Case Title: Connor v. Benedict

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12551

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC–12551 
 
LAYNE C. CONNOR  vs.  WILLIAM P. BENEDICT. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 6, 2018. - March 7, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Divorce and Separation, Alimony, Division of property.  
Marriage. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint for divorce filed in the Middlesex Division of 
the Probate and Family Court Department on June 2, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by Kevin R. Connelly, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Robert Clark for the husband. 
 
Marc G. Bellerose for the wife. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  Layne C. Connor (wife) filed a complaint for 
divorce in June 2014 against William P. Benedict (husband), to 
whom she had been married for a little more than two years, and 
with whom she had lived for much of the prior twelve years.  
Following a trial, a judge of the Probate and Family Court 
 
 
 
2 
 
issued a judgment of divorce nisi that awarded general term 
alimony to the wife and, among other things, divided the marital 
estate such that fifty-five percent of the over-all assets were 
awarded to the husband and forty-five percent to the wife.  
Although the legal marriage lasted 2.25 years, for purposes of 
determining the amount of alimony pursuant to the Alimony Reform 
Act of 2011, St. 2011, c. 124, the judge considered the marriage 
to have been of slightly more than eight years' duration.  In 
doing so, the judge took into account an approximately six-year 
period from 2005 to 2011, during which he found that the parties 
had lived together and had engaged in an economic marital 
partnership.  The husband appealed, and we transferred the case 
to this court on our own motion. 
 
The husband challenges the alimony award on two grounds.  
First, he claims that, as a matter of law, the wife was 
precluded from entering an economic marital partnership with him 
during much of the six-year period because she received alimony 
payments from her former spouse during that time.  In the 
alternative, the husband claims that, even if the wife could 
have entered into an economic marital partnership, the judge did 
not make sufficient findings to support a determination that she 
had done so.  The husband also challenges the division of the 
marital estate on the grounds that the judge selected the wrong 
valuation date; made an incorrect determination of the assets in 
 
 
 
3 
 
the marital estate; improperly assigned liabilities to the 
husband; and did not clarify the distribution of the retirement 
accounts.  We affirm. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the judge's findings of fact, 
supplemented by undisputed facts in the record and reserving 
certain facts for later discussion.  See Pierce v. Pierce, 455 
Mass. 286, 288 (2009). 
 
a.  Early years (2000 to 2004).  When the parties met in 
August 2000, the wife owned a single-family house.  In July 
2001, she sold that property and used the proceeds to make a 
down payment on a house in Maynard.  The parties began living 
together in the Maynard house in August 2001, along with the 
wife's minor son.1  At the time, the husband recently had filed 
for bankruptcy; his name did not appear on the deed or mortgage.  
Nonetheless, the parties shared the mortgage payments, as well 
as the costs of utilities, groceries, and other household 
expenses.  At some point in 2001, the wife became disabled and 
unable to work.2  In 2003, she began receiving disability 
payments. 
                     
 
1 Each party had a son from a prior marriage.  The husband's 
son did not live with the couple. 
 
 
2 Due to her disability, the wife remains incapable of 
working and is not expected to be able to work in the future. 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
b.  Australia (2004 to 2005).  From March 2004 to September 
2005, the wife relocated to Australia with her son in order to 
receive medical treatment.  The parties arranged for the husband 
to live in the house in Maynard while he coordinated with a 
realtor to sell it.  In September 2004, after the house had been 
sold, the husband moved to a rental townhouse in Shirley.  Some 
of the proceeds from the sale were used to pay the wife's 
medical bills; $5,000 went to the husband for improvements he 
had made to the house while the wife was away; the wife received 
the remainder. 
 
c.  Reunification (2005 to 2012).  The wife returned to the 
United States in October 2005, when her Australian medical visa 
expired.  In November 2005, the wife moved into the townhouse in 
Shirley and the parties resumed living together, sharing rent 
and utility expenses.  The husband provided for the wife's 
health insurance through his employer's "domestic partner 
benefits program." 
 
In November 2006, the parties jointly purchased a house in 
Townsend (marital home).3  They each contributed at least $44,000 
                     
 
3 The parties dispute the current value of the marital home 
and provided no evidence to support their varying estimates.  
The judge declined to make a finding as to the value of the 
house; he ordered the parties to sell the house and to share the 
sale proceeds equally. 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
to the down payment.4  They made substantial improvements to the 
house, including installing hardwood floors, retiling several 
rooms, and building a gymnasium in the basement.  The wife 
purchased most of the furniture, using credit cards; the husband 
paid at least some of the credit card bills.  The parties also 
bought additional household items, such as a dining room set, 
together.  Throughout the time they lived in the marital home, 
they shared the costs of the mortgage, utilities, and other 
household expenses. 
 
In December 2008, the husband's employer terminated the 
wife's health insurance due to a change in company policy 
concerning "domestic partners."  In response, the wife obtained 
COBRA insurance at a monthly cost of $500, and the husband began 
contributing "slightly more" to the household expenses. 
 
The wife's minor son lived with the parties in the marital 
home and became close to the husband.  When the husband's father 
passed away in 2011, the husband named the wife's son in the 
obituary as a grandson of the deceased. 
                     
 
4 The judge found that the wife used $50,000 from the sale 
of her former house toward the down payment on the marital home. 
At another point in the decision, however, the judge noted that 
the wife contributed $44,000 toward the down payment on that 
house.  It is not clear whether the amount of $44,000 represents 
a portion of the funds from the sale of the wife's former house, 
or whether it represents an additional payment on the marital 
home. 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
d.  Receipt of alimony from prior spouse.  The wife and her 
prior spouse had divorced in 2001.  After that divorce, the wife 
received regular child support and alimony payments.  By 2006, 
the husband was "at least somewhat aware" of the alimony 
payments, which ceased in 2011. 
 
e.  Marriage and separation (2012 to 2014).  The parties 
were married on February 18, 2012.  Thereafter, the wife again 
received health insurance through the husband's employer, at 
that point as his spouse. 
 
The trial judge found that, throughout the course of the 
marriage (including at least the 6.33-year period in which they 
lived together immediately prior to their legal marriage), the 
parties enjoyed an "upper-middle-income lifestyle."  They dined 
out two to three times per week, and traveled together several 
times per year to destinations such as Switzerland, the Bahamas, 
and California.  The husband purchased diamond earrings, 
pendants, rings, and bracelets for the wife. 
 
During 2013, however, the parties had a series of 
disagreements.  The wife testified to incidents of abuse and 
harassment by the husband, and both parties suggested that the 
other had used intoxicating substances to excess.  Ultimately, 
the judge found that the parties suffered from "a great deal of 
marital discord."  The wife and her minor son left the marital 
 
 
 
7 
 
home on May 25, 2014, and began renting an apartment, while the 
husband and his adult son lived in the marital home.5 
 
f.  Divorce.  The wife filed a complaint for divorce in the 
Probate and Family Court on June 2, 2014; the husband accepted 
service on June 13, 2014.  In July 2014, the wife sought a 
number of temporary orders, and the motion judge, who was not 
the trial judge, ordered the husband to pay temporary alimony 
and all expenses related to the marital home.  At trial, the 
husband and wife testified as the only witnesses, and submitted 
individual financial statements. 
 
A judgment of divorce nisi issued on August 25, 2016.  The 
trial judge determined that, at the time of trial, the wife was 
receiving disability payments, child support, and disability 
benefits for her child, totaling approximately $1,375 per week.  
The husband remained in good health and had been able to 
maintain his job at a large corporation, where he earned $2,832 
per week,6 as well as retirement, medical, and other benefits.  
The judge ordered the husband to maintain payments on the wife's 
                     
 
5 The wife describes this situation as "essentially 
subsidizing the husband and his son's lifestyle while she 
simultaneously went into debt." 
 
 
6 Because of the commissions the husband received on complex 
financial products, his income fluctuated greatly from year to 
year.  For instance, the husband's reported salaries during the 
eight years preceding the divorce ranged from lows of 
$124,623.50 in 2008 and $128,558.72 in 2015 to highs of 
$362,838.68 in 2011 and $305,153.51 in 2014. 
 
 
 
8 
 
health insurance and to maintain a life insurance policy in her 
name.  The judge also ordered the husband to pay alimony in the 
amount of $511 per week for a period of sixty-one months.  With 
respect to the division of property, the judge awarded fifty-
five percent of the assets to the husband and forty-five percent 
to the wife, with the exception of the marital home, which was 
to be sold and the proceeds divided evenly. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The husband contends that the judge erred 
in calculating the duration of the marriage for purposes of 
awarding alimony, and also that the judge erred in his division 
of the marital estate. 
 
a.  Payment of alimony.  In determining the length of 
alimony payments to be awarded, the judge found that the parties 
had been legally married for 2.25 years.  See G. L. c. 208, 
§ 48.  A judge, however, may "increase the length of the 
marriage if there is evidence that the parties' economic marital 
partnership began during their cohabitation period prior to the 
marriage."  See id.  Here, the judge determined that the parties 
had cohabited and engaged in an economic marital partnership for 
approximately 6.33 years, from November 2005, when they lived 
together in Shirley, to the date of their marriage in February 
2012.  The judge therefore increased the duration of the 
 
 
 
9 
 
marriage to include that period,7 and ordered payment of alimony 
for 5.148 years, the corresponding presumptive maximum duration 
under the statute.8 
 
The husband argues that it was error to consider the 6.33 
years as an economic marital partnership, because, as a matter 
of law, the wife was precluded from entering an economic marital 
partnership during the time when she was receiving alimony from 
a former spouse, and, even if she could have entered into an 
economic marital partnership, the judge's findings of fact are 
insufficient to support a determination that she had done so. 
 
i.  Durational limits on alimony.  Alimony is "the payment 
of support from a spouse, who has the ability to pay, to a 
spouse in need of support for a reasonable length of time."  See 
G. L. c. 208, § 48.  "The purpose of alimony is to provide 
adequate support for a spouse who needs it."  See Williams v. 
Massa, 431 Mass. 619, 634 (2000).  General term alimony, in 
                     
 
7 At trial, the parties disputed whether the period from 
August 2001 to February 2004, during which they cohabited in 
Maynard, also should qualify as a period of economic marital 
partnership.  The judge declined to increase the length of the 
marriage to include that period of time.  See note 14, infra. 
 
 
8 Combining the 2.25-year legal marriage and the 6.33-year 
economic marital partnership, the judge calculated the duration 
of the marriage to be 8.58 years.  Pursuant to G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49 (b), because the total duration of the marriage fell 
between five and ten years, the presumptive maximum duration of 
alimony payments is sixty percent of 8.58 years, i.e., 5.148 
years. 
 
 
 
10 
 
particular, aims to support one spouse who has become 
"economically dependent" on the other.  See G. L. c. 208, § 48. 
 
"A judge has broad discretion when awarding alimony under 
the statute."  Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 235 (2014). 
Nonetheless, the "reasonable length of time" for which alimony 
payments may be ordered is constrained by the Alimony Reform Act 
of 2011, which sets presumptive durational limits on general 
term alimony.  See G. L. c. 208, § 49.  The limits are premised 
on the length of the parties' marriage; the longer the marriage, 
the longer the maximum permissible duration of alimony, up to a 
maximum cap.9  G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b).  See 2 C.P. Kindregan, 
Jr., M. McBrien, & P.A. Kindregan, Family Law and Practice 
§ 53:1, at 1134 (4th ed. 2013) ("The longer a marriage lasts the 
more likely it is that there will be a closer economic union and 
dependence on support").  In order to determine the duration of 
an award of general term alimony, therefore, a judge first must 
calculate the length of the parties' marriage.  See G. L. 
c. 208, § 49 (b) (1)-(4); Duff-Kareores v. Kareores, 474 Mass. 
528, 535 (2016). 
                     
 
9 "The legislative history clearly shows that the broad 
discretion judges historically have had in making awards of 
alimony was not affected by the Alimony Reform Act of 2011, St. 
2011, c. 124 . . . ."  See Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 
235 n.13 (2014).  Judges also may deviate from the presumptive 
maximum durations "in the interests of justice," upon a written 
finding.  See G. L. c. 208, § 49 (b). 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
General Law c. 208, § 48, defines the "[l]ength of the 
marriage" as "the number of months from the date of legal 
marriage to the date of service of a complaint or petition for 
divorce . . . duly filed in a court."  The parties were married 
on February 18, 2012, and the husband accepted service of the 
complaint for divorce on June 13, 2014.  There was no error in 
the judge's calculation that the parties had been married for 
2.25 years. 
 
As stated, the statute also provides that "the court may 
increase the length of the marriage if there is evidence that 
the parties' economic marital partnership began during their 
cohabitation period prior to the marriage."  G. L. c. 208, § 48.  
A period of "cohabitation" and "economic marital partnership" 
"resembles, but is not equivalent to, a legal marriage."  See 
Duff-Kareores, 474 Mass. at 534-535.  During such a period, the 
parties act like a married couple, and form the financial 
dependencies, crystalized in marriage, for which alimony later 
may compensate. 
 
"[I]n order to ascertain whether the parties were 
participating in an economic marital partnership," "a judge must 
consider the factors set forth in G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (1)."  
See Duff-Kareores, 474 Mass. at 535.  These factors include, but 
are not limited to, economic dependence or interdependence, 
collaborative conduct in furtherance of a shared life, benefits 
 
 
 
12 
 
derived, and representations made or reputations acquired 
regarding the relationship.  See G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (1) (i)-
(vi).  Here, the judge determined that the period from November 
2005 to February 2012 constituted an economic marital 
partnership. 
 
ii.  Receipt of alimony from third party.  The husband 
argues that, as a matter of law, the wife could not have entered 
into an economic marital partnership with him from 2005 to 2011, 
because she was receiving alimony payments from a previous 
marriage during that period.  He maintains that the word 
"marital" in the phrase "economic marital partnership" imbues 
the phrase with a requirement of monogamy, and permits either an 
alimony relationship with a former spouse or an economic marital 
partnership with a current partner, but not both.  He contends 
that to permit otherwise would be to endorse "financial 
infidelity," "financial bigamy," or "financial polyandry." 
 
Our jurisprudence recognizes, however, that the receipt of 
alimony, without more, does not place an individual in an 
economic marital partnership with a former spouse.  While an 
economic marital partnership "resembles . . . a legal marriage," 
a court-ordered obligation to pay alimony does not.  See Duff-
Kareores, 474 Mass. at 534-535, 537. 
"While it often may be the case that there is some measure 
of mutual dependence and benefit enjoyed by formerly 
married parties where one party is paying the other court-
 
 
 
13 
 
ordered alimony, that alone would not convert court-ordered 
payments into an economic marital partnership." 
 
Id. at 537.  An economic marital partnership is premised, in 
part, on the parties' conduct "in furtherance of their life 
together" and their "community reputation . . . as a couple."  
See id. at 534, quoting G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (1).  By 
contrast, "[a] judgment requiring payment of alimony does not 
contemplate a shared life," nor does it create a reputation of a 
romantic pair within the community.  See Duff-Kareores, supra at 
537. 
There is no indication that, between 2005 and 2011, the 
wife and her former spouse shared a primary residence, presented 
themselves to the public as husband and wife, or planned their 
schedules and vacations together.  Contrast Duff-Kareores, 474 
Mass. at 537, 539 (once-married couple resumed economic marital 
partnership after divorce).  The transfer of payments, itself, 
does not create a marriage-like relationship, and it does 
nothing to preclude the recipient from seeking out and entering 
into an economic marital partnership. 
Indeed, the Legislature expressly contemplated that an 
individual who receives alimony payments may enter a new 
romantic relationship, see G. L. c. 208, § 49 (a), (d), and the 
formation of a new economic marital partnership is not 
prohibited by the statute.  Rather, if an alimony recipient 
 
 
 
14 
 
cohabits and forms a "common household"10 with a new partner for 
a period of at least three months, a former spouse's obligation 
to pay alimony may be "suspended, reduced or terminated."  See 
G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d).  Where an individual who receives 
alimony enters an economic marital partnership, therefore, it is 
the alimony -- not the economic marital partnership -- which may 
give way.  See id.  Cf. G. L. c. 208, § 49 (a) (remarriage 
terminates alimony). 
Here, the former spouse's continued payment of alimony did 
not prevent the wife from becoming economically interdependent 
with the husband, nor did it diminish the extent to which the 
new pair functioned as a couple and invested in a shared future 
during the period from November 2005 to February 2012.11  It was 
these mutual actions on which the husband's obligation to pay 
alimony now rests, without regard to the burdens once borne by 
the former spouse. 
                     
10 The factors delineated in G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (1), are 
used to determine both whether two individuals have engaged in a 
"common household" and whether they have entered into an 
"economic marital partnership."  See Duff-Kareores v. Kareores, 
474 Mass. 528, 534 (2016). 
 
11 The husband is not disadvantaged by the wife having 
received alimony payments during the period of economic marital 
partnership.  If anything, the wife's receipt of alimony helped 
fund the husband and wife's common enterprises, including 
renovating, furnishing, and maintaining a home together. 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
The judge was aware that the wife had received alimony from 
her former spouse, a fact that appears repeatedly throughout his 
findings.  In accordance with G. L. c. 208, § 49 (d) (1) (vi), 
the judge was permitted to consider this and "other relevant and 
material factors."  Nothing in the record suggests that he 
neglected to do so. 
 
iii.  Sufficiency of factual findings.  The husband 
contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a 
determination that the parties cohabited and entered an economic 
marital partnership.  We do not agree. 
 
 The judge found that the parties cohabited between October 
2005 and February 2012; during that time, they lived together in 
Shirley and Townsend.  As to their economic marital partnership, 
the judge properly considered the factors set forth in G. L. 
c. 208, § 49 (d) (1).  With respect to economic interdependence, 
the judge found that the wife had become disabled and relied on 
the husband's health insurance during this period.  The wife 
also relied, at least in part, on the husband's salary, as she 
was unable to work.  In furtherance of building a life together, 
the parties shared in the purchase of a house in 2006, the cost 
of the mortgage, and the work required to perform renovations.  
During the same period, the husband repeatedly represented his 
 
 
 
16 
 
wife to his employer as his "domestic partner."12  Moreover, the 
husband held out the wife's son as his own in a 2011 obituary.  
The judge determined that "[t]he parties acted as a married 
couple in all respects."13 
The judge's factual findings, supported by the record, also 
support his conclusion that the parties engaged in an economic 
marital partnership from November 2005 to February 2012.14  
Accordingly, the judge did not abuse his discretion in including 
the entire seventy-six month period in his calculation of the 
duration of the marriage. 
                     
12 The husband's employer defined "domestic partners" as 
"two adults of the same or opposite sex who are in an ongoing 
and committed spouse-like relationship.  They reside together 
and are jointly responsible for each other's welfare and 
financial obligations." 
 
 
13 The husband argues, "Functionally, the parties' financial 
transactions were undistinguishable from similar transactions 
engaged in by unrelated roommates, and the parties' romantic 
involvement did nothing to alter their financial arrangements."  
We do not agree.  It is the confluence of economic 
interdependence, contemplation of a shared life, and reputation 
or representation as a couple which suggest a marriage-like 
economic marital partnership, pursuant to G. L. c. 208, 
§ 49 (d) (1). 
 
