Case Title: Love v. Givens

Citation: 183 Kan. 653, 331 P.2d 585

Docket Number: 41,084

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1958-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
183 Kan. 653 (1958)
331 P.2d 585
GLENN W. LOVE and JANE E. LOVE, Appellees,
v.
TOM GIVENS, Appellant.
No. 41,084

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed November 8, 1958.
David H. Fisher and Donald Patterson, both of Topeka, were on the briefs for the appellant.
Arthur S. Humphrey, of Junction City, was on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JACKSON, J.:
This suit was begun in the court below by Mr. and Mrs. Love to specifically perform a written contract for the sale of an undivided half interest in certain described real estate and personal property located thereon to the defendant, Tom Givens, as vendee. The petition ended with the following allegations and prayer:
After a motion by defendant, plaintiffs amended their petition by interlineation adding the following:
Later an amended answer (really a second amended answer) was filed by defendant. To this answer plaintiffs filed a reply, and thereupon defendant filed a demurrer and also a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Both of these objections were overruled by the trial court, and defendant appeals from the orders of the trial court. We shall continue to refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court.
The demurrer of the defendant, which was not filed until after he had answered and plaintiffs had replied, recited: "Comes now the defendant and demurs to the petition of the plaintiffs."
Despite this statement, the demurrer is to be taken as one filed in accord with the provisions of G.S. 1949, 60-718.
The only faults defendant attempts to find with the petition are in connection with a comparison of the petition with the reply. Of course, such a demurrer has the power to search the record back to the petition. (State v. County of Pawnee, 12 Kan. 426; Rohrbaugh v. Cunningham, 101 Kan. 284, 166 Pac. 471; and cases in West, Kan. Dig. Pleadings sec. 217, Hatcher's Kan. Dig. Pleadings sec. 157.)
In the Rohrbaugh case, it will be noted that a defendant's demurrer to the reply was sustained against his own insufficient answer.
Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings only raises the same questions attempted to be raised by the demurrer and requires no separate consideration herein.
Before considering the validity of the challenge to the pleadings by defendant's demurrer, we shall have to amplify our account of the pleadings themselves to a limited extent. Plaintiffs' petition shows that the original contract to sell this property was entered into between the parties on July 30, 1952; that contract is attached and made a part of the petition as Exhibit A. The defendant by the original contract agrees to buy the property for the sum of $7,800 payable in monthly installments of $200 together with interest *655 upon the principal amount at the rate of five percent per annum. The property was to be purchased "subject to all outstanding liens, encumbrances and indebtedness." The defendant as the purchaser further agreed:
On July 1, 1954, the plaintiffs and defendant entered into a supplemental written agreement which will be summarized as follows:
It was recited that defendant was then in default under the terms of the above original agreement and still owed the sum of $5,100 upon the principal amount together with the sum of $405 accrued interest as of July 1, 1954; that defendant agreed to pay the principal amount and interest then due in monthly payments of $60 per month; that the payments would be made to the escrow agent designated in the original agreement; and that:
The above supplemental contract was made a part of the plaintiffs' petition and marked Exhibit B.
The last draft of defendant's answer reads as follows:
*656 "AMENDED ANSWER
*657 The plaintiffs filed the following reply to the above answer:
"REPLY
The first and principal objection of the defendant to the attempt of the plaintiffs to state a cause of action for specific performance of the contracts and recovery of the purchase price is that it appears from the reply that plaintiffs had not executed a deed to their interest in the real estate along with bills of sale to the personal property, and had not deposited the same with the escrow agent as provided in the original contract of sale entered into on July 30, 1952; defendant contends, therefore, that plaintiffs had not fully performed their obligations as alleged in their petition. It will be noticed that in the reply, plaintiffs offered to furnish these documents and further show that defendant had never become entitled to receive them from the escrow agent. It should be further noticed that the original contract of sale sets no specific time when such instruments should be delivered *658 to the agent, and provides: "Said instruments and other papers to be delivered to second party upon the fulfillment of the terms of this agreement."
True it might have been convenient, in case of the death of one or both of the plaintiffs, if the deed had been filed with the escrow agent. But there appears no reason to prevent the plaintiffs from now giving a proper conveyance to defendant on receipt of the purchase price. The district court, as a court of equity, is amply able to safeguard the rights of the defendant and to provide that plaintiffs shall convey the interest in the property to defendant in exchange for the purchase price. In fact, the court's decree can convey title to the defendant under G.S. 1949, 60-3108.
It would appear that defendant relies to a great extent upon the case of Soper v. Gabe, 55 Kan. 646, 41 Pac. 969. But defendant overlooks the fact that the chief fault found with the judgment of the trial court in that case was that it had ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff some $13,000 purchase money, and, as said by the learned Mr. Justice Johnston. "No provision was made whatever for securing a title to the land to the defendants, nor that the plaintiffs should execute a deed to the defendants upon the satisfaction of the judgment, or at any other time." (p. 649)
Further in the opinion, the great justice said:
Plaintiffs not only offer to convey in the case at bar, but the district court will be fully able to protect the defendant as suggested in the case of Soper v. Gabe, supra.
The above really disposes of the questions in this case. Defendant suggests plaintiffs cannot state a cause for damages for breach of contract because of certain language in the original contract providing that in case of default by the vendee, the vendors might retake possession of the land and that all amounts received should be considered rental payments and in settlement of the unliquidated damages caused by the breach of contract. The short answer is that plaintiffs did not seek to sue for breach of contract and damages, *659 but for specific performance and recovery of the purchase price under the terms of the supplemental agreement. It would also appear defendant is still in possession of the property.
There is some argument that the court did not have jurisdiction of the case. This seems to be based upon a contention that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation should have been made a party to the suit, see second paragraph of the prayer to the petition, supra. This is only a strained construction of plaintiffs' rather plain allegations and prayer for relief, and clearly untenable. Moreover, even if there had been a defect of parties, which there was not, that defect would have been reached by a motion under G.S. 1949, 60-741, and not by demurrer. All other contentions have been fully considered, but require no comment.
The orders of the trial court appealed from were correct, and are hereby affirmed.