Case Title: TZ Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Grieve

Citation: 

Docket Number: 94-47

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
TZ Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Grieve1994 WY 146887 P.2d 511Case Number: 94-47, 94-48Decided: 12/16/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
TZ LAND & CATTLE CO., 
INC.,

Appellant,

v.

Thomas GRIEVE, 
Receiver,

Appellee.

 

Thomas GRIEVE, 
Receiver,

Appellant,

v.

TZ LAND & CATTLE CO., 
INC.,

Appellee.

 

Appeal from District 
Court, Carbon County, Arthur T. Hanscum, J.

 

Joel M. Vincent 
of Vincent & Vincent, Riverton, for TZ Land & Cattle 
Co.

Kermit C. Brown 
of Brown, Erickson & Hiser, Rawlins, for Thomas 
Grieve.

 

Before 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR, JJ., and BRACKLEY and PRICE, District 
Judges.

BRACKLEY, District 
Judge.

 

[¶1]      In these appeals, 
we are asked to determine if the district court erred: In awarding a real estate 
appraiser's fee which is claimed not to be congruous with the governing statute; 
and in denying a receiver's request for attorney's fees incurred in collecting 
receiver's fees ordered in a final judgment.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      In Case No. 
94-47, TZ Land & Cattle Co., Inc. (TZ), describes this 
issue:

Whether the district 
court, in awarding appraiser's fees in this matter, exceeded the authority to 
award such fees as set forth in § 1-17-341, W.S. 1977.

[¶4]      Thomas Grieve, 
the receiver, responds:

Whether the District 
Court acted properly and in accordance with law in allowing appraiser's fees in 
the sum of $2,288.59 incurred by the receiver on execution to realize fees 
awarded to the Receiver and to his counsel by the District Court in the Final 
Judgment entered on January 12, 1989, in * * * Carbon County Civil No. 
82C-219

[¶5]      In Case No. 
94-48, the receiver asks:

Whether the District 
Court acted properly and in accordance with law in denying that portion of the 
Receiver's Motion for Costs, Application of Certain Sums Tendered and for a 
Deficiency Judgment filed on September 28, 1993, asking the court to award 
attorney's fees in the sum of $1,860.00 incurred by the receiver on execution to 
realize fees awarded to him and to his counsel by the District Court in the 
Final Judgment entered on January 12, 1989, in * * * Carbon County Civil 
82C-219.

[¶6]      TZ restates that 
question:

Whether attorney's fees 
may be properly awarded as a cost of execution upon a 
judgment.

FACTS

[¶7]      Alden, Aurilla, 
and Karen Condict initiated this case in 1982, seeking dissolution of a 
partnership and partition of real property. Win and Elsie Condict were their 
principal adversaries. Thomas Grieve was appointed as receiver to collect and 
manage assets pending resolution of the litigation. A final judgment in that 
action was entered on January 12, 1989.1 Among other things, said judgment 
provided that: Win and Elsie Condict pay the receiver's fees of $2,821.69, and 
related attorney's fees of $4,442.76; execution could issue in the event of 
nonpayment; the judgment constituted a lien on real property set over to Win 
Condict in a 1985 judgment; and the receiver be discharged from his duties. 
Neither Win nor Elsie Condict paid all of these fees when due. Eventually, the 
real property upon which execution was to be levied was transferred to TZ. In 
March of 1993, Grieve filed a notice of levy against property held by TZ, 
seeking his unpaid receiver's fees, plus interest. TZ unsuccessfully attempted 
to set aside the notice of levy. On August 5, 1993, the Carbon County Sheriff 
executed documents entitled "Designation of Qualified Appraiser," appointing an 
appraiser of the real property in accordance with WYO. STAT. § 1-17-316 (1988). 
The appraiser filed a detailed "Appraisal Report" giving an opinion of value 
regarding the real property subject to execution. For that work, the appraiser 
charged a fee of $2,288.59

[¶8]      On September 12, 
1993, TZ tendered a check in the amount of $7,070.22, signed by Win Condict, 
toward payment of the 1989 final judgment. The receiver did not accept that 
check as payment in full. On September 28, 1993, the receiver asked the district 
court for: $5,855.78 toward the unsatisfied principal amount of the 1989 
judgment; $919.46 toward statutory interest on the 1989 judgment principal; 
$175.95 for publication costs relating to the execution; $2,288.59 for the 
appraiser's fee; and $1,860.00 for attorney's fees incurred in collecting 
receiver's fees awarded in the 1989 judgment.

[¶9]      On December 1, 
1993, the district court entered its "Judgment for Costs, Application of Certain 
Sums Tendered and for a Deficiency" which gave the receiver judgment for all 
sums requested, except the $1,860.00 for attorney fees. The latter sum was 
specifically denied because no authority was presented in support of the 
fees.

DISCUSSION

[¶10]   We first address TZ's objection to 
the award of appraiser's fees. When one levies execution upon real property in 
Wyoming, WYO. STAT. § 1-17-316(a) requires an appraisal:

(a) The officer who 
levies execution upon real property shall designate a qualified appraiser or 
three (3) disinterested property owners who are residents of the county where 
the lands taken in execution are situate and administer to the appraiser or to 
the property owners an oath to view and impartially appraise the value of the 
property levied upon or any interest of the judgment debtor. The appraiser or 
the property owners shall return to the officer as soon as possible a signed 
estimate of the appraised value.

[¶11]   Thus, an appraisal may be 
accomplished by a "qualified appraiser" or by "three (3) disinterested property 
owners." For purposes of our analysis, it is important to note the words 
"qualified appraiser" were added to this statute via a 1988 amendment. 1988 WYO. 
SESS. LAWS ch. 37, § 2. 

[¶12]   TZ contends appraisers may only be 
paid $3.00 per day, as provided in WYO. STAT. § 1-17-341 
(1988):

Each appraiser of real 
estate under W.S. 1-17-301 through 1-17-345 shall receive three dollars ($3.00) 
per day and one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) per half day for his services, to 
be collected on the execution.

[¶13]   With the exception of the 1988 
amendment, which added "qualified appraisers" to § 1-17-316(a), the sequence of 
statutes which govern "Lien of Judgment and Enforcement by Execution" have 
remained unchanged since their passage in 1886, except for renumbering. Section 
1-17-341 was not amended in 1988. The specific question we must answer is 
whether the $3.00 feelimit applies to the circumstances of this case.2 It is obvious that the legislature, 
years ago, intended § 1-17-341 to provide compensation for disinterested 
property owners who might be called upon to give an opinion, as appraisers, 
concerning the value of real estate. It is not logical to assume the 
legislature, in 1988, expected officials executing on real property to hire a 
professional appraiser for $3.00 per day. See State of Wyoming ex rel. Albany 
County Weed & Pest Dist. v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 592 P.2d 1154, 
1156-57 (Wyo. 1979). By legislative silence, trial courts are left with the 
responsibility of approving fees for "qualified appraisers" under the 
circumstances presented here. In similar contexts a "reasonable" fee is the 
standard. WYO. STAT. § 1-32-122 (1988); WYO. STAT. § 2-7-404 (Supp. 1994); WYO. 
STAT. § 17-17-141 (1989); WYO. STAT. § 17-21-701(j) (Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 
24-3-116 (1993); WYO. STAT. § 24-5-115 (1993); WYO. STAT. § 24-9-103 (1993); 
WYO.R.CIV.P. 71.1(h)(5); WYO.R.EVID. 706(b). The reasonableness of this 
appraiser's fee is unchallenged. So, the district court properly awarded the 
appraiser's fee herein.

[¶14]   Next, we address the receiver's 
contention that the district court erred in denying an award of attorney's fees 
incurred in aid of the execution. In the December 1993 judgment, the district 
court determined the receiver failed to present authority supporting the 
attorney's fee request. Thus, it was not allowed. We agree with the district 
court's decision. The 1989 final judgment awarded receiver a fee and discharged 
him from further responsibility. The receiver asks that the real property pay 
for his personal attorney employed to collect receiver's fee. We have recognized 
that a receiver may be reimbursed for attorney's fees under circumstances which 
are strictly controlled by statute. Krist v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 667 P.2d 665, 671 (Wyo. 1983); and see 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 383 
(1952). Here, the receiver seeks to recover a sum he expended for attorney's 
fees in order to collect a judgment in his favor, but which was not authorized 
by the district court or a statute. In view of our rule that each party in a 
lawsuit ordinarily bears his own attorney's fees and, in the absence of 
authority to the contrary, we hold the district court properly refused to award 
attorney's fees here. See Sheridan Commercial Park, Inc. v. Briggs, 848 P.2d 811, 817 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶15]   The judgment of the district court 
is affirmed.

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶16]   I dissent from that portion of the 
majority opinion which affirms the district court's award of an appraiser's fee 
in excess of the amount specifically provided by WYO. STAT. § 1-17-341 
(1988).

[¶17]  I have a great amount of difficulty with 
this statement in the majority opinion: "By legislative silence, trial courts 
are left with the responsibility of approving fees for `qualified appraisers' 
under the circumstances presented here." First of all, the majority did not cite 
any authority for this proposition because none exists. Secondly, the 
Legislature was not silent as it provided: "Each appraiser . . . shall 
receive three dollars ($3.00) per day and one dollar and fifty cents 
($1.50) per half day for his services." Section 1-17-341 (emphasis 
added). The majority opinion further states: "It is not logical to assume the 
legislature, in 1988, expected officials executing on real property to hire a 
professional appraiser for $3.00 per day." It is not for this Court to make such 
an assumption. We have stated so many times it needs no citation that, when a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, we will not look beyond the words in the 
statute to determine the Legislature's intent. If the Legislature does not 
expect appraisers of real property under WYO. STAT. §§ 1-17-301 to -345 (1988), 
whether qualified or not, to receive three dollars per day for their services, 
it should amend the statute to provide whatever fee it deems to be appropriate. 
It is not proper for this Court to legislate by judicial fiat. KN Energy, 
Inc. v. City of Casper, 755 P.2d 207, 216 (Wyo. 1988).

Footnotes

1 The appeal 
in the principal case was dismissed for failure of the appellants, Win and Elsie 
Condict, to adhere to the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. Condict v. 
Condict, Case No. 89-51 (dismissed by order entered on January 24, 
1990).

2 Because the 
question is not posed, we need not determine whether that limit applies to 
disinterested property owners.