Case Title: McBride v. Worth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 54

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 54 
Docket: 
Yor-17-314 
Submitted 
On Briefs: February 26, 2018 
Decided: 
April 19, 2018 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
ANNE M. MCBRIDE 
 
v. 
 
JEFFREY R. WORTH 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  Anne M. McBride appeals from a judgment of the District Court 
(Springvale, Foster, J.) entered in June 2017.  The court granted McBride’s 
motion to enforce Jeffrey R. Worth’s spousal support obligation pursuant to the 
parties’ 2009 divorce judgment after determining that Worth was in arrears in 
the amount of $11,055.25; granted Worth’s motion to enforce McBride’s 
obligation to refinance the marital home; and granted Worth’s motion for 
division of omitted property.  McBride contends that the court (1) abused its 
discretion when it issued an income withholding order instead of ordering 
immediate payment of the entire amount of Worth’s spousal support arrears; 
(2) erred when it ordered McBride to attempt to refinance her home every six 
months; and (3) abused its discretion when it declined to award McBride all of 
 
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the attorney fees she requested.  Because the judgment misstated Worth’s 
ongoing spousal support obligation and we are uncertain of the court’s intent 
regarding the amount to be withheld from Worth’s earnings to enforce his 
spousal support and arrears obligations, we must vacate the income 
withholding order, partially vacate the judgment, and remand to the trial court 
for clarification.  We affirm the judgment in all other respects. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court's 
judgment, the record supports the following facts.”  Brochu v. McLeod, 2016 ME 
146, ¶ 2, 148 A.3d 1220.  After nineteen years of marriage, McBride and Worth 
were divorced in 2009.  Relevant to this appeal, the divorce judgment ordered 
Worth to pay McBride $150 every week for spousal support until McBride 
reaches age sixty-five or remarries and awarded the marital residence to 
McBride and ordered her to “refinance the property as soon as the mortgage 
market improves and she is financially capable of doing so.”   
[¶3]  As the court found, “The parties have been in court frequently since 
the entry of the [divorce] Judgment, almost exclusively on the issue of spousal 
support.”1  On September 6, 2016, McBride filed another motion to enforce 
                                         
1  In January 2012, the court (Janelle, J.) granted McBride’s first motion to enforce spousal support, 
ordered Worth to pay an additional $150 per week until the $3,600 spousal support arrears was 
 
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Worth’s spousal support obligation, alleging that Worth was $13,032.97 in 
arrears and requesting that Worth pay the arrears “in full or go to jail” and that 
he pay her costs.  Twenty-three days later, Worth filed a motion to enforce the 
divorce judgment requirement that McBride refinance the note and mortgage 
of the marital home and a motion for division of omitted property.2   
[¶4]  On May 25, 2017, the court held a hearing on the motions.  In an 
order dated June 26, 2017, the court found that Worth had a continuing 
obligation to pay McBride $150 for spousal support every week; that, based on 
the parties’ stipulation, he failed to comply with that obligation, resulting “in 
arrears as of May 25, 2017 in the amount of $11,055.25”; and that Worth could 
afford to pay his spousal support obligation but chose to spend his 
discretionary income elsewhere.  The court entered judgment for McBride in 
the amount of $11,055.25, with post-judgment interest to accrue.   
                                         
satisfied, and issued an income withholding order.  This order was followed by an order for contempt 
in February 2013 (Cantara, J.), an order to pay after a show cause hearing in May 2013, an order 
based on a payment agreement between the parties in February 2014, a contempt order in October 
2014 (Mulhern, J.), an appeal to us that we dismissed in July 2015, see McBride v. Worth, 2015 ME 92, 
¶¶ 2-3, 120 A.3d 666, an order to enforce in December 2015, an income withholding order for $300 
every other week entered in April 2016, and a contempt order in August 2016 (Janelle, J.).  Given the 
repetitive nature of the motions, it is not clear why a single judge was not assigned responsibility for 
this case.   
2  Worth also filed a motion to modify spousal support, but he withdrew the motion one day before 
the hearing.   
 
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[¶5]  To ensure payment of Worth’s ongoing spousal support and arrears 
obligations, the judgment described a new income withholding order to 
accompany the judgment that would “continue[] in effect the payment of $150 
per pay period (every two weeks) for ongoing spousal support, and add[] $150 
per pay period toward the established arrearage.”  The income withholding 
order required the withholding of “the sum of $300 per pay period, that is every 
two weeks . . . .  That amount is comprised of [Worth’s] current spousal support 
obligation ($150 per week or $300 every two weeks), together with an 
additional sum ($150 per week or $300 per pay period), to be applied toward 
the arrearage of spousal support owed by [Worth], that is $11,055.25 as of 
May 25, 2017.”   
[¶6]  The court also found that McBride did “not have the capability to 
secure refinancing despite her good faith efforts to do so.”  However, the court 
directed McBride to attempt to refinance the mortgage on her residence by 
applying for refinancing at least once every six months, “[a]ssuming that 
[Worth] continues to make regular spousal support payments, thereby 
ensuring [McBride] can document a regular stream of income.”   
 
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[¶7]  On requests from both parties for attorney fees, the court found that 
the fees were substantial for each party and out of proportion to the issues 
presented.  The court ordered Worth to pay $5,000 of McBride’s attorney fees.   
[¶8]  McBride filed this timely appeal.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1901 (2017); 
M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3) (Tower 2016).3 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Spousal Support 
 
[¶9]  McBride argues that the court abused its discretion by issuing an 
income withholding order to enforce Worth’s spousal support arrears 
obligation instead of ordering immediate full payment of the $11,055.25 
arrears.   
 
[¶10]  “We review an order on a post-divorce judgment motion, including 
a motion to enforce, for an abuse of discretion or error of law, and we review 
factual findings contained therein for clear error.  A party to a divorce judgment 
who files a motion to enforce is entitled to an order of enforcement when the 
other party has failed to comply with an unambiguous provision of the 
judgment.”  Sullivan v. Rockwood, 2015 ME 119, ¶ 19, 124 A.3d 150 (citations 
                                         
3  This appeal was commenced before September 1, 2017, and therefore the restyled Maine Rules 
of Appellate Procedure do not apply.  See M.R. App. P. 1. 
 
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omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  “An unambiguous judgment must be 
enforced in accordance with the plain meaning of the language in the 
judgment.”  Curtis v. Medeiros, 2016 ME 180, ¶ 8, 152 A.3d 605 (quotation marks 
omitted).  
[¶11]  The divorce judgment unambiguously requires Worth to pay  
McBride $150 in spousal support each week.  As of May 25, 2017, he was in 
arrears of that obligation in the amount of $11,055.25.  The court properly 
granted McBride’s motion to enforce Worth’s spousal support obligation 
because Worth had failed to comply with an unambiguous term of the divorce 
judgment.  See Sullivan, 2015 ME 119, ¶ 21, 124 A.3d 150.  
[¶12]  Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2602 (2017) and 19-A M.R.S. § 2603 
(2017), the court’s options in enforcing a judgment of spousal support include 
ordering installment payments and ordering an employer to make direct 
payments.  The court found that McBride had “been chasing spousal support for 
five and one half years[, and] it was not until she was finally able to implement 
the income withholding order in April of 2016 that [McBride] began to receive 
regular ongoing payments.”  Given this finding, the court did not abuse its 
discretion when it chose to enforce Worth’s spousal support arrears obligation 
by way of an income withholding order instead of ordering a lump-sum 
 
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payment.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 2602; 19-A M.R.S. § 2603.  However, because the 
judgment misstates the amount of ongoing spousal support and we are unable 
to ascertain what sum the court intended to be withheld to pay the arrears, we 
cannot fully address McBride’s argument that the court abused its discretion.   
 
[¶13]  Although the judgment purported to “continue in effect” ongoing 
spousal support payments of $150 every two weeks, Worth’s “ongoing” 
obligation under the divorce judgment is actually $150 each week, as the court 
found.4  The judgment also required Worth to pay an additional $150 every two 
weeks toward the arrears, which does not square with the accompanying 
income withholding order.   
[¶14]  The income withholding order requires Worth’s employer to 
withhold “the sum of $300 per pay period, that is every two weeks.”  Although 
this sum is consistent with the express language of the judgment, it is at odds 
with the court’s explanation in the withholding order that the $300 amount “is 
comprised of [Worth’s] current spousal support obligation ($150 per week or 
$300 every two weeks), together with an additional sum ($150 per week or 
                                         
4  The court was not presented with a motion to modify spousal support and it did not perform 
the requisite modification analysis.  See Voter v. Voter, 2015 ME 11, ¶ 18, 109 A.3d 626 (“A party who 
seeks a modification of spousal support must prove that the modification is justified based on a 
showing of a substantial change in either the payor or payee spouse’s financial condition.” (quotation 
marks omitted)).   
 
