Case Title: EMPLOYERS'LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORP. v. Owens

Citation: 78 So. 2d 104

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1955-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
78 So. 2d 104 (1955)
The EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Limited, Garnishee, Appellant,
v.
H.W. OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
E.L. Cooksey, Defendant-Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.
February 4, 1955.
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1955.
Marks, Gray, Yates & Conroy and Francis P. Conroy, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Dunham & Dunham, St. Augustine, for appellees.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., James L. Graham, Jr., and Howard S. Bailey, Asst. Attys. Gen., amici curiae.
DREW, Justice.
Appellee J.W. Owens recovered a judgment in the St. Johns County Circuit Court against E.L. Cooksey, also an appellee herein, for injuries sustained by Owens as employee of Cooksey while engaged in that employment and while riding in the employer Cooksey's truck. Owens was not covered, nor required to be covered, by Workmen's Compensation insurance. In an effort to collect on this judgment, Owens garnisheed The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, which had insured Cooksey under a standard automobile liability insurance policy. The lower court entered a summary judgment in favor of Owens against the insurer and the insurer brought this appeal.
The provisions of the policy of insurance involved in this appeal which are pertinent to the discussion of this case are the following:
It is the basic contention of the appellant insurer that all employees of the insured, except domestic employees (and these if benefits are payable or required to be provided under any workmen's compensation law), are excluded from coverage under paragraph (d) of the exclusions and that, therefore, it is not liable as garnishee or otherwise for the amount of the judgment recovered by the employee of the insured.
On the other hand, the appellee Owens argues that clause (d) under exclusions must be limited to employees protected by or required to be protected by the provisions *106 of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law, F.S.A. § 440.01 et seq., with the exceptions of domestics as noted above. He further argues that if clause (d) is ambiguous, it should be construed in favor of the assured.
In the case of Webb v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 148 Fla. 714, 5 So. 2d 252, an exclusion clause in a similar policy was before us. While the exclusion provision in that policy was not in the identical language as that in the policy now under consideration, we think the language of the two clauses are so substantially the same that the decision in the Webb case is controlling here. The pertinent language in the policy involved in the Webb case was, "`This policy does not apply * * * to bodily injury or to death of the Insured; or to bodily injury or to death of any employee of the Insured while engaged in the business of the Insured (other than domestic employment in the home), or in the operation, maintenance or repair of the automobile; or to any obligation for which the Insured may be held liable under the Workmen's Compensation Law * * *.'" The ruling of the lower court which we approved was that, "the Garnishee is not liable upon the policy, because the policy does not apply if the interest of the insured is other than is stated on the policy, and because the policy does not apply to bodily injury of an employee of the insured while engaged in the business of the insured." (Italics added.)
An exclusion clause identical to that in the main case has been construed by the New York Supreme Court and there held to exclude from coverage the employees of the named insured. Jewtraw v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 280 App. Div. 150, 112 N.Y.S.2d 727; Id., 284 App. Div. 312, 131 N.Y.S.2d 745. The court with reference to this particular clause, at 112 N.Y.S.2d 727, 730, said:
Clauses (e) and (d), referred to in the foregoing quotation, are in language identical to that of clauses (e) and (d) in the instant case.
In Security Ins. Co. v. Jay, D.C., 109 F. Supp. 87, the liability insurance policy before the court contained a clause (d) with language identical to that of clause (d) in the instant case. This language was held to exclude from coverage liability for injury to a person who was serving the insured as an employee when the accident occurred.
In the case of National Surety Corporation v. Windham, Fla., 1954, 74 So. 2d 549, the language of the exclusion clause was before this Court. The appellant contended that the claimant, who was injured by its insured, was not within the terms of the policy because he was an employee of the named insured engaged in employment at the time of injury and, therefore, excluded by reason of the clause (d). This contention was rejected by this Court because we found that the complainant Windham was an independent contractor instead of an employee of the insured. Implicit in this decision is the holding that an employee of a named insured, other than domestic, is not within the terms of the policy by reason of the exclusion clause.
There are obvious reasons for differentiating between the public as a class and one's own employees. Upon the authority of the foregoing cases it is clear that the appellee Owens was not within the coverage of the liability policy issued by the appellant to appellee Cooksey. Finding no merit to other contentions of the appellees the summary judgment against the appellant is reversed.
*107 MATHEWS, C.J., and TERRELL, THOMAS, SEBRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
HOLT, Associate Justice, dissents.
HOLT, Associate Justice (dissenting).
J.W. Owens, appellee herein, recovered a judgment in the Circuit Court in and for St. Johns County, against his employer, E.L. Cooksey, also appellee herein, for injuries sustained in the course of his (Owens) employment, while riding in (employer) Cooksey's truck. Cooksey was insured by the appellant, The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, under a standard automobile liability insurance policy. Owens brought this action of garnishment against the insurer, believing that Cooksey did not have in his possession visible property upon which a levy could be made sufficient to satisfy said judgment. The Court below entered a summary judgment against the garnishee, insurer, from which it now appeals.
The position of insurer is that its policy afforded Cooksey no coverage under the facts and circumstances existing at the time Owens was injured, by reason of a provision in its policy which reads as follows:
Owens contends that this exclusion (1) applies only to employees who are covered or required to be covered by workmen's compensation, and (2) is in conflict with the Florida Financial Responsibility Law and therefore a nullity.
In Firemans Fund Insurance Company of San Francisco v. Boyd, Fla., 45 So. 2d 499, 501, this Court stated:
In giving effect to this rule, it is equally important that the contract made by the parties shall prevail, and no new contract be interpolated by construction. Provisions clearly disclosing their real intent are not to be given a strained construction to raise doubts where none reasonably exist. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Chapman, 240 Ala. 599; 200 So. 425; McDowell v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 260 Ala. 412, 71 So. 2d 64.
The language of exclusion (d) read without reference to the other provisions of the policy is clear and unambiguous. All employees, other than domestics not covered by workmen's compensation, are excluded.
The identical exclusion was construed in Jewtraw v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 280 App.Div. 150, 112 N.Y.S.2d 727, 730, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, in which Presiding Justice Foster stated:
The policy now before the court for construction contained the same exclusion (e).
When the insurance contract in question was entered into, it was written subject to all the existing and valid Florida Statutes which were pertinent and applicable, as fully as if such statutes were written into the contract. See Poole v. Travelers Insurance Co., 130 Fla. 806, 179 So. 138; New York Life Insurance Company v. Valz, 5 Cir., 141 F.2d 1014. See also 29 American Jurisprudence, section 180, page 197.
The insurer recognized this rule of law by providing in its policy Condition 5 which reads as follows:
However, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, insurance companies have the same rights as individuals to limit their liability, and to impose whatever conditions they please on their obligations, not inconsistent with public policy. Loveman, Joseph & Loeb v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 233 Ala. 518, 173 So. 7; Rodgers v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co., 237 Ala. 301, 186 So. 684; Kindervater v. Motorists Casualty Co., 120 N.J.L. 373, 190 A. 606.
A careful study of the Florida Financial Responsibility Law, Chapter 324 of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A., discloses that exclusion (d) is repugnant and contrary to the requirements set out therein.
Section 324.001, entitled "Purpose of chapter", provides:
Section 324.04 entitled "Report of accidents; suspension of licenses", provides in part as follows:
Section 324.01, entitled "Definitions" further provides:
Section 324.02, entitled "Manner of proving financial responsibility" also further provides:
Cooksey, at the time his truck was involved in this accident, had in effect a Motor Vehicle Liability Policy written by the appellant. He entered into this contract with appellant to make himself financially responsible, i.e., to be able to respond in damages for accidents arising out of the use of his motor vehicle, in accordance with the Florida Financial Responsibility Law, section 324.02, subsection (1), supra.
It clearly appears that the Legislature did not intend that employees be excluded from coverage under a Motor Vehicle Liability Policy, written in this state, where the insurer would otherwise be liable to the insured under its policy. No distinction is made in Section 324.01, subsection (7), supra, between employees and other persons injured in accidents arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.