Case Title: Stuckey v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Stuckey v. State, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div.1995 WY 21890 P.2d 1097Case Number: 94-75Decided: 02/27/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Alvin 
STUCKEY, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, ex rel. WYOMING WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent/Objector).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Campbell County, Dan R. Price II, 
J.

J. Stan Wolfe and C. John 
Cotton of Law Firm of J. Stan Wolfe, Gillette, representing 
appellant.

Gerald Laska, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Kenneth E. Spurrier, Asst. Atty. Gen., representing 
appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ. 

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Alvin Stuckey 
(Stuckey) appeals from the denial of worker's compensation benefits. Stuckey was 
injured while performing a personal project at work. The hearing officer denied 
benefits, finding that there was no nexus between Stuckey's activities and his 
employment. Benefits were also denied because the hearing officer concluded that 
Stuckey had violated W.S. 27-14-102(a)(vii).

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Stuckey raises 
three issues, framed as statements:

A. The [hearing officer] erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that Alvin Stuckey was involved in an illegal activity at the time of 
the accident so as to deprive him of Worker's Compensation 
benefits.

B. The [hearing officer] erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that Alvin Stuckey's injuries did not arise out of and in the course 
of his employment.

C. The State of Wyoming ex rel. Worker's Compensation 
Division cannot, as a matter of law, assert greater rights or defenses than 
those available to the Employer.

The Worker's Compensation 
Division (Division) presents us with a single issue:

Whether the decision of the hearing officer, denying 
claimed Worker's Compensation benefits, was in accordance with law and was 
supported by substantial evidence?

FACTS

[¶4]      On September 5, 
1993, Stuckey "clocked in" at 3:45 a.m. for his job with the Parks and 
Recreation Department of Campbell County. Stuckey was employed by the County as 
a seasonal irrigation specialist. His duties involved the operation and 
maintenance of irrigation systems in the County's parks and 
ballfields.

[¶5]      While on break 
that day, Stuckey took some tires he had acquired for his personal vehicle to 
the county shop, intending to inflate them using the county's air compressor. 
While in the process of inflating one of the tires, it exploded causing severe 
injuries to Stuckey. It was later determined that the cause of the explosion was 
due to the mounting of the tire on a rim which was the wrong size. Stuckey filed 
a claim for worker's compensation benefits based on the injuries received from 
this accident.

[¶6]      There was 
evidence introduced that the performance of small personal projects by county 
employees on county premises and using county equipment was generally allowed. 
The director and other supervisors of the Parks Department were aware of this, 
and many of them also had done small projects at work. Permission was not 
generally required if the project was relatively minor in nature. Furthermore, 
Stuckey's supervisor indicated that he would have given permission to Stuckey to 
inflate his tires if he had been asked.

[¶7]      Nevertheless, the 
hearing officer denied Stuckey's claim for benefits. He concluded that Stuckey 
was working on a private project unrelated to his duties for his employer. 
Specifically, the hearing officer found that the inflating of the tires bore no 
"nexus" to Stuckey's work and could not be said to "arise out of" and be "in the 
course of" his employment as an irrigator. Alternatively, the hearing officer 
held that Stuckey, being a public employee, unlawfully utilized county equipment 
for personal purposes in violation of W.S. 27-14-102(a)(vii) precluding him from 
benefits. Stuckey timely appeals.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶8]      The person 
claiming worker's compensation benefits bears the burden of proving a causal 
connection between the injury and the course of employment. Wyoming Steel & 
Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo. 1994); Bearden v. State ex rel. 
Workers' Compensation Div., 868 P.2d 268, 270 (Wyo. 1994). A "causal connection 
exists when there is a nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, 
environment or requirement of the employment." Bearden, 868 P.2d  at 270 (quoting 
Johnson v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 798 P.2d 323, 325 (Wyo. 
1990)); Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 892 (Wyo. 1984). 

[¶9]      The definition of 
an "injury" can be found at W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xi) (Cum.Supp. 
1993):

"Injury" means any harmful change in the human 
organism other than normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any 
artificial replacement and death, 
arising out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the 
premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work 
in places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and 
which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.

(Emphasis added.) Whether 
there is a nexus between the injury and the course of employment is a question 
of fact. Sinclair Trucking v. Bailey, 848 P.2d 1349, 1351-52 (Wyo. 1993); 
Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874, 877 (Wyo. 1984). Thus the issue 
of whether a particular injury is connected to the claimant's employment must be 
reviewed for substantial evidence. Bailey, 848 P.2d  at 
1352.

