Case Title: Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC12-2075

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2015-10-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC12-2075 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM P. AUBIN,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,  
Respondent. 
 
[October 29, 2015] 
 
PARIENTE, J. 
 
William P. Aubin contracted peritoneal mesothelioma—an incurable, 
terminal disease—which he claimed was caused by his exposure to SG-210 
Calidria, an asbestos product designed and manufactured by Union Carbide 
Corporation.  The jury returned a verdict for Aubin and determined that Union 
Carbide was liable for Aubin’s damages, in part, under theories of both negligence 
and strict liability defective design and failure to warn.  
In Union Carbide Corp. v. Aubin, 97 So. 3d 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), the 
Third District Court of Appeal reversed the jury verdict and $6,624,150 judgment 
in Aubin’s favor, after making three key holdings: (1) the trial court erred in failing  
 
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to apply the Restatement (Third) of Torts (“Third Restatement”), which 
exclusively adopts the “risk utility” test for a design defect claim and imposes on 
plaintiffs the requirement of proving a reasonable alternative design; (2) the design 
defect was not a cause of Aubin’s damages; and (3) the jury instructions given by 
the trial court regarding the failure to warn were misleading because they failed to 
discuss Union Carbide’s learned intermediary defense—a doctrine setting forth the 
circumstances under which a manufacturer could discharge its duty to warn the end 
user by reasonably relying on an intermediary, who has received and has 
knowledge of the extent of the danger.1  The Third District’s decision creates 
multiple points of express and direct conflict with decisions of this Court and of 
other district courts of appeal.2  
First, in applying the Third Restatement to strict products liability cases, the 
Third District’s decision in Aubin conflicts with our holding in West v. Caterpillar 
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976), and with the Fourth District Court of 
                                          
 
 
1.  As addressed in this opinion, the learned intermediary doctrine focuses 
on numerous factors to determine whether a manufacturer can discharge its duty to 
warn by relying on an intermediary.  As set forth in the Second Restatement, the 
“question remains whether this method gives a reasonable assurance that the 
information will reach those whose safety depends upon their having it.”  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 cmt. n (1965). 
 
2.  Based on these conflicts, we have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. 
Const.  
 
 
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Appeal’s decision in McConnell v. Union Carbide Corp., 937 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 2006), both of which applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Second 
Restatement”) to strict products liability cases and utilized the “consumer 
expectations” test as an essential part of determining a design defect.  Resolving 
this conflict in the law, we conclude that the definition of design defect first 
enunciated in West, which utilizes the consumer expectations test, instead of 
utilizing the risk utility test and requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design, 
best vindicates the purposes underlying the doctrine of strict liability.3  We thus 
disapprove of the Third District’s adoption of the risk utility test for design defects, 
as enunciated in the Third Restatement.   
Second, in determining that Aubin failed to show that the asbestos designed 
and manufactured by Union Carbide was the legal cause of Aubin’s mesothelioma, 
the Third District erroneously merged the Third Restatement’s definition of design 
defect with causation, which again creates a conflict as the Third Restatement’s 
                                          
 
 
3.  The Third District stands alone among the district courts of appeal in 
having adopted the Third Restatement and its requirement that the plaintiff 
establish a reasonable alternative design, despite this Court’s precedent.  In fact, 
the Third District has even held that the jury should be instructed only on the risk 
utility test, although this is contrary to both Florida’s Standard Jury Instructions 
and decisions from this Court.  Compare Agrofollajes, S.A. v. E.I. Du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 48 So. 3d 976, 997 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding that courts 
should not instruct juries on the consumer expectations test), with In re Std. Jury 
Instr. in Civ. Cases—Report No. 13-01, 160 So. 3d 869, 871 (Fla. 2015) 
(approving jury instructions on the consumer expectations test).  
 
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definition of a design defect is different than the definition Florida courts have 
previously used.  After applying a proper legal analysis, we conclude that Aubin 
did present sufficient evidence of causation, and thus the determination of legal 
causation was properly a jury question based on conflicting evidence.  We 
accordingly further disapprove that aspect of the Third District’s opinion, including 
the conclusion that Union Carbide was entitled to a directed verdict on the design 
defect claim.   
Finally, in reversing the judgment for the failure to warn claim based on the 
failure to instruct the jury on the learned intermediary defense, the Third District’s 
decision conflicts with the portion of McConnell that holds that the learned 
intermediary defense is not applicable in this type of asbestos case.  See 
McConnell, 937 So. 2d at 156.  Although we approve the Third District’s holding 
that the jury could be instructed on the learned intermediary doctrine, we conclude 
that this issue does not require reversal of the verdict because, while Union 
Carbide could argue that the learned intermediary defense is applicable to this type 
of case, it failed to submit proposed jury instructions that accurately discussed the 
defense.  Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to give Union Carbide’s 
proposed special jury instructions.  In looking to the jury instructions as a whole, 
we conclude that the trial court’s instructions were not so misleading as to require 
a reversal.  
 
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Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Third District in Aubin and 
disapprove adopting the Third Restatement’s approach, which uses the risk utility 
test, instead of the consumer expectations test, and requires plaintiffs to establish a 
reasonable alternative of how a product could have been designed.  We also 
disapprove of the Third District’s prior cases of Kohler Co. v. Marcotte, 907 So. 2d 
596 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005), and Agrofollajes, S.A. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & 
Co., 48 So. 3d 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), as to the adoption of the Third 
Restatement.  As to the failure to warn claim, we agree with the Third District’s 
discussion of the learned intermediary defense, which is in accordance with the 
Fourth District’s decision in Union Carbide Corp. v. Kavanaugh, 879 So. 2d 42, 
44-45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).  To the extent that the Fourth District’s opinion in 
McConnell holds that the learned intermediary defense is not applicable in asbestos 
cases, we disapprove that portion of McConnell.  As the Third District erroneously 
reversed the final judgment, we remand this case to the Third District with 
directions that the judgment be reinstated. 
FACTS 
 
William P. Aubin worked as a construction supervisor for his father’s 
company between 1972 and 1974, overseeing construction of the residential 
development Desoto Lakes in Sarasota, Florida.  While at work on the construction 
site, Aubin was exposed to and inhaled respirable dust created by the sanding and 
 
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sweeping of drywall joint compounds and spraying of ceiling texture sprays.  
Aubin did not know that these joint compounds and texture sprays contained 
asbestos and thus did not know that he was inhaling asbestos fibers.  In 2008, 
Aubin was diagnosed with malignant peritoneal mesothelioma, which is a fatal, 
incurable form of cancer in the lining of the abdomen.  
 
Aubin filed suit against numerous defendants, including Union Carbide, 
alleging that his disease was caused by asbestos in joint compounds and texture 
sprays designed, manufactured, and sold by third parties (such as Georgia-Pacific) 
that contained asbestos supplied by Union Carbide.  After resolving his claims 
against the other defendants through settlement or dismissal, Aubin went to trial 
solely against Union Carbide on theories of strict liability design defect, strict 
liability failure to warn, and negligent failure to warn.    
 
The evidence showed that Union Carbide began mining a naturally 
occurring, unique short fiber form of chrysotile asbestos in 1963 from a deposit in 
California.  After removing the asbestos from the ground, Union Carbide passed it 
through a centrifuge multiple times to separate the fibers, a process that caused the 
asbestos to become more efficient as a thickening agent.  Union Carbide then 
formed the asbestos into pellets to reduce dust, packaged it in bags, and sold it in 
bulk under the trade name SG-210 Calidria for use in many products, including 
joint compounds and texture sprays.   
 
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Union Carbide’s asbestos was 99.9% pure in comparison to competitors’ 
asbestos that contained filler.  In its marketing literature to manufacturers of 
products such as the joint compounds and texture sprays at issue, Union Carbide 
focused on its asbestos’s purity and natural properties.  For example, a 1971 Union 
Carbide report explained the “Special Properties of ‘Calidria’ Asbestos” as 
follows: 
Most asbestos materials, marketed commercially for use in tape joint 
compounds, contain rock dust and other abrasive type fillers, that have 
no specific desirable effects on joint compound performance.  
“Calidria” SG-210 and SG-130 asbestos are produced by a proprietary 
manufacturing process that yields essentially a pure asbestos fiber 
content.  The SG-210 product is preferred for ready-mix smoothness 
and water absorption efficiency.  Another feature is the unique shape 
and physical structure of the “Calidria” asbestos fibers.  The micro-
size particles are actually “fibrils” and the respective stems are 
hollow; hence, the fibers have a tremendous water absorption 
capacity.  In like manner, there are more “active sites” for other inert 
fillers to associate with, in formulated film formation.  As a result 
“Calidria” asbestos generally goes twice as far, on a pound for pound 
basis, as the Canadian and other commercial types used in tape joint 
compounds.  It is these physical properties that enhance the wet joint 
compound workability and performance properties mentioned above. 
While Union Carbide specifically marketed its product to intermediary 
manufacturers for use of the asbestos in products such as joint compounds, Union 
Carbide was not involved in the formulation, packaging, or sale of the end 
products.  The intermediary manufacturers combined the asbestos with other 
ingredients to make end products.  However, as the literature from Union Carbide 
recognized, SG-210 Calidria was a specially designed product subjected to a 
 
