Case Title: Meadows Dev., L.L.C. v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2010-Ohio-249

Docket Number: 20090064

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Meadows Dev., L.L.C. v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-249.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-249 
MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., APPELLANT, v. CHAMPAIGN COUNTY 
BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Meadows Dev., L.L.C. v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Revision,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-249.] 
A board of revision has jurisdiction to perform a second certification of its 
decision pursuant to R.C. 5715.20, provided it does so within the 30-day 
appeal period established by its first certification and provided no appeal 
has yet been taken from the first certification — When valid, a second 
certification of a board’s decision starts a new 30-day appeal period 
under R.C. 5717.01 — A board of revision properly certifies its decision 
under R.C. 5715.20 when it mails the decision by certified mail to any 
address that is reasonably calculated to give notice of the decision to the 
owner. 
(No. 2009-0064 — Submitted November 4, 2009 — Decided February 3, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2007-B-595. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Meadows Development, L.L.C. (“Meadows”) appeals from a 
decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), in which the BTA dismissed 
Meadows’s appeal from a decision of the Champaign County Board of Revision 
(“BOR”).  The BTA held that Meadows had filed its notice of appeal more than 
30 days after the BOR had certified its decision pursuant to R.C. 5715.20.  See 
R.C. 5717.01 (“An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be 
taken to the board of tax appeals within thirty days after notice of the decision of 
the county board of revision is mailed as provided in division (A) of section 
5715.20 of the Revised Code”). 
{¶ 2} On line 1 of its valuation complaint, Meadows identified itself as 
the owner of the property, and gave its own address as called for by the complaint 
form.  Then, on line 3, Meadows identified a law firm as its agent and gave the 
address of the law firm in the appropriate space.  The issue in this case arises 
because the Champaign County Board of Revision (“BOR”), when it issued its 
decision in this case, certified that decision first to Meadows at its own address, 
and second to Meadows at its attorneys’ address.  The BTA held that the 30-day 
period for Meadows to file its appeal from the BOR decision began to run when 
the BOR first certified the decision.  Because Meadows filed its appeal more than 
30 days after that certification, the BTA held that Meadows’s notice of appeal was 
untimely, and ordered that it be dismissed. 
{¶ 3} On appeal to this court, Meadows argues that the 30-day appeal 
period ran from a later date – the date on which the BOR certified the decision to 
the address of Meadows’s attorneys.  While we reject the legal reason that 
Meadows advances, we agree that the appeal period began to run from the later 
certification.  We therefore reverse the decision of the BTA and remand the cause 
for further proceedings. 
Facts 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 4} On March 30, 2007, Meadows filed a complaint that challenged 
the value that the Champaign County Auditor had assigned to its property.  The 
three parcels at issue constitute a 200-pad mobile-home park that the auditor 
valued at $2,170,428 for tax year 2006.  Meadows argued before the BOR that the 
property was worth only $1,718,100.  The Triad Local School District Board of 
Education filed a countercomplaint seeking to retain the auditor’s valuation.  
After a hearing, the BOR retained the auditor’s valuation. 
{¶ 5} On June 14, 2007, the BOR certified its decision by certified mail 
to the address set forth on the complaint as Meadows’s own address.  Fifteen days 
later, on June 29, 2007, the BOR certified the decision again, this time sending it 
by certified mail to the address set forth on the complaint as the address of 
Meadows’s agent – namely, the law firm Siegel, Siegel, Johnson & Jennings Co., 
L.P.A.  A lawyer from the law firm had appeared and represented Meadows at the 
BOR hearing in May 2007. 
{¶ 6} On July 24, 2007, 40 days after the first certification of the BOR 
decision and 25 days after the second certification, Meadows filed a notice of 
appeal from the BOR to the BTA.  The school board moved to dismiss the appeal 
as untimely filed.  Meadows did not respond. 
{¶ 7} In its December 9, 2008 decision, the BTA agreed with the school 
board, holding that the BOR had complied with R.C. 5715.20 when it sent notice 
“to the owner at the address listed on the complaint.”  Meadows Dev., L.L.C. v. 
Champaign Cty. Bd. of Revision (Dec. 9, 2008), BTA No. 2007-B-595, at 3.  The 
BTA further held that the June 14, 2007 mailing “started the thirty-day appeal 
period.” 
{¶ 8} The BTA also held that the subsequent mailing of the decision to 
the address of Meadows’s attorneys “did not change the date the appeal period 
began.”  In so holding, the BTA relied upon its decision in E. Sky Ministries v. 
Monroe Cty. Bd. of Revision (Sept. 3, 2004), BTA No. 2004-T-559, which 
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rejected the contention that Civ.R. 5(B) applied and that the rule required 
certification to be made to the attorney of an owner who was represented in the 
proceedings.  Neither in E. Sky nor in the present case did the BTA address the 
propriety of a board of revision’s certifying its decision to the attorney named by 
the owner; in both, the BTA relied exclusively on its holding that the decision had 
been properly certified to the owner itself. 
{¶ 9} Meadows appealed the dismissal to this court.  We now reverse the 
BTA’s decision and remand the cause for further proceedings. 
Analysis 
{¶ 10} The BTA is responsible for determining factual issues, but we “ 
‘will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal 
conclusion.’ ”  Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 856 
N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14, quoting Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. 
Zaino (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789. 
{¶ 11} The present appeal involves a legal issue.  R.C. 5715.20 provides 
that a county board of revision, after it “renders a decision on a complaint filed 
under section 5715.19 of the Revised Code,” shall “certify its action by certified 
mail to the person in whose name the property is listed or sought to be listed and 
to the complainant if the complainant is not the person in whose name the 
property is listed or sought to be listed.”  R.C. 5717.01 provides that a party who 
wishes to appeal from a decision of a board of revision to the BTA must file its 
appeal within 30 days of the certified mailing of the board of revision’s decision.  
The issue in this case is whether the BTA correctly concluded that the appeal 
period expired 30 days after the initial certification by the BOR of its decision. 
{¶ 12} We conclude that the BTA erred.  The BOR had jurisdiction to 
perform a new certification of its decision to the address of Meadows’s attorneys 
on June 29, 2007, and because that certification was reasonably calculated to give 
actual notice of the decision to the owner, it commenced the running of a 30-day 
January Term, 2010 
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appeal period.  Since Meadows filed its appeal 25 days thereafter, the appeal was 
timely filed. 
Under R.C. 5715.20, a board of revision validly certifies its decision 
when it sends the decision by certified mail to an address 
that is reasonably calculated to give notice to the owner. 
{¶ 13} The BTA concluded that the BOR’s first certification was proper 
and started the running of the appeal period and that the second certification had 
no effect on the appeal period.  Meadows contends that the BTA erred because 
under Civ.R. 5(B), the BOR had a legal duty to certify the decision to the address 
of Meadows’s attorneys, not Meadows’s address.  Meadows reasons that the first 
certification was invalid because it did not comply with Civ.R. 5(B) and that the 
BOR started the appeal period running when it complied with the rule by 
certifying the decision to Meadows’s attorneys. 
{¶ 14} We do not agree that the Civil Rules apply to the circumstances in 
this case.  By their own terms, the Civil Rules apply to “all courts of this state in 
the exercise of civil jurisdiction at law or in equity.”  Civ.R. 1(A).  Neither the 
BOR nor the BTA constitutes a “court,” and neither entity exercises civil 
jurisdiction at law or in equity.  See HealthSouth Corp. v. Levin, 121 Ohio St.3d 
282, 2009-Ohio-584, 903 N.E.2d 1179, ¶ 24, quoting Columbus S. Lumber Co. v. 
Peck (1953), 159 Ohio St. 564, 569, 50 O.O. 457, 113 N.E.2d 1 (as an 
administrative agency, the BTA “ ‘does not have equitable jurisdiction’ ”).  It 
follows that the proceedings in this case, being administrative in nature, do not as 
a general matter fall within the ambit of the Civil Rules. 
{¶ 15} Moreover, 
although 
Meadows 
relies 
on 
Swander 
Ditch 
Landowners’ Assn. v. Joint Bd. of Huron & Seneca Cty. Commrs. (1990), 51 Ohio 
St.3d 131, 554 N.E.2d 1324, that decision does not furnish grounds for resorting 
to the Civil Rules here.  Swander Ditch differs from the present case in two 
material respects.  First, Swander Ditch applied Civ.R. 5(B) where the appeal 
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from the administrative decision was prosecuted to the common pleas court – a 
forum in which the Civil Rules do govern the proceedings.  Id. at 133.  Second, in 
Swander Ditch no statute prescribed the means for giving notice of the 
administrative decision, and the court therefore looked to the Civil Rules as a gap 
filler.  Id.  By stark contrast, R.C. 5715.20 articulates the certification requirement 
for BOR decisions.  There is therefore no reason to resort to the Civil Rules, 
because there is no gap to fill.  See also Tower City Properties v. Cuyahoga Cty. 
Bd. of Revision (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 67, 70, 551 N.E.2d 122 (the nature of 
property-valuation proceedings makes the Civil Rules inapplicable under Civ.R. 
1(C)). 
{¶ 16} Although 
we 
reject 
Meadows’s 
argument 
regarding 
the 
applicability of the Civil Rules, that rejection does not by itself establish whether 
the second certification of the BOR decision affected the time for appeal.  Our 
recent decision in Knickerbocker Properties, Inc. XLII v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 119 Ohio St.3d 233, 2008-Ohio-3192, 893 N.E.2d 457, ¶ 17, provides 
guidance in this regard. 
{¶ 17} In Knickerbocker Properties, we held that the board of revision 
failed to properly give notice of a hearing pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(C) and 
5715.12.  Id., ¶ 18.  R.C. 5715.19(C) requires a board of revision to notify a 
complainant and, if the complainant is not the owner, to send notice of the hearing 
to the property owner as well.  R.C. 5715.12 requires a board of revision to notify 
an owner and give that person an opportunity to be heard before any increase in 
valuation.  Like R.C. 5715.20, both R.C. 5715.19(C) and 5715.12 call for the use 
of certified mail and do not specify what address ought to be used. 
{¶ 18} Because the statutes did not state what address must be used, we 
held that in accordance with the basic dictates of due process, the notice could be 
mailed to any address that was reasonably calculated to give notice to the owner.  
Knickerbocker Properties, 2008-Ohio-3192, ¶ 17.  The same reasoning applies 
January Term, 2010 
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here:  a board of revision properly certifies its decision under R.C. 5715.20 when 
it mails the decision by certified mail to an address that is reasonably calculated to 
give notice of the decision to the owner. 
{¶ 19} Thus, if the second certification of the BOR decision in this case 
was reasonably calculated to give notice of the BOR decision to the owner, it may 
have been effective in restarting the running of the appeal period. 1 
Sending the BOR decision to the address of the owner’s attorney 
is reasonable when the attorney has represented the owner 
at the BOR hearing 
{¶ 20} As an initial matter, we note that the due-process standard does not 
necessarily fix one address as proper to the exclusion of all others.  It is possible 
that more than one address satisfies the requirement that the mailing be 
reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the intended recipient.  In this case, 
that means that the BOR might have been able to validly certify its decision to the 
owner’s address, the law firm’s address, or some other address. 
{¶ 21} That said, we have little difficulty in determining that the BOR’s 
certification of its decision to the law firm was reasonably calculated to give 
Meadows actual notice of the decision.  This conclusion flows from two facts:  
first, Meadows identified the firm as its agent for purposes of the valuation 
complaint; second, the firm actually represented Meadows at the BOR hearing.  
Indeed, where an attorney is clearly engaged in active representation of the owner, 
sending the BOR decision to the attorney generally constitutes the best practice 
for the BOR to follow. 
                                                 
1. We note that Meadows predicated its argument solely on applying Civ.R. 5(B).  Usually, our 
jurisdiction on appeal from a BTA decision is confined to the issues raised in the notice of appeal 
and the brief.  See Newman v. Levin, 120 Ohio St.3d 127, 2008-Ohio-5202, 896 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 28.  
But the question whether a notice of appeal was timely filed concerns the BTA’s jurisdiction.  See 
Hafiz v. Levin, 120 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-6788, 900 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 8.  We have held that our 
jurisdiction to consider and decide such an issue is plenary and not limited by the appellant’s 
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{¶ 22} Despite these considerations, the BTA found that the second 
certification did not affect the appeal period.  It based that conclusion on its 
determination that the initial certification to the owner’s address was valid, and 
that the earlier certification started the appeal period running.  The BTA’s 
conclusion raises one final question for our review:  Did the first certification 
preclude the second certification?  We now consider that issue. 
The BOR had jurisdiction to certify its decision to a new address, as long as the 
second certification occurred within 30 days of the first certification 
{¶ 23} The BTA held that the BOR had complied with R.C. 5715.20 when 
it sent notice “to the owner at the address listed on the complaint.”  Meadows 
Dev., L.L.C. v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Revision (Dec. 9, 2008), BTA No. 2007-B-
595, at 3.  Apart from Meadows’s claim under Civ.R. 5(B), which we have 
rejected, Meadows has not challenged this finding.  Since the first certification 
was valid under R.C. 5715.20, it started the running of a 30-day appeal period. 
Did that first certification make the second certification invalid? 
{¶ 24} We hold that the first certification did not preclude the second 
certification.  The BOR originally certified its decision on June 14, 2007, and then 
15 days later recertified its decision.  Because the second certification fell within 
the 30-day period for appealing from the first certification, and because it was 
reasonably calculated to give notice, the second certification was valid. 
{¶ 25} We have held that boards of revision, being administrative 
tribunals, have “ ‘ “inherent authority to reconsider their own decisions since the 
power to decide in the first instance carries with it the power to reconsider,” ’ ” 
but that such authority “does not extend beyond ‘the actual institution of an 
appeal or expiration of the time for appeal.’ ”  Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. 
v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 121 Ohio St.3d 218, 2009-Ohio-760, 903 N.E.2d 
                                                                                                                                     
notice of appeal.  See Elyria v. Lorain Cty. Budget Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 403, 2008-Ohio-940, 
884 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 12-13.   
January Term, 2010 
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299, ¶ 14, quoting Cincinnati School Dist., 87 Ohio St.3d at 368, 721 N.E.2d 40, 
quoting Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 
20, 28 OBR 83, 502 N.E.2d 590, paragraph three of the syllabus.  Under this 
principle, the BOR still possessed authority to vacate or modify its decision as of 
the date of the second certification.  Had the BOR issued a new and substantively 
different decision on that date, the proper certification of that modified decision 
would unquestionably have commenced the running of a new appeal period. 
{¶ 26} We hold that the same rationale extends to the situation where a 
board of revision certifies a substantively identical decision to a new address 
within the 30-day appeal period.  Because the BOR modified its certification of 
the decision within the 30-day window for an appeal from the initial certification, 
and because no appeal had actually been instituted from the first certification, the 
second certification was valid and restarted the running of the 30-day appeal 
period. 
{¶ 27} The recertification of the BOR’s decision on June 29, 2007, 
commenced the running of the 30-day appeal period within which Meadows, on 
July 24, 2007, timely filed its appeal to the BTA.  Accordingly, the BTA erred by 
dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  We therefore reverse the decision 
and remand the cause for further proceedings. 
Decision reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Siegel, Siegel, Johnson & Jennings Co., L.P.A., Nicholas M.J. Ray, and J. 
Kieran Jennings, for appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Jonathan T. Brollier, and Mark A. Engel, for 
appellee Triad Local School District Board of Education. 
______________________