Case Title: State v. Cyr

Citation: 169 Vt. 50, 726 A.2d 488

Docket Number: 97-450

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Cyr  (97-450); 169 Vt. 50; 726 A.2d 488

[Filed 29-Jan-1999]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 97-450

State of Vermont	                      Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
     v.		                              District Court of Vermont
                                              Unit No. 3, Washington Circuit

Ronald Cyr	                              September Term, 1998

Edward J. Cashman, J.

       William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney,
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Cheever,
          S. J., Specially Assigned.

       MORSE, J.,  Defendant Ronald Cyr was convicted of first degree
  aggravated domestic  assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1043(a)(1) arising from an
  altercation that occurred during the early  morning hours of February 8,
  1997.  On appeal, he claims the trial court erred by: (1) allowing  the
  State under V.R.Cr.P. 7(d) to amend its single-count information during
  trial; (2) denying his  motion at sentencing to redact statements he made
  during the pre-sentence investigation (PSI); and  (3) refusing to grant him
  use immunity before allocution.  We affirm.

       At trial, evidence was introduced that defendant and his girlfriend
  returned to her  residence after the two spent an evening drinking in a
  Barre bar.  An argument ensued and  defendant attacked her.  She described
  the attack as one of repeated closed blows to the face,  choking,
  smothering, and tearing of her facial skin with his fingers.  During this
  attack, defendant  said he would kill her.  She escaped to a neighbor's
  home and called the police.  

 

       Defendant did not take the stand and offered no evidence to dispute
  his girlfriend's version  of the event.  In the PSI report prepared after
  trial, however, defendant's version of the attack  differed substantially
  from hers.  According to him, after the two returned from the bar they 
  started arguing, and she grabbed and twisted two of his fingers, breaking
  one of them.  He pushed  her away, and she hit a doorway.  She then smacked
  him in the face, whereupon he hit her in the  back.  She dug her
  fingernails deep into his neck, at which point he scratched her in the
  face.   Defendant estimated that the entire episode lasted sixty seconds.

       The State charged in a single-count that defendant "did attempt to
  cause or willfully or  recklessly caused serious bodily injury to a family
  or household member."  At the close of the  State's case, defendant moved
  for acquittal under V.R.Cr.P. 29 (requiring judgment of acquittal  if
  evidence insufficient to sustain conviction), arguing that the information
  was impermissibly  vague and that State's failure to elect "what exactly it
  is they are charging" warranted dismissal. 
 	
       Addressing defendant's motion, the court stated: "I think the State
  has got to develop a  theory of the case . . . . I think [the State] can
  charge it the way they've charged it but . . .  they've got to marry up the
  charge with the facts.  So I need to know what [the State's] factual 
  theory [is] to support the charge."  The court gave the State until the
  next day to amend its  information to articulate "what the specific act or
  acts are."  

       In response to the court's direction, the State filed an amended
  information, charging in  one count that defendant

       willfully caused or attempted to cause serious bodily injury by 
       creating a substantial risk of death by smothering and choking; or 
       willfully caused or attempted to cause serious bodily injury by 
       substantial disfigurement by the entire course of conduct culminated 
       by clawing-digging her face; or recklessly caused serious bodily 
       injury by creating a substantial risk of death by smothering and 
       choking; or recklessly caused serious bodily injury by substantial 
       disfigurement by the entire course of conduct culminated by 
       clawing-digging her face, to a family or household member.

       The defense again moved to dismiss on the basis that the amended
  information charged defendant  with multiple alternative offenses, and the
  State had failed to elect a theory of the case.

 

       The trial court denied the motion but instructed the jury to consider
  a variety of possible  verdicts.  The court submitted a total of twelve
  different verdict forms to the jury, which required  jurors to choose among
  different combinations of elements potentially sufficient for a conviction. 
  Specifically, in order to return a verdict of guilty, jurors had to choose
  one of three types of  culpability -- willfully caused bodily harm,
  willfully attempted to cause bodily harm, or recklessly  caused bodily
  harm.  They also had to choose between the State's two factual theories,
  i.e.,  whether the assault was accomplished by "smothering or choking" or
  by "the entire course of  conduct culminated by clawing-digging [the
  victim's] face."  Finally, because defendant had  requested instructions on
  the lesser-included offense of domestic assault, jurors had to choose 
  between harms resulting in bodily injury or "serious" bodily injury, the
  former being sufficient  for a non-aggravated domestic assault conviction. 
  The court instructed the jury that it could return  a guilty verdict on
  only one of the twelve possible theories.  

       The jury returned a verdict of guilty indicating that defendant had
  "Recklessly Caused  Serious Bodily Injury by substantial disfigurement by
  the entire course of conduct culminated by  clawing-digging the face of . .
  . a family or household member."  Subsequently, defendant filed  a motion
  for arrest of judgment under V.R.Cr.P 34 ("the court . . . shall arrest
  judgment if the  indictment or information does not charge an offense")
  and, alternatively, a motion for new trial  under V.R.Cr.P 33, arguing that
  the State's amendment of the information during trial violated  V.R.Cr.P.
  7.  The trial court denied the motion.

                                     I.

       Defendant's first claim is that the State violated V.R.Cr.P. 7(d)
  (permitting amendment  of information at trial only if "no additional or
  different offense is charged and if substantial  rights of the defendant
  are not prejudiced") by alleging alternative offenses within a single 
  count.  We agree with the State that the amended information charged merely
  one crime and,  albeit not simply, clarified the alternative means by which
  the offense was alleged to have been  committed.  Rule 7(b) states in part,
  "[t]he indictment or the information shall be a plain, 

 

  concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting
  the offense charged."   V.R.Cr.P. 7(b).  The State's initial information
  satisfied the requirement of Rule 7(b).

       Defendant was charged with assaulting his girlfriend by hitting,
  smothering, choking,  and clawing her.  The acts of defendant were related
  to one attack.  While the amended  information did charge three offenses in
  the disjunctive, two -- attempt and reckless action --  are subsumed within
  the third, willful causation of serious bodily harm.  See State v. Bolio, 
  159 Vt. 250, 253-54, 617 A.2d 885, 887 (1992) (establishing proof of higher
  culpable mental  state necessarily establishes the lower state of
  recklessness); State v. Young, 139 Vt. 535, 542,