Case Title: Bd. of Aldermen of Town of Bay Springs v. Jenkins

Citation: 423 So. 2d 1323

Docket Number: 54001

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1982-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
423 So. 2d 1323 (1982) BOARD OF ALDERMEN OF TOWN OF BAY SPRINGS, Mississippi, et al. v. J.I. JENKINS. No. 54001. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 15, 1982. Rehearing Denied January 12, 1983. William R. Ruffin, Bay Springs, for appellants. Tom Tullos, Bay Springs, for appellee. Before WALKER, P.J., and BROOM and HAWKINS, JJ. HAWKINS, Justice, for the Court: The Town of Bay Springs and a number of its citizens have appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District of Jasper County reversing an order of its Mayor and Board of Aldermen refusing to rezone certain realty of the appellee Mr. J.I. Jenkins to a commercial classification. The only issue we address on this appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the order of the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of this municipality. Finding this order to be supported by law and the evidence before the Mayor and Board, we reverse and render. In 1971, Bay Springs adopted a zoning ordinance, which has been in effect ever since. *1324 In November, 1980, Mr. Jenkins filed a petition with the Planning Commission of Bay Springs to rezone all of his realty from R-1 residential to C-2 commercial. There is no plat in the record and the land description fails to give the acreage. Under the ordinance, zone C-2 is a central business commercial district classification, authorizing virtually every type of commercial and professional establishment. No side or rear yard is required; only a front yard building setback line at least thirty (30) feet from the street right of way is required in property zoned C-2. Numerous neighborhood landowners objected and on December 11, 1980, the Commission by a 6-5 vote denied Mr. Jenkins' request. Mr. Jenkins appealed to the Mayor and Board of Aldermen, where a hearing was conducted on January 20, 1981. Mr. Jenkins, his son, a real estate broker, and the city clerk testified at this hearing. Mr. Jenkins testified that the land was being prepared for a restaurant type of business. The realty is located on the west side of Highway 15, a main artery of traffic in the town. Three rental homes are now on the property, two of which are in very poor condition, while the third is in a fair condition. Mr. Jenkins testified that there is no chance to sell the property for residential purposes because the realty was commercial property. He stated other commercial classifications were not suitable to him. C-3 classification requires an offset of fifty (50) feet for the front yard, which in his opinion would waste too much of his land. C-2 "modified" would require an offset of one hundred (100) feet. C-1 "modified" was not discussed at the hearing, Mr. Jenkins stating he was not familiar with the C-1 requirements.[1] Mr. Jenkins stated the side yard requirements caused an unnecessary loss of the use of his property. He was of the opinion that no adjacent property owner would benefit from the existence of side yards. John Jenkins, the son of Mr. Jenkins, discussed various commercial sites near the location of the proposed realty to be reclassified. All were within 6/10 of a mile from the property. He listed Depositor's Savings and Alexander Motor Company.[2] Also listed by John Jenkins were the Bay Springs Equipment Company, an auto parts store; the Bay Springs Animal Hospital; the Jasper County Florist; a filling station; and the Bay Shopping Center. With the exception of the Depositor's Savings, all these establishments were shown to be less than thirty (30) feet away from the right of way of Highway 15. Depositor's Savings was thirty-five (35) feet from the right of way. On the same side of the highway as Mr. Jenkins' property were Depositor's Savings, the tractor company, the animal clinic, the Forestry Commission Building, the florist's business, the land owned by the Jasper County Bank, the filling station, and the shopping center. The Cox family owns a home which is surrounded on all sides by the property sought to be reclassified. A real estate broker, who was also a licensed appraiser, testified that it would be difficult for this property to be sold as residential because of the highway traffic noise, as well as the topography of the land, and that only two portions of the realty could be used as residential. He also stated that the area had changed in the nine years he had lived in Bay Springs in that commercial activity had grown. It was the opinion of the realtor that the highest and best use of the property was commercial. It was also his opinion that rezoning would have a good effect on the Cox property, and that harm could only come if the business establishments to be placed on the realty were auto repair or service stations. The realtor also stated there was no benefit to having side yards. He was of the opinion that Highway 15 is an area where growth will probably occur and that the classification of *1325 the realty as residential would ruin its value. The city clerk testified that the shopping center was not in existence at the time the zoning ordinance was adopted. He further testified that before zoning no business establishments were located south of the property. He also testified that the land lying due north of the property was zoned C-3, and that the land lying southeast of the property (the bank) was zoned C-2 "modified". Property owners in the area voiced statements at the hearing before the Mayor and Board of Aldermen that they did not object to some commercialization of the area, but that the zoning requested by Mr. Jenkins would allow any type of commercial property to be located thereon and they objected to that as it would materially affect the value of their residential property across the highway. They stated that in the past they had agreed to some commercialization of the property with the understanding it would be restricted, but that they were being penalized for having agreed to any change in the rezoning in the past. They stated they wanted to keep an environment around their homes with an atmosphere of some peace and quiet. Mr. and Mrs. Cox also objected to the rezoning. Their objection had an additional aspect: that there would be no side yard required in the set-back lines. Following the hearing the Mayor and Board of Aldermen entered the following order: The circuit judge found that the petitioner had met his burden of proof by sworn testimony, and that the witnesses he presented were not cross-examined. The court further found the objectors offered no sworn testimony in opposition, and therefore the testimony of the petitioner was not denied. It was upon this basis that the circuit judge reversed the municipality's decision. In our view the circuit judge placed too limited a view upon what the Mayor and Board of Aldermen could consider in reaching a decision upon the petition to rezone. We believe the better view is stated in R. Khayat and D. Reynolds, Zoning Law in Mississippi, 45 Miss.L.J. 365, 372-73 (1974): See also R. Anderson, 3 American Law of Zoning § 16.24, at 211-12 (1968); D. Hagman, Urban Planning and Land Development Control Law, § 122 (1971); A. Rathkopf, 2 The Law of Zoning and Planning 44-1 to -2 (3rd ed. 1964); E. Yokley, 2 Zoning Law and Practice § 13-9, at 93-94 (3rd ed. 1965). In rendering the municipal order, the Mayor and Board of Aldermen were authorized to consider the statements expressed by all the landowners at the hearing, as well as to call upon their own common knowledge and experience in their town. It is manifest that the Mayor and Board took into consideration all statements, both sworn and unsworn, and their common knowledge and familiarity about their small municipality, in reaching their decision. We believe this method to be sound and practical, and courts should respect *1328 such findings unless they are arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. We have set forth the entire order of the Mayor and Board, which to us appears to have shown these officials' concern for, interest in, and fairness to all parties concerned. We certainly cannot say their decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious. Beyond this, we have often stated that before property is reclassified from one zone to another, there must be proof either (1) that there was a mistake in the original zoning, or (2) the character of the neighborhood has changed to such an extent as to justify rezoning and that public need exists for rezoning. See City of New Albany v. Ray, 417 So. 2d 550, 552 (Miss. 1982), and cases therein cited. The petitioner in this case failed to prove any public need to have his property rezoned to an unlimited commercial classification. The Mayor and Board quite properly affirmed the finding and recommendation of its planning commission. We therefore reverse and render, reinstating the February 3, 1981 order of the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of Bay Springs. REVERSED AND RENDERED. PATTERSON, C.J., SUGG and WALKER, P.JJ., and BROOM, ROY NOBLE LEE, DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, JJ., concur. BOWLING, J., takes no part. [1] C-1 zoning was the subject matter of the Planning Commission's suggestion of a compromise. C-1 "modified" also requires more setback footage than does C-2, C-1 "modified" requiring a setback footage of fifty (50) feet. [2] The Depositor's Savings and the motor company were at their locations before the zoning ordinance was enacted.