We examine the entire record to determine if there is 
substantial evidence to support an agency's findings. If the agency's decision 
is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our judgment 
for that of the agency, and must uphold the findings on appeal. Substantial 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of 
the conclusions of the agency. It is more than a scintilla of 
evidence.

Hohnholt v. Basin Elec. 
Power Co-op, 784 P.2d 233, 234 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting Trout v. Wyoming Oil & 
Gas Conservation Comm'n, 721 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Wyo. 1986)). We will reverse a 
determination that a claimant has failed to meet its burden of proof only if it 
is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or not in accordance with law. 
W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) (1990); Bohren v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation 
Div., 883 P.2d 355, 357-58 (Wyo. 1994).

DISCUSSION

[¶10]   Stuckey argues that injuries 
sustained while working on personal projects during a break or a "lull" period 
are within the course of employment when the project was performed with the 
employer's permission or acquiescence. Stuckey points out that there is 
uncontradicted evidence that his employer allowed personal projects to be 
performed. Thus, he claims, he met his burden of proof and the hearing officer 
erred in denying benefits.

[¶11]   Essentially, Stuckey's argument is 
that injuries suffered while performing personal projects are, as a matter of 
law, within the course of employment if the employer permits or acquiesces in 
them. The problem with this position is that it ignores the law in Wyoming - the 
question of whether an injury occurred in the course of employment is one of 
fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Bailey, 848 P.2d  at 1351-52. We 
acknowledge that some states accept, apparently as a matter of law, these types 
of claims if: the employer allows the activity, it occurs on the employer's 
premises, and during slack time. See Ablola v. Holland Road Auto Center, Ltd., 
11 Va. App. 181, 397 S.E.2d 541 (1990); Parker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 142 Ga. 
App. 711, 236 S.E.2d 915 (1977); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Payne, 501 S.W.2d 252 
(Ky.App. 1973). However, we decline to deviate from our precedent in order to 
make an exception for these types of injuries.

[¶12]   That does not mean, however, that a 
worker suffering an injury while working on a personal project may never be in 
the course of employment. See J & G Cabinets v. Hennington, 269 Ark. 789, 
600 S.W.2d 916 (App. 1980); Haddock v. Hardwoods of Orlando, Inc., 452 So. 2d 97 
(Fla.App. 1984); Chrisman v. Farmers Coop. Ass'n, 179 Neb. 891, 140 N.W.2d 809 
(1966). It simply means that each case must be decided on its particular and 
unique set of facts. If there is a reasonable relationship between the project 
being performed and the employee's job, then the trier of fact may be able to 
find a nexus between the injury and the course of employment. That 
determination, however, must be made on a case-by-case 
basis.

[¶13]   Turning to the case before us, the 
evidence showed that Stuckey's duties were as an irrigator. Stuckey was supposed 
to water fields and parks belonging to the County and to perform certain 
maintenance functions on the irrigation system, such as raising sprinkler heads. 
His duties did not involve the inflation of tires or equipment or vehicle 
maintenance. There was no evidence that inflating tires was reasonably related 
to Stuckey's duties as an irrigator. The hearing officer's conclusion that the 
risk associated with inflating tires "was not a risk or hazard which was 
incident to his responsibilities as a seasonal irrigator" was supported by 
substantial evidence; and, therefore, his denial of benefits was not arbitrary 
or capricious.

[¶14]   On appeal, Stuckey has, for the 
first time, contended that the Division cannot contest his claim for benefits 
because the Division cannot assert greater defenses than those available to the 
employer, and since his employer could not raise the defense of "beyond the 
course of employment," the Division is similarly barred from raising the 
defense.

[¶15]   This court will not consider issues 
that are raised for the first time on appeal. Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. 
Freudenthal, 861 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 1993); Iberlin v. TCI Cablevision of 
Wyoming, Inc., 855 P.2d 716, 726 (Wyo. 1993); Strom v. Felton, 76 Wyo. 370, 389, 
302 P.2d 917, 924 (1956). Accordingly, we decline to address this 
issue.

[¶16]   Finally, the hearing officer also 
concluded, in the alternative, that Stuckey was barred from claiming benefits 
because he had violated W.S. 27-14-102(a)(vii) by appropriating county property 
for his personal use. Since we have already determined that Stuckey is not 
entitled to benefits, we need not address this issue. Consequently, we express 
no opinion on the propriety of the hearing officer's 
conclusion.

CONCLUSION

[¶17]   The hearing officer's decision 
denying benefits was supported by substantial evidence and is 
affirmed.