Case Title: Town of Randolph v. Estate of White

Citation: 166 Vt. 280, 693 A.2d 694

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Town of Randolph v. Estate of White  (95-581); 166 Vt. 280; 693 A.2d 694

[Filed 28-Feb-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 95-581

Town of Randolph                            Supreme Court

                                            On Appeal from
     v.                                     Orange Superior Court

Estate of Mildred White,                    September Term, 1996
Anthony White, Administrator
and Donal R. White

Marilyn R. Skoglund, J.

Peter M. Nowlan of Nowlan & Meyer, Randolph, for plaintiff-appellee

Steven H. Atherton of Atherton & Willner, Northfield Falls, for
  defendant-appellant Donal R. White

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       GIBSON, J.  Defendant Donal White appeals from a superior court
  decision for the Town of Randolph in this action to enforce a zoning
  ordinance.  The court held that defendant cannot contest the zoning
  administrator's finding that defendant was in violation of the zoning
  ordinance because the finding became final when defendant failed to appeal
  it to the zoning board of adjustment.  Defendant maintains that the notice
  of violation was inadequate because it failed to inform him of his right to
  contest the finding before the board, and therefore, the notice violated
  the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.(FN1) We agree and reverse.

  

       Defendant is the owner of fifty-six acres of land in the Town of
  Randolph.(FN2)  On May 17, 1993, the Town zoning administrator notified
  defendant, in a three-page letter entitled  "Notice of Violation," that the
  accumulation of junk motor vehicles and other debris on his land violated
  Town zoning regulations.  Defendant was advised to stop accumulating junk
  and to remove the junk already accumulated on the property by June 1, 1993. 
  The letter stated that the penalty provisions of 24 V.S.A. §§ 4444 & 4445
  provide for fines up to $50.00 per day for each day the violation
  continues.  Defendant was directed to remove the junk by June 15, 1993, to
  avoid penalties.  The letter also told defendant to contact the zoning
  administrator or the Town attorney if defendant had any questions about the
  notice and to contact the zoning administrator when the violation had been
  corrected so that he could inspect the site.  

       In August 1993, the Town filed a complaint against defendant in
  superior court seeking an order requiring removal of the junk and assessing
  fines.  The Town then moved for summary judgment on the determination of
  the violation and issuance of an injunction, claiming that the only issue
  that needed to be resolved at trial was the amount of the fine to be
  imposed.  In response, defendant moved to dismiss the action and argued,
  among other grounds, that the notice of violation had failed to advise him
  that he had a right to a hearing to contest the administrator's
  determination that he was in violation of the zoning ordinance.  Defendant
  also filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

       The superior court denied defendant's motion to dismiss and
  cross-motion for summary judgment.  It granted the Town's motion for
  summary judgment, ruling that the notice of violation complied with the
  notice requirements of 24 V.S.A. § 4444(a), and that defendant was bound by
  the administrator's decision because he had not contested the decision
  before the zoning board of adjustment.  Although framing the due process
  issue, the court did not explicitly address it.  In a subsequent hearing,
  the court ordered defendant to remove all junk vehicles 

  

  within forty-five days and assessed a fine of $8.00 per day for each day
  defendant was in violation up to the date of the hearing, and $5.00 per day
  for each day thereafter.  Defendant appeals. 

       As a preliminary matter, we reject the Town's contention that we lack
  jurisdiction to hear this appeal because defendant failed to file a notice
  of appeal within thirty days of the March 23, 1995 decision, in which the
  court granted the Town's motion for summary judgment.  For an order to be
  final and appealable, it must end litigation on the merits or conclusively
  determine the rights of the parties, leaving nothing further for the court
  to do but execute the judgment.  In re Burlington Bagel Bakery, Inc., 150
  Vt. 20, 21,