Case Title: In re D.S.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88460

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88460-Agenda 4-November 2000.
In re D.S., a Minor (D.S. et al., Appellees and Cross-Appellants, 
v. R.S. et al. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant and
Cross-Appellee)).


Opinion filed June 21, 2001; modified on denial of rehearing
February 4, 2002

	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	The principal issue presented in this appeal is whether the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, contained in article
II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. II, §1), is violated when a circuit court issues an order
directing the State's Attorney to prosecute a petition for the
termination of parental rights, after the court has set a permanency
goal for the minor consisting of substitute care pending a court
determination on the termination petition. The circuit court of
Kane County, after selecting its permanency goal for D.S., ordered
the State's Attorney's office to prosecute a pending petition to
terminate parental rights after the State had previously indicated
that it would not undertake such prosecution. The State's Attorney
appealed. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court. 307 Ill. App. 3d 249. This court allowed the State's petition
for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.


BACKGROUND


	On September 9, 1993, D.S. and her three older sisters, R.S.,
R.S., and E.H., were removed from the home of their parents and
taken into protective custody by the Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) based upon evidence that they were
neglected and abused minors.(1) Specifically, the State alleged in its
"Second Amended Petition for Adjudication of Wardship" that the
minors were subject to environmental neglect because the family
home had been declared unfit for human habitation by the City of
Aurora. The petition further alleged that the minors had been
abused because their father presented a substantial risk of physical
harm to them. On November 9, 1993, the children's parents
waived an adjudicatory hearing and stipulated that the minors were
environmentally neglected and abused. The circuit court
adjudicated the minors to be wards of the court and ordered that
they remain in the custody and guardianship of DCFS until further
order. On November 10, 1993, the circuit court appointed CASA
Kane County, Inc., a social service agency, as guardian ad litem
(hereinafter GAL) to represent the minors.
	On July 8, 1997, the GAL filed a verified petition in the
circuit court to terminate the parental rights of the minors' parents.
Count I of the termination petition was brought by the GAL on
behalf of D.S. Count I of this petition was also brought by D.S.,
individually. Count II of the petition was brought by the GAL on
behalf of R.S. and her sister R.S.(2) Both minor sisters objected to
the termination petition filed on their behalf, stating that they did
not wish their parents' rights to be terminated as to them.
Accordingly, the attorney for the GAL withdrew his appearance on
their behalf and they were appointed new counsel.
	The petition to terminate parental rights proceeded solely as
to D.S. The petition alleged that the parental rights of both of
D.S.'s natural parents should be terminated because the parents
were unfit in four respects. Specifically, the termination petition
alleged that D.S.'s parents were unfit because they had failed to
maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility
with respect to D.S.'s welfare; had continuously and repeatedly
neglected D.S. since her removal; had failed to protect D.S. from
an injurious environment; and had failed to make reasonable
efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for removal of
D.S. as well as reasonable progress toward the return of D.S.
within 12 months after she was adjudicated neglected and abused.
750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (D)(d), (D)(g), (D)(m) (West 1998).
	The petition to terminate parental rights stated that D.S. had
resided with her foster parents continuously since the shelter care
hearing in September, 1993, and alleged that the foster parents
were "ready, willing and able to adopt [D.S.]" after the rights of
the natural parents were terminated. The petition further alleged
that "[t]he Kane County State's Attorney *** has in the exercise
of its discretion decided not to seek termination of parental rights
in this proceeding," and requested that the circuit court
"guarantee[ ] [D.S. and the GAL] the right to prosecute this
petition."
	In response, the State filed with the circuit court a motion to
dismiss the termination petition filed by the GAL and D.S. The
dismissal motion alleged that the State's Attorney is the only party
authorized to prosecute a petition to terminate parental rights
under the Juvenile Court Act. Because the State's Attorney's
office, in the exercise of its discretion, had declined to seek
termination of parental rights in this matter, the motion concluded
that the petition must be dismissed.(3)
	On August 26, 1997, the circuit court held that the GAL had
standing to file (as opposed to prosecute) the petition to terminate
parental rights on behalf of D.S. under section 2-13(1) of the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-13(1) (West 1998)),
which provides in relevant part that "any adult person *** may file
***a petition with respect of a minor under this Act." The circuit
court further ruled that D.S., as a minor, lacked both the standing
and capacity to proceed individually to file a petition to terminate
her parents' rights. Therefore, the circuit court granted the State's
oral motion to dismiss D.S., individually, as a petitioner. The
circuit court, however, reserved ruling on the question of whether
the GAL had the authority to prosecute the termination petition.
	On September 9, 1997, the circuit court denied the GAL's
request to prosecute the petition to terminate parental rights. The
court ruled that "there is no support in current Illinois law to allow
for a termination petition to be prosecuted by any party other than
the State," and that "the case law and the statute is very clear that
it is within the sole discretion of the State's Attorney's Office to
prosecute all proceedings." The circuit court further observed that
it would be "contrary to public policy" as expressed in the Juvenile
Court Act to allow any party other than the State to prosecute a
termination petition.
	The circuit court, however, did not dismiss the termination
petition. The court ruled that the State had until September 23,
1997, to decide whether it would prosecute the petition filed by the
GAL. On September 17, 1997, the State renewed its motion to
dismiss the GAL's petition to terminate parental rights. The State
alleged in its motion that "[a]fter consideration of the facts and
circumstances which exist in the instant case at this time, and after
considering the best interests of [D.S.], the People do not believe
it is appropriate to proceed with a prosecution of the [termination
petition] at this time."
	On September 23, 1997, the circuit court denied the State's
motion to dismiss the termination petition, pending a permanency
review hearing with respect to the future status of D.S. In the
course of his ruling, the circuit court judge observed that "with the
addition to the Juvenile Court Act of the permanency review
statute *** the court has increased authority to direct the
permanency goal. *** If the court sets a permanency goal of
adoption, then I believe that the court can direct *** the State to
prosecute a petition to terminate parental rights."
	On October 28, 1997, the circuit court conducted the
permanency review hearing. The court entered an order finding
that DCFS's recently determined permanency goal for D.S. of
foster home placement, with guardianship to remain in DCFS, was
"not an appropriate goal." The court also noted in its order that the
State still did "not wish to proceed" with respect to the petition to
terminate parental rights filed on D.S.'s behalf.
	Another permanency review hearing was conducted by the
circuit court with respect to D.S. on January 16, 1998. In its order,
the circuit court ruled that the appropriate permanency goal for
D.S. was to place her permanent guardianship in her foster parents.
The court found that this goal was in the best interests of D.S.
"due to the length of current placement" (D.S. had been in the
protective custody of her foster parents since 1993), D.S.'s
"emotional and physical status," and "the lack of success at past
attempts at reunification." The circuit court further ordered that
"[a]ll parties shall work toward completion of and success of the
permanency goal entered herein." The court, however, specifically
stated in its order that it was not ruling out the permanency goal of
substitute care pending a court determination on the termination
of parental rights.
	On March 24, 1998, the State again renewed its motion to
dismiss the petition to terminate parental rights filed by the GAL,
stating that it would, "once again, decline to prosecute said
petition." On March 31, 1998, in accordance with effectuating the
court's permanency goal of placing permanent guardianship of
D.S. in her foster parents, DCFS filed with the circuit court a
motion to vacate DCFS's guardianship of D.S., terminate DCFS's
wardship as to D.S., and to close D.S.'s case. DCFS also filed a
motion to appoint D.S.'s foster parents as guardians of D.S.
	On May 26, 1998, the circuit court conducted a hearing
regarding the entry of an agreed order with respect to the
guardianship of D.S. The record reveals that the mother of D.S.
signed a letter of consent to the guardianship, and that the GAL,
D.S.'s foster parents and D.S.'s mother agreed to the terms of the
agreed guardianship order. Although the father of D.S. had
previously indicated that he would also agree to the order, during
the hearing he declined to sign a letter of consent because he had
reservations with respect to restrictions upon his visitation with
D.S. Based upon the best interests of D.S., the circuit court then
ordered that the permanency goal for D.S. be changed to substitute
care with D.S.'s foster parents (with the guardianship of D.S. to
remain in DCFS) pending the outcome of the proceedings to
terminate parental rights. The circuit court directed the State to
prosecute the termination petition which had been filed by the
GAL on behalf of D.S. The circuit court judge then recused
himself from hearing the termination proceedings in this matter.
	The State filed a motion requesting the circuit court to
reconsider its ruling directing the State to prosecute the petition to
terminate parental rights. The circuit court held a hearing on the
State's motion to reconsider on July 7, 1998. During the hearing,
the circuit court noted that, pursuant to provisions of the Juvenile
Court Act, it has the "responsibility to determine what permanency
goal is in the minor child's best interests." The circuit court
explained that after determining that the appropriate permanency
goal for D.S. was substitute care pending a legal determination on
the termination of parental rights petition, the court then had the
responsibility "to set forth or consider what tasks and what orders
need to be made in order to accomplish the permanency goal."
Because D.S. had been in foster care placement from 1993 to
1998, and to achieve the permanency goal set in this case, the
court ordered the office of the State's Attorney to prosecute the
termination of parental rights petition. The circuit court then
entered an order denying the State's reconsideration motion on the
basis that the court's direction to the State to prosecute the
termination petition was "appropriate" and "in furtherance of the
court-ordered goal of substitute care pending termination."
	On appeal, the State alleged that the circuit court erred in two
respects: allowing the GAL to file the petition to terminate
parental rights, and ordering the State to prosecute the termination
petition. The GAL filed a cross-appeal, contending that the circuit
court erred in holding that the State's Attorney has the sole
authority to prosecute a petition for the termination of parental
rights.
 	The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
307 Ill. App. 3d 249. The appellate court rejected the argument
advanced by the State that the GAL was not entitled to file a
petition to terminate parental rights on behalf of D.S. The court
observed that, under the plain language of section 2-13(1) of the
Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-13(1) (West 1998)), "[a]ny
adult person *** may file *** a petition in respect of a minor
under this Act." The appellate court determined that, in light of
this broad statutory provision, the circuit court did not commit
error in allowing the GAL to file the termination petition. 307 Ill.
App. 3d at 253.
	Although the appellate court determined that the circuit court
properly allowed the GAL to file the termination petition, the court
agreed with the State that the office of the State's Attorney is
vested with the sole authority to prosecute petitions to terminate
parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act. Relying upon this
court's prior decisions in In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1 (1991), and
People v. Piccolo, 275 Ill. 453 (1916), the appellate court
concluded that it is well settled that upon the filing of a petition
under the Juvenile Court Act, the State becomes the real party in
interest and has the responsibility of prosecuting the proceedings.
Accordingly, the appellate court held that the circuit court did not
err in denying the request by the GAL to prosecute the termination
petition.
	Having held that the State's Attorney is vested with the sole
right to prosecute termination petitions under the Juvenile Court
Act, the appellate court then addressed the question of the circuit
court's authority to order the State to prosecute a termination
petition. Placing principal reliance upon our decision in In re J.J.,
the appellate court concluded that "the juvenile court may order
the State to prosecute [a termination petition] when consistent with
the overriding purposes of the [Juvenile Court] Act." 307 Ill. App.
3d at 255. The appellate court reasoned that "In re J.J. makes it
clear that it is the juvenile court as well as the State's Attorney that
is responsible to ensure that the best interests of the minor, the
minor's family, and the community are served, which are the
overriding purposes of the Act." 307 Ill. App. 3d at 255. Applying
this reasoning to the matter before it, the appellate court panel
concluded that "we find no error in the [circuit] court's decision
to order the State to prosecute the petition given the length of time
D.S. has been in foster care placement and the fact that there was
some indication in the record that the parents failed to make
reasonable progress toward the return of the child or to correct the
conditions that led to her removal." 307 Ill. App. 3d at 255-56.
	We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a). We also allowed amicus curiae briefs to be filed by the
State's Attorney of Cook County, the Cook County public
guardian, and the Children and Family Justice Center of the
Northwestern University School of Law.
	In its brief to this court, the State asserts that it "do[es] not
take issue" with the appellate court's ruling that, pursuant to
section 2-13(1) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-13(1)
(West 1998)), the GAL had statutory authority to file the
termination petition. The State confines its appeal to the sole
question of whether the circuit court's direction to the office of the
State's Attorney to prosecute the petition to terminate parental
rights brought on behalf of D.S. violates the doctrine of separation
of powers found in article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1).
	Our grant of the State's petition also brings before us the
GAL's request for cross-relief. 155 Ill. 2d R. 318(a). The GAL
contends that the lower courts erred in two respects. First, the
GAL asserts that the courts below improperly barred D.S. from
individually filing the termination petition. Second, the GAL
maintains that the lower courts erred in holding that the State
possesses the sole authority to prosecute a petition to terminate
parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act.



ANALYSIS
	The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to secure for each
minor subject to it the care and guidance that will serve "the safety
and moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor
and the best interests of the community." 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1)
(West 1998). The goals of the Act include preserving and
strengthening family ties "whenever possible," but if reunification
is delayed or fails, then the best available placement is to be made
to provide permanency for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West
1998). To effectuate the intended purposes of the Act, the Illinois
General Assembly has instructed that this legislation is to be
"liberally construed" (705 ILCS 405/1-2(4) (West 1998)) and that
"[i]n all proceedings under this Act the court may direct the course
thereof so as promptly to ascertain the jurisdictional facts and fully
to gather information bearing upon the current condition and
future welfare of persons subject to this Act." 705 ILCS
405/1-2(2) (West 1998).
	Proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act are initiated by the
filing of a petition(4) pursuant to section 2-13(1) of the Act (705
ILCS 405/2-13(1) (West 1998)), which provides, in relevant part:
			"Any adult person, any agency or association by its
representative may file, or the court on its own motion,
consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the
minor may direct the filing through the State's Attorney
of a petition in respect of a minor under this Act."
	As stated, in its submissions to this court the State has
abandoned the contention advanced below that the GAL lacked
statutory authority to file a petition to terminate parental rights on
behalf of D.S. The State now correctly acknowledges in its
pleadings that section 2-13 of the Act "clearly provides for the
filing of the [termination] petition by the GAL."
	However, in the petition for cross-relief filed by the GAL with
this court, the GAL makes a brief argument that D.S., individually,
has a right to a file a petition under the Juvenile Court Act,
including a petition to terminate her parents' rights. We disagree.
The plain language of section 2-13(1), which provides that a
petition may be filed by "[a]ny adult person," establishes that the
General Assembly did not contemplate the filing of petitions under
the Act by minors. This conclusion is supported by the provisions
contained in section 2-17 of the Act, wherein the legislature has
provided that minors who are the subject of proceedings under the
Act must be appointed a GAL whose duty it is to "represent the
best interests of the minor and *** present recommendations to the
court consistent with that duty." 705 ILCS 405/2-17(1) (West
1998). Therefore, minors, such as D.S., are assured representation
by a GAL who is obliged to advocate for their best interests and
file the appropriate pleadings to protect their rights. Accordingly,
we conclude that a minor, individually, may not file a petition
under the Juvenile Court Act.
	We now turn to the principal issue raised in this appeal:
whether the circuit court's order, directing the State's Attorney to
prosecute the petition to terminate parental rights after the court
had set the permanency goal for D.S. as substitute care pending a
determination on the termination petition filed by the GAL, was
unconstitutional because it violated the doctrine of separation of
powers set forth in article II, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution
of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1). Because this issue presents
a question of law, our review is de novo. City of Belvidere v.
Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998).
	The Illinois Constitution provides that the legislative,
executive and judicial branches are separate, and that "[n]o branch
shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." Ill. Const.
1970, art. II, §1. In " 'both theory and practice, the purpose of the
[separation of powers] provision is to ensure that the whole power
of two or more branches of government shall not reside in the
same hands.' " Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 410
(1997), quoting People v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 465, 473 (1988).
However, the doctrine of separation of powers "was not designed
to achieve a complete divorce among the three branches of
government" (In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 7; Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d 53, 58 (1979)) and does not require "governmental powers to
be divided into rigid, mutually exclusive compartments" (In re
J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 7; In re Estate of Barker, 63 Ill. 2d 113, 119
(1976)). Because the "separation of the three branches of
government is not absolute and unyielding" (Best, 179 Ill. 2d at
411), the doctrine of separation of powers "is not contravened
merely because separate spheres of governmental authority may
overlap" (Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 411; see also People ex rel. Devine
v. Murphy, 181 Ill. 2d 522, 530 (1998); McAlister v. Schick, 147 Ill. 2d 84, 94 (1992); In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 7).
	It has long been established that, upon the filing of a petition
under the Juvenile Court Act, the "people become the real party
complainant and must prosecute the proceeding." People v.
Piccolo, 275 Ill. 453, 455 (1916); see also In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at
6. Section 1-6 of the Juvenile Court Act provides that the people
of the State of Illinois shall be represented by the State's Attorney
in proceedings under the Act. 705 ILCS 405/1-6 (West 1998). The
State contends that because prosecutorial discretion is a purely
executive function of the office of the State's Attorney, the circuit
court violated the principle of the separation of powers when it
ordered the State's Attorney to prosecute the termination petition
filed by the GAL on behalf of D.S., even though the State's
Attorney's office had declined to prosecute the petition at that
time.
	 The State acknowledges that the overriding purpose of the
Juvenile Court Act is to secure the best interests of the minor and
the community, and, if possible, to preserve and strengthen the
minor's family ties. The State contends, however, that the goals of
the Act "must be accomplished within the framework of the
constitutional provisions requiring the separation of powers." The
State proffers the general argument that "[n]o section of the
Juvenile Court Act can operate to grant a court the authority to
exercise powers properly belonging to the executive branch," but
does not make citation to any specific section of the Act which
may allegedly violate the separation of powers principle. Rather,
the primary focus of the argument advanced by the State is that the
appellate court erred in holding that this court's decision in In re
J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1 (1991), provided the circuit court with the duty
and authority to order the State to prosecute the termination
petition. The State contends that the reasoning in our decision in
In re J.J. is inapposite because that case is factually
distinguishable from the matter at bar. We disagree with the
State's contentions. 
	In In re J.J., petitions for adjudication of wardship were filed
by DCFS with respect to three minor children who had allegedly
been abused. The State's Attorney moved to dismiss these
petitions, and the GAL objected. The circuit court dismissed the
petitions for adjudication of wardship without considering the
merits because the court concluded that, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, it was " 'without legal authority or precedent
to require the State to proceed with the prosecution of this case.' "
In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 4. The circuit court accepted the argument
proffered by the State that the office of the State's Attorney had
the exclusive right to request dismissal of a petition for
adjudication of wardship because of its role in the executive
branch of government, and that any judicial interference with this
executive discretion violated the separation of powers.
	On appeal, this court rejected the State's attempt to narrowly
and rigidly compartmentalize the exercise of executive and
judicial powers with respect to abuse, neglect and dependency
proceedings conducted pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act. We
agreed with the State's assertion that it had been well settled that
"the office of the State's Attorney enjoys wide discretion in both
the initiation and management of criminal litigation." In re J.J.,
142 Ill. 2d  at 6-7. However, we held that the "evil of a court's
attempting to invade the exclusive executive discretion of the
constitutional office of the State's Attorney in controlling the
initiation and management of criminal litigation is absent in
dependency and neglect proceedings, where both the State's
Attorney and the court are charged with the duty of ensuring that
*** the best interests of the minor, the minor's family and the
community are served." In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 8-9.
	We found that under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act,
the circuit court had "not only the authority but the duty to
determine whether the best interests of the minor will be served by
dismissing a petition alleging abuse of a minor." In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 9. For example, we noted that the legislature determined that
in all proceedings brought under the Act, the court is vested with
the authority to " 'direct the course thereof so as promptly to
ascertain the jurisdictional facts and fully to gather information
bearing upon the current condition and future welfare of persons
subject to [the] Act.' " In re J.J. 142 Ill. 2d  at 9, quoting Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 801-2(2) (now 705 ILCS 405/1-2(2) (West
1998)). We further observed that, in section 2-21 of the Act, the
legislature specifically instructed that " '[a]fter hearing the
evidence' " presented during an adjudicatory hearing, " 'the court
shall make *** a finding of whether or not the minor is abused,
neglected or dependent,' " and if the court " 'finds that the minor
is not such a person, the court shall order the petition dismissed
and the minor discharged.' " In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 9, quoting Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 802-21(1) (now 705 ILCS
405/2-21(1) (West 1998)).
	This court reasoned that, under the framework of the Juvenile
Court Act, although the prosecution of a petition "is the
responsibility of the State's Attorney," the determination of
"whether the best interests of the minor will be served by dismissal
of a petition *** is the responsibility of the juvenile court." In re
J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 11. Therefore, "when the State moves to dismiss
a petition alleging abuse of a minor, the circuit court shall consider
the merits of the motion and determine, on the record, whether
dismissal is in the best interests of the minor, the minor's family,
and the community." In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 9. We found that
"[o]nly in this way will the circuit court be able to fulfill its duty
[under the Act] to ensure the best interests of the minor and
'gather information bearing upon the current condition and future
welfare of persons subject to [the] Act.' " In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at
9-10, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 801-2(2). We
further concluded that the circuit court may order the office of the
State's Attorney to prosecute a petition under the Act against its
wishes if the court determines that such prosecution is in the best
interests of the minor. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 11.
	 In sum, we held in In re J.J. that the statutory duties imposed
upon the circuit court by the Juvenile Court Act did not conflict
with the role of the State's Attorney under the Act because both
the court and the State's Attorney are jointly charged with acting
in the best interests of the minor. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 11.
Accordingly, the principle of the separation of powers was not
violated.
	In the matter at bar, the State attempts to factually distinguish
our decision in In re J.J. on the basis that "the interest of the
protection of the minor [present in In re J.J.] *** is absent here."
The State asserts that, unlike in In re J.J., where the dismissal of
the minors' petitions for adjudication of wardship would have
denied them the right of access to the protective services of the
juvenile court, in the instant cause the best interests of D.S. remain
secure despite the State's refusal to prosecute the petition to
terminate parental rights. According to the State, the State's
Attorney's "failure to prosecute a termination petition does not
frustrate the purposes of the Act *** [as] D.S. is still subject to the
court's jurisdiction so the court can fulfill its obligation to see that
her best interests are addressed." We find the arguments of the
State unpersuasive.
	In the present cause, the circuit court, like the court in In re
J.J., was charged with carrying out statutory duties imposed by the
Juvenile Court Act with the purpose of ensuring the best interests
of the minor, D.S. Section 2-28 of the Act requires the circuit
court to conduct a permanency hearing within 12 months of the
entry of a temporary custody order and at least every six months
thereafter. 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1998). The statute
provides that "[a]t the permanency hearing, the court shall
determine the future status of the child." 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2)
(West 1998). The circuit court complies with this directive by
selecting a permanency goal, from among several listed in section
2-28, which the court finds to be "in the best interest of the child."
705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1998). Section 2-28 of the Act
further provides that, upon completion of the permanency hearing,
the court shall enter an order which sets forth the "future status of
the minor, including the permanency goal, and any order necessary
to conform the minor's legal custody and status to such
determination." 705 ILCS 405/2-28(3)(a) (West 1998).
	In the matter before us, the circuit court determined that it was
in the best interests of D.S. to set a permanency goal of substitute
care pending court determination on the termination of parental
rights. The parties to this appeal neither dispute the court's
authority to set this permanency goal nor challenge the goal itself.
We conclude that, under the facts presented, once the circuit court
found that this particular permanency goal was in the best interests
of D.S., the court had the duty and the authority, pursuant to
section 2-28(3)(a) of the Act, to enter any order "necessary to
conform the minor's legal custody and status to the goal the court
selected." Therefore, under these circumstances, the circuit court
appropriately ordered the State's Attorney to prosecute the
termination petition as a means of accomplishing the permanency
goal found to be in the D.S.'s best interests.
	In its submission to this court, the State also raises the
contention that our decision today places the office of the State's
Attorney in an "ethical dilemma" with respect to Illinois Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.1 (134 Ill. 2d R. 3.1). We find the State's
argument to be without merit. Rule 3.1 provides, in relevant part,
that a lawyer "shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that
is not frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law." The plain
language of Rule 3.1 prohibits a lawyer from bringing a
proceeding that is "frivolous." Actions on the part of the State in
compliance with an order of the circuit court would not be deemed
"frivolous."
	In instances where, as here, reunification between a minor and
her family is delayed or fails, section 1-2(1) of the Act directs the
circuit court to select "the best available placement to provide
permanency for the child." 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 1998).
Indeed, the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act would be
rendered meaningless and the functions of the juvenile court
would be nullified if the court were powerless to effectuate the
permanency goal it found to be in a minor's best interests. A clear
example is provided by the matter at bar: if the circuit court does
not have the statutory duty and authority to effectuate the
permanency goal found to be in the best interests of D.S., it is
conceivable that the future status of D.S. could remain in limbo
until the time, if ever, the State decides to prosecute the
termination petition. As we have recently observed in In re D.L.,
because "it is not in [a minor's] best interests for his status to
remain in limbo for an extended period of time," the circuit court
should "consider, in an expedited manner, cases involving [such
children], so that the minors whose futures are at stake in
[juvenile] proceedings can obtain a prompt, just, and final
resolution of their status." In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2000).
	Our decision today is not without precedent. We have
previously held that "each branch of government has concurrent
powers and responsibilities that are in the nature of parens
patriae." In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 488 (1997). The doctrine of
parens patriae "represents an expression of the general power and
obligation of the government as a whole to protect minors and the
infirm." In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d  at 488; People ex rel. Wallace v.
Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 623-24 (1952). The parens patriae power is
codified in the Juvenile Court Act, which specifically charges the
circuit court with the duty to act in the best interests of the minor
and for the minor's own protection. Labrenz, 411 Ill.  at 624. In
addition to our decision in In re J.J., the duty and authority of the
circuit court to guard the interests of minors in proceedings
conducted pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act and to direct the
State's Attorney to take actions in accordance with that duty have
been repeatedly upheld. See People ex rel. Davis v. Vasquez, 92 Ill. 2d 132, 151 (1982) (ordering the State to file a petition in
respect of a minor under the Juvenile Court Act is not an
impermissible exercise by the judicial branch of powers belonging
exclusively to the executive branch and therefore does not violate
the separation of powers doctrine); In re J.M., 245 Ill. App. 3d 909
(1993) (the circuit court possessed the authority to order the State
to prosecute a dependency action under the Act); Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 110 Ill. App. 3d 714 (1982) (there is no separation of
powers violation when a circuit court ordered a State's Attorney
to prosecute a neglect petition under the Juvenile Court Act).
	The State contends, incorrectly, that our decision today
contravenes the "deep and broad[ ] societal policies" which
recognize the serious and final nature of termination proceedings.
In the matter before us, the circuit court, pursuant to the
permanency review provisions of section 2-28 of the Act,
determined that the permanency goal in the best interests of D.S.
is substitute care pending court determination on termination of
parental rights. We stress that "[t]he selection of a permanency
goal is not a final determination on the merits with regard to
termination of parental rights but, rather, an intermediate
procedural step taken for the protection of and best interests of the
child." In re K.H., 313 Ill. App. 3d 675, 682 (2000). It is well
settled that "[p]arental rights and responsibilities are of deep
human importance and will not be lightly terminated." In re Paul,
101 Ill. 2d 345, 351-52 (1984). Indeed, it is precisely because "the
private interest affected [in termination proceedings] is
commanding" (Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 609, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982)), that parental rights
may be terminated only upon a finding, supported by clear and
convincing evidence, that a parent is an "unfit" person as defined
in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)
(West1998)). 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998). Our decision
today expresses no opinion with respect to the ultimate disposition
of the termination of parental rights proceeding in the case at bar.
	In sum, the doctrine of separation of powers does not seek to
achieve a complete divorce between the branches of government.
In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d  at 7. Inevitably, there are areas in which
separate spheres of governmental authority overlap and certain
functions are thereby shared. Such an overlap of governmental
authority does not contravene the separation of powers doctrine.
E.g., Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 411. As we explained in In re J.J., due to
the unique nature of abuse, neglect and dependency proceedings
conducted pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, both the State's
Attorney and the circuit court have concurrent obligations to
protect the best interests of the minor. Just as the circuit court in
In re J.J. had a statutory duty to determine whether the State's
motion to dismiss was in the best interests of the minor, the circuit
court in the matter at bar had a duty under the statute to set a
permanency goal and enter orders to effectuate that goal. The duty
and authority vested in the circuit court by the Juvenile Court Act
does not offend the separation of powers doctrine. Accordingly,
the appellate court did not err in affirming the judgment of the
circuit court.
	We now turn to the remaining argument raised in the petition
for cross-relief (155 Ill. 2d R. 318(a)) filed by the GAL. The GAL
contends that it should be allowed to prosecute the petition to
terminate parental rights on behalf of D.S. The GAL asserts that
denying D.S. the opportunity to prosecute the termination petition
through her GAL violates rights guaranteed her under the Juvenile
Court Act, as well as under the United States and Illinois
Constitutions. The GAL further contends that ordering the State's
Attorney to prosecute the termination petition, while not allowing
the GAL to do so, would compromise D.S.'s case. In the
alternative, the GAL asserts that the circuit court appropriately
ordered the State's Attorney to prosecute the termination petition.
We conclude that the arguments raised in support of the GAL's
petition for cross-relief lack merit.
	The GAL cites three provisions of the Juvenile Court Act in
support of its argument that the GAL should be allowed to
prosecute the termination petition. First, relying upon section
1-2(1) of the Act (750 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 1998)), the GAL
contends that D.S. has a "right to be made available for adoption
within a reasonable amount of time after removal from her natural
parents, if her natural parents are unfit." Second, pursuant to
section 1-2(3)(a) of the Act, the GAL observes that, in all
proceedings under the Act, D.S. has the procedural rights of adults
unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the minor's
protection. (705 ILCS 405/1-2(3)(a) (West 1998)). Third, the
GAL asserts that pursuant to section 1-5 of the Act (705 ILCS
405/1-5(1) (West 1998)), D.S. has the right to counsel, the right
to be heard, and the right to present evidence material to these
proceedings.
	In addition, the GAL asserts that several constitutional rights
held by D.S. require that the GAL be allowed to prosecute the
termination petition. Specifically, the GAL contends that, pursuant
to article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §12), D.S. has the right to freely and promptly
obtain a remedy for the grievances alleged in the termination
petition. The GAL also makes the general argument that D.S. has
the right to due process and equal protection of the laws under the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amend. XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2).
	Apart from providing citation to the above provisions, the
GAL has failed to adequately explain, and we cannot discern, how
the statutory and constitutional rights cited by the GAL in the
petition for cross-relief would be violated if the office of the
State's Attorney, rather than the GAL, prosecutes the termination
petition. The GAL has not shown how allowing it to prosecute the
petition to terminate parental rights would appreciably add to the
ability of the circuit court to guard the welfare of a minor. Indeed,
the record in this matter belies the GAL's arguments. Contrary to
the position of the GAL that D.S. has been, and will continue to
be, without adequate rights during these proceedings, D.S. has
been represented by a GAL and counsel whose duty it is to protect
the rights of D.S. and advocate for her best interests. In accordance
with section 1-5 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/1-5 (West 1998)),
D.S.'s GAL has protected her right to be heard and to present
evidence material to these proceedings. Further, the circuit court
has assured the protection of D.S.'s statutory and constitutional
rights throughout the course of this matter.
	The Juvenile Court Act contains no provision affording
private parties the right to prosecute petitions filed pursuant to the
Act. As we noted above, it is well settled that the office of the
State's Attorney is charged with prosecuting petitions under the
Act, and the State's Attorney and the circuit court share the
concurrent duty to ensure the best interests of the child, the child's
family, and the community. Our decision today recognizing the
statutory duty and authority of the circuit court to guard the
interests of minors in proceedings conducted pursuant to the
Juvenile Court Act and to compel the State to take action in
accordance with that duty will assure that the shared duty will be
exercised in the minor's best interests.
	In addition, we note that, under the provisions of the Juvenile
Court Act, D.S. and the GAL have the right to be actively involved
in the termination proceedings. Section 1-5 of the Act provides
that D.S. has the right to be represented by counsel, to be present,
and to be heard. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 1998). Further, as a
party to the termination action, the GAL, on behalf of D.S., may
question witnesses, present evidence, examine pertinent court files
and records, and make arguments to the court. 705 ILCS
405/1-5(1) (West 1998). We therefore conclude that there is no
merit to the argument raised by the GAL that the statutory or
constitutional rights of D.S. would be compromised by ordering
the State to prosecute her petition.



CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the order of the circuit
court directing the State to prosecute a pending termination
petition after setting a permanency goal of substitute care pending
court determination on the termination of parental rights did not
violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers
contained in article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of
1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1). We further hold that the GAL
does not have authority to prosecute a petition to terminate
parental rights pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE THOMAS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
	 
1.      1At the time the minors were removed from the family home, D.S.
was 4 years old, R.S. was 8, R.S. was 11, and E.H. was 14.

2.      2E.H. was not named in the termination petition because she had
already reached the age of emancipation.

3.      3A motion to dismiss the petition to terminate parental rights was
also filed by DCFS. In its motion, DCFS echoed the arguments
advanced by the State.

4.      4The Act defines the term "petition" to include any supplemental
petitions filed in a case. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(12) (West 1998).