Case Title: Lucero v. Holbrook

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0062

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
KATRINA LUCERO and EL and IL, by and through their next Friend, Guardian and Mother, KATRINA LUCERO v. NANETTE HOLBROOK2012 WY 152Case Number: S-12-0062Decided: 11/30/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2012 
 
KATRINA 
LUCERO and EL and IL, by and through their next Friend, Guardian and Mother, 
KATRINA LUCERO,Appellants(Plaintiffs),v.NANETTE 
HOLBROOK,Appellee(Defendant).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Natrona County
The Honorable 
Catherine E. Wilking, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellants:
John I. Henley of 
Henley Law Firm, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Julie 
Nye Tiedeken and Brian J. Hunter of McKellar, Tiedeken 
& Scoggin, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Tiedeken.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN,* HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
*Justice Golden 
retired effective September 30, 2012.
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      
Nanette Holbrook, the appellee, left her car unattended with the 
motor running in her private driveway while she briefly returned to her home to 
retrieve her pocketbook.  In the 
interim, Colbey Emms (Emms), a methamphetamine 
user, stole her vehicle.  Emms later got into a 
high-speed chase with the police, which ended when the car he was driving 
collided with a vehicle driven by Katrina Lucero (Lucero), one of the 
appellants, and mother of EL and IL, also appellants.  Lucero 
filed a complaint on behalf of herself and her children alleging that 
the appellee breached a duty to them of due care by leaving her car 
unattended with the keys in the ignition.  The district court 
granted the appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that 
no duty was owed to the appellants under either the common law or by statute, 
and that the appellee’s leaving of her keys in her car with the 
motor running was not the proximate cause of the accident.  We 
affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      
Did the district court appropriately grant the appellee’s 
motion for summary judgment?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      
On the morning of December 18, 2009, the appellee got 
into her car, started the engine, and pulled the car out of her garage and onto 
her driveway as she was preparing to leave her home to go to work.  
She soon realized that she had forgotten her purse and returned to her 
home to retrieve it, leaving the car doors unlocked and engine 
running.  Within approximately three minutes, 
the appellee returned to the driveway only to find the car 
missing.  She quickly returned to the house and called 911 to 
report that her car had been stolen.
 
[¶4]      
The appellee testified that she did not see anyone suspicious 
in the vicinity of her driveway at the time that she had returned to the 
house.  Nevertheless, Emms stole her vehicle 
during the appellee’s brief absence.  The police 
located Emms driving the stolen vehicle and made contact 
with Emms who then attempted to flee.  This 
evolved into a high-speed chase.  The chase ended soon 
after Emms collided with Lucero, who was driving with her two 
children, ages six months and five years, to her mother’s house.  
Lucero and her children suffered serious 
injuries.  Emms was under the influence of 
methamphetamine at the time of the accident.
 
[¶5]      
The appellants filed a complaint in district court alleging that the 
appellee, by leaving the keys in the ignition of her unattended vehicle, 
was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries 
incurred by the appellants.  In response, 
the appellee filed a motion for summary judgment which the district 
court granted, finding that (1) the appellee owed the appellants no 
duty of care under the circumstances either by statute or under the common law, 
and (2) the appellee’s act of leaving the keys in the ignition was 
not the proximate cause of the appellants’ injuries.  The 
appellants now appeal that decision.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶6]      
Although summary judgment is disfavored in negligence actions, summary 
judgment will be affirmed where the record fails to show the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact.  Uinta Cnty. v. 
Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶ 11, 286 P.3d 138, 142 (Wyo. 
2012).  “The existence of duty is a question of law, making an 
absence of duty the surest route to summary judgment in negligence 
actions.”  Erpelding v. 
Lisek, 2003 WY 80, ¶ 13, 71 P.3d 754, 757 (Wyo. 2003) 
(quoting Daily v. Bone, 906 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Wyo. 
1995)).
 
We treat the summary 
judgment movant's motion as though it has been presented originally 
to us.  We use the same materials in the record that was 
before the district court.  Using the materials in the record, 
we examine them from the vantage point most favorable to the nonmoving party 
opposing the motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences 
which may fairly be drawn from the materials. . . .  If doubt 
exists about the presence of genuine issues of material fact after we have 
reviewed the record, we resolve that doubt against the movant.
 
Shafer v. TNT Well 
Serv., Inc., 2012 WY 126, ¶ 
8, 285 P.3d 958, 961 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting Lamar Outdoor 
Adver. v. Farmers Co-op Oil Co., 2009 WY 112, ¶ 10, 
215 P.3d 296, 300 (Wyo. 2009) (internal citations 
omitted)).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶7]      
Negligence occurs when one fails to act as would a reasonable person of 
ordinary prudence under like 
circumstances.  Keehn v. Town of 
Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 114 (Wyo. 1992).  
More specifically, to establish negligence, the following must be 
shown:
 
(1) The defendant 
owed the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care, (2) the 
defendant breached the duty of care, (3) the defendant’s breach of the duty of 
care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, and (4) the injury sustained by 
the plaintiff is compensable by money damages.
 
Hatton v. Energy 
Elec. Co., 2006 WY 151, ¶ 10, 
148 P.3d 8, 13 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc,, 
2002 WY 113, ¶ 8, 50 P.3d 697, 701 (Wyo. 2002)).  
Duty and breach of duty must be established before addressing causation 
and the tortfeasor’s responsibility for any harm 
suffered.  See Halpern v. 
Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 565 (Wyo. 
1995); Sapone v. Grand Targhee, Inc., 
308 F.3d 1096, 1103 (10th Cir. 2002).  “Elements 
(1) and (2), duty and breach of duty, address whether the conduct of the 
alleged tortfeasor was in fact negligent.  Element 
(3), proximate cause, is considered only after negligence is first established 
to determine whether the tortfeasor should be legally responsible 
for his negligence.”  Keehn, 
834 P.2d  at 115.  Proximate cause addresses the 
scope of a defendant’s liability and is a question of fact for the 
factfinder, and less appropriate for a summary judgment 
action.  Restatement (Third) of Torts § 7 (2010).
 
[¶8]      
A duty may arise based upon the existence of a contract, a statute, or 
the common law, “or when the relationship of the parties is such that the law 
imposes an obligation on the defendant to act reasonably for the protection of 
the plaintiff.”  Killian v. Caza Drilling, 
Inc., 2006 WY 42, ¶ 8, 131 P.3d 975, 980 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting 
Hamilton v. Natrona County Educ. Ass’n, 901 P.2d 381, 
384 (Wyo. 1995)).  The appellee clearly had no 
contractual relationship with the appellants, nor did the appellants have a 
special or particular relationship with the appellee beyond all 
being members of the public.  Regarding the existence of a 
statutory duty, the appellants argue in their reply brief that the following 
statute creates a duty which the appellee breached:
 
§ 31-5-509. 
Requirements before leaving motor vehicle unattended.
 
            
No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to 
stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, 
removing the key from the ignition, effectively setting the brake thereon and, 
when standing upon any grade, turning the front wheels to the curb or side of 
the highway.
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-509 (LexisNexis 2011).  This statute does not, however, 
apply to motor vehicles parked in private driveways.  Chapter 
5 is entitled “Regulation of Traffic on Highways.”  The 
statute is clear regarding its applicability: “The provisions of this act 
relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of 
vehicles upon highways except: (i) Where a different place is 
specifically referred to in a given section[.]”  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-5-103 (LexisNexis 2011).  Because “a different 
place” is not referenced in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-509, the statute applies only 
to vehicles “stand[ing] unattended” upon a highway.
 
[¶9]      
The Act defines “highway” and “street” synonymously as being “the entire 
width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained or if not 
publicly maintained, dedicated to public use when any part thereof is open to 
the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel[.]”  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-102(a)(xlix) (LexisNexis 2011).  
The appellants suggest, with little analysis, that 
the appellee’s driveway is “open to the use of the public for 
purposes of vehicular travel.”  We find this contention 
unsupported by law or logic.  The appellants point out that 
the harm that may occur where a car is left in a condition violating Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-5-509 on private property is similar, if not identical, to the harm 
that may occur by leaving a car in the same condition on a public 
highway.  That may very well be the case.  
The legislature was specific, however, in limiting the application of 
this statute to public highways.  “Where statutory language 
conveys a clear and definite meaning, this court neither faces the need nor 
acquires the license to construe the statute.”  State v. 
Curtis, 2002 WY 120, ¶ 8, 51 P.3d 867, 869 (Wyo. 
2002).  As we have said many times, if the legislature wanted 
to make the statute more general in its applicability, it could have done 
so.
 
[¶10]   
The existence of a duty as derived from the common law is a more 
complicated matter.  As the appellants discuss, this Court has 
relied upon a number of factors in determining whether the common law creates a 
duty of care.  
 
Some of the key 
policy factors to be considered are: (1) the foreseeability of harm 
to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) 
the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the 
defendant, (7) the consequences to the community and the court system, and (8) 
the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk 
involved.
 
Gates v. 
Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986).  Despite the appellants’ arguments 
to the contrary, we find that the balancing of these factors weighs against the 
imposition of a duty of care owed to the appellants by the 
appellee.
 
[¶11]   
In their brief, the appellants point out that the appellee 
admitted that there is a heightened risk of car theft when keys are left in a 
vehicle.  Tort liability, however, requires that the harm that 
befell a plaintiff was foreseeable by the tortfeasor.  
Id. at 196.  In the case at hand, for instance, 
the appellants must show that the injuries they incurred were foreseeable by the 
appellee, rather than that the car theft was foreseeable.  
We have recently discussed the importance of foreseeability 
in establishing common law negligence:
 
Many factors inform 
the duty analysis, but the most important consideration is 
foreseeability.  Generally a defendant owes a duty of 
care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct 
with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably 
dangerous.  Foreseeability establishes a 'zone of 
risk,’ which is to say that it forms a basis for assessing whether the conduct 
creates a generalized and foreseeable risk of harming others.
 
Glenn v. Union Pac. 
R.R. Co., 2011 WY 126, ¶ 
34, 262 P.3d 177, 193 (Wyo. 2011) 
(quoting Beugler v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Ry., 490 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 2007)).  
Glenn, a coal mine employee, was injured by falling coal when he opened 
the unlocked dump doors of a rail car.  Id. at ¶ 7, at 
181.  We agreed with the district court that such an injury 
was foreseeable “[g]iven the uncomplicated nature of the 
accident.”  Id. at ¶ 36, at 194.  
“One needs only a basic familiarity with the law of gravity to anticipate 
that heavy material precariously perched on an unlocked door may come down with 
unfortunate consequences.”  Id.
 
[¶12]   
Such scientific simplicity was not at work in the case at 
hand.  It is not sufficient to say that merely because 
something did happen, the result was foreseeable.  The 
injuries suffered by the appellants were not a natural consequence of the 
actions of the appellee, as was the case in Glenn.  
It was not as if the appellee left her car at the top of a 
hill with the parking brake disengaged, and the car rolled downward, injuring a 
passerby.  The appellee momentarily left her car 
running in her own private driveway.  In that brief interim, a 
methamphetamine user came upon the vehicle, trespassed on 
the appellee’s property, and stole her car.  After 
the car was reported stolen, the police located the thief with the vehicle and 
pursued him in a high-speed chase.  That chase tragically 
ended in a violent car accident.  We cannot say that the 
appellants’ injuries resulting from a subsequent high-speed chase were a 
foreseeable consequence of the appellee’s act of momentarily leaving 
her car unattended in her driveway.
 
[¶13]   
The closeness of the connection between the injury suffered and 
the appellee’s conduct is a corollary of 
foreseeability.  Foreseeability addresses 
whether the harm incurred was a natural consequence of the 
alleged tortfeasor’s actions.  The closeness of 
the connection between the injury and the conduct is related to causation and 
contemplates whether any intervening conduct contributed to the 
harm.  In Sorensen v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., State 
Farm alleged that Sorensen, the owner of, but not the driver of, a vehicle 
involved in a car accident with State Farm’s insured drivers, violated Wyoming 
law by failing to maintain liability insurance on her vehicle.  
2010 WY 101, ¶ 2, 234 P.3d 1233, 1235 (Wyo. 
2010).  We held that Sorensen owed no duty of care under 
statute or the common law.  Id. at ¶ 38, at 
1244.  In our analysis of the Gates factors listed 
above, see supra ¶ 10, we found that the damages incurred were closely 
connected with the driver’s failure to exercise reasonable care in the operation 
of the vehicle, rather than to Sorensen’s failure to maintain 
insurance.  Id. at ¶ 29, at 1242.
 
[¶14]   
It is true that the appellee’s act of leaving her car’s motor 
running while she briefly returned to her home contributed to a chain of events 
that ended in a motor vehicle accident between the appellants and the car 
thief.  The appellee’s conduct, however, was not 
sufficiently connected to the harm incurred to find that 
the appellee had a duty to prevent that harm.
 
[¶15]   
Regarding the third factor, there is no doubt that the appellants were 
injured.
 
[¶16]   
Moral blame results from misconduct more extreme than ordinary 
negligence.  Erpelding, 2003 WY 80, ¶ 26, 
71 P.3d  at 759.  Such culpability may result where 
the alleged tortfeasor “is the party best in the position to prevent 
injury.”  Larsen v. Banner Health Sys., 2003 WY 167, ¶ 
30, 81 P.3d 196, 205 (Wyo. 2003).  We cannot agree 
with the appellants that the appellee “essentially 
deliver[ed] [the] vehicle” to a drug-impaired thief.  
The fact that the appellee’s conduct may have contributed in 
some way to the accident that occurred does not make her morally 
culpable.  Certainly, Emms, who was driving the vehicle 
at a high rate of speed in an attempt to elude the police, was in a better 
position to prevent the harm to the appellants than was the 
appellee.  In truth, the same can be said about the 
police officer or officers involved in the pursuit.  And 
sadly, the same can even be said about Lucero because the accident occurred at 
an intersection that Lucero entered against a red light.
 
[¶17]   
While the harm suffered by the appellants in the instant case would not 
have occurred if the appellee had removed her keys from the 
ignition, these circumstances are so unique that imposing a duty upon every 
Wyoming resident not to leave a car in the driveway with the motor running will 
not likely prevent future harm such as this.  We say this 
primarily because, as the district court found, even if we recognized the 
existence of a duty, there simply is no proximate cause connection between the 
acts of the appellee and the harm to the appellants.
 
In order for 
proximate cause to exist, “the accident or injury must be the natural and 
probable consequence of the act of negligence.”  Foote v. 
Simek, 2006 WY 96, ¶ 22, 139 P.3d 455, 463 (Wyo. 
2006).  In fact, “[t]he ultimate test of proximate cause 
is foreseeability of injury.  In order to qualify 
as a legal cause, the conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing about the 
plaintiff’s injuries.”  Foote, ¶ 22, 
139 P.3d  at 464.  In our consideration of cases 
involving proximate cause, we have discussed not only what constitutes proximate 
cause, but also what does not:
 
In Lemos 
v. Madden, 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791, 793 (1921), this court first defined 
proximate cause as “[t]hat which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken 
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the 
result would not have occurred.”  This same definition has 
been relied upon in recent years.  Robertson v. TWP, 
Inc., 656 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1983); Kopriva v. 
Union Pacific R. Co., 592 P.2d 711 (Wyo. 1979). 
 In Lemos v. Madden, supra, 200 P. 
at 794, the court also rejected a “but for” rule of causation, 
stating:
 
“* * *  
But if the original wrong furnished only the condition or occasion, then 
it is the remote and not the proximate cause, notwithstanding the fact that 
there would have been no loss or injury but for such condition or occasion. * * 
*”
 
In later cases our 
court has identified legal causation as that conduct which is a substantial 
factor in bringing about the injuries identified in the complaint.  
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, Wyo. 666 P.2d 408 
(Wyo. 1983); Chrysler Corporation v. Todorovich, 
580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978); Phelps v. Woodward Construction 
Co., 66 Wyo. 33, 33, 204 P.2d 179 (Wyo. 1949).  
The obvious rationalization of that approach with the two propositions 
found in Lemos v. Madden, supra, is that if the 
conduct is “that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by a 
sufficient intervening cause produces the injury, without which the result would 
not have occurred,” it must be identified as a substantial factor in bringing 
about the harm.  If, however, it created only a condition or 
occasion for the harm to occur then it would be regarded as a remote, not a 
proximate, cause, and would not be a substantial factor in bringing about the 
harm.  An alternative method for explaining these concepts is 
found in the discussions of intervening cause in our cases.  
McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 
supra; Kopriva v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
supra; Gilliland v. Rhoads, 593 P.2d 1221 (Wyo. 1975); 
Fagan v. Summers, 498 P.2d 1227 (Wyo. 1972); and Tyler v. 
Jensen, 75 Wyo. 249, 295 P.2d 742 (Wyo. 1956).  
An intervening cause is one that comes into being after a 
defendant’s negligent act has occurred, and if it is not a foreseeable event it 
will insulate the defendant from liability.  It is reasonably 
foreseeable if it is a probable consequence of the defendant’s wrongful act or 
is a normal response to the stimulus of the situation created 
thereby.  Killian v. Caza Drilling, 
Inc, 2006 WY 42, ¶ 20, 131 P.3d 975, 985 (Wyo. 2006).
 
Collings v. 
Lords, 2009 WY 135, ¶ 6, 
218 P.3d 654, 656-57 (Wyo. 2009) (emphasis added).  
Under any statement or formulation of these tests, 
the appellee’s conduct in the instant case was not a proximate cause 
of the appellants’ injuries.
 
[¶18]   
The appellants argue that the appellee easily could have 
removed her keys from the ignition before returning to her house and that 
imposing a duty on the appellee to that extent would not impose a 
substantial burden.  The burden that this factor addresses is 
not, however, the effortlessness in removing the keys, but rather the burden 
that will result from imposing a duty not to leave the motor running temporarily 
in a vehicle parked in one’s driveway.  It must be remembered 
that the imposition of a duty not to leave the motor running in a vehicle in 
one’s driveway would apply across the board, and would create potential 
liability for every person in Wyoming who, on a cold winter day, starts his or 
her car to warm it up and defrost the windshield before driving upon the public 
highways.
 
[¶19]   
Finally, the appellants present no facts or analysis indicating whether 
motor vehicle insurance covering these circumstances--harm caused by the theft 
of one’s vehicle left with its motor running in a private driveway--is 
available, prevalent, or costly.  We will not, therefore, 
consider this factor.
 
[¶20]   
Our task here is to determine whether the interest of the appellants who 
have “suffered invasion [were] entitled to legal protection at the hands of the” 
appellee.  Daniels v. Carpenter, 2003 WY 11, ¶ 
21, 62 P.3d 555, 563 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Duncan v. Afton, 
Inc., 991 P.2d 739, 742 (Wyo. 1999)).  We 
conclude that, under the facts presented as analyzed under Gates, 
the appellee did not owe the appellants a duty of care. 
 And even if such a duty was recognized, the acts of 
the appellee were not the proximate cause of the appellants’ harm. 
 The district court properly granted summary 
judgment.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶21]   
The appellee’s conduct was not proscribed by statute and 
therefore does not result in the violation of a statutory duty of 
care.  The harm suffered was not a foreseeable consequence of 
the appellee’s conduct, nor was it closely connected to the 
conduct.  The appellee’s actions are not deserving 
of moral blame.  Imposing a duty on the appellee 
under these circumstances would substantially burden her and Wyoming residents 
in general.  We conclude that the appellee did not 
owe the appellants a common law duty of care to protect them from the harm that 
occurred in this case, and we therefore affirm the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment.