Case Title: In re Moulton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-328


 In re Allen Moulton                          Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
                                              Rutland Superior Court

                                              March Term, 1992



 Richard W. Norton, J.

 Charles Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for petitioner-appellee

 Marc D. Brierre, Rutland County Deputy State's Attorney, Rutland, for
   respondent-appellant



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      ALLEN, C.J..   The State appeals from a superior court order granting
 petitioner's motion for post-conviction relief.  We agree with its arguments
 that counsel had no duty to inform petitioner regarding parole eligibility
 and that the court's conclusion that petitioner relied on a material
 misunderstanding is not supported by its findings.  We therefore reverse and
 remand.
      Petitioner was arraigned on a charge of sexual assault, and retained
 private counsel.  A public defender was later appointed as co-counsel to
 assist in the defense.  Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere pur-
 suant to a plea agreement and received a three-to-six year sentence.  He
 later sought post-conviction relief, claiming that his attorneys had
 misinformed him regarding parole eligibility.  Specifically, he claimed that
 they had indicated he would be eligible for parole at the end of his minimum
 sentence and failed to advise him of an unwritten parole board policy to
 parole only those inmates who admit guilt and complete a Department of
 Corrections sexual offenders' program.
      At the post-conviction hearing, petitioner testified that he arrived
 late for the change of plea, that he expected a jury trial on that date,
 that he conferred with his attorneys for only ten or fifteen minutes before
 entering his plea, and that he had not participated in any prior serious
 discussions with his attorneys regarding a plea agreement.  He chose to
 accept the plea, he said, based on the recommended sentence of three-to-six
 years, rather than face a possible ten-to-fourteen year sentence if found
 guilty.  He further testified that his attorneys advised him that he would
 be eligible for parole in three years if he "behaved."  He was not advised,
 he claimed, of the parole board's policy to withhold parole from those who
 did not complete the sex offender program, acceptance into which required an
 admission of guilt.  Had he been aware of that policy, he claimed, he would
 have gone to trial rather than plead nolo contendere.
      The attorneys, on the other hand, testified that the conference
 preceding the change of plea lasted for over an hour, they had at least two
 prior conferences with petitioner during which he agreed to the change of
 plea, and they told petitioner that if he maintained his innocence
 throughout his incarceration, there was a reasonable chance it would have an
 adverse impact on parole eligibility.
      The superior court determined that petitioner's attorneys had an
 affirmative duty to advise petitioner how, and under what circumstances, his
 continued denial would affect his parole eligibility.  The court concluded
 that they had breached this duty, resulting in a material misunderstanding
 sufficient to render petitioner's plea involuntary.  The court further
 concluded petitioner had "clearly demonstrated that he entered his plea in
 reliance on the advice of his attorneys."  The court's order vacated
 petitioner's sentence and granted a new trial.
      On appeal, the State argues that (1) petitioner's attorneys complied
 with their duty to advise petitioner regarding parole eligibility or,
 alternatively, the duty imposed by the court was without legal foundation,
 and (2) the superior court's conclusion that petitioner reasonably relied on
 a material misunderstanding when entering his plea was not supported by its
 findings of fact.
                                     I.
      The trial court based its order setting aside the sentence and ordering
 a new trial partly on its conclusion that petitioner's attorneys had an
 affirmative duty "to advise petitioner of how and under what circumstances
 his parole eligibility would be affected by his continued denial of respon-
 sibility for the crime."  We agree with the State that defense counsel had
 no such duty.
      The validity of a guilty or nolo contendere plea depends on whether the
 trial court properly followed Rule 11 of the Vermont Rules of Criminal
 Procedure, which requires that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere "not be
 accepted unless the record shows that such plea was knowingly and volun-
 tarily made."  Reporter's Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 11.  "Because a defendant waives
 important constitutional rights when he pleads guilty, the court . . . must
 review with the defendant the circumstances surrounding the plea in order to
 satisfy itself that the plea is voluntary and made with an understanding of
 its consequences."  In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 594,