Case Title: Culver Community Teachers Ass'n v. Indiana Education Employment Relations Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: 21S-PL-00064

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2021-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 21S-PL-64 
Culver Community Teachers Association, Decatur 
County Education Association, Smith Green 
Community Schools Classroom Teachers Association, 
and West Clark Teachers Association, 
Appellants-Petitioners, 
West Clark Community Schools, 
Intervenor, 
–v–
Indiana Education Employment Relations Board, 
Appellee-Respondent. 
Argued: April 29, 2021 | Decided: September 16, 2021 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court 
No. 49D01-1810-PL-41794 
The Honorable Heather Welch, Special Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 19A-PL-2989 
Opinion by Justice Massa 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Slaughter, and Goff concur. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Sep 16 2021, 2:15 pm
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Massa, Justice.  
For the 2017–2018 school year, four Teachers Associations and their 
respective school corporations collectively bargained over various 
ancillary duties, such as supervising detention. The Indiana Education 
Employment Relations Board found the parties violated Indiana law, 
because they bargained over impermissible subjects and curtailed the 
schools’ unfettered authority to direct teachers’ performance of these 
various ancillary duties. The Teachers Associations jointly petitioned for 
judicial review, which the trial court denied. We are asked to decide 
whether teachers unions and schools may collectively bargain over a 
limitation on—or a definition of—ancillary duties. Because the plain 
language of the relevant statutes prohibits the parties from bargaining 
over what constitutes an ancillary duty, we affirm the trial court.  
Facts and Procedural History  
For the 2017–2018 school year, the Culver Community Teachers 
Association, Decatur County Education Association, Smith-Green 
Community Schools Classroom Teachers Association, and West Clark 
Teachers Association negotiated and ratified collective bargaining 
agreements with their respective schools.1 Pursuant to Indiana Code 
section 20-29-6-6.1, the ratified agreements were submitted to compliance 
officers appointed by the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board. 
The compliance officers concluded that each agreement contained a 
provision that violated Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4, which permits 
bargaining only for salary, wages, and related benefits.  
The noncompliant provision in Culver’s agreement defined ancillary 
duties as “meetings, professional development trainings, and other school 
 
1 Both Indiana and federal courts recognize exceptions to the mootness doctrine. See, e.g., Seo 
v. State, 148 N.E.3d 952, 965 (Ind. 2020) (Massa, J., dissenting) (discussing state and federal 
mootness doctrines). Here, under either standard, the Court is presented with a justiciable 
controversy because this same issue is likely to arise again between the same parties when 
they return to the bargaining table. 
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activities outside the contractual day or contractual year.” Appellants’ 
App. Vol. II, p.207. It specifically excluded lesson planning and grading 
from the definition and required teachers to perform ten hours of ancillary 
duties per school year for no additional pay. Although the parties may 
bargain wages for an ancillary duty, the provision was deemed 
noncompliant because “[w]hat constitutes an ancillary duty is not a 
bargainable subject pursuant to Indiana Code § 20-29-6-4 and 20-29-6-4.5.” 
Id., pp. 194–95.  
In Decatur’s collective bargaining agreement, the noncompliant 
provision stated that a teacher supervising “Friday Night Detention” shall 
be paid a flat rate of $75.00 “for 12 students or less.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 
III, p.33. The provision was deemed noncompliant because the 
“conditions of the assignment, i.e. for 12 students or less, is not a 
bargainable subject pursuant to Indiana Code § 20-29-6-4 and 20-29-6-4.5.” 
Id., p.17.  
For Smith-Green, the noncompliant provision stated that if a substitute 
is not available for a period of time, “upon mutual agreement, a teacher 
may be requested to supervise a class’s instructional time during his/her 
preparation period.” Id., p.95. The provision was deemed noncompliant 
because the parties had bargained to require “mutual agreement” of the 
teacher before the school could assign the teacher to serve as a substitute, 
which is not a bargainable subject pursuant to Indiana Code sections 20-
29-6-4 and 20-29-6-4.5. Id., p.81.  
For West Clark, the noncompliant provision stated that “[i]f a teacher is 
asked to, and accepts responsibility for, writing lesson plans, grading 
assignments, and entering grades for these assignments in the absence of a 
certified teacher for a week or longer, the teacher will receive an 
additional four hours of pay per week.” Id., pp. 115–16. Again, the 
provision was deemed noncompliant because the teacher “must agree to 
accept the duty.” Id., pp. 129–30. The parties cannot bargain any 
limitations or restrictions on the school’s ability to assign the duty.  
The Teachers Associations appealed to the Board. After a hearing, the 
Board adopted and affirmed the compliance officers’ reports for each 
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collective bargaining agreement. The Board found the Teachers 
Associations and their respective schools “impermissibly bargained for a 
definition of, or limitation on, what constitutes an ancillary duty, in 
violation of Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4, which permits bargaining 
only for salary, wages, and salary and wage related fringe benefits.” 
Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p.12. The Teachers Associations then jointly 
petitioned for judicial review. Based on its “reading of the statute and 
supporting Indiana law,” the trial court found the Board’s interpretation 
of Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4 to be reasonable and denied the petition. 
Id., p.20. The Teachers Associations appealed.  
In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 
The panel concluded that the parties merely “agreed as to what 
constituted an ancillary duty and bargained regarding the compensation 
therefor,” which “is not the same as bargaining.” Culver Cmty. Tchrs. Ass’n 
v. Ind. Educ. Emp. Rel. Bd., 153 N.E.3d 1130, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) 
(emphasis omitted), vacated. The panel remanded to the Board with 
instructions to adopt the collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 1143. 
Dissenting, Judge Riley would have affirmed the trial court because under 
“the plain terms of the statute, what constitutes an ancillary duty cannot 
be a subject for collective bargaining.” Id. (Riley, J., dissenting). The Board 
sought transfer, which we granted. 165 N.E.3d 75 (Ind. 2021). 
Standard of Review 
We may set aside an agency action only if, relevant here, it is “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.” Ind. Code § 4–21.5–5–14(d)(1). The party seeking judicial review has 
the burden of demonstrating the action’s invalidity. I.C. § 4–21.5–5–14(a). 
We review an agency’s conclusions of law de novo. Nat. Res. Def. Council 
v. Poet Biorefining-N. Manchester, LLC, 15 N.E.3d 555, 561 (Ind. 2014).  
We also review questions of law, such as the interpretation of a statute, 
de novo. Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1265 (Ind. 2015). When construing 
a statute, our primary goal is to determine and effectuate the legislature’s 
intent. Cooper Indus., LLC v. City of South Bend, 899 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Ind. 
2009). To discern that intent, we first look to the statutory language and 
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give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning. Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 
767, 772 (Ind. 2016). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, “there 
is ‘no room for judicial construction.’” Id. (quoting St. Vincent Hosp. & 
Health Care Ctr., Inc v. Steele, 766 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 2002)). We presume 
the legislature intended the statutory language to be applied “logically 
and consistently with the statute's underlying policy and goals, and we 
avoid construing a statute so as to create an absurd result.” Walczak v. Lab. 
Works–Ft. Wayne LLC, 983 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 2013). 
Discussion and Decision 
The Teachers Associations argue “there is nothing in Indiana law that 
prevents the parties from describing the conditions for which the pay will 
be provided.” Appellants’ App. Vol. III, p.185. In support of their 
argument, they claim the holdings in Indiana Education Employment 
Relations Board v. Nettle Creek Classroom Teachers Association and Jay 
Classroom Teachers Association v. Jay School Corporation make “clear that 
[the] parties have the ability to agree on what constitutes an ancillary duty 
and specifically define the job for which the person is to be paid.” Id. 
(citing 26 N.E.3d 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); 45 N.E.3d 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 55 N.E.3d 813 (Ind. 2016)).  
We first conclude that the relevant statutes prohibit the parties from 
bargaining over what constitutes ancillary duties. Next, we review the 
holdings of Nettle Creek and Jay Classroom and conclude they allow 
bargaining over wages for ancillary duties, but not over the duties 
themselves. Because we conclude these statutes and holdings do not 
authorize the bargaining at issue, we affirm.  
I. 
The General Assembly imposed strict 
limitations on bargainable subjects and vested 
schools with the authority to direct teachers’ 
work assignments. 
Our Constitution guarantees the citizens of Indiana a tuition-free, 
“general and uniform system of Common Schools . . . equally open to all.” 
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Ind. Const. art. 8, § 1. Because public schools ensure these constitutional 
rights, the citizens of Indiana have a fundamental interest in the 
“development of harmonious and cooperative relationships between 
school corporations and their certified employees.” Jay Classroom, 55 
N.E.3d at 816–17; I.C. § 20-29-1-1(1). This fundamental interest imposes 
upon the State the “basic obligation to protect the public by attempting to 
prevent any material interference with the normal public school 
educational process.” I.C. § 20-29-1-1(3). Recognizing that obligation, the 
General Assembly has enacted statutes to govern the collective bargaining 
process between schools and teachers, with the objective of “alleviat[ing] 
various forms of strife and unrest.” I.C. § 20-29-1-1(2).  
Prior to 2011, the law required teachers and their employers to bargain 
salary, wages, related fringe benefits, and hours, but permitted them to 
“bargain collectively, negotiate, or enter into a written contract” 
concerning a host of other topics, including work assignments, student 
discipline, and expulsion and supervision of students. I.C. §§ 20-29-6-4, 
20-29-6-7(b) (2005). In 2011, the General Assembly overhauled these 
statutes and “eliminated permissive bargaining subjects altogether, while 
also limiting mandatory bargaining subjects to just wages, salaries, and 
related fringe benefits.” Jay Classroom, 55 N.E.3d at 817 (citations omitted). 
Put another way, schools and teachers must bargain wages, salary, and 
benefits, but they may not bargain anything else. I.C. § 20-29-6-4(a) (school 
employers shall bargain collectively on salaries, wages, and related fringe 
benefits); I.C. § 20-29-6-4.5(a)(5) (a school employer may not bargain 
collectively on “[a]ny subject not expressly listed” in I.C. § 20-29-6-4).   
Also in 2011, the General Assembly vested school employers with the 
authority to manage and direct the work of teachers, and to maintain the 
efficiency of school operations. I.C. § 20-29-4-3(1), (5). A collective 
bargaining agreement may not include provisions that conflict with these 
rights of school employers. I.C. § 20-29-6-2(a)(3). And in 2015, the General 
Assembly empowered the Board to review ratified collective bargaining 
agreements for compliance with these collective bargaining statutes. I.C. § 
20-29-6-6.1. This expansion of oversight was meant to ensure that all 
ratified collective bargaining agreements comply with Indiana law.  
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II. 
Indiana precedent allows schools and teachers 
to bargain over wages for ancillary duties, but 
not over the duties themselves.  
The parties and lower courts have all disagreed over what Nettle Creek 
and Jay Classroom mean for this case. Before turning to the holdings 
themselves, we briefly review the various interpretations and arguments 
made about these two cases. The Teachers Associations and the Court of 
Appeals agreed that Jay Classroom and Nettle Creek authorized the parties’ 
bargaining here. Culver, 153 N.E.3d at 1141. The Board argued reliance on 
Nettle Creek and Jay Classroom was misplaced because the specific issues 
and holdings in those cases are irrelevant here. The trial court concluded 
that neither case allows the Teachers Associations to “bargain for what the 
ancillary duty is because Indiana law provides that only schools have the 
authority to direct the work of teachers and maintain efficient school 
operations.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p.20 (internal citations omitted). 
Judge Riley argued the panel relied on dicta from Nettle Creek and Jay 
Classroom, “neither of which addressed the issue at hand.” Culver, 153 
N.E.3d at 1143 (Riley, J., dissenting). 
In Nettle Creek, the teachers organization had requested additional 
compensation for required hours worked outside the normal workday. 
The Board struck a proffered provision that the school “shall have the 
right to require a total of fifteen [] hours [of] after school activities per 
semester for each full-time teacher, without additional compensation,” but 
for each hour in excess of the fifteen, the compensation would be thirty-
four dollars per hour. 26 N.E.3d at 50. The Board concluded this provision 
was an “improper attempt” by the teachers organization “to bargain for 
an overtime compensation system that is inconsistent with both Federal 
and Indiana law.” Id. at 49. The Court of Appeals concluded that “while 
teachers are not entitled to earn overtime for the completion of direct 
teaching functions,” the relevant legal authority does not exclude the 
bargaining for and potential receipt of additional wages for the 
completion of required ancillary or voluntary co-curricular duties.” Id.  
Relevant here, the Nettle Creek panel recognized that schools “may 
require [their] teachers to undertake, or a teacher may agree to undertake, 
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certain duties beyond a teacher’s ‘normal’ teaching duties.” Id. at 56. 
Specifically, a school may require its teachers to perform certain ancillary 
duties, such as professional development and training, supervising 
detentions on the weekend, or substituting for another class. Id. In 
addition, teachers may agree to take on certain co-curricular 
responsibilities, such as coaching athletic teams or sponsoring an 
academic or extracurricular club. Id. Teachers may indisputably negotiate 
for additional wages for responsibilities associated with these co-
curricular duties, and the panel found that teachers may also negotiate for 
additional wages for ancillary duties. Id. In sum, Nettle Creek addressed 
the question of whether ancillary duties entitle teachers to additional 
compensation, rather than whether Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4 
provides teachers the ability to bargain with a school corporation as to 
what constitutes an ancillary duty. 
In Jay Classroom, the Board struck a provision that authorized 
additional compensation for teachers who volunteered or were assigned 
to cover a vacancy in another classroom. 45 N.E.3d at 1221. The Court of 
Appeals found it to be still an “open question” after Nettle Creek “whether 
ancillary duties can occur during the normal, contracted teachers’ 
workday, or whether anything that occurs during the normal, contracted 
workday is, by definition, considered part of normal teaching duties.” Id. 
at 1225. The Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that “compensable 
‘ancillary duties’ can occur during the normal teachers’ workday.” Id. This 
Court granted transfer and agreed with the Court of Appeals on this issue. 
Jay Classroom, 55 N.E.3d at 815, n.1. Again, the question decided by this 
case was not whether Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4 provides teachers 
the ability to bargain with a school corporation as to what constitutes an 
ancillary duty, but rather whether compensable ancillary duties can occur 
during the normal, contracted workday.  
 
 
 
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III. Neither the relevant statutes nor precedent 
allow the type of bargaining at issue here.  
The provisions at issue violate the plain language of the collective 
bargaining statutes. The General Assembly’s intent and statutory 
language is clear: teachers and schools may bargain on wages, salary, and 
benefits, but nothing else. I.C. §§ 20-29-6-4(a), 20-29-6-4.5(a)(5). Schools 
alone have the authority to manage and direct the work of teachers, as 
evinced by the General Assembly abolishing permissive bargaining topics 
altogether, including work assignments, and by the plain language of 
Indiana Code section 20-29-4-3(1). Moreover, a collective bargaining 
agreement may not include provisions that conflict with this right of 
school employers. I.C. § 20-29-6-2(a)(3). The holdings in Nettle Creek and 
Jay Classroom do not change the result. These cases allowed teachers to be 
paid for ancillary duties, whenever they occur, but neither case authorizes 
bargaining over the duties themselves. Teachers and schools may not 
bargain over work assignments, including ancillary duties, because this is 
an impermissible bargaining subject and interferes with schools’ exclusive 
rights to assign and direct teachers’ work.  
For the Decatur contract, this means “12 students or less” is an 
impermissibly bargained condition that interferes with the schools’ ability 
to assign a teacher to supervise detention. If an unusually high number of 
students were sentenced to detention on a Friday night (say, 13? 16? 20?), 
the school principal can still assign a teacher to supervise under the 
contract as revised by the Board, consistent with the Legislature’s 
directive to explicitly reinforce administrators’ authority. This is not to 
say, henceforth, that a school corporation is without discretion to create 
different categories of ancillary duties and then bargain over the wages to 
be paid.  For instance, Decatur management could create different 
categories of ancillary duties, describing one as “Detention 1 – supervising 
Friday Night Detention of 12 students or less,” and “Detention 2 – 
supervising Friday Night Detention of 13 students or more,” and the two 
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sides could then bargain over wages to be paid for the respective 
assignments.2 
 This nuance seems admittedly trivial when such a subtle variance 
would pass muster. Counsel for the Board conceded at oral argument that 
it would approve this language describing the ancillary duty so long as 
the contract contains a disclaimer that said description was “not 
collectively bargained.” But given the actual contract language before us, 
we cannot fault the Board for supervising enforcement of the legislature’s 
will with exacting precision. 
For Culver’s agreement, the definition of ancillary duties is an 
impermissible bargaining subject. Schools alone can define what ancillary 
duties it may require of teachers, who may then bargain for additional 
wages. As discussed above, the definition of ancillary duties may be 
included along with the proper disclaimer. If the needs of the school 
change throughout the year, the school has the flexibility to change the 
definition of what activities constitute an ancillary duty. As for Smith-
Green and West Clark’s agreements, both have the similar issue of 
requiring a teacher’s acceptance of an ancillary duty before it may be 
assigned. The General Assembly has vested the authority to assign and 
direct work to schools alone. Schools are allowed to direct and assign 
work to teachers without impediment or constraint, and as Nettle Creek 
and Jay Classroom make clear, teachers are allowed to negotiate for 
additional wages for ancillary duties. 
 
 
2 Or the school could define the assignment simply as “Friday Night Detention.” Period. With 
no reference to the number of students to be supervised. Or the school could describe 
Detention 2 as having two teachers assigned to supervise 13 or more students, as long as the 
proper disclaimer was added. In fact, Decatur has already engaged in a similar exercise for 
the extracurricular pay scale. The pay for junior high football coaches is accompanied by the 
“informational” disclaimer that there will be two coaches “up to 44 participants; one 
additional if more than 44 participants.” Appellants’ App. Vol. III, pp. 53–55.  
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Conclusion 
 
All four provisions impermissibly bargained over what constitutes an 
ancillary duty and improperly curtailed the authority of schools to direct 
their teachers. Going forward, teachers organizations and schools may 
bargain over wages for ancillary duties, and describe the conditions with 
proper disclaimers. But they may not engage in the type of bargaining at 
issue here. Because the provisions were properly struck by the Board, the 
trial court correctly denied judicial review. We affirm.  
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.  
 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T S 
Eric M. Hylton 
Laura S. Reed 
Riley Bennett Egloff LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Theodore E. Rokita 
Attorney General of Indiana 
Aaron T. Craft 
Section Chief, Civil Appeals 
Natalie F. Weiss 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E Y F O R  I N TE R V EN O R  
Jonathan L. Mayes 
Bose McKinney & Evans LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana