Case Title: Board of Professional Responsibility, Wyoming State Bar v. Kara Crawford-Fink, WSB # 6-3966

Citation: 2019 WY 119

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2019 WY 119
October Term, A.D. 2019
December 4, 2019
BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, WYOMING
STATE BAR,
Petitioner,
D-19-0011

KARA CRAWFORD-FINK, WSB #
6-396,

Respondent.

ORDER OF ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION

[5.1] This matter came before the Court upon the Board of Professional Responsibility’s
“Report and Recommendation for One-Year Suspension.” filed herein November 20, 2019,
pursuant to Rule 12 of the Wyoming Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (stipulated
discipline). After a careful review of the Report and Recommendation and the file, the
Court finds the Report and Recommendation should be approved, confirmed and adopted
by the Court, and that Kara Crawford-Fink should be suspended from the practice of law
for one year. Itis, therefore,

 

 

 

[{2] ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that the Board of Professional Responsibility’s
“Report and Recommendation for One-Year Suspension,” which is attached hereto and
incorporated herein, shall be, and the same hereby is, approved, confirmed, and adopted by
this Court; and itis further

 

 

[$3] ADJUDGED AND ORDERED that, as a result of the conduet set forth in the
Report and Recommendation for One-Year Suspension, Respondent Kara Crawford-Fink
shall be, and hereby is, suspended from the practice of law for one year, with the peri
suspension to begin December 13, 2019; and itis further

   

  
$4] ORDERED that, during the period of suspension, Respondent shall comply with
the requirements of the Wyoming Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, particularly the
requirements found in Rule 21 of those rules. That rule governs the duties of disbarred and
‘suspended attomeys; and it is further

 

   

[$5] ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 25 of the Wyoming Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure, Respondent shall reimburse the Wyoming State Bar the amount of $50.00,
‘which represents the costs incurred in handling this matter, as well as pay an administrative
fee of $750.00. Respondent shall pay the total amount of $800.00 to the Wyoming State
Bar on or before February 3, 2020. If Respondent fails to make payment in the time
allotted, execution may issue on the award; and itis further

 

 

[£6] ORDERED that the Wyoming State Bar is authorized to issue the stipulated press
release contained in the “Report and Recommendation for One-Year Suspension”; and it
is further

 

 

[f7] ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall docket this “Order of One-Year
Suspension,” along with the incorporated “Report and Recommendation for One-Year
Suspension” as a matter coming regularly before this Court as a public record; and itis
further

 

[£8] ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 9(6) of the Wyoming Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure, this “Order of One-Year Suspension.” along with the incorporated “Report and
Recommendation for One-Year Suspension” shall be published in the Wyoming Reporter
and the Pacific Reporter; and itis further

[£9] ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court cause a copy of this “Order of One-Year
Suspension” to be served upon Respondent Kara Crawford-Fink.

[f 10] DATED this 4” day of December, 2019.
BY THE COURT:
Isl

MICHAEL K. DAVIS
Chief Justice
THE suPraMe cox
Teor WEN
Fuld

‘BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
NOV 2.0 2019
STATE OF WYOMING “i
In the matter of ) FE re
‘KARA CRAWFORD-FINK, )
WSB # 6-396, 2) WSB No, 2018-122
Resonant y D-19-0011

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION

‘THIS MATTER came before a Review Panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility
via telephone conference call on the 13° day of November, 2019, for consideration of the par-
ties’ Stipulation for One-Year Suspension pursuant to Rules 9 and 12 of the Wyoming Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure. Present on the call were Review Panel members Debra J, Wendtland,
Katherine A. Strike and Carolyn Orr. Mark W. Gifford, Bar Counsel appeared on behalf of the
‘Wyoming State Bar. Complainant Trayce Harris appeared. Respondent Kara Crawford-Fink did
not appear. The Review Panel having reviewed the Stipulation, the supporting Affidavit and be-
{ng fully advised in the premises, finds, concludes and recommends as follows:

—

1. The present complaint against Respondent, a Casper lawyer who was edmitted to

 

practice in 2006, was submitted in October 2018 by Respondent’s former client, Trayce Harris of
(Casper. At the time Ms, Harris’ complaint was received, there were two active disciplinary in-
‘vestigations of complaints that were filed against Respondent; one by Alaina Stedillie, a Casper
‘nwyer, involving litigation misconduct by Respondent (WSB 2017-024) and the other by Steph-
nie Smith, one of Respondent's clients, involving negligence and lack diligence by Respondent
ina divorce matter (WSB 2017-116). As result of these complaints, Respondent ultimately
received a 120-day suspension effective December 15, 2018.
2, Inher complaint, Ms. Haris reported that she hired Respondent on July 14,2017,
to represent her in filing a divorce action against her husband. On that date, Ms. Haris signed an
engagement agreement with Respondent that required an up-front payment of $3,500.00. The
engagement agreement provided in relevant prt that Respondent's time would be charged atthe
‘ate of $200.00 per hour and that Respondents office would “send out monthly statements for
‘ees and services incurred for tat month.”

3, Respondent’ billing records indicate that Respondent drafted the complaint on
‘August 10,2017. Ms. Haris signed it and Respondent's legal assistant, Rita Martin, notarized it
the same day. Respondents signature was added tothe complaint on August 16,2017, The di-
voree complaint was fled October 27,2017.

4, Between July 14, 2017 the date of Respondents initial meeting with Ms. Haris,
snd October 27, 2017, te day the divorce complaint was fled, Respondent recorded 12.0 hours
‘oftime on the matter. Respondent concedes that this is an unreasonable amount of time forthe
‘work connected with preparing and filing « 1¥-page, proforma divorce complaint. However,
the parties have differing recollections regarding the numberof times they met

5. On April 30, 2018, Ms. Harts ent Respondent an email terminating her services.
‘The emsil closed with the following request: “Please remit arefund ofthe total amount Ihave
‘id less the amount for service rendered thus far and thank you.” Respondent did not respond
to the request.

6. On March 30,2018, a stipulation fra public censure inthe Smith matter, WSB
2017-116, was submitted tothe BPR. In the stipulation, Respondent admitted that she violated
Rale 1.5 (billing ervor/unreasonsble charges) and Rule 1.16 (failure to refund wneamed portion
of fee) in her representation of Smith. The proposed public censure was rejected by the BPR.
7. On June 20, 2018, Ms. Harris sent another email wth a second request: “Please
remit and retum to me, tothe address indicated below, the amount I paid ($3500) less the cost of
your service rendered at your earliest convenience.” The “address indicated below’ for Ms. Har-
ris is P.O. Box 521, Casper, WY £2602. This is the same mailing address shown on Respond-
nt’s office's Client Information Sheet and on Ms. Harris’ complaint agninst Respondent inthis
‘matter. Respondent did not respond to the request.

8. On October 3, 2018, the BPR, which had easier rejected a public censure in the
Smith matter, approved a stipulated 30-day suspension. Inthe stipulation, Respondent again
‘admitted that she violated Rule 1.5 (billing erorsunreasonable charges) and Rule 1.16 (failure to
refund unearned portion of fe) in her representation of Smith,

9. On October 9, 2018, Ms, Haris filed a complaint with Bar Counsel, Bar Counsel
mailed a copy ofthe complaint to Respondent witha request for her written response by October
25,2018, The deadline to respond to the complaint passed without any word from Respondent,
‘Prompting Bar Counsel to send a follow-up request by certified mail on October 30, 2018

10, Inher intial response to Ms, Harris’ complaint, dated November 62018, Re-
spondent stated:

‘As fora refund, Ms. Haris called my office esking for her full refund,

however I do not have a curent address for Ms. Haris. I show there is a

refund she is due which is about $750, I would be happy to send that to

Ms. Harris. The address on the Bar Complaint shows a third address for

‘Ms. Haris diferent from any other address Ihave seen. If Ms. Harris

‘ould confirm that is her current address, I would gladly refund the $750,

11, On November 28,2018, the Wyoming Supreme Court issued an order of 120-day
suspension of Respondent, effective December 15, 2018. In the order, the Court approved and
‘adopted the BPR’s recommendation that Respondent receive a 30-day suspension for her con-
‘duct in the Smith matter,
12, On December 11, 2018, Bar Counsel mailed a copy of Ms. Haris’ supplemental
response to Respondent. The supplemental response also showed Ms. Haris’ mailing address as
P.O. Box 521, Casper, WY 82602, Still, Respondent did not send Ms. Harris a refund,

13, In Ber Counsel's December 11, 2018 letter, Bar Counsel asked Respondent to
‘produce her entire file in the Harris matter, including emails and billing records, by December
28,2018. Respondent did not comply withthe request for billing records until January 18, 2019
~after yet another follow-up reminder from Bar Counsel's office — when Respondent produced a
billing statement dated November 5, 2018, That billing statement ~ the first and only invoice
Respondent has produced for het work on Ms. Harts’ case (Respondent never did send Ms. Har-
isa bill for her work on the case, though the fee agreement provided that monthly statements
‘would be sent) shows a refund due to Ms. Harris in the amount of $749.00. Still, Respondent
id not send Ms. Haris a refund.

14, Ofrelevance tothe present proceeding is that on March 26, 2018, Respondent
signed an affidavit of conditional admission in the Stephanie Smith matter which included the
following admissions:

I further acknowledge that in my representation of Ms. Smith I violated Rule

1.5(@), which provides, “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or

collet an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.” The Wyo-

‘ming Supreme Court has held that a lawyer may only charge a client for work ac-

tually pecformed, and that a lawyer's invoices must “accurately describe the legal

services and amounts charged to the client” Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility v. Cas-

‘Per, 318 P.3d 790, 795 (Wyo. 2014). In addition, a lawyer is required to exercise

“billing judgment” inthe fees charged, whichis usually demonstrated “by the at-

tomey writing off unproductive, excess ot redundant hours.” Casper, supra, 318

P.3d at 796 (quoting Jn re NRF, 294 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo. 2013). Tacknowledge

‘that I filed in my Rule 1.5 duties o Ms. Smith in at leat the following respects:

| charged 5 hours at $200.00 per hour for the preparation ofthe letter of April 3,

2017. ‘That letter could not have taken me more than one-half hour to write and as

ook atit now, itis clearly an error. I charged 4 hours to prepare the motion to

‘withdraw. Having been terminated by Ms. Smith for my failure to discharge my
obligations to her, it was not reasonable for me to charge Ms, Smith forthe prepa

 

 

 

 
ration ofthat motion, I miscalculated the amount of Ms. Smith's refund and did

‘not correct that error when it was brought to my attention. That error resulted in

‘overcharging Ms. Smith $190.00.

‘Upon termination of representation, Rule 1.16(d) requires a lawyer tore-

fund any advance payment of fees that have not been eared, T acknowledge

‘that I violated this rule as set forth above,

15, ‘The parties stipulate that Respondent violated Rules 1.5 and 1.16 in hee represen
{ation of Ms. Haris. Specifically, as noted in Respondent's affidavit of conditional admission in
‘the Smith case, Rule 1.5(a) provides, “A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or col-
lect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.” A lawyer may only charge &
client for work setually performed. A lawyer's invoices must accurately describe the legal sex-
vices and amounts charged tthe client. In addition, a lawyer is required to exercise “billing
judgment” in the fees charged, which i usually demonstrated “by the attomey writing off unpro-
‘ductive, excess or redundant hours.” Casper, supra. The partis stipulate that there is clear and
‘convincing evidence that Respondent violated her Rule 1.5 duties to Ms, Harris in numerous re-
pects, just as she did in he representation of Ms. Smith.

16, Upon termination of representation, Rule 1.16(4) requires a lawyer to reftnd any
‘sdvance payment of fes that have not been eared. The partis stipulate that there is clear and
convincing evideace that Respondent violated her Rule 1.16(4) duty to Ms. Harris as set forth
above, justas she did in her representation of Ms. Smith.

17, _Aspart ofthe stipulated resolution ofthis matter, Respondent has refunded Ms.
Harris $3,000.00 ofthe $3,500.00 advance payment Ms. Harris made upon commencement of
the representation. This partial refund of Ms, Haris’ advance payment isa mitigating factor in
determining the eppropriate sanction for Respondent's misconduct.
18. Tn Respondent's ease, aggravating factors include: (1) a disciplinary history (Re-
spondent received a private reprimand in 2017 and a 120-day suspension in 2018); (2) a pattern
cf misconduct; and (3) multiple offenses. Respondent's agreement to refund a substantial por-
tion ofthe fee to the client is a mitigating facto.

19. Armujrity ofthe Review Panel approves the partes’ stipulation and recommends
that the Court impose a one-year suspension asthe appropriate sanction for Respondent's mis-
conduct. Ifthe Court issues an Order of One-Year Suspension in accordance herewith, Bar
Counsel and Respondent have agreed to the following press release:

‘The Wyoming Supreme Cour issued an order of one-year suspension of Cas-

per ttomey Kara Crawford-Fink. The disciplinary order resulted from Crawford

Fink's representation of a clint ina divoree matter. The client paid a $3,500.00

fee atthe outset ofthe representation. The client ultimately terminated Crawford-

Fink's representation and retained other counsel, demanding a retum ofthe fee.

CCrawford-Fink failed to retur the unearned portion ofthe fee. In stipulating to a

one-year suspension, Crawford-Fink agreed that she committed violations of Rule

1.5 (ee) and Rule 1.16 (duties upon termination of representation) of the Wy0-

‘ming Rules of Professional Conduct. In light of her prior disciplinary history

(which included a private reprimand in 2017 and a 120-day suspension in 2018),

(Cravford-Fink agreed that a one-year suspension was an appropriate sanction for

her conduct. Crawford-Fink agreed to return $3,000.00, representing the remain-

{ng uneamed portion ofthe fee, tothe client. In addition to receiving a one-year

suspension, Crawford-Fink was ordered to pay an administrative fee inthe

‘amount of $750.00 and costs of $50.00 to the Wyoming State Bar.

‘Conclusions of Law

20. W.R.D-P. Rule 15(b)(3)(D) provides that in imposing a sanction for professional
‘conduc, the BPR shall epply the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (the “ABA,
Standards"). Pertinent to the present Stipulation, itis necessary to apply the ABA Standards
relevant to the duties violated by Respondent as well as aggravating and mitigating factors

21, Respondent's violations of Rule 1.5 and 1.16 implicate Standard 7.0, which pro-
vides:
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application ofthe factors
set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases
involving false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's
services, improper communication of fields of practice, improper solicitation of
professional employment from a prospective client, unreasonable or improper
ees, unauthorized practice of law, improper withdrawal from misrepresentation,

 

7.1 Disbarmentis generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in
conduct that isa violation ofa duty owed as a professional with the intent
to obtain a benefit forthe lawyer or another, and causes serious or poten-
tilly serious injury to client, the public or the legal system.

7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in
conduct that isa violation of a duty owed as professional and causes in-
Jury or potential injury to client, the public, or the legal system.

7.3 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in
‘conduct that is violation ofa duty owed as a professional and causes in-
Jury or potential injury o a client, the public, or the legal system.

7.4. Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated
instance of negligence that is a violation ofa duty owed as a professional,
‘nd causes litle or no actual or potential injury to a cient, the public, or
the legal system.

23, ABA Standard 9.0, entitled “Aggravation and Mitigation,” provides as follows:

9.1 Generally
‘Afr misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating cir-
‘cumstances may be considered in deciding what sanction to impose.
92 Aggravation
921 Definition. Aggravation or aggravating circumstances are any consid-
erations or factors that may justify an inerease inthe degree of disci-
pline tobe imposed,
9.22 Factors which may be considered in aggravation. Aggravating factors
include:
(2) prior disciplinary offenses;
(© lines or ish motive
(©) a pattem of misconducs;
(@ multiple offenses;
(©) bad faith obstruction ofthe disciplinary proceeding by intentional-
ly falling to comply with rules or orders ofthe disciplinary agency,
(submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
practices during the disciplinary process;
() refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
() vulnerability ofthe victim;
substantial experience in the practice of law;
{@) indifference in making restitution; and

 
(W) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled sub-
stances.

93 Mitigation.
931 Definition. Mitigation or mitigating circumstances are any considera-
tions or factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline
tobe imposed,
9.32 Factors which may be considered in mitigation. Mitigating factors in-
clude:
(@) absence ofa prior diseiplinary record;
(©) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(©) personal or emotional problems;
(@) timely good faith effort to make restitution orto reetify conse-
quences of misconduct;
(@) full and fice disclosure of disciplinary board or cooperative attitude
toward proceedings;
(0 inexperience in the practic of law;
(@) character or reputation;
) physical disability;
(© mental disability or chemical dependency including sleoholism or
drug abuse when:
(1) there is medical evidence thatthe respondent is affected by a
chemical dependency or meatal dsabily
(@) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the mis-

duct;

(@) the respondent's recovery from the chemical dependency or
‘mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sus-
tained period of successful rehabilitation; and

(4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence ofthat
misconduct is unlikely.

@) delay in disciplinary proceedings;
(imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
() remorse; and

(q) remoteness of prior offenses.
94 Factors Which Are Neither Aggravating nor Mitigating.
tga OME fits should not be considered as either aggravating nor
(@) forced or compelled restitution;
(©) agreeing to the client's demand for certain improper behavior or result;
(©) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer,
(@ resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
(€) complainant's recommendation as to sanction; and
(© failure of injured client to complain,
Recommendation

In consideration of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, a majority of
the Review Panel recommends as follows:

1, That Respondent receive a one-year suspension for violations of Rules 1.5 and
1.16, W.R-Prof Cond.

‘That, upon issuance of the order of suspension, the foregoing pres release may be

issued.

3. That Respondeat be required to pay an administrative fee of $750.00 and costs of|
{$50.00 to the Wyoming State Bar within 10 days of such order.

Dated this [4 day of November, 2019.

Debra J. Wendtland, Chair

Review Panel of the Board of Professional
pends

‘Wyoming State Bar