Case Title: Commonwealth v. Velez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11503 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  IDELFONSO VELEZ. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     November 2, 2020. - May 25, 2021. 
 
Present:  Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel.  Insanity.  
Mental Impairment.  Intoxication.  Practice, Criminal, 
Assistance of counsel, New trial, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 30, 2010. 
 
The cases were tried before Sandra L. Hamlin, J.; and 
following review by this court, 479 Mass. 506 (2018), a motion 
for a new trial was heard by Laurence D. Pierce, J. 
 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan for the defendant. 
 
Jessica Langsam, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
on two indictments charging murder in the first degree in the 
stabbing deaths of Trisha Bennett and Angel Ortiz.  In these 
appeals from his convictions and from the denial of his motion 
for a new trial, following a remand for an evidentiary hearing 
2 
 
in the Superior Court, see Commonwealth v. Velez, 479 Mass. 506, 
515 (2018), the defendant contends that he is entitled to a new 
trial because he was deprived of his constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel.  The defendant argues, among 
other things, that it was manifestly unreasonable for trial 
counsel to forgo possible mental health defenses in favor of a 
third-party culprit defense. 
 
We conclude that the defendant was not deprived of his 
right to the effective assistance of counsel, and, having 
conducted a plenary review of the record pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, we discern no basis upon which to disturb the 
verdicts.  Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and the order 
denying his motion for a new trial. 
 
1.  Background  a.  Prior proceedings.  In September of 
2010, the defendant was indicted on two counts of murder in the 
first degree for the deaths of Bennett and Ortiz.  The defendant 
filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police on the 
ground that his waiver of his Miranda1 rights, and subsequent 
statements, had not been voluntarily made due to his 
intoxication, sleep deprivation, and mental illness.  The motion 
was denied after an evidentiary hearing. 
 
 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3 
 
 
During a February 2012 pretrial hearing, trial counsel 
informed the judge that the defense would "not be using the 
insanity defense in this case."  One and one-half months later, 
at a subsequent pretrial hearing, trial counsel assured the 
judge that he would not be raising mental health defenses, 
including "any other issues relating to [the defendant's] mental 
health status as it may bear on the issue of intent." 
 
The defendant's trial began on September 21, 2012, before a 
different judge.  His defense was that a third party, Jonathan 
Gonzales, committed the crimes.  On October 17, 2012, the jury 
returned verdicts of guilty on two counts of murder in the first 
degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme 
atrocity or cruelty.  On August 6, 2014, represented by new 
appellate counsel, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial 
on the ground that his trial counsel had been ineffective for 
not having pursued a defense of intoxication (based on the 
ingestion of drugs and alcohol) or a "mental impairment defense 
relative to the defendant's mental health."  The defendant later 
filed a supplemental pleading arguing, in part, that trial 
counsel did not properly investigate the mental impairment 
defense, and that the third-party culprit defense essentially 
was doomed to fail.  Another Superior Court judge (the trial 
judge having retired) denied the defendant's request for 
postconviction relief without a hearing.  In reviewing that 
4 
 
decision, this court concluded that "it [was] necessary to 
understand [trial] counsel's reasoning at the time he informed 
the judge that he would not pursue lack of criminal 
responsibility or mental impairment defenses."  Velez, 479 Mass. 
at 513.  We remanded the matter to the Superior Court for an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether trial counsel's 
strategy to forgo a mental impairment defense in favor of the 
third-party culprit defense was manifestly unreasonable.  Id. 
at 515. 
 
A different Superior Court judge (motion judge) then held a 
two-day evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel and the 
defendant testified.  The defendant also introduced in evidence 
certain of his medical records that had been available to trial 
counsel but that counsel had not obtained from the defendant's 
mental health providers.  Finding trial counsel's strategy to 
forgo defenses of mental impairment and intoxication not 
manifestly unreasonable, the motion judge denied the defendant's 
motion for a new trial. 
 
b.  Facts.  The facts in the underlying case were discussed 
at length in our prior decision.  See Velez, 479 Mass. at 507-
511.  We focus here on the evidence presented at the hearing on 
the defendant's motion for a new trial.  The following are 
summarized from the motion judge's findings, supplemented with 
5 
 
undisputed facts in the record.  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 
Mass. 669, 670 (2001). 
 
The defendant was represented by an experienced criminal 
defense attorney, who had been on the so-called "murder list," 
enabling him to represent defendants charged with murder in the 
first degree, for twenty-five years.  Trial counsel entered an 
appearance at the defendant's arraignment, and continued to 
represent him throughout the trial proceedings. 
 
Trial counsel investigated the possibility of asserting 
defenses based on either a lack of criminal responsibility or 
impaired capacity due to mental illness or intoxication.  To do 
so, counsel obtained the defendant's mental health records from 
three hospitals, a community health center, and an addiction 
treatment center.  The records documented that the defendant had 
been diagnosed with psychiatric illnesses, including bipolar 
disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and posttraumatic stress 
disorder, and had been treated with antidepressants, mood 
stabilizers, and antipsychotic medications.  The medical records 
also indicated that the defendant had reported experiencing 
auditory and visual hallucinations.2  Notably, on January 1, 2010 
 
 
2 For example, the defendant informed a physician at a 
community health center that he "hears a voice that calls his 
name or tells him to do something like 'go check the door to see 
if it's locked,' 'go take out the trash.'"  In May of 2010, 
while psychiatrically hospitalized following an emergency room 
6 
 
(four months before the stabbings), the defendant presented at a 
major medical center's emergency room with depression and 
suicidal thoughts, and was psychiatrically hospitalized.3  After 
approximately two weeks of stabilization and adjustment of his 
medications, he was released to a drug treatment center, where 
he relapsed within a few days and attempted to commit suicide 
through ingesting pills, cocaine, and alcohol.  Thereafter, the 
defendant again was hospitalized for psychiatric observation and 
treatment from January 15 to 19, 2010. 
 
In addition to obtaining the defendant's medical records, 
trial counsel consulted with two mental health professionals.  
One of these experts, psychiatrist Dr. David Rosmarin, 
interviewed the defendant on multiple occasions and also 
reviewed the defendant's mental health records.  On January 24, 
2012, Rosmarin and trial counsel met for three hours to discuss 
potential mental health defenses.  The meeting included a review 
of the defendant's "detailed" forensic interview.  It was 
Rosmarin's opinion that he could not offer expert testimony to 
 
admission, the defendant told clinicians that, for the past two 
to three weeks, he had heard voices and seen "shadows." 
 
 
3 Trial counsel did not obtain medical records from two 
providers -- the mental health unit at the Middlesex County 
house of correction, from 2007 and 2008; and the crisis 
stabilization unit at a Boston hospital, from January 2010 -- 
that were referenced in other medical records. 
7 
 
support mental health defenses based on a lack of criminal 
responsibility or on mental impairment. 
 
The other expert witness that trial counsel retained, Dr. 
Eric Brown, is a clinical and forensic psychologist.  Counsel 
engaged Brown to examine the defendant's mental health as it 
related to an ability to waive his Miranda rights or to provide 
a voluntary statement to police.  Brown did not interview the 
defendant; he based his opinion on police reports, as well as 
the defendant's mental health records, both prior to and 
following the stabbings.  At the hearing on the motion to 
suppress hearing, Brown testified that the defendant was 
suffering from schizoaffective disorder, a serious mental 
illness, as well as posttraumatic stress disorder.  As a result 
of these mental illnesses, Brown opined, the defendant was 
unable knowingly and intelligently to waive his constitutional 
rights and to "interact in an intellectually rational way for 
any series of interviews." 
 
The judge who decided the defendant's motion to suppress4 
credited Brown's testimony that the defendant was suffering from 
a serious mental illness and was not taking prescribed 
medications.  She rejected Brown's opinion that the defendant 
was unable knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily to waive 
 
 
4 This is the fourth judge whose rulings are discussed here. 
8 
 
his Miranda rights and to interact rationally with police 
officers.  The judge noted that Brown's opinion was contradicted 
"by the objective evidence of the manner in which the defendant 
interacted with medical personnel and with the police."  The 
judge concluded, "[N]otwithstanding that the defendant was off 
his medications at the time of the incident, Dr. Brown could not 
point to any significant record information about the 
defendant's behavior on the night in question that supported his 
hypothesis that the defendant was unable to interact in a 
rational way following the incident." 
 
Before trial, counsel and the defendant repeatedly 
discussed the relative benefits of raising defenses based on the 
defendant's mental condition.  On September 6, 2012, trial 
counsel wrote to the defendant to document counsel's efforts to 
obtain an expert witness to support a defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility, and the viability of asserting such a 
defense without an expert witness.  In the letter, counsel 
stated that he "did substantial research and investigation into 
[the insanity defense] but determined that it would ultimately 
be a weak defense."  The primary reason noted was that trial 
counsel had consulted with two expert witnesses and the 
defendant did not "have a formal diagnosis of mental disease at 
the time of the commission of the crime."  Furthermore, the note 
continued, the defendant had "fabricated statement[s] to 911, 
9 
 
the [emergency medical technicians] and the police immediately 
after the homicide which indicates appreciation of 
wrongfulness."5  Finally, the letter stated, there was evidence 
that the defendant was able to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law.  Trial counsel also explained that the 
defendant's "intentional use of alcohol and illicit drugs would 
be an issue."  Although not stated in the letter, trial counsel 
also had informed the defendant in prior conversations that the 
so-called "diminished capacity defense" was not a realistic 
option given the lack of expert testimony.6 
 
Ultimately, trial counsel and the defendant reached a joint 
decision to pursue a third-party culprit defense pointing at 
Gonzales.  This defense, as with the defenses based on the 
defendant's mental condition, had pluses and minuses.  The 
 
 
5 Trial counsel believed that the defendant's statements to 
police were inconsistent with an insanity defense "where the 
defendant would be admitting to the commission of the crimes."  
In three separate interviews, the defendant told police officers 
that he and the victims had been attacked by two intruders, one 
armed with a knife.  He did not recognize them because their 
faces were concealed, but thought that they were "Spanish based 
on their eyes." 
 
 
6 The mental impairment defense often is colloquially 
referred to as "diminished capacity."  Commonwealth v. Holland, 
476 Mass. 801, 804 n.3 (2017).  There is no diminished capacity 
defense in the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 426 
Mass. 725, 729 n.5 (1998).  A jury, however, may consider 
credible evidence of mental impairment in deciding whether the 
Commonwealth has met its burden of proving the defendant's state 
of mind.  See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 485 Mass. 416, 421 
(2020). 
10 
 
benefit of the third-party culprit defense, according to trial 
counsel, was that Gonzales had multiple motives to kill Ortiz.  
As outlined in trial counsel's opening statement, Gonzales 
wanted to kill Ortiz because (1) Bennett stopped dating Gonzales 
to date Ortiz; (2) Ortiz stole $10,000 from Gonzales by keeping 
the money that Gonzalez had posted for Ortiz's bail; and 
(3) Ortiz had beaten Bennett, and Gonzales was angered by the 
abuse.  The third-party culprit defense also was bolstered by 
evidence that Gonzales made incriminating statements to one of 
his friends, Shannon Begg.  In 2009, Gonzales told Begg that he 
wanted to hire someone to kill Ortiz.  After the stabbings, when 
Gonzales became the subject of suspicion, he told Begg, "Fuck 
you all.  I did it.  And fuck you all." 
 
Undoubtedly, there were numerous drawbacks to the third-
party culprit defense.  The Commonwealth alleged that the 
victims were stabbed after 2:51 A.M.  At trial, the prosecutor 
was able to produce evidence that, at the time of the stabbings, 
Gonzales had been in Lowell, twenty-four miles away from the 
scene.  A number of witnesses testified to having seen Gonzales 
at his apartment building in the early morning hours of May 1, 
2010.  This testimony was corroborated by video surveillance 
footage of Gonzales's vehicle arriving home at 2 A.M., and 
Gonzales walking out of the building at about 3 A.M.  In 
addition, a cellular telephone used by Gonzales connected to a 
11 
 
cellular tower in Lowell at 2:25 A.M.  To refute this evidence, 
trial counsel argued in his closing statement that Gonzales, who 
had unexplained access to large sums of cash, hired someone to 
kill Ortiz. 
 
The third-party culprit defense also arguably was 
inconsistent with the physical evidence.  The Commonwealth 
introduced evidence that blood on the defendant's jeans 
contained deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) from both the defendant 
and Bennett.  A blood spatter expert testified that the jeans 
were in "close proximity to the spatter-inducing event that bled 
out Ms. Bennett's blood."  Testing of Bennett's fingernails 
revealed a mixture of Y-chromosome short tandem repeat (Y-STR) 
DNA7 that matched DNA of the defendant and Ortiz.  In addition, 
the Commonwealth pointed out that the entry doors were not 
damaged, suggesting there had not been a break-in. 
 
At trial, the defendant pointed out that the Commonwealth's 
expert had conceded that the cause of the blood spatter was 
unknown.  The defendant's blood spatter expert testified that 
the jeans were in close proximity to "a spatter-producing 
event," but due to the mixed DNA profile, he could not "say 
definitely which person [(the defendant or Bennett)] was the 
 
 
7 The Commonwealth's expert explained that Y-STR testing 
examines a type of DNA found only in males and that it is 
inherited from father to son, so that all males in the same 
lineage would have the same Y-STR DNA. 
12 
 
source of the spatter."  The defendant also argued that the Y-
STR DNA testing was not significant because, given the 
limitations of that type of DNA testing, the profiles could have 
matched large numbers of Hispanic males.  Finally, the defendant 
argued that the third-party culprit defense was consistent with 
evidence of no forced entry because there were "many people with 
keys" to the apartment, and building security was lax.8 
 
2.  Discussion.  In reviewing a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in a case of murder in the first degree, 
we generally review under the more favorable standard of review 
of a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 358 (2016); G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E.  Under this standard, "[w]e consider whether there was an 
error in the course of the trial (by defense counsel, the 
prosecutor, or the judge) and, if there was, whether that error 
was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion."  Vargas, 
supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Lessieur, 472 Mass. 317, 327, 
cert. denied, 577 U.S. 963 (2015). 
 
 
8 The defendant claimed that other pieces of physical 
evidence demonstrated that the victims were killed by intruders.  
The police could not find any conclusive evidence linking 
Ortiz's DNA to the defendant's person or to a bloody knife found 
in the kitchen sink.  The third-party culprit defense also was 
consistent with an unidentified bloody footprint on the victims' 
bed.  The Commonwealth disputed the significance of the 
footprint, and suggested that the footprint had been deposited 
by a "tactical boot," i.e., footwear worn by first responders. 
13 
 
 
Where, as here, however, the defendant's claim of 
ineffective assistance is based on a tactical or strategic 
decision, we apply the more rigorous standard that, to be 
ineffective, the attorney's decision must have been manifestly 
unreasonable when made.  Commonwealth v. Lang, 473 Mass. 1, 14 
(2015).  "Two principles guide the manifestly unreasonable test.  
First, 'we evaluate the [strategic or tactical] decision at the 
time it was made, and make every effort . . . to eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight.' . . .  Second, 
'[s]ubstantively, [o]nly strategy and tactics which lawyers of 
ordinary training and skill in criminal law would not consider 
competent are manifestly unreasonable'" (quotations and 
citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Holland, 476 Mass. 801, 812 
(2017).  See Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 674-675 
(2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017) (describing manifestly 
unreasonable test as "search for rationality in counsel's 
strategic decisions" as opposed to "whether counsel could have 
made alternative choices"). 
 
The defendant makes five arguments in support of his claim 
that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective.  First, 
the defendant argues that the judge's finding that trial counsel 
and the defendant made a "joint decision" to pursue a third-
party culprit defense is clearly erroneous.  Second, the 
defendant maintains, trial counsel "abdicated" his sole 
14 
 
responsibility to decide a matter of trial strategy.  Third, 
notwithstanding that trial counsel was unable to find an expert 
witness to testify in support of the defense, the defendant 
contends that it was manifestly unreasonable not to pursue a 
mental impairment defense.  Fourth, trial counsel failed to 
consider whether he could explain the defendant's statements 
about home invaders as the product of hallucination.  Fifth, 
trial counsel did not adequately explore the defense of 
intoxication.  We address each argument in turn. 
 
a.  Motion judge's finding of a "joint decision."  The 
defendant challenges the motion judge's finding that trial 
counsel and the defendant reached a "joint decision" to rely 
upon a third-party culprit defense.  In reviewing a motion 
judge's findings of fact made after an evidentiary hearing, we 
accept the findings where they are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record.  Commonwealth v. Perkins, 450 Mass. 834, 
845 (2008).  "When, as here, the motion judge did not preside at 
trial, we defer to that judge's assessment of the credibility of 
witnesses at the hearing on the new trial motion, but regard 
ourselves in as good a position as the motion judge to assess 
the trial record."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 
Mass. 303, 307 (1986). 
 
At the motion hearing, both trial counsel and the defendant 
testified that the other had been in charge of the defense.  
15 
 
Trial counsel explained that his practice is to inform clients 
of the strengths and weaknesses of potential defenses and to 
make recommendations concerning trial strategy.  He testified, 
"With every client I discuss strategies.  What's the best 
defense, why is this strong, why is this weak, should he plead, 
should he [go to] trial, should he testify?  I go over that many 
times and ultimately, the client makes the decision.  I give 
recommendations.  This is weak, this is stronger . . . .  I do 
that in every single case.  I did it in this case."   It was the 
defendant, according to trial counsel, who made the ultimate 
decision to pursue a third-party culprit defense and to forgo a 
defense based on an impaired mental condition. 
 
The defendant offered contradictory testimony about the 
decision-making process.  According to the defendant, trial 
counsel selected the third-party culprit defense.  The defendant 
testified: 
Q.:  "What did [trial counsel] say to you about whose 
decision it was about trial strategy that was going to be 
used?" 
 
A.:  "It was his." 
 
Q.:  "Did he ever say to you that it's your decision?" 
 
A.:  "No." 
 
The defendant further testified that, by the time of trial, 
following multiple conversations about available defenses, he 
reluctantly went along with trial counsel's decision.  
16 
 
"[H]e convinced my mind; he changed my mind.  Every time I bring 
the subject, he says no, third party culprit is the right 
defense and we're going to do it with this and with this, and 
I'm not an expert; I let him do what he -- he does best, which 
is represent people, so I couldn't change his mind no more, no 
matter how many times I tell him I don't want this defense."  
The defendant added that, over the course of the two years from 
the time his counsel was appointed until the trial, while the 
defendant wanted to pursue a defense of lack of criminal 
responsibility, trial counsel convinced him that the third-party 
culprit defense was the best alternative. 
 
The motion judge reconciled the differing testimony by 
trial counsel and the defendant by finding that "the decision to 
pursue a third-party culprit defense [and forgo a mental 
impairment defense] was a joint decision, made by trial counsel 
and the defendant, after multiple attorney/client 
consultations."  See Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 Mass. 207, 215-
216, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1079 (2007), S.C., 479 Mass. 1032 
(2018), quoting Commonwealth v. Spagnolo, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 516, 
517-518 (1984) (motion judge's resolution of conflicting 
testimony "invariably will be accepted").  See also Commonwealth 
v. Linton, 483 Mass. 227, 239-240 (2019) (it was for judge to 
weigh and resolve conflicting testimony). 
17 
 
 
We discern no error in the motion judge's finding that the 
defendant and trial counsel, after consultation, reached an 
agreement to rely upon a third-party culprit defense.  The 
judge's finding was supported by evidence that trial counsel 
investigated the possibility of raising a mental health defense 
by obtaining the defendant's mental health records and 
consulting with expert witnesses; trial counsel and the 
defendant repeatedly discussed the viability of these defenses; 
and the defendant ultimately agreed with trial counsel's 
recommendation that they rely upon a third-party culprit defense 
rather than a defense of mental impairment. 
 
b.  Abdication of responsibility for formulating trial 
strategy.  The defendant argues that trial counsel was 
ineffective because he "abdicated his ultimate responsibility" 
to decide between a third-party culprit defense and a defense of 
mental impairment defense.  According to the defendant, such a 
decision is a matter of trial strategy that is "within the sole 
purview of defense counsel, albeit with consultation [with] the 
defendant (emphasis supplied). 
 
A criminal defendant's right to the effective assistance of 
counsel derives from the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights.  Commonwealth v. Patterson, 432 Mass. 767, 774 (2000), 
S.C., 445 Mass. 626 (2005).  The Sixth Amendment guarantees to 
18 
 
each defendant "the Assistance of Counsel for his [or her] 
defense."  Under art. 12, a defendant is entitled to "be fully 
heard in his defense by himself, or his council at his 
election."  A defendant who elects to be represented by counsel 
does not "surrender control entirely to counsel."  McCoy v. 
Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018).  The Sixth Amendment 
"speaks of the 'assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, 
however expert, is still an assistant."  Faratta v. California, 
422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).  The right to the assistance of 
counsel "contemplat[es] a norm in which the accused, and not a 
lawyer, is master of his own defense."  United States v. 
Rosemond, 958 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. 
Ct. 1057 (2021), quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 
368, 382 n.10 (1979). 
 
In practice, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
autonomy means that certain decisions are so "fundamental" that 
they rest ultimately with the defendant.  Jones v. Barnes, 463 
U.S. 745, 751 (1983).  These decisions include "whether to plead 
guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take 
an appeal."  Id.  See Commonwealth v. Miranda, 484 Mass. 799, 
819, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 683 (2020); Commonwealth v. 
Martin, 425 Mass. 718, 721 (1997).  See also Mass R. Prof. C. 
1.2 (a), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1313 (2015) (requiring 
criminal defense lawyers to "abide by the client's decision, 
19 
 
after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, 
whether to waive jury trial, and whether the client will 
testify"). 
 
By choosing to be represented by counsel, however, and 
notwithstanding the right to personal autonomy, a defendant 
necessarily relinquishes some control of the case to the 
attorney.  See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 248-249 
(2008); Miranda, 484 Mass. at 819.  "The adversary process could 
not function effectively if every tactical decision required 
client approval."  Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988).  
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, J., 
concurring) (counsel has authority to make decisions over "day-
to-day conduct of the defense").  "[T]he client must accept the 
consequences of the lawyer's decision to forgo cross-
examination, to decide not to put certain witnesses on the 
stand, or to decide not to disclose the identity of certain 
witnesses in advance of trial."  Taylor, supra.  "Strategic and 
tactical decisions should be made by defense counsel, after 
consultation with the client where feasible and appropriate."  
American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards for the 
Defense Function, Standard 4-5.2(d) (4th ed. 2017).  Decisions 
regarding jury selection, for example, are within counsel's 
control, United States v. Boyd, 86 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1231 (1997), as are decisions 
20 
 
regarding joinder, Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 
426, 432 (2005). 
 
To be sure, the line dividing decision-making authority 
between lawyer and client is not always clear.  See Miranda, 484 
Mass. at 820 & n.28 (there is no "precise test to determine 
whether a particular decision is 'tactical' as opposed to 
'fundamental'").  The United States Supreme Court has emphasized 
that it is the defendant who controls the objective of the 
defense.9  McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508.  Decisions such as whether 
to maintain innocence in the guilt phase of a capital trial in 
the face of overwhelming evidence "are not strategic choices 
about how best to achieve a client's objectives; they are 
choices about what the client's objectives in fact are (emphasis 
in original)."  Id.  "Once a defendant decides on an objective -
- e.g., acquittal -- [t]rial management is the lawyer's province 
and counsel must decide, inter alia, what arguments to pursue" 
(quotations and citations omitted).  Rosemond, 958 F.3d at 122. 
 
In Rosemond, 958 F.3d at 123, for example, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a 
defendant is not deprived of his or her right to personal 
 
 
9 Of course, a defendant's right to control the objective of 
the defense does not relieve counsel of the obligation to 
investigate potential defenses as well as to formulate trial 
strategy.  See Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664, 675 
(2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 189 (2017); Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 
Mass. 456, 472-473 (2014). 
21 
 
autonomy or the effective assistance of counsel when trial 
counsel concedes one element of the charged crime while 
maintaining that the defendant is not guilty as charged.  See 
Christian v. Thomas, 982 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2020) 
("counsel does not interfere with the objective of the defense 
by arguing alternative theories if he does so in pursuit of 
acquittal"). 
 
Consistent with McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508, we have held 
that a competent defendant maintains autonomy over the decision 
whether to assert a mental health defense.  See Commonwealth v. 
Companonio, 445 Mass. 39, 51-52 (2005); Commonwealth v. 
Federici, 427 Mass. 740, 744-745 (1998).  In Federici, supra 
at 743-744, we considered a defendant's claim that the judge 
erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility over the defendant's own objections.  On 
appeal, the defendant argued that "under art. 12 . . . , his 
trial counsel had complete control over the decision whether to 
raise the issue of lack of criminal responsibility."  Id. at 
744.  Based on the necessity of safeguarding the defendant's 
autonomy in decisions relating to his defense, we held that, 
after consultation with counsel, a defendant has a "choice not 
to label himself as 'criminally insane.'"10  Id.  See Lang, 473 
 
 
10 We honor a defendant's refusal to "label himself as 
'criminally insane'" in the exercise of his right of personal 
22 
 
Mass. at 21 (Lenk, J., concurring) (decision to present defense 
of lack of criminal responsibility rests entirely with 
defendant). 
 
Subsequently, in Companonio, 445 Mass. at 40, we considered 
a claim of ineffective assistance based on a failure fully to 
investigate the possibility that the defendant was suffering 
from a mental impairment at the time of the killing.  Although a 
"classic insanity defense" was not a viable option, trial 
counsel repeatedly spoke to the defendant about the possibility 
of pursuing an impairment defense based on mental disease or 
defect.  Id. at 45.  The defendant refused to allow trial 
counsel to raise this defense because, in his view, "crazy 
people go to hell."  Id.  On appeal, the defendant argued that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not forging ahead with the 
mental impairment defense notwithstanding the defendant's 
objections.  Id. at 41-42.  Relying on Federici, we concluded 
that trial counsel made a reasonable decision to forgo a mental 
impairment defense "in light of the fact that it was based on 
the defendant's personal choice against the advice of counsel."  
Id. at 51. 
 
autonomy, as long as "he is competent and does so with knowledge 
of the consequences" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 156 (2007). 
23 
 
 
Here, the defendant's argument that trial counsel was 
ineffective for "abdicat[ing] his sole authority" fails for two 
reasons.  First, as discussed, the decision whether to forgo a 
mental health defense was not within trial counsel's exclusive 
control.  See Companonio, 445 Mass. at 51-52; Federici, 427 
Mass. at 744-745.  As explained in McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508, 
the defendant had the right to control the objective of his 
defense, and trial counsel did not have the "sole authority" to 
decide between a defense that could result in acquittal -- the 
third-party culprit defense, see Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 
Mass. 395, 412 (2014) -- and a defense that could result in a 
conviction of murder in the second degree -- the mental 
impairment defense, see Commonwealth v. Cassino, 474 Mass. 85, 
95 (2016) -- no matter how unlikely those outcomes might appear 
to counsel. 
 
Second, the divisions of authority become problematic where 
"the views of defense counsel and the client diverge."  Miranda, 
484 Mass. at 820.  There is no prohibition against trial counsel 
and the defendant reaching an agreement, after meaningful 
consultation, to pursue a particular path that a defendant 
initially had rejected.  See United States v. Holloway, 939 F.3d 
1088, 1101 n.8 (10th Cir. 2019) (lawyer did not usurp ability of 
defendant to define objective of defense where both parties 
agreed to challenge intent element of offense).  See generally 
24 
 
Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy:  The Criminal Defendant's 
Right to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1147, 1161 (2010) 
(issues surrounding scope and impact of autonomy interests arise 
when counsel makes choices without affirmative consent of 
defendant).  In any event, by agreeing upon a trial strategy 
after multiple discussions with the defendant, trial counsel did 
not abdicate his responsibility to provide the defendant with 
competent representation. 
 
c.  Whether decision not to pursue mental health defense 
was manifestly unreasonable.  The defendant challenges the 
judge's finding that, "[g]iven his lack of an expert, [trial 
counsel]'s strategic choice not to assert a defense relating to 
the defendant's mental health was not manifestly unreasonable."  
The defendant contends that the judge did not weigh properly the 
possibility of presenting a mental health defense, without an 
expert witness, against the viability of a feeble third-party 
culprit defense.  He argues that "[o]ne cannot form an opinion 
on the inadvisability of pursuing a mental impairment defense 
without considering the viability of what would be the 
alternative defense." 
 
The defendant concedes that asserting a mental health 
defense without an expert witness "is a challenging task."  
Trial counsel testified that, in his extensive experience, the 
successful presentation of the defenses of a lack of criminal 
25 
 
responsibility or impaired capacity requires expert testimony.  
See Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 675 (noting difficulty in defending 
murder case based on lack of criminal responsibility even with 
expert testimony).  See also Commonwealth v. Wright, 479 Mass. 
124, 139 (2018) (absence of expert testimony to support defense 
of lack of criminal responsibility is "clear reason[]" for trial 
counsel not to pursue such defense); Commonwealth v. LaCava, 438 
Mass. 708, 714 (2003) (not unreasonable for trial counsel to 
abandon defense of lack of criminal responsibility where, along 
with other evidence of defendant's sanity, qualified expert 
witness opined that defendant was not suffering from mental 
disease or defect at time of shooting). 
 
As the defendant contends, an evaluation of trial counsel's 
performance involves weighing the strength of an asserted 
defense "relative to the availability and strength of other 
potential defenses."  Commonwealth v. Epps, 474 Mass. 743, 758 
(2016).  Here, however, we disagree with the defendant's 
contention that the motion judge did not take into account the 
viability of the third-party culprit defense.  Although the 
judge made no explicit findings weighing the alternative 
possible theories of defense against one another, that finding 
is implicit in his conclusion that trial counsel's choice to 
forgo the mental health defense was not manifestly unreasonable.  
See Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 621 (2017) (although 
26 
 
explicit finding is preferred, "it is not essential where the 
evidence supports the judge's implicit finding"). 
 
In his findings, the judge noted that trial counsel had 
assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the third-party culprit 
defense.  The judge stated, "[Trial counsel] explained that the 
strength of a third-party culprit defense included that the 
third-party culprit admitted to someone else that he had killed 
the two victims.  In addition, the third-party culprit had a 
motive for committing the crimes, and the physical ability and 
opportunity to carry out the crimes.  [Trial counsel] recalled 
that the third-party culprit had a reputation for carrying 
knives."  On the other hand, trial counsel "acknowledged that he 
was advised by the Commonwealth prior to trial that there was 
alibi evidence, including a video, showing that the alleged 
third-party culprit was not present at the time of the murders."  
The judge also considered that the defendant and the 
Commonwealth contested "whether the third-party culprit defense 
was viable given the evidence at trial regarding Bennett's blood 
on the defendant's jeans, the defendant's DNA under Bennett's 
fingernails, a third footprint on the bed where Ortiz's body was 
found, the lack of forced entry, and Gonzales's alibi for the 
night of the murders."  Against this backdrop, the judge framed 
the issue as "whether it was manifestly unreasonable for [trial 
counsel] to have proceeded with a third-party culprit defense 
27 
 
rather than a mental impairment or intoxication defense" 
(footnote omitted). 
 
Contrary to the defendant's suggestion, the judge did not 
consider the reasonableness of abandoning the mental health 
defenses in a vacuum.  Based on our review of the evidence, it 
is clear that "[t]rial counsel did not have particularly good 
cards in his hand."  Commonwealth v. Candelario, 446 Mass. 847, 
858 (2006).  Despite diligent efforts, trial counsel could not 
find an expert witness who would testify in support of a mental 
health defense.  At the same time, counsel was aware that the 
third-party culprit defense was vulnerable to attack by the 
Commonwealth due to alibi evidence tending to show that the 
purported third-party had been elsewhere, and physical evidence 
linking the defendant to the crimes.  Thus, trial counsel had 
two viable, yet flawed, defenses from which to make a 
recommendation; we cannot say that trial counsel was ineffective 
for urging one over the other. 
 
d.  Possible hallucinations concerning intruders.  The 
defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to consider whether the defendant's statements about 
home invaders could be explained as the product of 
hallucinations.  In our earlier decision in this case, we 
discussed whether the defendant's statements to police might 
have been the product of mental illness.  Velez, 479 Mass. at 
28 
 
514.  "Some of the evidence in the defendant's medical records 
indicates that, before the homicides, he suffered from 
hallucinations, including auditory hallucinations, that people 
were telling him to hurt people.  After the homicides, he 
reported seeing people coming to hurt him.  Such evidence, if 
developed and if admissible, might have supported such defenses.  
It might also have served to explain, in part, the defendant's 
statements to the police that others were in the apartment."  
Id. at 514-515. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing on remand following the initial 
denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial, trial counsel 
testified that he briefly considered the possibility that the 
defendant's statements had been the product of hallucinations.  
Ultimately, he relied on the expert advice of Rosmarin for 
guidance on this issue.  Counsel testified that he likely 
addressed the issue with Rosmarin during their three-hour 
meeting, but, due to the passage of time, could not recall 
specific details of that conversation. 
 
On this basis, the defendant has not shown that trial 
counsel was ineffective.  See Commonwealth v. Seino, 479 Mass. 
463, 472-473 (2018) (it is defendant's burden to establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel).  A duty to investigate a 
mental health defense "arises when counsel is aware of 
information suggesting at least the viability of a [mental 
29 
 
health] defense."  Holland, 476 Mass. at 807, citing 
Commonwealth v. Roberio, 428 Mass. 278, 280 (1998), S.C., 440 
Mass. 245 (2003).  In this case, in contrast with cases where we 
have concluded that the failure to investigate fell below the 
behavior expected from a reasonably effective attorney, trial 
counsel did conduct a thorough investigation into the viability 
of a mental health defense.  He retained two experts to review 
the defendant's extensive medical records, had the defendant 
interviewed by one of the experts, reviewed the defendant's 
records himself, and obtained evaluations from both experts.  
Compare Commonwealth v. Field, 477 Mass. 553, 556-557 (2017).  
See generally Epps, 474 Mass. at 757-758 (discussing counsel's 
duty to conduct complete investigation of "potentially 
substantial defense" such as lack of criminal responsibility 
before deciding to forgo it). 
 
In addition, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing 
to obtain two additional sets of medical records, for crisis 
interventions, which were mentioned in the records he already 
had obtained.  The mental health records trial counsel provided 
to the expert witnesses documented the defendant's lengthy 
mental health history and diagnoses of serious mental illnesses, 
as well as attempts at suicide.  The records contained an 
extensive list of psychiatric medications that he had been 
prescribed and the varying dosages that had been administered, 
30 
 
in multiple efforts to stabilize the defendant, and referenced 
instances of auditory and visual hallucinations that the 
defendant had experienced.  The additional medical records that 
subsequently were obtained by appellate counsel largely 
referenced the same symptoms of mental illness.  See 
Commonwealth v. Don, 483 Mass. 697, 707 (2019) (defendant was 
not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to obtain largely 
redundant medical records). 
 
e.  Intoxication.  The defendant also contends that the 
judge considered intoxication only in the context of the 
voluntariness of the defendant's statements to police, and 
disregarded the possibility that intoxication might have had an 
impact on his ability to form the intent to kill, premeditate, 
or commit a murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See 
Commonwealth v. Glass, 401 Mass. 799, 809 (1988).  The defendant 
points out that the judge found that the voluntariness of the 
defendant's statements was not a live issue at trial and 
accordingly that trial counsel could not be faulted for not 
pursuing a futile argument. 
 
The judge's findings concerning trial counsel's decision 
not to seek a humane practice instruction do not mean that the 
judge failed to consider that intoxication could have had an 
impact on the defendant's intent and knowledge, and potentially 
could negate a finding of murder in the first degree.  In his 
31 
 
memorandum of decision, the judge explicitly recognized that the 
defendant had argued that trial counsel was ineffective for 
"pursuing a third-party culprit defense rather than an 
intoxication and/or mental impairment defense."  Likewise, the 
issue presented at the hearing on remand was "whether it was 
manifestly unreasonable for [trial counsel] to have proceeded 
with a third-party culprit defense rather than a mental 
impairment or intoxication defense" (footnote omitted).  Quoting 
our decision in Velez, 479 Mass. at 512 n.5, the judge noted 
that a defense of mental impairment could have been supported by 
evidence either of mental disease or defect or of intoxication:  
"a defense based on the defendant's mental health and substance 
use . . . could have been one of a lack of criminal 
responsibility . . . or of mental impairment."  A successful 
defense of mental impairment, the judge observed, would negate 
the defendant's capacity to form a specific intent, or the 
ability to engage in deliberate premeditation, or to appreciate 
that his acts were extremely atrocious or cruel. 
 
Based on the judge's recitation of the applicable standards 
and case law, we are confident that he did not overlook the role 
that intoxication could play in a defense of mental impairment, 
and in this case in particular. 
 
f.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Pursuant to our duty 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we have conducted a thorough review 
32 
 
of the entire record and discern no basis upon which to exercise 
our extraordinary authority to order a new trial or to reduce 
the verdicts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order denying motion for a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  new trial affirmed.