Case Title: WILLIAM W. HARDEN AND KAREN L. HARDEN, HUSBAND AND WIFE v. GREGORY MOTORS, WAYNE HUDSON, D/B/A WYOMING AUTO WHOLESALERS, JAMES HUFFMAN; AND ALAN GREGORY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIAM W. HARDEN AND KAREN L. HARDEN, HUSBAND AND WIFE v. GREGORY MOTORS, WAYNE HUDSON, D/B/A WYOMING AUTO WHOLESALERS, JAMES HUFFMAN; AND ALAN GREGORY1985 WY 39697 P.2d 283Case Number: 84-119Decided: 03/05/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
WILLIAM W. HARDEN AND 
KAREN L. HARDEN, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

GREGORY MOTORS, APPELLEE 
(DEFENDANT), 

WAYNE HUDSON, D/B/A 
WYOMING AUTO 
WHOLESALERS, ADDED PER AMENDED COMPLAINT 9/8/83; JAMES HUFFMAN; AND ALAN 
GREGORY, (DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, William A. Taylor, 
J.

 
 
William W. 
Harden, Casper, 
for appellants 
(plaintiffs).

Donald E. 
Chapin, Casper, 
for appellee 
(defendant).

Before THOMAS, C.J., 
ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., and ARTHUR T. HANSCUM, District 
Judge.

ARTHUR T. 
HANSCUM, 
District Judge.

[¶1.]     This appeal is from a 
summary judgment against appellants, William and Karen Harden, in a transaction 
involving their purchase of a vehicle. Appellants' immediate transferor had 
tampered with the odometer reading on the vehicle. Appellants were granted 
summary judgment against their immediate transferor from which no appeal has 
been taken. A summary judgment was, however, granted against appellants in favor 
of appellee, Gregory Motors, an automobile dealership in the chain of title to 
the vehicle, but not the immediate transferor to appellants. It is from this 
summary judgment absolving the appellee-dealership from liability that this 
appeal is taken.

[¶2.]     We will 
reverse.

INTRODUCTION

[¶3.]     This is a unique case 
in this jurisdiction. The civil action in the District Court was commenced by 
appellants with the filing of a complaint under the Motor Vehicle Information 
and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1981-1991 (referred to herein as MVICS). This 
federal legislation was enacted to prohibit tampering with odometers on motor 
vehicles, and to compensate persons victimized by such tampering. MVICS imposes 
civil liability on persons who violate the provisions of the law and offers 
civil remedies for victims in the form of treble damages, costs and attorney's 
fees. In order to apply this law to the facts of this case, it is necessary to 
trace the chain of title to the vehicle purchased by appellants and to review 
the odometer mileage statements required by MVICS which were signed by 
transferors along the chain of title.

FACTS

[¶4.]     On December 2, 1982, 
appellants contacted Ray Sutton, a mechanic employed by appellee, Gregory 
Motors. Appellants expressed an interest in obtaining a low mileage, late model 
Jeep Wagoneer. Sutton informed appellants that he knew of such a vehicle and 
arranged for appellants to see the vehicle later in the day. Appellants arrived 
at Gregory Motors' place of business and contacted Sutton who introduced 
appellants to one Wayne Hudson. Hudson was an independent automobile wholesaler 
who conducted business under the name "Wyoming Auto Wholesalers." He also had 
served previously as Gregory Motors' sales manager. Hudson directed appellants 
to a grey, 1980 Jeep Wagoneer which was parked on Gregory Motors' sales lot. 
Appellants inspected the vehicle and observed that it had approximately 36,000 
miles showing on the odometer. After a test drive and an inspection by Sutton, 
appellants agreed to purchase the vehicle for the sum of 
$6,000.00.

[¶5.]     It was agreed that 
appellants would return the next day to permit Sutton to perform some minor 
repair work. The agreement was to be finalized and delivery to be taken by 
appellants on the next day, December 3, 1982.

[¶6.]     Events transpired 
rather quickly on December 3, 1982. As the day commenced, title to the vehicle 
was vested in Gregory Motors which had received title and possession of the 
vehicle from Precision Motors on or about November 26, 1982. Then, three 
transfers of title occurred:

[¶7.]     (1) Gregory Motors, by 
its sales manager, Alan Gregory, transferred title to the vehicle to one James 
Huffman.1 Title was filed at 11:54 
a.m.

[¶8.]     (2) Huffman transferred 
title to Hudson. 
Title was filed at 12:31 p.m.

[¶9.]     (3) Hudson transferred title 
to appellants in exchange for a cashier's check in the sum of $6,000.00. Title 
was filed at 3:58 p.m.

[¶10.]  When Gregory Motors acquired title, a 
statement was signed by Precision Motors stating a mileage of approximately 
96,500 miles, which accurately represented the reading on the odometer and the 
number of miles the vehicle had been driven. Sometime during Gregory Motors' 
possession and ownership, and prior to appellants' initial inspection of the 
vehicle on December 2, 1982, Hudson rolled back the odometer to read just 
under 37,000 miles.2

[¶11.]  At the time Gregory Motors transferred 
title to Huffman, Alan Gregory signed an odometer mileage statement which 
certified that the odometer on the vehicle "now reads 96,475 miles."3 Obviously, because of Hudson's intervention, it 
did not. 

[¶12.]  No one from Gregory Motors went out to 
the vehicle and actually observed the odometer reading at the time the odometer 
mileage statement was signed. For some reason, too, the transferee on the 
statement was listed as Wyoming Auto Wholesalers instead of Huffman, the 
transferee on the title.4 No odometer mileage was given by 
Huffman to Hudson. Finally, Hudson signed an odometer statement on the 
prescribed form in which he certified to appellants that the odometer reading on 
the vehicle "now reads 36,859 miles." And it did - that certification was 
truthful. Unfortunately, he checked other boxes which departed from the truth 
such that a summary judgment was properly awarded against 
him.

[¶13.]  Subsequently, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation notified appellants that the odometer on the vehicle had been 
rolled back. Suit was brought under MVICS and summary judgments were entered. It 
is against the backdrop of MVICS that the propriety of the summary judgment in 
favor of Gregory Motors must be evaluated.

THE LAW OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

[¶14.]  It is unnecessary to extensively review 
the duty of an appellate court on review of summary judgments. This court has 
recently had the occasion to consider the law of summary judgment in various 
factual contexts. In Blackmore v. Davis 
Oil Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334, 336 (1983), the court 
outlined the requisite elements which must be considered on 
review:

"The moving party is 
entitled to summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P.; Lafferty v. Nickel, Wyo., 663 P.2d 168 
(1983). Furthermore, the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of 
showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Timmons v. Reed, Wyo., 569 P.2d 112, 121 
(1977). A material fact is one with legal significance which would affect the 
outcome of litigation. Thus,

`* * * a determination, 
as to whether or not a fact is material, depends greatly upon the principle of 
law to be applied.' Timmons v. Reed, 
supra, 569 P.2d  at 117."

[¶15.]  In this action the Motor Vehicle 
Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1981-1991, is the principle of law 
to be applied to the material facts of this case. MVICS affords a civil action 
to purchasers to enforce liability for violations of the requirements of the law 
and provides a specific remedy for damages to the aggrieved purchaser. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1989(a). The action may be brought in any United States 
district court or "in any other court of competent jurisdiction. . . ." 15 
U.S.C. § 1989. It has been held that state courts of general jurisdiction have 
the power to entertain suits and award damages for violations of the MVICS. Christianson v. Lease Associates, Inc., 
87 Wis.2d 123, 273 N.W.2d 776 (1978) and Vogt v. Nelson, 69 Wis.2d 125, 230 N.W.2d 123 (1975).

[¶16.]  MVICS defines a number of violations for 
which civil actions may be brought to enforce liability to recover 
damages.

[¶17.]  It provides:

"No person shall 
disconnect, reset, or alter or cause to be disconnected, reset, or altered, the 
odometer of any motor vehicle with intent to change the number of miles 
indicated thereon." 15 U.S.C. § 1984.

And 
further,

"No person shall conspire 
with any other person to violate section . . . 1984. . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 
1986.

MVICS also 
provides for rules governing persons who transfer 
vehicles:

"No transferor shall 
violate any rule prescribed under this section or give a false statement to a 
transferee in making any disclosure required by such rule." 15 U.S.C. § 
1988(b).

[¶18.]  MVICS's remedy provision requires a 
showing of "intent to defraud." 15 U.S.C. § 1989(a). Accordingly, the element of 
intent is a requisite showing by the person who seeks recovery. It has been 
ruled that intent to defraud an ultimate purchaser under the MVICS is a factual 
determination. Ryan v. Edwards, 592 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1979). Furthermore in Jones v. Fenton Ford, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 1328 (D.C.Conn. 1977), the court held that "intent to defraud" did not require a 
showing of actual knowledge. Rather, the intent to defraud requirement could be 
satisfied by a showing that the representation regarding the mileage on the 
odometer was made with reckless disregard of the truth.

[¶19.]  Similarly, in Nieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640, 642 (5th 
Cir. 1978), the court stated:

". . . [A] transferor who 
lacked actual knowledge [of accuracy of odometer reading] may still be found to 
have intended to defraud and thus may be civilly liable for a failure to 
disclose that a vehicle's actual mileage is unknown. A transferor may not close 
his eyes to the truth. If a transferor reasonably should have known that a 
vehicle's odometer reading was incorrect, although he did not know to a 
certainty the transferee would be defrauded, a court may infer that he 
understood the risk of such an occurrence." (Footnote 
omitted.)

[¶20.]  In Jones v. Fenton Ford, Inc., supra, 427 F. Supp.  at 1336, the defendant defended on the basis of his certification on 
the odometer mileage statement that to the best of his knowledge the odometer 
was correct. The court ruled that such a statement was:

". . . false and 
misleading, and that these representations were made with actual knowledge of 
their falsity, or with such reckless disregard of the truth as to satisfy the 
`intent to defraud' requirement in § 409 MVICS Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1989(a). This 
leaves only the question of damages to consider."

[¶21.]  In this case, the employee of Gregory 
Motors, Alan Gregory, admitted he did not check the odometer on the vehicle 
itself at the time that he signed the odometer statement in which he attested to 
what the odometer "now reads." The question arises whether such a failure could 
constitute the type of reckless disregard of the truth from which a jury could 
find the inference of an "intent to defraud."

[¶22.]  While summary judgment was granted in 
favor of appellants against the principal culprit, Wayne Hudson, can it be said 
that there is no material factual scenario which would trigger liability on the 
part of Gregory Motors? The trial court found none.5

[¶23.]  Yet there appear to be several factual 
questions involving Gregory Motors which remain viable for determination by the 
trier of fact. Did Alan Gregory, as agent for Gregory Motors, know at the time 
he signed the odometer statement that the odometer had been rolled back? Was 
Gregory Motors the owner of the vehicle at the time the odometer was rolled 
back; thus, when coupled with Gregory Motors' failure to actually observe the 
automobile at the time the odometer statement was signed, could an inference of 
intent to defraud be drawn by the trier of fact? Are there other MVICS 
violations by Gregory Motors which give rise to civil liability to appellants? A 
mixed question of fact and law arises: May appellants as subsequent purchasers 
who ultimately received title avail themselves of a direct action against 
Gregory Motors for the alleged failure of Gregory Motors, its agent or 
employees, to comply with the odometer law despite the lack of privity between 
the appellants and the prior transferee?

[¶24.]  We think that the trier of fact should 
decide the questions after a full evidentiary exploration.

MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL

[¶25.]  In this appeal, appellee cites a variety 
of cases to stand for the proposition that the issues raised by the appellants 
on appeal are not properly before the court for the reason that they were not 
raised for consideration by the district court in appellants' motion for new 
trial. Such cases predated the promulgation of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, i.e. United States v. 
Trabing, 3 Wyo. 144, 6 P. 721 (1885) and Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Lampman, 
18 Wyo. 106, 104 P. 533 (1909). Appellee cites Murphy v. W. & W. Live Stock Co., 26 
Wyo. 455, 187 P. 187 (1920), for the proposition that: "Errors not presented by motion for new 
trial are not reviewable." Appellee, Gregory Motors, also cites more recent 
cases which interpret the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure to reaffirm the 
fundamental concept. In U.S. Aviation, 
Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 121, 125 (1983), it is 
stated:

". . . As a general rule 
of appellate procedure, we refuse to consider issues not raised in the trial 
court unless they go to jurisdiction or a fundamental right. . . ." Citing ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 
632 P.2d 925 (1981).

[¶26.]  We agree that the fundamental principles 
remain viable. We also agree with the general proposition that the district 
court should have an opportunity to review its decisions on the basis of a 
motion for new trial from asserted errors of law, thereby affording the district 
court the opportunity to correct errors which may be brought to its attention 
prior to the prospect of an appeal. Thus, in the event an error is brought to 
the trial court's attention and recognized, the prospect of an appeal with 
attendant costs and delays would be negated. However, this general proposition 
does not apply in the case of a grant of summary judgment, in which instance a 
motion for new trial is not necessary to preserve the issues for an appeal. In 
Wyoming Insurance Department v. Sierra 
Life Insurance Company, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1360, 1362-1363 (1979), we 
said:

". . . Summary judgment, 
on the other hand, requires that the court consider the merits of the cause of 
action. We, therefore, find that after summary judgment is granted and an order 
filed the judgment is final and appealable. No subsequent motion under Rule 
60(b) W.R.C.P., is required. Rule 1.05 W.R.A.P.; Bank of America National 
T. & S. Ass'n v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. App. 3d 435, 84 Cal. Rptr. 421, 424 
(1970)."

[¶27.]  In this case, appellants did file a 
motion for new trial alleging errors of law. Appellants alleged that the trial 
court erred by allowing the filing of depositions at the date of hearing over 
appellants' objection. Appellants objected to the trial court entertaining the 
filing of additional depositions for consideration by the court in ruling on the 
pending motion for summary judgment. In this respect, appellants are correct. 
The evidence to be considered at a summary judgment motion must be on file at some time prior to the 
hearing in accordance with Rule 56(c), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
states:

". . . The adverse party 
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . ."

The rules allow 
the court to permit the filing of supplemental affidavits, additional 
depositions and answers to interrogatories Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P.). In this case, 
the trial court heard the summary judgment motion, took it under advisement, on 
its own motion ordered the filing of additional depositions and, over the 
objections of appellants, ruled on summary judgment without further notice or 
hearing. The propriety of this particular procedure has not been tested by this 
court, although several cases have touched on this general area of the 
law.

[¶28.]  In Larsen v. Roberts, Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046 
(1984), this court held that an affidavit filed on the date of the hearing on 
summary judgment is untimely and may not be considered by the court unless a 
request to enlarge the time for filing of additional affidavits is made prior to 
the hearing date. Under Rule 6(b), W.R.C.P., a court may exercise discretion to 
permit or deny the request only if the request is timely made. DeHerrera v. MemorialHospital of Carbon County, Wyo., 
590 P.2d 1342, 1344 (1979). Here, since no request was timely made and no 
affidavit for continuance was filed under Rule 56(f), W.R.C.P., the basis for 
the additional filing must be found in Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., which enables the 
court to permit supplemental filings. This is properly within the discretion of 
the trial judge as this court recognized in DeHerrera v. Memorial 
Hospital of Carbon County, supra, at 1344, wherein it was 
stated:

". . . and it is likewise 
[by virtue of the discretion of the trial judge] when supplemental or additional 
affidavits are allowed under Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P., once affidavits are properly 
submitted."

Finally, in Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 625 P.2d 747, 750 
(1981), this court impliedly approved of the trial court's exercise of 
discretion in allowing additional filings to evaluate the propriety of summary 
judgment.

[¶29.]  Accordingly, while there is no error in 
this case in allowing additional filings, we hold that when additional filings 
are ordered, an opportunity for further hearing should be afforded prior to the 
court's ruling. Appellants in this case raised a timely objection to the 
procedure. The objection need not be renewed upon the entry of judgment and is 
preserved on appeal.

[¶30.]  Appellee, Gregory Motors, quite correctly 
argues that the motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence 
was improperly raised by the appellants. The evidence was known at the time 
judgment was entered; therefore, it may not be styled "newly-discovered." While 
appellee is correct, this court cannot overlook assertions in the motion for new 
trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence of an alleged perjury by Wayne 
Hudson which may impact the trial court's ruling on summary judgment. This 
court, however, would not make its opinion dependent upon the newly discovered 
evidence. In any event, a motion for new trial was not necessary, after the 
grant of a summary judgment, to preserve the issues on 
appeal.

CONCLUSION

[¶31.]  Finally, the question arises whether this 
court should grant affirmative summary judgment in favor of appellants. 
Appellants argue that appellee in the trial court filed no depositions or 
affidavits in opposition to summary judgment. Accordingly, appellee failed to 
meet its burden to oppose appellants' motion for summary judgment. This court 
has previously ruled in Blackmore v. 
Davis Oil Company, supra, 671 P.2d  at 336, as follows: 

"Once the moving party 
has made a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, 
the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to show that a genuine issue 
of material fact exists which justifies taking the case to trial." Citing Gennings v. First National Bank at 
Thermopolis, Wyo., 654 P.2d 154, 156 
(1982).

Yet, it is also 
this court's appellate duty to consider the record in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion. Timmons 
v. Reed, Wyo., 569 P.2d 112, 116 (1977) and 
Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil 
Company (Delaware), Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 150 
(1981). In applying this standard and giving appellee, Gregory Motors, all 
favorable inferences as to the facts and the applicable law, this court finds 
that there exist genuine issues of material fact which should be submitted to 
the trier of fact. While this case is reversed on the order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the appellee, Gregory Motors, it would be improper for this 
court to direct entry of summary judgment in favor of 
appellants.

[¶32.]  Accordingly, we remand this case to the 
district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion.

1 Huffman has no 
significant role in the chain of title, having apparently served only in the 
capacity of a middleman. He held title for 37 minutes.

2 This is a fact he later 
admitted on deposition.

3 The Motor Vehicle 
Information and Cost Savings Act prescribes certain certifications on the 
odometer mileage statement. A prescribed form is utilized in virtually all 
transfers. The Alan Gregory certification read as follows:

"ODOMETER MILEAGE 
STATEMENT

* * * * 
*

"I, Gregory Motors state 
that the odometer on the vehicle described below now SELLER OR TRANSFEROR'S NAME 
(PRINT)

reads 96,475 
miles/kilometers.

"(Check one box 
only)

" X I hereby certify that 
to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading as stated above reflects the 
actual mileage of the vehicle described below.

"____ I hereby certify 
that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading reflects the amount of 
mileage in excess of designed mechanical odometer limit of 99,999 
miles/kilometers of the vehicle described below.

"____ I hereby certify 
that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading as stated above is NOT the 
actual mileage of vehicle stated below, and should not be relied 
upon.



MAKE

Jeep

MODEL

15

     BODY 
      TYPE

           
      Van

VEHICLE 
      IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

JOD15NN003452

     
      YEAR

            
      1980

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"(Check one box 
only)

" X I hereby certify that 
the odometer of said vehicle was not altered, set back, or disconnected while in 
my possession, and I have no knowledge of anyone alse doing 
so.

"____ I hereby certify 
that the odometer was altered for repair or replacement purposes while in my 
possession, and that the mileage registered on the repaired or replacement 
odometer is identical to that before such service.

"____ I hereby certify 
that the odometer was altered for repair or replacement purposes while in my 
possession, and that the repaired or replacement odometer was incapable of 
registering the same mileage, that it was reset to zero, and that the mileage on 
the original odometer or the odometer before repair was ____ 
miles/kilometers.

 
 
 
 
"1743 E. 
Yellowstone                                               
    Casper        Wyo         82601

 (SELLER OR TRANSFEROR'S ADDRESS)               
    CITY       STATE          ZIP 

 x/s/ Alan Gregory                             
                 
                                          12/3/82

 (SELLER OR TRANSFEROR'S 
SIGNATURE)               
 DATE OF THIS STATEMENT 

"Wyo. Auto 
Wholesale                                                                                           .

 BUYER OR TRANSFEREE'S NAME 

 
P.O. Box 9753                                         
            
    Casper                          82609

 

 BUYER OR TRANSFEREE'S ADDRESS                     
CITY        STATE          ZIP 

"Receipt of 
a copy of this 

 statement is hereby acknowledged x/s/ 
Wayne Hudson                                          
.

                                                          "BUYERS 
OR TRANSFEREE'S SIGNATURE"

4 This represents a 
technical violation of MVICS and contraindicates the instructions on the 
prescribed form.

5 It should be noted that 
the trial judge apparently issued a Decision Letter reflecting findings which 
were mentioned in the summary judgment. By the terms of the summary judgment, 
the Decision Letter was incorporated into the judgment. Regrettably, the trial 
court's Decision Letter was not included in the record on appeal. Accordingly, 
it is unfortunate that this court does not have the benefit of the trial court's 
findings, especially on the issue of intent to defraud by Gregory 
Motors.