Case Title: State v. Gillard

Citation: 1999-Ohio-385

Docket Number: 19981157

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. GILLARD, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Gillard (1999), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Appellate procedure — Application for reopening appeal from judgment and 
conviction based on claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel — 
Application denied when performance of appellate counsel was not 
deficient. 
(No. 98-1157 — Submitted December 15, 1998 — Decided April 28, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. CA-6701. 
 
Appellant, John Grant Gillard, was convicted of aggravated murder and 
sentenced to death.  In 1987, the Court of Appeals for Stark County reversed his 
conviction and sentence.  State v. Gillard (Jan. 21, 1987), Stark App. No. CA-
6701, unreported, 1987 WL 5768.  The state sought and obtained this court’s leave 
to appeal.  Also by leave of court, Gillard cross-appealed on two assignments of 
error that the court of appeals had overruled.  We sustained the state’s six 
propositions of law, overruled Gillard’s two propositions on cross-appeal, reversed 
the court of appeals’ judgment, and remanded to that court for independent review 
of the death sentence.  State v. Gillard (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 226, 533 N.E.2d 272 
(Gillard I). 
 
On remand, the court of appeals affirmed the death sentence.  State v. 
Gillard (June 25, 1990), Stark App. No. CA-6701, unreported, 1990 WL 94632.  
Gillard appealed that judgment to this court.  In the process, he added a number of 
new claims, one of which involved a claimed conflict of interest on the part of his 
trial counsel.  We remanded to the Stark County Court of Common Pleas with 
instructions to determine whether or not a conflict existed, hold a new trial if it 
found a conflict, and return the cause to this court if not.  State v. Gillard (1992), 
64 Ohio St.3d 304, 595 N.E.2d 878 (Gillard II). 
 
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The trial court found that no conflict existed and returned the cause to this 
court.  We affirmed the trial court’s finding.  State v. Gillard (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 
548, 550-555, 679 N.E.2d 276, 280-283 (Gillard III).  We also conducted our 
independent review, R.C. 2929.05(A), and affirmed Gillard’s death sentence.  Id., 
78 Ohio St.3d at 555-558, 679 N.E.2d at 283-285.  In that proceeding, Gillard 
again tried to raise new issues, which we declined to consider because they were 
beyond the scope of our remand and also because they were res judicata, Gillard 
having failed to raise them in his 1988 cross-appeal to this court.  78 Ohio St.3d at 
550, 679 N.E.2d at 279-280. 
 
On July 7, 1997, Gillard filed in the court of appeals an application to reopen 
his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B).  He alleged that his appellate counsel had 
rendered ineffective assistance before the court of appeals by failing to raise 
certain issues during his 1987 appeal to that court. When the state failed to 
respond, the court of appeals granted the application, thereby reinstating Gillard’s 
direct appeal.  On the reinstated appeal, the court of appeals reaffirmed the 
judgment of the common pleas court.  State v. Gillard (Apr. 27, 1998), Stark App. 
No. CA-6701, unreported.  From the court of appeals’ judgment, Gillard appeals as 
of right. 
__________________ 
 
Robert D. Horowitz, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald Mark 
Caldwell, Chief, Appellate Division, for appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, Jennifer P. Hite and Laurence E. 
Komp, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. Gillard is not entitled to relief under App.R. 26(B).  A 
prerequisite for such relief is a finding that “the performance of appellate counsel 
 
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was deficient and the applicant was prejudiced by that deficiency.”  App.R. 
26(B)(9). 
 
Gillard was not denied the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal 
as of right — i.e., his direct appeal to the court of appeals in 1987.1  His counsel 
won the appeal for him.  We cannot see how the assistance of counsel could have 
been more effective than that. 
 
Moreover, assuming that Gillard had a viable ineffective-assistance claim 
against his appellate counsel, he should have raised any such claim in his 1988 
cross-appeal to this court.  See Gillard III, 78 Ohio St.3d at 549, 679 N.E.2d at 
279.  In that proceeding, Gillard was represented by different counsel.  Hence, 
there was no obstacle to his presenting to us any ineffective-assistance claim he 
may have had.2  Cf. State v. Lentz (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 527, 529-530, 639 N.E.2d 
784, 785-786 (counsel cannot be expected to argue his own ineffectiveness). 
 
The judgment of the court of appeals is therefore affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. 
As we held in Gillard III, 78 Ohio St.3d at 550, 679 N.E.2d at 279-280, 
Gillard’s counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to raise new issues 
in the court of appeals’ 1990 proceedings on remand from Gillard I, as such issues 
were beyond the scope of the remand. 
2. 
Jack A. Blakeslee represented Gillard before the court of appeals in 1987.  
After the state obtained leave to appeal, we granted Blakeslee’s motion to 
withdraw.  We then appointed John N. Mackey and Kathleen O. Tatarsky to 
represent Gillard in this court.  Five months after Blakeslee withdrew, Mackey and 
Tatarsky filed Gillard’s delayed cross-appeal. Gillard’s merit brief on cross-appeal 
 
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was signed by Mackey and Tatarsky and filed nearly eight months after Blakeslee 
withdrew.