Case Title: STATE v SANDERS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 12446

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12446 I N THE SUPREME C O U R T OF THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1373 STATE OF M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, RICHARD SANDERS, a l s o known a s D I C K SANDERS, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Sixth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable C . B. Sande, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robert L. Stephens argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J . C. Weingartner, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana Jack Yardley, County Attorney, argued, Livingston, Montana Submitted: October 16, 1973 Decided : & ~ g M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant, Richard Sanders, was convicted i n the d i s t r i c t court of Park County of second degree a s s a u l t and the court i m - posed a three year deferred imposition of sentence. The deferred imposition of sentence was subsequently revoked and a sentence of four years i n the s t a t e prison imposed. Defendant appeals the underlying conviction and the revocation of the deferred imposi- t i o n of sentence. The conviction was t h e second returned by a jury against defendant on the same charge. The f i r s t was reversed by t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Sanders, 158 Mont. 113, 489 P.2d 371, with re- m i t t i t u r issuing on October 18, 1971. I n t h a t case defendant was convicted of three counts of second degree assault. This Court dismissed one count and returned the remaining two t o the d i s t r i c t court f o r r e t r i a l . The two counts were s e t f o r t r i a l on April 3, 1972, by a minute entry dated January 7, 1972. A copy of t h i s minute entry was mailed t o defendant's counsel of record. O n April 11, 1972, defendant appeared with h i s counsel and claimed t h a t he had not known of the April 3 , 1972, t r i a l s e t t i n g , The court then s e t t r i a l f o r April 19, 1972, and re- appointed defendant's counsel. N o reason appears i n e i t h e r the court f i l e o r the trans- c r i p t f o r the further delay u n t i l May 10, 1972, when t r i a l w a s f i n a l l y had. A t t h a t time one count was dismissed on motion of t h e county attorney. Proceeding on the o r i g i n a l Information, the s t a t e then obtained a jury verdict of g u i l t y of a s s a u l t i n the second degree on the remaining count. The d i s t r i c t court deferred imposition of sentence f o r three years subject t o c e r t a i n condi- t i o n s , including the requirement t h a t defendant reimburse the county f o r h i s court appointed counsel. O n June 27, 1972, defendant was charged with disturbing the peace and plead g u i l t y . Thereafter, a p e t i t i o n f o r revocation of deferred imposition of sentence was f i l e d alleging defendant's f a i l u r e t o reimburse the county and the disturbing t h e peace i n c i - dent. Hearing was s e t f o r October 3 , 1972. This hearing was subsequently r e s e t f o r October 10. A t the hearing l i t t l e was accomplished, save substitution of counsel. The matter was then continued u n t i l October 17, 1972, and defendant ordered held pending the hearing. Bail was s e t a t $5,000. While defendant was incar- cerated pending hearing, he assaulted a deputy s h e r i f f . The p e t i t i o n t o revoke was amended t o r e f l e c t t h i s assault. A t the hearing on October 17, 1972, the allegation of f a i l u r e t o reimburse the county was dropped. Various witnesses were presented. These witnesses t e s t i f i e d t o the f a c t s underlying defendant's plea of g u i l t y t o disturbing the peace and t o h i s a s s a u l t on the deputy s h e r i f f . From t h i s testimony the d i s t r i c t court concluded t h a t defendant had twice been i n v i o l a t i o n of the law and revoked the deferred imposition of sentence. Defendant was then sentenced t o four years i n the s t a t e prison. O n appeal defendant r a i s e s f i v e issues, three r e l a t i n g t o the t r i a l which resulted i n h i s a s s a u l t conviction and two r e l a t i n g t o the hearing a t which h i s deferred imposition of sentence was revoked. Specifically, defendant claims the court erred a t the t r i a l by: (1) Denying him a speedy t r i a l , (2) Allowing the s t a t e t o base the prosecution on the o r i g i n a l Information, and (3) Giving the i n s t r u c t i o n defining second degree a s s a u l t out of order and separate from the other instructions. A s t o the hearing, defendant claims the d i s t r i c t court erred : (a) I n revoking h i s deferred imposition of sentence i n t h a t there was no proper basis f o r the revocation, and (b) The order of revocation does not meet minimum due process standards. The r i g h t of a defendant t o a speedy t r i a l i s guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment t o the United States Constitution and A r t . 111, 516, of the 1889 Montana Constitution. Recent cases of t h e United States Supreme Court and t h i s Court e s t a b l i s h the stan- dards t o be applied i n determining whether o r not a defendant has been denied t h i s r i g h t . While the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held t h a t the r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l i s a fundamental r i g h t imposed on the s t a t e s by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment t o the United States Constitution (Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L ed 2d 1; Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L ed 2d 607; Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L ed 2d 26) it was not u n t i l Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L ed 2d 101, 116,117, t h a t it s e t out the c r i t e r i a by which the r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l i s t o be judged. I n Barker, t h a t court expressly rejected both t h e fixed time period approach and the demand waiver approach and adopted a balancing t e s t "in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant a r e weighed." To guide the application of the balancing t e s t the Supreme Court went on t o i d e n t i f y some of the f a c t o r s which should be assessed i n determining whether o r not a p a r t i c u l a r defendant has been denied h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l : "Though some might express them i n d i f f e r e n t ways, we i d e n t i f y four such factors: Length of delay, the reason f o r the delay, the de- fendant's assertion of h i s r i g h t , and prejudice t o the defendant. I1 ' I n q l y l n g t h e s e factors of the balancing t e s t t o the f a c t s of Barker, the Supreme Court found t h a t the lack of prejudice and the f a i l u r e on the p a r t of the defendant t o seek a t r i a l outweighed the largely unexcused delay of more than f i v e years, which in- cluded nearly ten months of imprisonment. This Court held i n S t a t e v. McGowan, 113 Mont. 591, 594, "'Whether a t r i a l i s a speedy t r i a l within the Constitution i s a j u d i c i a l question. 111 I n State v. Lagerquist, 152 Mont. 21, 27, 445 P.2d 910, t h i s Court i d e n t i f i e d c e r t a i n factors f o r consideration i n deter- mining the answer t o t h i s j u d i c i a l question. Essentially the same factors established by the United States Supreme Court i n Barker, they include: "'(1) length of delay, (2) reason f o r delay, (3) waiver of r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l by defendant, and (4) prejudice t o t h e defendant from the delay. I I1 I n determining t h e length of delay, defendant claims the time which elapsed between the f i l i n g of the Information and the f i r s t t r i a l should be added t o the time between the f i l i n g of t h i s Court's r e m i t t i t u r and the second t r i a l . W e r e j e c t t h i s view and adopt the position taken by the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards f o r Criminal J u s t i c e , Speedy T r i a l , Section 2.2 (Approved Draft 1968), which provides: I I 'When time commences t o run. I t The time f o r t r i a l should commence running * * * "* Jc * "(c) i f the defendant i s t o be t r i e d again following a m i s t r i a l , an order f o r a new t r i a l , o r an appeal o r c o l l a t e r a l attack, from the date of the m i s t r i a l , order granting a new t r i a l , o r remand. I t The commentary which accompanies the A.B.A. Standard s p e c i f i c a l l y observes : I I I n cases of remand, the relevant date i s not the day of the higher court decision, but the day of r e c e i p t of the mandate by the lower court. 11 Accordingly i n deciding defendant's claimed denial of a speedy t r i a l , we need consider only the period from October 18, 1971 when t h i s court's r e m i t t i t u r was f i l e d , and May 10, 1972 when the defendant was brought t o t r i a l f o r t h e second t i m e . Therefore, t h e lapse of time which defendant claims resulted i n a denial of h i s constitutional r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l amounts t o s i x months and twenty-two days. From an examination of the second f a c t o r l i s t e d i n Barker and Lagerquist---the reason f o r the delay---it appears t h a t following the return of our mandate t o the d i s t r i c t court the cause was duly s e t f o r r e t r i a l on April 3, 1972, the next jury term. Notice of t h i s s e t t i n g was mailed t o defendant's counsel of record. O n April 3 defendant f a i l e d t o appear f o r t r i a l . Defendant appeared on April 1 1 and claimed lack of n o t i c e a s an excuse f o r h i s f a i l u r e t o appear on April 3. Defendant was then given u n t i l April 19, when the cause was again s e t f o r t r i a l . For reasons not appearing i n the record, the t r i a l was f u r t h e r post- poned u n t i l May 10, 1972. From the foregoing it appears the d i s t r i c t court gave the cause the reasonable prompt calendar consideration required under Lagerquist with regard t o cases returned t o d i s t r i c t court. The delays t h a t followed, i f not chargeable t o defendant, c e r t a i n l y cannot be charged t o the s t a t e . The f i r s t delay from April 3 t o April 1 1 can be charged t o defendant's counsel f o r f a i l u r e t o inform defendant t h a t t r i a l had been s e t a s per t h e minute entry. The second delay flowed from the f i r s t , since time was required a f t e r defendant had been n o t i f i e d t o resubpoena witnesses and t o arrage f o r a jury. The t h i r d delay from April 19 t o May 10 i s unexplained, but it i s not of such duration as t o a f f e c t the r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l . Considering the t h i r d and fourth factors i n Barker and Lagerquist---defendant's assertion of h i s r i g h t and the prejudice which resulted from the delay---it i s apparent (1) t h a t defendant made no assertion of h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l , and (2) no a c t u a l prejudice i s shown. Defendant alleges t h a t the eight days granted on April 1 1 t o prepare f o r t r i a l were so l i t t l e a s t o c o n s t i t u t e prejudice; however, other than t h i s bald assertion, no showing i s made of the manner i n which t h i s caused a c t u a l d e t r i - ment t o defendant; and, considered with the f a c t t h a t three addi- t i o n a l weeks were allowed before the t r i a l , defendant's claim of prejudice would seem t o be negated. From the foregoing we conclude defendant was not denied a speedy t r i a l within the meaning of t h e United States and the Montana constitutional guarantees. Defendant's issue (2) i s t h a t there was a denial of due process i n the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o require t h e f i l i n g of a new Information. I n S t a t e v. h s , 105 Mont. 82,87, 69 P.2d 584, t h i s Court considered whether or not a defendant whose conviction had been reversed on appeal could again be t r i e d on the same indictment. I n holding t h a t he could, the Court said: "'1t i s an established principle of law t h a t a defendant i n a criminal case who procures a verdict and judgment against him t o be s e t aside by the court may be t r i e d anew upon the same o r another indictment f o r the same offense - of which he was convicted."' (Emphasis added). This view is supported by a majority of jurisdictions. I n 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law $ 1426, it is said: I I For most purposes, the grant of a new t r i a l places t h e p a r t i e s i n the same position a s though the case had not previously been heard; however, neither a new indictment nor a new plea i s necessary." (Emphasis added). This r u l e i s equally applicable t o Informations. The d i s t r i c t court did not e r r by allowing the prosecution t o proceed without requiring the f i l i n g of a new Information. Defendant's issue (3) r e l a t e s t o the t r i a l and concerns the giving of the instruction defining second degree a s s a u l t l a t e and out of order. Defendant claims the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s action i n giving the instruction a f t e r the s t a t e ' s closing argument placed emphasis on the s t a t e ' s theory of the case t o the prejudice of defendant. I n support of h i s position, defendant c i t e s 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law 5 1299, f o r the proposition t h a t : I' The court should not i n t e r r u p t t h e argument of counsel i n order t o charge the jury * * *.'I While we agree with defendant's basic premise t h a t it i s by f a r the b e t t e r practice t o avoid the giving of instructions a f t e r the arguments have begun, we f e e l t h a t the s i t u a t i o n i n t h i s case i s more d i r e c t l y d e a l t with by the paragraph i n 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law 5 1299, immediately preceding that cited to us by defendant, which states: I1 Although it may be the approved practice to give the instructions before the argument, additional, omitted, or corrected instructions may be given thereafter * 9; * . I 1 Under Montana statutes the court is required to instruct the jury prior to arguments of counsel. Section 95-1910(e), R.C.M. 1947. However, section 95-1911, R.C.M. 1947, allows a departure from this prescribed order "for good reasons, and in the discretion of the court". In the instant case, an instruction was inadvertently omitted. Since it defined the crime with which defendant was charged and such crime could be found on the evi- dence presented to the jury, the court was obligated by section 95-1910(e), R.C.M. 1947, and this Court's decision in State v . Thomas, 147 Mont. 325, 413 P.2d 315, to give the instruction. Since the instruction was required, there was good reason for the court to depart from the normal order of trial to present it and thus fully instruct the jury. Any prejudice which may have resulted from this departure from the normal order of trial was cured by the district court's complete and careful caution to the jury: "THE COURT: * * * And through an oversight of the Court and an omission of the Court one instruction was left out. * * * At this time I want to caution the jury as to Instruction No. 1, that you have here, that says these instructions are to be considered as one instruction, and you have no right to consider any part or portion of them to the exclusion of other portions, and that the order that the instructions are given has no significance. In other words, there are 30 instructions. Somewhere along the line every in- struction has to be given and the order that they appear here is of no significance. Each instruction is to be weighed as its own instruction. * * * "And I caution the jury at this time that you are not to give any undue emphasis to this instruction as to the order that it's given. That it was omitted by the court in the original set of instructions. It The court's admonition fully informed the jury as to the reason the instruction was being given at the time it was, and adequately warned it against giving the instruction any undue prominence because it was given separate from the other instruc- tions. State v . Brooks, 150 Mont. 399, 436 P.2d 91. Defendant's remaining issues ( a ) and ( b ) relate to the revocation of deferred imposition of sentence. Defendant claims the revocation was improperly based on a plea of guilty entered without benefit of counsel, and on an assault which occurred while defendant was in custody. He alleges the revocation does not comply with due process requirements in that there was no written statement of reasons for the revocation or of the evi- dence relied on. On the record we find it unnecessary to consider defendant's argument as to whether or not a plea of guilty entered without assistance of counsel can form the basis for revocation of de- ferred imposition of sentence for the simple reason that the court did not rely on the plea, but rather considered evidence introduced at the revocation hearing regarding this incident. In regard to the incident, the court said: "It is the view of this court that by the evidence and by the admission of defendant himself in the revocation hearing, that the defendant was in viola- tion of his parole by his acts at that time. And I don't think it was necessary to consider the formal charges in the Justice Court * * *." Defendant also suggests that an assault committed while incarcerated should not serve as a basis for revocation of deferred imposition of sentence. No authority is cited for this proposi- tion and we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's consideration of the defendant's assault on a deputy sheriff while incarcerated awaiting his revocation hearing. Defendant's claim of denial of due process at the revocation hearing is equally ill-founded. Defendant's basic objection is that no written statement of reasons for the revocation was pro- vided. He alleges such a statement is required by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 Sect. 2593, 33 L ed 2d 4 8 4 . The mandate of Morrisse~, if applicable, was complied with in this case in that a complete transcript of the hearing on revocation and the proceedings at which the district court revoked the deferred imposition of sentence was kept and made available to defendant. In the transcript of the proceedings at which the deferred im- position was revoked, is the statement of reasons which defendant claims he was entitled, now reduced to writing. Accordingly, the conviction and the revocation of deferred imposition of sentence are affirmed. Justices _ ) , - Hon. Paul G. Hatfield, Judge, sitting for Mr. Justic John Conway Harrison.