Case Title: Suzanne Stoker v. Milwaukee County

Citation: 2014 WI 130

Docket Number: 2012AP002466

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 130 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2466 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Suzanne Stoker and Wisconsin Federation of 
Nurses and  
Health Professionals , Local 5001, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
Milwaukee County, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
Milwaukee County Pension Board, 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 352 Wis. 2d 125, 841 N.W.2d 532) 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2013 WI App 144 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 19, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 1, 2014 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
William S. Pocan 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.) 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Alan M. Levy and Lindner & Marsack, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Alan M. Levy. 
 
For 
the 
defendant-co-appellant-petitioner, 
there 
were 
briefs by Beth Ermatinger Hanan and Gass Weber Mullins LLC, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Beth Ermatinger Hanan. 
 
 
 
2 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there was a brief by 
Jeffrey P. Sweetland and Hawks Quindel, S.C., Milwaukee. Oral 
argument by Jeffrey P. Sweetland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 WI 130
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP2466 
(L.C. No. 
11CV18550) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Suzanne Stoker and Wisconsin Federation of 
Nurses and Health Professionals, Local 5001, 
AFT, AFL-CIO,   
 
 
Plaintiffs-Respondents,   
 
 
v. 
 
Milwaukee County,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner,   
 
Milwaukee County Pension Board,   
 
 
Defendant-Co-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
DEC 19, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.   Reversed 
and remanded.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court's2 order granting summary judgment 
                                                 
1 Stoker 
v. 
Milwaukee 
Cnty., 
2013 
WI 
App 
144, 
352 
Wis. 2d 125, 841 N.W.2d 532. 
2 The Honorable William S. Pocan presided. 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
2 
 
and 
declaratory 
and 
injunctive 
relief 
to 
Suzanne 
Stoker 
("Stoker")3 and her labor union, the Wisconsin Federation of 
Nurses and Health Professionals, Local 5001, AFT, AFL–CIO ("the 
Federation").  The suit was filed against the respondents, 
Milwaukee County and the Milwaukee County Pension Board ("the 
Pension Board").  We reverse and remand this matter to the 
circuit court to dismiss the complaint. 
¶2 
Milwaukee County calculates pension payments for its 
retired employees by multiplying a retiree's final average 
salary4 by a certain percentage known as a multiplier, and the 
resulting number is then multiplied by the retiree's total years 
of county service.  When Stoker's county service began, a 1.5% 
multiplier applied to her service.  In 2000 Milwaukee County 
                                                 
3 Stoker filed this suit on behalf of all similarly situated 
Milwaukee County employees. References to Stoker will refer to 
this class of employees unless the context clearly indicates 
otherwise. 
4 Milwaukee County, Wis. General Ordinance ("M.C.G.O.") 
§ 201.24(2.8) (2000) provides in relevant part:  
Final average salary for a member whose continuous 
membership began after January 1, 1982, means the 
average annual earnable compensation for the five (5) 
consecutive years of service during which the member's 
earnable compensation was the highest, or, if he 
should have less than five (5) years of service, then 
his average annual earnable compensation during such 
period of service. However, when a member is employed 
by the state but paid partly by the county, his final 
average 
salary 
with 
respect 
to 
any 
period 
of 
employment solely by the county shall be the average 
earnable compensation for the three (3) or five (5) 
consecutive years respectively of such service during 
which his earnable compensation was the highest. 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
3 
 
passed an ordinance that increased the multiplier from 1.5% to 
2% for service rendered on and after January 1, 2001.  Milwaukee 
County, Wis. General Ordinance ("M.C.G.O.") § 201.24(5.15)(1)(a) 
(2000).5  In 2011, consistent with the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement with the Federation, Milwaukee County 
passed an ordinance that reduced the multiplier from 2% to 1.6% 
for all county service performed on and after January 1, 2012, 
the 
effective 
date 
of 
the 
ordinance. 
 
M.C.G.O. 
§ 201.24(5.1)(2)(f) (2011).  The 2% multiplier continued to 
apply to service rendered by Stoker from 2001 through 2011.  
¶3 
Stoker argues that this reduction of the multiplier is 
a breach of contract because she had a vested right to have the 
2% multiplier apply to her post-2011 county service and because 
she did not personally consent to the reduction. Milwaukee 
County and the Pension Board argue that the reduction is 
authorized because Stoker had no vested right to have the 2% 
multiplier apply to her post-2011 county service. The Pension 
Board further argues that even if she had such a right, the 
Federation lawfully consented to the reduction on Stoker's 
behalf by ratifying the collective bargaining agreement that 
agreed to reduce the multiplier from 2% to 1.6% for post-2011 
service. 
                                                 
5 Technically, this ordinance provided a 0.5% multiplier in 
addition to the 1.5% multiplier that applied under M.C.G.O. 
§ 201.24(5.1).  Thus, these two ordinances combined provided a 
2% multiplier. 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
4 
 
¶4 
We conclude that Milwaukee County did not breach the 
contract with Stoker when it amended the pension multiplier from 
2% to 1.6%.  The amendment did not breach Stoker's contractual 
right to retirement system benefits earned and vested because it 
had prospective-only application to future service credits not 
yet earned, specifically, on and after January 1, 2012.  We 
conclude that the legislature preserved Stoker's rights and 
benefits already accrued but also gave Milwaukee County home 
rule authority with the flexibility to enact such prospective-
only changes.  We conclude that Stoker does not have a vested 
right to have the 2% multiplier apply to her then-unearned post-
2011 service.  In other words, Milwaukee County could so amend 
the formula and apply it prospectively because that prospective 
application does not "diminish or impair" benefits accrued from 
service credits already earned.  Because we conclude that 
Milwaukee County did have the ability to make these prospective-
only reductions of the multiplier without Stoker's personal 
consent, we need not address whether the Federation lawfully 
consented, on Stoker's behalf, to the reduction.  
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶5 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  In 1937 the 
legislature required counties with populations of 500,000 or 
more to develop retirement systems for their employees.  Ch. 
201, Laws of 1937.6  Pursuant to this law, the Milwaukee County 
                                                 
6 Section 1 of ch. 201, Laws of 1937 provided: 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
5 
 
Employees' Retirement System ("MCERS") was created on January 1, 
1938.  On May 14, 1945, the legislature required employee 
benefits under MCERS to "be assured by benefit contracts."  Ch. 
138, Laws of 1945.7  The legislature also provided that "each 
                                                                                                                                                             
RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM 
IN 
POPULOUS 
COUNTIES; 
DEFINITIONS.  In each county having a population of 
five hundred thousand or more a retirement system 
shall be established and maintained for the payment of 
benefits to the employes of such county and to the 
widows and children of such employes, except employes 
who 
are 
contributory 
to, 
participants 
in, 
or 
beneficiaries of a pension fund in operation in the 
state, or any municipal subdivision thereof.  The 
funds of the retirement system shall be derived, 
administered and disbursed in accordance with the 
provisions of this act.  Except where the context 
plainly requires a different meaning, the following 
words 
and 
phrases 
shall 
have 
the 
following 
meanings: . . . . 
7 Chapter 138, Laws of 1945, provided in pertinent part: 
Chapter 201, Laws of 1937, section 13a is created 
to read: 
(Chapter 201, Laws of 1937)  Section 13a (1) 
LEGISLATIVE POLICY.  Employes have been attracted to 
and have remained in the public service in counties of 
more than 500,000 population despite the prevailing 
higher wages in other employments because of the 
deferred compensation for their services promised to 
them in the form of retirement annuities and death 
benefits in the retirement system to which they have 
been admitted as contributing members.  The purpose of 
this act is to strengthen the public service in the 
most populous counties of the state by establishing 
the security of such retirement and death benefits. 
(2) CONTRACTS TO ASSURE BENEFITS.  The benefits 
of members, whether employes in service or retired as 
beneficiaries, 
and 
of 
beneficiaries 
of 
deceased 
members in the retirement system created by chapter 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
6 
 
[MCERS] member and beneficiary having such a benefit contract 
shall have a vested right to such annuities and other benefits 
and they shall not be diminished or impaired by subsequent 
legislation or by any other means without his consent."  Id.  
The legislature further provided that each MCERS member has a 
                                                                                                                                                             
201, laws of 1937, as amended, shall be assured by 
benefit contracts as herein provided: 
(a) Every such member and beneficiary shall be 
deemed to have accepted the provisions of this act and 
shall 
thereby 
have 
a 
benefit 
contract 
in 
said 
retirement system of which he is such member or 
beneficiary as of the effective date of this act 
unless, within a period of 30 days thereafter, he 
files with the board administering the system a 
written notice electing that this act shall not apply 
to him.  The annuities and all other benefits in the 
amounts and upon the terms and conditions and in all 
other respects as provided in the law under which the 
system was established as such law is amended and in 
effect on the effective date of this act shall be 
obligations of such benefit contract on the part of 
the county and of the board administering the system 
and each member and beneficiary having such a benefit 
contract shall have a vested right to such annuities 
and other benefits and they shall not be diminished or 
impaired by subsequent legislation or by any other 
means without his consent. 
. . .  
(c) Every future entrant who shall become a 
member of this retirement system [MCERS] after the 
effective date of this act shall have a similar 
benefit contract and vested right in the annuities and 
all other benefits in the amounts and on the terms and 
conditions and in all other respects as provided in 
the 
law 
under 
which 
the 
retirement 
system 
was 
established as such law shall have been amended and be 
in 
effect 
at 
the 
date 
of 
commencement 
of 
his 
membership [in MCERS].   
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
7 
 
"vested right in the annuities and all other benefits in the 
amounts and on the terms and conditions and in all other 
respects as provided in the law under which [MCERS] was 
established as such law shall have been amended and be in effect 
at the date of commencement of his membership [in MCERS]."  Id. 
¶6 
In 1957 the legislature provided that a member of 
MCERS has a "vested right . . . to all increases in benefits 
covered by amendments subsequent to the date his membership [in 
MCERS] is effective."  § 6, ch. 326, Laws of 1957.   
¶7 
In 1965 the legislature granted "home rule" authority 
to Milwaukee County over MCERS.  § 1, ch. 405, Laws of 1965.8  
                                                 
8 Section 1 of ch. 405, Laws of 1965 provided in relevant 
part: 
Chapter 155, laws of 1937, section 59.137 is 
created to read:  
(Chapter 155, laws of 1937)  59.137 PENSION STUDY 
COMMISSION.  (1) For the purpose of best protecting 
the 
employes 
subject 
to 
this 
act 
by 
granting 
supervisory authority over each benefit fund created 
hereunder to the governmental unit most involved 
therewith, it is declared to be the legislative policy 
that the future operation of each such benefit fund is 
a matter of local affair and government and shall not 
be construed to be a matter of state-wide concern.  
Each county which is required to establish and 
maintain a benefit fund pursuant to this act is hereby 
empowered by county ordinance, to make any changes in 
such benefit fund which hereafter may be deemed 
necessary or desirable for the continued operation of 
such benefit fund, but no such change shall operate to 
diminish or impair the annuities, benefits or other 
rights of any person who is a member of such benefit 
fund prior to the effective date of any such change. 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
8 
 
This session law provided that "the future operation of each 
[county] benefit fund is a matter of local affair and government 
and shall not be construed to be a matter of state-wide 
concern."  Id.  This law empowered Milwaukee County "to make any 
changes in [its employee] benefit fund which hereafter may be 
deemed necessary or desirable for the continued operation of 
[MCERS]."  Id.  However, "no such change shall operate to 
diminish or impair the annuities, benefits or other rights of 
any person who is a member of [MCERS] prior to the effective 
date of any such change."  Id. 
¶8 
On or about December 17, 1981, Milwaukee County passed 
an ordinance that applied a 1.5% pension benefit multiplier to 
county service performed by an employee whose employment with 
the County began after January 1, 1982.  M.C.G.O. § 201.24(5.1) 
(1981).9  Thus, under this ordinance, the pension payments for an 
employee whose employment with the County began after January 1, 
1982, were calculated by multiplying 1.5% by the employee's 
final average salary, and the resulting number was multiplied by 
the employee's total years of service with Milwaukee County.  
Id.  
                                                 
9 This ordinance provided in relevant part: "A [MCERS] 
member . . . other than a deputy sheriff or elected official, 
whose continuous membership began after January 1, 1982, who 
meets the requirements for a normal pension shall receive an 
amount equal to one and one-half (1 1/2) percent of his final 
average salary multiplied by the number of his years of 
service . . . ." 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
9 
 
¶9 
On or about April 13, 1982, Stoker began employment 
with Milwaukee County and thereby became a member of MCERS. 
Stoker was a Milwaukee County employee and MCERS member 
continuously since then and still was both when this lawsuit was 
filed.  
¶10 On or about November 2, 2000, Milwaukee County 
increased the pension multiplier to 2% for county employees, 
effective January 1, 2001.  M.C.G.O. § 201.24(5.15) (2000).  
This 2% multiplier applied to "all pension service credit earned 
on and after January 1, 2001."  Id.  This 2% multiplier also 
applied retroactively to eight years of service prior to 
January 1, 2001, for each year of service performed after that 
date.  
¶11 In 
approximately 
May 
2011, 
the 
Federation 
and 
Milwaukee County negotiated the terms of a collective bargaining 
agreement for January 1, 2012, through December 1, 2012.  Under 
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, a pension 
multiplier of 1.6% would apply to "all pension service credit 
earned on and after January 1, 2012."  On or about May 23, 2011, 
the Federation ratified the collective bargaining agreement.  On 
or about June 23, 2011, Milwaukee County approved the collective 
bargaining agreement. On or about July 28, 2011, Milwaukee 
County implemented the collective bargaining agreement by 
adopting an ordinance, which provided that a 1.6% pension 
multiplier would apply to "service . . . rendered on and after 
January 1, 2012."  M.C.G.O. § 201.24(5.1)(2)(f) (2011).  This 
ordinance is the subject of this lawsuit. 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
10 
 
¶12 By virtue of the ordinance adopted in 2000, the 2% 
multiplier applied to all of Stoker's county service through 
December 31, 2011.  The ordinance at issue changed the 
multiplier to 1.6% only with respect to Stoker's future, 
unearned service rendered on and after January 1, 2012.  To be 
clear, the ordinance at issue did not affect the 2% multiplier 
that applied to Stoker's vested retirement benefits earned 
through December 31, 2011.  
II. 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶13 On December 16, 2011, Stoker and the Federation filed 
suit in circuit court against Milwaukee County and the Pension 
Board. Stoker sought relief declaring that the 2011 ordinance 
that reduced the pension multiplier from 2% to 1.6% with respect 
to post-2011 county service is invalid. Stoker also sought 
injunctive relief requiring Milwaukee County and the Pension 
Board to apply the 2% multiplier to Stoker's county service 
performed on and after January 1, 2012, the effective date of 
the ordinance. Stoker argued that the 2011 ordinance was a 
breach of contract.10 Stoker, Milwaukee County, and the Pension 
Board filed motions for summary judgment. 
¶14 On July 11, 2012, the circuit court granted Stoker's 
motion for summary judgment.  The circuit court reasoned that, 
                                                 
10 Stoker also argued that the 2011 ordinance was an 
impairment of contract and an uncompensated taking of property 
in violation of Article I, Sections 12 and 13 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Stoker later abandoned these arguments, which are 
not before this court. 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
11 
 
under ch. 138 of the Laws of 1945, Stoker had a vested 
contractual right to retirement benefits since her employment 
with Milwaukee County began.  According to the circuit court, 
this right includes the 2% multiplier.  
¶15 Milwaukee County and the Pension Board appealed.  On 
November 14, 2013, the court of appeals affirmed.   
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶16 We independently review whether the circuit court 
correctly granted summary judgment to Stoker.  Tatera v. FMC 
Corp., 2010 WI 90, ¶15, 328 Wis. 2d 320, 786 N.W.2d 810 (citing 
Racine Cnty. v. Oracular Milwaukee, Inc., 2010 WI 25, ¶24, 323 
Wis. 2d 682, 781 N.W.2d 88).  Summary judgment "shall be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) (2011-
12).11 
¶17 This case requires us to interpret county ordinances 
and session laws. The rules for statutory interpretation apply 
to our interpretation of an ordinance.  Marris v. City of 
Cedarburg, 176 Wis. 2d 14, 32, 498 N.W.2d 842 (1993) (citing 
Cnty. of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 169 n.7, 288 
N.W.2d 129 (1980)). 
                                                 
11 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
12 
 
¶18 "Statutory interpretation is a question of law that 
this court reviews de novo while benefiting from the lower 
courts' analyses."  Noffke ex rel. Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, 
¶9, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156 (citing Megal Dev. Corp. v. 
Shadof, 2005 WI 151, ¶8, 286 Wis. 2d 105, 705 N.W.2d 645). 
"[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the 
statute.  If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily 
stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for 
Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 
(citations omitted).  We give statutory language "its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or 
special definitional meaning."  Id. (citing Bruno v. Milwaukee 
Cnty., 2003 WI 28, ¶¶8, 20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656; 
Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1)).  We interpret statutory language in the 
context of the statute in which it is used and in relation to 
closely-related statutes.  Id., ¶46 (citations omitted).  We 
interpret statutes to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.  Id. 
(citations omitted).  If the statutory language is unambiguous, 
we do not consult extrinsic sources of interpretation, such as 
legislative history.  Id. (citations omitted). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
¶19 Stoker argues that the Milwaukee County ordinance that 
reduced the pension multiplier from 2% to 1.6% for post-2011 
service does not apply to her because the County is barred from 
making such prospective-only reductions to her vested retirement 
benefits without her personal consent.  Stoker relies heavily on 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
13 
 
the session laws from 1945, 1957, and 1965 to support her 
argument.  In short, she argues that she is entitled to the most 
favorable pension formula available during her employment.  
Stoker asserts that when the County amended the formula to 
reduce the multiplier from 2% to 1.6% for unearned benefits, it 
served to "diminish or impair" her vested benefits. 
¶20 Milwaukee County argues that the legislature has 
endowed it with home rule authority to enact prospective changes 
in the Milwaukee retirement system.  The County argues that the 
pension formula reduction and its prospective-only application 
did not "diminish or impair" benefits already accrued for 
pension service credits earned.  The County contends that the 
change does not "diminish or impair" Stoker's benefits because 
any potential future benefit, due to future service, is not 
vested until earned.  The County asserts that under its home 
rule authority, it has the authority to amend its unvested 
pension plans with prospective-only application.    
¶21 Because Milwaukee County reduced the multiplier only 
prospectively, we first determine whether the County has the 
legal right to reduce employee benefits on a prospective-only 
basis.  We next determine whether Stoker has a vested right to 
have the 2% multiplier apply to her post-2011 service.  Because 
we conclude that Milwaukee County may prospectively reduce 
unvested employee benefits and that Stoker has no vested right 
to have the 2% multiplier apply to her post-2011 service, we do 
not consider whether the Federation may consent on Stoker's 
behalf to a prospective reduction of her vested benefits. 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
14 
 
 
A. Whether Milwaukee County May Prospectively  
Reduce an Employee Benefit 
¶22 To 
determine 
whether 
Milwaukee 
County 
may 
prospectively modify unvested benefits, we turn to the session 
laws that govern MCERS.  Chapter 138 of the Laws of 1945 
provides that every member of MCERS has a "vested right in the 
annuities and all other benefits in the amounts and on the terms 
and conditions . . . in effect at the date of commencement of 
his membership [in MCERS]."  Similarly, ch. 326 of the Laws of 
1957 provides each MCERS member with a "vested right . . . to 
all increases in benefits covered by amendments subsequent to 
the date his membership is effective."  However, ch. 405 of the 
Laws of 1965 gives to Milwaukee County home rule authority "to 
make any changes in [its employee] benefit fund which hereafter 
may be deemed necessary or desirable for the continued operation 
of [MCERS]."  Stoker notes that ch. 405 expressly limits this 
home rule authority by stating that "no such change shall 
operate to diminish or impair the annuities, benefits or other 
rights of any person who is a member of [MCERS] prior to the 
effective date of any such change."  
¶23 Stoker interprets ch. 405 of the Laws of 1965 to allow 
Milwaukee County to reduce benefits only with respect to persons 
who began employment with Milwaukee County after the reduction 
takes effect.  Stoker reaches this interpretation by invoking 
the canon of statutory construction known as the rule of the 
last antecedent, arguing that "prior to the effective date of 
any such change" modifies "who is a member" rather than 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
15 
 
"annuities, benefits or other rights."  Stoker thus argues that 
ch. 405 forbids Milwaukee County from reducing a benefit of a 
person whose county employment began prior to the effective date 
of the reduction.  We disagree.  
¶24 The principle of interpreting statutes to avoid 
unreasonable or absurd results is more compelling in this 
instance than the rule of the last antecedent.  See Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 
84, 94 (2001) (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 
U.S. 105, 115 (2001)) (holding that canons of construction "'are 
often countered . . . by some maxim pointing in a different 
direction.'").  Stoker's interpretation of ch. 405 of the Laws 
of 1965 would prohibit Milwaukee County from reducing a current 
employee's expected, future benefits before they vest.  That 
interpretation is unreasonable because a right that is unvested, 
by definition, can be taken away.  See Black's Law Dictionary 
1520 (10th ed. 2014) (A "vested right" is a "right that so 
completely and definitely belongs to a person that it cannot be 
impaired or taken away without the person's consent."); Neiman 
v. Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. Co., 2000 WI 83, ¶14, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 
613 N.W.2d 160 ("The concept of vested rights is 'conclusory——a 
right is vested when it has been so far perfected that it cannot 
be taken away by statute.'") (quoting Charles B. Hochman, The 
Supreme 
Court 
and 
the 
Constitutionality 
of 
Retroactive 
Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1960)).  We therefore 
conclude that ch. 405's limit on Milwaukee County's home rule 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
16 
 
authority allows Milwaukee County to reduce a benefit that has 
not vested prior to the effective date of the reduction.  
¶25 Indeed, Stoker seems to recognize that ch. 405's grant 
of home rule authority allows Milwaukee County to reduce a 
current employee's expected, future benefits before they vest.  
Specifically, Stoker argues that ch. 405 does not allow 
Milwaukee County to reduce the 2% multiplier with respect to her 
post-2011 service because her "right to the use of the 2% 
multiplier as to future as well as past service was already 'in 
existence'" when the multiplier was reduced.  Thus, Stoker's 
logic seems to acknowledge that ch. 405 would allow a 
prospective reduction of the 2% multiplier if she did not have a 
vested right to have the 2% multiplier apply to her post-2011 
service.  
¶26 Because Milwaukee County may prospectively reduce 
benefits before they vest, our analysis turns on whether Stoker 
has a vested right to the 2% multiplier for post-2011 service. 
 
B. Whether Stoker Has a Vested Right to Have the 2% Multiplier 
Apply to Her Post-2011 Service for Milwaukee County 
¶27 Having determined that the home rule authority in ch. 
405 of the Laws of 1965 allows Milwaukee County to prospectively 
reduce benefits before they vest, we now determine whether 
Stoker has a vested right to have the 2% multiplier apply to her 
post-2011 service.  
¶28 An employee benefit may be modified before it vests.  
Loth v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 129, ¶¶33-43, 315 Wis. 2d 35, 
758 N.W.2d 766.  In Loth, prior to 2004, the City of Milwaukee 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
17 
 
offered premium-free health insurance to its employees that 
reached age 60, were employed by the city for at least 15 years, 
and retired. Id., ¶2.  In 2002 the city amended this retirement 
benefit to provide shared-premium-cost health insurance to 
anyone who reached age 60, was employed by the city for at least 
15 years, and retired after January 1, 2004.  Id.  Loth had 15 
years of city service in 1999, and in 2005 he reached age 60 and 
retired.  Id.  When Loth received shared-premium-cost health 
insurance after retiring, he sued the city, arguing that he was 
entitled to premium-free health insurance.  Id., ¶3.  He 
reasoned that he reached 15 years of service when the premium-
free health insurance retirement benefit was in effect, and that 
reaching 15 years of city service was the only requirement for 
becoming entitled to this benefit.  Id.  
¶29 We upheld the city's modification of the retiree 
health insurance benefit with respect to Loth.  Id., ¶¶6-7.  We 
determined that the city made a unilateral contract offer of 
premium-free retiree health insurance benefits, and that the 
city modified the benefits before Loth became entitled to them 
by accepting the offer.  Id., ¶¶6, 14.  We focused on the terms 
and conditions of the benefits to determine how they could be 
accepted by an employee and thus become an entitlement.  Id., 
¶31.  According to the terms and conditions of the city's health 
insurance benefits for retirees, the benefits were accepted and 
became 
an 
entitlement 
when 
an 
employee 
fulfilled 
three 
requirements: being employed by the city for 15 years, reaching 
age 60, and retiring.  Id., ¶¶6, 16-29.  Because Loth did not 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
18 
 
"perform the requested acts" of reaching age 60 and retiring 
while the premium-free health insurance benefit was in effect, 
id., ¶14, he had no contractual right to this benefit.  Id., ¶6; 
see also id., ¶39 (Loth had no right to premium-free health 
insurance upon retirement because "he had not fully performed 
the services entitling him to such benefits when the City 
amended [its] policy . . . .").  We distinguished cases that 
rejected employers' attempts to reduce their employees' benefits 
after they vested.  Id., ¶¶32-46.  Thus, Loth stands for the 
principle that an employer may modify a benefit that has not 
vested because its terms and conditions for entitlement have not 
been satisfied. 
¶30 To determine whether Milwaukee County reduced a vested 
benefit of Stoker, we focus on the terms and conditions of the 
multiplier.  See id., ¶31; see also ch. 138, Laws of 1945 
(stating that MCERS members have a vested right to benefits on 
the "terms and conditions" of the benefits).  The terms and 
conditions of the 2% multiplier are located in Milwaukee County 
ordinances and the collective bargaining agreement.  The 
ordinance that created the 2% multiplier stated that the 2% 
multiplier applied to "all pension service credit earned on and 
after January 1, 2001."  M.C.G.O. § 201.24(5.15)(1)(a) (2000).12  
Pension credit service is earned by rendering service for 
Milwaukee County.  M.C.G.O. App. B. § 301 (1980).  The ordinance 
                                                 
12 This ordinance created a 2% multiplier by adding 0.5% to 
the existing 1.5% multiplier.  See supra note 5. 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
19 
 
at 
issue 
provided 
that 
the 
1.6% 
multiplier 
applied 
to 
"service . . . rendered on and after January 1, 2012."  M.C.G.O. 
§ 201.24(5.1)(2)(f) (2011).  Likewise, the collective bargaining 
agreement adopted in 2011 provided that a 1.6% multiplier would 
apply to "all pension service credit earned on and after 
January 1, 2012."  The plain language of these ordinances and 
the collective bargaining agreement shows that the multiplier 
accrues over time as county service is rendered, and the 
multiplier is directly tied to that service.  Because the 
multiplier accrues as service is rendered, the home rule power 
in ch. 405 of the Laws of 1965 allows Milwaukee County to reduce 
the multiplier with respect to Stoker's service rendered after 
the effective date of the reduction.  
¶31 Other case law also supports our conclusions that the 
multiplier accrues over time as service is rendered and that, 
therefore, Milwaukee County may reduce the multiplier with 
respect to service rendered after the reduction takes effect.  
In Loth we discussed the court of appeals' decision in Champine 
v. Milwaukee County, 2005 WI App 75, 280 Wis. 2d 603, 696 
N.W.2d 245.  Loth, 315 Wis. 2d 35, ¶¶44-46.  We noted that the 
court of appeals in Champine held that a "payout for accrued 
sick leave represents a benefit that is 'earned as the work is 
performed.'  An employee accrues sick allowance (and may earn 
the right to receive payout for the accrued sick allowance) 
gradually as the employee performs his or her work."  Id., ¶46. 
¶32 In Champine, prior to 2000, Milwaukee County allowed 
its 
non-union 
employees 
to 
receive 
the 
cash 
value 
of 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
20 
 
approximately 400 hours of their unused sick leave upon 
retirement.  Champine, 280 Wis. 2d 603, ¶¶2-3.  In 2000 
Milwaukee County adopted an ordinance that allowed its non-union 
employees to receive the cash value of all of their unused sick 
leave upon retirement.  Id.  This ordinance did not have a start 
date or end date.  Id., ¶2.  In February 2002 Milwaukee County 
adopted an ordinance that limited non-union employees' sick-
leave payout at retirement to approximately 400 hours of unused 
sick leave, effectively reinstating the limit in place prior to 
2000.  Id., ¶6.  This February 2002 ordinance took effect on 
March 15, 2002.  Id.  
¶33 The court of appeals held that the 2002 ordinance 
lawfully limited the sick-leave payout benefit with respect to 
sick leave that accrued after the limit took effect.  Id., ¶¶15-
17. 
 
Specifically, 
the 
court 
held 
that 
the 
ordinance's 
prospective reduction of the sick-leave payout benefit did not 
breach a contract with the non-union employees.  Id., ¶14.  
However, the court held that non-union employees who retired 
after the effective date of the 2002 ordinance were entitled to 
receive a retirement payout of all of the sick leave that they 
accrued prior to the effective date of the 2002 ordinance.  Id., 
¶¶15-17.  The court reasoned that the sick-leave payout benefit 
is "a form of deferred compensation that is earned as the work 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
21 
 
is performed.  The benefit can be changed, but only as it is 
related to work not yet performed."  Id., ¶16.13 
¶34 In Pasko v. Milwaukee County, 2013 WI App 91, 349 
Wis. 2d 444, 836 N.W.2d 461, two Milwaukee County retirees sued 
the County for paying them the cash value of approximately 400 
hours of unused sick leave upon retirement.  The two plaintiffs 
had been union members while Milwaukee County employees, and 
their union contracts provided that upon retirement they would 
receive a cash payout of all of their unused sick leave.  Pasko, 
349 Wis. 2d 444, ¶6.  Before retiring, the plaintiffs were 
promoted to non-union managerial positions, thus subjecting them 
to the Milwaukee County ordinance adopted in February 2002, 
which limited the sick-leave payout upon retirement for non-
                                                 
13 Stoker argues that Champine is distinguishable because 
the court of appeals stated that "in the absence of a collective 
bargaining agreement or employment contract, [Milwaukee County] 
should not be bound to continue providing a benefit it now 
regrets offering."  Champine v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2005 WI App 75, 
¶19, 280 Wis. 2d 603, 696 N.W.2d 245.  Stoker interprets this 
language to mean that Champine involved neither a collective 
bargaining agreement nor a contract, unlike the present case.  
To the contrary, the court of appeals explained that the 2000 
ordinance, which provided a right to a payout of all unused sick 
leave upon retirement, was a contract while it was in effect.  
Id., ¶14.  This quoted language simply meant that the 2000 
ordinance did not provide a vested right to the sick-leave 
payout with respect to future service.  In any event, in a 
nearly identical case that involved union contracts with 
Milwaukee County, the court of appeals reached the same 
conclusion as it did in Champine.  See Pasko v. Milwaukee Cnty., 
2013 WI App 91, ¶¶9-14, 349 Wis. 2d 444, 836 N.W.2d 461.  Thus, 
the fact that Champine did not involve union contracts or 
collective 
bargaining 
agreements 
is 
not 
a 
meaningful 
distinction. 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
22 
 
union employees to approximately 400 hours of unused sick leave.  
Id., ¶¶3-6.  This ordinance was at issue in Champine.  Id., ¶5.  
Because the plaintiffs retired as non-union employees, Milwaukee 
County argued that, under the 2002 ordinance, they were entitled 
to a payout of only approximately 400 hours of unused sick 
leave.  Id., ¶¶6, 9.  
¶35 The court of appeals held that the plaintiffs were 
entitled to a payout upon retirement of all of the unused sick 
leave that they accrued while they were covered by union 
contracts with Milwaukee County.  Id., ¶13.  Under the union 
contracts, the sick-leave hours that the plaintiffs accrued 
while they were union members "vested as they were earned."  
Id., ¶¶9-13.  Thus, the "vesting trigger" of sick leave was the 
"day-by-day accrual" of sick leave.  Id., ¶12.  The court noted 
that Milwaukee County could have used, but did not use, a 
different vesting trigger in its union contracts so as to 
preserve its ability to retroactively reduce the amount it was 
required to pay retirees for sick leave already accrued.  Id.  
¶36 In Valeo v. J. I. Case Co., 18 Wis. 2d 578, 119 
N.W.2d 384 (1963), a collective bargaining agreement provided 
that employees were eligible for a certain amount of vacation 
pay annually and that the right to vacation pay began accruing 
each year on June 1.  Valeo, 18 Wis. 2d at 579.  The employer 
terminated the collective bargaining agreement on February 29, 
1960, three months before June 1.  Id.  A strike ensued and 
lasted until a new collective bargaining agreement was signed on 
September 19, 1960.  Id. at 579-80.  The employer denied its 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
23 
 
employees any vacation pay for the period of June 1, 1959, 
through February 29, 1960, arguing that the right to vacation 
pay did not vest until June 1 and that the collective bargaining 
agreement was terminated before June 1.  Id. at 580.  An 
employee sued the employer, arguing that he was entitled to 
vacation pay that accrued during the nine months from June 1, 
1959, through February 29, 1960.  Id. at 580, 583.  This court 
held that the employee had a vested right to the vacation pay 
that "accrued as services were performed" for the employer 
during these nine months.  Id. at 585.  The court reasoned that 
"the 
nature 
of 
vacation 
pay 
[is] 
compensation 
for 
work 
performed," and the collective bargaining agreement did not 
provide that the right to vacation pay vested based on something 
besides service rendered.  Id. 
¶37 Champine, Pasko, and Valeo show that certain employee 
benefits, by their nature, accrue as service is rendered unless 
a contract or law states otherwise. In the present case, "the 
nature" of the pension multiplier is "compensation for work 
performed."  See id.  As we already explained, the relevant 
Milwaukee County ordinances and the collective bargaining 
agreement expressly state that the multiplier accrues as service 
is rendered.  See M.C.G.O. §§ 201.24(5.15) (2000), App. B. 301 
(1980), 201.24(5.1)(2)(f) (2011).  If Milwaukee County wanted to 
make the 2% multiplier vest immediately when enacted with 
respect to all future service, it could have used a "vesting 
trigger" besides "day-by-day accrual," but "[i]t did not."  See 
Pasko, 349 Wis. 2d 444, ¶12.  Thus, the language of the 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
24 
 
ordinances and collective bargaining agreement and the nature of 
the multiplier show that the multiplier, like vacation pay and 
sick leave, accrues over time as service is rendered. 
¶38 Because 
the 
multiplier 
is 
"a 
form 
of 
deferred 
compensation that is earned as the work is performed," it "can 
be changed, but only as it is related to work not yet 
performed."  See Champine, 280 Wis. 2d 603, ¶16. See also  
Wisconsin Prof'l Police Ass'n v. Lightbourn, 2001 WI 59, ¶¶111-
12, 243 Wis. 2d 512, 627 N.W.2d 807 (holding that statute 
governing 
Wisconsin 
Retirement 
System, 
which 
stated 
that 
benefits accrued as service is rendered, allows reduction of 
benefits 
with 
respect 
to 
service 
performed 
after 
the 
reduction).14   
                                                 
14 The statute in Lightbourn provided in relevant part:  
Rights exercised and benefits accrued to an 
employee under this chapter for service rendered shall 
be due as a contractual right and shall not be 
abrogated by any subsequent legislative act.  The 
right of the state to amend or repeal, by enactment of 
statutory changes, all or any part of this chapter at 
any time, however, is reserved by the state and there 
shall be no right to further accrual of benefits nor 
to future exercise of rights for service rendered 
after the effective date of any amendment or repeal 
deleting the statutory authorization for the benefits 
or rights. 
(continued) 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
25 
 
¶39 Loth, Champine, Pasko, and Valeo show that Stoker's 
reliance on ch. 138 of the Laws of 1945, ch. 326 of the Laws of 
1957, and ch. 405 of the Laws of 1965 is misplaced.  These 
chapters state that MCERS members shall have a benefits contract 
that protects their vested rights, but these chapters do not 
explain whether the 2% multiplier is a vested right with respect 
to future service.  Indeed, these chapters do not mention this 
multiplier at all.15  As we explained, the relevant Milwaukee 
County ordinances, the collective bargaining agreement, and 
Loth, Champine, Pasko, and Valeo show that Stoker did not have a 
vested right to have the 2% multiplier apply to her post-2011 
service. 
¶40 We note that our conclusion that Milwaukee County may 
prospectively modify benefits before they vest is consistent 
with the anti-cutback rule of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act ("ERISA") of 1974.16  The anti-cutback rule allows 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis. Stat. § 40.19(1) (1997-98).  Stoker argues that Lightbourn 
is not helpful in the present case because, unlike Wis. Stat. 
§ 40.19(1), the session laws governing MCERS do not state that 
benefits accrue as service is rendered or allow prospective 
reductions of benefits.  However, the relevant Milwaukee County 
ordinances and collective bargaining agreement state that the 
pension multiplier accrues as service is rendered, and ch. 405 
of the Laws of 1965 allows prospective reduction of unvested 
benefits.  Thus, we find helpful the Lightbourn court's 
conclusion that a benefit that accrues as service is rendered 
may be prospectively reduced. 
15 Section 1 of ch. 326, Laws of 1957 mentions a multiplier, 
but Stoker does not argue that this multiplier is relevant in 
the present case.  
16 See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g). 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
26 
 
employers subject to ERISA to modify benefits with respect to 
future service because those benefits have not yet accrued.  
Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 747 (2004).  
The anti-cutback rule prohibits employers subject to ERISA from 
adding new conditions to benefits that have accrued for service 
rendered.  Id.  Stoker argues that Milwaukee County may go 
beyond the protections under the anti-cutback rule by providing 
benefits that vest before service is rendered.  However, as we 
have explained, the relevant Milwaukee County ordinances and 
collective bargaining agreement show that the multiplier is a 
benefit that accrues for service rendered.  
¶41  Similarly, Stoker's reliance on Welter v. City of 
Milwaukee, 214 Wis. 2d 485, 571 N.W.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1997), and 
Rehrauer v. City of Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 151, 246 Wis. 2d 863, 
631 N.W.2d 644, is also misplaced.  In Welter the City of 
Milwaukee provided a duty disability retirement allowance to 
police officers who became disabled due to injuries suffered in 
the course of their employment.  Welter, 214 Wis. 2d at 487-88. 
At a certain age, known as the conversion age, an officer who 
was receiving a duty disability retirement allowance began 
receiving a less-generous service retirement allowance instead.  
Id. at 488.  The City of Milwaukee lowered the conversion age 
while the plaintiffs were employed as police officers.  Id.  The 
plaintiffs became disabled and received a duty disability 
retirement allowance that was converted to a service retirement 
allowance when they reached this lower conversion age.  Id.  The 
plaintiffs sued the city, arguing that they had a vested right 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
27 
 
to the higher conversion age that was in effect when they began 
employment with the City of Milwaukee.  Id.  The court of 
appeals agreed with the plaintiffs.  Id.  The court of appeals 
reasoned that an officer's right to a disability pension vests 
when the officer begins employment with the City of Milwaukee, 
rather than when the officer becomes disabled.  Id. at 494-95.  
The court held that two session laws governing the City of 
Milwaukee's retirement system dictated this result.  Id. 
¶42 Welter is inapposite in the present case.  Welter 
involved a right that vested when a person began employment.  In 
the present case, we already determined that Stoker accrues a 
right to the pension multiplier as she renders county service.  
Further, the multiplier in effect when Stoker began employment 
with Milwaukee County was 1.5%, and the multiplier has not been 
reduced below that level with respect to any of Stoker's past or 
future service.17  Although the court of appeals in Welter relied 
solely on two session laws to conclude that a disability pension 
vested when employment began, we think the better approach in 
the present case is to interpret the relevant ordinances to 
determine the extent to which the multiplier was a "vested" 
right within the meaning of the session laws governing MCERS.  
See Dunn v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2005 WI App 27, ¶¶2, 10-11, 13, 279 
Wis. 2d 370, 693 N.W.2d 82 (relying on relevant ordinance to 
                                                 
17 This fact also provides a basis for distinguishing ch. 
138 of the Laws of 1945, upon which Stoker heavily relies, 
because this chapter applies only to benefits in existence when 
a person's county employment began. 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
28 
 
determine if Milwaukee County employees had a vested right to 
future pay increases); 
Champine, 280 Wis. 2d 603, ¶¶13-14 
(relying on relevant ordinance to determine if Milwaukee County 
employees had a vested right to receive a cash payout for all of 
their unused sick leave upon retiring); Hussey v. Milwaukee 
Cnty., 740 F.3d 1139, 1143 (7th Cir. 2014) (relying on relevant 
ordinances to determine if Milwaukee County retirees had a 
vested right to premium-free health insurance).  Again, these 
ordinances provide that the multiplier accrues as service is 
rendered. 
¶43 In Rehrauer the plaintiffs began their employment as 
City of Milwaukee firefighters prior to February 8, 1972. 
Rehrauer, 246 Wis. 2d 863, ¶2.  When their employment began, the 
City of Milwaukee provided limited-term duty disability benefits 
to its firefighters who became disabled due to an injury 
suffered during the course of employment.  Id.  A contract in 
effect between February 8, 1972, and September 30, 1977, 
provided more-generous lifetime duty disability benefits.  Id., 
¶¶2, 7.  After September 30, 1977, the City of Milwaukee again 
offered limited-term duty disability benefits.  Id., ¶3 n.3.  
The 
plaintiffs 
applied 
for 
disability 
benefits 
after 
September 30, 1977, so the City of Milwaukee awarded them 
limited-term duty disability benefits in effect at that time.  
Id., ¶2.  The plaintiffs sued the city, arguing that they gained 
a vested contractual right to the lifetime duty disability 
benefits established during their employment.  Id., ¶5.  
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
29 
 
¶44 The court of appeals agreed with the firefighters.  
Id.  The court concluded that "the firefighters gained vested 
rights in the highest level of duty disability benefits that 
came to be contractually established during their years of 
active duty."  Id., ¶20.  The court reasoned that, "[u]nder 
§ 36-13-2-c of the Milwaukee City Charter, [the plaintiffs] have 
a 'vested right in the . . . benefits in the amounts and on the 
terms and conditions and in all other respects as provided in 
the law . . . in effect at the date of commencement of his [or 
her] membership and as subsequently amended.'"  Id., ¶16 
(emphasis added by court of appeals).  
¶45 Rehrauer is inapposite in the present case. In 
Rehrauer the court of appeals relied on an ordinance that 
expressly provided a vested right to an increase in benefits, 
and it also relied on the holding in Welter that disability 
benefits vest immediately rather than when an employee becomes 
disabled.  Id., ¶¶13-14, 16.  In contrast, the ordinances 
relevant in the present case do not state that MCERS members 
have a vested right to have an increased multiplier apply in 
perpetuity.  To the contrary, these ordinances provide that the 
multiplier accrues over time as service is rendered.  It is true 
that the ordinance relied upon in Rehrauer is similar to ch. 326 
of the Laws of 1957, which provides each MCERS member with a 
"vested right . . . to all increases in benefits covered by 
amendments subsequent to the date his membership is effective."  
However, as we already discussed, ch. 326 does not explain the 
precise nature of the "vested right" it mentions.  Because the 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
30 
 
multiplier vests over time as service is rendered, the "vested 
right" to which ch. 326 refers does not include a vested right 
to have the 2% multiplier apply in perpetuity.  Rather, the 
"vested right" to which ch. 326 refers includes the right to 
have the 2% multiplier apply to all service that is rendered 
while the 2% multiplier is in effect.  
¶46 Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Stoker's argument 
that Welter and Rehrauer apply in the present case because they 
involved session laws similar to the session laws that govern 
MCERS.  Disability benefits, unlike the pension multiplier, are 
a promise by an employer that is not conditioned on subsequent 
action by an employee, such as rendering service.  Instead, 
disability benefits are a promise to receive coverage for an 
unforeseen event that happens at some point in the future.  As 
we 
explained, 
we 
rely 
on 
the 
relevant 
Milwaukee 
County 
ordinances and the collective bargaining agreement to determine 
the extent to which the 2% multiplier is a vested right within 
the meaning of the session laws.  In light of these ordinances 
and the collective bargaining agreement, we conclude that Stoker 
does not have a vested right to have the 2% multiplier apply to 
her 
post-2011 
service, 
which 
she 
rendered 
after 
the 
2% 
multiplier was reduced to 1.6%.  Because Stoker did not have a 
vested right to have the 2% multiplier apply to her post-2011 
service, Milwaukee County was free to reduce the multiplier 
below 2% for her post-2011 service.  See Loth, 315 Wis. 2d 35, 
¶¶30-47. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
No. 
2012AP2466   
 
31 
 
¶47 We conclude that Milwaukee County did not breach the 
contract with Stoker when it amended the pension multiplier from 
2% to 1.6%.  The amendment did not breach Stoker's contractual 
right to retirement system benefits earned and vested because it 
had prospective-only application to future service credits not 
yet earned, specifically, on and after January 1, 2012.  We 
conclude that the legislature preserved Stoker's rights and 
benefits already accrued but also gave Milwaukee County home 
rule authority with the flexibility to enact such prospective-
only changes.  We conclude that Stoker does not have a vested 
right to have the 2% multiplier apply to her then-unearned post-
2011 service.  In other words, Milwaukee County could so amend 
the formula and apply it prospectively because that prospective 
application does not "diminish or impair" benefits accrued from 
service credits already earned.  Because we conclude that 
Milwaukee County did have the ability to make these prospective-
only reductions of the multiplier without Stoker's personal 
consent, we need not address whether the Federation lawfully 
consented, on Stoker's behalf, to the reduction. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and remanded. 
 
 
No.  2012AP2466.awb 
 
1 
 
¶48 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   Rather 
than 
addressing the session laws which provide a clear answer to our 
inquiry and dictate protection of the employees' benefits, the 
majority shifts the focus of its analysis to language in the 
Milwaukee County General Ordinance.  It is only by repeatedly 
ignoring the language of the governing session laws that the 
majority is able to conclude that the County may reduce the 
pension multiplier, thereby dealing a blow to the rights of the 
employees. 
¶49 I conclude instead, as did a unanimous court of 
appeals, that the session laws mean what they say: employees 
have a vested right to their benefits when they accept 
employment with the County and the County is not permitted to 
diminish or impair those benefits.  As such, the County was 
without authority to pass an ordinance reducing Stoker's pension 
multiplier.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.    
I 
¶50 The 
Milwaukee 
County 
Employee 
Retirement 
System 
[MCERS] was created by the legislature in chapter 138 of the 
Laws of 1945.  That session law provided that employees shall 
have a benefit contract and vested rights to their benefits at 
the time each employee commences membership:  
Every future entrant who shall become a member of 
[MCERS] after the effective date of this act shall 
have a similar benefit contract and vested right in 
the annuities and all other benefits in the amounts 
and on the terms and conditions and in all other 
respects as provided in the law under which the 
retirement system was established as such law shall 
have been amended and be in effect at the date of 
commencement of his membership. 
No.  2012AP2466.awb 
 
2 
 
Laws of 1945, Ch. 138 (emphasis added).  The legislature did not 
refer to an employee earning or accruing benefits through 
services rendered.  Rather, the legislature provided that rights 
to benefits "vested" at the "date of commencement of [an 
employee's] membership."1  It is hard to imagine how much clearer 
the legislature could have been. 
¶51 Not surprisingly, Wisconsin courts have previously 
concluded that language similar to that used in chapter 138 of 
the Laws of 1945 created a vested right to benefits at the time 
of hire.   In Welter v. City of Milwaukee, 214 Wis. 2d 485, 571 
N.W.2d 459 (Ct. App. 1997), the court considered substantially 
similar laws relating to police officers' retirement benefits.  
The session law at issue provided that: 
Every such member . . . shall thereby have a benefit 
contract in said retirement system of which he is such 
member or beneficiary as of the effective date of this 
act . . . . [E]ach member and beneficiary having such 
a [retirement system] benefit contract shall have a 
vested right to such annuities and other benefits and 
they shall not be diminished or impaired by subsequent 
legislation or by any other means without [the 
officer's] consent. . . . Every future entrant who 
shall become a member of this retirement system after 
the effective date of this act shall have a similar 
benefit contract and vested right in the annuities and 
all other benefits . . . . 
Laws of 1947, ch. 441, § 30(2).  After considering this 
language, the court determined that the retirement benefits at 
issue vested at the time officers became employees.   
                                                 
1 "Vested" is defined as "[t]hat has become a completed, 
consummated 
right 
for 
present 
or 
future 
enjoyment; 
not 
contingent; unconditional; absolute."  Black's Law Dictionary 
1557 (7th ed. 1999). 
No.  2012AP2466.awb 
 
3 
 
¶52 The Welter court reasoned that the language of the 
session laws "[is] not ambiguous; [its] meaning is plain."  
Welter, 214 Wis. 2d at 491. "Under [the laws at issue], 
retirement-plan benefits in effect when a Milwaukee police 
officer becomes a member of the retirement system are vested as 
to that officer unless the officer agrees to a change."  Id.  
The court rejected the city's argument that the rights vested at 
some later date, stating that "[t]his argument, however, ignores 
the legislative command that the critical date is not that of 
the duty-related disability but the date the officer becomes a 
member of the retirement system——the date he or she was first 
employed by the City as a police officer."  Id. at 494-95.  See 
also Rehrauer v. City of Milwaukee, 2001 WI App 151, ¶¶11-13, 
246 Wis. 2d 863, 631 N.W.2d 644 (following Welter's conclusion 
that the officers' benefits vested at the date of hire). 
¶53 The majority attempts to avoid the plain language of 
the session laws and the cases interpreting similar language by 
shifting its focus to the language of the Milwaukee County 
General Ordinance.  Majority op., ¶30.  It asserts that this is 
the proper approach because the session laws do not "explain 
whether the 2% multiplier is a vested right with respect to 
future service" and thus, the majority implies that the 
Ordinance does.  Id., ¶39.  Pointing to the Ordinance's 
statement that 0.5% of the multiplier applies to "service 
rendered," 
the 
majority 
concludes 
that 
this 
means 
"the 
No.  2012AP2466.awb 
 
4 
 
multiplier accrues over time."  Id., ¶30.2  It then states that 
Welter is inapposite because it relied on the language of the 
session laws and not an ordinance.  Id., ¶42. 
¶54 Contrary to the majority's implications, the Ordinance 
does not directly address whether the multiplier creates vested 
rights with respect to future service.  The majority's strained 
reasoning on this point conflicts with the common definition of 
the word "accrue."  The word "accrue" generally means "to 
accumulate over time."  The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 12 (3d ed. 1992); see also Black's Law 
Dictionary 
21 
(7th 
ed. 
1999) 
(defining 
accrue 
as 
"[t]o 
accumulate periodically").   
¶55 Nothing in the Ordinance indicates that the multiplier 
grows over time.  Under the Ordinance, an employee "shall 
receive an amount equal to one and one-half (1½) percent of his 
final average salary multiplied by the number of his years of 
service rendered."  MCGO § 201.24(5.1)(1).   
¶56 The Ordinance further provides that "all pension 
service credit earned on and after January 1, 2001, shall be 
credited in an amount equal to an additional one-half (0.5) 
percent 
of 
the 
member's 
final 
average 
salary." 
 
MCGO 
§ 201.24(5.15).  As indicated by the language of the Ordinance, 
the multiplier does not grow or accumulate in proportion to the 
                                                 
2 It is unclear why the majority focuses on the language in 
the Ordinance creating the additional 0.5% multiplier and not 
the 
language 
regarding 
the 
base 
1.5% 
multiplier, 
MCGO 
§ 201.24(5.1)(1).  The two provisions have different language.     
No.  2012AP2466.awb 
 
5 
 
years of service rendered.  It is the number of pension service 
credits that increases over time, not the multiplier.  The 
multiplier itself does not "accrue." 
¶57 The majority's refusal to acknowledge the words of the 
governing session laws is evident in its reliance on Champine, 
Pasko, and Valeo to support its conclusion that the multiplier 
accrues as service is rendered.  I recognize that each of those 
cases determined that under the governing law or contract being 
interpreted, the benefit at issue vested as service was 
rendered.  However, each of those cases also acknowledged that 
legislation or a contract could include a different vesting 
trigger, such as the commencement of employment.  See Champine 
v. Milwaukee County, 2005 WI App 75, ¶19, 280 Wis. 2d 603, 696 
N.W.2d 245; Pasko v. Milwaukee County, 2013 WI App 91, ¶12, 349 
Wis. 2d 444, 836 N.W.2d 461; Valeo v. J. I. Case Co., 18 Wis. 2d 
578, 584, 119 N.W.2d 384 (1963).   
¶58 In this case, clear language in a governing session 
law creates a vesting trigger different from the trigger found 
in those cases.  Chapter 138 of the Laws of 1945 states that 
employees "shall have a similar benefit contract and vested 
right in the annuities and all other benefits in the amounts and 
on the terms and conditions . . . at the date of commencement of 
his membership."  In other words, upon acceptance of employment, 
employees gain a vested right to benefits on the terms and 
No.  2012AP2466.awb 
 
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conditions of the contract.3  Because one of the terms and 
conditions of the pension benefit was that it would be 
calculated using a 2% multiplier, there is a vested right to 
that multiplier. 
¶59 The majority further attempts to distance this case 
from the governing session laws by asserting that chapter 138 of 
the Laws of 1945 does not apply because that chapter applies 
only to benefits in existence when a person's county employment 
began and that the multiplier when Stoker began employment was 
1.5%, lower than the 1.6% at issue here.  Majority op., ¶42 
n.17.  Again, the majority's narrow focus has led it astray. 
¶60 Although chapter 138 of the Laws of 1945 could have 
initially been read as the majority posits, a 1957 amendment to 
that chapter clarifies that an employee has vested rights to 
increases in benefits, not just the benefits available at the 
start of employment.  Specifically, Chapter 326 of the Laws of 
1957 amended the language to read: 
                                                 
3 Citing Loth v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 129, 315 Wis. 2d 
35, 758 N.W.2d 766, the majority alludes to the argument that 
the session law was a unilateral contract offer that the county 
could modify until an employee became entitled to the benefits 
by accepting the offer.  Majority op., ¶¶29, 46.  It is 
understandable that the majority does not attempt to directly 
embrace the unilateral contract argument.  Neither the session 
law nor the Ordinance creates eligibility requirements that 
employees need to meet before being entitled to the multiplier.   
As illustrated above, to the extent the session law can be 
viewed as a unilateral contract offer, the only action an 
employee need take to accept the offer, and thereby create a 
binding contract, is to accept employment.  Similarly, under the 
Ordinance, an employee is entitled to the multiplier regardless 
of how many years of service the employee has rendered.   
No.  2012AP2466.awb 
 
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[E]ach member and beneficiary having such a benefit 
contract shall have a vested right to all benefits 
stated by the act at the time his membership is 
effective and to all increases in benefits covered by 
amendments subsequent to the date his membership is 
effective and they shall not be diminished or impaired 
by subsequent legislation on or by any other means 
without his consent. 
Ch. 326, Laws 1957, § 6 (emphasis added). 
¶61 Nearly identical language was interpreted in Rehrauer, 
246 Wis. 2d 863.   In that case the ordinance at issue provided 
that firefighters have a "vested right in the . . . benefits in 
the amounts and on the terms and conditions and in all other 
respects as provided in the law . . . in effect at the date of 
commencement of his membership and as subsequently amended." 
Id., ¶16 (quoting Milwaukee City Charter § 36-13-2-c).   Based 
on the language of the ordinance and the governing statutes, the 
principles set forth in Welter, and the importance of the 
attraction 
and 
retention 
of 
public 
employees, 
the 
court 
concluded that "firefighters gained vested rights in the highest 
level of duty disability benefits that came to be contractually 
established during their years of active duty."  Id., ¶20.  
Given that the language in this case is nearly identical to that 
at issue in Rehrauer, there is little justification for 
interpreting it differently.   
II 
¶62 In contrast to the majority's interpretation, I 
conclude that the language of the session law governs: employees 
"shall have a vested right to all benefits stated by the act at 
the time his membership is effective and to all increases in 
benefits covered by amendments subsequent to the date his 
No.  2012AP2466.awb 
 
8 
 
membership is effective."  Ch. 326, Laws of 1957, § 6.  This 
language 
is 
unambiguous 
and 
is 
not 
open 
to 
alternative 
interpretations.  See Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 
99, ¶145, __ Wis. 2d  ___, 851 N.W.2d 337 (concluding that 
similar provisions in Milwaukee's Charter "unmistakably evince 
the clear intention of the Common Council to create a 'vested 
and contractual right to the [pension] benefits in the amount 
and on the terms and conditions' as provided in [the Charter]"). 
¶63 Here, upon accepting employment with the County in 
1982, Stoker entered into a contract which provided her with a 
vested 
right 
to 
a 
1.5% 
pension 
multiplier. 
 
See 
MCGO 
§ 201.24(5.1) (1981).  During her employment, that multiplier 
was increased to 2%.  See MCGO § 201.24(5.15)(1) (enacted 2000).  
Under chapter 326 of the Laws of 1957, Stoker had a vested right 
to the increase as well.   
¶64 Once her rights to the multiplier vested, the County 
was unable to reduce it.  The legislature's restrictions on the 
County's home rule authority with respect to altering employee 
benefits are clear.  It instructed that "no such change shall 
operate to diminish or impair the annuities, benefits or other 
rights of any person who is a member of [MCERS] prior to the 
effective date of any such change."  Ch. 405, Laws 1965.  An 
ordinance that conflicts with the authority granted by the 
session laws is void.  See State ex rel. Ziervogel v. Wash. 
Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2004 WI 23, ¶38, 269 Wis. 2d 549, 676 
N.W.2d 401.  Here, the County’s amendment to the Ordinance would 
operate to reduce Stoker's pension multiplier to 1.6%, thereby 
No.  2012AP2466.awb 
 
9 
 
conflicting with the Legislature’s mandate that employee rights 
and benefits not be diminished.  Accordingly, the amendment to 
the Ordinance is void.     
¶65 In sum, the majority's attempt to avoid the language 
of the governing session laws and shift the focus to the 
language in the Ordinance is unpersuasive.  It turns a blind eye 
to the clear language of the session laws which must trump the 
amendment to the County Ordinance.   
¶66 Although the County offered employment to individuals 
with the promise that a certain pension benefit formula would 
accompany such employment, the majority erroneously concludes 
that the County has unfettered discretion to prospectively 
reduce it.  As a result, an employee who accepted the offer has 
no contractual rights to enforce that formula.  Because I 
conclude that employees have a vested right to the formula 
containing the multiplier and that the County was without 
authority to pass an ordinance reducing that multiplier, I would 
affirm the unanimous court of appeals' decision.4 
                                                 
4 The same day the court heard argument on this case, we 
also heard argument on another case involving when Milwaukee 
County employees' benefits become vested.  The decision in that 
case is still pending.  Efforts should be made to make the two 
opinions consistent.  The core function of courts is, of course, 
clear, consistent, and reliable application of the law.  
 
Because 
of 
the 
court's 
new 
procedure 
for 
opinion 
preparation and mandate, I cannot comment on the other decision 
at this time given that I want this dissent to be mandated at 
the same time as the majority opinion.  See State v. Gonzalez, 
2014 WI 124, ¶30, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring) (setting forth the new procedure).  
No.  2012AP2466.awb 
 
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¶67 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent.       
¶68 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion.   
 
   
 
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