Case Title: Combs v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20S-CR-00616

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2021-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 20S-CR-616 
James Combs, 
Appellant (Defendant below), 
–v– 
State of Indiana, 
Appellee (Plaintiff below). 
Argued: December 10, 2020 | Decided: June 3, 2021 
Appeal from the Boone Superior Court 
No. 06D02-1702-F3-134 
The Honorable Bruce E. Petit, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 19A-CR-1991 
Opinion by Justice Massa 
Chief Justice Rush and Justice David concur. 
Justice Slaughter concurs in the judgment with separate opinion. 
Justice Goff dissents with separate opinion. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Jun 03 2021, 11:23 am
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Massa, Justice. 
James Combs was driving his company van when he swerved off the 
road and demolished a utility box. He then drove to his nearby home. The 
responding officer found Combs just as he parked in his front driveway. 
The officer ultimately took Combs to the hospital for a blood test. After 
they left, other officers towed the van as evidence of leaving the scene of 
an accident. Before the tow, they conducted an inventory search, which 
revealed pills in a bag under the driver’s seat.  
Combs was charged with several offenses, including four based on the 
pills. After he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the pills, a jury convicted 
him of all but one charge. On appeal, a panel concluded the pills should 
have been suppressed. Finding the van’s seizure and search lawful, we 
affirm the trial court.  
Facts and Procedural History 
In the late afternoon of February 11, 2017, Combs was driving north on 
Lafayette Avenue in Lebanon, Indiana. He was in a yellow Ford van that 
prominently advertised the company he ran with his wife—Combs Gold 
& Stuff, a pawn shop and gold-buying business. In addition to the name, 
the van included the company’s phone number, address, and slogans, 
making it “a mobile billboard.” Tr. Vol. II, p.62.  
While speeding, Combs came upon stopped traffic near the Lebanon 
Street Department. He swerved to his right to avoid hitting the vehicle in 
front of him, driving off the road and demolishing a utility box. Witnesses 
called 911 to report the crash. Combs exited the van, viewed the scene, 
took pictures, and rummaged around under the driver’s seat. He then 
drove away, over the objections of witnesses, to his home in Clear Vista 
Estates, a nearby neighborhood.  
Officer James Koontz of the Lebanon Police Department quickly 
arrived at the crash scene. He spoke with a witness, who described the 
van as “yellow” with “Combs on the side” and pointed him toward Clear 
Vista. Tr. Vol. III, p.21. As he drove through the neighborhood, a family 
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who saw the van pointed Officer Koontz in its direction. The van had also 
left a “a fluid trail” that helped guide Officer Koontz. Tr. Vol. II, p.9. 
Officer Koontz spotted a van that matched the witness’ description in a 
driveway and pulled in behind it as Combs was stepping out of it. After 
exiting his vehicle, Officer Koontz “could see the side of the van.” Id., p.10. 
He observed “[t]he front driver’s side tire was flat and [there was] a clear 
fluid trail from the roadway, up the driveway, to the van.” Id. The grill 
and bumper were also damaged. 
Officer Koontz began speaking with Combs, who quickly admitted to 
the crash and leaving the scene. By then, witnesses to the crash had 
arrived. One witness informed Officer Koontz that Combs may have been 
trying to hide something in the van. Officer Koontz asked Combs if he 
could look inside the van, and Combs initially consented. But after Officer 
Koontz refused to allow Combs to hand him items from the van, Combs 
withdrew his consent, and there was no search. Based on witness 
statements and his interactions with Combs, Officer Koontz believed 
Combs was intoxicated. He administered three field sobriety tests, and 
Combs failed two of them (although his breathalyzer test was negative for 
alcohol). 
By this point, other Lebanon officers had arrived at Combs’ home, 
including Lieutenant Rich Mount. He asked Combs for permission to look 
inside the van, and Combs consented to a search under the seats. Officer 
Koontz found a bag under the driver’s seat, but Combs did not consent to 
him opening it, so the search stopped. Combs agreed to a blood test, so 
Officer Koontz took him to a hospital. The remaining officers decided to 
tow the van as evidence of Combs leaving the crash, so they inventoried 
it. Under the driver’s seat, they found a black bag that contained, among 
other things, various pills that were later determined to be alprazolam, 
hydrocodone, and oxycodone (both 7.5- and 10-milligram doses). The 
officers seized the pills but turned over the bag and its other contents to 
Combs’ wife before the van was towed. 
The State ultimately charged Combs with nine counts, the first four 
based on the pills. Counts I through III—possession of a narcotic drug as a 
Level 3 felony in violation of Indiana Code sections 35-48-4-6(a) and 
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(d)(2)—were based on the hydrocodone, 10-milligram oxycodone, and 7.5-
milligram oxycodone pills, respectively. Count IV—possession of a 
controlled substance as a Level 6 felony in violation of Indiana Code 
section 35-48-4-7(a)—was based on the alprazolam. Count VIII was 
leaving the scene of an accident as a Class B misdemeanor in violation of 
Indiana Code sections 9-26-1-1.1(a)(4) and (b).1  
Combs unsuccessfully moved to suppress the pills under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of 
the Indiana Constitution.2 The case proceeded to trial, where a jury found 
Combs guilty of all counts except Count IV. Combs appealed, arguing, 
among other things, that the trial court erroneously admitted the pills. 
Our Court of Appeals found that Combs’ federal constitutional rights 
were violated. Combs v. State, 150 N.E.3d 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. 
granted, 157 N.E.3d 527. It concluded “the towing and impound search . . . 
were merely pretextual means by which officers could search the [van] to 
find incriminating evidence.” Id. at 275. Because “Combs admitted that he 
was going to contact law enforcement regarding the accident . . . it [was] 
not clear why the officers needed the van to solve the crime.” Id. at 276. 
The “indicia of pretext” meant “the search . . . was unreasonable” and 
“impermissible under the open view and plain view doctrines and the 
Fourth Amendment.” Id. Because the pills should have been suppressed, 
the panel reversed Combs’ convictions for Counts I, II, and III. Id. at 277. It 
declined to address his state constitutional argument, id. at 274 n.5, and 
rejected his other arguments, id. at 281–82. 
 
1 The other counts were: Count V, operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person 
as a Class A misdemeanor in violation of Indiana Code section 9-30-5-2(b); Count VI, 
operating a vehicle while intoxicated as a Class C misdemeanor in violation of Indiana Code 
section 9-30-5-2(a); Count VII, operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance 
or its metabolite in the body as a Class C misdemeanor in violation of Indiana Code section 9-
30-5-1(c); and Count IX, public intoxication as a Class B misdemeanor in violation of Indiana 
Code section 7.1-5-1-3(a)(1). 
2 Although the trial court certified its order denying Combs’ suppression motion for 
interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals declined to accept jurisdiction. 
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The State petitioned for transfer, which we granted.3 See Ind. Appellate 
Rule 58(A). 
Standard of Review 
Generally, “[t]rial courts have broad discretion to admit or exclude 
evidence,” and we review for abuse of that discretion. Satterfield v. State, 
33 N.E.3d 344, 352 (Ind. 2015). However, “when a challenge to an 
evidentiary ruling is based ‘on the constitutionality of the search or 
seizure of evidence, it raises a question of law that we review de novo.’” 
Johnson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1199, 1203 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Thomas v. State, 
81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017)), cert. denied, --- S. Ct. ---- (2021), No. 20-7612, 
2021 WL 2044617 (U.S. May 24, 2021). 
Discussion and Decision 
Combs asserts that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 
seizing and searching his van without a warrant. The Fourth 
Amendment—incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment—protects people against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 464–65 (Ind. 
1998). Because it “generally requires warrants for searches and seizures,” 
Johnson, 157 N.E.3d at 1203, “a warrantless search or seizure is per se 
unreasonable, and the State bears the burden to show that one of the 
‘well-delineated exceptions’ to the warrant requirement applies,” Osborne 
 
3 Because we only address whether the pills should have been suppressed, we summarily 
affirm the panel’s disposition of Combs’ other arguments. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2). 
We agree with the panel that Combs waived his state constitutional argument, see App. R. 
46(A)(8)(a), so we only address his federal constitutional argument. Combs’ briefing on this 
argument largely lacked the “cogent reasoning” required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). But 
his noncompliance with that rule was not “sufficiently substantial to impede our 
consideration” of his argument, Davis v. State, 265 Ind. 476, 478, 355 N.E.2d 836, 838 (1976), 
largely because of his pretrial suppression motion. And because we prefer to resolve cases on 
their merits, we address the substance of his argument. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1268 
(Ind. 2015).  
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v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).  
When police seize and then search a vehicle, “both measures must be 
reasonable—that is, executed under a valid warrant or a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement.” Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 374 
(Ind. 2016). One exception to the warrant requirement arises when an 
incriminating object is in plain view. Another arises when police 
inventory a seized object. Because both exceptions apply here, Combs’ 
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.   
