Case Title: State v. Rideout

Citation: 2007 VT 59A

Docket Number: 2005-310

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Rideout (2005-310)

2007 VT 59A

[Filed 20-Jul-2007]

                                 ENTRY ORDER


                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2005-310

                               JULY TERM, 2007


  State of Vermont                     }         APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
       v.                              }         District Court of Vermont,
                                       }         Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
  Robert J. Rideout                    }
                                       }         DOCKET NO. 1833-4-04 CnCr


         In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       The opinion in State v. Rideout, 2007 VT 59, is retracted and replaced
  with the opinion issued today, State v. Rideout, 2007 VT 59A.  Paragraph 32
  is amended in the following two respects.  The third sentence now reads, "A
  felony is any crime punishable by a maximum term of more than two years." 
  The fourth sentence now reads, "Therefore, under the habitual-criminal
  statute, defendant might have been sentenced to any term up to and
  including life for offenses such as intentionally damaging property valued
  at more than $1,000, id. § 3701(a), or breaking or removing a flag holder
  on a grave stone, id. § 3766(a) (cum. supp. 2006)."

       Affirmed.  

                                       FOR THE COURT:


                                       _______________________________________
                                       Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice


                                       Concurring:

                                       _______________________________________
                                       John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

                                       _______________________________________
                                       Brian L. Burgess, Associate Justice


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State v. Rideout (2005-310)

2007 VT 59A

[Filed 20-Jul-2007]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2007 VT 59A

                                No. 2005-310


  State of Vermont                               Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

  Robert J. Rideout                              December Term, 2006



  Michael S. Kupersmith, J.

  Robert Simpson, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall
    Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.

  Thomas D. Anderson, United States Attorney, Carol L. Shea, Chief, Civil
    Division, and Heather E. Ross, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Burlington, for
    Amicus Curiae United States of America.

  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

       ¶  1.  REIBER, C.J.   Defendant Robert Rideout appeals from his
  convictions for lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and furnishing
  drugs to a child, and from the sentences imposed thereon.  Defendant argues
  that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to enforce a subpoena against a
  federal officer, (2) a supplemental jury instruction confused the jury and
  shifted the burden of proof, and (3) the trial court improperly relied on
  adult convictions obtained when defendant was a minor in finding that he
  was a habitual criminal.  We affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  The record reveals the following facts.  Defendant was born
  on May 5, 1963.  In 1979, when he was sixteen, defendant was convicted of
  four felonies: two counts of breaking and entering, 13 V.S.A. § 1202; one
  count of receiving stolen property, 13 V.S.A. § 2561; and one count of
  armed robbery, 13 V.S.A. § 608(b).  All were adult convictions, although
  defendant was a minor at the time.  In 1986, when he was twenty-three,
  defendant was convicted of the felony of escape, in violation of 13 V.S.A.
  § 1501(a)(1), and in 1992 he was convicted of possession of a firearm by a
  felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924(e)(1)-(2), also a felony.  Defendant
  was imprisoned on this last conviction until the fall of 2003, soon after
  which the events underlying his current convictions ensued.  In the summer
  of 2004, defendant was charged with two counts of lewd and lascivious
  conduct with a child, 13 V.S.A. § 2602, and one count of dispensing a
  regulated drug to a minor, 18 V.S.A. § 4237(a).  The three 2004 offenses
  were all charged under 13 V.S.A. § 11, Vermont's habitual-criminal statute,
  which provides for enhanced sentences - up to life imprisonment - upon
  conviction of a fourth or subsequent felony.  
   
       ¶  3.  The 2004 charges arose from events that occurred when
  defendant's daughter, then age fifteen, moved in with him after his release
  from prison.  The first lewd-and-lascivious-conduct charge stemmed from an
  incident, between Thanksgiving and Christmas of 2003, in which daughter
  awoke to find defendant lying next to her touching her vagina through her
  underwear.  The second lewd-and-lascivious-conduct charge arose from an
  incident, in April 2004, when daughter awoke to find defendant holding her
  hand on his penis.  The charge of dispensing a regulated drug to a minor
  was based on defendant's repeated provision of marijuana to his daughter
  during late 2003 and early 2004. During this period, defendant was on
  unsupervised release, with conditions, stemming from his 1992 felony
  firearm-possession conviction.  His release conditions required that he
  submit to regular drug tests, and defendant was never found to be in
  violation of those conditions, but the record is silent as to whether he
  failed any drug test. (FN1) 

       ¶  4.  On April 25, 2005, the night before trial was to begin,
  defendant served his federal probation officer with a subpoena to appear at
  trial on April 27.  The following day, the United States Attorney's Office
  moved to quash the subpoena, on the ground that a federal court rule
  required service fifteen days in advance of the requested appearance, a
  specific description of the testimony sought, and a recitation of the
  reasons the information sought was unavailable from other sources.  After
  much back-and-forth, the trial court neither granted the motion to quash
  nor attempted to enforce the subpoena.  

       ¶  5.  At trial, defendant's daughter testified that she had lived
  with her aunt while defendant was serving time on the firearm-possession
  conviction.  Defendant was released from prison and returned to Vermont in
  the fall of 2003, and daughter moved in with defendant in November 2003,
  after she had a series of arguments with her aunt.  For the first few
  weeks, defendant and daughter lived in a house with friends.  Defendant
  slept on the couch at first, but later began sleeping in the same bed as
  daughter.   One night, daughter testified, she woke up to find defendant
  kneeling next to the bed, massaging her vagina with his hand.  On two or
  three other nights, daughter testified, she awoke to find defendant pressed
  up against her with his hand on his penis.  
   
       ¶  6.  Defendant and daughter ultimately left the friends' house and
  lived for a time in a nearby motel.  While there, defendant sometimes slept
  in the same bed with daughter, who testified that she woke up more than
  once to find defendant "right on the side of [her]" masturbating.  When
  defendant and daughter moved out of the motel, they lived with another
  family friend for about two months before moving into a one-bedroom
  apartment of their own in Burlington.  Soon after they moved into the
  apartment, according to daughter's testimony, she awoke one night to find
  defendant sitting next to her in her bed, holding her hand on his penis. 
  Daughter testified that she moved back in with her aunt the following day,
  in April 2004.  

       ¶  7.  Soon after daughter moved back in with her aunt, both provided
  sworn statements to a detective at the Chittenden Unit for Special
  Investigations (CUSI) who testified at trial.  Defendant's mother also
  provided a sworn statement to CUSI.  The defense and the prosecution were
  both properly provided with copies of the sworn statements.  Defendant's
  mother appeared as a defense witness at trial and testified that she had
  observed defendant and daughter to have a "normal" parent-child
  relationship, and that she could not recall a conversation with defendant
  in which he admitted to furnishing marijuana to daughter and to "treating
  [daughter] like a wife."   The prosecution used the CUSI statement to
  impeach the veracity of this testimony.  Daughter testified for the
  prosecution at trial.  On cross-examination, the defense did not refer to
  any inconsistencies between daughter's CUSI statement and her testimony at
  trial.  

       ¶  8.  After the close of the evidence, the jury was charged without
  objection and retired to deliberate.  During the course of its
  deliberations, the jury questioned the court regarding the
  lewd-and-lascivious conduct charge, requested playback and transcripts of
  certain testimony, and finally asked the following questions:

    Is there any way we can have information confirming that
    [daughter's] Court testimony is consistent with the statement made
    to CUSI?
   
    Did the Defense find any inconsistencies between [daughter's]
    Court testimony and the statements made to CUSI? If yes, can we
    know what?

  Following a conference with counsel, detailed more fully below, the court
  issued a supplemental instruction responding to the questions.  The jury
  subsequently returned guilty verdicts on the two
  lewd-and-lascivious-conduct charges.

       ¶  9.  Defendant was ultimately convicted of the two counts of lewd
  and lascivious conduct with a child and a single count of dispensing a
  regulated drug to a minor, and was sentenced under the habitual-criminal
  statute, 13 V.S.A. § 11, to two concurrent sentences of twenty to fifty
  years.  This appeal followed.

                              I.  The Subpoena
   
       ¶  10.  Defendant first asserts that the trial court violated his
  right, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
  Chapter 1, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution, to call witnesses on his
  own behalf when it refused to enforce his subpoena of the federal probation
  officer.  Defendant averred that the officer would testify that defendant
  had not been found in violation of probation during a period when a
  condition of his probation was that he submit to regular drug tests.   This
  testimony, however, was peripherally relevant at best, particularly in
  light of defendant's admission at trial that he had regularly smoked
  marijuana during the period in question and had at times provided it to his
  daughter, and the testimony of an acquaintance to whom defendant had
  bragged that he knew how to beat the drug tests.  Further, the State
  averred that police officers had found, among defendant's other
  possessions, a device designed to dispense "clean" urine through a tube to
  beat the tests, which evidence would have been subject to admission if the
  officer had testified.  In the face of these facts, the officer's testimony
  would have served no exculpatory purpose, as defendant's counsel expressly
  recognized, even had it been deemed relevant.  At best, it might have
  supported a conclusion that defendant violated the conditions of his
  probation, but was not caught.   


       ¶  11.  Further, whether defendant violated his federal probation is a
  matter of public record, and the information sought from the officer was
  therefore readily available from other sources.  Finally, defendant's
  subpoena seeking the probation officer's appearance was not timely filed
  under the federal court's rules.  See Testimony of Judiciary Personnel and
  Production of Judiciary Records in Legal Proceedings, adopted by the
  Judicial Conference of the United States in March 2003, available at
  http://www.uscourts.gov/courts/regulations.htm.  

       ¶  12.  Compulsory process is mandated, under the Sixth Amendment and
  Article 10, only where "the witness[] to be called will offer testimony
  which is competent, relevant and material to the defense."  State v.
  Kennison, 149 Vt. 643, 649,