Case Title: State v. Jones

Citation: 2001-Ohio-57

Docket Number: 19981483

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 2001-Ohio-57.] 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. JONES, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 98-1483 — Submitted October 10, 2000 — Decided April 18, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Ashtabula County, No. 97-CR-221. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J.  On November 17, 1997, a dispatcher for 
the Ashtabula City Police Department advised officers that appellant Odraye G. 
Jones, an individual with outstanding felony warrants, had been spotted in the 900 
block of West 43rd Street in Ashtabula. A week earlier, appellant had told his 
cousin, Jimmie Lee Ruth, that he “was facing a lot of time for robbing Isaac 
Coleman” and that he “was going to shoot at the police if they ever tried to arrest 
him.” 
 
Officer William D. Glover, Jr., responded to the dispatcher’s call. Officer 
Glover found appellant with a friend, Anthony Gene Barksdale, and Jimmie Lee 
Ruth walking together on West 43rd Street. Officer Glover followed the three men 
to the home of one of their friends, Flo Chapman. Barksdale knocked on the door 
of the Chapman home while Ruth and appellant stood behind him on the porch. 
Officer Glover approached the Chapman home, got out of his car, and beckoned 
to appellant. Ruth testified that Officer Glover told appellant, “[C]ome on, you 
know why I’m here. I don’t want no problem. I’m just doing my job.” Appellant 
jumped off the side of the porch and began running down the side of the Chapman 
home. Officer Glover pursued him. Not long after the pursuit commenced, 
appellant turned around, pulled a .38 caliber revolver from his pocket, and began 
firing shots at Officer Glover. 
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After firing the first shot, appellant began to approach Officer Glover, 
firing several more shots. Officer Glover fell to the ground. Appellant turned and 
fled. He ran to a nearby fence and began to climb through a hole in it. Appellant 
then stopped, turned around, and ran back to where Officer Glover lay. Appellant 
kicked Officer Glover in the chest. The kick was done with such force that it left a 
large bruise on Officer Glover’s chest that was visible to the paramedics who later 
treated Officer Glover at the scene. After kicking Officer Glover, appellant fled 
the scene. 
 
As Officer Glover was pursuing appellant, another Ashtabula City Police 
Officer, Robert Stell, was en route in his patrol car. Officer Stell located appellant 
several blocks away from the scene of the shooting, still running. Officer Stell got 
out of his car and ordered appellant to stop. Appellant ignored the command and 
continued running. Officer Stell pursued appellant on foot. Appellant led Officer 
Stell into a nearby apartment complex. He stopped at the door of an apartment 
and began attempting to force his way inside. While appellant managed to 
squeeze part of his body through the door, the occupant of the apartment 
prevented appellant from fully entering. As appellant was struggling to enter the 
apartment, Officer Stell began to approach appellant. Officer Stell drew his 
weapon and ordered appellant to the ground. Appellant did not immediately 
respond. Appellant threw his revolver behind him. The gun landed in some nearby 
shrubbery. Officer Stell again ordered appellant to the ground and, this time, 
appellant complied. Officer Stell held appellant at gunpoint until assistance 
arrived. Officers recovered the weapon and appellant was placed under arrest. 
This gun was later matched to fired cartridge casings recovered at the scene of the 
shooting, live cartridges found on appellant at the time of his arrest, and bullets 
taken from Officer Glover’s body. All of the ammunition was hollow point. This 
type of ammunition is designed to open up on impact, causing larger wounds. 
January Term, 2001 
 
3 
 
Officer Glover had sustained gunshot wounds to the top of his head and to 
the area just below his right eye. He also sustained a bullet wound to his right 
shoulder. The gunshot wound to the top of Officer Glover’s head and the wound 
to his face were both fired from a distance of less than one foot. The suddenness 
of appellant’s attack had apparently caught Officer Glover by surprise. Officer 
Glover’s duty weapon was found in Officer Glover’s holster. The holster’s strap 
was snapped securely shut. 
 
Paramedics transported Officer Glover to Ashtabula County Medical 
Center for emergency treatment. After Officer Glover’s condition had been 
stabilized, he was life-flighted to Cleveland’s Metro-Health Hospital. X-rays and 
CT scans revealed substantial damage to Officer Glover’s brain. Officer Glover 
had severe cerebral swelling and profuse bleeding from his nose and mouth. 
Neurological assessments revealed minimal brain stem function. Officer Glover 
died from his gunshot wounds the following morning, November 18, 1997. 
 
The state charged appellant with the aggravated murder of Officer Glover 
with prior calculation and design. This charge carried with it four specifications. 
Under the first specification, appellant was charged with killing Officer Glover 
for the purpose of escaping apprehension for his earlier aggravated robbery 
offense (R.C. 2929.04[A][3]). The second and third specifications charged 
appellant with knowingly and purposefully causing the death of a law 
enforcement officer (R.C. 2929.04[A][6]). The fourth specification charged 
appellant with using a firearm in the killing of Officer Glover (R.C. 2941.145). 
 
Appellant was found guilty as charged in a jury trial, and the case 
proceeded to the penalty phase. The trial court merged the second and third death 
penalty specifications and instructed the jury to consider only the first and 
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second.1 Following a hearing, the jury recommended that appellant be sentenced 
to death. The trial court concurred. In addition to imposing the sentence of death, 
the trial court sentenced the defendant to a three-year mandatory term of 
imprisonment on the firearm specification. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
Appellant has raised fifteen propositions of law (see Appendix), which we 
have considered fully. We have considered the death penalty for appropriateness 
and proportionality and we have independently weighed the aggravating 
circumstances against the evidence presented in mitigation. For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm appellant’s convictions and the sentence imposed. 
PRETRIAL ISSUES 
Restrictions on Voir Dire 
 
In his first proposition of law, appellant argues that he should have been 
permitted to ask prospective jurors about their views on specific mitigating 
factors. Appellant suggests that the trial court’s refusal to permit this line of 
questioning left several jurors confused as to the meaning of mitigation. Appellant 
believes that his inability to ask about specific mitigating factors, coupled with 
juror confusion about the meaning of mitigation, limited his ability to uncover 
potential biases in prospective jurors and may have resulted in the empanelling of 
jurors who were unwilling to consider mitigating factors. 
 
During voir dire, a trial court is under no obligation to discuss, or to permit 
the attorneys to discuss, specific mitigating factors. See State v. Wilson (1996), 74 
Ohio St.3d 381, 385-386, 659 N.E.2d 292, 300-301; State v. Lundgren (1995), 73 
Ohio St.3d 474, 481, 653 N.E.2d 304, 315. Realistically, jurors cannot be asked to 
                                                          
 
1.  The fourth specification of which defendant was convicted, the firearm specification, is not an 
aggravating circumstance warranting the death penalty under R.C. 2929.04(A). The jury was 
therefore instructed to disregard this specification in the penalty phase. 
January Term, 2001 
 
5 
weigh specific factors until they have heard all the evidence and been fully 
instructed on the applicable law. Id. We reject appellant’s first proposition of law. 
Juror Bias 
 
In his third proposition of law, appellant contends that several errors 
committed during voir dire require us to order a retrial. First, appellant argues that 
the prosecutors’ use of peremptory challenges to exclude those jurors who 
expressed reservations about the death penalty denied him his right to a fair and 
impartial jury. This argument lacks merit. It is well established that “death-
qualifying a jury ‘does not deny a capital defendant a trial by an impartial jury.’ ” 
State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 315, 652 N.E.2d 988, 995, quoting 
State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, 
paragraph two of the syllabus. Indeed, prosecutors may even exclude a juror for 
cause when the juror’s views on capital punishment “would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with 
his instructions and his oath.” Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 433, 105 
S.Ct. 844, 857, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 857, followed in Dunlap at 315, 652 N.E.2d at 
995. 
 
Second, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to excuse two 
jurors for cause. The first juror is Juror Lance McCollum, who appellant suggests 
should have been dismissed sua sponte. Juror McCollum testified during voir dire 
that he had discussed the case with his ex-father-in-law, the former chief of police 
of Ashtabula. McCollum stated that he was, to some degree, biased against the 
defense. However, McCollum also stated that he would try to disregard the 
conversation with his ex-father-in-law, would decide the case only on the 
evidence, and would accord the accused the usual presumption of innocence. 
 
We find no error in the trial court’s decision not to excuse Juror 
McCollum. The conversation between McCollum and his ex-father-in-law did 
not, by itself, require McCollum’s exclusion. While fairness requires that jurors 
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be impartial, jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. 
State v. Sheppard (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 230, 235, 703 N.E.2d 286, 292. The trial 
court was entitled to accept McCollum’s assurances that he would be fair and 
impartial and would decide the case on the basis of the evidence.  “[D]eference 
must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.”  Wainwright, 469 
U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853, 83 L.Ed.2d at 853.  Furthermore, appellant has 
waived any potential error by failing to challenge the prospective juror at trial.  
State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 105, 684 N.E.2d 668, 685. 
 
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in denying a challenge for 
cause brought against another prospective juror, a Mr. Shears, who testified 
during voir dire that, according to his religious beliefs, one who takes the life of 
another should “automatically” lose his own life. However, Mr. Shears further 
testified that he would follow the law and that he was capable of considering a 
penalty less than death. 
 
Here again, the trial court’s determination that Juror Shears’s scriptural 
beliefs would not prevent or impair his ability to perform his duties as a juror is 
entitled to deference. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853, 83 L.Ed.2d 
at 853. Where, as here, a juror gives conflicting answers, it is for the trial court to 
determine which answer reflects the juror’s true state of mind. State v. Webb 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 325, 339, 638 N.E.2d 1023, 1035-1036. Appellant’s third 
proposition of law is overruled. 
Change of Venue 
 
Appellant argues in his fourth proposition of law that the trial court’s 
denial of his request to change venue violated his rights under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Appellant based his 
request for a change of venue on the fact that only a handful of the original jury 
pool were African-Americans and that none of these individuals found their way 
onto the jury. Defense counsel pointed out to the trial court that the demographics 
January Term, 2001 
 
7 
of Ashtabula County resulted in African-Americans being unable to serve. 
Defense counsel noted that in Ashtabula County, there is only one central area 
where most African-Americans live and that this is the area in which the crime 
occurred.  Thus, appellant’s counsel argued, holding the trial in Ashtabula County 
virtually eliminated African-Americans as potential jurors because most people in 
the area were either aware of the details of the crime or knew the parties or their 
families. The trial court rejected appellant’s request, relying upon a recent 
decision from this court, State v. Moore (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 22, 28, 689 N.E.2d 
1, 9, which held that it is constitutional to rely upon voter registration rolls as 
exclusive sources for jury selection, as the trial court did in the instant case. 
 
“[T]he selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the 
community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial.” Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522, 528, 95 S.Ct. 692, 697, 42 
L.Ed.2d 690, 697. However, the Sixth Amendment does not require that petit 
juries “mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the 
population.” Id. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 702, 42 L.E.2d at 703.  Under the Sixth 
Amendment, “[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular 
composition, * * * but the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from 
which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the 
community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.” Id. 
 
In Duren v. Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 
the United States Supreme Court held that in order to establish a prima facie 
violation of the Sixth Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement, a defendant 
must demonstrate “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ 
group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from 
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of 
such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to 
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Id. at 364, 99 
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S.Ct. at 668, 58 L.Ed.2d at 587. Accord State v. Fulton (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 120, 
566 N.E.2d 1195, paragraph two of the syllabus. 
 
In reviewing the propriety of appellant’s arguments concerning the jury 
venire in the instant case, we find that appellant has failed to establish all of the 
elements of a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement. 
 
Appellant has satisfied the first prong of the Duren analysis. For purposes 
of the fair cross-section analysis, African-Americans are a distinctive group. 
United States v. Buchanan (C.A.6, 2000), 213 F.3d 302, 310; United States v. 
Rioux (C.A.2, 1996), 97 F.3d 648, 654. However, appellant has not satisfied the 
remaining prongs of Duren. With respect to the second prong, for example, 
appellant has come forward with no evidence to suggest that African-Americans 
in Ashtabula County are unfairly represented in venires in relation to their number 
in the community. He merely alleges that African-Americans were not adequately 
represented on his particular venire and jury. 
 
Even if the appellant’s venire was underrepresentative, the appellant has 
not presented any evidence of “systematic exclusion” as required under the third 
prong of Duren. Appellant must do more than show that his particular panel was 
unrepresentative. Where, as here, the trial court relies upon voter registration lists, 
the 
defendant-appellant 
“must 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
voter-registration 
qualifications are suspect, or that the jury-selection procedure is administered in a 
discriminatory manner.” United States v. Ireland (C.A.8, 1995), 62 F.3d 227, 231. 
There is nothing inherently unconstitutional about using voter-registration rolls as 
exclusive sources for jury selection. Moore, 81 Ohio St.3d at 28, 689 N.E.2d at 9. 
Because appellant has failed to demonstrate systematic discrimination, we reject 
his Sixth Amendment claim. 
 
A defendant may also bring a federal equal protection challenge to the 
selection and composition of the petit jury. Fulton, 57 Ohio St.3d at 123-124, 566 
N.E.2d at 1200, citing Duren, 439 U.S. at 368, 99 S.Ct. at 670, 58 L.Ed.2d at 589, 
January Term, 2001 
 
9 
fn. 26. To establish this equal protection claim, the defendant must “adduc[e] 
statistical evidence which shows a significant discrepancy between the percentage 
of a certain class of people in the community and the percentage of that class on 
the jury venires, which evidence tends to show discriminatory purpose.” Id. This 
evidence is then subject to rebuttal evidence suggesting that either no 
discriminatory purpose was involved or that such purpose had no “determinative 
effect.” Id.; Duren, 439 U.S. at 368, 99 S.Ct. at 670, 58 L.Ed.2d at 589, fn. 26. 
 
The appellant has offered no statistical evidence showing a discrepancy 
between the percentage of African-Americans in Ashtabula County and the 
percentage of African-Americans on jury venires. We therefore reject appellant’s 
equal protection argument. Having rejected appellant’s arguments under the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, we find that the trial court did not err in denying 
appellant’s motion for a change of venue. 
Choice of Counsel 
 
In his fifth proposition of law, appellant argues that the trial court denied 
him the right to counsel guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. On May 14, 1998, approximately two hours after the jury was 
sworn, Attorney David Per Due filed an entry of appearance with the trial court. 
The following morning, a hearing was held. Present at this hearing were 
appellant’s court-appointed counsel, the prosecution, and Per Due. Appellant 
indicated to the trial court that he wanted Per Due to represent him. Appellant 
stated that he had a “conflict of interest” with the court-appointed attorneys who 
had been representing him to that point. Specifically, appellant felt that his court-
appointed attorneys were “mostly concerned with saving [his] life.” He further 
stated that “if [they] can’t win the case for me, then [they] can’t do nothing for 
me.” Appellant’s court-appointed attorneys explained to the trial court that their 
relationship with the appellant had been “pretty good” and that there existed an 
open line of communication between themselves and appellant. They 
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acknowledged appellant’s concern that they were not concentrating upon 
acquittal. They further noted that appellant was concerned that the relationship 
between themselves and the prosecution had, to that point, been too cordial. 
Appellant concurred with this assessment. 
 
The trial court offered to let Per Due assist appellant’s court-appointed 
counsel. However, the trial court would not allow Per Due to act as lead counsel 
because he had not been death-penalty certified by this court. When the court 
asked Per Due if he would be ready to commence with trial the following 
Monday, he responded, “Absolutely not.” Instead, Per Due requested a four-
month continuance. He further indicated that he would be unwilling to assist 
appellant’s court-appointed attorneys as third counsel. 
 
The court denied Per Due’s motions for entry and a continuance, 
concluding that the relationship between appellant and his court-appointed 
attorneys did not warrant a change in counsel. The court further concluded that 
the request for continuance was made in bad faith and for purposes of delay. The 
trial court noted that there had never been, up to that point, any indication that 
there was a lack of cooperation or trust between appellant and his attorneys. 
 
“The grant or denial of a continuance is a matter [that] is entrusted to the 
broad, sound discretion of the trial judge. An appellate court must not reverse the 
denial of a continuance unless there has been an abuse of discretion.” State v. 
Unger (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67, 21 O.O.3d 41, 43, 423 N.E.2d 1078, 1080. In 
evaluating a motion for a continuance, a trial court should consider, inter alia, the 
length of the delay requested; the inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, 
opposing counsel, and the court; and whether the requested delay is for legitimate 
reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived. Id. at 67-68, 21 O.O.3d 
at 43, 423 N.E.2d at 1080. 
 
The trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in denying the 
motion for continuance. Because the trial had already commenced, the lengthy 
January Term, 2001 
 
11 
delay requested by appellant and Per Due would have greatly inconvenienced 
everyone involved in the case, including the witnesses, the prosecution, the trial 
court, and the jury, which had already been sworn. Given the timing of the 
motion, and the fact that appellant had never, up to that point, expressed any 
concerns about his court-appointed counsel, it was reasonable for the trial court to 
conclude that the continuance was requested in bad faith and for purposes of 
delay. 
 
Because Per Due adamantly refused to immediately proceed with trial, the 
trial court’s refusal to grant the continuance effectively denied appellant the 
services of Per Due. We reject appellant’s contention that this denial violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
 
“[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one’s preferred attorney 
is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is 
to guarantee an effective advocate * * * rather than to ensure that a defendant will 
inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.” Wheat v. United 
States (1988), 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140, 148. 
Thus, “[a] defendant has only a presumptive right to employ his own chosen 
counsel.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Keenan (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 133, 137, 689 
N.E.2d 929, 937. Factors to consider in deciding whether a trial court erred in 
denying a defendant’s motion to substitute counsel include “the timeliness of the 
motion; the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and 
whether the conflict between the attorney and client was so great that it resulted in 
a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.” United States v. 
Jennings (C.A.6, 1996), 83 F.3d 145, 148. In addition, courts should “balanc[e] * 
* * the accused’s right to counsel of his choice and the public’s interest in the 
prompt and efficient administration of justice.” Id.  Decisions relating to the 
substitution of counsel are within the sound discretion of the trial court. Wheat, 
486 U.S. at 164, 108 S.Ct. at 1700, 100 L.Ed.2d at  152. 
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The trial court conducted an extensive inquiry into the appellant’s 
relationship with his court-appointed counsel. The record supports the trial court’s 
determination that any problems between appellant and his attorneys had not led 
to a total lack of communication. Indeed, both appellant and his attorneys agreed 
that the lines of communication between them were open. In balancing the 
accused’s right to the representation of his chosen counsel against the interests of 
the public in the prompt and efficient administration of justice, the trial court 
correctly found that the public’s interests outweighed those of the appellant. 
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to 
substitute Per Due for court-appointed counsel. We must therefore overrule 
appellant’s fifth proposition of law. 
TRIAL ISSUES 
Admissibility of Evidence 
 
In his sixth proposition of law, appellant argues that the trial court erred 
during the guilt phase in admitting evidence concerning the efforts made to save 
Officer Glover’s life. Specifically, appellant challenges the admission of evidence 
concerning Officer’s Glover’s difficulty in breathing, his internal bleeding and 
brain injury, and the consultations between medical personnel and Officer 
Glover’s family. Appellant also challenges the introduction of Officer Glover’s 
medical records. Appellant contends that this evidence was both irrelevant and 
unduly prejudicial. Because appellant’s counsel failed to object to the admission 
of this evidence at trial, he now waives all but plain error. State v. Joseph (1995), 
73 Ohio St.3d 450, 455, 653 N.E.2d 285, 291. “Plain error does not exist unless, 
but for the error, the outcome at trial would have been different.” Id. 
 
For the most part, the medical evidence that appellant now challenges 
illustrated the nature and circumstances of the crime, including the physical 
condition and circumstances of the victim. This type of evidence is relevant and 
admissible. State v. Lorraine (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 414, 420, 613 N.E.2d 212, 
January Term, 2001 
 
13 
218. “The victi[m] cannot be separated from the crime.” Id. at 420, 613 N.E.2d at 
218-219. Furthermore, evidence detailing the impact of the crime on the victim’s 
family is admissible when, as here, it is coupled with evidence depicting the 
circumstances surrounding the crime. State v. Fautenberry (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 
435, 440, 650 N.E.2d 878, 883. 
 
Assuming, arguendo, that the medical evidence admitted by the trial court 
was unduly prejudicial or cumulative in nature, we find that its admission does 
not constitute plain error. There is no doubt that the jury would have convicted 
appellant even if it had never been presented with this evidence. The evidence 
produced at trial clearly established that the appellant committed the charged 
crimes. As for admission of this medical evidence at the sentencing phase, we 
find that, given the severity of the aggravating circumstances, admission of the 
medical evidence could not have had a determinative effect upon the trial court’s 
sentencing decision. In sum, we conclude that admission of the medical evidence, 
even if error, did not work to the material prejudice of the appellant. Therefore, 
appellant’s sixth proposition of law is overruled. 
 
In his seventh proposition of law, appellant points to three items of 
evidence that he believes should not have been admitted at trial. Appellant 
contends that the admission of this evidence constituted reversible error. 
 
The first item of evidence consists of testimony from Officer Stell, the 
arresting officer. On direct examination, the prosecution examined Officer Stell 
regarding the day of the shooting and the moment at which he recognized 
appellant and began his foot pursuit. The prosecution asked Officer Stell to 
explain how he was able to recognize appellant. Officer Stell responded, “[F]rom 
times we have had him in our jail.” Defense counsel objected. The trial court 
sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard Officer Stell’s 
comment about appellant’s being in jail. 
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Appellant also challenges testimony from Anthony Barksdale. During the 
prosecution’s redirect examination of this witness, the prosecution asked whether 
the witness had been given a lie detector test. Defense counsel objected, but 
before the court could rule, the witness responded affirmatively. The trial court 
sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the question. The trial 
court also admonished the prosecution not to make any further references to the 
lie detector test.2  The defense counsel moved the trial court for a mistrial. The 
trial court did not grant this motion. 
 
With respect to the testimony of both Officer Stell and Anthony 
Barksdale, we find no error in the trial court’s reliance upon curative instructions 
and its refusal to grant a mistrial in response to Barksdale’s testimony. The jury is 
presumed to have followed the court’s instructions. State v. Raglin (1998), 83 
Ohio St.3d 253, 264, 699 N.E.2d 482, 492. 
 
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain 
“inflammatory statements” made by appellant. Specifically, appellant refers to the 
following statement he made just prior to arraignment: “If I had my SKS [Russian 
assault rifle], I would have killed 16 of you mother fuckers,” referring to the 
police. Appellant also objects to the admission of his statement to Jimmie Lee 
Ruth that appellant “was going to shoot at the police if they ever tried to arrest 
him.” Appellant contends that, under Evid.R. 403(A),3 these statements should 
not have been admitted because their potential prejudicial effect substantially 
outweighed their probative value. We disagree. 
                                                          
 
2.  In Ohio, the results of a polygraph examination are admissible in evidence in a criminal trial for 
purposes of corroboration or impeachment only when the prosecution and defense stipulate to 
their admissibility. State v. Souel (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 123, 7 O.O.3d 207, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 
syllabus. 
3.  Evid.R. 403(A) provides: “Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of 
misleading the jury.” 
January Term, 2001 
 
15 
 
Both statements were of considerable probative value. Appellant’s first 
statement regarding his assault rifle and what he would do with it helped to prove 
appellant’s identity as the shooter in this case and helped to establish his intent to 
kill a police officer. Similarly, appellant’s statement to Jimmie Lee Ruth helped to 
establish that he killed Officer Glover with prior calculation and design. It also 
tended to support the state’s charges that appellant’s specific purpose was to kill a 
police officer and that he killed to escape apprehension for aggravated robbery. 
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that the probative 
value of these statements outweighed their potential prejudicial effect. We reject 
appellant’s seventh proposition of law. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
In his eighth proposition of law, appellant argues that the state failed to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he killed Officer Glover with prior 
calculation and design. According to appellant, the trial court erred in submitting 
this issue to the jury. 
 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal 
conviction, the relevant inquiry is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Stallings (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 289, 731 N.E.2d 159, 171. “[T]he phrase 
‘prior calculation and design’ * * * indicate[s] studied care in planning or 
analyzing the means of the crime as well as a scheme encompassing the death of 
the victim.” State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 19, 676 N.E.2d 82, 88. The 
amount of care or time that the defendant spends in planning and analyzing the 
crime are not critical factors in themselves; however, they “must amount to more 
than momentary deliberation.” Id.  In short, there is no bright-line test for 
determining the existence of prior calculation and design. Id. at 20, 676 N.E.2d at 
89. “[E]ach case turns on the particular facts and evidence presented at trial.” Id. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Whether a defendant’s prior statement of intent to kill a police officer 
constitutes evidence of prior calculation and design depends largely upon the 
totality of other facts and circumstances surrounding the killing. In State v. Reed 
(1981), 65 Ohio St.2d 117, 120-121, 19 O.O.3d 311, 313-314, 418 N.E.2d 1359, 
1362-1363, we held that a defendant’s isolated statement that “if a cop got in his 
way [during a robbery] he would blow him away” did not, by itself, establish 
prior calculation and design when the totality of the facts and circumstances 
indicated that the killing resulted from an instantaneous deliberation. More 
recently, in State v. White (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 16, 24, 693 N.E.2d 772, 779-780, 
we suggested that such statements could be used to establish prior calculation and 
design. The distinguishing factor in the White decision was the presence of other 
evidence establishing prior calculation and design. Unlike in Reed, the 
defendant’s threat to kill a police officer in White was repeated several times. In 
White, there was also evidence presented at trial indicating that the defendant, 
who was on probation, would do whatever necessary to avoid being returned to 
prison. Here, as in White, the totality of facts and circumstances surrounding the 
killing, including the manner in which appellant killed Officer Glover, clearly 
indicates that appellant’s act of killing was not an instantaneous decision and that 
his prior statement of intent to kill a police officer was not merely an idle threat. 
Accordingly, we are willing to consider appellant’s threat as evidence of prior 
calculation and design. 
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we 
find that the jury could have found the element of prior calculation and design 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Shortly before the murder, appellant informed 
his cousin that he “was going to shoot at the police if they ever tried to arrest 
him.” On the day of the murder, appellant was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. 
When approached by the police, appellant followed up on his promise to his 
cousin, executing Officer Glover with two point-blank gunshots to the head. This 
January Term, 2001 
 
17 
evidence clearly establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant killed 
Officer Glover with prior calculation and design. 
 
Appellant also argues in his eighth proposition of law that the state failed 
to prove that he killed Officer Glover for the purpose of escaping apprehension 
for aggravated robbery, the first death penalty specification. Appellant contends 
that the prosecution bore the burden of proving his commission of the aggravated 
robbery offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
The state argues that appellant waived this claim by failing to raise the 
issue at trial. We disagree. Appellant’s “not guilty” plea preserved his right to 
object to the alleged insufficiency of the evidence proving the prior offense. See 
State v. Carter (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 218, 223, 594 N.E.2d 595, 599. 
 
R.C. 2929.04 sets forth the criteria for imposing the sentence of death for 
the commission of a capital offense. The statute provides that the death penalty 
may be imposed when it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the capital 
offense “was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, 
or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.” (Emphasis added.) 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(3). Appellant contends that, under this statute, the state must 
prove that the defendant committed the offense for which he sought to avoid 
apprehension by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree. 
 
Appellant’s interpretation of R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) is consistent with both 
the statute’s plain language and established constitutional law. R.C. 2929.04(A) 
plainly states that all of the aggravating circumstances listed therein, including 
that contained in subsection (A)(3), must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Indeed, conviction under any lesser standard of proof would be inconsistent with 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. It is axiomatic that the state must prove each and every element of 
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560; In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368. We find that the defendant’s commission of the prior 
offense constitutes an essential element of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) specification. 
Had the General Assembly intended that the death penalty be applied to those 
who simply attempt to avoid apprehension on a warrant, it would not have 
included the words “committed by the offender.” 
 
We conclude, however, that in the case sub judice, the state proved, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant had committed the prior offense for 
which he sought to avoid apprehension. The state introduced evidence that a week 
before the killing, appellant told his cousin Jimmie Ruth that he “was facing a lot 
of time for robbing Isaac Coleman.” Appellant’s admission proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he committed the prior offense of aggravated robbery. We 
therefore affirm appellant’s conviction on the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) specification. 
Trial Phase Instructions 
 
In his ninth proposition of law, appellant challenges three jury 
instructions. Because appellant failed to object to these instructions during the 
trial, he now waives all but plain error. Joseph, 73 Ohio St.3d at 455, 653 N.E.2d 
at 291. 
 
Appellant challenges the trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction, which 
the court recited verbatim from R.C. 2901.05(D). Appellant argues that this 
instruction unconstitutionally permits juries to convict upon a standard of proof 
below proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We summarily reject this argument. We 
have repeatedly affirmed the constitutionality of R.C. 2901.05(D)’s definition of 
reasonable doubt. See State v. Hessler (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 115, 734 
N.E.2d 1237, 1246; State v. Getsy (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 202, 702 N.E.2d 
866, 888. 
 
Appellant also challenges the trial court’s instruction on the two separate 
elements of purpose and prior calculation and design. Appellant argues that the 
January Term, 2001 
 
19 
court’s instruction equated the two concepts and essentially directed a verdict on 
the element of prior calculation and design. 
 
The record does not support appellant’s contention that the trial court 
equated purpose with prior calculation and design. The court defined “purpose” as 
“a decision of the mind to do an act with a conscious objective of producing a 
specific result.” It noted that the terms “purpose” and “intent” are synonymous. 
While the court went on to explain how the element of “prior calculation and 
design” relates to the element of “purpose,” the court’s instruction in no way 
confused these elements. The court explained that “prior calculation and design” 
means that “the purpose to cause the death was reached by a definite process of 
reasoning in advance of the homicide, which process of reasoning must have 
included a mental plan involving studied consideration of the method and means 
with which to cause the death of another.” The court further explained that prior 
calculation and design includes “planning,” “a scheme designed to carry out the 
calculated decision to cause the death.” Finally, the court noted that prior 
calculation and design does not include “spur of the moment” decisions. We find 
no error in these instructions. The instructions are consistent with the standardized 
Ohio Jury Instructions and our own definitions of these elements. See 4 Ohio Jury 
Instructions (1997), Sections 409.01 and 503.01(A)(4); R.C. 2901.22(A) (defining 
“purposeful” action); State v. Cotton (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 8, 10 O.O.3d 4, 381 
N.E.2d 190, paragraph three of the syllabus (defining “prior calculation and 
design”). 
 
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court improperly shifted the burden 
of proof from the state to the defense when it instructed the jury to deliberate on 
the guilt “or innocence” of appellant. The trial court instructed the jury that in the 
guilt phase of the trial they should “not consider at this time or in any way discuss 
the subject matter of punishment.” The court instructed the jury that its duty was 
“confined to the determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
Appellant contends that a reasonable jury would have understood this instruction 
to mean that the defendant bore the burden of putting forward evidence of his 
innocence. 
 
We disagree with appellant’s suggestion that the trial court’s instruction 
effectively shifted the burden of proof from the state to the defendant. Any 
reasonable juror would have taken the instruction as nothing more than a warning 
not to consider punishment during the guilt phase. “A single instruction to a jury 
may not be judged in artificial isolation but must be viewed in the context of the 
overall charge.” State v. Price (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 14 O.O.3d 379, 398 
N.E.2d 772, paragraph four of the syllabus. Given the trial court’s repeated 
instruction to the jury that the state bore the burden of proving guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, no reasonable juror could have concluded that the single 
instruction set forth above shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. 
SENTENCING ISSUES 
Duplicative Death Penalty Specifications 
 
In his tenth proposition of law, appellant argues that the trial court erred in 
failing to merge the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) and (A)(6) death penalty specifications. 
These specifications represent, respectively, killing to escape apprehension and 
killing a law enforcement officer. 
 
Where two or more aggravating circumstances arise from the same act or 
indivisible course of conduct, they are duplicative and must be merged for 
purposes of sentencing. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 
264, paragraph five of the syllabus. Merger is not required when the aggravating 
circumstances arise from a divisible course of conduct. State v. Robb (2000), 88 
Ohio St.3d 59, 85, 723 N.E.2d 1019, 1047. 
 
Appellant’s act of fleeing and his killing of Officer Glover were part of a 
divisible course of conduct. Therefore, merger of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) and 
(A)(6) death penalty specifications was unnecessary. Appellant’s purpose to 
January Term, 2001 
 
21 
escape apprehension for his prior robbery offense is demonstrated by his fleeing 
when Officer Glover approached him at the Chapman home. Although appellant 
killed Officer Glover after fleeing, the circumstances surrounding the killing 
reveal that it was a distinct, divisible act. When appellant had drawn his weapon 
and aimed it at Officer Glover, he had stopped running. Appellant fired shots at 
Officer Glover while walking toward him. Appellant’s killing of Officer Glover 
was clearly a separate act, which demonstrated a separate animus. The killing was 
in no way implicit in appellant’s decision to flee Officer Glover. Id. See, also, 
White, 82 Ohio St.3d 16, 693 N.E.2d 772 (R.C. 2929.04[A][3] and [A][6] 
specifications treated as separate). 
Penalty Phase Instructions 
 
In his twelfth proposition of law, appellant challenges several of the trial 
court’s instructions to the jury at the penalty phase. First, appellant argues that the 
trial court erred when it instructed the jury that “only that testimony and evidence 
which was presented in the first phase that is relevant to the aggravating 
circumstances [appellant] was found guilty of committing, or to any of the 
mitigating factors that will be described below, is to be considered by you.” 
Appellant suggests that this instruction improperly permitted the jury to determine 
what evidence was relevant. Because appellant failed to raise this issue in the trial 
court, he waives all but plain error. Joseph, 73 Ohio St.3d at 455, 653 N.E.2d at 
291. We find no plain error here. 
 
The trial court’s instruction was ambiguous as to whether relevance was to 
be determined by the court or the jury. We agree that the trial court’s instruction 
could reasonably be interpreted by one or more members of the jury as implying 
that it was their responsibility to determine the relevance of evidence presented 
during the first phase of trial. Of course, jurors may also have interpreted the 
court’s statement as instructing them to consider only that evidence that the court 
deemed relevant. This interpretation is particularly plausible given that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
immediately after the trial court gave the challenged instruction, it further 
instructed the jury that it would allow it to consider during deliberations only 
those exhibits which it, as the trial court, determined to be relevant. 
 
To the extent that the jury interpreted the trial court’s instruction as 
allowing them to determine relevancy, the trial court misled the jury. It is “the 
trial court’s responsibility, not the jury’s, to determine what evidence [is] 
relevant.” Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d at 201, 702 N.E.2d at 887. We find, however, that 
the trial court’s misstatement did not prejudice the outcome of this case. Much of 
the trial phase evidence was relevant at the sentencing phase because it was 
related to the aggravating circumstances, the nature and circumstances of the 
offense, and the asserted mitigating factors. See State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio 
St.3d 413, 653 N.E.2d 253, syllabus. Moreover, we find that the aggravating 
circumstances in this case outweigh the mitigating evidence. Therefore, no basis 
exists for finding outcome-determinative plain error in the trial court’s instruction 
on relevance. 
 
Appellant also challenges, in his twelfth proposition of law, the trial 
court’s denial of defense counsel’s requested instruction that a sole juror could 
prevent a verdict of death. We find no error in the trial court’s instruction.  Trial 
courts must instruct juries that “[i]n Ohio, a solitary juror may prevent a death 
penalty recommendation by finding that the aggravating circumstances in the case 
do not outweigh the mitigating factors.” State v. Brooks (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 
148, 162, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 1042. In advising juries of the need for a unanimous 
verdict, no specific language has to be used as long as the “substance” of what the 
jury must determine is included in the charge given. See State v. Goff (1998), 82 
Ohio St.3d 123, 129, 694 N.E.2d 916, 922. 
 
The substance of the trial court’s charge adequately conveyed the need for 
unanimity. The court instructed the jury that “[i]n order for you to decide that the 
sentence of death shall be imposed upon [the appellant], the State of Ohio has the 
January Term, 2001 
 
23 
burden to prove to each member of this jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
aggravating circumstances * * * outweigh the factors in mitigation.” At another 
point in its charge, the trial court instructed that “all twelve members” of the jury 
had to find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigation before death 
could be imposed. Finally, the trial court instructed that the jury had to consider 
life sentence options “if any one or more of you conclude the State has failed to 
prove that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors.” The 
need for a unanimous verdict was more than adequately conveyed by these 
instructions. 
 
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court denied him due process of law 
when it failed to instruct the jury on the issue of sympathy. We summarily reject 
this argument. It is well established that sympathy and mercy are not relevant 
sentencing criteria. See Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 30, 676 N.E.2d at 96; State v. 
Allen (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 638, 653 N.E.2d 675, 687. 
Constitutional Error in the Trial Court’s Sentencing Opinion 
 
In his fourteenth proposition of law, appellant challenges two aspects of 
the trial court’s sentencing opinion. First, appellant contends that the court failed 
to properly consider psychological evidence submitted under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) requires trial courts to consider, in addition to the specific 
mitigating factors set forth in R.C. 2929.04(B), “[a]ny other factors that are 
relevant to the issue of whether the offender should be sentenced to death.” 
 
We conclude that the trial court thoroughly considered the evidence 
submitted by the appellant under R.C. 2929.04(B)(7). The trial court made 
specific findings as to the existence of appellant’s psychological disorders as 
required under R.C. 2929.03(F). The court found that this mitigation evidence 
was entitled to little weight. Specifically, the court weighed against appellant’s 
mitigation evidence other evidence that appellant’s psychological disorders did 
not prevent him from understanding the criminality of his conduct or conforming 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
his conduct to the requirements of the law. The trial court concluded that this 
evidence, along with evidence that appellant was fairly sophisticated and 
intelligent, required that the psychological disorders be accorded little weight. The 
court acted well within its discretion in making this determination. “ ‘[T]he 
assessment and weight to be given mitigating evidence are matters for the trial 
court’s determination.’ ” State v. Mitts (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 223, 235, 690 
N.E.2d 522, 532, quoting State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 171, 555 
N.E.2d 293, 305. 
 
Appellant contends that the trial court’s reference to appellant’s ability to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law suggests that the court 
confused appellant’s psychological evidence, offered by the defense under the 
R.C. 2929.04(B)(7) catchall provision, with evidence offered under R.C. 
2929.04(B)(3), a provision that makes the defendant’s ability to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law a mitigating factor. Appellant’s argument 
lacks any merit. We fail to see how the trial court’s alleged weighing of the 
psychological evidence under (B)(3) rather than (B)(7) could possibly have 
prejudiced the appellant, especially in light of the fact that the trial court weighed 
the psychological evidence against other evidence unrelated to (B)(3), namely, 
appellant’s intelligence. In any event, “[t]he process of weighing mitigating 
factors * * * is a matter for the discretion of the individual decisionmaker.” State 
v. Fox (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 193, 631 N.E.2d 124, 132. We find no abuse of 
that discretion here. 
 
In his fourteenth proposition of law, appellant also argues that the trial 
court improperly accorded “exceptional weight” to the fact that the victim in this 
case was a law enforcement officer—the R.C. 2929.04(A)(6) aggravating 
circumstance. Appellant accuses the trial court of creating “a kind of ‘super’ 
aggravating circumstance that no amount of mitigation could outweigh.” 
Specifically, appellant challenges the trial court’s statement that “the act of killing 
January Term, 2001 
 
25 
a police officer who, in the pursuit of his duties is attempting to apprehend a 
person accused of a felony crime, strikes at the very heart of the justice system.” 
 
We reject appellant’s argument. The trial court never suggested that the 
mitigating evidence in this case could not outweigh this aggravating factor. The 
trial court’s statement regarding the severity of killing a police officer was not 
improper. Courts are certainly entitled to consider the gravity of the aggravating 
circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Keene (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 671, 693 
N.E.2d 246, 266-267 (noting that the killing of a witness in order to avoid 
prosecution is an act that strikes at the heart of the criminal justice system); State 
v. Coleman (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 129, 145, 707 N.E.2d 476, 491. 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
 
In his eleventh proposition of law, appellant contends that prosecutorial 
misconduct at several stages of his trial denied him due process of law. First, 
appellant argues that the prosecution engaged in misconduct when, during voir 
dire, it informed prospective jurors that they could determine what evidence was 
mitigating. Because appellant failed to raise this objection during trial, he now 
waives all but plain error. Joseph, 73 Ohio St.3d at 455, 653 N.E.2d at 291. 
 
We find no error, plain or otherwise, in the prosecution’s statements to 
prospective jurors regarding mitigation. The prosecution merely reminded 
prospective jurors that it was their duty to determine what evidence does in fact 
mitigate the appellant’s crime and what weight to give this evidence. This was not 
improper. “Prosecutors can urge the merits of their cause and legitimately argue 
that defense mitigation evidence is worthy of little or no weight.” Wilson, 74 Ohio 
St.3d at 399, 659 N.E.2d at 309. The prosecution’s statements correctly 
summarized the law on mitigation. “[T]he jury * * * may properly choose to 
assign absolutely no weight to * * * evidence if it considers it to be non-
mitigating.” State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 129, 31 OBR 273, 289, 
509 N.E.2d 383, 399. Even if the prosecution’s statements were improper, we can 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
find no plain error here. Statements made during voir dire cannot reasonably be 
thought to affect sentencing verdicts. See Darden v. Wainwright (1986), 477 U.S. 
168, 183-184, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2472-2473, 91 L.Ed.2d 144, 158-159, fn. 15. 
 
Appellant also cites as prosecutorial misconduct the prosecution’s remark, 
made in its opening statement of the penalty phase and essentially repeated in 
closing, that “there can be no mitigating factors which outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances of the murder of a police officer in order to escape apprehension 
for another crime or the murder of a police officer while doing his duty.” Here 
again, appellant has waived all but plain error. 
 
We reject appellant’s contention that the prosecution’s statement 
constituted misconduct. As noted above, prosecutors are permitted to urge the 
merits of their cause and, in so doing, are permitted to argue that defense 
mitigation evidence is entitled to no weight. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d at 399, 659 
N.E.2d at 309. It is difficult for prosecutors to argue vigorously for the death 
penalty without making what might arguably be statements of personal opinion. A 
prosecutor may offer his or her opinion if it is based on the evidence presented at 
trial. State v. Stephens (1970), 24 Ohio St.2d 76, 83, 53 O.O.2d 182, 186, 263 
N.E.2d 773, 777. Finally, we note that any potential error here was cured by the 
trial court’s instruction to the jury that statements and arguments made by the 
attorneys are not evidence. State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 562, 687 
N.E.2d 685, 702. 
 
Last, appellant argues that the prosecution engaged in misconduct when, 
during the cross-examination of a witness, it implied that appellant had been 
involved in another homicide. During the cross-examination of a witness named 
Charles See, the prosecution elicited information that an acquaintance of the 
appellant, Emasio Hull, had been involved in an altercation with the appellant and 
had, during this altercation, hit the appellant in the head with a hammer. The 
prosecution then asked the witness whether he was aware of the fact that, after 
January Term, 2001 
 
27 
this incident, Hull was murdered. Defense counsel objected. The trial court 
sustained the objection and informed the jury to disregard the question because 
Hull’s murder had no relevancy to the matter before it. 
 
In light of the trial court’s sustaining of defense counsel’s objection and 
the trial court’s subsequent instruction to the jury, we find no prejudicial error in 
the prosecution’s question. Juries are presumed to follow trial court instructions. 
Raglin, 83 Ohio St.3d at 264, 699 N.E.2d at 492. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
 
In his thirteenth proposition of law, appellant argues that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the pretrial, trial, and penalty phases. To 
win a reversal on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must 
show, first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, that the 
deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693. Accord State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 
538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus. “To show that a defendant has 
been prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, the defendant must prove 
that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the 
result of the trial would have been different.” Id., paragraph three of the syllabus. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Pretrial and Trial Phases 
 
Appellant raises several alleged instances of ineffective assistance during 
the pretrial and trial phases. First, appellant contends that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel when, during voir dire, his counsel failed to move that Juror 
McCollum be excused for cause on the basis of that juror’s alleged bias. Above, 
we noted that juror McCollum indicated to the trial court that, if selected as a 
juror, he would follow the law and would assume appellant’s innocence. We have 
already held that the trial court did not err in declining to excuse this juror sua 
sponte. Thus, defense counsel could quite reasonably have concluded that a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
motion to dismiss Juror McCollum for cause would not have been successful. 
“Counsel need not raise meritless issues or even all arguably meritorious issues.” 
Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 31, 676 N.E.2d at 97. The record reveals that defense 
counsel instead used one of its peremptory challenges to exclude Juror 
McCollum. These kinds of tactical decisions fall “well within the range of 
professionally reasonable judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699, 104 S.Ct. at 
2070, 80 L.Ed.2d at 701. 
 
As a second instance of ineffective assistance, appellant points to defense 
counsel’s failure to object to the admission of evidence regarding Officer 
Glover’s medical treatment and the efforts to save his life. We have already 
thoroughly discussed this issue and have concluded that this evidence was 
relevant and admissible as evidence illustrating the nature and circumstances of 
the crime. Again, counsel need not raise meritless issues or even all arguably 
meritorious issues for that matter. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 31, 676 N.E.2d at 97. 
Accordingly, defense counsel’s failure to object did not constitute deficient 
performance. 
 
Third, appellant challenges defense counsel’s failure to move for merger 
of the second and third death penalty specifications until after the guilt phase of 
the trial had concluded, at which time defense counsel moved for, and was 
granted, merger. These death penalty specifications constituted duplicative 
aggravating circumstances under R.C. 2929.04(A)(6) and did in fact have to be 
merged. See Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 199-200, 15 OBR 311, 341-342, 473 
N.E.2d 264, 296-297. However, we do not believe that defense counsel acted 
unreasonably in waiting until the penalty phase to move for merger. Certainly, 
this tactical decision caused no prejudice to the appellant. 
 
Finally, appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance when 
defense counsel failed to move for dismissal of the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) death 
penalty specification. We have held that the prosecution proved each element of 
January Term, 2001 
 
29 
this specification by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, there was no 
basis for moving to dismiss this specification and, hence, no ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Taylor, 78 Ohio St.3d at 31, 676 N.E.2d at 97 (counsel need not raise 
meritless objections). 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty Phase 
 
Appellant raises four alleged instances of ineffective assistance at the 
penalty phase of his trial. First, appellant challenges defense counsel’s failure to 
object when the trial court instructed the jurors that they had to determine what 
evidence was relevant. We have already examined this instruction and concluded 
that the instruction could reasonably have been interpreted by jurors to mean that 
they were to consider only evidence deemed relevant by the trial court. Certainly, 
defense counsel could reasonably have attached the same meaning to the trial 
court’s statement and declined to object for this reason. In any event, we have 
already determined that this instruction did not prejudice the outcome of the case. 
 
Second, appellant challenges defense counsel’s failure to object when the 
prosecution informed jurors that no amount of mitigation could outweigh the 
killing of a police officer. We have already held that these statements from the 
prosecution were not improper. The statements did not warrant an objection. 
 
Third, appellant argues that defense counsel should have objected to 
allegedly “irrelevant” exhibits, photos, and medical evidence relating to Officer’s 
Glover’s wounds and treatment. We have concluded that much of this evidence 
was relevant and admissible because it illustrated the nature and circumstances of 
the crime. Moreover, given the serious nature of the aggravating circumstances, 
the admission of some or all of this evidence could not have affected the outcome 
of the trial. 
 
Finally, appellant argues that he was provided ineffective assistance when 
defense counsel failed to emphasize to the jury specific facts from mitigation 
exhibits submitted to the jury. Specifically, appellant challenges defense counsel’s 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
30 
failure to point out that, just before appellant was born, a physician had referred to 
appellant’s mother as noncommunicative and in need of guidance. Appellant also 
challenges defense counsel’s failure to point out to the jury that appellant’s 
mother had committed suicide by intentional drug overdose. The record indicates 
that appellant’s defense counsel had presented an abundance of evidence 
regarding appellant’s mother, including her inability to form an attachment with 
appellant and the effect her suicide had upon him. The subtle tactical choices that 
appellant now challenges were decisions that lay within the realm of 
professionally reasonable judgment. We further find that defense counsel’s failure 
to highlight to the jury specific items of mitigation contained in exhibits submitted 
to it could not have affected the outcome of the trial, especially in light of the 
weight and gravity of the aggravating circumstances. 
 
We have reviewed each of appellant’s alleged instances of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and conclude that appellant received constitutionally 
adequate representation at each phase of his trial. Accordingly, we reject 
appellant’s thirteenth proposition of law. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OHIO’S DEATH PENALTY LAW 
 
In his fifteenth and final proposition of law, appellant raises several 
constitutional challenges to Ohio’s death penalty law, which we summarily reject. 
Appellant’s arguments have been rejected in numerous previous decisions issued 
by this court. See, e.g., State v. Hill (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 195, 201, 661 N.E.2d 
1068, 1076; State v. Coleman (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 308-309, 544 N.E.2d 
622, 633-634. 
INDEPENDENT SENTENCE EVALUATION 
 
Having considered appellant’s propositions of law, we must now 
independently review the death sentence for appropriateness and proportionality. 
We find beyond a reasonable doubt that the balance of aggravating circumstances 
against mitigating factors in this case weighs in favor of a death sentence. 
January Term, 2001 
 
31 
 
Much of appellant’s mitigation evidence focused upon his relationship 
with his mother. In mitigation, appellant presented testimony that he was born to 
an eighteen-year-old mother who foisted the bulk of his care onto others. 
Appellant’s primary caregiver was his foster grandmother, Theresa Lyons. 
Appellant had no relationship with his father. Nor did appellant have any positive 
male role models in his life. Appellant’s natural mother was a drug user. Her legal 
and substance abuse problems caused her to drift in and out of her son’s life. 
When appellant was only six years old, his mother was incarcerated for theft. 
When appellant was thirteen, his mother died from a drug overdose, an apparent 
suicide. The testimony of several witnesses suggests that the death of his mother 
was a turning point in appellant’s life. Appellant became involved with gangs and 
began to run afoul of the law. He was frequently truant from school until he was 
expelled. Testimonial evidence in the record suggests that appellant suffers from 
antisocial personality and attachment disorders, which may have created in 
appellant an inability to empathize and a tendency to violate the rights of others. 
 
Appellant’s mitigation evidence suggests that violence and death have 
characterized much of appellant’s life. Both his grandmother and great-
grandmother, for example, died from gunshot wounds. Like his mother, a cousin, 
who was a close friend to appellant, committed suicide. One of his own daughters 
died young. An uncle is in prison serving time for murder. At the age of sixteen, 
appellant was severely beaten and robbed by someone he had considered to be a 
friend. 
 
Nothing in the nature and circumstances of the offense mitigates the 
appellant’s crime. A mere week before he killed Officer Glover, appellant 
professed to his cousin that he would kill any officer who attempted to arrest him. 
To this end, appellant armed himself with a .38 caliber revolver and loaded it with 
hollow point bullets, a particularly deadly form of ammunition. Appellant 
displayed chilling mercilessness in his killing of Officer Glover, firing the fatal 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
32 
shots at point-blank range. He then fled the scene, stopping only to kick the 
wounded and defenseless officer. Appellant surrendered only when all available 
means of escape had been exhausted. 
 
Upon review of the evidence in mitigation, it appears that appellant had a 
chaotic and troubled childhood. We find that appellant’s background and 
personality disorders are entitled to some weight in mitigation. See State v. 
Johnson (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 95, 123, 723 N.E.2d 1054, 1078. At the time he 
committed this offense, appellant was twenty-one years old. Appellant’s relative 
youth is entitled to some, but minimal, weight in mitigation. Id. Nothing in the 
nature and circumstances of the crime is mitigating. 
 
We determine that the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) and (A)(6) aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors presented. In order to escape 
apprehension for his prior aggravated robbery offense, appellant knowingly killed 
a police officer who was, at the time, engaged in his professional duties. After 
considerable thought and review, we conclude that these aggravating 
circumstances outweigh the mitigating evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
We have undertaken a comparison of the sentence imposed in this case to 
those in which we have previously upheld the sentence of death and have found 
that the appellant’s death sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the 
sentence imposed in similar cases. See, e.g., White, 82 Ohio St.3d 16, 693 N.E.2d 
772; State v. Glenn (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 451, 28 OBR 501, 504 N.E.2d 701. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and 
uphold the sentence of death. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur separately. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2001 
 
33 
 
COOK, J., concurring. Like the majority, I would affirm 
appellant’s convictions and death sentence.  I respectfully disagree, however, with 
the majority’s conclusion that the aggravating circumstance in R.C. 
2929.04(A)(3) requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the offense for which he sought to avoid apprehension. 
I 
 
The (A)(3) specification requires the state to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the capital offense was committed for a particular purpose—“for the 
purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another 
offense committed by the offender.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2929.04(A)(3).  
The (A)(3) specification enhances the potential penalty for aggravated murder 
based on the offender’s mens rea—the offender’s purpose—not the actus reus of 
a collateral offense.  Cf.  Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), 530 U.S. 466, ___, 120 
S.Ct. 2348, 2364, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, 457 (finding that, under a New Jersey hate 
crime statute, “it is precisely a particular criminal mens rea that the * * * 
enhancement statute seeks to target”). 
 
A comparison between the (A)(3) specification and our state’s kidnapping 
statute illustrates the distinction between a core mens rea requirement (an 
element) and a collateral offense.  The kidnapping statute provides: 
 
“No person * * * shall remove another from the place where the other 
person is found * * * for any of the following purposes: 
 
“ * * * 
 
“(4) To engage in sexual activity * * * with the victim against the victim’s 
will.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2905.01(A)(4). 
 
Like the (A)(3) specification, the kidnapping statute requires the state to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the offender acted with a specific purpose.  
In State v. Powell (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 255, 552 N.E.2d 191 (superseded by 
constitutional amendment on other grounds as noted in State v. Smith [1997], 80 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
34 
Ohio St.3d 89, 103, 684 N.E.2d 668, 684), the appellant claimed that his 
conviction for kidnapping under this section was improper because there was 
insufficient evidence to prove that sexual activity actually occurred.  This court 
unanimously rejected Powell’s contention, deciding that the kidnapping statute 
“requires only that the restraint or removal occur for the purpose of non-
consensual sexual activity—not that sexual activity actually take place.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id., 49 Ohio St.3d at 262, 552 N.E.2d at 199.  The same logic 
should apply to this court’s analysis of the (A)(3) specification. 
 
The (A)(3) specification has appeared in over forty cases decided by this 
court since 1976.4  Like the majority, Jones cites none of them in his brief as 
support for his contention that commission of the collateral offense must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Both the majority and Jones simply cite the 
general rules from Winship and Jackson that the state has the burden to prove all 
the elements of any charge beyond a reasonable doubt.  See In re Winship (1970), 
397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368;  Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 
U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.  Because I do not agree with the 
majority that the modifying phrase “committed by the offender” constitutes an 
element of the (A)(3) specification, I do not find the constitutional rules of 
Winship and Jackson offended by Jones’s conviction of the specification absent 
proof that he committed the underlying offense. 
 
In the present case, the state introduced evidence that Jones had 
outstanding felony warrants.  The state also showed that a week before the killing, 
Jones told his cousin that he was “facing a lot of time for robbing Isaac Coleman,” 
and that he “was going to shoot at the police if they ever tried to arrest him.”  This 
is exactly what occurred.  When Officer Glover told Jones, “[Y]ou know why I’m 
                                                          
 
4.  See, e.g., State v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 714 N.E.2d 867; State v. Chinn (1999), 
85 Ohio St.3d 548, 709 N.E.2d 1166; State v. Lawson (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 336, 595 N.E.2d 902; 
State v. Hancock (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 147, 2 O.O.3d 333, 358 N.E.2d 273. 
January Term, 2001 
 
35 
here, * * * I’m just doing my job,” Jones fled, eventually shooting and then 
viciously kicking Officer Glover.  The state proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Jones fled and killed Officer Glover to escape apprehension for another 
offense.  It was unnecessary for the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Jones actually committed the other offense, and it is therefore unnecessary for this 
court to decide, as the majority does, that the state met this burden of proof by 
introducing the single “admission” Jones made to his cousin.5  As one annotation 
has put it, “[p]roof that a law enforcement officer was killed in the course of an 
investigation or arrest has been uniformly held sufficient to establish that the 
murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest.”  
Annotation (1988), 64 A.L.R.4th 755, 763. 
II 
 
I would also resolve Jones’s tenth proposition of law somewhat differently 
from the majority.  In his tenth proposition, Jones contends that the trial court 
erred when it failed to merge the R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) and (A)(6) death penalty 
specifications.  Death specifications are duplicative and should be merged when 
they arise from the same act or indivisible course of conduct.  State v. Jenkins 
                                                          
 
5.  The majority decides that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones actually 
committed the prior offense of aggravated robbery.  The majority states that Jones’s “admission” 
to his cousin that he was “facing a lot of time for robbing Isaac Coleman” was all the evidence that 
the state needed to introduce in order to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones actually 
committed the aggravated robbery.  Under the majority’s analysis, if the state charges someone 
with aggravated robbery, the state may discharge its burden of proof in the case solely by 
introducing the testimony of a witness (not necessarily an eyewitness), who merely testifies that 
the accused said that he was “facing a lot of time” for robbery—an offense that differs 
significantly from aggravated robbery.  Compare R.C. 2911.01 and R.C. 2911.02.  Though I deem 
it unnecessary to resolve this issue in the first place, see supra, I feel compelled to disagree with 
the majority’s conclusion that Jones’s statement to his cousin sufficed, in and of itself, to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones committed aggravated robbery.  In this state, to convict 
someone of aggravated robbery, the state must prove, inter alia, either (1) that the offender had a 
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance on or about his person, R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) and (2), or (2) 
that the offender inflicted or attempted to inflict serious physical harm.  R.C. 2911.01(A)(3).  
Jones’s “admission” to his cousin did not contain any information tending to prove these elements 
of aggravated robbery.  Accordingly, even if I agreed with the majority’s threshold determination 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
36 
(1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264, paragraph five of the 
syllabus.  Merger is not required when the specifications are not duplicative or 
arise from divisible courses of conduct.  See State v. Robb (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 
59, 85, 723 N.E.2d 1019, 1047 (declining to merge [A][4], [A][5], and [A][7] 
specifications).  A trial court’s failure to merge duplicative aggravating 
circumstances does not always result in reversible error.  State v. Garner (1995), 
74 Ohio St.3d 49, 53-55, 656 N.E.2d 623, 630-631, citing Jenkins, at paragraph 
five of the syllabus.  Rather, the reviewing court must determine “whether the 
jury’s penalty-phase consideration of those duplicative aggravating circumstances 
affected its verdict, and [must] independently determine whether the merged 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Id. at 53, 656 N.E.2d at 630. 
 
Here, Jones was convicted of three capital specifications—one (A)(3) 
specification and two (A)(6) specifications.  The trial court did merge the two 
(A)(6) specifications, and thus presented one (A)(3) specification and one (A)(6) 
specification to the jury in the penalty phase.  The majority decides that merger of 
the (A)(3) and (A)(6) specifications was not required, but I find it unnecessary to 
resolve this issue here.  Assuming, arguendo, that specifications (A)(3) and (A)(6) 
arose from an indivisible course of conduct, and that the trial court should have 
merged them, I would nevertheless conclude that the failure to do so “did not 
influence the jury to recommend death [where] it would otherwise have 
recommended life.”   Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d at 54, 656 N.E.2d at 631.  As in 
Garner, merger of the specifications “would not have significantly changed the 
nature of the evidence the jury was statutorily required to consider in making its 
recommendation as to a possible sentence of death.”  Id.  Accordingly, I would 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
that the defendant’s commission of the prior offense constitutes an essential element of the (A)(3) 
specification, which I do not, I could not join its analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence. 
January Term, 2001 
 
37 
overrule appellant’s tenth proposition of law without deciding the merger 
question. 
III 
 
Assessing appellant’s thirteenth proposition of law, the majority concludes 
that because the state proved each element of the (A)(3) specification beyond a 
reasonable doubt, “there was no basis for moving to dismiss this specification.”   I 
agree that Jones’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail, but not 
because I share the majority’s view that the state proved each element of the 
(A)(3) specification beyond a reasonable doubt.  See fn. 5, supra.  Because the 
trial court was not required to dismiss the (A)(3) specification, counsel’s failure to 
request dismissal cannot be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concur in the foregoing 
concurring opinion. 
__________________ 
APPENDIX 
 
“Proposition of Law No. I: A capital defendant’s right to a reliable death 
sentence under the Eighth Amendment as well as his right to a fair and impartial 
jury under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment are violated when the defendant is prohibited, or unduly restricted 
from asking questions during voir dire about the prospective jurors’ ability to 
consider mitigating factors. U.S. Const. Amends. VIII and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. II: The death sentence must be vacated where 
mitigating factors are not outweighed by the aggravating circumstances. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. III: Retrial is required where errors that occurred 
during voir dire denied a capital appellant a fair and impartial jury. U.S. Const. 
Amends. VI, VIII and XIV. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
38 
 
“Proposition of Law No. IV: Denial of a change of venue based upon 
racial imbalance of the jury deprived the appellant of a fair trial. U.S. Const. 
Amends. VI and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. V: When a trial court denies a capital defendant 
his counsel of choice, the trial court deprives that defendant of his rights to 
counsel and to due process as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and §§ 10 and 16, Article I of the 
Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VI: The admission of irrelevant evidence about 
the extraordinary efforts made to save the victim’s life denied appellant due 
process and constituted plain error at both phases of this capital trial. U.S. Const. 
Amends. VIII and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VII: Where multiple evidentiary errors in the trial 
phase prejudice the defendant, the conviction must be reversed. U.S. Const. 
Amend. XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. VIII: The state must present evidence of a 
deliberate plan to kill in order to sustain a conviction for a killing with prior 
calculation and design under Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2903.01(A). The state must 
also present evidence on all essential elements of the charged specifications. U.S. 
Const. Amends. VI, VIII and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. IX: A defendant’s conviction must be reversed 
when multiple errors in the trial phase instructions denied him a fair trial and due 
process of law. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. X: Where it is alleged that a defendant killed a 
police officer to prevent the defendant’s arrest for another offense, the § 
2929.04(A)(3) and (A)(6) aggravating circumstances are duplicative and must be 
merged because they arise from the same act or indivisible course of conduct. 
U.S. Const. Amends. VIII and XIV. 
January Term, 2001 
 
39 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XI: Misconduct by the prosecutor at Odraye 
Jones’s capital trial denied him due process of law and undermines confidence in 
the trial and the sentencing verdict. U.S. Const. [Amends.] VIII and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XII: Where penalty phase instructions allow the 
jury to decide what evidence is admissible concerning the aggravating 
circumstances and where the instructions do not conform to Ohio and federal law, 
reversal is required. U.S. Const. Amend[s]. VIII and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XIII: Counsel’s performance will be deemed 
ineffective if it falls below an objective standard of reasonable representation and 
prejudice arises therefrom. U.S. Const. Amends. VI and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XIV: Resentencing is required where the trial 
court fails to accord weight to (B)(7) mitigating evidence because it does not 
qualify as (B)(3) and the court weighs the (A)(6) as a super aggravating 
circumstance. U.S. Const. Amends. VIII and XIV. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. XV: Ohio’s death penalty law is unconstitutional. 
The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and §§ 2, 9, 10 and 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution establish 
the requirements for a valid death penalty scheme. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. §§ 
2903.01, 2929.02, 2929.021, 2929.022, 2929.023, 2929.03, 2929.04 and 2929.05 
(Anderson 1996), do not meet the prescribed constitutional requirements and are 
unconstitutional on their face and as applied to Odraye Jones.” 
__________________ 
 
Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ariana E. 
Tarighati, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, State Public Defender, and Stephen A. Ferrell, 
Assistant Public Defender; and Robert A. Dixon, for appellant. 
__________________