Case Title: Skendzel v. Marshall

Citation: 330 N.E.2d 747

Docket Number: 

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
330 N.E.2d 747 (1975)
Josephine SKENDZEL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Agnes P. MARSHALL and Charles P. Marshall, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 773S145.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
July 14, 1975.
*748 Richard F. DeTar, Frank E. Spencer, Indianapolis, for appellants.
Le Roy K. Schultess, Howard E. Petersen, LaGrange, for appellees.
HUNTER, Justice.
Following the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court of this Court's opinion on transfer in this matter, the trial court requested that the parties submit a proposed decree in compliance with the order of remand contained in the opinion. That order was as follows:
*749 Skendzel v. Marshall (1973), Ind., 301 N.E.2d 641, 650-51.
Vendors filed a motion for a hearing, the purpose of such motion being to provide the trial court with evidence "of any and all other equitable relief" which the trial court might grant the vendors. Specifically, the vendors hoped to focus the court's attention upon lines of inquiry suggested in a separate opinion.[1] The trial court impliedly overruled vendors' motion when it entered its judgment of foreclosure on August 6, 1974. The judgment contained findings, in part, that:
Plaintiffs-vendors filed a motion to correct errors, asserting that the new judgment was inequitable and insufficient. Hearing was held on the motion to correct errors, during which counsel for the vendors renewed the prior motion for a hearing. When the trial court overruled both motions, plaintiffs commenced this original action for mandate to force compliance with the decision.
When an appellate court remands a cause to the trial court with instructions for further proceedings, the appellate court retains jurisdiction to see that its instructions are carried out. Union Trust Co. v. Curtis (1917), 186 Ind. 516, 116 N.E. 916, and cases cited therein. If the trial court on remand refuses to comply with the order, in full or in part, intentionally or by mistake, the party aggrieved thereby may promptly seek a writ of mandate from the Court issuing the order to enforce compliance with its terms. When such claim is advanced, the procedure of this Court has been to compare the action taken by the trial court with the action ordered. State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm'n. v. Marion Cir. Ct. (1953), 232 Ind. 561, 114 N.E. *750 2d 879. A comparison of the instructions to the trial court, contained in our opinion and set out above, and the final judgment entered demonstrates a compliance with all the mandatory aspects thereof. The order on remand stated that the judgment "may also embrace any and all other equitable relief that the court deems just." The award of further equitable relief being specifically committed to the discretion of the trial court by the remand order, an action for mandate to force compliance with said order will not ordinarily lie to challenge the quantity or quality of the discretionary relief afforded. But see Union Trust Co. v. Curtis, supra. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandate is denied.
GIVAN, C.J., and ARTERBURN, DeBRULER and PRENTICE, JJ., concur.
[1]  The portion of the concurring opinion of Prentice, J., upon which the vendors based their motion states:

"If the court finds that forfeiture, although provided for by the terms of the contract, would be unjust, it should nevertheless grant the vendor the maximum relief consistent with equity against a defaulting vendee. In so doing, it should consider that, had the parties known that the forfeiture provision would not be enforceable, other provisions for the protection of the vendor doubtlessly would have been incorporated into the agreement. Generally, this would require that the transaction be treated as a note and mortgage with such provisions as are generally included in such documents customarily employed in the community by prudent investors. Terms customarily included in such notes and mortgages but frequently omitted from contracts include provisions for increased interest during periods of default, provision for the acceleration of the due date of the entire unpaid principal and interest upon a default continuing beyond a reasonable grace period, provisions for attorneys' fees and other expenses incidental to foreclosure, for the waiver of relief from valuation and appraisement laws and for receivers."
Skendzel v. Marshall (1973) Ind., 301 N.E.2d 641, 651.