Case Title: IDHW v. John Doe

Citation: 

Docket Number: 50875

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2023-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 50875 
In the Interest of:  JOHN DOE I, JANE DOE 
I, JOHN DOE II, JOHN DOE III, AND JANE 
DOE II, Juveniles Under Eighteen (18) Years 
of Age. 
---------------------------------------------------- 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE 
     Petitioner-Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN DOE (2023-25),
     Respondent-Appellant. 
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Boise, September 2023 Term 
Opinion filed: November 3, 2023 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Bannock County. Anson Call, Magistrate Judge.   
The magistrate court’s order is affirmed. 
Price Legal Care, PLLC, Pocatello, attorneys for Appellant. James Price submitted 
argument on the briefs. 
Department of Health and Welfare, Pocatello, attorneys for Respondents. Jason 
Chandler submitted argument on the briefs.  
________________________________ 
BEVAN, Chief Justice. 
This case involves parents who were living separately and their five children. It proceeded 
to the legal system because of concerning reports of physical abuse and neglect brought to the 
attention of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (“Department”) that resulted in a court- 
ordered investigation. The child protection case began in February 2023 as a protective 
 
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supervision1 case. Nearly three months later, the magistrate court ordered that the children be 
removed from the home and placed in the legal custody of the Department.  
John Doe (Father) appeals the magistrate court’s order removing his five children from the 
parents’ custody and temporarily placing the children in the legal custody of the Department. 
Father asserts that the magistrate court’s order failed to contain detailed written findings as 
required by Idaho law, that the order was not supported by substantial and competent evidence, 
and that the magistrate court’s actions violated Father’s fundamental rights to the care and custody 
of his children. We affirm. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Jane Doe (Mother) and Father are married but have been separated since February 2023 
and live in separate households. Mother and Father have five children, ranging in ages from fifteen 
to eight: Oldest Son, Oldest Daughter, Middle Son, Youngest Son, Youngest Daughter.  
Before the children were placed in protective custody, Mother and Father had extensive 
contact with the Department. The Department received a referral on December 15, 2020, over 
concerns related to a fight between Mother and Father, in which Father allegedly put a gun to his 
head and refused to allow Mother access to their children. On March 9, 2022, the Department 
received a report that Father held Oldest Son down and yelled at him. The Department received 
another referral on September 30, 2022, alleging that Youngest Daughter was often hungry and 
not permitted to eat freely. On October 24, 2022, the Department was alerted after Father 
threatened to put Oldest Son “through a wall.”  
In January and February 2023, the Department conducted six court-ordered investigations 
involving claims of physical abuse by Father and Mother against the children.2 At the initial contact 
with Mother and Father, the Department spoke to Father over the phone. Father reported concerns 
about Mother’s mental health. Father sent the Department screenshots of text messages between 
him and Mother. One message, sent to Father in January 2023, was from a contact saved in his 
phone as “Mother’s name,” that stated: “Just kill me already I’m done . . . Tell the kids I love them 
 
1 “‘Protective supervision’ is a legal status created by court order in a child protective case whereby the child is in the 
legal custody of his or her parent(s), guardian(s) or other legal custodian(s), subject to supervision by the department.” 
I.C. § 16-1602(35). 
2 The Department received twenty-three reports of concern against Mother and Father with eleven assignments for 
assessment involving domestic violence, physical abuse, educational neglect, and general neglect. One report had been 
substantiated against Mother; Father had no prior substantiations.  
 
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bye.” Father responded to this message stating, “Answer your phone please . . . So you’re 
threatening to kill yourself if I don’t drop the order? Answer your phone, this isn’t funny.”   
Father filed several petitions for civil protection orders (“CPO”) against Mother on behalf 
of all the children, one of which was in late February 2023. At the hearing on the petition, Father 
introduced a recording from Mother, where she made statements such as “Shut up before I smack 
you.” Father alleged this statement was made to Oldest Son. Later in the recording, Mother stated, 
“Crazy person trying to kill people.” Father also reported that he told Oldest Son he was going to 
“lay him out” if Oldest Son hit Mother.  
On February 27, 2023, the Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office filed a petition under the 
Child Protective Act and requested that the children be placed under the protective supervision of 
the Department. In the adjudicatory report of investigation, filed by the Department on March 17, 
the Department noted that Mother had experienced trauma related to prior domestic violence by 
Father against her during their marriage. Although Mother did not disclose any mental health 
diagnosis, the Department explained that collateral contacts reported concerns about Mother’s 
mental health. Related to Father, the Department’s report revealed that Father displayed PTSD 
symptoms from his military service in Iraq. The Department also noted several of Father’s prior 
convictions, including a 2009 charge for misdemeanor domestic battery/assault with an 
enhancement for a child present, that was pleaded down to disturbing the peace. In 2019, Father 
was charged with felony injury to child, which was later dismissed. Both Father and the children 
reported that Father disciplined the children by yelling, sending them to their room, and spanking 
them.  
Soon after, the magistrate court appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”). Following an 
adjudicatory hearing a few days later on March 27, the magistrate court placed the children under 
the Department’s protective supervision, with Mother and Father retaining custody of the children.  
The Department, Mother, and Father worked to create a visitation plan for the parents since they 
lived in different households. That said, on April 8, Mother would not allow two of the children to 
visit with Father, as required by their agreement, and Father contacted law enforcement. Police 
responded, but ultimately told Father he would need to resolve the issue through the courts.  
On April 18, the magistrate court held a case plan hearing. In its proposed case plan, the 
Department noted that there were no safety concerns in either Mother’s or Father’s home to limit 
the length or frequency of visitation with either parent. The Department explained in that plan that 
 
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it was “in the best interest of the children for the parents to identify a schedule[,]” which should 
be done before leaving the hearing. At the hearing, the magistrate court interviewed each child. 
During those interviews, the children reported fighting with Mother and one instance of physical 
contact. Following the interviews, the magistrate court gave the parents general tasks to complete, 
including enrolling the children in school, abstaining from any physical discipline, and not 
restricting access between the children and the other parent. The magistrate court ordered visitation 
on a three-day rotating basis, beginning with Mother on April 20. The order also permitted Oldest 
Son, who is autistic, the option to spend time with either parent if he became overstimulated.  
On April 22, while the children were with Mother, the children texted and called Father to 
report “fighting throughout the day.” That night, Father contacted law enforcement, requesting a 
welfare check after receiving a text from Oldest Daughter that Mother had taken Oldest Daughter’s 
phone. When law enforcement responded to Mother’s residence, the children were sleeping. Law 
enforcement spoke with Mother and asked about the children having phones. Mother told police 
that the children were allowed to have phones, but Father gave an extra phone to Oldest Daughter, 
which Mother took away when it was bedtime.  
On May 1, 2023, the magistrate court entered a case plan order that would: (1) require 
visitation to proceed with Mother for three days and then Father for three days; (2) permit Oldest 
Son to visit the home of the other parent if he became overstimulated; (3) restrict both parents from 
involving the children in court proceedings; (4) require the children to be enrolled in school; (5) 
prohibit physical discipline; and (6) mandate that neither parent restrict the other from access to 
the children.  
On May 2, Father again received texts from the children while in Mother’s care. The 
children told Father that Mother was threatening to hurt herself. Father contacted law enforcement 
again after receiving a text from one of the children alleging that Mother was “going nuts.” Law 
enforcement advised Father that because police had responded before to a welfare check for a 
similar incident, Father needed to provide his court paperwork and the text message he had 
received. They also informed Father that they would conduct a welfare check, but “would not 
allow him to use his children as collateral in an ongoing child protection case and civil divorce to 
his advantage.” As officers reviewed the case plan order that Father sent, Father reported to 
dispatch that one of the children had sent him a text message alleging Mother planned to commit 
suicide. Police went to the home and found Mother and three of the children crying and upset. 
 
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Mother denied having suicidal ideations, and law enforcement did not believe the children were at 
risk. After law enforcement told Father that a welfare check had been completed, Father asked the 
status of Mother’s mental health. Law enforcement declined to release that information, which 
made Father upset. Law enforcement reiterated that the children were safe and declined to release 
any other information.  
Following the case plan order, Father filed for another CPO, which was granted on May 8, 
preventing Mother from having contact or visitation with the children. On May 11, the GAL filed 
a review report. In the report, the GAL worried about Father, including a concern that Father “has 
spent the entire time contacting various people trying to make himself look like the best parent and 
trying to make [Mother] look bad.” The GAL summarized by explaining that the “children are still 
being manipulated by the parents and the situation. Even though there is no proof of what is being 
said in the home[,] the constant calling of law enforcement and the inability to exchange custody 
without a fight is taking a toll on the children.” The GAL recommended that the children be placed 
in the legal custody of the Department so that the “children no longer have to be in the middle[.]”  
The next day, the Department filed its progress report. The Department’s report echoed 
some of the same concerns the GAL had raised, explaining that both parents “have demonstrated 
they were unable to manage their personal and marital conflict in a way that ensured stability and 
safety for the children.” The report also stated that the “children have been exposed to their parents’ 
domestic violence and unhealthy communication and interactions.” Even so, the report clarified 
that Father “has demonstrated his desire to safely parent all his children through open 
communication…[Father] has demonstrated his ability to meet the children’s physical, emotional, 
and medical needs…[and] reported he is participating in counseling[.]” The Department’s report 
recommended that the case remain as a protective supervision case.  
On May 17, the magistrate court conducted a status hearing. The Department reiterated 
that it did not have any imminent safety concerns for the children but recommended that the parents 
use an app to communicate and coordinate transfers so that text messages would be recorded and 
could be reviewed by the Department and the GAL. The GAL generally disagreed with the 
Department’s recommendation, labeling the case as a “classic example of the power-and-control 
wheel.” Instead, the GAL requested that the children be placed in foster care. Counsel for Oldest 
 
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Son and Oldest Daughter3 told the magistrate court that the young children were not displaying 
concerns but suggested the magistrate court interview the children. The magistrate court did not 
interview the children at that hearing.  
After hearing from the parties, the magistrate court summarized the latest CPO petition and 
law enforcement reports and placed the children in the temporary legal custody of the Department, 
which then placed them with their paternal grandmother pending a redisposition hearing, 
explaining, “I can’t make heads or tails of what’s going on here.” The court then scheduled a 
redisposition hearing for May 19. At the redisposition hearing, the magistrate court heard 
testimony from four witnesses: Father, the GAL, the case worker, and a counselor who had seen 
the children and father. Following that testimony, the magistrate court discussed concerns about 
the children and identified the factors the court had to weigh in making its decision. The magistrate 
court made verbal findings of fact, ultimately continuing the placement of the children in the legal 
custody of the Department but approving Oldest Son for extended home visits with either parent 
at the Department’s discretion. The magistrate court later issued a written redisposition order, from 
which Father filed a motion for permissive appeal. The magistrate court granted Father’s motion. 
II. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A party to a Child Protective Act proceeding may bring a direct permissive appeal to this 
Court from the orders and decrees specified under Idaho Code section 16-1625(1). “The Supreme 
Court reviews the magistrate court record to determine whether there is substantial, competent 
evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of 
law follow from those findings.” Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 151 Idaho 300, 303, 
256 P.3d 708, 711 (2011) (quoting Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 
(2008)). 
“Decisions regarding child custody are committed to the sound discretion of the magistrate, 
and the magistrate’s decision may be overturned on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Nelson 
v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 713, 170 P.3d 375, 378 (2007) (quoting McGriff v. McGriff, 140 Idaho 
642, 645, 99 P.3d 111, 114 (2004)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the evidence is 
insufficient to support a magistrate’s conclusion that the interests and welfare of the children would 
be best served by a particular custody award or modification.” Id. (quoting McGriff, 140 Idaho at 
 
3 Oldest Son and Oldest Daughter were appointed counsel shortly after the petition was filed.  
 
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645, 99 P.3d at 114). “Appellate courts, however, are not permitted to substitute their own view of 
the evidence for that of the trial court, or to make credibility determinations.” Id. 
“When reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact, the appellate court will not set aside the 
findings on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous such that they are not based upon substantial 
and competent evidence.” Id. (quoting Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 56, 44 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2002)). 
“If the findings of fact are based on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, they 
will not be overturned on appeal.” Id. (quoting State v. Hart, 142 Idaho 721, 723, 132 P.3d 1249, 
1251 (2006)). “When reviewing the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, this Court exercises 
free review of the court’s decision to determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable 
law, and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found.” Id. (quoting Hart, 142 
Idaho at 723, 132 P.3d at 1251). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
Before we discuss the merits of Father’s arguments on appeal, we first address an issue the 
Department raised in its brief regarding this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The Department argues 
that this appeal should be denied because the redisposition order is not a final judgment. We 
recently discussed this question in IDHW v. Doe, 171 Idaho 692, 525 P.3d 730, 737 (2023), noting 
“that the ‘final judgment’ language used in [Idaho’s Appellate] rules does not appear to be 
consistent with the language used in Idaho Juvenile Rule 49 and Idaho Code section 16-1625(1).” 
After referring the matter to the Child Protection Committee for additional study, this Court 
decided, in the interim, to amend Idaho Appellate Rules 11.1(b) and 12.1(a), as well as Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 83(a)(1), to allow a party to a Child Protective Act proceeding to bring a direct 
permissive appeal from the orders and decrees identified in Idaho Code section 16-1625(1).4 A 
redisposition order is one such order. See I.C. § 16-1625. As a result, we accept Father’s appeal 
and consider the merits.  
A. 
The magistrate court failed to provide detailed, written findings of fact, but the error 
is harmless given that its verbal findings are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence.  
Father first makes two interrelated arguments, maintaining that the magistrate court’s 
written findings of fact were not detailed as required by statute and, separately, that the court’s 
 
4 See In re: Permissive Appeals in Child Protective Act Proceedings, ISC ORDER (Aug. 31, 2023).  
 
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verbal findings of fact are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. For the reasons 
discussed below, we disagree with Father’s arguments and affirm the magistrate court’s order.   
1. The magistrate court’s verbal findings of fact. 
Father argues that the magistrate court’s verbal findings were not supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. While Father concedes that the magistrate court made “several 
comments,” he maintains that the magistrate court did not “identify” its remarks as findings and 
spoke only briefly before summarily concluding that it would be contrary to the welfare of the 
children to remain in Mother’s or Father’s home, and it was in the best interests of the children to 
vest legal custody with the Department. We disagree with Father’s characterization of the 
magistrate court’s ruling.  
At the redisposition hearing, the magistrate court heard testimony from several witnesses, 
including the GAL assigned to the case and the case manager with the Department. During direct 
examination, the GAL expressed concerns that arose when trying to communicate with Father 
about the children’s welfare:  
I felt like it was -- like he was directing [the conversation], putting [it] back on me, 
leave his kids alone; he would do the parenting. Because I’d ask him to do it, and 
he said no, he wasn’t going to. I said, “Then I will ask -- talk to them when I see 
them about appropriate texts, appropriate language.” And then he became 
combative, abusive, manipulative in that thread. 
 
The GAL was also asked about her report, in which she stated that “Each child expressed 
concern about food in the home of their father.” The GAL’s report also described what she 
characterized as “trauma” each time there was an exchange between parents. On cross-
examination, the GAL clarified that “trauma” referred to the children’s repeated exposure to law 
enforcement. When the Department’s case manager testified, she reiterated the concerns the GAL 
had raised about the children’s repeated exposure to police in the context of having a safety plan:  
And it is damaging to have the police called once, twice, three times a month. And 
so we just need someone else that the kids are familiar with, that the family’s 
familiar with that is appropriate, that can provide some feedback and help the 
parents in those situations de-escalate so that it isn’t outside like law enforcement 
or something else.  
 
When asked whether the case manager believed the behavior in the case warranted vesting 
the children in the Department’s legal custody, she responded:  
I -- I see -- I see the reasons and the justification for them being placed in legal 
custody. It was not my recommendation at the time of the hearing.    
 
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. . . . 
Just -- I recommend that they -- they -- I believe the parents have a lot of stuff we 
need to figure out and work through. And we can do that -- if the kids stay with 
grandma through legal custody and in foster care, we can do that.  
I also believe that with some real dedicated conversations and more open 
communication they can safely parent their children at home. 
 
According to the magistrate court, the Chubbuck Police Department responded to Mother’s 
house the night of April 22 after Father called requesting a welfare check on the children. Police 
responded to the house where they found Mother and children asleep in bed. On the evening of 
May 2, Father called the Chubbuck Police Department and requested a welfare check again. When 
Mother answered the door, she told law enforcement that she was having a hard time with the 
children and advised that Father “was using her kids against her and she had been trying to get her 
children to trust her.” After concluding that Mother was not suicidal, officers contacted Father 
advising him of the outcome of the welfare check. Father was not happy with the amount of 
information that law enforcement provided because law enforcement would not disclose Mother’s 
mental status, and he demeaned the officer: “If you would stop thinking with your dick because 
you think [Mother] is cute or something.”  
After hearing from the witnesses and reviewing reports from the GAL and the Department, 
the magistrate court reviewed the evidence, which demonstrated Father’s aggression toward 
Mother in the presence of the children, and made factual findings based on the contested 
information presented to the court. Indeed, as detailed in the magistrate court’s oral findings, the 
children experienced considerable turmoil and trauma when spending time with either parent. The 
magistrate court’s remarks extend through fourteen pages of transcript. In part, the magistrate 
court’s findings of fact explained:  
Here’s what I see is the big picture: The picture -- and I read directly from the civil 
protection order petition on Wednesday some of the things that I’d seen in there 
that were reported that [Mother] had allegedly said and that had happened in her 
home. And they’re outrageous if they’re true, what has been said to and in front of 
the kids. And that clearly imposed trauma on the kids if that’s what happened.  
. . . . 
There’s clearly evidence that there’s conflict that goes on when the kids are at 
[Father’s] house. I don’t know that it’s constant. When you hear [Father] talk about 
it, it sounds like it’s constant; that he’s getting texts and calls all day every day that 
the kids are there; that is what it seems like, that there’s conflict going on. Not all 
 
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day every day. He said he doesn’t hear from all the kids every time, but at times 
that that gets pretty severe. 
. . . . 
The other part that I have to look at is, like I said, every individual instance of 
[Father] reaching out to law enforcement or filing a civil protection order on its 
own seems like it could potentially be reasonable. I granted the temporary order on 
this last one because when I read what was included in the petition, I didn’t see 
another way to go around that and not do it based on those allegations. 
But then we sit here today and [Father] says, “No. I don’t need a civil protection 
order.” And I don’t know if he says that because he thinks that’s what I want to 
hear or if he says that because he thinks that’s what everybody else here wants to 
hear, but it’s not the first time that that’s happened. We have a history of four or 
five civil protection orders, according to [Father’s] testimony, that have been filed 
and have existed or gone away. I think there was an instance more recently with 
this court where he attempted to pursue that more actively. But there’s a history of 
these civil protection orders just not being followed through with. 
. . . . 
I can’t ignore the fact that there’s a pending charge for attempted strangulation. I 
don’t know if it happened or didn’t happen. I wasn’t there and the case hasn’t been 
adjudicated yet, so I can’t make a decision on that it did or didn’t happen. But the 
kids are certainly caught up in the middle of a domestic violence allegation, and a 
felony domestic violence allegation at that, that is causing them trauma. And so 
that’s something that they’re having to deal with. 
. . .  
So based on those factors that I’m required to consider, to what extent there are 
factors, but the rules of the things I’m required to consider with respect to the best 
interests of the children, what would be contrary to their welfare and whether the 
department’s [sic] made reasonable efforts, all these factors apply to those things 
and the things I’ve had to consider. 
. . . . 
So at this time I do find that it’s contrary to the welfare of the children to be returned 
home at this time. I find it’s in their best interest to remain in the legal custody of 
the Department of Health and Welfare and that the department’s [sic] made 
reasonable efforts to prevent placement in foster care. The department continues to 
do so. 
On appeal, Father points to a series of facts to suggest that the magistrate court abused its 
discretion in finding that it was contrary to the welfare of the children to remain in his home. From 
Father’s perspective, some of those facts include that Father acted responsibly when he: (1) sought 
a CPO to keep the children from returning to Mother until the situation was clearer; (2) took the 
children to a counselor to help them work through their feelings and stress; (3) encouraged the 
 
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magistrate court and the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) to speak with the children; 
and (4) ensured the children’s needs were met and that the children felt safe while there.  
Father’s account of these scenarios, however, merely asks “this Court to disregard the 
function of the trial court—weighing evidence.” State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 
1117 (2007). We will not do so. “It is well established that appellate courts in Idaho do not reweigh 
evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 388, 146 P.3d 649, 654 (2006)). “Instead, we 
defer to the trial court’s unique ability to ‘accurately weigh the evidence and judge the demeanor 
of the witnesses’ and take into account the trial court’s ‘superior view of the entire situation.’” Id. 
(quoting Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 809, 992 P.2d 1205 1209 (1999)). “Findings are competent, 
so long as they are supported by substantial, albeit possibly, conflicting, evidence.” Roe v. Doe, 
142 Idaho 174, 177, 125 P.3d 530, 533 (2005) (quoting Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 405, 
64 P.3d 327, 331 (2003)). “Substantial, competent evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” In re Doe I, 164 Idaho 883, 888, 436 P.3d 1232, 
1237 (2019) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doe v. Doe, 150 Idaho 46, 49, 244 P.3d 190, 193 
(2010)). The record before the magistrate court here contains sufficient evidence that could lead a 
reasonable person to conclude that vesting legal custody of the children with the Department was 
in the children’s best interest.  
While we decline to usurp the magistrate court’s role in weighing evidence, we note that 
Father’s account of events is unsupported by the record. For example, Father characterizes his 
petition for a CPO as his intent “to keep the children from returning to Mother’s home until things 
could get sorted out.” But Father did not limit his filings to a single CPO; rather, he often filed 
CPOs to prevent the children from seeing their mother. Father would then move to dismiss the 
orders once he had strategically benefited by preventing the children from seeing their mother. 
Indeed, as the magistrate court pointed out, Father failed to explain how the situations were so 
dangerous as to warrant a CPO one moment, but warrant dismissal the next. Other witnesses who 
testified, as recognized by the magistrate court, noted that frequent interference with Mother’s 
access to the children had a significant effect on Mother’s ability to establish a relationship with 
the children. While there is conflicting evidence about some of the other facts that Father recounts, 
the magistrate court found it was contrary to the welfare of the children to remain at Father’s home. 
This conclusion was based on substantial and competent evidence consistent with Idaho Code 
section 16-1623. 
 
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Whether Father believes that the children should have remained in protective custody is 
not the pertinent question. Our sole focus in this appeal is whether there was substantial and 
competent evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” to support the magistrate 
court’s decision to vest legal custody with the Department. We conclude that there was. We 
therefore hold that the magistrate court’s verbal findings were supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
2. The magistrate court’s written findings of fact.  
Father next argues that the magistrate court failed to make detailed written findings under 
Idaho Code sections 16-1623 and 16-1919 and Idaho Juvenile Rule 41. Relatedly, Father maintains 
that substantial and competent evidence supported the children remaining under protective 
supervision. The Department responds by arguing that the magistrate court’s written findings of 
fact and conclusions of law were sufficient, and the court’s findings were supported by substantial 
and competent evidence.  
Under Idaho Code section 16-1623, the magistrate court is required to make detailed 
written findings based on facts in the record: 
(1) Where the child has been placed under the protective supervision of the 
department pursuant to section 16-1619, Idaho Code, the child may be removed 
from his or her home under the following circumstances: 
. . . . 
(3) When a child under protective supervision is removed from his home pursuant 
to subsection (1)(a) or (b) of this section without a hearing, a redisposition hearing 
shall be held within forty-eight (48) hours of the child’s removal from the home, 
except for Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. At the hearing, the court shall 
determine whether to vest legal custody in the department or other authorized 
agency pursuant to section 16-1619(5)(b), Idaho Code. When a child under 
protective supervision is removed from his home pursuant to subsection (1)(b) of 
this section and the facts supporting the removal are presented to the court at a 
hearing, the hearing at which the court orders the child’s removal is the 
redisposition hearing. 
(4) In determining whether to vest legal custody in the department or other 
authorized agency, the court shall consider any information relevant to the 
redisposition of the child, and in any event shall make detailed written findings 
based upon facts in the record as required by section 16-1619(6), Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 16-1623(1), (3)–(4) (emphasis added). 
 
Under Idaho Code section 16-1619(6), the magistrate must also make “detailed written 
findings” if it “vest[s] legal custody in the department or other authorized agency[.]” Separately, 
 
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Idaho Juvenile Rule 41 obliges the court to “make a written, case-specific finding that remaining 
in the home is contrary to the welfare of the child, or, in the alternative, removal from the home is 
in the best interest of the child.” I.J.R. 41(f).  
 
On appeal, Father argues that paragraph 6(b) of the redisposition order makes the 
conclusory determination that remaining in the home was contrary to the welfare of the children 
and that it is in the children’s best interest to be placed in the custody of the Department. Father 
also points to the order’s language suggesting that the magistrate court’s findings are based on “the 
information in the affidavit(s) in support of the motion for removal and redisposition, that has been 
filed in this case, and is incorporated in this decree by reference.” According to Father, however, 
there was no motion for removal and, therefore, there was no affidavit in support of that motion.   
 
The plain language of Idaho Code section 16-1623 requires courts to issue detailed written 
findings when determining whether to vest legal custody of children in the Department. According 
to the Department, incorporating evidence by reference constitutes sufficient written findings. 
Indeed, the Department points to this Court’s decision in Matter of Doe, where we explained:  
In the magistrate court’s written findings of fact, it referred to and incorporated by 
reference an “Adjudicatory/Disposition Report of Investigation” to support its 
decree placing Child in the Department’s custody. This report, however, is not 
contained in the record before us. Because Father brought this appeal and was 
responsible for presenting the record in this appeal, we assume information not 
provided supports the magistrate court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
169 Idaho 328, 341, 495 P.3d 1016, 1029 (2021). 
 
Similar to Matter of Doe, the magistrate court’s written findings of fact incorporated by 
reference the “report of [the GAL], dated 5/11/2023, and the report of [the case manager], dated 
5/12/2023,” as well as earlier testimony. Relating to the best interests of the children, the written 
order also incorporates by reference “information in the affidavit(s) in support of removal and 
redisposition, that [have] been filed in this case . . . .” Among other findings, the reports from the 
GAL and the case manager identify concerns about the children remaining in Father’s custody. 
The case manager’s report, which she testified about at the redisposition hearing, discussed the 
children’s exposure to their parents’ domestic violence and ongoing concerns related to education 
negligence. The GAL’s report raised concerns about a power struggle between the parents, with 
the children in the middle. The GAL also noted that Father was requesting unwarranted welfare 
checks from the Chubbuck Police Department to interfere with the children’s visitation with 
 
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Mother. The magistrate court also heard testimony at the status hearing on May 17 and the 
redisposition hearing on May 19, which was incorporated by reference into the redisposition order. 
Father points out that the magistrate court explained its findings in the redisposition order 
were based on “the information in the affidavit(s) in support of the motion for removal and 
redisposition[.]” As Father notes, no affidavits directly supported the motion. We agree with Father 
that the redisposition order does not contain detailed findings of fact, but we ultimately conclude 
that this does not constitute reversible error.  
We recently addressed what constitutes a “finding of fact” and explained that a statement 
that merely recites portions of the record which could be used in support of a finding is not a 
“finding of fact”: 
“A finding of fact is a determination of a fact supported by the evidence in the 
record.” Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 77, 156 P.3d 
573, 578 (2007) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 284 (2d Pocket ed. 2001)). 
A statement that “merely recite[s] portions of the record which could be used in 
support of a finding” is not a finding of fact. Crown Point Dev., Inc., 144 Idaho at 
77, 156 P.3d at 578. 
Searle v. Searle, 162 Idaho 839, 846, 405 P.3d 1180, 1187 (2017).  
 
The magistrate court’s redisposition order was a check-box style mandatory form 
authorized by this Court. As for child custody and the best interest of the children, the Order stated: 
6. 
Custody of the child(ren), best interest of the child(ren). 
 
 
☒   Custody to IDHW 
a. This child(ren): [Does] are placed in the legal custody of IDHW. The 
date the child(ren) entered foster care is May 17, 2023. 
☒    While in IDHW custody, the child(ren) may travel out-of-state for 
a period of up to 3 days, in the company of an adult and consistent with 
IDHW policies and regulations, for health care services, educational or 
recreational opportunities, or other routine purposes. 
b. It is contrary to the welfare of the child(ren) to remain in the home. It is 
in the best interest of the child(ren) to be placed in the custody of IDHW. 
The court makes this finding based on: 
☒   the information in the affidavit(s) in support of the motion 
for removal and redisposition, that has been filed in this case, and is 
incorporated in this decree by reference. 
With respect to reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the children, the order stated: 
7.          Reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child(ren). 
a. Efforts 
 
15 
 
☒    IDHW made reasonable efforts prior to placement of the child(ren) in 
shelter care to eliminate the need for shelter care but those efforts were 
unsuccessful. 
☒    IDHW made reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for shelter care but 
was not able to safely provide preventative services. 
☒     IDHW made reasonable efforts to temporarily place the child(ren) with 
related persons but those efforts were unsuccessful. 
b. Basis 
The court makes this finding based on: 
       ☒     the report of [GAL], dated 05/11/2023, and the report of [Case Worker], 
dated 05/12/2023, that has been filed in this case, and is incorporated in this order 
by reference. 
        ☒  testimony. 
The redisposition order entered by the magistrate court does not comply with the detailed 
written findings requirement of Idaho Code section 16-1623(4). Rather than setting forth factual 
findings, the form merely incorporates by reference certain portions of the record (e.g., the 
references to affidavits, reports, and “testimony”), which could support a factual finding. Under 
Searle, these evidentiary references do not suffice as “findings of fact.”  
Having made this determination, the failure to comply with the law is not the failing of the 
magistrate court. The mandatory form is inadequate. To that end, we refer the form redisposition 
order (and form adjudicatory decree which contains similar incorporation language) to the Child 
Protection Committee and request that the Committee make proposed revisions to these forms so 
that they accurately reflect the “detailed written findings” requirements of Idaho Code section 16-
1619 and section 16-1623. 
As a result, while we agree with Father that the redisposition order does not contain 
adequate written findings of fact, we do not agree that this constitutes reversible error. We 
explained in Jasso v. Camas Cnty., 151 Idaho 790, 794-95, 264 P.3d 897, 891-92 (2011) 
(discussing Evans v. Teton Cnty., 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003)), that under the Local Land Use 
Planning Act, a reviewing court may overlook otherwise inadequate findings and conclusions if 
the record contains substantial and competent evidence to support the decision-maker’s findings 
and conclusions. We apply similar reasoning here for two reasons. First, because the magistrate 
court explained the reasons for its decision in detail on the record following the receipt of testimony 
from multiple witnesses, we may overlook the otherwise inadequate findings and conclusions of 
the magistrate court’s form order and rely on that substantial evidence. Second, because federal 
 
16 
 
regulations governing Idaho’s foster care system permit court transcripts to be used as acceptable 
documentation of judicial determinations of the best interest of the children and reasonable efforts 
to eliminate the need for shelter care, we likewise uphold the magistrate court’s decision here. See 
45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(d)(1) (“If the reasonable efforts and contrary to the welfare judicial 
determinations are not included as required in the court orders . . . , a transcript of the court 
proceedings is the only other documentation that will be accepted to verify that these required 
determinations have been made.”).  
In short, the magistrate court’s ruling from the bench makes it clear why the magistrate 
judge made the decision to vest custody of the children with the Department. We thus can engage 
in meaningful judicial review and conclude that there is substantial and competent evidence to 
support the magistrate court’s decision.   
B. 
Placing the children in the legal custody of the Department did not violate Father’s 
rights to the custody, care, and control of his children.  
Father argues that the magistrate court’s decision to place the children in the legal custody 
of the Department interfered with Father’s fundamental right to the care and custody of his 
children. While Father acknowledges that the State may have a compelling interest in protecting 
the children’s welfare, Father argues there were less restrictive means to keep the children safe, 
including the Department’s safety plan. The Department responds that, because the magistrate 
court followed the law, there was no violation of Father’s parental rights. We agree with the 
Department.  
 “The United States Supreme Court has held that a parent has a fundamental liberty interest 
in maintaining a relationship with his or her child.” In Int. of Doe, 164 Idaho 143, 145–46, 426 
P.3d 1243, 1245–46 (2018) (quoting Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002)). 
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case—
the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 
(2000).  
Father relies on Idaho Code section 32-1013(3) to support his claim that the magistrate 
court’s decision to vest legal custody of the children in the Department violates his fundamental 
right to parent. Indeed, the Idaho Legislature has highlighted a parent’s fundamental rights under 
this statute, which explains that any restriction or interference with rights protected by the Act 
 
17 
 
“shall not be upheld unless it demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the restriction or 
interference is both: (a) Essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and (b) The least 
restrictive means available for the furthering of that compelling governmental interest.” Critically, 
the statute also provides that “[n]othing in this act shall be construed as invalidating the provisions 
of the child protective act in chapter 16, title 16, Idaho Code, or modify the burden of proof at any 
stage of proceedings under the child protective act.” I.C. § 32-1013(3). Father challenged only the 
factual findings here, not whether the evidence sustained the required burden of proof under the 
CPA. Because the Act does not supplant the burden of proof in CPA proceedings, Father’s 
argument for strict scrutiny is inapplicable. 
Importantly, “[t]he clear and convincing evidence standard” set forth by this section only 
applies in termination hearings. In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 110, 320 P.3d 1262, 1269 (2014). 
Father’s parental rights have not been terminated. Instead, legal custody of Father’s children has 
been temporarily vested in the Department. “[I]n any court decision affecting children, the best 
interests of the child should be the primary consideration.” Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401, 
403–04, 64 P.3d 327, 329–30 (2003); I.C. § 16-1601 (“At all times, the health and safety of the 
child shall be the primary concern.”). While “the state of Idaho shall, to the fullest extent possible, 
seek to preserve, protect, enhance and reunite the family relationship[,]” the purpose of the Child 
Protective Act is “the protection of any child whose life, health or welfare is endangered[.]” I.C. § 
16-1601. Indeed, the Act authorizes law enforcement and a magistrate court to act quickly when a 
child’s welfare is in question. The magistrate court may vest legal custody in the Department if 
there is reasonable cause to believe it is in the best interests of a child. I.C. § 16-1615(5)(b). In 
making this determination, the magistrate court may consider “[a]ny evidence . . .  which is of the 
type which reasonable people may rely upon.” I.C. § 16-1615(5). 
If a magistrate court finds reasonable cause to believe a child falls under the jurisdiction 
of the Act, then an adjudicatory hearing must be held as soon as possible, but no later than thirty 
days after the CPA petition was filed, to determine whether a child falls under the protections of 
the Act. I.C. § 16-1615(6). The Act sets forth a “preponderance of the evidence” standard for 
conducting an adjudicatory hearing: 
If a preponderance of the evidence at the adjudicatory hearing shows that 
the child comes within the court’s jurisdiction under this chapter upon the grounds 
set forth in section 16-1603, Idaho Code, the court shall so decree and in its decree 
 
18 
 
shall make a finding on the record of the facts and conclusions of law upon which 
it exercises jurisdiction over the child.  
I.C. § 16-1619(4) (emphasis added).  
Even when a magistrate court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that a child 
falls under the jurisdiction of the CPA, the magistrate court does not have to vest custody with the 
Department. Like was done here, the Act authorizes the magistrate court to “[p]lace the child under 
the protective supervision of the department for an indeterminate period not to exceed the child’s 
eighteenth birthday . . . .” I.C. § 16-1619(5)(a). When a child is placed under the Department’s 
protective supervision, the child can be removed from the parents’ home, but a redisposition 
hearing must be held within 48 hours. I.C. § 16-1623(3). Redisposition is “based upon facts 
presented to the court, that the child should be removed from his or her present conditions or 
surroundings because continuation in such conditions or surroundings would be contrary to the 
welfare of the child and vesting legal custody in the department . . . would be in the child’s best 
interests.” I.C. § 16-1623(1)(b). Redisposition hearings provide the magistrate court the 
opportunity to exercise broad discretion, while focusing on the best interests of the child. The court 
may rely on any information relevant to the redisposition of the child in reaching its decision. I.C. 
§ 16-1623(4). 
This Court has not previously examined whether removal of the child from his or her home 
after being placed under the protective supervision of the Department violates a parent’s 
fundamental right to the custody, care, and control of his child.  The redisposition hearing process 
is, in essence, another adjudicatory hearing resulting in a “redisposition” of the child’s custody. It 
is therefore subject to the same “preponderance of the evidence” standard set forth in Idaho Code 
section 16-1619(4). Importantly, as we have addressed, this is the applicable standard because the 
parent’s custody, care, and control of the children has not yet been terminated. While there are due 
process protections throughout the process, when the State intervenes to terminate the parent-child 
relationship the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the 
statutorily approved grounds for terminating the relationship is satisfied and that termination is in 
the child’s best interest. Matter of Doe Children, 164 Idaho 486, 489, 432 P.3d 35, 38 (2018) 
(citing In re Doe (2011-02), 151 Idaho 356, 362, 256 P.3d 764, 770 (2011)); I.C. § 16-2005(1). 
Here, however, the State has not terminated the parent-child relationship, and the magistrate 
court’s ruling even reflects it is open to reconsidering its decision if or when circumstances change. 
 
19 
 
For example, after making the decision to vest legal custody with the Department, the magistrate 
court clarified:  
[M]aybe we can keep this a short turnaround. I’m going to set a hearing in about 
two weeks. I’ve got -- it will be a little less than two weeks. It won’t be a full-
fledged evidentiary hearing like we’ve had today with all the information and 
evidence being presented, but why don’t we try -- I think we can squeeze it in the 
1st before lunch maybe. 
Father maintains that the Department’s safety plan was a less restrictive alternative to removing 
the children from the home and the magistrate court violated his fundamental rights by departing 
from that plan. This argument, however, is unsupported by the record or Idaho Code section 32-
1013. The magistrate court had a range of options available when exercising discretion within its 
outer bounds. See Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018). As 
we have already discussed, there was substantial and competent evidence to support the 
magistrate’s determination that the children remaining in Father’s custody was not in their best 
interests and contrary to their welfare. The magistrate court temporarily placed the children in the 
legal custody of the Department to manage visitation and provide a safety monitor for the children 
during supervised visitation with Father and Mother. In light of the substantial and competent 
evidence in the record, we hold that there was no unconstitutional interference with Father’s 
parental rights.  
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
The magistrate court’s redisposition order is affirmed.  
JUSTICES BRODY, STEGNER, MOELLER and ZAHN CONCUR.