Case Title: State v. Glenn F. Schwebke

Citation: 2002 WI 55

Docket Number: 1999AP003204-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 55 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
99-3204-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Glenn F. Schwebke,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2001 WI App 99 
Reported at:  242 Wis. 2d 585, 627 N.W.2d 213 
(Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 29, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 8, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac   
 
JUDGE: 
Dale L. English   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Keith A. Findley and the Frank J. Remington Center, Madison, and 
oral argument by Keith A. Findley. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent that cause was argued by 
Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 55 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  99-3204-CR  
(L.C. No. 
97 CM 457) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Glenn F. Schwebke,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 29, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Petitioner Glenn Schwebke 
(Schwebke) was convicted by a jury on six counts of disorderly 
conduct for sending anonymous mail on six different occasions to 
three different individuals.  The court of appeals affirmed 
these convictions.  Schwebke now seeks a reversal of that 
decision based on the assertion that, as a matter of law, the 
disorderly conduct statute cannot apply to his conduct.  He 
argues that the statute was not intended to apply and should not 
apply to such private mailings because they are harassing in 
nature and cause the recipients mere personal discomfort.  We 
disagree.  The disorderly conduct statute may apply to the 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
2 
 
mailings at issue in this case.  Further, the evidence was 
sufficient 
to 
convict 
the 
defendant 
on 
all 
six 
counts.  
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' decision.   
I 
¶2 
Schwebke was initially charged with 14 counts of 
disorderly conduct in Fond du Lac County Circuit Court arising 
from mailings and telephone calls directed at four individuals.  
The mailings were sent anonymously by Schwebke and contained 
items such as newspaper clippings, records, and stenciled 
letters.  Schwebke moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging in 
part that, as to all counts, the complaint failed to allege 
facts sufficient to establish that Schwebke committed the crimes 
alleged.  In this respect, Schwebke contended that sending "non-
threatening, non-abusive and non-disturbing" news clippings, 
letters, and records through the mail did not constitute 
disorderly conduct because it was not the type of substantial 
intrusion that the disorderly conduct statute was intended to 
proscribe.  He argued that the receipt of such materials by a 
person of average sensibilities would not tend to cause a 
disturbance.   
¶3 
The circuit court, the Honorable Dale L. English 
presiding, issued an order granting Schwebke's motion to dismiss 
in part and denying it in part.  It dismissed one of the counts 
because it was charged 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
statute of 
limitations and dismissed five other counts because the criminal 
complaint did not establish that Schwebke committed the behavior 
alleged in the counts. 
 
With respect to 
the 
remaining 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
3 
 
allegations, the court held that the complaint contained 
sufficient information to support probable cause and that venue 
was properly established in Fond du Lac County.   
¶4 
Schwebke filed a petition for leave to appeal this 
order.  The court of appeals denied the petition, concluding 
that a grant of leave to appeal would not materially advance the 
termination of the litigation and was not necessary to protect 
Schwebke from substantial or irreparable harm.  The court of 
appeals also held that Schwebke's case did not present any novel 
issues of general importance to the administration of justice.  
Two other counts were later severed by the circuit court.  These 
counts related to a victim separate from the three victims 
involved in the remaining counts.     
¶5 
The amended complaint charged Schwebke with six counts 
of disorderly conduct for mailing envelopes with "disturbing 
contents" on six different occasions to three different people.1  
                                                 
1 The November 18, 1998 third amended complaint against 
Schwebke alleged the following counts: 
COUNT #1: [The defendant did] engage in otherwise 
disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the 
conduct tends to cause a disturbance, to-wit:  did 
mail an envelope with disturbing contents to Thomas 
Lamke;  
COUNT #2: FURTHER, the defendant did on or about 5-7-
96 in the City and County of Fond du Lac, engage in 
otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in 
which the conduct tends to cause a disturbance, to-
wit:  did mail an envelope with disturbing contents to 
Robbie Twohig; 
COUNT #3:  FURTHER, the defendant did on or about 9-
27-96 in the City and County of Fond du Lac, engage in 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
4 
 
Four counts related to mailings sent to Robbie Twohig.  One 
related to a mailing sent to Patty Marcinko, who was Twohig's 
sister.  The final count related to Thomas Lamke, who was 
Twohig's former boyfriend.  Before trial, Schwebke signed a 
stipulation admitting that he had compiled and mailed the 
envelopes to these individuals.  The three victims——Twohig, 
Marcinko, and Lamke——testified on behalf of the State at trial.  
Schwebke neither testified nor presented any witnesses.  The 
trial revealed the following facts concerning the three victims.   
                                                                                                                                                             
otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in 
which the conduct tends to cause a disturbance, to-
wit:  did mail an envelope with disturbing contents to 
Robbie Twohig; 
COUNT #4: FURTHER, the defendant did on or about 27th 
of January 1997 in the City and County of Fond du Lac, 
engage 
in 
otherwise 
disorderly 
conduct 
under 
circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause a 
disturbance, to-wit:  did mail an envelope with 
disturbing contents to Robbie Twohig; 
COUNT #5: FURTHER, the defendant did on or about 2-12-
97 in the City and County of Fond du Lac, engage in 
otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in 
which the conduct tends to cause a disturbance, to-
wit:  did mail an envelope with disturbing contents to 
Robbie Twohig; 
COUNT #6: FURTHER, the defendant did on or about 2-19-
97 in the City and County of Fond du Lac, engage in 
otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in 
which the conduct tends to cause a disturbance, to-
wit:  did mail an envelope with disturbing contents to 
Patti Marcinko; 
 . . . . 
 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
5 
 
A.  Twohig 
¶6 
In May 1996, Twohig received two manila envelopes in 
the mail.  She received one at her home and the other at her 
place of work.  Neither envelope had a return address.  The 
mailing addresses on both envelopes were stenciled.  Both 
envelopes bore 30th birthday greetings.  Twohig's birthday is 
May 9.  Both envelopes contained unsigned stenciled letters.  
The letter received at her home stated: 
 
THE HIGH SCHOOL YEARS 
 
ROBBIE, NO DOUBT A VERY FINE YOUNG LADY 
 
YOU WOULD HAVE MADE A LOVELY MISS TEEN WISCONSIN AND 
FAIREST OF THE FAIR 
 
I'M SURE YOU WERE VERY POPULAR WITH ALL THE GUYS AND 
GIRLS IN HIGH SCHOOL AND ARE WELL LIKED BY ALL YOUR 
STUDENTS AT BHS 
 
I WILL ALWAYS LOVE YOU, ROBBIE 
The envelope then contained about 30 newspaper clippings of 
articles in which Twohig's name appeared.  In most of these 
articles, Twohig was not the primary focus of the article, but 
instead her name was one of several names listed in fine print.  
The clippings all related to activities in which Twohig 
participated while she was a high school student, including 
articles about 4-H awards, prizes won at the county fair, 
scholarships awarded, appearances in local theater productions, 
and participation in the Fond du Lac County "Fairest of the 
Fair" competition.   
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
6 
 
¶7 
The letter sent to Twohig's workplace contained the 
following letter: 
 
THE COLLEGE YEARS 
 
ROBBIE WAS NO DOUBT A VERY INTERESTING YOUNG WOMAN 
 
I'M SURE YOU WERE VERY POPULAR AT UW-FDL AND UW-O 
 
YOU MUST HAVE HAD A LOT OF FUN IN FLORIDA WITH YOUR 
BUBBLY PERSONALITY 
 
SPAIN MUST HAVE BEEN A REAL LEARNING EXPERIENCE ALSO 
 
YOUR NEIGHBORS MUST THINK THAT YOUR [sic] A VERY NICE 
PERSON 
 
I WILL ALWAYS LOVE YOU ROBBIE 
Like the envelope received at her home, this envelope also 
contained clippings of newspaper articles, 21 in total, in which 
Twohig's name was mentioned.  Again, Twohig was not the focus of 
any of the articles, but instead her name was mentioned along 
with the names of several others.  All of the articles related 
to activities in which Twohig participated while she was a 
college student.   
¶8 
Twohig testified that she felt "completely violated" 
by these mailings at her home and her work.  She stated that 
"[t]o have someone keep this meticulous track of what you did 
over half your life ago, it's a feeling of violation that is 
almost indescribable."  Twohig immediately contacted the police 
after receiving these mailings.   
¶9 
In September 1996, Twohig received another manila 
envelope at the school where she worked.  The envelope had a 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
7 
 
stenciled address like the May 1996 mailings, but had no return 
address.  The envelope contained a stenciled letter that stated 
"I want to share two of my favorite records with you[.]  I love 
you Robbie[.]"  Two 45 RPM records were contained in the 
envelope.  One of the records was entitled "Roberta," Twohig's 
first name.  The second record was entitled "Every Breath You 
Take."  The label on the opposite side of the record had been 
blackened.   
¶10 Twohig testified that she was familiar with the lyrics 
of "Every Breath You Take," which was a very popular song in the 
early 1980s.2  She also testified that she was very disturbed to 
                                                 
2 At trial, the song's lyrics were admitted into evidence: 
Every breath you take, Every move you make, Every bond 
you break, Every step you take, I'll be watching you. 
Every single day, Every word you say, Every game you 
play, Every night you stay, I'll be watching you. 
O can't you see, You belong to me, How my poor heart 
aches, With every step you take. 
Every move you make, Every vow you break, Every smile 
you fake, Every claim you stake, I'll be watching you. 
Since you've gone I've been lost without a trace, I 
dream at night I can only see your face, I look around 
but it's you I can't replace, I feel so cold and I 
long for your embrace, I keep crying baby, baby 
please. 
O can't you see, You belong to me, How my poor heart 
aches, With every step you take. 
Every move you make, Every vow you break, Every smile 
you fake, Every claim you stake, I'll be watching you. 
Every move you make, Every step you take, I'll be 
watching you, I'll be watching you. 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
8 
 
receive this song, stating that "whoever sent it was taking 
every step they could to make sure that I knew they still had an 
eye on me and still knew what I was doing."  Twohig contacted 
the police after receiving this mailing as well. 
¶11 In January 1997, Twohig received another envelope at 
the school where she worked.  Like all the previous mailings, 
the address was stenciled.  The envelope again contained two 45 
RPM records and a piece of paper with the stenciled words, "I 
will always love you Robbie."  Both records again had the labels 
blackened on one side.  The legible labels were for the songs, 
"I Wonder What She's Doing Tonight" and "Green-Eyed Lady."  
Twohig again informed the police when she received this mailing. 
¶12 In February 1997, Twohig received another envelope at 
the high school where she worked.  Again, the envelope bore a 
stenciled address.  It also contained a hand-written notation, 
stating "FRAGILE Open on Valentine's Day."  The envelope 
contained a silk rose, a 45 RPM recording of the song "Hot For 
Teacher," and a blank piece of paper.  Twohig again contacted 
the police after receiving this mailing. 
¶13 Twohig testified that she became "more frightened 
[with each mailing], looking over her shoulder twice as many 
times, taking twice as many precautions.  It was terrible to be 
in such fear day after day going to the mailbox seeing a manila 
envelope."  Twohig told family members about the mailings she 
received.  Twohig testified that the mailings had an effect on 
her friends and family, that everyone was taking precautions to 
protect her, including making sure that everything she received 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
9 
 
was legitimate.  She described her parents as "distraught" and 
other family members as beside themselves.  Marcinko testified 
that she was concerned about Twohig because it was affecting 
Twohig's work and all aspects of her life.  Lamke testified that 
he became fearful for Twohig's safety when he learned about the 
mailings. 
¶14 The mailings caused Twohig to make significant changes 
in her life.  She moved several times over a period of a few 
years.  She changed her telephone number to an unlisted number 
and subscribed to Caller ID service.  She told her family, 
friends, 
and 
co-workers 
that 
they 
should 
not 
give 
out 
information about her.  She and her family also consulted with 
experts on harassment.   
B.  Marcinko 
¶15 Schwebke 
also 
sent 
anonymous 
mailings 
to 
Patty 
Marcinko.  In particular, on February 22, 1997, she received two 
manila envelopes, one sent to her home and the other sent to the 
junior high school where she worked.  Both envelopes bore 
stenciled addresses and a 34th birthday greeting and had no 
return address.  The envelope sent to her home contained a 
stenciled letter that said: 
 
UW-OSHKOSH DAYS AND BEYOND. . . . . . . 
 
YOU WOULD HAVE MADE A GOOD MISS FOND DU LAC 
 
REVEREND ANTHONY SCANNELL DID AN EXCELLANT [sic] JOB 
PRESIDING OVER YOUR WEDDING CEREMONY IN 1994 
The 
envelope 
also 
contained 
25 
newspaper 
clippings 
that 
mentioned Marcinko, including articles about her wedding, family 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
10 
 
events, academic achievements, and her participation in local 
theater productions.   
 
¶16 The 
envelope 
sent 
to 
Marcinko's 
workplace 
also 
contained a stenciled letter and newspaper clippings.  The 
letter said: 
 
CAMPBELLSPORT H.S. AND UW-FDL DAYS 
 
WHAT DO . . . . . 
 
BURGER KING, HARDEES, THE EXCLUSIVE COMPANY & UW-O 
ACADEMIC STAFF 
 
. . . . . ALL HAVE IN COMMON? 
Marcinko had worked at Burger King (a restaurant), the Exclusive 
Company (a retail record store) and the University of Wisconsin 
at Oshkosh (UW-O).  The 37 newspaper clippings in the envelope 
dated to the early 1980s and described various events in 
Marcinko's life as a high school and college student.   
¶17 Marcinko testified that, when she received the mailing 
at school, she contacted her principal and they called the 
police.  Marcinko stated that she found the mailings threatening 
in light of the mailings that her sister had received.  Marcinko 
also testified that her husband was concerned that Twohig's 
harasser had taken the next step by harassing Twohig's immediate 
family.  Marcinko also stated that her parents found the 
mailings to her overwhelming in light of Twohig's history with 
harassment.   
C.  Lamke 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
11 
 
¶18 Schwebke also sent anonymous mailings to Thomas Lamke.  
Prior to October 1996, Lamke received unrequested gay literature 
at his home and workplace at Racine County Sheriff's Department.  
He testified that, as a result of these mailings, he was 
subjected to "pretty substantial ridicule" from other members of 
the sheriff's department.  In October 1996, Lamke received a 
manila envelope with a stenciled address and no return address 
mailed to his workplace.  The envelope contained a blank piece 
of paper and two 45 RPM records.  The recordings were of the 
songs, "Where The Boys Are" and "San Francisco (Be Sure To Wear 
Some Flowers In Your Hair)."  Lamke testified that these records 
bothered him because he believed that the titles had "something 
to do with homosexuality."  He also testified that these 
mailings affected his relationship with his co-workers.  He did 
not contact the police until over a month later, after learning 
that Twohig had also received such mailings.   
¶19 At the close of the State's case, Schwebke argued that 
the evidence was insufficient to prove either of the elements of 
disorderly conduct.  The court denied the motion, finding that 
there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find 
Schwebke guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury later 
convicted Schwebke on all six counts.   
¶20 Schwebke appealed his conviction and his sentence.  In 
a published decision, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment 
of conviction, but reversed the sentence based on an error in 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
12 
 
imposing consecutive terms of probation.3  State v. Schwebke, 
2001 WI App 99, ¶1, 242 Wis. 2d 585, 627 N.W.2d 213.  Applying a 
sufficiency of the evidence standard of review, the court first 
concluded that the evidence supported the jury's findings that 
Schwebke violated the disorderly conduct statute.  Id. at ¶¶19-
20.  The court noted that the first element was met, that is, 
that the defendant had engaged in "otherwise disorderly" 
conduct, stating that "a jury could reasonably find that 
Schwebke's conduct of sending these types of repeated, unwelcome 
and anonymous mailings rises to the level of 'otherwise 
disorderly conduct.'"  Id. at ¶20.   It also found that the 
second element was met, that is, that the conduct occurred under 
circumstances that tended to cause or provoke a disturbance.  
The court stated: "The predictable and the actual result of 
Schwebke's antisocial conduct was to menace and disrupt the 
lives of Twohig, her friends and family.  Schwebke's conduct was 
significantly disturbing, permeating the lives of not only the 
recipients of his mailings but those who were close to the 
recipients."  Id. at ¶22.  The court also emphasized the 
important factual circumstances surrounding Schwebke's conduct, 
stating: 
 
In some other circumstances, mailing anonymous letters 
and 
newspaper 
clippings 
might 
not 
constitute 
disorderly conduct.  However, we do not consider 
Schwebke's mailings in a vacuum.  Instead, we consider 
                                                 
3 The State did not seek review of the court of appeals' 
decision related to sentencing.  For this reason, we do not 
discuss it here.   
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
13 
 
his 
mailings 
in 
the 
context 
of 
the 
harassment 
previously endured by Twohig and Lamke.  In addition, 
we note that Marcinko and Lamke, along with friends 
and family, were aware of these more current mailings 
and of the previous harassment that Twohig had 
experienced.  Twohig, in turn, knew that both her 
sister and her friend had now become targets of 
harassment 
and 
she 
testified 
that 
this 
greatly 
disturbed her.  The mailings sent a clear message that 
someone was following the recipients' every move.  
That message not only "tended to cause a disturbance," 
it did in fact deeply disturb the lives of Schwebke's 
victims and those close to the victims.  Again, it was 
reasonable for a jury to find that Schwebke's mailings 
were sent under circumstances that tended to cause or 
provoke a disturbance.   
Id. at ¶23.   
¶21 We granted Schwebke's petition for review.  Schwebke 
argues that his case presents more than a simple question of 
whether the evidence presented was minimally sufficient to 
permit the jury to convict, which was the question addressed by 
the court of appeals.  Instead, the underlying issue is whether, 
based on the undisputed facts presented at trial, the disorderly 
conduct statute can, as a matter of law, apply to his conduct.  
To answer this question, he asserts that we must analyze the 
language, history, context, and constitutional principles that 
inform the interpretation of the disorderly conduct statute.  
When viewing all of these factors, Schwebke argues that we must 
conclude that the disorderly conduct statute cannot apply to his 
conduct.   
¶22 In response, the State argues that only the question 
of whether the disorderly conduct statute applies to private 
mailings is a question of law because it is an issue of 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
14 
 
statutory construction.  The State contends, however, that the 
ultimate issue remains whether the facts presented at trial were 
sufficient to constitute disorderly conduct.  This issue, argues 
the State, must be reviewed under a sufficiency of the evidence 
standard.  When proceeding in this manner, the State asserts 
that we must affirm the court of appeals' decision that upheld 
Schwebke's conviction under the statute. 
¶23 Our two-step analytical framework is as follows.  We 
first address Schwebke's arguments pertaining to whether the 
disorderly conduct statute can be applied to his private 
mailings.  We conclude that the statute may be applied to such 
conduct.  We then examine whether the evidence presented at 
trial was sufficient to convict Schwebke under all six counts.  
We conclude that the evidence was sufficient.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals' decision.   
II 
¶24 Wisconsin 
Stat. § 947.01 
(1999-2000)4 
states 
as 
follows:  "Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in 
violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably 
loud or otherwise disorderly conduct under circumstances in 
which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is 
guilty of a Class B misdemeanor."  The State must prove two 
elements to convict a defendant under this statute.  State v. 
Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, ¶15, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725.  
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
15 
 
"First, it must prove that the defendant engaged in violent, 
abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud, or 
similar disorderly conduct."  Id.  "Second, it must prove that 
the defendant's conduct occurred under circumstances where such 
conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance." Id.  An 
objective analysis of the conduct and circumstances of each 
particular case must be undertaken because what may constitute 
disorderly conduct under some circumstances may not under 
others.  See State v. A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶33, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 
626 N.W.2d 712.  Schwebke argues that the statute cannot be 
applied to the private mailings that he sent in this case.  He 
bases his argument on the statutory language, its legislative 
history 
and 
statutory 
framework, 
and 
the 
constitutional 
principles surrounding the statute.  We address each basis for 
his argument in turn.   
A.  Statute 
¶25 Schwebke first points to the language of the statute 
and our interpretation of this language to show that the statute 
cannot be applied to his conduct.  In this case, the State 
charged Schwebke under the "otherwise disorderly" provision.  We 
have interpreted this provision to "mean conduct of a type not 
previously enumerated but similar thereto in having a tendency 
to disrupt good order and to provoke a disturbance."  State v. 
Givens, 28 Wis. 2d 109, 115, 135 N.W.2d 780 (1965); see also 
City of Oak Creek v. King, 148 Wis. 2d 532, 540-41, 436 
N.W.2d 285 (1989).  As mentioned, the statute also requires that 
such conduct must have occurred under circumstances that tended 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
16 
 
to cause or provoke a disturbance.  Schwebke argues that the 
statute cannot be applied to his conduct because his conduct was 
not of the type that tends to disrupt "good order" or provoke a 
"disturbance."  He asserts that, as we have interpreted it, 
"otherwise disorderly" conduct must have a tendency to disrupt 
"public order" and to provoke a "public disturbance."  He 
contends that his conduct did not have the likelihood of causing 
such a disruption or disturbance.  Instead, it merely had a 
tendency to cause the recipient of the mailing to be personally 
upset.  Such personal and private annoyance, Schwebke contends, 
is insufficient to support a conviction of disorderly conduct.  
There must be, he asserts, "something much more threatening to 
'order' in a public sense than mere personal discomfort."  There 
must at least be conduct that will likely provoke a response 
that "threaten[s] to spill over and disrupt the peace and 
tranquility of the surrounding community." 
¶26 This argument requires us to examine and define terms 
under the disorderly conduct statute.  We specifically examine 
the meaning of a disruption to good order and a disturbance.  
This examination requires an interpretation of the statute.  
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we may 
decide de novo.  Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, ¶14.  Our goal in 
interpreting a statute is to discern the intent of the 
legislature.  State v. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, ¶14, 241 
Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528.  In determining legislative intent, 
we begin with the plain language of the statute.  Id.  At the 
outset we note that the plain language of the statute does not 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
17 
 
specifically require a "public" disturbance.  Instead, the 
statute only requires "a disturbance."  Along these lines, all 
that we have required for a disruption is one that affects "good 
order;" we have not specifically required a disruption to 
"public order."  Certainly, the failure to use such a modifier 
suggests that the statute does not require the conduct to 
necessarily reach the public in some capacity.   
¶27 Schwebke attempts to further define the type of 
disruption and disturbance required under the statute, claiming 
that there must be some public element to such a disruption or 
disturbance.  He claims that his argument is supported first by 
language from our previous opinions that have suggested that 
what is required are disruptions affecting the public or 
community.  See, e.g., Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, ¶24 (The 
disorderly conduct statute is intended "to root out conduct that 
unreasonably disturbs the public peace."); State v. Zwicker, 41 
Wis. 2d 497, 508, 164 N.W.2d 512 (1969) ("Wisconsin's disorderly 
conduct statute proscribes conduct in terms of results which can 
reasonably be expected therefrom, rather than attempting to 
enumerate the limitless number of anti-social acts which a 
person could engage in that would menace, disrupt or destroy 
public order.").  However, Schwebke merely highlights language 
that discussed generally the overall purpose of the disorderly 
conduct statute.  Our discussions have never specifically 
injected a public element into the statute.   
¶28 Schwebke also points to this court's jurisprudence 
relating to the disorderly conduct statute to support his 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
18 
 
argument.  Specifically, he argues that we have traditionally 
upheld disorderly conduct convictions only where there has been 
a threat to public order or public peace.  Reviewing our 
previous disorderly conduct cases, we acknowledge that there has 
always been some public aspect in each of these cases.5  Schwebke 
particularly highlights Douglas D., in which we held that the 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute 
could 
apply 
to 
a 
threatening 
communication from a student to a teacher.  That case involved a 
student essay that implicitly threatened to cut off the 
teacher's head.  Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, ¶¶6-7.  We concluded 
that, even though the conduct involved a private interaction 
                                                 
5 State v. A.S., 2001 WI 48, 243 Wis. 2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712 
(juvenile's 
threatening 
comments 
at 
public 
youth 
center 
constituted disorderly conduct under the circumstances); City of 
Oak Creek v. King, 148 Wis. 2d 532, 436 N.W.2d 285 (1989) 
(newsperson's refusal to obey police command at scene of 
helicopter crash constituted disorderly conduct); State v. 
Elson, 60 Wis. 2d 54, 208 N.W.2d 363 (1973) (defendant's loud 
conduct in a state mental hospital was disorderly conduct); 
State 
v. 
Becker, 
51 
Wis. 2d 659, 
188 
N.W.2d 449 
(1971) 
(defendant's violent conduct against police officer in public 
department store constituted disorderly conduct); State v. 
Maker, 48 Wis. 2d 612, 180 N.W.2d 707 (1970) (defendant's stage 
performance in a crowded tavern constituted disorderly conduct); 
State v. Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d 497, 164 N.W.2d 512 (1969) (public 
demonstrations at university constituted disorderly conduct); 
Lane v. Collins, 29 Wis. 2d 66, 138 N.W.2d 264 (1965) (abusive 
language against police officer causing retaliatory conduct 
leading to a breach of the peace may constitute disorderly 
conduct); State v. Givens, 28 Wis. 2d 109, 135 N.W.2d 780 (1965) 
(sit-in 
demonstration 
in 
public 
building 
was 
disorderly 
conduct); Teske v. State, 256 Wis. 440, 41 N.W.2d 642 (1950) 
(acts of pickets during public strike were disorderly conduct).  
Compare State v. Werstein, 60 Wis. 2d 668, 211 N.W.2d 437 (1973) 
(mere presence in military recruitment office and mere refusal 
to obey a police command was not disorderly conduct).  
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
19 
 
between the teacher and student, the disorderly conduct statute 
could apply, not because it caused the teacher to become upset, 
but 
instead 
because 
the 
threat 
jeopardized 
the 
proper 
functioning of the school itself, which was regarded as a threat 
to public order.  Id. at ¶28.   
¶29 However, simply because the cases before us have all 
involved disturbances on a public level does not mean that the 
statute cannot be applied in instances where the disturbance is 
private in nature.  Indeed, as the State points out, there have 
been some cases involving domestic disputes where the defendants 
were convicted under the statute, even though the conduct 
apparently did not involve a threat to disturb the public at 
large.  See, e.g., State v. Vinje, 201 Wis. 2d 98, 548 
N.W.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Leprich, 160 Wis. 2d 472, 
465 N.W.2d 844 (Ct. App. 1991).  In particular, in Vinje, Kevin 
Vinje was arrested after the police witnessed him pushing his 
wife.  Vinje, 201 Wis. 2d at 101.  Kevin was charged and 
convicted for disorderly conduct and intimidation of a witness.  
Id.  Although the opinion addressed whether Kevin could be 
convicted of intimidating a witness when the underlying crime is 
disorderly conduct, the court of appeals noted that disorderly 
behavior was present.  Id. at 100-04.  The facts in the opinion 
do not suggest that there was any threat to disturb the public 
order or peace or that there was any potential for a disturbance 
to spill over into the community itself.  Id. at 100-01.  Thus, 
even though our jurisprudence traditionally has applied the 
statute only to instances where the disturbance takes on a 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
20 
 
public nature, the statute's reach has not been limited in this 
respect.   
¶30 We certainly agree with Schwebke that, from our 
jurisprudence, the statute is appropriately applied in instances 
where conduct, under the circumstances, has a tendency to 
provoke a disruption to the public peace, public safety, or 
public order or is likely to cause a reaction from the community 
based on the fact that the public peace, public order, or public 
safety is being threatened.  We conclude, however, that the 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute 
does 
not 
necessarily 
require 
disruptions or disturbances that implicate the public directly.  
The 
statute 
encompasses 
conduct 
that 
tends 
to 
cause 
a 
disturbance or disruption that is personal or private in nature, 
as long as there exists the real possibility that this 
disturbance or disruption will spill over and disrupt the peace, 
order or safety of the surrounding community as well.  Conduct 
is not punishable under the statute when it tends to cause only 
personal annoyance to a person.  See Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, 
¶27.  An examination of the circumstances in which the conduct 
occurred must take place, considering such factors as the 
location of the conduct, the parties involved, and the manner of 
the conduct.   
¶31 Schwebke also argues that it is the state's interest 
in maintaining peace and order in the community that permits the 
state to punish such conduct under the disorderly conduct 
statute.  Indeed, we have noted that "'[w]hen clear and present 
danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
21 
 
public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, 
peace, or order appears, the power of the State to prevent or 
punish is obvious.'"  A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶14 (quoting Feiner v. 
New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951)).  For this reason, Schwebke 
argues that the disorderly conduct statute cannot be stretched 
to apply to conduct that does not pose any threat to public 
order or safety.  We do not construe this language from A.S. as 
prohibiting the disorderly conduct statute from being applied to 
conduct that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance that is 
private or personal in nature.  This language merely states that 
prohibiting conduct that poses a threat to the public is 
obvious.  Nevertheless, we conclude that the disorderly conduct 
statute requires, at a minimum, that, when the conduct tends to 
cause or provoke a disturbance that is private or personal in 
nature, there must exist the real possibility that this 
disturbance will spill 
over 
and 
cause a 
threat to the 
surrounding community as well.  In this respect, the state's 
interest in maintaining peace and order in the community is not 
limited only to threats of riots or interference with traffic 
upon public streets.  Certainly, as in domestic disputes, even 
though the disturbance may only occur on a private level, such 
conduct affects the overall safety and order in the community, 
and the state has an interest in regulating this conduct as 
well.   
¶32 Based 
on 
this 
analysis, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute 
was 
appropriately 
applied 
to 
Schwebke's conduct in this case.  In each instance, the conduct 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
22 
 
at issue, in light of the circumstances, went beyond conduct 
that merely tended to annoy or cause personal discomfort in 
another person.  In each instance, the mailings constituted 
conduct that not only caused disturbances to the lives of the 
recipients, but the conduct was of the type that would be 
disruptive to peace and good order in the community.  The 
disturbing nature of the conduct toward Twohig is the most 
obvious.  The repeated mailings displayed obsessive behavior on 
the part of Schwebke that he was observing every aspect of 
Twohig's 
life. 
 
The 
subsequent 
mailings 
exacerbated 
the 
disturbing nature of this first mailing.  The mailings to 
Marcinko were similar and were especially disturbing to Marcinko 
in light of the recent mailings that her sister received.  The 
mailings to both women were also of the type that tended to be 
disruptive to the community itself, causing other friends and 
relatives to become concerned for the safety of the women.  Such 
circumstances obviously necessitate the involvement of the 
police, and in both instances, the police were contacted.  
Finally, the October 1996 mailing sent to Lamke constituted 
conduct that tended to cause more than mere personal discomfort.  
This 
mailing 
followed 
other 
unwelcome 
anonymous 
mailings 
received by Lamke.  Considering the mailings sent to Twohig and 
Lamke's prior intimate association with Twohig, the repeated 
mailings to Lamke, conveying animosity toward Lamke, would 
certainly tend to cause Lamke and others to be concerned for his  
safety.  The conduct also affected Lamke's relationship with his 
coworkers.  On the whole, such conduct necessitates the 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
23 
 
involvement of the police, and the police were contacted.  For 
this reason, we conclude that the application of the disorderly 
conduct statute in this case was appropriate.   
B.  Legislative History 
¶33 Schwebke next argues that the legislative history 
reveals that the legislature never intended the disorderly 
conduct statute to apply to the conduct at issue in this case.  
He asserts that, when the legislature adopted the current 
version of the disorderly conduct statute, the legislature 
considered harassing conduct, but did not contemplate that such 
conduct would be covered by the statute.   
¶34 Schwebke's argument looks first to a proposed version 
of the disorderly conduct statute from the Legislative Council 
Judiciary Committee and the comments on this version.6  The 
                                                 
6 The proposed version stated as follows: 
 
347.01  DISORDERLY CONDUCT.  Whoever does any of 
the following, whether in a public or private place, 
may be fined not more than $100 or imprisoned not more 
than 30 days: 
 
(1) 
Engages 
in 
violent, 
abusive, 
indecent, 
profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud, or otherwise 
disorderly conduct under circumstances in which such 
conduct tends to cause or provoke an immediate 
disturbance of public order or tends to disturb or 
annoy others; or 
 
(2) Intentionally causes, provokes, or engages in 
a fight other than a bona fide athletic contest.   
5 Wisconsin Legislative Council, Judiciary Committee Report on 
the Criminal Code 208 (1953).   
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
24 
 
comments specifically discussed whether annoying telephone calls 
would be covered under the proposed statute: 
 
The 
words 
"violent, 
abusive, 
indecent, 
profane, 
boisterous, 
unreasonably 
loud . . . conduct" 
give 
certainty to the crime while at the same time being 
broad in scope.  On the other hand, they are not broad 
enough to take care of every situation generally 
considered to be disorderly.  Suppose, for example, 
that the actor solely for the purpose of annoying 
another person persists in calling that person on the 
telephone at all hours of the night.  It might be 
difficult to fit this situation within the specific 
words above quoted, but there is no difficulty in 
holding that it is conduct which is "otherwise 
disorderly" and that the circumstances are such that 
the conduct tends to disturb or annoy others . . .  
5 Wisconsin Legislative Council, Judiciary Committee Report on 
the Criminal Code 208 (1953) (emphasis added).  Schwebke argues 
that the legislature revised the proposed language in 1955 and 
that this revision reflected that the legislature disagreed with 
this viewpoint.  The revision specifically deleted the proposed 
subsection (2) and instead adopted an alternate subsection that 
expressly covered the telephone scenario described above.  The 
new subsection defined disorderly conduct to include anyone who 
"[w]ith the intent to annoy another, makes a telephone call, 
whether 
or 
not 
conversation 
ensues."  
Wis. Stat. § 947.01(2)(1955).  This change, argues Schwebke, 
shows that the legislature did not believe that annoying 
telephone calls were already covered by the general definition 
of "otherwise disorderly conduct."   
¶35 Schwebke 
also 
points 
to 
action 
taken 
by 
the 
legislature in 1979 to support his argument.  He states that the 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
25 
 
legislature considered redefining the language in subsection (2) 
to include telephone calls made "with the intent to abuse, 
threaten or harass."  LRB 3076/2, 1979 A.B. 507.  He notes, 
however, 
that 
the 
legislature 
rejected 
this 
redefinition 
alternative 
and 
instead 
removed 
subsection 
(2) 
from 
the 
disorderly conduct statute altogether, creating a separate 
harassment statute that included a separate offense for unlawful 
use of the telephone.  §§ 2-3, ch. 131, Laws of 1979.  This 
statute requires a showing that the offending telephone calls 
were made with the intent to frighten, intimidate, threaten, 
abuse or harass.  Id. at § 3.  The legislature subsequently 
adopted 
other 
specific 
harassment 
statutes. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. §§ 813.125 and 947.013.  Overall, Schwebke argues 
that these changes indicate that the legislature intended that 
the disorderly conduct statute would not apply to harassing 
conduct, like the conduct at issue in this case.  The harassment 
statutes would apply instead. 
¶36 Despite this history, Schwebke's argument is flawed 
because it assumes that harassment and disorderly conduct are 
mutually exclusive.  As the State contends, when conduct falls 
within 
the 
definition 
of 
disorderly 
conduct, 
it 
may 
be 
prosecuted under that statute as well as under the harassment 
statute.  The history certainly indicates that the legislature 
intended to create a separate statute to cover harassing 
conduct; however, prosecutors are afforded broad discretion in 
charging criminal conduct.  See Sears v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 128, 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
26 
 
133, 287 N.W.2d 785 (1980).  For this reason, we decline to 
limit the prosecutor's discretion in this instance. 
C.  Constitutional Considerations 
¶37 Schwebke also argues that the legislature could not 
have intended the disorderly conduct statute to apply to the 
conduct 
at 
issue 
in 
this 
case 
based 
on 
constitutional 
principles.  Indeed, as Schwebke points out, the legislature 
repealed the specific annoying telephone calls provision from 
the disorderly conduct statute and created a new more specific 
provision after the court of appeals concluded that the language 
was overly broad.  See State v. Dronso, 90 Wis. 2d 110, 117, 279 
N.W.2d 710 (Ct. App. 1979).  To address any constitutional 
concerns, 
argues 
Schwebke, 
the 
legislature 
repealed 
the 
disorderly conduct provisions related to private harassment or 
annoyances and instead created more narrowly tailored harassment 
statutes.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 947.012 and 947.013.  Schwebke 
contends that, by creating these separate and more narrowly 
tailored provisions, the legislature intended any harassing 
conduct, like the conduct in this case, to be charged under this 
provision, not under the broad language of the disorderly 
conduct statute.  Specifically, he asserts that "by applying the 
general disorderly conduct provisions to Mr. Schwebke's conduct, 
the state attempts to do that which the more narrow private 
nuisance 
provision 
was 
too 
broad 
to 
accomplish 
within 
constitutional bounds."   
¶38 It is reasonable to conclude that the legislature 
reacted to the decision in Dronso in removing the telephone call 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
27 
 
provision from the disorderly conduct statute and revising it to 
create a new telephone harassment statute.  This action 
certainly reflects that the legislature sought a more specific 
statute in the event that conduct, like that in Dronso, would 
not escape prosecution based on constitutional concerns and that 
the disorderly conduct statute may not be sufficiently narrowly 
tailored to apply to certain types of harassing speech.  
However, that is not to say that the legislature intended that 
all conduct that may be characterized as harassing in nature, 
such as Schwebke's conduct, must be prosecuted under the 
harassment statute.  Further, although Schwebke characterizes 
his mailings as "communications," the prosecution of the content 
of his speech in this instance is merely incidental to the 
prosecution of his overall conduct.  This conduct consisted of 
repeated mailings to related recipients containing unwelcome 
gifts and numerous newspaper clippings.  Because the content of 
the mailings is not being directly prosecuted, concerns of 
overbreadth are not implicated in this instance.  Even if they 
were, Schwebke never raised such a constitutional challenge 
either here, in the circuit court, or in the court of appeals.  
For 
this 
reason, 
we 
decline 
to 
address 
the 
overall 
constitutionality of the statute in this case.   
¶39 Schwebke also asserts that the current harassment 
statutes, unlike the disorderly conduct statute, require a 
showing of an intent to annoy or harass and are limited to 
particular types of harassing communications.  Because the 
disorderly conduct statute does not include such language, it 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
28 
 
cannot apply to the conduct at issue in this case without 
running into concerns of vagueness.  See Bachowski v. Salamone, 
139 Wis. 2d 397, 408, 407 N.W.2d 533 (1987) (upholding the 
harassment statute on a challenge of vagueness in part because 
the statute narrowed the meaning of harassment to conduct that 
was "intended to harass").  We disagree.  Such vagueness 
concerns are not presented by the application of the disorderly 
conduct statute to Schwebke's conduct.  The statute provided 
Schwebke with sufficient notice that his conduct would be deemed 
unlawful if it fell within the categories of the statute.  The 
lack of an intent element in the statute might be of concern if 
the statute were applied only to Schwebke's speech.  In this 
case, however, any concerns with respect to vagueness are 
without merit.   
III 
¶40 Having concluded that the disorderly conduct statute 
may be applied to Schwebke's conduct, we now review whether 
there was sufficient evidence to convict Schwebke on the various 
counts in this case.  See State v. Duda, 60 Wis. 2d 431, 439, 
210 
N.W.2d 763 
(1973). 
 
The 
standard 
for 
reviewing 
the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is 
that a conviction will not be reversed unless the evidence, 
viewed most favorably to the State and the conviction, is so 
insufficient in probative value and force that it can be said as 
a matter of law that no trier of fact, acting reasonably, could 
have 
found guilt 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt. 
 
State v. 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).   
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
29 
 
¶41 Based on the evidence, a rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt in all cases.  Again, the elements in this case 
required (1) otherwise disorderly conduct, which must be similar 
to the conduct enumerated in the statute in having a tendency to 
disrupt good order, and (2) under circumstances that tended to 
cause or provoke a disturbance.   
¶42 The mailings sent to Robbie Twohig show an obsessive 
interest from an unidentified person in her life.  Although the 
messages sent were not overtly threatening, the evidence showed 
a person who was obsessively interested in every detail of 
Twohig's life.  The subsequent mailings exemplified the extent 
of the obsession, including songs that indicate the sender would 
perhaps be watching "every move she makes."  Such conduct 
certainly has the tendency to disrupt the peace, safety, and 
good order because they were unwelcome advances and the extent 
of 
this 
obsession 
was 
abusive 
in 
nature. 
 
Under 
such 
circumstances, the conduct was likely to cause or provoke a 
disturbance because such conduct would cause concern from other 
members of the community, including the police. 
¶43 In light of these prior mailings to her sister, a 
rational trier of fact could have also concluded that the 
mailings sent to Marcinko constituted disorderly conduct.  These 
mailings also revealed an obsessive interest into Marcinko's 
life, with newspaper clippings dating back several years.  In 
light of the fact that Twohig had received similar mailings, the 
anonymous mailings sent to Marcinko revealed that the sender's 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
30 
 
obsession was not limited to Twohig.  Such calculated mailings 
caused concern from Marcinko's family, friends, and community 
for her safety and necessitated the involvement of the police. 
¶44 Finally, a rational trier of fact could have concluded 
that the conviction for the October 1996 mailing to Lamke at his 
workplace also constituted disorderly conduct.  This mailing 
followed other anonymous literature sent by Schwebke.  The 
source of these mailings placed Lamke on edge because he knew 
someone was trying to upset him by sending numerous, unwanted 
mailings but Lamke did not know the source.  The October 1996 
mailing containing the records, the source of which was again 
unknown to Lamke, placed him further on edge because he then 
knew the previous mailings were not sent by mistake and that 
someone was consciously trying to upset him, especially after 
learning of Twohig's similar mailings.  As noted, the mailings 
also affected Lamke's relationship with his coworkers.  This 
repeated 
unwelcome 
interest, 
under 
the 
circumstances, was 
sufficient to cause or provoke a disturbance because it could 
have reasonably led to concerns of public safety for both Lamke 
and other members of the community.  Schwebke's conduct 
necessitated, and resulted in, the involvement of the police. 
IV 
¶45 In sum, we affirm the court of appeals' decision to 
uphold the convictions of Schwebke.  The disorderly conduct 
statute can be applied to the private mailings involved in this 
case, and based on the facts presented in this case, there was 
sufficient evidence to convict Schwebke on the charges. 
No. 
99-3204-CR   
 
31 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 99-3204-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶46 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
Glenn F. Schwebke has a lengthy history of harassing people.  It 
used to be by phone.  Now it is by mail.  The recipients of the 
mailings were personally and traumatically disturbed by the 
defendant's conduct, and justifiably so.  The legal system 
should, and can, help protect the victims from Mr. Schwebke.   
¶47 The law provides remedies for these victims other than 
the disorderly conduct statute.  These remedies are available 
and effective.  In the circuit court, the State analyzed the 
available remedies in a document entitled "Dispositional Brief."  
The 
available 
remedies 
included 
obtaining 
a 
harassment 
restraining order and injunction;7 charging Mr. Schwebke with 
harassment;8 or charging Mr. Schwebke with stalking.9  Instead, 
                                                 
7 A 
harassment 
restraining 
order 
and 
injunction 
were 
available 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 813.125 
(1999-2000). 
 
(All 
subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1999-
2000 version, unless otherwise indicated.)  If Mr. Schwebke had 
violated the injunction, he then would have been liable for 
criminal penalties under § 947.013(1r)(b).  
The State recognized that the failure to get such an order 
in the present case weakened the State's case against the 
defendant.  An advantage to this order, according to the State, 
was that the defendant had in the past "conformed his conduct to 
the requirements of the law and not had any charges filed 
against him."  The prior record demonstrates "there is no one 
who can tell this Court they know how to stop Mr. Schwebke from 
engaging in this conduct, except to say that when a court order 
is in effect, he has complied with it."  At the time of his 
sentencing, the defendant had been out on bail for over two 
years and had made no attempt to contact any of the three 
recipients of his mailings. 
8 The State could have sought a civil forfeiture for 
harassment under Wis. Stat. § 947.013.  A harassment conviction 
would have subjected the defendant under the circumstances of 
this case to a maximum forfeiture of $1000.  The State concluded 
that a more severe penalty was needed. 
No. 99-3204-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
the State chose to prosecute Mr. Schwebke under the disorderly 
conduct statute. 
¶48 The State decided to prosecute under the disorderly 
conduct statute "because of the broad language of the law and 
the ability to charge each and every incident as a separate act.  
The State also surmised, since the instruction contemplates the 
actions being disorderly under the circumstances as they then 
and there existed, the door to the prior offense evidence would 
be open to show why the conduct here tended to create a 
disturbance." 10   
                                                                                                                                                             
9 The State could have charged the defendant with stalking 
in violation of § 940.32.  The problem with a stalking charge, 
according to the State, was that the mailings were juvenile and 
definitely annoying, but also complimentary in nature, thereby 
casting doubt on whether there could be a reasonable fear of 
bodily injury of great magnitude or death. 
Although a deferred prosecution agreement was considered, 
the defendant refused to go forward with it. 
10 See the State's "Dispositional Brief" at unnumbered p. 6. 
According to the State, the defendant could face a maximum 
of $6,000 in fines plus court costs, four years' probation, and 
540 days in county jail if convicted of six counts of disorderly 
conduct.  The circuit court sentenced the defendant for each of 
the first three counts to 90 days in jail each, to run 
consecutively.  On each of the last three counts, the circuit 
court sentenced the defendant to four-year probation terms, to 
be served consecutively. 
Advocates across the country are urging the creation of 
state mental health courts modeled after drug courts.  A mental 
health court would be more than an adjudicator of charges; it 
would take an active role in the mental health treatment of 
people coming before it.  See LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the 
Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision 
of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 Seattle U. 
L. Rev. 373 (2000).  
No. 99-3204-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶49 The question before us, however, is whether the State 
and this court can stretch the disorderly conduct statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 947.01,11 to cover the facts of this case.  The 
majority opinion says yes.  I think not.  Therefore, I dissent.  
¶50 The majority opinion recognizes it is extending the 
reach of the disorderly conduct statute beyond where it has gone 
before.  According to the majority opinion, a mailing that may 
be personally disturbing to the recipient but that is not 
"violent, 
abusive, 
indecent, 
profane, 
boisterous, 
or 
unreasonably 
loud"12 
can 
constitute 
"otherwise 
disorderly 
conduct" 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 947.01. 
 
Furthermore, 
this 
"otherwise disorderly conduct" constitutes a crime under the 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute 
because 
there 
is 
"the 
real 
possibility that this disturbance will spill over and cause a 
threat to the surrounding community as well."  Majority op. at 
¶31.   
¶51 I agree with the defendant that the language of the 
statute, its legislative history, and the case law support the 
notion that disorderly conduct requires a threat to public order 
and does not apply to the kind of private harassment-type 
conduct involved in the present case.  The majority opinion's 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 947.01 encompasses far too much 
                                                 
11 Section 947.01 provides:  "Whoever, in a public or 
private place, engages in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, 
boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct 
under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or 
provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor." 
12 Wis. Stat. § 947.01. 
No. 99-3204-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
conduct that the legislature could not have intended to include 
in the statute.   
¶52 Virtually 
any 
antisocial 
or 
offensive 
conduct, 
including a mailing from one person to another, is now included 
within the parameters of the criminal disorderly conduct 
statute.  Under the majority opinion, any disturbing private 
mailing, even though it is not "violent, abusive, indecent, 
profane, boisterous, or unreasonably loud,"13 can be viewed as 
spilling over and causing a threat to the surrounding community, 
because it may be disturbing to those who are told of the 
private mailing.  The majority opinion errs because "disturbing" 
does not a "disturbance" make!  "Disturbing" has been conflated 
in the majority opinion with "disturbance." 
¶53 The court seems to be moving the disorderly conduct 
statute back to the laws of the 1950s and 1960s that gave law 
enforcement officers and prosecutors broad discretion to arrest 
and prosecute people.  Those laws are characterized as "so broad 
that they 'legally' authorize the police to arrest virtually 
anyone."14   
¶54 The legislature has wisely recognized that society 
requires laws to govern conduct related to the strains and 
                                                 
13 Id. 
14 Robert Force, Decriminalization of Breach of the Peace 
Statutes: A Nonpenal Approach to Order Maintenance, 46 Tul. L. 
Rev. 367, 399 (1972), quoted in Debra Livingston, Police 
Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, 
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 596 
(1997).  For a discussion of these laws, see, for example, Debra 
Livingston, Police Discretion, 97 Colum. L. Rev. at 595-600.   
No. 99-3204-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
stresses of people living in close proximity.  The disorderly 
conduct statute is one such law.  The majority opinion goes too 
far, however, by reading the disorderly conduct statute to cover 
the defendant's behavior in the present case.  
¶55 The 
majority 
opinion's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
disorderly conduct statute will allow the disorderly conduct 
statute to be used to place in Wisconsin's already overburdened 
jails and prisons those, including the mentally ill, who 
privately disturb others while failing to provide those persons 
with appropriate treatment.   
¶56 The record is clear that the defendant is suffering 
from a chronic mental illness.  He lives at home with his 
elderly 
parents 
and 
receives 
social 
security 
disability 
benefits.  He receives psychiatric care and medications, which 
at times abate his aberrant behavior.  Nonetheless, the 
defendant's condition remains chronic and requires ongoing 
treatment.  The defendant's conduct evinces the symptoms of his 
disease. 
¶57 According to the National Association for the Mentally 
Ill, prisons and jails have become the mental hospitals of the 
1990s.15  A 1999 U.S. Department of Justice report revealed that 
16% of the persons in state and local prisons and jails have a 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment 
of 
Mental 
Health 
Specialty 
Courts 
in 
the 
Provision 
of 
Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 Seattle U. L. 
Rev. 373 (2000); Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons Are Brim-Full of 
the Mentally Ill: Is Their Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of 
Failure?, 11 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 157 (2000). 
No. 99-3204-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
serious mental illness.16  The result is crowded jails and 
inappropriate 
interventions 
for 
seriously 
mentally 
ill 
individuals who become subject to penal incarceration for 
conduct related to their mental illness.  Indeed, the problem of 
overcrowding in Wisconsin's prisons and jails and the number of 
mentally ill people already in them is of concern to the people 
of the state of Wisconsin.17  Using the "otherwise disorderly 
conduct" provision of Wis. Stat. § 947.01 with the majority 
opinion's expanded view of what conduct "tends to cause or 
provoke a disturbance" will merely exacerbate this problem. 
¶58 Because the majority opinion has gone too far in its 
interpretation 
and 
application 
of 
the 
disorderly 
conduct 
statute, I dissent.   
¶59 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
 
 
                                                 
16 Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons Are Brim-Full of the Mentally 
Ill: Is Their Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 
Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 157, 159 (2000). 
17 See, e.g., Who Holds the Key to the Jail Problem?, Wis. 
State Journal, December 26, 2000, at 8A. 
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