Case Title: Dayton Bar Assn. v. Overman

Citation: 1996-Ohio-252

Docket Number: 19952139

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dayton Bar Association v. Overman. 
[Cite as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Overman (1996), ____ Ohio St.3d. _____.] 
Attorneys at law -- Misconduct -- Permanent disbarment -- Failure to 
maintain client funds in identifiable bank account -- Engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice -- Engaging in 
conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law -- Neglect of 
an entrusted legal matter -- Charging a clearly excessive fee -- 
Conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation -- 
Representation without adequate preparation. 
 
(No.  95-2139 -- Submitted February 6, 1996 -- Decided February 22, 1996.) 
 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 93-52. 
 
Relator, Dayton Bar Association, filed a complaint and amended complaint 
with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme 
Court (“board”), charging respondent, John Laurence Overman of Cincinnati, 
Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0044025, with numerous counts of professional 
misconduct. A panel appointed by the board heard the matter on July 25 and 26, 
and December 19 and 20, 1994. 
 
2
 
The panel found that respondent violated DR 9-102(A) (failure to maintain 
client funds in identifiable bank account) because he regularly deposited unearned 
fees in his personal savings or checking account. 
 
The panel found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6) (engaging 
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice and that adversely 
reflects on fitness to practice law) and 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of an entrusted legal 
matter) in representing Reba Hawkins during 1992.  Hawkins paid respondent 
$400 to defend her in a criminal matter pending in Franklin County Municipal 
Court.  The week before the scheduled trial, respondent advised Hawkins that the 
trial had been postponed and that she should contact him later about a new date.  
Hawkins grew concerned in the days that followed when she had no success in 
reaching respondent.  She later learned from court officials that her trial had not 
been postponed, and she appeared in court as scheduled.  Respondent did not 
appear on the trial date and also failed to appear a month later at a contempt 
hearing.  Hawkins appeared at the contempt proceedings and was so exasperated 
with respondent that she pleaded no contest to the charge against her.  Respondent 
later refused to refund Hawkins’s money, challenging her to sue him in small 
claims court.  Respondent finally returned Hawkins’s $400 in July 1994. 
 
3
 
The panel also found that respondent violated DR 2-106(A) (charging a 
clearly excessive fee) in representing Elvin Catlett, Jr. during 1993.  Respondent 
accepted $500 to obtain Catlett’s immediate release from a city jail.  When Catlett 
was not released promptly, he discharged respondent, who agreed to return the 
paid fee.  Respondent subsequently reconsidered, advising Catlett that he would 
retain some part of the fee as earned.  Respondent promised Catlett a letter that 
would account for the fee, but Catlett did not receive it.  Respondent also did not 
reply to a letter from another attorney who requested repayment on Catlett’s 
behalf.  Respondent ultimately repaid Catlett’s money in July 1994 -- several 
weeks prior to the panel hearing and more than two years after respondent 
received the fee. 
 
The panel further found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(6) in 
representing Terry L. Martin during 1993.  Martin paid respondent $800 to defend 
him in a criminal matter.  Respondent appeared at Martin’s arraignment, but he 
was fifteen minutes late for a subsequent pretrial conference.  For this and other 
reasons, Martin grew to suspect respondent’s commitment to his case, and he 
eventually discharged him.  Martin requested a $200 refund, as respondent had 
spent only three hours on the case, and respondent agreed to return at least that 
 
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amount.  In April 1993, respondent wrote Martin a $200 check, but stopped 
payment before Martin could cash it.  After months of stalling, respondent finally 
repaid Martin $200 in August 1993 and an additional $600 early in 1994. 
 
The panel found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct 
involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation) and (5) in representing 
clients before the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, 
during July 1993.  Respondent either forged or arranged to have forged two entries 
in different custody actions by photocopying a legitimate court order.  Respondent 
also prepared, notarized and filed an affidavit of indigence in one of these cases 
without the court’s permission, which is required by local rule. 
 
The panel also found that respondent filed at least one false affidavit of 
indigence in the Montgomery County Juvenile Court during 1992 and that he had 
thereby violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and (5).  Respondent filed the affidavit for a 
client who was not indigent and who had paid respondent to represent him in a 
change of custody proceeding.  Respondent falsely represented the client’s 
inability to afford counsel in order to “save” payment of court costs.  
 
The panel found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and 6-101(A)(3) 
in representing Daryle T. Wheeler.  In March 1993, respondent agreed to represent 
 
5
Wheeler in his divorce for a fee of $180.  Wheeler advised respondent that he did 
not know his wife’s whereabouts, but that he hoped to remarry soon and had set 
June 5, 1993 as the wedding date.  In preparing for his wedding, Wheeler 
attempted to obtain a marriage license with a document that respondent had given 
him for this purpose.  The marriage license bureau refused to issue the license.  
When Wheeler advised respondent, respondent called Wheeler’s pastor and 
suggested the pastor conduct a “mock wedding,” with the official wedding to be 
conducted after the divorce became final.  The pastor refused.  Then, in trying to 
obtain service on Wheeler’s wife, respondent proposed that the papers be sent to 
the wife’s last known address in Kansas City and, if she didn’t sign for them, that 
Wheeler encourage someone to forge her signature. 
 
Wheeler eventually obtained his divorce on his own by serving his wife by 
publication.  Respondent appeared in court when the divorce decree was issued.  
Wheeler’s divorce did not become final in time for his June 1993 wedding, 
however, and the event had to be canceled, costing Wheeler and his fiancee 
approximately $2,300. 
 
The panel further found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4), (5) and 
(6) in representing LaDonna Harris during 1993.  Harris paid respondent $280 to 
 
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represent her in the dissolution of her marriage.  Respondent directed Harris and 
her estranged husband to sign the dissolution paperwork in blank.  He later filled 
in false information about their employment and earnings. 
 
Respondent also agreed to obtain a restraining order for Harris for an 
additional fee of $80.  The day after Harris paid respondent for this service, she 
reconsidered the request and asked for an $80 refund.  On respondent’s 
instruction, Harris went to his office the next day to be repaid.  She waited for him 
for over an hour, but he did not appear.  Respondent also failed to refund her 
money after two more requests, one time advising her that the dissolution costs 
had been more than he had anticipated and that he actually owed her nothing. 
 
Respondent filed Harris’s dissolution action in April 1993. At a hearing on 
the dissolution, respondent misrepresented to a judge inquiring about child support 
that Harris was unemployed.  When Harris attempted to correct him and advise the 
judge that she was and had been employed, respondent told her to “be quiet.”  The 
judge rejected affidavits of income that respondent had filed with false 
information.  The panel specifically determined that respondent lied to the 
domestic relations court about the Harrises’ income.   
 
7
 
After the dissolution hearing, Harris tried many times to contact respondent, 
but had little success.  Respondent later sent a letter to Harrris accusing her of 
having used racial slurs and declaring his intention to withdraw as her counsel in 
the dissolution.  Respondent also threatened to report Harris to a civil liberties 
organization if she objected to his withdrawal.  Respondent filed his notice of 
withdrawal with the domestic relations court, but was subsequently found in 
contempt for filing a withdrawal request without the required court approval, for 
failing to file a decree in the Harris case, and for failing to appear at a show cause 
hearing on these issues.  Respondent eventually prepared the required decree and 
refunded the $80 Harris had requested earlier. 
 
The panel found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and(6) in 
representing Teresa A. Hamlin in a bankruptcy proceeding during 1993.  Hamlin 
paid respondent $300 on his representation that half the amount would pay his fee 
for filing the petition in bankruptcy and the other half would pay all court costs 
and expenses.  Hamlin provided respondent with her financial information and 
signed bankruptcy forms in May 1993.  In June, Hamlin advised respondent that a 
creditor had contacted her.  Respondent assured Hamlin that a petition had been 
filed and that her creditors would be notified of the bankruptcy.  However, other 
 
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creditors started contacting Hamlin, and she soon had to again alert respondent, 
who just told her not to worry.  On July 19, 1993, Hamlin met with respondent and 
received a copy of her bankruptcy petition, which had just been filed earlier that 
day.  In July, Hamlin also received from the bankruptcy court an “application and 
order to pay filing fee in installments” on which her signature had been placed 
without her authorization.  When Hamlin asked respondent about the forged 
signature, he evaded her question.  The panel specifically found that respondent 
falsified documents he filed in the bankruptcy court. 
 
The panel also found that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(2) [sic, (5)] and 
6-101(A)(2) (representation without adequate preparation) in representing Tonya 
Stoney in a divorce action during 1993.  Stoney testified in court that she had been 
employed since December 1992; however, court records revealed that she had 
signed an affidavit in 1993 indicating that she was unemployed.  Respondent had 
prepared the affidavit for Stoney’s signature, notarized it, and filed it on Stoney’s 
behalf.  At the hearing on Stoney’s divorce, respondent further failed to present 
corroborating witnesses as required by Civ. R.75(L), demonstrating to the court’s 
satisfaction that he was unaware of this requirement. 
 
9
 
Finally, the panel found that respondent committed two violations of DR 1-
102(A)(4) and another violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) in representing Susan Farthing 
during divorce proceedings in 1993.  Farthing paid respondent $380, which he 
represented to be the fees and costs for the entire proceeding.  Thereafter, 
respondent signed Farthing’s name on an affidavit of custody without her 
authority, notarized her forged signature, and filed the affidavit in court.  
Respondent also instructed Farthing to sign an affidavit of indigence, even though 
she was able to pay, and he directed her to sign a blank copy of an affidavit of 
income and expenses on which he later filled in false information.  The affidavit of 
custody and other papers were dated May 31, 1993, a date on which Farthing did 
not sign any documents.  The panel concluded that respondent had again filed 
falsified documents in court. 
 
The panel found little in the record to militate against imposition of a severe 
sanction for this misconduct.  Respondent graduated from law school in 1989 and 
was admitted to the practice of law in 1990, after passing the bar examination on 
his second attempt.  He has been a sole practioner nearly from the beginning, he 
employed a secretary intermittently, and he received most of his clients from a 
Yellow Pages advertisement.  Although respondent subpoenaed many judges and 
 
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referees to provide testimony or correspondence concerning his professional 
ability, the panel received only one letter that described respondent as competent 
and heard only one character witness.  That witness, a judge, told respondent, 
“There is the feeling that you really don’t know what you are doing.  That is the 
feeling of the court.” 
 
In addition, respondent testified to his perception that local bankruptcy, 
domestic relations, and juvenile courts were conspiring against him.  He filed at 
least fifteen ethics grievances against these judges or their staff members, usually 
for rulings or administrative decisions that he considered to be persecution.  In a 
motion filed with the board, respondent also accused one bankruptcy judge of 
having accepted a bribe from relator’s counsel to “fix” the court’s system for 
making judicial assignments as a means to further the counsel’s bankruptcy 
practice and defeat respondent’s business prospects.  Respondent had no evidence 
to substantiate this allegation.  Respondent further accused the bankruptcy judge 
of treating him and his clients unfairly because the judge was religiously and 
racially biased.  This accusation, too, was based purely on his speculation.1  
 
The panel received no evidence of substance abuse, and respondent denied 
mental illness.  Respondent submitted a doctor’s report confirming that he did not 
 
11
need psychiatric counseling and that “no clinical diagnosis was appropriate.”  
Respondent was also evaluated by a psychiatrist upon order of the board pursuant 
to Gov.Bar. R. V(7)(C) also evaluated respondent.  This psychiatrist essentially 
agreed with respondent’s physician, but added: 
 
“While there is no evidence of overt illness [in respondent], his behavior, 
his demeanor, and his history are indicative of a distortion of reality and inability 
to function in a socially acceptable and professional manner.” 
 
In reviewing this evidence, the panel summarized respondent’s misconduct 
as a “course of conduct” characterized by “(1) neglect of legal matters; (2) lying to 
clients and the courts; (3) being unable to get along with anyone and blaming his 
incompetence on others; and (4) being totally unable to practice law in any 
rational manner.”  The panel further observed that “[r]espondent has wreaked 
havoc on the legal system in and around Dayton, which might explain his 
relocation to Cincinnati.”  The panel concluded: 
 
“Unfortunately, Respondent began practicing law with no ‘mentoring’ and 
has really no idea about the proper practice of law.  We simply cannot allow 
Respondent to continue to practice law in this manner -- the actual and potential 
harm is too great.” 
 
12
 
The panel rejected the sanction recommended by relator, permanent 
disbarment, and instead recommended an indefinite suspension from the practice 
of law.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct; but recommended 
that respondent be permanently disbarred.  The board recommended disbarment 
“[i]n consideration of the number of disciplinary violations and Respondent’s 
complete inability to act as a lawyer without engaging in habitual acts of fraud and 
deceit resulting in repeated abuses of the judicial system * * *.” 
 
 John Paul Rieser, for relator. 
 
John Laurence Overman, pro se. 
 
Per Curiam.  Upon review of the record, we concur in the board’s findings 
of misconduct and agree with the recommended sanction.  Respondent is therefore 
ordered permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs taxed to 
respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, GLASSER, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and 
COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
13
 
GEORGE M. GLASSER, J., of the Sixth Appellate District, sitting for WRIGHT, 
J. 
                                          
 
1   Respondent’s testimony was marked by a number of other irrational 
perceptions.  One of the most bizarre was his suspicion that he was not wanted in 
bankruptcy court because he drove women away.  Respondent also thought that he 
was treated unfairly because his middle name was Linus.  He consequently 
changed his middle name to Laurence.