Case Title: State v. Sharafeldin

Citation: 382 Md. 129

Docket Number: 102/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 24-C-00-2057
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 102
September Term, 2003
______________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
IBNOMER SHARAFELDIN
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
______________________________________
Filed:   July 27, 2004
In September, 1999, Ibnomer Sharafeldin sued the State Department of Public Safety
and Correctional Services in U.S. District Court, claiming, among other things, breach of
contract.  The contract allegedly breached was a 1995 Settlement Agreement intended to
resolve a discrimination claim that Sharafeldin had filed against the Department with the
State Human Relations Commission (HRC) and the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).  When, in April, 2000, his Federal breach of contract action was
dismissed on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds, Sharafeldin filed a similar
claim in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, where he met with better success. The jury
returned a verdict in his favor of $366,500, which, upon his acceptance of a remittitur in
order to avoid a new trial, was reduced to $108,000.
Two inter-related issues are before us in this appeal from the Circuit Court judgment,
both emanating from the Department’s defense of sovereign immunity.  Through the
enactment of what is now Maryland Code, §12-201 of the State Government Article (SG),
the Legislature has conditionally waived the State’s sovereign immunity in actions filed in
Maryland courts for breach of a written contract, but in §12-202 has provided that “[a] claim
under this subtitle is barred unless the claimant files suit within 1 year after the later of: (1)
the date on which the claim arose; or (2) the completion of the contract that gives rise to the
claim.”  The first question is whether §12-202 constitutes a condition to the waiver of
sovereign immunity and thus to the right of action itself against the State or is, instead,
merely a statute of limitations.
It is undisputed that the action in Circuit Court was not filed within the allowable one-
1 There is a third issue, of whether Sharafeldin’s breach of contract claim was filed
in Federal court within the one-year period.  It clearly was not filed within one year after
the dates upon which the claims arose, but there is at least an argument that it was filed
within one year after “completion of the contract that gives rise to the claim.”  We need
not address that issue in light of our response to the other two.  Sharafeldin also moved to
dismiss the Department’s appeal as untimely.  We deny that motion.
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year period.  In order to save that action, Sharafeldin relies on Maryland Rule 2-101(b),
which provides, in relevant part, that, if an action is filed in U.S. District Court within “the
period of limitations prescribed by Maryland law” and the Federal action is dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, an action filed in the State Circuit Court within 30 days after entry of the
order of dismissal “shall be treated as timely filed in this State.”  The second issue, as
presented, depends on the answer to the first.  If SG §12-202 is merely a statute of limitations
and Sharafeldin’s action was filed in Federal court within the one-year period, the action
filed in Circuit Court would be regarded as timely, as it was filed within 30 days after the
Federal breach of contract claim was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.  If SG §12-202 is
a condition to suit and not a statute of limitations, however, the question arises whether Rule
2-101(b) can save the action even if it had been filed in Federal court within the one-year
period; does §12-202, in other words, bar the action if not filed in State court within the one-
year period?1
BACKGROUND
Sharafeldin was employed by the Department as a chaplain at one or more of the State
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prisons in the Hagerstown area.  He began in 1989 as a contractual employee but, after filing
discrimination charges against the Department with the HRC and EEOC, he became a full-
time employee in 1991.  Since then, he has filed seven further complaints of discrimination.
The gist of his current unhappiness was his desire to be transferred from the Hagerstown
complex to prisons in the Baltimore/Jessup area.
In February, 1995, in a resolution of one of his complaints to HRC and EEOC, the
Department entered into a written Settlement Agreement with Sharafeldin in which the
Department made three commitments:
(1) It would rescind two existing suspensions and pay lost wages of $632;
(2) It would “[n]otify and interview [Sharafeldin] for consideration of Chaplain
position in the Baltimore/Jessup region”; and
(3) It agreed that “there will be no retaliation or harassment taken against
[Sharafeldin].”
In October, 1995, a chaplain position opened in the Jessup area.  The Department
notified Sharafeldin of the vacancy, interviewed him for the position, but selected someone
else for the job – a  chaplain who received higher scores from three different raters selected
by the Department to review the applications.  In the Fall of 1997, another chaplain position
opened in the Jessup area.  Believing that it had fulfilled its obligation to Sharafeldin by
considering him for the 1995 vacancy, the Department filled that position without notifying
or interviewing Sharafeldin.  In March, 1998, the Department informed Sharafeldin of a third
2 Sharafeldin claims to be a black, Sudanese-born Muslim.
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vacancy in a chaplain position in Jessup, interviewed him for the position, but, again, hired
someone else, a person who received higher scores from five different raters.  On August 21,
1998, an incident involving Sharafeldin and two correctional officers occurred at one of the
Hagerstown prisons, in which Sharafeldin was allegedly shoved and mildly bruised.  He filed
criminal charges against the officers, which were dismissed, and another discrimination
complaint with HRC and EEOC, which also was unsuccessful.  He never returned to work,
although, for whatever reason, the Department kept him on the payroll until June, 1999.
On September 27, 1999, Sharafeldin filed a three-count complaint against the
Department in the U.S. District Court, alleging hostile-work-environment harassment on the
basis of his race, color, religion, and national origin (Count I)2, constructive discharge arising
from the hostile-work-environment harassment (Count II), and breach of the 1995 Settlement
Agreement (Count III).  In Count III, Sharafeldin alleged that the Department breached the
1995 agreement “by not notifying him of chaplaincy position on at least two occasions” and
by “retaliating against him when the Defendant did not hire him or transfer him for the
chaplaincy position for which he was well qualified” and picking, instead, “candidates who
were less qualified than the Plaintiff.”
The Department’s response to the complaint is not in the record before us. It appears
from the court’s discussion, however, that the dispositive argument with respect to Count III,
made in a motion to dismiss, was Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, for, on April
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10, 2000, the court dismissed Count III on that ground and discussed no other.  
In February, 2001, the court entered summary judgment for the Department on the
other two counts, concluding that Sharafeldin had not shown that the harassment alleged by
him was based on race, religion, or national origin.  Indeed, the court concluded that
Sharafeldin was “a contentious, disgruntled and paranoiac employee who clashed with almost
everyone with whom he came into contact, including inmates, correctional officers, nurses,
other chaplains, and superiors,” that he “constantly complained about his duties and work
assignments,” that he “overreacted to petty slights and inconveniences,” that it was his
“inability to work with others and to comply with the directions of his superiors which led
to the claims asserted by him,” and that “ [w]henever disputes or conflicts arose, Sharafeldin
attributed them to his race, his religion or his national origin.”  Sharafeldin v. Maryland,
Dept. of Public Safety, 131 F. Supp.2d 730, 740 (D.Md. 2001).  In an unreported opinion
filed November 15, 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit summarily
affirmed the judgment of the District Court.
On April 25, 2000 – 15 days after dismissal of Count III of his Federal complaint –
Sharafeldin filed a two-count complaint against the Department in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City.  Count 1, captioned “Breach of Settlement Agreement,” alleged that, in the
1995 Settlement Agreement, a copy of which was attached to the Complaint, the Department
promised that it would notify Sharafeldin “of vacant chaplain positions in the Baltimore and
Jessup regions and would interview him for consideration of those positions” and that the
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Department breached the agreement in two respects: first, in the Fall of 1997, by appointing
another person to fill a vacant position in Jessup without notifying him of the vacancy, and
second, by failing to hire him to fill vacancies that occurred in October, 1995 and March,
1998, failures which Sharafeldin averred constituted retaliation against him for filing a
discrimination complaint.
Count 2, captioned “Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,”
incorporated the earlier averments and asserted that the Department “did not observe good
faith and fair dealing under the agreement when it had every opportunity to do so” and that,
by reason of its failure to make a good faith effort to honor the Settlement Agreement,
Sharafeldin was forced to endure “years of hostile and abusive work environment and to
subsequently los[e] his job.”  Count 2 was thus also in the nature of a breach of contract
claim, based on an alleged breach of the 1995 Settlement Agreement.
 The Department moved to dismiss the action on the ground of sovereign immunity.
As to Count 1, the Department argued, that, because the action was not brought within one
year from the date on which Sharafeldin’s claims arose, the Department retained its defense
of sovereign immunity.  In presenting that defense, the Department contended, at least by
implication, that the requirement imposed by SG §12-202 of bringing suit within one year
constitutes not a statute of limitations but a condition precedent to the action itself – a
condition to the waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity.  In taking that position, the
Department neglected to plead, as an alternative and in conformance with the requirement
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of Maryland Rule 2-323(g), that the one year requirement stated in §12-202, did constitute
a special Statute of Limitations and that Sharafeldin’s action was barred on that ground.
Count 2, the Department argued, rested on implied provisions, and the State retained its
sovereign immunity with respect to implied contracts.
The Department’s motion was denied without comment or explanation.  After some
discovery, Sharafeldin and the Department filed cross-motions for summary judgment, both
of which were denied.  The Department’s motion rested on its view that the Settlement
Agreement required it to inform Sharafeldin of a vacancy in the Baltimore/Jessup area and
to interview him for such a position only one time, and that it complied with that requirement
in October, 1995.  It asserted, in that regard, that the Department “had an obligation only to
notify Plaintiff of, and interview him for, a single Chaplain position.”
The dispositive motions having been denied, the case was submitted to trial before a
jury, which returned a verdict in Sharafeldin’s favor in the amount of $366,500.  In response
to the Department’s post-verdict motion, the court determined that the verdict was “excessive
and shocks the Court’s conscience,” and therefore ordered a new trial unless Sharafeldin
accepted a reduction to $108,000.  Sharafeldin accepted the remittitur in order to avoid a new
trial and judgment was entered in that amount.  
The Department appealed, complaining about the denial of its motions to dismiss and
for summary judgment.  Sharafeldin cross-appealed; he complains only about the remittitur.
We granted certiorari prior to proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, principally to
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review the Department’s argument that the requirement in SG §12-202 that an action against
the State or its agencies for breach of contract be brought within one year constitutes a
condition precedent to the State’s waiver of its sovereign immunity in breach of contract
actions, rather than a statute of limitations, and that it is jurisdictional in nature.  Because we
are reviewing the judgment of the Circuit Court, rather than one of the Court of Special
Appeals, the other two issues raised by the parties are also before us, although it will not be
necessary for us to address them.
DISCUSSION
The Nature of SG §12-202
The nature and effect of SG §12-202 is a matter of statutory construction which, as
we have often said, depends on legislative intent: did the General Assembly intend the
requirement that an action subject to §12-201 be filed within one year to be a condition to the
waiver of sovereign immunity and thus a condition to the action itself, or merely a shorter
statute of limitations than would otherwise apply to a breach of contract action?  As we
recently observed in a case involving §12-202, in attempting to divine legislative intent, we
look first to the words of the statute, “but if the true legislative intent cannot readily be
determined from the statutory language alone, we look to other indicia of that intent,
including the title to the bill, the structure of the statute, the inter-relationship of its various
provisions, its legislative history, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal
3 Much of the concern in that regard was expressed by county and municipal
governments which the Commission assumed enjoyed sovereign immunity in contract
actions.  As we pointed out in RTKL, however, that assumption was a mistaken one.
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effect of various competing constructions.”  Baltimore County v. RTKL Associates, 380 Md.
670, 846 A.2d 433 (2004).
The mere wording of SG §12-202 does not inform us clearly of what the Legislature
intended in this regard.  We may, as we shall explain, draw certain inferences from that
wording, but it does not directly supply an answer.  As we pointed out in RTKL, the question
of waiving sovereign immunity in both tort and breach of contract actions was the subject of
considerable study by the Legislature in the mid-1970's.  Bills to waive immunity in breach
of contract actions were passed in 1974 and 1975 but were vetoed by the Governor, who
preferred to await the result of a comprehensive study of the matter by a gubernatorial
Commission that had been created to examine the issue.  In an interim report made in
February, 1976, the Commission recommended a conditional waiver of immunity in contract
actions, and that report served as the basis for the enactment of what is now codified in SG
§§12-201 and 12-202.  See 1976 Md. Laws, ch. 450.  Indeed, the Legislature made specific
reference to the Commission report in the bill.
In its report, the Commission noted concerns that the waiver of immunity in contract
actions might have a significant fiscal impact by increasing liability on the part of the State,
not only for contract damages but also for the cost of having to defend actions that then were
routinely dismissed on motion.3  Responding to those concerns, the Commission observed
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that, in other States that had waived immunity, the fiscal impact was negligible, in part
because “when the states abrogate sovereign immunity in contract, they do so subject to a
number of exceptions and limitations which act to further minimize the fiscal impact.”  See
Report of the Governor’s Commission to Study Sovereign Immunity, November, 1976, at 40.
(Emphasis added).  
Perhaps keying on the word “limitations” used by the Commission, but without any
documented critical analysis, the Legislature used that word in the title to the bill.  The
descriptive title stated the purpose of the bill to be to provide that the State and its various
units may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity in the courts of this State in an action
in contract based on certain written contracts, and “[to set] forth certain exclusions and
limitations applicable to such actions.”  
Several “exclusions and limitations” were provided in the bill: the waiver applied only
to breaches of written contracts executed by an official or employee acting withing the scope
of his/her authority; there would be no liability for punitive damages; and the action was
barred if not filed within the one-year period.  The best that can be said for this, from
Sharafeldin’s point of view, is that the Legislature used the word “limitations” as a generally
descriptive term that probably included the requirement of bringing suit within one year, but
not in the technical sense of a true statute of limitations.  In Frankel v. Board of Regents, 361
Md. 298, 308, 761 A.2d 324, 329 (2000), we referred to §12-202 as providing a “period of
limitations,” again as a generally descriptive term, and in RTKL, supra, we referred to a
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similar statute, applicable to actions against chartered counties, as a statute of limitations but
noted that we did so as a matter of convenience and expressed no view whether it, or its
counterparts, such as §12-202, “are true statutes of limitations or conditions on the right to
sue.”  RTKL, supra, 380 Md. at 677, n.1, 846 A.2d at 437, n.1.  In neither case was the issue
now before us presented.
Two considerations militate against inferring an intent to regard SG §12-202 as a mere
statute of limitations, waivable at will by State agencies or their respective attorneys.  We
have held, consistently, that immunity from suit is “one of the highest attributes of
sovereignty,” and that any waiver of that immunity must come from the Legislature.  See
Katz v. Washington Sub. San. Comm’n, 284 Md. 503, 512-13, 397 A.2d 1027, 1032 (1979);
Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 59-60, 521 A.2d 313, 315-16 (1986).
State agencies may not, on their own, waive sovereign immunity “either affirmatively or by
failure to plead it.”  Welsh, 308 Md. at 60, 521 A.2d at 316.  See also Board v. John K. Ruff,
Inc., 278 Md. 580, 583, 366 A.2d 360, 362 (1976); Bd. of Education v. Alcrymat Corp., 258
Md. 508, 516, 266 A.2d 349, 353 (1970).  Moreover, unlike the situation in some States, we
have made clear that the origin of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Maryland did not
stem from judicial fiat but was statutory in nature, and “[w]e have consistently declined to
abrogate sovereign immunity by judicial fiat.”  Dep’t of Natural Resources v. Welsh, supra,
308 Md. at 59, 521 A.2d at 315, and cases cited there.
SG §12-202 is not worded like the traditional statutes of limitations, which normally
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state only that an action “shall be filed within” the allowable period.  See, for example,
Maryland Code, Courts & Jud. Proc. Article, §5-101 (general three-year statute of limitations
for civil actions), §5-102 (twelve year statute of 
limitations for actions on specialties), §5-104
(five year statute of limitations for action on public officer’s bond); §5-105 (one year statute
of limitations for action for assault, libel, or slander); §5-106 (statute of limitations for
prosecution of misdemeanor); §5-109 (statute of limitations for actions against health care
providers); §5-110 (action to enforce liability under Public Information Act); §5-111 (action
for contempt for failure to pay child or spousal support); §5-113 (action for damages arising
out of occupational disease).  
Those statutes say nothing about an untimely action being “barred.”  Thus, we have
regarded limitations as not “deny[ing] the plaintiff’s right of action, but only the exercise of
the right,”  Foos v. Steinberg, 247 Md. 35, 38, 230 A.2d 79, 80 (1967).  Accordingly, we
have held that limitations is an affirmative defense that can be waived and that is waived
unless raised in the defendant’s answer.  See Maryland Rule 2-323(g); Foos, supra; Brooks
v. State, 85 Md. App. 355, 365, 584 A.2d 82, 87 (1991) (Opinion by Bell, J.).   
In contrast, SG §12-202 states that a claim under the subtitle “is barred” unless suit
is filed within one year.  That, we believe, was intended to preserve the effect of sovereign
immunity itself, which barred the action entirely.  In using that language, the Legislature
could not have intended to permit subordinate agencies, or counsel for those agencies, to be
able to permit an action that the Legislature expressly declared “barred” to proceed
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nonetheless, by simply omitting to raise the defense.  That would effectively allow sovereign
immunity to be waived by subordinate agencies or the attorneys who represent them which,
as noted, we have consistently held they are not empowered to do.
When the predecessor to §12-202 was first enacted in 1976, and even when the statute
was re-enacted as part of the State Government Article in 1984, through the code revision
process, the Federal courts had almost unanimously construed similarly worded Federal
statutes as jurisdictional in nature and not as statutes of limitations that could be tolled or
waived.  Title 28 U.S.C. §2401 sets time limits on the bringing of actions against the United
States.  Section 2401(a) provides that “every civil action commenced against the United
States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action
first accrues.”  (Emphasis added).  Subsection (b), applicable specifically to tort claims,
provides that a tort claim against the United States “shall be forever barred” unless the claim
is presented to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after it accrues and an action
in court is filed within six months after denial of the claim by the agency.  
Until 1990, the Federal courts had construed those provisions as meaning that, if an
action under §2401(a) was not brought within the prescribed six-year period, or a claim under
§2401(b) was not submitted to the agency within the two year period and, if the claim was
denied, an action was not filed in court within six months after notice was received of the
denial, the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the action.  See Crown Coat Front Co.
v. United States, 363 F.2d 407 (2nd Cir. 1966), rev’d on other grounds, 386 U.S. 503, 87 S.
4 There are a few State cases that appear to state a contrary view, but, on analysis,
they are distinguishable in that they all involved notice of tort claim requirements rather
than filing of suit requirements.  See Pritchard v. State, 788 P.2d 1178 (Ariz. 1990);
Fredrichsen v. City of Lakewood, 491 P.2d 805 (Cal. 1971); Bryant v. Duval Hosp.
Authority, 502 So.2d 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Hill v. Board of Ed. of Middletown,
443 A.2d 225 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).  We have regarded our analogous notice
of tort claim requirement as substantive in nature, although, by statute, it is subject to
waiver for good cause and may be satisfied by substantial compliance.  See Moore v.
Norouzi, 371 Md. 154, 807 A.2d 632 (2002).  Pritchard is distinguishable in another
important respect. The Arizona court had previously abolished sovereign immunity by
judicial fiat, so the time limitation was not a condition to a statutory waiver of immunity
and therefore was not regarded as part of the right of action itself.  The Pritchard court
noted that the right to sue the State in Arizona “is not a statutory grant, as is the case in
several other states; rather it is a common law rule in Arizona that the government is
liable for its tortious conduct and immunity is the exception,”id. at 1182, and, on that
basis, the court found the notice requirement to be merely procedural. Id. at 1183. 
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Ct. 1177, 18 L. Ed.2d 256 (1967); Powers v. United States, 390 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1968);
Mann v. United States, 399 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1968); Houston v. United States Postal
Service, 823 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006, 108 S. Ct. 1470, 99
L. Ed.2d 699 (1988); Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1996); Girard v.
United States, 455 F. Supp. 502 (D.N.H. 1978); Thompson v. Duggan, 427 F. Supp. 342
(E.D.Pa. 1977); Huntington Steel Corp. v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).4
In Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 77 S. Ct. 269, 1 L. Ed.2d 306 (1957), the Supreme
Court confirmed its earlier holding in Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123, 2 S. Ct. 277,
27 L.Ed. 437 (1883) that a similar statute – 28 U.S.C. §2501, barring claims otherwise within
the jurisdiction of the then-constituted Court of Claims unless filed within six years after the
5 We need not complicate the issue by addressing it in terms of whether the
defense is “jurisdictional” in nature.  The question involves the State’s immunity from
suit, not the jurisdiction of the court.  The courts were never deprived of fundamental
jurisdiction over the State and its agencies; even before the general waiver of immunity,
the State and its agencies were subject to suit for breach of contract if the Legislature
authorized them to be sued and funds were available to pay any judgment that might be
rendered against them.  University of Maryland v. Maas, 173 Md. 554, 197 A. 123
(1938).  The relevant focus is on whether the time limitation for bringing an action for
breach of contract is a non-waivable, non-tollable condition to the waiver of immunity.  If
it is and the condition is not met, an action against the State must be dismissed because
the State remains immune from suit, not because the court is without jurisdiction.
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claim first accrued – was jurisdictional in nature and not subject to equitable tolling.5
That nearly universal construction of the Federal statute was shattered in 1990 –
fourteen years after the first enactment of the Maryland statute and six years after its re-
enactment as part of the State Government Article – when the Supreme Court released its
opinion in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 111 S. Ct. 453, 112 L.
Ed.2d 435 (1990).  Irwin did not involve 28 U.S.C. §2401, but rather 42 U.S.C. §2000e-
16(c), which required that an employment discrimination complaint against the Federal
Government under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be filed “[w]ithin thirty days of
receipt of notice of final action taken” by the EEOC.   In Irwin, the EEOC decision was sent
to Irwin’s lawyer, who was out of the country at the time.  The complaint in court was filed
44 days after the decision was received by the attorney’s office but 29 days after the decision
was first received by Irwin.  The Court concluded that the time began to run when the
decision was received in the attorney’s office and that the complaint therefore was not timely.
It turned then to whether the late-filed claim was jurisdictionally barred or whether there was
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a basis for equitable tolling of the limitations period.
The Court agreed that the statute, even as worded, was “a condition to the waiver of
sovereign immunity and thus must be strictly construed.”  Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94, 111 S. Ct.
at 456, 121 L. Ed.2d at 443.  Though acknowledging Soriano and its more recent statement
in Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479, 106 S. Ct. 2022, 2029, 90 L. Ed.2d 462,
474  (1986) that it should not “‘assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress
intended,’” (citation omitted),  the Court nonetheless regarded some of its decisions on
Federal statutes of limitations as not entirely consistent, and felt the need “to adopt a more
general rule to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in suits against the Government.”
Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95, 111 S. Ct. at 457, 121 L. Ed.2d at 443.  The rule it adopted, with
respect to equitable tolling, was to equate suits against the Government with suits against
private parties, and it thus held that “the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling
applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United
States.”  Id.  at 95-96, 111 S. Ct. at 457, 121 L. Ed.2d at 443-44.  In announcing that
decision, the Court observed that the language of 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16(c) was not identical
to that in statutes such as 28 U.S.C. §2501, construed in Soriano, and that “[a]n argument can
undoubtedly be made that the latter language is more stringent than the former,” but was not
persuaded “that the difference between them is enough to manifest a different congressional
intent with respect to the availability of equitable tolling.”  Id. at 95, 111 S. Ct. 457, 112 L.
Ed. 2d 443. 
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Although intended to create uniformity in this area, Irwin has appeared to sow more
confusion and disuniformity than existed earlier.  In two later cases, the Court concluded that
the 12-year period of limitations applicable to actions against the Government to quiet title
to land and the period of limitations for filing a claim for a tax refund were not subject to
equitable tolling.  See United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 118 S. Ct. 1862, 141 L. Ed.2d
32 (1998) and United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 117 S. Ct. 849, 136 L. Ed.2d 818
(1997).  The courts must still look at each statute to determine whether Congress meant for
the limitations period to be subject to equitable tolling.  Apart from that, the lower Federal
courts are in some disarray as to how 
Irwin impacts other limitations periods, especially those
applicable to Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claims.  
Title 28 U.S.C. §2401(b), as noted, contains two limitations requirements.  A tort
claim against the United States is barred unless, first, it is presented in writing to the
appropriate Federal agency within two years after the claim accrues, and second, a lawsuit
is filed within six months after the agency mails notice of final denial of the claim.  Prior to
Irwin, both requirements had been regarded as jurisdictional, and the failure to comply with
either one doomed the action.  There are now conflicting decisions as to whether equitable
tolling may excuse a failure to comply with either or both.
Irwin did not involve or directly address statutes such as 28 U.S.C. §2401, and much
of the language in the opinion was thus essentially obiter dicta with respect to that statute.
Most of the lower Federal courts have given credence to that language, however, have shifted
6 In the First Circuit, compare Roman v. Townsend, 224 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2000)
and Heinrich v. Sweet, 44 F. Supp.2d 408, 415 (D.Mass. 1999), holding that the period of
limitations for a FTCA claim is jurisdictional in nature and thus non-waivable, and De
Casenave v. United States, 991 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1993), recognizing the prospect of
equitable tolling “‘where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing
a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to
pass,’” (quoting Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96, 111 S. Ct. at 457-58), but finding no such tolling in
that case.  In the Second Circuit, compare Air India v. Brien, 261 F. Supp.2d 134, 137
(E.D.N.Y. 2003), holding that 28 U.S.C. §2401 is “a jurisdictional predicate for this
court’s ability to entertain the claim” with Hyatt v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 96
(E.D.N.Y. 1997), applying equitable tolling to an untimely FTCA claim.  The Third
Circuit, citing Irwin, has concluded that the six-month period allowed by §2401(b) is not
jurisdictional, but is waivable and subject to equitable tolling.  See Hughes v. United
States, 263 F.2d 272, 278 (3rd Cir. 2001).  In the Fourth Circuit, we read Muth v. United
States, 1 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 1993) as indicating that equitable tolling might apply to a
FTCA claim, in an appropriate case, but one District Court has continued to hold that the
requirement of filing suit within six months after administrative denial of the claim is
jurisdictional.  See Gibbs v. United States, 34 F. Supp.2d 405 (S.D.W.Va. 1999).  In Flory
v. United States, 138 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit court declared baldly that
both limitations periods in §2401(b) were jurisdictional, but in Lambert v. United States,
44 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 1995), the court read Irwin as permitting equitable tolling, although
it declined to apply the doctrine in that case.  See also Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d
913 (5th Cir. 1999) (permitting and applying equitable tolling).  The Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have construed Irwin as allowing equitable tolling even of the
two-year requirement for filing a claim with the administrative agency.  See Glarner v.
United States, 30 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 1994); Goodhand v. United States, 40 F.3d 209 (7th
Cir. 1994); Kanar v. United States, 118 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1997); Schmidt v. United
States, 933 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1991) (on remand for reconsideration in light of Irwin);
Slaaten v. United States, 990 F.2d 1038 (8th Cir. 1993); Alvarez-Machain v. United
(continued...)
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their previously-held view, and have applied equitable tolling principles to untimely claims
made to the administrative agency or to untimely lawsuits after denial of the claim.  Not all
of the Federal courts have taken that approach, and there appears to be a split in some of the
circuits.6  Very few cases have arisen since Irwin with respect to contract claims against the
6(...continued)
States, 107 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1997).  In Hoery v. United States, 324 F.3d 1220, 1221
(10th Cir. 2003), the Tenth Circuit Court held that, “because the FTCA is a waiver of
sovereign immunity, timeliness is a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction.”  In Benge
v. United States, 17 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 1994), that court declined to address whether
equitable tolling applied to an FTCA claim because it would not have benefitted the
plaintiff in that case in any event.  A District Court in the Eleventh Circuit applied
equitable tolling to an FTCA claim in Stanfill v. United States, 43 F. Supp.2d 1304
(M.D.Ala. 1999).
-19-
Government.  In UOP v. United States, 99 F.3d 344 (9th Cir.1996), the Ninth Circuit court,
without mentioning Irwin, held that 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) was jurisdictional and not a waivable
defense.  In Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765 (9th Cir.1997), the same
court held the exact opposite – that §2401(a) was not jurisdictional and was subject to
waiver. 
We are not bound, of course, by any of these Federal decisions, including 
Irwin.  Their
only relevance is in how they might impact our view of the legislative intent behind SG §12-
202, which is the controlling consideration.  If that statute had been enacted after 1990, we
might embrace the fiction that the Legislature was aware of the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Irwin and construe §12-202 in accordance with it.  The fact is, however, that when the
Legislature first waived immunity in contract actions in 1976 and later re-enacted that waiver
as part of the State Government Article, the Federal decisions, including the Supreme Court’s
decision in Soriano, were nearly all to the effect that the analogous time limitations were,
indeed, conditions to the waiver of immunity and were not subject to waiver or tolling.  For
our purposes, therefore, the relevant Federal law is that which existed before Irwin.
-20-
Allied with the principle applied in the pre-Irwin decisions, arising from the language
of the statute itself, is the well-recognized but more general rule, to which we have adhered,
that, where a statute creates a new cause of action and fixes a time within which a suit under
the statute must be filed, “[t]he time within which the suit must be brought operates as a
limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone.”  The Harrisburg, 119
U.S. 199, 214, 7 S. Ct. 140, 147, 30 L. Ed. 358, 362 (1886).  The Harrisburg Court noted
that, in such a situation:
“Time has been made of the essence of the right and the right is
lost if the time is disregarded.  The liability and the remedy are
created by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy
are therefore to be treated as limitations of the right.”
Id.
In State v. Parks, 148 Md. 477, 479-82, 129 A. 793-94 (1925), we adopted and
applied that principle to actions under the wrongful death statute, and, notwithstanding that
the more central holding of The Harrisburg, that there was no common law right of action
for wrongful death in Federal maritime cases, was overruled in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 26 L. Ed.2d 339 (1970), we have continued to follow
that approach and have treated the overruling of the substantive holding of The Harrisburg
as irrelevant.  See Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52, 57-59, 626 A.2d 353, 355-56 (1993).
 
Significant in this regard is our application of that principle to claims against
decedents’ estates.  In language similar to that used in SG §12-202, Estates and Trusts
Article, §8-103 provides that such claims are “forever barred” unless filed within the periods
-21-
stated in the statute.  In Blocher v. Harlow, 268 Md. 571, 303 A.2d 395 (1973), disapproved
on other grounds in Eastgate Assoc. v. Apper, 276 Md. 698, 703, 350 A.2d 661, 665 (1976),
we confirmed earlier rulings that the limitations period, even though affirmatively waivable
by a personal representative under certain circumstances, is a condition to the right itself and
not merely to the remedy.  We expressed the more general view that “[t]here is a substantial
body of law to the effect that where a limitation period is stipulated in a statute creating a
cause of action it is not to be considered as an ordinary statute of limitations, but is to be
considered as a limitation upon the right as well as the remedy. . . .”  Id. at 581, 303 A.2d at
400.
The 1976 law, now codified in SG §§12-201 and 12-202, was intended as a
conditional waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity in contract actions, which was to be
accomplished by precluding the State and its agencies from raising that defense if the action
was founded on a written contract executed by an authorized official or employee and the
action was brought within the one-year period.   If the action was not brought within that
period, however, it was “barred.”  The sovereign immunity that the State enjoyed remained
in effect; it could not be waived by subordinate agencies or their attorneys, and thus the
agencies were required by law to raise the defense.  We hold, therefore, that §12-202 is not
a mere statute of limitations but sets forth a condition to the action itself.  The waiver of the
State’s immunity vanishes at the end of the one-year period, and an action filed thereafter is
subject to the same fate it would have suffered prior to the enactment of the 1976 legislation.
-22-
Maryland Rule 2-101(b)
The second issue, of whether Rule 2-101(b) can save an action against a State agency
for breach of contract that is (1) timely filed in Federal court, (2) dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds, and (3) refiled within 30 days in State court, is also one we have not yet addressed.
The Department interprets the Rule as providing an “automatic extension of a period of
limitations” and argues that, as SG §12-202 is not a period of limitations, the Rule is
inapplicable.  We agree with the Department’s ultimate conclusion, but on a somewhat
different analysis.
The Rule is a general one, intended to save actions initially filed in a non-Maryland
court but in a timely manner under Maryland law.  We need not consider in this case whether
the Rule operates to save other actions subject to a “condition of suit” limitations period that
are initially filed within the prescribed period.  There is a more precise reason why it does
not apply to actions subject to SG §12-202.
Sections 12-201 and 12-202 must be read together.  Section 12-201 precludes the
State and its agencies from raising the defense of sovereign immunity in a contract action “in
a court of the State” (emphasis added), meaning a court that is part of the Maryland judiciary.
There was clearly no intent on the part of the Legislature to waive the State’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity in actions in Federal court or to waive its inherent sovereign immunity
in actions filed in the courts of some other State.  Section 12-201 is plainly limited to an
action in a Maryland court.  
-23-
Section 12-202 states that “[a] claim under this subtitle is barred unless the claimant
files suit within 1 year . . . .”  (Emphasis added).  A claim “under this subtitle” is necessarily
a claim filed in a Maryland court, a claim to which §12-201 would otherwise apply.  If, as
we hold, the one year requirement is a condition to the action itself, it follows that sovereign
immunity is not waived unless the action is filed in a Maryland court within the one year
period.  There would be no reason to impose a condition on the waiver of sovereign
immunity with respect to an action in which that immunity had not been waived in the first
instance.  Thus, even if the Rule could be read to save some other action subject to a
“condition of suit” period of limitations, it cannot save an action subject to §§12-201 and 12-
202 that is not filed in a Maryland court within the one year period.  
To construe the Rule otherwise would be tantamount to this Court, by judicial fiat,
effecting a waiver of the State’s immunity beyond that decreed by the Legislature, which, as
noted, we have steadfastly refused to do.  This Court’s rule-making authority under Art. IV,
§18 of the Maryland Constitution is limited to adopting rules “concerning the practice and
procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other courts of this
State.”  It does not extend to substantively waiving the State’s sovereign immunity.
As Sharafeldin’s action was concededly not filed in the Circuit Court within the one
year period, it is barred by sovereign immunity.  The court erred in overruling the
Department’s motion to dismiss.
-24-
JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY
REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS COMPLAINT; COSTS TO 
BE
PAID BY APPELLEE.