Case Title: AVERY v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
AVERY v. STATE2002 WY 8747 P.3d 973Case Number: 01-104Decided: 06/07/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

IN THE 
MATTER OF LAWRENCE

AVERY, 
D/O/B 09-18-28:

 

LAWRENCE 
AVERY, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
Donald L. Painter, Casper, Wyoming.

Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bryan A. 
Skoric, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

VOIGT, 
Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court; KITE, 
Justice, filed a dissenting opinion, with which HILL, 
Justice, joined.

            
VOIGT, Justice. 

[¶1]      After pleading no 
contest, Lawrence Avery, the appellant, was convicted in 1985 of first-degree 
sexual assault and second-degree sexual assault, the victims being his 
step-grandchildren.  He was 
sentenced to ninety days in a community alternatives program or forty-five days 
in jail, to be followed by two years of supervised probation.  In September 2000, the State filed an 
Application for Hearing to Designate Risk of Re-Offense, pursuant to the Wyoming 
Sex Offender Registration Act.  In 
February 2001, the State filed an Amended Application for Hearing to Designate 
Risk of Re-Offense, in which several allegations were added as to recent 
behavior that suggested a high-risk classification was in order.  The appellant appeals the district 
court's determination that he poses a high risk to re-offend.  We find insufficient evidence to support 
the district court's order and we, therefore, reverse.

 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      The appellant 
words the issue as follows:

 

Whether, 
as a matter of law, there was sufficient evidence for the district court to 
enter an Order and Designation of High Risk of Re-offense.

 

The 
State posits the issue as follows:

 

Did the 
State show that appellant posed a high risk of re-offense by a preponderance of 
the evidence?

 

THE 
WYOMING SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION ACT

 

[¶3]      In 1994, this 
state adopted the Wyoming Sex Offender Registration Act (the Act).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-301 (LexisNexis 
2001) contains several rather complex definitions that are determinative of 
which offenders must register and for which crimes.  Suffice it to say for purposes of this 
appeal that the appellant's 1985 convictions required him to register.  He has not raised his duty to register 
as an issue in this appeal.

 

[¶4]      In addition to 
registration, the Act provides for a process whereby certain sex offenders are 
to be classified as to their risk of re-offense.  That process is found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7-19-303 (LexisNexis 2001).  The 
appellant does not contend that he should not be subject to this process.  Rather, he contends that the evidence 
presented was insufficient for the district court to have classified him as high 
risk, when considered under the mandatory factors of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-19-303(d):

 

In 
determining an offender's risk of reoffense under subsection (c) of this 
section, the court shall consider:

 

            
(i)         
Conditions of release that minimize risk of reoffense, including whether 
the offender is under supervision of probation or parole, receiving counseling, 
therapy or treatment, or residing in a home situation that provides guidance and 
supervision;

 

            
(ii)        
Physical conditions that minimize the risk of reoffense, including 
advanced age or debilitating illness;

 

            
(iii)       
Criminal history factors indicative of high risk of reoffense, 
including:

 

            
(A)       
Whether the offender's conduct was found to be characterized by 
repetitive and compulsive behavior;

 

            
(B)       
Whether the offender served the maximum term under the court 
order;

 

            
(C)       
Whether the offender committed the sexual offense against a 
child;

 

            
(D)       
Whether psychological or psychiatric profiles indicate a risk of 
recidivism;

 

            
(E)       
The offender's response to treatment;

 

            
(F)       
Recent behavior, including behavior while confined or while under 
supervision in the community as well as behavior in the community following 
service of sentence;

 

            
(G)       
Recent threats against persons or expressions of intent to commit 
additional crimes; and

 

            
(H)       
Other criminal history factors, including:

 

            
(I)         
The relationship between the offender and the 
victim;

 

            
(II)        
Whether the offense involved the use of a weapon, violence or infliction 
of serious bodily harm;

 

            
(III)       
The number, date and nature of prior offenses.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶5]      On appeal, 
sufficiency of the evidence is analyzed by viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party and by affording to the prevailing party 
the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that 
evidence.  Nollen v. State, 
12 P.3d 682, 684 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 962 P.2d 141, 
148 (Wyo. 1998)).  We do not reweigh the evidence or 
re-examine the credibility of the witnesses.  Nollen, 12 P.3d  at 684 
(quoting Rodriguez, 962 P.2d at 148).  Neither do we usually consider 
conflicting evidence presented by the non-prevailing party.  Williams v. State, 986 P.2d 855, 
857 (Wyo. 1999).  Where, however, as here, the fact finder 
was a judge, rather than a jury, our role is somewhat more 
expansive:

 

"The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  Hopper v. All Pet 
Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo.1993).  While the findings are presumptively 
correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence 
in the record.  Id.  Due regard is given to the opportunity 
of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review 
does not entail weighing disputed evidence.  Id.  Findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  
Id.  A finding is 
clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed.  
Id."

 

Stroup 
v. Oedekoven, 995 P.2d 125, 128 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Springer v. Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Wyo. 1997)).  When supported by substantial evidence, 
a judge's factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are 
against the great weight of the evidence.  
McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 886 P.2d 595, 597 (Wyo. 
1994); 
Leavell v. Linn, 884 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶6]      Obviously, 
sufficiency of the evidence cannot be evaluated without knowing the standard 
against which the evidence is to be measured.  That is problematic in the present 
situation because the Act neither assigns the burden of persuasion nor says what 
that burden is to be.  That fact is 
exacerbated by the failure of the parties to provide any guidance to this Court 
on the issue.  The appellant does 
not even address the burden of proof.  
The State's entire analysis is as follows:

 
            
Appellant's hearing was a civil proceeding, not a criminal 
proceeding.  The logical burden of 
proof which the State had to meet as the movant was showing by a preponderance 
of the evidence that Appellant posed a high risk of re-offense.  Appellant has not argued for the 
application of a different burden of proof, and there is no logical basis for 
the application of a more rigorous standard in Appellant's hearing.  The record shows that the State 
satisfied its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Appellant posed a high risk of re-offense.

 

[¶7]      It is true that 
the Act is a regulatory device, not a method of imposing criminal 
punishment.  Johnson v. 
State, 922 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Wyo. 1996); Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1130-31 (Wyo. 1996).  
Consequently, it is not difficult to conclude that "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" is not the appropriate standard.  
That is not the same as saying, however, that "preponderance of the 
evidence" is the correct standard.  
Contrary to the State's observation, there may well be some logical basis 
for a more rigorous standard.  It 
has been held that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution requires not only that the state carry the burden of 
persuasion at sexual offender classification hearings, but that it do so by 
clear and convincing evidence.  
E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1106-11 (3rd Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1109, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110 (1998).  See also Jane A. Small, Note, 
Who are the People in Your Neighborhood?  Due Process, Public Protection, and Sex 
Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1451 (Nov. 1999).1

 

[¶8]      As mentioned 
above, this issue has not been briefed in the instant case.  The appellant ignored the issue and the 
State assumed the burden of proof standard was "preponderance of the 
evidence."  Because important 
constitutional and policy issues are involved, we do not intend to rule on the 
appropriate standard until such time as it is properly presented to us and 
adequately briefed.  For purposes of 
the instant case only, we will follow the lead of the parties and consider the 
evidentiary issue as it has been presented; that is, as a question of the 
preponderance of the evidence.2  By doing so, we are not making a 
determination that such is the proper standard to be applied under the 
Act.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶9]      Two witnesses 
testified at the hearing.  The 
first, Lynn Cohee, is an investigator in the Natrona County Sheriff's 
Office.  Cohee's testimony can best 
be described as an unsuccessful attempt to "hearsay in" allegations of improper 
sexual contact between the appellant and three minors during the period from 
1995 to 1999.  No specific improper 
conduct by the appellant was established through Cohee's testimony, and the 
district court did not indicate that it relied on Cohee's testimony in any way 
in reaching its decision.

 

[¶10]   The second witness to testify was 
the appellant.  His testimony 
contained considerable information that may be seen as relevant to the statutory 
factors to be considered by the district court:

 

            
1.         
At the time of the hearing, the appellant was seventy-two years 
old.

 

            
2.         
At the time of the hearing, the appellant was not married and lived with 
no one.

 

            
3.         
The male victim was seven years old and the female victim was six years 
old at the time of the original offenses.

 

            
4.         
The appellant denied the original offenses, contrary to statements he 
allegedly made that were included in the presentence investigation 
report.

 

            
5.         
The appellant served the full forty-five days of his jail 
sentence.

 

            
6.         
The appellant obtained no counseling.

 

            
7.         
The appellant has never been diagnosed with a mental or psychological 
problem.

 

            
8.         
The appellant suffers from erectile dysfunction as a result of injuries 
received when a trailer fell on him, and he has not had an erection since that 
occurred, approximately in 1988.

 

            
9.         
The appellant's probation was never revoked.

 

            
10.       
The appellant denied the allegations of any recent improper sexual 
contact with minors.

 

            
11.       
The appellant has had aneurysm surgery, with frequent angioplasty 
procedures thereafter.

 

[¶11]   At the end of the classification 
hearing, the district court announced its decision and the reasons for it.  For ease of analysis, we quote the 
comments verbatim:

 

            
THE COURT:  Very good.  I find matters such as the one presented 
here most challenging.  My view of 
this particular case is that the factors set forth by statute cut both 
ways.  There's many things that can 
be argued going both ways in this situation.

 

            
The question to be determined is not whether there has been re-offense 
but whether there's a risk of re-offense, and in my mind the factors that are 
laid out here can be analyzed in a couple of different ways.  For example, the factors whether there 
are conditions of release that minimize the risk of re-offense, whether the 
offender is under supervision or received counseling, therapy or 
treatment.

 

            
In that regard, Mr. Painter is correct that he's not under supervision, 
he's not receiving counseling at this time.  But on the other hand, even though it 
may not have been his fault, it appears to me that if someone were convicted of 
first degree sexual assault and second degree sexual assault that maybe even if 
it wasn't mandated by the Court that the problem be addressed by counseling, 
therapy, treatment, by dealing with the underlying problem that created the 
offense in the first place.  So I 
can see where you could argue a factor like that to cut both 
ways.

 

            
Focusing on the offense itself, which is the criminal history factors, I 
have very big concerns.  We have two 
serious convictions for the most serious sex offenses under Wyoming law, sexual 
assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the second degree.  We have offenses committed against very 
young minor children.  We have 
offenses committed against a male and a female.  We have offenses he's committed against 
grandchildren.

 

            
There was a concern I have about the testimony of Mr. Avery basically 
denying any offense in the first hand relative to offenses to which he stands 
convicted.  The Court clearly had to 
have accepted a factual basis to accept his pleas of nolo contendere in the 
first instance and his denial of statements made in a pre-sentence investigation 
which was adopted in the course of that criminal proceeding and documents his 
statement or his version of the offense substantially in my mind impeached his 
credibility in these proceedings.

 

            
So because of those primary factors, although I'm considering all of the 
factors, including clearly that his physical condition minimizes his risk for 
offense, I have to come down on the side of the State in this matter because of 
huge concerns I have in those areas I've identified.

 

            
I'm going to make a finding of a high risk for re-offense in this case 
and ask, Ms. Wilking, if you would, to prepare an order reflecting that ruling 
for Mr. Painter's approval as to form.

 

[¶12]   Essentially, the points made by the 
district court are (1) the appellant had not undergone counseling or other 
therapy; (2) first-degree sexual assault and second-degree sexual assault are 
the most serious sexual assault crimes under Wyoming law; (3) the victims were 
children, a male and a female, and they were the appellant's step-grandchildren; 
(4) the appellant denied committing the offenses despite contrary statements 
contained in the presentence investigation report, which denial casts doubt on 
the appellant's credibility; and (5) the appellant's physical condition 
minimized the risk.

 

[¶13]   The question now before this Court 
is whether these conclusions and the district court's decision to categorize the 
appellant as high risk are contrary to the great weight of the evidence.  We conclude that such is the case.  The evidence established that the 
appellant was a seventy-two-year-old man who, approximately sixteen years 
earlier, had been convicted of sexually assaulting his step-grandchildren.  For some reason not explained in the 
record, he was allowed to plead no contest, and he served only forty-five days 
in jail.3  He successfully completed two years of 
supervised probation.  Most 
glaringly absent from the evidence was proof, as opposed to accusation, of 
recidivism during the sixteen years since the offenses.  In addition, the appellant's physical 
condition at least raised a serious question as to the likelihood of re-offense 
or even the ability to re-offend.

 

[¶14]   Contrary to the district court's 
findings, the great weight of the evidence suggests that the appellant does not 
pose a high risk of re-offense.  The 
State did not prove, for instance, that the appellant's conduct was 
"characterized by repetitive and compulsive behavior," or that there were any 
"psychological or psychiatric profiles [to] indicate a risk of recidivism," or 
that the appellant's recent behavior indicated a threat of re-offense, or that 
the appellant had made recent threats or expressions of intent to 
re-offend.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-9-303(d)(iii)(A) and (D).

 

[¶15]   There will be cases such as this 
one, where newly registering offenders committed their crimes many years 
ago.  If the statutory 
classification system is to have any integrity, the State must prove more than 
the mere commission of the original offense, especially where the offender has 
been out and about in society during the interim without further offense.  The five points outlined by the district 
court in this case might carry greater weight in the case of a recent crime with 
a newly released offender.  However, 
they cannot very well meet the State's burden where the offender has been in the 
community for sixteen years without proven recidivism.

 

[¶16]   We recognize that the risk 
classification scheme of the Act creates a dilemma for the district courts.  The district court, without much 
information, is asked to predict the likely future conduct of an offender.  If the district court "guesses" wrong, 
and someone who was assessed as low risk or moderate risk re-offends, the 
district court's judgment may be called into question, not to mention the fact 
that there will be a new victim or victims.  On the other hand, if the district court 
takes the safer route, and classifies all offenders as high risk, then the 
public warning feature of the system is rendered meaningless, and individual 
offenders are not treated fairly.

 

[¶17]   The only way this statutory scheme 
will work is if the State is held to a burden of proof sufficient to allow the 
district court to distinguish one offender from another, utilizing the statutory 
factors.  In the instant case, the 
great weight of the evidence simply did not justify placing the appellant in a 
high-risk category.

 

[¶18]   We reverse and remand for a new 
classification hearing under the statute.

  

            
KITE, 
Justice, dissenting, with whom HILL, Justice, joins. 

[¶19]   I respectfully dissent from the 
majority opinion.  After stating the 
applicable standard of review, the majority proceeds to disregard the 
substantial evidence supporting the district court's findings and make its own 
determination without the benefit of observing the witnesses.  The majority uses preponderance of the 
evidence as the standard of proof.  
This standard is met if the evidence leads the trier of fact to find that 
the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.  Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming 
Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1078 (Wyo. 1993).  "The conclusion of what preponderates is 
with the trier of fact."  Id.; see also Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 429 
(Wyo. 1985).  

 

[I]t is 
important that the exercise of discretion be accompanied by the trial court's 
articulation of the factors considered and the weight accorded to them 
. . . . [A]rticulation of the reasons for the decision tends to 
provide a firm base for an appellate judgment that discretion was soundly 
exercised.  It confines review of 
the exercise of discretion to its appropriate scope--i.e., whether the relevant 
factors were considered and given appropriate weight 
. . . .

 

United 
States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981); see also 
WJH v. State, 2001 WY 54, ¶18, 24 P.3d 1147, ¶18 (Wyo. 2001); Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶15, 22 P.3d 861, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001).   The 
district court concluded, based on all the evidence and consideration of the 
statutory factors, Mr. Avery presented a high risk of reoffense.  

 

[¶20]   If the record contains substantial 
evidence, we will not disturb a judge's factual findings on appeal unless they 
are against the great weight of the evidence.  McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 886 P.2d 595, 597 (Wyo. 1994); Leavell v. Linn, 884 P.2d 1364, 1368 
(Wyo. 1994).

 

Findings 
of fact will not be set aside unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.

 

Springer 
v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, 
944 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Wyo. 1997) (citation omitted); see also 
Stroup v. Oedekoven, 995 P.2d 125, 128 (Wyo. 1999).  Although a different judgment may have 
been reached and the question the district court faced may have been a close 
one, the court's findings are not clearly erroneous.  It cannot be reasonably concluded, based 
upon this record, that a mistake was made.

 

[¶21]   Two factors cause me to disagree 
with the majority's decision to reverse the district court's order.  First, the record indicates the court 
considered substantial evidence, the most persuasive of which may have been Mr. 
Avery's own testimony.  Second, the 
court carefully explained how the statutory factors were considered and 
weighed.  Nothing in the statute 
mandates one factor should be determinative of the outcome.  Instead, the district court is directed 
to find the appropriate level of risk of reoffense based upon a review of all 
the factors, weighing them equally.  
The majority places undo emphasis on the lack of evidence of actual 
reoffense and Mr. Avery's physical condition, which, contrary to the inference 
of the majority, does not prevent him from committing another sexual assault 
similar to those for which he was convicted.

 

[¶22]   Evidence indicating a high risk of 
reoffense included the testimony of Lynn Cohee, an investigator for the Natrona 
County sheriff's office, and Mr. Avery and the record of the original 
offense.  The nature of the original 
offense establishes several of the statutory factors.  Mr. Avery was charged with and convicted of first-degree sexual assault and 
second-degree sexual assault of very young victims who were six and seven years 
old.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-19-303(d)(iii)(C) (LexisNexis 2001).  
The children were Mr. Avery's step-grandchildren who were living with him 
at the time the crimes were committed.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303(d)(iii)(H)(I) (LexisNexis 2001).  Mr. Avery pleaded no contest to the 
charges which constitutes an admission of all the essential elements of the 
charges.  Zanetti v. State, 783 P.2d 134, 139 
(Wyo. 1989); State v. Steele, 620 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Wyo. 1980).

 

[¶23]   Significantly, at the hearing on 
the state's petition to designate Mr. Avery as high risk for reoffense, Mr. 
Avery was no longer subject to probation or parole; was not receiving any 
counseling, therapy, or treatment; and was not residing in a home situation that 
provided guidance and supervision.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303(d)(i) (LexisNexis 2001).  Further, he refused to accept any 
responsibility for his conduct and denied ever having physical contact with his 
step-grandchildren.  This denial 
directly contradicted his nolo contendere plea.  His conviction required that he register 
his address with the sheriff's office and send a written notice of any change of 
address within ten days of establishing a new residence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-302(e) 
(LexisNexis 2001).  Despite this, he 
admitted he had not been living at his registered address for over a year. 

 

[¶24]   Fundamental to a sexual offender's 
success in avoiding future offenses is acceptance of his problem and commitment 
to seek help.  Mr. Avery's testimony 
showed neither.  His blatant refusal 
to even admit the prior offense occurred and failure to comply with the 
registration requirements provided ample foundation for the district court's 
conclusion he was not credible and its belief Mr. Avery presented a high risk 
for reoffense. 

 

[¶25]   The majority dismisses Ms. Cohee's 
testimony as an attempt to "hearsay in" evidence concerning improper conduct by 
Mr. Avery with other minors since his conviction.  While it is true that the alleged 
victims did not testify, Ms. Cohee testified she received a complaint against 
Mr. Avery in 1996 regarding allegations of sexual intercourse with two 
minors.  She also testified to 
receiving a complaint in 1999 in which a ten-year-old girl claimed Mr. Avery 
performed oral sex with her.  Ms. 
Cohee offered the results of a lie detector test administered on Mr. Avery as a 
result of those complaints, and Mr. Avery successfully objected to its admission 
into evidence.  Ms. Cohee also 
testified regarding Mr. Avery's repeated denials of any wrongdoing during her 
interview with him.  The record 
contains no explanation why the complaints did not result in formal 
charges.  While certainly not proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of repetitive behavior or recent threats, which are 
additional statutory factors to consider, this evidence demonstrated allegations 
of improper sexual contact with minors continued to be an aspect of Mr. Avery's 
life.  Since this was not a criminal 
proceeding but, as noted by the majority, was a regulatory one subject to the 
more lenient standard of proof of preponderance of the evidence, Ms. Cohee's 
testimony could certainly have substantiated the district court's belief, when 
considered together with the other evidence, that Mr. Avery presented a high 
risk of reoffense.

 

[¶26]   The primary factor upon which Mr. 
Avery relied to demonstrate a low risk of reoffense was an injury he incurred 
which apparently caused him to be unable to achieve an erection.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-303(d)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2001) directs the court to consider "[p]hysical conditions that 
minimize the risk of reoffense, including advanced age or debilitating 
illness."  Neither Mr. Avery nor the 
majority provides an explanation, and none logically exists, how an inability to 
achieve an erection reduces the risk a sexual offender will reoffend through 
other means including fondling and oral sex.  Mr. Avery and the majority also suggest 
that his age of seventy-two years and his aneurysm surgery somehow militate 
against the risk of reoffense.  
While advanced age and poor health may weigh in favor of a lower risk, 
those factors alone do not mandate such a conclusion.

 

[¶27]   The majority effectively requires 
district courts to find a reoffense or a more recent conviction before a sexual 
offender can be designated as high risk.  
The legislature did not see fit to require such a finding to justify a 
high risk designation, and this court should refrain from allowing its apparent 
disagreement with the district court's factual finding to rationalize creation 
of a requirement not provided by the statute. 

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  
1This approach 
utilizes a balancing test derived from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
334-35, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), whereby the court considers four 
factors:  (1) the private interest 
affected by the official action; (2) the risk of the erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used; (3) the probable value of any 
alternative procedures; and (4) the government's 
interest.

  
2A preponderance 
of the evidence is such evidence that leads the trier of fact to find that the 
existence of the contested fact is more probable than its non-existence.  In re Worker's Compensation Claim of 
Johnson, 2001 WY 48, ¶ 9, 23 P.3d 32, 36 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Scherling 
v. Kilgore, 599 P.2d 1352, 1359 (Wyo. 
1979)).

  3One reason the 
district court expressed concern about the appellant's credibility was that the 
appellant now denied the original crimes, despite the fact that the sentencing 
court "had to have accepted a factual basis to accept his plea of nolo 
contendere . . .."  The record does 
not, however, establish that the appellant, himself, established a factual basis 
and, furthermore, the establishment of a factual basis by a defendant upon 
pleading nolo contendere is not required.  
Peitsmeyer v. State, 2001 WY 38, ¶ 7, 21 P.3d 733, 734 (Wyo. 
2001); State v. 
Steele, 620 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Wyo. 1980).