Case Title: S.Ct. Coronel v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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No. 26403

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

PAUL KAY CORONEL, Petitioner-Appellant

evn Sone

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent-Appellee
(No. 26398; CIV. NO. 03-1-1088)

 

 

PAUL KAY CORONEL, Petitioner-Appeliant

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent-Appellee
(NO. 26403; S..P. NO. 03-1-0006K)

 

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST AND THIRD CIRCUIT COURTS

(ey: Moon, C.J., Levineon, Nakayama, Acoba, and OUELY J.)

Plaintiff-appellant Paul fay Coronel, aka Paul Dennis
coronel, appeals pro se from: (2) the Circuit Court of the Third
circuit's February 2, 2004 final order! denying his petition
under Havai't Rules of Penal Proceduse (HRPP) Rule 40 for relief
from his judgment of conviction for multiple counts of theft in
the first degrees and (2) the Circuit Court of the First
circuit's August 23, 2003 interlocutory order? transferring venue
te the third circuit and reclassitying his petition for

declaratory judgment as a HRPP Rule 40 petition for post~

\ the Honorable Ronald Ibarra entered the February 2, 2004 order

! the Honorable Sabrina S. McKenna entered the August 29, 2003 order

ayes
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conviction relief.’ As points of error on appeal, Coronel
contends that: (1) Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-835
(1985) violates the Hawai‘ and United States Constitutions by
allowing defendants to be convicted of crimes for which they were
not indicted (2) Coronel himself was denied due process and
grand jury rights because he was convicted, with the aid of HRS §
108-835, of a theft offense different from that for which he was
indicted; and (3) the first circuit court erred in transferring
his petition to the third circuit and compelling him to use HRPP
Rule 40 to test the constitutionality of HRS § 708-835.

upon carefully reviewing the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the argunents advocated and the issues raised, we hold as
follows:

(2) the first cireuit court did not err in transferring

Coronel’s petition because it did not have jurisdiction

to entertain it as a petition for declaratory judgment,

and only the third circuit court had jurisdiction to

hear it as a non-conforming HRPP Rule 40 petition for

 

> As an interlocutory order, the August 23, 2003 order was not
Andependently appealable, but becase so upon entry of the February 2, 2004
Hinal order, See State v, Adan, 97 Hawaii 475, 462, 40 P.30 877, 684 (2002)
(an appeal froma final order of Judgment brings up for review all preceding
interlocutory orders in the case). Coronel filed separate appeals from each
of the first circvit'e interlocutory order and the third circuit's final
order, which were docketed in this court as Nos. 26398 and 26403,
Fespectively. the appeals were consolidated by order of this court under No.
26403.
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post-conviction relief. First, neither court had
jurisdiction under the declaratory judgment statute,
HRS § 632-1 (1993), because Coronel had an adequate

renedy at law

 

the defense of his own criminal

prosecution -- for challenging the constitutionality of
HRS § 708-835. See Pacific Meat Co, v. Otagaki, 47

Haw. 652, 655-56, 394 P.2d 618, 620-21 (1964)
(declaratory relief is not available to enjoin the
enforcement of a criminal statute where its
constitutionality may be tested by defense of 2
criminal prosecution). Second, only the third circuit
court, and not the first circuit court, had
jurisdiction under the criminal jurisdiction statute,
HRS § 603-21.5 (1993), because Coronel’s offenses were
conmitted within the third circuit and his case was not
transferred from a court of that circuit to the first
circuit for trial. See HRS § 603-21.5(1) (circuit
courts shall have jurisdiction over offenses “committed
within their respective circuits or transferred to them
for trial by change of venue from sone other circuit

court”)

 

(2) Coronel’s petition was properly treated as a non-
conforming HRPP Rule 40 petition because it constituted

a post-conviction attack on his conviction based on a
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constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of his
Andictment. See HREP Rule 40(a) (1) (1) (post-conviction
proceedings under Rule 40 encompass challenges to a
judgment of conviction on the grounds that the judgment,
was obtained in violation of the federal or state
constitution); HRPP Rule 40(c) (2) (the court may, upon
written order, require that non-conforming post-
conviction petitions claiming illegality of judgment be
conformed to the requirements of Rule 40 with the
filing of a supplenental petition);

(3) Coronel’s argument regarding the constitutionality
of HRS § 108-835 is precluded, and thus his petition
properly denied, because he has previously challenged
the constitutional sufficiency of his indictment on
Gizect appeal and in other post-conviction
proceedings.‘ See HRPP Rule 40(3) (3) (Rule 40 relief
not available where the issues sought to be raised have
been waived or previously ruled upon). Therefore,

IT 18 HEREBY ORDERED that: (1) the third circuit

court’s February 2, 2004 final order denying Coronel’s petition

 

‘ cozonel’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by memorandum
‘opinion of this court on June 18 1990. state v, Corane], No. 13919, 71 Haw.
687, 194 F.2d 616 {1990}. His HREP Rule 40 petition for post-conviction
Felief was denied by sumtary disposition order of this court on Septenber 30,
1999. Stace 'v. Coronel, No, 21369, 92 Hawai'i 632, 994 P.2d S6¢ (1999)
Coronel raised challenges to the constitutionality of his indictment
Uneluding, inter alia, that the sedictnent was impermissibly smended) that
were ruled upon in both of those proceedings.

 

 

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for post-conviction relief; and (2) the first circuit court’s
August 29, 2003 interlocutory order transferring and
reclassifying Coronel’s petition are affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, August 30, 2005.

on the briefs: Gone —

Paul Kay Coronel, :
petitioner-appellant, i oe

pro se

Dale Y. Ross, Bessetes CN eapcioey Ve
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

for respondent-appellee
State of Hawai'i YX

Vane, Buatgs be