Case Title: Davis v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Davis v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc.1990 WY 132802 P.2d 840Case Number: 89-63Decided: 12/04/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
John DAVIS; Wayne 
Barnett; Fred Barnett; Clair Cheatham and Vida Cheatham,

 Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

CONSOLIDATED OIL & 
GAS, INC., a Colorado Corporation, successor in interest to Vanderbilt Resources 
Corporation, a Texas Corporation and Vanderbilt Energy Corporation, a Texas 
Corporation; Adobe Resources Corporation, a Delaware Corporation; The Grayrock 
Corporation, a Texas Corporation, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Hot Springs County, William Taylor, J.

P. Richard Meyer 
and Robert N. Williams of Meyer & Williams, Jackson, and Henry C. Phibbs II 
of Phibbs & Resor, Jackson, for appellants.

James R. Miller 
and Kurt C. Weiss of Baker & Hostetler, Denver, Colo., for appellee 
Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc.

Cameron Walker, 
of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, for appellees Adobe Resources 
Corp., Grayrock Corp., Vanderbilt Resources Corp. and Vanderbilt Energy 
Corp.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, J., 
Retired.

ROONEY, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1]      Appellants are 
engaged in ranching and farming operations about seven miles east of Greybull. 
Appellees1 were involved in drilling, plugging 
and abandoning of an oil and gas well located about one mile from appellants' 
properties. The well was drilled over 2,900 feet into the Madison Formation 
where it encountered pressurized water. Contending that failure to properly plug 
and abandon the well resulted in salty seepage water damaging their lands, 
appellants filed this action with claims of negligence, trespass and nuisance, 
fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life 
and punitive damages.

[¶2]      Appellees were 
granted a directed verdict on all claims except those for negligence and 
trespass. The claims for negligence and trespass were submitted to the jury on 
special verdict interrogatories.

[¶3]      Appellants word 
the issues on appeal as follows:

"Issue I

"Whether the trial court 
erred in submitting the special verdict form, Interrogatory Number 1 to the jury 
over the objection of the appellants.

"Issue II

"Whether the trial court 
erred in excluding appellants' evidence, made known to it by an offer of proof, 
which was proper rebuttal evidence.

"Issue III

"Whether the trial court 
erred by reversing itself and permitting the appellee to list four additional 
expert witnesses on the eve of the trial 3 of whom testified at the 
trial.

"Issue IV

"Whether the trial court 
erred in granting appellee-defendants a directed verdict on 
appellants-plaintiffs' cause of action for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.

"Issue V

"Whether the trial court 
erred in granting appellee-defendants a directed verdict on 
appellants-plaintiffs' cause of action for fraud."

[¶4]      Finding no error, 
we affirm as to all parties except appellee Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 
action as to it being for the bankruptcy court and not for this 
court.

ISSUE I - SPECIAL VERDICT 
INTERROGATORY

[¶5]      The jury was 
instructed that it need not consider additional interrogatories if the answer to 
the first interrogatory was in the negative. The jury answered the first 
interrogatory in the negative, resulting in a judgment for appellees. Appellants 
here object to the wording of the first interrogatory. It read: 

"Have plaintiffs proven 
by a preponderance of the evidence that ineffective plugging and abandonment of 
the Herren Gulch # 2 well caused Madison water to flow on to any of their 
ranches?"

[¶6]      Appellants' 
contention for error in this respect fails for either of two reasons: First, if 
there was error, it was not preserved with a proper objection, and second, there 
was no error in the wording of the interrogatory.

[¶7]      In forming this 
issue, appellants contend that the trial court erred in submitting the 
interrogatory to the jury "over the objection of the appellants." The 
instructions and the verdict form were considered at length by the court and 
counsel at conference. Numerous objections were made by the parties to various 
potential instructions, but there was no objection to this interrogatory, nor 
was there an objection to it at any time before the jury retired to consider its 
verdict as required by W.R.C.P. 51, which reads in pertinent part:

"Before the argument of 
the case to the jury is begun, the court shall give to the jury such 
instructions on the law as may be necessary and same shall be in writing, 
numbered and signed by the judge, and shall be taken by the jury when it 
retires. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of 
his objection." (Emphasis added.)

The purpose of 
the rule is to inform the court of the nature and specific grounds of contended 
error in the instruction or verdict form so that the judge may reconsider the 
same and correct or modify it, if necessary, to avoid error. Oeland v. Neuman 
Transit Co., 367 P.2d 967 (Wyo. 1962); Edwards v. Harris, 397 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 
1964); Bentley v. State, 502 P.2d 203 (Wyo. 1972); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. 
Robles, 511 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 1973); Reeder v. State, 515 P.2d 969 (Wyo. 1973); 
Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307 (Wyo. 1975); Haley v. Dreesen, 532 P.2d 399 
(Wyo. 1975); Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶8]      Appellants argue 
that an objection was unnecessary to preserve error under the provisions of 
W.R.C.P. 61 relative to harmless error. W.R.C.P. 61 states:

     "No error in either 
the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling 
or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is 
ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, 
modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take 
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The 
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the 
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties."

[¶9]      W.R.C.P. 61 
cannot be interpreted to nullify the specific requirements and provisions 
of other rules of civil procedure, including the provision of W.R.C.P. 51 
requiring the necessity for an objection to the failure to give or to the giving 
of an instruction, and including the provisions of W.R.C.P. 49(a) requiring a 
demand to include submission of a desired issue of fact in a special verdict to 
prevent waiver of its consideration by the jury. W.R.C.P. 49(a) 
reads:

     "Special 
verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in 
the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the 
court may submit to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or 
other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several special findings 
which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use 
such other method of submitting the issues and requiring the written findings 
thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall give to the jury such 
explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be 
necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue. If in so 
doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the 
evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted 
unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to 
an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a finding; or, if it 
fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the 
judgment on the special verdict." (Emphasis added.)

If W.R.C.P. 61 
were interpreted as argued by appellants, an attorney would never object to the 
giving of the other party's requested instructions or to the failure to give his 
own requested instructions, thereby "sandbagging" the court and establishing a 
basis for appeal in the event of a verdict for the other party. Such 
interpretation would have the effect of inviting error. W.R.C.P. 51 must be 
taken to mean what it says. A failure to make a timely objection to the giving, 
or to the refusing to give, an instruction "stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds of his objection" is a waiver of any error 
thereon.

     "The matter of waiver 
is grounded, among other things, on the proposition that jury trials are 
time-consuming and costly proceedings and while a litigant is entitled to a fair 
trial, certain it is that he has responsibilities to assist the trial court in 
bringing about such a result. It will not do to permit a litigant to remain mute 
and speculate on the outcome of a jury trial on the record made with knowledge 
of irregularities or improprieties therein that might readily and easily have 
been corrected during the trial and then, when misfortune comes his way, to 
attempt to set the invited result aside by way of a new trial because of such 
matters. It is not fitting for the trial court or this court knowingly to reward 
or condone such conduct."

Dewitty v. 
Decker, 383 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo. 1963).

[¶10]   Second, there was no error in the 
wording of the interrogatory as contended by appellants. They argue that the use 
of the words "on to" therein prevented the jury from considering damage caused 
to their lands by the raising of the water table under their lands due to 
seepage water from the well. They argue further that the use of the word 
"Madison" in the interrogatory prevented the jury from considering damage caused 
to their lands by water from other than the Madison formation but which was 
included in, or activated by, seepage from the well.

[¶11]   With reference to the words "on to" 
in this instance, the meaning is not restricted to water moving on the surface 
of the ranch lands as argued by appellants. Appellants' ownership of the lands 
extends under the surface to the center of the earth. Such was recognized during 
the trial through appellants' evidence that most, if not all, of the damage from 
salty water or excess water was to appellants' subsurface lands, i.e., to the 
roots of the vegetation growing on the lands. The thrust of the evidence 
presented to the jury concerned damage from subsurface water. The jury was not 
misled by the interrogatory. The trial took six weeks. The testimony was 
primarily from opinions of expert witnesses. On the one side, the opinions 
included, for example, (1) that the pressurized water from the Madison formation 
was improperly blocked in the well allowing the water to enter other porous 
formations and migrate underground to appellants' lands and causing the water 
table to rise and prevent normal drainage; and (2) that improperly blocked water 
migrated underground to appellants' lands by virtue of a fault causing the rise 
in the water table. On the other side, the opinions included, for example, (1) 
that the salt and excess water migrating underground to appellants' lands came 
from leakage of the Porter Canal; (2) that it resulted from the Muddy Shell 
Creek aquifer discharge; (3) that it resulted because of a retention dam for 
open pit bentonite mines lying north of appellants' lands; and (4) that the 
water table was changing pursuant to a ten-year precipitation cycle. The 
negative answer to the interrogatory was the jury's determination that the 
subsurface water causing damage to appellants' lands was not caused by 
the plugging and abandoning of the well. 

[¶12]   With reference to the use of the 
word "Madison" in the interrogatory, the jury was likewise not misled. The 
testimony related to whether or not water from the Madison formation caused the 
damage to the appellants' lands. The contention that the well was improperly 
plugged was with reference to plugging of the Madison formation. Some of the 
experts testified to tests made by them to determine if the damage-causing water 
was from the Madison formation. Water from the Madison formation as the cause of 
damage was the central issue. Appellants argue that the reference in the 
interrogatory to Madison water precluded the jury from determining that Madison 
water from the well migrated to their lands and caused a rise in the water table 
with the damage being a result of the presence of water table water other than 
Madison water. The argument disregards the common sense of the jury. If Madison 
water actually migrated into other water in the water table, it would not retain 
its separate substance. The fluid nature of both waters would cause them to mix 
and combine. Accordingly, if the jury believed any of the Madison water had 
migrated into the raised ground water, it would have answered the interrogatory 
in the affirmative.

[¶13]   There was no error in the wording 
of the interrogatory. It addressed the fact which was basic to the premise upon 
which appellants founded their case.

ISSUE II - EXCLUSION OF 
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

[¶14]   Appellants contend that the 
district court erred in refusing to admit evidence in rebuttal consisting of a 
video tape and ten still photographs depicting seeps in the vicinity of the 
well. Appellants argue that the exhibits rebutted the testimony of appellees' 
witness Huntoon to the effect that the area was drying pursuant to a ten-year 
cycle. The trial court allowed testimony concerning the seeps but refused 
admission of the exhibits. Such was within the court's discretion.

     "A court does not 
abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of 
reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse 
of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. Eager v. Derowitsch, 68 Wyo. 
251, 232 P.2d 713 (1951); Anderson v. Englehart, 18 Wyo. 409, 108 P. 977 (1910); 
DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 303 A.2d 709 (1972); In re Estate of Horman, 
265 Cal. App. 2d 796, 71 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1968)."

Martinez v. 
State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo. 1980).

     "Judicial discretion 
is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. 
Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985)."

Martin v. State, 
720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶15]   W.S. 1-11-205(a)(iv) provides that 
after a defendant has presented his evidence "the parties will then be confined 
to rebutting evidence unless the court permits them to offer evidence in their 
original case." The general rule here applicable is stated in 75 Am.Jur.2d, 
Trials §§ 150 and 151 (1962):

     "§ 150. 
Rebuttal.

"One cannot, except in 
the discretion of the trial court, introduce as a part of his rebuttal testimony 
relative to new and independent facts competent as a part of his testimony in 
chief. What is rebuttal evidence rests largely within the discretion of the 
trial court. * * *

* * * * * *

     "The general principle 
that in order to warrant a reversal the error must have been prejudicial to some 
substantial right of the appellant or plaintiff in error applies to rulings of 
the trial court on matters relating to examination on rebuttal.

"§ 151. - Evidence in 
chief on rebuttal. 

     "As a general rule, 
the party upon whom the affirmative of an issue devolves is bound to give all 
his evidence in support of the issue in the first instance, and will not be 
permitted to hold back part of his evidence confirmatory of his case and then 
offer it on rebuttal. Rebuttal testimony offered by the plaintiff should rebut 
the testimony brought out by the defendant and should consist of nothing which 
could have been offered in chief. And unless the court in its discretion 
dispenses with the requirement, the defendant, as well as the plaintiff, should 
introduce all his evidence in chief in support of his main case. But the trial 
court may, in its discretion, permit the introduction of such evidence on 
rebuttal, and an appellate court will not interfere except in cases of clear 
abuse of discretion. Nor, as a general rule, will the court on appeal interfere 
with the discretion of the trial court in refusing to permit evidence in chief 
to be introduced in rebuttal. However, where evidence is real rebuttal evidence, 
the fact that it could have been offered in chief does not preclude its 
admission in rebuttal."

The court has 
discretion in admitting evidence admissible during a party's case in chief when 
offered in rebuttal. Gies v. Boehm, 78 Wyo. 449, 329 P.2d 807 (1958); Hunt v. 
City of Laramie, 26 Wyo. 160, 181 P. 137 (1919).

[¶16]   In this case, appellants had taken 
the deposition of witness Huntoon prior to trial. At that time they had the 
opportunity to determine the nature of his testimony, and they did so. Their 
argument that they were surprised by such testimony is not sustainable. The 
presence of seeps, bogs and surface water was testified to at length by 
appellants' witnesses in their case in chief. The exhibits were in the nature of 
cumulative evidence presented in rebuttal.

[¶17]   Of pertinence is the fact that the 
exhibits were presented on the last day of appellants' rebuttal, yet they were 
prepared and were available for presentation before appellants rested their case 
in chief. Additionally, the parties were earlier advised by the court concerning 
the offering of exhibits as a surprise to the other side. The following was said 
previously when appellants offered to introduce another exhibit not first made 
known to appellees:

     "THE COURT: Before we 
have the objection, I am going to announce to you guys, exchange these exhibits. 
Even if it's an overlay, exchange them before we get into Court. We are getting 
the jury in and out and if you don't -

     "MR. MEYER: I'm sorry 
-

     "THE COURT: That is * 
* * all right. If you don't advise each other, I'm not going to admit them after 
today."

[¶18]   This court indicated its concern 
over the necessity for prior disclosure of contemplated evidence in Barber v. 
State Highway Commission, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 726-27 (1959).

"[I]f there be no 
trickery, material evidence should not be rejected merely because it is in 
improper order. However, under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, the bar and 
bench of this State are dedicated to a full and fair disclosure of all the facts 
in a case at or prior to the time of trial, with no withholding of certain 
matters to be used as secret weapons. It is our view that rebuttal testimony 
should ordinarily be limited to that which will relieve a litigant who, having 
been free from deception in the pleadings and pretrial stages, has at the trial 
been surprised and placed at an unfair disadvantage. To effectuate this, the 
trial court must have considerable latitude in demarcating rebuttal 
testimony."

[¶19]   The trial court was also aware of 
the potential for surrebuttal if the exhibits were allowed in evidence. 
Appellees would require time to examine any seeps near the well including those 
testified to by witness Huntoon to determine their cause - whether or not they 
resulted from rain, from another outside source, etc.

[¶20]   Under the circumstances of this 
case, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing 
testimony concerning that reflected in the exhibits but denying the introduction 
into evidence of the exhibits themselves. The action did not exceed the bounds 
of reason. The court could reasonably conclude as it did.

ISSUE III - ALLOWANCE OF 
ADDITIONAL EXPERT WITNESSES

[¶21]   Appellants contend that the trial 
court erred in allowing an exception to its pretrial order by granting appellees 
Vanderbilt, Adobe and Grayrock an amendment to their list of witnesses to 
include expert witnesses Gene George, Don Cearly and Reginald Lee.2 George's expertise was as a 
geologist, Cearly's expertise was as a "mud" expert, and Lee's expertise was as 
a geophysicist. Consolidated Oil and Gas had previously been denied a request to 
add George to its list of witnesses. The trial court expressed his reasoning in 
allowing the listing of the additional witnesses as follows:

"I did let those people 
in at a late hour and I appreciate the fact that that was late in the game, but 
I did that to be fair to these people because Cam Walker c[a]me into this case 
late and didn't have an opportunity to list experts at the time we were all 
talking about them early on in the case and I thought he deserved the 
opportunity - and he did - to list some experts of his own for your 
theory."

[¶22]   Following is the chronology 
pertinent to the court's reasoning.

March 3, 1987 
John Davis v. Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc. and Loy E. Harris3 was filed. Docket      
14978.

August 12, 1987 
Wayne Barnett, Fred Barnett, Clair Cheatham and Vida Cheatham v. Consolidated 
Oil and Gas, Inc., Loy E. Harris & Halliburton Company4 was filed. Docket 
15092.

November 3, 1987 
A scheduling order was issued requiring notification of witnesses by January 2, 
1988.

November 12, 
1987 John Davis, Wayne Barnett, Fred Barnett, Clair Cheatham and Vida Cheatham 
v. Vanderbilt Resources Corp., Vanderbilt Energy Corp.,5 Adobe Resources Corp., the Grayrock 
Corp. and Loy E. Harris was filed. Docket 15153.

March 4, 1988 
The three cases were consolidated.

May 5, 1988 
Appearance was entered by Walker for Vanderbilt Corp., Adobe Resources Corp. and 
Grayrock Corp., previous counsel having had to withdraw because of a conflict of 
interest.

May 16, 1988 
Walker, for his three clients, gave notice of supplemental witnesses George, 
Cearly, Lee and Lindley.

May 20, 1988 
Appellants filed motion in limine to exclude testimony of the supplemental 
witnesses.

June 21, 1988 
Trial commenced.

July 29, 1988 
Verdict returned.

[¶23]   The court also ruled that it would 
allow appellants to list an additional rebuttal witness since appellees were 
allowed to list the four expert witnesses.

[¶24]   W.R.E. 103(a) provides in pertinent 
part:

"Effect of erroneous 
ruling. - Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected."

The "substantial 
right" which appellants contended to have been affected by the court's ruling 
was a right to additional time in which to depose the newly listed experts and 
to react to the anticipated testimony. Appellants described such right in their 
affidavit in support of a motion to reconsider. Appellants stated they would 
suffer the following prejudices:

"1. Insufficient time in 
which to properly and adequately prepare to depose each expert;

"2. Insufficient time to 
actually depose each witness;

"3. No literature search 
or search relating to each witness' testimony can be accomplished in the time 
period allowed; 

"4. Typing of transcripts 
will take additional time and thereby allow insufficient time to prepare 
deposition summaries for purposes of impeachment;

"5. Insufficient time 
once the transcripts are received to permit Plaintiffs' experts to thoroughly 
review each prior to trial resulting in insufficient time for Plaintiffs to list 
the one (1) additional expert rebuttal witness the Court indicated it would 
permit;

"6. The additional work 
required of Plaintiffs' counsel because the Court allowed in Defendants' experts 
late in the game further prejudiced Plaintiffs' case by decreasing their time 
for trial preparation."

[¶25]   However, appellants took lengthy 
depositions of George, Lee and Cearly on June 10, 11 and 12, 1988. Thereafter, 
they did not avail themselves of the opportunity to list the authorized rebuttal 
witness. They did not ask for a continuance on the basis of that contained in 
the depositions - for the purpose of obtaining transcripts of the depositions to 
locate a rebuttal witness or to otherwise react to the information resulting 
from the depositions. The three witnesses were subject to extensive 
cross-examination at the trial.

[¶26]   The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion under the circumstances of this case. If it had refused the attorney 
who had recently made an appearance for Adobe Resources Corporation, Grayrock 
Corporation and Vanderbilt Corporation the ability to present his evidence, the 
potential for an abuse of discretion may have been greater than it would if the 
ruling was as here made.6 The trial court's ruling did not 
exceed the bounds of reason. The court could reasonably conclude as it did. 
There was no abuse of discretion.

ISSUE IV - DIRECTED 
VERDICT ON INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

[¶27]   On September 2, 1974, the United 
States Geological Survey sent a form to appellees containing conditions 
necessary for approval of a well abandonment, should an abandonment become 
necessary.7 It required, among other things, 
the injection of concrete into the bottom of the hole sufficient to fill it 
above the Madison formation.

[¶28]   The well was plugged on September 
25 and 26, 1974. One-hundred-fifty sacks of cement were injected into the 
Madison formation at the bottom of the hole. Normally, 75 sacks would be 
sufficient to fill the hole above the Madison formation. However, due to the 
cavernous nature of the formation at the well site, the 150 sacks of cement did 
not fill the hole above the Madison formation. "Heavy mud," a commonly used 
plugging material, was used to finish plugging the Madison 
formation.

[¶29]   The reports made by appellee 
Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., to the government were inaccurate in reporting 
the well plug to have been made as required. However, attached to the first 
report was a well history which accurately set forth the method in which the 
well was plugged. On August 13, 1979, the government approved the abandonment of 
the well.

[¶30]   Appellants, including appellant 
Davis, and their agents were inaccurately told by employees of appellee 
Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., in 1982, 1983 and 1984 that the well was plugged 
according to the government directions. Appellants argue that such 
misrepresentations caused appellant Davis to suffer emotional distress and 
mental anguish. They argue that "because of the salt on the ranch and the 
failure of his crops," Davis took many medications, had a portion of his stomach 
removed and became chronically depressed. This was the basis of appellants' 
claim for relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

[¶31]   Appellants correctly note the 
standard upon which we review an appeal of a directed verdict, and they 
correctly note the fact that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress is recognized in Wyoming:

     "In reviewing the 
district court's decision to grant a directed verdict for appellee (defendant) 
at the close of appellant's (plaintiff's) case in chief, we will consider all of 
the evidence favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed 
(appellant) together with all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be 
drawn therefrom. Carey v. Jackson, [603 P.2d 868 (Wyo. 1979)]; Town of Jackson 
v. Shaw, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1246 (1977). When determining the question of 
sufficiency of the evidence on a motion for a directed verdict, we must, without 
weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of 
the evidence, determine whether there can be but one conclusion as to the 
verdict that reasonable jurors could have reached. Carey v. Jackson, supra; Town 
of Jackson v. Shaw, supra; Barnes v. Fernandez, Wyo., 526 P.2d 983 (1974). 
Credibility of the witnesses and the weight given their testimony are for the 
jury to determine. Kahler v. Martin, Wyo., 570 P.2d 720 (1977); Cimoli v. 
Greyhound Corp., Wyo., 372 P.2d 170 (1962). Whether or not appellant's evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to her, is sufficient to create an issue for 
the jury to consider is solely a question of law to be answered by the trial 
court. Town of Jackson v. Shaw, supra."

Vassos v. 
Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Wyo. 1983).

[¶32]   Appellants referred to Leithead v. 
American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo. 1986) to note that the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress was a valid cause of action in 
Wyoming. In that case, we commented on and quoted in part as follows from 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 (1965):

"Outrageous Conduct 
Causing Severe Emotional Distress

     "`(1) One who by 
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe 
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional 
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily 
harm.'

     "Outrageous conduct is 
defined in comment `d' of the Restatement as conduct which goes beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, is regarded as atrocious, and is utterly intolerable 
in a civilized community. Severe emotional distress is defined in comment `j' as 
distress which is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure 
it.

     "* * * Comment `h' to 
§ 46 of the Restatement, Second, Torts, (1965) states:

     "`Court and 
jury. It 
is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant's 
conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit 
recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it 
is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in 
the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to 
result in liability.'

* * * * * *

             "* * * Comment `j' of § 46 of the 
Restatement, Second, Torts states:

"`Severe emotional 
distress. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the 
emotional  distress has in fact 
resulted, and when it is severe. * * *

* * * * * *

"`It is for the court to 
determine whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it is 
for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact 
existed.'"

Leithead, 721 P.2d  at 1065-67.

[¶33]   Without considering whether or not 
the necessary element of "outrageousness" for the tort claim is here present, 
conclusive in this instance that the directed verdict was proper is the lack of 
causation. The basic element for the tort is "causing" emotional distress. If 
appellees' statements did not "cause" the distress, there could not be grounds 
upon which to found the tort claim.

[¶34]   The manner in which the well was 
actually plugged was known to appellant Davis and his attorney since 1982 when 
they were supplied with a copy of the well history. As noted supra, appellants 
acknowledge in their argument that appellant Davis' distress was "because of the 
salt on the ranch and the failure of his crops." A reasonable jury could not 
conclude other than whatever emotional distress suffered by appellant Davis was 
caused by the condition of his lands and its effect on his crops and not by any 
statements, true or untrue, made to him concerning the well. The directed 
verdict on the issue was proper.

ISSUE V - DIRECTED 
VERDICT ON FRAUD

[¶35]   Appellants again refer to the 
inaccurate statements made in 1982, 1983 and 1984 by employees of appellee 
Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., to appellants and their agents that the well was 
plugged according to the government directions as the basis for their claim of 
fraud.

[¶36]   To constitute fraud, there must be 
a false or fraudulent statement or misrepresentation or concealment of a 
material fact, made by the defendant to induce action or inaction, which was 
reasonably and justifiably believed to be true by the plaintiff, and relied upon 
by the plaintiff to his damage. Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867 (Wyo. 1975) and 
Davis v. Schiess, 417 P.2d 19 (Wyo. 1966).

[¶37]   The standard set forth supra upon 
which we review an appeal of a directed verdict is here applicable. A reasonable 
jury could not find all of the elements of fraud in this case.

[¶38]   The following reflect that 
appellants could not "reasonably and justifiably believe the statements were 
true," and that appellants "relied upon" such statements. The manner in which 
the well was actually plugged was known to appellant Davis and his attorney 
since 1982 when they received a copy of the well history. Appellant Davis 
employed Geomax, a geological firm, to determine the cause of the groundwater. 
It reported in May of 1983 that the groundwater came from other than the well. 
At Davis' request, the Bureau of Land Management investigated the condition of 
the Davis ranch. It concluded:

"Conclusions:

"Based on analyses within 
this report, the following conclusions regarding the Davis Ranch seepage problem 
are forwarded:

"1. The seepage problem 
on Mr. Davis' property appears to be the result of a complex combination of two 
groundwater systems merging within the problem area. One system is comprised of 
waters associated with the Shell Creek floodplain and alluvium. The other system 
is associated with one or both of the following: 1) a discrete groundwater 
discharge point which is part of a larger geological system discernable 
throughout the area, or 2) subterranean movement down the Porter Gulch alluvium 
which is merging with and is being diluted by Shell Creek floodplain 
water.

"2. Chemical analyses of 
the problem-causing seeps and water within the Davis drain do not conform to 
expected Madison water characteristics in this area. The Madison should produce 
a very fresh calcium bicarbonate or calcium sulfate type water. Water observed 
within the Davis Ranch problem area is very saline sodium sulfate water. This 
water is more typical of discharges from shale areas which overlie most of the 
area north of the Davis Ranch.

"3. Based on conclusions 
1 and 2, it is highly unlikely that the Davis problem is related to leakage from 
Consolidated Oil and Gas Well No. 2. The problem is more likely a manifestation 
of a long occurring natural groundwater discharge area."

On May 25, 1982, 
in response to appellant Davis' inquiry, the potential that the well plugs did 
not hold was made known to appellant Davis by Professor Heasler, Geology 
Department, University of Wyoming.

[¶39]   Not only did appellants not 
"reasonably and justifiably" believe the statements to be true, they 
"disbelieved" them. The investigative activities of appellants belie any 
reliance on the statements or the existence of any belief in their 
truth.

[¶40]   The directed verdict on this issue 
was proper.

[¶41]   Finding no error, we affirm as to 
all parties except appellee Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., action as to it 
being for the bankruptcy court and not for this court.

URBIGKIT, 
J., 
files a dissenting opinion.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶42]   In this case, the majority makes an 
assumption of procedural fact and redefines the English language to sustain a 
jury verdict in the face of an erroneous special verdict form which submitted a 
case to the jury for decision that had not been presented as the issues of the 
litigation. Agreeing to do neither, I dissent.

[¶43]   I agree with appellants in their 
contention that allowable discretion of the trial court in procedural decisions 
was exceeded in late granted authorization to appellees for additional expert 
witnesses and in denied rebuttal evidence presented for use by appellants. 
However, in these other regards except to state disagreement with the trial 
court's decision, the subjects will not be extensively pursued since 
reoccurrence in future cases should not be expected.

[¶44]   The principal problem of this case 
is submission for jury decision of a factually erroneous and substantively 
conflicting special jury verdict form. In actual result, if we apply the often 
but usually overstated declination that it is presumed the jury will follow the 
court's instructions, Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282 (Wyo. 1985); State 
Highway Commission v. Peters, 416 P.2d 390 (Wyo. 1966), the instruction actually 
given in this case constituted a directed verdict for appellees. The preclusive 
decision occurred in the phraseology of the verdict for the issue then remaining 
after other claims had been rejected by the trial court's preemptory partial 
directed verdict.

[¶45]   The facts of this case, relating to 
the terminology used in the dysfunctional form of the jury verdict, require some 
recitation for proper analysis of the preclusive error. Appellants in this case 
are several second or third generation homesteader ranchers in an irrigated 
farming area of the Big Horn basin first settled about 1892. The area was the 
Shell Creek Valley in the north central part of Wyoming. The families in the 
area over the many years of farming and ranching raised small grains, beets, hay 
and cattle.

[¶46]   In 1974, appellees came to the 
valley to drill an exploratory oil well on a federal oil and gas lease in Herren 
Gulch which was located about a mile from the farming land of the appellants. 
The test well was reasonably shallow, about 2,700 feet to the Ten Sleep 
formation. The record, however, reasonably demonstrates that the test continued 
200 feet deeper and entered the Madison formation where high bottom hole 
pressure was then encountered which blew the drilling mud out of the well. 
Ultimately, the test was unsuccessful and the well was plugged and 
abandoned.

[¶47]   The six week trial tested and 
contested what was done or not done in plugging and abandoning the unsuccessful 
saline water pressured Madison formation well. In oil patch parlance, this could 
have been called a "duster," but in fact it was a high pressure salt water 
non-oil producer.

[¶48]   Appellee Consolidated Oil & 
Gas, Inc., as the driller and principal in the wildcat effort, received specific 
instructions for plugging and abandoning the well from the United States 
Geological Service. It does not appear to be questioned that the instructions 
were not actually followed and that a false affidavit of plugging was filed by 
Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. with the governmental agency. Consolidated Oil 
& Gas, Inc. continued to pretend by supplying the same false and misleading 
plugging information for about ten years thereafter and even after questions 
subsequently developed about the well's involvement in subsurface water problems 
which came to develop under the appellants' property. This much is clear from 
the record. Nearly everything thereafter is in controversy except for another 
trial time development of catastrophic significance to the appellants arising 
from the form of jury verdict used.

[¶49]   About four years after the 
abandonment of the well, appellants started to observe changes in their ranch 
and farmlands and the desert areas near the well. Subsurface water problems 
began to develop, progressively destroying the productivity of the agricultural 
lands. Alkaline seeps developed and general alkaline subsurface water raised the 
underground water table.

[¶50]   The resulting theory of litigation 
that followed is succinctly outlined in one of appellants' briefs:

1. The Appellees drilled 
an exploratory well which penetrated the high pressure Madison formation (this 
was admitted by the Appellees);

2. The Appellees 
intentionally failed to seal off the Madison Formation in accordance with the 
approved plan for doing so (this was admitted by Appellees);

3. The approved plugging 
plan would have resulted in a cement plug ending more than 100 feet into the 
formation above the Madison Formation (this was admitted by 
Appellees);

4. The actual plugging by 
Appellees left a cement bottom plug which was 23 feet below the top of the 
Madison Formation (this was admitted by Appellees);

5. After this took place, 
the subsurface water table in the valley floor below the well was increased by 
16%, and the Appellants suffered water damage to their ranches.

Without being 
able to specify the specific median of intrusion by which the Madison waters 
were affecting the upward movement of water from the 2,845 foot elevation, or 
exactly how the underground extrusion of pressure occurred, appellants argued 
that the down hole Madison pressure was intruding into the subsurface water 
level and forcing the water up underneath the soil to saturate and alkalize the 
lands from underneath the surface by a raised water table of contaminated 
water.

[¶51]   The case from this point became a 
battle of forensic experts with defenses directed to analysis that the plugging 
was adequate, even if improper, and that the resulting killing of the farmland 
by subsurface water could not be properly attributed to the Madison formation 
plugging in the abandoned well whether leaky or not. This scenario within the 
six week trial provided the eternal quandary between cause and effect and sheer 
happenstance for application of logical reasoning. An overabundance of experts 
provided fodder for jury cogitation with one group concluding that the Madison 
formation pressure released upwards was raising the water table, while the 
others responsively discerned that it could not possibly be so.

[¶52]   Those contested issues, despite the 
unquestioned circumstance that the plugging was not done in accordance with 
United States Geological Service instructions and that a false affidavit had 
been filed, now come here on appeal on a verdict which, on its own 
surface, was improper. These were subsurface events and not surface flow 
controversies. The jury verdict form asked a question not involved in the 
litigative controversy and did not ask the question actually 
presented.

[¶53]   The jury was given a special 
verdict form with included instruction that if the first question was answered 
"no," the jury need not go further. That part of the special verdict form 
stated:

     We, the jury, present 
the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:

     1. Have plaintiffs 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that ineffective plugging and 
abandonment of the Herren Gulch # 2 well caused Madison water to flow on 
to any of their ranches?

     Yes _ No X 

    If your answer to this 
question is "no" do not answer any other questions, have the foreperson sign the 
verdict form and notify the bailiffs. If your answer to this question is "yes" 
answer question number 2.

     2. Did the defendant 
Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., commit a subsurface trespass onto or 
under the land of the following plaintiffs?

John Davis                             
Yes ____ No ____

 Wayne Barnett                                  
Yes ____ No ____ 

Fred Barnett                          
Yes ____ No ____ 

Clair Cheatham and Vida 

Cheatham                              
Yes ____ No ____

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶54]   The problem in the instruction is 
illuminated by the difference in terminology found in questions one and 
two:

     Question 1: "flow on 
to"

     Question 2: "commit a 
subsurface trespass onto or under."

[¶55]   The entire theory of appellants' 
case was upward subsurface pressure which raised the saltine contaminated water 
level. This case and its six week trial had absolutely nothing to do with 
Madison water flowing "on to" appellants' ranches. This was not a surface flow 
case. The majority now recreates a case that did not then exist by redefining 
"on to" to include concepts of upward pressurized migration of water into zones 
at the closer surface elevation. If this is not so, why was the second 
interrogatory, which the jury was not permitted to answer and which more 
appropriately stated the case, not presented?1

[¶56]   I believe the English language, 
physics, and even common knowledge require recognition of the clearly erroneous 
nature of the verdict form given. Since the case did not factually involve 
trespass upon the surface, the instruction closed out the case with what was 
essentially a directed verdict by special verdict form and limited review to a 
subject which had not occupied the trial evidence. Cf. Gilliland v. Rhoads, 539 P.2d 1221 (Wyo. 1975) and Gillaspie v. Duncan, 410 P.2d 577 (Wyo. 
1966).

[¶57]   The more difficult question 
requires analysis of the record to determine if appellants committed a waiver 
sufficient to absolve the error resulting from the dispositively wrong and 
derogatory instruction. Goggins, 704 P.2d 1282. This court takes refuge in 
characterizations of "sandbagging" and "invit[ed] error" attributable to losing 
counsel when the jury has been improperly instructed. This record, within my 
observation, totally fails to support that sloganistic justification for 
affirming this appeal. Furthermore, I cannot accept the harmless error 
constituency within the language of the instruction by attribution to the words 
of what they do not say and then by definition to mean fairly what they do not 
mean; and, consequently, removing from jury consideration the defined issue at 
controversy in the trial - that appellants seek damage for the improper plugging 
of an abandoned oil well which raised the subsurface level of contaminated 
waters.

[¶58]   The lack of any justification for 
the unsupported usage of condemnatory terms, such as sandbagging and invited 
error, cannot be settled by attribution of waiver or failure to object. What was 
obviously not properly perceived by counsel or the trial court, was that a bad 
verdict form was proposed by appellees and was then given. Wyoming Coal Mining 
Co. v. Stanko, 22 Wyo. 110, 135 P. 1090 (1913). W.R.C.P. 49 involves the 
correlative duty of all counsel to assist the court to avoid mistakes or, 
conversely, to document the record by objection when a faulty instruction for 
improper verdict is tendered for jury resolution. Goggins, 704 P.2d 1282. See 
generally W.R.C.P. 51 (according the same responsibility for verdict form as 
exists for instructions); and Note, Special Verdicts and Interrogatories to 
Jury, 12 Wyo.L.J. 280 (1958). The spirit of the rule is the issue at task. 
Oeland v. Neuman Transit Co., 367 P.2d 967 (Wyo. 1962).

[¶59]   In briefing, appellees announce 
that no objection was made and now this majority adopts that construction of the 
record. Appellants state to the contrary that objection was made. Consequently, 
we do not even have congruity within this subject to properly address what would 
involve harmless error resulting from a misphrased instruction or plain error to 
which no objection was taken. When all else fails, we could look at the record 
to see what it reveals compared to what the litigants and the majority have 
recited in an undocumented conclusion. In this regard and consequent necessity 
for reversal, this case is comparable to Edwards v. Harris, 397 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 
1964).

[¶60]   It is first found that three 
special verdict forms were submitted by appellants which generally, except for 
deletion of the last paragraph and the changes in the form of the first 
paragraph, are identical with the instruction used:

     We, the jury, present 
the following answers to the questions submitted by the Court:

     1. Did the Herren 
Gulch # 2 well leak water unto or under the property of the following 
plaintiffs?

John Davis                             
Yes ____ No ____ 

Wayne Barnett                                   
Yes ____ No ____ 

Fred Barnett                          
Yes ____ No ____ 

Clair and Vida Cheatham 
   Yes ____ No ____

     If your answer is yes 
to any of the plaintiffs, go on to question 2 for those plaintiffs. If your 
answer is no to any of the plaintiffs, do not answer the rest of the questions 
with respect to those plaintiffs.

     2. Did the defendant 
Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., commit a subsurface trespass onto or under the 
land of the following plaintiffs?

John Davis                             
Yes ____ No ____ 

Wayne Barnett                                   
Yes ____ No ____ 

Fred Barnett                          
Yes ____ No ____ 

Clair Cheatham 

and Vida Cheatham                         
Yes ____ No ____

[¶61]   The quandary that remains is why 
the term of the first question on the verdict form as submitted by appellants 
was changed only as to the subject here presented on review? (The deletion of 
the last clause of the proposed instruction is not presently in contention.) The 
record reveals that the verdict form was created by someone taking the first 
paragraph from a form submitted by Adobe Resources Corporation (one of the 
appellees) and then copying, in almost exact or identical form, all succeeding 
paragraphs from the three requested forms submitted by appellants except for the 
last deleted paragraph.

[¶62]   The record, without assistance of 
any transcript of the instruction conference which apparently occurred the day 
before the jury was instructed, does not add knowledge to assess why the trial 
court rejected the appellants' portion of the instruction in the critical first 
paragraph and, instead, adopted the submission of the appellees by attachment to 
the general form supplied by appellants. Small words can make a world of 
difference. The change in phraseology was to delete the "onto or under" language 
found in appellants' submission and replace it with the "on to" transformation 
provided by appellees.

[¶63]   Lacking a transcript of the 
discussion from which the transformation was derived, we are left with a brief 
colloquy in open court when it was time for stating objections for any 
information in the record about the occurrence. After stating a number of 
objections to instructions given or rejected at the prior unrecorded conference, 
counsel for appellants stated:

     And then I've got 
three proposed verdict forms which I have presented to the Court and plaintiffs. 
Verdict number one, special verdict number two and verdict form number 
three.

     The Court: One, two 
and three?

     Mr. Williams: That's 
correct, but I should wait until the Court reviews its verdict form before I 
make a record on that.

     The Court: 
Cam?

     Mr. Walker: Go ahead. 
We will join in defendant Consolidated's offers.

     Mr. Weiss: At this 
point defendant Consolidated and the others would also object to not - the Court 
not instructing or including in the instructions given on the fraud and estoppel 
as a bar to the statute of limitations -

     The Court: You have to 
give me a -

     Mr. Weiss: What we 
proposed as Instruction lettered A, to keep them clear, either a separate 
instruction or should have been included in it concerning the effect of an 
independent investigation on the plaintiff to rely upon any misrepresentation of 
fraud.

     Defendant Consolidated 
would also object to the Court's failure to instruct what we have tendered as 
Instruction B, concerning speculation on facts as well as the one that was given 
concerning speculation on damages.

     The Court: Okay, 
Cam?

     Mr. Walker: I join in 
those offers and I also offer special verdict which I will mark at the top 
Adobe.

     The Court: 
One.

     Mr. Walker: One special verdict 
form.

     Mr. Williams: Let me 
give you that special verdict form and I will make my record.

     Mr. Weiss: Could I put 
in one thing? Defendant Consolidated would join in Mr. Walker's objection 
concerning the special verdict form.

     Mr. Williams: Attached 
to my plaintiffs' offered jury instructions are three proposed plaintiffs' 
verdict forms which I understand the Court rejected. I believe there should be a 
question and answer regarding the agency of Consolidated - rather the agency - 
whether or not an agency relationship exists between Vanderbilt Resources, that 
is the Adobe entities, as a principal and Consolidated Oil and Gas as an 
agent.

     I also object to the 
failure of the Court to give Plaintiff's [sic] Instruction No. 6 dealing with 
committing a subsurface trespass and I cite the Restatement of Torts, 158 and 
159, which is right on point which says we are entitled to this instruction. I 
tender these instructions.

     The Court: These are 
the ones you object to, Counsel?

     Mr. Williams: These 
are ones you refused.

Appellees only 
addressed the verdict as quoted by tendering the special form for which the 
first paragraph was substituted for the first section tendered by appellants to 
create the instruction which was given. So ended the colloquy for the open trial 
objections to the form of the jury verdict.

[¶64]   We are placed in review with 
decision of error as possibly harmless when objection is taken or plain error 
when the proper objection is not made. Obviously, objection to the instruction 
was made and a proper instruction on the subject involved had been tendered. 
Nothing within the entire scope of the tendered record reveals why the 
phraseology of the Adobe Resources Corporation document was used for paragraph 
one and the totally different appellants' form used for paragraph two when the 
subjects addressed were identical in factual significance. To be compared in the 
dispositive language is Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 
1973), where the appellant neglected to supply a properly worded instruction. 
See also Haley v. Dreesen, 532 P.2d 399 (Wyo. 1975).

[¶65]   I perceive that adequate objection 
was taken and it was not harmless. I further find that under the confining 
circumstances of the six week trial, plain error otherwise appeared when a 
subsurface bad water intrusion case was converted into a surface flow problem 
for decision. By no means can I accept any contention that "onto" means under in 
one paragraph, but requires "under" in the next paragraph to properly define the 
nature of the case as one of subsurface occurrence.2 The elastic boundaries we have 
created by W.R.A.P. 7.04, harmless error and W.R.A.P. 7.05, plain error, cannot 
be extended to an empirically misinstructed jury decision. This is not a Goggins 
case. Fundamental error exists where the case tried is not the case for which 
the verdict form is provided or the decision is rendered. Twing v. Schott, 80 
Wyo. 100, 338 P.2d 839 (1959); McNamara v. O'Brien, 2 Wyo. 447 (1881). If not 
accommodated with a harmful error review, this misadventure in verdict 
terminology constitutes plain error. Hays v. State, 522 P.2d 1004 (Wyo. 
1974).

[¶66]   Addressing another subject, in a 
long and severely contested trial such as this one, it is understandable why the 
appellate court accords discretion to the trial court in normalized decision as 
here found in a late date permission to appellees to add additional expert 
witnesses and the rejection of rebuttal evidence tendered by appellants. Having 
said it is understandable, I am not persuaded that it did not constitute an 
abuse of discretion. Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894 (Wyo. 1986). Many courts have 
opined about criminal defendants' use of changing attorneys to obtain delay in 
proceedings. Here a change in attorneys afforded a basis to correct a glaring 
omission in pretrial preparation by present appellees. I might more easily 
accept that result as fair if an adequate opportunity to recover had been 
realistically available to the innocent party. Lacking that time within the 
status where, by changing attorneys, a litigant sought to add additional expert 
witnesses at the last moment, I perceive that organized process as fairly 
applied would have required denial. This is the exact converse and the opposite 
result of what happened in Kobos By and Through Kobos v. Everts, 768 P.2d 534 
(Wyo. 1989). See Shields v. Carnahan, 744 P.2d 1115 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶67]   I also fail to find any proper 
basis for rejection of the rebuttal video tape which was put together while the 
trial was in progress and consequently could not have been subjected 
chronologically or factually to an earlier tender, since the proposed exhibit 
would have shown what was different from what appellees said it was to have 
been, clear and proper office for rebuttal evidence was constructed. State v. 
Alexander, 78 Wyo. 324, 324 P.2d 831 (1958), cert. denied 363 U.S. 850, 80 S. Ct. 1630, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1733 (1960); New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. of Manchester v. Boler, 
55 Wyo. 530, 102 P.2d 39 (1940).

[¶68]   I would have reversed for retrial 
and, consequently, dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellee Consolidated 
Oil & Gas, Inc. was a defendant in this matter during the proceedings in the 
district court, and it was made an appellee in this appeal which was filed 
February 17, 1989. On March 7, 1989, it filed a voluntary petition in 
bankruptcy, thus staying this appeal insofar as it is concerned. Accordingly, 
that said and decided herein has no pertinency insofar as appellee Consolidated 
Oil & Gas, Inc. is concerned.

2 The amendment also 
included expert witness Lindley, but he did not testify.

3 The case against Harris 
was dismissed before trial.

4 Halliburton settled out 
of the case.

5 Vanderbilt Resources 
Corp. and Vanderbilt Energy Corp. merged in 1986.

6 Adherence to a pretrial 
order is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Oukrop v. 
Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 233 (Wyo. 1988).

7 Such is the usual 
procedure when a well is being drilled on land leased from the federal 
government.

FOOTNOTES for the 
Dissent

1 "Onto" and "on to" may 
have different linguistic attributes, but "onto" is defined as: "to a position 
on." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 825 (1986). The word clearly 
means supported by and not underneath and pressured upward towards the 
surface.

2 It is my conclusion, not 
only from a diligent review of the record but also questions addressed at oral 
argument and statements found in brief, that no one really knew or necessarily 
recognized the transformation that occurred through whatever process. Adobe 
Resources Corporation must have known what they meant and not intended to do any 
favor, but why the incorrect terminology was accepted to be added to the verdict 
form is just untold in this record. Strangely enough through briefing and into 
oral argument, the contentions and arguments which are now followed by the 
majority fail to recognize the chasm separating the text and tenor of the first 
instruction from what the question would have been if the jury had ever moved 
further to the second decision. Anyone in irrigated farming communities knows 
the singular difference between subsurface moisture rising from below and excess 
accumulation of surface water running from higher elevations on to the 
land.