Case Title: State v. Williams

Citation: 2010-Ohio-2453

Docket Number: 20082424

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2453.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-2453 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAMS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Williams, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-2453.] 
An involuntary commitment under R.C. 2945.39 does not violate principles of 
equal protection or due process — Because R.C. 2945.39 is civil in nature, 
a person committed under the statute need not be afforded the 
constitutional rights afforded to a defendant in a criminal prosecution. 
(No. 2008-2424 — Submitted October 20, 2009 — Decided June 8, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, 
No. 22532, 179 Ohio App.3d 584, 2008-Ohio-6245. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  An involuntary commitment under R.C. 2945.39 does not violate principles of 
equal protection or due process. 
2.  Because R.C. 2945.39 is civil in nature, a person committed under the statute 
need not be afforded the constitutional rights afforded to a defendant in a 
criminal prosecution. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} In this appeal we consider the constitutionality of R.C. 2945.39.  
This statute, along with its related statutes, authorizes a common pleas court to 
exercise continuing jurisdiction over a criminal defendant who has been charged 
with a violent first- or second-degree felony and who has been found incompetent 
to stand trial and remains so after the expiration of R.C. 2945.38’s one-year time 
frame for restoring competency.  R.C. 2945.39 authorizes the common pleas court 
to order the involuntary commitment of such a person in a mental-health facility 
when the statutory criteria are met.  For the reasons that follow, we determine that 
R.C. 2945.39 is a civil statute and that its provisions and those of related statutes 
do not violate principles of due process or equal protection.  We therefore reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals, which held to the contrary. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} Defendant-appellee, Thonex Williams, was indicted for rape (a 
first-degree felony) and other offenses in December 2005.  Williams entered a 
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and underwent a mental-health evaluation.  
A judge of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas determined, 
consistent with the report of the mental-health examiner, that Williams was 
incompetent to stand trial and that there was a substantial probability that he could 
be restored to competency within the one-year time period prescribed by R.C. 
2945.38.  The trial court committed Williams to Twin Valley Behavioral 
Healthcare for restorative treatment. 
{¶ 3} The trial court’s review of Williams’s mental status six months 
later resulted in a determination that Williams remained incompetent to stand 
trial, and the court ordered continuing treatment.  As the maximum time under 
R.C. 2945.38 for restoration approached, a mental-health-examination report 
indicated that Williams remained incompetent to stand trial and opined that he 
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could not be restored to competency within the statute of limitations for his most 
serious charge, rape. 
{¶ 4} The state then orally moved at a hearing for the trial court to retain 
jurisdiction under R.C. 2945.39(A)(2).  Williams moved to dismiss the 
indictment, arguing that the trial court’s exercise of continuing jurisdiction 
pursuant to R.C. 2945.39 would deprive him of his rights to due process and equal 
protection.  After the state responded by defending the constitutionality of the 
court’s retaining jurisdiction, and after an oral hearing, the trial court denied the 
motion to dismiss and held that R.C. 2945.39 is constitutional. 
{¶ 5} On November 30, 2007, the trial court held a hearing under R.C. 
2945.39(A)(2) to decide whether to retain jurisdiction.  The trial court found by 
clear and convincing evidence that (1) Williams committed the offense of rape 
with which he was charged, (2) he was a mentally ill person subject to 
hospitalization by court order, (3) he was not competent to stand trial, and (4) the 
statutory time limit for restoration treatment had expired.  The court rejected 
Williams’s arguments that the matter belonged in probate court for a commitment 
under R.C. Chapter 5122.  The trial court retained jurisdiction subject to R.C. 
2945.401 and 2945.402 and ordered Williams to remain hospitalized at Twin 
Valley. 
{¶ 6} Upon Williams’s appeal, the Second District Court of Appeals 
reversed in a divided decision.  The majority held that R.C. 2945.39 is 
unconstitutional on three grounds.  First, the majority held that an involuntary 
commitment under that statute is “criminal, not civil in nature” and that 
Williams’s constitutional rights were therefore violated because he had not 
received all the procedural safeguards in his R.C. 2945.39 commitment hearing 
that he should have received as a criminal defendant undergoing prosecution.  179 
Ohio App.3d 584, 2008-Ohio-6245, 902 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 49. 
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{¶ 7} Second, the appellate majority held that R.C. 2945.39 violated 
Williams’s right to equal protection because that statute’s procedures for 
committing persons under indictment for a serious felony offense do not also 
apply to persons who have been convicted of the same offense and because the 
procedures for terminating commitment are more onerous for a person committed 
under R.C. 2945.39 than for a person committed under R.C. Chapter 5122.  Id. at 
¶ 66-67. 
{¶ 8} Third, the appellate majority agreed with Williams’s arguments 
that R.C. 2945.39 violated his right to due process because the common pleas 
court’s retention of jurisdiction pursuant to the criminal indictment, and the 
permitted length of the commitment—the maximum term that he could have 
received for the most serious offense in the indictment—are not reasonably 
related to the purpose of commitment, which is to protect society from dangerous 
persons who are mentally ill.  Id. at ¶ 79-82. 
