Case Title: Zingiber Investment, LLC v. Hagerman Highway District - Water / ditch rights

Citation: 

Docket Number: 36298/36840

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2011-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No.  36298/36840 
 
ZINGIBER INVESTMENT, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
 
       Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
HAGERMAN HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
 
       Defendant-Respondent, 
 
and 
 
LYNN BABINGTON and KATHY 
BABINGTON, husband and wife; and 
CLIFTON E. JENSEN and SUZANNE 
K. JENSEN, husband and wife, dba 
LYNCLIF FARMS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
 
       Intervenors-Respondents. 
___________________________________ 
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Boise, December 2010 Term 
 
2011 Opinion No. 44 
 
Filed: March 22, 2011 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
    
    
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Gooding County.  Hon. John M. Melanson and R. Barry Wood, District Judges. 
 
The judgments of the district courts in cases Nos. CV 2008-57 and CV 2008-125 
are affirmed.  The grant of attorney fees in CV 2008-57 is affirmed and the 
denial of attorney fees in CV 2008-125 is affirmed.  Attorney fees and costs on 
appeal are awarded to Respondents LynClif and Hagerman Highway District. 
 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chtd., Boise, for Appellants William 
G. Van Horn and Zingiber Investment, LLC.  Andrew J. Waldera argued. 
 
Sherer & Wynkoop, LLP, Meridian, for Respondent Hagerman Highway 
District.  David E. Wynkoop argued. 
 
Robertson & Slette, PLLC, Twin Falls, for Intervenors/Respondents Lynn J. 
Babington, Kathy L. Babington, Clifton E. Jensen, Suzanne Jensen and LynClif 
Farms, LLC.  Gary D. Slette argued. 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
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W. JONES, Justice 
I.  NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case revolves around the respective rights of LynClif Farms, LLC (“LynClif”) and 
Zingiber Investment, LLC (“Zingiber”) in regard to the Padgett Ditch, which crosses both of 
their properties.  LynClif constructed a pipe along the Justice Grade right-of-way, which is 
located adjacent to Zingiber’s land and is under the jurisdiction of the Hagerman Highway 
District (the “District”).  In a consolidated appeal, Zingiber challenges two separate judgments 
entered against it.  First, Zingiber argues that the district court erred in determining that LynClif 
had the unilateral right to pipe the portion of the ditch that had been on Zingiber’s property in 
Case No. CV-2008-125.  Zingiber contends that I.C. § 42-1207 did not give LynClif that 
authority, and that its water rights and separate ditch rights have not been protected.  Second, 
Zingiber argues that the district court erred in determining that it lacked standing to bring a 
declaratory action against the District to void the District’s issuance of a permit to LynClif in 
order to construct a pipe in the Justice Grade right-of-way in Case No. CV-2008-57.   
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
William Van Horn is the owner and manager of Zingiber.  LynClif and Zingiber own 
adjacent parcels of land along Highway 30 in Gooding County.  The Padgett Ditch is a manmade 
ditch that crosses both LynClif’s and Zingiber’s properties carrying water diverted from 
Billingsley Creek.  LynClif’s property is located downstream along Padgett Ditch from 
Zingiber’s property.  A public roadway known as the Justice Grade is situated adjacent to 
Zingiber’s property and is under the jurisdiction of the District.  LynClif owns 97% of the water 
rights in the Padgett Ditch.  LynClif’s water rights include a 10 cfs aquaculture right for rearing 
fish.  Zingiber’s water right includes .3 cfs for irrigation and .02 cfs for stockwatering.  Zingiber 
does not hold any water right for aesthetic or wildlife purposes.  Kirt Martin, who is not a party 
to this action, is the only water user downstream from LynClif on Padgett Ditch, and holds a .04 
cfs water right. 
Zingiber purchased its property in June 2006.  Almost immediately thereafter, without 
LynClif’s written permission, Van Horn relocated the portion of Padgett Ditch that flowed on his 
land to meander around the property.  Van Horn’s goals were to create a more aesthetic 
environment, make irrigation easier, and create a fly fishing habitat in the ditch.  Van Horn more 
than doubled the length of the ditch, but at the same time narrowed its width, and also installed a 
 
 
 
 
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fish screen at the downstream border of his property, apparently to keep fish from leaving his 
property.  Zingiber alleges that even after relocation of the ditch, the ditch still delivered the full 
quantity and quality of LynClif’s water to the upstream edge of LynClif’s property. 
LynClif feared the relocation of the ditch and installation of the fish screen would disrupt 
its downstream fish rearing facility by diminishing water flow and contaminating the water, and 
therefore applied to the District for a permit to construct a pipe to deliver its water that flowed 
through Zingiber’s property.  LynClif stated in its brief that its original plan was to pipe the ditch 
across Zingiber’s property in the location of the ditch as it was in 2006, but it decided that 
avoiding Zingiber’s property altogether would be in LynClif’s best interest.  LynClif secured the 
permission of Kirt Martin, the only other downstream user, to pipe the ditch on the Justice 
Grade.  The District granted LynClif a permit to construct the pipeline in the Justice Grade right-
of-way located adjacent to Zingiber’s property.  The pipe conveyed the flow of LynClif’s 
appropriated water around Zingiber’s property and delivered it to LynClif’s property.  Zingiber’s 
.32 cfs water right was still delivered to the upstream edge of its property.1  The pipe also 
conveys Kirt Martin’s .04 cfs water right to the Padgett Ditch.  
After the District issued the permit, Zingiber filed a declaratory action against the District 
in Case No. CV 2008-57, alleging that the District did not have the authority to grant the permit 
to Zingiber and seeking that the permit be declared void.  Judge Melanson of the district court 
granted summary judgment to the District, holding that Zingiber did not have standing to 
challenge the District’s actions.   Zingiber timely appealed from the Final Judgments entered in 
that case.2  
LynClif subsequently brought a declaratory action in Case No. CV 2008-125 against 
Zingiber seeking a declaration that it had the unilateral right to pipe the portion of Padgett Ditch 
located on Zingiber’s property either in the original location of the ditch on the property prior to 
                                                 
1  Pursuant to both the court’s Order for Summary Judgment re: Carriage Water and the Final Judgment of the 
district court in Case CV 2008-125, LynClif is obligated to supply Zingiber with the water to which it is entitled at 
the upstream edge of his property, and is also obligated to provide a water control device at that point to ensure 
Zingiber receives the correct quantity of water at the correct season.  
 
2  Judgment was entered on November 19, 2008.  Zingiber filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment on 
December 3, 2008, arguing that he did meet the requirements for standing.   The district court denied this motion on 
February 4, 2009, confirming the holding on the motion for summary judgment that Zingiber could not show that 
LynClif caused Zingiber a legally cognizable injury.  Final Judgment regarding the District was entered on March 2, 
2009, and the District was awarded costs and attorney fees.  Final Judgment regarding LynClif as an Intervenor was 
entered on the same day, and LynClif was awarded costs and attorney fees.    
 
 
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2006 or in the District’s public right-of-way.  The parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  Judge Wood granted LynClif’s motion, holding that it had the unilateral right to pipe 
the ditch in either location pursuant to I.C. § 42-1207.3  LynClif constructed the pipe in the 
Justice Grade right-of-way pursuant to the District’s permit.  In order to ensure the piping did not 
injure Zingiber’s water rights, the district court subsequently adopted a proposal by LynClif to 
deliver Zingiber’s full water right to a concrete structure located at the point where the Padgett 
Ditch enters Zingiber’s property.  A Final Judgment was entered on July 13, 2009, holding that 
(1) LynClif had the right to pipe the ditch under the location of the ditch prior to 2006 or in the 
Justice Grade right-of-way pursuant to the permit issued by the District; (2) LynClif bears the 
responsibility of conveying Zingiber’s water right to the concrete structure; and (3) LynClif is 
obligated to provide a measurement device at the concrete structure to ensure the delivery of 
Zingiber’s full water right.  Zingiber appealed that judgment.   
Zingiber argues that the loss of the flow of the ditch across its property will injure its 
ability to irrigate and will also injure its wildlife and aesthetic interests.  Zingiber argues that the 
district court erred in determining that LynClif had the unilateral right to pipe the portion of the 
ditch running across Zingiber’s property through an off-premises right-of-way in Case CV 2008-
125.  Zingiber further argues that the district court erred in determining that it did not have 
standing against the District in Case CV 2008-57.   
III.  ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. 
Whether the district court erred in determining that I.C. § 42-1207 gave LynClif the 
unilateral right to pipe the portion of the Padgett Ditch running across Zingiber’s property 
in either the 2006 location of the ditch or along the Justice Grade right-of-way.  
                                                 
3  This was the ruling on Count I.  Count II of LynClif’s complaint sought a declaration from the court that 
previously appropriated water, running through the Padgett Ditch, is not subject to further appropriation, and that 
therefore under Idaho law, Zingiber could not be granted a permit for a 10 cfs flow water right for aesthetic and 
recreational appropriation.  In the Order granting summary judgment on Count I, which declared that LynClif had 
the unilateral right to pipe the ditch, the court deferred judgment on Count II.  LynClif and Zingiber subsequently 
agreed to dismiss Count II, and thus a final appealable judgment was only entered for Count I.  Zingiber 
subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was converted into a Motion to Alter or Amend.  The court 
maintained its earlier order, holding that LynClif had the right to bury the pipe, and clarifying that the location of the 
ditch was its location as it existed prior to 2006 and not the location after Zingiber moved it.  The district court also 
stated that an evidentiary hearing should be held “to determine the carriage amount of water each party is 
responsible to contribute for Van Horn’s irrigation water right.” After Van Horn stated that he had no intention to 
restore the ditch to its 2006 location, LynClif filed another Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of carriage 
water.  Judge Wood held that LynClif had the responsibility to deliver Zingiber’s full water right to the concrete 
structure at the upstream edge of Zingiber’s property.  The Final Judgment of the court maintained that LynClif had 
the right to pipe the ditch in either the original location or in the Justice Grade right-of-way and that LynClif held the 
responsibility to convey Zingiber’s full water right to a concrete structure at the upstream edge of his property.   
 
 
 
 
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2. 
Whether the district court erred in providing that Zingiber’s full water right was to be 
delivered to a concrete structure at the upstream edge of Zingiber’s property where the 
Padgett Ditch enters it.  
3. 
Whether the district court erred in determining that Zingiber lacked standing to challenge 
the District’s issuance of the construction permit, or whether that issue is now moot.  
4. 
Whether attorney fees were properly awarded to LynClif and the District in Case CV 
2008-57 below, were properly denied to LynClif in Case CV 2008-125 below, and should 
be awarded to any party on appeal.  
IV.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on appeal from a summary judgment is the same standard used by 
the district court in rendering its decision.  Sorenson v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 
141 Idaho 754, 758, 118 P.3d 86, 90 (2005).  Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law.”  I.R.C.P. 56(c).  “If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then 
only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.”  Watson v. Weick, 
141 Idaho 500, 504, 112 P.3d 788, 792 (2005).  Summary judgment is a proper procedural 
method for dismissing a claim based on a lack of standing.  Thompson v. City of Lewiston, 137 
Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002).  This Court freely reviews questions of law.  Barmore 
v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 179 P.3d 303, 306 (2008).  Further, “[t]he interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.”  Doe v. Boy Scouts of 
Am., 148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009).   
V.  ANALYSIS 
A. 
The District Court Correctly Determined that I.C. § 42-1207 Gave LynClif the 
Unilateral Right as a Ditch Owner to Pipe the Ditch Located on Zingiber’s Servient 
Estate. 
Zingiber argues that the district court erred when it interpreted I.C. § 42-1207 to allow 
LynClif to unilaterally pipe the portion of the Padgett Ditch that flows through Zingiber’s 
property, because “both LynClif and Zingiber are equally-footed ‘landowners’ and ‘ditch 
owners.’”  In Idaho, ditch rights and water rights are separate and independent from one another.  
Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Assoc. v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 242, 869 P.2d 554, 559 
(1993); Simonson v. Moon, 72 Idaho 39, 47, 237 P.2d 93, 98 (1951).  Here, it is undisputed that 
both Zingiber and LynClif owned water rights that were diverted from Billingsley Creek into 
Padgett Ditch.  It is also not disputed that once LynClif piped the ditch, Zingiber’s .32 cfs of 
 
