Case Title: DeFabio v. Gummersheimer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88383

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88383-Agenda 22-May 2000.
LEONARD DeFABIO, Appellee, v.
 JULIE GUMMERSHEIMER, Appellant.


Opinion filed July 6, 2000.
	JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
	The sole issue presented is whether the circuit court of
Monroe County properly invalidated every ballot cast in a
particular precinct, where none of those ballots contain the
requisite initials from an election judge.
BACKGROUND
	On November 5, 1996, the voters of Monroe County cast
ballots to decide whether Julie Gummersheimer or Leonard
DeFabio would serve as the county's next coroner. Two days later,
the Monroe County canvassing board declared Gummersheimer the
winner by two votes.
	DeFabio then filed a petition for election contest, alleging in
pertinent part that the official election results were invalid because,
in violation of sections 17-9, 19-8, and 20-9 of the Election Code
(10 ILCS 5/17-9, 19-8, 20-9 (West 1998)), none of the 524
ballots cast in Monroe County's second precinct were initialed by
an election judge. In the second precinct, Gummersheimer received
290 votes and DeFabio received 212 votes. DeFabio asked the trial
court to examine the ballots cast in the second precinct, to
invalidate any ballots that were not initialed, to recount the valid
ballots, and to declare DeFabio the winner of the November 6
election. Gummersheimer moved to dismiss the petition as both
facially deficient and time-barred, and the trial court denied that
motion.
	After the parties stipulated to both the total number of ballots
cast for each candidate and the number of uninitialed ballots in
each precinct, DeFabio moved for summary judgment. DeFabio
noted that the parties had stipulated that, of the 524 uninitialed
ballots cast in the second precinct, 290 were cast for
Gummersheimer and 212 were cast for DeFabio. In addition, of the
59 uninitialed ballots cast in other precincts, 38 were cast for
Gummersheimer and 21 were cast for DeFabio. DeFabio argued
that, in light of the stipulation, no genuine issue of material fact
existed because, pursuant to both the Election Code and case law,
the uninitialed ballots were legally invalid and could not be
counted.
	In her response to DeFabio's summary judgment motion,
Gummersheimer argued that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to the legal effect of the uninitialed ballots cast in the
second precinct. In support, Gummersheimer attached affidavits
from (1) the second precinct election judges, who would testify
that the absence of initials was due to mistake rather than to fraud
or corruption; and (2) two second precinct voters who failed to
notice that the election judge had not initialed the ballots.
	The trial court granted DeFabio's summary judgment motion.
In so doing, the trial court explained that, according to both the
Election Code and the Illinois Supreme Court, the initialing
requirement is mandatory for in-precinct ballots,(1) uninitialed ballots
are invalid and cannot be counted, and the absence or existence of
fraud is irrelevant to determining whether uninitialed in-precinct
ballots are valid. The trial court therefore invalidated all of the
uninitialed ballots, including every ballot cast in the second
precinct, and declared DeFabio the winner by 92 votes. After
allowing Gummersheimer's petition to recount the ballots from 10
additional precincts, the trial court modified its order and declared
DeFabio the winner by 70 votes.
	The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. 307 Ill.
App. 3d 381, and this court granted Gummersheimer's petition for
leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).
ANALYSIS
	The fundamental issue in this case is whether the trial court
properly invalidated all of the ballots cast in Monroe County's
second precinct. We hold that it did.
	Section 24A-10.1 of the Election Code provides that,"[i]f any
ballot card or ballot card envelope is not initialed, it shall be
marked on the back 'Defective', initialed as to such label by all
judges immediately under the word 'Defective' and not counted."
(Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/24A-10.1 (West 1998). For more
than 100 years, this court has "adhered to the rule that statutes
requiring election judges to initial ballots are mandatory, and that
uninitialed ballots may not be counted." McDunn v. Williams, 156 Ill. 2d 288, 311 (1993); see also Morandi v. Heiman, 23 Ill. 2d 365
(1961); Griffin v. Rausa, 2 Ill. 2d 421 (1954); Tuthill v.
Rendelman, 387 Ill. 321 (1944); Laird v. Williams, 281 Ill. 233
(1917); Kelly v. Adams, 183 Ill. 193, 195 (1899). This is true even
where the parties agree that there was no knowledge of fraud or
corruption. McDunn, 156 Ill. 2d  at 320.
	To be sure, this court has permitted relaxation of the
mandatory initialing requirement under very limited circumstances.
Specifically, this court has permitted the counting of only
uninitialed absentee ballots that are easily distinguished from in-precinct ballots. See, e.g., Pullen v. Mulligan, 138 Ill. 2d 21
(1990); Craig v. Peterson, 39 Ill. 2d 191 (1968). However, this
court has never permitted relaxation of the mandatory initialing
requirement for in-precinct ballots. In fact, this court has
repeatedly rejected such a notion. In Kelly, this court stated:
		"To ignore this provision of the statute and allow ballots
to be counted which do not contain the official
endorsement would authorize the voting of ballots that
might have been surreptitiously obtained or copied, and
one of the purposes of the Ballot law be entirely frittered
away and the door opened for fraud." Kelly, 183 Ill.  at
195.
In Craig, this court stated:
		"The statute requires the ballots to be initialled, it
commands that no unindorsed ballot shall be counted, this
requirement substantially contributes to the integrity of the
election process and is a valid, mandatory provision which
the courts must enforce." (Emphasis added.) Craig, 39 Ill. 2d  at 198.
Likewise, in addressing uninitialed absentee ballots that could not
be separated from the in-precinct ballots, this court stated:
		"[T]here must *** in order to prevent fraud, be some
method whereby illegally cast ballots may be distinguished
and rejected. The initialling provision is the principal
method chosen by the legislature for accomplishing this
purpose since the judge who has indorsed his initials upon
the ballot can thereafter identify that ballot as legally cast.
Because of the compelling importance to the public that
elections be honestly conducted, and the substantial
contribution of the initialling procedure to that result, no
constitutional problem arises and courts are free to enforce
the statutory command even though absentee voters may
be disenfranchised without fault on their part (one who
votes at the polls has the opportunity to see whether the
judge of election has initialled his ballot and request it to
be done if it has not)." Craig, 39 Ill. 2d  at 200-01.
In Pullen, this court stated:
		"Applying the initialling requirement to in-precinct ballots
is certainly necessary to preserve the integrity of the
election, because the initials provide the only means by
which the election officials can identify and separate the
legally cast from the illegally cast in-precinct ballots. Thus,
here, as in Craig, application of the initialling requirement
to in-precinct ballots prevented fraudulent practices, such
as stuffing the ballot box." (Emphasis in original.) Pullen,
138 Ill. 2d  at 53.
Most recently, in McDunn, this court stated:
			"[S]tatutes requiring initialling are not constitutionally
suspect. Voters who cast a ballot in-precinct will not lose
the right to vote without fault of their own because such
voters could tell whether the election judges had initialled
their ballots. Any voter at the precinct with an uninitialled
ballot could ask the election judge to initial his ballot and
thus ensure that his vote would be counted." McDunn,
156 Ill. 2d  at 314.
Significantly, notwithstanding this court's 100-year history of
strictly construing the statutory mandate that prohibits the counting
of uninitialed ballots, the legislature has never seen fit, in any
manner, to substantively amend that portion of the Election Code.
See Miller v. Lockett, 98 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (1983) ("Where the
legislature chooses not to amend a statute after a judicial
construction, it will be presumed that it has acquiesced in the
court's statement of the legislative intent").
	Applying these well-established principles to the present case,
we hold that the trial court properly invalidated all of the ballots
cast in Monroe County's second precinct. None of these ballots
contain the requisite initialing, and neither party argues that any of
the uninitialed ballots can be distinguished or identified as absentee
ballots. As the trial court correctly recognized, both section
24A-10.1 and more than 100 years of this court's jurisprudence
compel the invalidation of those ballots.
	Gummersheimer argues strongly against this result, insisting
that the foregoing precedents do not control because "[t]his court
has never considered the initialing requirement in the context
presented here, i.e. where the judges have failed in their duties by
failing to initial any and all of the ballots cast in the precinct, and
where there is no evidence of any fraud." (Emphasis in original.)
We disagree. In Laird v. Williams, 281 Ill. 233 (1917),(2) this court
examined whether any of the ballots cast in a municipal election
were valid, where the election judge who handed out the ballots
marked those ballots with the initials of another election judge.
After reviewing both the plain language of and the public policy
behind the mandatory initialing requirement, this court invalidated
every ballot cast in that election:
		"As our statute makes it absolutely necessary that every
ballot shall bear the official endorsement in the manner
aforesaid, we must hold that the election in this case was
void, although there is no evidence in the record that
discloses any fraud or intended fraud upon the part of the
election judges. We think it would be a very dangerous
rule to establish that the election judges may disregard the
plain provisions of this statute, and thereby defeat the
intention of the law to prevent actual frauds from being
committed in elections and to disarm the constituted
authorities of the efficient means provided by the statute
for detecting such frauds. Such salutary laws should not be
repealed, in effect, by the action of election judges simply
because their mistakes are innocent or because an honest
voter may lose his vote by holding such mistakes fatal. It
is more preferable that a voter should lose his vote by the
innocent action of the judges and by his own neglect to see
to it that he votes a ballot properly endorsed by a judge,
than to open the doors to wholesale fraud and corruption.
Every voter is presumed to know the law, and by proper
care on his part he can know, and should know, that the
ballot delivered to him is properly endorsed by one of the
election judges with his own initials." Laird, 281 Ill.  at
241-42.
Consequently, this court held that "there was not a single legal
ballot cast at the election in question, and for that reason no one
was elected as supervisor at that election." Laird, 281 Ill.  at 242.
	Certainly, if Laird permits the invalidation of every ballot cast
in an entire electoral district, subjecting a single precinct to a
similar fate compromises neither the constitution nor the Election
Code.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the appellate
court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
1.      1As opposed to absentee ballots.

2.      2Although Laird's construction of the mandatory initialing
requirement was briefly overruled (see Waters v. Heaton, 364 Ill. 150,
160 (1936)), it was promptly reaffirmed (see Tuthill v. Rendelman, 387 Ill. 321, 328-30 (1944); see also Harvey v. Sullivan, 406 Ill. 472, 477
(1950); Morandi, 23 Ill. 2d at 370-71).