Case Title: RUSSELL JAMES MARTIN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
RUSSELL JAMES MARTIN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 76157 P.3d 923Case Number: 05-263Decided: 05/10/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
RUSSELL 
JAMES MARTIN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane 
Courselle, Faculty Director, UW Defender Aid; Vincent P. Schutte and Daniel B. 
Kelley, Student Interns.  Argument 
by Mr. Kelley.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank; Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Causey.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, C.J., files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 

HILL, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In of June 2005, 
Appellant, Russell James Martin ("Martin"), was found guilty of attempted 
second-degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-1041 and 6-1-3012 (LexisNexis 2005).  On appeal, Martin contends that the 
district court erred in admitting hearsay testimony relating to previous 
uncharged misconduct and in providing an improper limiting instruction on the 
suitable use of this evidence.  
Martin also claims that the district court erred in allowing a mental 
health expert to invade the province of the jury and testify that the statements 
Martin voiced shortly after the charged crime established that he intended to 
kill his wife.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Martin presents 
these issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Whether the district court erred by allowing hearsay accounts of 
uncharged misconduct evidence, when the victim was available and testified at 
trial.  Were both the form of the 
evidence and the uses to which the court told the jury the evidence could be put 
improper.

 

II.         
Whether the district court erred in allowing a mental health expert to 
invade the province of the jury and exceed her expertise by letting her testify 
to her semantic interpretation that Martin's statements showed he intended to 
kill his wife.  

 
 

FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      On the morning of 
August 22, 2004, Martin was having an unpleasant conversation with his wife, 
Marla Martin ("Mrs. Martin").  
During this discussion, Martin accused Mrs. Martin of, inter alia, 
being a "pathetic mother."  Later 
that morning, as Mrs. Martin stood in the kitchen preparing her young daughter's 
breakfast, Martin picked up a hammer, approached Mrs. Martin from behind, and 
struck her multiple times on her head.

 
 
[¶4]      When Martin 
witnessed Mrs. Martin collapse to the floor, he believed that he had killed 
her.  Martin then went upstairs to 
his mother's apartment, where he told his mother that he thought he had killed 
his wife, and called 911.  Martin 
also told the 911 dispatcher that he thought he had killed Mrs. Martin.  While he was still on the cellular 
telephone with the 911 dispatcher, Martin went back to his apartment where he 
found that his wife was still alive.  
The dispatcher instructed Martin to wait outside of the apartment for the 
EMTs to arrive and Martin complied.

 
 
[¶5]      Shortly 
thereafter, emergency medical care arrived at the Martin residence and Mrs. 
Martin was taken to the CampbellCountyMemorialHospital.  There, physicians determined that Mrs. 
Martin had suffered a severe bilateral skull fracture and required immediate 
neurosurgery.

 
 
[¶6]      While Mrs. Martin 
was undergoing medical treatment, law enforcement collected physical evidence 
from the crime scene and interviewed Martin.  During Martin's crime scene interview, 
which was recorded on audiotape, he stated that he had been awake since the 
previous night, as he had ingested a small amount of methamphetamine and was 
hearing voices.  Martin also 
informed law enforcement that these voices did not instruct him to harm Mrs. 
Martin, instead, Martin claimed that he had "just lost 
it."

 
 
[¶7]      The State of 
Wyoming 
charged Martin with attempted second-degree murder, a felony in violation of 
§§ 6-2-104 and 6-1-301.  
Subsequent to the filing of the Information, the circuit court suspended 
the proceedings against Martin so that the WyomingStateHospital's Criminal Justice 
Service could evaluate him for competency.  
Dr. Cathy Buckwell, a forensic psychologist for the Hospital, evaluated 
Martin and determined that he was fit to proceed to trial.

 
 
[¶8]      After the case 
had been bound over to district court, the State filed its Notice of Intent to 
Introduce W.R.E. 404(b) evidence of uncharged misconduct, in the form of prior 
incidents of domestic violence.  
Defense counsel objected to the introduction of this evidence.  Following a 404(b) hearing, the district 
court concluded that the uncharged misconduct evidence was admissible for the 
purpose of showing "intent, motive, or absence of mistake or 
accident."

 
 
[¶9]      The jury trial 
commenced on June 27, 2005.  As part 
of its case, the State called Mrs. Martin, who testified to multiple incidents 
of prior domestic abuse by Martin.  
Particularly, Mrs. Martin testified that Martin had threatened to kill 
her "a couple times."  Mrs. Martin 
also stated that over the length of their marriage, Martin had pushed her down, 
hit her, and punched her in the back.  
Mrs. Martin further testified that approximately one year after their 
wedding, Martin had gotten on top of her and choked her.

 
 
[¶10]   On cross-examination, defense 
counsel attempted to prove that the choking incident was not as serious or 
brutal as Mrs. Martin had portrayed it.  
For example, defense counsel questioned Mrs. Martin as to why Martin had 
not killed her, given his larger size and greater strength.  In response, Mrs. Martin stated that she 
was uncertain whether Martin had let her go or whether she had 
escaped.

 
 
[¶11]   The State then sought to supplement 
Mrs. Martin's testimony with the W.R.E. 404(b) domestic violence evidence 
through the testimony of Officers Hloucal and West. Prior to the officers' 
testimony, the district court gave a limiting instruction and informed the jury that any uncharged acts of domestic 
violence could only be considered for a limited purpose.  Defense counsel did not object to this 
instruction or propose any alterations.

 
 
[¶12]   Officer Hloucal stated that in July 
of 1998, he had been called to the Martin residence due to a "family violence 
incident."  When Officer Hloucal 
began to recount what Mrs. Martin had told him at the scene, defense counsel 
objected as to hearsay.  The State 
argued that the testimony was admissible as Mrs. Martin's prior consistent 
statement, and the district court concurred.  Therefore, Officer Hloucal went on to 
testify that Mrs. Martin had told him that she had been choked and hit in the 
face by Martin.

 
 
[¶13]   Officer West then testified to a 
2004 domestic violence episode that had also occurred at the Martin 
residence.  West testified that 
during her conversations with the Martins, she observed physical injuries to 
Mrs. Martin's left arm.  When the 
State questioned Officer West about what Mrs. Martin had told her during their 
conversation, defense counsel again objected as to hearsay.  The prosecution responded that he wanted 
to use the testimony to "establish the time frame in which [Martin's threats to 
kill Mrs. Martin] occurred and the specific nature of the statement."  The district court again overruled the 
objection and the testimony was admitted.  
Officer West then testified that Martin "had threatened to slit her 
throat."

 
 
[¶14]   When the defense presented its 
case, Martin did not deny that he had struck his wife with the hammer.  Martin also admitted to previous 
incidents of domestic violence, but stated that he loved her and never wanted to 
kill her.  Instead, Martin's defense 
was premised upon two theories: (1) At the time of the incident, he was 
suffering from a mental disease or defect that made him unable to appreciate 
what he was doing; and (2) based upon his methamphetamine-induced psychosis, he 
had not acted with the specific intent to kill his wife.

 
 
[¶15]   Martin's defense also consisted of 
the testimony of Dr. Berton Toews and Dr. Robert J. Innes.  These doctors both opined that because 
of Martin's "methamphetamine psychosis," it was likely that Martin had acted 
impulsively on the morning that he took up the hammer.

 
 
[¶16]   Mrs. Martin was also called to 
testify for the defense in relation to Martin's attitude and general disposition 
over the months preceding the incident.  
During this direct examination, Mrs. Martin was also asked questions 
regarding whether she had started any fights with Martin, whether he had 
threatened to kill her "when he got mad a lot of times," and whether he had ever 
really tried to kill her.

 
 
[¶17]   The State then called Dr. Cathy 
Buckwell as a rebuttal witness.  She 
was a forensic psychologist who had previously evaluated Martin's competency to 
stand trial.  Dr. Buckwell testified 
that Martin did not satisfy the requirements for the defense of not guilty by 
reason of mental disease or deficiency.  
Dr. Buckwell also stated, over defense counsel's objection, that based 
upon her interpretation of the audio taped statements Martin had made after the 
incident, he had acted with the specific intent to kill Mrs. Martin.  The district court later instructed the 
jury that it could consider expert testimony and the reasons offered therefor, 
but was not "bound to accept the expert's opinion as 
conclusive."

 
 
[¶18]   At the conclusion of the trial, 
Martin was convicted of attempted second-degree murder.  In September of 2005, the district court 
sentenced Martin to a term of imprisonment of 50 years to 
life.

 
 
[¶19]   These facts will be supplemented 
when necessary.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶20]   Martin claims that the district 
court erred in allowing hearsay accounts of uncharged misconduct and that Dr. 
Buckwell's testimony invaded the province of the jury.  Decisions 
regarding the 
introduction of 
evidence are 
entrusted to the 
sound 
discretion of the 
district 
court.  See Law v. State, 2004 
WY 111, ¶ 14, 98 P.3d 181, 
187 (Wyo. 2004); Betzle 
v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1022 (Wyo. 
1993) (discussing the admission of expert testimony).  The district 
court's ruling regarding the admission of 
evidence will not 
be disturbed absent a finding of a clear abuse of discretion.  Id.  As this Court has previously held, a 
decision of the district court is entitled to considerable deference and, as 
long as there exists a legitimate basis for the district court's ruling, it will 
not be reversed on appeal.  See Williams v. State, 2002 WY 184, 
¶ 5, 60 P.3d 151, 154 (Wyo. 2002).  
The burden is on the appellant to establish that the district court 
abused its discretion.  See Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 
571 (Wyo. 2000).  The abuse-of-discretion standard reviews the reasonableness of the 
district court's holding.  See Kenyon v. 
State, 2004 
WY 100, ¶ 19, 96 P.3d 1016, 
1024 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶21]   However, if we hold that the 
district court erred in admitting this evidence, we 
must then determine whether or not the error affected any of Martin's 
substantial rights, providing grounds for reversal, or whether the error was 
harmless.  See Skinner v. 
State, 2001 
WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766-67 (Wyo. 2001); W.R.A.P. 
9.04; W.R.Cr.P. 52.  The error is 
harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been 
more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred.  Skinner, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d  at 
767.  To demonstrate harmful error, 
Martin must prove prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play."  Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 1990)). 

 
 
[¶22]   When reviewing questions involving 
the impropriety of jury instructions, we afford 
the district court significant deference.  
See Bromley v. State, 2007 
WY 20, ¶ 31, 150 P.3d 1202, 1212 (Wyo. 2007).  The 
district court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire 
charge covers the relevant issue, reversible error will not be found.  
Prejudice will be determined to exist only where an appellant 
demonstrates that the instruction given confused 
or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of law.  Id.  Failure to object to an instruction 
at trial forecloses appellate review of that instruction absent plain 
error.  See Butcher v. State, 2005 
WY 146, ¶ 29, 123 P.3d 543, 552 (Wyo. 2005).  Plain error exists only when: (1) The 
record is clear concerning the alleged error; (2) a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law was violated; and (3) the appellant was materially prejudiced by denial 
of a substantial right.  Id.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
W.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(B)

 
 
[¶23]   Martin maintains that his 
conviction must be reversed due to the significant amount of hearsay testimony 
given by Officers Hloucal and West.  
Specifically, Martin claims that Officers Hloucal and West were 
improperly permitted to recount Mrs. Martin's statements of domestic violence, 
even though the requirements of W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) were not met and the State 
did not claim that any hearsay exception applied.

[¶24]   Pursuant to Rule 802 of the Wyoming 
Rules of Evidence, hearsay 
is inadmissible "except as provided by these rules or by other rules adopted by 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming or by statute."  Wilde v. State, 2003 
WY 93, ¶ 11, 74 P.3d 699, 
706 (Wyo. 2003); O'Brien v. State, 2002 
WY 63, ¶ 28, 45 P.3d 225, 234 (Wyo. 2002); W.R.E. 
802.  Hearsay, as defined by W.R.E. 801(c): "is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted." O'Brien, ¶ 28, 
45 P.3d  at 234.  
Although our evidentiary rules provide for twenty 
three specific exceptions to the hearsay exclusionary 
rule, the 
one exception that we are to be concerned with here is set forth in W.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(B): prior consistent statements.3  W.R.E. 803, 804.

 
 
[¶25]   Although prior consistent statements are inadmissible where the person providing 
those statements has testified in open court and 
has been available for cross-examination, W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) allows for the use of a prior consistent statement when required for the rehabilitation of a witness whose 
credibility has been impeached.  See Lancaster v. State, 2002 
WY 45, ¶ 15, 43 P.3d 80, 87 (Wyo. 2002); Dike v. 
State, 990 P.2d 1012, 1028 (Wyo. 1999).

 
 
[¶26]   Four requirements must be satisfied 
before a prior consistent statement will be properly admissible: (1) The 
declarant testifies at trial; (2) the declarant is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the prior statement; (3) the prior statement is consistent with the 
declarant's trial testimony; and (4) the prior statement is offered to rebut an 
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or 
improper influence or motive.  Lancaster, ¶ 17, 43 P.3d  at 88.  We have held that the fourth requirement 
does not mandate a specific allegation during cross-examination; rather, it may 
be made by implication or innuendo, and it may be found in the "thrust" of the 
defenses and testimony presented.  
Lancaster, ¶ 18, 43 P.3d  at 89 (citing 
Alicea v. State, 13 P.3d 693, 698-99 (Wyo. 2000)).

 
 
a.         
Officer Hloucal

 
 
[¶27]   Upon review of Officer Hloucal's 
testimony, we find that it was properly admitted pursuant to W.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(B).  Mrs. Martin testified 
that at one point during her marriage to Martin, he had choked her.  Mrs. Martin was then subjected to 
cross-examination regarding this incident.  
During this cross-examination, defense counsel clearly attempted to 
impeach or discredit Mrs. Martin's allegations.  Officer Hloucal then testified that when 
he was called to the Martin residence, Mrs. Martin stated that she had been 
choked and hit in the face by Martin, which was consistent with her prior 
testimony.  Although this testimony 
does not represent the ideal application of W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), it will 
suffice.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Officer Hloucal's 
testimony.

 
 

            
b.         
Officer West

 
 
[¶28]   In regard to Officer West's 
testimony, we find that her statements were far more grievous.  During Mrs. Martin's testimony, she only 
testified to the choking incident and mentioned that, in general, there had been 
other death threats and domestic violence incidents in the past.  Mrs. Martin never testified to an 
incident wherein Martin had threatened to slit her throat.  Additionally, in responding to defense 
counsel's specific objections to West's testimony, the State did not indicate 
that it was seeking to use the testimony as a "prior consistent statement."  Instead, the State provided that West's 
testimony would be useful "to establish the time frame in which [Martin's 
threats to kill Mrs. Martin] occurred and the specific nature of the 
statement."

 
 
[¶29]   Although we find that the prior 
statements need not be identical word-for-word, W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) was not 
intended to allow testimony to move from the vague to the specific.  The Rule does not allow for the use of 
hearsay evidence to fill in the gaps in the testimony elicited from the initial 
declarant.  Here, Mrs. Martin's 
testimony that Martin had threatened to kill her was only vaguely consistent 
with Officer West's testimony that Martin had threatened to slit Mrs. Martin's 
throat.  Accordingly, we find that 
the district court abused its discretion when it admitted Officer West's 
testimony.

 
 
[¶30]   While we are gravely concerned with 
the district court's admission of this hearsay testimony, we find that the error 
was harmless.  See Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 
641 (Wyo. 
1996).   Mrs. Martin was 
called by both parties and subject to extensive cross and direct 
examination.  During Mrs. Martin's 
testimony, she recounted prior incidents of domestic abuse, threats to her life, 
and portions of the charged crime itself.  
This testimony was supplemented by the admissible testimony of Officer 
Hloucal.  Therefore, we find that 
there is no reasonable probability that the exclusion of Officer West's 
testimony would have led to Martin's acquittal.

 
 
Limiting 
Instruction

 
 
[¶31]   Martin's second claim of error 
concerns the district court's limiting instruction given to the jury prior to 
Officer Hloucal's and Officer West's testimony.  While Martin agrees that a limiting 
instruction was necessary under the circumstances, he argues that the uncharged 
domestic violence evidence was admitted for eight purposes, even though the 
district court had never found the evidence admissible for each of these 
purposes.

 
 
[¶32]   The challenged Instruction 
provided:

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show he acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence, 
however, will be admitted and may be heard by you for the following purposes: To 
show that the defendant acted with intent, to show lack of mistake, to show a 
course of conduct, a common scheme and a continuing criminal design, to show 
motive, to place the offenses in their proper setting, to understand the nature 
of the offenses, and to support the credibility of the 
victim.

 
 
W.R.E. 
404(b) provides:

 
 
Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.

 
 

And see 
Dettloff v. State, 2007 
WY 29, ¶ 39, 152 P.3d 376, 386-87 (Wyo. 2007).  As uncharged misconduct 
carries an inherent danger for prejudice, the district court must instruct the jury, upon counsel's request, that the 
evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was 
admitted.  See Williams, ¶ 13, 
99 P.3d  at 440; Gleason v. State, 2002 
WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶33]   In this case, when the district 
court ruled that some evidence of uncharged domestic violence would be 
admissible, the district court determined that a limiting instruction was 
appropriate.  The record also 
provides that defense counsel failed to object to the instruction that now forms 
the basis for Martin's claim of error on appeal.  Due to the district court's wide 
latitude in instructing the jury and the fact that 
the instruction correctly stated the law, we cannot find reversible 
error.

 
 
[¶34]   Furthermore, the doctrine of 
invited error prohibits a party from raising error on appeal that was induced by 
the party's own actions.  See Bromley, ¶ 35, 150 P.3d  at 
1213 (citing Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 29, 123 P.3d 543, 552 
(Wyo. 2005)).  Martin's defense 
counsel stated that, after his review of the instruction, he did not have any 
proposed changes or corrections.  
Under these circumstances, there will be no grounds for reversal unless 
the instruction was prejudicial.  
Martin maintains that he was prejudiced by this instruction because it 
may have discouraged a "careful analysis by the jury."  Although somewhat persuasive, this 
argument provides only speculation as to how Martin may have been prejudiced, 
which is insufficient to establish prejudice or reversible 
error.

 
 

Expert 
Testimony

 
 
[¶35]   Martin's final argument is that the 
district court improperly allowed Dr. Buckwell to testify in relation to the 
statements that he made shortly after his attack on Mrs. Martin.  Martin maintains that because a 
critically contested issue at trial was Martin's intent when he struck his wife, 
Dr. Buckwell's testimony invaded the province of the jury and was beyond her 
expertise.

 
 
[¶36]   As outlined briefly above, Dr. 
Buckwell was called as a rebuttal witness for the State.  In explaining how she conducted her 
evaluation of Martin for the WyomingStateHospital, Dr. Buckwell 
stated that one consideration that factored into her determination that Martin 
was not suffering from a mental illness was the audio taped interview between 
Martin and law enforcement.  Dr. 
Buckwell noted that in that recording, Martin seemed coherent and acted in a 
manner that was "purposeful and rational."  
After this colloquy, the State then asked:

 
 
Q:        Did 
you identify any significance to the use of words that he had with law 
enforcement and with dispatch when Mr. Martin specifically said, I killed my 
wife, or I killed her?

 
 
A.        Well, 
you know, semantics is an interesting thing, but if you say, I killed someone, I 
mean, that does kind of make us think an inference that was an intention.  

 
 
This was 
followed by defense counsel's objection.  After a brief bench conference, the 
State, at the district court's instruction, rephrased the question 
as:

 
 
Q.        Did 
you identify any significance in your analysis of his mental state with respect 
to the phrase that he used in talking to apparently a large number of people 
after the event where he said either, I killed my wife, I killed Marla, or I 
killed her?

 
 
A.        
Okay.  
Yes.

 
 
Q.        What 
was that  the significance of that?

 
 
A.        The 
significance was it seemed to be a statement that indicated deliberate or 
purposeful action.

 
 
Defense 
counsel again objected and the district court ordered that the State again 
rephrase the question.

 
 
Q.        I 
believe previous  just before this question you indicated that you believed it 
was significant in your assessment of his mental illness as to the phrase he 
used, either I killed Marla, I killed my wife, or I killed her, and I believe 
you indicated that was significant?

 
 
A.       
Yes.

 
 
Q.        
Okay.  And my follow-up 
question was in what manner did you find that it was significant in rendering 
your opinion regarding his mental status?

 
 
A.        Well, 
I guess what I can say is that it wasn't  he didn't say, I hurt her, or I 
accidentally  I mean, it just  the semantics to me indicated that he was 
telling the police what he did, what he thought he did.

 
 
[¶37]   Martin argues that the problem with 
this testimony was not that it directly commented on the ultimate issue of the 
entire case, but that the testimony was not useful to the jury's understanding 
of the issue at hand.  Martin also 
states that experts are merely called upon to help the jury better understand an 
issue, not to opine on matters well within the grasp of the average 
individual.  The State claims that 
Dr. Buckwell's testimony was not offered to prove Martin's intent at the time of 
the offense, but rather to explain how Buckwell arrived at her opinion regarding 
his mental status at the time.

 
 

[¶38]   Wyoming juries are 
extended the responsibility to resolve the factual issues, judge the credibility 
of witnesses, and ultimately determine whether the 
accused is guilty or innocent.  See Burton v. State, 2002 
WY 71, ¶ 38, 46 P.3d 309, 
319 (Wyo. 2002).  Testimony by an expert witness concerning a belief that the defendant is guilty 
of the offense invades the province of the jury and 
generally mandates reversal of the conviction.  Id.; see also Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo. 1990).  Yet, we have also held that the trier of 
fact may give whatever weight and credence it may to the expert testimony as 
well as all the evidence in reaching a verdict.  See McGinn v. State, 928 P.2d 1157, 1163 (Wyo. 1996).

 
 
[¶39]   In this case, because Martin was 
charged with attempted second-degree murder, the State was required to prove 
that Martin struck his wife purposely and maliciously, with the general intent 
to kill her.  Upon an extensive 
review of the record, we agree with Martin that this testimony was inappropriate 
and do not find that Dr. Buckwell's testimony was presented to merely establish 
what facts she relied upon in evaluating Martin's mental status.  Although disguised in that manner, it is 
clear that the State called Dr. Buckwell because it wanted the jury to hear 
that, in Dr. Buckwell's opinion, Martin's statements "indicated deliberate or 
purposeful action."

 
 
[¶40]   Although we are troubled by Dr. 
Buckwell's testimony, any error was harmless.  We have confidence that the jury 
considered all of the expert testimony presented at trial.  In Martin's defense, the jury heard 
testimony from Doctors Toews and Innes, who testified that due to Martin's 
methamphetamine psychosis, he could not have struck Mrs. Martin with the 
specific intent of killing her.  
Furthermore, the jury was also instructed by the district court that it 
was not required to accept any expert's opinion as conclusive.  Therefore, we find no reversible error 
here.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶41]   While errors were made in the trial 
of this case, a review of the complete record convinces us that Martin received 
a fair trial, and the verdict would remain unchanged had the errors not 
occurred.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1§ 
6-2-104.  Murder in the second 
degree; penalty.

Whoever 
purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is 
guilty of murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in the 
penitentiary for any term not less than twenty (20) years, or during 
life.

 
 

2§ 
6-1-301.  Attempt; renunciation of 
criminal intention.

(a)  A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if:

(i)  With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which 
is a substantial step towards commission of the crime. A "substantial step" is 
conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's 
intention to complete the commission of the crime; 
or

(ii)  He intentionally engages in conduct which would 
constitute the crime had the attendant circumstances been as the person believes 
them to be.

(b)  A person is not liable under this section if, under 
circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal 
intention, he avoided the commission of the crime attempted by abandoning his 
criminal effort.  Within the meaning 
of this subsection, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is 
motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the 
inception of the person's course of conduct, which increase the probability of 
detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the 
criminal intention.  Renunciation is 
not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct 
until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but 
similar objective or victim.

 
 

3(d)  Statements which are not hearsay. - A 
statement is not hearsay if:

(1)  Prior Statement by Witness.-The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an 
express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive[.]

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, dissenting.

 
 
[¶42]   I respectfully dissent.  I would reverse Martin's conviction 
because there were just too many errors below for us to know that Martin 
received a fair trial.  Briefly 
stated, my concerns are as follows:

 
 
[¶43]   First, the majority states that 
Martin presented two defense theories:  
(1) that he was mentally ill at the time of the offense; and (2) that 
methamphetamine-induced psychosis prevented him from forming the specific intent 
to kill.  Two problems arise from 
that duality:  Wyoming does not 
recognize diminished capacity defenseswhich is what the second theory must 
beand expert witnesses should not be allowed to testify as to the state of mind 
of the defendant outside the parameters of a mental illness defense. Keats v. State, 2005 WY 81, ¶ 22, 115 P.3d 1110, 1119 (Wyo. 2005); Price v. 
State, 807 P.2d 909, 915 (Wyo. 1991).

 
 
[¶44]   Second, the district court's 
limiting instruction concerning the uncharged misconduct evidence simply ignored 
the whole point of Gleason v. State, 
2002 WY 161, ¶¶ 16-18, 31-32, 57 P.3d 332, 339-40, 343-44 (Wyo. 2002) and its 
progeny.  There is no point in 
requiring the State to identify and substantiate the relevancy of the uncharged 
misconduct evidence if one is then going to instruct the jury that the evidence 
may be considered as proof of everything under the sun.

 
 
[¶45]   Third, Officer West's hearsay 
testimony was admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that being 
that Martin specifically intended to kill his wife.  It was also uncharged misconduct 
evidence apparently offered to prove character to prove conducthe did it once, 
so he must have done it again.  I 
cannot accept the majority's presumption of no prejudice resulting from this 
testimony, given that the case revolved solely around the question of intent to 
kill.

 
 
[¶46]   Fourth, although covered somewhat 
in the first issue discussed above, I would emphasize again that Dr. Buckwell's 
testimony that Martin acted with the specific intent to kill was simply 
inadmissible.  She had a right to 
testify that he was not suffering from a mental illness or defect at the time of 
the offense, but she invaded the province of the jury when she opined as to his 
specific intent.  

 
 
[¶47]   Admittedly, many of these problems 
were self-induced by Martin's counsel, but I think we should expect our criminal 
jury trials to come closer than this one did in following fundamental 
rules.  We are never going to get 
adherence to the principles that underlie the admissibility of uncharged 
misconduct evidence, or hearsay testimony, or expert opinion testimony as to 
guilt if we don't enforce those principles.