Case Title: BARKELL v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-223

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
BARKELL v. STATE2002 WY 15355 P.3d 1239Case Number: 00-223Decided: 10/16/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

GERALD 
P. BARKELL,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Defendant).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. 
Roden, Assistant Appellate Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, Director, Sean Minahan, 
Student Intern, and Kirk Morgan, Student Intern, of the Wyoming Defender Aid 
Program.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; T. Alan Elrod, Assistant 
Attorney General.  Argument by Mr. 
Elrod.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

* 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
On 
January 25, 2000, a jury convicted Gerald P. Barkell (Barkell) of two counts of 
third degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  On appeal, 
Barkell challenges his convictions based on the alleged ineffectiveness of his 
trial counsel.  We find that Barkell 
has not overcome the strong presumption that his counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and affirm his convictions.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
Barkell 
states the issues as follows:

 

I.  Did [trial counsel's] failure to conduct 
an adequate investigation, failure to effectively examine witnesses at trial, 
and general lack of understanding of controlling principals [sic] of law, deny 
Mr. Barkell his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel under 
the 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Article 
1, §10 of the Wyoming Constitution?

 

II.  Did this Court effectively deny Mr. 
Barkell the right to due process and a meaningful appeal by denying Mr. Barkell 
the opportunity to supplement the trial record in his attempt to prove his 
appellate claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel?

 

The 
State puts the issues as follows:

 

I.  Did Appellant receive effective 
assistance of counsel?

 

II.  Should this Court refuse to consider 
Appellant's improper, second issue?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
Barkell 
was charged with two counts of third degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii).  The 
charges were based on allegations by Barkell's stepdaughter, BV, that on 
successive nights in early July 1999, Barkell forced her to shower with him, to 
lie naked with him, to rub lotion on him and allow him to do the same to her, 
and to touch his genitals and allow him to do the same to her.  BV was ten years old at the 
time.

 

[¶4]           
The 
morning after the second incident, BV told her mother about the 
allegations.  Her mother took her 
immediately to the Safe House shelter in Cheyenne and called the police.  A detective from the Laramie County 
Sheriff's Department interviewed BV and her mother at the shelter.  BV told the detective that Barkell first 
offered her money to shower with him and, when she refused, used physical force 
to disrobe her and force her into the shower.

 

[¶5]           
Mr. 
Barkell was arrested in July 1999, and a public defender was appointed for 
him.  A replacement public defender 
entered his appearance on October 26, 1999.  Following a continuance at Barkell's 
request, he was tried on January 24 and 25, 2000.  The jury returned guilty verdicts on two 
counts of third degree sexual assault, and Barkell received consecutive 
sentences of five to seven years on each count.

 

[¶6]           
At 
trial, the State's witnesses included BV's mother, a child psychologist, BV, and 
the investigating detective.  BV's 
mother testified about her daughter's allegations and about behavioral problems 
she had observed in her daughter before learning of those allegations.  The psychologist testified regarding 
behavioral patterns commonly seen in child victims of sexual assault.  The detective testified regarding his 
interviews with BV and her mother, as well as his investigation of the crime 
scene.

 

[¶7]           
Barkell's 
defense at trial was based on the lack of corroborating physical evidence and on 
BV's alleged motivation to fabricate the allegations of sexual assault in 
retaliation for Barkell's efforts to discipline her more strictly than did her 
mother.  In support of the latter 
argument, he presented three witnesses to testify regarding BV's reputation for 
dishonesty.  Barkell did not 
testify.

 

[¶8]           
On 
appeal to this Court, Barkell previously filed a motion and brief requesting a 
limited remand to develop evidence of trial counsel's ineffectiveness.  That motion was denied.   

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶9]           
We 
recently reaffirmed our standard for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel in Becker 
v. State, 
2002 WY 126, ¶12, 53 P.3d 94, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002), and Chapman 
v. State, 
2001 WY 25, ¶6, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001).  Those cases approve the standard 
articulated in Jackson 
v. State, 
902 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Wyo. 1995), and applied in Grainey 
v. State, 
997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Wyo. 2000):

 

When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Herdt 
v. State, 
891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo. 1995); Starr 
v. State, 
888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 (Wyo. 1995); Arner 
v. State, 
872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo. 1994); Frias 
v. State, 
722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 1986).  The 
reviewing court should indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment.  
Herdt, 
at 796; Starr, 
at 1266; Arner, 
at 104; Strickland 
v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  

 

Under 
the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland 
and Frias, 
an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice 
resulted.  Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, 
at 1266; King 
v. State, 
810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo. 1991)  
(Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell 
v. State, 
728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo. 1986); Frias, 
722 P.2d  at 145.   In other 
words, to warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an 
appellant must demonstrate that his counsel failed to "render such assistance as 
would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney" and that "counsel's 
deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case."  Lower 
v. State, 
786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1990).  "The 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the 
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."  Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.

 

[¶10]      
The 
burden of proving that counsel was ineffective therefore rests entirely on the 
Appellant.  Sorenson 
v. State, 
6 P.3d 657, 660 (Wyo. 2000), cert. 
denied, 
531 U.S. 1093 (2001).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶11]      
In 
connection with his first issue, Barkell asserts three general categories of 
ineffective assistance by trial counsel:  
1) failure to adequately prepare for trial; 2) failure to present proper 
witnesses and evidence at trial; and, 3) unfamiliarity with trial practice rules 
and standards.  He cites nine 
particulars of alleged ineffective assistance, which we will discuss in the 
order presented.  As to each, we 
begin with a presumption that counsel rendered adequate representation unless 
Barkell demonstrates on the record that counsel's performance was deficient and 
that prejudice resulted.  Becker, 
 ¶¶16, 17.

 

 

Failure 
to present testimony of BV's counselors

 

[¶12]      
Testimony 
at trial indicated that BV had been in counseling before the incidents that led 
to the charges against Barkell.  
Barkell alleges that trial counsel failed to investigate "possible 
evidence" that the victim's counselors "may have been able to reveal."  He makes the assumption that, because BV 
was in counseling, there may 
be evidence 
in her counseling records to support his defense theory that she was either 
dishonest or motivated to fabricate the allegations of sexual 
assault.

 

[¶13]      
We 
have often said that a defendant does not meet his burden to show his counsel's 
performance was deficient by mere speculation or equivocal inferences as to 
potential witnesses and testimony that could have been called at trial.  Grainey, 
997 P.2d at 1039-40; Cutbirth 
v. State, 
751 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Wyo. 1988).  
"[The listing] of possible witnesses along with vague statements of the 
testimony they might provide . . . falls far short of a presentation of the 
facts about which the proposed witnesses would have testified that is necessary 
to overcome the strong presumption that the failure to call these witnesses was 
a strategic trial decision."  
Eustice 
v. State, 
11 P.3d 897, 904-05 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶14]      
Because 
Barkell does not identify any specific testimony or evidence that the counselors 
would have offered, the presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment is not rebutted, and 
it is therefore not necessary to address the second prong of the Strickland 
test.

 

 

Failure 
to Consult with or Call an Expert

 

[¶15]      
At 
trial, Barkell's counsel vigorously cross examined the State's expert witness, a 
child psychologist, but did not call a second expert to testify on behalf of 
defendant.  Barkell assumes from 
this that his counsel did not consult with an expert or consider the possibility 
of calling a defense expert, and that such failure constitutes ineffective 
assistance.

 

[¶16]      
In 
McCoy 
v. State, 
886 P.2d 252, 256 (Wyo. 1994), we recognized that failure to call an expert 
witness may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.  However, in Bloomquist 
v. State, 
914 P.2d 812 (Wyo. 1996), we also stated that "the defendant must show that such 
expert testimony was available and necessary" and that "[a]ppellant must show 
that an expert was available who would have testified consistently with his 
theory."  Id. 
at 
820.  Barkell fails to make such a 
showing, but invites us to speculate about what type of expert and what type of 
testimony could 
have 
assisted his defense.   We 
decline to engage in such speculation to overcome the strong presumption of 
adequate assistance.

 

[¶17]      
The 
decision not to call a witness is a strategic choice, normally within the 
judgment of counsel and will not be second-guessed with the benefit of hindsight 
absent the specific showing required by McCoy 
and Bloomquist.  Eustice, 
11 P.3d  at 904-05.

 

 

Failure 
to Adequately Question the State's Expert

 

[¶18]      
Barkell 
concedes on appeal that the testimony of the State's expert was probably 
admissible under applicable case law and criticizes his attorney for vigorously 
objecting to its admission at trial.  
Barkell fails to demonstrate how the making of an objection, ultimately 
and correctly overruled by the trial court, constituted ineffective assistance 
of counsel or prejudiced his defense.

 

[¶19]      
Barkell 
then proceeds to criticize the quality of the cross-examination.  Through cross-examination, defense 
counsel attacked the credibility of Dr. Dietrick-MacLean by admission that her 
services are available for hire by both prosecution and defense.  He obtained an admission that there can 
be other causes for the symptoms the doctor associated with sexual abuse, and 
that child victims may incorporate into their memory of sexual abuse information 
obtained from an interviewer's questions.  
He also obtained an admission that the doctor did not know if emotionally 
disturbed children are more prone to allege sexual abuse than other 
children.  All of these are 
legitimate points for attacking an expert's credibility on cross-examination and 
were consistent with the defense theory of the case.

 

[¶20]      
We 
will not evaluate the trial counsel's efforts from a hindsight perspective.  We attempt to reconstruct the 
circumstances which existed during the trial counsel's challenged conduct and 
evaluate the performance from his perspective.  Owen 
v. State, 902 P.2d 190, 199 (Wyo. 1995).  A close 
review of the record reveals that the trial attorney's cross-examinations were 
relevant and useful to the theory which the defense was pursuing.  Although generally critical, Barkell 
does not make any concrete suggestions for cross-examination that should have 
been pursued, and therefore does not rebut the presumption that counsel's cross 
examination was effective.

 

 

Ineffective 
Cross-examination of the Victim

 

[¶21]      
Barkell 
likewise criticizes the cross-examination of BV in a general way but fails to 
elucidate any failings that fall below the standard of a reasonably competent 
attorney, especially any that were likely to have changed the outcome of the 
trial.  Becker, 
¶12.

 

[¶22]      
Barkell's 
counsel, on cross-examination of BV, exposed some minor inconsistencies in BV's 
testimony and the potential motivation for her to fabricate the allegations, 
both of which points he brought to the attention of the jury during 
closing.  Any additional 
inconsistencies developed by Barkell with the advantage of 20/20 hindsight would 
not have changed the outcome of the trial.  
The jury's rejection of the defense strategy does not necessarily 
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel but merely a defense strategy that 
the jury did not accept.

 

[¶23]      
Whether 
to cross-examine and the extent of cross-examination are strategic 
decisions.  The risk of excessive 
cross-examination is that the witness may reconcile inconsistencies, additional 
unfavorable testimony may be elicited, and ineffective efforts to attack 
credibility may in fact enhance the witness's testimony. Smith 
v. State, 
959 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Wyo. 1998). Speculation as to how the cross-examination 
could have been conducted differently does not meet the Strickland 
test 
for ineffective assistance.  
Cutbirth, 
751 P.2d  at 1266. 

 

Quality 
of Closing Argument

 

[¶24]      
Barkell 
claims that trial counsel failed to exploit, in his closing argument, 
inconsistencies in the testimony of BV and her mother.  A close review of the closing argument 
shows that counsel emphasized the defense theory of the case:  lack of physical evidence, 
inconsistencies in the witness's testimony, and the victim's possible motivation 
for fabrication.  The few additional 
inconsistencies identified by Barkell in the testimony of the 10-year old victim 
are trivial at best and unrelated to the elements of the sexual abuse 
allegations.  Counsel's decision not 
to list for the jury every possible inconsistency in the testimony cannot be 
said to be ineffective assistance.

 

 

Conduct 
of Voir Dire

 

[¶25]      
Barkell 
criticizes trial counsel for his handling of a prospective juror who admitted on 
his questionnaire that he had been convicted of a felony.  The trial judge determined that the 
conviction was a juvenile conviction.  
The prosecutor, defense counsel and the court each expressed some 
uncertainty whether the automatic exclusion of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-102 
applied to juvenile convictions.  
Barkell's counsel in addition stated that he would not object to the 
juror's retention.

 

[¶26]      
Because 
the juror in question was not seated, and because any prejudice would likely 
inure to the benefit of the defendant, we fail to see how counsel's opinion 
reflects incompetence.  "Because 
voir dire questioning techniques are diverse, any alleged voir dire error must 
be egregious and obvious in order to fall below the line of competence."   Arner 
v. State, 
872 P.2d 100, 105 (Wyo. 1994). 

 

 

Failure 
to Contest Victim's Testimonial Competency

 

[¶27]      
Barkell 
alleges that trial counsel should have objected to the testimony of BV because 
she may have been incompetent to testify.  
Once again, Barkell shows us no evidence beyond speculation that such an 
objection would have been well founded.

 

The 
competency of child witnesses is determined by the application of a five-part 
test.  The child must 
demonstrate:

 

(1) 
an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) 
the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to 
testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to 
retain an independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to 
express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to 
understand simple questions about it.

 

Ryan 
v. State, 
988 P.2d 46, 57-58 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting English 
v. State, 
982 P.2d 139, 145 (Wyo. 1999)).  A 
careful review of the record does not show any grounds to indicate that BV was 
not competent to testify.  Again, 
Barkell must show some evidence, not mere speculation, to justify a competency 
hearing.  Failure to present a 
baseless defense does not constitute the ineffective assistance of counsel.  Allen 
v. State, 
2002 WY 48, ¶36, 43 P.3d 551, ¶36 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶28]      
Counsel 
obviously made the tactical decision to attempt to impeach BV rather than 
exclude her testimony.  Tactical 
decisions do not become ineffective assistance of counsel when they do not 
succeed, or when hindsight shows the different decision may have been the better 
course.  Dudley 
v. State, 
951 P.2d 1176, 1181 (Wyo. 1998).

 

 

Applicability 
of W.R.E. 608

 

[¶29]      
On 
appeal, Barkell criticizes his trial counsel for attempting to elicit from the 
defense witnesses specific examples of BV's untruthfulness.  The prosecutor successfully objected to 
the testimony and counsel proceeded to elicit testimony of BV's reputation for 
untruthfulness, as permitted by W.R.E. 608.

 

[¶30]      
Barkell 
fails to explain how his counsel's testing the limits of the evidentiary rule or 
the prosecutor's alertness constitutes ineffective assistance.  The questions were properly objected to 
and sustained.  No prejudice to 
defendant can result where the evidence was properly excluded; attempting to 
obtain such evidence is not ineffective assistance.

 

 

Failure 
to Make Timely Motion for Acquittal

 

[¶31]      
At 
the close of the State's case, the trial court prompted counsel to move for 
judgment of acquittal, apparently before it occurred to counsel to do so.  Counsel then made the motion, and it was 
denied.  Likewise, at the close of 
the evidence, the trial court beat counsel to the punch and stated that any 
motion for judgment of acquittal was deemed to have been made and 
denied.

 

[¶32]      
Barkell 
points to no professional standard that requires counsel to put his pro forma 
objection on the record before the trial court thinks of it first.  His criticism in this regard is at best 
picayune.  We have consistently held 
that we will not consider claims unsupported by cogent argument or pertinent 
authority.  Madrid 
v. State, 
910 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶33]      
Barkell 
also asserts cumulative error in the aggregation of all of the alleged 
errors.  Because this Court finds 
that there was no error with respect to any one of the allegations, there cannot 
be cumulative error.   
Pearson 
v. State, 
12 P.3d 686, 692 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶34]      
In 
his second issue, Barkell claims that he was entitled to remand for an 
evidentiary hearing on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, citing 
Calene 
v. State, 
846 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1993).  The 
present case, however, is more similar to Griswold 
v. State, 
994 P.2d 920, 930-31 (Wyo. 1999).  
Appellant cannot rely on mere allegations and speculation for the purpose 
of obtaining a remand to develop a record on his claims of ineffective 
assistance.  We previously denied 
Barkell's Motion for a Partial Remand and, in his appellate brief, he provides 
no additional facts or argument justifying a remand.  Id.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶35]      
A 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be accompanied by specific facts 
in the record showing counsel's performance was deficient.  Speculation and 20/20 hindsight do not 
meet this requirement.  Reviewing 
the entire record under the circumstances as they existed at the time of the 
trial, we find that Barkell was provided with effective assistance of counsel 
and affirm.