Case Title: Kadrmas v. Valley West Homeowner's Ass'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-169

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kadrmas v. Valley West Homeowner's Ass'n1993 WY 37848 P.2d 826Case Number: 92-169Decided: 03/18/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Wayne KADRMAS and Shirley 
Kadrmas, Husband and Wife,

 Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

VALLEY WEST HOMEOWNER'S 
ASSOCIATION, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Sheridan County, James N. Wolfe, J.

Stuart S. Healy, 
Sheridan, for appellants.

H.W. Rasmussen 
and Bruce P. Badley of Badley & Rasmussen, Sheridan, for 
appellee.

Before MACY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellants, Wayne 
Kadrmas and Shirley Kadrmas, brought this negligence action against Valley West 
Homeowner's Association (VWHO), appellees, to recover damages resulting from 
violation of protective covenants. Following a one-day trial, the district court 
entered judgment in favor of VWHO. Kadrmas appeals from the district court's 
judgment.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      The issues 
presented for determination as stated by appellant are:

A. Whether the District 
Court incorrectly decided this case on the basis of first-party negligence and 
comparative negligence to the exclusion of third-party contribution, indemnity 
and estoppel.

B. If the case was 
properly resolved on principles of negligence, whether the District Court failed 
to allocate and apply the proper burdens of proof[,]

and as stated by 
appellee are:

A. Does the record 
support the judgment of the District Court?

B. Appellants failed to 
present any issues which warrant reversal.

C. Is Appellee entitled 
to attorney fees for enforcement of the covenants?

FACTS

[¶4]      Kadrmas owned a 
3.4 acre lot in the Valley West Subdivision on which he constructed a barn in 
violation of protective covenants. An adjoining landowner, Morris, sued to 
enforce the covenants. Kadrmas asserted a third party complaint against VWHO. On 
appeal, summary judgment in favor of Kadrmas and against Morris was reversed, 
Morris v. Kadrmas, 812 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1991), with this court requiring strict 
compliance with the 25-foot setback and residence requirements and further 
holding that Kadrmas be allowed to file his complaint and pursue his damage 
claim against VWHO.

[¶5]      Kadrmas settled 
and paid Morris' claim upon Kadrmas', Morris' and VWHO's stipulation of damages 
in the amount of $2,000.00. In this case, Kadrmas seeks contribution from VWHO 
for its percentage share of the negligence causing damage of $2,000.00 to Morris 
and its percentage share of negligence causing damage incurred by Kadrmas in the 
cost and expense of razing and moving the barn.

[¶6]      In a trial to the 
court, Kadrmas testified that a plan showing a 12-foot setback from the lot line 
had been approved by VWHO and that he did not recall a member of the VWHO 
control committee warning him of the need to comply with the 25-foot setback 
requirement. Members of the committee testified that the plan with the 12-foot 
setback had not been approved, that the 25-foot requirement had been noted on 
the plan before construction began, and that committee member Laughton had 
specifically advised Kadrmas of the need to comply with the setback requirement 
before construction. 

[¶7]      The trial court, 
in its decision denying Kadrmas recovery, stated:

     My view is that the 
committee does have an obligation to review these plans and specifications, and 
they do have an obligation to notify the owner, the builder of, you know, 
whether they approve them or not. And if that builder, the owner, relies upon 
that to his detriment, I think they would be liable. * * *

* * * * * 
*

* * * They said, okay. Go 
ahead and build it. Then there was this space of time. Mr. Kadrmas had a right 
to rely upon that.

     I think that the crux 
of this case comes down to whether Mr. Kadrmas was warned that there might be a 
problem with the setback, whether there was or not, and Laughton said, I did 
warn him. Kadrmas says, you know, if you did, I've forgotten 
it.

* * * * * 
*

     If that conversation 
really didn't take place, I think he should recover. If the conversation took 
place, he shouldn't recover. He has the burden. Based upon the testimony, 
I can't decide one way or the other, so I have to just find that I can't - I 
can't find in his favor because the Kadrmases have that burden. I'm just 
kind of in the middle, so that's the decision of the Court. [emphasis 
added]

The court 
concluded:

[The 
conversation] might not have happened, but the problem is, I can't decide that. 
I'm stuck right here. The scales of justice are balanced evenly. 
[emphasis added]

[¶8]      Kadrmas argues 
that the effect of the above explanation by the court of its decision is that 
each party was found 50 percent at fault with the result that Kadrmas should 
recover 50 percent of his payment to Morris by contribution (equitable 
indemnity) and 50 percent of his damage for razing and moving the barn. We do 
not agree that the effect of the court's stated reasons for its decision equates 
to a finding of 50 percent negligence on each party.

[¶9]      The trial court 
correctly stated that Kadrmas had the burden of proving that VWHO was negligent 
before it could be liable in damage. Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler, 685 P.2d 13, 16 (Wyo. 1984). We believe that the court saw this case as one in which it 
would find that the committee approved the plan and authorized violation of the 
covenants, or one in which there was no approval and authorization, in which 
event VWHO would be zero percent negligent and Kadrmas would recover nothing. If 
the state of the evidence was such that the court could not find that Kadrmas 
satisfied his burden of proving that VWHO approved the 12-foot setback and 
authorized construction of the barn in violation of the covenants, then it must 
find that VWHO was not negligent in any degree.

[¶10]   The standard for reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence is well established. On review, this court assumes 
that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true. Richardson v. 
Schaub, 796 P.2d 1304, 1309 (Wyo. 1990). We leave out of consideration entirely 
the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party that conflicts with the 
evidence of the successful party, and we afford to the evidence of the 
successful party every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly 
drawn from it. Richardson, 796 P.2d  at 1310; DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182, 
185 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶11]   The trial court held Kadrmas had 
not proved that VWHO authorized the deviations from the covenants. Substantial 
evidence supported the trial court's decision, and that decision must be 
sustained. Appellants have presented no cogent argument for reversal. The 
following excerpts from the testimony at trial illustrate the ambiguity 
surrounding the question whether VWHO approved Kadrmas' plans. Mr. Kadrmas 
testified:

THE COURT: There's a 
couple of questions I missed. You testified a few minutes ago, as I understood 
it, that there was a conversation you had with Mr. Laughton and some of the 
other people that came by and looked at your barn? 

THE WITNESS: That's 
correct.

THE COURT: When did that 
conversation take place?

THE WITNESS: Those 
conversations, sir, took place during the construction 
process.

THE COURT: And that would 
have been after you had already squared it up and set the 
poles?

THE WITNESS: 
Yes.

Mr. Laughton 
testified:

Q. What was the next 
thing you recall in regard to the Kadrmas' building?

A. No. After, I'd say, 
two or three months, the building was - there was stakes out in the lot, and the 
day that they started to drill the holes for the, I think it was the pole 
building, why, I went over there just to check. And from my - from my home over 
to this lot, there's quite a few trees in the Hanes' residence in a fairly large 
house. I was not able to see that, but when they started with the equipment, it 
was either a Kiewit Construction or a Kiewit mining tan and natural truck there. 
And they were working real close to the property line.

Anyway, I went over there 
and I did look. It seems to me it was fairly close, and I had a tape measure. I 
went with the tape measure over there, and I measured out to one of the stakes 
on, it would be the - well, north and a little bit east, but mainly the north 
border, and it was - to my recollection, it was between - it was between 12 and 
13 feet from the property line, at least from the fence 
there.

Q. After making that 
measurement, what did you do?

A. Well, I just discussed 
it with Mr. Kadrmas that, you know, the covenants said it had to be 25 feet 
minimum.

As noted above, 
we accept the successful party's evidence as true and afford to that evidence 
every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. We 
find the evidence presented sufficient to support the trial court's decision 
that appellants failed to satisfy their burden of proving appellee's 
negligence.

[¶12]   Appellee asserted a counterclaim 
which it wished preserved in the event of remand. The trialcourt found the 
counterclaim to be without substance, and we do also. Since there is no remand, 
we will not pursue the counterclaim further.

[¶13]   Affirmed.