Case Title: Hosea O. Weaver and Sons, Inc. v. Ira W. Balch, as personal representative of the estate of Danny E. Balch, deceased, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2013-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 09/20/2013
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2013
____________________
1100637
____________________
Hosea O. Weaver and Sons, Inc.
v.
Ira W. Balch, as personal representative of the estate of
Danny E. Balch, deceased, et al.
Appeal from Clarke Circuit Court
(CV-09-900034)
On Application for Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
The opinion of June 28, 2013, is withdrawn, and the
following is substituted therefor.
1100637
Hosea O. Weaver and Sons, Inc. ("Weaver"), appeals the
judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Ira W. Balch,
as personal representative of the estate of Danny E. Balch,
deceased, and Melvin R. Balch, as personal representative of
the estates of Bernard R. Balch, deceased, and Armie Butler
Balch, deceased (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the
Balch personal 
representatives"). 
 We reverse the judgment and
render a judgment for Weaver.
Facts and Procedural History  
In March 2001, the Alabama Department of Transportation
("ALDOT") awarded Weaver, a road-construction company, the
resurfacing contract for approximately eight miles of Highway
84 in Clarke County. The plans and specifications designated
by ALDOT for the resurfacing project provided that the
completed road surface would have a total width of 24 feet and
a cross slope of 2.5 degrees.   During the resurfacing
1
project, employees of  ALDOT and Weaver inspected and measured
the resurfaced highway to ensure compliance with the contract
specifications.  Weaver completed the resurfacing project in
The cross slope is the tilt in the pavement.
1
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March 2002.  In a letter dated March 25, 2002,  Terry
2
McDuffie, a construction engineer for ALDOT, notified Weaver
that ALDOT was assuming 
maintenance 
of the resurfaced highway,
stating:
"All work included in [the Highway 84 project]
has been completed, and you are hereby notified that
[ALDOT] will assume maintenance of the same as of
March 19, 2002.  This assumption of maintenance is
conditioned 
specifically 
on 
materials 
and
workmanship being found satisfactory as determined
from our 'Record Check' still in progress and
meeting [ALDOT] Specifications.
"Should this Department find upon completion of
the 'Record Check' that any of the materials or
workmanship fail to meet the requirements of the
plans and specifications, [Weaver] will be required
to make such changes as necessary to correct the
deficiencies without expense to the Department."
On June 7, 2002, ALDOT issued a letter of acceptance to
Weaver, stating:
"All work included in [the Highway 84 project] has
been satisfactorily completed, and you are hereby
notified that the work was accepted by [ALDOT] as of
March 19, 2002."
On October 18, 2007, Danny E. Balch, Bernard R. Balch,
and Armie Butler Balch were traveling east in a vehicle on the
portion of Highway 84 that Weaver had resurfaced when their
The letter actually carried the incorrect date of March
2
25, 2001.
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1100637
vehicle, driven by Danny, crossed the centerline and collided
with an oncoming tractor-trailer truck, driven by 
James 
Daniel
Bradley.  Danny, Bernard, and Armie died as a result of the
accident. 
On March 13, 2009, the Balch personal representatives
filed a wrongful-death action, pursuant to § 6-5-410, Ala.
Code 1975, against Weaver and others alleging, as to Weaver, 
that Weaver had negligently performed the Highway 84
resurfacing project in 2001-2002 and that its negligent
performance caused the accident and, as a result, the deaths
of Danny, Bernard, and Armie.  Specifically, the Balch
personal representatives alleged:
"[Weaver] breached [its] duty of care by, among
other things:
"(a) negligently ... paving the subject
portion of Highway 84 such that [it]
created a deep and dangerous edge drop-off;
"(b) negligently ... paving the subject
portion of Highway 84 such that it was less
than the required width;
"(c) negligently ... traffic striping the
subject portion of Highway 84;
"(d) negligently ... failing to take
corrective measures on the subject section
of the roadway; 
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"(e) negligently ... failing to perform the
road 
work 
in 
accordance 
with 
the
requirements of the contract and/or the
applicable standard of care.
"The deaths of [Danny, Bernard, and Armie] were
caused as a proximate consequence of the wrongful,
negligent ... conduct of [Weaver]."
At trial, Lakesha Steele, a senior engineering assistant
with ALDOT, testified that she and three other ALDOT employees
made daily inspections of the Highway 84 resurfacing project
when Weaver was engaged in the project to ensure compliance
with the contract specifications.  She recalled taking
measurements to determine that the asphalt had been laid to
the proper width and at the correct cross slope.  Both Steele
and her supervisor at ALDOT, Johnnie Cook, testified that if,
during one of those daily 
inspections, 
ALDOT inspectors and/or
supervisors found that Weaver was not complying with the
contract specifications, the resurfacing process was stopped
until the specifications could be met.  A field note, dated
October 31, 2001, was admitted in evidence; it indicated that
ALDOT had halted the resurfacing process to address a cross-
slope 
issue. 
 Steele testified that ALDOT's inspection records
contained no evidence indicating that Weaver had not complied
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with the resurfacing specifications in the contract by the
time the project was completed.
Terry McDuffie stated that, upon completion of the
contract, ALDOT sent Weaver a letter officially accepting
Weaver's work. According to McDuffie, the letter served as
notice to Weaver that the State would assume maintenance of
the roadway as of March 19, 2002.  
3
With regard to the accident, the evidence indicated that
the vehicle in which the Balches were riding was traveling on
a portion of the eastbound lane of Highway 84 that had been
resurfaced by Weaver when it left the right side of the road
and encountered a shoulder drop-off, causing the driver of the
Balch vehicle to lose control of the vehicle, which then 
crossed the centerline into the westbound lane of Highway 84,
colliding with a tractor-trailer 
truck 
traveling in that lane.
According to expert testimony presented by the Balch personal
representatives, the accident occurred because Weaver did not
comply with the road-resurfacing specifications provided by
At oral argument before this Court, the Balch personal
3
representatives admitted that after ALDOT had assumed
maintenance of the roadway, Weaver could not, without ALDOT's
permission, perform any additional work on the roadway.
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ALDOT with regard to the cross slope and width of the road 
when it resurfaced the road in 2001-2002.  The testimony,
however, further indicated that even if Weaver had been
negligent in its performance of the resurfacing contract, if
ALDOT had maintained the road routinely and the shoulder drop-
off had been filled, the accident probably would not have
occurred.
Weaver moved for a judgment as a matter of law at the
close of the Balch personal representatives' evidence and
again at the close of its evidence.  In its motions for a
judgment as a matter of law, Weaver argued, in pertinent part,
that it did not owe a duty of care to Danny, Bernard, and
Armie because ALDOT had accepted its resurfacing work as
satisfactory upon its completion of the contract and had
assumed responsibility for maintenance of the road from that
time.  The trial court denied Weaver's prejudgment motions for
a judgment as a matter of law.  The jury returned a verdict
for the Balch personal representatives, and Weaver filed a
postjudgment motion for a judgment as a matter of law, which
the trial court denied.  Weaver appeals.
Standard of Review
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1100637
This Court's standard of review on a ruling on a motion
for a judgment as a matter of law is well settled.
"'When reviewing a ruling on a motion
for a JML [judgment as a matter of law],
this Court uses the same standard the trial
court used initially in deciding whether to
grant or deny the motion for a JML.  Palm
Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So. 2d
3 (Ala. 1997).  Regarding questions of
fact, the ultimate question is whether the
nonmovant 
has 
presented 
sufficient 
evidence
to allow the case to be submitted to the
jury for a factual resolution.  Carter v.
Henderson, 598 So. 2d 1350 (Ala. 1992). 
The 
nonmovant 
must 
have 
presented
substantial evidence in order to withstand
a motion for a JML.  See § 12-21-12, Ala.
Code 1975; West v. Founders Life Assurance
Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala.
1989).
  A reviewing court must determine
[4]
whether the party who bears the burden of
proof has produced substantial evidence
creating 
a 
factual 
dispute 
requiring
resolution by the jury. Carter, 598 So. 2d
at 1353.  In reviewing a ruling on a motion
for a JML, this Court views the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant
and entertains such reasonable inferences
as the jury would have been free to draw. 
Id.  Regarding a question of law, however,
this Court indulges no presumption of
correctness as to the trial court's ruling. 
"Substantial evidence" is "evidence of such weight and
4
quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought
to be proved."  West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of
Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).
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1100637
Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So.
2d 1126 (Ala. 1992).'
"Waddell & Reed, Inc. v. United Investors Life Ins.
Co., 875 So. 2d 1143, 1152 (Ala. 2003)."
Ex parte Howell Eng'g & Surveying, Inc., 981 So. 2d 413, 418
(Ala. 2006).
Analysis
Weaver contends that the trial court erred in denying its
motions for a judgment as a matter of law because, it says, it
did not owe a legal duty of care to Danny, Bernard, and Armie
once it had completed the resurfacing project and ALDOT had
accepted its work and assumed responsibility for maintenance
of the road.
"In 
a 
negligence 
action 
the 
plaintiff must 
prove
(1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty;
(2) that the defendant breached that duty; (3) that
the plaintiff suffered a loss or injury; and (4)
that the defendant's breach was the actual and
proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss or injury.
Ford Motor Co. v. Burdeshaw, 661 So. 2d 236, 238
(Ala. 1995).  '"It is settled that for one to
maintain a negligence action the defendant must have
been subject to a legal duty,"' Thompson v. Mindis
Metals, 
Inc., 
692 
So. 
2d 
805, 
807 
(Ala.
1997)(quoting Morton v. Prescott, 564 So. 2d 913,
915 (Ala. 1990)), because 'where there is no duty,
there can be no negligence.'  City of Bessemer v.
Brantley, 258 Ala. 675, 681, 65 So. 2d 160, 165
(1953).  '"In Alabama, the existence of a duty is a
strictly legal question to be determined by the
court."'  Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance, Inc., 938
9
1100637
So. 2d 933, 937 (Ala. 2006)(quoting Taylor v. Smith,
892 So. 2d 887, 891-92 (Ala. 2004))."
DiBiasi v. Joe Wheeler Elec. Membership Corp.,  988 So. 2d
454, 460 (Ala. 2008).  The trial court's denials of Weaver's
motions for a judgment as a matter of law indicate that the
trial court concluded that Weaver did owe a duty of care to
Danny, Bernard, and Armie.  
"[T]he existence of a duty is strictly a legal question
and, under our standard of review, this Court does not afford
the trial court's conclusions of law any presumption of
correctness."  Id.  Therefore, this Court must first address
the strictly legal question presented in this case:  whether
a road-construction company, which has been granted authority
to perform work on a road under a contract with ALDOT and has
completed its work on a road to the satisfaction of ALDOT owes
a duty of care to the users of the road after ALDOT has
assumed responsibility for the maintenance of the road.
ALDOT has responsibility for the superintendence of
public roads in the State of Alabama.  Section 23-1-40, Ala.
Code 1975, explains ALDOT's responsibility in this regard,
stating:
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"(a)  It shall be the duty of the State
Department of Transportation to designate the roads
to be constructed, repaired, and maintained and to
construct, standardize, repair, and maintain roads
and bridges of this state ...."
Alabama law is clear:  ALDOT controls the public roads of this
State, and a road-construction company can perform work on a
public road only with ALDOT's permission.  Therefore, a road-
construction company's duty of care arises pursuant to its
contract with ALDOT, and the road-construction company can
perform work on a road only in accordance with the
specifications and instructions provided by ALDOT in that
contract.  Thus, after a road-construction company has
completed the authorized work and ALDOT has accepted the work
and assumed responsibility for the superintendence of the
road, the 
road-construction 
company no longer has authority to
perform any work on the road.
In light of a road-construction company's limited
authority to perform work on a public road as permitted by
ALDOT and ALDOT's responsibility to superintend the public
roads, we apply the following general rule, known as the
"accepted-work doctrine," which limits the post-acceptance
duty of a road-construction company to third parties when, in
11
1100637
situations like this one, the work is performed pursuant to a
government contract:
"It has long been the general rule that an
independent contractor is not liable for injuries
occurring to a third person after the contractor has
completed the work and turned it over to the owner,
and it has been accepted by him, even though the
injury results from the contractor's negligent
performance of the contract or his failure to
perform it properly, at least if the defect in the
work is not hidden, but is readily observable on
reasonable inspection."
Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Highway Contractor's Liability to
Highway User for Highway Surface Defects, 62 A.L.R. 4th 1067,
1070 (1988).  See also Black v. Kiewit Sons' Co., 94 Idaho
755, 497 P.2d 1056 (1972)(applying accepted-work doctrine in
negligence action against road-construction company and
holding that company was not liable to plaintiff); Williams v.
Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, Inc., 209 So. 2d 618 (Miss.
1968)(holding that contractor was not responsible for
maintenance of road after county had accepted contractor's
work); and City of Richmond v. Branch, 205 Va. 424, 137 S.E.2d
882 
(1964)(holding 
that 
although 
contractor 
had 
been 
negligent
in performance of contract, the contractor was not liable to
an injured motorist for any failure to properly perform the
contract because the work had been completed and accepted by
12
1100637
the city before the accident).  But see Suneson v. Holloway
Constr. Co., 337 Ark. 571, 582, 992 S.W.2d 79, 85
(1999)(discussing the accepted-work doctrine and refusing to
continue its application because it was "outmoded and often
unnecessarily unfair in application").
In this case, because ALDOT had accepted Weaver's
resurfacing work and had assumed responsibility for the
maintenance of the road, we conclude that Weaver owed no duty
of care to Danny, Bernard, and Armie.   "[B]ecause 'where
5
there is no duty, there can be no negligence,'" DiBiasi, 988
So. 2d at 460, and because we conclude that Weaver did not
have a duty, Weaver is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.6
Our conclusion that Weaver did not have a duty of care
5
in this case does not overrule or disturb this Court's
decision in McFadden v. Ten-T Corp., 529 So. 2d 192 (Ala.
1988), which holds that following acceptance of the work by
the owner a road contractor may be liable for injuries to
third persons that are the result of the contractor's
performance of defective plans and specifications that are
"'"so obviously defective that an ordinary builder of ordinary
prudence would be put upon notice that the work was dangerous
and likely to cause injury."'"  529 So. 2d at 200 (quoting
other cases).  
Our decision to reverse the trial court's judgment and
6
to render a judgment on this basis pretermits discussion of
the remaining issues raised by Weaver on appeal.
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Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the
trial court in favor of the Balch personal representatives and
render a judgment as a matter of law in favor of Weaver.
APPLICATION OVERRULED; OPINION OF JUNE 28, 2013,
WITHDRAWN; 
OPINION 
SUBSTITUTED; 
REVERSED 
AND 
JUDGMENT
RENDERED.
Stuart and Bolin, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., and Parker, Murdock, Wise, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur in overruling the application for rehearing and concur
in the result as to the opinion.
Main, J., dissents.
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1100637
MOORE, 
Chief 
Justice 
(concurring 
in 
overruling 
the 
application
for rehearing and concurring in the result as to the opinion).
I concur in overruling the application for rehearing and
concur in the result reached by the main opinion. There is
evidence in this case from which this Court could conclude
that proximate causation did not exist between the allegedly
negligent conduct of Hosea O. Weaver and Sons, Inc.
("Weaver"), and the accident that resulted in the deaths of
three people.7
However, I disagree with the plurality's application of
the "accepted-work doctrine." Under this rule, a State agent
may relieve a contractor from liability simply by accepting
the contractor's work, so long as any defect with the
contractor's work is readily observable upon reasonable
inspection and is not hidden. In such a case, an injured
plaintiff would not be able to sue either the State (which is
protected by State immunity under Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.
1901) or the negligent contractor (which would be protected by
I believe that the modern view of proximate cause based
7
on foreseeability does not comport with the common-law view of
causation. The modern view appears to be rooted in Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). However,
under either view, I do not believe proximate causation
existed in this case.  
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the accepted-work doctrine). Such a construction of the law
would deprive an injured plaintiff of the rights to a trial by
jury and to open access to courts under Art. I, §§ 11 and 13,
Ala. Const. 1901. Consequently, by depriving the citizens of
Alabama of these inviolate rights, the State would be assuming
the power to abridge the Declaration of Rights, in violation
of Art. I, § 36, Ala. Const. 1901, which says: "[T]o guard
against any encroachments on the rights herein retained, we
declare that everything in this Declaration of Rights is
excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall
forever remain inviolate." 
Finally, although in this case the plurality could have
reached the same result by holding that Weaver's alleged
negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident, the
accepted-work 
doctrine 
would 
cut 
off 
liability 
for 
contractors
in future cases where it is undisputed that the contractor's
negligence, which resulted in an open and obvious defect that
was readily observable on reasonable inspection, was in fact
the proximate cause of the resulting injury. 
For these reasons, although I agree that Weaver is not
liable in this case and that a judgment should be rendered for
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it, I object to applying this "new rule," which, if adopted,
in my view, would deprive the citizens of Alabama of rights
that the Alabama Constitution declares shall "forever remain
inviolate." Art. I, § 36, Ala. Const. 1901. 
17
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MURDOCK, 
Justice 
(concurring 
in 
overruling 
the 
application 
for
rehearing and concurring in the result as to the opinion).
The alleged deficiencies in the work performed for the
State by Hosea O. Weaver and Sons, Inc. ("Weaver"), were of
such a nature that they were readily observable by the State. 
The State accepted the work.  The contract work, as performed
by Weaver and accepted by the only other party to the
contract, did 
not imminently present the danger the plaintiffs
assert ultimately was responsible for the accident, i.e., the
combined effect of an improper slope, an improperly narrow
lane, and a shoulder rut.  Following completion of the work,
the State assumed responsibility for maintaining the shoulder
of the road.  A period of five and one-half years then passed,
during which time a rut developed in that shoulder that,
according to the plaintiff, played a necessary role in the
accident.  The evidence indicates that, if the State had
properly maintained the roadway, the shoulder rut would not
have developed.  Under the circumstances of this case,
responsibility for the accident lies with the State.  I
therefore concur in the result.
Wise, J., concurs.
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BRYAN, Justice (concurring in overruling the application for
rehearing and concurring in the result as to the opinion).
I concur to overrule the application for rehearing, and
I concur in the result reached by the main opinion.  I write
specially to note that, because the main opinion is a
plurality opinion, it is not binding precedent.  I further
note that § 6-5-701, Ala. Code 1975, which was enacted in
2012, clarifies the law in this area.  Section 6-5-701
provides:
"A 
contractor 
is 
justified 
ordinarily 
in 
relying
upon the specifications that are contained in the
contract with an awarding authority.  No contractor
shall be held civilly liable for work performed on
a highway, road, bridge, or street including
repairs, construction, or maintenance on behalf of
the awarding authority unless it is shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that physical injury,
property damage, or death is proximately caused by
any of the following:
"(1) A failure by the contractor to
follow 
the 
plans 
and 
specifications
resulting in a dangerous condition. 
"(2) The contractor's performance of
the contract in compliance with the plans
and 
specifications 
creates 
a 
condition 
that
should have appeared, to a reasonably
prudent contractor, to be a dangerous
condition. 
"(3) A latent defect which creates a
dangerous condition that is the result of
the work of the contractor." 
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This statute, which was enacted during the pendency of this
appeal, does not control this case.  I simply note that it
will control in future cases.
20