Case Title: Ex parte TitleMax of Georgia, Inc., and TMX Finance LLC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1200128

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: May 21, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1200128
____________________
Ex parte TitleMax of Georgia, Inc., and TMX Finance LLC
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Phallon Billingsley
v.
TitleMax of Alabama, Inc., et al.)
(Talladega Circuit Court, CV-19-900591)
BOLIN, Justice.
TitleMax of Georgia, Inc., and its parent company, TMX Finance
LLC ("TMX"), petition this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the
Talladega Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to
1200128
dismiss them as parties to the underlying action commenced against them
and others by Phallon Billingsley and to enter an order dismissing them
from the action based on the trial court's lack of personal jurisdiction over
them.
Facts and Procedural History
This case involves the repossession of a 2005 Range Rover
automobile.  In December 2014, the individual who owned the vehicle at
that time allegedly entered  into a "pawn ticket" agreement with TitleMax
of Georgia pursuant to which the owner borrowed money from TitleMax
of Georgia and provided TitleMax of Georgia a security interest in the
vehicle. 
On January 16, 2016, Billingsley, an Alabama resident, purchased
the vehicle from a dealer in Georgia, with financing from Coosa Pines
Federal Credit Union ("Coosa Credit"), and received a certificate of good
title.    After a "perceived" default on the "pawn ticket" agreement by the
person who had owned the vehicle in December 2014, TitleMax of Georgia
authorized a vehicle-repossession company to take possession of the
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vehicle when it was located in Virginia on June 21, 2019.      TitleMax of
Georgia asked Insurance Auto Auctions Corp. ("IAA") to sell the vehicle. 
At the time of repossession, the vehicle had a valid Alabama license
tag.    On June 21, 2019, IAA  received the vehicle.    IAA subsequently
listed the vehicle for sale on its Web site, identifying  TMX as the owner
of the vehicle.   On July 1, 2019, TitleMax of Georgia received notice from
Coosa Credit that Billingsley was the owner of the vehicle.    On July 8,
2019, Coosa Credit received a letter from TitleMax of Georgia notifying 
it that TitleMax of Georgia would withhold selling the vehicle pending
further investigation.  That letter was signed by a paralegal employed by
TMX.
From July 1, 2019, to September 6, 2019, TMX, on behalf of
TitleMax of Georgia, communicated with Coosa Credit regarding the
vehicle.  On   November 1, 2019, the paralegal employed by TMX
contacted Attention to Detail Transportation, LLC, about transporting the
vehicle from Yorktown, Virginia, to Sylacauga, Alabama, so that the
vehicle could be returned to Billingsley.  On November 21, 2019,  TitleMax
of Georgia, through TMX's paralegal, authorized IAA to release the
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vehicle to Attention to Detail for transport to Alabama.   On November 25,
2019, Attention to Detail sent TMX a bill for $1,600 for transporting the
vehicle.    When Billingsley received the vehicle, it was damaged and
inoperable.  It is unclear when the damage to the vehicle occurred.    
On November 27, 2019, Billingsley sued TitleMax of Alabama, Inc., 
IAA, Coosa Credit, and other fictitiously named defendants.    She
asserted claims of  conversion, negligence, and wantonness against IAA
and TitleMax of Alabama and a claim of negligence against Coosa Credit. 
TitleMax of Alabama  filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court
granted on March 2, 2020.   Billingsley filed an amended complaint on
March 18, 2020, adding TitleMax of Georgia as a defendant and
substituting TitleMax of Georgia as the party against whom the claims
originally asserted against  TitleMax of Alabama were being asserted.  
On April 24, 2020, TitleMax of Georgia filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P.   On
August 14, 2020, Billingsley  filed a second amended complaint and
substituted TMX for one of the fictitiously named defendants.    
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 On September 23, 2020, TitleMax and TMX filed a joint Rule
12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that 
neither TitleMax of Georgia nor TMX reside in Alabama and that neither
entity has a presence in Alabama.   They further argued that none of the
alleged events giving rise to the claims against them occurred in Alabama. 
In support of their motion, TitleMax of Georgia and TMX attached two
affidavits from a TMX employee.   
Specifically, TitleMax of Georgia and TMX argued that the trial 
court should dismiss them as parties to the action for lack of personal
jurisdiction because they (1) were not incorporated in Alabama and did
not have their  principal places of business in Alabama; (2) have never
maintained a registered agent for service of process in Alabama; (3) have
never owned any real estate, personal property, or other assets in
Alabama; (4) have never maintained any telephone, computer or server,
or any other electronic equipment in Alabama; (5) have never had a bank
account in Alabama; (6) have never borrowed any money (or applied to
borrow any money) from a bank in Alabama; (7) have never paid any taxes
in Alabama; and (8) have never purchased television or radio
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advertisements in Alabama to market themselves to Alabama residents. 
Consequently, TitleMax of Georgia and TMX argued that they did not
have continuous and systematic contacts with Alabama so as to support
general personal jurisdiction over them.
TitleMax of Georgia and TMX further argued that the trial court
lacked specific personal jurisdiction over them because neither TitleMax
of Georgia nor  TMX  did  business in Alabama.  TMX is a holding
company that does not engage in the business of consumer lending or
repossession, in Alabama or elsewhere.   They further argued that neither
IAA nor  Attention to Detail were  their agents and that they did not
reserve the right to control the manner in which IAA or Attention to
Detail transacted business.   
On October 7, 2020, Billingsley filed a response to TitleMax of
Georgia and TMX's joint motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court
had general personal jurisdiction over TMX.  She argued that TMX offers
title and personal loans through its subsidiaries operating under the trade
names TitleMax, TitleBucks, and InstaLoan and that TMX controls the
Web site www.titlemax.com, which advertises title-loan and title-pawn
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services and employment opportunities in Alabama.  Billingsley also
argued that TMX had been sued for its corporate conduct in Alabama. 
She attached a copy of a 2016 consent order issued by the federal
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regarding TMX, which arose from
complaints that TMX, while operating under the trade names TitleMax,
Title Bucks, and InstaLoan, allegedly engaged in abusive sales practices
in Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee.  Billingsley further relied on a
workers' compensation case pending in the Etowah Circuit Court in which
TMX was a defendant, had not contested personal jurisdiction, and was
participating in discovery.   Billingsley specifically argued that  TMX
"should not feign surprise when it is hauled into court in one of the 17
states where its agents and subsidiaries operate storefronts, like
Alabama, for its alleged misdeeds, when TMX ... directs, supervises, and
controls subsidiaries, employees and agents in these states and  derives
substantial benefits" therefrom. 
Billingsley also argued that the trial court had specific personal
jurisdiction over TitleMax of Georgia and TMX because, she asserted, an
agency relationship existed between those defendants and IAA and 
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Attention to Detail.   She argued that TitleMax of Georgia and TMX (1)
controlled IAA and directed IAA not to sell the vehicle but to continue
wrongfully possessing the vehicle, (2) directed and instructed IAA to
release the vehicle to Attention to Detail, and (3) directed Attention to
Detail to transport the vehicle to Alabama.   
On October 19, 2020, the trial court denied TitleMax of Georgia and
TMX's joint motion to dismiss.    They now seek mandamus review of that
decision. 
Standard of Review 
" '[A] petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper
device by which to challenge the denial of a motion
to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction. See
Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795 (Ala. 2001); Ex
parte Paul Maclean Land Servs., Inc., 613 So. 2d
1284, 1286 (Ala. 1993). " 'An appellate court
considers de novo a trial court's judgment on a
party's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.' " Ex parte Lagrone, 839 So. 2d 620,
623 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830
So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala. 2002)). Moreover, "[t]he
plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court's
personal jurisdiction over the defendant."  Daynard
v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole,
P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2002).'
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"Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr, Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C., 866
So. 2d 519, 525 (Ala. 2003).
" ' "In considering a Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ.
P., motion to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction, a court must consider as true the
allegations of the plaintiff's complaint not
controverted 
by 
the 
defendant's 
affidavits,
Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253
(11th Cir. 1996), and Cable/Home Communication
Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829
(11th Cir. 1990), and 'where the plaintiff's
complaint and the defendant's affidavits conflict,
the ... court must construe all reasonable inferences
in favor of the plaintiff.' Robinson, 74 F.3d at 255
(quoting Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th
Cir. 1990))." '
"Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck & Equip., Inc., 853 So. 2d
888, 894 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795,
798 (Ala. 2001)). However, if the defendant makes a prima
facie evidentiary showing that the Court has no personal
jurisdiction, 'the plaintiff is then required to substantiate the
jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by affidavits or
other competent proof, and he may not merely reiterate the
factual allegations in the complaint.' Mercantile Capital, LP v.
Federal Transtel, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala.
2002)(citing Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys.,
218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)). See also Hansen v.
Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D. 471, 474-75 (D. Del. 1995)
('When a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), and supports that motion with affidavits,
plaintiff is required to controvert those affidavits with his own
affidavits or other competent evidence in order to survive the
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1200128
motion.') (citing Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts,
Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984))."
Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229-30 (Ala. 2004).
Discussion
It is well settled that a nonresident defendant's physical presence in
Alabama is not a prerequisite to obtaining personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant.   In Ex parte McNeese Title, LLC, 82 So. 3d 670,
673 (Ala. 2011), this Court stated:
"Jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants is acquired
pursuant to Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which provides, in
pertinent part:
" 'An appropriate basis exists for service of process
outside of this state upon a person or entity in any
action in this state when the person or entity has
such contacts with this state that the prosecution
of the action against the person or entity in this
state is not inconsistent with the constitution of
this state or the Constitution of the United
States....'
"In other words, '[t]his rule extends the personal jurisdiction
of Alabama courts to the limit of due process under the United
States and Alabama Constitutions.' Hiller Invs., Inc. v.
Insultech Group, Inc., 957 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Ala. 2006).
Under this rule, the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate so
long as the out-of-state defendant has ' "some minimum
contacts with this state [so that] ... it is fair and reasonable to
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require  the person to come  to  this  state  to defend an
action." '  Dillon Equities v. Palmer & Cay, Inc., 501 So. 2d
459, 461 (Ala. 1986) (quoting former Rule 4.2(a)(2)(I), Ala. R.
Civ. P.)."
Because Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.,  extends the personal
jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the limits of due process, we must
determine whether the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
TitleMax of Georgia and/or TMX comports with due process.   Recently,
in Ex parte Bradshaw, [Ms.  1190765, Dec. 4, 2020]       So. 3d      ,      
(Ala. 2020), this Court set out the analysis to be used in determining
whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant satisfies the requirements of due process.
" 'The sufficiency of a party's contacts are assessed
as follows:
" ' " 'Two 
types 
of
contacts can form a basis for
personal 
jurisdiction:
general contacts and specific
contacts. General contacts,
which give rise to general
personal jurisdiction consist
of the defendant's contacts
with the forum state that
are unrelated to the cause of
action and that are both
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" c o n t i n u o u s  
a n d
systematic." 
Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 n.9, 415, 104 S.Ct. 1868,
80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984);
[citations omitted]. Specific
contacts, which give rise to
specific jurisdiction, consist
of the defendant's contacts
with the forum state that
are related to the cause of
action. Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
472-75, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85
L. 
Ed. 
2d 
528 
(1985).
Although 
the 
related
contacts 
need 
not 
be
continuous and systematic,
they must rise to such a
level 
as 
to 
cause 
the
defendant 
to 
anticipate
being haled into court in the
forum state. Id.'
" ' "Ex parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723
So. 2d 1263, 1266 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J.,
concurring in the result). ...
" ' "In the case of either general in
personam jurisdiction or specific in
personam 
jurisdiction, 
'[t]he
"substantial connection" between the
defendant 
and 
the 
forum 
state
necessary for a finding of minimum
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contacts must come about by an action
of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum State.' Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of
California, 480 U.S. 102, 112, 107 S. Ct.
1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987). This
purposeful-availment 
requirement
assures that a defendant will not be
haled into a jurisdiction as a result of
the ' "unilateral activity of another
person or a third person." '  Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174,
quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
417, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404
(1984)."
" 'In Burger King the United States
Supreme Court explained:
" ' "[I]t is essential in each
case that there be some act
by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of
its laws.
" ' "This 
purposeful
availment 
requirement
ensures that a defendant
will not be haled into a
jurisdiction 
solely 
as 
a
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result of random, fortuitous,
or attenuated contacts, or of
the unilateral activity of
another party or a third
person. 
Jurisdiction 
is
proper, however, where the
contacts proximately result
from 
actions 
by 
the
defendant 
himself 
that
create 
a 
substantial
connection with the forum
State. 
Thus 
where 
the
defendant deliberately has
engaged 
in 
significant
activities within a State, or
has 
created 
continuing
obligations between himself
and residents of the forum,
he manifestly has availed
himself of the privilege of
conducting business there,
and because his activities
are shielded by the benefits
and 
protections 
of 
the
fo rum's 
laws 
it  
is
p r e s u m p t i v e l y  
n o t
unreasonable to require him
to submit to the burdens of
litigation in that forum as
well."
" '471 U.S. at 475-76, 105 S. Ct. 2174
(internal 
quotations 
and 
citations
omitted).'
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"Ex parte Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 889 So.
2d 545, 550-51 (Ala. 2004).
"Further,
" ' "If there are substantial contacts with the
state, for example a substantial and continuing
business, and if the cause of action arises out of the
business done in the state, jurisdiction will be
sustained. If there are substantial contacts with
the state, but the cause of action does not arise out
of these contacts, jurisdiction may be sustained.
But if there is a minimum of contacts, and the
cause of action arises out of the contacts, it will
normally be fair and reasonable to sustain
jurisdiction. If there is a minimum of contacts and
the cause of action does not arise out of the
contacts, there will normally be no basis of
jurisdiction, since it is difficult to establish the
factors necessary to meet the fair and reasonable
test." '
"View-All, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., 435 So. 2d 1198, 1201
(Ala. 1983) (quoting 2 J. Moore, Federal Practice,¶ 4.25, pp.
4-258 through 4-267 (2d ed. 1982) (emphasis added))."
I. General Personal Jurisdiction
With the above-cited caselaw regarding personal jurisdiction in
mind, we begin our analysis by examining whether TMX had "continuous
and systematic contacts" with Alabama sufficient to support the exercise
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of general personal jurisdiction over it.1 Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984).  Before the trial
court,  Billingsley argued that, because TMX controlled the Web site
where its subsidiary, TitleMax of Alabama, offered services and
employment in Alabama, TMX had  continuous and systematic contacts
with Alabama even though the operation of that Web site did not give rise
to Billingsley's claims against TMX.   
"Doing business through a wholly owned subsidiary does
not, in and of itself, constitute doing business by the parent
corporation. Cf. Ex parte Baker, 432 So. 2d 1281 (Ala. 1983)
(comparing activities in Alabama of parent and subsidiary
corporations for purposes of determining venue); see also
Thompson v. Taracorp, Inc., 684 So. 2d 152, 158 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996) (concluding that trial court was correct in finding that
acts of subsidiary corporation in Alabama were insufficient to
impose personal jurisdiction over parent corporation)."  
 
Ex parte Unitrin, Inc., 920 So. 2d 557, 561 (Ala. 2005).    We cannot equate
TMX's control of the Web site that its subsidiary, TitleMax of Alabama,
used in its business operations with TMX's control of TitleMax of Alabama
1In response to TitleMax of Georgia and TMX's joint motion to
dismiss, Billingsley did not argue that the trial court had general personal
jurisdiction over TitleMax of Georgia. 
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for the purpose of determining whether the trial court had general 
personal jurisdiction over TMX.    The evidence before the trial court did
not show that TMX controlled the internal business operations and
decision-making of TitleMax of Alabama such that TitleMax of Alabama's
operations in Alabama should be imputed to TMX for the purpose of
determining whether the trial court had general personal jurisdiction over
TMX.  Cf.  Portera v. Winn Dixie of Montgomery, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 1418
(M.D. Ala. 1998)(applying Alabama's long-arm rule and holding that a
foreign corporation did not have sufficient contacts with Alabama to allow
the court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over the foreign
corporation in an action arising out of an employment dispute between the
plaintiff and the foreign corporation's Alabama subsidiary  even though
the foreign corporation owned the subsidiary, employed plaintiff, who was
also employed by the subsidiary, and furnished general personnel
guidelines to the subsidiary).  
Billingsley also relied on a consent order issued by the federal
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and TMX's participation in a
workers' compensation case pending in the Etowah Circuit Court as
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evidence of TMX's contacts with Alabama.  The consent order was  based
on allegations of abusive sales practices conducted in Alabama, Georgia,
and Tennessee, and, pursuant to the consent order, TMX, without
admitting wrongdoing,  agreed to operate under certain conditions set out
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.     Although TMX agreed
to the federal agency's conditions regarding future operations in Alabama,
the consent order applied not only to TMX, but also to "its TitleMax,
TitleBucks, and InstaLoan operating subsidiaries, parents, and their
respective successors and assigns."   The consent order does not prove that
TMX conducted the allegedly abusive sales practices in Alabama and,
thus, does not support a finding that TMX has sufficient contacts with
Alabama to subject  it to general personal jurisdiction in this State.  
In the workers' compensation action pending in the Etowah Circuit
Court, TMX is a defendant but did not challenge the court's personal
jurisdiction over it; however,  TMX did not avail itself of Alabama courts
as a plaintiff.  Cf., e.g., International Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotelladora
Agral Regionmontana S.A. de C.V., 277 F. Supp. 2d 654, 668 (N.D. Tex.
2002)("Under  Texas law, '[v]oluntarily filing a lawsuit in a jurisdiction is
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a purposeful availment of the jurisdiction's facilities and can subject a
party to personal jurisdiction in another lawsuit when the lawsuits arise
from the same general transaction.' Primera Vista S.P.R. de R.L. v. Banca
Serfin, S.A. Institucion de Banca Multiple Grupo Financiero Serfin, 974
S.W.2d 918, 926 (Tex.App. -- El Paso 1998, no pet.) (citing General
Contracting & Trading Co. v. Interpole, 940 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir.1991))."). 
It may be that Billingsley's argument regarding TMX's participation
in the case pending in the Etowah Circuit Court is based on principles of
judicial estoppel. However, the principles of judicial estoppel do not apply
to bar TMX from challenging an Alabama court's jurisdiction over it, even
though TMX apparently waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction in
the Etowah Circuit Court  case.   Judicial estoppel applies to preclude a
party from assuming a position in a legal proceeding that is clearly
inconsistent with a position that party has previously asserted in a
separate legal proceeding, such that judicial acceptance of the inconsistent
position in the later proceeding would create the perception that either
the first or the second court has been misled.  Ex parte First Alabama
Bank, 883 So. 2d 1236 (Ala. 2003).  We cannot say that TMX's waiving a
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challenge to personal jurisdiction in the Etowah Circuit Court case is
inconsistent with its position in this case when the circumstances out of
which the Etowah Circuit Court case arose are indisputably distinct from
those that form the basis of this action.   
TMX's general contacts with Alabama, which are unrelated to the
claims against TMX, are insufficient to give the trial court in this case
general personal jurisdiction over TMX.   
II. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
Billingsley next argued that the trial court had specific personal
jurisdiction over TitleMax of Georgia and TMX because, Billingsley
asserted, TitleMax of Georgia and TMX purposefully availed themselves
of the privilege of conducting activities in Alabama through their agents,
IAA and Attention to Detail.  The United States Supreme Court, in
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 135 n.13 (2014), explained:
"Agency relationships, we have recognized, may be
relevant to the existence of specific jurisdiction. '[T]he
corporate personality,' International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945), observed, 'is a fiction, although a fiction
intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact.'  Id., at 316. 
See generally 1 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of
Corporations § 30, p. 30 (Supp. 2012-2013) ('A corporation is a
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1200128
distinct legal entity that can act only through its agents.'). As
such, a corporation can purposefully avail itself of a forum by
directing its agents or distributors to take action there. See,
e.g., Asahi [Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California,
Solano Cnty.], 480 U.S. [102], at 112 [(1987)] (opinion of
O'Connor, J.) (defendant's act of 'marketing [a] product
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales
agent in the forum State' may amount to purposeful
availment); International Shoe, 326 U.S., at 318 ('the
commission of some single or occasional acts of the corporate
agent in a state' may sometimes 'be deemed sufficient to
render the corporation liable to suit' on related claims). See
also Brief for Petitioner 24 (acknowledging that 'an agency
relationship may be sufficient in some circumstances to give
rise to specific jurisdiction')."
