Case Title: State v. Todd D. Dagnall

Citation: 2000 WI 82

Docket Number: 1998AP002746-CR, 2013AP001108-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 82 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-2746-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Todd D. Dagnall,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  228 Wis. 2d 495, 596 N.W.2d 482 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 6, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
February 8, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Fiedler 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by John D. Lubarsky, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
 
2000 WI 82 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-2746-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Todd D. Dagnall,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   The State of Wisconsin (State) 
seeks review of a published decision of the court of appeals, 
State v. Dagnall, 228 Wis. 2d 495, 596 N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 
1999).  The court of appeals reversed a decision of the Circuit 
Court for Dane County, Patrick J. Fiedler, Judge, denying the 
motion of Todd D. Dagnall (Dagnall) to suppress incriminating 
statements he made to detectives.  The circuit court held that 
the statements were not obtained in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment because Dagnall had not personally, unambiguously, and 
unequivocally invoked his right to counsel prior to answering 
questions.  After his motion was denied, Dagnall pled no contest 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
2 
to the charge of first-degree intentional homicide by use of a 
dangerous weapon, as party to the crime. 
¶2 
Dagnall later appealed the judgment of conviction, 
challenging the decision to deny his suppression motion.  He 
argued that a letter from his attorney to the sheriff's 
department, acknowledging that Dagnall had been arrested in 
Florida and directing that no one should question Dagnall about 
the homicide, as well as Dagnall's own remark to detectives 
that, "My lawyer told me that I shouldn't talk to you guys," 
constituted a proper invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  The court of appeals agreed and reversed the judgment. 
 The court held that Dagnall's remark, when considered together 
with 
the 
admonitions 
in 
the 
attorney's 
letter 
and 
the 
detectives' conceded awareness of that letter, would lead a 
reasonable police officer to understand that Dagnall was 
invoking the right to counsel.  The court therefore remanded the 
cause to the circuit court for trial or further proceedings with 
directions to grant Dagnall's motion to suppress the statements 
elicited by the detectives. 
¶3 
The State presents one issue for review, whether 
Dagnall properly invoked the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  
Stated this way, the issue presupposes that one must "invoke" 
the right to counsel to give it effect, even after an attorney 
has been "retained."  We also address a corollary to the central 
issue, whether a defendant who has counsel may waive the right 
to counsel by talking to detectives after receiving Miranda 
warnings. 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
3 
¶4 
We hold that Dagnall was not required to invoke the 
right to counsel in this case because he had been formally 
charged with a crime and counsel had been retained to represent 
him on that charge.  Because Dagnall was an accused person under 
the Sixth Amendment who had an attorney to represent him on the 
specific crime charged, and because the attorney had informed 
the police of his representation of Dagnall and admonished them 
not to question his client about that crime, any subsequent 
questioning about that crime was improper.  In addition, we 
conclude that Dagnall did not waive his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel by talking to the detectives after he had been given the 
Miranda warnings.  We therefore hold that, under these facts, 
Dagnall's motion to suppress the inculpatory statements should 
have been granted.  For these reasons and the reasons set forth 
below, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
FACTS 
¶5 
The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. 
 On October 14, 1997, the Dane County District Attorney's office 
issued a criminal complaint charging Dagnall with one count of 
first-degree intentional 
homicide, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.01(1).  The complaint alleged that on October 13 Dagnall 
and another individual, Christopher E. Murray, entered the 
residence of Norman G. Gross in the Village of DeForest and beat 
Gross to death with baseball bats.  The circuit court found 
probable cause to believe that Dagnall committed the crime and 
authorized a warrant for his arrest.  Dagnall was promptly 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
4 
arrested in Fort Myers, Florida, at the request of the Dane 
County Sheriff's Department. 
¶6 
That same day, October 14, Madison Attorney James H. 
Connors delivered a letter to the sheriff's department, in which 
he stated: 
 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
 
Please be advised that I represent Todd Dagnall 
who has been arrested in the State of Florida per your 
instructions. 
 
 
It is my understanding that Mr. Dagnall is a 
suspect in a homicide case here in Dane County. 
 
 
Please be advised that I do not want my client 
questioned by anyone concerning criminal matters and, 
more particularly, the homicide in which he is a 
suspect here in Dane County. 
¶7 
The following day, October 15, two officers, Kevin 
Hughes (Hughes) of the sheriff's department and Nick Tomlin 
(Tomlin) of the Village of DeForest, traveled to Florida, where 
they contacted Dagnall at the Lee County Jail.  Detective Hughes 
later testified that he was aware that the sheriff's department 
had received the letter from Attorney Connors, but he did not 
believe the letter barred him from initiating a conversation 
with Dagnall because only a defendant "can exercise his 
constitutional rights."  
¶8 
Hughes explained that in questioning Dagnall, he hoped 
Dagnall would provide a statement about the homicide.  Hughes 
candidly stated that he wanted "to try to get him to talk about 
the case."  
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
5 
¶9 
The detectives informed Dagnall that their purpose was 
to question him about the homicide.  Hughes recalled his 
impression of Dagnall, stating, "Basically [ ] he didn't want to 
talk to us [at] allactually what he told us, that his lawyer 
told him that he shouldn't be talking to us, were his words, or 
something to that effect.  That he'd been advised by counsel not 
to talk to us."  Hughes conceded that Dagnall remarked, "My 
lawyer told me that I shouldn't talk to you guys."  
¶10 The October 14 criminal complaint described Detective 
Hughes as having interviewed Christopher Murray and having 
secured from him a statement that he and Dagnall went to the 
residence of Norman Gross, where both of them hit Gross with 
baseball bats.  In Florida the next day, Hughes and Tomlin: 
 
explained to [Dagnall] that we ha[d] been conducting 
interviews and talking to other people regarding the 
homicide and that it was his decision as to whether or 
not he wanted to talk to us and we would like to read 
him his rights, and after he heard his rights, he 
could make a decision as to whether or not he wished 
to provide a statement. 
Hughes told Dagnall that the detectives were interested in 
obtaining his account of what took place, and that it was 
Dagnall's decision whether or not to talk to them.  Hughes read 
the Miranda rights to Dagnall,1 and then asked Dagnall, 
"Realizing that you have these rights, are you now willing to 
answer questions or make a statement?"  Hughes testified that 
                     
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  The detectives 
informed Dagnall of his Miranda rights using a "standard 
Wisconsin Department of Justice Rights card."  
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
6 
Dagnall said he "would talk to us until he felt that he would be 
at a point where he would discriminate [sic] against himself."2  
¶11 The detectives questioned Dagnall for slightly more 
than one hour.  During this interview, Dagnall never requested 
an attorney.  The detectives made no promises or threats.  
¶12 On October 16, the detectives again spoke with 
Dagnall, this time while they waited with Dagnall at the Fort 
Myers airport for a flight that would transport Dagnall back to 
Wisconsin.  Hughes asked Dagnall if he would answer some 
additional questions about the homicide.  Hughes again read 
Dagnall the Miranda rights, and Dagnall indicated that he 
understood the rights and would answer questions.  The interview 
lasted ten minutes. 
¶13 That same day, after flying to Madison, the detectives 
spoke once again with Dagnall.  While being transported to the 
Dane County Jail at 10:40 p.m., according to Hughes, Dagnall 
explained that he believed his lawyer "would be mad at him for 
speaking" to the detectives, but he stated that "he was glad he 
told [the detectives] his version of the story."  Dagnall said 
he felt it was necessary for him to give his version, because he 
was aware that the police had obtained information from others 
involved in the incident.  
                     
2 At the suppression hearing, neither the State nor defense 
counsel 
drew 
attention 
to 
Dagnall's 
use 
of 
the 
word 
"discriminate," 
rather 
than 
"incriminate," 
but 
the 
word 
"discriminate" was faithfully put in quotation marks in Hughes's 
report to the sheriff's department, signifying that Dagnall's 
misstatement had been noticed by the officer. 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
7 
¶14 The next day, October 17, Hughes met with Dagnall at 
7:40 a.m. in the Dane County Jail.  Hughes advised Dagnall he 
had more questions because additional information about the 
investigation had been brought to his attention.  Dagnall 
responded by asking whether Attorney Connors was aware that 
Dagnall was in town.  When Detective Hughes replied that he 
"didn't know," he recalled that Dagnall said "it would probably 
be best to have his attorney present."  No further questioning 
occurred, and Dagnall was returned to his cell.  
¶15 On October 17, 1997, the district attorney's office 
filed an amended complaint, charging Dagnall with first-degree 
intentional homicide by use of a dangerous weapon as a party to 
the crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(1), 939.63(1)(a)2, 
and 939.05, and burglary while armed with a dangerous weapon as 
a party to the crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 943.10(1)(a), 
943.10(2)(a), and 939.05.  
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶16 After the court entered a plea of not guilty on his 
behalf, 
Dagnall 
filed 
a 
motion 
seeking 
to 
suppress 
the 
incriminating statements he made to the detectives during the 
three interviews.  Dagnall claimed the detectives violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel when they questioned him after 
the sheriff's department received notice that Attorney Connors 
represented Dagnall.  
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
8 
 
¶17 The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing to 
decide the suppression motion.3  It found that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attached on October 14, the date on 
which authorities filed the criminal complaint; but it denied 
the suppression motion for four reasons.  First, the court 
concluded that the letter from Attorney Connors did not 
constitute a personal invocation of Dagnall's right to counsel. 
 The court stated that the right cannot be asserted on someone's 
behalf by an attorney because it must be invoked personally by 
the accused.  
¶18 Second, the court concluded that Dagnall's remark, "My 
lawyer told me that I shouldn't talk to you guys," was not an 
unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. 
 The court made a finding that Dagnall was aware that he was 
represented by an attorney.  The court also acknowledged that 
the police knew Attorney Connors represented Dagnall, and that 
Connors had instructed authorities not to question Dagnall.  
Nonetheless, the court determined that Dagnall's remark did not 
rise to the level of "an express statement that 'I don't want to 
talk to you guys.'"  
¶19 Third, the court held that the questioning that 
transpired after Dagnall made the "my lawyer" remark was 
intended only to clarify what Dagnall wanted to do.  The court 
reasoned that the detectives sought to determine whether Dagnall 
                     
3 Dane County Sheriff's Detective Kevin Hughes was the only 
witness who testified at the suppression hearing.  
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
9 
intended to invoke the right to counsel, and it found that the 
detectives assisted Dagnall with full information about his 
rights and decision-making authority.  Furthermore, noting that 
standards for the Sixth Amendment are no higher than for the 
Fifth Amendment, the court determined that the detectives' 
reading of Miranda warnings for the Fifth Amendment "was 
likewise letter perfect for purposes of the Sixth Amendment."  
¶20 Fourth, the circuit court concluded that Dagnall 
knowingly, freely, and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel before the detectives elicited statements from 
him.  Finding that Detective Hughes complied scrupulously with 
the requirements of the Miranda decision, the court determined 
that Dagnall was well informed about his rights when he 
volunteered his version of the story.  
 
¶21 Following 
the denial 
of 
his 
suppression motion, 
Dagnall entered a plea of no contest to the charge of first-
degree intentional homicide by use of a dangerous weapon, party 
to a crime.4  On March 19, 1998, the circuit court accepted the 
plea and sentenced Dagnall to life imprisonment.5  Dagnall 
                     
4 Dagnall entered the plea pursuant to a plea agreement with 
the State.  The State moved to dismiss the charge of burglary 
while armed with a dangerous weapon as party to the crime and 
recommended that the circuit court establish a parole date no 
later than 40 years from the date of the homicide.  
5 The court subsequently also imposed a concurrent prison 
term of five years for the so-called weapons enhancer, because 
Dagnall had used a dangerous weapon in the commission of the 
crime.  Dagnall's first parole eligibility date was established 
as October 13, 2037, 40 years from the date of the homicide.  
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
10
appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied his 
motion to suppress.  Dagnall, 228 Wis. 2d at 496. 
¶22 The court of appeals reversed, holding that Dagnall's 
incriminating statements should have been suppressed because 
detectives elicited the information after Dagnall properly 
invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Id.  Although the 
court acknowledged that the parameters for the invocation of a 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel are not precise, it indicated 
that the Sixth Amendment offers broader protections for the 
accused than the Fifth Amendment provides for suspects.  Id. at 
503-05.   
¶23 The court of appeals suggested that the evidentiary 
facts in this case must be taken together, not in isolation, to 
determine 
whether 
Dagnall 
effectively 
invoked 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment right.  Id. at 500, 505.  Borrowing from Fifth 
Amendment 
analysis, 
the 
court 
reasoned 
that 
under 
the 
"unambiguous request" rule fashioned for the Fifth Amendment in 
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994), suspects must 
articulate the "desire to have counsel present sufficiently 
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances 
would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." 
 Id. at 503-04.  The combination of circumstances here, namely 
the letter from Attorney Connors, the detectives' conceded 
awareness 
that 
Attorney 
Connors 
represented 
Dagnall, 
and 
Dagnall's remark, "My lawyer told me that I shouldn't talk to 
you guys," established that a reasonable officer would have 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
11
understood that Dagnall was invoking the right to counsel for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 505-06.   
¶24 The court commended the circuit court's detailed and 
thoughtful decision from the bench but disagreed with the 
conclusion that the detectives' questioning of Dagnall meant to 
clarify Dagnall's intentions about invoking the right to 
counsel.  On the contrary, the court of appeals found that 
Hughes and Tomlin planned to obtain a statement from Dagnall.  
Id. at 502 n.6, 502-03.  Because the detectives knew Dagnall had 
retained legal assistance before the questioning, communicated 
with Attorney Connors about the crime, received advice not to 
speak with authorities, and placed the detectives on notice 
about his relationship with an attorney, the court concluded 
that the detectives should not have pursued the interview.  Id. 
at 505-06. 
¶25 The court of appeals found the State's contention that 
Dagnall waived the Sixth Amendment right to counsel meritless.  
Id. at 506 n.11.  Having determined that Dagnall properly 
invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the court 
concluded that once a defendant invokes that right, all 
subsequent waivers are invalid.  Id. (citing Michigan v. Harvey, 
494 U.S. 344, 345 (1990); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 635 
(1986)). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶26 The essential issue in this case is whether police 
detectives violated Dagnall's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
 This, in turn, entails a determination, under the facts 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
12
presented, whether Dagnall consummated his Sixth Amendment 
right, and, if so, whether he later waived that right.  To 
resolve an issue of constitutional fact requires a circuit court 
to apply constitutional principles to evidentiary or historical 
facts.  State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶17, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 
N.W.2d 552.  A constitutional fact is one that is "decisive of 
constitutional rights."  Id. 
¶27 When reviewing issues of constitutional fact, an 
appellate court engages in a two-step analysis.  Id. at ¶17.  
First, in assessing a circuit court's decision in a suppression 
matter, we apply a deferential, or clearly erroneous, standard 
to the circuit court's findings of evidentiary or historical 
facts.  Id. at ¶18; State v. Coerper, 199 Wis. 2d 216, 221-22, 
544 N.W.2d 423 (1996). 
 
