Case Title: Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Albright

Citation: 

Docket Number: 15/12

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2013-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Albright, et al., No. 15, September Term 2012.
TORTS – FRAUD – DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE REQUIRED
Although a plaintiff may recover for fraud where the allegedly fraudulent statement was not
made directly to the plaintiff, recovery is not permitted without a demonstration that the
plaintiff relied, either directly or indirectly, on the relevant misrepresentation to his or her
detriment.  Maryland law does not permit a third party to recover damages for fraud purely
on the basis of a false statement made to a governmental entity.  Thus, where a plaintiff does
not prove reliance on a personal basis or does not establish detriment arising from his or her
reliance, he or she may not recover damages for fraud.
TORTS – DAMAGES – EMOTIONAL DISTRESS FOR FEAR OF DEVELOPING
DISEASE
To recover emotional distress damages for fear of developing disease, a plaintiff must show
that (1) he or she was exposed actually to a toxic substance due to the defendant’s tortious
conduct; (2) which led him or her to fear objectively and reasonably that he or she would
contract a disease; and, (3) as a result of the objective and reasonable fear, he or she
manifested a physical injury capable of objective determination.  
TORTS – DAMAGES – MEDICAL MONITORING
A plaintiff may recover damages for medical monitoring costs, usually through the
administration of an equitable fund, upon a showing of the following; (1) that the plaintiff
was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance through the defendant’s tortious
conduct; (2) that as a proximate result of significant exposure, the plaintiff suffers a
significantly increased risk of contracting a latent disease; (3) that increased risk makes
periodic diagnostic medical examinations reasonably necessary; and, (4) that monitoring and
testing procedures exist which make the early detection and treatment of the disease possible
and beneficial.  
TORTS – DAMAGES – EMOTIONAL DISTRESS FOR FEAR OF INJURY TO
REAL PROPERTY
A plaintiff may ordinarily recover emotional distress damages attendant to injury to real
property only in the presence of fraud, malice, or like motives.
DAMAGES – INJURY TO REAL PROPERTY – DUPLICATIVE COMPENSATION
PROHIBITED
Owners of real property are not precluded necessarily from recovering both permanent
diminution in value and loss of use and enjoyment damages, provided that the injuries for
which recovery is sought do not overlap, so as to result in duplicative compensation. Where
an alleged loss of use and enjoyment is “not distinguishable from” and “subsumed in” a
claim for diminution in value, the impaired market value of the real property presumably
reflects the injury, and a plaintiff may not recover damages for both loss of use and
enjoyment and diminution in value.
TORTS – INJURY TO REAL PROPERTY – NO PHYSICAL IMPACT TO LAND
In the absence of physical injury to real property resulting from a defendant’s tortious
actions, a plaintiff must demonstrate more than modest adjustments in his or her use of his
or her real property in order to recover damages.  Thus, a plaintiff who has not provided
present proof of contamination must show more than a possibility of future contamination
or mere annoyance in order to recover.  Absent a substantial interference with a plaintiff’s
use and enjoyment of his or her land, any diminution in value suffered by a plaintiff is not
compensable.
DAMAGES – INJURY TO REAL PROPERTY – LOSS OF USE AND ENJOYMENT
An award for compensatory damages must be anchored to a rational basis on which to ensure
that the awards are not merely speculative.  In the context of damages for loss of use and
enjoyment of real property, we determine that loss of use and enjoyment of real property
cannot exceed the fair market, unimpaired value of the property at issue.
EXPERT TESTIMONY – VALUATION OF REAL PROPERTY
Expert testimony is required ordinarily to establish diminution in property value resulting
from environmental contamination.  Although Maryland law does not require the use of
comparable sales data, to the exclusion of all other methodologies, a real estate appraisal
expert must proffer a reasonable justification for ignoring market data where it is available.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case # 03-C-07-003809
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 15
September Term, 2012
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION
v.
THOMAS M. ALBRIGHT, et al.
Bell, C.J.
                    Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Barbera
McDonald
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Filed:  February 26, 2013
1The 2006 gasoline leak is also the genesis of Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford, ____ Md.
____, ____ A.3d ____ (2013), the opinion in which is filed immediately after the opinion in
the present case.
On 17 February 2006, Appellant, Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Exxon”), reported a
leak of approximately 26,000 gallons of gasoline from the underground tanks at its fueling
station located in Jacksonville, Maryland.1  The seemingly cursed Jacksonville community,
the unfortunate site of multiple gasoline leaks over the years, see, e.g., Exxon Corp. v.
Yarema, 69 Md. App. 124, 516 A.2d 990 (1987) (noting that in the early 1980s, three
gasoline stations located along Jarrettsville Pike in Jacksonville experienced underground
gasoline tank leaks), is reliant largely on private wells, rather than municipal supply sources,
for its potable water.  Thus, following the 2006 release into the underground aquifer serving
certain of those wells, 466 residents and business proprietors of Jacksonville (hereinafter
referred to collectively as “Appellees”) filed the present suit against Exxon for asserted
damages stemming from the contamination of their water supply, other consequential effects,
and alleged misrepresentations by Exxon.  The result was a jury award of $496,210,570 in
compensatory damages and $1,045,550,000 in punitive damages for Appellees.  Exxon
appealed both the compensatory and the punitive damages awards as to all recovering
plaintiffs, which were based on claims sounding in fraud, emotional distress for fear of
contracting cancer, medical monitoring, emotional distress for fear of loss of property value,
diminution in value of real property, and loss of use and enjoyment of real property.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Exxon purchased the property located at 14258 Jarrettsville Pike in Phoenix,
2
Maryland, in 1981 for the construction of a new gasoline fueling station (“the Jacksonville
Exxon”).  Exxon was granted initially a construction permit in 1981.  It applied for an
extension of the life of the construction permit in 1983.  Upon its application for extension,
however, the Baltimore County Health Department expressed its formal opposition due to
pre-existing contamination of the underground water supply stemming from prior leaks in
the surrounding area.  As a result, the Baltimore County Office of Permits and Licenses
denied Exxon’s request.
Exxon appealed the denial to the Baltimore County Board of Appeals.  At a 24 August
1983 hearing before the Board, an environmental engineering specialist for Exxon, Frederick
M. Anderson, testified regarding, among other things, the ongoing remediation efforts for the
three prior spills in the community.  During his testimony, Anderson described the
containment prevention features of the proposed underground fuel storage system at the new
station, stating that Exxon was “planning to really take some extraordinary measures” in
constructing the underground storage system.  Specifically, he asserted that Exxon planned
to construct secondary containment measures at the Jacksonville Exxon station, including (1)
fiberglass tanks and fiberglass lines; (2) sloped concrete troughs under the product lines
running from the dispensers back to the tank field; (3) a polymer-coated polyester lining
under the entire tank field; and (4) an observation well that would extend nearly to the
bottom of the tank field.   In response to concerns regarding potential repeated contamination
in the wake of the prior gasoline leaks, Anderson opined that the proposed Jacksonville
design ensured that the station would not be a source of contamination.  He also conceded,
2Exxon did not provide any direct evidence at trial that amended construction plans
were submitted to Baltimore County, but maintained rather that it was its ordinary practice
to update permit applications when altering design plans in the field.
3Regulations passed by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1988 established
underground storage tank standards, which required station owners and operators to retrofit
their stations to comply with the new regulations within a ten-year period.  The 1990
amendments to the Clean Air Act required stations located in certain metropolitan areas,
including Baltimore, to install Stage II vapor recovery systems.
4In 1987, the Jacksonville Exxon experienced a leak, which was contained
successfully by the secondary containment system as constructed.
3
however, that “[a]nything is possible.”  The Board granted to Exxon the construction permit
on 20 October 1983.
During the construction process, Exxon elected to depart from the containment design
plans described by Anderson.2  Rather than installing the tank field liner and single-walled
tanks, Exxon installed instead newly-available, double-walled, fiberglass Buffhide tanks,
fabric-lined product lines, and a plastic overliner.  The Jacksonville Exxon station opened
for business on or about 1 November 1984.  The station was retrofitted with additional
protective features in 1992, made in response to enactment of amendments in 1990 to the
federal Clean Air Act.3  Evidence was submitted at trial suggesting that, during the
retrofitting construction, the plastic overliner containment system was destroyed and was not
repaired subsequently.  Nevertheless, the Jacksonville Exxon station was operated for its
owner by Storto Enterprises, Inc. without a harmful incident for over twenty years.4 
On 13 January 2006, an employee from Crompco Corporation, an Exxon contractor,
drilled unknowingly, while performing maintenance on the “super unleaded grade”
5Appellees attribute this human error to a flaw in Exxon’s station design following the
retrofitting construction in 1992.  Specifically, they contend that, because Exxon sought to
disturb the original design of the station as minimally as possible in completing the retrofit,
the “regular grade” gasoline line was too close to the containment sump for the “super
unleaded grade” gasoline line.  Thus, when the Crompco contractor performed maintenance
on the “super unleaded grade” containment sump, he was enabled to drill accidentally into
the “regular grade” product line – an error that would not have occurred if the product line
was located properly.  Exxon admits that the “regular grade” gasoline line was located
improperly too closely to the containment sump.
6The Station employed primarily two leak detection systems, in compliance with
Maryland regulations.  The first was a daily inventory control system, required by COMAR
26.10.04.01E-G, which consisted of daily measurements of product levels in the tanks and
comparison with inventory revealed by the station operator’s delivery records, and was
capable of detecting leaks both in piping and in the tanks.  At the Jacksonville Exxon, this
was performed by station operator Andrea Loeiro of Storto Enterprises.  The second was an
electronic leak detection system, EECO 3000, manufactured by Emco Wheaton, which
monitored leak detectors designed to identify leaks in the underground storage tank systems
and generate alarms in the event of a positive detection.  The automatic line leak detector
feature measured pressure levels in the piping system, and could indicate leaks through two
types of tests: (1) a precision test designed to detect leaks as small as one-tenth of a gallon
per hour, pursuant to COMAR 26.10.05.02D(2)(b); and (2) an “hourly test,” run after each
dispensing cycle after the pump motor was turned off, designed to detect leaks as small as
three gallons per hour, pursuant to COMAR 26.10.05.02D(2)(a).   
7Exxon contracted with Gilbarco Veeder-Root (“Gilbarco”), a remote monitoring
service located in North Carolina.  In the event of a failed test by the EECO system, Gilbarco
received notice of the alarm and, if the alarm could not be cleared remotely, would notify
Exxon’s designated Managed Maintenance Service Manager, Integrated Process
Technologies (“IPT”), of the alarm.  IPT would then dispatch contractors to visit the station
and determine the cause of the alarm.
4
containment sump, a hole in the underground fiberglass “regular grade” gasoline feed line
leading from one of the gasoline storage tanks to the pumps.5  This hole, approximately 3/16
inch in diameter, was detected duly by an electronic leak detection system,6 which signaled
an alarm inside the station and at the central monitoring service, Gilbarco Veeder-Root,7
8An alarm indicated a catastrophic line failure when the EECO 3000's hourly test
detected a leak measuring five gallons or more per hour.
9The sign was removed, due to its inaccuracy, following a meeting on 21 February
2006 between Exxon representatives, government officials, and residents of the Jacksonville
community.
5
indicating a catastrophic line failure.8  The leak detection system shut down automatically
the regular unleaded gasoline product line.  Contractors from Alger Electric, Inc. (“Alger”)
were sent to the Jacksonville Exxon station to investigate the cause of the alarm.  They
concluded (incorrectly) that no actual leak existed.  Rather, the technicians concluded that
the alarm resulted from a problem with a submersible pump motor.  After replacing the
motor, the Alger technicians recalibrated the leak detection system (incorrectly), such that
the alarm system could no longer detect the actual leak when the fuel system was reactivated.
As a result of this confluence of events, the leak continued uninterrupted without
activating the alarm system.  Andrea Loiero, the station operator, noticed inventory
discrepancies following the incident on January 13.  Loeiro testified that, although she
realized in January that she had an inventory problem, she did not know that the daily
inventory variances resulted from a leak.  On 16 February 2006, Loeiro reported the
discrepancies in her gasoline inventory to Exxon employee Russ Bowen, at which time the
fuel system was shut down and the station closed.  A sign posted on the property stated,
“Please excuse our appearance, we are working to serve you better.  Fueling facilities are
temporarily closed for upgrade.”9  Following a manual precision line test, which the regular
gasoline line failed on February 17, Exxon reported the gasoline release to the Maryland
10Appellees contended at trial that Exxon and the MDE adopted an oversimplified
explanation of the hydrogeology of Jacksonville in order to justify the “strike line” theory,
and that Exxon avoided investigating the vertical migration of the contamination.
11Under the Consent Decree, Exxon agreed to pay a $4 million civil penalty to the
(continued...)
6
Department of the Environment (“MDE”), informing it of both the leak and the lost product
amount.  By then, over 26,000 gallons of gasoline were released into the underground
environment by the Jacksonville Exxon station.
After notifying the MDE of the leak, Exxon held multiple public meetings in the
Jacksonville community to inform residents of the situation, beginning with a previously-
scheduled meeting of the Greater Jacksonville Neighborhood Association on February 21.
The presentations, conducted by both Exxon and MDE officials, included information
regarding the projected migration of the gasoline plume within the underground aquifer.
Specifically, Exxon and the MDE predicted that, because of the hydrogeology of the area,
the contamination would remain concentrated within a half-mile radius along a line running
northeast and southwest from the station, which they termed the “strike line.”10  Baltimore
County notified individuals residing or operating businesses within a half-mile radius of the
station of the leak.  The MDE maintained a website on which it posted information regarding
the remediation efforts and all well test results.  Some residents outside of the area predicted
initially to be contaminated, however, ultimately suffered water contamination. 
The MDE is responsible for supervising Exxon’s remediation efforts, pursuant to a
Consent Decree entered in September 2008.11  The MDE will determine when Exxon has
11(...continued)
MDE, comply fully with the Interim Remedial Measures Plan approved by the MDE,
develop and follow a Corrective Action Plan subject to the MDE’s approval, and submit
quarterly progress reports to the MDE including sampling data and volume of treated
groundwater, among other things.
12POET systems, or point of entry treatment systems, remove gasoline contamination
from potable wells before the water is used by the occupants of the dwelling or users of a
business.
7
completed its remediation obligations under the Consent Decree.  During the remediation
process, the MDE directed Exxon’s investigation of the severity and scope of the leak, as
well as in drilling and sampling monitoring and recovery wells.  Exxon also submitted
weekly site status reports to the MDE.  Exxon has installed over 225 monitoring and
recovery wells in the Jacksonville area, and, as of the time of trial, spent over $46 million on
remediation.  
Additionally, in accordance with the MDE’s directives, Exxon provided written
updates to residents and government officials regarding the progress of the remediation
efforts, including the amount of gasoline recovered.  In March and April of 2006, Exxon
distributed estimates of how much gasoline had been recovered to Jacksonville residents.
After discovering an error in the recovery calculations, Exxon advised residents of the error
in April 2006, and submitted corrected estimates to the MDE on 29 June 2006. Exxon and
its contractors provided residents with test results from their individual potable wells (where
applicable), along with information regarding the drinking water guidelines promulgated by
the MDE, and installed POET systems12 where it and the MDE deemed necessary.  Exxon
13The action was filed initially with 119 plaintiffs and styled as Allison v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., Case No. 03-C-07-003809.  Five additional actions, also filed on 5 April 2007, were
consolidated under the Allison caption by order dated 12 May 2008.
14Appellees named initially, in addition to Exxon, the following defendants: Storto
Enterprises; the Veeder Root Company; Gilbarco Veeder-Root; Crompco, LLC; Crompco
Corporation; Alger Electric, Inc.; BP America, Inc.; BP Products North America Inc.;
Phoenix BP; and The Carroll Independent Fuel Company. Claims against all other defendants
were dismissed, however, and Exxon remained the sole defendant at trial.
15Appellees’ Fifth and Sixth Amended Complaints, as well as their Motion for Leave
of Court to Amend to Add Plaintiffs to the Proposed Seventh Amended Complaint, were
stricken by the first judge assigned specially to try the case, Judge Susan Souder, on 9 June
2009 as a violation of the Scheduling Order.  An Eighth Amended Complaint was struck by
Judge Souder on 23 August 2010.  Although Judge Souder struck Appellees’ Motion for
Leave of Court to Amend to Add Plaintiffs to the Proposed Seventh Amended Complaint,
nothing in the record indicates that she struck the Seventh Amended Complaint.
8
also delivered voluntarily, for a limited period of time, bottled water to those residents whose
wells were being ordered tested by the MDE. 
Appellees filed suit initially in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on 5 April
200713 against a number of defendants14 for negligence, strict liability for an abnormally
dangerous activity, private nuisance, trespass to land, and fraudulent concealment.  Appellees
sought compensatory damages for diminution in value and loss of use and enjoyment of real
property, emotional distress for fear of loss of property value, medical monitoring, emotional
distress for fear of contracting cancer, and punitive damages.  Understandably, the case
endured a lengthy procedural travail.  Appellees filed a total of nine complaints, with the
ultimate Eighth Amended Complaint filed on 12 March 2010.15  Prior to trial, Exxon filed
16Exxon filed multiple motions for partial summary judgment on 18 June 2010.  Judge
Souder granted Exxon’s motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims for
emotional distress as to certain plaintiffs, but denied it as to others.  She also granted Exxon’s
motion for partial summary judgment as to claims for fear of contracting cancer.
Judge Souder denied Exxon’s motions for partial summary judgment as to the
following claims: medical monitoring, prospective loss of use and enjoyment, fraud, and
liability for punitive damages based on allegations of evil motive, ill will, or intent to injure.
Judge Souder required Appellees to elect between pursuit of damages for diminution in value
of real property and prospective loss of use and enjoyment of their properties in an order
dated 23 August 2010, and also ordered that Exxon’s use of MTBE (“methyl tertiary-butyl
ether,” a chemical additive to vehicular motor fuel) in gasoline and its remediation efforts
could not provide a basis for the fraud claims.
17Following his assignment to try the case, Judge Robert N. Dugan, on 14 October
2010, reversed Judge Souder’s Order granting partial summary judgment as to fear of cancer.
On 19 October, Judge Dugan reversed Judge Souder’s order stating that Exxon’s use of
MTBE in gasoline and its remediation efforts could not provide a basis for fraud.
18Exxon contends that, of the instances submitted to the jury on the special verdict
sheets, two should not have been submitted to the jury because they were not pleaded in any
operative complaint.  Specifically, an allegation of a 1992 permit fraud was pleaded only in
Appellees’ Eighth Amended Complaint, which was stricken by Judge Souder on 23 August
2010 (a ruling not reversed by Judge Dugan), and a claim regarding double-walled piping
(continued...)
9
multiple motions for summary judgment,16 but ultimately, nearly all of Appellees’ claims for
damages were permitted to be tried.17 
At trial, which lasted from 3 January 2011 to 17 June 2011, Appellees maintained that
Exxon perpetuated an ongoing fraud designed to deceive both public authorities and
members of the community, beginning in 1983 with the construction of the containment
system and continuing through the remediation efforts following the discovery of the leak.
In support of their allegations, Appellees presented evidence regarding six specific instances
of alleged fraud:18 (1) Anderson’s 1983 testimony before the Board of Appeals (construction
18(...continued)
was never pleaded, and raised for the first time only at trial.
Further, Exxon argues, it was unclear throughout trial what were the specific bases
and arguments in support of Appellees’ fraud claims.  For example, although Appellees
characterized at times their fraud claims as a single overarching fraudulent scheme, and thus
only one count of fraud, the special verdict sheets submitted to the jury appeared to contain
reference to six separate incidents of fraud, but did not require the jury to allocate any
compensatory or punitive awards among the various frauds (or other torts) alleged.
Moreover, in closing arguments on 13 June 2011, counsel for Appellees stated that they had
“established in this case six fraud claims by clear and convincing evidence.”
19Appellees argue that the secondary containment system, as installed, was less
comprehensive than that proposed by Anderson in 1983, and part of a concerted corporate
plot to deceive state and local authorities and cut regulatory corners.  By contrast, Exxon
contends that the containment system as installed was not only superior, more costly, and
incorporated newer technology than that proposed by Anderson in 1983, but also that its
features as installed were well-known to the County.
20The double-walled piping allegations are based on a “Notification for Underground
Storage Tanks” form filed with the MDE in April 2001 by Exxon, which stated incorrectly
that the Jacksonville Exxon station utilized double-walled piping.  According to Exxon, by
2004, the MDE’s files reflected correctly that the Jacksonville Exxon station utilized single-
walled piping only.
10
fraud);19 (2) failure to inform the MDE that the 1992 retrofitting of the station, pursuant to
the Clean Air Act, would involve destruction of the overliner (1992 permit fraud); (3) the
posting of a misleading sign outside of the Jacksonville Exxon following the discovery of the
leak (sign fraud); (4) a 2001 statement by Exxon to the MDE representing that the
underground piping at the Jacksonville Exxon was double-walled piping, when actually it
was single-walled piping (2001 double-walled piping fraud);20 (5) inaccuracies in
remediation reports regarding the quantity of leaked product recovered and the alleged flow
of the leak (remediation fraud); and (6) deception of the MDE during the remediation
21Appellees’ claim appears to include not only the alleged manipulation of the MDE
by Exxon regarding locations of monitoring wells, amount of gasoline recovered, and
migration of contamination, but also an alleged awareness by Exxon of the leak prior to
notifying the MDE.  This allegation appears to be precipitated by a 14 February 2006 visit
to the Jacksonville Exxon by employee Brian Shedd of Kleinfelder, Inc., (a company which
later played an active role in remediation efforts).  It is undisputed that Shedd visited the
Jacksonville Exxon on that date to determine whether a soil vapor extraction system was
appropriate for that site.  Appellees contended that, because soil vapor extraction technology
is used to assist in cleaning up gasoline leaks, Shedd’s visit constituted evidence of Exxon’s
knowledge at that time.  By contrast, Exxon posited that Shedd’s visit was merely part of an
ongoing company policy to examine each Maryland Exxon site to determine suitability for
soil vapor extraction technologies.  Counsel for Exxon indicated in a post-trial motions
hearing on 11 October 2011 that Shedd visited three Exxon stations in Maryland, including
the Jacksonville Exxon, for this purpose on 14 February 2006.  Shedd did not testify at trial.
22Benzene is a constituent of gasoline and a known human carcinogen.  Both the EPA
and the MDE have promulgated drinking water standards indicating that benzene
contamination in drinking water may not exceed five parts per billion.  See 40 C.F.R. §
141.61; COMAR 26.04.01.07(D).
23Although MTBE was first used in 1979, it was added to some gasoline in higher
concentrations following the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act to fulfill oxygenate
requirements, help gasoline burn more cleanly, and reduce tailpipe emissions.
24The EPA classifies formaldehyde as a “probable human carcinogen.”  United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Integrated Risk Information System: Formaldehyde,
available at www.epa.gov/iris/subst.0419.htm (last visited 5 February 2013).  At trial,
Exxon’s expert, Dr. James Swenberg, testified that because formaldehyde is present in every
(continued...)
11
process.21
Additionally, Appellees sought emotional distress damages for fear of contracting
cancer, as well as relief in the form of medical monitoring costs, stemming from their alleged
actual or future exposure to gasoline constituents, particularly benzene,22 a known human
carcinogen, and methyl tertiary-butyl ether (“MTBE”),23 a metabolite of which is
formaldehyde.24  Although not classified as known human carcinogens, MTBE and
24(...continued)
cell of the human body, is exhaled in each human breath, and is essential to life and growth,
there is a safe level of exposure of formaldehyde, despite its classification as a probable
human carcinogen.  By contrast, Appellees’ expert witnesses – Dr. Nachman Brautbar and
Dr. Kathleen Burns – opined that there is “no safe level” of human exposure to
formaldehyde, nor, therefore, to MTBE.  There is no relevant EPA or MDE action level for
formaldehyde in drinking water.
25A mutagen is “an agent (as mustard gas or various radiations) that tends to increase
the frequency or extent of mutation.”  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 768 (10th
ed. 1993).  In the present case, it refers to a chemical agent that operates at an intra-cellular
level.
26Benzene was detected at the following Appellees’ properties: Ensor family; James
and Mary Kelly family; Over family; Rusinko family; Yen family; Dogwood Management,
LLC; Klein Family Development Corp.; Klein’s of Jacksonville; 3313 Paper Mill Road,
LLC; Jarrettsville Retail, LLC; and, Van Ho (Elegant Hair & Nails).  Five of these properties
were located within the strike line zone (northeast and southwest of the station).  The
remainder were located outside of the strike line zone, but within an approximately half-mile
radius of the Jacksonville Exxon station. 
12
formaldehyde are known to have mutagenic properties.25  Monitoring performed by Exxon
in accordance with the MDE’s requirements revealed benzene contamination in only ten
wells.26  Because few potable wells contained detectable concentrations of benzene, and
therefore few Appellees could support their claims for fear of contracting cancer or a need
for medical monitoring on the basis of benzene exposure, Appellees’ primary contention at
trial was that any MTBE contamination detected in any Appellee’s well was sufficient to
support that Appellee’s fear of cancer and medical monitoring claims.  Specifically,
Appellees contended, through their expert witnesses, that there is “no safe level” of MTBE,
and that any exposure to MTBE increases an individual’s risk of cancer and is therefore
sufficient to support a claim for fear of contracting cancer and medical monitoring.  Of
27MTBE is not regulated presently by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
under the federal Safe Drinking Water Act.  Both the MDE and the EPA have promulgated
guidelines, however, recommending control levels for communities that experience MTBE
drinking water contamination.  The MDE notes that contamination of MTBE in drinking
water at or above levels of twenty parts per billion constitutes a “level of concern,” see
COMAR 26.10.02.03(B)(3)(e), while the EPA issued an advisory recommending limiting
acceptable levels of contamination between twenty and forty parts per billion.  The EPA
noted, however, that its respective action level is not based on concerns for human health,
but rather is classified appropriately as an “aesthetic” standard, above which MTBE can be
detected by an unpleasant odor or taste.  The EPA noted that a range of 20–40 parts per
billion provides “a large margin of exposure (safety) from toxic effects.”  United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Drinking Water Advisory: Consumer Acceptability
Advice and Health Effects Analysis on Methyl Tertiary-Butyl Ether (MtBE) 2 (1997). 
13
Appellees’ potable wells, only eight recorded detections of MTBE above the MDE action
level of twenty parts per billion (“ppb”) for MTBE in drinking water.27
On Appellees’ claims for emotional distress for fear of contracting cancer and medical
monitoring, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
To recover for fear of disease, a Plaintiff need not offer
definitive proof of actual exposure to the disease-causing agent
where such proof is unavailable; it is sufficient in such a
situation if the Plaintiff proves that the Defendant created
circumstances making the Plaintiff’s exposure a reasonable
probability.  The evidence is sufficient to establish a reasonable
probability if it produces in your minds a belief that an outcome
is more likely true than not true. 
A Plaintiff’s entitlement to damages for fear of disease must be
confined to injury suffered during the Plaintiff’s legitimate
window of mental anxiety.  The window of anxiety begins when
the Plaintiff first learns of the potential exposure to [sic] disease-
causing agent and ends when satisfactory information becomes
available that puts to rest the fear of disease.
***
Furthermore, a Plaintiff must show that all claimed emotional
14
distresses are objectively ascertainable through evidence of
physical manifestations.  Physical manifestations of emotional
distress may include, but are not limited to, any of the following:
Depression, inability to work or perform routine household
chores, loss of appetite, insomnia, nightmares, loss of weight,
extreme nervousness and irritability.
***
The Plaintiffs seek a form of relief called medical monitoring.
Medical monitoring is a form of relief that represents the cost of
periodic medical tests or examinations, to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty, that are necessary to monitor a Plaintiff’s
health and to facilitate early diagnosis and treatment of a disease
caused by exposure to a chemical.  To qualify for medical
monitoring damages, a Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence: Relative to the general population, the Plaintiff
has been exposed to MTBE, benzene, toluene, or other gasoline
constituents; MTBE, benzene, or toluene are disease-causing
agents; the exposure was caused by the 2006 Jacksonville Exxon
release of gasoline into the environment; the exposure created
a significant increase of risk for contracting a serious disease
when compared to the general nonexposed population;
diagnostic or early detection tests exist for this increased risk of
a serious disease and is reasonably beneficial in the treatment of
serious disease; this testing would be prescribed by a qualified
physician in accordance with contemporary scientific principles
and would not be prescribed to the general population absent
this exposure.
In support of their claims for fear of contracting cancer, and over the objection of
Exxon’s counsel, many Appellees testified regarding their opinions that they, members of
their families, or their pets contracted disease as a result of the gasoline leak.  At trial,
however, no Appellee “assert[ed] a claim for sickness or death of any person or animal.”
The trial court instructed the jury that no claim could be asserted unless Appellees “offered
appropriate expert testimony linking those illnesses or deaths to the level of exposure to
28Appellees initially pursued damages for both diminution in value and prospective
loss of use and enjoyment, but were required to elect between the two theories of recovery
prior to trial.  Appellees elected to pursue damages for permanent diminution in value
measured as of the day the leak was discovered, as well as damages for past loss of use and
enjoyment, measured between the date the leak was discovered and the date trial began.
29Many Appellees’ properties had not received positive detection well tests at the time
of trial.  Rather, their claims relied on expert testimony provided by Dr. Caroline Loop and
Dr. Richard Spruill, who opined that it was “possible” or “probable” that Appellees’
properties would experience contamination at some point during the next thirty years.
30The jury adopted ultimately the view of Dr. Kilpatrick, awarding compensatory
damages to each property owner amounting to sixty percent of the pre-leak value of his, her,
or its property.
15
gasoline, including any constituent that has caused sickness or death and to any person or
animal.” 
In addition, Appellees sought compensatory damages for diminution in value and past
loss of use and enjoyment of real property28 as a remedy for their claims of nuisance,
trespass, negligence, and strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity.29  Some
Appellees sought additional recovery for emotional distress for fear of loss of property value.
Appellees testified that they were reluctant to use portions of their properties, needed to
purchase bottled drinking water, and were disturbed generally by the lights, noise, and smells
produced by remediation activities, which reduced their enjoyment of their properties.
Further, in support of their diminution in value allegations, Appellees introduced Dr. John
Kilpatrick as an expert witness, who testified that each of the residential Appellees’
properties had sustained a sixty percent diminution in value as of the day the leak was
discovered.30  Exxon countered with its expert witness, Richard Roddewig, who testified that,
31For some Appellees, Exxon admitted causation and liability for some compensatory
damages, while preserving its arguments as to the type and amount of damages that may be
awarded.  Specifically, Exxon admitted that it caused the following Appellees to suffer
compensatory damages of some type as a result of the Jacksonville Exxon gasoline leak:
Allison family; Craig family; DiPino family; Ensor family; Hairston family; Van Ho; James
and Mary Kelly family; Larrabee family; Lindenmeyer family; Munson family; Odend’hal
family; Puller family; Rebold family; Riegger family; Rusinko family; Sheeler family;
Stehman family; Sullivan family; Trader family; Tripp family; Vuong family; Welms family;
Yen family; Lenore Zaccari; 14237 Jarrettsville Pike, LLC; 14231 Jarrettsville Pike, LLC;
3313 Paper Mill Road, LLC; 3422 Sweet Air Road, LLC; and Dogwood Management, LLC.
32Following Exxon’s notice of appeal, proceedings continued in the trial court.  On
17 November 2011, Judge Dugan issued an opinion explaining his reasons for denying
(continued...)
16
based on post-leak sales in the Jacksonville community, some properties had not sustained
any diminution in value, while others sustained diminution up to 35% of their pre-leak value.
At the close of trial, Judge Dugan granted Exxon’s Motion for Judgment on Plaintiffs’
Claims for Punitive Damages based on allegations of evil motive, ill will, or intent to injure,
determining that Appellees’ only viable basis for seeking recovery of punitive damages was
fraud.  Thus, the case went to the jury on causes of action for negligence, strict liability,
trespass, nuisance, and fraud.31  The jury returned verdicts for 466 plaintiffs on all causes of
action on 28 June 2011, amounting to a total compensatory damages award of $496,210,570.
Following presentation of evidence on the issue of punitive damages, the jury returned an
award for punitive damages totaling $1,045,550,000.
Exxon filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial
and/or remittitur, which were denied on 19 July 2011.  On 18 August 2011, Exxon noted
timely an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.32  Before the intermediate appellate court
32(...continued)
generally Exxon’s request to set aside or reduce the punitive damages award.  Judge Dugan
reduced the punitive damages awards for five plaintiffs, as set forth in an order dated 16 May
2012.  The trial court proceeded to resolve various ambiguities and errors with regard to
specific plaintiffs and the verdict sheets, with the final judgment entered on 14 June 2012.
33Because the case is before this Court on bypass of the Court of Special Appeals by
virtue of our granting Appellees’ petition for certiorari pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-302(a),
we stand in the shoes of the Court of Special Appeals.  See Md. R. 8-131(b)(2).  Thus,
although the scope of our review with regard to the issues raised by Appellees is limited, as
in a cross-appeal, to those contained in their petition for certiorari, any and all issues raised
by Exxon in its brief, if preserved in the trial court, are within the purview of this Court on
review.  See Wildwood Med. Ctr., LLC v. Montgomery Cnty., 405 Md. 489, 496, 954 A.2d
457, 461 (2008). 
34In its brief, Exxon posited the following questions:
(1) May verdicts for fraud be upheld (a) when based on claims
not found in the operative complaint or defined for the jury; and
(b) absent clear and convincing evidence that Defendant made
a knowingly false representation to the Plaintiff, intending to
deceive the Plaintiff, and resulting in reliance by and damage to
the Plaintiff?
(2) May punitive damage verdicts be upheld when it is
impossible to determine what, if any, compensatory damages
were awarded for fraud, or what punitive damages were
awarded on any of the six frauds, and where the punitive
damage instructions did not advise the jury of all of the relevant
factors it should consider?
(continued...)
17
could decide the appeal, Appellees filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court on 24
February 2012.  Exxon opposed Appellees’ petition, arguing that it was better for the case
to proceed first through the Court of Special Appeals.  We granted Appellees’ petition for
certiorari on 9 May 2012, 426 Md. 427, 44 A.3d 421 (2012), to consider the following
issues,33 rephrased and consolidated for brevity:34 
34(...continued)
(3) Did the trial court commit reversible error in admitting
highly prejudicial, emotional lay opinion regarding cancer and
other illnesses that was not supported by expert testimony and
contradicted by the admissions of Plaintiffs’ counsel?
(4) Did the trial court commit reversible error in allowing
recovery for emotional distress damages for fear of contracting
cancer recoverable in the absence of proof of exposure or proof
that future disease is more likely than not to occur, and by
failing to instruct the jury that such proof was required?
(5) Does Maryland law permit recovery of medical monitoring
damages and, if so, should recovery be permitted where (a) no
Plaintiff claimed to have any current disease caused by MTBE;
(b) no Plaintiff has a significantly increased risk of disease; and
(c) many Plaintiffs were not exposed to MTBE?
(6) Were the property damage awards speculative, duplicative,
grossly excessive and contrary to Maryland law? 
(7) If punitive damages were permitted, were the punitive
damage awards impermissibly excessive?
In their petition for certiorari, Appellees framed the following questions for review:
(1) Whether, in an action for fraud, evidence of the Defendant’s
deceitful representations to the government, made with the
intent of influencing government action, and relied upon by it to
the Plaintiffs’ detriment, satisfies the requirement that Plaintiffs
prove reliance?
(2) Whether, in an action involving the release of 26,000 gallons
of gasoline into the aquifer which is the Plaintiffs’ sole source
of potable water, where expert testimony has established the
Plaintiffs’ resulting exposure to a genotoxic substance for which
there is no safe level, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages
for fear of cancer and medical monitoring?
(continued...)
18
34(...continued)
(3) Whether, in an action for property damage, evidence that the
Defendant released 26,000 gallons of gasoline into the aquifer
that serves as the Plaintiffs’ sole source of potable water is
sufficient to establish the Defendant’s liability for an invasion
of the Plaintiffs’ land? 
19
(1) Does Maryland recognize third party reliance in a fraud
action?
(2) Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury’s fraud
awards?
(3) Where a Plaintiff alleges multiple instances of fraud, must
the jury verdict sheet allocate compensatory damages among the
various instances of fraud?
(4) Was the punitive damages award excessive?
(5) Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury’s award of
emotional distress damages for fear of cancer?
(6) Does Maryland recognize a claim for medical monitoring?
(7) Were the jury’s property damages duplicative, excessive,
and speculative?
(8) Is the release of a contaminant into an aquifer sufficient to
establish trespass to land regardless of the level of detected
contamination in an individual Plaintiff’s well?
ANALYSIS
I. Sufficiency of Evidence for Fraud Verdict and Punitive Damages
Exxon challenges on multiple grounds the jury’s fraud verdicts and resultant punitive
damages awards.  First, Exxon seeks to undermine the legal sufficiency of the jury’s finding
of fraud, contending that Appellees did not prove detrimental reliance as to any of the six
20
alleged categories of alleged fraudulent conduct.  Second, Exxon argues that the jury verdict
sheets were faulty in that they failed to allocate compensatory and punitive damages among
the separate categories of alleged fraud, such that an assumed finding of insufficiency by this
Court on some, but not all, of the fraud claims mandates nonetheless a new trial.  Third,
Exxon contends that by failing to require Appellees to define what they meant by
“remediation fraud” prior to the commencement of trial, the trial court permitted Appellees
to shift their theory of liability during trial in violation of Exxon’s due process rights.  Lastly,
Exxon asseverates that the punitive damages awards are constitutionally excessive.  Because
we conclude that Appellees’ evidence in support of their fraud claims was legally
insufficient, we need not decide Exxon’s other contentions. 
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding a verdict
for fraud, we must determine whether “there is any evidence adduced, however slight . . .
from which reasonable jurors, applying the appropriate standard of proof, could find in favor
of the plaintiff on the claims presented.”  Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 16, 867 A.2d 276,
285 (2005); see also Darcars v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249, 270, 841 A.2d 828, 840 (2004)
(noting that a court “must account for and consider the appropriate burden of persuasion in
deciding whether to allow the jury to decide an issue”).  We review the trial court’s decision
to “determine whether it was legally correct, while viewing the evidence and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”  Scapa
Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville, 418 Md. 496, 503, 17 A.3d 159, 163 (2011) (internal citations
omitted).  We will reverse the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
21
“only if the facts and circumstances permit but a single inference as relates to the appellate
issue presented.”  Jones v. State, 425 Md. 1, 31, 38 A.3d 333, 350 (2012) (citing Scapa, 418
Md. at 503, 16 A.3d at 163).  Thus, because fraud must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence, Hoffman, 385 Md. at 16, 867 A.2d at 285 (citing VF Corp. v. Wrexham Aviation,
350 Md. 693, 704, 715 A.2d 188, 193 (1998)), reversal of the trial court’s denial of the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is only appropriate when, looking at the
evidence in the light most favorable to Appellees, we determine that Appellees did not meet
their burden of establishing fraud by clear and convincing evidence.
A. Third Party Reliance
At trial, Appellees alleged on Exxon’s part a continuous course of fraudulent conduct
continuing over approximately thirty years, based on six specific instances.  Exxon
challenges the legal sufficiency of the jury’s verdict as to three of those instances – the 1983
construction fraud, 1992 permit fraud, and 2001 double-walled piping fraud – on the grounds
that the jury relied improperly on a theory of third party reliance, which Exxon contends is
not recognized under Maryland law.  We determine that Appellees’ theory of third party
reliance fails to satisfy the requirement that Appellees demonstrate personal reliance, and
thus, because they presented no competent evidence on this missing element, their proof is
legally insufficient.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment as to fraud. 
To establish fraud, a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that “(1)
the defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff, (2) the falsity of the representation
was either known to the defendant or the representation was made with reckless indifference
22
to its truth, (3) the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff,
(4) the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation and had the right to rely on it, and (5) the
plaintiff suffered compensable injury as a result of the misrepresentation.”  Hoffman, 385
Md. at 28, 867 A.2d at 292.  Exxon takes issue with the trial court’s jury instructions on
reliance, which read, in relevant part, that, in order to recover damages for fraud, Plaintiffs
need only prove that Exxon “intended the Plaintiffs or Baltimore County or the State of
Maryland would act in reliance on [its false] statements” and that “the Plaintiff or Baltimore
County or the State of Maryland did justifiably rely on the representations of the Defendant.”
(Emphasis added). 
Ordinarily, a plaintiff seeking recovery for fraud must prove that “the defendant . . .
made a false representation to the person defrauded.”  Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, 759,
955 A.2d 769, 791 (2011) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).  Here, there is no dispute
that (1) Exxon did not direct any of these three allegedly fraudulent representations to any
of the Appellees; and (2) none of the Appellees relied personally on the three allegedly
fraudulent misrepresentations.  None of the Appellees contend that they were present at the
1983 meeting of the Baltimore County Board of Appeals at which Anderson testified, knew
about the 1992 permit application, or saw, prior to the leak, the 2001 MDE document
representing that the Exxon station employed double-walled piping.  In the absence of
personal reliance, however, Appellees assert an attenuated third-party reliance theory under
which they claim that they need not show any evidence of actual, personal reliance in order
to establish fraud.  Rather, they claim, a cause of action for fraud may be successful under
23
a theory of third-party reliance by demonstrating that Exxon made intentionally or recklessly
a false statement to public officials (Baltimore County or the State of Maryland), which the
public officials then relied on to the ultimate detriment of the Appellees – rather like fraud
on the people’s government constitutes fraud on the people.  Exxon, by contrast, contends
that Maryland law requires that “a plaintiff prove he had knowledge of, and relied upon, a
misrepresentation” on a direct and personal basis.
In some circumstances, an individual may recover for fraud even when the allegedly
fraudulent statement at issue was not made to him or her directly.  See, e.g., Diamond Point
Plaza Ltd. P’ship v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 400 Md. 718, 741–42, 929 A.2d 932, 946
(2007) (“Liability [for fraud] is not defeated by the fact that Diamond Point’s representations
[in a commercial document] were not made directly to Wells Fargo.”); Rhee v. Highland
Development Corp., 182 Md. App. 516, 539–40, 958 A.2d 385, 389–90 (2008) (permitting
a subsequent purchaser of real estate to proceed against the original seller for his or her
alleged fraudulent concealment, even though the misrepresentation was not made directly to
the subsequent purchaser); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 531 (“One who makes a
fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability to the persons or class of persons whom
he intends or has reason to expect to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon the
misrepresentation . . .”).  But see Gourdine, 405 Md. at 759–60, 955 A.2d at 791–92
(declining to sustain a cause of action for fraud to a third party in part because the third party
was not a party to the alleged misrepresentation).  
Despite the instances where recovery for fraud has been sanctioned where the
35Moreover, even assuming that reliance by Baltimore County or the MDE alone was
(continued...)
24
allegedly fraudulent statement was not made directly to the plaintiff, we have not permitted
recovery without a demonstration that the plaintiff relied, either directly or indirectly, on the
relevant misrepresentation.  For example, in Diamond Point Plaza, the defendant, Diamond
Point, made a fraudulent misrepresentation to two lenders, Pinnacle and PaineWebber, “for
the purpose of inducing Pinnacle and PaineWebber to extend a loan, aware that PaineWebber
likely would sell the loan in the secondary market.”  400 Md. at 741, 929 A.2d at 946.  Wells
Fargo bought the loan in the secondary market.  Thus, we reasoned that Diamond Point had
“reason to expect that the loan documents, including [the fraudulent misrepresentation],
would be presented to, would be considered by, and would influence the decision of
prospective buyers in the secondary market.”  Id. at 741–42, 929 A.2d at 946.  Therefore, not
only did Pinnacle and PaineWebber, the parties to whom the actual misrepresentation was
made, rely, but so too did Wells Fargo, the third party buyer in the secondary market.  Id.
Although Diamond Point’s representations were not made directly to Wells Fargo, Wells
Fargo, as the third party, established reliance and resultant harm. 
Appellees contend that, because we have permitted previously recovery where the
allegedly fraudulent statement was not made directly to the plaintiff, recovery by Appellees
for the statements made to Baltimore County and the MDE is justified in the present case.
Reliance by Baltimore County or the State of Maryland is simply February 22, 2013not
enough, however.35  Appellees, like Wells Fargo in Diamond Point, must also have relied
35(...continued)
sufficient to support Appellees’ cause of action for fraud, we are not convinced that
Appellees proved by clear and convincing evidence reliance by the governmental entities.
Rather, Appellees’ claims appear to be based on mere conjecture, and the absence of any
testimony by anyone at either the MDE or the Baltimore County Board of Appeals
demonstrates Appellees’ failure to meet their burden of proof.
36Appellees also rely on State v. Fox, 79 Md. 514, 29 A. 601 (1894), and State v.
Katcef, 159 Md. 271, 150 A. 801 (1930), which each noted that the seller of a horse,
represented falsely to be healthy or safe, could be held liable to third parties sickened or
injured by the horse.  These cases, however, are inapposite, as they imposed liability for the
sale of an inherently dangerous instrumentality that was “placed in such position that injury
might be inflicted, and that without notice or warning to the vendee in respect to the
dangerous qualities or afflictions.”  Rounds v. Phillips, 166 Md. 151, 162–63, 170 A. 532,
536 (1934) (discussing Fox and Katcef).  Moreover, in Fox, we emphasized that liability to
a third party could only exist where the third party was “in some way connected with the
purchaser,” noting that under the facts of that case, the third party was acting under the
direction of the purchaser. 79 Md. at 529, 29 A. at 604.  Specifically, we stated, “we do not
mean to decide that any third party [injured by the horse] . . . could sue.”  Id.
25
personally, either directly or indirectly, on the allegedly false representations.  Here,
however, Appellees do not provide any evidence that they relied personally on Exxon’s
allegedly fraudulent statements,36 nor do they provide any persuasive legal authority
sufficient to support their contention that proof of reliance is excused.  Cf. Philip Morris, Inc.
v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 752 n.29, 752 A.2d 200, 234 n.29 (2000) (denying class
certification for a claim of fraud in part because reliance on a misrepresentation by a plaintiff,
on an individual basis, is essential to a civil claim of fraud).  Maryland law does not permit
a third party to recover damages for fraud purely on the basis of a false statement made to
a governmental entity. 
Appellees argue that such an interpretation, in effect, immunizes corporate deceit to
26
governmental officials.  We disagree.  Government is capable and empowered generally to
take action in such instances to protect its interests and those of the public.  Other parties
meeting the elements of fraud may proceed properly on such an action if they so choose.
Appellees, however, purely by virtue of being residents in the area, without more, cannot
maintain an action for fraud based on false statements for which they have admitted no
direct, indirect, or personal reliance.  Thus, to the extent the jury verdict was dependent on
the 1983 construction fraud, the 1992 permit fraud, and the 2001 double-walled piping fraud
claims, it is unsupported.
B.  Sign Fraud and Remediation Fraud
Exxon argues that Appellees failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
remaining three instances of alleged fraud: (1) sign fraud; (2) remediation fraud; and (3)
remediation fraud in allegedly misleading affirmatively the MDE.  Specifically, Exxon
contends that, of the approximately 125 Appellees who testified that they saw the misleading
sign, most did not provide any testimony lending itself to establishment of any detrimental
reliance or change in their water consumption habits.  Additionally, although 459 Appellees
received awards for remediation fraud either personally or on the basis of the MDE’s
reliance, Exxon argues that at least 300 of these Appellees did not offer any testimony
mentioning the alleged remediation fraud in the first instance, no Appellee proved
detrimental reliance, and Appellees provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
MDE relied on any false statements.  
1. Sign Fraud
27
Exxon contends that the sign fraud verdicts should be reversed.  One-hundred, eighty-
six Appellees recovered damages for sign fraud, stemming from the placement of the
“misleading” sign outside of the Jacksonville Exxon station from 17 February until 21
February 2006.  Exxon claims that of the 186 recovering Appellees, most either provided no
testimony regarding seeing the sign in the first instance or “offered no evidence of
detrimental reliance or continued using their well water even after they discovered the sign
was inaccurate.”  Moreover, Exxon argues, those demonstrating reliance did not offer any
evidence of resulting injury or damage.  
As noted above, a false statement by a defendant does not alone provide a sufficient
basis to support a cause of action for fraud.  Rather, the plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she relied on the allegedly fraudulent statement to his or her
detriment.  See Hoffman, 385 Md. at 28, 867 A.2d at 292.  Here, Appellees’ failure to
demonstrate detrimental reliance is fatal to their claims.  As Exxon notes, very few Appellees
testified that they continued to use their well water after seeing the sign because they
presumed the sign was correct, that they altered their water consumption following the
discovery that the sign was misleading, or that they would have altered immediately their
water consumption had the content of the sign been accurate at its installation.  For example,
many Appellees who asserted that they saw the sign did not begin using bottled water or
install POET systems until well after the leak was publicized and the sign removed, therefore
negating any claim that their continued consumption of potentially contaminated water
resulted from the sign’s inaccuracy.  Thus, even though 186 Appellees saw the sign, very few
37Upon our review of Appellees’ testimony, it appears that only the following
Appellees demonstrated arguably reliance on the sign: Susan Allison; Margaret Brown; John
Wright; Clever Fonseca; Denise Fonseca; James Kelly; Mary Kelly; Stephanie Kelly;
Jennifer Riegger; Julia Riegger; KatieRose Riegger; Meghen Riegger; Anna Walega; and,
Nancy Williams. 
28
demonstrated reliance.37  
Of those Appellees that claimed to have relied on the misleading sign, none
established that he or she suffered injury or damages as a result of his or her reliance.
Appellees testifying as to reliance either did not have demonstrable contamination of their
wells stemming from the Jacksonville Exxon leak until months after Appellees learned about
the leak, or never had a positive well test for contamination. Thus, no Appellee proved by
clear and convincing evidence any resulting injury from consuming contaminated water
during the five-day period during which the sign was displayed.  As a result, Appellees failed
to establish a cause of action for fraud based on the posting of the “misleading” sign.  The
sign fraud verdicts as to all Appellees are therefore reversed.  
2.  Remediation Fraud
Exxon urges this Court to reverse the fraud verdicts for the 459 Appellees who
recovered for remediation fraud, claiming that they failed to prove fraud by clear and
convincing evidence.  Exxon challenges additionally the remediation fraud verdicts based
on the reliance by the MDE on Exxon’s remediation expertise.  Lastly, Exxon complains that
even the concept of remediation fraud is a violation of Exxon’s due process rights, claiming
that Appellees’ theory of remediation fraud remained undefined and ever-shifting throughout
38Many Appellees who received verdicts for remediation fraud did not offer any
testimony in support of their assertions, including most of the minor and adult children
occupants of residences.  Because fraud requires proof of reliance on an individual basis, the
trial court should not have permitted the claim for remediation fraud for these Appellees to
go to the jury, absent the presentation of testimony regarding their fraud claims offered by
them or on their behalf.  See, e.g., Agniezka Hudzik (Allison); Eric Allison; Kristen Allison;
Caitlin Andrews; Daniel Andrews; Jeanne Andrews; Ian Austin; Reid Austin; Emily Backus;
Alex Blum; Madelyn Blum; Lloyd Burke, Jr.; Lloyd Burke; Riley Burke; Ashley Brookhart;
Sean Brookhart; Victoria Brookhart; Tara Brown; Terry Bueche; Louise Bull; Amanda
Buscemi; Cari Cheelsman (Buscemi); Charles Cheelsman (Buscemi); Mary Buscemi; Rachel
Buscemi; Adriana Capizzi; Francesca Capizzi; Julia Capizzi; Maria Cole-Navarro; Phillip
Diedeman, Jr.; Dominique DiPino; Francesca DiPino; Joseph DiPino; Paul DiPino III; Sarah
Dyer; Brian Easton; David Easton; Michael Easton; James Turfler (Eisgruber); Janice Elliott;
(continued...)
29
the course of the trial.  
The concept of remediation fraud appears to encompass various subtheories premised
mainly on actions taken by Exxon during the remediation process.  Appellees point to a
number of Exxon’s representations, including recovery estimates of gasoline proclaimed by
Exxon, which later proved to be incorrect and were amended by a subsequent recovery
estimate; statements made by Exxon officials predicting that the contamination would
migrate, and thus be contained generally, to a “strike line” within a half-mile radius of the
station, which was proved incorrect later; representations concerning the safety of the state
action level for MTBE contamination; Exxon’s decision to deliver or discontinue the delivery
of bottled water; and, the decision of where to drill monitoring wells and sample for
contamination. 
We need not consider whether the amorphous concept of remediation fraud violated
Exxon’s due process rights. Upon our review of Appellees’ testimony,38 we conclude
38(...continued)
Christopher Federico; Emily Federico; Grace Federico; Kevin Federico; Sarah Fletcher;
Zachary Fletcher; Bruna Fonseca; Maira Fonseca; Tiago Fonseca; Gia Fontanazza; Debra
Gillespie; Kevin Gillespie; Tara Gillespie; Thomas Gillespie III; Marjorie Gribble; Gavin
Grogan: Linda Hairston-Taulton; Theodore Hannibal; Connor Hartman; Gavin Hartman;
Allison Higgins; Patrick Higgins; Richard Higgins; Kenneth Kelly; Lauren Dance (Kelly);
Michele Tehan (Kelly); Kathleen Kennedy; Calvin Kirkwood; Chase Kirkwood; Jeremy
Kirkwood; Tyler Kirkwood; Kristen Lawrence; Jennifer Lazzaro; Kaitlyn Lindenmeyer;
Megan Lindenmeyer; Corey Makowy; Allie Mangione; Taylor Mangione; Ryan McCleary;
Leigh Morgan Sharp (Morgan); R. Wade Morgan; Catherine Murphy (Moss); Gregory Moss;
Natalie Murphy; Payton Murphy; Rosemary Murphy; Gregory Naylor, Jr.; Kenneth Naylor;
Tracy Naylor; Bessie Over; Andrew Palmer; Geoffrey Palmer; Andrew Parker; James Parker;
Bradley Peters; John Peters; Jena Pietropaoli; Joseph Pietropaoli, Jr.; Paulette Pietropaoli;
Jennifer Riegger; KatieRose Riegger; Meghen Riegger; Mary Judith Rudell; Janice Scarff;
Allison Shields; Erin Shields; John Shields, Jr.; Kevin Shields; Marah Schmitz; Susan
Schmitz; Adam Seery; Meghan Seery; Chelsea Simanski; Alexander Trader; Matthew
Trader; Brian Tripp; Steven Tripp; Elliot Gloger (Vaughan); Kieran Vaughan; Chase
Vosvick; Tanner Vosvick; Jack Wachter; Kimberly Wachter; Ryan Wachter; Megan Welms;
Cole Wilhelmsen; Hans Wilhemsen III; and, Jennifer Winfield.
In addition to these Appellees, the following Appellees did not present any testimony
supporting remediation fraud by any owner or occupier of the relevant premises, but
recovered verdicts and punitive damages for fraud nonetheless: Edgar Argo, through personal
representative Marlene Argo (did not seek recovery for fraud); Dana Rhyne Dieter; Patricia
Dieter; Alissa Dutrow; Daryl Dutrow; Emily Dutrow; Jennifer Dutrow; Anthony Frattarola;
Marianne Frattarola; Victoria Frattarola; Eugene Freeman; Pearlie Freeman; Katherine King,
through personal representative Paul King; Kathleen Oursler; Rodger Oursler; Bessie Over,
through personal representative Nancy Lee Over Webster; Christy Shaw; Thomas Shaw;
Amy Vuong; Krystal Vuong; Man A. Vuong; Shuzhen Wu (Vuong); Sinh Vuong; Stacy
Vuong; Chen-Yu Yen (regarding remediation fraud due to false statements made by MDE);
Ray-Whey Yen (regarding remediation fraud due to false statements made by MDE);
Christopher Zaccari; Patricia Zaccari; Lenore Zaccari; Dogwood Management, LLC; Klein
Family Development Corp.; Klein’s of Jacksonville, Inc.; 14342 Jarrettsville Pike, LLC;
3313 Paper Mill Road, LLC; Jarrettsville Retail, LLC; 14231 Jarrettsville Pike, LLC; 14237
Jarrettsville Pike, LLC; and, 3422 Sweet Air Road, LLC.
We therefore reverse the verdicts for remediation fraud for these Appellees.
30
that the Appellees’ claims for remediation fraud suffer from various deficiencies of proof.
39See, e.g., Phillip Diedeman; Susan Diedeman; Laura Hartman; Michael Hartman;
Cheryl Howells; Almarie Ianuly; Paul Ianuly; Charles Parker; Kimberly Parker; Joseph
Pietropaoli; Anna Popomaronis; Cynthia Popomaronis; Eleni Popomaronis; Peter Vailas
(Popomaronis); Thomas Popomaronis; William Popomaronis; Joseph Schmitz; David
Vaughan; Terri Vaughan; David Vosvick; Deedra Vosvick; Anna Walega; and, John Walega.
40See, e.g., Annette Armstrong; John Armstrong; Ryan Backus; Shelly Backus;
Patricia Bateman; Jon Blum; Tracey Blum; Florence Brock; Keith Brock; Ellen Brookhart;
Margaret Brown; Adriane Burke; Karen Buscemi; Frederick Craig; Rosina Craig; Bruce
Elliott; Ellison Ensor; Sarah Ensor; Gina DiPino; Paul DiPino, Jr.; Tracy Federico; Edward
Fletcher; Regina Fletcher; Thomas Gillespie, Jr.; Curtis Glatfelter; Alicia Grogan; David
Grogan; Mary Pat Goodhues; Jeanette Hairston; Walter Hairston; Virginia Hannibal;
Rebecca Heyman-Magaziner; John Higgins; Mary Higgins; Dorothy Hyman; Richard
Hyman; Kenneth Kelly; Stephanie Kelly; Kimberly Kobus; Thomas Kobus; Ellen Koerner
(through Gloria Quinan);  Henry Koerner (through Gloria Quinan); Barbara Larrabee; John
Larrabee; Mitchell Larrabee; William Larrabee; Donna Lawrence; Lelah Mahoney; Patrick
Mahoney; Christopher Makowy; Heather Meldron (Makowy); Kim Makowy; Rebecca
Meldron (Makowy); William Makowy; Alexander Makris; Eleni Makris; Nikolaos Makris;
Valerie Makris; Brian Mangione; Justine Mangione; John Matra; Mary Matra; Eric Munson;
Georgia Munson; Jeffrey Munson; Leslie Munson; John Murphy; Christian O’Brien;
Christopher O’Brien; Shelby O’Brien; Edward Odend’hal; Nanette Odend’hal; Betty Over;
Sylvester Over; Emily Pagani; Nicholas Pagani; Rebecca Pagani; Steven Pagani; Charles
Parker; Kimberly Parker; Joseph Pietropaoli; Anna Popomaronis; Cynthia Popomaronis;
Eleni Popomaronis; Peter Vailas (Popomaronis); Thomas Popomaronis; William
Popomaronis; Mary Prime; William Prime; Casey Proefrock; Kate Proefrock; John
Proefrock; Mary Kathryn Proefrock; Megan Proefrock; Scott Proefrock; Gloria Quinan;
Granville Quinan; Jerome Rebold; Rochelle Roth; Steven Roth; Alan Saeva; Ellaine Saeva;
Alexander Scheetz; Arden Scheetz; Michele Scheetz; Ricky Scheetz; Charlotte Slaughter;
Diann Kohute (Slaughter); Emily Slaughter; Kaitlyn Jones (Slaughter); Nancy Slaughter;
William Slaughter, Jr.; William Slaughter; Bruce Stumpp; Norma Stumpp; David Vaughan;
Terri Vaughan; Anna Walega; John Walega; Nancy Welms; Christy Whaley; Neil Whaley;
Dolores Whitehurst; Gertrude McNicholas (Whitehurst); and, Van Ho, Elegant Nails & Hair.
31
Specifically, some Appellees never established that the source of their impressions related
to the remediation efforts was a representation made by Exxon Mobil,39 nor that any
statement allegedly relied upon was false,40 let alone intentionally so.  Others relied on
opinions or predictions regarding where the contamination would flow in the aquifer to form
41See, e.g., Susan Allison; David Austin; Emily Austin; Tracey Blum; Margaret
Brown; Adriane Burke; Ronald Bueche; Carlo Capizzi; Franca Capizzi; Philip Capron; Susan
Capron; Philip Carbone; Joan Clark; Lloyd Clark; Michael Cole; Frederick Craig; Rosina
Craig; Phillip Diedeman; Susan Diedeman; Gina DiPino; Paul DiPino, Jr.; Sharon Dorsch;
William Dorsch; Robert Dyer; Teresa Dyer; Christopher Easton; Monique Easton; Edward
Fletcher; Regina Fletcher; Franklin Fontanazza; Gina Fontanazza; Alexandra Freas; James
Freas; Kathleen Freas; Paul Freas; Thomas Gillespie, Jr.; Charlene Glatfelter; George
Gribble; Alicia Grogan; David Grogan; Walter Hairston; Joan Hanst; John Hanst; Laura
Hartman; Michael Hartman; Brendan Huey; Heather Huey; Michael Huey; Shannon Huey;
James Kelly; Mary Kelly; Mark Kirkwood; Nancy Pugliese Kirkwood; Dale Knapp; James
Knapp; Kimberly Kobus; Thomas Kobus; Barbara Larrabee; John Larrabee; Mitchell
Larrabee; William Larrabee; Robert Lazzaro; Susan Lazzaro; Karen Lindenmeyer; Mark
Lindenmeyer; Lelah Mahoney; Patrick Mahoney; Carol Malstrom; William Malstrom; Brian
Mangione; Justine Mangione; Ian Marsico; Jodi Marsico; Kaitlin Marsico; Michael Marsico;
Denise Moss; Gregory Naylor; Susan Naylor; Alexandra Nemer; Emanuel Nemer; Donald
Nemer; Kelli Nemer; Edward Odend’hal; Nanette Odend’hal; Emily Pagani; Nicholas
Pagani; Rebecca Pagani; Steven Pagani; David Palmer; Kimberly Palmer; Cathy Gay-Peters;
Marcus Peters; Andrew Podles; Anita Podles; Claire Podles; John Podles; Thomas Podles;
Thomas Podles, Jr.; Amy Gumina (Prime-Gumina); Brynn Puller; John Puller; Patricia
Puller; Richard Puller; Gloria Quinan; Granville Quinan; Charles Riegger; Julia Riegger;
Rochelle Roth; Steven Roth; Paul Rudell; Barbara Rusinko; John Rusinko; Alexander
Scheetz; Arden Scheetz; Michele Scheetz; Ricky Scheetz; Joseph Schmitz; Susan Seery;
Thomas Seery; Ernest Sessa; Paula Sessa; Barbara Sheeler; Donald Sheeler; Natalie Shields;
Alyssa Stehman; John Stehman; Jonathan Stehman; Marina Stehman; Sierra Stehman;
Theresa Stehman; Bruce Stumpp; Norma Stumpp; Alicia Sullivan; Brendan Sullivan, Jr.;
Brendan Sullivan; Emily Sullivan; Leslie Tripp; Timothy Tripp; Martin Wachter; Christy
Whaley; Neil Whaley; Hans Wilhelmsen; Kristen Wilhelmsen; Jean Wimmer; Paul Wimmer;
Janet Winfield; Timothy Winfield; Andrea Zachary; and, Mary Lefell (Zachary).
32
the basis for their fraud claims,41 which is an insufficient basis for fraud.  See, e.g., Babb v.
Bolyard, 194 Md. 603, 609, 72 A.2d 13, 16 (1950) (noting that, to form the basis for fraud,
the statement “must be a statement of an alleged existing fact or facts, and not merely of
some future or contingent event, or an expression of opinion as to the subject of the
statement”  (quoting Boulden v. Stilwell, 100 Md. 543, 551, 60 A. 609, 610 (1905))).  Most
claims, however, suffered in particular from an insufficient showing of detrimental reliance.
42See, e.g., Richard Andrews; Margaret Brown; Bari Jo Burnett; John Wright
(Bull/Wright); Ellen Brookhart; Ronald Brookhart; Carlo Capizzi; Franca Capizzi; Robert
Dyer; Teresa Dyer; Carl Eisgruber; Lynn Eisgruber; Clever Fonseca; Denise Fonseca;
Alexandra Freas; James Freas; Kathleen Freas; Paul Freas; Ann Fuller; Stanley Fuller;
Thomas Gillespie, Jr.; George Gribble; Virginia Hannibal; Jeffrey Hummel; Dorothy Hyman;
Richard Hyman; James Kelly; Mary Kelly; Kenneth Kelly; Stephanie Kelly; Leonard
Kennedy; Margaret Kennedy; Mark Kirkwood; Nancy Pugliese Kirkwood; Robert Lazzaro;
Susan Lazzaro; Karen Lindenmeyer; Mark Lindenmeyer; Lelah Mahoney; Patrick Mahoney;
Christopher Makowy; Heather Meldron (Makowy); Kim Makowy; Rebecca Meldron
(Makowy); William Makowy; Eric Munson; Georgia Munson; Jeffrey Munson; Leslie
Munson; John Murphy; Gregory Naylor; Susan Naylor; Kathleen Naughton; Tim Naughton;
Alexandra Nemer; Emanuel Nemer; Donald Nemer; Kelli Nemer; Betty Over; Sylvester
Over; Anna Popomaronis; Cynthia Popomaronis; Eleni Popomaronis; Peter Vailas
(Popomaronis); Thomas Popomaronis; William Popomaronis; Amy Gumina (Prime-
Gumina); Casey Proefrock; Kate Proefrock; John Proefrock; Mary Kathryn Proefrock;
Megan Proefrock; Scott Proefrock; Jerome Rebold; Barbara Rusinko; John Rusinko; Alan
Saeva; Ellaine Saeva; Alexander Scheetz; Arden Scheetz; Michele Scheetz; Ricky Scheetz;
Joseph Schmitz; Natalie Shields; Amanda Sutor; Austin Sutor; David Sutor; Lynn Sutor;
Mary Trader; Patrick Rudolph (Trader); Christopher Tsakalos; Nicholas Tsakalos;
Triantafilia Tsakalos; Ernest Viscuso; Francesca Viscuso; Gabrielle Viscuso; Lisa Viscuso;
Nicole Viscuso; Martin Wachter; Lindsey Williams; Nancy Williams; Owen Williams;
Thomas Williams; Janet Winfield; Timothy Winfield; Andrea Zachary; Mary Lefell
(Zachary); Dogwood Management, LLC; and, Van Ho, Elegant Nails & Hair.
33
A mere false statement is insufficient to establish fraud.  Even for those Appellees
who could demonstrate the falsity of a statement, no Appellee proved by clear and
convincing evidence detrimental reliance.  Most Appellees did not demonstrate any change
in behavior resulting from any of the allegedly false statements42 – for example, few changed
(or did not change, as applicable) their water consumption habits in response to the
assumedly false statements or in response to their discovery of the assumed falsity of the
gasoline recovery estimates.  Moreover, many Appellees disclaimed expressly reliance on
Exxon’s statements, testifying that they knew immediately of the gasoline release or thought
43See, e.g., Richard Andrews; Ryan Backus; Shelly Backus; Christopher Easton;
Clever Fonseca; Denise Fonseca; Alicia Grogan; David Grogan; Edward Odend’hal; Nanette
Odend’hal; Joseph Schmitz; Charlotte Slaughter; Diann Kohute (Slaughter); Emily
Slaughter; Nancy Slaughter; William Slaughter, Jr.; William Slaughter; Martin Wachter; and,
Van Ho, Elegant Nails & Hair.
44See, e.g., Susan Allison; David Austin; Emily Austin; Patricia Bateman; Jon Blum;
Tracey Blum; Margaret Brown; John Wright (Bull/Wright); Adriane Burke; Bari Jo Burnett;
Carlo Capizzi; Franca Capizzi; Philip Capron; Susan Capron; Joan Clark; Lloyd Clark;
Sharon Dorsch; William Dorsch; Christopher Easton; Monique Easton; Bruce Elliott; Tracy
Federico; Clever Fonseca; Denise Fonseca; Ann Fuller; Stanley Fuller; Mary Pat Goodhues;
Connor Hartman; Gavin Hartman; Laura Hartman; Michael Hartman; Cheryl Howells;
Brendan Huey; Heather Huey; Michael Huey; Shannon Huey; Dorothy Hyman; Richard
Hyman; Kenneth Kelly; Stephanie Kelly; Leonard Kennedy; Margaret Kennedy; Mark
Kirkwood; Nancy Pugliese Kirkwood; Ellen Koerner (through Gloria Quinan); Henry
Koerner (through Gloria Quinan); Donna Lawrence; Jennifer Lazzaro; Robert Lazzaro;
Susan Lazzaro; Alexander Makris; Eleni Makris; Nikolaos Makris; Valerie Makris; John
Matra; Mary Matra; Kelly McCleary; Kirk McCleary; Mary McCleary; Pamela Morgan;
Ronald Morgan; Denise Moss; Kathleen Naughton; Tim Naughton; Gregory Naylor; Susan
Naylor; Alexandra Nemer; Emanuel Nemer; Donald Nemer; Kelli Nemer; Joanne O’Connell;
Andrew Podles; Anita Podles; Claire Podles; John Podles; Thomas Podles; Thomas Podles,
Jr.; Anna Popomaronis; Cynthia Popomaronis; Eleni Popomaronis; Peter Vailas
(Popomaronis); Thomas Popomaronis; William Popomaronis; Casey Proefrock; Kate
Proefrock; John Proefrock; Mary Kathryn Proefrock; Megan Proefrock; Scott Proefrock; Jeff
Reckseit; Edna Rudell; Paul Rudell; Richard Rudell (no potable water on property); Alan
Saeva; Ellaine Saeva; Joseph Schmitz; Ernest Sessa; Paula Sessa; Natalie Shields; Alyssa
Stehman; John Stehman; Jonathan Stehman; Marina Stehman; Sierra Stehman; Theresa
Stehman;  Bruce Stumpp; Norma Stumpp; Chester Tokarski; Marilyn Tokarski; Ernest
Viscuso; Francesca Viscuso; Gabrielle Viscuso; Lisa Viscuso; Nicole Viscuso; David
(continued...)
34
Exxon was understating the severity of the leak.43  Additionally, many of the Appellees who
recovered for remediation fraud never experienced a positive well test for contamination,
thereby undercutting conclusively any contention that false representations regarding
recovery estimates, predicted migration of contaminants, necessity for bottled water, safety
of MTBE, and locations of monitoring wells caused any harm.44 Further, most Appellees
44(...continued)
Vosvick; Deedra Vosvick; Nancy Welms; Christy Whaley; Neil Whaley; Jean Wimmer; Paul
Wimmer; Christopher Garliss/Highpoint Homebuilders, Inc.; 14342 Jarrettsville Pike, LLC;
and, 3422 Sweet Air Road, LLC.
45See, e.g., Richard Andrews; Annette Armstrong; John Armstrong; Ryan Backus;
Shelly Backus; Ellen Brookhart; Ronald Brookhart; Ronald Bueche; Florence Brock; Keith
Brock; Karen Buscemi; Philip Carbone; Michael Cole; Frederick Craig; Rosina Craig; Phillip
Diedeman; Susan Diedeman; Gina DiPino; Paul DiPino, Jr.; Robert Dyer; Teresa Dyer; Carl
Eisgruber; Lynn Eisgruber; Ellison Ensor; Sarah Ensor; Edward Fletcher; Regina Fletcher;
Franklin Fontanazza; Gina Fontanazza; Alexandra Freas; James Freas; Kathleen Freas; Paul
Freas; Thomas Gillespie, Jr.; Charlene Glatfelter; Curtis Glatfelter; George Gribble; Alicia
Grogan; David Grogan; Virginia Hannibal; Joan Hanst; John Hanst; Rebecca Heyman-
Magaziner; John Higgins; Mary Higgins; Jeffrey Hummel; Almarie Ianuly; Paul Ianuly;
James Kelly; Mary Kelly; Dale Knapp; James Knapp; Kimberly Kobus; Thomas Kobus;
Ellen Koerner; Henry Koerner; Robert Lazzaro; Susan Lazzaro; Karen Lindenmeyer; Mark
Lindenmeyer; Lelah Mahoney; Patrick Mahoney; Christopher Makowy; Heather Meldron
(Makowy); Kim Makowy; Rebecca Meldron (Makowy); William Makowy; Makris family;
Carol Malstrom; William Malstrom; Brian Mangione; Justine Mangione; Ian Marsico; Jodi
Marsico; Kaitlin Marsico; Michael Marsico; Eric Munson; Georgia Munson; Jeffrey
Munson; Leslie Munson; John Murphy; Christian O’Brien; Christopher O’Brien; Shelby
O’Brien; Betty Over; Sylvester Over; Emily Pagani; Nicholas Pagani; Rebecca Pagani;
Steven Pagani; David Palmer; Kimberly Palmer; Charles Parker; Kimberly Parker; Cathy
Gay-Peters; Marcus Peters; Joseph Pietropaoli; Andrew Podles; Anita Podles; Claire Podles;
John Podles; Thomas Podles; Thomas Podles, Jr.; Anna Popomaronis; Cynthia Popomaronis;
Eleni Popomaronis; Peter Vailas (Popomaronis); Thomas Popomaronis; William
Popomaronis; Mary Prime; William Prime; Brynn Puller; John Puller; Patricia Puller;
Richard Puller; Jerome Rebold; Charles Riegger; Julia Riegger; Rochelle Roth; Steven Roth;
Richard Rudell; Barbara Rusinko; John Rusinko; Alexander Scheetz; Arden Scheetz;
Michele Scheetz; Ricky Scheetz; Joseph Schmitz; Alfred Schober; Susan Seery; Thomas
Seery; Barbara Sheeler; Donald Sheeler; Simanski family; Charlotte Slaughter; Diann
Kohute (Slaughter); Emily Slaughter; Kaitlyn Jones (Slaughter); Nancy Slaughter; William
Slaughter, Jr.; William Slaughter; Alicia Sullivan; Brendan Sullivan, Jr.; Brendan Sullivan;
Emily Sullivan; Amanda Sutor; Austin Sutor; David Sutor; Lynn Sutor; Mary Trader; Patrick
Rudolph (Trader); Leslie Tripp; Timothy Tripp; Christopher Tsakalos; Nicholas Tsakalos;
(continued...)
35
offered no evidence that their period of alleged reliance on Exxon’s representations caused
any damage,45 and some did not switch to bottled water after discovering contamination in
45(...continued)
Triantafilia Tsakalos; David Vaughan; Terri Vaughan; David Vosvick; Deedra Vosvick;
Martin Wachter; Dolores Whitehurst; Gertrude McNicholas (Whitehurst); Lindsey Williams;
Nancy Williams; Owen Williams; Thomas Williams; Hans Wilhelmsen; Kristen Wilhemsen;
Janet Winfield; Timothy Winfield; Andrea Zachary; Mary Lefell (Zachary); and, Dogwood
Management, LLC.
46See, e.g., Michael Marsico and Jerome Rebold.
36
their water supply.46  Bare contamination of a well or brief consumption of water containing
contaminants at or below the MDE and EPA action levels is not, without more, sufficient to
support detrimental reliance.
Additionally, Appellees attempt to anchor a claim for remediation fraud based on
Exxon’s alleged deception of the MDE.  Even assuming such a claim by Appellees is
permissible under Maryland law, no representative of the MDE testified that Exxon misled
intentionally the MDE, or that the MDE relied on Exxon’s assertions.  Any claim that
Appellees relied on Exxon’s representations to the MDE fails necessarily for the same
reasons that Appellees’ personal remediation fraud claims fail on this record.  Appellees
failed to prove any intentionally misleading statement, by clear and convincing evidence, that
resulted in detrimental reliance.
Appellees’ proof, rather than proving fraud, demonstrates a general dissatisfaction
with Exxon’s remediation efforts.  The shortcomings in Exxon’s remediation efforts (and
reporting) simply do not rise to the level of fraud, however.  Not only was the decision of
where and when to test or install monitoring wells directed by the MDE, but many of the
allegedly fraudulent statements made by Exxon were statements of opinion and prediction
37
reflecting the available knowledge at the time.  Appellees attempt to paint Exxon as
attempting intentionally to deceive Jacksonville residents at every turn with a callous
disregard for their health and safety, yet provide little but speculation as to Exxon’s actual
knowledge during the remediation process.  Certainly, Exxon could have done a better job
communicating with residents of the Jacksonville area, reduced errors, and described more
clearly the investigatory process.  That Exxon’s efforts were imperfect, however, does not
rise to fraud.  Appellees did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that they relied
justifiably, and to their detriment, on statements made with the intention to mislead by
Exxon.  In the absence of such proof, we reverse the jury’s verdict for all Appellees as to the
two asserted types of remediation fraud.
Because we reverse the verdicts as to each of the alleged instances of fraud submitted
to the jury, the award to Appellees of punitive damages must be reversed as well.  Punitive
damages may be awarded only if a plaintiff proves at trial malice, ill will, or intent to injure.
See, e.g., Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, F.S.B., 337 Md. 216, 228–29, 652 A.2d 1117, 1122–23
(1995) (noting that Maryland law restricts recovery of punitive damages to situations where
the defendant acted wrongfully intentionally); Owens-Illinois Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420,
460, 601 A.2d 633, 652 (1992) (noting that punitive damages may be awarded only where
“the plaintiff has established that the defendant’s conduct was characterized by evil motive,
intent to injure, ill will, or fraud, i.e., ‘actual malice’”). At the close of trial, Judge Dugan
granted Exxon’s Motion for Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims for Punitive Damages based on
Allegations of Evil Motive, Ill Will, or Intent to Injure.  Appellees did not appeal that aspect
38
of the court’s decision.  Because no basis for recovering punitive damages remains, we
reverse the jury’s award of punitive damages.
II. Emotional Distress Damages for Fear of Contracting Cancer
Exxon argues primarily that, because Appellees established neither the existence of
present disease nor that they were more likely than not to contract cancer as a result of the
2006 Jacksonville Exxon leak, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Appellees’
emotional distress claims premised on fear of contracting cancer.  In the alternative, Exxon
contends that, because recovery for fear of cancer requires a showing of past or present
exposure and objective, reasonable fear, the instructions submitted to the jury were
erroneous, entitling it to a new trial.  Lastly, Exxon argues that the trial court committed
reversible error by permitting Appellees to testify regarding their opinions that they,
members of their families, or their pets contracted various disorders as a result of the gasoline
leak, in the absence of expert testimony sufficient to demonstrate causation.  Thus, there are
three central issues for our consideration: (1) whether Maryland permits recovery for
emotional distress due to fear of contracting cancer; (2) if such recovery is permitted, what
are the elements required to be established to permit recovery; and (3) whether the evidence
in this record, viewed in a light most favorable to Appellees, is legally sufficient to justify
recovery of emotional distress damages due to fear of contracting cancer.  
We review the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict to determine whether it was legally correct.  Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville,
418 Md. 496, 503, 16 A.3d 159, 163 (2011) (quoting Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville,
39
190 Md. App. 331, 343, 988 A.2d 1059, 1065 (2010)).  In so doing, we must “resolve all
conflicts in the evidence in favor of the plaintiff and must assume the truth of all evidence
and inferences as may naturally and legitimately be deduced therefrom which tend to support
the plaintiff’s right to recover.” Smith v. Bernfeld, 226 Md. 400, 406, 174 A.2d 53, 55 (1961).
If there is any competent evidence, “however slight, from which a rational mind could infer
a fact in issue,” then denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is
appropriate.  Impala Platinum v. Impala Sales, 283 Md. 296, 328, 389 A.2d 887, 905–06
(1978).  Thus, if there is any evidence legally sufficient to generate a jury question, we must
affirm the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  Jones v. State, 425
Md. 1, 30–31, 38 A.3d 333, 350 (2012).
The decision whether to grant a motion for a new trial is “within the sound discretion
of the trial court.”  Buck v. Cam’s Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 56, 612 A.2d 1294,
1296 (1992) (quoting Brinand v. Denzik, 226 Md. 287, 292, 173 A.2d 203, 206 (1961)).
Thus, the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial and/or remittitur will be reversed
only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order a new trial.
Merritt v. State, 367 Md. 17, 28, 785 A.2d 756, 763 (2001).
A. The Law Relating to Emotional Distress Damages 
for Fear of a Latent Disease
In Maryland, recovery of damages for emotional distress must arise out of tortious
conduct.  Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 66 Md. App. 46, 63, 502 A.2d 1057, 1066
(1986) (“Recovery may be had in a tort action for emotional distress arising out of negligent
47In Green, over a period of nearly eight months, the defendants conducted blasting
operations in the vicinity of the plaintiff’s home, hurling large stones on the plaintiff’s
property that broke the roof, windows, other glass, and doors of the house.  The plaintiff
sought damages for mental distress caused by the defendants’ negligent operations.  The
evidence showed that the defendants’ negligent conduct caused the plaintiff to fear for her
life, drove her frequently to take refuge in the cellar, and to suffer frequent and violent
vibrations.  This Court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to demonstrate that the
plaintiff suffered a physical injury as a proximate result of the fright she suffered because of
the defendants’ negligence, even though the plaintiff was not struck by the hurled stones.
111 Md. 69, 71–83, 73 A. 688, 689–93 (1909).
40
conduct. In such case, the emotional distress is an element of damage, not an independent
tort.”).  The seminal case is Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co.,47 where we adopted a rule
allowing recovery for mental distress if physical injury resulted from the commission of a
tort, regardless of impact.  111 Md. 69, 77–78, 73 A. 688, 691 (1909).  After noting that
mental distress alone cannot be an independent cause of action and that recovery cannot be
obtained for mental distress without “physical impact,” we expressed concern that emotional
distress may be feigned easily.  Id. at 77–79, 73 A. at 691–92.  Although no fool-proof
method to measure such suffering was imagined, we held that demonstrable emotional
distress due to a physical impact would provide a “sufficient guarantee of genuineness that
would otherwise be absent in a claim for mental distress alone.” Vance v. Vance, 286 Md.
490, 498, 408 A.2d 728, 732 (1979) (discussing Green).  Thus, as long as the emotional
distress due to the tortious conduct is manifested objectively, the emotional distress is
deemed genuine and compensable even though the tortious conduct did not cause bodily
harm.  Beynon v. Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. P’ship, 351 Md. 460, 506–07, 718 A.2d
48In Beynon, the survivors of the decedent’s estate filed actions against a cable
company, as well as others, for wrongful death and survivorship, claiming that defendants
were negligent and were liable jointly and severally for the car accident that killed the
decedent.  We held that a decedent’s estate may recover for emotional distress and mental
anguish where a decedent experiences undoubtedly “great fear and apprehension of imminent
death before the fatal physical impact,” as long as the distress is capable of objective
determination.  Id. at 464, 621 A.2d at 1163.  Based on evidence showing that the decedent’s
vehicle left 71 ½ feet of skid marks before the collision (indicating that the decedent applied
his brakes), we determined that the decedent’s anticipation of an imminent collision and great
fear was capable of objective determination, and reversed the judgment denying the plaintiffs
damages for pre-impact emotional distress suffered by the decedent.  Id. at 507–09, 621 A.2d
at 1184–85.  Several other wrongful death cases have affirmed this form of recovery for pre-
impact emotional distress that was manifested objectively.  See, e.g., Smallwood v. Bradford,
352 Md. 8, 15, 720 A.2d 586, 589 (1998); Freed v. D.R.D. Pool Serv., 186 Md. App. 477,
488, 974 A.2d 978, 985 (2009), aff’d, 416 Md. 46, 5 A.3d 45 (2010).
41
1161, 1184–85 (1998).48  A physical injury may operate, however, “as the yardstick by which
a tort victim’s emotional harm may be measured,” and serves as an “objective determination
[that] provides reasonable assurance that the claim is not spurious.”  Id. at 507, 718 A.2d at
1184 (quoting Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Found., 329 Md. 709, 735, 621 A.2d 872, 885
(1993)); see also Belcher, 329 Md. at 735, 745–46, 621 A.2d at 885, 890 (holding that a
plaintiff may recover under the Worker’s Compensation Act for Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder sustained after a three-ton beam crashed through her office and landed several feet
from her work desk, even in the absence of physical injury, as her mental distress was
manifested through ample objective evidence).
With these concerns and principles in mind, the central issues to address in the present
case are, first, whether recovery for emotional distress based on fear of contracting cancer
49Recovery for damages for fear of cancer differs from the cause of action of a claim
for enhanced or increased risk of disease.  Fear of cancer is contemporaneous, but the risk
of developing future disease necessitates speculation.  See Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869,
879 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (determining that to allow  recovery for increased risk of cancer would
be to permit speculation).
50In Faya, an oncological surgeon performed operations on two patients knowing that
he had the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), but did not inform his patients of his
condition.  329 Md. at 450, 620 A.2d at 330.  After discovering one year later that the
surgeon had died from acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), the patients sued the
surgeon’s estate, the surgeon’s Maryland professional association business entity, and the
hospital for failing negligently to inform them that he was HIV-positive prior to their
operations.  Id.  Several weeks after the discovery, the patients tested HIV-negative.  In their
suit, the patients claimed that the surgeon’s negligence placed them in fear of contracting
HIV, causing severe emotional distress, including headaches and sleeplessness.  Id.  The trial
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaints for failure to state a claim for a legally
compensable injury.  Id. at 442–43, 620 A.2d at 330–31.
42
that arose from a defendant’s tortious act is permissible in Maryland;49 and, if so, under what
circumstances may a plaintiff recover for fear of cancer. 
We hold that, to recover emotional distress damages for fear of contracting a latent
disease, a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she was exposed actually to a toxic substance due
to the defendant’s tortious conduct; (2) which led him or her to fear objectively and
reasonably that he or she would contract a disease; and (3) as a result of the objective and
reasonable fear, he or she manifested a physical injury capable of objective determination.
1. A Reasonable and Objective Fear of Disease
Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993),50 a case involving a claim for
emotional distress damages based on a fear of contracting the human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV), determines the appropriate standard in this case.  To constitute a “reasonable” fear,
43
we held that the defendant’s conduct must create circumstances that would cause a
reasonable person to fear contracting HIV.  Id. at 447–48, 620 A.2d at 333.  Requiring the
plaintiffs to prove actual transmission of the virus, we concluded, “would unfairly punish
them for lacking the requisite information” to prove transmission at the time of their
discovery, which produced their fears.  Id. at 455, 620 A.2d at 336–37.  The plaintiffs’ actual
exposure to the risk of contracting the virus (as the disease vector was understood at that
time), however, was undisputed.  Id. at 439–41, 620 A.2d at 329. 
Because the Faya plaintiffs tested negative for HIV over one year after their surgeries,
we held that their continued fear of contracting the virus after the negative test was
unreasonable as a matter of law.  Id. at 455–56 & n.9, 620 A.2d at 337 & n.9.  The plaintiffs
therefore recovered for their mental distress only within a reasonable window of time: the
time period between learning of the surgeon’s HIV-positive status and their subsequent
negative blood test.  Id. at 459, 620 A.2d at 337.  In triangulating this window of time, we
concluded that the time period for which the plaintiffs could recover was approximately six
months because evidence at the time showed that there was a 95% certainty that an individual
will test positive for HIV, if at all, within six months after exposure.  Id.  The plaintiffs’ fear
within that particular time period, based on actual exposure to the virus by means of their
surgeon’s HIV-positive status, created an objectively reasonable fear of contracting HIV.
Id.  Faya thus demonstrates that there may be a reasonable “window,” or measure, of time
for which to recover for fear of future disease.  Beyond that window of time, the likelihood
of contracting future disease becomes so remote that the fear of future disease becomes
44
objectively unreasonable.   
Exxon contends that the more stringent “reasonably certain” or “reasonably probable”
standards to recover damages for fear of contracting future disease are applicable.  See Pierce
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 666–67, 464 A.2d 1020, 1026–27 (1983) (in
a case decided before Faya, the Court adopted a reasonably certain (“greater than 50%
chance”) standard in holding that the plaintiff’s cause of action for developing lung cancer
as a result of asbestosis accrued when the presence of cancer was reasonably discovered in
the cancer diagnosis, and not when he was diagnosed with asbestosis).  See also Lohrmann
v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1986) (interpreting Maryland law
prior to Faya and holding that “recovery of damages based on future consequences of an
injury” requires a reasonably probable standard, where the plaintiffs sought recovery for
sustaining risks to cancer after being exposed to asbestos, and the district court excluded
cancer testimony on the issue of damages).  Lohrmann and Pierce, however, dealt with
recovery of damages based on future consequences of an injury, namely, recovery for disease
that may (or may not) develop in the future.  By contrast, damages for fear of cancer are
limited to recovery for present, particularized emotional distress based on an objective,
reasonable fear as a matter of law.  See Wetherill v. Univ. of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553,
1559 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (where a federal district court rejected the “reasonably certain”
standard for recovery of feared disease because “such a stringent requirement would distort
traditional notions of proximate cause.  That concept’s touchstone – reasonable foreseeability
of the claimed injury [emotional distress] – merely demands a reasonable fear, not a high
45
degree of likelihood, that the feared contingency be likely to occur.”). 
While cancer caused by chemical carcinogens and the transmission of HIV are clearly
distinct vectors of different diseases, a fear of contracting any disease has several common
principles as a matter of law.  Faya provides a template for analogous cases involving fear
of future disease: namely, that recovering emotional distress damages for fear of future
disease requires a rational basis, based on objective circumstances, that the disease may occur
because of actual exposure caused by a defendant’s tortious conduct.  These principles are
supported by our precedent.  See Smith v. Borello, 370 Md. 227, 247–48, 804 A.2d 1151,
1163 (2002) (a pregnant woman who suffers personal injury and the loss of the fetus due to
a defendant’s tortious conduct may recover for any demonstrable psychic injury, rather than
sorrow, that arose as a result of losing the fetus, including depression, anguish, and distress);
Beynon, 351 Md. at 507–08, 718 A.2d at 1184–85 (where an automobile crash caused the
decedent plaintiff’s fatal injuries, “[d]amages for ‘pre-impact fright’ are recoverable when
the decedent experiences it during the ‘legitimate window of mental anxiety,’” which was
the time period between the decedent’s realization that he was in “imminent” danger and his
subsequent death (quoting Faya, 329 Md. at 459, 620 A.2d at 338–39))).  See Buck v. Brady,
110 Md. 568, 572–73, 73 A. 277, 279 (1909) (a plaintiff was permitted properly to testify
about her continuing fear of developing rabies after having been bitten by a rabid dog, even
though she did not have the disease currently and had received immediate preventive
treatment for the disease). 
Our sister jurisdictions that permit recovery for fear of contracting cancer developed
51In Devlin, an asbestos-related case, the court held that recovery for reasonable and
reliable fear of cancer was permitted if (1) the plaintiff suffers currently from “serious fear
or emotional distress or a clinically diagnosed phobia of cancer;” (2) the “fear was
proximately caused by exposure to asbestos;” (3) the plaintiff’s “fear of getting cancer due
to their exposure to asbestos is reasonable;” and (4) the defendants “are legally responsible
for plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos.”  Id. at 499.  If plaintiffs meet this burden of proof, the
court concluded such plaintiffs’ reasonable “fear of cancer will not lead to recovery for
speculative claims.”  Id.
46
an array of guidance by which a plaintiff may recover damages for fear of contracting cancer;
however, most jurisdictions require a form of objectively reasonable fear.  See, e.g., Atkins
v. Ferro Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 662, 667 (M.D. La. 2008) (where plaintiffs presented no
evidence that they were exposed actually to harmful levels of hydrochloric acid, their fear
was not sufficiently reasonable as a matter of law); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-1898, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50255, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2008)
(expert could not testify reliably that plaintiffs had reasonable fear of cancer because he did
not analyze levels of plaintiffs’ exposure to MTBE); Salazar v. American Sterilizer Co., 5
P.3d 357, 369 (Colo. App. 2000) (expert medical testimony that plaintiff’s fear of cancer was
reasonable because of the length of her exposure and because ethylene oxide is a known
carcinogen provided a reasonable basis for admitting evidence regarding plaintiff’s fear of
cancer); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1985).51
These jurisdictions differ, however, on how a plaintiff must prove his or her
objectively reasonable fear.  While expressing concerns similar to those we voiced in Vance
and Green regarding the difficulty of proving genuine fear and consequent mental anguish,
see supra, most jurisdictions require actual exposure.  See, e.g., Meyer v. Lockformer Co.,
47
No. 02-C-2672, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15844, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2005) (no facts
supported plaintiff’s allegation of actual exposure to industrial solvent trichloroethylene
(TCE)); Reynolds v. Highland Manor, Inc., 954 P.2d 11 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (examining
several states’ different requirements for exposure in fear of HIV claims and noting that
Kansas requires actual exposure).  Many jurisdictions also require that the fear be genuine
and a foreseeable result of the defendant’s tortious conduct.  See Bennett v. Mallinckrodt,
Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (in a case involving a denial of recovery for
“cancerphobia,” the court emphasized that such fear must have been foreseeable reasonably
by the defendant); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252 (N.Y. 1958) (explaining that,
for recovery for fear of cancer, “[i]t is entirely possible to allow recovery only upon
satisfactory evidence . . . , or to look for some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances
of the case”).
Our assessment of these cases leads us to conclude that a plaintiff must have a rational
basis to recover for fear of cancer.  Therefore, recovery for fear of disease is allowed if the
plaintiff proves he or she was exposed actually to a toxic substance, which created an
objective, reasonable fear that the plaintiff will contract an identified disease.   Mere
exposure to a toxic substance is insufficient; rather, the circumstances of actual exposure to
a toxic substance must lead a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position to believe that
contracting a disease is a real consequence of the defendant’s tortious conduct.   
2. Demonstrable Physical Injury is Required
Jurisdictions considering the question are divided on whether a plaintiff must sustain
52In Bowman, the defendant operated negligently a truck and crashed into the
plaintiff’s house.  Prior to the crash, the plaintiff saw the truck coming toward his house and
feared that his son, who was in the basement, was in danger.  As a result, the plaintiff
experienced a nervous shock when the defendant crashed into the foundation of his house,
and he fell to the floor.  For several weeks thereafter the plaintiff was bed-ridden and was
unable to work for six months.  The plaintiff experienced no physical injury or impact from
the truck.  Id. at 398–99, 164 A. at 182.
48
additionally a physical injury to recover for fear of cancer.  In Maryland, however, a plaintiff
may recover damages for emotional distress “if a physical injury resulted from the
commission of the tort, regardless of impact.”  Hoffman, 385 Md. at 34, 867 A.2d at 295
(emphasis in original).  See Green, 111 Md. at 77, 73 A. at 691 (determining that recovery
for mental distress damages should be permitted “when it is shown that a material physical
injury has resulted from fright caused by a wrongful act, and especially, as in this case, from
a constant repetition of wrongful acts, in their nature calculated to cause constant alarm and
terror” (emphasis in original)).  For example, in Green, we approved the admission of
evidence showing the plaintiff’s nervous condition, even though there was no physical
impact with or corporal injury to her person.  Id.  A defendant’s tortious conduct does not
have to produce necessarily a physical impact for a plaintiff to recover emotional distress
damages.  A plaintiff must prove, however, a “clearly apparent and substantial physical
injury” in one of four ways: (1) an external condition; or (2) symptoms of a resulting
pathological; (3) physiological; or (4) mental state.  Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 404,
165 A. 182, 184 (1933) (emphasis added).52  See also H&R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275
Md. 36, 48, 338 A.2d 48, 55 (1975), abrogated on other grounds by Owens-Illinois, Inc. v.
53The plaintiff in Vance, Muriel Vance, obtained damages for emotional distress
arising from negligent misrepresentations made by Dr. Vance, the person whom she believed
for 18 years was her husband, but had never divorced his first wife before marrying Muriel.
286 Md. 490, 492–93, 408 A.2d 728, 729 (1979).
49
Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992) (“The cases have adhered to the Bowman rule
. . . in requiring that there be clearly apparent and substantial physical injury, to guard against
the possibility of feigned claims.” (citations omitted)); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 69,
77 A.2d 923, 927 (1951) (affirming Bowman).
In Vance v. Vance,53 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979), we addressed specifically
the methods by which the traditional “physical injury” element may be proved.  The first
three methods echo the standards we expressed in Bowman, because they include evidence
of an external condition that manifests physical injury or “symptoms of a pathological or
physiological state.”  Id. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733.  The fourth way to prove a physical injury
that demonstrates emotional distress is by “evidence indicative of a ‘mental state.’”  Id.
These four methods must each be “capable of objective determination” so as to “guard
against feigned claims.”  Id. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733–34.
Three key principles are thus relevant to determine whether a physical injury is
capable of objective determination:
First, . . . the evidence must contain more than mere conclusory
statements, such as “He was afraid,” . . . . The evidence must be
detailed enough to give the jury a basis upon which to quantify
the injury.  Second, a claim of emotional injury is less likely to
succeed if the victim is the sole source of all evidence of
emotional injury . . . There is no reason why the victim’s own
testimony may not be sufficient, as long as it otherwise provides
50
the jury with enough information to render his or her injuries
capable of objective determination.  Third, although minor
emotional injuries may be less likely to produce the kind of
evidence that renders an injury capable of objective
determination, that does not mean that an emotional injury must
reach a certain threshold level of severity before it becomes
compensable.  There is no severity prong of the Vance test.  Our
focus thus is properly on the evidence of mental anguish
produced . . . . 
Hunt v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 121 Md. App. 516, 531, 710 A.2d 362, 369–70 (1998) (emphasis
added).
The evidence in Vance of Muriel Vance’s mental distress is a particularly effective
example of an objective and demonstrable physical injury, as a matter of law:  
The disclosure that her twenty-year marriage was void was
shown to have had a devastating effect on Muriel. She went  into
a state of shock, engaged in spontaneous crying and for a period
seemed detached and unaware of her own presence. She was
unable to function normally, unable to sleep and too
embarrassed to socialize. In addition to experiencing symptoms
of an ulcer, Muriel suffered an emotional collapse and
depression  which  manifested  itself  in  her  external  condition,
i.e., her significantly deteriorated physical appearance –
unkempt hair, sunken cheeks and dark eyes.
 
286 Md. at 501, 408 A.2d at 734.  We concluded that this evidence demonstrated an
objectively demonstrable physical injury caused proximately by the defendant’s negligence.
Id.  The requirement of an objective and demonstrable physical injury stands unchanged for
claims of recovery for emotional distress.  Compare New Summit Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v.
Nistle, 73 Md. App. 351, 362–63, 533 A.2d 1350, 1355 (1987) (where the court found
compensable emotional distress based on objective evidence of insomnia, diarrhea, and
54Specifically, the evidence of the objectively demonstrable physical injury in Belcher
showed that, after a three-ton beam (under the control of the defendant) crashed into the
plaintiff’s office and landed near the plaintiff’s work desk, the plaintiff’s employer sought
trauma counseling for the plaintiff as a result of the plaintiff’s fright and nervous condition
subsequent to the crash.  Id. at 713, 621 A.2d at 874.  After processing her worker’s
compensation claim, the plaintiff received psychiatric counseling for evaluation and
treatment twenty-two times.  Id.  The psychiatrist’s reports were introduced into evidence at
the administrating hearing, and included the following history of the accident after the beam
fell:
[The plaintiff] was frozen in fear, did not know what had
(continued...)
51
nausea, as a result of the tortious conduct), with  Roebuck v. Steuart, 76 Md. App. 298, 315,
544 A.2d 808, 816  (1988) (where the court held there was no compensable emotional
distress where the plaintiff’s sole evidence of physical injury rested on testimony that she
went to see a psychiatrist six times, but did not testify as to her own symptoms).  See Belcher,
Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 338 Md. 341, 342–43, 658 A.2d 675,
675–76 (1995) (where, on two separate occasions, a water pipe of the defendant’s broke and
damaged the plaintiff’s property, which plaintiff claimed caused her severe and permanent
bodily injury and severe and “protracted shock” to her nervous system and mental anguish,
this Court held that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries were not caused proximately by the
defendant’s negligence); 329 Md. at 745–46, 621 A.2d at 890 (where the plaintiff provided
ample and objective evidence that, as a result of defendant’s tortious conduct, she suffered
from nightmares, heart palpitations, headaches, and other mental anguish, and was diagnosed
with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, we held that she proved an objective and demonstrable
physical injury);54 Beynon, 351 Md. at 505, 718 A.2d at 1183 (noting that “the
54(...continued)
happened and wondered if it had been a bomb.  She was quite
shaken.  She seemed to have had some amnesia for the next
several hours but was told that she was shaking, chain smoking
and holding onto the walls.  She was, at that point, quite cold
and may have been in shock.  Concrete pieces were all over her
bodice.  There are still some nuggets present on her desk. . . .
Headaches occur and she often has dry mouth.  She is fearful of
a heart attack.  She feels like she may explode.  She has panic
attacks at work and sometimes has to leave the area. . . . She has
had ongoing nightmares, waking up screaming several times
and, in each nightmare, she herself has been killed. . . . She has
had some weight gain, a loss of senses and, at times feels “as if
she is dead”.
Id. at 713–14, 621 A.2d at 874.
52
compensability of ‘pre-impact fright’ [in survival actions] is permissible [for the decedent’s
estate] when it is the proximate result of a wrongful act and it produces a physical injury or
is manifested in some objective form”); Faya, 329 Md. at 456, 620 A.2d at 337 (noting that
"nervous disturbances may constitute suffering of the body or of the mind”).  An objective
and demonstrable physical injury requirement achieves a primary purpose of emotional
distress damages: to compensate plaintiffs for actual harm, rather than feigned or speculative
injury.  Green, 111 Md. at 81, 73 A. at 692 ("[A] nervous injury arising from actual physical
impact is as likely to be imagined as one resulting from fright without physical impact, and
that the former is as capable of simulation as the latter.”).
In the context of physical injuries sustained as a result of exposure to toxic substances,
subcellular change produced by exposure to toxic chemicals – without manifested symptoms
of a disease or actual impairment – is not a compensable “injury” under Maryland law.  See
55 A “subclinical” condition is one that is “not detectable or producing effects that are
not detectable by the usual clinical tests,” such as cancer.  Merriam-Webster Dictionary 1173
(9th ed. 1989). 
56The Bailey court required a physical injury for recovery for feared disease because
“mere ingestion of a toxic substance does not constitute sufficient physical harm upon which
(continued...)
53
Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Connor, 136 Md. App. 91, 128, 764 A.2d 318, 338 (2000)
(pleural plaques or thickening of blood or vessel walls caused by asbestos exposure is not a
compensable injury).  Likewise, most states decline to recognize subcellular or subclinical55
injuries as an element of recovery of damages for fear of disease.  Rainer v. Union Carbide
Corp., 402 F.3d 608, 620–22 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that Kentucky courts would be adverse
to allowing a claim based upon subcellular damage); Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752
P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting subcellular injury as a basis for emotional
distress damages); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985)
(subclinical injury resulting from exposure to asbestos is insufficient to constitute actual loss
or damage). 
With these standards in mind as to how a plaintiff must prove physical injury to
recover damages for emotional distress in Maryland, we must determine how such standards
apply to recovery of emotional distress damages for fear of contracting cancer.  The majority
of states allowing recovery for fear of cancer require that a plaintiff sustain a manifested and
physical injury to prove an objective and reasonable fear of disease.  See, e.g., Capital
Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 195 (Ky. 1994);56 Cleary v. Wallace Oil Co., 865
56(...continued)
to base a claim for damages.”  A plaintiff has the burden to prove some harmful result
attributable to the exposure, though he or she need not prove that he or she suffers from
cancer.  Id.
57The court in Wolff required proof of asbestos-induced disease or presence of asbestos
fibers in the plaintiff’s body.
58The court required a physical injury for recovery for feared disease because “mere
ingestion of a toxic substance does not constitute sufficient physical harm upon which to base
a claim for damages.”  Thus, a plaintiff has the burden to prove some harmful result
attributable to the exposure, though he or she need not prove that he or she suffers from
cancer.  Id.
54
N.Y.S.2d 663, 665–66 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (rejecting plaintiffs’ fear of disease claim
because there was insufficient evidence of exposure and no evidence of physical
manifestation of contamination); Wolff v. A-One Oil, Inc., 627 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789–90 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1995) (plaintiff must establish a “rational basis” for his fear of developing disease,
which “has been construed to mean the clinically demonstrable presence” of the feared
disease, specifically, a “physical manifestation” of an asbestos-induced disease);57 Capital
Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873 S.W.2d 187, 195 (Ky. 1995).58
For these reasons, we hold that to recover emotional distress damages for fear of
contracting a disease, a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she was exposed actually to a toxic
substance due to the defendant’s tortious conduct; (2) which led him or her to fear objectively
and reasonably that he or she would contract a disease; and (3) as a result of the objective and
reasonable fear, he or she manifested a physical injury capable of objective determination.
B. Appellees Cannot Recover Emotional Distress Damages for 
Fear of Contracting Cancer
59The following Appellees recovered damages for emotional distress for fear of
cancer, but did not provide evidence of actual exposure: Agnieszka Hudzik (Allison); Eric
Allison; Susan Allison; David Austin; Emily Austin; Jon Blum; Tracy Blum; Margaret
Brown; John Wright (Bull/Wright property); Adriane Burke; Lloyd Burke; Bari Jo Burnett;
Philip Capron; Susan Capron; Joan Clark; Lloyd Clark; Sharon Dorsch; William Dorsch;
Monique Easton; Bruce Elliott; Clever Fonseca; Denise Fonseca; Ann Fuller; Mary Pat
Goodhues; Laura Hartman; Michael Hartman; Cheryl Howells; Heather Huey; Michael
Huey; Richard Hyman; Kenneth Kelly; Stephanie Kelly; Margaret Kennedy; Calvin
Kirkwood; Chase Kirkwood; Jeremy Kirkwood; Mark Kirkwood; Nancy Pugliese Kirkwood;
Tyler Kirkwood; Donna Lawrence; Kristen Lawrence; Robert Lazzaro; Susan Lazzaro;
Alexander Makris; John Matra; Mary Matra; Kelly McCleary; Kirk McCleary; Mary
McCleary; Denise Moss; Gregory Naylor; Susan Naylor; Donald Nemer; Kelli Nemer;
Joanne O’Connell; Anita Podles; Thomas Podles; Anna Popomaronis; Cynthia Popomaronis;
Eleni Bowden (Popomaronis); Thomas Popomaronis; William Popomaronis; Mary Kathryn
Proefrock; Scott Proefrock; Jeff Reckseit (Wilhelmsen property); Edna Rudell; Paul Rudell;
Ellaine Saeva; Joseph Schmitz; Susan Schmitz; Ernest Sessa; John Stehman; Theresa
Stehman; Bruce Stumpp; Norma Stumpp; Chester Tokarski; Marilyn Tokarski; Ernest
Viscuso; Lisa Viscuso; David Vosvick II; Deedra Vosvick; Man A. Vuong; Stacy Vuong;
Nancy Welms; Christy Whaley; Neil Whaley; Jean Wimmer; and, Paul Wimmer. 
55
1.  No Evidence of Actual Exposure Giving Rise to 
Objective Reasonable Fear
As explained above, recovery of emotional distress damages for fear of contracting
cancer requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that he or she has been exposed actually to a toxic
chemical as a result of the defendant’s tortious conduct.  Thus, Appellees who did not
demonstrate actual exposure to benzene or MTBE stemming from the Jacksonville Exxon
leak cannot recover damages for fear of cancer.  Here, eighty-eight Appellees recovered
damages for emotional distress for fear of contracting cancer, yet did not provide evidence
of any detectable contamination in their potable wells, air, or water vapors.59  In the absence
of demonstrable contamination, these Appellees have provided no evidence of actual
60As to many of the Appellees, Exxon challenges whether the contaminants found in
their potable wells was attributed properly to the Jacksonville Exxon leak.  The jury was
presented with conflicting evidence regarding the underground flow of the gasoline.  Because
we must view all inferences in the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellees, we
presume that Appellees who demonstrated contamination in their potable wells attributed the
contamination correctly to the Jacksonville Exxon leak.
61At trial, Appellees’ experts testified that there is “no safe level” of MTBE, and thus
any exposure to MTBE, however slight, is sufficient to justify an award of damages for fear
of cancer.  Without delving into the reliability of such a theory (which was not raised by
(continued...)
56
exposure to toxic chemicals stemming from Exxon’s conduct.60  As a result, these Appellees
cannot recover damages for fear of cancer. 
2. Insufficient Evidence of Actual Exposure Giving 
Rise to an Objectively Reasonable Fear
In addition to actual exposure, Appellees must demonstrate an objective, reasonable
fear of developing cancer in order to recover emotional distress damages for fear of cancer.
A plaintiff may demonstrate an objective reasonable fear by showing that he or she has a
rational basis to believe reasonably that cancer is likely to develop as a result of exposure to
toxic substances stemming from the defendant’s tortious conduct.  Here, Appellees contend
that proof that the aquifer is contaminated with MTBE and benzene is sufficient to support
a claim for emotional distress for fear of cancer, regardless of any actual, demonstrable
exposure on an Appellee-specific basis.  We determine that Appellees who were exposed
actually to MTBE as a result of the Jacksonville Exxon leak (as determined by tests of their
potable wells), but at levels below the relevant EPA and MDE action levels, cannot
demonstrate an objective, reasonable fear of developing cancer.61 
61(...continued)
Exxon on appeal), we do not believe that such testimony is sufficient to support the causation
requirement set forth today.  To satisfy their burden of proof, Appellees must show that any
actual exposure, as well as any objective and reasonable fear they have of developing cancer,
is attributable to the Exxon leak.  Individuals are exposed routinely to MTBE and its
metabolite of concern, formaldehyde, in everyday life.  Thus, Appellees would need to show
that any objectively reasonable fear, and any actual exposure, was due not to the MTBE and
formaldehyde that they have been exposed to routinely, but specifically to that released by
Exxon.  If Appellees’ experts are correct that there is no safe level of exposure to MTBE,
then a claim that Appellees’ fear of developing cancer as a result of the Exxon spill
specifically would necessarily be unreasonable, due to the background levels of MTBE that
individuals (and Appellees) are exposed to on a regular basis.
57
For a fear to be objectively reasonable, it must be based on more than mere exposure
to a chemical or contaminant of concern.  The exposure must be sufficient, based on
objective standards, to justify fear of disease.  In Faya, for example, we noted that there was
“current credible evidence of a 95% certainty that one will test positive for the AIDS virus,
if at all, within six months after exposure to it.”  329 Md. at 455, 620 A.2d at 337.  Thus, we
determined that it was only reasonable for the plaintiffs to fear contracting HIV or AIDS
within a limited period of time – specifically, the period of time between discovery of the
surgeon’s illness, which was over a year after their last contact with him, and when they
received a negative HIV test.  Id. at 455–56, 620 A.2d at 337. 
Although individuals are exposed routinely and unfortunately in everyday life to
MTBE and other carcinogenic toxins, low levels of exposure, absent a rational basis to
support a fear of developing cancer, are not sufficient generally to justify an objectively
reasonable fear.  Here, similar to the circumstances in Faya, there is credible scientific
evidence to suggest levels of exposure to benzene and MTBE at which a fear of developing
62The EPA recommends against exposure in drinking water to MTBE at levels above
20–40 parts per billion.  Because the MDE’s standard is stricter than the recommended level
promulgated by the EPA, we look to the MDE’s action level for purposes of our analysis.
63The MTBE action level is described generally as an aesthetic standard, meaning a
level at which contamination is detectable by unpleasant taste and smell, rather than
necessarily a human safety level.  The MDE has not developed a standard at which MTBE
is deemed to be hazardous to human health, although testimony presented at trial suggests
that this level may be many times higher – perhaps 20,000 to 100,000 times higher – than the
aesthetic standard.  Absent specific standards from the MDE regarding the level at which
MTBE exposure becomes hazardous to human health, however, we decline to speculate that
the action level promulgated by the MDE is insufficiently protective of human health.  Thus,
for purposes of this case, we shall treat any measurable contamination of MTBE exceeding
the MDE action level of 20 parts per billion as sufficient to support an objective, reasonable
fear of developing cancer.
64These Appellees are: Jeanne Andrews; Richard Andrews; Annette Armstrong; John
Armstrong; Ryan Backus; Shelly Backus; Florence Brock; Ellen Brookhart; Ronald
(continued...)
58
cancer becomes objectively reasonable.  The EPA and MDE establish routinely action levels,
above which exposure to contaminants is deemed generally to be unsafe for human health.
As admitted at trial, the relevant drinking water standards are 5 parts per billion for benzene,
and 20 parts per billion62 for MTBE.63  We therefore determine that in order to have an
objectively reasonable fear of developing cancer as a result of water contamination,
measurable contamination must meet or exceed the relevant environmental action levels, if
applicable, for the allegedly carcinogenic or mutagenic contaminant.  As a result, Appellees
residing at or occupying properties whose evidence shows test results detecting
contamination below five parts per billion of benzene and twenty parts per billion of MTBE
offered insufficient evidence  to establish an objectively reasonable fear supporting recovery
of emotional distress damages for fear of contracting cancer.64 We therefore reverse the
64(...continued)
Brookhart; Sean Brookhart; Ronald Bueche; Terry Bueche; Amanda Buscemi; Charles C.
Buscemi; Karen Buscemi; Mary Buscemi; Rachel Buscemi; Philip Carbone; Maria Navarro
Cole; Michael Cole; Frederick Craig; Rosina Craig; Phillip Diedeman; Susan Diedeman;
Dana Rhyne Dieter; Patricia Dieter; Gina DiPino; Paul DiPino, Jr.; Robert Dyer; Teresa
Dyer; Carl Eisgruber; Lynn Eisgruber; Ellison Ensor; Edward Fletcher; Regina Fletcher;
Franklin Fontanazza; Gia Fontanazza; Gina Fontanazza; Paul Freas; Eugene Freeman;
Pearlie Freeman; Debra Gillespie; Kevin Gillespie; Tara Gillespie; Thomas Gillespie, Jr.;
Charlene Glatfelter; Curtis Glatfelter; George Gribble; Marjorie Gribble; Alicia Grogan;
David Grogan; Jeanette Hairston; Linda Hairston-Taulton; Walter Hairston; Virginia
Hannibal; John Higgins; Patrick Higgins; Richard Higgins; Jeffrey Hummel; Almarie Ianuly;
Paul Ianuly; James Kelly; Dale Knapp; James Knapp; Kimberly Kobus; Thomas Kobus;
Kaitlyn Lindenmeyer; Karen Lindenmeyer; Mark Lindenmeyer; Megan Lindenmeyer; Kim
Makowy; William Makowy; Carol Malstrom; William Malstrom; Brian Mangione; Justine
Mangione; Jodi Marsico; Michael Marsico; Jeffrey Munson; Leslie Munson; John Murphy;
Rosemary Murphy; Christian O’Brien; Christopher O’Brien; Kathleen Oursler; Roger
Oursler; Betty Over; Sylvester Over; Rebecca Pagani; Steven Pagani; David Palmer;
Kimberly Palmer; Charles Parker; Kimberly Parker; Cathy Peters; Marcus Peters; Mary
Prime; William Prime; Brynn Puller; John Puller; Patricia Puller; Richard Puller; Charles
Riegger; Jennifer Lookingbill (Riegger); Julia Riegger; KatieRose Dobrzykowski (Riegger);
Meghen Riegger; Rochelle Roth; Steven Roth; John Rusinko; Michele Scheetz; Ricky
Scheetz; Susan Seery; Thomas Seery; Barbara Sheeler; Donald Sheeler; Anna Marie
Simanski; Kaitlyn Jones (Slaughter); Diann Kohute (Slaughter); William Slaughter; Brendan
Sullivan; Emily Sullivan; David Sutor; Lynn Sutor; Alexander Trader; Mary Trader; Patrick
Rudolph (Trader); Leslie Tripp; Timothy Tripp; Christopher Tsakalos; Triantafilia Tsakalos;
David Vaughan; Terri Vaughan; Kimberly A. Wachter; Martin R. Wachter; Delores
Whitehurst; Gertrude Whitehurst; Hans Wilhelmsen; Kristen Wilhelmsen; Lindsey Williams;
Nancy Williams; Owen Williams; Thomas Williams; Chen-Yu Yen; Ray-Whey Yen; Andrea
Zachary; and, Mary Leffell (Zachary).
59
awards for these Appellees.
3. Legally Insufficient Evidence of Physical Injury 
Resulting from the Jacksonville Exxon Leak
Only eight Appellees recovering emotional distress damages for fear of cancer offered
well test results detecting contamination sufficient to create an objectively reasonable fear
65These Appellees are: Barbara Larrabee; Jon Larrabee; Edward Odend’hal; Nanette
Odend’hal; Amy Gumina; Gloria Quinan; Anna Walega; and, Van Ho (Elegant Nails &
Hair).
Exxon contends, and presented evidence at trial supporting its assertion, that the
contamination on the property owned by Anna and John Walega is not attributable to the
Jacksonville Exxon leak, but rather to an improperly abandoned underground storage tank
found nearby.  The jury, however, determined otherwise.  Because we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to these Appellees, we will not disturb the jury’s conclusion that the
evidence was sufficient to determine that the contamination detected on the Walega property
was attributable to the Jacksonville Exxon spill.
Similarly, the property leased by Van Ho (Elegant Nails & Hair) was contaminated
already at the time of the Jacksonville Exxon leak due to a prior gasoline leak in 2004 at the
Four Corners Amoco/BP station, and was already equipped with a carbon filtration system.
The jury, however, determined apparently that the contamination detected in March of 2006
(after the POET system malfunctioned) was attributable to the Exxon leak.
60
of developing cancer.65  These Appellees still must prove, however, a physical injury
resulting from their objectively reasonable fear.  The physical injury requirement
contemplates not necessarily a “physical” injury as used in its ordinary sense, but rather “that
the injury for which recovery is sought is capable of objective determination.”  Vance, 286
Md. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733–34.  Because the physical injury requirement is intended to
guard against feigned claims, id. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733, an injury that is capable of
objective determination must be supported by sufficient evidence tending to prove both the
genuineness of the claims and a causal relationship to the alleged tortious conduct.  Id. at
502, 408 A.2d at 734.  
As we noted in Vance, claims for emotional distress need not be supported necessarily
by expert medical testimony to establish injury and causation where “the causal connection
61
is clearly apparent from the illness itself and the circumstances surrounding it, or where the
cause of the injury relates to matters of common experience, knowledge, or observation of
laymen.” Id. at 502–03, 408 A.2d at 734–35 (quoting Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety
Comm’n, 230 Md. 91, 99, 185 A.2d 715, 719 (1962)); see also Hunt, 121 Md. App. at 531,
710 A.2d at 369 (“[A] claim for emotional injury is less likely to succeed if the victim is the
sole source of all evidence of emotional injury.”).  In Vance, for example, we determined that
expert testimony was not necessary because the plaintiff’s discovery of the true status of her
“marriage” and its attendant emotional toll is a matter within the common understanding of
a layperson.  286 Md. at 503–04, 408 A.2d at 735.  See also Md. R. 5-702 (“Expert testimony
may be admitted . . . if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”).  Here, however, the causal
connection between the physical injuries alleged and fear resulting from exposure to
carcinogenic or mutagenic contaminants is neither clearly apparent, nor within the “common
experience, knowledge, or observation of laymen.”  See Vance, 286 Md. at 502–03, 408 A.2d
at 734–35.  Thus, in order for Appellees to demonstrate that their alleged physical injury is
related causally to their fear of developing cancer as a result of the Exxon leak, expert
testimony is necessary.
None of the remaining Appellees, with the exception of Gloria Quinan, presented
expert testimony attributing their alleged physical injury to the Jacksonville Exxon leak.
Therefore, we reverse the jury awards for emotional distress for fear of contracting cancer
to Amy Gumina, Van Ho, Barbara Larrabee, Jon Larrabee, Edward Odend’hal, Nanette
66Because we determine that Appellees have not demonstrated sufficiently on this
record a causal connection between their alleged physical injuries and the Jacksonville Exxon
leak, we make no determination regarding the sufficiency of Appellees’ testimony to
establish physical injury.
62
Odend’hal, and Anna Walega.66 
Only one Appellee demonstrating an objectively reasonable fear of developing cancer,
Gloria Quinan, presented expert testimony linking her claimed physical injury to the
Jacksonville Exxon release.  In reviewing Quinan’s claims for emotional distress for fear of
cancer to determine if there was sufficient evidence to support her claim as a matter of law,
we must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in her favor.  See Houston v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., 346 Md. 503, 521, 697 A.2d 851, 859 (1997) (“Only where reasonable minds cannot
differ in the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, after it has been viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, does the issue in question become one of law for the court and
not of fact for the jury.” (quoting Pickett v. Haislip, 73 Md. App. 89, 98, 533 A.2d 287, 291
(1987))).
As noted previously, the Court of Special Appeals in Hunt provided guidance for
determining whether an injury is capable of objective determination.  The evidence offered
in support of physical injury “must contain more than mere conclusory statements,” and be
sufficiently detailed “to give the jury a basis upon which to quantify the injury.”  Hunt, 121
Md. App. at 531, 710 A.2d at 369.  Moreover, because the requirement for physical injury
must be viewed objectively, and is designed to protect against feigned claims, a claim for
emotional distress damages is more likely to succeed “if the victim is [not] the sole source
67Mr. Dell’uomo filed a medical malpractice suit with the Medical Health Claims
Arbitration Office after being misdiagnosed with prostate cancer and receiving several
radiation treatments.  Id. at 520, 710 A.2d at 364.  Prior to the arbitration hearing, Mr.
Dell’uomo passed away, and the personal representative of his estate, Carol Sue Hunt (the
appellant), was substituted for Mr. Dell’uomo.  Id. at 520–21, 710 A.2d at 364.  Mr.
Dell’uomo sat for a deposition prior to his death, the transcript of which was introduced at
the arbitration hearing.  Id. at 533, 710 A.2d at 370.
63
of all evidence of emotional injury.”  Id.  Lastly, although more severe injuries may be more
likely “capable of objective determination,” there is no threshold severity requirement for
establishing compensable physical injury.  Id. at 531, 710 A.2d at 369–70.
In Hunt, the decedent plaintiff,67 Charles Dell’uomo, offered testimony from three
sources in support of his claim for emotional distress damages: his doctor, himself, and the
personal representative of his estate.  The doctor testified, in essence, that Mr. Dell’uomo
was “emotionally upset and . . . very skeptical,” which the court characterized as “simple,
unadorned statements that Mr. Dell’uomo was upset,” and thus insufficient to establish an
injury capable of objective determination.  Id. at 532, 710 A.2d at 370.  In reviewing Mr.
Dell’uomo’s testimony, the court determined that statements like, “I thought I was going to
die,” and “[my physical problems consisted of] the stress and the aggravation and the
worrying about it,” were insufficient to render his injury capable of objective determination,
id. at 533–34, 710 A.2d at 371, whereas detailed statements regarding “the duration of [his]
constipation, the types of activities with which [his] fatigue interfered, and the incessant
nature of [his] sleeplessness would give a jury at least some of the information necessary for
quantifying a level of damages attributable to his mental injury.”  Id. at 535, 710 A.2d at 371.
68Quinan’s husband, Granville Quinan, also testified.  He did not, however, offer any
testimony regarding his wife’s emotional distress.
In its brief, Exxon criticizes the testimony of Dr. Malik, noting that of the ninety-six
plaintiffs for whom he performed a psychiatric evaluation, every plaintiff but one received
a psychiatric diagnosis, despite Dr. Malik’s conclusion that all of the plaintiffs seen were
functioning normally.  Additionally, Exxon claims that Dr. Malik erred in conducting clinical
examinations, rather than forensic examinations, which take into account broader sources of
information (rather than relying solely on the patient).  Despite these criticisms, Exxon did
not raise the admission of Dr. Malik’s expert testimony as an issue on appeal on grounds of
reliability or methodology.  We therefore presume that Dr. Malik’s testimony was admitted
properly.
64
Because the personal representative of Mr. Dell’uomo’s estate testified that Mr. Dell’uomo
became “extremely tired,” “more irritable,” stopped walking and accepting invitations to
social events, lost his appetite, and became “extremely quiet,” the Court of Special Appeals
determined that there was sufficient evidence to show a “reasonable basis for [Mr.
Dell’uomo’s] anxiety and . . . render [his] emotional injury capable of objective
determination.”  Id. at 536–37, 710 A.2d at 372.  
Here, in support of her claim for emotional distress for fear of contracting cancer,
Quinan testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of Dr. Abdul Malik, a
psychiatrist, who examined Quinan.68  Quinan testified as to the following:
Q: Has the gasoline release affected your emotional state?
A. Yes.
Q: Can you please explain?
A: Well, you know, you get depressed.  Anxiety.  Headaches.
You feel nauseous.  Lose your appetite.  Don’t feel like doing
anything.  You lose your enthusiasm.
65
Q: Do you have any concerns for your health and your
husband’s health?
A: Yes, I do.  I’m concerned about cancer or any other things
that might develop because not knowing how long – I mean, we
were drinking it for all that time and didn’t even know it. . . .
***
Q: You mentioned a couple of things, but do you know whether
or not the fears and concerns that you have have physically
manifested themselves in you in any way?
A. Yes. . . . 
Q: You talked about depression?
A. Yes. 
Q: Okay.  And you talked about lethargy?
A. Yeah.  It depends.  You start thinking about all of this, and it
just gets you so down and then you just lose all your enthusiasm.
You don’t feel like doing anything. . . . So, you know, it just
gets you down, and it just comes out in all different ways.  You
lose your appetite.  It depends how much you think about it and
when you think about it.  If you think about it at night, then you
don’t sleep.
Q. I understand.  When did you first begin to feel depressed
about the effects of the gasoline release on your family and your
home?
A. Well, you know, in the very beginning the concerns made us,
you know, gave us, you know, an uneasy feeling and everything,
but, when it finally kicked in the fact that we had the
contamination, it really did and then I had a rash that wouldn’t
69Testimony regarding the rash suffered presumptively by Quinan was admitted by the
trial court solely for the purpose of establishing Quinan’s state of mind.  The rash may not
support an award for emotional distress damages for fear of cancer on the grounds that it
constitutes a physical injury resulting from the Exxon leak.  Because we determine that
expert medical testimony is required to establish that physical injury is related causally to
fear of developing disease as a result of exposure to toxic substances, and Quinan did not
present expert medical testimony supporting a claim that the rash resulted from her fear of
developing cancer, Quinan’s rash may not support an award for emotional distress damages
for fear of cancer on these grounds.
Exxon argues that this type of testimony, admitted as probative of the state of mind
of an Appellee, should have been excluded by the trial court because the prejudicial impact
of the testimony far outweighs its probative value.  See Md. R. 5-403.  Alternatively, Exxon
contends that the trial court should have given an immediate limiting instruction to the jury,
rather than waiting until the end of the trial. Because we review the trial judge’s decision to
admit such evidence under an abuse of discretion standard, reversal is appropriate only
“where no reasonable person would share the view taken by the trial judge.”  Consol. Waste
Indus., Inc. v. Std. Equip. Co., 421 Md. 210, 219, 26 A.3d 352, 357 (2011).  Because we do
not believe that “no reasonable person” would admit the testimony regarding Quinan’s rash,
we decline to disturb Judge Dugan’s evidentiary ruling in the limited circumstances
presented by the testimony relating to Quinan.
66
go away.69 
Q. When did that start?  When did the rash start?
A. It started before May of 2008.  I don’t know how far before
that, but I know May of 2008 I had it.
Q. So after the release?
A. Pardon?
Q. After the gasoline release?
A. After the gasoline release.
Q. How long did you suffer with the rash?
A. Over a year.
67
Q. Did you try to treat it?
A. Yes.  I used all types of prescription topical ointments and
creams.  I was given a lot.  A very potent one by the
dermatologist.  It did nothing.  Nothing took it away until we
went on vacation for two weeks, went away and not bathing in
the water.  When I came back, it was gone.
Q.  And during that approximate year that you were suffering
from a rash, did you ever receive any communication from
Exxon giving you any information about any potential
association between exposure to MTBE and the water and
rashes?
A. No.
Q. You mentioned sleeplessness?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you start beginning to have issues with
sleeplessness as it relates to your fears and concerns about the
gasoline release?
A. We had in the beginning of 2006 and afterwards and they
continued but not regularly.  I mean, it was a concern and it
would bother me, and some nights I couldn’t sleep, but after we
found out about the contamination, it was going on and on
because everything would go through your head. You know,
how long have you been drinking it?  You know, what is it
going to do to us?  How is it going to impact our lives?
Q.  So over this five year period from 2006 to the present, how
often would you say you would have issues of sleeplessness?
A. Sometimes, several nights a week.  Sometimes, maybe
several times a month.
Q. And you also mentioned headaches?
A. Yes. Same thing.
68
Q. Same kind –
A. It just depends on how much you let yourself get, I guess,
worked up over the whole thing.  You know, you try to settle
down and then it just gets you again.
Q. . . . [O]ver this five year period are you able to tell us would
you find yourselves [sic] worked up to the point that would you
experience headaches as a result of your fears and concerns
relating to the gasoline release?
A. Several times a week.  Sometimes, it would be a week or so
and then you have them again, but would be, you know, several
times a week.  Several times a month.
Q. You also mentioned a loss of appetite?
A. Yes. 
A. Can you talk a little bit about what you mean by that?
A. Well, you just don’t feel like eating.  You’re kind of feeling
nauseous.  You get upset and then you just don’t feel like eating.
Q. Do you feel that way when you’re thinking about the
gasoline release?
A. Definitely.
Q. How often would you find yourself feeling nauseous and not
willing to eat as it relates to your fears and concerns with the
gasoline release?
A. Maybe, you know, weekly or a few times a month.  I guess
several times.  I mean, like, a couple days a week or several
times a month, you know.  Whatever.  Like, you might have a
few days or a week in between and then it hits you again.
Dr. Malik testified that Quinan was “angry and frustrated and concerned” that she had
been drinking and bathing in her well water from 2006 until the first positive detection of
70The Quinan well first tested positive for MTBE contamination below the MDE
action level on 16 April 2009.  On 9 July 2009, a well test revealed MTBE contamination at
22 ppb, exceeding the MDE action level.  The MDE installed a POET system at the Quinan
property on 3 August 2009.
69
contamination of her well in April of 2009.70  He testified that Quinan “had a rash which
started before May of 2008 which [she] never had before . . . [which] continued . . . until June
of 2009 when she went to Florida for one week and South Carolina for one week, so in those
two weeks, it – the rash all disappeared after being way from [the] water and has not come
back.”   Additionally, he testified that Quinan was concerned about her future health:
Q: . . . Did you notice anything about her anxiety elements?
A.  Yes.  She had been drinking and bathing in the contaminated
water for several months to years before it was detected in April
of 2009, and she had all kinds of problems which disappeared
after she was on vacation for two weeks; and her husband also
had all kinds of health problems related to [his] stomach, and
nothing definitive was diagnosed.  And it all disappeared after
he started drinking bottled water within two weeks.  She was
anxious about developing cancer. . . .
Q: Doctor, were you able to reach a diagnosis to a reasonable
degree of psychiatric certainty?
A. Yes.  She was suffering with anxiety disorder not otherwise
specified.
Q: Were you able to determine the cause of her mental disease
to a reasonable degree?
A. Yes.  It was directly caused by the Exxon spillage.
Q: This did not affect her normal functioning, I take it?
A: No.  She has been able to function in her usual ways.
70
Q: Has it impacted her quality of life and relationships?
A: Yes.  She had been drinking bottled water as soon as she
learned about the contamination of the water, and she had
suffered through a skin condition[]; and her husband had
suffered through gastrointestinal conditions.  Both of them are
feeling much better away from the water.
Although the testimony proffered by Quinan and Dr. Malik does not rise to the level
of detail observed in Hunt, we conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to create
a jury question as to whether Quinan suffered an injury capable of objective determination.
Quinan provided testimony regarding the duration and extent of her physical symptoms.
Moreover, although much of Dr. Malik’s testimony contained conclusory statements which
otherwise might be insufficient to establish physical injury, he testified regarding his
examination and diagnosis of anxiety disorder.  Although we recognize that anxiety disorder
not impacting normal functioning is less severe than the physical injuries asserted in Vance,
as the Court of Special Appeals noted in Hunt, “[t]here is no severity prong of the Vance
test.”  121 Md. App. at 531, 710 A.2d at 370.  Thus, “although minor emotional injuries may
be less likely to produce the kind of evidence that renders an injury capable of objective
determination, that does not mean that an emotional injury must reach a certain threshold
level of severity before it becomes compensable.”  Id. at 531, 710 A.2d at 369–70.
Therefore, even though Dr. Malik testified that Quinan remained able to function normally
in spite of her diagnosed anxiety disorder, we conclude there is sufficient evidence,
considered in the light most favorable to Quinan, to submit her claim to the jury.  Therefore,
we shall direct remand for Quinan’s claim for emotional distress damages for fear of
71Recovery of damages for medical monitoring, also known as medical surveillance,
where allowed, is distinct from a cause of action for an enhanced or increased risk of disease.
In theory, a plaintiff may receive damages for medical monitoring only for “quantifiable
costs of periodic examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical harm, whereas an
enhanced risk claim seeks compensation for the anticipated harm itself, proportionately
reduced to reflect the chance that it will not occur.” Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 781 n.40, 752
A.2d 200, 251 n.40 (2000) (quoting Recovery for Damages for Expense of Medical
Monitoring to Detect or Prevent Future Disease or Condition, 17 A.L.R.5th 327, § 3).
71
contracting cancer to the trial court for a new trial.
C. Compensatory Damages for Medical Monitoring
1. Does Maryland Recognize a Right to 
Recovery for Damages for Medical Monitoring?
Although the trial court permitted nearly every Appellee’s claim for damages for
medical monitoring to go to the jury, this Court has not recognized yet a cause of action for
the recovery of medical monitoring damages71 in Maryland.  Exxon contends that the trial
court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding
Appellees’ medical monitoring awards.  In considering Exxon’s assertions, we must decide
first whether to recognize a right in Maryland to recover damages for medical monitoring.
Secondly, we must determine, if we recognize such a claim vel non, whether, considering the
evidence in this record “taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” the trial
court was legally correct in denying Exxon’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.  Gallagher, 182 Md. App. at 101,  957 A.2d at 632. 
The possibility of recovery of damages for medical monitoring in Maryland was
raised, but not decided by this Court, in Philip Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689,
72In Angeletti, the plaintiffs, as class representatives, sought damages and injunctive
relief against tobacco manufacturers and related entities for cancer and pulmonary disorders
from smoking cigarettes, claiming violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, Md.
Code Ann. Com. § 13-101 et seq., and damages for medical monitoring, among other claims.
Angeletti, 358 Md. at 699–704, 752 A.2d at 205–08.  The case reached this Court on a
petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition by the tobacco manufacturers based on issues
of class certification.  Id.  We granted the relief of mandamus and ordered the trial court to
decertify two classes.  Specifically, and most relevant to this case, we held that, even if
medical monitoring constituted a valid cause of action or form of relief in Maryland, a class
action seeking equitable relief should not have been certified under Maryland Rule 23(b)(2)
on the basis of a claim for medical monitoring, under the circumstances of that case.  Id. at
782, 752 A.2d at 251.
72
779–80, 752 A.2d 200, 250 (2000).72  In Angeletti, we recognized that many courts permit
a cause of action for medical monitoring or allow compensation for such as damages in tort
actions, and discussed briefly the purpose of recovering damages for medical monitoring and
policy concerns associated with this form of recovery.  Id.  Under such a claim, a plaintiff
may recover only the quantifiable costs of “periodic medical examinations necessary to
monitor plaintiffs’ health and to facilitate early diagnosis and treatment of disease(s) caused
by exposure to chemicals . . . .” Id. at 781, 752 A.2d at 250 (citing Ayers v. Jackson, 525
A.2d 287, 308 (N.J. 1987); In re Paoli R. Yard PCB Litigation (Paoli I), 916 F.2d 829,
849–50 (3d Cir. 1990)).   These standards for recovering for medical monitoring costs help
enforce the common law principle that a defendant must compensate a plaintiff fully for past
or present injuries caused by the defendant’s tortious conduct.  See, e.g.,  Ayers, 525 A.2d
at 311–12 (“Compensation for reasonable and necessary medical expenses is consistent with
well-accepted legal principles. . . . It is also consistent with the important public health
interest in fostering access to medical testing for individuals whose exposure to toxic
73Moreover, “if a reasonable physician would not prescribe [medical monitoring] for
a particular plaintiff because the benefits of the monitoring would be outweighed by the
costs, which may include, among other things, the burdensome frequency of the monitoring
procedure, its excessive price, or its risk of harm to the patient, then recovery would not be
allowed.”  Hansen, 858 P.2d at 980.
73
chemicals creates an enhanced risk of disease.”).
We agree now with other jurisdictions that recognize that “exposure itself and the
concomitant need for medical testing” is the compensable injury for which recovery of
damages for medical monitoring is permitted, Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d
970, 977 (Utah 1993), because such exposure constitutes an “invasion of [a] legally protected
interest.”  Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 430 (W. Va. 1999)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts  § 7(1) (1964)).  Invasion of a specific legally-
protected interest in a claim for compensable medical monitoring consists of  “a significantly
increased risk of contracting a particular disease relative to what would be the case in the
absence of exposure.”  Id. at 433.   
While problems may arise in limiting the potentially expansive class of plaintiffs in
medical surveillance awards, see Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,
442–43, 117 S. Ct. 2113, 2122–23, 138 L. Ed. 2d 560, 576 (1997), permitting only proven
necessary medical costs helps prevent the danger of awarding medical monitoring for
speculative injuries, a risk inherent in the area of other common law torts, such as emotional
distress.73  Id.
Although in Angeletti we considered the possibility that a plaintiff may recover for
74
damages for medical monitoring either as an independent cause of action or as an element
of damages, we noted that a “medical monitoring claim may perhaps more accurately be
deemed a remedy rather than a distinct cause of action.”  358 Md. at 786, 752 A.2d at 253.
See also Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 823 (Cal. 1993) (holding that
a defendant’s conduct creating the need for future medical monitoring “does not create a new
tort. It is simply a compensable item of damage when liability is established under traditional
tort theories of recovery.”);  James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation
Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical
Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 815, 840 (2002) (academic commentators concluded that those
states that allow recovery for medical monitoring did not create new causes of action, but
rather recognized a new form of tort remedy).   
Likewise, our sister jurisdictions that allow recovery for medical monitoring, more
often than not, allow such recovery as a remedy, rather than as an independent cause of
action.  See Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. C 10-02067, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107959, at *8–*9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010) (dismissing stand-alone medical monitoring claim,
but recognizing that California allows a medical monitoring claim as a remedy); Mann v.
CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:07-CV-3512, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106433, at *7 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 10, 2009) (medical monitoring recognized as a form of tort damages in Ohio); Duncan
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., No. C98-130Z, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18276 (W.D. Wash. Nov.
5, 2001) (declining to create new and independent tort for medical monitoring because flight
attendants exposed to second-hand smoke, with present injury, could seek medical
75
monitoring as remedy to a negligence cause of action); Meyer v. Fluor Corp., 220 S.W.3d
712 (Mo. 2007) (medical monitoring is a compensable element of damage if liability is
demonstrated under traditional tort theories of recovery); Badillo v. American Brands, Inc.,
16 P.3d 435, 440 (Nev. 2001) (concluding that remedy of medical monitoring, but not a
stand-alone claim, may be available under common law).  For these reasons, we hold that a
remedy for medical monitoring costs is a compensable element of damage under traditional
tort theories of recovery.  
2. Burden of Proof for Recovery of Damages for Medical Monitoring
The United States Supreme Court noted that “an exposed plaintiff can recover related
reasonable medical monitoring costs [as an element of damages] if and when he develops
symptoms.”  Buckley, 521 U.S. at 438, 117 S. Ct. at 2121, 138 L. Ed. 2d at 573.  By contrast,
there is a divided array of states that allow medical monitoring based on different threshold
standards.  Compare Remson v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. CV 07-5296, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20310 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2009) (finding that, in New York, recovery for medical
monitoring is allowed as long as the plaintiff alleges exposure to an allegedly toxic chemical
and a rational basis for belief of contracting a disease), with Parker v. Brush Wellman, Inc.,
377 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1296, 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (where plaintiffs claimed a"subclinical"
condition due to toxic exposure, but lacked any contemporaneous physiological
manifestations, the court concluded that Georgia does not recognize a medical monitoring
action without a showing of physical injury).  When those costs are deemed “reasonable,”
and irrespective of whether actual physical  “symptoms” of the toxic substance-induced
74To recover for medical monitoring, the court held, the plaintiff must prove “through
reliable expert testimony predicated upon the significance and extent of exposure to
chemicals, the toxicity of the chemicals, the seriousness of the diseases for which individuals
are at risk, the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in those exposed, and the
value of early diagnosis.” Id. at 312.
76
disease are required to recover such costs, is what we must determine in the present case. 
a. “Reasonable and Necessary” Medical Costs
The weight of authority across the country recognizes that recovery for costs of
medical monitoring is limited to costs that are necessary and reasonable. The seminal case
recognizing compensable damages for medical monitoring seems to be Ayers v. Jackson, 525
A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).  The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a group of plaintiffs could
recover medical surveillance costs for toxic exposure after their Township contaminated the
town aquifer and consequently their well water, even though no plaintiff had developed
symptoms of exposure-related disease that were “quantified” by the evidence, if such
monitoring were found to be reasonably necessary.  Id. at 312–14.  The court articulated
certain factors to consider in defining the meaning of “reasonably necessary.”74  Id. at 312
(noting that the evidence must prove that medical surveillance of the “effect of exposure to
toxic chemicals is reasonable and necessary”).  Necessity for medical monitoring, however,
must be reasonably certain, rather than merely possible.  Potter, 863 P.2d at 824 (“[T]he cost
of medical monitoring is a compensable item of damages where the proofs demonstrate,
through reliable medical expert testimony, that the need for future monitoring is a reasonably
certain consequence of a plaintiff’s toxic exposure and that the recommended monitoring is
reasonable.”). The prime inquiry into the necessity and reasonableness of a plaintiff’s
75The Third Circuit outlined specific elements that a plaintiff must prove to recover
damages for medical monitoring: a plaintiff must show (1) that he or she “was significantly
exposed to a proven hazardous substance through the negligent actions of the defendant;” (2)
that, “[a]s a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly increased risk of
contracting a serious latent disease;” (3) that “increased risk makes periodic diagnostic
medical examinations reasonably necessary;” and (4) that “monitoring and testing procedures
exist which make the early detection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial.”
Paoli I, 916 F.2d  at 852 (emphasis added).
77
claimed monitoring costs  is whether “medical monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, necessary in order to diagnose properly the warning signs of disease.”
Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 851 (emphasis added).  This standard requires, necessarily, medical
testimony by a plaintiff’s expert(s).  
To determine whether monitoring is reasonably necessary, several courts have
established specific multi-factor tests, such as that adopted by the Supreme Court of
California: 
In determining the reasonableness and necessity of monitoring
. . . the following factors are relevant: (1) the significance and
extent of the plaintiff’s exposure to chemicals; (2) the toxicity
of the chemicals; (3) the relative increase in the chance of onset
of disease in the exposed plaintiff as a result of the exposure,
when compared to (a) the plaintiff’s chances of developing the
disease had he or she not been exposed, and (b) the chances of
the members of the public at large of developing the disease; (4)
the seriousness of the disease for which the plaintiff is at risk;
and (5) the clinical value of early detection and diagnosis. 
Potter, 863 P.3d at 824–25; see also Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 852 (identifying analogous factors
to consider in awarding compensable damages for medical surveillance);75 Donovan v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 891, 901 (Mass. 2009) (“When competent medical testimony
establishes that medical monitoring is necessary to detect the potential onset of a serious
78
illness or disease due to physiological changes indicating a substantial increase in risk of
harm from exposure to a known hazardous substance, the element of injury and damage will
have been satisfied and the cost of that monitoring is recoverable in tort.”).
b. Proving Causation and a “Significantly Increased Risk” are Key to Recovery
Keys to a plaintiff’s recovery are evidence of causation (from the defendant’s tortious
conduct) and a significantly increased risk of contracting a latent disease.  For example, in
Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724 (N.J. 1993), the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that recovery for medical monitoring may be obtained only by plaintiffs who have
“experienced direct and hence discrete exposure to a toxic substance and who have []
suffered an injury or condition resulting from that exposure and whose risk of cancer [can]
be limited and related specifically and tangibly to that exposure." Id. at 733 (emphasis
added).   Hence, a plaintiff who was exposed to asbestos by laundering her husband's clothes
had no medical monitoring claim because evidence linking any potential risk of cancer to the
defendant’s tortious conduct was tenuous; also, the plaintiff was a smoker.  Id.  Courts have
concluded, moreover, that an increased or different monitoring of a latent disease, even due
to a preexisting condition caused by a plaintiff’s voluntary conduct, may create entitlement
to recover damages, as long as there is  reliable evidence that the increased risk is a direct
and proximate result of the exposure to defendant’s tortious conduct.  Potter, 863 P.2d at 825
n.27.
Although we recognize that the injury giving rise to an alleged need for medical
monitoring costs is the exposure to toxic substances, and that this exposure is an invasion of
79
a legally-protected interest, see Hansen, 858 P.2d at 977, we are wary of damages for
speculative claims resting on tenuous proof of risk of disease attributable to the type of
exposure.  In evaluating at “what stage in the evolution of a toxic injury should tort law
intercede by requiring the responsible party to pay damages[,]” Ayers, 525 A.2d at 298, we
believe that, by its nature, recovery for a latent disease due to toxic exposure involves
necessarily somewhat nebulous forecasts of a potential risk to develop a disease in the future.
We recognize that, because of the “latent nature of most diseases resulting from exposure to
toxic substances,  . . . most toxic-tort plaintiffs cannot establish an immediate physical injury
of the type contemplated in traditional tort actions . . . [because] the physical injury . . .
manifests itself years after exposure.”  Hansen, 858 P.2d at 977. Requiring quantifiable and
reliable proof, however, will assist courts in determining whether causation and significant
risk are present in a plaintiff’s prima facie case.
For a fact finder to “ascertain the probability” that the remedy of medical monitoring
is appropriate, Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 852, proof of a ”significantly increased risk” of
developing a future disease, based on reliable expert testimony quantifying the risk, is
necessary.  See id. at 851 (requiring medical expert testimony to demonstrate a plaintiff’s
need for reasonable and necessary medical costs); Donovan, 914 N.E.2d at 901 (“When
competent medical testimony establishes that medical monitoring is necessary to detect the
potential onset of a serious illness or disease due to physiological changes indicating a
substantial increase in risk of harm from exposure to a known hazardous substance, the
element of injury and damage will have been satisfied and the cost of that monitoring is
80
recoverable in tort.”).  Otherwise, it is difficult for a reasonable fact finder to measure “the
relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in the exposed plaintiff as a result of the
exposure, when compared to (a) the plaintiff’s chances of developing the disease had he or
she not been exposed, and (b) the chances of the members of the public at large of
developing the disease.” Potter, 863 P.2d at 824–25.
Quantifiable and reliable indicators of risk in developing disease are also helpful to
determine a “significant” increase in risk of disease, thus ensuring that the nature and extent
of medical monitoring is actually greater than that which should be undertaken by the general
population, a key purpose in awarding appropriate medical monitoring damages. Id. at 825
(noting that “there can be no recovery for preventative  medical care and checkups to which
members of the public at large should prudently submit”). 
Hence, we conclude that quantifiable, reliable indicia that a defendant’s actions have
so increased significantly the plaintiff’s risk of developing a disease are necessary to recover
damages for medical monitoring costs.  The indicia may be proven by a medical expert’s
testimony, particularized to a plaintiff, and demonstrating a reasonable link to toxic exposure.
This requirement helps to achieve the objective of medical monitoring – that a defendant
must compensate a plaintiff for past or present injuries caused by the defendant – and inhibits
damages awards for speculative, and thus unreliable, opinions as to a plaintiff’s potential risk
of developing a future disease.
c. A Showing of “Physical Injury” is Not Required
We conclude, as have the majority of our sister jurisdictions, that evidence of physical
81
injury is not required to support costs for medical surveillance. A compelling illustration of
why proof of physical injury is not needed for this form of relief is Friends for All Children,
Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 818–19 (D.C. Cir. 1984), where recovery for
medical monitoring was permitted, without proof of physical injury, where the defendant
caused proximately a present physical manifestation of the plaintiff children who developed
brain dysfunctions.  The plaintiff organization, on behalf of 149 Vietnamese orphans who
survived a plane crash during the evacuation of Vietnam in 1975, sued Lockheed, alleging
that because of decompression, as well as the crash, the children suffered from a neurological
disorder that was classified generically as Minimal Brain Dysfunction.  Id.  Initial medical
diagnosis trials were conducted for selected children to provide necessary information about
probable litigation results.  Id. at 820–22.  Lockheed did not deny liability for compensatory
damages, but disputed that the crash was a cause of the need for medical diagnostic tests.
Id.
The federal court rejected the argument that the need for diagnostic examination was
not a compensable injury, and affirmed the imposition on Lockheed of liability for diagnostic
examination expenses because the need for such examinations was the proximate result of
the crash.  Id. at 825–26.  Even without further proof of injury, the court held, a reasonable
need for medical examinations was compensable.  Id. at 826.  The court held further that a
reasonable need for medical examinations was itself compensable, without proof of other
injury: "[i]t is difficult to dispute that an individual has an interest in avoiding expensive
diagnostic examinations just as he or she has an interest in avoiding physical injury. When
82
a defendant negligently invades this interest, the injury to which is neither speculative nor
resistant to proof, it is elementary that the defendant should make the plaintiff whole by
paying for the examinations."  Id. (emphasis added). 
As we discussed earlier, the physical injury a plaintiff suffers in a claim for recovery
for medical surveillance costs is the invasion of a legally-protected interest.  See Hansen, 858
P.2d at 977.  Hence, we believe that, as long as the plaintiff presents proof that the
significantly increased risk of contracting a latent disease is not “speculative,” Friends, 746
F.2d at 826, but is instead reasonably certain based on reliable evidence, there is no need that
such plaintiff sustain an actual physical harm to recover damages.  
d. Administration of Medical Monitoring Award Through an Equitable Fund
We note with approval the recent tendency of many courts that award medical
monitoring costs to do so by establishing equitably a court-supervised fund, administered by
a trustee, at the expense of the defendant. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford, 204 Md. App. 1,
144, 40 A.3d 514, 598 (2012) (J. Eyler, J., concurring and dissenting in part), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2013) (“In our view, the alternative that best
achieves the goal of medical monitoring is that a court, in the exercise of its equitable
powers, can establish a fund, when justified by the evidence, to be administered by a trustee,
at the expense of the defendant.”).  See also Buckley, 521 U.S. at 441, 117 S. Ct. at 2122, 138
L. Ed. 2d at 574. This approach helps ensure that the medical surveillance funds will be used
for their intended purpose, while still achieving the objectives of the medical monitoring
remedy, for “given the difficulty in precisely estimating the cost of relief to the plaintiffs, any
83
money damages award would run the risk of overcompensating the plaintiffs, and the surest
way for the Court to avoid any such inefficiency is to fashion relief through an injunction
rather than a money damages award.” Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 06-12234,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37974,  at *55 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2012).  The U.S. Supreme Court
assessed the ample support among courts across the country to order an equitable fund to
disburse appropriate medical monitoring costs: 
[T]he cases authorizing recovery for medical monitoring in the
absence of physical injury do not endorse a full-blown,
traditional tort law cause of action for lump-sum damages – of
the sort that the Court of Appeals seems to have endorsed here.
Rather, those courts, while recognizing that medical monitoring
costs can amount to a harm that justifies a tort remedy, have
suggested, or imposed, special limitations on that remedy.
Compare Ayers, [] 525 A.2d at 314 (recommending in future
cases creation of “a court-supervised fund to administer
medical-surveillance payments”); Hansen, [858 P.2d] at 982
(suggesting insurance mechanism or court-supervised fund as
proper remedy); Potter, [] 863 P.2d at 825, n.28 (suggesting that
a lump-sum damages award would be inappropriate); Burns, []
752 P.2d at 34 (holding that lump-sum damages are not
appropriate) with, e.g., Honeycutt v. Walden, 294 Ark. 440, 743
S.W.2d 809 (1988) (damages award for future medical expenses
made necessary by physical injury are awarded as lump-sum
payment) . . .
Buckley, 521 U.S. at 440–41, 117 S. Ct. at 2122, 138 L. Ed.2d at 574.
The District Court of Appeals of Florida, holding that future medical monitoring costs
are compensable in Florida, determined that a Florida trial court could use its equitable
powers to create a fund for medical monitoring recovery, if the plaintiff established a prima
facie case for recovery.  Petito v. A.H. Robbins Co., 750 So.2d 103, 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999).  The court outlined specific guidelines for a trial court to follow if it decided that a
84
fund was appropriate, such as: (1) appoint a plan administrator; (2) with the administrator’s
advice, approve an advisory panel of persons qualified and knowledgeable in the relevant
medical field or fields to supervise, among other things, the persons who consume or undergo
medication and treatment, and select a list of skilled and neutral examining physicians to
perform the medical tests; (3) establish a time frame for those eligible to obtain the
monitoring; and, (4) authorize the plan administrator to pay the reasonable amounts of claims
based on submitted reports and findings by the monitoring physicians.  Id. at 107.   For these
procedures to operate effectively, they “must be tailored to fit the facts in a given case.”
Ford, 204 Md. App. at 146, 40 A.3d at 599 (J. Eyler, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
In sum, we hold that Maryland recognizes a remedy of recovery for medical
monitoring costs resulting from exposure to toxic substances resulting from a defendant’s
tortious conduct.  To sustain an award for recovery for medical costs, a plaintiff must show
that reasonable medical costs are necessary due to a reasonably certain and significant
increased risk of developing a latent disease as a result of exposure to a toxic substance.  In
awarding relief, a court must consider whether the plaintiff has shown: (1) that the plaintiff
was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance through the defendant’s tortious
conduct; (2) that, as a proximate result of significant exposure, the plaintiff suffers a
significantly increased risk of contracting a latent disease; (3) that increased risk makes
periodic diagnostic medical examinations reasonably necessary; and (4) that monitoring and
testing procedures exist which make the early detection and treatment of the disease possible
and beneficial.
76These appellees are: Agnieszka Hudzik (Allison); Eric Allison; Kristen Allison;
Susan Allison; David Austin; Emily Austin; Ian Austin; Reid Austin; Patricia Bateman; Alex
Blum; Jon Blum; Madelyn Blum; Tracy Blum; Margaret Brown; Tara Brown; John Wright
(Bull/Wright property); Adriane Burke; Lloyd Burke; Lloyd Burke, Jr.; Riley Burke; Bari
Jo Burnett; Adriana Capizzi; Carlo Capizzi; Franca Capizzi; Francesca Capizzi; Julia
Capizzi; Philip Capron; Susan Capron; Joan Clark; Lloyd Clark; Sharon Dorsch; William
Dorsch; Alissa Dutrow; Daryl Dutrow; Emily Dutrow; Jennifer Dutrow; Brian Easton; David
Easton; Michael Easton; Monique Easton; Bruce Elliott; Janice Elliott; Chris Federico; Emily
Federico; Grace Federico; Kevin Federico; Tracy Federico; Bruna Fonseca; Clever Fonseca;
Denise Fonseca; Maira Fonseca; Tiago Fonseca; Anthony Frattarola; Marianne Frattarola;
Victoria Frattarola; Ann Fuller; Stanley Fuller; Mary Pat Goodhues; Connor Hartman; Gavin
Hartman; Laura Hartman; Michael Hartman; Cheryl Howells; Brendan Huey; Heather Huey;
Michael Huey; Shannon Huey; Dorothy Hyman; Richard Hyman; Kenneth Kelly; Lauryn
Kelly; Michele Kelly; Stephanie Kelly; Kathleen Kennedy; Leonard Kennedy; Margaret
Kennedy; Calvin Kirkwood; Chase Kirkwood; Jeremy Kirkwood; Mark Kirkwood; Nancy
Pugliese Kirkwood; Tyler Kirkwood; Ellen Koerner; Henry Koerner; Donna Lawrence;
(continued...)
85
To determine what is a “significantly increased risk of contracting a latent disease”
for a particular plaintiff, the court may consider quantifiable and reliable medical expert
testimony that indicates the plaintiff’s chances of developing the disease had he or she not
been exposed, compared to the chances of the members of the public at large of developing
the disease.  We hold further that, where a plaintiff sustains his or her burden of proof in
recovering this form of relief, the court should award medical monitoring costs ordinarily by
establishing equitably a fund, administered by a trustee, at the expense of the defendant.
3. Recovery of Medical Monitoring Damages by Appellees in the Present Case
Appellees’ claims for medical monitoring damages suffer from various deficiencies
of proof under the tests set out above.  Specifically, because Appellees with no detected
contamination have not demonstrated sufficiently that they were exposed significantly to a
proven hazardous substance, they may not recover damages for medical monitoring.76
76(...continued)
Kristen Lawrence; Jennifer Lazzaro; Robert Lazzaro; Susan Lazzaro; Alexander Makris;
Eleni Makris; Nikolaos Makris; Valerie Makris; John Matra; Mary Matra; Kelly McCleary;
Kirk McCleary; Mary McCleary; Ryan McCleary; Leigh Morgan; Pamela Morgan; R. Wade
Morgan; Ronald Morgan; Denise Moss; Gregory Naylor; Gregory Naylor, Jr.; Kenneth
Naylor; Susan Naylor; Tracy Naylor; Alexandra Nemer; Donald Nemer; Emmanuel Nemer;
Kelli Nemer; Joanne O’Connell; Andrew Podles; Anita Podles; Claire Podles; John Podles;
Thomas Podles; Thomas Podles, Jr.; Anna Popomaronis; Cynthia Popomaronis; Eleni
Bowden (Popomaronis); Peter Vailas (Popomaronis); Thomas Popomaronis; William
Popomaronis; Casey Proefrock; John Proefrock; Kate Proefrock; Mary Kathryn Proefrock;
Megan Proefrock; Scott Proefrock; Jeff Reckseit (Wilhelmsen property); Edna Rudell; Paul
Rudell; Alan Saeva; Ellaine Saeva; Joseph Schmitz; Marah Schmitz; Susan Schmitz; Ernest
Sessa; Paula Sessa; Allison Shields; Erin Shields; John Shields, Jr.; Kevin Shields; Natalie
Shields; Alyssa Stehman; John Stehman; Jonathan Stehman; Marina Stehman; Sierra
Stehman; Theresa Stehman; Bruce Stumpp; Norma Stumpp; Chester Tokarski; Marilyn
Tokarski; Ernest Viscuso; Francesca Viscuso; Gabrielle Viscuso; Lisa Viscuso; Nicole
Viscuso; Chase Vosvick; David Vosvick II; Deedra Vosvick; Tanner Vosvick; Amy Vuong;
Krystal Vuong; Man A. Vuong; Shuzhen Vuong; Sinh Vuong; Stacy Vuong; Megan Welms;
Nancy Welms; Christy Whaley; Neil Whaley; Jean Wimmer; and, Paul Wimmer. 
86
Moreover, as noted above in our discussion of emotional distress damages for fear of
contracting cancer, individuals are exposed routinely in everyday life activities to MTBE and
its metabolite of concern, formaldehyde.  Thus, those Appellees with no demonstrated
exposure exceeding the MDE action levels for MTBE and/or benzene are no more at risk of
developing a latent disease from these contaminants than the average person – much less
suffer a significantly increased risk of developing disease.  As a result, Appellees with no
demonstrated contamination exceeding the governmental action levels of five and twenty
parts per billion for benzene and MTBE, respectively, did not prove as a matter of law that
they suffer a significantly increased risk of developing a latent disease justifying an award
77These appellees are: Thomas Albright; Paula Albright; Caitlin Andrews; Daniel
Andrews; Jeanne Andrews; Richard Andrews; Annette Armstrong; John Armstrong; Emily
Backus; Ryan Backus; Shelly Backus; Keith Brock; Ashley Brookhart; Ellen Brookhart;
Ronald Brookhart; Sean Brookhart; Victoria Brookhart; Ronald Bueche; Terry Bueche;
Amanda Buscemi; Cari C. Buscemi; Charles C. Buscemi; Karen Buscemi; Mary Buscemi;
Rachel Buscemi; Philip Carbone; Maria Navarro Cole; Michael Cole; Frederick Craig;
Rosina Craig; Phillip Diedeman; Phillip Diedeman, Jr.; Susan Diedeman; Dana Rhyne
Dieter; Patricia Dieter; Dominique DiPino; Francesca DiPino; Gina DiPino; Joseph DiPino;
Paul DiPino, Jr.; Paul DiPino, III; Robert Dyer; Sarah Dyer; Teresa Dyer; Carl Eisgruber;
James Turfler (Eisgruber); Lynn Eisgruber; Ellison Ensor; Sarah Ensor; Edward Fletcher;
Regina Fletcher; Sarah Fletcher; Zachary Fletcher; Franklin Fontanazza; Gia Fontanazza;
Gina Fontanazza; Alexandra Freas; James Freas; Kathleen Freas; Paul Freas; Eugene
Freeman; Pearlie Freeman; Debra Gillespie; Kevin Gillespie; Tara Gillespie; Thomas
Gillespie, Jr.; Thomas Gillespie, III; Charlene Glatfelter; Curtis Glatfelter; George Gribble;
Marjorie Gribble; Alicia Grogan; David Grogan; Gavin Grogan; Jeanette Hairston; Linda
Hairston-Taulton; Walter Hairston; Theodore Hannibal; Virginia Hannibal; Joan Hanst; John
Hanst; Rebecca Heyman-Magaziner; Allison Higgins; John Higgins; Mary Higgins; Patrick
Higgins; Richard Higgins; Almarie Ianuly; Paul Ianuly; James Kelly; Mary Kelly; Dale
Knapp; James Knapp; Kimberly Kobus; Thomas Kobus; Kaitlyn Lindenmeyer; Karen
Lindenmeyer; Mark Lindenmeyer; Megan Lindenmeyer; Christopher Makowy; Corey
Makowy; Heather Makowy; Kim Makowy; Rebecca Makowy; William Makowy; Carol
Malstrom; William Malstrom; Allie Mangione; Brian Mangione; Justine Mangione; Taylor
Mangione; Ian Marsico; Jodi Marsico; Kaitlin Marsico; Michael Marsico; Eric Munson;
Georgia Munson; Jeffrey Munson; Leslie Munson; John Murphy; Natalie Murphy; Payton
Murphy; Rosemary Murphy; Christian O’Brien; Christopher O’Brien; Shelby O’Brien;
Kathleen Oursler; Roger Oursler; Betty Over; Sylvester Over; Emily Pagani; Nicholas
Pagani; Rebecca Pagani; Steven Pagani; Andrew Palmer; David Palmer; Geoffrey Palmer;
Kimberly Palmer; Andrew Parker; Charles Parker; James Parker; Kimberly Parker; Bradley
Peters; Cathy Peters; John Peters; Marcus Peters; Jena Pietropaoli; Joseph Pietropaoli; Joseph
Pietropaoli, Jr.; Paulette Pietropaoli; Sheila Pinsch; Mary Prime; William Prime; Brynn
Puller; John Puller; Patricia Puller; Richard Puller; Jerome Rebold; Charles Riegger; Jennifer
Lookingbill (Riegger); Julia Riegger; KatieRose Dobrzykowski (Riegger); Meghen Riegger;
Rochelle Roth; Steven Roth; Barbara Rusinko; John Rusinko; Alexander Scheetz; Arden
Scheetz; Michele Scheetz; Ricky Scheetz; Alfred Schober; Adam Seery; Meghen Seery;
Susan Seery; Thomas Seery; Barbara Sheeler; Donald Sheeler; Anna Marie Simanski;
Chelsea Simanski; Garrett Simanski; James Simanski; Julia Simanski; Charlotte Slaughter;
Emily Slaughter; Kaitlyn Jones (Slaughter); Diann Kohute (Slaughter); Nancy Slaughter;
William Slaughter; William Slaughter, Jr.; Alicia Sullivan; Brendan Sullivan; Brendan
(continued...)
87
of damages for medical monitoring.  We therefore reverse these judgments.77
77(...continued)
Sullivan, Jr.; Emily Sullivan; Amanda Sutor; Austin Sutor; David Sutor; Lynn Sutor;
Alexander Trader; Mary Trader; Matthew Trader; Patrick Rudolph (Trader); Brian Tripp;
Leslie Tripp; Steven Tripp; Timothy Tripp; Christopher Tsakalos; Nicholas Tsakalos;
Triantafilia Tsakalos; David Vaughan; Elliott Gloger (Vaughan); Kieran Vaughan; Terri
Vaughan; Kimberly A. Wachter; James Wachter; Martin R. Wachter; Ryan Wachter; Delores
Whitehurst; Gertrude Whitehurst; Cole Wilhemsen; Hans Wilhelmsen; Hans Wilhelmsen,
III; Kristen Wilhelmsen; Lindsey Williams; Nancy Williams; Owen Williams; Thomas
Williams; Janet Winfield; Jennifer Winfield; Timothy Winfield; Chen-Yu Yen; Ray-Whey
Yen; Christopher Zaccari; Patricia Zaccari; Andrea Zachary; and, Mary Leffell (Zachary).
78These Appellees are: Amy Gumina; Van Ho; Barbara Larrabee; John Larrabee;
Mitchell Larrabee; William Larrabee; Edward Odend’hal; Nanette Odend’hal; Gloria
Quinan; Granville Quinan; Anna Walega; and, John Walega.
79Specifically, Dr. Burns testified to the following:
Q. Did you qualitatively assess the risk faced by individuals in
the Jacksonville area who were exposed or being exposed to
MTBE in terms of whether or not they are at increased risk of
cancer?
(continued...)
88
The remaining Appellees’ potable wells tested at or above the relevant state action
levels for benzene and/or MTBE.78  As we noted above, however, in order for any Appellee
to recover damages for medical monitoring, he or she must present expert testimony
quantifying his or her risk of developing a latent disease.  Specifically, the expert must
indicate a particularized, significantly-increased risk of developing a disease in comparison
to the general public.  Here, in support of their medical monitoring claims, Appellees
presented testimony by medical experts Dr. Kathleen Burns and Dr. Nachman Bratbaur.  Dr.
Burns testified, in effect, that if an individual is exposed to MTBE or benzene in any dosage
or amount, he or she incurs an additional risk of developing cancer.79  Similarly, Dr. Brautbar
79(...continued)
A. Yes.  “Qualitative” means I didn’t assign numbers to people,
but I did look at where there’s going to be increased cancer risk.
If somebody is exposed to MTBE or benzene, they are incurring
additional risk.
***
Q. At what level of exposure in your professional opinion
should individuals be afforded medical monitoring who have
been exposed to MTBE?
A. . . . You know, any level of exposure, whether it’s by dermal
exposure in a shower, inhalation [sic] or ingestion imposes some
risk so any level of exposure of people really requires that they
be[] offered medical monitoring.”
***
Q. Do you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty as to what level of exposure to benzene puts someone
at risk of developing leukemia before the nonexposed person?
A. Any level of exposure to benzene imposes some cancer risk.
80In particular, Dr. Brautbar stated:
Q. Doctor, I want you to assume that there was a 26,000 gallon
gasoline release at the Jacksonville Exxon from January 13th to
February 13th, 2006.  I want you to further assume that it is
more likely than not that all of the Plaintiffs in this case have
been or will be exposed to gasoline constituents, including
MTBE, in the 30 years following the release.  Finally, I want
you to assume that the exposure as a result of that release to
(continued...)
89
opined that plaintiffs exposed to MTBE or benzene contamination in groundwater at greater
levels than that to which they would otherwise be exposed through everyday activities
possessed a significantly increased risk of developing cancer.80
80(...continued)
these individuals and Plaintiffs will be greater than that to which
they would otherwise be exposed.  Assuming all of those to be
true, do you have an opinion based on a reasonable degree of
medical certainty whether those Plaintiffs would have a
significantly increased risk greater than the normal risk all of us
encounter in our everyday lives?
***
Q. Do you have an opinion, Doctor?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And what is that opinion?
A. The opinion is that they will have an increased risk of cancer.
Q.  And how would you characterize the risk, significant?
A. Significantly increased risk of cancer.
Q. What do you mean by significantly increased risk of?
A. Meaning that it is not a theoretical or rhetorical factor.  It is
an actual factor.
90
Such testimony is insufficient to establish that Appellees had a significantly increased
risk of developing cancer as a result of their alleged exposure to MTBE and benzene.
Neither Dr. Brautbar nor Dr. Burns attempted to quantify any individual Appellee’s increased
risk of developing cancer.  Rather, because Dr. Brautbar and Dr. Burns testified under the
assumption that any exposure to MTBE or benzene is unacceptable from a public health
standpoint and increases the risk of developing cancer, they offered no Appellee-specific
testimony.  The level of generalization in this regard presented at trial is insufficient to
81Although this Court has not recognized previously the availability of damages for
medical monitoring, we determine that, because the jury instructions given by Judge Dugan
hew closely to the standards we adopt today, Judge Dugan’s exposition of law relating to
medical monitoring was consistent with this opinion.  Our opinion does not alter the legal
standard as instructed by Judge Dugan, but merely elaborates on the sufficiency of the
evidence needed to create a jury question.  Thus, because the evidence provided by Appellees
at trial was insufficient, considering the legally correct standard enunciated by Judge Dugan,
to create a jury question, reversal (without remand) is appropriate.  
91
establish that the remaining Appellees suffered a significantly increased risk of developing
cancer as a result of their exposure to MTBE and/or benzene as a consequence of the Exxon
leak.  Accordingly, we reverse.81
III. Compensatory Damages for Injury to Real Property
A. The Proper Measure of Compensatory Damages for Injury to Real Property
As noted earlier, we review the trial court’s denial of Exxon’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict to determine whether it was legally correct.  Scapa Dryer
Fabrics, 418 Md. at 503, 16 A.3d at 163.  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded
Appellees damages for injury to real property of three principal types: (1) emotional distress
for fear of property value loss and fear of loss of use and enjoyment; (2) diminution in value,
measured by the difference in value between the day immediately preceding the
announcement of the leak and the day immediately subsequent to the announcement of the
leak; and (3) loss of use and enjoyment for the period spanning from the day immediately
subsequent to the discovery of the leak until the commencement of trial.  Exxon challenges
these awards as contrary to Maryland law, duplicative, speculative, and grossly excessive.
Specifically, Exxon contends that emotional distress damages for fear of injury to property
92
is not compensable, that Appellees’ recovery of damages for both diminution in value and
past loss of use and enjoyment constitutes impermissible double compensation, that awards
to Appellees not experiencing well contamination were improper and speculative, and that
the jury awards were excessive and based on inadmissible expert testimony.
1.  Appellees May Not Recover Emotional Distress Damages 
For Injury to Real Property
The jury awarded approximately one hundred and ninety-five Appellees emotional
distress damages for fear of loss of property value and fear of loss of use and enjoyment.
Exxon contends that these awards were impermissible.  Exxon advances principally three
alternative arguments in support of its contention.  First, Exxon argues that, in the absence
of actionable fraud, Appellees cannot recover for emotional distress as a result of property
damage.  In the alternative, Exxon maintains that, even if Appellees proved actionable fraud,
the emotional distress awards should be reversed as duplicative of the loss of use and
enjoyment awards.  Lastly, Exxon argues that, of those Appellees recovering damages for
emotional distress for fear of loss of property value, approximately one hundred and eighteen
did not provide testimony at trial supporting their emotional distress claims. 
We need not reach the latter contentions.  Ordinarily, as Judge James Eyler of the
Court of Special Appeals noted in Ford, in the absence of fraud, malice, or like motives,
“emotional distress attendant to property damage is not compensable.”  Ford, 204 Md. App.
at 101, 40 A.3d at 573 (J. Eyler, J., concurring and dissenting in part).  See also H & R Block,
Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 48–49, 338 A.2d 48, 55 (1975) (stating that “Maryland
decisions have generally denied compensation for mental anguish resulting from damage to
82As noted earlier, Judge Dugan granted Exxon’s Motion for Judgment Motion for
Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims for Punitive Damages based on Allegations of Evil Motive,
Ill Will, or Intent to Injure.  Thus, because Judge Dugan determined as a matter of law that
Appellees could not establish malice or evil intent sufficient to support a finding of punitive
damages, Appellees similarly may not recover emotional distress damages related to injury
to real property on the basis of evil motive, ill will, or intent to injure. 
83The awards being reversed are as to the following Appellees: Susan Allison; Jeanne
Andrews; Richard Andrews; Annette Armstrong; John Armstrong; David Austin; Emily
Austin; Ryan Backus; Shelly Backus; Tracy Blum; Florence Brock; Ellen Brookhart; Ronald
Brookhart; Margaret Brown; Ronald Bueche; Terry Bueche; Louise Bull; Adriane Burke;
Lloyd Burke; Bari Jo Burnett; Philip Capron; Susan Capron; Philip Carbone; Joan Clark;
Lloyd Clark; Michael Cole; Frederick Craig; Rosina Craig; Phillip Diedeman; Susan
Diedeman; Dana Rhyne Dieter; Patricia Dieter; Paul DiPino, Jr.; Sharon Dorsch; William
Dorsch; Robert Dyer; Teresa Dyer; Christopher Easton; Monique Easton; Carl Eisgruber;
Lynn Eisgruber; Bruce Elliott; Ellison Ensor; Edward Fletcher; Regina Fletcher; Clever
Fonseca; Denise Fonseca; Franklin Fontanazza; Gina Fontanazza; Paul Freas; Eugene
Freeman; Pearlie Freeman; Ann Fuller; Debra Gillespie; Thomas Gillespie, Jr.; Charlene
Glatfelter; Curtis Glatfelter; Mary Pat Goodhues; George Gribble; Marjorie Gribble; Alicia
Grogan; David Grogan; Jeanette Hairston; Walter Hairston; Virginia Hannibal; Richard
Higgins; Heather Huey; Michael Huey; Jeffrey Hummel; Richard Hyman; Almarie Ianuly;
Paul Ianuly; James Kelly; Kenneth Kelly; Stephanie Kelly; Margaret Kennedy; Mark
Kirkwood; Nancy Pugliese (Kirkwood); Dale Knapp; James Knapp; Kimberly Kobus;
Thomas Kobus; Barbara Larrabee; John Larrabee; Donna Lawrence; Robert Lazzaro; Karen
Lindenmeyer; Mark Lindenmeyer; Kim Makowy; William Makowy; Carol Malstrom;
William Malstrom; Brian Mangione; Justine Mangione; Jodi Marsico; Michael Marsico;
John Matra; Mary Matra; Kirk McCleary; Mary McCleary; Denise Moss; Jeffrey Munson;
Leslie Munson; John Murphy; Rosemary Murphy; Gregory Naylor; Susan Naylor; Donald
Nemer; Kelli Nemer; Christian O’Brien; Christopher O’Brien; Joanne O’Connell; Edward
Odend’hal; Nanette Odend’hal; Kathleen Oursler; Roger Oursler; Betty Over; Sylvester
(continued...)
93
property”); Zeigler v. F. Street Corp., 248 Md. 223, 226, 236 A.2d 703, 705 (1967) (noting
that emotional distress damages attendant to injury to property may be recovered only where
there is fraud or malice).  Because, as we explained supra, we reverse the fraud award in this
case,82 the emotional distress damages related to fear of loss of property value alleged by
Appellees are not compensable as a matter of law, and the awards are therefore reversed.83
83(...continued)
Over; Rebecca Pagani; Steven Pagani; David Palmer; Kimberly Palmer; Charles Parker;
Kimberly Parker; Cathy Gay-Peters; Marcus Peters; Joseph Pinsch; Anita Podles; Thomas
Podles; Cynthia Popomaronis; William Popomaronis; Mary Prime; William Prime; Mary
Kathryn Proefrock; Scott Proefrock; Patricia Puller; Richard Puller; Gloria Quinan; Jeff
Reckseit (awarded to landlord Hans Wilhelmsen); Charles Riegger; Julia Riegger; Rochelle
Roth; Steven Roth; Edna Rudell; Paul Rudell; Richard Rudell; John Rusinko; Ellaine Saeva;
Michele Scheetz; Ricky Scheetz; Joseph Schmitz; Susan Schmitz; Susan Seery; Thomas
Seery; Ernest Sessa; Barbara Sheeler; Donald Sheeler; Anna Marie Simanski; William
Slaughter; John Stehman; Theresa Stehman; Bruce Stumpp; Norma Stumpp; Brendan
Sullivan; Emily Sullivan; David Sutor; Lynn Sutor; Chester Tokarski; Marilyn Tokarski;
Mary Trader; Christopher Tsakalos; Triantafilia Tsakalos; David Vaughan; Terri Vaughan;
Ernest Viscuso; Lisa Viscuso; Man A. Vuong; Stacy Vuong; Kimberly A. Wachter; Martin
R. Wachter; Anna Walega; Nancy Welms; Christy Whaley; Neil Whaley; Hans Wilhelmsen;
Kristen Wilhelmsen; Nancy Williams; Thomas Williams; Jean Wimmer; Paul Wimmer;
Chen-Yu Yen; Ray-Whey Yen; Andrea Zachary; Mary Leffell (Zachary); and, Christopher
Garliss. 
84The parties characterize differently the loss of use and enjoyment damages awarded
by the jury.   Exxon refers in its brief to these awards as damages for prospective loss of
enjoyment, presumably because its primary contention is that these damages were incurred
prospectively from the date of valuation of property and thus are subsumed in its market
value.  By contrast, Appellees refer to these damages as past loss of use and enjoyment,
presumably because the trial court determined that damages for prospective loss of use and
(continued...)
94
2. Appellees May Recover Damages for Diminution in Value Only
The jury awarded to Appellees, in many instances, damages for both diminution in
property value and past loss of use and enjoyment of real property, over Exxon’s objection.
Prior to trial, Judge Dugan required Appellees to elect between pursuit of damages for
diminution in value and prospective loss of use and enjoyment, noting that the forms of relief
are duplicative. Appellees elected to pursue damages for diminution in value of real property,
rather than prospective loss of use and enjoyment.  In addition, however, Judge Dugan
permitted Appellees to seek damages for past loss of use and enjoyment,84 measured as
84(...continued)
enjoyment and diminution in value are duplicative.  For purposes of simplicity and
consistency with the trial court’s characterization of these damages, we will refer to the loss
of use and enjoyment damages awarded by the jury for the period between when the harm
first occurred and the commencement of trial as damages for “past loss of use and
enjoyment.”
95
damages for loss of use and enjoyment incurred between the date of the discovery of the leak
and the commencement of trial.
Exxon contends that the awards for past loss of use and enjoyment are duplicative of
(and subsumed by) the awards for diminution in value, and therefore the trial court erred in
permitting recovery of both.  Because diminution in value of real property, measured on the
date the leak was discovered, encompasses necessarily the lost use and enjoyment of that real
property suffered by the property owner from that date forward, Exxon contends that there
remains no period of time for which Appellees are eligible for lost use and enjoyment
damages.  Moreover, Exxon avers that, even if Appellees were entitled to receive both types
of damages, the awards for loss of use and enjoyment are excessive because they, in
conjunction with the diminution in value damages, exceeded frequently the unimpaired value
of the real property.  In retort, Appellees contend that their recovery of damages for
diminution in value, in addition to past loss of use and enjoyment for the period between the
announcement of the leak and the commencement of trial, is consistent with Maryland law.
Such an award is neither duplicative nor excessive, as Appellees see it, because the right to
use and enjoy one’s property exists as a compensable element, independent of the monetary
value of real property.
85Generally, diminution in value damages are available only where the injury to real
property is permanent.  Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 285 Md. 673, 682, 404 A.2d
1064, 1068 (1979). Here, the trial court did not determine expressly that the injury to
Appellees’ property was permanent in nature, although Appellees’ expert, Dr. John
Kilpatrick, based his valuation opinion upon the assumption that the well water
contamination was permanent.  Because Appellees elected to proceed to trial claiming
damages for diminution in value, rather than prospective loss of use and enjoyment, and no
party has raised on appeal the issue of the propriety of awarding damages for diminution in
value, we assume, without deciding, that the injury to land here is permanent.
Because damages for permanent injury to real property are generally available only
to the owners of real property, see Peters v. Contigroup, 292 S.W.3d 380, 389 (Mo. Ct. App.
2009) (noting that, because “damages for a permanent nuisance involve the diminution in
value of the property[,] . . . one seeking damages for a permanent nuisance must have a
property interest”); In re the Premcor Refining Grp., Inc., 233 S.W.3d 904, 908–09 (Tex.
App. 2007) (dismissing the claims of minor plaintiffs, adult next friends, and adult plaintiffs
who were not “record owners of the real property at the time the initial injury [constituting
a permanent nuisance] to the real property occurred”), awards for loss of use and enjoyment
to children and non-owner occupiers of the land therefore are reversed.
Thus, the loss of use and enjoyment awards are reversed as to the following
Appellees:  Agniezka Hudzik (Allison); Eric Allison; Kristen Allison; Caitlin Andrews;
Daniel Andrews; Ian Austin; Reid Austin; Emily Backus; Alex Blum; Madelyn Blum;
Ashley Brookhart; Sean Brookhart; Victoria Brookhart; Tara Brown; John Wright
(Bull/Wright); Amanda Buscemi; Cari Cheelsman (Buscemi); Charles Cheelsman (Buscemi);
Karen Buscemi; Mary Buscemi; Rachel Buscemi; Adriana Capizzi; Francesca Capizzi; Julia
Capizzi; Maria Navarro-Cole; Dominique DiPino; Francesca DiPino; Gina DiPino; Joseph
DiPino; Paul DiPino, III; Alissa Dutrow; Emily Dutrow; Sarah Dyer; Brian Easton; David
Easton; Michael Easton; James Turfler (Eisgruber); Emily Federico; Grace Federico; Kevin
Federico; Sarah Fletcher; Zachary Fletcher; Bruna Fonseca; Maira Fonseca; Tiago Fonseca;
Gia Fontanazza; Anthony Frattarola; Marianne Frattarola; Victoria Frattarola; Alexandra
Freas; James Freas; Eugene Freeman (individually); Pearlie Freeman (individually); Kevin
Gillespie; Tara Gillespie; Thomas Gillespie, III; Gavin Grogan; Linda Hairston-Taulton;
Allison Higgins; John Higgins; Patrick Higgins; Brendan Huey; Shannon Huey; Lauryn
(continued...)
96
Assuming that the trial court required properly Appellees to elect between pursuing
either diminution in value or prospective loss of use and enjoyment damages, and Appellees
were in fact entitled to receive damages for diminution in value,85 the trial court erred in later
85(...continued)
Kelly; Michele Kelly; Kathleen Kennedy; Calvin Kirkwood; Chase Kirkwood; Jeremy
Kirkwood; Tyler Kirkwood; Mitchell Larrabee; William Larrabee; Kristen Lawrence;
Jennifer Lazzaro; Susan Lazzaro; Kaitlyn Lindenmeyer; Megan Lindenmeyer; Christopher
Makowy; Corey Makowy; Heather Makowy; Rebecca Makowy; Alexander Makris; Eleni
Makris; Allie Mangione; Taylor Mangione; Ian Marsico; Kaitlin Marsico; Kelly McCleary;
Leigh Morgan; R. Wade Morgan; Catherine Moss; Natalie Murphy; Payton Murphy;
Gregory Naylor, Jr.; Kenneth Naylor; Tracy Naylor; Alexandra Nemer; Emmanuel Nemer;
Shelby O’Brien; Emily Pagani; Nicholas Pagani; Andrew Palmer; Geoffrey Palmer; Andrew
Parker; James Parker; Bradley Peters; John Peters; Andrew Podles; Claire Podles; John
Podles; Thomas Podles, Jr.; Anna Popomaronis; Eleni Popomaronis; Peter Vailas
(Popomaronis); Thomas Popomaronis; Casey Proefrock; John Proefrock; Kate Proefrock;
Megan Proefrock; Brynn Puller; John Puller; Jennifer Riegger; KatieRose Riegger; Meghen
Riegger; Mary Judith Rudell; Alexander Scheetz; Arden Scheetz; Marah Schmitz; Adam
Seery; Meghen Seery; Allison Shields; Erin Shields; Kevin Shields; Chelsea Simanski;
Garrett Simanski; Julia Simanski; Charlotte Slaughter; Diann Kohute (Slaughter); Emily
Slaughter; Kaitlyn Jones (Slaughter); Nancy Slaughter; William Slaughter, Jr.; Alyssa
Stehman; Jonathon Stehman; Marina Stehman; Sierra Stehman; Alicia Sullivan; Brendan
Sullivan, Jr.; Amanda Sutor; Austin Sutor; Alexander Trader; Matthew Trader; Patrick
Trader; Brian Tripp; Steven Tripp; Nicholas Tsakalos; Elliott Gloger (Vaughan); Kieran
Vaughan; Francesca Viscuso; Gabrielle Viscuso; Nicole Viscuso; Chase Vosvick; Tanner
Visvoci; Amy Vuong; Krystal Vuong; Shuzhen Vuong; Sinh Vuong; Jack Wachter; Ryan
Wachter; Megan Welms; Delores Whitehurst; Gertrude McNicholas (Whitehurst); Cole
Wilhelmsen; Hans Wilhelmsen III; Lindsey Williams; Owen Williams; and, Jennifer
Winfield.
As explained below, Exxon admitted liability for some compensatory damages to
Appellee Van Ho.  Because Ms. Ho is a lessee, she did not claim, and is not entitled to
recover, damages for diminution in value of the real property she leased.  Because Exxon
admitted liability to Ms. Ho, however, she may recover damages for loss of use and
enjoyment as a lessee, and not an owner, of the real property at issue in this case.  As
explained below, we will reverse and direct remand for a new trial as to the loss of use and
enjoyment award to Ms. Ho. 
97
permitting Appellees to recover damages for both diminution in value and past loss of use
and enjoyment.  Compensatory damages should be “precisely commensurate with the injury;
nothing more, nor less.”  Baltimore Belt R.R. Co. v. Sattler, 102 Md. 595, 601, 62 A. 1125,
1127 (1906).  Thus, “the general principle upon which compensation for injuries to real
98
property is given is that the plaintiff shall be reimbursed to the extent of his injury.”  Id.
(quoting Redemptorists v. Wenig, 79 Md. 348, 355, 29 A. 667, 668 (1894)).  Plaintiffs are
entitled to “but one compensation,” and thus may not recover twice for the same injury.
Mayor & City Council of Havre de Grace v. Maxa, 177 Md. 168, 182, 9 A.2d 235, 242
(1939).
Compensation for injury to real property is dependent generally upon the character
of the harm.  See, e.g., Hall v. Lovell Regency Homes Ltd. P’ship, 121 Md. App. 1, 23–24,
708 A.2d 344, 355 (1998) (noting that permanent harm to property is measured properly by
the permanent diminution in the property’s value, while temporary harm may be measured
by the decrease in the value of the property’s use and enjoyment or by the cost of restoring
the property to its unimpaired state).  Diminution in value of real property is available
generally as the remedy for damages in actions where the injury to real property is permanent
in nature. Goldstein v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 285 Md. 673, 682, 404 A.2d 1064, 1068
(1979).  In addition to damages for permanent diminution in value of real property, an
individual whose real property has suffered permanent injury may also recover the loss in the
“usable value” of his property and any consequential damages incurred, provided that neither
is encompassed within the diminution in value.  See Maxa, 177 Md. at 182–83, 9 A.2d at 242
(permitting a property owner to collect damages for diminution in value as a result of his
property’s loss of water access, in addition to the consequential damages incurred by plaintiff
for having to store his boat in an alternate location); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929
Cmt. d (noting that a plaintiff may recover loss of use and enjoyment damages, in addition
86Maryland law requires sellers of real property to disclose any latent defects of which
he or she has actual knowledge.  See Md. Code (1974, 2010 Repl. Vol.), Real Property
Article § 10-702.  As the trial court instructed the jury, “[u]nder Maryland law, a seller of
real property has a duty to disclose any latent defects of which he or she has actual
(continued...)
99
to diminution in value, provided that the loss of use and enjoyment award is not encompassed
within the diminution in value of the real property). 
Diminution in value damages are appropriate where the injury is considered
permanent because such damages compensate presumably the property owner fully for the
injury to his or her land and improvements.  Damages for diminution in value are determined
by calculating the difference between the fair market value of the property immediately
preceding the harm and the fair market value of the property immediately following the
harm.  The fair market value of property in Maryland is generally the “price as of the
valuation date for the highest and best use of the property which a [seller], willing but not
obligated to sell, would accept for the property, and which a purchaser, willing but not
obligated to buy, would pay . . . .” Md. Code Ann. (1974, 2010 Repl. Vol.) § 12-105(b) of
the Real Property Article; see also Pumphrey v. State Roads Comm’n, 175 Md. 498, 506, 2
A.2d 668, 671 (1938) (“Market value is defined as the price which an owner willing but not
obliged to sell would accept for the property and which a buyer willing but not obliged to
buy would pay therefor.”).  
The definition of fair market value suggests that an agreement as to price between the
prospective buyer and prospective seller necessarily takes into account any known defects
or deleterious conditions in the property.86  Here, for example, fair market value as
86(...continued)
knowledge that a purchaser would not reasonably be expected to ascertain by a careful visual
inspection and that would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the purchaser or an
occupant.  The seller must disclose, among other things, any latent defects in the ‘source of
household water’ and any issues related to ‘hazardous materials’.”
87Indeed, Appellees who purchased their properties in the vicinity of the strike line
radius subsequent to 16 February 2006 acknowledged that they knew about the leak prior to
closing, yet opted to complete the sale, in some instances even signing a written statement
acknowledging their knowledge of the leak.  
88Thus, Appellees who purchased their homes or business properties following the
announcement of the leak presumably did so at a depreciated value, and are therefore
ineligible to receive damages for either diminution in value or loss of use and enjoyment.
These Appellees include the Hartmans (Laura and Michael), Cheryl Howells, and the
Vosvicks (Chase, David II, Deedra, and Tanner).  Exxon contends that the verdicts for the
Hueys, Nemers, and Proefrocks should be reversed also on these grounds.  These Appellees
entered into contracts to buy homes in the Jacksonville community prior to announcement
of the leak, but did not go to settlement until after the discovery of the leak.  We do not
believe that these Appellees’ awards for injury to property should be reversed simply because
(continued...)
100
determined immediately after public announcement of the gasoline leak would rely
necessarily on the highest and best price that a willing purchaser would pay – and thus,
would consider presumably not only the features of the individual property, but also, among
other things, the existence of a nearby underground gasoline leak, the reliance of the property
on well water, the likelihood of ongoing and future remediation activities and potential
resulting disturbances, and the possibility that the tap water may be inappropriate or
undesirable for consumption or other normal household or business use.87  Because fair
market value as determined immediately following the announcement of the gasoline leak
would take presumably these factors into account prospectively, these inconveniences
constitute, for Appellees, part of the permanent diminution in value of their properties.88
88(...continued)
they did not proceed to closing until after the leak was discovered.  Rather, because they
entered into contracts for sale prior to discovery of the leak, they paid presumably the pre-
leak, unimpaired values for their homes, and thus, barring any other grounds for reversal,
would be eligible for damages for diminution in value of real property only (as explained
herein).
101
Owners of real property, however, are not precluded necessarily from recovering both
permanent diminution in value and loss of use and enjoyment damages, see Maxa, 177 Md.
at 182–83, 9 A.2d at 242, provided that the injuries for which recovery is sought do not
overlap, so as to result in duplicative compensation. See id.; Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 929 Cmt. d.  Appellees claim that, in addition to diminution in value, they are entitled to
recoup damages for injury to property as past loss of use and enjoyment for the period
spanning from the date of the injury through the commencement of the trial.  To permit
Appellees to recover for these injuries, as a measure of the loss in monetary value of their
home, as well as in past loss of use and enjoyment is, however, to permit recovery twice for
the same injury on the record of this case.
In  Mayor & City Council of Havre de Grace v. Maxa, we considered whether an
individual suffering permanent injury to property by virtue of a town dredging improperly
fill material and depositing it onto his property (cutting off his water frontage and access)
could recover damages for loss of “usable value” in addition to diminution in market value.
177 Md. at 182–83, 9 A.2d at 242.  Noting that an individual may not recover twice for the
same injury, but that an individual is entitled to “complete” compensation, we permitted
recovery of damages for loss in market value as well as loss in “usable value.”  Id.  We
102
defined “usable value” as “the personal enjoyment and use by the plaintiffs as occupiers of
the premises, independently of the difference in market value.”  Id. at 182, 9 A.2d at 242.
In Maxa, the plaintiff was permitted to recover, as loss in “usable value,” boat storage and
wharfage fees, which constituted an additional expense that the plaintiff was forced to bear
in order to obtain the same benefit from his property from what he was deprived of by the
defendant’s conduct.  Thus, the plaintiff recovered damages for diminution in value, as well
as loss of use and enjoyment in the form of consequential damages – as an additional expense
incurred by the plaintiff as a direct result of the defendant’s tortious conduct.
In Hall v. Lovell Regency Homes, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the
plaintiffs could not recover both diminution in value and loss of use and enjoyment damages,
based on breach of contract, caused by drainage problems left behind by their builder’s
construction of the subdivision and their homes.  121 Md. App. at 25, 708 A.2d at 356.  The
plaintiff homeowners in Hall sought damages for diminution in value as a result of damage
done essentially to their basements, as well as loss of use and enjoyment based on the
following: 
The type of loss that they can’t use their basements.  Its [sic] the
type of loss that they have a lot of tension between the spouse
and the husband.  They don’t enjoy their home when they walk
in there and think about what the fungus might be in the
basement or think about in a few months when the winter comes
the water table is coming up again, that they don’t enjoy being
there.
Id.  Because the alleged loss of use and enjoyment was, in effect, the same as the condition
that diminished the market value of their properties, the court determined that “[t]he damages
89We assume, without deciding, that the testimony offered in support of Appellees’
claims for loss of use and enjoyment was appropriate to that purpose.  As Judge James Eyler
recognized in Ford, however, a plaintiff may not circumvent the prohibition against the
recovery of emotional distress awards relating to property damage by cloaking his or her
emotional distress claim as a claim for loss of use and enjoyment of property.  204 Md. App.
at 103, 40 A.3d at 574 (J. Eyler, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (citing Hall v. Lovell
Regency Homes, 121 Md. App. 1, 26, 708 A.2d 344, 356 (1998)).
103
the homeowners were seeking for the loss of use of their basements (and their yards) were
subsumed in and were not distinguishable from the damages that they were seeking for loss
in fair market value of their properties.” Id. 
Although Appellees’ claims differ qualitatively from those in Hall, in that Appellees
suffered injury as a result of Exxon’s tortious, rather than contractual, wrongdoing, the
principle set forth in both Hall and Maxa applies to the present case.  Appellees may not
recover twice for the same injury.  Testimony by Appellees reveals that their claims for loss
of use and enjoyment revolve largely around their inability to use their well water for
customary purposes and the emotional toll and stress attendant to such a disruption.89
Specifically, Appellees noted that they reduced their outdoor activities, including gardening
and swimming, reduced the frequency and length of showers and baths, entertained less or
worried about potential contamination impacting visitors, drank bottled water, and endured
noise and other disturbance emanating from the remediation activities.  We fail to see,
however, how the injury alleged is distinguishable from the injury constituting the diminution
in value.
Unlike the plaintiff in Maxa, who recovered consequential damages for loss of use and
enjoyment resulting from his payment for alternative boat storage charges – a defined
90Exxon cites Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. CAE-Link Corp., 330 Md.
115, 622 A.2d 745 (1993) (“WSSC”), for the proposition that loss of use and enjoyment and
diminution in value damages are necessarily duplicative remedies.  Exxon’s reliance on
WSSC is mistaken, however.  In WSSC, we considered whether damages for inverse
condemnation, calculated under both the common law and the statutory method, could be
recovered for the same injury.  Id. at 149–52, 622 A.2d at 762–63.  We determined that,
because both measures of damages sought to achieve the same goal, they were necessarily
duplicative and thus could not both be recovered.  Id. at 151–52, 622 A.2d at 763 (citing
Brannon v. State Roads Comm’n, 305 Md. 793, 799, 506 A.2d 634, 637–38 (1986)).  Here,
however, Appellees did not assert both a common law and a statutory remedy, but rather two,
permissible, common law methods of calculating damages.  Thus, any analogy sought to be
drawn between WSSC and the present case fails.
104
expense caused directly by the defendant and not encompassed necessarily within the value
and expected use of the home itself – the contentions here are, like in Hall, largely subsumed
within the claim for diminution in market value.90  Appellees allege loss of use and
enjoyment due to their inability to use their water, but their homes are diminished in value
precisely because their water is contaminated, where evidence supports that conclusion, and
the property’s use is therefore circumscribed.  Appellees argue that noise from remediation
activities disturbed their use and enjoyment, but such activities, too, diminished the market
value of their property.  Thus, their alleged loss of use and enjoyment damages are “not
distinguishable from” and “subsumed in” their claim for diminution in value, and
presumably, the impaired market values of their respective homes reflects the injury.  Thus,
to the extent that Appellees pleaded and proved at trial an incidental cost that they were
forced to bear to obtain or regain a benefit provided previously to them by their property,
akin to the boat storage and wharfage charges incurred by the plaintiff in Maxa, such
91Some Appellees with businesses were allocated damages for out-of-pocket expenses
by the jury.  It does not appear, however, that the residential Appellees claimed recovery of
costs for the installation and maintenance of POET systems or the purchase of bottled water,
which, provided that causation was proved sufficiently, may have been recoverable under
Maxa. Although the proposed versions of the verdict sheets offered by Appellees’ counsel
appear to indicate the possibility that some Appellees could recover out of pocket expenses
if alleged, and some Appellees testified regarding the costs of such out-of-pocket
expenditures, the Appellee-specific verdict sheets sent to the jury did not provide an option
for the jury to allocate damages for out-of-pocket expenses.  As a result, damages were
therefore not allocated thusly and it appears that no residential Appellee sought out-of-pocket
expenses for POET systems and bottled water. 
92These Appellee-owned properties include the following Appellee families or
businesses: Allison; Austin; Bateman; Blum; Brown; Bull/Wright; Burke; Burnett; Capizzi;
Capron; Clark; Dorsch; Dutrow; Easton; Elliott; Federico; Fonseca; Frattarola; Fuller;
(continued...)
105
damages would be recoverable.91  In the absence of such proof, however, Appellees are not
entitled to any damages for loss of use and enjoyment.  Allowing Appellees to recover both,
then, constitutes an impermissible double recovery.  Because Appellees elected at trial to
pursue damages for diminution in value, we therefore reverse the trial court’s award of
damages for loss of use and enjoyment of real property to all Appellees who pursued
damages for both diminution in value and loss of use and enjoyment.  Thus, we need not
consider whether the damages awarded by the jury for past loss of use and enjoyment are
excessive. 
3. Plaintiffs With No Detected Contamination May Not 
Recover Property Damages
The potable wells on the properties of approximately sixty-five Appellees or Appellee
families did not test positive for either benzene or MTBE contamination as of the time of
trial.92    Nonetheless, these Appellees recovered property damages stemming from the leak,
92(...continued)
Goodhues; Hartman;  Howells; Huey; Hyman; Kenneth & Stephanie Kelly; Kennedy; King;
Kirkwood/Pugliese; Koerner; Lawrence; Lazzaro; Makris; Matra; McCleary; Morgan; Moss;
Naughton; Naylor; Nemer; Joanne O’Connell; Podles; Popomaronis; Proefrock; Jeff Reckseit
(Wilhelmsen property); Edna Rudell; Paul Rudell; Richard Rudell; Saeva; Schmitz; Sessa;
Shields; Stehman; Stumpp; Tokarski; Viscuso; Vosvick; Vuong; Welms; Whaley;
Wilhelmsen (properties located at 13707, 13729, and 13821 Jarrettsville Pike); Wimmer;
Christopher Garliss/Highpoint Homebuilders, Inc.; 14342 Jarrettsville Pike, LLC; and, 3422
Sweet Air Road, LLC.
Of these Appellees, Exxon admitted liability for negligence, trespass, nuisance, and
strict liability to the following: Allison, Stehman, Vuong, Welms, and 3422 Sweet Air Road,
LLC.  Because Exxon admitted liability to these Appellees, they are excluded from this
discussion and may recover damages for diminution in value to real property, even though
their properties never tested positive for contamination.
106
predicated on expert testimony produced at trial predicting probable or possible
contamination appearing during the next thirty years based on the prevailing hydrogeology
of the region.  Exxon argues primarily that the expert testimony predicting the flow of
contamination over the next thirty years was speculative, and thus should not have been
admitted.  Alternatively, Exxon argues that, despite this expert testimony, in the absence of
present proof of contamination, these Appellees may not recover property damages because
they cannot satisfy the elements necessary to maintain a cause of action in negligence,
nuisance, trespass, or strict liability and prove legal injury.  By contrast, Appellees contend
that the trial court properly awarded damages to the “non-detect” Appellees because the
general contamination of the aquifer from which Appellees draw their water constitutes a
substantial interference with a property interest.  We consider each of the four theories
asserted by Appellees for recovery for damage to property – trespass, nuisance, strict liability
for abnormally dangerous activities, and negligence – to determine whether the non-detect
93All of the Appellees listed at supra n.92 claimed damages for diminution in value,
with the exception of the Viscuso family, who claimed damages for loss of use and
enjoyment only.
107
Appellees may recover damages for injury to real property.93
a. Trespass
Appellees contend that the mere existence of any contamination in the aquifer from
which the non-detect Appellees draw their water permits the non-detect Appellees to recover
damages for injury to property on a theory of trespass, by virtue of the potential for future
detected contamination.  Appellees are mistaken.  An action for trespass may lie “[w]hen a
defendant interferes with a plaintiff’s interest in the exclusive possession of the land by
entering or causing something to enter the land.”  Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md.
58,  78, 642 A.2d 180, 189 (1994).  Thus, recovery for trespass requires that the defendant
must have entered or caused something harmful or noxious to enter onto the plaintiff’s land.
See, e.g., Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 176 Md. 197, 205–06, 4 A.2d 757, 761–62
(1939) (noting that because the premises of the plaintiffs was not physically invaded, an
action in trespass cannot lie).  Here, the non-detect Appellees failed to demonstrate any
physical intrusion of their land.  General contamination of an aquifer that may or may not
reach a given Appellee’s property at an undetermined point in the future is not sufficient to
prove invasion of property.  Thus, the non-detect Appellees could not recover, at the time of
trial, damages for diminution in value of property based on a theory of trespass. 
b. Nuisance
Exxon contends that the non-detect Appellees may not recover damages for
108
diminution in value under a theory of nuisance because the interference with their properties
is not substantial.  A cause of action for nuisance does not require present proof of
contamination.  See Yarema, 69 Md. App. at 147–49, 515 A.2d at 1003–04.  Private nuisance
is “a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”
Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conf. Ass’n, 421 Md. 355, 374, 26 A.3d 931, 943 (2011) (quoting
Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 80, 642 A.2d at 190 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §
821D)).  Not every interference with a plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of land, however, will
support a cause of action for nuisance.  WSSC, 330 Md. at 143, 662 A.2d at 749 (citing
Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123, 126 (1873)).  See Wietzke, 421 Md. at 382–83, 26 A.3d at
948 (noting that a finding of nuisance involves “a balance of the competing property interests
at stake”).  To succeed on a nuisance claim, a plaintiff must establish an unreasonable and
substantial interference with his or her use and enjoyment of his or her property, such that
the injury is “of such a character as to diminish materially the value of the property as a
dwelling . . . and seriously interfere with the ordinary comfort and enjoyment of it.”  WSSC,
330 Md. at 143–44, 662 A.2d at 759 (quoting Slaird v. Klewers, 260 Md. 2, 9, 271 A.2d 345,
348 (1970)).
In Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, the Court of Special Appeals considered whether property
owners, who had not demonstrated any physical injury to property from contamination
resulting from a gasoline leak, could recover in nuisance despite the absence of tangible or
physical harm.  69 Md. App. 124, 515 A.2d 990.  Noting that Maryland courts permitted
recovery for nuisance resulting from the intangible emanation of sound, see, e.g., Gorman
109
v. Sabo, 210 Md. 155, 122 A.2d 475 (1956); Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc. v. Albert,
173 Md. 641, 197 A. 146 (1938), and the threat of future harm related to nearby storage of
explosives, see Hendrickson v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Md. 577, 95 A. 153 (1915), the court
determined that the gravamen of a nuisance claim rests not on a tangible invasion of
property, but rather on the disturbance and interference in use and enjoyment of property
resulting from a defendant’s actions.  Yarema, 69 Md. App. at 147–49, 516 A.2d at 1003–04.
In so holding, the Yarema court emphasized that, despite there being no requirement to
demosntrate physical injury, a plaintiff must show nonetheless that the defendant’s
interference with the plaintiff’s property rights, tangible or intangible, is substantial in order
to recover for nuisance.  Id. at 151–52, 516 A.2d at 1004.  Thus, mere diminution of property
value, in the absence of a demonstrable tortious injury, is not sufficient to support a cause of
action for nuisance.  Id. at 151, 516 A.2d at 1004.
In order to get to the jury on their claimed cause of action in nuisance, therefore,
Appellees without demonstrable contamination were obliged to establish that Exxon’s
tortious actions unreasonably and substantially interfered with their use and enjoyment of
their properties.  In Yarema, the court determined that the property owners demonstrated a
substantial interference due to the “crippling restrictions” imposed on the property owners
by Baltimore County government officials.  69 Md. App. at 153, 516 A.2d at 1005.
Specifically, owners of contaminated and surrounding non-contaminated properties were
forbidden from using their water, constructing homes, or selling their land.  Id.  Thus, the
Yarema court distinguished the plaintiffs’ injury from cases in which only the reputation of
110
the plaintiffs’ land was harmed as a result of the defendant’s actions, see, e.g., McGaw v.
Harrison, 259 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Ky. 1953) (a cemetery did not constitute a nuisance “merely
because it is a constant reminder of death and has a depressing influence on the minds of
persons who observe it, or because it tends to depreciate the value of property in the
neighborhood, or is offensive to the aesthetic sense of the adjoining proprietor”); Gray v.
Southern Facilities, Inc., 183 S.E.2d 438, 445 (S.C. 1971) (no recovery for nuisance when
the “claim for damages is predicated upon an asserted diminution in market value resulting,
not from any physical injury, but from a psychological factor, in that prospective buyers
allegedly would be reluctant to purchase the property due to the fear of a similar occurrence
in the future”).  Yarema, 69 Md. App. at 152–53, 516 A.2d at 1004–05.
Here, however, although there is no dispute that any interference with Appellees’
properties by Exxon was unreasonable, there is little to suggest that Appellees with non-
detect results experienced a substantial interference.  Unlike the plaintiffs in Yarema, the
gravamen of Appellees’ complaints consist largely of relatively minor disturbances and
stigma impacts that are not comparable to the severe restrictions placed on the Yarema
plaintiffs.  Although interference with the use and enjoyment of property, in the absence of
physical impact, need not rise necessarily to the level of the restrictions in Yarema to
constitute a nuisance, the disturbances reported in this case fall well on the opposite end of
the continuum and are insufficient to maintain a nuisance action.  For example, most non-
detect Appellees complain primarily of using bottled water or Brita filters, entertaining in and
about their homes less than expected, reducing the frequency of use of outdoor spaces, and
111
taking shorter showers and baths.  Such Appellees were not deprived, however, of the use
of significant portions of their property, nor was the availability of their properties for their
customary uses impaired substantially.
Moreover, Appellees’ adjustments in the use of their properties appear to derive not
from Exxon’s actual interference with their property, but rather from their fear of
contamination and its possible impacts.  In order to recover for nuisance, however, a plaintiff
must establish that any adjustments he, she or it makes in the use of his, her, or its property
as a result of the defendant’s tortious conduct are objectively reasonable.  See, e.g., Gorman,
210 Md. at 159, 122 A.2d at 477 (noting that, to recover for nuisance, the disturbance alleged
must be “offensive or inconvenient to the normal person”).  As noted above in our discussion
of fear of contracting cancer, however, these Appellees’ fear of future contamination and
resultant effects thus far is not objectively reasonable.  They have no detected contamination,
nor been advised that their water is unsafe for use.  Unlike the plaintiffs in Yarema,
Appellees have not received communication from governmental entities that would lead them
to believe reasonably that alteration of water use is necessary to protect their health.  Thus,
in the absence of physical injury to real property resulting from Exxon’s actions, Appellees
must demonstrate more than modest adjustments in their use of their real property resulting
from the leak in order to establish nuisance.  Because this category of Appellees have not
demonstrated that Exxon’s interference with the use and enjoyment of their land was
substantial, they may not recover damages for diminution in value of real property on the
grounds that Exxon’s actions constituted a nuisance.
94The Yarema court noted that leaking underground storage tanks could support causes
of action for negligence and strict liability because a leak “constitute[s] a breach of [Exxon’s]
duty to its neighboring landowners not to impair their ownership rights through water
contamination,” and “the placement of large underground gasoline tanks in close proximity
to private residences and drinking wells constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity from
which strict liability may flow.”  Id. at 153–54, 516 A.2d at 1005 (citing Yommer v.
McKenzie, 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969)).
112
c. Negligence and Strict Liability
The Yarema court concluded also that no proof of physical harm to property is
required to recover under a negligence or strict liability theory.94  69 Md. App. at 153–55,
516 A.2d at 1005–06.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals relied
principally on Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company, 176 Md. 197, 4 A.2d 757 (1939),
where this Court considered whether a defendant could be held liable for negligence despite
the absence of physical invasion of property.  Yarema, 69 Md. App. at 155, 516 A.2d at
1006.  In Toy, the plaintiffs sought recovery for the loss of water access and use of a carp
pond on their property resulting from obstruction of a navigable creek following dredging
operations performed by the defendant.  We noted that, because the destruction of the creek
“greatly diminished in value the property of the Plaintiffs, . . . [it] was the cause of a
particular and special injury for which an action will lie,” despite the lack of physical
invasion of property owned by the plaintiffs.  Toy, 176 Md. at 207, 4 A.2d at 763.  Because
plaintiffs had suffered damages as a result of the obstruction of the navigable creek –
specifically, they could  no longer access their property via boat, nor control the level of
water necessary to sustain the carp in their pond – we determined that plaintiffs alleged a
sufficient injury to land in order to recover, provided that they could establish a wrongful act
95The plaintiffs in Toy were denied recovery ultimately, however, because plaintiffs
could not demonstrate that defendant failed to take reasonable care in performing the
dredging operations, nor did the facts support a cause of action for strict liability.  Id. at 211,
214, 4 A.2d at 764–65.
96Because Exxon conceded liability to Ms. Ho and the Tripp family (while disputing
(continued...)
113
on the part of the defendant.95  Id. at 207–08, 4 A.2d at 762–63.
The alleged injury to the non-detect Appellees’ properties here, however, is different
in kind than that suffered by the plaintiffs in Toy.  In Toy, the defendant’s actions deprived
the plaintiffs of substantial benefits of their property – specifically, their right of access by
water and the use and enjoyment of the carp pond on their property.  Id. at 207, 4 A.2d at
762–63.  The non-detect Appellees here, however, have proven no analogous injury.  In the
absence of direct evidence of physical injury, Appellees must show more than a possibility
of future contamination or mere annoyance in order to recover.  Although we do not
determine expressly that it need rise to the level of the interference in Yarema or Toy, there
is insufficient evidence on which to base recovery for the non-detect Appellees on the record
of this case.  The diminution in real property value suffered by these Appellees is, without
more, damnum absque injuria – a loss without legal injury. 
4. Remaining Loss of Use and Enjoyment Awards
It appears to us that only four Appellees may maintain a claim for loss of use and
enjoyment of real property: Amy Gumina, Van Ho, and Leslie and Timothy Tripp.  Exxon
conceded that it was liable to Ms. Ho and to the Tripp family for compensatory damages, but
did not specify which type of damages.96  Ms. Ho leased her property from a landlord, who
96(...continued)
expressly any fraud, fear of cancer, or medical monitoring claims), they may recover
damages for loss of use and enjoyment, their sole remaining category of damages.
114
was not a named plaintiff in either this case or Ford.  Ms. Gumina and the Tripps, who have
each sold their properties subsequent to the announcement of the leak, were owners of real
property at the time of the leak and that tested positive for contamination during their period
of occupancy in their properties.  None of these four named Appellees claimed damages for
diminution in value.  
Exxon asserts that the loss of use and enjoyment awards are excessive and that the
trial court should have granted its motion for a new trial and/or remittitur.  We review the
trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial and/or remittitur under an abuse of discretion
standard.  Merritt, 367 Md. at 28, 785 A.2d at 763. As we noted, we will reverse a trial
court’s denial of a motion for remittitur only where the verdict is “‘grossly excessive’ or
‘shocks the conscience of the court.’” Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 624, 541 A.2d 969,
976 (1988) (citations omitted). 
Compensatory damages awards “attempt to make the plaintiff whole again by
monetary compensation.”  Yarema, 69 Md. App. at 137, 516 A.2d at 997.  Although, as the
Court of Special Appeals noted in Yaffe v. Scarlett Place Residential Condo., Inc.,
determining damages for loss of use and enjoyment “must be flexible and based on the
factual circumstances of each case,” 205 Md. App. 429, 450, 45 A.3d 844, 856 (2012), such
damages must also be capable generally of reasonable measurement, rather than purely
speculative.  See McAlister v. Carl, 233 Md. 446, 455, 197 A.2d 140, 145 (1963). 
115
 Although we recognize that an interest in property may be composed of a “bundle of
rights” and is thus not determinate, see Weems v. County Comm’rs, 397 Md. 606, 618–24,
919 A.2d 77, 85–88 (2007) (discussing an individual’s right to compensation “for the taking
of . . . [a] ‘stick’ from [his or her] bundle of rights”), plaintiffs may not receive generally
damages for loss of use and enjoyment of real property exceeding the pre-injury fair market
value of the property.  See generally Regal Constr. Co. v. West Lanham Hills Citizen’s
Assoc., 256 Md. 302, 305, 260 A.2d 82, 84 (1970) (noting that restoration damages
exceeding the pre-impairment value of the home are not permitted generally, but may be
recovered only where the owner establishes a “reason personal for restoring the original
condition”).  Even though compensatory damages are intended to make the plaintiff whole,
see Sattler, 102 Md. at 601, 62 A. at 1127; Yarema, 69 Md. App. at 137, 516 A.2d at 997,
they are not intended to grant to the plaintiff a windfall as a result of the defendant’s tortious
conduct.  Thus, an award for compensatory damages must be anchored to a rational basis on
which to ensure that the awards are not merely speculative.  See McAlister, 233 Md. at 455,
197 A.2d at 145 (noting, while considering a claim for loss of enjoyment of life, the difficulty
in laying down a “hard and fast rule and to draw a clear and sharp line of demarcation
between damages which are purely speculative and damages which are capable of some
reasonable measurement”).  In the context of damages for loss of use and enjoyment of real
property, we determine that loss of use and enjoyment of real property cannot exceed the fair
market, unimpaired value of the property at issue.
We affirm the awards for loss of use and enjoyment as to Ms. Gumina and Leslie and
116
Timothy Tripp.  The fair market value of Ms. Gumina’s unimpaired property was, as
determined by Appellees’ expert, $370,000.  Ms. Gumina testified that, because her water
made her skin itchy and had an odor that burned her nostrils, she showered at an alternate
location, avoided consumption of her well water, and changed her gardening habits.
Additionally, she testified that she could no longer maintain koi fish in her pond, and that her
cooking pots and bathtub began to stain.  Ms. Gumina received, for her approximately
fourteen months’ residency, $250,000 in compensatory damages for loss of use and
enjoyment.  
Similarly, Appellees’ expert determined that the unimpaired value of the Tripps’
property was $730,000.  Mr. and Mrs. Tripp testified that, as a result of the gasoline leak,
they used bottled water, stopped using their Jacuzzi and pool, stopped doing yardwork,
showered outside for a time, and suffered from noise and odors relating to remediation
activities.  Mr. and Mrs. Tripp each recovered $350,000 in damages for loss of use and
enjoyment, thus totaling $700,000 – $30,000 less than the unimpaired value of their home.
Although Ms. Gumina and the Tripps’ compensatory damage awards approach very nearly
the unimpaired market value of their respective properties, they do not violate the standards
discussed above.   Thus, while acknowledging that Ms. Gumina and the Tripps resided in the
contaminated properties for only limited amounts of time, we do not think the awards are
unsupported by the evidence, nor do they shock this Court’s conscience.  Thus, we decline
to substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
As to Ms. Ho, Exxon challenges the facial excessiveness of the award for loss of use
97Evidence produced at trial suggested that Ms. Ho paid approximately $590 per
month in rent and associated costs for her salon space.
117
and enjoyment, although it admitted liability.  Ms. Ho operates a nail and hair salon in a
property located directly adjacent to the Jacksonville Exxon station.  Ms. Ho provided no
evidence regarding the unimpaired market value of her salon as an ongoing business,97 and
thus we do not have a rational basis, on appeal, upon which to determine whether her award
was excessive.  Moreover, Ms. Ho testified that the remediation efforts and related noise
impacted negatively her business, and that the use of bottled water to provide service to her
customers was extremely difficult in practice.  Although difficult, she stated that it was
necessary because some customers told her that they would no longer patronize her salon if
she discontinued the use of bottled water.  She testified that, following the announcement of
the leak, her business has dropped off by an average of $3,000 to $4,000 per year, lost twenty
to thirty percent of its customers, and required the addition of hair services and related
investments (such as the purchase of appropriate chairs) to remain in business.  Ms. Ho
testified that she shortened her operating hours during the evening as a result of her fears of
the men performing remediation activities nearby.  Additionally, Ms. Ho testified that the
testing of the POET system in her building was inconvenient, the nearby monitoring well was
noisy, and that the area outside surrounding the Exxon station (and her adjacent business)
was chaotic.
We determine that, in light of the evidence provided at trial, the $1.6 million loss of
use and enjoyment award to Ms. Ho was too speculative and thus, denial of the request for
118
a new trial as to Ms. Ho’s claim was an abuse of discretion.  As noted above, awards for loss
of use and enjoyment may not exceed the unimpaired market value of the property at issue.
Without evidence of the pre-leak, unimpaired market value of the ongoing business of the
salon operated by Ms. Ho, we cannot determine appropriately whether the jury’s award was
premised on a rational basis.  Although we are sympathetic to the inconveniences suffered
by Ms. Ho, an award of $1.6 million was not justified properly, based on the  evidence of a
discomfort, annoyance, and a $3,000-$4,000 per year loss in business.  We therefore reverse
her verdict and direct remand of her claim for a new trial.
B. Admissibility of Testimony of Dr. Kilpatrick to Establish 
Diminution in Value of Real Property
Exxon contends that the trial court admitted impermissibly the testimony of Dr. John
Kilpatrick, Appellees’ real property valuation expert witness.  “[T]he admissibility of expert
testimony is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court and its action will seldom
constitute ground for reversal.”  Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 173, 367 A.2d 472, 476
(1977).  Thus, the admissibility of expert opinion “is within the sound discretion of the trial
judge and will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.”  Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408
Md. 575, 618, 971 A.2d 235, 261 (2009) (quoting Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191, 200, 803
A.2d 1034, 1039 (2002)); see also Radman, 269 Md. at 173, 367 A.2d at 476 (“[I]t is well
settled . . . that the trial court’s determination [regarding expert qualification] . . . may be
reversed if it is founded on an error of law or some serious mistake, or if the trial court
clearly abused its discretion.”).  Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court abused
98Exxon contends that Dr. Kilpatrick’s testimony should have been disqualified under
Frye-Reed, and that we should therefore apply a de novo standard of review.  See Wilson,
370 Md. at 201 n.5, 803 A.2d at 1040 n.5 (“Appellate review of a trial court’s decision
regarding admissibility under Frye-Reed is de novo . . . .”).  Frye-Reed is the Maryland test
for determining the admissibility of expert scientific testimony.  See Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (articulating standard of “general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community”); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978) (adopting the Frye
standard in Maryland).  Frye-Reed applies only to expert opinion based on new and novel
scientific techniques.  Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chesson, 399 Md. 314, 328, 923 A.2d
939, 946 (2007); Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 364, 896 A.2d 1059, 1073 (2006); Reed,
283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368.  As the Court of Special Appeals noted in CSX
Transportation, Inc. v. Miller, Frye-Reed contemplates “new, and arguably questionable,
techniques such as lie detector tests, breathalyzer tests, paraffin tests, DNA identification,
voiceprint identification, as in the Reed case itself, and the use of polarized light microscopy
to identify asbestos.”  159 Md. App. 123, 187, 858 A.2d 1025, 1062 (2004). 
Here, Exxon attempts to impose the strictures of Frye-Reed on the expert testimony
of a real estate appraiser.  Valuation of real property, however, is not the type of scientific
expert opinion contemplated by the Frye-Reed test.  See id.  Thus, even though the trial court
conducted a Frye-Reed hearing prior to accepting Dr. Kilpatrick as an expert witness, we
determine that Frye-Reed does not apply here.
119
its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of Dr. Kilpatrick.98
Expert testimony is required ordinarily to establish diminution in property value
resulting from environmental contamination.  See Ford, 204 Md. App. at 151, 241–42, 40
A.3d at 602, 654 (J. Eyler, J., concurring and dissenting in part, and Graeff, J., concurring);
Hous. Auth. of City of New Brunswick v. Suydam Investors, LLC, 810 A.2d 1137, 1150 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“[T]he effect of environmental contamination upon a property’s
value must be determined on the basis of expert appraisal evidence.”), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part on other grounds, 826 A.2d 673 (N.J. 2003).  The admissibility of expert testimony
is examined generally under Maryland Rule 5-702, which requires the court to make three
determinations regarding an expert’s opinion.  Specifically, the court must determine that (1)
99Exxon did not object at trial to Dr. Kilpatrick’s valuation methods as it relates to the
following Appellee commercial properties: Dogwood Management, LLC; Klein Family
Development Corp.; 14342 Jarrettsville Pike, LLC; 3313 Paper Mill Road, LLC; Jarrettsville
Retail, LLC; 14231 Jarrettsville Pike, LLC; 14237 Jarrettsville Pike, LLC; 3422 Sweet Air
Road, LLC; and, Lenore Zaccari/Lenore Zaccari Residual Trust (property at 3411 Sweet Air
Road).  Exxon does not challenge specifically on appeal the diminution in value awards to
(continued...)
120
the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education;
(2) the subject matter is appropriate for expert testimony; and (3) a sufficient factual basis
exists to support the expert’s opinion.  Md. R. 5-702.  
As the Court of Special Appeals noted in Giant Food, Inc. v. Booker, “simply because
a witness has been tendered and qualified as an expert in a particular occupation or
profession, it does not follow that the expert may render an unbridled opinion, which does
not otherwise comport with Md. Rule 5-702.”  152 Md. App. 166, 182–83, 831 A.2d 481,
490 (2003).  Rather, an expert’s opinion must be grounded in sufficient facts, such  that it
constitutes more than mere speculation or conjecture, and reflect the use of “reliable
principles and methodology in support of the expert’s conclusions.”  Id.; see also CSX
Transp., Inc., 159 Md. App. at 189, 858 A.2d at 1063 (noting that the third factor of
Maryland Rule 5-702 encompasses the two sub-issues of sufficient factual basis and reliable
methodology).  Here, Exxon challenges the trial court’s admission of Dr. Kilpatrick’s expert
testimony under only the third requirement, contending that (1) the methodology underlying
his estimates as to diminution in value is unreliable (as reflected in Exxon’s Frye-Reed
challenge); and (2) the testimony lacked a sufficient factual basis because Dr. Kilpatrick
failed to take into account actual comparable real estate sales in the area following the leak.99
99(...continued)
these Appellees, and thus, with the exception of 14342 Jarrettsville Pike, LLC (reversed on
other grounds as explained supra), those judgments are affirmed.
Exxon challenges on appeal, however, Dr. Kilpatrick’s valuation of Appellee Klein’s
of Jacksonville (“Klein’s”), which operated a grocery store on property owned by Appellee
Klein Family Development Corp. at 14330 Jarrettsville Pike, and recovered damages for
injury to its business based on a “forced liquidation theory.”  Exxon did not object to the
admission of Dr. Kilpatrick’s testimony before the trial court, but argued at trial that Dr.
Kilpatrick’s testimony as to Klein’s was speculative, not supported by a factual basis, and
should not be permitted to go to the jury.  
Klein’s opened for business in the years immediately preceding the subject gasoline
leak, and remained unprofitable at the time of the leak (as was expected by Klein’s,
according to Dr. Kilpatrick’s testimony).  Dr. Kilpatrick testified that the proper valuation
of Klein’s was its liquidation value, or what the store would be worth to a prospective
purchaser.  Dr. Kilpatrick’s “impaired” valuation was based on what he termed a “disorderly
liquidation,” in which there is no prospective purchaser due to the undesirability of locating
in the Jacksonville area.  Under Dr. Kilpatrick’s theory, therefore, Klein’s would be forced
to sell off its fixtures and furniture in piecemeal form to prospective purchasers from outside
the Jacksonville area, thus incurring additional costs.
Exxon argues that this methodology was based on the unfounded assumption that
Klein’s of Jacksonville would go out of business regardless of the existence of the leak, an
assumption not supported by testimony from any Klein’s representative or other evidence
produced at trial.  To the contrary, Dr. Kilpatrick acknowledged that unprofitability in the
store’s first few years of operation was anticipated by Klein’s, and that, following the leak,
revenues had increased approximately fifty percent.  Because Dr. Kilpatrick’s fundamental
assumption – that Klein’s would be forced to liquidate due to negative impacts resulting from
the spill – was unsupported by any evidence offered at trial, we conclude that his opinion
lacked a sufficient factual basis.  Thus, because Dr. Kilpatrick’s testimony had no probative
force as to the valuation of the business, and Klein’s offered no additional evidence in
support of its claim for damages, the trial judge erred in submitting the claim to the jury.  See
Giant Food, 152 Md. App. at 182, 831 A.2d at 490 (“No matter how highly qualified the
expert may be in his field, his opinion has no probative force unless a sufficient factual basis
to support a rational conclusion is shown.” (quoting State Dep’t of Health v. Walker, 238 Md.
512, 520, 209 A.2d 555, 559 (1965))).  Therefore, we reverse the judgment for “loss of
liquidation value” as to Klein’s of Jacksonville.
121
In developing his “impaired” valuation of Appellees’ residential properties, Dr.
100Dr. Kilpatrick’s case study methodology considered summaries of settlements or
jury verdicts in seven trials that involved claimed property damage due to groundwater
contamination.  One of these seven trials was Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford, in which the jury
was permitted to find that some of the plaintiffs’ homes were valueless.  Although we
recognize, assuming that the case study methodology is an appropriate valuation technique,
that the data generated in Ford is likely most relevant as it concerns the same community,
we do not think it appropriate to base valuation conclusions on jury awards that are not yet
final because of a contemporaneously pending appeal. 
101Dr. Kilpatrick testified that proximity was, in essence, the same for each and every
plaintiff in this case, and thus an irrelevant factor, because every Appellees’ property sits
atop the same aquifer that experienced MTBE contamination. 
122
Kilpatrick used three primary methods: (1) meta-analysis derived from an article published
by Dr. Robert Simons; (2) case studies, including jury verdicts and settlements from around
the country (including Ford);100 and (3) a contingent valuation telephone survey designed by
Dr. Simons, in which respondents were asked what they would be willing to pay for a
hypothetical house with MTBE well water contamination.  Dr. Kilpatrick did not rely on
comparable sales data, despite numerous sales of residential properties in the relevant
Jacksonville area following the announcement of the leak, opining that the market was
unreliable and the buyers uninformed perhaps. Thus, Dr. Kilpatrick concluded, as a blanket
proposition, that each of the Appellees’ properties suffered a 60% permanent diminution in
value as of 16 February 2006 – regardless of the distance of the property from the emanating
gasoline station101 and whether, and in what amount, the wells on the properties tested
positive for MTBE or benzene contamination.  Exxon contends that Dr. Kilpatrick’s
methodology was faulty, and claims that he should have considered the comparable sales
data of the nearly 180 real estate sales that occurred in Jacksonville between the leak and
102Dr. Kilpatrick acknowledged the existence of the sales in his testimony, and even
noted that he deemed 100 of these sales to be relevant to valuing the contaminated properties.
He did not consider them, however, in calculating his impaired values.  These sales reflected,
as a general proposition, an approximately seven percent diminution in value.
123
2008.102  We agree with Exxon’s points.  Because we determine that Dr. Kilpatrick’s
methodology was faulty, for failing to consider comparable sales data, we do not consider
here the validity of the use of the three alternative methods utilized in his report.
Appraisals of fair market value are the most common method of establishing the value
of real property.  Comparable sales are often utilized in determining fair market value, and
“ha[ve] long been accepted in Maryland.”  Bern-Shaw Ltd. P’ship v. Mayor & City Council
of Balt., 377 Md. 277, 289, 833 A.2d 502, 509 (2003) (citing Brinsfield v. Mayor & City
Council of Balt., 236 Md. 66, 202 A.2d 335 (1964)).  While Maryland law does not compel
the use of comparable sales data, to the exclusion of all other methodologies, a real estate
appraisal expert must proffer a reasonable justification for ignoring market data where it is
available.  Here, there was ample actual market data from which a valuation opinion
(baseline or otherwise) could have been made, had Dr. Kilpatrick chosen to use it.  Any
adjustments could have been explained and justified.  Thus, to discard market data, Dr.
Kilpatrick had to provide a reasonable justification explaining the unsuitability or
unreliability of the comparable sales data in the Jacksonville area.  
Dr. Kilpatrick did not discard the use of comparable sales data generally.  In fact, he
measured the value of plaintiffs’ properties prior to the leak using actual transactional data.
He opined, however, that the post-leak value of the properties at issue could not be calculated
124
principally using comparable sales data because of the inherent unreliability of the
comparable sales data in the post-leak Jacksonville community.  In trying to establish this
unreliability, Dr. Kilpatrick’s report advanced a nuanced distinction between “market value”
and “market price.”  Specifically, Dr. Kilpatrick stated that market value represents the true
value of the property where the buyer and seller possess perfect and utterly complete
information.  Market price, by contrast, does not necessarily reflect perfect information.
Because of the possibility that the buyer may be uninformed, Dr. Kilpatrick asserts that the
market price of real estate reflects an artificial inflation over the market value.   Here, Dr.
Kilpatrick determined that the transactional data could not be relied upon because the sales
in Jacksonville represented the market price, rather than the market value, stating that
“disclosure of the ExxonMobil spill, and the risks of latent defects stemming from that spill,
is not occurring in a reasonable fashion.  The lack of information to buyers is creating market
inefficiencies and thus sales transactions that do not represent market value.”  
Dr. Kilpatrick based his assessment of unreliability on informal interviews and
surveys of real estate agents.  These interviews, however, belie Dr. Kilpatrick’s assertions.
The surveyed real estate agents noted the difficulties in closing sales in the Jacksonville real
estate market subsequent to announcement of the leak.  Specifically, these agents noted that
some buyers stayed away from the area surrounding the spill, with buyers refusing to “even
look at the house because of the spill,” or “look and then decide it’s just too much to deal
with.”  Other agents noted that prices were reduced dramatically in order to complete a sale;
that disclosure forms were given to prospective purchasers; and in most cases, water tests
103One lender stated that many banks “stay away from lending on property near gas
stations” as a general proposition.
125
were performed prior to the sale of residential properties in the Jacksonville area.
Additionally, surveys of real estate mortgage lenders suggested that some financial
institutions would not even agree to finance the purchase of a property with actual
groundwater contamination.103  Taken together, these interviews and surveys suggest,
contrary to Dr. Kilpatrick’s assertions, that individuals in the Jacksonville real estate market
were, in fact, informed regarding the leak, and that such information made it significantly
more difficult to complete a sale; yet, there were nearly 180 sales after the leak was made
public.
The statements of the real estate agents are relevant to the amount of diminution in
value of properties in the Jacksonville area, but do not provide an acceptable or sufficient
factual basis for Dr. Kilpatrick’s conclusion that the sales that occurred were unreliable.  An
expert’s opinion “is of no greater probative value than the soundness of his reasons given
therefor will warrant.”  Surkovich v. Doub, 258 Md. 263, 272, 265 A.2d 447, 451 (1970).
Not only do the interviews and surveys of real estate agents and the testimony of the
homeowners contradict Dr. Kilpatrick’s proffered justifications for ignoring comparable sales
data, but the level of speculation attendant to that conclusion is, as the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California noted in reviewing Dr. Kilpatrick’s proposed
testimony in another case, “serious[ly] concern[ing].”  Palmisano v. Olin Corp., No. C-03-
01607 RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48005, at *16 n.5 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2005).  Dr.
126
Kilpatrick testified that he does not know when, if ever, the “market price” will reflect the
sixty percent diminution in “market value” that he concludes the properties suffered.  As we
have noted, however, fair market value is the highest and best price at which a prospective
buyer and a prospective seller will agree for the sale of a given property.  See Md. Code
(1974, 2010 Repl. Vol.), Real Property Article § 12-105(b).  Thus, even if we accepted, for
the sake of argument, Dr. Kilpatrick’s theory that prospective purchasers are ill-informed
regarding the Jacksonville Exxon leak, the market prices represented by actual sales in the
community still represent the highest and best price for the property – even if the buyers are
paying, as Dr. Kilpatrick asserts, too much.  Allowing the plaintiffs to recover damages for
a hypothetical and speculative diminution in market value that may never materialize is to
permit them a potential double recovery – “[i]f plaintiffs could recover for a decline in value
that had not yet been reflected in prices, they could sell their homes immediately and receive
a windfall: damages for as-yet unrealized diminution in value plus the full market price.”
Palmisano, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48005, at *16 n.5.  Dr. Kilpatrick’s disregard of the
existence of an actual, functioning market – no matter how skewed – was clear error.
Because the trial court’s admission of Dr. Kilpatrick’s testimony was clear error, we reverse
the jury awards for diminution in value as to all Appellees and direct remand for a new trial.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY
FOR FRAUD IN FAVOR OF ALL
A P P E L L E E S  
R E V E R S E D ;
JUDGMENTS 
FOR 
PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF ALL
A P P E L L E E S  
R E V E R S E D ;
JUDGMENTS FOR EMOTIONAL
127
DISTRESS 
FOR 
FEAR 
OF
CONTRACTING CANCER  IN
FAVOR OF ALL APPELLEES
REVERSED, EXCEPT THAT THE
CLAIM OF APPELLEE GLORIA
QUINAN 
IS 
VACATED 
AND
REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL NOT
INCONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS
OPINION; 
JUDGMENTS 
FOR
MEDICAL MONITORING IN FAVOR
OF ALL APPELLEES REVERSED;
JUDGMENTS FOR EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS FOR FEAR OF LOSS OF
PROPERTY VALUE IN FAVOR OF
ALL APPELLEES REVERSED;
JUDGMENTS FOR LOSS OF USE
AND ENJOYMENT IN FAVOR OF
APPELLEES AMY GUMINA, LESLIE
TRIPP, AND TIMOTHY TRIPP
AFFIRMED; JUDGMENT FOR LOSS
OF USE AND ENJOYMENT IN
FAVOR OF APPELLEE VAN HO
REVERSED AND REMANDED TO
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR A NEW
TRIAL NOT INCONSISTENT WITH
THIS OPINION; JUDGMENTS FOR
LOSS OF USE AND ENJOYMENT IN
F A V O R  
O F  
A L L  
O T H E R
A P P E L L E E S  
R E V E R S E D ;
JUDGMENTS FOR DIMINUTION IN
VALUE OF REAL PROPERTY IN
FAVOR OF APPELLEES DAVID
AUSTIN, EMILY AUSTIN, PATRICIA
BATEMAN, JON BLUM, TRACY
BLUM, 
MARGARET 
BROWN,
LOUISE BULL, ADRIANE BURKE,
LLOYD BURKE, BARI JO BURNETT,
CARLO 
CAPIZZI, 
FRANCA
CAPIZZI, PHILIP CAPRON, SUSAN
CAPRON, LLOYD CLARK, JOAN
128
CLARK, 
SHARON 
DORSCH,
WILLIAM 
DORSCH, 
DARYL
DUTROW, JENNIFER DUTROW,
CHRISTOPHER EASTON, MONIQUE
EASTON, BRUCE ELLIOTT,  CHRIS
FEDERICO, TRACY FEDERICO,
CLEVER 
FONSECA, 
DENISE
F O N S E C A ,  
M A R I A N N E
FRATTAROLA LIVING TRUST, ANN
FULLER, STANLEY FULLER, MARY
PAT GOODHUES, HEATHER HUEY,
MICHAEL 
HUEY, 
DOROTHY
HYMAN, 
RICHARD 
HYMAN,
KENNETH KELLY, STEPHANIE
KELLY, LEONARD KENNEDY,
MARGARET KENNEDY, PAUL
K I N G  
A S  
P E R S O N A L
R E P R E S E N T A T I V E  
F O R
KATHERINE 
KING, 
MARK
KIRKWOOD, NANCY PUGLIESE,
ELLEN 
KOERNER, 
HENRY
KOERNER, DONNA LAWRENCE,
ROBERT LAZZARO, NIKOLAOS
MAKRIS, VALERIE MAKRIS, JOHN
MATRA, MARY MATRA, KIRK
MCCLEARY, MARY MCCLEARY,
PAMELA 
MORGAN, 
RONALD
M O R G A N ,  
D E N I S E  
M O S S ,
GREGORY MOSS, KATHLEEN
NAUGHTON, TIM NAUGHTON,
GREGORY 
NAYLOR, 
SUSAN
NAYLOR, DONALD NEMER, KELLI
NEMER, JOANNE O’CONNELL,
ANITA PODLES, THOMAS PODLES,
C Y N T H I A  
P O P O M A R O N I S ,
WILLIAM POPOMARONIS, MARY
KATHRYN PROEFROCK, SCOTT
PROEFROCK, EDNA RUDELL,
PAUL RUDELL, RICHARD RUDELL,
ALAN SAEVA, ELLAINE SAEVA,
JOSEPH 
SCHMITZ, 
SUSAN
129
SCHMITZ, ERNEST SESSA, PAULA
SESSA, NATALIE SHIELDS, BRUCE
STUMPP, 
NORMA 
STUMPP,
CHESTER TOKARSKI, MARILYN
TOKARSKI, CHRISTY WHALEY,
NEIL WHALEY, HANS WILHEMSEN
(AWARDS 
FOR 
PROPERTIES
LOCATED AT 13707, 13729, AND
13821 JARRETTSVILLE PIKE), JEAN
WIMMER, 
PAUL 
WIMMER,
C H R I S T O P H E R  
G A R L I S S /
HIGHPOINT HOMEBUILDERS, INC.,
KLEIN’S OF JACKSONVILLE, AND
14342 JARRETTSVILLE PIKE, LLC
REVERSED; JUDGMENTS FOR
DIMINUTION IN VALUE OF REAL
PROPERTY 
IN 
FAVOR 
OF
DOGWOOD MANAGEMENT, LLC,
KLEIN FAMILY DEVELOPMENT
CORP., 3313 PAPER MILL ROAD,
LLC, JARRETTSVILLE RETAIL,
LLC, 14231 JARRETTSVILLE PIKE,
LLC, 14237 JARRETTSVILLE PIKE,
LLC, 3422 SWEET AIR ROAD, LLC,
LENORE ZACCARI/LENORE E.
ZACCARI 
RESIDUAL 
TRUST
AFFIRMED; JUDGMENTS FOR
DIMINUTION IN VALUE OF REAL
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF ALL
OTHER APPELLEES REVERSED
AND REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL NOT
INCONSISTENT 
WITH 
THIS
OPINION.  COSTS IN THIS COURT
TO BE DIVIDED PRO RATA BY
APPELLEES.