Case Title: MARRIAGE OF WILLIAMS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 14981 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A 1980 I N RE T H E MARRIAGE O F LINDA WILLIAMS, P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent, HARRY L. WILLIAMS, Respondent and Appellant. 1 from: The D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e county o f Flathead, The Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: James D. Moore, K a l i s p e l l , Montana For Respondent: Xenneth E. O'Brien, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : March 6 , 1980 Decided : & & 4. 1980 - - F i l e d : &IN 4: .- J@;Q! M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Appellant appeals from an order denying h i s p e t i t i o n t o modify support payments. The order was entered by t h e District Court, Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Flathead County. The p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n w e r e divorced on December 13, 1971. Under t h e divorce decree, respondent was given t h e custody of t h e p a r t i e s ' four minor children. Appellant was ordered t o pay $60 per month per c h i l d i n support payments. I n September 1977, t h e D i s t r i c t Court entered an order modifying c h i l d support. Under t h i s order a p p e l l a n t was required t o pay $75 p e r month per c h i l d u n t i l J u l y 1, 1978, and t h e r e a f t e r $85 per month per c h i l d c u r r e n t support and $50 p e r month on accrued support which t o t a l e d $2,280. Shortly a f t e r t h e e n t r y of t h i s o r d e r , a p p e l l a n t sus- t a i n e d an i n j u r y which r e s u l t e d i n a one month d i s a b i l i t y . The p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d i n w r i t i n g t o reduce a p p e l l a n t ' s October 1977 c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n by one-half. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s , on? of t h e c h i l d r e n began r e s i d i n g with a p p e l l a n t on a part-time b a s i s while a t t e n d i n g school. A s a r e s u l t of t h e s e circumstances, t h e p a r t i e s f u r t h e r s t i p u l a t e d t o reduce a p p e l l a n t ' s c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n , a s t o t h a t c h i l d , by one-half. Approximately a year a f t e r t h e September 1977 order t h e a p p e l l a n t sustained a severe, work-related i n j u r y t o h i s f o o t , and a s a r e s u l t , t h e f r o n t h a l f of t h e f o o t was nearly severed. H e underwent two o p e r a t i o n s and was still t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e May 1979 hearing. A t t h e t i m e of t h e September 1977 o r d e r , a p p e l l a n t ' s monthly n e t income was $1,074.62. A s a r e s u l t of t h e second i n j u r y and h i s temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y , a p p e l l a n t ' s expendable income was diminished. H i s cumulative income, a f t e r t h e accident, comprised of i n d u s t r i a l accident d i s - a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s i n t h e s u m of $752 a month and d i s a b i l i t y c r e d i t payments i n t h e sum of $153.71 per month, f o r a t o t a l monthly income of $905.71. This s i t u a t i o n was brought t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t Court, and although a formal p e t i t i o n was n o t f i l e d by e i t h e r p a r t y , proceedings w e r e commenced f o r a f u l l review of c h i l d support o b l i g a t i o n s and f o r such modifica- t i o n as had become appropriate under t h e circumstances. The D i s t r i c t Court entered i t s findings of f a c t , conclusions of l a w and order on May 22, 1979. I t found t h a t a p p e l l a n t owed $2,335 i n accrued support and ordered him t o repay t h e sum a t t h e r a t e of $50 p e r month. The c o u r t , however, suspended t h e s e payments during t h e period of a p p e l l a n t ' s d i s a b i l i t y . The c o u r t f u r t h e r ordered a p p e l l a n t t o continue t o pay c h i l d support f o r t h e couple's two remaining minor c h i l d r e n a t t h e r a t e of $85 per month, suspending $10 p e r c h i l d per month during t h e period of d i s a b i l i t y . These suspended payments w e r e t o be added t o t h e amount a p p e l l a n t owed i n accrued support. The c o u r t a l s o required t h e p a r t i e s t o share equally a l l medical, d e n t a l and o c u l a r expenses i n excess of t h e insurance coverage which a p p e l l a n t i s required t o main- t a i n . F i n a l l y , t h e c o u r t ordered t h a t during periods of v i s i t a t i o n of two weeks o r more, t h e c h i l d support payments would be reduced by one-half f o r t h e d u r a t i o n of t h e v i s i t . Appellant r a i s e s t h e following i s s u e on appeal: 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court's f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law were s u f f i c i e n t t o support t h e May 1979 order? More p a r t i c u l a r l y , t h e i s s u e s t o be resolved are: (a) Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n denying a p p e l l a n t a reduction i n c h i l d support? (b) Did the District Court err in its computation of accrued child support? (c) Did the District Court err in reserving the right to order all or a part of accrued support to be paid from proceeds of appellant's industrial accident settlement, if any? Appellant initially contends that the District Court erred in not reducing his child support obligation. He submits that the change in his financial circumstances occurring after his accident was sufficient to require a modification of the support decree. Respondent argues that the plan laid out by the District Court to suspend appel- lant's payments during the period of disability was a more than adequate modification under the circumstances. Before it was amended in 1979, and for the purposes of this appeal, section 40-4-208(1), MCA, pro-"*ided: "Except as otherwise provided in 40-4-201(6), the provisions of any decree respecting main- tenance or support may be modified by a court only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification and either: "(a) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable; or " (b) upon written consent of the parties. The provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified by a court, except: I' (i) upon written consent of the parties; or "(ii) if the court finds the existence of condi- tions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state." The record here shows that the trial court was cogni- zant of appellant's financial situation when issuing its order partially suspending support payments. Further, the order was formulated in a manner which would serve the best interests of the children. Therefore, we cannot say that t h e D i s t r i c t Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n modifying t h e support payments as it did. W e a f f i r m t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e modification order p a r t i a l l y suspending a p p e l l a n t ' s f u t u r e c h i l d support. W e must, however, r e v e r s e t h a t p a r t of t h e order r e - l a t i n g t o t h e suspension of payments f o r a p p e l l a n t ' s d e l i n - quent c h i l d support during t h e period of h i s d i s a b i l i t y . This p o r t i o n of t h e o r d e r , i n e f f e c t , modified t h e judgment previously entered i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court a s t o the accrued c h i l d support payments. A s such, it c o n f l i c t s with s e c t i o n 40-4-208(1), MCA, and i s impermissible. W i l l i a m s v. Budke (1980), - Mont. , 606 P.2d 515, 37 St.Rep. 228, 231. ". . . t h e order of t h e District Court d e f e r r i n g payments took away [ t h e wife's] r i g h t t o levy execution f o r t h e accrued payments i f property could be found i n t h e possession of t h e husband which could be applied t o t h e arrearages. Our holding here keeps i n force t h e r i g h t s t h a t every holder of a judgment f o r support i n a d i s - s o l u t i o n of marriage has: 11 I . . . There a r e various means of enforcing o r d e r s d i r e c t i n g t h e paymen.t of support money i n a c t i o n s f o r divorce. The most common a r e : ( a ) By r e q u i r i n g t h e husband t o give s e c u r i t y f o r t h e enforcement of t h e payments ordered [ c i t i n g a s t a t u t e and a case]; (b) by contempt proceedings [ c i t i n g cases] ; (c) by execution, as i n t h e case of o t h e r money judgments [ c i t i n g t h e a u t h o r i t y ] ; and (d) by invoking t h e p o l i c e power of t h e state t o punish t h e p a r e n t f o r w i l f u l l y f a i l i n g , r e f u s i n g o r neglecting t o support h i s c h i l d [ c i t i n g a u t h o r i t y ] . ' S t a t e v. District Court (1948), 1 2 2 Mont. 61, 72, 198 P.2d 761, 767. "Moreover, our holding here does nct nean t h a t a D i s t r i c t Court i s e n t i r e l y without power t o arrange a deferred schedule f o r a r r e a r a g e s and support payments. . . The D i s t r i c t Court always has j u r i s d i c t i o n i n contempt proceedings f o r t h e purpose of enforcing a support money decree, t o f i n d t h e d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y i n contempt, and t o s t a y t h e execution of punishment f o r t h e contempt upon t h e proviso t h a t t h e d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y purge himself by making payments i n accordance with a schedule e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. W e s o s t a t e d i n S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t Court, supra, 122 Mont. a t 74, 75, 198 P.2d a t 768. "However, the deferral schedule adopted by the District Court here, without reference to con- tempt, constituted a modification of a judgment for accrued payments. This cannot be done." Williams v. Budke, supra, 37 St-Rep. at 232-33. Appellant next contends the District Court erred in computing the amount of delinquent child support owed by him. A review of the record indicates that, although a conflict in the evidence exists, there is substantial evi- dence to support the District Court's findings and conclu- sions. Cameron v. Cameron (1978), - Mont. , 587 P. 2d 939, 35 St.Rep. 1723. The District Court's computation of accrued child support is therefore affirmed. Finally, appellant submits the District Court erred in its Finding of Fact No. 15 wherein it reserved the right to order all or a portion of the delinquent child support payments to be paid from any workers' compensation settle- ment appellant might receive. This is merely a statement of a future action the court might take. It is not a final order and, therefore, does not constitute an appealable issue. Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. /' We concur: Chief Justice - a Justices