Case Title: RICHARD PAUL MEYERS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICHARD PAUL MEYERS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 163124 P.3d 710Case Number: 04-223Decided: 12/22/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
RICHARD PAUL 
MEYERS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCarbonCounty

The 
Honorable Kenneth Stebner, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ken Koski, State Public Defender; 
Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; 
Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General; 
Matthew D. Obrecht, Student Intern.          

 
 
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
VOIGT, BURKE, JJ., and ARNOLD, D.J.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]       Richard P. 
Meyers challenges his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter.  Mr. Meyers claims his rights under the 
double jeopardy provisions of both the United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions were violated.  Mr. 
Meyers also claims the district court considered improper evidence during 
sentencing.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]       Mr. Meyers 
submits the following issues for review:

 
 
Whether double jeopardy prohibited 
the district court from entering a judgment and sentence against [Mr. Meyers] 
for voluntary manslaughter.

 
 
Whether the district court abused 
its discretion when it allowed the victim to present to the court a written and 
oral victim impact statement.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]       On March 
22, 2002, Trooper Jason Green of the Wyoming Highway Patrol responded to a call 
for a motorist in need of assistance on Interstate 80 in CarbonCounty.  Trooper Green observed a vehicle on the 
side of the road with its four-way flashers activated.  No occupants were in the vehicle, but 
the passenger door was ajar.  
Alcohol containers were in plain view and contents from the car were on 
the ground next to the open door.  
As Trooper Green continued with his investigation, Mr. Meyers arrived at 
the scene.  Trooper Green initiated 
contact and grew concerned that Mr. Meyers was intoxicated.  He asked Mr. Meyers to accompany him to 
his patrol car.  Trooper Green 
advised of his intention to conduct a pat-down search.  Mr. Meyers informed Trooper Green that 
he had knives and a gun in his pocket.  
Trooper Green ordered Mr. Meyers to place his hands on the hood of the 
patrol car.  Mr. Meyers initially 
complied, but, as Trooper Green approached him, Mr. Meyers stated that he would 
not relinquish his gun.  He then 
pulled the gun from his pocket.  
Trooper Green responded by retreating to a safer position and drawing his 
weapon.  Mr. Meyers began shooting 
at Trooper Green.  Trooper Green 
returned fire.  The confrontation 
ended when Mr. Meyers fled the scene.  
He was apprehended in Ogden, Utah 
the following day.  Neither party 
was injured in the incident.

 
 
[¶4]       Mr. Meyers 
was charged with one count of felony interference with a peace officer1 
and one count of attempted first degree murder.2  He pled not guilty to both counts.  A trial was held.  Prior to deliberations, the jury was 
instructed that it could find Mr. Meyers guilty of the lesser included offense 
of attempted second degree murder.3  On March 7, 2003, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty on the charge of felony interference with a peace officer, but 
found Mr. Meyers not guilty of attempted first degree murder.  The jury deadlocked on the lesser 
included offense of attempted second degree murder.  The district court accepted the verdicts 
and declared a mistrial on the charge of attempted second degree 
murder.

 
 
[¶5]       A new trial 
date was set on the charge of attempted second degree murder.  Mr. Meyers filed a motion to dismiss 
claiming a retrial on the charge would violate both the due process and the 
double jeopardy provisions of the United States and Wyoming 
Constitutions.  The district court 
denied the motion.  The second trial 
commenced on November 3, 2003.  On 
the second day of deliberations the jury indicated it was deadlocked.  The district court again declared a 
mistrial and dismissed the jury.  

 
 
[¶6]       The State 
requested a new trial date on the same charge.  Trial was scheduled for April 6, 
2004.  Mr. Meyers again filed a 
motion to dismiss based upon double jeopardy and the court's inherent power to 
dismiss the charge in the interest of justice.  The district court, after hearing, 
denied the motion.

 
 
[¶7]       On March 
22, 2004, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Meyers entered a plea of nolo 
contendere to attempted voluntary manslaughter.4  The district court accepted the 
plea.  Mr. Meyers was sentenced to a 
single term of imprisonment of 18 to 20 years with credit for 788 days.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

            

[¶8]       In his 
first claim of error, Mr. Meyers alleges a violation of the double jeopardy 
provisions of the United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions.  The Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Wyoming Constitution guarantee 
that a person will not be placed twice in jeopardy for the same criminal 
offense.  The Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution guarantees that no "person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."  The Wyoming Constitution contains a 
similar provision in Article 1, Section 11 which states:

 
 
            
No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal 
case, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.  If a jury disagree, or if the judgment 
be arrested after a verdict, or if the judgment be reversed for error in law, 
the accused shall not be deemed to have been in 
jeopardy.

 
 
We have previously recognized that 
"[a]lthough the federal and [the] Wyoming double jeopardy clauses are dissimilar 
in language, they have the same meaning and are coextensive in 
application."  Longstreth v. State, 
890 P.2d 551, 553 (Wyo. 1995).  We review claims alleging violations of 
a constitutional right under our de novo standard of review.  Strickland v. State, 2004 WY 91, ¶ 40, 
94 P.3d 1034, 1051 (Wyo. 2004).  

 

[¶9]       The double 
jeopardy provisions of both Constitutions provide an accused three 
protections:  1) protection against 
a second prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal; 2) protection 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction; and 3) 
protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.  Pope v. State, 2002 WY 9, ¶ 14, 38 P.3d 1069, 1072 (Wyo. 2002).  Mr. Meyers 
has failed to establish a violation of any of these 
protections.

 
 
[¶10]     Mr. Meyers was 
convicted of felony interference with a peace officer.  He was never acquitted, or convicted, of 
attempted second degree murder.  Mr. 
Meyers concedes that the offenses of felony interference with a peace officer 
and attempted second degree murder encompass separate and distinct statutory 
elements and that the State could properly bring both charges against him.5  Mr. Meyers concedes that he did not 
receive multiple punishments for the same offense.  He acknowledges that his convictions 
were properly merged for the purposes of sentencing.  See Owen v. State, 902 P.2d 190, 195 
(Wyo. 1995); Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 
1354 (Wyo. 
1977).  He also acknowledges that a 
retrial following a hung jury does not violate principles of double 
jeopardy.  Richardson v. United 
States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S. Ct. 3081, 3085, 82 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1984); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505, 98 S. Ct. 824, 
830, 54 L. Ed. 2d 717 (1978); United 
States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 6 L. Ed. 165, 166 (1824).  As was noted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, "without exception, the courts have held that the 
trial judge may discharge a genuinely deadlocked jury and require the defendant 
to submit to a second trial. This rule accords recognition to society's interest 
in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who have 
violated its laws."  Arizona, 434 U.S.  at 509, 98 S. Ct.  at 
832.

 
 
[¶11]     In reality, Mr. Meyers 
does not assert a constitutional double jeopardy violation in his first claim of 
error.  Rather, he urges 
us

 
 
to adopt a rule of law, consistent with 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, which would bar prosecution of a defendant following 
a trial where the jury is deadlocked on one count, but has reached a decision on 
the other count, where the count which has been decided and the retrial on the 
deadlocked count would merely result in a conviction for merged sentences.  

Although unclear from his appellate 
brief, Mr. Meyers appears to rely upon a Tennessee decision, State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913 
(Tenn. 1978), 
to support his position.  In Witt, 
the trial court dismissed first degree murder charges against the defendant 
after three mistrials had been declared because of deadlocked juries.  The State appealed.  The Tennessee Supreme Court, after 
specifically recognizing that double jeopardy protection was not implicated, 
upheld the dismissal on the basis that:  

            

. . . trial judges have the inherent 
authority to terminate a prosecution in the exercise of a sound judicial 
discretion, where . . . repeated trials, free of prejudicial error, have 
resulted in genuinely deadlocked juries and where it appears that at future 
trials substantially the same evidence will be presented and that the 
probability of continued hung juries is great.

 
 

Id. at 917.  

 
 
[¶12]     In his motion to 
dismiss, Mr. Meyers cited Witt contending that the district court possessed 
inherent authority to terminate his prosecution.  The district court denied the motion 
stating in its decision letter:

 
 
It is unlikely that the evidence to 
be admitted at the third trial will differ significantly from the first two 
trials (at least insofar as the only remaining charge).  Two juries have deadlocked to date.  The Court cannot be certain of the 
reasons for the hung juries except that it appears the juries disagreed as to 
Defendant's intent.  The previous 
trials have been fair.  Defendant's 
remaining charge, [attempted] second-degree murder of a Wyoming State Trooper, 
is quite serious.  Defendant was, at 
one time, appointed a public defender but now has retained private counsel, 
resulting in increased costs to him of another trial.  However, the costs to society of 
dismissing the case, at this point outweigh the costs of retrial, even though 
the costs of retrial are significant.  
Finally, given the seriousness of the charges and the circumstances of 
the alleged crime, public perception in the justice system would be strengthened 
by allowing this case to proceed.  
At this point, the Court concludes that the interests of justice require 
the case to proceed to a third jury trial.

 
 
(Footnote 
omitted.)

 
 
[¶13]     On appeal, Mr. Meyers 
has not challenged the district court's denial of his motion.  He has not alleged the district court 
abused its discretion.  Instead, he 
attempts to prevail on appeal by mischaracterizing his "inherent authority" 
claim as a "double jeopardy" claim.  
The Tennessee court rejected this approach noting 
that multiple trials following a hung jury cannot be accurately labeled double 
jeopardy.  Witt, 572 S.W.2d  at 
917.  Additionally, the court 
noted:

 
 
The sound judicial discretion of a 
trial judge to terminate a criminal prosecution is a power that ought to be used 
with the greatest caution and only in the most urgent circumstances and for very 
plain and obvious causes, . . . with respect to the discretion to be exercised 
in finding manifest necessity for the declaration of a mistrial.  

  

Id.  We have not had previous occasion to 
address the "inherent authority" issue confronted by the Tennessee Supreme Court 
in Witt and need not determine that issue here.  In this case, the district court 
proceeded as if it had the inherent authority to dismiss the charge but declined 
to do so and provided a well-reasoned explanation for its decision.  We find no error in the district court's 
denial of the motion to dismiss.

  

[¶14]     Additionally, we note 
that Mr. Meyers waived all nonjurisdictional defenses when he entered his 
unconditional nolo contendere plea:

 
 
A criminal defendant, by pleading 
guilty, admits all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thus 
waives all nonjurisdictional defenses. A plea of nolo contendere has the same 
effect as a guilty plea. Therefore, when a criminal defendant pleads nolo 
contendere, he or she waives all nonjurisdictional defenses and objections. 

 
 
We have said that jurisdictional 
defenses and objections involve:

 
 
"[T]he very power of the state to 
bring the defendant into court to answer the charge against him." Jurisdictional 
defects include: unconstitutionality of the statute defining the crime pled to, 
failure of the indictment or information to state an offense, and double 
jeopardy. 

In other words, a criminal 
defendant may, after pleading guilty or nolo contendere, attack a defect only if 
it involves "attributes of jurisdiction." Nonjurisdictional defenses and 
objections are those "objections and defenses which would not prevent a 
trial." 

 
 
Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 
1361-62 (Wyo. 
1993) (internal citations omitted).  
Mr. Meyers' inherent authority claim is not properly a double jeopardy 
claim or a jurisdictional claim which survives the entry of his 
plea.

 
 
[¶15]     Next, Mr. Meyers 
challenges the sentencing procedure and sentence.  His claim of error relates to the victim 
impact statements offered by Trooper Green.  Trooper Green submitted a written victim 
impact statement which was included in the presentence report.  He was also permitted to make an oral 
statement at the sentencing hearing.  
Mr. Meyers contends that the district court erred in considering both 
statements and was unduly influenced by Trooper Green's input.  He claims prejudice is demonstrated by 
the fact that he received the maximum sentence for his crime.6 

 
 
[¶16]     We review sentencing 
decisions under our abuse of discretion standard:

 
 
"Sentencing decisions are normally 
within the discretion of the trial court.  
A sentence will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless 
the defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to 
him, and circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or 
conduct which offends the public sense of fair play.  An error warrants reversal only when it 
is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial rights.  The party who is appealing bears the 
burden to establish that an error was prejudicial."

 
 
Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Because Mr. Meyers failed to object 
during the sentencing hearing, our review is limited to a search for plain 
error:

 
 
"First, the record must be clear as 
to the incident which is alleged as error.  
Second, the party claiming the error amounted to plain error must 
demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated.  Finally, that party must prove a 
substantial right has been denied him and, as a result, he has been materially 
prejudiced."

 
 
Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 7, 49 P.3d 975, 981 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 
[¶17]     Mr. Meyers contends 
that a victim is entitled to submit a written impact statement or make an oral 
statement to the court, but is not entitled to offer more than one 
statement.  Mr. Meyers relies solely 
on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-102(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2001) to support his 
contention that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated.  His reliance is misplaced.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-102(a)(iii) 
states:

 
 
§ 7-21-102.  Notice to crime 
victims.

 
 
(a)  If a defendant is convicted of a crime 
involving an identifiable victim, the district attorney, upon and in accordance 
with the request of the victim, shall give to the victim notice of the 
following:

 
 
. . .  

            

(iii)  The victim's opportunity to make a 
written or oral impact statement for use in the preparation of the presentence 
investigation report concerning the defendant when a presentence investigation 
report is to be prepared[.]

 
 
[¶18]     Our rules concerning 
statutory interpretation are well established.  Words of a statute are to be given their 
plain and ordinary meaning.  
Keene v. State, 812 P.2d 147, 150 
(Wyo. 
1991).  If the language is clear and 
unambiguous, effect must be given to the plain meaning of the statute.  Abeyta v. State, 2002 WY 44, ¶ 9, 42 P.3d 1009, 1011 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 
[¶19]     The language of the 
statute cited by Mr. Meyers is clear and unambiguous.  It relates to notice which a district 
attorney must provide to a crime victim of his opportunity to make a victim 
impact statement for inclusion in the presentence report.  By its terms, the statute does not limit 
a victim's right to also make an oral statement to the court.  In fact, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-21-102(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2001) requires that the victim shall also be given 
notice of his "opportunity to make an impact statement at sentencing . . . 
"  Mr. Meyers has failed to 
establish a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law.

 
 
[¶20]     Although not raised by 
Mr. Meyers, we note that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-103 (LexisNexis 2003), as it 
existed at the time of Mr. Meyers' sentencing, appears to limit a crime victim 
to either the submission of a written statement for inclusion in the presentence 
report or an oral statement to the court.7  The statute, however, also specifies 
that "[a]ny failure to comply with the terms of this chapter shall not create a 
cause for appeal or reduction of sentence for the defendant, . . . ."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-21-103(c).

 
 
[¶21]     Assuming arguendo that 
the district court erred pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-103 in considering 
both a written and oral submission and that Mr. Meyers' appeal on such issue was 
not barred by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-103(c), in order to prevail on such issue, 
Mr. Meyers is also required to establish that he was prejudiced by such 
error.  He has failed to meet that 
burden.

 
 
[¶22]     In its oral 
pronouncement, the district court set forth its reasoning for the length of the 
sentence imposed.  In doing so, the 
district court focused primarily upon Mr. Meyers' extensive criminal record and 
the dangerous situation created by Mr. Meyers' conduct.  The court stated: 

 
 
Well, initially I want to make it 
clear that this Court's extremely aware of the facts of this case and the 
circumstances that surrounded this event . . . will guide me to impose what I 
feel is a proper sentence.  
Obviously, the State and the Defense disagree in interpreting those facts 
as to what they are, vis-a-vis, an appropriate sentence.

 
 
            
The Court has listened to both the Defendant and the trooper, but will 
utilize my knowledge of the - - my interpretation of the events as I saw and 
heard them during two trials.  The 
Court's extremely aware of the evidence in this case and will rely on its own 
interpretation of the facts and circumstances in imposing this 
sentence.

 
 
. . .

 
 
            
Well, the Court recognizes that the law requires this Court to consider 
probation and make a finding why it should not be granted.

 
 
            
The Court finds that probation should . . . not be granted, first of all, 
the prior criminal record that has been discussed and is in the presentence 
investigation, even - - 

 
 
. . . 

 
 
            
But the prior criminal record, even taking into account the corrections 
that the Defendant wished placed on it and the interpretation that [defense 
counsel] argued should be given to this record.  So the Court, in disregarding minor 
offenses, dismissals and the corrections that were made, I find that this record 
on its face demonstrates an extreme record and demonstrates dangerous behavior 
over a long period of time, which obviously culminated here in this most extreme 
event imaginable, although it did not cause death or injury to the officer or 
other motorists on the interstate in Carbon County, the record indicates 
obviously good cause for probation to not be granted.

 
 
            
Also, this attempted manslaughter, in the Court's opinion, represented 
one of the most serious and egregious events imaginable.

 
 
            
The Court has weighed, as the Defense has argued, the Defendant's version 
and the possible mitigation.  

 
 
. . . 

 
 
            
[T]he Court independently, in imposing this sentence, considered the 
extreme danger to Trooper Green that night, and it was inexcusable.  And the Court, by this sentence, will 
hopefully encourage a general deterrent to other people to not present that 
danger to other law enforcement [officers] who are engaged in just trying to 
perform their duties.  There is no 
excuse for them to be exposed, as this officer was.

 
 
Nothing contained in the district 
court's pronouncement supports Mr. Meyers' contention that the court was unduly 
influenced by Trooper Green's statements.  
The sentencing judge properly considered Mr. Meyers' criminal history 
and, because he presided over the two trials held in this case, was fully aware 
of the facts and circumstances surrounding Mr. Meyers' conviction.  We find no prejudicial error in the 
sentencing process or abuse of discretion in the sentence 
imposed.

 
 
[¶23]     
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Felony interference with a peace 
officer is defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(b) (LexisNexis 2001) 
as:

 
 
(b)  A person who intentionally and knowingly 
causes or attempts to cause bodily injury to a peace officer engaged in the 
lawful performance of his official duties is guilty of a felony punishable by 
imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) (LexisNexis 
2001) defines first degree murder as:

 
 
(a)  Whoever purposely and with premeditated 
malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, . . . resisting 
arrest, . . . , kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first 
degree.

 
 

3Murder in the second degree is 
defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 (LexisNexis 2001).  It states:

 
 
Whoever purposely and maliciously, but 
without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the second 
degree, . . . .

 
 
The attempt element of both first 
degree and second degree murder is defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2001):

 
 

(a)     
 A person is guilty of an attempt to 
commit a crime if:

 
 
(i)  With the intent to commit the crime, he 
does any act which is a substantial step towards commission of the crime.  A "substantial step" is conduct which is 
strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to complete the 
commission of the crime[.]

 

4Voluntary manslaughter is defined by 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001) which 
states:

 
 
(a)  A person is guilty of manslaughter if he 
unlawfully kills any human being without malice, expressed or implied, . . . 
:

 
 
 (i)  
Voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion; . . 
.

 
 
The attempt element of voluntary 
manslaughter is defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-1-301(a)(i).

 

5The Blockburger test is used to 
analyze claims that a person has been prosecuted twice for the same offense and 
is articulated as follows:  "The 
applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a 
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision 
requires proof of a fact which the other does not."  Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 
52 S. Ct. 180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932).  
We adopted the Blockburger test in State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1131 
(Wyo. 
1993).        

 
 

6Mr. Meyers was sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment of 18 to 20 years.  
The crime of manslaughter carries a maximum prison sentence of 20 
years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-105(b) (LexisNexis 2001).

 
 

7Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-103 (LexisNexis 
2003) states in pertinent part:

 
 
§ 7-21-103.  Submission of victim impact statement to 
sentencing court. 

 
 
(a)  Prior to imposition of sentence or any 
correction or reduction of sentence in a felony case, an identifiable victim of 
the crime may submit a victim impact statement to the 
court:

 
 
      (i)  By appearing, with or without counsel, 
to present an oral victim impact statement at the sentencing hearing or at any 
subsequent hearing for correction or reduction of sentence; 
or

 
 
                  
(ii)  By submitting a written 
victim impact statement to the department of corrections, which shall be 
appended to the presentence report of the defendant, or by submitting a written 
statement to the court in the case of any subsequent hearing for correction or 
reduction of sentence.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-103 was amended 
in 2005 and now states:

 
 
(a)  At any hearing to determine, correct or 
reduce a sentence, an identifiable victim of the crime may submit, orally, in 
writing or both, a victim impact statement to the 
court.