Case Title: State ex rel. Shaughnessy v. City of Cleveland

Citation: 2016-Ohio-8447

Docket Number: 2015-0360

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Shaughnessy v. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8447.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-8447 
THE STATE EX REL. SHAUGHNESSY v. THE CITY OF CLEVELAND ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Shaughnessy v. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No.  
2016-Ohio-8447.] 
Mandamus—Public Records Act—R.C. 149.43—Relator did not show that 
Cleveland had a clear legal duty to respond to his public-records requests 
within eight business days—Writ denied—Statutory damages denied. 
(No. 2015-0360—Submitted August 30, 2016—Decided December 29, 2016.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
_____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relator, Matthew Shaughnessy, filed this original action in 
mandamus alleging that respondents, the city of Cleveland and its public-records 
administrator, Kim Roberson (collectively, “Cleveland”), violated R.C. 149.43, 
Ohio’s Public Records Act, by failing to produce within eight business days the 
police incident reports that Shaughnessy requested.  We deny Shaughnessy’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
2
request for relief and conclude that he has not shown that Cleveland had a clear 
legal duty to produce, or that he had a clear legal right to receive, the records he 
requested within eight business days.  We also deny Shaughnessy’s request for 
statutory damages. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
{¶ 2} Shaughnessy is an attorney whose practice focuses on recovering 
economic losses for crime victims through the Ohio Crime Victims Fund.  He 
requests and reviews police incident reports and then sends information about the 
fund to individuals named in those reports who may be victims of crime. 
{¶ 3} Shaughnessy alleges that on five different occasions, Cleveland 
failed to produce copies of police incident reports in a reasonable amount of time, 
which he quantifies as eight business days.  Cleveland produced copies of the 
requested records 12 to 31 business days after receipt of the initial requests.  
Shaughnessy submitted evidence showing that the cities of Akron, Canton, and 
Columbus have fulfilled his requests for police incident reports within four 
business days. 
{¶ 4} Shaughnessy typically requested police incident reports involving 
felonious assaults or other assaults causing serious harm but excluding those 
involving domestic violence, elder abuse or assault upon a minor.  Cleveland’s 
evidentiary submission explained the steps involved in fulfilling his requests.  
Cleveland first had to search its database for reports that involved incidents of 
assaults or aggravated assaults and then exclude records involving the types of 
victims and offenses that Shaughnessy did not want.  Then, to retrieve the actual 
reports, the records custodian typed each police-report number into Cleveland’s 
database to extract and print each individual report.  Cleveland submitted each 
report to its law department for review and redaction of information that the law 
department deemed exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act.  The 
information typically redacted from reports included Social Security numbers, 
January Term, 2016 
 
3
criminal information obtained from the National Crime Information Center and 
the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation, the names of juveniles, medical 
information, and information describing the details of sexual offenses. 
{¶ 5} Shaughnessy also submitted supplemental evidence purporting to 
show that on three different occasions after he initiated this action, Cleveland was 
able to provide copies of responsive police incident reports within two to four 
business days after Cleveland printed each report. 
{¶ 6} Shaughnessy argues that Cleveland failed to respond to his requests 
in a reasonable amount of time and asks this court to order Cleveland to respond 
to future requests within eight business days, invoking our ruling in State ex rel. 
Wadd v. Cleveland, 81 Ohio St.3d 50, 689 N.E.2d 25 (1998).  He also requests 
$1,000 in statutory damages, the maximum amount authorized in R.C. 
149.43(C)(2), for each count of his five-count complaint. 
ANALYSIS 
Mootness  
{¶ 7} As an initial matter, we consider Cleveland’s argument that the case 
is moot because it has produced all the records at issue in the complaint.  This 
argument is misplaced: Shaughnessy challenges the timeliness of Cleveland’s 
response, not a refusal to provide records.  This case therefore does not fall within 
the general rule that the production of requested records moots a public-records 
case.  See State ex rel. Consumer News Servs., Inc. v. Worthington City Bd. of 
Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 58, 2002-Ohio-5311, 776 N.E.2d 82, ¶ 31, citing Wadd, 81 
Ohio St.3d at 52, 689 N.E.2d 25.  We reject Cleveland’s mootness argument and 
proceed to the merits. 
Timeliness of Cleveland’s Responses 
{¶ 8} The Public Records Act states that all public records responsive to a 
request “shall be promptly prepared and made available for inspection,” R.C. 
149.43(B)(1), and that “a public office or person responsible for public records 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
4
shall transmit a copy of a public record to any person by United States mail or by 
any other means of delivery or transmission within a reasonable period of time 
after receiving the request for the copy,” R.C. 149.43(B)(7).  The determination 
whether a public office has complied with its duty to timely provide requested 
records depends on “all of the pertinent facts and circumstances.”  State ex rel. 
Morgan v. Strickland, 121 Ohio St.3d 600, 2009-Ohio-1901, 906 N.E.2d 1105,  
¶ 10, citing Consumer News Servs. at ¶ 37-38.  As we detail below, Shaughnessy 
made frequent requests and those requests required Cleveland to search for 
records containing specific retrieval criteria, to cull out certain records that he did 
not want, and then to redact protected information.  When we consider 
Shaughnessy’s requests in the context of these circumstances, we conclude that 
Cleveland’s responses were timely with respect to the requests identified in each 
count of the complaint, and we deny Shaughnessy’s request for relief. 
Count One 
{¶ 9} Count one concerns Shaughnessy’s October 10, 2014, faxed request 
for police reports within a two-week period “from the first and second districts for 
all non domestic violence related aggravated assaults or assaults where the 
victims sought medical care at a hospital.” 
{¶ 10} This was an improper public-records request, because it required 
Cleveland to do research for Shaughnessy and to identify a specific subset of 
records containing selected information.  Cleveland had to search its database for 
reports that involved (1) incidents of “aggravated assaults” or “assaults,” (2) 
occurring within a specific geographical location, (3) with victims who sought 
medical care at a hospital, but (4) who were not victims of domestic violence.  
The Public Records Act does not compel a public office “to do research or to 
identify records containing selected information.”  See State ex rel. Fant v. Tober, 
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 63737, 1993 WL 173743, *1 (Apr. 28, 1993), aff’d, 68 
Ohio St.3d 117, 623 N.E.2d 1202 (1993).  See also Morgan, 121 Ohio St.3d 600, 
January Term, 2016 
 
5
2009-Ohio-1901, 906 N.E.2d 1105, at ¶ 14-15 (request for “[a]ny and all e-mail 
communications * * * which reference * * * the ‘evidence-based model’ or 
education funding in general” was overbroad) (first ellipsis sic); State ex rel. 
Thomas v. Ohio State Univ., 71 Ohio St.3d 245, 246, 643 N.E.2d 126 (1994) 
(noting denial of writ of mandamus where request for records sought selected 
information “regarding or related to” any pro-animal-rights action group or 
individual), citing Fant. 
{¶ 11} For this reason, Cleveland could have denied Shaughnessy’s 
request outright and asked him to revise it.  See R.C. 149.43(B)(2).  Instead, 
Cleveland searched its database for incident reports that referred to assaults or 
aggravated assaults and generated a list of police-report numbers.  Cleveland 
produced that list the same day of Shaughnessy’s request.  But Cleveland’s work 
did not end there.  In order to retrieve the actual reports, the records custodian had 
to type each police-report number into Cleveland’s records-management system 
to extract and print out each individual report.  Cleveland then submitted each 
report to the law department for review and redaction.  After taking these steps, 
Cleveland produced copies of the incident reports on November 17, 2014, or 24 
business days after Shaughnessy’s request. 
{¶ 12} R.C. 149.43(A)(1) excludes certain information from the definition 
of a public record, some of which is prohibited from public release by law.  Public 
offices therefore often find it necessary to conduct a legal review of responsive 
records and to redact non-public-record information.  This court has recognized 
that the Public Records Act envisions an opportunity for the public office to 
examine records prior to release in order to redact exempt materials appropriately.  
Morgan, 121 Ohio St.3d 600, 2009-Ohio-1901, 901 N.E.2d 1105, at ¶ 16, citing 
State ex rel. Warren Newspapers, Inc. v. Hutson, 70 Ohio St.3d 619, 623, 640 
N.E.2d 174 (1994).  And we have stated that police incident reports are subject to 
redactions to prevent the disclosure of exempt information.  See State ex rel. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
6
Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 
819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 55-56 (police incident reports may be redacted to eliminate 
personal victim information).  It was therefore reasonable for Cleveland to delay 
disclosure a bit longer to conduct a legal review.  Our analysis of the timeliness of 
Cleveland’s response must take into account the practical and legal restrictions 
that Cleveland faces. 
{¶ 13} Shaughnessy’s supplemental evidence purports to show that 
Cleveland was able to complete its legal review and produce responsive records 
within two to four business days after Cleveland printed each incident report.  But 
the possibility that Cleveland may be able to complete its legal review within a 
shorter time frame does not transform Shaughnessy’s improper requests into 
proper ones.  See State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson, 106 Ohio St.3d 
160, 2005-Ohio-4384, 833 N.E.2d 274, ¶ 38 (past disclosure of information does 
not transform a nonrecord into a record under the Public Records Act). 
{¶ 14} Shaughnessy bases his argument that Cleveland had a legal duty to 
respond to his public-records requests within eight business days on Wadd, 81 
Ohio St.3d 50, 689 N.E.2d 25, in which we concluded that Cleveland must 
provide access to accident reports within eight days after the accidents occur.  Id. 
at 55.  However, Wadd is inapposite.  The relator in Wadd requested access to 
reports for motor-vehicle accidents occurring on one specific day.  Id. at 51.  
Here, by contrast, Shaughnessy requested copies of reports for incidents spanning 
a two-week period, and he made several subsequent, similar requests, which 
generally resulted in 100 to 300 pages of responsive reports.  In addition, Wadd 
involved the availability of accident reports for in-person inspection and copying 
by the requestor.  Id. at 50-51.  Here, the issue is not the records’ availability for 
inspection; rather, a public office had to locate, retrieve, copy, redact, and 
transmit copies of the responsive records.  Wadd does not provide a comparable 
basis to impose an eight-business-day deadline on Cleveland in this case. 
January Term, 2016 
 
7
{¶ 15} Nor does Shaughnessy’s comparison of Cleveland’s response times 
to response times in other cities, without more context, justify imposing an eight-
business-day deadline on Cleveland.  Shaughnessy offers no evidence as to the 
manner in which those cities keep, organize or retrieve incident reports or whether 
those cities conducted legal review and redaction. 
{¶ 16} To be sure, Cleveland could have done things differently.  In 
conformity with the Public Records Act, Cleveland’s public-records policy states 
that if a request is overbroad, the city may deny the request but must inform the 
requestor about the manner in which the city keeps and accesses its records so that 
the requestor can revise the request.  Accord R.C. 149.43(B)(2).  If it cannot 
immediately fulfill a request, Cleveland’s policy requires it to estimate the time 
necessary to do so.  Cleveland’s failure to comply with its own policy does not in 
itself compel relief in mandamus, however.  In Morgan, although the governor’s 
office failed to provide the requestor with an estimated response time in 
accordance with its policy, we determined that the office otherwise acted 
reasonably given the broad scope of the request and the office’s decision to 
review records before production.  See Morgan, 121 Ohio St.3d 600, 2009-Ohio-
1901, 906 N.E.2d 1105, at ¶ 12-17. 
{¶ 17} Similarly, here, Cleveland’s response time of 24 business days was 
reasonable given the steps Cleveland took to search for responsive records by 
subject matter, exclude the records that Shaughnessy did not want, retrieve and 
print each individual police incident report, and then review and redact exempt 
information.  In the context of these circumstances, Cleveland’s response to the 
request at issue in count one was timely. 
Count Two   
{¶ 18} Count two concerns Shaughnessy’s November 13, 2014, hand-
delivered request for nine specific police incident reports listed by date, address, 
and offense.  Cleveland produced responsive records 25 business days after 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
8
Shaughnessy’s request.  Unlike the request involved in count one, this request did 
not require a subject-matter search.  As explained above, however, it is not the 
initial search but Cleveland’s subsequent retrieval and review of each document 
that requires more than a few days.  Cleveland was also simultaneously 
responding to Shaughnessy’s October 10, 2014 request, which it completed on 
November 17, 2014.  Given these circumstances, Cleveland’s response was 
timely. 
Count Three 
{¶ 19} Count three concerns Shaughnessy’s January 26, 2015, certified-
mail request for every police incident report from January 8 through January 14, 
2015, involving felonious assault or assaults causing serious harm, but excluding 
domestic violence, elder abuse by a caregiver or assault upon a minor.  Cleveland 
received Shaughnessy’s request on January 29, 2015, and on that same day 
produced a list of 19 responsive reports.  Cleveland produced 68 pages of 
responsive records on February 17, 2015, or 12 business days after receipt of 
Shaughnessy’s request. 
{¶ 20} Once again, Shaughnessy’s request was improper, because it asked 
Cleveland to search for records containing select information and excluding other 
information.  Shaughnessy requested reports that referred to felonious assaults or 
assaults causing serious harm and then asked Cleveland to cull out the reports that 
involved domestic violence, elder abuse by a caregiver or assault upon a minor.  
As in count one, Cleveland could have denied Shaughnessy’s request and asked 
him to revise it.  But once again, Cleveland obliged him by searching for 
responsive records by subject matter, retrieving the search results by police-report 
number, excluding the records that he specified, and then reviewing and redacting 
exempt information before producing the reports.  Given all these steps, 
Cleveland’s response was timely. 
January Term, 2016 
 
9
Counts Four and Five  
{¶ 21} On February 2, 2015, Shaughnessy requested by certified mail 
copies of every police incident report made during a seven-day period involving 
felonious assault or assaults causing serious harm, but excluding domestic 
violence, elder abuse by a caregiver or assault upon a minor.  On February 6, 
2015, he sent an identical request for reports made during a different seven-day 
period.  In response to the February 2 request, Cleveland produced 136 pages of 
records on March 24, 2015, or 31 business days after Cleveland’s receipt of the 
request on February 6, 2015.  In response to the February 6 request, Cleveland 
produced 141 pages of records on March 25, 2015, also 31 business days after 
receipt of the request on February 9, 2015. 
{¶ 22} While 31 business days may appear to stretch the outer limits of 
reasonableness, we should note that, again, Shaughnessy’s requests were 
improper because they asked Cleveland not only to retrieve records containing 
selected information but also to cull out the ones that he did not want.  In addition, 
we have to examine Cleveland’s response time in the context of the frequency and 
volume of Shaughnessy’s requests.  He submitted three requests in the span of 
two weeks.  His requests on January 26, February 2, and February 6 combined 
resulted in 345 pages of responsive records.  And each of these requests required 
the city to search for responsive records by subject matter, exclude the records 
Shaughnessy did not want, retrieve responsive records by police-report number, 
and then review the records for possible redactions.  Under these circumstances, 
and considering that Shaughnessy’s requests were improper from the outset, 
Cleveland’s response time was reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 23} We conclude that Shaughnessy has not shown that Cleveland had a 
clear legal duty to produce, or that he had a clear legal right to receive, the records 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
10 
he requested within eight business days.  We deny Shaughnessy’s request for a 
writ of mandamus and deny his request for statutory damages. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
Kennedy, J., dissenting. 
 
{¶ 24} When a public office does not reject a public-records request as 
being “ambiguous or overly broad” pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(2) or deny the 
request with explanation pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(3), the Public Records Act 
requires the public office to produce responsive records in a “reasonable period of 
time” given the pertinent facts and circumstances of the case.  R.C. 149.43(B)(1); 
accord State ex rel. Morgan v. Strickland, 121 Ohio St.3d 600, 2009-Ohio-1901, 
906 N.E.2d 1105, ¶ 10.  Because relator, Matthew Shaughnessy, complied with 
the city of Cleveland’s request form, which asked for the “specific details about 
what” the requestor wanted, the public-records requests described in counts 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5 of the complaint were proper.  Therefore, I dissent. 
{¶ 25} Because the totality of the evidence demonstrates that Cleveland 
was capable of identifying, printing, reviewing and redacting, and producing 
responsive records within three to five business days, I would hold that the eight-
business-day standard established in State ex rel. Wadd v. Cleveland, 81 Ohio 
St.3d 50, 689 N.E.2d 25 (1998) is reasonable.  Therefore, I would grant the writ 
of mandamus as to counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the complaint and order Cleveland 
to produce responsive records to future similar written public-records requests 
within eight business days.  Moreover, I would grant Shaughnessy $2,000 in 
statutory damages pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(2). 
January Term, 2016 
 
11 
{¶ 26} “In Ohio, public records are the people’s records, and officials in 
whose custody they happen to be are merely trustees for the people; therefore, 
anyone may inspect these records at any reasonable time.”  State ex rel. Warren 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hutson, 70 Ohio St.3d 619, 640 N.E.2d 174 (1994).  To that 
end, we have construed the Public Records Act liberally in favor of disclosure of 
public records.  State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 126 Ohio 
St.3d 224, 2010-Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 6. 
{¶ 27} To facilitate broad access to public records, the Public Records Act 
requires a public office to “organize and maintain public records in a manner that 
they can be made available for inspection or copying.”  R.C. 149.43(B)(2).  
However, it is “ ‘the responsibility of the person who wishes to inspect and/or 
copy records to identify with reasonable clarity the records at issue.’ ”  State ex 
rel. Morgan v. New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 
1208, ¶ 29, quoting State ex rel. Fant v. Tober, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 63737, 
1993 WL 173743, *1 (Apr. 28, 1993), aff’d, 68 Ohio St.3d 117, 623 N.E.2d 1202 
(1993). 
{¶ 28} “If a requester makes an ambiguous or overly broad request,” then 
the public office may deny the request.  R.C. 149.43(B)(2).  If a request is denied 
on this basis, then the public office must give the requestor “an opportunity to 
revise the request by informing the requester of the manner in which records are 
maintained by the public office and accessed in the ordinary course of the public 
office’s or person’s duties.”  Id.  If the public office “ultimately” denies the 
public-records request, the public office must “provide the requester with an 
explanation, including legal authority, setting forth why the request was denied.”  
R.C. 149.43(B)(3). 
{¶ 29} In denying the writ of mandamus, the majority concludes that 
Shaughnessy’s requests in counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the complaint were improper 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
12 
because they required Cleveland to research its database in order to identify 
selected information in a subset of records.  I disagree. 
{¶ 30} The evidence demonstrates that Shaughnessy made all of the 
public-records requests at issue on Cleveland’s public-records-request form and 
specifically conformed his requests to the requirements of the form, which asked 
for, in addition to the requestor’s name and contact information, the “specific 
details about what [the requestor wanted], including time frame, locations, etc. (if 
applicable).”    
{¶ 31} In keeping with the generalized request form, Cleveland’s Public 
Records Policy stated that the requestor “must clearly state the records and/or 
information being sought to allow the City of Cleveland to identify, retrieve and 
review records” and that “[i]f a request is vague and overbroad, the City may 
deny the request.” 
Count 1 
{¶ 32} Shaughnessy sent the request described in Count 1 of the complaint 
on October 10, 2014.  It stated: 
 
I am an attorney who advocates for crime victims.  I would like to 
recieve [sic] copies of initial police reports from the first and 
second districts for all non domestic violence related aggravated 
assaults or assaults where the victims sought medical care at the 
hospital.  Maybe you can help me with the best way to word this 
request to best meet my requirements as I would like to make 
requests for this information on a weekly basis and do not want to 
cause you unnecessary work.  I would like copies of these reports 
for Sunday September 21, 2014 through Saturday October 5, 2014. 
 
January Term, 2016 
 
13 
{¶ 33} Cleveland’s law department stamped the request received on 
October 10, 2014.  In response to the request, Cleveland did not indicate that 
Shaughnessy’s request was “vague or overbroad.”  On the contrary, Nancy 
Diemer, a public-records assistant in Cleveland’s law department, responded by e-
mail on October 10, 2014, stating, “In response to your public record request 
above, we’ve attached is [sic] a list of all assaults in D1 and D2 for the time 
period requested.  If you would like this on a weekly basis the information is 
available online at: http://clevelandgis.org/pub/index/html?config=crime.xml.” 
{¶ 34} After further clarification that Shaughnessy wanted a copy of the 
actual police incident reports, on November 17, 2014, Carol A. Harvanek, another 
public-records assistant in Cleveland’s law department, sent Shaughnessy an e-
mail that provided a link to the incident reports. 
Count 2 
{¶ 35} Shaughnessy’s second request, dated November 13, 2014, 
requested the “initial * * * Police Report * * * created for the Following 
incidents” and thereafter listed nine incidents, setting forth the date, location, and 
type of offense for each one.  The format of this request—the listing of the nine 
incidents by date, location, and offense type—was consistent with the information 
retrievable by the hyperlink that Diemer provided to Shaughnessy on October 10, 
2014. 
 
Cleveland 
Gis 
Crime 
Calls, 
http://www.clevelandgis.org/pub/ 
index.html?config=crime.xml (accessed December 14, 2016). 
{¶ 36} The law department stamped the request received on November 13, 
2014.  In response, Cleveland did not indicate that Shaughnessy’s request was 
“vague or overbroad.”  On December 19, 2014, Harvanek sent Shaughnessy an e-
mail with an electronic file containing the responsive records and indicated that 
redactions had been made pursuant to law. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
14 
Counts 3, 4, and 5 
{¶ 37} Shaughnessy’s third request, dated January 26, 2015, was worded 
differently from the first two requests:  
 
Please provide 1 copy of each police incident report made 
by the Cleveland Police Department within the time frame of 
January 8, 2015, and January 14, 2015, with regard to the crimes of 
Felonious Assault (R.C. 2903.11) and Assaults causing serious 
harm (R.C. 2903.13)[.]  
For purposes of this request you may omit entirely, without 
explanation, any reports with regard to Domestic Violence; Elder 
Abuse by caregiver, or assault upon victims who are minors. 
This request is not made in preparation of any criminal 
defense whatsoever * * *. 
Please call if you need any clarification[.] 
 
{¶ 38} The law department stamped the request received on January 29, 
2015.  Again, Cleveland did not reject Shaughnessy’s request because the request 
was “vague or overbroad.”  Thereafter, a reported-crimes report was generated for 
the date range requested, setting forth the report numbers and locations for 19 
incidents of aggravated assault.  On February 17, 2015, Harvanek e-mailed 
Shaughnessy a link to the responsive documents. 
{¶ 39} Shaughnessy’s fourth and fifth requests followed the exact same 
format as his third request.  The law department stamped the requests received on 
February 10, 2015, and February 9, 2015, respectively.  Again, Cleveland did not 
reject Shaughnessy’s requests because the requests were “vague or overbroad.”  
On March 25 and 24, 2015, respectively, Harvanek e-mailed Shaughnessy links to 
the responsive documents for his fourth and fifth public-records requests. 
January Term, 2016 
 
15 
All of Shaughnessy’s public-records requests were proper 
{¶ 40} I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the public-records 
requests detailed in counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 of Shaughnessy’s complaint were 
“improper,” because I conclude that Shaughnessy specifically complied with the 
instructions provided on Cleveland’s public-records-request form.  Cleveland has 
a standard, generalized form for public-records requests.  The form asks 
requestors to provide specific information that would enable Cleveland to locate, 
retrieve, and review the records sought. 
{¶ 41} The majority concludes that Cleveland could have done things 
differently—but it didn’t.  Cleveland’s public-records form asked requestors to be 
specific about the facts of the report being requested and provided, as an example 
of the specific information needed, the “time frame” and location of the requested 
reports.  Cleveland’s public-records policy also required specificity by requiring a 
requestor to “clearly state the records and/or information being sought” in order to 
allow Cleveland the opportunity to “identify, retrieve and review the records.”  
Cleveland did not reject Shaughnessy’s public-records requests as being 
“ambiguous or overly broad” under R.C. 149.43(B)(2), ask Shaughnessy to revise 
his requests, or deny his request with explanation under R.C. 149.43(B)(3). 
{¶ 42} In the majority’s view, this specificity, which Cleveland required, 
made the request improper, because Shaughnessy was seeking information from a 
subset of records, which required a search of the records.  However, as set forth 
above, Cleveland’s form and policy specifically asked Shaughnessy for the 
specific details of the reports sought.  By prompting a requestor to provide details, 
Cleveland recognized that every request will seek a subset of police reports, not 
all police reports.  Moreover, as is demonstrated in this case, because of the way 
Cleveland chooses to organize and maintain its records, a search of the record 
database is always required in order to provide a subset of the records—whether 
that is one report, nine reports, or more.  The supplemental affidavit of Kim 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
16 
Roberson, a public-records administrator for Cleveland, and the supplemental 
exhibits demonstrate that Cleveland does retrieve police-incident-report numbers 
based on the type of offense, i.e., “felonious assault and assaults causing serious 
harm.” 
{¶ 43} Shaughnessy’s public-records request described in count 1asked for 
police reports for a specific time period, for a specific location, and for specific 
crimes.  Cleveland responded with a hyperlink that mapped out the responsive 
incidents.  When he clarified that he wanted the actual reports and not just the 
information provided in the hyperlink, Cleveland followed up with a second e-
mail directing him to a file with the incident reports he sought. 
{¶ 44} The request also asked Cleveland to advise Shaughnessy if he was 
not wording his request properly and stated that he would make the request 
consistent with Cleveland’s wishes.  As set forth above, however, Cleveland’s 
only response was the production of the responsive records. 
{¶ 45} Shaughnessy’s public-records request in count 2 followed the 
outline of the information provided in the hyperlink that Cleveland provided to 
Shaughnessy in its initial response to his first public-records request.  The 
majority concludes that this request was proper because “this request did not 
require a subject-matter search.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 18.  However, the majority 
misses the point that the information Shaughnessy provided was essentially the 
same information that he provided in the request in count 1.  Shaughnessy still 
specified the records sought by date, location, and offense—which is what 
Cleveland’s public-records form required.  Moreover, regardless of which request 
Cleveland received—the request in count 1 of the complaint or the one in count 
2—Cleveland still had to conduct a search of its records to produce a subset of the 
entire record.  How Cleveland searched the database for the police-incident-report 
numbers to fulfill the records request in count 2 of the complaint is unknown and 
irrelevant.   
 
January Term, 2016 
 
17 
{¶ 46} Moreover, the majority’s conclusion that the request in count 2 was 
proper because it “did not require a subject-matter search,” majority opinion at  
¶ 18 does not comport with our past precedent, in which we have held that a 
request is only improper if it requires a government agency to “search through 
voluminous documents for those that contain certain information or to create a 
new document by searching for and compiling information from existing 
records.”  State ex rel. Carr v. London Corr. Inst., 144 Ohio St.3d 211, 2015-
Ohio-2363, 41 N.E.3d 1203, ¶ 22, citing State ex rel. Morgan v. New Lexington, 
112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 1208, ¶ 30-31, 35, and State ex 
rel. Kerner v. State Teachers Retirement Bd., 82 Ohio St.3d 273, 274, 695 N.E.2d 
256 (1998).  Our precedent does not disallow requests for records that require 
subject-matter searches. 
{¶ 47} By finding the request in count 2 proper, the majority admits that a 
request for a specific subset of incident reports is permissible.  It appears then that 
the majority views the requirement of “a subject-matter search” as the crucial 
factor that determines whether or not a request is proper.  The only difference 
between Shaughnessy’s request in count 2 and the requests at issue in counts 1, 3, 
4, and 5 is that the request in count 2 listed the nine incidents by a specific date, 
specific location, and offense type for each police incident report requested, while 
the other requests listed a date by range, location by district, and offense type for 
each police incident report requested. 
{¶ 48} Shaughnessy’s request described in count 3, while worded 
differently, still provided Cleveland with the same general information that the 
city’s form requested and that Shaughnessy had provided in the requests set forth 
in counts 1 and 2 of the complaint.  Shaughnessy’s requests in counts 4 and 5 
mirrored the request in count 3. 
{¶ 49} The requests in counts 3, 4, and 5 of the complaint also gave 
Cleveland discretion not to provide reports involving domestic violence, elder 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
abuse by a caregiver, or assault of a juvenile.  Importantly, Shaughnessy stated 
that Cleveland “may omit entirely” these categories.  Use of the term “may” 
should be construed as permissive, not mandatory.  In re Application of Ormet 
Primary Aluminum Corp., 129 Ohio St.3d 9, 2011-Ohio-2377, 949 N.E.2d 991,  
¶ 17.  Therefore, it was within the discretion of Cleveland to cull out those records 
or not to cull out those records. 
{¶ 50} In reaching the conclusion that Wadd is “inapposite,” majority 
opinion at ¶ 14, the majority focuses on the fact that Wadd wanted a single day’s 
worth of vehicle crash reports while Shaughnessy requested a series of reports.  
However, this conclusion is contrary to Cleveland’s own admission that it has 
identified documents responsive to Shaughnessy’s requests on the same day that 
his requests have been made.  And it is contrary to the evidence that Cleveland 
produced nine police incident reports in 20 minutes when a request (which was 
not included in Shaughnessy’s complaint) was made in person.  It was only when 
Shaughnessy made a written request for nine police incident reports that 
Cleveland took 26 days to produce the responsive records. 
{¶ 51} Moreover, the majority concludes that Shaughnessy’s similar 
requests to other large metropolitan police departments cannot “justify” imposing 
the Wadd eight-business-day requirement on Cleveland “without more context” 
because Shaughnessy does not offer “evidence as to the manner in which those 
cities keep, organize or retrieve incident reports or whether those cities conduct 
legal review and redaction.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 15.  While I agree that the 
record is silent as to how these other cities store police incident reports or whether 
they conduct legal review and redaction of responsive records, the most 
reasonable interpretation of this silence is not that these other police departments 
have ignored their obligations under the Public Records Act but that these cities 
have created efficient processes that ensure records are produced in a reasonable 
amount of time with protected information shielded from disclosure. 
January Term, 2016 
 
19 
{¶ 52} Shaughnessy submitted evidence showing that the Cincinnati 
Police Department provided all police incident reports involving felonious 
assaults and assaults causing serious harm committed within a one-week time 
period within two days of Shaughnessy’s request.  Likewise, the Columbus 
Division of Police provided all police incident reports involving felonious assaults 
and assaults causing serious harm committed within a two-week period, for a total 
of 399 pages of records, within one day of Shaughnessy’s request.  The 
responsive-record production from Columbus is far larger than any of the 
responsive-record productions from Cleveland, which were 68 pages, 136 pages, 
141 pages, and likely less than 50 pages, respectively.  Yet it took Columbus one 
day and Cleveland anywhere from 12 to 31 days to respond to Shaughnessy’s 
written public-records requests. 
{¶ 53} The Canton Police Department provided all police incident reports 
involving felonious assaults committed within a 30-day period on the same day of 
the request, for a total of 30 responsive pages.  The city of Akron posts police 
incident reports online within a few days of the incident, and as a result, 
Shaughnessy does not need to make individual public-records requests of Akron. 
{¶ 54} Shaughnessy has demonstrated that Cleveland should be able to 
produce the requested records within three to five business days.  Specifically, 
Cleveland admitted in its answer that it can identify responsive records on the 
same day they are requested.  And Shaughnessy’s supplemental affidavit and its 
exhibits show that the remaining steps have been completed in two to four 
business days.  Exhibits I, J, and K show the dates on which the reports were 
printed and also the dates they were e-mailed to Shaughnessy.  The time in 
between is presumably the time for review and redaction, which is two to four 
days.  Therefore, Cleveland should be able to produce records within three to five 
business days. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
20 
{¶ 55} Moreover, while the majority concludes that Shaughnessy’s 
requests in counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 were improper, it is noteworthy that 
Shaughnessy’s requests to the other large metropolitan police departments 
mirrored his requests to Cleveland, with the exception that he sought all 
responsive police reports made throughout those cities, while his request to 
Cleveland was limited to districts one and two. 
{¶ 56} Just as in Wadd, I believe the time other cities take to respond to 
similar requests and the way Cleveland responded to Shaughnessy’s requests after 
the mandamus action was filed are pertinent facts that provide an illustrative 
standard for a “reasonable” time for responding to a public-records request.  See 
Wadd, 81 Ohio St.3d at 53, 689 N.E.2d, 25.  In light of all the pertinent facts, I 
believe that the eight-business-day standard of Wadd is applicable here. 
{¶ 57} Additionally, the majority’s reliance on Fant, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 
No. 63737, 1993 WL 173743, is misplaced.  As the Fant court recognized, the 
public-records requestor did not request a specific record.  Id. at *1.  Instead, he 
requested “information,” specifically, the “names, payroll numbers, residential 
mailing addresses, and dates of employment” of certain bus operators.  Id.  Here, 
Shaughnessy requested police incident reports.  Shaughnessy did not ask for 
information from the police incident reports.  Cleveland did, however, ask 
Shaughnessy for specific information about his request (i.e. date and location) in 
order to fulfill that request. 
{¶ 58} Seemingly, the majority places great emphasis on the procedural 
process that Cleveland undertakes to produce records responsive to 
Shaughnessy’s requests.  However, all public offices will engage in some rote 
process of locating, retrieving, and reviewing a public record prior to release to a 
requestor.  The process that Cleveland has designed and implemented, which 
includes checks and balances to ensure that a records request does not slip 
January Term, 2016 
 
21 
through the cracks, is not at issue.  The length of time that Cleveland takes in 
completing that process when the request is made in writing is the issue. 
{¶ 59} While the facts are distinguishable because of the length of the 
delay and the type of records sought, this court should nevertheless adopt the legal 
reasoning of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Hartkemeyer v. 
Fairfield Twp., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-04-080, 2012-Ohio-5842.  In 
Hartkemeyer, a resident of Fairfield Township made a public-records request on 
July 27, 2011, via certified mail, for the following public records maintained by 
Fairfield Township:   
 
(1) audio recordings of all meetings of the Fairfield Township 
Board of Trustees from May 1 through July 27, 2011, (2) meeting 
minutes from all meetings of the Fairfield Township Board of 
Trustees from May 1 through July 27, 2011, and (3) meeting 
agendas from all meetings of the Fairfield Township Board of 
Trustees from May 1 through July 27, 2011. 
 
Id. at ¶ 3. 
{¶ 60} The assistant township administrator acknowledged receipt of the 
public-records request via e-mail, and she stated, “I * * * will make the items 
available to you as soon as possible.”  Id. at ¶ 4.  In October 2011, Fairfield 
Township provided some of the requested records.  Id. at ¶ 8.  After some back-
forth between the requestor and the township, the township finally provided all of 
the remaining responsive records on July 20, 2012, after the requestor had already 
filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
{¶ 61} In granting the writ, the Twelfth District rejected Fairfield 
Township’s argument that the burdensome nature of the public-records requests 
excused its tardy response:  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
22 
 
The statute does not offer exceptions to public offices that are 
understaffed or otherwise unable to comply with the statutory 
mandates because of the way the entity chooses to use its 
resources. While such circumstances may be considered to a 
limited degree when determining the reasonableness of a public 
office’s response, the statute itself gives little latitude to 
circumventing the affirmative responsibilities placed upon those 
that maintain public records. 
 
Id. at ¶ 26.  The majority accepts essentially the same argument from Cleveland 
that Fairfield Township made in Hartkemeyer.  The majority excuses Cleveland’s 
late response, stating that Shaughnessy’s “frequent requests * * * containing 
specific retrieval criteria, to cull out certain records” made Cleveland’s response 
timely.  Majority opinion at ¶ 8.  The burden that a specific request places on a 
public entity cannot, in isolation, make a delay in responding to the request 
reasonable. 
{¶ 62} In Hartkemeyer, the Twelfth District also considered that the 
public-records request was confusing and that some of the requested meeting 
minutes were not available.  Hartkemeyer, 2012-Ohio-5842, at ¶ 27-28.  This is 
similar to the majority’s conclusion that Shaughnessy’s requests were improper 
because they “required Cleveland to do research for Shaughnessy and to identify a 
specific subset of records containing selected information.”  Majority opinion at  
¶ 10.  The Twelfth District in Hartkemeyer found it determinative that “[t]he 
township never informed relator that it did not understand the July 27 request or 
that it found the request ambiguous or overly broad.”  Hartkemeyer at ¶ 27.  
Likewise, this court should not excuse Cleveland’s slow response because 
Shaughnessy’s requests were “improper.”  Cleveland could have denied the 
January Term, 2016 
 
23 
requests, but it did not.  As a result, we should ensure that Cleveland “promptly” 
produces requested records.  In the end, I predict that the long-term effect of the 
majority’s decision will be that Cleveland will endure more expansive, time-
consuming public-records requests. 
{¶ 63} The majority does not explain the distinction that it makes between 
the requests described in counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the complaint, which were 
deemed improper, and the one set forth in count 2 of the complaint, which it 
deemed proper, other than to state that the request in count 2 did not request a 
search by offense.  It is undeniably apparent, however, from the majority’s 
statement of Cleveland’s procedural process, that in order to fulfill the public-
records request described in count 2 of the complaint, Cleveland had to conduct a 
search of the database using the information that Shaughnessy had provided (i.e., 
the date, location, and type of offense) to obtain each offense-report number in 
order to retrieve the actual incident reports.  The distinction between a more-
general request giving a time frame, a location by district, and a type of offense 
versus a more-specific request providing a date, address, and type of offense is a 
distinction without a difference.  In both cases, Cleveland must conduct a search 
of the database to find the police-incident-report numbers. 
{¶ 64} Because Shaughnessy used Cleveland’s public-records-request 
form and provided Cleveland with the specific information for the records he 
sought and Cleveland did not reject the request as being vague or overly broad, 
ask Shaughnessy to revise his request, or deny the request with explanation, the 
public-records requests in counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the complaint were proper.  
Therefore, I dissent.  Because the totality of the evidence demonstrates that 
Cleveland has the ability to prepare records responsive to requests similar to those 
in counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the complaint in three to five days, I would hold that 
the eight-business-day standard established in Wadd is reasonable.  Therefore, I 
would grant the writ of mandamus as to counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the complaint 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
24 
and order Cleveland to produce responsive records to future similar written 
public-records requests within eight business days.  Moreover, I would grant 
Shaughnessy $2,000 in statutory damages pursuant to R.C. 149.43(C)(2). 
_________________ 
Matthew Shaughnessy, pro se. 
 
Barbara A. Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, and Shawn M. 
Mallamad, Assistant Director of Law, for respondents. 
_________________