Case Title: McNamara v. Rittman

Citation: 1999-Ohio-454

Docket Number: 19980366

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
MCNAMARA ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES, v. CITY OF RITTMAN, 
APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT. 
[Cite as McNamara v. Rittman (1999), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed as improvidently allowed. 
(No. 98-366 — Submitted February 24, 1999 — Decided April 7, 1999.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Wayne County, No. 
97CA0003. 
__________________ 
 
Steve J. Edwards and Andrew Hyde, for appellants and cross-appellees. 
 
Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, Jack R. Baker and Mel L. Lute, 
Jr., for appellee and cross-appellant. 
 
Barry M. Byron, Stephen L. Byron and John Gotherman, urging affirmance 
for amicus curiae, Ohio Municipal League. 
__________________ 
 
The appeal and cross-appeal are dismissed, sua sponte, as having been 
improvidently allowed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., dissent separately. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.  This case involves over fifty homeowners whose 
water wells were adversely affected by the city of Rittman’s pumping of 
groundwater during the operation of its municipal wellfield.  The question in the 
case is whether the city’s water pumping was a “discretionary function,” entitling 
the city to immunity from liability pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) and (5).  While 
I believe that Ohio’s sovereign immunity statutes are unconstitutional for the 
 
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reasons stated in my concurring opinion in Garrett v. Sandusky (1994), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 139, 141, 624 N.E.2d 704, 706, even under those statutes the city does not 
enjoy immunity in this case.  R.C. 2744.03(A) states: 
 
“(3)  The political subdivision is immune from liability if the action or 
failure to act by the employee involved that gave rise to the claim of liability was 
within the discretion of the employee with respect to policy-making, planning, or 
enforcement powers by virtue of the duties and responsibilities of the office or 
position of the employee. 
 
“* * * 
 
“(5)  The political subdivision is immune from liability if the injury, death, 
or loss to persons or property resulted from the exercise of judgment or discretion 
in determining whether to acquire, or how to use, equipment, supplies, materials, 
personnel, facilities, and other resources unless the judgment or discretion was 
exercised with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” 
 
Everything that government does is the result of some official’s or 
employee’s decision to act.  However, not everything that flows from that decision 
is entitled to immunity under the statute.  The appellate court held that the 
establishment and operation of a wellfield are a part of the city’s discretionary 
function.  There is protection for the policy decisions concerning creating and 
maintaining a system — but for the day-to-day operation of the facilities there is 
not.  This court has already held in Hill v. Urbana (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 130, 679 
N.E.2d 1109, that the operation of a municipal water supply system is a 
proprietary function and that a municipality may be liable for negligence in the 
operation thereof.  Simply stated, if something goes wrong during the operation of 
the system, the city can be liable.  In Hill, the wrong was an injury to a person 
 
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repairing the system; here the alleged wrong is the dewatering of the plaintiffs’ 
wells. 
 
The city was not immune from liability in this case.  Moreover, the 
plaintiffs’ claim of unreasonable harm to their water rights sufficiently established 
the negligent performance of a proprietary function necessary to set forth a claim 
under R.C. 2744.02(B).  This case should have survived summary judgment. 
__________________ 
 
Cook, J., dissenting.  I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
by adopting its opinion.