Case Title: N.E.M. v. Eugene Strigel

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1995AP000755

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
95-0755 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
N.E.M., by her Guardian ad Litem, Gary M.  
 
 
 
Kryshak,   
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
 
 
 
Charles Meyer, and Patti Meyer,   
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs,  
 
 
 
 
v.  
 
 
 
Eugene Strigel, and Judy Strigel,   
 
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners,  
 
 
 
Scott Strigel,   
 
 
 
 
Defendant.  
 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  198 Wis. 2d 719, 543 N.W.2d 821 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                               
 
Opinion Filed:  
February 21, l997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument:  
October 17, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Wood 
 
JUDGE: 
 
EDWARD F. ZAPPEN, JR. 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. did not partipate 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Steven M. Anderson and Ruder, Ware & Michler, S.C., 
Wausau and Robert G. Craig, Marshfield and oral argument by Steven 
M. Anderson. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by Leon S. 
Schmidt, Jr., and Schmidt, Grace & Duncan, Wisconsin Rapids and 
oral argument by Leon S. Schmidt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 95-0755 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
N.E.M. by her Guardian ad Litem, Gary M. 
Kryshak, 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
Charles Meyer, and Patti Meyer, 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
 
v. 
 
Eugene Strigel, and Judy Strigel, 
 
 
 
Defendants-Respondents-  
 
 
Petitioners, 
 
Scott Strigel, 
 
 
 
Defendant. 
FILED 
 
FEB 21, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.    This case is before the court on 
a petition for review filed by Eugene and Judy Strigel.  The 
petitioners seek review of a published court of appeals 
decision, N.E.M. v. Strigel, 198 Wis. 2d 719, 543 N.W.2d 821 
(Ct. App. 1995), that reversed a circuit court judgment.  Wood 
County circuit court Judge Edward F. Zappen held that the 
Strigels' parental liability under Wis. Stat. § 895.035(4) 
(1993-94)1 was limited to $2,500 for the 20 sexual contacts 
between their son, Scott, and N.E.M.  The court of appeals held 
                     
     1  Unless otherwise stated, all future statutory references 
are to the 1993-94 volume. 
No. 95-0755 
 
 
2
that pursuant to § 895.035(4), the Strigels were liable up to 
$2,500 for each of the 20 instances of sexual contact, or a 
$50,000 limit on total liability. 
¶2 
On review, we consider two issues: (1) whether Wis. 
Stat. § 895.035(4) limits the Strigels' liability to $2,500 for 
each of the 20 sexual contacts or to $2,500 for all 20 of the 
sexual contacts between Scott and N.E.M.; and (2) if the 
Strigels' liability is limited to $2,500 for each of the 20 
instances of sexual contact, whether the jury must determine 
individual damages for each sexual contact.  We hold that the 
Strigels' liability under § 895.035(4) is limited to $2,500 for 
each of the 20 instances of sexual contact and that in this case 
it was not necessary for the jury to make individual damage 
determinations for each assault. 
¶3 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  N.E.M., a 10 
year old, and her parents brought suit against Scott Strigel, a 
15 year old, and his parents, Eugene and Judy Strigel.  In the 
action, N.E.M. alleged that she had sexual contact with both 
Eugene and Scott Strigel.  On April 29, 1994, the jury found 
that Eugene Strigel had not had sexual contact with N.E.M., but 
that Scott Strigel had.  In a special verdict, the jury 
concluded that Scott had sexual contact with N.E.M. "20 times" 
and that his conduct was wanton and willful.  The jury awarded 
N.E.M. $35,000 for past and future pain and suffering.2  In 
                     
     2  The jury was presented with the following questions: 
 
QUESTION 3: 
Did the defendant, Scott Strigel, have 
sexual contact with [N.E.M.]? [Answer:] 
Yes 
 
QUESTION 4: 
If you answered Question #3 "Yes", then 
answer this question: Was the sexual 
contact of [N.E.M.] by Scott Strigel a 
cause of injury to [N.E.M.]? [Answer:] 
No. 95-0755 
 
 
3
addition, the jury awarded $10,000 in punitive damages and 
$8,589 for N.E.M.'s parent's out-of-pocket expenses.3 
I. 
¶4 
The first issue that we address is whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.035(4) limits the Strigels' liability to $2,500 for each 
of the 20 sexual contacts between Scott and N.E.M. or to $2,500 
for all of the sexual contacts.  Resolution of this issue 
requires us to determine the meaning of "act" as used in § 
                                                                  
Yes 
 
QUESTION 5: 
If you have answered Question #3 "Yes", 
then answer this question: How many 
times did Scott Strigel have sexual 
contact with [N.E.M.]? [Answer:] 20 
times 
 
QUESTION 6: 
. . . 
 
 
 
 
b.) With respect to the sexual contact 
of [N.E.M.] by Scott Strigel, what sum 
of money will reasonably compensate 
[N.E.M.] for: 
 
 
 
 
1.) Past and future pain and suffering 
[Answer:] $35,000 
 
QUESTION 7: 
. . . 
 
 
 
 
b.) With respect to the sexual contact 
of [N.E.M.] by Scott Strigel, what sum 
of money will reasonably compensate [the 
parents of N.E.M.] for: 
 
 
 
 
 
1.) Out-of-pocket expenses for the 
treatment & care of [N.E.M.] 
[Answer:] $1,200 
 
 
 
 
 
2.) Loss of society and 
companionship of their daughter, 
[N.E.M.] [Answer:] $7,000 
 
 
QUESTION 10: 
If you answered "Yes" to question #4, 
answer this question: Was Scott 
Strigel's conduct willful and wanton? 
[Answer:] Yes 
 
QUESTION 11: 
If you answered the preceding question 
"yes", answer this question: What sum, 
if any, do you assess against Scott 
Strigel as punitive damages? [Answer:] 
$10,000 
3 The issue of whether punitive damages should be included in the 
calculation of the Strigels' liability under Wis. Stat. § 
895.035(4) is an open question that is not before this court.  
The attorneys for both the Strigels and N.E.M. so indicated at 
oral argument. 
No. 95-0755 
 
 
4
895.035(4).  Statutory interpretation and the application of a 
statute are questions of law that this court reviews de novo.  
Wagner Mobile, Inc. v. City of Madison, 190 Wis. 2d 585, 527 
N.W.2d 301 (1995); Braatz v. LIRC, 174 Wis. 2d 286, 293, 496 
N.W.2d 597 (1993).  Accordingly, we owe no deference to the 
decisions of the circuit court and court of appeals.  Colby v. 
Columbia County, 202 Wis. 2d 342, 349, 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996).  
However, we must strictly construe § 895.035(4) because it is in 
derogation of the common law.  State ex rel. Chain O'Lakes 
Protective Ass'n v. Moses, 53 Wis. 2d 579, 583, 193 N.W.2d 708 
(1972); Poston v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 107 Wis. 
2d 215, 224, 320 N.W.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1982). 
¶5 
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to discern 
the intent of the legislature.  Doe v. American Nat. Red Cross, 
176 Wis. 2d 610, 616, 500 N.W.2d 264 (1993).  In determining 
this intent, the court must first look at the language of the 
statute. Kelly Co., Inc. v. Marquardt, 172 Wis. 2d 234, 247, 493 
N.W.2d 68 (1992).  If the language of the statute clearly and 
unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, it is the duty 
of the court to apply that intent to the case at hand and not 
look beyond the statutory language to ascertain its meaning. Id. 
¶6 
Accordingly, we first examine the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 895.035(4).  Section 895.035(4) states in relevant part:  
Except for recovery for retail theft under s. 943.51, 
the maximum recovery from any parent or parents may 
not exceed $2,500 for damages resulting from any one 
act of a child in addition to taxable costs and 
disbursements 
and 
reasonable 
attorney 
fees, 
as 
determined by the court. 
(emphasis added).  Use of the word "one" before the word "act" 
suggests that the legislature contemplated a situation in which 
No. 95-0755 
 
 
5
parents would be liable for each of a series of acts.  However, 
without a more precise definition of act, we are unable to 
determine what distinguishes a series of acts from a single act. 
¶7 
In the absence of a statutory definition, the words of 
a statute are construed according to their common and approved 
usage.  Swatek v. County of Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 61, 531 N.W.2d 
45 (1995), quoting State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 377-78, 
340 N.W.2d 511, 514 (1983).  The court may use a dictionary to 
determine the common and approved usage of words in a statute.  
Swatek, 192 Wis. 2d at 61; State v. Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 2d 788, 
795, 407 N.W.2d 901 (1987).  As used in Wis. Stat. § 895.035(4), 
the 
most 
appropriate 
definition 
is 
"something 
done 
or 
performed." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 17 (3d ed. 1992).  This 
definition suggests that an act is a complete course of conduct. 
 Accordingly, from the language of the statute alone, we can 
presume that the legislature intended parents to be liable for 
each of a series of complete courses of conduct.  Despite this 
definition the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 895.035(4) may be 
ambiguous. 
¶8 
A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being 
understood by a reasonably well-informed person in either of two 
senses.  Robinson v. Kunach, 76 Wis. 2d 436, 444, 251 N.W.2d 449 
(1977).  In resolving whether § 895.035(4) is ambiguous, we 
consider a hypothetical situation in which a child uses two 
stones to consecutively break two windows.  One reasonable 
interpretation is that the child completed one course of conduct 
(or committed one act) and the parents should be liable up to 
$2,500 
for 
the 
broken 
windows. 
 
Another 
reasonable 
No. 95-0755 
 
 
6
interpretation is that each time the child threw a stone and 
broke a window, he completed a course of conduct (or committed a 
separate act), thus subjecting the parents to liability up to 
$5,000.  The language of the statute alone does not indicate 
which interpretation the legislature intended; thus, the statute 
is ambiguous. 
¶9 
When the statutory language is found to be ambiguous 
this court examines the scope, history, context, subject matter, 
and object of the statute to discern the intent of the 
legislature.  Swatek, 192 Wis. 2d at 58.  The parental liability 
statute4 was enacted in response to growing concern over juvenile 
vandalism and the perception that juvenile vandalism was the 
result of negligent supervision by parents.5   The goal of the 
                     
     4 The predecessor of Wis. Stat. § 895.035 was Wis. Stat. § 
331.047 (1957).  In 1963, Section 331.047 was renumbered to § 
895.035.  Section 331.047, which was introduced by Assemblyman 
Earle Fricker, made similar use of the word act: 
 
 
(1) The parent or parents having legal custody of 
an unemancipated minor child, in any circumstances where 
he or they may not be otherwise liable under the common 
law, may nevertheless for cause shown and in the 
discretion of the court be held liable for damages to 
property not to exceed $300, in addition to taxable 
costs and disbursements directly attributable to any 
wilful, malicious or wanton act of the child. 
 
 
(2) Maximum recovery from any parent or parents of 
any child may not exceed the limitation provided in sub. 
(1) for any one wilful, malicious or wanton act of such 
child and if 2 or more children of the same parent or 
parents having legal custody commit the same act the 
recovery may not exceed in the aggregate $300, in 
addition to taxable costs and disbursements.   
     5  See REPORT OF THE CHILD WELFARE COMMITTEE TO THE WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO SERVICES FOR DELINQUENT CHILDREN, at 3 
(December 29, 1954) ("Many persons appearing before the committee 
were concerned about the a great increase in the amount of 
vandalism committed by children. . . . A law making parents liable 
for the amount of damage done by their child was recommended by 
the Child Welfare Committee as a possible means of curbing the 
amount of vandalism committed.  It was alleged that making a 
parent monetarily responsible for the damage done by his child 
would cause the parent to take a greater interest in the 
activities of his child and to see that the child does not engage 
No. 95-0755 
 
 
7
parental liability law was to impose a certain degree of 
financial responsibility on parents for the acts of their 
children.  See First Bank Southeast, N.A. v. Bentkowski, 138 
Wis. 2d 283, 289, 405 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1987).  Accordingly, 
we must define act consistent with this statutory purpose. 
¶10 We must also define the word act in such a way as to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results.  Swatek, 192 Wis. 2d at 
58. We believe that it is not possible to set forth an exact 
definition that would render a result both consistent with the 
statute's purpose and reasonable in all cases.  This can only be 
achieved by considering the surrounding circumstances of each 
case.  In determining what constitutes a complete course of 
conduct, and, thus, what distinguishes one act from multiple 
acts we find three factors of particular importance: (1) whether 
a sufficient period of time separates the conduct, (2) whether 
the conduct occurred at different locations, and (3) whether 
there is a distinct difference in the nature of the conduct.6 
¶11 In this case, we find that 20 acts occurred because 
the instances of sexual contact between Scott and N.E.M. were 
separated by a sufficient period of time.  If, however, the 20 
                                                                  
in destructive acts."); Vandalism Cost Bill Sent Back, WIS. ST. J., 
March 1, 1957, § 1, at 4 ("Assemblyman Earle W. Fricker (D [sic]-
Milwaukee) [the parental liability bill's] author, told the house 
the bill aimed to 'hit parents in the pocketbook' to force tighter 
disciplining of children."); Bill Making Parents Liable for 
Vandalism Gets First Okay, WIS. ST. J., March 14, 1957, § 2, at 9 
("'Any parents who have children have a duty to properly rear 
them." [Fricker] said."); Jack Harned, Student Group Backs 
Liability on Vandalism, WIS. ST. J., March 28, 1957, § 1, at 4. 
("'The youth of today needs a firm hand on the part of their 
parents.' Fricker said.") 
     6  We decline to adopt a standard for distinguishing one act 
from multiple acts that is analogous to the criminal standard for 
determining whether acts are sufficiently different for purposes 
of bringing multiple charges.  See Harrell v. State, 88 Wis. 2d 
546, 572-74, 277 N.W.2d 462 (Ct. App. 1979).      
No. 95-0755 
 
 
8
sexual contacts had occurred within an hour we might have a 
situation in which the contacts could be characterized as one 
act. This would depend on surrounding circumstances such as the 
locations where the conduct occurred.  Additionally, if there 
was a distinct difference in the nature of the acts they could 
not be characterized as one act.  In this case, where the 
conduct in question consisted exclusively of sexual contact, 
there can be no distinct difference.  However, if Scott had both 
sexually assaulted N.E.M. and vandalized her parents property, 
the distinct difference in the nature of these two actions would 
warrant finding that there were two acts and subjecting Scott's 
parents to liability up to $2,500 for the sexual assault and 
$2,500 for the vandalism.7   
¶12 Accordingly, we conclude that it is consistent with 
the legislature's intent to hold the Strigels liable up to 
$2,500 for each of the 20 sexual contacts between Scott and 
N.E.M. 
II. 
¶13 The second issue that we address is whether it was 
necessary for the jury to make individual damage determinations 
                     
     7  A consideration of the surrounding circumstances, with 
particular regard to the three factors set forth, has a similar 
application to the window hypothetical we used to demonstrate that 
Wis. Stat. § 895.035(4) is ambiguous.  The parents of the vandal 
who consecutively threw two rocks and broke two windows would be 
liable up to a maximum of $2,500.  The breaking of the two windows 
in this manner would be one act for purposes of § 895.035(4).  
However, if the child had broken one window on one day and the 
other window on the following day, the parents would be liable up 
to $2,500 for each of the acts that caused each broken window.  
Similarly, if the child broke one neighbor's window, then walked 
across the street and broke another neighbors window, we would 
have two acts.  Additionally, if the child had broken the 
neighbor's window and then assaulted the neighbor, the parents 
would be liable up to $2,500 for the broken window and up to 
$2,500 for damages caused by the assault. 
No. 95-0755 
 
 
9
for each sexual contact.  This is also a question of statutory 
interpretation that this court reviews de novo.  Wagner Mobile, 
190 Wis. 2d 585; Braatz, 174 Wis. 2d at 293. 
¶14 The Strigels argue that a new trial is necessary so 
that damages can be determined for each of the sexual contacts. 
 N.E.M. contends that a new trial is not necessary because it is 
impossible to attribute specific amounts of damage to each act. 
 We hold that in this case the jury need not determine damages 
for each of the sexual contacts. 
¶15 In other cases where the damages caused by each act 
are 
distinct, 
the 
jury 
should 
make 
separate 
damage 
determinations for each act.  However, in cases involving 
improper sexual contact, where the damages are primarily 
psychological and emotional, the jury need not make individual 
damage 
determinations 
for 
each 
act. 
To 
require 
a 
jury 
determination of individual damages for each instance of sexual 
contact would add unnecessary complexity to an already difficult 
question.  Accordingly, we hold that the jury determination of 
damages in this case was sufficient. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate.