Case Title: Renee K. VanCleve v. City of Marinette

Citation: 2003 WI 2

Docket Number: 2001AP000231

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 2 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0231 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Renee K. VanCleve and Thomas C. VanCleve,  
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
v. 
City of Marinette and Wausau Insurance Company,  
 
Defendants-Appellants, 
Kenneth Keller, d/b/a Keller Cement Contractors, 
Keller Cement Contractors, Auto Owners 
Insurance, and State Farm Fire & Casualty, Co.,  
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 10 
Reported at:  250 Wis. 2d 121, 639 N.W.2d 792 
(Ct. App. 2001-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 3, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Marinette   
 
JUDGE: 
Tim A. Duket   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners there was a 
brief by Jonny L. Waara and Petrucelli & Petrucelli, P.C., Iron 
River, Michigan, and oral argument by Jonny L. Waara. 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief by James O. 
Moermond, III, and Law Offices of Stilp and Cotton, Wausau, and 
oral argument by Peter M. Farb. 
 
 
2003 WI 2 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0231  
(L.C. No. 
99-CV-98) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Renee K. VanCleve and Thomas C. VanCleve,  
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents- 
          Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Marinette and Wausau Insurance  
Company,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants, 
 
Kenneth Keller, d/b/a Keller Cement  
Contractors,  
Auto Owners Insurance, and State Farm  
Fire & Casualty, Co.,  
 
          Defendants. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 3, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  Rene and Thomas VanCleve 
(VanCleve) commenced this action to recover damages arising out 
of an injury Rene VanCleve sustained to her left knee when she 
fell into a trench adjacent to a newly installed cement curb in 
the City of Marinette.  VanCleve now seeks review of a published 
decision of the Court of Appeals, District III, which reversed a 
No. 
01-0231   
 
2 
 
judgment in the amount of $49,311.15 entered against the City of 
Marinette (City) by the Circuit Court for Marinette County, the 
Honorable Tim A. Duket presiding.   
¶2 
The parties dispute how a Pierringer1 release, between 
an injured plaintiff and the defendant who is primarily liable 
under Wis. Stat. § 81.17 (1999-2000),2 affects the enforceability 
of a judgment against a non-settling municipality in light of 
the statute.  Section 81.17 establishes the statutory liability 
of a municipality or a person or private corporation when injury 
results from a highway defect.   
¶3 
The critical language of Wis. Stat. § 81.17 has 
remained unchanged since 1898, and has been clearly and 
consistently interpreted by this court.  Section 81.17 clearly 
establishes successive liability between a person or private 
corporation who is, under the statute, primarily liable and a 
municipality who is deemed to be secondarily liable.  We hold, 
therefore, that a municipality may not be held to pay the 
remaining amount of the jury award when an injured plaintiff 
enters into a Pierringer release with the defendant (here 
                                                 
1 The court of appeals correctly noted that "[a] Pierringer 
release operates to impute to the settling plaintiff whatever 
liability in contribution the settling defendant may have to 
non-settling defendants and to bar subsequent contribution 
actions the non-settling defendants might assert against the 
settling defendants."  VanCleve v. City of Marinette, 2002 WI 
App 10, ¶3 n.1, 250 Wis. 2d 121, 639 N.W.2d 792 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(citing Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 192-93, 124 N.W.2d 
106 (1963)). 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-0231   
 
3 
 
Kenneth Keller d/b/a Keller Cement Contractors) who is primarily 
liable under the statute.   
¶4 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 further provides that a judgment 
against a municipality is not enforceable until execution has 
been issued against the party found primarily liable and 
returned unsatisfied.  Since VanCleve has not obtained, and 
cannot obtain,  a judgment against the defendant Keller, no 
execution can issue and be returned unsatisfied, and, therefore, 
VanCleve cannot enforce a judgment against the City. 
¶5 
In addition, we hold that the City did not waive its 
statutory affirmative defenses by failing to object to the 
Pierringer release and stipulating to the dismissal, because the 
City did not have a legal basis to make such an objection.  
Similarly, we hold that the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal 
is not a waiver of the City's affirmative defenses, since it 
does not resolve any of the claims between VanCleve and the City 
pursuant to the Johnson and Pierringer cases.  Johnson v. 
Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 297, 243 N.W. 2d 815 (1976); Pierringer 
v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 193, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963). 
¶6 
Finally, 
we 
hold 
that 
VanCleve's 
public 
policy 
arguments 
fail 
because 
the 
statutory 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 is unambiguous, and we have previously ruled 
that public policy considerations cannot trump unambiguous 
statutes. 
 
Additionally, 
VanCleve's 
argument 
that 
the 
application of § 81.17, as applied here, will stifle future 
settlement agreements ignores the clear statutory history of 
§ 81.17 and our previous decisions applying the statute.  
No. 
01-0231   
 
4 
 
Parties should have adequate notice of the risks involved in 
entering into settlements, and it is incumbent upon the party 
entering into a Pierringer release to be aware of the risks 
associated with such an agreement and make settlement decisions 
accordingly.  
¶7 
If we adopt VanCleve's policy argument, we would, in 
essence abrogate the intent of Wis. Stat. § 81.17 and render the 
statute meaningless.  
¶8 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision.  
I.  FACTS 
¶9 
The facts in this case are undisputed.  In August 
1998, Renee VanCleve injured her left knee when she fell into a 
trench adjacent to a newly installed cement curb in the City of 
Marinette.  VanCleve sued both the City and the contractor, 
Kenneth Keller, d/b/a 
Keller Cement 
Contractors 
(Keller), 
alleging negligence in the construction and maintenance of the 
curb and gutter. Keller was named in the suit based on 
information from the City, stating that the contractor was also 
responsible for the curb that VanCleve injured herself on.  In 
addition to providing this information, the City cross-claimed 
against Keller for contribution alleging negligence. 
¶10 The City asserted Wis. Stat. §§ 81.17 and 81.15 among 
several affirmative defenses.3  In August 2000, VanCleve signed a 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 81.17 states: 
Whenever damages happen to any person or property by 
reason of any defect in any highway or other public 
ground, or from any other cause for which any town, 
city, village or county would be liable, and such 
No. 
01-0231   
 
5 
 
Pierringer release, Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 
N.W.2d 106 (1963), which released Keller from all claims.  The 
Pierringer release terms provided that in exchange for $7,500, 
VanCleve would release Keller and the insurers from any claims 
resulting from VanCleve's fall on August 24, 1998.  Pet'r App. 
                                                                                                                                                             
damages are caused by, or arise from, the wrong, 
default or negligence thereof and of any person, or 
private 
corporation, 
such 
person 
or 
private 
corporation shall be primarily liable therefore; but 
the town, city, village or county may be sued with the 
person or private corporation so primarily liable. If 
the town, city, village or county denies its primary 
liability and proves upon whom such liability rests 
the judgment shall be against all the defendants shown 
by the verdict or finding to be liable for damages; 
but judgment against the town, city, village or county 
shall not be enforceable until execution has been 
issued against the party found to be primarily liable 
and returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; on such 
return being made the defendant town, city, village or 
county shall be bound by the judgment.  The unpaid 
balance shall be collected in the same way as other 
judgments. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 81.15 states in relevant part: 
If damages happen to any person or his or her property 
by reason of the insufficiency or want of repairs of 
any highway which any town, city or village is bound 
to keep in repair, the person sustaining damages has a 
right to recover the damages from the town, city or 
village. If the damages happen by reason of the 
insufficiency 
or 
want 
of 
repairs 
of 
a 
highway . . . [t]he amount recoverable by any person 
for any damages so sustained shall not exceed $50,000.  
The procedures under s. 893.80 shall apply to the 
commencement 
of 
actions 
brought 
under 
this 
section . . . . 
 
No. 
01-0231   
 
6 
 
at 105.  The Pierringer release also stated that VanCleve 
reserved the claims against the City.  
¶11 Following the signing of the Pierringer release, the 
circuit court approved a stipulation and signed an order to 
dismiss. The City joined the stipulation to dismiss Keller from 
the lawsuit, which expressly stated that the City's cross-claim 
against Keller was settled.  
¶12 After the Stipulation and Order for Dismissal, the 
jury returned a special verdict finding the City ninety percent 
(90%) causally negligent, Keller nine percent (9%) causally 
negligent, and VanCleve one percent (1%) causally negligent. The 
jury awarded VanCleve $15,000 in past non-economic loss damages, 
and $60,000 in future non-economic loss damages. 
¶13 The City filed a motion to dismiss VanCleve's claim, 
arguing that no judgment could be enforced against it, because 
it would violate the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 81.17.  The 
City claimed that the judgment against it was not enforceable 
until execution of a judgment against Keller was returned 
unsatisfied.  Because VanCleve settled with Keller, the City 
argued that VanCleve cannot recover against it.  The circuit 
court denied the City's motion and ordered a judgment be entered 
against the City, and limited it to $50,000 in accordance with 
Wis. Stat. § 81.15 and § 893.80(3).4 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(3) also caps recovery against a 
municipality at $50,000. 
No. 
01-0231   
 
7 
 
¶14 The City appealed and the court of appeals reversed. 
In its holding, the court of appeals held that the City was not 
responsible for paying any amount of the jury verdict under 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 because, under the statute, if no judgment 
was entered against the individual who is primarily liable, then 
the City, who is secondarily liable, cannot be held to pay.  In 
its reasoning, the court of appeals asserted that VanCleve 
failed to cite any authority to support the argument that the 
City remains primarily liable for its ninety percent (90%) 
causal negligence. The court of appeals relied on Weis v. A.T. 
Hipke & Sons, Inc., 271 Wis. 140, 72 N.W.2d 715 (1955), finding 
the statute to be unambiguous.5  
¶15 VanCleve now seeks review of the decision of the court 
of appeals, and specifically asks this court to affirm the 
circuit court's decision, which granted judgment in the amount 
of $49,311.15 against the City.  We granted VanCleve's petition 
for review and now turn to the issues presented. 
¶16 Specifically, the issues presented in this case are: 
(1) If Wis. Stat. § 81.17 is applicable, what effect does 
entering into a valid Pierringer release with a settling 
defendant have for the plaintiff, VanCleve, in attempting to 
enforce judgment against the non-settling City of Marinette?   
(2) Did the City of Marinette, by its actions, waive its 
affirmative defenses? 
                                                 
5 See VanCleve, 250 Wis. 2d 121, ¶20.  We recognize that 
Weis predates Pierringer.   
No. 
01-0231   
 
8 
 
¶17 The issues presented here require this court to 
interpret Wis. Stat. § 81.17. Statutory interpretation is a 
question of law we review independently, benefiting from the 
decisions of the court of appeals and the circuit court. 
Industry to Industry, Inc. v. Hillsman Modular Molding, Inc., 
2002 WI 51, 252 Wis. 2d 544, 644 N.W.2d 236.  In interpreting a 
statute, we first look to the language of the statute itself to 
attempt to interpret it based on "the plain meaning of its 
terms."  State v. Williquette, 129 Wis. 2d 239, 248, 385 
N.W.2d 145 (1986). Furthermore, it is a well established rule 
that if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the 
court must not look beyond the statutory language to ascertain 
the statute's meaning.  Only when statutory language is 
ambiguous may we examine other construction aids such as 
legislative history, context, and subject matter. State v. 
Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d 18, 24, 386 N.W.2d 47 (1986). 
¶18 VanCleve challenges the court of appeals holding on 
several 
grounds. 
 
On 
the 
first 
issue, 
relating 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 and the effect of the Pierringer release, 
VanCleve asserts that the statute is inapplicable here because 
Keller is not a party to the lawsuit.  Next, VanCleve argues 
that the court of appeals erred, and that a judgment can be 
entered against the City even though there was a valid 
Pierringer release.  
¶19 Next, 
in 
addressing 
the 
second 
issue, 
VanCleve 
maintains that by failing to object to the Pierringer release, 
and because of its stipulation to the dismissal of its cross-
No. 
01-0231   
 
9 
 
claims against Keller, the City waived its statutory affirmative 
defense that it was not primarily responsible or liable for this 
action.  Similarly, VanCleve argues that in failing to object to 
the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, thereby dismissing its 
cross-claims, the City waived its assertion that it was not 
primarily liable in this action.   
¶20 Finally, 
VanCleve 
argues 
that 
social 
policy 
considerations favor settlement over contribution. VanCleve 
maintains that if this court accepts the City's arguments, the 
end result will be the stifling of future settlements. 
¶21 The 
City 
counters 
that 
the 
application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 bars any recovery by VanCleve against the 
City.  The City asserts that when the jury found Keller liable, 
his liability became primary pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 81.17.  
Therefore, since VanCleve did not obtain a judgment against 
Keller, and chose instead to settle through a Pierringer 
release, VanCleve cannot recover against the City.  
II.  APPLICABILITY OF WIS. STAT. § 81.17 AND EFFECT OF 
PIERRINGER RELEASE ON VANCLEVE CLAIM 
 
¶22 As a threshold question, we must determine whether 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 applies.  We agree with the City that § 81.17 
is applicable to the case at hand.  First, § 81.17 creates 
primary and secondary liability for injuries caused by highway 
defects or defects on other public grounds.  A curb and gutter 
falls under the definition of "[h]ighway defects" or defects on 
"other public grounds."  See Wis. Stat. § 81.17.  See also, Weis 
v. A.T. Hipke & Sons, Inc., 271 Wis. 140, 141, 72 N.W.2d 715 
No. 
01-0231   
 
10 
 
(1955)(holding a ditch, gully or depression to fall under the 
definition of "highway" defect).  Second, § 81.17 explicitly 
states that if any person or private corporation is found 
negligent, then that person or private corporation shall be 
primarily liable under the statute.  
¶23 In addition to the plain language of the statute, 
Wisconsin case law interpreting the statutory language provides 
guidance on this issue.   
¶24 In Weis, we held that according to Wis. Stat. § 81.17 
any liability the City of New Holstein (city) may have under 
this statute is secondary, not joint.  A city is only liable for 
the portion of damages and costs that the private individual is 
unable to pay.  In reaching that decision, we looked at the 
language of the statute and rejected the plaintiff's argument, 
that under the statute, the city involved was required to deny 
its primary liability and prove that the private property owner 
was primarily liable.  In rejecting the plaintiff's argument we 
said that according to the statutory language which states: 
" . . . any person or private corporation shall be primarily 
liable . . . " the city cannot be jointly or primarily liable.  
In addition, we held that "[b]y statute the liabilities of these 
tort-feasors from the outset are successive, rather than 
joint . . . ." 
 
Weis, 
271 
Wis. 
at 
144. 
 
Under 
such 
circumstances, the doctrine of contribution does not apply. 
¶25 In a similar vein, we previously held in Dickens, that 
the municipal corporation (Eau Claire County) may not be held 
primarily liable.  In that case, we addressed the application of 
No. 
01-0231   
 
11 
 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 and held that the statute creates "a 
secondary liability on a town, city, village, or county, for 
defects in a highway which cause damage only when the negligence 
of another tort-feasor also causally contributes to that 
defect." 
 
Dickens 
v. 
Kensmoe, 
61 
Wis. 2d 211, 
220, 
212 
N.W.2d 484 (1973). 
¶26 Thus, according to Weis, and Dickens, the City may not 
be held primarily liable, and there can be neither joint, nor 
primary liability on the part of a town, city, village, or 
county, if any person or private corporation has any liability.  
Rather, this liability is successive, and as a result, any 
liability the municipality may have is only for the portion of 
the damages and costs that the private individual is unable to 
pay.  Since the jury found Keller liable, he became primarily 
liable in accord with Wis. Stat. § 81.17, and the City's 
liability is triggered only if execution has been issued against 
Keller and returned unsatisfied.    
¶27 Based on the statute and the case law cited above, 
since Keller was found to be nine percent (9%) causally 
negligent for VanCleve's injuries, it is clear that Keller is 
primarily liable under the statute.  However, since Keller was 
dismissed from the action, no judgment can be rendered against 
Keller, and no execution can issue and be returned unsatisfied.  
¶28 Dickens v. Kensmoe, 61 Wis. 2d 211, 212 N.W.2d 484 
(1973) accurately sets forth the historical construction and 
development of Wis. Stat. § 81.17:  
No. 
01-0231   
 
12 
 
The statutory liability of a municipality for damages 
sustained as a result of a highway defect goes back to 
the beginning of this state.  This liability was first 
created by the Revised Statutes of 1849, ch. 16, sec. 
103.6  At that time, governments were immune from tort 
claims under a common-law, court-made rule which was 
expressly recognized in Hayes v. Oshkosh (1873), 33 
Wis. 314, 14 Am. Rep. 760. The statute was a 
forerunner of present sec. 81.15 and was designed to 
ameliorate in part the harshness on the public of the 
doctrine of governmental tort immunity.  This statute 
of 1849 expressly created liability on a town for 
damages caused by reason of the insufficiency or want 
of repair of a road. The language creating this 
liability became Title VI, ch. 19, sec. 120, Revised 
Stats. 1858, which was construed in Kittredge v. 
Milwaukee (1870), 26 Wis. 46.  The court there held 
the statute imposed liability regardless of whether 
the municipality created the defect in the highway or 
the defect was allowed to exist due to insufficiency 
of repair. 
. . . .  
Thereafter, municipalities began to enact ordinances 
designed to protect themselves from Kittredge.  These 
ordinances generally provided that when the negligence 
of a private tort-feasor had created the defect for 
which the municipality was also liable statutorily, 
the municipality's liability was only secondary to the 
liability 
of 
the 
private 
tort-feasor. 
 
A 
city 
ordinance of this type was involved in Hincks v. 
Milwaukee (1879), 46 Wis. 559, 1 N.W. 230, and was 
held valid and constitutional. 
                                                 
6 This statute provided in relevant part as follows: 
"If any damage shall happen to any person, his team, 
carriage, 
or 
other 
property, 
by 
reason 
of 
the 
insufficiency or want of repairs of any bridge, or 
sluiceway, or road in any town of this state, the 
person sustaining such damages shall have a right to 
sue 
for 
and 
recover 
the 
same 
against 
such 
town . . . ."   
Revised Stats. 1849, Title VI, ch. 16, 103. 
No. 
01-0231   
 
13 
 
 . . . . 
In 1889, a statute was enacted entitled "Primary 
Liability for Damages——Parties" which contained almost 
verbatim the language of these city ordinances.  See 
Laws of 1889, ch. 471, secs. 1 and 2; 1 Sanborn & 
Berryman, Annotated Statutes (1889), sec. 1339 b.  
 . . . . 
In 1898 the statute was revised and renumbered as sec. 
1340 a and provided substantially as sec. 81.17 now 
reads. . . . The statute of 1898 creating sec. 1340 a 
was a revisor's statute and the revisor's note dealing 
with the section expressly states "An attempt has been 
made to condense and otherwise improve the language, 
without changing the legal effect thereof." . . . The 
critical language of this statute has ever since 
remained unchanged; in 1923 the section was renumbered 
by the Laws of 1923, ch. 108, sec. 101; in 1943, it 
was revised by the Laws of 1943, ch. 334, sec. 76; and 
eventually became sec. 81.17. 
Dickens, 61 Wis. 2d at 214-217. 
¶29 As noted above, Wis. Stat. § 81.17 was originally 
created when governments were immune from tort claims under the 
common law.  Dickens, 61 Wis. 2d at 214.  VanCleve argues that 
§ 81.17 is inapplicable based on Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 
Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962), which abrogated the common 
law governmental immunity for tort claims.  The City disagrees, 
and asserts that VanCleve's argument that § 81.17 should be 
interpreted to hold the City liable for the percentage of causal 
negligence as determined by the jury is without legal authority.  
If § 81.17 is interpreted as suggested by VanCleve, it would 
become, in essence, a joint liability statute, rather than a 
successive liability statute.  Such an interpretation of § 81.17 
would render § 895.045, the contributory negligence statute, to 
No. 
01-0231   
 
14 
 
some extent unnecessary or redundant.7  The City maintains that 
the critical language of § 81.17 has remained unchanged since 
1898, and has been clearly and consistently interpreted by this 
court. 
¶30 As noted before, based on case law, it is clear that 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 is a successive liability statute, rather 
than a government immunity statute. Accordingly, we find Holytz 
is not helpful in interpreting § 81.17 in the present case 
because it does not directly address § 81.17. 
                                                 
7 895.045. Contributory negligence 
(1) Comparative negligence. Contributory negligence 
does not bar recovery in an action by any person or 
the person's legal representative to recover damages 
for negligence resulting in death or in injury to 
person or property, if that negligence was not greater 
than the negligence of the person against whom 
recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be 
diminished 
in 
the 
proportion 
to 
the 
amount 
of 
negligence attributed to the person recovering. The 
negligence 
of 
the 
plaintiff 
shall 
be 
measured 
separately against the negligence of each person found 
to be causally negligent.  The liability of each 
person found to be causally negligent whose percentage 
of causal negligence is less than 51% is limited to 
the 
percentage 
of 
the 
total 
causal 
negligence 
attributed to that person. A person found to be 
causally 
negligent 
whose 
percentage 
of 
causal 
negligence is 51% or more shall be jointly and 
severally liable for the damages allowed. 
(2) Concerted action. Notwithstanding sub. (1), if 2 
or more parties act in accordance with a common scheme 
or plan, those parties are jointly and severally 
liable for all damages resulting from that action, 
except as provided in s. 895.85(5). 
No. 
01-0231   
 
15 
 
¶31 Next, 
VanCleve 
maintains 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 
should be interpreted to hold the City liable for the percentage 
of causal negligence as determined by the jury.  VanCleve argues 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 
is 
to 
protect 
municipalities from paying the portion of damages that were 
attributable to the individual who is primarily liable, and not 
to relieve a municipality from paying their portion of the 
damages.  
¶32 This argument, while interesting, is not supported by 
any legal authority.  The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 81.17 
provides conditional protection to a municipality when it is 
sued along with another for injuries caused by highway defects.  
If both the municipality and the other individual or private 
corporation are found liable, the statute unambiguously states 
that the other person or private corporation is responsible for 
the entire award, if a judgment can be satisfied against it.  
Thus, § 81.17 is unambiguous, based on the case law and the 
clear language of the statute. 
¶33 Consequently, we hold that the unambiguous statutory 
language of Wis. Stat. § 81.17 bars any recovery by VanCleve 
against the City.  As previously noted, the critical language of 
§ 81.17 has remained unchanged since 1898, and has been clearly 
and consistently interpreted by this court as illustrated in our 
opinions in Weis and Dickens.   
¶34 When the jury found Keller liable, his liability 
became primary pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 81.17.  So under the 
statute, Keller would have been responsible for all the damages 
No. 
01-0231   
 
16 
 
and the municipality would have been responsible only for the 
damages Keller was not able to pay.  In this case, the 
Pierringer agreement represents what Keller was willing to pay, 
not what he was able to pay upon an execution issued on a 
judgment.  By entering into the Pierringer release, VanCleve was 
essentially agreeing to accept a lesser amount in damages by 
releasing the individual that turned out to be primarily liable 
under the statute.  Therefore, since VanCleve did not obtain a 
judgment against Keller, and chose instead, to settle through a 
Pierringer release, VanCleve cannot recover against the City 
pursuant to § 81.17.  The consequence of entering into the 
Pierringer release with Keller is that VanCleve, in essence, 
indirectly waived any right to hold the City secondarily liable.   
¶35 Thus, according to the holdings in Weis, 271 Wis. 140, 
and Dickens, 61 Wis. 2d 211, under Wis. Stat. § 81.17 there can 
be neither joint, nor primary liability, on the part of a 
municipality, if any person or private corporation is liable.8  
¶36 Accordingly, 
we 
hold 
that 
application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 bars any recovery against the City.  Since 
the jury found Keller liable, he is primarily liable and 
consequently, the City may not be held to pay the remaining 
amount of the jury award where, as here, an injured plaintiff 
enters into a Pierringer release with the defendant, Keller, who 
                                                 
8 VanCleve argues here, like the parties argued in Weis, 
that this is a case among joint tort-feasors.  Weis v. A.T. 
Hipke & Sons, Inc., 271 Wis. 140, 144, 72 N.W.2d 715 (1955).  We 
rejected 
that 
argument 
in 
Weis because Wis. Stat. § 81.17 
establishes successive liability.  Id. 
No. 
01-0231   
 
17 
 
is primarily liable under the statute. Since Keller was 
dismissed from the action, no judgment can be rendered against 
Keller, and no execution can issue and be returned unsatisfied.  
III.  EFFECT OF PIERRINGER RELEASE ON AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
¶37 Next, in addressing the second issue of whether the 
City waived its affirmative defenses, VanCleve takes the 
position that that the City's failure to object to the 
Pierringer release waived its statutory affirmative defenses 
under Wis. Stat. § 81.17.  We disagree.  This argument fails to 
consider that there was no legal basis for the City to make such 
an objection.  See Unigard Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 
184 Wis. 2d 78, 87 n.5, 516 N.W. 2d 762 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding 
"[a] non-settling tort-feasor has no control over a claimant's 
decision to settle with another tort-feasor"); and Johnson v. 
Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 297, 243 N.W. 2d 815 (1976) (holding "no 
objection [by the third party] could be raised to the fact that 
the plaintiff and a joint tort-feasor defendant were exercising 
the option approved by Pierringer").  Moreover, this argument 
incorrectly assumes, without citing to authority, that the City 
has the burden of objecting to a Pierringer release. 
¶38 Generally, the rule is that a joint tort-feasor has a 
right to contribution from another tort-feasor for any sums the 
first 
tort-feasor 
is 
obligated 
to 
pay 
a 
plaintiff 
in 
satisfaction 
of 
the 
second's 
liability. 
 
Fleming 
v. 
Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 131 Wis. 2d 123, 130, 388 N.W.2d 
908 (1986).   
No. 
01-0231   
 
18 
 
¶39 However, as previously noted, a Pierringer release, in 
effect, limits a second joint tort-feasor's liability to the 
amount reflecting its proportion of wrongdoing.9  Id.  Stated 
differently, a Pierringer release operates to impute to the 
settling 
plaintiff 
whatever 
liability 
in contribution the 
settling defendant may have to non-settling defendants and to 
bar subsequent contribution actions the non-settling defendants 
might assert against the settling defendants.  Pierringer, 21 
Wis. 2d at 193. 
¶40 In Pierringer, 
the 
settling 
defendant 
moved for 
summary judgment to dismiss a cross-claim of a non-settling 
defendant for contribution, after it entered into a Pierringer 
release with the plaintiff.  We held that as long as the causal, 
comparative and contributory negligence of all the relevant 
parties is determined by the jury, there is no requirement that 
a settling defendant remain a party to the suit.  Pierringer, 21 
Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106. 
¶41 According to our decision in Pierringer, the non-
settling tort-feasor has no control over a claimant's decision 
to settle with another tort-feasor.  Id.  See also, Unigard, 184 
Wis. 2d 78 at 87 n.5.   
¶42 In Johnson, a passenger in a car sued the driver and 
her insurance company, American Family Insurance. American 
Family then filed a third-party complaint against State Farm for 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that the rules with regard to joint and 
several liability have been changed by recent amendments to 
Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1). 
No. 
01-0231   
 
19 
 
contribution. State Farm insured the driver of a car that rear-
ended the car the plaintiff rode in.  In Johnson, the plaintiff 
entered into a Pierringer release with State Farm over American 
Family's objection.  Johnson, 73 Wis. 2d at 294-95.  The trial 
court 
approved 
the 
settlement 
agreement. 
On 
appeal, 
we 
recognized that it was harmless error for the trial court to 
approve the settlement agreement.  Id.  The plaintiff did not 
have a right to settle with State Farm because there was no 
direct claim against State Farm.  Id. at 297.  However, the 
error was harmless, because the parties could have taken steps 
to place themselves in a direct adversary position.  Id. at 298.  
The court reasoned that had State Farm "been an initial party 
defendant . . . no objection could be raised to the fact that 
the plaintiff and a joint tort-feasor defendant were exercising 
the option approved by Pierringer.  The settlement of the claim 
against a defendant under those circumstances requires that he 
be dismissed from the action."  Id. at 297. 
¶43 Applying the rules of Pierringer and Johnson to the 
present case, the City did not have standing to object to the 
release, since pursuant to the terms, VanCleve assumed all of 
Keller's potential liability.  Furthermore, it is clear from the 
rules set forth above, a non-settling tort-feasor has no control 
over a claimant's decision to settle with another tort-feasor.   
See also Unigard, 184 Wis. 2d at 87 n.5.   
¶44 Therefore, since VanCleve and Keller were direct 
adversaries, any attempt by the City to object to the Pierringer 
release would have been unsuccessful.  
No. 
01-0231   
 
20 
 
¶45 Consequently, we reject VanCleve's argument that the 
City waived its statutory affirmative defenses by failing to 
object to the Pierringer release.  We approve of the court of 
appeals' approach, which held that the non-settling City, 
claiming secondary liability as an affirmative defense, was not 
required to object to a Pierringer release to retain its 
affirmative defense.10  VanCleve fails to cite any authority 
which places the burden of objecting to the release upon the 
non-settling tort-feasor in a successive liability case.   
IV.  EFFECT OF STIPULATION AND DISMISSAL ORDER ON 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
¶46 Next, VanCleve argues that the City's failure to 
object to the Stipulation and Order of Dismissal, thereby 
dismissing its cross-claims, waived its assertion that it was 
not primarily liable under this action.  
¶47 We disagree.  The failure to object to the Stipulation 
and Order of Dismissal is not a waiver of affirmative defenses, 
since it does not resolve any of the claims between VanCleve and 
the City.  This is supported by the fact that the Stipulation 
and 
Order 
failed 
to 
mention 
any 
affirmative 
defense. 
Additionally, VanCleve neglects to cite authority, and we have 
uncovered none, that supports the contention that in dismissing 
                                                 
10 The court of appeals correctly pointed out that "[i]t is 
VanCleve's 
responsibility 
to 
evaluate 
the 
effects 
of 
a 
Pierringer release and to determine whether the release is in 
her best interests."  VanCleve, 250 Wis. 2d 121, ¶32.   
No. 
01-0231   
 
21 
 
the cross-claim against Keller, the City waived its affirmative 
defense under Wis. Stat. § 81.17.  (Def.-Appellant Br. at 16).  
¶48 The 
City's cross-claim for 
contribution and its 
affirmative defenses are two distinct parts of the pleadings 
according to Wis. Stat. § 802.01(1). We have previously held 
that a writing must contain an express statement waiving a 
statutory affirmative defense before a court should find waiver.  
Gonzalez v. City of Franklin, 137 Wis. 2d 109, 132-133, 403 
N.W.2d 747, 756 (1987). Here, the City simply acquiesced in the 
dismissal, 
consistent 
with 
our 
decisions 
in 
Johnson 
and 
Pierringer, which stated that no objection could be raised, and 
that 
dismissal 
of 
the 
released 
defendant 
was 
required. 
Additionally, the City's cross-claim against Keller was a 
standard 
cross-claim 
for 
indemnification 
and 
contribution.  
Therefore, because the failure to object to the Stipulation and 
Order of Dismissal did not resolve any of the claims between 
VanCleve and the City, there was no waiver of an affirmative 
defense.  
¶49 Ultimately, the City's ability to object to Keller's 
dismissal was eliminated when a Pierringer release had been 
signed by VanCleve releasing Keller.  Johnson, 73 Wis. 2d at 
296-297; Pierringer, 21 Wis. 2d 182.  As a result, we hold that 
the City did not waive its assertion that it was not primarily 
liable, when it failed to object to the Stipulation and Order of 
Dismissal. 
V.  PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENT 
No. 
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22 
 
¶50 Lastly, VanCleve raises a public policy argument that 
a ruling in favor of the City would stifle settlement of 
personal injury claims.  VanCleve maintains that the application 
of Wis. Stat. § 81.17 does not promote settlement, and is 
contrary to Wisconsin's abrogation of governmental immunity 
pursuant to the decision in Holytz.  However, it is a well- 
settled rule that if the language of a statute is clear and 
unambiguous, the court must not look beyond the statutory 
language to ascertain the statute's meaning.  Only when 
statutory 
language 
is 
ambiguous 
may 
we 
examine 
other 
construction aids such as legislative history, context, and 
subject matter.  State v. Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d 18, 24, 386 N.W.2d 
47 (1986).  As previously noted, the statutory language of 
§ 81.17 is unambiguous.  Therefore, we agree with the court of 
appeals that "[c]onsiderations of public policy cannot trump an 
unambiguous statute."  VanCleve v. City of Marinette, 2002 WI 
App 10, 250 Wis. 2d 121, 639 N.W.2d 792 (citing Kelly Co. v. 
Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 247, 493 N.W.2d 68 (1992)).   
¶51 The 
application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 
should 
not 
stifle future 
settlement 
agreements, 
because 
parties 
have 
adequate notice of the risks involved in entering into such 
settlements.  Given the clear statutory language of § 81.17 and 
our previous decisions, it is incumbent upon the party entering 
into a Pierringer release to be aware of the risks associated 
with 
such 
an 
agreement 
and 
make 
settlement 
decisions 
accordingly. 
No. 
01-0231   
 
23 
 
¶52 Hence, VanCleve's public policy arguments are not 
persuasive in the context of an unambiguous statute.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
¶53 In summary, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 81.17, the effect 
of entering into a valid Pierringer agreement is that VanCleve 
is barred from any recovery against the City.  The critical 
language of § 81.17 has remained unchanged since 1898, and has 
been clearly and consistently interpreted by this court.  
Section 81.17 clearly establishes successive liability between a 
person or a private corporation who is, under the statute, 
primarily liable, and a municipality, who is deemed to be 
secondarily liable.  Therefore, a municipality may not be held 
responsible to pay the remaining amount of the jury award, when 
an injured plaintiff enters into a Pierringer release with the 
defendant (here Keller) who is primarily liable under the 
statute.  Section 81.17 provides that judgment against a 
municipality is not enforceable until execution has been issued 
against 
the 
party 
found 
primarily 
liable 
and 
returned 
unsatisfied.  Since VanCleve has not obtained, and cannot 
obtain, a judgment against Keller, no execution can issue and be 
returned unsatisfied, and, therefore, VanCleve cannot enforce a 
judgment against the City. 
¶54 Next, because there was no legal basis for the City to 
object to the Pierringer release, we hold that the City did not 
waive any statutory affirmative defense by failing to object to 
the Pierringer release.  
No. 
01-0231   
 
24 
 
¶55 For similar reasons, we hold that the City did not 
waive its assertion that it was not primarily liable in this 
action, by failing to object to the Stipulation and Order of 
Dismissal.  The Order of Dismissal did not resolve any claims 
between the City and VanCleve, and the City's ability to object 
was eliminated when the Pierringer release was signed by 
VanCleve.  
¶56 Finally, 
we 
hold 
that 
VanCleve's 
public 
policy 
arguments fail, because we have previously held that public 
policy considerations cannot trump unambiguous statutes. As 
noted before, VanCleve's argument that the application of 
Wis. Stat. § 81.17 as applied here will stifle future settlement 
agreements ignores the clear statutory history of § 81.17 and 
our previous decisions applying the statute.  Parties should 
have adequate notice of the risks involved in entering into 
settlements, and it is incumbent upon the party entering into a 
Pierringer release to be aware of the risks associated with such 
an agreement and make settlement decisions accordingly.  If we 
adopt VanCleve's policy argument, we would, in essence, abrogate 
the intent of § 81.17 and render the statute meaningless.   
¶57 For the reasons set forth herein, the decision of the 
court of appeals is affirmed.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
01-0231   
 
 
 
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