Case Title: Moody v. Transylvania County

Citation: 156 S.E.2d 716, 271 N.C. 384

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1967-09-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
156 S.E.2d 716 (1967) 271 N.C. 384 P. E. MOODY, trading and doing business as Frank Moody Funeral Home v. TRANSYLVANIA COUNTY. No. 36. Supreme Court of North Carolina. September 20, 1967. *717 Hamlin, Ramsey & White, by William R. White, Brevard, for plaintiff appellant. Ramsey, Hill & Smart, by Ralph H. Ramsey, Jr., Brevard, for defendant appellee. PLESS, Justice. Two questions arise upon this appeal. Is ambulance service a necessary expense for which the County Commissioners may legally contract? If such contract is ultra vires, must it be pleaded by the defendant, or is it proper ground for demurrer? The appellant's position cannot be sustained on either question. In Madry v. Town of Scotland Neck, 214 N.C. 461, 199 S.E. 618, Barnhill, J. (later C.J.) made this concise statement: While that case involved a city rather than a county, the same rule would apply to the latter. When the questioned contract was made in Sept. 1964, the County Commissioners did not have the power "in express terms" to provide ambulance service. Without the "express" authority, we must determine whether the object of the purported contract was "essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects (of the County) * * * not simply convenient, but * * * indispensable to the declared objects" (of the County). In Palmer v. Haywood County, 212 N.C. 284, 193 S.E. 668, 113 A.L.R. 1195, the plaintiff sought an order to restrain the County Commissioners from issuing bonds *718 to provide funds to construct an addition to the county hospital. The Superior Court denied the order, and in reversing it, this Court said: To hold that the County may provide transportation at public expense to a hospital whose operation is not a necessary public expense would be incongruous and inconsistent. We therefore hold that the Commissioners could not legally contract for such service, and that their attempt to do so was ultra vires. The plaintiff cites several statutes and decisions in support of his position, but an examination of each of them discloses a distinction between them and the present question. G.S. § 153-2(3) deals with the corporate powers of the counties in broad terms but has no explicit reference to the power sought here. G.S. § 153-176.1 authorizes counties having a population of 60,000 or over to provide hospitalization for the indigent sick, but this does not apply to Transylvania County, which has less than half the required population. G.S. § 131-28.3 and .4 deals with the authority of the counties to own and support hospitals by bonds authorized by the voters. G.S. § 153-9(58) does authorize the counties to contract for ambulance service, but it was not enacted until 1967, while the contract must be construed as of its date, which was September 1964. The case of Harrison v. New Bern, 193 N.C. 555, 137 S.E. 582, is distinguishable here because it involved the purchase of ninety-three acres of land for use as a cemetery; and at the time the suit was brought, the transaction had been completed. The Court held that the action of the City in purchasing the lands and paying for them was ultra vires, but that since the transaction had been fully performed, it should be permitted to stand. Morgan v. Town of Spindale, 254 N.C. 304, 118 S.E.2d 913, involved the issuance of bonds by the Town following an election in favor of them; and Turner v. City of Reidsville, *719 224 N.C. 42, 29 S.E.2d 211, also involved bonds issued after approval by the voters of the City. The other cited authorities do not, in our opinion, sustain the plaintiff's position. The plaintiff further contends that the demurrer should not have been sustained for that the action of the County Commissioners did not appear invalid upon the face of the complaint and that it should have been required to answer. However, the plaintiff seeks to recover upon a contract allegedly made by the County Commissioners. That, without more, raises the question of their authority, and a demurrer seeks an immediate answer. The pleading should be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties, giving the pleader the benefit of every reasonable intendment in his favor. It admits the truth of the factual averments well stated and the relevant inferences of fact reasonable deducible therefrom. 3 Strong's N. C. Index, Pleadings, § 12, and many cases there cited. In Madry v. Town of Scotland Neck, supra, the Court said: The complaint contains the following allegation: "(I)n entering into this contract the Board of County Commissioners of Transylvania County were acting within the scope of their authority as the governing body for Transylvania County." That squarely presents the question involved here; and we can see no practical reason why the County should be required to answer when, as stated in Madry v. Town of Scotland Neck, supra, "As it appears on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is seeking to enforce a contract which is ultra vires and void the demurrer interposed by the defendant should have been sustained." In his brief the plaintiff takes the position that defendant is estopped to deny the validity of the contract. *720 The contention of the plaintiff that the contract had been largely executed by it, that the County had accepted the benefits of it, and had made two of the monthly payments, and that it was therefore estopped to deny its responsibility, cannot be sustained. In 38 Am.Jur. 202, Municipal Corporations § 522, it is said: The plaintiff's prayer for relief is (1) "That he * * * recover a sum of $333.33 for each calendar month from and after November 10, 1964, to the date of the filing of this complaint," etc.; and (2) "That a writ of mandamus issue * * * ordering the governing body of the defendant to continue with the terms of its contract" etc. In St. George v. Hanson, 239 N.C. 259, 78 S.E.2d 885, Parker, J. (now C. J.) said for the Court: Also, in Thomas v. State Board of Elections, 256 N.C. 401, 124 S.E.2d 164, it is said: The plaintiff has not established "a clear legal right" to demand mandamus, nor that the defendant is "under a positive legal obligation to perform the act sought to be required." The judgment of the Court below was correct, and it is hereby Affirmed.