Case Title: Greif v. Town of Bar Harbor

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 163

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 163 
Docket: 
Han-16-539 
Submitted 
  on Briefs: 
May 25, 2017 
Decided: 
July 20, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
ARTHUR J. GREIF 
 
v. 
 
TOWN OF BAR HARBOR 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
[¶1]  Arthur J. Greif appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court 
(Hancock County, Anderson, J.) affirming the decision of the Bar Harbor Town 
Council declining to conduct an investigatory hearing after receiving a letter 
from Greif in which he detailed allegations of misconduct by two of the Town’s 
councilors.  We conclude that the Council acted properly pursuant to the Bar 
Harbor Town Charter and Maine’s Freedom of Access Act, and we affirm the 
judgment.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts are set out in the administrative record.  See 
M.R. Civ. P. 80B(f); Osprey Family Tr. v. Town of Owls Head, 2016 ME 89, ¶ 2, 
141 A.3d 1114.  
 
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[¶3]  Greif is a Bar Harbor resident.  On January 4, 2016, he sent a letter 
to five of the Town’s seven councilors detailing allegations of misconduct 
concerning the other two councilors.  In the letter, Greif alleged that, in 2013, 
the two councilors secretly met with the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer 
(CEO) to encourage the CEO to clandestinely monitor another Town 
employee’s use of the Town photocopier in hopes of uncovering evidence that 
the Town employee used the photocopier to conduct his private real estate 
business.  According to Greif, the two councilors planned to report any 
wrongdoing the CEO observed to the Town manager.    
[¶4]  Greif’s letter alleged that the councilors’ actions violated the Town 
Charter, which prohibits the Town Council or its councilors from giving orders 
to Town employees.  See Bar Harbor, Me., Charter § C-11 (July 1, 2010).  
Accordingly, Greif urged the Town Council to convene an investigatory 
hearing to determine whether the councilors’ conduct violated the Town 
Charter and consequently warranted forfeiture of their positions on the 
Council.   
[¶5]  On January 5, 2016, one day after the date of Greif’s letter, the 
Town Council held a meeting.  While in a regular session, the Council voted 
7-0 to enter an executive session “for the purpose of consulting with the 
 
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Town’s attorney concerning the legal rights and duties of the Town in regard 
to” the Council’s receipt of Greif’s letter.  After approximately one hour, the 
Council—excluding the councilors who were named in the complaint—
reentered regular session and voted unanimously to pursue no further action, 
concluding “that the alleged facts and circumstances contained in the 
January 4, 2016 letter do not warrant further review or consideration by the 
Council.”  
[¶6]  On January 29, 2016, Greif filed with the Superior Court an appeal 
in which he sought review of the Council’s actions in disposing of the 
allegations contained in his letter.  See 4 M.R.S. § 105(3); M.R. Civ. P. 80B.  
Additionally, Greif alleged in his complaint that the Town Council violated the 
provisions of Maine’s Freedom of Access Act (FOAA), 1 M.R.S. §§ 400-521 
(2016), when, he claimed, the Council discussed the substance of his 
allegations in an executive session closed to the public.  The court rejected 
Greif’s FOAA claims and affirmed the actions of the Town.  Greif appeals.1   
                                         
1  The parties have represented that, at the time of this appeal, one of the councilors involved in 
the alleged misconduct is no longer on the Council, having not sought reelection after the expiration 
of his term.  The parties agree that this appeal, to the extent it involves the councilor no longer 
serving on the Council, is moot.  Because, however, with regard to the active councilor, “there 
remain sufficient practical effects flowing from the resolution of the litigation to justify the 
application of limited judicial resources,” Greif’s claims pertaining to that councilor are not moot.  
Monroe v. Town of Gray, 1999 ME 190, ¶ 4, 743 A.2d 1257 (alteration omitted) (quotation marks 
omitted).     
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶7]  We review the Town Council’s decision “directly for error of law, 
abuse of discretion or findings not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record.”  Osprey Family Tr., 2016 ME 89, ¶ 9, 141 A.3d 1114 (quotation marks 
omitted).  In so doing, we review the relevant provisions of the Town Charter 
de novo.  Id.  
A. 
Town Charter 
 
[¶8]  Greif contends that the Town Charter requires the Town Council to 
convene an investigatory hearing into allegations of councilor misconduct 
upon receiving a written complaint from any aggrieved citizen.  A plain 
language reading of the Town Charter does not support Greif’s interpretation.  
See Lane Constr. Corp. v. Town of Washington, 2007 ME 31, ¶ 7, 916 A.2d 973 
(“We look first to the plain meaning of the terms of the ordinance to give effect 
to the legislative intent.”).  
 
[¶9]  Section C-12 of the Town Charter provides that a councilor “shall 
forfeit his/her office” if the councilor “[v]iolates any express prohibition” of 
the Town Charter.  Bar Harbor, Me., Charter § C-12 (July 1, 2010).  Section 
C-13, entitled “Judge of qualifications,” establishes that “[t]he Council shall be 
the judge of . . . the grounds for forfeiture of their office and for that purpose 
 
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shall have the power to provide for compulsory attendance of witnesses, the 
administering of oaths, and the compulsory production of evidence.”  Id. 
§ C-13.  That same section sets forth that “[a]n officer charged in writing with 
conduct constituting grounds for forfeiture of his/her office shall be entitled 
to a public hearing on demand, made within 10 days of receipt of notice of 
forfeiture.”  Id.  
 
[¶10]  It is therefore incongruous that a private citizen could “charge” a 
councilor with “conduct constituting grounds for forfeiture of his/her office” 
by invoking a section of the Town Charter that reserves to the Council itself 
the power to determine what conduct warrants forfeiture under the Charter.  
Id.   
 
[¶11]  On the contrary, a plain language reading of the Charter comports 
with the Town Council’s actions here.  After receiving Greif’s letter, the Town 
Council, in an executive session where the councilors named in Greif’s letter 
were not present, conferred with its attorney about the Council’s duties and 
obligations regarding the letter and, in public session, as the “judge of the 
grounds of forfeiture,” decided to pursue no further action.  See id.  If the 
Town Council had determined that the councilors’ conduct as alleged in the 
letter constituted grounds for forfeiture, it could have then charged them in 
 
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writing, at which point the charged councilors could request a public hearing 
on the charges.  See Bar Harbor, Me., Charter §§ C-12, C-13.  Therefore, the 
court did not err in concluding that the Council, upon receiving Greif’s letter, 
was not required to hold an investigatory hearing on Greif’s allegations.   
B. 
Freedom of Access Act  
 
[¶12]  Greif also contends that the court erred in concluding that the 
procedure the Town Council utilized in declining to pursue further action on 
his allegations was permissible pursuant to FOAA.2  Specifically, he argues that 
the Town Council violated the Act by making a decision “as to whether to 
believe or disbelieve” the allegations in Greif’s letter in a closed executive 
session.    
 
[¶13]  Title 1 M.R.S. § 405 (2016) sets forth the circumstances under 
which a town council may conduct a nonpublic executive session as well as 
the topics on which the council may permissibly deliberate during those 
sessions.  Section 405(6)(E) permits, during an executive session, 
“[c]onsultations between a body or agency and its attorney concerning the 
legal rights and duties of the body or agency.”  Alternatively, the statute 
                                         
2  It is not clear from the face of his Rule 80B complaint whether Greif relies on FOAA as a 
statutory avenue for review under M.R. Civ. P. 80B or if he is asserting a separate cause of action 
based on a violation of the Act.  See M.R. Civ. P. 80B(i).  Nonetheless, as explained in detail below, 
the Town Council’s actions did not violate the Act, and therefore the court did not err in affirming 
the Town’s actions in that regard.   
 
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prohibits a town council from approving “any ordinances, orders, rules, 
resolutions, regulations, contracts, appointments or other official action in an 
executive session.”  1 M.R.S. § 409(2) (2016).  If a town council violates this 
section, “[u]pon learning of any such action, any person may appeal to any 
Superior Court in the State.”  Id.  
 
[¶14]  The Town Council’s actions comported with FOAA mandates.  
The official minutes of the January 5, 2016, Town Council meeting indicate 
that the council voted 7-0 to enter into an executive session “for the purpose 
of consulting with the Town’s attorney concerning the legal rights and duties 
of the Town in regard to a complaint received against two Council members.”  
At the conclusion of the executive session, the Town Council returned to 
regular session and unanimously passed a resolution providing that “the 
alleged facts and circumstances contained in [Greif’s] letter do not warrant 
further review or consideration by the Council.”  Section 405(6)(E) explicitly 
permitted the Town Council to enter into an executive session to consult with 
“its attorney concerning the legal rights and duties” of the Council as they 
pertained to the allegations contained in Greif’s letter.  Therefore, because the 
Town Council neither violated the Town Charter nor FOAA, we affirm the 
judgment.   
 
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The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arthur J. Greif, appellant pro se 
 
Edmond J. Bearor, Esq., and Jonathan P. Hunter, Esq., Rudman Winchell, 
Bangor, for appellee Town of Bar Harbor 
 
 
Hancock County Superior Court docket number AP-2016-01 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY