Case Title: U.S. Bank N.A. v. Manning

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2014 ME 96 
Docket: 
Cum-13-473 
Argued: 
June 10, 2014 
Decided: 
July 24, 2014 
Corrected: 
November 13, 2014 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
AS TRUSTEE FOR RASC 2005KS9 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS MANNING et al. 
 
MEAD, J. 
 
[¶1]  U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for RASC 2005KS9 (the 
Bank) appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, 
Wheeler, J.) dismissing with prejudice its foreclosure complaint against Thomas 
Manning as a sanction for its failure to comply with the court’s discovery order.  
The Bank contends that the court’s action constitutes an abuse of discretion given 
the circumstances of this litigation, and that the court erred at several points as the 
case progressed through its pretrial stages.  We agree and vacate the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  In July 2010, the Bank filed an amended complaint for residential 
foreclosure against Thomas Manning and several parties-in-interest who are not 
involved in this appeal.  The complaint alleged that the Bank is the current holder 
 
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of a $520,000 promissory note executed by Manning on August 2, 2005, and of a 
mortgage on Manning’s property in Falmouth securing the note.  The complaint 
further alleged that Manning was in default because he had made no payments on 
the note beginning with the payment due in February 2008, and that he owed 
$631,048.25 as of April 2010. 
 
[¶3]  After the complaint was filed, the case progressed through many 
procedural steps, including the following key events: 
• 8/22/11:  The court issued a standard scheduling order specifying a 
discovery deadline of April 22, 2012, and warned that failure to comply with 
the scheduling order could result in sanctions. 
 
• 3/13/12:  At Manning’s request, the discovery deadline was extended to 
July 21, 2012. 
 
• 7/25/12:  At the Bank’s request, the discovery deadline was enlarged to 
November 30, 2012. 
 
• 11/7/12:  In anticipation of seeking an order pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 37(a) 
compelling discovery, Manning wrote a letter to the court requesting a 
hearing pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1). 
 
• 11/9/12:  In response to Manning’s November 7, 2012, letter, the court, 
without holding a hearing, issued an order requiring the Bank to provide 
discovery by November 30, 2012, and to “pay to Defendant reasonable 
expenses in the amount of $150 within 30 days.”  The order provided that 
“[f]ailure to comply . . . will result in a dismissal with prejudice of the 
complaint.”  The order was entered on the docket on November 14, 2012, 
and mailed to the parties the same day. 
 
 
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• 12/13/12:  Manning filed a letter with the court asking it to dismiss the 
complaint with prejudice because the Bank had failed to pay the $150 
sanction within 30 days of the November 9, 2012, order. 
 
• 12/14/12:  Manning moved to continue the trial and to amend the scheduling 
order, asserting that “[w]hile [the Bank] has provided some [discovery] 
responses by the deadline of November 30, 2012, those responses were 
deficient in several respects,” and asserting that the Bank had not provided 
potential dates for a noticed deposition. 
 
• 12/17/12:  The Bank filed a letter with the court responding to Manning’s 
December 13, 2012, letter, asserting that it had already produced “over 1700 
pages of responsive discovery to [Manning’s] counsel,” and that it had paid 
the $150 sanction that same day in accordance with “our position that the 
payment is due today, December 17, 2012.” 
 
• 12/19/12:  The court granted Manning’s December 14, 2012, motion to 
continue and ordered that the deposition of Bank officials be completed by 
February 28, 2013. 
 
• 1/8/13:  Manning moved the court for an order on his December 13, 2012, 
letter, again requesting a dismissal of the complaint with prejudice on the 
ground that the Bank paid the $150 sanction late. 
 
• 1/30/13:  Manning filed a letter with the court asserting that the Bank had 
failed to oppose his January 8, 2013, motion for an order of dismissal, and 
therefore the Bank had “waiv[ed] all objections to the motion.” 
 
• 2/1/13:  The court, without holding a hearing, entered an order dismissing 
the complaint with prejudice “for failure to comply with the Court’s 
Discovery Order.”  The order was mailed to the parties on February 4, 2013. 
 
• 2/4/13:  The Bank filed a letter dated February 2, 2013, in which it disputed 
the representations made in Manning’s December 14, 2012, motion and 
opposed his January 30, 2013, letter.  The Bank asserted that it had 
previously noted its opposition to a dismissal in its December 17, 2012, 
letter to the court. 
 
 
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• 2/14/13:  The Bank moved for reconsideration of the court’s 
February 1, 2013, dismissal order, and for a hearing.  Manning opposed the 
motion for reconsideration, attaching supporting affidavits from himself and 
his attorney. 
 
• 4/18/13:  The court, without holding a hearing, amended its 
February 1, 2013, dismissal order “to reflect the dismissal is without 
prejudice.” 
 
• 4/25/13:  Manning, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(a), moved for findings of 
fact and conclusions of law concerning the court’s April 18, 2013, amended 
order, and submitted eight proposed findings.  The Bank opposed the motion 
for further findings. 
 
• 6/3/13:  The court ordered the parties “to file simultaneously proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law within 21 days.”  Manning, citing for 
support the affidavits that he and his attorney had filed in opposing the 
Bank’s February 14, 2013, motion for reconsideration, responded with fifty 
proposed findings.  The Bank filed twenty-one proposed findings and 
conclusions. 
 
•  9/19/13:  The court, without holding a hearing, entered the following order: 
 
After reviewing the competing proposed findings of fact, the 
court adopts [Manning’s] proposed findings and incorporates 
[the Bank’s] findings # 4, 5, 7, 8, 11.  [The Bank] has failed to 
address the allegations regarding scheduling of a deposition and 
correspondence regarding incomplete discovery.  Accordingly, 
the 4/18/13 order is vacated and the 2/1/13 order is reinstated.  
Case dismissed with prejudice. 
 
 
[¶4]  The Bank filed a notice of appeal.  Manning filed a motion to strike 
section two of the Bank’s reply brief; we ordered that the motion be considered 
with the merits of the appeal.  We now deny the motion to strike and reach the 
merits of the parties’ arguments. 
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶5]  To address the issues raised on appeal, we examine the court’s key 
actions in their chronological order. 
A. 
The November 9, 2012, Order Imposing a Discovery Sanction 
 
[¶6]  On November 7, 2012, Manning wrote to the court to request a hearing 
“pursuant to [M.R. Civ. P.] 26(g)(1) . . . regarding an ongoing discovery dispute.”  
Manning advised the court that he sought an order compelling discovery, and “the 
attorney[] fees expended in trying to get the [Bank] to comply with its discovery 
obligations.” 
 
[¶7]  Two days later, without holding a hearing, the court responded to the 
letter with an order that provided, in part: 
Pursuant to the provisions of M.R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2), it is ORDERED 
and ADJUDGED, as follows: 
 
 
 
1.  That the [Bank] file and serve answers to the interrogatories 
upon opposing counsel on or before November 30, 2012. 
 
 
1a.  That the [Bank] respond in full to the request [for 
discovery] and serve the response upon opposing counsel on or before 
November 30, 2012. 
 
 
 
2.  That the [Bank] pay to [Manning] reasonable expenses in 
the amount of $150 within 30 days. 
 
 
3.  That service of this order be made by the clerk of this court 
by mailing attested copies to counsel of record. 
 
 
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4.  Failure to comply with this order will result in a dismissal 
with prejudice of the complaint. 
 
The court’s eventual dismissal of the Bank’s complaint with prejudice, subsequent 
amendment to a dismissal without prejudice, and ultimate reinstatement of the 
dismissal with prejudice, all flowed from that order, specifically the provision 
imposing a $150 discovery sanction. 
 
[¶8]  Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g), invoked by Manning to request a 
hearing on the parties’ discovery dispute, provides, in part, that 
[n]o written motions under Rule . . . 37 [concerning orders compelling 
discovery and sanctions] shall be filed without the prior approval of a 
justice or judge of the court in which the action is pending.  The 
moving party shall first confer with the opposing party in a good faith 
effort to resolve by agreement the issues in dispute.  If the dispute is 
not resolved by agreement, the moving party shall request a hearing 
from the clerk by letter. 
 
. . . . 
 
The court may issue an order without a hearing if the request is based 
on a failure to either answer or object to outstanding discovery 
requests. 
 
M.R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)-(2).  The Bank’s alleged failure to respond to outstanding 
discovery requests was the basis for Manning’s letter, and so the court did not err 
in issuing an order compelling discovery without first holding a hearing.1 
                                         
1  Even if a formal hearing is not required, the Rule correctly anticipates that active interaction 
between the parties and the court, for example an in-chambers or telephonic conference of counsel, can 
often resolve discovery disputes before they become the primary focus of the litigation, as occurred in this 
case. 
 
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[¶9]  The court’s order did more than simply compel discovery, however.  
Two days after Manning requested a hearing, the order imposed a $150 sanction on 
the Bank without a hearing, or any other intervening event, actually taking place.  
Rule 37(a), cited by the court as the authority for its order, requires a hearing 
before a monetary sanction is imposed on a party: 
If the motion [for an order compelling discovery] is granted, the court 
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent 
whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney 
advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the 
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including 
attorney fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion 
was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award 
of expenses unjust. 
 
M.R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) (emphasis added).  Applying the plain language of 
Rule 37(a)(4), the court erred in imposing the monetary sanction when it did.  See 
Bertin v. Bertin, 2013 ME 70, ¶ 6, 71 A.3d 729 (stating that “[w]e review an 
interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure de novo and look to the plain 
language of the rules to determine their meaning” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
[¶10]  Furthermore, in addition to compelling discovery and imposing a 
monetary sanction, the court included in its order a predetermined penalty to be 
imposed if the Bank failed to comply—the ultimate sanction of a dismissal with 
prejudice.  Although “[t]he imposition of sanctions . . . remains a discretionary 
decision,” we have cautioned that “[d]ismissal with prejudice is a severe sanction 
 
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that has constitutional implications and will be given close scrutiny on appeal.”  
U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Sawyer, 2014 ME 81, ¶ 11, --- A.3d ---.  In this case, the court’s 
predetermination of the ultimate sanction at a preliminary stage of the litigation, to 
be imposed regardless of how serious or minor the Bank’s noncompliance with the 
discovery order might prove to be, acted to limit the discretion that the court could 
have exercised at a future hearing.  
 
B. 
The February 1, 2013, Order Dismissing the Complaint With Prejudice 
 
[¶11]  The court’s February 1, 2013, order dismissing the Bank’s complaint 
with prejudice was a straightforward grant of Manning’s January 8, 2013, motion 
requesting an order of dismissal.  Manning’s motion asserted one ground—that the 
$150 discovery sanction was paid several days late. 
 
1. 
Standard of Review 
   
 
[¶12]  We closely review a dismissal with prejudice for an abuse of the 
court’s discretion: 
Due to the severity of a dismissal or default, and the constitutional 
implications of such an action, we have observed that the trial court’s 
discretion in imposing either ultimate sanction is narrow indeed and 
will be given close scrutiny on appeal. 
 
. . . . 
 
In imposing sanctions, the trial court must consider a number of 
factors, including (1) the purpose of the specific rule at issue; (2) the 
party’s conduct throughout the proceedings; (3) the party’s basis for 
its failure to comply; (4) prejudice to other parties; and (5) the need 
 
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for the orderly administration of justice.  The court should also 
consider the purpose to be served by imposing sanctions, including 
penalizing the noncompliant party and deterring similar conduct. 
 
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Bartlett, 2014 ME 37, ¶¶ 11-12, 87 A.3d 741 
(alteration, citations, and quotation marks omitted). 
 
[¶13]  Because it is “the rare case that requires the ultimate sanction,” Estate 
of Hoch v. Stifel, 2011 ME 24, ¶ 36, 16 A.3d 137 (quotation marks omitted), we 
have said that “serious instances of non-compliance with pretrial procedures can 
support a trial court’s imposition of dismissal as a sanction.”  Unifund CCR 
Partners v. Demers, 2009 ME 19, ¶ 12, 966 A.2d 400 (alteration and quotation 
marks omitted).  Nevertheless, “[w]hen a trial court is forced to intervene in the 
discovery process, it has broad discretion to impose deadlines and enforce 
discovery sanctions, including dismissal with prejudice.”  Douglas v. Martel, 
2003 ME 132, ¶ 11, 835 A.2d 1099. 
 
2. 
Application of the Standard of Review to These Facts 
 
[¶14]  Applying “close scrutiny” to the trial court’s decision, Sawyer, 
2014 ME 81, ¶ 11, --- A.3d ---, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in 
dismissing the complaint with prejudice for two reasons.  First, Manning’s letter 
that resulted in the order did not specify an amount sought as a sanction, but rather 
requested “attorney[] fees associated with pursuing [discovery]” to be determined 
at a hearing.  The court evidently determined that the matter was not serious 
 
10 
enough to require a hearing, and it imposed a sanction of only $150—likely 
representing a small percentage of Manning’s actual attorney fees.  The Bank’s 
payment of the $150 penalty between four and eight days late (by Manning’s 
calculations) is not a violation of the discovery order significant enough to satisfy 
the test for imposing the ultimate sanction of dismissal.  See Bayview, 2014 ME 37, 
¶ 11-12, 87 A.2d 741. 
 
[¶15]  By way of comparison, in Sawyer we affirmed the Superior Court’s 
dismissal with prejudice of U.S. Bank N.A.’s foreclosure complaint after the Bank 
(1) conceded that it failed to participate constructively in four rounds of mediation, 
(2) appeared unprepared to proceed at a show cause hearing of which it had notice, 
and (3) acknowledged to the trial court that the homeowners had “been through 
hell.”  2014 ME 81, ¶¶ 12-13, 16 n.5, --- A.3d ---.  We concluded that “[g]iven the 
Bank’s failure to meet its burden at the show cause hearing—after receiving 
adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the potential 
dismissal— . . . the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction [of 
dismissal with prejudice].”  Id. ¶ 12 (emphasis added). 
 
[¶16]  In contrast to Sawyer, here the court imposed the ultimate sanction 
without ever holding a hearing or conference of counsel, and did so for the 
comparatively minor violation of allegedly paying a $150 penalty between four 
and eight days late.  That justification for dismissing a $631,000 claim does not 
 
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survive close scrutiny.  See id. ¶ 11.  Accordingly, the court abused its discretion in 
dismissing the complaint with prejudice on this ground. 
 
[¶17]  The second reason for our conclusion that the court abused its 
discretion in dismissing the complaint is that the Bank’s payment of the $150 
sanction on December 17, 2012, was not late.  The order imposing the sanction 
was signed on November 9, 2012.  It required payment of the $150 penalty “within 
30 days”—but did not say within thirty days of what—and specified that “service 
of this order be made by the clerk of this court by mailing attested copies to 
counsel of record.”  The order was entered on the docket and mailed to the parties 
on November 14. 
 
[¶18]  By rule, “[t]he notation of a judgment in the civil docket . . . 
constitutes the entry of the judgment. . . . The date of entry of the judgment or 
order shall govern time calculations pursuant to these rules. . . .”  M.R. Civ. P. 58.  
November 14 plus thirty days falls on December 14.  Three days is then added 
because the court specified that service was to be made by mail—logical because 
there was no hearing at which the parties would have become aware of the order—
and “[w]henever a party . . . is required to do some act . . . after [] service . . . and 
the notice or paper is served upon the party by mail, 3 days shall be added to the 
prescribed period.”  M.R. Civ. P. 6(c).  Accordingly, whether the Bank was 
required to pay the sanction within thirty days of the entry of the order on the 
 
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docket or within thirty days of service by mailing, payment was due on 
December 17, which is the date payment was made. 
 
[¶19]  The payment could only be considered late if November 9, which is 
the date the order was signed, is used as a starting point for the time calculation.  
Manning argues that signing the order was the operative act because Rule 58 
makes the order “effective and enforceable upon signature by the court,” but the 
same rule differentiates between when an order is effective and when the time for 
compliance with it begins to run.  See M.R. Civ. P. 58 (“The date of entry of the 
. . . order shall govern time calculations pursuant to these rules . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 
[¶20]  Dismissal of the complaint with prejudice for late payment of the 
$150 sanction when the payment was not late constitutes an abuse of the court’s 
discretion.  See Bayview, 2014 ME 37, ¶ 11, 87 A.2d 741 (“When the court has 
determined the facts without error . . . we will defer to the trial court . . . .” 
(emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)). 
C. 
The Court’s Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
 
[¶21]  After the court amended its February 1, 2013, order to reflect a 
dismissal without prejudice, Manning moved for findings of fact and conclusions 
of law pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(a).  The court ordered the parties to 
simultaneously file proposals; it then adopted, without a hearing, the fifty findings 
 
