Case Title: State v. Jason J. Trawitzki

Citation: 2001 WI 77

Docket Number: 1999AP002234-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 77 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Jason J. Trawitzki,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2000 WI App 205 
Reported at:  238 Wis. 2d 795, 618 N.W.2d 884 
(Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 29, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 2, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
John Ullsvik 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BABLITCH, J., join dissent. 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Donald T. Lang, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Sandra L. Nowack, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2001 WI 77 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-2234-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jason J. Trawitzki,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed 
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   In this case, we review a 
court of appeals decision that affirmed a circuit court's denial 
of a post-conviction motion brought by Petitioner Jason J. 
Trawitzki (Trawitzki).  After Trawitzki was found guilty of ten 
theft charges for his role in the taking of ten firearms from a 
home and five charges of concealing stolen property for his role 
in the subsequent hiding of five of the firearms, he claimed 
that the charges were multiplicitous, and therefore in violation 
of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.  
Trawitzki also claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to impeach three of the State's witnesses with the 
specific number of prior convictions for each one.   
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
2 
¶2 
The circuit court denied his motion.  The court of 
appeals affirmed.  State v. Trawitzki, 2000 WI App 205, 238 Wis. 
2d 795, 618 N.W.2d 884.  We accepted Trawitzki's petition for 
review. 
¶3 
We hold that the charges are not multiplicitous 
because the charges are not identical in fact, and because 
Trawitzki has not overcome the presumption that the legislature 
intended to allow multiple prosecutions.  We further hold that 
Trawitzki's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
impeach three of the State's witnesses with the number of their 
prior 
criminal 
convictions, 
because 
Trawitzki 
has 
not 
established 
that 
this 
failure 
was 
prejudicial 
to 
him.  
Confidence in the outcome of the trial has not been undermined 
by such failure.  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals 
decision that in turn affirmed the circuit court's judgment and 
its denial of Trawitzki's post-conviction motion. 
I 
 
¶4 
On August 29, 1997, members of a criminal gang known 
as the West Side City Crips burglarized the Lehman residence in 
Watertown.  Included in the group that entered the home were 
Trawitzki, Kristy Lehman (Lehman), Chris Schoch (Schoch), Jason 
Glascock (Glascock), and Johnny Weiss (Weiss).  Members of this 
group took ten firearms from various rooms and wrapped them all 
in a sheet, in order to carry the firearms out of the home.  The 
firearms were then placed in the trunk of Glascock's car and 
taken to the Weiss residence, where they were stored in the 
basement.  The next morning, Trawitzki, Schoch, Glascock, Weiss, 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
3 
Phillip Ziegler, and J.R. Robinson took five of the stolen 
firearms 
and 
hid 
them 
near 
a 
bridge 
in 
Helenville.  
Subsequently, 
members of 
this group, 
including 
Trawitzki, 
traveled to Minnesota where they were taken into custody near 
Duluth.  Some of the firearms were found in their possession. 
 
¶5 
The State charged Trawitzki with one count of armed 
burglary as a party to a crime and in association with a 
criminal gang, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 943.10(1)(f), 
943.10(2)(b), 939.05, and 939.625(1)(a)(1997-98).1  The State 
also charged Trawitzki with ten counts of theft for taking and 
carrying away a firearm as a party to a crime and in association 
with 
a 
criminal 
gang, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 943.20(1)(a), 
943.20(3)(d)5, 
939.05, 
and 
939.625(1)(a).  
Lastly, the State charged Trawitzki with five counts of 
concealing stolen property as a party to a crime and in 
association with a criminal gang, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 943.20(1)(a), 943.20(3)(d)5, 939.05, and 939.625(1)(a). 
 
¶6 
Trawitzki pled not guilty to all charges.  He admitted 
being present at the Lehman residence when the ten firearms were 
carried out, and being present when the five firearms were 
concealed in Helenville, but denied participating in the crimes. 
 He also denied being a member of the West Side City Crips. 
 
¶7 
The case was tried before a jury.  During the trial, 
Lehman, Schoch, and Glascock testified for the State and 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated.  
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
4 
implicated Trawitzki in the crimes charged.  Lehman testified 
that Trawitzki was a member of the West Side City Crips, that 
Trawitzki went to the Lehman residence on August 29, and that 
Trawitzki carried firearms from the trunk of Glascock's car into 
the Weiss residence.  Schoch testified that Trawitzki was a 
member of the West Side City Crips, that Trawitzki entered the 
Lehman residence on August 29, and that Trawitzki traveled to 
Helenville with Glascock and Ziegler to hide the firearms.  
Glascock testified that Trawitzki entered the Lehman residence 
on August 29, that Trawitzki carried a bag of ammunition out of 
the basement of the Lehman residence, that Trawitzki assisted in 
placing the firearms in the Weiss basement, and that Trawitzki 
went to Helenville to hide the firearms.  All three testified 
that they were incarcerated for their roles in the events that 
led to the charges against Trawitzki.  In addition, all three 
testified while wearing jail or prison clothes.   
¶8 
The State also called other witnesses who testified to 
Trawitzki's 
involvement 
in 
the 
crimes, 
including 
Katy 
Eigenberger (Eigenberger), Steve Cira (Cira), Watertown Police 
Detective Kenneth Severn (Detective Severn), and Dodge County 
Deputy 
James 
Ketchem 
(Deputy 
Ketchem). 
 
Eigenberger, 
an 
acquaintance of Trawitzki, Lehman, Schoch, Glascock, and others 
in the gang, testified that, on August 30th, members of this 
group told her that Trawitzki, Lehman, Schoch, and Glascock 
broke into the Lehman residence and took firearms.  Cira 
testified that Trawitzki was a member of the West Side City 
Crips.  Detective Severn, who investigated the August 29th 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
5 
burglary at the Lehman residence, testified that Schoch told 
him, in an interview on January 24, 1998, that Trawitzki carried 
at least one firearm up from the basement of the Lehman 
residence on August 29th.  Deputy Ketchem, who picked up 
Trawitzki as a runaway on August 7, 1997, testified that 
Trawitzki claimed to be a member of the Crips in Watertown.    
¶9 
In addition, Trawitzki's own testimony placed him at 
the scene of the crimes.  He testified that he entered the 
Lehman residence on August 29th, that he saw the firearms 
wrapped in a sheet on the kitchen floor, and witnessed Schoch 
carry the firearms out of the Lehman residence.  He also 
testified to traveling to Helenville with Glascock and Ziegler 
when the firearms were hidden near the bridge.   
 
¶10 The jury found Trawitzki guilty of all charges.  The 
court sentenced Trawitzki to a 15-year prison term for the 
burglary charge.  The court withheld sentence on the other 15 
charges, placing Trawitzki on probation for 10 years on each 
charge, to run concurrently. 
 
¶11 Trawitzki 
brought 
a 
post-conviction 
motion. 
 He 
claimed that all of the firearm theft charges and the concealing 
stolen firearm charges were multiplicitous, because all the 
charges arose from "a single act of taking and a single act of 
concealing."  (Br. in Support of Def.'s Post-conviction Mot. at 
2).  Trawitzki claimed that all of the firearms were removed 
from the Lehman residence at one time, when the firearms were 
wrapped in a sheet and carried out of the house.  Trawitzki also 
argued that the legislature did not intend multiple charges for 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
6 
a single incidence of taking and a single act of concealing the 
firearms.  According to Trawitzki, the legislature intended 
increased penalties based on the value of the items stolen, not 
the number of items.  Trawitzki also contended that punishing 
theft of multiple firearms and the concealing of multiple 
firearms with multiple charges would lead to arbitrary and 
absurd results.  For example, the State could charge a person 
with two counts of theft for stealing a pair of socks.   
¶12 In addition, Trawitzki claimed that he was deprived of 
his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, 
because his trial counsel failed to impeach Lehman, Schoch, and 
Glascock, by questioning them about the existence and number of 
their prior criminal convictions.  Trawitzki suggested that the 
State's case against him rested primarily on the testimony of 
these three witnesses.  Arguing that prior criminal convictions 
are 
relevant 
to 
the 
jury's 
determination 
of 
a 
witness' 
credibility, Trawitzki contended that with such information 
before them the jurors would have reasonably doubted the 
credibility of the three witnesses, when they implicated him in 
the crimes charged.   
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
7 
¶13 The circuit court denied Trawitzki's post-conviction 
motion.2  The circuit court held that the firearm theft charges 
and the concealing stolen property charges against Trawitzki 
were not multiplicitous, because each charge required proof of a 
different fact, namely, the specific identity of each firearm 
taken away and later concealed.  The circuit court's conclusion 
also relied on the fact that each theft required "a new 
volitional act to take or conceal a different firearm."  (Tr. 
Ct. Mem. Decision at 3).  Furthermore, the circuit court held 
that Trawitzki could not rebut the presumption that the 
legislature intended separate charges in regard to each firearm. 
 In reaching this determination, the circuit court relied on the 
legislature's choice to use the singular form of the word 
"firearm" in Wis. Stat. § 943.20(3)(d)5.  The circuit court also 
noted that the theft statute treats firearms differently than 
other forms of property, punishing the theft of a firearm and 
the concealment thereof as a felony regardless of its value, 
because of the dangerousness associated with such acts in regard 
to firearms. 
                     
2 In his post-conviction motion, Trawitzki also claimed 
that:  1) there was insufficient evidence to apply the criminal 
gang enhancer; 2) the jury instructions failed to require the 
jury to unanimously agree on the existence of two or more 
criminal offenses necessary to apply the criminal gang enhancer; 
and 3) there was a new factor which warranted the reduction of 
his sentence.  The circuit court also rejected these arguments. 
 Since Trawitzki did not present these issues to the court of 
appeals or to this court, we do not address them.  
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
8 
 
¶14 In addition, the circuit court held that Trawitzki was 
not denied effective assistance of counsel as a result of his 
trial counsel's failure to impeach Lehman, Schoch, and Glascock 
with their prior criminal convictions.  The circuit court 
concluded that trial counsel's performance was not deficient, 
because the choice not to impeach was a reasonable tactical 
decision.  According to the circuit court, it was reasonable for 
counsel to refrain, in order not to emphasize the unfairness of 
the witnesses being convicted for their role in the crimes, 
while Trawitzki was seeking acquittal.  The circuit court also 
determined that the decision not to impeach was reasonable, so 
that Trawitzki could avoid accusing his friends of lying.  
Moreover, the circuit court concluded that, even if trial 
counsel's failure to impeach constituted deficient performance, 
this failure did not prejudice Trawitzki's defense.  The circuit 
court found no prejudice because:  1) the jury knew that the 
witnesses had criminal convictions; 2) the jury was instructed 
that convictions are relevant to a witness' credibility; 3) the 
witnesses testified that they were incarcerated for their 
respective roles in the burglary and thefts; 4) the witnesses 
testified wearing prison clothing; 5) other witnesses implicated 
Trawitzki in the crimes; and 6) Trawitzki's own testimony placed 
him at the scene of the crimes.  For all these reasons, the 
circuit court concluded that Trawitzki failed to establish that 
the result of the trial would have been different had his 
counsel impeached the three witnesses with their convictions. 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
9 
 
¶15 Trawitzki appealed the judgments of conviction and the 
circuit court order denying his post-conviction motion. 
 
¶16 The court of appeals affirmed.  The court of appeals 
held that the firearm theft charges and the concealing stolen 
property charges were not multiplicitous because each charge 
required proof of a different fact, the identity of the 
individual firearm, and because each charge required a separate 
volitional act on the part of Trawitzki.  Trawitzki, 2000 WI App 
205 at ¶10.  The court of appeals also determined that Trawitzki 
did not overcome the presumption that the legislature intended 
to allow multiple prosecutions.  Id. at ¶17.  In reaching this 
determination, the court of appeals relied on the legislature's 
use 
of 
the 
singular 
phrase 
"a 
firearm" 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.20(3)(d)5, 
rather 
than 
"firearms" 
or 
"one 
or 
more 
firearms."  Id. at ¶12.  The court of appeals found that the 
legislative history of the theft statute provided no indication 
that the legislature intended but one charge when multiple 
firearms are taken or concealed in one episode.  Id. at ¶14.  In 
addition, the court of appeals concluded that separate charges 
for each firearm are appropriate to address society's concern 
about the spread of firearms among criminals.  Id. at ¶16.  
According to the court of appeals, it is appropriate to 
separately punish the theft or concealment of each firearm, 
because each stolen firearm potentially places a dangerous 
weapon into the hands of a criminal for use in the commission of 
another crime.  Id. 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
10
 
¶17 The court of appeals also held that Trawitzki was not 
denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel when his trial counsel failed to impeach Lehman, Schoch, 
and 
Glascock 
with 
the 
number 
of 
their 
prior 
criminal 
convictions.  Id. at ¶18.  The court of appeals concluded that 
this failure to impeach did not prejudice Trawitzki's defense, 
because the jury knew that the three witnesses were incarcerated 
for their role in the crimes, giving the jury reason to question 
their credibility.  Id. at ¶22.  While the court of appeals 
recognized that the number of convictions is relevant to the 
credibility determination, it was not convinced that the result 
of Trawitzki's trial would have been different had the jury 
known the exact number of convictions each witness had.  Id. 
II 
 
¶18 This case presents two issues for our review.  One, 
are the separate charges against Trawitzki for each firearm 
taken 
and 
carried 
away 
and 
for 
each 
firearm 
concealed 
multiplicitous, 
therefore 
violating 
the 
constitutional 
prohibition against double jeopardy?  Two, was Trawitzki's trial 
counsel ineffective for failing to impeach Lehman, Schoch, and 
Glascock with the number of prior criminal convictions for each 
witness? 
 
¶19 To resolve these two issues, the following standards 
of review are applicable.  The issue of whether a person's right 
to be free from double jeopardy has been violated presents a 
question of law that we review de novo.  State v. Anderson, 219 
Wis. 2d 739, 746, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998).  The issue of whether a 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
11
person has been deprived of the constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law 
and fact.  State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 127, 449 N.W.2d 
845 (1990).  We will uphold the circuit court's findings of fact 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  Whether counsel's 
performance was deficient and prejudicial presents a question of 
law that we review de novo.  Id. at 128. 
III 
 
¶20 We first consider Trawitzki's claim that the firearm 
theft charges and the concealing stolen firearm charges are 
multiplicitous.  The double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which are nearly 
identical, protect a person from being "placed twice in jeopardy 
of punishment for the same offense."  State v. Sauceda, 168 Wis. 
2d 486, 492, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992).  These clauses provide three 
protections:  1) "protection against a second prosecution for 
the same offense after acquittal;" 2) "protection against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction;" and 
3) "protection against multiple punishments for the same 
offense."  Id.  This case involves the third of the double 
jeopardy protections. 
 
¶21 To resolve the issue of whether the charges against 
Trawitzki are multiplicitous, we must apply the well-established 
two-part multiplicity test.  First, we must determine whether 
the charged offenses are identical in law and fact.  Anderson, 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
12
219 Wis. 2d at 746.3  If the charged offenses are identical in 
law and in fact, then they are multiplicitous, and are therefore 
in violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the United States 
and Wisconsin Constitutions.  Id. at 747.   Second, if the 
charged offenses are not identical in law and in fact, we must 
determine whether the legislature intended multiple prosecutions 
for the charged offenses.  Id. at 751.  If we conclude that the 
legislature intended a single charge for the offenses, then the 
charged offenses are multiplicitous.  Id. at 752.  
¶22 It is only the first part of the multiplicity test 
that involves the constitutional double jeopardy provisions.  
State v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 159 n.3, 493 N.W.2d 23 
(1992).  If the charged offenses are not identical in law and in 
fact, then we are no longer concerned with a double jeopardy 
violation.  Id.  The second part of this test is not a 
constitutional inquiry, but rather a question of statutory 
interpretation.  Id.  The second part of the test "focuses on 
the legislative intent as to the allowable unit of prosecution 
under the statute in question."  State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 
63, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980).  When charged offenses are deemed 
                     
3 This test has been referred to by this court as the 
"elements only test" from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 
299 (1932), the "additional fact" test, the "different fact" 
test, and the "identical in law and fact" test.  State v. 
Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d 486, 493 n.8, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992).  
Regardless of the name of the test, the analysis under the first 
part of the multiplicity test is the same regardless of whether 
the charges are brought under multiple statutes or whether the 
charges are brought under the same statute.  State v. Anderson, 
219 Wis. 2d 739, 747, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998).      
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
13
multiplicitous under this part of the test, they are so because 
multiple charges are contrary to the will of the legislature.  
Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 159 n.3. 
¶23 The State argues that the firearm theft charges and 
the concealing stolen property charges against Trawitzki are not 
multiplicitous.  The State contends that the charges are 
different in fact because each charge requires proof of a fact 
that another charge does not, namely, the identity of the 
specific firearm.  In addition, the State claims that the theft 
and concealment of each firearm required a separate volitional 
act; that is, a choice to take each firearm out of the Lehman 
residence and a choice to conceal each firearm near the bridge 
in Helenville.   
 
¶24 The State also argues that Trawitzki cannot overcome 
the presumption that the legislature intended separate charges 
for each firearm.  In making this argument, the State relies on 
the plain language of the statute, in which the legislature used 
the 
phrase 
"a 
firearm." 
 
According 
to 
the 
State, 
the 
legislature's choice to use the singular form of the word 
"firearm," 
rather 
than 
the 
plural, 
indicates 
that 
the 
legislature intended a separate charge for each firearm.  The 
State further contends that the legislative history of Wis. 
Stat. § 943.20(3)(d)5 indicates that the legislature intended 
multiple charges.  The State claims that when the legislature 
changed the statute to make the theft or concealment of a 
firearm a felony regardless of value, the legislature meant to 
emphasize the dangerousness of each individual firearm.  Lastly, 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
14
the State argues that multiple punishments for the theft and for 
the concealment of multiple firearms are appropriate to address 
society's concern regarding the proliferation of firearms among 
criminals. 
 
¶25 Trawitzki argues that the ten firearm theft charges 
and the five concealing charges are multiplicitous because the 
charges are identical in law and in fact.  Trawitzki contends 
that the charges are identical in law because all of the charges 
arise under the same statute.  According to Trawitzki, the 
charges are also identical in fact.  Trawitzki claims that, even 
though the theft charges each involve a different firearm, all 
of the charges arose from a single transaction.  He claims that 
the concealing charges likewise arose from a single incident.  
The ten theft charges for taking and carrying away arose out of 
a single act of taking the firearms out of the Lehman residence 
and the five charges for concealing arose out of a single act of 
hiding the firearms.  Trawitzki contends that the fact that each 
charge involves a different firearm is not significant because 
the focus of the statute is on the criminal act of taking or of 
concealing, not the nature of the property. 
 
¶26 Trawitzki also argues that, when multiple charges are 
brought under the same statute, the presumption that the 
legislature intended multiple punishments is inappropriate.  
Trawitzki claims that this presumption is contrary to the 
established principle that criminal statutes should be construed 
strictly in favor of the accused, and that this presumption 
prevents an objective determination of legislative intent.   
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
15
 
¶27 Trawitzki contends that the legislature did not intend 
separate charges for each firearm.  According to Trawitzki, the 
structure of the statute demonstrates that the legislature 
intended to increase the punishment based on the value of items 
stolen, not the number of items.  Trawitzki submits that 
increasing the punishment depending on the number of items would 
lead to absurd results, such as charging a person with two 
counts of theft for taking one pair of shoes.  Trawitzki argues 
that 
the 
legislature's 
decision 
to 
punish 
the 
theft 
or 
concealment of a firearm more severely than other property does 
not mean that the legislature intended separate charges for each 
firearm.  Trawitzki points to the fact that the statute punishes 
the theft of domestic animals more severely.  Trawitzki then 
suggests that it would be an absurd result to charge a person 
with eight counts of theft for taking a litter of eight kittens. 
 Furthermore, Trawitzki claims that the legislature's use of the 
phrase "a firearm" does not mean that the legislature intended 
separate charges because, when construing statutes, the singular 
form of a word also includes the plural, relying on Wis. Stat. 
§ 990.001(1).  Lastly, Trawitzki argues that there is nothing in 
the legislative history of the statute to support the conclusion 
that the legislature intended separate charges for each firearm. 
¶28 We apply the first part of the multiplicity test and 
conclude that the firearm theft charges and the concealing 
stolen firearms charges against Trawitzki are not identical in 
law and in fact.  As both parties concede, the charges are 
identical in law because they arise under the same criminal 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
16
statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(a).  However, the charges 
against Trawitzki are not identical in fact.  The test for 
whether charges are not identical in fact is whether "the facts 
are either separated in time or of a significantly different 
nature."  Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 749.  To be of a 
significantly 
different nature, each 
charged 
offense 
must 
require proof of an additional fact that the other charges do 
not.  Id. at 750.  In this case, each theft charge and each 
concealment charge against Trawitzki does require proof of an 
additional fact that the other charges do not, namely, the 
identity of the individual firearm.  Because each charge alleges 
that Trawitzki either took or concealed a specific firearm, the 
State must prove the identity of the specific firearm.  For 
example, the first firearm theft charge alleges that Trawitzki 
took and carried away a Smith & Wesson model 28 N-frame 6" 
revolver with satin stainless steel finish and black rubber 
grips.  The State must prove, therefore, that Trawitzki did 
exactly what is alleged.  The second firearm theft charge 
alleges that Trawitzki took and carried away a Star PD 45 semi-
auto 4" blue/alloy frame pistol.  Consequently, the State must 
prove that.  
¶29 Our conclusion that the charges against Trawitzki are 
not identical in fact is consistent with previous decisions by 
this court.  In Anderson, we held that multiple charges of bail 
jumping were not identical in fact, because each charge required 
proof of a fact that the other charge did not, the specific 
violation of a condition of bail.  219 Wis. 2d at 751.  We 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
17
concluded that one charge of bail jumping required proof that 
Anderson consumed alcohol, while another charge required proof 
that Anderson had contact with his previous battery victim.  Id. 
 We have reached similar conclusions in other cases.  See also  
Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 66 (holding that multiple homicide charges, 
for the deaths of four people resulting from the intoxicated use 
of a motor vehicle, were not identical in fact, because each 
charge required proof of the death of the specific victim) and 
Madison v. Nickel, 66 Wis. 2d 71, 83-84, 223 N.W.2d 865 (1974) 
(holding that four obscenity charges, for the sale of four 
obscene magazines in one transaction, were permissible because 
each charge required proof of the sale of a particular 
magazine). 
¶30 Having determined that the firearm theft charges and 
the concealment charges against Trawitzki are not identical in 
law and in fact, we apply the second part of the multiplicity 
test, 
whether 
the 
legislature 
intended 
multiple 
charges.  
Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 746.  Because the charges against 
Trawitzki are not identical in fact, we presume that the 
legislature intended separate charges for the theft and for the 
concealment of each firearm.  See id. at 751.  Trawitzki may 
rebut this presumption only by a clear indication of legislative 
intent to the contrary.  See id.  We consider four factors in 
discerning legislative intent for a multiplicity challenge:  "1) 
statutory language; 2) legislative history and context; 3) the 
nature of the proscribed conduct; and 4) the appropriateness of 
multiple punishment."  Id.  at 751-52. 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
18
¶31 We apply this four-factor examination and conclude 
that Trawitzki has not overcome the presumption that the 
legislature intended separate charges for the theft and for the 
concealment of each firearm.  With respect to the first factor, 
nothing in the language of Wis. Stat. § 943.20 clearly indicates 
that the legislature intended one charge for the theft and one 
charge for the concealment of multiple firearms.  In fact, the 
penalty provision of the statute uses the phrase "a firearm."  
Wis. Stat. § 943.20(3)(d)5.  The legislature's use of the 
singular 
form 
of 
the 
word 
"firearm" 
indicates 
that 
the 
legislature intended a separate charge for each individual 
firearm.4  An example of language that would provide a clear 
indication that the legislature intended one charge regardless 
of the number of firearms would be "one or more firearms."  We 
agree with Trawitzki that Wis. Stat. § 990.001(1) states that, 
when construing statutes, the singular form of a word includes 
the plural.  However, this rule of statutory construction 
renders the phrase "a firearm" in the statute, at best, 
ambiguous regarding the allowable unit of prosecution.  Even if 
                     
4 The dissent claims that it is the act of theft, rather 
than the object of the theft, that determines the appropriate 
number of charges.  Dissent at ¶53 n.1.  However, the only 
source that the dissent relies upon for this proposition, a 
Wisconsin Law Review article by Frank J. Remington and Allan J. 
Joseph, was published in 1961, well before the legislature 
changed Wis. Stat. § 943.20, in 1977, to separate the theft of a 
firearm from the thefts of other forms of property.  Ch. 255, 
Laws of 1977.  Consequently, this law review article provides no 
guidance on the proper interpretation of § 943.20, in regard to 
the multiplicity issue.        
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
19
we construe the phrase "a firearm" to include the singular and 
the 
plural, 
this 
construction 
does 
not 
provide 
a 
clear 
indication that the legislature intended one charge for the 
theft and one charge for the concealment of multiple firearms. 
¶32 In considering the second factor, we find that there 
is no legislative history for Wis. Stat. § 943.20 which clearly 
indicates that the legislature did not intend multiple charges. 
 In fact, our review of the legislative history of the statute 
indicates that the legislature did intend separate charges for 
each firearm.  The legislature changed the statute, by virtue of 
Chapter 255, Laws of 1977, from punishing the taking or 
concealing of property based only on the value of the property, 
to punishing the taking or the concealing of a firearm with a 
Class D felony, regardless of the value of the firearm.  The 
drafting record of Chapter 255, Laws of 1977 indicates that the 
legislature changed the penalty section of the statute to 
emphasize the danger associated with each stolen firearm.  In 
Assembly Amendment 1 to 1997 Assembly Bill 130, which would 
later become Chapter 255, Laws of 1977, the legislature amended 
the penalty section of the statute from the phrase "dangerous 
weapons" to the phrase "a firearm."  This change from the plural 
to the singular, and from the generic term "dangerous weapons" 
to the specific term "a firearm," demonstrates that the 
legislature was concerned with the theft or the concealment of 
each individual firearm.  Furthermore, Representative Stanley 
Lato, in a drafting request to the Legislative Reference Bureau, 
stated that "the idea [behind Chapter 255, Laws of 1977 is] to 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
20
change from monetary amount to the danger involved with the 
weapon."  Since it appears that the legislature changed the 
statute to reflect a concern about the dangerousness of each 
stolen firearm, it follows that the legislature intended 
separate charges for each stolen firearm. 
¶33 Under this second factor, we also examine the context 
of the statute.  Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 751.  Context is 
defined as "[t]he part of a text or statement that surrounds a 
particular word or passage and determines its meaning."  The 
American Heritage Dictionary 407 (3d ed. 1992).  In this case, 
we look at the structure of the penalty section of the statute, 
which surrounds the specific penalty provision regarding the 
theft or the concealment of a firearm.  In the penalty section 
of the statute, there are three classifications for the taking 
or the concealing of property.  Wis. Stat. § 943.20(3).  For 
punishment 
purposes, 
these 
classifications 
are 
treated 
differently.  The first classification relates to general 
property, which is punished according to the value of the 
property. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.20(3)(a)–(c). 
 
The 
second 
classification relates to property under certain circumstances, 
such as property taken after a physical disaster, punished as a 
Class D felony.  Wis. Stat. § 943.20(3)(d)4.  The third 
classification relates to certain kinds of property, such as a 
firearm or a domestic animal, punished as a Class D felony.  
Wis. Stat. § 943.20(3)(d)1 and 5.  Since the legislature 
separated the taking or concealing of a firearm from the taking 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
21
or concealing of other kinds of property, it follows that the 
legislature intended separate charges for each firearm involved. 
¶34 The fact that the penalty section of the statute 
divides property into three classifications leads to us to 
reject Trawitzki's argument that absurd results will follow from 
our decision.  According to Trawitzki, the decision to allow 
multiple charges will lead to arbitrary and absurd results, such 
as charging a person with two counts of theft for stealing one 
pair of shoes.  This comparison is inappropriate because shoes 
and firearms are treated differently by the statute.5  A pair of 
shoes falls under the first classification, punished according 
to the value of the property.  A firearm falls under the third 
classification, punished as a Class D felony regardless of the 
firearm's value.  Therefore, a defendant accused of stealing one 
pair of shoes will be charged according to the value, not the 
number, of the shoes.  
¶35 The third factor, the nature of the proscribed 
conduct, fails to indicate clearly that the legislature did not 
intend multiple charges.  The nature of the proscribed conduct, 
the theft of a firearm or the concealing of a stolen firearm, is 
                     
5 The dissent suggests that our conclusion will lead to 
multiple charges based on the number of items of property stolen 
in the ordinary theft case.  Dissent at ¶64.  According to the 
dissent, the State advanced the position, at oral argument, that 
the theft of five compact discs could result in five theft 
charges.  Id.  If the State made such an argument, we are not 
persuaded by it.  As stated above, firearms are treated 
differently from other forms of property, including compact 
discs, in Wis. Stat. § 943.20.  Accordingly, the comparison 
between firearms and compact discs is not a valid one.  
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
22
dangerous to society.  Each firearm stolen might result in 
putting a dangerous weapon into the hands of a criminal.  The 
criminal can then use that firearm in the commission of another 
crime.  In this case, Trawitzki, and the other members of the 
West Side City Crips, took ten firearms from the Lehman 
residence.  Consequently, this criminal gang gained ten firearms 
to use in the commission of other crimes.  This increased the 
ability of the West Side City Crips to commit crimes and 
increased the threat to society posed by this gang.  If each 
stolen firearm increases the threat to society, then the theft 
of each firearm and the concealing of each stolen firearm may be 
charged separately. 
¶36 The fourth and final factor, the appropriateness of 
multiple punishments, also fails to clearly indicate that the 
legislature did not intend multiple prosecutions.  As stated 
above, the theft and concealment of each firearm increases the 
danger posed to society.  Accordingly, it is appropriate to 
punish the taking and the concealing of each firearm separately. 
 Imposing a punishment in regard to each individual firearm 
serves two purposes.  First, each punishment will serve as a 
sanction for the increased potential danger posed to society by 
each firearm.  Second, each punishment will hopefully deter both 
the defendant, and others, from taking or concealing even one 
more firearm.   
¶37 We therefore conclude that the firearm theft and 
concealment charges against Trawitzki are not multiplicitous, 
because the charges are not identical in fact, and because 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
23
Trawitzki failed to rebut the presumption that the legislature 
intended multiple prosecutions under these circumstances. 
¶38 We now turn to the second claim in Trawitzki's post-
conviction motion, that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to impeach Lehman, Schoch, and Glascock with the number 
of their prior criminal convictions. 
¶39 Both 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution afford a criminal defendant the right to counsel.  
This right to counsel includes the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 126 (citing 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).  To 
determine whether counsel was ineffective, we apply the test 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 126.  
"The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning 
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.   
¶40 The Strickland test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel is a two-part test.  The first part of the test requires 
a defendant to show that counsel's performance was deficient.  
Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 127.  In order to satisfy this part of 
the test, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel made serious 
errors so that "'counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.'"  Id. (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).  We give great deference to 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
24
counsel's performance, and, therefore, a defendant must overcome 
"a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably within 
professional norms."  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 127.  If the 
defendant establishes that counsel's performance was deficient, 
then the defendant must satisfy the second part of the 
Strickland test and prove that this deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.  Id.  To make this showing, the 
defendant has the burden to prove that "'there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.'"  Id. at 
129 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  "'A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome.'"  Id.  We may dispense with the first part of 
the Strickland test, if the defendant fails to establish 
prejudice.  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 128. 
¶41 The State argues that Trawitzki's trial counsel was 
not ineffective by failing to impeach Lehman, Schoch, and 
Glascock in regard to the number of prior criminal convictions 
of each witness.  The State claims that this failure did not 
prejudice Trawitzki's defense, because the jury knew that, at 
the time they testified, each one was incarcerated for their 
involvement in the events that led to the charges against 
Trawitzki.  Therefore, the State claims that the jury had reason 
to question the credibility of Lehman, Schoch, and Glascock.  
The State concedes that the number of their convictions might 
have decreased their credibility with the jury; however, the 
State 
contends 
that 
it 
would 
not 
have 
diminished 
their 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
25
credibility enough to cast a reasonable doubt on Trawitzki's 
conviction.  The State further argues that the failure to 
impeach on the number of convictions did not prejudice the 
defense, 
because other witnesses 
testified 
to 
Trawitzki's 
involvement in the crimes and Trawitzki's own testimony placed 
him at the scene of the crimes.  Lastly, the State contends that 
the decision not to impeach Lehman, Schoch, and Glascock in such 
a manner was a reasonable one, because the jury could have 
associated their guilt with Trawitzki. 
¶42 Trawitzki 
argues 
that 
his 
trial 
counsel 
was 
ineffective for failing to raise the number of convictions in 
order to impeach Lehman, Schoch, and Glascock.  According to 
Trawitzki, trial counsel's decision not to impeach these 
witnesses 
was 
not 
objectively 
reasonable, 
and, 
therefore, 
constituted deficient performance, because the number of prior 
convictions of a witness is relevant to the jury's credibility 
determination.  Trawitzki contends that impeachment was a 
necessary part of his defense, because he denied participating 
in the crimes, claiming that his accusers, Lehman, Schoch, and 
Glascock, 
actually 
perpetrated 
the 
crimes. 
 
Furthermore, 
Trawitzki argues that trial counsel's justification for failing 
to raise the number of prior convictions, that he did not want 
the jury to associate the witnesses' guilt with Trawitzki, was 
unreasonable, because the jury was instructed to use prior 
convictions only to judge a witness' credibility, and for no 
other purpose.  Wis JI——Criminal 325.  Trawitzki also argues 
that the failure to impeach prejudiced his defense.  Trawitzki 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
26
claims that the case against him rested primarily on the 
testimony, and therefore the credibility, of these three 
witnesses.  Trawitzki contends that, had the jury known about 
the witnesses' prior convictions, it would have created a 
reasonable doubt as to the truthfulness of their testimony, and, 
subsequently, about Trawitzki's guilt. 
¶43 We apply the second prong of the Strickland test and 
conclude that Trawitzki's counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to impeach Lehman, Schoch, and Glascock with the number 
of their prior criminal convictions.  We dispense with the 
inquiry as to whether this failure amounts to deficient 
performance, 
because 
we 
conclude 
that 
Trawitzki 
has 
not 
satisfied the burden to prove that this failure prejudiced his 
defense.  Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 128.   
¶44 Trawitzki 
has 
not 
established 
that 
there 
is 
a 
reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have 
been different, if his trial counsel had impeached Lehman, 
Schoch, and Glascock with the number of their prior convictions. 
 From their testimony on direct examination, the jury knew that 
all three were incarcerated because of their participation in 
the crimes that led to the charges against Trawitzki.  In 
addition, all three testified wearing jail or prison clothes.  
Therefore, the jury had reason to question the credibility of 
all three witnesses.  While the exact number of convictions 
might have incrementally weakened the credibility of the 
witnesses, this decrease is not enough to establish a reasonable 
probability that the jury would have reached a different 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
27
verdict.  Confidence in the outcome of the trial is not 
undermined by the failure to impeach with the numbers of 
convictions of each witness.      
¶45 Moreover, the failure to impeach the three witnesses 
did not prejudice Trawitzki's defense, because they were not the 
only ones to implicate Trawitzki in the firearm thefts and 
concealment.  When there is strong evidence supporting a verdict 
in the record, it is less likely that a defendant can prove 
prejudice.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.  Eigenberger testified 
that members of the West Side City Crips, including Trawitzki 
himself, told her that Trawitzki entered the Lehman residence 
and took firearms.  Cira testified that Trawitzki was a member 
of the West Side City Crips.   Detective Severn testified that 
Schoch told him that Trawitzki carried at least one firearm up 
from the basement of the Lehman residence.  Deputy Ketchem 
testified that Trawitzki claimed to be a member of the Crips of 
Watertown.  In addition, Trawitzki's own testimony placed him at 
the Lehman residence, when the firearms were taken, and at the 
scene in Helenville, when the firearms were hidden.             
¶46 In summary, we conclude that the ten firearm theft 
charges for taking and carrying away and the five firearm theft 
charges for concealment are not multiplicitous, because the 
charges are not identical in fact, and because Trawitzki cannot 
rebut the presumption that the legislature intended multiple 
prosecutions.  We further conclude that Trawitzki's trial 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to impeach Lehman, 
Schoch, and Glascock with the number of their prior criminal 
No. 
99-2234-CR 
 
 
28
convictions, because Trawitzki has not established that this 
failure prejudiced his defense.  Confidence in the outcome of 
the trial has not been undermined by such failure. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.                                  
 
                                                                
                                                                
                                                
 
 
99-2234-CR.awb 
 
1 
¶47 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting).  At issue in this 
case is the permissible unit of prosecution under the theft 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.20.  I believe that the permissible 
unit of prosecution for theft is found in the statutory 
definition of the crime.  In examining the statutory definition, 
I conclude that the legislature did not intend that two discrete 
violations of the theft statute be parsed into fifteen separate 
charges.   
¶48 Yet, the majority ignores the unit of prosecution 
defined by the statute and determines the unit of prosecution to 
be the number of firearms stolen.  In defining the underlying 
substantive offense by looking to the penalty provision of the 
statute, the majority is allowing the tail to wag the dog.  
Because the majority misreads the statute, misconstrues the  
legislative history, and allows for gross over-prosecution of 
theft offenses, I respectfully dissent.   
 
¶49 In essence, today's case should be viewed as an 
inquiry into legislative intent.  See Bell v. United States, 349 
U.S. 81, 82-83 (1955).  Whether the defendant's challenge is 
addressed under a multiplicity analysis or as a question of 
statutory interpretation, the intent of the legislature is 
ultimately determinative of the appropriate unit of prosecution. 
 See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1983). 
¶50 The majority misreads § 943.20 when it concludes under 
its multiplicity analysis that these offenses are not the same 
in law and fact.  The majority hinges its conclusion that the 
offenses are not the same in fact on the assertion that the 
99-2234-CR.awb 
 
2 
State must prove the identity of each specific firearm.  
Majority op. at ¶28.  However, under a proper construction of 
the statute, no such proof is needed.  
¶51 With respect to theft, the unit of prosecution 
intended 
by 
the 
Wisconsin 
legislature 
is 
embodied 
in 
§ 943.20(1)(a), which provides the substantive definition of the 
offense: 
 
 (1) ACTS. Whoever does any of the following may be 
penalized as provided in sub. (3): 
  (a) Intentionally takes and carries away, uses, 
transfers, conceals, or retains possession of movable 
property of another without the other's consent and 
with intent to deprive the owner permanently of 
possession of such property. 
When the State has convinced a jury beyond a reasonable doubt 
that all of these elements are satisfied, a defendant is guilty 
of the crime of theft.   
¶52 Under 
§ 943.20(1)(a), 
theft 
is 
defined 
by 
the 
defendant's conduct in engaging in one of the enumerated acts.  
Provided that the property is moveable property of another, the 
nature of that property is irrelevant to the initial question of 
whether the defendant is guilty of theft.  Cf. Sartin v. State, 
44 Wis. 2d 138, 148, 170 N.W.2d 727 (1969) (value of property 
stolen is not an element of the crime of theft).  The 
substantive definition of the offense leaves no room for asking 
what was taken, how many were taken, or from whom specifically 
the property was taken.  The sole focus is the act of the 
defendant. 
99-2234-CR.awb 
 
3 
¶53 It follows that the number of charges allowable is 
dependent upon the number of such acts that were committed.  The 
appropriate unit of prosecution is the act that violates 
§ 943.20(1).  In this case there were two such acts: the act of 
taking the guns from the Lehman home and the subsequent act of 
concealing 
them. 
 
Accordingly, 
it 
is 
permissible 
under 
§ 943.20(1)(a) that Trazwitzki be charged with two violations of 
the statute.6   
¶54 Only after the substantive elements of the offense 
have been established is the nature of the property relevant.  
The statute is divided into three subsections: (1) Acts, (2) 
                     
6 The commentary of one authority who sat on the Criminal 
Code Advisory Committee that assisted in the drafting of Wis. 
Stat. § 943.20 and the 1955 criminal code, reveals that it is 
the act, and not the object of the offense, that defines the 
appropriate unit of prosecution in theft cases: 
Where several items are taken or damaged by a single 
act, it seems that only one offense can be charged.  
For example, a defendant who steals a suitcase cannot 
be charged with separate thefts for each item of 
clothing contained in the suitcase.  Nor can a 
defendant who takes two suitcases at the same time and 
from the same place be so charged.  However, where the 
thefts or acts of damage occur at different times or 
at different places the prosecution can, but need not, 
charge a single offense.  
 
Frank J. Remington & Allan J. Joseph, Charging, Convicting, and 
Sentencing the Multiple Criminal Offender, 1961 Wis. L. Rev. 
528, 540.   
The same view pervades the statutory and common law of a 
majority of states.  See, e.g., 37 A.L.R.3d 1407, 1409 (1971) 
(explaining that a majority of jurisdictions subscribe to the 
"single larceny doctrine"). 
99-2234-CR.awb 
 
4 
Definitions, and (3) Penalties.  Under the express terms of the 
statute, the penalty provisions are not triggered until a 
violation of subsection (1), "Acts," is established.  See Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 943.20(3) 
("Penalties. 
 
Whoever 
violates 
sub. 
(1) . . . .").  It is only under the penalty provisions that we 
are required to examine the nature of the property that is the 
object of the theft.  
¶55 In the ordinary case, subsection (3), "Penalties," 
requires that the value of the property taken (or concealed) in 
an act of theft under § 943.20(1)(a) be assessed after a theft 
violation of subsection (1) is established.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 943.20(3).  The value of the property taken will determine the 
appropriate penalty level.   
¶56 However, the legislature has placed special emphasis 
on two kinds of property that will allow for a heightened 
penalty where they are the object of the theft: domestic animals 
and firearms.  § 943.20(3)(d)1 & 5.  When a firearm is the 
object of a theft and where the value of the property taken does 
not 
exceed 
$2,500, 
the 
defendant's 
theft 
conviction 
is 
classified as a Class D felony, and the defendant may be 
properly sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed ten 
years.  If the property that is the object of the act of theft 
exceeds $2,500, the defendant is guilty of a Class C felony.  
The same analysis applies to domestic animals.  
¶57 Proper construction of § 943.20 in this case would 
require that the jury first answer whether the elements of 
§ 943.20(1)(a) were satisfied.  Upon that determination, the 
99-2234-CR.awb 
 
5 
jury would then have to decide whether a firearm was an object 
of the theft.  See Wis JI——Criminal 1441B cmt.  If so, the 
defendant may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to 
exceed ten years, regardless of the value of that weapon.   
¶58 Thus, contrary to the majority's assertions, the State 
must simply prove, in addition to the other elements of the 
offense, that the defendant took and concealed the movable 
property of another.  Nothing in the statutory scheme requires 
the State to prove the identity of each individual weapon.  If 
the State desires to pursue a Class D felony it must then prove 
that a firearm was the object of the theft.  
¶59 The fact that more than one firearm was taken and more 
than one was concealed should be relevant only in determining 
the overall value of the property taken and concealed.  If upon 
aggregating the value of all the guns, the value exceeds $2,500, 
the defendant may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to 
exceed 15 years (Class C felony).7  However, the number of 
firearms stolen does not define the number of theft convictions 
that are permissible.  
¶60 The majority also misreads the legislative history in 
justifying its result.  I agree with the court of appeals' 
conclusion that "[t]he history of Wis. Stat. § 943.20 offers 
little insight as to what the legislature intended regarding the 
                     
7 Indeed, in the case at hand it seems that the appropriate 
penalty for the act of taking and carrying away the ten firearms 
should have been a Class C felony.  The State advances in its 
brief, and the criminal complaint reflects, that the alleged 
aggregated value of these weapons exceeded $2,500.   
99-2234-CR.awb 
 
6 
allowable unit of prosecution when a number of firearms are 
stolen or concealed in a single episode of theft."  State v. 
Trawitzki, 2000 WI App 205, ¶14, 238 Wis. 2d 795, 618 N.W.2d 
884.  All that the legislative history reveals is an intent to 
increase the penalty when the object of a theft is a firearm.  
An offense that might otherwise be a misdemeanor under Wis. 
Stat. § 943.20(3)(a), because of limited value, is treated as a 
felony.  The legislative emphasis on the danger of a stolen 
firearm that the majority describes is reflected in the 
increased penalty. 
¶61 The legislative history does not indicate that the 
legislature intended that a new offense be created.  The crime 
is theft, not theft of a firearm.  The increase in the penalty 
does not change the nature of the underlying offense.  The 
required proof for a theft conviction remains the same.  It is 
unfounded to infer from the legislative history that the 
upgrading of the offense of theft where a firearm is involved to 
a Class D felony is tantamount to the creation of the new 
offense of theft of a firearm.  Yet, that is exactly what the 
majority infers.  While the legislature may no doubt create such 
an offense, it simply has not done so.  
¶62 The unfortunate consequence of the majority's opinion 
is the gross over-prosecution that its decision will allow.  In 
the instant case, Jason Trawitzki, age 16, committed two theft 
offenses.  Nonetheless, at the hands of a zealous prosecutor and 
majority of this court, he is marked for the remainder of his 
life as a felon——15 times over——for those two offenses.   
99-2234-CR.awb 
 
7 
¶63 The majority attempts to limit its decision to the 
theft of firearms under § 943.20(3)(d)5.  See majority op. at 
¶34.  Its attempts are futile.  By deconstructing the theft 
statute in a manner that allows the unit of prosecution required 
by the statute to be ignored, today's decision may have untold 
consequences in ordinary theft cases.   
¶64 Under 
the 
majority's 
analysis 
an 
overzealous 
prosecutor may now be free to disregard the unit of prosecution 
defined by § 943.20(1)(a), and through artful pleading can 
subdivide any act of theft into any number of charges.  See 
majority op. at ¶14.  Indeed, at oral argument the State 
advanced the untenable position that an ordinary theft offense 
may be subdivided into numerous charges based on the individual 
items stolen.  The State believes that the theft of five compact 
discs in one episode of theft may result in five separate theft 
charges.  Because it is now apparently the prosecutor's, and not 
the legislature's, definition of the offense that controls, the 
presumption of the validity of separate charges in such a case 
will attach.  It may take some careful analysis on the part of 
the majority to prevent today's decision from having such an 
effect in future cases.   
¶65 While 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority's 
conclusions 
regarding the effectiveness of Trawitzki's trial counsel, I 
disagree with its conclusions regarding the allowable number of 
theft charges.  The majority's result can be justified only 
through its misreading of § 943.20 and misconstruing of the 
legislative history.  By defining the unit of prosecution in 
99-2234-CR.awb 
 
8 
theft cases in a manner that ignores the statutory text and 
misinterprets the legislative history, the majority may have 
opened the door to the unbridled over-prosecution of theft 
offenses.   
¶66 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH join this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
99-2234-CR.awb 
 
1