Case Title: Craney v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-86

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Craney v. State1990 WY 114798 P.2d 1202Case Number: 89-86Decided: 10/17/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
LESTER 
CRANEY,

 APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender and Mike Cornia, Appellate Counsel, for 
appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Roben D. Hunter and Camille Call, Student Interns, for 
appellee.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J.,* and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Lester Craney 
(Craney) was charged with attempted first degree sexual assault, first degree 
sexual assault and delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. He was 
convicted on three counts of attempted third degree sexual assault, third degree 
sexual assault and delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. We reverse the 
convictions and sentences for attempted third degree sexual assault and third 
degree sexual assault, but affirm the conviction and sentence for delivery of a 
controlled substance to a minor.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Craney raises 
four issues:

I. Was it * * * plain 
error for the court to instruct the jury that third degree sexual assault is a 
lesser included offense of first degree sexual assault.

II. Did the trial court 
exceed its jurisdiction when it sentenced Appellant [for third degree sexual 
assault] to three years probation to commence on completion of the prison 
sentence imposed.

III. Whether the order 
that the Appellant pay restitution in an amount to be determined as a condition 
of probation [for third degree sexual assault] must be stricken as in excess of 
jurisdiction.

[IV]. Whether the trial 
court's failure to order the prosecution to produce reports used by witness 
Anderson to prepare for his testimony was error and resulted in a violation of 
Appellant's right to confrontation.

[¶3]      We reverse in 
favor of Craney on Issue I.1

FACTS

[¶4]      On August 18, 
1988, a criminal complaint was filed against Craney. Count I of that complaint 
charged Craney with attempted sexual assault in the first degree in violation of 
W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i) and 6-1-301.2 Count II charged him with sexual 
assault in the first degree in violation of W.S. 6-2-302(a)(i). Count III 
charged him with unlawful delivery of marijuana by a person eighteen years or 
older to a person under eighteen years and who is at least three years his 
junior which is a violation of W.S. 35-7-1014(d)(xiii) and 35-7-1036.3

[¶5]      Without objection 
from the defense counsel, the trial judge gave jury instructions which permitted 
Craney's conviction of sexual assault in the third degree4 as a lesser included offense to 
sexual assault in the first degree. The jury found Craney not guilty of 
attempted sexual assault in the first degree, not guilty of sexual assault in 
the first degree, but guilty of attempted sexual assault in the third degree, 
guilty of sexual assault in the third degree, and guilty of delivering a 
controlled substance to a person under eighteen years of age. By judgment and 
sentence entered February 28, 1989, Craney was sentenced to prison for not less 
than three nor more than five years for attempted third degree sexual assault 
and a concurrent term of not less than five nor more than six years for delivery 
of a controlled substance to a minor. The trial court also sentenced him to 
three years probation for his third degree sexual assault conviction. That 
probation was to run consecutively with the prison sentences. In effect, 
Craney's sentence of probation would not begin to run until after he had served 
his prison sentences.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR 
THE THIRD DEGREE RAPE CONVICTION

[¶6]      Craney argues it 
is plain error for the trial judge to instruct the jury that third degree sexual 
assault is a lesser included offense of first degree sexual assault. We 
agree.

[¶7]      Lacking proper 
trial objection, the jury instruction at issue requires analysis under the plain 
error doctrine. See Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379, 383 (Wyo. 1989). Our standard 
of review under plain error is well established.

"`First, the record must 
be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party 
claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a 
substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially 
prejudiced.'"

Johnston v. 
State, 747 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Auclair v. State, 660 P.2d 1156, 
1159 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 909, 104 S. Ct. 265, 78 L. Ed. 2d 249 and 
Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Wyo. 1981)). See W.R.Cr.P. 
49(b).

ANALYSIS

[¶8]      The first 
component under plain error review is established because the record is clear as 
to the incident alleged as error. Instructions nineteen through twenty-two 
allowed the jury to find Craney guilty of attempted third degree sexual assault 
and third degree sexual assault as a lesser included offense. 

[¶9]      To establish the 
second component, Craney must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law was violated. This demonstration is made because third degree sexual assault 
is not a lesser included offense of first degree sexual assault. Seeley v. 
State, 715 P.2d 232, 238 (Wyo. 1986) held that for an offense to be a lesser 
included offense "every element of the lesser offense must be included in the 
greater, that is one cannot commit the greater offense without also necessarily 
committing the lesser offense." Seeley used that definition to explain why third 
degree sexual assault was not contained within the first degree sexual assault 
statute in force at that time. The Seeley discussion is helpful here. First 
degree sexual assault requires physical force or forcible confinement. Carey v. 
State, 715 P.2d 244 (Wyo.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 882, 107 S. Ct. 270, 93 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1986). Third degree sexual assault can be committed even if no force or 
confinement was used. The primary factor for commission of an offense is an age 
differential. Kallas v. State, 704 P.2d 693 (Wyo. 1985). In fact, third degree 
sexual assault can occur even where there is agreement by the parties. Ross v. 
State, 16 Wyo. 285, 93 P. 299, reh'g denied 16 Wyo. 285, 94 P. 217 (1908). Third 
degree sexual assault only requires sexual intrusion between two people, one of 
whom is less than sixteen5 years old and another who is more 
than four years older than the one who is less than sixteen. Third degree sexual 
assault cannot be a lesser included offense to first degree sexual assault 
because its elements are not contained within the set of elements for first 
degree sexual assault.6 Seeley, 715 P.2d 232; Carey, 715 P.2d 244. The violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law is then 
demonstrated.

[¶10]   The third component is similarly 
established because Craney demonstrates that a substantial right has been denied 
him and, as a result, he has been materially prejudiced. The right not to be 
convicted of a crime for which one is not charged is substantial. The Wyoming 
Constitution prohibits a person from being convicted of a crime not charged.7 We explained in State v. Selig, 635 P.2d 786, 793 (Wyo. 1981) that one is materially prejudiced when there is no 
notice of the charges to be defended against. In Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 481 (Wyo. 1983) (quoting Gonzales v. State, 551 P.2d 929 (Wyo. 1976)), we 
said:

Rule 9(a), W.R.Cr.P., 
implements the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to be informed of 
the nature of the charge(s) against him. This court has said: "[i]n a criminal 
indictment, it is only necessary to allege sufficiently to allow the accused to 
understand the charge and prepare his defense."

[¶11]   To charge Craney with first degree 
sexual assault and attempted first degree sexual assault and then convict him of 
third degree sexual assault and attempted third degree sexual assault not only 
prevents an adequate defense, but allows for the conviction of an uncharged 
crime. Craney was materially prejudiced.

DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE 
INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S REPORT

[¶12]   Our review of the record of 
Craney's trial attorney's opening and closing arguments indicates this appellate 
issue can only relate to the third degree sexual assault convictions. We are 
left with this impression because his trial counsel appeared to concede during 
opening argument that Craney purchased alcohol for the minor child and that the 
two smoked marijuana together. During closing argument, his trial counsel seemed 
to make the same concession by indicating that Craney and the minor child had 
passed a marijuana pipe back and forth. Our impression that the delivery 
conviction is not being challenged was confirmed when Craney's appellate counsel 
responded in the negative during oral argument when asked if he was attacking 
the conviction for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor. Since we are 
convinced that this appeal is directed to the convictions upon which Craney has 
prevailed, we leave undisturbed the conviction for delivery of a controlled 
substance to a minor. Consequently, we will not consider the significant issue 
of denied access to the police officer's investigation report for 
cross-examination8 when consideration would be 
academic and advisory for appellate resolution of this case. Mari v. Rawlins 
Nat. Bank of Rawlins, 794 P.2d 85 (Wyo. 1990); Tobin v. Pursel, 539 P.2d 361 
(Wyo. 1975); West v. Willey, 453 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1969). See also, in regard to 
interpretation of a rule of this court, Arland v. State, 788 P.2d 1125, 1128 n. 
5 (Wyo. 1990).

CONCLUSION

[¶13]   For these reasons, we reverse 
Craney's convictions and sentences for attempted third degree sexual assault and 
third degree sexual assault. We affirm the conviction and sentence for delivery 
of a controlled substance to a minor.

FOOTNOTES

1 With disposition of the 
appeal on Issue I, we will not consider the sexual assault sentencing issue 
raised by Craney's second claim. Relating to Issue III, Keller v. State, 771 P.2d 379, 387 (Wyo. 1989) held that a trial judge exceeds the "sentencing 
authority by ordering restitution without providing an amount[.]"

Although not raised as an 
issue, we also note that Craney was convicted and sentenced for both attempted 
sexual assault in the third degree and completed sexual assault in the third 
degree. It is not clearly determinable whether these convictions relate to the 
same act or different events. If the two charges relate to the same criminal 
act, dual convictions would be improper. A person may not be convicted and 
sentenced for both the attempt and the completed crime. The two merge. Entry of 
judgment on both charges is barred by double jeopardy. See Malemute v. State, 
791 P.2d 624, 625 (Alaska App. 1990); Tuckfield v. State, 621 P.2d 1350, 1352 
(Alaska 1981); and State v. Benite, 6 Conn. App. 667, 507 A.2d 478, 482 
(1986).

2 W.S. 6-1-301 provides in 
pertinent part that:

(a) A person is guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime if:

(i) With the intent to 
commit the crime, he does any act which is a substantial step towards commission 
of the crime. A "substantial step" is conduct which is strongly corroborative of 
the firmness of the person's intention to complete the commission of the 
crime[.]

See 
Ramirez v. State, 739 P.2d 1214 (Wyo. 1987).

W.S. 6-2-302 provides in 
pertinent part that:

(a) Any actor who 
inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first 
degree if:

(i) The actor causes 
submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably calculated 
to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible 
confinement[.]

3 W.S. 35-7-1036 provides 
in pertinent part that:

Any person eighteen (18) 
years of age or over who violates W.S. 35-7-1031(a) [unlawful manufacture or 
delivery] by distributing a controlled substance listed in Schedules I or II 
which is a narcotic drug to a person under eighteen (18) years of age who is at 
least three (3) years his junior is punishable by the fine authorized in W.S. 
35-7-1031(a)(i), by a term of imprisonment of up to twice that authorized by 
W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(i), or both.

4 W.S. 6-2-304(a)(i) 
provides that an actor commits sexual assault in the third degree if the actor 
is at least four years older than the victim and sexually intrudes a victim who 
is less than sixteen years.

5 The ancestor of this 
offense is the old time statutory rape crime with which senior attorneys who 
practiced in criminal law became very familiar, since at one time it could 
involve young persons of about the same age. State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 224 P.2d 500 (1950).

6 While there are at least 
three distinct approaches available, this court has never settled on a theory 
for application of a lesser included offense instruction. These are the common 
law or strict statutory elements approach, the cognate approach and the model 
penal code approach. State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1988); Corbin v. 
Hillery, 74 N.Y.2d 279, 545 N.Y.S.2d 71, 543 N.E.2d 714, cert. granted ___ U.S. 
___, 110 S. Ct. 362, 107 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1989), aff'd ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 
109 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1990); Barnett, The Lesser-Included Offense Doctrine: A Present 
Day Analysis For Practitioners, 5 Conn.L.Rev. 255, 255-56 (1972); Blair, 
Constitutional Limitations on the Lesser Included Offense Doctrine, 21 
Am.Crim.L.Rev. 445 (1984); Ettinger, In Search of a Reasoned Approach to the 
Lesser Included Offense, 50 Brooklyn L.Rev. 191 (1984).

Justice Lavorato, writing 
for the Iowa Supreme Court in Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d  at 730, has provided an 
organized evaluation of the lesser included offense approaches.

This subject is fraught 
with confusion because of the doctrine's elusiveness in its definition and 
application. Adding to this confusion is the interplay between the doctrine and 
several constitutional principles. * * * Generally, the doctrine allows a trier 
of fact to convict a defendant of an offense less serious than the one charged. 
* * * Rooted in sixteenth-century English common law, the doctrine found its way 
into American jurisprudence in the late 1700's. * * *

* * * * * *

In applying the doctrine, 
courts must ask two questions: what is a lesser-included offense, and when 
should a trial court instruct on it. Koenig, The Many-Headed Hydra of 
Lesser-Included Offenses: A Herculean Task for the Michigan Courts, 1975 
Det.C.L.Rev. 41, 43.

We 
need not settle on a particular approach here since under any approach, third 
degree sexual assault is not a lesser included offense to first degree sexual 
assault.

7 Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
10, provides in pertinent part:

In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation, to have a copy 
thereof, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process served for obtaining witnesses, and to a speedy trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed.

(Emphasis 
added.)

8 W.R.Cr.P. 18(c) (Jencks 
Act); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 77 S. Ct. 1007, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1103 
(1957).