Case Title: RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cantley

Citation: 717 So. 2d 751

Docket Number: 1961972

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
717 So. 2d 751 (1998)
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY and Lorillard Tobacco Company, Inc.
v.
Mikki CANTLEY, as Administratrix of the Estate of Harlon Godfrey, Deceased.
1961972.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 5, 1998.
Samuel H. Franklin, Lee M. Hollis, and Stephen J. Rowe of Lightfoot, Franklin & White, L.L.C., Birmingham; and Charles R. Stephens, Jasper, for appellant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
William C. Knight, Jr., and John C. Morrow of Burr & Forman, Birmingham; and Edward R. Jackson of Tweedy, Jackson & Beech, Jasper, for appellant Lorillard Tobacco Co.
No brief filed for appellee.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Pursuant to Rule 5, Ala.R.App.P., we granted the defendants, Lorillard Tobacco Company, Inc. ("Lorillard"), and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company ("Reynolds"), permission to appeal the trial court's interlocutory order granting a Rule 60, Ala.R.Civ.P., motion to set aside a summary judgment that it had entered against the plaintiff, Mikki Cantley, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her father, Harlon Godfrey. We reverse and remand.
This is the second time these parties have been before this Court. See Cantley v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 681 So. 2d 1057 (Ala.1996), for a full explanation of the background of this litigation. For the purposes of this appeal, the following facts are pertinent: The *752 plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Lorillard and Reynolds on April 2, 1993, alleging that they had caused Godfrey's death; Godfrey had been a smoker. The plaintiff originally pleaded three causes of action  fraudulent suppression; liability under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD") for failure to warn of an unreasonable hazard; and liability under the AEMLD for design defect. Lorillard and Reynolds filed separate summary judgment motions on May 30, 1995, and July 7, 1995, respectively. Those motions were based on federal preemption grounds, relying on 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1992). Essentially, those summary judgment motions were based on the argument that all of the plaintiff's claims that were based on alleged tortious conduct committed on or after July 1, 1969, were preempted by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 ("the Labeling Act of 1969"), which amended the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965. The effective date of the Labeling Act of 1969 was July 1, 1969.
On July 17, 1995, before the trial court had ruled on the two pending summary judgment motions, Reynolds filed another motion for a summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's claims that were based on alleged tortious conduct committed before July 1, 1969. Godfrey did not begin smoking Lorillard's brand of cigarettes until after July 1, 1969; therefore, Lorillard did not join in this motion. In support of the July 17 motion, Reynolds argued that, as a matter of law, cigarettes were not "defective" within the meaning of that term as it is used in the AEMLD. Following a hearing, the trial court, on November 21, 1995, granted Lorillard's May 30 summary judgment motion as to the plaintiff's fraudulent suppression and design defect claims. The trial court also granted Reynolds's July 7 summary judgment motion as to those two claims, to the extent that the plaintiff sought redress for alleged tortious conduct occurring on or after July 1, 1969. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her failure-to-warn claims, conceding that those claims were preempted under Cipollone. The claims alleging tortious conduct against Reynolds committed before July 1, 1969, remained pending. The trial court certified the November 21 summary judgment as final, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R.Civ.P.; the plaintiff appealed that judgment on January 3, 1996.
On March 4, 1996, the attorney for Lorillard and Reynolds wrote the following letter to the trial court, requesting that a hearing be set on Reynolds's July 17 summary judgment motion:
(Emphasis in original.)
On March 29, 1996, the trial court granted Reynolds's July 17 summary judgment motion; however, the order it entered was based on preemption grounds  the same grounds on which Lorillard and Reynolds had based their May 30, 1995, and July 7, 1995, summary judgment motions. On April 23, 1996, the attorney for Lorillard and Reynolds wrote a letter to the plaintiff's attorney explaining that he thought the trial court's order had been mistakenly based on the wrong grounds:
In addition to that letter, the attorney for Lorillard and Reynolds also sent to the plaintiff's attorneys a proposed motion to alter or amend the March 29 judgment and a proposed revised order entering a summary judgment based on what Reynolds's attorney understood to be the proper grounds. On April 26, 1996, Reynolds filed the following motion to alter or amend the March 29 judgment:
After the plaintiff's attorneys had had a chance to review the proposed revised summary judgment and the respective attorneys for Reynolds and the plaintiff had agreed on *754 the wording of the proposed judgment, the plaintiff's attorney personally presented the proposed judgment to the trial court on April 29, 1996. That proposed judgment, which the trial court signed that same day, read as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
On June 7, 1996, this Court ruled on the appeal of the November 21, 1995, summary judgment, holding that the fraudulent suppression claims were preempted by federal law, but that the design defect claims brought under the AEMLD were not. See Cantley v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., Inc., supra. Four days later, on June 11, 1996, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal of the April 29 revised summary judgment. Reynolds filed a motion on June 21, 1996, to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was untimely filed; the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her appeal on July 17, 1996, stating in a letter to the clerk of this Court: "Please be advised that the plaintiff wishes to withdraw the appeal dated June 11, 1996, in light of the Supreme Court decision dated June 7, 1996."
On December 20, 1996, Lorillard and Reynolds moved for a summary judgment on the only claims remaining in the case  the design defect claims under the AEMLD that were based on conduct committed on or after July 1, 1969. Lorillard and Reynolds argued that the April 29 summary judgment, which had not been appealed, had held that cigarettes were not a defective product within the meaning of the AEMLD, as a matter of law. That holding, Lorillard and Reynolds argued, constituted the law of the case and made a summary judgment proper as to the remaining post-June 30, 1969, design defect claims. On February 28, 1997, approximately 10 months after the April 29 summary judgment had been entered, the plaintiff filed a motion under Rule 60(a) to vacate the April 29 summary judgment, arguing that she had never intended to stipulate, before that judgment, that cigarettes were not "defective" under the AEMLD. She took the position that she did not intend to dispose of her pre-July 1, 1969, claims; she argued, instead, that she had intended only to dispose of her post-June 30, 1969, claims on preemption grounds. Reynolds responded to the Rule 60(a) motion, arguing that the April 29 summary judgment stated exactly what the parties had agreed to. Reynolds pointed out that the April 29 summary judgment was *755 clear on its face; that the wording in that judgment had been agreed to by the plaintiff's attorneys; that the plaintiff's attorney had personally taken the proposed judgment to the trial court for entry; and that all of this had happened after the trial court had already disposed of the post-June 30, 1969, claims on preemption grounds in the November 21, 1995, summary judgment, which the plaintiff had appealed to this Court.
The court held a hearing on the Rule 60(a) motion on March 6, 1997. At that hearing the plaintiff's attorney suggested that Rule 60(b)(6) could also provide a basis upon which to set aside the April 29 judgment. The plaintiff's attorney took the position again that the plaintiff had not intended to have a summary judgment entered on the pre-July 1, 1969, claims on the ground that cigarettes were not defective under the AEMLD, even though the April 29 summary judgment clearly stated otherwise. The attorney for Lorillard and Reynolds retraced for the trial court the events leading up to the entry of the April 29 judgment, pointing out that the plaintiff's attorneys had negotiated for and agreed to the wording in the April 29 summary judgment. For edification purposes, we quote a portion of the transcript of that hearing:
The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to set aside the April 29 judgment, without specifying which subsection or clause of Rule 60 it had found to be applicable, stating only that the judgment did not reflect what the court had intended to do. The trial court did not rule on Lorillard and Reynolds's December 20, 1996, motion for a summary judgment.
