Case Title: City of Evanston v. Griffith

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
City of Evanston v. Griffith1986 WY 76715 P.2d 1381Case Number: 85-103Decided: 03/21/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
CITY OF EVANSTON, 
WYOMING, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; TOWN OF LYMAN, WYOMING, A MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION; TOWN OF MOUNTAIN VIEW, WYOMING, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; AND UINTA 
COUNTY, WYOMING, A BODY POLITIC; AND STATE OF WYOMING EX REL., CITY OF EVANSTON, 
WYOMING, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; TOWN OF LYMAN, WYOMING, A MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION; TOWN OF MOUNTAIN VIEW, WYOMING, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; AND UINTA 
COUNTY, WYOMING, A BODY POLITIC, PETITIONERS/RELATORS AND 
PLAINTIFFS,

v.

JAMES B. GRIFFITH, 
AUDITOR OF THE STATE OF WYOMING AND STAN SMITH, TREASURER OF THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS.

Mark W. Harris, 
Evanston (argued), for City of Evanston.

Thomas F. 
Mealey, Evanston, for Town of Lyman.

Bruce R. 
Barnard, Evanston, for Town of Mountain View, and Larry M. Donovan, Evanston, for 
UintaCounty.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Mary B. Guthrie, Senior 
Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for 
respondents/defendants.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE,* ROONEY,[fn**] BROWN, and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

[fn**] Retired 
November 30, 1985.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case was certified 
to this court from the district court pursuant to Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P. It 
involves a decision by the state auditor and treasurer to withhold impact 
assistance funds from the City of Evanston. We must decide whether those funds 
must be paid under §§ 39-6-411(c) and 39-6-512(d), W.S. 1977 (May 1985 
Replacement) even though the industrial facility to which the funds relate did 
not receive a permit until after construction commenced. We hold that the funds 
must be disbursed.

[¶2.]     On August 7, 1981, 
Amoco Production Company began construction of a natural gas processing facility 
in UintaCounty. Amoco failed to 
obtain a permit before commencing construction as required by § 35-12-106(a), 
W.S. 1977 of the Industrial Development Information and Siting Act.1

[¶3.]     Amoco finally applied 
to the Office of Industrial Siting Administration for a permit on July 13, 1983. 
An evidentiary hearing was held before the Industrial Siting Council (Council) 
and, on March 12, 1984, the Council issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and an order granting Amoco the permit. In its fourth conclusion of law, the 
Council created a retroactive date for the permit:

"As a result of the 
construction commencing on the central production facility pursuant to Air 
Quality Permit No. CT-391 on August 7, 1981, the Council concludes that the 
permit issued in this matter shall be effective as of August 7, 1981, and that 
the permit conditions established by this Order shall be effective as of the 
date of execution of this Order and the permit."

[¶4.]     The permit itself also 
included the retroactive date:

"This permit is issued 
effective August 7, 1981, and shall remain in force throughout the useful life 
of the facility. The conditions and stipulations of this permit shall become 
effective as of the date of execution hereof."

[¶5.]     The decision of the 
Council was not appealed or collaterally attacked by the State. Instead, this 
dispute arose when the City of Evanston requested the state treasurer to pay 
impact assistance funds to the City based on the August 7, 1981 commencement of 
plant construction. The treasurer paid the impact assistance monies that accrued 
after March 12, 1984, the date upon which the Council issued the Amoco permit, 
but refused to make payments covering the period from August 7, 1981 to March 
12, 1984. The City filed a claim for $3,201,511.82, the amount withheld, and the 
treasurer formally denied it. 

