Case Title: Bailey v. Collier

Citation: 465 So. 2d 381

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1985-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
465 So. 2d 381 (1985)
Michael BAILEY
v.
J.V. COLLIER, individually, and Charles Daugherty.
GLIDDEN COATINGS AND RESINS, INC., A DIVISION OF SCM CORPORATION
v.
J.V. COLLIER and Charles Daugherty.
83-879, 83-912.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
February 8, 1985.
*382 Joseph M. Brown, Jr. and Gregory B. Breedlove of Cunningham, Bounds, Yance, Crowder & Brown, A. Neil Hudgens, Michael S. McGlothren, and Edward L. Lasseter, Jr. of Brown, Hudgens, Richardson, Mobile, for Appellant Glidden Coatings & Resins, Inc.
Robert H. Smith and Lawrence M. Wettermark of Collins, Galloway & Smith, Mobile, for appellees.
MADDOX, Justice.
These are appeals from summary judgments granted in favor of defendants/cross-defendants in a personal injury action.
Bailey, plaintiff, an employee of J.V. Collier Shipbuilding, Inc., was injured when paint vapors ignited while he was painting inside a "mud tank" aboard the vessel "Golden Condor," which was under construction at his employer's shipyard. For some time thereafter he received compensation payments under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (L.H.W.C.A.), until he notified his employer's compensation carrier that he wished to have his compensation classified as being received under the Alabama Workmen's Compensation Act rather than the L.H.W. C.A. The reclassification was made and the benefits continued.
Bailey then brought suit charging J.V. Collier, the owner of J.V. Collier Shipbuilding, Inc., and Charles Daugherty, who was Bailey's foreman at the time of the injury, with negligent supervision. He also charged Glidden Coatings & Resins, Inc., the manufacturer of the paint, with breach of warranty and liability under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (A.E.M.L.D.).
Glidden cross-claimed, seeking indemnity from Collier and Daugherty, asserting that they were actively negligent in failing to provide adequate safety equipment at the jobsite and that their negligence was the proximate cause of Bailey's injuries.
Defendants/cross-defendants, Collier and Daugherty, moved for summary judgment on both the initial claim and the cross-claim. Summary judgment was granted as to both. The trial court held that the initial claim was barred by the exclusivity provision of the L.H.W.C.A., 33 U.S.C. § 933(i), which prohibits suits against co-employees. In addition, the trial court held that the cross-claim failed to present a genuine issue of material fact. The court certified its judgments pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala.R. Civ.P. Both the plaintiff, Bailey, and the cross-plaintiff, Glidden, appeal here.
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment against Bailey. As the trial court stated and as this Court recently held in Fillinger v. Foster, 448 So. 2d 321 (Ala.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 105 S. Ct. 223, 83 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1984), the exclusivity provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 933(i) pre-empt negligence suits by land-based maritime workers against co-employees. It is undisputed that Bailey is a maritime employee covered by the L.H.W.C.A. and it is further undisputed that Fillinger, supra, is controlling. In fact, rather than arguing the inapplicability of Fillinger, Bailey simply argues that this Court should reconsider and overrule its opinion in that case. At the time Bailey's brief was filed, he was correct in stating that Fillinger was pending in the Supreme Court of the United States on petition for certiorari; however, on October 1, 1984, that court denied certiorari. *383 ___ U.S. ____, 105 S. Ct. 223. Consequently, we follow Fillinger and affirm the summary judgment granted against Bailey.
We also hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Collier and Daugherty on Glidden's cross-claim against them. The factual setting of this case is strikingly similar to the factual setting in Sherman Concrete Pipe Machinery, Inc. v. Gadsden Pipe Co., 335 So. 2d 125 (Ala.1976). That appeal involved a final judgment dismissing a third-party claim by the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product against another party who the manufacturer alleged was actively negligent in causing the injury to the plaintiff.
The facts of that case, as set out in this Court's opinion, were as follows:
This Court opined:
Although we recognize that Sherman Concrete Pipe, Inc. is distinguishable from the case sub judice because indemnity therein was sought against an employer rather than, as here, against a co-employee, we nevertheless believe the rule stated in the last paragraph of that opinion to be applicable here. According to that rule, a manufacturer, such as Glidden, who markets a product not reasonably safe when put into the stream of commerce is negligent as a matter of law and, as a matter of law, may not seek indemnity against those whose concurrent negligence may have precipated an injury resulting from use of that product. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment against Glidden's cross-claim seeking indemnity.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
JONES, J., concurs in the result.