Case Title: Commonwealth v. Reese

Citation: 354 A.2d 573, 467 Pa. 107

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1976-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
467 Pa. 107 (1976) 354 A.2d 573 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Donald Lakey REESE. Appeal of Mark WILMORE. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued January 23, 1976. Decided April 7, 1976. *108 Calvin S. Drayer, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, John P. Gregg, for appellant. Milton O. Moss, Dist. Atty., William T. Nicholas, First Asst. Dist. Atty., Stewart J. Greenleaf, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Bert M. Goodman, Norristown, for appellee. Before JONES, C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. This appeal arises from the holding of appellant, Mark Wilmore, in direct criminal contempt of court for invoking *109 his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at the trial of Donald Reese. The facts surrounding this appeal are as follows. On August 20, 1972, Parnell Butler was found murdered in his cell at Graterford Prison. On October 24, 1972, appellant was called as a witness by the Commonwealth during the preliminary hearing for Donald Reese, who was accused of the murder of Butler. Appellant's testimony implicated Reese as the assailant, placed himself in the cell during the altercation which caused Butler's death, and implicated himself as a participant in the slaying. Appellant was cross-examined by Reese's attorney but he was not represented by counsel. On September 19, 1974, appellant was called as a witness at the trial of Reese for the murder of Butler. Appellant was sworn and testified that he had been "residing" at Graterford for the past two (2) years. Appellant then testified as follows: Appellant's counsel then argued to the court below that he had advised his client to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. The argument was summarily dismissed and the court imposed the following sentence: This appeal followed. Appellant argues that the court below erred in finding him guilty of direct criminal contempt for exercising his right against self-incrimination. We agree. This court in Snyder Appeal, 398 Pa. 237, 242-243, 157 A.2d 207, 210 (1960), stated: In the instant case, appellant clearly would have incriminated himself by placing himself at the scene of the murder at the exact time of the murder; therefore, in light of our decision in Snyder, appellant was entitled to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege at Reese's trial. Alternatively, the Commonwealth urges this court to abandon the Snyder rationale and adopt the waiver rule enunciated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Ellis v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 416 F.2d 791 (1969). The court in Ellis stated: The Ellis rationale is not applicable under the facts of the instant case, since appellant, prior to his testimony at the preliminary hearing, was neither represented by counsel nor was he informed by the district magistrate, the district attorney or defense counsel for Reese, of his Fifth Amendment rights; therefore, no knowing waiver of those rights can be inferred. Judgment of sentence reversed. EAGEN, J., concurs in the result.