Case Title: RANDY LEE LESNER V LIQUID DISPOSAL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 116205

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MAY 7, 2002  
ROBERT C. LESNER, Father of 
Randy Lee Lesner, Deceased,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 116205  
LIQUID DISPOSAL, INC., and 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
The plaintiff’s son was fatally injured in the course of  
employment. Plaintiff, a partial dependent of the decedent,  
sought worker’s compensation benefits.  Through extended  
proceedings, there has been uncertainty with regard to the  
proper amount of the benefits to be paid to plaintiff under  
the formula established by this Court in Weems v Chrysler  
Corp, 448 Mich 679; 533 NW2d 287 (1995).  
We hold that the formula for calculating worker’s  
compensation death benefits for surviving partial dependents  
established in Weems is inconsistent with the governing  
statute, MCL 418.321. Accordingly, we overrule that portion  
of the Weems opinion. However, the portion of this opinion  
that overrules Weems is to have limited retroactive effect.  
We further hold that Weems correctly held that the  
minimum and maximum limits in MCL 418.355 (2) and MCL  
418.356(2) do not require an alteration after the partial  
dependent benefits calculation.  In addition, we hold that the  
500-week limitation on benefits applies to benefits for a  
partially dependent person.  
Set forth in this opinion is the proper method for  
determining partial dependent benefits in keeping with the  
controlling statutory language. Accordingly, we remand this  
case to the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission for  
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I. Facts and Proceedings  
In January 1982, plaintiff lived with his wife and two  
adult 
sons. 
 
All 
four individuals made financial contributions  
to the household as plaintiff drew a small pension and the  
others earned money from employment.  Plaintiff, then 57 years  
old and disabled from employment since 1978, was partially  
dependent on the contributions of his sons and wife. One of  
the plaintiff’s sons died as the result of a work-related  
accident in mid-January 1982.  
2  
  
 
 
The 
following 
month, plaintiff, as a survivor and partial  
dependent of the deceased son, sought benefits pursuant to §  
321 of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.321.  
A hearing referee found that plaintiff was a partial  
dependent, and ordered a weekly benefit of $170.21 until  
further order of the bureau.  
After both sides appealed to the former Worker’s  
Compensation Appeal Board, a two-member panel affirmed the  
referee’s decision, with some modification.1  
The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal2 and  
affirmed in part and reversed in part.3  
While defendants’ application for leave to appeal was  
pending in this Court, we decided Weems, supra, which provided  
a formula for calculating benefits for a partial dependent.  
Then, in lieu of granting leave to appeal in the present case,  
1 The WCAB ordered compensation “at the rate of $170.23 
per week from January 13, 1982 [in accordance with MCL 
418.356(2)] for a period not to exceed 500 weeks from the date 
of the employee’s death” and further ordered a reduction of 
that benefit amount, in accordance with the formula set forth 
in Franges v General Motors Corp, 404 Mich 590; 274 NW2d 392 
(1979). Franges concerned allocation of the cost of obtaining 
a third-party tort recovery.  
2 
 Unpublished order, entered July 6, 1993 (Docket No. 
136338).  
3 
 The Court of Appeals remanded for application of a 
formula it had employed in LePalm v Revco DS, Inc, 202 Mich  
App 33, 43-46; 507 NW2d 771 (1993). The Court directed that  
the plaintiff receive “the greater of the amount calculated 
under the LePalm formula or fifty percent of the average  
weekly wage in 1982" and that the award “be reduced  
appropriately pursuant to Franges.”  
3  
 
  
we directed the WCAC to recalculate death benefits using the  
formula set forth in Weems. 449 Mich 901 (1995).  
On remand, the WCAC once again recalculated the benefit  
amount.  A further recalculation occurred when the case  
returned to the Court of Appeals.4  
We granted leave to appeal in order to clarify this area  
of the law and consider whether the formula for the  
calculation of worker’s compensation death benefits for  
surviving 
partial 
dependents 
established 
in 
Weems is  
consistent with the governing statute, MCL 418.321.  
II. Standard of Review  
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation,  
which we review de novo as a question of law.  Levy v Martin,  
463 Mich 478, 482, n 12; 620 NW2d 292 (2001); Donajkowski v  
Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248; 596 NW2d 574 (1999).  
III. Analysis  
A. The Statute at Issue  
Death benefits for a dependent are governed by MCL  
418.321. 
In 1982, when the plaintiff’s decedent died, the  
language for this section, drawn from 1980 PA 357, read:  
4 The Court of Appeals initially denied leave to appeal 
for lack of merit in the grounds presented.  Unpublished  
order, entered June 5, 1997 (Docket No. 199205). In lieu of  
granting leave to appeal, we remanded the case to the Court of 
Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. 457 Mich 856  
(1998). The Court of Appeals then decided this matter in an 
unpublished opinion per curiam, entered December 28, 1999 
(Docket No. 211230).  
4  
 
If death results from the personal injury of 
an employee, the employer shall pay, or cause to be 
paid, subject to [MCL 418.375], in 1 of the methods 
provided in this section, to the dependents of the 
employee who were wholly dependent upon the  
employee's earnings for support at the time of the 
injury, a weekly payment equal to 80% of the 
employee's after-tax average weekly wage, subject 
to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation 
under this act, for a period of 500 weeks from the 
date of death. 
If at the expiration of the  
500-week period any such wholly or partially 
dependent person is less than 21 years of age, a 
hearing referee may order the employer to continue 
to pay the weekly compensation or some portion 
thereof until the wholly or partially dependent 
person reaches the age of 21.  If the employee 
leaves dependents only partially dependent upon his 
or her earnings for support at the time of injury, 
the weekly compensation to be paid shall be equal 
to the same proportion of the weekly payments for 
the benefit of persons wholly dependent as the 
amount contributed by the employee to such partial 
dependents bears to the annual earnings of the 
deceased at the time of injury.  
Later, the section was amended by 1985 PA 103 and 1994 PA  
271.  One significant change was made to the final sentence of  
the section to provide an eighty-percent multiplier in the  
formula for the calculation of benefits.5  
5 The current language, as enacted in 1994 PA 271, reads:  
If death results from the personal injury of 
an employee, the employer shall pay, or cause to be 
paid, subject to [MCL 418.375], in 1 of the methods 
provided in this section, to the dependents of the 
employee who were wholly dependent upon the  
employee's earnings for support at the time of the 
injury, a weekly payment equal to 80% of the 
employee's after-tax average weekly wage, subject 
to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation 
under this act, for a period of 500 weeks from the 
date of death. 
If at the expiration of the  
500-week period any such wholly or partially 
dependent person is less than 21 years of age, a 
worker's compensation magistrate may order the  
5  
 
 
B. The Weems Formula is Inconsistent with the Formula  
Provided by the Plain Language of the Statute  
As we have indicated with great frequency, our duty is to  
apply the language of the statute as enacted, without  
addition, subtraction, or modification. See, e.g., Helder v  
Sruba, 462 Mich 92, 99; 611 NW2d 309 (2000); Robinson v  
Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 459; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). We may not  
read anything into an unambiguous statute that is not within  
the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the  
words of the statute itself.  Omne Financial, Inc v Shacks,  
Inc, 460 Mich 305, 311; 596 NW2d 591 (1999). In other words,  
the role of the judiciary is not to engage in legislation.  
Tyler v Livonia Public Schools, 459 Mich 382, 392-393, n 10;  
590 NW2d 560 (1999).  
Interpreting the plain language of MCL 418.321 at the  
time of the work related death of the plaintiff’s son in 1982,  
that statute provided that the weekly benefit to be paid to a  
partially dependent person (BPD) was calculated by multiplying  
the benefit that would be paid if the person were wholly  
employer to continue to pay the weekly compensation 
or some portion thereof until the wholly or  
partially dependent person reaches the age of 21. 
If the employee leaves dependents only partially 
dependent upon his or her earnings for support at 
the time of injury, the weekly compensation to be 
paid shall be equal to the same proportion of the 
weekly payments for the benefit of persons wholly 
dependent as 80% of the amount contributed by the 
employee to the partial dependents bears to the 
annual earnings of the deceased at the time of 
injury.  
6  
  
dependent 
(BWD) 
by a percentage figure (“the proportion”).  The  
benefit for a wholly dependent person (BWD) was eighty percent  
of the decedent’s after-tax average weekly wage (WWAT)6.  The  
proportion (P) was calculated by dividing the amount the  
decedent contributed to the partial dependent (C)7 by the  
decedent’s annual earnings (AE). Thus:  
BPD = (BWD)(P), where 
P = (C/AE), and 
BWD = (.80)(WWAT).  
Accordingly,  
BPD = (C)(.80)(WWAT)/(AE), or  
Benefit = (decedent’s contribution)(.80)(decedent’s weekly wage after taxes) 
(decedent’s annual earnings)  
This equation is the proper one; it is directly based on  
the plain language of MCL 418.321 as it was in force in 1982.8  
6 MCL 418.321 calls for “a weekly payment equal to 80% of 
the employee's after-tax average weekly wage, subject to the 
maximum and minimum rates of compensation under this act, for 
a period of 500 weeks from the date of death.”  These  
limitations, to which the weekly payment is “subject,” are 
respectively the maximum benefit of MCL 418.355(2), the 
minimum 
benefit 
of 
MCL 418.356(2), and the 500-week limitation 
that is expressly stated in MCL 418.321.  When these  
limitations are applicable, they can be substituted into the 
formula for (BWD).  We will discuss these limitations later in  
the opinion.  
7 The “amount” of a contribution must be computed with 
respect to a period and, given the ratio being described by 
the Legislature, it surely meant an annual amount.  
8 As indicated above, the Legislature added, in 1985 PA 
103, a second .80 multiplier that remained in effect after 
1994 PA 271.  See the final lines of the statutory language  
quoted 
in 
footnote 
5 
and 
Justice 
BOYLE’s 
partial 
concurrence/partial dissent in Weems, 448 Mich 719.  
With that change, P = (.80)(C)/(AE), so that:  
7  
In our view, the statute on its face requires a factual  
determination of “the amount contributed by the employee” to  
the partial dependent, that is, the amount actually  
contributed by that deceased worker, in order to calculate the  
amount of benefits to which the partial dependent is entitled.  
However, in Weems, supra at 695-697, this Court created  
its own formula for determining benefits payable to a partial  
dependent under MCL 418.321, despite the plain language of the  
statute.9  Rather than merely examining, as the statute  
directed, “the amount contributed by the employee” to the  
partial dependent, the Weems Court substituted other factors  
to determine the level of benefits. 
In particular, it  
concluded that the partial dependent would receive the amount  
obtained by dividing the deceased employee’s annual after-tax  
earnings by the sum of those earnings and the partial  
BPD = (.80)(C)(.80)(WWAT)/(AE), or  
Benefit = (decedent’s contribution)(.64)(decedent’s weekly wage after taxes) 
(decedent’s annual earnings)  
This modified formulation, currently applicable, would 
have been appropriately applied in Weems, where the fatal 
accident occurred in March 1986, well after the effective date 
of 1985 PA 103.  In the present case, however, the accident  
occurred in 1982, so the statutory modification is not 
applicable.  
9 
 
While 
we 
recognize 
that 
MCL 
418.321 
requires 
significant study to parse, we also recognize that the 
complexity and density of a statute does not in itself cause 
the statute to be ambiguous and thus warrant construction of 
the statute.  
8  
 
 
 
dependent’s regular and substantial annual income.10
 See  
Weems, supra at 696. 
The problem with this calculation is  
that it is not derived from the language of the statute.  MCL  
418.321 includes no mention of the income of a partial  
dependent as a factor in the calculation of the benefits due  
that partial dependent.11  
As explained by Justice CAVANAGH in his partial dissent in  
Weems, in order to determine the benefits due a partial  
dependent, a faithful application of MCL 418.321 “would  
10 Like the present case, Weems involved a situation with  
only one partial dependent.  In a footnote, the Weems majority 
seemed to indicate that the formula it adopted should be 
modified in a case involving multiple partial dependents.  See  
Weems, supra at 697, n 22 (discussing treatment of a situation 
with multiple partial dependents).  Because we are overruling  
the Weems formula and the present case involves only one 
partial dependent, this opinion does not address situations 
involving multiple partial dependents.  
11 Moreover, the Weems formula distorts the evident  
legislative goal of allowing different levels of benefits on 
the basis of the different circumstances of otherwise  
similarly 
situated 
partial dependents.  This is illustrated by 
considering that the Weems formula, by eschewing any  
determination of the amount that the deceased employee 
actually 
contributed 
to 
the 
partial 
dependent’s 
support, 
would 
provide the same benefit level to a partial dependent in each 
of the following two hypothetical cases.  Assume that in both  
cases A and B, the deceased employees had exactly the same 
after-tax earnings and had a partial dependent who had the 
same regular and substantial income.  Now consider that in  
case A, the partial dependent had substantial medical or 
educational expenses that the partial dependent in case 
B did 
not and that these expenses were paid for by the deceased. 
This would mean that the employee in case A contributed more 
to the partial dependent’s support than in case B.  That no  
allowance for the difference in the level of support actually 
contributed by the deceased employee to the partial dependent 
is made by the Weems formula demonstrates its inconsistency 
with the language of MCL 418.321.  
9  
 
require a factual determination by the trier of fact” to  
establish the amount contributed by the employee to the  
partial dependent.  Id. at 709. We agree. This is necessary  
for the simple reason that the amount contributed by the  
deceased employee to the partial dependent will vary from case  
to case and cannot be determined by any blanket formula.  
The Weems majority rejected such a factual inquiry,  
apparently primarily on the basis of the view that such a  
factual determination would be “unworkable”:  
Such a determination is absolutely unworkable 
in practice. It would be impossible in most cases 
to even roughly estimate which portion of the 
decedent’s income was used for the sole support of 
the dependent. [Weems, supra at 698.]  
We acknowledge that, in many cases, the factfinder will  
be presented with a difficult task in determining what amount  
of money to consider as having been contributed by the  
deceased employee to the partial dependent.  In large part,  
this is because household expenses are often paid in  
essentially a lump sum for items that benefit multiple members  
of the household.12  Yet the difficulty of an administrative  
tribunal in making a factual determination called for by a  
statute is not a justification for ignoring the statute.  The  
reason is that the Legislature, the policy-making arm of our  
government, in taking up this matter, is held to have  
12 For example, a rental payment might allow both an 
employee and a partial dependent to live in the same  
apartment.  Similarly, groceries might be purchased for a 
household with all of its members sharing in the food.  
10  
 
 
 
considered this issue and settled on this approach.  It is not  
within our authority to disregard that choice.  See, e.g.,  
Helder, supra at 99 (when a statute is clear on its face, the  
judicial role is to apply the statute in accord with its plain  
language, not to articulate its view of “policy”).  
Accordingly, we overrule Weems to the extent that it is  
inconsistent with this opinion.  In particular, we overrule  
the Weems formula for calculating benefits due a partial  
dependent because it is inconsistent with the plain language  
of MCL 418.321.13  
C. Statutory Limitations  
In deducing the proper formula to be employed,  
consideration must also be given to the limitations stated in  
the opening sentence of MCL 418.321.14  
1. Maximum and Minimum Benefits  
Recall that an element of the calculation for a partial  
dependent is the benefit that would be paid if the survivor  
had been wholly dependent on the decedent (BWD). If one were  
determining the benefit for a wholly dependent person, the  
first sentence of MCL 418.321 instructs that it might be  
necessary to reduce the benefit in light of the maximum  
benefit of MCL 418.355(2) or to raise it to reach the minimum  
13 Specifically, we note that we have not overruled the  
Weems analysis regarding determining whether a person is 
partially dependent.  
14 See n 6.  
11  
 
benefit specified by MCL 418.356(2).  
The majority in Weems held that no separate adjustment  
should be made after the benefits for a partially dependent  
person are calculated.  The majority said that “a partially  
dependent person’s weekly benefits are inherently subject to  
the maximum and minimum rates of compensation because the  
calculation of a wholly dependent person’s weekly benefit is  
included in the partially dependent person’s calculation.”  
448 Mich 684-685. We agree.  
The minimum or maximum benefit language in MCL 418.321 is  
located in the sentence discussing benefits for wholly  
dependent 
persons, 
not 
the 
calculation 
for 
partially 
dependent  
persons.15
 Therefore, where the maximum or minimum is  
applicable, it is to be inserted at the step where (BWD) is  
determined.  
For that reason, when (BWD) is more than the maximum or  
less than the minimum, it will be necessary to substitute the  
minimum or maximum for (BWD), which is calculated using the  
15  Unlike our concurring colleague, we do not believe 
that MCL 418.321 is ambiguous concerning the introduction of 
the minimum or maximum benefit rate into a partially dependent 
person’s benefit calculation.  The maximum or minimum benefit  
clause is directed solely at the calculation for a wholly 
dependent individual and is the only reference to the minimum 
or maximum benefit rate in the statute.  Since, under the 
plain language of the statute, a partial dependent’s benefit 
calculation 
first 
requires the calculation of the benefit that 
the 
partial 
dependent would have received if wholly dependent, 
we conclude there is no ambiguity about the point of 
introduction of a minimum or maximum benefit rate into the  
calculation of a partial dependent’s weekly compensation.  
12  
formula stated ante at page 7. That change would mean that  
the usual value of (BWD), which is (.80)(WWAT) or 80% of the  
decedent’s weekly wage after taxes, would be replaced by the  
statutory maximum or minimum (SM) under MCL 418.355(2) or MCL  
418.356(2).  This change would be necessary because in such  
cases the benefit level of a partial dependent is tied by the  
language of MCL 418.321 to the benefits that would be provided  
a wholly dependent person.  Ordinarily, a wholly dependent  
person would be entitled to 80% of the deceased employee’s  
after-tax earnings, but that is not the case in situations in  
which such a wholly dependent person’s benefits would be  
subject to the maximum or minimum benefit restrictions.  
Thus, where the minimum or maximum applies, as the law  
existed in 1982, the statutory formula would be:  
BPD = (C)(SM)/(AE), or  
Benefit = (decedent’s contribution)(statutory maximum or minimum) 
(decedent’s annual earnings)  
In a case arising under the amended language of 1985 PA  
103 and currently applicable, it would be:  
BPD = (.80)(C)(SM)/(AE), or  
Benefit = (.80)(decedent’s contribution)(statutory maximum or minimum) 
(decedent’s annual earnings)  
2. 500-Week Limitation  
The first sentence of MCL 418.321 also states a 500-week  
limitation of benefits for a wholly dependent person. This  
limitation also applies to benefits for a partially dependent  
person.
 The second sentence of MCL 418.321 provides a  
13  
  
 
specific 
means 
for 
partially (and wholly) dependent persons to  
seek an extension of benefits beyond 500 weeks. In light of  
the entire structure of MCL 418.321-
-
-
-in which the benefit for  
a partially dependent person is derived arithmetically from  
the benefit that would be paid if the person were wholly  
dependent-
--the 
second 
sentence 
communicates 
the 
Legislature’s  
intent that the 500-week limitation is likewise applicable to  
partially dependent persons.  
V. Retroactivity  
The general rule is that judicial decisions are given  
complete retroactive effect. 
Michigan Ed Emp Mut Ins Co v  
Morris, 460 Mich 180, 189; 596 NW2d 142 (1999). 
However,  
recognition of the effect of changing settled law has led this  
Court to consider limited retroactivity when overruling prior  
case law.
 In examining the potential effect of a retroactive  
decision, this Court gauges (1) the purpose served by the new  
rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the  
effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice. Id.  
at 190.  
The purpose of the rule adopted in this opinion is to  
correct what we believe to be the flawed construction of MCL  
418.321 in Weems. 
However, Weems has been controlling  
authority for over six and one-half years. Thus, it appears  
that there has been widespread reliance on the Weems formula  
in calculating worker’s compensation benefits for partial  
dependents of deceased employees. 
Further, attempting to  
14  
revisit the benefit levels finally determined or agreed upon  
during the period that Weems was controlling authority could  
have a detrimental effect on the administration of justice by  
imposing an enormous burden on the worker’s compensation  
system, not to mention the reliance of the beneficiaries on  
the benefits previously awarded under Weems.  
For these reasons, we hold that the present opinion is to  
be given only limited retroactive effect. The interpretation  
of MCL 418.321 articulated in this opinion is to be applied  
only to the present case; to other cases pending decision by  
a worker’s compensation magistrate or on appeal, to either the  
WCAC or the Court of Appeals, in which the determination of  
the level of benefits to be paid a partial dependent is in  
issue; and to future cases in which the level of benefits due  
a partial dependent under MCL 418.321 needs to be initially  
determined.  
VI. Conclusion  
In the present case, the WCAC and the Court of Appeals,  
as they were bound to do, attempted to apply Weems as binding  
precedent from this Court.  However, for the above reasons, we  
overrule the portion of Weems that provides a formula for  
calculating 
worker’s 
compensation 
death 
benefits 
for 
surviving  
partial dependents.  The portions of this opinion that  
overrule the Weems opinion are to have limited retroactive  
effect.  
15  
We further hold that the minimum and maximum benefit  
limits do not require an alteration after the partial  
dependent benefits are calculated, but rather are to be  
inserted before that calculation. In addition, we hold that  
the 500-week limitation on benefits applies to partially  
dependent persons.  
For these reasons, it is necessary to again remand this  
case to the WCAC. On remand, the commission shall calculate  
the plaintiff’s benefits as a partial dependent in accordance  
with MCL 418.321 as explained in this opinion, and in  
accordance with other provisions of law, including those  
stated in Franges, supra. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and TAYLOR and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred with  
YOUNG, J.  
16  
 
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ROBERT C. LESNER, father of 
Randy Lee Lesner, deceased,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 116205  
LIQUID DISPOSAL, INC., and 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
KELLY, J. (concurring).  
I agree with the formula that the majority has adopted to  
be used for determining death benefits of a partial dependent.  
However, it is obvious to me that § 321 of the Worker's  
Disability Compensation Act1 is ambiguous.  Consequently, the  
majority's plain meaning analysis is inadequate to determine  
the Legislature's intentions in writing it.  
The majority has adopted the formula proposed in Justice  
1  MCL 418.321.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cavanagh's dissent in Weems v Chrysler Corp,2 except that it  
retains the Weems majority's application of the maximum and  
minimum rates of compensation for injuries.  Sometimes, the  
formula yields a benefit for a whole dependent that falls  
above the maximum rate or below the minimum rate.  In those  
cases the statutory maximum or minimum is substituted for the  
figure 
representing 
eighty 
percent 
of 
the 
decedent's 
after-tax  
weekly wage in the formula.3  
When the maximum and minimum amounts do not apply, the  
majority's formula for a partial dependent is as follows:4  
Benefit 
=(.80)(decedent's 
annual 
contribution)(.80)(decedent's 
after-tax 
weekly 
wage)  
(decedent's annual earnings)  
Whenever the maximum or minimum is substituted, the benefit  
for a partial dependent is computed as follows:5  
Benefit = (.80)(decedent's annual contribution)(statutory maximum or minimum)  
(decedent's annual earnings)  
Justice Cavanagh's formula in Weems differs in this  
2 448 Mich 679; 533 NW2d 287 (1995).  
3  In 2002, the minimum is $357.56 per week and the 
m a x i m u m  
i s  
$ 6 4 4 . 0 0  
p e r  
w e e k .   
Http://www.cis.state.mi.us/wkrcomp/82_ 
now.htm, on April 19, 2002.  
4 
 There are two 80% multipliers in this formula.  The  
first is the multiplier in the whole dependent's benefit, 
which is 80% of the after-tax weekly wage of the decedent. 
The second 80% multiplier, which was added by a 1985 amendment 
of the act, is found in the partial dependent's formula. Slip 
op at 7, n 8.  
5 The 80% multiplier in this formula is the one found in 
the formula for a partial dependent's benefit.  
2  
respect:
 The death benefit for a partial dependent is  
calculated without regard to the maximum and minimum rates.  
Then, whenever the resulting death benefit falls outside the  
maximum-minimum benefit range, the benefit is adjusted upward  
to the minimum or downward to the maximum, as the case may be.  
Both interpretations are reasonably derived from the  
language of the statute.  Section 321 of the Worker's  
Disability Compensation Act states that a wholly dependent  
survivor's benefit is calculated as follows:  
If death results . . . the employer shall pay  
. . . a weekly payment equal to 80% of the 
employee's after-tax average weekly wage, subject 
to the maximum and minimum rates of compensation 
under this act, for a period of 500 weeks from the 
date of death. [MCL 418.321.]  
Another part of the same section then directs how the  
benefit is adjusted for a partially dependent survivor:  
If 
the 
employee 
leaves 
dependents 
only 
partially dependent upon his or her earnings for 
support at the time of injury, the weekly 
compensation to be paid shall be equal to the same 
proportion of the weekly payment for the benefit of 
persons wholly dependent as 80% of the amount 
contributed by the employee bears to the annual 
earnings of the deceased at the time of injury. 
[MCL 418.321.]  
The majority reasons that, because the clause "subject to the  
maximum and minimum rates of compensation" appears only in the  
whole dependents part of § 321, it refers only to the benefit  
paid to a whole dependent.  On the other hand, the Weems  
dissent rejects that logic because the 500-week limitation of  
3  
 
§ 321 appears in the whole dependents part.  Yet it applies to  
partial dependents and is not repeated in the partial  
dependents part. Also, the partial dependents part does not  
state that the partial benefit is subject to the maximum and  
minimum rates of compensation, whereas the fact that it is so  
subject is undisputed.  
Both 
constructions 
are 
antagonized 
by 
additional  
ambiguity in the wording of §§ 355 and 356. Section 355(2),  
which defines the maximum rate of compensation, states:  
[T]he maximum weekly rate of compensation for 
injuries within the year shall be established as 
90% of the state average weekly wage . . . .  
Proponents of the Weems dissent can rely on the fact that the  
rate referred to is called the maximum rate of compensation.  
That suggests that they should adjust the result of all  
benefit calculations, whole or partial.  On the other hand,  
the statutory language can reasonably be read to mean that  
placement of the maximum rate within the formula is determined  
by § 321.  
The language of § 356(3) also can be read in two  
different manners. It states:  
The minimum weekly benefit for death under 
section 321 shall be 50% of the state average 
weekly wage as determined under section 355.  
Proponents of the Weems dissent argue that, because the  
minimum weekly benefit is referred to as the minimum "for  
death under section 321," it should replace any death benefit  
4  
  
calculated under § 321 that is lower than it.  It should be  
the smallest sum that a partial or whole dependent could  
possibly receive. On the other hand, one can again point to  
the minimum benefit as only one factor in the partial  
dependent's benefit calculation.  
I find that both are reasonable interpretations of the  
language of §§ 321, 355 and 356.  Therefore, § 321 is  
ambiguous as regards application of the maximum and minimum  
benefit rates, and rules of statutory construction must be  
applied to determine the Legislature's intent.  
It is undisputed that the overarching intention of the  
Legislature was to award a death benefit that is less than the  
amount that the employee contributed to the dependent.  If the  
Weems dissent formula reflected legislative intent, it would  
yield that result.  However, the contrary is true.  Using it,  
in cases where an employee contributed a small but not de  
minimus amount before his death, a partial dependent would  
receive the minimum rate of compensation. Thus, the benefit  
could be significantly higher than the amount the decedent  
contributed to the dependent during his lifetime.6  
6 
 This is demonstrated by an example from the Weems 
dissent:  
. . .[I]f, for instance, twenty percent of Mr. 
Weems' after-tax earnings were contributed to Mrs. 
Weems, the formula yields:  
(continued...)  
5  
 
By contrast with the Weems dissent's formula, the  
majority's formula yields a death benefit that is normally  
eighty percent of the amount that the employee contributed to  
the dependent.  
Because it satisfies the Legislature's purpose of  
compensating part, but not one hundred percent or more, of the  
dependent's loss, I agree with the majority's formula.  Of the  
possible interpretations of § 321, it alone conforms with the  
legislative intent to calculate a death benefit that is  
normally less than the decedent employee's contribution.  
Therefore, I concur in the result of the majority opinion.  
6 (...continued) 
80% X $ 8,558 X $822.91 = $131.66 
 $42,791  
However, applying § 356, which sets the  
statutory minimum for death benefits, the payable 
death benefit would be $207.35, the applicable 
minimum rate for these parties. [Id. at 718, n 17 
(Cavanagh, J. dissenting).]  
In this example, the calculated benefit of $131.66 was raised 
to $207.35 a week, which was the minimum rate for death 
benefits in 1986.  However, the employee had contributed only 
$8,558 annually before death. Hence, under the Weems dissent  
formula, the dependent received only $164.57 a week from the 
decedent and would receive $207.35 a week after.  
6  
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ROBERT C. LESNER, Father of 
Randy Lee Lesner, Deceased,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
No. 116205  
LIQUID DISPOSAL, INC., and 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
While I agree that the formula the majority adopts today  
for calculating worker’s compensation death benefits for  
surviving partial dependents is the correct formula under MCL  
418.321, I do not agree with the majority’s interpretation of  
the minimum and maximum benefit language located in MCL  
418.321.
 Also, I write separately because I believe that  
leave was improvidently granted in this case.  
The procedural history of this case is substantial.  
Plaintiff first sought benefits in connection with his son’s  
death in 1982.  In 1995, after this Court decided Weems v  
 
 
Chrysler Corp, 448 Mich 679; 533 NW2d 287 (1995), this case  
was 
remanded 
to 
the 
Worker’s 
Compensation 
Appellate 
Commission  
to recalculate death benefits using the formula set forth in  
Weems.  449 Mich 901 (1995). Today, the majority overrules  
the Weems formula and remands for yet another recalculation  
using a new formula.  
This case has been up and down the worker’s compensation  
and appellate court systems for over twenty years and has been  
remanded once already to calculate benefits under the now  
abandoned Weems formula. 
While I remain committed to the  
formula set forth in my partial dissent to Weems, which this  
Court adopts today, I believe that it is time to put this case  
to rest.  Leave was improvidently granted. Further, I remain  
committed to the interpretation of the application of the  
minimum and maximum benefits as expressed in my partial  
dissent to Weems. Weems, 448 Mich 711-712, 716-717 (1995).  
2  
 
 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ROBERT C. LESNER, Father of 
Randy Lee Lesner, Deceased,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v 
No. 116205  
LIQUID DISPOSAL, INC., and 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY,  
Defendant-Appellants.  
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).  
I dissent from the majority’s decision to overrule the  
formula established by this Court in Weems v Chrysler Corp,  
448 Mich 679; 533 NW2d 287 (1995).  As noted by the Weems  
majority, in most instances it is difficult, if not  
impossible, to calculate the amount contributed by the  
decedent solely to the support of the partial dependent.  Id.  
at 698.  The formula articulated in Weems, which takes into  
consideration the dependent person’s regular and substantial  
income, represents a practical, workable formula that gives  
effect to the statute, MCL 418.321, and is faithful to its  
intent.1  Therefore, I would not overrule this aspect of the  
Weems opinion.  
1 
  At oral argument, counsel for both plaintiff and 
defendants agreed that the formula established in Weems has  
proven workable since the decision was made over six years 
ago.  
2