Case Title: WENDELL JACKSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0048

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
WENDELL JACKSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 82209 P.3d 897Case Number: S-08-0048Decided: 06/19/2009
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
WENDELL 
JACKSON,

 
 
Appellant

 
 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

 
 
(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 
 
The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. 
Alden, Senior Assistant Public Defender.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristin Shaun Wilkerson, 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Wendell 
Jackson appeals from an Order Revoking Probation and Imposing Sentence.  He contends that the district court 
erred in failing to award credit against his sentence for the time he spent in 
jail awaiting resolution of the Petition to Revoke Probation.  We conclude that Mr. Jackson was 
entitled to credit against his sentence.  
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for modification of Mr. Jackson's 
sentence.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]        
Is 
Mr. Jackson entitled to credit against his sentence for time spent in jail 
pending resolution of the Petition to Revoke Probation?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Mr. 
Jackson was charged with one count of Possession of a Weapon with Unlawful 
Intent in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103 (LexisNexis 2007), one count of 
Aggravated Assault and Battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii), and two counts of Kidnapping in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
6-2-201(a)(iii), (b)(i).  Mr. Jackson and the State entered 
into a plea agreement.  Mr. Jackson 
agreed to plead no contest to the charge of Possession of a Weapon with Unlawful 
Intent.  That crime carries a 
maximum sentence of "imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103.1  In exchange for Mr. Jackson's plea, the 
State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges.  Both parties agreed to a sentence of 
three to five years incarceration, suspended in favor of three years of 
probation.  The district court 
accepted Mr. Jackson's plea.  The 
court entered a judgment and sentence imposing the agreed upon three to five 
year sentence.  The court suspended 
the sentence and placed Mr. Jackson on probation.  

 
 

[¶4]        
Four 
months later, the State filed a petition to revoke Mr. Jackson's probation. 
 The accompanying affidavit alleged 
five violations of the terms of probation: termination of his employment, two 
urine samples testing positive for cocaine and benzoylecgonine (a cocaine 
metabolite), failure to attend substance abuse counseling, and absconding from 
supervision.  A warrant was issued 
for Mr. Jackson's arrest.  He was 
arrested on July 9, 2007.  On August 
3, 2007, Mr. Jackson entered a plea admitting that he had violated the terms of 
his probation by absconding from supervision.  He requested that the district court 
delay disposition and make referrals to several community corrections programs 
and an intensive supervision program.  
The State did not object to the request.  The district court entered an order 
revoking probation but delayed taking further action until learning whether Mr. 
Jackson was accepted into any of the treatment programs.  Mr. Jackson waived his right to 
speedy disposition pending admission decisions from those 
programs.

 
 

[¶5]        
Mr. 
Jackson was denied admission to all of the programs and a dispositional hearing 
was held on October 26, 2007.  At 
the hearing, defense counsel requested that Mr. Jackson receive credit for all 
of the time he spent in jail pending resolution of the probation revocation 
proceedings.  The State opposed any 
credit award.  On November 26, 2007, 
the district court entered its Order Revoking Probation and Imposing Sentence. 
 The district court ordered that Mr. 
Jackson receive credit for 55 days of the 109 he spent in jail pending probation 
revocation.  The court imposed the 
underlying sentence of three to five years of incarceration, subject to that 
credit.  Mr. Jackson 
appeals.

 
 
Standard 
of review

 
 

[¶6]        
Sentencing 
decisions are normally within the discretion of the trial court.  Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 2003).  "Such 
discretion is limited, however, inasmuch as a court may not enter an illegal 
sentence.  A sentence is illegal if 
it violates the constitution or other law."  In re CT, 2006 WY 101, ¶ 8, 140 P.3d 643, 646 (Wyo. 2006) (internal case citation omitted).  Whether a sentence is illegal is a 
question of law, which we review de 
novo.  Manes v. State, 2007 WY 6, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 179, 181 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
Discussion

 
 

[¶7]        
Mr. 
Jackson pled no contest to violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103.  The maximum sentence that may be imposed 
for conviction of that crime is five years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103.  A sentence that exceeds the statutory 
maximum is illegal.  E.g., Ayers v. State, 949 P.2d 469, 470 (Wyo. 
1997).  A defendant's sentence may 
not be increased as a result of events that occur after the initial sentencing 
and the revocation of probation.  See Yates v. State, 792 P.2d 187, 192 (Wyo. 
1990); Wlodarczyk v. State, 836 P.2d 279 (Wyo. 1992), overruled on other 
grounds by Daugherty v. State, 2002 WY 52, ¶ 26, 44 P.3d 28, 37 (Wyo. 
2002).  Mr. Jackson was sentenced to 
the maximum sentence of five years.  
He was also sentenced to a minimum term of three years.2  He asserts that he should receive credit 
against his maximum sentence for the time spent in custody pending resolution of 
the petition to revoke his probation because the pre-revocation time3 is attributable to the underlying 
crime.  He contends that failure to 
award credit resulted in a sentence that exceeded the maximum permitted by the 
statute.  Although he does not argue 
this point, if Mr. Jackson correctly reasons that his maximum sentence increased 
as a result of the failure to receive credit, his minimum sentence also 
increased.  This would be an 
impermissible increase in his minimum sentence as a result of events occurring 
after his initial sentencing.  See Yates, 792 P.2d  at 192; Wlodarczyk, 836 P.2d  at 
292.

 
 

[¶8]        
The 
State, relying upon our decision in Halbleib v. State, 7 P.3d 45, 49 (Wyo. 
2000), contends that Mr. Jackson was not entitled to any credit against his 
original sentence because the incarceration pending probation revocation 
proceedings was not "directly attributable" to the underlying criminal 
charge.  Mr. Jackson does not 
dispute the State's interpretation of Halbleib.  Instead, he asks us to revisit that 
decision and overrule it.  He 
contends that, in appropriate circumstances, a defendant should be awarded 
credit against his original sentence for time spent in custody awaiting 
disposition of revocation proceedings.  
He contends that his incarceration is "directly attributable" to the 
underlying criminal charge.

 
 

[¶9]        
In 
Halbleib, we recognized the general 
principle that a defendant must receive credit for all time spent in custody 
that is directly attributable to the underlying criminal charge.  We went further, however, and held that, 
as a matter of law, time spent in custody awaiting revocation proceedings can 
never be attributable to the underlying offense.  We stated:

 
 
[The 
defendant is not entitled] to credit for confinement which is attributable to 
acts or omissions separate and apart from those for which he was originally 
convicted and received a sentence of probation.  The time served while awaiting a 
revocation hearing is not directly attributable to a criminal charge.  Rather it is solely due to the violation 
of the conditions of probation.

 
 
For 
the probationer awaiting a probation revocation hearing, until the trial court 
revokes the suspension of the execution of his sentence, the probationer is not 
serving time on that sentence.  The 
time spent awaiting the revocation is not the "punishment" which implicates 
double jeopardy concerns.  Rather it 
is time spent on an administrative hold because of the alleged probation 
violation. . . .  

 
 
[W]e 
hold that incarceration pending probation revocation proceedings is 
qualitatively different from presentence incarceration and from incarceration 
which is a condition of probation.

 
 

Id.

 
 

[¶10]     
Mr. 
Jackson takes issue with our observation that incarceration pending probation 
revocation is "qualitatively different" from other forms of incarceration for 
which credit must be awarded.  As 
Mr. Jackson has pointed out, the distinction is not obvious.  At least one court has recognized that, 
to a person held by the State, the deprivation of liberty is the same regardless 
of whether it is intended to be punitive.

 
 
We 
find no merit in the argument sometimes advanced that presentence jail time 
should not be credited because it is not "punishment."  Whatever it may be called, it is 
certainly a deprivation of liberty, which, in itself, is punishment to most 
human beings.  We should not like to 
try to convince those held in such confinement, along with those undergoing 
punishment, of the soundness of such an argument.  We reject it, as other courts have.  In re Young, 32 Cal. App. 3d 68, 107 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1973); Parker v. 
Bounds, 329 F. Supp. 1400 (D.C.N.C. 1971).

 
 

Smith 
v. State, 
508 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Ark. 1974).  We 
agree.  Put simply, a day in jail is 
a day in jail, and our holding in Halbleib did not implicate the nature of 
the incarceration.  Our 
"qualitatively different" reference was intended to help distinguish between 
incarceration that was directly attributable to the underlying offense and 
required credit against the sentence, and incarceration that results from a 
violation of probation.

 
 

[¶11]     
We 
concluded in Halbleib that detention 
following a probation violation is solely attributable to the act that violates 
probation, and not to the underlying criminal charge.  7 P.3d  at 49.  Mr. Jackson's case leads us to question 
that conclusion.  Certainly there 
are situations where the incarceration is directly attributable to the act that 
violates the conditions of probation rather than the underlying criminal 
charge.  The most obvious are those 
situations where a defendant is arrested and charged with committing a new 
crime.  But there are also 
circumstances where a defendant is alleged to have violated probation conditions 
by committing acts that are not otherwise criminal.  For example, probationers are frequently 
barred from leaving a defined geographic location, drinking alcohol, contacting 
the victim of the underlying crime, and so on.  Violating these conditions may be the 
direct cause of the probationer's detention, but it is indisputable that the 
State would be unable to incarcerate the probationer for these acts absent the 
conviction for the underlying crime.  
Under those circumstances, we are forced to conclude that pre-revocation 
incarceration is attributable to the underlying crime.

 
 

[¶12]     
This 
conclusion undermines our holding in Halbleib.  Although stare decisis is necessary for the 
orderly development of the law, we do not blindly adhere to its principles.  Borns v. Voss, 2003 WY 74, ¶¶ 25-27, 70 P.3d 262, 271-72 (Wyo. 2003).  We 
depart from our precedent when necessary to promote plain principles of law and 
to remedy obvious injustice.  Id., ¶ 26, at 271.  We do so now, and hold that credit for 
time served awaiting probation revocation may be attributable to the underlying 
criminal charge in appropriate circumstances. 
 To 
the extent that any prior opinion holds otherwise, it is expressly 
overruled.  

 
 

[¶13]     
Where 
pre-revocation time is attributable to the underlying criminal charge, credit 
must be awarded against the underlying sentence.4  Failure to award this credit effectively 
and impermissibly increases both the minimum and maximum sentence as a result of 
events occurring after the initial sentencing.  In some cases, failure to award this 
credit results in a sentence that exceeds the statutory 
maximum.

 
 

[¶14]     
We 
must now consider whether Mr. Jackson's pre-revocation time served was 
attributable to the underlying offense.  
The sole reason for Mr. Jackson's detention was the accusation that he 
violated one or more conditions of his probation.  Although some allegations in the 
petition would be independent criminal activity if proven, Mr. Jackson was never 
charged with a separate criminal offense as a result of the facts alleged in the 
petition to revoke his probation.  
The only allegation resolved in the State's favor was that Mr. Jackson 
absconded from supervision.  Under 
the undisputed facts of this case, we conclude that the 109 days that Mr. 
Jackson was detained pending resolution of the State's petition to revoke his 
probation were served as a result of the underlying criminal conviction.  Mr. Jackson received credit for only 55 
days of that time.  Accordingly, we 
find that Mr. Jackson must also receive credit, against both his minimum and 
maximum sentence, for the additional 54 days that he was incarcerated pending 
resolution of the petition to revoke his probation.

 
 

[¶15]     
Reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103 states:

 
 
A 
person who knowingly possesses, manufactures, transports, repairs or sells a 
deadly weapon with intent to unlawfully threaten the life or physical well-being 
of another or to commit assault or inflict bodily injury on another is guilty of 
a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-201 provides that a sentencing court 

 
 
shall 
establish a maximum and minimum term within the limits authorized for the 
statute violated.  The maximum term 
shall not be greater than the maximum provided by law for the statute violated, 
and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum provided by law for the 
statute violated, nor greater than ninety percent (90%) of the maximum term 
imposed.

 
 

3For 
the sake of brevity, we refer to the time a defendant spends in custody between 
arrest and disposition of a petition to revoke probation as "pre-revocation 
time."

 
 

4This 
holding is consistent with the statutes and case law from other 
jurisdictions.  Some states 
statutorily require credit for pre-revocation time served.  E.g., Ala. Code § 15-22-54(d)(3); N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 15-196.1 (2008); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1206(8) 
(2008).  Courts generally find that 
pre-revocation time should be credited to the underlying sentence when the 
defendant is jailed solely for violating conditions of release, as opposed to 
also being charged with a separate criminal offense.  E.g., People v. Young, 779 N.E.2d 293, 301 
(Ill. App. 1 Dist. 2002); State v. 
Allen, 172 P.3d 1150, 1152 (Idaho App. 2007); Padilla v. State, 697 S.W.2d 522, 524 
(Tx. App. El. Paso 1985); People v. 
Myles, 702 P.2d 292, 293 (Colo. App. 1985).