Case Title: City of Pittsfield v. Local 447 International Brotherhood of Police Officers

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12450

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-10-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12450 
 
CITY OF PITTSFIELD  vs.  LOCAL 447 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
POLICE OFFICERS. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     May 7, 2018. - October 3, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Municipal Corporations, Police.  Police, Discharge.  Public 
Employment, Police, Termination.  Arbitration, Police, 
Confirmation of award.  Public Policy. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
May 11, 2017. 
 
 
The case was heard by Daniel A. Ford, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Richard M. Dohoney for the plaintiff. 
 
Timothy M. Burke (Jared S. Burke also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Eric R. Atstupenas, for Massachusetts Chiefs of Police 
Association, Inc., amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  Dale Eason was terminated from his position as 
a police officer in the Pittsfield police department on grounds 
of conduct unbecoming a police officer, untruthfulness, and 
2 
 
 
falsifying records.  His union, Local 447 International 
Brotherhood of Police Officers (union), filed a grievance, 
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the union 
and the city of Pittsfield (city).  The union and city submitted 
Eason's termination to arbitration with two agreed-upon issues:  
(1) "Was there just cause to terminate the employment of Dale 
Eason?"; and (2) "If not, what shall the remedy be?"  The 
arbitrator found that there was not just cause for termination 
and reinstated Eason with a three-day suspension. 
 
The city commenced an action pursuant to G. L. c. 150C, 
§ 11, in the Superior Court to vacate the arbitrator's award, 
arguing that it is contrary to public policy.  A Superior Court 
judge confirmed the arbitration award, and the city appealed.  
We thereafter granted the city's application for direct 
appellate review.  We conclude that the arbitrator's award of 
reinstatement does not violate public policy in the 
circumstances of this case, where the arbitrator found that the 
officer's statements were "intentionally misleading" but not 
"intentionally false" and where the statements did not lead to a 
wrongful arrest or prosecution, or result in any deprivation of 
liberty or denial of civil rights. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts as found by the 
arbitrator.  The case arose from a February, 2016, incident in 
which Eason responded to a reported larceny at a supermarket.  
3 
 
 
Eason arrested a woman, identified by supermarket security, and 
placed her in the back of his police cruiser.  In his arrest 
report, Eason said the suspect "began thrashing her body around 
in the back seat . . . .  For her safety, I attempted to remove 
the [suspect] from my vehicle and place her onto the ground to 
control her body."  He additionally noted, "Also, [supermarket] 
[s]ecurity wanted to get a photo as part of their process." 
 
The arbitrator explained that "[w]hen questioned during the 
investigation, [Eason] acknowledged that he removed the 
[suspect] from the back seat of his police cruiser to enable the 
supermarket security to photograph her, pursuant to a practice 
of photographing larceny suspects, which officers know about and 
facilitate."  The city terminated Eason for "conduct unbecoming 
a police officer, untruthfulness, and falsifying records, based 
on the reason [he] reported for removal of the [suspect], 
expressed [as]:  'for her safety.'"  The city also asserted that 
there was no evidence that the suspect was thrashing in the 
cruiser.  Eason "acknowledge[d] that he removed the [suspect] to 
enable the store to photograph her, according to practice" and 
"also assert[ed] that the [suspect] had been out of control in 
the back of the car before she was removed, but not immediately 
prior to her removal.  [He] denie[d] that he lied, implicitly, 
because she was thrashing and they needed to photograph her, 
fairly simultaneously." 
4 
 
 
 
The arbitrator held that Eason's misconduct did not amount 
to just cause for termination, "a capital offense in the 
employment context."  The arbitrator found that "the three words 
at issue were untrue, intentionally misleading, and cause for 
discipline, but less than intentionally false" (emphasis in 
original).1  He also found that there was "persuasive evidence 
that the [suspect] acted up in the back before she was removed."  
The arbitrator held that the city failed to "persuade [him] that 
[Eason's] misconduct was so serious that it justified 
termination without prior, corrective discipline." 
 
Discussion.  A brief reminder of the history of labor 
arbitration is useful to put the discussion that follows in 
context.  In 1935, Congress recognized that "the refusal by some 
employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining 
lead[s] to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or 
unrest" and enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-169.  29 U.S.C. § 151.  In pursuit of labor peace 
and "the free flow of . . . commerce," Congress declared it to 
be the policy of the United States to encourage collective 
bargaining.  Id.  See National Labor Relations Bd. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) ("National labor 
policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their 
                     
 
1 The arbitrator also found that the statements were 
"knowingly inaccurate." 
5 
 
 
economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely 
chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit 
have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in 
wages, hours, and working conditions").  To effectuate that 
policy, Congress established a framework for representation of 
private sector workers by a labor organization elected by the 
majority of employees.  Once that organization, often a union, 
was elected and certified as the employees' exclusive bargaining 
representative, it was a violation of law for an employer to 
refuse to bargain in good faith to reach a collective bargaining 
agreement.  29 U.S.C. § 158. 
 
The NLRA, however, does not reach the bargaining 
relationship between workers and their public employers at the 
State and local level.  In 1973, the Legislature established an 
analog to the NLRA, G. L. c. 150E, governing bargaining between 
public employers and employees.  Similar to the NLRA,2 G. L. c. 
150E prohibits employers from refusing to bargain in good faith 
with elected employee representatives. 
 
The Legislature further evinces its preference for the 
results of collective bargaining, including the outcome of 
arbitration, in G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (d), mandating that the terms 
                     
 
2 We have long recognized the relationship between 
Congress's endorsed policy of collective bargaining and that of 
the Legislature's as embodied in G. L. c. 150E.  Trustees of 
Forbes Library v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 384 Mass. 559, 562 n.2 
(1981). 
6 
 
 
of collective bargaining agreements shall prevail over certain 
statutes governing myriad working conditions of public 
employees, including regulations promulgated by a police 
commissioner.  See id.; Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's 
Ass'n, 477 Mass. 434, 441 (2017) (Williams) (noting "courts' 
reluctance to allow [police commissioner's] broad discretionary 
powers to subsume bargained-for provisions"). 
 
1.  Standard of review.  The collective bargaining 
agreement between the city and the union, like many of its kind, 
contains a grievance procedure.  A delicate balance of both 
parties' concessions and demands yielded the city's promise to 
consider the union's grievances3 through a process that, if 
necessary, culminates with arbitration.  In any collective 
bargaining context, it is the arbitrator's expertise that the 
parties bargained for.  United Steelworkers of Am. v. American 
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).  The Legislature has 
indorsed, and we must respect, a strong public policy favoring 
arbitration.  School Comm. of Pittsfield v. United Educators of 
Pittsfield, 438 Mass. 753, 728 (2003) ("Public policy in the 
Commonwealth strongly encourages arbitration").  "Arbitration 
would have little value if it were merely an intermediate step 
                     
 
3 The grievance process allows the union or, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 150E, individual employees to object to an action taken 
by the city that is governed by the collective bargaining 
agreement.  Such actions include, but are not limited to, the 
termination of employment, at issue here. 
7 
 
 
between a grievance and litigation in the courts."  Id.  The 
Legislature has codified this priority, permitting courts to 
vacate arbitration awards only in rare, statutorily enumerated 
circumstances.  See G. L. c. 150C, § 11. 
 
The system of collective bargaining created and indorsed by 
the Legislature necessitates deference to the bargained-for 
result of an arbitrator's award.  We review the trial judge's 
decision to uphold the arbitration award de novo, but our 
examination of the underlying award is informed by the "strong 
public policy favoring arbitration" (citation omitted).  See 
Bureau of Special Investigations v. Coalition of Pub. Safety, 
430 Mass. 601, 603 (2000).  However, the relationship between a 
reviewing court and the result of an arbitration is unlike the 
relationship between an appellate court and the outcome of a 
lower court's proceedings.  Lynn v. Thompson, 435 Mass. 54, 61 
(2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1131 (2002).  Our review of the 
underlying arbitration decision is considerably more deferential 
than even the abuse of discretion or clear error standards 
applied to lower court decisions.  Id.  See Williams, 477 Mass. 
at 439-440.  Indeed, an arbitration award carries a presumption 
of propriety because it is the arbitrator's judgment, not 
necessarily an objectively correct answer, for which the parties 
have bargained.  United Steelworkers of Am., 363 U.S. at 568. 
8 
 
 
 
We therefore "uphold an arbitrator's decision even where it 
is wrong on the facts or the law, and whether it is wise or 
foolish, clear or ambiguous."  Boston v. Boston Police 
Patrolmen's Ass'n, 443 Mass. 813, 818 (2005) (DiSciullo).  
"Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by 
an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the 
arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the 
contract that they have agreed to accept."  United Paperworks 
Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37–38 (1987) 
(Misco).  Where the arbitrator allegedly engaged in 
"improvident, even silly, factfinding," we are nonetheless bound 
by those facts.  Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 
532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001), quoting Misco, supra at 39.  See Lynn, 
435 Mass. at 62, quoting Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line 
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 670 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 871 (1989) ("An arbitrator's result may be 
wrong; it may appear unsupported; it may appear poorly reasoned; 
it may appear foolish.  Yet, it may not be subject to court 
interference").  An award cannot be disturbed even if an 
arbitrator's findings are so confusing or unclear that, in order 
to evaluate the merits of an award, we would have to confront 
conflicting inferences.  See Misco, supra at 44 ("A refusal to 
enforce an award must rest on more than speculation or 
assumption," and it was "inappropriate" for lower court to infer 
9 
 
 
connection between arbitrator's facts and public policy at 
issue); Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers & Employees 
of Suffolk County, 451 Mass. 698, 701-703 (2008) (arbitrator's 
factual findings were "far from a model of clarity" but "it 
would not be appropriate to vacate the arbitrator's award based 
on possibly incorrect factual inferences we might draw from his 
ambiguous findings").4 
 
2.  Public policy exception.  Bound by the facts as 
explicitly found by the arbitrator, we evaluate the city's 
argument that public policy prohibits the enforcement of the 
arbitration award.  The city cites a public policy that requires 
police officers "to be truthful in all of their official 
dealings," which is necessary for "the police to gain and 
preserve the public trust [and] maintain public confidence" 
(citation omitted).  The city finds the root of this public 
                     
 
4 Although we attempted to remand for clarification of facts 
in Sheriff of Suffolk County v. Jail Officers & Employees of 
Suffolk County, 451 Mass. 698, 702 n.5 (2008), remand was not 
possible due to the arbitrator's death, so we were left to 
wrestle with the facts as found.  See United Steelworkers of Am. 
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) 
("Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their 
reasons for an award.  To require opinions free of ambiguity may 
lead arbitrators to play it safe by writing no supporting 
opinions.  This would be undesirable for a well-reasoned opinion 
tends to engender confidence in the integrity of the process and 
aids in clarifying the underlying agreement" [footnote 
omitted]). 
10 
 
 
policy in G. L. c. 268, § 6A,5 prohibiting "false written reports 
by public officers or employees."6 
 
"[T]he judiciary must be cautious about overruling an 
arbitration award on the ground that it conflicts with public 
policy" (citation omitted).  Bureau of Special Investigations, 
430 Mass. at 604.  "[W]e apply a stringent, three-part analysis" 
to determine whether the public policy exception applies to the 
otherwise mandated enforcement of an arbitration award 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Williams, 477 Mass. at 442.  
"First, the policy at issue must be well defined and dominant, 
and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal 
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed 
                     
 
5 "Whoever, being an officer or employee of the commonwealth 
or of any political subdivision thereof or of any authority 
created by the general court, in the course of his official 
duties executes, files or publishes any false written report, 
minutes or statement, knowing the same to be false in a material 
matter, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment."  G. L. c. 268, § 6A. 
 
 
6 The city also notes that in May, 2017, after Eason had 
been terminated, the district attorney for the Berkshire 
district sent the Pittsfield police chief a letter stating that 
he would not call Eason "to testify on behalf of the 
Commonwealth in any criminal matter, whether presently pending 
or in the future."  Although very troubling, this was not part 
of the evidence considered by the city when firing Eason or by 
the arbitrator when making his decision.  It therefore has no 
bearing on our consideration of the propriety of the 
arbitrator's decision.  However, although it is required to 
abide by the results of this arbitration, the city is, of 
course, not prohibited from pursuing any additional appropriate 
discipline based on the district attorney's letter or any other 
newly acquired information. 
11 
 
 
public interests" (quotations and citation omitted).  Id.  
Second, the exception must not merely address "disfavored 
conduct, in the abstract" but must target "disfavored conduct 
which is integral to the performance of employment duties" 
(emphasis in original).  Id., quoting Massachusetts Highway 
Dep't v. American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, 
Council 93, 420 Mass. 13, 16 (1995).  Third, we inquire whether 
an award reinstating the employee violates public policy.  
Williams, supra at 442-443.  The burden is on the party seeking 
vacation of the award, the city, to demonstrate that the award 
satisfies each of these prongs.7  DiSciullo, 443 Mass. at 819. 
 
We have already held that public policy supports 
terminating police officers for lying and that such a public 
policy satisfies the first two prongs.  Id.8  We turn our 
attention to the third prong of this test, whether the award 
violates public policy.  It is crucial to note that "[t]he 
                     
 
7 The city erroneously argues that "the burden ought to be 
on the party arguing against the mandatory termination of an 
officer who lies about a material matter in a police report to 
proffer some authority for that position" (emphasis in 
original).  We decline to shift the burden from the party 
seeking judicial intervention in the arbitration process. 
 
 
8 Unlike in Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 443 
Mass. 813, 819 (2005), the union here does not concede any 
element of this test.  The city and the union dispute whether 
Eason's alleged misconduct constituted knowingly false 
statements about a "material" matter in violation of G. L. 
c. 268, § 6A.  Neither party cites any authority for its 
contention that the disputed aspect of the report was or was not 
"material." 
12 
 
 
question in the third prong is not whether the employee's 
behavior violates public policy," but whether the award itself 
does.  Williams, 477 Mass. at 442-443. 
 
In the rare circumstances where Massachusetts reviewing 
courts have exercised the power to vacate an arbitration award 
on public policy grounds, there was no ambiguity in the material 
underlying factual findings.  See Massachusetts Bay Transp. 
Auth. v. Boston Carmen's Union, Local 589, Amalgamated Transit 
Union, 454 Mass. 19, 24-26, 29-30 (2009) (arbitrator's award 
removing seniority from employee who won settlement as result of 
discrimination violated public policy); School Dist. of Beverly 
v. Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 224 (2001) (vacating arbitration award 
where arbitrator reinstated teacher who had used physical force 
against students); Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, 74 
Mass. App. Ct. 379, 380-382 (2009) (reinstatement of officer who 
admitted to sufficient facts for assault by means of dangerous 
weapon when off duty and whose case was continued without 
finding violated public policy). 
In DiSciullo, 443 Mass. at 814, which the city argues is 
controlling, we vacated an arbitrator's award reinstating an 
officer who was found to have behaved with "egregious dishonesty 
and abuse of [an] official position."  In that case, DiSciullo 
filed an incident report and a statement of criminal charges 
falsely alleging disorderly conduct, assault and battery on a 
13 
 
 
police officer, and resisting arrest.  Id. at 815.  Thus, the 
factual findings established a clear nexus between the officer's 
dishonesty and the arrest and charges.  Our decision to vacate 
the arbitrator's award in DiSciullo was based on our conclusion 
that the specific factual findings of the arbitrator concerning 
the officer's egregious dishonesty and abuse of official 
position mandated dismissal of the officer.  Id. at 819-820.  
Here, the arbitrator's findings about Eason's misconduct do not 
describe conduct that rises to the level of misconduct that 
necessitated termination of the officer in DiSciullo.  We 
cannot, in these circumstances, substitute our judgment for that 
of the arbitrator's in determining the appropriate discipline.  
See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the 
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 
757, 765 (1983) ("Regardless of what our view might be of the 
correctness of [the arbitrator's] contractual interpretation, 
the Company and the Union bargained for that interpretation.  A 
. . . court may not second-guess it"). 
In Sheriff of Suffolk County, 451 Mass. at 701, we 
considered an arbitrator's decision where "the factual findings 
. . . [were] far from a model of clarity."  There, "the 
arbitrator concluded that [the jail officer] filed reports with 
the sheriff's internal investigation officers that were 
incomplete or false or misleading, but does not attempt to 
14 
 
 
distinguish among these three possibilities" (emphasis added).  
Id. at 701-702.  We stated that "[i]n a situation where a jail 
officer actually witnesses fellow officers assault an individual 
who is held in the sheriff's custody, and then lies about this 
fact and files false reports that memorialize the falsity, we 
have little doubt that established public policy would condemn 
such conduct and would require the discharge of such an 
officer."  Id. at 702.  In that case, therefore, there was a 
nexus between the misconduct of the jail officer and the harm to 
the prisoner.  We concluded, however, that "the arbitrator's 
findings [were] not sufficiently clear on what [the officer] 
witnessed, or on the character of his reports and participation 
in the sheriff's investigation -- that is, did he supply false 
information, or was he simply less than complete?"  Id.  In 
light of the "strong public policy . . . that favors 
arbitration," we determined that "it would not be appropriate to 
vacate the arbitrator's award based on possibly incorrect 
factual inferences we might draw from his ambiguous findings."  
Id. at 702-703. 
In Williams, 477 Mass. at 436-437, 445, we were constrained 
to approve the reinstatement of an officer who used a choke hold 
on someone who "testified that he could not breathe and began to 
lose consciousness," because the arbitrator found that the 
officer did not use excessive force and was "not untruthful" in 
15 
 
 
reporting the incident.  We held that it was not a violation of 
public policy to reinstate an officer who, as found by the 
arbitrator, did not use excessive force and did not lie.  Id. at 
445. 
The distinction between a statement that is "intentionally 
misleading" but not "intentionally false" is, at best, elusive.9  
We need not dwell on the meaning of the arbitrator's factual 
findings, however, because the arbitrator found that the officer 
made a statement that was both "knowingly inaccurate" and 
"intentionally misleading" -- and this finding alone is 
sufficient to raise a question whether the arbitrator's award 
reinstating him is contrary to public policy.  Undoubtedly, were 
we to conduct a de novo analysis we would not draw the same 
distinction between an "intentionally misleading" and an 
"intentionally false" statement, as did the arbitrator.  See 
Williams, 477 Mass. at 444.  See Misco, 484 U.S. at 38 ("an 
arbitrator must find facts and a court may not reject those 
findings simply because it disagrees with them").  "The question 
. . . is not whether [Eason's] conduct justified termination, 
but whether it required termination, such that any lesser 
sanction would violate public policy" (emphasis in original).  
Williams, supra at 445.  We have drawn the public policy 
                     
 
9 Logically, if a statement is not only "untrue" but also 
"knowingly inaccurate" and "intentionally misleading," it must 
also be "intentionally false." 
16 
 
 
exception quite narrowly because "[w]e cannot purport to 
encourage arbitration and yet devise ways to undermine an 
arbitrator's authority."  School Dist. of Beverly, 435 Mass. at 
248 (Cowin, J., dissenting).  Obligated to credit the 
arbitrator's conclusion that a phrase in Eason's report was no 
more than misleading and that termination was not permissible 
under the collective bargaining agreement, we must uphold the 
award.  See Concerned Minority Educators of Worcester v. School 
Comm. of Worcester, 392 Mass. 184, 187 (1984) ("we have no 
business overruling an arbitrator because we give a contract a 
different interpretation"). 
Our decision does nothing to limit the ability of police 
chiefs to terminate officers for lying where the arbitrator 
agrees that such conduct occurred.  Nor does this decision 
change the public policy exception that bars the reinstatement 
of officers, as was the case in DiSciullo, whose lies have 
restricted other's liberty.  Even a statement which is 
"intentionally misleading . . . but less than intentionally 
false" that resulted in arrest, prosecution, loss of liberty, or 
a violation of civil rights would justify, on public policy 
grounds, the decision of a police chief to terminate an officer. 
General Laws c. 268, § 6A, which makes it a crime for a 
police officer in the course of his or her official duties to 
file or publish "any false written report, minutes[,] or 
17 
 
 
statement, knowing the same to be false in a material matter," 
and G. L. c. 268, § 13B, which makes it a crime for anyone to 
wilfully mislead another person who is a judge, prosecutor, or 
police officer "with the intent to impede, obstruct, delay, 
harm, punish or otherwise interfere thereby" with a criminal 
investigation or any criminal, juvenile, or civil proceeding "or 
do so with reckless disregard," reflect the Legislature's 
embrace of the important public policy interest that our police 
officers speak and act with integrity.10  Had Eason's wilfully 
misleading statement constituted a crime under § 13B, meaning 
that it was made with the intent to impede, obstruct, or 
otherwise interfere with a criminal investigation or any 
criminal, juvenile, or civil proceeding, then the third prong 
would have been met and public policy would have required that 
we set aside an award reinstating him.  But the suspect here was 
not charged with any conduct related to her removal from the 
police cruiser -- she was charged only with larceny, not with 
assault and battery on a police officer or disorderly conduct.  
Therefore, the officer's "knowingly inaccurate" and 
"intentionally misleading" statement in his police report was 
not made with the intent to impede, obstruct, or otherwise 
                     
 
10 In contrast with § 6A, a violation of § 13B does not 
require a knowing false statement; it suffices that the 
statement "directly or indirectly, willfully . . . misleads 
. . . another person." 
18 
 
 
interfere with any criminal investigation or proceeding; the 
arbitrator's factual findings indicate instead that the officer 
made this statement solely in an attempt to avoid discipline for 
removing the suspect from his police cruiser for the purpose of 
allowing supermarket personnel to photograph her.11 
In making these employment decisions, police chiefs who are 
responsible for maintaining the integrity of their departments 
and for preserving public trust in their officers need clear 
lines.  It requires commitment and courage for a police chief to 
terminate the employment of a police officer; it is generally 
easier to avoid doing so.  Termination of an officer's 
employment means that the police department almost invariably 
will need to incur the expense of arbitration, including the 
substantial attorney's fees from litigating such an arbitration.  
And if the arbitrator disagrees with the decision to terminate, 
the officer will be reinstated and the police department will be 
required to make the officer whole with respect to lost benefits 
under the collective bargaining agreement, including back pay, 
compensation for lost income from overtime and details, and the 
return of seniority rights.  If there are no clear public policy 
lines supporting termination, it is extremely difficult for a 
                     
 
11 The arbitrator wrote, "I believe the [officer] wanted to 
conceal the real reason for removing the [suspect] by falsely 
reporting that it was safety-related . . . [and that] the 
[officer] referred to safety to deflect the readers of his 
report away from his bad judgment." 
19 
 
 
police chief to risk such a decision where it might be undone by 
an arbitrator whose decision cannot be reversed by a court even 
when it is plainly wrong as a matter of fact or as a matter of 
law. 
Where a police chief decides to terminate an officer in 
circumstances in which the officer's false statements violated 
G. L. c. 268, § 6A or 13B, or which otherwise resulted in an 
unjustified arrest or prosecution, or in a deprivation of 
liberty or denial of civil rights, an arbitration award finding 
no just cause for such a dismissal and reinstating the officer 
would violate public policy.  We affirm the arbitrator's award 
here only because it did not cross this public policy line. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.