Case Title: In re Children of Bethmarie R.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 59

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 59 
Docket: 
Ken-18-436 
Submitted 
   On Briefs: April 9, 2019 
Decided: 
April 18, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF BETHMARIE R. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
[¶1]  The mother of the two children at issue in this case appeals from a 
judgment of the District Court (Waterville, Stanfill, J.) terminating her parental 
rights to the children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(a)-(b)(i), 
(iv) (2018).1  The mother contends that (1) the evidence admitted at the 
termination hearing was insufficient to support the court’s unfitness finding, 
(2) in making its best interest finding the court erred by focusing on who should 
adopt the children rather than focusing on the central question of whether they 
should be adopted by anyone, and (3) the procedural interaction between the 
Probate Court and the District Court in this case deprived her of due process.  
We affirm the judgment. 
                                         
1  Concerning one of the children, the father’s parental rights were previously terminated; 
concerning the other, the putative father’s motion for genetic testing was granted and the results 
were pending at the time the court entered its judgment. 
 
2 
 
[¶2]  We recently addressed this matter in affirming the court’s jeopardy 
order concerning these children.  In re Children of Bethmarie R., 2018 ME 96, 
¶ 1, 189 A.3d 252.  In doing so, we recited in detail the procedural history of the 
case leading to the jeopardy order as well as the court’s supported factual 
findings; we do not repeat them here.  Id. ¶¶ 2-13, 25.  Similarly, we do not 
repeat the relevant facts relating to the mother’s conviction for criminal 
restraint by a parent (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 303(1)(A) (2018)—a case that 
concerned these children—which we discussed in State v. Retamozzo, 
2016 ME 42, 135 A.3d 98. 
 
[¶3]  While our decision in the mother’s appeal from the jeopardy order 
was pending, the Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition to 
terminate the mother’s parental rights.  Following our decision, the court held 
an evidentiary hearing on August 8, 2018, at which the children’s maternal 
grandmother, the grandmother’s ex-husband, the Department’s caseworker, 
a Waterville Police detective, the mother, the children’s former therapist, and 
the guardian ad litem testified.  On October 16, 2018, the court entered its 
judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights, from which the mother 
timely appealed. 
 
3 
 
[¶4]  The court made the following findings of fact by clear and 
convincing evidence, all of which are supported by competent evidence in the 
record:2 
In the jeopardy order, this court found that the children had 
suffered serious emotional harm from [the mother], and would 
continue to do so if returned to her care.  The court found that 
contact between [the mother] and the children was not in the best 
interest of the children.  The court specifically found that [the 
mother] subjected the children to “treatment that is heinous or 
abhorrent to society” under 22 M.R.S. § 4002(1-B) and that she had 
abandoned five of her other children.  As a result, the court found 
that not only were the children in jeopardy with [the mother] but 
that reunification with her was not in the best interest of the 
children. 
 
 
Nothing has happened since then to change this court’s view 
of the situation.  [The mother] has not accepted any responsibility 
for her actions, nor does she have any insight into the impact on the 
children of any of her actions.  Indeed, her view of the past and 
present situation is notably inconsistent with reality and truth. 
 
 
 
Despite this court’s finding that visits were not in the best 
interest of the children and despite this court’s denials of [the 
mother]’s repeated requests for visits, [the mother] continued to 
take matters into her own hands.  She showed up, uninvited and 
unannounced, at several events the children attended with [the 
grandmother]. She repeatedly tried to get [her daughter] in 
particular to come with her.  She caused scenes at these events, 
upsetting the children and family.  She repeatedly called [her 
daughter] to come out and meet her.  She frequently goes by the 
children’s home, parks her car nearby, and watches what is 
happening in an effort to see the children. 
                                         
2  Because the same judge heard the evidence at the jeopardy hearing, the court was entitled to 
consider that evidence at the termination stage.  In re Children of Bethmarie R., 2018 ME 96, ¶ 1, 
189 A.3d 252; In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 23, 159 A.3d 345. 
 
4 
 
 
The children, especially [her daughter], were triggered and 
escalated after the confrontations at [two events].  At both of these 
events, [the mother] caused a scene . . . . She would refuse to leave 
and would yell things like the children need to come with her, that 
she has a plan, that the Department and [the grandmother] are 
stealing her children, and the like.  This kind of behavior is a 
particular trigger for the children in light of all of the unresolved 
issues surrounding the time she “kidnapped” them. (Footnote 
omitted.) 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
[The mother]’s testimony is very telling.  She denied that she 
had ever abandoned [another of her] daughter[s] . . . . She denied 
she had ever abandoned her other four children.  She denied being 
aware that any of her parental rights have ever been terminated to 
any other children.  She denied that she had taken [the children at 
issue in this case] without permission; indeed, she continued to 
insist to this court that she had permission to bring the kids to 
Florida.  All of those statements are contrary to findings of other 
courts and contrary to the findings of this court as set forth in the 
Jeopardy Order.  She denied having any mental health issues that 
needed to be addressed. She disagreed with [an examining 
psychologist’s] diagnosis and findings.  She denied she had any 
pattern of self-defeating behavior. She denied that she has 
“different” views on parenting except to say that everyone does.  
She denied that the children have any concerns about the 
“kidnapping[.]” If they did, she denied that those concerns are 
warranted. 
 
 
Although she acknowledged that she understood this court’s 
jeopardy findings, she flatly stated that they were not accurate.  She 
does not feel that she has anything to work on in order to reunify 
with her children.  When asked about the court’s findings regarding 
the incident of biting [her son] and taking the children out of Maine, 
she flatly stated “these are not facts to me[.]” 
 
 
5 
 
She admitted going to [a] school concert in March.  She knew 
there was a court order that said it was not in the best interest of 
the children to see her.  Nonetheless, she felt it was not a mistake 
for her to be there.  She would do the same thing again.  It did not 
ruin the experience for [her daughter] or have any negative impact 
on her. 
 
 
She also admitted showing up at [a community] event in June.  
She went there specifically to see the children.  Again, she said it 
was not a mistake for her to be there.  She would not have done 
anything differently, except maybe she would have come earlier. 
 
 
She admitted calling the [grandmother’s] home and having 
[her daughter] come out and meet her on several occasions.  She 
understood that neither the Department nor [the grandmother] 
permitted her to do that, but testified that it was not a mistake on 
her part.  She also testified that if she had to do it over, she would 
call more often. 
 
 
She admitted going to the [grandmother’s] home in July.  She 
did it to see the children.  She was aware she was not supposed to 
do that according to the Department.  Again, when asked what she 
would do if she had the opportunity to do it over, she said she 
would do it again.  She simply wanted to see the children and could 
not understand why there was anything wrong with that. 
 
 
When asked, [the mother] stated that she knows how the 
children feel.  She is adamant that they love her, that she is their 
mother, and that they want to be with her.  It is entirely the fault of 
the Department and of [the grandmother] that they are not 
together. 
 
 
This court agrees with the assessment of the Guardian 
ad litem. [The mother] has not accepted responsibility for 
anything.  She has no insight into how anything she has done has 
impacted the children, when in fact everything she has done has 
impacted 
them. 
Without 
any 
insight 
and 
without 
any 
 
6 
acknowledgment of her past actions, she has not, can not, and will 
not change. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
The court also finds that termination is in the best interest of 
the children so that they may have permanency.  The Child and 
Family Services and Protection Act clearly states a policy favoring 
permanency for children.  (Citations omitted.) 
 
 
The children have been in the care of [the grandmother] for 
most of their lives, with her ex-husband . . . also acting as caretaker.  
That is the home they know.  Although [the daughter] in particular 
wants her mother in her life, they are bonded to [the grandmother] 
and settled in to that home.  It is in their best interest to have a safe, 
predictable and stable home.  It is particularly in their best interest 
to end all the ongoing court proceedings, proceedings that have 
raised and dashed hopes and have sent mixed signals to the 
children for years.  They need closure, both from court proceedings 
and from worrying about what will happen with their mother. 
 
 
The plan has been for adoption by [the grandmother].  
Consideration ought to be given to adoption by [her ex-husband] 
as a coparent as well. . . . Absent termination, there will always be 
doubt and uncertainty for [the grandmother] and for the children 
as to what the future holds with [the mother].  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
 
In summary, therefore, this Court finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that [the mother] is unable to protect her 
children from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to 
change within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the 
children’s needs, and that she has failed to make a good faith effort 
to reunify and rehabilitate. 22 M.R.S. §4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (iv).  
Likewise, it is in the children’s best interest that [the mother]’s 
rights be terminated.  22 M.R.S. §4055(1)(B)(2)(a). 
 
7 
 
[¶5]  Given these supported factual findings, we review the court’s 
unfitness finding for clear error and find none.  See In re Child of Kaysean M., 
2018 ME 156, ¶ 5, 197 A.3d 525. 
 
[¶6]  Concerning the court’s ultimate conclusion that termination was in 
the children’s best interests, which we review for an abuse of discretion, id., the 
mother is correct in noting that we have said that “[t]he question of who is the 
best person to adopt the child . . . is beyond the scope of a termination 
proceeding because that question must be addressed in a separate adoption 
action . . . [t]herefore, in a consolidated proceeding where the court addresses 
a termination petition and establishes a permanency plan, while the court may 
determine that as a general matter adoption is in the child’s best interest and 
will be the permanency plan, the court would overreach if it were to designate 
the adoptive party.”  In re Children of Nicole M., 2018 ME 75, ¶ 17, 187 A.3d 1 
(citations omitted). 
 
[¶7]  For two reasons, the court’s best interest findings do not constitute 
factual errors or an abuse of discretion.  First, contrary to the mother’s 
argument, the court’s findings were not predicated solely on an assumption 
that the grandmother would adopt the children.  The court found that 
[i]t is in [the children’s] best interest[s] to have a safe, predictable 
and stable home.  It is particularly in their best interest[s] to end all 
 
8 
the ongoing court proceedings, proceedings that have raised and 
dashed hopes and have sent mixed signals to the children for years.  
They need closure, both from court proceedings and from worrying 
about what will happen with their mother. 
 
Those findings, which acknowledge our oft-stated recognition of the 
Legislature’s emphasis on permanency for children, see, e.g., In re Child of 
Amanda H., 2019 ME 39, ¶ 5, --- A.3d ---, are not predicated on an adoption by a 
specific person. 
 
[¶8]  Second, while the court noted that “[t]he plan has been for adoption 
by [the grandmother],” it did not declare that to be the inevitable result of its 
termination judgment;3 rather, the court simply recognized the reality of the 
situation—the children had been in the legal care of their grandmother for the 
great majority of their lives.  See In re Children of Bethmarie R., 2018 ME 96, 
¶¶ 2-9, 189 A.3d 252.  To the extent the court may have “overreach[ed],” 
In re Children of Nicole M., 2018 ME 75, ¶ 17, 187 A.3d 1, we make clear that we 
do not opine on who should become the adoptive parent(s) in a prospective 
adoption proceeding.  See id. 
 
[¶9]  Finally, the mother contends that the interaction between the 
Probate Court and the District Court in resolving their respective cases 
                                         
3  The court could not have made such a determination given that the parental rights of the 
putative father of one of the children had not been resolved at the time of the hearing, see supra n.1. 
 
9 
concerning the children deprived her of due process.  Although that question 
concerned us as well in the mother’s first appeal, see In re Children of 
Bethmarie R., 2018 ME 96, ¶¶ 26-27, 189 A.3d 252, we concluded that the 
mother had not been deprived of due process, id. ¶ 25.  Nothing that occurred 
at the termination hearing changes that conclusion. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Julian Richter, Esq., Richter Law, LLC, Gardiner, for appellant mother 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services 
 
 
Waterville District Court docket numbers PC-2017-41 and -42 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY