Case Title: P. v. Leon

Citation: 

Docket Number: S143531

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JOSE LUIS LEON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S143531 
 
Riverside County Superior Court 
RIF109916 
 
 
January 23, 2020 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakuaye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
Justice Cuéllar filed a concurring opinion. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
S143531 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
 
While his estranged girlfriend was studying abroad, 
defendant Jose Luis Leon went to her home and fatally stabbed 
her grandmother and 13-year-old brother.  He also attacked her 
grandfather with a hatchet.  Although admitting the crimes, he 
claimed he acted in imperfect self-defense.  He was convicted of 
two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder, with 
a multiple-murder special circumstance and enhancements for 
personal use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily 
injury.1  The jury fixed the penalty at death for one murder and 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the other.  
The court imposed an additional sentence of life without 
possibility of parole plus four years for the attempted murder.  
We affirm the judgment. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Defendant’s Relationship with the Ragland Family 
 
Veronica Haft and her younger brother, Austin Perez, 
lived with their grandparents, Hope and Marion Ragland.  Hope 
                                        
1  
Penal 
Code 
sections 187, 
subdivision (a), 
664/187, 
subdivision (a), 
190.2, 
subdivision (a)(3), 
12022, 
subdivision (b)(1), 
12022.7, 
subdivision (a), 
and 
1192.7, 
subdivision (c)(8) & (c)(23).  All statutory references are to the 
Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
 
was a nurse, and Marion was retired.2  They had raised Veronica 
since childhood.  Austin came to live with them around age 
seven.  Veronica was particularly close to Hope, whom she called 
“my best friend.”  
 
Veronica began dating defendant when she was 16.  He 
said he was 19 but was actually 21.  He had moved to the country 
from Mexico two years earlier and spoke only limited English.  
Veronica and her grandmother were fluent in Spanish. 
Veronica’s brother and grandfather did not know Spanish and 
spoke with defendant in English.  
 
The first year of their relationship was happy.  Defendant 
spent time at the Ragland home and was included in their 
family activities.  Hope initially welcomed defendant’s presence, 
cooking for him and joining the couple on outings.  A few months 
into the relationship, Hope purchased a red Ford Mustang for 
defendant, who agreed to make monthly payments to her.  He 
kept up with the payments initially but later began missing 
them.   
 
After defendant’s parents moved back to Mexico, he rented 
an apartment from a woman Hope visited for tarot card 
readings.  Defendant believed the two were involved in 
witchcraft.  Around this time, defendant stopped working.  He 
spent his days at the Ragland house and became increasingly 
possessive and jealous.  Near the end of her senior year, 
Veronica suggested breaking up.  Defendant responded by 
angrily punching his windshield and grabbing Veronica’s wrist 
as she tried to leave the car.  
                                        
2  
To avoid potential confusion, we refer to family members 
by their first names. 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
 
 
Hope argued with defendant frequently and warned 
Veronica that the relationship seemed abusive.  Once, the family 
came out of church to find defendant waiting by their car.  When 
Hope asked why defendant could not leave them alone, he 
insulted her in Spanish.  Hope tried to slap him but missed.  
Defendant then ran around the parking lot laughing while Hope 
chased him.   
 
Veronica attended the University of California, Riverside 
and secured a full scholarship to spend the spring term studying 
at Oxford.  When told, defendant begged her not to go.  This 
angered Hope, who told defendant to stop ruining Veronica’s 
life.  During the argument, Hope followed the couple outside 
and, at one point, moved as if to pick up a brick from the 
walkway.  Veronica told Austin to call the police.  Hope did not 
pick up the brick, and no one was injured.  
 
Veronica went to England in mid-February 2003.  
Although she tried to end the relationship before leaving, 
defendant called her often.  When he began calling 20 to 25 
times a day, she turned off her phone.  Defendant called on April 
29, begging her to return to him.  She spent more than two hours 
explaining the relationship was over.  Defendant blamed Hope, 
but Veronica assured him the decision was hers.  By the end of 
the conversation, defendant’s tone had changed, and Veronica 
thought he had finally accepted the situation.  Two days later, 
on May 1, Veronica answered a final call from defendant, who 
said, “No matter what happens . . . I’ll always love you.”  
Irritated, Veronica hung up.  The attacks happened that night. 
2. Testimony Regarding the Night of the Murders 
 
The Raglands lived in a gated community near a small 
shopping center.  Two video store employees who knew 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
 
defendant saw him shortly before 6:00 p.m. on May 1, 2003.  
Monique Perez saw him driving a red Mustang slowly around 
the parking lot.  Not long thereafter, he walked toward the 
Raglands’ house.  Yvette Alvarez also saw him sometime after 
sundown, walking back at a faster pace.  
 
Consistent with his usual routine, Marion left home 
around 6:20 p.m. to walk the family dog.  Austin was at his 
friend Osvaldo Magdaleno’s house, directly across the street.  At 
some point, Magdaleno noticed defendant standing outside the 
community’s gate.  Pedestrian entrances to the property were 
kept locked, but defendant walked inside when a resident 
opened the gate to drive out.  While playing outside, Magdaleno 
saw defendant inside the Ragland house, looking out the 
window.  Austin went home but could not open the front door.  
No one answered his knock, so he jumped the back fence.  
 
Marion returned home around 8:15 p.m., finding it odd 
that both the security screen and front door were locked.  The 
moment he stepped inside, he was hit in the head.  The noise of 
the impact was so loud Marion thought he had been shot.  
Fearing he had interrupted a robbery, he backed out and went 
to the shopping center for help.  He managed to enter the video 
store with his head bleeding and asked the employees to check 
on his wife.  Alvarez called 911.  Marion sustained a severe 
concussion and skull fracture.  Seventeen staples were required 
to close the wound.  
 
Crime scene investigators found two bodies in the house.  
Hope had been killed while sitting in a lounge chair, but her 
body was stuffed into a kitchen closet.  She had been stabbed 
eight times in the throat, chest, and abdomen.  The neck wound 
pierced her larynx and jugular vein.  Her lungs, pulmonary 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
 
artery, and aorta were also perforated.  Austin lay in the 
kitchen, facedown in a pool of blood.  Blood spatter evidence 
indicated he had been stabbed near a door leading to the garage 
then dragged into the kitchen.  He had been stabbed 12 times.  
The wounds severed the jugular vein and carotid artery and 
perforated the liver, stomach, and aorta.  
 
The contents of Hope’s purse had been dumped on the 
floor,  and “Austin is a bad student” was written on the living 
room mirror in Hope’s lipstick.  The upstairs rooms had been 
ransacked.  In the backyard, investigators found a hatchet and 
a knife with a bent and bloody blade.  A ski mask and vinyl 
gloves were later found in defendant’s car, and his keys bore 
remnants of blood.  
3. Defendant’s Police Interviews and Walkthrough 
 
After the murders, defendant arrived on time for his 10:00 
p.m. shift at a local dairy.  The police brought him to the station 
for questioning the next morning.  He waived his Miranda 
rights3 and spoke with the police.  
 
During the initial interview, defendant adamantly denied 
committing the killings or even entering the Ragland house.  In 
his first version, he said he went to the house to give Hope a car 
insurance payment but left because Marion was home.  Marion 
did not like him and did not want him there while Veronica was 
away.  Defendant claimed he had dinner then returned around 
7:30 p.m.  No one answered the door, so he sat on the porch but 
left when he saw Marion returning.  
 
Questioned again the next morning, defendant said he 
was fearful and angry with Hope.  He believed she put things in 
                                        
3  
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
 
his food and practiced witchcraft to ruin his relationship with 
Veronica.  The day before the murders, Hope told defendant 
Veronica was having fun in England and would go many places 
without him after her return.  Defendant became angry and 
emotional, as if “the devil got inside of me.”4  When he went to 
the house the next day, Hope taunted him with Veronica’s 
happiness at Oxford.  Defendant said, “[T]hat pissed me off so 
much that we started to fight. . . . a lot.  She pulled out a knife 
. . ., but she didn’t do anything to me.”  Hope tried to call the 
police, but he took the phone away.  Defendant explained, “Then 
I remembered all the bad that she was doing to me, and I saw 
her with a look on her face that wasn’t hers.  Like with the look 
of a witch.  [¶] And it scared me so much.  And in a moment of 
desperation and everything we started to fight.  And that was 
when I grabbed the knife that was there.  [¶] And I started 
stabbing, and stabbing her.  And then her son came in with a 
skateboard and he threw the skateboard at me and we also 
started to fight. . . .  and I started to feel that everything got 
dark.”  He put Hope’s body in a closet afterward because he was 
afraid of her, and he ransacked the house because he was 
looking for Veronica’s new phone number.  When Marion 
arrived, defendant hit him and fled.  
 
Shortly 
after 
this 
interview, 
defendant 
provided 
additional details during a videotaped walkthrough at the crime 
scene.  He and Hope argued.  She stood and tried to slap him, 
but he grabbed her and took her phone.  Hope retreated but 
came back at him holding a knife.  They fell to the floor fighting.  
                                        
4  
Defendant spoke Spanish in the interviews.  All 
quotations attributed to him are to the English translation in 
the clerk’s transcript.  
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
 
Hope threatened to kill him, but he rolled on top of her and 
grabbed the knife.  Hope threw him off, then lunged at him and 
impaled herself on the knife, afterward exclaiming, “What did 
you do to me?”  Defendant “lost [his] mind” when he saw the 
blood and stabbed Hope repeatedly.  When Austin came in, 
defendant dropped the knife.  Seeing Hope, Austin yelled and 
tried to hit him with his skateboard.  Defendant closed the 
sliding door so the neighbors would not hear the commotion.  He 
took away the skateboard and tried to calm Austin, but the child 
ran toward the front door yelling for help.  Defendant grabbed 
him and kicked the door shut.  Austin struggled and tried to 
escape, so defendant stabbed him.  Defendant said he sat crying 
for several minutes then looked for Veronica’s new phone 
number.  His anger returned.  He went back to Hope’s body and 
saw her lipstick on the floor.  He stuffed her into a closet, then 
dragged Austin’s body across the floor and wrote the message in 
lipstick on the mirror.  Worried that Marion would return soon, 
defendant took a hatchet and a crowbar from the garage and 
waited for him in the living room.  When Marion opened the 
front door, defendant threw the hatchet at him and fled.  He 
dropped the knife outside.  Defendant claimed everything he did 
was in self-defense.  
B. Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
 
Veronica described Hope as happy, outgoing, and much 
loved by her friends and family.  A nurse for 30 years, she cared 
greatly about her patients and was respected by her coworkers.  
She attended church every Sunday and gave Veronica a 
religious upbringing.   
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
 
 
Veronica considered Hope her mother and “best friend.”  
The two frequently did things together and expressed their love 
for each other.  Hope encouraged Veronica to work hard in school 
and take advantage of opportunities she never had.  When 
Veronica left for England, both became emotional because they 
were not used to being apart.  Veronica was devastated to learn 
of the murders.  She continued living with her grandfather, but 
their life was lonely, especially at holidays.  She was no longer 
comfortable in the house, and they moved five months after the 
crimes.  Veronica had difficulty with the loss and will always 
feel guilty for inviting defendant into their family.  
 
Hope’s nephew remembered her generosity.  She cooked 
breakfast and dinner for the household every day, even though 
she worked full time.  Holidays were especially hard for the 
family now.  
 
Veronica testified that Austin came to the Raglands from 
a foster home.  His birth mother abused drugs and had lost 
custody of her four children.  Austin initially knew Hope as 
“grandma,” but after a while began calling her “mom.”  Hope 
took him to church regularly.  Austin was polite, respectful, and 
very popular.  After he died, fellow students planted a tree in his 
memory.  Marion enjoyed spending time with Austin.  They 
regularly walked the dog, played catch, and worked outside 
together.  He missed having Austin and Hope in his life and now 
spent most of his time alone.  
2. Defense Evidence 
 
Defendant grew up in a town about three hours south of 
Mexico City.  He lived with his parents and three younger sisters 
in a small house that, for many years, lacked indoor plumbing.  
All of his extended family lived on the same dirt road.  One sister 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
 
testified the home was humble but filled with love.  Defendant 
and his eldest sister took a university entrance examination 
together but were not accepted.  Defendant dreamed of marriage 
and a family.  He enjoyed rural life and wanted to work with 
animals.  
 
Around age 12, defendant began working with a neighbor, 
curing hides to make leather jackets.  He worked half days while 
in school, then later full time.  He was trustworthy, responsible, 
and hard-working.  At age 16, when he was finishing school, 
defendant worked weekends at a pig ranch.  His manager 
trusted him to work alone and considered him a good worker.  
At 17, defendant began training with his uncle to become a truck 
driver.  The uncle thought defendant unusually naïve due to his 
strict and isolated upbringing.  Defendant typically gave the 
money he earned to his mother.  
 
Defendant’s father once came to the United States but 
soon left because he missed the family.  The father later 
returned to America, and defendant accompanied his mother to 
join him.  They traveled 15 days and made four unsuccessful 
attempts before finally crossing the border at Sonora in 2000.  
Defendant never returned to Mexico.  His mother and sisters 
missed him and hoped he would not be executed.  
 
Defendant’s girlfriend from Mexico testified that they 
began dating as teenagers.  He often ate with her family and 
helped with chores.  Her parents liked him and treated him like 
a son.  The girlfriend’s parents testified that they trusted 
defendant and believed he would have made a good husband.  
The couple loved each other and often talked of marriage and 
children.  Defendant left for America during the girlfriend’s first 
year at university.  While parting was difficult, defendant felt 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
 
he had to go to protect his mother.  Initially, the couple spoke 
frequently by phone, but the relationship faded and defendant 
said he had met someone else.  
 
A deputy sheriff who worked for two years at defendant’s 
jail testified that he never had to report defendant for rules 
violations.  Defendant took adult education courses and 
correspondence courses in religion.  A correctional consultant 
interviewed defendant and reviewed his county jail history, 
finding no indication of future dangerousness.  The consultant 
believed defendant could be institutionalized and avoid future 
problems.  Once, when another inmate tried to intimidate him, 
defendant struck the man in the jaw, a response the witness 
considered appropriate under the circumstances.  Afterward, 
the two interacted without further animus.  Unlike most 
inmates facing capital charges, defendant had successfully 
shared living quarters with at least 15 others.  The witness was 
confident that, if given a life sentence, defendant could be 
successfully housed in a level 4 prison.  Defendant had no prior 
criminal record in Mexico or the United States.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Admissibility of Defendant’s Confessions  
 
Defendant contends the court erred in admitting his 
confessions, both because he did not knowingly and intelligently 
waive his Miranda rights and because he was denied his right 
to consular notification under the Vienna Convention on 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
 
Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77 (Vienna 
Convention).5  The statements were properly admitted. 
a. Background 
 
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements.  
The court reviewed a videotape and transcript of defendant’s 
first interview and heard testimony from an interrogating 
officer and a clinical psychologist. 
 
Defendant was initially interviewed on May 2, 2003 at the 
Corona Police Department by Detective Ron Anderson and 
Corporal John Rasso.  Rasso is a native Spanish speaker and 
certified as a bilingual officer.  Rasso brought defendant water 
at the start of the interview.  Before any mention was made of 
the murder, Rasso read defendant his Miranda rights in 
Spanish from a preprinted form.  When admonishing in 
Spanish, Rasso takes care that the subject understands what is 
said.  There are multiple Spanish dialects, and words in one may 
have a different meaning in others.  Rasso “made sure” 
defendant would understand the dialect he chose.  It appeared 
defendant understood Rasso, and Rasso was able to understand 
him.  Rasso asked if defendant understood each right and 
defendant confirmed that he did.   Defendant initially responded 
“uhm-hm,” but Rasso asked him to clarify “yes or no.”   
Defendant answered “yes” then, after a pause asked, “[D]oes my 
girlfriend already know” about the murders?  Focusing on the 
Miranda issue rather than a discussion of the facts, Rasso 
                                        
5  
Defendant contends admission of the statements violated 
his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, analogous state constitutional provisions, and the 
Vienna Convention. 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
 
responded, “[Y]ou have these rights with you.  Do you want to 
talk about what happened last night or what?”  
 
When defendant replied in the affirmative, Rasso gave 
him the form, which lists the rights in both Spanish and English 
and asks whether, with those rights in mind, the subject wishes 
to speak with police.  Rasso crossed out the English portion of 
the form to indicate that the rights were given in Spanish.  
Rasso recorded defendant’s Spanish replies that he both 
understood his rights and he wished to speak with officers.  
Defendant, Rasso, and Anderson all signed the form.  
 
Defendant denied the murders and insisted he had not 
even gone into the house.  The next day he was interviewed a 
second time, then walked through the crime scene with 
investigators.  Before the interview, Rasso told defendant, 
“[Y]ou always have the right to, not, not talk to us.  To not tell 
us anything, and . . . that way yesterday, . . . where I read you 
those rights.”  Defendant responded affirmatively.  Rasso asked 
again, “[Y]ou understand that?”  Defendant nodded.  During 
that second interview, defendant confessed.  In the subsequent 
walkthrough, Rasso reminded defendant of the rights he had 
read to him and said, “[Y]ou have [those rights] with you right 
now.”  He asked defendant to tell him if he wanted to exercise 
his rights.   
 
Defense expert Dr. Francisco Gomez tested defendant to 
assess his ability to understand the Miranda advisements.  
Defendant consistently performed in the borderline range on 
intelligence tests, indicating low intellectual functioning.  He 
reported failing sixth grade, which was consistent with “mild 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
 
retardation” or borderline intelligence.6  Gomez administered 
screening tests for intelligence.  He did not go on to assert 
whether defendant was intellectually disabled.  He was not 
asked, nor did he give, a specific IQ score for defendant. 
 
Defendant read, in Spanish, at a third to fifth grade level.  
In Gomez’s view, understanding the Miranda warnings requires 
at least seventh grade level reading comprehension.  Defendant 
was depressed, with low self-esteem and a “dependent” 
personality.  He was passive, anxious, and agreeable, “a 
follower” who might “be easily manipulated.”  Gomez detected 
no symptoms of any thought disorder.  
 
Although defendant had been in the United States for 
some time, his acculturation was very low.  He had been 
sheltered for most of his life, living with family and securing jobs 
through friends.  Because he grew up in a small town and had 
never been in trouble, defendant’s knowledge of the legal system 
came mainly from Mexican soap operas.  He had the distorted 
view that American police are very aggressive.  For example, he 
once interrupted the officers to ask, “ ‘Are they gonna kill me 
today, or are they gonna kill me tomorrow?’ ”  
 
Gomez acknowledged that defendant was initially read 
the full Miranda warnings from a form, “which is the standard 
way of doing it.”  He was reminded of the rights twice on the 
second day of questioning.  In addition, Corporal Rasso 
                                        
6  
The witness used the terms “mildly retarded” and “mild 
retardation.”  In accordance with current law and usage, this 
court now uses the phrase “intellectually disabled” except when 
quoting or characterizing a source that uses older terms.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 717, fn. 24 (Boyce); 
see also Stats. 2012, ch. 448.) 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
 
explained to defendant that the prosecutor who was with them 
in the crime scene walkthrough was not his lawyer but was “the 
attorney for . . . the law.”  Defendant was told he would be given 
his own attorney when he went to court.  The third time 
defendant was given the Miranda warnings, later in the 
walkthrough, he agreed he would tell Rasso if he wanted to 
invoke his rights, then added, “[W]ell anyway when I go to court 
my attorney is going to be there right?”  To Gomez, this response 
implied defendant did not understand his rights.  Gomez opined 
that defendant lacked the intellectual ability to understand the 
Miranda warnings as they were read to him.  He only said he 
understood because his passive nature inclined him to agree 
with authority figures.   
 
On 
cross-examination, 
Gomez 
acknowledged 
that 
defendant lied to police almost immediately after he agreed to 
talk to them.  The doctor was aware that there was writing in 
English on “a window” at the crime scene.  Gomez did not read 
the statement but agreed that if it said, “Austin is a bad 
student,” the statement would be grammatically correct.  Gomez 
was unaware that defendant was able to consult want ads, find 
two different apartments, or move in and pay rent.  He admitted 
defendant “concocted a story.”  He was unaware that after the 
murders defendant went to the dairy and worked a normal shift.  
During the first interview, when told the family had been killed, 
defendant appeared to cry and denied involvement.  Gomez 
agreed that was a lie.  Gomez asserted he was providing an 
opinion based on “the best information available,” but he 
admitted he did not read the police reports, interview 
defendant’s coworkers, or do further evaluation for IQ testing. 
 
The court denied the suppression motion.  Referring to 
defendant’s demeanor in the videotaped interview, the court 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
 
observed, “[T]here is not even a scintilla of evidence to suggest 
that he did not understand the rights that were read to him.  He 
immediately responded in the affirmative, either through a nod 
or audible answer, that he understood them, that he was willing 
to waive them and talk to the officers.”  Defendant’s 
understanding could also be inferred from the lies he told after 
waiving his rights.  The court noted, “Clearly, he knew he was 
in trouble and he needed to come up with some sort of 
explanation regarding the conduct he was being accused of, and 
he set forth a story denying even being present.”  Defendant 
spoke clearly and without hesitation.  He did not ask for 
questions to be repeated.  Furthermore, there was no evidence 
the police induced his statements through any threats or 
promises of reward.  The court concluded it was “abundantly 
clear” that defendant understood his rights and voluntarily and 
intelligently waived them.  The court acknowledged that the 
preponderance of evidence standard applied but noted, “in fact, 
if the standard were even higher, it would be beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he understood his rights and voluntarily 
and intelligently waived them.”   
b. Validity of the Miranda Waiver 
 
“To safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination from the ‘inherently compelling 
pressures’ of custodial interrogation (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 
at p. 467), the high court adopted a set of prophylactic measures 
requiring law enforcement officers to advise an accused of his 
right to remain silent and to have counsel present prior to any 
custodial interrogation (id. at pp. 444-445).”  (People v. Jackson 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 338-339.)  A suspect who has heard and 
understood these rights may waive them.  (Maryland v. Shatzer 
(2010) 559 U.S. 98, 104; People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
 
683.)  “[T]he prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances of the interrogation.”  (People v. Linton (2013) 56 
Cal.4th 1146, 1171; see Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 
421; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425.)  This 
analysis requires an evaluation of both the defendant’s state of 
mind and circumstances surrounding the questioning.  (People 
v. Nelson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 367, 375; see Fare v. Michael C. 
(1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725.)  On appeal, we accept the trial court’s 
factual findings and credibility assessments if supported by 
substantial evidence.  (People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 20; 
People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 551; People v. Dykes (2009) 
46 Cal.4th 731, 751.)  “ ‘ “ ‘We independently determine from the 
undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the trial court 
whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.’ ” ’  
[Citations.]  Where, as was the case here, an interview is 
recorded, the facts surrounding the admission or confession are 
undisputed and we may apply independent review.”  (Duff, at 
p. 551.) 
 
Defendant cites several circumstances to show he did not 
knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.  He 
argues he was distressed and inattentive during the 
advisements, merely affirming his understanding and agreeing 
to talk out of a need to please authority figures.  The 
advisements were read to him all at once, rather than 
individually, which defendant suggests gave him less time to 
consider their significance.  Defendant similarly contends his 
signing of the waiver form was perfunctory.  He looked at the 
form only briefly and signed without reading.  Separately, 
relying on Gomez’s testimony, defendant argues he lacked the 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
 
cognitive ability, acculturation, or criminal justice experience to 
make a knowing and intelligent waiver.  To the contrary, ample 
evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that defendant 
understood the Miranda rights and validly waived them. 
 
Defendant waived his rights at the beginning of the first 
interview, before any questions were asked about the incident.  
The videotape indicates that Rasso read the Miranda rights 
slowly.  He paused periodically and looked up.  Defendant 
nodded throughout this recitation and immediately responded 
in the affirmative when asked if he understood “all of these 
rights” as read to him.  He also immediately and unequivocally 
agreed to “talk about what happened last night” and signed the 
Miranda waiver form without hesitation.  In his responses and 
demeanor, defendant exhibited no reluctance to speak with the 
police.  There is no suggestion, and no allegation, that the 
officers used coercive interrogation tactics or made improper 
promises.  There is substantial evidence of voluntariness.  (See 
People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 248-249; Colorado v. 
Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 164.)  Nor is there any allegation 
that defendant did not understand the language of the 
warnings.  Rasso verbally advised defendant in Spanish, taking 
care to match defendant’s dialect, and used a waiver form 
printed in Spanish.  (See People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 
666, 668-669.)  Defendant claims he was distressed and 
inattentive during the Miranda warnings because he reached 
for a tissue and answered that he understood his rights only as 
part of his question about whether Veronica was aware of the 
murders.  However, the videotape reveals a more subdued 
reaction to news of the murders than defendant now depicts, and 
he was advised of his rights before officers shared any details 
about their investigation.  Moreover, the tape reveals that 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
 
defendant’s affirmation of understanding was separate from his 
question about his girlfriend.  Defendant first nodded and said, 
“mmhmm” when asked if he understood his rights.  Prompted 
for a verbal answer, defendant immediately responded, “yes.”  
He did not ask about his girlfriend until approximately three 
seconds later, during the silence while Rasso was preparing the 
waiver form.  
 
The trial court rejected defendant’s claim that he lacked 
the intellectual capacity and experience necessary to make a 
knowing and intelligent waiver.  Our independent review of the 
videotape supports that conclusion.  We have not decided that 
any particular intelligence or experience level is required to 
understand the Miranda warnings or to waive them.  (See 
People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 951.)  Moreover, 
defendant’s attempt to deceive the officers in his initial 
interview indicates attentiveness and an awareness of his 
circumstances.  He was not so inattentive or distracted during 
the questioning that he could not formulate a false account of 
what happened.  
 
Defendant’s reliance on federal appellate cases is also 
unavailing.  The cases are not controlling precedent and are 
factually distinguishable.  In Cooper v. Griffin (5th Cir. 1972) 
455 F.2d 1142, 1144-1145, the defendants were only 15 and 16 
years old and demonstrated considerable intellectual deficiency.  
They read at or below third grade level and had IQs ranging 
between 61 and 67, well into the “mentally retarded” range.  (Id. 
at p. 1145.)  Moreover, uncontroverted testimony from four of 
their special education teachers established that neither was 
capable of understanding the Miranda warnings, let alone the 
consequences of waiving their rights.  (Id. at pp. 1145-1146.)  In 
U.S. v. Garibay (9th Cir. 1998) 143 F.3d 534, 537-539, the 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
 
defendant was interrogated in English even though his primary 
language was Spanish and he had difficulty understanding 
English.  Even with this discrepancy, and the defendant’s 
borderline intellectual disability, the court suggested the claim 
would have been rejected if officers had obtained a written 
waiver.  (Id. at p. 539, fn. 10.) 
 
Apart from Gomez’s testimony, which the trial court was 
entitled to reject, the record reveals no basis to conclude 
defendant’s Miranda waiver was anything other than knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  Having been admonished in his own 
language, defendant, an adult, repeatedly affirmed both 
verbally and in writing his understanding of the Miranda rights 
and his desire to waive them.  The trial court’s denial of the 
suppression motion is well supported. 
c. Violation of Consular Rights 
 
It is undisputed that the officers did not alert defendant to 
his right to have the Mexican consulate notified of his detention, 
as required by section 834c and the Vienna Convention.  The 
court declined to suppress defendant’s statements as a remedy 
because it found no prejudice flowed from the omission.  While 
a member of the consulate might have responded and advised 
defendant to remain silent, the court found in regard to the 
Miranda waiver that defendant understood his rights to counsel 
and silence.  Nevertheless, defendant “couldn’t wait [to] get 
started talking about his lack of involvement in this.  [¶] Yes, 
ultimately his story changed and he did admit criminal conduct, 
but he had no hesitation whatsoever, none, in talking to the 
police officers.”  
 
“Article 36, paragraph 1(b), of the Vienna Convention 
provides that law enforcement officials ‘shall . . . inform’ 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
 
arrested foreign nationals of their right to have their consulate 
notified of their arrest, and if a national so requests, inform the 
consular post that the national is under arrest.”  (People v. 
Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 709.)  Article 36 generally 
requires that such an advisement be given “without delay.”  
(Vienna Convention, supra, art. 36, at p. 23 (Article 36); see 
§ 834c, subd. (b).)  California implemented the Convention’s 
requirements in section 834c.  (See Howell, A Proposal for U.S. 
Implementation 
of 
the 
Vienna 
Convention’s 
Consular 
Notification Requirement (2013) 60 UCLA L.Rev. 1324, 1366.)  
Our statute requires law enforcement to inform any “known or 
suspected foreign national” of the right to consular notification 
when the foreign national has been arrested, booked, or 
detained for more than two hours.  (§ 834c, subd. (a)(1).)  
 
Several minutes into his first interview, defendant told 
the police he was “an illegal Mexican” and did not “have papers 
here.”  The officers therefore had reason to know he was a 
foreign national.  Moreover, while it is unclear how long 
defendant had been detained when he declared his immigration 
status, he was in police custody for well over two hours before 
confessing to the murders.  Under these circumstances, 
section 834c and Article 36 required the officers to advise 
defendant of his right to consular notice.  They failed to do so.  
It should go without saying that law enforcement officers are 
obligated to follow the Penal Code.  The question here is whether 
defendant is entitled to relief. 
 
We have assumed, without deciding, that Article 36 gives 
foreign nationals individual, enforceable rights.  (See In re 
Martinez (2009) 46 Cal.4th 945, 957, fn. 3.)  Even so, “Article 36 
does not guarantee defendants any assistance at all.  The 
provision secures only a right of foreign nationals to have their 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
 
consulate informed of their arrest or detention—not to have 
their consulate intervene, or to have law enforcement 
authorities cease their investigation pending any such notice or 
intervention.  In most circumstances, there is likely to be little 
connection between an Article 36 violation and evidence or 
statements obtained by police.”  (Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon 
(2006) 548 U.S. 331, 349 (Sanchez-Llamas).)  Accordingly, the 
“failure to notify a suspect of his or her consular rights does not, 
in itself, render a confession inadmissible” under Article 36.  
(People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 756 (Enraca); see 
Sanchez-Llamas, at p. 349.)  It appears no case has addressed 
potential penalties for noncompliance with section 834c.  
Because defendant’s claim does not raise the issue, we have no 
occasion to decide the proper scope of any remedy available for 
a  section 834c violation. 
 
A consular notification claim may be raised as part of a 
broader challenge to the voluntariness of a confession.  
(Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 350.)  But defendant 
does not claim his statements to police were involuntary.  As a 
result, he frames his consular notification argument somewhat 
differently, asserting the lack of consular notice is a 
circumstance that rendered his Miranda waiver invalid because 
the waiver was not knowing or intelligent.  Assuming this 
argument is appropriate, it fails because defendant has 
established no relation whatsoever between his confession and 
the lack of consular notice.  Defendant asserts he needed 
consular assistance because he was poorly acculturated and 
inexperienced.  He contends, “Miranda advisements read from 
a form by an interrogating police officer” could not substitute for 
the “full[] and careful[]” explanation of his rights from a 
representative of the consulate.  Even assuming defendant 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
 
might have received a more compelling advisement from a 
consular representative, the suggestion that he would have 
deferred to this advice is entirely speculative.  Defendant was 
told, clearly and in Spanish, that he had the rights to remain 
silent and have an attorney’s assistance.  He asked no questions 
and exhibited no confusion or hesitation before waiving these 
protections.  On the contrary, as the trial court observed, he 
seemed eager to talk with the officers.  Having been fully 
advised of his rights to silence and a free attorney, defendant 
nevertheless chose to speak with the police and actively 
participated in the questioning.  Although sometimes tearful, 
defendant never stopped responding or asked to end the 
interview.  Defendant’s immediate, continued, and active 
participation belies the suggestion he would have remained 
silent if advised of his consular rights.  (See Enraca, supra, 53 
Cal.4th at pp. 757-758.) 
2. Instruction Regarding Preoffense Statements 
 
Defendant claims the court improperly gave CALJIC 
No. 2.71.7, which instructs that a defendant’s statements 
reflecting intent, plan, motive, or design must be viewed with 
caution.7  The instruction was appropriate as supported by the 
evidence and any possible error was harmless. 
 
Veronica testified that defendant had difficulty accepting 
the end of their relationship and blamed Hope for influencing 
Veronica’s decision.  In a phone call two days before the 
murders, defendant told Veronica, “I know it’s [Hope] that’s 
                                        
7  
Defendant asserts the instruction violated his rights to 
present a defense and to a fair trial and penalty under the Sixth, 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and analogous state 
constitutional provisions. 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
 
making you think like this.”  Veronica also testified that in their 
last brief phone call, on the day of the murders, defendant said, 
“No matter what happens . . . I’ll always love you.”  Although 
Veronica found the statement odd, she was mainly irritated by 
the call.  
 
Based on these two statements, the prosecution requested 
CALJIC No. 2.71.7.  As read to defendant’s jury, this instruction 
states:  “Evidence has been received from which you may find 
that an oral statement of intent, plan, motive, or design was 
made by the defendant before the offense with which he is 
charged was committed.  It is for you to decide whether the 
statement was made by the defendant, and evidence of such an 
oral statement ought to be viewed with caution.”  Defense 
counsel objected that the instruction applies only when there 
has been an “actual” or “blatant” statement of intent or 
planning.  He noted that “obviously inferences can be made 
from” defendant’s statements but suggested these inferences did 
not require a jury instruction.  The court responded, “You’ve 
kind of answered your own objection there.  There is an 
inference that he’s intending to do something in the future, 
something evil.  Generally speaking, the law is that if there is 
some evidence that supports an instruction, it should be given.”  
 
We recently held that trial courts need not instruct the 
jury to view defendant’s extrajudicial statements with caution 
unless such an instruction is requested by the defense.  (People 
v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1189-1190.)  However, “[t]he law 
in effect at the time of [defendant’s] trial was clear:  A trial court 
had the duty to instruct the jury sua sponte to view a defendant’s 
oral admissions with caution.”  (People v. Johnson (2018) 6 
Cal.5th 541, 587, italics added (Johnson); see People v. 
Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 392-393; People v. Beagle 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
 
(1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 455.)  If the jury heard evidence of a 
defendant’s 
inculpatory 
statement, 
or 
from 
which 
an 
inculpatory statement could be inferred (see People v. Rodrigues 
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1136-1137), a cautionary instruction such 
as CALJIC No. 2.71 or 2.71.7 was required even over defense 
objection.  (See, e.g., People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 
1157 (Zambrano).) 
 
Defendant argues the instruction was not supported by 
the evidence.  “A trial court must give a requested instruction 
only if it is supported by substantial evidence, that is, evidence 
sufficient to deserve jury consideration.”  (People v. Marshall 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 39.)  Veronica’s testimony supported the 
instruction.  Defendant acknowledges that she testified about 
the statements in question but disputes the reasonable 
inferences that could be drawn from them.  Defendant insists 
his statement “No matter what happens, I’ll always love you” 
did not suggest an “intent, plan, motive, or design” to kill, but 
“was simply the classic lament of a man professing eternal and 
unconditional love for a young woman who has told him she 
wants to end their relationship.”  While this is one possible 
interpretation of the statement, it is not the only one.  Even 
defense counsel acknowledged that ominous inferences could be 
drawn from the statement, in which defendant suggested 
something might “happen” only hours before he went to the 
Ragland house, murdered Hope and Austin, and attacked 
Marion with a hatchet.  Defendant’s innocent interpretation is 
also at odds with his other statement, blaming Hope for “making 
[Veronica] think like this.”  This earlier statement conveys 
defendant’s apparent aggravation with Hope and could support 
a conclusion that he harbored a criminal intent.  Ultimately, the 
jury had to decide whether defendant actually made the 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
 
statements attributed to him, and, if so, what the statements 
implied.  The cautionary instruction properly informed them 
how to evaluate this evidence. 
 
Defendant argues the jury’s only proper role under 
CALJIC No. 2.71.7 is to determine whether the defendant made 
a statement attributed to him, not whether the statement 
expressed an intent, motive, plan, or design.  He complains 
CALJIC No. 2.71.7 improperly suggested that jurors were 
required to view his extrajudicial statements as expressions of 
criminal intent.  We rejected a similar claim in Zambrano, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at page 1157, and do so again here.  “Far from 
presenting motive as a predetermined ‘fact,’ the instruction 
merely stated that the jury ‘may’ find defendant expressed such 
a motive and must view any such expression with caution.”  
(Ibid., italics added)  Moreover, the jury would have understood 
from numerous other instructions that it was the ultimate judge 
of all disputed facts.  Indeed, just before CALJIC No. 2.71.7, the 
judge read CALJIC No. 2.70, which stated they were “the 
exclusive judges as to whether the defendant made a confession 
or an admission, and if so, whether that statement is true in 
whole or in part.”  The court also instructed jurors to disregard 
any instructions that were inapplicable to what they found to be 
the facts.  (CALJIC No. 17.31.)  In the context of the instructions 
as a whole, the meaning of CALJIC No. 2.71.7 would have been 
clear. 
 
Finally, any error in giving the instruction was clearly 
harmless.  As we have previously observed, CALJIC No. 2.71.7 
generally serves a salutary purpose.  “[T]he principal effect of 
the instruction was to reemphasize, on defendant’s behalf, that 
his inculpatory extrajudicial statements, if any, should be 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
 
viewed with caution.”  (Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1157-1158.) 
B. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Instructions Requested by Defense  
 
Defendant challenges the court’s denial of his request to 
change to CALCRIM instructions at the penalty phase and its 
refusal to give three special instructions.8  We conclude there 
was no prejudicial error. 
a. CALCRIM Instructions 
 
Before trial began, the court gave counsel the option of 
using either CALJIC jury instructions or the CALCRIM 
instructions that had recently been released.  The court said it 
would not “mix and match” the two types of instructions.9  
Defendant’s attorneys agreed that the CALJIC instructions 
were “fine,” and CALJIC instructions were given in the trial’s 
guilt phase.  At the penalty phase, however, defense counsel 
wanted to use CALCRIM instructions because he felt they better 
explained some concepts.  Specifically, counsel preferred 
CALCRIM No. 763 to CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88.  Although he 
                                        
8  
Defendant’s instructional error claims assert violations of 
his rights to due process and a fair penalty trial under the Fifth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and analogous California 
constitutional provisions. 
9  
The Judicial Council’s official guide for using the 
CALCRIM instructions states:  “The CALJIC and CALCRIM 
instructions should never be used together.  While the legal 
principles are obviously the same, the organization of concepts 
is approached differently.  Mixing the two sets of instructions 
into a unified whole cannot be done and may result in omissions 
or confusion that could severely compromise clarity and 
accuracy.”  (Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Insts. (2019) 
p. xxii.) 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
 
acknowledged that the CALCRIM instructions are not meant to 
be combined with other model jury instructions, he argued there 
was no risk of confusion because jurors would be admonished to 
disregard all of the CALJIC instructions given in the guilt 
phase.  The court denied the request, preferring to maintain 
consistency in the instructions used throughout trial.  
Defendant now argues this decision was an error of 
constitutional dimension.  We disagree. 
 
Defendant’s argument rests entirely on the complaint that 
CALJIC No. 8.88 is inferior to its counterpart, CALCRIM 
No. 766.  Defendant’s jury was given CALJIC No. 8.88, 
explaining that a death verdict requires each juror to be 
persuaded “that the aggravating circumstances are so 
substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances 
that it warrants death instead of life without parole.”  In 
contrast, CALCRIM No. 766 would have instructed the jury to 
decide whether a death sentence was “appropriate and 
justified.”  Defendant argues the verb “warrant” imposes a 
lesser standard.  He suggests jurors might have misunderstood 
the instruction to mean that a death sentence was “warranted” 
simply because it was permitted. 
 
We have frequently rejected this argument.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 122; People v. Townsel 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 73.)  CALJIC No. 8.88’s instruction that 
each juror consider whether death was “ ‘warrant[ed]’ ” was not 
error because the instruction twice references the jury’s duty to 
decide the death penalty’s appropriateness.  (People v. McKinzie 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1361.)  First, the instruction explains 
that a mitigating circumstance is one that “may be considered 
as 
an 
extenuating 
circumstance 
in 
determining 
the 
appropriateness of the death penalty.”  (CALJIC No. 8.88, italics 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
 
added.)  Second, the instruction tells jurors to “determine under 
the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate 
by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances 
with the totality of the mitigating circumstances.”  (Ibid., italics 
added.)  Defendant dismisses these references as mere 
“prefatory” filler.  This argument distorts the instruction’s 
meaning by focusing on one word taken out of context.  
Considered as a whole, “the instruction properly conveyed to the 
jury that circumstances ‘warrant[]’ the death penalty when such 
punishment is appropriate in the eyes of the jury.”  (McKinzie, 
at p. 1361.)  Accordingly, it was not error for the court to give 
CALJIC No. 8.88, and it was within the court’s discretion to 
deny defendant’s request for CALCRIM instructions in the 
penalty phase. 
b. Special Instructions 
 
Defendant next claims the court erred in refusing three 
proposed special instructions based on CALCRIM No. 763.  The 
court declined to give the instructions, concluding the 
information was adequately conveyed by CALJIC No. 8.85.   
 
Defendant’s first proposed instruction stated:  “You may 
consider sympathy or compassion for the defendant.”  However, 
the jury had already been instructed that it could consider “[a]ny 
other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime 
even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any 
sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or 
record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less 
than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is 
on trial.”  (CALJIC No. 8.85.)  We have consistently held that 
“CALJIC No. 8.85 adequately instructs the jury concerning the 
circumstances that may be considered in mitigation, including 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
 
sympathy and mercy,” and no further instructions on the subject 
are required.  (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 261; 
accord Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 706-707.)  Defendant’s 
special instruction was duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.85.  (See 
People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 659.) 
 
The second proposed instruction stated:  “You may not 
consider as an aggravating factor anything other than the 
factors contained in this list that you conclude are aggravating 
in this case.  You must not take into account any other facts or 
circumstances as a basis for imposing the death penalty.”  On 
request, trial courts generally should permit an instruction 
explaining that only the listed sentencing factors and related 
evidence may be considered in aggravation.  (See People v. 
Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1275, fn. 14; People v. Williams 
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1324.)  However, any error in refusing 
such an instruction is “nonprejudicial under any standard 
[where] the record does not suggest that any extraneous ‘factors’ 
were in fact presented to or considered by the jury.”  (Williams, 
at p. 1324.)  That standard is satisfied here.  The concept that 
aggravating evidence is limited to that described in CALJIC 
No. 8.85 is reasonably inferable from that instruction, which 
directs jurors to consider the listed sentencing factors “if 
applicable.”  (See People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 
1100; Gordon, at p. 1275, fn. 14.) 
 
Moreover, no evidence or argument here concerned a 
nonstatutory factor.  There was guilt phase evidence that 
defendant went to work as usual on the night of the murders 
and did not seem agitated.  That evidence was relevant to show 
that mitigation was not appropriate under section 190.3, 
factor (d).  Factor (d) permits mitigation if the offense was 
committed while the defendant was under the influence of an 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.  (§ 190.3, factor (d).)  
Defendant asserts his special instruction was needed because 
the prosecutor’s closing argument mentioned “how normal, how 
fine” defendant acted during the videotaped walkthrough.  
However, in the very next sentence the prosecutor linked this 
comment to factor (d), stating, “There’s no evidence at all under 
factor (d).”  No argument was made that defendant’s demeanor 
could be used as an aggravating factor.  Because there was no 
basis for the jury to have considered aggravation on a 
nonstatutory basis, any error in failing to give defendant’s 
special instruction was harmless. 
 
Defendant’s third proposed instruction stated:  “Even if a 
fact is both a ‘special circumstance’ and also a ‘circumstance of 
the crime,’ you may consider that fact only once as an 
aggravating factor in your weighing process.  Do not double-
count that fact simply because it is both a ‘special circumstance’ 
and a ‘circumstance of the crime.’ ”  There is no sua sponte duty 
to instruct that facts supporting a special circumstance may not 
also be used as an aggravating factor.  (See People v. Salazar 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 254 (Salazar); People v. Ramirez (2006) 
39 Cal.4th 398, 476.)  However, “[a] trial court should, when 
requested, instruct the jury against double-counting these 
circumstances.”  (People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 
789.)  “The literal language of [section 190.3, factor] (a) presents 
a theoretical problem . . . since it tells the penalty jury to 
consider the ‘circumstances’ of the capital crime and any 
attendant statutory ‘special circumstances.’  Since the latter are 
a subset of the former, a jury given no clarifying instructions 
might conceivably double-count any ‘circumstances’ which were 
also ‘special circumstances.’ . . .  [¶] However, the possibility of 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
 
actual prejudice seems remote. . . .”  (People v. Melton (1988) 44 
Cal.3d 713, 768.) 
 
