Case Title: State v. Lampkins

Citation: 196 S.E.2d 697, 283 N.C. 520

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1973-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
196 S.E.2d 697 (1973)
283 N.C. 520
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Robert Jerome LAMPKINS.
No. 94.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
June 1, 1973.
*698 Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan, Asst. Attys. Gen. H. A. Cole, Jr. and Walter E. Ricks, III, for the State.
Legal Aid Society of Forsyth County by David B. Hough, Winston-Salem, for defendant.
BRANCH, Justice.
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury as to flight by defendant because there was no evidence in the record to support such instruction.
The challenged portion of the charge reads as follows:
The evidence relating to defendant's flight after the alleged crime was the statement of Officer Kenneth Ray Cook of the Winston-Salem Police Department, viz:
Authority is somewhat meager and diverse on the precise question here presented.
Some jurisdictions hold that flight before arrest raises a legal presumption of guilt. Annot., 25 A.L.R. 886, at 890; 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 280.
The rule in North Carolina is that flight of an accused may be admitted as some evidence of guilt. However, such evidence does not create a presumption of guilt, but may be considered with other facts and circumstances in determining whether all the circumstances amount to an admission of guilt or reflect a consciousness of guilt. Proof of flight, standing alone, is not sufficient to amount to an admission of guilt. An accused may explain admitted evidence of flight by showing other reasons for his departure or that there, in fact, had been no departure. State v. Self, 280 N.C. 665, 187 S.E.2d 93; State v. Gaines, 260 N.C. 228, 132 S.E.2d 485; State v. Downey, 253 N.C. 348, 117 S.E.2d 39; State v. Godwin, 216 N.C. 49, 3 S.E.2d 347; State v. Payne, 213 N.C. 719, 197 S.E. 573; State v. Lewis, 209 N.C. 191, 183 S.E. 357; State v. Hairston, 182 N.C. 851, 109 S.E. 45; State v. Malonee, 154 N.C. 200, 69 S.E. 786; 2 Stansbury North Carolina Evidence § 178 (Brandis rev. 1973).
This Court, in accord with earlier decisions, has recently approved an instruction nearly identical to the one here challenged. State v. Self, supra. However, we must consider defendant's contention that there *699 is no evidence in the record warranting such instruction.
Defendant did not object to the introduction of the evidence as to flight and, therefore, the competency of the evidence is not challenged. State v. Camp, 266 N.C. 626, 146 S.E.2d 643; State v. Gaskill, 256 N.C. 652, 124 S.E.2d 873. Moreover, most jurisdictions recognize that testimony of a law enforcement officer to the effect that he searched for the accused without success after the commission of the crime is competent. See cases collected in Annot., 25 A.L.R. 886; Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 214 (1972). See also State v. Wallace, 162 N.C. 622, 78 S.E. 1; State v. Jones, 93 N.C. 611.
A trial judge should never give instructions to a jury which are not based upon a state of facts presented by some reasonable view of the evidence. When such instructions are prejudicial to the accused he would be entitled to a new trial. State v. McClain, 282 N.C. 396, 193 S.E.2d 113; State v. McCoy, 236 N.C. 121, 71 S.E.2d 921; State v. Wilson, 104 N.C. 868, 10 S.E. 315. This rule is consistent with the statement of the Court in State v. Gaskins, 252 N.C. 46, 112 S.E.2d 745:
The defendant's flight was submitted to the jury as a circumstance showing some evidence of guilt in the case of State v. Beard, 207 N.C. 673, 178 S.E. 242. We quote the pertinent portion of that case:
The Supreme Court of Missouri considered a question similar to the one here presented in State v. Davis, 237 Mo. 237, 140 S.W. 902. There the Court said:
We conclude that the judge's charge as to flight was based on evidence reasonably supporting the theory that defendant had fled after commission of the crime.
Perhaps the trial judge inadvertently overstated the State's contentions by saying that defendant left Forsyth County and Winston-Salem; however, error in stating contentions as to where defendant had fled is not material, and this slight inaccuracy in the statement of contentions will not be held reversible error since the misstatement was not called to the court's attention in apt time to allow correction. State v. *700 McClain, supra; State v. Butler, 269 N.C. 733, 153 S.E.2d 477; State v. Shumaker, 251 N.C. 678, 111 S.E.2d 878.
Defendant's defense of alibi was properly and fairly presented to the jury by the trial judge, and defendant was given full opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to explain his departure.
This assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next contends that the trial judge erred by allowing the Solicitor to cross-examine him concerning a crime for which he has not been convicted.
Defendant was asked if he had been arrested and convicted of nonsupport on 9 May 1972. He admitted the arrest but denied having been convicted, explaining that the warrant had actually been issued for his brother. The Solicitor continued to cross-examine in this vein:
After a brief recess, the court stated to the jury:
Ordinarily, there must be timely objection when the evidence is offered in order to present on appeal a contention that evidence is incompetent. State v. Mitchell, 276 N.C. 404, 172 S.E.2d 527; State v. Williams, 274 N.C. 328, 163 S.E.2d 353; State v. Camp, supra. And exceptions which appear nowhere in the record except in the assignments of error will not be considered on appeal. State v. Washington, 283 N.C. 175, 195 S.E.2d 534; Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 136 S.E.2d 240; Cratch v. Taylor, 256 N.C. 462, 124 S.E.2d 124; Rule 21 of the Supreme Court Rules of Practice.
An examination of that portion of the record here challenged reveals no objections to the questions asked or motions to strike the answers given. Nor does the record show exceptions except within the *701 assignment of error. However, because of the gravity of the crime charged, we elect to consider the contention here presented. State v. Gaskill, supra.
The general rule that answers made by a witness to collateral questions on cross-examination are conclusive does not preclude the examiner from pressing or "sifting" the witness by further cross-examination. The extent of the cross-examination rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Fountain, 282 N. C. 58, 191 S.E.2d 674; State v. Robinson, 272 N.C. 271, 158 S.E.2d 23. Abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge does not appear.
Further, any error which may have resulted from the cross-examination by the Solicitor was cured when the trial judge clearly explained the Solicitor's reasons for the cross-examination and unequivocally withdrew the testimony from the jury's consideration.
Defendant's final assignment of error is that the trial judge erred by denying his motions for judgment as of nonsuit.
We do not deem it necessary to here repeat the well known rules concerning sufficiency of evidence to repel motions for judgment as of nonsuit. These rules are fully stated in the cases of State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 156 S.E.2d 679; State v. Bruton, 264 N.C. 488, 142 S.E.2d 169; State v. Virgil, 263 N.C. 73, 138 S.E.2d 777, and State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42, 120 S.E.2d 580. We think it sufficient to state that when tested by these rules the testimony of the witness Linda Faye Crockett, standing alone, was sufficient to carry the case to the jury.
Careful examination of this entire record discloses no error prejudicial to defendant.
No error.