Case Title: DIAMOND B SERVICES, INC. V. LAWRENCE ROHDE; LAWRENCE ROHDE V. DIAMOND B SERVICES, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
DIAMOND B SERVICES, INC. V. LAWRENCE ROHDE; LAWRENCE ROHDE V. DIAMOND B SERVICES, INC.2005 WY 130120 P.3d 1031Case Number: 04-258, 04-259Decided: 10/06/2005
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
DIAMOND 
B SERVICES, INC.,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 

LAWRENCE 
ROHDE,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 

LAWRENCE 
ROHDE,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
DIAMOND 
B SERVICES, INC.,

 
 
Appellee

( 
Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Diamond B Services, Inc.:

            
 Terry W. Connolly of Patton 
& Davison, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
 
Lawrence 
Rohde:

            
 Steven W. Holland of 
Huenergardt & Vance, Kimball, Nebraska.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

  
 
 
 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In these cross 
appeals, the parties contest the Department of Employment's (Department) order 
which granted Lawrence Rohde's request for unpaid wages from Diamond B Services, 
Inc. (Diamond B Services), but denied his request for interest on the unpaid 
wages, attorney fees, and costs.  
The district court affirmed the administrative decision.  

 
 
[¶2]      We hold the 
Department had jurisdiction to hear Mr. Rohde's wage claim and there is 
substantial evidence to support the Department's decision that Mr. Rohde is 
entitled to be paid his wages.  That 
aspect of the Department's decision is, therefore, affirmed.  We conclude, however, the Department is 
authorized by statute to award interest on the unpaid wages, attorney fees and 
costs.  The Department's decision, 
holding that it did not have the authority to make those awards is reversed, and 
we remand for a determination of Mr. Rohde's claims.  

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      In Case No. 
04-258, Diamond B Services presents the following issues for our 
review:

 
 

A.     
Whether 
the Department's finding that the Claimant was an employee of Diamond B Services 
was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial 
evidence.

 
 

B.     
Whether 
the Department improperly created contractual provisions not in accordance with 
law.

 
 

C.    
Whether 
the Department misapplied the Wage Offset Rules[.]

 
 

D.    
Whether 
the Department of Employment Wage Offset Rules, or its interpretation thereof, 
[are] in derogation of Wyoming Statute.

 
 

E.     
Whether 
the Department of Employment lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this 
particular wage claim. 

 
 
Mr. 
Rohde restates the issues as:

 
 
1. 
        
Does the Wyoming Department of Employment lose subject matter 
jurisdiction to take claims for unpaid wages if the employer illegally withholds 
more than two month[]s of wages which were earned by an employee? 

 
 
2. 
        
Is the Wyoming Department of Employment's decision which stated that 
Lawrence Rohde's claim for unpaid wages is enforceable to the extent of 
$6,400.00, supported by substantial evidence?

 
 
In 
Case No. 04-259, Mr. Rohde states the following issue:

 
 
Is 
an employee who has quit or has been discharged from service, who has cause to 
bring suit for wages earned and due, and establishes with the Wyoming Department 
of Employment the amount which is justly due, entitled to recover interest 
on  the past due wages at the rate 
of eighteen [percent] (18%) per annum from the date of discharge or termination, 
together with reasonable attorney fees and all costs of the suit, pursuant to 
the provisions of W.S. § 27-4-502 (2003) and W.S. § 27-4-104(b) 
(2003)?

 
 
Diamond 
B Services restates the issue as:

 
 

A.                 
Did 
the hearing officer err in refusing to award Mr. Rohde attorney[] fees, costs 
and interest[?]

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      In 1997 or 
1998, Randy Burry contacted Mr. Rohde, who was employed as an automobile 
mechanic in Grand Island, Nebraska, and asked him to move to Pine Bluffs and 
work for Diamond B Casing, Inc. (Diamond B Casing).  At that time, Diamond B Casing, which 
was in the business of constructing pipelines and fences, was owned by  Randy Burry's brother, Robert Burry.1  Mr. Rohde accepted the offer of 
employment and moved to Pine Bluffs.  
On October 27, 1998, Randy Burry's wife, Devota, wrote a check for 
$3,330.07 from a "Diamond B" account to Home Federal Savings & Loan to pay 
off Mr. Rohde's truck loan.  On 
December 31, 1999, Mr. Rohde and Randy Burry joined Robert Burry as shareholders 
in Diamond B Casing.  Mr. Rohde 
contributed his personal tools as consideration for his interest in the company. 

 
 
 [¶5]     Diamond B Services was 
incorporated in June 2000, by Randy and Devota Burry.  Diamond B Services' home office was 
located in Pine Bluffs, and it was in the business of providing large trucks to 
transport automobiles across the country.  
Mr. Rohde performed mechanic duties for Diamond B Services from the time 
of its incorporation until he was discharged on December 31, 2002.  He earned $3,200 per month for his 
services, which Diamond B Services paid in bi-monthly payments of $1,600.  

 
 
[¶6]      During 2002, 
Diamond B Services did not pay Mr. Rohde for several pay periods.  In December 2002, Randy Burry gave Mr. 
Rohde a check for $2,500 and informed him that Diamond B Services could no 
longer afford his services.  Mr. 
Rohde filed a claim with the Department for the remainder of his unpaid 
wages.  Diamond B Services agreed it 
owed Mr. Rohde $944.94, but disputed the remainder of his claim and requested a 
contested case hearing.  

 
 
[¶7]      A hearing officer 
for the Department's appeals section held a contested case hearing on November 
25 and 26, 2003.  Diamond B Services 
argued that the Department did not have statutory authority to decide Mr. 
Rohde's wage claim because it exceeded two months wages and Mr. Rohde was an 
independent contractor rather than an employee.  Finally, Diamond B Services argued that, 
even if the Department had authority to hear Mr. Rohde's wage claim, Diamond B 
Services was entitled to deduct certain amounts from his checks for monies he 
owed to the company.  Mr. Rohde 
argued that he was entitled to be paid his wages and requested that the 
Department award him interest on the unpaid wages, attorney fees and costs. 

 
 
[¶8]      The hearing 
officer found Mr. Rohde was Diamond B Services' employee and the company owed 
him $8,700 in wages, but ruled that, under statute, it could award a maximum of 
two months worth of wages, or in this case $6,400.  She also concluded that Diamond B 
Services' wage offset claims were unfounded.  The hearing officer denied Mr. Rohde's 
request for interest on the unpaid wages, attorney fees and costs on the basis 
that the Department did not have the authority to make such an award.  

 
 
[¶9]      Each party filed 
a petition for review with the district court.  The district court affirmed the hearing 
officer's decision, but stated that Diamond B Services should have been credited 
with the $944 payment it made to Mr. Rohde.  The district court ruled, however, that 
even with the credit, Mr. Rohde's claim was valid for more than the $6,400 
maximum and the hearing officer's ruling should, therefore, stand.  Diamond B Services appealed in Case No. 
04-258, and Mr. Rohde appealed in Case No. 04-259.  We consolidated the cases for 
review.  

   

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶10]   As with all decisions from 
administrative agencies, the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act governs this 
Court's review of decisions from the Department.  See DC Production Service v. Department of 
Employment, 2002 WY 142, ¶6, 54 P.3d 768, 771 (Wyo. 2002).  Our 
review of agency decisions is limited to those considerations specified in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005) which provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
            
(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions 
found to be:

 
 
(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.  

 
 
[¶11]   In KG Construction, Inc.  v. Sherman, 2005 WY 116, we 
reiterated our standard for reviewing an administrative agency's findings of 
fact:

 
 
The 
substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of review in appeals from 
contested case proceedings when factual findings are involved and both parties 
submit evidence.  Robbins v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2003 WY 29, ¶18, 64 P.3d 729, 732 (Wyo. 2003).  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  Even if the 
factual findings are found to be supported by substantial evidence, the ultimate 
agency decision may still be found to be arbitrary or capricious for other 
reasons.  An appellate court does 
not examine the record only to determine if there is substantial evidence to 
support the agency's decision, but it also must examine the conflicting evidence 
to determine if the hearing examiner could have reasonably made its finding and 
order upon all of the evidence before it.  
Newman v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 24, 49 P.3d 163, 172 
(Wyo. 2002). 

 
 
[¶12]   An administrative agency's 
conclusions of law are not entitled to the same deference as its factual 
findings.  We review an agency's 
conclusions of law de novo, and "[w]e 
will affirm an agency's legal conclusion only if it is in accordance with the 
law."  DC Production Service, ¶7.   

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
 
 

A.        Department of Employment's Jurisdiction to 
Hear Mr. Rohde's Wage Claim

 
 
[¶13]   Diamond B Services insists that the 
Department did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mr. Rohde's claim 
for unpaid wages.  We will consider 
this issue first because subject matter jurisdiction is an issue of such 
magnitude.  "The issue of subject matter jurisdiction is so fundamental 
that it cannot be waived, can be raised on the court's own motion, and can be 
raised at any time, even on appeal."  
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. 
Blury-Losolla, 952 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Wyo. 1998).  Subject matter jurisdiction 
refers to "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which 
the proceedings in question belong."  
Lacey v. Lacey, 925 P.2d 237, 238 ( Wyo. 1996) (quoting 
Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900, 
903 (Wyo. 
1977)).  Like a court, an 
administrative agency is  required 
to have subject matter jurisdiction before it can hear a case.  Bruns v. TW Services, Inc., 2001 
WY 127, ¶16, 36 P.3d 608, 613-14 (Wyo. 2001).  The determination of whether the 
agency has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law to be reviewed de 
novo.  Director of the Office of 
State Lands & Investments, Board of Land Commissioners v. Merbanco, Inc., 
2003 WY 73, ¶7, 70 P.3d 241, 246 
(Wyo. 2003). 

 
 

[¶14]   The Department derives its subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear wage claims from statute.  There are two statutes which 
pertain 
to the Department's authority to resolve Mr. Rohde's wage claim -- Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-502 and § 
27-4-104 (LexisNexis 2005).  
Section 27-4-502 
states:

 
 
           
The department is hereby empowered to take 
claims for unpaid wages under the provisions of W.S. 27-4-101 and 27-4-104. The 
department in taking a claim for unpaid wages as provided for in this act is not 
to exceed the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or two (2) months wages, 
whichever is the greater, per employee per wage claim. 

 
 
Section 
27-4-104 pertains to wage claims from employees who quit or are discharged from 
their positions.  That provision 
provides, in pertinent part:

 
 
(a) 
Whenever an employee quits the service or is discharged, the employee shall be 
paid whatever wages are due him in lawful money of the United States of 
America, or by check or draft which can be 
cashed at a bank, within five (5) working days of the date of termination of 
employment. The employer may offset from any monies due the employee as wages, 
any sums due the employer from the employee which have been incurred by the 
employee during his employment.  . . 
.

(b) 
Whenever an employee who has quit or has been discharged from service has cause 
to bring suit for wages earned and due, and shall establish in court the amount 
which is justly due, the court shall allow to the plaintiff interest on the past 
due wages at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the date of 
discharge or termination, together with a reasonable attorney fee and all costs 
of suit.  . . 
.

 
 
[¶15]   To resolve this issue, we must 
interpret the relevant statutory provisions.  Our statutory interpretation rules are 
well-known:

 
 
"We 
first decide whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. This Court makes that 
determination as a matter of law. A statute is unambiguous if its wording is 
such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with 
consistency and predictability.' A statute is ambiguous only if it is found to 
be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations.'"

 
 
 Powder River Coal Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶6, 38 P.3d 423, 426  (Wyo. 2002) 
(citations omitted).  State ex 
rel. Dep't. of Revenue v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶16, 18 P.3d 1182, 1187 (Wyo. 
2001).  "If, on the other 
hand, the Court determines that a statute is ambiguous, it may use extrinsic 
aids of statutory interpretation to help it determine the legislature's 
intent."  Shippy v.      Rogers  (In re Estate of Kirkpatrick), 2003 
WY 125, ¶7, 77 P.3d 404, 406 (Wyo. 2003).  

 
 
            
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that courts may try to 
determine legislative intent by considering the type of statute being 
interpreted and what the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in 
light of the objects and purposes to be accomplished.  Furthermore, when we are confronted with 
two possible but conflicting conclusions, we will choose the one most logically 
designed to cure the mischief or inequity that the legislature was attempting to 
accomplish.

 
 

Id., 
quoting 
Collicott v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div., 2001 WY 35, ¶9, 20 P.3d 1077, 1080-81 (Wyo. 
2001).  While considering the 
statutory language, we give effect to every word, clause and sentence, and 
construe them in pari materia. Kunkle v. State ex rel., Wyo. Workers' 
Safety and Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, ¶11, 109 P.3d 887, 889-90 (Wyo. 2005); 
Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2004 WY 84, ¶27, 94 P.3d 412, 420 (Wyo. 
2004). 

 
 

[¶16]   Focusing on the word "take" in 
§ 
27-4-502, Diamond B Services insists that the 
legislature limited the Department's authority by allowing it to hear only wage 
claims which have a value of $500 or two months wages, whichever is 
greater.  Larger claims, argues 
Diamond B Services, must be resolved through civil suit, which is allowed by § 
27-4-104(b).2  The Department interpreted its 
statutory authority differently.  It 
concluded that it can hear wage claims of any amount, but it is limited to 
awarding two months salary or $500, whichever is greater.  

 
 
[¶17]   In accordance with our rules of 
statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute.  In the first sentence of § 27-4-502, the 
Department is empowered to "take" 
claims for unpaid wages under the provisions of § 
27-4-104.  Section 27-4-104 allows a 
separated employee to bring a suit for any wages "earned and due" which are not 
paid within five days after termination of the employment relationship.  The second sentence of § 27-4-502 limits 
the Department's authority by stating that "[t]he department in taking a claim for unpaid wages as 
provided for in this act is not to exceed the sum of five hundred dollars 
($500.00) or two (2) months wages, whichever is the greater, per employee per 
wage claim."  The question 
then, is whether the legislature intended that the Department entertain only 
claims involving $500 or two months wages, whichever is greater, or if it simply 
meant to limit the amount it could award for unpaid wages.  

 
 
[¶18]   "Take" is defined by Black's Law 
Dictionary 1492 (8th ed. (1999)) as "to obtain possession or 
control."  To the extent the statute 
in one part seems to give the Department jurisdiction over all unpaid wage 
claims and then, in another part, states that in "taking" the claim it is 
limited to a certain monetary amount, we conclude that it is ambiguous.  We must, therefore, turn to our typical 
statutory interpretation tools to determine whether the Department has 
jurisdiction over claims which exceed two months salary.

 
 
[¶19]   Section 27-4-104 is an old statute, 
having first been adopted in 1919, when courts almost exclusively exercised 
judicial powers.  See A. Aman & 
W. Mayton, Administrative Law, 
Introduction, 1-8, 118-20 (2000) (generally discussing the history of 
administrative law and the growth of administrative agency adjudicatory 
powers).  Over time, the Wyoming 
Legislature empowered some administrative agencies with the authority to make 
adjudicatory decisions in contested case hearings.  See e.g., Wyoming Administrative 
Procedures Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101, et seq. (LexisNexis 2003).  
Following this trend, in 1971 the legislature enacted § 27-4-502, 
thereby providing employees with an administrative procedure to recover unpaid 
wages.3  

 
 
[¶20]   When considered in pari materia, the wage collection 
statutes emphasize the importance of an employee's right to the prompt payment 
of wages.  Jensen v. Fremont Motors Cody, Inc., 
2002 WY 173, ¶21, 58 P.3d 322, 328 (Wyo. 2002).  The statutes provide several tools to 
aid the employee in recovering wages rightfully due to him, including the 
expedited contested case process before the Department and authorizing the 
county attorney to assist the employee in collecting wages which the Department 
has declared must be paid.  Sections 
27-7-504 through 506.    

 
 
[¶21]   The legislature is, however, also 
cognizant of the fact that contested case proceedings are different than court 
proceedings. See e.g., Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act, § 16-3-101, et seq.   In general, contested case 
proceedings have more lenient rules of evidence and procedures than formal court 
proceedings.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
16-3-107 through 109 (LexisNexis 2005).   See also, Lunde v. State ex rel., Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 6 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Wyo. 2000).  Thus, it is not surprising that the 
legislature recognized the limitation of administrative processes by placing a 
limit on the amount the Department could award to an employee after a contested 
case proceeding.    

 
 

 [¶22]  Many of these same principles were 
evaluated in Hurst v. 
Davis, 386 P.2d 943 (Wyo. 
1963).   In that case, the 
landlord sought to eject a tenant from his property and collect $600 in unpaid 
rents.  Id. at 
943-45.  At that time, exclusive 
jurisdiction for forcible entry and detainer suits lay in the justice of the 
peace courts.  Id.  
The justice of the peace court's monetary jurisdiction was, however, 
limited to $200.  Id. at 950.  We recognized that the legislature's 
principal objective in enacting the forcible entry and detainer statutes was to 
give landlords a summary remedy against tenants who hold over after their 
tenancy has expired.  Id. at 949.  The legislature did not intend to deny a 
landlord, who was owed more than $200 in rent, the opportunity to use the 
abridged procedure provided in the forcible entry and detainer statute.  Id.  

 
 
[¶23]   We recognized, however, that the 
legislature had placed a monetary limit on the justice of the peace court's 
jurisdiction.  In resolving this 
"conundrum," we stated that, although a judgment by the justice of the peace 
court for an amount of rent due in excess of its monetary jurisdiction would be 
erroneous, "a mere finding of the 
amount of rent due, even though that amount be in excess of the jurisdictional 
limitation" would be lawful.  
Id. at 950.  Thus, the justice of the peace court 
could order that the tenant vacate the property, find the amount of rent due, 
and award the landlord a judgment for unpaid rent up to the amount of its 
statutory jurisdiction.  Id.  
This rationale was confirmed more recently in Jessen v. Burry, 13 P.3d 1118, 1121 
(Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶24]   Considering this precedent, 
together with the purposes of the wage collection statutes, we conclude that the 
Department's interpretation of its statutory authority is correct.  The Department may hear wage claims of 
any amount, but it is limited to awarding two months salary or $500, whichever 
is greater. 

 
 
[¶25]   In making this ruling, we do not 
want to give the impression that we are weakening the "amount in controversy" 
requirement for subject matter jurisdiction.  When a statute clearly states an amount 
in controversy requirement, it must be enforced.  In Mutual of Omaha, 952 P.2d  at 1120, we 
discussed the amount in controversy limitations upon the county court's (now 
known as the circuit court) jurisdiction.  

 
 
When 
the question of subject matter jurisdiction revolves around the amount claimed, 
this court has established the following determinative rules: (1) the sum 
claimed, rather than the amount eventually recovered, controls unless the amount 
claimed was not done in good faith; (2) to find a lack of good faith, it must 
appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than $ 7,000.00; 
(3) the amount is determined as of the time the action is commenced; and (4) a 
plaintiff cannot control jurisdiction between the county and district court by 
setting forth an improper amount in the prayer for relief.

 
 

Id. 
(citation omitted).   Thus, if we 
were to interpret § 27-4-502 as stating an "amount in controversy" 
jurisdictional requirement, we would have to agree with Diamond B Services' 
argument that the Department did not have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Rohde's wage 
claim because it exceeded the statutory limit.  Our ruling here, however, is that § 
27-4-502 does not limit the claims the Department can hear, it simply limits the 
amount it can award for each unpaid wage claim.  The Department correctly ruled that it 
had the authority to consider and decide Mr. Rohde's wage claim, but that it was 
limited to awarding a maximum of two months worth of wages.     

 
 
 
 
B.        Employee 
v. Independent Contractor

 
 
[¶26]   Diamond B Services insists that Mr. 
Rohde was not entitled to pursue his claim for unpaid wages through the 
Department because he was an independent contractor rather than an 
employee.  
Diamond B Services argues, therefore, that the hearing officer's finding 
that Mr. Rohde was a salaried employee was not supported by substantial 
evidence.  

 
 
[¶27]   For purposes of wage claims, "employee" 
is defined as "any person who, 
under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee 
relationship, has the status of an employee."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 27-4-501(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 
2003).  An 
independent contractor "is one who, exercising an independent employment, 
contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being 
subject to the control of his employer except as to the result of the 
work."  Combined Insurance 
Company of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034, 1043 (Wyo. 1978) 
quoting Lichty v. 
Model Homes, 66 Wyo. 
347, 211 P.2d 958, 967 
(Wyo. 1949).  Our case law 
provides significant guidance in differentiating between employees and 
independent contractors.4  

 
 
[¶28]   The overriding consideration in 
distinguishing between master-servant relationships and employer-independent 
contractor relationships is the employer's right to control the means and manner 
of the work.  
See e.g., Stratman v. Admiral Beverage Corp. 760 P.2d 974, 980 
(Wyo. 1988); Cline v. State, Dep't. 
of Family Services, 927 P.2d 261, 263 (Wyo. 1996); 
Noonan v. Texaco, 
Inc., 713 P.2d 160, 164 
(Wyo. 1986).  

 
 
Such a right to control is a prerequisite of the 
master-servant relationship. Conversely, the absence of such a right of control 
is a prerequisite of an independent contractor relationship. Master-servant and 
independent contractor are thus opposite sides of the same coin; one cannot be 
both at the same time with respect to the same activity; the one necessarily 
negatives the other, each depending on opposite answers to the same right of 
control inquiry.

 
 

Coates v. Anderson, 2004 WY 11, ¶7, 84 P.3d 953, 957 (Wyo. 2004).  When a worker is an independent contractor, 
the employer is typically interested only in the results of the work and does 
not direct the details of the how the work is performed.  Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 
166; Natural Gas 
Processing Co. v. Hull, 
886 P.2d 1181, 1186 
(Wyo. 1994).  

 
 
[¶29]   When an express contract exists between 
the parties, it is important evidence in defining the relationship, although it 
is not conclusive of the issue.  Coates, ¶14; Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 164.  Other factors which are important to the 
determination include: the method of payment, the right to terminate the 
relationship without incurring liability, the furnishing of tools and equipment, 
the scope of the work, and the control of the premises where the work is to be 
done.  Stratman, 760 P.2d  
at 980; Combined 
Insurance 584 P.2d  at 1043. Another factor to be considered is whether the 
worker devotes all of his efforts to the position or if he also performs work 
for others.  
Id.   

 
 
[¶30]   With regard to the "method of payment" 
criterion, an independent contractor usually determines the price of his 
services and bills for his services on a regular basis.  Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 
166, citing Simpson, 
770 F.2d  at 501; Combined Insurance, 584 P.2d  at 1043.  On the other hand, 
when the employer determines the worker's rate of pay and takes deductions out 
of his paychecks for federal income taxes, Social Security, and Medicare then a 
master-servant relationship is indicated.  Id.   We have said that 
payment of workers' compensation and unemployment insurance premiums by an 
employer suggests that the worker is an employee rather than an independent 
contractor.  
See In re: 
Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 1240-41 (Wyo. 
1986); In re Reed, 
444 P.2d 329, 330 
(Wyo. 1968).  Similarly, when a 
worker is eligible to participate in benefit programs such as retirement or 
insurance plans, as a result of his association with the employer, it suggests a 
master-servant relationship exists.  Combined Insurance, 584 P.2d  at 1043.

 
 
[¶31]   Applying these factors to the case at 
bar, we note first that there was no written contract between Diamond B Services 
and Mr. Rohde.  
Instead, when Diamond B Services was incorporated in June 2000, the 
parties entered into a verbal agreement in which Mr. Rohde worked as a mechanic 
on Diamond B Services' trucks.  Some of the trucks were actually owned by 
Diamond B Services and others were leased by the company, but Mr. Rohde 
apparently worked on all of the trucks regardless of their ownership 
status.  
Diamond B Services paid Mr. Rohde $3,200 per month, in bi-monthly 
payments of $1,600, and Randy Burry testified that Mr. Rohde was a "salaried 
employee."  
There is no evidence that Mr. Rohde submitted any bills to Diamond B 
Services for his work or that he had control over the price of his 
services.  
Randy Burry stated that Mr. Rohde was expected to work all of the hours 
necessary to complete Diamond B Services' work and was not paid any 
overtime.  
Diamond B Services withheld deductions from Mr. Rohde's paychecks for 
federal income taxes, Social Security, and Medicare.5   Mr. Rohde 
apparently participated in Diamond B Services' health insurance program and the 
company paid unemployment insurance premiums on him.  

 
 
[¶32]   Diamond B Services did not set a work 
schedule for Mr. Rohde, but he generally worked from 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on 
weekdays and half days on Saturday.  Although Randy Burry testified that Mr. Rohde 
could "come and go" as he wanted, Diamond B Services kept track of Mr. Rohde's 
absences from work and expected him to get all of its work done.  Mr. Rohde performed 
his mechanic services at one of three locations  a truck stop in Pine Bluffs, 
the Burrys' rented office/shop location in Pine Bluffs, or on the Burrys' 
"ranch" in Nebraska.  Mr. Rohde and Randy 
Burry both testified that, in the interests of convenience, Mr. Rohde generally 
performed his mechanic work at the location where the truck was parked.  Mr. Rohde's 
personal pickup was set up with equipment and tools to allow him to repair the 
trucks at the different locations.  Although the record is unclear as to who 
owned or possessed the truck stop, the Pine Bluffs office/shop facility and the 
Nebraska ranch were specifically 
under Diamond B Services' control.  Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that Mr. 
Rohde did not have control or possession of any of the three locations where he 
routinely performed his mechanical work. 

 
 
[¶33]   The tools Mr. Rohde used while working 
for Diamond B Services were a combination of Mr. Rohde's private supply, Diamond 
B Services' tools, and Diamond B Casing's tools.  Diamond B Services provided specialized 
equipment for him to perform his work, including a hoist, a welder, and a 
generator.  The 
welder and generator were placed in the back of Mr. Rohde's personal pickup so 
that he could go to the trucks to repair them.  Diamond B Services also furnished a card for 
Mr. Rohde to use for fuel purchases and allowed him to purchase automotive parts 
to use in the repairs on its accounts with various automotive parts 
dealers.      

 
 
[¶34]   Randy Burry stated that Mr. Rohde 
worked on "whatever he wanted"  and indicated several times that Mr. Rohde 
was performing mechanic work for other customers including Diamond B Casing (of 
which Mr. Rohde was a part owner) and D & B Trucking.  Even though the 
trucks belonged to Diamond B Casing and D & B Trucking, they were leased to 
Diamond B Services.  
Although Randy Burry complained that Mr. Rohde did not fill out the 
paperwork correctly regarding these leased trucks, Mr. Rohde's mechanic work was 
performed at the request of, and for the benefit of, Diamond B Services.  There is no 
evidence which suggests that Mr. Rohde was compensated by anyone other than 
Diamond B Services for his work.  

 
 
[¶35]   Mr. Rohde testified that he typically 
visited with Randy Burry each evening to determine which trucks he would work on 
the next day.  
Randy Burry would meet with the truck drivers about the trucks and then 
either direct Mr. Rohde to perform the necessary repairs or maintenance or ask 
him to talk to the drivers to determine what work needed to be done.  In addition, 
Diamond B Services obviously had the right to terminate Mr. Rohde's employment 
as it, in fact, exercised that right in December of 2002.  

 
 
[¶36]   Although there were a few factors which 
support a finding that Mr. Rohde was an independent contractor, such as his use 
of his personal pickup and some of his own tools in the course of his 
employment, there was, obviously, a wealth of evidence to support the hearing 
officer's finding that Diamond B Services controlled Mr. Rohde's work.  Randy Burry told 
Mr. Rohde which trucks to work on and Diamond B Services controlled, for the 
most part, the locations where he performed that work.  Diamond B Services 
treated Mr. Rohde as an employee.  The company set his rate of pay, took the 
typical employee deductions out of his check, allowed him to participate in its 
employee benefits programs, and, ultimately, exercised its right to terminate 
the employment relationship.  The Department's determination that Mr. Rohde 
was an employee of Diamond B Services and was not an independent contractor was 
definitely supported by substantial evidence. 

 
 
 
 
C.        Time Off 
Work

 
 
[¶37]   Diamond B Services claims that the 
hearing examiner erred when she ruled that it was not entitled to deduct 
$2,773.16 from Mr. Rohde's pay to account for 26 days he was absent from 
work.  The 26 
days included vacation days, sick days, Sundays and legal holidays.  Diamond B Services 
claims that Mr. Rohde was not entitled to be paid for any time he was absent 
from work and it could reduce his pay if he took any time off work.  By requiring it to 
pay Mr. Rohde for days he was absent from work, Diamond B Services argues that 
the Department improperly imposed upon it a contractual responsibility to 
provide "paid vacation" to Mr. Rohde when the parties had no such agreement. 

 
 
[¶38]   The hearing officer relied on Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §27-4-507(b) (LexisNexis 2003) in ruling that Diamond B Services was 
not entitled to refuse to pay Mr. Rohde for the days he missed work.  That statute 
states:

(b) It shall be unlawful for any employer to pay to any 
employee a lower wage, salary, or compensation than that provided for or agreed 
upon by (1) a collective bargaining agreement; (2) a contract between the 
employer and employee. In no event shall a collective bargaining agreement or a 
contract provide for compensation lower than any applicable existing statute of 
this state.

   

Id.

 
 
[¶39]   The hearing officer found that the 
parties did not have an express agreement with

regard to vacation time, and the record bears that 
out.  Mr. 
Rohde's pay stubs consistently showed "0" on the vacation hours line, and 
neither party testified that Mr. Rohde was entitled to a certain amount of 
vacation per year.  
Although not stated in so many words, the hearing officer essentially 
found that the parties' course of conduct indicated that Mr. Rohde was allowed 
to take days off work without having his pay reduced.  See e.g., WERCS v. Capshaw, 
2004 WY 86, ¶20, 94 P.3d 421, 426 (Wyo. 2004) (discussing how the parties' course of conduct may define 
an employment relationship).

 
 
[¶40]   Mr. Rohde testified that Randy Burry 
was aware when he was going to be absent from work.  During February 
2002, Mr. Rohde missed a few days of work to attend a car race in California.  That trip had been 
arranged by his girlfriend as a surprise for him and she had contacted Randy 
Burry and received authorization for Mr. Rohde to be absent from work.  He received full 
pay in the paycheck which covered the days he was absent in February 2002.  

 
 
[¶41]   Mr. Rohde's other absences included 
short vacations around and including the Independence Day and Thanksgiving 
holidays.  Mr. 
Rohde had, apparently, been taking those vacations for years to attend family 
functions, and Randy Burry was aware that Mr. Rohde would be gone on those days 
in 2002.  There 
is no indication that his pay had been reduced in previous years for taking 
those vacation days and, in fact, the  paycheck which covered the Independence Day 
holiday in 2002 did not include a deduction for the days he was absent from 
work.   
Mr. Rohde was also absent from work in December for the Christmas 
holiday, and he testified that Randy Burry was aware that he would be gone 
during that time.  

 
 
[¶42]   Substantial evidence exists in the 
record to support the hearing officer's determination that the parties' course 
of conduct evinced an agreement that Mr. Rohde was to have time off from work 
without having his pay reduced.  

 
 
  

D.        Wage 
Offsets

 
 
[¶43]   At the contested case hearing, Diamond 
B Services claimed that Mr. Rohde owed it money for various reasons and it was, 
therefore, entitled to deduct those amounts from his paychecks under the 
Department's wage offset rules.  In particular, Diamond B Services argued that 
it was entitled to deduct money from Mr. Rohde's paychecks as reimbursement for: 
1) unauthorized fuel purchases for his personal pickup ($1,420.90); 2) Diamond B 
Services purchase of license plates for Mr. Rohde's personal pickup ($72.33); 3) 
auto parts purchased by Mr. Rohde on Diamond B Services accounts and installed 
on his personal pickup or the vehicles of his family and friends ($577.91);  4) the payoff of 
Mr. Rohde's truck loan ($3,330.07); and 5) loss of a tool box ($313.30).6  The hearing officer ruled that, under the 
Department's wage offset rules, Diamond B Services was not entitled to any of 
these wage offsets.  
Diamond B Services argues that the Department misapplied the wage offset 
rules when it refused to allow the offsets it claimed.

 
 
[¶44]   Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-104(a) 
"the employer may offset from any monies due the employee as wages, any sums due 
the employer from the employee which have been incurred by the employee during 
his employment."  
The Department adopted Chapter I, Section 6 of the Department of 
Employment Labor Standards Rules to provide rules and procedures for wages 
offsets.  The 
wage offset rules state in pertinent part:

 
 
(b) Offsets.

 
 
The following sums shall constitute proper offsets from 
wages due an employee.

 
 
            
 * * 
*

 
 
(v) Any sums deducted from wages as payment for any 
purchase of goods or services by the employee from the employer, provided:

 
 
(A)  That the goods or services sold by the 
employer are sold in the ordinary course of his or her business.

 
 
(B) That the employee has actual or constructive possession 
of the goods or services purchased; and

 
 
(C)       That the 
employee's purchase is evidenced by the employee's written acknowledgement.

 
 

(vi)              
Any sums deducted from wages for damages suffered by the 
employer due to the employee's negligence, provided:

 
 
(A) That the employee's negligence is determined by a 
judicial proceeding;

 
 
(B)       That the amount 
of the damage suffered by the employer is determined by a judicial 
proceeding;

 
 
(C)       That the 
negligence and damages arise in the course of the employment; and

 
 
(D)       That the 
employer has not received payments, compensation, or any form of restitution 
from any insurer, assurer, surety or guaranty to cover any of the damages.  Where the employer 
has received payments, compensation, or any form of restitution from any 
insurer, assurer, surety or guaranty to cover any of the damages caused by the 
employee's negligence, the sum of the offset shall not exceed the amount of any 
applicable deductible or two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) whichever is 
less.  

 
 
* * *

 
 
(viii)     Any sums deducted from wages as 
repayment to the employer by the employee of any cash advances, loans or 
payments of expenses for optional benefits such as tuition assistance, 
relocation and training, made to the employee by such tuition assistance, 
relocation and training, made to the employee by such employer, provided:

 
 
(A)       That the cash 
advance, loan or payment of expenses to the employee occurred while said 
employee was in the employ of such employer; and

 
 
(B)       That the employee's 
receipt of such cash advance, loan or payment of expenses is evidenced by the 
employee's written acknowledgement.

            

* * *

 
 
(x)        Any sums deducted as 
wages as payment for any purchase of tools, equipment, uniforms, or other items 
required for the employment of the employee, provided:

 
 

(A)              
That the employee had actual or constructive possession of 
the items; and  

 
 

(B)              
That the employee's purchase and receipt of the item is 
evidence by written acknowledgement. 

 
 
(xi)       Any sums deducted 
from wages as payment for tools, equipment, uniforms, or other items assigned to 
the employee by the employer, provided:            

 
 
(A)       That such item was assigned 
to the employee to be used within the scope of the employee's employment; 

 
 

(B)              
 That the employee gave written acknowledgement 
of the receipt of such items; and

 
 

(C)             
 That such items have not been returned to the 
employer upon termination. 

 
 
Department of Employment Labor Standards Rules, Chap. I, § 
6.  

 
 
 
 
1.         
Fuel Purchases

 
 
[¶45]   When he started working for Diamond B 
Services, the company issued Mr. Rohde a "Comdata" fuel card.  Randy Burry 
testified that Mr. Rohde was only allowed to use the card to purchase diesel 
fuel for the large trucks used in their business.  He claimed that Mr. Rohde was not authorized 
to purchase gasoline on the card.  Mr. Rohde did, in fact, purchase gasoline for 
his personal pickup, which he used in the course of his employment.  Mrs. Burry, who 
worked as the bookkeeper for the company, received a faxed report from Comdata 
each day which showed the transactions on the various fuel cards used by Diamond 
B Services.  
The fuel report apparently showed which card was used and the amount and 
cost of the fuel purchased.  Mr. Rohde testified that, when he received 
his card, he asked Mrs. Burry whether he should turn in any of his receipts and 
she said, "no" because she received the daily Comdata reports.  Nevertheless, he 
saved the receipts and presented them to Diamond B Services after he was 
discharged.   

 
 
[¶46]   Diamond B Services contends that the 
hearing officer erred by refusing to allow it to deduct the value of the fuel he 
used in his personal pickup from Mr. Rohde's pay.  Diamond B Services argued that it was 
entitled to offset the values of the fuel purchases from his wages because they 
were either "cash advances" under Section 6(b)(viii) or "other items required 
for the employment of the employee" under Section 6(b)(x).    

 
 
[¶47]   Section 6(b)(viii) allows an employer 
to deduct the value of "cash advances" made to the employee during his 
employment.  
"Cash" is defined as "money or its equivalent."  Black's Law 
Dictionary 229 (8th ed. 1999).  An "advance" is "the furnishing of money or 
goods before any consideration is received in return."  Id. at 57.  Fuel obviously does 
not qualify as "cash" as it is not money or its equivalent.  Furthermore, the 
definition of "advance" indicates that the party doing the advancing (i.e. the 
employer) has prior knowledge of the transaction.  Diamond B Services maintained that it did not 
have knowledge of or authorize the fuel purchases; consequently, they could not 
be "advances."  

 
 
[¶48]   Neither do the fuel purchases qualify 
under Section 6(b)(x) "as payment for any purchase of tools, equipment, 
uniforms, or other items required for the employment of the employee."  Diamond B Services 
maintained that Mr. Rohde was supposed to use a company vehicle rather than his 
personal vehicle in the course of his employment.  Under Diamond B Services' theory that the 
fuel purchases were not authorized, the fuel expenses do not qualify as "other 
items required for the employment" under subsection (x).  The fuel could not 
have been purchased on the basis that it was "required for the employment" if 
the employer insisted it did not authorize the purchase.  

  

 
 

2.         Truck Loan 
Payoff   

 
 
[¶49]   Diamond B Services argues that it was 
entitled to deduct the amount it paid to satisfy Mr. Rohde's truck loan from the 
wages due to him.  
Mr. Rohde went to work for Diamond B Casing in 1998.  He testified that 
Randy Burry had contacted him when he was living in Grand 
Island, Nebraska and asked him to move to 
Pine Bluffs to work for Diamond B Casing.   In order to entice Mr. Rohde to accept 
the job offer, Randy Burry agreed to pay off his pickup loan and to purchase a 
car from Mr. Rohde.  
On October 27, 1998, Mrs. Burry wrote a $3,330.07 check to Mr. Rohde's 
lender on a "Diamond B" account.  Mr. Rohde did not repay "Diamond B Casing," 
"Diamond B Services," "Diamond B," or the Burrys for the loan payment.

 
 
[¶50]   The hearing officer ruled that Diamond 
B Services was not entitled to deduct the amount "Diamond B" paid to satisfy Mr. 
Rohde's pickup loan from Mr. Rohde's wages.   The Department rules allow an employer 
to deduct cash advances or payments of expenses made by the employer to, or on 
behalf of, the employee.  However, in order to be entitled to this 
deduction, an employer must show that the cash advance or payment was made while 
the employee was employed by the employer and the employee must give his written 
authorization to the employer.  Section 6(b)(viii).  In this case, the 
truck loan payment was made by "Diamond B" in 1998, when Mr. Rohde was working 
for Diamond B Casing.  
Randy Burry claims that "Diamond B" was a predecessor of Diamond B 
Services and, therefore, it should be counted as a payment while Mr. Rohde was 
working for Diamond B Services.  The record does not bear out Diamond B 
Services' claim.  
Clearly, Mr. Rohde was working for Diamond B Casing (which was Robert 
Burry's company), rather than Diamond B Services when the pickup loan was 
satisfied.  In 
addition, there was no written agreement indicating that Mr. Rohde would pay 
back the money for the loan payment or any other type of receipt signed by the 
employee acknowledging receipt of the loan payment.   

 
 
 
 
            
            
3.         License Plates and 
Auto Parts 

 
 
[¶51]   Diamond B Services claimed that it was 
entitled to offset Mr. Rohde's wages with  the amount it paid for the license plates for 
his personal pickup and for automobile parts he charged on the company's account 
and used to repair his personal vehicle and the vehicles of his friends and 
family.  It 
maintains that these payments amounted to cash advances under Section 
6(b)(viii).  

 
 
[¶52]   Mr. Rohde's license plates were due for 
renewal at the end of December 2002.  Since Diamond B Services had not paid him in 
quite some time, Mr. Rohde borrowed money from his father to pay for his license 
plates.  When 
he told Randy Burry that he was going to go into Cheyenne to purchase his license plates, Randy 
Burry told him that Mrs. Burry was going to Cheyenne anyway and she would get 
the license plates for Mr. Rohde's truck.  Mr. Rohde offered to pay for the license 
plates with the money he had borrowed from his father, but the Burrys declined 
his offer.  

 
 
[¶53]   In addition, Mr. Rohde routinely 
charged parts for his work on accounts Diamond B Services carried with various 
auto parts dealers.  
He also occasionally charged parts which he used to repair his personal 
vehicle or the vehicles of his family and friends.  Mr. Rohde testified 
that he had permission to charge the parts, and, when he offered to reimburse 
the company for those costs, he was refused.  

 
 
[¶54]   The hearing officer determined that 
Diamond B Services was not entitled to an offset for the amount it paid for Mr. 
Rohde's license plates and the auto parts because they were  not "cash 
advances."  
Diamond B Services did not give "cash" to Mr. Rohde when it supplied him 
with license plates and automobile parts.  Furthermore, there was substantial evidence 
that Diamond B Services did not expect to be reimbursed for the cost of the 
license plates or the automobile parts; consequently, those payments obviously 
were not "advances."  

 
 
 
 
            
            
4.         Stolen 
Toolbox

[¶55]   Diamond B Services claimed that it was 
entitled to deduct from Mr. Rohde's wages the value of a toolbox which was 
stolen from Mr. Rohde's pickup.  It claims that, under § 6(b)(xi) of the 
offset rules, the tool box was assigned to Mr. Rohde and was not returned to 
Diamond B Services at the end of his employment.  Mr. Rohde acknowledged that, during his 
employment, he had a tool box which contained Diamond B Services tools, and that 
it had been stolen from the back of his pickup.  He claimed that he reported the theft to his 
personal insurer, but, when he asked Randy Burry for a list of the tools for the 
insurer, Randy Burry told him "not to worry about it."  

[¶56]   The hearing officer denied the offset 
because there was no written acknowledgement of his receipt of the tools.  Included in the 
record is an example of Diamond B Services toolbox checklist with a place for 
the employee to sign, acknowledging receipt of the tools.  There is, however, 
no such form signed by Mr. Rohde.  Consequently, there was no written 
authorization from Mr. Rohde which would have allowed Diamond B Services to 
deduct the value of the tool box from his wages pursuant to § 6(b)(xi) of the 
Department's rules.

[¶57]   The hearing officer's conclusions that 
Diamond B Services was not entitled to any offsets against Mr. Rohde's wages 
were supported by substantial evidence.

 
 
 
 
5.         Validity 
of Wage Offset Rules Requiring Employee's Written Authorization

 
 
[¶58]   Diamond B Services argues that, in 
adopting the wage offset rules which require an employee's written 
acknowledgement before certain sums may be deducted from his wages, the 
Department exceeded its statutory authority.  Section 27-2-104(a) outlines the Department's 
authority and states in pertinent part:

 
 
(a) The department of employment shall:

   (i) Enforce all laws enacted by the 
legislature of Wyoming, relating to labor, wages, 
hours of labor, and to the health, welfare, life and limb of the workers of this 
state;

* * *

   (v) [P]romulgate reasonable rules.

 

[¶59]   The substantive law which authorized 
wage offsets is included in § 27-4-104(a).   The relevant language states:  "The employer may 
offset from any monies due the employee as wages, any sums due the employer from 
the employee which have been incurred by the employee during his employment." 

 
 
[¶60]   Diamond B Services claims that  § 27-4-104(a) 
allows the employer to deduct any sums it believes are due it from the employee and, 
by requiring written authorization from the employee before an employer may 
deduct amounts from his wages, the Department's rule exceeds its statutory 
authority.  

 
 
"An administrative agency is limited in authority to powers 
legislatively delegated. Administrative agencies are creatures of statute and 
their power is dependent upon statutes, so that they must find within the 
statute warrant for the exercise of any authority which they claim.'"

 

 Amoco Production Co. 
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 12 P.3d 668, 673 (Wyo. 2000) (citations omitted). "An agency is wholly 
without power to modify, dilute or change in any way the statutory provisions 
from which it derives its authority." Platte Development 
Co. v. State, Environmental Quality Council, 966 P.2d 972, 975 
(Wyo. 1998). Thus, 
administrative agencies are bound to comply with their enabling statutes.  Sears v. Romer, 928 P.2d 745, 751 (Colo.App. 1996).  An administrative 
rule or regulation which is not expressly or impliedly authorized by statute is 
without force or effect if it adds to, changes, modifies, or conflicts with an 
existing statute. Id. 
Conversely, a rule or regulation which is expressly or impliedly authorized by 
the enabling statute will be given force and effect.  Id. Public Service Comm'n v. Formal Complaint of WWZ Co., 
641 P.2d 183, 186 (Wyo. 
1982) (An agency's "implied powers are only those derived by necessary 
implication from express statutory authority granted to the agency."); Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 938 (Wyo. 
2000) ("Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of 
law.").

 
 

Billings v. Wyo. Bd. of Outfitters and Guides, 
2001 WY 81, ¶24, 30 P.3d 557, 568-69 (Wyo. 
2001).

 
 
[¶61]   The obvious purpose of the offset rules 
is to define, under what circumstances, monies are due to the employer from the 
employee pursuant to § 27-4-104(a).  Clearly defining the respective 
responsibilities of the parties to the employment relationship serves the 
legislative purposes of the wage collection statutes.  See Jensen, ¶21.

 
 
[¶62]   Under § 27-4-507(b) and § 27-4-104(b), 
an employer must fully and promptly pay an employee's wages as provided by the 
parties' employment agreement, and payment of any lower amount is unlawful.  The only deductions 
which an employer may make from an employee's wages are those which are actually 
due to the employer.  
Requiring written authorization from the employee ensures there is a 
mutual understanding between the employee and employer about the deduction.  This requirement, 
obviously, helps prevent misunderstandings between employers and employees and 
helps avoid situations, such as the one in this case, where the employer claims 
an amount is due and the employee argues otherwise.  We conclude, 
therefore, that the wage offset rules requiring written authorization are 
reasonable and promulgation of the rules did not exceed the Department's 
statutory authority.

 
 
 
 
E.        Attorney 
Fees 

 
 
[¶63]   In his cross appeal, Mr. Rohde claims 
that the hearing officer erred by concluding that the Department did not have 
authority under § 27-4-104(b) to award him interest, attorney fees, and 
costs.  That 
statute states, in pertinent part:

 
 

(b)               
Whenever an employee who has quit or has been discharged 
from service has cause to bring suit for wages earned and due, and shall 
establish in court the amount which is justly due, the court shall allow the 
plaintiff interest on the past due wags at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) 
per annum from the date of discharge or termination, together with a reasonable 
attorney fee and all costs of suit.

 
 
[¶64]   Diamond B Services argued, and the 
hearing officer concluded, that, under § 27-4-104(b), only a court could award 
interest, attorney fees and costs.  As we stated earlier in this opinion, we are 
charged with the duty to construe all statutes pertaining to the collection of 
unpaid wages in pari 
materia.  Thus, § 27-4-104(b) must be construed together 
with the statutes which delegated the power to collect unpaid wages to the 
Department  § 27-4-501 et seq.   As we stated earlier, § 27-4-104 was 
adopted in 1919, when courts rather than administrative agencies typically 
resolved matters like wage claims.  In 1967, the legislature amended § 27-4-104 
and added subsection (b) which allowed for the award of interest, attorney fees 
and costs.  
Section 27-4-502, which was adopted in 1971, empowers the department to 
"take claims for unpaid wages under the provisions of W.S. 27-4-101 and 
27-4-104."  
Section 27-4-502 evinces a legislative intent to allow the Department to 
take the place of the court in determining wage claims.  The attorney fees 
provision predates the administrative procedure.  Since the legislature specifically directed 
the Department to take claims under § 27-4-104 and did not limit its authority 
to subsection (a), we conclude that the department is authorized to make awards 
under subsection (b), as well.  Consequently, the Department erred when it 
ruled that it did not have the authority to award interest, attorney fees and 
costs under § 27-4-104(b).  

 
 
[¶65]   We, therefore, affirm the Department's 
decision awarding Mr. Rohde his unpaid wages and reverse its determination that 
it did not have the authority to award interest, attorney fees and costs.  We remand this 
matter to the district court who will then remand it to the Department for a 
determination on those matters.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1It is unclear from the 
record what Randy Burry's association with Diamond B Casing was when he 
contacted Mr. Rohde.  
There is, however, no claim that Robert Burry objected to Randy Burry's 
decision to hire Mr. Rohde.

  

2Section 27-4-503, which 
was repealed in 2001, also provided:  "Any proceedings by one (1) or more employees 
to assert claims arising pursuant to the terms of this act [§§ 27-4-501 through 
27-5-508], may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction.

 
 

3When the legislature 
passed the first version of § 27-4-502 in 1971, it placed the Labor Commissioner 
in the position of deciding unpaid wage claims.  1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws 198.  In 2001, the 
legislature amended the statute and directed the Department of Employment to 
hear wage claims.  
2001 Wyo. Sess. Laws 497.

 
 

4The hearing officer 
relied on the factors outlined in Internal Revenue Service Ruling  87-41, 1987-1 to 
determine whether Mr. Rohde was an employee or an independent contractor.  The Revenue Ruling 
essentially encompasses the same principles as Wyoming common law.  Because § 27-4-501(a)(ii) directs us to use 
the common law definition of "employee," we choose to rely on a synthesis 
of Wyoming case law rather than the Revenue Ruling to distinguish between 
employees and independent contractors.

 
 

5Diamond B Services did 
not withhold any deductions from the last payment it made to Mr. Rohde of $2,500 
in December 2002, and did not include that amount on his 2002 W-2.

  

6At the contested case 
hearing, Diamond B Services argued that it was entitled to additional wage 
offsets including:  
cellular telephone charges; the costs of repairing a truck on which Mr. 
Rohde allegedly negligently performed mechanic work; a used dining set which the 
Burrys provided to Mr. Rohde for his Pine Bluffs residence; and a hitch and 
exhaust system installed on Mr. Rohde's personal vehicle.  Diamond B Services 
does not, however, continue to assert these claims on appeal.