Case Title: BITKER v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN EVANSTON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
BITKER v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN EVANSTON2004 WY 11498 P.3d 853Case Number: 03-239Decided: 10/05/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

ALBERT 
J. BITKER,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK IN EVANSTON

a 
national banking corporation; MIKE SEPPALA,

President; 
VERNON L. MOHLIS, Vice President;

and 
DENNIS R. OTTLEY,

 

Appellees(Defendants).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable Nena R. James, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Albert J. Bitker, pro se. 

 

Representing 
Appellees:

            
Gregory C. Dyekman of Dray, Thomson & Dyekman, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming and Ann L. Hoover of Topeka, Kansas.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      In 1996, Albert 
Bitker purchased 3.4 acres of partially developed land in Evanston, Wyoming, 
from Dennis Ottley by paying him $3,500 in cash and executing a promissory note 
for $31,500 for the remainder of the purchase price.1  A mortgage on the land was also 
executed.  Mr. Ottley ultimately 
assigned the promissory note and mortgage to First National Bank in Evanston 
(First National Bank) as collateral for other debts.  When Mr. Ottley defaulted on his loans, 
First National Bank foreclosed against both Mr. Ottley and Mr. Bitker.  Mr. Bitker filed suit against First 
National Bank alleging numerous claims.  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of First National 
Bank.  We 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The sole issue 
presented for review in this matter is whether the district court correctly 
granted summary judgment to First National Bank.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In June 1996, Mr. 
Bitker executed a promissory note and mortgage agreeing to pay Mr. Ottley the 
sum of $31,500 for the purchase of land located in Evanston, Wyoming.  On January 23, 1997, Mr. Ottley assigned 
the promissory note and mortgage to First National Bank for the purpose of 
providing additional security and collateral for existing debts.  The promissory note did not include a 
non-assignment clause.  

 

[¶4]      After Mr. Ottley 
defaulted on his debts and Mr. Bitker defaulted on the promissory note, First 
National Bank demanded payment of the note from Mr. Bitker.  When First National Bank did not receive 
payment from Mr. Bitker, it filed suit seeking to recover $31,500 plus interest 
on the promissory note.  The 
district court dismissed the lawsuit against Mr. Bitker on February 8, 2001, 
because Mr. Bitker had filed for bankruptcy in 1999.  On June 10, 2002, the bankruptcy court 
granted Mr. Bitker's motion to dismiss the bankruptcy. 

 

[¶5]      Acting pro 
se, Mr. Bitker filed suit on January 30, 2002, against First National Bank, 
its president, Mike Seppala, and its vice president, Vernon Mohlis, as well as 
Mr. Ottley.2  Mr. Bitker's complaint alleged, inter 
alia, fraudulent foreclosure by First National Bank, fraudulent assignment 
by Mr. Ottley, and numerous other vague allegations.  He sought $4 million in actual 
damages, without alleging how he was damaged, and $5 million in punitive 
damages.  Mr. Ottley filed a motion 
to dismiss the claims against him, which the district court granted because Mr. 
Ottley had filed for bankruptcy and Mr. Bitker's complaint was subject to the 
stay created by the bankruptcy statutes. 

 

[¶6]      First National 
Bank filed a motion for summary judgment on February 19, 2003, stating there 
were no disputed issues of material fact in the case against it, and it was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
On February 24, 2003, Mr. Bitker filed his objection to that motion. 

 

[¶7]      The motion was 
decided on the briefs, and on July 28, 2003, the district court  granted First National Bank's motion for 
summary judgment because Mr. Bitker  
had failed to plead his fraud claims with the requisite 
particularity.  With respect to the 
fraudulent assignment claim, the court found that the promissory note did not 
contain a provision preventing assignment.  
As to the fraudulent foreclosure claim, the court concluded First 
National Bank met the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-4-103 (LexisNexis 
2003), which sets forth the prerequisites for foreclosure.  Finally, the court found summary 
judgment was appropriate because Mr. Bitker presented "no cogent argument or 
legal authority" in support of his other claims.  Mr. Bitker appeals from the order 
granting summary judgment.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]      When we review 
summary 
judgment orders, we have the same duty, review the same materials, 
and follow the same standards as the district court. Merrill v. Jansma, 
2004 WY 26, ¶ 6, 86 P.3d 270, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2004).  To that end, 

 

[t]he 
propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the 
correctness of a court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  A genuine issue of material 
fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or 
defense. 

 

Id. 
(citations omitted).  We further 
stated:

     We view the record 
from the standpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to 
that party all favorable inferences that fairly may be drawn from the record. 
Id. We will uphold summary judgment on the 
basis of any proper legal theory appearing in the record. Id. We review a 
grant of summary 
judgment deciding a question of law de novo and afford no 
deference to the district court's ruling. Goglio v. Star Valley Ranch 
Association, 2002 WY 94, P12, 48 P.3d 1072, P12 (Wyo. 2002). 

 

Id., 
¶ 7.

 

[¶9]      Actions sounding 
in fraud must be pled with particularity and proved by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Lee v. LPP Mortgage, 
Ltd., 2003 WY 92, ¶ ­­11, 74 P.3d 152, ¶ 11 (Wyo. 2003).  

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶10]   The only question before this Court 
is whether summary judgment was appropriate.  Among Mr. Bitker's many generalized 
complaints on appeal, he contends that the assignment of the note and mortgage 
was not recorded.  He also complains 
about his attorney's conduct during failed settlement negotiations.  Although his complaint was largely based 
on fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent assignment, Mr. Bitker argues 
neither on appeal.  Nonetheless, 
because the district court granted summary judgment on Mr. Bitker's allegations 
of fraud, we will address them here.

 

[¶11]   When 
determining if a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding a claim of 
fraud, a trial judge must bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof 
necessary to support liability.  
Lee, ¶ 12.  In 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "the judge must view the evidence 
presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden." 
Id.  A demonstration of a 
genuine issue of material fact requires more than repeated assertions that a 
defendant is liable.  Radosevich 
v. Board of County Commissioners of the County of Sweetwater, 776 P.2d 747, 
750 (Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶12]   This is never truer than when fraud 
is alleged.  Wyo. R. Civ. P. 9(b) 
states: "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting 
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."  Fraud is established when a plaintiff 
demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence that, (1) the defendant made a 
false representation intended to induce action by the plaintiff; (2) the 
plaintiff reasonably believed the representation to be true; and (3) the 
plaintiff relied on the false representation and suffered damages.  Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson Rural 
Electric Co., 8 P.3d 324, 330 (Wyo. 2000).  Fraud will never be presumed.  Richardson v. Hardin, 5 P.3d 793, 
797 (Wyo. 2000).  Assuming the 
pleadings alleged fraud with sufficient particularity, and the parties accused 
of fraud have presented facts in support of a motion for summary judgment that 
refute the allegations of fraud, the party relying upon the fraud claims then 
must demonstrate the existence of genuine issues of material fact by clear, 
unequivocal and convincing evidence.  
Id.  

 

[¶13]   Mr. Bitker's allegations of fraud 
were not pled with particularity.  
He made general allegations of fraudulent conduct, but did not provide 
any facts.  Furthermore, in response 
to First National Bank's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Bitker did not meet 
his burden of demonstrating genuine issues of material fact existed by "clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence."  
Indeed, we find no facts in the record to support his position.  

 

[¶14]   Notwithstanding Mr. Bitker's 
allegation of "fraudulent foreclosure," his claim appears to be one for wrongful 
foreclosure.  Section 34-4-103 sets 
forth the prerequisites of foreclosure as follows:

 

(a)   To 
entitle any party to give a notice as hereinafter prescribed and to make such 
foreclosure, it is requisite:

(i)                 
That 
some default in a condition of such mortgage has occurred by which the power to 
sell became operative;

(ii)               
That no suit 
or proceeding has been instituted at law to recover the debt then remaining 
secured by such mortgage, or any part thereof, or if any suit or proceeding has 
been instituted, that the same has been discontinued, or that an execution upon 
the judgment rendered therein has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; 
and 

(iii)             
 That the mortgage containing the power of 
sale has been duly recorded; and if it has been assigned, that all assignments 
have been recorded; and

(iv)              
That 
written notice of intent to foreclose the mortgage by advertisement and sale has 
been served upon the record owner, and the person in possession of the mortgaged 
premises if different than the record owner, by certified mail with return 
receipt, mailed to the last known address of the record owner and the person in 
possession at least ten (10) days before commencement of publication of notice 
of sale. Proof of compliance with this subsection shall be by 
affidavit.

 

The record 
shows Mr. Bitker did not make payments on the promissory note, thus 
satisfying  § 34-4-103(a)(i).3  No lawsuit or proceeding was instituted 
to recover the debt, as provided by § 34-4-103(a)(ii).4  Although Mr. Bitker complains on appeal 
that the assignment of the mortgage was never recorded, he did not argue this to 
the district court, and marshaled no evidence to prove this allegation.  Regardless, First National Bank wrote 
Mr. Bitker a letter on March 24, 1998, which constituted actual notice of the 
assignment of the promissory note and the pending foreclosure on the property, 
which satisfied § 34-4-103(a)(iii) and (iv).  Having failed to present any facts in 
support of his allegations of fraudulent foreclosure, summary judgment was 
appropriate on that claim.

 

[¶15]   Finally, Mr. Bitker vaguely alleged 
breach of contract, intentional interference with a prospective business 
relationship, and breach of duty by his former attorney.  Unfortunately, Mr. Bitker presented no 
cogent argument or pertinent legal authority to support any of those allegations 
either to the district court or to this Court.  Pro se litigants are not excused 
from the requirements that cogent argument and legal authority must be 
presented.  Haworth v. Royal, 
2003 WY 26, ¶ 4, 63 P.3d 912, ¶ 4 
(Wyo. 2003).  

 

[¶16]   We affirm the order of the district 
court granting First National Bank's motion for summary 
judgment.

 

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1The 
promissory note actually reflects that the amount owed was $31,000.  However, as indicated in the record, 
both parties seem to agree the amount was intended to be $31,500 
instead.

 

2Mr. 
Mohlis was never served with the complaint.  

 

3First National Bank asserts, and Mr. Bitker admits, that he did not make 
any payments.  However, we do not 
find such an admission in the record, nor do we find any evidence to the 
contrary.  Nonetheless, the district 
court relied on that fact, which is undisputed by Mr. 
Bitker.

 

4First National Bank's suit to recover the debt was dismissed