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water would continue to be delivered to the upstream edge of its property.  The district court 
ensured this in its Final Judgment, holding that LynClif had the responsibility to deliver 
Zingiber’s .32 cfs to a concrete structure located at the point where Padgett Ditch enters 
Zingiber’s property.  The Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) of Zingiber’s Water Right 
36-10283B states that the water is to be delivered “at a point of measurement where the delivery 
ditch enters the place of use described below [describing Zingiber’s property].”     
1. Zingiber does not hold ditch rights in the portion of Padgett Ditch that crosses its 
property because it is simply the owner of the servient estate.  
Zingiber contends that it holds independent ditch rights in the portion of the Padgett 
Ditch that runs over its land, and that these rights have been violated by the piping of the ditch 
around its land.  However, Zingiber was not the owner of that portion of the ditch, but was 
simply the owner of the servient estate.  Therefore, Zingiber does not have independent rights in 
the ditch under I.C. § 42-1207. 
An irrigation ditch right, unlike a water right, acts like an easement in land.  I.C. § 42-
1102 (“The existence of a visible ditch, canal or conduit shall constitute notice to the owner, or 
any subsequent purchaser, of the underlying servient estate, that the owner of the ditch, canal or 
conduit has the right-of-way.” (emphasis added)); Olson v. H & B Props., Inc., 882 P.2d 536, 
539 (N.M. 1994) (“Water rights are derived from appropriation for beneficial use, while ditch 
rights are derived from ownership of the ditch and an easement in it.” (emphasis added)).  The 
dominant estate downstream is benefited by the water that runs through the servient estate 
upstream.  The “owner” of the ditch is therefore the dominant-estate owner.  “Although the 
person who has an easement for a ditch across the land of another does not thereby gain legal 
title to any portion of that land, Reynolds Irrig. Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 
(1948), the owner of such an easement is often called the ‘owner’ of the ditch.”  Camp v. E. Fork 
Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 857, 55 P.3d 304, 311 (2002).  Thus, Zingiber did not have any 
independent ditch rights in the portion of the ditch running over its land because “an easement is 
defined as a right in the lands of another, and therefore one cannot have an easement in his own 
lands.”  Gardner v. Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 771, 450 P.2d 990, 994 (1969). 
The owner of the servient estate does not have any right in the easement that crosses his 
land, because a servient estate simply permits another’s use of its land.  25 Am. Jur. 2d 
Easements and Licenses § 1 (2004) (“The creation of an easement thus gives rise to two distinct 
property interests: a ‘dominant estate,’ that has right to use land of another, and a ‘servient 
 
 
 
 
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estate,’ that permits the exercise of that use.”).  Here, LynClif as the downstream estate was the 
ditch owner in regard to the portion of the ditch that runs through Zingiber’s property, the 
servient estate.  A dominant estate owner may not increase the burden on the servient estate by 
increasing the size of the ditch or moving the ditch within the servient estate’s property.  Linford 
v. G.H. Hall & Son, 78 Idaho 49, 55, 297 P.2d 893, 896 (1956) (“As the right to the ditch or 
other artificial watercourse is an easement, no change can be made against the landowner over 
whose land the ditch passes that is burdensome to the servient tenement, or that changes the 
character of the servitude; such as moving a ditch to a new place, or enlarging it.” (quoting 
Samuel Charles Wiel, Water Rights 539 (3d ed. 1911).  However, as the holder of the ditch right, 
the dominant estate owner may make changes to the easement so long as they do not increase the 
burden on the servient land, even if those changes remove an incidental benefit to the servient 
estate holder.  See Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 549, 808 P.2d 1289, 
1294 (1991); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 152 (Utah 1946); see 
also L. S. Tellier, Annotation, Right of owner of easement to alter its use in such a way as to 
deprive servient estate of an incidental benefit, 172 A.L.R. 193 (2009).  Thus, Zingiber did not 
have the right to the continued benefit of the flow of the ditch across its property, and LynClif 
had the right as the dominant-estate holder to move the ditch off the property, because doing so 
did not increase the burden on the servient estate.4     
2. Idaho Code § 42-1207 permits the owner of the ditch to unilaterally pipe the ditch.  
Zingiber argues that it is both a ditch owner and a landowner under I.C. § 42-1207.  
“Where a statute is unambiguous, statutory construction is unnecessary and courts are free to 
apply the plain meaning.”  Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 312, 109 P.3d 
161, 166 (2005).  Ambiguity exists where reasonable minds might differ as to interpretations of 
the statute.  State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 274, 92 P.3d 521, 524 (2004).  While the district court 
found that the language of “ditch owner” and “landowner” in the statute was ambiguous, this 
Court holds that given the nature of a ditch right, the language of the statute is clear.  Because a 
ditch right acts as an easement, the “ditch owner” the statute refers to is the owner of the 
dominant estate, and the “landowner” the statute refers to is the owner of the servient estate.  See 
also Act of March 22, 1994, ch. 151, 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 345, 345 (1994) (stating the 
                                                 
4 It is noted that Kirt Martin, as a downstream estate owner, had rights as a ditch owner under I.C. § 42-1207 as well.  
However, because he consented to LynClif’s actions, those rights were not violated here.  
 
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purpose of I.C. § 42-1207 is “to allow a ditch owner to bury his ditch on the property of a 
landowner servient estate to such ditch easement so long as the construction is at standard 
specifications”).  With this clarification in mind, the language of the statute is clear. 
The relevant portions of I.C. § 42-1207 state: 
Where any ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried irrigation conduit has 
heretofore been, or may hereafter be, constructed across or beneath the lands of 
another, the person or persons owning or controlling said land shall have the right 
at their own expense to change said ditch, canal, lateral or drain or buried 
irrigation conduit to any other part of said land, but such change must be made in 
such a manner as not to impede the flow of the water therein, or to otherwise 
injure any person or persons using or interested in such ditch, canal, lateral or 
drain or buried irrigation conduit. Any increased operation and maintenance shall 
be the responsibility of the landowner who makes the change. 
 
. . . . 
The written permission of the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or 
buried irrigation conduit must first be obtained before it is changed or placed in a 
buried pipe by the landowner. 
While the owner of a ditch, canal, lateral, drain or buried irrigation conduit 
shall have no right to relocate it on the property of another without permission, a 
ditch, canal, lateral or drain owner shall have the right to place it in a buried 
conduit within the easement or right-of-way on the property of another in 
accordance with standard specifications for pipe, materials, installation and 
backfill, as set forth in the Idaho standards for public works construction or other 
standards recognized by the city or county in which the burying is to be done, and 
so long as the pipe and the construction is accomplished in a manner that the 
surface of the owner’s property and the owner’s use thereof is not disrupted and is 
restored to the condition of adjacent property as expeditiously as possible, but no 
longer than thirty (30) days after the completion of construction. 
 
I.C. § 42-1207 (emphases added).  The first paragraph above gives a servient-estate owner the 
right to move the ditch on his own property so long as it does not injure any of the ditch users.  
See Abbott, 119 Idaho at 547, 808 P.2d at 1292 (“In Idaho easements for irrigation laterals are 
also subject to the servient estate owner’s right to move the lateral at his own expense.  Idaho 
Code § 42-1207 allows such a change when it does not impede the flow of water or injure any 
person using the lateral ditch.”).  Thus, it would only apply if Zingiber was to move the ditch, 
and it does not apply to Zingiber’s objections to LynClif moving or piping the ditch.5   
Zingiber argues that I.C. § 42-1207 required LynClif to obtain Zingiber’s written 
permission before burying the pipe, and cites the second and third paragraphs above to support 
                                                 
5 This section could have applied to Zingiber’s relocation of the ditch in 2006, but LynClif did not challenge that 
action.  
 
 
 
 
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this contention.  The second paragraph above does not apply in this case to require Zingiber’s 
permission, because it is clear from its language that it only applies when the landowner, which 
here is Zingiber, changes the location of the ditch or buries it.  Even if it did apply, it only 
requires the permission of the ditch owner, which here is LynClif.   
The third quoted paragraph above similarly does not require Zingiber’s written 
permission in order for LynClif to pipe the ditch.  As the dominant estate owner and thus the 
ditch owner under the statute, LynClif was only required to obtain the written permission of 
Zingiber if it buried the pipe on Zingiber’s land in a location different than where the easement 
was.  I.C. § 42-1207 (“[T]he owner of a ditch . . . shall have no right to relocate it on the property 
of another.”).  This is in complete accordance with the law of easements and the nature of a ditch 
right, under which a dominant estate owner may not unreasonably increase the burden of the 
easement on the servient estate by moving the ditch to another location on the servient estate.  
Linford, 78 Idaho at 55, 297 P.2d at 896.  Idaho Code § 42-1207 grants a ditch owner the express 
right to pipe the ditch under the existing ditch easement or right-of-way.  It also implicitly grants 
the ditch owner the right to pipe the ditch in a location off of the servient land without the 
servient landowner’s permission, because the statute states that written permission is only 
required if the ditch is relocated on the servient land.  Further, piping the ditch in a location 
outside the servient land and thus removing an incidental benefit along with it is well within the 
rights of a dominant-estate holder.  See Abbott, 119 Idaho at 549, 808 P.2d at 1294 (1991); see 
also Tellier, supra.  Thus, this Court holds the district court correctly found that under I.C. § 42-
1207, LynClif had the unilateral right to bury the ditch in the right-of-way or on the adjacent 
Justice Grade right-of-way.   
Zingiber argues that the location of the ditch easement was the location of the ditch after 
it moved it in 2006, and thus the district court erred in determining that LynClif had the right to 
pipe the ditch under its original location prior to 2006.  Zingiber cites I.C. § 42-1102 for the 
proposition that the visible location of the ditch serves as the location of the easement.  However, 
this statute supports the decision of the district court that the location of the easement was its 
visible location prior to 2006, before Zingiber moved the ditch.  The statute states: “The 
existence of a visible ditch, canal or conduit shall constitute notice to the owner, or any 
subsequent purchaser, of the underlying servient estate, that the owner of the ditch, canal or 
conduit has the right-of-way and incidental rights confirmed or granted by this section.”  I.C. § 
 
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42-1207.  Thus, the visible location of the ditch in 2006, when Zingiber purchased the property, 
served as notice to Zingiber, the servient estate owner, that LynClif had a right-of-way in that 
location.  The location of the easement did not change just because Zingiber chose to reroute the 
ditch over its property after purchasing it, because it was already located, and Zingiber had 
notice of that location.  See, e.g., Youngstown Steel Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 240 P.2d 
977, 979 (Cal. 1952) (en banc) (“Once the location of an easement has been finally established . . 
. it cannot be substantially changed without the consent of both parties.”); see also Note, The 
Right of Owners of Servient Estates to Relocate Easements Unilaterally, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1693, 
1694–95 (1996) (stating that the majority of jurisdictions hold that once an easement has been 
located, neither the owner of the dominant estate nor the owner of the servient estate may 
unilaterally relocate it).  Thus the district court did not err in determining that LynClif had the 
right to pipe the ditch under the ditch’s location prior to 2006.   
In conclusion, this Court affirms the district court’s determination that LynClif had the 
right under I.C. § 42-1207 to pipe the ditch either in the location of the ditch prior to 2006, or off 
of Zingiber’s servient estate, on the Justice Grade right-of-way.   
B. 
The District Court Protected Zingiber’s Water Rights by Providing That Zingiber’s 
Full Water Right Be Delivered to the Concrete Structure Where the Padgett Ditch 
Enters Zingiber’s Property.   
Zingiber argues that its water rights were not protected by the district court because 
Zingiber contends it has the right to use some of LynClif’s water as “carriage water” to carry its 
irrigation water right through the ditch to a point across its property, rather than just to the 
upstream edge.  Under I.C. § 42-110, Zingiber’s irrigation right entitles Zingiber “to such 
quantity measured at the point of diversion.”  Contrary to Zingiber’s assertions, Judge Wood did 
take Zingiber’s water rights into consideration and fully protected them in his Final Judgment.  
Once Zingiber made clear that it had no intention to restore the ditch to its original location prior 
to 2006, the district court adopted a proposal by LynClif to deliver Zingiber’s full water right to a 
concrete structure located where the Padgett Ditch enters Zingiber’s property.  The district court 
already held that Zingiber’s stockwater right required the water to be delivered to this location 
pursuant to the SRBA Adjudication.  The only issue left was whether the irrigation right should 
be delivered to that same location or to somewhere else on Zingiber’s land.  The location 
referred to in the SRBA Adjudication was the upstream edge of the property.  Further, the SRBA 
Adjudication does not include any carriage or conveyance right as the district court noted in its 
 
 
 
 
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August 12, 2008 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment.  Judge Wood pointed out that 
Zingiber’s irrigation right would presumably be measured at the point of diversion on Billingsley 
Creek, and further provided that the full water right should be delivered to a concrete structure at 
the edge of Zingiber’s property so that Zingiber’s water rights would be protected.  That location 
is where the evidence indicated the water had been historically taken out of the ditch and 
dispersed around the farm by gravity irrigation, as was supported by the affidavits of two 
experts, Idaho Department of Water Resources Agents Steve Clelland and Helen Thorton.      
A subsequent order entered by the district court on May 4, 2009, held that in regard to the 
carriage water issue, “LynClif shall bear the responsibility of providing carriage water of Van 
Horn/Zingiber’s Water Right No. 36-10283B from the point of diversion of the Padgett Ditch on 
Billingsley Creek to the concrete structure located on the north side of Justice Grade Road at the 
point where Padgett Ditch enters the Van Horn/Zingiber property.”  The Final Judgment of the 
court similarly provided that LynClif was responsible for delivering Zingiber’s full water right 
from Billingsley Creek to the concrete structure.  Inherent in the Final Judgment appealed to this 
Court was the determination that the historical point of delivery of the irrigation right was at the 
location of the concrete structure and not somewhere else on the property.  That Judgment was 
supported by substantial evidence.  Judge Wood determined that delivery to the concrete 
structure would fully protect Zingiber’s water rights and therefore the issue of whether Zingiber 
was entitled to carriage water did not need to be further addressed.  Had the point of historical 
delivery been determined to be somewhere else within his property, then Zingiber’s claim that it 
is entitled to carriage water might have merit.  However, given the court’s determination of the 
place of delivery from the point of diversion, which was supported by substantial evidence, 
Zingiber’s claim to carriage water does not have merit.  Zingiber does not have the right to have 
its water “ride” on LynClif’s water.  Schodde v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 224 U.S. 107, 118, 32 S. 
Ct. 470, 472 (1912).  His rights were protected by the district court.  
This case does not change Idaho law on carriage water.  As this Court stated in State v. 
Twin Falls Canal Co.: 
It is a well-recognized fact that, in order to properly irrigate land, the 
irrigator must have a proper stream or head of water, and the question arises as to 
how much water is necessary to furnish a sufficient head or stream for that 
purpose . . . . Much of the land in the Snake river valley is of the character or kind 
that, unless you have a sufficient head of water to rush it over the land, the sandy 
and gravelly soil will absorb all of it and not permit it to pass on over the land.  
 
12 
Hence, to successfully irrigate land, a sufficient head of water is required to flow 
entirely over the land. 
21 Idaho 410, 437, 121 P. 1039, 1048 (1911).  This case is decided on its unique facts and 
conduct of the parties.  If this case is misused without proper attention to its detail it could have 
significant unforeseen circumstances.  If Idaho citizens think it is a good idea to just pipe around 
other common ditch users’ properties, the cooperation which makes the desert bloom will be 
compromised.  
C. 
The District Court’s Determination that Zingiber Lacked Standing Against the 
District in Case No. CV 2008-157 is now Moot.  
The Declaratory Judgment Act authorizes courts to “declare rights, status, and other legal 
relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.”  I.C. § 10-1201; see also 
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006) (“The Declaratory 
Judgment Act provides authority for the courts to render declaratory judgments.”).  However, 
even if the court has the authority to issue a declaratory judgment, the plaintiff is also required to 
show he has standing.  “[T]o invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment 
action, the plaintiffs must allege a ‘personal stake’ in the outcome of the controversy, which ‘has 
come to be understood to require not only a ‘distinct palpable injury’ to the plaintiff, but also a 
‘fairly traceable’ causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.’”  
Idaho Branch Inc. of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Nampa Highway Dist. No. 1, 
123 Idaho 237, 242, 846 P.2d 239, 244 (1993).   The district court held that Zingiber did not have 
standing against the District.  Zingiber argues that it did have standing because the issuance of 
the permit by the District to locate the pipe in the Justice Grade right-of-way caused injury to 
Zingiber’s rights in the ditch and that injury is redressable by voiding the permit.  
The Court need not consider the merits of this argument because the issue is now moot.  
“When conduct sought to be redressed by either declaratory or injunctive relief is peculiar to a 
particular event that has already occurred, the finality of the event in a manner incapable of 
repetition moots the controversy.” 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory Judgments § 36 (2003); see also 
Euclid Ave. Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 310, 193 P.3d 853, 857 (2008) (“A case is 
moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no practical 
effect upon the outcome.” (citation omitted)).  “Mootness . . . applies when a favorable judicial 
decision would not result in any relief. This Court may only review cases in which a judicial 
determination will have a practical effect on the outcome.”  Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 779, 
 
 
 
 
13 
133 P.3d 1240, 1244 (2006).  The permit issued by the District authorized LynClif to construct a 
pipe.  That pipe has already been constructed.  Voiding the permit would not provide Zingiber 
the relief it requests.  This is a declaratory judgment action, not an action for damages, and thus 
Zingiber can make no argument for damages in regard to this proceeding.  Therefore, the issue of 
standing is now moot and this Court does not address it.   
D. 
Attorney Fees Were Properly Awarded to the District and LynClif in Case CV-
2008-57, Properly Denied to LynClif in Case CV-2008-125, And Are Awarded to the 
District and LynClif on Appeal.  
Zingiber argues that the award of attorney fees to the District and LynClif in Case CV-
2008-57 pursuant to I.C. § 12-117 and I.C. § 12-121, respectively, was improper.  The court 
found that Zingiber had not “advanced a reasonable legal basis to support standing” and that its 
position was thus without a foundation in the law.  LynClif argues that the denial of its request 
for attorney fees and costs under I.C. § 12-121 in Case CV 2008-125 was improper.   
Attorney fees may be awarded to a prevailing party under I.C. § 12-117 in an action 
where a state agency is a party if the court finds “that the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law.”  I.C. § 12-117(1).  An award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-
117 is reviewed freely.  Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 78, 156 P.3d 
573, 579 (2007).  Attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party under I.C. § 12-121 
“when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, 
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.”  Michalk v. Michalk, 
148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009).  An award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Rae v. Bunce, 145 Idaho 798, 805, 186 P.3d 654, 661 
(2008).  A court does not abuse its discretion so long as it “perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; acted within the outer boundaries of this discretion and consistent with applicable 
legal standards; and reached the decision by an exercise of reason.”  Anderson v. Goodliffe, 140 
Idaho 446, 450, 95 P.3d 64, 68 (2004). 
The Court holds that the district court properly awarded attorney fees to the District under 
I.C. § 12-117 in Case CV 2008-57.  The District is a state agency.  The District was clearly the 
prevailing party, as Zingiber’s claims were dismissed with prejudice in a motion for summary 
judgment.  Although we find the issue of standing moot, we nevertheless find that Zingiber’s 
case was without a reasonable basis in the law.  In order to have standing, a party must allege a 
“distinct palpable injury” and a “fairly traceable” causal connection between that injury and the 
 
14 
challenged conduct.  Idaho Branch, Inc. of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. 
Nampa Highway Dist. No. 1, 123 Idaho 237, 242, 846 P.2d 239, 244 (1993).  The District’s grant 
of a construction permit to build a pipeline on the District’s right-of-way did not cause any of 
Zingiber’s alleged injuries.  As Judge Melanson held, “Zingiber’s remedies, if any, are between 
Zingiber and LynClif.”  We thus find that the district court was correct in awarding fees to the 
District. 
This Court also holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
attorney fees to LynClif under I.C. § 12-121 in Case CV 2008-57.  For the purpose of deciding 
whether attorney fees are to be awarded against a party, adversity of parties is not to be 
determined by a formalistic view of pleadings, but is to be determined in a functional sense by 
examining the practical effect of the positions taken by the parties.  Bonaparte v. Neff, 116 Idaho 
60, 68, 773 P.2d 1147, 1155 (1989).  Thus the district court properly determined that as to 
Zingiber and LynClif in Case CV 2008-57, LynClif, as an intervenor, was the prevailing party 
because, as the district court stated, “LynClif had a direct interest in the outcome of the dispute” 
and “LynClif fully participated in the case, answered Zingiber’s complaint for declaratory relief, 
and supported [the] motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment.”  Using the same 
rationale as it did in awarding the District attorney fees in the same case, the district court 
properly determined that Zingiber’s position was without a basis in the law.  Therefore, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion and this Court affirms the grant of attorney fees to 
LynClif in Case CV 2008-57. 
This Court holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award 
LynClif attorney fees in Case CV 2008-125.  LynClif argues that it should have been awarded 
attorney fees and discretionary costs under I.C. § 12-121.  Under I.A.R. 15, a respondent must 
file a cross-appeal if “affirmative relief is sought by way of reversal, vacation or modification of 
the judgment or order.”  I.A.R. 15(1).  LynClif properly filed a cross-appeal.  The district court 
did not abuse its discretion in declining to award LynClif attorney fees and discretionary costs.  
As required, the court correctly recognized the issue as one of discretion, stating that it “may 
award” fees, and it acted within the applicable legal standards by considering the factors in 
I.R.C.P. 54(e), the language of I.C. § 12-121, and the applicable case law. It exercised reason in 
declining to award fees when it stated that the legal issues inherent in the interpretation of I.C. § 
42-1207 were “fairly complicated,” indicating that neither side could be sure of its claim.  While 
 
 
 
 
15 
this Court may disagree with the district court’s perception of the issues, it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the court to determine that Zingiber’s defense of the action was not completely 
frivolous or without merit.  Thus, the district court’s denial of fees to LynClif is affirmed. 
LynClif claims attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41.  Zingiber and 
the District claim attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-117, I.C. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54 and 
I.A.R. 41.  Zingiber is not the prevailing party and thus no fees are awarded to it.  “Attorney fees 
can be awarded on appeal under [§ 12-121] only if the appeal was brought or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.”  Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 596, 166 
P.3d 382, 386 (2007).  Zingiber cannot show any violation of its rights, and therefore its 
arguments under I.C. § 42-1207 are without a foundation in the law.  Thus this Court awards 
attorney fees on appeal to the District and LynClif under I.C. § 12-121.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Court affirms the final judgments granted by the district courts in Case CV 2008-57 
and Case CV 2008-125.  The district court properly interpreted I.C. § 42-1207 to allow LynClif 
to unilaterally pipe the ditch in either its original location or along the Justice Grade right-of-
way.  Zingiber’s water rights were fully protected.  The issue of standing in Case CV 2008-57 is 
now moot because the pipe has been constructed.  The Court affirms the district court’s grant of 
attorney fees in Case CV 2008-57 and the denial of attorney fees to LynClif in Case CV 2008-
125.  The Court awards attorney fees and costs to both LynClif and the District on appeal.  
 
Justices BURDICK, J. JONES, HORTON and Justice pro tem KIDWELL CONCUR.