Case Title: Shell v. Butcher

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1200097

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: May 14, 2021
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2020-2021
____________________
1200097
____________________
Irvin Shell, as administrator of the Estate of Annie Ruth
Peterson, deceased
v.
Terri Butcher and Shayla Payne
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-14-901569)
SELLERS, Justice.
Irvin Shell, as administrator of the estate of Annie Ruth Peterson,
deceased ("the estate"), appeals from separate summary judgments
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entered in favor of Montgomery-municipal jail employees Terri Butcher
and Shayla Payne, respectively, on the basis of State-agent immunity.  We
affirm.
I.  Facts
On April 13, 2013, at approximately 2:10 a.m., Montgomery police
officers arrested Annie Ruth Peterson for driving under the influence "of
any substance" and transported her to the municipal jail.1  Peterson,
however, was not under the influence of an intoxicating substance at the
time of her arrest; rather, she was suffering from a hemorrhagic stroke.
Upon arriving at the jail, Butcher "booked" Peterson into the jail. 
Specifically, Butcher accessed Peterson's arrest report, verified her
personal information, and made an inventory of her personal belongings.
Butcher also observed that, although Peterson appeared intoxicated, she
was able to communicate verbally during the booking process and did not
appear to be suffering from any medical condition or illness. After Butcher
1Peterson was also issued citations for driving on the wrong side of
the road, driving without first obtaining a driver's license, and leaving the
scene of an accident. 
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completed the booking process, she had no further contact with Peterson. 
Upon admission to the jail, Peterson was also required to undergo a "strip
search" by a correctional officer of the same gender.  However, the female
officer responsible for conducting the search was on break or otherwise
unavailable.  Therefore, Payne, a female correctional officer who had been
assigned to work with the male inmates, was asked to perform the search. 
Payne conducted the search, had Peterson change into a jail "jumpsuit,"
and escorted her into the security cell and/or "drunk tank" to sober up.
Thereafter, the officer responsible for supervising the female inmates
returned to the designated area of the jail, and Payne returned to her
assigned position with the male inmates, thus having no further
interaction with Peterson. After spending time in the security cell,
Peterson was taken to the processing room where she was photographed,
fingerprinted, and underwent a medical profile and/or screening.  Peterson
was then taken to a regular cell where she was issued a mat, a sheet, and
a blanket.  Later that morning, a correctional officer retrieved Peterson
from her cell for her to meet with a bonding agent.  When that officer
attempted to awaken Peterson, he observed that she appeared "drowsy"
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and could not stand up.  Peterson was taken to the nurse's station where
she was assessed by a nurse for approximately one hour; Peterson's vital
signs were normal, and she was returned to her cell.  Later that afternoon,
another correctional officer who was checking on inmates requested that
the nurse examine Peterson because Peterson appeared ill. After
observing Peterson, the nurse determined that Peterson had left-side body
weakness; the nurse contacted a doctor and relayed that information.  The
doctor, in turn, issued an order to "release inmate and send to emergency
room."  After the bonding process was complete, Peterson was released to
a family member who transported Peterson to a local hospital where she
was diagnosed with having suffered a stroke; she died three days later on
April 16, 2013.   
The estate sued Butcher and Payne in their individual capacities,
alleging that they had been negligent and wanton in failing to obtain
medical care for Peterson in a timely manner.  Butcher and Payne filed
individual motions for a summary judgment asserting that they were
entitled to State-agent immunity under the standard announced in Ex
parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000) (plurality opinion), and
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adopted by the Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000);
the trial court granted those motions.  This appeal followed. 
II.  Standard of Review
This Court reviews a summary judgment de novo, and we use the
same standard used by the trial court to determine whether the evidence
presented to the trial court presents a genuine issue of material fact.  Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Nettles v. Pettway, 306 So. 3d 873 (Ala. 2020).  The
movant for a summary judgment has the initial burden of producing
evidence indicating that there is no genuine issue of material fact.  Once
the movant produces evidence establishing a right to a summary
judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial
evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact.  We consider all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every
reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. 
Id. 
III.  Discussion
A.  Law-of-the-Case Doctrine
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Initially, the estate argues that the motions for a summary judgment
filed by Butcher and Payne are barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine.  We
disagree.  In May 2017, Butcher and Payne filed a motion for a summary
judgment based on State-agent immunity, which the trial court denied.2 
Butcher and Payne petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing
the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion for a summary
judgment and to enter a summary judgment in their favor.   On February
21, 2018, this Court entered an order summarily denying the petition for
a writ of mandamus.  Ex parte City of Montgomery et al. (No. 1170321). 
In August 2020, Butcher and Payne filed individual motions for a
summary judgment on the basis of State-agent immunity, which the trial
court granted.  In its orders granting the motions for a summary
judgment, the trial court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine was
inapplicable because the motions presented new additional facts and
evidence, i.e., sworn testimony, relevant to the issue of immunity.  The
estate asserts that this Court's February 21, 2018, order denying
2The summary-judgment motion was filed collectively by the City of
Montgomery, Butcher, and Payne.  The City is not a party to this appeal.
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mandamus relief was an adjudication on the merits and, thus, became the
law of the case regarding State-agent immunity.  
The filing of a petition for a writ of mandamus is a unilateral act of
a party requesting extraordinary relief from an action taken by a trial 
court during the pendency of litigation.  Rule 21, Ala. R. App. P. When
this Court summarily denies such a petition without ordering a response,
that act of denial neither amounts to a ruling on the merits of the
assertions in the petition nor affirms the determination of the trial court
such that it becomes the law of the case.  Contrary to the estate's claim,
this Court's February 21, 2018, order denying the petition for a writ of
mandamus had no effect on the underlying litigation, but merely returned
the parties to the status quo ante as if no petition had been filed.   See,
e.g., Ex parte Shelton, 814 So. 2d 251, 255 (Ala. 2001).   Stated differently,
a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary writ, and this Court routinely
denies petitions for a writ of mandamus for procedural deficiencies
without consideration of the merits of the petition whatsoever.  By way of
example, Rule 21(a)(1)(F), Ala. R. App. P., requires a petition for a writ of
mandamus to contain "copies of any order or opinion or parts of the record
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that would be essential to an understanding of the matters set forth in the
petition."  Therefore, in the context of seeking review of a trial court's
order denying a summary-judgment motion on the basis of State-agent
immunity, a petitioner who fails to provide the motion for a summary
judgment, any responses to that motion, and the trial court's order
denying that motion would be in a perilous position, because the
petitioner has essentially deprived the appellate court of any means by
which to conduct a meaningful review of the issues presented in the
petition.  See Ex parte Staats-Sidwell, 16 So. 3d 789 (Ala.  2008) (holding
that the failure to include essential information in petition for writ of
mandamus rendered petition fatally defective).  Because the summary
denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus is not a ruling on the merits,
the law-of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable to bar the summary-judgment
motions at issue, which the trial court concluded were supported by
additional facts and evidence that was not a part of the evidentiary record
of the May 2017 motion for a summary judgment.  See Ex parte Jones, 147
So. 3d 415, 420 (Ala.  2013) ("[G]enerally, 'a court may reconsider its
ruling on a motion for summary judgment and may correct an erroneous
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ruling at any time before final judgment.... The number of times a
subsequent motion for summary judgment will be allowed rests within the
sound discretion of the judge before whom the case is to be tried.' "
(quoting Food Serv. Distribs., Inc. v. Barber, 429 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Ala.
1983))).
B.  State-agent Immunity
 A State agent claiming immunity in his or her individual capacity
bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from
a function that would entitle the State agent to immunity.  Ex parte
Cranman, supra.   If the State agent makes such a showing, the burden
then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that one of the two categories
of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman is
applicable. The estate asserts that the second exception applies in this
case, i.e, that Butcher and Payne acted "willfully, maliciously,
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under  a
mistaken interpretation of the law."  Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.  One of
the ways in which a plaintiff can demonstrate that a State agent acted
beyond his or her authority is by offering evidence that the State agent
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failed " 'to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such
as those stated on a checklist.' "  Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046,
1052 (Ala.  2003) (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d at 178).  It is
undisputed that Butcher and Payne were discharging duties pursuant to
Montgomery municipal-jail policies and procedures and, therefore,
generally would be entitled to State-agent immunity.  The issue for our
resolution is whether the estate met its burden of showing that Butcher
and Payne failed to follow those policies and procedures and, thus, acted
beyond their authority so as to become liable for their respective actions. 
 1.  Butcher
 The estate contends that Butcher acted beyond her authority by
failing to complete a medical profile pursuant to Policy No. 2.01.B.4. 
Policy No. 2.01, concerning the "inmate admission process," provides, in
relevant part: 
"PROCEDURE 
"1.  The officers assigned to Post 994 will book each person
committed to the Montgomery Municipal Jail. ...  The officer(s)
processes each new admission into the computerized jail
management system.  The officer must first obtain personal
information such as date of birth, height, weight, etc.  They
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also enter arrest information such as arresting officer,
processing officer, searching officer, and charges.
"....
"B.  PROCESS FOR ADMITTING NEW INMATES INTO JAIL
"1.  All inmates are subject to a pat search upon entering the
Municipal Jail.  Inmates will be searched by officers of the
same gender.  A strip search will be conducted as soon as
possible for incoming inmates.
"2.  Arresting officers should not bring an inmate to the
Municipal Jail who is medically unfit for incarceration into
this facility.
 
"3.  All personal property is logged in and the prisoner
acknowledges by signing the property folder.  All transactions
will be in view of the jail's video equipment.  If the prisoner is
not competent by reason of insanity or intoxication to verify
the personal effects, inventory, and authenticate the property
envelope, the booking officer will secure a signature from the
arresting officer.
"4.  The booking officer must visually evaluate the inmate's
condition.  If the inmate appears to be medically unfit for
confinement, the Jail-1 supervisor will notify a jail nurse.  The
officer obtains the initial medical profile to include a mental
health inquiry on each new admission and forwards the profile
to the medical department for review.
"5.  New inmates will be fingerprinted, photographed, given a
wristband, and a medical screening form will be prepared.
"....
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"8.  Inmates charged with Public Intoxication, D.U.I., or
inmates under the influence of drugs will be housed in a
security cell until sufficiently sober to be processed and placed
in general population.  During the sobering-up period, close
supervision must be maintained to guard against the ever-
present danger of medical emergencies.  Before placing any
inmate who appears to be intoxicated or under the influence of
drugs in a security cell, he/she should be examined carefully
for symptoms of illness or injury.
"9.  Incoming inmates will be issued bedding, jumpers, and
personal hygiene items.  They will be provided with a shower
and hair care if necessary."
(Emphasis added.)
We are unwilling to conclude that Policy No. 2.01 constitutes the
type of "detailed," checklist-like rule that defines the scope of a State
agent's authority.  Giambrone.  The provisions of Policy No. 2.01 are
broadly phrased, some of the provisions do not indicate which correctional
officer is tasked with the duty stated in the provision, and other provisions
are ambiguous.  Relevant here is Policy No. 2.01.B.4., which states: 
"4. [a.] The booking officer must visually evaluate the inmate's
condition. [b.] If the inmate appears to be medically unfit for
confinement, the Jail-1 supervisor will notify a jail nurse. [c.]
The officer obtains the initial medical profile to include a
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mental health inquiry on each new admission and forwards the
profile to the medical department fo review."
(Emphasis added.)
The first part of subsection B.4. states that the "booking officer"
must visually evaluate the inmate's condition, which Butcher did. The
second part states that "the Jail-1 supervisor" will notify a jail nurse if the
inmate appears to be medically unfit for confinement.  The third part 
states that the "officer" obtains the initial medical profile.  However, it is
not clear whether the "officer" who is required to obtain the medical
profile is the booking officer, the Jail-1 supervisor (who may also be a
correctional officer),  or some other correctional officer of the jail.   In other
words, Policy No. 2.01.B.4.  is not so specific as to put Butcher on notice
that she was required to obtain a medical profile on an inmate during the
booking process.  In any event, Policy No.  5.01, the more detailed policy
regarding "health care services," confirms that the medical profile is to be
obtained by a "processing officer."  That policy states, in relevant part:
"2.  During processing into the Municipal Jail, each inmate
will have a Primary Health medical Screening Form completed
by the processing officer.  The form will become a part of the
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inmate's medical record.  The original screening form will be
forwarded to the jail medical staff and a copy will be
maintained in the inmate's property folder.  The inmate will be
assessed by the medical staff within 24 hours.  
"....
"4.  If during processing an inmate indicates he/she has chest
pain, high blood pressure, diabetes, shortness of breath,
seizures, heart problems, uncontrolled bleeding, or dizziness,
the medical staff will be notified immediately...."
(Emphasis added.)
  Sharleswen Atchinson, another correctional officer employed at the
jail, stated in her deposition that the medical profile is obtained during
processing, which, she said, occurs after an inmate has spent at least four
hours in a security cell.  Atchinson stated in her deposition that, after
Peterson had spent the required time in the security cell, she escorted
Peterson to the processing room where Peterson was photographed,
fingerprinted, and underwent a medical profile.  Because Policy No.
5.01.2. expressly states that  the processing officer is required to obtain
medical profiles on inmates, the estate did not meet its burden of
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demonstrating that Butcher, the booking officer, acted beyond her
authority in failing to obtain a medical profile on Peterson. 
The estate also argues that Butcher violated Policy No. 2.04 by
failing to notify a nurse when Peterson was booked into the jail. Policy No.
2.04 concerns the "classification of inmates" and states, in relevant part,
"5.  Intoxicated Inmates
"All inmates committed to jail for public intoxication or
marked drunk on the arrest report will be processed and
housed in a security cell.  All individuals charged with D.U.I.
will remain in jail custody for a minimum of 4 hours.  When
placed in a security cell, the inmate will be placed on his/her
side to prevent choking and observed closely. [Correctional
officers] will wake the inmate up when the round[s] are made. 
The jail nurse must be notified."
(Emphasis added.)  
The trial court concluded that Policy No. 2.04.5. did not constitute
a detailed rule, such as one stated on a checklist, because the policy does
not specify "when, who or under what conditions a jail nurse must be
notified."  We agree.  Like Policy No. 2.01, Policy No. 2.04.5. is broadly
phrased and not sufficiently detailed to impose a duty to notify the jail
nurse during the booking process. In fact, given the chronological order of
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the steps listed in Policy No. 2.05.5., it would appear that notification of
the jail nurse would not occur until after an inmate has been searched and
confined in a security cell.  Notably, Major Orlando Gonzalez, another
correctional officer employed at the jail, testified in his deposition that
Policy No. 2.04.5. was revised in January 2014, after Peterson's death, to
specifically provide that "a nurse is to see any person before [he or she
goes] into the drunk tank."  Because Policy No. 2.04.5. was not so specific
or sufficiently detailed as to impose a duty upon Butcher to contact a jail
nurse during the booking process, the estate did not meet its burden of
establishing that Butcher violated that policy.  
2.  Payne
 The estate contends that Payne is not entitled to State-agent
immunity because, it says, Payne also violated Policy No. 2.04.5. by failing
to notify the jail nurse either before or after she conducted Peterson's
search and placed her in the security cell.  As indicated, Policy No. 2.04.5.
does not constitute the type of detailed, checklist-like rule that defines the
scope of a State-agent's authority; the policy did not specify "when, who
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or under what circumstances a jail nurse must be notified."   Thus, Policy
No. 2.04.5. did not impose a duty on Payne to contact a jail nurse either
before or after she searched Peterson and placed her in the security cell. 
Accordingly, the estate failed to demonstrate that Payne acted beyond her
authority in any manner. Moreover, there is simply no evidence indicating
that Payne acted negligently and/or wantonly in conducting the search of
Peterson.  As indicated, when Peterson was ready to be searched, the
female officer responsible for conducting the search was on break or
otherwise unavailable. Therefore, Payne, who had been assigned to work
in another area of the jail, was asked to conduct the search.  After Payne
conducted the search, the officer responsible for supervising female
inmates returned to the designated area of the jail, and Payne went back
to her assigned position with the male inmates, thus having no further
interaction with Peterson.          
IV. Conclusion
The estate has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in
entering a summary judgment in favor of Butcher and Payne based on
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State-agent immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's summary
judgments. 
AFFIRMED.   
Parker, C.J., and Bolin, Wise, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
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