Case Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Nosan

Citation: 2006-Ohio-163

Docket Number: 20051184

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Nosan, 108 Ohio St.3d 99, 2006-Ohio-163.] 
 
 
CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. NOSAN. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Nosan, 108 Ohio St.3d 99, 2006-Ohio-163.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Aiding a nonlawyer in the practice of law —
Sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer —Forming a partnership with a 
nonlawyer — Charging a clearly excessive fee — Six-month suspension 
stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2005-1184 — Submitted August 23, 2005 — Decided February 1, 2006.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 03-059. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Bernard J. Nosan of Broadview Heights, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0032097, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1973.  On July 2, 2003, relator, Cleveland Bar Association, charged respondent in 
a two-count complaint with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  
Respondent answered, and a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances 
and Discipline heard the cause and made findings of misconduct and a 
recommendation, which the board adopted. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 2} Both counts arose from respondent’s affiliation during 1997 
through 1999 with Financial Services Management Corporation of Las Vegas, 
Nevada (“FSMC”), a company that provided consumer-debt-consolidation 
services and debt-relief advice. 
Count I 
{¶ 3} The board found that respondent’s working arrangement with 
FSMC resulted in violations of DR 3-101(A) (a lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
in the unauthorized practice of law), 3-102(A) (in general, a lawyer shall not share 
legal fees with a nonlawyer), and 3-103(A) (a lawyer shall not form a partnership 
with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice 
of law). 
{¶ 4} In 1997, when respondent began working with the company, 
FSMC associated with attorneys to offer consumers help in managing their 
financial problems.  FSMC leased office space for the associated attorneys, 
arranged advertising for their services, and provided support staff.  In exchange 
for these business expenses, the attorney shared clients’ legal fees with FSMC. 
{¶ 5} Respondent entered into this arrangement with FSMC.  He kept 
office space in Cleveland and Akron where a nonlawyer intake interviewer would 
meet with a financially troubled client and, using computer software, determine 
whether to recommend a debt-repayment plan or bankruptcy.  The interviewer 
would also explain the services that respondent and FSMC offered, review the 
client’s financial records, and set up a payment plan.  On the few occasions that 
the client could not afford to repay the debts, the intake officer would refer the 
client to respondent to explore bankruptcy options. 
{¶ 6} Documents supplied to the consumers-turned-respondent’s-clients 
bore his “Bernard J. Nosan, Esq., Attorney at Law” letterhead; however, 
respondent did not prepare the documents or any forms that were used by his 
intake staff.  In addition, respondent rarely talked with any of the clients who 
signed up for the debt-management advice that the intake interviewer provided in 
conjunction with FSMC.  In fact, respondent could recall at the panel hearing only 
a few times that he had had any personal contact with the many clients whom he 
supposedly represented. 
{¶ 7} Respondent charged his clients a fee for establishing their 
repayment plan.  Upon payment, he deposited the fees into his client trust account 
and wrote two checks: one to FSMC for 75 percent of the collected fee and the 
January Term, 2006 
3 
other to himself for the remaining 25 percent.  Respondent and FSMC took their 
fees before any creditors were paid, requiring the client to bank that sum first. 
Count II 
{¶ 8} Dwight Edmond went to respondent’s Cleveland office in 
December 1997 looking for a lawyer to help him file bankruptcy.  Believing that 
he was retaining legal representation, Edmond discussed with respondent’s intake 
staff ways to manage his debt, which he estimated to be around $30,000.  Edmond 
wanted to file for bankruptcy but couldn’t pay the filing fee, so the intake 
interviewer suggested a plan to save up money for the bankruptcy fee and, in the 
meantime, keep his creditors at bay.  The plan required Edmond to mail $156 
every two weeks to respondent’s office.  Edmond also signed a contract with 
“Bernard J. Nosan Attorney at Law,” in which he agreed to a $485 consulting and 
setup fee, among other, lesser charges. 
{¶ 9} Over the next year, Edmond paid respondent and FSMC $425 in 
installments, none of which went to creditors.  At some point, Edmond lost his job 
and could not keep up the $156 payments.  At first, respondent’s staff told 
Edmond to continue paying whatever amount he was able.  Later, the telephone 
number that Edmond had for respondent’s office was disconnected, and no one 
replied to his letter to the Akron office.  Edmond eventually hired an attorney who 
completed the bankruptcy process on his behalf. 
{¶ 10} The board found that in representing Edmond, respondent had 
violated DR 2-106(A) (a lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or 
collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee) and 2-106(B) (a fee is clearly excessive 
when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with 
a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee). 
Sanction 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
{¶ 11} In recommending a sanction for this misconduct, the board 
weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors of respondent’s case.  See Section 
10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and 
Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
(“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
{¶ 12} The board found as a mitigating factor that respondent, who has 
nearly stopped practicing law and is living on Social Security retirement benefits, 
had no prior disciplinary record.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a).  The board also 
noted that respondent had not acted dishonestly in associating with FSMC, with 
whom he is no longer connected, because he did not understand that their 
arrangement violated the Disciplinary Rules.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(b).  As 
an aggravating factor, however, the board noted respondent’s inability to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(g).  The board also found respondent’s failure to refund Edmond’s 
money to be an aggravating factor. 
{¶ 13} Relator suggested that respondent’s license to practice be 
suspended for six months.  Respondent did not believe that he had violated any 
Disciplinary Rules. 
{¶ 14} Adopting the panel’s report, the board recommended that 
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months, with the 
suspension stayed on the condition that he repay Edmond $425.  The board relied 
in part on Wayne Cty. Bar Assn. v. Naumoff (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 637, 660 
N.E.2d 1177, in which we suspended a lawyer’s license for six months because he 
advised clients about their estate-planning options, without ever having met them, 
based solely on worksheets completed by a referring tax preparer.  Because 
respondent, unlike Naumoff, has no history of professional discipline, the board 
recommended a stayed six-month suspension for respondent. 
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶ 15} Neither respondent nor relator objects to the board’s recommended 
sanction. 
Review 
{¶ 16} Respondent allowed nonattorneys in his office to counsel clients 
about how to protect their legal interests through bankruptcy or some other 
financial plan.  He also impermissibly associated and shared fees with a 
nonlawyer, creating the impression through his professional status that his clients’ 
interests were being protected in accordance with the ethical and competency 
standards of the legal profession.  We therefore agree that he violated DR 3-
101(A), 3-102(A), and 3-103(A), as found by the board.  Moreover, because 
Edmond paid respondent $425 and got nothing for his fee, we find that respondent 
violated DR 2-106(A). 
{¶ 17} Respondent abandoned his professional responsibility to oversee 
and safeguard his clients’ individual interests by fronting for a business that 
profited from the sale of debt-management services to consumers.  His 
misconduct is thus similar to cases in which we have sanctioned lawyers for 
aiding nonattorneys in the sale or marketing of living trusts.  In Cincinnati Bar 
Assn. v. Kathman (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 92, 748 N.E.2d 1091, we suspended a 
lawyer from the practice of law for six months in a case of first impression.  In 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Fishman, 98 Ohio St.3d 172, 2002-Ohio-7086, 781 N.E.2d 
204, we suspended a lawyer for one year because he had set up his clients as sales 
prospects for other financial products in addition to a living trust and was largely 
unrepentant for his misconduct.  In Columbus Bar Assn. v. Moreland, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 492, 2002-Ohio-6726, 780 N.E.2d 579, we publicly reprimanded a 
relatively unseasoned and contrite lawyer for his involvement in a living-trust 
marketing scheme. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶ 18} Respondent has been in practice for many years, and yet he still 
has difficulty understanding that he acted unethically, a circumstance that 
distinguishes this case from Moreland.  On the other hand, respondent did not 
compromise his clients’ interests to the extent that he targeted them for sales, and 
that factor distinguishes his case from Fishman.  The six-month suspension 
imposed in Kathman served to deter other lawyers from relinquishing their 
professional responsibilities to laypersons.  Moreover, because respondent and 
FSMC are no longer in business together and the board recommended it, we find 
a conditional stay of the six-month suspension appropriate in this case. 
{¶ 19} Respondent is therefore suspended from the practice of law for six 
months; however, this suspension is stayed on the condition that he commit no 
further misconduct within the suspension period and that he repay Edmond $425 
within 60 days of our order.  If respondent violates these conditions, the stay will 
be lifted and respondent shall serve the entire six-month suspension.  Costs are 
taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR and 
LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Buckley King and Douglas N. Barr, for relator. 
 
Bernard J. Nosan, pro se. 
_______________________