Case Title: Deering v. Board of Directors of County Library of Fremont County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Deering v. Board of Directors of County Library of Fremont County1998 WY 25954 P.2d 1359Case Number: 96-218Decided: 03/02/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Andrew J. DEERING, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF the COUNTY LIBRARY OF FREMONT 
COUNTY, Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal from The District Court, 
Fremont County, Nancy J. Guthrie, J.

 

David B. Hooper, Riverton, 
for Appellant (Plaintiff).

Norman E. Young (argued), 
Fremont County and Prosecuting Attorney, and Denise G. Malloy, Deputy Fremont 
County and Prosecuting Attorney, Riverton, for Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant Andrew J. Deering, a former ten and 
one-half year Riverton Branch Librarian, contends that the public meeting of the 
Appellee Board of Directors of the County Library of Fremont County, at which 
that board decided to eliminate three job positions, including his, under its 
written reduction in force policy because of a reorganization driven by a lack 
of funds, was a meeting not in conformity with Wyoming's Public Meetings Act,1 and, therefore, the board's 
decision is null and void. WYO. STAT. § 16-4-403(a) (1997). He also contends 
that the board's payment to him of thirty days' severance pay in lieu of the 
thirty days' advance written notice of the decision, as required by the board's 
policy, frustrated his opportunity to persuade the board to explore options 
other than the elimination of his job and constituted a breach of his implied 
employment contract arising from the board's written 
policy.

 

[¶2] The district court 
granted the board's motion for summary judgment, and Deering appeals. As 
explained below, we affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] Deering presents these 
issues:

 

I. 
Is the action taken at the special meeting of the board whereby Deering's job 
was eliminated void because such action was not taken at a meeting held in 
conformance with Wyoming's Public Meeting Law; W.S. § 16-4-401, et seq. (1977, 
as amended).

 

II. Were Deering's contractual rights to employment 
breached by the Board's action in terminating him without notice, cause, or a 
hearing?

 

III. Is the Board's action in eliminating Deering's 
position without notice to Deering a violation of his civil rights including his 
right to due process?

 

[¶4] The board succinctly 
states the issue in this way:

 

1. Was the granting of Appellee's motion of Summary 
Judgment legally correct?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶5] Because this case is in 
summary judgment posture, we will state the facts in the light most favorable to 
Deering, the non-movant.  Having 
carefully read the summary judgment materials submitted by the parties and the 
statements of facts contained in their briefs, we note that the material facts 
are undisputed.

 

[¶6] Deering had been 
employed as the Riverton Branch Librarian in the Fremont County Library System 
since August, 1983. From the time of his hiring until the time of the board's 
decision to eliminate his job position, the board has operated under several 
policy manuals. Over the years the board has from time to time unilaterally 
updated these policies. Deering raises no issues about the effect of these various updates; he states he 
considered that the board's written policies in effect on the day of the board's 
decision, March 23, 1994, governed the terms of his 
employment.

 

[¶7] The board's budget 
depends upon county valuation which, beginning in 1986, began to decline, 
necessitating yearly budget cuts.  
The board implemented a number of plans to curtail costs, and by 1994 had 
completed a study indicating that positions must be eliminated as a cost-saving 
measure. The board held meetings with library personnel in 1993 and in February 
1994 to discuss the expected changes.

 

[¶8] At the board's regular 
meeting on February 23, 1994, according to board members Jean Eichler and Jo 
Wilbert, the board changed its next regularly scheduled meeting from March 30, 
1994, the last Wednesday of the month, to March 23, 1994, because a quorum would 
not be present on March 30. According to Roberta Olson, the Library Director of 
the County Library of Fremont County, following the February board meeting she 
prepared and distributed a memo to all library staff which recited, among other 
information, that the March board meeting had been changed from March 30 to 
March 23.

 

[¶9] On March 23, 1994, at 
the board's rescheduled regular meeting, the board decided to implement a 
reorganization involving a reduction in force because of continued budget cuts, 
which eliminated the three staff positions of Head of Technical Services in 
Lander, the Children's Librarian in Riverton, and the Riverton Branch Librarian 
(Deering's job).

 

[¶10] Board member Eichler 
told Deering of the board's decision. Deering asserts he was also told that he 
could pursue neither the board's grievance procedure nor its appeal procedure 
set forth in the termination and discharge section of the board's policies. The 
board delivered to him the letter notifying him of the board's decision. The 
board also paid Deering for his regular March pay period, for an additional month's pay, and for earned and 
accrued vacation and sick leave time.

 

[¶11] Deering filed suit 
against the board on July 17, 1995, contending that the board's March 23 meeting 
at which the fateful decision had been made was an improperly noticed special 
meeting and, therefore, not in conformity with the provisions of Wyoming's 
Public Meetings Act, and under that law, the decision was null and void. 
Asserting that a property interest in his employment entitled him to 
constitutional due process, he claimed that the process due would have been a 
properly noticed meeting at which the decision could be made. He asserted that 
because the decision was null and void the board must reinstate him and pay him 
back pay and damages for due process and civil rights violations. He also 
asserted that the board breached his implied employment contract by terminating 
him without cause and failing to give him thirty days' advance notice before 
eliminating his position as required by the board's policies. In its answer to Deering's complaint, the 
board denied the material allegations and lodged various affirmative 
defenses.

 

[¶12] Following discovery, 
the board moved for summary judgment, which Deering opposed. The parties' 
summary judgment submissions included the pleadings; answers to interrogatories; 
responses to production and admissions requests; affidavits from two board 
members, the library director, and Deering; the transcript of Deering's 
deposition; and various exhibits, including the board's policies. After the hearing on the board's 
summary judgment motion, the district court granted the motion, ruling that no 
genuine issue of material fact existed; Deering was an at-will employee with no 
legitimate expectation of entitlement to continued employment; the board's 
decision to reorganize and implement a reduction in force was based on economic 
reasons and Deering's position was 
eliminated because of economic reorganization; Deering failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies through grievance and appeal; the board's March 23 
meeting at which the decision had been made was a regular meeting in conformity 
with Wyoming's Public Meetings Act; and the board was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Deering timely filed this appeal.

 

[¶13] Before moving to our 
legal analysis, we must recite a few more facts relevant to the issues. The 
record does not expressly tell us whether the board's normal business required 
regular meetings, i.e., meetings at a set date each and every month on which it 
would hold a regular meeting to transact its normal business. In this regard, 
the record does not contain a written board resolution, by-law or rule 
establishing a regular meeting date. The record does contain, however, Deering's 
affidavit testimony that "[d]uring at least the last 3 years of my employment by 
the Board, it always held its regular monthly meeting on the last Wednesday of 
the month." The board does not challenge that this was the board's custom; 
therefore, for purposes of this appeal, in the light most favorable to Deering, 
we take as true that the board's custom was to hold its regular monthly meeting 
on the last Wednesday of each month.

 

[¶14] The board's policies 
that are relevant to the issues presented are those relating to reduction in 
force and termination and discharge. In March 1993, the board adopted amendments 
to the Fremont County Personnel Practice and Policy Manual. In a preface to 
those amendments the following language appeared:

 

In 
all instances in this manual, the Fremont County Library Board of Directors 
shall take on all responsibilities designated to the County Commissioners on all 
policy matters in the Fremont County Library System.

 

[¶15] The board's reduction 
in force policy states:

 

5.3 REDUCTION IN FORCE: Employment is, of course, 
dependent upon the County's ability to finance services in the various areas or 
departments. The Board of County Commissioners has the right to discontinue any 
area other than the offices provided by law. These employees will be eligible 
for the COBRA Benefit. No employee in an office whose head is an Elected Official shall have an expectancy of 
continued employment or a property right to continued employment beyond the term 
of the Elected Official in whose office or department he/she is employed. 

 

If it shall become necessary to institute a reduction 
in force of County employees due to lack of funds, lack of work, or 
reorganization, the [Library Board of Directors] shall render the final decision 
as to the reduction in force on the recommendation of the Elected Officials and 
Department Heads.

 

In deciding which employees shall be affected by the 
reduction in force, the following order shall be utilized:

 

          
1. Temporary employees shall be the first employees to be 
affected.

 

2. Probationary employees in the affected class or 
classes shall be dismissed prior to those employees in the class who have 
completed the established probationary period.

 

3. In regard to full-time and part-time employees; 
i.e., those who have completed the designated probationary period, reduction in 
force shall be administered as deemed necessary and 
appropriate.

 

A full-time or part-time employee who is to be 
affected by the reduction in force shall receive written notice at least 30 days 
prior to the effective reduction in force date. A reduction in force is not 
considered to be a termination.

 

[¶16] The board's 
termination and discharge policy states:

 

          
SECTION 14 TERMINATION AND DISCHARGE

 

An employee cannot be discharged because of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, age or disability. All employees of 
Fremont County are at-will employees with employment terminable at the will of 
either party. A probationary employee 
may be terminated at any time. A full-time/part time employee may be terminated 
after two weeks written notice; such termination can be done with cause at the 
discretion of the Elected Official or Department Head.

 

14.1 REASONS FOR TERMINATION AND DISCHARGE: 
Employment by the County may be terminated for any of the following reasons; 
however, these are not exclusive reasons for termination:

 

          
1. Neglect or inefficiency in properly performing his/her 
duties;

 

2. Inefficiency, disobedience, misconduct, 
carelessness or negli-negligence with the County's monies or 
property;

 

          
3. Theft or willful destruction of County property;

 

          
4. Being under the influence of alcohol or drugs while on 
duty;

 

5. Endangering the safety of himself, herself or 
other employees in the performance of activities related to 
employment;

 

          
6. Accepting fees or valuable gifts.

 

14.2 GRIEVANCES, COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS: Copies of 
all information in the Grievance Procedure must be available to all interested 
parties. The Employee Grievance Procedure Form is available through the County 
Commissioners' Office to covered employees.

 

          
Procedure:

 

1. All personnel disputes should first be discussed 
with the employee's immediate Supervisor. If a satisfactory solution is not 
reached, the employee must submit his written grievance to his immediate 
Supervisor within 10 working days of the event or circumstances causing the 
grievance. If the grievance advances to the review level, a copy of 
the           
documentation must be furnished to the County 
Commissioners.

 

          
2. First Level of Review:

 

The subject's immediate Supervisor has five working 
days to render his written decision to the employee.

 

          
3. Second Level of Review:

 

If 
the employee is not satisfied with the decision of the First Level of Review, he 
has five working days to submit his written complaint to the Second Level of 
Review - normally the Department Head or, if the Department Head is his 
immediate Supervisor (as it may be in many cases), then the complaint goes 
directly to the County Commissioners.

 

          
4. Final Level of Review:

 

If 
the Department head is the Second Level of Review, the employee's complaint, if 
still not resolved, should be presented to a Grievance Board of three impartial 
people within five working days. The final decision will be made within five 
more working days. 

 

          
5. Exit Interview:

 

May be requested by either the employee or the 
employer upon separation of service.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶17] This Court reviews a 
summary judgment in the same light as the district court, using the same 
materials. Smith v. Bd. Of Comm'rs of Sublette Cty., 891 P.2d 88, 91 (Wyo. 
1995). When no genuine issues of material fact exist, we affirm summary judgment 
unless the district court committed an error of law. Loghry v. Unicover, 927 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶18] As we understand the 
syllogism of Deering's legal position, it is that

 

1. The board's custom was to hold its regular 
meetings on the last Wednesday of each month;

 

2. The board's March 23 meeting was not held on the 
last Wednesday of that month; therefore, it was a special, not a regular, 
meeting;

 

3. Under the Wyoming Public Meetings Act, the notice 
of a special meeting must specify the business to be transacted at the special 
meeting;

 

4. The board's notice of its March 23 special meeting 
did not specify what business the board would transact at that meeting, that is, 
more particularly, the decision to reorganize and eliminate three positions 
including Deering's;

 

5. Because the board's notice of its March 23 meeting 
failed to specify the business to be transacted at that meeting, the notice was 
not in accordance with Wyoming's Public Meetings Act;

 

6. Because the board's notice was not in accordance 
with Wyoming's Public Meetings Act, the March 23 meeting was not in conformity 
with that Act;

 

7. Because the March 23 meeting was not in conformity 
with Wyoming's Public Meetings Act, the action taken at that non-conforming 
meeting, namely, the reorganization and job elimination decision, is null and 
void according to the Wyoming Public Meetings Act.

 

[¶19] The validity of 
Deering's syllogism depends on its second step, namely, whether the March 23 
meeting was a special, not a regular, meeting as Deering contends. Deering's 
counsel acknowledged as much when he stated during the district court's summary 
judgment hearing, "[n]ow, as I started trying to respond to [the board's] 
arguments, it became more and more apparent to me that the real key to this thing is whether or not this was a 
special meeting or a regular meeting." Deering reasons that because the March 23 
meeting date was not the regularly scheduled meeting date, the March 23 meeting 
must have been a special meeting. The only legal authority to which Deering 
refers us is Palmer v. Bd. of Trustees of Crook Cty. School District No. 1, 785 P.2d 1160 (Wyo. 1990), and Ward v. 
Goshen Cty. School District No. 1, 865 P.2d 618 (Wyo. 1993), neither of which 
have substantive application to the pivotal issue of whether the March 23 
meeting was regular or special.

 

[¶20] Countering Deering's 
position, the board notes correctly that the Wyoming Public Meetings Act does 
not expressly prohibit the rescheduling of a regular meeting. While the Act 
defines "meeting," WYO. STAT. § 16-4-402(a)(iii) (1997), the Act does not 
expressly define "regular meeting" or "special meeting," although those terms 
appear in several provisions. The term "emergency meeting" also appears in the Act, WYO. STAT. § 
16-4-404(d) (1997), but without express definition. Because the Act concerns 
public meetings of deliberative governing bodies of government agencies, we find 
it helpful to turn, as we have before, to parliamentary procedure and law for 
guidance. Hirschfield v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of the Cty. of Teton, 944 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Wyo. 1997). In the parliamentary context,

 

The term regular meeting (or stated 
meeting) refers to the periodic business meeting of a permanent . . . board, 
held at weekly, monthly, quarterly, or similar intervals, for which the day (as, 
"the first Tuesday of each month") should be prescribed by the bylaws. . . 
.

 

Any business that falls within the objects of the 
society as defined in its bylaws (or, in the case of a board, any business 
within the authority of the board) can be transacted at any regular meeting. . 
..

 

The Scott, Foresman Robert's 
Rules of Order Newly Revised § 9 at 90-91 (1990 ed.); and see Sturgis Standard 
Code of Parliamentary Procedure, Ch. 12 at 110 (2d ed. 
1996).

 

[¶21] In 
contrast,

 

[a] special meeting (or called meeting) is a separate 
session of a society held at a time different from that of any regular meeting, 
and convened only to consider one or more items of business specified in the 
call of the meeting. . . . The reason for special meetings is to deal with 
important matters that may arise between regular meetings and that urgently 
require action by the society before the next regular meeting. . . 
.

 

Robert's Rules, supra, at 91-92; Sturgis, supra, at 
110.

 

[¶22] Factually, it is clear 
that the board at its regular February meeting approved the change of the March 
regular meeting date from the 30th to the 23rd. It is, we think, implicit in 
that simple act of rescheduling that the board members intended to conduct 
normal regular business on that rescheduled date. No inference can be fairly 
drawn from the facts that the board members intended the rescheduled meeting to 
be restricted only to a specific item of business as opposed to normal regular 
business. The record is clear that the board members had notice of the 
rescheduling because they attended the February meeting. Deering complains that 
he did not have notice; yet he does not, and cannot, point to any provision of 
the Public Meetings Act requiring the board to give him 
notice.

 

[¶23] In his reply brief, 
Deering asserts, for the first time, that the simple statement in the board's 
minutes of the February meeting, that the date for the regular March board 
meeting has been changed from March 30 to March 23, is not proof that the 
rescheduling was board action conducted by motion and vote. Deering fails to 
account for the testimony of board members Eichler and Wilbert that at the February board meeting the change "was 
approved." He also fails to support his point with any legal authority. Our own 
research on this parliamentary point informs us that "[i]n small boards . . . 
most parliamentary rules apply, but certain modifications permitting greater 
flexibility and informality are commonly allowed." Robert's Rules, supra, § 1 at 
9. One area where this is so is "where 
there seems to be no opposition in routine business or on questions of little 
importance," in which case time is saved by the procedure of unanimous or 
general consent. Id. at § 4, pp. 52-53. This method "can be used to take action 
without even the formality of a motion." Id. at § 4, p. 53. We think the 
important question in a matter of this nature is whether the board members 
agreed to change the date of the March 
regular meeting. See Lafleur v. City of Chicopee, 352 Mass. 746, 227 N.E.2d 702, 
705 (1967) (unanimous consent permits change, at least in advance of the usual 
meeting date, of the date set by rule for the regular meeting). If it is clear 
that they have agreed, as it is here, and that agreement is expressed in a way 
not inconsistent with any controlling law, as it is here, "that the niceties of every parliamentary 
rule have not been followed does not render the act illegal." Commonwealth v. 
Chace, 403 Pa. 117, 168 A.2d 569, 571 (1961). The record shows that this 
February board meeting was handled in an orderly way and in accordance with the 
procedure customarily used by this board. Deering offers no legal authority to 
sustain his position of a parliamentary 
violation. At the risk of putting too fine a point on this matter, we find the 
explanation in Hill v. Goodwin, 56 N.H. 441, 447, 449 (1876), 
apropos:

 

These popular assemblies, we may presume, are usually 
presided over by men of at least average intelligence, but without experience in 
the intricacies of parliamentary rules; and to compel such presiding officers to 
govern their meetings according to such rules would inevitably result in very 
great confusion. However wise or necessary such rules may be for legislative 
bodies, they are not adapted to the successful or prompt dispatch of business in 
town meetings.

          
. . .

 

          
. . . .

 

To hold that there was any such irregularity in this 
as would affect the proceedings . . . would be "sticking at the bark" rather 
than regarding the substances of things.

 

[¶24] We hold that the 
board's March 23 meeting was simply a rescheduled regular meeting; the board 
members had proper notice of that meeting and that normal business within the 
board's authority would be transacted in accordance with the Wyoming Public 
Meetings Act; and the decision eliminating Deering's position made at that 
meeting was in conformity with the Act and was lawful.

 

[¶25] We now turn to 
Deering's contention that the board violated its reduction in force policy when 
it paid him thirty days' severance pay instead of giving him thirty days' 
advance notice before the effective reduction in force date. Deering maintains 
that the board's action frustrated one purpose of the advance notice provision, 
which is to give the employee some opportunity for input and to explore options. 
Deering acknowledges that he accepted the severance pay offered by the board in 
lieu of thirty days' notice, and that he did not have to work during that period 
of time.

 

[¶26] We find no merit in 
Deering's argument. As we read the board's reduction in force policy, we 
understand that such a reduction "is not considered to be a termination."2 It "shall be administered as deemed 
necessary and appropriate" by the board which enjoys the prerogative and heavy 
responsibility of management. Deering does not claim that the board has used the 
reduction in force policy as a false pretext because it lacked grounds of poor 
job performance for termination. He does not challenge the evidentiary 
sufficiency of the board's 
economic-based decision. We have previously recognized that an employer facing 
budgetary constraints has a right to act in accordance with legitimate business 
interests. Rompf v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc., 685 P.2d 25, 29 (Wyo. 1984). 
See also Cox v. Resilient Flooring Div. of Congoleum Corp., 638 F. Supp. 726, 
731-33 (C.D.Cal. 1986). We find no support, in the record or in the law, for Deering's argument that the 
thirty-day notice period provides the employee an opportunity to dissuade 
management of an economic-driven decision reserved to it in the exercise of its 
discretionary business judgment. The board has referred this Court to Larson v. 
SYSCO Corp., 767 P.2d 557 (Utah 1989), in which the court upheld an employer's 
termination without notice because the employer provided the employee with 
severance pay for a period of time equal to the advance-notice time specified in 
the employment agreement. Although not on "allfours," the case is instructive. 
We agree with the board that relieving Deering of the obligation to perform 
employment services for a thirty-day period in exchange for the severance pay he 
accepted violates neither the board's 
policy nor due process notions.

 

[¶27] We have considered 
each of Deering's contentions and find no merit in any of them. We affirm the 
district court's summary judgment in favor of the board.

     

 

FOOTNOTES

1WYO. STAT. §§ 16-4-401 through 407 
(1997).

2It is 
clear to this Court, as it is to Deering's counsel, that the grievance and 
appeal procedures set forth in the termination policy do not apply here, because 
this is a reduction in force case only. Consequently, we do not need to address 
the board's assertion that Deering failed to exhaust the grievance and appeal 
remedies. Because those remedies do not apply to a reduction in force action, 
Deering quite simply had no administrative remedies to 
exhaust.