Case Title: In re Child of Charlene F.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 173

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 173 
Docket: 
Han-19-326 
Submitted 
On Briefs: December 17, 2019 
Decided: 
December 23, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF CHARLENE F. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Charlene F. appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Ellsworth, Roberts, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child pursuant to 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2018).  The mother 
contends that the court erred in finding by clear and convincing evidence that 
she is unfit and that termination is in the child’s best interest.  See id.  We affirm 
the judgment.1 
 
[¶2]  The court’s findings are supported by competent evidence in the 
record.  “We review the court’s factual findings supporting its determination of 
parental unfitness and best interest[] of the child[] for clear error, and review 
its ultimate conclusion that termination is in the best interest[] of the child[] for 
                                         
1  The father’s parental rights were terminated by the same judgment.  We previously dismissed 
his appeal for want of prosecution. 
 
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an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, 
through the trial court’s lens, and giving the court’s judgment substantial 
deference.”  In re Children of Jessica D., 2019 ME 70, ¶ 4, 208 A.3d 363 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶3]  The court’s supported factual findings underlying its unfitness and 
best interest determinations include the following:  
 
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence, that . . . [the 
mother] is unable to protect [the child] from jeopardy and these 
circumstances are unlikely to change within a time reasonably 
calculated to meet the child’s needs.  [The mother’s] relationship 
with [the father] was marred by domestic violence to a degree which 
would jeopardize [the child’s] safety.  The Department first became 
involved with [the parents] in June of 2016.  [The child’s] parents 
agreed to work with the Department at that point, including drug 
testing and releases for their providers.  [In] July . . . 2016, the 
parents had another violent argument culminating in a suicide 
attempt by [the mother].  [The child] was placed with [the father’s] 
parents as a safety plan [in] August . . . 2016.  [The child] remains 
with [the father’s parents] to this day.  [The mother] suffers from 
PTSD and Persistent Depressive Disorder.  She is in therapy . . . and 
has made significant progress.  She is working to respond 
appropriately to [the child’s] behaviors.  Unfortunately, [the 
mother’s] efforts to manage her emotions and her decision making, 
her executive functions, will be a lifetime struggle.  [The mother] 
believes that [the child’s] behaviors are the result of spoiling by [the 
father’s parents].  She intends to adopt a strict parenting style.  She 
disagrees with [the child’s clinician’s] recommendations for de-
escalating [the child].  [The child] has been in treatment with [the 
clinician and the child’s therapist] since coming into the 
Department’s care. . . . [The child] is a complex child who must have 
stability and understanding in her relationships.  She needs a calm 
and composed caregiver.  [The mother’s] strict authoritarian style 
 
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would exacerbate [the child’s] troubling behaviors.  [The child] is 
very attuned to the adults in her life and is aware of their conflicts.  
[The child] has made progress, but, will need therapy until at least 
young adulthood.  [The mother] presents as an appropriate loving 
parent in visits with her daughter.  She participated in therapy with 
[the child’s clinician] initially.  Unfortunately, she stopped working 
with [the clinician] [in] January . . . 2019.  [The mother’s] inability to 
recognize the basis for [the child’s] . . . issues and to adopt 
appropriate responses to them place [the child] in jeopardy. 
 
 
This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DHHS 
offered [the mother] . . . appropriate services and referred [her] to 
providers.  [She was] simply unwilling or unable to engage or make 
changes.  This court finds that there is nothing more that DHHS 
could have done to assist [the mother] . . . in this case. 
 
 
[The child] resides in the home of [the father’s parents].  [The 
father’s mother] displayed a very clear understanding of [the 
child’s] concerning behaviors and a willingness to work with [the 
child’s] therapists to resolve them.  [The child] is making progress in 
the [father’s parents’] care and they are prepared to adopt her.  The 
[father’s parents] have the resources to meet [the child’s] needs.  
They are [the child’s] grandparent[s] and have the ability to allow 
her the opportunity for contact with her extended family. 
 
 
The difficulty for [the mother] . . . is one of timing.  [The child] 
is 5 years old.  She’s been out of her parents’ care for 3 years.  She 
cannot continue to wait for her parents to do all the things necessary 
to set up a stable, consistent and safe life.  [The child] has established 
a good bond with [her paternal grandparents].  [The child] would 
best benefit from maintaining loving relationships with her parents 
and [the father’s parents].  Unfortunately, that is very unlikely to 
ever occur.  She needs a permanent home now and cannot wait any 
longer for her parents to get their lives in order.  This is a particularly 
troubling case because it is clear to this court that [the child’s] 
parent[s] love her dearly.  Despite that love, they are unable to take 
full responsibility for [the child] at this time.  The court does not 
 
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believe that they will be able to take responsibility for her within a 
time reasonably calculated to meet her needs. 
     
 
The court must look at whether . . . [the mother] will be able 
to take responsibility for [the child] within a time reasonably 
calculated to meet her needs, and [she] cannot.  The time reasonably 
calculated to meet the child’s needs is measured from the child’s 
perspective.  [The child] has been in DHHS custody for almost 36 
months.  [The child] has been in the care of [the father’s parents] for 
more than half of her life.  Each month is a long time in the [life] of a 
child this age. . . . 
 
 
The Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act, which 
governs these proceedings, clearly states a policy favoring 
permanency for children. . . . As the Law Court has stated, long-term 
foster care is inherently impermanent and therefore disfavored as a 
permanency plan for children.  Long-term options for a child other 
than 
termination 
allow 
future 
disruptions, 
uncertainty, 
inconsistency and lack of permanency in the child’s life. . . . 
 
 
This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that even 
though [the mother] . . . may be willing, [she is] unable to protect [the 
child] from Jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change 
within a time[] which is reasonably calculated to meet her needs.  
This court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that even 
though [the mother] . . . may be willing, [she is] unable to take 
responsibility for [the child] within a time[] which is reasonably 
calculated to meet her needs.   
 
 
Finally, the court finds that it is in the best interest of [the 
child] that the parental rights be terminated . . . . 
 
  
 
Given the strong public policy favoring permanency for 
children, In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, 889 A.2d 297, together with 
the lack of any compelling reason supporting long-term care, the 
court finds that termination is in [the child’s] best interest[].  The 
court further finds that the plan of adoption is clearly in the best 
 
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interest of [the child] so that she has permanency in the happy home 
where she belongs. 
 
 
The Guardian ad litem supports termination of [the mother’s] 
. . . parental rights and has no concerns about her current placement.  
The GAL agrees that adoption . . . is in [the child’s] best interest. 
 
(Citations and quotation marks omitted.) 
 
[¶4]  After carefully reviewing this record, we discern no clear error or 
abuse of discretion in the court’s findings or analysis.  See In re Child 
of Shaina T., 2019 ME 107, ¶ 12, 211 A.3d 229. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mary Kellett Gray, Esq., Brooklin, for appellant mother 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
James C. Munch, III, Esq., Vafiades, Brountas & Kominsky, Bangor, for appellees 
paternal grandparents 
 
 
Ellsworth District Court docket number PC-2016-26 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY