Case Title: State v. Steven J. Carty

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-28-00

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). COLEMAN, J., writing for a majority of the Court. This consensual search and seizure case presents the novel question whether a request to search a motor vehicle, following a valid stop by police, requires reasonable and articulable suspicion that a search would reveal evidence of criminal wrongdoing. Carty was a passenger in a motor vehicle that was operated by his brother, Leroy Coley, on March 27, 1997. The vehicle was stopped by State Trooper Walter Layton on the New Jersey Turnpike for traveling 74 to 75 miles per hour when the posted speed limit was 55 miles per hour. After Coley signed a form consenting to a search of the vehicle, the trooper conducted a pat down search of Coley and Carty. The frisk of Carty uncovered cocaine. Carty was arrested immediately and later indicted on charges of second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and third-degree possession. Prior to trial, Carty moved to suppress the use of the cocaine in the impending trial. The testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that Coley was unable to produce his driver's license or vehicle registration. Coley and Carty advised the trooper that the vehicle had been rented. There was conflicting evidence whether the rental papers were in the vehicle, but the trial court found they were not. A computer search disclosed that Coley had a valid driver's license and that the vehicle was not stolen. The evidence, however, is also conflicting about when the trooper first became aware of those facts, and the trial court did not specifically determine when the trooper received that information from the dispatcher. The trial court found that because there was no proof of ownership or the rental status of the vehicle, the trooper had the right to search the car to look for those credentials and to see if there was any evidence the car was stolen. After Coley signed the consent form, the trooper asked him if he could pat him down for the trooper's safety. Coley agreed, and the pat-down revealed no incriminating evidence. The trooper then went back to the vehicle and asked Carty to step out so he could search the vehicle. Carty was also asked whether the trooper could pat him down for safety reasons, and Carty agreed. As noted previously, the frisk of Carty uncovered cocaine. The trial court found that the search was conducted pursuant to the driver's voluntary and knowing consent. It also found that the pat-down reasonably was justified as the least intrusive method of securing the trooper's safety while conducting the consent search of the vehicle. The trial court, therefore, denied Carty's suppression motion. Thereafter, a jury found Carty guilty as charged in the indictment, and he was sentenced to a custodial term of six years. Carty appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the pat-down was illegal. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction. State v. Carty, 332 N.J. Super. 200 (App. Div. 2000). The Appellate Division observed that the trooper should have waited, before doing anything further, for confirmation from headquarters that he was dealing with a licensed driver who did not have his credentials with him. It noted that had the trooper done so, he could have issued the appropriate summons and let Coley and Carty go on their way and be done with the matter. This Court granted the State's petition for certification. HELD: Consent searches during a lawful stop of a motor vehicle are not valid unless there is reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that the motorist or passenger has engaged in, or is about to engage in, criminal activity. 2. When a motorist is pulled over, the officer's decision to ask for consent to search is a purely discretionary one. A standardless request to search a lawfully stopped automobile invites intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than an inarticulate hunch. In the context of motor vehicle stops, where an individual is at the side of the road and confronted by a uniformed officer seeking to search the vehicle, most would feel compelled to consent. Recent reports indicate that ninety-five percent of detained motorists granted a law enforcement officer's request for consent to search. Yet, the vast majority of those searches yield no evidence of wrongdoing. What can be synthesized from a review of scholarly articles, cases from around the country, and the empirical data referred to in this opinion, is that despite use of the voluntary and knowing standard adopted in Johnson, consent searches following valid motor vehicle stops are either not voluntary because people feel compelled to consent for various reasons, or are not reasonable because of the detention associated with obtaining and executing the consent search. (Pp. 11-20) 3. Given the widespread abuse of our existing law that allows law enforcement officers to obtain consent searches of every motor vehicle stopped for even the most minor traffic violation, the Court must decide what objective standard should be imposed to restore some semblance of reasonableness to the type of consent searches involved in the present case. The Court is expanding the Johnson two-part constitutional standard and holding that unless there is a reasonable and articulable basis beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention after completion of the valid traffic stop, any further detention to effectuate a consent search is unconstitutional. Applying that constitutional requirement to this case, Trooper Layton lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion that a search would reveal any evidence of criminal wrongdoing. There was nothing more than Coley's and Carty's nervousness to raise the trooper's suspicions. The trooper's lack of information regarding the status of the driver's license and registration of the car was, at most, due to the trooper's own failure to be informed because the information was easily at his disposal. (Pp. 20-28) 4. Because the Court is affirming the judgment of the Appellate Division, this decision should be applied retroactively to all stops made after the date of that court's decision - June 23, 2000. To avoid confusion, the Court emphasizes that this decision does not affect the principles enunciated in various state and federal cases that allow roadblocks, checkpoints and the like based on a concern for the public safety. The special governmental concerns regarding public safety or national security merit full public cooperation with a constitutionally permissible roadblock or checkpoint. (Pp. 28-34) The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE STEIN has filed a separate, concurring opinion, expressing his view that the Court's decision should be based on a judicially imposed rule of law rather than mandated by the State Constitution. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion. JUSTICE STEIN has filed a separate concurring opinion. JUSTICES VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 28 September Term 2000 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN J. CARTY, Defendant-Respondent. Argued October 9, 2001 -- Decided March 4, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 332 N.J. Super. 200 (2000). Linda A. Shashoua, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Lee A. Solomon, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney). Edward J. Crisonino argued the cause for respondent. Deborah C. Bartolomey, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for amicus curiae Office of the Public Defender (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney). John P. McDonald argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (McDonald, Rogers & Rizzolo, attorneys). Kevin McNulty argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione, attorneys; Lawrence S. Lustberg, of counsel). The opinion of the Court was delivered by COLEMAN, J. This consensual search and seizure case presents the novel question whether a request to search a motor vehicle, following a valid stop by the police, requires reasonable and articulable suspicion that a search would reveal evidence of criminal wrongdoing. The Appellate Division held that a request for consent absent reasonable and articulable suspicion violated the New Jersey Constitution and reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. We hold that, in order for a consent to search a motor vehicle and its occupants to be valid, law enforcement personnel must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing prior to seeking consent to search a lawfully stopped motor vehicle. The reasonable and articulable suspicion standard is derived from the New Jersey Constitution and serves the prophylactic purpose of preventing the police from turning routine traffic stops into a fishing expedition for criminal activity unrelated to the lawful stop. Because that standard was not satisfied in this case, the evidence seized must be suppressed. [State v. Carty, 332 N.J. Super. 200, 205 (App. Div. 2000).] We granted the State's petition for certification, 165 N.J. 605 (2000), and now affirm. I have knowingly and voluntarily given my consent to the search described above. I have been advised by [the investigating officer] and fully understand that I have the right to refuse giving my consent to search. I have been further advised that I may withdraw my consent at any time during the search. The form is filled out by the officer to include, among other things, the officer's name and a description of the vehicle to be searched. It then is presented to the consentee for his or her signature. Because Johnson involved the search of a residence, this is the first time that this Court has addressed what the standard should be for an officer seeking consent to search incident to a lawful stop of a motor vehicle for violation of traffic laws. A lawful stop of an automobile must be based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense, including a minor traffic offense, has been or is being committed. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673 (1979); State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). Once a lawful stop is made, the subsequent reasonable detention of the occupants of the motor vehicle constitutes a seizure. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95 (1996); State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 475 (1998). Such reasonable seizures, however, are permissible. Although stopping a car and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the governmental interest in investigating an officer's reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, may outweigh the Fourth Amendment interest of the driver and passengers in remaining secure from the intrusion. [United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S. Ct. 675, 679, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985)(emphasis added)(citing Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 653-55, 99 S. Ct. at 1395-97, 59 L. Ed 2d at ___).] The fact that the motorist already has been detained at the point when an officer asks for consent to search is not dispositive of whether a suspicionless search should be allowed to continue. Because the motorist cannot leave the area before the search is completed, unless it is terminated earlier, the detention associated with roadside searches is unlike a mere field interrogation where an officer may question an individual without grounds for suspicion. State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 483 (2001) (quoting State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 447, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876, 94 S. Ct. 83, 38 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1973)). Roadside consent searches are instead more akin to an investigatory so that does involve a detention. Such a stop traditionally has required reasonable and articulable suspicion. Id. at 487. [Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1398, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979) (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95, 95 S. Ct. 2585, 2587, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1975).] Moreover, the special governmental concerns regarding public safety or national security merit full public cooperation with a constitutionally permissible roadblock or checkpoint. Under the search and seizure provision of the New Jersey Constitution, Article I, paragraph 7, roadblocks established on a purely discretionary basis are invalid. State v. Kirk, 202 N.J. Super. 28, 38-44 (App. Div. 1985). In order to pass muster under our state constitution, a roadblock or checkpoint must be established for a specific need and to achieve a particular purpose at a specific place. Id. at 37. If the road block was established by a command or supervisory authority and was carefully targeted to a designated area at a specified time and place based on data justifying the site selection for reasons of public safety and reasonably efficacious or productive law enforcement goals, the road block will likely pass constitutional muster. Other factors which enhanced judicial approval were (1) adequate warnings to avoid frightening the traveling public, (2) advance general publicity designed to deter drunken drivers from getting in cars in the first place, and (3) officially specified neutral and courteous procedures for the intercepting officers to follow when stopping drivers. [Id. at 40-41.] Accord State v. Flowers, 328 N.J. Super. 205, 207, 218 (App. Div. 2000) (upholding roadblock designed to detect stolen cars in area with high rate of auto theft by stopping every vehicle); State v. Kadelak, 280 N.J. Super. 349, 377 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 98 (1995) (upholding roadblock designed to detect vehicle safety violations by stopping every fifth vehicle and vehicles with obvious safety violations); State v. Barcia, 235 N.J. Super. 311, 316, 318-19 (App. Div. 1989) (invalidating roadblock designed to intercept inter-state drug trafficking as arbitrary and excessive where roadblock caused over one million vehicles to come to complete stop and wait in line for up to four hours). It follows that roadblock or checkpoint stops cannot be designed simply to check for criminal violations, Kirk, supra, 202 N.J. Super. at 55, and that any car detained for further investigation must be detained on the basis of a reasonable and particularized suspicion that the motorist or vehicle is associated with criminal wrongdoing. State v. Reynolds, 319 N.J. Super. 426, 434 (App. Div. 1998) (finding officer at roadblock had both articulable suspicion of intoxication and probable cause that justified sending defendant to secondary area for further sobriety analysis). In general, roadblocks may be justified based on reasons of public safety and reasonably efficacious or productive law enforcement goals. State v. Mazurek, 237 N.J. Super. 231, 235 (App. Div. 1989), certif. denied, 121 N.J. 623 (1990) (internal quotations omitted). The balance to be struck is whether the checkpoint advance[s] the public interest to a much greater degree than could be achieved through traditional less intrusive police procedures. Id. at 239. Likewise, federal courts, in analyzing checkpoints, have adopted a balancing test that involves the gravity of the safety interest, the effectiveness of the checkpoint, and the intrusion on the individual's privacy. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448-49, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2484, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990). Although the United States Supreme Court has approved sobriety checkpoints because of the magnitude of the drunken driving problem [and] the States' interest in eradicating it, id. at 451, 110 S. Ct. at 2485, the Court also has stated: We address only the initial stop of each motorist passing through a checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and observation by checkpoint officers. Detention of particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard. [Id. at 450-51, 110 S. Ct. at 2485.] Accord Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 428 U.S. at 567, 96 S. Ct. at 3087 (approving highway checkpoints for detecting illegal aliens but stating that '[A]ny further detention . . . must be based on consent or probable cause.' United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, [ 422 U.S. 873, 882, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2580, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975)]. ). Where there is no individualized suspicion, as in the case of airport security, federal courts apply the balancing test. See, e.g., United States v. Herzbrun, 723 F.2d 773, 775 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding airport searches [d]ue to the intense danger of air piracy ); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (upholding airport searches of carry-on baggage with magnetometers to prevent airplane hijacking and/or bombing where device searched all carry-on baggage). The need to protect public safety today is perhaps even more readily apparent than it was when those cases were decided. Therefore, the holding in the present case is limited in that it pertains to consent searches pursuant to a stop for a traffic infraction. In times of national crisis the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts have carved out exceptions to the normal search and seizure protections afforded to Americans. We do not disturb that jurisprudence with our decision today, which rests exclusively on independent state grounds. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN J. CARTY, Defendant-Respondent. STEIN, J., concurring The Court today holds that a consent to search a motor vehicle and its occupants is invalid unless the police officer, following a valid stop of the vehicle, possesses a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a search would reveal evidence of a crime. The Court's holding applies only to consent searches of vehicles stopped for traffic-type violations, and is based on evidence in the record that the use by police officers of consent searches in those circumstances has been abused. The Court's holding is consistent with the current State Police Standard Operating Procedures and the December 29, 1999 Consent Decree entered into by the State Police with the United States Department of Justice. The Court's decision is one of great significance to all those who operate motor vehicles on our State's roadways. With but one reservation, I enthusiastically join the Court's disposition. I My reservation about the Court's decision is based on its holding that our State Constitution is the source of the requirement that a police officer who requests a motorist to consent to a search of his vehicle after a lawful traffic stop must have in advance a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the search will reveal evidence of criminal activity. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 22). I would impose precisely the same condition as does the Court, but would not rely on the State Constitution as its source. Rather, based on the virtually uncontradicted evidence that some police officers in New Jersey frequently have abused the power to request consents to search motor vehicles after routine traffic stops _ and that motorists routinely accede to those requests _ I would hold that the requirement of reasonable and articulable suspicion that a search will reveal evidence of a crime is simply a prophylactic rule of law adopted by this Court for the purpose of preventing abuses of the power of law enforcement officers to request motorists to consent to searches of their motor vehicles. Two reasons counsel against constitutionalizing the Court's holding. The first is that the court's analysis encourages fragmentation of the protections afforded by the State Constitution. As noted, the Court's holding establishes a constitutional standard that applies only to requests for consents to search motor vehicles after a traffic stop, ante at ___ (slip op. at 2), but does not apply to the wide variety of other settings in which consent searches may be sought by police officers. Thus the Court's newly established constitutional principle has no application to consent searches in airports, bus terminals, train stations, college dormitories, private homes, or business premises. Our State constitution has been described as the State's organic law and as a document that embodies the will of the people, as the final law[.] Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 12-13 (1957). Its fundamental role is to function as the core of the legal principles that guide the operation of State government. In Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 310 (1977), the Court explained: The cornerstone of our state government is our state Constitution. All state governmental action whether it be executive, legislative or judicial must conform to this organic law. Even though governmental action is generally clothed with a presumption of legality, the judiciary, which is the final arbiter of what the Constitution means, must strike down governmental action which offends a constitutional provision. Because the Constitution serves as the State's organic law, we ordinarily do not invoke its protections lightly, to apply only to some but not all aspects of the challenged activity. See State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 158 (1987) (rejecting good- faith exception to exclusionary rule adopted by United States Supreme Court and holding inadmissible under New Jersey Constitution evidence seized pursuant to warrant issued without probable cause where well-trained officer relied in good faith on warrant in gathering evidence); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 346- 48 (1982) (holding invalid under New Jersey Constitution warrantless search and seizure of toll billing records); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 226 (1981) (holding under New Jersey Constitution that defendants, driver, and passengers in automobile owned by another had automatic standing to challenge admissibility of weapons found by police in warrantless search of vehicle, and holding that automatic standing rule under State Constitution applies to any persons charged with offense in which possession of seized evidence at time of contested search is essential element of guilt); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353- 54 (1975) (holding that under Art. 1, par. 7 of New Jersey Constitution the validity of all consents to search must be measured in terms of waiver[,] requiring the State to bear burden of showing that the consent was voluntary, an essential element of which is knowledge of the right to refuse ). Secondly, from a law enforcement perspective, the Court's unnecessary constitutionalization of its holding significantly limits the State's use in criminal prosecutions of voluntary confessions, as well as other evidence of criminal conduct, that may directly result from a consent search conducted without the requisite level of reasonable and articulable suspicion. The Attorney General, undoubtedly reflecting similar concerns, strongly opposes constitutional or judicial limits on automobile consent searches and, citing to the Monitor's Fifth Report by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, asserts that enhanced training of police officers already has been effective in limiting abuses in the conduct of automobile consent searches. A significant difference exists, however, between the more substantial law enforcement implications of a constitutional holding compared to the less restrictive effect of a judicially imposed limitation on automobile consent searches. NO. A-28 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN J. CARTY, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED March 4, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz