Case Title: Evelyn Werner v. Kenneth Hendree

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2009AP002322

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2011-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 WI 10 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP2045 and 2009AP2322 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Evelyn Werner, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Kenneth Hendree and Michael Honeck, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
___________________________________________ 
 
Evelyn Werner, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Kenneth Hendree and Michael Honeck, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 16, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha County   
 
JUDGE: 
Kathryn W. Foster 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Andrew J. Shaw and Shaw Law Offices, and Joseph F. Owens,  
and Arthur & Owens, S.C., and oral argument by Joseph Owens. 
 
 
2 
 
For the Defendants-Respondents, the cause was argued by 
John J. Glinski, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 10
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
Nos.  2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322 
(L.C. No. 
2007CV1212) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Evelyn Werner, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Kenneth Hendree and Michael Honeck, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 16, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
Evelyn Werner, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Kenneth Hendree and Michael Honeck, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals, and 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Kathryn W. Foster, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded 
back to the circuit court with instructions. 
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This case comprises 
two separate appeals.  A brief summary of the facts and 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
2 
 
procedural history is necessary to explain the posture of our 
review. 
¶2 
Eighty-four-year-old 
Evelyn 
Werner 
(Werner) 
was 
physically attacked in her home and had her safe stolen by three 
assailants, one of whom was Kenneth Hendree (Hendree).  Hendree 
had previously visited Werner's home several times while 
employed as an insurance examiner by the Office of the 
Commissioner of Insurance (OCI).  Werner filed suit against both 
Hendree and Michael Honeck (Honeck), Hendree's supervisor. 
¶3 
The Waukesha County Circuit Court, Judge Kathryn W. 
Foster presiding, dismissed Werner's complaint against Honeck on 
the grounds of governmental immunity.  At a subsequent hearing, 
the circuit court ruled that Hendree was ineligible for 
indemnification from the State under Wis. Stat. § 895.46 (2007-
08).1  For purposes of combining the matters for later appeal, 
Werner's counsel requested that the circuit court not sign and 
file the above two orders until a trial was held and judgment 
was entered as to Hendree's liability and damages.  The Attorney 
General, counsel for Honeck, did not voice an objection.  
Accordingly, on the record, multiple times, the circuit court 
assured counsel that it would not sign and file the order 
dismissing Honeck and the order ruling that Hendree was 
ineligible for indemnification until the case was entirely 
resolved as to Hendree.  However, contrary to those assurances 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
3 
 
and unbeknownst to the parties, the circuit court prematurely 
signed the two orders on December 3, 2007, several months before 
the trial was conducted and judgment was entered against 
Hendree.  Once the orders were signed, the clerk of the circuit 
court was then obligated to file the orders.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.06(2). 
¶4 
In fact, it was on June 24, 2008, that the circuit 
court held a bench trial and determined Hendree's liability and 
Werner's damages.  On July 11, 2008, the circuit court signed 
the judgment against Hendree.  Werner filed her notice of appeal 
on August 18, 2008.  Werner appealed from the following: (1) the 
order dismissing Honeck on the grounds of governmental immunity, 
(2) 
the 
order 
ruling 
that 
Hendree 
was 
ineligible 
for 
indemnification, and (3) the July 11, 2008, judgment against 
Hendree.   
¶5 
Werner timely appealed from the July 11, 2008, final 
judgment entered after trial.  However, because the circuit 
court did not adhere to its assurances to hold the earlier 
orders for signature and filing until after trial, Werner's 
notice of appeal was filed more than 90 days after the date on 
which the order dismissing Honeck and the order ruling that 
Hendree 
was 
ineligible 
for 
indemnification 
were 
filed.  
Accordingly, as to those orders, the court of appeals dismissed 
Werner's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 808.04(1). 
¶6 
Werner petitioned this court for review of the court 
of appeals' published per curiam decision, Werner v. Hendree, 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
4 
 
2009 WI App 103, 320 Wis. 2d 592, 770 N.W.2d 782, which 
dismissed as untimely her appeal of (1) the order dismissing 
Honeck and (2) the order ruling that Hendree was ineligible for 
indemnification.  We granted Werner's petition for review, and 
the parties presented oral arguments. 
¶7 
Subsequent to the court of appeals decision, Werner 
moved the circuit court to vacate and reenter those two orders 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a).  The circuit court denied 
Werner's motion.  Werner then appealed the circuit court's 
denial of her motion to vacate and reenter the orders to the 
court of appeals at the time that Werner's first appeal was 
pending before this court.  Consequently, the court of appeals 
stayed Werner's second appeal pending our decision in the first 
appeal.   
¶8 
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.612 and Article 
VII, Section 3, subsection 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution,3 upon 
the court's own motion, we removed Werner's second appeal from 
the court of appeals in the interests of judicial economy.  
Thus, we are also reviewing the circuit court's order denying 
Werner's motion to vacate and reenter the order dismissing 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 provides that the supreme 
court may take jurisdiction of an appeal in the court of appeals 
"upon the supreme court's own motion." 
3 Article VII, Section 3, subsection 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution states: "The supreme court may review judgments and 
orders of the court of appeals, may remove cases from the court 
of appeals and may accept cases on certification by the court of 
appeals." 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
5 
 
Honeck and the order ruling that Hendree was ineligible for 
indemnification.   
¶9 
Our holding today resolves both appeals. 
¶10 Concerning 
the 
order 
ruling 
that 
Hendree 
was 
ineligible for indemnification, we conclude that Werner's appeal 
survives on two alternative grounds: Werner timely appealed from 
the order in the first instance because the order was not final, 
and alternatively, the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion when it denied Werner's motion to vacate and reenter 
the order.  Concerning the order dismissing Honeck, we conclude 
that Werner's appeal survives on the second basis; that is, the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
denied Werner's motion to vacate and reenter the order.  Our 
analysis is broken down into two parts. 
¶11 First, we hold that the court of appeals improperly 
dismissed as untimely Werner's appeal of the order ruling that 
Hendree was ineligible for indemnification, irrespective of the 
date on which the order was filed.  This is so because the order 
was not final under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  The order did not 
dispose of the entire matter in litigation as to either Werner 
or Hendree,4 and accordingly, was not appealable until July 11, 
2008, when the circuit court entered judgment on Hendree's 
liability and Werner's damages. 
                                                 
4 By that point in litigation, Honeck had been dismissed on 
the grounds of governmental immunity.  Furthermore, the State 
was not a named party and chose not to become a party through 
intervention or otherwise. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
6 
 
¶12 Second, we hold that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it denied Werner's motion to 
vacate and reenter (1) the order dismissing Honeck and (2) the 
other 
order 
ruling 
that 
Hendree 
was 
ineligible 
for 
indemnification.  The circuit court erroneously concluded that 
it was without the power to vacate and reenter the orders given 
Werner's failure to bring the motion within one year after the 
orders were filed.   
¶13 Accordingly, we reverse both the court of appeals 
decision dismissing Werner's first appeal and the circuit 
court's order denying Werner's motion to vacate and reenter the 
orders.  We remand to the circuit court with instructions to 
vacate and reenter the order dismissing Honeck and the order 
ruling that Hendree was ineligible for indemnification. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶14 We derive the facts of this case from Werner's 
complaint and her testimony before the circuit court.5  As they 
have been relayed by Werner, the facts of this case are quite 
unsettling. 
                                                 
5 Hendree never answered Werner's complaint and has yet to 
appear in this action.  Accordingly, we accept as true Werner's 
allegations against Hendree.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.02(4); Estate 
of Otto v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2008 WI 78, ¶42, 311 
Wis. 2d 84 ("The ordinary rule is that the allegations in a 
complaint 'are admitted when not denied' in the answer of a 
defendant against whom the allegations are made.  Furthermore, 
when a defendant is determined to be in default, the factual 
allegations against the defendant, except those relating to the 
amount of damages, ordinarily are deemed true." (Internal 
footnotes omitted.)). 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
7 
 
¶15 In 
August 
2005, 
Werner, 
then 
84-years-old 
and 
wheelchair-ridden,6 filed a complaint with OCI regarding her 
annuities.  Beginning in September 2005 and continuing through 
October 2006, Hendree, then employed by OCI as an insurance 
examiner, visited Werner in her home.  Hendree informed Werner 
that he had been assigned by OCI to gather information about her 
claim. 
¶16 Hendree's visits to Werner's home were numerous, 
unannounced, and often took place in the evenings and on the 
weekends.  Hendree stayed for hours each visit and asked Werner 
detailed questions about her finances.  Trusting of his position 
with OCI, Werner always let Hendree into her home and answered 
his questions. 
¶17 Throughout this time period, Werner made several 
telephone calls to OCI to complain about Hendree's frequent and 
strange visits.  According to Werner, she spoke with Honeck, 
Hendree's supervisor, but nothing was done.  Werner averred that 
no one at OCI ever told her that Hendree was not authorized to 
visit her after-hours or so frequently. 
¶18 Hendree's final visit to Werner's home took place on 
Sunday, October 29, 2006, and lasted for about three hours.  The 
next day, Werner again telephoned OCI and complained to Honeck. 
                                                 
6 Werner passed away in June 2010 subsequent to this court's 
decision to grant her petition for review. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
8 
 
¶19 On November 1, 2006, Hendree resigned from his 
position at OCI.  At the time, Werner was unaware of Hendree's 
resignation. 
¶20 On the evening of December 13, 2006, two men and one 
woman carrying a gun broke into Werner's home, physically 
attacked her, and stole her safe.  The female attacker hit 
Werner on the head with the gun, and one of the other attackers 
held a pillow over Werner's face.  Werner never saw the 
attackers' faces, but she recognized one of their voices as 
belonging to Hendree. 
¶21 Around the same time, Victoria Colletti (Colletti), 
Werner's nightshift caregiver, arrived at Werner's home and 
noticed two people getting into a car parked inside Werner's 
garage.  Colletti called out to them, but they did not respond.  
A third person then came running out of the house, pointing a 
gun at Colletti.  Colletti got back into her car, backed out of 
the driveway, and called 911 on her cellular phone.  The other 
car followed Colletti's until she arrived at a gas station to 
meet up with a police officer. 
¶22 Werner was transported by ambulance to a hospital, 
where she was treated for head injuries.   
¶23 To our knowledge, no one has been criminally charged 
in connection with Werner's attack.  However, during the time-
span of Hendree's visits to Werner's home and unbeknownst to 
Werner, Hendree had pending criminal charges for stalking and 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
9 
 
second-degree sexual assault.7  Those criminal charges were filed 
on July 21, 2005. 
¶24 On December 28, 2006, the Director of the Bureau of 
Market Regulation for OCI sent a letter to Werner.  The letter 
provided, in relevant part:  
As I told you in our telephone conversation on 
December 27, 2006, Mr. Hendree resigned his position 
effective November 1, 2006 and is no longer a state 
employee.   
I have asked Mike Honeck to contact you regarding 
your questions about your complaint file.  Mr. Honeck 
was Ken Hendree's supervisor and is very familiar with 
your complaint file. 
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶25 On February 2, 2007, Werner served a notice of claim 
on the Attorney General pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.82.8  The 
notice of claim specifically named OCI as the agency involved 
                                                 
7 According to court records, that criminal case has since 
been resolved.  It is entirely unrelated to the case now before 
this court. 
8 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.82(3) provides, in relevant part:  
[N]o civil action or civil proceeding may be brought 
against any state officer, employee or agent for or on 
account of any act growing out of or committed in the 
course of the discharge of the officer's, employee's 
or agent's duties, . . . unless within 120 days of the 
event causing the injury, damage or death giving rise 
to the civil action or civil proceeding, the claimant 
in the action or proceeding serves upon the attorney 
general written notice of a claim stating the time, 
date, location and the circumstances of the event 
giving rise to the claim for the injury, damage or 
death and the names of persons involved, including the 
name 
of 
the 
state 
officer, 
employee 
or 
agent 
involved. . . .  
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
10 
 
and Hendree as the agent involved.  In her notice of claim, 
Werner alleged that Hendree's October 29, 2006, visit to her 
home gave rise to a cause of action for negligent hiring, 
retention, training, or supervision.  In particular, Werner 
claimed that OCI should have suspended Hendree during the time 
of his pending criminal charges, and had it done so, Hendree 
never would have come into contact with Werner or targeted her 
home for robbery. 
¶26 On April 30, 2007, Werner filed a complaint against 
Hendree and Honeck.  The State was not named as a defendant, and 
the State chose not to intervene in the lawsuit.  Werner alleged 
several causes of action against Hendree, including trespass, 
aiding and abetting assault and battery, theft, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  As to Honeck, Werner alleged 
negligent supervision of an employee. 
¶27 Hendree never filed an answer and never appeared in 
this action.  Nonetheless, as will be discussed later, the 
circuit court held a bench trial on Hendree's liability and 
ultimately entered judgment against him. 
¶28 The Attorney General appeared on behalf of Honeck and 
filed an answer.  Honeck asserted several affirmative defenses, 
including, inter alia, that the complaint failed to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, Werner failed to comply 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.82, 
and 
Honeck 
is 
entitled 
to 
discretionary immunity. 
¶29 On June 21, 2007, Honeck filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint against him.  Honeck argued that Werner failed to 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
11 
 
strictly comply with Wis. Stat. § 893.82, namely because the 
notice of claim did not name Honeck as the agent involved and 
did not allege any act by Honeck that caused injury to Werner.  
In addition, Honeck argued that Werner failed to plead, and 
further, cannot establish, any exception to the general rule of 
public officer immunity.  
¶30 In her brief in opposition to Honeck's motion to 
dismiss, Werner argued that her notice of claim was more than 
sufficient to give the State meaningful notice and information 
to investigate her claim.  In addition, Werner contended that 
Honeck was not immune from her negligent supervision claim 
because Honeck knew that Werner was in a dangerous situation and 
had no discretion not to act to protect her.9 
¶31 On September 10, 2007, the circuit court held a 
hearing on Honeck's motion to dismiss.  At the outset of its 
decision, the circuit court acknowledged Hendree's failure to 
appear and consequently expressed "no difficulty on [its] part 
in accepting the averment or the contents of the complaint, both 
the original and the amended[,] that [Werner] was the victim of 
                                                 
9 On August 1, 2007, Werner filed an amended complaint and 
specifically pled the "known danger" exception to governmental 
immunity.  See Kierstyn v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 228 
Wis. 2d 81, 96, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999) ("[T]he known danger 
exception is effective only in those cases where the 'nature of 
the danger is compelling and known to the officer and is of such 
force that the public officer has no discretion not to act.'" 
(quoting C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 422 N.W.2d 614 
(1988))).  On August 29, 2007, Honeck moved the court to dismiss 
the amended complaint against him, relying on the same arguments 
made in his original motion to dismiss. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
12 
 
[an] egregious crime."  The court found that Hendree was "at 
least 
initially . . . obviously 
within 
the 
scope 
of 
his 
employment" when he began visiting Werner's home.10 
¶32 On that same date, the circuit court granted Honeck's 
motion to dismiss but stated on the record that it would not 
sign the order until the case was resolved as to Hendree.  The 
circuit court granted Honeck's motion to dismiss on the grounds 
that Honeck was protected from liability by governmental 
immunity.  The court reasoned that even assuming Honeck had been 
aware of Hendree's pending criminal charges, the circumstances 
did not impose on Honeck a nondiscretionary duty to act; rather, 
Honeck had the discretion to choose between alternative courses 
of action.  Moreover, the circuit court concluded that Werner's 
notice of claim did not strictly, or even substantially, comply 
with Wis. Stat. § 893.82 in regards to Honeck.  The court found 
that the notice of claim referred to Honeck only in passing and 
did not afford the State an adequate opportunity to investigate 
Honeck's potential responsibility for Werner's injury. 
¶33 At 
the 
close 
of 
the 
hearing, 
Werner's 
counsel 
requested that for purposes of appeal, the circuit court not 
                                                 
10 Later in the hearing, the Attorney General interjected to 
purportedly contest the issue of whether Hendree was acting 
within the scope of his employment:  
Your 
Honor, may I interject something with 
respect to Mr. Hendree?  We have in our Answer denied 
that he was within the scope of his employment [with] 
what he was doing and under the statute, 893 or 895.46 
[the] 
Attorney 
General 
does 
have 
a 
right 
to 
participate to contest that issue. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
13 
 
sign its order dismissing Honeck until Hendree's liability is 
resolved.  After hearing no objection from the Attorney General, 
the circuit court stated on the record: "The court will refrain 
from filing any orders of today's proceeding until we resolve 
the issue with the matter which pertains to Mr. Hendree." 
¶34 On October 10, 2007, because Hendree failed to answer, 
Werner moved the court to grant her a default judgment against 
Hendree and requested that a jury determine the amount of her 
damages.11 
¶35 On October 12, 2007, the Attorney General moved the 
court for a ruling that Hendree had refused to cooperate in the 
defense of this litigation, and consequently, pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 895.46(1),12 Hendree was ineligible for indemnification 
                                                 
11 Werner subsequently waived her right to a jury trial and 
agreed to a bench trial on the issue of damages. 
12 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.46(1)(a) provides:  
If the defendant in any action or special 
proceeding is a public officer or employee and is 
proceeded against in an official capacity or is 
proceeded against as an individual because of acts 
committed while carrying out duties as an officer or 
employee and the jury or the court finds that the 
defendant was acting within the scope of employment, 
the judgment as to damages and costs entered against 
the officer or employee in excess of any insurance 
applicable to the officer or employee shall be paid by 
the state or political subdivision of which the 
defendant is an officer or employee.  Agents of any 
department of the state shall be covered by this 
section while acting within the scope of their agency.  
Regardless of the results of the litigation the 
governmental unit, if it does not provide legal 
counsel to the defendant officer or employee, shall 
pay reasonable attorney fees and costs of defending 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
14 
 
from the State.  The Attorney General denied that Hendree was 
acting within the scope of his employment.  Nevertheless, 
assuming that he was, the Attorney General asserted that Hendree 
would still be ineligible for indemnification based on his 
failure to cooperate in the defense. 
¶36 Werner opposed the Attorney General's motion.  Citing 
Wis. Stat. § 895.46(1)(a), Werner argued that the Attorney 
General waived the issue of whether Hendree was acting within 
the scope of his employment because the Attorney General failed 
                                                                                                                                                             
the action, unless it is found by the court or jury 
that the defendant officer or employee did not act 
within the scope of employment.  The duty of a 
governmental unit to provide or pay for the provision 
of legal representation does not apply to the extent 
that 
applicable 
insurance 
provides 
that 
representation.  If the employing state agency or the 
attorney 
general denies that the state officer, 
employee or agent was doing any act growing out of or 
committed in the course of the discharge of his or her 
duties, the attorney general may appear on behalf of 
the state to contest that issue without waiving the 
state's sovereign immunity to suit.  Failure by the 
officer or employee to give notice to his or her 
department head of an action or special proceeding 
commenced against the defendant officer or employee as 
soon as reasonably possible is a bar to recovery by 
the officer or employee from the state or political 
subdivision of reasonable attorney fees and costs of 
defending the action.  The attorney fees and expenses 
shall not be recoverable if the state or political 
subdivision offers the officer or employee legal 
counsel and the offer is refused by the defendant 
officer or employee.  If the officer, employee or 
agent of the state refuses to cooperate in the defense 
of the litigation, the officer, employee or agent is 
not eligible for any indemnification or for the 
provision of legal counsel by the governmental unit 
under this section. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
15 
 
to appear on behalf of the State to contest the issue.  
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Hendree was ineligible for 
indemnification 
from 
the 
State, 
Werner 
contended 
that 
§ 895.46(1)(a) still rendered Hendree eligible for insurance 
coverage. 
¶37 On November 28, 2007, the circuit court held a hearing 
on the Attorney General's motion and determined that Hendree was 
ineligible for indemnification under Wis. Stat. § 895.46.  The 
circuit court found that Hendree clearly failed to cooperate in 
the defense of this litigation.  Moreover, according to the 
circuit court, there was nothing in the record to support a 
finding that Hendree committed a trespass of Werner's home 
during the course of his employment with OCI.13 
¶38 At the end of the hearing, Werner's counsel again 
requested that the circuit court hold the order pending judgment 
on Hendree's liability.  The circuit court again assured the 
                                                 
13 At the close of the hearing, the Attorney General 
attempted to clarify the court's finding: 
Assistant Attorney General Glinski [counsel for 
Honeck]: . . . Is [the] court also making a finding 
then that Mr. Hendree——nothing has been alleged that 
would have been within the scope of employment. 
The Court: Correct. 
Assistant Attorney General Glinski: Prior to Mr. 
Hendree——prior to his leaving the employment of his 
insurance Commissioner. 
The Court: Correct . . . . 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
16 
 
parties that it would not sign the order until the case was 
resolved as to Hendree:  
I can do that, so if you can submit an order in 
effect at your leisure [Assistant Attorney General] 
Glinski, I will hold it beyond five days then pending 
resolution of the order for judgment on liability.  I 
can certainly accommodate what we did with the last 
hearing.  So I will hold that. 
¶39 To confirm that the circuit court was to hold the two 
orders, Werner's counsel sent a letter to the court's clerk.  
The letter was dated December 3, 2007, but not filed until 
December 5, 2007.  The letter provided, in relevant part:  
Pursuant to today's conversation, I want to make 
sure that the trial date is set for April 22, 2008.  
Also, the two orders are not to be entered until the 
case is done.  This agreement was approved by the 
court on the record.  If you have any questions, 
please contact the opposing counsel John Glinski.  He 
will confirm this agreement.  I wanted to protect the 
record for the appeal, especially on any time issues. 
¶40 The circuit court subsequently initialed a notation on 
the letter, stating that "[t]his is all correct." 
¶41 Nevertheless, for reasons unknown and in error, on 
December 3, 2007, the circuit court prematurely signed the order 
dismissing Werner's complaint against Honeck and the order 
ruling that Hendree was ineligible for indemnification under 
Wis. Stat. § 895.46.  Once the orders were signed, the clerk of 
the circuit court was then obligated to file the orders.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 806.06(2) ("The judge or the clerk upon the written 
order of the judge may sign the judgment.  The judgment shall be 
entered by the clerk upon rendition.").  Each order was stamped 
by the clerk of the circuit court as "filed" on December 3, 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
17 
 
2007, and again on April 2, 2008.  Without explanation, the 
court's docket reflects that both orders were filed only on 
April 2, 2008.  As of that date, the circuit court had not yet 
held a trial on Hendree's liability and had not yet entered 
judgment on Hendree.  Nevertheless, both the order dismissing 
Honeck and the order ruling that Hendree was ineligible for 
indemnification contain the following provision: "This is a 
final order for the purpose of filing an appeal." 
¶42 On June 24, 2008, the circuit court held a bench trial 
on Hendree's liability and Werner's damages.  After hearing the 
testimony of Werner, Colletti, and Werner's physician, the 
circuit court awarded Werner a $3,175,420.77 verdict against 
Hendree, $3 million of which was punitive. 
¶43 On July 11, 2008, the circuit court entered judgment 
against Hendree pursuant to the trial verdict.14 
¶44 Werner filed her notice of appeal on August 18, 2008.  
Her notice provided that she was appealing the circuit court's 
judgment against Hendree, the order dismissing Honeck, and the 
order ruling that Hendree was ineligible for indemnification 
under Wis. Stat. § 895.46. 
¶45 According to Werner's counsel, in February 2009, upon 
reading Honeck's response brief to the court of appeals, Werner 
learned for the first time that the order dismissing Honeck and 
                                                 
14 Because Hendree failed to answer, the judgment against 
him was technically a default judgment. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
18 
 
the order ruling that Hendree was ineligible for indemnification 
were mistakenly filed on April 2, 2008. 
¶46 On June 17, 2009, in a per curiam decision, the court 
of appeals dismissed Werner's appeal.  Werner, 320 Wis. 2d 592.  
The court of appeals concluded that it lacked appellate 
jurisdiction because Werner filed her notice of appeal more than 
90 days after April 2, 2008, the date on which the two final 
orders were filed.  Id., ¶1.15  The court of appeals acknowledged 
the circuit court's agreement to hold entry of the final orders 
but ruled that "[the court of appeals'] jurisdiction is based on 
what actually occurred and not what was intended by the 
parties."  Id., ¶7.  The court of appeals declined to "pretend 
that the orders were not entered more than ninety days before 
the filing of the notice of appeal."  Id. 
¶47 In addition, the court of appeals rejected Werner's 
argument that the order ruling that Hendree was ineligible for 
indemnification 
was 
otherwise 
not 
final. 
 
See 
id., 
¶9.  
According to the court of appeals, the Attorney General's motion 
for a ruling on Hendree's refusal to cooperate in the defense 
"had 
the 
effect 
of 
commencing 
a 
special 
proceeding 
for 
declaratory judgment."  Id.  Citing Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1), the 
                                                 
15 See Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1) ("An appeal to the court of 
appeals must be initiated within 45 days of entry of a final 
judgment or order appealed from if written notice of the entry 
of a final judgment or order is given within 21 days of the 
final judgment or order as provided in s. 806.06(5), or within 
90 days of entry if notice is not given, except as provided in 
this section or otherwise expressly provided by law. . . . "). 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
19 
 
court of appeals concluded that the order ruling that Hendree 
was ineligible for indemnification was final because it "had the 
effect of terminating the special proceeding and the attorney 
general's appearance in the action."  Id. 
¶48 Finally, the court of appeals noted and then dismissed 
Werner's suggestion that she would return to the circuit court 
and move for the final orders to be vacated and reentered.  Id., 
¶10.  The court of appeals noted this court's decision in Edland 
v. 
Wisconsin 
Physicians 
Service 
Insurance 
Corp., 
210 
Wis. 2d 638, 563 N.W.2d 519 (1997), but "question[ed] whether 
the jurisdictional infirmity can be cured in that fashion."  
Werner, 320 Wis. 2d 592, ¶10.  The court of appeals concluded 
that the circuit court "is not authorized to vacate a final 
judgment or order for the sole purpose of extending the time for 
appeal."  Id. (citing Edland, 210 Wis. 2d at 647). 
¶49 Werner petitioned this court for review of the court 
of appeals decision, which we granted on March 16, 2010.  The 
parties presented oral arguments on October 7, 2010. 
¶50 However, on July 8, 2009, after the court of appeals 
issued its decision, Werner filed a motion requesting the 
circuit court to vacate and reenter the order dismissing Honeck 
and 
the 
order 
ruling 
that 
Hendree 
was 
ineligible 
for 
indemnification, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a) and 
Edland. 
 
