Case Title: ALCALDE v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
ALCALDE v. STATE2003 WY 9974 P.3d 1253Case Number: 01-188Decided: 08/22/2003

 

                                                                                                            

 

DIEGO 
ALCALDE,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan 
R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Roden.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution 
Assistance Program; and Nancy D. Conrad, Student Intern.  Argument by Ms. 
Conrad.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

HILL, 
C.J., 
delivered the opinion of the Court; LEHMAN, J. filed a specially 
concurring opinion in which KITE, J., joins.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Diego Olmos 
Alcalde (Alcalde) appeals his conviction for kidnapping in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-201(a)(iii), (b)(i) and (c).  Alcalde claims error in the substitution 
of an alternate juror after deliberation had commenced and challenges the 
constitutionality of the kidnapping statute, § 6-2-201, alleging it is 
unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied in this case.  We reject Alcalde's claims that § 
6-2-201 is unconstitutional.  
However, we conclude that the substitution of the alternate juror after 
deliberations had begun constituted prejudicial error.  Accordingly, we reverse Alcalde's 
conviction and remand for a new trial.

 

ISSUES

[¶2]      Alcalde 
frames his two issues on appeal as follows:

            
Whether the district court committed reversible error when it substituted 
a discharged alternate juror for a regular juror after deliberations had 
commenced for a number of hours?

 

ISSUE 
II

            
Is W.S. § 6-2-201 is [sic] unconstitutionally vague facially and 
as applied to the facts in the case, denying [Alcalde] due process of law, 
because it provides no standard of conduct or notice of forbidden conduct and it 
allows for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement?

 

The 
State sets forth the issues before us in the following 
language:

 

I.                     
Did 
the district court commit reversible error when it substituted an alternate 
juror for a regular juror after deliberations had begun?

 

II.                   
Is 
Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-201 constitutionally vague, either facially or as applied to 
[Alcalde's] conduct?

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Early on the 
morning of August 10, 2000, Alcalde followed a young woman to her apartment 
parking lot.  After parking his car 
in such a way that she could not move her vehicle, Alcalde approached her under 
the guise of being lost.  The woman 
remained sitting in her car but with her legs out the open driver's side 
door.  While the woman was 
attempting to give Alcalde directions, he lunged and pinned her inside the 
car.  Alcalde began choking her, 
which prevented her from crying out.  
The woman was, however, able to reach the car horn and sound it 
twice.  Complaining that she "just 
had to do that," Alcalde forced the woman out of the car and dragged her about 
15 to 20 feet to a privacy fence.  
After approximately a minute, Alcalde abruptly stopped the assault and 
returned to the apartment parking lot where he was confronted by the victim's 
brother and sister, who had come out of their apartment upon hearing the car 
horn.  Meanwhile, the victim had 
come back around the fence whereupon she cried for help.  The victim's father, who had just come 
out of the apartment, chased after Alcalde, who managed to get into his car and 
escape the scene.  Alcalde was 
apprehended shortly thereafter by the police and identified as the assailant by 
the victim, her brother, and father.

 

[¶4]      Alcalde was 
charged with one count of kidnapping in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 
6-2-201(a)(iii), (b)(i) and (c) (LexisNexis 2003).1  The matter went before a jury for trial 
and after the parties had presented their closing arguments, the district court 
dismissed the alternate juror:

 

Earlier 
when we drew the name of the alternate, that was done so that if somebody in the 
course of the trial became ill or disabled or somehow unable to finish, we'd 
have an alternate juror to fill that place.  Happily, we've arrived at this point 
without any so misfortunes.  We'll 
now identify and excuse the alternate.

            
The alternate should understand that until the verdict is received, 
there's always the possibility that the alternate could be called upon, so the 
instruction is not to discuss the case remaining until the alternate hears that 
there is a verdict.

            
Who is the alternate, [name of juror]?  [The alternate], you are excused.  Now, depending on your point of view, 
you don't get to or you don't have to help with deliberations. Thank you very 
much for participating, and we will be in recess until we've heard that there's 
a verdict.

 

During 
deliberations, the jury sent a series of notes requesting clarification of the 
terms "vicinity" and "confined" as used in the kidnapping statute and whether or 
not a verdict had to be unanimous.  
After consulting with counsel for both parties, the court sent a 
stipulated reply to the jury:

 

The 
answer to the first question is yes.  
Any verdict must be unanimous.

"Vicinity" 
and "confined" are the words of the statute.  The elements listed are taken from the 
statute, using the parts that could apply to the evidence in this case.  The other portions could not 
apply.

