Case Title: Board of Zoning Appeals v. Kahhal

Citation: 

Docket Number: 971655

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF  
THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
 
v.  Record No. 971655     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
April 17, 1998 
MEHRI KAHHAL, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court 
erred in reversing the decision of a board of zoning appeals 
because the board applied erroneous principles of law. 
Mehri Kahhal and Mahmoudi Zarandi (collectively, the 
owners) purchased property located at 4000 Parker Avenue in 
the City of Norfolk, in 1990.  The property was zoned for 
commercial use.  The owners leased the property to Frederick 
Holloway, who held a business license from the City to operate 
"D&H Grocery."  In 1992, the City rezoned the property for 
residential use.  However, the zoning ordinance allowed 
nonconforming uses to continue subject to § 12–9 of the 
ordinance.  That section provides:  
If a nonconforming use is discontinued for a 
period of two years, then that use shall not be 
renewed or reestablished and any subsequent use of 
the lot or structure shall conform to the use 
regulations of the Zoning District in which it is 
located. 
In 1994, following a fire in the store, Holloway 
abandoned his lease.  He surrendered his business license on 
June 16, 1994.  The owners decided to operate the grocery 
store themselves and secured a loan to finance the necessary 
repairs to the property.  On October 9, 1995, the City issued 
the owners a business license to operate a grocery store on 
the property.  That same day, the owners also paid a meal tax 
cash bond to the City in the amount of $300.  A second 
business license was later issued with an expiration date of 
December 31, 1996. 
On February 9, 1996, the owners obtained a building 
permit from the City to repair the property, and the City 
subsequently issued permits for electrical and plumbing work.  
City inspectors approved the repair work on a number of 
occasions from June through August of 1996.  On August 21, 
1996, the owners received a Notice of Zoning Violation from 
the zoning inspector informing them that the property could 
not be used as a grocery store because it had lost its 
nonconforming use status. 
The owners appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (the 
Board).  At the public hearing, the zoning administrator 
testified that the property had lost its nonconforming use 
status on June 16, 1996, pursuant to § 12-9 of the zoning 
ordinance, because it had not been operated as a grocery store 
for a period of two years.  The administrator measured the 
two-year period from the date the owners' lessee had 
 
2
surrendered his business license.  The administrator also 
testified that, at the time the building permit was issued, 
the owners were told that the business had to be in operation 
by June 16, 1996.  
The owners presented evidence of the repair and 
renovation work they had done on the property, as well as the 
business licenses, building permits, and inspection approvals 
they had received from the City.  They denied they were told 
that they had to be operating the business by June 16.  A 
number of neighborhood representatives testified both for and 
against the owners.  One resident of the neighborhood, Mr. 
Isaiah Rogers, testified that the property had not been used 
as a grocery store since "about '88, something like that."  
The Board upheld the zoning administrator's decision.  
The owners filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the 
circuit court arguing that the Board applied erroneous 
principles of law in making its decision.  The circuit court 
did not take additional evidence, but relied on the record of 
the hearing before the Board and argument of counsel. 
The owners argued, as they had before the Board, that 
continuation of the nonconforming use under § 12-9 is not 
limited to the actual operation of the "use," but includes 
preparatory actions such as securing financing to repair the 
property, paying the meal tax bond, and getting business 
 
3
licenses as well as building permits.  They asserted that, 
even though § 12-9 is silent as to its scope, other sections 
of the zoning ordinance support their interpretation of § 12-
9. 
The owners pointed to § 12-8 of the ordinance, which 
allows restoration or reconstruction of a nonconforming use in 
the event of a fire as long as the owners diligently prosecute 
the repairs to completion.  This provision, they argued, not 
only is applicable to their specific situation because of the 
1994 fire, but it also shows that actual operation is not a 
prerequisite for avoiding a determination that a nonconforming 
use has been discontinued.  Similarly, the owners suggested 
that the definition of "used or occupied" as "intended, 
designed or arranged to be used or occupied" in § 1-4.8 of the 
ordinance is consistent with their interpretation of § 12-9.  
This definition is relevant, the owners argued, because § 1-4 
of the zoning ordinance, which includes § 1-4.8, states that 
"[t]he regulations contained in this ordinance shall be 
interpreted and applied in accordance with the general rules 
set out in this section."  Finally, the owners claimed that 
the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "discontinuance" — an 
ending, causing to cease, ceasing to use, giving up -- 
supports their position that a nonconforming use is not 
abandoned or discontinued as long as affirmative actions are 
 
4
ongoing to recommence the operation.  Black's Law Dictionary 
464 (6th ed. 1990).  
The circuit court agreed with the owners and concluded 
that, under § 12-9, neither continuation nor abandonment of a 
nonconforming use is contingent upon actual operation of the 
use.  Because the Board's decision was premised on the 
principle that a nonconforming use is "discontinued" on the 
date the use ceases to be in actual operation, the circuit 
court concluded that the Board applied an erroneous legal 
principle.  Applying what it considered the correct principle, 
the circuit court held that the activities of the owners at 
the time the City issued the building permit did not 
constitute "discontinuation" of the nonconforming use.  
Therefore, the circuit court concluded that the property 
retained its nonconforming use status because the use had not 
been discontinued for a period of two years, and entered an 
order reversing the decision of the Board. 
In this appeal, the Board seeks reversal of the circuit 
court's judgment and reinstatement of its decision, asserting 
that the circuit court erred in ignoring the testimony of the 
neighborhood resident who said there was no grocery store in 
operation since "about '88;" in improperly relying on the 
issuance of the building permit because the permit was 
improvidently or erroneously granted; and by relying on § 1-
 
5
4.8 of the zoning ordinance because that section was not 
"argued before the Board" and is "irrelevant to the issues in 
this case."  Finally, the Board asserts that its decision 
should be reinstated because the circuit court erred in 
failing to accord the decision of the Board a presumption of 
correctness.  None of these challenges is well taken. 
First, the Board's decision was based on the initial 
presumption that the nonconforming use was operational until 
just prior to June 16, 1994, the date the owners' lessee 
surrendered his business license.  By adopting this position, 
the Board implicitly rejected the testimony that the grocery 
store was not operational since sometime around 1988.  The 
circuit court was not required to afford such testimony more 
weight than that given it by the Board.  
Next, whether the building permit was improvidently or 
illegally granted in February 1996 because the use was 
discontinued at an earlier date, as now asserted by the Board, 
is not determinative.  The issue before the Board and the 
circuit court was whether the owners' actions constituted 
discontinuation of the nonconforming use under § 12-9 of the 
zoning ordinance.  That same issue would have arisen if the 
City had denied the building permit on the basis that the 
nonconforming use had been discontinued.  The owners were 
already engaged in activities directed to reopening the 
 
6
grocery store, such as obtaining financing, securing business 
licenses, and paying the meal tax bond.  Thus, had the 
building permit been denied, the same legal question could 
have been raised. 
We also reject the Board's contention that the circuit 
court erred in considering other sections of the zoning 
ordinance, specifically the definition of "used or occupied" 
in § 1-4.8.  The circuit court did not apply this definition 
to § 12-9.  Rather it looked to this section and others in the 
ordinance to determine the purpose and intent of the zoning 
ordinance, specifically § 12-9.  This reference to other 
provisions in pari materia with the section at issue is an 
accepted method of statutory construction and did not 
constitute error by the circuit court.  See Prillaman v. 
Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 405-06, 100 S.E.2d 4, 7-8 (1957). 
 
Finally, we reject the Board's assertion that the circuit 
court erred by failing to extend the presumption of 
correctness to the Board's decision.  It is well established 
that the decision of a board of zoning appeals is presumed to 
be correct and will be reversed or modified only if the board 
applied erroneous principles of law or was plainly wrong and 
in violation of the purpose and intent of the zoning 
ordinance.  Foster v. Geller, 248 Va. 563, 566, 449 S.E.2d 
802, 804-05 (1994).  Furthermore, great weight must be given 
 
7
to the consistent construction of an ordinance by the official 
charged with enforcing the ordinance.  Cook v. Board of Zoning 
Appeals of the City of Falls Church, 244 Va. 107, 111, 418 
S.E.2d 879, 881 (1992). 
 
In support of its position, the Board only points again 
to those actions of the circuit court to which it assigned  
error:  ignoring the testimony of the neighborhood resident, 
relying on the issuance of the building permit, and referring 
to other sections of the zoning ordinance in interpreting 
§ 12-9.  We have already held that the circuit court did not 
err in any of these particulars and we find nothing else in 
the record to suggest that, in reaching its decision, the 
circuit court ignored any of the principles which govern its 
review of the Board's decision in this case.*
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will affirm the 
decision of the circuit court.  
Affirmed. 
                     
* We are not called upon to consider whether the circuit 
court's interpretation of § 12-9 is correct because the 
validity of that interpretation was not the subject of an 
assignment of error. 
 
8