Case Title: Stephen J. Stinsman v. State of Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 578-2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2015-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.

STEPHEN J. STINSMAN, §
§ No. 578, 2014
Defendant Below- §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware in and
v. § for New Castle County
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § No. 1209020601
§
§
§

‘Submitted: August 26, 2015
Decided: September 9, 2015

Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.
ORDER

On this 9" day of September 2015, it appears to the Court that:

(1) Defendant-below/Appellant Stephen J. Stinsman appeals from a Superior

Court jury verdict finding him guilty of Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”),!

 

Stinsman raises two claims on appeal. First, Stinsman argues that the trial court erred

 

in admitting testimony from police regarding statements obtained from him absent
Miranda warnings. Second, Stinsman argues that the trial court erred in admitting
this testimony because it was unfairly prejudicial.” We find no merit to Stinsman’s

appeal and affirm.

21 Del. C. § 4177(.
+ Stinsman either stipulated or conceded to all other charges brought against him.
(2) On September 28, 2012, at around 10:00 a.m., Stinsman was driving with
his dog over the Delaware Memorial Bridge. As he approached the toll plaza, he
struck another vehicle in the rear. Stinsman claimed that his money fell to the floor

and he leaned over to retrieve it. As he returned upright, his dog blocked his view,

 

causing him to hit the other vehicle.

(3) Shortly after the impact, Corporal Eric Roberts of the Delaware River and
Bay Authority Police Department responded to the scene. While investigating,
Corporal Roberts noticed that Stinsman was (1) slurring his speech, (2) not following.
directions;? (3) off balance and staggering; and (4) shaking. At the crash scene,
Corporal Roberts obtained two forms of identification from Stinsman: a New Jersey
identification card for “Stephen J. Stinsman” and a New Jersey driver's license for
“Henry J. Stinsman, Jr.” Both forms of identification had Stinsman’s picture.*
Shortly thereafter, Corporal Roberts’ colleague, Officer Peyto, placed Stinsman under
arrest for DUI and transported him to the police station immediately adjacent to the
toll plaza.

(4) Once

 

sman arrived at the police station, Corporal Roberts began

> According to Corporal Roberts, Stinsman exited his vehicle des
had difficulty following instructions when asked for his driver's li
+ Stinsman concedes that he possessed a drivers license bearing,
biographical information.

  
 
 

instructions tothe contrary and
asking him, “[WJho are you, are you Henry or Stephen?”* Stinsman

 

lly
identified himself as Henry, but then went back and forth, identifying himself as
Henry or Stephen. Stinsman eventually admitted that he was Stephen and that he

used his deceased brother's

 

certificate to obtain a false

 

1's license.
Corporal Roberts then asked him to fill out a pedigree sheet “[a]nd that’s as far as
{the] questioning went about his identity.”* Stinsman was ultimately indicted on five
separate offenses, including DUI.

(5) On December 17, 2013, a jury trial commenced as to the charge of DUI.
‘While presenting its case, the State presented information on how Stinsman used his
deceased brother's identity to obtain a false driver's license. Although Stinsman did
not object during the State’s opening statement, he did object to Corporal Roberts’

testimony regarding his admission on the grounds that the information was obtained

 

in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Following this objection, the t

 

I judge
conducted a brief hearing outside of the jury's presence. The State argued that
pedigree information, such as a detainee’s identity, is exempt from Miranda. The

trial court ruled that Stinsman’s adm

 

ns regarding his identity were “consistent

with Title 11, Section 1902 and . . . not violative of the Fifth Amendment right

+ Appellant's Op. Br. App. at 22.
* Appellant's Op. Br. App. at 22
against self-incrimination.””

 

(6) Stinsman next argued that information concerning his method of obtaining,
the false license (impersonating his deceased brother) was unfairly prejudicial under

Rule 403 of the Delaware Rules of Evidence. He argued that it was not necessary in

 

reaching a disposition in the case and “just show[ed] another layer of deviousness.”*
The State did not oppose Stinsman’s objection. The trial court ruled that “it {was}
unnecessarily prejudicial at this stage of the proceeding to dwell on or have further

testimony on the issue that [Stinsman’s] brother

 

deceased,” but any statements up
to that point in time were so minimal that they did not require a curative instruction.?
Both the court and Stinsman’s trial counsel expressly permitted the State to inquire
into the issue, so long as there was no reference to Stinsman’s brother as “dead” or
“deceased.”

(7) After the trial court’s rulings, and after the jury was brought back into the
courtroom, the following exchange occurred between the State and Corporal Roberts:
Q: Generally speaking, did [Stinsman] have an explanation as to
how he came to be in possession of two identifications with the

same picture on them?
A: Yes.
7 Appellant's Op. Br. App. at 24.

* Appellant's Op. Br. App. at 25.
* Appellant's Op. Br. App at 26
Q: And generally speaking, what was his -- what did he say?

A: [Stinsman] said he used his brother's birth certificate. He said
that his brother was dead and he used his brother's birth
certificate to get a driver’s license in his brother’s name as well
as register his car."°

 

(8) Stinsman did not object to the State’s questions or Corporal Roberts’

answers. No other reference to Stinsman’s brother being deceased was made during

 

The jury retumed a guilty verdict and Stinsman was convicted of all charges.

(9) On December 26, 2013, Stinsman filed a motion for a new trial. He argued
that the State introduced testimony obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights. He further argued that “the effect of [the] statements caused prejudice with
regard to [the DUI] charge . ...”"" The trial court denied Stinsman’s motion.'? This
appeal followed.

(10) Stinsman first argues that the trial court erred by allowing testimony
regarding his admission to Corporal Roberts because it was obtained while he was
under arrest and before being advised of his Miranda rights, which violated his Fifth
Amendment rights.

(11) This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence

 

" appellant's Op. Br. App. at 27.

"Appellant's Op. Br. App. at 46.

"The court held tat Stinsman’s admissions regarding his identity were admissible pursuant to 11
Del. C. § 1902. The court further held that Stinsman had not demonstrated that the testimony
complained of caused any prejudice.
for abuse of discretion."” Any claim that the trial judge erred in applying the law is
reviewed de novo.'*

(12) Law enforcement officers must advise a person in custody of his Miranda

 

hts prior to interrogation about “matters that may tend to incriminate him.” There
is, however, “an exception to Miranda for booking-type information.”"* Pedigree
information, such as names and dates of birth, “falls within the ambit of booking-type

information.”"” Pedigree information, thus,

 

“a recognized exception to Miranda,

even though [it] also further(s) the police’s investigation.’

 

(13) In Quintero v. State, the defendant, a 28 year-old man, was having a
sexual relationship with a 15 year-old girl.” After the defendant was arrested for
rape, a police officer requested pedigree information from him, including his date of
birth.” At trial, the defendant objected when the State tried to introduce this
information on the basis that the defendant had not been given Miranda warnings

prior to pedigree questioning.”” The trial court overruled the defendant's objection

® Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores E, LP, 930 A.2d 881, 886 (Del. 2007).

Miller v, State Farm Mit, Aut. Ins. Co.,993 A.24 1049, 1053 (Del. 2010),

 Laury v. Site, 260 A.2d 907, 908 n.* (Del. 1969) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436
(1966)).

" Herring v. State, 2006 WL 3062899, at #2 (Del. Oct. 30, 206).

"id

"a

" Quintero v. State, 2007 WL 2827680, at *1 (Del. Oct. 1, 2007).

Id.

"id.
and noted that case law

 

icated that pedigree information was outside the scope of
Miranda.” On appeal, the defendant argued that the officer should not have been.
able to testify about the defendant's date of birth because it was an essential element

ofthe offense and was obtained without giving defendant a Miranda warning.” This

 

Court held that such questioning “falls squarely within the booking exception to
Miranda.”™ This Court stated that “asking [defendant] for his date of birth is the type
of booking question reasonably designed to ensure that the officer had arrested the
correct individual." This Court further held that “the only rational conclusion on
m6

these facts is that the police officer asked the question as a matter of routine.

(14) This Court issued a similar ruling in Herring v. State.” The defendant in

 

Herring filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from his residence on the basis
that he divulged his address while under arrest and prior to receiving Miranda
warnings." The trial court denied the defendant’s motion.” On appeal, we found the

questioning at issue was “normally and reasonably related to police administrative

2d
® Quintero, 2007 WL 2827680, at *2.

 

Herring v. State, 2006 WL 3062899, at *2 (Del. Oct. 30, 2006),
Mid al,
id
concerns attendant to arrest and custody.” We held that this inquiry fell within the
exception to Miranda “even though [it] also furthered the police's investigation."

(15) Our reasoning in Quintero and Herring is directly applicable to the case

 

at bar as Corporal Roberts’ inquiry into Stinsman’s identity was within the booking

procedure exception to Miranda. Stinsman was under arrest for DUI, but the officers

 

did not know his true identity. Corporal Roberts’ questioning, which was
accompanied by a pedigree sheet, was a normal and reasonable procedure related to
processing Stinsman once placed in custody. It is true that this information aided the
police’s investigation, but that information was not necessary to determine that
Stinsman possessed false identification. Stinsman had two identification cards with
his picture but different biographical descriptions.” There are no facts that move
Corporal Roberts’ inquiry out of the booking procedure exception.” Accordingly,
Miranda did not apply and Stinsman’s Fifth Amendment rights were not violated.

(16) Stinsman next argues that the tes

 

jony regarding how he obtained the

  

false license was unfairly prejudicial. He further contends that the State disregarded

id a2,

» Herring, 2006 WL 3062899, at *2.

» Stinsman concedes that possessing two inconsistent identifications is prima facie proof that he
possessed a false identification,

 Stinsman claims that determining how he obtained the false identification was outside standard
booking procedure, Stinsman cannot, however, reconcile the fact thatthe uncontradicted testimony
in the record shows that Stinsman volunteered this information in response to Corporal Roberts’
attempts to confirm his identity

 
 

the trial court’s ruling when it elicited testimony on this issue.™*

(17) Rule 403 of the Delaware Rules of Evidence states that relevant evidence
‘may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations
ns

of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Deciding whether the probat

  

value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice “falls particularly within the discretion of the trial judge.”*

(18) “[W]here defense counsel fails to raise any objection at trial to alleged
prosecutorial misconduct and the trial judge fails to intervene sua sponte, we review

a

claims of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal for plain error.”"” We employ a

error review." First, we review the record de novo to

 

three-step analysis for p
determine if there was prosecutorial misconduct.” “If we determine that no

misconduct occurred, our analysis ends.” If there was misconduct, we then apply

 Stinsman does not specifically claim that prosecutorial misconduct occurred in his motion for a
new trial or on appeal. The State, however, believes Stinsman raised tis claim in his opening brief
*DRE. 403.

* Trowbridge v. State, 1996 WL 145788, at *2 Del. Mar.4, 1996) (quoting Lynch v State, 588 A.2d
1138, 1141 Del, 1991),

» Bake v, Sate, 906 A.2d 139, 151 (Del. 2006).

 
the Wainwright standard." If plain error is found under the Wainwright standard, we
will reverse the conviction.* If plain error is not found, we then apply the Hunter
analysis to determine if there were repetitive errors that “cast doubt on the integrity

of the judicial process."

 

(19) We find no prosecutorial misconduct based on the facts of this case. The
trial court did not rule that the State was prohibited from inquiring into how Stinsman
obtained the false driver's license. The trial court merely stated that it was
unnecessary to discuss the fact that Stinsman’s brother was deceased. The prosecutor
then asked Corporal Roberts a very general question and he mentioned that
Stinsman’s brother was deceased in response. There was no specific prompt in the
State’s question that required Corporal Roberts to respond the way that he did. And
the State did not mention or elicit any other testimony for the remainder of the trial
regarding the fact that Stinsman’s brother was deceased. The prosecutor questioned

the witness in a way that was expressly permitted by the trial judge and Stinsman’s

 

Baker, 906 A.2d at 150. Under the Waimeright standard
[T]he error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights
{8s o jeopardize the faimess and integrity ofthe tril process. Furthermore,
the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on
the face of the record, which are basic, serious, and fundamental in their
character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or
which clearly show manifest injustice.
1d. (quoting Wainright v. Sate, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986)).

 

 
trial counsel. The result was a simple error on the part of the witness. Accordingly,
‘we do not find that any prosecutorial misconduct occurred.

(20) Even if we were to find the prosecutor's question to have been
inappropriate, Stinsman would not prevail on the remaining steps of the plain error
analysis. The trial judge found previous references to Stinsman’s deceased brother

to be materially insignificant. We fail to see how this passing reference somehow

 

cast doubton the integrity ofthe trial process or created “manifest injustice.* Thus,
Stinsman’s second claim lacks merit.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

 

BY THE COURT:

See Baker, 906 A.24 at 150.