Case Title: Dowdy v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 082143

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and Millette, JJ., 
and Carrico and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
MATTHEW M. DOWDY 
 
OPINION BY  
v. 
 
Record No. 082143 
JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER  
 
 
 
November 5, 2009 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 476 S.E.2d 920 
(1996), we held "that an indigent defendant who seeks the 
appointment of an expert witness, at the Commonwealth's 
expense, must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates 
the assistance of the expert is 'likely to be a significant 
factor in his defense,' and that he will be prejudiced by the 
lack of expert assistance."  Id. at 211-12, 476 S.E.2d at 925 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 
U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985)).  In this appeal, we decide, among 
other issues, whether the Husske prejudice requirement runs 
afoul of the decision in Ake and whether the trial court 
abused its discretion by refusing to provide all the 
investigative services requested by the defendant.  We answer 
these questions in the negative and, finding no other error, 
we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia upholding the defendant's convictions. 
I.  MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Matthew M. Dowdy was indicted in the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County for the rape and first-degree murder of Judy 
Jaimie Coate in violation of Code §§ 18.2-61 and –32, 
respectively.  In a pre-trial motion, Dowdy requested the 
appointment of an investigator to aid in building Dowdy's 
alibi defense and to rebut the Commonwealth's theory that the 
murder occurred on September 23, 2005.  At a hearing on the 
motion, Dowdy explained that he was with the victim on 
September 23 and again the next morning when, according to 
Dowdy, they engaged in consensual sexual intercourse.  Dowdy 
also asserted that he had a list of witnesses, some of whom 
allegedly saw him either on September 23 or 24 and could 
corroborate Dowdy's statements to the police regarding his 
activities on those two days.  Thus, according to Dowdy, he 
needed an investigator to interview these witnesses because if 
his attorney did so, the attorney would not be able to impeach 
such a witness at trial if the witness testified 
inconsistently with his or her prior statement. 
Following argument by the parties, the circuit court 
denied Dowdy's motion seeking the appointment of an 
investigator.  Citing this Court's decision in Husske, the 
circuit court explained that Dowdy needed to demonstrate not 
only that the subject for which expert assistance was sought, 
2 
i.e., Dowdy's alleged alibi, would be a significant factor in 
his defense but also that he would be prejudiced without the 
services of an investigator.  As to the prejudice showing, the 
court noted that the only justification offered for the 
appointment of an investigator was the inability of Dowdy's 
counsel, as opposed to that of an investigator, to offer 
impeachment testimony if witnesses testified contrary to their 
earlier statements.  Thus, the court concluded that the 
appointment of an investigator was not warranted under those 
circumstances.1 
More than nine months later, Dowdy moved for 
reconsideration of the circuit court's denial of his request 
for the appointment of an investigator.  Dowdy claimed that he 
needed an investigator to inspect the crime scene, pursue 
information about alternate suspects, and locate individuals 
who could corroborate Dowdy's alibi and provide evidence about 
the relationship between Coate and Dowdy.  Further, Dowdy 
argued that the discovery of personal effects purportedly 
belonging to an individual named Billy Gacheru near the crime 
scene now made appointment of an investigator crucial, as 
necessary to finding Gacheru.  Dowdy also argued, as before, 
that an investigator was needed to avoid a possible conflict 
                                                 
1 In his pre-trial motion, Dowdy also requested the 
appointment of a forensic pathologist.  The circuit court 
granted that request. 
3 
for his counsel if witnesses' testimony differed from 
statements given to his counsel. 
Both orally before the circuit court and in a memorandum, 
Dowdy raised the claim that denial of investigative services, 
which are made available to persons represented by the public 
defender, deprived him of due process and equal protection of 
the law, as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.2  
In his memorandum, Dowdy also argued that requiring an 
"advance showing of prejudice" under Husske violated his due 
process rights and contravened the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Ake, and further that denial of an 
investigator violated his Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel and was not in accord with 
Code § 19.2-163.3 
The circuit court rejected Dowdy's argument that he 
needed an investigator to offer impeachment evidence if 
witnesses testified contrary to their prior statements, noting 
that use of a signed statement from each potential witness 
would resolve the dilemma posed by Dowdy.  Dowdy agreed with 
the court's observation.  The circuit court, however, granted 
                                                 
2 Apparently, the public defender could not represent 
Dowdy because of a conflict of interest. 
3 Dowdy also raised these latter arguments in a memorandum 
in support of his original motion for the appointment of an 
investigator. 
4 
the motion for the appointment of an investigator for the 
limited purpose of locating Billy Gacheru and directed that 
the investigator perform solely that task. 
At trial, the evidence showed that Coate's body was 
discovered on September 27, 2005 behind a large, metal 
telephone utility box located near Lee Highway in Fairfax 
County.  Dowdy admitted that he had been in that location 
previously to drink, as recently as the Tuesday before Coate 
was killed.  A trail of bloody footprints leaving the crime 
scene continued for approximately 275 feet towards the City of 
Falls Church, where Dowdy was then residing in a motel room, 
before becoming too faint to trace.4 
Coate had been stabbed repeatedly and had sustained, 
among other injuries, an incise wound to her neck, fractured 
ribs, two fractures of her jaw, and multiple abrasions and 
bruises.  The medical examiner who performed an autopsy on 
Coate's body opined that the cause of death was the "incise 
wound of [the] neck with contributing multiple stab wounds and 
blunt force injuries."  Based on the nature of the stabbing 
and cutting wounds, he also opined that a knife had been used 
to inflict them.5  The medical examiner, however, could not 
                                                 
4 A crime scene police investigator testified that the 
footprints were left by an “athletic shoe.”  Dowdy admitted 
that he was wearing tennis shoes on September 23.  
5 The murder weapon was not recovered. 
5 
pinpoint the time of death because of the body's decomposed 
condition. 
A friend of Coate's, Stephanie Schelhorn, testified that 
she spoke by telephone with the victim around noon on 
September 23 regarding their plans to go out of town during 
the upcoming weekend.  Schelhorn was unable to make further 
contact with the victim.  Coate's supervisor at her place of 
employment, a temporary staffing agency located adjacent to 
Lee Highway, saw Coate sometime between 3 p.m. and 6 p.m. on 
September 23 when she came in from a job assignment to collect 
her pay.  A blood-soaked paycheck from Coate's employer was 
found in her pants pocket at the crime scene, but the 
condition of the check made its date illegible. 
Dowdy admitted seeing the victim twice on September 23.  
The first encounter occurred between 1:30 p.m. and 2:45 p.m. 
at the staffing agency's office, where Dowdy also worked.  
Dowdy left the office but returned at approximately 6:00 p.m., 
hoping to get a job assignment for the evening.  Learning that 
no jobs were available, Dowdy went to an adjacent convenience 
store where he saw Coate.  Coate agreed to accompany Dowdy to 
a nearby plaza.  Dowdy and Coate subsequently proceeded on 
foot to a liquor store, by way of a townhouse where one of 
Dowdy's friends resided, arriving at the liquor store between 
6:25 p.m. and 6:45 p.m.  Dowdy purchased a bottle of liquor 
6 
while Coate waited outside.6  According to Dowdy, he and Coate 
walked together a short distance from the liquor store and 
then parted company, with Coate heading toward a beauty salon 
along a route that would take her within one hundred and 
thirty yards of the location where her body was later 
discovered.7 
Dowdy testified that he walked a short distance, in the 
opposite direction as Coate, to a bus stop where he waited 
approximately 15 minutes for a bus that transferred him to 
another bus stop.  He eventually rode a bus to a soccer field, 
arriving at approximately 8:00 p.m.  Dowdy claimed that he met 
several friends there but then left only a few minutes later.  
According to Dowdy, he spent the remainder of the night, from 
approximately 8:20 p.m. until 12:30 a.m., with friends walking 
around and drinking at various locations, returning to his 
motel room at 1:30 a.m. 
The next morning, September 24, Dowdy returned to his 
employer's office around 6:25 a.m. to find work, but when he 
                                                 
6 When the police initially interrogated Dowdy after 
Coate's body was discovered, he did not tell them about 
walking with the victim to the liquor store.  He later 
admitted doing so when confronted with pictures obtained from 
a video surveillance camera at the liquor store.  The pictures 
showed Coate and Dowdy together at the liquor store. 
7 Dowdy's motel room was a "couple miles" from the place 
where Dowdy testified that he left the victim on the evening 
of September 23. 
7 
discovered that no one was on duty, he walked behind the 
adjacent convenience store and gas station, where he 
encountered Coate.  Dowdy stated that Coate was drinking, 
visibly upset, and conversing with a man whose name Dowdy did 
not know.  According to Dowdy, the man left shortly after 
Dowdy arrived, at which point Coate began to cry and threw her 
arms around Dowdy.  Dowdy testified that he and Coate then 
engaged in consensual sexual intercourse in a grassy area only 
partially visible from the adjacent street.8  
Dowdy testified on direct examination that he and Coate 
parted company in front of the convenience store at 
approximately 11:15 a.m., but on cross-examination Dowdy 
stated that he left her at the front of their employer's 
office at approximately 6:55 a.m.  Dowdy claimed that he spent 
the remainder of the day at a friend's house, his motel room, 
and his employer's office.  Dowdy stated that he never saw 
Coate again and maintained he had no part in her rape and 
murder.  
Several items of physical evidence were recovered at the 
crime scene and during the autopsy.  The evidence included 
vaginal swabs taken from the victim that revealed spermatozoa.  
A forensic scientist generated a DNA profile from those swabs 
                                                 
8 When questioned by the police, Dowdy initially denied 
having sexual intercourse with the victim. 
8 
and when that profile was compared with the DNA profile 
generated from buccal swabs taken from Dowdy, the results 
could not eliminate Dowdy as a contributor of the DNA 
developed from the vaginal swabs—the DNA profiles matched.  
The forensic scientist testified that the "probability of 
randomly selecting an unrelated individual with a DNA profile 
matching the foreign DNA profile developed from the vaginal 
sample . . . is one in greater than 6.5 billion[,] which is 
approximately the world population in the Caucasian, Black, 
and Hispanic populations."  Forensic testing of a pair of 
underwear found three to four feet from Coate's head at the 
crime scene revealed the presence of Dowdy's DNA in "the 
underwear sperm fraction."  Dowdy, however, was eliminated as 
a contributor to a DNA profile developed from the crotch of 
the underwear.  That profile was consistent with a mixture "of 
two individuals' genetic material." 
Police investigators also lifted latent hand and finger 
prints from the doors of the electrical utility box, and 
obtained hand and finger prints from Coate during the autopsy, 
and hand and finger prints from Dowdy.  William J. Reeves, who 
was employed by the Fairfax County Police Department and 
qualified at trial as an expert in the field of fingerprint 
analysis, concluded that a bloody palm print and fingerprints 
lifted from the utility box matched Dowdy's known prints.  
9 
Reeves testified that he reached this conclusion upon finding 
30 points of agreement [corresponding features of ridge detail 
created by the impression of a hand or finger] between the 
prints taken from Dowdy and those lifted from the utility box.  
Reeves opined that the prints on the utility box door could 
not have been there before the blood was deposited on it.  
Another crime scene investigator who also qualified as an 
expert in the field of fingerprint identification agreed: "the 
handprints that are on that door in blood are there from a 
transfer of a wet hand onto a dry surface." 
During cross-examination, Reeves testified that he was "a 
hundred percent certain that Mr. Dowdy left the prints," and 
on both cross-examination and redirect stated that any 
inconsistency in the number of points he identified at Dowdy's 
preliminary hearing was attributable to confusion as to the 
area of the print about which he was being questioned.  Reeves 
admitted that during his approximately 28 years working in the 
field of fingerprint identification prior to his employment 
with the Fairfax County Police Department, he had worked with 
known prints, not latent prints.9  Reeves testified, however, 
                                                 
9 Known prints, also called "ink prints," are taken from 
an identified subject by "the recording of the tips of the 
fingers from the first joint to the tip of the finger onto 
generally a white card using . . . black printers ink."  
Latent prints are "hidden or undeveloped, and must be 
10 
that since joining the Fairfax County Police Department over 
five years ago, his work as a fingerprint examiner has 
involved comparing known prints with latent prints "every day 
of the week," specifically affirming that he engages in 
"continuous comparison of fragmentary impressions, 
observations of peculiarities and variations and thoughtful 
consideration" of latent prints.  Reeves admitted, however, 
that he had not taken a proficiency test for several years, 
although the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge 
Analysis, Study and Technology ("SWGFAST") guidelines, which 
he recognized as authoritative, directed that such a test be 
completed annually. 
Reeves was also asked during cross-examination whether he 
was aware of and/or followed the Fairfax County Police 
Department guidelines for latent fingerprint examination, and 
whether he took steps to guard against expectation bias—when 
observations may be skewed toward what the observer expects to 
see.  Reeves testified that he was not aware of and did not 
follow any Fairfax County guidelines, but nevertheless did 
comply with the generally accepted practices for latent 
fingerprint evaluation, did not deviate from those practices, 
or take any shortcuts.  Acknowledging the danger of 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
developed or [made] visible through some means of either 
powdering or some type of chemical development." 
11 
expectation bias, Reeves stated that he nevertheless examined 
the latent prints lifted from the utility box door knowing 
Dowdy was the main suspect. 
With regard to his evaluation process and timeline, 
Reeves testified that he was unsure of the exact dates on 
which he performed the evaluation of the latent prints.  
Reeves was uncertain as to which known prints, Coate's or 
Dowdy's, he first compared with the latent prints recovered 
from the utility box door, and he used only Coate's known 
prints as "elimination prints."10  Reeves also stated that he 
did not prepare a contemporaneous report of his conclusions or 
make contemporaneous notes, instead finishing his standard, 
one-page report about a month after completing his evaluation 
of the prints.  While the report provided no basis for his 
conclusion that Dowdy's known prints matched the latent 
prints, it did, however, state that there were no latent 
prints of identification value that remained unidentified.  
Finally, Reeves testified that he turns over his work to other 
fingerprint examiners to have them "independently check [and] 
verify" the accuracy of his conclusions and that he does not 
"make an identification if there is a doubt about" whether two 
prints came from the same subject. 
                                                 
10 Elimination prints are those taken from persons who 
were known to be at the place in question for legitimate 
reasons. 
12 
At the conclusion of Reeves' testimony, Dowdy moved to 
strike the testimony on the grounds that Reeves' method of 
identifying the latent prints as Dowdy's was not 
scientifically reliable because Reeves deviated from the 
SWGFAST guidelines, performed no validity testing, had no 
method for calculating an error, had no scientific basis for 
the number of points he used, did not do proficiency testing, 
made no notes, and utilized only one set of elimination 
prints.  The circuit court overruled the motion, concluding 
that the concerns raised went to the credibility of Reeves' 
testimony, which was for the jury to decide.  The court 
concluded that Reeves' opinion was not "inherently incredible" 
and that his training and experience rendered his testimony 
admissible.11 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both charges.  
Dowdy was sentenced to life imprisonment on the first-degree 
murder conviction and 30 years imprisonment on the rape 
conviction, to run consecutively. 
In a per curiam order, the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
refused Dowdy's appeal.12  Dowdy v. Commonwealth, Record No. 
                                                 
11 The circuit court also denied Dowdy’s motion to strike 
the evidence as to both charges. 
12 A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals 
subsequently refused Dowdy's appeal and affirmed his 
convictions for the reasons previously stated in its per 
13 
2204-07-4, slip op. at 7 (May 30, 2008).  As to Dowdy's 
challenge to the circuit court's refusal to appoint an 
investigator to find persons who allegedly saw Dowdy the night 
of September 23, the Court of Appeals concluded that these 
potential witnesses, if found by an investigator, could not 
buttress Dowdy's alibi because he had admitted being alone 
with Coate not far from the crime scene the morning of 
September 24.  Id.  The Court of Appeals also rejected Dowdy's 
claim that he needed to find and interview individuals who 
allegedly saw Dowdy later in the day on September 24.  Id. 
The Court of Appeals further applied Rule 5A:18 to bar 
review of Dowdy's argument that requiring a showing of 
prejudice under Husske contravened the decision in Ake, 
Dowdy's assertion that his equal protection rights were 
violated because he would have had the services of an 
investigator if he had been represented by the public 
defender, and his claim that the provisions of Code §§ 19.2-
163 and –332 required the appointment of an investigator.  
Id., slip op. at 8-10.  Although Dowdy raised these arguments 
in memoranda before the circuit court, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the arguments were waived because Dowdy did not 
make the particular arguments during the hearings in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
curiam order.  Dowdy v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2204-07-4, 
slip op. at 1 (Oct. 2, 2008). 
14 
circuit court and the court did not specifically rule on them.  
Id.  The Court of Appeals also held that Dowdy's claim 
asserting that the circuit court's refusal to appoint an 
investigator denied him the effective assistance of counsel 
could not be raised on direct appeal.13  Id., slip op. at 10. 
The Court of Appeals, however, did reach Dowdy's final 
contention that the circuit court erred by refusing to strike 
the fingerprint expert's testimony as scientifically 
unreliable.  Finding that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in failing to strike Reeves' testimony, the Court 
of Appeals observed that fingerprint analysis, which was the 
scientific method offered, required no foundation of 
reliability because it is "'so familiar and accepted.'"  Id., 
slip op. at 12-13 (quoting Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 
78, 97, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (1990) (emphasis omitted)).  As to 
the reliability of Reeves' analysis of the latent prints found 
at the crime scene, the Court of Appeals concluded that his 
testimony, in which Reeves indicated that he "followed the 
generally accepted practices of the latent fingerprint 
community" and obtained independent verification of his 
                                                 
13 The Court of Appeals in its per curiam order also held 
that Dowdy, by agreeing with the circuit court's suggestion 
that he obtain signed statements from all potential witnesses 
interviewed to avoid the purported advocate-witness conflict 
for his counsel, had waived any claim of error as to that 
particular ruling.  Dowdy, slip op. at 7-8. 
15 
findings by another fingerprint examiner, provided "a 
sufficient foundation to warrant admission of the testimony."  
Id., slip op. at 13.   
Now on appeal to this Court, Dowdy raises multiple 
assignments of error that can, however, be grouped into three 
categories: (1) procedural issues concerning the Court of 
Appeals' application of Rule 5A:18 and Dowdy's ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim; (2) failure to appoint an 
investigator and related questions concerning the Husske 
prejudice requirement, equal protection, and a statutory claim 
to investigative services; and (3) admission of the testimony 
of Reeves, the Commonwealth's fingerprint analyst.  We will 
address the issues in that order. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Procedural Issues 
Dowdy challenges the holding of the Court of Appeals 
that, under Rule 5A:18, he waived the following arguments:  
the showing of prejudice articulated in Husske imposed a 
burden on him that is not in accord with the decision in Ake 
and therefore violated his right to due process; the circuit 
court violated his right to equal protection because he would 
have received the services of an investigator if he had been 
represented by the public defender; and Code §§ 19.2-163 and –
332 required the appointment of an investigator.  We conclude 
16 
that the Court of Appeals erred in its application of Rule 
5A:18.  As we recited in section one of this opinion, Dowdy 
raised each of the foregoing arguments either at the hearing 
when he requested the circuit court to reconsider its refusal 
to appoint an investigator or in memoranda that were before 
the circuit court at the time of its initial decision on his 
request or later on reconsideration of its ruling.  At both 
hearings on this issue, the circuit court expressly indicated 
that it had read Dowdy's pleadings, and refused the relief 
requested.  Thus, Dowdy did not waive these particular 
arguments, and they are now properly before this Court.14  See 
Rule 5:25. 
                                                 
14 When Dowdy filed his petition for appeal, he presented 
ten assignments of error, and this Court granted an appeal on 
all the assignments of error.  Dowdy v. Commonwealth, Record 
No. 082143 (Apr. 8, 2009).  In his opening brief filed 
pursuant to Rules 5:27 and 5:17(c), he omitted four of the 
assignments of error in the heading titled "Assignments of 
Error."  Three of the omitted assignments of error challenge 
the circuit court's substantive rulings on whether the Husske 
prejudice requirement contravenes the decision in Ake, whether 
Dowdy's equal protection rights were violated, and whether he 
has a statutory right to appointment of an investigator.  
Those three omitted assignments of error are thus waived.  See 
Rules 5:27 and 5:17(c); White v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 96, 
102-03, 591 S.E.2d 662, 665-66 (2004) (holding that the Court 
will not consider assignments of error as modified by 
appellant’s opening brief, but only as granted by the Court).  
We can, however, reach the underlying issues raised in those 
omitted assignments of error because Dowdy’s first assignment 
of error encompasses the same issues and because Dowdy briefed 
those issues. 
The fourth omitted assignment of error challenges the 
circuit court's conclusion that refusing to appoint an 
17 
The Court of Appeals, however, did not err in holding 
that Dowdy's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on 
the denial of investigative services may not be heard on 
direct appeal.  Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 675, 529 
S.E.2d 769, 781 (2000).  Insofar as Dowdy now argues that the 
circuit court's refusal to appoint an investigator violated 
his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, we hold that 
Dowdy defaulted that claim by arguing in the circuit court 
only that it denied him effective assistance of counsel.  See 
Rule 5:25. 
B.  Appointment of Investigator 
In challenging the circuit court's refusal to appoint an 
investigator, Dowdy not only asserts that he made the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
investigator did not amount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  This challenge to the circuit court’s decision is 
likewise waived, but we nevertheless reach the remaining 
assignment of error challenging the Court of Appeals’ holding 
that Dowdy could not raise his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim on direct appeal. 
We also note that, in Dowdy's opening brief, he reworded 
his first assignment of error challenging the circuit court's 
refusal to appoint an investigator.  While it is improper for 
an appellant to alter the wording of an assignment of error 
from that stated in the petition for appeal, non-substantive 
changes to an assignment of error, like those in Dowdy's first 
assignment of error, do not default the issue raised.  
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gauthier, 273 Va. 416, 418 n.*, 641 
S.E.2d 101, 103 n.* (2007).  See Hudson v. Pillow, 261 Va. 
296, 301-02, 541 S.E.2d 556, 560 (2001) (holding that the 
Court could review a modified assignment of error because the 
modification did not allow the appellant to argue “a different 
question on appeal or an issue not presented to the [trial 
court]”). 
18 
requisite showing of particularized need but also claims that 
the Husske prejudice requirement is not in accord with Ake and 
violated his due process rights, that his equal protection 
rights were violated, and that Code §§ 19.2-163 and –332 
required the appointment of an investigator.  We will address 
each claim separately, starting with the prejudice issue. 
1.  Husske Prejudice 
In Ake v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court of the United 
States decided "whether, and under what conditions, the 
participation of a psychiatrist is important enough to 
preparation of a defense to require the State to provide an 
indigent defendant with access to competent psychiatric 
assistance in preparing the defense."  470 U.S. at 77.  The 
Court identified three factors that were relevant to the 
determination:  
the private interest that will be affected by the action 
of the State[;] the governmental interest that will be 
affected if the safeguard is to be provided[; and] the 
probable value of the additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards 
are not provided. 
 
Id. 
Weighing the nature of the private interest at stake with 
the probable value that appointment of the expert would add 
against the burden on the State, the Court concluded that 
"when the State has made the defendant's mental condition 
19 
relevant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment he 
might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be 
crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense."  
Id. at 80.  The Court thus held "that when [an indigent] 
defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at 
the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at 
trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant 
access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an 
appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, 
and presentation of the defense."  Id. at 83.  According to 
the Court, "[i]t is in such cases that a defense may be 
devastated by the absence of a psychiatric examination and 
testimony; with such assistance, the defendant might have a 
reasonable chance of success."  Id.  In contrast, the Court in 
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), decided a few 
months after Ake, concluded that a significant factor was not 
shown when a defendant offered "little more than undeveloped 
assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial."  
Id. at 323 n.1. 
While Ake involved the appointment of a psychiatric 
expert, we observed in Husske that courts have held "that the 
Due Process and Equal Protection clauses require the 
appointment of non-psychiatric experts to indigent defendants" 
where "the defendants ma[k]e a particularized showing of the 
20 
need for the assistance of such experts."  252 Va. at 211, 476 
S.E.2d at 925.  We viewed the Ake and Caldwell decisions as 
requiring the Commonwealth to provide indigent defendants with 
these "'basic tools of an adequate defense,'" when properly 
requested, but not "all assistance that a non-indigent 
defendant may purchase."  Husske, 252 Va. at 211, 476 S.E.2d 
at 925 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 77). 
We thus held "that an indigent defendant who seeks the 
appointment of an expert witness, at the Commonwealth's 
expense, must demonstrate that the subject which necessitates 
the assistance of the expert is 'likely to be a significant 
factor in his defense,' and that he will be prejudiced by the 
lack of expert assistance."  Id. at 211-12, 476 S.E.2d at 925 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83).  
We further stated that an indigent defendant satisfies this 
test by showing that "the services of an expert would 
materially assist him in the preparation of his defense and 
that the denial of such services would result in a 
fundamentally unfair trial."  Id. at 212, 476 S.E.2d at 925.  
Dowdy contends that Husske's requirement of prejudice imposed 
a burden on him beyond that required by Ake and thus violated 
his due process rights.  We do not agree. 
Essential to our holding in Husske was the determination 
that an indigent defendant's private interest in an accurate 
21 
and fair criminal proceeding may outweigh the Commonwealth's 
interest in economy when the "probable value of the additional 
. . . safeguards that are sought," and "the risk of error in 
the proceeding" if those safeguards are not provided are 
significant.  Ake, 470 U.S. at 77-79.  As the Court recognized 
in Ake, "[i]t is in such cases that a defense may be 
devastated by the absence of" the expert assistance.  470 U.S. 
at 83 (emphasis added). Or, as we stated in Husske, that the 
defense will be prejudiced by the lack of the requested expert 
assistance.  252 Va. at 212, 476 S.E.2d at 925.  Thus, when an 
indigent defendant has demonstrated that the subject that 
requires expert assistance is "likely to be a significant 
factor in his defense," id., Husske's prejudice requirement 
merely directs a trial court to determine, based on the facts 
of the particular case, the probable value of providing the 
requested assistance and the risk of error in the criminal 
proceeding if such is not provided.  See State v. Campbell, 
498 A.2d 330, 332-33 (N.H. 1985) ("The analyses of probable 
value and risk must necessarily focus on the relationship 
between the subject of the expert services and the issues in 
the case."). 
Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar construction 
of Ake.  See, e.g., Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 690-91 (6th 
Cir. 1988) (holding that denial of expert assistance did not 
22 
violate due process where "the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of . . . liberty [] is . . . slight"); Little v. 
Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that the defendant must "show a reasonable probability that an 
expert would aid in his defense, and that denial of expert 
assistance would result in an unfair trial"); Moore v. Kemp, 
809 F.2d 702, 709-10, 712 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming denial 
of a request for expert assistance because the defendant had 
failed to show that, unless the expert was provided, he "would 
likely be denied an adequate opportunity fairly to . . . 
present his defense"); Chao v. State, 780 A.2d 1060, 1069-70 
(Del. 2001) (affirming the trial court's refusal of expert 
assistance when the expert's absence would not "significantly 
prejudice the defense or increase the risk that the jury would 
convict . . . erroneously"); Thorson v. State, 895 So. 2d 85, 
122-23 (Miss. 2004) (holding that state-funded expert 
assistance must be afforded only when the court finds that "a 
defendant is prejudiced by the denial of expert assistance to 
the extent that he or she is denied a fair trial"); Alverson 
v. State, 983 P.2d 498, 511 n.34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) 
(noting that the defendant "must make a showing of need and 
show that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert 
assistance"); State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 746, 752-53 (Tenn. 
2000) (holding that state-funded expert assistance is mandated 
23 
only where the defendant shows "'that a substantial need 
exists requiring the assistance . . . and that his defense 
cannot be fully developed without such professional 
assistance' ") (citation omitted). 
We conclude that Husske's requirement of prejudice is 
faithful to Ake and is nothing more than another way of asking 
whether the denial of expert assistance would result in a 
fundamentally unfair trial, thereby bringing into question the 
accuracy of the criminal proceeding.  See Moore, 809 F.2d at 
712 ("[A] defendant must show the trial court that there 
exists a reasonable probability both that an expert would be 
of assistance to the defense and that denial of expert 
assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial."); 
accord Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411, 416 (4th Cir. 2003).  Thus, 
the circuit court did not violate Dowdy's due process rights 
when it analyzed his request for appointment of an 
investigator using the criteria articulated in Husske: whether 
Dowdy's alleged alibi was likely to be a significant factor in 
his defense and whether he would be prejudiced by the denial 
of additional investigative services. 
24 
2.  Denial of Investigator 
Dowdy argues the circuit court erred when it refused to 
appoint an investigator to assist in locating and interviewing 
a "host of people" who allegedly saw Dowdy on the evening of 
September 23 and the next morning, and could have corroborated 
Dowdy's alibi.15  Dowdy claims he satisfied the Husske and Ake 
requirements by showing that the subject necessitating expert 
assistance, his alibi, would be a significant factor in his 
defense and that he would be prejudiced without investigative 
services.  We do not agree. 
As we have already stated, an indigent defendant 
requesting expert assistance has the burden to make "a 
particularized showing of the need" for such assistance.  
Husske, 252 Va. at 211, 476 S.E.2d at 925.  Whether an 
indigent defendant makes that showing is determined on a case-
by-case basis, and the determination is a matter resting 
within a trial court's discretion.  Green v. Commonwealth, 266 
Va. 81, 92, 580 S.E.2d 834, 841 (2003); Barnabei v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 171, 477 S.E.2d 270, 276 (1996).  
When deciding whether an indigent defendant has shown a 
particularized need, the trial court must consider all the 
                                                 
15 We find no merit in the Commonwealth's assertion that 
Dowdy waived this issue when he did not object to the circuit 
court's decision to provide him with investigative services 
for the limited purpose of locating and interviewing Billy 
Gacheru. 
25 
facts and circumstances known at the time of the request for 
expert assistance.  See Page, 337 F.3d at 415-16; Moore, 809 
F.2d at 710, 713, 716.  On appellate review, the inquiry is 
whether the trial court, at the time it heard the defendant's 
reasons for needing expert assistance, abused its discretion 
in concluding that the defendant did not demonstrate the 
requested expert would materially assist in his defense and 
the lack of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally 
unfair trial.  See Husske, 252 Va. at 212, 476 S.E.2d at 925; 
see also Page, 337 F.3d at 416. 
To demonstrate a particularized need, an indigent 
defendant must offer more than a "'[m]ere hope or suspicion 
that favorable evidence is available.'"  Husske, 252 Va. at 
212, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (citation omitted); see also 
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 268 Va. 161, 166, 597 S.E.2d 197, 200 
(2004) ("[C]onclusory assertions" that expert testimony 
regarding scientific testing may show the presence of errors 
that "'could have had a significant impact'" were not 
"'particularized' because they indicate[d] nothing more than 
[the defendant's] 'hope or suspicion.'").  For example, in 
Husske, we held the defendant's explanation as to why he 
needed a DNA expert, i.e., because DNA evidence is technical, 
an attorney cannot challenge such evidence without expert 
assistance, and the Division of Forensic Science no longer 
26 
conducts paternity testing in criminal cases, insufficient to 
demonstrate a "particularized need."  252 Va. at 213, 476 
S.E.2d at 926.  We have also concluded that a defendant's 
assertions that he had no available investigative resources 
and defense counsel lacked the time or special training to 
perform criminal investigative services did not show a 
particularized need for the appointment of an investigator.  
Green, 266 Va. at 91-92, 580 S.E.2d at 840-41; Bailey v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 737, 738, 529 S.E.2d 570, 578 
(2000). 
Likewise, Dowdy did not show a particularized need for 
additional investigative services as he did not demonstrate 
that the services "would materially assist him in the 
preparation of his defense and that the denial of such 
services would result in a fundamentally unfair trial."  
Husske, 252 Va. at 212, 476 S.E.2d at 925.  His stated reasons 
for needing an investigator fell short of the required showing 
when viewed in light of the facts and circumstances made known 
to the circuit court at the time of the request. 
Dowdy's only defense was that of alibi: one that is 
"based on the physical impossibility of a defendant's guilt by 
placing the defendant in a location other than the scene of 
the crime at the relevant time."  Black's Law Dictionary 84 
(9th ed. 2009); see also Cooper v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 377, 
27 
384, 673 S.E.2d 185, 189 (2009) (same).  Dowdy's own 
representations to the circuit court in his request for an 
investigator demonstrate that defense's lack of viability. 
Dowdy admitted to the circuit court in his multiple 
requests that he was alone with Coate on Friday, September 23, 
2005, the last day anyone other than Dowdy claimed to have 
seen Coate alive.  Dowdy also admitted that he had consensual 
intercourse with Coate on the morning of September 24.  
Tellingly, Dowdy did not allege that there were witnesses who 
could confirm his activities with Coate, or that Coate was 
alive after Dowdy and she parted company on September 24.  
Instead, Dowdy described the witnesses to be found as persons 
"who saw Mr. Dowdy on September 23" and September 24 that 
could, "for as much time as possible," "corroborate his 
whereabouts and . . . his alibi," "testify concerning his 
demeanor and appearance," and bolster Dowdy's credibility.  An 
investigator was also sought to find and interview individuals 
"whose names and addresses [he did] have," investigate 
"information discovered there at the . . . crime scene," and 
"determine . . . the nature and extent of [Dowdy and Coate's] 
friendship."  Thus, the evidence that the requested 
investigator would supposedly have uncovered would not have 
established that Dowdy lacked the opportunity to commit the 
rape and murder. 
28 
Dowdy's other arguments for why he needed an 
investigator, to find witnesses to establish the nature of 
Dowdy and Coate's relationship as well as his demeanor and 
appearance on September 23 and 24, were not buttressed with 
any representations regarding what further investigation on 
either subject would reveal, despite having personal knowledge 
of both.  As for his assertion that he needed an investigator 
to inspect the crime scene and pursue information about 
alternate suspects, Dowdy received investigative assistance to 
explore the specific lead he identified, Billy Gacheru.  Dowdy 
offered only generalized assertions to justify further 
assistance in these areas, even though he had received 
information from the Commonwealth, and had been provided a 
fingerprint examiner, a forensic pathologist, and a DNA 
expert.  And, Dowdy's request for an investigator to interview 
witnesses because his counsel did not have the expertise or 
time does not show a particularized need.  See Green, 266 Va. 
at 91-92, 580 S.E.2d at 840-41. 
Dowdy's testimony at trial further demonstrates that he 
lacked a particularized need for additional investigative 
services.  Dowdy mentioned various persons who saw him on 
September 23, but did not indicate that any of them could 
testify to his whereabouts from, at the latest, 6:45 p.m. on 
September 23, when Dowdy admitted he and Coate were together 
29 
and, at the earliest, 8:00 p.m., when Dowdy allegedly met 
friends at a soccer field.  Although Dowdy claimed that Coate 
was with another person when he first saw her on the morning 
of September 24, he did not allege there were any witnesses 
who could confirm that Coate was alive on September 24 after 
his allegedly consensual encounter with her, but only 
mentioned persons that could corroborate his whereabouts for 
the remainder of the day.  In sum, Dowdy's testimony at trial 
confirms that even if all these purported alibi witnesses for 
both September 23 and 24 had been located and testified at 
trial, they would not have corroborated Dowdy's alleged alibi.  
See Cooper, 277 Va. at 385-86, 673 S.E.2d at 190 (alibi 
instruction to be given only "when there is 'evidence that the 
accused was elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the 
exact time or for the entire period during which it was or 
could have been committed'") (citation omitted). 
Thus, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to provide Dowdy with additional 
investigative services, as Dowdy's representations to the 
30 
court as to why an investigator was necessary fell short of 
showing a particularized need.16 
3.  Equal Protection Challenge 
Dowdy alleges that, but for a conflict of interest, he 
would have been represented by the public defender's office 
and would have had available to him the services of that 
office's investigator.  See Code § 19.2-163.01(A)(10) 
(granting the Virginia Indigent Defense Commission the power 
to authorize "the public defender . . . to employ such . . . 
investigative personnel, as may be necessary to carry out the 
duties imposed upon the public defender office").  Thus, 
according to Dowdy, the circuit court's denial of an 
investigator violated his right to equal protection of the 
laws.  In support of this argument, Dowdy cites Mason v. 
Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1974) and Green v. State, 620 
So.2d 188 (Fla. 1993), and contends that if a defendant proves 
that but for some arbitrary reason, such as the conflict in 
this case, he would have been represented by a public defender 
and that the public defender would have "actually used" the 
                                                 
16 Dowdy also argued before the circuit court that he 
needed an investigator because his counsel could not offer 
impeachment evidence at trial if a witness testified contrary 
to a prior statement.  However, Dowdy agreed with the circuit 
court's suggestion that the use of signed statements would 
resolve that potential dilemma, and failed to assign error to 
the Court of Appeals' holding that he waived this argument.  
See Rule 5:17(c).  Thus, the argument is not before the Court. 
31 
available investigative resources, the denial of substantially 
equivalent resources is a violation of equal protection. 
Without deciding whether Dowdy stated an equal protection 
claim or what test would govern the disposition of such a 
claim, we conclude that Dowdy's argument fails.  Under his own 
construct, he made no showing that, if he had been represented 
by the public defender, that office would have "actually used" 
available investigative resources for the purposes Dowdy 
requested appointment of an investigator.  Having failed to 
make that showing, there can be no violation of equal 
protection. 
Thus, Dowdy is in the same position as other indigent 
defendants requesting expert assistance.  Whether a request 
for appointment of expert assistance is based on the Due 
Process or Equal Protection clause, the test is whether an 
indigent defendant has made a particularized showing of need 
for the expert assistance.  See Husske, 252 Va. at 211, 476 
S.E.2d at 925 (courts have applied the same analysis to a 
defendant's equal protection and due process claims to 
appointment of an expert).  As we have already stated, Dowdy 
did not establish a particularized need for additional 
investigative services. 
32 
4.  Statutory Claim 
Dowdy alleges that denial of an investigator contravened 
the provisions of Code §§ 19.2-163 and -332 by requiring 
appointed counsel to perform investigative services without 
compensation.  According to Dowdy, the "low" amount of 
compensation allowed court-appointed counsel for representing 
indigent defendants under Code § 19.2-163 and the provision 
for payment of other reasonable expenses pursuant to Code 
§ 19.2-332 means that the Commonwealth must pay for 
investigative assistance instead of placing that burden on 
court-appointed counsel.  Dowdy, in essence, urges us to find 
a right to a court-appointed investigator whenever leaving the 
investigation to counsel could result in counsel not being 
fully compensated for time expended.  We find no merit in 
Dowdy's argument. 
The provisions of Code § 19.2-163 provide generally for 
the compensation of court-appointed counsel according to a fee 
schedule, and for a waiver of statutory limits in certain 
circumstances.17  The statute also states: "The circuit or 
district court shall direct the payment of such reasonable 
expenses incurred by such court-appointed counsel as it deems 
                                                 
17 The version of Code § 19.2-163 in force at the time of 
Dowdy's trial lacked the fee cap waiver provisions set forth 
in the current version of this statute.  See 2007 Acts chs. 
938, 946.  The change does not affect our analysis. 
33 
appropriate under the circumstances of the case."  Code 
§ 19.2-163.  The relevant portion of Code § 19.2-332 provides: 
"Whenever in a criminal case an officer or other person 
renders any service required by law for which no specific 
compensation is provided, or whenever any other service has 
been rendered pursuant to the request or prior approval of the 
court, the court shall allow therefor such sum as it deems 
reasonable." 
Both of these statutes merely authorize a trial court to 
exercise its discretion in awarding reasonable expenses 
incurred by counsel appointed to represent indigent 
defendants.  Neither statute mandates the appointment of 
experts to assist indigent defendants, nor their counsel.  
Thus, there could be no abuse of discretion for failing to use 
these statutes to provide additional investigative services to 
Dowdy. 
C.  Admissibility of Fingerprint Testimony 
Dowdy assigns error to the circuit court's refusal to 
strike Reeves' testimony.  Dowdy claims Reeves' opinion, that 
the prints recovered from the crime scene matched prints taken 
from Dowdy, was not reliable because Reeves did not follow the 
generally accepted practices and procedures for examining and 
identifying latent prints.  In particular, Dowdy points to the 
following as examples of Reeves' flawed methodology: not 
34 
knowing of, and not following, Fairfax County Police 
Department standard operating procedures for fingerprint 
examination; not comparing the latent prints with any 
elimination prints (except the victim's); not documenting his 
fingerprint evaluation process and failing to draft a 
contemporaneous report; failing to state in his report the 
"points or characteristics" used in his evaluation, thus 
making it impossible to determine if he followed the standard 
methodology of "Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, Validation"; 
and not having taken a competency examination in several 
years, though required annually by the SWGFAST guidelines. 
Dowdy also cites Reeves' failure to calculate an error 
rate with regard to his fingerprint identification, and the 
lack of a scientific basis for the number of points he used to 
make the identification.  Finally, Dowdy argues that the 
circuit court improperly placed the burden of proving the 
testimony's unreliability on Dowdy, rather than properly 
placing the burden to prove reliability on the Commonwealth, 
and also used an incorrect legal standard for the admission of 
expert testimony when the court admitted the testimony on the 
finding that Reeves' opinion was not "inherently incredible." 
The "admission of expert testimony is in the sound 
discretion of the trial court."  Payne v. Commonwealth, 277 
Va. 531, 542, 674 S.E.2d 835, 841 (2009) (citation omitted); 
35 
see John v. Im, 263 Va. 315, 319-20, 559 S.E.2d 694, 696-97 
(2002) (evaluating the trial court's finding of an adequate 
foundation to admit expert testimony under an abuse of 
discretion standard).  "Expert testimony is admissible when it 
concerns matters not within the ordinary knowledge of the 
jury" such that it may assist the jury's understanding of the 
evidence presented.  Payne, 277 Va. at 542, 674 S.E.2d at 841; 
Compton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 716, 726, 250 S.E.2d 749, 
755-56 (1979). 
"When scientific evidence is offered, the court must make 
a threshold finding of fact with respect to the reliability of 
the scientific method offered, unless it is of a kind so 
familiar and accepted as to require no foundation to establish 
the fundamental reliability of the system, such as fingerprint 
analysis."  Spencer, 240 Va. at 97, 393 S.E.2d at 621 (citing 
Avent v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 474, 478, 164 S.E.2d 655, 658 
(1968) ("'The accuracy of fingerprint identification is a 
matter of common knowledge and no case has been cited, and we 
have found none, where identification so established has been 
rejected.'")); accord Billips v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 805, 
808-09, 652 S.E.2d 99, 101 (2007).  When the scientific method 
has been found reliable, either by its familiarity or a 
specific finding, a trial court must then find that the 
"expert testimony [is] based on an adequate foundation; 
36 
'expert testimony is inadmissible if it is founded on 
assumptions that have an insufficient factual basis.'"  Payne, 
277 Va. at 542-43, 674 S.E.2d at 841 (citation omitted). 
Because the reliability of fingerprint identification 
methodology need not be established, Spencer, 240 Va. at 97, 
393 S.E.2d at 621, the Commonwealth had the burden to show 
only that Reeves' opinion had an adequate foundation.18  Reeves 
examined all the relevant data, the palm and finger prints 
lifted from the utility box and those taken from Dowdy, 
leaving no part of the prints with identification value 
unidentified.  This analysis occurred over a period of days.  
Reeves reviewed much of the basis for his conclusions during 
his testimony, identifying both points of agreement that he 
relied on to make a positive identification and those portions 
of the print he did not use for lack of the necessary clarity 
or continuity.  Reeves also testified that he turned over his 
work to another fingerprint examiner so that the accuracy of 
his conclusions could be verified.  Finally, he stated that he 
did not deviate from the generally accepted practices for 
latent fingerprint evaluation. 
                                                 
18 When Dowdy moved to strike Reeves' testimony, he 
acknowledged that he was not challenging the science of 
fingerprint analysis. 
Contrary to Dowdy's argument, the circuit court did not 
place on him the burden of showing the unreliability of 
Reeves' testimony. 
37 
Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting Reeves' testimony.19  Dowdy's 
contentions go to "factual issues involving the weight of the 
evidence rather than its admissibility" and as such were for 
the jury to resolve.  O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 
696-97, 364 S.E.2d 491, 505 (1988) (affirming the admission of 
expert testimony because challenges to the "experience and 
competence of the examiner . . . and the manner in which [the 
examiner] did the tests" went to the weight the testimony 
should be afforded, not its admissibility). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals upholding Dowdy's conviction for the rape 
and first-degree murder of Judy Jaimie Coate. 
Affirmed. 
                                                 
19 By characterizing Reeves' testimony as not "inherently 
incredible," the circuit court was commenting on his 
credibility.  It was not adopting a legal standard for 
admitting testimony. 
38