Case Title: Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019AP002073

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2021 WI 41 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2019AP2073 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the matter of the mental commitment of 
S.N.W.: 
 
Fond du Lac County, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
S.N.W., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 393 Wis. 2d 596,947 N.W.2d 655 
(2020 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 7, 2021   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 23, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac   
 
JUDGE: 
Dale L. English   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per Curiam. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., dissent. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Megan Sanders-Drazen, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Megan Sanders-Drazen. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Chelsea Belinda Brocker, corporation counsel. There was an oral 
argument by Chelsea Belinda Brocker.  
 
 
2021 WI 41 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2019AP2073 
(L.C. No. 
2019ME20) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the matter of the mental commitment of 
S.N.W.: 
 
Fond du Lac County, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
S.N.W., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 7, 2021 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Dismissed as 
improvidently granted.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   S.N.W. petitioned for review of the 
decision of the court of appeals, Fond du Lac Cnty. v. S.N.W., 
No. 2019AP2073, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. June 17, 
2020), affirming the circuit court's orders for involuntary 
commitment and involuntary medication and treatment.  After 
reviewing the record and the briefs of both parties, and after 
hearing oral arguments, we conclude that this matter should be 
dismissed as improvidently granted. 
No. 
2019AP2073   
 
2 
 
By the Court.—The review of the decision of the court of 
appeals is dismissed as improvidently granted. 
 
 
No.  2019AP2073.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶2 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  Dismissing a 
case 
as 
improvidently 
granted 
is 
thankfully 
an 
uncommon 
occurrence in this court.  An examination of such dismissals 
issued in recent years reveals a largely inconsistent practice 
with regard to whether this court provides any explanation for 
its decision. 
¶3 
I write separately because I believe that this court 
should explain to the litigants and public the reason for its 
dismissal.  The litigants, after all, have expended substantial 
effort and resources arguing the case before us. 
¶4 
Additionally, I write because this case implicates 
substantial rights and presents important questions of mental 
health commitment law.  We granted review in order to address 
these novel issues of statewide public concern.  And now, 
without explanation, we dispose of the case in a two-sentence 
per curiam decision, dismissing the case as improvidently 
granted. 
¶5 
Because the per curiam decision dismissing the case is 
infirm in both form and substance, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶6 
The per curiam decision provides:  "After reviewing 
the record and the briefs of both parties, and after hearing 
oral arguments, we conclude that this matter should be dismissed 
as improvidently granted."  This text should ring familiar.  In 
the 2019-20 term, this court issued two per curiam decisions 
dismissing cases as improvidently granted, and each provided 
No.  2019AP2073.awb 
 
2 
 
only identical boilerplate language.  State v. Kloss, 2020 WI 
26, 390 Wis. 2d 685, 939 N.W.2d 564; Waukesha Cnty. v. J.J.H., 
2020 WI 22, 390 Wis. 2d 531, 939 N.W.2d 49.   
¶7 
However, this dearth of explanation has not always 
been the norm.  For example, in Michael J. Waldvogel Trucking, 
LLC v. LIRC, the court explained that dismissal as improvidently 
granted was appropriate because a change in the law rendered the 
issue in question unlikely to recur and a decision in the case 
"would not develop or clarify the law."  2012 WI 28, ¶8, 339 
Wis. 2d 248, 810 N.W.2d 811. 
¶8 
Similarly, in Smith v. Anderson, the court examined 
the issues in the case and ultimately explained that the 
dismissal as improvidently granted was based on the presence of 
outstanding coverage questions "for which no argument or 
briefing was provided" and on the premise that deciding the 
issues before the court only would "cause confusion and provide 
no answer to the parties on how they are to proceed."  2017 WI 
43, ¶9, 374 Wis. 2d 715, 893 N.W.2d 790.  Indeed, in Smith, two 
separate writings provided further nuanced discussion.  See id., 
¶¶11-13 (Roggensack, C.J., concurring), ¶¶14-124 (Abrahamson, 
J., dissenting).1 
¶9 
In some instances in the past where the majority has 
failed to provide an explanation regarding the reasons for its 
                                                 
1 For additional instances of explanations provided by the 
court for a dismissal as improvidently granted, see Nedvidek v. 
Kuipers, 2009 WI 44, 317 Wis. 2d 340, 766 N.W.2d 205; State v. 
Welda, 2009 WI 35, 317 Wis. 2d 87, 765 N.W.2d 555; State v. 
Gajewski, 2009 WI 22, 316 Wis. 2d 1, 762 N.W.2d 104; State v. 
Townsend, 2007 WI 31, 299 Wis. 2d 672, 728 N.W.2d 342. 
No.  2019AP2073.awb 
 
3 
 
dismissal as improvidently granted or any analysis, a separate 
writing has stepped in to fill the void.  See Halbman v. 
Barrock, 2017 WI 91, ¶12, 378 Wis. 2d 17, 902 N.W.2d 248 
(Abrahamson, J., concurring); Hoskins v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 180 
Wis. 2d 534, 535-36, 509 N.W.2d 432 (1994) (Abrahamson, J., 
dissenting); id. at 536-39 (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).   
¶10 The result of the court's inconsistent practice is a 
lack of guidance for potential litigants and the public, as well 
as an effective negation of the numerous hours of work and sums 
of money spent seeking a decision on the merits.  Acknowledging 
the strong public policy rationale behind providing reasons for 
a dismissal as improvidently granted, the court's general 
practice should be to provide an explanation for such a 
dismissal, and as such it should have provided an explanation in 
this case.  It is the least we can do for parties who have 
expended time, energy, and money seeking a resolution from this 
court. 
II 
¶11 I not only take issue with the majority's lack of 
explanation of its decision, but I also disagree with the 
decision itself.  In my view, we should decide this case on the 
merits and not dismiss it as improvidently granted. 
¶12 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 51.20(10)(b) 
provides 
that 
"[c]ounsel for the person to be committed shall have access to 
all psychiatric and other reports 48 hours in advance of the 
final hearing."  In this case, it is undisputed that such a 
report was filed late. 
No.  2019AP2073.awb 
 
4 
 
¶13  The issues presented by S.N.W.'s petition for review 
are as follows:  (1) whether the circuit court lacked competency 
to proceed with the final hearing due to the 48-hour rule 
violation; (2) if the circuit court retained competency, whether 
it erred in admitting the tardy report and its author's 
testimony; (3) whether the evidence presented at S.N.W.'s final 
hearing was sufficient to prove him dangerous; and (4) whether 
this appeal is moot. 
¶14 Mootness provides no obstacle to our review.  Although 
S.N.W. has passed away, we knew that when we granted the 
petition for review in this case.  In any event, our decision in 
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶26 n.5, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 
942 N.W.2d 277, controls.  There, citing State v. McDonald, 144 
Wis. 2d 531, 532, 424 N.W.2d 411 (1988), which determined in the 
criminal context that the right to bring an appeal survives the 
defendant's death, we concluded that the same rule applies to a 
ch. 
51 
involuntary 
commitment 
proceeding 
"[g]iven 
the 
significant 
liberty 
interests 
at 
stake." 
 
D.J.W., 
391 
Wis. 2d 231, ¶26 n.5.  We should simply apply this rule here.  
¶15 Further, even if the case is moot, exceptions to 
mootness apply that allow for an otherwise moot case to be 
decided.  Because the issues here are of great public importance 
and are capable of repetition, yet evade review, mootness 
exceptions are met.  See Portage Cnty. v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, 
¶12, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509.  This case should proceed 
to a full written opinion. 
No.  2019AP2073.awb 
 
5 
 
¶16 Issues 
of 
great 
public 
importance 
substantially 
affecting 
the 
rights 
of 
those 
subject 
to 
mental 
health 
commitments should not be curtly discarded by the court with no 
explanation.  Rather, these important issues in mental health 
commitment law, if decided, will serve to develop the law in a 
meaningful way.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r) (setting 
forth criteria for granting review, including "[a] decision by 
the supreme court will help develop, clarify or harmonize the 
law").   
¶17 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
No.  2019AP2073.awb 
 
 
 
1