Case Title: High v. Lenow

Citation: 258 S.W.2d 742

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1953-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
258 S.W.2d 742 (1953) HIGH v. LENOW. Supreme Court of Tennessee. April 25, 1953. James H. Hicks, of Memphis, for petitioner. Metcalf, Apperson & Crump and George W. Grider, all of Memphis, for respondent. BURNETT, Justice. The single question presented in this suit is whether in an action brought on a contract to recover unliquidated damages for breach thereof, the defeated party can complain that the jury rendered a verdict for a sum less than that required by the instructions of the court and less than the evidence warrants. The suit was instituted by Lenow against High to recover damages for breach of an oral contract. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, fixing damages at $5,800. This was approved by the trial judge. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed because "the verdict was a compromise". We granted certiorari and after argument have the case now for determination. There was substantial evidence to support the following version of the facts. In March, 1950, the parties entered into an oral contract which substantially is as follows: The Court of Appeals found, and the record amply supports, that: After considering other matters the Court of Appeals continues thus: And: And: The reason for the Court of Appeals conclusion is thus ably and succinctly stated. What is necessary for a verdict to be a compromise verdict? It was said by Cooley, J., in Goodsell v. Seely, 46 Mich. 623, 10 N.W. 44, 46, 41 Am. Rep. 183: The jury should not go contrary to their convictions but they should properly give heed to the opinions of their fellow jurors, and by reasonable concessions reach a conclusion which although not originally entertained by any of them, nevertheless may be one to which all can scrupulously adhere. In Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 97 N.E. 102, 105, Rugg, C.J., said: It is the general rule that a party against whom a verdict for money damages is rendered in a tort action may not complain. This Court has followed this rule in Illinois Central R. Co. v. Abernathey, 106 Tenn. 722, 64 S.W. 3. In this case the plaintiff had a cow and a heifer killed by the railroad and testified as to the value of each of these animals. There was no testimony as to value contrary to that as fixed by the plaintiff. The railroad attempted among other things to assign this as error because it was evidently a compromise verdict since the verdict was for less than the amount testified to as damages. This Court denied the railroad's claim of error with the language that it "was against the plaintiff only, it affords the defendant no legal ground of complaint". It is likewise a general rule that one against whom an award has been made in a suit for a breach of contract cannot complain that the amount of the award is inadequate. It is the usual practice of the courts in these matters of unliquidated damages to deny the defeated party the right to complain that it is a compromise verdict because the successful party should have recovered the full amount or nothing. In liquidated damage suits on notes or such matters the courts are in disagreement. The better reasoned authorities seem to us to hold that in cases of liquidated damages where the amount is fixed, suits on notes, etc., that the verdict there is clearly a compromise and should be set aside. The division on these questions is reflected in numerous cases collected from all over the United States in notes found in 31 A.L.R. 1091, 174 A.L.R. 765 and 15 Am. Jur., 665, Sec. 231. In the case now before us the Court of Appeals concluded that this Court had clearly indicated that the rule which they adopted was put into effect by this Court in the case of W.T. Grant Co. v. Tanner, 170 Tenn. 451, 95 S.W.2d 926, 928. They feeling that this case controlled the question in this State no other authorities from other jurisdictions were discussed. In the W.T. Grant Co. v. Tanner, supra, this Court said: The Grant case, in our estimation, is not authority for the proposition contended for here. In the Grant case the plaintiff alone appealed and the defendant did not but was willing to accept the verdict of the jury. As a matter of fact that case was reversed and remanded for a new trial because the injuries received by Mrs. Tanner in that case were so severe that the amount of the award did not compensate her for the injuries. Of course the question was presented by the defendant but these injuries complained of by her were not due to the accident of which she complained. Nevertheless the Court felt that she was either entitled to far more or to nothing and it was largely on the matter of the inadequacy of the damages that this case was reversed and remanded for a new trial and not on the fact that it was a compromise judgment. The decision of the Court of Appeals rests on the fact of their finding that the jury gave a verdict for a less sum than the plaintiff's testimony showed him entitled to and that this being true the defendant has a right to complain and to insist that the verdict was reached as a compromise. This holding of the Court of Appeals would probably be correct if it was a suit for liquidated damages and there was no issue of the amount due for the jury to consider. The Court in instructing the jury as heretofore pointed out did not instruct them that if they found for the plaintiff it would be for the whole or for nothing. This suit was for unliquidated damages for a breach of a contract. The Court of Appeals concludes and argues very forcefully that the jury could not have found, under the proof, for anything less than the whole; that the jury either had to find for the whole or for nothing. As we see it this inference is not a necessary one from the premises. It is true that the verdict was for a less amount than that claimed but the amount might have been the result of mistake in computation, or it may have been that the jury, on their own judgment, considered portions of the plaintiff's testimony inherently improbable. Or it might be and could very logically have been that the jury felt that since the plaintiff had done all the work in acquiring the plan, arranging for finances, etc., of the houses that then he was entitled to the amount of their verdict as damages for the work thus done when the contract was breached by the defendant in taking away from the plaintiff his right of sale and compensation agreed to be paid to him for making this sale. Clearly evidence was not necessary as to what this damage had been to the plaintiff because the jury could, on their own judgment, have arrived at these damages as a jury customarily and ordinarily does in a damage suit in a tort action. To enforce a rule as laid down by the Court of Appeals we think that it must necessarily follow that there is only one conclusion that the jury could reach, that is, that the verdict should have been for either the whole or nothing and when the jury arrives at a less figure than the whole on an unliquidated amount it cannot necessarily be said by an appellate court that it is a compromise verdict when there are probabilities and that a jury could reach a less amount. Clearly the members of the jury have a right without evidence being offered to take into consideration their judgment from their ordinary experiences in life as to what damage has been caused the plaintiff by reason of what he has shown he has done considering what everyone knows in a community as to the probable damages thus occasioned him. It seems to us that the reasoning in a case of the kind before us should be very similar to that as used in a tort action and as applied by this Court in Illinois Central R. Co. v. Abernathey, supra. For the reasons above expressed the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the trial court affirmed.