Case Title: Commonwealth v. Espinal

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12597

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC–12597 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ARISMENDY ESPINAL. 
 
 
 
Essex.     December 6, 2018. - May 6, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Indecent Assault and Battery.  Jury and Jurors.  Interpreter.  
Practice, Criminal, Jury and jurors, Empanelment of jury, 
Examination of jurors, Voir dire, Interpreter, Instructions 
to jury.  Evidence, Inflammatory evidence, First complaint. 
 
 
 
 
Complaint received and sworn to in the Lawrence Division of 
the District Court Department on December 14, 2015. 
 
 
The case was tried before Michael A. Uhlarik, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
Catherine Patrick Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, 
for the Commonwealth. 
 
J. Anthony Downs, for Lawyers for Civil Rights & others, 
amici curiae, was present but did not argue. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  A jury in the District Court convicted the 
defendant of indecent assault and battery on a twelve year old 
2 
child.  On appeal, the defendant, whose native language is 
Spanish, maintains that the judge erred in denying his request 
that a question be posed collectively to potential jurors about 
bias toward non-English speakers.  He argues further that the 
judge abused his discretion by allowing the introduction of 
prejudicial testimony from an investigator and testimony that 
amounted to improper bolstering by the first complaint witness.  
Finally, the defendant contends that the judge should have given 
the jury a modified form of the first complaint instruction. 
 
While we recognize that there may well be bias toward non-
English speakers, and that a thorough voir dire is necessary to 
ensure an unbiased jury, in the circumstances here, we discern 
no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in declining to ask 
the requested question.  We conclude further that the 
defendant's other arguments are unavailing, and affirm the 
conviction.  Going forward, however, we anticipate that where a 
defendant is entitled to the services of a translator because of 
an inability to speak English, the judge will, on request, 
ordinarily pose a question to the venire regarding language-
related bias.1 
 
1.  Facts.  We summarize the facts that the jury could have 
found, reserving additional details for discussion of specific 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Lawyers for 
Civil Rights, Centro Presente, and Brazilian Workers Center. 
3 
issues.  See Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 299 
(2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1181 (2009). 
 
a.  Assault.  At the time of the complaint, the victim, 
Sofia2 was twelve years old.  She recently had moved to the 
United States from Spain and was living with her single father 
in Lawrence.  When her father was at work, the victim often was 
looked after by her father's friend, Eusabia Magali Concepcion.  
Concepcion was like a "grandmother" or "mother" to Sofia.  
Concepcion babysat her over the course of approximately one 
year. 
 
When Concepcion looked after Sofia, Sofia would go to 
Concepcion's apartment.  Concepcion shared the apartment with 
the defendant, her romantic partner.  When the victim was at the 
apartment, the defendant sometimes was there, too. 
 
In January 2015, Concepcion left the defendant and the 
victim alone while Concepcion took a shower.  The victim had 
been left alone with the defendant before, and there were no 
allegations that anything improper had taken place during those 
times.  This time, however, the defendant gave the victim wine 
and insisted that she drink it, at one point "forc[ing]" her, 
despite her protests.  The wine made her feel dizzy.  The 
defendant then told her to stick out her tongue, and he "sucked 
                     
 
2 A pseudonym. 
4 
[her] tongue" with his mouth.  He asked her to stick out her 
tongue again, but she refused. 
 
When Concepcion returned from the shower, the victim said 
nothing about what had happened because she was "scared that 
[the defendant] was going to do something to [her]."  Instead, 
she went into the bathroom and washed out her mouth.  She called 
her father to pick her up and take her home.  The victim's 
father testified that, when she got into his vehicle, he "knew 
something was wrong because I know her. . . .  She's my 
daughter.  I'm a father and a mother.  I know her.  I know when 
she is worried and I know when she is not worried." 
 
The automobile was being driven by Sofia's father's boss.  
Because the boss was in the vehicle, she said nothing about the 
incident during the ride home.  When the victim and her father 
got out of the car and entered their house, however, she began 
crying "a lot" and told her father what had happened.  She spent 
much of the night washing out her mouth. 
 
The defendant was charged with indecent assault and battery 
on a child under the age of fourteen, in violation of G. L. 
c. 265, § 13B. 
5 
 
b.  Trial.  The case was tried in the District Court in 
June of 2017.  Throughout trial, the defendant required the use 
of a Spanish-speaking interpreter.3 
 
Before trial, the defendant submitted a written request 
that certain questions be posed to the venire, collectively, 
during voir dire.  The requested questions were "mostly standard 
questions," with the exception of the final question:  "Do you 
have any problem with a defendant that requires the services of 
a Spanish-speaking interpreter?"  The Commonwealth did not 
object to the final question being asked.  Defense counsel 
explained the reasons the question should be asked as follows: 
"I do think that the question about a witness or a 
defendant that requires the services of the Spanish-
speaking interpreter is important . . . .  The concern is a 
racial bias, or some sort of ethnic bias.  There's a lot of 
people that believe that if you're in this country and you 
don't speak English, that you've done something wrong, 
period.  My client is a naturalized citizen of the United 
States.  I think that that is a huge bias." 
 
 
The judge denied the request; counsel objected, citing the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and arts. 12 and 14 of the Massachusetts 
                     
 
3 As noted, the defendant's native language is Spanish.  He 
does not speak English.  The proceedings took place in English.  
Two witnesses testified for the Commonwealth in English (the 
victim and an investigator from the Department of Children and 
Families), and one witness testified in Spanish (the victim's 
father).  The defense also called one witness, who testified in 
Spanish.  The witnesses who testified in Spanish made use of a 
Spanish-language interpreter. 
6 
Declaration of Rights.  Counsel asserted further, "I think that 
racial bias is something that should be explored when the 
defendant is of a minority race, in this case, Latino."  The 
judge clarified: 
The court:  "Is the complainant a different ethnicity?" 
 
The prosecutor:  "No." 
 
The court:  "Okay.  No.  I'm not going to give it to you." 
 
The attorneys for both sides were introduced to the members of 
the venire.  The witnesses, as well as the defendant, were asked 
to stand when their names were called.  The interpreter was not 
introduced. 
 
The judge posed several questions to the collective venire 
regarding bias, including, "[A]re any of you aware of any bias 
or prejudice that you have toward either the defendant or the 
prosecution?" and "[D]o any of you know of any reason why you 
would not be impartial in this case and be able to render a true 
and just verdict based solely on the evidence and the law?"  No 
prospective juror indicated an affirmative response to either 
question.4 
 
The jury were sworn, and trial commenced.  Throughout the 
trial, the jury heard testimony from four witnesses.  Among 
                     
 
4 During individual voir dire, the judge also asked, "[I]s 
there anything about this charge that would make it difficult 
for you to be impartial?" 
7 
them, the victim's father testified as the first complaint 
witness, and an investigator for the Department of Children and 
Families (DCF) testified as to statements made by the defendant 
during an interview. 
 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty.  The defendant 
commenced a timely appeal, and we allowed his motion for direct 
appellate review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant claims that four errors at 
trial warrant a new trial:  (1) the judge improperly denied his 
request to pose a question to the venire regarding language-
related bias; (2) the judge permitted prejudicial testimony from 
the DCF investigator; (3) the judge permitted improper 
bolstering of the victim's credibility through the first 
complaint witness; and (4) the judge improperly instructed the 
jury regarding first complaint testimony.  We discern no error 
warranting a new trial. 
 
a.  Jury voir dire.  The defendant maintains that the judge 
erred in denying his request to ask the members of the venire, 
collectively, "Do you have any problem with a defendant that 
requires the services of a Spanish-speaking interpreter?" 
 
"A criminal defendant is entitled to a trial by an 
impartial jury pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration 
of Rights."  Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 443, 447 
8 
(2019).  "[P]art of the guarantee of a defendant's right to an 
impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified 
jurors" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Dabney, 478 Mass. 
839, 848, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 127 (2018).  Following voir 
dire, a judge's determination that a jury are impartial will not 
be disturbed absent a clear error of law or abuse of discretion.  
Id. 
 
General Laws c. 234A, § 67A, governs the examination of 
jurors during voir dire.  The first paragraph of that statute 
provides, in relevant part: 
"Upon motion of either party, the court shall . . . examine 
on oath a person who is called as a juror, to learn whether 
the juror . . . has expressed or formed an opinion, or is 
sensible of any bias or prejudice." 
 
We have not required, however, that judges ask every question 
requested by a defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Morales, 440 
Mass. 536, 548–549 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. Sanders, 383 
Mass. 637, 341 (1981) ("[a] judge has broad discretion as to the 
questions to be asked, and need not put the specific questions 
proposed by the defendant").  Rather, in most cases, the proper 
scope of jury voir dire is left to the sound discretion of the 
trial judge.  See Commonwealth v. Silva, 455 Mass. 503, 512 
(2009).  "A trial judge, who is aware of the facts of a 
particular case and can observe firsthand the demeanor of each 
prospective juror, is in the best position to determine what 
9 
questions are necessary reasonably to ensure that a particular 
jury can weigh and view the evidence impartially."  Commonwealth 
v. Lopes, 440 Mass. 731, 736 (2004). 
 
i.  Mandatory questions.  Certain categories of questions, 
however, must be asked.  See Silva, 455 Mass. at 512.  General 
Laws c. 234A, § 22, for example, established the confidential 
juror questionnaire, which requires that prospective jurors be 
asked to respond, in writing, to a series of personal questions 
concerning, among other things, their home address, birthdate, 
family members, and jobs.5  The first paragraph of G. L. c. 234A, 
§ 67A, moreover, establishes a separate set of topics about 
which a trial judge must examine prospective jurors in all 
criminal cases.6  Neither statute explicitly requires questions 
concerning language-related biases. 
                     
 
5 General Laws c. 234A, § 22, requires that the 
questionnaire elicit 
 
"the juror's name, sex, age, residence, marital status, 
number and ages of children, education level, occupation, 
employment address, spouse's occupation, spouse's 
employment address, previous service as a juror, present or 
past involvement as a party to civil or criminal 
litigation, relationship to a police or law enforcement 
officer, and such other information as the jury 
commissioner deems appropriate." 
 
 
6 General Laws c. 234A, § 67A, inserted by St. 2016, c. 36, 
§ 4 (formerly G. L. c. 234, § 28), mandates that several 
categories of questions be asked in every criminal case, 
including questions regarding the presumption of innocence, the 
Commonwealth's burden of proof, and the absence of any burden on 
the defendant. 
10 
 
The second paragraph of G. L. c. 234A, § 67A, requires 
additional inquiry of prospective jurors, 
"[where] it appears that . . . a decision [may] be made in 
whole or in part upon issues extraneous to the case, 
including, but not limited to, community attitudes, 
possible exposure to potentially prejudicial material or 
possible preconceived opinions toward the credibility of 
certain classes of persons." 
 
We have interpreted this language to mean that, where a 
defendant can show that "there exists a substantial risk of 
extraneous issues that might influence the jury," additional 
questioning is required.  See Lopes, 440 Mass. at 736.  In such 
circumstances, the questions are to be posed to each prospective 
juror "individually and outside the presence of other persons."  
See G. L. c. 234A, § 67A. 
 
Under our superintendence powers, we have determined that a 
substantial risk of extraneous influence exists, as a matter of 
law, whenever the victim and the defendant are of different 
races or ethnicities, and the crime charged is murder, rape, or 
sexual offenses against children.7  Accordingly, on the request 
of a defendant, judges are required to conduct individual voir 
dire regarding race and ethnicity in such cases.  See 
Commonwealth v. Young, 401 Mass. 390, 398 (1987) (murder); 
                     
 
7 Individual voir dire also is required, upon request, when 
a defendant indicates that lack of criminal responsibility may 
be at issue.  See Commonwealth v. Seguin, 421 Mass. 243, 249 
(1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1180 (1996). 
11 
Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863, 873 (1982) (sexual 
offenses against children); Sanders, 383 Mass. at 640-641 
(rape).  See also Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162,     
(2019) (expanding requirement to include not only "race," but 
also "ethnicity"). 
 
The defendant does not maintain that he was of a different 
race or ethnicity from that of the victim, and indeed, both the 
victim and the defendant appear to have been of Hispanic origin.8  
Nor does the defendant argue that a substantial risk of an 
extraneous influence was present in this case. 
 
Rather, the defendant suggests that a collective question 
should be required upon a showing of something less than a 
                     
 
8 Of course, questions related to race and ethnicity may be 
appropriate even in situations where there is no racial or 
ethnic difference between a defendant and a victim.  For 
example, a defendant may be constitutionally entitled to a 
collective question, upon request, where such a question is 
"aimed at revealing racial bias or any similarly indurated and 
pervasive prejudice" (quotation and citation omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 289 (1984).  See also 
Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 493 n.34 (2010) 
("unconscious racial bias is most effectively addressed by 
recognizing it and addressing it," including in "voir dire 
questions and jury instructions"). 
 
 
In Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162,     (2019), which 
was decided after the trial in this case, we recognized the 
pervasiveness of ethnic, as well as racial, biases.  Here, 
however, while defense counsel noted that the defendant was 
"Latino," he did not request a collective question regarding 
bias toward individuals of particular ethnic or racial 
backgrounds, but solely as to the use of an interpreter.  The 
defendant does not argue that the two are equivalent. 
12 
substantial risk of extraneous influence.  He emphasizes that he 
requested collective questioning, as opposed to individual 
questioning, and contends that posing a "single collective 
question" would require relatively little additional time during 
empanelment.  See Lopes, 440 Mass. at 737. 
 
General Laws c. 234A, § 67A, contains no requirement 
regarding voir dire on the use of interpreters, and we decline 
to read into the statute a new standard for mandatory collective 
questioning.  We understand the statute to require that, where a 
defendant demonstrates a substantial risk of an extraneous 
influence, a judge must include the subject of that extraneous 
influence within the questions posed to the venire, and must do 
so in the form of individual voir dire.  See Lopes, 440 Mass. 
at 737.  Where the subject of requested questioning is not 
enumerated in G. L. c. 234A, § 22, or G. L. c. 234A, § 67A, and 
where, as here, no substantial risk of extraneous influence has 
been shown, both the scope and form of such questioning are left 
to the sound discretion of the trial judge.  See Silva, 455 
Mass. at 512-513; Lopes, supra at 737-738; Commonwealth v. 
Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 695 (1979) (where there is no 
substantial risk, "a judge may propound voir dire questions 
collectively").9 
                     
 
9 Had this case been tried in the Superior Court, we note 
that defense counsel could have posed such a question during 
13 
 
ii.  Abuse of discretion.  Where a requested question is 
not mandated by statute or constitutional requirements, a trial 
judge's decision not to ask the venire the question is reviewed 
for abuse of discretion.  Lopes, 440 Mass. at 736.  It is not an 
abuse of discretion "simply because a reviewing court would have 
reached a different result"; rather, an abuse of discretion 
occurs "where we conclude the judge made a clear error of 
judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision, such 
that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable 
alternatives" (quotation and citation omitted).  L.L. v. 
Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).  A judge need not 
probe into every conceivable bias imagined by counsel.  "Absent 
some reason to suspect that jurors may be so prejudiced, . . . a 
                     
attorney-conducted voir dire.  See G. L. c. 234A, § 67D, 
inserted by St. 2016, c. 36, § 4.  Where attorney-conducted voir 
dire takes place, judges should approve questions designed to 
ascertain "preconceptions or biases relating to the identity of 
the parties . . . or issues expected to arise in the case," in 
order to ferret out "explicit and implicit bias."  See Rule 6(1) 
and (3)(c) of the Superior Court Rules (2019).  While not 
mandatory, attorney-conducted voir dire is permissible in the 
District Court, and judges have been encouraged to allow 
requests for the practice.  Although "the empanelment process 
takes somewhat longer when attorneys participate in voir dire, 
the consensus is that [attorney participation in voir dire] has 
improved the process of jury selection.  As a result, judges and 
attorneys should have greater confidence that the jurors who are 
ultimately empaneled are more likely to be impartial."  See 
Commonwealth v. Dabney, 478 Mass. 839, 848, cert. denied, 139 S. 
Ct. 127 (2018), quoting Supreme Judicial Court Committee on 
Juror Voir Dire, Final Report to the Justices, at 5 (July 12, 
2016). 
14 
judge is warranted in relying upon his [or her] final charge to 
the jury to purge any bias from the jurors prior to their 
deliberations."  Commonwealth v. Estremera, 383 Mass. 382, 388 
(1981). 
 
In this case, it was evident at the outset that the jury 
would learn that the defendant did not speak English.  Whether 
an interpreter sat near the defendant and whispered to him, or 
spoke to him remotely through headphones,10 the jury likely would 
have been able to discern his use of interpretation throughout 
the trial.  Had the interpreter needed to interrupt the 
proceedings to ask for a repetition or clarification, the 
defendant's use of an interpreter also would have become 
apparent.11  Moreover, had the defendant wished to exercise his 
right to testify, it would have become evident that he spoke in 
Spanish. 
 
The defendant notes on appeal that, in the court room, 
perception of an individual as a noncitizen -- whether correctly 
or incorrectly associated with the ability to speak English -- 
                     
 
10 On the record before us, there is not sufficient evidence 
to determine which method was employed in this case. 
 
 
11 The interpreters in this case in fact did interrupt the 
proceedings on several occasions (e.g., "I'm sorry.  The 
interpreter said [the wrong name]"; "Your honor, may the 
interpreter have just one moment?"; "I'm sorry.  The interpreter 
needs clarification"). 
 
15 
can result in an increased likelihood that the individual will 
be found guilty, as well as the likelihood of a more severe 
sentence.12  See Espinoza, Willis-Esqueda, Toascano, & Coons, The 
Impact of Ethnicity, Immigration Status, and Socioeconomic 
Status on Juror Decision Making, 13 J. Ethnicity in Crim. Just. 
197 (2015).  The amici also note that a defendant who testifies 
in Spanish may be perceived by non-Spanish speakers to be more 
guilty than one who testifies in English.  See Maeder & 
Yamamoto, Culture in the Courtroom:  Ethnocentrism and Juror 
Decision-Making, 10 PLoS ONE, no. 9, Sept. 2015, at 4, citing 
Stephan &  Stephan, Habla Ingles?  The Effects of Language 
Translation on Simulated Juror Decisions, 16 J. Applied Soc. 
Psychol. 577 (1986). 
 
The record on appeal contains a significant number of 
studies that indicate disparities in rates of conviction and the 
severity of sentences imposed between defendants who used 
interpreters and those who did not.  Given these disparities, we 
recognize the importance, in appropriate circumstances, of 
                     
 
12 The defendant also cites surveys showing that the 
overwhelming majority of Americans believe it is "essential" or 
"important" for immigrants living in the United States to learn 
and speak English, see, e.g., Most in U.S. Say It's Essential 
that Immigrants Learn English, Gallup News, Aug. 9, 2013, while 
a majority believe that English proficiency should be a 
requirement for an individual being allowed to remain in the 
United States.  See, e.g., Hispanics Support Requiring English 
Proficiency for Immigrants, Gallup News, July 5, 2007. 
16 
questioning the venire, at least collectively, concerning 
language-related bias.  Nor is such questioning limited to 
situations where a defendant speaks Spanish.  Our courts serve 
individuals who communicate in many diverse languages from all 
parts of the world.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jules, 464 Mass. 
478, 487 (2013) (Haitian Creole); Adoption of Roni, 56 Mass. 
App. Ct. 52, 55 & n.6 (2002) (Mandarin Chinese).  Whether an 
individual requires the use of interpretation from Arabic, 
Vietnamese, or any other language, there is potential for 
preconceived notions among jurors with respect to an inability 
to speak English. 
 
The determination we must make, however, is not whether, 
sitting in review after the fact, we have reason to believe that 
prospective jurors might harbor biases toward non-English-
speaking defendants, but, rather, whether the trial judge had 
reason to believe that they did.  In requesting that a question 
be posed to the venire, the burden is on the defendant to "fully 
inform the judge of the basis for the request."  Commonwealth v. 
LaFaille, 430 Mass. 44, 51 (1999).  See Estremera, 383 Mass. 
at 388.  The surveys and studies that the defendant proffers on 
appeal were not before the trial judge.  Nor did the defendant 
draw the judge's attention to any cases that recognized 
language-related bias.  See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 
U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (observing that language elicits range of 
17 
reactions, from "admiration and respect, to distance and 
alienation, to ridicule and scorn.  Reactions of the latter type 
all too often result from or initiate racial hostility").  
Rather, counsel relied on her assertion that "[t]here's a lot of 
people that believe that if you're in this country and you don't 
speak English, that you've done something wrong, period."13  A 
defendant's "bare allegation" that there exists a "widespread 
belief" that could result in bias is not sufficient to cause us 
to conclude that the judge abused his discretion by declining to 
conduct voir dire on the issue.  See Commonwealth v. Sheline, 
391 Mass. 279, 290-291 (1984) (no abuse of discretion where 
judge declined to pose requested questions regarding propensity 
to believe police witnesses).  Cf. Toney v. Zarynoff's, Inc., 52 
Mass. App. Ct. 554, 561 (2001). 
 
Moreover, defense counsel's argument was intertwined with 
arguments about racial and ethnic differences, which tended to 
detract from the specific language-related concern.  The judge 
attempted to discern whether the defendant and the victim were 
of different races or ethnicities, and the prosecutor responded 
that they were not.  These were reasonable considerations with 
                     
 
13 "The ultimate decision as to whether the question should 
be asked lies within the judge's sound discretion, but the judge 
must be assisted in this decision by the party seeking the 
inquiry."  See Toney v. Zarynoff's, Inc., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 554, 
561 (2001). 
18 
respect to the individual voir dire determination required by 
G. L. c. 234A, § 67A.  On the limited information presented to 
the trial judge, therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion in 
his decision not to pose the requested question on the use of 
interpreters. 
 
That being said, we note the long-standing recommendation 
that, "[w]hen an interpreter for a witness or party is 
necessary, the judge should describe the role of the interpreter 
for the jury.  This includes a brief statement of the underlying 
need for the interpreter's service . . . ."14  See P.M. Lauriat & 
D.H. Wilkins, Massachusetts Jury Trial Benchbook § 3.1.1.5, at 
81 (3d ed. 2016).  See also P.M. Lauriat, Massachusetts Jury 
Trial Benchbook § 3.1.4, at 65-66 (2d ed. 2004); P.M. Lauriat & 
T.L. Pomeroy, Massachusetts Jury Trial Benchbook § 3.1.4, at 41-
42 (1996).  Subsequent questions regarding "any bias or 
                     
 
14 General Laws c. 221, § 92, provides that "[t]he justices 
of the Superior Court may appoint such official interpreters as 
they may deem necessary for the sessions of the court."  Rule 41 
of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, 378 Mass. 918 
(1979), states that a "judge may appoint an interpreter or 
expert if justice so requires."  While the question has not been 
squarely presented to the United States Supreme Court, Federal 
Courts of Appeals have concluded that the rights of a defendant 
to be present at trial, to consult meaningfully with counsel, 
and to confront adverse witnesses "mandate that an interpreter 
be available to the defendant or witness who cannot effectively 
communicate."  See Reporter's Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P. 41, 
Massachusetts Rules of Court, at 222 (Thomson Reuters 2019), 
citing United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 
(2d Cir. 1970), and cases cited. 
19 
prejudice" and "any reason why [prospective jurors] would not be 
impartial" thereafter could help to unearth bias against non-
English speakers.15  Cf. Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 775-
776 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011) 
(no error where individual question regarding experience with 
domestic abuse was denied, but judge "agreed to make clear the 
nature of the charge against the defendant and to specify that 
if any jurors were uncertain about their ability to be fair and 
impartial, they should speak with the judge at sidebar"); Lopes, 
440 Mass. at 738 (no error where collective question regarding 
experience with crime was denied, but "panel was sufficiently 
advised as to the nature of the case and the charge against the 
defendant" and asked if they could be impartial).16 
                     
 
15 See, e.g., Colon, 482 Mass. at     n.16 (following 
affirmative response to collective question regarding general 
bias, juror was removed for stating, "Does [the defendant] not 
understand English? . . .  [H]e's an American citizen, and he 
can't understand and speak English, so that's why I've formed an 
opinion [about his culpability]"). 
 
16 At argument before us, the Commonwealth maintained that, 
by the time the judge made a general inquiry as to whether any 
member of the venire harbored any general biases, it should have 
been evident to them that the defendant was using an 
interpreter.  We cannot say that this was so in the brief time 
that elapsed between the venire being sworn and the judge 
inquiring as to their ability to be impartial.  Among other 
things, the interpreter does not appear to have been introduced.  
Nor is there evidence that indicates whether the defendant was 
wearing a listening device at that point or that the 
significance of such a device was explained to the venire. 
20 
 
Given this, where the fact of a defendant's inability to 
speak English is reasonably likely to become known to the jury, 
we urge the trial judge to inquire, upon the request of the 
defendant,17 whether any prospective juror harbors bias toward 
non-English speakers.  "[A]s a practical matter, when a motion 
that prospective jurors be interrogated as to possible prejudice 
is presented, we believe the trial judge should grant that 
motion."  Commonwealth v. Lumley, 367 Mass. 213, 216 (1975).  
Doing so is consistent with the trial judge's duty, under G. L. 
c. 234A, § 67A, to learn whether any juror "is sensible of any 
bias or prejudice."  Such a question may be posed through 
individual voir dire, collective voir dire, or a written 
questionnaire.  See Silva, 455 Mass. at 513 (no error where 
individual questions were denied but written questionnaire 
"covered much of what the defendant had sought"); Lopes, 440 
Mass. at 735, 737-738 (no error where collective question was 
denied but subject was included on written questionnaire).  See 
also Commonwealth v. Carvalho, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 840, 844-845 
(2016).  While posing a question on possible language bias may, 
                     
 
17 In calling attention to his or her inability to speak 
English, a defendant "runs the risk" of "activat[ing] latent 
. . . bias in certain prospective jurors . . . .  However, the 
opposite choice is not without risk" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Cf. Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 314 (2012) 
(defendant controls whether to request individual voir dire on 
racial issues). 
21 
in some cases, increase the time required to seat a jury, "it 
would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that 
persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to 
serve as jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact 
of disqualification were barred.  No surer way could be devised 
to bring the processes of justice into disrepute" (citation 
omitted).  See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 191 
(1981).  See also Lopes, 440 Mass. at 737 ("We do not consider 
the time it might take particularly to inquire further to assess 
bias on the part of prospective jurors who respond positively as 
persuasive justification to forgo the practice"). 
 
b.  Testimony of DCF investigator.  The defendant maintains 
that a portion of the DCF investigator's testimony was 
substantially more prejudicial than probative, and should not 
have been admitted.  Over the defendant's objection, the 
investigator was permitted to testify that he "talked to a lot 
of individuals, people who are part of the family, people who 
are involved in the allegation, and people who are working 
professionally with the minor in question."  He also explained 
that he spoke to the defendant, and proceeded to recount the 
defendant's statements. 
 
Testimony detailing an investigation "generally is not 
allowed unless it is from the first complaint witness or in 
response to a defense theory."  Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 
22 
838, 847 (2010).  "The fact that the Commonwealth brought its 
resources to bear on this incident creates the imprimatur of 
official belief in the complainant."  Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 
450 Mass. 449, 457 (2008).  Where evidence of an investigation 
"has no relevance to whether the defendant in fact committed the 
acts charged," its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the extreme risk of prejudice.  See id. 
 
Here, however, the fact of the investigation had relevance 
in providing a foundation for the admission of the defendant's 
statements to the investigator.  Cf. McCoy, 456 Mass. at 847 
(testimony detailing investigation permitted as foundation for 
admission of physical evidence collected during investigation).  
Although the jury learned that the Commonwealth had investigated 
the case, we cannot say that the effect thereof substantially 
outweighed the probative value in laying a foundation for the 
defendant's subsequent statements to the investigator.  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2019). 
 
It was not necessary, however, for the investigator to 
describe the various parties to whom he spoke, apart from the 
defendant.  The defendant contends that, by testifying that he 
spoke to "a lot of individuals," including "people who are 
working professionally with the minor," the investigator created 
the impression that other people, who would not be testifying in 
23 
court, including medical "professional[s]," had taken the 
victim's allegations seriously. 
 
Because the issue was properly preserved,18 we review to 
ensure that, if there were error, "the error[] did not influence 
the jury or had but very slight effect" (citation omitted).  See 
Commonwealth v. Mayotte, 475 Mass. 254, 261 (2016).  We conclude 
that, even if this testimony was admitted erroneously, there was 
no prejudice warranting a new trial. 
 
The investigator mentioned other "professional[s]" only 
once, and did not elaborate.  Nor did the investigator convey 
that these professionals had heard the allegations, or had 
believed them.  Moreover, the singular reference to 
                     
 
18 The Commonwealth argues that this claim is not preserved, 
because defense counsel objected to "relevanc[e]," but not 
"prejudice."  At the outset, we note that the two determinations 
often go hand in hand.  See Commonwealth v. Bin, 480 
Mass. 665, 678 (2018) ("Even where evidence may be relevant and 
otherwise admissible, a trial judge has discretion to exclude it 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk 
of confusion").  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 403 (2019).  Here, 
counsel had previously moved in limine to exclude "a description 
of the investigative process, which is irrelevant to guilt and 
unfairly prejudicial."  See Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 
715, 719 (2016) (objection at motion in limine stage preserves 
appellate rights "if what is objectionable at trial was 
specifically the subject of the motion in limine").  Although 
the word "prejudicial" was not used in making the objection 
during trial, "[p]erfection is not the standard by which we 
measure the adequacy of an objection."  Commonwealth v. 
McDonagh, 480 Mass. 131, 138 (2018).  This is all the more true 
where, as here, the judge did not permit counsel to complete her 
explanation.  See id. at 139 (grounds imperfectly explained 
"perhaps because the judge interrupted counsel in the midst of 
the objection"). 
24 
"individuals" and "professional[s]" played little role in the 
Commonwealth's case.  The prosecutor asked no follow-up 
questions, and made no mention of the testimony during closing 
argument.  Thus, we are confident that the effect of the 
testimony, if any, was "very slight" (citation omitted).  See 
Mayotte, 475 Mass. at 261. 
 
c.  Testimony of victim's father.  The defendant argues 
that the victim's father, who was the first complaint witness, 
see Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 246 (2005), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006), improperly bolstered her 
credibility.  He testified that, upon collecting the victim from 
the defendant's apartment, she was "nervous," and that 
"I knew there was something wrong because I know her. . . .  
I know her.  I know when she is worried and I know when she 
is not worried." 
 
In closing, the Commonwealth relied on the father's testimony; 
the prosecutor argued, 
"A father knows his daughter.  He stood there and testified 
to you, she's my daughter, I know her.  When he picked her 
up at the house that night, he knew immediately something 
was wrong." 
 
 
Because the defendant did not object either to the 
witness's testimony or to the closing argument, we review to 
determine whether the testimony and argument were improper and, 
if so, whether they created a substantial risk of a miscarriage 
of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 (1999). 
25 
 
We first announced the doctrine of first complaint under 
our superintendence power to regulate the presentation of 
evidence in court proceedings.  A first complaint witness "may 
not testify to belief in the witness's truthfulness or otherwise 
supplant the fact finder's function in determining credibility."  
King, 445 Mass. at 246 & n.26.  Such a witness may, however, 
testify as to the "circumstances surrounding the initial 
complaint."  Id. at 246. 
"By 'circumstances,' we mean that the witness may testify 
to his or her observations of the complainant during the 
complaint; the events or conversations that culminated in 
the complaint; the timing of the complaint; and other 
relevant conditions that might help a jury assess the 
veracity of the complainant's allegations or assess the 
specific defense theories as to why the complainant is 
making a false allegation." 
 
Id.  Moreover, evidence of the demeanor of a complainant at or 
around the time of the incident is permissible to rebut a claim 
of fabrication.  See Commonwealth v. Santos, 465 Mass. 689, 699-
700 (2013) (parent permitted to testify that child victim was 
"pale," "clammy," "like he had seen a ghost," and that this was 
"unusual" for him); Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 221, 
225-226 (2009) (parent permitted to testify that child victim 
was "upset," "crying," "sad," and "need[ing] help"). 
 
The defense at trial was that the victim fabricated the 
allegations, perhaps in order to avoid having to be cared for by 
Concepcion.  The victim's father testified that, before he 
26 
talked to his daughter, he observed "something was wrong," and 
believed that she appeared "nervous" and "worried."19  Such 
testimony is not a reflection whether he believed her subsequent 
statements but, rather, a description of how she appeared prior 
to making those statements, close in time to the assault.  That 
the jury might use this description to corroborate the timeline 
of the victim's allegations is not the same as her father 
substituting his credibility determination for that of the fact 
finder.20 
                     
 
19 This testimony may have constituted a lay opinion.  Lay 
opinion testimony is admissible only if it is "(a) rationally 
based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the witness's testimony or in determining a 
fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge."  See Mass. G. Evid. § 701 (2019).  
To the extent that the victim's father's testimony might not 
have been "based on [his own] perception," or that he lacked 
personal knowledge, the defendant does not raise the issue 
before us, nor was it raised at trial.  See Commonwealth v. 
Millyan, 399 Mass. 171, 183 (1987) ("The general rule is that a 
witness may testify only to facts that he observed and may not 
give an opinion on those facts"); Commonwealth v. Carver, 33 
Mass. App. Ct. 378, 383 (1992) (witnesses not permitted to offer 
"mere opinion or speculation as to another person's state of 
mind").  See also H.P. Carroll & W.C. Flanagan, Trial Practice 
§ 13:61, at 592 n.34 (3d ed. 2017), quoting Mauet & Wolfson, 
Trial Evidence § 4.7 (4th ed. 2009) ("non-expert witnesses 
generally cannot testify to what someone else thinks, feels, or 
intends").  Contrast Commonwealth v. Santos, 465 Mass. 689, 700 
(2013) (parent described child's physical appearance). 
 
20 By contrast, had the victim's father testified that, upon 
hearing the allegations, he believed her, that testimony would 
have been impermissible. 
27 
 
There was no error in allowing the admission of this 
testimony.  Accordingly, the Commonwealth was permitted to rely 
on it during closing argument.  See Commonwealth v. Andrade, 468 
Mass. 543, 552 (2014) ("Arguments based on testimony submitted 
at trial . . . are proper"); Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 
287, 304 (2009) (prosecutor permitted to "argue strenuously from 
the evidence that the Commonwealth's witnesses were credible").21 
 
d.  Jury instructions.  The judge denied the defendant's 
request to limit or substitute the standard instruction 
concerning first complaint testimony.  On appeal, the defendant 
contends that providing the standard instruction was error.  The 
portion of the instruction, first defined in King, 445 Mass. at 
247-248, that the defendant sought to exclude provides: 
"The length of time between the alleged crime and the 
report of the complainant to this witness is one factor you 
may consider in evaluating the complainant's testimony, but 
you may also consider that sexual assault complainants may 
delay reporting the crime for a variety of reasons." 
 
                     
 
21 The victim's father also testified that he told his 
sister "what had happened."  We agree with the defendant that 
the statement should not have been admitted.  Willingness to 
tell another individual about an allegation implies a belief in 
the allegation.  We do not, however, consider the issue 
preserved.  Although counsel initially objected to the line of 
questioning, no grounds were stated, and the judge reasonably 
could have understood the objection as being to hearsay.  When 
the question was rephrased ("Without saying what you said or 
what they said back to you, who did you tell?"), defense counsel 
made no further objection.  The single admission, "I told my 
sister," does not, in the circumstances of this case, generate a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth 
v. Alphas, 430 Mass. 8, 13 (1999). 
28 
Id. at 248. 
 
The defendant argues that, in this case, the instruction 
was unnecessary, and, worse, prejudicial.  Delay was not at 
issue; the victim reported the incident to her father shortly 
after arriving home.  The defendant argues, essentially, that 
the instruction drew the jury's attention to the possibility 
that the victim could have "delay[ed] reporting the crime," but 
did not, thereby injecting delay as an issue and bolstering her 
credibility. 
 
In King, 445 Mass. at 242, we recognized that "victims 
often do not promptly report a sexual assault for a variety of 
reasons that have nothing to do with the validity of the claim 
of assault."  We sought to disabuse the jury of the 
misapprehensions that "'real' victims will promptly disclose a 
sexual attack" and that "the absence of a timely complaint 
suggests fabrication."  See id. at 238, 240.  Nonetheless, we 
determined that "the timing of a complaint is [still] . . . one 
factor the jury may consider in weighing the complainant's 
testimony."  See id. at 242.  It was not improper, therefore, 
for the jury to be instructed that they could consider a delay, 
or lack thereof. 
 
Moreover, some jurors may have perceived a delay, albeit a 
short one, in this case.  The victim did not report the 
allegations immediately; she waited until after her father's 
29 
boss had left her and her father at their apartment.  The jury 
were permitted to consider this evidence, and the instruction 
appropriately contextualized the passage of time between the 
incident and the report.  We discern no error in the judge's 
decision to instruct using the standard instruction set forth in 
King, 445 Mass. at 247-248. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.