Case Title: Goldring + Lyles v. State

Citation: 358 Md. 490

Docket Number: 100/99

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 100
September Term, 1999
WILMER ANTHONY GOLDRING and
CLARENCE LYLES
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.,
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C.J.
 Rodowsky, Wilner, and Harrell, JJ., dissent
Filed:   April 18, 2000
That section provides:
1
“(a) The date for trial of a criminal matter in a circuit court:
“(1) Shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of:
“(i) The appearance of counsel; or
“(ii) The first appearance of the
defendant before the circuit court, as
provided in the Maryland Rules; and
“(2) May not be later than 180 days after the earlier of
those events.
“(b) On motion of a party or on the court's initiative and for good
cause shown, a county administrative judge or a designee of that
judge may grant a change of the circuit court trial date.
“(c) The Court of Appeals may adopt additional rules of practice and
procedure for the implementation of this section in circuit courts.” 
Maryland Rule 4-271 Provides:
2
“(a) Trial Date in Circuit Court.
“(1) The date for trial in the circuit court shall be set
within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of
counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before
the circuit court pursuant to Rule 4-213, and shall be
not later than 180 days after the earlier of those events. 
When a case has been transferred from the District
Court because of a demand for jury trial, and an
appearance of counsel entered in the District Court
was automatically entered in the circuit court pursuant
to Rule 4-214(a), the date of the appearance of counsel
for purposes of this Rule is the date the case was
docketed in the circuit court.  On motion of a party, or
on the court's initiative, and for good cause shown, the
county administrative judge or that judge's designee
may grant a change of a circuit court trial date.”
 
This is yet another case in which this Court is required to consider the proper
sanction for violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1999 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, '5911
and Maryland Rule 4-271.   In this case, it is contended by Wilmer Anthony Goldring
2
2
and Clarence Lyles, the petitioners, that the continuance that resulted in a trial date
beyond the 180 day period prescribed by the statute and the rule, was not properly
granted because the trial judge who granted it had been improperly designated by the
county administrative judge, and thus was not authorized to do so.  Judge Henderson,
one of the three Charles County judges expressly designated to grant postponements
of the Circuit Court trial dates, rejected the respondent=s challenge, concluding that
there was good cause for the continuance and that when that is the case, A[a]nyone can
grant a continuance.@   The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, in an unreported
opinion.  Having granted the petitioners’ petition for writ of certiorari to address this
important issue, Goldring v. State, 356 Md. 495, 740 A.2d 612 (1999), we shall
reverse.
I
Article 27, ' 591 and Maryland Rule 4-271 Acodify and implement the chief
legislative objective that >there should be a prompt disposition of criminal charges in
the circuit courts.@= Dorsey v. State, 349 Md. 688, 700, 709 A.2d 1244, 1249 (1998),
quoting State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356, on motion for reconsideration,
285 Md. 334, 403 A.2d 368, 369 (1979).   We have explained the rationale for their
operation:  
“Consistent with, and to facilitate the achievement of, their objective,
both  ' 591 and Rule 4-271, >set forth a definite time requirement for the
trial of criminal cases and an explicit procedure for postponing a case
beyond the 180-day limit.= [Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 109, 442 A.2d
550, 556 (1982)]. Both mandate that a criminal defendant must be
Maryland Rule 16-101.d.3 (ii) provides:
3
“(ii) In the implementation of Code, Article 27, § 591 and Rule
4-271(a), a County Administrative Judge may (A) with the approval
3
brought to trial within 180 days after the earlier of the arraignment of
the defendant or the appearance of defense counsel.  In the event that a
defendant cannot be brought to trial within 180 days, the county
administrative judge or his designee must make a finding of good cause
justifying the postponement of the trial date beyond the prescribed time
limit.  Accordingly, postponements that cause the scheduling of a
criminal trial beyond the 180 day period must be granted by the county
administrative judge or his designee and must be supported by good
cause.  State v. Brown, 307 Md. 651, 657-58, 516 A.2d 965, 968
(1986).  >Neither the accused nor the prosecution nor the trial court are
empowered to dispense with the mandates of  ' 591 and Rule [4-271].=
Id.  Hence, we have determined that the mechanism established by the
statute and the rule meet the intended objectives as it affords reasonably
prompt trials, and eliminates excessive scheduling delays and
unjustifiable postponements. See id.; Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 41,
472 A.2d 452, 456 (1984).  Additionally, the mechanism of the  Hicks
Rule serves as a means of protecting society's interest in the efficient
administration of justice.  The actual or apparent benefits of ' 591 and
Rule 4-271 confer upon criminal defendants are purely incidental.  See
Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1, 11-12, 472 A.2d 436 (1984);  Curley v.
State, 299 Md. 449, 460, 474 A.2d 502 (1984);   [State v.]Frazier, 298
Md. [422,]456, 470 A.2d [1269,]1286-87 [(1984)];  Marks v. State, 84
Md. App. 269, 277, 578 A.2d 828, 832 (1990).@
Dorsey, 349 Md. 688, 701, 709 A.2d 1244, 1250 (1998). 
As we have seen, both the statute and the rule require a finding of good cause
by the county administrative judge, or that judge=s designee, to change the Circuit
Court trial date.  In implementation of the statute and the rule, Maryland Rule 16-
101.d.3 (ii) prohibits a county administrative judge from authorizing more than one
judge at a time to postpone the trial date of cases originating in the Circuit Court.  
3
of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, authorize one or more
judges to postpone criminal cases on appeal from the District Court
or transferred from the District Court because of a demand for jury
trial, and (B) authorize not more than one judge at a time to postpone
all other criminal cases.”
 
Administrative Order  97-1 was superceded by Administrative Order 98-1, dated
4
February 17, 1998, which was, in turn, superceded by Administrative Order 99-1,
dated February 23, 1999.   Both these latter Administrative Orders also designate
all three Charles County Circuit Court judges, but for specified dates set forth in a
schedule attached to the order.  As we shall see, the purpose of placing the
postponement responsibility in the hands of the administrative judge was to give it
to the judge in the best position to discharge that responsibility appropriately and
consistently with the Legislative intent.  See also State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422,
453-454, 470 A.2d 1269, 1285-86 (1984).  Rule 16-101.d.3 (ii)(B), allowing the
administrative judge to designate another judge for that purpose, must be read to
further that intent.
4
Despite this prohibition, the Charles County Administrative judge, by Administrative
Order No. 97-1, applicable during the times at issue in this case,  designated all of the
4
other Charles County Circuit Court judges, three in number, as well as Aany other
judge assigned to sit in the stead of any of them,@ for the purpose of changing Circuit
Court trial dates.    
Their cases previously having been consolidated for trial, the petitioners and
their co-defendant, a Mr. Heard, appeared for trial on September 9, 1997.  Mr.
Heard=s counsel was ill and thus unavailable.  The cases were continued over the
petitioners= objection, not by the Administrative judge, but by Judge Henderson, who
had been designated along with all of the other Charles County judges for that
purpose.  Judge Henderson found in each case that the Aunfortunate illness of one of
5
the defense counsel,@ coupled with its order consolidating the cases, to be “good
cause@ for the continuance.   The cases were rescheduled for November 17, 1997.
On that date, the petitioners moved to dismiss the charges against them.   The
basis for the motion was their contention that the continuance was granted in violation
of § 591 and Rule 4-271.  They argued that, because he was not the only Charles
County judge designated by the county administrative judge to grant continuances,
Judge Henderson "did not have authority to act as the administrative judge's designee
and grant a continuance for purposes of Rule 4-271 and § 591" and, thus, the
continuance he granted was invalid. Rejecting the petitioners' argument, Judge
Henderson concluded, relying on the Court of Special Appeals' decision in Dorsey v.
State, 114 Md. App. 678, 691 A.2d 730 (1997), aff'd on other grounds, 349 Md. 688,
709 A.2d 1244 (1998), that when there is good cause for continuance,"[a]nyone can
grant a continuance."  He also found "(a), I had the authority to continue the case, (b)
we were missing an attorney, and (c), it really doesn't matter because there was good
cause to continue it from September 9, so we are going to deny the motion.”
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court, but
on somewhat different grounds. To be sure, the intermediate appellate court did not
condone the practice of designating all of the Circuit Court judges in a County for the
purpose of changing trial dates and it did suggest that dismissal may not be the proper
sanction for such a violation.  But that was not the basis for its decision.  Although not
raised by the State, the Court of Special Appeals held that the petitioners waived their
6
argument that Judge Henderson did not have the authority, even for good cause, to
grant the continuance which postponed the case beyond the 180 day limit.   In support
of that holding, it noted its careful review of the transcript of the September 9, 1997
hearing and its "conclu[sion] that violation of Rule 16-101.d.3 (ii), the precise ground
on which appellants subsequently sought to rely, both prior to trial, at sentencing, and
on appeal, was not raised at that time and, thus, was waived."   The court explained:   
      
“[T]he purpose to be served by requiring a party to bring fully
and fairly their position to the trial court is so that the trial court can
pass upon and possibly correct any error or irregularity in the
proceedings. ...  In this case, if expressly confronted with the Rule 16-
101.d.3 (ii) requirement, the trial court at least would have had the
opportunity to advise the County Administrative Judge of the situation
and perhaps resolved the matter.    By not raising the issue until trial on
the date agreed to at the critical Hicks hearing, the opportunity for
compliance was lost.  Although the trial court later determined that his
actions as a designee of the County Administrative Judge was
appropriate, this after-the-fact determination was made when the Hicks
calendar could not be turned back.   An after-the-fact argument does not
promote fairness or the orderly administration of the law.” (Citation
omitted)
II
The petitioners argue that, to preserve the matter for appellate review, it is not
necessary that an objection to the authority of the judge to postpone their trial date
past the 180 day period prescribed by § 591 and Rule 4-271 be made at the time the
postponement is granted.   Stated differently, they maintain that those provisions of
the statute and the Rule requiring postponements to be granted by the County
7
Administrative judge or his designee may not be waived.   They rely on State v.
Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984), State v. Brown, 307 Md. 651, 516 A.2d
965 (1986) and Dorsey, supra.   They are correct.
It is well settled that the requirements of § 591 and Rule 4-271 are mandatory.
Hicks, 285 Md. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360. (“The provisions of Rule 746 are of
mandatory application, binding upon the prosecution and defense alike; they are not
mere guides or bench marks to be observed, if convenient.”).  Their interpretation
does not relate to the fact-finding determination of whether a defendant did the act,
but, like an exclusionary rule, is a prophylactic measure designed to insure
compliance with the requirements imposed on the State regarding prompt trials of
criminal cases.  Id. at 337, 403 A.2d at 370.   Thus, the applicability of §591 and Rule
4-271 simply does not depend upon the action or inaction of the defendant.  
In one of the cases decided with Frazier, in addition to arguing full compliance
with the statute and the Rule, the State placed some reliance on the defense attorney's
failure to object both to the critical postponement and at the time a new trial date was
selected. 298 Md. at 445-46, 470 A.2d at 1281.   Rejecting that argument, the Court
stated:
“ ... the trial judge was clearly correct in holding that the defense
attorney's failure to object would not preclude a dismissal if § 591 and
Rule 746 [the predecessor to Maryland Rule 4-271] were violated.   The
defense attorney's conduct in this case is not what was contemplated in
Hicks when we stated that a
‘circumstance where it is inappropriate to dismiss the
8
criminal 
charges 
is 
where 
the 
defendant, 
either
individually or by his attorney, seeks or expressly
consents to a trial date in violation of Rule 746.’  285 Md.
at 335, 403 A.2d 356.’
“And in Goins, with respect to certain allegedly dilatory conduct by
defense counsel, we held (293 Md. at 108, 442 A.2d 550):
‘At best, it might arguably constitute an implied consent to
a postponement of the trial date, depending upon the
circumstances.   However, in order to avoid such doubts
and controversies, Hicks carefully limited this exception
to the situation where the defendant seeks or expressly
consents to a trial date in violation of the rule.’”
Id. at 447, n.17, 470 A.2d at 1282, n.17.  See Rash v. State, 299 Md. 68, 70-71, 472
A.2d 470, 471 (1984).
The question in Brown was whether the defendant's “waiver of Rule 746
requirements” constituted express consent to a trial date in violation of Rule 746,
thereby rendering inapplicable the dismissal sanction, the question expressly reserved
in  Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 42, 472 A.2d 452, 456 (1984).  Id. at 652, 516 A.2d
at 965.    The defendant in that case had executed a document, captioned “Waiver of
Maryland Rule 746 Requirements,” in which he purported, having been advised by
counsel of the right to a prompt disposition of his case, to “[waive] the time
requirements from appearance of Defendant before the Court pursuant to Maryland
Rule 7[46] to trial (180 days).” Noting that all postponements of a Circuit Court
criminal trial date must be done in accordance with the requirements of § 591 and
Rule 4-271, i.e., that every postponement must be granted by the county
9
administrative judge or his designee and must be supported by good cause, and that is
true even when  the defendant seeks the postponement or agrees to it,   id. at 657-58,
516 A.2d at 968, the Court was explicit in its admonition 
“that this case does not involve a defendant's "waiver" of the
requirements of Art. 27, § 591, and former Rule 746.   Despite the
terminology used by both parties and by the courts below, the
requirements of § 591 and Rule 746 cannot be rendered inoperable
because a defendant purports to "waive" them.   Neither the accused nor
the prosecution nor the trial court are empowered to dispense with the
mandates of § 591 and Rule 746.”
Id. at 656-57, 516 A.2d 967-68. 
The Court then rationalized the situation in which "the defendant, either
individually or by his attorney, seeks or expressly consents to a trial date in violation
of Rule 746, a situation to which the sanction of dismissal is inapplicable,
distinguishing it from a waiver scenario: 
“This is not because the defendant, by his action or consent, has
"waived" the requirements of  § 591 and Rule 746, so that the
requirements are inapplicable.   Rather, it is because ‘[i]t would ... be
entirely inappropriate for the defendant to gain advantage from a
violation of the rule when he was a party to that violation."’  
Id. at 658, 516 A.2d 968-69, quoting State v. Hicks, supra, 285 Md. at 335, 403 A.2d
10
at 369.  It concluded that the former scenario applied to the defendant, thus rejecting
his argument for dismissal.
The same result was reached in Dorsey.   In that case, when the defendant
failed to appear at his trial, having turned himself in on charges pending in another
Circuit Court in another county, the trial judge, who was neither the administrative
judge or that judge’s designee, postponed the case, revoked his bond and issued a
bench warrant.  The State neither sought a good cause determination from the
administrative judge nor sought to bring the defendant to trial prior to expiration of
the Hick’s period.   Consequently, at his trial scheduled three months after the 180
day period had passed, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges and the trial court
granted the motion.  This Court reversed, holding that “the petitioner's absence was
voluntary, the effect of which was to force postponement of his trial.  His absence,
therefore, was tantamount to seeking a trial date in violation of § 591 and Rule
4-271.”  Id. at 709, 709 A.2d at 1254.    In so concluding, we reiterated what is now
well settled: ‘“that a defense attorney's failure to object at the time when a case is
being postponed to a date beyond 180 days does not ordinarily constitute express
consent, as contemplated in  Hicks, to a trial date in violation of the 180 day rule,” id.
at 703-04, 709 A.2d at 1251, quoting Frazier, 298 Md. at 447, n. 17, 470 A.2d at 1282
n. 17, and that the requirements of the Rule are mandatory whatever the conduct or
wishes of the State or the defendant.  Id. at 701, 709 A.2d at 1250.    The Court also
11
revisited the purpose of the statute and the Rule - afford reasonably prompt trials, and
eliminate excessive scheduling delays and unjustifiable postponements, (citing
Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 41, 472 A.2d 452, 456 (1984)), thereby protecting
society's interest in the efficient administration of justice.  Id.   We thought it
significant that “[t]he actual or apparent benefits ... § 591 and Rule 4-271 confer upon
criminal defendants are purely incidental.” Id., citing Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1,
11-12, 472 A.2d 436 (1984);  Curley v. State, 299 Md. 449, 460, 474 A.2d 502
(1984); Frazier, 298 Md. at 456, 470 A.2d at 1286-87;  Marks v. State, 84 Md. App.
269, 277, 578 A.2d 828, 832 (1990).
If, as the Court of Special Appeals held and the State argues, the defendant, by
failing to state not simply an objection to a postponement, but the precise defect
rendering the postponement invalid, waives or forfeits his right to the dismissal
sanction, the purpose of the Hicks mechanism is undermined.   Rather than being
mandatory, the statute and the Rule are mandatory only to the extent that the
defendant objects, thus, allowing, even requiring, the defendant to dispense with the
statute’s and the Rule’s mandate.   Moreover, this approach is inconsistent with this
Court’s Hicks jurisprudence.   Indeed, adopting it will necessitate the overruling of a
number of our cases, beginning with Hicks.   We hold that the Court of Special
Appeals erred in holding that traditional waiver principles apply to the application of
§ 591 and Rule 4-271.
The Court explained the rationale for this conclusion as follows:
5
“The major safeguard contemplated by the statute and rule, for
assuring that criminal trials are not needlessly postponed beyond the
180-day period, is the requirement that the administrative judge or
his designee, rather than any judge, order the postponement.   This is
a logical safeguard, as it is the administrative judge who has an
overall view of the court's business, who is responsible ‘for the
administration of the court,’  who assigns trial judges,  who
‘supervise[s] the assignment of actions for trial,’  who supervises the
court personnel involved in the assignment of cases, and who
receives reports from such personnel.”
12
III
The State acknowledges that there was a violation of Maryland Rule 16-
101.d.3 (ii) when the county administrative judge authorized each of the county
Circuit Court judges, at the same time, to postpone criminal cases originating in the
Circuit Court.  It recognizes, as well, this Court’s prior admonitions and cautions
concerning such broad authorizations, see  Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. at 37-38 n. 2,
472 A.2d at 454 n. 2 (“any procedure adopted by a circuit court consisting of several
trial judges, by which all trial judges are purportedly authorized to grant
postponements for purposes of § 591 and Rule [4-271(a)]), would not comply with §
591 and Rule [4-271(a)]", see also Rosenbach v. State, 314 Md. 473, 477, 551 A.2d
460 (1989), and the rationale underlying those admonitions, as enunciated in Frazier:
the administrative judge ordinarily is in a much better position than any other trial
judge on the court to make the judgment as to the existence of good cause for, as well
as the length of, a postponement.  298 Md. at 454, 470 A.2d at 1285.
   
5
State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 453-54, 470 A.2d 1269, 1285 (1984).
To be sure, the Court did refuse to address the issue of the authority of the court
6
granting the postponement to do so; however, we pointed out:
“That argument was apparently directed to the factual issue of
whether Judges Pines and Arabian had been designated by
Administrative Judge Kaplan and not to the question of whether
numerous judges could be lawfully designated under the statute and
rule.”
Rosenbach v. State, 314 Md. 473, 482, 551 A.2d 460, 464 (1989).
 
13
The State argues, however, that there is “no authority for the proposition that
the order designating Judge Henderson and others to grant a postponement for good
cause shown was rendered null and void by the designation of more than one judge.” 
It finds relevant, as negating the petitioners’ argument that the issue sub judice is
jurisdictional, the fact that, in Rosenbach, this Court refused to address the
defendant’s motion to dismiss because “neither the Administrative Judge or his
designee [has] granted a change in the trial date.”  314 Md. at 482, 551 A.2d at 464.  
6
Finding Capers v. State, 317 Md. 513, 516, 565 A.2d 331(1989), Ingram v. State, 80
Md. App. 547, 565 A.2d 348, cert. denied, 318 Md. 2, 566 A.2d 754 (1989), and
Franklin v. State, 114 Md. App. 530, 539, 691 A.2d 257, 262 , cert. denied, 346 Md.
241, 695 A.2d 1229 (1997) inapposite, it proffers that, rather than dismissal, the
appropriate sanction in this case is one of internal judicial administration, recognized
 In  State v. Brown, 307 Md. 651, 658, 516 A.2d 965, 968 (1986), after noting the
7
holding of Hicks and its progeny, that when a Circuit Court criminal case is not
tried within the 180-day time limit set forth by then § 591 and then Rule 746, and
was not postponed beyond the 180-day deadline in accordance with § 591 and
Rule 746, the sanction for such violation of the statute and rule is ordinarily
dismissal of the criminal charges, this Court stated that “[t]he sanctions for other
violations of § 591 and Rule 746 are ones of internal judicial administration.”
(Citing Farinholt v. State, supra, 299 Md. 32, 41, 472 A.2d 452, 456 (1984), State
v. Hicks, 285 Md. at 335, 403 A.2d 356 and Grant v. State, 299 Md.47, 53, 472
A.2d 459, 462 (1984)).  What we said in Farinholt makes clear to what our
reference to “other violations of  § 591 and Rule 746" related:  
"In the  Hicks opinion we indicated that every postponement of a
circuit court criminal trial date was required to be granted by the
administrative judge or his designee and only upon a showing of the
requisite cause. ...  At the same time, we made it clear in  Hicks that
the purpose of § 591 and Rule 746 was to set a time limit for the trial
of a criminal case, that the dismissal sanction was applicable when
the case was not tried within that time limit and not postponed in
accordance with § 591 and Rule 746, but that the dismissal sanction
was inapplicable to violations of § 591 and Rule 746 which did not
prevent the case from being tried within the prescribed time period.
... Thus, when there are several orders by the administrative judge
postponing a criminal trial, and one of those orders has the effect of
postponing the trial beyond the 180-day deadline, it is the latter
order with which a judge hearing a motion to dismiss is concerned.  
The critical order by the administrative judge, for purposes of the
dismissal sanction, is the order having the effect of extending the
trial date beyond 180 days."
299 Md. at 40-41,  472 A.2d at 456, quoting Frazier,  298 Md. at 428, 470 A.2d
1269. 
   
 
14
in Brown as applicable to “other” violations of § 591 and Rule 4-271.7
As has been stated time and time again, it is a violation of § 591 and Rule 4-
15
271, for which dismissal is the appropriate sanction, for a Circuit Court case to be
tried more than 180 days after the earlier of the arraignment of the defendant or the
appearance of defense counsel, when the postponement resulting in the trial date
beyond the 180 day limit has not been granted by the administrative judge or his
designee to be for good cause.  Indeed, as we pointed out in Frazier, 298 Md. at 450,
n.20, 470 A.2d at 1284, “if a case is not tried within the 180-day deadline, and if there
was no order by or approved by the administrative judge [or that judge’s designee]
having the effect of postponing the trial past the deadline, a motion to dismiss for a
violation of § 591 and Rule 746 must ordinarily be granted even if there may have
been good cause for such a postponement.”  See Goins, 293 Md. at 106, 109-112, 442
A.2d 550.”  Thus, we have applied the dismissal sanction, without regard to the merits
of the good cause determination, where the postponement that took the case beyond
the prescribed 180 day limit was not authorized by the administrative judge or the
administrative judge’s designee.   
In Capers, the critical postponement was granted by the Circuit Court
assignment officer. 317 Md. at 516, 565 A.2d at 332.     In Ingram, it was granted by
the designee of the administrative judge’s designee. 80 Md. App. at 555, 565 A.2d at
351.    In Franklin, pursuant to a differeniated case management plan, the Circuit
Court assignment office set the trial date that violated the 180 days limit.    Although
not on all fours with the facts in this case, in each case, neither the administrative
judge nor that judge’s designee granted the critical postponement.   Moreover, what
16
the Court of Special Appeals said in Ingram is instructive on this point:
“Interpreting the statute and the rule as permitting the County
Administrative Judge's designee, in turn, to designate another judge to
perform the administrative duties delegated to him leads to, and, indeed,
invites, an anomalous result.   If the administrative judge's designee may
further designate, so, too, may that judge's designee and so forth.   It is
therefore conceivable that, at any given time, each judge in a circuit
could be authorized to grant changes in trial dates.   That result was
specifically made the subject of a caution in  Farinholt, 299 Md. at
37-38 n. 2, 472 A.2d 452:  "... any procedure adopted by a circuit court
consisting of several trial judges, by which all trial judges are
purportedly authorized to grant postponements for purposes of § 591
and Rule [4-271(a) ], would not comply with § 591 and Rule [4-271(a)
]".  (Emphasis in original)  It would also run afoul of the purpose of the
statute and rule, which, as we have indicated, are designed to ensure that
the judge in the best position to do so changes the trial date.”
80 Md. App. at 558, 565 A.2d at 353.
Dorsey also is instructive.   In that case, as we have previously pointed out, the
critical postponement was granted by the trial judge, who was neither the
administrative judge nor that judge’s designee.  The Court of Special Appeals
addressed that point, concluding that the trial court’s postponement decision was
"substantively unassailable," a defendant's unavailability constituting good cause for a
postponement, as a matter of law. Dorsey v. State, 114 Md. App.678, 698, 691 A.2d
730, 740 (1997).  That court went on to hold, relying upon its holding in Simms v.
State, 83 Md. App. 204, 210, 574 A.2d 12, 15, cert. denied, 321 Md. 68, 580 A.2d
1077 (1990), that a good cause finding by the administrative judge or that judge's
designee was unnecessary because, “[t]here was no special ‘expertise’ or policy
17
consideration or calendar overview that an administrative judge could have
contributed,” Dorsey, 114 Md.App. at 701, 691 A.2d at 741, that, “[s]ave only for the
option of trying the appellee in absentia, an option not to be exercised by the
administrative judge in any event, [the trial judge] had no choice but to do what he
did.  The administrative judge could have done nothing different.” Id.    
Although we affirmed the judgment of the intermediate appellate court in
Dorsey, we were careful to make clear that we did so for reasons different from those
advanced by that court and to point out that our affirmance was “neither an adoption
or endorsement of the intermediate appellate court’s three alternative rationales or
grounds.” 349 Md. at 699, 709 A.2d at 1249.   Thus, it is significant that this Court
reiterated the oft repeated Hicks standard: “the county administrative judge or his
designee must make a finding of good cause justifying the postponement of the trial
date beyond the prescribed time limit [and] postponements that cause the scheduling
of a criminal trial beyond the 180 day period must be granted by the county
administrative judge or his designee and must be supported by good cause.”  Id. at
701, 709 A.2d at 1250.   
 
The State points out that, when he granted the postponement at issue in this
case, Judge Henderson had been designated, pursuant to Administrative Order 97-1,
albeit he was not the only designee, as authorized to postpone Circuit Court cases.  
In effect, then, it argues that when there is good cause for postponement and the judge
18
granting it is at least one of the  designees of the administrative judge for that purpose,
dismissal is not an appropriate sanction even though the designation violates Rule 16-
101.d.3 (ii).  We reject this argument.  First, it is inconsistent with, if it does not
ignore, this Court’s prior “caution” with respect to the effect of designating more than
one judge on a multi-judge court at a time to postpone circuit court cases.  Moreover,
to adopt the State’s position and, in effect overlook violation of Rule 16-101.d.3 (ii),
is contrary to, and indeed undermines,  the purpose for the Rule, which, as we have
seen, is to assure that trials are not unnecessarily postponed by entrusting the decision
to postpone to the judge who “is ordinarily in a much better position than another
judge of the trial court, or an appellate court, to make the judgment as to whether good
cause for the postponement of a criminal case exists.”  Frazier, 298 Md. at 454, 470
A.2d at 1285.    Finally, our prior admonition in Farinholt suggests that compliance
with  Rule 16-101.d.3 (ii) is mandatory and, therefore, that the appropriate sanction
for its violation is dismissal of the charges.
We agree with the petitioners that “to permit ‘good cause’ to be found by any
circuit court judge in violation of [Rule] 16-101[.d.3], would effectively nullify Rule
4-271 and § 591 and their requirements which ‘transfer the authority to postpone a
criminal trial from any trial judge to the administrative judge or his designee. ...  If all
of the judges are appointed administrative judge’s designees, then, contrary to Frazier
that aspect of the statute and the Rule would be abolished.”  Accordingly, we hold
that the proper sanction when the violation  of § 591 and Rule 4-271 is caused by
19
violation of Rule 16-101.d.3 (ii) is dismissal of the charges.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS  REVERSED.   CASE REMANDED TO
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY
WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS 
TO 
DISMISS 
THE
CHARGES 
AGAINST 
THE 
PETITIONERS. 
COSTS TO BE PAID BY CHARLES COUNTY.
 
1
Dissenting Opinion by Wilner, J;
With respect, I dissent from the judgment directing that the charges against petitioners
be dismissed.  I do not agree that there has been any violation of either Maryland Rule 4-271
or Article 27, § 591.  The order that caused trial to be postponed beyond 180 days was, in
fact, entered by a designee of the administrative judge for good cause.  Rule 4-271 and Article
27, § 591 have been fully complied with; nothing in either provision precludes an
administrative judge from designating another judge to handle postponement requests,
including requests that might cause trial to commence beyond the 180 days allowed. 
We decided, purely as an administrative matter, to preclude circuit court
administrative judges from designating more than one other judge at a time to handle the
postponement of criminal cases, except those cases reaching the circuit court from the district
court, either by appeal or demand for jury trial, and we expressed that policy in Rule 16-
101.d.3(ii).  That rule is an administrative rule, in Title 16, dealing with courts, judges, and
attorneys.  It is not a rule in Title 4, dealing with practice and procedure in criminal cases, and
the remedy for its violation should not be dismissal of criminal charges.  The purely
administrative nature of the rule, even apart from its placement in the Maryland Rules, is
shown quite clearly by the fact that more than one designee at a time is allowed with respect
to cases coming from the district court.  Had this been a theft case, either on appeal or for
which a demand for jury trial had been made, the order entered by Judge Henderson would
have been perfectly all right.  What harm or prejudice has occurred to anyone — to
petitioners, to the State, to the court, or to society at large — sufficient to justify a sanction of
dismissing charges?  This is a serious case.  Lyles was charged, among other things, with
2
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in drug trafficking, and
conspiracy.  It could, of course, have been worse.  Had petitioners been charged with murder
or rape, the charges, under this ruling, also would have to be dismissed.
Given the fact that the offending administrative order has been abrogated, and the
problem thus cured, I do not see the need for any remedy at all in this case, but, at most, a
frank discussion between the Chief Judge of this Court and the administrative judge of the
Circuit Court for Charles County concerning the need to be aware of and follow the rules in
Title 16 of the Maryland Rules would suffice.  It serves no useful purpose whatever to dismiss
criminal charges because of this kind of violation.
Judges Rodowsky and Harrell have authorized me to state that they join in this
dissenting opinion.