Case Title: State ex rel. Brady v. Pianka

Citation: 2005-Ohio-4105

Docket Number: 20050448

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Brady v. Pianka, 106 Ohio St.3d 147, 2005-Ohio-4105.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. BRADY, APPELLANT, v. PIANKA, JUDGE, ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Brady v. Pianka, 106 Ohio St.3d 147, 2005-Ohio-4105.] 
Writ of prohibition sought to prevent municipal court from proceeding in a 
forcible-entry-and-detainer case — A pending appeal from a 
declaratory-judgment action does not deprive a municipal court of 
jurisdiction over forcible-entry-and-detainer action — Rule of 
jurisdictional priority does not apply if the first case does not involve the 
same cause of action as the second case — Court of Appeals’ dismissal 
of petition affirmed. 
(No. 2005-0448 — Submitted July 26, 2005 — Decided August 31, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 
No. 85490, 2005-Ohio-377. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for a writ 
of prohibition.  The writ was sought to prevent a municipal court judge and 
magistrate from proceeding in a forcible-entry-and-detainer case. 
{¶ 2} In January 2002, the Cuyahoga County Probate Court appointed 
John McCaffrey as guardian of the estate of Nora Brady, the mother of appellant, 
attorney Catherine M. Brady (“Brady”).  At the time, Brady lived in a home 
owned by her mother. 
{¶ 3} In May 2004, Brady filed a complaint for declaratory judgment 
and motion for a temporary restraining order in the Cuyahoga County Court of 
Common Pleas, seeking a declaration of rights relating to a settlement agreement 
with McCaffrey and a restraining order to prevent McCaffrey from evicting Brady 
or listing or selling her residence.  On May 19, 2004, the common pleas court 
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dismissed Brady’s declaratory-judgment action.  On appeal, the court of appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the common pleas court.  Brady v. McCaffrey, 
Cuyahoga App. No. 84866, 2005-Ohio-1197, 2005 WL 628517. 
{¶ 4} While Brady’s appeal from the common pleas court’s dismissal of 
her declaratory-judgment action was pending, McCaffrey filed a forcible-entry-
and-detainer action against Brady in the Housing Division of the Cleveland 
Municipal Court. 
{¶ 5} On November 8, 2004, Brady filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Cuyahoga County.  Brady sought a writ of prohibition to prevent 
appellees, Judge Raymond L. Pianka and Magistrate David D. Roberts of the 
Cleveland Municipal Court, Housing Division, from proceeding in the forcible-
entry-and-detainer action against Brady.  Brady claimed that she was entitled to 
the writ based on the rule of jurisdictional priority.  Judge Pianka and Magistrate 
Roberts moved to dismiss Brady’s prohibition complaint.  On February 1, 2005, 
the court of appeals granted appellees’ motion and dismissed the complaint. 
{¶ 6} In this appeal as of right, Brady asserts that the court of appeals 
erred in dismissing her prohibition claim.  Dismissal was appropriate if, after 
presuming the truth of all material factual allegations of Brady’s complaint and 
making all reasonable inferences in her favor, it appeared beyond doubt that she 
could prove no set of facts entitling her to the requested extraordinary relief in 
prohibition.  State ex rel. Buck v. Maloney, 102 Ohio St.3d 250, 2004-Ohio-2590, 
809 N.E.2d 20, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 7} In order to be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Brady 
had to establish that (1) Judge Pianka and Magistrate Roberts were about to 
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power was 
unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no 
other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  Tatman v. Fairfield 
Cty. Bd. of Elections,  102 Ohio St.3d 425,  2004-Ohio-3701,  811 N.E.2d 1130,  
January Term, 2005 
3 
¶ 14.  It is uncontroverted that Judge Pianka and Magistrate Roberts are exercising 
judicial or quasi-judicial authority in the underlying forcible-entry-and-detainer 
action. 
{¶ 8} Nevertheless, Judge Pianka and Magistrate Roberts assert that this 
case is moot because they have now exercised jurisdiction over the forcible-entry-
and-detainer action by evicting Brady and ordering the sale of the house.  But “a 
prohibition action is not necessarily rendered moot when the act sought to be 
prevented occurs before a court can rule on the prohibition claim.”  State ex rel. 
Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm., 102 Ohio St.3d 301, 2004-Ohio-2894, 
809 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 11.  “ ‘[W]here an inferior court patently and unambiguously 
lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition will lie both to prevent the future 
unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of previous 
jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.’ ”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Rogers v. 
McGee Brown (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 408, 410, 686 N.E.2d 1126, quoting State ex 
rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 97, 98, 671 N.E.2d 236.  
Therefore, Brady’s prohibition claim is not moot. 
{¶ 9} Nevertheless, regarding the remaining requirements for a writ of 
prohibition, “ ‘[i]n the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a 
court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own 
jurisdiction, and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by 
appeal.’ ”  State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 395, 
2003-Ohio-1630, 786 N.E.2d 39, ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel. Nalls v. Russo, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 410, 2002-Ohio-4907, 775 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 10} Judge Pianka and Magistrate Roberts did not patently and 
unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the forcible-entry-and-detainer case.  R.C. 
1901.18(A)(8) grants municipal courts original jurisdiction in “any action of 
forcible entry and detainer.”  And if a municipal court has a housing division, 
which the Cuyahoga County Municipal Court does, that “division has exclusive 
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jurisdiction within the territory * * * in any civil action commenced pursuant to 
Chapter 1923 [forcible entry and detainer] * * * of the Revised Code.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  R.C. 1901.181(A).  We have held that under the pertinent statutes, “a 
municipal court’s housing division has exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry 
and detainer actions, * * * and the housing division has full power to render a 
complete determination of the rights of the parties.”  State ex rel. J.K. & E. Auto 
Wrecking v. Trumbo (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 73, 591 N.E.2d 1238, syllabus. 
{¶ 11} Because the housing division of the municipal court had exclusive 
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the forcible-entry-and-detainer action against 
Brady, Judge Pianka and Magistrate Roberts did not lack ─ much less patently 
and unambiguously lack ─ jurisdiction to proceed. 
{¶ 12} Moreover, even assuming that the housing division’s jurisdiction 
was not exclusive, Brady’s reliance on the jurisdictional priority rule to claim 
entitlement to the writ is misplaced.  Under this rule, “ ‘[a]s between [state] courts 
of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose power is first invoked by the 
institution of proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other 
tribunals,  to adjudicate upon the whole issue and to settle the rights of the 
parties.’ ”  State ex rel. Racing Guild of Ohio v. Morgan (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 54, 
56, 17 OBR 45, 476 N.E.2d 1060, quoting State ex rel. Phillips v. Polcar (1977), 
50 Ohio St.2d 279, 4 O.O.3d 445, 364 N.E.2d 33, syllabus. 
{¶ 13} “In general, the jurisdictional priority rule applies when the causes 
of action are the same in both cases, and if the first case does not involve the same 
cause of action or the same parties as the second case, the first case will not 
prevent the second.”  State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 
426, 429, 751 N.E.2d 472.  A “forcible entry and detainer claim is not the same 
cause of action as [a] declaratory judgment claim.”  State ex rel. Weiss v. Hoover 
(1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 530, 532, 705 N.E.2d 1227.  “Application of the 
jurisdictional priority rule to bar a forcible entry and detainer action from 
January Term, 2005 
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proceeding based on a previously filed collateral proceeding bringing title to the 
same property into question is ‘inequitable and inappropriate in a recovery of real 
property case.’ ”  Id. at 532-533, 705 N.E.2d 1227, quoting Cleveland v. A.J. Rose 
Mfg. Co. (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 267, 275, 624 N.E.2d 245.  Consequently, 
Brady’s previous declaratory-judgment action did not bar the forcible-entry-and-
detainer action. 
{¶ 14} Finally, Brady raises constitutional issues on appeal that she did 
not raise in the court of appeals, and thus she has waived them.  State ex rel. 
Chagrin Falls v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 96 Ohio St.3d 400, 2002-Ohio-
4906, 775 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 15. 
{¶ 15} Based on the foregoing, Judge Pianka and Magistrate Roberts 
properly exercised jurisdiction over the forcible-entry-and-detainer action, and 
Brady has an adequate remedy by way of appeal to raise any claim of error in 
those proceedings.  Therefore, the court of appeals properly dismissed Brady’s 
prohibition complaint because it appeared beyond doubt that she was not entitled 
to the writ.1  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Catherine M. Brady, pro se. 
 
Teresa M. Beasley, Cleveland Director of Law, and Joseph G. Hajjar, 
Assistant Director of Law, for appellees. 
______________________ 
                                                 
1.  We note that Brady has instituted several unsuccessful actions relating to her mother’s estate.  
See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Brady, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 84517 and 84743, 2005-Ohio-287, 
2005 WL 174773, In re Guardianship of Brady, Cuyahoga App. No. 83881, 2004-Ohio-5972, 
2004 WL 2537048; Brady v. Benzing, Cuyahoga App. No. 81894, 2003-Ohio-3354, 2003 WL 
21469584.