Case Title: Burgos-Seberos v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-329

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Burgos-Seberos v. State1998 WY 153969 P.2d 1131Case Number: 97-329Decided: 12/10/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Eudaldo BURGOS-SEBEROS, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Sweetwater County, Jere Ryckman, J.

 

Sylvia L. Hackl, State 
Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, for 
Appellee.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and Robin Sessions Cooley, Assistant Attorney 
General, for Appellant.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Retired November 2, 1998.

 

MACY, 
Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant Eudaldo Burgos-Seberos appeals from 
the judgment and sentence entered after a jury convicted him of possessing more 
than three ounces of marihuana.

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] The appellant presents 
the following issues, which are phrased as statements, for our review on 
appeal:

 

I: 
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress the marijuana 
found in his vehicle, since Appellant did not voluntarily consent to the 
search.

 

II: Appellant did not voluntarily waive his 
constitutional right to testify since he did not understand either the rights 
themselves or the concept of waiver, due to a language 
barrier.

 

                                        
      FACTS

 

[¶4] During the early 
morning hours of September 1, 1996, Robert Mizel, Jr., a watch commander with 
the Sweetwater County sheriff's office, noticed a car driving slowly, weaving 
within its lane, and crossing the center line of the road. Thinking that the 
driver might be intoxicated, Commander Mizel stopped the vehicle and summoned 
Michael Crosson, a deputy sheriff, to assist in the stop. When Commander Mizel 
approached the vehicle, he recognized the appellant. The commander was aware 
that the appellant usually carried a gun in his car, and he, therefore, asked 
the appellant where his gun was. The appellant pointed to his legs. Commander 
Mizel told the appellant to exit and stand at the rear of the vehicle. He 
subsequently determined that the appellant was not intoxicated and told him that 
he was free to leave.

 

[¶5] The appellant remained 
outside his car and engaged in casual conversation with Commander Mizel. At some 
point during the conversation, Commander Mizel asked the appellant if he could 
search the car, and the appellant acquiesced. During his search, Commander Mizel 
discovered two packages containing approximately thirty-one ounces of marihuana. 
He arrested the appellant and charged him with possessing more than three ounces 
of marihuana. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the 
charge.

 

[¶6] The appellant's trial 
attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence that was seized during the 
search of the vehicle. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court 
denied the motion to suppress. The appellant was tried by a jury in July 1997, 
and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial court entered a judgment in 
accordance with the jury's verdict and sentenced the appellant. The appellant 
subsequently perfected his appeal to the Wyoming Supreme 
Court.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

  A. 
Motion to Suppress

 

[¶7] The appellant contends 
that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence that 
was seized during Commander Mizel's search of his car. The state asserts that 
the evidence was admissible because the appellant consented to the search. We 
agree that the appellant voluntarily gave the commander permission to search his 
car. The trial court correctly admitted the evidence that was seized during the 
search.

 

[¶8] We generally do not 
disturb evidentiary rulings made by a trial court unless the trial court abused 
its discretion. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994). In reviewing a 
trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not interfere with 
the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. 
Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 361 (Wyo. 1998). We view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial court 
has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess "the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, 
and conclusions." Id. The constitutionality of a particular search or seizure 
is, however, a question of law that we review de novo. Id.; Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶9] The appellant concedes 
that Commander Mizel's initial detention of him was proper because it was part 
of a routine traffic stop.  He 
asserts, however, that he was unlawfully detained when Commander Mizel requested 
permission to search his car and that, consequently, he did not freely give his 
consent to the search. The appellant points to the following facts as being 
evidence that he was coerced into consenting to the search: The appellant did 
not return to his vehicle before Commander Mizel sought permission to conduct 
the search; he was not told that he could decline to give his permission for the 
search; two officers attended the stop; and the stop occurred late at night on a 
deserted side street. The appellant maintains that these coercive factors, 
coupled with the facts that he was not a United States citizen and that he had a 
less-than-perfect command of the English language, rendered his consent 
involuntary.

 

[¶10] The Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution generally prohibit warrantless searches and seizures. Borgwardt v. 
State, 946 P.2d 805, 807 (Wyo. 1997). The rule that warrantless searches and 
seizures are, per se, unreasonable is, however, subject to a few exceptions. 
Id.; Gehnert, 956 P.2d  at 362. Searches and seizures that are conducted pursuant 
to a valid consent fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the 
prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures. Gehnert, 956 P.2d  at 362; 
Jones, 902 P.2d  at 690.

 

[¶11] In the course of 
making a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may: request a driver's 
license and vehicle registration; run a computer check; and issue a citation. 
United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 539-40 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 
224. Generally, the driver must be allowed to proceed without further delay once 
the officer determines that the driver has a valid license and is entitled to 
operate the vehicle. Elliott, 107 F.3d  at 813. An officer may further question a 
driver, however, if the driver voluntarily consents to the additional 
questioning. Id.; Sandoval, 29 F.3d  at 540. When the driver has given his 
voluntary consent to being questioned further, no seizure has taken place. 
Elliott, 107 F.3d  at 813; Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 
115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991). A consensual encounter between a law enforcement officer 
and a citizen does not prompt constitutional scrutiny. Bostick, 501 U.S.  at 434, 
111 S. Ct. 2382.

 

[¶12] In determining whether 
a warrantless search was justified by a valid consent, we inquire "into the 
'voluntariness' of the consent in light of 'the totality of the circumstances' " 
of the particular case. Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Wyo. 1985). See also 
Elliott, 107 F.3d  at 813-14. Some of the factors that a court may consider in 
determining whether the consent was voluntary include: the way the law 
enforcement officer phrased the request for permission to search; whether the 
officer told the individual that he could refuse the request; and the presence 
of other coercive factors. Stamper v. State, 662 P.2d 82, 87 (Wyo. 1983). We 
must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine 
whether a reasonable person would have felt "free to decline the officers' 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Bostick, 501 U.S.  at 436, 111 S. Ct. 2382. See also Sandoval, 29 F.3d  at 540. No single factor is determinative 
when we are ascertaining whether a seizure occurred. Sandoval, 29 F.3d  at 
540.

 

[¶13] In Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the voluntariness of a driver's 
consent to search in the context of a routine traffic stop. In that case, a 
patrolman issued a warning ticket to Elliott after he stopped her for exceeding 
the speed limit. 107 F.3d  at 812. The patrolman returned Elliott's driver's 
license and registration to her and asked if there was anything illegal in the 
trunk of her car. Id. Elliott responded in the negative. The patrolman requested 
permission to inspect the trunk, and Elliott agreed. Id. The patrolman 
discovered marihuana during his search of the trunk. 107 F.3d  at 
812-13.

 

[¶14] The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals determined that Elliott had voluntarily consented to the 
patrolman's search. 107 F.3d  at 814.1 In concluding that Elliott's 
consent was voluntary, the court stated that, although the patrolman did not 
inform Elliott that she was free to leave after he returned the documentation to 
her, the patrolman's questioning was not accompanied by a "coercive show of 
authority." 107 F.3d  at 814. The court noted that the patrolman testified that 
he did not lean on or touch Elliott's car, his demeanor was normal, he did not 
threaten Elliott or her passenger, and he did not gesture toward his holster. 
Id. The court determined that, after the patrolman returned Elliott's 
documentation to her, the remainder of the encounter between them was " 'an 
ordinary consensual encounter between a private citizen and a law enforcement 
official.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th 
Cir. 1990)).

 

[¶15] In the case at bar, 
Commander Mizel stopped the appellant to determine whether he was intoxicated. 
After Commander Mizel determined that the appellant was not intoxicated, he told 
him that he was free to leave. The appellant did not, however, return to his car 
but chose, instead, to linger outside and engage in a casual conversation with 
the commander. Because the appellant was not being detained and was free to 
leave at that time, the encounter was consensual.

 

[¶16] Commander Mizel 
testified at the motion-to-suppress hearing that he subsequently asked the 
appellant for permission to search his vehicle. Although the commander was not 
sure of his exact words, he stated that he said something like: " 'Would you 
have a problem if I searched the car?' " or " 'Would it be okay with you if I 
searched your car[?]' " The commander testified that the appellant replied: " 
'Yes. I have no problem.' " Commander Mizel explained that his conversation with 
the appellant continued as follows:

 

[COMMANDER MIZEL]: When [the appellant] said, "Yes. I 
have no problem with it[,]" I said, "Well, I appreciate it, you know. Last time 
we talked, you cooperated and said I could search your car [at] any time[,"] and 
he said, "That's right.  I have 
nothing to hide[."]

 

Commander Mizel then 
proceeded to search the car and discovered the marihuana.

 

[¶17] Deputy Crosson 
testified at the motion hearing that the appellant did not object to Commander 
Mizel's search of his car. The deputy also testified that he stood five to eight 
feet away from the appellant during the search. No evidence was presented to 
show that the officers displayed their weapons, handcuffed the appellant, or 
used a commanding tone of voice in attaining permission to search the car. Even 
though two officers were present and the hour was late, the general tenor of the 
encounter between the appellant and the officers was one of 
cooperation.

 

[¶18] Although the 
appellant's native language was apparently Spanish, he conversed with Commander 
Mizel in English, and he did not indicate, at any time, that he did not 
understand the commander. Additionally, the state presented evidence at the 
motion hearing that showed the appellant had also conversed in English during 
prior contacts with law enforcement officers. The trial court determined that 
the appellant had a sufficient command of the English language to give his 
consent to the search. We agree with the trial court. Despite the fact that the 
appellant's choice of words was not technically correct, he clearly intended to 
grant Commander Mizel permission to search the car.

 

[¶19] Considering the 
totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination, we conclude that the officers did not coerce the appellant into 
consenting to the search and that the appellant did, in fact, voluntarily grant 
his permission for Commander Mizel to search his car. The trial court did not, 
therefore, abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to 
suppress.

 

B. Right to Testify

 

[¶20] The appellant did not 
testify during his trial. He asserts on appeal that he did not voluntarily waive 
his right to testify because he did not understand "either the rights themselves 
or the concept of waiver, due to a language barrier." He claims that he would 
have testified that the marihuana did not belong to him.

 

[¶21] The United States 
Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to testify in his own 
defense. Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 797 (Wyo. 1995); Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1125 (Wyo. 1997). The right to testify is a fundamental right, and it 
is grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment's 
privilege against self-incrimination. Herdt, 891 P.2d  at 797; Rock v. Arkansas, 
483 U.S. 44, 50-51, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987).

 

[¶22] In order to succeed on 
appeal, an appellant must initially demonstrate that "he was denied his right to 
testify and that he would have offered relevant testimony if he had testified." 
Harris, 933 P.2d  at 1125. See also Sanchez v. State, 841 P.2d 85, 88 (Wyo. 
1992). If an appellant satisfies his initial burden, the state has the 
responsibility to show that the denial of the appellant's right to testify was 
harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanchez, 841 P.2d  at 
88.

 

[¶23] The appellant's trial 
attorney and the trial judge had a lengthy discussion with the appellant about 
his right to testify and the effect of waiving that right. The appellant was 
assisted by an interpreter throughout the trial and during the conference with 
the attorney and the judge. Although the appellant initially seemed to be 
confused about the differences between the trial process and the appellate 
process, the transcript reveals he understood that he had the option of 
testifying at the trial and that, if he waived the right, he could not change 
his mind later. The appellant steadfastly stated throughout his discussion with 
his counsel and the judge that he did not want to testify on his own behalf. He 
apparently believed that the state had not proven he was guilty of the charged 
crime and that it was not necessary, 
therefore, for him to testify.

 

[¶24] A representative 
sample of the discussion between the appellant, his attorney, and the judge 
illustrates the appellant's adamant refusal to testify on his own behalf at the 
trial:

 

          
COURT: You understand that you have the right to testify if you 
wish?

           

          
APPELLANT]: Yes. Yeah, Your Honor.

 

          
COURT: And you've made the decision not to testify?

 

          
[APPELLANT]: Yes.

 

          
COURT: And is that your decision?

 

          
[APPELLANT]: Yes, it's my decision.

 

          
. . . .

 

COURT: But as I said before, you can't decide in an 
hour that you want to testify after you're telling me you don't want  to.

 

[APPELLANT]: I understand this. I understand - I 
understand, Your Honor. I no want to testify. I understand that I can't testify 
later. I can't change.

 

[¶25] The appellant argues 
that he did not have sufficient comprehension of the English language to 
understand that he had the right to the testify or the effect of waiving that 
right. His argument ignores the fact that he had an interpreter available to 
assist him during the discussion with his attorney and the judge about his right 
to testify. Furthermore, the judge commented that the appellant seemed to 
comprehend the majority of the discussion without the interpreter's assistance. 
The appellant does not complain about the interpreter's performance, and he does 
not explain what more the trial court could have done to help him overcome his 
language difficulty.

 

[¶26] We conclude that the 
appellant was not denied his right to testify on his own behalf. His counsel and 
the judge gave him every opportunity to testify. They, aided by the interpreter, 
took great pains to ensure that the appellant comprehended his right to testify 
and the consequences of waiving that right. The record reveals that the 
appellant understood he had the right to testify and that he knowingly and 
deliberately waived that right.

 

[¶27] 
Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did ultimately rule, however, that the patrolman 
exceeded the scope of Elliott's consent when he looked inside the bags that were 
located in the trunk. Elliott, 107 F.3d  at 815-16.