Case Title: State v. Lesher

Citation: 669 P.2d 146

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 1983-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
669 P.2d 146 (1983) STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Debra Ann LESHER, Defendant-Appellant. No. 8719. Supreme Court of Hawaii. September 9, 1983. Gregory K. Tanaka and Peter England Roberts on briefs, Office of the Public Defender, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant. Shirley Smith, Office of Pros. Atty., City and County of Honolulu, Honolulu, on brief, for plaintiff-appellee. Before LUM, C.J., NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI, JJ., and Chief Judge BURNS, assigned by reason of vacancy. PADGETT, Justice. This is an appeal from a conviction for operating a motor vehicle without no-fault insurance, in violation of § 294-8(a)(1), Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS). We affirm. It was stipulated that at the time and place of the offense charged, the appellant was operating a motor vehicle which was not insured under a no-fault policy. Appellant had previously been convicted of an offense under this section of the law. At the time of the present offense, she was operating the vehicle in question without *147 having made any inquiry whatsoever as to whether it was or was not insured. Section 294-1, HRS, states: Were drivers permitted to escape penal responsibility for operating uninsured motor vehicles by failing to inquire as to whether or not there was insurance, the purpose of the statute would be frustrated, since the no-fault system is designed to require that all vehicles being operated on the highways are insured. Section 702-204, HRS, provides: Section 702-212, HRS, provides: Appellee argues that absolute liability is imposed by § 294-8(a)(1), HRS, which reads as follows: Appellant argues that absolute liability is not imposed and that, therefore, she should have been acquitted since there was no proof of "intent" to commit the offense. We cannot accept either position. Section 294-8.5(a), HRS, provides: Section 294-8.6, HRS, provides: From the foregoing requirement, making it a violation to knowingly use a fraudulent no-fault insurance card, it is obvious that the legislature did not intend to impose absolute liability for operating an uninsured vehicle in a situation in which the operator is innocently using a fraudulent no-fault card. *148 Obviously also, there can arise situations in which the operator has a validly issued no-fault card but is operating the vehicle not knowing that the card had been cancelled. For example, this is what had factually occurred in Joshua v. MTL, Inc., 65 Haw. 623, 656 P.2d 736 (1982). We do not ascertain, from the statute, any legislative purpose to impose absolute penal liability on such innocent operators. On the other hand, under the statutory scheme, all vehicles (other than federally-owned vehicles) operated on the highways must be insured and the statutory indicia of such insurance is a no-fault insurance card kept in the vehicle. All citizens are charged with knowledge of the law. It is therefore incumbent upon the borrower of a vehicle to ascertain whether or not there is a current no-fault insurance card in the vehicle. The state of mind under the statutes cited, which can give rise to penal liability, includes acting recklessly. Section 702-206(3)(a), HRS, provides that "[a] person acts recklessly with respect to his conduct when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he engages in such conduct." By operating the vehicle in question without ascertaining that there was a valid, current no-fault card in the vehicle, appellant acted recklessly with respect to whether her conduct in driving the vehicle was in violation of § 294-8(a)(1), HRS. There were, accordingly, sufficient facts to sustain her conviction. Affirmed.