Case Title: Jack Cline v. Ashland, Inc., et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1041076

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 01/05/07
Cline v. Ashland
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
____________________
1041076
____________________
Jack Cline
v.
Ashland, Inc., et al.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division
(CV-01-423)
On Application for Rehearing
SEE, Justice.
APPLICATION GRANTED; NO-OPINION AFFIRMANCE OF OCTOBER 4,
2005, WITHDRAWN; AFFIRMED.  NO OPINION.
See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R. App. P.
Nabers, C.J., and See, Stuart, Smith, and Bolin, JJ.,
concur specially.
Lyons, Harwood, Woodall, and Parker, JJ., dissent.
1041076
2
SEE, Justice (concurring specially).
Jack Cline appeals from the summary judgment entered by
the Jefferson Circuit Court, which held that Cline's claims
are barred by the statute of limitations.  On October 14,
2005, this Court affirmed the summary judgment without an
opinion.  Cline applied for a rehearing.  We granted his
application and heard oral argument.  This Court today affirms
the summary judgment on rehearing, without an opinion, and I
write specially to explain why I concur in its decision to do
so. 
Cline alleges that from 1968 to 1987, while he was
working for Griffin Wheel Company of Bessemer, he was exposed
to the chemical benzene.  He retired from Griffin Wheel in
1995, and he was diagnosed with acute myelogenous leukemia
("AML") on October 7, 1999.  On April 6, 2001, Cline sued
Ashland, Inc.; Chevron Phillips Chemical L.P., the successor
in interest to Chevron Chemical Company, LLC; and ExxonMobil
Corporation, alleging that the defendants manufactured and/or
supplied the benzene to which he was exposed during the course
of his employment at Griffin Wheel.  He alleges that the
defendants are responsible for his developing AML and are
1041076
3
liable under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability
Doctrine ("the AEMLD").  The defendants moved for a summary
judgment, arguing that Cline's claims are barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.  Cline argued that the
statute of limitations did not begin to run until he was
diagnosed with AML.  The trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that the
applicable statute of limitations began to run in 1987, when
Cline was last exposed to the benzene.  Cline appealed the
trial court's summary judgment as to his AEMLD claim, and this
Court affirmed the summary judgment, without an opinion.
Cline applied for a rehearing, which this Court granted. 
In 1979, in Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala.
1979), this Court considered the case in which Jerry Garrett
sued several companies, claiming that he had unknowingly been
exposed to massive amounts of radiation from 1955 to 1957
because, he argued, the companies had negligently designed
certain radar systems where he worked.  He did not experience
any health problems as a result of the radiation exposure
until March 1975, when his hair suddenly turned white and then
fell out.  He consulted several doctors but it was not until
1041076
This provision was recodified at § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code
1
1975, after the limitations period was increased to two years
in 1985.
4
March 1977 that a radiologist told him that his earlier
radiation exposure had caused his health problems.  Although
Garrett brought his action within 1 year of the radiologist's
diagnosis, he did so more than a year after the first
manifestation of his health problems and more than 20 years
after his last exposure to the radiation.  At the time this
Court decided Garrett, the applicable statute of limitations
required that "[a]ctions for any injury to the person or
rights of another not arising from contract and not
specifically enumerated in this section" be commenced within
one year from accrual.  § 6-2-39(a)(5), Ala. Code 1975.   In
1
Garrett, this Court held that "the statute of limitations of
one year began to run when [the] plaintiff was last exposed to
radiation and the plaintiff's ignorance of the tort or injury,
there being no fraudulent concealment, does not postpone the
running of the statute until the tort or injury is
discovered."  368 So. 2d at 521.  
The Garrett Court invited the legislature to respond.
The legislature responded by enacting Act No. 79-468, Ala.
1041076
Act No. 79-468 is codified at §§ 6-5-500 through -504,
2
Ala. Code 1975.
5
Acts 1979.   Act No. 79-468 provided a discovery rule for
2
cases in which a person has been injured by a toxic substance
over a period of time.  § 6-5-502, Ala. Code 1975.  Under the
discovery rule, the statute of limitations did not begin to
run until the date the plaintiff discovered, or should have
discovered, the injury.  § 6-5-502, Ala. Code 1975.  The
legislature, however, provided in Act No. 79-468 that if any
part of the Act was declared unconstitutional, then the entire
Act would become inoperative.  § 6-5-504, Ala. Code 1975.  In
accordance with this limitation, this Court invalidated the
entire Act when it held that a particular section of Act No.
79-468 concerning a rule of repose was unconstitutional.  With
Act No. 79-468 no longer in effect, the law reverted to the
"last exposure" rule declared in Garrett.  Since then, the
legislature has acted in the toxic-tort area, but has limited
the scope of the subsequent act to injuries resulting from
exposure to asbestos.  § 6-2-30(b),  Ala. Code 1975.  The
Alabama Legislature also has considered, and thus far chosen
1041076
See Senate Bill 534 and Senate Bill 535 (2006 Regular
3
Session); House Bill 659 and House Bill 660 (2005 Regular
Session); and House Bill 93 and House Bill 103 (2004 Regular
Session).
6
not to adopt, proposals that would provide a discovery rule in
cases of the nature of this one.  
3
This Court also has consistently chosen to continue to
follow Garrett's "last exposure" rule.  See, e.g., Moore v.
Glover, 501 So. 2d 1187, 1190 (Ala. 1986) ("[T]his Court's
opinion in Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala.
1979), settled the question of the 'accrual' of a plaintiff's
claim in a radiation exposure case for purposes of determining
when the applicable statute of limitations begins to run
...."); Hubbard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 599 So. 2d 20, 21
n.2 (Ala. 1982) ("[I]t seems to be settled in Alabama that the
'date of injury,' which starts the running of the statutory
period of limitations in a continuous exposure case, occurs
when the plaintiff was last exposed to the chemical or
condition causing his injuries.").
The legislature has acted in this area both by enacting
legislation and by considering, and thus far not adopting,
proposed legislation.  See §§ 6-5-500 through -504, Ala. Code
1975, and citations in footnote 3.  The power "to declare what
1041076
7
the law shall be" is a legislative power, and this Court will
not revisit an area of the law in which the legislature has
already acted.  City of Daphne v. City of Spanish Fort, 853
So. 2d 933, 942 (Ala. 2003).  
The determination of when the statute of limitations
ought to begin to run in toxic-substance-exposure cases
depends on a weighing of competing public policies.  We seek
in Alabama to compensate those who have been injured.  Ala.
Const. 1901, Art. I, § 13 ("[T]hat every person, for any
injury done him ... shall have a remedy by due process of law;
and right and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial, or delay.").  On the other hand, we also seek to avoid
stale claims and the injustice such claims can engender.
Travis v. Ziter, 681 So. 2d 1348, 1355 (Ala. 1996) ("At its
core, the statute of limitations advances the truth-seeking
function of our justice system, promotes efficiency by giving
plaintiffs an incentive to timely pursue claims, and promotes
stability by protecting defendants from stale claims.").  The
proper balance between these competing public policies
requires a weighing, and "[i]t is well established that
'"[t]he Legislature is endowed with the exclusive domain to
1041076
"Within 
their 
respective 
spheres 
each 
branch 
of
4
government is supreme.  Judicial power and legislative power
are coordinate, and neither can encroach upon the other."
Morgan County Comm'n v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 306, 293 So. 2d
830, 834 (1974) (citations omitted).
8
formulate public policy in Alabama ...."'"  Leonard v.
4
Terminix Int'l Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 534 (Ala. 2002) (citations
omitted).   
Justice Harwood states in his dissent that he would
require that there be a manifest, physical injury before the
statute of limitations begins to run in these toxic-substance-
exposure 
cases. 
 
He 
would 
apply 
this 
interpretation
prospectively only, as a forward-looking resolution of the
problem.  There is an appeal to the proposal; it looks very
much like the statute enacted by the legislature in response
to this Court's decision in Garrett, but without the repose
provision that this Court held unconstitutional and that the
legislature considered essential to the Act.  The imposition
of this sort of policy change, however, falls squarely within
the power and competence of the legislative branch of our
government.  Berdeaux v. City Nat'l Bank of Birmingham, 424
So. 2d 594, 595 (Ala. 1982) ("[W]e cannot agree that redress
should come by rewriting the law of torts. ...  To be able to
1041076
9
answer [the question presented by the appeal] would require
data that a court is ill equipped to gather, but which the
legislature is equally capable of assessing.  The issue itself
presents a policy matter peculiarly within the province of the
legislative as opposed to the judicial branch of government.
... [C]ourts ... should leave to the executive and legislative
branches matters requiring resolution in the body politic.").
The public-policy question presented to this Court in
this case is one of profound importance, not only to the
parties involved, but to countless others as well; however,
this Court's jurisdiction and competence are not defined by
the importance of the matter presented.  See Etowah County
Comm'n v. Hayes, 569 So. 2d 397, 398 (Ala. 1990) ("In testing
the absolutism of the authority of the legislative branch to
appropriate operational funds for the executive branch, the
judicial branch of government is constrained not to substitute
its judgment for that of the legislature and thus usurp the
plenary power of that branch.").  The legislature is entrusted
with making the public policy of this State, whether or not it
is public policy of which this Court would approve.  Boles v.
Parris, [Ms. 1030744, August 18, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___
1041076
10
(Ala. 2006) ("[I]t is well established that the legislature,
and not this Court, has the exclusive domain to formulate
public policy in Alabama."); Marsh v. Green, 782 So. 2d 223,
231 (Ala. 2000) ("Matters of policy are for the Legislature
and, whether wise or unwise, legislative policies are of no
concern to the courts.").  The legislature is empowered to
investigate the full impact of a public-policy decision on not
only the parties involved in a particular case, but on the
State as a whole; it is designed to offer the very kind of
forward-looking resolution Justice Harwood proposes in the
dissent.  See Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 505, 244 N.W.2d
65, 70 (1976) ("The Legislature may hold hearings, debate the
relevant policy considerations, weigh the testimony, and, in
the event [it] determines a change in the law is necessary or
desirable, it can then draft statutes which would most
adequately meet the needs of the public in general, while
balancing the interest of specific sectors.").  I, therefore,
defer to the legislature for a resolution of the problem
presented by this case.
I 
would 
also 
note 
that 
the 
proposed 
prospective
application of the interpretation of the law advocated by the
1041076
11
dissent to only future litigants may exceed the power of this
Court.  This Court has stated that whether to apply an
interpretation of the law retroactively or prospectively is a
"matter of judicial discretion," State v. Morrison Cafeterias
Consol., Inc. of Delaware, 487 So. 2d 898, 903 (Ala. 1985),
but that this Court's "strong inclination is to avoid
establishing rules that are to be applied prospectively only."
Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So. 2d 432, 439
(Ala. 2001).  We have stated that applying the law
retroactively "'is in keeping with the traditional function of
the courts to decide cases before them based on their current
understanding of the law. ... It also reflects the declaratory
theory of law, ... according to which the courts are
understood only to find the law, not to make it.'"  McCullar
v. Universal Underwriters Life Ins. Co., 687 So. 2d 156, 165
(Ala. 1996).  "'Courts do not and cannot change the law by
overruling or modifying former opinions.  They only declare it
by correcting an imperfect or erroneous view.  The law itself
remains the same.'"  G.P. v. A.A.K., 841 So. 2d 1252, 1255 n.1
(Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (quoting Crigler v. Shepler, 79 Kan.
834, 842, 101 P. 619, 621 (1909)).  
1041076
12
The Supreme Court of the United States has renounced the
practice of prospective application of judicial decisions.
See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97
(1993)("When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the
parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation
of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in
all cases still open on direct review and as to all events,
regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our
announcement of the rule."); Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde,
514 U.S. 749, 752 (1995)(following Harper and summarizing the
decision as follows: "this Court, in Harper v. Virginia Dept.
of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97, ... held that, when (1) the
Court decides a case and applies the (new) legal rule of that
case to the parties before it, then (2) it and other courts
must treat that same (new) legal rule as 'retroactive,'
applying it, for example, to all pending cases, whether or not
those cases involve predecision events").  In his special
concurrence 
in 
Harper, 
Justice 
Scalia 
explained 
that
prospective application of judicial decisions violates the
separation-of-powers doctrine.  Harper, 509 U.S. at 107
(Scalia, J., concurring).  ("Fully retroactive decisionmaking
1041076
13
was considered a principal distinction between the judicial
and the legislative power: '[I]t is said that that which
distinguishes a judicial from a legislative act is, that the
one is a determination of what the existing law is in relation
to some existing thing already done or happened, while the
other is a predetermination of what the law shall be for the
regulation of all future cases.'  T. Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations *91 [(1868)].").
I agree with Justice Scalia and the Supreme Court of the
United States that prospectivity is incompatible with the
traditional conception of judicial power.  Moreover, the
Alabama Constitution unequivocally states that "the judicial
[branch] shall never exercise the legislative and executive
powers, or either of them; to the end that it may be a
government of laws and not of men."  Article III, § 43, Ala.
Const. 1901.  As I stated in State ex rel. King v. Morton,
[Ms. 1051771, October 12, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala.
2006) 
(See, 
J., 
concurring 
specially): 
 
"Unlike 
the
Constitution of the United States, from which we may deduce a
general, but limited, separation-of-powers doctrine by its
structure, the Constitution of Alabama provides expressly for
1041076
14
a separation of powers that appears more rigorous than that of
the federal constitution."  (Footnote omitted.)  Certainly, if
the prospective application of a judicial decision is
violative of the United States Constitution, it is also
violative of the Alabama Constitution.  As we stated in City
of Daphne v. City of Spanish Fort, 853 So. 2d 933, 942 (Ala.
2003): "'"[T]o declare what the law is, or has been, is a
judicial power; to declare what the law shall be, is
legislative."'" (quoting Sanders v. Cabaniss, 43 Ala. 173, 180
(1869), quoting in turn Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations 91-95 (1868)).  
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in affirming the
summary judgment.
Nabers, C.J., and Stuart, J., concur.
1041076
15
SMITH, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in affirming the judgment of the trial court.
I write specially to emphasize, as this Court has in the past,
that the legislature must act to determine the date of the
accrual of the cause of action in toxic-substance-exposure
cases.  
Although the Justices in Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So.
2d 516 (Ala. 1979), were split as to the proper definition of
"accrued," both the majority opinion and the dissenting
Justices called on the legislature to enact legislation
addressing that definition.  Garrett thus placed the ball in
the legislature's court.
The legislature responded by enacting Act No. 79-468,
Ala. Acts 1979 (codified at Ala. Code 1975, §§ 6-5-500 through
-504).  Section 6-5-502 provided a discovery rule for actions
seeking damages for injuries resulting from exposure to toxic
substances.  However, § 6-5-502(c), which contained a rule of
repose, was declared unconstitutional in Lankford v. Sullivan,
Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982), as recognized in
Daniel v. Heil Co., 418 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 1982).  Because §
6-5-504 provided that in the event any part of §§ 6-5-500
1041076
Act No. 80-566 was also challenged as unconstitutional,
5
and part of it was declared unconstitutional.  See Tyson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399  So. 2d 263 (Ala. 1981).
However, unlike Act No. 79-468, it did not contain a clause
nullifying the entire act if a portion were found to be
invalid.  Thus, the discovery rule provided by Act No. 80-566
in asbestos-exposure cases remains operable.  
16
through -504 was declared invalid the entire act would become
inoperable, Garrett remained the law.  Soon thereafter, the
legislature again acted to alter this Court's definition of
"accrued" in toxic-substance-exposure cases by enacting Act
No. 80-566, Ala. Acts 1980, but this time it limited the act
strictly to claims alleging injury from asbestos.  See Ala.
Code 1975, § 6-2-30(b).   The definition of "accrued" in
5
toxic-substance-exposure cases other than asbestos cases was
left untouched, and the legislature is presumed to have
knowledge of this fact.  Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Hodgen,
884 So. 2d 801, 814 (Ala. 2003) ("The Legislature, when it
enacts legislation, is presumed to have knowledge of existing
law and of the judicial construction of existing statutes.").
This Court has continued to apply the holding of Garrett
since 1979.  See, e.g., Ramey v. Guyton, 394 So. 2d 2, 5 (Ala.
1980) (stating that "while rejecting the 'discovery of injury'
rule, [Garrett] remained true to the common law 'accrual'
1041076
17
principle"); Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So. 2d
263, 268 (Ala. 1981) (noting that, before the enactment of Act
No. 80-566, Garrett held that a claim based on injury from
exposure to asbestos accrued on the date of plaintiff's last
exposure); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 491 So.
2d 904, 908 (Ala. 1986) (holding that "the longstanding
damages rule followed in [Garrett]" was applicable in a case
involving an injury sustained from exposure to cotton fibers);
Moore v. Glover, 501 So. 2d 1187, 1190 (Ala. 1986) ("[T]his
Court's opinion in [Garrett], settled the question of the
'accrual' of a plaintiff's claim in a radiation exposure case
for purposes of determining when the applicable statute of
limitations begins to run ...."); Hillis v. Rentokil, Inc.,
596 So. 2d 888, 890 (Ala. 1992) (applying the rule in Garrett
that the statute of limitations begins to run from the "date
of injury"); Hubbard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 599 So. 2d 20,
21 n.2 (Ala. 1992) (citing Garrett for the proposition that
"the 'date of injury,' which starts the running of the
statutory period of limitations in a continuous exposure case,
occurs when the plaintiff was last exposed to the chemical or
condition causing his injuries"); Johnson v. Garlock, Inc.,
1041076
18
682 So. 2d 25 (Ala. 1996) (applying the rule of Garrett in an
asbestos-exposure case in which § 6-2-30(b) did not apply);
and Becton v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 706 So. 2d 1134, 1135 (Ala.
1997) (citing Garrett for the proposition that "[f]or purposes
of an action based on continuous exposure to a hazardous
substance, the date of the injury is the day on which the
plaintiff was last exposed to the hazardous substance causing
the injuries").  See also Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So. 2d
829 (Ala. 2001).
Proposals to adopt a discovery rule or to redefine when
a cause of action accrues in toxic-substance-exposure cases
have been introduced in the legislature, but those proposals
have not been enacted.  See Senate Bill 535 (2006 Regular
Session) (expanding Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-30(b), to provide
that a civil action for any injury to the person resulting
from exposure to "any toxic substance" shall be deemed to
accrue on the first date the injured party, through reasonable
diligence, should have reason to discover the injury); House
Bill 660 (2005 Regular Session) (proposing a constitutional
amendment to provide that a civil cause of action for exposure
to toxic substances shall be deemed to accrue on the date the
1041076
19
injured party should have reason to discover the injury giving
rise to the cause of action); and House Bill 103 (2004 Regular
Session) (providing that an action for breach of warranty or
for injury caused by the "latent" effects of exposure to
"substances" must be brought within two years from the date
the injury is discovered or, by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should have been discovered).
On some level, all statutes of limitations can lead to
harsh results.  On the other hand, the absence of statutes of
limitations, or statutes of limitations that allow the
litigation of exceedingly old and stale cases, can also lead
to harsh results.  Given the various types of toxic substances
and injuries that could result from exposure to such
substances, the science involved in detecting and diagnosing
injuries or the manifestation of injuries resulting from such
exposure, and the public-policy considerations that must be
taken into account, I believe the legislature is better
equipped than is this Court to formulate a proper definition
of "accrued" in these types of cases.  The legislature has
certain fact-finding and investigative capabilities that this
Court lacks; it is thus in a better position to weigh the
1041076
20
countervailing 
public-policy 
considerations 
inherent 
in
properly determining "how long is too long."  See Leonard v.
Terminix Int'l Co., 854 So. 2d 529, 534 (Ala. 2002)(holding
that the legislature, and not this Court, has the exclusive
domain to formulate public policy in Alabama); Berdeaux v.
City Nat'l Bank of Birmingham, 424 So. 2d 594, 595 (Ala. 1982)
(declining to create a duty requiring banks to provide
protection for customers using automatic teller machines
because to do so "would require data that a court is ill
equipped to gather, but which the legislature is especially
capable of assessing" and noting that "[t]he issue itself
presents a policy matter peculiarly within the province of the
legislative as opposed to the judicial branch of government");
and Matthews v. Mountain Lodge Apartments, Inc., 388 So. 2d
935, 938 (Ala. 1980) (plurality opinion) (stating that the
legislature--through 
hearings 
and 
other 
fact-finding
procedures--is better equipped to accurately weigh various
factors in creating law in accord with public policy).
Given the long history of Garrett, the difficulty in
crafting a proper definition of "accrued" in toxic-substance-
exposure cases, along with the public-policy considerations
1041076
21
that must be taken into account in formulating such a
definition, and the legislature's specific prior action in
asbestos-exposure cases, I believe that the legislature is the
more appropriate body to impose a new rule.
Bolin, J., concurs.
1041076
22
HARWOOD, Justice (dissenting).
In their special concurrences to this Court's decision to
affirm the trial court's summary judgment in this appeal
without an opinion, Justice See and Justice Smith emphasize
that it is the role of the legislature, not this Court, to
declare public policy.  I quite agree.  Indeed, the
legislature has already acted and declared the public policy
applicable to this case, by means of the interaction of two
provisions of the Code of Alabama.  Section 6-2-30(a), Ala.
Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ll civil
actions must be commenced after the cause of action has
accrued within the period prescribed ... and not afterwards
...."  Section 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code 1975, provides that an
action of the type Jack Cline has filed "must be brought
within two years."  Therefore, the legislatively declared
public policy is that an action such as Cline's can be filed
(within the two-year limitations period) only after the cause
of action has accrued.  By this dissent, I do not presume to
advocate a contrary public policy; I simply attempt to honor
the public policy the legislature has declared, by correctly
construing the statutory language "cause of action has
1041076
23
accrued" in § 6-2-30(a) in  in accord with traditional
principles of tort law.
Neither special concurrence takes the position that the
construction given that language in Garrett v. Raytheon Co.,
368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979), was in accord with those
principles and true to the legislature's intent.  They simply
take the position, in support of which they offer reasoned
argument, that any change from the rule set out in Garrett
must, at this late date, be left exclusively to the
legislature.  For the reasons I set forth hereinafter, I
respectively disagree.
First, 
however, 
these 
three 
miscellaneous 
points:
Although Justice See fairly states the basic facts underlying
Cline's tort claim, it is appropriate to note that it is
undisputed that acute myelogenous leukemia can be caused by
exposure to benzene, which this Court described in Shell v.
Union Oil Co., 489 So. 2d 569, 570 (Ala. 1986), as "a
carcinogen known to cause leukemia."  Also, Cline made the
alternative argument before the trial court and on original
submission on this appeal that his "last exposure" in 1999 to
benzene contained in the product of an alleged "joint
1041076
24
tortfeasor" of the present appellees should serve to delay the
running of the statute of limitations as to them as well.
Because this contention was not revisited in Cline's brief in
support of his application for rehearing, it was thereby
waived and will not now be considered.  Birmingham News Co. v.
Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 77 (Ala. 2004).  Last, the defendants
have not attempted to argue that the natural history of acute
myelogenous leukemia is such that Cline must have been
suffering from it, i.e., that he must have actually
experienced a manifest, present injury in connection with it,
before his October 7, 1999, diagnosis.  Accordingly, Cline's
action filed on April 6, 2001, was timely under the two-year
statute of limitations, if the commencement of the running of
that statute is measured from October 7, 1999, or any other
time within two years before April 6, 2001.
Relevant Caselaw and Legislation
In Garrett, supra, Jerry Kenneth Garrett filed an action
in 1978 against seven companies he alleged had designed,
manufactured, or serviced certain radar systems with which he
had had contact from 1955 to 1957; he asserted that because of
the defective condition of those systems, he unknowingly had
1041076
25
been exposed to massive dosages of dangerous radiation.  He
had experienced no symptoms or health problems until March
1975.  He then consulted numerous doctors, but the nature of
his problems was not diagnosed until March 1977 when a
radiologist advised him that his problems were the result of
his earlier radiation exposure.  Garrett's action was filed
within one year of that diagnosis, but more than one year
after the first manifestation of his health problems and more
than two decades after his last exposure to the radiation.
Then, as now, § 6-2-30, Ala. Code 1975, required that all
civil actions must be commenced within the statutorily
prescribed limitations period "after the cause of action has
accrued" (emphasis supplied). The then applicable statute of
limitations, former § 6-2-39(a)(5), required "[a]ctions for
any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from
contract and not specifically enumerated in this section" to
be commenced within one year from accrual.  (That provision
was recodified as § 6-2-38(l) when the limitations period was
increased to two years in 1985.)
The opinion of the five-member Garrett majority (four
Justices dissented) commenced: "When does the statute of
1041076
26
limitations begin to run for injuries suffered as a result of
radiation exposure?  We conclude that it begins to run when
the plaintiff is exposed to radiation and an injury occurs."
368 So. 2d at 517-18 (emphasis supplied).  However, the
majority then collapsed injury into exposure, holding that
"the statute of limitations of one year began to run when
plaintiff was last exposed to radiation and plaintiff's
ignorance of the tort or injury, there being no fraudulent
concealment, does not postpone the running of the statute
until the tort or injury is discovered."  The Court justified
this conclusion by stating, "[i]f plaintiff was not injured in
1955-1957 then defendant committed no negligent act at that
time which resulted in injury and defendant would not be
liable.  If plaintiff did become injured or damaged at that
time, then the statute of limitations has run."  368 So. 2d at
521.  The Court similarly reasoned, "[d]amage must have
occurred at the time of exposure else defendant would not be
liable.  It is simply that all the progressive nature of the
injury has not made itself manifest at the time of the last
exposure."  368 So. 2d at 520. As Justice Shores observed in
her dissent, "[t]he majority opinion assumes that the injury
1041076
27
occurred simultaneously with the plaintiff's exposure to the
radiation."  368 So. 2d at 526. She disagreed, stating that
"[t]he defendant's exposure of the plaintiff to radiation
would not create a cause of action in the plaintiff until
injury resulted from that exposure."  368 So. 2d at 526.
Justice Jones in his dissenting opinion on application for
rehearing likewise explained that the holding of the majority
"reduces date of injury (and thus accrual of the cause of
action) to a legal conclusion without regard to when the
injury in fact occurs."  386 So. 2d at 528. 
Leading up to its conclusion that "[t]he injury in this
case occurred on the date or dates of exposure," 368 So. 2d at
520, the majority acknowledged that 
"there are cases where the act complained of does
not itself constitute a legal injury at the time,
but plaintiff's injury only comes as a result of,
and in furtherance and subsequent development of,
the act defendant has done. In such cases, the cause
of action accrues, and the statute of limitation
begins to run, 'when, and only when, the damages are
sustained.'"
368 So. 2d at 519.  The countervailing rule was explained by
the Court as follows: 
"'"If the act of which the injury is the natural
sequence is of itself a legal injury to plaintiff,
a completed wrong, the cause of action accrues and
1041076
28
the statute begins to run from the time the act is
committed, be the actual damage (then apparent)
however slight, and the statute will operate to bar
a recovery not only for the present damages but for
damages developing subsequently and not actionable
at the time of the wrong done; for in such a case
the subsequent increase in the damages resulting
gives no new cause of action."'"
368 So. 2d at 519 (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Stuart-McCorkle,
291 Ala. 601, 608, 285 So. 2d 468, 473 (1973), quoting in turn
Kelly v. Shropshire, 199 Ala. 602, 604-05, 15 So. 291, 292
(1917)).  
The majority's explanation that Garrett's radiation
exposure fell within the second class of cases because the
"defendant committed no negligent act at that time which
resulted in injury and defendant would not be liable," 368 So.
2d at 521, and "[d]amage must have occurred at the time of
exposure else defendant would not be liable," 368 So. 2d at
520, seems to me to be no more than circular reasoning that
ignores the first class of cases.  Indeed, to my best attempt
to follow the reasoning of the Garrett majority, it represents
judicial public policy-making of the type the majority in this
case now rightfully decries.
In selecting "last exposure" as the accrual date, the
Garrett Court relied upon three of its prior decisions and a
1041076
29
federal case:  Howell v. City of Dothan, 234 Ala. 158, 174 So.
624 (1937); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Agricola Furnace
Co., 236 Ala. 535, 183 So. 677 (1938); Garren v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 340 So. 2d 764 (Ala. 1976); and Minyard v.
Woodward Iron Co., 81 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ala. 1948), aff'd 170
F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1948).
Howell simply commented in connection with its review of
a lower court's order abating a nuisance caused by the
overflow of sewage but failing to award any monetary damages,
as follows: 
"It may not be out of place to observe, as to
damages that are recurring and separable, that the
right to recover, as to such damages not barred by
statute, is not affected by the fact that other
damages of the same character are barred by statute,
provided the damages sustained within the statutory
period are separable from those that are barred
under the statute by the lapse of time."  
234 Ala. at 162, 174 So. at 628.  There was no issue in the
case about when each item of damage had occurred.  
In Agricola Furnace, the plaintiff in the lawsuit
underlying his employer's declaratory-judgment action against
its insurer alleged that he had contracted silicosis and
tuberculosis by his exposure to dust and metal particles in
his 10 years of employment.  The plaintiff claimed that "along
1041076
30
about the first of May 1936 while so engaged [in his
employment] he was made sick in that way," although his
sickness "did not appear suddenly, violently or by accidental
means but gradually appeared to grow progressively worse as a
result of said continuous effect of said dust and particles of
metal ...."  236 Ala. at 537, 183 So. at 678.  The Court
stated its understanding of the employee's complaint to be
that his exposure was continuous, "but that in May 1936 he was
for that cause made sick."  236 Ala. at 537, 183 So. at 679.
The employee filed his action in November of that year; thus,
there was no issue of its timeliness vis-à-vis the stated date
of injury.  The Court held that a tort "may be of a continuous
sort, and, if so, a recovery may be had for all damages which
occurred within the period of limitations," and that such a
continuous tort could qualify as "an accident" under an
insurance policy, "however difficult it may be to separate the
amount of the damages done within the period of the statute of
limitations from that occurring in the period preceding."  236
Ala. at 538, 183 So. at 679.  
In Minyard, the federal district judge awarded the
plaintiff, who had been exposed to silica dust from November
1041076
31
1945 until he quit his job for health reasons in September
1946, monetary damages representing the aggravation by that
exposure of the employee's preexisting "silicotic condition."
The judge held that Alabama's one-year statute of limitations
"began to run from the last date on which plaintiff inhaled
silica dust while employed by defendant ...."  81 F. Supp. at
417.  Citing Howell and Agricola Furnace, among other cases,
the judge concluded that under Alabama caselaw 
"a recovery may be had for injury resulting from a
continuous tort subject to the limitation that only
damages 
which 
occurred 
within 
the 
period 
of
limitations may be recovered, provided that the
damages sustained within the statutory period are
separable from those that are barred under the
statute by the lapse of time."
81 F. Supp. at 417.  The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment,
stating simply that it found no merit in the defendant's
contention that the action was barred by Alabama's one-year
statute of limitations.  Woodward Iron Co. v. Minyard, 170
F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1948).  
Garren was a third-party-tortfeasor action by an employee
who had suffered pulmonary injury "as a consequence of
continuously breathing dust and lint" emanating from a machine
1041076
32
she had operated on her job for several years, until she was
forced to quit work on April 23, 1974.  On April 22, 1975, she
sued the manufacturer of the machine on a products-liability
theory and her employer's insurance carrier on a negligent-
safety-inspection theory.
"Both defendants were granted partial summary
judgments on the grounds that plaintiff's claims for
relief, seeking to recover damages for injuries
suffered more than one year prior to April 22, 1975,
are barred by the one-year statute of limitations;
further, any damages to which plaintiff might
otherwise be entitled could not include those for
any injuries suffered by plaintiff more than one
year prior to April 22, 1975. Plaintiff appeals from
these partial summary judgments. Rule 54(b), [Ala.
R. Civ. P.]."
340 So. 2d at 766.
Thus, the issue in Garren was not when the statute of
limitations had been triggered, but simply whether the
plaintiff could recover damages for an injury that had
occurred more than one year before the date she sued.  Given
the fact that plaintiff's right to file a third-party action
arose out of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Court
reasoned that "the statute of limitations begins to run from
the date of the injury, which is defined in [Code of Alabama,
Tit. 26,] § 313(42) [of the Workmen's Compensation Act] as the
1041076
33
date of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease which
gave rise to the injury."  340 So. 2d at 765. That Code
section (recodified at the time of Garrett as § 25-5-117)
provided that for the purpose of bringing a workmen's
compensation claim, "[t]he date of the injury shall mean ...
the date of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease in
the employment of the employer in whose employment the
employee was last exposed to the hazards of the disease."
However, as Justice Jones emphasized in his dissent in
Garrett and his extended dissent on denial of application for
rehearing in that case, the Garren Court's reliance on the
workers' compensation Code section was "misplaced because the
third-party common law action in Garren does not draw upon the
Workmen's Compensation Act for its definition of date of
injury."  368 So. 2d at 525.  Justice Jones pointed out that
if the Workmen's Compensation Act definition of date of injury
had in fact applied, Garren should have been decided
differently because under the Workmen's Compensation Act Ms.
Garren would have been entitled to recover her full injuries,
not just those incurred during the one-year period preceding
the filing of her complaint.  Justice Faulkner likewise
1041076
34
explained in his dissent in Garrett that "to engraft this
[Workmen's Compensation Act] statutory scheme on unrelated
common law claims is illogical and unsupported."  368 So. 2d
at 523. 
Recognizing the harsh effect of its holding, the Garrett
majority encouraged the legislature to consider adopting a
"discovery" rule, "so that a plaintiff's claim will not be
barred when he has no way to ascertain that he has been
damaged by a deleterious substance because the result has not
manifested itself until the statute of limitations has run."
368 So. 2d at 521 (emphasis supplied).  Noting that the
legislature "'has the inherent power to determine the date and
time within which an action may be brought unless the time
fixed is clearly arbitrary or unreasonable,'" 368 So. 2d at
520 (quoting an earlier case), the Court stated:
"It may be that Alabama's rejection of the
'Discovery Rule' is contrary to the weight of
opinion generally.  However, as this Court is
committed to the proposition that the legislature
has the inherent power to establish statutes of
limitation, we have no other alternative than to
leave it to the legislature to abrogate this rule
and adopt a more equitable one should it see fit
...."
1041076
35
368 So. 2d at 521. Justice Shores in her dissent joined the
majority in inviting the legislature to remedy the situation.
The legislature attempted to do just that later that
year, enacting Act No. 79-468, Ala. Acts 1979, now codified as
§§ 6-5-500 through -504.  The legislation represented "a
comprehensive system consisting of the time for commencement
of actions, for discoverability of actions based on insidious
disease and the repose of actions" and "a complete and unified
approach to the time in which product liability actions" might
be brought. § 6-5-500.  It contained, among other things, a
"rule of discovery" whereby latent-injury cases resulting from
exposure to toxic substances over a period of time could be
brought within one year from the date that the injury "is or
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been
discovered by the plaintiff," and the cause of action was
"deemed to accrue" at that time. § 6-5-502(b).  Section 6-5-
503 stated that the legislation would "apply only to product
liability actions, wherein each element accrues after the
effective date of this division, and no provision of this
division shall have retroactive application."  The legislature
also included a 10-year absolute rule of repose measured from
1041076
36
the date the product was first put to use, § 6-5-502(c), but
that feature was declared unconstitutional in Lankford v.
Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416  So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982).  This
Court's decision in Lankford had the result of invalidating
the entire act, because § 6-5-504 provided that "each section,
clause, provision, or portion" of the act was to be deemed
"inseparable and nonseverable from all others," and in the
event any aspect of the legislation was declared invalid or
unconstitutional "the entire [Act] and each section, clause,
provision, or portion thereof shall be inoperative and have no
effect."  Therefore, after Lankford Act No. 79-468 was a "dead
letter."  
In 1980 the legislature enacted Act No. 80-566.  Section
2 of that act, now codified as § 6-2-30(b), provides that
asbestos-exposure claims "shall be deemed to accrue on the
first date the injured party, through reasonable diligence,
should have reason to discover the injury giving rise to such
civil action."  Although Section 3 of Act No. 80-566, stating
that following its effective date the act would "apply
retroactively to all pending causes of action," was held
unconstitutional in Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399
1041076
37
So. 2d 263 (Ala. 1981), as violating § 95, Ala. Const. 1901,
the prospective "discovery rule" feature remains viable. Bills
providing for the adoption of the discovery rule in all
hazardous-exposure cases have been proposed in the legislature
for at least the last three years, but have not been passed;
Senate Bill 534 and Senate Bill 535 (2006 Regular Session);
House Bill 659 and House Bill 660 (2005 Regular Session); and
House Bill 93 and House Bill 103 (2004 Regular Session).
In his dissent in Garrett, Justice Jones noted the
potentially anomalous result that logically could flow from
the artificiality of the "last exposure" rule of accrual:
"The holding of the majority says, or it may be
fairly interpreted to say, that one so exposed can
bring his action within the year of last exposure
and be entitled to at least nominal damages without
medical proof of radiation damage -- injury being
presumed as a matter of law; or, having timely filed
his claim, he may be able to delay trial to await
the manifestations of injury and medical proof."
368 So. 2d at 528 (footnote omitted). 
The flawed artificiality of the Garrett Court's choice of
the last-exposure rule was evident when this Court had to
apply it to the particular facts in Hillis v. Rentokil, Inc.,
596 So. 2d 888 (Ala. 1992).  The plaintiff there suffered
physical injury as a result of his exposure to chromated
1041076
38
copper arsenate during the course of his employment from
September 1985 to December 31, 1987, when his employment was
terminated.  His adverse physical symptoms had manifested well
before that "last exposure," however, and he had actually been
diagnosed by a doctor on September 25, 1987, who advised him
"to see a dermatologist because of an allergic reaction to the
[chromated copper arsenate]."  596 So. 2d at 889.  He did not
file suit until November 15, 1989.  Relying on the traditional
rule that the running of the statute of limitations is
triggered by the first actual damage, the defendant argued
that the limitations period had begun to run, at the latest,
by September 25, 1987, when the plaintiff's physical symptoms
had progressed to the point that he had returned to see his
doctor and had, in effect, received a diagnosis.  Constrained
by the Garrett last-exposure rule, however, this Court held
that because the action was filed within two years after the
date of last exposure, it was timely.  Thus, in Hillis the
last-exposure rule became a sword instead of a shield; an
individual whose cause of action had clearly accrued under the
conventional common-law approach, because he had experienced
1041076
39
a manifest, present injury, was given the protection of the
"last exposure equals first injury" rule of Garrett.
Although, 
as 
Justice 
See 
notes, 
this 
Court 
has
consistently chosen to continue to follow in subsequent cases
the last-exposure rule of Garrett, it has done so simply by
accepting that holding at face value, under the constraint of
stare decisis, without any reexamination of its underlying
rationale.
Garrett's last-exposure rule is purely a "court made"
rule, because § 6-2-30 then provided, and § 6-2-30(a) now
provides, only that civil actions must be commenced within the
applicable limitations period "after the cause of action has
accrued."  The Garrett Court simply declared, as a matter of
policy rather than scientific fact, that a toxic-exposure
cause of action accrues contemporaneously with the last
exposure to the toxic substance, it being judicially  deemed
that an injury has occurred at that time as a matter of law.
Neither Garrett nor any of its progeny articulate any
scientific basis for that conclusion, and certainly the
defendants in the present case do not argue that benzene
exposure, even up through a last exposure, is known to cause
1041076
40
concurrently some actual damage at the cellular level or
otherwise to inflict an objectively ascertainable bodily
injury.  
Although it is undisputed that "the Legislature has the
inherent power to enact a statute of limitations establishing
the period within which a claim must be brought,"  Baugher v.
Beaver Constr. Co., 791 So. 2d 932, 934 n.1 (Ala. 2000), the
question presented by this appeal is whether this Court should
reexamine its construction in Garrett of the operative phrase
in § 6-2-30, "after the cause of action has accrued" and
interpret it differently than it did in Garrett for toxic-
substance-exposure cases.
The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, and When Change in the
Law is the Role of the Judiciary
"Stare decisis is '[t]he doctrine of precedent under
which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial
decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.'
Black's Law Dictionary, 1443 (8th ed. 2004)."  Goldome Credit
Corp. v. Burke, 923 So. 2d 282, 292 (Ala. 2005).  As we
explained in Burke:
"Stare decisis, however, 'is a golden rule, not an
iron rule.' Ex parte Nice, 407 So. 2d 874, 883 (Ala.
1981) (Jones, J., dissenting). At times 'this Court
1041076
41
has had to recognize ... that it is necessary and
prudent to admit prior mistakes and to take the
steps necessary to ensure that we foster a system of
justice that is manageable and that is fair to all
concerned.' Foremost Ins. Co. v. Parham, 693 So. 2d
409, 421 (Ala. 1997). As Justice Maddox has stated:
'[W]hile we accord "due regard to the principle of
stare decisis," it is also this Court's duty "to
overrule prior decisions when we are convinced
beyond ... doubt that such decisions were wrong when
decided or that time has [effected] such change as
to require a change in the law."' Ex parte State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 764 So. 2d 543, 545-46 (Ala.
2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Beasley v. Bozeman,
294 Ala. 288, 291, 315 So. 2d 570, 572 (1975)
(Jones, J., concurring specially)). See also Ex
parte Melof, 735 So. 2d 1172, 1186 (Ala. 1999)
('"'courts are not bound by stare decisis to follow
a previous interpretation [that is] later found to
be erroneous'"' (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
v. J.M. Tull Metals Co., 629 So. 2d 633, 638 (Ala.
1993), quoting in turn 2B Norman J. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 49.05 at 16 (5th
ed. 1992)))."
923 So. 2d at 292-93.
Admittedly, we stated in Hexcel Decatur, Inc. v. Vickers,
908 So. 2d 237, 241 (Ala. 2005), that "[w]hen revisiting this
Court's interpretation of a statute, we will afford greater
deference to the doctrine of stare decisis than we would if
asked to revisit an interpretation of a constitutional
provision."  Nonetheless, this Court on a number of occasions
has 
felt 
obliged 
to 
correct 
its 
earlier 
statutory
construction, including Burke, supra.  For example, in
1041076
42
Foremost Insurance Co. v. Parham, 693 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1997),
one of the issues presented was when a fraud cause of action
"accrued" under Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-30(a), so as to trigger
the running of the limitations period of § 6-2-38(l).  Before
1989, the Court had construed the term "accrued" in that
context to mean that "a fraud claim accrued, thus commencing
the running of the statutory limitations period, when the
plaintiff discovered the fraud or when the plaintiff should
have discovered the fraud in the exercise of reasonable care."
693 So. 2d at 417.  Under the combined effect of Hickox v.
Stover, 551 So. 2d 259 (Ala. 1989), and Hicks v. Globe Life &
Accident Insurance Co., 584 So. 2d 458 (Ala. 1991), that
judicial interpretation was changed so that the theretofore
recognized "reasonable reliance" standard was replaced by a
"justifiable reliance" standard.  Under that new construction,
a person's reliance was to be judged only by what he or she
actually knew of facts that would have put a reasonable person
on notice of fraud.  693 So. 2d at 418.  The Court determined
in Parham, supra, that the reasonable-reliance standard had in
fact been the proper construction for the statutory term
1041076
43
"accrued" and overruled Hickox and Hicks on that point.  In
doing so, the Court declared:
"Although this Court strongly believes in the
doctrine of stare decisis and makes every reasonable
attempt to maintain the stability of the law, this
Court has had to recognize on occasion that it is
necessary and prudent to admit prior mistakes and to
take the steps necessary to ensure that we foster a
system of justice that is manageable and that is
fair to all concerned. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of
Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 598, 320 So. 2d 68, 73
(1975), in which Justice Shores, writing for this
Court, stated: 'As strongly as we believe in the
stability of the law, we also recognize that there
is merit, if not honor, in admitting prior mistakes
and correcting them.'"
693 So. 2d at 421.
The Court further held in Parham, however, that
"[b]ecause this return to the reasonable reliance
standard represents a fundamental change in the law
of fraud, we think it appropriate to make the new
standard applicable in all fraud cases filed after
the date of this decision, i.e., all cases filed
after March 14, 1997."
693 So. 2d at 421.
In Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So. 2d
68 (1975), the plaintiff/appellant sought "a re-evaluation of
this court's construction" of a statute, acknowledging that in
order for the plaintiff/appellant to prevail, the Court would
have to overrule a line of cases extending for more than 60
1041076
44
years following the 1907 enactment of the statute.  The
interpretation accorded the statute during that period had
occasioned opinions employing what the Jackson Court labeled
a "judicial sleight of hand," the necessity for which "could
have been avoided entirely by giving to the 1907 legislative
enactment its clear meaning."  294 Ala. at 597, 320 So. 2d at
72.  In choosing to correct its erroneous construction of the
statute, despite the fact that the legislature had reenacted
the statute without change as a part of its adoption of the
Codes of 1923 and 1940, the Court had the following to say:
"No one believes in the validity of the rule of
stare decisis and the necessity for stability in the
law more than we do. ...
"....
"As strongly as we believe in the stability of
the law, we also recognize that there is merit, if
not 
honor, 
in 
admitting 
prior 
mistakes 
and
correcting them. The city here argues that the
failure of the legislature to act in this area
constitutes its approval of the construction placed
on its enactments by this court. It is equally
arguable, as noted by Justice Currie, concurring
specially in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d
26, 115 N.W.2d 618, 626 (1962), that '... they (the
legislature) deferred to the supposed wisdom of the
court, or else determined that the court should
correct its own mistakes,' or as Judge Moremen of
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky responded to the
same argument in Haney v. City of Lexington, (Ky.),
386 S.W.2d 738, 741 (1964):
1041076
45
"'... It seems to us that an equally
reasonable 
assumption 
is 
that 
the
legislature 
might 
expect 
the 
courts
themselves to correct an unjust rule which
was judicially created. ...'"
294 Ala. at 597-98, 320 So. 2d at 73.
More recently, we explained in Ex parte State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co., 764 So. 2d 543, 545-46 n. 3 (Ala. 2000):
"'... The doctrine of stare decisis tends to
produce certainty in our law, but it is important to
realize that certainty per se is but a means to an
end, and not an end in itself. Certainty is
desirable only insofar as it operates to produce the
maximum good and the minimum harm and thereby to
advance justice.... When it appears that the evil
resulting from a continuation of the accepted rule
must be productive of greater mischief to the
community than can possibly ensue from disregarding
the previous adjudications on the subject, courts
have frequently and wisely departed from precedent,
14 Am.Jur., Courts, § 126."
In Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Alabama, Inc., 453 So. 2d
735 (Ala. 1984), the Court, having determined that a change
from the law as previously declared by it was necessary,
proceeded to determine whether the change "should be effected
by the judiciary."  453 So. 2d at 740.  The Court's analysis
of that issue was as follows:
"First, the judiciary originally created this
rule of law. It has not been altered, amended, or
expanded upon by our legislative body. In this
circumstance, where a judicial creation has become
1041076
46
outmoded or unjust in application, it is more often
appropriate for the judicial body to act to modify
the law. Further, it is not uncommon for the
Legislature to defer to the court's wisdom regarding
such a rule of law. See Jackson v. City of Florence,
294 Ala. 592, 320 So. 2d 68, 73 (1975); Haney v.
City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Ky. 1964);
and Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115
N.W.2d 618, 626 (1962). McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33
N.J. 172, 193, 162 A.2d 820, 832 (1960).
"Second, this is a tort law issue. An unjust
tort law may indirectly affect every citizen of the
state, but it will almost never directly affect
enough people at any given point in time to generate
a great deal of attention. It is not likely,
therefore, to be placed on the Legislature's crowded
agenda for consideration. For that reason, tort law
issues are, when certain other factors are present,
proper subjects for judicial reform.
"Last, when it has determined that a judicially
created law is unjust in its application, this court
cannot long permit itself to be used as an
instrument of inequity by refusing to act to change
the law. To do so undermines our credibility in the
public perception. The judicial branch of government
cannot avoid action. It must continuously apply the
law to resolve the conflicts between citizens of
this state. To continue to apply a judicially
created rule this court has recognized as obsolete
and unjust is a violation of its integrity."
453 So. 2d at 740.
Given 
the 
legislative 
history 
recited 
earlier,
particularly the legislature's prompt response to this Court's
decision in Garrett by enacting Act No. 79-468 (Ala. Code
1975, §§ 6-5-500 through -504) so as to register its
1041076
47
disagreement with the holding in Garrett, I do not view the
legislature's failure to act further than it has done in this
area to constitute its approval of the construction this Court
has placed on the statutory term "accrued" in toxic-exposure
cases.  Since Garrett, this Court has again and again
reaffirmed the proposition acknowledged but ignored in Garrett
-- that there are cases where the defendant's act does not
cause a contemporaneous injury to the plaintiff, but an injury
later manifests as a result of, and in furtherance and
subsequent development of, the defendant's act.  See, e.g., Ex
parte Stonebrook Dev., LLC, 854 So. 2d 584 (Ala. 2003); Hinton
ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto, 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001); Payton
v. Monsanto, 801 So. 2d 829 (Ala. 2001); Ex parte Floyd, 796
So. 2d 303 (Ala. 2001); System Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Boykin,
683 So. 2d 419 (Ala. 1996); Smith v. Medtronics, Inc., 607 So.
2d 156 (Ala. 1992); and Payne v. Alabama Cemetery Ass'n, Inc.,
413 So. 2d 1067 (Ala. 1982).  In Hinton, the Court was asked
in a certified question from a federal district court whether
Alabama law recognized a cause of action for medical
monitoring following hazardous-substance exposure when the
plaintiffs were not claiming any present injury or illness.
1041076
48
Based on that precise set of facts, the Court concluded that
Alabama law "provides no redress for a plaintiff who has no
present injury or illness" because, as the plurality opinion
explained, "Alabama law has long required a manifest, present
injury before a plaintiff may recover in tort."  813 So. 2d at
831-32, 829.
In his special writing concurring in the result, which I
joined, Justice Lyons observed:
"Turning to the question as phrased by the
district court, this Court, dealing with a similar
issue involving the accrual of a cause of action for
radiation exposure, stated the question as follows:
'When does the statute of limitations begin to run
for injuries suffered as a result of radiation
exposure?' Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516,
517-18 (Ala. 1979). This Court then answered the
question as follows: 'We conclude that it begins to
run when the plaintiff is exposed to radiation and
an injury occurs.' Id. (emphasis added). Recently,
in Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So. 2d 829, 835 (Ala.
2001), this Court quoted Ex parte Floyd, 796 So. 2d
303, 308 (Ala. 2001):
"'"Thus, if the act complained of does not
in and of itself constitute a legal injury
on the date on which it was performed, the
cause of action does not accrue on that
date. It is only when the first legal
injury occurs that the cause of action
accrues and the limitations period begins
to run."'"
813 So. 2d at 832.
1041076
49
In Southern Bakeries, Inc. v. Knipp, 852 So. 2d 712 (Ala.
2002), addressing the issue of what constitutes an "injury"
under § 6-2-30(b), Ala. Code 1975, sufficient for a cause of
action for exposure to asbestos to accrue, the Court had this
to say:
"Alabama has long required a manifest, present
injury before a plaintiff may recover in tort.7
Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 829 (Ala.
2001); see also DeArman v. Liberty Nat'l Ins. Co.,
786 So. 2d 1090 (Ala. 2000); Stringfellow v. State
Farm Life Ins. Co., 743 So. 2d 439 (Ala. 1999);
Williamson v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 741 So. 2d
1057 (Ala. 1999); Ford Motor Co. v. Rice, [726 So.
2d 626 (Ala. 1998)]; Pfizer, Inc. v. Farsian, 682
So. 2d 405 (Ala. 1996). The plaintiff in Hinton did
not allege that he sustained a physical injury or an
illness 
as 
a 
result 
of 
his 
exposure 
to
polychlorinated biphenyls ('PCBs'); instead, he
sought to recover the cost of medical monitoring he
alleged was made necessary by his exposure to PCBs.
813 So. 2d at 828. In Hinton, a plurality of this
Court held that Alabama law provides no redress for
a plaintiff who has suffered no present injury or
illness. 813 So. 2d at 831-32.
"________________
" It is a basic principle of tort law that in
7
negligence cases, the plaintiff must suffer actual
injury; the threat of future harm, not yet realized,
is not enough. W. Page Keeton et al., The Law of
Torts § 30 at 165 (5th ed. 1984). ..."
852 So. 2d at 716-17. 
1041076
"Catch-22: a frustrating situation in which one is
6
trapped by contradictory regulations or conditions."  Random
House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2001).
50
As things now stand, and as left in placed by the
majority in this case, the law in this State would seem to be
this: A person exposed to a toxic substance having the
potential to cause disease on a delayed basis, but who has
suffered no manifest, present injury within two years
thereafter, may not file an action within that two-year
period.  Hinton, supra; Southern Bakeries, supra.  If, after
two years, that same person in fact suffers an injury from the
exposure and files an action, the action will be dismissed on
the basis that it should have been filed earlier.  Thus, no
matter when the person attempts to file the action, it is
either too soon or too late.  This is a classic Catch-22,  and
6
one that would seem to violate Art. 1, § 13, Ala. Const. 1901,
which provides, in pertinent part, "that every person for any
injury done him ... shall have a remedy by due process of
law."
Perhaps, however, I am mistaken in understanding that the
interaction of the rule in Garrett and our more recent caselaw
serves to disallow the maintenance of a personal-injury tort
1041076
51
claim after exposure to a toxic substance but in advance of a
manifest, present injury.  After all, as noted earlier,
Justice Jones forecast in his dissent in Garrett that "one so
exposed can bring his action within the year [now two years]
of last exposure without medical proof of ... damage -- injury
being presumed as a matter of law."  368 So. 2d at 528.  In
fact, the defendants embraced this view of the Garrett rule
when they asserted in their initial brief to this Court that
Cline "was entitled to sue these defendants for his exposure
to benzene at Griffin Wheel from the first day he was exposed
to benzene there to any time up to and including the day two
years after he was last exposed there to benzene supplied by
the defendants ...."  (Appellee's brief, p. 43.)  If this then
is the correct state of the law, why could not the plaintiff
in such a situation, after asserting a "Garrett injury," claim
as additional damage mental anguish stemming from his or her
fear of subsequently developing disease?  And why could not
the plaintiff in such a case, if asserting claims of
fraudulent suppression, misrepresentation, and/or wantonness
(as in Southern Bakeries, supra), additionally maintain a
1041076
52
demand for punitive damages?  All without any proof of any
manifest, present injury. 
The number of persons eligible to file an action if all
that is required is some period of exposure to a toxic
substance is potentially huge.  See Ex parte BASF Corp., [Ms.
1051060, Oct. 27, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2006) (1,600
plaintiffs); Ex parte Flexible Prods. Co., 915 So. 2d 34 (Ala.
2005) (1,675 plaintiffs); and Ex parte Monsanto Co., 862  So.
2d 595 (Ala. 2003) (3,500 plaintiffs). 
I submit that under either view of the implications of
the Garrett rule, the law is confounded; thus, a continued
blind obedience to that rule, simply in deference to stare
decisis, does not serve the law, but rather greatly disserves
it.   As the Court explained in Ex parte First Alabama Bank,
883  So. 2d 1236, 1245 (Ala. 2003):
"Justice Houston, writing specially in Southern
States Ford, Inc. v. Proctor, 541 So. 2d 1081 (Ala.
1989), embraced a useful standard for weighing the
need for change against the advantages of settled
principles of law under the doctrine of stare
decisis. He posed the question as follows: whether
the ratio decidendi of earlier precedent would
'"hypothetically be consented to today by the
conscience and the feeling of justice of the
majority of all those whose obedience is required by
[that] rule of law?"' Southern States Ford, Inc.,
1041076
53
541 So. 2d at 1093 (quoting Laun, Stare Decisis, 25
Va. L.Rev. 12, 22 (1938))."
Surely the conscience and feeling of justice of the
majority of those whose obedience would be required to a rule
that says an action filed by a victim of delayed-onset injury
from toxic-substance exposure will always be disallowed as
either premature or too mature would be shocked.  On the other
hand, similar shock would surely be the reaction of the
majority of those required to accept a rule that would permit
anyone and everyone exposed to a toxic substance to maintain
a tort action even though that person had not yet suffered,
and statistically would probably never suffer, any health
problem as a result of that exposure. 
Based on the foregoing analyses, I conclude that the
Garrett construction of the § 6-2-30(a) phrase "after the
cause of action has accrued" in toxic-substance-exposure
situations should be corrected, that it should be corrected
now, and that this Court should undertake the correction
rather than abdicating that responsibility to the legislature.
Construction of "Accrued"
The proper construction of the term "accrued" in § 6-2-
30(a) in the context of toxic-substance-exposure cases should
1041076
54
honor the rule that a cause of action accrues only when there
has occurred a manifest, present injury.  I understand
"manifest" in this context to mean an injury manifested by
observable signs or symptoms or the existence of which is
medically identifiable.  "Manifest" in this sense does not
mean that the injured person must be personally aware of the
injury or must know its cause or origin.  All that is required
is that there be in fact a physical injury manifested, even if
the injured person is ignorant of it for some period after its
development.  This approach is mandated by the rule stated as
early as Kelly v. Shropshire, 199 Ala. 602, 605, 75 So. 291,
292 (1917), and as late as Gilmore v. M&B Realty Co., LLC, 895
So. 2d 200, 208 (Ala. 2004), and on innumerable occasions in
between, that "plaintiff's ignorance of the tort or injury, at
least if there is no fraudulent concealment by defendant,
[does 
not] 
postpone 
the 
running 
of 
the 
statute 
[of
limitations] until the tort or injury is discovered."  An oft-
declared companion rule is that "this Court will not apply the
discovery rule unless it is specifically prescribed by the
Legislature."  Travis v. Ziter, 681 So. 2d 1348, 1354 (Ala.
1996).  
1041076
55
We operate within our proper sphere when we undertake to
determine the construction that should be ascribed to the
legislatively prescribed term "accrued" in § 6-2-30(a); we
would operate outside that sphere were we to attempt to add to
the text of § 6-2-30(a) so as to superimpose some sort of
discovery feature.  Thus, I reject the notion that our prior
and present requirement of a "manifest," present injury means
that the injury must be obvious to and known by the injured
party.  That would simply represent the creation of a type of
discovery rule.  I reaffirm that creation of a discovery rule
lies within the province of the legislature, which is equipped
to weigh the competing public-policy arguments and to fashion
variations of discovery principles tailored to the particular
nature of each affected cause of action.  The legislature has
shown its special capability in that regard by structuring
variations of discovery features in the following statutes: §
6-2-3; § 6-2-30(b); § 6-5-482; § 6-5-502(b); § 6-5-574(a); §
7-2A-506(2); § 8-19-14; § 8-26A-16(c); and § 8-27-5.
Thus, as used in the phrase "manifest, present injury,"
the word "manifest" designates a condition that has evidenced
itself sufficiently that its existence is objectively evident
1041076
56
and apparent, even if only to the diagnostic skills of a
physician.  
"An injury manifests itself 'when it has become
evidenced in some significant fashion, whether or
not the patient/plaintiff actually becomes aware of
the injury.'  (Marriage & Family Center v. Superior
Court (1991) 228 Cal. App. 3d 1647, 1654 [279 Cal.
Rptr. 475]."
Photias v. Doerfler, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1014, 1021, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 202, 206 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by
Arredondo v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 131 Cal. App. 4th 614,
619, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 800 (2005).
Moreover, this case does not properly present the issue
whether a discovery feature should apply, because Cline claims
that his injury occurred on the date of his diagnosis of acute
myelogenous leukemia, and there is no present argument by the
defendants that the actual onset of the disease had accrued at
some earlier time.
The defendants argue that apart from the statute-of-
limitations issue there were failure-of-proof bases on which
the trial court should have entered a summary judgment in
their favor, and this Court could rely on those bases to
affirm that judgment.  They acknowledge that the trial court
did not reach those issues, but they invoke the principle of
1041076
57
appellate procedure that this Court may affirm the judgment of
a trial court on any valid ground presented by the record,
regardless of whether the ground was considered, or even if it
was rejected, by the trial court.  See Unum Life Ins. Co. of
America v. Wright, 897 So. 2d 1059, 1082 (Ala. 2004).  Because
I would not affirm the summary judgment here based on a
statute-of-limitations ground, it behooves me to explain why
I do not explore the option of affirming that judgment based
on other grounds.  
This Court unhesitatingly resorts to the device of
affirming a trial court's judgment on an alternative basis if
to do otherwise would have us apply an incorrect rule of law
to the parties' circumstances.  See Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 960 (Ala. 2004).
Nonetheless, the decision to affirm a trial court's ruling on
an alternative basis is discretionary with the appellate
court.  E.g., Tualatin Valley Builders Supply, Inc. v. TMT
Homes of Oregon, Inc., 179 Or. App. 575, 13 P.3d 1006 (2002);
Frady v. Morrow, 169 Or. App. 250, 255-56, 9 P.3d 141, 144
(2000); and Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 662
N.E.2d 397, 214 Ill. Dec. 831 (1996).  I would decline to
1041076
58
exercise our discretion to invoke that principle under the
circumstances presented by this case.  It was necessarily
clear to the trial court, obliged as it was to apply the last-
exposure rule of Garrett, that the case had to be dismissed
because the statute of limitations had expired.  Thus, it was
not just that the trial court failed to consider other
possible bases for entering a summary judgment, it was
effectively precluded from doing so.  
The defendants principally argue that Cline's evidence
failed sufficiently to establish the element of causation
required under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability
Doctrine,  but the trial court's reliance on the Garrett rule
effectively eliminated causation as an issue.  That is to say,
if a last exposure effects a legally cognizable injury as a
matter of law, then one need not prove actual causation.
Additionally, Cline's counsel asserts, and submits arguably
supportive materials, that he forwent fully developing certain
evidentiary aspects once it became evident that the trial
judge was going to dispose of the case on the basis of the
statute of limitations, and Cline's counsel came to understand
1041076
59
that counsel for the defendants was in agreement that the
planned appeal would focus solely on that issue.  
Presumably because of its determination early on that
Garrett clearly would require a dismissal of the claims
against the defendants, the trial court did not address
certain challenges they made to the admissibility and adequacy
of some of Cline's evidentiary submissions.  Because the
construction of "accrued" in § 6-2-30(a) that I advocate as
the proper one would so alter the analytical approach the
trial court would have taken had it had the benefit of that
rule, I would deem it appropriate to afford the trial court
the opportunity to address on the merits the defendants'
evidentiary-challenge arguments. 
Retroactive Versus Prospective Application
of the New Standard Proposed by this Dissent
Although my position was not adopted by the majority of
the Court, I nonetheless believe a discussion of the reasons
favoring a prospective application of a new accrual rule for
toxic-substance-exposure cases is in order.
"'The determination of the retroactive or
prospective application of a decision overruling a
prior decision is a matter of judicial discretion
that must be exercised on a case-by-case basis.' Ex
parte Coker, 575 So. 2d 43, 51 (Ala. 1990), citing
1041076
60
City of Birmingham v. Blount County, 533 So. 2d 534
(Ala. 1988); State Dep't of Revenue v. Morrison
Cafeterias Consol., Inc., 487 So. 2d 898 (Ala.
1985). Although circumstances occasionally dictate
that judicial decisions be applied prospectively
only, 
retroactive 
application of judgments is
overwhelmingly the normal practice. McCullar v.
Universal Underwriters Life Ins. Co., 687 So. 2d 156
(Ala. 1996) (plurality opinion). 'Retroactivity "is
in keeping with the traditional function of the
courts to decide cases before them based upon their
best current understanding of the law.... It also
reflects 
the 
declaratory 
theory 
of 
law, 
...
according to which the courts are understood only to
find the law, not to make it."' 687 So. 2d 156,
quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501
U.S. 529, 535-36, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2443-44, 115
L.Ed.2d 481 (1991). While reliance upon prior law is
an 'important variable that must be appraised in
every case presenting questions of prospectivity,'
we 
conclude 
that, 
as 
a 
policy 
matter, 
the
application of this newly adopted rule to these
parties 'rewards the prevailing party on the appeal,
thereby providing "an incentive for litigants to
challenge existing rules of law that are in need of
reform."'  Hosea O. Weaver & Sons, Inc. v. Towner,
663 So. 2d 892, 899 (Ala. 1995), quoting Prospective
Application of Judicial Decisions, 33 Ala. L.Rev.
463, 473 (1982)."
Professional Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 352
(Ala. 1997).
"Because the rule stated in this opinion would
change this Court's construction of the limitations
provision of § 6-5-547(a) and reject its previous
construction of the statute, a construction [the
plaintiff] may have relied on, we would apply this
new rule prospectively only, i.e., to legal-
malpractice actions filed after the date of this
decision. See Professional Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland,
1041076
61
700 So. 2d 347, 351-52 (Ala. 1997); Foremost Ins.
Co. v. Parham, 693 So. 2d 409, 421 (Ala. 1997);
McCullar v. Universal Underwriters Life Ins. Co.,
687 So. 2d 156, 165-66 (Ala. 1996)."
Ex parte Panell, 756 So. 2d 862, 869 (Ala. 1999) (plurality
opinion of three Justices, but all six remaining Justices
concurred in the result, thus joining in the decision for
prospective relief only).
"The United States Supreme Court has suggested
consideration of the following factors in choosing
whether to apply a judicial decision prospectively:
"'First, 
the 
decision 
to 
be 
applied
nonretroactively must establish a new
principle of law, either by overruling
clear past precedent on which litigants may
have relied, see, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc.
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., [392 U.S.
481, 496, 88 S.Ct. 2224, 2233, 20 L.Ed.2d
1231 (1968)] ... or by deciding an issue of
first impression whose resolution was not
clearly foreshadowed, see, e.g., Allen v.
State Board of Elections, [393 U.S. 544,
572, 89 S.Ct. 817, 835, 22 L.Ed.2d 1
(1969)]. Second, it has been stressed that
"we must ... weigh the merits and demerits
in each case by looking to the prior
history of the rule in question, its
purpose 
and 
effect, 
and 
whether
retrospective operation will further or
retard 
its 
operation." 
Linkletter 
v.
Walker, [381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S.Ct. 1731,
1737-38, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)]. Finally,
we have weighed the inequity imposed by
retroactive application, for "[w]here a
decision of this Court could produce
substantial inequitable results if applied
1041076
62
retroactively, there is ample basis in our
cases for avoiding the 'injustice or
h a r d s h i p '  
b y  
a  
h o l d i n g  
o f
nonretroactivity."'
"Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92
S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971)[, but see
Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86
(1993)]."
McCullar v. Universal Underwriters Life Ins. Co., 687 So. 2d
156, 165 (Ala. 1996).
My view of the proper construction to be accorded the
term "accrued" in § 6-2-30(a) in the context of toxic-
substance-exposure cases would establish a new principle of
law by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may
have relied.  This consideration weighs in favor of a
prospective application of the principle, as does the purpose
of time limitations for filing actions.  On the other hand,
Cline, as the prevailing party in bringing about a change in
the law should be rewarded for his efforts and to deny him the
benefit of the new rule would have a chilling effect on
litigants who desire to challenge existing rules of law that
are in need of reform.  Weighing the merits and demerits of
the possible options for effectuating the new rule, I would
recommend that it be accorded a completely prospective
1041076
63
operation, save only for its application in Cline's case,
where it would apply retroactively.  Therefore, except for
Cline, only those persons whose last exposure to a toxic
substance, and first manifest injury resulting from that
exposure, occurred within two years of the opinion adopting
the new rule would be entitled to have the accrual of their
cause of action determined according to the new rule.  
By this approach, there would be no "flood gates of
litigation" opened, and only if the legislature chose to
refrain from any action for many years would there eventually
develop the potential for a significant lag time between last
exposure and manifest, present injury.  Likewise, this
approach would answer the concerns of the specially concurring
Justices about the presentation of "stale" claims.  Claims
could become stale, in the sense of there being a significant
temporal separation between cause and effect, only if the
legislature is satisfied with the new rule and forgoes for a
decade or more any legislative adjustment.  (It bears noting,
moreover, that under the Garrett rule, a claim is "fresh" only
at a time when it is not actionable, and when it finally
becomes actionable, upon the occurrence of a manifest, present
1041076
64
injury, it is necessarily impermissibly "stale" under the
statute of limitations.)
I do not seek to preempt the legislature by having this
Court correct the erroneous Garrett rule.  I simply take the
position that the Court, having created the rule, should
assume the responsibility for overruling it and replacing it
with a rule that conforms to established principles for
determining when a tort cause of action accrues.  Thereafter,
the Court having corrected its own mistake, I would welcome
further legislative action aimed at providing any different
rules for accrual, including those incorporating a "discovery"
feature, that the legislature might determine to be in order.
I therefore would reverse the trial court's judgment and
remand this case to the trial court so that it might gauge the
accrual of Cline's Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability
Doctrine cause of action under the new rule, as well as
consider the other grounds the defendants asserted in support
of their motion for a summary judgment.
Lyons, Woodall, and Parker, JJ., concur.