Case Title: People v. Williams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88663

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88663-Agenda 2-January 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								DOROTHY WILLIAMS, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 20, 2002.
	 
	 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	In the circuit court of Cook County a jury convicted
defendant, Dorothy Williams, of the robbery and murder of Mary
Harris. Defendant waived a jury for sentencing. The court found
defendant eligible for the death penalty, concluded that there were
no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death
penalty, and sentenced defendant to death. This court affirmed
defendant's convictions and sentence (People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1 (1994)), and the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari (Williams v. Illinois, 515 U.S. 1136, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818,
115 S. Ct. 2566 (1995)).
	In June 1995, petitioner filed a petition with the aid of counsel
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 1994)). Counsel subsequently filed an amended
petition and two amendments to the amended petition. The court
dismissed the final version of the petition on the State's motion.
Petitioner appeals. We reverse and remand.



BACKGROUND
Conviction and Sentence
	The facts underlying petitioner's convictions and sentence
were set out in this court's opinion on direct appeal (Williams, 164
Ill. 2d 1), and we will not repeat them in detail here. Defendant
was convicted of the murder of 97-year-old Mary Harris and the
theft of the victim's stereo. The evidence included petitioner's
signed confession to the crime. After petitioner waived a jury for
sentencing, the court found petitioner death-eligible beyond a
reasonable doubt, based on the murder having been motivated by
robbery. The case then proceeded to the aggravation/mitigation
phase.
	In aggravation, the State introduced evidence that petitioner
had murdered not only Harris, but had also murdered two other
elderly victims and had committed various other crimes against
elderly victims. Petitioner was often physically abusive of her
elderly robbery victims. The State also adduced evidence of other
occasions on which petitioner exhibited aggressive, violent
behavior.
	In mitigation it was brought to the court's attention that
petitioner had no disciplinary violations during her pretrial
incarceration other than one incident in which she was verbally
abusive and verbally threatening to a correctional officer.
Petitioner's mother testified that she and petitioner's father had
separated shortly before petitioner's birth, and as a result,
petitioner's contact with her father "had been limited essentially
to 'writing' " before he died, four years prior to the hearing.
Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 26. At the time of the hearing defendant
had two children. One of the fathers had died in 1978 and there
was testimony that the father of the other child provided no
support for his child. Petitioner's daughter testified that petitioner
had raised her two children and treated them well.
	The trial court found that " 'the matters in aggravation so far
exceed the matters in mitigation as to reduce the matters in
mitigation to insignificance,' " and sentenced petitioner to death.
Williams, 164 Ill. 2d  at 26.

Post-Conviction
	Petitioner's counsel filed her first post-conviction petition in
June 1995. Therein, petitioner alleged that she suffered from a
"serious neurological deficit" during and before trial, and had not
been competent to stand trial, stating specifically that she had not
been competent to make a voluntary statement to the police (her
confession), to cooperate with counsel, to waive a jury for
sentencing, or to be sentenced. Petitioner contended that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to discover her mental deficits,
and that her deficits had been masked by medication administered
to her during her pretrial and trial incarceration at the Cook
County jail.
	This petition was supported by the affidavit of Caryn Tatelli,
a social worker employed as a mitigation specialist by the Capital
Resource Center. Tatelli stated that petitioner claimed to have a
blood clot in her brain resulting from an auto accident at age 12.
According to petitioner, the blood clot was related to a visible
lump above petitioner's left eyebrow. Tatelli confirmed the
existence of the lump, and stated that it "varies in size, depending
on the day *** [and] felt like a very deep blister." Petitioner
reported migraine headaches and occasionally experienced severe
headaches, dizziness and nosebleeds. Tatelli reported that
petitioner told her that "she has trouble understanding things
which are said to her and things which she reads," stating further
that she "easily and quickly forgets what she has read, and that she
read and signed documents pertaining to her trial, but that she did
not understand what she was reading and signing."
	In August 1995, petitioner, through counsel, moved that
petitioner be examined for fitness to proceed with the post-conviction action. Petitioner attached two affidavits to the motion.
In the first, petitioner's counsel averred that he had some doubt of
petitioner's ability to understand and communicate with him. The
second affidavit was sworn out by Dr. Linda Wetzel, a
psychologist. Dr. Wetzel performed several tests to establish
petitioner's level of intellectual function. She concluded that
petitioner was "experiencing the long term effects of a closed head
injury, incurred at age 11, which have diminished her intellectual
level to the mentally retarded level. She is significantly limited in
her capacity to understand or remember the explanations or
instructions of her lawyer." Dr. Wetzel recommended that
petitioner be given a CAT scan and MRI in order to better quantify
her head injury.
	On petitioner's motion, the court ordered an evaluation of
petitioner's fitness to participate in post-conviction proceedings.
Discovery on this issue lasted for nearly three years. During this
time petitioner was examined and her fitness was evaluated by
several professionals, both psychologists and psychiatrists. Finally
in May 1998 the court commenced the hearing on petitioner's
fitness for purposes of post-conviction proceedings.
	At the May 1998 hearing the assistant State's Attorney stated
for clarification that it was the understanding of the State that the
only issue to be addressed in that hearing was petitioner's
competency for purposes of post-conviction proceedings. The
court noted that it "hoped we were going to go into the hearing
itself if she was found competent. If not, of course, we wouldn't."
During opening remarks the assistant State's Attorney reiterated
that
			"I'd like the record to be clear that at this stage in the
proceedings we are still doing the fitness hearing.
			THE COURT: Yes.
			[Assistant State's Attorney]: And we have not and can
not address any of the issues in the post conviction
petition or file an answer or motion to dismiss until we
determine whether petitioner is competent to even sit
through these proceedings. So today we will start the
fitness hearing for post-conviction proceedings with Dr.
Mathew Markos and Dr. Ed Blumstein."
	Three witnesses testified for the State at the hearing. Dr.
Mathew Markos, clinical director of Forensic Clinical Services for
the Circuit Court of Cook County, and Dr. Edward Blumstein,
chief psychologist for the adult division of Forensic Clinical
Services for the Circuit Court of Cook County, both testified that
petitioner was fit for purposes of post-conviction proceedings.
Each admitted that in 1995 he had reached the opposite
conclusion, but the witnesses explained that because of additional
information they had received in the interim, they now believed
that petitioner was fit, but was malingering-attempting to make
her symptoms appear more severe than they actually were.
	During the hearing Dr. Markos testified that when he
examined petitioner in 1997, she was taking Pamelor, a
psychotropic antidepressant. In response to a hypothetical
question, Dr. Markos testified that he did not believe that a 50-milligram per-day dose of Sinequan would interfere with
petitioner's fitness to participate in post-conviction proceedings.
He testified that 50 milligrams is "not a heavy dose." He testified
that the Pamelor petitioner was ingesting at the time that he
examined her was chemically very similar to Sinequan, and that
she was fit while receiving that medication. When the State asked
Dr. Markos whether petitioner's ability to cooperate with counsel
in post-conviction proceedings would have been affected by a 150-milligram dose of Sinequan, he responded that 150 milligrams was
an antidepressant level dose, and so could alleviate some
symptoms of depression. However, 150 milligrams was "well
within the therapeutic range," and it would not "make any
significant changes with respect to her fitness." When counsel for
petitioner attempted to inquire regarding the effects of a 200-milligram dose of Sinequan, the court sustained the State's
objection.
	The court recessed the hearing, ordering the parties to obtain
records of the medications petitioner was currently ingesting and
ordering Dr. Markos to examine petitioner to determine whether
any psychotropic medication she was ingesting could have any
impact on her fitness to engage in post-conviction proceedings. Dr.
Markos examined petitioner and concluded that the only
psychotropic medication she was currently ingesting, a 50-milligram dose of Pamelor, would not adversely affect her fitness
to continue with post-conviction proceedings. He opined that such
a dosage level suggested it was being administered as a sedative,
because the usual antidepressant therapeutic dosage was "much
higher," from 100 or 150 to 250 milligrams daily. Dr. Markos
testified that the other medications petitioner was
ingesting-insulin, naproxen, and Depakote-were nonpsychotropic.
When counsel for petitioner asked if Dr. Markos had examined
any records relating to "medication that [petitioner] received at the
time of her trial" the court sustained the State's objection,
reminding counsel that the hearing "is now only on competency
today. That is the purpose of this particular hearing now."
	The State's other expert was Dr. Calvin Flowers, a
radiologist. Dr. Flowers reviewed a CAT scan and MRI
examination which had been performed on petitioner and testified
that both tests returned normal results. The CAT scan was
"essentially a normal examine [sic]," with no evidence of acute
hemorrhage, no masses, and no abnormal calcification. On the
MRI, Dr. Flowers did identify several "high signal or unidentified
bright objects in the brain," but he stated that such results would
return in 3 or 4 out of every 10 MRI tests administered, and to him
they "signify nothing great in terms of abnormalities." Nothing in
the CAT scan or the MRI was indicative of any brain injury. He
testified that if a patient had received a traumatic brain injury of
sufficient significance to cause cognitive dysfunction, there should
be residual effects that could be observed in a CAT scan or MRI.
He saw no such effects on petitioner's tests; he also saw no
evidence of any fractures, current or healed. The absence of any
indications on the tests led Dr. Flowers to conclude that petitioner
had not received a traumatic brain injury in the past.
	Final arguments on the issue of petitioner's mental
competency to engage in post-conviction proceedings were
scheduled for March 1999. During argument, petitioner's counsel
stated that petitioner had demonstrated the ability to communicate
with counsel. Accordingly, petitioner argued, no further
proceedings on fitness were necessary, and proceedings on the
petition itself should begin. The court found petitioner fit to
engage in post-conviction proceedings and allowed petitioner to
amend her petition.
	Petitioner filed an amended post-conviction petition in June
1999, and filed "amendment[s] to amended post-conviction
petition" in June and August 1999, providing additional factual
allegations. Petitioner attached two documents to her August 1999
amendment. The first was a set of photocopies of physicians'
orders and prescription orders which purported to indicate the
dates upon which petitioner was prescribed various dosages of
medications while incarcerated during trial. The second document
was captioned "Affidavit of John Williams." The first paragraph
of the document stated that "[t]he undersigned, under penalties of
perjury as provided by law, certifies that the following statements
are true," and the document was signed on the last of three pages.
In the body of the document, Williams stated that he was
petitioner's brother, and averred that petitioner never graduated
from grammar school or attended high school; that petitioner was
illiterate; that petitioner had been using heroin and cocaine since
she was 14 years old; and that petitioner was taken to a hospital in
an ambulance after she was hit by a car when she was 11 years old.
	In its final version, all of the claims in the petition were
allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: (1) for failing
to discover and call to the court's attention the fact that petitioner
was mentally incompetent to stand trial; (2) for failing to raise the
issue that petitioner was ingesting psychotropic medication at the
time of trial and to move for a competency hearing on that basis;
(3) for failing to move to suppress petitioner's confession on the
basis that petitioner was illiterate and mentally deficient, and thus
could not have knowingly waived her Miranda rights; and (4) for
failing to raise petitioner's mental deficiency as a mitigating factor
at sentencing.
	The State moved to dismiss. In August 1999, the circuit court
granted the State's motion. In a detailed ruling from the
bench-spanning some 33 pages of transcript-the court explained
its rejection of each of the claims raised in the final version of the
petition and dismissed the petition in its entirety. At the beginning
of its ruling, the court stated that in addition to the hearing on
petitioner's post-conviction competence, "[a]n evidentiary hearing
was held on the allegations as to petitioner's competency at time
of trial." At a later point during its ruling, the court restated that it
"did order and conduct an extensive hearing into petitioner's
mental condition at the time of the trial and for purposes of
determining her mental capacity to proceed in these post
conviction proceedings as well." In its conclusion, the court ruled:
			"One, the various pleadings, the attachments thereto
and the post conviction hearing before me, taken in the
light of the entire record, do not make a substantial
showing, indeed do not make any showing that trial
counsel was ineffective.
			***
			Two, the evidence is that petitioner was at all times
competent to stand trial. Accordingly, post conviction
relief is denied."
	Following the court's ruling, counsel for petitioner spoke,
stating in part that he took		"exception to your Honor's on [sic] hearing on present
competency as a post conviction hearing.
			I think the record reflects that there was no post
conviction hearing. I think the record also reflects that
when I tried to inquire at the competency hearing of Dr.
Markos about the effective, [sic, likely should be 'effect
of'] 200 milligrams of Sinequan at the time of trial. An
objection was made.
			THE COURT: I sustained the objection because there
was no evidence to support the question. But the record of
the proceedings clearly, clearly point out that I had said as
long as we were going into competency, now we were
also going into competency at time of trial. The only
reason I sustained the objection is, there was no evidence
of any 200 grams of any medication."
The court curtailed counsel's further urgings of his recollection of
matters.
	Petitioner moved to reconsider, attaching an affidavit from Dr.
James O'Donnell to the effect that his review of petitioner's
medication records indicated that petitioner was receiving 200
milligrams per day of Sinequan during the time of trial. The circuit
court denied petitioner's motion and petitioner appealed. Because
petitioner is under a death sentence, her appeal lies directly to this
court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).
	Several arguments are raised before this court, both
procedural and substantive. One of the parties' disagreements
constitutes a threshold issue, of sorts. That is, whether the circuit
court acted correctly in basing its dismissal of the petition in part
upon the information adduced at the hearing on fitness to
participate in post-conviction proceedings. We find that reversal
is necessitated on this issue, because the circuit court unacceptably
blurred the lines between the hearing on fitness for purposes of
post-conviction proceedings and an actual hearing on the fitness
question raised in the substance of the post-conviction petition.
Accordingly, we need not reach the other issues discussed by the
parties.

ANALYSIS
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 1998)) provides a remedy to criminal defendants
who claim that a substantial violation of their federal or state
constitutional rights occurred at the proceedings which resulted in
their convictions, when such a claim has not been, and could not
have been, adjudicated previously. People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 72-73 (1997); People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 242 (1995).
A proceeding under the Act is not an appeal; it is a collateral
attack on the prior judgment. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d  at 242. Issues
that were decided on direct appeal are barred by the doctrine of res
judicata, and issues that could have been raised on direct appeal,
but were not, are deemed waived. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502-03 (1998); Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 73.
	A petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a
matter of right. Rather, a hearing will be held only where the
allegations of the petition, supported by the trial court record and
accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing of a
violation of a constitutional right. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 427-28 (1998); Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 73. In determining
whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in
the petition and affidavits are taken as true. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at
503. Whether the allegations in a post-conviction petition are
sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing is reviewed de novo.
People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).
	A defendant is presumed to be fit to stand trial, to plead, and
to be sentenced. 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 1998). A defendant is
also presumed to be fit at the time of post-conviction proceedings.
See People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351 (1990). When a bona fide
doubt of a defendant's fitness to proceed with post-conviction
proceedings is raised, the court may order a psychological
evaluation of the defendant and consider the matter at an
evidentiary hearing. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d  at 365.
	The issue here is not a challenge to the trial court's initial
determination that there existed a bona fide doubt of petitioner's
fitness to proceed with the post-conviction action, nor the court's
ultimate determination that she was fit to proceed. Petitioner
challenges neither ruling on appeal, and it would be difficult
indeed for her to do so, as she requested both rulings.
