Case Title: Dewsnup v. Farmers Ins. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S057895

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: September 16, 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
BETH DEWSNUP
AND TIM DEWSNUP,
Petitioners on Review,
v.
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 06CV4790CC; CA
A136394; SC S057895)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted June 8, 2010.
Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, argued the cause
and filed the brief for petitioners on review.  With her on the brief was Robert
E.L. Bonaparte.
Beth Cupani, Maloney Lauerdorf Reiner PC, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her on the
brief was Francis J. Maloney III.
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Balmer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Linder, J., joined.
*Appeal from Douglas County Circuit Court, Randolph Garrison, Judge. 229 Or App 314, 211 P3d 354 (2009).
KISTLER, J.
The primary question
in this case is what is a "roof" within the meaning of plaintiffs'
homeowners' insurance policy.  Plaintiffs Beth and Tim Dewsnup sustained losses
due to water damage while their roof was undergoing repair.  Although their
insurance policy generally excludes coverage for water damage, they contended
that an exception to that exclusion applies.  The trial court ruled otherwise
on defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Dewsnup v. Farmers Ins. Co., 229 Or App 314, 324, 211 P3d 354 (2009). 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the exception to the water damage exclusion
did not apply because, at the time of the loss, plaintiffs' roof was not a
"roof" within the meaning of the policy.  Id.  In particular,
the court held that a "roof," by its ordinary definition, is
permanent, and because plaintiffs' roof was undergoing repair at the time of
the loss, no permanent roof was in place to which the exception could apply.  Id. 
We allowed plaintiffs' petition for review and now reverse the Court of Appeals
decision and the trial court's judgment.
Because this case
arises on defendant's motion for summary judgment, we state the facts in the
light most favorable to plaintiffs.  Bergmann v. Hutton, 337 Or 596,
599, 101 P3d 353 (2004).  Plaintiffs' roof, which consisted of a plywood
sublayer and an outer layer of wood shakes, was in need of repair.  Plaintiff
Tim Dewsnup is a contractor and took it upon himself to perform the repairs. 
In doing so, he removed the layer of wood shakes in its entirety, replacing it
with a layer of six-mil-thick polyethylene plastic that completely covered the
plywood sublayer beneath.(1) 
The polyethylene sheets(2)
were secured to the plywood sublayer with one-half-inch long T-50 staples located
at the center of each sheet.  The edges of the polyethylene layer were secured
with roof tacks driven through plastic washers to prevent tearing.  The edges
were further secured with wooden bats spaced at 24 to 30 inches on center. 
According to plaintiffs' expert, the polyethylene sheets were secured in such a
way that they "would have been adequate to protect [plaintiffs'] home for
one or two years if necessary under normal circumstances." 
On the first night
of plaintiffs' roof repair project, a storm moved through the area.  Rising
winds caused part of the polyethylene sheeting to loosen and eventually blow
away.  Tim Dewsnup attempted to replace the sheeting but, in doing so, fell off
of the house, taking one or more of the plastic sheets with him to the ground. 
Dewsnup injured himself when he fell.  While he was injured and unable to secure
the sheets over the now-exposed areas of the plywood sublayer, rain began to
enter the home through the joints in the sublayer.  The rain caused water
damage to plaintiffs' personal property inside the home, for which plaintiffs
filed an insurance claim.  Defendant denied the claim on the ground that water
damage was excluded under plaintiffs' policy. 
Plaintiffs brought
an action in the trial court for breach of contract.  In response, defendant
moved for summary judgment, claiming that plaintiffs' insurance policy excluded
loss resulting from water damage.  Defendant reasoned that water damage is
generally excluded except when a windstorm or hail creates an opening in a
roof.  Defendant contended that, because the polyethylene "tarp" was
not a "roof," the policy did not cover plaintiffs' water damage. 
Alternatively, defendant argued that, to the extent that the plastic tarp could
be considered a "roof," the loss resulted from "faulty or
inadequate workmanship" and was, for that reason, also excluded from
coverage under the policy. 
The trial court
granted defendant's summary judgment motion.  Rather than doing so on the
grounds set forth by defendant, the court interpreted plaintiffs' insurance
policy to cover only the "dwelling" described in the policy
declarations; that is, a dwelling of "frame" construction with a
"wood shingle or shake" roof.  According to the trial court, at the
moment plaintiffs removed the wood shakes, the building was no longer the
"dwelling" insured under the policy.  As a result, coverage was not
merely excluded under the circumstances; coverage simply did not exist.  The
trial court accordingly entered judgment in defendant's favor.
On appeal, the Court
of Appeals rejected the trial court's conclusion that, by removing the wood
shakes, the entire structure was no longer insured under the policy.  The court
reasoned that no plausible interpretation of the insurance policy supported
such a conclusion, pointing out that "[i]f, for example, the policy
happened to describe the house as having been painted white, the fact that the
owners later decided to paint it yellow would not mean that the house would no
longer be covered."  Dewsnup, 229 Or App at 320.  The Court of
Appeals reasoned that the policy declarations should not be construed as
"condition[s] of coverage." Id. (emphasis omitted).
The Court of Appeals
nevertheless affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that "in no
reasonable sense would the sheet of plastic constitute [a] roof."  Id. at
322.  Noting that the policy did not define the term "roof," the
court looked to the ordinary meaning of the terms "roof" and
"roofing" and determined that, "[a]s defined, 'roofing' is the
outermost layer of the cover of a building and consists of materials that are
suitable for construction and for application to a roof as protection from the
weather."  Id. at 321-22 (emphasis omitted).  According to the
court, "a temporary, plastic sheet * * * is not, itself, a 'roof'
or part of the roof," id. (emphasis added); rather, the sheet was
simply a temporary protective covering in place of an actual roof, and
therefore, the loss was not covered.  Because the court found its definition of
"roof" dispositive, it did not address defendant's alternative grounds
for affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
We allowed
plaintiffs' petition for review to consider what constitutes a "roof"
within the meaning of plaintiffs' insurance policy and whether, viewing the facts
in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a reasonable juror could find that
plaintiffs' roof came within that definition.  We begin with the meaning of the
term "roof" in plaintiffs' policy.
The insurance policy
at issue here, like other insurance policies, is organized in terms of
coverages and exclusions; in this policy, the coverage clauses bring certain
property within the protection of the policy, while the exclusion clauses deny
protection to property that, but for the circumstances to which the particular
exclusion applies, would otherwise be covered.  See Cimarron Ins. Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 224 Or 57, 61, 355 P2d 742 (1960)
(distinguishing coverage and exclusion clauses in the context of an automobile
insurance policy).  The policy also contains exceptions to the exclusions and
specifies the particular circumstances in which those exceptions apply. 
Generally speaking, this case turns on an interpretation of one specific
exception to the policy's exclusion of water damage from general coverage.  For
the sake of clarity, we begin by describing the content of the policy in terms
of its organizational structure.
The general coverage
clauses in plaintiffs' insurance policy are found in the section entitled
"LOSSES INSURED."  These clauses extend coverage to plaintiffs'
"[d]welling," to "[s]eparate structures," and to certain
personal property located within the dwelling or separate structures. 
Exclusions from that coverage are listed in the section entitled "SECTION
I -- LOSSES NOT INSURED."  The policy excludes coverage for water damage,
but provides exceptions to that exclusion.  It states, in part:
"Whenever water damage occurs, the resulting loss is
always excluded under this policy, however caused; except we do cover:
* * * * *
"2.    Loss
or damage to the interior of any dwelling or separate structures, or to
personal property inside the dwelling or separate structures caused by water
damage if the dwelling or separate structures first sustain loss or damage
caused by a peril described under SECTION I -- LOSSES INSURED -- Coverage C --
Personal Property."
The perils described under "SECTION I --
LOSSES INSURED -- Coverage C -- Personal Property" include
"[w]indstorm or hail."(3) 
Where "loss to property contained in a building" is sustained, as is
the case here, coverage is limited to situations where "the direct force
of wind or hail damages the building causing an opening in a roof or
wall and the rain, snow, sleet, sand or dust enters through this opening." 
(Emphasis added.)
The practical effect
of this string of coverages, exclusions, and exceptions is that, for coverage
to extend to water damage, the "direct force of wind or hail" must
first damage a building by causing an opening in a roof.  Only if rain enters
the building through that opening and causes damage to personal property
contained in the building will the policy cover that loss.  It necessarily
follows, and the parties agree, that the building must first have a
"roof" in order for the exception to the water damage exclusion to
apply.  That raises the question:  What is a "roof?" -- a question
that entails two related but separate issues.  First, what is the meaning of
the term "roof," as used in plaintiffs' insurance policy?  Second,
could an objectively reasonable juror, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to plaintiffs, find that the condition of the plaintiffs' roof at the
time of the water damage came within that definition?
On the first issue,
plaintiffs contend that, contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, the
plain meaning of the term "roof" does not include a durational component. 
More specifically, plaintiffs argue that nothing in the definition of
"roof" requires that it be permanent.  On that point, plaintiffs note
that the policy expressly authorized them to "make * * * repairs to the
residence" and that the Court of Appeals' reasoning would effectively read
that authorization out of the policy.  Defendant, on the other hand, contends
that a "roof" must be permanent and relies on three cases to support
that contention.  Defendant argues alternatively that polyethylene plastic
sheeting cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a roof.
In interpreting the
meaning of an insurance policy, "'[t]he primary and governing rule * * *
is to ascertain the intention of the parties.'"  Hoffman Construction
Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 313 Or 464, 469, 836 P2d 703 (1992)
(quoting Totten v. New York Life Ins. Co., 298 Or 765, 770, 696 P2d 1082
(1985) (brackets in Hoffman)).  To that end, we examine the terms and
conditions of the policy, Groshong v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 329
Or 303, 307, 985 P2d 1284 (1999) (citing Interstate Fire v. Archdiocese of
Portland, 318 Or 110, 117, 864 P2d 346 (1993)), and where a particular term
is not defined in the contract, we begin by identifying that term's plain
meaning.  Groshong at 308.  If the term has no plain meaning; that is,
if the term is ambiguous, we examine that term within the context of the policy
as a whole.  Hoffman, 313 Or at 470.  If two or more plausible
interpretations still remain, we construe the term against the drafter and in favor
of the insured.  Id. at 470-71.  Accordingly, because the policy
does not define "roof," we begin by asking whether that term has a
plain meaning.
Without a definition
of the term "roof" in the policy, both parties look to the dictionary
to identify its plain meaning.  According to Webster's, the term
"roof" means "the outside cover of a building or structure
including the roofing and all materials and construction necessary to maintain
the cover upon its walls or other support."  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary 1971 (unabridged ed 2002).  The term "roofing," in
turn, is defined as:
"a material used or suitable for the construction of a
roof; specif : a material designed for application to a roof as
protection from the weather  
."
Id.  The
terms enclosed in the angle brackets -- "slate [roofing],"
"aluminum [roofing]," and "mineral-surfaced [roofing]" -- serve
as "verbal illustrations," illustrating appropriate uses of the term
"roofing" in context.  See id. at 17a (describing the
purpose of examples following a definition). 
The ordinary meaning
of the terms "roof" and "roofing" do not expressly require that
a roof must be permanent, as defendant argues.  To be sure, a "roof,"
which consists, in part, of "roofing" materials, should be reasonably
suitable to "maintain a cover upon [a building's] walls" in order to
serve its function.  See id. at 1971 (so defining the term). 
"Roofing," to do the same, must provide some level of
"protection from the weather."  See id.  Taken together, those
definitions imply requirements of structural integrity and protection from the
elements; those are functional elements, not necessarily durational ones.  No
roof is permanent.  When a roof is sufficiently durable to serve the functional
purposes described above, it is still a "roof" within the ordinary
understanding of that term, even if it is not necessarily permanent.
Defendant, however,
relies on three cases to support its argument that a roof, by its plain
meaning, must be permanent:  Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. New Buena Vista Hotel
Co., 199 Miss 585, 24 So 2d 848 (1946); Diep v. California Fair Plan Ass'n,
15 Cal App 4th 1205, 19 Cal Rptr 2d 591 (1993); and Aginsky v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 409 F Supp 2d 1230 (D Or 2005).  In our view, those
cases provide less support than defendant perceives, and the most persuasive of
the three cases cuts against defendant's position.  We discuss those cases at
greater length than we ordinarily would because we think that the reasoning in
those cases helps put the issue in this case in perspective. 
The first case, Camden
Fire Ins. Ass'n, cuts in plaintiffs' favor in one respect.  The roof in
that case was a flat composition roof, composed of a pine sublayer, five layers
of alternating felt and pitch, and a gravel layer on top.  24 So 2d at 849.  In
the course of repairing the roof, the plaintiffs' contractor cut a
12-by-46-foot opening in the roof, down to the pine sublayer.  Id.  When
a storm came up suddenly, only two layers of felt, unsecured by any pitch, had
been placed over half of the opening.  Id.  The workers sought to cover
the remainder of the opening by covering it with felt and "casting
themselves upon [the felt], seeking to h[o]ld it against the wind and
rain."  Id.  Their efforts proved unsuccessful, and the building's
owner brought a claim for damage caused by water entering through the opening
that the contractor had cut in the roof, under an insurance policy
substantially similar to the policy at issue here.
In resolving that
claim, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the building did not have a
"roof" within the meaning of the policy.  Id. at 850.  The
court noted that "[s]uch a so-called roof would not be a roof, but only a
part thereof * * *." Id.  In reaching that conclusion, the court in
Camden did not hold that a roof must be permanent.  Rather, the court
concluded that, in order to constitute a "roof,"
"its construction or reconstruction must have reached the
point where a reasonably prudent householder would consider it, if left in that
condition for a month or months, or longer, as adequate against all risks of
wind and rain which could be reasonably anticipated as likely to happen
according to the general and recurrent experiences of the past * * *."
Id.  As we
read the court's decision in Camden, it adopted a functional definition
of a roof that required that the construction or reconstruction be sufficient
to protect against the elements and sufficiently durable to last a month or
more.  The court concluded that no reasonable juror could find that a layer or
two of felt, without anything to seal or secure it, would come within that
functional definition.   
Camden cuts
against defendant's position in two respects.  First, it does not hold that
construction or reconstruction must provide a permanent seal against the
weather to qualify as a roof.  Its temporal requirements are far more modest.  Second,
the court was careful in Camden to examine the nature and construction
of the roof.  As it noted, the purported "roof" in that case
consisted of only the pine sublayer, not both the pine sublayer and a
waterproof covering.  The court made clear that, under the facts in that case,
the pine sublayer, either by itself or with an insecure layer of felt, did not
serve the function of a roof and therefore did not bring the loss within the
scope of the exception to the water damage exclusion.  See id. at
850 ("Such a so-called roof would not be a roof, but only a part thereof,
as are the rafters, or the sheeting on the rafters."
The second case
relied on by defendant, the California Court of Appeals decision in Diep,
appears at first glance to provide greater support for defendant's argument.  However,
the court's cursory description of the facts makes it difficult to determine
the breadth of its holding.  The court explained in Diep only that a
contractor had "removed a portion of [a warehouse] roof and covered the
opening with plastic sheeting."  19 Cal Rptr 2d at 592.  The decision
contains no further discussion of the nature of the opening in the roof or the
way in which the plastic sheeting covered it; for instance, the decision omits
any explanation whether the sheeting was securely attached to a plywood
sublayer, as in this case, or was simply thrown over an otherwise gaping hole. 
There is a suggestion in the opinion that the latter view of the facts is the
correct one.  See id. at 593 (explaining that "part of the roof was
missing, and [even the plaintiff] could not have considered [that] the plastic
sheeting constituted anything other than a nonstructural band-aid").(4)  But ultimately, the
opinion provides such a limited recitation of the facts that the breadth of its
holding is difficult to gauge.
Diep's
reasoning is similarly unhelpful.  In defining what constitutes a roof, the
court quoted three dictionary definitions, none of which contained any
durational component.  See id.  The court then added, "We could go
on, but a roof is commonly considered to be a permanent part of the structure
it covers."  Id.  The court in Diep thus deduced a
requirement of permanency from three sources that do not mention duration. 
Having done so, it then relied on the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Camden,
which defined a roof primarily in terms of its function.  Not only is the
court's reference to permanence unsupported, but its requirement that a roof be
permanent is inconsistent with its later reliance on Camden.  It
may be that on its facts, few of which are mentioned, the court reached the
correct result in Diep, but we do not find its reasoning persuasive.
In the third case
relied on by defendant, Aginsky, the district court noted that it was
"persuaded by the authority cited by [the insurer], and in particular by Diep,"
that a roof has to be a permanent structure.  409 F Supp 2d at 1236.  The court
accordingly concluded that a temporary tarp, put over a roof that had been
completely removed, could not be considered a roof. (5)  Id. at 1231,
1236.  The district court's decision in Aginsky provides support for
defendant's position that one essential quality of a roof is permanence. 
However, the district court in Aginsky relied particularly on Diep
in reaching that conclusion, and its conclusion is no more persuasive than the
authority on which it relied.
In our view, neither
Diep nor Aginsky provides persuasive support for defendant's
contention that a roof must be permanent, and Camden is at odds with
defendant's argument on that point.  Beyond that, we note that defendant does
not offer any explanation of what "permanent," in the context of a
roof, means.  It is not clear whether defendant defines "permanency"
as one to two years, five years, ten years, or more.  We find the term "permanent,"
in this context, unhelpful, and decline to set a necessarily arbitrary limit on
the length of time that a roof must last in order to qualify as such.  Rather,
a roof should be sufficiently durable to meet its intended purpose:  to cover
and protect a building against weather-related risks that reasonably may be
anticipated.  In our view, the meaning of the term "roof" is
sufficiently plain that we need go no further to define its meaning.  See
Hoffman, 313 Or at 470-71 (describing methodology for interpreting
insurance agreements).(6)
Having defined a
roof for the purposes of plaintiffs' insurance policy, the remaining issue is
whether no reasonable trier of fact could find that plaintiffs' roof came
within that definition.  See ORCP 47 C ("No genuine issue as to a
material fact exists if, based upon the record before the court viewed in a
manner most favorable to the adverse party, no objectively reasonable juror
could return a verdict for the adverse party * * *.").  On that issue, the
record before the trial court on defendant's motion for summary judgment showed
that plaintiffs' "roof," at the time of the storm, did not solely
consist of a "plastic tarp," as defendant argues.  Rather, it
consisted of a plywood sublayer, a six-mil-thick polyethylene covering, and a
system of staples, roof tacks, and wooden bats to secure the roof components in
place.  In plaintiffs' expert's opinion, the polyethylene sheeting was secured
to the plywood sublayer in such a way that it "would have been adequate to
protect the home for one or two years if necessary * * *."  The expert
further described the roof construction as "functionally permanent." 
Taking that evidence as true, as we must on review of defendant's motion for
summary judgment, we conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that
plaintiffs' roof was sufficiently durable to meet its intended purpose, which
was to provide protection from the elements while plaintiffs undertook the roof
repair work that the policy expressly authorized. 
Defendant's
remaining arguments reduce, in our view, to factual disagreements with plaintiffs'
expert's opinion.  Defendant contends that the "[t]he plastic tarp [p]laintiffs
adhered to the top of their house" cannot be a "material that can
protect the structure from the elements."  The only evidence in the record
says otherwise, however.  To the extent that defendant relies on the definition
of "roofing" in Webster's to argue that a "roof," in
order to function as such, must be composed of certain, specific materials, we
think it reads too much into that definition.  Webster's definition of
"roofing" includes "verbal illustrations," examples of
possible materials commonly used in the construction of a roof.  See Webster's
at 1971 (listing examples).  Those examples, however, are not intended to
be exhaustive, and the question whether a particular material is "suitable
for the construction of a roof" is a factual issue for the jury.  Given
the record before the trial court, we cannot say that no reasonable juror could
find that polyethylene sheeting, properly secured to a plywood sublayer, was
not suitable to protect the house for the duration of the repair.
Defendant argues
alternatively that, because the polyethylene sheeting suffered wind damage on
the first day of its use, it is "self-evident" that polyethylene
sheeting is not a suitable material for the construction of a roof.  Perhaps
defendant could ask a trier of fact to draw that inference, but defendant
cannot elevate a permissible factual inference to a legal rule.  Under
defendant's logic, if plaintiffs had used a commercially acceptable roofing
material (e.g., wood shakes) and if that covering had blown off on the
first evening after it was installed, then wood shakes could not be considered
a suitable material for use as roofing.  There are a multitude of reasons why a
roof may blow off on the first, second, or some successive day after its
installation.  Defendant errs in seeking to convert one of a multitude of
potential causes into the only possible cause of the breach in plaintiffs'
roof.  Certainly, nothing in this record requires the inference that defendant
contends we must draw.(7)
Given the record
before the trial court, we cannot say that no reasonable juror could find that
securing the polyethylene sheeting to the plywood sublayer constituted a roof
for the purposes of plaintiffs' homeowners' insurance policy.  It follows that
the primary ground on which defendant relies did not provide a basis for
granting summary judgment in its favor.  As noted, before the trial court,
defendant advanced an alternative ground for its summary judgment motion.  It
contended that, even if plaintiffs' roof could be considered a "roof"
within the meaning of the policy, the damage to plaintiffs' roof resulted from
"faulty or inadequate workmanship or materials" and was excluded from
coverage for that reason.  We turn to that argument, which, if correct, would
provide an alternative ground for affirming the Court of Appeals decision and
the trial court's judgment.
