Case Title: Six Brothers, Inc. v. Town of Brookline

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13434

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13434 
 
SIX BROTHERS, INC.,1 & others2  vs.  TOWN OF BROOKLINE 
& another.3 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     November 6, 2023. - March 8, 2024. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ.4 
 
 
Tobacco.  Municipal Corporations, By-laws and ordinances.  
Constitutional Law, Municipalities, Equal protection of laws.  
Statute, Construction.  Practice, Civil, Motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 17, 2021. 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Brian A. Davis, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
1 Doing business as Brookline Sunoco. 
 
 
2 Fahd Iqbal; IPGG, Inc., doing business as One Stop Market; 
Sukhjinder Gill; Comm. Ave. Gas & Service, Inc., doing business 
as Commonwealth Mobil; Emile Heraiki; OMR Corporation, doing 
business as Village Mobil; and Elias Audy. 
 
3 Select board of Brookline. 
 
4 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case 
prior to his retirement. 
2 
 
 
Patrick C. Tinsley (Adam C. Ponte also present) for the 
plaintiffs. 
Christopher N. Banthin (Mark Gottlieb also present) for the 
defendants. 
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: 
Nicholas A. Ogden, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
Commonwealth. 
Christopher M. Morrison for American Snuff Company, LLC. 
Mina S. Makarious, Christina S. Marshall, & Matthew R. 
Bowser for American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network 
& others. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  In 2018, as part of a larger act entitled 
"An Act protecting youth from the health risks of tobacco and 
nicotine addiction," St. 2018, c. 157 (Tobacco Act or act), the 
Legislature prohibited the sale of tobacco products in the 
Commonwealth to persons under the age of twenty-one, thereby 
raising the minimum age for such sales from eighteen.  See G. L. 
c. 270, § 6 (b), as appearing in St. 2018, c. 157, § 9.  The act 
expressly preempts any "inconsistent, contrary or conflicting" 
local law related to the Statewide minimum age provision, but 
otherwise affirms the authority of local communities to limit 
and to ban the sale of tobacco products within their 
municipalities.  St. 2018, c. 157, § 22.   
Two years later, the town of Brookline (town) went further 
than the act, following a long tradition of local communities 
augmenting the protections against the harmful effects of 
tobacco products available at the State level.  Specifically, 
the town approved warrant article 14 (bylaw), which divides 
3 
 
potential consumers of tobacco products into two groups based on 
birth year:  a group comprising those born before January 1, 
2000 (group one); and a group comprising those born on or after 
that date (group two).  Merchants in the town may sell tobacco 
products to group one, but not to group two.  Those in group 
two, no matter the age they attain, will not be able to purchase 
tobacco from the town's merchants; over time, an increasing 
percentage of the town's population will comprise group two.  In 
effect and by design, the bylaw is an incremental prohibition on 
the sale of tobacco products in the town.   
 
The plaintiffs in this case -- several retailers seeking to 
sell tobacco products in the town to those in group two who are 
twenty-one years of age and older (retailers) -- brought the 
present action under G. L. c. 231A, § 1, for a judgment 
declaring that the bylaw is preempted by the Tobacco Act.  
Because the bylaw falls within the type of local law limiting or 
prohibiting the sale of tobacco products expressly permitted by 
the act, and because the bylaw is not otherwise inconsistent, 
contrary, or conflicting with the act's minimum age standard, we 
conclude that it is not preempted.   
Further concluding that the bylaw is rationally related to 
a legitimate government interest and does not violate the equal 
protection provisions of art. 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights, as amended by art. 106 of the Amendments to the 
4 
 
Massachusetts Constitution, we affirm the well-reasoned decision 
of the Superior Court judge dismissing the retailers' amended 
complaint pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 
(1974), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted.5 
 
1.  Background.  "We summarize the factual allegations set 
forth in the complaint and in the undisputed documents 
incorporated by reference in the complaint . . . 'accepting as 
true all well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint.'"  
Osborne-Trussell v. Children's Hosp. Corp., 488 Mass. 248, 250, 
253 (2021), quoting Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp., 483 
Mass. 612, 614 (2019).   
The retailers are licensed to sell tobacco products in the 
Commonwealth.  They each seek to sell tobacco products in the 
town to all consumers who have attained the minimum age of 
twenty-one as set forth by the Tobacco Act, but are precluded 
from doing so to those consumers who also fall within group two, 
having been born on or after January 1, 2000.  In their amended 
complaint for a declaratory judgment, they assert that the bylaw 
is preempted by the Tobacco Act and that it violates the State 
Constitution's equal protection provisions.  A Superior Court 
 
 
5 We acknowledge the amicus letter submitted by the 
Commonwealth and the amicus briefs submitted by American Snuff 
Company, LLC; and medical, public health, and community groups. 
5 
 
judge allowed the Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss 
of the defendants, the town and its select board.  The retailers 
timely appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on 
our own motion. 
2.  Legal framework.  Local communities have a lengthy 
history of regulating tobacco products to curb the well-known, 
adverse health effects of tobacco use.  For decades, such local 
laws have coexisted with State laws, often augmenting available 
Statewide protections.  See, e.g., American Lithuanian 
Naturalization Club, Athol, Mass., Inc. v. Board of Health of 
Athol, 446 Mass. 310, 321-322 (2006) (municipal prohibition on 
smoking in membership associations not preempted by State law 
only limiting locations where smoking may be permitted); Tri-Nel 
Mgt., Inc. v. Board of Health of Barnstable, 433 Mass. 217, 218, 
224 (2001) (Tri-Nel) (affirming authority of local board of 
health to issue municipal regulation prohibiting smoking in all 
food service establishments, lounges, and bars despite State 
statute also regulating smoking in restaurants); Patton v. 
Marlborough, 415 Mass. 750, 751-752 (1993) (upholding local 
board of health regulation limiting the operation of cigarette 
vending machines to certain locations); Take Five Vending, Ltd. 
v. Provincetown, 415 Mass. 741, 746 (1993) (Take Five) 
(upholding bylaw forbidding sale of cigarettes from vending 
6 
 
machines despite State statute, which only prohibited vending 
machine sales to persons under age of eighteen).   
Pertinent to the present case, for the thirty-three years 
prior to 2018, the Statewide minimum age standard for tobacco 
products prohibited the sale of tobacco products to any person 
under the age of eighteen.  G. L. c. 270, § 6, as appearing in 
St. 1985, c. 345.  Many towns and cities went further, raising 
the minimum age in their locales.6  See Reynolds, Crane, & 
Winickoff, The Emergence of the Tobacco 21 Movement from 
Needham, Massachusetts, to throughout the United States (2003-
2019), 109 Am. J. Pub. Health 1540, 1546 (2019) (over 175 towns 
in Massachusetts raised minimum sales age prior to Tobacco Act). 
a.  Tobacco Act.  Mirroring the action of these local 
community laboratories,7 the Legislature enacted the Tobacco Act, 
 
6 See Winickoff, Gottlieb, & Mello, Tobacco 21 -- An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come, 370 New Eng. J. Med. 295, 296 (2014) 
(Needham became first jurisdiction in country to raise minimum 
age for sales of tobacco products from eighteen to twenty-one).  
 
7 Municipalities also have led the State in enacting other 
smoking-related protections.  For example, several 
municipalities required smoke-free working places before the 
Legislature enacted "An Act improving public health in the 
commonwealth," St. 2004, c. 137, § 2, inserting G. L. c. 270, 
§ 22.  See American Nonsmokers' Rights Foundation, Chronological 
Table of U.S. Population Protected by 100% Smokefree State or 
Local Laws (Jan. 1, 2024), https://no-smoke.org/wp-content 
/uploads/pdf/EffectivePopulationList.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8NZ-
NEKA]; Dove et al., The Impact of Massachusetts' Smoke-Free 
Workplace Laws on Acute Myocardial Infarction Deaths, 100 Am. J. 
 
7 
 
which, inter alia, raised the minimum age for consumers of 
tobacco products from eighteen to twenty-one, effective 
December 31, 2018.  See St. 2018, c. 157, §§ 9, 23.  It provides 
that "[n]o person shall sell or provide a tobacco product to a 
person who is under [twenty-one] years of age."  G. L. c. 270, 
§ 6 (b), inserted by St. 2018, c. 157, § 9.  Pertinently, § 22 
of the act, which we discuss in detail infra, expressly sets 
forth the Legislature's intent to preempt certain local bylaws 
and ordinances.  St. 2018, c. 157, § 22.   
b.  Bylaw.  Nearly two years after the effective date of 
the act, town voters approved the bylaw, which amended art. 8.23 
of the town's general bylaws as follows:8  "No person, firm, 
 
Pub. Health 2206, 2208 (2010) (sixty-one cities and towns 
implemented workplace smoking bans before State ban). 
 
Similarly, several cities and towns restricted flavored 
tobacco products before the Legislature passed "An Act 
modernizing tobacco control," St. 2019, c. 133, § 25, inserting 
G. L. c. 270, § 28 (b), which restricted flavored tobacco 
product sales Statewide.  See Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, 
Impact of Restricting the Sale of Flavored Tobacco Products:  
The Massachusetts Experience, at 1 (July 3, 2023), https: 
//assets.tobaccofreekids.org/factsheets/0421.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/P4CA-E9KV]. 
 
 
8 Prior to the amendment of the bylaw, § 8.23.5(d) stated, 
"No person, firm, corporation, establishment, or agency shall 
sell tobacco or e-cigarette products to a minor."  Under State 
law, a minor is "any person under eighteen years of age."  G. L. 
c. 4, § 7, Forty-eighth.  At the time the voters approved the 
bylaw, those "born on or after [January 1, 2000]" had not yet 
turned twenty-one years old.  We take judicial notice of the 
town's previous and current bylaw, versions of which are also 
 
8 
 
corporation, establishment, or agency shall sell tobacco or 
e-cigarette products to anyone born on or after 1/1/2000" 
(emphasis added).9  Thus, as discussed supra, the bylaw divides 
potential consumers of tobacco products into two groups:  those 
born before January 1, 2000, as to whom the minimum age to 
purchase tobacco is twenty-one, as provided by the Tobacco Act 
(group one); and those born on or after that date, who will not 
be able to purchase tobacco from the town's retailers regardless 
of their age (group two).  Over time, an increasing percentage 
of the town's population will fall within group two, resulting 
in an incremental prohibition on the sale of tobacco products in 
 
available in the appellate record.  See City Council of 
Springfield v. Mayor of Springfield, 489 Mass. 184, 190 n.6 
(2022). 
 
 
9 The bylaw also amended § 8.23.5(h) to require sellers of 
tobacco products in the town to "conspicuously post a sign 
stating that 'The sale of tobacco or e-cigarette products to 
someone born on or after 1/1/2000 is prohibited.'"  In the 
amended complaint, the retailers also challenge this 
requirement, claiming that it is preempted by the Tobacco Act's 
requirements regarding signage.  St. 2018, c. 157, § 18 
(retailers "shall conspicuously post a notice produced by the 
department of public health that states the minimum age for a 
person to purchase a tobacco product").  See 105 Code Mass. 
Regs. § 665.015(A) (2020) (retail "signage shall include:  [1] a 
copy of [G. L.] c. 270, §§ 6 and 6A; [2] referral information 
for smoking cessation resources; [3] a statement that sale of 
tobacco products, including e-cigarettes, to someone younger 
than [twenty-one] years old is prohibited; [4] health warnings 
associated with using electronic nicotine delivery systems; and 
[5] except in the case of smoking bars, notice to consumers that 
the sale of flavored tobacco products are prohibited at all 
times"). 
 
9 
 
the town.  See Town of Brookline, Reports of the Select Board 
and Advisory Committee on the Articles in the Warrant for the 
Special Town Meeting, at 14-13 (Nov. 17, 2020) (bylaw is 
"incrementally phasing out the sale of tobacco over time"). 
 
As required by G. L. c. 40, § 32,10 the town sought and 
obtained approval of the bylaw from the Attorney General, who 
concluded that the act did not preempt the bylaw.11  The bylaw 
became effective on August 27, 2021, and enforcement commenced 
on September 27, 2021. 
3.  Discussion.  "We review the allowance of a motion to 
dismiss de novo, accepting as true all well-pleaded facts 
alleged in the complaint."  Osborne-Trussell, 488 Mass. at 253, 
quoting Ryan, 483 Mass. at 614.  "We draw all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff[s'] favor, and determine whether the 
allegations plausibly suggest that the plaintiff[s are] entitled 
 
10 General Laws c. 40, § 32, provides:  "Except to the 
extent that a zoning by-law may take effect as provided in 
[G. L. c. 40A, § 5], before a by-law takes effect it shall be 
approved by the attorney general . . . ." 
  
 
11 The Attorney General reasoned that "the preemptive effect 
of the [Tobacco Act] is limited to local laws that would allow 
tobacco sales to those under the age of twenty-one (except in 
the limited circumstances listed in [St. 2018, c. 157, § 22])."  
Because "both [the Tobacco Act and the bylaw] aim for the same 
goal of barring the sale of tobacco products to those under the 
age of twenty-one," because the bylaw "simply goes further than 
the [Tobacco Act]," and in view of "the broad public health 
power of municipalities to regulate tobacco products," the 
Attorney General reasoned that the bylaw was not inconsistent, 
contrary, or conflicting with the Statewide minimum sales age. 
10 
 
to relief on that legal claim" (quotations omitted).  Osborne-
Trussell, supra, quoting Buffalo-Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real 
Estate Co., 481 Mass. 13, 17 (2018). 
 
a.  Preemption.  We first consider whether the Tobacco Act 
preempts the bylaw's prohibition on tobacco sales to those born 
on and after January 1, 2000 –- a question of statutory 
interpretation that we review de novo.  See Commonwealth v. 
Rainey, 491 Mass. 632, 641 (2023).  "Our primary goal in 
interpreting a statute is to effectuate the intent of the 
Legislature . . . 'begin[ning] with . . . the plain language of 
the statute.'"  Id., quoting Patel v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 489 Mass. 
356, 362 (2022). 
"[A] statute must be interpreted according to the intent of 
the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by 
the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered 
in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief 
or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be 
accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers 
may be effectuated."   
 
Rainey, supra, quoting Conservation Comm'n of Norton v. Pesa, 
488 Mass. 325, 331 (2021). 
 
"Ordinarily, where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent."  
Sharris v. Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 586, 594 (2018), quoting 
Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 452 Mass. 436, 444 (2008).  "Where 
the statutory language is not conclusive, we may 'turn to 
extrinsic sources, including the legislative history and other 
11 
 
statutes, for assistance in our interpretation.'"  HSBC Bank 
USA, N.A. v. Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 332-333 (2022), quoting 
Chandler v. County Comm'rs of Nantucket County, 437 Mass. 430, 
435 (2002).  Furthermore, we do not construe a statutory 
provision in isolation; instead, we "look to the statutory 
scheme as a whole . . . so as to produce an internal consistency 
within the statute" (quotations and citations omitted).  
Plymouth Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 
483 Mass. 600, 605 (2019).   
 
"Municipal by-laws are presumed to be valid."  Take Five, 
415 Mass. at 744.  A town exceeds its power "only when it passes 
a by-law inconsistent with the [State] Constitution or laws of 
the Commonwealth" (quotation and citation omitted).  Id.  See 
art. 2 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, as 
amended by art. 89, § 6, of the Amendments ("[a]ny city or town 
may, by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of local ordinances 
or by-laws, exercise any power or function which the general 
court has power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent 
with the constitution or laws enacted by the general court" 
[emphasis added]); G. L. c. 43B, § 13. 
Importantly, State laws and local ordinances and bylaws can 
and often do exist side by side.  See Bloom v. Worcester, 363 
Mass. 136, 156 (1973) ("[t]he existence of legislation on a 
subject, however, is not necessarily a bar to the enactment of 
12 
 
local ordinances and by-laws exercising powers or functions with 
respect to the same subject").  This is particularly true of 
local ordinances and bylaws regulating public health, the 
importance of which we have long acknowledged.  See Baker v. 
Boston, 12 Pick. 184, 193 (1831) ("[a]mong these [local] powers 
no one is more important than that for the preservation of the 
public health"); Vandine, petitioner, 6 Pick. 187, 192 (1828) 
("[t]he great object of the city is to preserve the health of 
the inhabitants").   
With deference to the role local communities historically 
have played as laboratories for potential Statewide standards,12 
municipal laws are afforded "considerable latitude"; we require 
"a sharp conflict" between the local and State laws before 
concluding that the local law is preempted.  Bloom, 363 Mass. at 
153, 154.  See Tri-Nel, 433 Mass. at 223, quoting Take Five, 415 
Mass. at 744 (to assess whether reasonable health regulation is 
inconsistent with State statute, local board afforded 
"considerable latitude," and preemption of local law requires 
"sharp conflict" with State statute). 
 
12 See discussion and note 7, supra; Baker, 12 Pick. at 193 
(localities "have necessarily the power of deciding in what 
manner" to mitigate effect of nuisance that may endanger public 
health). 
 
13 
 
A sharp conflict exists only where "[t]he legislative 
intent to preclude local action [is] clear."  St. George Greek 
Orthodox Cathedral of W. Mass., Inc. v. Fire Dep't of 
Springfield, 462 Mass. 120, 125-126 (2012) (St. George), quoting 
Bloom, 363 Mass. at 155.  This preemptive intent may be stated 
expressly by the Legislature, or it may be implied where "the 
purpose of the statute cannot be achieved in the face of the 
local [rule]."13  Tri-Nel, 433 Mass. at 223, quoting Take Five, 
415 Mass. at 744.  See Wendell v. Attorney Gen., 394 Mass. 518, 
528 (1985) ("[t]he question . . . is whether the local enactment 
will clearly frustrate a statutory purpose").  Guided by these 
principles, we examine the act to determine whether it evinces a 
clear legislative intent to preclude local action.   
i.  Express preemption provision.  A.  Section 22.  We 
begin with § 22 of the act, which expressly delineates the 
 
 
13 See, e.g., St. George, 462 Mass. at 128-130 (statute 
empowering State board to adopt comprehensive State building 
code "intended to occupy a field" and preempted local ordinance 
purporting to require use of only one of four State-approved 
fire protection systems); Connors v. Boston, 430 Mass. 31, 40-41 
(1999) (State group insurance provision preempted city ordinance 
purporting to extend coverage to domestic partners where purpose 
of State law, as expressed in legislative record, was to achieve 
uniformity across government insurance programs to effectuate 
cost containment and where ordinance would foil that aim); 
Wendell v. Attorney Gen., 394 Mass. 518, 529 (1985) (local bylaw 
purporting to authorize local board to regulate use of 
pesticides in town preempted by State-level statute authorizing 
centralized State-level subcommittee to propound standards for 
pesticide use).   
 
14 
 
Legislature's intent as to the preemptive scope of the act.  See 
St. 2018, c. 157, § 22.  It provides:  
"This act shall preempt, supersede or nullify any 
inconsistent, contrary or conflicting state or local law 
relating to the minimum sales age to purchase tobacco 
products; provided, that this act shall neither preempt, 
supersede nor nullify any inconsistent, contrary or 
conflicting local law in effect on December 30, 2018 that 
prohibits the sale of tobacco products to persons under the 
age of [nineteen], [twenty], or [twenty-one] as applied to 
persons who attained the age of [eighteen] before December 
31, 2018.  This act shall not otherwise preempt the 
authority of any city or town to enact any ordinance, by-
law or any fire, health or safety regulation that limits or 
prohibits the purchase of tobacco products."  (Emphases 
added.) 
 
Most relevant to our analysis, the second sentence of § 22 
evinces that the Legislature intended a narrow preemptive scope, 
preserving to local municipalities plenary authority to limit 
and indeed to ban outright the purchase of tobacco products in 
their communities so long as the local ordinance or bylaw is not 
"otherwise" preempted.  Thus, the bylaw, which limits tobacco 
product sales in the town and over time is an incremental 
prohibition on those sales, expressly is permitted by the second 
sentence of § 22, unless it is "otherwise" preempted. 
As the retailers correctly note, the word "otherwise"  
refers to the first clause of the first sentence of § 22.  That 
clause sets forth the legislative intent to preempt "any 
inconsistent, contrary or conflicting . . . local law relating 
to the minimum sales age to purchase tobacco products."  St. 
15 
 
2018, c. 157, § 22.  The phrase "minimum sales age to purchase 
tobacco products" in the clause necessarily refers to the 
minimum sales age provision of the act, which is the only 
provision of the act regarding a minimum sales age to purchase 
tobacco products (emphasis added).14  Significantly, the act's 
minimum sales age provision neither states that everyone may buy 
tobacco products once they reach the Statewide minimum age nor 
authorizes any person to sell tobacco products to those who 
attain that age.  Instead, the act sets forth, in restrictive 
terms, a prohibition on sales to persons under twenty-one, 
stating "[n]o person shall sell or provide a tobacco product to 
a person who is under [twenty-one] years of age."15  G. L. 
c. 270, § 6 (b), as appearing in St. 2018, c. 157, § 9.   
Thus, passing over the question whether the bylaw 
"relat[es] to the minimum sales age to purchase tobacco 
 
 
14 The act also refers to minimum age in connection with the 
sale of "tobacco rolling papers to a person under the age of 
[twenty-one]."  St. 2018, c. 157, § 9.  This provision, however, 
does not concern "minimum sales age to purchase tobacco 
products."  See id. (definition of "tobacco product" does not 
include tobacco rolling papers).   The only antecedent basis for 
the clause in § 22 is the Statewide minimum age provision for 
the sale of tobacco products. 
 
15 Section 22 describes the minimum age provision as the 
"minimum sales age to purchase tobacco" -- a reference to the 
act's prohibition of sales to persons under the age of twenty-
one (emphasis added).  St. 2018, c. 137, §§ 9, 22.     
 
16 
 
products,"16 our query centers on whether the bylaw is 
"inconsistent, contrary or conflicting"17 with the Tobacco Act's 
prohibition on sales of tobacco products to individuals who are 
under the Statewide minimum age of twenty-one.  Applying the 
plain and ordinary meaning of these terms, see note 17, supra, 
the act expressly preempts local laws that are not compatible 
with, or in opposition to, the act's Statewide minimum age 
standard.   
 
16 The parties dispute whether the bylaw "relat[es] to the 
minimum sales age to purchase tobacco products."  Citing Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985), the 
retailers contend that "related to" has a broad meaning, 
requiring "nothing more than 'a connection with or reference to' 
the matters in question."   See Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014) ("related" means "[c]onnected in some way").  See also 
Pace v. Signal Tech. Corp., 417 Mass. 154, 156 (1994) ("relates 
to" has "broad common-sense meaning" that requires only 
"connection with or reference to" the subject matter [citations 
omitted]).  The bylaw, the retailers assert, "contemplates an 
ever-increasing minimum age for purchasing tobacco products" and 
thus relates to the minimum sales age.  The town disagrees and 
contends that the bylaw is not a minimum age law at all as those 
in group two (born on or after January 1, 2000) will never 
attain an age -- minimum or otherwise -- when they will be able 
to purchase tobacco products from town retailers.  Because we 
conclude that the bylaw is not "inconsistent, contrary or 
conflicting" with the Statewide minimum age provision of the 
Tobacco Act, we need not resolve the parties' differing 
characterizations of the bylaw. 
 
17 The term "inconsistent" means "not compatible with 
another fact or claim."  Merriam Webster Collegiate Dictionary 
631 (11th ed. 2020).  "Contrary" means "a fact or condition 
incompatible with another."  Id. at 271.  "Conflicting" means 
"being in conflict, collision, or opposition."  Id. at 261. 
 
17 
 
B.  Compatibility of bylaw with act.  The retailers 
maintain that the bylaw is not compatible with the Statewide 
minimum age standard because it sets a different standard.  
Certainly, the retailers are correct insofar as if a local law 
permitted sales of tobacco products to persons under the 
Statewide minimum age of twenty-one, it would be incompatible 
with, and in opposition to, the Statewide standard.  Of course, 
the bylaw does no such thing.18  Instead, the bylaw leaves 
 
18 This conclusion is buttressed by the second clause of the 
first sentence of § 22, which provides additional guidance as to 
the type of local laws the Legislature considered to be 
"inconsistent, contrary or conflicting" and confirms that such 
laws include those that permit sales to persons younger than 
twenty-one years of age.  Specifically, the clause provides that 
the act does not preempt preexisting "inconsistent, contrary or 
conflicting" local laws that, despite the prior State standard 
of eighteen years, prohibited tobacco sales to persons aged 
nineteen, twenty, and twenty-one; thus, if a local community's 
preexisting law banned sales to persons in these age groups, 
those local laws continued to apply to persons already age 
eighteen on the act's effective date.  Accordingly, the 
Legislature understood that preexisting local laws relating to 
the minimum age to purchase tobacco products that are 
"inconsistent, contrary or conflicting" include those laws that 
set a lower minimum age than twenty-one years of age -- namely, 
nineteen or twenty years of age.  Such laws, the Legislature 
understood, otherwise would fall within the preemptive scope of 
the first clause of § 22; to preserve them, the Legislature 
created this carve-out. 
 
To be sure, the clause also exempts from preemption 
preexisting local laws setting the minimum age to purchase 
tobacco products at twenty-one years.  Obviously, a local law 
that mirrors the State standard of twenty-one is not 
inconsistent, contrary, or conflicting.  We do not construe the 
Legislature's reference to these preexisting laws to suggest 
that it understood such laws to be "inconsistent, contrary or 
 
18 
 
untouched the Statewide prohibition on sales to persons under 
the age of twenty-one and augments the prohibition to extend to 
all persons in group two.  In other words, the bylaw is more 
restrictive than the Statewide minimum age standard. 
In assessing whether this type of local law is incompatible 
with the Statewide standard, our decision in Take Five is 
instructive.  There, a company that had obtained State licenses 
to operate cigarette vending machines in Provincetown challenged 
a local ordinance banning the sale of cigarettes by machine.  
Take Five, 415 Mass. at 743.  Specifically, the company argued 
that a State statute, which only prohibited the vending machine 
sales of cigarettes to minors, preempted the local bylaw, which 
prohibited all such sales.  Id. at 746.  See G. L. c. 64C, § 10.  
We concluded that the local bylaw was not inconsistent with the 
statute; both restricted minors' access to cigarettes, and thus 
the "by-law does not detract from, but rather augments," the 
statute.  Take Five, supra.   
 
conflicting" with the Statewide minimum age standard.  Instead, 
the inclusion of preexisting local laws that set the minimum age 
at twenty-one was intended to preserve the status quo for 
persons who were already eighteen on the act's effective date 
but were precluded from purchasing tobacco products in local 
communities that had already set the minimum age to twenty-one.  
Absent the provision preserving such preexisting local laws, as 
discussed infra, sales to such eighteen year olds would be 
permitted pursuant to § 19. 
19 
 
Similarly, in Tri-Nel, 433 Mass. at 223-224, we considered 
whether a municipal regulation prohibiting smoking "in all food 
service establishments, lounges and bars" was preempted by a 
State statute, which only prohibited smoking in certain venues, 
including in restaurants of a certain seating capacity, other 
than in an area specifically designated as a smoking area.  See 
G. L. c. 270, § 22, inserted by St. 1987, c. 759, § 3.  
Concluding that the regulation was not preempted by the statute, 
we reasoned that the statute set forth "minimum Statewide 
restrictions on smoking in restaurants to protect and 
accommodate the nonsmoking public"; accordingly, the local 
regulation, which placed additional restrictions on smoking, was 
not inconsistent with the statute because it "further[ed], 
rather than frustrate[d], this intent."  Tri-Nel, supra at 224-
225.  
Here, the act prohibits sales to persons under the age of 
twenty-one.  That the bylaw goes further does not render it 
incompatible with the State statute; instead, the bylaw (like 
those in Take Five and Tri-Nel) augments the State statute by 
further limiting access to tobacco products to persons under the 
age of twenty-one.  See Oyster Creek Preservation, Inc. v. 
Conservation Comm'n of Harwich, 449 Mass. 859, 866 (2007) (where 
State "act establishes Statewide minimum wetlands protection 
standards, . . . local communities are free to impose more 
20 
 
stringent requirements").  Indeed, the Legislature expressly set 
forth its intent to continue to allow municipalities to play 
their traditional role in enacting local limitations on tobacco 
products sales, including entire prohibitions.  See St. 2018, 
c. 157, § 22.  Cf. Wendell, 394 Mass. at 529 (finding preemption 
where bylaw would add "[a]n additional layer of regulation" that 
"would prevent . . . the identifiable statutory purpose of 
having centralized, Statewide determination" of reasonable 
pesticide uses). 
The retailers contend that § 22's preemption of 
"inconsistent, contrary or conflicting" local bylaws and 
ordinances reflects the Legislature's intent to foreclose a 
"patchwork" of local laws, by preempting every "local by-law 
that references the minimum age for purchasing tobacco 
products."  But if eliminating all local enactments related to 
the minimum age to purchase tobacco products was the legislative 
aim, the inclusion of the phrase "inconsistent, contrary or 
conflicting" would be superfluous.19  See Commonwealth v. Moreau, 
 
19 In furtherance of their argument, the retailers rely on 
portions of the statements of two legislators, as well as a 
portion of a comment of the then Governor, as reported on a 
local news website.  Where, as here, the legislative intent is 
discernable from the plain language of the statute, we need not 
rely on the legislative history.  See Garcia v. Steele, 492 
Mass. 322, 326 (2023) ("[w]here the statutory command is 
straightforward, there is no reason to resort to legislative 
history" [quotation and citation omitted]).  Indeed, even if 
 
21 
 
 
resort to legislative history were apt, the culled portions of 
the statements of two of the over one hundred legislative 
"sponsors" of the act is not an appropriate "source from which 
to determine the intent of legislation."  Boston Water & Sewer 
Comm'n v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 408 Mass. 572, 578 (1990).  
 
Moreover, in their statements in support of the act, while 
the two legislators briefly referenced the existing local laws 
that already had raised the minimum age, they overwhelmingly 
focused on the health concerns from tobacco products, the 
correlation of early access to tobacco products and addiction, 
the need to address the tobacco industry's targeting of young 
persons with vaping products, and the costs to the economy of 
tobacco products.  See State House News Service (House Sess.), 
May 9, 2018 (statement of Rep. Kate Hogan, co-chair, Joint 
Committee on Public Health); State House News Service (Sen. 
Sess.), June 28, 2018 (statement of Sen. Jason Lewis, co-chair, 
Joint Committee on Public Health).  No review of the available 
legislative history supports the conclusion advocated by the 
retailers that the purpose of the act was to protect merchants 
from local action.  See State House News Service (House Sess.), 
May 9, 2018 (statement of Rep. Paul McMurtry) (act has "three 
life-saving components":  raising minimum sales age of tobacco 
to twenty-one, prohibiting tobacco sales in pharmacies, and 
aligning e-cigarettes with smoke-workplace laws).  Indeed, the 
two legislators highlighted the leading role that municipalities 
had played in protecting young persons from the dangers of 
tobacco products; they did not indicate an intent to prevent 
future local action.  See Statement of Rep. Hogan, supra ("More 
than 170 cities and towns have led the way . . ." [emphasis 
added]); Statement of Sen. Lewis, supra ("local boards of health 
have a lot of authority to enact regulations" and "[i]n many 
ways this is very positive").  See also Lazlo L. v. 
Commonwealth, 482 Mass. 325, 333 n.13 (2019) (we do not consider 
legislators' statements when parties "paint an incomplete 
picture of the intent behind a particular act by 'cherry 
picking' statements of various legislators").  Similarly, the 
news website that reported on the Governor's comments when he 
signed the act noted that he simultaneously acknowledged his 
support for local action, as opposed to Statewide measures.  See 
Massachusetts Raises Statewide Tobacco Buying Age to 21, 
MassLive (July 27, 2018), https://www.masslive.com/politics 
/2018/07/massachusetts_raises_statewide.html [https://perma.cc 
/BA8S-LFRW] ("Baker acknowledged that he is typically a 
supporter of local control.  In this case, more than 170 
 
22 
 
490 Mass. 387, 389 (2022), quoting Wolfe v. Gormally, 440 Mass. 
699, 704 (2004) ("a statute [must] be construed so that effect 
is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous").   
C.  Section 19.  The retailers' reliance on § 19 of the act 
fares no better.  Section 19 provides that 
"the prohibition [of the Tobacco Act] on sales of tobacco 
products to persons under the age of [twenty-one] shall not 
prohibit such sales to persons who attained the age of 
[eighteen] before December 31, 2018; provided, however, 
notwithstanding [§] 22, that a person who attained the age 
of [eighteen] before December 31, 2018 shall be subject to 
any municipal ordinance, by-law or other regulation that 
prohibited sales of tobacco products to persons under the 
age of [nineteen, twenty, or twenty-one] in effect on 
December 30, 2018" (emphasis added). 
 
St. 2018, c. 157, § 19.  Section 19 sets forth the legislative 
intent to exempt from the act's Statewide minimum age 
prohibition sales to persons who were able to purchase tobacco 
products prior to the act so long as such sales were not 
prohibited by preexisting local laws.  The phrase 
"notwithstanding [§] 22" reflects the Legislature's 
understanding that local laws relating to the minimum age to 
purchase tobacco products that are "inconsistent, contrary or 
conflicting" include those laws that set a lower minimum age 
than twenty-one years.  Such laws, the Legislature understood, 
 
municipalities already raised the tobacco purchase age above 
[eighteen]"). 
 
23 
 
otherwise would fall within the preemptive scope of the first 
clause of § 22; to preserve them, the Legislature created this 
carve-out. 
The retailers maintain that § 19 contemplates that "even 
local by-laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco to persons under 
the age of twenty-one -- seemingly consistent with the [a]ct -- 
are preempted by [§] 22."  The conclusion is unsupported.  As 
discussed in note 18, supra,20 a local law that mirrors the State 
standard of twenty-one obviously is not "inconsistent, contrary 
or conflicting" with the age standard of twenty-one set by the 
act.  We decline the retailers' invitation to conclude that the 
Legislature believed otherwise.  See Chelsea Hous. Auth. v. 
McLaughlin, 482 Mass. 579, 594 (2019), quoting Attorney Gen. v. 
School Comm. of Essex, 387 Mass. 326, 336 (1982) ("[w]e assume 
the Legislature intended to act reasonably"). 
Instead, it is evident that the Legislature referenced 
preexisting local laws that set the minimum age at twenty-one in 
§ 19 to ensure that the act did not change the status quo for 
persons who were already eighteen on the act's effective date 
but were precluded from purchasing tobacco products in local 
 
20 Section 19 echoes the second clause of the first sentence 
of § 22, related to the Legislature's intent not to preempt 
certain preexisting local laws as applied to persons who were 
eighteen years of age at the time of the act's effective date.  
See note 18, supra. 
 
24 
 
communities that had already set the minimum age to twenty-one.  
Without reference to preexisting local laws barring the sale of 
tobacco products to those under the age of twenty-one years, the 
initial provision of § 19, which states that the act's Statewide 
minimum age provision "shall not prohibit such sales to persons 
who attained the age of [eighteen] before December 31, 2018," 
could have eviscerated those preexisting local protections.  
Section 19's reference to § 22 is significant to our analysis 
not because it refers to preexisting local ordinances and bylaws 
setting a minimum age of twenty-one, but because it reiterates 
the Legislature's understanding that "inconsistent, contrary or 
conflicting" local laws in the preemption provision of § 22 
include those local laws that set a minimum age to purchase such 
products at less than twenty-one years. 
In view of the foregoing and the "considerable latitude" 
municipalities are afforded in crafting local rules, § 22 is not 
the type of "clear" expression of the Legislature's intent 
necessary to preclude local action.  That the bylaw "augments" 
the protections available Statewide pursuant to the minimum age 
provision does not render it "inconsistent, contrary or 
conflicting" with that provision.  Instead, as expressly 
permitted by the second sentence of § 22, the bylaw is the type 
of local measure that "limits or prohibits the purchase of 
tobacco products."  St. 2018, c. 157, § 22.  In short, the bylaw 
25 
 
is not in "sharp conflict" with the act's minimum age provision 
as required for a determination of preemption.  Bloom, 363 Mass. 
at 154. 
ii.  Implied preemption.  Finding no express preemption of 
the bylaw, we consider whether the act impliedly preempts the 
bylaw by frustrating the purpose of the act.  We conclude that 
it does not.   
The Legislature's intent, as its title reflects, was to 
"protect[] youth from the health risks of tobacco and nicotine 
addiction."  St. 2018, c. 157.  Toward that end, the act 
prohibits sales to those under twenty-one years of age, aiming 
to restrict the sale of tobacco products and to limit access to 
those products by persons under twenty-one.21  Other provisions 
of the act reflect a legislative intent to protect against the 
harmful effects of tobacco products and restrict the purchase 
 
21 The retailers claim that the purpose of the Tobacco Act 
was "actually to benefit tobacco retailers . . . by eliminating 
the confusion that arises when the minimum age for purchasing 
tobacco varies from town to town and city to city across the 
Commonwealth."  To the contrary, the act reflects the 
legislative intent to protect young persons and other vulnerable 
populations from the deleterious health effects of tobacco 
product use.  See note 22, infra.  Moreover, the Legislature 
expressly permitted local communities to limit and to ban 
tobacco product sales altogether, St. 2018, c. 157, § 22, hardly 
evincing an intent to "benefit" tobacco retailers. 
 
26 
 
and use of tobacco generally, and especially by youth and other 
vulnerable populations.22  
The bylaw furthers these purposes.  Over time, the bylaw 
broadens the separation between those under twenty-one years of 
age and those to whom tobacco products may be sold in the town, 
eventually banning sales of such products in the town 
altogether.  In other words, the group two cohort will have less 
access to tobacco products because it is likely that fewer 
individuals in their social circles will be able to purchase 
tobacco, reducing the likelihood that persons in group two will 
begin to use such products in the first instance.  See Town of 
Brookline, Reports of the Select Board and Advisory Committee on 
the Articles in the Warrant for the Special Town Meeting (Nov. 
17, 2020) (bylaw "helps to prevent the future targeting of not 
 
22 The act prohibits the sale of tobacco by health care 
institutions and retail pharmacies, St. 2018, c. 157, § 8, and 
prohibits the use of tobacco on school grounds and by nursing 
home employees in patient care areas, id. at §§ 4, 7.  It also 
establishes a special legislative commission to "study the 
potential negative health effects of using different e-cigarette 
devices" and to "develop[] best practices for restricting the 
use of e-cigarette devices in and near schools."  Id. at § 21. 
 
The act also prohibits manufacturers and retailers from 
distributing free samples of tobacco products in retail or other 
commercial establishments, id. at § 9; requires retailers to 
conspicuously post a notice indicating the minimum sales age of 
twenty-one, id. at § 18; requires child-resistant packaging for 
liquid nicotine, id. at § 13; and allows the commissioner of 
public health to "promulgate regulations to restrict the sale of 
tobacco products to persons under the age of [twenty-one]," id. 
at § 17. 
27 
 
only underage users but the extended social circle that can 
possibly provide increased access").  Also, as the market base 
for tobacco products in the town shrinks, the economic 
incentives to sell the products in the town reduce.  See 
Prohibition Juice Co. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 45 
F.4th 8, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2022) ("Businesses seeking to make a 
profit selling tobacco products . . . face powerful economic 
incentives to reach younger customers").  In brief, the 
legislative purpose of the minimum age provision of the act -- 
namely, to prohibit sales to those under twenty-one years of age 
-- can be achieved in the face of the local law.  See, e.g., 
Tri-Nel, 433 Mass. at 224-225 (where State statute "sets forth 
minimum Statewide restrictions on smoking in restaurants to 
protect and accommodate the nonsmoking public," local "ban 
placing additional restrictions on smoking furthers, rather than 
frustrates, this intent").   
The retailers maintain that the bylaw would frustrate the 
purported aim of § 19 to preserve the right to purchase tobacco 
products for those who were able to do so under the prior State 
and local law.23  But this misapprehends § 19.  That provision 
 
 
23 The bylaw went into effect on August 27, 2021.  The 
town's previous bylaw prohibited sales of tobacco products to 
minors.  See note 8, supra.  Therefore, as of the effective date 
of the act, December 31, 2018, retailers in the town were not 
prohibited from selling tobacco products to some individuals in 
 
28 
 
only provides that the act itself would not preclude merchants 
from continuing to sell to those who had already turned eighteen 
years of age at the time of the effective date.  Section 19 says 
nothing about the authority of cities and towns to limit the 
sale of tobacco products to those who had already turned 
eighteen.  Indeed, as discussed supra, § 22 of the act expressly 
allows localities to prohibit tobacco sales in full, including 
to those who had already turned eighteen.  For these reasons, 
the act does not expressly or impliedly preempt the bylaw.24 
 
b.  Equal protection.  We next consider whether the bylaw 
violates the equal protection guarantees of the State 
 
group two -- namely, persons born in 2000.  After the bylaw went 
into effect, the retailers could no longer sell tobacco products 
to these persons. 
 
 
24 The retailers marshal no argument that the bylaw's 
signage requirement is preempted that differs from their 
arguments related to the act's Statewide minimum age provision; 
as such, their challenge to the bylaw's signage requirements 
also fails.  Moreover, the act does not expressly preempt local 
laws pertaining to signage.  See St. 2018, c. 157, § 18.  The 
bylaw's signage requirements do not frustrate the purpose of the 
State signage requirement.  Compliance with the bylaw's signage 
requirement does not prevent sellers from complying with State 
regulations.  Compare 105 Code Mass. Regs. § 665.015(A) 
(requiring sign to include copy of act, referral information for 
smoking cessation resources, statement that sale to those under 
twenty-one is prohibited, health warnings, and statement on 
flavored tobacco ban), with § 8.23.5(H) of the town's bylaw 
(requiring sign to state that "[t]he sale of tobacco or 
e-cigarette products to someone born on or after 1/1/2000 is 
prohibited"). 
29 
 
Constitution.25  The retailers argue that the bylaw discriminates 
on the basis of birth year, which they contend requires 
application of a heightened level of scrutiny.26  We disagree. 
The bylaw neither burdens a fundamental right27 nor 
discriminates based upon a suspect classification.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 487 Mass. 770, 777 (2021), cert. 
denied, 142 S. Ct. 831 (2022); Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. 
Connector Auth., 459 Mass. 655, 663 (2011), S.C., 461 Mass. 232 
 
 
 
25 Article 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as 
amended by art. 106 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts 
Constitution, states in full,  
 
"All people are born free and equal and have certain 
natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may 
be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives 
and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting 
property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their 
safety and happiness.  Equality under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or 
national origin." 
 
Other articles of the Massachusetts Constitution also provide 
equal protection guarantees.  See Finch v. Commonwealth Health 
Ins. Connector Auth., 459 Mass. 655, 668 (2011), S.C., 461 Mass. 
232 (2012), citing arts. 6, 7, and 10 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights. 
 
26 The retailers alternatively ask us to apply "enhanced 
rational basis" review, an "intermediate level of judicial 
scrutiny," or "heightened rational basis review." 
 
27 The retailers rightly do not argue that the purchase of 
tobacco products, or the sale thereof, is a fundamental right.  
See Kligler v. Attorney Gen., 491 Mass. 38, 58 (2022), quoting 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015) (fundamental 
rights under State Constitution are "interests of the person so 
fundamental that the State must accord them its respect"). 
30 
 
(2012).  The bylaw does not target "a prototypical example of 
[a] 'discrete and insular" minority,'" Finch, supra at 674-675, 
quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 375-376 (1971), 
or a "historically disadvantaged or unpopular" group, 
Massachusetts v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 
682 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 570 U.S. 931 
(2013). 
To the contrary, many of those within group two -- the 
class of persons born on or after January 1, 2000 -- can vote, 
including in favor of a new tobacco bylaw if they wish.  Cf. 
Finch, 459 Mass. at 675 n.20 ("[l]ack of the franchise is a 
substantial, although certainly not the sole, concern underlying 
the rule that classification on the basis of alienage is 
generally suspect").  Those who cannot -- minors -- 
traditionally have been subject to protections society deems 
appropriate for our children.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 10, § 29 
(minors cannot purchase lottery tickets); G. L. c. 159A, § 9 
(minors cannot drive common carrier vehicles for hire).  Indeed, 
State and local laws prohibiting sales of tobacco products to 
these nonvoting members of group two have long been in place. 
See G. L. c. 270, § 6 (b), as appearing in St. 1985, c. 345.  
Accordingly, we decline the retailers' invitation to apply a 
heightened level of scrutiny to the bylaw.  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Freeman, 472 Mass. 503, 506 (2015) (no heightened scrutiny for 
31 
 
classification based on date of arraignment); English v. New 
England Med. Ctr., Inc., 405 Mass. 423, 428 (1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990) (no heightened scrutiny for statute 
that limits damages for tort victims of charitable 
institutions).   
Instead, we consider whether the bylaw "is rationally 
related to the furtherance of a legitimate [S]tate interest" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Roman, 489 Mass. 81, 86 
(2022).  Here, the town clearly has a legitimate interest; 
indeed, "we have previously recognized the ill effects of 
tobacco use, particularly when it involves minors, as a 
legitimate municipal health concern justifying municipal 
regulation of tobacco products."  Tri-Nel, 433 Mass. at 222.  
See Take Five, 415 Mass. at 748 (concluding that town bylaw 
prohibiting sale of cigarettes by vending machine is rationally 
related to "serious public health concerns" such as "[k]eeping 
young people from smoking").  See also Food & Drug Admin. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) 
("tobacco use, particularly among children and adolescents, 
poses perhaps the single most significant threat to public 
health in the United States").  The retailers do not suggest 
otherwise. 
The retailers contend that the birthdate cutoff of January 
1, 2000, is arbitrary and thus not rationally related to the 
32 
 
town's legitimate interest.  We disagree.  Line drawing –- a 
legislative necessity -- does not, without more, make a law 
unconstitutional.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 
(2005) (line drawing "is subject, of course, to the objections 
always raised against categorical rules," but "a line must be 
drawn").  The bylaw's birthdate classification, starting in the 
year 2000, is rationally related to the town's legitimate 
interest in mitigating tobacco use overall and in particular by 
minors.  Few individuals in group two could purchase tobacco 
products prior to the bylaw's enactment.28  Grouping this subset 
of young adults with minors, who could not purchase tobacco 
products under the preexisting law, rationally relates to 
curbing minors' use of tobacco products because, inter alia, the 
young adults are closer in age to minors.  This, in turn, the 
town could conclude rationally, might limit access to tobacco 
products by younger persons.  Also, these young adults within 
group two, because they only recently were able to purchase 
tobacco products, might not have yet formed addictive habits.  
The bylaw also is a rational alternative to an immediate and 
outright ban on sales of all tobacco products, preserving in-
town sales to those in group one who may already suffer from 
addiction.  And it provides sellers time to adjust to revenue 
 
 
28 See note 23, supra. 
33 
 
losses that stem from shrinking tobacco product sales.  For 
these reasons, the bylaw does not violate the guarantees of 
equal protection. 
 
Judgment affirmed.