Case Title: Wigfall v. City of Detroit (Opinion on Application)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 156793, 157097

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
WIGFALL v CITY OF DETROIT 
WEST v CITY OF DETROIT 
 
Docket Nos. 156793 and 157097.  Argued on application for leave to appeal April 11, 
2019.  Decided July 16, 2019. 
 
 
In Docket No. 156793, Dwayne Wigfall brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court 
against the city of Detroit for injuries he sustained in a motorcycle accident allegedly caused when 
he hit a pothole on a city street.  On advice from the city’s Law Department, Wigfall sent a notice 
via certified mail addressed to the Law Department that included a description of the pothole, its 
location, and a description of plaintiff’s injuries.  An adjuster from the Law Department 
acknowledged receipt of Wigfall’s claim.  After Wigfall filed his complaint, the city moved for 
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that Wigfall’s claim was barred by 
governmental immunity because Wigfall failed to serve notice of his claim on the mayor, the city 
clerk, or the city attorney as required by MCL 691.1404(2) and MCR 2.105(G)(2).  The court, 
Daniel A. Hathaway, J., denied the city’s motion, and the city appealed.  The Court of Appeals, 
SAAD, P.J., and CAVANAGH and CAMERON, JJ., reversed and remanded for entry of an order 
granting the city’s motion for summary disposition.  322 Mich App 36 (2017).  Wigfall applied 
for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, which ordered and heard oral argument on whether to 
grant the application or take other action.  501 Mich 1089 (2018). 
 
 
In Docket No. 157097, Faytreon O. West brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court 
against the city of Detroit, for injuries she allegedly suffered when she tripped on a pothole and 
fell while walking on a city street.  West’s counsel sent notice of the injury and highway defect to 
the city’s Law Department via certified mail, instructing the city to immediately contact West’s 
counsel if it believed that the notice did not comply with any applicable notice requirements.  The 
Law Department received the letter, and an adjuster from the Law Department acknowledged 
receipt of West’s claim.  After West filed her complaint, the city moved for summary disposition 
under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that West had failed to comply with the notice requirement in 
MCL 691.1404(2) because she had not served an individual who may lawfully be served with civil 
process.  The trial court, John A. Murphy, J., granted summary disposition in favor of the city and 
denied West’s motion for reconsideration.  West appealed, and the Court of Appeals, JANSEN, P.J., 
and CAVANAGH and CAMERON, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion issued 
December 12, 2017 (Docket No. 335190).  West applied for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, 
which ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action.  
501 Mich 1089 (2018). 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Bridget M. McCormack 
Chief Justice Pro Tem: 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice VIVIANO, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the 
Supreme Court held: 
 
 
Plaintiffs complied with the requirements of MCL 691.1404(2) by serving their notices on 
the city’s Law Department, because the Law Department is an agent of defendant’s city attorney—
also known as the Corporation Counsel—and is charged with receiving notice under the city’s 
charter and ordinances. 
 
 
1.  Under the governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1401 et seq., unless one of five 
exceptions applies, governmental agencies are immune from tort liability when they are engaged 
in a governmental function.  One such exception is the highway exception, MCL 691.1402(1), 
which provides in part that a person who sustains bodily injury by reason of failure of a 
governmental agency to keep a highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a 
condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may recover the damages suffered by him or her from 
the governmental agency.  A claimant seeking recovery under the highway exception must comply 
with MCL 691.1404(1), which requires the injured person to serve a notice on the governmental 
agency that specifies the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained, and the names 
of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant.  MCL 691.1404(2) provides that the notice 
may be served upon any individual, either personally or by certified mail, who may lawfully be 
served with civil process directed against the governmental agency.  In turn, MCR 2.105(G)(2) 
provides that service of process on a municipal corporation may be made by serving a summons 
and a copy of the complaint on the mayor, the city clerk, or the city attorney.   
 
 
2.  Plaintiffs complied with the statute’s notice requirement because the city authorized its 
Law Department to receive notices of injuries sustained and of highway defects.  Under the 
common law of agency, the Law Department is an agent of the Corporation Counsel.  The city 
acknowledged that the Corporation Counsel is the administrative head of its Law Department, and 
the city’s charter provides that the Law Department “is headed by the Corporation Counsel who is 
the duly authorized and official legal counsel for the City of Detroit and its constituent branches, 
units and agencies of government.”  As the head of the Law Department, the Corporation Counsel 
has the right to control the Law Department.  Consequently, the Law Department and its members 
are agents of the Corporation Counsel.  That the Law Department has the authority to receive the 
notice required by MCL 691.1404(2) on behalf of the Corporation Counsel is supported by the 
practical reality that the Corporation Counsel is not individually capable of receiving notice for 
every claim filed against the city.  Further, a city ordinance provides that all claims of whatever 
kind against the city, excluding certain claims not relevant here, shall be first submitted to and 
reviewed by the Law Department.  Because receiving notice is necessary for the Law Department 
to exercise its express authority to receive and review claims, the Law Department had implied 
authority to receive service of the notices of injury and highway defects required by 
MCL 691.1404(2).  Moreover, the Law Department’s receipt of these notices was the usual 
practice to which the Corporation Counsel had knowingly acquiesced.   
 
 
Reversed and remanded to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings. 
 
 
Chief Justice MCCORMACK, joined by Justice BERNSTEIN, concurred in full with the 
majority but wrote separately to state that the Corporation Counsel and the Law Department are 
functionally interchangeable barring exceptional circumstances not present in this case.  She 
further stated that advancing such a false technical argument ill served both lawyers generally and 
their clients specifically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2019 State of Michigan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FILED  July 16, 2019 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
DWAYNE WIGFALL, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 156793 
 
CITY OF DETROIT, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
FAYTREON ONEE WEST, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 157097 
 
CITY OF DETROIT, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH       
 
VIVIANO, J.       
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Bridget M. McCormack  
 
Chief Justice Pro Tem: 
David F. Viviano 
 
 
Justices: 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
The issue in these cases is whether plaintiffs, Dwayne Wigfall and Faytreon West, 
properly served their notices of injuries sustained and of highway defects.  MCL 
691.1404(2) provides that this notice “may be served upon any individual . . . who may 
lawfully be served with civil process directed against the governmental agency, anything 
to the contrary in the charter of any municipal corporation notwithstanding.”  MCR 
2.105(G)(2) states that service may be made upon a city by leaving the summons and a 
copy of the complaint with “the mayor, the city clerk, or the city attorney . . . .”  Here, West 
and Wigfall served their notices on the Law Department of the city of Detroit (the City).  
We hold that plaintiffs complied with the requirements of MCL 691.1404(2) by serving 
their notices on the Law Department, which is an agent of the Corporation Counsel.1  
Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals in both cases and remand to the trial court for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.   
I.  FACTS 
A.  WIGFALL v DETROIT 
Wigfall alleges that he was driving his motorcycle on Algonac Street in Detroit 
when he hit a pothole.  As a result, Wigfall fell off his motorcycle and sustained multiple 
injuries.  Through counsel, Wigfall contacted the City’s Law Department and was informed 
that his notice of injury and highway defect should be addressed to “City of Detroit Law 
Department -- Attention Claims.”  Consequently, Wigfall sent notice via certified mail to 
“City of Detroit Law Department – CLAIMS.”  The notice stated, “Pursuant to MCL 
                                              
1 The Corporation Counsel is an “officer having substantially the same duties as” a city 
attorney.  MCL 600.1925.   
 
 
 
3 
 
600.6431, this letter is intended to provide you with statutory notice that our client, Dwayne 
Wigfall, suffered personal injuries as a result of a defect under the City of Detroit’s care 
and control on June 9, 2014 at approximately 9:00 p.m.”  The notice also included a 
description of the pothole, its location, and a description of plaintiff’s injuries.  The Law 
Department received the notice on September 22, 2014.   
An adjuster from the Law Department contacted Wigfall’s attorney via a letter dated 
December 3, 2014.  The letter stated, “The filing of your client’s claim regarding the above-
referenced incident is hereby acknowledged.”  The adjuster also requested additional 
documents to proceed with processing the claim.   
Wigfall later filed the instant complaint against the City.  The City sought summary 
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), asserting that Wigfall’s claim was barred by 
governmental immunity because the statutory notice was not served upon an individual 
who may lawfully be served with civil process, as MCL 691.1404(2) requires.  The trial 
court denied the City’s motion for summary disposition.  The City appealed, and the Court 
of Appeals reversed, holding that Wigfall failed to comply with MCL 691.1404(2).2  
Wigfall applied for leave to appeal in this Court.  We scheduled oral argument and 
requested briefing on the following issue, among others: “[W]hether an individual 
described in MCR 2.105(G)(2) can delegate the legal authority to accept lawful process 
under MCL 691.1404(2), see 1 Mich Civ Jur Agency § 1 (2018).”3   
                                              
2 Wigfall v Detroit, 322 Mich App 36, 44-45; 910 NW2d 730 (2017). 
3 Wigfall v Detroit, 501 Mich 1089 (2018). 
 
 
 
4 
 
B.  WEST v DETROIT 
West alleges that she was walking on Mansfield Street in Detroit when she tripped 
on a pothole and fell, suffering injuries as a result.  West’s counsel sent notice of the injury 
and highway defect to the City’s Law Department via certified mail.  It instructed the City, 
“If you believe that this notice does not comply in any way with any applicable notice 
requirements, immediately contact the undersigned and any additional information 
required by statu[t]e, ordinance, rule, or regulation will be promptly furnished.”  The Law 
Department received the letter on August 8, 2014.  As with Wigfall, a municipal adjuster 
responded with a letter stating, “The filing of your client’s claim regarding the above-
referenced incident is hereby acknowledged” and requesting additional documentation.   
West later filed the instant complaint, and the City filed a motion for summary 
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing—as it did in Wigfall—that West had failed 
to comply with the notice requirement in MCL 691.1404(2) by failing to serve an 
individual who may lawfully be served with civil process.  The trial court granted summary 
disposition in favor of defendant.  
West moved for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court erred because the notice 
statute, MCL 691.1404(2), states that “the notice may be served upon any individual” and 
the word “may” is permissive and not mandatory.  The trial court denied the motion.  West 
appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion, citing 
its earlier decision in Wigfall v Detroit.4  West then filed an application for leave to appeal 
in this Court.  This Court scheduled oral argument and requested briefing on the following 
                                              
4 West v Detroit, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued 
December 12, 2017 (Docket No. 335190), p 3.   
 
 
 
5 
 
issue, among others: “[W]hether an individual described in MCR 2.105(G)(2) can delegate 
the legal authority to accept lawful process under MCL 691.1404(2), see 1 Mich Civ Jur 
Agency § 1 (2018).”5 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“This Court reviews the grant or denial of summary disposition de novo to 
determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”6  “ ‘When a 
motion is filed under [MCR 2.116(C)(7)], the court must consider not only the pleadings, 
but also any affidavits, depositions, admissions or documentary evidence that is filed or 
submitted by the parties.’ ”7  “The contents of the complaint are accepted as true unless 
contradicted by documentation submitted by the movant.”8  A question of statutory 
interpretation is a question of law that we also review de novo.9 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Under the governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1401 et seq., unless one of five 
exceptions applies, governmental agencies are immune from tort liability when they are 
                                              
5 West v Detroit, 501 Mich 1089, 1090 (2018). 
6 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).  
7 Bauserman v Unemployment Ins Agency, 503 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2019) (Docket 
No. 156389); slip op at 8, quoting Kerbersky v Northern Mich Univ, 458 Mich 525, 529; 
582 NW2d 828 (1998).  See also MCR 2.116(G)(5).   
8 Maiden, 461 Mich at 119.   
9 Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n, IAFF Local 344 v Detroit, 482 Mich 18, 28; 753 NW2d 579 
(2008). 
 
 
 
6 
 
engaged in a governmental function.10  One such exception is the highway exception, MCL 
691.1402(1), which provides that “[a] person who sustains bodily injury or damage to his 
or her property by reason of failure of a governmental agency to keep a highway under its 
jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel may 
recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency.”  
A claimant seeking recovery under the highway exception must comply with the 
notice requirements of MCL 691.1404, which provides, in relevant part: 
(1) As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of 
any defective highway, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the 
injury occurred, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) shall serve a 
notice on the governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the 
defect.  The notice shall specify the exact location and nature of the defect, 
the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the 
claimant. 
(2) The notice may be served upon any individual, either personally, 
or by certified mail, return receipt requested, who may lawfully be served 
with civil process directed against the governmental agency, anything to the 
contrary in the charter of any municipal corporation notwithstanding.   
Finally, to determine the “individual[s] . . . who may lawfully be served with civil process 
directed against the governmental agency,” we look to MCR 2.105(G)(2).  That court rule 
provides, in relevant part, as follows:  
Service of process on a public, municipal, quasi-municipal, or 
governmental corporation, unincorporated board, or public body may be 
made by serving a summons and a copy of the complaint on: 
                                              
10 See MCL 691.1407(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in this act, a governmental agency 
is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or 
discharge of a governmental function.”). 
 
 
 
7 
 
*   *   * 
(2) the mayor, the city clerk, or the city attorney of a city[.][11] 
Plaintiffs complied with the statute’s notice requirement because they sent their 
notices to the agent of the Corporation Counsel.  As noted above, MCL 691.1404(2) 
provides that “[t]he notice may be served upon any individual who may lawfully be served 
with civil process against the governmental agency.”  While MCR 2.105(G)(2) says that 
cities may be served with process by leaving a summons and a copy of the complaint with 
the “the mayor, the city clerk, or the city attorney,” “whatever a person may lawfully do if 
acting in his own right and on his own behalf he may lawfully delegate to an agent.”12  For 
                                              
11 MCL 600.1925 similarly provides that  
[s]ervice of process upon public, municipal, quasi-municipal, or 
governmental corporations, unincorporated boards, or public bodies, may be 
made by leaving a summons and a copy of the complaint with 
*   *   * 
(2) the mayor, city clerk, or city attorney, in the case of cities[.] 
Ordinarily the court rules would take precedence, McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 26; 
597 NW2d 148 (1999) (“It is beyond question that the authority to determine rules of 
practice and procedure rests exclusively with this Court.”); 1 Longhofer, Michigan Court 
Rules Practice, Text (7th ed), § 2105.2, pp 213-214 (“Since there can be little doubt that 
the means of service of process is procedural, the rules must control when they are in 
conflict.”).  But because the Legislature duplicated what were then the proposed court rules 
regarding service of process when it enacted Chapter 19 of the Revised Judicature Act, 
MCL 600.1901 through MCL 600.1974, there is no conflict between the pertinent 
provisions here.  1 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated, pp 76-77.  
12 Link, Petter & Co v Pollie, 241 Mich 356, 359-360; 217 NW 60 (1928) (citation omitted).  
Notably, the Court of Appeals has already applied agency principles to MCL 691.1404(1), 
which states, in relevant part, that “the injured person . . . shall serve a notice on the 
governmental agency . . . .”  In Russell v Detroit, 321 Mich App 628, 646; 909 NW2d 507 
(2017), the Court of Appeals rejected the City’s argument that the “injured person” himself 
or herself had to send the notice required by Subsection (1).  Instead, the Court of Appeals 
 
 
 
8 
 
the reasons below, we conclude that the City authorized its Law Department to receive 
notices of injuries sustained and of highway defects.13   
“Under the common law of agency, in determining whether an agency has been 
created, we consider the relations of the parties as they in fact exist under their agreements 
or acts and note that in its broadest sense agency includes every relation in which one 
person acts for or represents another by his authority.”14  “Fundamental to the existence of 
an agency relationship is the right of the principal to control the conduct of the agent.”15   
An agent’s actual authority may be express or implied.16  Implied authority consists 
of the power “ ʻto do all things which are reasonably necessary or proper to efficiently 
                                              
concluded, “Given the legal relationship between agents and principals, and, in particular, 
between attorneys and their clients, it follows that an injured person may serve a 
governmental agency through the acts of an agent, including an attorney.”  Id. at 641.  Just 
as “established agency principles” apply to MCL 691.1404(1), Russell, 321 Mich App at 
641, such principles also apply to MCL 691.1404(2). 
13 Because we conclude that, under traditional agency principles, the Corporation Counsel 
delegated the authority to receive the notice required by MCL 691.1404(2) to the Law 
Department, we need not address whether the Law Department was authorized to receive 
such notice because it was delegated the authority to receive service of process under MCR 
2.105(H)(1) or MCL 600.1930.  See MCR 2.105(H)(1) (“Service of process on a defendant 
may be made by serving a summons and a copy of the complaint on an agent authorized 
by written appointment or by law to receive service of process.”); MCL 600.1930 (“Service 
of process upon any defendant may be made by leaving a summons and a copy of the 
complaint with an agent authorized by written appointment or by law to receive service of 
process.”).  That rule and statute only impose restrictions on delegation of the authority to 
receive service of process, not delegation of the authority to receive the requisite notice 
under traditional agency principles.   
14 St Clair Intermediate Sch Dist v Intermediate Ed Ass’n/Mich Ed Ass’n, 458 Mich 540, 
557; 581 NW2d 707 (1998) (quotation marks and citations omitted).   
15 Briggs Tax Serv, LLC v Detroit Pub Sch, 485 Mich 69, 80; 780 NW2d 753 (2010).   
16 See, e.g., Stephenson v Golden, 279 Mich 710, 734; 276 NW 849 (1937) (“ ‘An agent is 
 
 
 
9 
 
carry into effect the power conferred, unless it be a thing specifically forbidden.’ ”17  
“[I]mplied authority must rest upon acts and conduct of the alleged agent known to and 
acquiesced in by the alleged principal prior to the incident at bar.”18  “Whether the act in 
question is within the authority granted depends upon the act’s usual or necessary 
connection to accomplishing the purpose of the agency.”19   
                                              
a person having express or implied authority to represent or act on behalf of another person, 
who is called his principal.’ ”), quoting Bowstead on Agency (4th ed), p 1.  We focus on 
actual authority because we believe that in this case the Law Department had actual 
authority to accept notice.  However, we recognize that agents may have apparent authority 
as well.  See, e.g., Shinabarger v Phillips, 370 Mich 135, 140; 121 NW2d 693 (1963) (“ ‘As 
between the master and servant, the master is liable only when the servant acts within the 
actual scope of his authority, but as between defendant and third persons injured by the 
acts of the servant, defendant may be liable when the servant is acting within the apparent 
scope of his authority.’ ”), quoting Anderson v Schust Co, 262 Mich 236, 239; 247 NW 
167 (1933).   
17 Kerns v Lewis, 249 Mich 27, 29; 227 NW 727 (1929), quoting Emery v Ford, 234 Mich 
11, 28; 207 NW 856 (1926).  See also Grossman v Langer, 269 Mich 506, 510; 257 NW 
875 (1934) (“The general rule is that the powers of an agent are prima facie coextensive 
with the business intrusted to his care.”); Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs, Inc v 
Riverview, 55 Mich App 703, 706; 223 NW2d 314 (1974) (“Agents have the implied power 
to carry out all acts necessary in executing defendant’s expressly conferred authority.”); 1 
Michigan Civil Jurisprudence (2009 rev), Agency, § 53, pp 254-255 (“It is a fundamental 
principle of agency that every delegation of power carries with it authority to do all things 
reasonably necessary or proper to efficiently carry into effect the power conferred, unless 
an act is specifically forbidden.”); 1 Michigan Civil Jurisprudence (August 2018 cum 
supp), Agency, § 53, p 14 (“ Agents have the implied power to carry out all acts necessary 
in executing the principal’s expressly conferred authority.”).  
18 Shinabarger, 370 Mich at 139.  See also Field v Jack & Jill Ranch, 343 Mich 273, 279; 
72 NW2d 26 (1955) (“[T]he authority of an agent includes not only those things he is 
expressly told to do, but those things the principal knowingly acquiesces in his doing.”).   
19 Smith, 55 Mich App at 706.  See also Meretta v Peach, 195 Mich App 695, 698; 491 
NW2d 278 (1992) (“An agent has implied authority from his principal to do business in 
the principal’s behalf in accordance with the general custom, usage and procedures in that 
business.  However, the principal must have notice that the customs, usages and procedures 
 
 
 
10 
 
Implied authority is not without limits: “ ‘The apparent or implied authority of an 
agent cannot be so extended as to permit him to depart from the usual manner of 
accomplishing what he is employed to effect.  Nor can he enlarge his powers by 
unauthorized representations and promises.’ ”20  “An implied agency cannot exist contrary 
to the express intention of an alleged principal although it may spring from acts and 
circumstances permitted by the principal over a course of time through acquiescence.”21   
In this case, it is clear that the Law Department is an agent of the Corporation 
Counsel.  Indeed, defendant acknowledges that the Corporation Counsel is the 
administrative head of its Law Department.  This truism is also made clear by the Detroit 
Charter, which provides, “The Law Department is headed by the Corporation Counsel who 
is the duly authorized and official legal counsel for the City of Detroit and its constituent 
branches, units and agencies of government.”22  As the head of the Law Department, the 
                                              
exist.”) (citation omitted); 1 Michigan Civil Jurisprudence (2009 rev), Agency, § 53, p 255 
(“However, an agent’s implied authority cannot be so extended as to permit the agent to 
depart from the usual manner of accomplishing that which he or she is employed to effect, 
or to enter into a transaction, the only possible result of which would be to work a fraud on 
a client of the firm for which he or she is an agent.”). 
20 Modern Globe, Inc v 1425 Lake Drive Corp, 340 Mich 663, 667; 66 NW2d 92 (1954), 
quoting 2 Am Jur, Agency, § 103, p 85.  See also Shinabarger, 370 Mich at 139 (“[I]mplied 
authority must rest upon acts and conduct of the alleged agent known to and acquiesced in 
by the alleged principal prior to the incident at bar. . . . ‘An implied agency must be based 
upon facts, and facts for which the principal is responsible; and upon a natural and 
reasonable, but not a strained, construction of those facts.’ ”), quoting 2 CJ, Agency, § 32, 
p 436. 
21 Flat Hots Co, Inc v Peschke Packing Co, 301 Mich 331, 337; 3 NW2d 295 (1942).   
22 Detroit Charter, § 7.5-201.  The Law Department’s website also states on its home page:  
 
 
 
11 
 
Corporation Counsel has the right to control the Law Department and consequently, the 
Law Department and its members are agents of the Corporation Counsel.23   
That the Law Department has the authority to receive the notice required by MCL 
691.1404(2) on behalf of the Corporation Counsel is supported by the practical reality that 
the Corporation Counsel is not individually capable of receiving notice for every claim 
filed against the City.  In Brown v Dep’t of State,24 the Court of Appeals explained this 
reasoning in a similar context:  
To interpret the Vehicle Code to require the “commissioner” to 
personally reexamine every driver whose competence to drive can be 
reasonably questioned and to personally recommend the suspension or 
revocation of licenses would be in defiance of the obvious purpose of 
Chapter III of the Code.  Michigan has over 5,000,000 licensed drivers 
residing in 83 counties.  Each year approximately 100,000 of those drivers 
are summoned for reexamination in their home counties.  One man cannot 
possibly do the task.  Were the law as plaintiff states it, thousands of drivers, 
whose competence to operate a motor vehicle can be reasonably questioned, 
would not be reexamined and thousands of drivers who should not be on the 
highway would still be driving and endangering others.  The courts will not 
assume that a legislature passed an act that serves no useful purpose, if the 
act can be interpreted in a way which avoids such a consequence. 
                                              
Established by the Detroit City Charter, the Law Department is an 
independent agency that represents the interests of the City of Detroit as a 
corporate body.  The Department is headed by the Corporation Counsel, 
whose mission is to provide a variety of legal services to the City, its elected 
officials, departments, agencies, offices, commissions, and boards, as well as 
its individual employees, in their official capacity.  [Detroit, Law Department 
 (accessed June 13, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/8SXE-8VDN].] 
23 Briggs Tax Serv, 485 Mich at 80.   
24 Brown v Dep’t of State, 45 Mich App 322, 326; 206 NW2d 481 (1973). 
 
 
 
12 
 
On the basis of such reasoning, and considering the relevant portion of the Michigan 
Vehicle Code, the Court of Appeals in Brown rejected an argument that the commissioner 
could not delegate his duty to examine drivers’ competency.25   
The Detroit Ordinances provide further support that receiving notice was within the 
scope of the Law Department’s authority.  Detroit Ordinances, § 2-4-18 states, “All claims 
of whatever kind against the city, excluding claims by city employees arising out of the 
employment relationship, claims against the department of water and sewerage and 
undisputed claims for services, labor and materials furnished to city departments shall be 
first submitted to and reviewed by the law department.”  “Claim” is defined as “ ʻ[t]he 
assertion of an existing right; any right to payment or to an equitable remedy, even if 
contingent or provisional’ and ‘a demand for money, property, or a legal remedy to which 
one asserts a right; esp., the part of a complaint in a civil action specifying what relief the 
plaintiff asks for.’ ”26  This broad definition of “claim” necessarily encompasses the notice 
required by MCL 691.1404.27  The notice must be submitted “[a]s a condition to recovery 
for injuries,” and it must “specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury 
                                              
25 Id. at 324-325, 328. 
26 Bauserman, 503 Mich at ___; slip op at 10, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed). 
27 The City argues that “claims,” as used in the ordinance, does not include legal claims.  
We are unpersuaded by this argument.  According to the above definition, the term 
“claims,” as used in the ordinance, is broad enough to encompass both legal and nonlegal 
claims, particularly given that the ordinance refers to “all claims of whatever kind.”  
Additionally, when acknowledging plaintiffs’ notices, the municipal adjuster referred to 
the notices as claims: “The filing of your client’s claim regarding the above-referenced 
incident is hereby acknowledged.”  (Emphasis added.)   
 
 
 
13 
 
sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant.”28  The notice 
includes such facts to establish that a plaintiff is entitled to monetary relief, in other words 
to “assert[] . . . an existing right” to monetary relief.   
It is difficult to understand how “[a]ll claims of whatever kind against the city” can 
be submitted to and reviewed by the Law Department if the Law Department has no 
authority to receive the notice required by MCL 691.1404(2).  Service of such notice is the 
primary way the City will know of a claim against it.  If notice were sent to an outside party 
and the Law Department only received a copy in order to review the claim, the Law 
Department could accomplish only one of its two required tasks under the ordinance—the 
ordinance requires not only that claims be reviewed by the Law Department but also that 
claims be submitted to, and therefore received by, the Law Department.  Consequently, 
receiving notice is necessary for the Law Department to exercise its express authority to 
receive and review claims.29  Thus, the Law Department had implied authority to receive 
service of the notices of injury and highway defects required by MCL 691.1404(2).   
Moreover, the Law Department’s receipt of these notices was the usual practice to 
which the Corporation Counsel knowingly acquiesced.  The plaintiff’s attorney in West 
explained during oral argument that he had sent notices to the Law Department for several 
years prior to this case without incident.  The City has only recently begun claiming that 
the Law Department cannot receive notice.30  Under traditional agency principles, the Law 
                                              
28 MCL 691.1404(1).   
29 Slocum v Littlefield Pub Sch Bd of Ed, 127 Mich App 183, 194; 338 NW2d 907 (1983).   
30 In 2011, the Court of Appeals addressed an argument of this type for the first time, 
holding that the plaintiff’s notice did not comply with MCL 691.1404 because it was 
 
 
 
14 
 
Department had authority to receive claims because the Corporation Counsel, at a 
minimum, knowingly acquiesced in this practice.31  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Because the Law Department is the agent of the Corporation Counsel and is charged 
with receiving notice under the City’s charter and ordinances, we conclude that West and 
Wigfall complied with the requirements of MCL 691.1404(2) by mailing their notices of 
injury and highway defect to the Law Department.32  We therefore reverse the Court of 
                                              
mailed to the City’s Risk Management Division rather than the mayor, city clerk, or city 
attorney.  Carroll v Flint, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued 
February 10, 2011 (Docket No. 296134).  It appears that it was not until a few years later 
that the City began to raise this defense.  See, e.g., Withers v Detroit, unpublished per 
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 18, 2016 (Docket No. 324009); 
Powell v Detroit, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 
8, 2017 (Docket No. 332267); Church v Detroit, unpublished per curiam opinion of the 
Court of Appeals, issued December 12, 2017 (Docket No. 335413); Garza v Detroit, 
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 18, 2018 (Docket 
No. 334342); Sadler v Detroit, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
issued March 6, 2018 (Docket No. 336117); Sykes v Detroit, unpublished per curiam 
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 11, 2018 (Docket No. 339722).   
31 See Field, 343 Mich at 279 (“Clear it is also, on plainest principles of agency, that the 
authority of an agent includes not only those things he is expressly told to do, but those 
things the principal knowingly acquiesces in his doing.”).   
 
We realize that McLean v Dearborn, 302 Mich App 68, 80; 836 NW2d 916 (2013), 
rejected an agency argument because there was “no record evidence [that the third party] 
was authorized by written appointment or law to accept service on behalf of defendant.”  
(Emphasis in original.)  But McLean is distinguishable.  There, the plaintiff argued for the 
first time on appeal that that the city could delegate the authority to receive service of 
process under MCR 2.105(H)(1) (“Service of process on a defendant may be made . . . on 
an agent authorized by written appointment or by law to receive service of process.”).  
Therefore, unlike here, the Court did not address traditional agency principles.   
32 Though MCL 691.1404(2) requires service upon an “individual,” plaintiffs may comply 
with the statute by serving an agent of that individual, even if the agent, like the Law 
 
 
 
15 
 
Appeals’ judgments in both cases, and we remand both cases to the Wayne Circuit Court 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.33   
 
David F. Viviano 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
Megan K. Cavanagh 
 
                                              
Department, is not an individual.   
33 Because we determine that the Law Department is the agent of the Corporation Counsel, 
we need not decide whether the word “may” in MCL 691.1404(2) is permissive, such that 
service of notice may be permitted on individuals other than those named in MCR 
2.105(G)(2).  We also do not decide whether equitable estoppel may apply. 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
DWAYNE WIGFALL, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 156793 
 
CITY OF DETROIT, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
FAYTREON ONEE WEST, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
 
v 
No. 157097 
 
CITY OF DETROIT, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellee. 
 
 
 
MCCORMACK, C.J. (concurring). 
I concur in the majority opinion in full.  I write separately because it should not take 
all that. 
The city of Detroit, through its lawyers, has taken the position that a notice of injury 
and defect that complies with all the substantive statutory requirements and which the city 
acknowledged receiving is nevertheless insufficient because it was mailed to the city’s Law 
Department and not the Corporation Counsel—the person himself.  The city takes this 
 
 
 
2 
 
puzzling position even though the Corporation Counsel is the Law Department’s 
administrative head and the Law Department is his agency. 
The notice rules require service on “the mayor, the city clerk, or the city attorney of 
a city[.]”  MCR 2.105(G)(2); see MCL 691.1404(2).  The city attorney in Detroit is the 
Corporation Counsel.  The Corporation Counsel has a staff and that staff works in the city’s 
Law Department; they work in the same building with their boss, together representing the 
city’s legal interests.  They all receive mail at the exact same address.   
In these cases, the Law Department received timely notice, acknowledged receiving 
it, and had no complaints about its contents.  There is no dispute that all the purposes of 
notice were satisfied; the Law Department makes no claim that it would have processed 
the notice any differently had the words “Corporation Counsel” appeared at the top of the 
address on the envelope.  And indeed for years the Law Department accepted notice in 
cases just like these, as acknowledged (unsurprisingly) during oral argument before this 
Court.   
But at some point after acknowledging notice in these cases, one of the lawyers on 
the Corporation Counsel’s staff came up with a wacky idea to get the lawsuit dismissed: 
argue that the plaintiff’s notices were not compliant after all, because, instead of mailing 
them to the Corporation Counsel personally, at 2 Woodward Avenue, Suite 500, Detroit, 
MI, 48226, the plaintiffs mailed them to the Corporation Counsel’s staff, the Law 
Department, at that same address.   
And with no sense of irony, attorneys in the Law Department then wrote and filed 
with a court a motion to dismiss, advancing this theory.  They submitted the motions on 
behalf of the Corporation Counsel.  The Corporation Counsel personally did not sign the 
 
 
 
3 
 
motion, nor did he come to court to argue it.  His staff did so, acting, as usual, on behalf of 
his office.  Same again in the Court of Appeals, and again in this Court.  
Apparently, it is the city’s position that when the lawyers from the Law Department 
file motions and appellate briefs and show up in court to make arguments they do so on 
behalf of the Corporation Counsel, but not so when they receive and acknowledge notices 
from litigants.  The city’s argument reduces to: “On behalf of Corporation Counsel, we, 
the Law Department, submit that serving notice on us is insufficient because we do not act 
on Corporation Counsel’s behalf for that purpose.” 
This kind of pseudo technicality can give lawyers a bad name.  Notice to the “City 
Attorney” is satisfied by notice to the Corporation Counsel or to the Law Department.  
These are functionally interchangeable, barring exceptional circumstances not relevant 
here (such as a suit against the Corporation Counsel in his individual capacity).   
The city has every right to insist that litigants follow the rules when they file a claim.  
But the Corporation Counsel and his Law Department have done themselves and their 
client little service in advancing the argument made here.  
 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
Richard H. Bernstein