Case Title: State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. Mayfield Hts.

Citation: 2008-Ohio-3181

Docket Number: 20072325

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. Mayfield Hts., 119 Ohio St.3d 11, 2008-Ohio-
3181.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. GILMOUR REALTY, INC., APPELLANT, v. 
CITY OF MAYFIELD HEIGHTS ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. Mayfield Hts., 119 Ohio St.3d 11, 
2008-Ohio-3181.] 
Mandamus — Petition to compel city to commence appropriation proceedings 
based on alleged regulatory taking — Pending action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief on same facts is not adequate remedy in ordinary course 
of law as it is not complete, beneficial, and speedy — Mandamus is 
appropriate remedy when involuntary taking of property is alleged — 
Court of appeals’ judgment dismissing petition reversed and cause 
remanded. 
(No. 2007-2325 — Submitted June 24, 2008 — Decided July 2, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 90575, 174 Ohio App.3d 113, 2007-Ohio-6480. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action for a writ 
of mandamus to compel a city and its planning commission to commence 
appropriation proceedings based on an alleged regulatory taking.  Because the 
court of appeals erred in holding that the appellant has an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law by way of its pending common pleas court action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remand the cause for further proceedings. 
Purchase of Property for Commercial Use 
{¶ 2} Beginning in 1999, appellant, Gilmour Realty, Inc. (“Gilmour”), 
operated a mortgage brokerage and title agency on property it owned at 5747 
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Mayfield Road in appellee city of Mayfield Heights, Ohio. Gilmour 
purchased 
two properties in Mayfield Heights, 1461 Eastwood Avenue in 2001, and 1455 
Eastwood Avenue in 2003.  Before each purchase, the city had verified that the 
property was zoned U-4 Local Retail/Wholesale District, which permitted 
commercial use.  The Eastwood Avenue properties were located directly north of 
Gilmour’s existing business property, and Gilmour purchased them to be used for 
additional office space.  The Mayfield Heights City Council approved a site plan 
for the conversion of Gilmour’s Eastwood Avenue properties for office use in 
conjunction with their existing mortgage and title businesses at 5747 Mayfield 
Road in March 2003. 
Rezoning of the Property 
{¶ 3} In January 2004, appellee Mayfield Heights Planning Commission 
recommended that the city council rezone Gilmour’s Eastwood Avenue properties 
from U-4 Local Retail/Wholesale District, which permits commercial use, to U-1 
Single Family House District, which does not. 
{¶ 4} In March 2004, the city council adopted Ordinance No. 2004-4, 
which rezoned 1455 and 1461 Eastwood Avenue from U-4 to U-1. 
Action for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
{¶ 5} Just before the city council rezoned Gilmour’s Eastwood Avenue 
properties from commercial to residential, Gilmour filed a complaint in the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas against Mayfield Heights, the mayor, 
and the members of city council for a judgment declaring that the proposed 
rezoning amounted to an unlawful taking of Gilmour’s property without 
compensation.  Gilmour further requested a prohibitory injunction preventing the 
city and the other defendants from proceeding to enact the rezoning ordinance. 
{¶ 6} A few months later, Gilmour filed an amended complaint 
requesting $750,000 in compensation as a result of the rezoning.  Gilmour later 
dismissed its action without prejudice. 
January Term, 2008 
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{¶ 7} Gilmour filed a new complaint in June 2006, requesting a 
declaratory judgment against the city and the other defendants and an injunction 
prohibiting them from rezoning the property.  Gilmour again alleged that the 
rezoning of its Eastwood Avenue properties constituted a compensable taking, but 
he did not request damages. 
Mandamus Case 
{¶ 8} In October 2007, Gilmour filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, 
Mayfield Heights and its planning commission, to commence appropriation 
proceedings.  Gilmour alleged that the city’s rezoning of the Eastwood Avenue 
properties from commercial to residential constituted a taking because the 
rezoning denied Gilmour “the economical[ly] viable use of the properties as [it] 
planned and interfered with [its] investment backed expectations.”  Appellees 
filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, motion to dismiss. 
{¶ 9} The court of appeals treated appellees’ motion as a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, granted the 
motion, and dismissed Gilmour’s mandamus complaint.  174 Ohio App.3d 113, 
2007-Ohio-6480, 881 N.E.2d 277. 
Mandamus:  Adequate Remedy in the Ordinary Course of the Law 
{¶ 10} Gilmour asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his 
mandamus claim.  Dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted is appropriate if, after all factual allegations are 
presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in Gilmour’s favor, it 
appears beyond doubt that Gilmour could prove no set of facts warranting the 
requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  State ex rel. Turner v. Houk, 112 
Ohio St.3d 561, 2007-Ohio-814, 862 N.E.2d 104, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 11} The court of appeals concluded that Gilmour’s pending common 
pleas court action for declaratory and injunctive relief constitutes an adequate 
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remedy in the ordinary course of law, which precluded his mandamus action.  
“Dismissals of mandamus actions based upon the existence of an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law are appropriate as long as it appears beyond 
doubt that relator can prove no set of facts warranting relief.”  State ex rel. 
Weaver v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 116 Ohio St.3d 340, 2007-Ohio-6435, 879 
N.E.2d 191, ¶ 8. 
{¶ 12} For the reasons that follow, the court of appeals erred in 
determining that Gilmour’s pending action for declaratory and injunctive relief 
constitutes an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 
{¶ 13} First, we have consistently recognized that “[m]andamus is the 
appropriate action to compel public authorities to institute appropriation 
proceedings where an involuntary taking of private property is alleged.”  State ex 
rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts. (2002), 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 63, 765 N.E.2d 345, 
judgment modified in part on other grounds, 96 Ohio St.3d 379, 2002-Ohio-4905, 
775 N.E.2d 493; State ex rel. Coles v. Granville, 116 Ohio St.3d 231, 2007-Ohio-
6057, 877 N.E.2d 968, ¶ 21.  Gilmour properly alleged an involuntary taking of 
its private property in its mandamus complaint.  Appellees incorrectly claim that 
this authority does not apply when the alleged taking is not a physical taking of 
the property.  In fact, Shemo, like this case, involved a regulatory taking rather 
than a physical taking. 
{¶ 14} Second, the pending action for declaratory and injunctive relief is 
not an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  For an alternate remedy to 
constitute an adequate remedy so as to preclude the requested extraordinary relief 
in mandamus, it must be complete, beneficial, and speedy.  State ex rel. Vaughn 
Industries, L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 109 Ohio St.3d 482, 2006-Ohio-
2994, 849 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 18.  The pending action for declaratory and injunctive 
relief does not provide a complete remedy to Gilmour because this type of action 
cannot compel the city to commence an appropriation proceeding for the property 
January Term, 2008 
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allegedly taken.  Coles, 116 Ohio St.3d 231, 2007-Ohio-6057, 877 N.E.2d 968, ¶ 
32 (mandamus action proper where “pending civil action does not afford a 
complete remedy to relators because it cannot compel the board of public 
commissioners to commence appropriation proceedings for the property relators 
claim has been taken by the board”).  The declaratory judgment action does not 
preclude Gilmour’s mandamus claim because it does not provide a complete 
remedy to Gilmour unless coupled with ancillary extraordinary relief in the nature 
of a mandatory injunction to compel the city to institute appropriation 
proceedings.  See State ex rel. Fattlar v. Boyle (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 123, 125, 
698 N.E.2d 987. 
{¶ 15} The court of appeals erred in determining that the pending action 
for declaratory and injunctive relief provided a “complete and adequate remedy in 
light of the fact that Gilmour seeks damages for the alleged injuries, which 
occurred as a result of the rezoning of the two parcels of property.”  174 Ohio 
App.3d 113, 2007-Ohio-6480, 881 N.E.2d 277, ¶ 8.  Gilmour’s current complaint 
for declaratory and injunctive relief does not include a request for damages.  In 
addition, in comparable circumstances, we held that a request for money damages 
against a municipality in a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of 
a rezoning ordinance is precluded.  Superior Uptown, Inc. v. Cleveland (1974), 39 
Ohio St.2d 36, 68 O.O.2d 21, 313 N.E.2d 820, syllabus (“A cause of action for 
money damages can not be maintained against a municipality for losses sustained 
as the result of the adoption of a rezoning ordinance which is subsequently 
declared invalid”).  By contrast, a mandamus claim to compel public authorities to 
institute appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of private 
property is alleged and proven is not barred.  Shemo, 96 Ohio St.3d 379, 2002-
Ohio-4905, 775 N.E.2d 493, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 16} Third, although we have sometimes held that a pending declaratory 
judgment action may bar a mandamus action, see State ex rel. Bennett v. Lime 
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(1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 62, 9 O.O.3d 69, 378 N.E.2d 152, syllabus, we have also 
held that this precedent is inapplicable when ─ as here ─ the pending declaratory 
judgment action does not provide an adequate remedy.  See State ex rel. N. Main 
St. Coalition v. Webb, 106 Ohio St.3d 437, 2005-Ohio-5009, 835 N.E.2d 1222, ¶ 
40-46; State ex rel. Huntington Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Duryee (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 
530, 537-538, 653 N.E.2d 349. 
{¶ 17} Therefore, the court of appeals erred in holding that Gilmour’s 
pending action for declaratory and injunctive relief barred its mandamus action to 
compel appellees to institute appropriation proceedings. 
Mandamus ─ Failure to Allege a Taking 
{¶ 18} Appellees claim that even if the court of appeals’ rationale was 
erroneous, its dismissal of Gilmour’s mandamus complaint was proper because 
Gilmour failed to allege a taking of its property.  We will not reverse a correct 
judgment because it was based on an erroneous rationale.  State ex rel. Kaylor v. 
Bruening (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 684 N.E.2d 1228. 
{¶ 19} Appellees argue that dismissal was warranted because Gilmour 
never alleged in its mandamus complaint that the rezoning did not substantially 
advance legitimate state interests or that it denied all economically viable use of 
the land. 
{¶ 20} Appellees’ argument lacks merit because the United States 
Supreme Court has now held that whether a governmental regulatory action 
substantially advances a legitimate state interest is no longer an appropriate test to 
evaluate constitutional takings claims.  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2005), 544 
U.S. 528, 532, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876, abrogating Agins v. Tiburon 
(1980), 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106; Hallco Texas, Inc. v. 
McMullen Cty. (Tex.2006), 221 S.W.3d 50, 61, fn. 6; Boice v. Ottawa Hills, 
Lucas App. No. L-06-1208, 2007-Ohio-4471, 2007 WL 2458488, ¶ 28. 
January Term, 2008 
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{¶ 21} Nor does Gilmour’s failure to allege a denial of all economically 
viable use of its Eastwood Avenue properties render its mandamus claim 
insufficient.  Gilmour can still establish a partial regulatory taking under the 
standard set forth in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City (1978), 438 U.S. 
104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631.  “Penn Cent. recognizes an ad hoc, factual 
inquiry that requires the examination of the following three factors to determine 
whether a regulatory taking occurred in cases in which there is no physical 
invasion and the regulation deprives the property of less than 100 percent of its 
economically viable use:  (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the governmental action.  
Id. at 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631.”  State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. 
Clark Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 115 Ohio St.3d 337, 2007-Ohio-5022, 875 N.E.2d 59, 
¶ 19.  Courts have applied the Penn Cent. test to claimed partial regulatory-
takings cases involving rezoning.  See, e.g., Byrd v. Hartsville (2005), 365 S.C. 
650, 657-659, 620 S.E.2d 76; Reagan v. St. Louis Cty. (Mo.App.2006), 211 
S.W.3d 104, 107-111; Dorman v. Clinton Twp. (2006), 269 Mich.App. 638, 646-
650, 714 N.W.2d 350.  On remand, the parties shall be given the opportunity to 
introduce evidence and argument on Gilmour’s partial regulatory-takings claim. 
{¶ 22} Therefore, appellees have not established that the court of appeals’ 
dismissal of Gilmour’s mandamus action is correct. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 23} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in dismissing 
Gilmour’s mandamus complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to that court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  We also deny appellees’ request for attorney fees and sanctions for 
frivolous conduct. 
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Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Rudolph J. Geraci, for appellant. 
 
Leonard F. Carr and L. Bryan Carr, for appellees. 
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