Case Title: STATE ex rel. FENT v. STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96276

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE ex rel. FENT v. STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD  STATE ex rel. FENT v. STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD 2003 OK 29 66 P.3d 432 Case Number: 96276 Decided: 03/18/2003 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. MARGARET B. FENT and JERRY R. FENT, as State of Oklahoma resident taxpayers, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD; STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. WATER CONSERVATION STORAGE COMMISSION; and J. ROSS KIRTLEY, RICHARD McDONALD, DICK SEYBOLT, LONNIE FARMER, GRADY GRANDSTAFF, ERVIN MITCHELL, BILL SECREST, RICHARD SEVENOAKS, and WENDELL E. THOMASSON, as individuals and as members of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board and the Water Conservation Storage Commission; and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY and its CORPS OF ENGINEERS, Defendants/Appellees. ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II ¶0 Taxpayers brought a statutory qui tam action in the District Court, Oklahoma County, Daniel L. Owens, trial judge, against the United States and certain subordinate federal entities, the State of Oklahoma ex rel. certain subordinate state entities, and members of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board in their official and individual capacities. The petition sought to recover from the federal and individual state defendants public funds paid to the United States pursuant to an allegedly unlawful contract for water supply storage space in Sardis Lake, together with the triple penalty authorized by the qui tam statutes. The cause was removed to federal district court where the federal defendants were dismissed. Upon remand to state court, cross motions for summary judgment were made. The trial court gave summary judgment to the remaining defendants and taxpayers appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division II, affirmed. On certiorari granted upon taxpayers' petition, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISPOSITION BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. William A. Pipkin, Moore, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs/Appellants. Andrew Tevington and E. Clyde Kirk, Assistant Attorneys General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees. OPALA, V.C.J., ¶1 The dispositive issue in this taxpayers' qui tam I ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 The Flood Control Act of 1962 ¶3 In the 1970's, decisions regarding state participation in water supply projects in Oklahoma were among the duties of a state commission known as the Water Conservation Storage Commission (WCSC). The amount of the Project investment costs allocated to the storage for present demand shall be paid in 50 consecutive annual installments, the first of which shall be due and payable within 30 days after the User [the WCSC] is notified by the contracting Officer that the Project is completed and operational for water supply purposes. Annual installments thereafter will be due and payable on the anniversary date of the first payment. Except for the first payment which will be applied solely to the retirement of principal, all installments shall include accrued interest on the unpaid balance . . . ." (emphasis added) Payments of principal and interest allocated to future demand storage space were not required to begin until ten years after the project became operational unless the State commenced using that storage space during that period. ¶4 In addition to contracting to repay the project's construction costs, the WCSC also agreed to pay a percentage of the annual operating and maintenance costs, to pay a portion of the costs of any major capital replacement items, and to hold the Corps [66 P.3d 436] harmless from liability for damages incurred on account of the water storage component of the project. The contract does not give the WCSC a right to terminate the agreement or otherwise to be relieved of its contractual obligations, but as permitted by federal law, "The parties agree that this contract is not an obligation for which the full faith and credit of the State of Oklahoma is pledged. Nothing herein shall be construed as legally obligating the Oklahoma Legislature to make any appropriation of funds." ¶5 Finally, the contract recites the opinion of the Oklahoma Attorney General that the WCSC is acting within its authority in entering into the contract. ¶6 The project became operational for water storage purposes on 6 January 1983 and the Corps notified the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (the OWRB or the Board), ¶7 A group of taxpayers in 1997 served on the OWRB and its members a written demand that the Board "authorize and diligently prosecute an action to recover" from the federal government all payments made under the contract. ¶8 Two of the taxpayers who had issued the written demand, Margaret B. Fent and Jerry R. Fent (taxpayers) filed this qui tam action pursuant to the provisions of ¶9 The petition alleged that the contract between the WCSC and the Corps violated the Oklahoma Constitution and that all payments made pursuant to the contract were therefore unlawful. The petition further alleged that the individual defendants had wrongfully refused to prosecute an action for the return of the funds from the United States. Taxpayers sought to hold the federal and individual defendants jointly and severally liable under the qui tam statutes for the return to the State of Oklahoma of all public funds paid under the contract and for treble damages of $13,244,102.07, half of which [66 P.3d 438]would be payable to them and half to the State. ¶10 The cause was removed by the federal defendants to the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. That court dismissed taxpayers' claim against the federal defendants on sovereign immunity grounds and dismissed without prejudice taxpayers' claim against the remaining defendants - the State ex rel. the state agencies and the individual defendants - on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Taxpayers appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal as to the federal defendants, but vacated the dismissal of the claim against the state defendants and remanded the cause to the federal district court with directions that the claim against the state defendants be remanded to state court. ¶11 Upon remand to Oklahoma County District Court, taxpayers filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the uncontroverted facts, consisting of the contract and the conduct of state officials in carrying it out, established that the contract violated the constitutional prohibition on contracting debt and that they were hence entitled to judgment as matter of law. ¶12 The trial court gave judgment to defendants without elaboration. Taxpayers appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, adopting defendants' contention that the contract does not violate the state Constitution. We granted certiorari on taxpayers' petition. While we agree that summary judgment is defendants' due, we vacate the appellate court's opinion because we deem it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue. Where the legal relief sought is affordable on non-constitutional grounds, consideration of constitutional infirmities is deemed precluded by a self-erected "prudential bar" of restraint. II STANDARD OF REVIEW ON SUMMARY PROCESS ¶13 Summary process--a special pretrial procedural track pursued with the aid of acceptable probative substitutes ¶14 Summary relief issues stand before us for de novo examination. III PUBLIC OFFICERS MAY NOT BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE UNDER THE QUI TAM STATUTES WHEN THEY ACT IN CONFORMITY WITH AN OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THAT THEIR ACTIONS ARE LAWFUL ¶15 Defendants argue that the trial court's summary disposition in their favor was correct because a public official is insulated from civil liability for actions taken in reliance upon the advice of the state Attorney General.32 We agree. [66 P.3d 440] ¶16 The state Constitution establishes the office of the attorney general.33 The duties and responsibilities of the Attorney General are prescribed by statute.34 As the state's chief law officer,35 the Attorney General has been entrusted with the duty of providing legal guidance to public officers and of advising them on questions of law which relate to their official duties.36 With the exception of an Attorney General's opinion that an act of the legislature is unconstitutional,37 an Attorney General's opinion is binding upon the state officials whom it affects.38 Public officers have the duty to follow Attorney General opinions until they are judicially relieved of compliance.39 Since a public officer's failure to heed the Attorney General's advice to perform a duty required by law can result in civil penalties, it also follows from sound principles of policy that one who acts in conformity with the Attorney General's advice should be afforded the law's protection from civil liability as well as from forfeiture of office, at least until a clear judicial pronouncement would indicate a different course of conduct.40 ¶17 Appended to the end of the contract at issue is the Attorney General's opinion that the contract is lawful. It states: "It is my opinion that this contract is within the authority of the contracting agency and in reaching this conclusion I have considered the effect of Section 221 of the Flood Control Act 1970 (42 USC 1962d-5b)." ¶18 Acting on the Attorney General's advice, members of the WCSC and the OWRB, [66 P.3d 441] as well as successive governors and legislatures, have treated the contract at issue as lawful. For the defendants to have acted on taxpayers' written demand to obtain a refund from the United States of the state funds paid under the contract would have been in direct conflict with the advice given by the state's chief law officer charged with the duty of providing them with legal advice. "Sound principles of policy" dictate that public officials should be shielded from civil liability in such circumstances. For this reason, we join in the trial court's view that summary judgment was defendants' due. That ruling is hence affirmed. IV SUMMARY ¶19 We hold today that the defendant state officials, who treated as lawful a contract which taxpayers allege is constitutionally infirm, cannot be held liable under the qui tam statutes regardless of the contract's constitutionality because they acted in conformity with an opinion of the Attorney General that the contract was lawful. ¶20 THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISPOSITION BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED. ¶21 WATT, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, BOUDREAU and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur. ¶22 KAUGER and SUMMERS, JJ., concur in result. [ 66 P.3d 442 ] FOOT