This Court has discussed the concept of agency in an action
concerning whether a trial court had specific personal jurisdiction over the
alleged principal:  
" ' " 'The test for agency is whether the alleged
principal has retained a right of control over the
actions of the alleged agent.' "  Ex parte Wild Wild
West Social Club, Inc., 806 So. 2d 1235, 1241 (Ala.
2001) (quoting Gist v. Vulcan Oil Co., 640 So. 2d
940, 942 (Ala. 1994)).... The party asserting the
existence of an agency relationship has the burden
of presenting sufficient evidence to prove the
existence of that relationship. See Ex parte Wild
Wild West Social Club, 806 So. 2d at 1242 (citing
Mardis v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 642 So. 2d 701,
704 (Ala. 1994)). Agency may not be presumed. Ex
parte Wild Wild West Social Club, 806 So. 2d at
21
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1242 (citing Carlton v. Alabama Dairy Queen, Inc.,
529 So. 2d 921 (Ala. 1988)). The plaintiff must
present substantial evidence of an agency
relationship. Id.'
"Dickinson v. City of Huntsville, 822 So. 2d 411, 416 (Ala.
2001)."
Worthy v. Cyberworks Techs., Inc., 835 So. 2d  972, 980 (Ala.
2002)(holding a telemarketing company did not have a right of control
over a Web-site-design company that had contracted with the
telemarketing company to build the Web site, and, thus, that the Web-
site-design company and its president were not agents of the
telemarketing company for purposes of determining whether the trial
court had specific personal jurisdiction over the telemarketing company
in consumers'  fraud action against the telemarketing company).
In this case, there is no evidence to support a finding that an agency
relationship exists between either TitleMax of Georgia or TMX and IAA
or Attention to Detail.   There is no evidence suggesting  that either
TitleMax of Georgia or TMX controlled the means or methods of IAA's
storage of the vehicle or Attention to Detail's transportation of the vehicle. 
 Instead, it appears that IAA and Attention to Detail are independent
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contractors.   See Ex parte Edgetech I.G., Inc., 159 So. 3d 629 (Ala.
2014)(holding that independent sales contractor was not employed by
manufacturer and, thus, that manufacturer's contacts with Alabama were
insufficient to support specific personal jurisdiction over manufacturer).2
2While this case was pending, the United States Supreme Court
decided Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592
U.S. ___, 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021).   Ford Motor concerned two cases against
Ford arising out of automobile accidents in Montana and Minnesota that
involved a certain model of vehicle manufactured by Ford. Ford did
substantial business in both states, including advertising, selling, and
servicing the model of the cars the suits claimed were defective, and did
not dispute that it had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in both states.   However, Ford contended that
specific jurisdiction in those states was improper because the specific  cars
involved in the accidents had been purchased, manufactured, and
designed out of state.  Ford argued that, under Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
v.  Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 582 U.S. ___, 137
S.Ct. 1773 (2017),  specific jurisdiction requires a "causal link" between
the defendant's contacts with a forum and the plaintiff's claims, which was
not present because the cars involved in the accidents were not designed,
manufactured, or first sold in the states where the suits were brought.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding specific jurisdiction
exists when a company "serves a market for a product in the forum State
and the product malfunctions there." Ford Motor, 592 U.S. at ___, 141
S.Ct. at 1027.  The Supreme Court's most common formulation of the
causal-connection rule demands that the suit " 'arise out of or relate to the
defendant's contacts with the forum.' "  Ford Motor, 592 U.S. at ___, 141
S.Ct. at 1026 (quoting  Bristol Myers, 592 U.S. at ___, 137 S.Ct. at 1780). 
The Court stated that the absence of finding specific jurisdiction without
showing that a claim "arises out of" a defendant's contacts with a forum
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1200128
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we grant TitleMax of Georgia and
TMX's mandamus petition and direct the Talladega Circuit Court to
vacate its order denying TitleMax of Georgia and TMX's joint motion to
dismiss and to enter an order granting the motion on the basis that the
trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over TitleMax of Georgia and TMX.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, and
Stewart, JJ., concur.
Mitchell, J., recuses himself.
"does not mean anything goes" and that "the phrase 'relate to'
incorporates real limits."  Ford Motor, 592 U.S. at ___, 141 S.Ct. at 1026. 
The present case is distinguishable from Ford Motor because Ford Motor
did not involve the issue of agency.  
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