Case Title: Arnold v. Davis

Citation: 503 S.W.2d 100

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1973-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
503 S.W.2d 100 (1973) James T. ARNOLD, III, Appellant, v. Rickey H. DAVIS et al., Appellees. Supreme Court of Tennessee. December 3, 1973. *101 Robert L. Ogle, Jr., Sevierville, Frank N. Bratton, Athens, for appellant. Higgins & Biddle, Athens, for appellees. FONES, Justice. James T. Arnold, III, was injured on January 16, 1970, while riding as a guest passenger in an automobile owned by William E. Davis and being driven by Rickey H. Davis. Arnold will be referred to as plaintiff and the Davises as defendants. Plaintiff attained his 19th birthday on December 19, 1969, and was a minor on the date of the accident, 28 days after said birthday. By virtue of the Public Acts of 1971, Chapter 162, Sec. 4, he attained his majority, along with many other minors, on May 11, 1971, the effective date of said Act. Plaintiff filed suit against defendants in the Circuit Court for McMinn County, on December 7, 1972. The trial court sustained defendants' motion for summary judgment, based on the one-year statute of limitations for personal injuries and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff perfected a direct appeal to this Court and takes the position that the statute did not run until December 19, 1972, his 22nd birthday. Plaintiff's assignment of error is as follows: We understand the thrust of plaintiff's contentions to be that, since he was more than 18 and less than 21 years of age on May 11, 1971, his minority was not removed *102 by the Legal Responsibility Act of 1971. Plaintiff elects to construe the Act as removing his disability, not on May 11, 1971, but on plaintiff's 18th birthday, December 19, 1968. Having assumed that construction, it is said that the Act is unconstitutional, in violation of Article I, Section 17. Public Acts of 1971, Chapter 162, reads as follows: Section 3 of the Legal Responsibility Act is codified as T.C.A. § 1-313. T.C.A. § 28-107, as amended by Section 2 of the Legal Responsibility Act, reads as follows: We construe the Legal Responsibility Act of 1971 as removing the disabilities of minority of all persons 18 to 21 years of age on May 11, 1971, as of May 11, 1971, and from and after that date all persons reached their majority at age 18. This construction involves no retrospective application. The Act plainly says any person who is 18 years of age or older is emancipated on its effective date. Thus, the premise upon which plaintiff predicates his attack of unconstitutionality, to wit: that his disability of minority was retroactively removed on his 18th birthday, simply does not exist. The legislative purpose involved in T.C.A. § 28-107 is to declare that statutes of limitation do not begin to run until a person's disability is removed. While not a saving clause in the respect that plaintiff uses the phrase, T.C.A. § 28-107 performs the function of granting to minors who were emancipated on May 11, 1971, the period of limitation applicable to any cause of action then accrued, up to three years. Plaintiff ignores the existence of this statute in making the argument that the trial court legislated a saving clause, where none exists, by holding that plaintiff had one year after May 11, 1971 within which to commence his action. The Legal Responsibility Act is not a statute of limitation, although its effect shortens the period within which minors, in the position of plaintiff, could commence actions. As plaintiff concedes, no person has a vested interest in a statute of limitations in force at the time his cause of action accrues. See Bradley v. LaPenna, Tenn., 490 S.W.2d 500 (1973). Parenthetically, no person had a vested interest in remaining a minor until age 21, which is the position plaintiff seeks to sustain. As this Court held in Bradley, supra, the period allowed for suit *103 may be shortened, provided a reasonable time is permitted to bring the action. Plaintiff had the full year following May 11, 1971, as provided in T.C.A. § 28-304, within which to bring his personal injury action resulting from the accident on January 16, 1970. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's suit is affirmed. The costs are adjudged against the plaintiff. DYER, C.J., McCANLESS, J., and JENKINS and LEECH, Special Justices, concur.