Case Title: Commonwealth v. Steeves

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12981

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12981 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  DOUGLAS STEEVES. 
 
 
 
Essex.     February 7, 2022. - July 18, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Verbal completeness, Prior misconduct.  
Jury and Jurors.  Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, 
Empanelment of jury, Instructions to jury, Voir dire, 
Cross-examination by prosecutor, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 10, 2016. 
 
The cases were tried before James F. Lang, J. 
 
 
Stephen Paul Maidman for the defendant. 
Emily R. Mello, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree, on a theory of deliberate premeditation.1  The 
conviction arose from the defendant's admitted strangulation of 
 
 
1 The defendant was also convicted of violating a 
restraining order. 
2 
 
his estranged wife, which the defendant contended occurred under 
mitigating circumstances of reasonable provocation or sudden 
combat during an argument.  On appeal, the defendant argues that 
portions of a recorded interview with police should have been 
admitted under the doctrine of verbal completeness, instruction 
of the venire and attorney-conducted voir dire were improperly 
limited, certain communications with a former romantic partner 
should have been excluded from evidence, and the prosecutor's 
cross-examination of the defendant was improper.  We affirm the 
convictions and decline to exercise our power under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict to manslaughter or to order 
a new trial. 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We summarize the facts the 
jury could have found, reserving certain details for discussion.  
On the evening of August 1, 2016, the defendant was invited to 
the apartment shared by his daughters and his estranged wife, 
the victim, to have dinner and use the shower facilities.  The 
defendant was homeless at the time, having broken up that same 
day with a romantic partner, Jean Chakoutis, with whom he had 
been living for the preceding two months.  The victim had been 
dating another man in the preceding weeks; the defendant was 
aware of, and upset about, this relationship.  Despite their 
separate dating relationships, an existing restraining order 
requiring the defendant to stay away from the victim, and the 
3 
 
victim's initiation of divorce proceedings in February 2016, the 
victim and the defendant had been in intermittent contact over 
the preceding months, and the victim agreed to have the 
defendant come over for dinner on the night of the killing.  
During dinner, the mood was awkward:  the defendant appeared to 
cry, and then he left the table. 
After dinner, the defendant received a telephone call from 
an unknown caller who warned the defendant to stay away from the 
caller's "girl" and called the defendant by his nickname, 
"Binky" (Binky call).  The defendant then sent a text message to 
his former romantic partner, Chakoutis, stating that he believed 
he had just received a call from Chakoutis's former boyfriend, 
and warning her that "no one better mess with [his] stuff."  
Chakoutis called the defendant shortly thereafter, assuring him 
that his personal belongings were safe at her home until he was 
ready to retrieve them; the defendant did not seem upset to 
Chakoutis at the time. 
The defendant subsequently stayed the night in the 
apartment and joined the victim in her bedroom.  The victim's 
family observed her alive at approximately 1 A.M.  At some time 
before 2 A.M, the defendant killed the victim by strangling her, 
causing substantial crushing injuries to her neck.  Other family 
members in the apartment did not awaken during the killing.  The 
victim's body, when later discovered, showed no indication of 
4 
 
injuries to her hands or defensive wounds.  Bloodstains were 
found on pillows near the victim's body, but no blood was found 
under her fingernails.  The defendant left the apartment around 
2 A.M., without attempting to summon medical help or telling his 
daughter, with whom he spoke as he left, that he had just killed 
the victim. 
At 3:44 A.M., the defendant arrived in the lobby of a 
police station, where he stated to the desk officer that he had 
"just killed [his] wife."  After giving the defendant Miranda 
warnings, a police lieutenant walked the defendant to a booking 
room to process his arrest.  As he walked down the hallway to 
the booking room, the defendant told the police lieutenant that 
he "strangled [the victim] with [his] hands" and that she was 
"probably not" still alive.  The defendant further told the 
lieutenant that he had been angry about the call telling him, 
"Stay away from my girl, Binky Bink."  Despite the defendant's 
conversation with Chakoutis about the Binky call prior to the 
killing, the defendant told the lieutenant at this time that he 
believed the Binky call was related to the victim.  Neither the 
conversation with the desk officer, nor the conversation with 
the lieutenant in the hallway, was audio recorded. 
When the defendant was examined at the police station that 
morning, the only injury observed on his body was a small, 
fingernail-sized abrasion on his chest.  His shirt had a 
5 
 
bloodstain on the chest area, which contained a combination of 
his and the victim's deoxyribonucleic acid. 
b.  The trial.  On August 10, 2016, the defendant was 
indicted on one count of murder in the first degree, pursuant to 
G. L. c. 265, § 1; and one count of violation of a restraining 
order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, § 7.  A jury trial commenced on 
September 9, 2019.  At trial, the Commonwealth's theory of the 
case was that the defendant killed the victim with premeditation 
because he remained obsessed with her after the breakup of their 
relationship, despite his new relationship with Chakoutis, and 
blamed the victim for "ruining his life."  The Commonwealth 
presented cellular text messages sent by the defendant to his 
daughter and the victim's boyfriend in support of the inference 
that the defendant's anger about perceived infidelity and 
thoughts of killing the victim escalated over several weeks 
until culminating in deliberately premediated murder.2  The 
 
2 On multiple occasions, the defendant made statements 
consistent with threats against the victim.  Six weeks before 
the killing, the defendant sent text messages to his daughter in 
which he stated that the victim was "making a fool of [him]," 
and that the victim's "days [were] numbered."  The defendant 
stated that he hated the victim, warning his daughter to "watch 
what [he] do[es]," that he "want[ed] to go to jail," that he 
would have "[n]o more . . . cheating whore," and that he was 
"not taking it anymore." 
 
Approximately two weeks before the killing, the defendant 
sent text messages to his daughter stating that "[he] c[ould 
not] do this anymore," that "a person can only take so much," 
and that "it [was] in [his] head continu[ing] [non]stop."  He 
6 
 
Commonwealth also introduced testimony recounting the unrecorded 
confessions the defendant made to the desk officer and 
lieutenant when he first arrived at the police station.  The 
Commonwealth chose not to introduce in evidence a subsequent 
recorded interview of the defendant by a Salem police detective 
and a State police trooper, conducted more than two hours after 
the initial confessions, wherein the defendant again admitted to 
strangling the victim after he was upset by the Binky call but 
for the first time claimed that he had done so in response to a 
physical attack by the victim during a verbal argument.3 
 
stated that he knew whom the victim was dating and where the man 
lived, telling his daughter to "let [the victim] know[,] [he 
was] going to cave [the man's] [f]ucking head in," and stating 
that he "hate[d]" the victim. 
 
 
Approximately one week before the killing, the defendant 
sent a text message to Scott McHugh, who had been dating the 
victim for approximately a month.  The defendant warned McHugh 
to stay away from the victim, and stated that he knew where 
McHugh lived and worked and what vehicle he drove. 
 
 
3 Over the course of this approximately hour-long recorded 
interview, the defendant further explained the circumstances of 
the killing as follows.  He received the Binky call at 
approximately 9:30 P.M., but initially "let it go."  Later, he 
became upset about the call when he came to believe the caller 
was the victim's boyfriend telling the defendant to stay away 
from her.  The defendant claimed that he argued with the victim 
about this call multiple times over the subsequent hours, ending 
with a final argument about infidelity at approximately 1:30 
A.M.  He described a verbal argument escalating when the victim 
grabbed his chest and then his mouth, inserted her fingers, and 
pulled his mouth open with her hands.  The defendant claimed 
that it was only in response to the victim's physical attack 
that he grabbed her throat with both hands for a period of what 
he guessed was five to seven minutes.  The defendant recalled 
7 
 
The defendant conceded to the killing at the outset of the 
trial, and he urged the jury to find that the killing was 
manslaughter committed in the heat of passion.  Trial counsel 
argued that the defendant and the victim had been in a loving 
relationship that deteriorated due to the victim's alcoholism 
and drug use, but that the pair intermittently reunited over the 
preceding year and were talking of moving to California together 
in the days prior to the killing.  Trial counsel asserted that 
the defendant, upset by the Binky call, argued repeatedly with 
the victim about infidelity until she grabbed his chest and 
mouth, causing the defendant to "snap[]," "los[e] it," and 
strangle the victim before he realized what he had done. 
The defendant sought to introduce the recorded interview 
pursuant to the doctrine of verbal completeness, arguing that it 
contained details of the alleged mitigating circumstances of the 
argument and physical attack on the defendant that were 
necessary to explain the meaning of his initial confessions to 
strangulation.  The judge excluded the recorded interview as 
inadmissible hearsay, ruling that the doctrine of verbal 
 
the victim as unable to speak and gagging while he strangled 
her; he admitted that he continued to strangle her after she 
removed her hands from his mouth.  The defendant described that 
the victim was limp and unresponsive when he eventually let go 
of her throat.  He stayed with the victim for a further five to 
six minutes, before leaving the apartment; the victim's body was 
cold by this time. 
8 
 
completeness was not applicable where the recorded interview was 
a separate conversation conducted hours after the defendant's 
initial confessions. 
With the recorded interview excluded from evidence, the 
defense theory of reasonable provocation by heat of passion or 
sudden combat was supported solely through the defendant's own 
testimony on the stand.  The defendant testified that in the 
year before the killing, his previously happy relationship with 
the victim had deteriorated due to her heavy drinking.  The 
defendant testified that although the victim had filed for 
divorce and obtained a restraining order against him, they 
continued to socialize several times per week, and spoke of 
getting back together.  A few days before the killing, according 
to the defendant, he and the victim spoke of moving to 
California together within the month. 
As to the night of the killing, the defendant recounted 
that he received a telephone call from a number he did not 
recognize.  The caller referred to the defendant as "Binky Bink" 
and stated, "You talk to my girl, don't do it –- don't do it," 
before hanging up.  The defendant testified that he had 
concluded that the call was from the man the victim had been 
dating and that he argued with her about it before leaving the 
apartment briefly.  After the defendant returned, he testified, 
he continued to argue with the victim over the next few hours.  
9 
 
The defendant recounted that the Binky call telling him to stay 
away from the victim "drove [him] absolutely nuts in [his] head.  
It just wouldn't stop." 
At some point during the argument, the defendant recalled, 
the victim "grabbed [his] chest, and then somehow got both of 
her hands inside of [his] mouth and was pulling them apart."  In 
response, the defendant testified, he grabbed the victim by the 
throat.  The defendant testified that then "everything went 
black," and the next thing he remembered was holding the 
victim's cold body in his arms.  The defendant testified that, 
at that time, the victim was not breathing and had lost control 
of her bodily functions.  Believing the victim to be dead, the 
defendant recounted, he left the apartment and later went to the 
police station, where he told officers several times that he had 
just killed his wife and participated in a "long" interview.4 
The Commonwealth's cross-examination of the defendant 
challenged his version of his relationship with the victim.  The 
defendant admitted that he was angry with the victim for dating 
other people, despite the fact that he had been cohabitating and 
in a sexual relationship with Chakoutis until shortly before the 
killing.  The defendant denied that the text messages he sent to 
 
 
4 The existence of the recorded interview, but not its 
contents, was referenced during the defendant's testimony and at 
other times during the trial; the judge instructed the jury not 
to speculate as to its contents. 
10 
 
his daughter were threats to kill the victim.  Using portions of 
the transcript of the recorded interview, the prosecutor 
impeached the defendant's testimony that he "blacked out" and 
could not remember strangling the victim to death; the defendant 
testified that he did not remember stating in the recorded 
interview that he had strangled the victim for "five to six, 
seven minutes."5 
 
c.  The verdict.  The jury found the defendant guilty of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation, and guilty of violating the restraining order 
requiring him to stay away from the victim.  The defendant 
timely appealed. 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant argues that the trial judge 
erred in not admitting portions of the recorded interview under 
the doctrine of verbal completeness, abused his discretion by 
limiting the instruction of the venire and improperly limited 
attorney-conducted voir dire during jury selection, abused his 
discretion in admitting the defendant's cellular text messages 
and a letter to former romantic partner Chakoutis, and allowed 
 
 
5 The trial judge determined that the defendant's professed 
lack of memory was feigned, and admitted the defendant's prior 
inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes only.  During 
cross-examination, the prosecutor read aloud the portion of the 
recorded interview transcript where the defendant estimated the 
time of strangulation -- the recorded interview itself was not 
admitted in evidence. 
11 
 
improper cross-examination of the defendant by the prosecutor.  
The defendant also asks this court to exercise its power under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or a reduction in the 
verdict.  We address each contention in turn. 
 
a.  Exclusion of the recorded interview.  The defendant 
argues that the failure to admit in evidence "exculpatory 
portions"6 of his recorded interview with police forced him to 
testify to potentially mitigating circumstances under which the 
killing occurred, thereby violating his right not to testify, 
his right to a fair trial, and his right to a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense under the Fifth, Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Where the 
exclusion of evidence involves constitutional dimensions, we 
examine the judge's decision independently, under "a standard 
higher than that of abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 470 Mass. 320, 327 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Conkey, 443 Mass. 60, 67 n.14 (2004), S.C., 452 Mass. 1022 
(2008) (examining standard of review for third-party culprit 
 
 
6 The defendant fails to specify which "exculpatory 
portions" of the recorded interview he asserts should have been 
admitted under the Federal standard.  It is not clear from the 
record whether trial counsel sought admission of the entire 
recorded interview under the doctrine of verbal completeness; 
trial counsel's arguments and the judge's evidentiary rulings on 
that theory of admissibility did not address any particular 
statements, and were general in nature. 
12 
 
hearsay evidence).  Upon examination under this higher standard, 
we are satisfied that the exclusion of the recorded interview 
was not error and did not infringe on the defendant's 
constitutional rights. 
 
When offered by the defendant, the recorded interview was 
inadmissible hearsay because he sought to prove the truth of the 
statements he made therein, i.e., to prove that he became upset 
when he came to believe that the Binky call referred to the 
victim's perceived infidelity, resulting in a heated verbal 
argument during which the victim grabbed his chest and pulled 
his mouth apart with her hands, causing him to strangle her.  
See generally Mass. G. Evid. § 801 (2022).  Commonwealth v. 
McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 485 (2010) ("the defendant's statement 
. . . was inadmissible hearsay, because the defendant made the 
statement outside the court room, the defendant was not subject 
to cross-examination regarding the statement, the statement was 
intended to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and the 
defendant, not an adverse party, was offering the statement in 
evidence").  In its case-in-chief, the Commonwealth did not 
elect to offer the recorded interview.  Rather, its presentation 
was confined to officer testimony regarding the defendant's 
initial admissions regarding killing the victim, which he made 
upon his arrival at the police station.  For that reason, the 
defendant could only offer the recorded interview to the extent 
13 
 
that the Commonwealth's introduction of the prior unrecorded 
statements warranted an exception to the rule against hearsay. 
 
Under Massachusetts law on this subject, "[w]hen a party 
introduces a portion of a statement or writing in evidence the 
doctrine of verbal completeness allows admission of other 
relevant portions of the same statement or writing which serve 
to clarify the context of the admitted portion and prevent one 
side from presenting a fragmented and misleading version of 
events to the finder of fact" (quotations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Aduayi, 488 Mass. 658, 671 (2021), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Carmona, 428 Mass. 268, 272 (1998).  "For a 
hearsay statement to be admitted under the doctrine [of verbal 
completeness], an adverse party must show that the additional 
statements are (1) on the same subject as the admitted 
statement; (2) part of the same conversation as the admitted 
statement; and (3) necessary to the understanding of the 
admitted statement" (quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Amaral, 482 Mass. 496, 504 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 247 (2014). 
 
The defendant concedes that his unrecorded confessions upon 
arrival at the police station were "temporally separate" from 
his subsequent recorded interview, which occurred approximately 
two hours later.  Moreover, the recorded interview was conducted 
by different investigators, not the desk officer and lieutenant 
14 
 
to whom the defendant confessed upon his arrival at the police 
station.  For those reasons, the second prong of the doctrine 
was not met –- the recorded interview was not part of the "same 
conversation" as the defendant's initial, unrecorded admissions 
upon arrival.  Amaral, 482 Mass. at 504, quoting Crayton, 470 
Mass. at 247. 
 
Nevertheless, the defendant argues that the recorded 
interview would have been admissible under the broader Federal 
common-law doctrine of verbal completeness, to qualify the 
admitted statements that he strangled the victim, regardless of 
the time elapsed between those separate conversations.  On that 
basis, the defendant asserts that the exclusion of the recorded 
interview was error because the circumstances of this case 
required the application of the broader Federal common-law 
doctrine to protect his fundamental rights to not testify, to a 
fair trial, and to a meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense of reasonable provocation or sudden combat. 
 
"[A]lthough they share many similarities, Massachusetts 
courts follow statutory and common law of evidence, not the 
Federal rules."  Commonwealth v. Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 784, 
cert. denied, 565 U.S. 967 (2011).  The Federal "common law 
doctrine [of verbal completeness] is partially codified in Rule 
106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence."  United States v. Lopez-
Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 734 (10th Cir. 2010).  Specifically, Fed. 
15 
 
R. Evid. 106 allows the introduction of "any other part -- or 
any other writing or recorded statement -- that in fairness 
ought to be considered at the same time" as "all or part of a 
writing or recorded statement" introduced by an opposing party.7  
"[T]he provision of Rule 106 grounding admission on 'fairness' 
reasonably should be interpreted to incorporate the common-law 
requirements that the evidence be relevant, and be necessary to 
qualify or explain the already introduced evidence allegedly 
taken out of context."  United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 
1369 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 
Relying on United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 974 (7th 
Cir. 2001), the defendant argues that the Federal common-law 
doctrine contemplates the introduction of statements made in 
separate conversations, even where the opposing party has 
introduced the entirety of one conversation, without any 
limitation on the temporal relationship between those 
conversations when determining whether "fairness" requires 
 
 
7 "Rule 106, by its text, does not apply to unrecorded oral 
statements."  United States v. Altvater, 954 F.3d 45, 51 (1st 
Cir. 2020).  However, the Federal common-law doctrine of verbal 
completeness has been applied to encompass unrecorded oral 
conversations in addition to the written and recorded statements 
explicitly identified in rule 106.  Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d at 
734 ("we have held the rule of completeness embodied in Rule 106 
is substantially applicable to oral testimony, as well by virtue 
of [Fed. R. Evid. 611(a)], which obligates the court to make the 
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment 
of the truth" [quotations and citation omitted]). 
16 
 
admission.  On that basis, the defendant asserts that the 
Commonwealth's introduction of his initial confessions upon 
arrival would likely require admission, under the Federal 
common-law doctrine, of "exculpatory portions" of the recorded 
interview, despite the approximately two-hour delay and 
difference in participants between the conversations.  Even if 
we were to assume without deciding that some or all of the 
recorded interview statements would be admissible under the 
Federal common-law doctrine,8 we nevertheless decline to apply 
 
 
8 Giles provides only limited support for the defendant's 
proposition, and it is distinguishable in several key aspects 
from the case at bar.  There, a prosecutor offered the entirety 
of several recorded conversations between a defendant and an 
informant, but did not offer another, allegedly exculpatory, 
conversation between the pair occurring three weeks after the 
admitted conversations.  Giles, 246 F.3d at 974.  The Giles 
defendant argued that the later conversation should have been 
admitted under any of three Federal rules of evidence:  as 
evidence of his then-existing mental state under Fed. R. Evid. 
803(3), as completeness evidence necessary to contextualize his 
prior statements under Fed. R. Evid. 106, and otherwise under 
the Fed. R. Evid. 807 catch-all provision.  Id.  Without 
specifying which rule provided the basis of its conclusion, the 
Giles court held that although a "close evidentiary call," the 
later conversation "should have been admitted"; its reasoning 
emphasized the defendant's intention to testify at trial and the 
attendant opportunity for cross-examination.  Id.  The Giles 
court ultimately concluded that the exclusion of the later 
conversation was not an abuse of discretion and that any error 
was harmless given the strong evidence of guilt.  Id.  Even 
assuming for the purposes of argument that the Giles court's 
ambiguous holding as to admissibility rested upon Fed. R. Evid. 
106, the circumstances at issue here are distinguishable:  the 
defendant's initial unrecorded confessions were made to 
different individuals from those to whom his recorded interview 
statements were made, and the claimed error arises from the 
defendant's assertion that he planned not to testify at trial 
17 
 
the Federal doctrine in this case because the application of 
Massachusetts law did not burden the defendant's constitutional 
rights.  "A defendant's right to present relevant evidence is 
not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable 
restrictions."  United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 
(1998).  "[S]tate . . . rulemakers have broad latitude under the 
Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal 
trials.  Such rules do not abridge an accused's right to present 
a defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or 
'disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.'"  
Id., quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987).  Only 
where the exclusion of evidence has "infringed on a weighty 
 
but was compelled to do so by the exclusion of the recorded 
interview.  Id. 
 
 
Moreover, even though the Federal doctrine of completeness 
does not categorically exclude temporally separate 
conversations, such wholly distinct conversations may 
nevertheless fail to meet Federal rule 106's relevance or 
necessity requirements.  See, e.g., United States v. Burks, 746 
Fed. Appx. 191, 201 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
1204 (2019) (rule 106 did not apply to additional "separate 
conversations" where admitted statements between defendant and 
coconspirator were "complete conversations or email exchanges"); 
United States v. Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1019-1020 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(no abuse of discretion in declining to admit under rule 106 
"entirely separate and distinct" conversations between defendant 
and one coconspirator occurring several months after admitted 
conversations between defendant, confidential informant, and one 
coconspirator); United States v. Bauzo-Santiago, 49 F. Supp. 3d 
155, 159 (D.P.R. 2014) (rule of completeness inapplicable to 
"two separate and distinct interviews" with two different law 
enforcement agencies occurring on same day). 
18 
 
interest of the accused" is such exclusion unconstitutionally 
arbitrary or disproportionate.  Scheffer, supra. 
 
Here, the application of Massachusetts law did not wholly 
preclude admission of evidence supporting the defense's theory 
of reasonable provocation or sudden combat.  Instead, it merely 
eliminated the strategic option to present the defendant's 
testimonial statements absent the risk of cross-examination:  it 
restricted only the form, not the content, of evidence that the 
victim grabbed the defendant's chest and mouth during a heated 
argument about the Binky call.  See Commonwealth v. Leiva, 484 
Mass. 766, 782 (2020), quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308 (where 
evidentiary rule "restrict[s] only the manner in which a party 
may present evidence, without restricting its content," and is 
not "arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes [it is] 
designed to serve," rule "do[es] not abridge an accused's right 
to present a defense" [quotations omitted]).  We conclude that 
the application of Massachusetts law in this instance did not 
infringe on the defendant's State or Federal constitutional 
rights, because (i) the limitation of our existing doctrine of 
verbal completeness to exclude a separate conversation, 
occurring more than two hours later and amongst different 
individuals, is logically related to the important purposes we 
intend our law of evidence to serve, and (ii) insofar as our law 
of evidence may limit the defendant's opportunity to present a 
19 
 
defense of reasonable provocation or sudden combat without 
having his statements subject to cross-examination, "the 
interests served by [our] [law] justify the [possible] 
limitation imposed on the defendant's constitutional right[s]" 
(alterations in original).  Leiva, supra at 783, quoting Rock, 
483 U.S. at 56. 
 
"'[A]dherence to rules of procedure that govern the orderly 
presentation of facts and arguments to provide each party with a 
fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to contradict 
or explain the opponent's case' are necessary for the adversary 
process to function effectively, and '[t]he State's interest in 
the orderly conduct of a criminal trial is sufficient to justify 
the imposition and enforcement of firm, though not always 
inflexible, rules relating to the identification and 
presentation of evidence.'"  Leiva, 484 Mass. at 781 n.14, 
quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411 (1988).  "State 
. . . [g]overnments unquestionably have a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that reliable evidence is presented to the trier of 
fact in a criminal trial.  Indeed, the exclusion of unreliable 
evidence is a principal objective of many evidentiary rules."  
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309.  This objective underpins the rule 
against hearsay, which informs the purpose of the Massachusetts 
doctrine of verbal completeness.  The purpose of the rule 
against hearsay is "the prevention of evidence by those not 
20 
 
present at trial."  Commonwealth v. Diaz, 453 Mass. 266, 278 
(2009), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Womack, 
457 Mass. 268 (2010).  This rule guards against the admission of 
unsworn testimony presented without the opportunity for cross-
examination of the declarant, wherein the reliability and 
accuracy of the statement could be tested.  2 McCormick on 
Evidence § 245 (R.P. Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2020).  See 
Commonwealth v. DelValle, 351 Mass. 489, 491 (1966), S.C., 353 
Mass. 684 (1968) ("The theory which underlies exclusion [of 
hearsay evidence] is that with the declarant absent[,] the trier 
of fact is forced to rely upon the declarant's memory, 
truthfulness, perception, and use of language not subject to 
cross-examination").  Thus, exceptions to the rule against 
hearsay must be narrowly crafted so as not to frustrate the 
purpose of the rule itself. 
 
Our law of evidence accomplishes this purpose without 
unduly burdening a defendant's constitutional rights through the 
interaction of two exceptions:  the doctrine of verbal 
completeness, and the constitutionally based exception to the 
hearsay rule articulated in Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 
23, 25 (2015), S.C., 479 Mass. 479 (2018).  Our doctrine of 
verbal completeness exception is limited in scope to instances 
where otherwise inadmissible hearsay on the same subject is 
necessary to prevent a presentation of a misleading version of 
21 
 
events through admission of selected fragments of a single 
conversation or document.  Aduayi, 488 Mass. at 671.  As such, 
the doctrine directly specifies temporal and subject factors as 
determinative of the equivalent, but more general, relevancy 
standard incorporated into Fed. R. Evid. 106.  Compare Sutton, 
801 F.2d at 1369 (rule 106 incorporates "common-law 
requirement[] that the evidence be relevant"), with Amaral, 482 
Mass. at 504 (statements at issue must be on "same subject" and 
made in "same conversation" as admitted statements).  For that 
reason, these temporal and subject factors may operate to 
exclude hearsay statements that could otherwise be determined to 
be relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 106.  However, "[a]lthough 
perhaps no rule of evidence has been more respected or more 
frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable to the 
exclusion of hearsay," our law of evidence, such as the doctrine 
of verbal completeness exception, "may not be applied 
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice."  Drayton, 473 
Mass. at 35, quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 
(1973). 
 
It is for that reason that we have applied the United 
States Supreme Court's reasoning in Chambers to recognize a 
"narrow, constitutionally based exception to the hearsay rule 
. . . where otherwise inadmissible hearsay is critical to the 
defense and bears persuasive guarantees of trustworthiness."  
22 
 
Drayton, 473 Mass. at 25.  This constitutional hearsay exception 
"operat[es] only in the rarest of cases," id. at 40, to avoid 
injustice "where constitutional rights directly affecting the 
ascertainment of guilt are implicated," Chambers, 410 U.S. at 
302, and exclusion of evidence "significantly undermine[s] 
fundamental elements of [a] defendant's defense," Scheffer, 523 
U.S. at 315.  Although the application of this exception 
requires a highly fact-intensive inquiry, certain elements 
support the conclusion that a hearsay statement has "persuasive 
guarantees of trustworthiness":  hearsay that fails to satisfy 
the technical requirements for a traditional hearsay exception, 
but nevertheless appears to fall within the rationale for such 
an exception; hearsay that is corroborated by some other 
evidence in the case; and hearsay offering a consistent account 
on multiple occasions over time.  Drayton, supra at 37, 38.  
These elements fairly balance the interest in excluding 
unreliable testimony with a defendant's right to present a 
defense, ensuring that a defendant's constitutional rights are 
not infringed by the application of our doctrine of verbal 
completeness to the extent that its temporal and subject factors 
apply more narrowly than the Federal relevancy standard. 
 
Here, despite the substantial similarity between the 
defendant's arguments regarding the Massachusetts and Federal 
doctrines of verbal completeness and the reasoning in Drayton, 
23 
 
the defendant does not urge this court to find that Drayton 
applies here, and we find no reason to conclude that it does.  
Insofar as the recorded interview falls within the rationale of 
the Massachusetts doctrine of verbal completeness, but not the 
technical "same conversation" requirement, the recorded 
interview is not corroborated by other evidence in the case or 
reflective of multiple consistent accounts over time.  Drayton, 
473 Mass. at 37, 38.  No witness other than the defendant 
testified that an argument occurred between the pair on the 
night in question; to the contrary, none of the other family 
members present in the apartment awoke during the killing.  
Likewise, the physical evidence was largely inconsistent with 
the defendant's version of events:  although the defendant had a 
small scratch on his chest at the time of the recorded 
interview, no blood was found under the victim's fingernails, 
and her hands bore no injuries consistent with forcing apart the 
defendant's mouth.  Further, the defendant did not mention to 
his daughter an argument or strangulation triggered by the 
victim assaulting him, despite speaking with the daughter as he 
left the apartment shortly after the killing –- this explanation 
was only offered to investigators during the recorded interview 
two hours after the defendant's arrival at the police station, 
after time for reflection. 
24 
 
 
In such circumstances, the defendant's recorded interview 
statements represent not the "rarest of cases" warranting the 
application of the constitutionally based hearsay exception, but 
a common circumstance where a defendant makes potentially 
favorable hearsay statements to investigators at various times 
during an investigation that would benefit the defense if 
offered without the risk of cross-examination.  See Drayton, 473 
Mass. at 40.  In this context, it is reasonable to require that 
evidence of the defendant's version of events be subjected to 
cross-examination and the legitimate demands of the adversarial 
system.  Leiva, 484 Mass. at 782.  Accordingly, we find that, in 
the circumstances of this case, the exclusion of the defendant's 
recorded interview statements as inadmissible hearsay did not 
violate the defendant's right not to testify, his right to a 
fair trial, or his right to a meaningful opportunity to present 
a complete defense under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments and art. 12. 
 
b.  Instruction of the venire and limitation on attorney-
conducted voir dire.  The defendant contends that two aspects of 
the jury empanelment violated his right to trial by an impartial 
jury.  First, he argues that the judge erroneously refused to 
instruct the venire that murder is subject to mitigating 
circumstances, such as heat of passion on reasonable 
provocation.  Second, the defendant asserts that his trial 
25 
 
counsel was improperly restrained in the type of questions he 
was permitted to ask during individual voir dire.  We conclude 
that no prejudicial error occurred during empanelment. 
 
"A criminal defendant is entitled to a trial by an 
impartial jury pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights."  Commonwealth v. Espinal, 482 Mass. 190, 194 (2019), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 443, 447 (2019).  
"[P]art of the guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial 
jury is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors."  
Espinal, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Dabney, 478 Mass. 839, 
848, cert. denied, 139 U.S. 127 (2018).  Since 2014, attorneys 
and self-represented parties in the Superior Court have had the 
right to question potential jurors during voir dire, but "the 
scope of such questioning remains in the discretion of the 
judge," Dabney, supra, who "need not [approve] the specific 
questions proposed by the defendant," Commonwealth v. Morales, 
440 Mass. 536, 548-549 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Sanders, 
383 Mass. 637, 641 (1981).  See G. L. c. 234A, § 67D.  
"Following voir dire, a judge's determination that a jury are 
impartial will not be disturbed absent clear error or law or 
abuse of discretion."  Espinal, supra. 
 
However, certain categories of questions posed to the 
venire are mandatory.  General Laws c. 234A, § 67A, inserted by 
26 
 
St. 2016, c. 36, § 4 (formerly G. L. c. 234, § 28), requires the 
trial judge in every criminal case to inquire as to several 
subjects, including the presumption of innocence, the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof, and the absence of any burden on 
the defendant.9  The second paragraph of § 67A requires 
additional inquiry of jurors where "it appears that . . . a 
decision [may] be made in whole or in part upon issues 
extraneous to the case, including, but not limited to, community 
attitudes, possible exposure to potentially prejudicial material 
or possible preconceived opinions toward the credibility of 
certain classes of persons."  "We have interpreted this language 
to mean that, where a defendant can show that there exists a 
substantial risk of extraneous issues that might influence the 
jury, additional questioning is required . . . [of] each 
prospective juror individually and outside the presence of other 
persons" (quotations and citations omitted).  Espinal, 482 Mass. 
at 196.  We have determined that a substantial risk of 
extraneous influence exists as a matter of law where the 
 
 
9 General Laws c. 234A, § 22, also requires that prospective 
jurors complete a confidential juror questionnaire, which 
elicits "the juror's name, sex, age, residence, marital status, 
number and ages of children, education level, occupation, 
employment address, spouse's occupation, spouse's employment 
address, previous service as a juror, present or past 
involvement as a party to civil or criminal litigation, 
relationship to a police or law enforcement officer, and such 
other information as the jury commissioner deems appropriate." 
27 
 
defendant's lack of criminal responsibility is at issue, 
Commonwealth v. Seguin, 421 Mass. 243, 249 (1995), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 1180 (1996), and "in trials for murder, rape, and sex 
offenses against children where the defendant and victim are of 
different races" or ethnic backgrounds, Commonwealth v. Mason, 
485 Mass. 520, 524 (2020), citing Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 
Mass. 162, 175-176 (2019) (collecting cases). 
 
Here, the defendant requested that the judge instruct the 
jury regarding mitigating circumstances to murder, a subject 
that we have not previously recognized as posing a substantial 
risk of extraneous influence or as required by § 67A.  
Specifically, the defendant requested before trial that the 
judge include in his statement of facts to the venire the 
contention that "[t]he defense in this case maintains that 
although [the defendant] did cause the death of [the victim], he 
did so as a result of heat of passion upon reasonable 
provocation."  The defendant argued that because the legal 
concept of mitigating circumstances to murder was "less known to 
the public," it was necessary to raise the issue to the 
attention of the venire to properly assess impartiality through 
the general bias question posed collectively to members of the 
venire.  Although the judge did not make a clear ruling on the 
defendant's request during the pretrial conference, he 
28 
 
subsequently did not include the requested description in his 
statement of the facts to the venire. 
 
Notably, the defendant did not offer before empanelment, 
and does not offer on appeal, any support for his assertion that 
the public has limited awareness of reasonable provocation as a 
mitigating circumstance.  He also does not argue that such 
limited awareness would result in a substantial risk of 
extraneous influence.  "Where the subject of requested 
questioning is not enumerated in G. L. c. 234A, § 22, or G. L. 
c. 234A, § 67A, and where, as here, no substantial risk of 
extraneous influence has been shown, both the scope and form of 
such questioning are left to the sound discretion of the trial 
judge."  Espinal, 482 Mass. at 197.  We cannot conclude that the 
judge here abused his discretion by declining to instruct the 
venire as to the existence of the defendant's reasonable 
provocation defense theory before posing the collective general 
bias question.  Id. at 200 (defendant's "bare allegation that 
there exists a widespread belief that could result in bias" 
insufficient to conclude decision declining to voir dire on that 
basis was abuse of discretion).  Moreover, we see no reason to 
invoke our power of general superintendence to require trial 
judges in future cases to include upon the defendant's request 
mitigating circumstances, or reasonable provocation 
specifically, in collective or individual voir dire. 
29 
 
 
Next, we turn to the defendant's arguments regarding the 
scope of attorney-conducted individual voir dire.  At the 
beginning of individual voir dire, the defendant's trial counsel 
asked a prospective juror about the subject of her education 
degree.  The judge permitted the prospective juror to answer the 
question, but subsequently instructed trial counsel that he 
would not permit attorney questions relating to "general 
background information that might help inform" peremptory 
challenges unless there was an apparent connection to potential 
bias.  The judge later clarified that he did not intend to 
"chill either attorney's legitimate questioning on bias issues," 
and assured counsel that they should "stand up and ask [their] 
questions" because he would "let [them] know after the fact if 
it was something that [he] thought was more extraneous."  
Thereafter, trial counsel subsequently questioned three 
additional prospective jurors about the subject of their 
respective doctoral degrees, without restriction or further 
comment by the judge.  One of these prospective jurors was 
seated, one was excused upon the Commonwealth's exercise of a 
peremptory challenge, and one was excused upon the defendant's 
exercise of a peremptory challenge.10 
 
 
10 During empanelment, the defendant exercised the majority 
of, but did not fully exhaust, his peremptory challenges. 
30 
 
 
We agree that the judge erred in instructing counsel that 
attorney-conducted voir dire is properly limited to questions 
solely relating to apparent bias, and does not include the 
opportunity to elicit information that may help counsel exercise 
a peremptory challenge.  See American Bar Association, 
Principles for Juries and Jury Trials, Principle 11(B)(3) (rev. 
2016) (voir dire should be "sufficient to disclose grounds for 
challenges for cause and to facilitate intelligent exercise of 
peremptory challenges").  However, we conclude that the error 
was harmless and did not result in a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice where the record demonstrates that the 
judge's misstatement did not produce actual restraint upon trial 
counsel's subsequent inquiry regarding background information, 
such as educational degrees, or the exercise of the defendant's 
peremptory challenges.  See Colon, 482 Mass. at 175 (defendant's 
exclusion from voir dire harmless error where no demonstration 
of actual prejudice). 
 
c.  Admission of the Chakoutis text messages and letter.  
Next, the defendant argues that the trial judge abused his 
discretion in admitting prior bad act evidence in the form of 
text messages between the defendant and his former romantic 
partner, Chakoutis, as well as a letter the defendant sent to 
Chakoutis three years after the homicide.  "We review a judge's 
decision to allow the introduction of prior bad act evidence for 
31 
 
abuse of discretion."  Commonwealth v. Peno, 485 Mass. 378, 386 
(2020).  "When assessing whether the risk of unfair prejudice 
outweighs the probative value of the challenged evidence, the 
factors a reviewing court considers may include (1) whether the 
trial judge carefully weighed the probative value and 
prejudicial effect of the evidence introduced at trial; (2) 
whether the judge mitigated the prejudicial effect through 
proper limiting instructions; (3) whether the challenged 
evidence was cumulative of other admissible evidence, thereby 
reducing the risk of any additional prejudicial effect; and (4) 
whether the challenged evidence was so similar to the charged 
offense as to increase the risk of propensity reasoning by the 
jury" (alterations omitted).  Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 
794, 807 (2021), quoting Peno, supra. 
 
At trial, Chakoutis testified that she had a romantic 
cohabitation relationship with the defendant for more than two 
months, and that she amicably terminated the relationship on 
August 1, 2016, the day before the victim's death.  Over the 
defendant's objection, text messages between the defendant and 
Chakoutis were admitted in evidence.  In text messages during 
May and June, the defendant expressed love for Chakoutis, made 
limited references to sexual activity with her, and expressed an 
intent to stay in a relationship with her for a "long time."  
Text messages from August 1 corroborated Chakoutis' account of 
32 
 
the end of the relationship.  On appeal, the defendant 
challenges only the admission of the text messages between 
himself and Chakoutis expressing love, referencing sex, and 
discussing future plans; the defendant does not challenge the 
admission of Chakoutis's direct testimony regarding her 
relationship with the defendant. 
 
We conclude that the admission of the relationship-related 
text messages between the defendant and Chakoutis was not an 
abuse of discretion, where there was little risk of unfair 
prejudice outweighing the probative value of these text messages 
in establishing the defendant's state of mind and relationship 
with the victim shortly before the killing.  First, the text 
messages, although corroborative and in the defendant's own 
words, were cumulative of other admissible evidence of the 
defendant's own infidelity with Chakoutis and posed little risk 
of additional prejudicial effect:  Chakoutis directly testified 
that she had a sexual and romantic cohabitation relationship 
with the defendant for more than two months and that she 
amicably terminated the relationship the day before the killing.  
See West, 487 Mass. at 807.  Moreover, the evidence of the 
defendant's own infidelity and apparently happy romantic 
relationship was not similar to the charged offenses of murder 
and violation of a restraining order, such that there was little 
to no risk of propensity reasoning by the jury.  Id.  Last, the 
33 
 
trial judge carefully considered the probative value and risk of 
prejudicial effect of each of a large number of text messages 
between the defendant and Chakoutis in the course of their 
relationship, excluding all but eleven messages that fairly 
represented the entire corpus without excess or salaciousness. 
 
Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion in the admission 
over the defendant's objection of a letter he wrote to Chakoutis 
in June 2019, approximately three years after the killing.  In 
the letter, the defendant blamed Chakoutis for the loss of his 
family, his freedom, and the victim.  The defendant wrote that 
he believed that it was Chakoutis' former boyfriend, Joe Kerwin, 
who "called [him]" after she gave the defendant's telephone 
number to Kerwin.  This evidence was consistent with the 
Commonwealth's theory that the defendant never believed the 
Binky call came from the victim's boyfriend and that he had 
premeditated the murder of the victim over several weeks before 
the call ever occurred.  Consequently, it also undermined the 
defendant's heat of passion defense, wherein he claimed that he 
argued with the victim over his belief that her boyfriend made 
the Binky call and strangled her after she grabbed his chest and 
mouth.  Although the three-year delay between the killing and 
the time the defendant wrote the letter limited the relevance of 
this evidence as to his state of mind at the time of the crime, 
the risk of unfair prejudice outweighing probative value was 
34 
 
minimal where the letter was cumulative of the properly admitted 
testimony by Chakoutis and the related text message establishing 
that the defendant believed the caller was Kerwin on the night 
of the killing.  See West, 487 Mass. at 807 
 
For those reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
admission of either the defendant's text messages or his letter 
to Chakoutis. 
 
d.  Cross-examination of the defendant.  The defendant 
claims that the judge committed reversible error in overruling 
his objections to three improper questions posed to him by the 
prosecutor during cross-examination.  Specifically, the 
defendant argues that the prosecutor's first question, noting 
that the defendant did not mention Chakoutis during his 
testimony on direct examination, improperly shifted the burden 
of proof to the defendant, and that two subsequent questions 
referencing the defendant's relationship with Chakoutis were 
humiliations with no valid evidentiary purpose.  Because the 
defendant timely objected, we review the claims of burden 
shifting and excessive personal attacks on the defendant for 
prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 487 Mass. 770, 
790-791 (2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 831 (2022).  "An error 
is nonprejudicial only if we are convinced that the error did 
not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect" 
(quotations omitted).  Peno, 485 Mass. at 399, quoting 
35 
 
Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 428 Mass. 161, 163, cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1007 (1998). 
 
The prosecutor began his cross-examination of the defendant 
with the question:  "One person we didn't hear about at all 
during the course of your direct examination, was Jean 
Chakoutis; is that correct?"  The defendant's objection to the 
question was overruled, and he answered, "Yes."  After 
intervening questions about the defendant's relationship with 
Chakoutis to which the defendant did not object, the prosecutor 
asked, "So, you moved in with her, you had sex with her, you 
told her that you loved her, and that didn't make [Chakoutis] 
think that you were starting a new life with her?"  The 
defendant's objection was overruled, and he answered, "No."  The 
defendant then testified that he was angry that the victim was 
dating other people.  The prosecutor asked, "And do you realize 
what a giant hypocrite that makes you, this whole nine months 
that –- leading up to the time you killed your wife?"  The 
defendant's objection was overruled, and he answered, "A 
hypocrite, how?"11 
 
 
11 The prosecutor responded to the defendant's question by 
rearticulating the prior question:  "You were telling somebody 
else that you loved them, yet you were angry with your wife 
because you thought she was seeing other people.  That makes you 
[a] hypocrite; right?"  The defendant did not object to this 
rearticulated question, and answered that he "was angry with her 
because of who she was seeing." 
36 
 
 
The first question, regarding the absence of testimony 
about the defendant's relationship with Chakoutis, posed little, 
if any, "implication by [the] prosecutor that [the] defendant 
failed to meet a purported burden at trial" (emphasis omitted).  
See Commonwealth v. Pierre, 486 Mass. 418, 435 (2020).  This 
simple "yes or no" question did not directly require the 
defendant to explain a testimonial choice, and merely confirmed 
what had not been said.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ivy, 55 
Mass. App. Ct. 851, 859 (2002) (no burden shifted by question 
why defendant had not produced sign-in log for night of 
assault).  Moreover, the absence of this information in the 
defendant's testimony was probative to the extent that it 
contradicted the defendant's claim that on the night of the 
killing, he was a loving husband who expected to reunite with 
the victim until the Binky call occurred.  Where the jury 
received precharge instructions that the Commonwealth bore the 
burden of proof and that the attorneys' questions were not 
evidence, the judge did not err in overruling the defendant's 
objection to the first question. 
 
As to the second question, regarding a new life with 
Chakoutis, we conclude that the prosecutor did not "go beyond 
the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy 
or humiliate."  Commonwealth v. Johnson, 431 Mass. 535, 540 
(2000), quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 
37 
 
(1931).  Like the first question, the second question was 
probative to contradict the defendant's claim of a loving 
relationship with the victim and mutual plans for a future with 
her in California, and cumulative of extensive evidence of the 
defendant's prior sexual and romantic relationship with 
Chakoutis extending to the day before the killing.  There was no 
error. 
 
To the extent that the third question contained excessive 
hyperbole regarding the defendant's character as a "giant 
hypocrite" that crossed the boundary of proper cross-
examination, any error was not prejudicial.  See Johnson, 431 
Mass. at 540.  No more than a slight effect was possible where 
the jury received extensive, properly admitted evidence of the 
defendant's romantic relationship with Chakoutis, supporting a 
reasonable conclusion that the defendant's anger at the victim's 
dating relationship and accusations of infidelity were 
hypocritical.  See Fernandes, 487 Mass. at 792, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Salazar, 481 Mass. 105, 118 (2018) (prosecutor's 
"brief, isolated statement . . . was not egregious enough to 
infect the whole of the trial").  For these reasons, we conclude 
that the Commonwealth's cross-examination of the defendant did 
not result in reversible error. 
 
e.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant asks 
us to exercise our authority under § 33E to reduce or set aside 
38 
 
his conviction of murder in the first degree, on the ground that 
the claimed errors addressed supra, combined with the weight of 
the evidence, produced a verdict that was not consonant with 
justice.  As we have already noted, the defendant fails to show 
reversible error with respect to exclusion of his recorded 
interview, the scope of voir dire, the questions posed to him 
during cross-examination, or the admission of his communications 
with Chakoutis.  Where we agree with the Commonwealth that the 
limited evidence offered in support of the defendant's 
reasonable provocation defense was substantially contradicted by 
contrary evidence of deliberate premeditation, we decline to 
order a new trial or reduce the conviction to manslaughter. 
 
"Reasonable provocation is provocation [deemed adequate in 
law] by the person killed . . . that would be likely to produce 
such a state of passion, anger, fear, fright, or nervous 
excitement in a reasonable person as would overwhelm his 
capacity for reflection or restraint and did actually produce 
such a state of mind in the defendant" (alteration in original).  
Commonwealth v. Yat Fung Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 257 (2022), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Brea, 488 Mass. 150, 156 (2021).  Neither mere 
quarreling, nor discovery of spousal infidelity over an extended 
period, constitutes legally adequate provocation to prove heat 
of passion upon reasonable provocation.  See Commonwealth v. 
Vatcher, 438 Mass. 584, 588-589 (2003) (insults or verbal 
39 
 
arguments insufficient); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 431 Mass. 
804, 812 (2000) (discovery of spousal infidelity must be 
sudden).12  Thus, where the evidence clearly established that the 
defendant knew of the victim's relationship with Scott McHugh 
for weeks before the Binky call and killing, only the victim's 
purported physical assault on the defendant could arguably have 
constituted reasonable provocation by sudden combat.13 
 
Even if credited by the jury, the defendant's description 
of events provided little evidence that this physical assault 
posed any threat of serious harm to him, or that the assault 
would have rendered a reasonable person incapable of reflection 
or restraint for the period of time it took to strangle the 
 
 
12 While it is not necessary here to determine whether the 
sudden revelation of infidelity should continue to be considered 
provocation deemed adequate in law, we express serious doubt 
about the ongoing viability of this legal principle, where it 
rests on the outmoded perception that "[t]he killing of a spouse 
(usually a wife) by a spouse (usually a husband)" is "an 
acceptable response to the discovery of infidelity," thereby 
"reinforc[ing] male irrationality as normal, and legitim[izing] 
the view of women as property" (quotation and citations 
omitted).  See Commonwealth v. Richards, 485 Mass. 896, 923 
(2020) (Cypher, J., concurring). 
 
 
13 "Sudden combat is a form of reasonable provocation" that 
"involves a sudden assault by the person killed . . . and the 
defendant upon each other" (quotation omitted).  Yat Fung Ng, 
489 Mass. at 266, quoting Brea, 488 Mass. at 157. 
40 
 
victim to death.14,15  Unlike a killing by knife or gun, which 
could be consistent with death occurring as a result of single, 
impulsive blow, a manual strangulation requires sustained force 
over a prolonged period of time to accomplish death, during 
which an objectively reasonable person would likely have "cooled 
off."  See Felix, 476 Mass. at 759 ("the time required to 
strangle the victim . . . supported a finding of deliberate 
premeditation inconsistent with sudden provocation").  Moreover, 
there was substantial evidence of deliberate premeditation in 
the months and weeks leading up to the killing, as the defendant 
sent text messages repeatedly threatening the victim and her 
boyfriend, and warned his daughter that he wanted to "go to 
jail" and to "watch what [he] do[es]."  In this context, the 
 
 
14 "'[P]hysical contact between a defendant and a victim is 
not always sufficient to warrant a manslaughter instruction, 
even when the victim initiated the contact.'  This may be 
especially true where the defendant outweighs and is physically 
far more powerful than the victim, and the defendant uses . . . 
excessive force" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Felix, 476 
Mass. 750, 757 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 
724, 727 (1980). 
 
 
15 The victim was 149 pounds; the defendant weighed more 
than twice her weight, approximately 350 pounds at the time of 
the killing.  The defendant sustained no injuries to his face or 
mouth from this purported physical attack and only a small, 
fingernail-sized abrasion of unknown origin on his chest.  The 
victim's hands showed no signs of defensive wounds or injuries 
consistent with forcing the defendant's mouth apart.  None of 
the family members sleeping nearby heard any argument or 
physical altercation around the time of killing. 
41 
 
weight of the evidence supported the defendant's conviction on a 
theory of deliberation premeditation. 
 
After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that 
there is no other reason to exercise our authority under § 33E 
to grant a new trial or reduce or set aside the verdict of 
murder in the first degree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.