Werner 
cited 
the 
circuit 
court's 
multiple 
representations that the orders would not be filed until after 
the case was resolved as to Hendree.  Werner argued that her 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
20 
 
reliance on the circuit court's representations should not 
result in Werner being deprived of her right to appeal. 
¶51 Honeck opposed Werner's motion to vacate and reenter 
the orders, arguing that the motion was untimely under Wis. 
Stat. § 806.07(2). 
¶52 On August 14, 2009, the circuit court denied Werner's 
motion to vacate and reenter the two orders.  At the hearing on 
the motion, the circuit court "acknowledge[d] right off the bat 
that, yes, a mistake was made" by the court and that the orders 
should not have been filed until judgment was entered against 
Hendree.  According to the circuit court, its calendar clerk 
mistakenly entered the orders on April 2, 2008, when handling 
the file with respect to another matter: "[The clerk] saw an 
undocketed order, didn't see the letter saying it was supposed 
to be held until the end, and went ahead and docketed it. . . 
with no notice to anyone and without specific direction of the 
court."  The circuit court did not hesitate to accept full 
responsibility for the clerk's mistake.  Furthermore, the 
circuit court acknowledged that Wis. Stat. § 806.07 could have 
provided Werner a remedy: "The reality is that it is a mistake 
that could have been corrected within the confines of the 
statute that recognizes that errors are made on a daily basis by 
well-intending individuals . . . ." 
¶53 Nevertheless, the circuit court declined to vacate and 
reenter the two orders pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07.  The 
circuit court admonished Werner for not bringing the mistake to 
the circuit court's attention within the one-year time limit 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
21 
 
prescribed by § 806.07(2).16  According to the circuit court, 
Werner was twice put on notice that the orders were prematurely 
filed: first on October 27, 2008, when the circuit court 
provided Werner with a copy of the appeal index and a second 
time in February 2009 when Werner received Honeck's response 
brief to the court of appeals.  The circuit court maintained 
that if Werner had made a motion to vacate and reenter the 
orders once Werner was put on notice of the court's error, then 
the motion would have been successful. 
¶54 Finally, the circuit court pointed to the court of 
appeals decision, see Werner, 320 Wis. 2d 592, ¶10, and regarded 
it as dropping a "huge hint" that the circuit court cannot 
vacate the orders for the sole purpose of extending Werner's 
time for appeal. 
¶55 Werner appealed the circuit court's denial of her 
motion to vacate and reenter the order dismissing Honeck and the 
order ruling that Hendree was ineligible for indemnification.  
The court of appeals stayed briefing on that appeal pending this 
court's review of the court of appeals decision in Werner, 320 
Wis. 2d 592. 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07(2) provides that if a motion to 
vacate is based on subsection (1)(a) ("Mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect") or subsection (1)(c) ("Fraud, 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party"), 
then the motion must be made "not more than one year after the 
judgment was entered or the order or stipulation was made."  In 
this case, the order dismissing Honeck and the order ruling that 
Hendree was ineligible for indemnification were both entered on 
April 2, 2008.   
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
22 
 
¶56 On October 28, 2010, upon this court's own motion, we 
removed from the court of appeals Werner's appeal of the circuit 
court's denial of her motion to vacate and reenter the orders.  
See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61; Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3(3). 
¶57 We now reverse both the court of appeals decision 
dismissing Werner's first appeal and the circuit court's order 
denying Werner's motion to vacate and reenter the orders.  We 
remand to the circuit court with instructions to vacate and 
reenter the order dismissing Honeck and the order ruling that 
Hendree was ineligible for indemnification.  
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶58 Whether an order is final for purposes of appeal, and 
in turn, whether a party timely appealed from a final order, are 
questions of law that this court reviews independently.  Sanders 
v. Estate of Sanders, 2008 WI 63, ¶21, 310 Wis. 2d 175, 750 
N.W.2d 806; 
Tyler 
v. 
Riverbank, 
2007 
WI 
33, 
¶12, 
299 
Wis. 2d 751, 728 N.W.2d 686. 
¶59 In addition, the circuit court's denial of a motion to 
vacate 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07 
is 
a 
discretionary 
determination that we will not reverse absent an erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  See Miller v. Hanover Ins. Co., 2010 WI 
75, ¶29, 326 Wis. 2d 640, 785 N.W.2d 493; Mullen v. Coolong, 153 
Wis. 2d 401, 406, 451 N.W.2d 412 (1990); State ex rel. M.L.B. v. 
D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 541, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985); Edland, 210 
Wis. 2d at 643.  The circuit court erroneously exercises its 
discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or if the 
facts of record fail to support the circuit court's decision.  
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
23 
 
See Bank Mut. v. S.J. Boyer Constr., Inc., 2010 WI 74, ¶20, 326 
Wis. 2d 521, 785 N.W.2d 462.  Furthermore, the circuit court 
erroneously exercises its discretion when it refuses to exercise 
its discretionary power on the erroneous ground that the power 
does not exist.  Farmers & Merchs. Bank v. Reedsburg Bank, 12 
Wis. 2d 212, 228, 107 N.W.2d 169 (1961). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶60 Concerning 
the 
order 
ruling 
that 
Hendree 
was 
ineligible for indemnification, we conclude that Werner's appeal 
survives on two alternative grounds: Werner timely appealed from 
the order in the first instance because the order was not final, 
and alternatively, the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion when it denied Werner's motion to vacate and reenter 
the order.  Concerning the order dismissing Honeck, we conclude 
that Werner's appeal survives on the second basis; that is, the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it 
denied Werner's motion to vacate and reenter the order.   
¶61 Our analysis is broken down into two parts.  First, we 
conclude that the court of appeals improperly dismissed as 
untimely Werner's appeal of the order ruling that Hendree was 
ineligible for indemnification, irrespective of the date on 
which the order was filed.  Second, we conclude that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion when it denied 
Werner's motion to vacate and reenter (1) the order dismissing 
Honeck and (2) the other order ruling that Hendree was 
ineligible for indemnification. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
24 
 
A. The court of appeals improperly dismissed as untimely 
Werner's appeal of the order ruling that Hendree was 
ineligible for indemnification. 
¶62 An appeal may be taken as a matter of right only from 
a final judgment or a final order.  Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  "A 
final 
judgment 
or 
final order is a judgment, order or 
disposition that disposes of the entire matter in litigation as 
to one or more of the parties, whether rendered in an action or 
special proceeding . . . ."  Id.  This court has previously held 
that a document must meet three conditions in order to be 
considered a final judgment or order for purposes of appeal: the 
document must (1) be entered by the circuit court, (2) dispose 
of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more parties, 
and (3) state on its face that it is the final document for 
purposes of appeal.  Tyler, 299 Wis. 2d 751, ¶26. 
¶63 In this case, the order ruling that Hendree was 
ineligible for indemnification met only two of those three 
conditions and thus could not be considered final.  While the 
order was entered by the circuit court on April 2, 2008, and 
stated on its face that it was "a final order for the purpose of 
filing an appeal," the order did not dispose of the entire 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
25 
 
matter in litigation as to either Werner or Hendree.17  By that 
point in litigation, Honeck had been dismissed on the grounds of 
governmental immunity.  Moreover, the State was not a named 
party and chose not to intervene in the lawsuit.  The order 
ruling that Hendree was ineligible for indemnification did not 
dispose of the entire matter in litigation as to either Werner 
or Hendree because the circuit court had not yet resolved any 
issue as to Hendree's liability or Werner's damages.  See 
Kenosha Prof'l Firefighters v. City of Kenosha, 2009 WI 52, ¶38, 
317 Wis. 2d 628, 766 N.W.2d 577 (concluding that a peremptory 
writ of mandamus did not constitute a final order under Wis. 
Stat. § 808.03(1) because it left at least one matter in 
litigation unresolved).  In this case, the relevant final 
document was the default judgment against Hendree entered on 
July 11, 2008, because only that document disposed of the entire 
                                                 
17 The court of appeals concluded that the order ruling that 
Hendree was ineligible for indemnification under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.46 constituted a final order because it was rendered in a 
special proceeding and had the effect of terminating the State's 
interest therein.  Werner v. Hendree, 2009 WI App 103, ¶9, 320 
Wis. 2d 592, 770 N.W.2d 782.  We decline to adopt the court of 
appeals' conclusion.  A final order in a special proceeding is 
one which, so long as it stands, precludes any further steps 
therein.  Sanders v. Estate of Sanders, 2008 WI 63, ¶26, 310 
Wis. 2d 175, 750 N.W.2d 806.  In this case, the State's interest 
is 
attached 
to 
Hendree's 
liability. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 893.82(3), 895.46(1).  The order ruling that Hendree was 
ineligible for indemnification was entered before Hendree's 
liability had even been resolved. 
Again, in this case, the State was not a named party, and 
for whatever reason, the State chose not to intervene in the 
lawsuit. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
26 
 
matter in litigation between Werner and Hendree.  See Sanders, 
310 Wis. 2d 175, ¶40. 
¶64 Once judgment was entered against Hendree, Werner 
timely appealed from both the July 11, 2008, final judgment and 
the 
order 
ruling 
that 
Hendree 
was 
ineligible 
for 
indemnification. 
¶65 Therefore, we conclude that the court of appeals 
improperly dismissed as untimely Werner's appeal of the order 
ruling 
that 
Hendree 
was 
ineligible 
for 
indemnification, 
irrespective of the date on which the order was filed.  On that 
basis, we reverse the court of appeals decision. 
B. The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when 
it denied Werner's motion to vacate and reenter (1) the 
order dismissing Honeck and (2) the order ruling that 
Hendree was ineligible for indemnification. 
¶66 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07 prescribes the circumstances 
under which the circuit court may relieve a party from a 
judgment, order, or stipulation.18  M.L.B., 122 Wis. 2d at 539.  
                                                 
18 In its entirety, Wis. Stat. § 806.07, "Relief from 
judgment or order," provides:  
(1) On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court, subject to subs. (2) and (3), may relieve a 
party or legal representative from a judgment, order 
or stipulation for the following reasons:  
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect;  
(b) Newly-discovered evidence which entitles a 
party to a new trial under s. 805.15(3);  
(c) Fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct 
of an adverse party;  
(d) The judgment is void;  
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
27 
 
Subsections 806.07(1)(a) through (g) enumerate the specific 
circumstances under which a party may be entitled to relief.  
Subsection (1)(h) extends the grounds for relief beyond the 
circumstances 
provided in subsections (1)(a) through (g), 
granting the court broad discretionary authority to relieve a 
party from a judgment, order, or stipulation for "[a]ny other 
reasons justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."  
§ 806.07(1)(h).   
                                                                                                                                                             
(e) The judgment has been satisfied, released or 
discharged;  
(f) A prior judgment upon which the judgment is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated;  
(g) It is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or  
(h) Any other reasons justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment.   
(2) The motion shall be made within a reasonable 
time, and, if based on sub. (1)(a) or (c), not more 
than one year after the judgment was entered or the 
order or stipulation was made.  A motion based on 
sub. (1)(b) shall be made within the time provided in 
s. 805.16.  A motion under this section does not 
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation.  This section does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a 
party from judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud on the court.   
(3) A motion under this section may not be made 
by an adoptive parent to relieve the adoptive parent 
from a judgment or order under s. 48.91(3) granting 
adoption of a child.  A petition for termination of 
parental rights under s. 48.42 and an appeal to the 
court of appeals shall be the exclusive remedies for 
an adoptive parent who wishes to end his or her 
parental relationship with his or her adoptive child. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
28 
 
¶67 In this case, after the court of appeals dismissed 
Werner's appeal as untimely, Werner moved the circuit court to 
vacate and reenter (1) the order dismissing Honeck and (2) the 
order ruling that Hendree was ineligible for indemnification, 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a).  Subsection (1)(a) 
permits the circuit court to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order, 
or 
stipulation 
on 
the 
grounds 
of 
"[m]istake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."  § 806.07(1)(a).   
¶68 The circuit court immediately acknowledged that it 
made a mistake and that the order dismissing Honeck and the 
order ruling that Hendree was ineligible for indemnification 
should not have been filed until judgment was entered against 
Hendree.  Furthermore, the circuit court recognized that its 
mistake "could have been corrected" within the confines of Wis. 
Stat. § 806.07.  Nevertheless, the circuit court denied Werner's 
motion to vacate and reenter the orders.  The circuit court 
concluded that it was without the power to vacate and reenter 
the orders given Werner's failure to bring the motion within one 
year after the orders were filed.  That conclusion was in error.   
¶69 Generally, a motion for relief under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07 
must 
be 
brought 
"within 
a 
reasonable 
time."  
§ 806.07(2). 
 
However, 
a 
motion 
based 
specifically 
on 
§ 806.07(1)(a) shall be made "not more than one year after the 
judgment was entered or the order or stipulation was made."19  
                                                 
19 The one-year time limit is also applicable to motions 
made under subsections (1)(b) and (c).  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 806.07(2), 805.16(4). 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
29 
 
§ 806.07(2).  In this case, the order dismissing Honeck and the 
order ruling that Hendree was ineligible for indemnification 
were both entered on April 2, 2008.  Werner did not file her 
motion to vacate and reenter the orders until July 8, 2009.  
Largely because Werner failed to bring the motion within one 
year after the orders were filed, the circuit court concluded 
that it was without the power to vacate and reenter the orders.  
In fact, the circuit court maintained that if Werner had made 
her motion within one year after the orders were filed, then the 
motion would have been successful. 
¶70 However, contrary to the circuit court's conclusion, 
the circuit court had the power under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 to 
vacate and reenter the orders, even though Werner did not file 
her motion within the one-year time limit prescribed in 
§ 806.07(2).  This court has expressly held that even if the 
movant's claim sounds in § 806.07(1)(a) and is brought outside 
of the one-year time limit, the motion can still be granted 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
30 
 
under the broader subsection (1)(h).  M.L.B., 122 Wis. 2d at 
552-53.20   
¶71 Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) grants the circuit 
court broad discretionary authority to relieve a party from a 
judgment, 
order, 
or 
stipulation 
for 
"[a]ny 
[] 
reason[] 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."  In 
keeping with that broad authority, this court has recognized 
that § 806.07(1)(h) must be "'liberally construed to provide 
relief from a judgment whenever appropriate to accomplish 
justice.'"  Miller, 326 Wis. 2d 640, ¶33 (quoting Shanee Y. v. 
Ronnie 
J., 
2004 
WI 
App 
58, 
¶11, 
271 
Wis. 2d 242, 
677 
N.W.2d 684); see also Conrad v. Conrad, 92 Wis. 2d 407, 418, 284 
                                                 
20 Werner filed her motion to vacate and reenter the orders 
15 months after the orders were mistakenly entered.  The dissent 
regards the 15-month time period as utterly unreasonable, 
lamenting that our holding subjects final judgments "to attack 
for 
an 
unlimited 
number 
of 
years," 
dissent, 
¶90, 
and 
"indefinitely extends the timeframe for bringing a motion" under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h), id., ¶115.  The dissent's position 
defies our holding in State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 
Wis. 2d 536, 553, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985), in which we explicitly 
recognized 
that 
a 
motion 
can 
still 
be 
granted 
under 
§ 806.07(1)(h) even when the claim sounds in § 806.07(1)(a) and, 
more important, even when the motion is brought outside of the 
one-year time limit.  Hence, in M.L.B., "[t]he seminal case 
addressing the interpretation and application of subsection 
(h)," see Miller v. Hanover Ins. Co., 2010 WI 75, ¶67, 326 
Wis. 2d 640, 785 N.W.2d 493 (Bradley, J., concurring), this 
court expressly anticipated the reasonableness of bringing a 
§ 806.07 motion beyond 12 months after the judgment or order was 
entered.  Contrary to the dissent's perception, our conclusion 
in this particular case that Werner reasonably filed her 
§ 806.07 motion three months beyond the one-year time limit does 
not translate into condoning a limitless timeframe under 
§ 806.07(1)(h). 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
31 
 
N.W.2d 674 
(1979). 
 
At 
the 
same 
time, 
when 
applying 
§ 806.07(1)(h), the circuit court must be mindful of the 
competing policy favoring the finality of judgments.  See Larry 
v. Harris, 2008 WI 81, ¶18, 311 Wis. 2d 326, 752 N.W.2d 279; 
Edland, 210 Wis. 2d at 644; M.L.B., 122 Wis. 2d at 550.  Thus, 
§ 806.07(1)(h) should be applied only in those cases in which 
"the sanctity of the final judgment is outweighed by 'the 
incessant command of the court's conscience that justice be done 
in light of all the facts.'"  M.L.B., 122 Wis. 2d at 550 
(quoting Bankers Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 
(5th Cir. 1970)).  In such "extraordinary circumstances," relief 
is justified.  Id. at 552. 
¶72 Accordingly, 
the 
proper 
test 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(h) for a motion that in part sounds in subsection 
(1)(a) but is brought outside the one-year time limit is 
"whether there are extraordinary circumstances justifying relief 
in the interest of justice."  Id. at 553. 
¶73 In this case, extraordinary circumstances justify 
relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  Specifically, despite 
the circuit court both orally and in writing stating that it 
would hold the orders so that one appeal could later be taken 
after trial, it did not so hold the orders.  Here, Werner's 
counsel's reliance on the court's representation to hold the 
orders provides a basis for extending Werner's time to appeal 
under § 806.07.  Werner's counsel had no reason to be on guard 
that the court would sign and file the orders before trial. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
32 
 
¶74 Indeed, the circuit court is without authority to 
vacate and reenter an order or judgment "when its sole basis for 
doing so is the unadorned desire to allow an appeal."  Edland, 
210 Wis. 2d at 647.  However, in Edland, we held that a circuit 
court's acknowledged mistake in failing to send notice of an 
order to the parties was sufficiently compelling under Wis. 
Stat. § 806.07(1)(a) to outweigh the goal of finality and 
provide a basis for extending the time to appeal.  Id. at 648.  
In that case, the circuit court did not mail a copy of its order 
to the parties, despite the court's contrary intention as 
evidenced by the order's carbon copy signal naming the parties' 
attorneys.  Id. at 641.  The parties did not become aware of the 
order's entry until after the expiration of the 90-day time 
limit for appeal.  Id. (citing Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1)).  The 
plaintiffs moved the circuit court to vacate and reenter the 
order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a).  Id. at 642.  The 
circuit court acknowledged its mistake and granted the motion.  
Id.  The court of appeals then certified the case to this court, 
asking us to determine whether the plaintiffs' failure to timely 
appeal the original order deprived the court of appeals of 
jurisdiction.  Id.  In Edland, however, the court did not assure 
the parties orally and in writing that it would mail to them a 
copy of the order. 
¶75 Nonetheless, on review, we held that the circuit court 
appropriately exercised its discretion by granting the motion to 
vacate and reenter the order under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a).  
Id. at 648.  Our holding was based on the fact that the record 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
33 
 
reflected the circuit court's intention to send notice of the 
order to the parties, the court failed to send such notice 
through no fault of the parties, and the court acknowledged 
committing the mistake.  Id.  Unlike in Edland, in which the 
parties had no reason to believe that the circuit court would 
mail to them a copy of the order, the parties in the case now 
before this court had every reason to believe that the court 
would follow its commitment to hold the orders. 
¶76 Similarly, this court recently held in Miller that the 
circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying 
the defendant's motion to vacate a $2 million default judgment 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h), in part because the circuit 
court's error contributed to the defendant's failure to timely 
answer the amended complaint.  See 326 Wis. 2d 640, ¶48.  In 
particular, the circuit court's personnel failed to list the 
defendants' attorney as counsel of record on the Wisconsin 
Circuit Court Access system.  Id., ¶22 & n.7.  As a result of 
that error, several correspondences and pleadings were not 
served on the defendant or its attorney.  Id., ¶22.  We 
concluded that the circuit court's error contributed to the 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
that 
justified 
relief 
under 
§ 806.07(1)(h).  Id., ¶58. 
¶77 In this case, the circuit court failed to consider 
whether extraordinary circumstances brought Werner's motion to 
vacate and reenter the orders within Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  
Instead, the circuit court erroneously concluded that it was 
without the power to vacate and reenter the orders given 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
34 
 
Werner's failure to bring the motion within one year after the 
orders were filed.  
¶78 Pursuant to the circuit court's verbal and written 
assurances that it would not sign the orders until the case was 
resolved as to Hendree, (1) the order dismissing Honeck and (2) 
the order ruling that Hendree was ineligible for indemnification 
should not have been signed and filed until judgment was entered 
against Hendree.  The record leaves no doubt that the circuit 
court was to hold the orders and that neither order would be 
filed until the case was resolved as to Hendree.  Specifically, 
at the close of both the hearing on Honeck's motion and the 
hearing on the Attorney General's motion, the circuit court 
expressly stated on the record that it would refrain from 
signing the orders until the case was resolved as to Hendree.  
Indeed, when Werner sent a letter to the circuit court seeking 
to ensure that the orders were held, the court initialed its 
confirmation on the letter.  There is simply no question that 
the circuit court was to hold the orders until the case was 
resolved as to Hendree. 
¶79 However, contrary to that unmistakable understanding 
and unbeknownst to the parties, the circuit court signed and 
filed the orders months before judgment was entered against 
Hendree.  We do not know the circuit court's reasons for 
prematurely signing the orders, but it is clear from the circuit 
court's explanation that the court never intended for its clerk 
to then file the orders before judgment was entered against 
Hendree.  Nevertheless, Werner relied on the circuit court's 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
35 
 
previous assurances and did not appeal from the orders until 
after judgment was entered against Hendree.  Werner's reliance 
on the circuit court's assurances effectively deprived her of 
the right to appeal.  Justice rings hollow if Werner is 
penalized for the circuit court's failure to act according to 
its clear intention as stated both orally and in writing on the 
record. 
¶80 At its core, Edland recognizes that when the circuit 
court's clear and acknowledged mistake deprives a party of its 
right to appeal, Wis. Stat. § 806.07 may provide a basis for 
vacating and reentering the order or judgment.  See 210 
Wis. 2d at 648.  In this case, rather than vacating and 
reentering the orders in accordance with Edland, the circuit 
court admonished Werner's counsel for not bringing the motion 
within the one-year time limit prescribed in § 806.07(2).21  The 
circuit court acknowledged its mistake but then refused to 
remedy 
it 
within 
the 
confines 
of 
§ 806.07, 
effectively 
penalizing Werner's counsel for not discovering the mistake soon 
enough.  In so ruling, the circuit court missed the mark.  When 
                                                 
21 It is true that in Edland, there was no issue as to the 
timeliness of the plaintiffs' motion to vacate and reenter the 
order.  See Edland v. Wis. Physicians Serv. Ins. Corp., 210 
Wis. 2d 638, 642, 563 N.W.2d 519 (1997).  However, it is also 
true that in Edland, the plaintiffs were not relying on any 
assurance by the circuit court made on the record.  Indeed, the 
plaintiffs did not even know of the circuit court's intention to 
send notice of the order.  That is, the only indication of the 
circuit court's intention to send notice of the order appeared 
on the face of the order itself (via a carbon copy signal), 
which of course was never mailed to the plaintiffs.  See id. at 
641.   
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
36 
 
the circuit court made multiple assurances on the record that it 
would not sign and file the orders until the case was resolved 
as to Hendree, Werner's counsel was entitled to rely on those 
assurances.  A conclusion otherwise places the onus on parties 
to constantly confirm that the circuit court has lived up to its 
statements on the record or second-guess the court.  The circuit 
court should exercise its authority to right its own wrong 
particularly when it deprives a party of the opportunity to 
appeal. 
¶81 The circuit court erred when it concluded that it was 
without the power to vacate and reenter the orders given 
Werner's failure to bring the motion within one year after the 
orders were filed.  Accordingly, the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion.  See Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 12 
Wis. 2d at 228. 
¶82 We therefore reverse the circuit court's order denying 
Werner's motion to vacate and reenter the orders.  We remand to 
the circuit court with instructions to vacate and reenter the 
order dismissing Honeck and the order ruling that Hendree was 
ineligible for indemnification.  See id. (When a trial court 
fails to exercise a discretionary power with which it is vested 
on the erroneous ground that the power does not exist, "the 
usual practice is for the appellate court to reverse and remand 
in order that the trial court may exercise the discretion it 
previously refused to exercise.  Such procedure is unnecessary 
in the instant appeal inasmuch as the [trial] court has stated 
in its memorandum decision that it would exercise its discretion 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
37 
 
to grant the relief requested if it possessed the power to do 
so."). 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶83 First, we hold that the court of appeals improperly 
dismissed as untimely Werner's appeal of the order ruling that 
Hendree was ineligible for indemnification, irrespective of the 
date on which the order was filed.  This is so because the order 
was not final under Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1).  The order did not 
dispose of the entire matter in litigation as to either Werner 
or Hendree,22 and accordingly, was not appealable until July 11, 
2008, when the circuit court entered judgment on Hendree's 
liability and Werner's damages. 
¶84 Second, we hold that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it denied Werner's motion to 
vacate and reenter (1) the order dismissing Honeck and (2) the 
other 
order 
ruling 
that 
Hendree 
was 
ineligible 
for 
indemnification.  The circuit court erroneously concluded that 
it was without the power to vacate and reenter the orders given 
Werner's failure to bring the motion within one year after the 
orders were filed. 
¶85 Accordingly, we reverse both the court of appeals 
decision dismissing Werner's first appeal and the circuit 
court's order denying Werner's motion to vacate and reenter the 
                                                 
22 By that point in litigation, Honeck had been dismissed on 
the grounds of governmental immunity.  Furthermore, the State 
was not a named party and chose not to become a party through 
intervention or otherwise. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322   
 
38 
 
orders.  We remand to the circuit court with instructions to 
vacate and reenter the order dismissing Honeck and the order 
ruling that Hendree was ineligible for indemnification. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals and the 
order of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is 
remanded to the circuit court with instructions. 
 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
1 
¶86 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting in part). "Equity 
has a well-known maxim that equitable relief will be denied to a 
complainant who has slept on his rights."  Visser v. Koenders, 6 
Wis. 2d 535, 538, 95 N.W.2d 363 (1959); see also State ex rel. 
Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, 25, 290 Wis. 2d 352, 714 
N.W.2d 900 ("equitable remedies are not available to one whose 
own inaction results in the harm").     
¶87 In considering the equities, the circuit court made a 
finding of fact that Werner's attorney had constructive notice 
within seven months of the entry of the orders.  It explained 
that if Werner had brought a motion to vacate at that time, the 
motion would have been successful.  Additionally, the circuit 
court found that Werner's attorney had actual notice within 11 
months of the orders' entry.  Although the circuit court did not 
say whether it would have granted Werner's motion for relief had 
it been made at that time, it found that Werner's attorney had 
no excuse for failing to bring a motion once he had actual 
notice of the mistake.   
¶88 Given the fact that Werner squandered two earlier 
opportunities to "bring this mistake to the court's attention," 
the circuit court concluded that Werner's motion was not brought 
within a reasonable time.  It therefore exercised its discretion 
to deny equitable relief.  
¶89 The majority responds by substituting its discretion 
for that of the circuit court.  In doing so, it ignores the 
well-known maxim and disregards, without explanation, the rule 
of law that a circuit court's findings will be upheld unless 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
2 
they are clearly erroneous.  Even though Werner never requested 
relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h), the majority concludes 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
failing to grant this unrequested relief. 
¶90 In directing that upon remand the circuit court must 
vacate and reenter the orders under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) 
and Edland,1 the majority compromises the goal of finality of 
judgments.  Although Werner's motion sought relief from judgment 
due to mistake under the statute that allows for a one-year 
window of opportunity, the majority has bequeathed an unlimited 
number of years under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h).  At the same 
time, the majority now has transformed the "narrow" equitable 
exception set forth in Edland into an exception that may provide 
relief to those who have slept on their rights.  As a result, 
final judgments are subject to attack for an unlimited number of 
years while at the same time the circumstances under which an 
attack can be made now has been broadened.    
¶91 I part ways with my colleagues in the majority because 
I would uphold both the time-honored maxim and the circuit 
court's findings of fact.  Unlike the majority, I cannot 
conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by failing to consider an argument for relief that 
was never made.  Because the majority substitutes its discretion 
for that of the circuit court and because it further undermines 
the finality of judgments by subjecting them to broader attack, 
                                                 
1 Edland v. Wisconsin Phys. Serv. Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 2d 638, 
563 N.W.2d 519 (1997). 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
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I respectfully dissent from the part of the majority opinion 
that addresses relief from judgment.2  
I 
¶92 The majority acknowledges that Werner had constructive 
knowledge that the orders had been entered within seven months 
of entry and actual knowledge within 11 months of entry.  See 
majority op., ¶53.  It acknowledges that even though Werner 
actually knew about the mistaken entry before the one-year time 
period for correcting mistakes under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a) 
had elapsed, Werner waited more than 15 months to seek redress.  
See id.  Nevertheless, the majority concludes that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying the motion 
to vacate and reenter the orders.  Id. at ¶60. 
¶93 According to the majority, the circuit court made a 
mistake of law by focusing on the one-year time period under 
sub. (1)(a) and concluding that it had no authority to vacate 
and reenter the orders.  Id., ¶¶68-69, 77.  Although Werner did 
not make a motion under sub. (1)(h), the majority admonishes the 
circuit court for failing to consider "whether extraordinary 
                                                 
2 This case involves two orders, both entered April 2, 2008. 
This opinion addresses the majority's conclusion that the orders 
should be vacated and remanded under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) 
and Edland.  I agree with the majority that the order providing 
that Hendree was not eligible for indemnification was not a 
final order, and that the court of appeals has jurisdiction to 
review that order on the merits.  See majority op., ¶¶62-65. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
4 
circumstances brought Werner's motion to vacate and reenter the 
orders within Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h)."  Id., ¶77.3   
¶94 Having determined that the circuit court should have 
considered whether relief was appropriate under sub. (1)(h), the 
majority abandons our usual practice of remanding to the circuit 
court for its exercise of discretion.  Instead, the majority 
exercises its own discretion.  It concludes that extraordinary 
circumstances are present, and it instructs the circuit court to 
vacate and reenter the orders.  Id., ¶73, 80-82. 
II 
¶95 To determine whether the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion, I turn to a review of the hearing 
transcript.  Contrary to the majority's assertion, a review 
demonstrates that the circuit court did not conclude that it 
lacked authority to vacate and re-enter the orders given 
Werner's failure to bring the motion within one year after the 
order was filed.  Rather, the circuit court considered the 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. 806.07(1)(a) provides that "upon such 
terms as are just," the circuit court may relieve a party from 
an order for reason of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect."  A motion under sub. (1)(a) must be made 
"not more than one year after" the order was entered.  Wis. 
Stat. § 806.07(2).   
Additionally and again "upon such terms as are just," 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) permits a circuit court to relieve a 
party from an order for "any other reasons justifying relief"——
including 
a 
mistake——if 
"extraordinary 
circumstances" 
are 
present.  Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h); State ex rel. M.L.B. v. 
D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 550, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985).  A motion 
under sub. (1)(h) must be made "within a reasonable time," but 
it is not constrained by the rigid one-year time limit specified 
for sub. (1)(a). 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
5 
applicable facts, applied the applicable law, and reached a 
decision that a reasonable court could reach.  Kocken v. 
Wisconsin Council 40, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 2007 WI 72, ¶25, 301 
Wis. 2d 266, 732 N.W.2d 828.  
¶96 As an initial matter, it is difficult to make the case 
that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) given that Werner did not bring 
a motion under sub. (1)(h).  Rather, Werner's motion was based 
on sub. (1)(a), and the circuit court correctly determined that 
motions under that subsection must be filed within one year of 
the entry of the orders.  In effect, the majority pretends that 
Werner brought a motion under sub. (1)(h), and then it 
admonishes the circuit court for not considering whether the 
test under the imaginary motion for relief under sub. (1)(h) was 
met.   
¶97 Even though Werner did not file a motion under sub. 
(1)(h), a review of the hearing transcript reveals that the 
circuit court implicitly determined that the requirements of 
sub. (1)(h) were not met.4  The circuit court appears to have 
concluded that the motion was not made within a reasonable time.   
¶98 During 
the 
motion 
hearing, 
the 
circuit 
court 
acknowledged that a mistake was made.  However, it determined, 
"[t]here is more than a little blame to go around here." 
¶99 The circuit court indicated that Werner's attorney 
should have——but failed to——make the motion to vacate the orders 
                                                 
4 The relevant portion of the transcript is attached to this 
opinion as an exhibit.  
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
6 
once it had notice that the orders had been entered.  It found 
that Werner's attorney squandered at least two opportunities to 
ask the court to correct the mistake: "There were, in my 
estimation, at least two opportunities for plaintiff's counsel 
to bring this mistake to the court's attention and to rectify 
easily within the 1 year time period and to have the Court of 
Appeals decide whether that error was appropriately corrected 
under Edland . . . . But that didn't happen." 
¶100 The court made a finding of fact that Werner's 
attorney should have known about the mistake within seven months 
of entry, at the time that he received the appeal index.  The 
court explained that the appeal index, which showed that the 
orders had been filed on April 2, 2008, was sent to Werner's 
attorney on October 27, 2008.5  Had he exercised reasonable 
diligence in uncovering the mistake in October and made a motion 
"at that time," the circuit court implied, it would have granted 
the motion: "[I]f the court had been confronted with a motion at 
that time, I hazard a guess it would have been successful to 
correct that error."  (Emphasis added.)   
                                                 
5 Werner's attorney acknowledged that he received the index, 
but he protested that he did not discover the error because 
"[t]he jurisdiction issue was not a concern for me at that 
time":  
I filed my notice of appeal first and I ordered a 
transcript of what had taken place.  Then I looked at 
the documents but I didn't put together they were 
entered on the April.  I was focusing more on the 
judgment that was taking place on July 11 of '08.  
What I am saying is I am regular on everything.  The 
jurisdiction issue was not a concern for me at that 
time, your Honor.    
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
7 
¶101 The circuit court called Werner's attorney's failure 
to uncover the error in October of 2008 "distressing" and 
explained that this fact distinguished this case from Edland:  
"In Edland there was never any notice given, apparently, of the 
entry of that judgment that was intended.  There is notice given 
here."   
¶102 Further, the circuit court made a finding of fact that 
Werner's attorney had actual knowledge of the mistaken entry in 
February of 2009, within 11 months of the entry of the orders.  
Again, Werner's attorney failed to bring a motion to correct the 
mistake.  This second squandered opportunity occurred when 
Werner's attorney received opposing counsel's court of appeals 
brief.  It noted that the orders were "entered on April 2, 2008" 
and argued that the court of appeals "does not have jurisdiction 
over an appeal" from the orders.  Werner's attorney acknowledged 
that he read the brief and learned about the error at that time, 
but despite his actual knowledge, he declined to move the 
circuit court to vacate the orders. 
¶103 The circuit court did not say whether it would have 
granted a motion for relief had Werner brought the motion to the 
court's attention in February of 2009.  However, it did find 
that there was no excuse for Werner's failure to bring a motion 
once Werner's attorney had actual notice of the mistake:  
Now we have the second event [when the State filed its 
appellate brief in February of 2009].  Was there a 
motion brought in this court at that time?  No.  I 
frankly do not understand the explanation or lack of 
explanation here.  It deprived this court of making a 
record at that time, whether I granted the motion then 
or denied it[.]"   
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
8 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶104 In its oral ruling denying Werner's motion, the court 
in essence concluded that the motion was not made within a 
reasonable time and that, given Werner's delay in bringing the 
motion, extraordinary circumstances were not present: "The 
reality is that [the mistake] is a mistake that could have been 
corrected within the confines of the statute that recognizes 
that errors are made on a daily basis by well-intending 
individuals, whether they be the judge, the clerks, . . . or by 
the attorneys involved in the case."     
¶105 A circuit court's findings of fact will be upheld 
unless clearly erroneous.  State v. Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶19, 324 
Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695.  There is no argument advanced that 
the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous.  Thus, there 
is no indication that the circuit court's exercise of discretion 
was based on a mistake of fact.   
¶106 Further, there is no indication that the circuit court 
made an error of law.  Rather, it is the majority here that errs 
by conflating the circuit court's comments regarding the October 
2008 constructive notice with the circuit court's comments 
regarding the February 2009 actual notice.    
¶107 In its comments regarding February of 2009, the 
circuit court implicitly concluded that because Werner "slept on 
her rights"6 for a period of months, she was not entitled to 
relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07 and that the compelling 
                                                 
6 Visser v. Koenders, 6 Wis. 2d 535, 539, 95 N.W.2d 363 
(1959). 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
9 
equitable considerations present in Edland are not present here.  
Applying the facts and the law, the circuit court reached a 
decision that a reasonable court could reach.  See Kocken, 301 
Wis. 2d 266, ¶25.   
III 
¶108 By substituting its judgment for that of the circuit 
court, the majority compromises the goal of finality of 
judgments.  Final judgments now are subject not only to attack 
for an unlimited number of years, but also the circumstances 
under which an attack can be made have been broadened.  
Apparently litigants can now sleep on their rights and still 
obtain equitable relief.    
¶109 A review of this court's decision in Edland v. 
Wisconsin Phys. Serv. Ins. Co., 210 Wis. 2d 638, 563 N.W.2d 519 
(1997), provides a touchstone for my analysis.  In Edland, we 
were asked to determine whether a circuit court was ever 
permitted to vacate and reenter a judgment to effectively extend 
the time for appeal.  We recognized that Wis. Stat. § 806.07 
"attempts 
to 
achieve 
a 
balance 
between 
fairness 
in 
the 
resolution of disputes and the policy favoring the finality of 
judgments."  Id. at 644.  
¶110 The equitable circumstances presented in Edland were 
compelling.  When the circuit court entered judgment, it had 
expressed in writing its intention to notify the parties by 
carbon copy, but it mistakenly neglected to do so.  Accordingly, 
"none of the parties had notice of the order until after the 
appeal period expired" and "the plaintiffs' failure to file a 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
10 
timely notice of appeal was the result of the court's error 
alone."  Id. at 647.   
¶111 Once the court's failure to notify the parties was 
discovered, 
the 
appellants 
moved 
quickly 
to 
bring 
the 
circumstance to the court's attention by filing a motion under 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07(1)(a).  Id. at 642.  The motion was filed 
less than six months after judgment was entered and less than 
two months after the parties discovered the court's mistake.7  
Exercising its discretion under sub. (1)(a), the circuit court 
vacated and reinstated the judgment, which permitted the 
appellants more time to appeal. 
¶112 In our discussion of whether the court erroneously 
exercised its discretion by vacating the judgment, we reiterated 
the general rule: "Considerations of finality militate strongly 
against resuscitating a case after the time for appeal has 
expired," and the "unadorned desire to allow an appeal" will not 
justify a court vacating and reinstating a final judgment.  
Edland, 210 Wis. 2d at 647.   
¶113 Nevertheless, we concluded that a blanket rule would 
undermine the aim of Wis. Stat. § 806.07 to provide "a balance 
between fairness in the resolution of disputes and the policy 
                                                 
7 According to the briefs filed in that case, judgment was 
entered on October 9, 1995, but it was not mailed to the 
parties.  It was not until January 24, 1996, that either party 
learned 
that 
judgment 
had 
been 
entered. 
 
Memorandum 
of 
Appellants at 1-2, Edland v. Wisconsin Phys. Serv. Ins. Co., 210 
Wis. 2d 638 (1997) (on file at the Wisconsin Law Library).  The 
appellants moved the circuit court to vacate and reenter the 
order shortly thereafter on March 19.  Edland v. Wisconsin Phys. 
Serv. Ins. Co., No. 96-1883, unpublished slip. op. at 2 (Wis. 
Ct. App., July 31, 1996).   
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
11 
favoring the finality of judgments."  Id. at 644.  We concluded 
that under certain circumstances, a circuit court may determine 
that the "compelling equitable consideration[s] . . . outweigh[] 
the goal of finality and provide[] a basis for effectively 
extending the time to appeal."  Id. at 648.   
¶114 In Edland, we cautioned that our holding was "narrow," 
and we cited with approval the court of appeals' decision in Eau 
Claire County v. Employers Insurance of Wausau.  Id. at 648, 
645-47.  In Eau Claire County, the court of appeals explained 
that an attorney's "inaction and assumptions" did not "justify 
the court stepping in to mitigate the situation."  Eau Claire 
Cnty. v. Empl'rs Ins. of Wausau, 146 Wis. 2d 101, 111, 430 
N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1988).  "[I]nsufficient cause is offered in 
the present case to justify an exception to the strong policy 
behind the finality of judgments."  Id.    
¶115 In Edland, relief was granted under Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(a), which contains a one-year time limit.  By 
mandating relief under sub. (1)(h) (even though Werner did not 
request relief under sub. (1)(h)), the majority indefinitely 
extends the timeframe for bringing a motion with the purpose of 
"effectively extending the time to appeal."  See Edland, 210 
Wis. 2d at 648.    
¶116 We have recognized that a broad application of sub. 
(1)(h) could undermine the goal of finality because that statute 
is unmoored from any specific time limit other than what is 
"reasonable."  Accordingly, we have stated that relief under 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
12 
sub. (1)(h) should be granted "sparingly."  State ex rel. M.L.B. 
v. D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d at 550.        
¶117 At the same time that the majority bequeaths an 
unlimited number of years for extending the time for appeal, it 
now also expands the circumstances under which relief is 
available.  By reversing the circuit court's exercise of 
discretion when the party squandered its opportunity to file a 
motion within a reasonable time, the majority lowers the burden 
on litigants to safeguard their appellate rights.     
¶118 Edland recognized that under narrow circumstances, 
"compelling equitable consideration[s] . . . outweigh[] the goal 
of finality."  210 Wis. 2d at 648.  But here, the majority fails 
to fully consider the equities——it fails to factor Werner's 
inexcusable delay into its evaluation of all the "equitable 
considerations." 
 
It 
appears 
that 
the 
majority 
tacitly 
understands that its analysis of Edland is tenuous and does not 
support its position.  At the same time that it relies on 
Edland, the majority attempts to distinguish it.8   
¶119 The majority's analysis upends the reasoning in Eau 
Claire County, which explained that failure to appeal timely due 
to an attorney's "inaction and assumptions" would not "justify 
the court stepping in to mitigate the situation."  It ignores 
the time-honored maxim that "equitable relief will be denied to 
a complainant who has slept on his rights."  Visser, 6 
Wis. 2d at 538.  Instead, it now broadens the scope of attack.  
                                                 
8 See majority op., ¶¶75, 80 n.21. 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
13 
Even those who have slept on their rights (as the circuit court 
found here) are entitled to equitable relief.     
¶120 The majority compounds its expansion of attack on the 
finality of judgment by failing to follow the usual practice of 
appellate courts.  According to the majority, the circuit court 
erroneously concluded that it had no authority to vacate the 
orders once one year had passed.  Majority op., ¶¶68-69, 77.  
Even if the circuit court had erroneously concluded that it had 
no authority to vacate the orders, however, such a result would 
not 
justify 
the 
majority 
imposing 
its 
own 
exercise 
of 
discretion.   
¶121 When 
a 
circuit 
court 
fails 
to 
exercise 
its 
discretionary power on the erroneous ground that the authority 
does not exist, it is the "usual practice" for an appellate 
court to reverse and remand so that the circuit court is 
permitted to exercise the discretion it previously failed to 
exercise.  Farmers & Merchs. Bank v. Reedsburg Bank, 12 
Wis. 2d 212, 228, 107 N.W.2d 169 (1961) ("In such a situation 
the usual practice is for the appellate court to reverse and 
remand in order that the trial court may exercise the discretion 
it previously refused to exercise."); see also Paschong v. 
Hollenbeck, 13 Wis. 2d 415, 425, 108 N.W.2d 668 (1961).   
¶122 In sum, I conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion by failing to consider an 
argument for relief that was never advanced.  Because the 
majority substitutes its discretion for that of the circuit 
court and because it further undermines the finality of 
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
14 
judgments by subjecting them to broader attack, I respectfully 
dissent in part. 
¶123 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. joins this opinion. 
 
   
Nos. 2008AP2045 & 2009AP2322.awb 
 
 
 
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