{¶ 9} The dissenter disagreed with the majority’s conclusions on each of 
the constitutional grounds considered and would have affirmed the trial court’s 
commitment order.  Id. at ¶ 85-92 (Wolff, P.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 10} We accepted the state’s appeal under our discretionary jurisdiction 
to review three propositions of law regarding whether an involuntary commitment 
under R.C. 2945.39 is civil or criminal in nature, whether such a commitment 
violates a defendant’s equal-protection rights, and whether such a commitment 
violates a defendant’s due-process rights.  121 Ohio St.3d 1438, 2009-Ohio-1638, 
903 N.E.2d 1222. 
II.  The Relevant Statutes 
{¶ 11} A summary of the several statutes applicable to cases in which a 
defendant charged with a serious offense of violence (here rape, a first-degree 
felony) is mentally ill, is useful to an understanding of this matter.  Under R.C. 
2945.38(B)(1) and (C)(1), a common pleas court presiding over a criminal case 
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involving a defendant charged with a violent first- or second-degree felony who 
has been found incompetent to stand trial pursuant to R.C. 2945.37 may require 
the defendant to undergo treatment for up to one year.  One situation in which the 
court is authorized to order treatment is when it finds there is a “substantial 
probability” that the incompetent defendant will become competent to stand trial 
within one year while undergoing treatment.  R.C. 2945.38(B)(1)(a). 
{¶ 12} If the one-year time for treatment expires and the defendant 
remains incompetent to stand trial, R.C. 2945.38(H)(3) directs that further 
proceedings must occur under R.C. 2945.39, 2945.401, and 2945.402.  R.C. 
2945.39(A) provides two options that can be pursued at that point for a defendant 
who is mentally ill.  First, the court or prosecuting attorney may seek the 
defendant’s civil commitment in probate court under R.C. Chapter 5122.  R.C. 
2945.39(A)(1).  Second, the court or prosecuting attorney may seek to have the 
common pleas court retain jurisdiction over the defendant.  R.C. 2945.39(A)(2). 
{¶ 13} To retain jurisdiction, the trial court must find, by clear and 
convincing evidence after a hearing, both that the defendant committed the 
charged offense and that the defendant is a mentally ill person subject to 
hospitalization by court order.  R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)(a) and (b).  “Mentally ill 
person subject to hospitalization by court order” has the same meaning as that set 
forth in R.C. 5122.01(B), which includes persons who, because of mental illness, 
represent a substantial risk of physical harm to others as manifested by evidence 
of recent violent behavior or present dangerousness.  R.C. 2945.37(A)(7) and 
5122.01(B)(2).  See In re Burton (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 147, 11 OBR 465, 464 
N.E.2d 530, paragraph one of the syllabus (a totality-of-the-circumstances test 
governs whether a person who is alleged to be mentally ill should be hospitalized 
under R.C. 5122.01(B)). 
{¶ 14} If the court does not make both R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) findings, it 
must dismiss the indictment, and is required to discharge the defendant unless the 
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court or the prosecuting attorney files for the defendant’s civil commitment in 
probate court under R.C. Chapter 5122.  R.C. 2945.39(C).  But “[a] dismissal of 
charges under [R.C. 2945.39(C)] is not a bar to further criminal proceedings 
based on the same conduct.”  Id. 
{¶ 15} If the court does make both R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) findings, then R.C. 
2945.39(D)(1) directs the court to commit the defendant to a hospital operated by 
the department of mental health or to another appropriate facility.  The court must 
order that the defendant be placed in the least-restrictive commitment alternative 
available consistent with public safety and the defendant’s welfare, “ giv[ing] 
preference to protecting public safety.”  Id. 
{¶ 16} Once a court commits a defendant under R.C. 2945.39(D)(1), all 
further proceedings are governed by R.C. 2945.401 (which include proceedings 
regarding the defendant’s possible placement in nonsecured status; the 
termination of the commitment; periodic clinical reports and clinical 
recommendations on the defendant’s competence, degree of confinement, and 
termination of commitment; and trial court hearing requirements) and 2945.402 
(regarding the defendant’s possible conditional release).  R.C. 2945.39(D)(3). 
{¶ 17} Under R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(a) through (c), a commitment pursuant 
to R.C. 2945.39 terminates upon the earlier of (a) the trial court’s determination 
that the defendant is no longer a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by 
court order, (b) the expiration of the maximum prison term the defendant could 
have received if the defendant had been convicted of the most serious offense 
charged,1 or (c) the trial court’s termination of the commitment under R.C. 
2945.401(J)(2)(a)(ii), which requires findings that the defendant is competent to 
stand trial and is no longer a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court 
order. 
                                                          
 
1.  The parties agree that the applicable maximum term in this case is ten years. 
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{¶ 18} If the trial court’s jurisdiction is terminated pursuant to R.C. 
2945.401(J)(1)(b) because the defendant’s commitment ends upon the expiration 
of the maximum prison term the defendant could have received, the court or 
prosecuting attorney may seek the defendant’s civil commitment in probate court 
under R.C. Chapter 5122.  R.C. 2945.401(A). 
III.  Analysis 
{¶ 19} Each of Williams’s assignments of error in the court of appeals 
challenged the facial constitutionality of R.C. 2945.39.  Williams did not 
challenge the way the trial court applied R.C. 2945.39 and related statutes to his 
situation.  The resolution of this case, therefore, turns on the evaluation of R.C. 
2945.39’s facial constitutionality on each of the three grounds considered by the 
appellate court. 
{¶ 20} All statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality.  State 
v. Cook (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 409, 700 N.E.2d 570, citing State ex rel. 
Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  To overcome the presumption, one must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional.  State v. Bloomer, 
122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 41; State v. Ferguson, 
120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 12.  “In order for a statute 
to be facially unconstitutional, it must be unconstitutional in all applications.”  
Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 
2009-Ohio-5030, 915 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 13. 
A.  Is R.C. 2945.39 Criminal in Nature? 
{¶ 21} The appellate court held that an involuntary commitment under 
R.C. 2945.39 is criminal rather than civil in nature and that Williams’s 
constitutional rights were therefore violated because in his R.C. 2945.39 
commitment hearing, he was not afforded the procedural safeguards required by 
the Constitution for criminal prosecutions.  In so holding, it applied the “intent-
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effects test” employed by this court in State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 415, 700 
N.E.2d 570, to consider whether sex-offender legislation enacted in 1996 was 
civil or criminal for purposes of conducting an analysis under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause, Section 10, Article I of the United States Constitution. 
{¶ 22} In applying the intent-effects test, a court first considers whether 
the legislature intended the statute to be remedial (and therefore civil) or penal 
(and therefore criminal).  Id.  If the intent was that the statute be penal and 
criminal, then the inquiry ends.  However, if the intent was that the statute be 
remedial and civil, then the statute’s specific effects must be examined.  The 
statute may still be determined to be punitive and criminal if its effects negate a 
remedial intention.  Id. at 417-418.  See also United States v. Ward (1980), 448 
U.S. 242, 248-249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742. 
{¶ 23} The intent-effects test was also applied by the United States 
Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks (1997), 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 
L.Ed.2d 501.  In that case, the court evaluated the constitutionality of a Kansas 
statute permitting the state to institutionalize “sexually violent predators” who had 
completed their criminal sentences but who had mental abnormalities or 
personality disorders that indicated that they would likely reoffend.  Id. at 350-
353.  The court held that the statute was civil in nature and did not violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Id. at 370, 371. 
{¶ 24} The statute in Hendricks was determined to be civil for reasons 
that included the fact that the statutory provision was in the state’s probate code 
and not in its criminal code, id. at 361, the statute did not implicate retribution or 
deterrence, which are the primary goals of criminal punishment, id. at 361-363, 
and the statute did not require a finding of scienter, id. at 362.  The appellate court 
in the case at bar distinguished Hendricks, pointing out that R.C. 2945.39 and 
other implicated statutes are in the state’s criminal code and that there is no 
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explicit indication of a civil purpose in R.C. 2945.39.  179 Ohio App.3d 584, 
2008-Ohio-6245, 902 N.E.2d 1042, at ¶ 43. 
{¶ 25} Although the appellate court here recognized that R.C. 2945.39 is 
meant to protect the public, it read the statute to “suggest” that “protecting the 
public from dangerous mentally ill persons is secondary to punishing those 
dangerous mentally ill persons who cannot be tried.”  Id. at ¶ 45.  In support of 
this view, the court noted that the criminal indictment remains pending after the 
trial court commits the defendant under R.C. 2945.39.  Id. at ¶ 46. 
{¶ 26} As to the requirement that the evaluator conducting the periodic 
reviews under the statutes must express an opinion as to whether the defendant 
remains incompetent to stand trial, the appellate court considered the requirement 
to be an indicator that a key statutory purpose is to “confine” the defendant in 
case he regains competency to be tried.  Id.  The court found fault with the way 
the relevant statutes link the maximum length of detention to the maximum 
criminal sentence the defendant could have received if convicted.  It determined 
that this connection bears no relation to the purposes of civil commitment and 
shows that the charged offense is not used solely as evidence of dangerousness or 
mental illness in determining whether commitment is appropriate.  Id. at ¶ 47. 
{¶ 27} According to the appellate court, the statutory framework “strongly 
suggests that commitment procedures under R.C. Chapter 5122 are adequate to 
address society’s interest in confining dangerous mentally ill persons.”  Id. at ¶ 
48.  The appellate court stated that “although R.C. 2945.39 attempts to 
accomplish some of the same goals as civil commitment, the commitment 
procedures of R.C. 2945.39 reflect an overriding intent to confine incompetent 
defendants who have been charged with serious felonies as if they had been 
convicted or until they can be tried.”  Id. at ¶ 49. 
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{¶ 28} Because the appellate court found that the intent of R.C. 2945.39 is 
penal, and that the statute is criminal for that reason, it did not consider the 
“effects” prong of the intent-effects test. 
{¶ 29} In contrast, the dissent agreed with the trial court that R.C. 2945.39 
is civil in nature and functions as “merely a transfer of commitment authority to 
the criminal court from the probate court for mentally ill persons subject to 
hospitalization by court order, whose present dangerousness is demonstrated by 
the commission of a serious felony.”  Id. at ¶ 87 (Wolff, P.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 30} Our consideration of R.C. 2945.39 and related statutes leads us 
away from the view that the commitment of an incompetent defendant under R.C. 
2945.39 is the functional equivalent of criminally confining the defendant.  Nor 
do we see any indication of an overriding intent to punish or confine criminal 
defendants within the statutory framework. 
{¶ 31} Rather, we view R.C. 2945.39 and related statutes as designed 
primarily for the purpose of protecting the public.  In particular, we note that R.C. 
2945.39(D)(1), which requires the trial court to order the least-restrictive 
commitment alternative available consistent with public safety and the 
defendant’s welfare if it enters a commitment order under R.C. 2945.39, explicitly 
states that the court “shall give preference to protecting public safety.”  This 
statement gives voice to the predominant intent underlying R.C. 2945.39. 
{¶ 32} The present dangerousness of a specific offender (who, as a 
threshold matter, must have been charged with a serious offense, R.C. 
2945.38(C)(1), to be subject to the statutes at issue) is the critical component of an 
R.C. 2945.39 proceeding.  The type of offense charged is a reasonable indicator 
of the level of the offender’s dangerousness.  The seriousness of the charged 
offense plays a permissible and highly relevant role in the trial court’s 
determination whether the offender’s commitment under R.C. 2945.39 is 
appropriate.  See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (a 
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person’s prior conduct may permissibly be considered to support a finding of 
dangerousness). 
{¶ 33} Moreover, R.C. 2945.39, as with the statute under consideration in 
Hendricks, does not require a finding of scienter, nor does it implicate retribution 
or deterrence, which are the primary objectives of criminal punishment and the 
two most telling factors that a particular statute is criminal in nature.  See id. at 
361-363.  R.C. 2945.39 does not implicate retribution, because it does not affix 
culpability for prior criminal conduct.  See id. at 362.  A trial court’s 
determination by clear and convincing evidence under R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) that 
the defendant committed the offense does not require a finding of scienter and is 
merely a factor considered in determining the propriety of the commitment; it 
plays no role beyond that limited purpose.  R.C. 2945.39 does not implicate 
deterrence, because a defendant to whom it applies is unlikely, by the very nature 
of his mental illness, to possess the ability to tailor his behavior to the 
requirements of the law upon the threat of commitment.  See id. at 362-363. 
{¶ 34} Although it is true that R.C. 2945.39 and its related statutes are 
contained within Title 29 of the Revised Code, that fact is not dispositive as to 
whether these statutes are civil or criminal.  The sum of the statutory attributes 
must be examined.  See Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 417, 700 N.E.2d 570.  Similarly, 
the fact the statutes refer to the person being considered for commitment as the 
“defendant” does not mean that proceedings under R.C. 2945.39 are necessarily 
criminal in nature.  We view both of these statutory characteristics as naturally 
flowing from the reality that the person has been charged with a serious criminal 
offense and is subject to proceedings under R.C. 2945.38, and not as any 
particular indication of an intent to punish.  Moreover, although periodic reviews 
of a person committed under R.C. 2945.39 include an assessment of his ability to 
stand trial, see R.C. 2945.401(C), that fact does not transform proceedings that are 
inherently civil into ones that are criminal. 
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{¶ 35} We therefore determine that R.C. 2945.39 is manifestly civil in its 
intent.  As the dissent in the appellate court noted, “individuals committed under 
R.C. 42945.39 must be released when they have been found to be no longer a 
mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order.  * * * [T]he release 
provision emphasizes that the primary purpose of R.C. 2945.39 is to provide 
stricter confinement for mentally ill persons who are particularly dangerous.  As 
noted by the United States Supreme Court in Hendricks, the confinement of the 
dangerously mentally ill ‘is a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and 
has been historically so regarded.’  521 U.S. at 363, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 
501.”  179 Ohio App.3d 584, 2008-Ohio-6245, 902 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 87 (Wolff, 
P.J., dissenting). 
{¶ 36} The question that arises next, under the second prong of the intent-
effects test, is whether the statute operates in such a way that the statute’s effects 
negate the civil intent.  We see nothing in the effects of the statutory framework 
that negates its civil intent.  The same features that have caused us to conclude 
that the statute is intended to be civil in nature with an overriding purpose of 
protecting the public also support the conclusion that the effects of the statute are 
civil in nature and consistent with the civil intent.  In particular, R.C. 2945.39 
does not implicate retribution or deterrence, does not require a finding of scienter, 
and provides that commitments under the statute must terminate when the person 
is no longer mentally ill and subject to hospitalization by court order. 
{¶ 37} We conclude that R.C. 2945.39 is a civil statute.  Consequently, a 
person committed under the statute need not be afforded the constitutional rights 
afforded to a defendant in a criminal prosecution.  The judgment of the court of 
appeals on this issue is, therefore, reversed. 
B.  Equal-Protection Considerations 
{¶ 38} The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides, “No State shall * * * deny to any person 
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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  Ohio’s Equal Protection 
Clause, Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, provides, “All political 
power is inherent in the people.  Government is instituted for their equal 
protection and benefit * * *.”  These two equal-protection provisions are 
functionally equivalent and require the same analysis.  Eppley v. Tri-Valley Local 
School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 2009-Ohio-1970, 908 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 
11; State v. Thompson, 95 Ohio St.3d 264, 2002-Ohio-2124, 767 N.E.2d 251, ¶ 
11. 
{¶ 39} The standard of review to be applied is one of rational basis.  
Pursuant to this level of review, a statute that does not implicate a fundamental 
right or a suspect classification does not violate equal-protection principles if it is 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.  Eppley, 122 Ohio St.3d 56, 
2009-Ohio-1970, 767 N.E.2d 251, at ¶ 15, citing Menefee v. Queen City Metro 
(1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 550 N.E.2d 181; Oliver, 123 Ohio St.3d 278, 2009-
Ohio-5030, 915 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 40} Ohio courts grant substantial deference to the legislature when 
conducting an equal-protection rational-basis review.  State v. Williams (2000), 88 
Ohio St.3d 513, 531, 728 N.E.2d 342.  Classifications will be invalidated only if 
they “ ‘bear no relation to the state’s goals and no ground can be conceived to 
justify them.’ ”  State v. Peoples, 102 Ohio St.3d 460, 2004-Ohio-3923, 812 
N.E.2d 963, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Thompkins, (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 558, 561, 664 
N.E.2d 926. 
{¶ 41} Appellee asserts, and the appeals court agreed, that “[c]ommitment 
under R.C. 2945.39 is substantially more restrictive” than under R.C. Chapter 
5122.  179 Ohio App.3d 584, 2008-Ohio-6245, 902 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 64.  The court 
reasoned that R.C. 2945.39 applies only to persons who have been accused of 
committing serious violent offenses and not to persons who have been convicted 
of serious violent offenses or to persons who have a history of committing serious 
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violent offenses but are not under indictment.  Id. at ¶ 66.  The court then held, 
“R.C. 2945.39 cannot reasonably effectuate the goal of providing more restrictive 
commitment to those who have committed dangerous crimes.”  Id.  In addition, 
the court below saw no reasonable basis for the “more onerous procedures” it 
perceived for terminating commitment under R.C. 2945.39 than for terminating 
an ordinary civil commitment under R.C. Chapter 5122.  On that basis, the court 
found an equal-protection violation.  Id. at ¶ 67. 
{¶ 42} Appellee’s arguments that R.C. 2945.39 violates his right to equal 
protection rely in large part on Jackson v. Indiana (1972), 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 
1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, and Baxstrom v. Herold (1966), 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 
760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620.  In Jackson, the court held that the involuntary commitment 
of a defendant under an Indiana statute that amounted to “condemning him in 
effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for 
commitment or the opportunity for release afforded by” statutes applicable to 
those not charged with offenses deprived the defendant of equal protection.  Id. at 
729. 
{¶ 43} In Baxstrom, the court held that the involuntary commitment under 
a New York statute of a mentally ill person who had completed his criminal 
sentence violated equal protection because the person did not receive the benefit 
of a judicial hearing to determine whether he was dangerous, which as he would 
have had if he had not been in prison at the time the civil commitment proceeding 
was instituted.  Id. at 110.  The court stated that there was “no conceivable basis 
for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal 
term from all other civil commitments.”  Id. at 111-112. 
{¶ 44} The state argues that R.C. 2945.39 does not violate equal-
protection rights, because its procedures are justified by the state’s interest in 
restraining mentally ill persons subject to hospitalization who have committed a 
serious crime.  We agree. 
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{¶ 45} We accept as valid the arguments presented by the state and by the 
amicus curiae Attorney General of Ohio that a commitment under R.C. 2945.39 
and related statutes has many of the same attributes as a commitment under R.C. 
Chapter 5122, and that the differences between the two are not as substantial as 
appellee asserts.  For example, R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)(b) uses the term “mentally ill 
person subject to hospitalization by court order” and defines that term exactly as it 
is defined in R.C. 5122.01(B).  See R.C. 2945.37(A)(7).  Moreover, R.C. 
2945.401(B) states that provisions of R.C. Chapter 5122 “regarding 
hospitalization or institutionalization shall apply to the extent they are not in 
conflict with this chapter.” 
{¶ 46} This court in In re Burton, 11 Ohio St.3d at 150-151, 11 OBR 465, 
464 N.E.2d 530, upheld the constitutionality of R.C. Chapter 5122’s standards for 
involuntary commitments in the face of due-process and equal-protection 
challenges.  Certainly, to the extent that R.C. 2945.39 incorporates many of those 
same standards, it does not violate equal-protection principles. 
{¶ 47} R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)’s specific requirement that a court must make 
a threshold finding (by clear and convincing evidence) that the defendant 
committed the crimes he is charged with before ordering the defendant’s 
commitment is a requirement not found in R.C. Chapter 5122.  But this does not 
create an equal-protection violation, because the standards for commitment in this 
regard under R.C. 2945.39 are actually stricter than those under R.C. Chapter 
5122.  This factor distinguishes this case from Jackson, in which an equal-
protection violation was found in part because the accused person in that case was 
subjected to “a more lenient commitment standard” than was applicable to others.  
(Emphasis added.)  See 406 U.S. at 730, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435. 
{¶ 48} The state concedes that there are some differences between the 
procedures by which a person is involuntarily committed through the probate 
court under R.C. Chapter 5122 and those procedures by which a person is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
 
involuntarily committed under R.C. 2945.39, as well as in the respective 
procedures once the commitment has been ordered.  For example, those 
committed by a probate court are given earlier initial review hearings, compare 
R.C. 5122.15(C) and (H) with R.C. 2945.401(C); do not face the same level of 
scrutiny as to public-safety concerns, compare, e.g., R.C. 5122.15(C) with R.C. 
2945.39(A)(2) and (D)(1); can more easily have their restrictions within the 
institution reduced, compare R.C. 5122.20 with R.C. 2945.401(D); and have less 
stringent procedures for the termination of the commitment, including possible 
termination of commitment by a chief medical officer pursuant to R.C. Chapter 
5122 without the probate court’s approval, compare R.C. 5122.21(A) with R.C. 
2945.401(I). 
{¶ 49} These statutory differences, however, are justified by the differing 
contexts of the two types of commitments.  The fact that the subject of an R.C. 
2945.39 commitment has been found to be a danger to others, and also has been 
found to have committed a violent felony, such as the rape in this case, 
fundamentally distinguishes an R.C. 2945.39 commitment from one under R.C. 
Chapter 5122.  It is a distinction that may permissibly be taken into account.  
Public-safety concerns reasonably justify assigning to the common pleas court 
that entered the commitment order an important role in the committed person’s 
possible reduction in restrictions and in the determination of whether the 
commitment should be terminated.  Although a person committed under R.C. 
2945.39 may have to wait longer to receive an initial review hearing than a person 
committed under R.C. Chapter 5122, see R.C. 2945.401(C), that difference is not 
unreasonable, because such a person has already been subjected to the extensive 
evaluation procedures of R.C. 2945.38. 
{¶ 50} Even though R.C. 2945.39 concerns only persons who are under 
indictment and does not include others with a history of committing serious 
felony offenses who are not under indictment, the General Assembly “could 
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
rationally conclude that an individual’s present involvement in the criminal-
justice system indicates a greater degree of dangerousness.”  179 Ohio App.3d 
584, 2008-Ohio-6245, 902 N.E.2d 1042, at ¶ 88 (Wolff, P.J., dissenting).  
Moreover, “because those committed under R.C. 2945.39 are particularly prone to 
commit serious felonies, the legislature could rationally distinguish [such persons 
from those] persons committed through the probate court for purpose of release 
procedures.  * * *  [S]ociety has a substantial interest in ensuring that those 
individuals who have been deemed particularly dangerous truly are no longer 
mentally ill persons subject to hospitalization by court order prior to their release 
from commitment.”  Id. 
{¶ 51} Upon review, we hold that the procedures in R.C. 2945.39 and its 
related statutes that are less favorable to the person facing commitment than are 
the provisions governing a probate court commitment under R.C. Chapter 5122 
are rationally related to legitimate government interests.  Consequently, R.C. 
2945.39 withstands equal-protection scrutiny, and appellee has not successfully 
borne his burden of establishing an equal-protection violation.  See State v. Bretz 
(Dec. 30, 1999), 5th Dist. No. CA-98-001, 2000 WL 93739, * 9 (holding that an 
involuntary commitment under R.C. 2945.39 does not violate equal-protection 
rights). 
{¶ 52} Because we hold that an involuntary commitment under R.C. 
2945.39 does not violate equal protection, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed on this issue also. 
C.  Due-Process Considerations 
{¶ 53} The inquiry into whether R.C. 2945.39 violates due-process 
protections is also governed by the rational-basis standard.  As stated in Jackson 
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, “due process requires 
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
purpose for which the individual is committed.”  See also State v. Sullivan (2001), 
90 Ohio St.3d 502, 506, 739 N.E.2d 788. 
{¶ 54} A civil commitment for any purpose is a significant deprivation of 
liberty and due-process protections must be afforded to a person facing 
involuntary commitment.  Addington v. Texas (1979), 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 
1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323.  However, the right to be free from physical restraint is not 
absolute; the United States Supreme Court has consistently upheld statutes 
authorizing the forcible civil commitment of persons who are unable to control 
their behavior and who pose a danger to the safety of the public, “provided the 
confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary 
standards.”  Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356-357, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501; 
Foucha v. Louisiana (1992), 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437. 
{¶ 55} In arguing that R.C. 2945.39 fails to comport with due process, 
appellee places great emphasis on the United States Supreme Court’s statement in 
Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435, that “a person charged 
by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his 
incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of 
time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will 
attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.”  Appellee also relies on this court’s 
decision in State v. Sullivan, 90 Ohio St.3d 502, 739 N.E.2d 788.  Sullivan held 
that former R.C. 2945.38, requiring all defendants found incompetent to stand 
trial to undergo treatment for a set amount of time for the purpose of restoring 
them to competency, violated due-process protections because the defendant’s 
treatment could not be discontinued even if a court found that the defendant could 
not be restored to competency in the foreseeable future.2 
                                                          
 
2.  The General Assembly, in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 122, 149 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1081, effective 
February 20, 2002, amended the provisions of former R.C. 2945.38 that this court struck down in 
Sullivan to address the holding in that case.  See id. at Section 3, 1097, and Legislative Service 
Commission Final Bill Analysis, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 122, 124th General Assembly, 
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
{¶ 56} The state asserts that the court of appeals erred when it concluded 
by relying on Sullivan and other decisions that due process requires all efforts to 
restore competency to cease upon a court determination that a defendant is not 
restorable to competency within a reasonable time. 
{¶ 57} The appellate court held that “[b]ecause commitment under R.C. 
2945.39 involves attempts at restoration to competency beyond a reasonable 
period of time,” a commitment under that statute amounts to a due-process 
violation.  179 Ohio App.3d 584, 2008-Ohio-6245, 902 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 79.  Due 
process requires that an indictment against a criminal defendant be dismissed 
upon a finding that the defendant cannot be restored to competency, the appeals 
court reasoned, because “it is fundamentally unfair for an incompetent defendant 
to have charges pending indefinitely when there is little hope that he may [be] 
brought to trial and exonerated.”  Id. at ¶ 81.  Finally, the appellate court held that 
R.C. 2945.39(A)(2)(a)’s use of a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard rather 
than a proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for determining whether an 
incompetent defendant committed the charged offense violates due process.  Id. at 
¶ 82. 
{¶ 58} The appellate court’s conclusions appear to be based on a belief 
that the statute’s primary goals are to punish the defendant and restore his 
competency to stand trial.  However, as discussed in our analysis above, R.C. 
2945.39 is a civil statute with a primary goal of protecting the public.  It is of 
great significance to our due-process inquiry that R.C. 2945.39(D)(1) requires the 
court to order the least-restrictive commitment alternative available consistent 
with public safety and the defendant’s welfare, while also emphasizing that the 
court “shall give preference to protecting public safety.” 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses124/01-sb122.pdf (explaining the amendments and discussing 
Sullivan).  No aspects of R.C. 2945.38, including the amendments enacted in the wake of Sullivan, 
are at issue in this case. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
{¶ 59} It is apparent that a person committed under R.C. 2945.39 is not 
committed “solely” on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial, unlike the 
defendant in Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435.  Rather, 
such a person is committed only after being found by clear and convincing 
evidence to be mentally ill and subject to hospitalization by court order under 
R.C. 5122.01(B), through the application of R.C. 2945.39(A)(2) and 
2945.37(A)(7), and being found to be a danger to the public because he was 
determined to have committed the offense with which he was charged.  See Bretz, 
5th Dist. No. CA-98-001, 2000 WL 93739, * 7 (upholding the constitutionality of 
R.C. 2945.39, and distinguishing Jackson because in Jackson, “there was no 
‘affirmative proof’ that the accused had committed criminal acts or was otherwise 
dangerous”).  If the person at some point is no longer mentally ill and subject to 
hospitalization by court order, his commitment under R.C. 2945.39 will terminate, 
subject to additional court proceedings.  R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(a).  These statutory 
features are similar to those of the statute upheld in Hendricks.  See 521 U.S. at 
352-353, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501. 
{¶ 60} The 
clear-and-convincing-evidence 
standard 
of 
R.C. 
2945.39(A)(2) for determining whether the defendant committed the crime 
charged does not violate the defendant’s due-process rights.  Instead, a trial 
court’s finding under this evidentiary standard that the defendant has committed 
the offense charged is used only to determine the defendant’s degree of 
dangerousness. 
{¶ 61} The state asserts that Sullivan does not support appellee’s 
argument that his due-process rights were violated here.  The purpose of the 
commitment in Sullivan, which involved the former version of R.C. 2945.38, was 
to restore the defendant to competency in order to stand trial.  Because there was 
no probability that competency could be restored within the time set by the former 
statute, the mandatory treatment period bore no rational relationship to the 
January Term, 2010 
21 
 
purpose of commitment, and, therefore, the defendant’s due-process rights were 
violated.  See Sullivan, 90 Ohio St.3d at 508, 739 N.E.2d 788.  Our limited 
decision in Sullivan, however, has no application to this case, which involves the 
distinctly different procedures of R.C. 2945.39.  The overriding purpose of this 
statute is to protect the public from a person who is dangerously mentally ill, has 
perpetrated felonious conduct, and cannot presently be tried because of his mental 
incompetency. 
{¶ 62} Thus, we conclude that R.C. 2945.39 and 2945.401 do not violate a 
defendant’s due-process rights by allowing the indictment to remain intact, by 
allowing continued efforts to restore the defendant to competency, or by 
permitting a defendant to be committed for a term equal to the maximum term of 
imprisonment that he could receive for the most serious offense charged.  
“Although * * * a defendant may be committed until the expiration of the 
maximum term of imprisonment that he could have received for the charged 
offense, due process is satisfied by the fact that he may be released sooner if he is 
no longer subject to hospitalization by court order.”  Williams, 179 Ohio App.3d 
584, 2008-Ohio-6245, 902 N.E.2d 1042, at ¶ 90 (Wolff, P.J., dissenting).  
Moreover, as the dissent correctly observed, principles of due process do not 
prevent a person committed under R.C. 2945.39 from being reevaluated for 
competency.  If competency is restored while the person is still mentally ill, he 
can “be tried on the offense while remaining committed for his mental illness.  
R.C. 2945.401(J)(2).”  Id. at ¶ 91. 
{¶ 63} For the reasons expressed herein, we conclude that the nature and 
duration of the commitment that occurs under R.C. 2945.39 bear a reasonable 
relationship to the purpose for which the person is committed.  See Jackson, 406 
U.S. at 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
{¶ 64} We hold that an involuntary commitment under R.C. 2945.39 does 
not violate principles of due process.  The judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed on this issue. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 65} The crux of appellee’s arguments is that every involuntary 
commitment of the type at issue here should occur through a probate court 
proceeding under R.C. Chapter 5122, but we hold that such a practice is not 
constitutionally required.  It is reasonable to provide, as R.C. 2945.39 does, that a 
common pleas court that already has had extensive interaction with a defendant 
under R.C. 2945.38 can continue to exercise jurisdiction over that defendant; an 
involuntary commitment in this situation need not be exclusively pursued in a 
probate court to be constitutional.  And even though an R.C. Chapter 5122 
commitment may be one way to handle the involuntary commitment of a 
defendant who has committed a serious offense of violence and who is not 
presently competent to stand trial, the availability of procedures under R.C. 
Chapter 5122 does not stand in the way of the General Assembly’s ability to 
create alternative procedures for persons who pose an especially high degree of 
risk to the safety of the public. 
{¶ 66} We hold that because R.C. 2945.39 is civil in nature, a person 
committed under the statute need not be afforded the constitutional rights afforded 
to a defendant in a criminal prosecution.  We also hold that an involuntary 
commitment under R.C. 2945.39 does not violate principles of equal protection or 
due process.  The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the judgment 
of the trial court is reinstated. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
January Term, 2010 
23 
 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 67} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that R.C. 2945.39 
is civil in nature. 
{¶ 68} First, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2945.39 as part of 
Ohio’s criminal code.  Ohio already has a civil commitment process pursuant to 
R.C. Chapter 5122 regarding those who are mentally ill and R.C. Chapter 5123 
regarding those who are developmentally disabled. 
{¶ 69} Second, tying the length of a criminal defendant’s commitment to 
the maximum possible prison term for the most serious offense also indicates that 
the commitment is criminal in nature.  If the maximum period of commitment is 
reached without the defendant’s becoming competent to stand trial, he or she is 
discharged, unless the state seeks civil commitment.  R.C. 2945.401(J)(1)(b).  In 
other words, the general division of the common pleas court no longer has the 
authority to punish the defendant for the offense once the time has been served. 
{¶ 70} Finally, unlike a person committed under the civil process, a 
defendant who is committed under R.C. 2945.39 remains under a pending 
indictment.  The proceeding occurs as part of the defendant’s criminal case and, 
therefore, the defendant should be afforded all the rights of a criminal defendant. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Carley J. Ingram and Melissa M. Ford, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellant. 
 
Anthony Comunale, for appellee. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Stephen P. Carney, Deputy Solicitor, and Jeffrey R. Loeser, Assistant Solicitor, 
urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General.