Case Title: JUSTINE MALDONADO V FORD MOTOR CO

Citation: 

Docket Number: 126274

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 31, 2006 
JUSTINE MALDONADO, 
Plaintiff-Appellee/ 
Cross-Appellant, 
v 
No. 126274 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 
 
Defendant-Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee 
and 
DANIEL P. BENNETT, 
Defendant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
CORRIGAN, J. 
In this case we consider the essential authority of trial courts to control the 
proceedings before them. The issue in this case pertains to the extent of a trial 
court’s authority to govern the conduct of counsel and their clients in court 
proceedings. Where the Michigan Constitution authorizes us to make rules to 
 
 
 
govern court proceedings, the authority to enforce those rules inescapably follows. 
At the heart of preserving an organized polity, we must attend to relevant issues, 
including concerns over belligerent, antagonistic, or incompetent lawyering.  To 
this end, we affirm the authority of trial courts to impose sanctions appropriate to 
contain and prevent abuses so as to ensure the orderly operation of justice. 
We reiterate that trial courts possess the inherent authority to sanction 
litigants and their counsel, including the power to dismiss an action.  Banta v 
Serban, 370 Mich 367, 368; 121 NW2d 854 (1963); Persichini v Beaumont Hosp, 
238 Mich App 626, 639-640; 607 NW2d 100 (1999); Prince v MacDonald, 237 
Mich App 186, 189; 602 NW2d 834 (1999).  This power is not governed so much 
by rule or statute, but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their 
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.  See 
Chambers v NASCO, Inc, 501 US 32, 43; 111 S Ct 2123; 115 L Ed 2d 27 (1991). 
We further acknowledge that our trial courts also have express authority to 
direct and control the proceedings before them.  MCL 600.611 provides that 
“[c]ircuit courts have jurisdiction and power to make any order proper to fully 
effectuate the circuit courts’ jurisdiction and judgments.”  Additionally, MCR 
2.504(B)(1) provides that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to comply with these rules or a 
court order, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or a claim against 
that defendant.” 
In the instant case, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in dismissing plaintiff’s case because plaintiff and her attorneys repeatedly and 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
intentionally publicized inadmissible evidence so as to taint the potential jury pool, 
deny defendants a fair trial, and frustrate the due administration of justice.  We 
conclude that because the trial court possessed the inherent authority to dismiss the 
action, and because the trial court warned plaintiff and her counsel that dismissal 
would result if they continued to publicize evidence ruled inadmissible by court 
order, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff’s case. 
We also consider whether the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s case 
because plaintiff intentionally disobeyed its explicit warning to refrain from 
publicizing information regarding defendant Daniel P. Bennett’s excluded 
conviction violated the First Amendment. The trial court’s limitation on the speech 
of plaintiff and her counsel was a narrow and necessary limitation aimed at 
protecting potential jurors from prejudice. See Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 
US 1030; 111 S Ct 2720; 115 L Ed 2d 888 (1991). The trial court’s narrow 
restriction on speech did not offend the First Amendment.  The Court of Appeals 
novel requirement that dismissal is improper unless the jury pool was actually 
tainted conflicts with the substantial likelihood of prejudice test of Gentile. 
Moreover, “actual taint” is an impossible and unworkable standard, especially 
where nearly three years have passed since the incidents occurred.  Accordingly, 
we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s 
order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint. 
3  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Plaintiff Justine Maldonado, an employee of defendant Ford Motor 
Company, filed suit against Ford, alleging that a Ford supervisor, Daniel Bennett, 
sexually harassed her in violation of the Michigan Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 
37.2101 et seq.1  Ford (hereafter defendant) moved in limine to exclude evidence 
of Bennett’s 1995 indecent exposure conviction.  Judge Kathleen Macdonald, the 
original judge assigned to the case, granted defendant’s motion and entered an 
order on February 16, 2001, excluding evidence of Bennett’s prior conviction in 
this case and in another action brought against Bennett, Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 
472 Mich 408; 697 NW2d 851 (2005).2  Plaintiff thereafter sought leave to appeal 
1 We have previously considered other actions in which Daniel Bennett was 
accused of sexual harassment, Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 472 Mich 408; 697 
NW2d 851 (2005), and McClements v Ford Motor Co, 473 Mich 373; 702 NW2d 
166 (2005), mod 474 Mich 1201 (2005). 
2 In the Elezovic case, Judge Macdonald also issued an order directing that 
witnesses be instructed that  reference to Bennett’s excluded conviction or any 
other excluded evidence would be considered a contempt of court, and would 
result in sanctions, including compensation to the court in the case of a mistrial. 
All the witnesses in that case, including plaintiff Justine Maldonado, signed 
statements indicating that they had been advised of the court’s ruling regarding 
inadmissible evidence, that they were not to mention any excluded evidence, and 
that they understood that sanctions would result from mentioning any excluded 
evidence. 
As Justice Cavanagh notes, Judge Macdonald stated, upon entering the 
order of exclusion, that she might reconsider her decision to exclude the evidence 
during the course of the trial if need be.  Justice Cavanagh, however, erroneously 
relies on this statement to conclude that plaintiff and her counsel were not 
precluded from “ever mentioning the indecent exposure conviction in public 
again . . . .” Post at 5 (emphasis omitted). Judge Macdonald’s order remained in 
(continued . . .) 
4  
 
 
 
 
   
_____________________ 
 
 
 
to the Court of Appeals and this Court regarding Judge Macdonald’s decision to 
exclude Bennett’s prior conviction.  Both the Court of Appeals and this Court 
denied plaintiff’s application.3 
On September 11, 2001, less than a month before a settlement conference 
scheduled for October 3, 2001, and shortly after a three-week trial resulting in a 
directed verdict for defendants in the Elezovic case, plaintiff’s counsel issued a 
press release on firm letterhead that referred to Bennett’s indecent exposure 
conviction, Judge Macdonald’s exclusion of that conviction as evidence, and the 
impending trial in this case.4  A series of news broadcasts and print media 
publications followed, replete with references to Bennett’s prior conviction.5 
(. . . continued)  
effect throughout this case.  As such, plaintiff and her counsel were bound by the  
order.  
3 465 Mich 971 (2002). 
4 Justice Weaver claims that plaintiff only, and not her counsel, made 
public statements about the excluded conviction after Judge Macdonald entered 
the order of exclusion. The September 11 press release, however, which referred 
to the excluded conviction, was issued by plaintiff’s counsel after the order of 
exclusion was entered. 
5 The following is a list of the publications stemming from plaintiff’s 
counsel’s September 11, 2001, press release, many of which refer to Bennett’s 
excluded conviction: (1) The Associated Press wire story, September 12, 2001, 
referencing the excluded conviction; (2) an article in the Detroit Free Press, 
September 13, 2001, referencing the excluded conviction; (3) an article by the 
United Press International, October 10, 2001, referencing the excluded conviction; 
(4) The Associated Press wire story, October 10, 2001, referencing the excluded 
conviction; (5) a Fox 2 news broadcast held at the law office of Scheff and 
Washington, October 10, 2001, referencing the excluded conviction and providing 
a closeup of the conviction papers; (6) a WDIV news broadcast, October 10, 2001, 
(continued . . .) 
5  
 
 
 
_____________________ 
 
 
On November 9, 2001, Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction was 
expunged in district court proceedings.  
By order dated January 11, 2002, Judge Macdonald established a trial date 
of July 8, 2002. 
In February 2002, Judge Macdonald was assigned to the family division of 
the circuit court. Consequently, this case was reassigned by lot to Judge William 
Giovan. 
On May 17, 2002, Judge Giovan held a hearing regarding the 
admissibility of propensity evidence not currently at issue.  Plaintiff’s counsel 
invited the media to this hearing.  Despite Judge Giovan’s order closing the 
hearing to the media, plaintiff’s counsel directed the media to wait outside until 
the hearing concluded to discuss details regarding the hearing. 
Immediately following the hearing, Judge Giovan met with all counsel to 
discuss plaintiff’s counsel’s continued public references to Bennett’s prior 
conviction despite Judge Macdonald’s previous court order and the expungement 
of the conviction. Bennett’s counsel pointed out that plaintiff’s counsel’s behavior 
(. . . continued)  
referencing the excluded propensity evidence; and (7) an article in the Oakland  
Press, October 11, 2001, referencing the excluded conviction.   
Justice Weaver contends that we assert that plaintiff’s counsel referred to 
the excluded conviction in these publications.  We assert no such thing.  Rather, 
we merely state that these publications stem from plaintiff’s counsel’s September 
11, 2001, press release. In other words, it was plaintiff’s counsel’s press release 
that prompted the mass of publications.  Plaintiff’s counsel’s press release was 
designed to draw media attention to the excluded conviction and, as shown above, 
indeed accomplished its goal.  
6  
 
   
  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
apparently violated MCL 780.623(5),6 which criminalizes the divulgence, use, or 
publication of information regarding an expunged conviction.  Plaintiff’s counsel 
responded by stating that “it was worth the risk” to continue to publicize Bennett’s 
expunged conviction.7 
Judge Giovan declined to order plaintiff’s counsel to obey MCL 780.623(5) 
because he considered it redundant to order an attorney to follow the law.8 
Despite Judge Giovan’s expression of confidence that counsel would follow the 
law, plaintiff’s counsel left the courtroom and met with the waiting media.  This 
6 The expungement statute states: 
Except as provided in subsection (2), a person, other than the 
applicant, who knows or should have known that a conviction was 
set aside under this section and who divulges, uses, or publishes 
information concerning a conviction set aside under this section is 
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more 
than 90 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both. [MCL 
780.623(5).] 
7 Plaintiff’s counsel’s comments at this meeting also demonstrate that 
plaintiff’s counsel continued to make public references to the excluded evidence 
despite the court order, contrary to Justice Weaver’s contention. 
8 Justice Cavanagh mischaracterizes Judge Giovan’s refusal to 
unnecessarily order an attorney to follow the law as a refusal to require the parties 
to refrain from referencing the excluded evidence. 
Justice Cavanagh’s 
mischaracterization that “the trial court never thought it issued an order” in this 
case is preposterous. Post at 17. While Judge Giovan did not specifically enter a 
gag order, he did, on numerous occasions, direct the parties to abide by Judge 
Macdonald’s order of exclusion, he subsequently denied plaintiff’s motion to 
dissolve the order, and he orally warned the parties that dismissal would result for 
failure to abide by the order.  Moreover, Justice Cavanagh’s mischaracterization of 
the lower court transcript is rebutted by plaintiff’s own comment, “If we don’t act 
the way he [Judge Giovan] wants it, the way he sees fit, then he’ll dismiss my case 
with prejudice.” 
7  
 
  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
meeting resulted in extensive television news and press coverage, some of which 
again referred to Bennett’s expunged conviction and the possible exclusion of the 
propensity evidence.9 Shortly thereafter, plaintiff’s counsel again discussed this 
case at a May 28 public meeting and a June 1, 2002, rally in Ann Arbor sponsored 
by BAMN (Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant 
Rights and Fight for Equality by any Means Necessary).10 
Plaintiff subsequently moved to dissolve Judge Macdonald’s order 
excluding Bennett’s prior conviction from evidence.  On June 13 and 21, 2002, 
Judge Giovan heard the motion.  During that hearing, plaintiff’s counsel 
mentioned that an article had been published in the June 12-18, 2002, issue of the 
Metro-Times, a free weekly publication readily available in the courthouse where 
jury selection was imminent. The article appeared on the front page of the 
9 The following is a list of the publications stemming from plaintiff’s 
counsel’s May 17, 2002, meeting with the media, some of which also referred to 
evidence that had been excluded before trial: (1) a WDIV news broadcast, May 
17, 2002, referencing the excluded propensity evidence; (2) a WXYZ news 
broadcast, May 17, 2002, also referencing the excluded propensity evidence; and 
(3) The Associated Press local wire story, May 17, 2002, referencing the expunged 
conviction. 
Again, contrary to Justice Weaver’s contention, we do not assert that 
plaintiff’s counsel actually made references to the excluded evidence in these 
publications. 
Rather, we assert that these publications stem from plaintiff’s 
counsel’s meeting with the media. 
10 Plaintiff’s counsel, George Washington, Miranda Massie, and Jodi 
Masley, are all members of the BAMN organization. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
newspaper and referenced Bennett’s expunged conviction.  This article prompted 
the following colloquy: 
The Court: But, you know, since you mentioned the article, 
where’s this coming from? I thought that there is a prohibition 
against counsel speaking to—making public statements designed to 
affect trial. 
Ms. Hardy [defense counsel]: There certainly is. There’s an 
ethics rule which prohibits counsel from intentionally trying to taint 
a jury pool by making the public aware of excluded evidence, which 
is exactly what’s been occurring for quite some time. 
The Court: Is counsel being quoted in this? 
Mr. Washington [plaintiff’s counsel]: I think counsel on both 
sides. Ford was not, but Mr. Morgan and Ms. Massie and I were 
both quoted, all quoted. 
The Court:  I’m not sure—well— 
Ms. Hardy: It was initiated, without a doubt, and Mr. 
Washington will not dispute this, by Mr. Washington, as all the press 
has been initiated by his office, and the constant publicity is one 
issue, but the really serious issue is the effort by Mr. Washington to 
make sure that the press continues to report evidence or information 
concerning this expunged conviction so that some way, somehow, 
irrespective of this Court’s ruling—[11] 
11 Although the article contained quotations from both plaintiff’s counsel 
and defense counsel, defendant claimed that plaintiff’s attorney provided the 
reporter with the extensive information in the article regarding Bennett’s excluded 
conviction. Plaintiff did not deny this allegation. 
Justice Cavanagh contends that because Bennett’s counsel, on two 
occasions, referred publicly to Bennett’s excluded conviction, plaintiff should not 
be punished for behaving as defense counsel did.  We acknowledge that Bennett’s 
counsel publicly referred to Bennett’s excluded conviction.  We disagree, 
however, that defense counsel’s behavior mirrored that of plaintiff and her 
counsel. Bennett’s counsel’s limited references to the excluded evidence were 
(continued . . .) 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________ 
 
The Court: I’m not making any decisions about this, but I’m 
going to tell you one thing. If I ever reach the conclusion that 
somebody is violating that ethical obligation and causing some 
difficulty in our getting a fair jury, I will dismiss the case with 
prejudice, or, and I should say, on the other side, grant a default 
judgment. I just want everyone to know that.  And then whatever 
counsel is involved can answer to their client. [Emphasis added.] 
The court denied the motion to dissolve Judge Macdonald’s previous order 
of exclusion. 
Three days later, on June 24, 2002, plaintiff was deposed, at which time she 
admitted that she had disclosed facts regarding Bennett’s expunged conviction 
despite the trial court’s order disallowing such evidence.  The following colloquy 
took place: 
[Defense counsel]: If you can give me a ballpark figure, how 
many times since you found out about the expungement have you 
told other people about the fact that Mr. Bennett had this conviction 
that was later expunged? 
[Plaintiff’s counsel]: You mean at people, period, one person 
at a time? 
[Defense counsel]:  Any individual, whetherit’s groups, how 
many times has she gone out and publicized it, divulged it. 
[Plaintiff]: I have no idea. It’s been a lot. 
(. . . continued) 
prompted by plaintiff and her counsel. Defense counsel’s statements were made 
in an attempt to minimize the damage caused by plaintiff’s and her counsel’s 
numerous public references to the excluded evidence.  Unlike plaintiff’s and her 
counsel’s public comments regarding the excluded evidence, defense counsel’s 
comments were not intended to taint the potential jury pool and cause prejudice to 
plaintiff. 
10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q: 
Over 100? 
A: 
I don’t know. 
Q: 
Over ten? 
A: 
Oh, definitely over ten, possibly over 100. 
Q: 
Okay. 
A: 
If I could get it out on the Internet, I would put it out 
on the Internet. 
Moreover, plaintiff admitted during her deposition on June 24, 2002, that 
she would continue to disclose facts regarding Bennett’s expunged conviction. She 
stated: 
A: 
I’m aware that you’re whining and crying because I’m 
talking about it all over town, yes, I am aware of that. 
I won’t shut up about it. It’s the truth. 
You can 
expunge it, but it’s the truth, and I’m going to tell it, 
and you know what? I will tell anybody that will listen 
because this man is a menace and he must be stopped, 
and you know it and you know it [sic].  But you guys 
want to protect him, that’s fine, I’m not. I don’t have 
to protect Mr. Bennett. 
Q: 
So you’ve been talking about it— 
A: 
To anyone. 
Q: 
—any chance you get, to anyone— 
A: 
That’s Right. 
Q: 
—even though-even since you became aware that it 
was expunged? 
A: 
Yes. Absolutely. 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
On June 26, 2002, two days after the deposition, plaintiff and certain of her 
counsel participated in a “Justice for Justine Committee” demonstration outside 
Ford headquarters. During the demonstration, participants distributed leaflets to 
the public containing information regarding Bennett’s expunged conviction and 
evidence regarding Bennett’s alleged behavior toward other female Ford 
employees that the trial court had ruled inadmissible.  The leaflet also stated that 
Judge Giovan “is in Ford’s pocket” and “is trying to keep the truth out of the 
courtroom.” Also on this day, a television interview was broadcast on WDIV 
Channel 4, in which plaintiff stated: 
If we don’t act the way he [Judge Giovan] wants it, the way 
he sees fit, then he’ll dismiss my case with prejudice.  And what he 
doesn’t know is, it doesn’t bother me, because I’m not going to quit 
fighting against sexual harassment. 
A demonstration similar to that held on June 26, 2002, was held the 
following day at the Ford Wixom plant, at which a similar leaflet was 
distributed.12 
On June 28, 2002, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s suit on the basis 
that plaintiff and her counsel engaged in improper pretrial publicity aimed at 
12 The following publications stemmed from the June 26 and 27 
demonstrations: (1) a WDIV news broadcast, June 26, 2002, showing picketers 
holding signs stating, “Ford, stop buying judges”; (2) a Click on Detroit, Channel 
4 website article, June 26, 2002, referencing the exclusion of the propensity 
evidence; and (3) an article in the Detroit News, June 27, 2002. 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
tainting the potential jury pool.  On July 1, 2002, plaintiff responded by moving to 
disqualify Judge Giovan. On July 3, 2002, Judge Giovan heard and denied this 
motion. 
The same day, plaintiff’s counsel, Miranda Massie, appeared in a 
television interview broadcast on WDIV, Channel 4.  She stated: 
Metro Detroit has a company town feeling, and it’s hard to 
get a fair hearing from any of these judges when you’re going 
against the Ford Motor Company.  They’ll stop at nothing to 
maintain the culture of abuse that exists in those plants, and we’ve 
found it hard to get unbiased judicial rulings in these cases.[13] 
On July 8, 2002, the date on which jury selection was to begin, Judge 
Timothy Kenny heard plaintiff’s appeal of Judge Giovan’s denial of the motion for 
his disqualification and affirmed the denial.  Also on July 8, 2002, Judge Giovan 
heard defendant’s motion to dismiss.14  Throughout the hearing, plaintiff and her 
counsel were discourteous to and uncooperative with the court. Specifically, in 
response to the court’s question, “Are you a member of the ‘Justice for Justine’ 
committee?” plaintiff’s counsel, Jodi Masley, responded by stating: 
Nobody’s ever asked me that in my life.  I—you know what. 
I fully support the “Justice for Justine”, you know, committee.  They 
have every right to do everything they [want].  And did I participate 
13 As a result of this news broadcast, the following publications were 
released: (1) a Click on Detroit, Channel 4 website article, July 3, 2002, 
referencing plaintiff’s and her counsel’s belief that Judge Giovan was biased and 
(2) a Channel 50 news broadcast, July 3, 2002, in which plaintiff stated that 
money cannot buy justice. 
14 Also on this day, an article was published on the Click on Detroit, 
Channel 4 website concerning Judge Giovan’s alleged bias. 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in a demonstration that was called by the “Justice for Justine” 
committee, I did. 
Judge Giovan attempted to respond to Ms. Masley’s comment, but she 
interrupted him, stating, “I mean, have I or have I ever been a member of the 
Communist Party, is that what this is?”  Moreover, in response to Judge Giovan’s 
inquiry regarding whether members of the “Justice for Justine” committee were 
present in the court, Ms. Masley stated: 
Have you guys even ever heard of the phrase “Freedom of 
association . . . ?” 
* * * 
I have no idea. 
Do they need to know—identify their 
political affiliations . . . ? 
* * * 
(Interposing) Who did you guys vote for in the last judicial 
election? 
The hearing continued into the following day.  At the conclusion of the 
two-day hearing, plaintiff requested permission to file a supplemental brief, which 
Judge Giovan granted. 
On August 21, 2002, Judge Giovan issued an opinion and order dismissing 
plaintiff’s case with prejudice, concluding that plaintiff and her counsel had 
14  
 
 
     
                                                 
 
engaged in premeditated misconduct designed to tamper with the administration of 
justice and that no lesser sanction would deter plaintiff or her counsel.15 
The Court of Appeals, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and acknowledged 
the trial court’s authority to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, but remanded the case to 
the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether plaintiff’s and 
her counsel’s comments actually prejudiced the jury pool.16 
15 Justice Weaver contends that Judge Giovan improperly attributed 
responsibility for plaintiff’s improper references to plaintiff’s counsel.  As these 
facts clearly demonstrate, however, Judge Giovan properly determined that both 
plaintiff and her counsel engaged in behavior designed to taint the potential jury 
pool. 
Justice Weaver further contends that plaintiff was not restricted by any 
order or court rule from making repeated public references to Bennett’s prior 
conviction. While we disagree with the contention that no order or court rule 
barred plaintiff from making pubic references to the excluded evidence, we 
reiterate that, whether a court order existed or whether a court rule applied, 
plaintiff was not free to repeatedly publicize excluded evidence, especially with 
the trial impending.  The only conclusion that can logically be drawn from 
plaintiff’s repeated references to the excluded conviction is that plaintiff was 
improperly attempting to admit the excluded evidence by means of the mass 
media.  Consequentially, Judge Giovan chose a principled option within his 
authority in dismissing plaintiff’s case in order to protect the administration of 
justice. Banta, supra at 368; Cummings v Wayne Co, 210 Mich App 249, 252; 
533 NW2d 13 (1995), citing Buchanan Home & Auto Supply Co v Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co, 544 F Supp 242, 244-245 ( D SC, 1981).  
16 Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 22, 
2004 (Docket No. 243763). 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Defendant sought leave to appeal to this Court.  We directed the clerk to 
schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or to take other 
peremptory action.17 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case requires us to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in 
reversing the trial court’s dismissal of this case.  Trial courts possess the inherent 
authority to sanction litigants and their counsel, including the right to dismiss an 
action. Banta, supra at 368.  “An exercise of the court’s ‘inherent power’ may be 
disturbed only upon a finding that there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” 
Brenner v Kolk, 226 Mich App 149, 160; 573 NW2d 65 (1997). A trial court’s 
dismissal of a case for failure to comply with the court’s orders is also reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. Thorne v Carter, 149 Mich App 90, 93; 385 NW2d 738 
(1986); MCR 2.504(B)(1). 
In People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003), this Court 
noted that an abuse of discretion standard must be one that is more deferential than 
review de novo, but less deferential than the standard set forth in Spalding v 
Spalding, 355 Mich 382; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).  This Court stated that “an abuse 
of discretion standard acknowledges that there will be circumstances in which 
there will be no single correct outcome; rather, there will be more than one 
reasonable and principled outcome.” Babcock, supra at 269.  The Babcock Court 
17 471 Mich 940 (2004). 
16  
 
 
   
 
further noted that “[w]hen the trial court selects one of these principled outcomes, 
the trial court has not abused its discretion and, thus, it is proper for the reviewing 
court to defer to the trial court’s judgment.” Id.  While Babcock dealt with a 
criminal sentencing issue, we prefer the articulation of the abuse of discretion 
standard in Babcock to the Spalding test and, thus, adopt it as the default abuse of 
discretion standard. 
Additionally, in cases raising First Amendment issues, an appellate court is 
obligated to independently review the entire record to ensure that the lower court’s 
judgment “‘“does not constitute a forbidden intrusion of the field of free 
expression.”’” Gentile, supra at 1038, quoting Bose Corp v Consumers Union of 
United States, Inc, 466 US 485, 499; 109 S Ct 1949; 80 L Ed 2d 502 (1984), 
quoting New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 258; 84 S Ct 710; 11 L Ed 2d 
686 (1964). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Trial Court’s Authority to Sanction Litigants for Unethical Behavior 
As stated above, trial courts possess the inherent authority to sanction 
litigants and their counsel, including the power to dismiss an action.  Banta, supra 
at 368. “The authority to dismiss a lawsuit for litigant misconduct is a creature of 
the ‘clean hands doctrine’ and, despite its origins, is applicable to both equitable 
and legal damages claims.” Cummings v Wayne Co, 210 Mich App 249, 252; 533 
NW2d 13 (1995), citing Buchanan Home & Auto Supply Co v Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co, 544 F Supp 242, 244-245 (D SC, 1981). “The authority is rooted in a 
17  
 
 
 
  
  
  
                                                 
 
 
court’s fundamental interest in protecting its own integrity and that of the judicial 
process.”  Cummings, supra at 252. “The ‘clean hands doctrine’ applies not only 
for the protection of the parties but also for the protection of the court.”  Id., citing 
Buchanan Home, supra at 244. 
Moreover, the Michigan Constitution confers on the judicial department all 
the authority necessary to exercise its powers as a coordinate branch of 
government.  “Const 1963, art 3, § 2 divides the powers of government among 
three branches and commits to each branch exclusive exercise of the functions 
properly belonging to it, except as otherwise expressly provided in the 
Constitution.”18 In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mich 660, 662; 255 NW2d 635 (1977). 
“Art 6, § 1 vests the judicial power of the state exclusively in one court of 
justice.”19 Id. “Section 4 of that article[20] vests general superintending control 
18 Const 1963, art 3, § 2 provides: 
The powers of government are divided into three branches; 
legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of 
one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another 
branch except as expressly provided in the constitution. 
19 Const 1963, art 6, § 1 provides: 
The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively in one 
court of justice which shall be divided into one supreme court, one 
court of appeals, one trial court of general jurisdiction known as the 
circuit court, one probate court, and courts of limited jurisdiction 
that the legislature may establish by a two-thirds vote of the 
members elected to and serving in each house. 
20 Const 1964, art 6, § 4 provides: 
(continued . . .) 
18  
 
  
_____________________ 
 
 
 
over all courts in the state in the Supreme Court and § 5 confers upon this Court 
the power to make rules to govern the practice and procedure within the courts.”21 
Id.  “It is also well settled that under our form of government the Constitution 
confers on the judicial department all the authority necessary to exercise its 
powers as a coordinate branch of government.”  Id. at 662-663.  “The judicial 
powers derived from the Constitution include rulemaking, supervisory and other 
administrative powers as well as traditional adjudicative ones.”  Id. at 663. “They 
have been exclusively entrusted to the judiciary by the Constitution and may not 
be diminished, exercised by, nor interfered with by the other branches of 
government without constitutional authorization.” Id., citing Attorney General ex 
rel Cook v O’Neill, 280 Mich 649; 275 NW 445 (1937).   
Moreover, express authority to dismiss a complaint is conferred by statute 
and court rule in Michigan.  MCL 600.611 provides that “[c]ircuit courts have 
jurisdiction and power to make any order proper to fully effectuate the circuit 
(. . . continued) 
The supreme court shall have general superintending control 
over all courts; power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and 
remedial writs; and appellate jurisdiction as provided by rules of the 
supreme court. The supreme court shall not have the power to 
remove a judge. 
21 Const 1964, art 6, § 5 provides: 
The supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify, 
amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this 
state. The distinctions between law and equity proceedings shall, as 
far as practicable, be abolished. The office of master in chancery is 
prohibited. 
19  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
courts’ jurisdiction and judgments.” Additionally, MCR 2.504(B)(1) provides that 
“[i]f the plaintiff fails to comply with [the court] rules or a court order, a defendant 
may move for dismissal of an action or a claim against that defendant.”   
Several of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct address 
sanctionable attorney conduct.  MRPC 3.6 concerns trial publicity.  It provides: 
A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a 
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of 
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. [Emphasis added.] 
MRPC 3.5 addresses impartiality and decorum of the tribunal.  It states: 
A lawyer shall not: 
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other 
official by means prohibited by law; 
(b) communicate ex parte with such a person concerning a 
pending matter except as permitted by law; or  
(c) engage in undignified or discourteous conduct toward the 
tribunal. [Emphasis added.] 
Finally, MRPC 8.4 deals with attorney misconduct.  It provides, in relevant 
part: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another; 
(b) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
misrepresentation, or violation of the criminal law, where such 
conduct reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, 
or fitness as a lawyer; 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration 
of justice. 
B The Trial Court’s Authority to Dismiss this Case 
In this case, Judge Macdonald initially concluded that evidence of 
Bennett’s prior conviction was inadmissible before the jury because of its unduly 
prejudicial nature. Rather than abiding by the trial court’s order, even after both 
the Court of Appeals and this Court denied plaintiff leave to appeal regarding the 
order, plaintiff and her counsel engaged in a concerted and wide-ranging campaign 
in the weeks before various scheduled trial dates to publicize the details of the 
inadmissible evidence through the mass media and other available means.  They 
continued to do so even after the trial court explicitly warned them that such 
misconduct would result in the dismissal of plaintiff’s lawsuit.     
The trial court has a gate-keeping obligation, when such misconduct occurs, 
to impose sanctions that will not only deter the misconduct but also serve as a 
deterrent to other litigants. 
Moreover, MCL 600.611 and MCR 2.504(B)(1) provide the trial court with 
the authority to impose sanctions such as dismissal.  Here, Judge Macdonald 
issued an order excluding evidence regarding Bennett’s expunged conviction. 
Judge Giovan later reaffirmed Judge Macdonald’s initial order of exclusion, and 
21  
 
    
                                                 
 
  
 
explicitly warned the parties that he would dismiss the case if the inappropriate 
remarks regarding the excluded conviction continued.22 
22 Both Justice Cavanagh and Justice Weaver claim that Judge Giovan’s 
warning to refrain from engaging in pretrial publicity was not an order of the 
court. In doing so, they rely on Judge Giovan’s statement that he “never issued a 
gag order” in this case. The dissenting justices, however, take this statement out 
of context. Judge Giovan clearly explained that a gag order was not necessary 
because rules were already in place governing pretrial publicity: 
So, what I say, I’m not going to issue a gag order because the 
rules of professional conduct already have a standard that bind you. 
So, why should Judge Giovan, who is only one of thousands of 
judges, select his own criteria for what people should say when we 
have standing rules that govern what attorneys are permitted to say? 
And one of the things that attorneys are not permitted to do is 
to make public statements that are intended to influence the outcome 
of a case. And when your opponents after several times coming to 
court accusing you and your colleagues and maybe the parties 
themselves of doing precisely that, I took no action. 
But after—on the day that this did occur, I had seen a long 
article about this case, I had heard counsel say on many occasions, 
as you have said here today, that you have invited public 
examination of this case, all I said was that if I should find that the 
rules were violated, I would take corrective action, which could 
include dismissing the case. 
Now, I was not referring to some mysterious, illusory, 
ambiguous rule fixed in my mind and known to nobody else.  It’s 
obvious I was not saying that, that I was going to take action or not 
based on a rule that I invented and disclosed to no one.   
What was obvious to anyone that what I was saying is that if I 
found that the rule of professional conduct was violated, that is to 
say that counsel or parties were making public statements intended 
to affect the outcome of this case, I would take action. 
22  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
Plaintiff’s understanding of Judge Macdonald’s order and Judge Giovan’s 
warning to adhere to the order was clearly demonstrated in her deposition and in 
the June 26, 2002, television interview that was broadcast on WDIV Channel 4 in 
which she acknowledged Judge Giovan’s warning that dismissal would result if 
she continued her behavior, but further stated that “it doesn’t bother me, because 
I’m not going to quit fighting against sexual harassment.” 
Plaintiff’s counsel also clearly understood Judge Macdonald’s order and 
Judge Giovan’s explicit warning to adhere to the order. The trial court twice 
explicitly discussed the improper conduct with plaintiff’s counsel and warned 
everyone about the consequences of continuing misconduct.  Despite the warning, 
and despite the approaching trial, plaintiff and her counsel continued the 
misconduct.23  In fact, as Judge Giovan noted, plaintiff’s lead counsel, George 
23 Justice Cavanagh suggests that Judge Giovan’s warning not to discuss the 
excluded conviction with the press was somehow insufficient to convey to the 
parties that they were not to discuss the excluded conviction with the media.  Post 
at 7-9. We strongly disagree.  The transcript of this exchange, which we have set 
forth on pages 9 to 11 of this opinion, makes it quite clear that the parties were 
advised in no uncertain terms that references to the excluded conviction were to 
cease. Contrary to Justice Cavanagh’s assertion, Judge Giovan explicitly warned 
the parties and the attorneys that further references to the excluded conviction 
would result in dismissal.  Although Judge Giovan did not embody this warning in 
a written order, the warning did not consist of “general comments . . . made in 
passing to both parties.”  Post at 11. Rather, the warning was explicit and made 
on the record in open court.  All involved were clearly aware of what was 
prohibited. To require a formal written order—as it appears Justice Cavanagh 
would—would be to permit any litigant or attorney to disregard an explicitly 
conveyed and clearly understood obligation on the ground that it was not 
(continued . . .) 
23  
 
 
 
 
_____________________ 
 
Washington and Miranda Massie, appeared in television news broadcasts that 
specifically referred to Bennett’s expunged conviction. 
Moreover, plaintiff’s 
counsel acknowledged that counsel could possibly be violating the expungement 
statute by publicly disseminating information regarding Bennett’s expunged 
conviction, but stated that it was “worth the risk.”  Also of note is Ms. Masley’s 
statement at the July 8, 2002, hearing that “Ms. Maldonado has a right to speak 
about Mr. Bennett’s conviction for sure.”  She further stated that plaintiff and her 
counsel, depending on how close it was to trial, had the right to publicize evidence 
that had been excluded by the court. 
Judge Giovan properly noted that, notwithstanding the rulings of two 
judges and the apparent illegality of disclosing Bennett’s excluded conviction, 
nothing would deter plaintiff from continuing to publicize information regarding 
Bennett’s excluded conviction. Plaintiff so admitted in her deposition.  Even 
without an explicit order precluding plaintiff and her counsel from publicizing 
Bennett’s excluded conviction, Judge Giovan chose a principled option in 
dismissing plaintiff’s case in order to protect the administration of justice.  The 
(. . . continued)  
communicated in a written order.  Such a rule would lead only to gamesmanship  
and we decline to adopt it.  
Plaintiff was well aware of Judge Giovan’s explicit warning to refrain from 
making public references to the excluded conviction and of the consequences of 
failing to abide by the warning.  Moreover, as demonstrated throughout this 
opinion, plaintiff failed to abide by the warning on numerous occasions.        
24  
 
   
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
imposition of any lesser sanction would have been unjust in light of plaintiff’s and 
her counsel’s flagrant misbehavior.24 
Not only did plaintiff and her counsel disregard Judge Macdonald’s order 
and Judge Giovan’s explicit warning to respect the order, counsel violated 
numerous rules of professional conduct. Plaintiff’s counsel’s public references to 
Bennett’s excluded conviction violated MRPC 3.6, which was the basis for Judge 
Giovan’s dismissal. Plaintiff’s counsel reasonably knew or should have known 
that their comments would have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing 
the proceedings by improperly influencing prospective jurors regarding Bennett’s 
propensities to commit sexual harassment, especially since trial was approximately 
two weeks away. 
Plaintiff argues that Judge Giovan improperly relied on MRPC 3.6 in 
dismissing plaintiff’s case. She contends that Judge Giovan’s dismissal was solely 
based on plaintiff’s comments, and that MRPC 3.6 does not apply to nonlawyers. 
Plaintiff correctly argues that the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct do not 
24 Justice Cavanagh suggests that the trial court had “numerous other 
options” available to it as sanctions apart from dismissal.  Post at 17.  Even if we 
agreed with this assertion, it is irrelevant in determining whether the sanction 
actually chosen—dismissal in this case—was within the range of “reasonable and 
principled outcome[s].” Babcock, supra at 269. In light of the repeated violation 
of the court’s instruction not to publicize the excluded conviction, we cannot say 
that Judge Giovan’s conclusion that nothing short of dismissal would deter 
plaintiff and counsel’s repeated misconduct was incorrect.  As such, even if we 
were to assume that there were other sanctions available—which we do not 
necessarily believe to be the case—the sanction of dismissal was clearly within the 
range of reasonableness under the circumstances.    
25  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
apply to nonlawyers, but mistakenly contends that Judge Giovan relied only on her 
behavior in ordering a dismissal.  Plaintiff also erroneously contends that she is 
free to engage in improper pretrial publicity designed to taint the potential jury 
pool. The Michigan Court Rules do apply to plaintiff.  They authorize the trial 
court to impose sanctions such as dismissal for party misconduct. MCR 
2.504(B)(1). Judge Giovan expressly warned plaintiff that if she continued to 
disseminate information regarding Bennett’s excluded conviction in violation of 
Judge Macdonald’s order, he would dismiss her case.  Plaintiff failed to obey this 
warning and, thus, Judge Giovan properly dismissed her case.25  In any event, even 
if plaintiff is not bound by MRPC 3.6, plaintiff’s counsel’s repeated public 
references to Bennett’s excluded conviction, coupled with Ms. Massie’s statement 
five days before trial that “Metro Detroit” judges were biased in favor of the Ford 
Motor Company, were substantially likely to materially prejudice the proceedings 
and improperly influence prospective jurors. 
Judge Giovan did not reach a conclusion regarding a possible violation of 
MRPC 3.5, finding it was unnecessary because he dismissed the case under MRPC 
25 Justice Cavanagh contends that we attempt to portray Judge Macdonald’s 
order excluding Bennett’s prior conviction as having the same effect as an order 
precluding any mention of this evidence in public.  We, however, do not 
misconstrue the order of exclusion as an order precluding any mention of the 
evidence in public. Rather, we rely on the order of exclusion in concluding that 
plaintiff’s and her counsel’s numerous references to the excluded evidence just 
weeks before trial was to begin constituted premeditated misconduct designed to 
taint the potential jury pool, deny defendants a fair trial, and frustrate the due 
administration of justice. 
26  
 
 
 
 
 
3.6. Because Judge Giovan did not rely on this rule in dismissing the case, we 
need not reach a conclusion regarding a possible violation of the rule.  We 
nevertheless enumerate plaintiff’s counsel’s acts of disrespect against the trial 
court to highlight plaintiff’s counsel’s undignified and discourteous conduct 
toward the trial court. 
Plaintiff’s counsel, on numerous occasions, despite court orders and an 
explicit warning by the trial court, publicly divulged information regarding 
Bennett’s excluded conviction. Plaintiff’s counsel also deliberately disregarded the 
trial court’s oral directive to refrain from disseminating information regarding 
Bennett’s excluded conviction. Ms. Masley sarcastically responded to the trial 
court’s questioning at the dismissal hearing, and at one point, while on the stand, 
turned to members of the “Justice for Justine” committee present in the courtroom 
and asked them who they voted for in the last judicial election.  Additionally, Ms. 
Massie commented during a July 3, 2002, television interview that “Metro 
Detroit” judges are biased toward the Ford Motor Company.  While this conduct 
may not amount to a violation of MRPC 3.5, it further justifies Judge Giovan’s 
dismissal for plaintiff’s and her counsel’s participation in pretrial publicity 
designed to taint the jury pool. 
We also note MRPC 8.4, although Judge Giovan did not rely on this rule in 
ordering dismissal.  MRPC 8.4 prohibits lawyers from engaging in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice. MRPC 8.4(a) prohibits lawyers from 
engaging in misconduct through the acts of others.  Here, plaintiff’s counsel not 
27  
 
 
 
 
only failed to restrain plaintiff from repeatedly and intentionally publicizing 
Bennett’s inadmissible expunged conviction in order to taint the potential jury 
pool and deny defendants a fair trial, they participated with plaintiff in the 
misconduct on numerous occasions.  This inappropriate and unprofessional 
conduct directly violated Judge Macdonald’s order, Judge Giovan’s reaffirmance 
of the order, and Judge Giovan’s explicit warning.  Moreover, this conduct was 
directly aimed at frustrating the due administration of justice.  It also supports the 
dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint. 
C.  The First Amendment and a Trial Court’s Ability to Restrict Speech 
The First Amendment guarantees that the freedom of speech shall not be 
abridged. It states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances.  [US Const, Am I.] 
In Gentile, the United States Supreme Court addressed the standard 
governing the state’s ability to discipline an attorney under an ethical rule that is 
identical in all relevant respects to MRPC 3.6, regarding speech about parties or 
proceedings in which an attorney is involved. The Court rejected the petitioner 
attorney’s claim that he should be held to the “clear and present danger” standard 
applicable to the press, and concluded that “the speech of lawyers representing 
clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than 
28  
 
 
 
 
 
that established for regulation of the press.”  Gentile, supra at 1074. The Court, in 
an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, explained: 
We agree with the majority of the States that the “substantial 
likelihood 
of 
material 
prejudice” 
standard 
constitutes 
a 
constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment 
rights of attorneys in pending cases and the State’s interest in fair 
trials. 
When a state regulation implicates First Amendment rights, 
the Court must balance those interests against the State’s legitimate 
interest in regulating the activity in question.  The “substantial 
likelihood” test . . . is constitutional . . . for it is designed to protect 
the integrity and fairness of a state’s judicial system and it imposes 
only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers’ speech. The 
limitations are aimed at two principal evils: (1) comments that are 
likely to influence the actual outcome of the trial, and (2) comments 
that are likely to prejudice the jury venire, even if an untainted panel 
can ultimately be found. [Id. at 1075 (emphasis added).] 
The Court noted that “[l]awyers representing clients in pending cases are 
key participants in the criminal justice system, and the State may demand some 
adherence to the precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their 
conduct.” Id. at 1074. The Court further observed that “[f]ew, if any, interests 
under the Constitution are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by 
‘impartial’ jurors, and an outcome affected by extrajudicial statements would 
violate that fundamental right.” Id. at 1075. 
Judge Giovan, after reviewing Gentile, found a substantial likelihood of 
prejudice: 
More important, however, is that the plaintiff should not be 
heard to make her argument, which goes like this:  “We deny that 
our behavior was intended to have a substantial likelihood of 
29  
 
 
 
 
 
prejudice. But even if you establish that it was, you cannot dismiss 
the plaintiff’s case until you establish that it has achieved its 
intended effect.” 
We believe otherwise. That is not an acceptable standard for 
preserving the integrity of a court system.  The behavior in question 
has been intentional, premeditated, and intransigent.  It was designed 
to reach the farthest boundaries of the public consciousness.  It 
should be presumed to have had its intended effect. 
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the applicable test under Gentile 
is whether the conduct generated a “substantial likelihood” of prejudice, yet 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether “actual” prejudice 
occurred. 
We hereby affirm the trial court’s understanding of Gentile. Plaintiff’s and 
her counsel’s numerous public references to Bennett’s inadmissible, expunged 
indecent exposure conviction, despite a court order excluding such evidence, were 
obviously intended to prejudice potential jurors.  The trial court thus warned the 
parties and counsel that all public references to the expunged conviction in 
violation of the ethical rules would result in dismissal.  This limitation on 
plaintiff’s and her counsel’s speech only applied to speech that was substantially 
likely to have a materially prejudicial effect and that, therefore, violated the rules 
of ethics. It did not prohibit plaintiff and her counsel from speaking about sexual 
harassment or the general nature of plaintiff’s case.  Judge Giovan, at the dismissal 
hearing, acknowledged the importance of upholding the First Amendment and 
30  
 
 
 
 
 
drew a distinction between protected speech and speech merely designed to thwart 
the judicial process. He stated to defense counsel: 
Well, now, before we move further, I think you understand 
that we need to draw a distinction between a party’s willingness and 
right to disseminate to the public their ideas of how they’ve been 
unjustly treated and the like, and even criticism of the Court as 
opposed to what’s really at stake here, and that is efforts to thwart 
the judicial system, and that is to disseminate, for example, excluded 
evidence and evidence forbidden to be disseminated by statute, 
which you have referred to.  But nevertheless, you do need to 
differentiate between those two things. 
The rules of evidence are designed to ensure fairness in the administration 
of justice, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the growth and 
development of the law of evidence. MRE 102.  Judge Macdonald’s exclusion of 
Bennett’s expunged conviction was based on the rules of evidence. 
She 
specifically relied on MRE 404(b) in excluding the evidence, determining that the 
evidence would not be offered for any purpose other than to show Bennett’s 
propensity to conduct himself in this manner.  Judge Macdonald further relied on 
MRE 403 to determine that, even if the evidence were relevant, its undue 
prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value in light of the availability of 
alternative means of proof. 
Judge Macdonald’s ruling, and Judge Giovan’s 
subsequent limitation on plaintiff’s and her counsel’s speech, was in accord with 
the purpose of the evidentiary rules.  Moreover, the rulings were necessary to 
protect defendants’ fundamental right to a fair trial and were directly aimed at 
protecting potential jurors from prejudice. 
31  
 
 
 
 
As the United States Supreme Court noted in the Gentile case, few, if any, 
interests are more fundamental than the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
Plaintiff stated that nothing would deter her from continuing to publicize Bennett’s 
expunged conviction, and that she would post it on the Internet if she could. 
Additionally, plaintiff’s counsel, despite court orders, publicly divulged 
information regarding the excluded expunged conviction.  Judge Giovan merely 
exercised his “‘affirmative constitutional duty’ to minimize the potential for 
prejudicial pretrial publicity,” United States v Houbriti, 307 F Supp 2d 891, 897 
(ED Mich, 2004), quoting Gannett Co, Inc v DePasquale, 443 US 368, 378; 99 S 
Ct 2898; 61 L Ed 2d 608 (1979), in dismissing plaintiff’s case, and did not violate 
the First Amendment in doing so. 
The Court of Appeals requirement that actual prejudice be shown conflicts 
not only with the “substantial likelihood” test set forth in Gentile, but also with the 
plain language of MRPC 3.6.  Moreover, the Court of Appeals standard has no 
practical workability. It would be impossible to determine “actual prejudice” to a 
potential jury pool three years after the incident in question.  We decline to order 
an evidentiary hearing that is no more than a fool’s errand.  The trial court 
narrowly tailored a restriction on plaintiff’s and her counsel’s speech consonant 
with the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct.  The trial court’s limitation on 
plaintiff’s and her counsel’s speech was narrowly tailored and necessary to 
prevent prejudice to the potential jury pool and did not violate the First 
Amendment. 
32  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
IV. RESPONSE TO JUSTICE CAVANAGH’S DISSENT  
Justice Cavanagh asserts that the majority opinion violates the First 
Amendment by restricting speech that does not have a substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing the proceedings.  We reiterate that the narrow and necessary 
limitation on plaintiff’s and her counsel’s speech only applied to Bennett’s 
expunged prior conviction that had been excluded as evidence.  Plaintiff and her 
counsel remained free to discuss the general nature of her case and sexual 
harassment. We agree with Justice Cavanagh that the First Amendment does 
protect even offensive expressions, see, e.g., R A V v City of St Paul, 505 US 377; 
112 S Ct 2538; 120 L Ed 2d 305 (1992).  The First Amendment, however, does 
not protect all speech in whatever circumstances.  See, e.g., Adderley v Florida, 
385 US 39; 87 S Ct 242; 17 L Ed 2d 149 (1966).  The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized the need to balance the rights of attorneys and litigants in 
pending cases and the state’s interest in fair trials.  In recognizing this tension, the 
Court has held that the First Amendment does not protect speech that has a 
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the proceedings.  Contrary to 
Justice Cavanagh’s implication that plaintiff is being punished for being 
discourteous and offensive toward the court, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s 
case solely because plaintiff and plaintiff’s counsel made numerous references to 
excluded evidence, despite the trial court’s oral warning that dismissal would 
result if such references continued, for the sole purpose of tainting the potential 
jury pool and denying defendants a fair trial.   
33  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
Justice Cavanagh opines that plaintiff’s and her counsel’s references to the 
excluded evidence did not have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing 
the proceedings. We, however, fail to see how plaintiff’s and her counsel’s 
numerous public references to Bennett’s prior indecent exposure conviction, after 
the court ordered the exclusion of that evidence, did not have a substantial 
likelihood of materially prejudicing this sexual harassment proceeding.  The 
excluded indecent exposure conviction, which was subsequently expunged, 
involved sexual behavior that is very similar to the alleged sexual behavior in this 
case. It could be offered for no other purpose than to show Bennett’s propensity to 
conduct himself in this manner.  This is the exact type of evidence that MRE 
404(b) precludes.  If the narrow limitation on speech in this case cannot pass 
muster under the substantial likelihood test of Gentile, we fail to see what 
limitation could survive.26 
26 To reiterate, as stated in Grievance Administrator v Fieger, 476 Mich 
___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 127547, decided July 31, 2006), slip op at 
34 n 34: 
Given the position advanced by the dissenting justices . . . , 
one wonders whether the dissenting justices would simply surrender 
the legal process to the least restrained and worst behaved members 
of the bar. With increasingly little need to adhere to the rules 
necessary to ensure public confidence in the integrity of the legal 
process, the dissenters would create a world in which legal questions 
come increasingly to be decided, not by a fair and rational search for 
truth, but by bullying and uncivil behavior, personal abuse, one­
upmanship, and public exhibitionism on the part of those who are 
(continued . . .) 
34  
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________ 
V. CONCLUSION  
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 
plaintiff’s suit. We further hold that the trial court’s explicit warning prohibiting 
any references to Bennett’s excluded conviction did not violate the First 
Amendment.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
reinstate the trial court’s order dismissing plaintiff’s case.  Because we hold that a 
dismissal is appropriate, we need not decide the remaining issue.  Additionally, we 
do not reach the issues in plaintiff’s cross-application because they are moot in 
light of our reinstatement of the trial court’s order of dismissal.   
 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
(. . . continued) 
custodians of this system, the bar.  Justice under the law cannot 
flourish within such a system. 
35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
JUSTINE MALDONADO, 
Plaintiff-Appellee/ 
Cross-Appellant, 
No. 126274 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 
 
Defendant-Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee 
and 
DANIEL P. BENNETT, 
Defendant. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
I agree with the majority that a trial court has the authority to control 
courtroom proceedings; however, this control must comport with the First 
Amendment. The desire for “preserving an organized polity,” ante at 2, cannot be 
exercised at the expense of an individual’s First Amendment right to free speech. 
Because I believe that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed 
plaintiff’s case with prejudice and because I vehemently disagree with the 
majority’s belief that its opinion today does not violate the Constitution, I must 
respectfully dissent. 
Further, because I agree with Justice Weaver that the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
majority’s decision undermines the basic tenets of our judicial system, I also 
concur with her dissent. 
I. THE STANDARDS FOR REVIEWING THE CONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF 
AND HER ATTORNEYS 
Plaintiff Justine Maldonado’s cause of action for sexual harassment against 
Daniel Bennett and defendant Ford Motor Company was dismissed with prejudice 
on August 21, 2002, because the trial court believed that plaintiff and her attorneys 
engaged in prejudicial pretrial publicity.  The Michigan Rules of Professional 
Conduct (MRPC) have an established court rule that specifically governs trial 
publicity. MRPC 3.6 states: 
A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a 
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of 
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. [Emphasis added.] 
The United States Supreme Court examined the “substantial likelihood of 
material prejudice” standard in Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030; 111 S 
Ct 2720; 115 L Ed 2d 888 (1991), in light of the First Amendment.1  The Supreme 
1  The United States Constitution provides: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress 
of grievances.  [US Const, Am I.] 
The Michigan Constitution provides: 
(continued . . .) 
2  
 
 
 
  
 
 
_____________________ 
 
Court observed that this standard “imposes only narrow and necessary limitations 
on lawyers’ speech.”  Id. at 1075. As the Supreme Court has also noted, “the 
likelihood, however great, that a substantive evil will result cannot alone justify a 
restriction upon freedom of speech or the press.”  Bridges v California, 314 US 
252, 262; 62 S Ct 190; 86 L Ed 192 (1941).  The evil must be substantial and 
“extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances 
can be punished.” Id. at 263. 
II. THE CONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEYS WAS NOT 
SUBSTANTIALLY LIKELY TO MATERIALLY PREJUDICE THE  
TRIAL 
The conduct of plaintiff and her attorneys was not substantially likely to 
materially prejudice the trial.  When plaintiff filed her sexual harassment cause of 
action, the Detroit Free Press published an article about the filing on June 9, 2000. 
Plaintiff also held a press conference about the filing of her complaint.  From that 
time forward, Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction was a matter of public 
record, available to any member of the public, including any journalist. 
Long before Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction was ultimately 
expunged on November 9, 2001, and the trial court made a general statement to 
the parties about pretrial publicity on June 21, 2002, the indecent exposure 
(. . . continued) 
Every person may freely speak, write, express and publish his 
views on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right; 
and no law shall be enacted to restrain or abridge the liberty of 
speech or of the press. [Const 1963, art 1, § 5.] 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
conviction and the facts surrounding it were well-publicized.  Accordingly, it is 
improper to blame plaintiff and her attorneys for every subsequent mention of 
Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction, as the majority has, because information 
about his conviction was available from numerous sources.  Journalists had access 
to this information from the time the complaint was filed, and journalists attended 
public courtroom proceedings, as they are allowed to do.  Police reports were 
readily available to anyone who properly requested them.  This information was 
contained in pleadings in the circuit court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court, 
and no objection was made.  Further, the indecent exposure conviction was 
repeatedly discussed in open court.  So regardless of whether plaintiff was the 
original provider of the information, any novice journalist willing to do a nominal 
amount of research would have ultimately discovered the conviction.  See, e.g., 
Gentile, supra at 1046 (Kennedy, J.) (Although the petitioner shared the 
information with journalists, it was also “available to any journalist willing to do a 
little bit of investigative work.”). 
Over seven months after information about Bennett’s indecent exposure 
conviction was first made known in relation to this case, on January 19, 2001, 
Judge Kathleen Macdonald granted a motion to exclude evidence of Bennett’s 
indecent exposure conviction from plaintiff’s trial.2  Later, on February 16, 2001, 
2 Notably, Judge Macdonald recognized that this decision may not be final. 
She stated the following: 
(continued . . .) 
4  
 
 
_____________________ 
the trial court granted a motion to exclude any evidence related to Bennett’s 
indecent exposure conviction.  However, these decisions did not preclude plaintiff 
and her attorneys from ever mentioning the indecent exposure conviction in public 
again, and it is erroneous to attempt to portray them as such.  While the majority 
refers to an order by Judge Macdonald that witnesses who mentioned Bennett’s 
indecent exposure conviction would be considered in contempt of court, this order 
applied to Lula Elezovic’s case, not plaintiff’s case, and the order applied only to 
testimony given in court.  This order did not restrict plaintiff’s right to discuss 
Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction in public settings as it relates to her case. 
Notably, in between the two decisions excluding evidence of Bennett’s 
indecent exposure conviction, on January 28, 2001, the New York Times published 
a lengthy article about the multiple claims of sexual harassment at defendant’s 
plant. 
The article also mentioned Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction, 
including a reference to the indecent exposure conviction made by the former 
plant manager for defendant’s Wixom plant.  Another article was published on 
(. . . continued) 
My ruling right now is that it [evidence of Bennett’s indecent 
exposure conviction] will not be allowed even as to notice to Ford 
Motor.  That’s my position now. However, whenever I make a 
ruling in a vacuum outside the context of a trial, I’m always 
concerned that when I get in the middle of the trial and I find out I 
may have made a mistake, I will change my ruling.  If I find the 
probative value of this evidence against only Ford Motor and 
somehow I can make a limited instruction so that somehow the jury 
won’t take it as propensity evidence, I would reconsider it.  As of 
right now this evidence is excluded. [Emphasis added.] 
5  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
June 12, 2002, in the Metro-Times. In the article, plaintiff is quoted as saying, 
“They are investigating everything in my life, but not the man who did it to me, 
not the man who had the criminal record, was in a company car and exposed 
himself to high-school girls and was convicted of it.”  However, the article also 
stated that “[a]ccording to Ford and Bennett’s attorney,” plaintiff began weaving 
her tale after she learned of Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction.3  Bennett’s 
attorney also talked about Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction in the article, as 
well as how Bennett was falsely accused by the girls and how the conviction was 
expunged.  Bennett’s conviction was also mentioned by the attorney for Lula 
Elezovic, a woman who also alleged that Bennett sexually harassed her; Pamela 
Perez, another woman who alleged that Bennett sexually harassed her; and a 
former plant manager for defendant. While the majority contends that it was 
proper for the trial court to dismiss plaintiff’s case with prejudice for mentioning 
Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction, it conveniently ignores the fact that 
3 The majority characterizes these remarks as necessary responses to 
comments made by plaintiff and her attorneys.  Ante at 9 n 11. The majority 
believes that saying that plaintiff is a lying opportunist who crafted her story after 
learning of the indecent exposure conviction is “not intended to taint the potential 
jury pool and cause prejudice to plaintiff.”  Id. I, however, believe that an 
objective reader of the facts of this case will recognize an analytical disparity in 
the majority’s reasoning. Simply, if mentioning Bennett’s indecent exposure 
conviction is—as the majority asserts—an attempt to influence the jury pool, then 
publicly arguing that plaintiff fabricated claims of sexual harassment in a 
desperate attempt to receive a large cash award from defendant is exactly the same 
type of conduct that the majority finds so egregious. 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
defendant’s attorney and Bennett’s attorney also did the same to advance their 
theory of the case to the public. 
On May 17, 2002, another evidentiary hearing was held in front of Judge 
William Giovan.4  At a conference in chambers, defendant’s attorney requested a 
gag order directing plaintiff’s attorneys not to publicize Bennett’s expunged 
indecent exposure conviction.  The court declined to issue a gag order. 
In the course of another evidentiary hearing on June 21, 2002, the trial 
court briefly stated that it would dismiss the case if it found that a party was 
“causing some difficulty in our getting a fair jury . . . .”  Yet this “explicit 
warning,” as the majority repeatedly calls it, was so vague and fleeting that it 
cannot possibly take the place of a formal court order.  It provided no guidance to 
the parties about what conduct was prohibited and clearly made no specific 
mention of Bennett’s expunged conviction.  Moreover, because the conviction had 
been previously referenced in the media and the trial court had refused to issue a 
gag order to prohibit this conduct, there can be no fair inference drawn from the 
trial court’s offhand comment that it was now prohibiting any mention of the 
conviction. 
It is important to note that the entire exchange about the possibility of 
dismissal occurred in an offhand manner as follows: 
4 Judge Giovan was assigned to the case after Judge Kathleen Macdonald 
was assigned to another division of the circuit court. 
7  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
Mr. Morgan  [Bennett’s counsel]: But first, they tried Mr. 
Bennett’s deposition, and they unilaterally scheduled it for the 12th, 
knowing that they had fed the Metro Times with all the information 
for that horribly one-sided, inflammatory article that came out—[5] 
The Court: You think it was one-sided? 
Mr. Morgan: I haven’t heard anyone comment to me to the 
contrary in the past week and a half. 
The Court: I will just tell you that I don’t know who it was, 
but somebody thought that it made a fair presentation.  That’s 
neither here nor there, if that makes you feel any better. 
Mr. Morgan: Well, the night before, and my client was ready 
to appear for the deposition in the Perez case. We had filed a motion 
for a protective order that we had scheduled for the previous Friday, 
and that motion for a protective order was, number one, to have the 
judge limit— 
The Court:  But, you know, since you mentioned that article, 
where’s this coming from? I thought that there is a prohibition 
against counsel speaking to—making public statements designed to 
affect litigation. 
Ms. Hardy [defendant’s counsel]: There certainly is. There’s 
an ethics rule which prohibits counsel from intentionally trying to 
taint a jury pool by making the public aware of excluded evidence, 
which is exactly what’s been occurring for quite some time. 
The Court: Is counsel being quoted in this? 
5 Part of this “one-sided” article states as follows: 
Perhaps the plaintiffs are colluding to pick Ford’s pockets. 
And perhaps Maldonado is the woman Ford portrays her to be—a 
greedy, sexually wanton, emotionally troubled ringleader of a 
conspiracy to gouge the company. 
Or perhaps she and the other women are telling the truth. 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Mr. Washington [plaintiff’s counsel]: I think counsel on both 
sides. Ford was not, but Mr. Morgan and Ms. Massie [plaintiff’s 
attorney] and I were both quoted, all quoted. 
The Court: I’m not sure—well— 
Ms. Hardy: 
It was initiated, without doubt, and Mr. 
Washington will not dispute this, by Mr. Washington, as all the press 
has been initiated by his office, and the constant publicity is one 
issue, but the really serious issue is the effort by Mr. Washington to 
make sure that the press continues to report evidence or information 
concerning this expunged conviction so that some way, somehow, 
irrespective of this Court’s ruling— 
The Court: I’m not making any decisions about this, but I’m 
going to tell you one thing. If I ever reach the conclusion that 
somebody is violating that ethical obligation and causing some 
difficulty in our getting a fair jury, I will dismiss the case with 
prejudice, or, and I should say, on the other side, grant a default 
judgment. I just want everyone to know that.  And then whatever 
counsel is involved can answer to their client.  [Emphasis added.] 
Contrary to the majority’s assertions, the trial court did not advise the 
parties “in no uncertain terms that references to the excluded conviction were to 
cease.” Ante at 23 n 23. And the trial court did not “explicitly warn[] the parties 
and the attorneys that further references to the excluded conviction would result in 
dismissal.” Id. In fact, there was no “explicit warning” that the case would be 
dismissed if remarks about the conviction were made, and there was no warning 
about what conduct would result in dismissal.  A review of the quoted transcript of 
the exchange reveals that not once does the trial court even utter a word about the 
expunged indecent exposure conviction or excluded evidence.   
Remarkably, I need only quote the trial court’s own words to show the 
falsity of the majority’s position that the trial court “explicitly warned the parties 
9  
 
 
 
that [it] would dismiss the case if the inappropriate remarks regarding the excluded 
conviction continued.”    Ante at 22. The trial court itself stated, “I told everybody 
then [at the May 17 hearing], certainly in chambers and maybe again after that on 
the record, I don’t know that I repeated it on the record, that I had no intention of 
telling anyone what they can say.” (Emphasis added.) At another hearing, the 
trial court stated, “I think I don’t have the right to decide for myself what a lawyer 
can say to the public.  I do not have that right.”  And finally and most importantly, 
“I have never issued such an order in my life.”  Therefore, I fail to see how the 
majority can characterize the trial court’s words as being an “explicit warning” 
when the trial court itself does not believe it issued such a warning. 
The trial court’s own statements that it did not issue an order or warning 
that explicitly restricted what could be said should persuade a reasonable reader 
that no such order was entered or warning issued that prohibited the mention of the 
indecent exposure conviction.  Yet the majority chooses to ignore this reality in 
favor of a factual scenario that it created and that it wishes had occurred. The 
majority attempts to portray an order excluding evidence from trial as having the 
same effect as an order precluding any mention of this evidence in public, and this 
erroneous portrayal is the crux of the majority’s analysis. 
Remarkably, the 
majority’s entire analysis relies on the faulty premise that two orders—one of 
which was never even entered—dealing with different topics and restricting 
different conduct can actually be the same.  But an order excluding evidence is not 
magically transformed into an order precluding the mention of the evidence in 
10  
 
 
 
 
public no matter how much the majority wishes it were so. Unfortunately, I 
believe that the majority has steadfastly refused to acknowledge the difference 
because it would show that its analysis is insupportable.   
While the majority labels as “preposterous” the dissent’s position that an 
order excluding evidence from a trial is not the same as an order precluding the 
mention of this evidence in public, the majority never goes beyond name-calling 
to explain its position that an order excluding evidence now means that this 
evidence can never be mentioned in any forum again.  Unfortunately, the 
majority’s insistence on resorting to such tactics and its refusal to explain its 
position is becoming standard operating procedure whenever the majority cannot 
legally support its position.  In this case, the majority so desires a specific outcome 
that it ignores the fact that an order excluding evidence cannot be labeled an order 
precluding mention of this evidence in public, and this blind adherence to its 
favored outcome leads it to espouse a position that is completely indefensible.   
Moreover, the trial court’s brief remarks at the evidentiary hearing about 
ethical obligations were made with no hearing or information about what plaintiff 
and her attorneys had or had not been doing.  There is no indication that the trial 
court believed that plaintiff and her attorneys had been engaging in misconduct 
and that they must now cease any of their activities.  The trial court’s general 
comments were made in passing to both parties.  There was no formal or informal 
hearing on this matter; there was only an extremely brief exchange.  Also, 
contrary to the majority’s contention, a comment made by plaintiff at a rally 
11  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
protesting sexual harassment is not adequate evidence that plaintiff understood the 
trial court’s June 21, 2002, “order.” In response to a reporter’s question at the 
rally, plaintiff stated that she was not going to quit fighting sexual harassment, 
even if that meant that her case would be dismissed. However, the news report 
does not show the question posed by the reporter that prompted plaintiff’s 
statement. Notably, there was no mention of Bennett’s expunged conviction 
during this news broadcast.  What was mentioned during the broadcast was a 
statement by a spokeswoman for defendant, in which she said that she would not 
comment on the case, but she did note that the judge had asked those involved to 
refrain from drawing attention to the case.  While the majority draws the 
conclusion from the broadcast that plaintiff somehow understood a limitation on 
referencing Bennett’s expunged conviction when no such limitation was ever 
ordered or discussed by the trial court, I draw no such conclusion.  It is highly 
probable that plaintiff was referring to the same directive that defendant’s 
spokeswoman was referencing—that the trial judge asked the parties to refrain 
from drawing unnecessary attention to the case. But there is no indication that 
such a vague “request” was somehow transformed into an “order” regarding 
referring to Bennett’s expunged conviction merely by plaintiff’s comment.6 
6 Plaintiff’s counsel later even sought more specificity and argued that the 
trial court’s request was too vague to provide any guidance because “there’s no 
way that any member of [plaintiff’s] legal team could know when you had drawn a 
conclusion, as you said, that we were running afoul of the ethical rules . . . .”    
12  
 
 
 
 
As it relates to the conduct of plaintiff’s attorneys, the majority states that it 
was misconduct for plaintiff’s attorneys to have “appeared in television news 
broadcasts that specifically referred to Bennett’s expunged conviction.”  Ante at 
24. Yet, in over ten televised news reports, plaintiff and her attorneys do not once 
mention Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction or the events that led to the 
conviction. Notably, the only person to comment off-camera on the conviction in 
one of the news reports is a spokesperson for defendant. Further, while the 1995 
conviction is referenced in various televised news reports, an attorney for Bennett 
or defendant appears in each one of these reports.  If it was misconduct for 
plaintiff’s attorneys to appear in these reports, I fail to see why defendant is not 
being held to a similar standard. 
I further note that, in a September 12, 2001, article by The Associated 
Press, it is Bennett’s attorney who mentions the indecent exposure conviction, not 
plaintiff’s attorneys. In an October 10, 2001, article in the Detroit Free Press, it is 
again Bennett’s attorney who mentions the indecent exposure conviction as he 
characterizes plaintiff and the other women who allege sexual harassment by 
Bennett as women who are lying, looking for easier jobs, “out to make a quick 
buck,” and attempting to capitalize on Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction.  
Notably, “in some circumstances press comment is necessary to protect the 
rights of the client and prevent abuse of the courts.”  Gentile, supra at 1058 
(Kennedy, J.). “[A]n attorney may take reasonable steps to defend a client’s 
reputation . . . .” Id. at 1043. In this case, defendant made numerous comments to 
13  
 
 
 
 
 
the media regarding plaintiff and her claims of sexual harassment.  Bennett’s and 
defendant’s strategy was clear. Plaintiff was a liar.  Bennett’s attorney made 
repeated, explicit statements to the media—plaintiff and the other women who 
alleged sexual harassment were lying. Defendant’s attorney stated that plaintiff 
had “credibility issues.” In the June 12, 2002, Metro-Times article, Bennett’s 
attorney said that plaintiff and the other women suing defendant and Bennett were 
lying about the harassment and were motivated in large part by greed. 
Defendant’s defense was summarized as being that “Maldonado is an overweight 
opportunist who is colluding with co-workers to make a fortune by falsely 
accusing Bennett of sexual harassment and falsely accusing the company of doing 
nothing about it.”  Pretrial allegations against Maldonado included an assertion 
that she had had sex in a car in defendant’s parking lot and frequently took her 
underwear off at work and hung it for all to see.  And defendant’s attorney 
repeatedly attempted to trivialize testimony and evidence that other women had 
been sexually harassed by Bennett by referring to this as “me too” evidence. 
In light of the forceful and contentious tactics engaged in by both parties, I 
do not believe that the mere mention of an expunged conviction of indecent 
exposure that some jurors might hear had a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing the trial.  See, e.g, Gentile, supra at 1058 (Statements made by an 
attorney alleging that the police department and the prosecutor’s office were 
corrupt were not substantially likely to materially prejudice the proceedings.).  It is 
not surprising that defendant would make this argument because it would like as 
14  
 
 
 
   
                                                 
 
little attention as possible paid to this case because it finds itself defending yet 
another sexual harassment claim involving Bennett.  What is surprising, however, 
is that the majority agrees with defendant and takes the position that dismissal 
with prejudice is a reasonable response for the courts in a matter in which plaintiff 
and her attorneys have behaved in a manner entirely consistent with the actions of 
defendant’s attorneys. 
Simply, if plaintiff and her attorneys are criticized for seeking to influence 
the public perception of events by talking about Bennett’s indecent exposure 
conviction, then I fail to see how defendant’s attorneys were not attempting to do 
the same. Both parties sought to negatively portray their adversary’s position in 
the media. While plaintiff is criticized by the trial court for sending out a press 
release, defendant also sent out press releases involving this case, yet it is only 
plaintiff who is being penalized with the extreme sanction of dismissal with 
prejudice.7 
The attention paid to this case unmistakably shows that public interest is 
going to be more acute when the matter at issue is controversial.  See Bridges, 
supra at 268. Sexual harassment, and, in this case, its alleged pervasiveness at 
defendant’s facilities, is a matter of public interest that will engender public 
7 I also note that after investigating this matter, the state of Michigan’s 
Attorney Grievance Commission did not find any evidence of misconduct that 
warranted further action, and it dismissed complaints filed by Bennett’s attorney 
against plaintiff’s attorneys. 
15  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
discussion.8  As the Detroit Free Press reported in an October 10, 2001, article, 
various women complained of sexual harassment at defendant’s Wixom plant, 
including women who were high-level supervisors.  In the article, a manager for 
the Michigan Department of Civil Rights stated, “‘It’s an extraordinary situation 
when you’ve got that many [sexual harassment complaints]. . . .  Filing a lawsuit is 
not something women take lightly.’”   
Making this case an even bigger issue of public interest is the manner in 
which the judicial proceedings are conducted, and the allegation, supportable or 
not, that participants are not receiving fair treatment in our courts.  The public 
undoubtedly has an interest in ensuring that proceedings are conducted fairly.  But 
punishing comments made while the case is pending will “produce their restrictive 
results at the precise time when public interest in the matters discussed would 
naturally be at its height.” Bridges, supra at 268. It is axiomatic that under the 
majority’s rationale, cases that command the most public interest will be removed 
from the arena of public discourse.  See id. It may take years to resolve a case, 
and the majority’s position effectively silences negative critiques of the justice 
system and its parties during that time. Id. With this, I cannot agree. 
8 Other women have also alleged sexual harassment involving Daniel 
Bennett. Notably, this Court has issued two other opinions involving similar 
allegations against Bennett.  See Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 472 Mich 408; 697 
NW2d 851 (2005); McClements v Ford Motor Co, 473 Mich 373; 702 NW2d 166 
(2005). Further, a majority of this Court addressed by order another case dealing 
with alleged sexual harassment by Bennett.  Perez v Ford Motor Co No 2, 474 
Mich 1057 (2006). 
16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. OTHER ADEQUATE AVENUES WERE AVAILABLE TO THE TRIAL  
COURT 
The trial court had numerous other options to use before employing the 
drastic measure of dismissing plaintiff’s case with prejudice.  The possibility that 
other less extreme measures could have been used by the trial court is a weighty 
factor that must be considered 
See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc v 
Virginia, 435 US 829, 843; 98 S Ct 1535; 56 L Ed 2d 1 (1978).  The trial court 
could have required a continuance; moved the location of the trial; continued 
forward with sequestered, individualized voir dire; or continued forward with voir 
dire and a larger pool of jurors. See, e.g., Gentile, supra at 1044 (Kennedy, J.).  At 
the very least, the trial court could have issued an order forbidding any future 
disclosure by the parties of Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction.  There is no 
record that any of these options were seriously considered by the trial court.   
The majority appears to argue that plaintiff would not comply with such an 
order. But plaintiff’s sarcastic and posturing comments to defense counsel that 
she had told people about the conviction and would continue to do so cannot 
seriously be deemed evidence from which it can be extrapolated that plaintiff 
would refuse to comply with an order from the court. Notably, it is clear that the 
trial court never thought it issued an order to any of the parties.  The trial court 
stated: 
I don’t believe in gag orders.  I’ve never issued a gag 
order. . . .  I have heard from time to time judges issuing orders 
personal to the attorneys saying you can’t talk about this case, you 
can’t do this, you can’t do that. I have never issued such an order in 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
my life. . . . I haven’t done it in thirty years and I didn’t do it in this 
case. [Emphasis added.]   
Moreover, defendant’s attorney knew that an order was not entered.  During 
a motion hearing, defendant’s attorney reiterated the court’s comment during a 
prior hearing that “you were not issuing an order . . . .” During the same hearing, 
Bennett’s attorney also said that he had asked the court to issue an order, but the 
court had declined.  And in any event, whether plaintiff theoretically would 
comply with such an order is unfounded speculation.  The critical fact is that 
plaintiff is suffering the ultimate punishment for violating an alleged “order” that 
was never even issued. 
To fully understand this case and any comments made by plaintiff, it is 
important to note that during her deposition, plaintiff endured days of questioning. 
At one point, her attorneys even filed a motion for a protective order barring 
further deposition questioning of plaintiff.  Plaintiff was questioned about her 
weight and her Internet habits. Evidence was sought and plaintiff was also 
questioned about her sexual fantasies, prior sexual assaults, sexual habits, and 
religious beliefs, as well as her brother’s drug addiction and her father’s criminal 
past. This case was highly contentious with defense counsel repeatedly claiming 
that plaintiff was lying so that she could receive a damages award.  Plaintiff’s 
statement of defiance to opposing counsel cannot reasonably be deemed 
dispositive evidence that she would continue to discuss excluded evidence if 
ordered not to do so by the court.  While I do not condone disrespectful behavior 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
during depositions or during any aspect of a proceeding, plaintiff’s response was a 
human, albeit inadvisable, response in light of the contentious proceedings.  But 
the statement did not rise to such a level that her case should be dismissed with 
prejudice because she made it, and I vehemently disagree with the majority that 
doing so was within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes at the trial 
court’s discretion. 
Remarkably, the trial court expressed no real concern about the ability of 
jurors to impartially decide this case.  During a hearing to decide defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, the trial court stated it was not listening to arguments to 
determine if the conduct of plaintiff and her attorneys impaired defendant’s right 
to a fair trial. The trial court stated, “I think it is often possible in high publicity 
cases to—you know, with appropriate safeguards, to try a case without—it may be 
difficult sometimes—without the publicity infecting the trial.”  Defendant’s 
attorney agreed that the gravamen of the proceeding was about the “alleged 
misbehavior” of plaintiff and her attorneys in publicizing material and it was not 
whether defendant could receive a fair trial.   
The majority now wants to portray this case as being about a defendant’s 
right to a fair trial. See ante at 3. It claims that the “trial court’s limitation on the 
speech of plaintiff and her counsel was a narrow and necessary limitation aimed at 
protecting potential jurors from prejudice.” Ante at 3. But I fail to see how 
necessary it was when the trial court itself did not even consider this as a reason 
for dismissing the case with prejudice. While the majority now wants to portray 
19  
 
 
 
 
 
this case as being about a defendant’s right to a fair trial because this portrayal 
better supports the majority’s outcome, I find this depiction to be disingenuous at 
best because neither the trial court nor defendant itself viewed the case in this way.    
IV. THE CONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEYS DID NOT 
VIOLATE MRPC 3.5 AND MRPC 8.4 
The majority states that the trial court did not rely on MRPC 3.5 and MRPC 
8.4 in reaching its conclusion to dismiss plaintiff’s case.  However, the majority 
nonetheless examines the conduct of plaintiff and her attorneys in light of these 
rules to provide further evidence that the conduct warranted dismissal of plaintiff’s 
sexual harassment cause of action.  MRPC 3.5 states the following: 
A lawyer shall not: 
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror, or other 
official by means prohibited by law; 
(b) communicate ex parte with such a person concerning a 
pending matter, except as permitted by law; or  
(c) engage in undignified or discourteous conduct toward the 
tribunal. 
Regarding MRPC 3.5, the majority refers to a “sarcastic” comment made 
by one of plaintiff’s attorneys to the trial court.  Further, the attorney also made a 
comment during a television interview that it was hard for a plaintiff to get a fair 
trial when the defendant is a large company like Ford Motor Company.  This 
comment stemmed from plaintiff’s filing of an emergency motion for 
disqualification of the trial judge because, in part, a member of the firm 
representing defendant who had entered appearances in the matter for defendant 
20  
 
 
 
 
 
was the reception chairperson for a “gala campaign reception” fundraising event 
for the judge at the Opus One Restaurant in Detroit.  After failing to get plaintiff’s 
attorney to disclose who shared the invitation with her and when, the trial judge 
refused to disqualify himself and then issued an order denying plaintiff’s motion to 
dissolve the order excluding evidence related to Bennett’s 1995 conviction.  And 
later, on August 21, 2002, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s case with prejudice 
because it claimed that plaintiff and her attorneys had engaged in prejudicial 
pretrial publicity. 
“There is no question that speech critical of the exercise of the State’s 
power lies at the very center of the First Amendment.”  Gentile, supra at 1034 
(Kennedy, J.). “Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First 
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”  Mills v 
Alabama, 384 US 214, 218; 86 S Ct 1434; 16 L Ed 2d 484 (1966).  This includes 
“the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such 
matters relating to political processes.”  Id. at 218-219. In Gentile, supra at 1033­
1034, the defendant was an attorney who held a press conference that criticized the 
state for indicting his client and not indicting members of the police department, 
who he referred to as “crooked cops.”  This speech was protected by the First 
Amendment.  Id. at 1058. 
People may disagree about whether the comment by plaintiff’s attorney 
about the bias of “Metro Detroit” judges was rude or forthright, crude or candid. 
21  
 
 
 
 
 
The statement could even be deemed unjustifiable.  However, it was within the 
attorney’s constitutional rights to make the statement.  “The assumption that 
respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism 
wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion.”  Bridges, supra at 
270. The essence of the right to free speech is that it gives the speaker the 
opportunity to express the speaker’s viewpoints, valid or not.  The citizens of 
Michigan are intelligent and do not need speech to be sanitized.  It does not 
advance the ideals of the justice system to shelter the public from comments, even 
those that may be deemed unwarranted by some. 
Moreover, there is nothing inherently undignified or discourteous in 
criticizing a court’s decisions. In fact, a judge should expect these critiques as a 
“judge must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny.”  See Code of 
Judicial Conduct, Canon 2(A).  But even if an attorney behaves in a manner that is 
deemed undignified or discourteous, then sanctions can be imposed against the 
attorney. Indeed, if every attorney who complained about a court’s ruling had his 
client’s case dismissed, the dockets of our state’s courts would be cleared almost 
immediately.  
At the outset of its opinion, the majority expresses a concern about 
“preserving an organized polity.”  Ante at 2. And I must note that I do not dispute 
that it would certainly be easier for a trial court to handle proceedings if there were 
no fear of criticism for its rulings.  However, the ease of a trial court in managing 
its day-to-day affairs is not sufficient to infringe on plaintiff’s First Amendment 
22  
 
 
 
 
 
rights in this case. Our citizens’ constitutional right to free speech does not exist 
merely when it falls within the majority’s narrowly defined “orderly” parameters. 
The First Amendment exists to protect speech—discourteous, disorderly, and 
sometimes downright offensive.  “Freedom” is the first and foremost concern 
protected by the First Amendment, not order.  The majority has offered nothing 
more than conjecture that the actions of plaintiff would impinge on the parties’ 
right to a fair trial, but the lack of any real concern about a fair trial is particularly 
obvious when one considers that the trial court itself did not have such a concern. 
The majority further ignores that before speech can be punished, it must be 
determined to have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the 
proceedings.  See MRPC 3.6.  Trial court proceedings are not protected by 
restricting an individual’s right to criticize those very same proceedings. 
Regarding MRPC 8.4, the rule states the following: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another;  
(b) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
misrepresentation, or violation of the criminal law, where such 
conduct reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, 
or fitness as a lawyer; 
(c) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration 
of justice; 
(d) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a 
government agency or official; or  
23  
 
 
  
 
(e) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that 
is a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct or other law.  
The majority states that plaintiff’s counsel did not restrain plaintiff from 
publicizing Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction and that plaintiff’s attorneys 
participated with plaintiff in this “misconduct” on numerous occasions.  The 
majority refers to MRPC 8.4(a), but I fail to see how plaintiff’s attorneys engaged 
in misconduct through the acts of plaintiff.  There is no evidence that plaintiff’s 
attorneys counseled her to speak about Bennett’s indecent exposure conviction. 
And I disagree that participating in a rally—a time-honored tradition in this 
country—and speaking to the media constitute “misconduct” that warrants 
dismissal of plaintiff’s case with prejudice. 
Finally, the majority states that remanding for an evidentiary hearing about 
the specifics of the conduct of plaintiff and her attorneys is “no more than a fool’s 
errand” that it refuses to engage in. Ante at 32. While I disagree that the conduct 
of plaintiff and her attorneys had a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing 
the trial, I fail to see what is foolish about remanding to specifically determine 
what happened, when, and why. When a person’s First Amendment rights are at 
stake and the extreme sanction of dismissing a cause of action with prejudice has 
been ordered, the majority’s steadfast refusal to examine the facts in light of the 
timetable of events is troubling to say the least. 
24  
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
The First Amendment does not exist merely to protect courteous and 
genteel speech. The First Amendment “must be taken as a command of the 
broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving 
society, will allow.” Bridges, supra at 263. Today, I believe that the majority has 
ignored the mandates of the Constitution in an ill-advised and unnecessary attempt 
at maintaining “order” in our courts.  I believe that the comments of plaintiff and 
her attorneys fall well within the parameters of the First Amendment. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
SUPREME COURT 
JUSTINE MALDONADO, 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee/ Cross-
Appellant, 
No. 126274 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 
 
Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-
Appellee 
and 
DANIEL P. BENNETT, 
 
Defendant. 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 
The majority’s assertion that its decision today is “[a]t the heart of 
preserving an organized polity” is false. Ante at 2. I concur fully in Justice 
Cavanagh’s dissent because I agree that the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s 
case violated her First Amendment right to free speech. 
In addition to the First Amendment violation, I write to explain that the 
premise of the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s case had no legal validity and, 
therefore, the majority’s acrobatic effort to justify its decision to affirm the circuit 
court’s order does not preserve an organized polity, it undermines it.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
An organized polity is governed by the law and is preserved by courts that 
apply the law and objectively state the facts.  In this case, the circuit court did not 
establish a legal foundation for its dismissal of plaintiff’s case, it acted on a whim. 
The circuit court’s decision was, therefore, an abuse of discretion.  Now, the 
majority legitimizes the circuit court’s order by misstating the facts of the case and 
misapplying the law.  The majority’s decision abuses this Court’s appellate review 
power and, therefore, is inconsistent with the preservation of an ordered polity. 
The circuit court in this case dismissed with prejudice plaintiff Justine 
Maldonado’s sexual harassment action against defendant Ford Motor Company 
and Ford’s employee, defendant Daniel P. Bennett.  The circuit court premised its 
dismissal on pretrial publicity that it attributed to plaintiff and plaintiff’s lawyers 
and referred to defendant Bennett’s prior conviction for indecent exposure in an 
unrelated case. The circuit court found that the publicity violated the Michigan 
Rules of Professional Conduct, MRPC 3.6.  The Rules of Professional Conduct 
govern the conduct of lawyers.  MRPC 3.6 prohibits lawyers from making 
extrajudicial statements about a case that might materially prejudice judicial 
proceedings. Despite the fact that MRPC 3.6 only applies to the conduct of 
lawyers and the fact that there is no evidence that her lawyers violated the rule, the 
circuit court opined that Ms. Maldonado’s activities could be imputed to her 
lawyers and dismissed the case. 
The question presented is whether the circuit court’s dismissal with 
prejudice of Ms. Maldonado’s case was an abuse of discretion.  I would hold that 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
it was an abuse of the circuit court’s discretion to dismiss plaintiff’s case for the 
reasons set forth below, and for those stated well by Justice Cavanagh in his 
dissent. 
I 
Because the majority mischaracterizes facts pertinent to understanding this 
case, the following time line lists the important dates and events in this case’s 
history: 
•  June 9, 2000: Ms. Maldonado files her sexual harassment cause of action. 
•  June 9, 2000: The Detroit Free Press publishes an article referring to 
defendant Bennett’s unrelated indecent exposure conviction.  The pending 
case, including statements about the case by both sides, is regularly in the 
media thereafter. 
•  January 19, 2001: Judge Kathleen Macdonald grants the motion to exclude 
from plaintiff’s trial evidence of defendant Bennett’s prior and unrelated 
indecent exposure conviction. 
•  February 16, 2001:  Judge Macdonald enters an order excluding from 
plaintiff’s trial evidence of defendant Bennett’s prior and unrelated indecent 
exposure conviction. 
•  September 11, 2001: Plaintiff’s lawyers issue a press release referring to 
defendant Bennett’s prior and unrelated conviction for indecent exposure. 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
•  November 2001:  Defendant Bennett’s prior and unrelated conviction for 
indecent exposure is expunged. 
•  June 21, 2002: During a hearing regarding the motion to dissolve Judge 
Macdonald’s order to exclude evidence of the expunged and unrelated 
indecent exposure conviction, Judge William Giovan warns the parties 
about pretrial publicity and states that if a party violates some ethical 
obligation, the case could be dismissed.1 
•  July 3, 2002: During a hearing on plaintiff’s motion for Judge Giovan’s 
disqualification, Judge Giovan states on the record that his prior warning 
was not a court order. 
•  August 21, 2002:  During a hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
case, defendant’s attorney states that the case was in the news again.  Judge 
Giovan dismisses the case with prejudice. 
1 Specifically, Judge Giovan said: 
I’m making any decisions about this, but I’m going to tell you 
one thing. If I ever reach the conclusion that somebody is violating 
that ethical obligation and causing some difficulty in our getting a 
fair jury, I will dismiss the case with prejudice, or, and I should say, 
on the other side, grant a default judgment.   
The majority incorrectly characterizes this warning by suggesting that “Judge 
Giovan expressly warned plaintiff that if she continued to disseminate information 
regarding Bennett’s excluded conviction in violation of Judge Macdonald’s, order 
he would dismiss her case.” 
Ante at 26. 
Contrary to the majority’s 
characterization, the warning issued by Judge Giovan simply warned the parties to 
not violate any ethical obligation.  Judge Macdonald’s order only excluded the 
evidence from trial, not the public forum. 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
II  
The circuit court did not establish a legal foundation to support its dismissal 
of Ms. Maldonado’s case.  The court based its dismissal of Ms. Maldonado’s case 
on her and her attorneys’ alleged violation of the Michigan Rules of Professional 
Conduct, MRPC 3.6.  The violation identified by the circuit court involved pretrial 
publicity by Ms. Maldonado and her attorneys regarding defendant Bennett’s prior 
conviction for indecent exposure, which Judge Giovan suggested violated Judge 
Macdonald’s order to exclude that evidence from trial.   
The circuit court’s attempt to hold Ms. Maldonado responsible for a 
violation of MRPC 3.6 is unsupportable.  MRPC 3.6 only applies to lawyers.  The 
rule states: 
A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a 
reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of 
public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially 
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. [Emphasis added.] 
Judge Giovan’s opinion reveals that he was aware that MRPC 3.6 does not apply 
to nonlawyers.  Nevertheless, he concluded that a nonlawyer client “is not immune 
for knowingly doing what [her lawyers] cannot.”  MRPC 3.6 does not apply to 
nonlawyers; therefore, it was an abuse of discretion to base the dismissal of Ms. 
Maldonado’s case on her violation of a rule that does not apply to her.   
Further, Judge Giovan failed to identify any violation of MRPC 3.6 by Ms. 
Maldonado’s attorneys that warrants dismissal of the case.  Judge Giovan noted 
that her lawyers “appeared in television news broadcasts that made specific 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
references to Mr. Bennett’s criminal conviction.”  However, Judge Giovan did not 
identify a specific instance when the lawyers themselves mentioned the conviction 
in these broadcasts or publications.  My review of the record reveals that the 
lawyers did not themselves refer to the conviction. 
It is true that one year before Judge Giovan heard the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss and two months before defendant’s prior conviction was expunged, the 
law firm representing Ms. Maldonado issued a press release that referred to 
defendant Bennett’s prior conviction. Judge Giovan found that the press release 
violated MRPC 3.6, suggesting that the lawyers knew trial was imminent when the 
press release was issued. But the information about defendant’s prior conviction 
referred to in the press release was already well-publicized.  Thus, it cannot be 
concluded that, when the press release was issued, a reasonable person would have 
expected that the content of the release would likely prejudice an adjudicative 
proceeding materially. 
Furthermore, contrary to the majority’s assertion 
otherwise, because Bennett’s prior conviction was well-publicized before 
plaintiff’s lawyer’s 2001 press release, the press release cannot be considered the 
source for all subsequent news publications that referred to the prior conviction.    
Judge Giovan also suggested that the press release somehow violated Judge 
Macdonald’s February 16, 2001, order, which excluded evidence of defendant’s 
prior conviction from trial.  However, while Judge Macdonald’s order excluded 
the evidence of defendant’s prior conviction from trial, it did not prohibit any and 
all public reference to the prior conviction by either plaintiff or plaintiff’s 
6  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
lawyers.2  For these reasons, it was not reasonable for Judge Giovan to premise his 
dismissal of plaintiff’s case on the actions of her lawyers. 
The majority admits that MRPC 3.6 does not apply to Ms. Maldonado 
because she is not a lawyer. Ante at 25. Further, like Judge Giovan, the majority 
fails to identify any specific instances in which Ms. Maldonado’s lawyers violated 
MRPC 3.6.  But, rather than acknowledging the circuit court’s abuse of discretion 
in relying on MRPC 3.6 to dismiss Ms. Maldonado’s case, the majority grasps for 
and creates its own alternative justifications for the circuit court’s order.   
2 After Judge Giovan took the case over from Judge Macdonald, defendant 
Ford and defendant Bennett filed a joint motion for entry of an order directing that 
the witnesses be instructed regarding excluded evidence and impermissible 
testimony on July 21, 2002.  In their brief supporting their request, defendants 
stated that every witness in the separate trial of Elezovic v Ford Motor Co had to 
sign off on a statement indicating that they had been advised of the 
ruling by the Court regarding inadmissible evidence, and that they 
were not to mention anything about any excluded evidence, and that 
they understood the consequence for mentioning any of the excluded 
evidence would be sanctions including contempt and imposition of 
all the costs of a mistrial.  Defendants request the same process in 
this case. 
The defendants apparently hoped that Judge Giovan would issue an order in 
this case like that which Judge Macdonald had issued in the Elezovic case to 
prevent witnesses from mentioning defendant Bennett’s prior conviction during 
their testimony on the witness stand. But Judge Giovan did not issue any such 
order. 
In any event, the Elezovic order appears to have only limited the witnesses’ 
speech inside the courtroom; it was directed at preventing impermissible testimony 
during the Elezovic trial regarding defendant Bennett’s prior conviction that Judge 
Macdonald had ordered to be excluded from the evidence.   
7  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The majority’s primary justification for its decision to affirm the order of 
dismissal is the need for order in the court. In this case, the majority concludes 
that the dismissal of Ms. Maldonado’s case was authorized under MCR 
2.504(B)(1), which provides:  
If the plaintiff fails to comply with [the court] rules or a court 
order, a defendant may move for summary dismissal of an action or 
a claim against that defendant. 
However, the mere fact that the court rule permits the circuit court to dismiss a 
case does not mean that dismissal is justified on a whim.  By the plain terms of 
MCR 2.504(B)(1), there must be a violation of an applicable court rule or order to 
justify a summary dismissal of a case. 
To make it seem like MCR 2.504(B)(1) justifies the dismissal of plaintiff’s 
case, the majority intentionally misstates the facts to make it appear that plaintiff 
and plaintiff’s lawyers violated a court order.  The majority states:  “Judge Giovan 
expressly warned plaintiff that if she continued to disseminate information 
regarding Bennett’s excluded conviction in violation of Judge Macdonald’s order 
he would dismiss her case. Plaintiff failed to obey this warning and, thus, Judge 
Giovan properly dismissed her case.” Ante at 26. This is untrue. The facts are: 
(1) Judge Giovan’s warning was not an order of the court,3 (2) there never was a 
3 Referring to the warning at the July 3, 2002, hearing on plaintiff’s motion 
for his disqualification, Judge Giovan said:  “I want to say a thing about gag 
orders. You’ve called what I said in court a gag order.  Not so.  As a matter of 
fact, I don’t believe in gag orders.  I’ve never issued a gag order.” 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
court order limiting pretrial publicity or references to defendant Bennett’s prior 
conviction, (3) Judge Macdonald’s order excluding evidence of defendant 
Bennett’s conviction for indecent exposure from plaintiff’s sexual harassment trial 
imposed no limitation on pretrial publicity, and (4) Judge Giovan did not premise 
his dismissal on plaintiff’s violation of his warnings; instead, he incorrectly 
attributed plaintiff’s activities to her lawyers to support his conclusion that they 
had violated MRPC 3.6. 
The majority also relies heavily on the assertion throughout its opinion that 
plaintiff’s lawyers were themselves quoted publicly referring to Bennett’s prior 
conviction. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, none of the broadcasts or articles 
cited by the majority quoted or discussed any statements by Ms. Maldonado’s 
lawyers regarding Bennett’s prior conviction for indecent exposure.  In those 
broadcasts and articles, Ms. Maldonado’s lawyers made statements about the case 
and about their perception that the circuit court was biased, but not about the 
expunged conviction.  Immediately after Judge Macdonald ruled that the 
conviction would be excluded, which was months before Judge Giovan was 
assigned the case, the lawyers were quoted as saying that they would appeal that 
order. Thereafter, all quoted statements about Bennett’s prior conviction were 
made by Ms. Maldonado, and Ms. Maldonado was not restricted by any order or 
court rule from making repeated public reference to Bennett’s prior conviction.   
It was an abuse of discretion for Judge Giovan to attribute to plaintiff’s 
lawyers responsibility for statements made by plaintiff and the press about the 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
well-known fact that Bennett had a prior conviction for indecent exposure.  It does 
not serve an organized polity for the majority to affirm a ruling that was based on 
a whim rather than the law. 
III 
A cornerstone for an organized polity is that courts of law will act in an 
orderly way, as opposed to acting on a whim. In an organized society, disputes are 
taken to a court of law for adjudication because a court is impartial and will handle 
cases with fairness and pursuant to the law.  Dismissing Ms. Maldonado’s case 
without a legal foundation is the same as dismissing the case on the basis of a 
whim. The majority’s decision to affirm the circuit court’s order damages the 
integrity of the judicial system and, contrary to the majority’s rhetoric, undermines 
the basic tenets of an organized society. 
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
 
Marilyn Kelly 
10