Case Title: Mittelstadt v. Buckingham

Citation: 480 P.2d 831

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1971-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
480 P.2d 831 (1971) Walter W. MITTELSTADT, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Donald C. BUCKINGHAM, et al., Defendants and Respondents. No. 11925. Supreme Court of Montana. February 10, 1971. Murphy, Robinson, Heckathorn & Phillips, Kalispell, James Murphy, argued, Kalispell, for appellants. Baldwin & Jellison, Kalispell, M. Dean Jellison, argued, Kalispell, Edward J. Bell, argued, Helena, for respondents. CASTLES, Justice. This is an appeal from a portion of an order of the district court of the eleventh judicial district, Flathead County, which order for summary judgment found that a notice of classification and appraisal given by Flathead County did not comply with section 84-429.11, R.C.M. 1947. The portion of the order for summary judgment appealed from is the court's declination to further litigate other questions, as will appear hereinafter. A large group of landowners in Flathead County brought action against the county commissioners and the State Board of Equalization. It was denominated a class action for declaratory judgment. It sought declarations interpreting sections 84-429.7 through 84-429.12, R.C.M. 1947; and declarations as to the constitutionality of those sections; and whether section 84-429.10 required completion of classification and appraisal of lands not later than March 9, 1962. It further sought a writ of mandate to compel the defendants to correctly interpret and apply such sections; to enjoin the assessment and collection of taxes based upon allegedly erroneous interpretations; and, for costs of suit and attorney fees. Defendants appeared by way of motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs responded by motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motions in part, finding that the notice of classification and appraisal did not comply with section 84-429.11. Plaintiffs thereafter moved for an order pursuant to Rule 56(d), M.R.Civ.P., specifying the facts that appeared without controversy and the facts remaining to be determined upon a trial. Plaintiffs also sought an injunction to enjoin the County *832 from assessing and collecting any taxes from members of the class based upon the classification of their lands. The court denied the motion. One of the plaintiff landowners then sought a writ of supervisory control from this Court seeking to require the district court to either decide the alleged remaining issues or set the same for trial. This Court denied the application. This appeal then is from that portion of the district court's order whereby the court excluded from the order and refused to rule on the remaining issues or to set the same for trial. Plaintiffs own rural lands, formerly classified as either timber or agricultural lands. The Flathead County appraisal office has, over a period of several years, reclassified over 50,000 acres. The lands would now be classified as suburban tracts and thus are assessed at a higher, sometimes much higher valuation. Plaintiffs contend: "1. That the notice of reclassification given to the landowners did not comply with the provisions of Section 84-429.11, RCM, 1947. "2. That the State Board did not have power to create new classes into which property is placed for the purpose of assessing property taxes. "3. That the power to create new classes cannot be vested in the State Board of Equalization without violating the following Constitutional provisions: Article III, Section 27; Article XII, Section 1 and Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution of the State of Montana and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. "4. That such power to create new classes had been exercised by the state and county boards of equalization in an arbitrary, unjust and discriminatory manner. "5. That such power to classify lands has been exercised by the state and county boards in an arbitrary, unjust and discriminatory manner. "6. That the state and county boards cannot classify property for tax purposes on the basis of a use other than the actual use to which the property is devoted. "7. That the value of property for taxation cannot be based upon any use other than the actual use to which the property is devoted." The district court in its order denying plaintiffs' motions after judgment said: The issues presented by appellants are: "1. Failure of the District Court to include in its Order of May 12, 1970, a ruling with respect to the following issues raised by the Pleadings, to-wit: "A. Whether the State Board has the power to create new classes into which property is placed for the purpose of assessing property taxes. "B. Whether such power can be constitutionally vested in the State Board of Equalization. "C. Whether such power has been exercised in an arbitrary, unjust or discriminatory manner. "D. Whether the State or County Board can classify property on the basis of a use other than the actual use to which the property is devoted. "E. Whether the value of property for taxation can be based upon any use other than the actual use to which the property is devoted. "2. Failure of the District Court to grant Plaintiffs' Motion filed pursuant to Rule 56(d), M.R.Civ.P. requesting an *833 order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy and the facts remaining to be determined upon the trial of this action. "3. Failure of the District Court to grant Plaintiffs' Motion for an order enjoining and restraining the Defendants from assessing and collecting any taxes from Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated based upon the classification and appraisal of their lands as suburban tracts or from holding any hearings upon the question of classification and appraisal of such lands as `Suburban Tracts' pending a final adjudication of all issues raised in this action. "4. Failure of the District Court to set this case for trial upon the merits." Respondents, defendants below, have filed separate briefs. The State Board of Equalization's position, in a nutshell, is that since the statutory notice was not given for reclassification of the property, the remaining questions are abstract and moot. Flathead County agrees with that position but goes on to raise other matters, such as the necessity of other county officers, particularly the county treasurer, being necessary parties; that other suits by the same plaintiffs for recovery of taxes paid under protest are before the same court and thus the issues will be determined in what the county calls a proper suit. As to subissues A, B, D and E of Issue No. 1 above, this Court has largely settled the law as will appear hereinafter. As to subissue C, each individual landowner, by the nature of the issues, might have completely different issues that would not fit a class action theory and the resolution of those issues would likely not fit the class generally. We have used the words "might" and "likely" to indicate just how speculative any discussion of those issues would be. We choose to discuss subissues A, B, D and E of Issue No. 1 presented by appellants. Two recent decisions of this Court are relevant. They are State ex rel. Lord v. District Court, 154 Mont. 269, 463 P.2d 323, 324 decided November 18, 1969, and Mohland v. State Board of Equalization, 155 Mont. 49, 466 P.2d 582, decided March 12, 1970. In Mohland this Court said: In Lord this Court said: See also our discussion in State ex rel. Board of Equalization v. Vanderwood, 146 Mont. 276, 405 P.2d 652. From the foregoing quoted portions we have in effect answered some of the contentions in Issue No. 1 here. However, since the individual lands and owners have not been considered we shall not attempt to go further. The district court undoubtedly had in mind that to determine the issues on the merits would better be done in subsequent suits. We agree. The district court directed the County to give proper notice and found that proper notice had not been given. It granted an attorney fee. On appeal, without any cross-appeal or without first having excepted to the findings, the County attempts to raise the issue of attorney fees. However, the matter not being properly raised on appeal, the judgment is affirmed. We fail to see where the district court abused its discretion. The judgment is affirmed. JAMES T. HARRISON, C.J., and HASWELL and DALY, JJ., concur.