	Rather, petitioner urges that it was improper for the trial court
to consider the evidence and testimony adduced at the post-conviction fitness hearing in dismissing the post-conviction
petition on the merits. Petitioner contends the court was prohibited
from considering anything other than the original trial record and
the petition and any materials attached thereto. The State responds
that in ruling on motions to dismiss post-conviction proceedings
this court permits trial courts to consider evidence adduced at trial
"or other proceedings." The State argues moreover that there is no
reason to preclude the court from considering evidence adduced in
post-conviction proceedings which was so precisely relevant to the
issues raised in the petition.
	We need not determine whether in another case it might be
appropriate for a circuit court to consider evidence adduced at a
hearing on post-conviction fitness in dismissing a post-conviction
petition. In the unique circumstances of this case, the court acted
improperly. The court precluded post-conviction counsel from
inquiry regarding the time of trial. For instance, the court
specifically barred counsel from cross-examining Dr. Markos
regarding any "medication that [petitioner] received at the time of
her trial" on the basis that the hearing "is now only on competency
today. That is the purpose of this particular hearing now." The
comments of the assistant State's Attorney make clear that it was
the understanding of the State, as well, that the hearing was
limited to post-conviction competency. However, when the court
ruled on the motion to dismiss it clearly operated under the
misapprehension that there had been a full hearing on fitness at the
time of trial. Indeed, both in its oral ruling and in the fact sheets,
the court referred to the petition as having been "denied," rather
than "dismissed." This cannot stand. The court cannot operate as
if a hearing had been held when it had not. We intimate no view
regarding the proper disposition of the petition; it is possible that
ultimately petitioner will receive no relief. But the denial of her
petition based on the trial court's misrecollection that a full
hearing had been held is unacceptable.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court
dismissing the post-conviction petition is reversed. Under the
unique circumstances of this case, where there appears to have
been such confusion regarding the hearing on petitioner's post-conviction fitness and the motion to dismiss the post-conviction
petition, we feel that the appropriate course of proceedings is for
the circuit court to conduct a hearing on the merits of the post-conviction petition. The court cannot dispose of a post-conviction
petition as if a hearing had been held, when the petitioner has been
affirmatively precluded from introducing any proof in support of
the allegations of the petition. Again, as previously noted, we
intimate no view on the ultimate disposition of this case. We also
reiterate that we express no opinion on whether a circuit court
could take into account facts adduced at a hearing on post-conviction fitness in ruling on a motion to dismiss, if all parties
were informed before the hearing on post-conviction fitness that
the court might so utilize any facts adduced. The cause is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

	Reversed and remanded.

	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree with the majority's conclusion that the circuit court
erred in dismissing Williams' post-conviction petition. I write
separately because I would go beyond the majority's disposition
and hold that Williams is entitled to immediate post-conviction
relief. Regardless of the outcome of any further proceedings on
remand, Williams' convictions and sentences cannot stand. That
is so because she was tried, convicted and sentenced under a
system of capital punishment that is fatally defective.
	Our court has now adopted a comprehensive set of new rules
governing the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the
death penalty. For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion
in People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 34-37 (September 27,
2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures contained in
those rules are indispensable for achieving an accurate
determination of innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital
cases now coming before us on review. Whether the new rules will
be sufficient to place this State's capital punishment system within
the tolerances permitted by the State and federal constitutions is a
question we cannot yet answer. It is clear, however, that no
proceeding conducted without the benefit of those rules can be
deemed reliable. As a result, remanding for further proceedings on
Williams' petition is unnecessary. Rather, we should grant
Williams relief on the merits, set aside her convictions and
sentences, and order that she be granted a new trial without further
delay.

	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
	I concur in part with the majority's judgment that the circuit
court erred in dismissing the post-conviction petition.
Nevertheless, I agree with Chief Justice Harrison that defendant's
convictions and sentence should be set aside because the trial
proceedings were not conducted in accordance with the new
supreme court rules governing capital cases. As I stated in my
dissents in People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43
(September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v.
Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35-38 (September 27, 2001)
(Kilbride, J., dissenting), I believe that the new rules should be
applied retroactively. See People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205,
220-21 (1997). Thus, this cause should be remanded for a new
trial conducted in compliance with the new rules.