Case Title: Gaines v. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1210304

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2022-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: November 18, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
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errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023 
 
_________________________ 
 
1210304 
_________________________ 
 
Dalen Gaines 
 
v.  
 
Nick Smith, individually and in his official capacity as sheriff of 
Walker County, and Christopher Doeur, individually and in his 
official capacity as a deputy sheriff of Walker County 
 
 
 
Appeal from Walker Circuit Court 
(CV-20-900217) 
 
 
 
 
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MITCHELL, Justice. 
 
In this appeal, Dalen Gaines seeks monetary and equitable relief 
against Walker County law-enforcement officers for their role in what 
Gaines asserts was a delayed bond hearing.  The trial court granted the 
law-enforcement officers' motion to dismiss, and Gaines asks us to 
overturn that decision.  We decline to do so.   
Facts and Procedural History1 
After Gaines failed to appear in the Walker Circuit Court to answer 
criminal charges, the court issued a warrant for his arrest.  Three months 
later, Walker County Sheriff's Deputy Christopher Doeur executed the 
warrant and took Gaines into custody.  Afterward, Deputy Doeur filed a 
certificate of execution, informing the Walker Circuit Court that he had 
arrested Gaines and placed him in the Walker County jail. 
 
After about a month, Gaines remained incarcerated and had not yet 
appeared in court.  Gaines then filed a complaint against Walker County 
Sheriff Nick Smith and Deputy Doeur ("the Officers"), in both their 
 
1For purposes of this appeal, we view the record in the light most 
favorable to Gaines, and we resolve factual disputes and ambiguities in 
his favor to the greatest reasonable extent.  See Nelson v. Megginson, 165 
So. 3d 567, 571 (Ala. 2014).   
1210304 
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official and individual capacities.  He claimed -- under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
-- that they had violated his civil rights, and he also asserted state-law 
claims for negligence and wantonness.  Gaines sought declaratory relief, 
injunctive relief, and unspecified monetary damages.  The day after 
Gaines filed his complaint, the Walker Circuit Court set his criminal case 
for a hearing.  Four days later, the trial court issued orders that released 
him on bond.   
Shortly after being released, Gaines was arrested on a separate 
capital-murder charge in Jefferson County; he is currently being held 
without bond on that charge.  He faces additional charges in Jefferson 
County, along with a probation-revocation matter in Cullman County.2 
 
About four months after Gaines was arrested for capital murder, 
the Officers filed a motion to dismiss his suit based on theories of 
insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, and failure to 
 
2We take judicial notice of Gaines's ongoing proceedings in 
Jefferson County and Cullman County.  See Geer Bros. v. Crump, 349 So. 
2d 577, 579 (Ala. 1977).  Because mootness is an issue in this appeal, "'we 
may receive facts relevant to that issue; otherwise there would be no way 
to find out if an appeal has become moot.'"  South Alabama Gas Dist. v. 
Knight, 138 So. 3d 971, 976 (Ala. 2013) (quoting Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 
979 F.2d 965, 967 (3d Cir. 1992)).   
 
1210304 
4 
 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Rule 12(b)(4)-(6), Ala. R. 
Civ. P.  In an unexplained order and without a hearing, the trial court 
granted the Officers' motion to dismiss with prejudice.  Gaines timely 
appealed to this Court. 
Standard of Review 
 
This Court reviews a ruling on a motion to dismiss "'without a 
presumption of correctness.'"  Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
915 So. 2d 557, 563 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Newman v. Savas, 878 So. 2d 
1147, 1148-49 (Ala. 2003)).  In conducting this review, we must determine 
"whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly 
in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of 
circumstances that would entitle her to relief."  Nance v. Matthews, 622 
So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993).  Granting a motion to dismiss is proper "only 
when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 
in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief."  Id.  We 
may, however, "affirm the circuit court's judgment for any legal, valid 
reason, even one not raised in or considered by the circuit court, unless 
due-process fairness principles require that the ground have been raised 
1210304 
5 
 
below and it was not."  State v. Epic Tech, LLC, [Ms. 1210012, May 20, 
2022] __ So. 3d __ , __ (Ala. 2022). 
Analysis 
 
Gaines makes two primary arguments on appeal.  First, he says 
that the trial court erred when it granted the Officers' motion to dismiss 
without holding a hearing.  Second, he argues that the trial court erred 
by dismissing the case for failure to state a claim.  We reject both 
arguments. 
A. The trial court's failure to hold a hearing before granting the 
Officers' motion to dismiss was harmless error 
 
 
Gaines first argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold a 
hearing on the Officers' motion to dismiss.  Gaines contends that the 
language of Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P., the accompanying committee 
comments to that rule, and this Court's previous interpretation of that 
rule require the trial court to conduct a hearing before granting a motion 
to dismiss. 
 
We begin with the text of Rule 78, which provides that "the court 
may enter an order denying a motion to dismiss without oral hearing."  
(Emphasis added.)  The significance of the word "denying" in that rule is 
made clear by the negative-implication canon of interpretation, which 
1210304 
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indicates that "'[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of 
others.'"  Martin v. Martin, 329 So. 3d 1242, 1245 (Ala. 2020) (quoting 
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts § 10 at 107 (Thomson/West 2012)).  Based on that canon, it 
follows that because Rule 78 allows a court to deny a motion to dismiss 
without an oral hearing, it does not allow a court to grant such a motion 
without a hearing.   
The committee comments accompanying Rule 78 as well as our 
precedent confirm this interpretation.  The committee comments provide 
that if "the court has any inclination toward the granting of the motion 
to dismiss, a hearing will continue to be required."  Committee Comments 
on 1973 Adoption of Rule 78, Ala. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).3  We 
upheld this view of Rule 78 in Burgoon v. Alabama Department of 
Human Resources, 835 So. 2d 131 (Ala. 2002), in which we held that 
"[u]nder the plain language of [Rule 78] and the comments to the rule, a 
 
3Although the committee comments are "'not binding[,]'" they may 
"'be highly persuasive.'"  Ex parte Aladdin Mfg. Corp., 305 So. 3d 214, 
237 n.11 (Ala. 2019) (quoting Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., 553 So. 2d 82, 
88 (Ala. 1989)).  
1210304 
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trial court may not grant a motion to dismiss without a hearing, 
although, in some circumstances, it may deny such a motion."  Id. at 133.   
Here, the trial court erred by granting the Officers' motion to 
dismiss without holding a hearing; but that is not the end of the analysis.  
Our rules of procedure require us to affirm the decision below if the trial 
court's error was harmless.  See Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. (prohibiting 
reversal of the judgment below unless "the error complained of has 
probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties").  We have 
consistently held that "'"'[t]he burden of establishing that an erroneous 
ruling was prejudicial is on the appellant.'"'"  Pensacola Motor Sales, 
Inc. v. Daphne Auto., LLC, 155 So. 3d 930, 936 (Ala. 2013) (citations 
omitted).  Therefore, Gaines must demonstrate to this Court that the lack 
of a hearing prejudiced him in a way that affected his substantial rights.  
See Rule 45.   
Gaines fails to make that showing.  In his initial brief to this Court, 
he focuses his argument on the fact that the trial court did not hold a 
hearing before granting the Officers' motion to dismiss.  But Gaines does 
not indicate in that brief how or why that error prejudiced him.  Rather, 
he waits until his reply brief to address the harmless-error argument for 
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the first time.4  His argument comes too late.  See Douglas v. Roper, [Ms. 
1200503, June 24, 2022] __ So. 3d __ , __ (Ala. 2022) ("Arguments not 
raised in an appellant's initial brief are deemed waived.").  Consequently, 
Gaines has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that the trial 
court's error was prejudicial.   
B. Gaines fails to state a plausible claim against the Officers 
 
 
Gaines next asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing his case 
with prejudice based on a failure to state a plausible claim for relief.5  In 
his complaint, Gaines seeks monetary and equitable relief against the 
Officers in both their official and individual capacities.  He makes several 
 
4Even then, however, he makes only conclusory statements that 
"the trial court's order dismissing plaintiff's case with prejudice 
injuriously affected his substantial rights" and that "the trial court's 
error in disregarding plaintiff's right, under Rule 78[,] Ala. R. Civ. P., to 
be heard before granting the same was anything but harmless."  Gaines's 
reply brief at 25, 26.  This is plainly insufficient -- and this Court has no 
duty to search the record on Gaines's behalf.  See Chestang v. IPSCO 
Steel (Alabama), Inc., 50 So. 3d 418, 431 (Ala. 2010).   
  
5Gaines also argues that the trial court could not have granted the 
Officers' motion to dismiss due to insufficient service of process.  We need 
not address that argument, however, because we can resolve this appeal 
on the plausibility of Gaines's claims. 
 
1210304 
9 
 
arguments to our Court in an effort to salvage his claims, but none of 
them are availing. 
1. Gaines cannot assert a claim for damages against the 
Officers in their official capacities 
 
 
We begin by examining Gaines's claims for monetary relief against 
the Officers in their official capacities under both state and federal law.6  
First, State immunity bars Gaines's state-law claims.  Article I, § 14, of 
the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Off. Recomp.) declares that "the State 
of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity" 
and acts as a jurisdictional bar that "strips courts of all power to 
adjudicate claims against the State."  Ex parte Pinkard, [Ms. 1200658, 
May 27, 2022] __ So. 3d __ , __ (Ala. 2022).  Our statutes likewise reinforce 
that any "officer, employee, or agent of the state ... acting in his or her 
official capacity is immune from civil liability in any suit pursuant to 
Article I, Section 14, of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901."  § 36-1-
12(b), Ala. Code 1975.  Therefore, those claims fail. 
 
6In his initial brief to our Court, Gaines implicitly renounces any 
claim for monetary relief against the Officers in their official capacities.  
But, because his complaint does not make a distinction between the 
Officers' official and individual capacities with respect to his claims for 
monetary relief, we address this issue to clarify the scope of our and the 
trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction.   
1210304 
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Second, Gaines is prohibited from making § 1983 claims that seek 
monetary relief against the Officers in their official capacities.  Our 
precedent plainly states that plaintiffs may not "assert a § 1983 claim for 
money damages against [State officials] in their official capacities."  Ex 
parte Ruffin, 160 So. 3d 750, 757 (Ala. 2014) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't 
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)) (holding that a State official sued 
in his official capacity for damages is not a "person" under § 1983).  We 
thus affirm the trial court's decision to dismiss this category of Gaines's 
§ 1983 claims.  
 
2. Gaines's claims seeking equitable relief against the Officers 
are moot 
 
 
In his complaint, Gaines seeks two forms of equitable relief against 
the Officers in their official and individual capacities -- a declaratory 
judgment that the Officers' actions violated his constitutional rights and 
"[p]rospective injunctive relief requiring defendants to comply with the 
express language of the writ and bring the plaintiff and those who are 
similarly situated immediately before the court so that they may secure 
their release …."  Unlike the claims for monetary relief against the 
Officers in their official capacities, which are impermissible, claims for 
equitable relief against State officers are permitted under certain 
1210304 
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circumstances.  See Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1131 (Ala. 2013) 
(furnishing causes of actions that fall outside of § 14's prohibition on 
actions brought against the State); Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So. 2d 
1142, 1143 (Ala. 1994) (providing exceptions to State immunity enjoyed 
by sheriffs and deputy sheriffs for equitable-relief claims).  Thus, the 
Officers do not have § 14 immunity against Gaines's claims for equitable 
relief. 
 
But those claims still fail because they are moot.  A case that is 
moot is nonjusticiable.  Rogers v. Burch Corp., 313 So. 3d 555, 560 (Ala. 
2020).  And though the Officers did not move to dismiss Gaines's 
complaint for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, "'[t]his Court must sua 
sponte recognize and address the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 
owing to the lack of justiciability.'"  Id. (quoting Surles v. City of Ashville, 
68 So. 3d 89, 92 (Ala. 2011)).  We do so because a case must remain 
justiciable at all stages of review.  South Alabama Gas Dist. v. Knight, 
138 So. 3d 971, 974-75 (Ala. 2013).  Here, Gaines's requests for equitable 
relief became moot just four days after he filed the complaint because the 
trial court released him on bond, meaning that the trial court could no 
longer order Sheriff Smith (or Deputy Doeur) to release Gaines from jail. 
1210304 
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Gaines nonetheless argues that his claims for prospective 
injunctive relief are not moot because they fall under the exception for 
claims that are capable of repetition but evading review.  See Veitch v. 
Friday, 314 So. 3d 1232, 1236 (Ala. 2020) ("Alabama law recognizes an 
exception to the mootness doctrine for questions capable of repetition but 
evading review ….").  Gaines contends that he has failed to appear for 
court hearings on numerous occasions.  Therefore, his argument goes, 
because he is a self-proclaimed dyed-in-the-wool bail-jumper, he asserts 
that he faces a realistic threat of future injury -- another arrest for failure 
to appear leading to a stay inside the Walker County jail. 
 
We reject that argument for several reasons.  First, we have 
previously held that injunctive relief is improper when "the likelihood of 
future harm is speculative."  Poiroux v. Rich, 150 So. 3d 1027, 1043 (Ala. 
2014).  Here, the prospect that Gaines will encounter the same scenario 
is, at best, extremely remote.  Gaines is currently being held without 
bond in Jefferson County while facing a capital-murder charge.  
Therefore, to encounter the same set of circumstances that produced this 
appeal, Gaines would first need to obtain a not-guilty verdict in his 
upcoming capital-murder case or complete his sentence if he is found 
1210304 
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guilty.7  He would then need to resolve the other criminal matters in 
Jefferson County as well as the probation-revocation matter in Cullman 
County.  After that, he would have to fail to appear to face criminal 
charges in Walker County.  Even at that point, there is nothing that 
indicates how long Gaines would wait for a hearing after a hypothetical 
future arrest for failing to appear.  It is exceedingly unlikely that he will 
ever face this issue again.  Consequently, Gaines has failed to meet his 
burden of establishing that his claims for prospective injunctive relief 
meet the exception to mootness for claims that are capable of repetition 
yet evading review.  For that reason, his claims seeking prospective 
injunctive relief are moot, and we affirm the trial court's motion to 
dismiss those claims. 
3. Gaines cannot obtain relief against the Officers under our 
separation-of-powers framework 
 
 
Gaines's surviving claims seek monetary relief against the Officers 
in their individual capacities.  To explain why it is impossible for Gaines 
 
7Section 13A-5-39(1), Ala. Code 1975, provides that adult 
defendants convicted of capital murder "shall be punished by a sentence 
of death or life imprisonment without parole …."  Therefore, absent 
executive clemency or a guilty plea on a lesser offense, Gaines could never 
face the same issue again in Walker County if he is convicted of capital 
murder. 
1210304 
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to prevail on those claims, we must outline our law on the separation of 
powers in Alabama.  In this State, "separation of powers is not merely an 
implicit 'doctrine' but rather an express command; a command stated 
with a forcefulness rivaled by few, if any, similar provisions in 
constitutions of other sovereigns."  Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 815 
(Ala. 2002).  Indeed, Article III, § 42(a), of the Alabama Constitution of 
1901 (Off. Recomp.) provides that "[t]he powers of the government of the 
State of Alabama are legislative, executive, and judicial."  Likewise, 
"[t]he government of the State of Alabama shall be divided into three 
distinct branches: legislative, executive, and judicial."  § 42(b).  And, 
because we remain "a government of laws and not of individuals, … the 
legislative branch may not exercise the executive or judicial power, the 
executive branch may not exercise the legislative or judicial power, and 
the judicial branch may not exercise the legislative or executive power."  
§ 42(c). 
 
With that understanding, we must determine which branch of State 
government houses Sheriff Smith and Deputy Doeur.  Article V, § 112, of 
the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Off. Recomp.) provides that "[t]he 
executive department shall consist of ... a sheriff for each county."  
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Therefore, § 112 of our Constitution squarely classifies Sheriff Smith as 
an executive-branch officer.  And our cases confirm that the same is true 
for Deputy Doeur.  See Alexander, 652 So. 2d at 1144 (restating the 
principle that "'[t]he deputy sheriff is the alter ego of the sheriff'" and 
that a "'deputy is legally an extension of the sheriff'" (quoting Carr v. 
City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990))).  Because the 
Officers are part of the State's executive branch, the Alabama 
Constitution forbids them from exercising the legislative or judicial 
power.  See § 42. 
Gaines argues that the Officers, namely, Sheriff Smith, 
"incarcerate indigent criminal defendants, such as Gaines, and allow 
them to remain incarcerated in the Walker County Jail for an 
indeterminable amount of time, or until such time the Warrant is 
recalled or the defendant is ordered to appear at a trial or a proceeding."  
Gaines's brief at 8.  But neither of the Officers has the authority to order 
him to appear -- only the trial judge does.  And, trial judges -- in this case, 
a circuit judge -- are part of the judicial branch and exercise the judicial 
power.  See Art. VI, § 139(a), Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.) ("The 
judicial power of the state shall be vested exclusively in a unified judicial 
1210304 
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system which shall consist of [, among other courts,] … a trial court of 
general jurisdiction known as the circuit court ….").  That power includes 
"the authority [of the trial court] to manage and control its docket."  Ex 
parte Watters, 220 So. 3d 1093, 1098 (Ala. 2016); see also Rule 16(a), Ala. 
R. Jud. Admin. ("The presiding judges of the circuit court and district 
court, or their designees over whom they have supervisory authority, 
shall determine the calendaring of cases within their respective courts.").  
And the "power to decide whether a defendant is entitled to remain at 
large on bail is a judicial power."  Ex parte State ex rel. Patterson, 268 
Ala. 524, 528, 108 So. 2d 448, 451 (1958). 
 
Contrary to Gaines's allegations, the Officers have no authority to 
"bring Gaines, and other similarly situated indigent criminal defendants, 
immediately before the Court" for a hearing.  Gaines's brief at 8.  Instead, 
the trial judge sets and conducts the hearing and makes the ultimate 
determination at the conclusion of that hearing.  The judicial power is 
distinct from the authority exercised by executive-branch officers such as 
Sheriff Smith and Deputy Doeur.  Gaines asks us to blend those roles 
together.  We cannot, and instead must remain faithful to the separation 
of powers mandated by the Alabama Constitution.  Because the Officers 
1210304 
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had neither the obligation nor the authority to schedule a hearing for 
Gaines, Gaines's claims against the Officers in their individual capacities 
fail as a matter of law. 
Conclusion 
 
We affirm the trial court's judgment.  Although the trial court erred 
by not holding a hearing before granting the Officers' motion to dismiss, 
the error was harmless.  As to the claims against the Officers: Gaines 
may not bring claims against State officials in their official capacities 
seeking monetary relief; the claims for equitable relief are moot; and the 
separation-of-powers framework embedded in our State Constitution 
precludes Gaines from obtaining relief from the Officers in their 
individual capacities.   
AFFIRMED. 
 
Parker, C.J., concurs. 
 
Shaw, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ., concur in the result.