Case Title: State v. Patricia A. Weed

Citation: 2003 WI 85

Docket Number: 2001AP001476-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 85 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1476-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Patricia A. Weed,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  256 Wis. 2d 693, 647 N.W.2d 467 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 18, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Columbia   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard Rehm   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
T. Christopher Kelly and Kelly & Habermehl, S.C., Madison, and 
oral argument by T. Christopher Kelly. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2003 WI 85 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1476-CR  
(L.C. No. 
98-CF-213) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Patricia A. Weed,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   The defendant, Patricia Weed 
(Weed) petitioned this court for review of a court of appeals' 
decision1 that upheld a circuit court's judgment of conviction 
and order denying post-conviction relief.  There are a number of 
issues presented: (1) whether the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in admitting a hearsay statement made 
by Weed's deceased husband; (2) whether the admitted hearsay 
statement violated Weed's right to confrontation; (3) whether 
Weed received ineffective assistance of counsel because her 
                                                 
1 State v. Weed, No. 01-1476-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. May 16, 2002). 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
2 
 
attorney failed to object to the statement on confrontation 
grounds; and (4) whether the constitutional right of a criminal 
defendant to testify on his or her behalf is a fundamental right 
that can only be personally waived by the defendant with an on-
the-record colloquy.   
¶2 
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that 
the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
admitting the hearsay statement under the recent perception 
exception to the hearsay rule.  We further conclude that 
admission of the hearsay statement did not violate Weed's right 
to confrontation since it had particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.  Nevertheless, even if the admitted hearsay 
violated Weed's right to confrontation, the error was harmless 
because in examining the effect of the error, "'it appears 
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained."'"  State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 
93, ¶44, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 (quoting Neder v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1999), quoting in turn Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).  Consequently, Weed was 
not denied the effective assistance of counsel because admission 
of the hearsay statement was not prejudicial.  Finally, we 
conclude that the constitutional right of a criminal defendant 
to testify on his or her behalf is a fundamental right.  
Accordingly, we hold that a circuit court should conduct an on-
the-record colloquy to ensure that the defendant is knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his or her right to 
testify.  In this case, the circuit court did not conduct a 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
3 
 
colloquy; however it conducted a post-conviction hearing and 
found that Weed had waived her right to testify.  Based on our 
review of the record and the evidence from the post-conviction 
hearing, we agree with the circuit court that Weed knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right to testify, even 
though 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
conduct 
a 
colloquy.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.         
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶3 
On September 12, 1998, Weed and her husband, Michael 
Weed (Michael), were invited to dinner at the cottage of Fred 
Fuerbringer (Fuerbringer), who was a good friend of Michael's.  
As the evening progressed, the atmosphere became tense when the 
conversation turned to Weed's recent suicide attempt.  Weed was 
allegedly upset that Michael had brought another woman with him 
when he had visited her at the hospital when she was being 
treated for the attempted suicide.  Michael allegedly responded 
that Weed should "keep her nose out of his business and not tell 
lies."  After several interchanges, Weed allegedly stated that 
"she was going to divorce him [Michael] and take his pension, 
[and] make him the poorest asshole in Portage."  At this point, 
Fuerbringer and his son, Chris, went outside with Michael to 
start a fish fry for dinner.  While they were outside lighting 
the kettle, Weed came out of the cottage and told Michael she 
wanted the keys to the car so she could go home.  Michael told 
her she could not have the keys because she had been drinking 
and had not yet eaten anything.  Weed then went back into the 
cottage, and Michael allegedly said in front of Fuerbringer and 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
4 
 
Chris, "that's the reason I took the bullets out of the .357."  
According to Chris's testimony, Michael made this same statement 
about unloading the gun earlier in the evening when Chris and 
Michael were playing cards in the cottage.        
¶4 
Three days later, on September 15, 1998, Weed shot and 
killed Michael using the .357 handgun.  Weed shot at Michael six 
times, hitting him at least four times in the arm, lower back 
and genitalia.  The shooting occurred after Michael had told 
Weed earlier that day that he was in love with another woman and 
that he wanted a divorce.  After the shooting, Weed called the 
Columbia County Sheriff's Department, identified herself, and 
stated that she shot her husband.  In a statement to police at 
the scene Weed said "I shot him; he's in love with another woman 
and I cannot live without him." 
¶5 
The State of Wisconsin (State) charged Weed with 
first-degree 
intentional 
homicide 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1) (1997-98).2  Weed was found guilty by a 
jury and was sentenced to life in prison, plus two years for 
using a dangerous weapon.  Prior to trial, the circuit court, 
Richard L. Rehm presiding, considered motions in limine, which 
included whether the hearsay testimony relating to Michael's 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
98 version unless otherwise indicated.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 940.01(1) provided: 
"OFFENSES. (a) Except as provided in sub. (2), whoever 
causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that 
person or another is guilty of a Class A felony."   
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
5 
 
statement regarding unloading the .357 should be excluded.  The 
State 
argued 
that 
the 
statement 
was 
admissible 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(2) as a statement of recent perception.3  
Weed claimed that the statement should be excluded because there 
was no indication of when Michael allegedly took the bullets out 
of the gun and there was no corroborating evidence that she had 
actually loaded the gun.  The circuit court decided not to 
exclude the statement, but noted a concern with laying the 
foundation, particularly with respect to the recency of the 
perceived event (i.e. removal of the bullets).  In its written 
order, dated June 28, 1999, the circuit court ordered that 
Michael's statement "shall be admitted subject to foundation on 
relevancy." 
¶6 
At the trial, Weed did not testify on her behalf, and 
the circuit court did not conduct a colloquy with Weed to ensure 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.045 provides: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if 
the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
 . . . . 
(2) STATEMENT OF RECENT PERCEPTION.  A statement, 
not in response to the instigation of a person engaged 
in investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, 
which narrates, describes, or explains an event or 
condition recently perceived by the declarant, made in 
good faith, not in contemplation of pending or 
anticipated litigation in which the declarant was 
interested, and while the declarant's recollection was 
clear.  
 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
6 
 
that she was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving 
her right to testify.              
¶7 
Weed filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial 
based on the following: (1) the hearsay testimony about 
Michael's 
statement 
regarding 
unloading 
the 
.357 
was 
inadmissible and violated her right to confrontation; (2) she 
received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney 
failed to object to the hearsay on the grounds that it violated 
her right to confrontation; and (3) she did not knowingly and 
voluntarily waive her right to testify on her own behalf.  The 
circuit court received briefs from both Weed and the State and 
held an evidentiary hearing on Weed's motion.  Weed testified at 
the post-conviction hearing that she only intended to scare 
Michael with the gun, not shoot him, and that she had no 
recollection of actually firing the gun.  Weed also testified 
that she was never informed of her right to testify; however, 
her trial counsel testified that he had discussed the right to 
testify with Weed on numerous occasions.  After reviewing the 
briefs and the record, the circuit court denied Weed's motion 
and concluded that "based on the post-trial testimony of 
defendant's counsel, other choices made by the defendant during 
trial, and the court's interaction with the defendant during the 
course of the trial, I find that she freely, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived her right to give testimony on her behalf."   
¶8 
Weed appealed the judgment of conviction and the order 
denying post-conviction relief.  In an unpublished per curiam 
opinion, the court of appeals affirmed both the judgment and 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
7 
 
order of the circuit court, concluding that any error the 
circuit court may have made in admitting the hearsay was 
harmless and that Weed knowingly and voluntarily waived her 
right to testify.  Weed petitioned this court for review, which 
was granted on September 18, 2002.        
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
¶9 
A circuit court's decision regarding the admissibility 
of a hearsay statement is within the discretion of the circuit 
court.  Christensen v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 50, 55, 
252 N.W.2d 81 (1977).  The circuit court has broad discretion in 
determining the relevance and admissibility of evidence and its 
decision will not be reversed absent an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  State v. Oberlander, 149 Wis. 2d 132, 140-41, 438 
N.W.2d 580 (1989).  This court will uphold a circuit court's 
decision to admit or exclude evidence if the court examined the 
relevant facts, applied a proper legal standard, and reached a 
reasonable conclusion using a rational process.  Martindale v. 
Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698.   
¶10 Whether admission of a hearsay statement violates a 
defendant's right to confrontation presents a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo.  Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 
116, 136-37 (1999).   
¶11 This court's review of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is a mixed question of fact and law.  State v. 
Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 768, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  The 
circuit court's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless 
they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  "However, the ultimate 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
8 
 
determination of whether the attorney's performance falls below 
the constitutional minimum is a question of law which this court 
reviews independently of . . . the circuit court."  Id. 
¶12 The issue of whether a criminal defendant can only 
waive his or her constitutional right to testify expressly and 
personally 
requires 
the 
application 
of 
constitutional 
principles.  State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶16, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 
611 N.W.2d 727.  Thus, we review such questions independently.  
Id.      
¶13 The 
determination 
of 
whether Weed 
knowingly and 
voluntarily waived her constitutional right to testify presents 
a question of constitutional fact.  State v. Hajicek, 2001 WI 3, 
¶14, 
240 
Wis. 2d 349, 
620 
N.W.2d 781. 
 
A 
question 
of 
constitutional fact is "'one whose determination is decisive of 
constitutional rights.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Martwick, 2000 
WI 5, ¶17, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552).  The issue of 
whether Weed waived her right to testify is a question of 
constitutional 
fact 
because 
the 
determination 
requires 
application of a constitutional standard to uncontroverted 
facts.  Id.  A question of constitutional fact presents a mixed-
question of fact and law that is reviewed using a two-step 
process.  Id., ¶15 (citing Martwick, 231 Wis. 2d 801, ¶16; State 
v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 189, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998)).  
First, we review the circuit court's findings of historical fact 
using a deferential standard of review and will uphold the 
circuit court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
9 
 
Second, 
we 
review 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination 
of 
constitutional fact de novo.  Id.   
ANALYSIS 
A. 
WHETHER 
THE 
CIRCUIT 
COURT 
ERRONEOUSLY 
EXERCISED 
ITS 
DISCRETION IN ADMITTING THE HEARSAY STATEMENT MADE BY WEED'S 
DECEASED HUSBAND  
 
¶14 The circuit court admitted the hearsay statement under 
the recent perception exception to the hearsay rule.  The 
exception 
for 
a 
statement 
of 
recent 
perception 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(2) requires that (1) the statement was not 
made in response to the instigation of a person engaged in 
investigating, litigating, or settling a claim and was made in 
good faith with no contemplation of pending or anticipated 
litigation in which the declarant would be an interested party; 
(2) the statement narrated, described, or explained an event or 
condition recently perceived by the declarant; and (3) the 
statement was made while the declarant's recollection is clear.  
See § 908.045(2). 
 
¶15 The recent perception exception is similar to the 
hearsay exceptions for present sense impression and excited 
utterances,4 "but was intended to allow more time between the 
observation of the event and the statement."  Kluever v. 
Evangelical Reformed Immanuels Congregation, 143 Wis. 2d 806, 
813-14, 422 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1988).  The exception for 
statements of recent perception has not been widely adopted due 
                                                 
4 See Wis. Stat. § 908.03(1) and (2).   
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
10 
 
to concerns regarding the time lapse between a declarant's 
perception and description of an event.5  To address these 
concerns, Wisconsin added the aforementioned limitations when it 
adopted 
the 
exception 
so 
as 
to 
assure 
accuracy 
and 
trustworthiness. 
 
Id. 
at 
814 
(citing 
Judicial 
Council 
Committee's Note——1974, Wis. Stat. § 908.045).   
The [recent perception] exception is based on the 
premise that probative evidence in the form of a 
noncontemporaneous, unexcited statement which fails to 
satisfy the present 
sense impression 
or 
excited 
utterance exceptions would otherwise be lost if the 
recently 
perceived 
statement 
of 
an 
unavailable 
declarant is excluded.   
The exception's purpose, therefore, is to admit 
probative evidence which in most cases could not be 
admitted under other exceptions due to the passage of 
time . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted).     
 
¶16 Weed 
argues 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
admitting 
Michael's 
statement 
regarding unloading the .357 because the statement did not meet 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
for 
admissibility 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(2).  Weed principally argues that Michael's 
statement was inadmissible under the exception due to the lack 
of a proper foundation; specifically, that the Fuerbringers 
could not testify as to the day Michael unloaded the gun.  We 
are not persuaded.   
                                                 
5 Kenneth E. Kraus, Comment, The Recent Perception Exception 
to the Hearsay Rule: A Justifiable Track Record, 1985 Wis. L. 
Rev. 1525, 1528.    
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
11 
 
 
¶17 First, we note that Michael's statement was not made 
in response to any pending or anticipated investigation or 
litigation and appeared to be made in good faith.  Michael's 
comment 
was 
made 
to 
his 
good 
friend, 
Fuerbringer, 
and 
Fuerbringer's son after Weed attempted to engage in dangerous 
behavior; namely, driving while intoxicated.   
¶18 Second, Michael's statement described an event——taking 
the bullets out of the .357——that was recently perceived by 
Michael.  Both Fuerbringer and his son testified that they 
thought the reason Michael stated that he took the bullets out 
of the gun was because of Weed's recent suicide attempt.  This 
is a reasonable conclusion based on the testimony that the 
conversation at the Fuerbringers' cottage became tense when it 
turned to Weed's recent suicide attempt, and Michael made the 
statement after Weed attempted to drive after she had been 
drinking.  Weed's attempted suicide occurred on September 4, 
1998, and she was released from the hospital on September 9, 
1998——just three days before the dinner at the Fuerbringers' 
cottage.  Thus, even though the Fuerbringers could not testify 
as to the exact date Michael allegedly took the bullets out of 
the gun, it appears that it would have been within, at the most, 
eight days.   
¶19 In analyzing the recency of an event under the 
exception, the court of appeals has stated that "[t]he mere 
passage of time, while important in a determination of whether 
the event was recently perceived, is not controlling . . . .  A 
determination regarding recency of perception depends on the 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
12 
 
particular circumstances of the case . . . ."  Kluever, 143 
Wis. 2d at 813.  Moreover, as noted above, the recent perception 
exception 
was 
intended 
to 
"allow 
more 
time 
between 
the 
observation of the event and the statement," as opposed to the 
exceptions for present sense impression and excited utterances.  
Id. at 814; see also State v. Ballos, 230 Wis. 2d 495, 507, 602 
N.W.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1999).   
¶20 Third, the statement appears to have been made when 
Michael's recollection was clear.  Weed claims that Michael had 
been drinking and therefore could not have had a clear 
recollection.  While Fuerbringer testified that Michael had 
drank a few beers and then switched to soda, there was no 
indication that Michael's recollection was not clear when he 
made the statement to Fuerbringer and Chris about unloading the 
gun.   
¶21 Thus, based on our review of the record and the 
circuit court's rulings regarding the admissibility of Michael's 
statement, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting Michael's 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
13 
 
statement under the recent perception exception to the hearsay 
rule.6   
B. WHETHER THE ADMITTED HEARSAY STATEMENT VIOLATED WEED'S RIGHT 
TO CONFRONTATION 
 
¶22 We next 
examine 
whether 
admitting 
the 
statement 
violated Weed's right to confrontation.  The right to confront a 
witness is guaranteed by Article 1, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.7  The threshold question in examining whether a 
                                                 
6 We note that we are not overruling State v. Stevens, 171 
Wis. 2d 106, 490 N.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1992), sub silencio as 
claimed by the concurrence.  Stevens dealt with a different 
issue: what constitutes a "recently perceived event."  The court 
concluded that the recent perception exception "does not apply 
to the aural perception of an oral statement privately told to 
another person," reasoning that what must be perceived is an 
event or condition since "there will generally be no doubt that 
an event occurred . . . ."  Id. at 119.  We further note that 
corroboration 
in 
and 
of 
itself 
does 
not 
determine 
the 
admissibility of a hearsay statement under the recent perception 
exception.  See concurrence, ¶56.  Rather, a statement of recent 
perception 
is 
admissible 
if 
the 
three 
criteria 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 908.045(2) are met.      
7 Article 1, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
Rights of accused.  SECTION 7.  In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be 
heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him; to meet the 
witnesses face to face; to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and 
in prosecutions by indictment, or information, to a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county 
or district wherein the offense shall have been 
committed; which county or district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
14 
 
defendant's right to confrontation is violated by the admission 
of hearsay evidence is whether that evidence is admissible under 
the rules of evidence.  State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 204, 210, 
325 N.W.2d 857 (1982).  Only after it is established that 
evidence is admissible pursuant to a hearsay exception is it 
necessary to consider the confrontation clause.  Id.  We have 
stated 
that 
the 
"overaching 
objective 
of 
the 
right 
of 
confrontation is to promote the reliability of the truth-
determining process in a criminal trial."  State v. Thomas, 144 
Wis. 2d 876, 887, 425 N.W.2d 641 (1988) (citing United States v. 
Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986)).  Thus, the right to confrontation 
has a similar purpose as the hearsay rule and its exceptions: 
"to ensure that the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis for 
evaluating the truthfulness of the evidence admitted in a 
criminal case."  State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶40, 254 
Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367 (citing Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d at 210).  
Although similar in purpose, the admissibility of evidence 
pursuant to a hearsay exception is insufficient to ensure 
compliance 
with 
a 
defendant's 
constitutional 
right 
to 
                                                                                                                                                             
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
15 
 
confrontation.  Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 
(1980)).   
¶23 The United States Supreme Court has established a two-
step approach for analyzing the admission of hearsay evidence 
under the confrontation clause.  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.  
First, the witness must be "unavailable" for trial.  Id.  
Second, the statement of the unavailable witness must bear some 
"'indicia of reliability.'"  Id. at 65 (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 
400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).  With respect to the second prong, 
"'[r]eliability is shown "if the evidence falls within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception" or "upon a showing of particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness."'"  State v. Moore, 921 P.2d 122, 
144 (Haw. 1996) (quoting State v. Ortiz, 845 P.2d 547, 555 (Haw. 
1993), quoting in turn Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).  
¶24 It is undisputed that Michael was "unavailable" to 
testify due to his death; therefore, we next turn to whether his 
statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or if 
the statement is supported by particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.  A hearsay exception is "firmly rooted" if "in 
light of 'longstanding judicial and legislative experience,' it 
'rest[s] [on] such [a] solid foundation that admission of 
virtually any evidence within [it] comports with the substance 
of the constitutional protection.'"  Lilly, 527 U.S. at 126 
(quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990); Roberts, 448 
U.S. at 66).  In Lilly, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the 
hearsay exception 
for 
spontaneous 
declarations 
is "firmly 
rooted" because it is at least 200 years old and is widely 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
16 
 
accepted among the states.  Id.  In contrast, the recent 
perception exception has not been deemed firmly rooted since it 
is a relatively recent exception that has only been adopted by a 
few states, and is not based in the common law.  See, e.g., 
State v. Ross, 919 P.2d 1080, 1089 (N.M. 1996).8  Assuming that 
the recent perception exception is not firmly rooted, we next 
consider 
whether 
Michael's 
statement 
was 
supported 
by 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  Even if a hearsay 
exception is not firmly rooted, it may satisfy a defendant's 
right 
to 
confrontation 
if 
the 
hearsay 
statement 
has 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  See, e.g., State 
v. Bintz, 2002 WI App 204, 257 Wis. 2d 177, 650 N.W.2d 913; 
State v. Murillo, 2001 WI App 11, 240 Wis. 2d 666, 623 
N.W.2d 187.    
¶25 In 
evaluating 
whether 
a 
statement 
evinces 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, we consider the 
"totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, 
but . . . the 
relevant 
circumstances include only those that surround the making of the 
statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of 
belief."  Wright, 497 U.S. at 819.  Some factors that have been 
considered in assessing the reliability of a statement include 
spontaneity, consistency, mental state, and a lack of motive to 
fabricate.  Id. at 821.  We look to see "if the declarant's 
truthfulness is so clear from the surrounding circumstances that 
                                                 
8 See also Kristen Komer, "Criminal Procedure: Defendants' 
Rights," in Developments in State Constitutional Law: 1996, 28 
Rutgers L.J. 915, 1035-36 n. 42 (1997).       
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
17 
 
the 
test 
of 
cross-examination 
would 
be 
of 
marginal 
utility . . . ."  Id. at 820.  In other words, we examine 
whether the statement is "so trustworthy that adversarial 
testing would add little to its reliability."  Id. at 821.          
¶26 In this case, Michael's statement appeared to have 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness to satisfy the 
confrontation clause.  Michael's statement was a spontaneous 
comment to his good friend and his friend's son in response to 
Weed's attempt to drive while intoxicated.  Michael allegedly 
made the statement twice——once to Chris inside the cottage and 
again to both Fuerbringer and Chris when they were outside 
starting the fish fry.  There also was not an apparent motive 
for Michael to fabricate the statement.   
¶27 However, Weed notes that Michael had been drinking and 
contends that his statement was not trustworthy because he made 
it in response to her humiliating comments (e.g. Weed's comment 
that she would divorce him and make him the "poorest asshole in 
Portage").  We acknowledge that Michael's mental state might 
have been affected by having a few beers, although Fuerbringer 
testified that Michael later switched to soda.  We also 
recognize that the conversation at the cottage was tense, with 
both Michael and Weed making negative comments about each other.  
Nevertheless, upon reviewing the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding Michael's statement, it still appears that his 
statement had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  
Although Michael had a few beers, there was no indication that 
Michael 
was 
drunk 
and 
making 
inaccurate 
or 
untruthful 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
18 
 
statements.  Furthermore, even though Michael and Weed spoke 
negatively about each other, this does not mean that Michael's 
statement was untrue.  Even if Michael intended to disparage 
Weed by stating "[t]hat's why I took the bullets out of the 
.357," this does not necessarily undermine the veracity of his 
statement.  In addition, it seems that if Michael's primary 
intention was to disparage Weed, he could have done so more 
directly than describing an act that he had recently performed 
(i.e. taking bullets out of the gun). 
¶28 Even if Weed's right to confrontation was violated 
when the circuit court admitted Michael's statement, we deem 
that the error was harmless.  The determination of a violation 
of the confrontation clause "does not result in automatic 
reversal, but rather is subject to harmless error analysis."  
State v. Williams, 2002 WI 118, ¶2, 256 Wis. 2d 56, 652 
N.W.2d 391 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdale, 475 U.S. 673, 684 
(1986)).  In analyzing Weed's hearsay challenge and ultimately 
concluding that any error was harmless, the court of appeals 
appeared to employ a sufficiency of the evidence standard: 
"Because there was sufficient evidence, other than Michael's 
alleged hearsay statement, to convict Patricia [Weed] beyond a 
reasonable doubt, we hold that any error in the admission of the 
Fuerbringers' testimony was harmless."  State v. Weed, No. 01-
1476-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶5 (Wis. Ct. App. May 16, 2002).  
To the extent that the court of appeals relied on a sufficiency 
of the evidence standard, it was in error.          
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
19 
 
¶29 To assess whether an error is harmless, we focus on 
the effect of the error on the jury's verdict.  Harvey, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶44; see also State v. Carlson, 2003 WI 40, ¶87, 
261 Wis. 2d 97, 661 N.W.2d 51 (Sykes, J., dissenting).  This 
test is "'whether it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error 
complained 
of 
did 
not 
contribute 
to 
the 
verdict 
obtained."'"  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶44 (quoting Neder, 527 
U.S. at 15-16, quoting in turn Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).  We 
have held that "in order to conclude that an error 'did not 
contribute to the verdict' within the meaning of Chapman, a 
court must be able to conclude 'beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error.'"  Id., ¶48 n.14 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18).  In 
other words, if it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have convicted absent the error," then the 
error did not "'contribute to the verdict.'"  Neder, 527 U.S. at 
15, 18 (citation omitted).     
¶30 We begin by evaluating the nature of the error in this 
case and the harm it is alleged to have caused.  See, e.g., 
Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶¶47-48; Carlson, 2003 WI 40, ¶88 
(Sykes, J., dissenting).  Michael's statement about unloading 
the .357 was admitted into evidence through the testimony of 
Fuerbringer and his son at trial.  Weed's defense counsel cross-
examined 
both 
Fuerbringer 
and 
his 
son 
regarding 
the 
circumstances surrounding the statement.  For example, Weed's 
counsel brought out that Fuerbringer and his son had also been 
drinking that evening, that Fuerbringer was one of Michael's 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
20 
 
best friends, that Fuerbringer had "no idea whether Mike was 
serious" when he made the statement, and that Fuerbringer did 
not know whether Michael had actually unloaded the gun.   
¶31 The hearsay statement was a minor piece of evidence in 
the State's case against Weed.  Although the statement had some 
probative value, it was not a significant part of the case.  It 
was undisputed that Weed shot and killed Michael; thus, the only 
issue was whether she intended to kill him.  The State presented 
overwhelming evidence that Weed intended to kill Michael, which 
included the following:  (1) Weed's statement to police——"I shot 
him; he's in love with another woman and I cannot live without 
him;" (2) Weed's statements to the police that she was upset and 
angry that Michael was seeing another woman and wanted a 
divorce, and that she wished he would die of AIDS; (3) Weed's 
statement to the police that having an affair was something "she 
could not forgive;" and (4) the fact that Weed shot off an 
entire round, with at least four shots hitting Michael primarily 
in the genital area.   
¶32 In light of defense counsel's cross-examination of 
Fuerbringer and his son, the low probative value of Michael's 
statement, and the overwhelming evidence presented by the State, 
we conclude that the admission of the hearsay statement was not 
prejudicial.  In other words, it is not the case that "the jury 
may not have been persuaded of the defendant's guilt had it not 
been 
presented 
with 
the 
erroneously 
admitted 
duplicative 
evidence."  State v. Billings, 110 Wis. 2d 661, 670, 329 
N.W.2d 192 (1983).  Thus, we conclude that the admission of 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
21 
 
Michael's statement did not contribute to the verdict because it 
is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would 
have convicted absent the error."  Neder, 527 U.S. at 18.     
C. WHETHER WEED RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
BECAUSE HER ATTORNEY FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE HEARSAY STATEMENT 
ON CONFRONTATION GROUNDS 
¶33 There is a two-part test for determining whether 
counsel's actions constituted ineffective assistance in the 
constitutional sense: deficient performance and prejudice to the 
defendant. State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 369 N.W.2d 711 
(1985).  The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth the test as 
follows: 
"A 
convicted 
defendant's 
claim 
that 
counsel's 
assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a 
conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the 
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.  
 . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense."  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  The first prong requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning 
as 
the 
"counsel" 
guaranteed 
the 
defendant 
by 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment.  State v. Harvey, 139 Wis. 2d 353, 375, 407 N.W.2d 
235 (1987).  With respect to the second prong, the defendant is 
obligated to show that "'there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.'" Id. (citations omitted).   
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
22 
 
¶34 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "there is no 
reason . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the 
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.  In particular, 
a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was 
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the 
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies."  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 697. 
¶35 Because we have concluded that any error by the 
circuit court in admitting Michael's statement was harmless, we 
accordingly conclude that any deficient performance by Weed's 
trial counsel with respect to failing to object to the 
admissibility of the statement was not prejudicial.        
D. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT TO 
TESTIFY ON HIS OR HER BEHALF IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT THAT CAN 
ONLY BE PERSONALLY WAIVED BY THE DEFENDANT WITH AN ON-THE-RECORD 
COLLOQUY 
 
¶36 Weed contends that her constitutional right to testify 
was violated when the circuit court presumed waiver of her right 
to testify from her silence.  Weed asserts that a criminal 
defendant's right to testify is a fundamental constitutional 
right that can only be waived personally by the defendant with 
an on-the-record colloquy.  However, after conducting a post-
conviction hearing, the circuit court concluded that based on 
the testimony of Weed's trial counsel, the court's interaction 
with Weed throughout the trial, and other choices made by Weed 
during the trial, that she had freely, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived her right to testify.   
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
23 
 
 
¶37 A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to 
testify as "part of the due process rights of the defendant 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."  State v. Albright, 96 
Wis. 2d 122, 128, 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980) (footnote omitted).  
Thus, "[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in 
his own defense, or to refuse to do so."  Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).  In Albright, the right to testify was 
characterized as "an important constitutional right," but not a 
fundamental right that "can only be waived in open court on the 
record by the defendant."  Albright, 96 Wis. 2d at 130.  Thus, 
the court in Albright concluded that "counsel, in the absence of 
the express disapproval of the defendant on the record during 
the pretrial or trial proceedings, may waive the defendant's 
right to testify."  Id. at 133.  Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that "the right to testify on one's own behalf in 
defense to a criminal charge is a fundamental constitutional 
right."  Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 n.10 (1987).  
Consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rock, the 
court of appeals has concluded that a "defendant's right to 
testify is fundamental in nature."  State v. Simpson, 185 Wis. 
2d 772, 778, 519 N.W.2d 662 (Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added); 
see also State v. Wilson, 179 Wis. 2d 660, 670, 508 N.W.2d 44 
(Ct. App. 1993).  
¶38 Despite the court of appeals' recognition that a 
criminal defendant's right to testify is fundamental, it 
nevertheless held that the principles of waiver set forth in 
Albright were precedential law, and "therefore, we are not in a 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
24 
 
