Case Title: Fountain v. Phillips

Citation: 439 So. 2d 59

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1983-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
439 So. 2d 59 (1983)
J.F. FOUNTAIN and Frank Fountain
v.
Gilmer P. PHILLIPS, et al.
82-527.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 23, 1983.
*60 Michael L. Roberts of Floyd, Keener & Cusimano, Gadsden, for appellants.
George Hawkins and Roger C. Suttle, Gadsden, for appellees.
JONES, Justice.
Plaintiffs/Appellees Gilmer P. Phillips and Inez B. Phillips initiated this cause on March 8, 1973, against Defendants/Appellants Frank Fountain and his father, J.F. Fountain, seeking to quiet title to approximately 1,377 acres of realty situated in Etowah and St. Clair Counties. Defendants answered and counterclaimed, alleging that they held interests in the real estate through certain instruments, particularly a lease/option to purchase agreement between the Phillipses and J.F. Fountain. Plaintiffs, while admitting the existence of certain transactions between the parties, denied the existence or execution of J.F. Fountain's alleged "option," and further contended that he had lost his interest because of abandonment and nonpayment of rent.
Subsequent to a mistrial in April of 1982, a jury, on November 5, 1982, returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs.[1] Defendants' post-trial motions were denied. This appeal, by J.F. Fountain only, followed.[2] We affirm.
When this case was before us on a prior appeal (in which the trial court's order granting Plaintiffs' motion for a summary judgment was reversed, Fountain v. Phillips, 404 So. 2d 614 (Ala.1981)), this Court's opinion set forth a basic outline of the triable factual issues. For purposes of this appeal, we need only relate those facts and procedural events essential to a consideration of the issues here presented and treated in this opinion.
During trial, J.F. Fountain sought to testify concerning an alleged handwritten "option to purchase," which, according to him, was executed by the Phillipses and given to him at the same time he received a one-year leasehold agreement. The trial court sustained objections to this evidence. Pertinent portions of that colloquy are quoted verbatim from the record, to-wit:
During summation to the jury Plaintiffs' counsel made the following argument, in part (quoting from the record):
Of the several issues presented, we consider the two issues arising out of the procedural *63 context set out under "FACTS" above deserving of our treatment:
Appellant states those issues thusly:
Fountain contends that the trial court erred in failing to accept his testimony concerning the alleged "missing" option agreement of July 1972. We disagree.
J.F. Fountain testified that the original "missing option" could not be found, and, as a result, Plaintiffs drew up a subsequent "option." While the "best evidence rule" objection may have been inappropriate, the trial judge correctly excluded the evidence under the general objection of relevancy. To be admissible, all evidence must first have some tendency to shed light on the inquiry in issue. Stated simply, it must be relevant. Taylor v. Mason, 390 So. 2d 1046 (Ala.1980); Ward v. State, 52 Ala.App. 392, 293 So. 2d 307 (1974).
It is not the "missing option" which Fountain seeks to enforce, but a subsequent one alleged by him to have been agreed upon by the parties. This is the agreement which the jury, after hearing conflicting testimony as to its alleged existence, found contrary to Fountain's assertions.
J.F. Fountain also testified that he never took possession of the alleged "missing option." In 17 C.J.S. Contracts, § 64 (1963), we find the following:
It is undisputed that the "missing option" was never delivered by the Phillipses to J.F. Fountain, and, as such, could not operate so as to bind the parties contractually. In other words, the very evidence offered to meet the requisite predicate for proof of a lost document failed the admissibility test for lack of relevancy and nondelivery of the instrument in question.
Fountain's next point of contention is that the trial court erred in not excluding certain remarks by Appellees' counsel during his closing arguments to the jury, when he stated:
Generally, an appeal to the jury's sympathy during closing argument by inviting the jurors, individually, to stand in the shoes of the litigant is considered improper. Allison v. Acton-Etheridge Coal Co., 289 Ala. 443, 268 So. 2d 725 (1972). Case law demonstrates, however, that the courts have not been overly restrictive in their application of this rule. An argument similar to the one here challenged was addressed in British General Insurance Co. v. Simpson Sales Co., 265 Ala. 683, 93 So. 2d 763 (1957):
Commenting on these remarks, the Court said:
See, also, Cofield v. State, 41 Ala.App. 469, 136 So. 2d 897 (1961).
Fountain's reliance upon Estis Trucking Co., Inc. v. Hammond, 387 So. 2d 768 (Ala. 1980), is misplaced. Indeed, the Estis Trucking Company Court, although reaching a different result, commented upon British General Insurance, supra, approvingly and distinguished the jury arguments in the two cases thusly:
As in British General Insurance Co., when the objected to portion of the argument in the instant case is viewed in its full context, we cannot say that "these remarks were so improper and prejudicial as to justify a reversal of the trial court." The reluctance of the courts to find prejudicial error in these situations finds its motivation in the countervailing rule "that great latitude should be given counsel in the content and scope of their closing arguments." R.C. Bottling Co. v. Sorrells, 290 Ala. 187, 275 So. 2d 131 (1973).
After careful consideration of these and each of the other issues presented, we find no reversible error; therefore, the judgment below is due to be, and hereby is, affirmed; and this 10-year old case (submitted *65 in this Court August 26, 1983) is brought to an end.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
[1]  Gilmer P. Phillips died in 1977 during the course of these proceedings, and Inez B. Phillips, as Executrix, was substituted as a party.
[2]  Although both defendants executed the notice of appeal, no adverse ruling pertaining to Frank Fountain is presented for review.