Second, 
we 
review 
the court's 
application of constitutional principles to the historical 
facts.  Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶17.  On this second question, we 
are not bound by the determination of the circuit court.  State 
v. Kramar, 149 Wis. 2d 767, 781, 784, 440 N.W.2d 317 (1989).  
Rather, we analyze the ultimate issue, the application of 
constitutional 
principles 
to 
the 
historical 
facts, 
independently.  Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶18; Kramar, 149 Wis. 2d at 
784. 
ANALYSIS 
¶28 This 
case 
implicates 
an 
accused 
person's 
Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in a pretrial, custodial setting.  
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in 
pertinent part, provides that:  "In all criminal prosecutions, 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
13
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence."6  The Supreme Court has applied the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 
                     
6 In full, the Sixth Amendment reads: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
 
U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
 
7 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 
§ 1.  In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963), the 
United States Supreme Court held that states must recognize 
those provisions of the Bill of Rights that are "fundamental and 
essential to a fair trial" and determined that the right to the 
assistance 
of 
counsel 
under 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
was 
a 
fundamental right. 
Article I, § 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution also affords 
accused persons with the right to counsel.  Article I, § 7 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
Rights of accused.  Section 7.  In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be 
heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him; to meet the 
witnesses face to face; to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and 
in prosecutions by indictment, or information, to a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county 
or district wherein the offense shall have been 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
14
¶29 The 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
counsel 
offers 
constitutional 
safeguards 
to 
the 
accused 
once 
the 
State 
initiates adversarial proceedings.  The right protects the 
unaided layperson at critical confrontations with his expert 
adversary, the government, after the adverse positions of 
government and defendant have solidified with respect to a 
particular crime.  McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78 
(1991) (citing United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 
(1984)).  The Sixth Amendment right fulfills this objective in 
two ways.8  First, it redresses the imbalance between the State, 
a powerful, sophisticated, and determined adversary, and the 
accused, allowing the accused to rely upon the services of an 
attorney as a medium during critical stages of a criminal 
proceeding.  McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177-78; Maine v. Moulton, 474 
U.S. 159, 176 (1985).  Second, it ensures fairness in criminal 
proceedings by recognizing "the obvious truth that the average 
defendant does not have the professional legal skill" to 
confront that expert adversary single-handedly during critical 
confrontations.  Moulton, 474 U.S. at 168-69 (quoting Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938)). 
                                                                  
committed; which county or district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law. 
 
The State does not raise the issue whether Dagnall properly 
invoked his right to counsel under the state constitutional 
provision.  Therefore, we do not address it. 
8 See Meredith B. Halama, Note, Loss of a Fundamental Right: 
The Sixth Amendment as a Mere "Prophylactic Rule", 1998 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 1207, 1209. 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
15
¶30 The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment arises 
after adversary judicial proceedings have been initiatedin 
Wisconsin, by the filing of a criminal complaint or the issuance 
of an arrest warrant.  Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 
(1972); State v. Harris, 199 Wis. 2d 227, 235 n.3, 544 N.W.2d 
545 (1996) (citing Jones v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 97, 105, 216 
N.W.2d 
224 
(1974)). 
 
The 
right 
extends 
to 
pretrial 
interrogations.9  Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977).  
The Sixth Amendment right thus protects a defendant during the 
early stages of a prosecution "where the results might well 
settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere 
formality."  Moulton, 474 U.S. at 170 (quoting United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)).  Police and prosecutors are 
under an affirmative obligation not to circumvent or exploit the 
protections guaranteed by the right.  Id. at 171, 176; Jackson, 
475 U.S. at 634 n.8.   
¶31 The Fifth Amendment has sometimes been identified as a 
source of the right to counsel, McNeil, 501 U.S. at 176-77, but 
the right embodied in the Fifth Amendment has a different 
theoretical underpinning from the right set forth in the Sixth 
                     
9 For a discussion of the types of judicial proceedings to 
which the right attaches, see Woody Anglade, Criminal Procedure: 
 Defendants' Rights, 29 Rutgers L. J. 1221, 1233-35 (1998).  
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
16
Amendment.10  The Sixth Amendment right to "Assistance of 
Counsel" is provided explicitly in the text of the Amendment and 
is designed to assist the "accused" with his or her "defence."  
The Fifth Amendment11 right to counsel is not expressly provided. 
 It is a right that exists by implication, a prophylactic 
devised by courts to protect a person's right, in a criminal 
case, not to incriminate himself or herself involuntarily.12  
This Fifth Amendment right ensures that uncharged suspects may 
                     
10 See generally Daniel C. Nester, Distinguishing Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment Rights to Counsel During Police Questioning, 16 
S. Ill. U. L. J. 101 (1991); James Tomkovicz, Standards for 
Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 Iowa 
L. Rev. 975, 989-94 (1986); Craig R. Johnson, Note, McNeil v. 
Wisconsin: Blurring a Bright Line on Custodial Interrogation, 
1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1643, 1652-53. 
11 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, 
nor 
be 
deprived 
of 
life, 
liberty, 
or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
  
12 See Halama, Loss of a Fundamental Right at 1214; David 
Edward 
Sipprell, 
Recent 
Case, 
Criminal 
LawRight 
to 
CounselDavis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994), 73 N.C. 
L. Rev. 2013, 2013-14 (1994); Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different 
Register: 
The 
Pragmatics 
of 
Powerlessness 
in 
Police 
Interrogation, 103 Yale L.J. 259, 295 (1993). 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
17
secure legal advice as a safeguard against relinquishment of the 
privilege against self-incrimination.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463-
66.  
¶32 The Fifth Amendment right, articulated in Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 444-45, applies to the custodial interrogation of 
suspects, not because accused persons need no protection against 
self-incrimination 
during 
police 
interrogation, 
but 
rather 
because persons who have been formally charged with a crime are 
protected by a robust right to counsel grounded in the Sixth 
Amendment.  This Sixth Amendment right is offense-specific.  
McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175-77; Coerper, 199 Wis. 2d at 222.  It is 
tied to the crime or crimes with which the accused is charged. 
¶33 The Fifth Amendment right to counsel is broader than 
the Sixth Amendment right because it can be invoked to bar 
questioning about any suspected crime.  McNeil, 501 U.S. at 
178.13  But the Fifth Amendment right also is narrower than the 
Sixth Amendment right because it focuses on a suspect's 
privilege against self-incrimination only while in custody.  Id. 
 By contrast, the accused's right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment provides assistance at each and every critical stage 
of a criminal prosecution for the offense charged.  Moulton, 474 
U.S. at 170.  The confusion surrounding these distinct "rights" 
results from a piecemeal blending of the two during custodial 
interrogation.   
                     
13 See also Johnson, McNeil v. Wisconsin at 1658.  
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
18
¶34 Historically, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did 
not hinge on a formal request.  In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 
506, 513 (1962), the Court declared that "it is settled that 
where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, 
the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request." 
 Carnley was a pre-Miranda decision.   
¶35 This understanding of the right was reaffirmed by 
Justice Rehnquist almost a quarter century later in his dissent 
in Jackson, when he said:  "[U]nlike a defendant's 'right to 
counsel' under Miranda, which does not arise until affirmatively 
invoked by the defendant during custodial interrogation, a 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not depend at 
all on whether the defendant has requested counsel."  475 U.S. 
at 641. 
¶36 Logically, a right that need not be requested or 
invoked is self-executing at every critical point where the 
right attaches.14  Thus, the law has frowned upon police 
interrogation of a person formally charged with a crime about 
that crime without the presence of the accused's counsel.  Once 
the "'suspect' has become an 'accused' . . . the right to the 
assistance of counsel is of such importance that the police may 
no longer employ techniques for eliciting information from an 
uncounseled defendant that might have been entirely proper at an 
earlier stage of the investigation."  Id. at 632. 
                     
14 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) ("the right 
to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant").  
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
19
¶37 Traditionally, 
Sixth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence 
has 
recognized that an accused person can waive the right to 
counsel.15  The waiver principle is readily understandable at a 
trial or hearing in which a judge or neutral magistrate is able 
to ascertain whether the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.16  But an accused person's waiver of the right to 
counsel in the context of a police interrogation is more 
problematic, especially when the accused has an attorney. 
¶38 The Miranda right to counsel was designed to protect 
suspects during custodial interrogation.  In Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Court, concerned about the need for 
additional safeguards for "suspects" in custody, reinforced 
Miranda by holding that once an "accused" asserts the Fifth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
counsel, 
police 
interrogation 
of 
the 
"accused" must cease, and the "accused" may not be approached 
for further interrogation until counsel has been made available. 
 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85; McNeil, 501 U.S. at 176-77. 
¶39 The Edwards decision spawned conceptual confusion.  
The Court repeatedly referred to Edwards as "the accused" 
because he had, in fact, been charged in a criminal complaint 
with several crimes, including first-degree murder.  After 
Edwards asked for an attorney ("I want an attorney before making 
                     
15 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 401-06; Id. at 410 (Powell, J., 
concurring); Id. at 417 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Brookhart v. 
Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966). 
16 See Wis JICriminal SM30 (Waiver and Forfeiture of 
Counsel) (1998). 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
20
a deal"), he was told "he had" to talk with detectives.  He did 
talk and ultimately incriminated himself after receiving Miranda 
warnings. 
¶40 The Court ducked the question of whether Edwards's 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached and been violated. 
 It instead decided the case on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds,  holding that the State had violated Edwards's rights 
by questioning him after he had asked for an attorney.  The 
Court selected a compelling case to reinforce Miranda, as all 
members of the Court voted to suppress the incriminating 
statements, 
but 
it 
blurred 
the 
distinctions 
between 
the 
different "rights" to counsel.  Justice Powell concurred in the 
result, stating bluntly:  "I do not join the Court's opinion 
because I am not sure what it means."  Edwards, 451 U.S. at 488. 
¶41 After Edwards, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
for suspects during custodial interrogation appeared to be 
superior to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for accused 
persons because accused persons still could waive their Sixth 
Amendment right but suspects, after personally invoking their 
right, could not. 
¶42 The Court wrestled with this anomaly in Jackson, 
directly applying the Edwards rule barring interrogation to the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Jackson was a consolidation 
of two cases.  In one, a man was formally charged with murder.  
At his arraignment, he requested that counsel be obtained for 
him.  A notice of appointment was promptly mailed to a law firm, 
but before the firm received it, the accused was interviewed 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
21
again and confessed to officers.  475 U.S. at 627.  In the other 
case, the defendant made incriminating statements about a murder 
while he was in custody for other offenses.  He was charged with 
the murder and arraigned, and at the arraignment he asked for 
counsel.  Before he had had a chance to meet with an attorney, 
the man made additional incriminating statements in a police-
initiated interview.  Id. at 628.  Both accused defendants 
received 
Miranda 
warnings 
before 
answering 
questions.  
Nonetheless, the Court voted to suppress their incriminating 
statements by extending Edwards to Sixth Amendment situations in 
which accused defendants have asserted the right to counsel.  
Id. at 636.  Justice Rehnquist's dissent attacked the majority 
for creating a rule that required the assertion of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, id. at 641, and for imposing Fifth 
Amendment doctrine on a Sixth Amendment right.  Id. at 639-40. 
¶43 Two years later, the Court confronted the fallout from 
its decision in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988).  
Patterson had been arrested on charges of battery and mob 
action.  Id. at 287.  After receiving Miranda warnings, he 
answered questions about the charges but denied knowledge of a 
gang slaying that had occurred the same day.  Id. at 287-88.  
Witnesses accused Patterson of involvement in the slaying, 
however, and police held him in custody.  Id.  Two days later he 
was indicted for the murder.  Id. at 288.  When an officer 
informed Patterson of the indictment, Patterson asked which of 
his fellow gang members had been charged.  Upon learning that 
the charges had omitted one particular gang member, Patterson 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
22
asked: 
 
"[W]hy 
wasn't 
he 
indicted, 
he 
did 
everything."  
Patterson also began to explain that there was a witness who 
would support his account of the crime.  Id. 
¶44 At this point, the officer stopped Patterson from 
talking and did not proceed to question him until Patterson had 
received Miranda warnings and waived his rights.  Id.  Patterson 
later attempted to 
suppress 
his 
incriminating 
statements, 
alleging that they were taken in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  Because the right to counsel had 
attached, he argued, police were barred from questioning him 
about the homicide.  Id. at 289. 
¶45 The principal issue in Patterson was whether a 
defendant whose Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached 
could waive the right to counsel after receiving Miranda 
warnings.  The Court concluded that a defendant could make a  
knowing and intelligent decision to face officers alone during 
questioning.  487 U.S. at 291.  The Court reasoned that 
"whatever warnings suffice for Miranda's purposes will also be 
sufficient in the context of postindictment questioning."  Id. 
at 298. 
¶46 In 
upholding 
Patterson's 
conviction, 
the 
Court 
suggested that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not 
qualitatively superior to the Fifth Amendment right, at least 
during custodial interrogation.  Id. at 291, 297.  More 
important here, the Court implied that although the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches at the time a charge is 
madein Patterson's case, at indictmenta defendant still has 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
23
to "exercise" the right affirmatively by expressing a desire for 
the assistance of counsel.  Id. at 290-91.  This ruling appeared 
to make two steps necessary to give the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel effect during police interrogation: (1) the right must 
attach by way of adversarial judicial proceedings; and (2) the 
accused must request, invoke, or assert the right to counsel.  
¶47 Despite this apparent clarification of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, the Patterson Court, by way of a 
footnote, struck a note of caution when it indicated that its 
analysis would not apply to represented defendants: 
 
We note as a matter of some significance that 
petitioner 
had 
not 
retained, 
or 
accepted 
by 
appointment, a lawyer to represent him at the time he 
was questioned by authorities.  Once an accused has a 
lawyer, a distinct set of constitutional safeguards 
aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorney-
client relationship takes effect. . . .   Indeed, the 
analysis 
changes 
markedly 
once 
an 
accused 
even 
requests the assistance of counsel. 
Id. at 290 n.3.  This potent observation left some commentators 
wondering whether the Sixth Amendment could still attach 
passively 
with 
the 
initiation 
of 
adversarial 
criminal 
proceedings.17  After Patterson, some courts explicitly declined 
to extend Patterson to those cases in which a lawyer already 
                     
17 See Colin E. Fritz, Comment, Patterson v. Illinois: 
Applying Miranda Waivers to the Sixth Amendment Right to 
Counsel, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 1261, 1262, 1272 (1989) ("the Court's 
decision in Patterson breaks from established constitutional 
precedent by denying automatic application of counsel for 
postindictment interrogations"); Halama, Loss of a Fundamental 
Right at 1226 ("[i]n light of the purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment, a request for counsel should be irrelevant").  
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
24
represented the accused, finding that the right continued to 
self-execute.18  Other courts acknowledged or implemented the 
                     
18 The Arkansas Supreme Court, for instance, declined to 
apply Patterson to a case in which a lawyer had been appointed 
for a defendant and the police, by imputation, had knowledge of 
that representation.  Bradford v. State, 927 S.W.2d 329, 335 
(Ark. 1996).  The court held that "the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel had clearly attached" even though the defendant "never 
formally requested counsel" because the "defendant enjoyed the 
right to rely on counsel as a medium between himself and the 
state."  Id. (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985)).  
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court observed that the 
"Patterson decision . . . [was] not critical to the analysis" 
when a defendant already was represented by counsel because by 
then, 
the 
"Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
had 
attached 
and 
been 
sufficiently invoked."  Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 290 n.8 
(Fla. 1997).  In Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 638-39 (Fla. 
1997), by contrast, the Florida Supreme Court held that the 
appointment of a public defender to represent a defendant did 
not activate the Sixth Amendment because the defendant was 
unaware of and had not accepted the appointment of counsel.  The 
court reasoned that unknown circumstances cannot affect a 
defendant's ability to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a 
constitutional right.  Id. at 639 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 
U.S. 412, 422 (1986)). 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
25
Patterson two-step approach, concluding that the accused must 
assert the right to counsel.19 
 
¶48 Three years later, in McNeil, 501 U.S. 171, the 
Supreme Court quietly backed away from Patterson.  It formulated 
a new statement of constitutional principles, building on 
Jackson but making no mention of Patterson.  The Court 
consistently employed language that implied that an accused must 
"invoke" the Sixth Amendment right to counsel once the right 
attached,20 but it acknowledged that "once this right to counsel 
has attached and has been invoked, any subsequent waiver during 
a police-initiated custodial interview is ineffective."  Id. at 
                     
19 See e.g., State v. Harris, 199 Wis. 2d 227, 235 n.3, 544 
N.W.2d 545 (1996) ("[t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attaches upon formal commencement of prosecution. . . .   Once 
asserted, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel bars further 
uncounseled interrogation"); State v. Hornung, 229 Wis. 2d 469, 
476, 600 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1999) ("[h]owever, once the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel has attached, a criminal defendant 
must seek to exercise this right"); Wilcher v. State, 697 So.2d 
1087, 1096-97 (Miss. 1997) (the "interrogation did not violate 
the [Sixth Amendment] because [the defendant] did not assert a 
right to counsel and thereby trigger its protection"); State v. 
Sanchez, 609 A.2d 400, 402 (N.J. 1992) ("now [the Sixth 
Amendment] apparently requires defendants to request counsel"); 
State v. Royer, 794 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) ("the 
accused must assert or exercise that right before the police are 
prohibited by the Sixth Amendment from thereafter initiating 
custodial questioning"); Holloway v. State, 780 S.W.2d 787, 790 
(Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 1989) ("[i]nvocation of counsel is 
therefore essential to bar further police contact"); State v. 
Robey, 371 S.E.2d 711, 713 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) ("[o]nce [the 
defendant] requested counsel, she could not be interrogated by 
police"); Chewning v. Rogerson, 29 F.3d 418, 420 (8th Cir. 1994) 
("[t]he right is not self-executing but must be invoked by the 
person claiming it"). 
20  McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-79 (1991). 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
26
175. 
 
The 
Court's 
repeated 
references 
to 
a 
defendant's 
"invocation" of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel appear to 
crystalize the Court's view that a charged defendant in custody 
who does not have counsel must invoke, assert, or exercise the 
right to counsel to prevent interrogation.   
¶49 We do not, however, read McNeil to require an accused 
defendant who has an attorney for the crime charged to show the 
same diligence as a defendant without an attorney.  We see 
nothing in McNeil that forces such a defendant to reassert the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to quash police-initiated 
questioning about the crime charged.  McNeil does not repudiate 
the unambiguous declaration that "[o]nce an accused has a 
lawyer, a distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at 
preserving the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship 
takes affect."  Patterson, 487 U.S. at 290 n.3. 
¶50 The McNeil court set out the rationale for this 
position: 
 
The State in Jackson [argued] that assertion of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not realistically 
constitute the expression (as Edwards required) of a 
wish 
to 
have 
counsel 
present 
during 
custodial 
interrogation. . . . Our response to that contention 
was not that it did constitute such an expression, but 
that it did not have to, since the relevant question 
was not whether the Miranda "Fifth Amendment" right 
had been asserted, but whether the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel had been waived.  We said that since 
our "settled approach to questions of waiver requires 
us 
to 
give 
a 
broad, 
rather 
than 
a 
narrow, 
interpretation 
to 
a 
defendant's 
request 
for 
counsel . . . we presume that the defendant requests 
the lawyer's services at every critical stage of the 
prosecution."  (emphasis added) 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
27
501 U.S. at 179.  This presumption means that an accused who has 
retained counsel for the crime charged need not make a "real 
request" as required by the Fifth Amendment.  See id. 
¶51 Inevitably, there is an additional consideration.  
Although the State may not knowingly exploit the opportunity to 
confront the accused without the accused's counsel being 
present, Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, this prohibition assumes 
knowledge by the authorities.  Whether an accused person has 
counsel at the time some incriminating statement is made is an 
historical fact.  It may not, however, be a fact known to 
authorities.  Hence, unless the authorities know that the 
accused person has an attorney, either the accused defendant or 
the defendant's counsel should advise the authorities of the 
existence of counsel on the charge.  The authorities must not 
avoid discovery of this information.  Once a person has been 
charged, the police should anticipate the accused's effort to 
invoke the right to counsel or to advise them of representation 
by counsel and should evaluate the accused's words and actions 
in that light. 
 
¶52 In our view, the upshot of McNeil and its predecessors 
is that a distinction remains between the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel and the right to counsel based on the Fifth 
Amendment.  The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach 
until the initiation of criminal charges.  It then attaches for 
those specific charges.  The right must be "invoked" by the 
accused to terminate police questioning before an attorney has 
been retained or appointed for those specific charges, provided 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
28
the accused has been fully alerted to the right to have an 
attorney and the right not to answer questions.  This normally 
would entail Miranda warnings.   
¶53 After 
an 
attorney 
represents 
the 
defendant 
on 
particular charges, the accused may not be questioned about the 
crimes charged in the absence of an attorney.  The authorities 
must assume that the accused does not intend to waive the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to the assistance of counsel. 
 
¶54 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated 
when "by luck or happenstancethe State obtains incriminating 
statements from the accused after the right to counsel has 
attached."  Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176.  The defendant's unguarded 
outburst in Patterson appears to fall within this category.  487 
U.S. at 288.  Moreover, an accused person may initiate contact 
with authorities without consulting his or her attorney.  
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485.  Chief Justice Burger noted in Jackson 
that behavioral and theological specialists have long recognized 
"a natural human urge of people to confess wrongdoing."  475 
U.S. at 637.  Incriminating statements made by a defendant after 
the 
defendant 
has 
contacted 
authorities 
are 
not 
per 
se 
inadmissible; but after an attorney has been retained or 
appointed, an accused's unsolicited contact with the police must 
be viewed with skepticism and will require authorities to show 
that incriminating statements were in fact voluntarily given.  
State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 180-82, 593 N.W.2d 427 
(1999).  The authorities themselves may not initiate contact for 
questioning about the charges. 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
29
 
¶55 A person who formally has been charged with crimes may 
be treated as a "suspect" in the investigation of other 
uncharged 
crimes, 
McNeil, 
501 
U.S. 
at 
175-76, 
but 
the 
investigation of these other uncharged crimes may not serve as a 
pretext to interview the accused about the crimes charged when 
the accused has an attorney. 
 
¶56 We now apply the law to this case.  The State does not 
dispute that Dagnall's right to counsel attached on October 14, 
the date on which Dane County authorities issued the criminal 
complaint and the date he was arrested in Florida and held in 
custody.  Rather, the State contends that Dagnall did not invoke 
the right to counsel because his remark, "My lawyer told me that 
I 
shouldn't 
talk 
to 
you 
guys," 
did 
not 
constitute 
an 
unambiguous, unequivocal, and personal invocation of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. 
 
¶57 The State's argument would be relevant if Attorney 
Connors did not already represent Dagnall.  Before an accused 
has counsel, the accused must invoke the right to counsel.  But 
here, Dagnall had counsel.  Attorney Connors represented Dagnall 
for the crime with which he was charged.  He communicated with 
Dagnall and may have spoken with him directly about the charge. 
 He then informed the Dane County Sheriff's Department that he 
represented Dagnall and instructed the department not to 
question Dagnall about the homicide. 
 
¶58 The law enforcement officers knew that Dagnall was 
represented by counsel but they proceeded to Florida, not only 
to accompany Dagnall back to Wisconsin, but also for the avowed 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
30
purpose of obtaining a 
statement 
from him. 
 
Given the 
information they possessed about Dagnall's part in the homicide, 
the officers admittedly intended to bolster the prosecution 
against Dagnall by inducing him to "talk about the case."  They 
accomplished this objective by convincing Dagnall that they 
wanted to hear his side of the story.  Dagnall realized he had 
an attorney.21  According to Hughes's own testimony, Dagnall gave 
the officers the impression that he did not want to talk with 
them.  Dagnall stated:  "My lawyer told me that I shouldn't talk 
to you guys."  Even as he began to talk, he expressed an 
inarticulate concern about self-incrimination, thereby revealing 
that he was indeed not equipped to navigate the legal system 
alone. 
 
¶59 To permit police questioning under these circumstances 
would 
authorize 
police 
subversion 
of 
the 
attorney-client 
relationship.  Under these facts, we need not examine whether 
Dagnall "invoked" his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  He did 
not have to invoke his right because he already had counsel.  To 
require an accused person to assert the right to counsel after 
the accused has counsel would invite the government to embark on 
                     
21 The record contains a document indicating that Dagnall 
appeared personally before Lee County Judge John Dommerich on 
October 15, 1997, to be advised of his rights.  Dagnall waived 
extradition.  This appearance probably occurred before Dagnall 
was questioned because the questioning did not begin until 4:20 
p.m. and lasted more than an hour.  The record does not include 
a transcript of Dagnall's initial appearance.  A transcript 
might 
have 
indicated 
Dagnall's 
exact 
words 
about 
his 
relationship with Attorney Connors. 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
31
a persistent campaign of overtures and blandishments to induce 
the accused into giving up his rights.  This would be 
inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of our law. 
 
¶60 Even if Sixth Amendment doctrine now requires some 
invocation of the right to counsel before an accused retains an 
attorney, we think the formality of either appointing counsel or 
retaining counsel serves to invoke the right.  For this case, we 
need not decide whether the test for invoking the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is identical to the Fifth Amendment 
test in situations where an unrepresented accused must invoke 
the right.22 
¶61 We find that, under the facts of this case, we need 
not assign the stringent standard of unambiguous, unequivocal, 
and personal invocation to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
                     
22 In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981), the 
Supreme Court held that an invocation of the right to counsel 
under the Fifth Amendment must constitute an expression of a 
"desire to deal with the police only through counsel."  The 
Court did not answer the question whether ambiguous or equivocal 
requests for counsel satisfy this threshold.   
Subsequently, in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 
(1994), the Court held that:  "Although a suspect need not 
'speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don,' he must 
articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently 
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances 
would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." 
 The Davis Court found that the defendant's remark, "Maybe I 
should talk to a lawyer," was not an unequivocal request for 
counsel.  The Davis suspect made the "[m]aybe I should talk to a 
lawyer" remark before authorities filed any charges; therefore, 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached.  Id. 
at 456-57.  Nor was there any indication in Davis that the 
suspect had retained an attorney.  
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
32
because the Sixth Amendment does not address the defendant's 
desire to deal with the police "only in the presence of 
counsel."   
¶62 Dagnall did not have to "invoke" his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel because he was formally charged with a crime, 
he was in custody for that crime, he had an attorney and had 
communicated with that attorney, the attorney had admonished the 
authorities not to question Dagnall about the crime, and Dagnall 
had alerted authorities to the attorney-client relationship when 
he made his "my lawyer" remark.  There is no dispute that the 
police knew Dagnall was represented by counsel. 
¶63 Dagnall listened to the detectives, received Miranda 
warnings, and made "incriminating" statements.  He did so three 
times. 
 
The 
State 
contends 
that 
Dagnall 
thus 
validly 
relinquished his right to counsel by speaking to the officers.  
¶64 Like the court of appeals, we conclude that this 
argument is without merit:  "Once a criminal defendant invokes 
his [or her] Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a subsequent 
waiver of that righteven if voluntary, knowing, and intelligent 
under traditional standardsis presumed invalid if secured 
pursuant to police-initiated interrogation."  Dagnall, 228 
Wis. 2d at 506 n.11 (citing Harvey, 494 U.S. at 345; Jackson, 
475 U.S. at 625); see also Harris, 199 Wis. 2d at 251; McNeil, 
501 U.S. at 175; Brewer, 430 U.S. at 399-404; Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964). 
¶65 In Patterson, 487 U.S. at 298, the Supreme Court held 
that a waiver of Miranda rights adequately satisfies the 
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
33
requisites for a valid waiver under either the Fifth or Sixth 
Amendments.  Nonetheless, once the accused has invoked the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel or once the accused has counsel, 
officers are "completely barred from approaching the accused" 
for a waiver "unless [the defendant] called for them."  Id. at 
291. 
 
Unlike 
Dagnall, 
the 
Patterson 
defendant 
was 
not 
represented by counsel.  Id. at 290-91, 298-99.  The Patterson 
Court indicated that its extension of the Fifth Amendment's 
waiver requirements to the Sixth Amendment did not apply to 
represented defendants.  Id. at 290 n.3, 296 n.9.  Other courts 
have taken note of this caution, declining to extend the 
Patterson analysis to represented defendants.23   
¶66 Similarly, 
other 
courts sometimes 
allude to the 
sanctity of the attorney-client relationship as a barrier 
against questioning represented defendants without explicitly 
distinguishing the Patterson decision.  In State v. Lefthand, 
488 N.W.2d 799, 801-02 (Minn. 1992), for example, the Minnesota 
                     
23 See Bradford v. State, 927 S.W.2d 329, 335 (Ark. 1996) 
(holding that a Miranda-based waiver did not apply to a 
represented defendant because he "enjoyed the right to rely on 
counsel as a medium between himself and the state"); Holloway v. 
State, 780 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant's 
waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel following a 
reading of Miranda warning was invalid because "Supreme Court's 
warning" in Patterson about the attorney-client relationship 
buttressed the Sixth Amendment protection); United States v. 
Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993) ("the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee would be rendered fustian if one of its 'critical 
components,' a lawyer-client 'relationship characterized by 
trust and confidence,' could be circumvented by the prosecutor 
under the guise of pursuing the criminal investigation"); State 
v. Piorkowski, 700 A.2d 1146, 1153 (Conn. 1997).  
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
34
Supreme Court chastised the state for its cavalier disregard of 
the attorney-client relationship and held that "in-custody 
interrogation of a formally accused person who is represented by 
counsel should not proceed prior to notification of counsel or 
the presence of counsel."  In Texas, the Court of Criminal 
Appeals held that once an attorney-client relationship arises in 
the Sixth Amendment context, police may conduct questioning only 
after notifying defense counsel.  Upton v. State, 853 S.W.2d 
548, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Patterson, 487 U.S. at 
289 n.3).24   
CONCLUSION 
 
¶67 We hold that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
protected Dagnall from police interrogation about the homicide 
once 
Dagnall 
was 
formally 
charged 
and 
once 
an 
attorney 
represented him on that charge.  Because the detectives went to 
Florida knowing that counsel had been retained on the charge and 
because Attorney Connors had notified authorities that he 
represented Dagnall and did not want Dagnall questioned about 
the homicide, the detectives had no authority to question 
Dagnall about that crime.  When they did so and obtained 
incriminating 
statements, 
they 
violated 
the 
constitutional 
safeguards to which Dagnall was entitled under the Sixth 
Amendment, and the statements should have been suppressed at 
trial.  We therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
                     
24 See generally Halama, Loss of a Fundamental Right at 
1222-23, 1231-33.  
No. 
98-2746-CR  
 
 
35
appeals, which remanded this case to the circuit court for 
further proceedings with directions to grant Dagnall's motion to 
suppress the incriminating statements.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
98-2746-CR.npc 
 
1 
¶68 N. PATRICK CROOKS, JUSTICE (dissenting).  I dissent.  
The majority holds "that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
protected Dagnall from police interrogation about the homicide 
once 
Dagnall 
was 
formally 
charged 
and 
once 
an 
attorney 
represented him on that charge."  Majority op. at ¶67.   
¶69 Such a bright-line rule means that law enforcement 
officials may not even question a person such as Dagnall once 
charges are filed and the person has an attorney.  According to 
the majority, it makes no difference that such an individual is 
given Miranda warnings, waives his or her Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights, and agrees to talk to police officers about 
the crime charged. 
¶70 The majority holds that such a waiver is of no 
consequence and that incriminating statements resulting from 
such questioning must be suppressed.  Majority op. at ¶4.  The 
result is that, in this case, Dagnall's statements detailing his 
involvement, with co-defendant Christopher E. Murray, in beating 
a man to death with baseball bats will not be allowed in 
evidence.  His conviction of first degree intentional homicide 
by use of a dangerous weapon, party to a crime, will be set 
aside. 
¶71 The majority's holding is contrary to the position 
taken by the United States Supreme Court and is contrary to 
Wisconsin legal precedent as well. 
¶72 I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals 
and allow Dagnall's conviction for the first-degree intentional 
homicide of the victim, Norman Gross, to stand. 
98-2746-CR.npc 
 
2 
¶73 The United States Supreme Court has identified the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments as two sources of a defendant's right 
to counsel.  McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-77 (1991); 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986). The Fifth 
Amendment provides protection against self-incrimination, and 
because of that, the right to counsel during a custodial 
interrogation.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).  
The Fifth Amendment does not expressly provide the protection of 
counsel; it is the protection against self-incrimination that 
allows a suspect the right to stop an interrogation until the 
assistance of counsel can be procured.  Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 433, 447-49 (1974); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-70.  Once the 
Fifth Amendment right has been invoked, a suspect may not be 
questioned 
further 
unless 
that 
suspect 
reinitiates 
such 
questioning.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.  
¶74 In most significant respects, the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments have been accorded similar treatment in regard to the 
right to counsel.  In Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636, the Supreme 
Court extended the Fifth Amendment ruling in Edwards v. Arizona, 
451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981), to apply to the Sixth Amendment.   
 The Court found that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
should be accorded "at least as much protection as the Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel at any custodial interrogation."  
Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632.  Therefore, as in a Fifth Amendment 
context, the Sixth Amendment guarantees that questioning must 
immediately cease after a suspect has asserted his or her right 
to counsel.   Id. at 626; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. 
98-2746-CR.npc 
 
3 
¶75 The Sixth Amendment right provides charged suspects 
the right to counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings 
against them.  Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-07 
(1964).  This right to counsel attaches automatically "at the 
initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings . . . ."  
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984).  See also 
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
 In Patterson v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel comes into effect with 
formal charges, but that the right must be affirmatively invoked 
by the defendant.  487 U.S. 285, 290-91 (1988). 
¶76 The Patterson decision also made it clear that while 
different policies are involved in the Fifth Amendment and Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, one right is not superior to the 
other, and it is not more difficult to waive the Sixth Amendment 
right than the Fifth Amendment right.  Id. at 297-98.  Dagnall 
was required to invoke the right personally.  Id. at 290-91.  
Dagnall offers two facts, a letter and a statement, to support 
his claim that he had invoked his Sixth Amendment right and 
therefore, he argues, his proffered incriminating testimony in 
connection with the intentional homicide should be suppressed.   
¶77 The letter from Dagnall's attorney, a third party, was 
insufficient 
to 
invoke 
Dagnall’s 
Sixth 
Amendment 
rights.  
Dagnall had neither signed the letter, nor retained the attorney 
himself.  Because a defendant must personally invoke his or her 
rights to be afforded Sixth Amendment protection, Dagnall's 
argument concerning this letter fails.  Id.   
98-2746-CR.npc 
 
4 
¶78 Also, the statement made by Dagnall to the officers 
that "[m]y lawyer told me that I shouldn't talk to you guys" 
fails to establish a personal invocation of his Sixth Amendment 
right.  Majority op. at ¶2.  This statement was merely a 
reiteration of the words of Attorney Connors and, as such, did 
not serve to invoke Dagnall's rights.  Further, Dagnall’s "my 
lawyer" statement made by him to the officers was ambiguous.  It 
did not indicate whether Dagnall was either choosing to follow 
Connors’ advice, or if he was reiterating a statement that he 
remembered his attorney making just hours before. 
¶79 The central issue in this case is whether, under the 
totality of circumstances, the letter from Attorney Connors 
combined with the "my lawyer" statement made by Dagnall, 
constituted 
a 
clear 
invocation 
to 
the 
officers 
of 
the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  If so, the 
incriminating statements gained through officer questioning, 
which 
was 
initiated 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
clarifying 
the 
defendant's ambiguous statement, should be suppressed.  If not, 
then the suppression motion was properly denied by Dane County 
Circuit Court Judge Patrick J. Fiedler.   
¶80 A 
matter 
involving 
a 
similar 
statement, 
where 
clarification by officers was not only allowed but appears to be 
encouraged, can be found in State v. Long, 190 Wis. 2d 386, 526 
N.W.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1994).  In Long, the defendant stated 
before the interrogation began that "[m]y attorney told me I 
shouldn’t talk unless he is here."  Id. at 391.  The court of 
appeals held that the defendant's statement was merely "an 
98-2746-CR.npc 
 
5 
indication of what Long’s attorney told him not to do."  Id. at 
397.  The court further held that the officers were correct in 
their attempt to clarify whether Long was invoking his right to 
counsel because the defendant’s statement "was not a clear 
assertion of his desire to have counsel present."  Id.  In Long, 
the court of appeals stated that "[a] reasonable police officer 
could have understood only that Long might be invoking his right 
to counsel.  His statement reflected indecision and uncertainty 
and was not an invocation of his right to consult with counsel  
. . . . "  Id.  The court held "that because Long's request for 
counsel was ambiguous, the police were under no obligation to 
cease the interrogation."  Id. at 390.  The desire to have 
counsel present "must be made 'sufficiently clearly [so] that a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand 
the statement to be a request for an attorney . . . .'"  Id. at 
395 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)).  
¶81 It is well established that when a defendant's 
statement is ambiguous or equivocal as to whether he or she 
wishes to invoke the right to counsel, officers are not required 
to cease the questioning of the individual unless it is clear 
that the defendant wishes to have an attorney present.  Davis, 
512 U.S. at 459.  In Davis, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the defendant's comment, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," 
was not an unambiguous, unequivocal request for counsel.  Id. at 
455.  See also State v. Walkowiak, 183 Wis. 2d 478, 486, 515 
N.W.2d 863 (1994) (finding the statement, "Do you think I need 
an attorney?" equivocal and ambiguous). 
98-2746-CR.npc 
 
6 
¶82 I believe such is the case here, where the "my lawyer" 
statement by Dagnall did not unambiguously or unequivocally 
indicate to the officers with sufficient clarity exactly what he 
wanted to do.  In accordance with Davis, the officers read 
Dagnall his Miranda rights and assured him that they would honor 
the defendant’s decision about whether or not to proceed with 
questioning.  Thereafter, Dagnall said he would talk to them and 
he voluntarily offered a statement to the officers, which 
certainly supports the conclusion that the "my lawyer" comment 
was not made with the intention to invoke his Sixth Amendment 
rights.  During the interview no request was made for an 
attorney, nor did the officers make any threats or promises.  
Majority op. at ¶11.  Dagnall’s subsequent statements support 
the conclusion that his statement was indeed ambiguous, since 
the actions taken by Dagnall were contrary to those that the 
defendant 
now 
asserts 
he 
really 
intended. 
 
His 
actions 
demonstrated the very indecision and uncertainty alluded to in 
Long.  There the court decision allowed the officers to continue 
questioning a suspect, in order to gain clarification of the 
intention as to whether or not he wished to invoke his rights. 
¶83 The 
majority asserts 
that 
Dagnall’s 
"my lawyer" 
statement, 
coupled 
with 
his 
stated 
concern 
about 
self-
incrimination, shows that he was "not equipped to navigate the 
legal system alone."  Majority op. at ¶58.  On the contrary, his 
statement about not wanting to incriminate himself demonstrates 
that he was aware of his rights when he started talking to the 
officers. 
98-2746-CR.npc 
 
7 
¶84 The 
bright-line 
rule 
adopted 
by 
the 
majority 
prohibiting police interrogation where there has been an 
ambiguous or equivocal Sixth Amendment invocation, or no 
invocation at all by the accused, could be disastrous for law 
enforcement officials in Wisconsin.  The majority's rule, which 
requires only formal charges and representation by an attorney 
and nothing more, flies in the face of the applicable legal 
precedent. 
¶85 I conclude that Dagnall did not personally and 
unambiguously invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and, 
therefore, 
his 
proffered 
incriminating 
statements 
to 
the 
officers were properly obtained and should not be suppressed.  
The totality of the circumstances leads me to this conclusion.  
The letter from Attorney Connors was from a third party, was not 
signed or joined in by Dagnall, and, therefore, it cannot be 
said that Dagnall had personally invoked his rights through that 
letter.  The "my lawyer" statement made by Dagnall to the 
officers did not personally and unambiguously invoke Dagnall’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, because not only did the 
statement merely reiterate the advice given to Dagnall by his 
attorney, but it was also ambiguous and equivocal.  Finally, the 
subsequent questioning by the sheriff's officers, for the 
purpose of clarifying the ambiguity of Dagnall's initial "my 
attorney" statement, was proper and praiseworthy as good police 
practice, in light of the precedent discussed in this dissent. 
¶86 The holding of the majority that all that is needed to 
prohibit police officers from questioning an accused such as 
98-2746-CR.npc 
 
8 
Dagnall is formal charges and representation by an attorney on 
the charge does not withstand scrutiny when United States 
Supreme Court and Wisconsin case law are applied here.  The 
majority's holding that despite the giving of the Miranda 
warnings by the officers to Dagnall, and despite the knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his rights by him, that his 
incriminating statements must be suppressed is contrary to the 
Supreme Court's holding in Patterson.  In that case, the Court 
stated: 
 
As 
a 
general 
matter, 
then, 
an 
accused 
who 
is 
admonished with the warnings prescribed by this Court 
in Miranda, 384 U.S., at 479, 86 S.Ct., at 1630, has 
been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth 
Amendment 
rights, 
and 
of 
the 
consequences 
of 
abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this 
basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent 
one.  We feel that our conclusion in a recent Fifth 
Amendment case is equally apposite here:  "Once it is 
determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on 
his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he 
could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was 
aware of the State's intention to use his statements 
to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and 
the waiver is valid as a matter of law." 
 
Patterson, 487 U.S. at 296-97 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 
at 422-23, 106 S.Ct. at 1142 (1986)).  The majority opinion 
appears to be based on a foundation of footnotes, while ignoring 
the central holding of Patterson. 
¶87 Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals, and thereby affirm the decision of the circuit court 
98-2746-CR.npc 
 
9 
to deny the suppression motion.  For all these reasons, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶88 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
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