Case Title: Barragan v. Casco Design Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99261

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 99261-Agenda 18-May 2005.
VERONICA BARRAGAN , Indiv. and as Special 
Adm'r of the Estate 
of Roberto Barragan, et al. (Osman Construction Corporation, 
Appellant), v. CASCO DESIGN CORPORATION, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 22, 2005.
 
CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs, Jesus Barragan and Veronica Barragan, filed 
suit in the circuit court of Cook County against defendants, Osman Construction 
Corporation (Osman) and Casco Design Corporation (Casco), to recover for death 
and injury caused by a construction-related accident. Casco filed a counterclaim 
for contribution against Osman, and Osman subsequently filed a responsive 
counterclaim for contribution against Casco. The issue presented in this case is 
whether section 13-207 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-207 
(West 2000)), which allows counterclaims to proceed even when otherwise barred 
by a statute of limitations, should have been applied to save Osman's responsive 
counterclaim for contribution that was admittedly time-barred by the two-year 
statute of limitations set forth in section 13-204 of the Code (735 ILCS 
5/13-204 (West 2000)). We answer in the affirmative.

BACKGROUND
On July 8, 1997, Jesus Barragan was injured and his 
brother, Roberto Barragan, killed, when a masonry wall collapsed at the 
construction site where the two were working. At the time of the accident, the 
Barragans were employed by Masonry Construction Corporation (Masonry), a 
subcontractor on the project. Osman was the general contractor at the site, and 
Casco was the architect who designed the specifications for the project.
On July 15, 1997, Jesus Barragan filed his initial 
negligence complaint against Osman in the circuit court. Three days later, 
Veronica Barragan, the special administrator of Roberto's estate, joined Jesus 
in filing a first amended complaint, adding a wrongful-death claim.(1) Osman was served with the summons on the 
original complaint on July 25, 1997, and with the summons on the amended 
complaint on August 1, 1997. Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on 
September 11, 1997, naming Casco as a defendant. Casco was served with the 
second amended complaint on September 15, 1997.
On May 28, 1999, Osman filed a contribution claim against 
Masonry, but not against Casco at that time. On July 29, 1999, Casco filed a 
claim for contribution against both Osman and Masonry, and on December 7, 2000, 
Osman filed a counterclaim for contribution against Casco. Casco filed a motion 
objecting to Osman's counterclaim for contribution. The trial court denied the 
motion, but gave Casco until January 11, 2001, to answer or otherwise plead to 
Osman's counterclaim.
Settlement negotiations between plaintiffs and Osman 
ensued. On January 12, 2001, the trial court entered a good-faith finding 
approving a settlement agreement between plaintiffs and Osman that required 
Osman to pay plaintiffs $4.65 million. The agreement extinguished plaintiffs' 
causes of action against both Osman and Casco, but noted that Osman had retained 
its right to proceed with its counterclaim for contribution against Casco. In 
accordance with the settlement, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' causes of 
action with prejudice, but ordered that Osman's counterclaim against Casco 
remain pending.
Casco eventually filed a motion pursuant to section 2-619 
of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)) to dismiss Osman's counterclaim for 
contribution. In its motion, Casco argued that Osman's counterclaim was barred 
by the two-year limitation period for contribution actions under section 13-204 
of the Code because Osman filed its claim for contribution more than two years 
after the date it was served with process on the plaintiffs' underlying 
complaint. Section 13-204 bars contribution actions filed more than two years 
after a defendant is served with process in the underlying suit. 735 ILCS 
5/13-204 (West 2000). Osman, on the other hand, maintained that section 13-207 
of the Code is a saving provision that allows a counterclaim to be filed in 
response to a pleading, despite the two-year limit for filing contribution 
claims under section 13-204. The circuit court rejected Osman's position and 
dismissed the counterclaim for contribution.
Osman appealed, and a divided appellate court affirmed. 
352 Ill. App. 3d 33, 38-39. According to the appellate court majority, section 
13-204 required that Osman file its contribution action within two years after 
being served with process in the underlying lawsuit. 352 Ill. App. 3d at 37. 
Because Osman's action was a counterclaim, the subject of section 13-207, and 
Osman had owned the claim before it was barred, section 13-207 seemingly would 
apply to negate the two-year limitation of section 13-204. 352 Ill. App. 3d at 
37. But, according to the appellate court majority, section 13-207 was preempted 
by section 13-204 because section 13-207 is a statute of limitations and section 
13-204 explicitly preempts " 'all other statutes of limitation.' " 352 Ill. App. 
3d at 37, quoting 735 ILCS 5/13-204(c) (West 2000). The dissent, however, found 
the majority's analysis flawed. It concluded that section 13-207 is not a 
statute of limitations as the majority claimed; rather, it is a "savings clause" 
and has been repeatedly recognized as such by courts. 352 Ill. App. 3d at 39-40 
(McBride, J., dissenting). Thus, the two statutes were not in conflict, and 
section 13-207 should have been applied to save Osman's counterclaim. 352 Ill. 
App. 3d at 39-40 (McBride, J., dissenting). 
We subsequently allowed Osman's petition for leave to 
appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS
This appeal involves the propriety of the section 2-619 
dismissal of Osman's contribution claim and the proper interpretation of two 
statutes. We conduct de novo review of both the dismissal of a claim 
and the interpretation of a statute. Paszkowski v. Metropolitan Water 
Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (2004).
As previously noted, the statutes at issue are sections 
13-204 and 13-207 of the Code. Section 13-204 provides in relevant part as 
follows:
"(b) In instances where an underlying action has been 
filed by a claimant, no action for contribution or indemnity may be commenced 
more than 2 years after the party seeking contribution or indemnity has been 
served with process in the underlying action or more than 2 years from the time 
the party, or his or her privy, knew or should reasonably have known of an act 
or omission giving rise to the action for contribution or indemnity, whichever 
period expires later.
(c) The applicable limitations period contained in 
subsection *** (b) shall apply to all actions for contribution or indemnity and 
shall preempt, as to contribution and indemnity actions only, all other statutes 
of limitation or repose, but only to the extent that the claimant in an 
underlying action could have timely sued the party from whom contribution or 
indemnity is sought at the time such claimant filed the underlying action, or in 
instances where no underlying action has been filed, the payment in discharge of 
the obligation of the party seeking contribution or indemnity is made before any 
such underlying action would have been barred by lapse of time." 735 ILCS 
5/13-204(b), (c) (West 2000).
Section 13-207 provides that despite the expiration of an 
applicable statute of limitations period, counterclaims may be pled in a pending 
action as follows:
"A defendant may plead a set-off or counterclaim barred by 
the statute of limitation, while held and owned by him or her, to any action, 
the cause of which was owned by the plaintiff or person under whom he or she 
claims, before such set-off or counterclaim was so barred, and not otherwise." 
735 ILCS 5/13-207 (West 2000).
Osman argues that the plain language of the two sections 
allows them to be reconciled with one another and both enforced as written. 
Osman acknowledges that section 13-204 bars contribution claims filed more than 
two years after process is served in the underlying suit, but argues that 
section 13-207 plainly "saves" responsive counterclaims that would otherwise be 
barred by the statute of limitations. Casco, on the other hand, argues that the 
two statutes conflict, and that it was the intent of the legislature that the 
mandatory language of section 13-204 should be applied to bar all contribution 
actions, even contribution actions that also happen to be counterclaims.
Our primary objective in construing a statute is to 
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, and to this end 
all other rules of construction are subordinate. Paszkowski, 213 Ill. 2d  at 6; Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001). 
We determine intent by reading the statute as a whole and considering all 
relevant parts. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d  at 232. When the language is 
unambiguous, the law is to be enforced as enacted by the legislature. 
Paszkowski, 213 Ill. 2d  at 7. Where two statutes are allegedly in conflict, 
a court has a duty to interpret the statutes in a manner that avoids an 
inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes, where such an interpretation is 
reasonably possible. Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill. 2d 304, 311-12 
(2001).
Initially, we must determine whether Osman satisfied the 
requirements of section 13-207 so as to bring it into play in this case. Casco 
argues that Osman did not hold or own a setoff to any claim "owned by the 
plaintiff" as required by section 13-207 because Casco was not a "plaintiff" for 
purposes of that section.
We disagree with Casco's interpretation. It overlooks that 
section 2-401(d) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-401(d) (West 2000)) deems a party 
bringing a counterclaim to be a "plaintiff" for purposes of the Code. 
Specifically, it provides that "[u]nless a contrary meaning is indicated, 
wherever used in this Act and in rules adopted pursuant hereto the term 
'plaintiff' includes counterclaimants and third-party plaintiffs, and the term 
'defendant' includes third-party defendants and parties against whom relief is 
sought by counterclaim." 735 ILCS 5/2-401(d) (West 2000). Thus, when Casco filed 
its contribution claim against Osman, which was technically a "counterclaim"under 
section 2-608 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-608 (West 2000)),(2) 
Casco became a "plaintiff" vis-a-vis Osman for purposes of section 
13-207. This is borne out by the few Illinois cases that have considered 
counterclaims among codefendants. See Benckendorf v. Burlington Northern 
R.R., 112 Ill. App. 3d 658 (1983); Dignan v. Midas-International Corp., 
65 Ill. App. 3d 188 (1978); Eddy v. Yellow Cab Co., 434 F. Supp. 447 
(N.D. Ill. 1977). These cases uniformly stand for the proposition that a 
codefendant initiating an adversarial relationship by filing a cross-claim 
against another codefendant is considered a "plaintiff" and the codefendant 
filing a counterclaim in response is considered a "defendant" for purposes of 
the saving clause.
In Benckendorf, the plaintiff filed a two-count 
complaint against Burlington and Lee to recover for injuries he sustained when a 
Burlington train collided with an auto driven by Lee and in which the plaintiff 
was a passenger. Burlington filed a counterclaim against Lee for contribution, 
and Lee responded by filing a counterclaim against Burlington. Burlington argued 
that Lee's counterclaim was not filed within the two-year limitation period of 
section 13-202 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13-202) and was 
therefore barred. The appellate court disagreed that the claim was ultimately 
barred, finding that section 13-207 " 'saves' otherwise barred claims." 
Benckendorf, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 663. In so concluding, the court rejected 
Burlington's argument that section 13-207 can never apply where a defendant has 
filed a counterclaim against another defendant. Benckendorf, 112 Ill. 
App. 3d at 663.
Benckendorf also distinguished Dignan v. 
Midas-International Corp., 65 Ill. App. 3d 188 (1978), and Eddy v. 
Yellow Cab Co., 434 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ill. 1977), two cases on which Casco 
relies to support its argument in the instant case. In both Dignan and
Eddy, a defendant sought to sue another defendant in the case by way of 
a cross-claim even though the statute of limitations had expired on the claim 
and the opposing defendant had not first filed any pleading against the 
defendant filing the cross claim. Both courts rejected arguments that these kind 
of first-strike cross-claims are saved by section 13-207 of the Code. Dignan, 
65 Ill. App. 3d at 191-92; Eddy, 434 F. Supp.  at 448. Dignan 
noted that the party seeking to invoke the "saving statute" sought relief for an 
otherwise stale claim from passive codefendants and was therefore " 'in no sense 
a defendant, but is the moving, acting litigant who seeks relief from the 
court.' " Dignan, 65 Ill. App. 3d at 192, quoting Hahn v. Gates, 
102 Ill. App. 385, 392 (1902). Similarly, in Eddy, the court affirmed 
the dismissal of a time-barred, first-strike counterclaim against another 
codefendant, noting that the codefendant who filed the counterclaim was "an 
active litigant seeking relief for her injuries, as a cross-claimant, from a 
passive co-party. As such, she is not protected by [the saving] statute." 
Eddy, 434 F. Supp.  at 448.
The distinction drawn in both Dignan and Eddy 
between passive and active codefendants was important to the court in 
Benckendorf. Benckendorf found that in both of the cited cases, 
"the parties against whom counterclaims had been filed were passive codefendants 
who had not, as in this case, brought actions against the counterclaimants." 
Benckendorf, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 663.
We believe that Benckendorf, Dignan and
Eddy are consistent, well reasoned and supportive of the conclusion 
that Casco was a "plaintiff" and Osman a "defendant" for purposes of section 
13-207. As in Benckendorf, the counterclaims between codefendants here 
placed them in adversarial relationship, and Osman's counterclaim was not 
against a passive codefendant, but was instead a responsive counterclaim. It 
therefore falls under the language of the statute and its plain intent to allow 
responsive claims.
Casco contends that Osman's counterclaim for contribution 
was not really an adversarial counterclaim because both counterclaims simply 
sought an equitable apportionment of damages to avoid the consequences of joint 
and several liability. Casco cites no authority on point to support its argument 
that a responsive counterclaim for contribution against another codefendant is 
not a "counterclaim" within the meaning of the statute, and we find its argument 
unpersuasive. Instead, it has been held that section 13-207 permits a 
"defendant" to plead "a set off or counterclaim *** to any action," even 
counterclaims not factually related to the original claim. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp. v. Chicago Eastern Corp., 863 F.2d 508, 511-12 (7th Cir. 1988). But 
here, Osman's counterclaim was directly related and responsive to Casco's 
contribution claim. While it is true that both claims sought an equitable 
apportionment of damages, each party had an opposing view of how those damages 
should be apportioned and each claimed that the fault of the accident rested 
solely with the other party. Casco even argued in the circuit court that it had 
evidentiary defenses to Osman's counterclaim that were "separate and apart from 
Casco's defenses to the plaintiff's action." Under the circumstances, we believe 
that Osman's claim was responsive to Casco's claim and was thus a true 
counterclaim within the meaning of section 13-207.
The saving provision comes into play in this case because 
Casco owned its contribution claim-the one that Osman countered-before Osman's 
counterclaim was barred. Osman was served with summons in the underlying suit on 
July 25, 1997, and therefore had until July 25, 1999,(3) 
to file a contribution claim to avoid the bar of section 13-204. Casco, on the 
other hand, had until September 15, 1999, to file its contribution claim, and it 
did so on July 29, 1999, four days after any potential contribution claim that 
Osman might bring became time-barred by section 13-204. But at the time Osman's 
claim became barred under section 13-204, Casco "owned" the claim that formed 
the subject of Osman's counterclaim within the meaning of section 13-207. If 
section 13-207 is deemed controlling, it would allow Osman's responsive 
counterclaim for contribution to proceed despite the bar of section 13-204.
Having determined that section 13-207 comes into play in 
this case, we now turn to the purposes of the two statutes and then to the 
question of which statute controls the outcome here. Section 13-207 is a 
"saving" provision that allows a counterclaim to proceed despite the failure to 
comply with the appropriate statute of limitations period. Pape v. Byrd, 
145 Ill. 2d 13, 30 (1991). This saving clause opens the door and exposes the 
initiating party to otherwise stale claims by sacrificing the protection of the 
statute of limitations. See Ogg v. City of Springfield, 121 Ill. App. 
3d 25, 34 (1984). One purpose of section 13-207 is to protect parties who have 
shorter limitations periods than their opponents. See Patsis v. Zion-Benton 
Township High School, No. 126, 234 Ill. App. 3d 232, 235 (1992). Thus, it 
has been often noted that section 13-207 prevents plaintiffs from intentionally 
filing their claims as late as possible in order to preclude defendants from a 
reasonable opportunity to file their counterclaims within the original 
limitations period. See, e.g., Mermelstein v. Rothner, 349 
Ill. App. 3d 800, 804 (2004); Cameron General Corp. v. Hafnia Holdings, Inc., 
289 Ill. App. 3d 495, 506 (1997). Section 13-207 is also premised on the notion 
that potential litigants do not always promptly file every possible claim they 
may have; instead, some litigants may refrain from filing until after a claim is 
brought against them. See Mermelstein, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 804. 
Regardless of the original purpose of this section, however, courts have long 
recognized that application of section 13-207 is based on the principle that a 
plaintiff waives application of the statute of limitations with regard to 
potential counterclaims. See Mermelstein, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 804; 
Cameron General Corp., 289 Ill. App. 3d at 506; Ogg, 121 Ill. App. 
3d at 33-34; Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d  at 512; but c.f.
Johnson v. Core-Vent Corp., 264 Ill. App. 3d 833, 837 (1993). Moreover, 
a plaintiff is not free to withdraw this waiver at will; once application of the 
statute of limitations has been waived, it remains waived even if the claim 
which triggered the waiver is later dismissed. See, e.g., 
Mermelstein, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 804.
Casco emphasizes that section 13-204 provides that in 
instances where an underlying action has been filed by a claimant, no action 
for contribution may be commenced more than two years after service of 
process in the underlying suit. It also emphasizes that section 13-204 preempts
all other statutes of limitation or repose. It argues that this evinces 
a legislative intent to override section 13-207.
We find Casco's argument to be unpersuasive. The mandatory 
"no action for contribution" language merely accomplishes what all statutes of 
limitation do-it time-bars the claim. As such, section 13-204 is not appreciably 
different from other statutes of limitation that have been found to be 
overridden by section 13-207. See, e.g., Pape, 145 Ill. 2d  at 
27 (section 13-207 applied to avoid the limitations bar of section 302(a)(1) of 
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 
40, par. 302(a)(1))); Westbank v. Maurer, 276 Ill. App. 3d 553, 564 
(1995) (section 13-207 applied to save a counterclaim despite a federal statute 
of limitations providing that the right to rescission "shall expire three years 
after the date of consummation of the transaction or sale of the property"); 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d  at 511 n.3 (section 13-207 held to override 
statute of limitations requiring that an "action for breach of contract for sale 
must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued" (Ill. 
Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 26, par. 2-725)); Benckendorf, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 
663 (section 13-207 applied to avoid the two-year limitations bar for personal 
injuries under section 13-202 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 
13-202)). These cases demonstrate that it takes more than mandatory language to 
override the saving provision of section 13-207. As we will explain more fully 
below, the language enacted by the legislature in section 13-204, and relied 
upon by Casco, appears to have had nothing to do with a desire to preempt 
section 13-207 and everything to do with clarifying which of two possible 
statutes of limitations should control in contribution actions. Moreover, if we 
were to accept Casco's argument, it would void section 13-207's clear intent to 
negate an otherwise applicable statute of limitations when the conditions are 
met.
The linchpin of Casco's argument is the erroneous premise 
that section 13-207 is a statute of limitations. A statute of limitations is 
"[a] law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute 
establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the 
claim accrued." Black's Law Dictionary 1450-51 (8th ed. 2004). Thus, a statute 
of limitations is by definition an arbitrary period after which all claims will 
be cut off. Langendorf v. City of Urbana, 197 Ill. 2d 100, 110 (2001); 
see also Guzman v. C.R. Epperson Construction, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 391, 
400 (2001) (the purpose of a statute of limitations is to prevent stale claims). 
Section 13-207, however, does the opposite of a statute of limitations. Instead 
of barring a claim after a specified period or setting a date for accrual of the 
claim, it saves otherwise barred claims. Section 13-207 cannot be a statute of 
limitations because its aim is not to bar claims, but to preserve 
them.(4)
Statutes of limitation must be construed in accordance 
with their objectives and purposes. Geneva Construction Co. v. Martin 
Transfer & Storage Co., 4 Ill. 2d 273, 289 (1954). There is nothing that 
can be garnered from the purpose of section 13-204 to indicate that it was meant 
to circumvent the saving clause of section 13-207. Prior to its amendment in 
1995, section 13-204 simply provided that "[n]o action for contribution among 
joint tortfeasors shall be commenced with respect to any payment made in excess 
of a party's pro rata share more than 2 years after the party seeking 
contribution has made such payment towards discharge of his or her liability." 
735 ILCS 5/13-204 (West 1992). Prior to 1995, there was some confusion as to 
which statute of limitations would be applied to a contribution action where 
there was no payment discharging liability, but where an underlying action had 
been filed. The question in such cases was whether the two-year statute of 
limitations for contribution applied or whether the statute of limitations for 
the underlying, predicate claim, which might be longer or shorter than two 
years, applied. Courts had held that where an underlying direct action is 
pending, an action for contribution is subject to the same statutes of 
limitation and repose that are applicable to the original claimant's cause of 
action in the underlying direct action. See Caballero v. Rockford Punch 
Press & Manufacturing Co., 244 Ill. App. 3d 333, 337 (1993) (and cases 
cited therein).
The 1995 amendment added subsections (b) and (c), which 
inserted the language providing that "[i]n instances where an underlying action 
has been filed by a claimant, no action for contribution or indemnity may be 
commenced more than 2 years after" service of process in the underlying suit and 
"shall preempt *** all other statutes of limitation and repose." 735 ILCS 
5/13-204(b), (c) (West 1994); Pub. Act 88-538, §5, eff. January 1, 1995. Thus 
the obvious purpose of the 1995 amendment of section 13-204 was to clarify which 
of two arguably relevant statutes of limitations should be applied to 
contribution claims: the two-year limitations for contribution, or the 
limitations for the predicate claim, which might be longer or shorter than two 
years. See, e.g., Medrano v. Production Engineering Co., 332 
Ill. App. 3d 562, 574 (2002). The 1995 amendment addressed this question by 
providing a mandatory two-year limitation period as stated in section 13-204, 
regardless of the underlying limitation period. Thus, the statute provides that 
all other limitation periods are preempted. However, nothing in section 13-204 
addresses the saving clause of section 13-207.
Moreover, the legislative debate over the amendment is 
bereft of any indication that the General Assembly wanted to prevent the saving 
provision from preserving responsive counterclaims for contribution that would 
otherwise be time-barred, or that it intended to amend section 13-204 to bring 
about that effect. Indeed, it would have been unreasonable for the legislature 
to have expected courts to interpret the preemption clause of section 13-204 as 
including section 13-207 within its ambit, given that Illinois courts had been 
interpreting section 13-207 as saving provision, and not a statute of 
limitations, for over a decade at the time of the 1995 amendment. See, e.g.,
Pape, 145 Ill. 2d  at 30 ("the courts below erred in construing section 
13-207 as not saving Pape's counterclaim despite her failure to comply with the 
limitations period of section 302(a)(1) of the Marriage Act"); Ogg, 121 
Ill. App. 3d at 34 ("The saving clause opens the door and exposes the initiating 
party to otherwise stale claims"); Benckendorf, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 663 
(section 13-207 " 'saves' otherwise barred claims"); Ogg, 121 Ill. App. 
3d at 34 (refers to section 13-207 as "the saving clause").
Casco relies upon a couple of rules of statutory 
construction to support its position. Specifically, it notes that when two 
statutes are in conflict, the more specific should take precedence over the more 
general and the more recently enacted statute should be applied over the earlier 
enacted statute. But neither of these principles is of any import here because 
the two statutes are compatible and can be read harmoniously. See Ferguson, 
202 Ill. 2d  at 311-12 (a court has a duty to interpret allegedly conflicting 
statutes in a manner that avoids inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes 
where possible); Jahn v. Troy Fire Protection District, 163 Ill. 2d 275, 282 (1994) (statutes must be in "direct conflict" to apply the more 
recently enacted statute over the earlier enacted one); Byrne v. City of 
Chicago, 215 Ill. App. 3d 698, 709-10 (1991) (the two principles of 
statutory construction at issue-that the more recently enacted and the more 
specific statute should take precedence-do not apply where the statutes do not 
actually contradict one another). Moreover, it has been specifically noted that 
no conflict arises when section 13-207 overrides a statute of limitations absent 
a clear legislative intent to prevent the applicability of 13-207, and therefore 
the principles of statutory construction relied upon-that the more specific and 
more recent statute take priority-do not apply. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
863 F.2d  at 511-12. With respect to the two sections of the Code to be 
reconciled in this case, it is only after the statute of limitations 
bars a claim that the saving provision can step in to save it, and then only in 
the event that the requirements of the provision are met. This is a two-step 
inquiry that gives effect to both statutes. As we have previously noted, section 
13-204 clearly bars contribution claims filed more than two years after service 
of process in the underlying suit. Section 13-207 plainly takes into account 
such barred claims, yet it saves them if they are responsive counterclaims, by 
negating the statute of limitations and allowing them to proceed. Our 
interpretation of the two statutes avoids any inconsistency and gives meaning 
and effect to both statutes, as we must do if reasonably possible. Ferguson, 
202 Ill. 2d  at 311-12. There is no merit to the notion that such an 
interpretation would render section 13-204 meaningless, as there is no question 
that section 13-204 bars all untimely filed actions for contribution that would 
seek to instigate an adversarial relationship, in contrast to actions that 
merely respond to one that has already been created.
The only case cited by Casco that arguably supports its 
position is Johnson v. Core-Vent Corp., 264 Ill. App. 3d 833 (1993), 
but we find that case to be distinguishable. There, a dentist and two of his 
patients sued the defendant, claiming that dental implants manufactured by the 
defendant failed after they were surgically installed. The defendant filed a 
counterclaim against the dentist, alleging that his negligence in installing the 
devices caused or contributed to the patients' injuries. The defendant's 
counterclaim, however, was filed beyond the four-year medical malpractice 
statute of repose set forth in section 13-212(a) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1991, ch. 110, par. 13-212(a)). The appellate court found that the four-year 
statute of repose should be read to override section 13-207 of the Code because 
section 13-212(a) was more "narrow in focus" and it expressed the legislature's 
intent "to limit the vulnerability of health care professions from medical 
malpractice liability by establishing that the four-year statute of repose 
applied to any action, including claims for contribution." Johnson, 264 
Ill. App. 3d at 837.
Johnson is distinguishable from the present case, 
as the same public policy concern of limiting the vulnerability of health 
professionals to medical malpractice claims is not present here. See Hayes 
v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 136 Ill. 2d 450, 461 (1990) ("the 
General Assembly perceived the medical malpractice insurance crisis as so grave 
that it limited to four years a patient's right to bring an action against 
certain health-care providers for damages arising out of patient care. For that 
reason, we find it difficult to believe that the General Assembly did not also 
intend to bar a culpable party's claim for contribution if not filed within the 
same statutory four-year period ***"). Moreover, Johnson intimated that 
its result might have been different if the defendant had not had any 
opportunity to file a responsive pleading before the statute of repose 
had expired, or if the case had involved a last-minute, eleventh-hour filing by 
the plaintiff to prevent the defendant from asserting a counterclaim. 
Johnson, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 837-38. But Johnson noted that the 
defendant had at least 11 months within which it could have filed a responsive 
counterclaim to the plaintiff's claim. In contrast to the defendant in 
Johnson, Osman arguably had no time within the limitation period of section 
13-204 to file a responsive claim because Casco filed its contribution 
claim four days after Osman's two-year period under section 13-204 had expired. 
Although Osman did have ample opportunity to file a first-strike action for 
contribution against Casco, it was not until four days after Osman's right to 
bring a claim had expired that Casco created an adversarial relationship with 
Osman by filing its contribution claim. The mere fact that Osman could have 
initially filed a contribution claim without the protection of the saving 
provision does not detract from its ability to rely upon it later. See 
Mermelstein, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 804 (one of the purposes of the saving 
provision is to protect potential litigants who do not promptly file every claim 
they may have, but instead refrain from filing against a party until that party 
asserts an adversarial claim against them). At any rate, we reject Casco's 
argument that the rationale of Johnson should be extended to bar 
Osman's responsive counterclaim for contribution in the case at bar.
Finally, Casco argues that allowing section 13-207 to save 
counterclaims like the one filed by Osman would foil meaningful settlement 
negotiations and trial preparation. Casco, however, does not explain its 
contention any further, nor does it point to any way in which it was 
specifically harmed by allowing Osman's counterclaim to proceed other than that 
it might be potentially on the hook for its pro rata share of the 
settlement for the underlying claimant's injuries. Moreover, the record belies 
Casco's cursory claim that it was prejudiced in this case. After Osman filed its 
counterclaim for contribution against Casco, Casco was allowed to supplement 
discovery and have the trial date continued from February of 2001 to May of 
2001.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the interplay 
between sections 13-204 and 13-207 allows Osman's otherwise time-barred 
counterclaim to proceed. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the appellate 
and circuit courts and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings..



Judgments reversed;
cause remanded.
 
 
1.  1This first amended complaint also named "Casco 
Development Corporation" as a defendant. However, plaintiff did not name "Casco 
Design Corporation" as a defendant until it filed its second amended complaint 
on September 11, 1997. At that time, the trial court allowed plaintiff to 
voluntarily dismiss Casco Development Corporation as a party defendant. Casco 
Design Corporation was served with the second amended complaint on September 15, 
1997.
2.  2Although Casco's action against Osman is technically 
called a "counterclaim" under section 2608 for the purpose of simplifying 
terminology in pleading, this kind of claim has been traditionally known as a 
cross-claim. In contradistinction, a traditional counterclaim, as intended by 
section 13207, has been defined as a "claim for relief asserted against an 
opposing party after an original claim has been made" by that opposing party 
(Black's Law Dictionary 376 (8th ed. 2004)). Section 2608 simplified matters by 
eliminating the distinction between the two types of claims when pleading. Ill. 
Ann. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2608, Historical & Practice Notes, at 182 (Smith-Hurd 
1983).
3.  3Other possible dates for accrual of Osman's 
contribution claim for purposes of section 13204 include August 1, 1997, the 
date Osman was served with summons on the amended complaint, and September 11, 
1997, the date Casco was sued by plaintiff and Osman became absolutely aware of 
its potential contribution rights. But no matter which of these dates is chosen, 
it is clear that Osman's contribution claim was filed beyond the limitations 
period of section 13204. But Casco argued in its motion to dismiss before the 
circuit court that time began to run on Osman's contribution claim as of July 
25, 1997, so we will apply that date for convenience sake.
4.  4Just because section 13207 "saves" otherwise barred 
counterclaims does not mean that it gives a party a right to bring the 
counterclaim for "all eternity" as Casco suggests. Section 13207 only applies 
to counterclaims that are made in response to the action at which they are 
directed. Patsis, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 236. More importantly, contribution 
claims have long been restricted to the underlying action in which they arise. 
See Laue v. Leifheit, 105 Ill. 2d 191 (1984); 740 ILCS 100/5 (West 2002).