Case Title: All Star Rent A Car, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation

Citation: 2006 WI 85

Docket Number: 2003AP002668

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 85 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2668 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
All Star Rent A Car, Inc.,  
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation  
and Wisconsin Division of Hearings and  
Appeals,  
          Respondents-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 198 
Reported at:  276 Wis. 2d 793, 688 N.W.2d 681 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 27, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Moria Krueger   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BUTLER, JR., J., joins the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondents-respondents-petitioners, the cause was 
argued by F. Thomas Creeron III, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
For the petitioner-appellant there was a brief by Richard 
J. Ward and RJW Legal Services Group, S.C., Madison, and oral 
argument by Richard J. Ward. 
 
 
2006 WI 85
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2668  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV1566) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
All Star Rent A Car, Inc., 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation and 
Wisconsin Division of Hearings and Appeals, 
 
          Respondents-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case involves All Star 
Rent A Car, Inc.'s (All Star) failure to name and serve the 
Division of Hearings and Appeals (DHA) as respondent when All 
Star sought review of DHA's decision in circuit court.  The 
circuit court dismissed All Star's petition on grounds that All 
Star failed to comply with Wis. Stat. § 227.53.1  The court of 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
2 
 
appeals reversed in a published decision2 because it concluded 
that the relevant statutes were ambiguous and, as a result, All 
Star's 
action 
in 
naming 
and 
serving 
the 
Department 
of 
Transportation (DOT), but not the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals (DHA), was reasonable under the circumstances.  We agree 
with the court of appeals that the relevant statutes are 
ambiguous.  We also recognize that All Star was required to 
serve 
DOT 
as 
a 
party 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(c).  
Nevertheless, we conclude that All Star's failure to follow the 
instructions in the "Notice" of review rights appended to DHA's 
written decision——instructions that directed All Star to name 
DHA as respondent in a notice that clarified the confusing 
statutes——was not reasonable.  Consequently, we reverse. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
The DOT licenses motor vehicle dealers in Wisconsin.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 218.0101(23) and 218.0114(1).  All Star is a 
licensed motor vehicle dealer that purchases damaged cars and 
sells them after making repairs.  In 2002 All Star's dealer 
license was scheduled to expire on September 30.  Because of 
consumer complaints and other evidence of statutory violations, 
the DOT filed a complaint with the DHA to revoke All Star's 
license.  The complaint was dated July 17, 2002. 
¶3 
On August 30, looking ahead to its September 30 
license expiration, All Star applied for renewal of its license.  
                                                 
2 All Star Rent A Car, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Transp., 2004 
WI App 198, 276 Wis. 2d 793, 688 N.W.2d 681. 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
3 
 
By letter dated September 4, 2002, DOT denied the application.  
On September 25 All Star responded to this denial by filing a 
request with DHA for a hearing to review the denial.  
¶4 
The DHA combined the revocation proceeding (TR-02-
0030) and the nonrenewal proceeding (TR-02-0044) for a contested 
case hearing on November 8, 2002, before Administrative Law 
Judge Mark J. Kaiser (ALJ).  On March 13, 2003, the ALJ issued a 
proposed decision.  The proposed decision found that DOT had 
proved two of the three violations it had alleged against All 
Star, and the proposed order revoked All Star's license and 
affirmed DOT's nonrenewal of the license. 
¶5 
After 
receiving 
comments 
from 
the 
parties, 
the 
Administrator of DHA, David Schwarz, issued a Final Decision on 
May 15, 2003.  In the Final Decision, the Administrator made 21 
findings of fact and asserted 6 conclusions of law.  The 
Administrator's Order affirmed DOT's denial of All Star's 
license renewal and revoked All Star's motor vehicle license.3   
                                                 
3 DHA ordered All Star's license revoked for two reasons.  
First, DHA found that All Star had sold a car with damage to its 
frame without supplying notice to the buyer, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(1)(gm) as interpreted by Wis. Admin. Code 
§ Trans 139.04(4) and (6).  Second, DHA found that All Star had 
refused to produce records when requested by DOT, in violation 
of Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(5). 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Attached to DHA's Final Decision was a Notice of All 
Star's right to judicial review of the decision.4  The Notice——
headed in bold type——stated: 
Set out below is a list of alternative methods 
available to persons who may wish to obtain review of 
the attached decision of the Division.  This notice is 
provided to insure compliance with Wis. Stat. § 227.48 
and sets out the rights of any party to this 
proceeding 
to 
petition 
for 
rehearing 
and 
administrative 
or 
judicial review 
of 
an 
adverse 
decision. 
. . . .  
2. 
Any 
person 
aggrieved 
by 
the 
attached 
decision 
which 
adversely 
affects 
the 
substantial 
interests of such person by action or inaction, 
affirmative or negative in form is entitled to 
judicial review by filing a petition [therefor] in 
accordance with the provisions of Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 
and 227.53.  Said petition must be filed within thirty 
(30) days after service of the agency decision sought 
to be reviewed.  If a rehearing is requested as noted 
in paragraph (1) [setting forth the procedure for 
requesting a rehearing before DHA] above, any party 
seeking judicial review shall serve and file a 
petition for review within thirty (30) days after 
service of the order disposing of the rehearing 
application or within thirty (30) days after final 
disposition by operation of law.  Any petition for 
judicial review shall name the Division of Hearings 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.48(2) requires DHA to append this 
notice to its decisions.  In part, § 227.48(2) states: "Each 
decision shall include notice of any right of the parties to 
petition for rehearing and administrative or judicial review of 
adverse decisions, the time allowed for filing each petition and 
identification of the party to be named as respondent." 
The legislature enacted the text of Wis. Stat. § 227.48(2) 
in ch. 378, Laws of 1981, in response to Sunnyview Village, Inc. 
v. Department of Administration, 104 Wis. 2d 396, 311 N.W.2d 632 
(1981). 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
5 
 
and Appeals as the respondent.  Persons desiring to 
file for judicial review are advised to closely 
examine all provisions of Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 
227.53 to insure strict compliance with all its 
requirements.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶7 
On May 26, 2003, All Star petitioned the Dane County 
Circuit Court for judicial review of DHA's decision pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 227.52.  In its petition, All Star named DOT as the 
respondent and served the petition upon DOT and the Attorney 
General.  All Star did not name or serve DHA.  On May 29, 2003, 
the circuit court held a hearing on All Star's motion to stay 
the effect of DHA's order.  On June 13, 2003, the circuit court 
held a second hearing on All Star's stay request.  Present at 
both hearings were attorneys for DOT and the Attorney General.  
Ultimately, the circuit court granted All Star's request for a 
stay. 
¶8 
On June 16, 2003, more than 30 days after All Star 
received the May 15 decision, and 20 days after All Star served 
DOT with its petition for judicial review, DOT filed a notice of 
appearance and a motion to dismiss.5  DOT claimed the circuit 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over DHA and subject matter 
                                                 
5 The number of days is significant because: (1) all parties 
necessary to judicial review of an administrative decision must 
be 
served 
within 
30 
days 
of 
the 
agency's 
decision, 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)2.; and (2) parties who desire to 
participate 
in 
the 
judicial 
review 
must 
serve 
upon 
the 
petitioner, within 20 days of receiving the petition for 
judicial review, a notice of appearance that sets forth that 
party's position on each material allegation in the petition.  
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(2). 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
6 
 
jurisdiction.6  The circuit court agreed and dismissed All Star's 
petition because All Star failed to name and serve DHA as the 
respondent, 
which 
the 
court 
concluded 
was 
required 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(b). 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
held: 
(1) 
Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53 clearly required service upon 
DHA; and (2) All Star's decision "to serve a party entirely 
unrelated to the deciding 'agency[,]'" was neither reasonable 
nor logical. 
¶9 
All Star appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
The court of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. § 227.53 is 
ambiguous in prescribing "which administrative entity All Star 
was required to serve . . . ."  All Star Rent A Car v. Wis. 
Dep't of Transp., 2004 WI App 198, ¶1, 276 Wis. 2d 793, 688 
N.W.2d 681.   
¶10 The court of appeals found two sources of ambiguity.  
First, Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(b) requires the petition to be 
entitled in "the name of the agency whose decision is sought to 
be reviewed as respondent . . . ."  (Emphasis added.)  Wisconsin 
Stat. § 227.01(1) defines an "agency" as "the Wisconsin land 
council or a board, commission, committee, department or officer 
                                                 
6 Subsequent to DOT filing its motion to dismiss, we decided 
Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, in which we discussed subject 
matter jurisdiction and competency (the court's ability to 
exercise its subject matter jurisdiction).  2004 WI 79, ¶¶8-9, 
273 
Wis. 2d 76, 
681 
N.W.2d 190. 
 
DOT 
and 
DHA 
correctly 
acknowledged in their brief to this court that the second basis 
for their motion to dismiss was actually a challenge to the 
circuit court's competency.  Accordingly, we will refer to this 
basis for dismissal as the competency of the circuit court. 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
7 
 
in the state government, except the governor, a district 
attorney or a military or judicial officer."  DHA is a 
"division" 
of 
the 
Department 
of 
Administration 
(DOA).  
Wis. Stat. § 218.0101(9).  A "division" does not fit within the 
definition of agency in § 227.01(1).  Therefore, the court of 
appeals concluded, § 227.53 does not clearly require DHA to be 
named and served as the respondent.  All Star Rent A Car, 276 
Wis. 2d 793, ¶11. 
¶11 Second, Wis. Stat. § 227.46(2m) states: "The decision 
of the administrator of the division of hearings and appeals is 
a final decision of the agency subject to judicial review under 
s. 227.52."  The court of appeals concluded that a reasonable 
reading of this statute is that "the DHA administrator's 
decision becomes the final decision of the DOT."  All Star Rent 
A Car, 276 Wis. 2d 793, ¶12.  Thus, the court of appeals 
concluded the interaction between Wis. Stat. §§  227.53 and 
227.46(2m) rendered the former unclear as to whom must be named 
and served as the respondent.  Id. 
¶12 We granted the DOT and DHA's petition for review. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 Whether 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1) 
clearly 
prescribes 
which agency must be named and served as the respondent requires 
statutory 
interpretation. 
 
Statutory 
interpretation 
is 
a 
question of law we review de novo.  State v. Tucker, 2005 WI 46, 
¶11, 279 Wis. 2d 697, 703, 694 N.W.2d 926. 
¶14 Likewise, whether All Star's failure to name and serve 
DHA was reasonable under the circumstances is a question of law, 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
8 
 
since the underlying facts are not in dispute.  See State ex 
rel. Coleman v. McCaughtry, 2006 WI 49, ¶17, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 
714 N.W.2d 900. 
¶15 Finally, determinations of waiver generally present 
mixed questions of fact and law.  See Reckner v. Reckner, 105 
Wis. 2d 425, 435, 314 N.W.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1981).  Where the 
facts are undisputed, however, the question of whether DOT 
waived its objection to the competence of the circuit court is a 
question of law we review de novo.  Johnson v. Rogers Mem'l 
Hosp., 2005 WI 114, ¶31, 283 Wis. 2d 384, 700 N.W.2d 27. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶16 This case requires the court to consider three 
questions: 
1. 
Does Wis. Stat. § 227.53 clearly set forth 
which agency must be named and served as respondent on 
the facts of this case? 
2. 
If § 227.53 does not clearly set forth which 
agency must be named and served, was All Star's action 
in naming and serving only DOT reasonable? 
3. 
Did 
DOT 
waive 
its 
objection 
to 
the 
"competency" of the circuit court by participating in 
two court hearings? 
¶17 Before we turn to the merits of the parties' dispute, 
we will briefly describe DOT's licensing procedure, judicial 
review of DOT licensing decisions, and the relationship of DHA 
to DOT. 
¶18 DOT is charged with issuing and supervising motor 
vehicle dealer licenses.  Wis. Stat. § 218.0111.  DOT has the 
authority to deny an application for a license, including a 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
9 
 
renewal application.  Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(2).  If an applicant 
wishes to contest DOT's denial decision, it must petition DHA 
for review.  Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(2).  DHA, therefore, is the 
final decision-maker as to whether a license application will be 
granted. 
¶19 DHA's 
authority 
is 
even 
clearer 
in 
a 
license 
revocation.  DOT lacks authority to suspend or revoke a motor 
vehicle 
dealer 
license 
without 
a 
hearing.  
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(4)(a). 
 
DOT 
may 
initiate 
license 
revocation proceedings, but these matters "shall be heard and 
decided 
by 
the 
division 
of 
hearings 
and 
appeals."  
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(4)(c).   
¶20 Thus, for both license-application denials and license 
revocations 
DHA 
is 
the 
final 
decision-maker. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 227.43(1)(bg) 
(requiring 
DHA 
administrator 
to 
assign a hearing examiner to preside over proceedings concerning 
the nonrenewal and revocation of motor vehicle dealer licenses) 
and 227.46(2m) ("The decision of the administrator of the 
division of hearings and appeals is a final decision of the 
agency subject to judicial review."); see also Racine Harley-
Davidson, Inc. v. State of Wis. Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 
WI 86, ¶¶24-25, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.  Thereafter, "[a]ny 
person in interest aggrieved by a decision of the division of 
hearings and appeals . . . may have a review of the decision as 
provided in ch. 227."  Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(9). 
¶21 Any person whose substantial interests are adversely 
affected by an administrative decision may obtain judicial 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
10 
 
review. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 227.52. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 227.53 
prescribes the procedures an aggrieved person must follow to 
obtain judicial review.  Among these requirements are the 
following:   
1. 
The person must petition for judicial review 
within 30 days of service of the agency decision 
(Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)2.); 
2. 
The person shall entitle the petition in the 
name of the person serving the petition as petitioner 
"and the name of the agency whose decision is sought 
to 
be 
reviewed 
as 
respondent" 
(Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(b)); and  
3. 
The person must serve a copy of the petition 
upon the agency whose decision is sought to be 
reviewed (Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(a)1.) and "upon each 
party who appeared before the agency in the proceeding 
in which the decision sought to be reviewed was made 
or 
upon 
the 
party's 
attorney 
of 
record."  
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(c).   
At issue is whether these provisions clearly designate the 
entity that must be named and served as respondent. 
A. 
Is Wisconsin Stat. § 227.53 Ambiguous? 
 
¶22 The dispute in this case centers on the meaning of the 
phrase 
"the 
agency" 
in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 227.53(1)(a)1. 
and 
227.53(1)(b): 
 
(a)1. 
Proceedings 
for 
review 
shall 
be 
instituted by serving a petition . . . upon the agency 
or one of its officials . . . . If the agency whose 
decision is sought to be reviewed is . . . . 
 
(b)  . . .  The petition shall be entitled in 
the name of the person serving it as petitioner and 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
11 
 
the name of the agency whose decision is sought to be 
reviewed as respondent . . . .  (Emphasis added.)7  
¶23 The 
phrase 
"the 
agency" 
appears 
10 
times 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1).  All Star contends that in this case 
"the agency" means DOT; DOT contends that "the agency" means 
DHA.  Given these competing interpretations, we must determine 
whether § 227.53(1) is ambiguous. 
¶24 A statute is not ambiguous merely because the parties 
disagree about its meaning.  Preston v. Meriter Hosp., Inc., 
2005 WI 122, ¶20, 284 Wis. 2d 264, 700 N.W.2d 158.  A statute is 
ambiguous 
if 
reasonable 
persons 
could 
reach 
different 
interpretations about its meaning.  Keup v. DHFS, 2004 WI 16, 
¶17, 269 Wis. 2d 59, 675 N.W.2d 755 (citing State v. Delaney, 
2003 WI 9, ¶14, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416).  The test for 
ambiguity is whether the language of the statute reasonably 
gives rise to different meanings, so that well informed persons 
should have become confused.  Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 
28, ¶21, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656.  
¶25 A statute that appears clear on its face may be 
rendered ambiguous by its interaction with other statutes.  
Aurora Med. Group v. DWD, 2000 WI 70, ¶35, 236 Wis. 2d 1, 612 
N.W.2d 646; 
McDonough 
v. 
DWD, 
227 
Wis. 2d 271, 
278, 
595 
                                                 
7 In particular, the parties' dispute centers on the meaning 
of "the agency" in Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(b), which states in 
relevant part: "The petition shall be entitled in the name of 
the person serving it as petitioner and the name of the agency 
whose decision is sought to be reviewed as respondent . . . ."  
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
12 
 
N.W.2d 686 (1999).  This potential source of ambiguity drives 
the dispute in the present case.   
¶26 All Star argues that when Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1) is 
read in the context of Wis. Stat. §§ 227.01(1), 227.46(2m), and 
227.48(2), 
it 
is 
clear 
that the 
agency 
referred 
to in 
§ 227.53(1) 
is 
DOT. 
 
Conversely, 
DOT 
argues 
that 
when 
§ 227.53(1) is read in the context of Wis. Stat. §§ 218.0116, 
227.46(2m), and 227.47(1), it is clear that § 227.53(1) refers 
to DHA. 
¶27 After reviewing the interplay of all these statutes, 
we believe the statutory directive as to which government entity 
must be named and served is ambiguous in this case. 
¶28 First, we consider whether Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1) can 
be interpreted reasonably to suggest or require DOT to be named 
and served as respondent.  If it cannot, then our analysis ends 
and the circuit court's dismissal must be affirmed. 
¶29 In interpreting the phrase, "the agency whose decision 
is sought to be reviewed[,]" we begin by considering how 
Wis. Stat. ch. 227 defines "agency."  Throughout Chapter 227, 
agency means "the Wisconsin land council or a board, commission, 
committee, department or officer in the state government, except 
the governor, a district attorney or a military or judicial 
officer."  Wis. Stat. § 227.01(1).  Notably absent from this 
definition of agency is any mention of a "division."  Because 
DHA is a division, All Star reasons that the references in 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1) to "the agency" cannot require DHA to be 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
13 
 
named and served as the respondent.  The court of appeals 
agreed. 
¶30 An almost identical issue was litigated 25 years ago 
in Sunnyview Village, Inc. v. Department of Administration, 104 
Wis. 2d 396, 311 N.W.2d 632 (1981).  The Sunnyview nursing home 
had failed to name and serve the Division of Nursing Home 
Forfeiture 
Appeals 
(DNHFA) 
located 
in 
the 
Department 
of 
Administration, as it was arguably required to do by then-
Wis. Stat. § 227.16(1) 
(1979-80), 
the 
predecessor 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1).  The court, in an opinion by then-
Justice Abrahamson, observed that "sec. 227.16 remains complex 
and becomes confusing not only when read in a cursory fashion 
but also when read in conjunction with sec. 227.01(1) which 
defines agency."  Id. at 400.  At that time, the definition of 
"agency" in § 227.01 had not been amended to reflect the 1967 
restructuring of the executive branch, which made "divisions" 
the principal subunit of a department.  Id. at 400-02 & n.4. 
¶31 That definition has still not been changed, and it 
still serves as something of a snare for the unwary litigant.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the definition of agency in 
Wis. Stat. § 227.01(1) can be reasonably interpreted to exclude 
a division.  Thus, All Star's failure to name and serve DHA as 
the respondent might be understandable if it had only the 
statutes for guidance. 
¶32 This does not mean, however, that naming and serving 
only DOT as respondent was a reasonable interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1).  Despite its similarities, Sunnyview 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
14 
 
Village does not control the outcome of this case.  In Sunnyview 
Village the nursing home did not name and serve DNHFA as 
respondent.  It named and served DOA as respondent.  Id.  
Because a department is clearly an agency, and because DNHFA was 
a division or subunit of DOA, we held that serving the petition 
upon 
DOA 
and 
naming it 
as 
respondent was 
a 
reasonable 
interpretation of the predecessor to § 227.53(1).  Id. at 412. 
¶33 Unlike the petitioner in Sunnyview Village, All Star 
did not name and serve DOA, of which DHA is a subunit.  All Star 
named and served DOT, an agency unrelated to DHA.  Thus, 
although the interplay of the definition of agency with § 227.53 
arguably produces ambiguity with regard to divisions, this 
ambiguity is not sufficient to justify naming and serving DOT as 
the respondent. 
¶34 Only 
after 
one 
considers 
the 
interaction 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 227.46(2m) 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1) 
does 
sufficient ambiguity arise to rationalize All Star's decision to 
name and serve DOT as the respondent.  Section 227.46(2m) 
states: "The decision of the administrator of the [DHA] is a 
final decision of the agency subject to judicial review under s. 
227.52.  The department of transportation may petition for 
judicial review."  All Star interprets § 227.46(2m) as imputing 
the decision of DHA to DOT, as though DOT adopted the decision 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
15 
 
as its own.8  The court of appeals apparently agreed, concluding 
it 
"could 
reasonably 
be 
read 
to 
mean 
that 
the 
DHA 
administrator's decision becomes the final decision of the DOT."  
All Star Rent A Car, 276 Wis. 2d 793, ¶12.   
¶35 We 
agree 
that 
this 
reading 
of 
§ 227.46(2m) 
is 
reasonable.  After all, § 227.46(2m) would appear redundant if 
it means that the decision of the administrator of DHA is a 
final decision of DHA.  Accordingly, we conclude that All Star 
could have interpreted § 227.53(1)(b) to require it to name DOT 
as respondent. 
¶36 All Star draws our attention to an additional problem.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 227.48(2), the statute that requires an agency 
to provide notice of judicial review rights to an aggrieved 
party, provides in part: 
2. 
Each decision shall include notice of any 
right of the parties to petition for rehearing and 
administrative 
or 
judicial 
review 
of 
adverse 
decisions, the time allowed for filing each petition 
and identification of the party to be named as 
respondent.  No time period specified under . . . s. 
227.53(1)(a) for filing a petition for judicial review 
or under any other section permitting administrative 
review of an agency decision begins to run until the 
agency has complied with this subsection.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
¶37 All Star cites Wis. Stat. § 227.01(8), which defines 
"party": "'Party' means a person or agency named or admitted as 
                                                 
8 Unlike the DNR, which automatically adopts DHA decisions 
if it does not seek review, there is no comparable statutory 
provision by which DOT adopts a DHA decision.  See Hilton v. 
DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶14, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (discussing 
Wis. Stat. § 227.46(3)(a)). 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
16 
 
a party in a contested case."  (Emphasis added.)  All Star notes 
that DHA's decision identified the parties to the contested case 
as All Star and DOT. 
 
¶38 This argument takes us back to the definitional 
problem with "agency," and it engenders some uncertainty as to 
whether DHA——the decision-making tribunal——is converted into a 
"party" in judicial review.  We note, on the other hand, that 
"the agency" that must comply with the notice requirement of 
Wis. Stat. § 227.48(2) would not be DOT.  It is DHA.  The 
subsection may be viewed as internally inconsistent. 
¶39 The conclusion that the statutes are confusing does 
not settle the issue.  The DOT presents an equally persuasive 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1) that would require All 
Star to name and serve DHA as respondent.  To refute the 
argument that DHA's decision becomes DOT's decision, DOT points 
to several statutes that make DHA the decision-maker.  First, 
Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(4)(c) 
states, 
"[m]atters 
involving 
suspensions or revocations brought before the [DOT] shall be 
heard and decided upon by the [DHA]."  Second, "every final 
decision of an agency shall be in writing accompanied by 
findings 
of 
fact 
and 
conclusions 
of 
law."  
Wis. Stat. § 227.47(1).  Since DHA, not DOT, issued the written 
decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law, DOT 
argues that DHA must be the agency decision-maker.  Third, 
"[a]ny person in interest aggrieved by a decision of the 
[DHA] . . . may have a review of the decision as provided in ch. 
227."  Wis. Stat. § 218.0116(9).  Fourth, DOT argues that All 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
17 
 
Star's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 227.46(2m) disregards the 
final sentence of that section.  The last two sentences of 
§ 227.46(2m) provide: "The decision of the administrator of the 
division of hearings and appeals is a final decision of the 
agency subject to judicial review under s. 227.52.  The [DOT] 
may petition for judicial review."  It would make no sense, DOT 
argues, if § 227.46(2m) transforms DHA's decision into the 
decision of DOT, but then allows DOT to appeal its own final 
decision. 
 
 
Because 
of 
these 
statutes, 
and 
because 
§ 227.53(1)(b) 
requires 
the 
petition 
to 
"be 
entitled 
in . . . the name of the agency whose decision is sought to be 
reviewed as respondent," DOT concludes that § 227.53(1) clearly 
requires DHA to be named and served as respondent, since it 
actually made the decision. 
¶40 We agree that DOT's reading of Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1) 
is also a reasonable interpretation and, in fact, the correct 
interpretation of the statute.  This case, however, is unlike 
other cases involving statutory interpretation.  Our purpose 
here is not to decide which interpretation most closely aligns 
with the legislative intent and is, therefore, the correct 
interpretation.  Our purpose here is to determine whether 
ambiguity exists. 
¶41 The general rule is that "strict compliance with 
procedural statutes is necessary to obtain jurisdiction to 
review administrative agency decisions."  DOT v. Peterson, 226 
Wis. 2d 623, 633, 594 N.W.2d 765 (1999) (quoting Trojan v. Bd. 
of Regents, 104 Wis. 2d 277, 283, 311 N.W.2d 586 (1981)).  
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
18 
 
Where, however, "a procedural statute lacks 'specific direction' 
clearly indicating who is to be served with notice, 'an 
ambiguity exists.'"  Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 633 (quoting Kyncl 
v. Kenosha County, 37 Wis. 2d 547, 555, 155 N.W.2d 583 (1968)).  
Ambiguity in a procedural statute requires the statute to be 
liberally construed so as to permit a determination upon the 
merits of the controversy if such construction is possible.  Id.  
Accordingly, these rules require that we resolve the ambiguity 
in favor of All Star unless its decision to name and serve DOT 
exclusively was neither reasonable nor logical under all the 
circumstances.  See McDonough, 227 Wis. 2d at 282; Peterson, 226 
Wis. 2d at 633-34. 
B. 
Did All Star Act Reasonably? 
¶42 If 
a 
party 
were 
forced 
to 
rely 
solely 
on 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53 and other Chapter 227 sections to determine 
whom to name and serve, we could understand the party's 
uncertainty.  Considered alone, § 227.53 is a bit confusing.  
Considered in the context of Chapter 227 as a whole, the 
statute's directive on how to obtain judicial review becomes 
even more confusing.   
¶43 All Star was not cast adrift without a life raft, 
however.  It was given specific notice of how to obtain judicial 
review, as required by Wis. Stat. § 227.48(2).  DHA appended a 
NOTICE to its decision identifying the agency to be named as 
respondent and requiring that the petition be filed and served.  
We must consider whether the DHA Notice was clear and whether 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
19 
 
All Star's decision to name and serve only DOT was reasonable 
given this Notice. 
¶44 Even if a procedural statute is ambiguous, the party 
who invokes the ambiguity to justify non-compliance must 
demonstrate 
that 
its 
action 
was 
reasonable 
under 
the 
circumstances.  See State ex rel. Grzelak v. Bertrand, 2003 WI 
102, ¶29, 263 Wis. 2d 678, 696, 665 N.W.2d 244; Peterson, 226 
Wis. 2d at 633.  Because the facts are not in dispute, we decide 
as a matter of law whether All Star's action was reasonable.  
Coleman, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶17.  Whether All Star's action was 
reasonable turns on whether the Notice that DHA appended to its 
decision was clear.  We believe that it was. 
¶45 Although All Star raised a host of statutorily based 
arguments for why its failure to name and serve DHA as the 
respondent was reasonable, they are not convincing and cannot 
defeat the clear directive provided by the Notice: "Any petition 
for judicial review shall name the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals as the respondent."  All Star did not name or serve DHA.  
Instead, All Star named and served DOT.9  
¶46 We have repeatedly exhorted administrative agencies to 
include with their decisions clear notices explaining the 
procedures that must be followed to obtain judicial review.  See 
e.g., Grzelak, 263 Wis. 2d 678, ¶24; McDonough, 227 Wis. 2d at 
                                                 
9 All 
Star 
was 
required 
to 
serve 
DOT 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(c), which requires the person seeking 
review to serve a copy of the petition "upon each party who 
appeared before the agency in the proceeding in which the 
decision sought to be reviewed was made[.]" 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
20 
 
283; Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 634-35; Sunnyview Village, 104 
Wis. 2d at 412.  More important, the legislature requires 
administrative 
agencies 
to 
afford 
this 
notice.  
Wis. Stat. § 227.48(2). 
¶47 When an agency appends a notice to its decision and 
the notice clearly directs a party how to appeal, the notice 
should remove any confusion created by the statutes about whom 
to name and serve.  See Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 634-35. 
¶48 In this case, the Notice clearly stated the decision 
was a "decision of the Division" and that the purpose of the 
Notice was to describe how All Star could obtain review.  All 
Star could either (1) pursue administrative review, asking DHA 
to rehear the case; or (2) pursue judicial review.  All Star 
chose the latter, obligating it to follow the procedures set 
forth in Paragraph 2 of the Notice supplied by DHA. 
¶49 To seek judicial review, the Notice clearly directed 
All 
Star 
to 
(1) 
"serve 
and 
file 
a 
petition 
for 
review . . . within (thirty) 30 days after final disposition by 
operation of law[;]" (2) "name the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals as the respondent[;]" and (3) "closely examine all 
provisions of Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53 to insure strict 
compliance with all its requirements." 
¶50 The Notice did not explicitly state that All Star had 
to "name and serve" DHA, but there can be no doubt that the 
Notice required All Star to serve DHA.  First, the Notice 
directed All Star to name DHA as the respondent.  As a matter of 
both logic and common sense, a party who is named as respondent 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
21 
 
should also be served.  Second, the fact that the Notice did not 
contain the exact phrase, "shall name and serve the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals as respondent," does not render the Notice 
unclear.  The Notice provided: "any party seeking judicial 
review shall serve and file a petition for review . . . ."  Upon 
reading this statement, the natural question is: "Whom must be 
served?"  The very next sentence answers this question because 
it directs the party to "name the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals as the respondent." 
¶51 Given the direct and clear nature of the Notice, the 
policy concerns raised in Grzelak and Sunnyview Village are not 
implicated.  In both cases, we stated, "it is important that 
citizens not be defeated in their redress of grievances by the 
maze of governmental entities.  A person aggrieved by an 
administrative 
decision 
should 
not 
have 
to 
guess 
which 
governmental entity to name and serve as the respondent in 
proceedings for judicial review."  Grzelak, 263 Wis. 2d 678, 
¶24; Sunnyview Village, 104 Wis. 2d at 412.  DHA's Notice should 
have removed any guesswork from determining which government 
entity to name and serve as respondent.  Once the Notice 
identified DHA as the entity whom the petitioner was required to 
name as respondent, the petitioner was given guidance on how to 
read Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52, 227.53, and the entire statutory 
scheme.  By clearly stating that DHA is "the respondent," the 
Notice clarified any statutory ambiguity in § 227.53 as to the 
identity of the respondent.  The Notice was a directive: "any 
petition shall name" DHA; it was not an invitation to search for 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
22 
 
ambiguity throughout Chapter 227.  The fact that All Star failed 
to follow the directive is the fault of All Star, not DHA.  
¶52 Faced with the choice between winding its way through 
a labyrinth of statutory sections and the Notice's clear order 
to name DHA as the respondent, All Star chose to disregard the 
Notice.  All Star's decision was not reasonable or logical under 
the circumstances.  It may not have been unreasonable to name 
DOT as a respondent because All Star was required to serve DOT 
under Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(c).  But it was not reasonable to 
ignore the directive in the Notice to name and serve DHA as 
respondent.  Accordingly, the circuit court properly determined 
that it lacked competency to hear All Star's petition. 
¶53 Although this result may seem harsh, strict compliance 
with procedural requirements is necessary "to maintain a simple, 
orderly, and uniform way of conducting legal business in our 
courts."  519 Corp. v. DOT, 92 Wis. 2d 276, 288, 284 N.W.2d 643 
(1979). 
C. 
Waiver 
¶54 Finally, we must consider All Star's argument that DOT 
waived its objections to the competency of the circuit court and 
the circuit court's lack of personal jurisdiction over DHA by 
appearing to contest All Star's motion to stay the revocation 
and nonrenewal of its motor vehicle dealer license. 
¶55 Although "no circuit court is without subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain actions of any nature whatsoever[,]" a 
circuit court may be deprived of competency——that is, its 
authority to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction——if the 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
23 
 
required 
statutory 
procedures 
for 
invoking 
the 
court's 
jurisdiction are not followed.  Village of Trempealeau v. 
Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶¶8-9, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190 
(internal punctuation omitted).  However, a failure to raise a 
competency objection in the circuit court can constitute waiver 
of the objection.  Id., ¶30. 
¶56 All Star argues that DOT waived any objection to the 
circuit court's competency by twice appearing before the court 
without raising the objection.  DOT's conduct, however, does not 
constitute waiver.  See id., ¶¶20-23.  In Mikrut we explained 
that an objection to the competency of a circuit court is waived 
if it is not raised before the circuit court at any time.  Id., 
¶22.  We explicitly rejected a pleading-waiver rule, stating 
that a competency objection is not waived even when the 
objection is raised four months after the Wis. Stat. § 227.53(2) 
notice of appearance is filed.10  See id., ¶23 & n.5. 
¶57 Here, DOT objected to the circuit court's competency 
on the same day it filed its notice of appearance.  Applying 
Mikrut, where we stated that no waiver would occur as long as 
the party makes a competency objection in the circuit court, we 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.53(2) required DOT to file a notice 
of appearance "within 20 days after service of the petition" for 
review by All Star.  The purpose of a notice of appearance is 
for the non-petitioner to "clearly stat[e] the person's position 
with 
reference 
to 
each 
material 
allegation 
in 
the 
petition . . . ." 
 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(2). 
 
A 
notice 
of 
appearance 
is 
not 
a 
substantive 
defensive 
pleading 
and 
objections to the competency of the circuit court need not be 
made in a notice of appearance.  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶23. 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
24 
 
conclude that DOT could not have waived its objection to the 
circuit court's competency in the present case. 
¶58 Regardless, even if DOT did waive its competency 
objection, DHA would still retain an objection based on personal 
jurisdiction.  Service of summons is the means by which a court 
obtains personal jurisdiction over a person.  Hagen v. City of 
Milwaukee Employes' Retirement Sys. Annuity & Pension Bd., 2003 
WI 56, ¶¶12-13, 262 Wis. 2d 113, 663 N.W.2d 268.  Without timely 
service on DHA, the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction 
over DHA.  Id.  Moreover, because personal jurisdiction is a 
personal defense, DOT could not have waived DHA's objection to 
the circuit court's lack of personal jurisdiction over DHA.  
Honeycrest Farms, Inc. v. Brave Harvestore Sys., Inc., 200 
Wis. 2d 256, 267, 546 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1996).  Accordingly, 
we find All Star's claim that DOT waived these objections to be 
without merit. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶59 By 
way 
of 
summary, 
we 
conclude: 
(1) 
Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1) 
did 
not 
clearly 
prescribe 
which 
governmental entity must be named and served as respondent in 
this case; but (2) DHA's notice gave clear instructions and 
clarified any ambiguity in § 227.53(1), making All Star's 
failure to follow the notice unreasonable; and (3) DOT did not 
waive its objection to the circuit court's competency to 
proceed.  For these reasons, the court of appeals decision is 
reversed and All Star's petition for judicial review is 
dismissed. 
No. 
2003AP2668   
 
25 
 
¶60 A quarter century ago we declared the statutory 
predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 227.53 "troublesome," "not easy to 
understand," "complex," and "confusing not only when read in a 
cursory fashion but also when read in conjunction with sec. 
227.01(1) which defines agency."  Sunnyview Village, 104 
Wis. 2d at 399-400.  That description remains equally valid for 
§ 227.53 today.  Once again, we urge the legislature to 
systematically review Wis. Stat. ch. 227 to clarify (1) who is 
included in the term "agency" and (2) whom should be named and 
served when a party seeks judicial review of an administrative 
decision. 
¶61 Meanwhile, pending legislative action, we encourage 
governmental entities to review their Wis. Stat. § 227.48(2) 
notices, which they append to administrative decisions, to 
ensure maximum clarity as to whom must be named and served to 
obtain judicial review of an agency decision. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
 
 
 
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶62 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting).   The 
majority opinion concludes that Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(c) (2003-
04)1 is ambiguous with regard to whether the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) was a proper party to serve in a license 
revocation review proceeding.  Majority op., ¶27.  The majority 
also concludes that if All Star would have had only the statutes 
for guidance, its failure to serve the Division of Hearings and 
Appeals (DHA) might have been understandable.  Majority op., 
¶31.  However, the majority then concludes that the DHA's notice 
to All Star created circumstances in which it was unreasonable 
for All Star to have served only the DOT.  Majority op., ¶52.   
¶63 I agree that Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(c) is ambiguous.  
However, the DHA's notice did not direct All Star to serve the 
DHA and therefore, it did not clarify the statute's ambiguity.  
We have previously decided to liberally construe ambiguous 
procedural statutes in favor of the party seeking review of an 
agency decision.  DOT v. Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d 623, 633, 594 
N.W.2d 765 (1999).  Therefore, I conclude All Star's serving 
only 
the 
DOT 
was 
reasonable 
under 
the 
circumstances.  
Accordingly, I would not deny judicial review and because I 
would affirm the court of appeals, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review   
¶64 This case requires us to construe a procedural statute 
relating to judicial review of agency decisions and to determine 
whether All Star acted reasonably in attempting to follow the 
statute.  Statutory construction involves a question of law that 
we review de novo.  Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 
973, 978, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996).  Reasonableness is a question 
of law based on factual findings.  Lohr v. Viney, 174 Wis. 2d 
468, 477-78, 497 N.W.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1993).  When the facts are 
known, we independently review reasonableness as a question of 
law.  State ex rel. McMillian v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 277, 
392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986). 
B. 
Adherence to Procedural Statutes 
¶65 We precede our discussion of Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(c) 
and the reasonableness of All Star's actions with a review of 
the rules we use to resolve a dispute over whether a party has 
adhered to the procedures necessary to afford judicial review of 
an agency decision.   
¶66 As we stated in Peterson, "[w]e have long adhered to 
the rule that 'strict compliance with procedural statutes is 
necessary to obtain jurisdiction to review administrative agency 
decisions.'"  Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 633 (citing Trojan v. 
Board of Regents, 104 Wis. 2d 277, 283, 311 N.W.2d 586 (1981); 
519 Corp. v. DOT, 92 Wis. 2d 276, 286-88, 284 N.W.2d 643 (1979); 
Brachtl v. DOR, 48 Wis. 2d 184, 187, 179 N.W.2d 921 (1970)).  
However, as we also pointed out in Peterson, a "companion rule" 
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
3 
 
to this proposition is that strict compliance depends upon the 
statutes clearly setting forth the procedural requirements to 
obtain review.  Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 633 (citing Trojan, 104 
Wis. 2d at 284; Brachtl, 48 Wis. 2d at 186-87).   
¶67 Therefore, when a procedural statute lacks specific 
direction indicating whom is to be served with notice, there 
exists an ambiguity that warrants a liberal construction in 
favor of the party attempting to follow the procedural directive 
to obtain judicial review of an agency decision.  Peterson, 226 
Wis. 2d at 633.  Under those circumstances, if a construction is 
reasonable that would afford the appealing party review and a 
determination on the merits, the procedural statute's ambiguity 
is to be resolved in favor of that construction.  Kyncl v. 
Kenosha County, 37 Wis. 2d 547, 555-56, 155 N.W.2d 583 (1968); 
see also Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 633; McDonough v. DWD, 227 
Wis. 2d 271, 282, 595 N.W.2d 686 (1999).   
¶68 The rule to liberally construe in favor of the party 
seeking 
review 
of 
an 
agency 
decision 
comports 
with 
our 
recognition of the unfairness that can arise where ambiguities 
in procedural statutes create confusion about the proper method 
of service.  We have said that where the petitioner has complied 
with the language of a procedural statute, even where it can be 
reasonably interpreted in more than one way, it would be 
"extraordinarily harsh to cut off [the] petitioner['s] right to 
a review."  McDonough, 227 Wis. 2d at 282 (citing Trojan, 104 
Wis. 2d 
at 
284). 
 
"Once 
[a 
party] 
has 
exhausted 
his 
administrative remedies, having followed . . . administrative 
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
4 
 
review procedures . . . he should not have to guess whom to 
serve to initiate the next step in the process and have his 
grievances heard in a court of law."  State ex rel. Grzelak v. 
Bertrand, 2003 WI 102, ¶32, 263 Wis. 2d 678, 665 N.W.2d 244; see 
also Sunnyview Village, Inc. v. DOA, 104 Wis. 2d 396, 412, 311 
N.W.2d 632 (1981).  Therefore, where a procedural statute is 
ambiguous 
because 
it lacks 
"specific 
direction[s] clearly 
indicating who[m] is to be served," service is sufficient for a 
court to acquire jurisdiction, if such service was reasonable 
under the circumstances.  Grzelak, 263 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶23, 31.  
In sum, we analyze the action a party takes under an ambiguous 
procedural statute for judicial review of an agency decision by 
asking 
the 
question: 
 
Was 
service 
reasonable 
under 
the 
circumstances?  See Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 633-34. 
¶69 On multiple occasions, we have applied this test to 
conclude that a party achieved sufficient service by acting 
reasonably under the circumstances, even when the party served 
was not necessarily "right."  See Sunnyview Village, 104 Wis. 2d 
at 412 (holding that service of a petition on the Department of 
Administration (DOA) and not the Division of Nursing Home 
Forfeiture Appeals (DNHFA) was a reasonable approach according 
to one interpretation of ambiguous statutory language in Wis. 
Stat. § 227.16(1)(a) when read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(1) and therefore, the petitioner had fulfilled the 
procedural requirements of § 227.16 and was entitled to its day 
in court); McDonough, 227 Wis. 2d at 283 (concluding that where 
the interaction of statutes produced an ambiguity, a health care 
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
5 
 
provider's service on the Labor and Industry Review Commission 
(LIRC) and not the Department of Workforce Development (DWD), 
accomplished the necessary service where the health care 
provider's decision to do so was reasonable under the language 
of the statutes); Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 635 (concluding that 
when property owners served the State of Wisconsin rather than 
the DOT in the course of condemnation proceedings, they had 
taken reasonable action under one interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute and therefore, the property owners had successfully 
completed the statutory requirements to obtain review by the 
circuit court); Grzelak, 263 Wis. 2d 678, ¶29 (concluding that 
where the procedural rules governing an inmate's service of a 
petition for writ of certiorari were ambiguous, the inmate's 
service of a petition on the warden rather than on the Secretary 
of the Department of Corrections (DOC) was reasonable, if 
incorrect, 
and successfully 
conferred 
jurisdiction on the 
circuit court to hear the petition).  
¶70 With the existence of statutory ambiguities in mind, 
we have also previously recommended to agency decision-makers 
that they append specific and clear written notice to their 
final decisions, indicating the proper method of service 
necessary to obtain judicial review of the decision.  McDonough, 
227 Wis. 2d at 283; Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 634-35; Sunnyview 
Village, 104 Wis. 2d at 412.  The purpose of such notice is to 
offer clarity where the statutes have created confusion.  See 
Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 634-35.   
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
6 
 
¶71 An agency's notice attached to its final decision can 
also play a role in our analysis of whether a party's course of 
action in attempting to fulfill procedural requirements was 
reasonable "under the circumstances."  However, the mere 
existence of such a notice does not necessarily mean that the 
notice offered sufficient clarity to determine a single, 
reasonable course of action.  For example, in McDonough, we held 
that where the DWD, in its final order, simply referred the 
petitioner to one of the ambiguous procedural statutes at issue, 
the petitioner could not be faulted for serving the LIRC as 
opposed to the DWD because that course of action comported with 
one reasonable view of the statute.  McDonough, 227 Wis. 2d at 
283-84.  In sum, the effect of such a notice on the 
reasonableness determination will depend on the clarity of the 
notice.   
C. 
Statutory Construction   
¶72 To properly analyze All Star's actions with regard to 
the applicable procedural rules, we must begin with the relevant 
language of Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1), which states: 
Parties and proceedings for review.  (1)  Except 
as otherwise specifically provided by law, any person 
aggrieved by a decision specified in s. 227.52 shall 
be entitled to judicial review of the decision as 
provided in this chapter and subject to all of the 
following procedural requirements:  
(a) 1. Proceedings for review shall be instituted 
by serving a petition therefor personally or by 
certified 
mail 
upon 
the 
agency 
or 
one 
of 
its 
officials, and filing the petition in the office of 
the clerk of circuit court for the county where the 
judicial review proceedings are to be held.  . . . 
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
7 
 
2.  Unless a rehearing is requested under s. 
227.49, petitions for review under this paragraph 
shall be served and filed within 30 days after the 
service of the decision of the agency upon all parties 
under s. 227.48.  If a rehearing is requested under s. 
227.49, any party desiring judicial review shall serve 
and file a petition for review within 30 days after 
service 
of 
the 
order 
finally 
disposing 
of 
the 
application for rehearing, or within 30 days after the 
final disposition by operation of law of any such 
application for rehearing.  The 30-day period for 
serving and filing a petition under this paragraph 
commences on the day after personal service or mailing 
of the decision by the agency. 
. . . 
(b) The petition shall state the nature of the 
petitioner's 
interest, 
the 
facts 
showing 
that 
petitioner is a person aggrieved by the decision, and 
the grounds . . . upon which petitioner contends that 
the decision should be reversed or modified.  The 
petition may be amended, by leave of court, though the 
time for serving the same has expired.  The petition 
shall be entitled in the name of the person serving it 
as petitioner and the name of the agency whose 
decision is sought to be reviewed as respondent 
. . . . 
(c) A copy of the petition shall be served 
personally or by certified mail or, when service is 
timely admitted in writing, by first class mail, not 
later than 30 days after the institution of the 
proceeding, upon each party who appeared before the 
agency in the proceeding in which the decision sought 
to be reviewed was made or upon the party's attorney 
of record.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶73 When we interpret a statute, we rely on the criteria 
set out in State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  In Kalal, we 
explained that: 
[T]he 
purpose 
of 
statutory interpretation 
is to 
determine what the statute means so that it may be 
given its full, proper, and intended effect. 
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
8 
 
Id., ¶44.  Context is also important when determining the plain 
meaning of a statute, as is the purpose of the statute and its 
scope, if those qualities can be ascertained from the language 
of the statute itself.  Id., ¶¶46-48.  These are all intrinsic 
sources for statutory interpretation.  Id.  However, if 
statutory language is ambiguous, we often consult extrinsic 
sources such as legislative history.  Id., ¶48.  
¶74 As both the court of appeals and the majority opinion 
conclude, the statute is ambiguous.  See All Star Rent A Car, 
Inc. v. DOT, 2004 WI App 198, ¶¶11-12, 276 Wis. 2d 793, 688 
N.W.2d 681; majority op., ¶27.  First, the term "agency" is 
ambiguous due to the interaction of Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1) with 
various other statutes, including Wis. Stat. § 227.01(1), Wis. 
Stat. § 227.46(2m), Wis. Stat. § 227.47(1), and Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.48(2).   
¶75 When Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(b) provides that the 
petition shall name the "agency whose decision is sought to be 
reviewed as respondent," and that language is considered in 
conjunction with the definition of agency as provided in Wis. 
Stat. § 227.01(1), it appears that the term "agency" would refer 
to the DOT, as the majority itself notes.  See majority op., 
¶¶30-31.  "Agency" is defined therein as follows: 
"Agency" means the Wisconsin land council or a 
board, commission, committee, department or officer in 
the state government, except the governor, a district 
attorney or a military or judicial officer. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 227.01(1).   
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
9 
 
¶76 This definition of "agency" readily applies to the 
DOT, which is a department in the state government, but it does 
not apply to the DHA, which is a division of the DOA.   
¶77 However, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.46(2m) 
provides, 
in 
pertinent part: 
In any hearing or review assigned to a hearing 
examiner under s. 227.43(1)(bg), the hearing examiner 
presiding at the hearing shall prepare a proposed 
decision, including findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, order and opinion . . . .   The decision of the 
administrator of the division of hearings and appeals 
is a final decision of the agency subject to judicial 
review 
under 
s. 
227.52. 
 
The 
department 
of 
transportation may petition for judicial review. 
¶78 When 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.53(1), 
specifically, "decision of the agency," is read in conjunction 
with Wis. Stat. § 227.46(2m), it appears that the DHA, as the 
final adjudicator under these facts, could be designated as the 
party to serve.   
¶79 To further complicate matters, three other closely 
related statutes, Wis. Stat. § 227.46(5), Wis. Stat. § 227.47(1) 
and Wis. Stat. § 227.48(2) provide the following: 
227.46(5) In any class 2 proceeding, if the 
decision to file a complaint or otherwise commence a 
proceeding to impose a sanction or penalty is made by 
one or more of the officials of the agency, the 
hearing examiner shall not be an official of the 
agency. 
227.47(1) Except as provided in sub. (2), every 
proposed or final decision of an agency or hearing 
examiner following a hearing and every final decision 
of an agency shall be in writing accompanied by 
findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The findings 
of fact shall consist of a concise and separate 
statement 
of 
the 
ultimate conclusions 
upon 
each 
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
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material issue of fact without recital of evidence.  
Every proposed or final decision shall include . . . . 
227.48(2) Each decision shall include notice of 
any right of the parties to petition for rehearing and 
administrative 
or 
judicial 
review 
of 
adverse 
decisions, the time allowed for filing each petition 
and identification of the party to be named as 
respondent.  No time period . . . for filing a 
petition for judicial review or under any other 
section permitting administrative review of an agency 
decision begins to run until the agency has complied 
with this subsection.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶80 In sum, it is difficult to derive from Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.53(1) and this statutory scheme a satisfactory conclusion 
with regard to which "agency" to serve, or whose "final 
decision" it is that triggers the need for judicial review.  
Absent a single answer that would consistently harmonize the 
seemingly 
conflicting 
implications 
of 
the 
aforementioned 
statutes, both the interpretation of All Star, that it is the 
DOT, and the interpretation of the DOT, that it is the DHA, are 
reasonable.   
¶81 In Sunnyview Village, we previously recognized the 
ambiguity produced by the term "agency" in this very statute.  
The legislature has not changed the definition discussed in 
Sunnyview Village, and as the majority notes, the term "still 
serves as something of a snare."  Majority op., ¶31.   
¶82 Furthermore, the ambiguity in the statutory scheme, 
particularly with regard to the relationship between the DHA and 
various line agencies, is illuminated by an entire line of cases 
in which proper service for judicial review of a DHA decision 
was not at issue, but in which a line agency was named as the 
respondent even though the final agency decision under review 
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was that of the DHA.  See Buettner v. DHFS, 2003 WI App 90, 264 
Wis. 2d 700, 663 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 2003); Bidstrup v. DHFS, 
2001 WI App 171, 247 Wis. 2d 27, 632 N.W.2d 866; Artac v. DHFS, 
2000 WI App 88, 234 Wis. 2d 480, 610 N.W.2d 115 (Ct. App 2000); 
Borsellino v. DNR, 232 Wis. 2d 430, 606 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 
1999); Froebel v. DNR, 217 Wis. 2d 652, 579 N.W.2d 774 (Ct. App. 
1998); Sea View Estates Beach Club, Inc. v. DNR, 223 Wis. 2d 
138, 588 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1998).   
¶83 This confusion comes from the gradual shift of the 
adjudicative function traditionally performed by line agencies 
themselves, or their individual adjudicative bodies, to the DHA.  
This occurred as a result of the legislature's creation of Wis. 
Stat. § 227.43 in 1977, which granted to the DHA authority to 
assign 
hearing 
examiners 
in 
contested 
cases 
previously 
adjudicated within various line agencies of the state.  The DHA 
now performs hearings over matters for the Department of Natural 
Resources, the DOT, the Department of Commerce, the DOC, the 
Department of Justice, the Department of Public Instruction, the 
Department of Employee Trust Funds, the DOA, and the Department 
of Health and Family Services.   
¶84 I 
recently 
discussed 
the 
shift 
of 
adjudicative 
functions to the DHA in Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Division 
of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶110, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (Roggensack, J., concurring) (citing DOT v. Office of 
the Comm'r of Transp., 159 Wis. 2d 271, 277-78, 463 N.W.2d 870 
(Ct. App. 1990)); see also 1995 Wis. Act 370, § 14.  The 
language of the procedural statutes has not been fully adjusted 
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
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to account for this evolving adjudicative reality.  The 
resultant situation is one similar to that recognized in 
Sunnyview Village, where the controlling procedural statute had 
not been adjusted for executive restructuring that created 
"divisions" as the principal subunit of a department.  As we 
explained, this created confusion as to whether the DOA, or a 
subunit therein, the DNHFA, was the appropriate entity to serve.  
Sunnyview Village, 104 Wis. 2d at 399-01; see also majority op., 
¶30. 
¶85 Contrary to the majority opinion, I conclude that the 
case at bar is analogous to Sunnyview Village.  The majority's 
attempt to distinguish Sunnyview Village is unconvincing.  The 
distinction the majority makes is based on the relationship 
between the DNHFA and the DOA, concluding that because DNHFA was 
within the DOA, Sunnyview Village's erroneous service on the DOA 
was reasonable where a statutory ambiguity made the correct 
procedure difficult to ascertain.  However, in this case, as in 
Sunnyview Village, there is confusing statutory language that 
could refer to either the DHA or the DOT, and All Star's service 
on the DOT was based on that confusion.  When the central issue 
in a review of the method of service is statutory language that 
could implicate more than one entity as the correct one to 
serve, the majority's distinction is not relevant.  That is, it 
makes no difference whether the DOT is or is not a part of the 
DHA; what matters is that according to the statutory scheme, it 
was reasonable for All Star to serve the DOT. 
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D. 
Reasonableness Under the Circumstances 
¶86 In seeking review from the DHA decision, All Star 
petitioned the Dane County Circuit Court, naming the DOT as 
respondent; All Star also served the petition on the DOT and the 
Attorney General.  All Star explains that course of action by 
noting the interaction of Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1) with Wis. Stat. 
§ 227.01(1), 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.46(2m), 
and 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 227.48(2), saying that the "agency" referred to in § 227.53(1) 
is the DOT.  The majority concludes that this is one reasonable 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statutory 
scheme, 
in 
part 
because 
§ 227.01(1) can be interpreted reasonably to exclude a division, 
thereby eliminating the DHA as the appropriate party on which to 
serve notice.   Majority op., ¶31.  The majority concludes that 
All Star's failure to name and serve the DHA as the respondent 
"might be understandable" if All Star were following only the 
statutes.  Id.  However, in the spirit of our rule that we will 
liberally construe ambiguous procedural statutes in favor of the 
petitioner seeking review, Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 633, I 
conclude that if All Star had only the statute for guidance, its 
actions were reasonable. 
¶87 However, also important to consider is the effect of 
the notice appended to the final decision of the DHA.  If the 
notice clearly specified the proper party or person to serve so 
as to eliminate the ambiguity in the statutory directive, then 
All Star's actions may not have been reasonable under the 
circumstances.  However, the DHA did not name whom to serve.   
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
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¶88 The majority contends, however, that "there can be no 
doubt that the Notice required All Star to serve DHA."  Majority 
op., ¶50.  I disagree.  The relevant portion of the Notice said: 
Any person aggrieved by the attached decision 
which adversely affects the substantial interests of 
such person by action or inaction, affirmative or 
negative in form is entitled to judicial review by 
filing a petition therefore in accordance with the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. §§  227.52 and 227.53.  Said 
petition must be filed within thirty (30) days after 
service of the agency decision sought to be reviewed.  
If a rehearing is requested as noted in paragraph (1) 
above, any party seeking judicial review shall serve 
and file a petition for review within thirty (30) days 
after service of the order disposing of the rehearing 
application or within thirty (30) days after final 
disposition by operation of law.  Any petition for 
judicial review shall name the Division of Hearings 
and Appeals as the respondent.  Persons desiring to 
file for judicial review are advised to closely 
examine all provisions of Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 
227.53 to insure strict compliance with all its 
requirements.   
¶89 The majority's conclusion that the nature of the 
Notice and its directive is "direct and clear" depends on the 
majority opinion's competent, but very complicated, analysis of 
the Notice.  Majority op., ¶51.  While an experienced attorney 
may come to the conclusion that the DHA should be served, a 
person unfamiliar with legal processes may not come to the same 
conclusion 
because 
the 
Notice 
is 
silent 
with 
regard 
to 
directions about whom to serve.  Additionally, the conclusion of 
the majority fails to recognize the influence of the statutes, 
also referred to in the Notice, which suggest that the DOT is 
the "agency" to be served.   
No.  2003AP2668.pdr 
 
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¶90 In addition, the Notice's provision stating that "any 
party seeking judicial review shall serve and file a petition 
for review" does not make it obvious to serve the DHA because of 
the Notice's subsequent instruction, to "name the Division of 
Hearings and Appeals as the respondent."  See majority op., 
¶¶50-51.  The combination of those phrases does not clearly 
state that the DHA is the "agency" to be served pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 227.53(1).  I conclude that the Notice is far from 
"direct and clear," and that it failed to clarify the statutory 
ambiguity or offer All Star a clear directive as to proper 
service.  Therefore, under all of the circumstances of the case, 
including the Notice, I conclude that All Star acted reasonably 
when it served only the DOT and therefore, All Star did preserve 
its opportunity for substantive judicial review.   
II.  CONCLUSION 
¶91 I agree that Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(c) is ambiguous.  
However, the DHA's notice did not direct All Star to serve the 
DHA and therefore, it did not clarify the statute's ambiguity.  
We have previously decided to liberally construe ambiguous 
procedural statutes in favor of the party seeking review.  
Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d at 633.  Therefore, I conclude All Star's 
service of only the DOT was reasonable under the circumstances.  
Accordingly, I would not deny judicial review and because I 
would affirm the court of appeals, I respectfully dissent. 
¶92 I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, 
JR. joins this dissent. 
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