Case Title: State ex rel. Longacre v. Penton Publishing Co.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-276

Docket Number: 19961362

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Longacre, Appellant, v. Penton Publishing Company, Appellee. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Longacre v. Penton Publishing Co. (1997),  Ohio St.3d    .] 
Mandamus to compel company to execute workers’ compensation 
settlement agreement and deliver copy of agreement to relator -- 
Complaint dismissed, when. 
 
(No. 96-1362 -- Submitted November 12, 1996 -- Decided January 15, 
1997.) 
 
Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 70455. 
 
Appellee, Penton Publishing Company (“Penton”), employed appellant, 
Marie F. Longacre.  Longacre sought workers’ compensation benefits related to 
her employment with Penton.  Longacre and Penton were parties in an appeal in 
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas of an administrative determination 
relating to Longacre’s workers’ compensation claim.  In February 1996, the parties 
stipulated that the appeal had been “settled *** for $33,000 subject to Industrial 
Commission approval,” and the common pleas court dismissed the appeal.   
 
After Penton refused to execute a written final settlement agreement signed 
by Longacre, Longacre filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga 
County for a writ of mandamus to compel Penton to execute the agreement and 
 
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deliver a copy of the agreement to her.  The court of appeals granted Penton’s 
motion and dismissed the complaint.   
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
____________________ 
 
William L. Blake, for appellant. 
 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey and Wm. Michael Hanna, for appellee. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  Longacre asserts in her various propositions of law that the 
court of appeals erred in dismissing her complaint.  In order to dismiss a complaint 
for a writ under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint, after presuming the truth 
of all material factual allegations and making all reasonable inferences in relator’s 
favor, that the relator can prove no set of facts warranting extraordinary relief.  
State ex rel. Hunter v. Patterson (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 512, 513-514, 664 N.E.2d 
524, 526.   
 
The court of appeals determined that dismissal was warranted  pursuant to 
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) because Longacre failed to sufficiently allege a clear legal duty on 
the part of Penton to execute the claimed settlement agreement.  Longacre 
 
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contends that the duty arises from R.C. 4123.65, which provides as follows for the 
settlement of workers’ compensation claims: 
 
“(C)  No settlement *** agreed to by a self-insuring employer and his 
employee shall take effect until thirty days *** after the self-insuring employer 
and employee sign the final settlement agreement.  During the thirty-day period 
*** the employer or employee, for self-insuring settlements, may withdraw his 
consent to the settlement by an employer providing written notice to his employee 
and the administrator or by an employee providing written notice to his employer 
and the administrator ***.” 
 
As the court of appeals correctly concluded, nothing in R.C. 4123.65 
imposes a duty on Penton to execute the alleged settlement agreement.  In fact, 
even if R.C. 4123.65 could be construed to place such initial duty on Penton, R.C. 
4123.65(C) empowers Penton to withdraw its consent to the settlement within 
thirty days after signing the final settlement agreement.  
 
Further, the court of appeals also properly held that Longacre’s mandamus 
action to compel her employer to execute a settlement of her workers’ 
compensation claim involved the requested enforcement of alleged private rights 
against a private person.  “‘Mandamus will not lie to enforce a private right 
 
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against a private person.’”  State ex rel. Russell v. Duncan (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 
538, 597 N.E.2d 142, 143, quoting State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 
11 Ohio St.2d 141, 40 O.O.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631, paragraph eight of the 
syllabus.  Longacre cites no applicable authority to the contrary.  See, e.g., Milkie 
v. Academy of Medicine (1969), 18 Ohio App.2d 44, 47 O.O.2d 33, 246 N.E.2d 
598, a non-mandamus case cited by Longacre in her appellate brief to support the 
proposition that mandamus can be used to enforce private rights. 
 
Finally, it is evident that Longacre has or had several adequate alternative 
remedies:  a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from the stipulated dismissal of the 
common pleas court case if she asserts that Penton fraudulently induced her to 
dismiss the case based on its misrepresentations regarding settlement, a motion for 
contempt in the common pleas court if she contends that Penton’s actions in 
refusing to execute a final settlement agreement violated the common pleas court 
dismissal, and a civil action for breach of the claimed settlement agreement and 
specific performance of the settlement.  See, e.g., Russell, supra (sua sponte 
dismissal of mandamus action affirmed on the basis that an action for damages for 
breach of contract would constitute an adequate remedy at law). 
 
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Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals committed no error in granting 
Penton’s motion and dismissing Longacre’s complaint.  The judgment of the court 
of appeals is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK and STRATTON, JJ., concur separately. 
 
COOK, J., concurring.  Through the opinion of the court of appeals, counsel 
for the appellant was alerted to what should have been obvious from the scantest 
of legal research -- that mandamus will not lie in this situation.  Not to be deterred, 
counsel appealed that decision to this court.  I would, therefore, find this appeal 
frivolous, and under the inherent powers of this court, assess appellant’s counsel 
for the reasonable attorney fees incurred by appellee. 
 
STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion.