Case Title: Vasco v. Wyo. DOT

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0235

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICHARD VASCO v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2011 WY 100Case Number: No. S-10-0235Decided: 06/27/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 

RICHARD 
VASCO,Appellant (Petitioner),v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,Appellee (Respondent).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

R. 
Michael Vang of Fleener & Vang LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Richard Vasco was arrested for 
interference with a police officer and for driving under the influence of 
alcohol.  He refused to submit to 
chemical testing, and the Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) advised 
him that it was suspending his driver's license for six months.  He requested a hearing, at the 
conclusion of which the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the 
suspension.  Mr. Vasco sought review 
in the district court, which affirmed the OAH order.  Mr. Vasco appealed to this Court, 
claiming the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest him.  We affirm.

 
 
 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]  The issue for our determination is 
whether probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Vasco for interference, such that 
the evidence that he had been driving under the influence of alcohol obtained 
thereafter was admissible and sufficient to support suspending his driver's 
license.

  

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On October 9, 2009, Laramie Police 
Officer Matthew Leibovitz responded to a report of a hit-and-run accident.  While en route, he learned that the 
driver had left the accident scene on foot.  He also learned that the vehicle 
involved, a 2008 black Nissan Titan, was registered to Richard Vasco who resided 
at an apartment on Baker Street in Laramie.  After confirming that other officers 
were at the accident scene, Officer Leibovitz went to the Baker Street 
address.  No one answered at the 
residence but Officer Leibovitz observed a man walking toward the apartment 
complex.  Having had previous 
contact with him, the officer recognized the man as Mr. Vasco.   

 
 
[¶4]  Officer Leibovitz approached and asked 
Mr. Vasco to identify himself.  Mr. 
Vasco responded that he was "Christopher" and attempted to walk past the 
officer.  Officer Leibovitz told him 
to stop, advised him that he was investigating a hit-and-run accident and asked 
him for identification.  Mr. Vasco 
produced his wallet, opened it enough to show a driver's license, but closed it 
before the officer could read the driver's license.  Officer Leibovitz asked him three more 
times for identification; each time, Mr. Vasco produced, opened and closed the 
wallet before the officer could read the driver's license. 

 

[¶5]  During this exchange, Officer Leibovitz 
smelled alcohol on Mr. Vasco's breath and noticed his eyes were red and glassy 
and he was swaying.  He asked Mr. 
Vasco where he was coming from; Mr. Vasco could not provide an answer.  He asked Mr. Vasco if he had been 
driving recently; Mr. Vasco said he had not been.  He asked Mr. Vasco where his vehicle 
was; Mr. Vasco did not answer.  Mr. 
Vasco kept saying that he was going inside and attempting to walk past Officer 
Leibovitz.

 
 
[¶6]  Officer Leibovitz again told Mr. Vasco 
to stay put and informed him that he was a suspect in the hit-and-run 
accident.  He told Mr. Vasco that if 
he did not provide identification he would take him into custody for interfering 
with a police officer.  Mr. Vasco 
nudged by him, stating "Let's go into my residence."  Officer Leibovitz placed him under 
arrest for interference and searched him.  
In Mr. Vasco's rear pocket, he found a set of keys with a Nissan remote 
control.  He later confirmed that 
the keys belonged to the black Nissan Titan involved in the accident.  

 
 
[¶7]  Officer Leibovitz took Mr. Vasco to the 
detention center.  He read the 
Wyoming implied consent advisement to him and Mr. Vasco refused to submit to a 
breath test.  The officer issued 
citations for DUI, interference, hit-and-run and failure to maintain automobile 
liability insurance.1         

 
 
[¶8]  Subsequently, WYDOT gave notice to Mr. 
Vasco that it was suspending his driver's license for six months because of his 
refusal to submit to a chemical test.  
Mr. Vasco requested a hearing.  
At the hearing, he argued that Officer Leibovitz did not have probable 
cause to arrest him for interference or DUI.  The OAH found otherwise and issued an 
order upholding the suspension.  Mr. 
Vasco sought review in the district court, which affirmed the OAH order.  Mr. Vasco then appealed to this 
Court.   

 
 
 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]  We accord no deference to a district 
court decision reviewing an administrative agency order.  Batten v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp. Drivers' 
License Div., 2007 WY 173, ¶ 6, 170 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Wyo. 2007).  Instead, we review the case as if it 
came directly from the administrative agency.  Id.  As provided by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) (LexisNexis 2009), we apply the substantial evidence standard 
when reviewing an agency's evidentiary findings.  When the burdened party prevailed before 
the agency, we will determine if substantial evidence exists to support the 
finding for that party by considering whether there is relevant evidence in the 
entire record which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  Schouboe v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp., 2010 
WY 119, ¶ 5, 238 P.3d 1246, 1248 (Wyo. 2010), quoting Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 
84, 188 P.3d 554 (Wyo. 2008).  On 
the question of probable cause, we apply the substantial evidence standard of 
review to the hearing examiner's factual findings concerning whether the trooper 
had probable cause to arrest, but review the constitutionality of the particular 
seizure de novo.  Batten v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp. Drivers' 
License Div., 170 P.3d 1236, 1240 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]  Wyoming's implied consent statutes which 
gave rise to the suspension of Mr. Vasco's driver's license and the 
administrative hearing in this case provide in relevant part as 
follows:

 
 
§ 
31-6-102. Test to determine alcoholic or controlled     substance content of 
blood; suspension of license.

 
 
            
(a) If arrested for an offense as defined by W.S. 31-5-233 
[DUI]:

            
(i) Any person who drives or is in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway in 
this state is deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of 
this act, to a chemical test or tests 
. . . or controlled substance content of his blood.  The test or tests shall 
be:

            
(A) Incidental to a lawful arrest;

            
(B) Given as promptly as possible after the arrest;

            
(C) Administered at the direction 
of a peace officer who has probable cause to believe the person was driving or 
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public street or 
highway in this state in violation of W.S. 31-5-233(b) or any other law 
prohibiting driving under the influence as defined by W.S. 31-5-233(a)(v).   * * * *

            
(ii) For tests required under this act, the arrested person shall be advised 
that:

            
(A) His failure to submit to all required chemical tests requested by the 
peace officer shall result in the suspension of his Wyoming driver's 
license 
or his privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of six (6) months for a 
first offense or eighteen (18) months for a second or subsequent offense and he 
may be required to drive only vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock 
device as provided by W.S. 31-6-107;

            
* * * *

            
(d) If a person under arrest 
refuses upon the request of a peace officer to submit to a chemical test 
designated by the agency employing the peace officer as provided in 
subsection (a) of this section, none shall be given except in cases where 
serious bodily injury or death has resulted.  The peace officer shall submit his signed 
statement to the department.  The 
statement submitted by the officer shall contain:

            
(i) His probable cause to believe the arrested person was driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle:

            
(A) On a public street or highway in this state;

            
(B) In violation of W.S. 31-5-233(b) or any other law prohibiting driving 
under the influence as defined by W.S. 31-5-233(a)(v);  and

            
(ii) That the person refused to submit to a test upon the request of the 
peace officer.

* 
* * *

(f) 
In addition to the signed statement submitted under subsection (d) . . . of this 
section, the peace officer shall issue the person a temporary license . . . 
contain[ing] a notice that the person has twenty (20) days from the date of 
issuance within which to request a hearing from the department. . . 
.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  

 
 
§ 
31-6-103. Application for hearing; stay of suspension of license; scope of 
hearing

 
 
            
(a) A timely request for a hearing shall stay the suspension until the 
order following the hearing is entered and all appellate review of the matter is 
completed, provided the stay of suspension is effective only so long as there is 
no suspension for a similar violation during the hearing and appeal 
period.

            
(b) The scope of a hearing for the 
purposes of this act shall cover the issues of whether a peace officer had 
probable cause to believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway in this 
state in violation of W.S. 31-5-233(b) or any other law prohibiting driving 
under the influence as defined by W.S. 31-5-233(a)(v), whether the person was placed under arrest, whether he refused to submit to a test upon 
request of the peace officer or if he submitted to a test whether the test 
results indicated that the person had an alcohol concentration of eight 
one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more, and whether, except for the 
persons described in this act who are incapable of refusing, he had been given 
the advisements required by W.S. 31-6-102(a)(ii).  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
hearing examiner shall order that the suspension either be rescinded or 
sustained. . . . 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

            

[¶11]  Pursuant to § 31-6-102(a)(i)(A) and (C), 
a chemical test was to be administered to Mr. Vasco incidental to a lawful 
arrest and at the direction of a police officer having probable cause to believe 
Mr. Vasco had been driving while under the influence of alcohol.  Subsection (a)(ii) required the officer 
to advise Mr. Vasco that his failure to submit to chemical testing would result 
in suspension of his license.  When 
Mr. Vasco refused the test, the officer was required pursuant to § 31-6-102(d) 
to submit a statement containing his probable cause to believe Mr. Vasco was 
driving under the influence and provide notice to Mr. Vasco pursuant to § 
31-6-102(f) that he could request a hearing to determine under § 31-6-103(b) 
whether probable cause existed to believe he was driving under the 
influence.  Clearly, the implied 
consent statutes are invoked when an officer lawfully arrests an individual with 
probable cause to believe he was driving under the 
influence.

 
 
[¶12]  Mr. Vasco contends his arrest for 
interference with a police officer was unlawful because Officer Leibovitz lacked 
probable cause for the arrest.  He 
argues further that because the interference arrest was unlawful, all of the 
evidence obtained thereafter was tainted and should have been suppressed.  Because the suspension of his driver's 
license depended upon a lawful arrest for DUI and the evidence giving rise to 
his DUI arrest resulted from an unlawful interference arrest, Mr. Vasco submits, 
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine barred the evidence of either arrest 
and the suspension of this license must be rescinded. 

 
 
[¶13]  Addressing the fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine, we have said:

 
 
            
When law enforcement obtains evidence through unlawful search or seizure, 
that evidence is inadmissible against the victim of the unlawful action.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
484, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).  This long-standing remedy for the 
accused is necessary to give effect to the fundamental protections against 
unreasonable search and seizure.  Id.  "[I]f the initial search is held 
improper, not only the evidence obtained by such search but everything which 
becomes accessible to the prosecution by reason of the initial search would be 
inadmissible as a fruit of the poisonous tree.'"  

 
 

Hall 
v. State, 
2007 WY 138, ¶ 7, 166 P.3d 875, 877 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶14]  As applied in the present case, if 
Officer Leibovitz lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Vasco for interference, 
the subsequent search was improper and the evidence obtained in the search which 
supported the DUI arrest was inadmissible.  
Mr. Vasco's assertion that probable cause did not exist to arrest him for 
interference is based upon several contentions:   first, even if he "nudged" the 
officer, a nudge does not constitute interference with a police officer; second, 
he had the right not to incriminate himself and consequently the right not to 
speak to the officer; third, even if he did provide a false name, doing so did 
not interfere with the investigation because Officer Leibovitz said he knew his 
real name; and fourth, the officer's statement that Mr. Vasco invited him into 
his apartment refutes the assertion that he was interfering with the 
investigation.  The State responds 
that the totality of the circumstances supported the OAH determination that 
probable cause existed to support the arrest and suspension of Mr. Vasco's 
license.  

      

[¶15]  We begin by considering whether probable 
cause existed to support Mr. Vasco's arrest for interference with a police 
officer.  Probable cause for a 
warrantless arrest exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, a 
prudent, reasonable, and cautious peace officer would be led to believe that a 
crime has been or is being committed and the individual arrested is the 
perpetrator.  Bradshaw v. Wyo. Dep't of Transp. Drivers' 
License Div., 2006 WY 70, ¶ 18, 135 P.3d 612, 618 (Wyo. 2006).  Officer Leibovitz arrested Mr. Vasco for 
violating Laramie Municipal Ordinance § 9.04.030, which provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 
            
No person shall resist any police officer . . . in the discharge of his 
duties or in any way interfere with or hinder or prevent him from discharging 
his duty . . . or endeavor to do so.  
* * * *2

    

[¶16]  The State had the burden of proving 
probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Vasco for interference.  The State's submission of the certified 
record in a driver's license suspension contested case proceeding has been 
deemed sufficient to establish a prima facie case and to shift the burden to the 
petitioner to provide evidence to refute the prima facie case.  Schouboe, ¶ 8, 238 P.3d  at 1248.  Thus, we consider whether the certified 
record established a prima facie case of interference with a police 
officer.  

 
 
[¶17] 
From the totality of the circumstances, we conclude a prudent, reasonable and 
cautious peace officer would have been led to believe that Mr. Vasco was 
resisting, interfering, hampering or preventing the discharge of his 
duties.  When Officer Leibovitz 
asked him for identification, Mr. Vasco gave a false name and attempted to walk 
past the officer.  Officer Leibovitz 
told him to stop, informed him that he was investigating a hit and run accident 
and asked again to see some identification.  Mr. Vasco hindered the officer's efforts 
by opening, closing and putting his wallet back in his pocket several times 
without letting the officer see his driver's license.  He also disregarded the officer's order 
to stay where he was and answer questions by attempting to go inside his 
apartment.  After Officer Leibovitz 
warned him that he would be arrested for interference if he did not produce his 
driver's license, Mr. Vasco nudged past him and headed for his apartment.  By these acts, Mr. Vasco gave the 
officer probable cause to believe that he was hindering him from discharging his 
duty to investigate the hit-and-run accident.  Officer Leibovitz had probable cause to 
arrest Mr. Vasco for interference with a police officer.

 
 
[¶18]  Office Leibovitz also had probable cause 
to believe Mr. Vasco had been driving under the influence of alcohol.  At the time the officer stopped and 
questioned Mr. Vasco, he knew the Nissan truck involved in the hit-and-run 
accident was registered to Mr. Vasco and the driver had left the scene on 
foot.  Additionally, he had seen Mr. 
Vasco, who he knew from previous contact, walking from the direction of the 
accident toward his apartment.  Upon 
stopping and questioning him, the officer smelled alcohol on Mr. Vasco's breath 
and noticed his eyes were red and he was swaying.  After arresting him for interference, 
the officer searched Mr. Vasco and found a set of keys with a Nissan remote 
control.  The officer subsequently 
confirmed that the keys belonged to the Nissan involved in the accident.  Additionally, he learned that another 
officer had found a beer bottle on the ground outside the passenger door of the 
Nissan and that the beer bottle fell out when the person whose vehicle the 
Nissan hit went looking for the driver and opened the passenger door.  With that information, Officer Leibovitz 
had probable cause to believe that Mr. Vasco had been driving the Nissan while 
under the influence of alcohol and was required to advise Mr. Vasco, who was 
then lawfully under arrest, in accordance with the Wyoming implied consent 
statutes.         

 
 
[¶19]  Although not mentioned in his statement 
of the issues, Mr. Vasco also asserts the OAH improperly disregarded his 
testimony and that of the only disinterested witness, a neighbor the police 
spoke to that evening who observed Mr. Vasco's interaction with Officer 
Leibovitz.  She testified that Mr. 
Vasco patted his pockets but produced nothing when the officer asked him for 
identification; it did not appear to her that the officer recognized Mr. Vasco; 
and it did not appear that Mr. Vasco touched the officer as he walked by 
him.  We have said:       

 
 
If, 
in the course of its decision making process, the agency disregards certain 
evidence and explains its reasons for doing so based upon determinations of 
credibility or other factors contained in the record, its decision will be 
sustainable under the substantial evidence test.  

 
 

Schouboe, 
¶ 5, 238 P.3d  at 1248.  

 
 
[¶20]  In its order, the OAH stated that it 
gave no weight to Mr. Vasco's testimony because he compromised his credibility 
when he testified that he was not driving his Nissan on the night of the 
accident, said he did not know who was driving it, and then said he 
misunderstood the question and, in fact, was driving the vehicle that 
night.  The OAH also found the 
neighbor's testimony insufficient to rebut the facts contained in Officer 
Leibovitz' report.  Having reviewed 
the record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the OAH decision. 

 
 
[¶21]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 
1The 
officers at the accident scene advised Officer Leibovitz that the proof of 
insurance found in the black Nissan Titan was 
expired.

2Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-5-204(a) (LexisNexis 2009) similarly 
provides:

 
 
            
(a)  A person commits a 
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of 
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both, if he knowingly obstructs, 
impedes or interferes with . . . a peace officer while engaged in the lawful 
performance of his official duties.