Case Title: KACEY ALLAN GIBBS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0231

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
KACEY ALLAN GIBBS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 79187 P.3d 862Case Number: S-07-0231Decided: 07/14/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
KACEY 
ALLAN GIBBS,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina Kerin, Appellate Counsel; and David E. 
Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Westling.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. 
Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; BURKE, J., files a special concurrence, 
in which VOIGT, C.J., 
joins.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Kacey 
Allan Gibbs (Gibbs), seeks review of the district court's judgment and sentence, 
asserting that, because the State violated the terms of the plea agreement 
entered into by the State and Gibbs, Gibbs should be permitted to withdraw his 
guilty pleas and plead anew.  We 
will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Gibbs raises this 
issue:

 
 
Should 
the judgment be vacated and [Gibbs] be allowed to withdraw his plea because the 
prosecutor violated the plea agreement?

 
 
The 
State views the issue differently:

 
 
Did 
[Gibbs] materially and substantially breach the plea agreement when he violated 
a number of [district] court orders prior to sentencing, thereby releasing the 
State from its obligations under the plea agreement.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      On July 21, 2006, 
a felony information was filed in 
Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial District alleging that on June 16, 2006, 
Gibbs knowingly defaced, injured or destroyed property of another in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201 (a) and (b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007).  On November 13, 2006, a second felony 
information was filed in that same 
court, alleging that on October 28, 2006, Gibbs engaged in conduct that 
constituted felony stalking in violation in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b)(i) and 
(e)(iv) (LexisNexis 2007) and that he entered a motor vehicle with the intent to 
commit a larceny therein in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301 (a) and (b) 
(LexisNexis 2007).  Although never 
formally consolidated, the two separate criminal actions (and three felony 
charges) were treated by the district court in a single 
proceeding.

 
 
[¶4]      Gibbs entered not 
guilty pleas to the charges described above on September 19, 2006, March 1, 
2007, and August 2, 2007, respectively.  
Gibbs eventually entered into a guilty plea agreement with the State and 
a hearing was held on that matter on May 18, 2007.  The plea agreement was not reduced to a 
writing prior to the plea being accepted, but the district court did summarize 
it in a written form, in his judgment upon the guilty pleas, as well as in his 
comments just prior to imposing sentence.  
Gibbs's public defender outlined the plea agreement in these 
terms:

 
 
Your 
Honor, the nature of the agreement is that the  the property destruction of the 
motorcycle would be reduced to a misdemeanor; that the defendant will plead 
guilty to that misdemeanor; that he will pay the full restitution of the 
motorcycle, which I believe is $1,059.

He will 
also plead guilty to a felony stalking case, which will run  and the sentence 
will run concurrent with that on the misdemeanor; that the burglary case would 
be dismissed.  He would get 
treatment as designated by the ASI [Addiction Severity Index].  The State has agreed to recommend a 
split sentence involving VOA [Volunteers of America] thereafter, and that 
they've also agreed to allow him to remain out on bond provided there are no 
bond violations of any sort.

 
 
The 
prosecutor added this:  "It would 
also obviously mean that he's to continue to lead a law-abiding life and have no 
contact with the victim in the stalking matter, Your 
Honor."

 
 
[¶5]      At that hearing, 
Gibbs expressed concern about the status of his visitation with his son.  His son was with his mother, and it was 
the mother that Gibbs was accused of stalking in violation of a protection 
order.  The district court clarified 
for Gibbs:

 
 
            
Sir, I need you to understand that insofar as almost all of this, the 
Court has no say in it.  The one 
part the Court does have say in has to do with the sentencing.  Whatever sentence you get, even if it's 
different than the recommendation, if I decide to give you a split sentence or 
not, if I decide to send you to VOA or not, if I decide that you're  whatever 
sentence you get on the motorcycle incident is going to run consecutive as 
opposed to concurrent, whatever I give you, you have to accept.  Sentencing is solely within the province 
of the Court.

            
I will listen to the recommendations and the reason for the 
recommendations.  I will review the 
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections, sir.  But at the end of the day, whatever 
orders I enter on sentence, even if they're different than that part of the plea 
agreement, you'll have to accept them.

Do you 
understand that?

 
 
Gibbs 
stated that he did understand, and the district court continued:  "You will not be able to withdraw your 
plea of guilty and you won't be able to go back on this deal.  Do you understand that?"  Gibbs stated that he did 
understand.  Furthermore, the 
district court explained to Gibbs, in great detail, the conditions to be imposed 
upon him during his release pending sentencing, including no contact with the 
mother of his son and no use or possession of alcohol or being in a place where 
alcohol is served.  In closing, the 
district court queried:  "I like to 
call this my favorite stupid question, but it's to make a point.  Do you think it would be a good idea or 
bad idea for you to get in more trouble between now and the next time I see 
you?"  Gibbs replied:  "It would be the stupidest thing I've 
ever done in my life probably."  
Judgment was entered on the guilty pleas on June 11, 
2007.

 
 
[¶6]      On August 30, 
2007, Gibbs appeared before the district court for sentencing.  At the outset of those proceedings, the 
district court took note that Gibbs was released following entry of his guilty 
pleas but "he's had some additional complicating features that have placed him 
back in the custody of the sheriff."1  The district court then asked for the 
State's recommendation and the prosecutor replied:

 
 
            
At the time this plea bargain was entered into it contained both a 
charging [section] and a sentencing proposal to the Court.  I feel Mr. Gibbs has violated both the 
spirit and the letter of the plea agreement, and I do not regard the sentencing 
agreement as being appropriate anymore.

            
In that connection, Your Honor, I'd note to the Court that less than one 
month after he entered his pleas of guilty to these charges, we had filed a 
petition to revoke his bond because he had violated by drinking.  He had violated it through apparent 
violence.  He had violated the 
no-contact provision of his bond with the victim in this case, in the stalking 
case, and quite frankly, I think that his behavior, plus his prior record, leads 
to this recommendation:

            
That in docket 4679, the destruction of property case, he should receive 
a sentence of one year.  Restitution 
should be awarded in the amount of $1,059 to [the victim].

            
And in docket number 4738, I believe he should be sentenced to no less 
than three nor more than five years.  
Said sentence to run concurrent to the sentence in docket 
4679.

 
 
[¶7]      In response, 
Gibbs's attorney argued strenuously that Gibbs be sentenced in accordance with 
the plea agreement, which had been reduced to writing by the district 
court.  Furthermore, defense counsel 
contended that Gibbs's punishment should not be based upon unproven violations 
of the conditions of his release pending sentencing, or upon yet unproven 
criminal charges for which he might be punished in the 
future.

 
 
[¶8]      Sentence was 
entered on September 7, 2007.  Gibbs 
was sentenced to six months in jail on the misdemeanor property destruction 
charge.  On the felony stalking 
charge, he was sentenced to three to six years of imprisonment.  The sentences are concurrent.  The sentences were stayed pending the 
outcome of Cr. 4861 (see Footnote 1, infra).  Gibbs has not filed a motion in the 
district court to withdraw his guilty plea based on the circumstances of this 
case, as he perceives them.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶9]      The applicable 
standard of review is well-summarized in Frederick v. State, 2007 WY 27, 
¶ 13, 151 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Wyo. 2007):

 
 
When a 
plea of guilty is entered as a result of a plea agreement, any promises made by 
the State must be fulfilled and whether a prosecutor has violated an alleged 
agreement is a question that is reviewed de novo.  Spencer v. State, 2005 WY 105, 
¶ 12, 118 P.3d 978, 982-983 (Wyo.2005).  A plea agreement is a contract between 
the defendant and the State to which the general principles of contract law are 
applied.  "When determining whether 
a breach of the plea agreement has occurred we:  (1) examine the nature of the 
promise;  and (2) evaluate the 
promise in light of the defendant's reasonable understanding of the promise at 
the time the plea was entered.'"  Ford v. State, 2003 WY 65, ¶ 11, 69 P.3d 407, 410 (Wyo.2003).  The 
prosecutor "must explicitly stand by" the terms of any agreement; and if the 
State is unable to carry out the terms, the correct remedy is withdrawal of the 
plea.  Ford, ¶ 18, 69 P.3d  at 412.  The State may not obtain the benefit of 
the agreement and at the same time avoid its obligations without violating 
either the principles of fairness or the principles of contract law.  Id.

 
 
[¶10]   Moreover, we have 
held:

 
 
In 
determining whether a breach has occurred, we:  (1) examine the nature of the 
promise;  and (2) evaluate the 
promise in light of the defendant's reasonable understanding of the promise at 
the time the plea was entered.  
"Principles of general contract law guide our analysis of the 
government's obligations under the agreement.'"  Clingman [v. State], 2001 WY 46, ¶ 20, 23 P.3d 
[27,] 31 [(Wyo.2001)] (quoting [United 
States v.] Peterson, 225 F.3d [1167,] 1170-71 
[(10th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1131, 121 S. Ct. 893, 148 L. Ed. 2d 799 (2001)]).  It follows that, "as 
in contract," a party should not be released from its obligations under a plea 
agreement absent another party's material or substantial breach of that 
agreement.  A material or 
substantial breach is one that goes to the whole consideration of the 
agreement.  Several factors are 
relevant to whether a breach is material or substantial, including the extent to 
which the non-breaching party will be deprived of the benefit it reasonably 
expected and the extent to which the breaching party's conduct comports with the 
standards of good faith and fair dealing.

 
 
[¶11]   Schade v. State, 2002 WY 133, ¶ 5, 
53 P.3d 551, 554 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Browning v. State, 2001 WY 93, 
¶ 32, 32 P.3d 1061, [1071] (Wyo. 2001)).

 
 
[¶12]   The procedures that govern plea 
agreements are well-defined in W.R.Cr.P 11(e):

 
 
            
(e)  Plea Agreement 
Procedure. --

                        
(1)  In General. -- The attorney for the state and the attorney 
for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions 
with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser related offense, 
the attorney for the state will do any of the following:

(A)  Agree 
not to prosecute other crimes or move for dismissal of other charges; 
or

(B)  Make 
a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request, for a 
particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request 
shall not be binding upon the court; or

(C)  Agree 
that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of this 
case.

 
 
            
The court shall not participate in any such 
discussions.

 
 
                        
(2)  Disclosure of Agreement; Decision of Court. -- If a plea 
agreement has been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, 
require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on a showing of good 
cause, in camera, at the time the 
plea is offered.  If the agreement is of the type specified 
in subdivision (e)(1)(A) or (e)(1)(C), the court may accept or reject the 
agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until 
there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.  If the agreement is of the type specified 
in subdivision (e)(1)(B), the court shall advise the defendant that if the court 
does not accept the recommendation or request, the defendant nevertheless has no 
right to withdraw the plea.  
[Emphasis added.]

                        
(3)  Acceptance of Agreement. -- If the court accepts the plea 
agreement, the court shall inform the 
defendant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition 
provided for in the plea agreement.

                        
(4)  Rejection of Agreement. -- If the court rejects the plea 
agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant 
personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court is not bound 
by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw the 
plea, and advise the defendant that if the defendant persists in a guilty plea 
or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may be less favorable to 
the defendant than that contemplated by the plea 
agreement.

                        
(5)  Notification to Court. -- Except for good cause shown, 
notification to the court of the existence of a plea agreement shall be given at 
the arraignment or at such other time, prior to trial, as may be fixed by the 
court.

 
 
[¶13]   When the proceedings at the change 
of plea hearing are considered in light of the district court's Judgment Upon 
Pleas of Guilty, to the extent the agreement was one identified by W.R.Cr.P. 
11(e)(1)(A) or (C), it is clear that the district court deferred its decision as 
to the acceptance or rejection of the plea until there had been an opportunity 
for it to consider the presentence report.  
To the extent that the plea was one identified in W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B), 
the district court was very explicit in telling Gibbs that it was not bound by 
the plea agreement, and that he would not be allowed to withdraw the plea if the 
bargained for sentence was not imposed.  
The presentence report indicated that the DOC had "no reason to disagree 
with the plea agreement."  However, 
the district court expressed its dissatisfaction with that report and gave Gibbs 
an opportunity to have a new report prepared.  Gibbs has not subsequently filed a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, so we are not confronted with any issue as 
to the trial court's abuse of discretion in denying such a motion.  We are persuaded that Gibbs did not 
comply with the terms of the plea bargain, and he was the first to breach 
it.  That does not necessarily 
justify a breach by the State in the form it took in this case, but Gibbs was 
clearly on notice that the State's agreement was premised upon his obeying the 
law and the terms of his release on bond pending his sentencing hearing.  Thus, the basis of our affirmance of the 
district court's sentence relies entirely upon the district court's compliance 
with the strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(2).  
The district court, in effect, deferred its acceptance of the guilty plea 
until the time of sentencing and opted not to accept it in light of Gibbs's 
conduct in the month preceding his sentencing, and Gibbs was fully 
informed of the possibility that the 
district court would not accept the plea bargain and that he would not be 
permitted to withdraw his guilty plea if that was the ultimate 
result.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶14]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court are affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1That 
complicating factor appears to be that Gibbs was charged with concealing stolen 
property in the interim.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice, 
specially concurring, with whom VOIGT, Chief Justice, 
joins.

                         

[¶15]   I concur in the result reached by 
the majority.  I write separately because I do not agree with the path 
taken by the majority to reach its decision to affirm.

[¶16]   The pivotal issue in this appeal, 
as identified by both parties, is whether the State breached the plea 
agreement.  The majority opinion does not directly resolve this issue.  Instead, it holds that the sentence 
should be affirmed solely because of "the district court's compliance with the 
strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(2)."  
This holding implies that the State is free to breach a plea agreement so 
long as a defendant has been advised that the court is not bound by the 
agreement and the defendant has also been advised that he cannot withdraw his 
guilty plea if the court does not impose the recommended sentence.  However, such an advisement is required 
in every plea agreement made pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(B).  If this advisement relieved the State of 
its obligation to comply with the plea agreement, it would render the State's 
promise to make a sentencing recommendation illusory. 

 
 

[¶17]   The court's discretion to accept or 
reject a sentence recommended pursuant to a plea agreement does not relieve the 
State from complying with that agreement.  
When a defendant enters a guilty plea in exchange for a promise from the 
State to recommend a specific sentence, the State is obligated to make the 
agreed-upon sentencing recommendation.  
The court has discretion to accept or reject the recommendation, but the 
defendant is entitled to have the court consider the State's recommendation when 
determining the appropriate sentence. This approach is consistent with our 
established precedent.  "When a plea 
of guilty rests to any significant degree on a promise or agreement by the 
State, that promise must be fulfilled."  
Herrera v. State, 2003 WY 25, 
¶ 8, 64 P.3d 724, 727 (Wyo. 2003); Rutti 
v. State, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 42, 100 P.3d 394, 410 (Wyo. 2004).  "[A] prosecutor must explicitly stand by 
those terms agreed upon and may not play fast and loose' with the established 
terms reached between the parties in a plea agreement."  Herrera, ¶ 18, 64 P.3d  at 729.  "[A] party should not be released from 
its obligations under a plea agreement absent another party's material or 
substantial breach of that agreement."  
Browning v. State, 2001 WY 93, 
¶ 32, 32 P.3d 1061, 1071 (Wyo. 2001);  Schade 
v. State, 2002 
WY 133, ¶ 5, 53 P.3d 551, 554 (Wyo. 2002); Herrera, ¶ 12, 64 P.3d  at 
727.

 
 
[¶18]   Nevertheless, I would affirm the 
district court's decision because the record establishes that Mr. Gibbs 
materially breached the plea agreement prior to the time when the State was 
obligated to perform.  "It is 
axiomatic that, if a defendant fails to comply with a plea agreement, the 
[S]tate is not bound by that agreement."  
Schade, ¶ 8, 53 P.3d  at 
555.  I believe it is equally 
axiomatic, however, that when a defendant complies with a plea agreement, the 
State must also fulfill its part of the bargain.  That obligation is not negated just 
because the court has discretion to accept or reject the sentencing 
recommendation.