position to mandate a new requirement concerning waiver of one's 
right to testify.  Thus, in line with Albright, we consider the 
totality of the record in deciding whether [the defendant] 
appropriately waived his right to testify."  Simpson, 185 Wis. 
2d at 779; see also Wilson, 179 Wis. 2d at 672 n. 3.   
¶39 In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rock, 
as well as the court of appeals' decisions in Simpson and 
Wilson, we affirm that a criminal defendant's constitutional 
right to testify on his or her behalf is a fundamental right.  
Therefore, we now examine whether this fundamental right may be 
waived by a defendant's silence.  With respect to the waiver of 
fundamental rights, such as the right to counsel and the right 
to a jury trial, this court has held that a circuit court must 
conduct a colloquy with the defendant.  State v. Anderson, 2002 
WI 7, 249 Wis. 2d 586, 638 N.W.2d 301; State v. Klessig, 211 
Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997).  In explaining the benefits 
of requiring a colloquy, we stated in Klessig, 
[W]e mandate the use of a colloquy in every case where 
a defendant seeks to proceed pro se to prove knowing 
and 
voluntary 
waiver 
of 
the 
right 
to 
counsel. 
Conducting such an examination of the defendant is the 
clearest and most efficient means of insuring that the 
defendant 
has 
validly 
waived 
his 
right 
to 
the 
assistance 
of 
counsel, 
and 
of 
preserving 
and 
documenting that valid waiver for purposes of appeal 
and postconviction motions. Thus, a properly conducted 
colloquy serves the dual purposes of ensuring that a 
defendant is not deprived of his constitutional rights 
and 
of efficiently 
guarding 
our 
scarce 
judicial 
resources. We hope that our reaffirmation of the 
importance of such a colloquy will encourage the 
circuit 
courts 
to 
continue 
their 
vigilance 
in 
employing such examinations. 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
25 
 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206.  
¶40 Since we deem that a criminal defendant's right to 
testify is a fundamental right, we conclude in line with 
Anderson and Klessing, that a circuit court should conduct a 
colloquy with the defendant in order to ensure that the 
defendant is knowingly and voluntarily waiving his or her right 
to testify.  We have stated that "the decisions whether to waive 
the right to an appeal, the assistance of counsel, or to be 
tried by a jury, are so fundamental to the concept of fair and 
impartial decision making, that their relinquishment must meet 
the standard set forth in Johnson v. Herbst, 304 U.S. 458 
(1938). 
 
That 
is, 
the 
waiver 
must 
be 
'an 
intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'"  
Albright, 96 Wis. 2d at 130-31 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 
464).  This same rationale applies to the fundamental right of a 
criminal defendant to testify on his or her behalf.  
¶41 We recognize that only a minority of jurisdictions 
impose an affirmative duty on circuit courts to conduct an on-
the-record colloquy to ensure that a criminal defendant is 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his or her 
right to testify.9  Many jurisdictions do not require circuit 
courts to engage in a colloquy based on concerns regarding trial 
strategy and the integrity of the attorney-client relationship.10  
                                                 
9 Michele C. Kaminski, Annotation, Requirement that Court 
Advise Accused of, and Make Inquiry with Respect to, Waiver of 
Right to Testify, 72 A.L.R. 5th 403, 418 (1999).   
10 Id.  
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
26 
 
Although these are valid concerns, they might be somewhat 
alleviated by the method employed by the circuit court in 
conducting a colloquy.  For example, the colloquy should be a 
simple and straightforward exchange between the court and the 
defendant outside the presence of the jury.  Furthermore, these 
same concerns could be raised with respect to other fundamental 
rights, such as the right to a jury trial; however, we have 
deemed that because of their fundamental nature, there is 
sufficient justification to require an on-the-record colloquy.   
¶42 We anticipate that requiring circuit courts to conduct 
an on-the-record colloquy to ensure that a criminal defendant is 
making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or 
her right to testify will not be significantly burdensome.  Even 
the State concedes that a colloquy would be beneficial to the 
criminal justice system and that the practice is already well-
accepted and implemented in the circuit courts.  Thus, the State 
agrees that mandating, as opposed to recommending, a colloquy 
would not likely create an additional burden on the circuit 
courts.           
¶43 Accordingly, in order to determine whether a criminal 
defendant is waiving his or her right to testify, a circuit 
court 
should 
conduct 
an 
on-the-record 
colloquy 
with 
the 
defendant outside the presence of the jury.  The colloquy should 
consist of a basic inquiry to ensure that (1) the defendant is 
aware of his or her right to testify and (2) the defendant has 
discussed this right with his or her counsel.   
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
27 
 
¶44 In this case, the circuit court did not conduct an on-
the-record 
colloquy 
to 
ensure 
that 
Weed 
knowingly 
and 
voluntarily waived her right to testify.  Notwithstanding the 
lack 
of 
a 
colloquy, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Weed 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right to testify based 
on our review of the record and the evidence presented at the 
post-conviction hearing.   
¶45 At the post-conviction hearing, Weed's trial counsel 
testified that he and Weed had discussed whether Weed should 
testify on several occasions.  Her trial counsel testified that 
although he had advised Weed not to testify, he also made very 
clear that she had the right to testify, and that it was her 
choice.  Weed's trial counsel claimed that he believed Weed 
understood her constitutional rights.  In support of his 
contention, he noted that at the insanity phase of the trial, 
Weed chose to waive her right to a jury trial against his 
advice.          
¶46 In contrast, Weed testified at the post-conviction 
hearing that she thought that she couldn't disagree with her 
attorney and that she was never informed of her right to 
testify.  Weed claimed that even though she was emotional during 
the trial, she still could have told her story.  During the 
trial, Weed stated in a colloquy with the circuit court in 
waiving her right to a jury trial, that the psychotropic 
medications she was taking were beneficial and did not prevent 
her from intellectually functioning and understanding her right 
to a jury trial.  Weed now argues that she did not understand 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
28 
 
that she had a right to testify due to the medications she was 
taking and her rough emotional state.  Upon reviewing the 
record, we agree with the circuit court that Weed knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right to testify based 
on the choices made by Weed during the trial, including waiving 
her right to a jury trial against her attorney's advice, her 
interaction with the circuit court throughout the trial, and the 
testimony presented at the post-conviction hearing.            
¶47 Although we conclude that Weed waived her right to 
testify based on the record and the evidence presented at the 
post-conviction hearing, we decline to determine whether a post-
conviction hearing would always be sufficient to ensure that a 
criminal defendant has waived his or her right to testify.  
Since Weed was provided an adequate remedy from the post-
conviction hearing and the parties did not fully brief the issue 
of remedy, we do not decide the appropriate remedy if a circuit 
court fails to conduct an on-the-record colloquy with a criminal 
defendant to ensure that the defendant is waiving his or her 
right to testify.  As we have stated before, "[s]uch a 
determination should be made with the benefit of briefs and 
argument on the merits by parties who take adverse positions."  
State ex rel. Nichols v. Litscher, 2001 WI 119, ¶31, 247 Wis. 2d 
1013, 635 N.W.2d 292 (citing Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass 
Corp., 230 Wis. 2d 212, 244, 601 N.W.2d 627 (1999)).     
¶48 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting the hearsay 
statement made by Michael under the recent perception exception 
No. 
01-1476-CR   
 
29 
 
to the hearsay rule.  We also conclude that the hearsay 
statement did not violate Weed's right to confrontation, but 
even if it did, the error was harmless.  Consequently, Weed was 
not denied the effective assistance of counsel because admission 
of the statement was not prejudicial.  Finally, we conclude that 
the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to testify on 
his or her behalf is a fundamental right; therefore, waiver of 
the right to testify requires that a circuit court conduct an 
on-the-record colloquy.  Despite the lack of a colloquy in this 
case, we conclude that Weed knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived her right to testify based on our review of 
the record and the evidence presented at the post-conviction 
hearing. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.              
 
 
No. 
01-1476-CR.awb   
 
1 
 
 
¶49 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  Because I 
believe that the admission of Michael's statement sub silencio 
overrules precedent, lacks foundation, and violates Weed's 
constitutional right to confrontation, I cannot join the 
majority.  Nevertheless, I concur because I agree with the 
majority that the error in admitting the statement is harmless 
in this case.  What is not harmless, however, is that the 
majority broadens a hearsay exception to such an extent that its 
foundational requirements are rendered meaningless. 
 
¶50 Wisconsin is one of only a few states that has adopted 
the exception for statements of recent perception.  Of those few 
that have adopted it, Wyoming's exception applies only in civil 
cases and New Mexico's exception has since been repealed 
altogether.  Wyo. Stat. R. Evid. Rule 804(b)(5) (2003); State v. 
Ross, 919 P.2d 1080, 1086-87 (N.M. 1996).  Thus, Wisconsin 
stands only with Hawaii and Kansas in applying this exception in 
criminal cases. 
 
¶51 When adopting the federal rules of evidence, Congress 
rejected the proposal to include the new exception because of 
"great potential breadth" and its inadequate guarantees of 
trustworthiness: 
 
The 
[House 
Judiciary] 
Committee 
eliminated 
[the 
proposed statement of recent perception exception] as 
creating a new and unwarranted hearsay exception of 
great potential breadth.  The Committee did not 
believe that statements of the type referred to bore 
sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to justify 
admissibility. 
No. 
01-1476-CR.awb   
 
2 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 93-650 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
7075, 7080. 
¶52 I share the concern of overbreadth in the application 
of this exception.  It must be narrowly applied. 
¶53 The exception is unlike other hearsay exceptions where 
the declarant is unavailable, such as statements under belief of 
impending death (§ 908.045(3)) and statements against interest 
(§ 908.045(4)), 
in 
which 
the 
circumstances 
and 
type 
of 
statements 
inherently 
contain 
strong 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness.  The lack of trustworthiness involved with the 
exception for statements of recent perception is evident from 
the reluctance of other jurisdictions to adopt it. 
 
¶54 Apparently, it is this same reluctance that caused the 
court in State v. Stevens, 171 Wis. 2d 106, 119, 490 N.W.2d 753 
(1992), 
to 
declare 
that 
corroboration 
is 
necessary 
when 
evaluating whether to admit hearsay under the exception for 
statements of recent perception: 
 
Corroboration is the key to reliability of a statement 
coming under [the exception for statements of recent 
perception]. . . . 
Reliability 
depends 
on 
the 
possibility 
of 
corroborating 
the 
declarant's 
statement. 
According to one treatise on Wisconsin evidence, corroboration 
poses a special problem for the introduction of hearsay 
testimony. 
 
Ralph 
Adam 
Fine, 
Fine's 
Wisconsin 
Evidence, § 908.045(2), at 319 (2002).  The treatise notes that 
"'Corroboration is the key to reliability of a statement coming 
under' Rule 908.045(2)."  Id. (quoting Stevens, 171 Wis. 2d at 
119). 
No. 
01-1476-CR.awb   
 
3 
 
 
¶55 The majority ignores the language in Stevens regarding 
the requirement that there be corroboration.  It allows for the 
admission of the statement without any corroboration whatsoever, 
and in doing so, sub silencio overrules Stevens. 
 
¶56 In this case, the hearsay involved the testimony of 
the Fuerbringers that Michael made a statement to the effect 
that he had removed the bullets from his gun.  The majority 
notes Weed's argument that the statement should be excluded 
because there was no corroborating evidence, but then fails to 
address it.  Majority op., ¶5.  The failure to do so is not 
surprising because it appears that the State did not offer any 
evidence to corroborate the hearsay statement.  Under Stevens, 
this lack of corroboration in and of itself makes the statement 
inadmissible.  See Stevens, 171 Wis. 2d at 119. 
 
¶57 In addition, it is not admissible because it fails to 
meet the foundational requirements.  The requirements necessary 
to satisfy the exception for statements of recent perception are 
correctly set forth in ¶14 of the majority opinion: the 
statement must (1) be made in good faith with no contemplation 
of pending or anticipated litigation, (2) relate to a recently 
perceived 
event, 
and 
(3) be 
made 
while 
the 
declarant's 
recollection is clear. 
 
¶58 The precise statement at issue is: "that's the reason 
I took the bullets out of the .357."  I conclude that the 
statement is ambiguous in meaning and uncertain in time. 
 
¶59 Michael did not tell the Fuerbringers when or what 
even caused him to remove the bullets and it is not clear from 
No. 
01-1476-CR.awb   
 
4 
 
the circumstances when the alleged removal took place.  Because 
the timing of the event is uncertain, the State failed to 
demonstrate that the statement describes a recent perception. 
 
¶60 The 
majority 
discusses 
the 
testimony 
of 
the 
Fuerbringers in which they state their assumption that Michael 
took the bullets out of the gun because of Weed's suicide 
attempt eight days prior to the statement being made.  According 
to the majority, it therefore "appears" that the event described 
in the statement occurred within eight days.  However, the 
assumptions of the Fuerbringers are insufficient to justify a 
conclusion that the State demonstrated recency. 
 
¶61 This case is similar to Tim Torres Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Linscott, 142 Wis. 2d 56, 78, 416 N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1987), 
which involved the introduction of hearsay under the exception 
for statements of recent perception.  The court of appeals 
determined that the party who sought to introduce the hearsay 
failed 
to 
reliably 
demonstrate 
when 
the 
perceived 
event 
occurred.  Id.  The court therefore concluded that the statement 
did not qualify for the hearsay exception.  Id. 
¶62 Similarly, in this case, the majority acknowledges 
that the Fuerbringers did not know when the alleged removal of 
the 
bullets 
occurred. 
 
According 
to 
the 
majority, 
the 
Fuerbringers made a "reasonable" assumption that the removal was 
in response to Weed's suicide attempt eight days before.  
Majority op., ¶18.  There are, however, other assumptions which 
are also reasonable. 
No. 
01-1476-CR.awb   
 
5 
 
¶63 Weed notes other things that Michael could have been 
referring to when he stated "that's the reason I took the 
bullets out of the .357":  he could have been referring to 
Patricia's angry state of mind, to her consumption of alcohol, 
or to their argumentative history, any of which may have 
provided a reason to unload the gun.  As a result of this 
ambiguity, the assumptions of the Fuerbringers do not reliably 
meet the required foundation that the event be recently 
perceived. 
¶64 Further, given that the purpose of his statement was 
to criticize his wife and that it was made in response to her 
humiliating comments, it is doubtful whether it meets the "good 
faith" necessary to establish the foundation for admission.  
Likewise, it is questionable whether the statement was made 
under circumstances which meet that foundational requirement 
that the declarant's recollection must be clear.  The majority 
acknowledges that "Michael's mental state might have been 
affected by having a few beers."  Majority op., ¶27. 
¶65 Although it is unfortunate that the majority sub 
silencio overrules Stevens and incorrectly applies these facts 
to the foundational requirements for admissibility, the most 
problematic part of the majority's evidentiary analysis is that 
it broadens the exception to such an extent as to render the 
foundational requirements meaningless. 
¶66 As noted above, Congress rejected this proposed new 
rule 
of 
evidence 
not 
only 
because 
it 
lacked 
sufficient 
reliability, but also out of a fear of its "great potential 
No. 
01-1476-CR.awb   
 
6 
 
breadth."  The majority employs an ardently criticized standard 
of admissibility and in doing so, not only unwisely broadens the 
exception, but essentially blows it wide open.  In describing 
this 
standard, 
a 
treatise 
observes 
that 
"[n]early 
any 
articulated thought meets the test."  Daniel D. Blinka, 
Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, § 8045.2, at 711. 
¶67 The majority in ¶19 applies the Kluever standard of 
admissibility.  The declarant in that case suffered a severe 
head injury and was rendered unconscious for a substantial 
period of time but for "islets of memory."  Kluever v. 
Evangelical Reformed Immanuels Congregation, 143 Wis. 2d 806, 
810-811, 422 N.W.2d 874 (1988).  Since the declarant possessed 
an "amorphous" concept of time, the court determined that the 
"mere passage 
of 
time" 
is 
not controlling 
and that "a 
determination regarding recency of perception depends on the 
particular circumstances of the case . . . ."  Id. at 813. 
¶68 In discussing the standard set forth in Kluever, one 
commentator warns that if broadly applied, the foundational 
requirements are rendered meaningless: 
 
As a standard of admissibility, this formulation fails 
to provide any meaningful yardstick for determining 
"recent perception."  Nearly any articulated thought 
meets the test.  The holding should be understood as 
applying only to cases where expert medical testimony 
supports a finding that the declarant has "islets" of 
accurate memory. 
Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, § 8045.2, at 711. 
¶69 Based on the above analysis, I conclude that the 
hearsay does not meet the exception for statements of recent 
perception.  There is no corroboration of the statement pursuant 
No. 
01-1476-CR.awb   
 
7 
 
to Stevens and it fails to meet the foundational requirements.  
Therefore, it should not have been admitted under the rules of 
evidence. 
¶70 In addition, the admission of the hearsay violated 
Weed's constitutional right to confrontation.  The hearsay rule 
and the confrontation clause protect similar values and stem 
from the same roots.  White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352-53 
(1992).  Yet, they are distinct doctrines and the confrontation 
clause prohibits the use of statements that would be permitted 
under the hearsay rule: 
 
Although the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule 
are designed to protect similar values, they are not 
identical.  More to the point, the hearsay rule 
generally permits a wider array of statements than the 
confrontation clause. 
Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, § 802.3, at 575. 
¶71 Analysis under the confrontation clause includes an 
examination of the totality of the circumstances that surround 
the making of the statement to determine whether the evidence is 
so trustworthy that cross-examination would have added little to 
its reliability.  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-821 (1990).  
This case does not meet that test. 
¶72 As noted above, it is unclear when the alleged removal 
of the bullets occurred.  The majority accepts the assumptions 
of the Fuerbringers that Michael was referring to Weed's suicide 
attempt.  However, this is not clear and cross-examination would 
be helpful to clarify the reason for and the timing of the 
removal. 
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¶73 In addition to clarifying the ambiguities that exist, 
cross-examination in this case would test Michael's candor and 
accuracy in making the statement.  The fact that the purpose of 
Michael's statement was to criticize his wife and not to recount 
an event calls into question its accuracy.  This is especially 
true because the statement was made during an argument and after 
he had consumed the proverbial "few beers."  Because cross-
examination would have meaningfully tested the reliability of 
the statement, it fails the test under the confrontation clause 
enunciated in Idaho v. Wright. 
¶74 For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the 
statement was inadmissible both under the rules of evidence and 
under the confrontation clause.  I concur in the mandate 
because, for the reasons set forth by the majority, I conclude 
that the admission of the hearsay was harmless error under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20-26 (1967) (the court must 
be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did 
not contribute to the verdict). 
¶75 The majority's conclusion of harmless error makes the 
expansion of the exception for statements of recent perception 
unnecessary.  Additionally, it seems unwarranted because the 
statement is one that the majority describes as having "low 
probative value."  Majority op., ¶32.   
¶76 Nevertheless, 
for 
whatever 
reasons, 
the 
majority 
apparently feels compelled to admit a statement which fails the 
foundational 
requirements, 
violates 
Weed's 
right 
to 
confrontation, and sub silencio overrules Stevens.  Most 
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problematic, however, is that for the future it broadens the 
exception to such an extent that "nearly any articulated thought 
meets the test."  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶77 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No. 
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