Case Title: People v. Phillips

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98070

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 98070-Agenda 6-March 2005.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee v. RUDY 							PHILLIPS, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 3, 2005.
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Rudy Phillips, was arrested after a technician found
child pornography on defendant's computer and informed the police.
Defendant made incriminating statements and consented to a search
of his home, which found more apparent child pornography. He was
charged by indictment with one count of possessing, with intent to
disseminate, a picture of a child engaged in sexual intercourse (720
ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1)(i), (a)(2) (West 2000)), and two counts of
possessing, with intent to disseminate, a picture of a child engaged in
oral sex (720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(1)(ii), (a)(2) (West 2000)).
Defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, which
was denied. After a bench trial in the circuit court of Kankakee
County, he was convicted of all three counts. Defendant appealed,
claiming the child pornography statute is unconstitutionally overbroad,
that the indictment was defective, that the circuit court erred in
denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, and that he
was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court
affirmed, with one justice dissenting. 346 Ill. App. 3d 487. Defendant
sought and obtained leave to appeal to this court. See 177 Ill. 2d R.
315. He has abandoned his constitutional attack on the statute, but
renews his other claims.

BACKGROUND
	On October 11, 2001, defendant took his computer to Fifth
Avenue Video in Kankakee to have it repaired. Defendant had
originally purchased the computer from John Paris, the proprietor of
Fifth Avenue Video. On the morning of October 12, after repairing the
computer, Paris tested it by playing an MPG file he accessed through
the My Documents menu on the Windows 98 desktop. The file proved
to be a short video depicting what appeared to be a young girl
performing oral sex on a man, with a woman looking on. Paris
immediately called Detective Buhrmester of the Bradley police
department, because he was an acquaintance. He told Buhrmester
what he had seen, and asked him to come and look at it.
	When Buhrmester arrived, Paris played the video for him.
Buhrmester agreed it was child pornography and informed other
officers. At about 10 a.m. Detectives Coy and Morris arrived, and
Paris played the video for them. There is conflicting testimony
regarding whether Coy and Morris proceeded to examine other files
on defendant's computer while they were at Fifth Avenue Video. The
officers decided to place Fifth Avenue Video under surveillance, and
asked Paris to contact them by cell phone when defendant returned to
pick up his computer. Paris did so. The officers stopped defendant
outside the store and, after he identified himself and told them the
computer was his, they arrested him and seized his computer.
	At the police station defendant received Miranda warnings and
agreed to speak with the officers. Morris testified defendant said he
did not produce child pornography, but was just a collector who
exchanged child pornography over the Internet, and that he would
post child pornography on Web sites in order to become a member.
Defendant also admitted there was child pornography at his home. He
consented in writing to a search of his home.
	At defendant's home, he handed the officers two pictures that
appeared to have been downloaded and printed from the Internet.
Each picture was sexually explicit and appeared to depict a preteen
girl. Defendant next showed the officers a box of 3- by 5-inch
computer disks and told them the disks contained child pornography.
The officers loaded several of the disks into a laptop computer
brought for that purpose, and viewed numerous pictures of what
appeared to be children engaged in vaginal, anal, and oral sex. The
officers seized the two printed pictures, over 100 disks, and various
pieces of computer equipment. Defendant was later indicted.
	Defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence,
in which he argued the warrantless search of his computer was illegal
because Paris lacked authority to consent to a search of his computer.
After a hearing in which Paris and Morris testified to the facts
recounted above, the court denied the motion. The court found Paris'
initial search of the file on defendant's computer was the act of a
private citizen, not an agent of law enforcement. The court further
found that the police viewed the same video Paris viewed, and by
doing so they acquired probable cause to arrest defendant. The court
found the officers had probably not viewed any items on defendant's
computer other than the video Paris viewed.
	Defendant then filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his
motion to suppress. The court issued a written ruling in which it again
held the police could legally arrest defendant after viewing the video
Paris viewed. However, the court reversed its finding that the police
had not viewed any other files. The court accordingly barred the State
from using at trial any file obtained from defendant's computer other
than the one Paris had discovered.
