Case Title: MASINTER v. MARKSTEIN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
MASINTER v. MARKSTEIN2002 WY 6445 P.3d 237Case Number: 01-129, 01-135Decided: 04/26/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

MARGERY 
MASINTER; RICHARD H.

and 
MARY M. VAUGHAN IRREVOCABLE

TRUST; 
ALAN J. HIRSCHFIELD LIVING

TRUST 
and BERTE HIRSCHFIELD LIVING

TRUST; 
ROBERT B. AIKENS; EDWIN      
AUGUSTAT 
and MARGARET AUGUSTAT;

R. 
MARK BODENHAMER and JUDY

BODENHAMER; 
ANN LANE, CELANESE

CORP.; 
ANNE B. EHRENKRANZ;

RICHARD 
D. FARMAN and SUZANNE H.

FARMAN; 
THOMAS W. FAUNTLEROY,

JR.; 
MARK FELDMAN; LAWRENCE G.

FINCH 
and RICH JUEL; GEORGE F. FRY,

JR. 
and HELEN E. FRY TRUST, 30

OCTOBER, 
1968; GEORGE HARRIS and

SUZANNE 
HARRIS; BILL JONES and KAY

JONES; 
MONROE LUTHER and KAY

LUTHER; 
ROBERT J. MacLEAN and MARY

ANNA 
MacLEAN; DOYEN P. McINTOSH;

LESTER 
S. MORSE, JR. and ENID W.

MORSE; 
RICHARD P. MORSE; MICHAEL

S. 
OLIN and MARLENE OLIN; GERALD

O'ROURKE 
and DONNA O'ROURKE;      

HAL 
RINEY; STANLEY B. SEIDLER;

KEITH 
STOLTZ; ELIZABETH K.

TREADWELL; 
RICHARD and LINDA

WALTER; 
and JOEL R. WOLPE, 

Appellants(Proposed 
Intervenors),

 

v.

 

KENNETH 
W. MARKSTEIN and

CAROLE 
MARKSTEIN, 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

CRESCENT 
H HOMEOWNERS

ASSOCIATION, 
INC.;

MARGERY 
MASINTER; RICHARD H.

and 
MARY M. VAUGHAN IRREVOCABLE

TRUST; 
ALAN J. HIRSCHFIELD LIVING

TRUST 
and BERTE HIRSCHFIELD LIVING

TRUST; 
ROBERT B. AIKENS; EDWIN

AUGUSTAT 
and MARGARET AUGUSTAT;

R. 
MARK BODENHAMER and JUDY

BODENHAMER; 
ANN LANE, CELANESE

CORP.; 
ANNE B. EHRENKRANZ;

RICHARD 
D. FARMAN and SUZANNE H.

FARMAN; 
THOMAS W. FAUNTLEROY,

JR.; 
MARK FELDMAN; LAWRENCE G.

FINCH 
and RICH JUEL; GEORGE F.

FRY, 
JR. and HELEN E. FRY TRUST,

30 
OCTOBER, 1968; GEORGE HARRIS

and 
SUZANNE HARRIS; BILL JONES and

KAY 
JONES; MONROE LUTHER and

KAY 
LUTHER; ROBERT J.  
MacLEAN

and 
MARY ANNA MacLEAN; DOYEN P.

McINTOSH; 
LESTER S. MORSE, JR. and

ENID 
W. MORSE; RICHARD P. MORSE;

MICHAEL 
S. OLIN and MARLENE OLIN;

GERALD 
O'ROURKE and DONNA

O'ROURKE; 
HAL RINEY; STANLEY B.

SEIDLER; 
KEITH STOLTZ; ELIZABETH

K. 
TREADWELL; RICHARD and LINDA

WALTER; 
and JOEL R. WOLPE, 

Appellants(Proposed 
Intervenors),

                                                                                    

v.

 

CHRISTIAN 
A. GUIER, M.D.; ALAN S.      
HIRSHBERG; 
ROBERT SPETZLER, M.D.

and 
NANCY SPETZLER, Trustees of the

SPETZLER 
FAMILY TRUST; JON M.

MALINSKI 
and ARLENE M. MALINSKI;

and 
KENNETH W. MARKSTEIN and

CAROLE 
MARKSTEIN, 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

 

Appeals 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Timothy W. Miller of Reeves & Miller, Casper, Wyoming 

Representing 
Appellees in Case No. 01-129:

R. 
Michael Mullikin and Carolyn L. Null-Anderson of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, 
Jackson, Wyoming  

 Representing 
Appellees in Case No. 01-135:

R. Scott 
Garland and Joseph F. Moore, Jr. of Moore, Myers & Garland, LLC, Jackson, 
Wyoming 

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

  

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      The district 
court denied owners in the Crescent H Subdivision the right to intervene in 
cases in which owners in neighboring McNeely Mountain and Fish Creek Meadows 
Subdivisions sued the successor in interest of the developer of both 
subdivisions to enforce fishing and recreational rights they claim the developer 
granted to them when they purchased their lots.  Those rights involved riparian lands 
included within the Crescent H Subdivision.  The district court denied the Crescent H 
owners' motions to intervene both as of right and permissively, and we 
affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The appellants 
present these issues for our review:

 

            
1.  Whether the Crescent H homeowners were entitled to 
intervene as of right.

 

            
2.  Whether the Crescent H homeowners should have been 
permitted to intervene.

 

The 
appellees in Case No. 01-129 phrase the issues as:

 

            
1.  Whether 
the district court properly denied appellants' motion to intervene as of 
right?

 

            
2.  Whether the district court properly denied the appellants' 
motion for permissive intervention?

 

            
3.  Whether the appellants have presented a sufficient record 
on appeal?

 

The 
appellees in Case No. 01-135 set out the issue as:

 

            
Have 
Appellants[] met their burden of proof that the District Court abused its 
discretion by denying the Appellants' Motion to Intervene?

 

 

FACTS 

 

[¶3]      This dispute has 
a massively complicated history, most of which is irrelevant to the resolution 
of the issues presented on appeal.  
However, some background is necessary. Donald H. Albrecht and his limited 
partnership, Rivermeadows Associates, Ltd. (RMA), originally developed both of 
the subdivisions involved.  The 
Crescent H Ranch, owned by RMA, included approximately 1,300 acres of land 
located near Wilson and contained a guest ranch with outstanding fishing habitat 
in the riparian lands near Fish Creek and the Snake River.  RMA platted the Crescent H Subdivision 
in 1985.  With the sale of 
individual lots within the Crescent H Subdivision, RMA granted the buyers 
certain fishing and recreational rights in the riparian lands on the ranch which 
remained in RMA's ownership.  RMA 
also developed the McNeely Mountain Subdivision and granted similar fishing and 
recreational rights to purchasers of those lots.  RMA ultimately assigned other adjacent 
property to Fish Creek Meadows, Inc. together with similar fishing and 
recreational rights.  Fish Creek in 
turn granted those rights to the individuals who purchased lots in the Fish 
Creek Meadows Subdivision.  Thus, 
RMA was the source of the rights claimed by the Crescent H, the McNeely 
Mountain, and the Fish Creek Meadows owners.  While RMA owned and controlled the 
Crescent H Subdivision, the appellees, who were purchasers in the McNeely 
Mountain and the Fish Creek Meadows Subdivisions, utilized their fishing and 
recreational rights in the RMA riparian lands without challenge and paid the 
requisite fees for such use.

 

[¶4]      On January 17, 
1995, RMA filed a petition for bankruptcy.  
At that time, some of the owners in all three subdivisions had not 
recorded or maintained documentation of the grants of their respective fishing 
and recreational rights. The bankruptcy called into question the validity and 
efficacy of the fishing and recreational rights, especially those that were 
unrecorded or allegedly conveyed after the petition for bankruptcy was 
filed.  Forty-six individual 
Crescent H owners filed an adversary action in the bankruptcy seeking a 
declaration of the validity of their rights.  The bankruptcy trustee also filed 
adversary actions against the McNeely Mountain and the Fish Creek Meadows owners 
seeking to avoid the fishing and recreational rights that RMA had conveyed to 
them.  The trustee ultimately sold 
RMA's remaining ranch property, including the riparian lands, to Countryside I, 
L.L.C.  However, that sale was not 
"free and clear of the interests of those fishing license and use agreement 
holders" which included the appellees in these cases.  Ultimately, the Crescent H owners 
entered into a settlement agreement with the trustee that involved the issuance 
of new fishing and recreational rights by Countryside to these owners which were 
intended to supersede the earlier rights.  
The McNeely Mountain and the Fish Creek Meadows owners objected to that 
settlement arguing disparate treatment of similarly situated potential 
creditors.  In the hearing on the 
settlement agreement, the counsel for the Crescent H owners made it clear that 
their claims were separate and distinct from the McNeely Mountain and the Fish 
Creek Meadows owners' claims and they were "not parties to the other two 
adversary proceedings, have taken no position, don't want to be involved."  Ultimately, the bankruptcy court 
approved the Crescent H owners' settlement, and the adversary matter was 
dismissed.  In addition, the 
bankruptcy court refused to consolidate all the adversary actions of the various 
homeowners concluding, "despite the existence of some common factual issues 
. . ., there remain different issues of law."1  Ultimately, the bankruptcy court also 
dismissed the adversary proceedings filed against the McNeely Mountain and the 
Fish Creek Meadows owners because the real property had been conveyed to 
Countryside and no justiciable controversy remained with regard to the 
trustee.

 

[¶5]      After the 
bankruptcy concluded, Countryside sent written notices to the McNeely Mountain 
and the Fish Creek Meadows owners denying the validity of their fishing and 
recreational rights in the Crescent H Ranch and its riparian lands.  That action prompted them to file the 
underlying complaint in Case No. 01-135 on December 23, 1998,2 seeking to enforce their alleged 
fishing and recreational rights.  
Countryside filed a motion to dismiss which, after a hearing on June 18, 
1999, remained pending for over a year and a half without action from the 
district court.  The Crescent H 
owners did not file their motion to intervene in Case No. 01-135 until February 
6, 2001, two years and forty-five days after the complaint was filed.3  The case was reassigned to another judge 
who held a hearing on the motion to intervene and denied the same.  That hearing was not transcribed, and 
the order provides no explanation of the basis for the district court's 
decision.

 

DISCUSSION

 

 [¶6]     The district court 
denied intervention both as a mater of right and permissively. W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) 
permits a party to intervene as of right in an action and provides in pertinent 
part:

 

            
(a) Intervention of right.  Upon timely application anyone shall 
be permitted to intervene in an action:

 

. . 
.

 

(2)  When the applicant claims an interest 
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and 
the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that 
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing 
parties.

 

Intervention 
may be allowed permissively when the intervenor's claim or defense has a 
question of fact or law in common with the main action and the court in its 
discretion determines intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudications of the rights of the original parties.  W.R.C.P. 24(b)(2).

 

[¶7]      In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v. Colley, 871 P.2d 191, 194 (Wyo. 1994) (citations omitted), we 
stated the standard of review in matters involving claims of intervention as a 
matter of right:

 

Four 
conditions must be satisfied to permit intervention as of right under W.R.C.P. 
24(a)(2).  First, the applicant must 
claim an interest related to the property or transaction which is the subject of 
the action.  Second, the applicant 
must be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical 
matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest.  Third, there must be a showing that the 
applicant's interest will not be adequately represented by the existing 
parties.  Fourth, the application 
for intervention must be timely. An applicant who fails to meet any one of these 
conditions is not permitted to intervene as of right under W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2). 
. . .  

            

            
Questions of law and judicial discretion are presented by the denial of a 
motion to intervene.  This court 
accords no deference to a district court's decisions on issues of law. 
Therefore, if the district court erroneously denied intervention as of right 
under the first, second or third conditions of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2), we will 
reverse.  However, the determination 
of the timeliness of an application to intervene is a matter within the 
discretion of the district court.  
The district court is permitted to weigh the timeliness of an application 
to intervene in light of the circumstances of the particular case, including 
whether the applicant may have sought intervention earlier.  Therefore, to prevail on an appeal from 
a finding that an application to intervene is untimely, an abuse of discretion 
must be demonstrated.  

 

[¶8]      This court must 
affirm the district court's action on appeal if the judgment is sustainable on 
any legal ground appearing in the record.  
Deisch v. Jay, 790 P.2d 1273, 
1278 (Wyo. 1990).  Although the 
orders denying the motions to intervene in these cases do not set out the 
grounds the district court specifically relied upon, we conclude sufficient 
bases exist in the records to warrant denial of the motions to 
intervene.

 

[¶9]      First, the 
intervenors must claim "an interest relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action."  
W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2).  The 
property which is the subject of the action in this case is the riparian lands 
of the Crescent H Subdivision, and the "transaction" involved is the alleged 
grant by RMA to the McNeely Mountain and the Fish Creek Meadows owners of 
nonexclusive fishing and recreational rights in those lands.  The Crescent H owners have an interest 
in the riparian lands as they too have nonexclusive easements in those lands 
which can be affected, albeit only slightly,4 by the confirmation of additional 
nonexclusive easements in the same property.  To meet this requirement, we have 
determined the movant must have a "significantly protectable interest" in the 
subject of the litigation and not a contingent interest or one similar to any 
member of the public. Colley, 871 P.2d  at 194.  
Clearly, the Crescent H owners' interest is not similar to that 
of any member of the public.  
Likewise, their interest is not contingent.

 

[¶10]   The second and third requirements 
are intertwined.  The applicant must 
be situated so that disposition of the action "may as a practical matter impair 
or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest" unless "the 
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties."  W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2).  To apply this requirement, we must 
examine the actual claims made by the McNeely Mountain and the Fish Creek 
Meadows owners to determine whether disposition of those claims will impede the 
Crescent H owners from protecting their own interests in their licenses and 
whether their interests are adequately represented by Countryside.  The claims include quiet title relating 
to the McNeely Mountain and the Fish Creek Meadows owners' right of access to 
the riparian lands owned by Countryside, declaratory judgment related to those 
rights in Countryside's property under the licenses, breach of contract by 
Countryside in denying them access, and tortious interference with contract by 
Countryside in inducing the bankruptcy trustee to breach the contracts.  We can discern no reason why 
Countryside's interests are not completely aligned with the Crescent H owners' 
interests with regard to the defense of these claims.  Countryside's unilateral and unexplained 
denial of the McNeely Mountain and the Fish Creek Meadows owners' rights 
provides clear indication that Countryside firmly intends to disallow these 
owners access to its riparian lands which is the same result sought by the 
Crescent H owners.

 

[¶11]   All the claims made by the McNeely 
Mountain and the Fish Creek Meadows owners rely upon their contractual 
relationship with RMA and its successor in interest, Countryside.  The Crescent H owners fail to identify 
any particular claims they would intend to make if allowed to intervene other 
than supporting Countryside's efforts to argue against the validity of the 
claimed rights.5  It may well be that the Crescent H 
owners have claims of their own against RMA and Countryside related to the 
alleged grant of licenses to owners of lands outside of the Crescent H 
Subdivision; however, those claims can be pursued independently as counsel 
admitted during argument.  
Consequently, those claims are not impaired or impeded by the disposition 
of the McNeely Mountain and the Fish Creek Meadows owners' separate claims based 
upon their alleged contracts with RMA.  
No showing was made concerning why the Crescent H owners' interests are 
not adequately represented by Countryside in this matter.

 

[¶12]   Finally, a motion to intervene can 
be denied solely on the basis of timeliness.  Platte County School District No. 1 v. Basin 
Electric Power Cooperative, 638 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Wyo. 1982).  The determination of the timeliness of 
an application to intervene is a matter within the district court's 
discretion.  Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 432 
(Wyo. 1985). The Crescent H owners filed their motion in Case No. 01-135 over 
two years6 after the action was 
initiated.  While this length of 
delay alone may not be fatal to a motion to intervene, we consider timeliness 
"in light of the circumstances of the particular case." Colley, 871 P.2d  at 194.  The issue of the validity of fishing and 
recreational licenses in these properties has been well known to all the parties 
at least since the Crescent H owners filed their adversary action in the RMA 
bankruptcy on October 17, 1996, over four years before they filed their motion 
to intervene in Case No. 01-135.  In 
the hearing approving the settlement of the Crescent H owners' adversary action, 
which was opposed by the McNeely Mountain and the Fish Creek Meadows owners 
because it did not include them, the counsel for the Crescent H owners clearly 
indicated awareness of the non-Crescent H owners' claims stating in reference to 
the adversary actions involving those other owners, "The [Crescent H owners] are 
not parties to the other two adversary proceedings, have taken no position, 
don't want to be involved."  At that 
time, the Crescent H owners opted to go it alone, obtain their own settlement, 
and let the McNeely Mountain and the Fish Creek Meadows owners pursue whatever 
course they deemed appropriate to protect their interests.  We cannot ignore that background in 
determining whether the motion to intervene was timely.

 

[¶13]   The Crescent H owners argue this 
case was moving very slowly at the time of their motion and granting it would 
not unduly delay the matter or prejudice the other parties.  While that may be true, the district 
court had denied an injunction, had a motion to dismiss under consideration, and 
had entered and revised various scheduling orders.  It can hardly be deemed unreasonable for 
the court to conclude adding thirty parties in Case No. 01-135 would unduly 
delay an ultimate resolution of the matter, which had been pending for over two 
years prior to the filing of the motion.7  We conclude the record supports the 
district court's denial of the motions to intervene as a matter of right as a 
result of the applicants' failure to meet three of the four requirements of 
W.R.C.P. 24 (a)(2). 

 

[¶14]   Motions to intervene permissively 
are subject to the district court's discretion.  W.R.C.P. 24(b)(2).  We will review a district court's ruling 
on permissive intervention for an abuse of discretion, and our review in this 
area is particularly deferential.  See United States v. City of New York, 198 F.3d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 1999).  We 
likewise hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motions to intervene based upon permissive intervention.

 

[¶15]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1We take judicial notice of the Order 
Denying Motion for Consolidation, United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Wyoming, Case No. 95-20322, Ch. 11, Adversary No. 97-2003 (Jan. 6, 
1998), found in the bankruptcy records.  
See Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1159 (Wyo. 
1992).

 

  
2The Fish Creek 
Meadows owners filed a complaint in Case No. 01-129 on June 18, 1999, seeking to 
enforce the same rights.

 

3In Case No. 01-129, the Crescent H 
owners filed their motion to intervene on February 8, 2001, almost one year and 
eight months after the complaint was filed.

 

  
4Five additional 
licenses would not likely have a great effect upon the use of the lands where 
forty-two licenses have already been granted.  However, there was evidence that the 
value a license added to an individual lot in these subdivisions was at least 
$125,000.

 

5In fact, the Crescent H owners planned 
to call no witnesses or experts, conduct no discovery, introduce no evidence, 
but simply file summary judgment motions in support of 
Countryside.

 

6In Case No. 01-129, they filed their 
motion almost one year and eight months after the action was 
initiated.

 

7In Case No. 01-129, there were 
twenty-nine parties who were asking to be added in a case which had been pending 
for almost a year and eight months prior to the filing of the motion to 
intervene.