Case Title: State v. Hugo

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-149


State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

     v.                                      On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
David J. Hugo                                Unit No. 2, Addison Circuit

                                             February Term, 1990


Hilton H. Dier, Jr., J.

John T. Quinn, Addison County State's Attorney, Middlebury, and Gary S.
   Kessler, Resource Attorney, Department of State's Attorneys, Montpelier,
   for plaintiff-appellee

Bonnie Barnes and Sandra Everitt of Sessions, Keiner, Dumont & Barnes,
   Middlebury, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.



     PECK, J.   Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle on a
public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation
of 23 V.S.A. { 1201(a)(2), and also with operating a motor vehicle with .10%
or more by weight of alcohol in his blood in violation of 23 V.S.A. {
1201(a)(1).  At trial the jury returned a guilty verdict on each count. The
trial judge subsequently dismissed the excessive blood-alcohol count pur-
suant to 23 V.S.A. { 1201(c) (formerly 23 V.S.A. { 1201(f)), which prohibits
more than one conviction under { 1201 arising out of the same incident.
Defendant appeals his remaining conviction.  We affirm.
     Although defendant raises six issues for our review, only four were
properly preserved for appeal: (1) whether the court erred by not permitting
the arresting officer to testify that defendant told him he was dyslexic;
(2) whether the court committed reversible error by excluding testimony of
defendant's father regarding his prior observations of his son's difficulty
in performing physical tasks as a result of dyslexia; (3) whether the court
failed to instruct the jury it need not presume that defendant was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor based upon a finding that there existed a
.10% or more by weight of alcohol in his blood; and (4) whether the court
erred by failing to instruct the jury it could not find defendant guilty of
violating both 23 V.S.A. { 1201(a)(1) and 23 V.S.A. { 1201(a)(2), where the
charges arose out of the same incident.  The two remaining issues are: (1)
whether the trial court erred by refusing to admit defendant's testimony
that he suffers from dyslexia; and (2) whether the court failed to clearly
separate the elements of the two charges.
     The basic facts are not in dispute.  At 10:30 in the evening on June
13, 1986, a Vermont state trooper on routine patrol observed a vehicle
traveling northbound in excess of the fifty mile-per-hour speed limit on
Route 7 in Ferrisburg.  The trooper pursued, activated his blue lights, and
caught up with the vehicle as it slowed for a traffic signal at a nearby
bridge construction site.  Rather than come to a stop, the vehicle pulled
onto the right shoulder of the roadway and passed another car which had
stopped in the traveled portion of the road for a red traffic signal.  At
this point the trooper briefly activated his siren and the vehicle came to a
halt.
      The trooper found two persons in the car.  Twenty-year-old defendant
was the driver, and a male companion sat in the front passenger seat.
During his initial conversation with defendant, the trooper detected a
strong smell of alcohol on defendant's breath and observed that he had
bloodshot eyes, a flushed face and slurred speech.  There were a number of
empty beer cans on the floor behind the front seat.
     Suspecting that the driver might be intoxicated, the trooper asked him
to step to the rear of the car to perform some field sobriety tests.
Defendant cooperated, but was unable to perform the tests successfully.  The
trooper placed defendant under arrest, drove him to the Vergennes Police
Department and processed him for driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.  Defendant consented to a standard breath test at 11:21
p.m..   Based on this test, a chemist testified at trial that defendant's
blood-alcohol count was .13% at the time he was stopped.
     At the station, defendant admitted that he and his companion began
drinking  beer at 6:30 that evening in Hyde Park, New York.  Defendant
stated that he drank only two beers before beginning the drive to Vermont
but admitted consuming four more beers at various points during the three
and one-half hour trip, the last of which he finished just ten minutes prior
to being stopped by the officer.  In response to a question on the DUI pro-
cessing form as to whether he thought he was under the influence of alcohol,
defendant replied, "[a]t this time, yes."  When asked whether he had any
physical handicaps, defendant informed the trooper that he suffers from
dyslexia.
     Defendant was tried and convicted of driving while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor.  This appeal followed.
                                    I.
     Defendant argues, first, that the court should have allowed the
arresting officer to testify that defendant told him he was dyslexic.  He
argues that the information was admissible as a statement of a party
opponent.  The State notes that defendant did not clearly object to the
exclusion.  Although there is some question as to whether defendant properly
saved the issue for review, we address defendant's claim because the court
was alerted to the claimed error and the substance of the evidence to be
presented was apparent from the context. (FN1) See V.R.E. 103(a)(2)(where ruling
is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence must be made known
to the court by offer or be apparent from the context); Camp v. Howe, 132
Vt. 429, 433,