Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Robinson

Citation: 2010-Ohio-3829

Docket Number: 20092267

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Robinson, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3829.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3829 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. ROBINSON. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Robinson,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3829.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — One-year license suspension. 
(No. 2009-2267 — Submitted April 20, 2010 — Decided August 25, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-013. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, David Jerome Robinson of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0059369, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1992, 
and his attorney registration is currently inactive.  Based upon stipulations and 
findings that respondent violated four of the Rules of Professional Conduct by 
giving false and misleading testimony and destroying documents that had 
potential evidentiary value, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
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Discipline recommends that we suspend respondent’s license to practice law in 
Ohio for two years. 
{¶ 2} Respondent objects to the board’s findings and recommended 
sanction, arguing that his testimony was not willfully false, and therefore, he did 
not violate Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation), (d) (prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice), or (h) (prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects on a 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  Furthermore, he argues, Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(a) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from destroying or concealing a document with evidentiary 
value) applies only to attorneys serving as advocates and not to those acting in 
their personal capacity as parties to litigation.  Consequently, respondent asks that 
we find no violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and thus impose no 
sanction.  In the event that we do find a violation, respondent asks that we impose 
a sanction that does not involve an actual suspension from the practice of law. 
{¶ 3} For the reasons that follow, we overrule respondent’s objections 
and accept the board’s findings that respondent violated the ethical standards 
incumbent on Ohio lawyers.  However, we will follow the panel recommendation, 
rather than the board’s recommended sanction, and suspend respondent’s license 
to practice law for 12 months. 
Misconduct 
Findings of the Panel and Board 
{¶ 4} The parties have stipulated and the board has found that in 2000, 
respondent joined a Columbus law firm as a partner to develop the firm’s 
government-affairs practice.  When the firm formed a lobbying subsidiary in 
2005, respondent entered into an employment agreement that required him to 
keep all business information confidential during his employment and thereafter.  
In early 2007, respondent began to organize his campaign for elected office.  But 
he abandoned his effort in July of that year when the firm’s managing partner 
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presented respondent with a revised employment agreement with a lobbying 
subsidiary that would have required him to resign his firm partnership and stop 
practicing law. 
{¶ 5} Believing that his job was in jeopardy, respondent began to 
investigate employment opportunities with two other Columbus law firms.  He 
sought copies of a number of his firm’s documents, including client-billing 
reports for himself and another employee, engagement letters for current and 
former clients, and powerpoint presentations.  Respondent met with 
representatives of the two other firms and faxed a copy of his employment 
contract and a partially redacted copy of his current firm’s engagement letter to 
one of them.  After executing a confidentiality agreement with one of those firms 
on August 3, 2007, he disclosed detailed information about his clients and his 
client-billing reports. 
{¶ 6} On August 3 and 4, 2007, while the rest of his firm was on a retreat 
in Pennsylvania, respondent went to his office, where he packed and removed 
seven boxes of documents.  He took some of those boxes to his home and some to 
a second house that he was renovating, and he disposed of the rest in a dumpster 
at the renovation site. 
{¶ 7} The firm terminated respondent’s employment on August 14, 
2007.  The following day, he accepted a position as a partner, chairing the 
government-relations practice group, at the law firm to which he had not 
disclosed the confidential information.  On August 23, 2007, respondent’s former 
employer filed a civil complaint alleging that he had violated the nonsolicitation 
and nondisclosure covenant of his employment agreement.  The firm sought 
injunctive relief. 
{¶ 8} At his August 27, 2007 deposition, respondent testified that he had 
“made sure not to take any client files or client information” and stated that he 
“did not take any of the [lobbying subsidiary’s] business plans or marketing 
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information.”  He claimed that he did not recall taking anything related to the 
subsidiary, and when asked, “So in your possession today either at your house, in 
your car, or in this law firm or somewhere else, do you have in your possession 
any documentation that relates to [the subsidiary]?” he testified, “Again, not that 
I’m aware of.” 
{¶ 9} Just two days later, at a hearing on the firm’s complaint for 
injunctive relief, respondent testified, “[T]o the best of my knowledge, I did not 
take any business plans or marketing lists” from the firm.  He claimed that he 
could not give a complete list of what he did or did not have, but denied having 
taken business plans or “other materials that * * * would be sensitive to [the 
firm].”  He said that he did not “recall” taking any information relating to the firm 
or its lobbying subsidiary while investigating other employment opportunities.  
Though he admitted that he “might have” begun to clean out his office after he 
started looking for a new position, respondent could not recall whether he had 
done so in August or during the firm’s retreat. 
{¶ 10} At the August 29 hearing, respondent agreed that the firm’s e-mail 
list of customers and prospective customers is confidential and declared, “And 
that’s why I didn’t take it.”  When questioned about the copies of engagement 
letters that he had requested, respondent stated, “I know that I do not possess the 
engagement letters.  I know I never intended to use the engagement letters, you 
know, in any way to the use of confidential information.  Again to the best of my 
knowledge, I believe they’re in my office, but I can’t attest to that because again I 
had two hours to clear out my stuff, and I did not have adequate time to do any 
sort of inventory as to what was in my office and what was not.  So all I can really 
testify to is that I to the best of my knowledge don’t possess these engagement 
letters.”  However, on further questioning, he did admit that he had taken a 
redacted version of the engagement letter from the firm and had forwarded it to 
his new employer. 
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{¶ 11} The parties further stipulate that after respondent’s testimony, the 
court recessed for lunch, and respondent went to the courthouse cafeteria with his 
attorney.  Before leaving the cafeteria, respondent took his personal trial notebook 
into the men’s restroom, removed a firm report of his 2004-2007 billable hours, 
tore it up, and disposed of it in the restroom trash receptacle.  At the end of the 
day, he returned home and placed several boxes of firm documents in his car.  As 
he drove toward downtown Columbus, he stopped three times to tear up and 
dispose of confidential firm documents. 
{¶ 12} On September 6, 2007, the trial court granted an agreed temporary 
restraining order in favor of the firm and ordered respondent to provide the firm 
with all its confidential information that remained in respondent’s possession.  
The next day, respondent returned three boxes of materials, including his 2000 to 
2006 timesheets, economic-development papers, powerpoint presentations, and 
various documents related to training, lobbying, and client strategy. 
{¶ 13} Four days later, respondent self-reported his destruction of 
documents to both the firm and the court.  He later provided an inventory of the 
documents that he had destroyed on August 4 and August 29.  On September 20, 
2007, respondent testified at a second hearing on the firm’s complaint.  
Subsequently, the trial court granted the firm’s motion for injunctive relief. 
{¶ 14} The panel and board accepted the parties’ stipulations and noted 
that respondent’s misconduct occurred over a brief, three-month period and arose 
in the context of the contractual dispute with his firm rather than in the provision 
of legal services to clients.  However, they concluded that much of respondent’s 
August 27, 2007 deposition and August 29, 2007 hearing testimony regarding his 
removal and possession of firm documents was “misleading and false.”  They 
further observed that the potential evidentiary value of the documents was not 
only in their content, but in the fact that respondent possessed them and had 
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violated or intended to violate his contractual obligation by sharing them with 
others. 
{¶ 15} Based upon these stipulations and findings of fact, the panel and 
board found that respondent had made false statements under oath at his August 
27, 2007 deposition and at the August 29, 2007 hearing, thereby violating 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h).  They also concluded that respondent’s 
conduct in destroying documents having potential evidentiary value on the same 
date that he testified that he did not possess such documents violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(a). 
Respondent’s Objections 
Insufficient Evidence of Willful Violation 
{¶ 16} Respondent contends that he did not violate Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), 
8.4(d), or 8.4(h) because he testified truthfully, based upon his knowledge at the 
time of both his deposition and the preliminary-injunction hearing.  He argues that 
at the time of that testimony, he genuinely did not remember when he had 
removed documents from his office, what documents he had removed, or what 
documents had remained in his possession, despite the fact that he had removed 
seven boxes of material from his office less than four weeks earlier.  Moreover, he 
claims that he did not intend to conceal the documents, or the fact that he 
possessed them, from opposing counsel.  Therefore, he argues, even if his 
testimony was misleading, relator has failed to prove that he willfully violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4, and therefore, pursuant to Gov.Bar R. IV(1), he cannot be 
punished for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct.  The record, however, 
contains ample evidence from which we may infer respondent’s willful violation 
of these rules. 
{¶ 17} Respondent offers many excuses for his false and misleading 
testimony: (1) he was confused by the questions; (2) he believed that the first 
question, which asked whether he took any documents after he left the firm, 
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framed all the subsequent questions; (3) he regularly took work home, but he 
could not speak “as to what [he] took out of the office or didn’t take out of the 
office”; (4) he did not have any litigation experience and was attempting to 
answer the questions to the best of his ability; (5) he was struggling under 
substantial pressure from his first experience in a courtroom and as a defendant in 
a highly contentious lawsuit just two weeks after having been fired; and (6) he 
had no access to his calendar, and opposing counsel did not offer to refresh his 
recollection as to the dates in question. 
{¶ 18} Respondent’s actions and the circumstances surrounding those 
actions, however, belie his self-serving claims.  See Detling v. Chockley (1982), 
70 Ohio St.2d 134, 137, 24 O.O.3d 239, 436 N.E.2d 208 (state of mind is inferred 
from the conduct and surrounding circumstances), overruled on other grounds by 
Cabe v. Lunich (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 598, 640 N.E.2d 159.  Approximately three 
weeks before his deposition and preliminary-injunction-hearing testimony, 
respondent went to his office while the rest of the firm was on retreat and carried 
seven boxes of documents out of the building.  He did not reveal that these 
materials were in his possession or offer to inventory them during his deposition 
testimony.  Instead, he admitted that he had billing sheets and his Microsoft 
Office contacts, claimed that he did not recall taking anything related to the 
subsidiary, and emphasized that he did not take “any client files or client 
information” and that he “did not take any of the business plans or marketing 
information.”  Indeed, he specifically denied having any other documents “that 
[he was] aware of” related to the firm or its subsidiary in his possession. 
{¶ 19} At the preliminary-injunction hearing, just two days later, 
respondent’s memory continued to fail him.  When asked whether he could recall 
cleaning or clearing things out of his office any time before August 14, 2007, 
respondent testified, “You know, I might have.  I just don’t recall the specific 
date.”  While he knew that he had cleaned his office “in the summer,” he could 
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not recall whether he had done so in the six or seven weeks—or more specifically 
in the three to four weeks—immediately preceding his testimony.  When 
confronted with surveillance tapes, which, unbeknownst to him, had recorded him 
exiting the firm’s offices with numerous boxes on August 3 and 4, 2007, 
respondent claimed that the materials he removed were “personal information,” 
that he had never intended to take anything of a “confidential nature,” and that he 
had removed “material that [he] didn’t know why [he] had [it] there in the first 
place.” 
{¶ 20} The very day that he was confronted with videotape evidence of 
his surreptitious removal of boxes from the firm’s office, respondent, while at the 
cafeteria with his counsel, went into the men’s restroom and destroyed a firm 
document that had been in his self-prepared trial notebook during his testimony 
and disposed of it in the waste can.  That night, he went home, reviewed the 
materials he had removed from his office, and disposed of a number of firm 
documents in several trash receptacles between his home and his new office in 
downtown Columbus.  Among the documents destroyed in this manner were 
business plans and marketing lists that respondent had testified were not in his 
possession.  He later acknowledged that he had known that the majority of the 
materials were in his possession when he testified on August 27, 2007. 
{¶ 21} Given the timing and circumstances surrounding respondent’s 
removal of materials from his office, his testimony, and his destruction of 
documents, the panel and board reasonably concluded that his inability to recall 
these events was simply “incredible.”  As we have observed, “it is of no 
consequence that the board’s findings of fact are in contravention of respondent’s 
or any other witness’s testimony. ‘Where the evidence is in conflict, the trier of 
facts may determine what should be accepted as the truth and what should be 
rejected as false.’ ”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Zingarelli (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 210, 
217, 729 N.E.2d 1167, quoting Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, 478, 
January Term, 2010 
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53 O.O. 361, 120 N.E.2d 118.  Because the record does not weigh heavily against 
the findings of the panel, as adopted by the board, “we defer to the panel’s 
credibility determinations, inasmuch as the panel members saw and heard 
[respondent’s testimony] firsthand.”  Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise, 108 Ohio 
St.3d 164, 2006-Ohio-550, 842 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 22} Consequently, we accept the board’s conclusion that the facts and 
circumstances clearly and convincingly demonstrate that respondent has willfully 
engaged in conduct that (1) is deliberately dishonest, (2) is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice, and (3) adversely reflects upon respondent’s fitness to 
practice law.  He has therefore violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h).  
Accordingly, we overrule respondent’s first, second, and fourth objections. 
Application of Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(a) to 
Attorney Acting as Party to Litigation 
{¶ 23} In his third objection, respondent contends that the board erred in 
applying Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(a) to his conduct.  He contends that the rule, which 
prohibits a lawyer from unlawfully destroying or concealing a document or other 
material having potential evidentiary value, applies only to attorneys who are 
acting in their professional capacity as advocates because Chapter III of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct is titled “Advocate.”   Respondent, however, cites no 
decision from this court or any other court that limits the applicability of the rule 
in this manner. 
{¶ 24} As the board observed, in In re Melvin (Del.2002), 807 A.2d 550, 
the Supreme Court of Delaware applied the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct 3.4(a) and 3.4(c), which are substantially similar to the Ohio 
Rules of Professional Conduct, to a respondent’s personal conduct that had 
occurred outside his role as an advocate.  Id. at 553.  There, the court imposed a 
one-year suspension from the practice of law after respondent admitted that he 
had violated a protection order that prohibited him from having contact with his 
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wife and concealed or destroyed his wife’s journal or papers, which might have 
aided in the lodging of a criminal charge against him.  Id. at 552. 
{¶ 25} Additionally, we observe that in Attorney Grievance Comm. v. 
White (1999), 354 Md. 346, 350, 731 A.2d 447, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
imposed reciprocal discipline after the United States District Court for the District 
of Maryland disciplined an attorney for destroying discoverable evidence and 
giving false testimony about the extent of that destruction in her capacity as a 
plaintiff in a civil action.  Id. at 364. 
{¶ 26} In White, in dismissing the respondent’s underlying employment-
discrimination claim, the United States District Court found that the respondent 
had (1) “destroyed parts of an autobiographical manuscript, a substantial portion 
of which described events bearing on her claims before the court,” (2) lied in her 
deposition “when she stated that she had destroyed the entire manuscript,” and (3) 
“knowingly and willfully intended to destroy discoverable and relevant evidence, 
and that her statements to the contrary were not believable.”  Id. at 350, 731 A.2d 
447; White v. Maryland Public Defender (1997), 170 F.R.D. 138, 150-151. 
{¶ 27} Based upon those findings, the respondent was indefinitely 
suspended from the practice of law in the United States District Court.  White, 354 
Md. at 351, 731 A.2d 447.  Relying upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, 
and sanction imposed by the United States District Court, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland concluded that respondent’s conduct violated Maryland Rules of 
Professional Conduct 3.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).  As a consequence of those 
violations, as well as additional instances false and misleading testimony (as both 
an advocate in a client’s postconviction proceedings and as the plaintiff in her 
civil action), the Court of Appeals of Maryland disbarred the respondent.  White, 
354 Md. at 368. 
{¶ 28} Notably, in applying Rule 3.3 to the respondent’s actions as a party 
to litigation and as an advocate, the Maryland court observed :  “Even though she 
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did not represent herself while testifying, candor by a lawyer, in any capacity, is 
one of the most important character traits of a member of the Bar.”  (Citations 
omitted.)  Id. at 364, 731 A.2d 447. 
{¶ 29} Likewise, we have recognized:  “One of the fundamental tenets of 
the professional responsibility of a lawyer is that he should maintain a degree of 
personal and professional integrity that meets the highest standard.  The integrity 
of the profession can be maintained only if the conduct of the individual attorney 
is above reproach.  He should refrain from any illegal conduct.  Anything short of 
this lessens public confidence in the legal profession — because obedience to the 
law exemplifies respect for the law.” Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Stein (1972), 29 
Ohio St.2d 77, 81, 58 O.O.2d 151, 278 N.E.2d 670. 
{¶ 30} R.C. 2921.12 (“Tampering with evidence”) makes it a third-degree 
felony for any person who knows that an official proceeding is in progress or 
likely to be instituted to destroy documents with potential evidentiary value so as 
to impair their value or availability as evidence.  Thus, in applying Prof.Cond.R. 
3.4(a) to respondent’s conduct undertaken as a party to litigation, we do not hold 
respondent to a higher standard than a member of the general public.  Instead, we 
recognize that respondent’s conduct, be it in a personal or professional capacity, 
demonstrates a lack of respect for the law that he has been sworn to uphold, 
thereby undermining public confidence in our justice system.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the prohibitions against the obstruction of access to evidence set 
forth in Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(a) apply with equal force to attorneys acting in either a 
personal or professional capacity.  Accordingly, we overrule respondent’s third 
objection and adopt the board’s finding that respondent’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(a). 
Sanction 
{¶ 31} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
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sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure of Complaints and 
Hearings before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.) 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 
2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.   
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
{¶ 32} Although the parties did not submit any stipulated factors in 
aggravation or mitigation, the panel and board found that the following 
aggravating factors weighed in favor of a more severe sanction:  a dishonest or 
selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and a refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  BCGD  Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), 
(c), (d), and (g).  In mitigation, the panel and board each noted respondent’s 
absence of a prior disciplinary record, his excellent reputation in the charitable 
and political communities, as demonstrated by the testimony of three witnesses, 
and his general character, as demonstrated by more than two dozen letters from 
attorneys, judges, law enforcement officers, elected officials, and business and 
community leaders.  BCGD Proc.Reg.  10(B)(2)(a) and (e). 
{¶ 33} Citing respondent’s pattern of misconduct involving multiple false 
statements under oath, his destruction of documents to conceal his possession of 
them, and a selfish motive, relator urged the panel to recommend a 12-month 
suspension.  In contrast, respondent argued that the complaint against him should 
be dismissed, claiming that his conduct did not violate any Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
{¶ 34} Noting that our precedent requires an actual suspension when an 
attorney has engaged in a pattern of dishonesty and finding that the aggravating 
factors outweighed the mitigating factors, the panel recommended a 12-month 
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suspension from the practice of law.  Having considered the relevant factors and 
having adopted the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct, the board, however, 
recommends that we suspend respondent’s license for two years. 
{¶ 35} In his final objection, respondent argues that the board erred in 
finding multiple aggravating factors, ignoring significant mitigating factors, and 
therefore recommending a sanction that was too harsh.  Based upon the foregoing, 
however, we find that the record clearly and convincingly demonstrates that 
respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses 
throughout August 2007 and that he did so with the selfish motives of furthering 
his own career and preventing the firm from discovering his breach of his 
employment agreement. 
{¶ 36} We acknowledge that respondent has self-reported his destruction 
of documents to both the firm and the trial court and that he has admitted the 
wrongfulness of that conduct.  Throughout this disciplinary proceeding, however, 
he has steadfastly maintained that his testimony was not false or misleading.  Yet 
the panel and board found, and we agree, that in light of the facts and 
circumstances of this case, respondent’s failure of recollection on the stand is 
simply not credible.  Therefore, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence 
demonstrates that respondent has refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of 
his conduct. 
{¶ 37} Respondent’s arguments that the panel and board failed to consider 
his mental state at the time of his conduct and the “minimal” injury that his 
conduct has caused as factors in mitigation of his punishment are likewise without 
merit. 
{¶ 38} Although he cites two cases in which we accepted board findings 
that have considered stress as a factor in mitigation, those cases are factually 
distinguishable.  In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fidler (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 396, 397, 
700 N.E.2d 323, while the panel received evidence that the respondent was under 
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great personal stress at the time he committed two minor theft offenses, it is not 
clear that that factor played a significant role in the recommendation or imposition 
of a sanction.  And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Spencer (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 316, 
317, 643 N.E.2d 1086, respondent’s stress was due, at least in part, to familial 
circumstances that were beyond his control.  Here, in contrast, respondent’s stress 
was the direct result of his own, conscious decisions (1) to seek public office, a 
move that appears to have precipitated his termination from his employment, (2) 
to give false and misleading testimony about his removal and possession of 
documents from his office, and (3) to destroy those documents upon learning that 
his former firm had videotape evidence of him removing boxes from his office. 
{¶ 39} Respondent’s reliance upon Disciplinary Counsel v. Walker, 119 
Ohio St.3d 47, 2008-Ohio-3321, 891 N.E.2d 740, for the proposition that we have 
demonstrated “substantial leniency toward lawyers whose personal conduct 
illustrates an impairment of their normally sound judgment” is similarly 
misplaced.  In Walker, the respondent presented evidence of alcoholism and 
substance abuse that contributed to his misconduct, and evidence of his successful 
treatment, such that his impairment qualified as a mitigating factor pursuant to 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g).  Id. at. ¶ 14.  Here, in contrast, respondent has 
offered no medical evidence to demonstrate that his “stress” rose to this level of 
impairment. 
{¶ 40} Because respondent’s claims that his conduct caused no harm to 
his former employer or his clients ignore the risk of harm that his false and 
misleading testimony created for the legal profession and the judicial system as a 
whole, this argument is also without merit. 
Sanctions Imposed in Similar Cases 
{¶ 41} We have held that attorney misconduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, warrants an actual suspension from the 
practice of law because this court “ ‘cannot permit attorneys who lie either to their 
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clients or to the court to continue practicing law without interruption.’ ”  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 190-191, 658 
N.E.2d 237, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Greene (1995),  74 Ohio St.3d 13, 
16, 655 N.E.2d 1299. 
{¶ 42} Respondent relies upon four cases to support his plea for a stayed 
suspension or a public reprimand.  While each of those cases addresses 
misconduct involving dishonesty, they are all factually distinguishable from this 
case because they involve fewer incidents of misconduct and a number of 
mitigating factors that far outweigh one or two aggravating factors. 
{¶ 43} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Niermeyer, 119 Ohio St.3d 99, 2008-
Ohio-3824, 892 N.E.2d 434, the respondent had committed a single incident 
involving dishonesty by filing a falsified document with the Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation.  Id. at ¶ 4.  Because the mitigating factors, including the 
respondent’s self-reporting, immediate efforts to rectify the consequences of his 
actions, and his good reputation, outweighed the respondent’s dishonest or selfish 
motive, we imposed a 12-month stayed suspension.  Id. at ¶ 9-10. 
{¶ 44} In Dayton Bar Assn. v. Ellison, 118 Ohio St.3d 128, 2008-Ohio-
1808, 886 N.E.2d 836, the respondent misled one client about the disposition of 
her case and neglected two client matters.  Id. at ¶ 1, 9.  Although respondent had 
previously received a public reprimand for neglect, we determined that her 27 
years of respected practice representing disadvantaged clients, acknowledgement 
of her wrongdoing, and cooperation in the disciplinary process weighed in favor 
of a one-year, stayed suspension.  Id. at ¶ 14-15. 
{¶ 45} In Columbus Bar Assn. v. Stubbs, 109 Ohio St.3d 446, 2006-Ohio-
2818, 848 N.E.2d 843, the respondent had falsified a document in an effort to 
convince the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles that she had in fact had insurance at 
the time she had received a traffic citation.  Id. at ¶ 3-4.  Her failure to carry 
insurance had resulted in the suspension of her driver’s license.  Id.  We 
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determined that mitigating factors of no prior discipline, a cooperative attitude 
during the disciplinary proceedings, good character and reputation, her genuine 
remorse for her actions, and her treatment for depression outweighed the single 
aggravating factor – the commission of multiple offenses.  Id. at ¶ 7-8, 12.  
Therefore, we imposed a six-month, stayed suspension and one year of monitored 
probation.  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 46} And in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Shea, 117 Ohio St.3d 55, 2008-
Ohio-263, 881 N.E. 847, we publicly reprimanded the respondent for making a 
false statement to a child-support enforcement agency in a failed attempt to obtain 
a copy of a default notice filed against his former employer.  Id. at ¶ 5-6, 17. 
There, in addition to mitigating factors including no prior discipline and full 
cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings, we noted that respondent’s conduct 
was “short-lived and harmed no one.”  Id. at ¶ 12-13. 
{¶ 47} We find Disciplinary Counsel v. Rohrer, 124 Ohio St.3d 65, 2009-
Ohio-5930, 919 N.E.2d 180, to be the most instructive.  There, the respondent 
directed a staff member to deliver a copy of a motion to a local newspaper in 
violation of the trial court’s verbal order prohibiting counsel from discussing the 
case with the media.  Id. at ¶ 8-10.  Respondent falsely told the court that his staff 
had misconstrued his instructions and had leaked the information to the media, 
and after firing his assistant for divulging confidential information, he wrote a 
misleading letter to the unemployment bureau, again suggesting that his assistant 
was responsible for the leak.  Id. at ¶ 12-16, 19, 22.  We determined that 
respondent’s conduct in deliberately disobeying a court order and lying about it to 
the judge during a hearing violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from knowingly making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal), 3.4(c) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of 
a tribunal), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h).  Id. at ¶ 3, 34. 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
{¶ 48} In aggravation, we found that the respondent in Rohrer had 
committed multiple offenses, had exhibited a selfish or dishonest motive in his 
misrepresentations to the unemployment bureau, and had demonstrated a lack of 
remorse with regard to his violation of the court order.  Id. at ¶ 34, 36, 40, citing 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b),(d), and (g).  But in mitigation of a more serious 
sanction, we found that respondent had no prior disciplinary record and had 
displayed a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, that the trial 
court had already imposed sanctions on him, and that he had presented character 
witnesses attesting to his good reputation.  Id. at ¶ 32.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a),(d),(e), and (f).  Observing our precedent favoring an actual 
suspension 
for 
misconduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation and respondent’s deliberate representations to the trial court 
and another state agency, we concluded that his misconduct warranted an actual 
six-month suspension from the practice of law.  Id. at ¶ 43, 52-53. 
{¶ 49} In this case, respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct 
involving multiple instances of lying and misrepresentation under oath, as well as 
the destruction of documents with potential evidentiary value in a pending civil 
proceeding.  Thus, his misconduct is more extensive and more serious than that of 
the respondent in Rohrer.  Although he admitted destroying the documents, 
throughout this disciplinary proceeding, he maintained that his inability to recall 
significant events, occurring as little as three weeks before his testimony, was 
genuine.  We agree that these aggravating factors outweigh respondent’s lack of 
prior discipline and good reputation. 
{¶ 50} Based upon the foregoing, we accept the board’s findings that 
respondent violated the ethical standards incumbent on Ohio lawyers and 
conclude that a one-year suspension is the appropriate sanction for his 
misconduct.  Accordingly, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of 
law in the state of Ohio for one year.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
O’CONNOR and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent and would suspend respondent 
from the practice of law in Ohio for two years. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Robert R. Berger, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Hadden Co., L.P.A. and E. Bruce Hadden, for respondent. 
______________________