Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Plough

Citation: 2010-Ohio-3298

Docket Number: 20092341

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Plough, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3298.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3298 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. PLOUGH. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Plough,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3298.] 
Judges — Misconduct — Violations of the Judicial Canons, the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, and the Disciplinary Rules — Misconduct warrants 
license suspension, partially stayed. 
(No. 2009-2341 — Submitted February 24, 2010 — Decided July 21, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-026. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John Joseph Plough of Ravenna, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0012818, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1973.  In 
November 2005, he was elected to fill an unexpired term on the Portage County 
Municipal Court and took office in December of that year.  After serving in the 
court’s Ravenna Division for 11 months, respondent transferred to the Kent 
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Division, where he continued to serve until his term expired on December 31, 
2009.  Respondent did not seek reelection. 
{¶ 2} On August 7, 2009, relator, Disciplinary Counsel, filed an 
amended complaint charging respondent with multiple violations of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility.1  After dismissing 
certain allegations, relator alleges that respondent has failed to uphold the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary; has failed to dispose of judicial 
matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly; has failed to diligently discharge 
administrative responsibilities without bias; has engaged in ex parte 
communication; and has engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
{¶ 3} In October 2009, a three-member panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline conducted a hearing.  Based upon 
the testimony of respondent and others, as well as the parties’ stipulated facts, 
exhibits, and violations, the panel made findings of fact and concluded that 
respondent had committed ten violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and four 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  Therefore, the panel 
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, 
with six months stayed, as jointly recommended by the parties.  Additionally, the 
panel recommended that we dismiss Count I of the complaint, as it determined 
that the alleged misconduct had not been proven by clear and convincing 
evidence.  The board adopted the panel report in its entirety. 
{¶ 4} We accept the board’s findings of misconduct and agree that a one-
year suspension, with six months stayed, is the appropriate sanction. 
Misconduct 
                                                 
1.  Respondent was charged under the former version of the Code of Judicial Conduct because all 
conduct in this case occurred before March 1, 2009, the effective date of the current code.   
 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
Count I 
{¶ 5} In May 2007, defense counsel moved for the continuance of a 
criminal trial, alleging that she had just received additional discovery from the 
prosecutor and needed additional time to prepare an adequate defense.  Without 
reviewing the discovery materials, respondent accepted the prosecutor’s 
representation that denying the motion would not prejudice the defendant and 
then denied the continuance and began the trial.  When defense counsel refused to 
participate in the proceedings, respondent found her in contempt of court.  At a 
contempt hearing later that afternoon, however, respondent acknowledged that the 
discovery was “rather voluminous,” withdrew the contempt, and granted a 
continuance of the trial. 
{¶ 6} Respondent’s conduct in denying the motion for continuance and 
citing defense counsel in contempt may have constituted an abuse of  his 
discretion.  We have observed, however,  that “[j]udges must routinely exercise 
their discretion in a myriad of ways while executing their duties in the 
administration of justice, and the abuse of that discretion typically generates an 
appeal, not disciplinary proceedings.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. O'Neill, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 7.  Upon review of the board’s 
factual findings, we agree that relator has not proven by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent’s conduct with respect to this count violated the former 
Code of Judicial Conduct.  Therefore, we adopt the unanimous recommendation 
of the panel and board and dismiss Count One. 
Count II 
{¶ 7} In Count II, the evidence established that respondent failed to 
either maintain or provide a complete record in three separate proceedings in his 
court despite numerous written requests filed by the parties.  In one case, 
respondent never produced an audio recording of the proceedings, and in another 
case, the recordings were either incomplete or incapable of being transcribed.  In 
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a third case, respondent failed to comply with multiple remands from the Eleventh 
District Court of Appeals ordering him to produce the audio recording of the 
proceedings or follow the App.R. 9(C) procedure for creating a statement of the 
evidence or proceedings.  Respondent’s failure to maintain or provide complete 
recordings resulted in (1) the reversal of a portion of one criminal defendant’s 
sentence that required him to register as a sex offender and (2) the reversal of 
another defendant’s conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol (“OVI”). 
{¶ 8} The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree that 
respondent’s conduct violated three Canons of the former Code of Judicial 
Conduct:  Canon 2 (requiring a judge to respect and comply with the law and act 
at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary), Canon 3(B)(8) (requiring a judge to dispose of all 
judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly), and Canon 3(C)(1) (requiring a 
judge to diligently discharge administrative responsibilities without bias and 
prejudice, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and 
cooperate with other judges and court officials in the administration of court 
business); and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice). 
Count III 
{¶ 9} In Count III, the evidence demonstrates that respondent waited 
almost three months to comply with an Eleventh District Court of Appeals 
remand ordering him to vacate an appellant’s OVI conviction and enter a 
judgment of acquittal.  The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree that 
relator has proven by clear and convincing evidence that this conduct violated 
Canons 2 and 3(B)(8) of the former Code of Judicial Conduct and Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(d). 
Count IV 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 10} In Count IV, the evidence established that respondent telephoned 
the county prosecutor without defense counsel present to discuss respondent’s 
opposition to an assistant prosecutor’s plea agreement reducing a pending third-
degree felony charge to a misdemeanor.  The parties stipulated, the board found, 
and we agree that this conduct violated Canons 3(B)(7) of the former Code of 
Judicial Conduct (prohibiting ex parte communication about a pending case). 
Count VI 
{¶ 11} The record demonstrates that at a September 2006 jury trial of a 
defendant charged with OVI, respondent interrupted defense counsel’s recross-
examination of the arresting officer when counsel attempted to ask whether the 
officer had properly performed the field sobriety tests.  Referring to the officer’s 
previous testimony during a suppression hearing, respondent stated, “[W]e’ve 
gone through this hearing before and we’ve determined that these tests were done 
in accordance with NHTSA [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration] 
standards, so go on with another question.”  Despite this improper statement of 
personal opinion on an issue of fact for the jury, respondent denied the resulting 
defense motion for a mistrial.  Later, during closing argument, respondent 
repeatedly interrupted defense counsel, berated him, and criticized his 
professional qualifications in front of the jury. 
{¶ 12} In its decision reversing the judgment of conviction in part, the 
Eleventh District Court of Appeals observed:  “We first point out that the trial 
court was entitled to intervene during closing argument to provide guidance as to 
its concerns regarding the parameters of defense counsel’s argument.  However, 
the initial intervention quickly evolved from a legitimate concern for procedure to 
a heavy-handed, insulting, and unnecessary display of authority.  The trial judge’s 
remarks transcended legitimate methods of courtroom control which served to 
fundamentally encumber defense counsel’s ability to effectively represent 
appellant.  In fact, the trial judge’s gratuitous vilification and general hostility 
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directed at defense counsel ultimately caused him to sit down and refrain from 
completing his closing argument.”  State v. Smith, Portage App. Nos. 2006-P-
0101 and 2006-P-0102, 2008-Ohio-3251, ¶ 76. 
{¶ 13} Respondent’s conduct in expressing his personal opinion on a 
factual issue to be resolved by the jury and in castigating defense counsel during 
closing argument caused defense counsel to forfeit closing argument, thereby 
prejudicing the defendant and adversely affecting public confidence in the judicial 
system.  Therefore, the parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree that 
respondent violated Canon 1 (requiring a judge to uphold the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary), 2, and 3(B)(4) of the former Code of Judicial 
Conduct. 
{¶ 14} Relator also charged respondent with engaging in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  The parties stipulated and the board 
found that respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d).  But the record demonstrates 
that the conduct giving rise to the charge occurred on September 12, 2006 – 
before the February 1, 2007 effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  
Therefore, we find that respondent’s conduct violates DR 1-102(A)(5), which 
likewise prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. 
Count VIII 
{¶ 15} With regard to Count VIII, the record demonstrates that respondent 
refused to accept a guilty plea for a charged minor-misdemeanor speeding offense 
based upon his mistaken belief that a statute mandated that the defendant be 
charged with a more serious offense.  In fact, the defendant did not have two prior 
convictions within one year so as to warrant a fourth-degree misdemeanor charge.  
The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree that this conduct violated 
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d). 
Sanction 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
{¶ 16} In determining the appropriate sanction for respondent’s violations 
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Rules of Professional Responsibility, and the 
Disciplinary Rules, we consider the duties violated, the injury caused, 
respondent’s 
mental 
state, 
the 
applicable 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating 
circumstances listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing 
Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”), and precedent.  Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Sargeant, 118 Ohio St.3d 322, 2008-Ohio-2330, 889 N.E.2d 96, ¶ 28, 
citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Evans (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 497, 501, 733 N.E.2d 
609. 
{¶ 17} Respondent has failed to maintain or provide complete records of 
the proceedings in his courtroom, resulting in the reversal of one criminal 
conviction and the removal of a sex-offender registration requirement from a 
criminal sentence.  He has unreasonably delayed compliance with a mandate of 
the court of appeals on remand, engaged in an improper ex parte communication 
with a prosecutor, expressed an opinion on an issue of fact in the jury’s presence, 
berated defense counsel during closing argument, and refused to grant a mistrial 
based upon his own prejudicial conduct.  He also refused to accept a guilty plea 
for a misdemeanor speeding violation based upon his mistaken belief that the 
prosecutor was statutorily required to charge the defendant with a greater offense.  
Rather than promoting the evenhanded administration of justice, these actions 
have served to erode public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. 
{¶ 18} The board noted, as aggravating factors, that respondent has 
committed multiple violations and that litigants’ appeal rights were prejudiced by 
respondent’s failure to provide an adequate record of proceedings in his court.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d) and (h).  And in mitigation, the board found that 
respondent (1) has no prior disciplinary record, (2) has not acted with dishonest or 
selfish motives, (3) has made a full and free disclosure of his conduct and has 
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exhibited a cooperative attitude toward these proceedings, and (4) has a good 
reputation among many of his friends, colleagues, and acquaintances for honesty, 
diligence, and fairness in the conduct of his duties as a judge.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2 )(a), (b), (d), and (e). 
{¶ 19} The board cites a number of cases in which the court imposed a 
more severe sanction than the sanction recommended in this case and 
distinguishes those cases because they generally involve a measure of dishonesty, 
a failure to concede the violations, or a prior disciplinary history – aggravating 
factors that are not present in this case.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Parker, 
116 Ohio St.3d 64, 2007-Ohio-5635, 876 N.E.2d 556, ¶ 117, 130 (18-month 
suspension with six months stayed in the presence of aggravating factors 
including dishonesty and failure to acknowledge the wrongfulness of the 
conduct).  See also Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-
Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 48, 55 (two-year suspension with one year stayed 
when aggravating factors included submission of false statements and a refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct); Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 
116 Ohio St.3d 110, 2007-Ohio-5588, 876 N.E.2d 933, ¶ 82, 112 (two-year 
suspension with one year stayed when aggravating factors included 
misrepresentation and failure to acknowledge wrongfulness of conduct; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 104 Ohio St.3d 251, 2004-Ohio-6402, 819 
N.E.2d 273, ¶ 38, 43 (18-month suspension with six months stayed when 
aggravating factors included prior disciplinary record and failure to acknowledge 
wrongfulness of conduct). 
{¶ 20} At the opposite end of the spectrum, the board notes that in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Karto (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 109, 111-117, 760 N.E.2d 
412, we imposed a six-month suspension for multiple disciplinary violations 
where the respondent’s misconduct included twice abusing the court’s contempt 
power, using an outdated rule book in sentencing, engaging in ex parte 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
communications, and urging the prosecutor to press felony charges against a 
defendant. 
{¶ 21} However, respondent’s conduct is more serious than that at issue in 
Karto because it involves respondent’s  (1) failure to maintain proper records of 
legal proceedings, thereby depriving the litigants of their right to appeal, and (2) 
failure to adhere to the mandates of a higher court, thereby impeding the efficient 
administration of justice. 
{¶ 22} We find our recent decision in Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 
__ Ohio St.3d __, 2010-Ohio-3265, __ N.E.2d __, to be most instructive.  There, 
we imposed a one-year suspension with six months stayed on the license of a 
judge who had committed multiple violations of the former Code of Judicial 
Conduct, including one violation of Canon 1, nine violations of Canon 2, one 
violation of Canon 3(B)(2), three violations of Canon 3(B)(4), and two violations 
of DR 1-102(A)(5) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  There, the judge 
(1) became involved in a criminal investigation, (2) attempted to try an indigent 
defendant without appointing counsel, (3) failed to follow applicable precedent 
from this court, (4) failed to faithfully discharge his duties upon a remand from an 
appellate court, (5) used his position as a judge to obtain access to a prosecutor’s 
file, and (6) behaved in an undignified, unprofessional, and discourteous manner 
toward attorneys and litigants in his courtroom. 
{¶ 23} Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the sanction 
recommended by the parties and the board is reasonable and appropriate.  
Accordingly, John Joseph Plough is hereby suspended from the practice of law in 
the state of Ohio for one year, with six-months of that suspension stayed on the 
condition that he commit no violations during the one-year suspension.  If 
respondent fails to meet this condition, the stay will be lifted, and he will serve 
the entire one-year suspension.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
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PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., 
concur. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., dissents and would suspend respondent from the practice 
of law in Ohio for one year. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Stacy Solochek 
Beckman, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
George D. Jonson and Kimberly Vanover Riley, for respondent. 
______________________