Case Title: Byre v. Wieczorek

Citation: 217 N.W.2d 151

Docket Number: 11139-A-FRW

State: south-dakota

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1974-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
217 N.W.2d 151 (1974) Edward BYRE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Bruno WIECZOREK, Defendant and Appellant. No. 11139-a-FRW. Supreme Court of South Dakota. April 25, 1974. *152 Charles Rick Johnson, Johnson & Johnson, Gregory, Sam Masten, Canton, for defendant and appellant. J. L. Morgan, Morgan & Fuller, Mitchell, for plaintiff and respondent. WINANS, Justice. This action in tort for damages against the defendant because of a battery against plaintiff on May 10, 1969 is before us for the second time. The first trial resulted in a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and upon appeal, this court in its reversal limited the issues to be tried to actual damages. The second trial on the issue of damages again resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, this time in the sum of $60,000. The appeal is from the judgment and the order denying the motion for new trial. The fact situation surrounding the tort is set forth in this court's prior judgment, the case being recorded in 85 S.D. 645, 190 N.W.2d 57. The evidence in brief shows that plaintiff was 38 years of age at the time of the injury; that he had served four years and two months in the U. S. Coast Guard, having been released in 1956 and thereafter engaged in the ranching business; that while in the Coast Guard he received a student's license to pilot an airplane and that in 1954 or 1955 he received his private license. As a private pilot he would have the privilege of hauling passengers but not for hire. As a student pilot he could operate an airplane by himself but could not take passengers. In 1958 he obtained his commercial license, permitting him to charge for services as a pilot, flying passengers for hire or spraying crops. Thereafter and prior to being injured, the plaintiff had passed the written examination and had received part of his flight instruction for instrument rating but did not have sufficient hours to take his flight check ride. He had attended ground schools in Huron and Winner, South Dakota, and had attended a seminar on instruments in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, given by the Federal Aviation Agency or Administration out of Oklahoma City, the agency licensing pilots in this country. Having passed the written examination in December of 1968, he had been preparing for the flight test. By 1959 he had started commercial activities by flying mostly chartered planes, mainly for people in and around Chamberlain. In 1963 he received his flight instructor rating, following which he occasionally instructed students. During most *153 of this time he was operating his farm and ranch. In 1963 the plaintiff flew aerial surveys for the State Game, Fish and Parks Department, making such surveys every year until he was grounded by his injuries received at the hands of the defendant. The state paid him at the start $15 per hour for the airplane and his services as pilot. As the years went on and right at the last, they had raised it to $20 per hour, the amount he received each year varying from $2000 to $8000. In 1967 and 1968 plaintiff was aerial spraying, being paid by the acre and averaging about $1.25 per acre which included the cost of both the material used and the airplane. To become an aerial applicator, plaintiff passed a test given by the South Dakota Department of Agriculture which required knowledge in the use of chemicals and in the difference in chemicals and how to mix them, and included a written test on such knowledge. In addition the plaintiff did charter and instructional work and earned as a pilot, if the student had his own plane, from $5 to $6 per hour, and in addition from $12 to $17 per hour for the rent of his planes. In 1967 plaintiff acquired a Cessna 150 trainer plane and a Mooney Mark 21 aircraft for chartering and rental, which he kept at the Chamberlain airport where he was office manager. In 1967 he and his uncle had four planes, a Cessna 180, an Aeronca Champ, in addition to the above two planes of plaintiff's. During all of this time, in addition to his flying, he operated the farm or ranch in Lyman County. In 1968 he was notified of the intention to sell the place he was renting. He continued to care for his cattle until March of 1969. Early in 1969 he entered into an employment agreement with Mr. Wieczorek, defendant in this action, to fly a Gruman Ag Cat plane, a highly special crop-spraying plane, to do aerial spraying, at $500 per month plus a 10% commission on the fertilizer applied. On May 10, 1969 at Huron, following some angry words between them, defendant struck the plaintiff on the left side of the face, breaking his jaw, pulling plaintiff's coat over plaintiff's head and putting an armlock on him. Plaintiff was flown to the Chamberlain hospital and placed under the care of Dr. Holland. In addition to the injured jaw plaintiff also had a cut on his right eye, bruises and abrasions, a split over the top of his ear and a bruised shoulder and back. Dr. Robert Loos, a Chamberlain dentist, was called in to wire plaintiff's jaws together. The plaintiff was hospitalized eight days, and required to suck food through his teeth during the six weeks his jaws were wired, resulting in a weight loss of 22 pounds. The plaintiff began noticing dizziness, ringing in his ears, headaches, loss of balance especially in the dark, and dizziness when riding in or driving a car. In August or September of 1969 Dr. Holland advised plaintiff he could return to work if it were in some type of office or in a garage as a parts man or something of that sort. After being unsuccessful in securing such employment the plaintiff purchased a hay grinder in December of 1969, grossing $1,034.85 during that season. Plaintiff went to work for Speckels in 1970 as a carpenter's helper at $3.00 per hour with the understanding that he could not work at heights, his gross earnings amounting to $2,758.50 for that year. That fall plaintiff returned to hay-grinding, grossing $3,037.50 in that season. In the summer of 1971 he worked as an equipment operator for Kent Brothers Construction, grossing $3,546.04. During this employment he suffered with dizziness while operating the equipment. After an unsuccessful attempt to sell the hay-grinding equipment, the plaintiff returned to grinding, grossing $2,699 in the 1971 season. Since that time plaintiff has sold the hay grinder and has entered the dairy business in partnership with his father. Plaintiff's share of the monthly milk check has been approximately $430 and $450 per month. Prior to working for the defendant the plaintiff had flown approximately 7,200 *154 hours including approximately 1000 hours of instructional work and approximately 500 hours of aerial spraying. He had also been active in the Flying Farmers Organization, serving as president in 1968 and 1969. He was voted the Airport Operator of the Year in 1968 and the Flying Farmer of the Year in 1969. However, after the injury the plaintiff could not qualify for the medical certificate required by the Federal Aeronautics Agency and, according to the testimony of the two FAA medical examiners, the plaintiff could not pass such a medical examination. The medical evidence submitted at the trial was that plaintiff incurred a broken jaw, a sprained shoulder, small lacerations of the external canal of the left ear and a cerebral concussion. This resulted in tinnitus (ringing in the ear) and vertigo (dizziness sometimes resulting in nausea). The vertigo condition was labeled as chronic labyrinthitis with two examining physicians testifying as to its being permanent. Chronic labyrinthitis was caused by an injury to the inner ear, according to Dr. Gregg's testimony, in plaintiff's case resulting in a hearing loss of 15% in the left ear or 1% on the whole man concept. Shortly before commencing the second trial on February 2, 1972 the plaintiff amended his complaint as a second amended complaint in which plaintiff Byre claimed hospital and medical expenses in the amount of $896.52, loss of earnings of $37,000, and hearing loss, broken jaw, permanent partial injury to the inner ear, pain of body and mind past and future, and loss of future earnings and earning capacity of $150,000. After both parties had rested their case, plaintiff amended the second amended complaint by alleging general damage in the amount of $250,000 for those particular losses claimed in the second amended complaint in the sum of $150,000. The defendant in his appeal has asserted error under five assignments which in general are as follows: (1) Adverse ruling by the court regarding Byre's past earnings loss, (2) Admission of certain hypothetical testimony bearing upon Byre's earning capacity, (3) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, (4) Error of the trial court in refusing to allow a new trial because of newly discovered evidence, (5) The judgment entered by the trial court was contrary to the evidence and the law applicable thereto. In his brief defendant states, "Because the assignments of error in this case are so closely related they will be argued under a single point. It is appellant's primary contention on this appeal that the lower court took an erroneous approach to the issue of what Byre's past loss of earnings were up to the time of trial." Under this first assignment of error defendant argues that the court confused "loss of earnings" with "loss of earning capacity". In this connection he quotes the comment to Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 30.07: Simmons v. Leighton, supra, is not authority for the statement that loss of earnings is capable of fairly definite and certain proof. It is authority for the following statement regarding proof: Allen v. Martley, supra, is authority for such statement and further, is authority for the definition of the difference between loss of earnings and earning capacity, and the following from Martley establishes our rules regarding their differences and proofs necessary to show them: In the former case of Byre v. Wieczorek, 85 S.D. 645, 190 N.W.2d 57, 59, this court stated that Loss of earnings, which involves a past loss capable of fairly definite and certain proof, must be given a reasonable interpretation and also must take into consideration factors such as whether the injured party is an employee on a straight salary or salary and commissions or whether the party injured is one engaged in business. We quote partially from 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 97, which is headed, "Persons engaged in business.": Again in 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 91, it is stated: In our case defendant desired to interrogate the plaintiff upon certain business records, particularly his income tax returns for a number of years. Regarding income tax returns, it should be observed that the plaintiff's returns were based upon his farm income, his aviation income, and were really in the nature of business returns which took into account inventory, depreciation, etc., and these were ruled out by the court. In Olson v. Aldren, 84 S.D. 292, 170 N.W.2d 891, 895, this court said: We think the court correctly ruled on that matter for the same reasons. In Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 3 Cir., 443 F.2d 1245, the court there gave much the same rule and for much the same reasons in measuring damages. Quoting from that case at page 1249, as follows: We also note from an examination of the record in this case that on Monday, February 7, 1972 at 9:30 A.M., plaintiff's attorney withdrew all of his former objections "made to the offer of the income tax returns, not agreeing that any of these matters are material or proper, but so that the defendant may reoffer". This was at a time when the plaintiff was being adversely examined and such income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968 were offered and received, which returns were the returns for the plaintiff and his wife, and in addition the return for 1968 included the Byre Aviation, Inc. In addition Exhibit 9 was offered. All of these exhibits were then received and went to the jury. We find no error on this assignment. By his next assignment of error the defendant asserts that the trial court's admission of certain hypothetical testimony based upon plaintiff's earning capacity was erroneous. This has to do with the testimony of Walter Ball, Harold Creager, Bernard Horstman and the deposition of Cecil Ice, all of them being plaintiff's witnesses. Walter Ball, Harold Creager and Cecil Ice are all men of considerable experience in the flying business. Dealing briefly with their testimony, Mr. Ball answered a hypothetical question giving the flying experience of the plaintiff and stating that such a pilot, in his opinion, would earn about $10,000 a year and that 25¢ per acre is paid for spraying. Harold Creager, an aerial sprayer from Kennebec, testified that a pilot is paid 25¢ per acre for spraying. Cecil Ice indicated that he pays his pilots $12,000 per year. These men were all expert in their field and they were testifying as to work the plaintiff was well qualified to do except for his injuries and had done before being injured. They testified as to the earning capacity of a pilot. In Kramer v. Sioux Transit Co., 1970, 85 S.D. 232, 180 N.W.2d 468, this court said: We do not believe the court abused its discretion in any manner in allowing this testimony. In the former case of Byre, supra, we stated that the prospective value of the dollar and expected interest rates are factors to be considered in a damage action. Mr. Horstman was called as an actuarial witness for the plaintiff. After he stated his qualifications, background and experience, plaintiff's counsel stated to him: Previous to that the attorney had stated to Mr. Horstman: "I'm going to let you use Exhibit 13, which has just been admitted into evidence and is an actuarial table showing the present value of one dollar per year payable at the end of each year for the specified numbers of years, and I think I have furnished you a copy of that table before". Exhibit 13 is Figure No. 12 in the Appendix to the American Jurisprudence Proof of Facts, Annotated, Vol. III which is a table showing present value of $1 per year, payable at the end of each year for a specified number of years. By its use it is possible for a jury instructed in its use to figure the commuted or discount value when figuring the present allowance for loss of earnings in the future. That was the purpose of the evidence and defendant should have no objection because it, if used properly, will reduce the plaintiff's award. We find no error in this. The defendant next attacks the sufficiency of the evidence. In Byre v. Wieczorek, supra, we stated the rule as follows: As in the former case we find the award is a substantial one. However, two separate juries hearing this case have each made a substantial award to the plaintiff. The first trial in Brule County yielded a verdict for plaintiff of $54,000 plus. We reversed that verdict. This trial was changed from Brule County to Davison County where the award was even substantially higher than the first. However, we believe the evidence submitted supports it and it can not be considered unreasonable nor outrageous nor such as to manifestly show the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption. We have heretofore in this opinion set forth much of the evidence in minuscule form. We are mindful that the plaintiff had qualified himself for highly skillful work, and we believe he is entitled to base his loss of future earnings on that. The defendant's next assignment is based upon the trial court's refusing to allow a new trial because of newly discovered evidence. Applications for a new trial are covered in SDCL 15-6-59(a). This application is made under (4) of the above section which reads: "Newly discovered evidence, material to the party making the application, which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial;". A motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the court's decision in granting or refusing the same will not be disturbed upon appeal by the appellate court unless it appears affirmatively from the record that there has been an abuse of such discretion. We do not find any such abuse. The rule that must be applied *160 by the trial court in disposing of a motion for a new trial is stated in 58 Am. Jur.2d, New Trial, § 25: Quoting from Museus v. Geyer, 75 S.D. 381, 66 N.W.2d 63, 1954, this court quoting further from an earlier case, Gaines v. White, 1 S.D. 434, 47 N.W. 524, stated: The last assignment of error by the defendant is that the judgment is contrary to the evidence and the law applicable thereto. In our foregoing discussion we have shown this is not true. For all of the reasons herein, we hold that the trial court ruled correctly in denying defendant's motion for a new trial and the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed. All the Justices concur. HANSON, Retired Justice, sitting for DUNN, J., disqualified.