One section of the policy
denies coverage for losses caused by "[f]aulty, inadequate or defective *
* * workmanship, construction, * * * maintenance repair materials, * * * or
maintenance of part or all of any property * * *."  In response to defendant's
summary judgment motion, plaintiffs offered their expert's opinion that
"Tim Dewsnup's workmanship was neither faulty nor defective."  Taking
that statement as true, as we must on defendant's motion for summary judgment,
we conclude that it is sufficient to defeat defendant's alternative ground for
summary judgment.(8)
Plaintiffs did not
move for summary judgment.  Only defendant did.  For the reasons set out above,
we conclude that the trial court erred when it granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment.  It goes without saying that, on remand, the question whether
plaintiffs' roof constituted a roof within the meaning of the policy will
present a factual issue for the jury.  The same is true of the question whether
the workmanship was either faulty or defective.  We hold only that, on this
record, the grounds that defendant has raised do not provide a basis for
granting summary judgment in its favor.
The decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.  The judgment of the circuit court is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
BALMER, J.,
dissenting.
When interpreting an
insurance policy, Oregon courts examine the terms and conditions contained in
the policy to determine the intentions of the parties.  Groshong v. Mutual
of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 329 Or 303, 307, 985 P2d 1284 (1999).  In this case,
the majority concludes that the term "roof" in a homeowner's
insurance policy can include an arrangement of polyethylene plastic sheeting,
six one-thousandths of an inch thick, that the homeowner temporarily stapled to
the plywood sublayer of what had been his roof after removing the existing wood
shakes.(1) 
If the homeowner and a representative of the insurance company had examined the
house together before the policy was issued, observed temporary plastic
sheeting rather than wood shakes covering the sublayer, and discussed whether
the policy's term "roof" would apply to the temporary plastic
sheeting -- and thus that the policy would cover a loss from damage to the
plastic sheeting for the same premium that would cover a loss from damage to an
intact wood shingle or shake roof -- they undoubtedly would have agreed that it
did not.(2) 
It follows, in my view, that no reasonable juror could conclude that the term
"roof" in the policy includes the plastic sheeting at issue here. 
For that reason, I respectfully dissent.
The majority
accurately describes the coverage, exclusions, and exceptions that, when
considered together, determine the kinds of losses -- and the causes of those
losses -- that are covered by the policy at issue here.  The dispute is over
the meaning of the term "roof" as used in the policy.  
The majority begins
well enough with the proposition, "No roof is permanent." ___ Or at
___ (slip op at 8).  It certainly is true that, at some level, nothing human is
permanent, and, even at a more mundane level, we can all agree that house roofs
need to be replaced from time to time.  But the majority then jumps off a roof
of its own by declaring that the concept of permanency is "unhelpful"
in determining the definition of "roof."  Id. at ___ (slip op
at 12).  How can that be?  "Permanency" is one aspect of determining
whether the materials and arrangement of the covering of a dwelling constitute
a "roof," as that term is used in a homeowner's insurance policy. 
Simply put, there are differences in useful life -- as well as in strength and
imperviousness to the elements -- of plastic tarps used as the covering for a
dwelling, compared to a wood shake or shingle roof.
The majority instead
adopts what it calls a "functional approach" to defining a roof: 
"When a roof is sufficiently durable to serve the functional purposes [of
covering and protecting a building against weather-related risks], but is not
necessarily permanent, it is still a 'roof' within the ordinary understanding
of that term."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 8).  It is true, of
course, that, in some "ordinary" sense, any material that covers the
top of a structure is a "roof" -- whether it be a sheet of galvanized
steel over a backyard shed, a canvas tarp atop a tree house, or a piece of
plywood over a chicken coop.  But context is key, and here the term
"roof" is not used in an advertisement for a garden shed or an
ordinance setting standards for keeping chickens.  Rather, the context here is
a homeowner's insurance policy and, although the term itself is not
defined in the policy, it is a "term[ ] of a writing," and therefore is
"presumed to have been used in [its] primary and general
acceptation," ORS 42.250, in such a policy.  See Hoffman Construction
Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 313 Or 464, 470, 836 P2d 703 (1992) (When
examining a disputed term in an insurance policy, this court considers "the particular context in which that term
is used in the policy and the broader context of the policy as a whole."). 
The "functional approach" adopted by the majority glosses over the
context in which the term "roof" is used.(3)
This policy covers a
"dwelling" and describes the roof of the covered dwelling as
"wood shake or shingle."  No reasonable juror could conclude that the
insurer and the homeowner, when they entered into the insurance contract,
intended the term "roof," as it applies to this insured
"dwelling," to cover a single sheet of galvanized steel, a canvas
tarp, or a piece of plywood.  Similarly, no reasonable juror could conclude that
the parties intended the term "roof" to include the plastic tarps
that the homeowner stapled to the plywood sublayer after he removed the wood
shakes as a temporary measure until he could install new wood shakes.(4)
In deciding this
case, we must, of course, put to one side the fact that the plastic tarps at
issue here obviously did not adequately cover or protect the house -- indeed,
although the homeowner's expert stated that the arrangement "was adequate to
protect the home for one or two years in normal circumstances" and that it
was "functionally permanent," the plastic sheeting in fact was
partially blown off the very next day after the homeowner had installed it.(5)  We can also put to one side the
question of just how much difference there is between the concept of "permanent"
relied upon by the insurer and the Court of Appeals and the majority's concept
of "durable."
Even without those
considerations, the majority still returns to the very concept of permanency that
it had just rejected in relying on the opinion of the homeowner's expert that
the plastic sheeting stapled to the plywood was "functionally permanent." 
___ Or at ___ (slip op at 14) (quoting expert affidavit).  The expert's wording
reveals what should be apparent to all:  that no roof lasts forever, but that
homeowners and insurers routinely distinguish between materials and types of
construction that are intended to be "permanent" and materials
and types of construction that are intended to be
"temporary."  The majority, appropriately, does not want to decide
whether "permanency" is one or two years or five or ten.  ___ Or at
___ (slip op at 13).  And this case does not require us to make that
distinction.  Rather, notwithstanding the expert's affidavit, it is plain that
the plastic tarps were not intended to be permanent -- they were a temporary
expedient, which the homeowner installed on his own after he removed the shakes
as part of "replacing the roof."  In agreeing to provide coverage for
certain losses when the "roof" was damaged, the insurer did not
undertake the increased risk of insuring the kind of temporary covering that
the homeowner substituted for the roof referred to in the policy.  Because the
policy does not cover losses that resulted from damage to the covering at issue
here, the trial court correctly granted the insurer's motion for summary
judgment.
Linder, J., joins in this
dissenting opinion.
1. The
expert's affidavit states that the polyethylene plastic was "six
millimeter[s] thick," but defendant noted at oral argument that this
measurement should read "six mil."  A "mil" is a unit of
measurement commonly used to measure the thickness of plastic sheeting.  One
mil is equal to one one-thousandth of one inch. The question whether the
plastic was six mils or six millimeters thick is not essential to resolving the
issue on review.
2. The
record indicates that the polyethylene plastic layer was composed of multiple
sheets that, when placed adjacent to one another, completely covered the
plywood sublayer.  Specifically, the exhibit attached to plaintiffs' expert's
affidavit contains a diagram showing that three sheets were used to cover the
sublayer completely.
3. "SECTION
I -- LOSSES INSURED -- Coverage C -- Personal Property" provides coverage
for a second peril that plaintiffs assert also applies here: "Falling
objects."  The "[f]alling objects" clause generally excludes
coverage to personal property unless "the roof * * * is first damaged by a
falling object."  Plaintiffs argue that Tim Dewsnup was a "falling
object" when he fell from the roof, pulling a portion of the polyethylene
sheeting with him.  Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's
roof, while under repair, was not a roof within the meaning of the policy.  It
did not move for summary judgment on the ground that Dewsnup was not a falling
object.  Accordingly, we do not address that issue. 
4. Similarly,
the decision notes that even the plaintiff in Diep did not consider that
"'[the plastic sheeting], if left in that condition for a month or months,
or longer, [would be] adequate against all risks of wind and rain.'"  19
Cal Rptr 2d at 594 (quoting Camden, 24 So 2d at 850; first
brackets in original).
5. It
appears that the contractor in Aginsky first removed the roof of an
apartment building and put a tarp in its place.  409 F Supp 2d at 1231.  It is
not clear, however, from the decision what, if any, structural elements supported
the tarp.  The court noted only that the tarp was "burned up," id.,
which we assume means that the contractor used some heat source, such as a blow
torch, to seal the edges of the tarp to the sides of the building.  Because of
unexpected delays in completing the project, the contractor built a
"temporary roof structure," consisting of "installed walls and a
ridge and joisting system in the form of a pitched roof to run the water to the
outside of the building."  Id.  The contractor put that temporary
structure over the "original flat-tarped system [which it] also left in
place."  Id. 
6. Defendant
has not identified any other provisions in the policy that would lead to a
different understanding of the word "roof."  Under Hoffman,
even if another meaning were plausible, we would still adopt the interpretation
that favors the insured.  See 313 Or at 470-71 (describing methodology
for interpreting insurance agreements).
7. Defendant
advances a series of additional arguments that require only brief discussion. 
Defendant contends that, under its policy, there must be damage to the
building, but here there was no damage.  It argues alternatively that, even if
the building was damaged, the wind did not cause the damage; Tim Dewsnup did
when he removed the wood shakes and exposed the joints in the plywood
sublayer.  In a variation on the second argument, defendant contends that the
wind did not cause the opening in the roof; Dewsnup did when he removed the
wood shakes.  All those arguments assume, incorrectly on summary judgment, that
the polyethylene sheeting secured to the plywood sublayer either did not
constitute a roof or was not part of the building.
8. As
explained above, on this record defendant cannot prevail on summary judgment on
the ground that the loss was caused by "[f]aulty, inadequate, or defective
* * * maintenance repair materials."
1. In
his complaint, homeowner tellingly states that he had removed the shakes
because he was "replacing the roof."
2. To
be sure, the insurer might have been willing to provide coverage for the
dwelling and its contents, notwithstanding the fact that plastic sheeting
rather than wood shakes covered the sublayer, but the insurer likely would have
required a higher premium to offset the greater risk that the less robust
material would be damaged by a storm.
3. This
dissent responds to the analysis undertaken in the majority opinion.  One might
also question, however, the majority's premise that "whether a particular
material is 'suitable for the construction of a roof' is a factual issue for
the jury."  ___ Or at ___ (slip op at 14).  On the contrary, this court
has said that the interpretation of an insurance policy is "a question of
law."  Hoffman, 313 Or at 469.  Accordingly, as the Court of
Appeals concluded, the determination of whether the temporary covering over
plaintiff's house was a "roof" for purposes of the insurance policy
is for the court, not for the jury.  Certainly, if there was a dispute over
what the covering consisted of, when it was installed, or some other issue of
fact, that question would be for the jury.  But here, where there is no such
dispute, to submit to the jury the legal question of whether the covering came
within the meaning of the term "roof" in the policy seems inconsistent
with Hoffman.
4. The
majority reviews three cases cited by the insurer, which it either dismisses as
not persuasive because they rely on "permanency" as an aspect of a
"roof" -- a proposition that the majority had earlier rejected -- or
because they differ on the facts.  See, e.g., ___Or at ___ (slip op at
12) (distinguishing contrary holding in Aginsky v. Farmers Ins. Exchange,
409 F Supp 2d 1230 (D Or 2005), because the temporary roof structure,
consisting of walls and a ridge and joisting system, was put over a roof that
had been completely removed, in contrast to the plastic here that was attached
to the sublayer).  The majority ignores the larger point:  federal and state
courts around the country have held, on summary judgment, that a temporary
covering put in place while a "more permanent" roof is repaired or
replaced is not a "roof" for purposes of a homeowner's insurance
policy.  This court should follow those decisions. 
5. The
expert also inaccurately described the plastic sheeting as being six
millimeters thick, rather than six mils thick -- an error of approximately 3,930
percent.