Case Title: COSSEY v. CHEROKEE NATION ENTERPRISES, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 105300

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
COSSEY v. CHEROKEE NATION ENTERPRISES, LLC  COSSEY v. CHEROKEE NATION ENTERPRISES, LLC 2009 OK 6 212 P.3d 447 Case Number: 105300 Decided: 01/20/2009 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA LOYMAN COSSEY, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. CHEROKEE NATION ENTERPRISES, LLC, formerly known as CHEROKEE NATION ENTERPRISES, INC., and CHEROKEE NATION ENTERPRISES, Defendant/Petitioner. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI OF CERTIFIED INTERLOCUTORY ORDER TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF ROGERS COUNTY, OKLAHOMA HONORABLE DYNDA POST, JUDGE ¶0 Plaintiff/Respondent Loyman Cossey sued Defendants/Petitioners Cherokee Nation Enterprises, L.L.C., formerly known as Cherokee Nation Enterprises, Inc., and Cherokee Nation Enterprises, Inc. (collectively, CNE), in state court for personal injuries he received on October 19, 2005, at the Cherokee Casino in Roland, Oklahoma. CNE appeared specially and moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, pursuant to AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED Darren M. Tawwater, Larry A. Tawwater, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Respondent, Stratton Taylor, Bradley Harold Mallett, Mark Harrison Ramsey, Claremore, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Petitioner, Robert L. Rabon, Hugo, Oklahoma, for the Choctaw Nation as Amicus Curiae, Deanna Hartley-Kelso, Chickasaw Nation Attorney General, Ada, Oklahoma, and Stephen H. Greetham, Chickasaw Nation Division of Commerce, Ada, Oklahoma, for the Chickasaw Nation as Amicus Curiae. OPINION WATT, J.: ¶1 We are asked to determine whether the District Court of Rogers County, Oklahoma (state court), is a "court of competent jurisdiction" as that term is used in the "Tribal Gaming Compact Between the Cherokee Nation and the State of Oklahoma" (the Compact), executed on November 16, 2004. The Compact is based on the Model Tribal Gaming Compact, I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 Plaintiff/Respondent Loyman Cossey, a non-Indian, II. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶3 We review a question of law. When an assigned error is one of law, the standard of review is de novo, a non-deferential, plenary and independent review of the trial court's legal ruling. Tibbetts v. Sight 'N Sound Appliance Centers, Inc., III. IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES AND THEIR CONTENTIONS ¶4 CNE contends the Cherokee Nation tribal court is the only court of competent jurisdiction to hear a claim which arose in Indian Country against the Tribe. In addition to its argument that it is entitled to assert the immunity of the Cherokee Nation, CNE contends the Compact provides only a limited, conditional waiver of that immunity. CNE further argues that because the state has not complied with federal law, as discussed in Part IV., infra, the tribal court is the only court with "civil adjudicatory jurisdiction" in Indian Country and thus is the only "court of competent jurisdiction" to consider Cossey's tort claim. CNE does not dispute the fact that the Tribe consented to suit under the Compact with respect to tort claims but argues that there are limitations on that consent and on the extent of its liability. ¶5 Cossey, a non-Indian, contends the Tribe is not a party to this suit ¶6 While we agree with Cossey, and we hold, that the Tribe, in conducting "non-tribal business," is not entitled to sovereign immunity from suit in state court in this case, IV. STATE COURT JURISDICTION OF CLAIMS ARISING ON INDIAN LAND AND THE EFFECT OF "PUBLIC LAW 280 ¶7 To support its contention that state courts have no jurisdiction over tort claims under the Compact, CNE refers us to Part 9 of the Compact. It provides the following: This Compact shall not alter tribal, federal or state civil adjudicatory or criminal jurisdiction. (emphasis added). ¶8 CNE contends the above section does not provide Oklahoma courts with jurisdiction over claims in Indian Country. It contends Oklahoma had not acquired civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over such claims before the Compact was executed because the State has failed to comply with federal law enacted in 1953 known as "Public Law 83-280 (PL-280). ¶9 This Court acknowledged Oklahoma did not take steps to assume jurisdiction under the previous PL-280 in Lewis v. Sac and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma Housing Authority. ¶10 Kennerly and the cases upon which it relied are distinguishable. There was no federal statute, such as the IGRA, containing specific requirements for approval by the Tribe's governing body to engage in Class III gaming. Moreover, the IGRA also provides that such gaming is to be subject to state law, i.e., the Model Tribal Gaming Compact, (C) Effective with the publication under subparagraph (B) of an ordinance or resolution adopted by the governing body of an Indian tribe that has been approved by the Chairman under subparagraph (B), class III gaming activity on the Indian lands of the Indian tribe shall be fully subject to the terms and conditions of the Tribal-State compact entered into under paragraph (3) ¶11 See also Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505 , 111 S. Ct. 905, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1112 (1991), which held PL-280 is not independently sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a State to extend the full range of regulatory authority over Indians and reservations. We hold that Public Law 280 is not an impediment to state court jurisdiction and is, in fact, inapplicable to this case. V. TRIBAL COURT'S JURISDICTION UNDER THE INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY ACT ¶12 We next consider whether Congress, through the enactment of the IGRA, enlarged tribal-court jurisdiction. The IGRA provides at §2710(d)(3)(C) a list of provisions which any negotiated tribal-state compact "may" include. "May" is ordinarily construed as permissive, while "shall" is ordinarily construed as mandatory. See Osprey L.L.C. v. Kelly-Moore Paint Co., Inc., 1999 OK 50, 984 P.2d 194 ; Shea v. Shea, 1975 OK 90, 537 P.2d 417 . Section 2710(d)(3)(C) provides in part: (C) Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under subparagraph (A) may include provisions relating to-- (i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation of such activity; (ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations; . . . . (emphasis added). ¶13 The Compact here does not include any such allocation of jurisdiction. Instead, the Compact provides only: "This Compact shall not alter tribal, federal or state civil adjudicatory or criminal jurisdiction" and that tort claims may be heard in a "court of competent jurisdiction." The Tribe could have, but did not, include such jurisdictional allocation in this Compact. Neither the IGRA nor the Compact as approved enlarged the Tribe's jurisdiction. VI. COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION AND DUAL SOVEREIGNTY ¶14 In determining whether Oklahoma courts are "courts of competent jurisdiction" in this case, we address subject matter jurisdiction and the sovereign immunity of the Tribe as a defense to being sued in state court. We are concerned with tribal and state court jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on "Indian lands."12 ¶15 A "court of competent jurisdiction" is one having jurisdiction of a person and the subject matter and the power and authority of law at the time to render the particular judgment. See Ex Parte Plaistridge, 1918 OK 352, 173 P. 645, 68 Okla. 256 ; Ex Parte Justus, 1909 OK CR 132, 104 P. 933, 3 Okla.Crim. 111. See also Choctaw County Excise Board v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, 1969 OK 110, 456 P.2d 545 . ¶16 While the ultimate issue on remand will be the tribe's liability for the injuries Cossey sustained at the casino, we first consider Cossey's status as a non-Indian citizen of Oklahoma and his right of access to Oklahoma courts to seek a remedy for his injuries. See Okla. Const., Art. 2, §6.13 Our constitution recognizes that the state of Oklahoma is an inseparable part of the federal union and that the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Okla. Const., Art. 1, §1.14 When our constitution was revised in 1967, existing courts were abolished, and the district courts were designated to succeed all previous courts on the effective date, and with that designation, the "jurisdiction, functions, powers and duties [were] transferred to the respective District Courts." Okla. Const., Art. 7, §7(b). District courts were vested with "unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters . . . and such powers of review of administrative action as may be provided by statute." Okla. Const., Art. 7, §7(a). Each district court succeeded to and assumed "jurisdiction of all causes, matters and proceedings then pending, with full power and authority to dispose of them and to carry into execution or otherwise to give effect to all orders, judgments and decrees theretofore entered by the predecessor courts." Okla. Const., Art. 7, §7(c). ¶17 The Compact is derived from the Oklahoma Statutes. It incorporates Oklahoma's Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA) into its provisions.15 The district courts of Oklahoma thus have subject matter jurisdiction of any claim arising under the GTCA, including one which originates under the Compact. ¶18 In Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 , 121 S. Ct. 2304, 150 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2001),16 the Supreme Court recognized the authority of state courts as courts of "general jurisdiction" and further acknowledged our system of "dual sovereignty" in which state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts, absent specific Congressional enactment to the contrary. Citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 , 110 S. Ct. 792, 107 L. Ed. 2d 887 (1990), the Court stated: We turn next to the contention of respondent and the Government that the tribal court, as a court of general jurisdiction, has authority to entertain federal claims under §1983. It is certainly true that state courts of 'general jurisdiction' can adjudicate cases invoking federal statutes, such as §1983, absent congressional specification to the contrary. 'Under [our] system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States,' . . . . That this would be the case was assumed by the Framers, see The Federalist No. 82, pp. 492-493 (C. Rossiter ed.1961). Indeed, that state courts could enforce federal law is presumed by Article III of the Constitution, which leaves to Congress the decision whether to create lower federal courts at all. This historical and constitutional assumption of concurrent state-court jurisdiction over federal-law cases is completely missing with respect to tribal courts. Nevada v. Hicks, ¶19 The argument was made by the Respondent tribal member and the Government as amicus curiae in Nevada v. Hicks that the tribal court, as a court of "general jurisdiction," had jurisdiction over his §1983 civil rights claim against state officials. The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that state court jurisdiction is general because it can hear all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction. In distinguishing state and tribal courts, the Court stated: Tribal courts, it should be clear, cannot be courts of general jurisdiction in this sense, for a tribe's inherent adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers is at most only as broad as its legislative jurisdiction. . . . Nevada v. Hicks ¶20 The Court concluded that tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to state law violations outside the reservation is not essential to tribal self-government or internal relations, i.e., "the right to make laws and be ruled by them." Nevada v. Hicks, VII. SOVEREIGN INTERESTS AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ¶21 In order to determine whether the state court may assert jurisdiction over the tribe in a case brought by a non-Indian, we must consider the nature of the activities of this particular non-Indian plaintiff under these facts and the manner in which these activities affect the tribe's "inherent tribal sovereignty," i.e., its power to self-govern and control its internal tribal relations. Indian tribes retain their inherent power to punish tribal offenders, determine tribal membership, regulate domestic relations among members, and prescribe rules of inheritance for members. Montana v. United States, ¶22 In Montana, the United States Supreme Court announced a general rule in addressing the sovereign powers of a tribe. Generally, tribes have no authority over the activities or conduct of nonmembers of the tribe. This general rule contained two exceptions which will, if found to be present under the facts, give a tribe the power to regulate the activities in question under its inherent sovereign powers over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands: A tribe may regulate through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on the lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Montana ¶23 If non-Indians' activities fall within the Montana exceptions, the tribe may regulate those activities under its sovereign powers. If the tribe has power to regulate, or legislate, the activities of the Plaintiff non-members, the tribe may also have civil adjudicatory authority, or jurisdiction, over the non-members' activities in tribal court. However, without that power to regulate non-members' activities, the Tribe may not assert civil jurisdiction over them in tribal court. See Strate, ¶24 We must determine whether Cossey's activities come within those which may be regulated by the tribe as a sovereign entity. We must, therefore, consider whether his activities come within the definition of the tribe's sovereign interests, the Montana exceptions, or a federal statute or treaty enlarging the Tribe's powers. ¶25 Under Montana, the tribes' retained inherent powers of self-government involve only the relations among members of a tribe. It is consistent with the "dependent status" of tribes; it is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom to determine their "external relations." ¶26 Under the Supreme Court's newest pronouncement, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Company, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2709, 171 L. Ed. 2d 457, 76 U.S.L.W. 4558 (2008), tribal members (the Longs) brought a discrimination claim in tribal court against the bank (Plains). They alleged Plains did not give them an equal opportunity to buy certain fee land which the Longs leased from Plains. The Longs attempted to enforce a tribal tort law which set limits on the sale of fee lands by nonmembers, even to the extent of regulating the substantive terms on which the Bank could offer it for sale. Acknowledging this was a form of regulation, the Longs argued that it was nevertheless authorized by the first Montana exception. ¶27 The Court held that Montana does not permit tribes to regulate the sale of non-Indian fee land. The particular land had ceased being part of the tribe's land many years earlier. Instead, it explained that Montana and its progeny "permit tribal regulation of nonmember conduct inside the reservation that implicates the tribe's sovereign interests." Plains, 128 S. Ct. at 2721 (emphasis in original). The Court further stated: Montana Plains ¶28 The Court held that the sale of such land did not affect the Tribe's sovereign interests. The Court stated the logic of Montana: [C]ertain activities on non-Indian fee land (say, a business enterprise employing tribal members) or certain uses (say, commercial development) may intrude on the internal relations of the tribe or threaten tribal self-rule. To the extent they do, such activities or land uses may be regulated. See Hicks, supra, at 361, 121 S. Ct. 2304 ("Tribal assertion of regulatory authority over nonmembers must be connected to that right of the Indians to make their own laws and be governed by them"). Put another way, certain forms of nonmember behavior, even on non-Indian fee land, may sufficiently affect the tribe as to justify tribal oversight. While tribes generally have no interest in regulating the conduct of nonmembers, then, they may regulate nonmember behavior that implicates tribal governance and internal relations. Plains ¶29 The Plains Court stated that the regulations it had approved under Montana "all flow directly from these limited sovereign interests." 128 S. Ct. at 2723. Not only is regulation of fee land sale beyond the tribe's sovereign powers, it runs the risk of subjecting nonmembers to tribal regulatory authority without commensurate consent. Tribal sovereignty, it should be remembered, is 'a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution.' United States v. Lara, ¶30 The regulation imposed on nonmembers "must stem from the tribe's inherent sovereign authority to set conditions on entry, preserve tribal self-government, or control internal relations." Plains, 128 S. Ct. at 2724, citing Montana, ¶31 Citing Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, ¶32 The Court also discussed the status of the land at issue as it related to the regulation of nonmember activity on the land. In Plains, this was fee land, i.e., land which had been previously alienated from tribal lands within the reservation. The Court approvingly quoted from Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Nevada v. Hicks, stating, "The status of the land is relevant 'insofar as it bears on the application of . . . Montana's exceptions to [this] case.'" Nevada v. Hicks, Montana . . . After Strate, it is undeniable that a tribe's remaining inherent civil jurisdiction to adjudicate civil claims arising out of acts committed on a reservation depends in the first instance on the character of the individual over whom jurisdiction is claimed, not on the title to the soil on which he acted. The principle on which Montana and Strate were decided (like Oliphant before them) looks first to human relationships, not land records, and it should make no difference per se whether acts committed on a reservation occurred on tribal land or on land owned by a nonmember individual in fee. It is the membership status of the unconsenting party, not the status of real property, that counts as the primary jurisdictional fact. Nevada v. Hicks ¶33 Thus, it is the regulation of the activities of non-members on the land, rather than the resale of the land, which the Plains Court found to be the key point with regard to the tribe's sovereign interests. 128 S. Ct. at 2724. In fact, the Court stated that in none of its previous cases has it found that Montana authorized a tribe to regulate the sale of non-Indian fee land. "Rather, our Montana cases have always concerned nonmember conduct on the land." Plains, 128 S. Ct. at 2722, citing Hicks, 533 U.S., at 359, 121 S. Ct. at 2309-10 (citations omitted). VIII. COSSEY'S ACTIVITIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY ¶34 In the present case, the land on which the casino is located is not "fee lands," but "land held in trust" for the Tribe. ¶35 Cossey was on the casino premises as an invitee of the Tribe. As such, the Tribe had the duty to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn Cossey of conditions which were in the nature of hidden dangers, traps, snares or pitfalls. See Martin v. Aramark Services, Inc., ¶36 We examine whether Cossey's activity, i.e., visiting the casino as an invitee on Indian lands, is an activity which the Tribe can regulate under its "inherent sovereign interests." If such activity is one which comes within the Montana exceptions, the Tribe can regulate it and assume civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over him in tribal court. ¶37 Cossey entered into no consensual relationship with the Tribe "through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements" by entering the casino as a customer. The Compact represents a consensual relationship between the Tribe and the State, but Cossey was not a party to it. Moreover, his presence at the casino on reservation lands was not conduct which "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." See Montana, IX. CONCLUSION ¶38 The Oklahoma district court is a "court of competent jurisdiction" to hear Cossey's tort claim. The Tribe's sovereign interests are not implicated so as to require tribal court jurisdiction under the exceptions in Montana, supra. Cossey's right to seek redress in the Oklahoma district court is guaranteed by our Constitution. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has upheld Montana and the cases following it, indicating the Court's continued recognition of the need to protect the sovereign interests of Indian tribes, while acknowledging the plenary powers of the states to adjudicate the rights of their citizens within their borders. ¶39 The order of the trial court denying the Tribe's motion to dismiss is affirmed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. ¶40 The remaining arguments raised by the parties are non-persuasive and will not be considered. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED TAYLOR, V.C.J, OPALA, WATT, WINCHESTER, JJ. - concur COLBERT, J. - concurring specially EDMONDSON, C.J., KAUGER, J. - concur in part, dissent in part HARGRAVE, REIF, JJ. - dissent FOOT