Case Title: Steele v. Commissioner of Social Security

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC2022-1342

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2024-02-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
No. SC2022-1342 
____________ 
KATHLEEN STEELE, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 
Appellee. 
February 15, 2024 
GROSSHANS, J. 
In this case, we are presented with two certified questions 
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit about the 
meaning of a Florida statute that speaks to the inheritance rights of 
“[a] child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a person or persons 
who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to 
a woman’s body.”  § 742.17(4), Fla. Stat. (2019).  The statute says 
that such children can only take from a decedent’s estate if they are 
“provided for” in the decedent’s will.  In response to the Eleventh 
Circuit’s first question, we hold that “provided for” in this context 
 
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means that the will must give something to the child as 
contemplated by the decedent when the will was made—a test that 
the appellant in this case does not satisfy.  Given that answer, we 
need not address the Eleventh Circuit’s other question, which asks 
whether Florida law allows a posthumously conceived child who is 
“provided for” in a decedent’s will to inherit the decedent’s intestate 
personal property.1 
Background 
 
Philip and Kathleen Steele married in 1997.  During their 
marriage, they had a son—conceived through in vitro fertilization.  
Following his son’s birth, Mr. Steele submitted additional sperm 
samples to a fertility clinic. 
 
Thereafter, with the assistance of a lawyer, Mr. Steele 
prepared a will.  At the outset, Mr. Steele defined his family to 
encompass his spouse, his living children, and any later-born or 
adopted children.  Elsewhere in the will, Mr. Steele addressed the 
disposition of his property.  He devised to his wife all tangible 
personal property, the homestead property, and the residue of his 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const. 
 
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estate.  If, however, his wife died before him, his children “then 
living” would inherit his tangible personal property. 
Mr. Steele died roughly a year and a half after executing the 
will.  Following Mr. Steele’s death, P.S.S. was conceived by in vitro 
fertilization using Mr. Steele’s deposited sperm samples.  After 
P.S.S. was born, Ms. Steele sought survivor benefits from the Social 
Security Administration (SSA), contending that P.S.S. was entitled 
to such benefits as a child of Mr. Steele.  The SSA denied 
Ms. Steele’s application.  In its view, P.S.S. did not qualify as Mr. 
Steele’s child under the controlling federal statutes. 
Disagreeing with that determination, Ms. Steele asked for 
administrative review.  However, an administrative law judge (ALJ) 
rejected Ms. Steele’s position, agreeing with the SSA’s determination 
that P.S.S. was not Mr. Steele’s child under the applicable federal 
statutes.  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (authorizing child’s 
insurance benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 416(e), (h)(2)(A) (defining child 
based on state intestacy law); Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 
U.S. 541, 545, 558 (2012) (interpreting section 416(h)(2)(A)’s 
intestacy-law requirement as informing section 416(e)’s 
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unelaborated definition of child).2  Since Mr. Steele died while 
domiciled in Florida, the ALJ considered whether P.S.S. could take 
from Mr. Steele’s estate under Florida’s intestacy statutes.  Such 
statutes, often located in Florida’s probate code, establish default 
rules for distributing a decedent’s property absent a valid will.  
Finding no controlling statute in the probate code, the ALJ turned 
to section 742.17—the statute noted at the beginning of this 
opinion.  Under the ALJ’s interpretation of the statute, a 
posthumously conceived child, like P.S.S., could only inherit 
through a will.  Thus, according to the ALJ, such a child could not 
take under Florida’s intestacy statutes. 
Ultimately, Ms. Steele sued the SSA in federal district court.  
The district court, however, ruled in the SSA’s favor, agreeing with 
the ALJ’s conclusion and statutory interpretation.  Following that 
unfavorable ruling, Ms. Steele appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. 
In its ensuing opinion, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the 
issue in this case—whether a “posthumously conceived” child could 
2. There are other ways for an individual to have child status.
See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)-(3).  These alternative methods, though, 
are not applicable in this case. 
 
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take under Florida intestacy law—was one of first impression.  
Steele v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 51 F.4th 1059, 1061 (11th Cir. 2022).  
The court then assessed the parties’ competing interpretations of 
section 742.17(4), finding that each side had advanced a reasonable 
interpretation of it.  Id. at 1064.  One plausible interpretation, said 
the court, was that the statute “limit[s] the rights of posthumously 
conceived children to property devised in the decedent’s will.”  Id.  
However, it also observed that “the phrase ‘unless the child has 
been provided for by the decedent’s will’ in section 742.17(4) can be 
reasonably read as a condition for a posthumously conceived child 
to inherit a share of the decedent’s property intestate.”  Id.  So, in 
light of the “two reasonable interpretations” and the absence of 
Florida case law on point, the court certified two questions of 
Florida law, asking: 
(1) Under Florida law, is P.S.S. “provided for” in the 
decedent’s will within the meaning of Fla. Stat. 
§ 742.17(4)? 
 
(2) If the answer is yes, does Florida law authorize a 
posthumously conceived child who is provided for in the 
decedent’s will to inherit intestate the decedent’s 
property? 
 
 
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Id. at 1065.  Notably, while the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion discussed 
alternative answers to the second certified question, the opinion did 
not analyze the threshold question about the meaning and 
application of the phrase “provided for” in section 742.17(4). 
 
This review proceeding follows. 
Analysis 
 
We answer only the first certified question because our 
interpretation of the phrase “provided for” in section 742.17(4) is 
dispositive.  As expressed in our cases involving statutory 
interpretation, we are committed to the supremacy-of-text 
principle—that is, “[t]he words of a governing text are of paramount 
concern” to us, and “what they convey, in their context, is what the 
text means.”  Coates v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 365 So. 3d 353, 
354 (Fla. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Levy v. Levy, 326 So. 
3d 678, 681 (Fla. 2021)).  In applying this principle, we begin with 
the text of the statute, which says in full: 
 
A child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a 
person or persons who died before the transfer of their 
eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a woman’s body shall not 
be eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate unless 
the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will. 
 
§ 742.17(4) (emphasis added). 
 
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Under the statute, a will must “provide[] for” a posthumously 
conceived child in order for that child to “be eligible for a claim 
against the decedent’s estate.”  Id.  The term “provided for” is not 
defined in the statute or in any other part of chapter 742; nor have 
we had occasion to consider it in the context of this statute.  To 
arrive at a fair reading of this term, we look to sources bearing on 
its objective meaning, that is: what a reasonable reader would have 
understood it to mean at the time it issued.  See Ham v. Portfolio 
Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 947 (Fla. 2020). 
Often, the first sources we consult are dictionaries.  
See Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 599 (Fla. 2022) 
(dictionaries are “best evidence” of ordinary meaning); Ham, 308 So. 
3d at 948 (looking to contemporaneous dictionary definition to 
ascertain objective meaning of statutory text).  One dictionary 
defines “provide” as “to make preparation to meet a need”—
especially “to supply something for sustenance or support.”  
Provide, Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 948 (9th ed. 
1990).  Another era-appropriate dictionary defines the intransitive 
form of the verb “provide” as “[t]o supply means of subsistence.”  
Provide, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
 
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1458 (3rd ed. 1992).  These definitions show that, as a whole, 
“provided for” carries the idea of giving something to someone. 
Consistent with these definitions, our case law in a related 
context underscores a necessary component of the term “provided 
for.”  See Furst v. DeFrances, 332 So. 3d 951, 954 (Fla. 2021) 
(looking to case law interpreting similar statutory phrase in a 
related context).  In Ganier’s Estate v. Ganier’s Estate, 418 So. 2d 
256, 258 (Fla. 1982), we considered the pretermitted-spouse 
statute, which protects “a spouse whom the testator . . . marrie[s] 
after executing a will” from “inadvertent disinheritance.”  Id.; 
cf. § 732.301, Fla. Stat. (1977) (pretermitted-spouse statute).3  By 
its terms, that statute does not apply if the surviving spouse is 
“provided for” in the relevant will.  In interpreting this term, we 
held: “[A] spouse has not been ‘provided for,’ within the meaning of 
section 732.301(2), unless the testator both provided for a person 
named in the will executed before marriage and made such 
provision in contemplation of marriage to that named person.”  
Ganier’s Estate, 418 So. 2d at 260 (emphasis added). 
 
3.  This statute has not changed since 1977.  See ch. 1977-87, 
§ 9, Laws of Fla. (last modification to statute). 
 
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We think that our interpretation of “provided for” in that case 
has some relevance here since giving something to someone  
encompasses contemplation of the recipient.  Thus, in the context 
of section 742.17, contemplation of the post-death conception of a 
child would be necessary in order for that child to be provided for in 
the will. 
 
Therefore, based on our analysis above, we conclude that 
“provided for” in section 742.17(4) means that the testator actually 
left something to the posthumously conceived child through the 
will.  Or, put another way, the child must have some inheritance 
right under the will.  As part of this requirement, the will must 
show that the testator contemplated the possibility of a child being 
conceived following his or her death. 
 
Assessed against this standard, Mr. Steele’s will does not 
“provide for” P.S.S.  No part of the will acknowledges the possibility 
of children being conceived after Mr. Steele’s death.  To be sure, the 
will references afterborn or adopted children.  But that mention of  
later-born children, as we read Mr. Steele’s will, refers most 
naturally to children born after his will was drafted but conceived 
before his death, i.e., when the dispositional portions of the will 
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create vested rights.  See § 732.514, Fla. Stat. (2019); see also 
§ 732.106, Fla. Stat. (2019) (defining afterborn heirs in a similar
fashion).  Thus, this reference to later-born children would not 
cover P.S.S., who was conceived after Mr. Steele’s death.4 
But, even if we found that post-death conception was in some 
generic sense contemplated by Mr. Steele, P.S.S. could not have  
received anything under the will.  Mr. Steele’s will conveyed all 
relevant property to Ms. Steele.  In the event that Ms. Steele had 
died before Mr. Steele, the tangible personal property would have 
been distributed to his “then living children.”  By its terms, this 
fallback provision only applied to children living at the time Mr. 
Steele died and necessarily excluded any posthumously conceived 
children, like P.S.S.  Therefore, as it was impossible for P.S.S. to 
inherit anything from the will, it is clear that Mr. Steele did not 
provide for P.S.S. as contemplated by section 742.17(4). 
4. We do not address whether parol evidence could establish
whether a child was contemplated by the decedent, as it is clear in 
this case that P.S.S. could not receive anything from the will.  
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Conclusion 
Accordingly, based on the reasoning above, Mr. Steele’s will 
does not provide for P.S.S.  Since P.S.S. is not provided for in the 
will, he is not “eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate.”  
§ 742.17(4).  This holding—answering the first certified question—is
determinative of the case.  We decline to answer the second 
question and return this case to the Eleventh Circuit for further 
proceedings. 
It is so ordered. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, and FRANCIS, JJ., concur. 
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion. 
SASSO, J., did not participate. 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
LABARGA, J., concurring in result. 
This Court has long observed that “the polestar of statutory 
construction [is the] plain meaning of the statute at issue.”  Acosta 
v. Richter, 671 So. 2d 149, 153 (Fla. 1996).  In this case, the plain
meaning of “provide” discussed in the majority opinion is sufficient 
to resolve the dispositive certified question. 
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Mr. Steele’s will does not “make preparation to meet a need” of 
P.S.S. or “supply [P.S.S.] something for sustenance or support,”5 
nor does it “supply [P.S.S. with] means of subsistence.”6  To the 
contrary, as explained by the majority, Mr. Steele devised the 
homestead, tangible personal property, and the residue of his estate 
to Ms. Steele.  What is more, in the event that Ms. Steele 
predeceased Mr. Steele, the tangible personal property would be 
distributed to the children living at the time of Mr. Steele’s death—a 
provision which unquestionably excludes P.S.S. 
Thus, Mr. Steele’s will does not “provide[] for” P.S.S. within the 
meaning of section 742.17(4), Florida Statutes (2019). 
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit – Case No. 20-11656 
Roger W. Plata and Enrique Escarraz, III, St. Petersburg, Florida, 
for Appellant 
Roger B. Handberg, United States Attorney, David P. Rhodes 
Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, Todd B. 
Grandy, Assistant United States Attorney, Appellate Division, 
5. Provide, Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 948 (9th
ed. 1990). 
6. Provide, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 1458 (3rd ed. 1992). 
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Nadine DeLuca Elder, Supervisory General Attorney, Natalie Liem, 
Special Assistant United States Attorney, and Richard V. Blake, 
General Counsel, Social Security Administration, Atlanta, Georgia, 
for Appellee 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor 
General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and 
Darrick W. Monson, Assistant Solicitor General, Office of the 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
for Amicus Curiae State of Florida