I'm 
sorry, but, again, we cannot further define or provide a 
dictionary.

 

The 
court excused the jury over defense's objection when a verdict had not been 
reached by the end of the first day of deliberations.

 

[¶5]      The next morning, 
the court was notified that a juror sought to be excused from the panel for 
medical reasons.  A conference was 
held in chambers with the court, counsel for both parties, and the juror.  The juror's doctor appeared by 
phone.  After the court and the 
parties' counsel questioned the juror and his doctor, the court dismissed the 
juror because of a serious medical condition.  The court then indicated that the 
dismissed juror would be replaced with the alternate juror, who was called into 
the conference.  Defense counsel 
objected to replacing the excused juror with the alternate but the court 
overruled him.  The alternate was 
questioned as to whether or not he had discussed the case with anyone since his 
dismissal the day before.  After 
satisfying itself that he had not discussed the case, the district court 
directed the alternate to join the jury, which would continue its 
deliberations.  Approximately 50 
minutes later, the jury delivered a guilty verdict.

 

DISCUSSION

 

 

[¶6]      Initially, 
Alcalde contends that a district court lacks the authority to substitute an 
alternate juror for a regular juror once deliberations have commenced.  Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 24(e), Alcalde 
argues that it is mandatory for the district court to discharge any alternate 
jurors when the jury retires to consider a verdict.  In an alternative argument, Alcalde 
contends that even if an alternate juror can be substituted for a regular juror 
after deliberations have begun, the district court in this case failed to take 
adequate procedural safeguards to protect the deliberative 
process.

 

[¶7]      We begin our 
analysis with the language from the relevant portion of W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) 
(emphasis added):

 

Alternate 
jurors. 
 The court may direct that not more than six jurors in addition to the regular 
jury be called and impanelled [sic] to sit as alternate jurors.  Alternate jurors in the order in 
which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury 
retires to consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or 
disqualified to perform their duties.  
Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same 
qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall 
take the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities and 
privileges as the regular jurors.  
An alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be 
discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.  Each side is entitled to one peremptory 
challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed by law if one or two alternate 
jurors are to be impanelled, two peremptory challenges if three or four 
alternate jurors are to be impanelled, and three peremptory challenges if five 
or six alternate jurors are to be impanelled.  The additional peremptory challenges may 
be used against an alternate juror only, and the other peremptory challenges 
allowed by these rules may not be used against an alternate 
juror.

 

Alcalde 
cites the use of the mandatory word "shall" to support his contention that an 
alternate can only replace a regular juror prior to the time the jury retires to 
deliberate and that once the jury does retire, the alternate must be discharged. 

 

[¶8]      Prior to 1999 the 
corresponding federal rule was identical to Wyoming's.  See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c) (1999).  In those circumstances, we have 
generally looked to federal case law for guidance in the interpretation of the 
rules of criminal procedure.  
Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 1999).  The federal courts adopted the view that 
the substitution of an alternate juror during mid-deliberations violated the 
plain language of the rule.  
United States v. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d 418, 420 (5th 
Cir. 1992).  However, the federal 
courts applied a harmless error standard and would reverse a conviction only if 
the defendant had suffered prejudice by the substitution.  Id.  The federal appellate courts evaluated 
prejudice to the defendant by examining, "among other things, the length of the 
jury's deliberations before and after substitution of the alternate and the 
district court's instructions to the jury upon substitution charging the jury to 
begin its deliberations anew."  
Id. (citing United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 at 
995-96 (5th Cir. 1981)).  
Consideration was also given to whether or not the trial court had 
ensured that the alternate juror had not discussed the case with anyone nor been 
exposed to extrinsic information about the case in the interim between his 
discharge and the time of substitution.2  Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d  at 420; 
United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448 (11th Cir. 
1987).

 

[¶9]      The majority of 
the state courts to consider the issue have adopted the federal approach.  See, e.g., State v. 
Sanchez, 2000-NMSC-021, ¶¶16-22, 6 P.3d 486, ¶¶16-22 (N.M. 2000) (collecting 
cases); and generally, David B. Sweet, Annotation, Propriety, Under State 
Statute or Court Rule, of Substituting State Trial Juror With Alternate After 
Case Has Been Submitted to Jury, 88 A.L.R.4th 711 (1991).  In People v. Burnette, 775 P.2d 583 (Colo. 1989), the Colorado Supreme Court held that recalling a discharged 
alternate to replace a regular juror after deliberations have begun violated 
Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(e), which at that time was identical to 
the Wyoming Rule at issue here.  
Id. at 586-87.  The 
Colorado court noted the potential prejudices inherent when substitution of a 
regular juror occurs in mid-deliberation:

 

The 
potential for prejudice occasioned by a deviation from the mandatory 
requirements of Crim.P. 24(e) is great. Where an alternate juror is inserted 
into a deliberative process in which some jurors may have formed opinions 
regarding the defendant's guilt or innocence, there is a real danger that the 
new juror will not have a realistic opportunity to express his views and to 
persuade others. . . .  Moreover, the new juror will not 
have been part of the dynamics of the prior deliberations, including the 
interplay of influences among and between jurors, that advanced the other jurors 
along their paths to a decision. . . .  Nor will the new 
juror have had the benefit of the unavailable juror's 
views. . . .  Finally, a lone juror who cannot in good 
conscience vote for conviction might be under great pressure to feign illness in 
order to place the burden of decision on an alternate.

 

Burnette, 
775 P.2d  at 588 (citations and footnote omitted).  While noting that the substitution 
raises a presumption of prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial, the 
court held that the presumption could be overcome by a showing that the trial 
court took adequate procedural precautions to obviate the danger of prejudice to 
the defendant.  Id. at 
587-88.  In its analysis, the 
Colorado court cited the following safeguards:  (1) whether the alternate juror was 
adequately instructed upon discharge not to discuss the case and avoid extrinsic 
information about the case that could influence him; (2) whether the alternate 
was questioned about his activities during the period from his discharge to 
recall and his present ability to serve on the jury; and (3) whether the 
remaining regular jury members had been instructed to recommence deliberations 
anew and whether they would be capable of disregarding their previous 
deliberations and any opinions formed during those deliberations.  Id. at 
590-91.

 

[¶10]   We concur with the authorities 
noted above and hold that the plain language of W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) does not permit 
the substitution of an alternate juror for a regular juror once deliberations 
have commenced.  The substitution of 
an alternate juror in those circumstances raises a presumption of prejudice to a 
defendant that can, however, be rebutted upon a showing that adequate procedural 
safeguards were undertaken by the trial court to ensure that the defendant 
received a fair trial.  
Specifically, the trial court must: (1) instruct the alternate upon 
discharge that his oath is still applicable and until a verdict has been 
rendered and the regular jury discharged, he must refrain from discussing the 
case with anyone and avoid extrinsic information that may affect his ability to 
impartially judge the case; (2) upon recall, inquire on the record whether the 
alternate juror did, in fact, comply with the court's instructions; (3) instruct 
the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew; and (4) inquire on the 
record whether the remaining members of the original jury can ignore the 
previous deliberations and set aside any opinions formed during them.  If the trial court cannot establish that 
all of these safeguards are met, then the court may not substitute the 
alternate, and the matter may proceed pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 23(b); otherwise, a 
mistrial may be declared.

 

[¶11]   In this case, the record clearly 
shows that adequate procedural safeguards were not taken.  The district court properly instructed 
the alternate before discharging him and, upon recall, inquired whether he had 
complied with those instructions.  
The district court then sent the alternate into the jury room.  The reconstituted jury was not 
instructed to begin deliberations anew.  
Nor was there an inquiry as to whether or not the remaining regular 
jurors could set aside their previous deliberations and any opinions formed 
during those deliberations.  This 
failure raises the potential for prejudice noted by the Colorado Supreme 
Court.  The potential for prejudice 
in this situation is evidenced by the fact that the original jury deliberated 
for the previous afternoon without reaching a verdict but managed to reach a 
verdict with the participation of the alternate juror in less than an hour.  Accordingly, we must reverse Alcalde's 
conviction and remand for a possible new trial.

 

            
II.         
Constitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201

 

[¶12]   In his second issue, Alcalde 
challenged the constitutionality of the kidnapping statute, 
§§ 6-2-201(a)(iii), (b)(i) and (c), claiming that it is unconstitutionally 
vague on its face and as applied to him.  
Although we have reversed Alcalde's conviction on his other claim, we 
will address this issue because of the possibility of a new trial upon 
remand.

 

[¶13]   We apply the following analysis to 
claims of facial vagueness:

A 
statute may be challenged for vagueness "on its face" or as applied to 
particular conduct.  When a statute 
is challenged for vagueness on its face, the court examines the statute not only 
in light of the complainant's conduct, but also as it might be applied in other 
situations.  See Schwartzmiller 
v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1984).  Facial review is not appropriate in all 
cases.

"[F]acial 
vagueness review is not common because ordinary canons of judicial restraint do 
not permit a party whose particular conduct is adequately described by a 
criminal statute to attack [the statute] because the language would not give 
similar fair warning with respect to other conduct which might be within its 
broad and literal ambit.' "  
(Emphasis omitted).  
Id. at 1346 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 2562, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974)).

This 
principle is sometimes described in terms of standing. Parker v. Levy, 
supra 94 S. Ct.  at 2561; State v. Hegge, 89 Wash. 2d 584, 574 P.2d 386, 389 (1978).

            
The standing requirement is relaxed when a statute reaches "a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct."  Village of Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 
L.Ed2d 362 (1982); Kolender v. Lawson, [461 U.S. 352, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983)].  The 
requirement is also relaxed when a statute is shown to be vague " not in 
the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but 
comprehensive normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of 
conduct is specified at all.' "  
Parker v. Levy, supra 94 S. Ct.  at 2561 (quoting Coates 
v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 1688, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 
(1971)).  See also Schwartzmiller 
v. Gardner, supra 752 F.2d 1341.

 

Griego 
v. State, 
761 P.2d 973, 975 (Wyo. 1988).  "A 
facial challenge' [to a statute] is available in only two situations: (1) when 
the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, 
and (2) when the statute is shown to specify no standard of conduct at 
all."  Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Wyo. 1993).  In 
regard to "as applied" challenges, we have said:

 

In 
making this determination we must decide whether the statute provides sufficient 
notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that appellant's conduct was illegal 
and whether the facts of the case demonstrate arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.  When evaluating a 
statute to determine whether it provides sufficient notice, we must again consider not only the statutory 
language but also any prior court decisions which have placed a limiting 
construction on the statute or have applied it to specific conduct.  Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 
97 S. Ct. 2085, 52 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1977); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 96 S. Ct. 243, 46 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1975); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 94 S. Ct. 190, 38 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1973); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S. Ct. 665, 92 L. Ed. 840 (1948).

 

Griego, 
761 P.2d  at 976.

 

[¶14]   The language that Alcalde 
challenges appears in subsection (a) of the kidnapping statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-201:

 

(a)  A 
person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place 
of residence or business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the 
removal, or if he unlawfully confines another person,  
[.]

 

Specifically, 
Alcalde claims that the words "vicinity" and "confines" are vague and 
ambiguous.  He contends that the 
statute does not put a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that "merely 
forcefully moving someone only 20 feet and for only under 30 seconds could 
result in a felony kidnapping conviction."  
Thus, he claims the statute does not specify a standard of conduct.  To support his contention, Alcalde cites 
the fact that the jury in his case requested a definition of "vicinity" and 
"confine" from the court three different times.  Accordingly, he concludes that the jury 
must have found the terms ambiguous and vague.

 

[¶15]   There is a strong presumption that 
a statute is constitutional and any doubt is resolved in favor of 
constitutionality.  Reiter v. 
State, 2001 WY 116, ¶7, 36 P.3d 586, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001).  We begin with the words of the statute 
that Alcalde claims are ambiguous or vague.  The ordinary meanings of the words 
are:

 

Vicinity 
 1. the quality or state of being near: proximity 2: a 
surrounding area or district: neighborhood

 

Confine 
 
1. a: to hold within a location b: imprison 2: to keep 
within limits

 

Merriam-Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary 1316 and 242 (10th ed. 1998).  In plain terms, the statute prohibits a 
person from unlawfully removing another from his place of residence or business 
or from the "surrounding area or district" where he was at the time of the 
removal, or if he unlawfully "holds within a location or imprisons" another 
person.  Alcalde claims that the 
statute establishes no standard of conduct at all.  That claim fails when considered against 
the plain meaning of the words used in the statute.  As we have already noted, a statute 
employs a standard, for purposes of vagueness, if " by [its] terms or 
as authoritatively construed [applies] without question to certain 
activities, but whose application to other behavior is uncertain.' "  Griego, 761 P.2d  at 976 (quoting 
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 577-78, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 1249, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1974) (emphasis in original)).  
The statute prohibits the unlawful removal of a person from the area in 
which the person is occupied and the unlawful holding of a person within a 
location.  The statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague. "[T]o succeed on a facial vagueness challenge to a 
legislative measure that does not threaten constitutionally protected conduct 
. . . a party must do more than identify some instances in which the 
application of the statute may be uncertain or ambiguous; he must demonstrate 
that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.' 
. . ."  People v. Moore, 75 Cal. App. 4th 37, 44-45, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 914, 
918 (Cal.App. 1999) (quoting Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1201, 246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 753 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1988) (emphasis in 
original)).  The statute prohibits 
specified conduct and is not unconstitutionally vague on its 
face.

 

[¶16]   We also disagree with Alcalde's 
assertion that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his 
conduct.  As noted above, neither 
the term "vicinity" nor "confine" is vague in its ordinary usage.  In this case, Alcalde approached the 
victim after following her home and parking his car so as to block her 
exit.  He used her readiness to help 
him as an opening to physically assault her.  After the victim had managed to honk her 
horn, Alcalde forcefully removed her from her vehicle and dragged her 15 to 20 
feet to a privacy fence.  Once he 
had successfully moved the victim to an area that could not be seen from the 
apartment complex, Alcalde pinned the victim to the ground and choked 
her.

 

[¶17]   Another court was confronted with a 
case in which the victim was confined for approximately five minutes and removed 
for a distance of only 100 to 150 feet.  
State v. Morris, 160 N.W.2d 715, 717 (Minn. 1968).  The defendant in that case argued that 
his actions were merely behavior incidental to an indecent assault and were not 
intended by the state's legislature to constitute kidnapping.  Quoting a California Supreme Court case 
where the victim was forcibly moved only 22 feet, the Minnesota court eloquently 
stated, "It is the fact, not the distance, of forcible removal which constitutes 
kidnapping in this state."  
Id. (quoting People v. Chessman, 238 P.2d 1001, 1017 (Cal. 
1951)).  The statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Alcalde because any person of ordinary 
intelligence would be on notice that his acts were illegal under the 
statute.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶18]   The substitution of the alternate 
juror after deliberations had begun without instructing the reconstituted jury 
to recommence deliberations from the beginning constituted prejudicial 
error.  Accordingly, we reverse 
Alcalde's conviction and remand for a new trial.

  

LEHMAN, 
Justice, specially concurring, with whom KITE, Justice, 
joins.

 

[¶19]   I agree with the majority's 
reasoning, application of established case law, and relevant rule interpretation 
in reaching its ultimate determination under the facts and circumstances that 
exist in this matter.  Nevertheless, 
while I am not bothered by the majority's holding which provides certainty and 
guidance in the future for the trial courts and litigants, I believe that this 
case points out the need for modification to W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) regarding the use 
of alternate jurors.

 

[¶20]   Frankly, the present condition of 
our established alternate juror rule defeats the very basic reason for selecting 
alternate jurors, namely, to prevent having to re-try an entire case should one 
of the regular jurors become unable to complete their assigned duties and thus 
promote judicial economy.  
Accordingly, I would respectfully suggest that W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) be 
modified to allow alternate jurors to take the place of original jurors 
even after deliberations have commenced under those safeguards set 
forth in People v. Burnette, 775 P.2d 583 (Colo. 1989) adopted by the 
majority.

 

[¶21]   Modification to W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) 
would not only assure that a defendant receives a fair and impartial review by a 
jury of his peers of those charges alleged against him in the furtherance of 
judicial economy, but would also promote enhanced trust and confidence by the 
public in our legal system.  
   

 

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1                     
§ 6-2-201.  Kidnapping; 
penalties; effect of release of victim.

     (a)  A person is guilty of 
kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or 
business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the removal, or if he 
unlawfully confines another person, with the intent 
to:

. . 
. .

            
(iii)  Inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or 
another.

     (b)  A removal or confinement is 
unlawful if it is accomplished:

(i)  By force, threat or deception; . . . 
.

     (c)  If the defendant voluntarily 
releases the victim substantially unharmed and in a safe place prior to trial, 
kidnapping is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) 
years.

  2In 1999 the federal rule 24(c) was 
amended to eliminate references to pre-submission substitution and to the 
discharge of alternate jurors when deliberations have commenced.  The federal rule now 
provides:

 

(3)  Retention 
of Alternate Jurors.  When the 
jury retires to consider the verdict, the court in its discretion may retain the 
alternate jurors during deliberations.  
If the court decides to retain the alternate jurors, it shall ensure that 
they do not discuss the case with any other person unless and until they replace 
a regular juror during deliberations.  
If an alternate replaces a juror after deliberations have begun, the 
court shall instruct the jury to begin its deliberations 
anew.

 

Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 24(c)(3) (2002 Second Rev. Ed.).