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proposed by Manning and five of the twenty-one findings proposed by the Bank.  
Based on its adopted findings and conclusions, the court reinstated its February 1 
order and again dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 
 
[¶22]  The Bank contends that the court erred in making findings pursuant to 
Rule 52(a) when there had not been a trial.  “We review an interpretation of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure de novo and look to the plain language of the rules to 
determine their meaning.”  Bertin, 2013 ME 70, ¶ 6, 71 A.3d 729 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Rule 52(a) provides: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the Superior Court justice . . . shall, upon the request of a party 
made as a motion . . . find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate 
judgment if it differs from any judgment that may have been entered 
before such request was made . . . . Findings of fact shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses. . . . Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary 
on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion 
except as provided in Rule 50(d). 
 
M.R. Civ. P. 52(a).2 
 
[¶23]  Manning is correct in arguing that the rule states that findings on 
motions are “unnecessary,” not that they are altogether barred.  Furthermore, he 
accurately cites a Maine treatise for the proposition that “[a] request for findings on 
                                         
2  Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 52 has been amended, effective September 1, 2014.  See 
Amendments to the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, 2014 Me. Rules 05 (dated June 19, 2014) (effective 
Sept. 1, 2014).  The amendments do not affect our analysis of this issue. 
 
14 
a motion is [] addressed to the discretion of the trial judge.”  3 Harvey, Maine Civil 
Practice § 52:2 at 151 (3d ed. 2013).  The tenor of the rule, however, anticipates 
that findings of fact are made by the court after it has received evidence at a trial or 
hearing—thus its references to “actions tried upon the facts” and the court’s 
“opportunity . . . to judge [] the credibility of the witnesses.”  See M.R. 
Civ. P. 52(a).  Here, Manning did not request explanatory findings, for example 
findings following an order granting a motion for summary judgment, or an order 
admitting or excluding evidence.  Instead, Manning’s motion sought initial, 
foundational findings, essentially in lieu of a hearing or trial, on which the court 
could then base a dispositive judgment, namely its order dismissing the Bank’s 
complaint with prejudice. 
 
[¶24]  The procedure employed by the trial court was the reverse of what 
Rule 52(a) contemplates.  The “plain language of the rule[],” Bertin, 2013 ME 70, 
¶ 6, 71 A.3d 729 (quotation marks omitted), does not anticipate the court making 
factual findings without an evidentiary record on which to base those findings; 
rather, it affords the court an opportunity to clarify and expound upon its rationale 
for a prior decision.  The rule allows a court to correct its prior decision by 
“direct[ing] the entry of the appropriate judgment if it differs from any judgment 
that may have been entered before such request was made.”  M.R. Civ. P. 52(a).  
As we construe Rule 52(a), the court erred in granting Manning’s motion for 
 
15 
findings of fact and conclusions of law when no hearing or trial had taken place to 
generate a record from which findings could be drawn.3 
D. 
The 9/19/13 Order Dismissing the Complaint With Prejudice 
 
 
[¶25]  The court’s final order reinstating its February 1, 2013, order is the 
operative judgment that we review in this appeal.  Because, as we have explained, 
(1) the order initially imposing a $150 sanction on the Bank was unauthorized; 
(2) the reinstated February 1, 2013, order dismissing the Bank’s complaint with 
prejudice was an abuse of the court’s discretion; and (3) M.R. Civ. P. 52(a) did not 
permit the court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on which to base 
its final order dismissing the complaint with prejudice for a second time, we must 
vacate the final September 19, 2013, order. 
 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
3  The Bank further contends that the court erred in finding facts that were not supported by the record, 
and that were beyond the scope of the order that led to Manning’s request for findings.  Because we have 
determined that the act of issuing findings in the first place was in error, we do not address this argument. 
 
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On the briefs: 
 
Elizabeth M. Crowe, Esq., Bendett & McHugh, P.C., 
Farmington, Connecticut, and William A. Fogel, Esq., Portland, 
for appellant U.S. Bank N.A.  
 
Kelly W. McDonald, Esq., Murray, Plumb & Murray, Portland, 
for appellee Thomas Manning 
 
 
At oral argument: 
 
 
William A. Fogel, Esq., for appellant U.S. Bank N.A. 
 
 
Kelly W. McDonald, Esq., for appellee Thomas Manning 
 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number RE-2011-20 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY