Case Title: Dodson v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR96-700

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Johnny Paul DODSON v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-700                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 18, 1996


1.   Criminal procedure -- postconviction relief due to ineffective
     assistance of counsel -- when it may be raised on direct
     appeal. -- Although A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37 generally provides the
     procedure for postconviction relief due to ineffective
     counsel, the issue may be raised by a defendant on direct
     appeal, provided it is first raised during trial or in a
     motion for new trial; evidence of the allegation must,
     however, be contained in the record, and the trial court must
     have been given the opportunity to rule on the issue; the
     court will not consider a claim of counsel's ineffectiveness
     unless the facts surrounding the claim were fully developed
     either during the trial or during other hearings conducted by
     the trial court.  
2.   Criminal procedure -- claim of ineffective assistance of
     counsel -- claim raised on direct appeal must have been fully
     developed below. -- The supreme court will review claims of
     counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal provided that the
     allegation is raised before the trial court (i.e., in a motion
     for new trial) and that the facts and circumstances
     surrounding the claim have been fully developed.

3.   Criminal procedure -- "deemed denied" ruling insufficient
     order from which to appeal denial of motion for new trial
     based on claim of ineffectiveness -- fully developed facts and
     an actual ruling are a necessity. -- Pursuant to Rule 2 of the
     Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure--Criminal, Rule 4(c) of
     the Rules of Appellate Procedure--Civil, which provides that
     certain posttrial motions may be "deemed denied" for purposes
     of filing a timely notice of appeal, does not constitute a
     sufficient order from which to appeal the denial of a motion
     for a new trial based on a claim of ineffectiveness; Rule 2
     makes it clear that the purpose of recognizing "deemed denied"
     rulings on posttrial motions is to enable an appellant to know
     when he must file his notice of appeal of the judgment of
     conviction; here, the ruling was "deemed denied" for purposes
     of filing a timely notice of appeal from an appealable order
     of a posttrial claim of ineffectiveness; Rule 2 applies in
     Rule 37 cases only with respect to appeals from the actual
     denial of the petition; this case, although not involving a
     Rule 37 petition, did involve a claim of trial counsel's
     ineffectiveness; the reasons for the necessity of an actual
     ruling and fully developed facts were the same in both
     instances. 

4.   Criminal procedure -- no evidence of the allegation or actual
     ruling of trial court presented -- "deemed denied" ruling on
     posttrial motion for new trial an insufficient order from
     which to raise claim of ineffectiveness on direct appeal --
     appellant's first point affirmed. -- There was no evidence as
     to why trial counsel made the particular decisions which were
     challenged in the appeal, and such information was necessary
     to conduct a meaningful review of the allegations, and based
     upon the decisions interpreting Rule 4(c) and the plain
     meaning of Rule 2, a "deemed denied" ruling on a posttrial
     motion for new trial was determined to be an insufficient
     order from which to raise on direct appeal a claim of
     ineffectiveness; as the trial court is in the best position to
     evaluate trial counsel's performance and competency, an order
     reciting its findings was necessary to conduct a meaningful
     review of the claim; because the court was not presented with
     any evidence on the allegation or any actual ruling of the
     trial court, appellant's first point was affirmed.

5.   Evidence -- forensic chemist's report properly admitted --
     appellant chose to rush to trial and could not assert lack of
     preparedness on appeal. -- Appellant's argument that it was
     error for the trial court to allow the prosecution to
     introduce into evidence a copy of the forensic chemist's
     report containing the analysis of the drugs recovered because
     he was denied his constitutional right to confront and cross-
     examine the chemist who conducted the analysis was without
     merit where appellant never indicated his desire to cross-
     examine the chemist at anytime prior to his trial, where he
     knew or should have known that the prosecution would attempt
     to use the evidence against him either through the chemist's
     testimony or through the report itself, and where it was clear
     from the abstract of the record that appellant was fully aware
     that his counsel had not had adequate opportunity to compile
     discovery or to attempt to negotiate a plea bargain, yet
     appellant desired to proceed to trial even though his attorney
     might not have been fully prepared to defend him; Appellant
     could not assert on appeal that he was not prepared to defend
     against the admission of the chemist's report without being
     allowed to cross-examine the chemist when it was appellant's
     own decision to rush through with the trial.  

6.   Criminal procedure -- State has burden to produce chemist for
     purposes of cross examination -- appellant must inform the
     state of his desire to have chemist present at trial. --   
     It is the State's burden to produce the chemist or to obtain
     a continuance when the State has caused the defendant to be
     unable to comply with the ten-day-notice prerequisite of Ark.
     Code Ann.  12-12-313 (Repl. 1995); nonetheless, the defendant
     is at least required to inform the State that he desires to
     have the chemist present at trial so the State would realize
     that it must fulfill its burden to produce the witness; an
     appellant must also demonstrate that he has been prejudiced,
     beyond the bare assertion of the constitutional right to
     confront witnesses, by the denial of cross-examination or that
     such a request would have availed him anything. 

7.   Criminal procedure -- appellant charged with controlled
     substances offenses should have known prosecution would
     introduce evidence establishing that substances were illegal
     drugs -- no prejudice demonstrated in appellant's being denied
     cross-examination of chemist. -- Appellant was charged with
     two controlled substance offenses and, thus, he knew or should
     have known that the prosecution would necessarily introduce
     evidence establishing that the substances were illegal drugs;
     had appellant truly desired to cross-examine the chemist, he
     should have informed the prosecution of this desire as soon as
     possible prior to commencement of the trial; appellant failed
     to demonstrate in any way that he was prejudiced by being
     denied cross-examination of the chemist.     

8.   Evidence -- attestation in chemist's report was sufficient --
     report contained indicia of truthfulness. -- Appellant's
     argument that the chemist's report was not properly attested
     as provided in Ark. Code Ann.  12-12-313 was without merit
     where the report displayed a laboratory case number, listed
     appellant's name along with the names of the other suspects,
     and was signed by the forensic chemist; the attestation
     contained in the analysis report was sufficient and proper
     under Ark. Code Ann.  12-12-313, in that it provided certain
     indicia of truthfulness.

9.   Appeal & error -- alleged errors not bought to trial court's
     attention -- trial court's sentence affirmed. -- The merits of
     appellant's claim were not reached where it was not properly
     preserved for review below; the appellate court will not
     consider alleged errors that were not brought to the attention
     of the trial court; the trial court's sentence was affirmed.


     Appeal from Monroe Circuit Court; Harvey L. Yates, Judge;
affirmed.
     Etoch Law Firm, by:  Louis A. Etoch, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  O. Milton Fine, II, Asst.
Att'y Gen., for appellee.

     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Johnny Paul Dodson appeals the judgment of
conviction of the Monroe County Circuit Court sentencing him to a
term of fifty years in the Arkansas Department of Correction for
the offenses of possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) with intent to deliver and possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana).  Our jurisdiction is pursuant to
Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(2).  In support of his appeal, Appellant
asserts that the trial court erred as follows:  (1) In denying his
motion for new trial on the grounds that trial counsel was
ineffective; (2) in allowing the prosecution to enter into evidence
a copy of the State Crime Laboratory report concerning the drug
analysis; and (3) in sentencing Appellant to a term of ten years
for simple possession of marijuana.  We affirm.
     Appellant was arrested during a traffic stop in Brinkley,
Arkansas, driving a car that belonged to his girlfriend.  Appellant
was accompanied by two other passengers:  James Martin and Ricky
Bennett.  During a search of the car and its occupants, officers
recovered a 10 mm gun and a bag containing what was believed to be
crystal methamphetamine and marijuana.  In addition, the officers
recovered $6,000.00 cash from Appellant's person.
     Appellant was charged by information with three felony
offenses, namely possession of methamphetamine with the intent to
deliver the substance, Class Y felony; possession of marijuana,
Class C felony; and being a felon in possession of a firearm, Class
D felony.  Appellant was also charged with two traffic violations. 
Appellant was tried before a jury and was convicted on all counts
with the exception of the firearm charge.  Judgment was entered by
the trial court, sentencing Appellant to a term of imprisonment for
fifty years.  It is from that judgment appeal is taken. 
              I.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
     Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective due to
a material conflict of interest involving his representation of all
three of the men arrested during the traffic stop and due to his
failure to move to sever the offense of felon in possession of a
firearm.  We do not reach the merits of his arguments on appeal, as
the facts surrounding each allegation of ineffectiveness were not
fully developed in the trial court.  
     It is evident from the abstract of the record that subsequent
to the trial court's entry of the judgment and commitment order on
November 8, 1995, Appellant retained new counsel and filed a motion
for new trial on December 7, 1995, alleging that he had been denied
effective assistance of counsel.  In that motion, Appellant
submitted eight grounds upon which his trial counsel was
ineffective; Appellant argues only two of those grounds on appeal. 
The trial court did not conduct a hearing on the motion for new
trial, nor did the court actually rule on the motion.  Appellant
asserts that the motion for new trial was "deemed denied" pursuant
to Rule 4(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
     We are thus presented with two distinct but related issues: 
(1) Whether we may properly consider on direct appeal Appellant's
claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, which amounts to a
collateral attack on the judgment pursuant to A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37,
and (2) whether it is sufficient for purposes of our review of such
a claim that the motion for new trial was "deemed denied" by the
trial court.
     This court has recognized that, although Rule 37 generally
provides the procedure for postconviction relief due to ineffective
counsel, the issue may be raised by a defendant on direct appeal
provided it is first raised during trial or in a motion for new
trial.  See A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37; Johnson v. State, 325 Ark. 44, 924 S.W.2d 233 (1996); Missildine v. State, 314 Ark. 500,