Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Gonzalez

Citation: 2014-Ohio-851

Docket Number: 2013-0222

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gonzalez, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-851.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-851 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. GONZALEZ. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Gonzalez,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-851.] 
Attorney discipline—Failure to notify clients of lack of malpractice insurance—
Commingling—Failure to maintain records for trust account—
Withdrawal from representation without permission of court—Failure to 
cooperate in disciplinary proceeding—Two-year suspension with one year 
stayed. 
(No. 2013-0222—Submitted June 5, 2013—Decided March 11, 2014.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 12-048. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Vincent Ferdinand Gonzalez of Cleveland, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0008558, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1974.  In 2000, we publicly reprimanded him for using undignified language and 
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shouting at another attorney during negotiations before a domestic-relations court 
magistrate.  Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Gonzalez, 89 Ohio St.3d 470, 733 N.E.2d 
587 (2000). 
{¶ 2} In 2012, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Gonzalez with 
commingling personal and client funds in his client trust account, failing to 
maintain records of client-related expenditures, misappropriating a portion of a 
client’s settlement award, and abandoning another client on the final day of trial.  
Although Gonzalez stipulated to many of the allegations in relator’s amended 
complaint, he denied that most of his actions violated the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  After a hearing, a three-member panel of the Board of Commissioners 
on Grievances and Discipline issued a report finding that Gonzalez had 
committed most of the charged misconduct and recommending that we 
indefinitely suspend him from the practice of law in Ohio, with reinstatement 
conditioned on restitution to a former client.  The board adopted the panel’s report 
and recommendation in its entirety. 
{¶ 3} Gonzalez objects to the board’s findings of misconduct in three of 
the seven counts against him.  Upon our review of the record, we sustain 
Gonzalez’s objections in part and overrule them in part and find that the 
appropriate sanction in this case is a two-year suspension with the second year 
stayed and payment of restitution as a condition of reinstatement. 
Misconduct 
Count one—notice of lack of liability insurance 
{¶ 4} Gonzalez is a solo practitioner concentrating in the areas of domestic 
relations, criminal defense, civil litigation, real estate, and personal injury.  He has 
not maintained professional liability insurance since February 2007.  Under 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c), if a lawyer does not maintain professional liability insurance 
over certain amounts, the lawyer must notify clients of this fact on a “separate 
form * * * signed by the client.”  The prescribed “separate form” is set forth at the 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
end of Prof.Cond.R. 1.4.  At the panel hearing, Gonzalez testified that he notified 
clients in his fee contract that he did not carry malpractice insurance, but at oral 
argument, he acknowledged that he does not always use a fee or retainer contract.  
Because Gonzalez did not use the prescribed separate notice form, the board 
found, and we agree, that Gonzalez violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c). 
Count two—commingling personal and client funds 
{¶ 5} In 2009, a jury awarded damages to Gonzalez’s wife in a personal-
injury case filed by her and Gonzalez.  In July 2009, Gonzalez deposited his 
wife’s award of $122,169.86 into his client trust account, and by the end of 
August 2009, Gonzalez had disbursed $38,065 to pay their attorney’s fees and 
$50,500 to himself, his wife, and to cash.  Gonzalez, however, kept the remaining 
amount of his wife’s personal jury award, $33,604.86, in his client trust account, 
and over the next five months, he issued 25 checks drawn on his trust account to 
various individuals and entities for personal items and services.  For example, in 
September 2009, he issued trust-account checks for car repairs and to purchase 
kitchen cabinets; in November 2009, he issued a trust-account check for chimney 
work; and in January 2010, he issued a trust-account check for tile work.  During 
that same time period, Gonzalez held another client’s funds in his trust account.  
As a result, the board found that Gonzalez violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) 
(requiring a lawyer to hold property of clients in an interest-bearing client trust 
account, separate from the lawyer’s own property).  Relator also charged 
Gonzalez with violating Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging 
in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  The 
board, however, recommends that we dismiss the charge under Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(h) because Gonzalez did not mishandle or misappropriate any of the client’s 
funds commingled with his wife’s personal funds.  We accept the board’s 
recommendation and hereby dismiss the alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) 
in count two. 
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Gonzalez’s objections 
{¶ 6} Gonzalez appears to object to the board’s findings here, stating in 
his brief that the trust-account disbursements from his wife’s settlement were 
requested by her, that he “did not hold money for clients,” and that his trust 
account was “primarily used for insurance settlements.”  Whether Gonzalez’s 
wife authorized the trust-account disbursements, however, is irrelevant to the 
alleged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a).  The problem was that Gonzalez held 
his wife’s personal funds in his trust account for five months, during which time 
period he had also deposited client funds.  Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) expressly requires 
a lawyer to hold property of clients “separate from the lawyer’s own property” in 
an interest-bearing account.  In addition, Gonzalez’s objection that he did not 
“hold money for clients” in his trust account is contradicted by the record.  During 
the board proceedings, Gonzalez stipulated and testified that at the time he kept 
his wife’s personal funds in his trust account, he had also deposited funds 
belonging to a client in that account.  Accordingly, Gonzalez’s objections to the 
board’s findings in count two are overruled, and we agree that Gonzalez violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a). 
Count three—Fernando Perez matter 
{¶ 7} On October 21, 2010, Gonzalez deposited a $20,000 settlement 
check into his trust account on behalf of Fernando Perez, whom Gonzalez 
represented in a personal-injury case.  Over the next two weeks, Gonzalez 
disbursed $6,000 to himself for his attorney fees in the Perez matter, $5,000 to a 
doctor related to Perez’s case, and $7,697.73 to Perez.  Gonzalez, however, failed 
to produce any records accounting for the remaining $1,302.27 from Perez’s 
settlement.  And within five months of depositing Perez’s settlement funds into 
his trust account, Gonzalez overdrew the account by issuing trust-account checks 
unrelated to Perez’s case.  Specifically, in January 2011, Gonzalez issued a check 
to the clerk of a court of appeals, although he could not establish the owner of the 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
funds for that check, and he also issued a $1,000 check to himself.  And in March 
2011, he issued two checks on behalf of a client who had no money in the 
account. 
{¶ 8} Relator charged Gonzalez with misappropriating $1,302.27 from 
Perez.  Gonzalez disputed the allegation, claiming that he used the remaining 
$1,302.27 from the settlement for expenses and fees relating to Perez’s case.  
Although Gonzalez could not produce any receipts accounting for these alleged 
case-related expenditures, he testified that Perez’s settlement statement indicated 
how all of Perez’s settlement proceeds were disbursed.  Gonzalez, however, 
refused to produce a copy of the settlement statement to relator, insisting that it 
was protected by the attorney-client privilege and that relator had the burden to 
first obtain a release from Perez.  Gonzalez also refused to ask Perez for a release 
himself, claiming that Perez had no complaints about him, and therefore Gonzalez 
did not want to unnecessarily involve Perez in the disciplinary matter. 
{¶ 9} Based on this record, the board determined that Gonzalez had 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a record for each 
client on whose behalf funds are held), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(h). 
Gonzalez’s objections 
{¶ 10} Gonzalez claims that relator failed to prove any rule violations 
regarding his representation of Perez and specifically objects “to the conclusion 
[that] he has been dishonest with his clients or that he did not give his clients what 
they were entitled to receive from their cases.”  In support, Gonzalez attached to 
his brief an affidavit from Perez and a copy of the previously undisclosed 
settlement statement. 
{¶ 11} We have recognized, however, that “Gov.Bar R. V provides for a 
formal evidentiary hearing before a panel of the board and does not provide for 
the introduction of additional evidence once the proceedings are before this 
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court.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 130 Ohio St.3d 368, 2011-Ohio-5578, 
958 N.E.2d 914, ¶ 45, fn. 3.  Accordingly, we will accept additional evidence at 
this late stage only “under the most exceptional of circumstances.”  Id., citing 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Sterner, 77 Ohio St.3d 164, 672 N.E.2d 633 (1996).  Here, 
Gonzalez could have called Perez to testify in his defense at the panel hearing, 
and he could have submitted a copy of the settlement statement into the record 
below—either in response to relator’s requests or as evidence at the panel hearing.  
Gonzalez, however, chose not to and instead insisted that relator had the burden to 
obtain the document from his client.  On this record, no exceptional circumstances 
exist that would allow Gonzalez to introduce these documents for the first time in 
his objections. 
{¶ 12} Nevertheless, we sustain in part and overrule in part Gonzalez’s 
objections in this count.  We agree with the board’s findings that Gonzalez 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2) and 8.4(h).  Gonzalez failed to maintain or 
produce receipts and other documentation accounting for $1,302.27 from Perez’s 
settlement, and he also overdrew his trust account, issued two trust-account 
checks on behalf of a client who had no funds in that account, issued a trust-
account check to the clerk of courts on behalf of a client he could not identify, and 
failed to keep client ledgers for Perez’s account.  In short, Gonzalez flagrantly 
violated the disciplinary rules requiring that he maintain detailed records of the 
money held and disbursed on behalf of clients, and that conduct adversely reflects 
on his fitness to practice law. 
{¶ 13} However, we disagree with the board’s conclusion that relator 
proved that Gonzalez misappropriated client funds or otherwise engaged in 
conduct involving “dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” in violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c).  In his amended complaint, relator alleged that Gonzalez 
“misappropriated $1,302.27 belonging to Perez.”  Although the board did not 
expressly conclude that Gonzalez “misappropriated” from Perez, it found that 
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7 
 
because Gonzalez “could not account for the missing $1,302.27,” he “committed 
the violations alleged.” 
{¶ 14} In attorney disciplinary proceedings, relator bears the burden of 
proving, by clear and convincing evidence, the facts necessary to establish a 
violation of a disciplinary rule.  Squire, 130 Ohio St.3d 368, 2011-Ohio-5578, 958 
N.E.2d 914, ¶ 34.  Although relator proved that Gonzalez failed to account for 
$1,302.27 in client funds—for which we are separately sanctioning him—this 
misconduct alone does not necessarily show that Gonzalez also misappropriated 
the money from Perez or defrauded him.  “[M]isappropriation is ‘[t]he application 
of another’s property or money dishonestly to one’s own use.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 40, 
quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1088 (8th Ed.2009).  The board did not cite any 
evidence that Gonzalez had dishonestly used Perez’s money for his own purposes. 
{¶ 15} Instead, the board cited Disciplinary Counsel v. Weiss, 133 Ohio 
St.3d 236, 2012-Ohio-4564, 977 N.E.2d 636, for the proposition that Gonzalez 
had a duty to produce records establishing the proper disbursement of Perez’s 
funds and because he refused to do so, he acted dishonestly with the money.  The 
board’s reliance on Weiss is misplaced.  Weiss was a default proceeding in which 
a former client of Weiss clearly believed that he was entitled to additional 
portions of settlement funds held in Weiss’s trust account, and evidence in the 
record supported the former client’s position.  But Weiss moved to Florida and 
would not respond to inquiries from his former client’s attorney or relator.  Id. at 
¶ 5-11.  The board characterized Weiss as having “essentially gone into hiding to 
avoid paying his client.” 
{¶ 16} In contrast, Perez did not testify against Gonzalez, and therefore 
the record is unclear whether Perez believed that Gonzalez had misappropriated 
any of his money.  And this is not a default proceeding—Gonzalez repeatedly 
testified that he had not misappropriated or acted dishonestly with any of Perez’s 
money.  Weiss is factually distinguishable, and we cannot rely on Weiss to 
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presume that Gonzalez dishonestly used Perez’s money for his own use.  On this 
record, Gonzalez’s deficient recordkeeping and accounting practices are at least 
as likely to blame for the missing funds. 
{¶ 17} Acts of misappropriation result in the “strictest discipline,” with a 
presumptive sanction of disbarment.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 39, 2009-Ohio-317, 901 N.E.2d 798, ¶ 17, quoting Cleveland Bar Assn. v. 
Belock, 82 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 694 N.E.2d 897 (1998).  Given the seriousness of 
the charge and the consequences of a violation, we find that relator has failed to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Gonzalez misappropriated Perez’s 
money or otherwise acted dishonestly in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c). 
{¶ 18} In sum, we sustain Gonzalez’s objection with respect to the 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and hereby dismiss that charge.  We overrule his 
remaining objections relating to this count and find that Gonzalez violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2) and 8.4(h). 
Count four—trust-account recordkeeping violations 
{¶ 19} Since February 2007, Gonzalez has not maintained client ledgers 
for funds deposited in his trust account, nor has he performed monthly 
reconciliations of his trust account or retained client records required for 
reconciliations.  Based on these recordkeeping improprieties, the board found that 
Gonzalez had violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2) and 1.15(a)(5) (requiring a lawyer 
to perform and retain a monthly reconciliation of transactions involving the 
lawyer’s client trust account).  We concur with the board’s findings. 
Count five—Ramon Colon matter 
{¶ 20} In March 2011, Ramon Colon, a client of Gonzalez, gave him $400 
to retain an expert.  Gonzalez, however, placed Colon’s money in a client file, 
rather than his trust account, and Gonzalez then paid the expert with a trust-
account check.  Gonzalez also admitted that he did not maintain client ledgers for 
Colon’s funds.  Based on this conduct, the board found, and we agree, that 
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Gonzalez violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2) and 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer to 
deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in 
advance). 
Count six—Maria Samame matter 
{¶ 21} In 2009, Maria Samame, a Venezuelan native, hired Gonzalez to 
represent her in a divorce case.  According to Gonzalez, Samame discharged him 
in July 2010 for financial reasons, but the trial judge would not release him as 
counsel.  Trial commenced in January 2011, and Gonzalez claimed that Samame 
had discharged him again on the morning of the fourth day of trial.  According to 
the trial transcript, Gonzalez stated the following to the magistrate:   
 
I am formally requesting that I be allowed to withdraw 
since I’ve been discharged twice in this case, and it was only at the 
behest of Judge Karner that I remain, because I was trying to help 
Miss Samame with understanding the process here. 
And at this point, in as much as, again, it’s been very clear 
to me that this court is not going to award any attorney fees to Miss 
Samame, then I wish to withdraw.  I’m not going to work for free. 
 
{¶ 22} The magistrate denied Gonzalez’s request to withdraw and ordered 
him to continue his representation of Samame.  Samame indicated that she could 
not afford to pay Gonzalez, but the magistrate explained to her that he had not yet 
made any decision on attorney fees and that because she had no legal background, 
he would not allow her attorney to withdraw in the middle of trial.1   
                                                 
1 Cuyahoga County Domestic Relations Court Local Rule 7 provides that an attorney of record 
may not be relieved of his or her responsibilities unless the court permits the attorney’s 
withdrawal.  The local rule further states that the trial court may deny an attorney’s request to 
withdraw if a trial date has been scheduled.   
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{¶ 23} At that point, Gonzalez was in the middle of cross-examining 
plaintiff, Samame’s husband, but after the magistrate denied his withdrawal 
request, Gonzalez stated that he had no further questions.  He then withdrew two 
previously marked exhibits.  The magistrate asked Gonzalez whether he 
understood the position in which his actions were placing his client, but Gonzalez 
insisted again—despite the fact that the magistrate had already denied his request 
to withdraw—that he had been discharged by his client. 
{¶ 24} Plaintiff’s counsel then testified regarding his attorney fees, and 
Gonzalez again offered no questions on cross-examination.  After plaintiff rested 
his case, Gonzalez informed the magistrate that Samame wanted to testify in 
narrative form, but the magistrate ordered him to ask his client questions under 
direct examination.  The magistrate also pleaded with Gonzalez to represent his 
client, explaining that the court had to make findings of fact for spousal support 
and division of property and without evidence for her case, Samame would be in a 
“dangerous position” and “really vulnerable.”  The magistrate further questioned 
whether Samame genuinely appreciated the danger that could result if she did not 
offer any evidence into the record.  Despite the magistrate’s pleading, Gonzalez’s 
direct examination consisted of one question—“what do you wish to tell the 
court?”—and after a brief narrative response by Samame, Gonzalez did not offer 
any substantive follow-up questions.  Nor did he call any other witnesses to 
support Samame’s case-in-chief.  In addition, the magistrate had to order 
Gonzalez to make a closing argument, which lasted only 30 seconds. 
{¶ 25} Despite Gonzalez’s fears regarding not getting paid, the magistrate 
ultimately awarded attorney fees to Samame.  Specifically, in his April 2011 entry 
granting the parties’ divorce, the magistrate ordered plaintiff to pay Gonzalez 
$1,754.05 in attorney fees. 
{¶ 26} At the panel hearing, relator called the magistrate and plaintiff’s 
counsel to testify about Gonzalez’s conduct during the fourth day of Samame’s 
January Term, 2014 
11 
 
divorce trial.  The magistrate described Gonzalez’s effort as “[h]alf-hearted at 
best,” and he testified that Gonzalez placed his client in an “untenable position” 
and that he “wasn’t doing his job.”  For his part, Gonzalez testified that Samame 
discharged him because she could not afford to pay him and that he was only 
following her instructions not to cross-examine any witnesses or otherwise 
participate in the trial. 
{¶ 27} The board determined that relator’s witnesses corroborated 
relator’s contention that Gonzalez “had failed to take the necessary measures to 
protect Samame’s interests.”  Further, the board concluded that Gonzalez’s 
conduct was “motivated by financial considerations and not by the wishes or 
needs of Samame,” as evidenced by his statement to the magistrate that he would 
not “work for free.”  Accordingly, the board found that Gonzalez had violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a) (requiring a lawyer to abide by the client’s decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation and to consult with the client as to 
means by which they are to be pursued), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with 
reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.16(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
withdrawing from representation in a proceeding without leave of court if the 
rules of the tribunal so require),2 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(h). 
Gonzalez’s objections 
{¶ 28} Gonzalez claims that relator has not proven any rule violations 
regarding his representation of Samame.  Specifically, he reiterates his position 
that Samame instructed him not to continue with the divorce case, and he further 
points to the testimony of plaintiff’s counsel, who stated that Samame ultimately 
received everything from the divorce to which she was entitled. 
                                                 
2 The board’s report states that Gonzalez violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.6(c), which is a typographical 
error, as relator’s amended complaint charged Gonzalez with violating Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(c) and 
the board’s description of the rule matches Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(c).   
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{¶ 29} We overrule Gonzalez’s objections with respect to the board’s 
findings that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.16(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h).  The fact 
that Samame ultimately received a fair judgment in the divorce proceeding—to 
the extent that is true—does not absolve Gonzalez’s professional misconduct.  
After the magistrate denied Gonzalez’s request to withdraw and ordered that he 
proceed with his representation of Samame, Gonzalez nonetheless continued to 
insist that he had been discharged and displayed little, if any, effort to protect his 
client’s best interests.  He affirmatively withdrew exhibits that he had previously 
marked, and the magistrate had to order him to conduct a direct examination of 
his client and a closing argument. 
{¶ 30} In the end, the panel members, who observed Gonzalez and the 
other witnesses at the panel hearing, determined that Gonzalez was more 
concerned about his compensation than ensuring that Samame receive the most 
equitable resolution in her divorce proceeding.  “Unless the record weighs heavily 
against a hearing panel’s findings, we defer to the panel’s credibility 
determinations, inasmuch as the panel members saw and heard the witnesses 
firsthand.”  Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 164, 2006-Ohio-
550, 842 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 24.  Accordingly, we accept the panel members’ 
conclusions here about Gonzalez’s motivations. 
{¶ 31} However, we cannot conclude that relator has proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that Gonzalez also violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a).  That rule 
requires a lawyer to “abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation” and “consult with the client” about those objectives.  Here, relator 
admitted that Samame refused to testify at the panel hearing.  Thus, we do not 
know the specific decisions she made about her case or whether Gonzalez failed 
to abide by her decisions.  Gonzalez testified that he consulted with Samame and 
she instructed him not to ask any further questions on cross-examination.  Neither 
relator nor the board has pointed to any evidence demonstrating that Gonzalez 
January Term, 2014 
13 
 
failed to abide by his client’s decisions.  Indeed, the magistrate testified at the 
panel hearing that it was “evident” that Gonzalez and Samame had discussed 
whether he would proceed with the case.  Accordingly, we cannot conclude that 
there is clear and convincing evidence that Gonzalez violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a). 
{¶ 32} Thus, we sustain Gonzalez’s objection with respect to the violation 
of Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a) and hereby dismiss that charge.  We overrule his 
remaining objections relating to this count and find that he violated Prof.Cond.R. 
1.3, 1.16(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). 
Count seven—failure to cooperate 
{¶ 33} In October 2011, plaintiff’s counsel in the Samame matter 
submitted a grievance to relator regarding Gonzalez’s conduct during that trial.  
Relator sent a letter of inquiry to Gonzalez by certified mail, and despite 
confirming receipt of the letter, Gonzalez failed to respond.  Gonzalez also failed 
to respond to a second letter sent by relator in December 2011.  Gonzalez 
appeared for a deposition in January 2012 and testified that he received relator’s 
letters but found them to be “of no consequence.”  In May 2012, relator sent 
Gonzalez letters requesting copies of client files relating to his representation of 
Samame, Perez, Colon, and another former client, but Gonzalez did not respond 
or object to the requests until September 2012. 
{¶ 34} The parties stipulated that Gonzalez violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for 
information by a disciplinary authority during an investigation) and 8.4(h).  The 
board accepted the parties’ stipulations, adding that “in light of [Gonzalez’s] 
explicit contempt for the disciplinary process and his complete lack of responses 
to the reasonable demands made by Relator,” clear and convincing evidence 
supported the violation for Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h).  We agree that Gonzalez violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(b) and 8.4(h). 
 
 
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Sanction 
{¶ 35} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several relevant factors, including the ethical duties violated, the actual injury 
caused, the existence of any aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. 
v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 
N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  The board recommends that Gonzalez be indefinitely 
suspended, with reinstatement conditioned on payment of restitution to Perez in 
the amount of $1,302.27.  Gonzalez does not address the appropriate sanction in 
his objections.  Instead, he indicates that he is contemplating retirement and that 
he submitted objections only to contest the board’s conclusion that he has been 
dishonest with his clients.  Upon consideration of the relevant factors, we find that 
a two-year suspension with the second year stayed, along with payment of 
restitution to Perez as a condition of reinstatement, is the appropriate sanction in 
this case. 
{¶ 36} The board found the existence of four aggravating factors—a prior 
disciplinary offense, multiple offenses, lack of cooperation in the disciplinary 
process, and refusal to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg.10(B)(1)(a), (d), (e), and (g).  The board did not find any mitigating 
factors.  We concur in the board’s findings. 
{¶ 37} For precedent, the board again relies on Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Weiss, 133 Ohio St.3d 236, 2012-Ohio-4564, 977 N.E.2d 636, a default 
proceeding in which an attorney was charged—as Gonzalez was—with using his 
client trust account as a personal account, failing to cooperate in the disciplinary 
proceeding, and dishonestly converting a portion of a client’s settlement to his 
own use.  But in contrast to the facts here, in Weiss, we found that the relator had 
sufficiently proven all of the charged misconduct, including a violation of 
January Term, 2014 
15 
 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) “by using dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to 
convert a portion of those [settlement] funds to his own use.”  Id. at ¶ 13.  
Accordingly, we indefinitely suspended Weiss from the practice of law and 
ordered that he make restitution to the client whose settlement funds he had 
converted.  Id. at ¶ 16.  Because we do not find that the evidence here supports a 
finding that Gonzalez similarly violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), a lesser sanction 
than in Weiss is justified. 
{¶ 38} However, we nonetheless accept the board’s recommended 
condition that Gonzalez make restitution to Perez.  Although the evidence does 
not clearly and convincingly show that Gonzalez dishonestly converted the 
$1,302.27 to his own use, Perez’s money remains unaccounted for.  And 
Gonzalez was either unable or unwilling to produce any receipts or any other 
records demonstrating how he expended those client funds.  Without any evidence 
showing the proper disbursement of the missing funds, we must assume that the 
money belongs to Perez, and therefore Gonzalez must make restitution to Perez in 
the amount of $1,302.27. 
{¶ 39} To summarize, Gonzalez has failed to properly notify clients that 
he lacks malpractice insurance, commingled client and personal funds, failed to 
account for client funds in his trust account, failed to keep records for client-
related expenditures, failed to cooperate in this disciplinary proceeding, and 
engaged in a range of misconduct during the trial of a client’s case.  Given this 
misconduct, and having reviewed the aggravating factors and finding no 
mitigating factors, we hold that the appropriate sanction in this case is a two-year 
suspension with the second year stayed on the condition that Gonzalez commit no 
further misconduct during the term of his suspension.  If Gonzalez fails to comply 
with the condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the full two-
year suspension.  In addition, reinstatement is contingent on the condition that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Gonzalez make restitution to Perez in the amount of $1,302.27.  Costs are taxed to 
Gonzalez. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
FRENCH, J., concurs with the sanction but would allow Gonzalez to submit 
an accounting of the proper disbursement of settlement funds to Perez in lieu of 
restitution to Perez. 
LANZINGER, J., dissents and would impose an indefinite suspension, as 
recommended by the board. 
____________________ 
Joseph Caligiuri, chief assistant disciplinary counsel, for relator. 
Vincent Ferdinand Gonzalez, pro se. 
_________________________