Case Title: Preston v. The Board of Adjustment of New Castle County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 410, 2000

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
GABRIEL N. PRESTON and
§
JEAN PRESTON, individuals,
§
§
Appellants Below,
§
Appellants,
§ No. 410, 2000
§
v.
§ Court Below: Superior Court 
§ of the State of Delaware in and
THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT
§ for New Castle County
OF NEW CASTLE COUNTY,
§ C.A. No. 00A-02-006
§
Appellee Below,
§
Appellee.
§
Submitted: February 27, 2001
Decided:
May 2, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and HOLLAND, Justices.
Appeal from Superior Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED.
Gabriel N. Preston and Jean Preston, Pro Se.
John E. Tracey, Esquire, New Castle County Law Department, New Castle,
Delaware, for Appellee.
Per Curiam:
2
In this appeal, we consider whether the Superior Court properly determined
that the appeal of the Appellants/Defendants-below, Gabriel and Jean Preston (the
“Prestons”), should be dismissed for failure to join a party as required by Superior
Court Civil Rule 19, and that such failure was not cured by the relation-back
requirements of Superior Court Civil Rule 15(c).  While we conclude that the
Superior Court correctly ruled that the Prestons failed to join an indispensable party
in their appeal, we further conclude that AT&T Wireless of Philadelphia, LLC
(“AT&T”) constructively intervened in the appellate proceedings and is thus
properly a party to the appeal.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court is
reversed.
I
In November 1999, AT&T applied to the New Castle County Board of
Adjustment (“Board”) for a Special Use Permit.  AT&T proposed to construct a
133-foot telecommunications monopole that was to be located within 500 feet of a
residentially-zoned parcel of land.  AT&T’s application was granted by the Board
on January 12, 2000.
1Counsel for AT&T were present at and participated in the hearing on July 7, 2000, though
they did not enter an appearance on that date.  Specifically, counsel for AT&T commented on the
completion date of the monopole, AT&T’s compliance with FCC emissions standards, and the
intended commencement date of the monopole. 
3
The Prestons, who reside near the proposed construction, opposed AT&T’s
application from the outset.   Following the Board’s decision to grant the Special
Use Permit, the Prestons filed a timely Writ of Certiorari to the Superior Court on
February 9, 2000 as required by 9 Del. C. § 1314(a).  The Prestons, however,
named only the Board, and not AT&T,  as respondents.  The Superior Court issued
the Writ of Certiorari on February 11, 2000.  On February 22, 2000, the Writ of
Certiorari was served on New Castle County.  Counsel for New Castle County sent
a copy of the Writ of Certiorari, via facsimile, to counsel for AT&T on February
22 or 23, 2000 in order to inform AT&T of the pendency of the appeal.
On March 14, 2000, the Board moved to dismiss the appeal based on the
Prestons’ failure to name AT&T in the Writ of Certiorari in violation of Superior
Court Civil Rule 19.  The Board contended that AT&T was required to be named
in the appeal because it was an indispensable party.  On July 5, 2000, the Prestons
sought a restraining order in the Superior Court to enjoin the construction of the
monopole pending resolution of their appeal.  Following a hearing on July 7, 2000,
the restraining order was dissolved.1  On July 25, 2000, the Superior Court granted
2Subsection (a) of § 1314 provides as follows:
Any person aggrieved by any decision of the Board of Adjustment,
or any taxpayer or any officer, department, board or bureau of the
County, may present to the Superior Court a petition duly verified
alleging that such decision is illegal in whole or in part, and
specifying the grounds of illegality.  The petition shall be presented
within 30 days after the filing of the decision in the office of the
Board.
4
the Board’s Motion to Dismiss, concluding that AT&T was an indispensable party
and the Prestons were incapable of satisfying the relation-back requirements of
Superior Court Civil Rule 15(c).  
II
This Court reviews de novo a ruling of the Superior Court granting or denying
a motion to dismiss.  See Precision Air, Inc. v. Standard Chlorine of Delaware,
Inc., Del. Supr., 654 A.2d 403, 406 (1995); State v. Cephas, Del. Supr., 637 A.2d
20, 23 (1994).
A.
 The Prestons assert that AT&T is not an indispensable party to the appeal
because they complied with the terms of 9 Del. C. § 1314(a), which governs a
petition for a Writ of Certiorari to review a decision of the Board.2  The Prestons
further contend that if AT&T is an indispensable party, they should be permitted to
3Rule 19(a) provides in pertinent part:
A person ... shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the
person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
(continued...)
5
amend their appeal to name AT&T as a respondent pursuant to Superior Court Civil
Rules 15(c) and 21.  The Board counters that the Prestons’ failure to name all
parties to the appeal is a fatal defect because AT&T is an indispensable party who
cannot now be joined due to the expiration of the statutory period for filing a Writ
of Certiorari.  The Board further contends that the Superior Court has no discretion
to permit the joinder of AT&T because the Prestons cannot satisfy the requirements
of Rule 15(c).
It is a well-settled principle in Delaware that wherever possible, appeals will
not be dismissed on the basis of a technical defect.  This Court has consistently
endorsed a policy favoring substantive review of appeals.  See Di’s, Inc. v.
McKinney, Del. Supr., 673 A.2d 1199, 1202 (1996); State Personnel Comm’n v.
Howard, Del. Supr., 420 A.2d 135, 137 (1980); Episcopo v. Minch, Del. Supr.,
203 A.2d 273, 275 (1964).  It is equally well-settled that “all parties to the litigation
who would be directly affected by a ruling on the merits of an appeal, should be
made party to the appellate proceedings.”  Howard, 420 A.2d at 137.  This policy
is clearly reflected in Superior Court Civil Rule 19(a).3
3(...continued)
already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the
subject of an action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in the person’s absence may (i) as a practical matter impair
or impede the person’s ability to protect that interest....
6
As the Superior Court correctly concluded, AT&T has a vested interest in the
subject matter of the Prestons’ appeal, and is therefore an indispensable party as
provided by Rule 19(a).  It was AT&T that sought and received the Special Use
Permit to construct the monopole and has expended the time and money necessary
to complete the construction of the monopole to effectively serve its customers.  It
is AT&T’s use of the property that may be “impeded or impaired” if the Prestons’
challenge to the validity of the Board’s decision is successful.  AT&T is therefore
a necessary party for a just adjudication of this dispute.
The Prestons argue that even if AT&T is an indispensable party, Superior
Court Rules 15(c) and 21 permit an amendment to the Writ of Certiorari, even
though the statute of limitations has expired.  The scope of Rule 15(a) has been
extended to include the substitution or addition of a party to a pleading, even after
the statute of limitations has expired, as long as the requirements of Rule 15(c) are
met.  See Mullen v. Alarmguard of Delmarva, Inc., Del. Supr., 625 A.2d 258, 263
(1993)(citing Mergenthaler, Inc. v. Jefferson, Del. Supr., 332 A.2d 396 (1975)).
4Superior Court Civil Rule 21 provides in pertinent part: “Parties may be dropped or added
by order of the Court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage and on such terms
as are just.”
7
If the requirements of Rule 15(c) are satisfied, then relation back to the original date
of the pleading is permitted, allowing joinder of a party under Rule 21.4
Rule 15(c) sets forth three requirements that must be met before relation back
will be permitted.  First, the claim asserted in the amended pleading must arise out
of the same conduct or occurrence set forth in the original pleading.  Second,  the
party to be added by the amendment must receive notice of the action within the
required statutory period.  Finally, Rule 15(c) requires that within the same statutory
period, the party to be added to the action knew or should have known that but for
a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been
brought against the party sought to be added to the pleading.
It is clear from the record that the Prestons cannot meet the second
requirement of Rule 15(c).  The decision of the Board was announced on January
12, 2000.  AT&T received notice of the Prestons’ appeal from counsel for the
Board on either February 22 or 23, 2000.  AT&T’s informal notice of the Prestons’
appeal was not within the statutorily mandated 30-day period, thereby precluding
8
relation back to the date of the original pleading.  Therefore, the Prestons cannot
invoke Rule 15 to amend their appeal to include AT&T.
B.
We conclude, however, that the Prestons’ failure to name AT&T as a party
to the action did not preclude the Superior Court from invoking its jurisdiction over
the action because the Prestons complied with the requirements of 9 Del. C.
§ 1314(a).  Generally, if a party fails to perfect an appeal within the statutorily
mandated period, a jurisdictional defect results, thereby preventing the appellate
court from exercising jurisdiction.  See Riggs v. Riggs, Del. Supr., 539 A.2d 163,
164 (1988); Fisher v. Biggs, Del. Supr., 284 A.2d 117, 118 (1971).  The filing of
a notice of appeal within the prescribed period, however, confers jurisdiction on the
appellate court, which will not dismiss the appeal for a defect that does not result
in substantial prejudice to a party in interest.  See Howard, 420 A.2d at 138; see
also McKinney, 673 A.2d at 1203; Weston v. State, Del. Supr., 554 A.2d 1119,
1122 (1989).  In this case, the Writ was filed and verified within the statutory 30-
day period and it named the Board as a respondent as required by § 1314(a).  We
9
conclude that compliance with § 1314(a) is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of
the Superior Court.  
Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 24, any party may intervene in an
action, upon a timely application to the court, when a statute grants the right to
intervene or when a party “claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject matter of the litigation.”  Generally, the party seeking to
intervene must take some affirmative action, such as filing a motion upon the
parties, before intervention will be granted by the court.  See Super. Ct. Civ. R.
24(c).  Other jurisdictions have recognized the principle of constructive intervention,
i.e.,  a party may be said to “constructively intervene” in a proceeding under certain
circumstances.   See Ross v. Ross, N.J. Super., 705 A.2d 784 (1998); Schulz,
Davis, & Warren v. Marinkovich, Mont. Supr., 661 P.2d 5 (1983); cf. Baca v.
Catron, N.M. Supr., 173 P. 862 (1917) (“A person not named in the complaint nor
served with summons, if he has an interest in the matter in litigation, makes himself
a party to the cause by acts and conduct on his part amounting to a general
appearance.”).  Indeed, the Superior Court, in a decision rendered after the entry
of the decision from which this appeal was taken, recognized the concept of
constructive intervention.  See Riedinger v. Board of Adjustment of Sussex County,
5The Reidinger decision was brought to the attention of the Court by counsel for appellee,
New Castle County, even though it is apparently adverse to its interests.  The action of counsel
is commendable and in accordance with the high standards expected of  members of the Delaware
Bar.
10
Del. Super., C.A. No. 99A-03-003, 2000 WL 33114345, Graves, J. (Sept. 26,
2000).5
 In Riedinger, Dominic and Leslie Marra (the “Marras”), applied to the Board
of Adjustment of Sussex County for a variance from the setback requirements of the
county zoning code.  Despite opposition to the proposal from the Marras’ neighbor,
Albert Riedinger (“Riedinger”), the Board approved the Marras’ request.  Riedinger
appealed the Board’s decision, but named only the Board of Adjustment as a party.
The Marras received notice of the appeal after the 30-day statute of limitations had
run.  Subsequent to the appeal, Riedinger filed a Motion to Stay the proposed
construction until after the appeal was completed.  The Marras participated in the
hearing on that motion.  After the motion was denied, the Marras requested, and
were granted, an opportunity to submit an amicus curiae brief in support of their
position.
The court in Riedinger found that the Marras had not technically intervened,
but acted to protect their interests in the case.  The Superior Court concluded that
because the Marras had taken affirmative steps to protect their interests through
11
their  participation in the Motion to Stay and by filing an amicus brief on appeal,
they had constructively intervened in the action and were therefore parties to the
appeal.
We adopt the Superior Court’s analysis in Riedinger.  While AT&T did not
file an amicus curiae brief in this matter, it did participate in the stay proceedings
to protect its interests during the pendency of the appeal.  Had the Superior Court
granted the restraining order, AT&T undoubtedly would have sought to appeal
based on the effect of the restraining order on its property interests.  Accordingly,
we conclude that AT&T constructively intervened through their conduct and as such
are now parties to the appeal.  
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Superior Court is REVERSED
and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.