The Attorney General concedes omitting the instruction 
was error but contends it was harmless.  We agree.  There is no 
reasonable likelihood the jury would have misunderstood the 
instructions to permit double counting.  (See People v. Ayala 
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 289.)  “ ‘[T]he standard instructions do 
not inherently encourage the double counting of aggravating 
factors.  [Citations.]  We have also recognized repeatedly that 
the absence of an instruction cautioning against double counting 
does not warrant reversal in the absence of any misleading 
argument by the prosecutor.’ ”  (Ibid.; see Boyce, supra, 59 
Cal.4th at p. 714.)  There was no misleading argument.  
Although the prosecutor mentioned that two people had been 
killed, he did not suggest that this fact be given additional 
aggravating weight.  
2. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Law  
 
Defendant raises several familiar challenges to the 
constitutionality 
of 
California’s 
death 
penalty 
scheme.  
Although recognizing we have previously rejected all of these 
arguments, he renews them to urge reconsideration and 
preserve the issues for federal review.  We decline to reconsider 
our settled precedent and continue to hold the following: 
 
The 
category 
of 
death-eligible 
defendants 
under 
section 190.2 is not unconstitutionally overbroad.  (People v. 
Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 488 (Winbush); see People v. Reed 
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 989, 1018.)  Section 190.3, factor (a), allowing 
aggravation based on the circumstances of the crime, does not 
result in arbitrary and capricious sentencing.  (People v. 
Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1129; see Salazar, supra, 63 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
 
Cal.4th at p. 255.)  The death penalty scheme is not 
unconstitutional for failing to require written findings 
(Winbush, at p. 490), unanimous findings (People v. Wall (2017) 
3 Cal.5th 1048, 1072 (Wall)), or findings beyond a reasonable 
doubt as to the existence of aggravating factors other than 
section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), that aggravating factors 
outweigh mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate 
penalty.  (Winbush, at p. 489; People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 
1192, 1235.)  These conclusions are not altered by Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 
584, or Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 616.  
(People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 45 (Henriquez).)  The 
prosecution is not constitutionally obligated to bear a burden of 
proof or persuasion in sentencing, which is “an inherently moral 
and normative function, and not a factual one amenable to 
burden of proof calculations.”  (Winbush, at p. 489.)  “ ‘Nor is an 
instruction on the absence of a burden of proof constitutionally 
required.’ ”  (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 619.)  The 
federal Constitution also does not require an instruction that life 
is the presumptive penalty.  (Wall, at p. 1072; Salazar, at 
p. 256.) 
 
CALJIC No. 8.88 is not defective for failing to require a 
determination that death is the “appropriate” penalty (see ante, 
at p. 25; see also Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 256; Boyce, 
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 724) or failing to require a life sentence 
if mitigating factors outweigh aggravating ones (Johnson, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 594; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 
42).  This instruction’s use of the phrase “so substantial” is not 
overbroad or unconstitutionally vague.  (Wall, supra, 3 Cal.5th 
at p. 1073; Salazar, at p. 256.)  CALJIC No. 8.85’s use of the 
words “extreme” and “substantial” to describe mitigating 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
 
circumstances does not impermissibly limit the jury’s 
consideration of mitigating factors.  (People v. Rices (2017) 4 
Cal.5th 49, 94; Wall, at p. 1073.)  Nor is CALJIC No. 8.85 flawed 
because it tells the jury not to consider sympathy for defendant’s 
family as a mitigating factor.  (People v. Livingston (2012) 53 
Cal.4th 1145, 1178-1179; People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
809, 855-856.)  The court was not constitutionally obligated to 
delete inapplicable sentencing factors, designate which factors 
are aggravating or mitigating, or instruct that certain factors 
are relevant only in mitigation.  (Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 
p. 490; People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 618.)   
 
The federal Constitution does not require intercase 
proportionality review.  (Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 594; 
Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490.)  Nor does the death penalty 
statute violate equal protection by providing different 
procedural safeguards to capital and noncapital defendants.  
(Johnson, at p. 594; Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 46.)  
Finally, we have repeatedly held that California’s capital 
sentencing scheme does not violate international norms or 
evolving standards of decency in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  (Henriquez, at p. 47; Winbush, at 
p. 490; Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 725.) 
C. Cumulative Error  
 
Defendant asserts that errors in his trial were 
cumulatively prejudicial.  We have held that potential errors in 
denying instructions on aggravating evidence and double 
counting were harmless.  Even considered together, these 
omissions do not warrant reversal.  (See People v. Nunez and 
Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 63.) 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
 
D. Restitution Fine  
 
At the time of defendant’s crimes, section 1202.4, 
subdivision (b) required the court to impose a felony restitution 
fine between $200 and $10,000.  A defendant’s inability to pay 
could be considered in setting a fine above the minimum level.  
(§ 1202.4, subd. (c).)  The court ordered defendant to pay a 
$10,000 restitution fine; however, this fine was not mentioned 
in defendant’s sentencing hearing or the court’s oral 
pronouncement of judgment.  Because the subject of restitution 
was not raised, defendant had no opportunity to object to the 
$10,000 fine.  Accordingly, we will not consider his claim 
forfeited.  (Cf. People v. Miracle (2018) 6 Cal.5th 318, 356 [failure 
to object at sentencing hearing forfeits excessive fine claim].) 
 
The trial court is generally required to include all aspects 
of a judgment in its oral pronouncement of judgment.  (See 
People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.)  Any discrepancy 
between the judgment as orally pronounced and as recorded in 
the clerk’s minutes or abstract of judgment is presumed to be 
the result of clerical error.  (Ibid.)  The abstract of judgment 
“does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment 
and may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to digest 
or summarize.”  (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) 
 
The Attorney General agrees the record does not support 
imposition of a $10,000 restitution fine.  Instead of remanding 
for a restitution hearing, which would entail an inordinate 
expenditure of resources, he agrees with defendant that the fine 
should be reduced to the $200 statutory minimum.  Defendant’s 
proposal is appropriate.  (See Wall, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1076; 
People v. Mitchell, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 188.) 
 
 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
The judgment is affirmed.  On remand, the trial court 
shall amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the minimum 
restitution fine of $200 under section 1202.4, subdivision (b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
GROBAN, J. 
 
1 
PEOPLE V. LEON 
S143531 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Cuéllar 
 
As 93 million Americans managed to travel abroad last 
year to nearly every corner of the planet, the United States 
hosted almost 80 million foreign nationals.  (Nat. Trade and 
Tourism Off., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Citizen Traffic to 
Overseas Regions, Canada & Mexico 2018 (Feb. 2019) U.S. 
Citizen 
Travel 
to 
International 
Regions: 
2018 
 [as of 
Jan. 23, 2020]; Nat. Trade and Tourism Off., U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce, U.S. Travel and Tourism Industry (Oct. 2019) 
International 
Visitors 
to 
the 
U.S. 
 [as of Jan. 23, 2020].)1  When our country 
ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the 
early 1960s, we gave our word that the United States would 
treat foreigners in our country with dignity by allowing them 
contact with their country’s consular officials –– and we let the 
world know we expected no less for Americans traveling abroad.  
(Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (Vienna 
Convention).)  While today’s decision underscores how article 36 
of the Vienna Convention grants certain protections to detained 
foreign nationals, it also describes a troubling failure of police to 
                                        
1  
All Internet citations in this opinion are archived by year, 
docket 
number 
and 
case 
name 
at 
. 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Cuéllar, J., concurring 
 
2 
 
fulfill the treaty’s obligations.  Lurking at the edge of this case 
is the problem I write to highlight:  how law enforcement 
agencies and courts can help ensure we honor our country’s 
promise when it ratified the Vienna Convention. 
Law enforcement officials have a duty under article 36, 
paragraph 1(b) of the Vienna Convention.  They must inform 
arrested foreign nationals, without delay, of their right to have 
their consulate notified about their arrest or detention.  (Vienna 
Convention, art. 36 (Article 36); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon 
(2006) 548 U.S. 331, 349 (Sanchez-Llamas).)  And when the 
national so requests, law enforcement officers shall inform the 
appropriate consular post that their citizen is under arrest.  
(People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 756 (Enraca).)  In 
principle, the United States and other countries who ratified the 
Vienna Convention treat consular notification as foundational 
to the sensible treatment of their nationals abroad.   When the 
citizens of any country cross national boundaries, certain 
concerns of theirs tend to be shared with citizens of every 
country:  to remain within range of help from one’s country.  
Consular notification allows foreign nationals to obtain legal 
and diplomatic assistance, among other support, as well as a 
means for contacting family.  (See Sanchez-Llamas, at pp. 367-
368 (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.); Buys, et al., Do unto Others:  The 
Importance of Better Compliance with Consular Notification 
Rights (2011) 21 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l. L. 461, 469-474.)   
The majority rightly observes that Article 36 does not 
command consular intervention or require law enforcement 
officers to halt an investigation pending consular notification.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)  A failure to notify a suspect of their 
consular rights does not — in itself — render a confession 
inadmissible under Article 36.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 21.)  But 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Cuéllar, J., concurring 
 
3 
 
implicit in our country’s promise to honor the Vienna 
Convention are issues of right, remedy, and responsibility that 
call for more — and more serious — attention. 
Whether or not violations of this international treaty ever 
require a specific judicial remedy, such as the suppression of 
statements made to police, our failure to honor our treaty 
commitment deserves to be remedied.  In fact, the United States 
Supreme Court has articulated several possible remedies for a 
consular notification violation.  A defendant may raise an 
Article 36 claim, for example, as part of a broader challenge to 
the voluntariness of the statements defendant made to police.  
(Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 350.)  If a defendant 
raises an Article 36 violation at trial, the court can make 
accommodations to secure for the defendant the benefits of 
consular assistance.  (Sanchez-Llamas, at p. 349.)  And 
suppression may be the only effective remedy in certain 
situations, specifically, where there is a “connection between an 
Article 36 violation and evidence or statements obtained by 
police.”  (Ibid.)  Although none of these remedies appear 
appropriate to address the violation of defendant Jose Luis 
Leon's right to consular notification, today’s opinion should not 
be read to suggest that remedies are always unavailable for a  
consular notification violation.  
Circumstances warranting a judicial remedy may arise 
rarely, but the United States Supreme Court has carefully 
avoided the conclusion that suppression is never a remedy for an 
Article 36 violation. Some situations involve little if any 
connection between Article 36 and statements obtained by 
police.  But where there is such a connection, suppression serves 
as an appropriate remedy.  For example, there may be 
defendants who cannot show their confession is involuntary 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Cuéllar, J., concurring 
 
4 
 
under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, but would have 
a claim under the Vienna Convention.  (Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 
548 U.S. at p. 393 (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.).)  We should also be 
concerned about confessions coerced, in part, because a law 
enforcement officer denied a foreign national the right to 
consular notification.  And a consular notification failure may be 
part of a scheme to deprive the national of any meaningful 
choice.  In such instances, a remedy for the consular notification 
violation is surely warranted. 
Also warranting attention is the telling fact that our own 
Penal Code requires law enforcement to advise detained foreign 
nationals of their right to consular notification.  (Pen. Code, § 
843c, subd. (b).)  California’s own requirement even goes beyond 
what the Vienna Convention calls for, by obligating every peace 
officer to advise a known or suspected foreign national of the 
right to consular notification upon arrest and booking, or 
detention for more than two hours.  (Pen. Code, § 843c, subd. 
(a)(1).)  California law enforcement agencies must also ensure 
their policy or procedure and training manuals incorporate 
language based upon Article 36 that designate procedures for 
handling the arrest, booking, or detention of a foreign national 
for more than two hours.  (Pen. Code, § 843c, subd. (c).)  As is so 
often the case, law enforcement personnel and the agencies in 
which they work hold in trust the responsibility of turning our 
society’s legal commitments into action rather than aspiration.  
Along with our courts, these capable and resourceful agencies 
share the obligation to ensure the Vienna Convention’s worth 
the paper on which it’s printed.  (See Harmon, The Problem of 
Policing (2012) 110 Mich. L.Rev. 761, 795.)  That courts must 
also do their part, by fashioning and applying remedies where 
appropriate, will no doubt help agencies do what they must to 
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Cuéllar, J., concurring 
 
5 
 
write into their internal cultures these commitments with 
indelible — not invisible — ink.  (See Sanchez-Llamas, supra, 
548 U.S. at p. 349 [explaining that courts exclude the fruits of 
unreasonable searches and seizures as a means to deter law 
enforcement agents from disregarding the constraints of the 4th  
Amend.].)    
Yet this case and others like it readily tell the story of how 
much work remains undone.  Consular notification in California 
often fails to materialize and the duty to notify is routinely 
honored in the breach.  (See People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
14; Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th 735; In re Martinez (2009) 46 
Cal.4th 945; People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686; Case 
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.) 
Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).)  Our vigilance in honoring 
these legal requirements should not arise solely because we 
hope Californians detained in foreign countries will be granted 
their rights to consular notification.  At issue are laws ratified 
by the United States and adopted by the Legislature as part of 
our Penal Code — ones that convey as clearly as they do 
consistently the importance of consular notification.  (Medellin 
v. Texas (2008) 552 U.S. 491, 505 [explaining that international 
treaties are domestic law where Congress has enacted 
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention 
that it be self-executing and is ratified on these terms]; id., at p. 
533 (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.) [endorsing the proposition that the 
Vienna Convention “ ‘is itself self-executing and judicially 
enforceable’ ”]; Pen. Code, § 843c, subd. (b).)  If the duty to 
provide consular notification and contact the relevant consular 
post when requested is indeed ignored by agents of our state, it 
ought not to be.  
PEOPLE v. LEON 
Cuéllar, J., concurring 
 
6 
 
No one should question how complicated it may sometimes 
prove to calibrate the proper remedy for any procedural 
violation affecting the criminal justice system.  Remedies in 
virtually any context, no less than in consular notification, often 
involve fact-specific determinations and intricate balancing of 
competing concerns.  I agree with the majority that we should 
not suppress Leon’s statements to the police here.  Nor should 
we forget that our police often shoulder difficult burdens and 
resolve competing demands with finite resources as they work 
to advance public safety.  But when our country’s given its word, 
there’s no sensible excuse for condoning practices that ignore 
our obligations under the Vienna Convention or disregard 
protections guaranteed by California’s Penal Code.  No 
competent institution can ignore that all too often these 
obligations are treated as though they are not worth the paper 
on which they’re printed.   
Americans abroad, and not just foreigners on our soil, are 
protected by the reciprocal logic of our commitment to honor 
consular notification.  I respect our law enforcement officials too 
much to believe they can’t honor our treaty commitments and 
the laws of this state while also pursuing their investigative 
mission effectively.  Nor can I presume their capacity to execute 
that mission is so fragile that success depends on permitting 
consular notification to slip through the cracks.  By repairing 
those cracks, we remind the world that, at least in some corners 
of the country, our word is our bond.     
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Leon  
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding  
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S143531 
Date Filed: January 23, 2020 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  Riverside 
Judge:  Christian F. Thierbach 
 
________________________________________________________________________________  
 
Counsel: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Andrea G. Asaro, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Holly D. Wilkens and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Andrea Asaro 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, 10th Floor 
Oakland, CA 94607-4139 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 738-9007