I. 
The police lawfully seized Combs’ van as 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment’s plain 
view exception. 
Police, acting under a valid warrant or Fourth Amendment exception, 
can seize a vehicle as evidence of a crime.4 See Trent v. Wade, 776 F.3d 368, 
387 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[V]ehicles also may be seized if . . . they are 
contraband in plain view of an officer.”); People v. Zamora, 695 P.2d 292, 
296–97 (Colo. 1985) (car lawfully seized as instrumentality of a crime); 
State v. Mitchell, 266 S.E.2d 605, 608 (N.C. 1980) (“A car reasonably 
believed to be the fruit, instrumentality or evidence of a crime can be 
seized whenever found in plain view.”); State v. Lewis, 258 N.E.2d 445, 
447–49 (Ohio 1970) (car lawfully seized as instrumentality of a crime). 
When this occurs, the seizure must be reviewed like any other. See, e.g., 
 
4 Police often impound vehicles pursuant to their community caretaking function, a broad 
label for actions that are not rooted in criminal investigation but still “enhance and maintain 
the safety of communities.” Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 431 (Ind. 1993). This Court has 
established a two-prong test to determine whether an impound pursuant to this function is 
reasonable. Id. at 433; Wilford v. State, 50 N.E.3d 371, 375–76 (Ind. 2016). But because “the 
community caretaking function is ‘totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or 
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,’” Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 433 
(quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)), the test is inapplicable here.   
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United States v. Sanchez, 612 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2010) (applying plain view 
exception to seized motorcycle).   
The plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement allows police to warrantlessly seize an object if they “are 
lawfully in a position from which to view the object, if its incriminating 
character is immediately apparent, and if [police] have a lawful right of 
access to the object.” Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 245 (Ind. 2002) (citing 
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135–37 (1990)). It “stands for the premise 
that objects which are in plain view of an officer who rightfully occupies a 
particular location can be seized without a warrant and are admissible as 
evidence.” Sloane v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. 
denied, 690 N.E.2d 1189. Seizures under this exception are “scrupulously 
subjected to Fourth Amendment inquiry.” Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 
56, 66 (1992). Here, the exception’s three requirements were satisfied, so 
police lawfully seized Combs’ van.  
A. The police lawfully viewed Combs’ van. 
Under the plain view exception, police must have lawfully viewed the 
object. Warner, 773 N.E.2d at 245. In other words, they must not have 
engaged in an “unlawful trespass” to discover it. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 66. 
Here, Officer Koontz was on Combs’ front driveway when he fully saw 
the van and realized it had crashed into the utility box and then left the 
scene. 
“[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among 
equals.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013). This special status extends 
beyond the home’s physical frame to the curtilage, “the area ‘immediately 
surrounding and associated’” with it. Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). However, the curtilage is not impenetrable. See 
id. at 8. So long as police “do no more than any private citizen,” their 
presence generally does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Kentucky 
v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469–70 (2011); Caniglia v. Strom, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 1599 
(2021). They must “limit their entry to places visitors would be expected to 
go, such as walkways, driveways, and porches.” Trimble v. State, 842 
N.E.2d 798, 802 (Ind. 2006); see also United States v. Contreras, 820 F.3d 255, 
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261 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[Police] may walk up to any part of private property 
that is otherwise open to visitors or delivery people.”). And “there is no 
Fourth Amendment protection for activities or items that, even if within 
the curtilage, are knowingly exposed to the public.” Trimble, 842 N.E.2d at 
802; see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“That the area is 
within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation.”).  
Assuming Combs’ front driveway was curtilage, Officer Koontz’s 
presence was lawful.5 When he arrived, Officer Koontz pulled into 
Combs’ driveway and stepped out of his car, which allowed him to fully 
view the van. He then began speaking with Combs, who had just exited 
the van. Officer Koontz, like anyone seeking to speak with the van’s 
driver, pulled into the front driveway. And when he saw Combs in the 
driveway, he reasonably spoke with Combs there. Officer Koontz used 
“the ordinary means of access” to view the van. Trimble, 842 N.E.2d at 802.  
Officer Koontz’s “legitimate investigatory purpose,” id., for being on 
the driveway did not make his presence unlawful. He was not 
unreasonably conducting a search by looking for evidence in a manner 
that exceeded his “implied license” to enter the driveway like a private 
citizen. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9–10; cf. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1668, 
1670–71 (2018) (officer went off the main route to the front door to 
examine a partially enclosed portion of the driveway, where he pulled a 
tarp off a motorcycle). Because he confined his actions to those of a private 
 
5 It is not a foregone conclusion that Combs’ front driveway was curtilage, even though it 
was—at least physically—“intimately linked to the home.” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 
213 (1986). The Supreme Court of the United States has provided four non-exclusive factors to 
help determine whether an area is curtilage: its proximity to the home, its location in an 
enclosure surrounding the home, its uses, and steps taken to protect it from public view. 
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987); see also Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 936 (Ind. 
2006) (acknowledging and applying the Dunn factors). The first heavily weighs in favor of 
curtilage, as the front driveway is attached to the home. The remaining weigh against. The 
driveway is not within an enclosure surrounding the home, its uses are open, and Combs took 
no steps to protect it from public view. But because “these factors are useful analytical tools,” 
not a rigid test, Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, we err on the side of caution and assume it was 
curtilage for our analysis.  
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citizen, Officer Koontz was lawfully on Combs’ driveway when he viewed 
the van.  
B. The van’s incriminating character was immediately 
apparent.  
When police lawfully view the object, its “incriminating character” 
must be “immediately apparent,” Warner, 773 N.E.2d at 245, so there is no 
uncertainty about its “probative value,” Horton, 496 U.S. at 137. Police 
must have probable cause to believe the object is contraband or evidence 
of a crime without conducting a further search of the object. Arizona v. 
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323, 326 (1987); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 
(1993). 
Probable cause exists “when the totality of the circumstances 
establishes ‘a fair probability’ . . . of criminal activity, contraband, or 
evidence of a crime.” Hodges v. State, 125 N.E.3d 578, 581–82 (Ind. 2019) 
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). We view the totality of 
the circumstances “from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police 
officer.” Id. at 582. And when “a seizure of items in plain view is 
supported by probable cause, an inquiring court will not look behind that 
justification.” Sanchez, 612 F.3d at 6. Subjective intentions are irrelevant 
when analyzing probable cause. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 
(1996). Because probable cause must exist when the seizure occurs, the 
object’s ultimate admission as evidence at trial does not impact this 
analysis.6 See Hodges, 125 N.E.3d at 582.  
The van’s incriminating character was immediately apparent. As soon 
as Officer Koontz exited his vehicle, he saw the van’s damaged front and 
 
6 The dissent goes beyond considering whether the van would be useful in prosecuting 
Combs to considering whether it ended up being strictly necessary. A reasonable officer, of 
course, would consider the instrument used to commit a crime—here, the van—to be useful at 
the time of the seizure. But a reasonable officer could not predict what would be strictly 
necessary. See United States v. Belt, 854 F.2d 1054, 1055–56 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding 
impoundment of car as evidence despite the existence of witness testimony because the 
defendant could deny the allegations at trial). 
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confirmed it had left the fluid trail, objective signs of a recent head-on 
collision. The fact that Officer Koontz had to exit his vehicle to fully see 
the van and its damage is inconsequential. While he could not have 
moved or otherwise manipulated it, Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324–25, he could 
lawfully change his position to better view it, United States v. Sanchez, 955 
F.3d 669, 676–77 (8th Cir. 2020) (“[O]fficers may . . .  change position when 
conducting an exterior examination.”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 930.  
He also realized the van matched the witness’ description, which 
included the van’s color and “Combs” marking. The witness was “a 
disinterested third-party,” Johnson, 157 N.E.3d at 1204, who saw the 
collision and remained at the scene to speak with the responding officer. 
Officer Koontz had little reason to doubt the veracity of the description. 
See id.; Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. 2010).  
Given the totality of the circumstances—the obvious damage, the fluid 
trail, the disinterested witness’ description, and the van’s distinct design—
we have little trouble concluding any reasonable officer would have 
immediately developed probable cause that the van crashed into the 
utility box and left the scene, a criminal offense.7 As such, it was evidence 
of that offense.8  
C. The police had a lawful right of access to the van. 
Police must “have a lawful right of access to the object.” Warner, 773 
N.E.2d at 245. This requirement “asks, in effect, whether the police had to 
 
7 We understand that leaving the scene of an accident as a Class B misdemeanor is not the 
most serious offense in the Indiana Code. Certainly, there are times when the seriousness of 
the offense matters. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (noting the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to a jury trial is not implicated for “petty crimes or offenses”). But it does 
not matter here. See United States v. Sanchez, 612 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010) (applying plain view 
exception to seized motorcycle that was evidence of criminal licensing violations). 
