Case Title: State v. Brown

Citation: 577 So. 2d 1256

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1991-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
577 So. 2d 1256 (1991)
STATE of Alabama
v.
James Clyde BROWN, et al.
89-1812.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 8, 1991.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Mary Elizabeth Culberson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
William J. Baxley and Joel F. Dillard of Baxley, Dillard & Dauphin, Birmingham, and J. Doyle Fuller and George L. Beck, Jr., Montgomery, for appellees.
David R. Boyd, W. Joseph McCorkle, Jr. and Dorman Walker of Balch & Bingham, Montgomery, amici curiae in support of the State.
SHORES, Justice.
This case is here after our remand of Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 585 (Ala.1990), to the trial court for the setting of attorneys fees. The Honorable Charles Price, Circuit Judge for Montgomery County, held a hearing and awarded the sum of $1,197,186.88 to the attorneys for the plaintiff class. The State of Alabama appeals. We affirm.
The class action that became Brown I[1] and Brown II[2] on earlier appeals, and now becomes Brown III, was an outgrowth of this Court's decision in Ex parte Dison, 469 So. 2d 662 (Ala.1984), which reversed a defendant's conviction for driving under the influence in violation of Code 1975, § 32-5A-191, because the Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint ("UTTC") issued to the defendant had not been verified before a judicial officer and the defendant had raised that issue at the time of trial.
A class action was filed by James Clyde Brown and Terry P. Duncan against the State of Alabama, the City of Montgomery, and others, on behalf of themselves and all those who were convicted of traffic offenses based upon improperly verified UTTCs. Two classes of plaintiffs were certified by the trial judge. Subclass A contained those persons whose tickets were not verified and that fact was apparent on the face of the ticket. Subclass B contained *1257 those persons whose UTTCs appeared to be properly verified on the face of the ticket but, in fact, were not. See Brown II, supra, at 586.
In Brown I, the trial judge entered a summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as to Subclass A only. On the authority of City of Dothan v. Holloway, 501 So. 2d 1136 (Ala.1986), this Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court as to Subclass A and remanded the cause.
The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims as to Subclass B. The trial judge dismissed the claims of Subclass B on the authority of the appeal in Brown I. This dismissal was appealed to this Court as Brown II. We affirmed the judgment of the trial court insofar as it denied the relief sought by the members of Subclass B. We did, however, award attorney fees to the plaintiff class, explaining as follows:
"....
565 So. 2d  at 590-91. We then remanded the case to the trial court for proceedings to determine the amount of attorney fees to be awarded. The question before the trial court was not whether to award attorney fees, but what amount should be awarded.
A hearing was held on September 4, 1990, to determine the amount of these fees. The State of Alabama did not file a motion for a new trial; instead, it filed a notice of appeal from the order awarding fees.
On appeal, the State attempts to reargue Brown II. It contends that the plaintiff class was not entitled to attorney fees as a matter of law, and second, that the plaintiff class was not entitled to attorney fees because the plaintiffs did not prevail. These are the same matters that were the subject of the State's application for rehearing in Brown II. Rule 40, A.R. App.P., prohibits us from revisiting these issues.
We observed in Glasscock v. Wallace, 488 So. 2d 1346 (Ala.1986), that an attempt *1258 in a subsequent appeal to overturn a ruling on an issue that has been decided in a prior appeal is improper. We stated as follows:
488 So. 2d 1348.
Accordingly, the only issue before us is whether the award of attorney fees was excessive. The record reflects that Judge Price held a hearing on the matter on September 4, 1990, and issued this order:
*1259 "One expert witness testified for each of the parties, affidavits from additional attorneys were introduced into evidence, and Montgomery County District Court records reflecting a total fine and costs amount in controversy were submitted to the Court by stipulation of the parties. The sum stipulated was $4,788,747.55.
"The attorneys for the plaintiff class have applied to the Court for an attorney fee of $2,394,373.77. This application is DENIED because the Court finds it excessive. In denying the fee requested by counsel for the plaintiff class, the Court is mindful of the undisputed evidence that counsel for the plaintiff class enjoy excellent reputations, have particular expertise in cases of this nature, devoted thousands of hours to this case for five years without any payment whatsoever, and did so in spite of the undesirability of the case and its contingent nature.
"Counsel for the plaintiffs in Mashburn, supra, recommends to this Court an attorney fee of $2,215,631.20 on an hourly lodestar basis, or in the alternative, $1,915,499.02 on a percentage basis, opining that any lesser fee would constitute a rejection of the Supreme Court's judgment that the attorneys for plaintiffs accomplished much more than mere establishment of a common fund. While the Court agrees that attorneys for Brown did, in fact, accomplish much more than the mere establishment of a common fund, it also REJECTS each of the amounts recommended by counsel for Mashburn as excessive. As unique as this case is, the Court is not persuaded that hourly lodestar calculationseven though in this case such calculations would reasonably result in an attorney fee of $2,215,631.20were mandated by the Supreme Court. The Court has, as ordered, considered the many hours expended by counsel for Brown with commendable zeal as but one of the thirteen guidelines required in its analysis.
"The Court is particularly impressed by the scholarly opinion and judgment of United States District Judge Joel Dubina in Mashburn, supra. Judge Dubina has provided not only the Alabama Supreme Court, but also this Court, with an invaluable comprehensive collection of case law, logically and intellectually interpreted, which is of enormous benefit in cases like this. In this case, the Court is convinced that application of Judge Dubina's hourly lodestar analysis would result in a substantially higher award to counsel for Brown, but nevertheless REJECTS such a method of determining the fee in this case as excessive.
"The Reynolds case cited in the Supreme Court's remand instructions is familiar to this Court; it involved a one-third percentage award ordered by this Court. The attorneys for Reynolds were no more successful than the attorneys for Brown, but the judicial task of determining an award of an attorney fee was simplified by the establishment of a common fund.
"The fact that no common fund exists in this case has been dealt with effectively by Justice Shores' majority opinion, which, like Justice Adams' opinion in Reynolds, supra, cites Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 616, 24 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1970), as follows:
"396 U.S.  at 392 [90 S. Ct.  at 625].
"Judgment is hereby entered in favor of William J. Baxley, Joel E. Dillard, J. Doyle Fuller and George L. Beck, collectively, against the State of Alabama in the sum of $1,197,186.88.
"Each party to this action is ordered to bear its own costs.
"Done this 7th day of September, 1990.
This order reflects that Judge Price heard evidence concerning the question of the appropriate amount to award as attorney fees. He had before him the fact that the total amount of fines and costs in controversy was stipulated to be $4,788,747.55. The attorneys for the plaintiff class had applied to the trial court for attorney fees of $2,394,373.77. In addition, he had the testimony of one expert witness for each of the parties. Judge Price weighed this testimony against the 13 guidelines this Court had given him and the cases cited for his consideration, and he awarded attorney fees of $1,197,186.88.
This Court has recognized that, in a proper case, a reasonable attorney fee may be set by the court in its discretion, and that the trial court's decision can be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Robbins v. Smith, 495 So. 2d 577, 580 (Ala.1986); Ingalls v. Hare, 266 Ala. 221, 96 So. 2d 266 (1957). We have carefully reviewed the record and the trial court's reasoning. We find that the award of attorney fees is due to be affirmed. See Reynolds v. First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A., 471 So. 2d 1238 (Ala.1983); Peebles v. Miley, 439 So. 2d 137 (Ala.1983); Mashburn v. National Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 679 (M.D.Ala.1988); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
AFFIRMED.
ALMON, ADAMS, HOUSTON, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur.
MADDOX and STEAGALL, JJ., dissent.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
In Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1990) ("Brown II"), I expressed, in a dissenting opinion, the reasons why I thought that attorney fees should not be awarded in this case. I desire to add additional reasons why I think that the awarding of attorney fees in this case is inappropriate. Statement in Brown II that Litigation Caused Change In Practice of Handling Traffic Tickets Not Supported in Record
In the opinion in Brown II this Court stated as a basis for the award of attorney fees that "[t]his litigation clearly resulted in a benefit to the general public," because "[i]t is unquestionable that plaintiffs' attorneys rendered a public service by bringing an end to an improper practice," and that "[t]he public nature of the services rendered by these lawyers justifies an award of attorney fees."
The inference from that statement in the majority opinion in Brown II is that the filing of this lawsuit was what caused the change in the practice used in Montgomery County to verify traffic tickets. With all due respect to the majority, I must point out that there was no evidence in the record that was before the Court in Brown II to support that finding. This record shows affirmatively that it was not this lawsuit that caused the practice to change, but the release of this Court's opinion in Ex parte Dison, 469 So. 2d 662 (Ala.1984), which was released before this case was filed,[3] and was later overruled by City of *1261 Dothan v. Holloway, 501 So. 2d 1136 (Ala. 1986).
I wish to make one further point. The State of Alabama, by and through the attorney general, raised in the trial court, and in this Court, a constitutional issue of the right of this Court to award attorney fees against the State of Alabama, in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Constitution of Alabama, 1901.[4] Unfortunately, the Court has elected not to address this important constitutional question, by stating that it is an issue that was decided adversely to the State on original deliverance and on rehearing, and that the State is attempting to raise the issue for a second time. I believe the Court is mistaken in thinking that the constitutional issue was raised in the State's application for rehearing in Brown II. I have checked the original briefs and the application for rehearing in that case, and I conclude that the constitutional issue was not raised. Normally, this Court will address a constitutional claim that is properly raised in the trial court. Delview Meadow Gold Division Beatrice Foods Co. v. Alabama Dairy Comm'n, 383 So. 2d 511 (Ala.1978).
Based on the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
STEAGALL, J., concurs.
[1]  State v. Brown, 514 So. 2d 836 (Ala.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961, 108 S. Ct. 1225, 99 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1988).
[2]  Brown v. State, 565 So. 2d 585 (Ala.1990).
[3]  The State of Alabama filed a motion for summary judgment in Brown II and for a denial of attorneys' fees, on the grounds that "[t]he State of Alabama is immune from the award of attorney's fees, pursuant to Article I, Section 14, Constitution of Alabama, 1901," and that "[t]he defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, because the undisputed facts show that the District Court of Montgomery County began to properly verify UTTCs in accordance with the decision in Ex parte Dison, 469 So. 2d 662 (Ala.1984), [when] the Clerk of the District Court learned of the decision in Dison on November 28, 1984, more than two months before the [instant] lawsuit was filed." The State attached affidavits of the district court clerk, the circuit court clerk, certified copies of "Legal Notes" from the Administrative Office of Courts, and certified copies of UTTCs.
[4]  As shown in footnote 2, supra, the constitutional issue was raised in a motion for summary judgment, supported by affidavits and other evidence.