[¶6.]     The City next attempted 
to compel payment by filing in district court a combined petition for a writ of 
mandamus, petition for review and complaint requesting declaratory judgment.2 The court held a hearing and 
decided that the case should be certified directly to this court under Rule 
12.09, W.R.A.P., which states:

"If after such review, 
the district court concludes the matter to be appropriate for determination by 
the Supreme Court, the district court may certify the case to the Supreme 
Court."3

PLAIN 
MEANING

[¶7.]     The two statutes at 
issue in this case, §§ 39-6-411(c) and 39-6-512(d), W.S. 1977 (May 1985 
Replacement), are part of the sales and use tax distribution structure.4 They create a mechanism by which 
extraordinary sales and use tax revenues collected during boom times are 
returned to the counties of collection for impact assistance. Both statutes are 
identical in their relevant terms, providing:

"If any person commences 
after the effective date of this act to construct an industrial facility, as 
that term is defined in W.S. 35-12-102(a), under a permit issued pursuant to 
W.S. 35-12-106, * * * the state treasurer shall thereafter pay to the county 
treasurer * * * impact assistance payments from the monies available under W.S. 
39-6-411(b)(i) [or W.S. 39-6-512(b)(i)]."

[¶8.]     The State contends that 
the state treasurer is not authorized to make payments under these statutes for 
construction that takes place before a permit has actually been issued. 
According to the State, construction does not commence "under a permit issued 
pursuant to W.S. 35-12-106" just because a permit is eventually issued with an 
effective date covering the entire construction period.

[¶9.]     The City, on the other 
hand, argues that construction commences "under a permit issued pursuant to W.S. 
35-12-106" as long as a permit is eventually issued and dated to correspond to 
the actual commencement of construction. The City claims, in effect, that the 
status of a project is not frozen at the time construction takes place. Its 
status as permitted or unpermitted can be retroactively changed by the issuance 
of a permit that relates back to the date of actual 
construction.

[¶10.]  It is clear from these arguments that the 
key statutory clause is, "under a permit issued pursuant to W.S. 35-12-106." We 
must decide whether construction of Amoco's natural gas processing plant was 
commenced "under a permit issued pursuant to W.S. 35-12-106" although the 
retroactively dated permit was issued after the actual commencement of 
construction.

[¶11.]  Ironically, both parties argue that the 
statute is so clear that we need not resort to any rules of statutory 
construction. They both implore us to interpret the statute according to 
contradictory "plain meanings." We do not believe that the statute is as clear 
as the parties claim.

[¶12.]  We think that the critical phrase of the 
statute is ambiguous because it is "uncertain and susceptible to more than one 
meaning." Attletweedt v. State, Wyo., 684 P.2d 812, 814 (1984). The statute 
does not tell us under what circumstances construction should be held to have 
commenced under a permit issued pursuant to § 35-12-106. Perhaps it commences 
"under a permit" only if the permit is issued before-hand. Perhaps, on the other 
hand, construction has commenced "under a permit" as long as the permit is dated 
to correspond to the first day of actual construction. We must turn to the 
applicable rules of statutory construction to make that determination. 
Attletweedt v. State, supra, at 814.

STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION

"In construing statutes, 
legislative intent is the primary consideration. If the language is sufficiently 
clear, there is no need to resort to rules of construction. When the language is 
not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief the statute was 
intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public 
policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other prior and contemporaneous 
facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted rules of construction to 
ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and consistent." State ex rel. 
Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, Wyo., 
674 P.2d 732, 736 (1983).

[¶13.]  The aids to construction outlined in 
Holtz, supra, are not always helpful because we do not have published 
legislative debates, committee reports and other legislative materials at our 
disposal in this state. In the case at bar, however, we do have the luxury of a 
comprehensive act, closely related to the statutes at issue, to which we can 
turn.

[¶14.]  The Industrial Development Information 
and Siting Act (Siting Act) was passed by the legislature in 1975 and has been 
amended several times since its passage. The statutory subsections at issue in 
this case, while not passed as one of these amendments, are nevertheless linked 
to the Siting Act because they refer explicitly to Siting Act provisions. Both 
§§ 39-6-411(c) and 39-6-512(d) apply when "industrial facilit[ies]" as "defined 
in W.S. 35-12-102(a)" are constructed and when permits are "issued pursuant to 
W.S. 35-12-106." We will rely heavily on the Siting Act in our analysis 
because

"[a]ll statutes relating 
to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be read as 
constituting one law, and, where possible, should be harmoniously construed in 
order to avoid conflicting and confusing results." Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 
Inc., Wyo., 
568 P.2d 908, 913 (1977).

[¶15.]  The Siting Act is designed to protect 
Wyoming's 
environment and the social and economic fabric of its communities from the 
mischiefs resulting from massive, unregulated industrial development. Industrial 
Siting Council of Wyoming v. Chicago and North Western Transportation Company, 
Wyo., 660 P.2d 776, 784 (1983); L. MacDonnell, Regulating Socioeconomic Impacts: 
Comparing the Colorado and Wyoming Approaches, 20 Land & Water L.Rev. 193, 
202-203 (1985); J. Van Baalen, Industrial Siting Legislation: The Wyoming Industrial 
Development Information and Siting Act - Advance or Retreat?, 11 Land & 
Water L.Rev. 27, 99-100 (1976). One way to provide the needed protection is to 
force developers to mitigate impacts through the construction of physical 
facilities such as housing, schools, or sewers. Developers can also be forced to 
grant financial aid directly to the communities impacted. Section 35-12-114, 
W.S. 1977, allows the Council to condition the issuance of an industrial siting 
permit on a developer's agreement to finance needed mitigation measures. The 
Council has employed this mechanism, often at the suggestion of local community 
leaders. L. MacDonnell, supra, at 205.

[¶16.]  The statutes at issue in this case, §§ 
39-6-411(c) and 39-6-512(d), are also mitigation measures and should be 
interpreted to advance the same purposes as the mitigation mechanisms in the 
Siting Act itself. But, it is hard to see how the impact assistance funding 
statutes can be given the State's interpretation and still help communities 
mitigate impacts.5 Funds are necessary to finance 
mitigation measures, such as roads, sewers, schools, and additional police 
protection when a large project is constructed, regardless of when the Council 
graces the developer with a permit. Yet, according to the State, the community 
must forfeit impact assistance funds until a permit is issued. We think the 
City's interpretation of the impact assistance statutes is far more likely to 
cure the mischiefs at which the statutes are aimed. When the Council grants a 
permit which is retroactively dated to the first day of construction, that 
construction should be held to have commenced "under a permit" and the state 
treasurer should pay impact assistance funds covering the entire period during 
which construction was "under a permit."

[¶17.]  The State contends that neither the City 
of Evanston, 
Amoco, nor the Council attempted to apply the permitting process before 
construction because they did not think the plant would fall under the Siting 
Act's jurisdictional provisions.6 In its brief, the State 
argues:

"[T]he strong inference 
must be drawn that no one thought the facility was a project which came under 
the jurisdiction of the Siting Council, or perhaps a cynic could conclude that 
Amoco preferred not having to comply with the standards of the Industrial Siting 
Council. Consequently, it could be argued that if the project was not subject to 
any of the Council's requirements and scrutiny, then financed benefits should 
[not] flow to the entities in UintaCounty. If Amoco was not subject to the 
`pervasive' regulatory requirements of the Industrial Siting Act, then the 
legislative message is that no impact assistance funds should be distributed to 
political subdivisions in UintaCounty."

[¶18.]  We find the State's proposed 
interpretation to be both unreasonable and inconsistent with the general purpose 
of the Siting Act. The State is essentially saying that a community waives its 
right to impact assistance if the community leaders mistakenly assume that the 
project falls outside the Act. The State is also saying that a community should 
lose its impact funds if an industry tries to avoid the Act's requirements. It 
is impossible to square these contentions with the purpose of impact 
assistance.

[¶19.]  While it is true that the legislature 
intended the impact assistance statutes to benefit only communities impacted by 
facilities above a certain minimum size, it does not follow that those benefits 
should be withheld based on the developer's or the community's initial 
projections. Benefits should be linked to the actual size of the project because 
the actual size, not the apparent size, controls the level of community 
impact.

[¶20.]  There is nothing in the Act which 
indicates that the legislature wanted to withhold benefits from impacted 
communities based on pre-project assumptions. Section 35-12-119(a)(i), W.S. 1977 
(May 1985 Replacement), which penalizes developers who proceed without a permit, 
does not punish the communities who are impacted by unauthorized projects. 
Instead, this penal provision benefits impacted communities by forcing 
developers to comply with the Act's many permitting requirements that protect 
target communities. We think that §§ 39-6-411(c) and 39-6-512(d), W.S. 1977 (May 
1985 Replacement) should be interpreted consistently with the general protective 
purpose of the Siting Act. We would be ignoring this legislative purpose if we 
interpreted these statutes to punish a community just because a developer fails 
to obtain a permit.

[¶21.]  One additional rule of statutory 
construction set forth in State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, supra, 
674 P.2d  at 736, is:

"When the language [of a 
statute] is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to * * * the 
historical setting surrounding its enactment * * *."

The historical 
setting surrounding the enactment of §§ 39-6-411(c) and 39-6-512(d) in 1981 
supports our construction of those statutes. Wyoming Session Laws 1981, ch. 145, § 1. At 
the time of enactment, Wyoming was undergoing an energy development 
boom, and communities were staggering under heavy impacts caused by increased 
construction. It is likely that the legislature intended these statutes to be 
construed broadly and flexibly so that communities would obtain the financing 
necessary to mitigate impacts. We doubt that the legislature intended that funds 
be withheld in the face of actual impact simply because the Council issued a 
late permit.

[¶22.]  Our holding should not produce any of the 
dire consequences raised by the State and the dissent. The Council was not 
required to issue a permit, much less a retroactive permit, in this case. In 
addition, the office of Industrial Siting Administration (Office) could have 
sought an injunction to prevent plant operation or could have fined Amoco up to 
$10,000 per day for its failure to get a permit in advance of construction. 
These remedies are sufficient to protect the permitting requirement without 
penalizing the citizens who live in impacted communities. No developer would 
knowingly risk large sums of money on a project if that project might be 
enjoined from operation or saddled with a fine of $10,000 per day. And, most 
developers will seek a permit prior to construction because additional 
requirements by other governmental agencies are barred after a permit is issued. 
Section 35-12-116, W.S. 1977.

[¶23.]  It is hard to see how penalizing the City 
of Evanston and 
its citizens would strengthen the permitting requirement. The developer, not the 
City, must apply for the permit and the Council, not the City, must decide 
whether it should issue. If a developer proceeds without a permit, it is the 
Office, not the City, that is empowered to initiate statutory sanctions.7 Finally, the Siting Act does not 
require cities to conduct independent investigations into industrial projects or 
to withhold local zoning or land use approval when the state requirements are 
violated. The City of Evanston can hardly be faulted for its failure 
to somehow enforce the permitting requirement in this case when the Council 
decided that the belated permit should be issued and the Office decided that the 
statutory violations should be overlooked.8 

[¶24.]  There is one final issue that we mention 
only in passing. The State argues in its brief that the auditor has an 
independent duty to look into state expenditures to make sure that they comply 
with statute. The City responds that neither the auditor nor treasurer can 
withhold payments that have been authorized by another state agency, in this 
case the Council. We need not address this issue because, under our 
interpretation of the critical statutes, the disputed funds are properly payable 
to the City of Evanston and must be 
paid.

[¶25.]  Remanded to the district court for entry 
of an order consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 35-12-106(a), 
W.S. 1977, states in part:

"No person shall commence 
to construct a facility, as defined in this act, in the state without first 
having obtained a permit issued with respect to such facility by the [Industrial 
Siting] council."

If a person violates the 
permitting requirement, he is subject to civil penalties of up to $10,000 and 
further construction can be enjoined. Section 35-12-119(b) and (d), W.S. 
1977.

There is no dispute in 
this case that the gas processing plant was an industrial facility that had to 
be permitted under the Act and that Amoco could have been fined or enjoined from 
further construction; but, no fine was ever levied and no injunction 
sought.

2 It was proper for the 
City to file for these forms of relief from agency inaction under Rule 12.12, 
W.R.A.P., which states:

"The relief, review, or 
redress available * * * in actions for a declaratory judgment of rights, status, 
or legal relations based on administrative action or inaction, in actions for 
mandamus to compel administrative action * * * shall be available by independent 
action notwithstanding any petition for review filed."

3 This case is properly 
before us under Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P. The petition for review was filed within 
the 30-day time limit of Rule 12.04, W.R.A.P., and the district court held a 
hearing on the petition before deciding that the matter was appropriate for 
certification. We note that appellant's alternative claims for mandamus and 
declaratory relief joined with his petition for review may not be properly 
certifiable to this court under Rule 12.09 which seems to restrict certification 
to petitions for review. In any event, the case was properly certified on the 
petition for review, and our determination on that petition will be conclusive 
of the issues raised in the alternative claims for mandamus and declaratory 
relief.

4 Sections 39-6-411(c) and 
39-6-512(d) were added to the sales and use tax structures in 1981 and amended 
in 1983 and 1985, but none of the portions crucial to this appeal have changed. 
Wyoming Session Laws 1981, ch. 145, § 1; 
Wyoming 
Session Laws 1983, ch. 184, § 1. The 1981 versions began with the word 
"whenever" rather than the word "if," an insignificant difference in context. We 
will refer to the 1985 version in this opinion even though the case arose under 
its predecessors.

5 The dissenters quote the 
Council's findings of fact to show that the City of Evanston will receive a 
windfall if the treasurer is forced to pay the sales and use tax revenues. But, 
it is hard to see how the findings quoted by the dissenters support that 
conclusion. If anything is shown by the Council's findings, it is that the City 
felt it needed the sales and use funds to mitigate impacts. In finding number 
11(e)(2), quoted by the dissent, the City and Amoco agreed that "[t]here may be 
future needs related to [the project]." And in finding number 11(e)(3), the City 
and Amoco identified many specific areas of current need created by population 
growth which was, in turn, attributable to an influx of project workers. 
Finally, the City stated that it was not asking for any assistance from the 
Council "other than through Amoco's 
participation in OIA and the sales and use tax paid to the State for impact 
assistance since August, 1981 * * *." Instead of showing that payment of the 
sales and use revenues would create a windfall, this final statement in the 
agreement between the City and Amoco shows that the City needed and expected the 
very funds withheld by the state treasurer.

6 Industrial facilities 
are defined in § 35-12-102(a)(iii), W.S. 1977, as those facilities above certain 
energy generating or conversion capacities or above certain estimated 
construction costs.

7 Section 35-12-119, W.S. 
1977, creates a somewhat vague procedure for enforcement of sanctions against 
developers who fail to obtain permits before they begin construction. The 
statute does not say who decides when statutory fines should be imposed, but it 
does indicate that violations ripe for injunctive relief should be identified by 
the Office and referred to the attorney general. As one might expect, the 
attorney general brings the actual civil actions when 
necessary.

8 The dissenters argue 
that there is no statutory authority which allows the Council to issue a permit 
with a retroactive date. We disagree. Section 35-12-114(d), W.S. 1977, gives the 
Council broad authority to set commencement times on its construction permits. 
It states in part:

"If the council decides 
to grant a permit for the facility, it shall issue the permit embodying the 
terms and conditions in detail, including 
the time specified to commence construction, which time shall be determined 
by the council's decision as to the reasonable capability of the local 
government, most substantially affected by the proposed facility, to implement 
the necessary procedures to alleviate the impact." (Emphasis 
added.)

The only 
statutory limit on the Council's power to set a commencement time in its permit 
is the requirement that impacted local governments be given a chance to 
alleviate impacts. Ironically, the dissenters' narrow interpretation of this 
statute would penalize the very local governments that the statute was designed 
to protect. We think the statute can be fairly interpreted to provide ample 
authority for the issuance of a retroactive permit.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom ROONEY, Justice, joins.