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$300 per pay period), to be applied toward the arrearage of spousal support.”  
Although $150 per week or $300 every two weeks should be withheld for 
ongoing spousal support, it is not clear what sum the court intended to 
withhold to pay the arrears.  As a result, “we are unable to ascertain the court’s 
intent sufficiently to allow for effective appellate review.”  Miliano v. Miliano, 
2012 ME 100, ¶ 28, 50 A.3d 534. 
[¶15]  Because the support and arrears provisions in the judgment are 
inconsistent with the income withholding order, we must partially vacate the 
judgment with respect to Worth’s spousal support and arrears obligations and 
remand for further proceedings to clarify the judgment; and because the 
income withholding order is unclear regarding the amount to be withheld, we 
must vacate the order and remand to the trial court for further proceedings to 
clarify its intentions. 
B. 
Refinancing the Home 
 
[¶16]  We next address McBride’s argument that the court erred when it 
granted Worth’s motion to enforce and ordered her to attempt to refinance her 
home every six months.   
 
[¶17]  On a motion to enforce the divorce judgment, “[w]e review de novo 
whether a provision in [the] divorce judgment is ambiguous, i.e., reasonably 
 
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susceptible to different interpretations, by examining that provision in the 
context of the divorce judgment as a whole.”  Curtis, 2016 ME 180, ¶ 8, 152 A.3d 
605 (quotation marks omitted).  “When the judgment is unambiguous, the court 
may not, under the guise of a clarification order, make a material change that 
modifies the provisions of the original judgment.  If the divorce judgment is 
ambiguous, however, the court has the inherent authority to construe and 
clarify the decision.”  Id. (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶18]  The 2009 divorce judgment orders McBride to “refinance the 
property as soon as the mortgage market improves and she is financially 
capable of doing so.”  Given the lack of clarity in that language, the court 
implicitly found this provision to be ambiguous.  We agree.  The court then 
found that the evidence clearly establishes that McBride currently “does not 
have the capability to secure refinancing despite her good faith efforts to do so.”  
Based on the language in the divorce judgment, however, the court also 
determined that Worth “is entitled to have [McBride] attempt, periodically, to 
refinance the mortgage” and that “[t]he frequency of that effort should be 
dictated by the goal of increasing its likelihood.”  After making these 
determinations, the court clarified the ambiguity in the divorce judgment and 
required McBride to apply for refinancing every six months, conditioned on 
 
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Worth’s payment of spousal support, which ensures that she can document a 
regular stream of income.  This reasonable construction and clarification of the 
divorce judgment was within the court’s inherent authority.  See id. 
C. 
Attorney Fees 
 
[¶19]  Finally, McBride argues that she was entitled to all of the attorney 
fees she requested.  The court ordered Worth to pay $5,000 of McBride’s legal 
fees, which was approximately sixty percent of the amount McBride’s attorney 
alleged in her affidavit on fees.   
 
[¶20]  We review awards of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion.  See 
Smith v. Padolko, 2008 ME 56, ¶ 17, 955 A.2d 740.  We have previously held that 
“in deciding what amount [of attorney fees] will be awarded the trial court has 
discretion to consider all factors that reasonably bear on the fairness and 
justness of the award. . . . [T]he trial court is not limited to considering the 
parties’ relative financial positions, but could also consider the parties’ conduct 
contributing to the need for the filing of the motion.  Whether the need for the 
post-judgment proceeding arose out of a party’s failure to abide by an existing 
order may also factor into the court’s consideration.”  Id. (citations omitted) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 
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[¶21]  The court considered the parties’ respective incomes and 
discretionary expenditures, the amount of fees that would be justified by the 
issues presented, and the parties’ litigation history before it awarded attorney 
fees.  Because the court considered the relevant factors and did not act outside 
the bounds of its discretion when it awarded McBride only sixty percent of her 
attorney fees, we will not disturb the court’s decision.  See id. ¶ 19. 
The entry is: 
Judgment partially vacated regarding Worth’s 
spousal 
support 
and 
arrears 
obligations.  
Judgment affirmed in all other respects.  Income 
withholding order vacated.  Remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anne M. McBride, appellant pro se 
 
Patrick S. Bedard, Esq., Bedard & Bobrow, P.C., Eliot, for appellee Jeffrey A. 
Worth 
 
 
Springvale District Court docket number FM-2009-58 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY