Case Title: SAMPSON v SNOW

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 81-177 IN THE SURPEMF, COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 ARTHUR SAMPSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, vs . JAYNE SNOW, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula. Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Williams Law Firm, Missoula, Montana Submitted on briefs: July 2, 1981 Decided : Clerk Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s a c t i o n i n v o l v e s an automobile a c c i d e n t t r i e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e S t a t e of Montana, i n and f o r t h e County of Missoula. The j u r y d e l i v e r e d a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t . P l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a motion f o r a new t r i a l which was d e n i e d , and t h i s appeal r e s u l t s . On J u l y 1, 1976, a p p e l l a n t attempted t o make a l e f t t u r n from t h e northbound l a n e of Reserve S t r e e t , County of Missoula, i n t o t h e westbound l a n e of t h e Wheeler V i l l a g e Road. R e s p o n d e n t , t r a v e l i n g n o r t h on R e s e r v e S t r e e t , attempted t o p a s s a p p e l l a n t on t h e l e f t a s a p p e l l a n t was t u r n i n g . They c o l l i d e d . There were no s i g n s o r road markings p r o h i b i t i n g a p a s s , and t h e c o l l i s i o n o c c u r r e d s h o r t l y a f t e r 10:OO a.m., on a c l e a r day, and on a d r y road. A t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t , a p p e l l a n t was engaged i n h i s d u t i e s a s a r u r a l m a i l c a r r i e r f o r t h e United S t a t e s P o s t a l S e r v i c e . H e t u r n e d n o r t h o n t o Reserve S t r e e t a f t e r making a s t o p , and t r a v e l e d a t about t h i r t y miles per hour behind an a s p h a l t t r u c k . According t o h i s v e r s i o n of t h e a c c i d e n t , a p p e l l a n t checked h i s m i r r o r and t u r n e d on h i s l e f t t u r n i n d i c a t o r about 100 t o 150 y a r d s b e f o r e t h e Wheeler V i l l a g e Road i n t e r s e c t i o n . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he slowed down a s he approached t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and motioned an ice cream d e l i v e r y t r u c k , which was stopped on Wheeler V i l l a g e Road w a i t i n g t o t u r n n o r t h o n t o Reserve S t r e e t , t o e n t e r t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n and t u r n . The Wheeler V i l l a g e Road is s l a n t e d so a s t o make a t u r n g r e a t e r t h a n 90 d e g r e e s . A f t e r t h e ice cream t r u c k had c l e a r e d t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n , a p p e l l a n t began h i s t u r n . H e was moving a t from f i v e t o t e n miles an hour, when he was hit on the side of his car by respondent's vehicle. The first contact occurred toward the rear of appellant's vehicle and respondent's vehicle then slid along the side of appellant's vehicle. According to respondent, she was traveling on Reserve Street at thirty-five to forty-five miles an hour, accel- erated to fifty miles an hour to pass a truck, and then returned to the northbound lane as she approached the Wheeler Village Road intersection. After that pass, she saw a car and a truck well ahead of her. She testified that she approached the vehicles at approximately forty to forty-five miles an hour and decided to pass them. She accelerated to fifty to fifty-five miles an hour and began her pass approx- imately 100 feet behind the appellant's vehicle, which was near the intersection. She intended to pass both appellant and the truck in front of him. Respondent testified that appellant did not signal for a left turn; that she did not see the ice cream truck turn onto Reserve Street; and that appellant was traveling between thirty and thirty-five miles an hour at the time of the impact. The visibility was clear for three miles south of the intersection according to the testimony of respondent. There was conflict in the respondent's testimony over whether appellant turned into her or she hit appellant. Appellant argues that respondent's testimony was that he turned while safely out in front of her. Testimony also was given that when respondent got out of her vehicle, the first thing she said to appellant was, "You doff, you cut right in front of me." Photographs of the vehicles introduced at the trial showed t h e l e f t f r o n t bumper of a p p e l l a n t ' s v e h i c l e was pushed o u t , b u t t h e l e f t f r o n t h e a d l i g h t was n o t damaged. The g r e a t e s t damage t o a p p e l l a n t ' s v e h i c l e was t h e l e f t f r o n t fender j u s t i n f r o n t of t h e l e f t door. The photo- graphs a l s o show t h a t t h e r i g h t f r o n t g r i l l of r e s p o n d e n t ' s v e h i c l e was pushed i n and t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t damage t o her v e h i c l e was on t h e r i g h t f r o n t fender immediately above t h e wheel. There were some s c r a t c h e s along t h e r i g h t s i d e of her v e h i c l e which was 1972 J e e p Commando. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e two p a r t i e s involved i n t h e a c c i - d e n t , two w i t n e s s e s t e s t i f i e d about t h e c o l l i s i o n . Bruce Brooks, who drove t h e i c e cream t r u c k , t e s t i f i e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t slowed and motioned him i n t o Reserve S t r e e t . Brooks t e s t i f i e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t somehow i n d i c a t e d he was t u r n i n g l e f t , b u t Brooks d i d n o t r e c a l l how. H e d i d t e s t i f y , however, t h a t i n a s t a t e m e n t t o an i n v e s t i g a t o r from t h e P o s t a l S e r v i c e who conducted an i n v e s t i g a t i o n s e v e r a l days a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t occur red t h a t a p p e l l a n t s i g n a l e d . The o t h e r w i t n e s s was Frank Hazelbaker, who was d r i v i n g a bread d e l i v e r y t r u c k toward t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n a t t h e time of t h e a c c i d e n t . H e t e s t i f i e d he d i d n o t s e e t h e c o l l i s i o n occur because he was looking a t a passenger a t t h e time. H e d i d hear t h e c o l l i s i o n , saw t h e scene an i n s t a n t a f t e r t h e c o l l i s i o n , and a t t h a t time saw r e s p o n d e n t ' s v e h i c l e a i r b o r n e . H e noted t h a t a p p e l l a n t ' s t u r n s i g n a l was on w i t h i n f i v e seconds a f t e r t h e c o l l i s i o n . He t e s t i f i e d , however, he d i d n o t s e e a p p e l l a n t ' s t u r n s i g n a l b e f o r e t h e c o l l i s i o n because r e s p o n d e n t ' s v e h i c l e was i n h i s way. Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r our c o n s i d e r a t i o n : 1. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y t h a t t h e mere f a c t t h a t an a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d , c o n s i d e r e d a l o n e , does n o t r a i s e a l e g a l i n f e r e n c e of negligence? 2. Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o set a s i d e t h e v e r d i c t on t h e grounds t h a t t h e evidence d i d n o t j u s t i f y i t ? The f i r s t i s s u e concerns t h e g i v i n g of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 32 over a p p e l l a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n . T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n reads: "The mere f a c t t h a t an a c c i d e n t happened, considered a l o n e , does n o t g i v e r i s e t o l e g a l i n f e r e n c e t h a t it was caused by n e g l i g e n c e o r t h a t any p a r t y t o t h i s a c t i o n was n e g l i g e n t o r o t h e r w i s e a t f a u l t . " A p p e l l a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n was made on t h e grounds t h e i n s t r u c t i o n is i n a p p r o p r i a t e where t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence of negligence beyond t h e mere happening of an a c c i d e n t . The g i v i n g of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n can be c o n f u s i n g t o a j u r y , and i n t h e f u t u r e we recommend t h a t it n o t be g i v e n . W e f i n d , however, no p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r n e c e s s i t a t i n g r e v e r s a l because t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was g i v e n i n t h i s c a s e . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n h a s b e e n e x p r e s s l y disapproved i n c a s e s i n which r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r is a p p l i c a b l e . H e l m k e v. Goff ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 597 P.2d 1131, 36 St.Rep. 1104, and Hunsaker v. Bozeman Deaconess Foundation (1978 ) , Mont . , 588 P.2d 493, 35 St.Rep. 1647. H e l m k e involved a s i n g l e c a r a c c i d e n t i n which t h e p a s s e n g e r , t h e p l a i n t i f f , was i n j u r e d . The c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y on both o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e and r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r . The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o gave a "mere happening" i n s t r u c t i o n . T h i s Court held t h a t a r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r i n s t r u c t i o n and a "mere happening" i n s t r u c t i o n a r e s o incompatible a s t o r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l because t h e j u r y may c o n s i d e r i t s e l f f o r e - c l o s e d from c o n s i d e r i n g t h e e v i d e n c e provided by t h e hap- pening of t h e a c c i d e n t i t s e l f . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s h e r e t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h e C o u r t is whether t h e C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n Helmke should be extended t o o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e c a s e s . Respondent a r g u e s t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t of law g i v e n i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i s c l e a r l y c o r r e c t i n an o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e c a s e and should be allowed. T h i s Court h a s d i s c u s s e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , o r one l i k e it, i n numerous n e g l i g e n c e c a s e s from a t l e a s t 1915 through 1976 i n a v a r i e t y of f a c t u a l t e x t s . See E r i c k s o n v. P e r r e t t ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169 Mont. 167, 545 P.2d 1074; Campbell v. Bozeman Community H o t e l ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160 Mont. 327, 502 P.2d 1141; F r i e s v . S h a u g h n e s s y ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 5 9 Mont. 3 0 7 , 496 P.2d 1 1 5 9 ; F l a n s b e r g v. Montana Power Co. ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 154 Mont. 53, 460 P.2d 263; Negaard v. E s t a t e of Feda ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 47, 446 P.2d 436; MacDonald v. P r o t e s t a n t E p i s c o p a l Church ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 150 Mont. 332, 435 P.2d 369; Jackson v. W i l l i a m Dingwall Co. ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 145 Mont. 127, 399 P.2d 236; S t o c k i n g v. Johnson F l y i n g S e r v i c e ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 143 Mont. 61, 387 P.2d 312; Wyrick v. H o e f l e ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 136 Mont. 172, 346 P.2d 563; S t a t e v. B a s t ( 1 9 4 4 ) , 116 Mont. 329, 1 5 1 P.2d 1009; Baatz v. Noble ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 105 Mont. 59, 69 P.2d 579; Cowden v. Crippen ( 1 9 3 6 ) , 1 0 1 Mont. 187, 53 P.2d 98; Mellon v. K e l l y ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 99 Mont. 1 0 , 41 P.2d 49; Lesage v. Largey Lumber Co. ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 99 Mont. 372, 43 P.2d 896; A u t i o v. M i l l e r ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 92 Mont. 150, 1 1 P.2d 1039; and Lyon v. Chicago, M . & St.P. Ry. Co. ( 1 9 1 5 ) , 50 Mont. 532, 148 P. 386. Respondent n o t e s t h a t i n none o f t h e s e c a s e s s t a t i n g t h e g e n e r a l r u l e was t h e d o c t r i n e o f r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r a p p l i c a b l e . I t h a s been o n l y r e c e n t l y t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n s i d e r t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y of a "mere happening" i n s t r u c t i o n i n a c a s e where t h e j u r y is a l s o p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d on t h e d o c t r i n e of r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r . Hunsaker v . Bozeman D e a c o n e s s F o u n d a t i o n , s u p r a . I n Hunsaker, t h i s Court considered a c a s e involving c l a i m s of medical m a l p r a c t i c e . The Court s t a t e d t h a t i n t h e c o n t e x t of p r o f e s s i o n a l m a l p r a c t i c e , a "mere f a c t of an i n j u r y " i n s t r u c t i o n is p r o p e r , e v e n where --- r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r is involved b u t implied t h a t such an i n s t r u c t i o n would n o t be proper i n an o r d i n a r y r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r t y p e of c a s e . T h i s i m p l i c a t i o n i n our Hunsaker o p i n i o n was made e x p l i c i t i n H e l m k e v. Gaff, s u p r a , where t h e Court con- s i d e r e d t h e p r o p r i e t y of a "mere happening" i n s t r u c t i o n i n a r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r c a s e i n v o l v i n g o n l y simple, i . e . , n o t p r o f e s s i o n a l , n e g l i g e n c e . The C o u r t , i n a c l o s e l y d i v i d e d o p i n i o n , h e l d it was n o t proper t o g i v e a "mere happening" i n s t r u c t i o n i n a r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r c a s e because t h e r e , t h e p e c u l i a r n a t u r e of t h e a c c i d e n t and t h e surrounding circum- s t a n c e s a l l o w t h e j u r y t o i n f e r n e g l i g e n c e from t h e happen- ing of t h e a c c i d e n t i t s e l f . Thus, t h e "mere happening" i n s t r u c t i o n and t h o s e on t h e d o c t r i n e of r e s i p s a l o q u i t u s were t o t a l l y incompatible. W e n o t e t h a t n e i t h e r Hunsaker nor Helmke o v e r r u l e any p r i o r c a s e s on on t h e i s s u e of n e g l i g e n c e . Nor do t h e y r e p r e s e n t a break i n our l o n g s t a n d i n g t r a d i t i o n a l law t h a t t h e mere happening of an a c c i d e n t , c o n s i d e r e d a l o n e , does n o t g i v e r i s e t o an i n f e r e n c e t h a t it was caused by n e g l i - gence. The c a s e s simply r e c o g n i z e t h e obvious--that a - r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r c a s e is an e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e . Appellant has s t a t e d t h e i s s u e , "The q u e s t i o n posed by t h i s c a s e is whether t h e C o u r t ' s r u l i n g i n H e l m k e should be extended t o o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e c a s e s . " Our answer t o t h a t is no. Such an e x t e n s i o n would change t h e law of n e g l i g e n c e i n t h i s s t a t e i n a v e r y fundamental way. I t would be unacceptable t o hold t h a t t h e "mere happening" i n s t r u c t i o n is a c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e law a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e c a s e b u t then hold t h a t t h e j u r y should n o t be informed a s t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r r u l e of law. Here t h e challenged i n s t r u c t i o n d o e s n o t t e l l t h e j u r y t h a t t h e y could f i n d n e i t h e r d r i v e r n e g l i g e n t . I t merely s t a t e s t h a t t h e j u r y cannot i n f e r t h e n e g l i g e n c e of e i t h e r t h e p l a i n t i f f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t from t h e s i n g l e f a c t t h a t t h e two c o l l i d e d on a highway. I n l i g h t of t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e , t h e o t h e r j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s and t h e j u r y ' s s p e c i a l v e r d i c t , it is c l e a r t h a t t h e g i v i n g of t h e "mere happening" i n s t r u c t i o n h e r e was r e v e r s i b l e n o t / e r r o r . T h i s is a c l a s s i c p a s s i n g and t u r n i n g c a s e . I t is c l e a r from t h e evidence t h a t t h e j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e a r e a where t h e a c c i d e n t occurred was s t r i p e d t o a l l o w p a s s i n g and t h a t no s i g n s o r markings were p r e s e n t t o pro- h i b i t p a s s i n g . By t h e u n c o n t r a d i c t e d evidence t h e roadway i n t o which p l a i n t i f f was i n t e n d i n g t o t u r n was simply a p r i v a t e driveway, open t o t h e p u b l i c u s e , w i t h n e i t h e r t h e s t a t e nor t h e county having any r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o m a i n t a i n it. Thus, it is c l e a r t h a t respondent had a r i g h t t o p a s s a p p e l l a n t a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r t i m e and p l a c e and a l s o t h a t a p p e l l a n t had a r i g h t t o make a l e f t t u r n i n t o t h e driveway. The j u r y was e x p l i c i t l y and completely i n s t r u c t e d on t h e v a r i o u s d u t i e s incumbent on each d r i v e r i n a passing- t u r n i n g s i t u a t i o n . There were no o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s made on a p p e a l . I n p a r t i c u l a r w e n o t e t h a t t h e j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d on t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e p a s s i n g d r i v e r : ". . . no v e h i c l e s h a l l be d r i v e n t o t h e l e f t s i d e o f t h e c e n t e r o f t h e roadway i n o v e r t a k i n g and p a s s i n g . . . u n l e s s . . . such o v e r t a k i n g o r p a s s i n g can be completed w i t h o u t i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h t h e s a f e o p e r a t i o n of . . . any v e h i c l e overtaken." I n s t r u c t i o n No. 15. ". . . when a v e h i c l e is t r a v e l i n g a t a slow r a t e of speed and i n d i c a t e s a l e f t t u r n by an automatic s i g n a l 100 f e e t o r more b e f o r e t u r n i n g , t h e d r i v e r of t h e f o l l o w i n g v e h i c l e must y i e l d t h e r i g h t of way t o t h e t u r n i n g v e h i c l e . " I n s t r u c t i o n No. 16. "The d r i v e r of a motor v e h i c l e is presumed t o s e e t h a t which he could s e e by l o o k i n g . He w i l l n o t be p e r m i t t e d t o s a y t h a t he d i d n o t s e e what he must have s e e n had he looked. The d u t y t o keep a l o o k o u t i n c l u d e s a d u t y t o see t h a t which is i n p l a i n s i g h t . " I n s t r u c - t i o n No. 20. "A person o p e r a t i n g . . . a v e h i c l e . . . s h a l l d r i v e it i n a c a r e f u l and prudent manner . . . and he s h a l l d r i v e it s o a s n o t t o unduly o r unreasonably endanger t h e l i f e , limb, p r o p e r t y , or o t h e r r i g h t s of a person e n t i t l e d t o t h e use of t h e s t r e e t o r high- way. "The d r i v e r of a v e h i c l e s h a l l d r i v e a t an a p p r o p r i a t e reduced speed when approaching and c r o s s i n g an i n t e r s e c t i o n . . ." I n s t r u c - t i o n No. 10. Here, t h e j u r y was a l s o p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d i n d e t a i l a s t o t h e d u t i e s of t h e t u r n i n g d r i v e r . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e j u r y was given a l l t h e s t a n d a r d i n s t r u c t i o n s on n e g l i g e n c e , v i o l a t i o n of s t a t u t e s and proximate cause. The j u r y was c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t y i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e a c t s and omis- s i o n s of respondent t h a t would c o n s t i t u t e n e g l i g e n c e . I t was a l s o i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e l e g a l meaning of n e g l i g e n c e , and t h e s t a n d a r d by which it was t o be measured. While t h e evidence was i n some c o n f l i c t on c e r t a i n c r i t i c a l points--most i m p o r t a n t l y , whether a p p e l l a n t had a c t i v a t e d h i s t u r n s i g n a l p r i o r t o t h e t i m e o f impact--there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence on both s i d e s which, i f b e l i e v e d , could j u s t i f y a v e r d i c t f o r e i t h e r p a r t y . The j u r y r e t u r n e d a s p e c i a l v e r d i c t i n which t h e y answered "no" t o t h e f i r s t q u e s t i o n asked, "Was t h e d e f e n d a n t n e g l i g e n t ? " They found s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t respondent was n o t n e g l i g e n t . For t h e r e a s o n s above g i v e n , w e f i n d no e r r o r i n t h e g i v i n g of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s . The second i s s u e is whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n r e f u s i n g t o s e t a s i d e t h e v e r d i c t on t h e grounds t h e e v i - dence d i d n o t j u s t i f y it. The b a s i c p r i n c i p l e f o r t h i s Court i n viewing e v i - dence is t h a t "where a f a c t i s s u e o r i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d b e f o r e a c o u r t s i t t i n g w i t h a j u r y , and t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t , such v e r d i c t is con- c l u s i v e on appeal." Holm v. Parsons ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 588 P.2d 531, 533, 36 St.Rep. 11, 13. Here t h e r e was sub- s t a n t i a l evidence i n s u p p o r t of t h e v e r d i c t . The a c c i d e n t occurred when a p p e l l a n t began t u r n i n g l e f t o n t o t h e Wheeler V i l l a g e Road j u s t a s respondent was p a s s i n g . The r e c o r d is c l e a r t h a t t h e r e were no road markings o r s i g n s o r anything on t h e roadway t o p r e v e n t respondent from p a s s i n g a p p e l l a n t where s h e d i d . There was no a c t u a l i n t e r s e c t i o n between two p u b l i c highways. Wheeler V i l l a g e Road is a c t u a l l y a d r i v e - way a s it is n o t maintained by t h e s t a t e or t h e county. A l l p a r t i e s were w i t h i n t h e a p p l i c a b l e speed l i m i t s , and t h e r e was no evidence t o show t h a t e i t h e r was d r i v i n g unreason- a b l y . The one s u b s t a n t i a l c o n f l i c t i n t h e evidence was t h e i s s u e of w h e t h e r a p p e l l a n t a c t i v a t e d h i s t u r n s i g n a l . Respondent s a i d t h a t he d i d n o t . Witness Hazelbaker, t h e d r i v e r of t h e bread d e l i v e r y t r u c k , was n o t p o s i t i v e . H e d i d n o t remember s e e i n g any t u r n s i g n a l f l a s h i n g b u t t e s - t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t a t u r n s i g n a l was on. Brooks, t h e d r i v e r of t h e ice cream t r u c k , t e s t i f i e d t h a t a p p e l l a n t i n d i c a t e d he was t u r n i n g , b u t d i d n o t t e s t i f y t h a t t h e t u r n s i g n a l was on. W e f i n d t h a t respondent p r e s e n t e d substan- t i a l evidence along w i t h her own testimony which q u a l i f i e d t h e c a s e f o r submission t o t h e j u r y . The j u r y was in- s t r u c t e d , without o b j e c t i o n , t h a t " t h e d i r e c t evidence of one w i t n e s s who is e n t i t l e d t o f u l l c r e d i t is s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e proof of any f a c t i n t h i s c a s e , " and "you a r e n o t bound t o d e c i d e i n conformity w i t h t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of any number of w i t n e s s e s n o t producing c o n v i c t i o n i n your minds a g a i n s t a l e s s e r number or a g a i n s t a presumption o r o t h e r evidence s a t i s f y i n g your minds." T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n is t h e law of t h e c a s e , and under it t h e j u r y could b e l i e v e respondent and d i s b e l i e v e a p p e l l a n t , a s it a p p a r e n t l y d i d . There being s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n t h e r e c o r d t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t , t h e judgment of t h e lower c o u r t is a f f irmed. W e c o n c u r : ? A d + , Chieef J u s t i c e & d g