8 We emphasize the need for probable cause of a crime. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 
130 (1990). Not every prohibited act involving a vehicle satisfies this requirement. For 
example, probable cause that a vehicle was used to commit a traffic violation codified as a 
civil infraction would not suffice. 
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commit a trespass” to access the object. Sanchez, 612 F.3d at 6; see also 
United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 810 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding requirement 
satisfied because agents “were lawfully searching” an apartment when 
they found a firearm); United States v. Naugle, 997 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 
1993) (finding requirement satisfied because “the gun was in the closet 
where the officer was permitted to be, and he did nothing more than reach 
out to the box containing the gun”). As previously discussed, Officer 
Koontz was lawfully present on Combs’ driveway. He did not have to 
trespass or take any other prohibited action to access the van.  
The incriminating nature of Combs’ van was immediately apparent, 
and Officer Koontz lawfully viewed and could lawfully access the van. It 
is inconsequential that Officer Koontz did not order the tow. Although he 
could have towed the van, he was also investigating Combs’ possible 
intoxication and was not required to put this investigation on hold. It was 
permissible for him to continue it and allow the other officers on the scene 
to handle the van.9  
II. Once seized, the police lawfully inventoried 
Combs’ van. 
The search of a vehicle—like its seizure—must be lawful. Wilford, 50 
N.E.3d at 374; Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 435 (Ind. 1993). Inventory 
searches, as the name suggests, occur when police inventory the contents 
of a seized object, often a vehicle, and are “a well-recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement.” Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006). 
They protect the vehicle’s owner and the police by providing a record of 
the vehicle’s contents. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976); 
Wilford, 50 N.E.3d at 374.  
 
9 Of course, the outcome may have been different had Officer Koontz been the only officer on 
the scene, he left, and then other officers arrived to tow the van without a warrant. See 
Middleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (Ind. 1999). 
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When police lawfully seize a vehicle—through either their community 
caretaking or criminal investigatory function—the ensuing inventory 
search “must be conducted pursuant to standard police procedures.” Fair, 
627 N.E.2d at 435. These “procedures must be rationally designed to meet 
the objectives that justify the search in the first place” while sufficiently 
limiting officer discretion. Id. (internal citation omitted). This ensures “the 
inventory is not a pretext ‘for a general rummaging in order to discover 
incriminating evidence.’” Id. (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)). 
However, an “expectation of finding criminal evidence” does not 
invalidate an otherwise “lawful inventory search.” United States v. Lopez, 
547 F.3d 364, 372 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Arrocha, 713 F.3d 
1159, 1164 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Lumpkin, 159 F.3d 983, 987 (6th 
Cir. 1998). 
At the time of the seizure, the Lebanon Police Department’s written, 
three-page tow policy allowed officers to impound vehicles “needed for 
evidence.” Ex. Vol. VI, p.5.10 When this occurred, officers were required to 
complete “a vehicle impound and inventory form” with “a complete 
inventory” before “releasing the vehicle to the towing service.” Id., p.6. 
And officers were required to open and inventory unlocked containers. 
This policy sufficiently regulated the towing and search of Combs’ van. Its 
plain language made clear that the officers had to provide thorough 
information about impounded vehicles and all their contents, including 
unlocked containers like bags. And it did not leave their discretion 
unchecked. For example, it specifically prohibited opening and 
inventorying locked containers without consent or a warrant. 
The officers followed the written policy. They conducted a thorough 
inventory and detailed their discoveries, including the pills, on the 
necessary form before towing the van. Cf. Fair, 627 N.E.2d at 436 (noting 
inventory was conducted by investigating officer who only focused on 
contraband, there was no evidence of completed formal inventory sheets, 
 
10 Although the policy was not admitted at trial, it was admitted at the suppression hearing, 
and the trial court granted Combs’ request for an ongoing objection to the admission of 
evidence from the search of the van. 
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it was unclear the vehicle was actually impounded, and the policy was not 
sufficiently established). While the inventory was conducted on Combs’ 
driveway, see id. (search conducted at crime scene was one indicia of 
pretext), the policy required an inventory before the van was released to 
the towing service, and it was reasonable for it to occur there.  
The need to “guard against claims of theft, vandalism, or negligence,” 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372–73 (1987), was heightened, as the van 
prominently advertised its use by a gold-buying business, indicating it 
might have contained valuables. And Combs had even informed the 
officers there was “a substantial amount of gold” in it. Tr. Vol. II, p.16. It is 
inconsequential that the officers turned over the black bag and its other 
contents—including gold jewelry—to Combs’ wife. Their policy did not 
prevent them from ensuring these smaller, valuable items did not remain 
in the van. Their decision to take extra precautions was reasonable.  