Lorillard and Reynolds contend that the trial court had no legal basis upon which to set aside its April 29 summary judgment. Specifically, they argue that the April 29 summary judgment clearly reflected what the parties had agreed to. According to Lorillard and Reynolds, there is no logical explanation in the record as to how the plaintiff's attorneys could have misunderstood the nature of the April 29 summary judgment. They maintain that if, for whatever reason, the plaintiff's attorneys had made a mistake in agreeing to the entry of the April 29 summary judgment, then relief from the judgment could have been had under Rule 60(b)(1), which authorizes a court to set aside a judgment within four months for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." According to Lorillard and Reynolds, Rule 60(a) was not available to the trial court as a basis upon which to set aside the judgment. Furthermore, Lorillard and Reynolds argue, Rule 60(b)(6) was not available to the trial court as a basis upon which to set aside the judgment because, they say, that clause cannot operate to the exclusion of another applicable clause in subsection (b), and because neither it nor Rule 60(a) can be used as a substitute for a timely appeal.[2]
As Lorillard and Reynolds point out, the plaintiff did not seek relief under Rule 60(b)(1). It appears from the record that that clause would have been the most logical one to invoke if the plaintiff's attorneys actually had misunderstood the nature of the April 29 summary judgment. Clauses (2) through (5) of subsection (b) clearly were not applicable, and, because clause (1) was available as a possible means for relief, clause (6) was not available. See R.E. Grills, Inc. v. Davison, 641 So. 2d 225 (Ala.1994) (clause (6) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances and is mutually exclusive of the specific grounds of clauses (1) through (5), and a party may not obtain relief under clause (6) if it would have been available under clauses (1) through (5)). Because clause (6) operates exclusively of the specific grounds listed in clauses (1) through (5), this Court has held that a party may not escape the four-month limitation applicable to clauses (1) through (3) merely by characterizing the motion as one seeking relief under clause (6). R.E. Grills, Inc. v. Davison; Ex parte Hartford Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d 933 (Ala.1981). [3]
Likewise, we can find no basis upon which to conclude that the April 29 summary judgment could be set aside as constituting a mere clerical error. The 1973 Committee Comments to Rule 60(a) state:
See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Sealy, 374 So. 2d 877 (Ala.1979); Cornelius v. Green, 521 So. 2d 942 (Ala.1988). If the plaintiff's attorneys stipulated to the April 29 summary judgment by mistake, as they indicated to the trial court they had done, then the error was not clerical, but substantive, going to the very heart of the judgment that was entered. On the other hand, based on the record one could conclude that the plaintiff's attorneys made a calculated decision to *759 stipulate to the entry of the April 29 summary judgment and that the trial court entered that judgment based on its understanding that it would amount to a consent judgment. The April 29 summary judgment is clear on its face. Although we could only speculate in this regard, the record suggests that the plaintiff's attorneys may have anticipated appealing the April 29 summary judgment and then petitioning this Court to consolidate that appeal with the pending appeal of the November 21, 1995, summary judgment. In any event, the plaintiff did not appeal the April 29 summary judgment. Neither Rule 60(a) nor Rule 60(b)(6) may be used as a substitute for a timely appeal. Cornelius v. Green, supra; Nowlin v. Druid City Hospital Board, 475 So. 2d 469 (Ala. 1985); Patterson v. Hays, 623 So. 2d 1142 (Ala.1993). This Court has also held that Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used for the purpose of relieving a party from the free, calculated, and deliberate choice he has made. R.E. Grills, Inc. v. Davison, supra.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order setting aside the April 29, 1996, summary judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, KENNEDY, COOK, SEE, and LYONS, JJ., concur.
[1]  The record indicates that the plaintiff is represented by more than one attorney; however, for ease of reference we will refer to the "plaintiff's attorney," unless the context requires otherwise.
[2]  The plaintiff has not filed a brief in this case.
[3]  We are unable to conclude from the record that the kind of extraordinary circumstances exist here that were discussed in R.E. Grills, Inc. v. Davison; Ex parte Oden, 617 So. 2d 1020 (Ala. 1992); Chambers County Comm'rs v. Walker, 459 So. 2d 861 (Ala.1984); Giles v. Giles, 404 So. 2d 649 (Ala.1981); and Rebel Oil Co. v. Pike, 473 So. 2d 529 (Ala.Civ.App.1985). Although the grounds for relief available under Rule 60(b)(1) generally cannot be valid grounds under Rule 60(b)(6), these cases recognized an exception when, in the interest of justice, aggravating circumstances may be considered sufficient to allow the trial court to treat what would otherwise be a Rule 60(b)(1) motion as a motion coming within Rule 60(b)(6). The application of this exception has generally been limited to circumstances where the judgment was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or neglect of counsel and where, despite all diligence exercised to protect his own interests, the client was unable to reasonably protect his interests because he was misled by his attorney as to the status or conduct of his case.