Case Title: LANKFORD v. CITY OF LARAMIE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
LANKFORD v. CITY OF LARAMIE2004 WY 143100 P.3d 1238Case Number: 03-205Decided: 11/19/2004Notice:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court, Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

STEVIA 
L. LANKFORD and

MARCUS 
C. SCHUENKE,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

CITY 
OF LARAMIE, a Municipal Corporation;

and 
DOE DEFENDANTS 1 to 20,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellants:

 

            
Robert T. Moxley of Gage & Moxley, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming; and John 
E. Stanfield of Stanfield Law Office, Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellees:

 

            
M. Gregory Weisz and Megan Overmann of Pence and MacMillan LLC, Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from an order granting summary judgment to the City of Laramie (the City) in a 
governmental claims case.  We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The appellants 
present the issues as follows:

 

I.          
Is legislation unconstitutional which prevents recovery against a 
governmental entity for property damage, by imposing a $500.00 damage cap, by 
narrowing the standard of liability, by vesting a "designated" official with 
"discretion" to pay orbased on the availability of fundsdeny payment, and by 
abolishing judicial review?

 

II.          
Can the plaintiff's complainta "notice pleading" prior to discoverybe 
sustained in setting forth a "taking or damaging" cause of action, or a claim 
sounding in inverse condemnation?

 

III.         
Where an amended or supplemental "governmental claim" is presented within 
the two-year statutory period for "presentation" of same after a cause of action 
accrues, may an action be commenced within one year of such 
claim?

 

The 
City restates the issues as follows:

 

            
I.          
Summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds was appropriate when 
appellants failed to meet the statute of limitations in the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act, appellants admitted they missed the statute of limitations, and 
appellants did not respond to the summary judgment motion in the district 
court.

 

            
II.          
The claims procedure and statute of limitations provisions of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act are constitutional and are rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental objective.

 

            
III.         
The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is presumptively constitutional and 
appellants' facial challenge to other portions of the Act must be rejected for 
lack of justiciability and appellants' failure to precisely and analytically 
argue the matter.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Stevia L. 
Lankford and Marcus C. Schuenke (the appellants) owned a home in Laramie.  On March 4, 2001, they returned home to 
find raw sewage in their basement.  
Subsequent investigation led them to believe that their sewer line had 
been damaged by the City during the repair of a water main in the street in 
front of their home.

 

[¶4]      On April 2, 2001, 
the appellants sent a letter to the City setting forth a claim for their as-yet 
undetermined repair costs.  In a 
letter dated June 6, 2001, the City's Utility Maintenance Supervisor responded 
as follows:

 

In 
regard to the repair of your broken sewer service, please send all unpaid 
invoices and any costs you have paid to the City of Laramie Utilities Division 
for payment and/or re-imbursement.  
Because it appears that the service was broken due to a water main line 
repair that was completed by city crews, we feel it is our responsibility to 
restore the service.

 

[¶5]      The matter was 
not quickly resolved, however, and on July 13, 2001, the appellants presented a 
formal claim to the City.  After 
detailing the damages and repair work being done, and expressing a claim of 
$150,000.00 to $250,000.00, the appellants offered to settle for $50,000.00 plus 
the costs of foundation repair.  The 
City denied the claim in a letter from its attorney on September 28, 2001.  The City took the position that its 
earlier offer to pay for the damages was based on an inadequate investigation, 
and that subsequent investigation showed that the sewer line damage had been 
caused by the initial service main break and not by the City's responsive repair 
work.  Further, the City contended 
that the appellants' damages, if any, were greatly overstated and were caused by 
the appellants' own failure to mitigate.

 

[¶6]      On February 28, 
2003, the appellants filed a complaint in the district court.  Although somewhat unclear, it appears 
that the complaint states as causes of action negligence, intentional infliction 
of severe emotional distress, and violation of constitutional rights.  An amended complaint filed on March 11, 
2003, somewhat more clearly contains allegations of negligence, willful and 
wanton misconduct, intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, 
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violation of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 33 (taking or 
damaging private property for public use without just compensation/inverse 
condemnation), and violation of the appellants' rights to due process and equal 
protection.  In addition, the 
amended complaint seeks declaratory relief and challenges the constitutionality 
of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (the WGCA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-101 
et seq. (LexisNexis 2003).  
On the same date that they filed their original complaint, the appellants 
also filed in the district court a second notice of claim.  Two copies of this notice of claim 
appear in the record, neither of which shows signature by the appellants or 
their attorney.

 

[¶7]      The City answered 
the amended complaint and on April 9, 2003, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
on State Law Damage Claims.1  The City's central argument in support 
of its motion was that nearly twenty months passed between presentment of the 
first notice of claim on July 13, 2001, and filing of the complaint on February 
28, 2003, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114.2  After hearing, the district court issued 
its Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment & Order on 
Declaratory Judgment.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      Our standard for 
review of summary judgments has been stated many times and need not be 
reiterated here.  See, for 
example, Nuhome Investments, LLC v. Weller, 2003 WY 171, ¶ 7, 81 P.3d 940, 
944 (Wyo. 2003) and Ahrenholtz v. Laramie Economic 
Development Corp., 2003 WY 149, ¶ 16, 79 P.3d 511, 515 (Wyo. 
2003).  We will particularly note, however, the 
following portion of that standard:

 

            
"The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie 
case for summary judgment.  
Thereafter, the party opposing summary judgment becomes obliged to 
marshal specific facts, as contrasted with general or conclusory allegations, 
which establish a genuine issue of material fact."

 

Coates 
v. Anderson, 2004 
WY 11, ¶ 5, 84 P.3d 953, 956 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Mize v. North Big Horn 
Hosp. Dist., 931 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1997)).  Our usual standard of review of summary 
judgments applies in the context of a declaratory judgment action.  Hirschfield v. Board of County Com'rs 
of County of Teton, 944 P.2d 1139, 1141-42 (Wyo. 1997).

 

[¶9]      Statutes carry a 
strong presumption of constitutionality and challengers bear a heavy burden in 
overcoming that presumption.  
Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d 1050, 1056 (Wyo. 2004) 
(quoting Reiter v. State; 2001 WY 116, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 586, 589 (Wyo. 
2001)).  The unconstitutionality of a statute 
must be clearly shown beyond a reasonable doubt.  Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 
1238 (Wyo. 1982) (quoting Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904, 910 (Wyo. 
1980)).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   Preliminarily, we must discuss the 
factual and legal setting in which this summary judgment was granted.  As mentioned earlier herein, the single 
basis for the City's motion was the appellants' admitted failure to file their 
complaint within the one-year limitation period set by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-114.  Paragraph 34 of the 
amended complaint contained this sentence:  
"This action was filed within the two year period specified in § 1-39-105 
but more than one year after a Notice of Claim was filed."3  In addition to this admission, paragraph 
15 of the amended complaint referred to an attached notice of claim dated July 
13, 2001.  The complaint was filed 
on February 28, 2003.  The amended 
complaint was filed on March 11, 2003.  
These are the undisputed facts upon which the City based its motion for 
summary judgment.

 

[¶11]   The appellants responded to the 
City's motion by seeking relief under W.R.C.P. 56(f), which 
provides:

 

Should 
it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the 
party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may 
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be 
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just.

 

The 
appellants submitted the affidavit of their attorney in support of their request 
for additional time in which to respond to the City's motion.  The contentions in that affidavit may be 
summarized as follows:  the 
appellants had not yet been informed whether the attorney general intended to 
participate in the action in defense of the constitutionality of the WGCA; the 
City's motion would only address the conduct of the appellantsthe issue of 
timely filing of the actionand not the conduct of the City in denying the 
claim; the appellants' attorney was ill; the appellants' attorney was busy; 
discovery was necessary given the numerous causes of action stated in the 
amended complaint; the recent firing of the city manager may have been related 
to this case; and city officials may have been biased against the appellants' 
attorney.

 

[¶12]   The City's reply to the appellants' 
motion for relief presented two arguments.  
First, the City pointed out that the appellants' motion was untimely 
under W.R.C.P. 6(c) and 56.  See 
Harris v. Grizzle, 625 P.2d 747, 750 (Wyo. 1981).  Second, the City contended that the 
motion and its supporting affidavit utterly failed to show that a continuance 
would enable the appellants to contest the undisputed facts surrounding the only 
relevant issue, that being the statute of limitations.  See Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of 
Sandy City, 998 F.2d 1550, 1553-55 (10th Cir. 1993) and Patty Precision v. Brown & 
Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 1260, 1264-65 (10th Cir. 1984).

 

[¶13]   The district court heard the 
appellants' motion for W.R.C.P. 56(f) relief on May 22, 2003, and issued its 
order denying that relief on June 4, 2003 (filed June 18, 2003).  The denial was based on four particular 
findings:

 

1.         
The appellants had failed to explain why they as parties could not 
present affidavits with the facts necessary to oppose the summary judgment 
motion.

 

2.         
The appellants had failed to show how an extension of time for discovery 
would enable them to meet their burden in opposing the summary judgment 
motion.

 

3.         
The appellants had failed to show how additional time for discovery would 
enable them to rebut the statement of undisputed facts set forth in the summary 
judgment motion.

 

4.         
The appellants had failed to show that the information they sought in 
discovery was relevant to the statute of limitations issue that served as the 
basis for the summary judgment motion.

 

[¶14]   Finally, on July 9, 2003, the 
district court heard the City's summary judgment motion.  The pertinent findings and conclusions 
contained in the order granting that motion can be summarized as 
follows:

 

1.         
The incident occurred on or about March 2, 2001.

 

2.         
The appellants presented a notice of claim to the City on July 13, 
2001.

 

3.         
The City denied the claim on September 28, 2001.

 

4.         
Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114, the appellants had one year from July 
13, 2001 in which to file suit.

 

5.         
The appellants filed suit on February 28, 2003, which date was beyond the 
one-year limitation period.

 

6.         
There are no genuine issues of material fact and the appellants' claim 
was time-barred when it was filed.

 

7.         
The WGCA is not unconstitutional.

 

[¶15]   After the district court announced 
its findings and conclusions, it granted the appellants' request to direct the 
entry of a final judgment on the issues presented to allow for immediate appeal 
under W.R.C.P. 54(b).  In further 
discussion, the district court clarified, and the parties agreed, that such 
would include the question of the constitutionality of the WGCA, and in 
particular, the issue of the Act's constitutionality in the face of Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 33.4

 

[¶16]   It is within this context that the 
appellants want to pursue the following issues:

 

1.         
Whether the $500.00 property damage limitation in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-118(f) is constitutional?

 

2.         
Whether the payment discretion vested in the governmental entity under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-118(f) is constitutional?

 

3.         
Whether application of the WGCA to inverse condemnation actions violates 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 33?5

 

4.         
Whether the district court erred in its interpretation and application of 
the limitation periods contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-113 and 
1-39-114.

 

[¶17]   Passing references in the 
appellants' brief suggest that they might also like to question whether either 
the July 13, 2001, notice of claim or the February 28, 2003, notice of claim was 
a valid notice of claim under the WGCA.  
However, their pleadings below identified the July 13, 2001, documents as 
a "notice of claim," those documents were the basis of the arguments and 
decision below, the appellants did not raise this issue below, and we will not 
consider it on appeal.  See Byrd 
v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶¶ 9-10, 78 P.3d 671, 674 (Wyo. 2003).

 

[¶18]   We propose to resolve the 
interrelated issues of this case by first addressing the question of whether 
application of the period of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 to 
inverse condemnation actions is constitutional.  In North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 
30 Wyo. 238, 219 P. 561, 572-73 (1923), aff'd, 268 U.S. 276 
(1925), 
we held that Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 33 was not violated by establishment of a 
statutory claims procedure.  We 
later cited that holding with approval and specifically held that the 
then-existing governmental claim statute applied to inverse condemnation actions 
under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 33.  
Wyoming State Highway Dept. v. Napolitano, 578 P.2d 1342, 1349 
(Wyo. 1978).  We repeated that holding and applied it 
to the WGCA in Waid v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp., 996 P.2d 18, 24-25 
(Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶19]   The appellants contend that Waid 
should not be controlling because the issue was not specifically litigated 
in that case.  Instead, the 
appellants point this Court to State Highway Commission v. Peters, 416 P.2d 390, 395 (Wyo. 1966), 
where we said that "the legislature cannot infringe upon or take from property 
owners the right to be compensated, according to the requirement of art. 1, § 
33."  The appellants also rely upon 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 630-634 (Utah 
1990), 
wherein the Utah Supreme Court declared its similar constitutional provision to 
be "self-executing," and therefore in need of no legislation to activate 
it.

 

[¶20]   The City counters these arguments 
by reliance upon Hoffman, Napolitano, and Waid, and by noting 
other state courts that have upheld the application of statutory limitation 
periods to constitutional inverse condemnation claims.  See Wadsworth v. Department of 
Transp., 128 Idaho 439, 915 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1996); 
Beer v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 400 N.W.2d 732, 735-36 (Minn. 
1987); 
and Hart v. City of Detroit, 416 Mich. 488, 331 N.W.2d 438, 441 
(1982).

 

[¶21]   Keeping in mind the strong 
presumption that statutes are constitutional, and that unconstitutionality must 
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, we are not convinced that the application of 
a statutory period of limitations to inverse condemnation claims is 
unconstitutional.  Even if we accept 
the rationale of Colman that Wyo. Const. art 1, § 33 is self-executing 
and therefore in need of no "activating" legislation, it does not necessarily 
follow that the legislature may not impose reasonable procedural requirements 
for the presentation of such a claim.  
We have long recognized that the purposes behind the limitation periods 
contained in governmental claims statutes are to protect public entities from 
having to defend against stale claims and to facilitate budget planning.  Rissler & McMurry Co. v. Wyoming 
Highway Dept., 582 P.2d 583, 587 (Wyo. 1978); 
Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 103-04 (Wyo. 1975), 
overruled on other grounds by Dye by Dye v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 
24, 820 P.2d 982, 986 (Wyo. 1991); 
Hoffman, 219 P.  at 573.  The appellants have provided no 
compelling evidence or argument to suggest that these legitimate governmental 
interests unduly infringe upon the right to pursue an inverse condemnation 
claim.  Peters offers no 
solace to the appellants because it is quite unlike this case.  In Peters, this Court did, 
indeed, say that the legislature cannot infringe upon a property owner's right 
to be compensated for the taking of or damage to his property.  Peters, 416 P.2d  at 395.  But the question in Peters was 
whether the legislature could provide by statute for diminished public highway 
access via frontage roads.  
Id.  In answering that 
question affirmatively, this Court took no position on the question of whether a 
statutory period of limitation could apply to an inverse condemnation 
action.

 

[¶22]   The conclusion that inverse 
condemnation claims are subject to the limitation periods found in the WGCA 
means that the district court was correct in applying its statute of limitation 
analysis to all of the state law claims.  
The next logical question then becomes whether that analysis was 
appropriate.  We cannot help but 
conclude that it was.  The amended 
complaint reflected on its face that the action was not filed within one year of 
presentment of the claim.  Our law 
is clear that the district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to 
adjudicate governmental claim cases where the action was not timely filed.  See Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 
WY 31, ¶¶ 10-15, 86 P.3d 863, 866-69 (Wyo. 2004) and the cases cited therein.  If not commenced within one year, such 
actions are "forever barred."  
Mountain View/Evergreen Imp. and Service Dist. v. Brooks Water and 
Sewer Dist., 896 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶23]   It follows that, because the 
appellants' claim was time-barred, there was no justiciable controversy before 
the district court to allow it to consider the appellants' additional 
constitutional issues (the $500.00 limitation and the discretionary payment 
provision).  Weller v. Weller, 
960 P.2d 493, 496 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Matter of Contempt Order 
Issued Against Anderson, 765 P.2d 933, 936 (Wyo. 1988)).  The same holds true for this Court 
inasmuch as we have no better jurisdiction than did the district court.  Platte Development Co. v. 
State, Environmental Quality Council, 966 P.2d 972, 974 (Wyo. 
1998); 
Sheridan Retirement Partners v. City of Sheridan, 950 P.2d 554, 556-57 
(Wyo. 1997).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶24]   The statutory periods of limitation 
found in the WGCA applied to the appellants' inverse condemnation cause of 
action, as well as to their tort claims.  
The undisputed material facts showed that the appellants' complaint was 
filed well beyond the one-year period set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114, 
and was, therefore, time-barred.  
Having no justiciable case to bring before the district court, the 
appellants had no standing to contest the constitutionality of various 
provisions of the WGCA.  The order 
of the district court is affirmed and the matter is remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings concerning any claim the appellants may have 
stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1The appellants' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claims are not before the Court.

2

Except 
as otherwise provided, actions against a governmental entity or a public 
employee acting within the scope of his duties for torts occurring after June 
30, 1979 which are subject to this act shall be forever barred unless commenced 
within one (1) year after the date the claim is filed pursuant to W.S. 
1-39-113.  . . .  In no case shall the statute of 
limitations provided in this section be longer than any other applicable statute 
of limitations.  In the absence of 
applicable insurance coverage, if the claim was properly filed, the statute 
shall be tolled forty-five (45) days after a decision by the entity, if the 
decision was not made and mailed to the claimant within the statutory time 
limitation otherwise provided herein.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114.

 

  3Presumably, the reference to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-105 was intended to be Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a), which 
provides, in pertinent part:

 

No 
action shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the 
claim upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission . . ..

 

  4"Private property shall not be taken 
or damaged for public or private use without just compensation."  Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
33.

 

  5Inverse condemnation occurs "[w]hen 
a person possessing the power of condemnation takes possession of or damages 
land in which he has no interest, or substantially diminishes the use or value 
of land, due to activities on adjoining land without the authorization of the 
owner of the land or before filing an action of condemnation . . ..'"  Waid v. State ex rel. Dept. of 
Transp., 996 P.2d 18, 22 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-26-516) (emphasis deleted).  See also Conner v. Board of County 
Com'rs, Natrona County, 2002 WY 148, ¶ 30 n.10, 54 P.3d 1274, 1285 n.10 
(Wyo. 2002) and Black's Law Dictionary 310 
(8th ed. 2004).