Case Title: Marvel v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 121, 2018

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
LARRY MARVEL, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 121, 2018 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  ID. No. 0510007925 (N) 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:   April 10, 2018 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: May 30, 2018 
 
Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 30th day of May 2018, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court 
that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Larry D. Marvel, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his motion for correction of illegal sentence and denial of his 
motion for reargument.  The State has moved to affirm the judgment below on the 
ground that it is manifest in the face of Marvel’s opening brief that his appeal is 
without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
On May 4, 2006, a Superior Court jury found Larry D. Marvel guilty of 
Criminal Solicitation in the Second Degree and Conspiracy in the Second Degree.  
2 
 
The Superior Court granted the State’s petition to declare Marvel a habitual offender 
under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).  The Superior Court sentenced Marvel as follows: (i) for 
Criminal Solicitation in the Second Degree, as a habitual offender under § 4214(a), 
life imprisonment; and (ii) for Conspiracy in the Second Degree, two years of Level 
V incarceration.  The Supreme Court affirmed Marvel’s convictions on direct appeal 
in 2007.1  Since then, Marvel has filed multiple motions for postconviction relief.2   
(3) 
On May 16, 2017, Marvel filed a motion for correction of illegal 
sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).  Marvel argued that his 
convictions and sentences for Criminal Solicitation in the Second Degree and 
Conspiracy in the Second Degree violated double jeopardy principles.  After the 
State responded to the motion and Marvel filed a reply, the Superior Court set a 
briefing schedule for the matter on August 11, 2017.   
(4) 
On August 21, 2017, Marvel filed a motion for appointment of counsel.  
The Superior Court granted the motion.  The Office of Defense Services asked the 
Superior Court to reconsider because there was no merit to Marvel’s arguments.  On 
September 27, 2017, Marvel filed a pro se opening brief in support of his motion for 
correction of illegal sentence. 
                                                 
1 Marvel v. State, 2007 WL 2713271 (Del. Sept. 18, 2007). 
2 See, e.g., Marvel v. State, 2014 WL 2949362, at *1 (Del. June 26, 2014) (affirming the Superior 
Court’s denial of Marvel’s fourth motion for postconviction relief); Marvel v. State, 2010 WL 
3636193, at *1 (Del. Sept. 20, 2010) (affirming the Superior Court’s denial of Marvel’s motion 
for correction of illegal sentence). 
3 
 
(5) 
On October 11, 2017, the Superior Court denied Marvel’s motion for 
correction of sentence.  The Superior Court vacated the order granting Marvel’s 
motion for appointment of counsel.  Marvel filed a motion for reargument of the 
denial of his motion for sentence correction.  The Superior Court denied the motion 
for reargument.  This appeal followed.     
(6) 
We review the denial of a motion for correction of sentence for abuse 
of discretion.3  To the extent the claim involves a question of law, we review the 
claim de novo.4  A sentence is illegal if it exceeds statutory limits, violates double 
jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be 
served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is 
uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction did not 
authorize.5  As he did below, Marvel argues that his convictions and sentences for 
Criminal Solicitation and Conspiracy in the Second Degree violated double jeopardy 
principles.    
(7) 
The Superior Court did not err in denying Marvel’s motions.  As the 
Superior Court recognized in denying Marvel’s motion for correction of sentence, 
Criminal Solicitation in the Second Degree and Conspiracy in the Second Degree 
have different elements and punish different criminal conduct.  To prove Criminal 
                                                 
3 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 
4 Id. 
5 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
4 
 
Solicitation in the Second Degree, the State had to show Marvel intended for another 
person to commit a felony and asked that person to engage in conduct constituting 
the felony.6  The State proved that Marvel asked another person to physically injure 
the woman who accused Marvel of rape.  The crime was complete once Marvel 
asked the other person to act.   
(8) 
To prove Conspiracy in the Second Degree, the State had to show that 
Marvel intended to promote the commission of a felony, Marvel and another person 
agreed to engage in conduct constituting the felony, and Marvel committed an overt 
act in furtherance of the conspiracy.7  The State proved that Marvel intended to 
promote the commission of Assault in the First Degree, Marvel and another person 
agreed on physically assaulting the woman who accused Marvel of rape, and Marvel 
provided information and money to the other person so that person could find and 
assault the intended victim.  Unlike Criminal Solicitation, Conspiracy requires that 
two or more people agree to commit a crime.  Marvel’s sentences for Criminal 
Solicitation in the Second Degree and Conspiracy in the Second Degree did not 
violate double jeopardy principles.   
 
 
                                                 
6 11 Del. C. § 502. 
7 11 Del. C. § 512. 
5 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice