Case Title: State of New Jersey v. Peter Vandeweaghe

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-9-02

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). In 1998, defendant was a homeless alcoholic living on the streets of Atlantic City. Penny Lacomchek was also homeless and an alcoholic. They pooled their resources to purchase alcohol, clothes and occasional shelter. On July 24, 1998, Atlantic City police officers were dispatched to investigate the report of a male beating a female. The officers found Lacomchek sitting at the top of a motel staircase with defendant standing nearby. Lacomchek refused to sign a complaint or to be transported to a hospital. Shortly thereafter, several witnesses saw defendant repeatedly kick Lacomchek in the head and the police were called again. The officer testified that on arriving he saw defendant standing over Lacomchek and kicking her. Defendant was arrested. Lacomchek was transported to a hospital, where she later died. The State charged defendant with purposeful or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1), (2). At trial, defendant admitted kicking Lacomchek, but claimed that his faculties were so prostrated due to self-induced intoxication that he was incapable of acting purposely or knowingly. In support, defendant offered the testimony of a forensic psychiatrist, who diagnosed him as suffering from severe alcohol addiction. The expert concluded that defendant was so overwhelmed by intoxication on the night he kicked Lacomchek to death that he was not able to form the intent to kill or to cause serious bodily injury. The defendant's expert also commented on a pretrial report authored by the State's expert. In that report, the State's expert opined that defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder. Defendant's expert testified that intoxication precludes a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder and that the diagnosis by the State's expert was incorrect. The State's expert testified that although defendant suffered from alcohol addiction, defendant was not unduly influenced by alcohol on the night Lacomchek died. The State's expert also testified that defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder and explained that the disorder would not affect defendant's ability to know what was happening or to act purposefully. The State's expert discussed the characteristics of the disorder as including impulsivity, lying, lawlessness, aggressiveness, irresponsibility and a lack of remorse. The expert then discussed defendant's past conduct that supported the diagnosis. That conduct included defendant's prior arrest for burglary, imprisonment for larceny, and statements by individuals interviewed by the expert who contended that defendant lied, gambled, stole and engaged in other undesirable conduct. The expert also testified that a person with an antisocial personality is able to lie successfully, and he testified as to defendant's ability to sound sincere. Defense counsel did not object to the expert's testimony. However, the court cautioned the jury not to infer that on the night in question the defendant acted in conformance with the prior acts mentioned, or that he is a bad person, or that because of those prior acts he committed the offense charged. The court instructed the jury that the discussion by the State's expert of defendant's alleged prior bad acts could be considered only for the purpose of assessing the foundation of the expert's conclusions. The jury found defendant guilty. The Appellate Division reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial. The panel held that the testimony by the State's expert regarding defendant's personality disorder, which included inadmissible hearsay statements and opinions regarding the credibility and moral character of the defendant, unduly prejudiced the defendant and thus had the capacity to produce an unjust result. The panel also noted that the trial court erred in allowing a police officer to testify that he was dispatched to investigate a report that a male was beating a female, because such testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence. This Court granted the State's petition for certification, 174 N.J. 363 (2002). The State conceded that evidence of defendant's personality disorder was irrelevant to whether defendant possessed the necessary mens rea for purposeful or knowing murder. The State argued, however, that the defense expert's testimony that a personality disorder cannot be diagnosed when an individual is under the influence of alcohol opened the door to allow the State's expert to explain the basis of his diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. HELD : The State's expert's testimony in respect of his determination that defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder was inadmissible and so prejudicial that it clearly had the capacity to produce an unjust result thereby denying defendant the right to a fair trial. 1. The opening-the-door doctrine authorizes admitting evidence that otherwise would have been inadmissible in order to respond to (1) admissible evidence that generates an issue, or (2) inadmissible evidence admitted over an objection. The doctrine allows a party to elicit otherwise inadmissible evidence when the opposing party has made unfair prejudicial use of related evidence. A related doctrine of curative admissibility provides that when inadmissible, prejudicial evidence has been allowed and when the proffered testimony would counter the prejudice, the opposition may introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to rebut or explain the prior evidence. (Pp. 10-11). 2. The opening-the-door doctrine and the curative admissibility doctrine can be used only to prevent prejudice and may not be subverted into a rule for the injection of prejudice. Introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence under those doctrines is permitted only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice that might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence. Here, the record is devoid of any evidence that harm or prejudice to the State resulted from the defense expert's testimony that defendant's alcoholism precluded a diagnosis of a personality disorder. Both the defense expert and the State's expert agreed at trial that such a diagnosis was irrelevant to defendant's capacity to act purposely or knowingly. Accordingly, the State's expert should not have offered testimony in respect of his opinion that defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder. (Pp. 11-12). 3. Much of the State's expert's testimony also should have been excluded on grounds of undue prejudice and inadmissible hearsay. The Court adopts the reasoning of the Appellate Division in respect of those issues and it expresses particular concern about the testimony that defendant's personality disorder enabled him to lie successfully. In effect, the State's expert told the jury that it should not believe the defendant. Such testimony impermissibly usurped the jury's exclusive role in assessing witness' credibility. (Pp. 12 13). 4. Defense counsel's failure to object to the testimony regarding defendant's antisocial personality disorder and the basis for that diagnosis does not excuse the State's introduction of such highly prejudicial evidence. The testimony by the State's expert, including his description of the disorder and the recitation of hearsay that formed the basis of the opinion, was so prejudicial as to clearly produce an unjust result. (Pp. 13 -15). 5. In respect of testimony by the police officer that he was dispatched to investigate a report that a male was beating a female, an officer may explain the reason he went to the scene of the crime by stating that he did so upon information received. Such testimony is admissible to show that the officer was not acting in an arbitrary manner or to explain his subsequent conduct. When an officer becomes specific by repeating what some other person told him concerning a crime of the accused, that testimony violates both the hearsay rule and the right of confrontation. On remand, the State may elicit evidence that the police went to the scene on information received, but it may not introduce evidence that the reason for the dispatch was a report of a man beating a woman. (Pp. 15-16). The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, and ALBIN join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI's opinion. Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETER VANDEWEAGHE, Defendant-Respondent. Argued April 29, 2003 Decided July 21, 2003 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 351 N.J. Super. 467 (2002). Nancy A. Hulett, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Ms. Hulett and Wendy Alice Way, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs). Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by ZAZZALI, J. In this appeal we must determine whether the admission of irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence that defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder was justified on the ground that defendant opened the door in his intoxication defense to murder. This matter arose after several individuals witnessed defendant Peter Vandeweaghe kick his female companion to death in Atlantic City. Defendant claimed that at the time of the incident he was incapable of forming the requisite mens rea for purposeful or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1),(2), due to severe, self-induced intoxication. Defendant and the State each presented a forensic psychologist to testify regarding defendant s intoxication and its impact on his ability to act purposely or knowingly. In addition, each expert presented conflicting testimony concerning whether defendant suffered from antisocial personality disorder. We conclude that the expert testimony in respect of antisocial personality disorder was inadmissible. We also find that the State s expert s testimony regarding that disorder was so prejudicial that it clearly had the capacity to produce an unjust result and, for that reason, denied defendant the right to a fair trial. We therefore affirm. Relying on his interview with defendant, police accounts of the night of the offense, and witnesses statements, as well as statements made by several individuals that had interacted with defendant in the past, Dr. Welner concluded that defendant s personality conformed to those criteria. Dr. Welner then discussed in greater detail the events in defendant s history that he relied on in reaching his diagnosis. He stated that defendant told him that after he was drafted for military service, he became involved with an exotic dancer, took on her name, and disappeared until he was arrested for burglary. Defendant also informed Dr. Welner that he had served time in prison for larceny, and then relocated to Illinois. Dr. Welner further testified that he had interviewed several individuals that had come into contact with defendant in Illinois, and learned that defendant had engaged in lying, gambling, stealing, womanizing, and abusing alcohol. As a result of his interviews, Dr. Welner determined that defendant had a history of alcohol and intravenous drug abuse, as well as a record of lawbreaking, that included numerous arrests. Dr. Welner then testified that defendant s past conduct was consistent with that of an individual who suffers from antisocial personality disorder. The doctor noted that a person with an antisocial personality has a longstanding history of being able to lie and to lie successfully. In discussing his assessment of defendant s recollection of the instant offense, and defendant s remorse regarding Lacomchek s death, Dr. Welner stated: I felt that [defendant] sounded sincere all the time. I felt that if I was sitting there and if I would close my eyes and listen to him, or even just open my eyes and listen to him, that I would have found him utterly believable. If I would have sat with [defendant] and he would have been my entire source of information he would leave me with the impression that everything happened exactly as it did. Defense counsel did not object to Dr. Welner s testimony concerning defendant s personality disorder or the evidence that Dr. Welner relied on to form the basis of his diagnosis. However, the trial court cautioned the jury not to infer that on the night in question that the defendant acted in conformance with those prior acts mentioned, that he s a bad person, or that because of those prior acts he committed the offense here charged. It then instructed the jury that Dr. Welner s discussion of defendant s alleged prior bad acts must be considered only for the limited and sole purpose of assessing the foundation of certain conclusions drawn by [Dr. Welner] with respect to [his] psychiatric diagnosis. The jury found defendant guilty of purposeful or knowing murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1),(2). The trial court sentenced defendant to a life term, with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, or sixty-two years, six months, and nineteen days, to be served without parole. The Appellate Division reversed defendant s conviction and remanded for a new trial. It held that Dr. Welner s testimony regarding defendant s personality disorder, which included inadmissible hearsay statements, as well as opinions regarding the credibility and moral character of defendant, unduly prejudiced defendant, and thus had the capacity to produce an unjust result. Vandeweaghe, supra, 351 N.J. Super. at 476. The panel also noted that the trial court erred in allowing Officer McGee to testify that he was dispatched approximately one-half hour before defendant s arrest to investigate a report that a male was beating a female, because such testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence. Id. at 484-85. We granted the State s petition for certification, 174 N.J. 363 (2002), and now affirm. [ 252 N.J. Super. 11, 39 (App. Div. 1991) (quoting Commonwealth v. Seese, 517 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. 1986)), aff d, 130 N.J. 554 (1993).] Here, Dr. Welner told the jury, in effect, that defendant was a liar and that defendant had a longstanding history of lying. Vandeweaghe, supra, 351 N.J. Super. at 480. Dr. Welner improperly suggested to the jury that it should not believe defendant. Such testimony impermissibly usurped the jury s exclusive role in assessing witness credibility. State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 595 (2002) ( [C]redibility is an issue which is peculiarly within the jury s ken and with respect to which ordinarily jurors require no expert assistance. ) (quoting J.Q., supra, 252 N.J. Super. at 39); State v. Pasterick, 285 N.J. Super. 607, 620 (App. Div. 1995) ( There is no provision in our legal system for a truth-teller who is authorized to advise the jury on the basis of ex parte investigations what the facts are and that the defendant s story is a lie. ). Accordingly, the trial court should not have allowed Dr. Welner s testimony in respect of defendant s veracity. NO. A-9 SEPTEMBER TERM 2002 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETER VANDEWEAGHE, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED July 21, 2003 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali CONCURRING OPINION BY DISSENTING OPINION BY