Case Title: State ex rel. Cleveland v. Sutula

Citation: 2010-Ohio-5039

Docket Number: 20100496

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Cleveland v. Sutula, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5039.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-5039 
THE STATE EX REL. CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLANT, v. 
SUTULA, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Cleveland v. Sutula,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-5039.] 
Prohibition — Trial court’s unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction is patent and 
unambiguous — Judgment reversed and writ granted. 
(No. 2010-0496 — Submitted September 15, 2010 — Decided October 21, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 94264, 
2010-Ohio-914. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint of 
appellant, the city of Cleveland, for a writ of prohibition to prevent appellee, 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge John D. Sutula, from exercising 
any jurisdiction over a civil case instituted by a union against the city.  Because 
Judge Sutula patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in the case 
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where the union’s claims arise from or are dependent upon the public-
employment collective-bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117, we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant the writ of prohibition. 
Facts 
Negotiations for an Initial Collective-Bargaining Agreement 
{¶ 2} In July 2007, following an election conducted pursuant to R.C. 
4117.07(C), the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB”) certified the 
Municipal Construction Equipment Operators’ Labor Council (“union”) as the 
exclusive representative of a bargaining unit composed of a group of employees 
in Cleveland’s water and property-management divisions.  Before that 
certification, a different union had represented these employees. 
{¶ 3} As required by R.C. Chapter 4117, the city and the union thereafter 
engaged in negotiations for an initial collective-bargaining agreement.  When the 
parties were unable to reach an agreement, SERB granted their request and 
appointed a mediator.  See R.C. 4117.14(C)(2).  In March 2009, the union 
declared an impasse and requested that SERB appoint a fact-finder to resolve the 
disputed issues.  See R.C. 4117.14(C)(3).  After conducting a hearing, the fact-
finder issued a report and recommendations in accordance with R.C. 
4117.14(C)(5). 
Strike 
{¶ 4} Pursuant to R.C. 4117.14(C)(6)(a) and (D)(2), the union rejected 
the fact-finder’s recommendations and submitted a ten-day notice of its intent to 
strike on July 17, 2009.  During subsequent negotiations, the mediator requested 
that Cleveland submit its last, best proposal in writing to avert a strike, and the 
city did so on July 16.  The union rejected it and proceeded to strike.  According 
to the city, on July 27, during the strike, the union presented a counteroffer, which 
the city rejected. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 5} The union then allegedly presented a second counteroffer, but 
before the city could respond to it, the union stated on July 29 that it was 
accepting the city’s last pre-strike offer and was ending the strike effective the 
next day.  The city notified the union that because the union had rejected the pre-
strike offer and had gone out on strike, the offer no longer existed and could not 
be accepted.  On July 30, all striking union members returned to work, and the 
city maintained their wages and other terms and conditions of employment as they 
existed before the strike. 
Common Pleas Court Case 
{¶ 6} On July 31, 2009, the union filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas against the city.  The union alleged that 
Cleveland had a duty to perform in accordance with its last pre-strike offer, which 
the union claimed it had properly accepted. 
{¶ 7} The union requested a declaratory judgment that “(a) Defendant 
Cleveland refused and failed to perform in accord with Cleveland’s Offer, [and] 
(c) Cleveland’s failure to perform has damaged the members of the bargaining 
unit described in this complaint.”  In addition, the union requested specific 
performance, injunctive relief, and damages, i.e., an order requiring Cleveland to 
“cooperate with the * * * Union in preparing a new collective bargaining 
agreement (the ‘New CBA’) consistent with Cleveland’s Offer, (b) presenting the 
New CBA to Cleveland City Council, with a recommendation by Cleveland’s 
administration for its prompt approval and implementation, and the withdrawal of 
any contrary communication, after ratification of the New CBA by the members 
of this bargaining unit, and (c) to thereafter make payments to the members of this 
bargaining unit in accord with Cleveland’s offer, with prejudgment and post 
judgment interest, and to otherwise fully perform in accord with Cleveland’s 
Offer and the New CBA.” 
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{¶ 8} In essence, the union claimed that the city committed unfair labor 
practices by interfering with the employees’ exercise of their rights under R.C. 
Chapter 4117 and by refusing to bargain collectively with the union by ignoring a 
valid collective-bargaining agreement.  See R.C. 4117.11(A)(1) and (5). 
{¶ 9} Judge Sutula set a date for a trial in the case.  Cleveland filed a 
motion to dismiss the union’s complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), claiming 
that SERB has exclusive jurisdiction over the claims, but Judge Sutula denied the 
motion. 
Prohibition Case 
{¶ 10} Shortly after its motion to dismiss was denied, Cleveland filed a 
complaint in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ of prohibition 
to prevent Judge Sutula from proceeding in the union’s case.  After the judge filed 
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
the court of appeals granted the judge’s motion and dismissed the city’s 
prohibition complaint.  State ex rel. Cleveland v. Sutula, Cuyahoga App. No. 
94264, 2010-Ohio-914. 
{¶ 11} This cause is now before the court upon the city’s appeal as of 
right from the dismissal of its complaint for a writ of prohibition. 
Legal Analysis 
Prohibition 
{¶ 12} In its appeal as of right, Cleveland asserts that the court of appeals 
erred in dismissing its complaint.  Dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted is appropriate if, after all factual 
allegations are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in the city’s 
favor, it appears beyond doubt that Cleveland could prove no set of facts entitling 
it to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.  Goudlock v. Voorhies, 119 
Ohio St.3d 398, 2008-Ohio-4787, 894 N.E.2d 692, ¶ 7. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 13} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, Cleveland has to 
establish that (1) Judge Sutula is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise 
of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury 
for which no adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. 
Sullivan v. Ramsey, 124 Ohio St.3d 355, 2010-Ohio-252, 922 N.E.2d 214, ¶ 15.  
Judge Sutula has exercised and continues to exercise judicial power in the 
underlying civil case. 
{¶ 14} For the remaining requirements, “[i]f a lower court patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, prohibition * * * will 
issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the 
results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.”  State ex rel. Mayer v. 
Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12. 
The Union’s Claims:  Exclusive Jurisdiction of SERB 
{¶ 15} Before the enactment of R.C. Chapter 4117, the Ohio Public 
Employees Collective Bargaining Act, “Ohio had no legal framework governing 
public-sector labor relations, and dealt with these issues on an ad hoc basis,” State 
ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44 v. State Emp. Relations 
Bd. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 22 OBR 1, 488 N.E.2d 181, and “[p]ublic 
employees had no constitutional or statutory right to bargain collectively * * * 
and no right to strike.”  Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. v. Fraternal Order 
of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 167, 169, 572 N.E.2d 
87. 
{¶ 16} “The current R.C. Chapter 4117 established a comprehensive 
framework for the resolution of public-sector labor disputes by creating a series of 
new rights and setting forth specific procedures and remedies for the vindication 
of those rights.”  Id.  “The State Employment Relations Board has exclusive 
jurisdiction to decide matters committed to it pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117.”  Id. 
at paragraph one of the syllabus.  “Exclusive jurisdiction to resolve unfair labor 
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practice charges is vested in SERB in two general areas:  (1) where one of the 
parties filed charges with SERB alleging an unfair labor practice under R.C. 
4117.11 and (2) where a complaint brought before the common pleas court 
alleges conduct that constitutes an unfair labor practice specifically enumerated in 
R.C. 4117.11.”  State ex rel. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health v. Nadel, 98 Ohio St.3d 
405, 2003-Ohio-1632, 786 N.E.2d 49, ¶ 23; E. Cleveland v. E. Cleveland Fire 
Fighters Local 500, I.A.F.F. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 125, 127-128, 637 N.E.2d 878.  
Therefore, “if a party asserts claims that arise from or depend on the collective 
bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117, the remedies provided in that 
chapter are exclusive.”  Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn., 59 Ohio St.3d 167, 
572 N.E.2d 87, at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 17} The claims made by the union in the common pleas court arise 
from and are dependent upon the collective-bargaining rights set forth in R.C. 
Chapter 4117.  The union claims that Cleveland has failed to abide by the 
agreement they reached through their collective-bargaining negotiations, which 
were conducted in accordance with R.C. Chapter 4117.  In their complaint, the 
union’s requests for relief are, in essence, that the city comply with R.C. 
4117.09(A) by reducing the parties’ purported agreement to writing and executing 
it and that it comply with R.C. 4117.10(B) by submitting the matter to the city 
council for approval and implementation. 
{¶ 18} The court of appeals reached a contrary conclusion by determining 
that (1) no claim of an unfair labor practice has been raised by either party in the 
common pleas court, (2) there exists no collective-bargaining agreement between 
the city and the union, and (3) Judge Sutula has basic statutory jurisdiction over 
the union’s civil action.  Cleveland, 2010-Ohio-914, at ¶ 27. 
{¶ 19} For the reasons that follow, the grounds specified by the court of 
appeals do not support the common pleas court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the 
union’s case. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 20} First, as noted previously, the dispositive test is whether the claims 
“arise from or depend on the collective bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 
4117.”  Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn., 59 Ohio St.3d 167, 572 N.E.2d 87, 
at paragraph two of the syllabus; State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio 
Labor Council, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1996), 76 Ohio 
St.3d 287, 289, 667 N.E.2d 929.  Therefore, “SERB has exclusive jurisdiction 
over matters within R.C. Chapter 4117 in its entirety, not simply over unfair labor 
practices claims.”  Assn. of Cleveland Fire Fighters, Local 93 of the Internatl. 
Assn. of Fire Fighters v. Cleveland, 156 Ohio App.3d 368, 2004-Ohio-994, 806 
N.E.2d 170, ¶ 12; Carter v. Trotwood-Madison City Bd. of Edn., 181 Ohio 
App.3d 764, 2009-Ohio-1769, 910 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 64. 
{¶ 21} Second, the union’s common pleas court case alleges conduct that 
constitutes unfair labor practices under R.C. 4117.11(A)(1) (prohibiting a public 
employer from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise 
of rights guaranteed in R.C. Chapter 4117) and (5) (prohibiting a public employer 
from refusing to bargain collectively with a certified, exclusive bargaining 
representative of its employees).  That is, if – as the union alleges – Cleveland has 
failed to comply with R.C. Chapter 4117 by ignoring a valid collective-bargaining 
agreement, the city is interfering with its employees’ statutory collective-
bargaining rights and is refusing to bargain collectively.  In fact, as the record 
shows, the union previously filed unfair-labor-practice charges against Cleveland 
with SERB in 2004 under comparable circumstances:  the union claimed that 
Cleveland had agreed to a collective-bargaining agreement but had later insisted 
on substantive changes to the agreement before the city would submit the 
agreement to its legislative body.  SERB found probable cause to support the 
union’s claims and issued a complaint charging the city with unfair labor practices 
under R.C. 4117.11(A)(1) and (5). 
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{¶ 22} Third, the lack of a collective-bargaining agreement is not 
dispositive.  In fact, the union’s claims in the underlying case are premised on its 
allegation that there is a collective-bargaining agreement, but that the city has 
failed to comply with R.C. Chapter 4117 by failing to execute and implement it.  
Again, the dispositive issue is whether the union’s claims arise from or are 
dependent upon R.C. Chapter 4117 collective-bargaining rights.  The court of 
appeals’ and the judge’s reliance on State ex rel. Rootstown Local School Dist. 
Bd. of Edn. v. Portage Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 489, 
678 N.E.2d 1365, is misplaced because in that case, the employees’ common 
pleas court action was based on their R.C. 3319.081 (“Contracts for nonteaching 
employees”) contract claims – rights that do not necessarily arise from or depend 
on R.C. Chapter 4117 collective-bargaining rights.  Id. at 490.  See also State ex 
rel. Boggs v. Springfield Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 
222, 223, 694 N.E.2d 1346. 
{¶ 23} Finally, the common pleas court’s basic statutory jurisdiction over 
actions for declaratory judgment, specific performance, injunction, and damages 
does not vest that court with jurisdiction over the union’s R.C. Chapter 4117-
related claims.  SERB’s exclusive jurisdiction over the union’s claims prevents 
judicial intervention before SERB has had the opportunity to act.  See Consolo v. 
Cleveland, 103 Ohio St.3d 362, 2004-Ohio-5389, 815 N.E.2d 1114, ¶ 12 
(questions committed to SERB pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4117 must first be 
addressed by SERB); see also State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 
111 Ohio St.3d 246, 2006-Ohio-5202, 855 N.E.2d 1188, ¶ 37, quoting Fletcher v. 
Coney Island, Inc. (1956), 165 Ohio St. 150, 155, 59 O.O. 212, 134 N.E.2d 371 (“ 
‘[w]here the General Assembly by statute creates a new right and at the same time 
prescribes remedies or penalties for its violation, the courts may not intervene and 
create an additional remedy’ ”).  That is, “[a]ny claim which is independent of 
R.C. Chapter 4117, such as a breach of contract or enforcement, still falls solely 
January Term, 2010 
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within the jurisdiction of SERB if the asserted claim arises from or is dependent 
on the collective bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117.”  Fraternal 
Order of Police, 76 Ohio St.3d at 290, 667 N.E.2d 929, citing State ex rel. 
Cleveland City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Pokorny (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 108, 
110, 663 N.E.2d 719.  The union’s attempt to recast its common pleas court case 
as a simple contract action is thus unavailing. 
{¶ 24} Therefore, because the union’s claims in the common pleas court 
case arise from and are dependent upon the collective bargaining rights set forth 
in R.C. Chapter 4117, the court of appeals erred in dismissing Cleveland’s 
prohibition complaint.  Moreover, because the pertinent facts relating to the city’s 
prohibition claim appear uncontroverted and from those facts, it appears beyond 
doubt that the city is entitled to the requested extraordinary relief, we exercise our 
plenary authority to grant the writ.  See State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., 
Ohio Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 577, 579, 728 
N.E.2d 395 (“The court’s plenary authority generally refers to our ability to 
address the merits of a writ case without the necessity of a remand if the court of 
appeals erred in some regard”). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 25} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and grant the writ of prohibition preventing Judge Sutula from exercising 
further jurisdiction in the underlying case.  He patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction over the case because SERB has the exclusive initial jurisdiction to 
resolve the union’s claims.  “In cases of a patent and unambiguous lack of 
jurisdiction, the requirement of a lack of an adequate remedy of law need not be 
proven because the availability of alternate remedies like appeal would be 
immaterial.”  State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 99 Ohio St.3d 97, 2003-Ohio-2476, 789 
N.E.2d 195, ¶ 18. 
Judgment reversed 
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and writ granted. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
BROWN, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 26} Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court 
having general subject-matter jurisdiction over an action possesses the legal 
authority to determine its own jurisdiction.  Whitehall ex rel. Wolfe v. Ohio Civ. 
Rights Comm. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 120, 123-124, 656 N.E.2d 684.  Like the 
appellate court, I cannot conclude based on the record before us that the common 
pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Cleveland 
v. Sutula, Cuyahoga App. No. 94264, 2010-Ohio-914, ¶ 27.  Accordingly, I 
dissent. 
__________________ 
 
Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A., Stephen S. Zashin, and Jon M. Dileno; and 
Robert J. Triozzi, Cleveland Law Director, for appellant. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Climaco, Wilcox, Peca, Tarantino & Garofoli Co., L.P.A., and Stewart D. 
Roll, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Municipal Construction Equipment 
Operators’ Labor Council. 
______________________