Case Title: In re A.S.D.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 489A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-94 
No. 489A20 
Filed 27 August 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: A.S.D. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 7 
August 2020 by Judge Wesley W. Barkley in District Court, Caldwell County. This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 21 June 2021 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Lucy R. McCarl for petitioner-appellee Caldwell County Department of Social 
Services. 
 
Matthew P. McGuire for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
David A. Perez for respondent-appellant mother.  
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent, the mother of the juvenile A.S.D. (Amanda),1 appeals from the 
trial court’s order terminating her parental rights. After careful review, we affirm. 
 
 
I. 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used in this opinion to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of 
reading. 
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¶ 2 
 
On 4 December 2018, the Caldwell County Department of Social Services 
(DSS) filed a petition alleging that Amanda, who was less than two weeks old, was a 
neglected and dependent juvenile. DSS stated that it was currently involved with 
Amanda’s half-brother, D.D., who was in DSS custody. DSS claimed that respondent-
mother had an extensive history of mental illness, had been diagnosed with several 
mental health disorders, and had a history of “polysubstance abuse.” DSS 
additionally alleged that respondent-mother did not have safe, stable housing and 
that respondent-mother had reported to hospital staff that she had been ousted from 
the home that she shared with Amanda’s father and had nowhere to stay. DSS also 
claimed that respondent-mother had been involved in “multiple violent relationships” 
and had several criminal convictions. DSS stated that respondent-mother had placed 
Amanda in a kinship placement in the same home as D.D. 
¶ 3 
 
On 6 March 2019, the trial court adjudicated Amanda to be a neglected and 
dependent juvenile based upon respondent-mother’s stipulations to the allegations 
contained within the juvenile petition. In a separate dispositional order, the trial 
court ordered that custody of Amanda be placed with DSS and that DSS have the 
authority to arrange a placement for the juvenile. The trial court further ordered 
respondent-mother to enter into an Out-of-Home Safety Agreement as her case plan 
and allowed respondent-mother to engage in supervised visitation with Amanda for 
one hour each week. 
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¶ 4 
 
The trial court entered a permanency planning order on 30 May 2019 in which 
it found that respondent-mother was not consistently attending mental health or 
substance abuse treatment and did not have stable housing. The trial court set the 
primary permanent plan as reunification with a secondary plan of adoption. 
¶ 5 
 
In a permanency planning review order entered on 3 October 2019, the trial 
court found as fact that respondent-mother had not attended mental health services 
since January 2019. The trial court additionally found that respondent-mother was 
not receiving substance abuse treatment and that respondent-mother refused to 
submit to hair follicle drug screens because she “believes that such may result in the 
use of Black Magic on her hair.” The trial court also found as fact that respondent-
mother still did not have stable housing. 
¶ 6 
 
On 5 March 2020, the trial court filed a permanency planning review order in 
which the trial court found that DSS had made numerous attempts to administer 
drug screens to respondent-mother, but that such attempts were often unsuccessful—
such as on 25 November 2019 and 7 February 2020 when respondent-mother refused 
to come to the door on both occasions. The trial court also found that respondent-
mother was living in a mobile home with her boyfriend, and that respondent-mother 
was unemployed because her boyfriend did not want respondent-mother to work and 
was paying respondent-mother $100 per week to complete chores around the home 
rather than have her to seek employment. The trial court further found as fact that 
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respondent-mother had not visited with the juvenile since respondent-mother had 
refused a drug screen on 14 October 2019. The trial court changed the primary 
permanent plan for Amanda to adoption and the secondary plan to guardianship with 
an approved caretaker. 
¶ 7 
 
On 12 March 2020, DSS filed a motion in the cause to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (9), based on 
neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress, and the fact that respondent-
mother’s parental rights with respect to another child had been terminated 
involuntarily and respondent-mother lacked the ability or willingness to establish a 
safe home. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (9) (2019). On 7 August 2020, the trial court 
entered an order in which it determined that grounds existed to terminate 
respondent-mother’s parental rights as alleged in the motion. The trial court further 
concluded that it was in Amanda’s best interests that respondent-mother’s parental 
rights to Amanda be terminated. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondent-
mother’s parental rights.2 Respondent-mother appeals. 
 
II. 
Analysis 
                                            
2 The trial court’s order also terminated the parental rights of Amanda’s father. He is 
not a party to the proceedings before this Court. 
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¶ 8 
 
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by concluding that 
grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. A termination of parental rights 
proceeding consists of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. N.C.G.S. §§ 
7B-1109, -1110 (2019); In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110 (1984). At the 
adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by “clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence” the existence of one or more grounds for termination under 
subsection 7B-1111(a) of our General Statutes. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(e), (f). We review 
a trial court’s adjudication “to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, 
cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In 
re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 111 (citing In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404 (1982)).  
¶ 9 
 
“[A]n adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient 
to support a termination of parental rights.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395 (2019). 
We begin our analysis with the consideration of whether grounds existed to terminate 
respondent-mother’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).  
¶ 10 
 
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), a trial court may terminate parental 
rights if “[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside 
the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court 
that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those 
conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). “[T]he 
willfulness of a parent’s failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the 
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conditions that led to a child’s removal from the family home ‘is established when the 
[parent] had the ability to show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to make the 
effort.’ ” In re L.E.W., 375 N.C. 124, 136 (2020) (second alteration in original) (quoting 
In re Fletcher, 148 N.C. App. 228, 235 (2002)). 
¶ 11 
 
In support of its adjudication of grounds pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)3, 
the trial court made the following findings of fact: 
14. . . . 
a. Respondent[-]mother has an extensive history of 
substance abuse for which she has received 
inadequate treatment. She received an updated 
Comprehensive Clinical Assessment (CCA) on 
January 27, 2020. She was recommended to 
complete 90 hours of Substance Abuse Intensive 
Outpatient Treatment (SAIOP). She has only 
attended a few classes.  
b. Respondent[-]mother has submit[ted] to urine 
drug screens as requested by the Movant on 5/1/19, 
5/15/19, and 6/19/19. She refused to submit to a hair 
follicle drug screen on 9/5/19 and again in January 
of 2020. She has on numerous other occasions not 
made herself available for drug screens. She has 
never had a consistent six (6) month period of 
negative drug screens.  
                                            
3 We note that Finding of Fact 14 and its subparts were in reference to the grounds to 
terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights for neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), but the findings also demonstrate respondent-mother’s failure to make reasonable 
progress in correcting the conditions which led to Amanda’s removal, which supports the trial 
court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights 
pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).  
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c. Respondent[-]mother completed a psychological 
evaluation with Dr. Jennifer Cappelletty. Dr. 
Cappelletty diagnosed Respondent[-]mother with 
Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type; Cannabis 
Use 
Disorder; 
Stimulant 
Use 
Disorder 
–
Amphetamine Type; and Opioid Use Disorder. Dr. 
Cappelletty made the following recommendations 
for 
Respondent[-]mother: 
(a) 
participate 
in 
psychotherapy; (b) participate in a psychiatric 
evaluation and comply with all recommendations; (c) 
participate in the Assertive Community Treatment 
Team (ACTT) program; (d) refrain from use of non-
prescribed substances; and (e) participate in 
Vocational Rehabilitation Services. Respondent[-
]mother has refused to take any prescription 
medication to address her mental health issues. In 
addition to the psychological evaluation by Dr. 
Cappelletty, Respondent[-]mother has completed 4 
or 5 other mental health assessments. She has not 
addressed any of the issues identified by Dr. 
Cappelletty. She has not completed any mental 
health treatment. She did not participate in the 
ACTT program. She did not participate in 
Vocational Rehabilitation Services.  
d. Respondent[-]mother has lived a transient 
lifestyle during the course of her involvement with 
the Movant up until the last few months. She has 
moved at least six (6) times since the birth of the 
juvenile. She currently lives with a boyfriend and is 
totally dependent upon him. She is unemployed and 
has had only sporadic employment during her 
involvement with the Movant. She exhibited no 
consistency from February 2019 to March 2020. The 
brief period of stability during the last few months 
does not outweigh the year of instability during 
which her environment shifted on a monthly basis.  
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e. Respondent[-]mother has not visited with the 
juvenile since October 14, 2019, due to her refusal to 
submit to drug screens.  
f. Respondent[-]mother has a history of domestic 
violence for which she has received no treatment.  
. . . . 
 
16. Grounds exist to terminate the parental rights of 
Respondent[-]mother 
pursuant 
to 
N.C.G.S. 
§ 
7B-
1111(a)(2). The juvenile has been willfully left in foster care 
or placement outside the home for more than 12 months 
without showing to the satisfaction of the Court that 
outside of consideration of poverty, reasonable progress 
under the circumstances has been made [in] correcting the 
conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile. 
Specifically, Respondent[-]mother has not completed any of 
the objectives of her case plan with [DSS] or complied with 
the prior orders of the court in order to reunify with the 
juvenile. She demonstrated no consistency for a period in 
excess of a year. 
“Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent 
evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019). 
Furthermore, this Court limits its review of findings of fact “to those challenged 
findings that are necessary to support the trial court’s determination that . . . parental 
rights should be terminated.” In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 900 (2020) (emphasis added). 
¶ 12 
 
Respondent-mother challenges several of the trial court’s findings of fact. First, 
respondent-mother disputes Finding of Fact 14(a), arguing that there was no 
evidence to show that substance abuse was a continuing issue at the time of the 
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termination of parental rights hearing.4 We are not persuaded by this argument. In 
this finding, contrary to respondent-mother’s assertion, the trial court did not purport 
to determine that respondent-mother was continuing to use drugs at the time of the 
hearing; rather, the trial court found that respondent-mother had an extensive 
history of substance abuse for which she received inadequate treatment. This finding 
is supported by the evidence of record. We note that respondent-mother stipulated to 
the allegations in the juvenile petition that she had “an extensive history of 
polysubstance 
abuse 
[and] 
a 
long 
history 
of 
using 
methamphetamines, 
benzodiazepines, opiates, and marijuana, as well as other substances.” Additionally, 
a DSS social worker testified at the termination hearing that respondent-mother had 
an extensive history of substance abuse and that respondent-mother did not complete 
the required substance abuse treatment. The trial court also observed that 
respondent-mother was referred to intensive outpatient treatment but attended only 
a few classes. Respondent-mother does not challenge this finding of fact on appeal, 
and therefore it is deemed to be binding on this Court. In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407. 
Furthermore, we recognize that Dr. Cappelletty stated in her psychological 
evaluation of respondent-mother that, in her opinion, “the combination of 
[respondent-mother’s] severe and chronic mental illness and her history of substance 
                                            
4 Respondent-mother makes additional arguments regarding Finding of Fact 14(a), 
but we do not address them because they are not relevant to grounds for termination under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). In re N.G., 374 N.C. 891, 900 (2020). 
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abuse has combined in such a way as to have a significant impact on her capacity to 
maintain stability and effectively parent.” Also, on several occasions, respondent-
mother refused drug screens and hair follicle tests. Thus, there is clear, cogent, and 
convincing evidence to support Finding of Fact 14(a).  
¶ 13 
 
Next, respondent-mother contends that the portion of Finding of Fact 14(b) 
that she had “on numerous other occasions not made herself available for drug 
screens” is not supported by the evidence. We disagree with this contention. The DSS 
social worker testified that respondent-mother refused to participate in drug screens 
on 1 May, 15 May, 19 June, and 14 October 2019. Additionally, respondent-mother 
refused to participate in hair follicle tests on 5 September 2019 and 6 January 2020. 
Consequently, we conclude that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supports this 
finding of fact.  
¶ 14 
 
Respondent-mother further contends that Finding of Fact 14(d), which states 
that she exhibited “no consistency from February 2019 to March 2020,” is erroneous. 
As support for her stance, respondent-mother cites the testimony of the DSS social 
worker that respondent-mother had maintained stable housing since December 2019, 
and that her “home was appropriate, clean and had space for Amanda were she to be 
returned.” Respondent-mother does not challenge, however, the portions of the trial 
court’s Finding of Fact 14(d) that respondent-mother had lived a “transient lifestyle” 
during the course of the case and had moved at least six times since Amanda was 
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born, that respondent-mother was unemployed and only had sporadic employment 
during the course of the case, and that respondent-mother lived with her boyfriend 
and was “totally dependent” upon him. Furthermore, the evidence of record showed 
that respondent-mother had moved multiple times during the course of the case, was 
not employed at the time of the termination of parental rights hearing, and had not 
been employed since losing her job in June 2019. Respondent-mother also 
acknowledged at the termination hearing that she was completely dependent upon 
her boyfriend. The trial court favorably noted that respondent-mother had exhibited 
a “brief period of stability during the last few months,” but nonetheless still assessed 
that this positive stint did not “outweigh the year of instability during which her 
environment shifted on a monthly basis.” We conclude that the trial court’s finding 
that respondent-mother did not exhibit consistency from February 2019 to March 
2020 was a permissible inference available to the trial court based upon the evidence 
and unchallenged findings of fact. See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 843 (2016) (stating 
that it is the trial court’s duty to consider all the evidence, pass upon the credibility 
of the witnesses, and determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom); 
see also Scott v. Scott, 157 N.C. App. 382, 388 (2003) (stating that when the trial court 
sits as fact-finder, it is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be given to the 
evidence, and it is not the role of the appellate court to substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court). 
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¶ 15 
 
Respondent-mother maintains that Finding of Fact 14(e) is erroneous because 
she visited with Amanda in March 2020. Respondent-mother claims that she was 
eligible to visit earlier but could not do so because Amanda was out of town. We agree 
with respondent-mother on this point. The DSS social worker testified that 
respondent-mother had not visited with Amanda since October 2019 because 
respondent-mother “had to pass two [drug] screens” before she would be permitted 
visitation. The social worker further went on to testify, however, that respondent-
mother passed drug screens in January 2020 and was eligible to visit with the 
juvenile during that month but could not do so because Amanda went with her “foster 
family . . . on a trip to California.” The trial court’s Finding of Fact 14(e) does not 
properly reflect the evidence submitted at the termination of parental rights hearing, 
and hence we disregard this finding of fact. See In re S.M., 375 N.C. 673, 684 (2020). 
¶ 16 
 
We next consider respondent-mother’s representation that a segment of 
Finding of Fact 16 is erroneous in its establishment that she had not completed any 
objectives of her case plan or complied with the prior orders of the trial court in order 
to reunify with Amanda, and that respondent-mother had demonstrated no 
consistency for a period in excess of twelve months. We begin by recalling that we 
have already determined that there was sufficient evidence to support Finding of Fact 
14(d) that respondent-mother exhibited “no consistency from February 2019 to March 
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2020,” and likewise conclude that the same evidence supports the trial court’s similar 
finding regarding respondent-mother’s lack of consistency in Finding of Fact 16.  
¶ 17 
 
As for the balance of Finding of Fact 16, we conclude that there was clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding. First, respondent-
mother admitted at the termination of parental rights hearing that she did not do 
anything toward completing her case plan other than working, and that she was 
unemployed by the time of the termination hearing. Second, we have found that there 
was sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s findings of fact that respondent-
mother did not always make herself available for drug screens, that she did not 
complete substance abuse treatment, and that she did not complete any mental 
health treatment. Furthermore, while the trial court acknowledged that at the time 
of the termination of parental rights hearing respondent-mother had a brief period of 
stability with regard to housing, nonetheless she had previously been transient, and 
the trial court thereupon determined that respondent-mother’s short period of 
stability did not outweigh her lengthy period of instability. Therefore, Finding of Fact 
16 is properly supported by the record. 
¶ 18 
 
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that 
grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) to terminate her parental 
rights. Although respondent-mother concedes that she was slow to address many 
components of her case plan, respondent-mother contends that she made reasonable 
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progress and rectified the issues which led to Amanda’s removal from respondent-
mother’s care by the time of the termination of parental rights hearing. We are not 
persuaded by these representations of respondent-mother. 
¶ 19 
 
This Court has recognized that “parental compliance with a judicially adopted 
case plan is relevant in determining whether grounds for termination exist pursuant 
to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 384 (2019). A trial court 
should refrain from finding that a parent has failed to make reasonable progress in 
correcting the conditions that led to the child’s removal “simply because of his or her 
‘failure to fully satisfy all elements of the case plan goals.’ ” Id. at 385 (quoting In re 
J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 151, 163 (2006)). However, “a trial court has ample authority to 
determine that a parent’s ‘extremely limited progress’ in correcting the conditions 
leading to removal adequately supports a determination that a parent’s parental 
rights in a particular child are subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2).” Id. 
 
¶ 20 
 
Here, respondent-mother admits that Amanda has resided in foster care or 
placement outside of the home for more than twelve months. However, respondent-
mother asserts that she made reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions 
which led to Amanda’s removal from her care. This contention is without merit. 
Respondent-mother’s case plan was directed at resolving her issues concerning 
substance abuse, mental health, and instability. The case plan also aimed at 
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addressing respondent-mother’s lack of stable, safe housing. The evidence in the 
record, which yielded the trial court’s supported findings of fact, demonstrates that 
respondent-mother largely failed to comply with her case plan. Significantly, 
although it was recommended that respondent-mother complete ninety hours of 
intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment, she only attended a few classes and 
failed to complete the treatment. Respondent-mother also failed to complete mental 
health treatment and refused to take any prescription medication to address her 
mental health issues. In like manner, respondent-mother demonstrated continued 
instability during most of the course of this case; she was consistently transient and 
unable to maintain stable employment. Respondent-mother remained completely 
dependent upon her boyfriend, even up to the time of the termination hearing. 
Although respondent-mother cites progress made by her just prior to the termination 
of parental rights hearing, it was within the trial court’s authority to decide that these 
improvements were insufficient in light of the historical facts of the case. See In re 
T.M.L., 2021-NCSC-55, ¶ 32 (concluding that while the respondent “made some last-
minute attempts to comply with the case plan by the time of the termination hearing 
. . . [his] partial steps—undertaken after DSS had filed petitions to terminate his 
parental rights and two years or more after the children’s removal from the home—
[were] insufficient to constitute reasonable progress under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2)”); see also In re O.W.D.A., 375 N.C. 645, 654 (2020) (concluding that, with 
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respect to grounds to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), that 
although the respondent may have made some recent, minimal progress, “the trial 
court was within its authority to weigh the evidence and determine that these 
eleventh-hour efforts did not outweigh the evidence of his persistent failures to make 
improvements . . . and to conclude that there was a probability of repetition of 
neglect.”). Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err by concluding that 
grounds existed pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights. 
III. 
Conclusion 
¶ 21 
 
The trial court’s conclusion that a ground for termination existed pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) is sufficient in and of itself to support termination of 
respondent-mother’s parental rights. In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395. As such, we do 
not need to address her arguments regarding N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (9). 
Respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that termination 
of her parental rights was in Amanda’s best interests. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of 
respondent-mother.  
AFFIRMED.