Case Title: PINO v. STATE ex rel. WYOMING WORKER'S SAFETY & COMPENSATION DIV.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-79

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
PINO v. STATE ex rel. WYOMING WORKER'S SAFETY & COMPENSATION DIV.2000 WY 20996 P.2d 679Case Number: 98-79Decided: 02/17/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF GERALD S. PINO, AN EMPLOYEE OF COWBOY DODGE: 
GERALD S. PINO, Appellant (Petitioner), v.STATE OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING 
WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge.

Representing 
Appellant: Terry J. Harris of Terry 
J. Harris, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.Representing Appellee: William U. 
Hill, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. 
Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant 
Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] The 
resolution of this case, in which judicial review is sought of an Order Denying 
Benefits for a worker's compensation claim, depends upon the recognition of a 
duty on the part of a hearing examiner to invoke the rules of law pertaining to 
the claimant's theory of the case. The issue claimed by Gerald S. Pino (Pino) is 
that the decision of the hearing examiner, denying benefits for a herniated disc 
in his back, was contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence, and such a 
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or other than in accordance with law. Pino 
was injured on the job. A bulge in a disc in Pino's back was disclosed by a 
Magnetic Imaging Resonance (MRI) test subsequent to that injury. Some twenty-one 
months later, the disc herniated when Pino coughed while stepping out of the 
shower at home. Two treating physicians testified that the ruptured disc was, as 
a matter of reasonable medical probability, a result of the earlier injury on 
the job. They did concede that, in the absence of any previous objective 
investigation such as x-rays or an MRI, the bulge could have been present prior 
to the injury. Both stated, however, that no symptoms of such a condition were 
present prior to the job injury, and that fact supported the opinion of each of 
the doctors that the condition did not antedate the injury. The hearing examiner 
ruled that the cause of the herniation was the cough while Pino was at home and, 
therefore, Pino had failed to prove a job-related injury. Our examination of the 
Order Denying Benefits in light of the record persuades this Court that the 
hearing examiner overlooked, and for that reason failed to apply, the pertinent 
rules of law relating to a second compensable injury. The result was a decision 
contrary to law, and the Order Denying Benefits must be reversed and the matter 
remanded to the Office of Administrative Hearings for entry of an order in 
accordance with this opinion.

[¶2] In the 
Brief of Appellant, the issue is stated in this way:

Did the Wyoming Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH) act arbitrarily, capriciously, other than in 
accordance with Wyoming workers' compensation law, and contrary to the 
substantial evidence before it, when it entered its December 4, 1997 final order 
denying Appellant Gerald S. Pino's claims for Wyoming workers' compensation 
benefits filed in connection with his continuing back complaints arising out of 
his original compensable back injury with Cowboy Dodge?

[¶3] This 
Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee, filed on behalf of 
the State of Wyoming, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division 
(Division):

The Hearing Examiner 
found the Employee's herniated disc was caused by his coughing while he exited 
the shower at home, not by his prior, work-related back 
injury.

A. Were the Hearing 
Examiner's findings supported by substantial evidence, within his discretion, 
and in accordance with law?

[¶4] In June of 
1995, Pino was employed as a mechanic in an automobile dealership in Cheyenne. 
He was severely injured when a van that he was working on slipped out of gear 
and rolled, pinning him against a workbench. His injuries were treated at the 
hospital, where x-rays disclosed no bone damage, and he returned to work within 
a couple of days. By the end of the following week, after he had continued 
working at his job, Pino sought treatment from his family physician, Dr. S. 
Pino's complaints were debilitating lower back pain and radiating bilateral leg 
pain. Dr. S. ordered an MRI test, which revealed mild disc degeneration and a 
bulge in Pino's spine at L-4 L-5, L-5 S-1. Dr. S. treated Pino conservatively 
with muscle relaxers, anti-inflammatories, and therapy for the following six 
months.

[¶5] Pino 
returned to work part-time within the six month period, and he began working 
full time shortly thereafter. Intermittently, he had good days and bad days over 
the course of the next fourteen months. He suffered recurrent pain, and 
occasionally he experienced work-related flare-ups. He would take time off from 
work depending on the nature and length of the flare-up. Dr. S. articulated an 
opinion that the symptoms experienced by Pino related back to the initial injury 
in June of 1995.

[¶6] In March of 
1997, Pino coughed as he was getting out of the shower at home; he heard a pop; 
and immediately felt pain that was very like the pain he experienced when the 
van pinned him against the workbench in 1995. Another MRI was obtained, and it 
disclosed a ruptured disc in Pino's back at the site of the bulge. Pino had 
experienced no trouble with his back prior to the injury in 1995, but the 
examination by Dr. S. following that occasion disclosed the bulge in his back 
and a weakening of the fibrous tissue surrounding the disc that ruptured. Dr. 
S., in his testimony, advanced the opinion that to a reasonable degree of 
medical probability, Pino's condition was attributable to the work-related 
injury in June of 1995. On cross-examination, Dr. S. conceded that in the 
absence of any x-rays taken prior to the 1995 injury, there was no way to tell 
definitively whether Pino had asymptomatic bulges or not. Dr. S. was clear that 
a hot shower would not relax the surrounding muscles and cause the bulge. 
Furthermore, a cough would not result in herniation of a disc in an asymptomatic 
individual who did not already have some defect.

[¶7] At the 
hearing, the Division endeavored to inject doubt with respect to the opinion of 
Dr. S. by questioning him about the report of the radiologist concerning the MRI 
that was made in 1995. The questioning suggested that a statement in the 
radiologist's report reflecting that Pino's symptoms were in the opposite, right 
leg, in the context of his identification of a bulge and spurring that was 
asymmetric in the left paracentral region at L-5 S-1, which might indicate mild 
disc protrusion beyond the osteophytes in that area, demonstrated that the 1995 
injury was not related to the ruptured disc. The ultimate statement was that the 
finding, i.e., the disc bulge and spurring that are asymmetric on the left 
paracentral region at L-5 S-1, was of questionable clinical significance because 
of the symptoms in the right leg. When asked to explain that, Dr. S. pointed out 
that the radiologist was hedging because he did not know whether that bulge was 
related to Pino's symptoms. Dr. S. pointed out that it is possible for a small 
fragment to bulge to the midline or even to the right that is not seen on the 
MRI and that the radiologist was simply saying he did not know whether that 
condition was present or not. Dr. S. agreed that there was no way of saying for 
sure because of the absence of prior objective diagnostic reports like the MRI 
or an x-ray, but for him it was a safe assumption that the crushing between the 
van and the workbench precipitated the bulge. He essentially supported that 
opinion by pointing out that Pino had no symptoms prior to the 1995 injury and 
the symptoms presented themselves following the injury.

[¶8] Another 
expert, Dr. V., the neurosurgeon who treated Pino, testified he had reviewed the 
two MRI's. According to Dr. V., although the 1995 MRI did not show an overtly 
herniated disc, a bulge was present which could have resulted from micro trauma 
over a period of time or a single episode. Dr. V. testified that only ten to 
fifteen percent of people about Pino's age have asymptomatic disc bulges and 
that Pino had only "very mild" degenerative changes in his spine in July of 
1995. Like Dr. S., he could not say with certainty what had caused the bulge, 
but his opinion was the same that the fact that Pino was asymptomatic prior to 
the 1995 accident and became symptomatic thereafter resulted in a conclusion in 
terms of reasonable medical probability that the 1995 injury had precipitated 
the bulge. He also pointed out that symptoms in the opposite leg of the location 
of the bulge were not very significant because damage had been done and the 
degenerative process had started.

[¶9] Dr. V., 
during cross-examination by the Division, summarized his position in this 
way:

I expect that he 
sustained an injury with his initial accident in 1995 that started degeneration 
in the disc, and accounted for the disc bulge seen on the MRI scan. I expect 
that his disc continued to weaken as the degeneration's usually a gradual 
process such that it was sufficiently weakened with a rather minor occurrence of 
a cough, it was enough to cause a disc herniation.

[¶10] While Dr. 
V. also conceded that a disc bulge could come from bending, twisting, or lifting 
and that Pino could have been asymptomatic and had a disc bulge prior to the 
injury, he still pointed to the reliance in his diagnosis upon the fact that 
Pino had been asymptomatic until after his work-related 
injury.

[¶11] In 
addressing these matters in the Order Denying Benefits, the hearing examiner 
included in his Conclusions of Law:

6. Pino has failed to 
meet his burden. The evidence does establish that in 1995 Pino suffered a 
work-related injury which may have resulted in a disc bulge. From 1995 through 
May 1997, Pino worked but had periodic flare-ups of his low back pain radiating 
into his legs. He sought medical treatment and these treatments were paid for by 
the Division. In May 1997, while at home, Pino coughed, felt a pop, and 
experienced immediate pain in his low back. An MRI in 1997 revealed a herniated 
disc. It is the opinion of the doctors that the work injury in 1995 weakened 
Pino's disc and predisposed him to a disc herniation. There is no question that 
the cough in 1997 caused the disc herniation and caused Pino's current back 
condition.

7. The medical evidence 
establishes that the injury in 1995 predisposed Pino to the possibility of a 
disc herniation. However, doing mundane things at home such as lifting, bending, 
twisting or coughing can cause a herniated disc. In this case, Pino was at home 
when he coughed. Pino has failed to establish that his herniated disc was caused 
by an injury received at work.

[¶12] 
Ultimately, the hearing examiner concluded that Pino had failed to establish 
that the herniated disc was causally related to the work-related injury in 
1995.

[¶13] Pino 
pursued judicial review of the Order Denying Benefits in the district court. The 
district court then certified the case to this Court in accordance with W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

[¶14] In 
Pederson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 
(Wyo. 1997), we summarized the appropriate approach to judicial review in an 
instance in which an agency declares that the party charged with the burden of 
proof has failed to meet that burden:

A claimant for worker's 
compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential elements of 
the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case hearing. 
Martinez v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 621 
(Wyo. 1996). When an agency decides that the party charged with the burden of 
proof has failed to meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the 
"[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law" language of Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990). City of Casper v. 
Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1995). On appeal the complainant, Pederson in 
this instance, has the burden of proving arbitrary administrative action. Knight 
v. Environmental Quality Council of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1991); 
Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo. 1974); Marathon Oil 
Co. v. Welch, 379 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo. 1963); Whitesides v. Council of City of 
Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957). The agency, as the trier of 
fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of 
witnesses. Utech, 895 P.2d  at 451, and cases there cited. The deference normally 
accorded to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the 
administrative agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be 
overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence. Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 
1994). Demonstrating evidentiary contradictions in the record does not establish 
the irrationality of the ruling, but we do examine conflicting evidence to 
determine if the agency reasonably could have made its finding and order based 
upon all of the evidence before it. Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 
1996); Knight, 805 P.2d  at 274; Ward v. Board of Trustees of Goshen County 
School Dist. No. 1, 865 P.2d 618, 623 (Wyo. 1993); State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div. v. Ramsey, 839 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo. 
1992).

[¶15] The 
articulated review approach is consistent with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) and (E) (Lexis 1999), which provides that the reviewing court 
must:

(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; 
[or]

***

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

[¶16] When an 
abuse of discretion is the issue on review, the reviewing court examines the 
question of whether the agency's "decision was based on a consideration of 
relevant factors and whether it is rational." Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 
971 (Wyo. 1996). The failure of any essential finding to be supported by 
substantial evidence results in an arbitrary and capricious decision and must be 
reversed. Matter of Goddard, 914 P.2d 1233, 1236 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Majority 
of Working Interest Owners in Buck Draw Field Area v. Wyoming Oil and Gas 
Conservation Com'n, 721 P.2d 1070, 1079 (Wyo. 1986)). Our definition of 
substantial evidence is "`relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept 
in support of the conclusions of the agency.'" State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Harris, 931 P.2d 255, 258 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Stuckey v. 
State, ext rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 890 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wyo. 
1995)). When there is substantial evidence present to support the agency's 
finding of fact, we do not substitute our judgment for the agency finding. 
Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 876 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting 
Sinclair Trucking v. Bailey, 848 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Wyo. 1993)). The reviewing 
court, however, may adjust the findings of fact when they are clearly contrary 
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Weaver v. Cost Cutters, 953 P.2d 851, 855 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Nelson v. Sheridan Manor, 939 P.2d 252, 255 (Wyo. 
1997)).

[¶17] The 
decision of the agency will only be affirmed, however, if it is in accordance 
with the law, and the reviewing court may substitute its own judgment if the 
decision does not comport with the law. Matter of Cordova, 882 P.2d 880, 882 
(Wyo. 1994). We also have ruled that in an instance in which a hearing 
examiner's "decision shocks the conscience of the court and appears to be so 
unfair and inequitable that a reasonable person could not abide it," such a 
decision can be reversed for an abuse of discretion. Matter of Goddard, 914 P.2d  
at 1238 (citing State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. v. Rivera, 796 P.2d 447, 451 (Wyo. 1990)).

[¶18] As the 
hearing examiner correctly ruled, Pino had the burden of establishing all the 
statutory elements which comprise a compensable injury by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Matter of Worker's Compensation Claim of Thornberg, 913 P.2d 863, 866 
(Wyo. 1996). The statute defines an injury as "any harmful change in the human 
organism other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any 
artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the course of employment 
while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the 
employer 9*9 9*9 9*9." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (Michie 1991). To 
satisfy that burden, Pino was required to establish by a degree of medical 
probability that the 1995 injury was a contributing cause to the 1997 injury in 
order to have his claim honored. It is undisputed that the injury Pino suffered 
in 1995 met the requirements of the statute. The focal issue before this Court 
is captured by this language, "in order for a second injury to be compensable, 
the original compensable injury must itself be the direct cause of the 
subsequent injury." State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. 
v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 377 n. 1 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶19] Whenever 
disparate results are obtained by those similarly situated, the specter of an 
arbitrary or capricious decision must be confronted and resolved. Wyoming has 
long recognized the proposition that a job-related injury can cause damage that 
is not immediately apparent or necessarily subject to treatment at the time. In 
Casper Oil Co. v. Evenson, 888 P.2d 221, 224-25 (Wyo. 1995), we 
said:

The basic rationale 
behind the second compensable injury rule is well stated in Baldwin v. Scullion, 
50 Wyo. 508, 530-31, 62 P.2d 531, at 539 (1936):

[I]t seems to us palpably 
unjust to the employee to deny him compensation because he has tried to keep his 
place on the employer's pay roll by doing his regular work and then has found 
that conditions produced at the time of the accident, and which medical science 
could not recognize or whose final consequences it could not forecast, have 
gradually and ultimately produced a compensable injury. We do not think the 
language employed in the law by our State Legislature was reasonably intended to 
produce any such result.

[¶20] This 
rationale remains persuasive and we apply it in our analysis today. See, Matter 
of Krause, 803 P.2d 81, 82 (Wyo. 1990); Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Rupe, 
741 P.2d 609, 610 (Wyo. 1987); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div. 
v. Malkowski, 741 P.2d 604, 605 (Wyo. 1987); Matter of Barnes, 587 P.2d 214, 
218-19 (Wyo. 1978) and Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 530-31, 62 P.2d 531, 
539 (1936).

[¶21] Matter of 
Barnes, 587 P.2d 214 is remarkably similar to the case before us. Barnes was 
injured in 1967 and filed a timely claim. Id. at 215. Barnes suffered an acute 
back strain and his physician noted that if his back trouble continued, a spinal 
fusion would be required. Id. at 216. Barnes underwent fusion surgery in 
February of 1976. Id. He filed a petition to reopen his case in June of 1976. 
Id. Attached to the petition was a note from his physician that stated, "`Mr. 
Barnes [sic] present condition is the result of his original injury on 
3/29/67.'" Id.

[¶22] Following 
a hearing, Barnes was awarded hospital and medical benefits as well as benefits 
for temporary total disability. Id. at 217. The Worker's Compensation Division 
objected and appealed to the district court, arguing that the claim was time 
barred. Id. This court affirmed the award and quoted from the district court's 
order:

"*** [T]he Court finding 
that the claim of the petitioner concerns on-going treatment necessitated by the 
petitioners [sic] previous injury on March 29, 1967 and that all proper claims 
are allowable.

[¶23] "IT IS 
THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition to reopen is not necessary and that all 
proper claims presented by the petitioner shall be allowed as part of the 
petitioners [sic] original claim."

Id.

***

[¶24] An 
industrial accident can give rise to more than one compensable injury. See, 
Rupe, 741 P.2d  at 610; Malkowski, 741 P.2d  at 605; Matter of Barnes, 587 P.2d  at 
218; and Scullion, 62 P.2d  at 539. When this principle is applied to the present 
case, there is no way to distinguish Evenson's injury and his multiple surgeries 
from the cases cited above. Evenson's back injury, followed by fusion surgery, 
is identical to the situation in Matter of Barnes, and is very similar to the 
facts in Rupe and Malkowski. In each case, a man suffered an injury during his 
employment which required relatively immediate medical attention for which he 
was promptly compensated. Rupe, 741 P.2d  at 610; Malkowski, 741 P.2d  at 604; 
Matter of Barnes, 587 P.2d  at 216; Scullion, 62 P.2d  at 539. Each man then 
required additional surgery at a later date and was ultimately awarded benefits 
under the second compensable injury rule. Rupe, 741 P.2d  at 610; Malkowski, 741 
P.2d at 605-06; Matter of Barnes, 587 P.2d  at 219; Scullion, 62 P.2d  at 
532.

[¶25] Nothing in 
this instance serves to substantially distinguish Pino's circumstances from 
those in the cited cases. The Findings of Fact by the hearing examiner read very 
much like the material facts reported in the cited cases. Further, there is no 
indication of internal inconsistencies between the testimony of Pino and his 
treating physicians like those that caused this court to affirm in Matter of 
Krause, 803 P.2d 81 (Wyo. 1990). Included among the hearing examiner's 
Conclusions of Law is this statement:

It is the opinion of the 
doctors that the work injury in 1995 weakened Pino's disc and predisposed him to 
a disc herniation. There is no question that the cough in 1997 caused the disc 
herniation and caused Pino's current back condition.

[¶26] The thrust 
of the hearing examiner's disposition is clear; he ruled that the cause of the 
herniation was a cough that occurred at home not the work place. Yet, there is 
nothing in the second compensable injury rule that attributes any significance 
to the place where the worker happened to be when the injury manifested itself 
nor is any triggering event required. Other cases simply report the increasing 
severity of the injury over time that ultimately required surgery. In Evenson, 
the triggering event was a slip and fall at home.

[¶27] We have 
ruled in a different medical context that the causal connection between an 
accident or condition at the workplace is satisfied if the medical expert 
testifies that it is more probable than not that the work contributed in a 
material fashion to the precipitation, aggravation or acceleration of the 
injury. Claim of Taffner, 821 P.2d 103, 105 (Wyo. 1991). We do not invoke a 
standard of reasonable medical certainty with respect to such causal connection. 
Kaan v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 689 P.2d 1387, 1389 
(Wyo. 1984) (citing Jim's Water Service v. Eayrs, 590 P.2d 1346 (Wyo. 1979)). 
Testimony by the medical expert to the effect that the injury "most likely," 
"contributed to," or "probably" is the product of the workplace suffices under 
our established standard. Kaan, 689 P.2d  at 1389. We have quoted above the mixed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to which the hearing examiner 
acknowledged that it was the opinion of the doctors that the work injury in 1995 
weakened the disc in Pino's back and predisposed him to herniation. Further, the 
hearing examiner acknowledged that the evidence established that the injury in 
1995 predisposed Pino to the possibility of disc herniation. The hearing 
examiner then ruled, however, that the cause of the herniated disc was the cough 
at home. The hearing examiner made no reference to the law surrounding a second 
compensable injury.

[¶28] This 
record discloses that under either the "reasonable medical probability" or "more 
probable than not" standard, Pino succeeded in demonstrating the causal 
connection by a preponderance of the evidence.1 Dr. V., the neurosurgeon who 
treated Pino, stated the causal connection in this way at the 
hearing:

Q. Doctor [V], do you 
have an opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, not certainty, 
but probability, as to whether [Pino's] present back condition arises out of his 
original June, 1995 injury with [his place of employment].

[The Division]: We 
object, and our position is in Workers' Compensation cases the standard is 
reasonable degree of medical certainty.

THE HEARING EXAMINER: 
Objection noted. Doctor, can you answer the question?

A. With standard medical 
certainty I expect that he started a spectrum of disease in his accident in 1995 
that led to the disc herniation when he coughed in 1997.

Q. [By Pino's Attorney] 
And, Doctor, do you have an opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability, as to whether [Pino's] present condition is a continuation of that 
original June, 1995 injury?

[The Division]: Same 
objection.

THE HEARING EXAMINER: 
Note the objection. Can you answer, Doctor?

A. As I just said, I 
expect that his - the current situation, the disc herniation, is a direct 
continuation of the accident in 1995.

(Emphasis added.) This 
evidence seems to establish the causal connection between the 1995 and 1997 
injuries even under the reasonable medical certainty standard which the Division 
asserted was applicable.

Pino's family 
practitioner, Dr. S., also established the connection in his testimony in which 
he reported:

Q. Dr. [S.], do you have 
an opinion as you sit here today, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, 
as to whether [Pino's] present back condition arises out of his June, 1995 
injury ***?

A. I sure think it does. 
Now, I think we should mention that I've sent [Pino] for physiotherapy, that we 
sent [Pino] to Dr. [V.], who's a neurosurgeon, to Dr. [G.], who's a 
neurosurgeon, and letters from them indicate that they felt that was, the disc 
was part of the original injury.

***

Q. And, Dr. [S.], can you 
tell us what it is in Dr. [V's] *** letter that causes you to state what you 
testified to earlier concerning the relationship?

A. Well, on the second 
page [Dr. V.] says, I expect his initial accident of June, 1995 weakened the 
disc and created a disc bulge. ***

***

Q. And, Doctor [S.], do 
you agree with the Division's assertion in this matter that it is speculative as 
to whether Mr. Pino suffered any injury to his L-5 S-1 disc in that June, `95 
accident?

A. I think June - Yes, I 
think he caused the bulge of the disc in June of '95. It weakened the disc and 
predisposed him to have the ruptured disc.

Q. Do you feel you hold 
that opinion as speculative or is that opinion held to a reasonable degree of 
medical probability.

A. I think that's 
reasonable.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶29] The 
Supreme Court of Utah dealt with a remarkably similar situation in Perchelli v. 
Utah State Indus. Commission, 25 Utah.2d 58, 475 P.2d 835 (1970). The claimant 
in that case had suffered a compensable back injury in 1966. Two years later, he 
sneezed and the disc herniated. Id. at 836. The agency in that case considered 
the sneeze to be an independent cause of Perchelli's disability, and 
compensation was denied. Id. at 837. The decision was reversed on appeal, and 
benefits were awarded. The court in that case said that if Perchelli had not 
sneezed, "some other episode would have triggered the actual disc herniation, 
requiring surgery." Id. The cough that triggered the herniation in Pino's back 
cannot be meaningfully distinguished from Perchelli's sneeze. 

[¶30] The 
Division contends that the disc bulge could have antedated the injury in 1995, 
focusing on the inability of the doctors to "tell for sure" whether the 1995 
accident initiated the bulge that resulted in the herniation in 1997. The 
Division contends that the subsequent injury bore only "a speculative 
relationship to the 1995 accident at work." This argument inverts the 
application of the requirement of substantial evidence to sustain the burden of 
proof. In effect, the Division seeks to compare speculation to the testimony of 
the treating physicians. We are satisfied that Pino met his burden not only of 
establishing the 1995 injury and the absence of a pre-existing bulge in his 
spinal column, but also the second compensable injury resulting from the injury 
at work.

[¶31] We note 
the additional testimony of Dr. S.:

Q. So, if we don't know 
when the bulge occurred, but the bulge, in your opinion, contributed to the 
coughing incident precipitating the herniated disc in 1997, if we don't know 
when that bulge occurred, there's no way to say with any level of certainty that 
the June, 1995 accident is the cause of that herniated disc almost two years 
later, correct?

A. I think we're looking 
at this, since he had no symptoms, since he had never had trouble with his back, 
no previous history of injury that I know, there's no way of saying that he 
didn't have the problems, but because he's saying he had no symptoms I think we 
have to assume, unless we'd had an MRI before he started working [at his place 
of employment], I think we have to assume that he had no trouble. This was a 
pretty severe injury that he had, and I think you must assume that crushing 
between a bench and a car certainly could have precipitated this, but I have no 
way of telling for sure.

(Emphasis added.) Dr. V. 
also testified:

Q. And can you say with 
any certainty what caused Mr. Pino's disc bulge that was observed on the 7/19/95 
MRI?

A. You can not say with 
certainty, but he was asymptomatic in 1995 and symptomatic 
thereafter.

[¶32] We 
conclude that the hearing examiner failed to recognize that the issue before the 
agency was one of a second subsequent injury rather than simply one of proximate 
causation. Like a trial judge instructing a jury, the Office of Administrative 
Hearings has an obligation to invoke and apply the rules of law that support a 
claimant's theory of the case. It may be that this Court has explained the case 
in more detail and with more specificity than did Pino, but the fact remains 
that his theory of the case encompassed a second compensable injury. The hearing 
examiner should have invoked and applied the rule relied upon in the cited 
cases. Under the circumstances, the failure to do so constitutes a decision "not 
in accordance with law."

[¶33] The case 
could be resolved by reversing the Order Denying Benefits and remanding it to 
the hearing examiner to consider the evidence in the light of the second 
subsequent injury rule. In this instance, however, the only medical testimony in 
the context of reasonable medical probability was to the effect that because 
Pino was asymptomatic prior to the 1995 injury, he did not have any prior 
weakness like a bulge in a disc in his back and that the bulge was the product 
of the 1995 injury. Since the medical testimony also ties the second injury to 
the 1995 accident by a reasonable medical probability, there is nothing in the 
record that would justify a different finding by the hearing examiner than those 
already made with respect to the testimony establishing the relationship between 
the 1995 injury and the 1997 surgery. Consequently, we reverse the Order Denying 
Benefits and the case is remanded to the Office of Administrative Hearings for 
the sole purpose of determining the appropriate amount of worker's compensation 
benefits that should be awarded to Pino.

[¶34] Reversed 
and remanded to the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Footnotes

1 The hearing 
examiner's Conclusions of Law specifically define preponderance of the evidence: 
"A `preponderance of the evidence' is defined as `proof which leads the trier of 
fact to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its 
non-existence.' Scherling v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352, 1359 (Wyo. 1979)."