Although the officers anticipated finding contraband in the van, they 
did not search “in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.” 
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added). Their decision to impound the 
van as evidence, as explained above, was lawful, and their policy required 
an inventory. And they recognized the need to ensure the van’s contents 
were documented, especially given the presence of valuables. Their 
inevitable partial investigatory motive did not invalidate an otherwise 
reasonable and lawful inventory search.11 See Lopez, 547 F.3d at 372. 
The police properly inventoried Combs’ van pursuant to their 
department’s thorough and reasonable policy, so the search was lawful.  
 
11 There was unfortunate testimony by Lieutenant Mount acknowledging he could have 
obtained a search warrant, but that doing so was “a pain in the ass.” Tr. Vol. III, p.169. The 
coarseness of the assertion notwithstanding, the constitutional analysis remains unaffected. 
The question we answer today is not “Could police have secured a warrant?” but, rather, 
“Did they have to?” Indeed, the plain view exception is “justified by the realization that resort 
to a neutral magistrate under such circumstances would often be impracticable and would do 
little to promote the objectives of the Fourth Amendment.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 
366, 375 (1993).  
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Conclusion 
The seizure and search of Combs’ van fell under recognized exceptions 
to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Thus, the police 
lawfully discovered the pills. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Rush, C.J., and David, J., concur. 
Slaughter, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion. 
Goff, J., dissents with separate opinion.  
A TT O R N E Y F O R  A PP E LLA N T  
Mohammad Slaimon Ayoubi 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Stephen R. Creason 
Courtney L. Staton 
Office of the Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 20S-CR-616 | June 3, 2021 
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Slaughter, J., concurring in the judgment. 
I agree that the trial court’s judgment for the State should be affirmed. 
But I do so for different reasons than the Court. Rather than reach the 
merits of Combs’s constitutional claims, I would hold that he waived 
those claims and thus did not satisfy his burden on appeal of establishing 
that the inventory search of his vehicle was illegal.  
The Court holds, rightly, that Combs waived his state constitutional 
claim. Ante, at 5 n.3. I would go further and hold that he waived his 
Fourth Amendment claim, too. The entirety of his federal constitutional 
argument consisted of the following sentence: “This Court should reverse 
the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress based on 
the law and factual circumstances in this case, notwithstanding Lieutenant 
Mount’s rationale that requesting a warrant is ‘a pain in the ass.’”  
By no plausible yardstick does this bare assertion amount to the 
“cogent reasoning” our rules require. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). 
Combs’s undeveloped “argument”, such as it is, neither identifies the 
governing legal standard nor explains how the factual record in this case 
satisfies that standard and entitles him to relief. Thus, I agree with the 
Court that the State is entitled to judgment. Though I do not quarrel with 
how the Court resolved the merits, I would not treat Combs’s federal 
claim as preserved and worthy of merits review. 
Applying waiver doctrine to parties’ arguments is not a judicial 
“gotcha” aimed at unfairly trapping unwary litigants. Insisting that 
litigants develop their arguments serves two valuable purposes: fairness 
to opposing counsel and efficiency in judicial decision-making. Developed 
arguments allow adversaries to respond meaningfully to each other and 
allow courts to fully address issues without undue commitment of judicial 
resources. There are only so many hours in the day, and the time we 
spend on undeveloped arguments necessarily means less time for 
deciding claims by parties who followed the rules. We disserve opposing 
parties and our system of appellate review when we indulge litigants 
whose claims were barely raised or not raised at all. 
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Goff, J. 
I respectfully dissent. 
In this case, the Court finds that police may seize and inventory a van 
as an instrumentality of a class-B misdemeanor leaving the scene of an 
accident. But what need is there to seize the entire van when the driver 
admitted to the offense and when police thoroughly documented the 
structural damage to the van with photographs? In my opinion, there is 
none. Because the State failed to show that the van itself would prove 
useful in solving a crime, and because the Court’s decision today will 
unnecessarily extend the government’s reach into our private lives, I 
respectfully dissent.  
I. The plain-view doctrine doesn’t justify the 
police’s seizure of the van. 
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Brigham 
City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). And there’s “no ready test for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search or 
seize against the invasion which the search or seizure entails.” Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (cleaned up). “The scheme of the Fourth 
Amendment becomes meaningful only when . . . the conduct of those 
charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, 
neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a 
particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 Ordinarily, a seizure “carried out on a suspect’s premises without a 
warrant is per se unreasonable.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
474 (1971). However, there are several “narrow and well-delineated 
exceptions” to this warrant requirement. Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 
11, 13 (1999) (per curiam). Because Lieutenant Mount determined that it 
would be a “pain in the ass” to obtain a warrant to seize Combs’s van, Tr. 
Vol. 3, p. 169, this Court can only affirm the admission of the evidence 
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obtained from the seizure if it fits within one of these narrow exceptions to 
the warrant requirement.  
The Court finds that the seizure of the van was proper under the plain-
view doctrine. As one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions, the 
plain-view doctrine allows police to seize property without a warrant 
where (1) the police are lawfully present, (2) the “incriminating character” 
of the evidence is “immediately apparent,” and (3) the police have a “lawful 
right of access to the object itself.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 
(1990) (citations omitted). 
I agree with the Court that the first and third elements of the plain-view 
exception are met in this case, but I cannot agree with its holding as to the 
“immediately apparent” prong. This prong requires police officers to 
“have probable cause to believe the evidence will prove useful in solving a 
crime.” Taylor v. State, 659 N.E.2d 535, 538 (Ind. 1995). Of course, “this 
does not mean that the officer must ‘know’ that the item is evidence of 
criminal behavior.” Id. at 539. Rather, it “requires only that the 
information available to the officer would lead a person of reasonable 
caution to believe the items could be useful as evidence of a crime.” Id. In 
the end, “a practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence 
is involved is all that is required.” Id. (citation and quotation marks 
omitted). Given the particular circumstances at hand, including the 
government’s need for the entire van and the degree of invasion the 
seizure entailed, I would not find the seizure reasonable.1  
In this case, the officers were investigating the crime of leaving the 
scene of an accident, a class-B misdemeanor. See Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1(b) 
(2017). The officers could plainly see the damage (the evidence of the 
crime) on the exterior of the van and took photographs of that damage. 
No one testified that any aspect of the van aside from its exterior 
 
1 My goal in writing separately is not to hamstring police investigations, but rather to protect 
an important constitutional right. Our nation has a “strong preference” for warrants and the 
use of warrants “greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct.” 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).  
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condition would be useful as evidence of the crime of leaving the scene of 
an accident.2 What’s more, Combs had already admitted to the accident 
and to leaving the scene. When police have sufficient photographic 
evidence of the crime, and where the suspect himself admitted to the 
offense, I question whether a person of reasonable caution would find 
seizure of the van itself as useful in proving the crime.3 Cf. Cardwell v. 
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974) (concluding that the prior impoundment of 
an automobile didn’t render the examination of the exterior of the car, 
which could have been done on the spot, unreasonable).4 As such, the 
need to seize the entire van was low. The degree of invasion, on the other 
hand, was high. Not only did the seizure lead the officers to rifle through 
the entire van while it was parked in Combs’s driveway, it also deprived 
Combs and his family of a company car that was important to their 
livelihood. Considering these circumstances, I don’t find the seizure 
reasonable.  
Since the police didn’t need the entire van as evidence, what explains 
the officers’ decision to seize it? The testimony of Lieutenant Mount 
sheds some light on the decision. “It just so happened in this situation 
that we started working another suspicion of whatever,” he stated, “we 
had leaving the scene.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 68 (emphasis added). Similarly, 
Officer Koontz testified that he decided to search the van “based on [the] 
 
2 To be sure, Lieutenant Mount did testify that the police could seize the van because it was 
evidence of a crime. But when questioned as to what evidence the police hoped to obtain from 
the car, Lieutenant Mount merely referenced the pieces of the van that had been left at the 
scene of the accident.  
3 It bears noting that the basic leaving-the-scene-of-an-accident offense is a class-B 
misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1.1(b) (2017). As such, the punishment cannot exceed a 
$1,000 fine and 180 days in jail. I.C. § 35-50-3-3. 
4 In Cardwell v. Lewis, the Supreme Court noted that “nothing from the interior of the car and 
no personal effects, which the Fourth Amendment traditionally has been deemed to protect, 
were searched or seized and introduced in evidence.” 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974). “With the 
‘search’ limited to the examination of the tire on the wheel and the taking of paint scrapings 
from the exterior of the vehicle left in the public parking lot,” the high Court “fail[ed] to 
comprehend what expectation of privacy was infringed.” Id. 
 
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information” provided by a witness that Combs had tried to hide 
something within the van. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 36. That something, of course, 
turned out to be the black bag containing drugs which elevated Combs’s 
criminal activity from a minor traffic misdemeanor to a felony. And, 
because Combs rescinded his consent to search the vehicle when police 
asked to open the black bag, the officers either had to seize the van as 
evidence of leaving the scene or get a search warrant. Because the latter 
option, according to Lieutenant Mount, would have been a “pain in the 
ass,” the officers pursued the former option.5 Id. at 169. Indeed, the 
officers didn’t decide to seize the van until after Combs had rescinded his 
consent to search the van.6 
Beyond the consequences for Combs, the Court’s decision today has 
larger implications for police search-and-seizure practices—practices 
which, in my opinion, will likely lead to further government intrusion into 
private lives. Under the Court’s view, for example, a police officer could, 
without a warrant, seize an entire car after stopping an unlicensed 
eighteen-year-old who took his parent’s car on a joy ride as evidence of 
violating our motor-vehicle laws. See I.C. § 9-24-18-1(a) (prohibiting 
driving a motor vehicle without a license). After all, police could recover 
evidence potentially useful in solving the crime, including fingerprints 
and DNA evidence on the driver’s side seat, steering wheel, and gearshift. 
At least in that situation, the evidence would be located inside the car and 
would require an evidence technician to collect. Here, by contrast, all of 
 
5 Ordinarily, such a degree of law-enforcement candor is both laudable and appreciated by a 
court when reviewing a police investigation. Here, unfortunately, I must conclude that the 
officer simply allowed his personal convenience to trump the requirements of the 
Constitution. Had the officers taken the time to apply for a search warrant, it seems clear to 
me that it would have been granted. After all, Combs failed two field sobriety tests and his 
breathalyzer test was negative for alcohol. And, later that same day, tests performed at the 
hospital confirmed that Combs was positive for opiates.  
6 While several courts have held that when “a seizure of items in plain view is supported by 
probable cause, an inquiring court will not look behind that justification,” United States v. 
Sanchez, 612 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing cases), I fail to see how a court can ignore a clear 
desire to obtain evidence unrelated to the crime at issue when it examines the reasonableness 
of a seizure in light of the particular circumstances of the case. The statements made by the 
officers in this case aren’t dispositive of the issue, but where police have a clear ulterior 
motive, it does no service to the administration of justice to turn a blind eye. 
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the damage was clearly visible on the exterior of the car. And the 
photographs taken to document this damage were the only physical 
evidence admitted at trial. In fact, there’s no evidence at all that police 
investigated the van any further after they had seized it and found the 
illegal drugs. And after only two days, they returned the van to Combs’s 
father.  
II. The evidence obtained from the inventory search 
was inadmissible. 
Because I would find that the seizure of the van was unconstitutional, I 
would also find that the evidence obtained during the inventory search 
should have been excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. The exclusionary 
rule excludes from a criminal trial any evidence seized from the defendant 
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and any fruits of such 
evidence. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171 (1969). “[W]hen an 
illegal search has come to light, [the State] has the burden of persuasion to 
show that its evidence is untainted.” Id. at 183. 
Here, the State didn’t show that the discovery of the evidence fell under 
an exception to the exclusionary rule. And there is nothing to show that 
police derived the evidence from an independent source or that it was an 
inevitable discovery. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984) 
(evidence obtained from an illegal search need not be excluded where it is 
also provided by an independent source); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 
(1984) (evidence need not be excluded where its discovery was inevitable). 
Instead, the officers’ discovery of the drugs and firearms was a direct 
result of the improper seizure of the van.  
Finally, contrary to the Court’s assertion, the inventory search was not, 
in fact, conducted in accordance with the Lebanon Police Department’s 
Standard Operating Guidelines. Under those Guidelines, a vehicle may be 
towed if it “[i]s needed for evidence.” Ex. Vol. 6, p. 5 (emphasis added). 
Even if the police had probable cause (which, admittedly, is a flexible 
concept) to believe the van would prove useful in solving the crime, any 
argument that it was “needed” for evidence strains credulity. In addition 
to photographic evidence of the van’s damage, the police had multiple 
eyewitnesses who could identify the van by its distinctive markings. 
What’s more, Combs himself admitted that he had an accident and left the 
scene. In my view, the van simply wasn’t “needed” as evidence; rather, 
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the photographs and the admission from Combs were more than 
sufficient to convict him of leaving the scene of an accident.  
Conclusion 
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Because I 
believe the seizure of Combs’s van was unreasonable, and thus violated 
his Fourth Amendment rights, I would reverse his convictions for the 
three counts of possession of a narcotic drug and remand for further 
proceedings.