[¶26.]  Reluctantly, I must dissent from the 
disposition of this case according to the majority opinion. I have concluded 
that what undoubtedly must be a popular result involves the institution of bad 
policy. The only way to avoid that unfortunate result that I am able to discern 
is to uphold the position of the state auditor and state 
treasurer.

[¶27.]  Because of the perceived inequity of the 
circumstances insofar as local government is concerned, the following quotation 
of the findings of fact by the Industrial Siting Council (hereinafter Council in 
accordance with § 35-12-102(a)(ii), W.S. 1977) is 
pertinent:

"11. e. The Council finds 
that the City of Evanston agreed with Amoco as 
follows:

"(1) There are no 
currently identified unmet needs related to the Anschutz Ranch East in Evanston;

"(2) There may be future 
needs related to Anschutz Ranch East in Evanston;

"(3) There are current 
needs related to population growth and demographic change in Evanston that have not 
been resolved. Specifically the following have been identified: (a) water 
development, (b) fire department satellite facility and equipment, (c) computer 
management system, (d) water, sewer, and transportation planning, (e) 
development of undeveloped park lands, (f) storm water master plan 
implementation, (g) redevelopment and implementation of urban renewal plan, (h) 
expansion of city hall, (i) completion of implementation of management 
system;

"(4) The City of 
Evanston is not 
at this time, other than through Amoco's participation in the OIA and the sales 
and use tax paid to the State for impact assistance since August, 1981, asking 
for any assistance from the ISC as a result of the Anschutz Ranch East permit 
application."

This agreement 
apparently concedes no impact prior to the hearing held in December of 
1983.

[¶28.]  While I agree that there does appear to 
be a parallel legislative purpose with respect to the impact assistance payments 
made from sales and use tax collected and with respect to the authority of the 
Council to require impact assistance from the developer of an industrial 
facility, I do note that in this instance the City of Evanston agreed with the 
developer that there had, as yet, been no impact in fact. The City did not 
request impact assistance directly from Amoco for prior impact. As the majority 
concedes, developers can be required to pay impact funds to the communities. 
Consequently, the claims of the City of Evanston for retroactive impact 
assistance payments under the tax portion of the statute appear to be designed 
to achieve a windfall for the City of Evanston rather than to compensate it for 
any otherwise unmet prior need.

[¶29.]  I have no difficulty in concluding that 
the statutory language in this instance is clear and unequivocal. It requires a 
person to commence to construct an industrial facility under a permit issued 
pursuant to statute. Amoco did not commence to construct an industrial facility 
under a permit issued pursuant to statute on August 7, 1981. It is clear from 
the record that the permit was issued March 12, 1984, and I am satisfied that 
for our purposes that was the date on which Amoco commenced to construct an 
industrial facility under a permit. In § 35-12-102(a)(viii), W.S. 1977, as 
amended (1985 Cum.Supp.), the following definition 
appears:

[¶30.]  "`Commence to construct' 
means:

"(a) Any clearing of 
land, excavation, construction or other action which would affect the 
environment of the site of any facility, * * *."

Construction 
subsequent to March 12, 1984, indeed could affect the environment of the site of 
this facility and consequently would meet the statutory definition of commence 
to construct although a permit application at that late date certainly would 
justify the invocation of the statutory penalties found in § 35-12-119, W.S. 
1977.

[¶31.]  It is provided in § 35-12-119, W.S. 1977 
that whenever the state office of industrial siting administration (hereinafter 
Office in accordance with § 35-12-102(a)(i), W.S. 1977) determines that a 
person, as defined in the statute, is violating any of the provisions of this 
section, it shall refer the matter to the attorney general for further action. 
In this instance that mandatory provision of the statute apparently was not 
followed, and it would appear that the Office and the Council pursued a 
settlement of the matter without involving the attorney general. The only 
purpose I can discern for the retrospective action in this instance is to 
inhibit the imposition of the fines and penalties provided in § 35-12-119, W.S. 
1977, and perhaps to preserve the impact assistance payments for the benefit of 
the City of Evanston and others.

[¶32.]  The majority of the court approves the 
retrospective action by the Council in the issuance of a permit. My reading of 
the Industrial Development Information Siting Act, §§ 35-12-101, et seq., W.S. 
1977, as amended, leads me to the conclusion that the legislature intended 
prospective action by the Council. The purpose and intent of this act is to 
require the study and consideration of certain statutory topics before, not 
after, the industrial facility is commenced. For example, § 35-12-114(c), 
allowing the Council to change the location, and § 35-12-108(a)(iii), requiring 
the applicant to estimate the commencement date, both contemplate that 
construction will begin after the permit is issued.

[¶33.]  This tacit approval of retrospective 
action by the Office and Council is not sound administrative 
law.

"The general rule is that 
only those powers expressly conferred by the legislature are granted to an 
administrative agency. McNeil v. Park County School District No. 1, Wyo., 635 P.2d  at 818 (1981); Tri-County Electric 
Association, Inc. v. City of Gillette, Wyo., 525 P.2d 3 (1974); Bruegman v. Johnson Ranches Inc., 
Wyo., 520 P.2d 489 (1974)." Brasel & Sims Construction Co., Inc. v. State Highway 
Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 655 P.2d 265, 267 (1983).

The majority 
disposition in this case not only supplies the authority to act retrospectively 
which is not explicitly afforded by statute to the Council, but it seems to 
approve action by the Office and the Council which the statute specifically 
ascribes to the office of the attorney general. The approval by this court of 
the retrospective action by the Council in this instance essentially permits a 
waiver of the statutory penalties by the Council and the Office, when those 
penalties and other remedies obviously are to be pursued and waived, if they are 
to be waived, by other state or county officials.

[¶34.]  My main difficulty with the majority 
position is that it adopts a legal fiction or perhaps more precisely a fiction 
of law structured by the Council. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) teaches 
that a legal fiction is an:

"Assumption of fact made 
by court as basis for deciding a legal question. A situation contrived by the 
law to permit a court to dispose of a matter, though it need not be created 
improperly; e.g. fiction of lost grant as basis for title by adverse 
possession." Id. at p. 804.

The same source 
defines a fiction of law as:

"An assumption or 
supposition of law that something which is or may be false is true, or that a 
state of facts exists which has never really taken place. An assumption, for 
purposes of justice, of a fact that does not or may not exist. A rule of law 
which assumes as true, and will not allow to be disproved, something which is 
false, but not impossible. Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 30 N.J. Eq. 531, 23 A.2d 607, 621.

"These assumptions are of 
an innocent or even beneficial character, and are made for the advancement of 
the ends of justice. They secure this end chiefly by the extension of procedure 
from cases to which it is applicable to other cases to which it is not strictly 
applicable, the ground of inapplicability being some difference of an immaterial 
character." Id. at p. 562, 23 A.2d 607.

I see the 
invocation of the legal fiction that the commencement of the construction of the 
industrial facility involved in this case was under a permit issued pursuant to 
the statute not as innocent or beneficial (except to the appellants) but fraught 
with peril in terms of the legislative intent relating to the proper functioning 
of the statutory scheme.

[¶35.]  I find the statutory language in this 
instance to be clear. It is clear from the record that in the absence of the 
invocation of a fiction of law, the statutory requirements were not met until 
March 12, 1984. I find it to be bad policy to encourage retrospective action by 
the Council. That encouragement can have only the effect of encouraging those 
who are developing industrial facilities to fail to comply with the statute and 
wait and see what happens. What happened in this case involves a usurpation by 
the Office and the Council of statutory prerogatives assigned to other 
officials. All of these effects, although concededly necessary to a popular and, 
some would claim equitable, result in this case are contrary to the legislative 
intent as I perceive it. I would uphold and confirm the position of the state 
auditor and state treasurer to the end that these unhappy policy effects would 
not receive the approval of this court.