	At trial, Paris and Morris again testified to the facts recounted
above. The State introduced the two printed pictures defendant turned
over to police, as well as a number of pictures printed from the disks
seized from defendant's home. Finally the court admitted the disks,
and viewed a small sample of the pictures that were stored on the
disks but had not been printed. Each of the pictures from the disks
appeared to depict a child engaged in a sex act, including sexual
intercourse and performing or receiving oral sex.
	The court made a number of express findings before announcing
its verdict. First, the court found the police did not "exceed the scope
of the initial search by the private citizen." The court then found the
pictures admitted at trial depicted real children under the age of 18.
Regarding the element of intent to disseminate the pictures, the court
noted there were duplicate pictures in evidence, which by statute
creates a rebuttable presumption of intent. However, the court then
stated that, "[w]ithout considering the two instances of duplicate
[sic]," it found Morris' testimony that defendant admitted he
exchanged child pornography over the Internet to be "very credible."
The court then found the State had proven possession of child
pornography with intent to disseminate as to all three counts. The
court later sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 4½ years and
a $1,000 fine for each count. Defendant appealed.

ANALYSIS
I. The Indictment
	Defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the indictment
was defective for failure to adequately inform him of the charges. He
also argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to attack the
indictment or request a bill of particulars.
		"Where a defendant challenges the sufficiency of an
indictment or information for the first time on appeal, a
reviewing court need only determine whether the charging
instrument apprised the defendant of the precise offense
charged with enough specificity to prepare his or her defense
and allow pleading a resulting conviction as a bar to future
prosecution arising out of the same conduct. [Citations.] In
making this determination, the reviewing court may resort to
the record. [Citation.]" People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336,
347-48 (2001).
Thus, the question is whether, in light of the facts of record, the
indictment was so imprecise as to prejudice defendant's ability to
prepare a defense. See People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill. 2d 441, 448
(1991).
	The indictment charged defendant as follows:
			"Count I *** That on or about the 11th day of October,
2001, in the County of Kankakee and State of Illinois, [the
defendant] committed the offense of CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY, in that said defendant, with the
knowledge of the nature or content thereof, possessed, with
intent to disseminate, a photograph or other similar visual
reproduction or depiction by computer, of a child whom he
knew or reasonably should have known to be under the age
of 18, actually or by simulation engaged in an act of sexual
intercourse with another person, in violation of Chapter 720,
Paragraph 5/11-20.1(a)(2)(i) of the Illinois Compiled
Statutes.
			Count II *** That on or about the 11th day of October,
2001, in the County of Kankakee and State of Illinois, [the
defendant] committed the offense of CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY, in that said defendant, with the
knowledge of the nature or content thereof, possessed, with
intent to disseminate, a photograph or other similar visual
reproduction or depiction by computer, of a child whom he
knew or reasonably should have known to be under the age
of 18, actually or by simulation engaged in an act of sexual
contact involving the mouth of the child and the sex organs
of another person, in violation of Chapter 720, Paragraph
5/11-20.1(a)(2)(ii) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes.
			Count III *** That on or about the 11th day of October,
2001, in the County of Kankakee and State of Illinois, [the
defendant] committed the offense of CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY, in that said defendant, with the
knowledge of the nature or content thereof, possessed, with
intent to disseminate, a photograph or other similar visual
reproduction or depiction by computer, of a child whom he
knew or reasonably should have known to be under the age
of 18, actually or by simulation engaged in an act of sexual
contact involving the sex organ of the child and the mouth of
another person, in violation of Chapter 720, Paragraph
5/11-20.1(a)(2)(ii) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes."
Defendant claims the indictment was imprecise in two ways. First,
each of the three counts charged him in the disjunctive by charging
that he possessed "a photograph or other similar visual reproduction
or depiction by computer." Second, each count failed to specify which
of the numerous pictures seized from his home would be offered at
trial.
	Defendant relies on People v. Eagle Books, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 235
(1992), to support his first argument. In Eagle Books, each of the 144
counts of the indictment alleged the defendant "provided, offered for
sale, or otherwise made available" an obscene magazine. Eagle Books,
151 Ill. 2d  at 245. We concluded the indictment was duplicitous, and
therefore void, because providing a magazine, offering it for sale, and
making it available are three disparate acts. Eagle Books, 151 Ill. 2d 
at 245-46. We noted that a defendant is prejudiced by a charging
instrument that alleges disparate acts in a single count because " '[t]he
use of the disjunctive under these circumstances causes uncertainty
and conjecture as to which of the alternative acts the accused is
charged with committing.' " Eagle Books, 151 Ill. 2d  at 245, quoting
People v. Heard, 47 Ill. 2d 501, 505 (1970). Defendant argues that
possessing a photograph is an act disparate from possessing some
"other visual reproduction," which in turn is an act disparate from
possessing a "depiction by computer." The State replies that the act
of possession relating to each of the three alternatives is the same act.
	On the facts of this case, we agree with the State. Defendant
certainly should have understood he was charged with possessing
pornographic pictures of children. The disjunctive language in each
count simply gave the State flexibility as to the physical form of the
pictures. That flexibility did not leave defendant uncertain about which
of several disparate acts he stood accused of committing, because the
record makes clear that on the date of his arrest he possessed all of the
pictures the police seized from him. Thus, in this case there was only
one act of possession, not three disparate and alternative acts. The
disjunctive language in the indictment did not prejudice defendant.
	Secondly, defendant argues the indictment was impermissibly
vague because its failure to specify which of the numerous pictures the
police seized would be offered into evidence made it "virtually
impossible" to prepare an adequate defense. We disagree. Defendant's
argument amounts to a claim that an indictment for child pornography
must preview the State's evidence. He cites no authority that supports
that proposition.
	People v. McNair, 89 Ill. 441 (1878), does not aid defendant. In
McNair, two of the counts of the indictment charged defendant with,
respectively, producing and giving away "a certain obscene and
indecent pamphlet," which was not further described in those counts.
We held those counts insufficient for failure to adequately inform the
defendant of the "nature and cause of the accusation." McNair, 89 Ill. 
at 444. In this case, the three counts of the indictment informed
defendant he was accused of possessing pictures of children engaged
in sexual intercourse, performing oral sex, and receiving oral sex.
Unlike the defendant in McNair, who was charged regarding a
pamphlet that was neither identified nor described, this defendant was
given, in the explicit language of the statute, a suitable description of
the kinds of pictures he was accused of possessing. The defendant in
McNair was given no indication why the pamphlet in question was
allegedly obscene, whereas this defendant was told exactly why the
pictures he was accused of possessing were child pornography. To
require more detail in this case would be to improperly require that the
indictment include one count for each image on the more than 100
disks seized at defendant's home-thousands of counts-or that it
preview the State's case by telling defendant exactly what evidence
would be offered.
	Defendant also asserts that the indictment was insufficient to
serve as a bar to double jeopardy, because the State could base a
successive prosecution of defendant for child pornography on any of
the pictures seized by the police but not introduced at defendant's
trial. However, defendant fails to support his assertion with argument
or citation to relevant authority. Points not argued are waived. 188 Ill.
2d R. 341(e)(7).
	In sum, we conclude defendant's arguments that the indictment
was defective lack merit. Because the indictment was not defective,
defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to attack it or
request a bill of particulars.

II. Defendant's Motion to Suppress
	Defendant claims the chain of events leading to his arrest
involved a violation of his fourth amendment right to privacy in his
computer. On that basis, he argues his statements to police and the
other evidence introduced against him should have been suppressed.
When reviewing a circuit court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the
court upholds findings of historical fact unless they are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502,
512 (2004). However, the question whether the facts require
suppression of the evidence is reviewed de novo. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 
at 512.
