Case Title: State v. Gonsalves. Concurring Opinion by J. Acoba, with whom J. Duffy joins [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 09/09/2005 [pdf].

Citation: 108 Haw. 289

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T. | &

ee OG

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintifs-Appellee,

 

RICHARD GONSALVES, Defendant-Appellant

SS

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CR. NO. 0441-004)

No. 27078
SEPTEMBER 9, 2005

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, AND NAKAYAMA, JJ. AND ACOBA, J.,
CONCURRING SEPARATELY, WITH WHOM DUFFY, J., JOINS

QRINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

The defendant-appellant Richard Gonsalves appeals from
the judgment of the circuit court of the first circuit, the
Honorable Virginia L. Crandall presiding, convicting him of and
sentencing hin for the offense of promoting a dangerous drug in
the second degree, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)
$ 712-1242 (1) (c) (1993 & Supp. 2003).* On appeal, Gonsalves

HRS § 712-1242 provided in relevant part

1) A person commits the offense of promoting a dangerous
drug in the Second degree if the person knowingly!

 

ibutes any dangerous drug in any amount.
chetanding any law to the contrary, except. for
ndera sentenced under section 106-622-5, if the
f promoting = dangerous sruz in the
‘section involved the possession or

 
  
 

 

 
‘4+ FOR PUBLICATION ***
argues that the circuit court erred (1) by excusing the jury for
the day rather than receiving the jury’s non-verdict following

the jury's communication to the court, which stated that it was
sunable to reach a unanimous decision” and (2) by sentencing him
as a repeat offender to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment
of three years and four months “without submitting the issue of
whether [he] qualifies as [a] repeat offender to a jury” to be

proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in contravention of the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
u.s. 466 (2000), and Blakely v, Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

I. BACKGROUND
on January 5, 2004, Gonsalves was charged by complaint

 

with promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree, in

violation of HRS § 712-1242(1)(c), see supra note 1.

the circuit court conducted a jury trial that commenced
on September 29, 2004 and concluded on October 8, 2004.

At 1:15 p.m. on October 6, 2004, during the first day
of jury deliberations, the jury foreperson sent communication No.
3 to the circuit court. The communication read, “What is the
procedure for returning a non-verdict?” The circuit court

ss scontinued)
Gistribution of methamphetamine, or any of te
Seles of isomers, the person shall be sentenced to an
[hdeterninate term of imprisonment of Een y
ength of watch shall
for than five years, at the
EELEEEIG."GF TRC" Sentencing Gourt. The person’ convicted shall

Sete eiiginie for parole during che mandatory period of
imprisonment

 

 

   

the Legislature amended HRS $ 712-1242 by, inter alia,

effective ouly 1, 2004
‘See 2004 Haw. Sees. L. Act 44, 5 6 at 212

deleting eubsection (3).

 

2
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responded, “You may advise the court by written communication if
you are not able to reach a verdict.” At 2:00 p.m. that same
day, the jury sent communication No. 4, which stated, “We are
unable to reach a unanimous decision.” The circuit court
responded, “You are excused for today. Return tomorrow at 9:00
a.m.” Gonsalves objected to the circuit court’s responses to the
jury's communication No. 4 as follows:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL): Defense objection was that they
should be allowed ~~ because they indicated that they were
Gnable to reach a unanimous decision, the court should have
Feconvened and taken their decision. I also informed the
Glezt’Sf"tne court that reserving my objection to the court
Sending then home for the day, I proposed an alternative

Uhsteueelon to the jury or response to the Juryly] whLeh
ies, "Would additional tine deliberating aeeist you in your

 

 

Seliberstions?”
‘and i believe then over that objection, the court sent
‘them hone, Again, . they should have been asked would

Aduitional time ateiet them Before they were sent hone
Because if they responded that no, additional tine would not
assist then, then the court should have reconvened and taken
their decision.

The jury did not deliberate on October 7, 2004. At
9:30 a.m. on October 8, 2004, the jury sent communication No. 5,
which stated, “We are submitting a non-verdict.” The circuit
court responded, “Would additional time deliberating assist you
in your deliberations?” At 2:10 p.m., the jury sent
communication No. 6, which stated, “Can you elaborate or explain
in layman’s terms element #2 on page 25 of the instructions.”

‘The circuit court responded, “Words are to be given their common

 

and ordinary meaning.” At 2:58 p.m. that same day, the jury
announced that it had reached a unanimous verdict. The jury
found Gonsalves guilty as charged of promoting a dangerous drug

in the second degree.
 

FOR PUBLICATION *#*
on December 1, 2004, the State of Hawai'i (hereinafter,
“the prosecution] filed a motion for consecutive term
sentencing, which sought to revoke Gonsalves’s probation with
respect to prior convictions in Cr. Nos. 0-1-0406, 99-0200, and
98-2519 and resentence him to terns of imprisonment that would
run consecutively to the term of imprisonment imposed in Cr. No.

04-1-0004.? That same day, the prosecution also filed a motion

 

+ the prosecution, in its menorandun in support of its motions for
consecutive and Fepest offender sentencing, stated

The Supreme Court of Hawail"]i recently addressed the
‘seeue by examining extended cerm sentencing
peereadARbecative sentencing. in State v, Bivera, (106 Hawas's
46, 102 P38 10t¢ (2004),] the court found that an extended term
Se imprisonment say be properly imposed without additional jury
findings, av long a2 the extended term does not exceed thet of an
applicable consecutive tern.
Bad the cirevit court sentenced Rivera to consecutive
1s of imprisonment in Counte I and IZ, the effect would
ir indeterminate maxiaun term of
Inpriscnment, 2 term equal to the two concurrent ten-year
extended terme of imprisonsent that the circuit court
Sctually ispesed in this case... It defies logic that
the circuit court could, consistent with Blakely,
[egitinstely inpose the sane ten-year sentence, comprised of
the consecutive five-year indeterminate maximun terms, under
Stainery sentencing principles, but run afoul of Blakely by
Gmposing concurrene Pen-yesr extended terns of imprisonment
bared on the finding of prior or multiple concurrent
{106 nowai'i at 168, 202 P.3 at 1062 (omphases in original).)

    

 

‘the foregoing statenent by the prosecution is false. Rivera held that
Hawaii's extended term sentencing schere does not contravene Blakely,
Nevertheless, aivera in ne way stande for the proposition that an extended
term of inprisonnent may be inposed "as long as it does not exceed that of an
applicable consecutive term.” Moreover, the prosecution seems to ignore the
Possibility that an extended term of imprisonment may, in some cases, be
Qaposea in’ connection with a single count and consecutive terms can gnly be
{necked if Squltipie terme of imprisonment are imposed on a defendent st the
bane tinel.J" HRS § 706-668.6 (1993). To clarity, the Rivera majority
Siscussed the reletionship between ARS §§ 706-668. and 706-662, the extended
term sentencing statute, in order to “underscore our point,” Rivera, 106
Howaitt ae 163, 102 P34 at 1061, thst judges have 2 broad ‘range of discretion
Inaentencing matters, including imposing consecutive sentences under certain
Lietunstances enen it’ nay be “necessary for the protection of the public.

 
‘++ FOR PUBLICATION ***

for sentencing of a repeat offender to a mandatory minimum term
of imprisonment of three years and four months, pursuant to HRS
§ 706-606.5 (1) (a) (441) (1993 6 Supp. 2004).”

on December 17, 2004, Gonsalves filed a memorandum in
opposition to the prosecution’s motions for consecutive and
repeat offender sentencing, arguing that both the “imposition of
‘a consecutive sentence” and “a mandatory minimum sentence upon
[him] pursuant to the repeat offender statute without a finding
by a jury that would support a consecutive sentence violates
[his] Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process under Apprendi v. New Jersey and
Blakely v. Washinoton.”

On January 13, 2005, the circuit court conducted a
sentencing hearing and a hearing on the prosecution’s motions for
(1) repeat offender sentencing, (2) consecutive term sentencing,
and (3) revocation of probation and resentencing, and (4)
sentencing together with Cr. Nos. 98-2519, 99-0200, and 00-1-
0406. At the hearing, the circuit court took judicial notice of
the records and files in Cr. Nos. 98-2519, 99-0200, and 00-1-

2 ERS § 106-606.5 provides in relevant pact:

(2) Notwithstanding section 706-669 and any other leu to the
ary, any person convictes of murder int
‘A felony’ (oz) any class B felony
Sonviction of price convictions for the following felonies,
{neluding an attempt to commit the sane: murder, murder in the
Hirst or second degree, a clase A felony, 2 class 8 felony, or any
felony conviction of another jurisdiction shall be sentenced toa
mandatory minimum period of igprisonment without possibility of
Parole during such period as follows:

(a) one prior felony conviction

   

 

 

 

(siL} tinere the instant conviction is for a class 8
felony -- three years, four monthe(.)

 

5
‘48 FOR PUBLICATION ***
0406. The circuit court noted that Gonsalves was on probation in
Cr. Nos. 98-2519, 99-0200, and 00-1-0406 at the time of his
conviction of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree in
cr. No. 04-1-0004, such that, pursuant to HRS § 706-625 (Supp.
2003), the court was required to revoke his probation in the
foregoing three criminal numbers for his conviction of a felony.
Gonsalves argued against the imposition of consecutive terms and
sentencing as a repeat offender on the basis that both
contravened the holdings in Apprendi and Blakely.

‘The circuit court granted the prosecution's motion to
sentence Gonsalves as 2 repeat offender and denied the
prosecution’s motion for consecutive term sentencing. The
circuit court resentenced Gonsalves to five-year indeterminate
maximum terms of imprisonment in Cr. Nos. 98-2519, 99-200, and
00-1-406. In Cr. No. 04-1-0004, the circuit court

 

ntenced
Gonsalves to a ten-year indeterminate maximum term of
imprisonment subject to concurrent mandatory minimum terms of (1)
three years and four months as a repeat offender pursuant to HRS
§ 706-606.5, see supra note 3, and (2) two years and six months
based on the involvement of the substance methamphetamine
pursuant to HRS § 712-1242(3), see supra note 1. The circuit

court ordered all sentences to run concurrently with one another.

 

 

«Rs § 106-625(3) provies:

 

(3) the court shall revoke probation if the defendant hi
inexcusably failed te comply with a substantial requirenent
{posed a:'a condition of the order or has been convicted of @
Helonys The court may revoke the suspension of sentence oF
Erobetion If the defendant has been convicted of another crime
ether than a felony.
appeal.

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on January 21, 2005, Gonsalves timely filed a notice of

Swwmen jury instructions or the omission thereof are
at issue on appeal, ‘the standard of review is whether, wh
ead and considered as 8 whole, the instructions given ore
Prejudicially ineueficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or
Risieading.’* State v, Kinnane, 79 Hawal't «6, 49, 897 P.2d
973, 976 (i995) (quoting State v. Kelekolic, 74 maw. 479,
514415, 849 B24 86, 14 (1993) (citations emitted)].
See alge State v. Hoey, 17 Hawaii 17, 38, 861 P-2d 504, 525
(1590)

Ss(p)zroneous instructions are presumptively harmful
and are a ground for reversal unless St atfirmatively
appears from the record asa whole that the error was not

 

prejudicial.” “state v. Pinera, 70 Haw. $09, 527, 778 P.2d
504, 116 (1989) - + (quoting Turner v. Millie, $9 Haw

319) 326, 562 P.3¢'7i0, "715 (1978) +
[Elrror ie not to be viewed in
isolation and consisered purely in
the abstract. Tt most be examined
in the Light of the entire
Proceedings and given the effect
Shieh the whole Fecord shows it to
be entitled. In that context, the
Foal question becones whether’ there
isa reasoneble possibility that.
error might have contribated to
Sonviction.
State z Heard, 64 Haw. 193, 194, 638 P.2¢ 307,
308 (1s61) {eltations oniteed)..' Tf there 43
such a reasonable possibility in 4 criminal
Gaze, then the error ie not harmless beyond @
reasonable doubt, and the Judgnent of conviction
on which it may have been based must be set
Seide., See Yates vs Evatt, 500 Urs. 392, 402-03
=. (2951) C)
tite vs welbion, 80 Hawai'i 27, 32, 906 p.24 912,
917, reconsideration denied, 80 Hawai't 187, 307 'P.24 773
(199s} (some citations omitted) (brackets in original)
(emphasis deletes) ; gee also state. loa, €3 Hawai'i 335,
350, 326 P24 1258, 1273 (1996); Staxa vy Robingon, 62
Hawas't 30¢, 310-11, 922 P.24 386, 364705 (193e)

 

 

 

State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai'i 1, 11-12, 928 P.2d 843, 853-54 (1996)
(footnote omitted) .
‘+++ FOR PUBLICATION ***

“(t]he circuit court's response to a jury communication
is the functional equivalent of an instruction.” State v. waili,
103 Hawai'i 69, 101, 79 P.34 1263, 1275 (2003) (quoting State v
Wyesuat, 100 Hawai'i 442, 458, 60 P.3d 843, 859 (2002) (citations
and internal quotation signals onitted)).

B. Sentencing

IA) sentencing judge generally has broad
discretion in inposing @ sentence. . ,
Je Hawai'i 127, 43-44, 090 P-24 1167, 1183-86 (1998)
a feta, 14 Haw. 424, 438, 088 P.2d 376,
=r {1353).."“the applicable standara of review
for sentencing of resentencing matters is whether the
SSurt committed plain ane manifest abuse of discretion
fn its decieion. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i at 144, 890 2.26
ae iss State y. Kumuway, 72 Haw, 218, 27°28, 787
Pizd 692, 687-98 (1990); State. Murcavl,) 63 Haw.
[br 25; bat poad 334, 342-43 (190); aeate vy Bry, 62
Baw, 206, 231, 602 P-24 13, 16 (1379)
Keaua ve Gtate, 19 Hawas't 261, 284, 902 P.2d dat, 404
WSsey eiFlactore which sndicate a plain and manifest
Abuse of discretion are arbitrary or capricious action by
the Juage and s rigid refusal to consider the defendant’ s
Contentions." Fry, 61 faw. at 231, 602 F.2d at 17. And,
SCigjeneraiiy, to constituce an abuse it must appear that
the dourt clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or
Gisregerded rules or principles of law or practice to the
Substantial detriment’ of a party litigant.'" Keawe, 79
Howai'i at. 266, 901 F.2d at 484 (quoting Gaylord, 78 Hawas's
ae ld, €90 P-2d at T1e¢ (quoting Kumukau, 71 Hew, at
250028, 767 P.2d at 68E))

‘State v. Rauch, 94 Hawai'i 315, 322, 13 P.3d 324, 331 (2000)
(brackets and ellipsis points in original).
C. Questions Of Constitutional Law

ie answer questions of constitutional Law ‘by
exercising cur own independent judgaent based on the facts
Of the care,’* and, thus, questions of constitutional law
Gre reviewed on appeal "onder the ‘right/wrong’ stendard.”

153 Howal't 87, 100, 997 P-2d 13, 26 (2000)
(citations omitted)

State v, Aplaca, 96 Hawai'i 17, 22, 25 P.3d 792, 797 (2001).

 

 

 

 

 
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IIT. DISCUSSION

wit +s suppl ry Inst Were
Nos Erroneous.

Gonsalves argues that the “trial court should have

 

reconvened the jury and received its non-verdict on October 6,
2004{,]” following jury communication No. 4, which indicated that
the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.

Gonsalves contends that “[bly forcing the jury to continue to
deliberate for two more days before reaching a verdict {,] the
court denied [him] his right to trial by jury(.1”

Gonealves’s arguments are without merit.

In Allen x, United states, 164 0.8. 492, 17 8.ct. 154,
41 ued, S20 T1850), the United states’ Suprene Court held
that an instruction to's deadlocked jury that directs
Minority Jurors to reconsider their views in light of the
Stews of the majority wae permissible. Subsequently know
Ga the Alan instruction, the instruction beca

Incteastagiy popular bechuse of “its perceived efficiency si
a'neans of ‘blasting’ a verdict out of

Uo "Falards, €? Haw. at 592, 699 Pe2d-at 22 (quoting
hones. Gainer, 19 Cal-3¢ 635, 844, 138 Cal-Rptr. S61,
Bee gee Peta sss, 1001 (1979)), However, this. court
Specifically rejected the se of the Allah instruction in
SEate wv. Falarde, 67 Haw. $93, 699 P.2a 20 (1985)

Ti Eauarse, appellant wae tried for murder. Following
three days cf Jury deliberations, the jury reported that it
ECuId not reach s verdict. Ate conference called to
Siscuse the communication, the court stated its intent to
Give the Jury a supplenental instruction. Appellant
Sbsectes anc asked for s mistrial. the motion was denied.

‘The trial court gave a supplemental instruction to the
jury asking that 1t “continue. = deliberations in an
Gtfere to agree on a verdict.” Additionally, the court
Savised that if a verdict could not be reached,

aN Sputhough the court reminded the
Suess co consult ana deliberate with « view to reaching an
agreenent “uithout tiolsting your individual judgment,” the
Gourt also stated that"
Sn the einorsev should his ws ane

ond that the

shenselnisttanjerity shovid-de iikesise- The court then
Ineetucted the Jury t0 retire to the jury room and “exercise
your very best effort to resch s verdict." Jd, at 594-95,
99 P20 at 21-22 (esphasis in original)

 

      

    

   

 

 

  

 
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on sppesl, eppellant Fajardo argued that the trial
court errea in giving the Allan instruction to the
Geadlocked jury. We agreed Decause in our view the
instruction was flawed for two reasons. First, whether or
ot a case must be retried ia not a factor that a Jury,
should consider in its deliberations. id. at €00, 699 F.2d
at 2.

Second, it was error for the triel court in Eatardo te
admonish the minority jurors to reconsider heir views in
Light of the opinicn ef the majority Jurors. ey Instructing
then in this vay, the dissenting jurors were required to
Consider not only the evidence presented, but also thelr
position in the minority. We held that this was error. AS
we stated, “A conscientious minority 1s the backbone of oUF
Bnerican way of life, No individual, group or snetitution,
however altruistic its intentions, can set aside the sincere
Convictions of s minority to conform to that of the majority
for the expedience of rendering a unanimous decision.”
at 601, 699 P.24 at 25, Therefore, we have explicitiy
Fejected the Allen instruction and’have held chat it was
error to instruct minority jurors to reconsider their views
In'Tight of the majority in their deliberations.

Eaiarda, 67 Haw. $93, 699 P.2d 20 (1985)

State v. Villeza, 72 Haw. 327, 334-35, 817 P.2d 1054, 1058
991.

 

 

 

In Villeza, this court extended its holding in Fajardo
by further holding that “it was error for the trial court to
instruct the Jury that it must unanimously decide that it was
unable to reach a verdict.” 72 Haw. at 335, 617 P.2d at 1958.
no basis in the

 

This court stated that “[s]uch an instruction ha

 

law and, like the Allen instruction, serves only to create a
coercive environment incapable of supporting a meaningful verdict
based solely upon the jury's consideration of the evidence.” 72
Haw. at 335, 817 P.2d at 1058.

In the present matter, the circuit court’s response to
jury communication No. 4, which excused the jury for the day, in
no way mirrored the erroneous instructions in Faiarde and villeza
that were deemed to have “blasted” verdicts out of deadlocked

juries. By contrast, the early dismissal of jurors on the first

10
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day of deliberations did net “create a coercive environment
incapable of supporting a meaningful verdict based solely upon
the jury's consideration of the evidence.” Villeza, 72 Haw. at
335, 817 P.2d 1058. Therefore, “when read and considered as a
whole, the instructions given” were not “prejudicially
insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading,” Kinnane,
79 Hawai'i at 49, 897 P.2d at 976, and the circuit court did not
err in instructing the jury.

B. err ng Gos
Rey ier

Gonsalves argues that the “factual issue of whether
[he] is a repeat offender should have been determined by a jury
and subject [ed] to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gonsalves
avers that “[t)he jury verdict only authorized a sentence ranging
from probation to an indeterminate sentence of ten years” and
that

(alpplication of Haaiits repeat offender statute . . . to

Ain decseased the prescribes range of penalties by

tlintesting the porsibility of probation and requiring the

Eourt to iepose sn indeterminate sentence of ten year(")s

Gmpeisonnent with a mandatory minimum sentence of three

youes and four sontha, without a finding by a jury based

pen proof beyond a reasonable doubt]
(Emphasis added).* Gonsalves insists that the United states
Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi and Blakely support his

foregoing contention. Gonsalves is mistaken.

 

Gonsalves does not raise as error on appeal the circuit court's
imposition of e mandatory minimum tern of isprisonment of two years and six
onthe based on the involvenent of the substance methamphetamine, pursuent to
Bee § 712-124213), ge supra note 1. Effective July 1, 2004, the legislature
anended HRS $ 712-1242 by, Apter alia, deleting subsection (3). See 2004 Haw.
Sess. L. Act 44, § 6 at 2i2

 

 

 

aa
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The rule declared by the United States Supreme Court in
Apprendi was that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, The Court
in Blakely extended the Apprendi rule, explaining that “the
relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge
may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximun he may
impose without any additional findings.” 42 U.S. at 302
(emphasis in original) -

In State v, Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146, 102 P.3d 1044
(2004), thie court analyzed the effect of the Supreme Court's

decisions in Apprendi and Blakely on Hawaii's sentencing scheme:

Blakely focused on the perceived defects of washington
state’= determinate sentencing schene, applying the rule che
Court had previously crafted in Btmands, ie, that
Sfoltner than the fact of « prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for @ orime beyona the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted toa jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Aograndl, $30 0.5."at 430)

Thos, the Elakely majority held that e Washington court’s
Sentencing of 2 defendant to nore than three years above the
SStnonth statutory maxinum of the prescribed “standard
Tange” for his offense, on the basis of the sentencing
jusge’s finding that the defendant had acted with deliberate
Eroelty, violated his sixth amendment right to telal by
jury. In our view, the Blakely analysis visca-vis Aoprend:
ie confined to the meaning of the construct “statutory
Raximun” within the context of determinate or “guideline”
Sentencing schenes. inasmuch as Hawaii's extended term
Sentencing structure Jo indeterminate, we believe tha!
Blakely does not affect the “intrinsic-extrinsic” analysis,
that this court articulated in (Stare v Ixaual, 102 Hewai's
1, 72:.36 473 (2003).

"e Blakely majority explained that “the ‘statutory
naxinun’ for Aeprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
Suage may Sepose.
inthe ‘aapiteed By the de set
Bites a 2537 lenphasis in original). “in cther words, the
Felevant ‘statutory maximun’ Le not che saxinum sentence
Suoge may impose after finding additions) facts, bur the
inarimun he nay impose without any additional facts.” I.

 

 

 

 

 

    

 

a2
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(emphasis in original). Accordingly, the essential mandate
of Boprendi ~~ ives, that any fact other than a price
Sonviction must be cubnittes tos jury and proved beyond a
Feasonabie soubt =~ is unaffected by the Court's decision in
Eluuely. Blakely can reasonably be construed, then, a5 a
Sloss ch Apgrends, clarifying (1) that the upward Limit of
ny given presumptive sentencing range prescribed ina
Statutory scheme utilizing @ "determinate" sentencing
Sguideline” system constitutes the “statutory maximum” and
(2) that's defendant upon whom a sentence exceeaing this
Setatutory maxinun” is imposed is entitled to all of the
procedural protections thet apptandi articulates:

Rivera, 106 Hawai'i at 156, 102 P.3d at 1054 (emphases in

original) .
By its plain language, the rule in Apprendi, ise., that

“any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt [,]” excepts from its purview
“the fact of a pricr conviction{.]" $30 U.S. at 490.

The Suprene Court exexpted “prior convictions” from
the auateadl ezuicenencsy"reassnie that, "sith cespect Co
Previous convictions, defendants have already received
the segoisize procedural safeguards. See Auprena, 530'0.5-
at 486, 120 8.€¢, 2340, This reasoning was consistent with
the Suprene Court's earlier decision in Alusndareg-Torres ve
United states, 523 U.8. 224, 118 S.ct. 1218, 140 L.ed.20 350
THSSEy, in stich tne Court held that vecidivisn was a
traditional basis for increasing an offender‘ s senten:
[t]he court said tong ago that a State need not
allege s defendant's prior conviction in the
Undictment or information that alleges the
Glenents of an underlying crime, even though the
Conviction was necessary to bring the case
Sithin the statute
Alnendarez-Torzes, 523 0-8. at 243, 118 S.ct. 1219.

Kaua v. Frank, 350 F.Supp. 848, 856 n. 7 (D. Hawai'i 2004).

Based on the foregoing, Gonsalves’s argument that

 

 

 

 

 

 

somehow the jury’s verdict did not authorize sentencing him to a
mandatory minimun term as a repeat offender is unfounded.

‘Apprendi pronounced a rule regarding the judge-imposed penalties
that increase statutory maximum sentences, not mandatory minimum

a3
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sentences, because the judicial factfinding “that give(s] rise to
a mandatory minimum sentence . . . does not expose a defendant to

a punishment greater than otherwise legally prescribed.” Harris

v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, S65 (2002). Prior to
Apprendi, in McMillan v, Pennsvivania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), the

United States Supreme Court “sustained a statute that increased
the minimum penalty for a crime, though not beyond the statutory
maximum, when the sentencing judge found, by @ preponderance of
the evidence, that the defendant had possessed a firearm.”
Harris, 536 U.S. at $50. Harris then answered the question of

“whether McMillan stands after Apprendi.” Id.

Aeprendite conclusions do not undermine Mestillan's.
‘There was no comparable historical practice of submitting
facts increasing the mandatory minimun to the Jury, a0 the
rule did not extend to those facts. Indeed, the

Gbart sade clear that ics holding did not effect Malian at
aul:

wwe do not overrule McMillan. We limit its

holding to cases that do not involve the

imposition of a sentence more severe than the

Statutory maxinus for the offense established by

the jury's verdict - a limitation Identifies in

the Batiiiian opinion itseif.” 530 U.S. at 487,

B.l3, 120 8.Ctr 2348

The Sentencing factor in Uctlillan dig not increase
the penalty for a azine beyond the prescribed statutory
maximus,” £30 U.S. st €30, 120 $.Ct. 23487 nor did ity
the concurring opinions in Janeai v. United states, 526 0.8
227 (1999),] "pot it, “alter the congressionally prescribed
Tonge of penalties to which a criminal defendant. is
exposed, "526 U.S. at 253, 1198.ct. 1215 (SCALIA, J.»
Goncurring)-. As the aporendi Court observed, the’ Moidillan
Ending merely required the Judge to impose “a specific
Sentence within the range authorized by the jury's finging
thet the defendant (was) guilty.” $30U.8. at 494, 1.33,
120 s.ct. 2348.

Harris, 536 U.S. at 563-64, The Supreme Court further explained:

Whether chosen by the judge or the legislature, the fact
Guiding jusietsl discretion below the statutory maximur need
hot be alleged in the indictment, submitted co the jury, oF
Proved beyond & reasonable doubt, ‘When a judge sentences
Fhe defendant to a mandatory minimum, no less than when the
Judge chooses 2 sentence within the range, the grand and

 

 

 

 

 

 

uu
‘+** FOR PUBLICATION *#*

petit juries already have found all the facts necessary to

 

Suthorize the Coverfaent to impose the sentence. Zhe iudae,
fay Snnese' the sinisum, che agximum, or any other sentence

fhose luries =-snd without contradicting Avorendt
536 U.S, at 565 (emphases added); see also State v. Tafova, 91
Hawai'i 261, 274 n.18, 982 P.2d 890, 903 n.18 (1999).

‘Thus, based on (1) the plain language of Apprendi and
(2) the Supreme Court’s holding in Harris that Apprendi does not
apply to mandatory minimums, I believe that the circuit court in
the present matter did not offend binding federal precedent in
sentencing Gonsalves to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment
as a repeat offender. See also United States v, Jones, __ F.3d
__, 2005 WL 1903746 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hitchcock,
286 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by 298 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir.
2001) (“It is now clear that mandatory minimums do not implicate
Apprendi.”); United States v, Antonakeas, 255 F.3d 714, 728 n.11
(9th Cir. 2001); United States v, Garcia-Sanchez, 238 F.3d 1200,
1201 (9th Cir. 2000).

IV. CONCLUSTON

Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the judgment
and sentence of the circuit court.

on the briefs:
clifford 8. Hunt,
for defendant-sppellant
Richard Gonsalves
Daniel H. Shimizu, Be Rcirrnner—
deputy prosecuting attorney
for the plaintiff-appellee Nsw romeeranen

State of Hawai'i

as