Case Title: Eoff v. McDonald

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC97640

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2019-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
ABRAHAM J. EOFF and   
) 
CRYSTAL M. EOFF, Individually 
) 
and as Plaintiffs Ad Litem for 
) 
SOPHEE R. EOFF,  
) 
) 
Appellants, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
No. SC97640 
) 
JENNIFER K. McDONALD, D.O., 
) 
and SEASONS HEALTHCARE   
) 
FOR WOMEN, P.C., 
) 
) 
Respondents.  
) 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County 
The Honorable Kristine Kerr, Judge 
Abraham and Crystal Eoff appeal the judgment against them following a jury 
verdict in favor of defendants Jennifer K. McDonald, D.O., and Seasons Healthcare for 
Women P.C.  The Eoffs allege the circuit court committed reversible error when it 
refused to allow their counsel additional voir dire time so he could ask the “insurance 
question” after counsel forgot to ask it during his initial voir dire.  This Court affirms. 
The parties do not challenge the holding in Ivy v. Hawk, 878 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. banc 
1994), that a party has the right to ask the insurance question during voir dire if the 
proper procedure is used so as to avoid unduly highlighting the question.  But, in so 
Opinion issued August 13, 2019
2 
holding, Ivy did not divest the circuit court of its discretion to control the proper timing 
and form of voir dire questioning, including discretion as to whether counsel’s proposed 
procedure would unduly highlight the question.  Here, once the Eoffs’ counsel forgot to 
ask the insurance question during multiple hours of voir dire, the circuit court acted 
within its discretion in finding it would unduly highlight the question to allow counsel to 
recommence his questioning to ask it as one of a small number of extra questions after 
voir dire otherwise had concluded.   
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Abraham and Crystal Eoff brought a medical negligence claim in St. Louis County
against Jennifer K. McDonald, D.O., and Seasons Healthcare for Women P.C. for the 
wrongful death of their daughter during delivery.  Before trial, the Eoffs learned that 
Missouri Doctors Mutual Insurance Company (MDMIC) provided medical malpractice 
liability insurance to Dr. McDonald and Seasons Healthcare.  MDMIC is a small 
insurance company with approximately 20 employees, located 50 miles north of Kansas 
City in St. Joseph, Missouri.   
In Ivy, this Court held that, when one party has insurance, it is reversible error not 
to permit the other’s counsel to ask the venire members whether they work for or have a 
financial interest in the insurer, so long as counsel asks a proper question in a manner that 
does not unduly highlight what is generally referred to as “the insurance question.”  Id. at 
445. In setting out an acceptable method for asking the insurance question, Ivy required
the plaintiff’s counsel first to submit and obtain the circuit court’s approval of the form of 
the proposed question outside of the venire panel’s hearing and then to avoid unduly 
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highlighting the question by not asking it first or last in a series of questions.  Id.  In 
accordance with Ivy, before jury selection began, the Eoffs’ counsel requested permission 
to ask the following question:  “Is anyone here employed by or have a financial interest in 
Missouri Doctors Mutual Insurance Company?”  Opposing counsel had no objection to 
the question’s form, and the circuit court ruled the Eoffs’ counsel could ask it during the 
plaintiffs’ voir dire.  Thereafter, however, the procedure utilized diverged from that 
envisioned in Ivy.  
The Eoffs’ counsel’s voir dire questioning was lengthy, covering 173 pages of the 
transcript.  Of those, 138 pages covered the period from mid-morning through the noon 
lunch break and up to an afternoon break, when the circuit court told the Eoffs’ counsel 
he needed to “wrap it up” so the defendants would have time to complete their voir dire 
that day and the jury could be seated the next morning.  The Eoffs’ counsel, nonetheless, 
took another 35 pages of transcript to complete his voir dire questioning.   
Defense counsel completed his voir dire after approximately an hour.  The circuit 
court then turned to the Eoffs’ counsel and said, “Plaintiff’s side, you’re done as well?” 
Counsel for both sides approached the bench, and the Eoffs’ counsel said: 
Your Honor, I in my haste to move in [sic], and looking at my buried and 
entrenched question, I forgot to ask the insurance question. So now I’m in 
the problem of I can’t ask it by itself in -- standing alone, I have three 
questions I can ask at this juncture. But I apologize, it’s partly my 
negligence. My effort was try [sic] to resolve getting my end sped up. 
Defense counsel objected, stating: 
Yeah, well, no, the one thing I’d say is obviously even if he has three 
question[s] now the insurance question becomes highlighted. I mean, the 
one thing we’ve said many times in all these cases is, there’s not a single 
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person in this room who’s related to Missouri Doctors Mutual Insurance 
Company because the insurance company’s out of St. Joe, all the 
employees are in St. Joe. And the only insurers are doctors, and there’s no 
doctors on this jury. So there’s nobody that has any rational, reasonable 
basis to answer that question yes. 
Although the statement by Eoffs’ counsel suggested his failure to ask the 
insurance question was due to “haste” in complying with the circuit court’s request to 
move along, the record shows the circuit court did not otherwise curtail the Eoffs’ voir 
dire period after asking counsel to move along.  Rather, the Eoffs’ counsel engaged in 
extensive questioning following the circuit court’s request until he turned voir dire over 
to defense counsel. 
After considering both sides’ arguments, the circuit court rejected the Eoffs’ 
counsel’s request. In doing so, she noted were she to allow him to continue with his voir 
dire, “the prejudice is more to the other side by unduly highlighting” the defendants’ 
insurance, particularly when the circuit court noted there was almost no likelihood of an 
affirmative answer given that MDMIC was a small, specialized insurance company from 
across the state. 
The following morning, the circuit court swore in a jury.  After six days of trial the 
jury found in favor of Dr. McDonald and Seasons Healthcare.  The circuit court overruled 
the Eoffs’ motion for new trial.  Following an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court 
granted transfer.  Rule 83.04. 
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in refusing to
allow the Eoffs’ counsel to ask the insurance question outside of their original portion of 
5 
voir dire.  “The denial of the right to ask a proper ‘insurance question’ is an issue of law.”  
Ivy, 878 S.W.2d at 445.  If the procedure for asking the insurance question is properly 
followed so as to avoid unduly highlighting the insurance question, and the circuit court 
incorrectly denies the request, Ivy held prejudice is presumed.  Id. at 446.  But if Ivy is 
not violated, “the trial judge is vested with the discretion to judge the appropriateness of 
specific questions, and is generally vested with wide discretion in the conduct of voir 
dire.”  State v. Oates, 12 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Mo. banc 2000).  This generally includes 
“[t]he nature and extent of questioning.”  State v. Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d 596, 608 (Mo. 
banc 1998).   When prejudice is not presumed under Ivy, “[a]n appellate court will find 
reversible error only where an abuse of discretion is found and the defendant can 
demonstrate prejudice.”  Oates, 12 S.W.3d at 311. 
III.
IVY DOES NOT PRECLUDE CIRCUIT COURT CONTROL OF THE
TIMING AND FORM OF THE INSURANCE QUESTION
The Eoffs claim that Ivy gives plaintiff’s counsel a right to ask the “insurance
question” whenever counsel does so in the manner set out in Ivy; therefore, the circuit 
court was without discretion to deny their counsel the right to continue his questioning, 
regardless of the other circumstances in voir dire, because he offered to ask it between 
two other questions to avoid highlighting it.  The Eoffs misconstrue Ivy.  
Ivy is one in a long line of Missouri cases, going back at least as early as 1929, 
holding the circuit court has no discretion to refuse to permit the plaintiff’s counsel to 
inquire into a juror’s potential relationship with the defendant’s insurer even though 
evidence of a defendant’s liability insurance is inadmissible under the collateral source 
6 
rule.  See Smith v. Star Cab Co., 19 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Mo. 1929).  Defense counsel did 
not challenge the correctness of the Ivy rule below or in this Court, so Ivy governs, and 
this Court will not question its holding here.   
But neither Ivy nor similar decisions give counsel the unqualified right to ask the 
insurance question whenever or however counsel wishes.  Rather, as noted in Taylor v. 
Republic Automotive Parts, Inc., 950 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Mo. App. 1997), the procedure of 
allowing counsel to ask a single insurance question in a manner that does not highlight it:  
has developed as a balance between two competing concerns, both based on 
the premise that parties to a lawsuit have the right to a fair and impartial 
jury. On the one hand is the right of the parties to know if any of the 
potential jurors or their families have an interest in the outcome of the 
lawsuit. On the other hand is the desire to avoid prejudicing the jury by 
emphasizing the existence of liability insurance coverage.  
(citations omitted).  It was in furtherance of this goal to avoid highlighting the presence 
of insurance that Ivy approved a procedure also approved by prior Missouri cases: 
1) first getting the judge’s approval of the proposed question out of the
hearing of the jury panel, 2) asking only one “insurance question,” and 3)
not asking it first or last in a series of questions so as to avoid unduly
highlighting the question to the jury panel. Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon
Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 871 (Mo. banc 1993).
878 S.W.2d at 445.  If this procedure is followed, the circuit court must allow the 
insurance question to be asked.  Id. at 444.  But the circuit court does have discretion in 
approving the form of the question.  Id. at 445.   
The problem for the Eoffs is that the circuit court gave their counsel permission to 
ask the insurance question.  The court having done its part, it then was up to the Eoffs’ 
counsel to do his by asking the question, but he failed to do so during his lengthy voir 
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dire.  It was only after the Eoffs’ counsel had asked all of his other questions, and defense 
counsel had finished his voir dire, that the Eoffs’ counsel recalled he had failed to ask the 
insurance question – and only the insurance question – and asked for permission to do so. 
Counsel’s contention that Ivy still controlled the circuit court’s discretion at that point, 
and required the circuit court allow his question, is simply incorrect.  Ivy did not address 
this situation.   
In Ivy, the circuit court refused to allow counsel to ask any insurance question.  Id. 
at 444.  Ivy held this was wrong and provided guidance as to how a proper question could 
be asked.  Id. at 445.  It did not otherwise divest the circuit court of its discretion to 
control the sequence and timing of voir dire.  “While a necessary component of a 
guarantee for an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire that identifies unqualified jurors ... 
the trial judge is vested with the discretion to judge the appropriateness of specific 
questions, and is generally vested with wide discretion in the conduct of voir dire.”  State 
v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 614 (Mo. banc 2009) (alterations in original) (quotations
omitted).  This includes “wide discretion” as to “[t]he nature and extent of questioning.” 
Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d at 608.1 
 While neither Ivy nor any other decision of this Court has had occasion to apply 
these principles to a situation in which counsel forgot to ask the insurance question until 
after the planned portion of voir dire was complete, the court of appeals did address a 
1 Further, despite the stress the Eoffs put on the circuit court’s directive to “wrap it up,” it 
is evident from the record that the only question counsel forgot due to haste was the 
insurance question.  Most of the morning and a good part of the afternoon of the first day 
of trial was devoted to the Eoffs’ voir dire, and the Eoffs do not, and could not, claim on 
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very similar situation in Buckallew v. McGoldrick, 908 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. App. 1995).  
There, as here, counsel forgot to ask his planned and approved insurance question during 
his portion of voir dire.  Id. at 706.  Once voir dire was concluded, he requested more 
time with the venire panel to ask the “insurance question.”  Id.  The circuit court rejected 
his request due to concern about highlighting the insurance question.  Id.  The appellate 
court affirmed, stating: 
Ivy reveals that the court has no discretion to refuse one’s right to ask a 
proper “insurance question.” [This] case is distinguishable from Ivy, 
however, because the court initially granted counsel the right to ask the 
proffered question. It was only after counsel “forgot” to ask the question 
during voir dire that the court made the denial which is now contested. 
Id. at 708.2  Buckallew held the circuit court did have discretion to deny counsel’s request 
to reopen voir dire for the sole purpose of asking the “insurance question” because to do 
so would unduly highlight the question, in contravention of Ivy: 
The trial court offered counsel reasonable opportunity to inquire as to the 
panel’s insurance connections. Counsel failed to seize that opportunity and 
therefore waived the right to ask the “insurance question.” A new trial is 
only required upon the denial of “the right to ask a proper ‘insurance 
question.’” See Ivy, 878 S.W.2d at 445 (emphasis added). The proposed 
question in [this] case was not proper, due to its untimeliness. 
Id.  The same holds true here.  By failing to take advantage during their voir dire of the 
appeal that the circuit court unduly or unfairly limited their time for questioning the jury. 
2 In Buckallew, and at the trial level in the present case, the circuit court erroneously also 
suggested that no prejudice could have resulted from not allowing the insurance question 
to be asked because the insurer was a small company from a different area and so was 
unlikely to have a connection to any venireperson.  908 S.W.2d at 708.  Ivy made it clear 
this is an insufficient basis to preclude the plaintiff’s counsel from asking the insurance 
question, however, as the plaintiff has the right to discover whether there is any such 
connection.  878 S.W.2d at 446. 
9 
opportunity to ask the question in a manner that would not unduly highlight the question, 
the Eoffs took themselves outside the procedure approved in Ivy.  It was then up to the 
circuit court to consider the circumstances and determine whether allowing their counsel 
to ask the question at the very end of voir dire would contravene the principle underlying 
Ivy that counsel must present the question in a manner that does not unduly highlight it. 
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding the asking of the insurance 
question at this late point would unduly highlight it. 
The Eoffs attempt to distinguish Buckallew by arguing in that case, the jury had 
actually been told voir dire was complete, while here, that was not the case.  908 S.W.2d 
at 706.  This was not the basis of the ruling in Buckallew, however.  As just quoted, the 
decision was based on the fact counsel had been offered the opportunity to ask the 
insurance question but had failed to do so, making the question untimely.  Id. at 708.  
That aspect of Buckallew’s rationale fully applies here.  
The Eoffs further note that in Buckallew, counsel asked to reopen voir dire to ask 
only the insurance question, id., whereas, in this case, the Eoffs’ counsel offered to add in 
two unrelated questions and place the insurance question between them.  But this ignores 
Buckallew’s statement that, even had counsel offered to surround the insurance question 
with a few other questions, “it is not unreasonable to conclude that [counsel’s] strategy of 
asking several questions would still place undue emphasis on the issue of insurance.”  Id.  
This reasoning also applies here.   
Having offered the Eoffs’ counsel the opportunity to ask the insurance question in 
a timely manner that did not highlight it, as approved in Ivy, and counsel effectively 
10 
having waived that right, it was not incumbent on the circuit court to give him a second 
chance to ask the question after the circuit court concluded the timing would unduly 
highlight the insurance question by isolating it at the very end of voir dire.  “[I]t is well-
settled that the trial court is better suited than an appellate court to judge the effect that 
‘insurance questions’ have on a jury panel.”  Banks v. Vill. Enters., Inc., 32 S.W.3d 780, 
794 (Mo. App. 2000).  Unduly highlighting the fact that the defendants carried insurance 
is the very ill that Ivy sought to cure by setting out its three-step procedure.  878 S.W.2d 
at 445 (“Allowing one question preserves the balance of permitting the plaintiffs to know 
if any members of the jury panel have an interest in the insurance company while 
avoiding the prejudice of emphasizing the issue of insurance”).   
IV.
CONCLUSION
The judgment is affirmed.
_________________________________ 
 LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
Wilson, Russell, Powell, Breckenridge, and 
Fischer, JJ., concur; Draper, C.J., dissents.