Case Title: State v. Lowe

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86-K-0542

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1986-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 
 
No. 10–1454 
 
Filed January 20, 2012 
 
 
STATE OF IOWA, 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
ROBERT DALE LOWE, JR., 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, D.J. Stovall, 
Judge (July 20, 2010 suppression ruling) and Joel D. Novak, Judge 
(August 30, 2010 suppression ruling). 
 
 
The Supreme Court granted the parties’ cross-applications for 
discretionary review of the district court’s grant and denial of the motions 
to suppress.  DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED ON 
APPEAL; DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED ON 
CROSS-APPEAL AND CASE REMANDED. 
 
 
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Elisabeth S. Reynoldson 
Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and 
Daniel C. Voogt, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Nicholas A. Sarcone and Dean A. Stowers of Stowers Law Firm, 
West Des Moines, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
2 
ZAGER, Justice. 
 
The State appeals an adverse ruling on a motion which suppressed 
statements made by the defendant, Robert Lowe, as having been made in 
response to a promise of leniency, thereby rendering them involuntary.  
Lowe cross-appeals, claiming the district court erred in overruling his 
motion to suppress his statements as a violation of Miranda and, more 
specifically, as a violation of the ban on questioning a defendant after 
that defendant has invoked his right to counsel.  Lowe further claims the 
district court erred in not suppressing all evidence found at the scene 
because the consent that led to the search of the premises was only 
obtained by prior police illegality.  Lowe also claims that the consent to 
search provided by Cody Audsley was not voluntary and that he—Lowe— 
was removed from the area to prevent him from objecting to any search, 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  We hold that the search was 
proper and that the motion to suppress the physical evidence obtained 
as a result of the search was properly denied.  We further hold that 
because there was not sufficient exigency to justify the police reinitiating 
questioning of Lowe following Lowe’s request for counsel, the public 
safety exception to Miranda does not apply under the facts of this case, 
and therefore, Lowe’s statements were properly suppressed. 
I.  Background Facts and Proceedings. 
At 10:00 p.m. on April 6, 2010, dispatch informed Detective Corey 
Schneden of the Ankeny Police Department that a female (Cindy) was 
being treated in the emergency room of a local hospital for a drug 
overdose.  Schneden was advised the female likely ingested the drugs at 
Cody Audsley’s residence, a mobile home in Ankeny.  Schneden went to 
Audsley’s residence for the purpose of interviewing her.  He was 
accompanied by Officers Webb and Ripperger, both of whom were in 
 
 
 
3 
uniform.  Schneden was not in uniform, but was wearing a police 
department T-shirt, as well as a badge and gun. 
Upon arrival, Schneden approached the main entrance on the 
south side of the mobile home.  Ripperger was directly behind Schneden, 
and Webb was on a gravel drive east of and adjacent to Audsley’s mobile 
home.  Webb went to the east side of the mobile home to prevent anyone 
from fleeing when Schneden knocked on the door.  Webb was standing 
on a gravel driveway between Audsley’s mobile home and another mobile 
home and was about a foot away from a window with a partially open 
blind which was broken or bent.  When Schneden knocked on the door, 
Webb observed Audsley retrieve something from the kitchen table and 
place it in a kitchen cabinet.  Webb also observed Lowe run towards the 
back of the residence and out of view.  At this point, Webb went to the 
yard on the north side of residence to determine whether Lowe had fled. 
After Schneden knocked on the door, he identified himself as a 
police officer.  Schneden asked for, and received, Audsley’s permission to 
enter the residence.  As he entered, he introduced Ripperger and asked if 
they could ask Audsley a few questions.  Audsley agreed.  At this point, 
Webb was advised that both residents were now in the living area, so 
Webb joined Schneden and Ripperger in the residence.  Audsley never 
gave Webb explicit permission to enter, but never asked him to leave.  At 
no point did Audsley ask the officers to leave. 
After entering, the police encountered Lowe and asked him to 
identify himself.  Lowe produced identification and stated he lived with 
his mother elsewhere in Ankeny.  He specifically denied that he lived at 
Audsley’s residence.  However, Lowe also stated that he was staying at 
Audsley’s and that he was a guest.  Later on in the evening, Lowe was 
 
 
 
4 
allowed to change from gym shorts into sweatpants.  Officers later found 
male clothing in a bedroom of the mobile home. 
In response to questioning, Audsley denied using drugs with Cindy 
that day.  During this initial questioning, Audsley was repeatedly 
reminded of the very serious medical condition Cindy was facing and was 
also confronted with Webb’s observation of Audsley grabbing something 
from the table and placing it in the kitchen cabinet.  During this time, 
officers asked her at least three times for consent to search the 
residence.  While she did not expressly deny consent the first two times, 
she said no on the third occasion.  At that point, Schneden asked Lowe 
to step outside with him to talk out of Audsley’s presence.  Schneden was 
outside with Lowe for only a few minutes.  He asked Lowe if he knew 
what drugs Cindy might have taken earlier that day and explained that 
Cindy was in need of medical treatment and that the officers needed to 
know what she might have taken.  According to Schneden, Lowe was free 
to leave at any time.  Lowe denied having knowledge of any drugs Cindy 
might have taken. 
While Schneden and Lowe were outside, Ripperger and Webb 
continued their questioning of Audsley.  Webb told Audsley that the 
officers needed to know what Cindy had taken and that Cindy’s life might 
be in danger if Audsley did not tell them what she knew.  Audsley then 
responded, “We smoked weed together.  Do you want it?”  At that point, 
Ripperger asked Audsley where the marijuana was, and Audsley pointed 
to a Del Monte fruit can on the coffee table.  Around this time, Schneden 
and Lowe reentered the residence, and Ripperger told Schneden that 
Audsley admitted smoking marijuana earlier in the day with Cindy and 
that there was marijuana hidden in the fruit can on the table.  With 
Audsley’s permission, Webb picked the fruit can up.  He then asked 
 
 
 
5 
Audsley for consent to open it, which he received.  After unscrewing a 
false bottom on the can, Webb found a pipe and marijuana.  Once the 
marijuana was discovered, Audsley and Lowe were not free to leave.  
Audsley then refused to consent to a search of the rest of the residence. 
Around midnight on April 6, 2010, Schneden contacted Detective 
Matthew Jenkins, a member of the Ankeny Police Department assigned 
to the Mid-Iowa Narcotics Task Force, to assist in obtaining a search 
warrant for Audsley’s mobile home.  The probable cause for the search 
warrant was the discovery of the marijuana and drug paraphernalia.1  
The police did not begin searching the residence until 3:00 a.m. when 
Jenkins arrived with the search warrant.  At that time, Lowe and Audsley 
were inside the residence and neither was in handcuffs.  Jenkins 
provided each of them with the Miranda warning.  While Audsley agreed 
to speak with Jenkins, Lowe immediately requested to speak with 
counsel.  Lowe was then placed in a squad car.  Audsley remained in the 
mobile home during the search. 
Sometime during the search, Schneden entered the bathroom area 
and found what he believed to be components of a meth lab.  This was 
not an active meth lab, and none of the officers reported smelling any 
odors associated with methamphetamine production.  After being advised 
of this discovery, Jenkins became concerned for the safety of his officers 
and the neighbors.  He spoke to Audsley, who confirmed that Lowe had 
been involved in manufacturing methamphetamine in the past, but it 
was not to be made in the residence.  Officers were told to suspend their 
                                                 
 
1The record does not contain the application for the search warrant or the 
search warrant itself.  However, both Lowe and the State agree that the marijuana and 
drug paraphernalia found as a result of the consensual search formed the basis for the 
search warrant. 
 
 
 
6 
search until Jenkins could speak to Lowe about whether there was 
anything dangerous in the residence. 
Jenkins then went back to the squad car, opened the door, and 
reiterated to Lowe that he did not have to speak with him, that he was 
“not asking to get you [Lowe] in trouble,” but that he did not want to find 
any anhydrous.  Lowe confirmed that there was nothing active going on 
at that time, but Lowe stated that there was an empty anhydrous tank in 
the shed and that it was his, not Audsley’s. 
On May 4, 2010, Lowe and Audsley were charged with conspiracy 
to manufacture a controlled substance, manufacturing a controlled 
substance, 
possession 
of 
anhydrous 
ammonia 
with 
intent 
to 
manufacture a controlled substance, and possession of lithium with 
intent to manufacture a controlled substance.  Lowe moved to suppress 
his statements to police, alleging the statements were elicited in violation 
of his rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution when 
Jenkins reinitiated questioning after Lowe invoked his right to counsel.  
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding 
that Jenkins reinitiated questioning out of a concern for officer safety 
and that such questioning was proper under a public safety exception to 
Miranda. 
Lowe filed another motion to suppress on June 17, alleging the 
search warrant for Audsley’s mobile home was based on information 
obtained by a prior illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa 
Constitution.  After an additional evidentiary hearing, the district court 
overruled Lowe’s second motion, finding Audsley’s consent was freely and 
voluntarily given and there was no evidence of coercion in the record.  
 
 
 
7 
The next day, Lowe moved to enlarge the findings and rulings, claiming 
the court insufficiently supported its findings and did not rule on all the 
issues before it, namely whether Audsley’s consent was induced by a 
prior illegal search.  The motion to enlarge the findings and rulings was 
overruled by the motion judge.  A motion to reconsider this ruling was 
brought before the trial judge who also denied it.  Further motions on the 
issues involving the search and seizure of physical evidence were also 
denied. 
On July 7, Lowe filed a renewed motion to suppress his statements 
and asked the court to reopen the record based on newly received 
recordings of his conversation with Jenkins.  This motion additionally 
argued the statements should be suppressed as a promise of leniency 
under State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 2005).  Lowe argued his delay 
in asserting his claim of promissory leniency was based on the State’s 
failure to deliver the audio recordings of his exchange with Jenkins in a 
timely fashion. 
In its resistance to the motion, the State argued the statements 
were not barred as a Miranda violation based on the public safety 
exception.  The State also argued Lowe’s July 7 motion was untimely 
because it was not brought within forty days of arraignment, as required 
under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.11(4), and any delay in Lowe 
receiving the recordings of his conversation with Jenkins was irrelevant 
because Lowe had a duty to disclose these facts to his attorney.  After a 
hearing, the district court ruled that Jenkins was concerned for the 
safety of himself and others, so the public safety exception to Miranda 
would apply.  However, the court ruled Jenkins’s statement, “I’m not 
asking to get you in trouble,” was a promise of leniency that Lowe would 
receive some benefit for his response and that led Lowe “to believe that if 
 
 
 
8 
he answered the detective’s questions he could do so without fear of his 
answers being used against him.”  Accordingly, the district court granted 
Lowe’s motion to suppress the statements made to Jenkins as a promise 
of leniency. 
The State sought discretionary review of the ruling on the 
suppression of Lowe’s statements, and Lowe filed a cross-application for 
discretionary review of the rulings of the district court regarding the 
search and seizure of physical evidence.  We now consider the merits of 
each party’s arguments. 
II.  Standard of Review. 
Lowe claims that the search was conducted without Audsley’s valid 
consent, that the search was conducted without his consent, and that 
these actions violate the state and federal constitutions.  Lowe also 
claims the police reinitiated questioning of him after he invoked his right 
to counsel.  Our review of constitutional issues is de novo.  State v. Lane, 
726 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Iowa 2007); see also State v. Palmer, 791 N.W.2d 
840, 844 (Iowa 2010) (holding we review de novo a district court’s 
decision to admit statements allegedly obtained in violation of the 
accused’s constitutional rights).  This review requires us to make an 
independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by 
the entire record, including the evidence presented at the suppression 
hearings.  Id.  Because of the district court’s opportunity to evaluate the 
credibility of witnesses, we will give deference to the factual findings of 
the district court, but we are not bound by them.  Id. 
Lowe argues the evidence against him should be suppressed under 
both the state and federal constitutions.  However, “we generally decline 
to consider an independent state constitutional standard based upon a 
mere citation to the applicable state constitutional provision.”  State v. 
 
 
 
9 
Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 895 (Iowa 2009) (Appel, J., specially 
concurring).2 
III.  The Physical Evidence Obtained in the Home and Shed. 
Lowe claims that the physical evidence found in Audsley’s mobile 
home—the marijuana, pipe, and the precursor substances—must be 
suppressed because the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of 
the Iowa Constitution.  Though neither party provided the search 
warrant application to aid in our review, both parties agree, and the 
district court found, that the marijuana formed the basis for the search 
warrant.  Therefore, if Audsley’s consent was invalid based on either the 
exploitation of a prior illegal search or seizure, or because Audsley’s 
consent was not voluntary, then there is no other basis for the warrant 
in the record, and the physical evidence obtained pursuant to that 
search warrant must be suppressed. 
Lowe also points to Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 
1515, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208 (2006), and claims that under Randolph, the 
police were required to obtain his consent in order to use the evidence 
against him.  Because they did not obtain his consent, Lowe argues that 
the marijuana and any evidence recovered pursuant to the search 
warrant predicated on the discovery of the marijuana cannot be used 
against him. 
Lowe claims that Audsley’s consent was invalid.  The Supreme 
Court has stated that “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights 
                                                 
 
2On appeal, Lowe only makes the argument that the Iowa Constitution should 
be interpreted differently than the United States Constitution when he claims the police 
should have been required to obtain his consent before searching the fruit can.  
Therefore, unless we indicate otherwise, we assume for the purposes of this appeal that 
the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution should be interpreted in an 
identical fashion.  State v. Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 838, 842 n.1 (Iowa 2008). 
 
 
 
10 
which . . . may not be vicariously asserted.”  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 133–34, 99 S. Ct. 421, 425, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 394 (1978) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Naujoks, 637 
N.W.2d 101, 106 (“The right afforded by the Fourth Amendment is 
specific to the individual and may not be invoked by third persons.”).  In 
order to object to the evidence on constitutional grounds, Lowe must 
show that his own constitutional rights, under either the state or federal 
constitutions, have been violated.  If he can show that his rights have 
been violated, then “[w]e are not inclined to require defendant to make an 
independent showing of standing.”  State v. Henderson, 313 N.W.2d 564, 
565 (Iowa 1981); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87–88, 119 S. 
Ct. 469, 472, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373, 379 (1998) (noting that the “standing” 
doctrine was rejected in Rakas and “in order to claim the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he 
personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that 
his expectation is reasonable”).  Lowe’s ability “to assert a Fourth 
Amendment violation will stand or fall on a [his] ability to show a 
substantive violation which in turn is based on a showing of a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the particular area searched or the particular 
objects seized.”   Henderson, 313 N.W.2d at 565 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. 
at 148, 99 S. Ct. at 432, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 404).3 
We employ a two-step approach to determine whether there has 
been a violation of the Fourth Amendment or article I, section 8 of the 
Iowa Constitution.  State v. Fleming, 790 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Iowa 2010); 
see also Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 106; State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 
                                                 
3We note that it is not necessary for a defendant to make an independent 
showing of standing because “[t]he standing issue inheres in the [determination of a 
legitimate expectation of privacy].”  State v. Eis, 348 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1984). 
 
 
 
11 
339, 342 (Iowa 1995); State v. Eis, 348 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1984).  To 
satisfy the first step, an individual challenging the legality of a search 
has the burden of showing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area 
searched.  Fleming, 790 N.W.2d at 564. 
The determination of whether a person has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy with respect to a certain area is made 
on a case-by-case basis, considering the unique facts of each 
particular situation.  The expectation must also be one that 
society considers reasonable. 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, as a 
preliminary matter, we must determine whether Lowe had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in Audsley’s mobile home.  An expectation of 
privacy must be subjectively and objectively legitimate and will be 
determined “on a case-by-case basis.”  Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 106.  An 
overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s 
home.  Id.  Leaving possessions in another’s residence and making 
frequent visits are also factors that favor a legitimate expectation of 
privacy.  State v. Lovig, 675 N.W.2d 557, 564 (Iowa 2004). 
Although Lowe denied living at Audsley’s residence when the 
officers first entered, it appeared to the officers that Lowe was a guest of 
Audsley’s.  Lowe had clothes and other items of a personal nature in 
Audsley’s mobile home.  Additionally, according to the minutes of 
testimony, Lowe had been staying there for about six months.  Based on 
these unique subjective and objective facts, we conclude Lowe had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in Audsley’s mobile home. 
Since Lowe has shown a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
Audsley’s mobile home, we must move to step two of the analysis in 
which we must decide whether the State unreasonably invaded the 
protected interest.  Fleming, 790 N.W.2d at 564; see also Naujoks, 637 
 
 
 
12 
N.W.2d at 106.  “Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable if they do 
not fall within one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.”  Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 107.  Consent searches are one of 
these exceptions.  Id.  To be valid, consent must be voluntary.  See State 
v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 465 (Iowa 2001). 
The officers did not have a warrant when they first approached 
Audsley’s residence, but they received Audsley’s consent to enter the 
mobile home and ultimately to search the fruit can.  Lowe claims that 
Audsley’s consent was the exploitation of prior police illegality, making it 
“fruit of the poisonous tree.”  See Lane, 726 N.W.2d at 383.  Lowe also 
claims Audsley’s consent was not voluntary.  If either of these claims is 
accurate, then Audsley did not validly consent to the search of the fruit 
can.  The State has not provided any basis other than Audsley’s consent 
to justify the search.  If Audsley’s consent was involuntarily obtained, 
then the police would have unreasonably searched her residence which, 
as stated above, is an area where Lowe had a legitimate expectation of 
privacy.  We now turn to Lowe’s challenges to Audsley’s consent. 
A.  Was Audsley’s Consent to Search the Result of Prior Police 
Illegality?  Around 11:00 p.m., Webb received consent to search what 
appeared to be a can of Del Monte fruit cocktail that was sitting in 
Audsley’s living room.  The fruit can contained a false bottom which held 
marijuana and a pipe.  The State asserts Audsley voluntarily consented 
to the search.  Lowe does not dispute that Audsley told the officers they 
could search the fruit can.  Lowe asserts that Audsley’s consent was only 
produced by exploiting prior police illegality, that her consent was not 
voluntary, and that even if it were, the evidence is still inadmissible 
against Lowe because he did not consent to the search. 
 
 
 
13 
Lowe points to two actions he claims constitute illegal searches 
and seizures prior to the consensual search of the fruit can.  First, he 
claims the police searched the mobile home illegally when Webb looked 
in the windows prior to the officers knocking at the door.  Second, he 
claims the police seized Audsley and him without reasonable suspicion 
prior to the discovery of the marijuana when they exceeded the scope of 
Audsley’s consent to a knock and talk and “took over” the mobile home. 
1.  The activities of the police prior to entering the mobile home.  We 
turn first to Lowe’s contention that Webb searched the mobile home by 
looking in the windows.  A person in his dwelling with the window 
coverings almost closed certainly has some expectation of privacy.  State 
v. Davis, 228 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Iowa 1975), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Hanes, 790 N.W.2d 545, 550 & n.1 (Iowa 2010).  However, a 
search only occurs if there is a violation of an expectation of privacy “that 
society considers reasonable.”  State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 46 (Iowa 
1998).  Regarding driveways, we have noted that “[i]t is common for 
solicitors, operators of motor vehicles, and other individuals to enter 
unsecured driveways of private residences.”  State v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 
516, 523 (Iowa 2004).  Therefore, a defendant “could not have had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway” and the Fourth 
Amendment would not prevent the police from entering it.  Id.; see also 
State v. Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d 526, 531–32 (Iowa 1981). 
Webb looked through Audsley’s windows while he was standing on 
the driveway of her mobile home.  We have distinguished between merely 
looking into a protected area from a public vantage point and making 
observations with the naked eye—which is not a search—and actually 
entering the protected area without the consent of the owner and 
conducting a warrantless search.  See Lewis, 675 N.W.2d at 523–24.  
 
 
 
14 
The police are free to observe areas they may not constitutionally enter 
without a warrant or some other recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement.  See id.  Officers entering areas that are open to the public 
do not wear a blindfold.  Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d at 531.  So long as 
officers make their observations from a location where they have a right 
to be, they have “a right to see what [is] visible from that position.”  Id. at 
532; see also Lewis, 675 N.W.2d at 523 (“[T]here is no legitimate 
expectation of privacy and no search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when authorities can view an activity occurring in the 
curtilage from a public area.”). 
 
In applying these legal principles to the facts of this case, we must 
analyze the significance of Webb’s location when he observed Audsley 
place something in the kitchen cabinet and saw Lowe run to the back of 
the mobile home.  Lowe claims that this observation constituted an 
illegal search and that it was later exploited to gain Audsley’s consent.  
Webb testified that he was outside the east window of the mobile home 
when he saw Audsley put something in the cabinet, that he was standing 
on the gravel drive on the east side of the house when this occurred, and 
that the blind was partially open so that he could readily see into the 
residence.  As Audsley was placing something in the cabinet, Webb 
observed Lowe run to the back of the residence.  It was only at that point 
that Webb entered the backyard.  We need not determine whether 
entering the backyard was an invasion of a legitimate expectation of 
privacy because Webb did not confront Audsley or Lowe with any 
observations he made from that vantage point.  Lowe’s claim is that 
confronting Audsley with the fact that Webb had seen her put something 
in the cabinet was an exploitation of prior police illegality.  We disagree. 
When Webb observed Audsley in the kitchen, he was standing on the 
 
 
 
15 
gravel driveway on the east side of the mobile home.  This was a public 
vantage point where the officer had a right to be, and an observation 
made with the naked eye from that point is not a search.  Lewis, 675 
N.W.2d at 523.  Since these observations were not illegal searches, 
confronting Audsley with them could not be the exploitation of a prior 
illegal search. 
2.  The officers’ alleged seizure of Lowe and Audsley after entering 
the mobile home.  Lowe contends that the police detained both Audsley 
and him without reasonable suspicion and in violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights and that this detention was exploited to gain 
Audsley’s later consent to search.  As a preliminary matter, we note that 
ordinarily, a defendant cannot challenge the seizure of another person.  6 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment § 11.3, at 129 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter LaFave] (“As for 
seizure of a person, it is clear that one person lacks standing to object to 
the seizure of another.”).  This is because “a defendant can urge the 
suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
only if that defendant demonstrates that his Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated by the challenged search or seizure.”  United States v. 
Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 81, 113 S. Ct. 1936, 1939, 123 L. Ed. 2d 635, 640 
(1993).  The mere seizure of another person would not, ordinarily, violate 
the Fourth Amendment rights of a third party.  In this case, however, 
Lowe alleges that Audsley was improperly seized and that prior illegal 
seizure was exploited to gain her consent to search the fruit can.  Lowe is 
therefore permitted to challenge the seizure of Audsley because, if 
Audsley was illegally seized and that seizure was exploited to gain her 
consent, then her consent would be fruit of the poisonous tree, making it 
invalid.  If her consent was invalid, then the police would have 
 
 
 
16 
unreasonably searched an area where Lowe had a legitimate expectation 
of privacy, therein violating his rights under the state and federal 
constitutions.4 
“Whether a ‘seizure’ occurred is determined by the totality of the 
circumstances.”  State v. Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Iowa 2008).  “The 
Supreme Court has long recognized that not all police contacts with 
individuals are deemed seizures within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”  State v. Smith, 683 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Iowa 2004) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Encounters with the police 
remain consensual “[s]o long as a reasonable person would feel free to 
disregard the police and go about his business.”  Id. at 547 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  Generally, police questioning, and 
the responses it elicits, does not constitute a seizure.  Wilkes, 756 
N.W.2d at 843; State v. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Iowa 2004). 
For a seizure to occur, there must be “objective indices of police 
coercion.”  Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d at 843.  The fact that an officer shows a 
badge, is “visibly armed,” or is in uniform has been given little weight in 
the analysis.  See id. at 843.  In order to maintain the consensual nature 
of the encounter, there should be “no show of authority, no intimidation, 
and no use of physical force by the officers in their encounter.”  Reinders, 
690 N.W.2d at 83.  Other signs of a seizure would be “evidence the 
[officer] used a commanding or threatening tone, displayed a weapon, or 
touched [the suspect].”  Smith, 683 N.W.2d at 547.  In sum, we must 
determine whether the officers impaired Audsley’s ability to control her 
                                                 
4From this point on, we will only deal with the alleged seizure of Audsley.  Lowe 
never consented to the search of the fruit can, making it impossible for the police to 
exploit a seizure of Lowe to gain his consent. 
 
 
 
17 
own residence or whether the “officers simply engaged [her] in 
conversation.”  Reinders, 690 N.W.2d at 83. 
When the officers arrived at Audsley’s residence, Schneden 
identified himself as a police officer and asked for permission to enter in 
order to question Audsley regarding a woman who had overdosed on 
drugs.  Audsley specifically consented to Schneden and Ripperger’s 
entry, and she never objected to Webb entering immediately thereafter.  
Audsley implicitly consented to Webb’s entry.  Audsley refused to 
consent to a search of her entire residence, but never asked the officers 
to leave.  The only instruction Audsley ever gave the officers—that they 
did not have permission to search her entire residence—was followed. 
Schneden characterized his interaction with Lowe and Audsley as 
“conducting an interview.”  During the course of that interview, 
Schneden took down Audsley’s information, recorded Lowe’s information 
from his identification card, and asked for both of their phone numbers, 
which they provided without objection.  During the course of the 
interview, Audsley willingly shared her interactions with Cindy during 
the day.  Schneden then asked questions about her relationship with 
Cindy.  He also informed Audsley that Cindy stated that she had 
consumed something she had gotten from Audsley earlier that day.  
Audsley denied that she had given Cindy anything illegal, but there is no 
evidence that the officers were lying about the statements Cindy made at 
the hospital or her current medical condition.  Audsley admitted that she 
knew Cindy smoked marijuana, repeatedly denied giving Cindy anything, 
and denied having any drugs in the mobile home.  She did not allow the 
officers to search because she felt there was no reason to.  Webb then 
confronted Audsley with his observations that she hid something when 
the officers knocked on the door.  When Audsley denied putting 
 
 
 
18 
something in the cabinet, Webb stated, “Don’t lie to me, ‘cause I was 
standing right there at the window and watched you do it.” 
At that point, Lowe was asked to go outside with Schneden to 
answer a few questions about his interactions with Cindy.  While Lowe 
and Schneden were outside, Webb and Ripperger continued to question 
Audsley.  Audsley denied putting anything in the cabinet, and Webb 
asked why she was lying to him.  Webb or Ripperger told Audsley, “The 
thing is, I don’t give a shit about arresting you; I don’t give a shit about 
charging you,” but that the doctors needed to know what Cindy took or 
“she may die from it.”  One of the officers reminded Audsley that Cindy 
indicated she got something from Audsley earlier that day.  At that point, 
Audsley stated, “We smoked weed together.  Do you want it?”  Lowe and 
Schneden then reentered the mobile home.  At this point, Audsley gave 
Webb permission to pick up and open the fruit can containing the 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia.  Schneden asked if the substance 
was only marijuana, and Audsley confirmed that it was.  Audsley then 
refused to consent to a search of her entire residence.  Webb and 
Schneden continued to try to find out if Audsley knew what else Cindy 
had taken, in addition to smoking marijuana, and Webb emphasized the 
danger that Cindy was in.  However, these questions occurred after 
Audsley consented to the search of the fruit can, and therefore, they 
would not impact the validity of the consent that Audsley had already 
given. 
During this encounter, all three officers were armed and had 
badges, and two were in uniform.  The officers never drew their weapons 
or touched Audsley, and they did not threaten her with arrest.  The 
officers questioned Audsley regarding the overdose, and repeatedly 
reminded her that if she were not forthcoming with any information she 
 
 
 
19 
had, it could lead to further health problems for Cindy.  There is no 
evidence in the record that this claim was false.  While the officers may 
have raised their voices, they did not use threats, intimidation, or 
physical force in such a way that would have impaired Audsley’s ability 
to control her own residence.  There were no “commands” to Audsley that 
she was required to tell the officers what they wanted to know, only 
requests for information.  There were no commands to Lowe that would 
give Audsley the impression she had been seized.  Schneden asked Lowe 
to step outside with him, and Lowe willingly did so.  There is no evidence 
either Lowe or Audsley expressed any objection to Schneden’s request to 
talk to Lowe outside Audsley’s presence.5 
After reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we determine that 
Audsley was not “seized” or detained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Audsley allowed the police into her home and voluntarily 
answered their questions.  She willingly discussed her interactions with 
Cindy throughout the day and allowed Schneden to read text messages 
off of her phone.  The officers were, as one might suspect, armed and 
wearing badges and uniforms.  This does not transform a consensual 
encounter with the police into a detention.  Audsley never asked the 
police to leave, and the one limit she placed on police activity inside her 
home—that the officers not search the entire residence—was respected 
until the officers obtained a search warrant.6  Under the facts of this 
                                                 
5We also note that, despite the claims in his brief, Lowe was not directed where 
to sit and officers did not accompany him while he changed into sweatpants, until after 
the marijuana was discovered.  These actions, therefore, could not have led Audsley to 
feel as though she had been “seized” by the police prior to her consent to search. 
 
6Lowe’s motion to suppress sought to exclude evidence obtained not only after 
consent to search was obtained, but also after police illegality.  We have stated the 
following: 
“When a claim of consensual search is preceded by illegal police action 
. . ., the government must not only show the voluntariness of the 
 
 
 
20 
case, we cannot conclude that there was any prior illegal police action 
leading up to the consent obtained from Audsley. 
B.  Was Audsley’s Consent to Search Voluntary?  A warrantless 
search conducted by free and voluntary consent does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment.  Reinier, 628 N.W.2d at 465 (citing Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2043–44, 36 L. Ed. 2d 
854, 858 (1973)).  Consent is considered to be voluntary when it is given 
without duress or coercion, either express or implied.  See Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 227, 93 S. Ct. at 2048, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 863.  This test 
balances the competing interests of legitimate and effective police 
practices against our society’s deep fundamental belief that the criminal 
law cannot be used unfairly.  See id. at 224–25, 93 S. Ct. at 2046–47, 36 
L. Ed. 2d at 861.  Thus, the concept of voluntariness which emerges as 
the test for consent represents a fair accommodation of these interests 
and values.  See id. at 229, 93 S. Ct. at 2048–49, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 864.  
The State has the burden to prove the consent was voluntary, and 
voluntariness is a “ ‘question of fact to be determined from the totality of 
all the circumstances.’ ”  Lane, 726 N.W.2d at 378 (quoting Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 227, 93 S. Ct. at 2048, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 862).  “The State is 
required to establish the consent was voluntary by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”  Reinier, 628 N.W.2d at 465. 
________________________________ 
subsequent consent under the totality of the circumstances, but must 
also establish a break in the illegal action and the evidence subsequently 
obtained under the so-called “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. 
. . .  Thus, there are two issues to analyze in a consent-to-search case 
such as this: (1) voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances, 
and (2) exploitation under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.” 
State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Iowa 2007) (citations omitted).  The two concepts 
are not the same.  However, because we conclude that no prior illegal police action has 
been established, we will focus on whether the consent was voluntary. 
 
 
 
21 
The question of voluntariness requires the consideration of many 
factors, although no one factor itself may be determinative.  See generally  
4 LaFave, § 8.2, at 50–141 (discussing several factors bearing upon the 
validity of consent).  In determining whether consent is voluntary, courts 
examine the totality of the circumstances, including relevant factors such 
as: 
“(1) the individual’s age and mental ability; (2) whether the 
individual was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs; 
(3) whether the individual was informed of [her] Miranda 
rights; and (4) whether the individual was aware, through 
prior experience, of the protections that the legal system 
provides for suspected criminals.  It is also important to 
consider the environment in which an individual’s consent is 
obtained, 
including 
(1) the 
length 
of 
the 
detention; 
(2) whether the police used threats, physical intimidation, or 
punishment to extract consent; (3) whether police made 
promises or misrepresentations; (4) whether the individual 
was in custody or under arrest when consent was given; 
(5) whether consent was given in a public or in a secluded 
location; and (6) whether the individual stood by silently or 
objected to the search.” 
United States v. Golinveaux, 611 F.3d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation 
omitted). 
There are several additional factors this court can consider when 
determining whether consent is valid.  “[L]imitations on the nature of the 
crime under investigation and the objects sought by the search” can 
minimize the seriousness of possessing drugs for personal use and may 
subtly create a belief that there will be no consequences if the occupants 
consent to a search.  Reinier, 628 N.W.2d at 469.  “These comments by 
police constitute a subtle form of deception with no reasonable basis.”  
Id.  However, a suspect acknowledging there are drugs in the house—
thereby giving the officer probable cause to obtain a search warrant—
supports the contention that consent was voluntarily obtained.  Id.; see 
also 4 LaFave § 8.2(g), at 100.  The court can also consider “knowledge 
 
 
 
22 
by the defendant of the right to refuse to consent . . . [and] whether 
police asserted any claim of authority to search prior to obtaining 
consent.”  Reinier, 628 N.W.2d at 465 (citations omitted). 
Audsley’s consent was obtained after a “knock and talk” encounter 
with the officers.  The “knock and talk” procedure generally  
involves officers knocking on the door of a house, identifying 
themselves as officers, asking to talk to the occupant about a 
criminal matter, and eventually requesting permission to 
search the house.  If successful, it allows police officers who 
lack probable cause to gain access to a house and conduct a 
search.   
The “knock and talk” procedure has generally been 
upheld as a consensual encounter and a valid means to 
request consent to search a house. 
Id. at 466 (citations omitted).  The State carries the burden of proving 
there was valid consent both to enter the home and to conduct the 
search.  Id. at 467.  The consent of officers to enter the mobile home in 
this case is not reasonably in dispute. 
Turning to our analysis of the relevant factors relating to Audsley’s 
consent, Audsley voluntarily allowed multiple police officers into her 
home.  She was twenty-eight years old, and there is nothing in the record 
to show that she suffered from any mental abnormality or was otherwise 
impaired by alcohol or drugs.  The encounter with the police took place 
“on the familiar surroundings of the threshold of [Audsley’s] home.”  See 
State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 782 (Iowa 2011).  Also, Audsley clearly 
knew she had the right to refuse consent to search because at all times 
she refused to consent to a search of her entire mobile home.7 
                                                 
7Though both parties presented evidence and made arguments regarding the 
voluntariness of Audsley’s consent to search, neither party presented evidence on the 
“knowing” and voluntary nature of her consent (requiring law enforcement to advise her 
of her right to refuse consent to search).  Audsley did not testify at the suppression 
hearings.  There is no direct evidence of her knowledge of her right to refuse consent to 
a search.  This is not surprising considering Lowe only claims that Audsley’s consent 
 
 
 
23 
Although Audsley admitted smoking marijuana earlier that day, 
there was no evidence she was too impaired to consent, and her 
discussions with the officers do not indicate the contrary.  The officers 
were at Audsley’s residence because Cindy, her friend, was at the 
hospital suffering from an overdose.  Cindy had not told the doctors what 
she took that day, but had indicated that, whatever the substance was, 
she got it from Audsley.  The officers reminded Audsley that if the 
doctors knew everything that Cindy had taken, the doctors could treat 
her more quickly.  At that point, Audsley admitted she had been smoking 
marijuana with her friend Cindy earlier that day and then asked the 
officer, “Do you want it?”  The officers then requested and received 
consent to take possession of the fruit can and received further consent 
to open the fruit can.  Audsley did not testify at the suppression hearing.  
Therefore, it is impossible to know whether Audsley admitted smoking 
marijuana and allowed the police to examine it in order to help the police 
determine what Cindy took in order to save Cindy’s life, or whether she 
only consented to a search because her will had been overborne by the 
officers.8  Though a close question, we believe, based on the behavior or 
the officers and the circumstances of the consent given, the former is a 
more accurate portrayal of Audsley’s consent than the latter. 
The questioning of Audsley was of a short duration, perhaps 
twenty minutes.  There is no evidence of threats or physical intimidation.  
________________________________ 
was involuntary, not that it was given without the knowledge she could refuse.  
Moreover, Lowe has not asked this court to adopt a knowing and voluntary requirement 
under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.  Without a full development of the 
legal and factual arguments on this issue, we decline to adopt a new standard regarding 
consent in this case. 
8It is certainly possible that Audsley would risk being charged with a minor drug 
possession offense in an effort to help the police determine what was causing her 
friend’s health problems. 
 
 
 
24 
The 
record 
does 
not 
disclose 
that 
the 
officers 
made 
any 
misrepresentations regarding Cindy’s medical condition in order to 
obtain Audsley’s consent to search the fruit can.9  The police never 
claimed they could search without Audsley’s consent.  While officers did 
ask for consent several times before the limited consent was granted, this 
is just one of the factors which the court can rely on in determining 
whether the ultimate search was voluntary.  See United States v. Cedano-
Medina, 366 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is certainly no legal 
rule that asking more than once for permission to search renders a 
suspect’s consent involuntary, particularly where the suspect’s initial 
response is ambiguous.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
see also 4 LaFave § 8.2(f), at 97–100.  Although we acknowledge prior 
unreasonable searches can also be a factor in this analysis, we have 
already concluded there was no prior misconduct by the police. 
There are also factors that weigh against the voluntariness of 
Audsley’s consent.  One of the officers told Audsley, “The thing is, I don’t 
give a shit about arresting you; I don’t give a shit about charging you,” 
and that the doctors needed to know what Cindy took or “she might die 
from it.”  These statements are troubling.  In Reinier, we noted: 
The officers told Reinier prior to obtaining her consent 
that they were not looking for small quantities of drugs but 
“meth labs” and “major dealers.”  These comments bear 
upon the voluntariness of the consent because they are 
limitations on the nature of the crime under investigation 
and the objects sought by the search.  The comments also 
tend to minimize the seriousness of possessing drugs for 
personal use or casual sales, and subtly create a false belief 
that no adverse consequences will result from a search if 
there is no meth lab in the house and the occupants are not 
                                                 
 
9The officers repeatedly reminded Audsley of Cindy’s medical condition as a way 
of pressuring her to tell them what she knew.  However, there is nothing in the record 
to indicate that these claims were inaccurate. 
 
 
 
25 
major dealers.  These comments by police constitute a subtle 
form of deception with no reasonable basis. 
Reinier, 628 N.W.2d at 469 (citations omitted).  Unlike in Reinier, the 
officer made it clear that he was looking for small amounts of drugs that 
would be used for personal use or casual sales.  In that respect, he did 
not “subtly create a false belief that no adverse consequences will result 
from a search if there is no meth lab in the house and the occupants are 
not major dealers.”  Id. 
He did, however, tell Audsley that he was not interested in 
charging her.  The officers indicated early on that they were interested in 
searching the entire premises in order to determine what drugs Cindy 
might have taken.  This officer’s comment, much like the officer’s 
comment in Reinier, “tend[ed] to minimize the seriousness of possessing 
drugs for personal use or casual sales.”  Id.  As such, it was a “subtle 
form of deception.”  Id.  However, the subtle use of deception to gain 
consent to search is only one factor among many when evaluating the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether consent is voluntary.  
Id.  We will therefore consider Webb’s statement as one of many factors 
in our analysis.10 
                                                 
10Lowe has not claimed that the officer’s statement was a promise of leniency or 
that such a promise might render Audsley’s consent involuntary, regardless of other 
factors.  Instead, Lowe makes a generalized attack under the totality of the 
circumstances.  Accordingly, we have limited our analysis to the challenges actually 
made by Lowe. 
This approach is consistent with our past cases.  Reinier treated a statement 
that minimized the consequences of possessing small amounts of drugs as one factor in 
the analysis of whether consent to search was voluntary.  On other occasions, we have 
held that statements made in response to a promise of leniency are per se inadmissible.  
See State v. Kase, 344 N.W.2d 223, 225–26 (Iowa 1984).  Evidence improperly obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded from the trial under the exclusionary 
rule in an effort to deter police misconduct, “to provide a remedy for a constitutional 
violation[,] and to protect the integrity of the judiciary.”  Lane, 726 N.W.2d at 392; see 
also State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 289 (Iowa 2000), abrogated on other grounds by 
State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).  On the other hand, “[s]tatements 
exacted by promissory leniency are not excluded on prophylactic grounds to deter police 
 
 
 
26 
While presenting a close case, in our review of the totality of the 
circumstances, we conclude that Audsley’s consent to search the can of 
fruit was voluntary.11 
We now turn to the issue of whether Audsley’s consent to search 
the fruit can is binding on Lowe. 
C.  The Impact of Audsley’s Consent on Lowe.  We have long 
held that a guest without exclusive possession of an area assumes the 
risk that his host will allow others into the common areas.  State v. 
Knutson, 234 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Iowa 1975).  Additionally, a cohabitant 
assumes the risk that other cohabitants will consent to searches of 
shared living areas.  Id. (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 
171, 94 S. Ct. 988, 993, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 249–50 (1974)).  If a person 
with authority grants consent to search shared areas, that authority is 
binding as to all other people who share the area.  State v. Bakker, 262 
N.W.2d 538, 546 (Iowa 1978). 
Authority to consent includes not only actual, but also apparent, 
authority.  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–87, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 
2799–2801, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 159–60 (1990).  Apparent authority will 
________________________________ 
misconduct; they are excluded on grounds that statements exacted under such 
circumstances are unreliable.”  Kase, 344 N.W.2d at 226.  When a statement is made in 
response to a promise of leniency, the statement’s “probative value, if any exists, is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion of issues and would be misleading 
to the jury under Iowa rule of evidence 403.”  State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 28 (Iowa 
2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  When reviewing a suspect’s 
consent to search the totality-of-the-circumstances test is used, and under that test, 
whether an officer has minimized the seriousness of possessing drugs is one factor 
among many that the court must consider. 
11We recently decided the case of State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767 (Iowa 2011).  
While on its face it may appear that the decision we make today is inconsistent with our 
decision in Pals, the cases are clearly distinguishable.  Pals involved the “inherently 
coercive” setting of a traffic stop where “Pals found himself seized in the front seat of a 
squad car with his own vehicle parked on the side of the public highway.”  Id. at 782–
83.  We noted the difference between a request for consent during a traffic stop and “an 
encounter on the familiar surroundings of the threshold of one’s home.”  Id. at 782. 
 
 
 
27 
validate a search where officials “enter without a warrant because they 
reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has 
consented to their entry” had the authority to do so.  Id. at 186, 110 S. 
Ct. at 2800, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 160.  We apply an objective standard when 
analyzing consent and ask “would the facts available to the officer at the 
moment . . . warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that 
the consenting party had authority over the premises?”  Id. at 188, 110 
S. Ct. at 2801, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 161 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
The United States Supreme Court has recently announced a 
narrow exception to the rule that a cotenant’s consent is binding on 
other cotenants.  Under the Fourth Amendment, “a physically present 
co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the 
warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him.”  Randolph, 547 
U.S. at 106, 126 S. Ct. at 1519, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 217.  Even under this 
rule, however, the police can only accord “dispositive weight to the fellow 
occupant’s contrary indication when he expresses it.”  Id. at 121–22, 126 
S. Ct. at 1527, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 227 (emphasis added).  The only possible 
way in which a co-occupant could successfully invoke this protection 
without being physically present and objecting would be if the police 
have “removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the 
sake of avoiding a possible objection.”  Id. at 121, 126 S. Ct. at 1527, 164 
L. Ed. 2d at 226–27. 
Audsley owned the mobile home where police initially obtained her 
consent to enter.  Additionally, the fruit can with the marijuana was 
found in the common area of the mobile home sitting out on the table.  
Not surprisingly, Lowe has not claimed that he was the exclusive owner 
of the fruit can.  Since the fruit can was located in the living room of her 
 
 
 
28 
home, Audsley had the actual and apparent authority to consent to a 
search of it.  There is no claim that any part of the mobile home was 
exclusively Lowe’s.  Therefore, any areas of the mobile home where Lowe 
could claim an expectation of privacy would be shared areas, and he 
would have to expect Audsley could consent to searches of those areas.  
Cf. Fleming, 790 N.W.2d at 565–67.  Most importantly, despite being 
present in the mobile home for all but a few minutes, Lowe never 
objected to the entry by the police or the search of the fruit can.  Further, 
the record evidence in this case does not support a conclusion that Lowe 
was removed from the premises for the improper purpose of his possible 
objection to the entry by officers or the search of the fruit can.  Lowe was 
not “removed” by the police.  He was asked to step outside, which he 
willingly did.  The police did not ask for consent to pick up or open the 
fruit can until after Lowe had reentered the residence. 
Lowe asks for a more expansive definition of “physically present” in 
the Randolph analysis under the Iowa Constitution.  A more expansive 
definition would not change our analysis.  Lowe’s claim under Randolph 
fails because he failed to object, not because he was not “present.” 
Lowe also asks this court to declare that article I, section 8 of the 
Iowa Constitution requires the police obtain affirmative consent from all 
physically present cotenants, as opposed to merely honoring their 
affirmative objections.  Randolph does not require this affirmative step.  
In Randolph, the Court acknowledged “it is fair to say that a caller 
standing at the door of shared premises would have no confidence that 
one occupant’s invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a 
fellow tenant stood there saying, ‘stay out.’ ” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113, 
126 S. Ct. at 1522–23, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 221.  The police should also be 
required to follow this social norm: 
 
 
 
29 
Since the co-tenant wishing to open the door to a third 
party has no recognized authority in law or social practice to 
prevail over a present and objecting co-tenant, his disputed 
invitation, without more, gives a police officer no better claim 
to reasonableness in entering than the officer would have in 
the absence of any consent at all. 
Id. at 114, 126 S. Ct. at 1523, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 222.   
The Supreme Court clearly noted it would only “afford[] dispositive 
weight to the fellow occupant’s contrary indication when he expresses it.”  
Id. at 121–22, 126 S. Ct. at 1527, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 227.  The reason for 
requiring a cotenant to actually voice his objection was that an 
alternative rule “requir[ing] the police to take affirmative steps to find a 
potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the permission they had 
already received” would “needlessly limit the capacity of the police to 
respond to ostensibly legitimate opportunities in the field.”  Id.  Lowe has 
not provided us with any reason to interpret the Iowa Constitution any 
differently.  Just as the United States Supreme Court refused to require 
the police to find every potential cotenant who may wish to object to the 
search and obtain their consent, we will not require the police to obtain 
the affirmative assent of every present cotenant prior to conducting a 
search. 
Nothing in this record would support the conclusion that Lowe was 
removed from the premises to prevent him from objecting to the search.  
Audsley had the authority to consent to the entry by police and the 
limited search of the fruit can on the coffee table.  Lowe was physically 
present at the time, but did not object to the entry by police or the search 
of the fruit can.  Because Lowe did not object, Audsley’s consent to 
search is valid as to Lowe, and allowing the evidence found to be used 
against him does not violate Lowe’s rights under either the federal or 
state constitutions. 
 
 
 
30 
D.  Conclusion.  Audsley validly consented to a search of a 
common area in the mobile home she owned.  The record evidence in this 
case does not support the conclusion Lowe was removed by the police to 
prevent his objection to the search.  Lowe never objected to the search 
even though he was physically present when the consent to search the 
fruit can was given.  The search of the fruit can with the false bottom 
was valid.   
Lowe also attempts to attack the search warrant that led to the 
discovery of the other physical evidence the State seeks to use against 
him.  This is based on the claim that the marijuana which formed the 
probable cause for the search warrant was the product of illegal police 
action or involuntary consent.  The parties agree, and the district court 
found, that the marijuana found as a result of that search did in fact 
supply the probable cause that supported the warrant application.  Since 
the consent that led to the discovery of the marijuana was not based on 
any prior illegal police action, and Audsley’s consent was voluntary, any 
attack on the search warrant is without merit.  The warrant was properly 
obtained, and therefore the physical evidence seized as a result of that 
warrant is admissible against Lowe. 
IV.  Lowe’s Statements to Jenkins Following Lowe’s Request 
for an Attorney. 
Upon his arrival with the search warrant, Jenkins read Audsley 
and Lowe their Miranda warnings.  Lowe immediately requested an 
attorney, and he was placed in a squad car while the search of the 
residence continued.  Once officers discovered what they believed to be 
components of a meth lab in the bathroom, Jenkins approached Lowe 
and asked if there was any anhydrous ammonia or other dangerous 
substances on the property.  In response to the State’s arguments on 
 
 
 
31 
discretionary review regarding the promise of leniency issue, Lowe 
contends this reinitiation of questioning violated his Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel.12  The State does not dispute that Lowe was subjected 
to a custodial interrogation or that Lowe had affirmatively invoked his 
right to counsel, when Jenkins began to question Lowe regarding the 
presence of anhydrous ammonia on the property.  The State contends 
Jenkins’s questions fall under the public safety exception to the Miranda 
warnings. 
After receiving the Miranda warnings, a suspect may waive his 
rights and respond to interrogation, or a suspect can request counsel.  
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884, 68 L. Ed. 
2d 378, 385 (1981).  “Under the Federal Constitution, the authorities 
must follow different procedural safeguards to re-interrogate a suspect 
depending on whether the suspect has invoked his or her right to remain 
silent or the right to the presence of counsel.”  Palmer, 791 N.W.2d at 
848.  In Edwards, the Court established a clear, bright-line rule: If the 
suspect requests counsel, all interrogation must cease until the detainee 
is provided with an attorney or “the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”  Edwards, 
451 U.S. at 484–85, 101 S. Ct. at 1885, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 386; see also 
                                                 
12The State claims the issue of the Miranda violation is not properly before the 
court because Lowe did not file a cross-application for discretionary review of the 
district court’s determination that the public safety exception was applicable in this 
case.  The district court ultimately suppressed the statements based on the promissory 
leniency argument.  We have stated that “we will uphold a ruling of the court on the 
admissibility of evidence on any ground appearing in the record, whether urged below 
or not.”  State v. McCowen, 297 N.W.2d 226, 227 (Iowa 1980); see also State v. Parker, 
747 N.W. 2d 196, 208 (Iowa 2008).  In this case, the issue was actually argued in front 
of the district court, which heard testimony from the officers at the scene regarding the 
potential dangers facing the officers and the reasons for reinitiating interrogation.  The 
record contains more than sufficient evidence for us to rule on the public-safety-
exception issue, and it is properly before us. 
 
 
 
32 
Palmer, 791 N.W.2d at 848 (“[T]he Court in Edwards adopted a per se 
ban on any further questioning of a suspect without the presence of 
counsel, for an indefinite duration, after the suspect invokes the right to 
counsel.”).  The Court reasoned that invoking the right to counsel is a 
“significant event” and once an accused has requested an attorney, he 
has an “ ‘undisputed right’ under Miranda to remain silent and to be free 
of interrogation.”  Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S. Ct. at 1885, 68 L. 
Ed. 2d at 386–87 (citation omitted). 
The State does not dispute that Lowe requested an attorney.  
Instead, the State seeks to extend the “public safety exception” to the 
Miranda requirements to situations like the one here, where the accused 
has requested an attorney and the police subsequently reinitiate 
questioning.  We have not previously decided whether the public safety 
exception applies after the Miranda protections have been invoked. 
The public safety exception to the Miranda warnings was first 
announced in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. 
Ed. 2d 550 (1984), and has since been adopted in Iowa.  See State v. 
Deases, 518 N.W.2d 784, 791 (Iowa 1994).  Under the public safety 
exception, when “police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a 
concern for the public safety,” without first giving suspects Miranda 
warnings, the responses those questions elicit do not violate Miranda.  
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656, 104 S. Ct. at 2631–32, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 557.  
The justification given for the rule is straightforward: “[T]he need for 
answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety 
outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.”  Id. at 657, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 558.  In ordinary interrogations, the Court 
reasoned, Miranda warnings are procedural safeguards which make a 
 
 
 
33 
suspect less likely to divulge information, and their primary “social cost” 
is fewer convictions.  Id. at 656–57, 104 S. Ct. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 
557.  In the public safety situation, however, “the cost would have been 
something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence.”  Id. at 657, 
104 S. Ct. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 558.  The cost in these situations 
would be increasing the risk of harm to the public.  Id. 
We have noted that the public safety exception is closely drawn 
and narrow in scope.  In re J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Iowa 1996); see 
also Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658, 104 S. Ct. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 558.  
For the exception to apply, there must be a threat to public safety and an 
“immediate necessity” for the information the officer seeks to obtain by 
questioning a suspect in violation of Miranda.  Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657, 
104 S. Ct. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 557.  The exception will only apply in 
situations where there is “sufficient exigency to justify the questioning.”  
In re J.D.F., 553 N.W.2d at 588.  A missing gun in a field creates 
“sufficient exigency” to justify pre-Miranda questioning.  Id. at 587–88.  
The 
exception 
also 
applies 
to 
the 
discovery 
of 
an 
active 
methamphetamine lab.  State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 275 (Iowa 
2006). 
In Simmons, officers could smell anhydrous ammonia from outside 
the door of an apartment.  Id. at 269.  After requesting permission to 
enter the apartment and receiving no response, officers forced the door 
open.  Id.  Once the door was open, the smell of anhydrous ammonia was 
strong enough to make one officer’s eyes water.  Id.  Without reciting 
Miranda warnings, the officers asked the defendant whether there was an 
active meth lab in the apartment, and the defendant said there was.  Id. 
at 269–70.  The officers then evacuated the residents of the apartment 
 
 
 
34 
across the hall, immediately called dispatch, and did not reenter the area 
without protective gear.  Id. at 270.  We held 
[the officer’s] inquiries as to the presence and status of a 
methamphetamine lab were for the purpose of obtaining 
information that would help him safely address the 
potentially volatile and dangerous situation confronting the 
officers at the scene, and not solely to obtain incriminating 
information from [the defendant]. 
Id. at 275.  Particularly, we noted the strong odor of anhydrous ammonia 
in the apartment.  Id.  The odor itself posed a safety risk to the officers 
and the neighbors, and that risk justified the officers’ failure to recite the 
Miranda warnings prior to questioning the defendant about the presence 
and nature of a meth lab.  Id.  These circumstances demonstrated 
sufficient exigency for the public safety exception to apply. 
In this case, the officers had been in Audsley’s mobile home for 
nearly five hours before officers found inactive components of a meth lab 
and Jenkins reinitiated questioning of Lowe.  During that time, the 
officers did not report any odor of anhydrous ammonia or ether, nor did 
they report any physical effects such as watering eyes.  Jenkins only 
reinitiated questioning after components of a meth lab were discovered, 
but he did not order the other officers out of the mobile home or evacuate 
the surrounding residences.  Jenkins testified that there was material in 
one of the bedrooms that smelled of anhydrous ammonia, but this 
material had not been located at the time Jenkins reinitiated 
questioning.  Jenkins also testified Lowe told him that he was not 
actively manufacturing methamphetamine in the mobile home at the 
time of the search.  Audsley confirmed that Lowe had manufactured 
methamphetamine in the past, but she had told him he could not do it in 
the house.  The only basis for the reinitiation of interrogation was the 
discovery of the inactive components of a meth lab in the bathroom. 
 
 
 
35 
The discovery of inactive components of a meth lab does not 
provide sufficient exigency to justify a public safety exception to the 
requirements of Miranda and its progeny.  Unlike the officers in 
Simmons, where the exception was applicable, Jenkins was not 
confronted with an active methamphetamine lab.  None of the officers in 
Audsley’s mobile home reported any odors of anhydrous ammonia or 
ether.  There was no evidence that the active “cooking” of meth was 
taking place.  Additionally, Jenkins did not feel the threat was severe 
enough to evacuate Audsley and his fellow officers, or to warn nearby 
residents and remove them from the potentially dangerous area.  Under 
these facts, we cannot conclude there was sufficient exigency for the 
public safety exception to apply. 
Once a suspect requests an attorney, all interrogation must cease.  
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85, 101 S. Ct. at 1885, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 386–
87; see also Palmer, 791 N.W.2d at 847–48.  Jenkins reinitiated 
questioning prior to Lowe speaking with an attorney.  Because the State 
has not shown sufficient exigency to invoke the public safety exception, 
the statements made by Lowe after he requested counsel were taken in 
violation of Miranda and Edwards.  Because there was insufficient 
exigency to invoke the public safety exception in this case, we need not 
determine whether the public safety exception could ever apply in a 
situation where the suspect had already requested an attorney.  Under 
the facts and circumstances of this case, and based upon our prior 
precedent, we hold that there is insufficient exigency to justify the 
officer’s departure from the Miranda requirements.  Since the statements 
are suppressed on this basis, we need not address the issue of 
promissory leniency. 
 
 
 
36 
V.  Disposition. 
The police did not violate Lowe’s federal or state constitutional 
rights when they searched the fruit can on the coffee table in Audsley’s 
living room.  Audsley’s consent was not the result of prior illegal police 
action and therefore the evidence is not “fruit of the poisonous tree,” nor 
was her consent involuntary under the totality of the circumstances that 
existed in this case.  Additionally, despite being physically present, Lowe 
never objected to the entry of the police or the search of the fruit can.  As 
such, the trial court was correct in denying the motion to suppress the 
physical evidence obtained pursuant to the consent and the search 
warrant.  Also, when the police reinitiated questioning of Lowe after he 
requested an attorney, they violated his constitutional rights under 
Miranda.  Accordingly, those statements were properly suppressed.  On 
discretionary review from the district court’s ruling granting the motion 
to suppress the statements, the ruling on the motion to suppress is 
affirmed.  On cross-application for discretionary review, the district 
court’s ruling denying the motion to suppress the physical evidence 
obtained based on the alleged violation of the United States and Iowa 
Constitutions is affirmed. 
 
DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED ON APPEAL; 
DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
AND CASE REMANDED. 
 
Cady, C.J., concurs; Appel, Wiggins, and Hecht, JJ., concur in part 
and dissent in part; and Waterman and Mansfield, JJ., concur specially. 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
#10–1454, State v. Lowe 
WATERMAN, Justice (concurring specially). 
 
I concur in the result and in all aspects of the well-reasoned 
majority opinion, except for its blessing of the language in State v. Pals, 
805 N.W.2d 767, 783 (Iowa 2011), characterizing traffic stops as an 
“inherently coercive” setting for determining whether a citizen’s consent 
to the search of his vehicle is voluntary.  Pals was wrongly decided for 
the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in that case.  See Pals, 
805 N.W.2d at 788 (Waterman, J., dissenting) (noting the “ ‘temporary 
and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop’ ” 
(quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 599 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1224, 
175 L. Ed. 2d 1045, 1058 (2010))).  Today’s majority correctly applies our 
precedent and Federal Fourth Amendment precedent to uphold Audsley’s 
consent to search as voluntary. 
 
I would like to respond to my dissenting colleagues.  The dissent 
thinks 
it 
“indisputable” 
that 
Howard, 
Reiner, 
and 
Randolph, 
“collectively,” require invalidation of the consent search under article I, 
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.  This is surprising because none of 
those cases was decided under a separate analysis of Iowa constitutional 
law.13 
 
Moreover, each of those cases is distinguishable.  In State v. 
Howard, the officer told the defendant that “he was only interested in 
retrieving the [stolen] property and that if Howard turned it over to the 
authorities, he would not be prosecuted.”  509 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Iowa 
1993).  That is quite different from the circumstances surrounding 
                                                 
13Reinier invalidated the search under both the Fourth Amendment and the Iowa 
Constitution, but its analysis was based on Fourth Amendment precedent and there 
was no separate consideration of the Iowa Constitution.  State v. Reiner, 628 N.W.2d 
460, 464, 469 (Iowa 2001). 
 
 
 
38 
Audsley’s consent to search.  No promise of leniency was made to her.  
State v. Reiner is closer to being on point, as the majority opinion 
acknowledges, but is still readily distinguishable because the police both 
“asserted authority to search” and engaged in “deception with no 
reasonable basis.”  628 N.W.2d 460, 468–69 (Iowa 2001).  Here, neither 
of those factors is present.  The police did not state or imply they could 
search without consent; rather, they asked Audsley whether they could 
search, and she initially told them no, but later handed them the 
Del Monte fruit can with the marijuana and pipe.  There is also no 
indication any misrepresentation was made to Audsley.  To the contrary, 
no one disputed the officer told Audsley the truth when he said her 
friend (who Audsley admitted smoked marijuana with her earlier that 
day) was in a medical emergency due to a drug overdose.  Finally, 
Georgia v. Randolph draws a “line” that the consent of the only cotenant 
who is present is valid “[s]o long as there is no evidence that the police 
have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the 
sake of avoiding a possible objection.”  547 U.S. 103, 121, 126 S. Ct. 
1515, 1527, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208, 226–27 (2006).  As the majority notes 
and the dissent does not dispute, there is nothing in the record to 
suggest the police removed Lowe to forestall his objection to a search. 
 
In short, I do not think Howard, Reiner, and Randolph can be fairly 
read, even “collectively,” to require invalidation of the initial search in 
this case.  As in Pals, the problem here is not that the existing Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure precedents are unclear.  The problem is 
that members of this court believe those precedents lead to an unjust 
result and therefore want to chart a different path under the Iowa 
Constitution. 
 
 
 
39 
 
The dissent then moves to its real point, which is that we should 
adopt a rule under the Iowa Constitution requiring police to advise 
occupants of their right to refuse a search.  The dissent claims this 
would provide a “much clearer rule.”  I have my doubts.  The dissent’s 
proposed rule works only in one direction: If the advice was not given, 
then the search is invalid.  If it was given, the search could still be 
invalid if the consent is shown to be involuntary for some other reason.  
See Reiner, 628 N.W.2d at 469 (consent found to be involuntary based on 
police conduct and statements even though defendant read and signed 
written consent form).  I am not sure the dissent’s one-way rule provides 
much clarity.  To the contrary, the dissent’s seductive allure of promised 
new clarity in determining the validity of residential consent searches 
must be weighed against the significant uncertainty inevitably resulting 
from the break with Iowa and federal search and seizure precedent and 
the lack of clarity over how far the new advance warning requirement 
would be extended in future cases. 
 
Yet another problem with the dissent’s approach is its disconnect 
from the present case.  In the dissent’s view, a consent to search is 
automatically “involuntary” unless the person was told he or she had a 
right to refuse the search.  But in this case, Audsley unquestionably 
knew she had that right.  She indicated to the police she would not 
consent to a search of her premises; those requests were consistently 
honored.  She did at one point retrieve the fruit can, hand it to the police, 
and agree that they could open it; but there is no doubt on this record 
she knew she had the right not to do so.  She then refused to consent to 
a broader search of the premises.  If the search here is to be deemed 
“involuntary,” the reason cannot be Audsley’s ignorance of her legal 
 
 
 
40 
rights.  Thus, the dissent would construct a rule to address an issue that 
is not even presented by this case.14 
In any event, I would be very hesitant to throw aside decades of 
precedent and create another discrepancy between Fourth Amendment 
law and how the identically worded article I, section 8 of the Iowa 
Constitution is interpreted.  See Reiner, 628 N.W.2d at 464 (stating that 
the “same fundamental right of privacy is found” in the Fourth 
Amendment and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution).  The 
dissent says that consent forms are practical to use and would not 
significantly affect law enforcement.  It would be nice if law enforcement 
could weigh in on this subject.15  They could if the consent requirement 
were adopted legislatively, rather than as a new-found interpretation of 
the Iowa Constitution.  Because we are talking about changing the law to 
make it more “practical,” this strikes me as an argument that should be 
directed in the first instance to the legislature.  The dissent cites Welch v. 
Iowa Department of Transportation, but it is important to recognize that 
Welch involved adherence to a long-standing bright-line rule of statutory 
interpretation, as opposed to overturning long-standing constitutional 
precedent.  801 N.W.2d 590, 592 (Iowa 2011).  And merely because prior 
warnings on written consent forms offer benefits and are currently in use 
by some law enforcement agencies does not mean we should reinterpret 
our state constitution to require them hereafter. 
                                                 
14The dissent accuses me of trying to send a “message” that repeated police 
pressure on a person who initially refuses a search but ultimately succumbs to the 
pressure renders the search valid.  Not at all.  All I am saying is (a) the pressure in this 
case was not such as to render Audsley’s consent involuntary, and (b) it makes no 
sense to adopt a new rule requiring police to tell persons they have a right to refuse a 
search in a case in which the individual’s knowledge of that right was not at issue. 
15Here, not even the parties have weighed in on the subject because no one 
argued here—or below—for the mandatory warning approach proposed by the dissent. 
 
 
 
41 
The dissent presents no persuasive reason to overturn our own 
precedent under both the Fourth Amendment and article I section 8 of 
the Iowa Constitution holding prior warnings are not required for consent 
searches. See State v. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Iowa 2004) (“An 
individual’s response [to police requests to search] is considered 
consensual, even though the person has not been advised that he is free 
to refuse to respond.”  (citing United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 
203, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2112, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242, 253 (2002))).  The only 
caselaw cited by the dissent in support of its proposed sea change in 
search and seizure law are the decisions of just four other state supreme 
courts.  Those decisions are outliers. 
The overwhelming majority of state appellate courts analyzing 
consent search issues on independent state constitutional grounds 
follows the federal approach and reject a requirement that police advise 
suspects they can decline requests for permission to search.  See, e.g., 
State v. Flores, 185 P.3d 1067, 1071 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (“Every other 
state court that has been asked to adopt the Ferrier rule as a matter of 
state constitutional law has rejected it.”) (collecting knock-and-talk 
cases); Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738 A.2d 427, 432 (Pa. 1999) (“Those 
states that have addressed this issue, however, have, for the most part, 
rejected the notion that knowledge of one’s right to refuse consent to a 
warrantless search is required under the applicable state constitution, 
opting instead to follow the federal voluntariness standard which focuses 
on the totality of the circumstances as opposed to any one factor.”) 
(collecting other cases). 
The dissent fails to note that the leading case of its minority of 
four, State v. Ferrier, was expressly based on a unique state 
constitutional provision stating, “No person shall be disturbed in his 
 
 
 
42 
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”  960 P.2d 
927, 930 (Wash. 1998) (quoting Wash. Const. art. I, § 7).  As the Ferrier 
court confirmed, “This provision differs from the Fourth Amendment in 
that, ‘[u]nlike the Fourth Amendment, Const. art. I, § 7 “clearly 
recognizes an individual’s right to privacy with no express limitations.” ’ ”  
Id. (quoting State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 596 (Wash. 1994)).  By 
contrast, the Iowa search and seizure provision and the Fourth 
Amendment are worded identically. 
Nevertheless, a sharply divided Arkansas Supreme Court relied on 
Ferrier in adopting a warning requirement under its state constitution in 
State v. Brown.  156 S.W.3d 722, 731 (Ark. 2004).  The dissenting 
opinion begins, “Today, a 4–3 divided court issues an opinion that makes 
a radical change in Arkansas search and seizure law.  The decision is 
clearly contrary to prior law and the change is totally unwarranted and 
unnecessary.” Id. at 732 (Glaze, J., dissenting).  Justice Glaze’s 
observation would be equally true for Iowa if today’s dissent had one 
more vote in this case. 
My colleagues’ dissent cites “values underlying article I, section 8,” 
but those values are the same values that underlie the Fourth 
Amendment and all other state constitutional search and seizure 
provisions.  None of those values are new; none of the dissent’s 
arguments are new.  Do today’s dissenters understand those values 
better than the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, the justices 
of the great majority of state supreme courts, and our own predecessors 
on this court who have declined to hold that a consent to search is 
automatically invalid unless the individual was expressly told he or she 
had a right to refuse consent?  Where others have looked at the same 
 
 
 
43 
“values” for so long and generally come to a different conclusion, I would 
be hesitant to substitute my assessment of “values” so quickly. 
Notwithstanding the dissent’s references to “special protection of 
the home,” the dissent also implies that its requirement of a prior 
warning of a right to refuse should apply to vehicle searches.  The 
dissent criticizes the reasoning in the Pals majority opinion that one of 
the dissenters wrote just three months ago.  And logically speaking, there 
is no reason why the dissent’s requirement of a prior warning should not 
apply to searches of the person.  Or, for that matter, to noncustodial 
interrogations that yield confessions which in the dissent’s new world 
would be inadmissible without prior warnings.  I would not go there. 
 
Mansfield, J., joins this special concurrence. 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
#10–1454, State v. Lowe 
APPEL, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
I 
readily 
concur 
in 
the 
majority’s 
discussion 
of 
exigent 
circumstances.  I dissent, however, on the issue of consent to search. 
 
Certainly we all recognize that the home is entitled to special 
protection under the Fourth Amendment.  This special protection of the 
home has been repeatedly emphasized by the United States Supreme 
Court and by this court.  Protection of the home is wired into the Fourth 
Amendment; article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution; and in the DNA 
of judges who believe the constitutional provisions regulating search and 
seizure have meaning. 
 
For instance, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 
524, 532, 29 L. Ed. 746, 751 (1886), abrogated on other grounds by 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1647–48, 18 
L. Ed. 2d 782, 789 (1967), the Court emphasized that constitutional 
search and seizure principles apply 
to all invasions on the part of the government and its 
employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies 
of life.  It is not the breaking of his doors, and the 
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of 
the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty, and private property . . . . 
 
And then in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 34 S. Ct. 
341, 344, 58 L. Ed. 652, 656 (1914), overruled in part on other grounds 
by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 
L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1089–90 (1961), the court said: 
If letters and private documents [could] . . . be [unlawfully] 
seized [from a home without a warrant] and used in evidence 
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 
[Fourth] Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against 
such searches and seizures, is of no value, and . . . might as 
well be stricken from the Constitution. 
 
 
 
45 
 
Similarly, in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14, 68 
S. Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440 (1948), the Supreme Court, in 
Justice Jackson’s famous words, declared: 
 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is 
not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 
reasonable men draw from evidence.  Its protection consists 
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.  Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a 
magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search 
warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a 
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave 
the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police 
officers. 
 
While the current United States Supreme Court has dramatically 
scaled 
back 
Fourth 
Amendment 
protections, 
it 
has 
repeatedly 
emphasized the sanctity of the home as being at the core of Fourth 
Amendment protections.  For example, in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 
705, 717, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3304, 82 L. Ed. 2d 530, 542 (1984), the Court 
held that a search warrant is required when an electronic monitor is 
placed in a drum outside of the home, but is subsequently carried into 
the home.  In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 
1388, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 661 (1980), the Court held that an arrest 
warrant is required to enter the home of an occupant.  In Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2046, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94, 106 
(2001), the Court held that a warrant is required to use a device not in 
general public use that measures heat within the home even when there 
is no physical intrusion. 
 
The sanctity of the home was an underpinning of this court’s 
recent opinion in State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 2010).  In Ochoa, 
we stated, “The home plays a central role in a person’s life, providing 
 
 
 
46 
sanctuary, comfort, seclusion, security, and identity.”  Ochoa, 792 
N.W.2d at 289.  We observed the Iowa framers “clearly endorsed” the 
notion of the sanctity of the home, and we explained our caselaw has 
historically “reflected considerable solicitude to the sanctity of the home.”  
Id. at 275, 285.  We further emphasized that “[i]nvasions of the home by 
government officials cannot be regarded as constitutionally insignificant.”  
Id. at 289. 
 
The need to guard against invasions of the home has been long 
recognized in the knock-and-talk context.  Felix Frankfurter once wrote 
to Chief Justice Warren in connection with search and seizure law that 
“[t]o the extent that I am charged, not by you, with being ‘a nut’ on the 
subject of the ‘knock at the door,’ I am ready to plead guilty.”  Bernard 
Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court—A Judicial 
Biography 266 (1983).  Not surprisingly, there is considerable caselaw 
and academic commentary cautioning about use of the knock-and-talk 
procedure to evade the warrant requirement ordinarily required before 
police may search a home. 
 
For example, in Hayes v. State, 794 N.E.2d 492, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2003), the court noted, “While not per se unlawful, the knock and talk 
procedure ‘pushes the envelope’ and can easily be misused.”  Similarly, 
in United States v. Johnson, 170 F.3d 708, 721 (7th Cir. 1999) (Evans, J., 
concurring), it was observed that “the seeds of this bad search were sown 
when the police decided to use the ‘knock and talk’ technique.”  Justice 
Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 
124, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1528–29, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208, 228 (2006) (Stevens, 
J., concurring), suggested that there is a need for a tightened 
voluntariness standard in connection with knock and talks. 
 
 
 
47 
 
A number of courts have suggested police must have at least 
reasonable suspicion before a knock-and-talk procedure may be 
implemented.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720–21 
(5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 
1991).  Some commentators have suggested the requirement of 
reasonable suspicion does not go far enough.  See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, 
“Knock and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 Ind. L.J. 1099, 1117 
(2009) [hereinafter Bradley].  Although the issue of reasonable suspicion 
is not an issue in this case, these authorities cited above demonstrate 
the sensitivity of courts in considering the invasion of privacy interests 
inherent in the knock-and-talk procedure. 
 
Academics have cautioned that knock-and-talk methods may 
render the search warrant requirement nugatory.  See, e.g., Bradley, 84 
Ind. L.J. at 1099.  These commentators often favor a requirement of a 
knowing and intentional waiver in order to promote the sanctity of the 
home and defend the ordinary requirements of probable cause and a 
judicial warrant before a home may be searched.  Id. at 1127. 
 
With this background, we now turn to the issue of consent in the 
present case.  In State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767 (Iowa 2011), this court 
determined that an automobile search was invalid under article I, section 
8 of the Iowa Constitution.  We noted weaknesses in the federal court 
application of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 
36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973).  Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 779–82.  While we reserved 
the issue of whether to adopt a more demanding “knowing and voluntary 
waiver test” under Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 
L. Ed. 1461 (1938), for another day, we held that any application of a 
totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether consent was 
voluntary must be done with rigor to promote the constitutional values 
 
 
 
48 
underlying article I, section 8.  Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 782.  Although we 
are confronted with a different factual scenario in this case, applying the 
more rigorous totality-of-the-circumstances test described in Pals leads 
to the conclusion that the consent in this case should be considered 
involuntary. 
 
First, I begin with recognition that this case involves a search of 
the home.  One of the abuses that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment 
was the abuse caused by the King’s agents through dragnet searches of 
homes without probable cause which were purportedly authorized by 
general warrants and writs of assistance.  In light of the history, and the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment itself, protection of the home from 
generalized searches not supported by probable cause has long been 
considered at the core of search and seizure law.  See Johnson, 333 U.S. 
at 14, 68 S. Ct. at 369, 92 L. Ed. at 440; Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630, 6 S. Ct. 
at 532, 29 L. Ed. at 751; see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40, 121 S. Ct. at 
2046, 150 L. Ed. 2d at 106; Karo, 468 U.S. at 716–17, 104 S. Ct. at 
3304, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 542; Payton, 445 U.S. at 603, 100 S. Ct. at 1388, 
63 L. Ed. 2d at 661.  Our cases recognize the sanctity of the home in the 
Iowa constitutional tradition as well.  See, e.g., Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 
274–75; State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 167, 96 N.W. 739, 731 (1903).  
Most recently, in Ochoa, we built on earlier state precedent, which noted 
that “the right of officers to thrust themselves into the home is a matter 
of ‘grave concern.’ ”  Id. (quoting State v. Brant, 260 Iowa 758, 763, 150 
N.W.2d 621, 625 (1967)). 
 
In short, there is ample support for the common sense notion that 
we should be especially solicitous of the privacy interest in a person’s 
home in considering search and seizure questions under article I, section 
8 of the Iowa Constitution.  The centrality of the home in search and 
 
 
 
49 
seizure law dictates that we engage in a searching analysis before we 
conclude that the constitutional right to privacy in the home has been 
waived in the knock-and-talk context.  “[T]he closer officers come to 
intrusion into a dwelling, the greater the constitutional protection.”  State 
v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 931 (Wash. 1998) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Brown, 156 S.W.3d 722, 731 
(Ark. 2004) (fundamental interest in the home requires that any violation 
requires strict scrutiny and compelling state interest).  Therefore, in the 
knock-and-talk context we should take seriously the notion that 
“physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of 
the Fourth Amendment is directed.”  United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 
U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 1225, 2134, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752, 764 (1972). 
 
Second, I think it obvious that knock and talks have an element of 
inherent coercion.16  I note the admonition of Caleb Foote many years 
ago that “what on their face are merely words of request take on color 
from the officer’s uniform, badge, gun, and demeanor.”  Caleb Foote, The 
Fourth Amendment:  Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 402, 403 (1960).  It has more recently been 
observed that “[i]t is inherently improbable that criminal suspects 
voluntarily would consent to the discovery of the very evidence necessary 
to seal their legal demise.”  Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from the 
Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interrogations, 27 Cap. U. L. Rev. 79, 128 (1998).  
A police request for consent “however gently phrased, is likely to be taken 
by even the toughest citizen as a command.  Refusal of requested 
‘permission’ is thought by most of us to risk unpleasant, though 
                                                 
 
16There is authority for the proposition that the level of inherent coercion in the 
context of a knock and talk is less than in a traffic stop.  See State v. Domicz, 907 A.2d 
395, 407 (N.J. 2006).  This may be true, but while the element of coercion may be 
somewhat less, the interest in privacy is at its zenith in the home. 
 
 
 
50 
unknown, consequences.”  H. Richard Uviller, Tempered Zeal: A Columbia 
Law Professor’s Year on the Streets with the New York City Police 81 
(1988).17  As a result, we have recently said that any application of 
Schneckloth must be made “with teeth” and cannot involve a cursory 
review of evidence leading to an inevitable conclusion.  See Pals, 805 
N.W.2d at 782; see also Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court’s 
Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 215, 233 (1997). 
 
Third, there is a question regarding a promise of leniency or similar 
representations.  In this case, law enforcement officers represented that 
they were not interested in the crimes of the homeowner, but only in the 
health of third parties.  This representation is indistinguishable from the 
representation made in State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1993).  In 
Howard, we held that an officer’s statement that “no one was in trouble 
and that the officer intended only to recover the stolen property” was a 
sufficient promise of leniency to invalidate consent to search.  Howard, 
509 N.W.2d at 767002E 
 
Further, in State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 469 (Iowa 2001), a 
resident signed a written consent form stating that the resident 
consented to the search, that the consent was “free from duress and 
coercion,” that the party could ask the officers “to stop searching at any 
time,” and that the officers could not make the search of the property 
except “by legal warrant.”  Appendix at 56, State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 
460 (Iowa 2001) (No. 99–1963).  Notwithstanding the execution of the 
consent, the officers’ statements that they were not looking for small 
                                                 
 
17These authorities are cited in Tracey Maclin, The Good and Bad News About 
Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 McGeorge L. Rev. 27, 28 n.6, 52 n.162 
(2008). 
 
 
 
51 
quantities of drugs but “meth labs” and “major dealers” were found to 
bear on the voluntariness of the consent because the statements 
reflected limitations on the nature of the crime under investigation.  We 
stated in Reinier that such statements “subtly create a false belief that no 
adverse consequences” will result from the search even when the police 
obtain a written consent to search from the defendant.  Reinier, 628 
N.W.2d at 469.  Like Howard, our holding and analysis in Reinier 
strongly indicates the consent in this case should not be considered 
voluntary. 
 
A ruling to the contrary in this case would amount to a departure 
from our established approach in Howard and Reinier.  Citing Reinier 
with approval, Professor LaFave emphasizes that even a truthful 
representation that tends to minimize the consequences undermines 
voluntariness.  4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment § 8.2(n), at 140 (4th ed. 2004) [hereinafter LaFave]. 
 
Fourth, there was an assertion of authority when the officers 
directed persons to sit on couches and leave the premises.  It may not 
have technically amounted to a seizure, but nonetheless it appears that 
police were asserting control of the situation.  Police commands in the 
confines of a home suggest consent may be more a product of 
acquiescence than a truly voluntary act.  This conduct is a factor that 
tips against voluntariness.  See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121, 126 S. Ct. at 
1527, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 226–27 (stating where police separate co-
occupant for purpose of avoiding possible objections of one of the 
occupants to the search, the search is invalid).  This is precisely what 
occurred in this case. 
 
Fifth, law enforcement did not advise the resident that she had a 
right to refuse consent.  We discussed this element extensively in Pals, 
 
 
 
52 
observing a disclosure of the right to decline the search is a very 
important feature of determining whether there has been an appropriate 
balance between police authority and the rights of citizens.  See Pals, 
805 N.W.2d at 783.  As noted by Justice Stevens in the context of the 
search of a home, cotenants should be advised that “each of the partners 
has a constitutional right that he or she may independently assert or 
waive.”  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 125, 126 S. Ct. at 1529, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 
229 (Stevens, J., concurring).  While under a Schneckloth-type totality-of-
the-circumstances test the failure to inform a suspect of the right to 
refuse consent is not dispositive, I would accord it great weight in the 
knock-and-talk context.  Where the privacy interests are the highest and 
most intense, a truly voluntary consent to search is less likely than 
where the invasion of privacy is minimal.  Stated in other words, ignorant 
consent does not seem likely to be truly voluntary when uniformed police 
arrive at the home and seek to search highly private areas.18 
 
In this regard, it is important to further note that the repetitive 
refusal to consent is an aggravating factor.19  4 LaFave § 8.2(f), at 98 
(stating it would seem that a suspect’s earlier refusal to give consent is a 
factor which is properly taken into account as part of the totality of 
circumstances in judging the later consent).  At least one commentator 
has suggested that once a person declines consent to a search, a rule 
similar to that in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 101 S. Ct. 
1880, 1885, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386 (1981), should apply, namely, that 
                                                 
 
18For exploration of the concept of ignorant consent, see Morgan Cloud, 
Ignorance and Democracy, 39 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1143 (2007). 
 
19Oddly, the special concurrence turns this factor on its head, suggesting that 
because Audsley at first refused, her later consent is voluntary.  The message of the 
special concurrence is that repeated police pressure on a resident after he or she 
refuses consent, which ultimately overcomes his or her resistance, produces a valid 
search. 
 
 
 
53 
police must scrupulously honor the request in order to avoid implicit 
coercion incompatible with Fourth Amendment principles.  Tracey 
Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme 
Court, 39 McGeorge L. Rev. 27, 80–81 (2008). 
 
Under the circumstances, namely, a search of a home, the lack of 
a clear statement of the right to refuse consent, statements limiting the 
purpose of the search, and the repeated refusal to consent to search, I 
would hold the search is involuntary under article I, section 8 of the Iowa 
Constitution.  As noted in Reinier: 
Police can request consent to enter and search a home in the 
course of investigating a complaint without intimidation, 
implied authority, or minimizing the consequences.  We 
think the fair accommodation between the interest in 
effective law enforcement and our fundamental belief in fair 
law enforcement procedures requires this conclusion. 
Reinier, 628 N.W.2d at 469. 
 
The cases try to put a degree of structure on the determination of 
voluntariness, and I think that Howard, Reinier, and Randolph, 
collectively require a finding of involuntariness.  If we do not utilize this 
caselaw to structure the analysis, we are left with a wide open, totality-
of-the-circumstances test in which the seven members of this court, in 
essence, sit as a jury to weigh whether the consent was really a voluntary 
one or whether it was directly or indirectly coerced.  Our caselaw, of 
course, has long recognized that atmospherics play an important role in 
that determination.  We seek a realistic, and not a formal, assessment of 
the totality of circumstances.  In my view, the majority does not give 
proper recognition to the notion that the consent exception to the 
warrant requirement is a “ ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ ” exception.  
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109, 126 S. Ct. at 1520, 164 L. Ed. 2d at 219 
 
 
 
54 
(quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499, 78 S. Ct. 1253, 1257, 
2 L. Ed. 2d 1514, 1519 (1958)). 
 
Yet, it is not at all surprising, and indeed, it is completely to be 
expected, that members of this court, like members of a jury, would have 
different views in many cases.  Specifically, the majority believes the 
record shows that the resident had knowledge of her right to decline the 
request to search and that the environment was not sufficiently coercive 
to invalidate the search.  For the reasons already stated, I see the 
situation much differently. 
 
In Pals, we declined to reach the question of whether we should 
abandon a Schneckloth-type voluntariness test in favor of the knowing 
and voluntary waiver test in Zerbst.  Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 782.  It was 
unnecessary in Pals to reach the larger issue as the court determined a 
narrower ground was sufficient to decide the issues at hand.  Id. 
 
While deciding an issue on narrow grounds is generally sound, this 
case demonstrates that a Schneckloth-type voluntariness test, even one 
“with teeth,” does not yield completely satisfactory results.  As a leading 
authority has noted in the context of Schneckloth, “[I]t can seldom be 
said with confidence that a particular combination of factors will 
inevitably ensure a finding of either consent or no consent” because of 
the difficulty in applying the multifactored voluntariness test.”  4 LaFave 
§ 8.2, at 53–54.  The spongy nature of the Schneckloth voluntariness test 
has not escaped the courts, where it has been noted that courts can be 
bogged down in “needless suppression motions, hearings, and appeals.”  
Hayes v. State, 794 N.E.2d 492, 497–98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).20 
                                                 
 
20According to a leading Fourth Amendment treatise, the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of consent in Schneckloth “generates almost universal criticism from 
commentators.”  See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment: Its History and 
Interpretation § 10.4.1, at 418 (2008) (citing numerous law review commentaries). 
 
 
 
55 
 
There have been several judicial reactions to the inherent 
instability of Schneckloth-type totality-of-the-circumstances review.  One, 
as noted by Professor Weinreb, has been for courts to simply “provide a 
lengthy factual description followed by a conclusion . . . without anything 
to connect the two.”  Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth 
Amendment, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47, 57 (1974).  Another approach is to 
give lip service to the open-ended totality-of-the-circumstances test in 
Schneckloth, but instead focus on something else, such as the wording of 
the request (was it a question or a demand) or upon police misconduct.  
See William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal 
Procedure, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1064 (1995) (stating that the consent 
issue often turns on whether police frame command as a question or a 
demand); Brian A. Sutherland, Note, Whether Consent to Search Was 
Given Voluntarily: A Statistical Analysis of Factors That Predict the 
Suppression Rulings of the Federal District Courts, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2192, 
2195 (2006) (finding that police misconduct rather than voluntariness 
factors is most predictive of outcomes).  Even these reformulated 
shortcuts are not always consistently applied, with the end result that 
there is considerable instability in the caselaw, with nuances and 
hairsplitting ultimately deciding the cases.  See generally Fern L. Kletter, 
Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule Permitting Knock and 
Talk Visits Under Fourth Amendment and State Constitutions, 15 A.L.R. 
6th 515 (2006) (citing hundreds of cases with differing results). 
 
In light of the difficulties of applying a multifactored test, a number 
of states have adopted the view that in the knock-and-talk setting, police 
must first advise a resident of his or her right to refuse consent before 
consent may be considered voluntary.  See, e.g., State v. Brown, 156 
S.W.3d 722, 732 (Ark. 2004); Graves v. State, 708 So. 2d 858, 864 (Miss. 
 
 
 
56 
1997); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J. 1975); State v. Ferrier, 960 
P.2d 927, 932–33 (Wash. 1998).21  These cases generally find that knock-
and-talk procedures carry with them a degree of coercion; that the home 
is entitled to special Fourth Amendment protection; and that as a result, 
a resident must be advised that they may lawfully refuse to give consent. 
 
It is sometimes claimed that advising a person of the right to refuse 
consent would deprive police of an effective law enforcement tool.  
Indeed, Schneckloth itself states that a requirement of a warning would 
“create serious doubt whether consent searches could continue to be 
conducted.”  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S. Ct. at 2049, 36 
L. Ed. 2d at 864.  Such an assertion is logically flawed and factually 
incorrect. 
 
First, the effective law enforcement argument proves too much.  If 
depriving police of a tool that produces evidence is the standard, the 
search and seizure provisions of article I, section 8 of the Iowa 
Constitution would never be enforced and it would be effectively 
                                                 
 
21There are now literally thousands of decisions where state supreme courts 
have interpreted state constitutions to grant claims of individual rights and liberties 
under circumstances where the United States Supreme Court has declined to do so.  
See 1 Jennifer Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims, 
and Defenses § 1.01[1], at 1-2 (4th ed. 2006); see generally Robert F. Williams, The Law 
of American State Constitutions (2009) [hereinafter Williams].  The principle of 
independent interpretation applies when state and federal constitutional provisions are 
identical or nearly identical.  See State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 264–66 (Iowa 2010) 
(generally discussing independent state law grounds, including when provisions of state 
and federal constitution are identical in language); State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 284–
85 (Iowa 2000) (stating “no principle of law requires this court to interpret the Iowa 
Constitution in line with the United States Constitution”), abrogated on other grounds 
by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001); see also State v. Christensen, 
953 P.2d 583, 586 (Idaho 1998) (“Long gone are the days when state courts will blindly 
apply United States Supreme Court interpretation and methodology” even under nearly 
identically worded constitutional provisions) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 20 (Tex. 1992) (stating state courts should 
borrow from well-reasoned and persuasive precedent when “deemed helpful, but should 
never feel compelled to parrot the federal judiciary”); Williams at 135 (stating the notion 
that United States Supreme Court precedents are presumptively correct under state law 
is “simply wrong”). 
 
 
 
57 
repealed.  As noted by the United States Supreme Court in the context of 
federal search and seizure law, “[T]he mere fact that law enforcement 
may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the 
Fourth Amendment.”  Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S. Ct. 
2408, 2414, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 301 (1978).  The same is true under 
article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. 
 
Further, the notion that effective law enforcement rests upon 
citizen ignorance is not a principle that should be relied upon in a 
democratic state based on the rule of law.  While justice should be blind 
to irrelevancies when weighing the evidence in the courtroom, citizens 
facing searches of their homes are entitled to have their eyes open.  
Justice Goldberg got it right fifty years ago in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 
U.S. 478, 490, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 1764, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 985 (1964), when 
he wrote, “We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no 
system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend 
for its continued effectiveness on the citizens’ abdication through 
unawareness of their constitutional rights.”  See also James A. Adams, 
Search and Seizure As Seen by Supreme Court Justices: Are They Serious 
or Is This Just Judicial Humor?, 12 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 413, 449 
(1993) [hereinafter Adams] (stating “constitutional rights are not to be 
hidden or only grudgingly given”). 
 
In any event, the available empirical evidence is that requiring 
knowledge of the right to refuse consent does not dramatically reduce the 
number of consent searches.  Empirical data from Ohio and New Jersey 
demonstrate that requiring warnings in the context of automobile 
searches only marginally decreases consent to search.  See Illya 
Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The Effects of Robinette on the “Voluntary” 
Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 How. L.J. 349, 370 (2001) 
 
 
 
58 
(stating warnings reduced consent to search by motorists by less than 
ten percent). 
 
The Schneckloth Court also declared that it would be “impractical” 
to provide warnings in the give and take of police encounters with 
citizens.  Professor Adams declared such an argument “absurd.”  Adams, 
12 St. Louis L. Rev. at 447.  Subsequent events have vindicated his 
position.  California and New Jersey have agreed to settlements of 
lawsuits which require written warnings for motorists when officers seek 
consent to search.  The FBI has used written consents that advise 
citizens of their right to refuse consent since the time of Schneckloth, and 
the caselaw across the country demonstrates that law enforcement 
officers commonly seek written consent to search.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Boone, 245 F.3d 352, 362 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1453–54 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Tatman, 
615 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (S.D. Ohio 2008); State v. Brown, 156 S.W.3d 
722, 724–25 (Ark. 2004). 
 
Indeed, law enforcement authorities in Iowa are no different than 
those in other states when it comes to written consent to search.  Our 
caselaw shows that written consent forms that advise a party of his right 
to refuse consent are practical and in use in Iowa.  See State v. Howard, 
509 N.W.2d 764 (Iowa 1993); State v. Dougherty, No. 09–0812, 2011 WL 
441551, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011); State v. DeWitt, No. 02–1379, 
2003 WL 22805617, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2003).  And, in this 
case, law enforcement officers properly recorded the encounter, thereby 
eliminating the “he said, she said” swearing match.22  Whatever else 
                                                 
 
22Affordable technology now allows interrogations, citizen encounters, and 
identification procedures such as lineups to be recorded.  Such recordings reduce the 
potential for factual disputes and promote adherence to professional law enforcement 
practices. 
 
 
 
59 
might be true, obtaining written consents that contain appropriate brief 
statements advising citizens of the right to refuse consent is not 
impractical at all. 
 
Indeed, our precedents are strongly pushing in the direction of 
cleaning up Schneckloth.  In Welch v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 
801 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 2011), this court considered whether a driver 
could change his mind after he refused to consent to a chemical testing 
under Iowa’s implied consent law.  We held that a driver could not 
change his mind once he refused.  We stated: 
[A] bright-line rule has the advantage of providing clear 
guidance to law enforcement personnel.  Clarity as to what 
the law requires is generally a good thing.  It is especially 
beneficial when the law governs interactions between the 
police and citizens. 
Welch, 801 N.W.2d at 601.  This powerful language cuts dead against 
continued application of the totality-of-the-circumstances test of 
Schneckloth. 
 
We can continue to employ a multifactored test for determining 
consent issues under article I, section 8.  We have improved on this test 
considerably by applying a more rigorous review than under federal 
precedents.  Yet, the totality-of-the-circumstances test of Schneckloth is 
inherently unstable. 
 
As a result, I am convinced that it would be better simply to 
require that law enforcement advise a homeowner or resident of his or 
her constitutional right to decline to consent to a search.  This would 
provide a much clearer rule for law enforcement and citizens alike.  See 
Welch, 801 N.W.2d at 601.  When the homeowner or resident is advised 
of his or her right to consent, a presumption would arise that the 
warnings are voluntary.  On the other hand, the failure of police to 
 
 
 
60 
provide such a warning would result in reversal.  Such an approach is 
consistent with constitutional values, provides a more workable rule for 
law enforcement, and ensures that citizens are aware of their 
constitutional rights before surrendering them.23 
 
In evaluating this case, we must ensure that our approach to 
article I, section 8 does not establish a framework where constitutional 
protection “fades away and disappears.”  Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443, 461, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2035, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 580 (1971).  A 
knock-and-talk process whereby police seek consent to search a home 
raises substantial privacy issues under article I, section 8 of the Iowa 
Constitution.  Under a rigorous application of a Schneckloth-type totality-
of-the-circumstances approach, the consent in this case is invalid.  In 
the alternative, we should abandon the totality-of-the-circumstances test 
of Schneckloth altogether and adopt a requirement that a citizen must be 
advised of his or her right to refuse consent before a knock-and-talk 
search is valid.  Such an approach is more stable than other alternatives; 
provides a brighter line for law enforcement and citizens alike; is more 
consistent with the values underlying article I, section 8; and would be a 
significant improvement in our search and seizure law. 
 
In any event, this case, decided by a four to three vote, has a clear 
practical message.  When law enforcement does not advise a homeowner 
or resident of their right to refuse consent, a subsequent search might 
                                                 
 
23In this case, Lowe did not brief the issue of whether Schneckloth should be 
abandoned and replaced by a mandatory warning or with a Zerbst-type test.  The 
majority thus declines to consider whether we should abandon Schneckloth under 
either theory.  Unlike the majority, I regard the issue as sufficiently intertwined to allow 
the court to address the issue.  See Feld v. Borkowski, 790 N.W.2d 72, 84 (Iowa 2010) 
(Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  In any event, it is critically 
important that the court not establish a pattern of narrowly viewing issues in order to 
defeat assertions of individual rights and then of broadly viewing issues in order to 
uphold the actions of the state or business actors against claims of individuals. 
 
 
 
61 
well be found invalid under the difficult to apply totality-of-the-
circumstances Schneckloth test as applied by this court under article I, 
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.  Law enforcement will increase the 
likelihood that a search of the home will be found “free and voluntary,” 
even under the current test, by advising home owners or residents of 
their right to refuse. 
 
Wiggins and Hecht, JJ., join this concurrence in part and dissent 
in part.