Case Title: New Jersey v. Burkert

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2017-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

                                    State v. William Burkert (A-6-16) (077623)

Argued September 11, 2017 -- Decided December 19, 2017

ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.

         This case tests the limits to which a broadly worded harassment statute, 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), can
criminalize speech.

         William Burkert and Gerald Halton were corrections officers, who held positions in different unions
representing distinct classes of officers. Their relationship became particularly strained after Burkert read online
comments attributed to Halton’s wife that Burkert felt insulted him and his family. Angered by the insulting online
comments, Burkert retaliated. Burkert downloaded the Haltons’ wedding photograph. He then copied the
photograph and made two flyers, writing lewd dialogue in speech bubbles over the faces of the bride and groom.

         Halton testified that on January 8, 2011, he arrived at the employee garage of the Union County Jail and
saw papers “blowing all over the place.” He picked one up and discovered Flyer #1. The next day, when Halton
arrived at work, a sergeant handed him Flyer #2, which the sergeant had found in the area of the officers’ locker
room. Halton identified the handwriting on both flyers as Burkert’s. On January 11, while Halton was engaged in
union negotiations, a lieutenant handed him Flyer #2, stating, “This came out the other night.” Halton indicated that
he “was a mess in negotiations,” went home, and never returned to work. Halton explained that he felt embarrassed
and concerned for his safety and received psychological counseling and treatment.

          Ten months after the January incidents, Halton filed criminal harassment charges against Burkert. Halton
stated that he filed the charges only because the county had failed to properly discipline Burkert. He also filed a
civil lawsuit against Burkert. During the county’s investigation into the flyers, Burkert admitted that he had
prepared the flyers but denied circulating them. Burkert explained that he expressed himself through the flyers
rather than “get physical with the guy.” Burkert retired as a corrections officer in September 2012.

         The municipal court entered a guilty verdict against Burkert for harassing Halton on January 8 and 11 in
violation of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). The court found that Burkert made and circulated the flyers in the garage and
locker room, that the bubble dialogue inscribed on the Haltons’ wedding photograph was “lewd and obnoxious,” and
that such language would “seriously annoy any person, in this case Mr. Halton.” In a de novo trial before the Law
Division, the court found Burkert guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing acts of harassment.

          A panel of the Appellate Division reversed Burkert’s conviction, concluding that “the commentary
[Burkert] added to [Halton’s] wedding photograph was constitutionally protected speech.” 
444 N.J. Super. 591, 594
(App. Div. 2016). The panel accepted the argument that “the altered photograph . . . was not directed to [Halton],”
but rather to an audience of possibly willing listeners—other corrections officers. Id. at 601-02. The panel
determined that the evidence did not support a finding that the flyers “were a direct attempt to alarm or seriously
annoy” Halton or to invade his privacy rights. Id. at 601. The panel also found that the vulgar commentary on the
flyers did not constitute criminal harassment. Id. at 603.

         The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 
227 N.J. 377 (2016).

HELD: To ensure that 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) does not exceed its constitutional reach in cases involving the prosecution
of pure speech, repeated acts to “alarm” and “seriously annoy” must be read as encompassing only repeated
communications directed at a person that reasonably put that person in fear for his safety or security or that intolerably
interfere with that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

                                                           1
1. 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 distinguishes between “communications” and “language” that violate the statute in subsection
(a), and “conduct” and “acts” that do so in subsection (c). Although a “course of alarming conduct” or “repeatedly
committed acts” can occur through communications and language alone, it is far from clear that the Legislature had
in mind offensive speech as the object of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). That the primary thrust of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) is not
to interdict speech, but rather conduct, is reinforced in State v. Hoffman, 
149 N.J. 564 (1997). (pp. 15-21)

2. Criminal laws touching on speech must give fair notice of where the line is set between what is permissible and
proscribed and must be drawn with appropriate definiteness. A court can invalidate a statute that is substantially
overbroad on its face if the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Such a drastic
remedy, however, is not the only—and not even the preferred—approach. Provided that a statute is reasonably
susceptible to an interpretation that will render it constitutional, courts must construe the statute to conform to the
Constitution. (pp. 21-28)

3. The vaguely and broadly worded standard in 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) does not put a reasonable person on sufficient
notice of the kinds of speech that the statute proscribes. The statute’s vagueness also gives prosecuting authorities
undue discretion to bring charges related to permissive expressive activities. That, in turn, means that the statute—if
not more narrowly defined—has the capacity to chill permissible speech. Under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c), a person who,
with the purpose to seriously annoy another, does seriously annoy another is guilty of harassment. Speech, however,
cannot be transformed into criminal conduct merely because it annoys, disturbs, or arouses contempt. The First
Amendment protects offensive discourse, hateful ideas, and crude language because freedom of expression needs
breathing room and in the long run leads to a more enlightened society. Outside of the category of obscenity, courts
should not play the role of censor by engaging in a weighing of an expression’s value or relative social costs and
benefits. Speech cannot be criminalized merely because others see no value in it. Nonetheless, neither the First
Amendment nor Article I, Paragraph 6 of our State Constitution prohibits the State from criminalizing certain
limited categories of speech, such as speech that is integral to criminal conduct, speech that physically threatens or
terrorizes another, or speech that is intended to incite imminent unlawful conduct. The First Amendment also does
not bar states from enacting laws that punish expressive activity when substantial privacy interests are being invaded
in an essentially intolerable manner. (pp. 28-33)

4. 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 provides: “[A] person commits a petty disorderly persons offense if, with purpose to harass
another, he: . . . (c) Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to
alarm or seriously annoy such other person.” In cases based on pure expressive activity, the amorphous terms
“alarming conduct” and “acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy” must be defined in more concrete terms
consonant with the dictates of the free-speech clauses of our Federal and State Constitutions. Narrowly reading the
terms alarm and annoy will save the statute from constitutional infirmity. Therefore, for constitutional reasons, the
Court will construe the terms “any other course of alarming conduct” and “acts with purpose to alarm or seriously
annoy” as repeated communications directed at a person that reasonably put that person in fear for his safety or
security or that intolerably interfere with that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. That standard applies only
in those cases where the alleged harassing conduct is based on pure expressive activity. (pp. 33-36)

5. The prosecution in this case targeted purely expressive activity and therefore the Court applies the heightened
standard of subsection (c) set forth above. Neither the municipal court nor Law Division judge who sat in this case
had the benefit of the standard developed in this opinion. They applied the statute as written. Although in other
circumstances a remand might be appropriate, the Court sees no point here because even the most indulgent view of
the record favoring the State would not support a harassment conviction under 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). (pp. 36-38)

         The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.

         JUSTICE SOLOMON, DISSENTING IN PART, agrees with the majority’s conclusion that N.J.S.A.
2C:33–4(c) required clarification because subsection (c)’s language is impermissibly vague. However, even under
the majority’s clarification of the statutory requirements for subsection (c), Justice Solomon finds that defendant
Burkert’s conduct violates the harassment statute.

         CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA,
and TIMPONE join in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion. JUSTICE SOLOMON filed a separate opinion,
dissenting in part.
                                                          2
                                    SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                       A-
6 September Term 2016
                                              077623

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

     Plaintiff-Appellant,

          v.

WILLIAM BURKERT,

     Defendant-Respondent.

          Argued September 11, 2017 – Decided December 19, 2017

          On certification to the Superior Court,
          Appellate Division, whose opinion is
          reported at 
444 N.J. Super. 591 (App. Div.
          2016).

          Sarah Lichter, Deputy Attorney General,
          argued the cause for appellant (Christopher
          S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney;
          Sarah Lichter, of counsel and on the
          briefs).

          Steven J. Kaflowitz argued the cause for
          respondent (Caruso Smith Picini, attorneys;
          Steven J. Kaflowitz on the briefs and
          Timothy R. Smith, of counsel and on the
          briefs).

          Edward L. Barocas argued the cause for
          amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union
          of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal
          Director, and Rutgers Constitutional Rights
          Clinic Center for Law & Justice, attorneys;
          Edward L. Barocas, Jeanne M. LoCicero,
          Alexander R. Shalom, and Ronald K. Chen, of
          counsel and on the brief).

          J. Gregory Crane and Eugene Volokh of the
          California bar, admitted pro hac vice,
          submitted briefs on behalf of amicus curiae

                                1
          Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment
          (Scott & Cyan Banister First Amendment
          Clinic, UCLA School of Law, attorneys; J.
          Gregory Crane and Eugene Volokh, on the
          briefs).

     JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

     The free-speech guarantees of our Federal and State

Constitutions safeguard not only polite and decorous

conversation and debate but also speech that we hate -- speech

that is crude, obnoxious, and boorish.   A commitment to free

discourse requires that we tolerate communication of which we

strongly disapprove.   This case tests the limits to which a

broadly worded harassment statute can criminalize speech.

     William Burkert and Gerald Halton were corrections

officers, who held positions in different unions representing

distinct classes of corrections officers.   Their relationship

became particularly strained after Burkert read online comments

attributed to Halton’s wife that Burkert felt insulted him and

his family.   In response, Burkert downloaded a wedding

photograph of Halton and his wife that was posted on social

media and then inscribed degrading and vile dialogue on copies

of the photograph.   Copies of those photographs were found

strewn in the employee parking garage and locker room of the

Union County Jail.

     Halton filed three complaints in municipal court charging

Burkert with harassment in violation of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c),

                                 2
which makes it an offense to have engaged in a “course of

alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to

alarm or seriously annoy [a] person.”   Halton’s private attorney

prosecuted this quasi-criminal offense on behalf of the State

while Halton contemporaneously pursued a civil action against

Burkert.   A municipal court judge found Burkert guilty of

harassment on two of the complaints, as did a Law Division judge

after a trial de novo on the record.

     The Appellate Division vacated Burkert’s conviction,

determining that although the flyers were wholly unprofessional

and inappropriate for the workplace, they did “not amount to

criminal harassment” in light of our constitutional free-speech

guarantees.

     We affirm.   Criminal laws targeting speech that are not

clearly drawn are anathema to the First Amendment and our state

constitutional analogue because they give the government broad

authority to prosecute protected expressive activities and do

not give fair notice of what the law proscribes.   Such laws also

chill permissible speech because people, fearful that their

utterances may subject them to criminal prosecution, may not

give voice to their thoughts.

     To ensure that 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c) does not exceed its

constitutional reach in cases involving the prosecution of pure

speech, repeated acts to “alarm” and “seriously annoy” must be

                                 3
read as encompassing only repeated communications directed at a

person that reasonably put that person in fear for his safety or

security or that intolerably interfere with that person’s

reasonable expectation of privacy.    We consider that approach to

be faithful to the legislative purpose in enacting subsection

(c) of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4 and consonant with the constitutional

guarantees of free speech.   Burkert’s intent to annoy was not a

crime, and he did not engage in the type of repetitive acts

contemplated by the statute.   Therefore, Burkert is not guilty

of a petty disorderly persons offense, although he may be

subject to workplace discipline or a civil tort action.    The

language on the flyers, despite its vulgarity and meanness, is

constitutionally protected from a criminal prosecution for

harassment.

     We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division,

which dismissed the charges against Burkert.

                                I.

                                A.

     On September 30, 2011, Halton filed three separate

complaints, alleging that Burkert committed the petty disorderly

persons offense of harassment on January 8, 9, and 11, 2011, in

violation of 
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). 1   A three-day trial was held in

1  A petty disorderly persons offense is punishable by up to
thirty days in jail. 
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-8.

                                 4
the Elizabeth Municipal Court.    Halton’s privately retained

attorney prosecuted the case on behalf of the State. 2

     At trial, Halton and Burkert testified, as did two other

corrections officers.   The testimony, much of which was

undisputed, elicited the following.

     As of January 2011, Halton and Burkert had both worked as

Union County correctional officers for more than twenty years.

Halton served as a sergeant and also as the vice president of

the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), a union representing high-

ranking corrections officers.    Burkert served as a corrections

officer and also as the treasurer of the Policemen’s Benevolent

Association (PBA), a union representing rank-and-file

corrections officers.   The rivalry between those two unions

evidently caused friction in their personal relationship.    The

tension became much more acute when Burkert learned that

Halton’s wife was posting derogatory comments about him and his

2  Our court rules do not permit an attorney to appear as a
private prosecutor on behalf of the State, except in cases
involving cross-complaints, and then only on motion to the
municipal court after review of “an accompanying certification
submitted on a form approved by the Administrative Director of
the Courts.” R. 7:8-7(b). No objection was made to Halton’s
attorney acting as the prosecutor in the municipal court. After
the conclusion of the municipal court proceedings, the Union
County Prosecutor’s Office represented the State in all matters
concerning this case. Going forward, our municipal courts must
strictly enforce Rule 7:8-7(b), which has the beneficent purpose
of ensuring that quasi-criminal actions brought in the name of
the State proceed in a disinterested manner.

                                  5
family on a public internet forum.    Halton’s wife referred to

Burkert and his two brothers -- who also were corrections

officers -- as bullies.    According to Burkert, the postings also

described him as “fat” and one of his brothers as “quirky” and

“kind of retarded.”

     Angered by the insulting online comments, Burkert

retaliated.   Burkert downloaded the Haltons’ wedding photograph,

which Halton’s wife apparently had posted on a social media

website.   He then copied the photograph and made two flyers,

writing lewd dialogue in speech bubbles over the faces of the

bride and groom.    On Flyer #1, over Halton’s face were the

words, “I know I’m a pussy with a little dick.    Don’t do the

inmates please Laura,” and over his wife’s face were the words,

“I wish you had a cock like the inmates.”    On Flyer #2, over

Halton’s face, the writing stated, “Fam, I got me another

whore.”    According to Halton, “fam” is a term denoting the

corrections officers as family, and the dialogue on the flyers

obliquely referenced his prior wife, a former corrections

officer who he claimed had relations with another officer and an

inmate.

     Halton testified that on January 8, 2011, at approximately

10:45 p.m., he arrived at the employee garage of the Union

County Jail, parked his vehicle, and saw papers “blowing all

over the place.”    He picked one up and discovered Flyer #1.

                                  6
Halton was offended and humiliated by the scurrilous writing

over his wedding photograph.    As he approached the gun locker

area, Burkert and his brother, Sergeant Kevin Burkert, stood in

his path.    As he walked between them, Halton asked, “What’s up,”

and Burkert replied, “You’re what’s up.”    Later, while Halton

was working at the booking area, he received a call from

Burkert.    During their conversation, Burkert mentioned that

Halton’s wife had called him fat; Halton denied having any

knowledge of it.    When asked, Burkert denied knowing about the

flyers.    The conversation came to an inconclusive end.

     The next day, January 9, when Halton arrived at work, a

sergeant handed him Flyer #2, which the sergeant had found in

the area of the officers’ locker room.    Halton identified the

handwriting on both flyers as Burkert’s.

     On January 11, while Halton was off his usual schedule and

engaged in union negotiations for the FOP, a lieutenant handed

him Flyer #2, stating, “This came out the other night.”    The

flyer was the same one turned over to Halton two days earlier. 3

Halton indicated that he “was a mess in negotiations,” went

home, and never returned to work.     Halton explained that he felt

embarrassed and concerned for his safety and received

3  Lieutenant Patricia Mauko testified that she found twenty to
thirty copies of one of the flyers during a routine inspection
of the corrections officers’ locker room on January 11.

                                  7
psychological counseling and treatment.      He received workers’

compensation benefits for this work-related injury and retired

on November 1, 2011.    Halton acknowledged that he did not know

who was responsible for placing the flyers in the various

locations.

      Ten months after the January incidents, Halton filed the

criminal harassment charges.    Halton stated that he filed the

charges only because the county had failed to properly

discipline Burkert. 4   He also filed a civil lawsuit against

Burkert.

      During the county’s investigation into the flyers, Sergeant

Stephen Pilot interviewed Burkert.      Sergeant Pilot advised

Burkert that a refusal to give a statement would jeopardize his

employment.   Burkert admitted to Pilot that he had prepared the

flyers but denied circulating them. 5

4   Burkert received a work-imposed suspension for his conduct.
5  At trial, Burkert claimed that the admission of his statement
violated Garrity v. New Jersey,