Case Title: In re G.O.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87476

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re G.O., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. G.O., 
Appellee).
Opinion filed March 23, 2000.

JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court: 

The State appeals from an order of the appellate court holding that 
respondent, G.O., is entitled to a jury trial and that respondent's confession 
was involuntary. See 304 Ill. App. 3d 719. We vacate the appellate court's 
holding that respondent is entitled to a jury trial and reverse the holding that 
respondent's confession was involuntary. 


BACKGROUND

The State, relying upon a theory of accountability, filed a petition in the 
circuit court of Cook County to adjudicate respondent delinquent for the first 
degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998)) of Rafael Kubera. 
Respondent also faced related allegations of aggravated discharge of a firearm 
(720 ILCS 5/24 1.2(a)(2) (West 1998)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 4(a) 
(West 1998)), and aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12 4.2(a)(1) 
(West 1998)). Respondent requested a jury trial. The trial court denied 
respondent's request. Respondent also sought to suppress incriminating 
statements that he had made. After a hearing, the trial court denied this 
motion. 

Subsequently, the trial court adjudicated respondent delinquent on all 
charges. Pursuant to section 5 33(1.5) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 
ILCS 405/5 33(1.5) (West 1996) (now 705 ILCS 405/5 750(2) (West 1998))), the 
trial court declared respondent a ward of the court and ordered him committed to 
the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, until his "21st birthday, 
without the possibility of parole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized absence 
for a period of 5 years." See 705 ILCS 405/5 33(1.5) (West 1996). Respondent 
timely appealed. 

The appellate court held that the trial court denied respondent his right to 
equal protection as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions (see U.S. 
Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 2) when it denied his request for 
a jury trial. The court explained that the sentence to which respondent was 
subject was similar to the sentences imposed upon habitual and violent juvenile 
offenders. Compare 705 ILCS 405/5 33(1.5) (West 1996) with 705 ILCS 405/5 35(f) 
(West 1996) (now 705 ILCS 405/5 815(f) (West 1998)) (requiring a habitual 
juvenile offender to be committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile 
Division, "until his 21st birthday, without possibility of parole, furlough, or 
non-emergency authorized absence") and 705 ILCS 405/5 36(f) (West 1996) (now 705 
ILCS 405/5 820(f) (West 1998)) (requiring a violent juvenile offender to be 
committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, "until his or her 
21st birthday, without possibility of parole, furlough, or non- emergency 
authorized absence"). The court described all three sentences as "punitive, 
determinate, nondiscretionary sentences of commitment to the age of 21 without 
hope of parole or furlough for at least five years from the date of commitment." 
304 Ill. App. 3d at 727. The court reasoned that the similar sentences rendered 
respondent similarly situated to habitual and violent juvenile offenders. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the three are similarly situated, the Juvenile 
Court Act treats juveniles charged with first degree murder differently than it 
treats juvenile offenders and violent juvenile offenders. Specifically, the 
Juvenile Court Act grants a jury trial to both habitual and violent juvenile 
offenders, but it does not grant such a right to juveniles charged with first 
degree murder. See 705 ILCS 405/5 35(d), 5 36(d) (West 1996). The appellate 
court concluded that no rational basis existed for granting a jury trial to 
habitual and violent juvenile offenders while denying one to juveniles charged 
with first degree murder. 304 Ill. App. 3d at 727-29. 

The appellate court also examined the evidence that had been presented at the 
suppression hearing and concluded that the trial court erred in denying 
respondent's motion to suppress. Subsequently, the State sought leave to appeal, 
both as a matter of right and as a matter of discretion (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315; 
134 Ill. 2d R. 317). We granted the State's petition and ordered that the action 
be considered on an expedited basis. We also granted the motions of the Cook 
County public defender and the Children and Family Justice Center to file briefs 
as amici curiae. 


ANALYSIS 

Equal Protection

We address first the State's argument that the appellate court erred in 
concluding that the trial court's refusal to grant respondent a jury trial 
denied him the equal protection of the laws. The basis for the appellate court's 
opinion is the similar sentences imposed on juveniles adjudicated delinquent of 
first degree murder and those imposed on juveniles adjudicated delinquent as 
habitual and violent juvenile offenders. See 304 Ill. App. 3d at 727. 

The sentencing provision for juveniles charged with first degree murder is 
found at section 5 33(1.5). This section was enacted as part of Public Act 88 
680 (Pub. Act 88 680, eff. January 1, 1995), commonly known as the Safe 
Neighborhoods Law. In People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80 (1999), this court 
held that the General Assembly violated the single subject clause of the 
Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, 8(d)) when it enacted Public 
Act 88 680. When an act is held unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void ab 
initio; the state of the law is as if the act had never been passed. People v. 
Tellez-Valencia, 188 Ill. 2d 523, 525 (1999); see also People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 390 (1990). Thus, respondent is no longer subject to a mandatory 
sentencing requirement. Instead, he is now treated similarly to all juvenile 
offenders except habitual and violent juvenile offenders. Because respondent is 
unquestionably not similarly situated to habitual and violent juvenile 
offenders, we have no basis upon which to conclude that the trial court's denial 
of respondent's request for a jury trial denied respondent of the equal 
protection of the law. 


Due Process

Respondent argues that, even if he is not entitled to a jury trial as a 
matter of equal protection, both the federal and state constitutions guarantee 
him such a right both as a matter of due process and as a matter of the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial. See U.S. Const., amends. VI, 
XIV, Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 2, 8. Both this court and the Supreme Court 
have previously rejected such arguments. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647, 91 S. Ct. 1976 (1971); People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 
83 Ill. 2d 67 (1980); In re Fucini, 44 Ill. 2d 305 (1970). Respondent urges us 
to reconsider these decisions in light of the fact that the mandatory minimum 
sentence required by section 5 33(1.5) renders the process to which respondent 
is subject much more punitive than rehabilitative. Here, however, respondent is 
no longer subject to the mandatory minimum sentence, and respondent has given us 
no other reason to reexamine our earlier decisions. Consequently, we must reject 
respondent's argument. 

Because the law underlying the appellate court's judgment has now been 
rendered void, we must vacate the appellate court's judgment holding that 
respondent was denied his equal protection rights when the trial court denied 
his request for a new trial. 


Respondent's Motion to Cite Supplemental Authority and the State's Reply 
Brief to the Briefs of the Amici Curiae

After this court issued its opinion in Cervantes, respondent sought leave to 
cite Cervantes as additional authority. In section II of this motion, respondent 
asserts that the legislature has reenacted the mandatory sentencing provision 
for juveniles charged with first degree murder (see 705 ILCS 405/5 750(2) (West 
1998)). Respondent contends that, because this provision has been reenacted, 
this court should, because of the "great public interest," decide whether a 
juvenile charged with first degree murder is entitled to a jury trial. 

Similarly, the State, in its reply brief to the briefs of the amici curiae, 
devotes approximately a third of its brief to discussing the effect of 
Cervantes. The State argues that (1) because of the reenactment of the 
sentencing provision, we should address whether juveniles charged with first 
degree murder are entitled to a jury trial; and (2) respondent is subject to the 
reenacted sentencing provision even though it was not effective until after the 
events forming the foundation of the finding of delinquency occurred. 
Subsequently, respondent moved to strike the State's reply brief. We ordered 
that motion taken with the case. 

This court's rules governing appeals provide, "The reply brief, if any, shall 
be confined strictly to replying to arguments presented in the brief of the 
appellee ***." (Emphasis added.) 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(g). The first third of the 
State's reply brief addresses issues contained within neither respondent's brief 
nor the briefs of the amici curiae, which were filed in support of the 
respondent's position. Because argument I of the State's brief violates Rule 
341(g), we grant respondent's motion in part and strike argument I of the 
State's brief. In so doing, we note that if the State wished to brief these 
issues, it should have sought leave from this court to do so. 

We turn now to respondent's argument. Respondent concedes that he is no 
longer subject to the mandatory sentencing requirements. He argues, however, 
that this court should issue what would in effect be an advisory opinion 
deciding whether, under the reenacted version of the sentencing provision for 
juveniles found delinquent of first degree murder, juveniles are entitled to a 
jury trial. Aside from the question of whether respondent should have raised 
this issue earlier, we note that respondent's argument contains no citation to 
any authority that would permit this court to issue such an advisory opinion. 
Because respondent has failed to cite any authority to support his argument, we 
find it waived. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 
20 (1995). 


Voluntariness of Respondent's Confession 

Standard of Review

We turn now to whether defendant's confession was voluntary. Before 
addressing the merits of this issue, we must first determine the proper standard 
of review. The State argues that we cannot reverse the trial court's ruling 
denying defendant's motion to suppress unless the court's conclusion is against 
the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court, finding that neither 
the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses was at issue, reviewed the trial 
court's ruling de novo. See 304 Ill. App. 3d at 730. Respondent argues that, 
regardless of which standard of review is applied, the trial court erred in 
denying respondent's motion to suppress. Nevertheless, respondent contends that 
de novo review is appropriate because "[o]nly the State's witnesses presented 
evidence with respect to the alleged statements and the immediate surrounding 
circumstances." 

Traditionally, this court has held that, when an appellate court reviews a 
trial court's ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress involuntary statements, 
the appellate court should affirm the trial court's judgment unless the judgment 
was manifestly erroneous. See People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 447 (1996) ("this 
court has never departed from the 'manifestly erroneous' standard in reviewing 
the denial of a defendant's motion to suppress based upon the voluntariness of a 
confession"). In Oaks, however, this court reviewed the ruling de novo because 
the record contained both a videotape and a transcript of the interrogation. 
Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d  at 447. 

After this court decided Oaks, the Supreme Court held that, when an appellate 
court reviews rulings on a motion to suppress involving questions of probable 
cause and reasonable suspicion, the reviewing court should review de novo the 
findings with respect to probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 920, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 
(1996). The Court explained that de novo review was justified for three reasons. 
First, "independent appellate review of these ultimate determinations of 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause is consistent with the position we have 
taken in past cases." Ornelas, 517 U.S.  at 697, 134 L. Ed. 2d  at 919, 116 S. Ct. 
at 1662. Second, "the legal rules for probable cause and reasonable suspicion 
acquire content only through application. Independent review is therefore 
necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the 
legal principles." Ornelas, 517 U.S.  at 697, 134 L. Ed. 2d  at 919, 116 S. Ct.  at 
1662. Third, "de novo review tends to unify precedent and will come closer to 
providing law enforcement officers with a defined 'set of rules which, in most 
instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to 
whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.' 
" Ornelas, 517 U.S.  at 698, 134 L. Ed. 2d  at 919, 116 S. Ct.  at 1662, quoting 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 773, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 
2863 (1981). The Court cautioned, however, that findings of historical fact 
should be reviewed only for clear error and that reviewing courts must give due 
weight to inferences drawn from those facts by the fact finder. Ornelas, 517 U.S.  at 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d  at 920, 116 S. Ct.  at 1663. 

Thereafter, the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, held that 
"Ornelas requires that the ultimate question of whether a confession is 
voluntary is a matter of law that must be reviewed de novo." United States v. 
D.F., 115 F.3d 413, 419 (7th Cir. 1996). In reaching this conclusion, the court 
noted that the same factors that the Supreme Court found dispositive in Ornelas 
apply equally to questions of voluntariness. First, the Supreme Court has 
traditionally treated the question of the voluntariness of a confession as a 
question of law. D.F., 115 F.3d  at 418, citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 
110, 88 L. Ed. 2d 405, 411, 106 S. Ct. 445, 449 (1985); see also Haynes v. 
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515-16, 10 L. Ed. 2d 513, 522, 83 S. Ct. 1336, 1344 
(1963). Second, the term voluntariness "is certainly given content through 
case-by-case adjudication, an adjudication tempered by the discipline of 
traditional common-law methodology. When employed as a constitutional standard 
of adjudication, it presents a very definite need for uniformity of meaning and 
consistency of application." D.F., 115 F.3d  at 417. Third, the court explained 
that the question of whether a confession is voluntary " 'turns as much on 
whether the techniques for extracting the statements, as applied to this 
suspect, are compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a 
conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means as on whether the 
defendant's will was in fact overborne.' " (Emphasis omitted.) D.F., 115 F.3d  at 
418, quoting Miller, 474 U.S.  at 116, 88 L. Ed. 2d  at 414-15, 106 S. Ct.  at 
452-53. Given this, the "unification of precedent by appellate courts is 
especially important because it comes closer to providing law enforcement 
officers with a set of rules upon which they can act with the assurance that 
they are not going beyond the pale of the Constitution." D.F., 115 F.3d  at 417. 
Because the factors used in Ornelas apply equally to questions of the 
voluntariness of a confession, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "Ornelas 
requires that the ultimate question of whether a confession is voluntary is a 
matter of law that must be reviewed de novo." D.F., 115 F.3d  at 419. In reaching 
this conclusion, the court, like the Supreme Court in Ornelas, emphasized that 
"the determination of the historical facts of the case are the proper domain of 
the trial court and that our review of its findings in that regard will be for 
clear error." D.F., 115 F.3d  at 419. Notably, virtually every other federal 
court of appeals agrees with this conclusion. See United States v. Tompkins, 130 F.3d 117, 120 n.10 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing cases from numerous federal appellate 
courts and noting that the question of whether a confession is voluntary "is 
uniformly held to be subject to de novo review"). 

After reviewing Ornelas and D.F., we agree with the Seventh Circuit that the 
decision in Ornelas applies equally to questions of the voluntariness of a 
confession and that the federal appellate courts and the Supreme Court review de 
novo the question of the voluntariness of a confession. The question facing us 
is whether we should adopt the same standard. 

First, we note that this court has followed Ornelas. See People v. Wardlow, 
183 Ill. 2d 306, 311 (1998), rev'd on other grounds, ____ U.S. ____, 143 L. Ed. 2d 669, 119 S. Ct. 1573 (1999). Thus, this court has already found persuasive 
the principles relied on in Ornelas. After considering this fact and reviewing 
the above cases, we believe that the same principles apply to our review of the 
voluntariness of a confession. A de novo standard of review ensures that our 
courts of review maintain and clarify the legal principals governing 
confessions. This, in turn, allows our reviewing courts to develop a uniform 
body of precedent that will enable police officers to determine, before 
attempting to obtain confession, what behavior is constitutionally permissible. 

Consequently, in reviewing whether respondent's confession was voluntary, we 
will accord great deference to the trial court's factual findings, and we will 
reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. However, we will review de novo the ultimate question of whether the 
confession was voluntary. We caution that, for this standard of review to 
function as it is intended, trial courts must exercise their responsibility to 
make factual findings when ruling on motions to suppress. Reviewing courts 
should not be required to surmise what factual findings that the trial court 
made. Instead, the trial court should make clear any factual findings upon which 
it is relying. It is only through this synergy between the trial and reviewing 
courts that appellate courts can develop a uniform body of precedent to guide 
law enforcement officers in their determination of whether their actions may 
violate the constitution. 


Evidence Relating to Respondent's Confession

At the hearing on respondent's motion, Detective Edward Cunningham testified 
that he first saw respondent at approximately 11 p.m. on the day of the 
shooting. At that time, respondent was under arrest and was sitting in an 
interview room measuring approximately 10 by 15 feet. Cunningham did not believe 
that respondent was handcuffed. At approximately 12:15 a.m., Cunningham called 
respondent's mother and told her that respondent was at the police station "in 
regards to a homicide investigation" and that he would like her to come the 
station. Respondent's mother appeared reluctant to come to the station and 
stated that she was not sure that she could get transportation. She also told 
Cunningham that, if she came to the station, she "would probably kill 
[respondent]" and she "wouldn't get the truth out of [respondent]." 

Cunningham next contacted Youth Officer Alicia Ayala. At approximately 12:30 
a.m., Cunningham and Ayala spoke with respondent. Cunningham advised respondent 
of his Miranda rights and then asked him what had happened that evening. 
Respondent stated that he had been riding in a van with some friends when they 
saw a person named Alfredo Nunez, also known as Weedo. Nunez joined respondent 
and his companions. After going to a restaurant, respondent and his companions 
took Nunez home. After taking this statement, Cunningham left and spoke with 
other investigators. 

At approximately 3:30 a.m., Cunningham again spoke with respondent, this time 
with Youth Officer Cecil Jefferson present. Cunningham again informed respondent 
of his Miranda rights. Cunningham then told respondent that he did not believe 
that, during their first conversation, respondent had told him everything that 
had happened that evening. Respondent then told Cunningham that he was in a van 
with three other individuals. They picked up Nunez, who told them that he 
"wanted to get some Popes because they had been messing with him a couple days 
earlier." Nunez told the driver to go to the Archer Park area to search for some 
Popes. After circling the area, they saw some Popes in the park. Nunez 
instructed the driver to park within a block or two of the park. Nunez also told 
the others in the rear of the van to hand him a gun from a hiding spot. Upon 
receiving the gun, Nunez stated that he was going to "pop some Popes." 

After the van was parked, respondent and Nunez exited the van and began 
walking toward the park. Respondent and Nunez became separated by several feet 
when respondent paused to urinate. As the two approached the Popes, one of the 
Popes, speaking toward respondent, questioned, "Who is the nig[g]er." Respondent 
replied, "Maniacs," which he explained meant Maniac Latin Disciples. 

The Popes began chasing respondent, and he ran toward where Nunez was 
standing. As respondent neared Nunez, respondent saw Nunez shoot at the Popes. 
Respondent turned to look at the Popes, and he heard Nunez fire several more 
shots. Respondent then shouted, "Pope killers," and he and Nunez returned to the 
van. They then drove to Nunez's house, where Nunez hid the gun and respondent 
discarded the used shell casings in the garbage. 

About the time that respondent finished relating the account, his mother 
arrived at the station. Cunningham took her to see respondent. Cunningham then 
told respondent: 


"I'm going to explain everything to your mother in front of you 
  that happened this evening and that you told me what happened. If I say 
  anything that isn't the truth, you stop me."

Respondent did not stop Cunningham at anytime during his description of the 
evening's occurrences. 

Cunningham did not recall that respondent had been handcuffed at any of the 
times he saw respondent that night. Cunningham admitted, however, that he did 
not know for sure that respondent had not been handcuffed. Cunningham also 
stated that he did not remember respondent going to the bathroom, getting 
something to eat, or getting something to drink. 

Assistant State's Attorney Michael O'Malley testified that at approximately 3 
a.m. he spoke with respondent in the presence of Ayala and Cunningham. At that 
time, respondent was not handcuffed. After advising respondent of his rights, 
O'Malley questioned respondent about what had happened that night. Respondent 
told him that Nunez had a gun and was going to Archer Park to shoot some Popes. 
The description of the shooting was consistent with Cunningham's testimony. 

Ayala testified that, when she asked Cunningham if respondent's parents had 
been notified, Cunningham told her, "The parent had been notified and the parent 
refused to come down." When Ayala first saw respondent at approximately 12:30 
a.m., he was not handcuffed, and he had a can of soda in front of him. After the 
initial interview was over, respondent requested to use the bathroom and the 
officers allowed him to do so. 

During the 3 a.m. interview, Ayala saw respondent receive a second can of 
soda, and she noticed that he was not handcuffed. Following this interview, 
respondent again asked to go to the bathroom, and he was allowed to go. 

Respondent's mother testified that when Cunningham told her that respondent 
was at the police station, she told him, "I am on my way. I am on public 
transportation, but I am on my way." She admitted that she said that she was 
going to kill respondent, but she explained that this was just an expression of 
her unhappiness that respondent was in Chicago when he was not supposed to be 
there. She denied that she said that she could not get the truth from him. 
During cross-examination, respondent's mother testified that respondent is a 
smart child who was doing "very well" in school. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that respondent was 
in custody for approximately two hours before he was questioned, that Cunningham 
had notified respondent's mother before he began questioning respondent, and 
that Cunningham informed respondent of his Miranda rights before questioning 
began. The court further found that the questioning had occurred in the presence 
of a youth officer and that respondent, who is a "very intelligent man," had "no 
problem" understanding his Miranda rights. The court emphasized that, between 
the times that respondent was questioned, he had ample time in which to 
contemplate what he was saying and to ask questions about his rights or anything 
else that was happening. Nevertheless, respondent made no such inquiries. 
Respondent was never physically or mentally abused, was not handcuffed, never 
requested an attorney, was allowed use the bathroom, and was provided with soda. 
The court stated that "no coercive environment was ever attached to the minor 
respondent." The court then denied respondent's motion. 


Governing Law

In determining whether a confession was voluntary, we must consider the 
totality of the circumstances. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (1996). 
Factors to consider include the respondent's age, intelligence, background, 
experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition at the time of 
questioning; the legality and duration of the detention; the duration of the 
questioning; and any physical or mental abuse by police, including the existence 
of threats or promises. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 500-01. Significantly, no single 
factor is dispositive. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 500. The test of voluntariness is 
whether the respondent "made the statement freely, voluntarily, and without 
compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the [respondent's] will was 
overcome at the time he or she confessed." Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d  at 500. 

Additionally, we have recognized that the taking of a juvenile's confession 
is "a sensitive concern." People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470, 476 (1977). Because 
of this, the "greatest care" must be taken to assure that the confession was not 
coerced or suggested and that " 'it was not the product of ignorance of rights 
or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.' " People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 561, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1458 (1967); see also Prude, 66 Ill. 2d  at 476. Because of this 
concern, the appellate court has also recognized an additional factor that is 
not present in cases involving adults. This factor, commonly known as the 
"concerned adult" factor, considers whether the juvenile, either before or 
during the interrogation, had an opportunity to consult with an adult interested 
in his welfare. See In re L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d 594, 600-01 (1998); In re 
S.D.S., 103 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1012 (1982). Other facets to this factor include 
whether the police prevented the juvenile from conferring with a concerned adult 
and whether the police frustrated the parents' attempt to confer with the 
juvenile. L.L., 295 Ill. App. 3d at 601; In re J.J.C., 294 Ill. App. 3d 227, 235 
(1998). The State devotes several pages of its brief to arguing that this factor 
is based on erroneous statutory interpretation and that the appellate court has 
erred by turning this factor into a per se rule requiring the suppression of a 
juvenile's confession if he is denied the ability to confer with a concerned 
adult either before or during his interrogation. Nevertheless, during oral 
argument, the State conceded that whether a juvenile is able to confer with a 
parent or other concerned adult can be a relevant factor to consider when 
determining whether a juvenile's confession is voluntary. 

We agree with the State that a juvenile's confession should not be suppressed 
simply because he was denied the opportunity to confer with a parent or other 
concerned adult before or during the interrogation. Nevertheless, we believe 
that this is a factor that may be relevant in determining whether a juvenile's 
confession was voluntary. This is particularly true in situations in which the 
juvenile has demonstrated trouble understanding the interrogation process, he 
asks to speak with his parents or another "concerned adult," or the police 
prevent the juvenile's parents from speaking with him. While not dispositive, 
this is one of many factors to be examined when determining whether a juvenile's 
confession was voluntary. 

Turning to the facts of this case, we conclude that the totality of the 
circumstances indicates that respondent's confession was voluntary. Weighing 
against admission are respondent's young age and the fact that he has had no 
previous contact or experience with the justice system. Although respondent was 
not provided with an opportunity to confer with a concerned adult, the testimony 
revealed that respondent never requested to do so, and the police never 
frustrated any attempt by respondent's mother to confer with him. Significantly, 
Cunningham phoned respondent's mother before he questioned respondent. Although 
he did not tell respondent's mother that respondent was under arrest, Cunningham 
explained that, when he spoke with her, he did not know that respondent was 
involved in the shooting. 

The other factors weigh in favor of admission. First, respondent's detention 
was valid. Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that the authorities repeatedly 
informed respondent of his Miranda rights and that respondent understood those 
rights. Respondent's mother testified that he was intelligent and did very well 
in school. Although respondent was in the police station for several hours, he 
was questioned for only a short period of time on only three or four occasions. 
Additionally, the trial court found that respondent was not handcuffed and that 
he was provided soda and access to the bathroom upon request. Respondent 
concedes that no physical coercion occurred, and the testimony revealed no 
evidence of any threats or promises. Thus, while we believe that the taking of a 
juvenile's confession is a sensitive concern and that care must be taken to 
ensure that the confession is voluntary, we believe that the totality of the 
circumstances indicates that respondent's confession was the result of his own 
decision and not the result of compulsion or his will being overborne. 

Amicus curiae Cook County public defender urges us to adopt a per se 
rule that minors tried as adults must consult with counsel before waiving their 
Miranda rights. Because the cause before us involves only a minor tried as a 
juvenile and not a minor tried as an adult, we decline to address this argument. 


Amicus curiae Children and Family Justice Center argues that this 
court should (1) create a per se rule requiring that minors must have an 
opportunity to consult with a parent, guardian, or attorney before the police 
can interrogate the minor; and (2) require that all interrogations of minors be 
videotaped. With respect to the first issue, we have already determined that the 
ability of a juvenile to consult with a concerned adult is one of many factors 
that courts must consider when determining whether a confession is voluntary. 
However, we see no basis in the law to conclude that this single factor should 
be dispositive. 

With respect to the videotaping of confessions, we believe that this is a 
policy question that is best left to the General Assembly and individual police 
departments. While we have no doubt that the presence of a videotape would 
assist a court in determining whether a confession is voluntary (see, e.g., 
Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d at 447-48), the constitution does not require that a 
confession be videotaped to be admissible at trial. 


Sufficiency of the Evidence

Respondent contends that, without his confession, the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain the finding of delinquency. Respondent does not argue 
that the evidence is insufficient if his confession is considered. Because we 
have determined that the trial court properly admitted defendant's confession, 
we need not address this issue. 


CONCLUSION

Because respondent is not subject to a mandatory determinate sentence, we 
must vacate the appellate court's holding that the trial court violated 
respondent's equal protection rights by denying his request for a jury trial. 
Moreover, because the trial court believed that it had to impose a mandatory 
determinate sentence, we must vacate the disposition and remand this cause to 
the trial court so that it may impose a disposition consistent with the 
applicable law. 

Additionally, we reverse the appellate court's judgment that respondent's 
confession was involuntary and affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress. 

Appellate court judgment vacated in part 

and reversed in part; 

circuit court judgment affirmed in part 

and vacated in part; 

cause remanded. 

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: 

Someone once posed the following hypothetical question to Abraham Lincoln. 
"If you call a tail a leg, how many legs does a dog have?" Lincoln answered, 
"Four. Calling a tail a leg doesn't make it one." In a similar vein, calling 
delinquency proceedings at which a juvenile could be sentenced to multiple years 
in the Department of Corrections noncriminal doesn't make it so. 

In the case at hand, the State filed a petition to adjudicate G.O., a 
13-year-old juvenile, delinquent based on charges of first degree murder, 
aggravated discharge of a firearm, aggravated battery and aggravated battery 
with a firearm. The trial court denied G.O.'s request for a jury trial and 
adjudicated G.O. delinquent on all charges. The trial court declared G.O. a ward 
of the court and, under the sentencing provision in the Juvenile Court Act for 
first degree murder, committed G.O. to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile 
Division, until his "21st birthday, without the possibility of parole, furlough, 
or non-emergency authorized absence for a period of 5 years." See 705 ILCS 405/5 
33(1.5) (West 1996). 

The appellate court reversed, holding the failure to provide G.O. with a jury 
trial violated his right to equal protection because the General Assembly 
provides jury trials for juveniles charged as either violent or habitual 
juvenile offenders which carry similar mandatory minimum sentences. The majority 
reverses and holds that G.O. does not have a constitutional right to a jury 
trial because the mandatory minimum sentencing provision for first degree murder 
was declared unconstitutional in People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80 (1999) 
(holding Public Act 88 680, which contained the sentencing provision for first 
degree murder, violated the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution). 
The majority concludes that Cervantes resolves G.O.'s constitutional challenge 
to the denial of his request for a jury trial. Slip op. at 3-4. I disagree. G.O. 
has a right to a jury trial under article I, section 8, of the Illinois 
Constitution even if he is not subject to the mandatory minimum sentence in 
section 5 33(1.5) of the Juvenile Court Act. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 

Article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that 
"[i]n criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to *** a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, 8. Delinquency proceedings 
have all the hallmarks of a criminal prosecution. The basis of the charge of 
delinquency is the commission of a criminal offense, and, if found delinquent, a 
juvenile can be incarcerated in the Department of Corrections until he is 21 
years old. This is a classic case of crime and punishment. 

In past decisions, this court has emphasized that delinquency proceedings are 
not criminal in nature because the overriding concern of these proceedings is 
rehabilitation, not punishment. See, e.g., In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d 385, 389 
(1977); In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 320 (1995). The prior analysis on this 
issue is flawed, however, because it relied on an outmoded characterization of 
the juvenile justice system. Much has changed in the last three decades since 
the United States Supreme Court refused to extend the right to a jury trial to 
juvenile delinquency proceedings on the grounds that the jury trial "will remake 
the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective 
end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective 
proceeding." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 29 L. Ed. 2d 647, 661, 
91 S. Ct. 1976, 1986 (1970). Rehabilitation no longer occupies its once 
preeminent status in the juvenile justice system; punishment and public safety 
are now the juvenile justice system's overriding concerns. The statement of 
purpose and policy in the Illinois Juvenile Court Act evinces this shift: 
"It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote a juvenile 
  justice system capable of dealing with the problem of juvenile delinquency, a 
  system that will protect the community, impose accountability for violations 
  of law and equip juvenile offenders with competencies to live responsibly and 
  productively. To effectuate this intent, the General Assembly declares the 
  following to be important purposes of this Article: 
  
(a) To protect citizens from juvenile crime. 
  
(b) To hold each juvenile offender directly accountable for his or her 
  acts. 
  
(c) To provide an individualized assessment of each alleged and adjudicated 
  delinquent juvenile, in order to rehabilitate and to prevent further 
  delinquent behavior through the development of competency in the juvenile 
  offender." 705 ILCS 405/5 101 (West 1998). Rehabilitation remains 
  an important aspect of the juvenile justice system, but the same is true of 
  the adult criminal justice system. However one chooses to characterize the 
  purpose of the juvenile justice system, the fact remains that "the 
  incarcerated juveniles' liberty *** is restrained just as effectively as that 
  of the adult inmates serving terms in State and Federal prisons." In re 
  Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 541 (1967). 
  
In addition to this shift in fundamental purpose, virtually all of the 
  constitutional requirements of an adversary criminal trial have been imported 
  into juvenile delinquency proceedings. These requirements include the right to 
  adequate notice of charges, the right to counsel, the privilege against 
  self-incrimination and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. In 
  re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d  at 320-21. Moreover, the State must prove delinquency 
  beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d  at 541-42. In fact, 
  juveniles have "all the procedural rights of adults in criminal proceedings" 
  except the right to a jury trial. 705 ILCS 405/5 101(3) (West 1998); see also 
  705 ILCS 405/5 605(1) (West 1998) ("All delinquency proceedings shall be heard 
  by the court except those proceedings under this Act where the right to trial 
  by jury is specifically set forth"). 
  
The majority rejects G.O.'s argument that juveniles have a constitutional 
  right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings under the Illinois 
  Constitution, holding such an argument is foreclosed by this court's decision 
  in In re Fucini, 44 Ill. 2d 305 (1970). Fucini, however, is distinguishable 
  because that case interpreted the jury trial provision under the 1870 
  Constitution, which has no bearing on the issue in this case. In Fucini, the 
  juvenile challenged the General Assembly's failure to provide a right to a 
  jury trial in delinquency proceedings under the jury trial provision in the 
  Illinois Constitution of 1870, which stated that "[t]he right of trial by jury 
  as heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate." (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 
  1870, art. II, 5. The Fucini court reasoned that the juvenile was not 
  entitled to a jury trial because the common law, at the time of the adoption 
  of the 1870 Constitution, did not provide for such a right. Fucini, 44 Ill. 2d  
  at 310, citing Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328 (1913). The holding in Fucini 
  has no bearing on G.O.'s argument in this case because the jury trial 
  provision in the 1970 Constitution, unlike its analogue in the 1870 
  Constitution, does not require that the right to a jury trial exist at common 
  law prior to 1870. 
  
In Beasley, the court implied that recognizing a juvenile delinquency 
  proceeding as a criminal prosecution would lead to the abandonment of the 
  intimate, informal protective proceeding of the juvenile justice system 
  altogether. In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d  at 390. This fear was unwarranted when 
  Beasley was decided in 1977, and it is even more so now. The incorporation of 
  virtually every aspect of criminal procedure (except the jury trial) into 
  juvenile proceedings has not undermined the justification for separate adult 
  and juvenile justice systems. Moreover, the right to a jury trial has already 
  been incorporated into the juvenile justice system for certain specific 
  offenses. See 705 ILCS 405/5 815(d), 5 820(d) (West 1998) (providing right to 
  jury trial for habitual and violent juvenile offenders). The failure to 
  provide the right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings should not be 
  treated as a method of shielding the juvenile defendant from the adult 
  criminal justice system. Rather, it should be recognized that most attributes 
  of the adult criminal justice system are already permanent features of the 
  juvenile justice system. A juvenile, no less than an adult, is entitled to the 
  protection of a jury trial when faced with incarceration in the Illinois 
  Department of Corrections. The failure to provide a jury trial should be seen 
  for what it truly is: an anachronism and a denial of equal justice for all. 
  
For the reason stated above, I respectfully dissent. 
  
JUSTICE McMORROW, also dissenting: 
  
I dissent from the majority's holding that the circuit court did not err in 
  admitting G.O's confession, since the confession was "the result of G.O.'s own 
  decision and not the result of compulsion or his will being overborne." Slip 
  op. at 17. I do not believe that the confession was voluntarily and knowingly 
  given by G.O. and therefore cannot agree that G.O.'s confession was properly 
  admitted at trial. The constellation of facts in the instant case does not 
  demonstrate that G.O., under the totality of the circumstances, confessed 
  either voluntarily or with an understanding of the consequences of his 
  confession. The majority unreasonably assumes that a child of 13 is capable of 
  making an intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. I do not adopt that 
  assumption and therefore I respectfully dissent. 
  
The totality of the circumstances surrounding a confession is to be 
  considered in the determination of whether a juvenile confessed to a crime 
  following a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Fare v. 
  Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724, 61 L. Ed. 2d 197, 212, 99 S. Ct. 2560, 2571 
  (1979); People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 179 (1975). The age, education, 
  experience and background of a juvenile are to be examined, as well as 
  "whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature 
  of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights." 
  Fare, 442 U.S.  at 725, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at 212, 99 S. Ct.  at 2572. In its 
  analysis, the court should also consider the youth's physical condition, the 
  existence of threats, promises or physical coercion, whether the minor was 
  informed of his constitutional rights, the duration of the interrogation and 
  whether the confession was the product of police deception. People v. Gilliam, 
  172 Ill. 2d 484, 500-01 (1996); People v. Martin, 102 Ill. 2d 412, 426-27 
  (1984); see People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d 470, 475-76 (1977). Perhaps the most 
  critical element in the totality of the circumstances is the admonition by the 
  United States Supreme Court that, in the absence of legal counsel to advise a 
  juvenile before or during the interrogation, "the greatest care must be taken 
  to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was 
  not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of 
  rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair." (Emphasis added.) In re 
  Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527, 561, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1458 (1967); see 
  also People v. Prude, 66 Ill. 2d  at 476 ("[T]he receiving of an incriminating 
  statement by a juvenile is a sensitive concern"). 
  
In the case at bar, the majority enumerates the factors that lead it to 
  conclude that G.O. confessed voluntarily and knowingly. My colleagues focus on 
  the Miranda warnings read to G.O., the youth's alleged intelligence, and the 
  fact that he was never overtly threatened or harmed. The majority relies too 
  on the absence of handcuffs in the interrogation room, and the presence of a 
  youth officer. That G.O. was permitted to drink soda and use the washroom also 
  removed the specter of coercion, according to the majority. The majority 
  further contends that there was no attempt to frustrate contact between G.O. 
  and his mother. 
  
I do not agree with the majority's reliance upon several of these factors. 
  In particular, the majority fails to give sufficient emphasis to G.O.'s very 
  young age. Facts that lead to one conclusion concerning the custodial 
  interrogation of an adult can compel an entirely different conclusion when 
  applied to the interrogation of a child. When reviewed with "the greatest 
  care" (In re Gault, 387 U.S.  at 55, 18 L. Ed. 2d  at 561, 87 S. Ct. at 1458), 
  and when truly mindful of G.O.'s tender years, the circumstances of G.O.'s 
  confession lead ineluctably to the conclusion that his statements should have 
  been suppressed. 
  
At the time of the murder, G.O. was just one month past his thirteenth 
  birthday. He was arrested late at night (between 10:15 and 10:45 p.m.) and 
  brought to a police station. He had never been arrested before. No parent or 
  other familiar person was with him. He was placed in an interrogation room, 
  and left alone until approximately 12:30 a.m., when he was questioned by a 
  detective and a youth officer. During this initial conversation with the 
  authorities, G.O. did not admit involvement in the murder. He was questioned 
  again at 3 and 3:30 a.m., by a variable combination of a youth officer, a 
  prosecutor, and a police detective. He was never asked to sign a written 
  waiver of his constitutional rights and no written account of his confession 
  was ever submitted to G.O. for his review. 
  
There is no indication in the record that G.O. had ever been in a police 
  station before his arrest. Thus, he was presumably unfamiliar with the 
  environment of a police station. For example, police frequently walk through 
  the station wearing police uniforms, displaying badges signaling authority, 
  and their service weapons and handcuffs are in plain sight. G.O., a boy barely 
  in his teens, with no record of previous criminal involvement and no 
  familiarity with police stations, was placed alone in a police station 
  interrogation room, a climate inherently intimidating to a thirteen year old. 
  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 713-14, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1618-19 (1966). The coercion of the situation was compounded by 
  interrogation, over a several hour period, by authority figures who were 
  unknown to him. Too, the interrogation of G.O. continued in the absence of any 
  person he knew, or in the absence of any person who at least appeared to 
  affirmatively intervene on his behalf. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 
  599-600, 92 L. Ed. 224, 228, 68 S. Ct. 302, 304 (1948). The questioning 
  occurred in the very early hours of the morning, and there is no evidence of 
  record to suggest that G.O. slept during his custody at the police station, or 
  whether he was fatigued at the time he allegedly confessed to his role in the 
  shooting. Individuals of greater age and experience could find these same 
  circumstances overwhelming and coercive. To a boy of G.O's youth and presumed 
  naivete, these circumstances could be sufficiently overpowering as to raise a 
  genuine doubt whether any confession made in this atmosphere would be the 
  product of a free will. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 92 L. Ed. 224, 68 S. Ct. 302 (1948), a fifteen-year-old criminal defendant confessed to committing 
  murder, after a five-hour interrogation by police. The Supreme Court 
  suppressed the confession. Haley, 332 U.S.  at 601, 92 L. Ed.  at 229, 68 S. Ct.  at 304. While the facts of Haley are distinguishable from the facts in the 
  instant appeal, the Haley Court explained why confessions yielded by juveniles 
  must be scrutinized particularly closely: 
  "[W]hen, as here, a mere child an easy victim of the law is 
    before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a 
    tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the 
    more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and 
    unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the 
    period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15- 
    year-old lad, questioned through the dead of night by relays of police, is a 
    ready victim of the inquisition. Mature men possibly might stand the ordeal 
    from midnight to 5 a.m. But we cannot believe that a lad of tender years is 
    a match for the police in such a contest. He needs counsel and support if he 
    is not to become the victim first of fear, then panic. He needs someone on 
    whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, 
    crush him. No friend stood at the side of this 15-year-old boy as the 
    police, working in relays, questioned him hour after hour, from midnight 
    until dawn. No lawyer stood guard to make sure that the police went so far 
    and no farther, to see to it that they stopped short of the point where he 
    became the victim of coercion. No counsel or friend was called during the 
    critical hours of questioning." Haley, 332 U.S.  at 599-600, 92 L. Ed.  at 
    228-29, 68 S. Ct.  at 304.In the case at bar, certain "findings" 
  of the trial court, undisputed and relied upon by the majority, lack any 
  evidentiary support in the record. For example, the trial court "found" that 
  G.O. had ample opportunity to "contemplate" his statements during the several 
  hours he was held at the police station (slip op. at 14), and that he never 
  used this time to ask questions or assert his rights. I do not believe that a 
  boy who had only very recently reached his thirteenth birthday, who was alone 
  and in unfamiliar surroundings, possesses, or should be expected to posses, 
  the maturity and understanding to use the several hours he was under arrest to 
  ask questions and assert his constitutional rights. There is no explanation by 
  the trial court or in the record to support this finding. Probably there is no 
  explanation. The alleged period of "contemplation" was more likely a period 
  that amplified the fears naturally borne of such a coercive atmosphere. The 
  prolonged periods of isolation between the interrogations predictably 
  reinforced the intimidation inherent in the surroundings, thereby undermining 
  G.O.'s will and the voluntariness of his confession. 
  
The trial court reached the untenable conclusion that, because G.O. was not 
  handcuffed, G.O. was not subject to coercion. Testimony adduced before the 
  trial court showed that G.O. was not free to leave the station; he had been 
  arrested and was in police custody. The police did not need to handcuff G.O. 
  to make it clear to him that he was not free to move at will. 
  
Further, there is an insufficient basis for the trial court to find that 
  G.O. is a "very intelligent man." The trial court's finding that G.O. is a 
  "very intelligent man," and had "no problem" understanding his Miranda rights 
  is flawed in two ways. Slip op. at 15. First, it ignores the single most 
  significant fact of this case: G.O. was just past his thirteenth birthday at 
  the time of his arrest. He is not, as he was described by the trial court, a 
  man. He is a boy. Second, the trial court's finding of "intelligence" suggests 
  that G.O. was sufficiently sophisticated to withstand the coercion inherent in 
  the circumstances of his interrogation. It is extremely significant that the 
  sole evidence regarding G.O.'s intelligence upon which the trial court based 
  its finding, a finding relied upon by the majority was the testimony of his 
  mother, on her son's behalf, at the suppression hearing. She stated that he 
  did "very well" in school and that he was a "smart kid." She was not asked 
  these questions in the context of his ability to understand Miranda warnings, 
  or whether he could resist intimidation by adults. It is reasonable to 
  conclude that she told the court that her son did very well at school in an 
  effort to convince the court that he was not a criminal, and not to convince 
  the court that he was resistant to any coercive interrogation occurring at the 
  police station. Again, the evidence of record is insufficient to sustain a 
  finding that G.O. was a "very intelligent man" who had "no problem" 
  understanding his Miranda rights, and understood and knowingly waived this 
  constitutional rights. 
  
An intelligent relinquishment of the right against self- incrimination 
  requires an individual to understand the entitlement to counsel and the right 
  to remain silent promised by the Constitution. A knowing waiver of these 
  constitutional rights also requires an understanding and comprehension of the 
  serious consequences that can flow from confession to a crime. The burden is 
  on the State to show that G.O., irrespective of his monosyllabic answers to 
  his interrogators, comprehended the consequences of a waiver of Miranda 
  rights. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 501 (1996). The State failed to 
  satisfy this burden. The record does not support a contrary conclusion. See 
  Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 8 L. Ed. 2d 325, 328-29, 82 S. Ct. 1209, 1212-13 (1962). In Gallegos, the Court recognized the limited ability of 
  a minor to comprehend constitutional concepts: 
  "[A] 14 year old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely 
    to have any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible 
    only to police. That is to say, we deal with a person who is not equal to 
    the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the 
    questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to 
    protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional 
    rights." Gallegos, 370 U.S.  at 54, 8 L. Ed. 2d  at 328, 82 S. Ct.  at 
  1212.In addition, I am not persuaded that the mere presence of 
  two youth officers during the course of the interrogation indicates that 
  G.O.'s confession was voluntary. The record indicates these officers were 
  silent as the detective and the assistant State's Attorney questioned G.O. The 
  youth officers, unknown to G.O., were only a mute presence in the 
  interrogation room. The record does no reflect any genuine help given by the 
  youth officers to G.O. See 304 Ill. App. 3d at 733. Also, I question whether 
  the presence of a youth officer shields a youth's rights from an overbearing 
  interrogation. "Youth officers" are police officers, employed and summoned by 
  law enforcement authorities. 705 ILCS 405/5 101, 5 405 (West 1998); Pub. Act 
  90 590, art. 2001, 2001 10, eff. January 1, 1999. Thus, while they are 
  intended to serve the laudable purpose of aiding youths in trouble, the fact 
  remains that, as an adjunct of law enforcement, their interests are inevitably 
  conflicted. A youth officer who essentially serves two masters the youth and 
  the State may not adequately protect a juvenile's rights from an interrogator 
  who is also working on behalf of the government. The dual nature of the youth 
  officer's employment raises the possibility that the officer may not represent 
  the youth's rights with the vigor of a family member, or of an attorney who 
  owes a fiduciary duty to the juvenile. 
  
Moreover, the majority overlooks the questionable accuracy of the alleged 
  statements obtained from G.O. by the assistant State's Attorney and the 
  detective that interviewed G.O. The prosecutor testified at the suppression 
  hearing that he made notes of his interrogation of G.O. "after talking or 
  while talking to" G.O. Similarly, the detective testified that his notes of 
  G.O.'s "confession" were part summary and part verbatim memorialization of the 
  interrogation, and were not made until after the interrogation ended. In 
  neither instance was a court reporter present to make a contemporaneous record 
  of the conversations between G.O. and the persons that questioned him. In 
  neither instance was G.O. shown notes or a written statement to review. The 
  majority relies, therefore, on G.O.'s "confession" as remembered by the 
  interrogators that heard the statements, and not as G.O. actually stated the 
  confession. 
  
As the majority notes, whether the police impeded a parent or guardian's 
  access to the youth is one of the material factors to be considered in the 
  "totality" test. Slip op. at 14. The evidence in this case does not support 
  the majority's conclusion that "the police never frustrated any attempt by 
  respondent's mother to confer with him." Slip op. at 14. The evidence suggests 
  an effort by police to complete their questioning of G.O. before his mother 
  could get to the station. Even if it is conceded that the mother's statements 
  as to whether she would come to the police station were ambiguous, the 
  difficulty of the mother obtaining transportation at 12:15 a.m. cannot be 
  doubted. She told the detective that she would have to rely on public 
  transportation. Nothing in the record suggests that any officer, though not 
  required to do so, offered to pick up and drive G.O.'s mother to the police 
  station before interrogation began. To the contrary, and in spite of the 
  mother's declared difficulty in obtaining transportation, interrogation of 
  G.O. began approximately 15 minutes after the police called his mother. It was 
  inaccurate for the interrogating detective to inform one of the youth officers 
  that G.O.'s mother refused to come to the station. At best, the conduct of the 
  police in this regard should have a neutral effect on our evaluation; at 
  worst, this fact should weigh in favor of suppressing the confession. 
  
Worse than the evidentiary lapses in the majority holding, however, is the 
  assumption that, at age 13, G.O. was sufficiently intelligent to knowingly 
  waive his Miranda rights. Although the majority rejects the per se rule urged 
  by the amicus curiae the Northwestern University Legal Clinic concerning 
  admission of juvenile confessions, I urge my colleagues to revisit the issue. 
  Indeed, I favor and recommend that the court adopt a per se rule whereby no 
  confession given by a juvenile under the age of 15 would be admitted into 
  evidence unless the youth is permitted, before or during interrogation, to 
  consult with a lawyer or other adult, preferably a family member, who is 
  personally interested in the child's well-being. See Comment, Testing the 
  Validity of Confessions and Waivers of the Self-Incrimination Privilege in the 
  Juvenile Courts, 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1035, 1055 (1999) (hereinafter, Testing 
  the Validity). The adult acting on behalf of the juvenile must also be 
  informed of the child's constitutional rights. Testing the Validity, 47 U. 
  Kan. L. Rev. at 1055. 
  
Sound justifications favor adoption of a per se rule. Beneath a certain 
  age, no person can reliably be believed to make a knowing waiver of the right 
  against self-incrimination. Two well- known studies show that only a few 
  persons under age 18 are able to grasp the meaning of the Miranda warnings. 
  Testing the Validity, 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 1050 n.129, citing B. Ferguson 
  & A. Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver, 7 San Diego L. Rev. 39 (1970); 
  T. Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical 
  Analysis, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 1134 (1980); E. Maykut, Who Is Advising Our 
  Children: Custodial Interrogation of Juveniles in Florida, 21 Fla. St. U. L. 
  Rev. 1345, 1368-1371 (1994) (citing same studies) (hereinafter, Who Is 
  Advising Our Children). At age 14 and younger, the ability to understand the 
  warnings falls dramatically. Who Is Advising Our Children, 21 Fla. St. U. L. 
  Rev. at 1369-70. To presume that all adolescents are capable of understanding 
  the right against self-incrimination and are able to make an informed waiver 
  of that right ignores the basic maturation process common to all persons. We 
  assume that adolescents lack the judgment and experience necessary to own a 
  credit card (815 ILCS 140/7.2 (West 1998)), get a tatoo (720 ILCS 5/12 10 
  (West 1998)), consume alcohol (235 ILCS 5/6 16 (West 1998)), or drive an 
  automobile (625 ILCS 5/6 103 (West 1998)). Yet the majority insists that 
  youths of the same age can synthesize subtle constitutional concepts, and 
  comprehend the life-altering consequences that will follow a waiver of those 
  rights. Our adherence to this artificial distinction is nonsensical and should 
  be abandoned. 
  
Adoption of a per se rule will lend greater predictability to the admission 
  of juvenile confessions into evidence. The totality of the circumstances test 
  is facially appealing, because it incorporates the basic truth that all 
  criminal defendants and all custodial interrogations are unique. Nonetheless, 
  the very flexibility of the "totality" test makes it difficult to predict, 
  during the course of an interrogation, which confessions will be deemed 
  knowingly and voluntarily made and thus admissible into evidence and which 
  confessions will be viewed as constitutionally infirm. For this reason, 
  concrete guidelines governing confessions obtained from minors 14 years or 
  younger will be of assistance to the police and courts in their determination 
  of whether a statement will be admissible at trial. Who Is Advising Our 
  Children, 21 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. at 1355. 
  
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority holding that no 
  error occurred in the admission of G.O.'s confession. G.O.'s finding of 
  delinquency should be reversed and G.O. should be given a new trial at which 
  his confession would not be admitted. I also urge the court to adopt the per 
  se guideline.