Case Title: State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner

Citation: 2010-Ohio-1895

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1895.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1895 
THE STATE EX REL. LETOHIOVOTE.ORG ET AL. v. BRUNNER, SECY. OF STATE. 
THE STATE EX REL. NEW MODELS ET AL. v. BRUNNER, SECY. OF STATE. 
THE STATE EX REL. CUMMINGS v. BRUNNER, SECY. OF STATE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1895.] 
Elections — Secretary of state’s investigations under R.C. 3501.05(N) — Issuance 
of subpoena is not exercise of quasi-judicial authority — Writ of 
prohibition denied. 
(Nos. 2010-0367, 2010-0415, and 2010-0421 — Submitted April 27, 2010 — 
Decided April 30, 2010.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} These are consolidated actions for writs of prohibition to prevent 
respondent, Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner, from enforcing subpoenas to 
compel relators to appear and testify at depositions and to produce documents 
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related to their efforts to exercise their constitutional right of referendum.  
Because the secretary of state did not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial authority 
in issuing the subpoenas, we deny the writ. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} Relator LetOhioVote.org is a ballot-issue committee that requested 
a referendum on the video-lottery-terminal (“VLT”) provisions of 2009 
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1 (“H.B. 1”), and relators Thomas E. Brinkman Jr. and Gene 
Pierce are committee members.  Pierce is also the treasurer of LetOhioVote.org, 
relator Carlo LoParo is a media-relations consultant for the committee, and relator 
Norman B. Cummings is a political consultant for the committee. 
{¶ 3} On September 21, 2009, we granted a writ of mandamus in favor 
of LetOhioVote.org and its committee members to compel the secretary of state to 
treat the VLT provisions of H.B. 1 as subject to referendum because these 
provisions do not fall within any of the exceptions to the constitutional right of 
referendum.  State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 322, 2009-
Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462.  We stayed the VLT provisions for 90 days from the 
date of the decision to allow the committee and its members a meaningful 
opportunity to circulate a referendum petition.  Id. at ¶ 54. 
{¶ 4} On December 21, 2009, the committee filed its referendum petition 
with the secretary of state.  After the secretary notified the committee that its 
petition was deficient by about 27,000 signatures, the committee filed over 
175,000 supplemental signatures.  On March 26, 2010, the secretary of state 
certified the VLT provisions of H.B. 1 to the November 2010 ballot for a 
referendum election. 
{¶ 5} On January 29, 2010, the committee electronically filed its annual 
campaign-finance report for 2009 with the secretary of state’s office.  In its report, 
the committee listed $1,551,000 in contributions received in 2009, with all of the 
contributions coming from relator New Models.  New Models claims to be a 
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Washington, D.C. corporation with a principal place of business in McLean, 
Virginia, but its corporate status had been revoked by the District of Columbia in 
September 2009 “for having failed and/or refused to file reports and pay all fees 
due and owing on or before April 15, 2009.”  On March 29, 2010, New Models’ 
corporate status was reinstated by the District of Columbia. 
{¶ 6} Upon examining LetOhioVote.org’s 2009 campaign-finance 
report, the secretary’s staff found what they considered to be irregularities.  The 
secretary of state decided to further investigate whether relator LetOhioVote.org’s 
campaign-finance statement complied with the law, and on February 16, 2010, the 
secretary’s office issued subpoenas for relators Pierce, LoParo, Brinkman, 
Cummings, and the committee’s records custodian to appear and testify as 
witnesses at depositions scheduled for March 5 and to produce certain documents 
related to the committee’s finances and Internet website.  The secretary of state’s 
office also issued subpoenas for the custodian of records of relator New Models 
and its president, relator Tim Crawford, to appear and testify at the March 5 
depositions and to produce certain documents related to financial and corporate 
information about New Models.  The subpoenas claimed to be issued pursuant to 
R.C. 3501.05(N) and (CC) and threatened criminal sanctions pursuant to R.C. 
3599.37 for a failure to appear, testify, and produce requested documents.  All of 
the subpoenas were successfully served except for the ones issued to Cummings. 
{¶ 7} On February 17, the day after she issued the subpoenas to relators, 
the secretary of state issued a press release entitled “Secretary Brunner Opens 
Campaign-Finance Investigation Regarding LetOhioVote.org.”  In her press 
release, the secretary of state opined that LetOhioVote.org had violated campaign-
finance law by concealing the true sources of its funding.  Notably, since 
Secretary of State Brunner took office in January 2007, she has filed 
approximately 764 complaints with the Ohio Elections Commission.  She has not, 
however, issued subpoenas in connection with an investigation of alleged 
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violations of campaign-finance law except for those that she issued in her 
investigation of LetOhioVote.org. 
{¶ 8} In March 2010, relators filed these original actions for writs of 
prohibition to prevent the secretary of state from enforcing her subpoenas.  We 
granted alternative writs and issued schedules for the submission of evidence and 
briefs.  State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 124 Ohio St.3d 1489, 2010-
Ohio-739, 922 N.E.2d 225; State ex rel. New Models v. Brunner, 124 Ohio St.3d 
1502, 2010-Ohio-809, 922 N.E.2d 966; State ex rel. Cummings v. Brunner, 124 
Ohio St.3d 1503, 2010-Ohio-863, 922 N.E.2d 967.  We later granted the parties’ 
joint motion to consolidate these cases.  State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 
124 Ohio St.3d 1511, 2010-Ohio-919, 923 N.E.2d 154; State ex rel. New Models 
v. Brunner, 124 Ohio St.3d 1512, 2010-Ohio-919, 923 N.E.2d 154; State ex rel. 
Cummings v. Brunner, 124 Ohio St.3d 1512, 2010-Ohio-919, 923 N.E.2d 155. 
{¶ 9} When the secretary of state attempted to depose some of the 
relators in the course of discovery in these cases, we granted their motions for 
protective orders to prevent the depositions and deferred consideration of relators 
New Models’ and its president’s motion for sanctions until the merits 
determination.  See, e.g., State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. Brunner, 124 Ohio 
St.3d 1525, 2010-Ohio-1230, 923 N.E.2d 624.  We then denied the secretary’s 
motion to vacate the protective orders.  See, e.g., State ex rel. LetOhioVote.org v. 
Brunner, 124 Ohio St.3d 1527, 2010-Ohio-1247, 923 N.E.2d 1157. 
{¶ 10} This case is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits as well as the motion for sanctions.  Because the parties’ briefs are 
sufficient to resolve the legal issues raised, we deny the secretary of state’s 
motion for oral argument. 
Legal Analysis 
Prohibition 
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5 
 
{¶ 11} To be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, relators must 
establish that by issuing the subpoenas, (1) Secretary of State Brunner is about to 
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is 
unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury for which no 
other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  See State ex rel. 
Sullivan v. Ramsey, 124 Ohio St.3d 355, 2010-Ohio-252, 922 N.E.2d 214, ¶ 15; 
State ex rel. Stewart v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2010-
Ohio-1176, __ N.E.2d __, ¶ 15. 
Quasi-Judicial Power 
{¶ 12} For the first requirement, “relators must establish that the secretary 
of state is about to exercise or has exercised judicial or quasi-judicial power.”  
State ex rel. Parrott v. Brunner, 117 Ohio St.3d 175, 2008-Ohio-813, 882 N.E.2d 
908, ¶ 6.  The office of secretary of state is a nonjudicial office.  Therefore, we 
must determine whether the secretary of state exercised quasi-judicial authority by 
issuing subpoenas, requiring persons to testify and to produce documents, as part 
of her general investigative authority. 
{¶ 13} We have consistently defined quasi-judicial authority as “ ‘the 
power to hear and determine controversies between the public and individuals that 
require a hearing resembling a judicial trial.’ (Emphasis added.)”  State ex rel. 
Upper Arlington v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Elections, 119 Ohio St.3d 478, 2008-
Ohio-5093, 895 N.E.2d 177, ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Bur. of 
Motor Vehicles (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 184, 186, 718 N.E.2d 508. 
{¶ 14} The secretary of state claims that she was authorized by R.C. 
3501.05(N)(1) to investigate whether LetOhioVote.org violated election law and 
by R.C. 3501.05(CC) to issue subpoenas in furtherance of her investigation.  
Neither R.C. 3501.05(N) nor 3501.05(CC), however, requires the secretary of 
state to conduct a quasi-judicial hearing when she decides to issue subpoenas as 
part of her investigation of a possible election-law violation.  Therefore, the 
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secretary has not exercised the requisite quasi-judicial authority.  See Parrott, 117 
Ohio St.3d 175, 2008-Ohio-813, 882 N.E.2d 908, ¶ 8-10 (because there is no 
requirement for the secretary of state to hold a hearing resembling a judicial trial 
when the secretary issues a directive or breaks a tie vote of a board of elections on 
whether to comply with the secretary’s directive, a writ of prohibition would not 
lie against the secretary). 
{¶ 15} Moreover, the mere fact that the subpoenas issued by the secretary 
of state themselves required relators to appear and testify at deposition 
proceedings that resemble in some respects a judicial trial does not warrant a 
different conclusion.  “The dispositive fact is that no statute or other law 
required” the secretary of state to conduct a quasi-judicial hearing when she 
issued the subpoenas.  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Scherach v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 123 Ohio St.3d 245, 2009-Ohio-5349, 915 N.E.2d 647, ¶ 23 (mere fact 
that board of elections held a protest hearing resembling a judicial trial even 
though not required to do so did not constitute the exercise of quasi-judicial 
authority subject to a writ of prohibition); State ex rel. Janosek v. Cuyahoga 
Support Enforcement Agency, 123 Ohio St.3d 126, 2009-Ohio-4692, 914 N.E.2d 
404, ¶ 1 (“Because no statute or other pertinent law required the agency to 
conduct a hearing resembling a judicial trial when it issued its notice to withhold 
income for spousal support, the agency did not exercise the judicial or quasi-
judicial authority required for appellants to be entitled to the requested 
extraordinary relief in prohibition” [emphasis sic]). 
{¶ 16} This result is consistent with our observation in State ex rel. Taft v. 
Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 190, 195, 586 
N.E.2d 114, that the “general obligation of the Secretary of State [under R.C. 
3501.05(N)] to investigate and report violations of election laws imposes no 
specific adjudicatory procedure, does not even grant quasi-judicial authority, and 
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is thus not comparable to * * * special statutory proceedings * * *.  It commands 
an administrative act–an investigation–not an adjudicatory proceeding.” 
{¶ 17} Most of the cases cited by relators are not on point, because in 
those cases, the entire proceedings at issue, which tangentially included the power 
to subpoena, were, in fact, quasi-judicial in nature.  See Ohio Historical Soc. v. 
State Emp. Relations Bd. (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 45, 46-47, 549 N.E.2d 157 
(proceedings before the State Employment Relations Board on a union’s petition 
for a representation election were quasi-judicial because a hearing was conducted 
at which notice was given and testimonial and documentary evidence was 
submitted); Haught v. Dayton (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 32, 35, 63 O.O.2d 49, 295 
N.E.2d 404 (charter proceeding before a city civil service board, which provided 
for a hearing on an appeal from a dismissal, reduction, or suspension, was a quasi-
judicial proceeding). 
{¶ 18} Relators’ reliance on State ex rel. Ministerial Day Care Assn. v. 
Montgomery, 100 Ohio St.3d 343, 2003-Ohio-6446, 800 N.E.2d 18, is also 
misplaced because we did not specifically hold in that case that the state auditor’s 
issuance of a subpoena constituted a judicial or a quasi-judicial act.  Instead, we 
resolved the prohibition claim by holding that the state auditor did not patently 
and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue the challenged subpoena.  Id. at ¶ 
13-16 (incorrectly numbered as ¶ 4-7). 
{¶ 19} Furthermore, the solitary case that relators cite that arguably 
supports their claim is inconsistent with our controlling precedent.  In Ohio Bell 
Tel. v. Ferguson (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 74, 15 O.O.3d 117, 399 N.E.2d 1201, we 
held that a writ of prohibition was the proper remedy to challenge the authority of 
the state auditor and the state examiner of the Bureau of Inspection and 
Supervision of Public Offices to issue subpoenas because it was uncontested that 
respondents’ actions in issuing the subpoenas were “in the exercise of a quasi-
judicial power.”  Id. at 77.  We did not apply the pertinent test for determining 
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whether quasi-judicial power was being exercised in that case, see, e.g., Upper 
Arlington, 119 Ohio St.3d 478, 2008-Ohio-5093, 895 N.E.2d 117, ¶ 16, and the 
case is bereft of any support for its conclusion in that regard.  Consequently, we 
will not apply Ohio Bell here, in the context of an investigation by the secretary of 
state, which we expressly held in a later case to be an administrative rather than a 
quasi-judicial act.  See Taft, 63 Ohio St.3d at 195, 586 N.E.2d 114. 
{¶ 20} Therefore, because no statute or other pertinent law required the 
secretary of state to conduct a hearing resembling a judicial trial when she 
decided to issue the subpoenas to relators in furtherance of her investigation of 
LetOhioVote.org’s 2009 campaign-finance report, the secretary of state did not 
exercise quasi-judicial authority in issuing them.  Scherach, 123 Ohio St.3d 245, 
2009-Ohio-5349, 915 N.E.2d 647, ¶ 22-23; Parrott, 117 Ohio St.3d 175, 2008-
Ohio-813, 882 N.E.2d 908, ¶ 8-10. 
Sanctions 
{¶ 21} When we granted the motion of relators New Models and 
Crawford for a protective order, we deferred consideration of their motion for 
sanctions against the secretary of state and her counsel for the attempted 
subpoenas for depositions and production of documents in discovery in this case.  
Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 14.5(A), if the court, “sua sponte or on motion by a party, 
determines that an appeal or other action is frivolous or is prosecuted for delay, 
harassment, or any other improper purpose, it may impose, on the person who 
signed the appeal or action, a represented party, or both, appropriate sanctions.  * 
* * An appeal or other action shall be considered frivolous if it is not reasonably 
well-grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”  Although we granted the 
protective order, we are not persuaded that the secretary’s attempted discovery 
constituted frivolous conduct because it was at least in part directed to the issue of 
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New Models’ corporate status and standing.  Therefore, we deny the motion for 
sanctions. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 22} Consequently, because the secretary of state did not exercise quasi-
judicial authority in issuing the subpoenas that relators challenge, relators are not 
entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.  This result does not 
leave relators without an adequate remedy, for a challenge may be made to the 
propriety of the subpoenas in a common pleas court action for a prohibitory 
injunction.  Scherach, 123 Ohio St.3d 245, 2009-Ohio-5349, 915 N.E.2d 647, ¶ 
25. For the foregoing reasons, relators are not entitled to the requested 
extraordinary relief in prohibition.  The parties’ remaining claims, including those 
regarding whether the secretary of state patently and unambiguously lacked 
jurisdiction to issue the challenged subpoenas, are rendered moot by this holding 
and need not be addressed.  This is consistent with our general rules precluding 
advisory opinions and extolling judicial restraint.  See LetOhioVote.org, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 322, 2009-Ohio-4900, 916 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 51. 
Writ denied. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, 
JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., concurs separately. 
 
The late CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS J. MOYER did not participate in the 
decision in this case. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., concurring. 
{¶ 23} On February 21, 1912, former president Theodore Roosevelt 
addressed the delegates at the Ohio Constitutional Convention regarding initiative 
and referendum: 
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{¶ 24} “If in any state the people are themselves satisfied with their 
present representative system, then it is of course their right to keep that system 
unchanged; and it is nobody’s business but theirs.  But in actual practice it has 
been found in very many states that legislative bodies have not been responsive to 
the popular will.  Therefore I believe that the state should provide for the 
possibility of direct popular action in order to make good such legislative failure.”  
1 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Ohio 
(1913) 383, available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Law 
Library/resources/day24.pdf. 
{¶ 25} Wouldn’t Teddy be dismayed to learn that the “direct popular 
action” of the people of Ohio is far, far from direct, involving straw men, front 
organizations, red herrings, and smoke and mirrors, and winding its way from 
Ohio to the New Models’ “headquarters” in a nondescript house in suburban 
McLean, Virginia, and back again, with possibly a couple of stops in the 
boardroom of a gaming company or in the luxury suite of a basketball arena?  
Shouldn’t we all be dismayed that the exercise of pure democracy that is the right 
of referendum, added to our Constitution after a vote of the people in 1912, has 
been made impure through surreptitious funding?  Shouldn’t we expect our 
secretary of state, as Ohio’s chief elections officer, to aggressively investigate 
instances where our election laws appear to be exploited?  Or in the alternative, 
should we not expect her to investigate in order to identify a gaping hole in our 
election law that could not have been intended by the General Assembly? 
{¶ 26} I concur. 
__________________ 
 
Langdon Law, L.L.C., David R. Langdon, Thomas W. Kidd Jr., and 
Bradley M. Peppo, for relators LetOhioVote.org, Thomas E. Brinkman Jr., Gene 
Pierce, and Carlo LoParo. 
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Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., John H. Burtch, Rodger L. Eckelberry, and 
Robert J. Tucker, for relators New Models and Timothy Crawford. 
 
Axelrod, L.L.C., Brian J. Laliberte, and David F. Axelrod, for relator 
Norman B. Cummings. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Richard N. Coglianese, Erick D. 
Gale, and Pearl M. Chin, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent. 
______________________