Case Title: In re Paulson

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49826

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: June 5, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of
LAUREN PAULSON,	
Accused.
(OSB 00-105; SC S49826)
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted March 10, 2003.
	Lauren Paulson argued the cause and filed the briefs for
himself.
	Mary Anne Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon
State Bar.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is publicly reprimanded.
	PER CURIAM
	In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) alleged that the accused had violated Code of
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-106(A) by
billing a client for time spent responding to the client's
complaint to the Bar against the accused. (1)  A trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board concluded that the accused had violated DR
2-106(A) and imposed a public reprimand.  The accused sought
review of the trial panel's decision.  We review de novo.  ORS
9.536(3); Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.6.  We also conclude that
the accused violated DR 2-106(A) and impose a public reprimand.
	The accused represented a client (Ring) in various
matters.  After a dispute arose regarding the representation, the
accused withdrew.  Ring then complained to the Bar regarding the
accused's conduct.  (The nature of Ring's allegations is not
relevant here.)  The Bar sent the accused a letter of inquiry. 
The accused responded to the letter, and the Bar took no further
action regarding Ring's original complaint.
	The accused, however, billed Ring $67.50 for the time
that he spent responding to the Bar's letter of inquiry.  Ring
complained to the Bar about that bill.  The accused continued to
bill Ring for the $67.50 for almost one year before deleting it. 
Afterwards, the Bar filed a formal complaint charging that the
bill for $67.50 was for an excessive fee in violation of DR 2-106(A).
	The accused first argues that the trial panel's delay
in filing an opinion requires dismissal.  The hearing transcript
in this matter was settled on June 28, 2002, but the trial panel
did not file its written opinion with Disciplinary Counsel until
October 2, 2002, 96 days later.  That was well outside the time
within which the trial panel should have filed its opinion with
Disciplinary Counsel.  BR 2.4(i)(2)(a). (2)  Therefore, the accused
contends that the charges should be dismissed.
	We reject the accused's argument.  Time delays do not
warrant dismissal except when the delay "substantially prejudiced
the ability of the accused or applicant to receive a fair
hearing."  BR 11.1. (3)  Here, the trial panel's delay occurred
after the hearing, and the accused fails to allege any prejudice
to his ability to receive a fair hearing or to seek review by
this court.
	On the merits, we conclude that the accused violated DR
2-106(A).  The accused cites nothing in the common law, and no
statute, rule, or contractual provision, that would entitle him
to collect the fee at issue from Ring. (4)  In other words, the
accused billed Ring for a fee that she had no obligation to pay. 
Without such an obligation, the fee is clearly excessive.
	This court has held fees to be clearly excessive when
the accused lawyer billed a client for time that the lawyer in
fact spent representing his or her own interests.  See In re
Benett, 331 Or 270, 278, 14 P3d 66 (2000) (violation of DR 2-106(A); "On this record, the accused was representing only his
own interests in his fee dispute with the [clients] and he could
not properly bill the [clients] for that time."); In re Stauffer,
327 Or 44, 64, 956 P2d 967 (1998) (violation of DR 2-106(A);
accused lawyer billed estate for, among other things, "the time
he spent defending himself against * * * [the former personal
representative of the estate's] complaints to the Bar about
him"); see also In re Miller, 303 Or 253, 256-57, 735 P2d 591
(1987) (violation of DR 2-106(A); accused lawyer billed client
for, among other things, 12 hours spent representing different
client).
	The accused disputes that interpretation of Benett and
Stauffer.  He contends that the quoted comment from Stauffer was
dictum and that Benett was decided wrongly because it misapplied
Stauffer.  We reject both arguments.  In Stauffer, the court held
that the accused lawyer charged a fee that was excessive for a
multitude of reasons, one of which was that the accused lawyer
had billed for time spent responding to a Bar complaint, see 327
Or at 63-64 (listing reasons that accused had charged excessive
fees); that conclusion was not dictum.  Benett thus correctly
characterized Stauffer as holding that "charges for defending
against Bar complaints constituted [an] excessive fee[.]"  331 Or
at 278.
	The accused also contends that DR 2-106(B) demonstrates
that the Bar may not challenge the reasonableness of an amount
that he includes as a particular item on a bill, but must
challenge the reasonableness of the fee as a whole.  That
argument is meritless.  The test for whether a fee is clearly
excessive is whether, "after a review of the facts, a lawyer of
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm
conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee." 
DR 2-106(B).  An accused lawyer who charges a client for work
that the lawyer performed -- but not for the benefit of that
client -- has charged a fee in excess of a reasonable fee, even
if the excessive charges appear within a bill that contains other
reasonable charges.
	The accused also contends that the trial panel should
have analyzed individually each of the factors of DR 2-106(B). 
Those factors are "considered as guides in determining the
reasonableness of a fee."  Id.  Application of those guides here
would not advance the analysis.  For example, there is no point
in considering the time expended or difficulty of the work,
DR 2-106(B)(1), because Ring had no obligation to pay for the
services regardless of how efficiently the accused performed
them.  Similarly, there is no need to consider the fee charged in
the area for similar legal services, DR 2-106(B)(3), because Ring
was not liable for any fee regardless of the reasonableness of
the accused's rate.
	We conclude that a fee charged for time spent
exclusively in pursuit of a lawyer's own interests violates DR 2-106(A).  The accused acted exclusively in his own interests when
he responded to Ring's complaint to the Bar.  Consequently, the
fee that the accused charged for his efforts was excessive and in
violation of DR 2-106(A).   
	As a final matter, we must determine the appropriate
sanction.
		"This court refers to the American Bar
Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) for guidance in
determining the appropriate sanction for lawyer
misconduct.  To determine the appropriate sanction,
this court first considers the duty violated, the
accused's mental state, and the actual or potential
injury caused by the accused's misconduct.  Considering
those three factors leads to a suggested sanction,
which this court may choose to impose or may modify
after examining aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and this court's case law."
In re Lackey, 333 Or 215, 228-29, 37 P3d 172 (2002) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
	The duty that the accused violated is one owed as a
professional.  ABA Standard 7.0 introduction (so characterizing
violations described in DR 2-106).  The trial panel found, and
the Bar does not dispute, that the accused's state of mind was
negligent; on de novo review we conclude, however, that the
accused's conduct was knowing.  The accused's conduct could have
injured Ring by causing her to pay fees that she did not owe.
	The accused's violation of DR 2-106(A) is aggravated by
the accused's substantial experience in the legal profession (he
has been a member of the Bar since 1973).  ABA Standard 9.22(i). 
However, the accused has no prior disciplinary record, and he
made full and free disclosure to the Disciplinary Counsel's
Office, which mitigate his actions.  ABA Standard 9.32(a), (e).
	In In re Potts/Trammel/Hannon, 301 Or 57, 718 P2d 1363
(1986), the only recent case in which this court considered a
violation of DR 2-106(A) without significant other disciplinary
violations, the court imposed a public reprimand.  Id. at 75. 
Under the facts and circumstances of this proceeding, we agree
with the trial panel and Bar, and conclude that a public
reprimand is the appropriate sanction.
	The accused is publicly reprimanded.



1.  DR 2-106 provides in part: 
		"(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement
for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive
fee.
		"(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a
review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence
would be left with a definite and firm conviction that
the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.  Factors to
be considered as guides in determining the
reasonableness of a fee include the following:
		"(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly.  
		"(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer. 
		"(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services.  
		"(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
		"(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or
by the circumstances.  
		"(6) The nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client.  
		"(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.  
		"(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent." 

2. When the Bar filed its formal complaint against the
accused in March 2001, former BR 2.4(i)(2)(a) required the trial
panel to file its opinion within 21 days after (among other
possibilities) the date when the transcript was settled. 
Effective June 28, 2001, BR 2.4(i)(2)(a) was amended to require
the trial panel to file its opinion within 28 days.  The Bar does
not address the issue explicitly, but appears to concede that the
21-day deadline applied here.  We need not decide which version
of the rule applied; the trial panel filed its decision well
outside both deadlines.

3. BR 11.1 provides:
		"The failure of any person or body to meet any
time limitation or requirement in these rules shall not
be grounds for the dismissal of any charge or objection
unless a showing is made that the delay substantially
prejudiced the ability of the accused or applicant to
receive a fair hearing."

4. The accused contended before the trial panel that Ring
was required to pay the charge for responding to the Bar
complaint under a quantum meruit theory.  He failed to elaborate
on that argument.  "The purpose of quantum meruit is to prevent
unjust enrichment at the expense of another."  Schroeder v.
Schaefer, 258 Or 444, 466, 483 P2d 818 (1971).  The accused did
not enrich Ring by responding to her complaint to the Bar.