within the context of the 
proof of the case where nearly all of the injury focus was upon brain damage, 
epilepsy and permanent ear injury, and that, therefore, the minor abrasions were 
overlooked and not considered within the context of the interrogatory. Even so, 
and for purposes of this decision conceding this impropriety, it does not 
follow, for us at least, that the instructions taken together with the 
special-verdict form caused the irregularity.

[¶49.]  There is no inherent error in telling the 
jury what plaintiff's burden of proof is and that it must decide whether 
plaintiff's injuries were caused by the alleged assault and battery and then 
instructing the jury to assess damages without regard to its findings concerning 
the fact of the assault and whether or not it proximately caused injury. This is 
done all the time in comparative-negligence cases (see § 1-1-109, W.S. 1977) 
where the liability of both parties is in issue. In the case at bar, the 
appellee does not charge the plaintiff with fault, and therefore it was 
unnecessary to compare negligence;16 however, the fact remains that 
juries are consistently asked to compare fault having first been instructed on 
proximate cause - and then, without regard to the fault of the parties, are 
requested to assess the plaintiff's damages. This established and accepted 
procedure tells us that this process does not violate the substantive law in a 
way that would indicate error - to say nothing of plain error. The 
comparative-negligence analogy becomes relevant and apropos when we consider the 
Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instructions. These instructions include No. 10.02, 
"Comparative negligence - Verdict form - Single parties," which 
provides:

"We, the jury, present 
the following answers to the questions submitted

by the 
court:

 
 
"1. Considering all of 
the fault at one hundred percent, what percentage 

of the total fault is 
attributable to each of the following persons?

 
 
"_________________________ 
(Plaintiff) .............. (0% to 100%) ___ % 

"_________________________ 
(Defendant) ......... (0% to 100%) ___ %

                     "Total 100% 

 
 
"2. Without 
considering the percentage of fault found in question one, 

what total amount of 
damages do you find was sustained by?

 
 
"______________________ 
(Plaintiff) ........... $ ___________________ 

"______________________ 
(Defendant, 

                 if applicable).... $ 
___________________ 

 
 
                                  "________________________ 

                         
                        Jury 
Foreman"

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶50.]  Therefore, it can be seen that jurors are 
often asked to assess damages without associating them to or considering them 
with the fault of the parties, and often the result of this exercise results in 
the jury finding no fault and yet the damages are nonetheless inserted. All that 
this amounts to is the jury finding - as to any given actor - that he is not 
guilty of fault (for whatever reason - i.e., there may have been no proximate 
cause), yet the jury must still go on to assess damages and, in many instances, 
they are indeed found to be substantial. This has not been found to be a 
confusing task for juries.

[¶51.]  In point of fact, in a 
comparative-negligence case, the jury having been informed of the consequences 
of its action as the judge is required to do when requested (see § 
1-1-109(b)(iii), W.S. 1977), and having found that the plaintiff was guilty of 
greater fault than a defendant tortfeasor otherwise liable, would always find 
itself in a position where it was assessing damages with the full knowledge that 
the particular defendant will not be responsible for them.17 That is what was done here. Having 
been informed that a plaintiff cannot hold the defendant liable where his 
negligence was not the cause of the injury, the jury simply found no proximate 
cause and then - presumably - went on to follow its instructions by fixing 
damages for the "alleged" (as that word is used in interrogatory No. 3) 
epilepsy, brain and permanent ear injury, on the theory that even though the 
defendant would not be liable for their payment, damages were, for whatever 
reason, required to be assessed.

[¶52.]  In concluding this point, we observe that 
the appellant has not referred us to a single authority which holds that the 
giving of a special verdict such as that which is in contest here is error. We 
have not been referred to a single case which holds any of the proximate-cause 
instructions - or any other given instructions - to misstate the law, and we 
have not been cited to any authority which holds the combination of 
proximate-cause instructions together with a special verdict such as the one 
that was given here to have caused juries to be misled and confused. Even though 
we have discussed the point in some detail, the rule of law is that this court 
will not consider alleged error that is supported only by perfunctory argument 
and no authority. Kincheloe v. Milatzo, Wyo., 678 P.2d 855 (1984); Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349 
(1981).

[¶53.]  We hold, then, that even though the jury 
rendered an inconsistent verdict it was not brought on by alleged improper 
instructions interacting with the special-verdict form.

Question No. 2 
Resolved

[¶54.]  Lastly, we address the question which 
asks whether the doctrine of plain error is applicable to overcome the failure 
of the defendant to object to an irregular and improper verdict. We hold that DeWitty v. Decker, supra, dictates a 
negative answer to this question.

[¶55.]  As has been noted, the verdict, as 
returned, in DeWitty, was irregular 
and improper in that the jury awarded special but no general damages. In the 
case at bar, the jury found an assault and battery but found that no part of the 
injury suffered by appellant was proximately caused by the blow - and, for 
purposes of this decision, we have said this was an irregular and improper 
verdict. There can be no doubt but that - in both DeWitty and the case at bar - the 
appellant's "substantial right[s]" were affected. Westmark v. State, supra. That is, as in 
DeWitty, if the jury in the case at 
bar, having found the fact of the assault, were to go on and find that the blow 
was the proximate cause of at least some of plaintiff's injury and damage, the 
jury would then have been compelled to assess at least some damages and, 
therefore, substantial rights of this appellant would be affected. In DeWitty, substantial rights of the 
appellant were affected because, having found really substantial special damages 
flowing from the negligence of the defendant-appellee, the jury assessed no 
general damages, and yet we held that because of the opportunity to correct the 
verdict offered by § 1-11-213, W.S. 1977, the complaining party will be held to 
have waived the error, notwithstanding its degree of impropriety and 
irregularity.18

[¶56.]  In the case at bar, no matter how obvious 
the irregularity, the right to complain of this verdict was, under DeWitty v. Decker, supra, waived and the 
appellant cannot now be successfully heard to complain.

[¶57.]  Affirmed.

1 These quotations are 
taken from the jury form, but we have furnished the emphasis for the word 
"alleged."

2 We have often 
said:

"`We assume that evidence 
in favor of the successful party is true, disregarding entirely the evidence of 
the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the 
successful party every favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly 
drawn from it.'" Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316, 1319 (1984), quoting from Richardson v. Green, Wyo., 644 P.2d 778, 779 
(1982).

Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. 
Stadler, 
Wyo., 685 P.2d 13, 17-18 (1984); Scott v. 
Fagan, Wyo., 684 P.2d 805, 809 (1984); Brockett v. Prater, Wyo., 675 P.2d 638, 
640 (1984); Herman v. Speed King 
Manufacturing Company, Wyo., 675 P.2d 1271, 1275 
(1984).

3 Since the causal issue 
is the principal concern of the appellant, we underline causal references in the 
following jury instructions although they were not emphasized when presented to 
the jury.

4 Wyoming Civil Pattern 
Jury Instruction No. 3.01, on plaintiff's burden of proof in a negligence case, 
provides that:

"In this action the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the 
following: * * *

* * * * * 
*

"(1) That the defendant 
was negligent; (2) that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of 
injury and damage to the plaintiff; and (3) The nature and extent of the 
injuries claimed to have been so suffered, the elements of plaintiff's damage 
and the amount thereof. * * * [Wyoming case 
citations.]"

5 Verbatim from 
W.C.P.J.I., No. 3.04.

6 Verbatim from W.C.P.J.I. 
No. 4.03.

7 Verbatim from W.C.P.J.I. 
No. 4.01.

8 If appellant's brief can 
be read to say that the instructions misstate propositions of law for which they 
purport to stand, he does not point to where the law in any given instruction is 
misstated, nor does he cite any authority for such position. We would therefore 
consider such a contention as either having been waived, or that we have no 
obligation to consider it. Kincheloe v. 
Milatzo, Wyo., 678 P.2d 855 (1984); Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 
622 P.2d 1349 (1981). In any event, we do not find errors of law to be contained 
in the instructions numbered 3, 6, 11, 12, 13 and 9, 
supra.

9 Again, we will not 
consider the law of proximate cause to have been "incorrectly spelled out" in 
the instructions, not only because we do not find this to be the case, but, if 
the appellant does not believe that the instructions constitute a proper 
statement of the law of proximate cause, it is his obligation to point out why 
this is true, and to cite authority. This has not been done. See n. 
8.

10 We hereafter assume 
throughout this opinion, unless convenience and clarity dictate otherwise, that 
the word "instructions" is understood by courts and counsel to be utilized 
generically to include the special verdict form containing the court's 
instruction to the jury that it will respond to the interrogatories therein 
contained. DeWitty v. Decker, 
Wyo., 383 P.2d 734 (1963.)

11 In this particular 
inquiry which is entitled "Instructions - Failure to Object," the special verdict 
is not considered to be an "instruction."

12 Plain or fundamental 
error will be discussed infra.

13 We will hold that the 
returned jury verdict was inconsistent on its face when compared to the 
uncontroverted facts and, arguendo, assume that it is inconsistent and irregular 
as returned, even though the appellant cites no authority which holds that a 
verdict which is returned, as was the verdict in the case at bar, is an 
irregular and improper verdict on its face.

14 Interrogatory No. 4, 
having to do with wilful and wanton misconduct, is not brought into issue by the 
appellant, and so it will not be a part of our consideration in this 
opinion.

15 This instruction defines 
assault and it also defines battery. The appellant's reference to the fact that 
it was "incorrectly spelled out," without citations, is insufficient objection 
to warrant a response from this court. Osborn v. Manning, Wyo., 685 P.2d 1121 
(1984).

16 Harwood Enterprises, a 
Wyoming 
corporation, had been dismissed during the proceedings for the reason that 
plaintiff had failed to prove the liability of this 
defendant.

17 We assume that juries 
follow their instructions and understand them. Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., 
Wyo., 664 P.2d 27, 36 (1983); Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349, 1365 (1981); State 
Highway 
Commission v. Peters, Wyo., 416 P.2d 390, 396 
(1966).

18 This opinion does not 
purport to cover jury misconduct. Jury misconduct was not alleged by the 
appellant or considered by the trial court and, thus, is not in issue 
here.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice, specially concurring.

[¶58.]  I do not quarrel with the result which is 
reached in the majority opinion in this instance. It does seem to me, however, 
that we hold nothing more than:

1. There was no error 
with respect to the instructions given the jury.

2. The verdict form which 
was submitted to the jury was not erroneous.

3. If the verdict was 
inconsistent with the instructions of the court the appellant is charged with 
the duty of raising that question at the trial level before the jury's discharge 
pursuant to DeWitty v. Decker, Wyo., 
383 P.2d 734 (1963).

[¶59.]  Consequently, since no error is found 
with respect to the instructions or the jury verdict form, plain error is not a 
proposition which the appellant can rely upon. Furthermore, the proposition of 
plain error is antithetical to the waiver concept found in DeWitty v. Decker, supra, and the two 
principles cannot be invoked in the same case.