 
14 To the extent that the judge also made findings that the 
parties engaged in an economic marital partnership from 
August 2001 to February 2004, he nonetheless retained discretion 
not to extend the length of the marriage to include this period.  
See G. L. c. 208, § 48 ("the court may increase the length of 
the marriage").  Because the wife explicitly waives this issue 
on appeal, we need not address it further.  See Popp v. Popp, 
477 Mass. 1022, 1023 n.1 (2017) (waiving claim of error in 
judge's decision not to include specific period in length of 
marriage). 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
b.  Division of assets.  The husband argues further that 
the judge made several errors in dividing the parties' assets: 
(i) selecting an improper date of valuation of the marital 
estate; (ii) not properly defining the marital estate; 
(iii) assigning some of the wife's liabilities to the husband; 
and (iv) not clarifying the method of distribution of the 
retirement accounts.  Evaluating each in turn, we ascertain no 
error. 
 
i.  Valuation date.  The husband contends that the judge 
erred by valuing the parties' marital assets based upon their 
then most recent financial statements, that were filed at trial 
on March 14, 2016, rather than valuing the assets as of June 
2014, when the parties first separated, or upon the issuance of 
temporary orders of support in July 2014. 
 
The determination of the appropriate valuation date is left 
to the discretion of the trial judge.  See Savides v. Savides, 
400 Mass. 250, 252-253 (1987) (no abuse of discretion where 
judge used date of separation as valuation date); Moriarty v. 
Stone, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 154 (1996) (no abuse of discretion 
where judge used date of trial as valuation date).  See also 
Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 364, 370 n.9 (1985) 
(determination of date is "best left to a case-by-case 
analysis").  Except where "warranted by the circumstances of a 
 
 
 
18 
 
particular case," however, the valuation date typically is the 
date of trial.  See Moriarty, supra. 
Only two years passed between the date of separation and 
the date of trial.  Contrast Savides, 400 Mass. at 250-253 
(trial took place approximately ten years after separation, and 
value of marital estate had increased significantly due to 
husband's exclusive contributions).  This case is not one in 
which either party obtained significant assets following the 
separation, distinct from accounts they had maintained during 
the marriage, such that the inclusion of those assets in the 
valuation would be rendered "contrary to the marital partnership 
concept on which [G. L. c. 208, § 34,] is founded."  Contrast 
Davidson, 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 370-376 (part of trust and 
expectancy under will not subject to property division where it 
was obtained after divorce).15  It was not an abuse of discretion 
for the judge to decide upon the date of trial as the date of 
valuation in the circumstances here. 
 
ii.  Defining the marital estate.  The husband argues that 
the judge did not properly "define the marital estate" because 
he did not indicate which assets were acquired during the 
                     
15 To the contrary, the husband argues only that he 
continued to contribute to his retirement account and to pay 
household expenses, including the mortgage -- all of which were 
obligations existing during the period of the marriage or 
ordered by the court as temporary payments during the course of 
the divorce proceedings. 
 
 
 
19 
 
marriage, and because his division did not flow rationally from 
the parties' contributions to the marital estate. 
 
As to the assets included in the marital estate, a judge is 
not limited to dividing assets acquired during the period of the 
marriage.  See G. L. c. 208, § 34 (permitting division of "all 
or any part of the estate of the other").  A judge may divide 
"all property to which a party holds title, however acquired."16  
See Pfannenstiehl v. Pfannenstiehl, 475 Mass. 105, 110 (2016).  
See also Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 400-401 (1977) (permitting 
assignment of property "whenever and however acquired").  This 
includes acquisitions made outside the period of the legal 
marriage or a period of marital economic partnership.  See, 
e.g., Brower v. Brower, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 216, 218 (2004) 
(dividing assets acquired during period of cohabitation before 
legal marriage); Moriarty, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at 156 (permitting 
division of "the pension, retirement and other benefits accrued 
prior to the marriage").  The assets considered in this case 
included the marital home, financial accounts, vehicles, 
jewelry, retirement accounts, and personal property.  As the 
parties "held title" to each, it was not improper for the judge 
                     
16 There is no requirement, as the husband would have it, 
that the judge delineate "which assets were acquired during the 
marriage and which were not." 
 
 
 
20 
 
to consider any of these assets, regardless of when they were 
acquired. 
 
General Laws c. 208, § 34, sets forth the factors which a 
judge must consider in dividing the parties' assets.  These 
include 
"the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties 
during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, 
amount and sources of income, vocational skills, 
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the 
parties, the opportunity of each for future acquisition of 
capital assets and income, and the amount and duration of 
alimony, if any, awarded . . . .  The court may also 
consider the contribution of each of the parties in the 
acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their 
respective estates and the contribution of each of the 
parties as a homemaker to the family unit." 
 
G. L. c. 208, § 34.  Trial judges retain "broad discretion" in 
weighing and balancing the factors described in G. L. c. 208, 
§ 34.  See Kittredge v. Kittredge, 441 Mass. 28, 43 (2004).  See 
also Adams v. Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 372-373 (2011), S.C., 466 
Mass. 1015 (2013). 
 
In reviewing a trial judge's division of property, we 
conduct a two-step analysis.  See Bernier v. Bernier, 449 Mass. 
774, 794 (2007).  First, "[w]e review the judge's findings to 
determine whether he [or she] considered all the relevant 
factors under [G. L. c. 208, § 34,] and no irrelevant factors."  
See Baccanti v. Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 790 (2001).  Second, if 
the judge has done so, we will not reverse a judgment unless it 
 
 
 
21 
 
is "plainly wrong and excessive" (citations omitted).  See 
Bernier, supra; Baccanti, supra at 793. 
 
Contrary to the husband's position, "[t]he judge did make 
findings as to these [assets]; he simply did not make the 
findings sought by the husband."  See Baccanti, 434 Mass. 
at 791.  The judge meticulously defined each of the assets 
within the marital estate, tracking them over the period from 
2001 through 2014.  After "fixing the nature and value of the 
property" pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 34, he explicitly 
considered the requirements of the statute; he took into account 
that the husband "contributed significantly more to the 
acquisition of marital assets," and weighed that against the 
wife's "health problems and lack of employability," as well as 
his determination that the "parties contributed equally to the 
marriage."  The judge decided that a division of assets favoring 
the husband, fifty-five percent to forty-five percent, was 
appropriate, but that the marital home should be divided evenly 
in recognition that the parties had "contributed equally" to its 
purchase and maintenance.  We cannot say that, having considered 
the appropriate factors, the judge was "plainly wrong and 
excessive" in his distribution of the parties' assets.  See 
Bernier, 449 Mass. at 794; Baccanti, supra at 793. 
 
iii.  Liabilities.  The husband maintains that the judge 
erred in allocating a portion of the wife's "post-separation 
 
 
 
22 
 
consumer debt" to the husband.  The husband relies on Rule 
411(a) of the Supplemental Rules of the Probate and Family 
Court, Massachusetts Rules of Court, at 815-816 (LexisNexis 
2018), which establishes an "automatic restraining order" on 
both parties after one party files a complaint for divorce.17  
The rule admonishes that 
"[n]either party shall incur any further debts that would 
burden the credit of the other party, including but not 
limited to further borrowing against any credit line 
secured by the marital residence or unreasonably using 
credit cards or cash advances against credit or bank 
cards." 
 
See Rule 411(a)(2) of the Supplemental Rules of the Probate and 
Family Court, supra at 816. 
 
Subsequent to the separation, the wife purchased furniture 
on credit for the apartment in which she and her son were 
living.  The wife appears to have used her own credit cards for 
                     
17 As to the "restraining order," the rule requires: 
 
"Neither party shall sell, transfer, encumber, conceal, 
assign, remove or in any way dispose of any property, real 
or personal, belonging to or acquired by, either party, 
except:  (a) as required for reasonable expenses of living; 
(b) in the ordinary and usual course of business; (c) in 
the ordinary and usual course of investing; (d) for payment 
of reasonable attorney's fees and costs in connection with 
the action; (e) written agreement of both parties; or 
(f) by order of the court." 
 
Rule 411(a) of the Supplemental Rules of the Probate and Family 
Court, Massachusetts Rules of Court, at 815 (LexisNexis 2018).  
The use of funds to purchase furniture satisfies the first 
exception, "as required for reasonable expenses of living." 
 
 
 
23 
 
the purchases, and there is no indication that the credit cards 
were in the husband's name, or that the debt encumbered the 
marital home.  As such, the wife does not appear to have 
incurred "any further debts that would burden the credit of" the 
husband.  Id.  Moreover, the wife's purchase of furniture was 
not unreasonable.  After the separation, the husband retained 
use of the marital home and the furnishings therein; the wife 
and her son moved into an apartment and required furniture of 
their own.  The judge was aware of the debt the wife incurred, 
and considering the purpose for which the furniture was 
purchased, the judge allocated liabilities such that the wife 
was responsible for fifty-five percent of the debt and the 
husband was responsible for the remainder.  There was no error 
in so doing.  The "ultimate goal of G. L. c. 208, § 34," is "an 
equitable, rather than an equal, division of property."  Adlakha 
v. Adlakha, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 860, 864 (2006), quoting Williams, 
431 Mass. at 626. 
 
iv.  Retirement accounts.  The judge ordered that "[t]he 
parties' retirement assets shall be divided between the parties, 
such that Wife receives [forty-five percent] of the total value 
in the accounts and Husband receives [fifty-five percent]."  The 
husband contends that the distribution ordered was impermissibly 
vague with respect to the date of segregation, the effect of 
market gains or losses prior to the date the account is divided, 
 
 
 
24 
 
and the means by which to divide the accounts.  He argues that, 
because a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) was not 
issued, the division of the retirement accounts could constitute 
"early distribution" that would trigger a tax penalty. 
 
A QDRO is an appropriate method by which to facilitate the 
distribution of child support, alimony, or marital property 
rights.  See, e.g., Silverman v. Spiro, 438 Mass. 725, 736 
(2003).  The parties concede that a QDRO would resolve any tax 
concerns here.  At oral argument, in response to a question 
whether a QDRO from the Probate and Family Court would be the 
appropriate resolution to the tax concerns, counsel for the 
husband responded, "It very easily would be, and I think that's 
really more of a housekeeping matter than anything else."  
Counsel for the wife represented that there "is an unequivocal 
agreement that a QDRO has to be done."  Nothing in the judgment 
nisi or anything in this opinion precludes the parties from 
returning to the Probate and Family Court to seek such an order. 
 
As to the husband's other concerns, as discussed, the 
valuation date for the parties' assets -- including the 
retirement accounts -- was set as March 14, 2016, the second day 
of trial.  The only open question is how to account for fair 
market adjustments.  The husband argues that the judge neglected 
to "specify whether the wife's portion would be subject to 
market gains or losses" after the valuation date.  This judgment 
 
 
 
25 
 
does not preclude the parties from returning to the Probate and 
Family Court to pursue a QDRO, or from seeking clarification on 
the issue of how to account for market adjustments.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                     
 
18 The wife seeks attorney's fees and double costs, on the 
ground that the husband's arguments are frivolous.  "We are 
hesitant to deem an appeal frivolous and grant sanctions except 
in egregious cases."  Symmons v. O'Keeffe, 419 Mass. 288, 303 
(1995).  Because we do not determine that the law was 
sufficiently well settled, such that "there [could] be no 
reasonable expectation of a reversal," we decline to allow the 
wife's request (citation omitted).  See id.