Case Title: McClellan v. French

Citation: 439 S.W.2d 813

Docket Number: 5-4776

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1969-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
439 S.W.2d 813 (1969) Don H. McCLELLAN, Appellant, v. James H. FRENCH, Appellee. No. 5-4776. Supreme Court of Arkansas. April 21, 1969. *814 Howell, Price & Worsham, Little Rock, for appellant. Smith, Williams, Friday & Bowen, by W. A. Eldredge, Jr., Little Rock, for appellee. BYRD, Justice. Appellant Don H. McClellan appeals from a jury verdict finding that appellee Dr. James H. French was not guilty of malpractice in his treatment of McClellan's perirectal wound. For reversal of the judgment, McClellan relies upon the following points: The record shows that McClellan suffered his perirectal wound at Lake Ouachita while skiing. He was taken by friends to a hospital in Hot Springs where he was referred to Dr. French. Dr. French observed the wound, cleansed it but did not suture it at that time. McClellan waited in Dr. French's waiting room for his friends who had returned to Lake Ouachita to pick up a boat and trailer. While waiting, McClellan began bleeding, the blood flowing down his leg and off the chair onto the floor. He was returned to Dr. French's operating table where his wound was again examined. This time Dr. French sutured the wound and placed McClellan in a Hot Springs hospital for observation. McClellan was released from the hospital the next day. He states that he was released in the afternoon. Dr. French contends that he was released during the morning. Subsequent to McClellan's release from the Hot Springs hospital, he was seen by Dr. Laurens sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 and placed in a Little Rock hospital. The allegations in the complaint were as follows: POINT 1. One of the pivotal issues concerning the alleged malpractice of Dr. French was whether he should have packed the wound open to permit drainage as testified to by Dr. Laurens or whether it *815 should have been sutured as testified to by Dr. French. To support his position that that was the standard medical procedure, Dr. French called Dr. Joseph Buchman who testified as follows: MR. PRICE: THE COURT: * * * THE WITNESS: McClellan argues that Dr. Buchman should not have been permitted to testify as to whether it was "malpractice" since this was the ultimate question for the jury. He cites as authority Johnston v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 182 Ark. 964, 33 S.W.2d 375 (1930). During oral argument counsel cited other authorities such as Hoener v. Koch, 84 Ill. 408 (1877). In the Johnston case the issue was whether Sam C. Johnston had committed suicide. In holding that it was prejudicial error for a doctor to express an opinion that Johnston died as a result of suicide, we said: In the Hoener case, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that it was proper for an expert to give his opinion as to whether or not the treatment the plaintiff received was proper, but that it was error for him to give his opinion as to whether, from all the evidence in the case, the doctor was guilty of malpractice. However, in the case of Dorr, Gray & Johnston v. Headstream, 173 Ark. 1104, 295 S.W. 16 (1927), we said: We find nothing in the Johnston case contrary to our holding in the Headstream case. The difference between the two cases is this in determining whether one committed suicide there is involved an element of intent, usually a matter of inference from the testimony which one person is as qualified to draw as another. On the other hand, in a malpractice case the testimony ordinarily relates to a subject upon which the average juror would have no information or experience and upon which he would not be in a position to formulate an intelligent conclusion unless he does it upon the testimony of one qualified to speak on the subject. Since Dr. Buchman's answer to the question of whether Dr. French was guilty of malpractice shows that Dr. Buchman used and understood the word malpractice in its connotation of "standard medical procedure in the community"[1], we find no error in the use of the term malpractice. POINT 2. ASSUMED FACTS. One of the controversial issues in the trial of this case was the time when McClellan was discharged from the Hot Springs hospital i. e., whether in the morning or in the afternoon. In contending that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. French to propound hypothetical questions based on assumed facts which were not in evidence, appellant relies upon the following proceedings: Appellant contends that Dr. Buchman was erroneously permitted to assume that plaintiff was discharged in the morning and that the discharge of appellant from the hospital in the morning was not sustained by the record. We need not decide whether there is any evidence in the record to support the assumed fact that appellant was discharged from the hospital in the morning because as we read the record that assumed fact was changed to have the doctor assume that the man was examined by Dr. French in the morning. After the correction there was no further objection by appellant. In Wheeler, Adm'x v. Delco Ben. & Broadway Ice Co., 237 Ark. 55, 371 S.W.2d 130 (1963), we said: For the reasons indicated we find the judgment must be affirmed. JONES, J., dissents. JONES, Justice (dissenting). I do not agree with the majority in this case. In the days when strychnine poisoning was diagnosed as "locked bowels" and treated by administration of additional strychnine in some localities, (Sneed v. State, 159 Ark. 65, 255 S.W. 895), perhaps medical doctors in a malpractice case were properly held only to that degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and used by members of the profession in good standing engaged in the practice of medicine in that locality. In those days of patent medicines and home remedies; when bleeding was stopped by witchcraft or the application of soot and cobweb, perhaps a medical expert was the only one competent to say what was, and what was not, medical malpractice. It is my opinion in this day of nationwide Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Medicare and sterile hospitals, and in this day of medical specialization and long internships, and closed circuit television, the same degree of skill and learning should apply in all localities and negligence in medical malpractice cases should in nowise be measured by the medical practice in the particular community where the doctor practices. In this enlightened age, when the importance of sanitation is a matter of common knowledge and the results of contamination in a closed or open wound are well known, it should not require the conclusion of a medical expert for a jury to determine whether a particular procedure in probing, cleansing, disinfecting, suturing and treating a wound, constitutes malpractice. Dr. Buchman was permitted to testify that Dr. French was not guilty of malpractice in suturing this wound. (Emphasis supplied.) Under the majority opinion, a jury was not necessary in this case at all. Dr. Buchman was permitted to give the answer the jury was empaneled to find. If Dr. Buchman had found malpractice, a jury would have only been necessary in fixing damage, if any. The evidence is undisputed that the appellant sustained a deep and severe puncture wound by falling or sinking down onto a sharp underwater object. The evidence is undisputed that the wound was more than a finger length in depth and actually extended into the peritoneal cavity. The evidence is undisputed that upon a second examination of the wound by Dr. French, the wound was closed with sutures sufficient to stop bleeding, and although the appellant was hospitalized by Dr. French, the full depth of the wound was never probed or ascertained and a half inch piece of wood was left deep within the wound. If we can logically assume that Dr. French obtained a history of how and where the injury occurred, then common sense would dictate the probability that the offending instrument was a highly contaminated wooden object, and that a residue from that object would be left in the wound. It is my opinion that it was for the jury to say, under proper instructions, whether the suturing of this wound constituted malpractice under all of the evidence in this case. I would reverse and remand for a new trial. [1] The propriety of limiting medical standards to a particular community is not an issue in this case.