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propriety processing method, in contrast to being more akin to a basic, raw product 
such as sand.  As explained by the Third District regarding the design of SG-210 
Calidria: 
The evidence established that SG-210 Calidria was chrysotile 
asbestos that had been subjected to Union Carbide’s carefully 
designed asbestos processing regimen.  During this process, the 
chrysotile asbestos was placed through a centrifuge multiple times in 
order to separate the chrysotile fibers and thereby increase the 
efficiency of the asbestos when added to water.  As a direct result of 
this process, Union Carbide, in its marketing literature, proclaimed 
that “Calidria asbestos generally goes twice as far, on a pound for 
pound basis, as . . . other commercial types used in tape joint 
compounds.”     
Aubin, 97 So. 3d at 896.  
Conflicting evidence was presented at trial as to whether Union Carbide 
properly warned its intermediary manufacturers—as well as the designers, 
manufacturers, and sellers of the joint compounds and texture sprays at issue—
about the then-known dangers of its product or whether Union Carbide engaged in 
a misinformation campaign, concealed the truth about the dangers of asbestos from 
its customers, and did not put warning labels on its asbestos bags.  Further, 
evidence was presented that showed Union Carbide was aware of numerous 
dangers of its product.   
Union Carbide’s 1964 “Asbestos Toxicology Report” acknowledged that 
workers exposed to high concentrations of asbestos dust “were prone to develop 
. . . asbestosis.”  A 1967 report, known as the Sayers Report, recognized that even 
 
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a brief exposure to asbestos dust could produce mesothelioma.  In 1969, Union 
Carbide updated its toxicology report to note that “[a] type of cancer named 
mesothelioma . . . has been noted to be associated with asbestos exposure in recent 
years” and that mesothelioma “may occur in individuals with histories of only 
slight exposures.”  However, the 1969 report also reflected the then-accepted view 
that exposure below a certain number of particles per cubic foot of air would not 
result in disease and recommended the use of respirators where those limits would 
be exceeded.   
In 1972, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
mandated the following warning for asbestos and certain asbestos-containing 
products, and Union Carbide began placing this new warning on the bags of 
asbestos it sold: 
CAUTION 
Contains Asbestos Fibers 
Avoid Creating Dust 
Breathing Asbestos May Cause 
Serious Bodily Harm 
 
Evidence showed that OSHA limits for occupational exposure indicated that no 
mask needed to be worn where one’s exposure to asbestos did not exceed five 
fibers that were greater than five microns in length per milliliter of air.  Testimony 
at trial demonstrated that nearly all of Union Carbide’s SG-210 Calidria asbestos 
was less than five microns in length.  However, there was also evidence that Union 
 
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Carbide had commissioned a study on rats that showed that short asbestos fibers—
like those in Union Carbide’s SG-210 Calidria asbestos—were actually more 
dangerous than longer fibers in increasing the risk of producing tumors.   
The Third District correctly explained the factual disputes in this case on 
Union Carbide’s failure to warn the end user: 
As is detailed below, there was sufficient evidence presented at 
trial to create factual questions to be resolved by the jury regarding: 
whether Union Carbide warned the intermediary manufacturers; 
whether the alleged warnings to the intermediary manufacturers were 
adequate; the actual degree of dangerousness of SG-210 Calidria with 
respect to the contraction of mesothelioma; whether it was feasible or 
unduly burdensome for Union Carbide to warn end users directly;  
and each intermediary manufacturer’s degree of education, 
knowledge, expertise, and relationship with the end users.  For 
example, although Union Carbide presented evidence that it regularly 
apprised the intermediary manufacturers of the dangers associated 
with asbestos by providing them with the latest scientific reports and 
studies, Aubin presented evidence that Union Carbide misled the 
intermediary manufacturers into thinking SG-210 Calidria was safe.  
And although Union Carbide claimed that it began placing warnings 
on its asbestos bags in 1968, a Georgia-Pacific representative called 
by Aubin testified that he did not recall such labels on Union 
Carbide’s bags of asbestos.  Further, while Aubin challenged the 
adequacy of the OSHA warnings, he testified at trial that if he had 
seen Union Carbide’s OSHA warning, he “more than certainly” would 
have taken steps to protect himself from the hazards of asbestos.  In 
addition, while Aubin presented expert testimony attributing his 
contraction of mesothelioma to his exposure to SG-210 Calidria, 
Union Carbide presented expert testimony that it was relatively 
unlikely, if not impossible, that Aubin contracted peritoneal 
mesothelioma from exposure to chrysotile asbestos.  Lastly, although 
Aubin claimed that it would have been feasible for Union Carbide to 
warn end users directly, or to contractually require intermediary 
manufacturers to warn end users, Union Carbide offered the testimony 
of Jack Walsh, a Union Carbide sales representative, who testified that 
 
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Union Carbide did not sell directly to consumers; claimed Union 
Carbide had no way of identifying the end users; attested to the fact 
that Union Carbide was not involved in how the intermediary 
manufacturers designed, distributed, or packaged their products; and 
contended that Union Carbide was incapable of requiring intermediary 
manufacturers to place warnings on products containing Union 
Carbide’s asbestos.  
Aubin, 97 So. 3d at 901.   
Aubin testified that he never wore any kind of protective device and did not 
recall seeing warnings on the products he used, but if he had seen a warning on the 
bags of asbestos, he “[m]ore than certainly” would have taken precautions to 
protect himself.  Aubin further testified that he did not expect that the normal use 
of the joint compounds and texture sprays would release dangerous dust into the 
air.   
Aubin presented expert testimony to demonstrate that exposure to respirable 
asbestos, such as the SG-210 Calidria manufactured by Union Carbide, causes 
peritoneal mesothelioma.  Aubin also presented expert testimony that his exposure 
to Union Carbide’s asbestos through the ordinary use of the joint compounds and 
texture sprays was a substantial contributing cause of his peritoneal mesothelioma.  
In contrast, Union Carbide presented expert testimony that chrysotile asbestos, 
such as the type manufactured by Union Carbide, is no more likely to cause 
mesothelioma in its designed state than in its pure state.  
 
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At the close of evidence, Union Carbide moved for a directed verdict, which 
the trial court denied.  As to the issue of warnings, Aubin proposed a special jury 
instruction regarding the failure to warn, to which Union Carbide objected as being 
incomplete because it did not include special instructions as to the learned 
intermediary defense.  Union Carbide also proposed its own special jury 
instructions on the failure to warn claim.  
The trial court gave a special jury instruction in accordance with Aubin’s 
request and rejected Union Carbide’s proposed instructions regarding the 
warnings.  The instruction given, as proposed by Aubin, stated: “An asbestos 
manufacturer, such as Union Carbide Corporation, has a duty to warn end users of 
an unreasonable danger in the contemplated use of its products.” 
The relevant instructions included both the Standard Jury Instructions and 
several special instructions: 
The issues for your determination on the strict liability claims 
of the Plaintiff against Union Carbide Corporation are whether 
Plaintiff was exposed to asbestos while working with or around 
products manufactured by Union Carbide Corporation; if so, whether 
such products were defective when they left the possession of Union 
Carbide Corporation; and, if so, whether such defendants were a legal 
cause of the injuries or damages sustained by the Plaintiff. 
A product is defective: 
1.  If it is in a condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user and the product is expected to and does reach the 
use without substantial change affecting that condition; 
or 
2.  If by reason of its design the product is in a 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user and the 
 
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product is expected to and does reach the user without 
substantial change affecting that condition. 
3.  A product is also considered defective when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the provision of 
reasonable instructions or warnings and their omission 
renders the product not reasonably safe. 
A product is unreasonably dangerous because of its design if 
the product fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would 
expect when used as intended or in a manner reasonably foreseeable 
by the seller, or the risk of danger in the design outweighs the 
benefits.    
In the context of strict liability failure to warn, an otherwise 
safe product may be defective solely by virtue of inadequate warning.  
The issue for your determination on the Plaintiff’s negligence 
claim against Union Carbide is whether Union Carbide was negligent 
in failing to warn of the health hazards, if any, associated with 
exposure to its asbestos which Union Carbide knew, or should have 
known, by the use of reasonable care existed and, if so, whether such 
negligence was a legal cause of loss, injury or damage sustained by 
Plaintiff. 
. . . . 
An asbestos manufacturer, such as Union Carbide Corporation, 
has a duty to warn end users of an unreasonable danger in the 
contemplated use of its products. 
All manufacturers are considered to hold the knowledge and 
skill of an expert.  They are obliged to keep abreast of any scientific 
discoveries and are presumed to know the result of all such advances. 
To warn adequately, the product label must make apparent the 
potential harmful consequences.  The warning should be of such 
intensity as to cause a reasonable man to exercise for his own safety 
caution commensurate with the potential danger. 
 
(Emphasis added as to non-standard instructions.) 
Regarding the proposed verdict, Union Carbide objected to the form of the 
verdict because it failed to provide for special interrogatories separately as to both 
negligent design and negligent warning, as well as strict liability failure to warn 
 
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and strict liability design defect.  The trial court overruled Union Carbide’s 
objections.   
The verdict, with the jury’s answers, stated as follows: 
WE, THE JURY, return the following verdict: 
1.  Was there negligence on the part of UNION CARBIDE which was 
the legal cause of damage to Plaintiff WILLIAM AUBIN? 
YES  __X__  NO ____ 
2.  Did UNION CARBIDE place products on the market with a defect 
which was the legal cause of damage to Plaintiff WILLIAM AUBIN? 
YES  __X__  NO ____ 
3.  Was there negligence on the part of Plaintiff which was a legal 
cause of his loss, injury, or damage? 
YES  ____  NO __X__ 
The jury returned a $14,191,000 verdict for Aubin, finding that Union 
Carbide’s negligence was the legal cause of Aubin’s damages and that Union 
Carbide placed products on the market with a defect that was the legal cause of 
Aubin’s damages.  However, the jury also found that some of the intermediaries 
were liable, attributing only 46.25% of the fault to Union Carbide and apportioning 
the remaining 53.75% to several intermediaries whose “negligence or defect” it 
found to be a contributing cause of Aubin’s damages.  Specifically, the jury 
attributed 8.75% of the fault to Georgia Pacific, LLC; 7.5% of the fault to Kaiser 
Gypsum Company; 12.5% of the fault to Premix Marbletite Manufacturing 
Company; and 25% of the fault to U.S. Gypsum Company, while also finding 
 
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several other intermediaries not at fault.4  After the trial court reduced the judgment 
to reflect Union Carbide’s percentage of fault and settlements with other 
tortfeasors, the trial court entered a total judgment for Aubin and against Union 
Carbide in the amount of $6,624,150.   
 
Union Carbide appealed, and the Third District reversed, holding that the 
trial court erred by denying Union Carbide’s motion for directed verdict as to the 
design defect claim and that Union Carbide was entitled to a new trial on Aubin’s 
failure to warn claim.  Aubin, 97 So. 3d at 889.  In reaching this result, the Third 
District made three legal conclusions.   
First, the Third District held that the trial court committed reversible error by 
applying the Second Restatement, rather than the Third Restatement, to strict 
products liability design defect claims: 
We note that Union Carbide is correct in pointing out that 
Aubin failed to present any evidence regarding a “reasonable 
alternative design.”  As is demonstrated from the transcript of the 
charge conference, Aubin’s counsel did not believe such evidence was 
necessary because he litigated the design defect claim as if it was 
governed by the Second Restatement’s “consumer expectations” 
standard: 
 
It’s defective by design if it does not act as a 
reasonable consumer would expect it to act.  And that’s 
what the jury has to decide.  
. . . .  
                                          
 
 
4.  There were seven intermediaries listed on the verdict form. 
 
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Mr. Terry is under the impression that . . . I’ve got 
to come in here with alternative designs of how they 
should have done it instead, and that’s not required.   
 
As has already been established, however, the Third 
Restatement rejects the consumer expectations test as an independent 
basis for finding a product defectively designed.  Restatement (Third) 
of Torts:  Products Liability § 2 cmt. g. (“Under Subsection (b), 
consumer expectations do not constitute an independent standard for 
judging the defectiveness of product designs.”); Agrofollajes, 48 So. 
3d at 996-97 (rejecting the consumer expectations test as an 
independent basis for finding a design defect in light of this Court’s 
adoption of the Third Restatement in Kohler).  Nevertheless, as is 
demonstrated below, Aubin’s failure to offer evidence regarding a 
reasonable alternative design did not necessarily preclude a finding of 
liability for a defective design. 
While the plain language of subsection 2(b) requires plaintiffs 
with design defect claims to prove the availability of a “reasonable 
alternative design,” satisfying subsection 2(b) is not the exclusive 
means by which plaintiffs may establish liability for a defective 
design under the Third Restatement.  Under comment e., plaintiffs 
may forego the demonstration of a “reasonable alternative design” by 
showing that the product design at issue is “manifestly unreasonable.”  
Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability § 2 cmt. e.  A 
product design is “manifestly unreasonable” when “the extremely 
high degree of danger posed by its use . . . so substantially outweighs 
its negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully 
aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use . . . the product.”  Id. 
 
Aubin, 97 So. 3d at 896-97 (emphasis added). 
Second, the Third District held that although there was sufficient evidence 
for the jury to conclude that SG-210 Calidria was a “designed” product and that the 
design was “defective,” Union Carbide was entitled to a directed verdict on the 
design defect claim because Aubin failed to present evidence that the defective 
design of the product caused Aubin’s harm.  Id. at 897-98.  In other words, the 
 
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Third District concluded that the asbestos in SG-210 Calidria was no more 
dangerous in its designed and manufactured state than asbestos was as a raw 
material: 
Under Section 5, the last hurdle is proving that the design 
defect caused the plaintiff’s harm.  See Restatement (Third) of Torts:  
Products Liability § 5(a) (predicating liability on a showing that “the 
component is defective in itself, as defined in this Chapter, and the 
defect causes the harm.”) . . . .  This requirement reflects the 
understanding that “[p]roducts are not generically defective merely 
because they are dangerous.”  Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products 
Liability § 2 cmt. a. 
In this case, Aubin failed to present any evidence suggesting 
that the defective design of SG-210 Calidria caused Aubin’s harm.  
While there is record evidence suggesting that the design of SG-210 
Calidria caused it to be more dangerous with respect to the contraction 
of asbestosis than raw chrysotile asbestos, such evidence is irrelevant 
to Aubin’s design defect claim because Aubin did not contract 
asbestosis; he contracted mesothelioma.  And as was established 
above, Aubin failed to present any evidence suggesting that the 
purported design defect of SG-210 Calidria made it more dangerous 
than raw chrysotile asbestos with respect to the contraction of 
mesothelioma.  It is clear, therefore, that Aubin pointed to nothing 
other than the dangerous propensities of basic, raw chrysotile asbestos 
as the source of his harm.  As we have already explained, such 
evidence is legally insufficient under the Third Restatement because 
“products are not generically defective merely because they are 
dangerous.”  Id.  Accordingly, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
product’s defective design, rather than its basic, raw, and naturally 
occurring characteristics, caused the plaintiff’s harm.  See 
Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability § 5.  Because Aubin 
introduced no evidence demonstrating that the design of SG-210 
Calidria caused it to be more dangerous than it naturally is with 
respect to the harm suffered by Aubin, the trial court erred in denying 
Union Carbide’s motion for a directed verdict pertaining to Aubin’s 
design defect claim. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
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Finally, the Third District held that the trial court reversibly erred on the 
warning claim by providing incomplete jury instructions, which informed the jury 
that Union Carbide had a duty to warn the ultimate users of an unreasonable 
danger in the contemplated use of its product but failed to instruct the jury that this 
duty could be discharged by reasonable reliance on an intermediary.  In 
disagreeing with the trial court’s reliance on the Fourth District’s opinion in 
McConnell, the Third District explained: 
To the extent the trial court may have relied on the Fourth 
District’s decision in McConnell, its reliance was misplaced because 
the McConnell court’s reading of the Kavanaugh court’s holding was 
flawed.  For example, the McConnell court concluded that the 
Kavanaugh court held “that the ‘learned intermediary’ exception is 
not applicable to Calidria Asbestos and Ready-Mix with its hidden 
measure of asbestos.”  McConnell, 937 So. 2d at 156.  The 
Kavanaugh court, however, made no such finding.  The Kavanaugh 
court concluded that it was for the jury to weigh whether the warnings 
provided to the manufacturer who integrated Union Carbide’s product 
were adequate and whether Union Carbide discharged its duty to end 
users.  It also appears that the McConnell court may have transformed 
the affirmation of the jury’s determination in Kavanaugh into a legal 
holding to be applied in all future cases involving Calidria asbestos.  
Because such a holding would effectively preclude Union Carbide 
from litigating against future plaintiffs as to whether its reliance on 
intermediaries was reasonable, it comes perilously close to application 
of non-mutual, offensive collateral estoppel, which is impermissible in 
Florida.  E.C. v. Katz, 731 So. 2d 1268, 1269 (Fla. 1999) (quoting 
Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 919 (Fla. 1995)).  In any 
event, the McConnell court neither receded from nor overruled 
Kavanaugh.  As such, Kavanaugh, which is consistent with our 
analysis in this case, is still good law. 
 
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Id. at 904 n.6.  Accordingly, the Third District affirmed in part and reversed in 
part, remanding the action for a new trial.  Id. at 904. 
ANALYSIS 
Aubin raises three issues before this Court: (1) whether the Third District 
ignored this Court’s precedent in West by applying the Third Restatement; (2) 
whether the Third District erred in holding that Aubin failed to present sufficient 
evidence that the defective design of SG-210 Calidria caused his mesothelioma; 
and (3) whether the Third District erred in determining that Union Carbide was 
entitled to a jury instruction on the learned intermediary defense.  We address each 
issue in turn.   
I.  Whether the Third District Erred in Failing 
 to Apply Our Precedent in West  
 
We first consider the Third District’s decision to apply the Third 
Restatement, which expressly and directly conflicts with our holding in West, 336 
So. 2d 80, and with the Fourth District’s decision in McConnell, 937 So. 2d 148, 
both of which applied the consumer expectations test set forth in the Second 
Restatement as the test for design defect under strict products liability.  In 
analyzing this claim, we must review the cases applying the consumer expectations 
test and then contrast that approach with the Third District’s adoption of the Third 
Restatement.  We then analyze other state supreme court opinions that have 
considered this same question and expressed concern that the Third Restatement’s 
 
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approach in strict products liability cases creates numerous public policy concerns 
that are inconsistent with the purpose behind adopting strict liability.  In doing so, 
we emphasize that the Restatement is not a uniform code that is promulgated to 
harmonize the law throughout the states.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
conclude that the Second Restatement, which applies the consumer expectations 
test as the appropriate test for determining a design defect, is more closely aligned 
with the policy reasons behind Florida’s adoption of strict liability in products 
design cases. 
A.  Florida’s Prior Adoption of Strict Liability in Design Defect Cases  
In West, this Court addressed the issue of whether a manufacturer may be 
held liable under the theory of strict liability in tort for injury to a user of the 
defective product and, joining the majority of jurisdictions that had considered the 
issue, adopted strict products liability: 
In other words strict liability should be imposed only when a 
product the manufacturer places on the market, knowing that it is to 
be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that 
causes injury to a human being.  The user should be protected from 
unreasonably dangerous products or from a product fraught with 
unexpected dangers.  In order to hold a manufacturer liable on the 
theory of strict liability in tort, the user must establish the 
manufacturer’s relationship to the product in question, the defect and 
unreasonably dangerous condition of the product, and the existence of 
the proximate causal connection between such condition and the 
user’s injuries or damages. 
 
- 21 - 
West, 336 So. 2d at 86-87.  In enunciating the policy reasons for the importance of 
strict liability, a unanimous Court explained: 
The cost of injuries or damages, either to persons or property, 
resulting from defective products, should be borne by the makers of 
the products who put them into the channels of trade, rather than by 
the injured or damaged persons who are ordinarily powerless to 
protect themselves.  We therefore hold that a manufacturer is strictly 
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it 
is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect 
that causes injury to a human being.   
Id. at 92.  We noted that prior Florida courts had imposed strict liability in tort in 
such situations and that this approach was also in conformity with the principles set 
forth in the Second Restatement.  Id. at 86. 
The Second Restatement applies the “consumer expectations” test, which 
considers whether a product is unreasonably dangerous in design because it failed 
to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used as intended 
or in a reasonably foreseeable manner.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A 
(1965).  This test intrinsically recognizes that a manufacturer plays a central role in 
establishing the consumers’ expectations for a particular product, which in turn 
motivates consumers to purchase the product.   
Since our adoption of the consumer expectations test, we have rejected 
applying legal principles that are inconsistent with the general philosophy 
espoused by this Court in West.  See, e.g., Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 
So. 2d 1167, 1167 (Fla. 1979) (rejecting the patent danger doctrine, which 
 
- 22 - 
insulates manufacturers from liability if a dangerous product does not create a 
unknown risk to the user and is without any latent defect, as a total defense to strict 
liability claims involving defective products); Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 
1049, 1050-52 (Fla. 1981) (rejecting the argument that only a negligence standard 
should apply to design defect claims).   
The principles this Court set forth in West have been subsequently applied 
for almost four decades to cases involving a variety of products and contexts.  See, 
e.g., Samuel Friedland Family Enter. v. Amoroso, 630 So. 2d 1067, 1071 (Fla. 
1994) (applying West to commercial lessors who were in the business of leasing a 
sailboat, which was an allegedly defective product); Stazenski v. Tennant Co., 617 
So. 2d 344, 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (applying West to a manufacturing defect 
claim regarding an industrial sweeper); Visnoski v. J.C. Penney Co., 477 So. 2d 
29, 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (applying West to strict liability claims against 
retailers); Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis, 973 So. 2d 467, 473-75 (Fla. 4th DCA 
2007) (applying the Second Restatement and West in a claim involving cigarette 
smoking injuries); Cintron v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 681 So. 2d 859, 861 
(Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (applying West in a strict liability claim regarding flame 
retardant plywood).   
In fact, two prior cases from the Fourth District, Kavanaugh and McConnell, 
involved this exact product—SG-210 Calidria—and the same defendant.  See 
 
- 23 - 
Kavanaugh, 879 So. 2d at 45; McConnell, 937 So. 2d at 154.  In Kavanaugh, the 
Fourth District affirmed a jury verdict of $1,153,000 against Union Carbide, where 
the jury found Union Carbide 100% liable for Kavanaugh’s damages related to 
asbestos exposure during “his employ as a carpenter when he sanded joint 
compound which contained asbestos.”  Kavanaugh, 879 So. 2d at 43.  The 
evidence established that Kavanaugh “primarily used ‘Ready Mix’ joint compound 
manufactured by Georgia-Pacific” and that Union Carbide “manufactured the 
asbestos and supplied Georgia-Pacific with the asbestos that eventually ended up in 
the ‘Ready Mix’ joint compound.”  Id. at 43.   
On appeal, Union Carbide claimed that it was entitled to a directed verdict 
on the failure to warn claim because “it satisfied its duty to warn by informing 
Georgia-Pacific of the hazards of asbestos” and that “as a bulk supplier, it had no 
affirmative duty to warn ultimate users of asbestos.”  Id. at 44.  In rejecting Union 
Carbide’s claim that, as a matter of law, it could not be responsible for warning 
ultimate users, the Fourth District relied on factors set forth in section 388 of the 
Second Restatement, concluding that Union Carbide did not fulfill its duty to warn.  
In affirming the jury verdict, the Fourth District noted that Union Carbide 
“provided Georgia-Pacific with limited information which was not communicated 
to the ultimate users.  Because [Union Carbide] did not take reasonable precautions 
 
- 24 - 
under the circumstances, its duty to warn did not stop with Georgia-Pacific, but 
continued to the ultimate user.”  Id. at 46. 
In McConnell, 937 So. 2d at 149, the Fourth District faced a similar factual 
scenario, in which the plaintiff worked for various drywall businesses and often 
used “Ready Mix,” a joint compound that contained Calidria asbestos.  The 
plaintiff asserted that he was never warned that the joint compound contained 
asbestos and, as a consequence of using the product as intended, he inhaled 
asbestos fibers manufactured by Union Carbide, which caused him to develop 
asbestosis.  Id. at 149-50.   
Union Carbide argued that the jury should not be instructed on the design or 
manufacturing defect as a basis for strict liability because it sold only “raw” 
asbestos, which was incapable of being defectively manufactured or designed.  Id. 
at 150.  The trial court agreed that Union Carbide could not be strictly liable for a 
product defect because the product was “raw” asbestos.  Id. 
On appeal, the Fourth District rejected that argument, relying on Union 
Carbide’s own marketing literature, which promoted its proprietary manufacturing 
process that caused Calidria asbestos to go “twice as far” as that of their 
competitors.  Id.  The Fourth District concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to 
have the jury instructed as to the consumer expectations test for strict liability, 
which originated in section 402A of the Second Restatement.  Id. at 155.  In 
 
- 25 - 
making this determination, the Fourth District relied on Force v. Ford Motor Co., 
879 So. 2d 103, 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), which held that “[u]nder the consumer-
expectation theory a product is defectively designed if the plaintiff is able to 
demonstrate that the product did not perform as safely as an ordinary consumer 
would expect when used in the intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.”  
McConnell, 937 So. 2d at 151 (quoting Force, 879 So. 2d at 106). 
B.  The Third District’s Adoption of the Third Restatement 
 
In contrast to McConnell and Kavanaugh, both of which applied the Second 
Restatement to similar scenarios, in Aubin, the Third District explicitly rejected the 
application of the consumer expectations test in section 402A of the Second 
Restatement.  Instead, the Third District held that the proper test for design defect 
was articulated in the Third Restatement, concluding that the risk utility test and 
the component parts doctrine, as explained in sections 2 and 5 of the Third 
Restatement, Products Liability, were applicable to the claims at issue.  Aubin, 97 
So. 3d at 894.  The Third District recognized that this Court had adopted the 
consumer expectations test set forth in section 402A of the Second Restatement in 
West and that the Fourth District in McConnell applied the consumer expectations 
test in a case involving the same product.  Id. at 893-94.  The Third District, 
however, adhered to its own precedent, noting that it had already adopted sections 
 
- 26 - 
2 and 5 of the Third Restatement, Products Liability, in Kohler, 907 So. 2d at 598-
99, and Agrofollajes, 48 So. 3d at 997.  See Aubin, 97 So. 3d at 893.   
Thus, in approving the use of the Third Restatement, the Third District 
utilized the risk utility test as the legal standard for a design defect claim, in which 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that “the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design 
renders the product not reasonably safe.”  Kohler, 907 So. 2d at 599.  Specifically, 
the pertinent portion of the Third Restatement reads as follows: 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, 
it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is 
defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings.  A product: 
 
 
 
. . .  
(b)  is defective in design when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a 
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and 
the omission of the alternative design renders the product 
not reasonably safe; 
(c)  is defective because of inadequate instructions 
or warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by 
the product could have been reduced or avoided by the 
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the 
seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
 
- 27 - 
instructions or warnings renders the product not 
reasonably safe.   
Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability § 2 (1998) (emphasis added).    
The critical difference regarding design defects between the Second 
Restatement and the Third Restatement is that the Third Restatement not only 
replaces the consumer expectations test with the risk utility test but also requires 
the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of “a reasonable alternative design.”  Id.  
The intent of the Third Restatement to introduce foreseeability of the risk as a part 
of a plaintiff’s proof of an action for design defects is evident.  As Comment (a) to 
Section 2 of the Third Restatement explains, the Third Restatement incorporates an 
element of foreseeability of risk of harm and a risk-benefit test.  Id.  By introducing 
foreseeability of the risk to the manufacturer as part of the calculus for design 
defect and requiring proof of a “reasonable alternative design,” the Third 
Restatement reintroduces principles of negligence into strict liability.   
C.  Whether to Adopt the Third Restatement  
in Strict Products Liability Design Defect Cases  
 
In determining whether to adhere to our precedent and continue to apply the 
Second Restatement or to adopt the Third Restatement in strict liability design 
defect cases, we are assisted by the reasoning of several state supreme courts, 
which were confronted with similar decisions and declined to adopt the Third 
Restatement because of its markedly different approach to strict products liability.  
 
- 28 - 
See, e.g., Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1332 (Conn. 
1997); Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000); Rodriguez v. 
Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47, 64-65 (Mo. 1999); Tincher v. Omega Flex, 
Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 335 (Pa. 2014); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 
N.W.2d 727, 751-752 (Wis. 2001).  These decisions have enunciated several 
compelling reasons for rejecting the adoption of the Third Restatement as to design 
defect.   
First, by departing from the consumer expectations test, set forth in the 
Second Restatement, and instead focusing on the foreseeability of the risk of harm, 
including a cost-benefit analysis, the Third Restatement “blurs the distinction 
between strict products liability claims and negligence claims.”  Green, 629 N.W. 
2d at 751.  Rather than focusing on the design of the product, it focuses on the 
conduct of the manufacturer.    
Besides shifting the emphasis away from strict liability principles, the Third 
Restatement’s risk utility test imposes a higher burden on consumers to prove a 
design defect than exists in negligence cases—the antithesis of adopting strict 
products liability in the first place.  As explained by the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin: 
But we are more troubled by the fact that 2(b) sets the bar 
higher for recovery in strict products liability design defect cases than 
in comparable negligence cases.  Section 2(b) does not merely 
incorporate a negligence standard into strict products liability law.  
 
- 29 - 
Instead, it adds to this standard the additional requirement that an 
injured consumer seeking to recover under strict products liability 
must prove that there was a “reasonable alternative design” available 
to the product’s manufacturer.  Thus, rather than serving the policies 
underlying strict products liability law by allowing consumers to 
recover for injuries caused by a defective and unreasonably dangerous 
product without proving negligence on the part of the product’s 
manufacturer, 2(b) increases the burden for injured consumers not 
only by requiring proof of the manufacturer’s negligence, but also by 
adding an additional—and considerable—element of proof to the 
negligence standard.  This court will not impose such a burden on 
injured persons.  Accord Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 
Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2 (Wis. 1984) (rejecting the argument that 
Wisconsin strict products liability requires proof of an alternative, 
safer design). 
Green, 629 N.W.2d at 751-52 (footnote omitted).   
The Third Restatement, in some instances, could insulate a manufacturer 
from all liability for unreasonably dangerous products solely because a reasonable 
alternative design for that type of product may be unavailable.  The Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania, in a scholarly and thoughtful analysis, explained its reasons 
behind rejecting the Third Restatement’s approach: 
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that “adoption” of the 
Third Restatement approach is problematic.  For one thing, 
articulating the burden of proof in terms of evidence (alternative 
design) deemed probative of the general principle of strict liability 
proscriptively limits the applicability of the cause of action to certain 
products as to which that sort of evidence is available.  The approach 
suggests a priori categorical exemptions for some products—such as 
novel products with no alternative design—but not others.   
Tincher, 104 A.3d at 395. 
 
- 30 - 
 
While the original purpose of imposing strict liability for defective and 
unreasonably dangerous products was to relieve injured consumers from the 
difficulties of proving negligence on the part of the product’s manufacturer, the 
Third Restatement eliminates consideration of consumer expectations, the linchpin 
of the Second Restatement.  The consumer expectations test intrinsically 
recognizes a manufacturer’s central role in crafting the image of a product and 
establishing the consumers’ expectations for that product—a portrayal which in 
turn motivates consumers to purchase that particular product.  As expressed by the 
Supreme Court of Kansas in rejecting the Third Restatement’s focus on only the 
risk utility test and explaining the benefit of the consumer expectations test: 
We are convinced that in products liability cases, consumer 
expectations play a dominant role in the determination of 
defectiveness.  Addressing this concern, Professor Marshall Shapo 
observed in his comments upon the Third Restatement’s failure to 
recognize the efficacy of consumer expectations, Shapo, Defective 
Restatement Design, 8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 59, 60 (1998):  
“A broad concern about the [Third] Restatement as 
published stems from its single-minded emphasis on a 
risk/utility test.  This seems to me, by itself, is an 
impoverished concept.  It is impoverished especially 
insofar as the reporters ruled out consumer expectations 
as an independent test.  They thereby ignored the 
centrality of what we all know as people and what I 
would hope that you would recognize as judges: the 
centrality of product portrayals and images and their role 
in creating consumer motives to purchase or encounter 
products.” 
 
- 31 - 
Delaney, 999 P.2d at 945 (emphasis added).  Clearly, the Third Restatement fails 
to consider the crucial link between a manufacturer establishing the reasonable 
expectations of a product that in turn cause consumers to demand that product.   
 Further, the Third Restatement places upon the plaintiff an additional 
burdensome element of proof, requiring the injured consumer to step into the shoes 
of a manufacturer and prove that a reasonable alternative design was available to 
the manufacturer.  Even while recognizing exceptions to requiring proof of a 
reasonable alternative design, under the Third Restatement, the burden is still 
placed on the plaintiff to demonstrate his or her exemption from this additional 
requirement.5  
The Supreme Court of Connecticut has expressed similar concerns: “in some 
instances, a product may be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user even though no feasible alternative design is available.”  Potter, 694 A.2d at 
1332.  As explained in Potter, the “feasible alternative design requirement imposes 
an undue burden on plaintiffs that might preclude otherwise valid claims from jury 
consideration.”  Id.  
                                          
 
 
5.  The Third Restatement identifies some exceptions to the requirement of 
proving a reasonable alternative design, including the “manifestly unreasonable 
design cases” under section 2(b), comment e, and where a product’s design fails to 
comply with the applicable product safety statute or regulation and renders the 
product defective. 
 
- 32 - 
In fact, many states have expressed concerns about the Third Restatement 
itself, as it pertains to strict products liability.6  The Supreme Court of Kansas has 
explained why the requirement of a reasonable alternative design in the Third 
Restatement has been harshly criticized and has not become the rule in the majority 
of jurisdictions: 
The Third Restatement’s requirement that a plaintiff produce a 
reasonable alternative design has been harshly criticized.  See Vargo, 
The Emperor’s New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a 
“New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects—A 
Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 
493 (1996); Vandall, State Judges Should Reject the Reasonable 
Alternative Design Standard of the Restatement (Third), Products 
Liability, Section 2(b), 8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 62 (1998); 
Westerbeke, The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 8 Kan. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 66 (1998).  Vandall states that the reasonable 
alternative design requirement is not supported by public policy or 
economic analysis because the cost of processing a case will make it 
economically impossible to produce a reasonable alternative design in 
a small products liability case.  8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 63. 
Further, contrary to the view of the authors of the Third Restatement 
that the majority of states require a reasonable alternative design to 
establish a design defect, research by John F. Vargo indicates that 
very few states in fact have this requirement.  See 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 
at 550–553.  Vargo, in his exhaustive review, examines the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts’ claim that “reasonable alternative 
design” is the majority rule in this country and concludes that, far 
                                          
 
 
6.  Not all states have concerns about the reasonable alternative design 
requirement, however.  At least three states have adopted an absolute requirement 
of alternative design evidence under the common law: Alabama, Maine, and 
Michigan.  See John F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The American Law 
Institute Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design 
Defects—A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 
493, 536-37 (1996). 
 
- 33 - 
from a majority rule, only three states require reasonable alternative 
design and five do so by statute.  See Appendix IV and related textual 
support for author’s conclusions, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. at 951, 501-951. 
 
Our own research also reflects that a majority of jurisdictions in 
this country do not require a reasonable alternative design in product 
liability actions.  It is clear in Kansas that evidence of a reasonable 
alternative design may be presented but is not required.  We adhere to 
this principle and believe that it represents the majority rule in this 
country.  Moreover, we believe the focus in such actions must remain 
on the product which is the subject of the litigation.  In Garst v. 
General Motors Corp., 484 P.2d 47 (Kan. 1971), a case decided before 
our adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, we noted 
that with regard to negligent design, it was “insufficient merely to 
assert that a different design would have alleviated or averted the 
plaintiff’s injuries.” 
 
In rejecting Comment I, we agree that as the foreword to the 
Third Restatement makes clear, the new Restatement “goes beyond 
the law.”  Hazard, Foreword to Restatement (Third) of Torts, xv, xvi 
(1997).  Rather than simply taking a photograph of the law of the 
field, the Third Restatement goes beyond this to create a framework 
for products liability.  We have examined Comment I and find it 
wanting.  The adoption of Comment I necessarily involves the 
adoption of the reasonable alternative design standard and an 
exclusive risk/utility analysis of that reasonable alternative design to 
determine whether the subject product is defective.   
 
Delaney, 999 P.2d at 945-46; accord Potter, 694 A.2d at 1331 (requirement of a 
reasonable alternative design as part of the plaintiff’s proof is not the view of a 
majority of jurisdictions). 
The Restatement is not a codification of law or necessarily the consensus on 
the best policy for courts regarding the proper legal standard for strict liability in 
 
- 34 - 
products liability cases.7  In fact, the methodology employed by the American Law 
Institute in drafting the Third Restatement reflects hurdles in creating a categorical 
pronouncement in an area of law as complex and fact-driven as strict products 
liability.  As explained by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Tincher:  
The methodology employed by the reporters suggests additional 
potential weaknesses in the strict liability schemata of the Third 
Restatement that should caution courts against categorical 
pronouncements.  Citing representative cases from several 
jurisdictions, the reporters offer that an alternative-design driven risk-
utility general rule—with a special consumer expectations rule for 
cases in which the design defect is demonstrable—reflects the 
consensus among American jurisdictions as to the applicable liability 
construct in “classic design cases.”  See [James A. Henderson, Jr. & 
Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product 
Design, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 867, 887-901 (1998)].  Notably, while 
                                          
 
 
7.  The American Law Institute (ALI), which publishes the Restatement, is a 
private body that was organized in 1923 and is composed of judges, law 
professors, and lawyers.  See Spencer H. Silverglate, The Restatement (Third) of 
Torts Products Liability—the Tension Between Product Design and Product 
Warnings, Fla. B.J., Dec. 2001, at 10, n.1.  According to its charter, the ALI’s 
purpose is “to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better 
adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to 
encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work.”  Id.  
About every 30 years, the ALI prepares a new Restatement of the Law 
of Torts (among other topic areas).  Although the restatements do not 
have the force of law, they traditionally have been influential on the 
courts of the United States.  The reporters of the Third Restatement 
were Professor James Henderson, Jr., of Cornell Law School and 
Aaron Twerski of Brooklyn Law School, who were assisted in its 
preparation by a 20-person advisory committee composed of judges, 
law professors, and practicing members of the plaintiff and defense 
bars. 
Id. 
 
- 35 - 
recognizing that “tort cases are particularly fact-sensitive,” the 
reporters purported to undertake an “empirical study of case law” to 
determine whether the alternative-design driven risk-utility general 
rule has support in the decisional law in a majority of jurisdictions.  
The reporters commented that: “[t]ort cases are particularly fact-
sensitive and courts are consequently prone to pepper their decisions 
with dicta and footnotes to allow ‘wiggle room’ for cases that may 
arise in the future.  In contrast to legal treatise writers and restaters 
who, in synthesizing the law, tend to speak precisely and 
categorically, courts in their published opinions are more likely to be 
open-textured and indecisive.”  Id. at 888.  This approach no doubt 
fulfills the role of the American Law Institute in its own salutary task 
of restating and clarifying a view of strict liability that can be reduced 
to decisive terms.  We also respect the effort of the Third Restatement 
reporters in approaching that non judicial task practically and with 
humility.  But, what drives the Institute and treatise writers does not 
make comparative modesty, nuance, and reticence in the judiciary 
mistaken (much less indecisive) in a jurisdiction, like Pennsylvania, 
where the area, to date, has been the exclusive province of the 
common law. 
Tincher, 104 A.3d at 396-97.   
While the Third Restatement was intended to restate the law as decided by 
state courts and state legislatures, various courts have criticized its discussion of 
strict products liability, emphasizing that it “goes beyond the law” because 
“[r]ather than simply taking a photograph of the law of the field,” the Third 
Restatement attempts to create a framework for strict products liability by urging 
the adoption of the reasonable alternative design standard and an exclusive 
risk/utility analysis, notwithstanding that the majority of jurisdictions in this 
country do not require a reasonable alternative design in strict products liability 
actions.  Delaney, 999 P.2d at 945-46; see also Potter, 694 A.2d at 1331 (“[O]ur 
 
- 36 - 
independent review of the prevailing common law reveals that the majority of 
jurisdictions do not impose upon plaintiffs an absolute requirement to prove a 
feasible alternative design.”).   
For example, Florida is counted by the reporters as having adopted the 
“risk/benefit” test for design defect cases and implicitly requiring proof of a 
reasonable alternative design.  See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab §2(b), 
Reporters’ Note, cmt. d (1998).  In support, the reporters rely on Radiation 
Technology, Inc. v. Ware Construction Co., 445 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1983), as the 
“leading case” in Florida for these legal principles.  But this reliance is misplaced 
because Radiation Technology was not a strict liability case—the legal issue before 
the Court involved a jury instruction in a negligence action.  Radiation Tech., 445 
So. 2d at 331.  In fact, in that decision, this Court explicitly noted the adoption of 
strict liability in West and then referred to the definition of strict liability under the 
Second Restatement.  Id. 
In considering which approach is in line with our prior strict liability 
jurisprudence, we are in accord with those state supreme courts that have 
thoughtfully considered this issue and determined that the Third Restatement’s 
new approach is inconsistent with the rationale behind the adoption of strict 
products liability.  The Third Restatement is, in fact, contrary to this state’s prior 
precedent.  Decades ago, this Court recognized that the reason behind adopting 
 
- 37 - 
strict products liability was based in part on the policy that “[t]he manufacturer, by 
placing on the market a potentially dangerous product for use and consumption and 
by inducement and promotion encouraging the use of these products, thereby 
undertakes a certain and special responsibility toward the consuming public who 
may be injured by it.”  West, 336 So. 2d at 86.  Thus, in approaching design defect 
claims, we adhere to the consumer expectations test, as set forth in the Second 
Restatement, and reject the categorical adoption of the Third Restatement and its 
reasonable alternative design requirement.   
The important aspect of strict products liability that led to our adoption in 
West remains true today: the burden of compensating victims of unreasonably 
dangerous products is placed on the manufacturers, who are most able to protect 
against the risk of harm, and not on the consumer injured by the product.  
Increasing the burden for injured consumers to prove their strict liability claims for 
unreasonably dangerous products that were placed into the stream of commerce is 
contrary to the policy reasons behind the adoption of strict liability in West.   
Adopting the definition of design defect advanced by the Third Restatement 
would frustrate these policy concerns.  As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
recognized: 
Where a manufacturer places a defective and unreasonably 
dangerous product into the stream of commerce, the manufacturer, not 
the injured consumer, should bear the costs of the risks posed by the 
 
- 38 - 
product.  Because 2(b) unduly obstructs this equitable principle, we 
refuse to adopt 2(b) into Wisconsin law.  
Green, 629 N.W.2d at 752.   
Further, a manufacturer plays a pivotal role in crafting the image of a 
product and establishing the consumers’ expectations for that product, a portrayal 
which in turn motivates consumers to purchase that particular product.  The 
consumer expectations test thus rightly focuses on the expectations that a 
manufacturer creates.  The Third Restatement’s risk utility test shifts away from 
this focus and, in fact, imposes a higher burden on consumers to prove a design 
defect than exists in negligence cases—the exact opposite of the purposes of 
adopting strict products liability in the first place.     
The consumer expectations test does not inherently favor either party.  In 
fact, manufacturers have at times sought application of the consumer expectations 
test over the risk utility test, such as in cases involving tobacco products or where a 
danger was open and obvious.  See Larry S. Stewart, Strict Liability for Defective 
Product Design: The Quest for A Well-Ordered Regime, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1039, 
1059 n.33 (2009). 
While we conclude that the Third Restatement’s risk utility test and 
establishment of a reasonable alternative design mandate are not requirements for 
finding strict liability, we note that nothing precludes the plaintiff in proving his or 
her case from showing that alternative safer designs exist—or for that matter 
 
- 39 - 
precludes the defendant from showing that it could not have made the product any 
safer through reasonable alternative designs.  The Third Restatement, while 
rejecting the consumer expectations test as an independent basis for defining strict 
liability design defect, also provides that a “broad range of factors may be 
considered in determining whether an alternative design is reasonable and whether 
its omission renders a product not reasonably safe under this provision, including, 
among others, the magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm, the 
instructions and warnings accompanying the product, and the nature and strength 
of consumer expectations regarding the product, including expectations arising 
from product portrayal and marketing.”  Am. L. Prod. Liab. 3d § 28:3.  In this 
regard, we conclude—as did the Supreme Courts of Kansas, Pennsylvania, and 
Wisconsin—that the plaintiff is not required, but is permitted, to demonstrate the 
feasibility of an alternative safer design and that the defendant may present 
evidence that no reasonable alternative design existed, while also arguing in 
defense that the benefit of the product’s design outweighed any risks of injury or 
death caused by the design.  See Delaney, 999 P.2d at 944; Tincher, 104 A.3d at 
397; Godoy ex rel. Gramling v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 768 N.W.2d 674, 
686 (Wis. 2009). 
 
- 40 - 
 
As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained, allowing evidence of a 
reasonable alternative design is different than mandating evidence of a reasonable 
alternative design as part of the plaintiff’s burden of proof: 
That evidence of the existence and specifications of an 
alternative design is relevant and even highly probative to prove 
disputed issues in a products liability case, such as technological 
feasibility, cost, etc., is certainly true.  That the more typical case 
implicates the type of products and circumstances in which evidence 
of an alternative product design is the most persuasive and efficient 
means of convincing the trier of fact may also be true.  That offering 
evidence of an alternative product design may be the preferred legal 
strategy of the plaintiff’s bar in certain cases—or may be a strategy 
the defense bar would like to impose on the plaintiff’s bar in certain 
cases—again may also be true.  But, while the reporters’ intuition that 
meritorious cases are premised upon certain types of evidence may 
have some general validity and support in practice (and may prove 
helpful to litigants in articulating claims and preparing defenses), the 
reporters’ commentary candidly betrays a problem—for the judiciary 
at least—of perspective.  Principally, at least in a climate where 
suggestions are made along the lines of simply “adopting” or “moving 
to” a Restatement construct, it is our view that the reporters’ “precise 
and categorical” perspective insufficiently accounts for the 
imperatives of the courts’ more modest decisional role, by, for 
example, describing the reasoned and purposeful articulation of 
general principles as “dicta.” 
 
Tincher, 104 A.3d at 397.   
In fact, the jury instructions approved by this Court use both the consumer 
expectations test and risk utility test as alternative definitions of design defect.  See 
In re Std. Jury Instr. in Civ. Cases—Report No. 13-01, 160 So. 3d 869, 871 (Fla. 
2015).  These alternative definitions have been in effect for over two decades after 
the Court directed the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions to improve its 
 
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products liability instructions.  See Ford Motor Co., 404 So. 2d at 1052 n.4.  
Significantly, however, there is absolutely no requirement embodied in the 
Standard Jury Instructions, nor has this Court ever adopted a requirement as set 
forth in the Third Restatement, that the plaintiff must either present proof of a 
reasonable alternative design or establish that the product was manifestly 
unreasonable before the requirement of proof of an alternative design could be 
excused.  We do not direct, at this point, whether the standard jury instructions 
should be modified in light of this opinion.  The parties may, in proving or 
defending against such claims, present evidence that a reasonable alternative 
design existed and argue whether the benefit of the product’s design outweighed 
any risks of injury or death caused by the design. 
Consistent with our decision in West, we approve the portion of McConnell 
that applied the Second Restatement, including its holding that correctly focused 
on the consumer expectations test.  We decline to recede from our precedent in 
West and thus disapprove of the Third District’s decisions in Aubin, Kohler, and 
Agrofollajes, which adopted and applied the Third Restatement.   
II.  Whether Union Carbide Was Entitled  
to a Directed Verdict on the Design Defect Claim 
 
 
Next, Aubin asserts that the Third District erred when it held that Aubin 
failed to present sufficient evidence that the defective design of SG-210 Calidria 
caused Aubin’s harm and thus Union Carbide was entitled to a directed verdict on 
 
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the design defect claim.  While the Third District concluded that Aubin presented 
sufficient evidence to prove that SG-210 Calidria was a “designed” product and 
that the design of SG-210 Calidria was “defective,” the Third District nevertheless 
concluded that Aubin did not establish causation under the Third Restatement in 
light of the fact that Aubin “failed to introduce any evidence suggesting SG-210 
Calidria was more dangerous than raw chrysotile asbestos with respect to the 
contraction of cancer or peritoneal mesothelioma.”  Aubin, 97 So. 3d at 890. 
  
We conclude that the Third District improperly merged the Third 
Restatement’s definition of design defect with causation, conflating the elements of 
those two prongs.  The causation prong, under both the Second Restatement and 
the Third Restatement, simply applies the general rules of causation, requiring the 
plaintiff to show that the defect caused the injury or harm alleged.  See, e.g., 
Liggett Grp., 973 So. 2d at 475 (holding that under the Second Restatement, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate “[f]irst, that the product is defective; and, second, that 
such defect caused plaintiff’s injuries”); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. 
§ 15 (1998) (“Whether a product defect caused harm to persons or property is 
determined by the prevailing rules and principles governing causation in tort.”).  
Likewise, in the newly adopted standard jury instructions, legal causation in a 
products liability case is explained as “[A defect in a product] [Negligence] is a 
legal cause of [loss] [injury] [or] [damage] if it directly and in natural and 
 
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continuous sequence produces or contributes substantially to producing such [loss] 
[injury] [or] [damage], so that it can reasonably be said that, but for the [defect] 
[negligence], the [loss] [injury] [or] [damage] would not have occurred.”  In re Std. 
Jury Instr. in Civ. Cases—Report No. 13-01, 160 So. 3d at 877. 
 
However, in analyzing causation, the Third District conflated this element 
with the Third Restatement’s definition of a design defect, requiring a plaintiff to 
show that SG-210 Calidria asbestos was more dangerous than raw asbestos in 
causing mesothelioma.  First, the use of the Third Restatement’s definition of a 
design defect is contrary to the consumer expectations test, as set forth in the 
Second Restatement.  Under the consumer expectations test, a product is 
considered to be defective “where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s 
hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be 
unreasonably dangerous to him.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. g. 
(1965).  Second, causation addresses only whether the defect caused the harm.  
The proper test of causation is not to compare the dangerousness of one product 
with another unreasonably dangerous product. 
Our review of the record demonstrates that the trial court correctly refused to 
direct a verdict for Union Carbide on its design defect claim because Aubin did in 
fact present sufficient evidence on causation to allow this claim to be considered 
by the jury.  In applying the correct standard for causation, Aubin was merely 
 
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required to show that the defective design of the SG-210 Calidria directly and in 
natural and continuous sequence produced or contributed substantially to 
producing Aubin’s mesothelioma, so that it can reasonably be said that, but for the 
defect, the injury would not have occurred.  
The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that, as to the design of the SG-
210 Calidria, Union Carbide specifically mined the short fiber form of chrysotile 
asbestos and subjected this asbestos to a “proprietary manufacturing process” in 
order to yield “essentially a pure asbestos fiber content” that had a unique shape 
and physical structure.  Union Carbide then created different grades based on the 
asbestos, including a resin grade for nonaqueous markets and a standard grade.  
SG-210 Calidria was distinctive in that it was subjected to the centrifuge process 
twice, which was significant to the manufacturing process, given that the more 
times chrysotile asbestos passed through this system, the more the fibers were 
pulled apart from each other, thereby increasing the efficiency of the product.  This 
material, unlike raw asbestos, was specifically designed to be incorporated into 
such products as joint compounds and texture sprays.  Further, Union Carbide was 
aware that using joint compounds and texture sprays, for which SG-210 Calidria 
was produced, would create respirable dust and thus be a more likely cause of both 
asbestosis and mesothelioma.  Aubin presented expert testimony that opined 
 
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exposure to respirable Calidria fibers causes mesothelioma.  This evidence was 
sufficient to permit the jury to make the determination pertaining to causation. 
Because we conclude that Aubin presented sufficient evidence to avoid a 
directed verdict on causation, the Third District erred as a matter of law in taking 
this issue away from the jury.  See Cox v. St. Josephs Hosp., 71 So. 3d 795, 800-01 
(Fla. 2011).  
III.  Whether the Third District Erred in Determining that Union Carbide 
Was Entitled to Jury Instructions on Failure to Warn End Users 
 
In the final issue, Aubin asserts that the Third District erred in determining 
that Union Carbide was entitled to a new trial based on a jury instruction pertaining 
to its duty to warn the end user and the failure to instruct on the learned 
intermediary defense.  In analyzing this issue, we first review the learned 
intermediary defense and determine that Union Carbide could present this defense 
to the jury.  We then consider whether the trial court erred in failing to give the 
proposed instruction on the learned intermediary defense and determine that the 
trial court did not err because the requested jury instruction pertaining to this 
defense was misleading.  We conclude that granting a new trial on this issue was 
error. 
A.  Union Carbide’s Duty to Warn and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
 
Both Aubin and Union Carbide requested special instructions based on the 
fact that Union Carbide supplied its asbestos product to intermediary 
 
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manufacturers, which used the asbestos to produce the final products, such as joint 
compounds, purchased by the end users.  The parties disagreed, however, on the 
state of the law regarding the duty to warn end users, and each submitted proposed 
jury instructions pertaining to the duty to warn.  Aubin requested the trial court to 
include a general instruction that Union Carbide had the duty to warn the end user, 
while Union Carbide asserted that it was entitled to an instruction pertaining to the 
learned intermediary defense and whether Union Carbide had fulfilled its duty to 
warn by warning the intermediaries as to the dangers.   
As correctly stated in Kavanaugh, Union Carbide “as a bulk supplier of 
asbestos, had a duty to warn of the danger of its product.”  Kavanaugh, 879 So. 2d 
at 44.  “Under the Second Restatement, [Union Carbide] is liable if it knowingly 
placed a dangerous product on the market, the dangerous condition of which is 
unnoticeable, and failed to properly warn of the dangerous condition.”  Id.  The 
manufacturer may be able to rely on an intermediary to relay the warnings to the 
end user but the intermediary must be “learned”; that is, “one who has knowledge 
of the danger and whose position vis-a-vis the manufacturer and consumer, confers 
a duty to convey the requisite warnings to the consumer.”  Kavanaugh, 879 So. 2d 
at 44 (quoting Brito v. Cty. of Palm Beach, 753 So. 2d 109, 111 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1998)).  However, as the Third District has recognized, the “learned intermediary 
doctrine” is not a complete defense and explained that the “intermediary’s level of 
 
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education, knowledge, expertise, and relationship with the end-users is 
informative, but not dispositive, on the issue of whether it was reasonable for the 
manufacturer to rely on that intermediary to relay the warning to end users.”  
Aubin, 97 So. 3d at 900. 
The Second and Third Restatements both recognize that a manufacturer may 
be able to rely on an intermediary to relay warnings to the end user, but the critical 
inquiry is whether the manufacturer was reasonable in relying on the intermediary 
to fully warn the end user and whether the manufacturer fully warned the 
intermediary of the dangers in its product.  The Second Restatement sets forth a list 
of non-exclusive factors: “Here, as in every case which involves the determination 
of the precautions which must be taken to satisfy the requirements of reasonable 
care, the magnitude of the risk involved must be compared with the burden which 
would be imposed by requiring them (see § 291), and the magnitude of the risk is 
determined not only by the chance that some harm may result but also the serious 
or trivial character of the harm which is likely to result.”  Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 388 cmt. n (1965).  The Third Restatement likewise states, “The standard is 
one of reasonableness in the circumstances.  Among the factors to be considered 
are the gravity of the risks posed by the product, the likelihood that the 
intermediary will convey the information to the ultimate user, and the feasibility 
 
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and effectiveness of giving a warning directly to the user.”  See Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 2, cmt. i (1998). 
 
Further, in certain instances, warnings from a supplier to a manufacturer 
alone are insufficient, as explained in the Second Restatement: 
If, however, the third person is known to be careless or inconsiderate 
or if the purpose for which the chattel is to be used is to his advantage 
and knowledge of the true character of the chattel is likely to prevent 
its being used and so to deprive him of this advantage—as when 
goods so defective as to be unsalable are sold by a wholesaler to a 
retailer—the supplier of the chattel has reason to expect, or at least 
suspect, that the information will fail to reach those who are to use the 
chattel and whose safety depends upon their knowledge of its true 
character.  In such a case, the supplier may well be required to go 
further than to tell such a third person of the dangerous character of 
the article, or, if he fails to do so, to take the risk of being subjected to 
liability if the information is not brought home to those whom the 
supplier should expect to use the chattel.  Even though the supplier 
has no practicable opportunity to give this information directly and in 
person to those who are to use the chattel or share in its use, it is not 
unreasonable to require him to make good any harm which is caused 
by his using so unreliable a method of giving the information which is 
obviously necessary to make the chattel safe for those who use it and 
those in the vicinity of its use. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 cmt. l (1965). 
 
Thus, a manufacturer may not be able to reasonably rely on an intermediary 
to provide warnings if the manufacturer knows that the necessary warnings would 
render the product less valuable and provide an incentive to the intermediary to 
withhold the necessary information from the consumer.  Likewise, if the 
manufacturer, such as Union Carbide, did not adequately convey the danger to the 
 
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intermediary or take steps to ensure that the intermediary would adequately warn 
the end user, a manufacturer may not be reasonable in relying on an intermediary 
to pass along such a crucial warning to the end user.  The reasonableness of a 
manufacturer’s reliance on an intermediary to convey the warnings to the end user 
is also impacted by the dangerousness of the product.  In general, the greater the 
harm that the end user would be subjected to if proper warnings are not given, the 
less reasonable a manufacturer will be in relying on an intermediary to ensure that 
the warnings are fully and adequately communicated to the end user.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 cmt. l (1965) (“[I]f the danger involved in the 
ignorant use of a particular chattel is very great, it may be that the supplier does not 
exercise reasonable care in entrusting the communication of the necessary 
information to even a person whom he has good reason to believe to be careful.”).   
 
 In this case, the Third District concluded that under both the Second and 
Third Restatements, “the determination as to whether a bulk supplier may rely on 
an intermediary to warn end users is a question reserved for the trier of fact.”  
Aubin, 97 So. 3d at 900.  However, the Third District held that the trial court did 
not adequately inform the jury about the learned intermediary defense and further 
observed that the trial court may have relied on the decision in McConnell, which 
incorrectly concluded that the learned intermediary defense “is not applicable to 
 
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Calidria Asbestos and Ready-Mix with its hidden measure of asbestos.”  Aubin, 97 
So. 3d at 904 n.6 (quoting McConnell, 937 So. 2d at 156).   
The Third District explained the error in McConnell, which was based upon 
a flawed reading of the decision in Kavanaugh: 
The Kavanaugh court concluded that it was for the jury to weigh 
whether the warnings provided to the manufacturer who integrated 
Union Carbide’s product were adequate and whether Union Carbide 
discharged its duty to end users.  It also appears that the McConnell 
court may have transformed the affirmation of the jury’s 
determination in Kavanaugh into a legal holding to be applied in all 
future cases involving Calidria asbestos.  Because such a holding 
would effectively preclude Union Carbide from litigating against 
future plaintiffs as to whether its reliance on intermediaries was 
reasonable, it comes perilously close to application of non-mutual, 
offensive collateral estoppel, which is impermissible in Florida. 
 
Aubin, 97 So. 3d at 904.  We agree that in McConnell, the Fourth District 
erroneously went farther than Kavanaugh and failed to recognize that determining 
whether the duty to warn the end user can be discharged by warning the 
intermediary was a jury question.  We therefore agree with the Third District that 
the learned intermediary defense is a doctrine that a manufacturer can use to argue 
to the jury that its duty to warn was fulfilled, provided that the evidence supports 
that defense and the jury instruction accurately explains the factors for the jury to 
consider in determining whether the manufacturer’s reliance was reasonable.  We 
disapprove of McConnell to the extent that it is inconsistent with our opinion here. 
 
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The Third District further concluded that because of the erroneous reliance 
on McConnell, the jury was not fully instructed on the learned intermediary 
defense and thus Union Carbide was entitled to a new trial in order to present its 
defense.  Accordingly, we analyze whether the jury instructions given in this case 
amount to reversible error and thus mandate a new trial. 
B.  Whether the Trial Court Erred in Instructing the Jury in this Case 
Generally, the applicable standard jury instructions are presumed correct and 
should be given unless such instructions are erroneous or inadequate.  See, e.g., 
Moss v. Kountry Kitchen of Key Largo, Inc., 952 So. 2d 558, 559 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2007); McConnell, 937 So. 2d at 153; Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1071 
(Fla. 2000) (“The standard jury instructions are presumed to be correct.”).  In this 
case, however, standard jury instructions did not exist pertaining to the failure to 
warn, so the parties proposed their own specific instructions.8   
                                          
 
 
8.  At the time of the trial, there were no standard instructions on failure to 
warn, and the instruction now approved for use by this Court does not address the 
issue of products distributed through intermediaries: 
403.8 STRICT LIABILITY FAILURE TO WARN 
A product is defective when the foreseeable risks of harm from 
the product could have been reduced or avoided by providing 
reasonable instructions or warnings, and the failure to provide those 
instructions or warnings makes the product unreasonably dangerous.