	The fourth amendment applies only to government action. United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 94, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984). A search by a private person does not violate
the fourth amendment. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.  at 115, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 95,
104 S. Ct.  at 1657. Further, the fourth amendment does not prohibit
the government from using information discovered by a private
search, because the private search has already frustrated any
expectation that the information will remain private. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.  at 117, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 96, 104 S. Ct.  at 1658. "The Fourth
Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with
respect to which the expectation of privacy has not already been
frustrated. In such a case the authorities have not relied on what is in
effect a private search, and therefore presumptively violate the Fourth
Amendment if they act without a warrant." Jacobsen, 466 U.S.  at
117-18, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 97, 104 S. Ct.  at 1658-59. Thus, where the
government uses privately discovered information to investigate a
crime without first obtaining a warrant, the fourth amendment
question is whether the investigation "exceeded the scope of the
private search." Jacobsen, 466 U.S.  at 115, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 95, 104 S. Ct.  at 1657.
	In Jacobsen, employees of a shipping company opened a
damaged box pursuant to company policy. They found crumpled
newspaper and a tube made of duct tape. They cut open the tube and
found a series of four clear plastic bags, the innermost of which
contained white powder. They put the bags back in the tube and the
tube back in the box and called federal authorities. When the first
federal agent arrived, he removed and opened the bags and field tested
the powder. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the agent's
visual inspection of the white powder was not a "search" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment because it "enabled the agent to
learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the private
search." Jacobsen, 466 U.S.  at 120, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 98, 104 S. Ct.  at
1660.
	Defendant argues that in this case the police exceeded the scope
of Paris's search when they opened the MPG file to view the video,
because there is no evidence that Paris gave Buhrmester a "particular
description" of what the video depicted before showing it to him.
However, Paris testified he told Buhrmester that the video appeared
to him to be child pornography. Once the police knew that, learning
with more precision what the video depicted did not take them beyond
the scope of Paris' search. See United States v. Simpson, 904 F.2d 607, 610 (11th Cir. 1990) (Government agents' search "did not
exceed the scope of the prior private searches *** simply because they
took more time and were more thorough"). In this case, the police
gained no new material information by viewing the video. They merely
confirmed Paris' report that it appeared to be child pornography.
	Our decision in People v. Hamilton, 74 Ill. 2d 457 (1979), is not
to the contrary. In Hamilton, a search of the defendant's briefcase
conducted pursuant to hospital policy by a nurse and an orderly
revealed a substance that the orderly believed was heroin. However,
the nurse only told the investigating officer "you better check the
briefcase," without explaining why. On those facts, we held that the
heroin was not discovered by the private search, but by a second
search conducted by the police. Hamilton, 74 Ill. 2d  at 471. In this
case, because Paris told the police he thought the video was child
pornography, it was discovered by the private search, not by a police
search.
	Defendant argues, alternatively, that Jacobsen should not apply
when the object of the search is material presumptively protected by
the first amendment, such as text or video. Defendant further suggests
that Jacobsen should not apply to a search of the hard drive of a
personal computer because it is a "highly private" area. We disagree.
Jacobsen reasoned that the fourth amendment does not protect
information once a private search has frustrated the defendant's
expectation that the information would remain private. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.  at 117, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 96-97, 104 S. Ct.  at 1658-59. That
reasoning applies just as well to the contents of defendant's computer
as it did to information about what was inside the elaborately sealed
package in Jacobsen. We conclude the police did not violate the
fourth amendment when they viewed the video Paris had already
viewed and reported as apparent child pornography.
	It is undisputed that, after viewing the video and confirming that
the computer belonged to defendant, the police had probable cause
sufficient to justify arresting defendant. Subsequent to his arrest,
defendant made incriminating statements and consented to the search
of his home. That search in turn produced all of the apparent child
pornography admitted at trial, except for the video Paris had viewed.
Defendant argues that the police went beyond the scope of Paris'
search by viewing other items on his computer. The trial court agreed
in its written ruling on the motion to reconsider denial of the motion
to suppress, and accordingly suppressed any items obtained from
defendant's computer except the initial video. Defendant argues his
consent to search and his statements were tainted because the police
confronted him with the illegally obtained evidence. The State replies
that the trial court ultimately found, after trial, that the police did not
exceed the scope of the private search, thereby reversing its earlier
finding that the police viewed other items.
	It is unnecessary to resolve the controversy about whether the
trial court ultimately found the police viewed additional items on
defendant's computer. Assuming, arguendo, that defendant is correct,
he is still not entitled to relief because nothing in the record indicates
he was confronted with any illegally obtained evidence. Detective
Morris testified he told defendant he was being investigated for
suspected child pornography in relation to "what was recovered or
what was viewed on his computer." Morris later clarified that he "told
[defendant] that what was observed on his computer, what was
located while it was being worked on." Absent record evidence that
the police specifically confronted defendant with evidence obtained
illegally, defendant's argument has no factual basis.
	In sum, we find no error in the admission of the evidence seized
during the search of defendant's home, nor in the admission of
defendant's statements to police.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
	Defendant next argues the evidence was insufficient to prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. When a court reviews the
sufficiency of the evidence, it must ask "whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781,
2789 (1979). We have adopted the Jackson formulation of the
standard of review. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). It
applies in all criminal cases, regardless of the nature of the evidence.
People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 217 (2002).
	In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court
invalidated a federal statute making it a crime to possess a picture
"that *** appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct" because it impermissibly criminalized virtual child
pornography, i.e., realistic pornographic pictures generated entirely by
computer without the use of real children. Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256, 152 L. Ed. 2d 403, 425, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1405 (2002) (invalidating 18 U.S.C. §2256(8)(B) (2000)).
Applying Ashcroft, we invalidated the definition of "child" in the
section of the Criminal Code that prohibits child pornography because
the definition included virtual images that only appear to depict a real
child. People v. Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d 472, 482-83 (2003)
(invalidating section 11-20.1(f)(7) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS
5/11-20.1(f)(7) (West Supp. 2001))). We further held the rest of the
child pornography statute was severable from the statutory definition
of "child." Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d  at 485. We finally held that, once
severed, the statute only applies to pornographic pictures of actual
children because the plain meaning of the word "child" includes only
actual children. Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d  at 485-86. Thus, the parties
correctly agree that, as to each count, the State was required to prove
that the picture in question depicts a real child and is not merely a
virtual image. Defendant contends the State failed to prove that
element beyond a reasonable doubt for any of the counts.
	The sole evidence that the pictures admitted at trial depicted real
children was the pictures themselves. Defendant argues that, without
other evidence, the most a trier of fact could reasonably conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt is that the pictures appear to depict real
children, not that they do depict real children. Put another way,
defendant contends that the pictures cannot stand alone as proof;
rather, some further evidence, such as expert opinion, was needed to
bridge the logical gap between how a picture appears and what it
actually is.
	All of the circuits of the federal court of appeals to consider the
question have held pictures may stand alone as proof that real children
are depicted. See United States v. Farrelly, 389 F.3d 649, 653-55 (6th
Cir. 2004) (and cases cited therein). In Farrelly, the prosecution
presented expert testimony regarding the age of the children in the
pictures, but the expert admitted she was not qualified to opine
whether the images were of actual children or had been generated by
computer. The defendant argued on appeal that, absent testimony of
an expert qualified to address the possibility the pictures were virtual
images, he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In
rejecting this argument, the court relied on United States v. Kimler,
335 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2003), which held that "[j]uries are
still capable of distinguishing between real and virtual images."
Kimler, in turn, relies on a passage from Ashcroft, which rejects the
hypothesis that virtual images are identical to real images. We will
discuss that passage from Ashcroft in some detail below.
	Defendant argues that the question cannot be decided by
consulting precedent, because the correct answer depends on the state
of computer technology at the relevant time, and the state of computer
technology is constantly changing. A defendant may be denied relief
to which he is entitled if courts consider only the state of the law and
not the state of technology. We do not understand defendant to mean
precedent is completely useless, only that it cannot be the sole basis
for decision. Clearly, precedent may be instructive even when it is not
dispositive. Subject to that caveat, we agree with defendant's
argument. Accordingly, we will consider defendant's argument that
the pictures introduced against him could not stand alone as proof that
they are pictures of real children, even though the same argument has
been consistently rejected in other jurisdictions.
	In many instances, a particular kind of evidence may be sufficient,
standing alone, to prove an element of a crime. For example, jurors
may use their own reason and experience to decide whether to accept
eyewitness testimony as the truth about what happened, without the
aid of expert opinion regarding the reliability of eyewitnesses. People
v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 289-90 (1990). In other instances, evidence
cannot stand alone. For example, the prosecution could not prove a
substance is marijuana simply by introducing the substance and asking
the trier of fact to apply its reason and experience. See People v. Park,
72 Ill. 2d 203, 209-11 (1978) (holding inadmissible a witness' opinion
that a substance was marijuana because the opinion was based only on
four years' experience as a police officer and not chemical or
microscopic analysis). At oral argument, defendant suggested the
pictures in this case cannot stand alone, just as a substance admitted
in the typical drug case cannot. He suggested that, absent evidence
specifically identifying the children in the pictures, expert testimony
was required to prove they were pictures of real children.
	Defendant is certainly correct that expert testimony might have
aided the trier of fact. It could conceivably have shown whether
realistic virtual child pornography existed at the relevant time and, if
it did, whether the pictures introduced against defendant were virtual
images. However, the comparison between this case and a drug
prosecution, though instructive, does not support defendant's claim.
In Park, we relied on statistics from the Wisconsin State Crime
Laboratory showing that 1 out of 7 samples turned in as marijuana
proved to be something else. We concluded that nonexperts are
unacceptably prone to mistake other plants for marijuana. Park, 72 Ill. 2d  at 208. By comparison, in this case we find little or no reason to
fear that realistic virtual child pornography exists and was so readily
available as to create an unacceptable risk that the trial judge, unaided
by expert testimony, mistook legal computer-generated images for
illegal child pornography.
	In taking the contrary view, the appellate court dissent stressed
the fact that Congress found, prior to the beginning of this case, that
highly realistic virtual child pornography exists. 346 Ill. App. 3d at
499, (Slater, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing
Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d  at 477-78, quoting 18 U.S.C. §2251,
Congressional Findings, Note (5) (2000). We give Congress' finding
due consideration. However, we find the reasoning of Ashcroft to be
persuasive proof that realistic virtual images are not widely available.
See People v. Normand, No. 97984, slip op. at 11 (June 3, 2005). The
Ashcroft Court, in pertinent part, reasoned as follows:
			"The Government next argues that its objective of
eliminating the market for pornography produced using real
children necessitates a prohibition on virtual images as well.
Virtual images, the Government contends, are
indistinguishable from real ones; they are part of the same
market and are often exchanged. In this way, it is said, virtual
images promote the trafficking in works produced through
the exploitation of real children. The hypothesis is somewhat
implausible. If virtual images were identical to illegal child
pornography, the illegal images would be driven from the
market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few
pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real
children if fictional, computerized images would suffice."
(Emphasis added.) Ashcroft, 535 U.S.  at 254, 152 L. Ed. 2d 
at 423, 122 S. Ct.  at 1403-04.
The italicized portion applies directly to defendant's argument that,
for all we know, there are virtual images that are indistinguishable
from real ones. Moreover, the italicized passage is clearly correct.
Because there is obviously substantial demand for illegal child
pornography, people would be all too willing to produce a legal
substitute were it readily available. The "market" for illegal child
pornography would quickly be flooded with the legal substitute.
Furthermore, the comparison between child pornography and illegal
drugs implies a further conclusion, not expressly stated in Ashcroft. If
a legal substance that does what marijuana or cocaine do ever became
available, it would obviously change the drug trade dramatically. Such
a change could hardly go unnoticed, at least in legal and law
enforcement circles. The same applies to child pornography. If a legal
substitute-realistic virtual pornography-became available, it would
dramatically affect the "market" for child pornography and would
surely not go unnoticed. See Normand, slip op. at 11. Therefore,
because we are not aware of it now, it is highly unlikely that realistic
virtual child pornography was available on the day defendant was
arrested some 3½ years ago.
	The prosecution bears the burden of proving each and every
element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Maggette,
195 Ill. 2d  at 353. However, mere possibilities or speculation are
insufficient to raise reasonable doubt. See People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 211-12 (2004). Defendant's suggestion that the pictures
introduced against him at trial may in fact be virtual images relies on
the congressional finding, made prior to his arrest, that realistic virtual
images were available. He also argues, alternatively, that we simply do
not know whether such images were available and therefore the
prosecution had the burden of proving that they were not. We
disagree. Our analysis in the previous paragraph shows that the
congressional finding was likely incorrect at the relevant time, and that
defendant does nothing more than raise a bare possibility that is
insufficient to overturn the verdict in this case.
	In sum, we conclude the trier of fact in this case could distinguish
real from virtual pictures beyond a reasonable doubt simply by
viewing the pictures. After reviewing the pictures ourselves, we hold
a trier of fact could reasonably find they depict real children.
	Defendant next argues the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he intended to disseminate the pictures he
possessed. He argues, first, that all of the evidence, including his
admission to police that he exchanged child pornography over the
Internet, at most proves past dissemination, not a present intent to
disseminate. Defendant points out he did not have telephone service
at the time of his arrest, which, he suggests, tends to show he had no
ability to access the Internet, and therefore no present intent to
disseminate. We disagree. Defendant's admission he would exchange
child pornography on the Internet using his computer, on its face,
describes his habit or practice. It was not couched as something he
used to do but had given up. It supports a reasonable inference that he
intended to continue exchanging child pornography on the Internet
when he could. Furthermore, defendant had his computer repaired
immediately before his arrest, which implies he intended to continue
using it. The computer contained software for Earth Link, which is an
Internet Service Provider (ISP). Morris testified Earth Link was not
defendant's ISP, but that an unidentified "friend" of defendant had an
account with Earth Link. Morris testified the friend told him defendant
used the friend's Internet service. The fact defendant had no phone
service therefore does little or nothing to defeat the inference that he
intended to continue his admitted practice of exchanging child
pornography on the Internet.
	Defendant also argues his admission to police that he exchanged
pornography on the Internet was insufficiently corroborated to
establish the corpus delicti of the crime of possession with intent to
disseminate. A criminal conviction may not be based solely on an
uncorroborated confession. People v. Willingham, 89 Ill. 2d 352, 358-59 (1982). There must be some evidence, independent of the
confession, tending to show the crime did occur. Willingham, 89 Ill. 2d  at 358. However, there is no requirement that the corroborating
evidence prove the existence of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Willingham, 89 Ill. 2d  at 359. Rather, if the defendant's confession is
corroborated, then the confession and the corroboration may be
considered together to determine whether the crime, and the fact the
defendant committed it, have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Willingham, 89 Ill. 2d  at 360.
	In this case there is ample corroboration of defendant's admission
that he exchanged child pornography over the Internet. The computer
containing Earth Link software, Morris' testimony that defendant's
friend told him that defendant accessed the Internet through the
friend's Earth Link account, and the numerous digital pictures on the
disks discovered in defendant's home all corroborate defendant's
admission.
	In sum, the prosecution introduced sufficient evidence to prove,
for each of the three counts on which defendant was convicted, that
defendant possessed a pornographic picture of a real child with the
intent to disseminate.

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed.

Affirmed.