Case Title: DURHAM v. DURHAM

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-130

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
DURHAM v. DURHAM2003 WY 9574 P.3d 1230Case Number: 02-130Decided: 08/19/2003
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

BECKY 
E. DURHAM,

 

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

BRIAN 
DURHAM,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Greg 
L. Goddard of Goddard, Wages & Vogel, Buffalo, Wyoming 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

DaNece 
Day Koenigs of Lubnau, Bailey & Dumbrill, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming 

 

 

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
The 
district court granted the parties a divorce, awarded primary custody of the 
parties' two children to Becky E. Durham (mother), and ordered Brian Durham 
(father) to pay child support.  In 
this appeal, mother challenges the district court's child support order, 
claiming the district court abused its discretion in imputing to her gross 
income of $35,000 per year, equal to a salary she earned in Virginia in 
1992.  She contends the district 
court's imputation of income is not supported by the record because there is no 
evidence regarding whether mother could earn such a salary in Gillette, Wyoming, 
where she now resides.  Mother also 
claims the district court abused its discretion in allocating the expense of 
travel for visitation.  We agree 
with mother that the record does not support the district court's imputation of 
income.  We reverse and remand for 
further proceedings.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
The 
parties generally agree on the following issues:

 

1.  Whether the District Court erred when it 
imputed [to mother] $35,000.00 gross annual income for purposes of calculating 
[mother's] child support contribution?

 

2.  Whether the District Court erred when it 
ordered [mother] to pay all of the reasonable and necessary travel expenses for 
the parties' children to visit [father] twice per year for 2003 and beyond 
and/or deviated from the presumptive child support guidelines because of 
[father's] difficulty and expense of visitation travel? 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
The 
parties were married on September 19, 1992.  During the marriage, the parties made 
their home in Alexandria, Virginia.  
Throughout the course of the marriage, father was employed by Navy Sea 
Systems Command. At the time of the marriage, mother was employed by American 
Express, where she earned $35,000 in 1992, the last year she worked for that 
entity. After the parties married, mother's employment with American Express 
ended, and she became a homemaker and worked part time for the parties' 
church.  Mother earned, on average, 
between $10,000 and $12,000 per year.  
Two daughters were born of the marriage, the first on April 28, 1997, and 
the second on November 18, 1998. Eventually, irreconcilable differences 
developed.  

 

[¶4]           
The 
parties separated around October 28, 1999.  
During that week, while father was out of the country on a work 
assignment, mother left the marital home without notifying father, taking the 
children with her.  Mother and the 
children moved from Virginia to Gillette, Wyoming, where they took up residence 
with mother's parents.  After 
settling in Gillette, mother began teaching piano lessons, performing piano 
accompaniments, and teaching music lessons to children.  In the year 2000, mother grossed 
approximately $7,000 from those and her other endeavors.  

 

[¶5]           
Mother 
filed for divorce, in Campbell County, in May of 2000.  The district court held a two-day 
divorce trial on December 21-22, 2000, and issued a decision letter on January 
29, 2001.  The district court 
awarded mother the primary care, custody and control of the parties' 
children.  Father was granted 
visitation and ordered to pay child support.  With respect to child support, the 
decision letter provides: 

 

Child 
Support:  The court finds that [mother] is 
intentionally underemployed.  By her 
own testimony she is but a few hours away from an MBA and in her last year of 
full-time employment, 1992, made $35,000.  
She is now employed teaching music to children, which, while a 
commendable endeavor, is not one that adequately meets her earning potential and 
accompanying benefit to the minor children.  [Mother] chooses this course.  The court imputes annual gross income to 
[mother] at $35,000 per year.  The 
court imputes [mother's] net monthly income at $2,383, after appropriate 
deductions.

 

* 
* * *

[Father's] 
net monthly income is $5387.  The 
parties total child support obligation to the children is $1590.  Under the Child Support Guidelines, 
[father's] share of the support obligation is $1105.  However, given the distance that 
[father's] children now reside from him, and the difficulty and expense of 
visitation, the court finds that a deviation from the guidelines is appropriate 
and, therefore assesses an obligation of $450 per month per child for a total of 
$900 per month, commencing February 1, 2001.  W.S. § 20-6-302(b)(vii).

 

[¶6]           
With 
respect to expense of travel for visitation, the decision letter also noted that 
"[g]iven the substantial distance of the parties from one another, occasioned by 
[mother's] move, and the ages of the children the court finds that special 
considerations concerning travel expenses should be made."  The district court determined that, 
beginning in 2003, mother "shall bear the reasonable and necessary expenses for 
two visits (round trip) for the children per year."

 

[¶7]           
After 
the district court issued its decision letter, the parties could not agree on a 
final order in a timely fashion.  
Consequently, the district court bifurcated the proceedings.  On December 21, 2001, it entered a 
decree of divorce, which served to divorce the parties and leave all remaining 
issues for a future order.  Finally, 
on March 26, 2002, the district court entered its "Order of Child Custody, 
Visitation and Support and Property and Debt Division."  That order implemented child support in 
accord with the district court's decision letter.  This 
appeal followed.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶8]           
Decisions 
concerning child support are committed to the sound discretion of the district 
court.  Carlton v. Carlton, 
997 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo. 2000); Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 
(Wyo. 1998); Scherer v. Scherer, 931 P.2d 251, 253-54 (Wyo. 1997).   

 

Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  We must ask ourselves 
whether the district court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any 
facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  

 

Thomas 
v. Thomas, 
983 P.2d 717, 719 (Wyo.1999) (citations and quotations 
omitted).

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶9]           
Mother 
claims the district court abused its discretion when, for purposes of 
calculating child support, it imputed to her an annual income of $35,000.  Mother does not challenge the district 
court's determination that she is underemployed and that income should be 
imputed.  Instead, her complaint is 
that the amount of imputed income is too high given the record in this 
matter.  Specifically, mother 
asserts that the record does not contain evidence of employment opportunities or 
prevailing wages in Gillette.  In 
addition, she points out that the only time she made $35,000 a year was in 1992 
in Virginia.  In response, father 
contends it is reasonable to impute income to mother at $35,000, especially 
considering that she has a degree in business administration and is four classes 
short of attaining a Masters Degree in Business Administration (MBA).  

 

[¶10]       
In 
defining "income" for child support purposes, the legislature has determined 
that, "[g]ross income also means potential income of parents who are voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-303(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  In turn, imputation of income is 
controlled by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307 (LexisNexis 2003), which provides in 
pertinent part:

 

(b) 
A court may deviate from the presumptive child support established by W.S. 
20-2-304 upon a specific finding that the application of the presumptive child 
support would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case.  In any case where the court has deviated 
from the presumptive child support, the reasons therefor shall be specifically 
set forth fully in the order or decree.  
In determining whether to deviate from the presumptive child support 
established by W.S. 20-2-304, the court shall consider the following 
factors:

 

* 
* * *

(xi) 
Whether either parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.  In such case the child support shall be 
computed based upon the potential earning capacity (imputed income) of the 
unemployed or underemployed parent.  
In making that determination the court shall 
consider:

(A) 
Prior employment experience and history;

(B) 
Educational level and whether additional education would make the parent more 
self-sufficient or significantly increase the parent's 
income;

(C) 
The presence of children of the marriage in the parent's home and its impact on 
the earnings of that parent;

(D) 
Availability of employment for which the parent is 
qualified;

(E) 
Prevailing wage rates in the local area;

(F) 
Special skills or training; and

(G) 
Whether the parent is realistically able to earn imputed 
income.

 

[¶11]       
A 
deviation from the child support guidelines is permitted only when the trial 
court makes a finding that it would be unjust or inappropriate to follow them in 
a particular case and it specifically sets forth in full the reasons for the 
deviation in the divorce decree.  
Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 334 (Wyo. 1998); Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259, 1265 (Wyo. 1998); 
Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 214 (Wyo. 1995).  
Nothing in this statute prevents a district court from imputing 
income to a custodial parent, and we affirmed the imputation of income to a 
custodial mother in In re Paternity 
of IC, 971 P.2d 603, 607 
(Wyo. 1999).  Also, in cases 
involving imputed income, we have required evidentiary support for imputation of 
income at a certain rate.  
Id. at 608; Whitt v. 
State ex rel. Wright, 2001 
WY 128, ¶¶14-15, 36 P.3d 617, ¶¶14-15 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶12]       
We 
agree with mother that the district court's decision is not supported by the 
record.  While the record does 
include evidence of mother's employment history and education level, it does not 
include any evidence regarding availability of employment and prevailing wage 
rates in the local area.  Thus, 
while it is true that mother has a degree in business administration and that 
she earned $35,000 in Virginia in 1992, the district court record includes 
nothing to support the proposition that mother is realistically able to earn, in 
the Gillette area, the income imputed to her.  See Connell v. Connell, 718 So. 2d 842 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 1998).

 

[¶13]       
Indeed, 
the parties seemed to acknowledge this lack of evidentiary support in making 
their written closing arguments to the district court.  Interestingly, in their child support 
calculations, both parties proposed that the district court impute income to 
mother based on the minimum wage.  
In fact, the imputed income proposed by the parties was identical.1   The written closing arguments 
underscore the problem on this issue:  
the record does not support the decision to impute income to mother at 
the rate of $35,000 per year.  The 
district court's decision to do so therefore must be reversed.  

 

 

[¶14]       
In 
her second issue, mother argues the district court abused its discretion with 
respect to allocation of visitation expenses.  First, mother claims an abuse of 
discretion in the district court's downward deviation in child support to offset 
visitation expense to father.  
Second, mother complains that, beginning in 2003, she is required to pay 
for two of the children's visits.  
Mother contends the district court's order allows the father to "have his 
cake and eat it, too" because not only is father's child support obligation 
reduced because of visitation expense, mother also has to pay for two visits per 
year.  Father responds that, while 
this action was pending, he exercised his visitation rights often and that he 
will continue to do so, as permitted by the district court's visitation 
order.  Father contends that, under 
the circumstances, making mother pay for two trips per year is not 
unreasonable.  Also, father points 
out that mother resides with her parents, thus reducing her living 
expenses.

 

[¶15]       
Before 
addressing these issues, we must note that the district court's decisions 
regarding allocation of visitation expenses are premised on an imputed income to 
mother of $35,000.  Because we have 
determined the record does not support imputation of income at that amount, we 
cannot address these issues without the risk of offering an advisory 
opinion.  However, for the sake of 
judicial economy and to reduce the litigation expenses for the parties, we will 
address the issues as best we can under the circumstances.  

 

[¶16]       
It must also 
be preliminarily noted that the district court granted father liberal visitation 
rights.  Beginning in 2003, when the 
oldest child will be of school age, father is permitted visitation on basically 
every other weekend, on alternating major holidays, and for Father's Day.  The district court also granted father 
summer custody of the children, beginning in 2003.2  

[¶17]       
Turning 
to mother's issues, she attacks, in two different ways, the downward deviation 
from the presumptive child support amount.  
Mother contends, first, that the district court erred in failing to 
consider all the factors contained in § 20-2-307(b).  Second, she  contends that the district court's 
decision is not supported by the record.  
As detailed in its decision letter, the district court found father's 
presumptive support obligation was $1,105 per month.  Taking into account the difficulty and 
expense to father in exercising visitation, the district court deviated from 
that amount, reducing father's support obligation to $900 per month.  In doing so, the district court relied 
on § 20-2-307(b)(vii), which permits a district court to deviate from the 
presumptive support amount in consideration of the "cost of transportation of 
the child to and from visitation."  

 

[¶18]       
With 
respect to mother's first contention, she presents no authority for the 
proposition that the district court, in making its determination to deviate from 
the presumptive support amount, must examine all the factors listed in § 
20-3-307(b) and that it cannot rely on only one of the factors.  In addition, even though the district 
court's decision relies on only one factor, that does not necessarily mean the 
district court did not consider the others.  We reject this 
contention.

 

[¶19]       
As 
for mother's contention that the record does not support the district court's 
decision, the record reveals that, because of mother's relocation with the 
children to Wyoming, father must incur substantial expenses in exercising 
visitation.  While this matter was 
pending in the district court, father made five trips to Wyoming, and the 
children traveled to Virginia, with their mother, once.  Father testified that his visits to 
Wyoming cost between $700 and $1200.  
Mother also presented testimony and exhibits concerning travel costs from 
her trip to Virginia with the children.  
Thus, unlike mother's claim with respect to imputed income, there is 
adequate support in the record to sustain the district court's decision to 
deviate.  Under the circumstances, 
the district court's decision to deviate is well within the bounds of reason, 
and we find no abuse of discretion on the deviation decision.  In re Paternity of IC, 971 P.2d  
at 607-08.  We further find that, 
under these circumstances, a downward deviation would be permissible regardless 
of whether the district court imputes income at $35,000 or at minimum wage.  

 

[¶20]       
However, 
we recognize that the district court's decision on the amount 
of deviation was based on a presumptive child support amount that was, in turn, 
based on imputed income of $35,000.  
Thus, while we affirm the decision to deviate, we must reverse the amount 
of deviation. The district court maintains the discretion to adjust the amount 
of deviation in light of the proceedings on remand.

 

[¶21]       
Mother 
also challenges the district court's requirement that she pay for two visits per 
year, starting in 2003.  In addition 
to challenging the allocation itself, mother argues that requiring her to pay 
for two trips per year, when combined with the deviation from the presumptive 
support amount due to transportation, amounts to an abuse of discretion.  We first note that the district court 
has statutory authority to allocate the costs of transporting the children 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-202(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).3  Second, as noted above, father was 
granted liberal rights to visitation, and the visitation expenses are 
substantial.  Finally, we note that 
other courts have approved a decision requiring a parent to share in the expense 
of a situation that he or she helped to create.  Stanton v. Abbey, 874 S.W.2d 493, 
501 (Mo.App. E.D. 1994) ("We do not find it inequitable for mother to pay the 
transportation costs which result from her moving [from Missouri] to California 
with the children.").  Here, because 
the district court relied on the imputed income of $35,000 in making its 
decision on this issue, and because the parties' respective incomes, whether 
imputed or otherwise, are key factors in allocating the expense of visitation, 
we must also reverse on this issue to allow the district court to reconsider its 
decision in light of the proceedings on remand.

 

[¶22]       
For 
the foregoing reasons, this case is reversed and remanded to the district court 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Imputing income to mother at minimum wage ($896 /month) would, utilizing 
the other number used by the district court, result in a presumptive support 
obligation for father of approximately $1,175 per month, as opposed to that 
found by the district court, $1,105 per month.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
20-2-304(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003).  
In fact, $1,175 per month is the amount mother calculated and proposed in 
her written closing argument.

 

2With 
respect to visitation, the district court's order provided:

Visitation.  The defendant shall have the right of 
visitation with the parties' minor children as set forth 
herein:

* 
* * *

3. 
 2003 and Beyond (When the 
Oldest Child is School Age).

1.         
Alternating 
major holidays, with said major holidays being defined as New Years (the 
second half of the break from school), Spring Break/Easter (April school 
break), July Fourth (for a period of four days), Thanksgiving and 
Christmas (the first half of the break from school). 

Beginning 
in 2003, the Defendant shall have New Years, July Fourth and Christmas in 
odd-numbered years and he shall have Spring Break/Easter and Thanksgiving in 
even-numbered years.  The calendar 
of the school which the children attend shall be the calendar used to determine 
visitation.

2.         
The 
schedule shall alternate each year so that the party who has the children for a 
particular holiday during the year will not have the children on the same 
holiday the following year.

3.         
The 
Plaintiff shall have the children on Mother's Day and the Defendant shall 
the children on Father's Day. 

c.  Summer Custody.  From five (5) days after school recesses 
in the spring until five (5) days before school resumes in the fall.  During Defendant's summer custody, 
Plaintiff shall have custody of the minor children for two (2) weekends 
commencing at noon on Friday and continuing until 5:00 p.m. on Sunday.  In 2004 and beyond, when Plaintiff has 
the children for July Fourth, she shall have only one other visit during 
Defendant's summer custody.  

 

3Wyo.Stat.Ann. 
§ 20-2-202(a)(i) provides in 
part:

(a)     The 
court may order visitation it deems in the best interests of each child and the 
court shall:

* 
* * *

(ii) 
Provide for the allocation of the costs of transporting each child for purposes 
of visitation[.]