Case Title: Schell v. Baker Furniture Co.

Citation: 461 Mich. 502, 607 N.W.2d 358

Docket Number: 113598, 113599

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
607 N.W.2d 358 (2000)
461 Mich. 502
Ronda SCHELL, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BAKER FURNITURE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
Sandra Collins, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Baker Furniture Company, Defendant-Appellant.
Docket Nos. 113598, 113599.

Supreme Court of Michigan.
March 16, 2000.
*359 Harold S. Sawyer, Rockford, MI, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
Warner, Norcross & Judd, L.L.P. (by Paul T. Sorensen and Brian J. Masternak), Grand Rapids, MI, for the defendant-appellant.
PER CURIAM.
The plaintiffs sued the defendant employer, alleging sexual harassment in the workplace. However, the circuit court dismissed the cases because the plaintiffs failed to appear personally at a settlement conference. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissals, and remanded the cases for further proceedings. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff Ronda Schell was an employee of defendant Baker Furniture Company.[1] She explains that she worked primarily "in its so-called `rubbing' department where final finishing of furniture is done." Plaintiff Sandra Collins also worked at Baker Furniture; she states that she was "employed in various production work capacities."
In March 1994, Ms. Schell sued Baker Furniture, alleging that she had been harassed by a fellow employee who was "constantly, without either invitation or provocation, addressing the plaintiff by profane and abusive names and descriptions in the feminine gender to an extent that repeatedly reduced the plaintiff to tears and extreme emotional disturbance." She further alleged that her requests for help from the employer resulted in her being wrongfully discharged. Her complaint sought monetary damages, presumably reflecting lost wages and other harm.
Two weeks after Ms. Schell filed her complaint, Ms. Collins sued Baker Furniture.[2] Ms. Collins alleged that she "was constantly addressed by obscene names and adjectives to the point of being reduced to tears and near hysteria." She too sought monetary damages.
The plaintiffs were represented by the same attorney, but the suits were assigned to different judges of the Kent Circuit Court.
Each case proceeded through discovery and pretrial motion practice: The plaintiffs were deposed; motions for summary disposition were argued and decided;[3] scheduling conferences were held.
In Collins, the circuit court conducted a settlement conference in June 1995. Agreement was not reached, however, so the court set an April 1996 trial date. Such a settlement conference took place in July 1995 in Schell, with the court scheduling a June 1996 trial.
In January 1996, the chief judge of the Kent Circuit Court sent out notices regarding a "settlement week conference."[4]*360 The parties were told in Schell that a ninety-minute conference would occur on the afternoon of Monday, March 11, 1996. A similar conference would take place in Collins on the morning of Tuesday, March 12, 1996. Each notice stated these conditions:
The attorney representing the plaintiffs arranged with the attorney for Baker Furniture to conduct both conferences on Monday, March 11, 1996. On that date, Baker Furniture's attorney was present, along with two representatives of the client, one of whom had traveled from Wisconsin. However, plaintiffs' counsel was aloneneither plaintiff appeared personally at the hearing.
Because the plaintiffs failed to appear, the chief judge dismissed the two cases. The orders cited MCR 2.401(G), set forth below:
Each plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the dismissal and reinstate the case. At the joint hearing, plaintiffs' counsel attempted to explain why they had been absent. The account was not entirely consistent, and was contradicted in some respects by the attorney for Baker Furniture. However, the basic situation was captured in the chief judge's written opinion:
Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledges that both of his clients knew that a conference was scheduled, when and where it *361 was, and its purpose. While the conference in Ms. Collins's case had been advanced one day by agreement of the attorneys, it is conceded that Ms. Collins knew of the new date and time. Neither plaintiff appeared because their counsel took it upon himself to countermand the Court's notices. Because of other proceedings in these cases, namely: motions, which he thought might affect the settlement conferences, plaintiffs were told by their counsel not to appear unless they heard otherwise from him. Unfortunately for them, by the time counsel concluded that the other proceedings would not forestall the settlement conferences, he was unable to reach his clients.
The chief judge denied the motion, saying that it would be "unprincipled" to set aside the dismissals. He explained that litigants are bound by actions of their attorneys"otherwise, evasion of rulings and rules would be rampant." The chief judge found culpable negligence on the part of counsel, MCR 2.401(G)(2)(b), and said that there was no injustice in light of the low mediation evaluation. Finally, the chief judge wrote of the value of the "settlement week" process, and the importance of maintaining its integrity:
Both plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed the dismissals. 232 Mich.App. 470, 591 N.W.2d 349 (1998).
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals noted that MCR 2.401(F) and 2.401(G) give the court discretion to dismiss a case when a plaintiff fails to appear for a settlement conference, but the Court concluded:
The Court of Appeals offered several bases for its decision. First, no court rule specifically authorizes settlement weeks. 232 Mich.App. at 475-476, 591 N.W.2d 349. Second, these cases were advancing normally, had been the subject of prior settlement conferences, and had not been plagued by the plaintiffs avoiding conferences or ignoring orders of the court. 232 Mich.App. at 476, 591 N.W.2d 349. Third, the analogous dismissal sanction for discovery violations, MCR 2.313(B)(2)(c), is to be applied "only in extreme cases."[6] 232 Mich.App. at 477, 591 N.W.2d 349. Fourth, MCR 2.401(G) provides that failure to appear is "grounds for dismissal under MCR 2.504(B)," and the latter rule is phrased in terms of a party's motion to dismiss, not a judge ordering dismissal sua sponte. 232 Mich.App. at 478-479, 591 N.W.2d 349.
The Court of Appeals made two additional points. It said that the mediation results should have remained confidential under MCR 2.403(N)(4) and should not have played a role in the decisions whether to dismiss or whether to reinstate. 232 Mich.App. at 479-480, 591 N.W.2d 349. The Court of Appeals also questioned the authority of the chief judge to enter *362 the dismissal orders in cases that were properly assigned to other judges. 232 Mich.App. at 480-481, 591 N.W.2d 349.
The defendant applied to this Court for leave to appeal.
The Court of Appeals indicated that there is no court rule authorizing "settlement week conferences." It is true that no rule uses that phrase, but such a conference is certainly authorized by rule. MCR 2.401(A) provides:
Moreover, "the possibility of settlement" and "other matters that may aid in the disposition of the action" are expressly listed as suitable subjects for discussion at a pretrial conference. MCR 2.401(C)(1)(g), (l).
MCR 2.401(A) speaks of a conference to be attended by "the attorneys for the parties." Further, MCR 2.401(F) allows the court to direct that the parties also attend.
Thus, the circuit court had the authority to call the settlement conference and to require that the parties attend.[7]
While the court (i.e., the assigned judge) had the authority to direct the settlement conference, this case presents the question whether the chief judge had authority to issue such a directive for cases pending before other judges of the court.
The authority of a chief judge is set forth in MCR 8.110, which this Court adopted in 1985 and refined in a series of amendments. Subrule (C) concerns the duties and powers of a chief judge. In pertinent part, it provides:
The provisions of MCR 8.110(C) are set forth at length because they represent an instance in which the whole exceeds the sum of the parts. A chief judge has the specific authority and responsibility to act in accordance with each separate provision of the rule. In promulgating the rule, however, we also intended that a chief judge have the authority to employ creative and energetic means to improve the delivery of justice to the citizens who come before the court.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals reflects the assumption that a chief judge is unable to take measures not specifically authorized by the court rule. 232 Mich.App. at 475-476, 591 N.W.2d 349. We instead have invested chief judges with the authority to take measures not prohibited by the letter or spirit of the court rules.
For these reasons, the chief judge of the Kent Circuit Court had authority to announce a "settlement week," during which an intense effort would be made to resolve as many of the circuit's pending cases as possible. The chief judge likewise had authority to summon attorneys and litigants to conferences to be held for that purpose, and to require personal attendance by individual litigants and by persons with authority to settle cases on behalf of corporate litigants. MCR 8.110(C)(3)(a)(b), (i).
The next question is whether the chief judge had the authority to enter dispositive orders in these cases, which had been assigned to other judges of the circuit.
Again we turn to the court rules, in this instance MCR 8.111. The relevant portions are these:
(B) Assignment. All cases must be assigned by lot, unless a different system has been adopted by local court administrative order under the provisions of subrule 8.112.[[10]] Assignment will occur at the time the case is filed or before a contested hearing or uncontested dispositional hearing in the case, as the chief judge directs. Civil actions must be assigned within appropriate categories determined by the chief judge. The chief judge may receive fewer assignments *364 in order to perform the duties of chief judge.
Pursuant to MCR 8.111, these two cases were originally and properly assigned to judges of the circuit. As we explained in part III of this opinion, the chief judge could summon lawyers and litigants to "settlement week conferences"such an administrative decision is an appropriate exercise of the chief judge's authority. However, in the absence of a proper reassignment order under MCR 8.111, the cases remained assigned to the circuit judges to whom they were first assigned. The chief judge should not have entered dispositive orders in these cases.
In part III of this opinion, we wrote of the broad powers of a chief judge, and indicated that an administrative action is not automatically ultra vires if unmentioned in MCR 8.110. There is no inconsistency in our interpreting MCR 8.111 more narrowly. Substantive or dispositive rulings in individual cases are not exercises of administrative authority. Further, adherence to the approach set forth in MCR 8.111 enhances personal judicial accountability and assures litigants that rulings are made by a judge who is familiar with the substance and circumstances of each case.[13]
Because the decision whether to dismiss these cases should have been made by the assigned judges rather than the chief judge, the orders of dismissal must be set aside. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand these cases to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[14] MCR 7.302(F)(1).
WEAVER, C.J., and MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, MARILYN J. KELLY, TAYLOR, CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
[1]  We are told that the proper name of the defendant is Baker, Knapp & Tubbs, Inc., and that it does business under the name Baker Furniture Company.
[2]  Ms. Collins evidently was still working for Baker Furniture when she filed her complaint. From statements made by her attorney later in the proceedings, we learn that she soon left for other employment.
[3]  Baker Furniture filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in Schell, but the circuit court denied the motion. It filed a second motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10), but the dismissal that is the subject of this appeal was entered before the court ruled on the renewed motion. In Collins, Baker Furniture's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was partially granted and partially denied. A second motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was later denied.
[4]  The chief judge was the assigned judge in neither case, and the court entered no order reassigning the cases to him. At a subsequent hearing, he stated:

The judges of this Court agreed that, for the sake of uniformity, all issues regarding Settlement Week would be made by the Chief Judge.
[5]  MCR 2.504 is the rule governing dismissals. It includes this paragraph:

If the plaintiff fails to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or a claim against that defendant. [MCR 2.504(B)(1).]
[6]  The Court of Appeals quoted 2 Martin, Dean & Webster, Michigan Court Rules Practice, p. 367.
[7]  As stated earlier, the notice included this directive:

Clients and persons with authority to settle shall be present at the settlement conference.
The plaintiffs argue that this sentence, calling for "clients" to attend is ambiguous, and does not clearly require the attendance of the party plaintiffs. We disagree.
[8]  MCR 8.111 concerns assignments of cases, and is quoted later in this opinion.
[9]  MCR 8.110(D) concerns court hours, court holidays, judicial vacations, and judicial absences.
[10]  MCR 8.112(B)(1) permits a trial court to "issue an administrative order governing only internal court management."
[11]  It is evident that the catch line for MCR 8.111(D) does not pertain to paragraph 8.111(D)(4). We recall, however, that "[t]he catch lines of a rule are not part of the rule and may not be used to construe the rule more broadly or more narrowly than the text indicates." MCR 1.106.
[12]  MCR 8.111(D)(1) provides that "if one of two or more actions arising out of the same transaction or occurrence has been assigned to a judge, the other action or actions must be assigned to that judge."
[13]  The rule that one circuit judge should not enter orders in a case assigned to another circuit judge is of longstanding. See, for instance, Zimmer v. Byers, 319 Mich. 410, 414-416, 29 N.W.2d 838 (1947), interpreting a now-repealed statutory provision concerning a subject now governed by court rule. See also MCR 2.613(B).
[14]  In the sound exercise of its discretion, the circuit court may choose in each case to enter an order pertaining to the events of March 11, 1996, or it may choose to schedule new settlement conferences and simply go forward from that point.