Case Title: State v. Tyran N. Anderson

Citation: 2002 WI 7

Docket Number: 2000AP001563-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 7 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-1563-CR 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Tyran N. Anderson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  241 Wis. 2d 48, 622 N.W.2d 769 
(Ct. App. 2000, Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 24, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 4, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Mary M. Kuhnmuench   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Michael K. Gould, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
Gregory M. Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 7 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-1563-CR   
(L.C. No. 
98-CM-013450) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tyran N. Anderson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 24, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.  
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   Tyran N. Anderson seeks review 
of an unpublished court of appeals decision affirming his 
conviction 
for 
disorderly 
conduct,1 
contrary 
to 
                                                 
1 Although not relevant to the merits of this case regarding 
the validity of Anderson's jury trial waiver, we note an 
inconsistency in the record.  The trial court proceedings reveal 
that 
Anderson 
was 
convicted 
of 
battery, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1).  Anderson was also sentenced pursuant to 
a judgment of conviction for battery.  The written judgment of 
conviction, however, shows Anderson was convicted of disorderly 
conduct. 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 947.01 (1997-98).2  Anderson contends that his jury 
trial 
waiver 
was 
both 
statutorily 
and 
constitutionally 
inadequate because the circuit court and the State failed to 
affirmatively approve and consent to the waiver, and the circuit 
court did not engage him in a personal colloquy confirming the 
written waiver.   
¶2 
We reject Anderson's argument that his jury trial 
waiver is invalid because the record lacks the required approval 
of the court and consent by the State.  We conclude that the 
circuit court approved Anderson's jury trial waiver by accepting 
the waiver on the record, scheduling a bench trial, and then 
subsequently conducting a bench trial.  Similarly, we conclude 
that the State consented to Anderson's jury trial waiver by 
participating in a bench trial without voicing objection.  
¶3 
With regard to Anderson's argument that the circuit 
court erred by failing to engage him in a personal colloquy, we 
hold that the record is insufficient to determine whether 
Anderson's jury trial waiver was knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary.  We, therefore, hold that the circuit court should 
have engaged Anderson in a personal colloquy.  We reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals, and remand for an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether Anderson knowingly, intelligently 
and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-
1998 version unless otherwise noted. 
 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
3 
 
recognizing that a jury trial involves a fundamental right, we 
mandate the use of a personal colloquy in every case where a 
criminal defendant seeks to waive his or her right to a jury 
trial. 
I 
¶4 
The relevant facts are not in dispute.  In November, 
1998, Anderson was charged in Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
with disorderly conduct, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 947.01.3  The 
charge 
was 
later 
amended 
to 
battery 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 940.19(1).4 
¶5 
Assistant 
State 
Public 
Defender 
Paul 
Ksicinski 
initially represented Anderson, but moved to withdraw on January 
26, 1999, citing attorney-client communication problems.  On 
February 25, 1999, the circuit court granted Ksicinski's motion 
with Anderson's approval.  Attorney Scott Connors was appointed 
as successor counsel.  Six months later, Attorney Connors moved 
to withdraw, also citing, among other reasons, attorney-client 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 947.01 states in full: 
947.01  Disorderly Conduct.  Whoever, in a public or 
private place, engages in violent, abusive, indecent, 
profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise 
disorderly conduct under circumstances in which the 
conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance is 
guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.19(1) states in full: 
940.19 
 
Battery; 
substantial 
battery; 
aggravated 
battery. (1) Whoever causes bodily harm to another by 
an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that 
person or another without the consent of the person so 
harmed is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
4 
 
communication problems.  On October 13, 1999, however, Attorney 
Connors essentially withdrew his request to withdraw as counsel, 
acknowledging that Anderson was not entitled to another Public 
Defender appointment because of the prior withdrawal of Attorney 
Ksicinski. 
¶6 
The jury trial was scheduled for November 10, 1999.  
On that morning, when the case was called, Anderson was 
apparently slow in getting to the defense table and the court, 
the Honorable Mary M. Kuhnmuench, presiding, addressed Anderson 
in the following manner: 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Anderson, you're going to have to do 
better than that.  Get in the defense table.  Hang on.  
You pull that crap in front of a jury and I can tell 
you——You get your butt from the jury box over to the 
defense table as quickly as possible.  I'm not 
standing for any of this kind of garbage.  Do you 
understand me? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  (No audible response.) 
 
THE COURT:  Do you understand me?  I don't want any 
comments from you.  All I need from you is for you to 
do what I tell you to do when I tell you to do it. 
¶7 
After a brief discussion about prior convictions and 
jury instructions, the court advised counsel that they would 
begin picking the jury after lunch.  Attorney Connors then 
informed the court that he had discussed with Anderson the 
possibility of having a bench trial rather than a jury trial.  
The court instructed Attorney Connors that he would have "to 
have a waiver of the jury trial form in the file."  Anderson 
subsequently signed a jury trial waiver.  The substance of the 
waiver reads in its entirety: 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
5 
 
 
And now comes the above named defendant, and in his 
own proper person hereby expressly waives trial by a 
jury and consents to immediate trial before the court 
without a jury. 
 
I will be giving up my right to have my case decided 
by 12 people sitting as a jury; I understand that all 
12 of those people would have to agree in order to 
reach a verdict. 
¶8 
After a recess, the court reconvened and discussed 
Anderson's jury trial waiver.  After stating appearances, the 
complete discussion went as follows: 
 
THE COURT:  The Court is in receipt of a waiver of 
trial by jury that is signed and dated today's date.  
The Court will receive it and enter it in the trial as 
a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury 
trial.  We will proceed with a bench trial at 1:30 
this afternoon.  Are there any questions of the Court? 
 
MS. ZIMMERS[State]:  No. 
 
THE COURT:  We'll see you both back at 1:30. 
When the proceedings reconvened, the case was presented to the 
circuit court and Anderson was found guilty. 
¶9 
Anderson appealed his conviction.  The Court of 
Appeals found that Anderson's jury trial waiver was sufficient 
and affirmed the circuit court's judgment.  On March 6, 2001, 
this court granted Anderson's Petition for Review. 
II 
¶10 A defendant's right to a jury trial is guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.5  While the 
                                                 
5 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides as follows: 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
6 
 
right to a jury trial is recognized as a fundamental right, see 
State v. Cleveland, 50 Wis. 2d 666, 670, 184 N.W.2d 899 (1971), 
it is also well established that a defendant can completely 
waive the right to a jury trial in favor of a trial by the 
court.  Wisconsin Stat. § 972.02 establishes the procedure for a 
criminal defendant to waive his right to a jury trial.  Section 
972.02(1) states: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, criminal 
cases shall be tried by a jury selected as prescribed 
in s. 805.08, unless the defendant waives a jury in 
writing or by statement in open court or under s. 
967.08(2)(b), on the record, with the approval of the 
court and the consent of the state. 
                                                                                                                                                             
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides 
as follows: 
Rights of accused.  SECTION 7.  In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be 
heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him; to meet the 
witnesses face to face; to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and 
in prosecutions by indictment, or information, to a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county 
or district wherein the offense shall have been 
committed; which county or district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law. 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
7 
 
¶11 This case is not the first opportunity for a Wisconsin 
appellate court to interpret Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1).  Rather, 
previous cases interpreting § 972.02 have established several 
requirements for determining a valid waiver of the right to a 
jury trial.  The waiver cannot be based on circumstantial 
evidence or reasonable inferences.  Cleveland, 50 Wis. 2d at 
670.  The defendant, not his attorney, must waive the right to a 
jury trial by an affirmative act of the defendant himself.  
State v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d 561, 569, 464 N.W.2d 839 
(1991).  Furthermore, the court must advise the defendant of the 
unanimity requirement, such that the court cannot accept a jury 
verdict that is not agreed to by each member of the jury.  State 
v. Resio, 148 Wis. 2d 687, 696-697, 436 N.W.2d 603 (1989).  
Finally, this court has stated that "[t]he right to a trial by 
jury is one of the rights that is 'so fundamental to the concept 
of fair and impartial decision making, that their relinquishment 
must meet the standard set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458 (1938).'"  Resio, 148 Wis. 2d at 694 (quoting State v. 
Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 122, 130-131, 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980)).  
Accordingly, a jury trial waiver must be "an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."  
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464; see also Resio, 148 Wis. 2d at 694. 
¶12 Anderson 
claims 
his 
jury 
trial 
waiver 
is 
both 
statutorily and constitutionally infirm.  First, he claims that 
his jury trial waiver does not comply with the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) because while his jury trial waiver was 
in writing, the record lacks the required "approval of the court 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
8 
 
and the consent of the state."  Anderson also contends that his 
jury trial waiver is invalid, because the circuit court failed 
to engage him in a personal colloquy to determine that his 
waiver 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
voluntary. 
 
We 
independently review both of Anderson's claims, benefiting from 
the analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals.  
"Whether an individual is denied a constitutional right is a 
question 
of 
constitutional 
fact 
that 
this 
court 
reviews 
independently as a question of law."  State v. Klessig, 211 
Wis. 2d 194, 204, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) (reviewing whether 
defendant waived right to counsel). 
¶13 Anderson first argues that the record fails to 
demonstrate approval of the court or consent by the State 
sufficient to satisfy Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1).  Specifically, 
Anderson relies on Spiller v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 372, 182 
N.W.2d 242 (1971), for his position that silence by the court 
and the State lacks the required affirmative acts, in order to 
waive the right to a jury trial. 
¶14 In Spiller, the defendant claimed that he waived his 
right to a jury trial, making it error for his case to be 
subsequently tried before a jury.  Id. at 373.  At his 
arraignment, Spiller stated that he waived his right to a jury 
trial.  Id.  The transcript is silent, however, on the reaction 
of the district attorney and the court.  Id.  Nearly eight 
months later, Spiller's case went to trial before a jury and no 
mention was made of the alleged jury trial waiver.  Id.  On 
appeal, Spiller argued it was error for him to be subject to a 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
9 
 
jury trial because his jury trial waiver was valid.  Focusing on 
the required approval of the court and consent of the State, 
this court held that there was no waiver of a jury trial because 
"silence 
as 
consent 
is 
not 
a 
reasonable 
inference 
when 
affirmative acts of consent and approval are required."  Id. at 
374.  "[S]ilence on the part of the district attorney and the 
court is not tantamount to their respective consent and 
approval."  Id. at 374-375. 
¶15 The State argues that Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) does not 
specify how the court's approval and the state's consent must be 
expressed, and that this court should infer approval and consent 
from the fact that the court and the State both proceeded with a 
court trial.  According to the State, Spiller is not controlling 
because the facts are opposite and applying Spiller does not 
support the reasonable objectives of the statute.  The defendant 
in Spiller allegedly waived his right to a jury trial, but he 
subsequently was tried before a jury.  In contrast, Anderson 
waived his right to a jury trial and got what he asked for, a 
bench trial.  The State argues that the approval and consent 
requirements of the statute are intended to preserve the state's 
interest in jury trials.  When the State does not dispute the 
jury trial waiver, by silence and by going forward with a bench 
trial as requested by the defendant, the State argues that a 
defendant cannot rely on silence by the State and the court to 
invalidate the waiver. 
¶16 We agree.  Anderson cannot rely on silence by the 
State, and a somewhat incomplete acceptance by the court, to 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
10 
 
invalidate his jury trial waiver, when the State and the court 
both proceeded to a bench trial without objection.  Although the 
court's approval of the jury trial waiver may not have been as 
explicit as it could have been, the record demonstrates that the 
court accepted the waiver and proceeded with a bench trial.  
Specifically, the court stated: 
 
THE COURT:  The Court is in receipt of a waiver of 
trial by jury that is signed and dated today's date.  
The Court will receive it and enter it in the trial as 
a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury 
trial.  We will proceed with a bench trial at 1:30 
this afternoon. 
This statement demonstrates that the court expressed its 
approval by accepting Anderson's written waiver, scheduling the 
bench trial, and later conducting a bench trial in this case. 
¶17 With regard to the State's consent, we find this case 
is more akin to United States v. Radford, 452 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 
1971), rather than Spiller.6  In Radford, the defendant claimed 
his jury trial waiver was invalid because the United States 
Attorney failed to sign the jury waiver form.  452 F.2d at 335.  
Looking at Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a),7 the Court 
                                                 
6 The state consent requirement was first established in 
1949, see § 120, ch. 631, Laws of 1949, and is based on Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a).  See State v. Murdock, 2000 WI 
App 170, ¶21, 238 Wis. 2d 301, 617 N.W.2d 175 (citing 1949 S.B. 
474 and Senate Amendment 5).  Federal cases addressing the 
government 
consent 
requirement, 
therefore, 
are 
instructive 
regarding the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1).  See id. 
7 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a) is nearly 
identical to Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1).  Rule 23(a) states: 
(a) Trial by Jury.  Cases required to be tried by jury 
shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
11 
 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the purpose of 
government consent is to protect the government's right to a 
jury trial.8  Id. at 335.  Accordingly, where the government does 
not contest the waiver, the government's silence should be 
considered consent and the "defendant cannot repudiate his 
signed waiver by asserting the United States Attorney's non-
signing as a defect."  Id. 
¶18 The United States Attorney's failure to sign the jury 
trial waiver is analogous to the State's silence in this case.  
Because the underlying principle of state consent is to protect 
                                                                                                                                                             
trial in writing with the approval of the court and 
the consent of the government. 
8 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on 
Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).  In Singer, the 
defendant offered to waive the right to a jury trial and the 
court was willing to approve the waiver, but the government 
refused to give its consent.  Id. at 25.  The United States 
Supreme Court examined the government consent requirement and 
found 
that 
the 
requirement 
was 
designed 
to 
protect 
the 
government's interest in a trial by jury.   
We find no constitutional impediment to conditioning a 
waiver of this right on the consent of the prosecuting 
attorney and the trial judge when, if either refuses 
to consent, the result is simply that the defendant is 
subject to an impartial trial by jury——the very thing 
that 
the 
Constitution 
guarantees 
him. 
 
The 
Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the 
proper 
method 
of 
determining 
guilt, 
and 
the 
Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest 
in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction 
is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the 
Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair 
result. 
Id. at 36. 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
12 
 
the state's interest in jury trials, we find that Anderson 
cannot rely on the State's silence to invalidate his jury trial 
waiver.  The fact that the State went forward with the court 
trial, and did not voice any opposition, demonstrates the 
State's consent to the jury trial waiver in this case. 
¶19 We next address Anderson's contention that his jury 
trial waiver is invalid, because the circuit court failed to 
engage him in a colloquy.  Anderson argues that without a 
colloquy, the court lacks sufficient information to guarantee 
that relinquishment of the right to a jury trial is knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  Anderson suggests that his written 
waiver is not sufficient to determine that he knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to a jury trial, 
because the court admonished him shortly before the waiver was 
accepted, 
and 
the 
record 
demonstrates 
he 
had 
problems 
communicating with his attorney.   
¶20 Relying on State v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d 561, 573, 
464 N.W.2d 839 (1991), State v. Cleveland, 50 Wis. 2d 666, 670, 
184 N.W.2d 899 (1971), and State v. Moore, 97 Wis. 2d 669, 294 
N.W.2d 551 (Ct. App. 1980), Anderson contends that the proper 
remedy for the court's failure to engage him in a colloquy is 
reversal of his conviction and remand for a new trial.  In all 
of those cases, the reviewing court found that the defendant did 
not waive his constitutional right to a jury trial, and ordered 
a new trial.  Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 573; Cleveland, 50 
Wis. 2d at 670; Moore, 97 Wis. 2d at 671.  In Livingston and 
Cleveland, the defendants themselves made no statement——written 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
13 
 
or oral——waiving the right to a jury trial.  Livingston, 159 
Wis. 2d at 565; Cleveland, 50 Wis. 2d at 669.  In Moore, the 
circuit court engaged the defendant in a short colloquy, 
informing the defendant of his right to a jury trial, but the 
court never asked the defendant if he wanted a jury trial or 
wished to waive it.  97 Wis. 2d at 670.  Based on these cases, 
Anderson argues that the circuit court erred by failing to 
engage him in a colloquy to establish his willingness and intent 
to give up his right to a jury trial, before accepting the 
written waiver.  See Krueger v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 272, 282, 267 
N.W.2d 602 (1978).   
¶21 The State contends that a personal colloquy is not a 
statutory 
or 
constitutional 
requirement. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. § 972.02(1) does not specifically require a colloquy, and 
there is nothing in the record to suggest Anderson's waiver was 
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  The State argues that 
Anderson's failure to protest the bench trial, after defense 
counsel informed the court of the jury trial waiver, should be 
construed as "knowing acquiescence."  The State also argues that 
if the court retains any doubt about whether Anderson's waiver 
was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, the proper remedy is a 
remand for an evidentiary hearing, rather than reversal of his 
conviction.   
¶22 The State contends that Livingston, Cleveland, and 
Moore do not apply here because unlike the defendants in those 
cases, Anderson's signed waiver is a personal, affirmative step 
to waive his right to a jury trial.  According to the State, 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
14 
 
this case is similar to State v. Grant, 230 Wis. 2d 90, 601 
N.W.2d 8 
(Ct. 
App. 
1999), 
where 
the 
defendant 
took 
an 
affirmative step——a brief personal colloquy on the issue of 
waiver——and the proper remedy was an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary regarding the jury unanimity requirement.  In Grant, 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
relied 
on 
State 
v. 
Klessig, 
211 
Wis. 2d 194, 207, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), and adopted the 
familiar State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986), procedure as the appropriate remedy when the circuit 
court fails to advise a defendant of the jury unanimity 
requirement.  230 Wis. 2d at 96, 100. 
¶23 We conclude that without a personal colloquy, we are 
unable to determine that Anderson's jury trial waiver is 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.9  The right to a jury trial 
is a fundamental right.  State v. Villarreal, 153 Wis. 2d 323, 
                                                 
9 We 
disagree 
with 
the 
dissent's 
application of the 
"totality of facts and circumstances" test to determine the 
validity of Anderson's jury trial waiver.  Dissent at ¶58.  The 
dissent gets this test from State v. Burns, 226 Wis. 2d 762, 
774, 594 N.W.2d 799 (1999), where this court stated, "that the 
only inference possible from the totality of the facts and 
circumstances of this case is that this defendant intended to 
plead no contest."  We decline to engage in a similar analysis 
because, unlike here, in Burns the circuit court engaged the 
defendant in a lengthy personal colloquy, see id. at 767, and 
the defendant signed a plea questionnaire and waiver of rights 
form.  Id. at 766-767.  In contrast, while Anderson signed a 
jury trial waiver form, the circuit court did not engage 
Anderson in any personal colloquy regarding his decision to 
waive his right to a jury trial.  Based on the facts presented 
here, we therefore, disagree with the dissent's "totality of 
facts and circumstances" analysis. 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
15 
 
326, 450 N.W.2d 519 (Ct. App. 1989).  As noted previously, this 
court has held that "[t]he right to a trial by jury is one of 
the rights that is 'so fundamental to the concept of fair and 
impartial decision making, that their relinquishment must meet 
the standard set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 
(1938).'"  Resio, 148 Wis. 2d at 694.  The waiver of a jury 
trial therefore must be an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege.  Id.  While 
Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) establishes the procedure for waiving the 
right to a jury trial, the statutory requirements are not 
sufficient to determine whether a defendant's waiver is knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  Therefore, based on our recognition 
that a jury trial involves a fundamental right, we mandate the 
use of a personal colloquy in every case where a criminal 
defendant seeks to waive his or her right to a jury trial.10  A 
colloquy is the clearest means of determining that the defendant 
is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his right 
to a jury trial, and a colloquy documents the valid waiver for 
postconviction motions and appellate proceedings.  As we stated 
in Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 206, "a properly conducted colloquy 
serves the dual purposes of ensuring that a defendant is not 
                                                 
10 We disagree with the dissent's conclusion that our 
decision 
to 
mandate 
a 
colloquy 
conflicts 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1), and makes compliance with the statute 
irrelevant.  Dissent at ¶¶42, 50.  Rather, a colloquy enhances 
the statutory requirements because we conclude that a colloquy 
is the best procedure to determine that a defendant is 
knowingly, 
intelligently 
and 
voluntarily 
relinquishing 
a 
fundamental right. 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
16 
 
deprived of his constitutional rights and of efficiently 
guarding our scarce judicial resources." 
¶24 To prove a valid jury trial waiver, the circuit court 
must conduct a colloquy designed to ensure that the defendant:  
(1) made a deliberate choice, absent threats or promises, to 
proceed without a jury trial; (2) was aware of the nature of a 
jury trial, such that it consists of a panel of 12 people that 
must agree on all elements of the crime charged; (3) was aware 
of the nature of a court trial, such that the judge will make a 
decision on whether or not he or she is guilty of the crime 
charged; and (4) had enough time to discuss this decision with 
his or her attorney.  See Wisconsin Judicial Benchbook, vol. 1, 
CR 
22-3 
through 
22-6 
(2d 
ed. 
2001). 
 
As 
with 
other 
constitutional rights, "If the circuit court fails to conduct a 
colloquy, a reviewing court may not find, based on the record, 
that there was a valid waiver . . . ."  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 
206 (involving waiver of right to counsel). 
¶25 We now turn to the facts before us, and what is the 
proper remedy when the circuit court fails to conduct an 
adequate colloquy.  We hold that the circuit court must hold an 
evidentiary hearing on whether the waiver of the right to a jury 
trial was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  The per se rule 
of requiring a new trial, based on Livingston, does not apply 
here 
because 
Anderson's 
written 
waiver 
was 
a 
personal 
affirmative step to waive his right to a jury trial.  The 
evidentiary hearing procedure we adopt is already followed to 
determine whether a defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
17 
 
and voluntary; see Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274, and to determine 
whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel; see Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 207.  
Accordingly, as the circuit court did not conduct a personal 
colloquy in this case, it must now hold an evidentiary hearing 
to determine whether Anderson knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. 
¶26 The evidentiary hearing procedure we adopt today stems 
from the procedure for resolving guilty plea waivers and has 
been extended to resolution of waivers of the right to counsel.  
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 207. The same approach is appropriate 
here.  "Nonwaiver is presumed unless waiver is affirmatively 
shown to be knowing, intelligent and voluntary."  Id. at 204.  
The State has the burden of overcoming the presumption of 
nonwaiver, and is required to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence 
that 
Anderson's 
jury 
trial 
waiver 
was 
knowing, 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
18 
 
intelligent, and voluntary.11  See id. at 207.  If the State is 
able to satisfy its burden, the conviction will stand.  If the 
State is unable to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his right to a jury trial, the defendant is entitled to a 
new trial. 
¶27 The State makes one final argument with regard to an 
evidentiary hearing.  The State contends that even if we find 
that an evidentiary hearing is the proper remedy, Anderson is 
not entitled to a hearing, because he has failed to allege that 
he did not know or understand the right he was waiving when he 
executed the written jury trial waiver.  See State v. Giebel, 
198 Wis. 2d 207, 217, 541 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1995).  However, 
the facts of this case demonstrate that Anderson was having 
                                                 
11 We adopt the clear and convincing burden of proof from 
our decision in State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 207, 564 
N.W.2d 716 (1997), involving waiver of the right to counsel.  We 
held that the State is required to prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the defendant's waiver of counsel was 
knowing, intelligent and voluntary.  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 
207; see also State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986) (requiring State to show clear and convincing 
evidence that defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary).  We further held that the clear and convincing 
evidence standard would satisfy the State's burden of overcoming 
the presumption of non-waiver.  Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 207.  
While we recognize that this burden of proof is sometimes stated 
as clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence, we state the 
burden of proof as applied in Klessig and Bangert, clear and 
convincing evidence.  See Wis JI——Criminal 140A (burden of proof 
in forfeiture actions); see also City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 
Wis. 2d 11, 22, 291 N.W.2d 452 (1980).  For these reasons, we 
adopt 
the 
clear 
and 
convincing 
standard 
of 
proof 
for 
establishing that a defendant's jury trial waiver was knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary. 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
19 
 
difficulty communicating with his attorneys, and that prior to 
accepting the jury trial waiver the court admonished Anderson 
stating, "All I need from you is for you to do what I tell you 
to do when I tell you to do it."  Under such circumstances, we 
find it appropriate to remand this case to determine whether 
Anderson's jury trial waiver was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary. 
III 
¶28 In sum, we conclude that while the court's acceptance 
of 
Anderson's 
jury 
trial 
waiver 
did 
not 
violate 
Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) on its face, Anderson's written waiver is 
insufficient to establish that he knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.  We reject 
Anderson's argument that his jury trial waiver is invalid 
because the record lacks the required approval of the court and 
consent by the State.  The court approved Anderson's jury trial 
waiver by accepting the waiver on the record, scheduling a bench 
trial, and subsequently conducting a bench trial in this case.  
The State also consented to Anderson's jury trial waiver by 
participating in a bench trial without voicing any objection.  
Because Anderson requested a bench trial, and subsequently 
received a bench trial, we hold that he cannot rely on the 
State's silence to invalidate his jury trial waiver. 
¶29 Although Anderson submitted a written jury trial 
waiver form, we find that the circuit court erred by failing to 
engage Anderson in a personal colloquy regarding the jury trial 
waiver.  Recognizing that a jury trial involves a fundamental 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
20 
 
right, we mandate the use of a personal colloquy in every case 
where a criminal defendant seeks to waive his or her right to a 
jury trial.  We explicitly rely on Klessig, where we faced 
circumstances similar to those presented here, and we mandated 
the use of a colloquy in every case where a defendant seeks to 
waive his or her right to counsel.12  A colloquy is the clearest 
means 
of 
determining 
that 
the 
defendant 
is 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his right to a jury 
trial, 
and 
a 
colloquy 
documents 
the 
valid 
waiver 
for 
postconviction motions and appellate proceedings.  Because the 
circuit court did not engage Anderson in a personal colloquy, we 
remand this case to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing 
                                                 
12 The dissent contends that we are simply mandating a new 
rule without explaining our source of authority.  Dissent at 
¶46.  The dissent, however, ignores our reliance on State v. 
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 206, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), where this 
court similarly mandated the use of a colloquy in every case 
where a defendant seeks to waive his or her right to counsel.  
As stated above, we explicitly rely on Klessig for our authority 
to mandate a colloquy where a criminal defendant seeks to waive 
his or her right to a jury trial.  Although not explicit in 
Klessig, the court seemed to rely on our superintending 
authority 
in 
Article 
VII, 
Section 
3 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution to mandate 
a 
colloquy 
in that 
case. 
 Our 
superintending authority "enables the court to control the 
course of ordinary litigation in the lower courts" and "is as 
broad 
and 
as 
flexible 
as 
necessary 
to 
insure 
the 
due 
administration 
of 
justice." 
 
Arneson 
v. 
Jezwinski, 
206 
Wis. 2d 217, 226, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996) (quoted source omitted).  
As demonstrated by our holding in Klessig, our superintending 
authority is broad enough to require a colloquy where a 
defendant seeks to waive a fundamental right.  Accordingly, we 
rely on Klessig for our authority to mandate a colloquy where a 
defendant seeks to waive his or her right to a jury trial. 
No. 00-1563-CR    
 
21 
 
to determine whether Anderson knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
1
 
¶30 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (dissenting).  Tyran Anderson 
asked the court to review this case to resolve a conflict 
between the court of appeals decision in State v. Hoffman, (No. 
98-3101-CR, January 18, 2000) and the single-judge court of 
appeals decision here, both unpublished. 
¶31 In Hoffman, the defendant signed a written waiver of 
trial by jury and the case proceeded to a bench trial.  There 
was no colloquy with the defendant on the record before trial 
and no explicit expression of approval by the court or consent 
by the state.  The court of appeals determined that the absence 
of an oral colloquy to determine whether the defendant was 
making a voluntary and knowing choice to give up his right to a 
jury trial made his waiver "constitutionally infirm."  Moreover, 
the court ruled that the failure of the circuit court and 
district attorney to take affirmative action to approve or 
consent 
to 
the 
defendant's 
waiver 
violated 
Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1), citing Spiller v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 372, 
182 N.W.2d 242 (1971).  The remedy for these deficiencies, the 
court said, was a new trial, not a remand for a hearing, 
pursuant 
to 
Krueger 
v. 
State, 
84 
Wis. 2d 272, 
282, 
267 
N.W.2d 602 (1978); State v. Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d 561, 573, 
464 N.W.2d 839 (1991); and State v. Moore, 97 Wis. 2d 669, 671, 
294 N.W.2d 551 (Ct. App. 1980). 
¶32 In State v. Anderson, No. 00-1563-CR, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2000), Judge Ted Wedemeyer came to 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
2
contrary conclusions on these issues, creating an intradistrict 
conflict for this court to resolve. 
¶33 The majority opinion appears to strike a middle ground 
between the two decisions.  Yet, in doing so, it opens the door 
to a substantial body of new and troublesome law.  Because I 
agree with Judge Wedemeyer's reasoning and conclusions and 
disagree with the majority's decision to reverse his decision, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶34 The Wisconsin Constitution provides for waiver of jury 
trial in Article I, Section 5: "The right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law . . . but 
a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the 
manner prescribed by law" (emphasis added). 
¶35 The legislature prescribed the manner of waiving a 
jury trial in Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1).  The statute reads: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, criminal 
cases shall be tried by a jury selected as prescribed 
in s. 805.08, unless the defendant waives a jury in 
writing or by statement in open court . . . on the 
record, with the approval of the court and the consent 
of the state (emphasis added). 
¶36 Section 972.02(1) dates back to 1970.  § 63, ch. 255, 
Laws of 1969 (effective July 1, 1970).  This section, in turn, 
was preceded by several earlier statutes, Wis. Stat. § 957.01 
(1959), § 357.01 (1925), and § 4687 (1911), which contained 
similar 
language 
authorizing 
jury 
waivers 
in 
writing.  
Consequently, Wisconsin statutory law has approved jury waivers 
in writing for close to a century. 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
3
¶37 Any question whether Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) is linked 
to Article I, Section 5 was settled in Dascenzo v. State, 26 
Wis. 2d 225, 132 N.W.2d 231 (1965).  In a previous case, 
Jennings v. State, 134 Wis. 307, 114 N.W. 492 (1908), this court 
held that an accused could not waive the right to trial by jury 
in the absence of legislation providing for waiver.  The court 
said: "If it is deemed good public policy to extend the 
privilege of waiving a jury in criminal cases, such policy 
should find expression in appropriate legislative action."  
Jennings, 134 Wis. at 310.  Thereafter, the legislature passed a 
statute——identified in Dascenzo as Wis. Stat. § 957.01(2), the 
immediate predecessor to Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1)——that prescribed 
the manner of waiving a jury trial. 
¶38 This court later interpreted the jury trial waiver 
statute to permit a defendant's attorney to waive a jury trial 
on behalf of a defendant, on the theory that the presence and 
silent acquiescence of the defendant demonstrated the attorney's 
authority and made the attorney's statement the defendant's own.  
Dascenzo, 26 Wis. 2d at 230; State ex rel. Derber v. Skaff, 22 
Wis. 2d 269, 274, 125 N.W.2d 561 (1964).  But in 1978, the court 
overruled Derber and Dascenzo.  In Krueger, the court said: 
 
[W]e now overrule State ex rel. Derber v. Skaff and 
Dascenzo v. State insofar as they permit a trial 
court . . . to presume from a defendant's silence that 
a waiver of the jury trial made by counsel is an 
expression of the defendant's knowing and voluntary 
intent.  Even if it is reasonable to assume that most 
defense attorneys will inform a client of the right 
and its meaning to the defendant, it seems wholly 
unreasonable to expect a defendant who does not 
understand these matters to contradict a waiver made 
by his attorney.  We hold that the record must 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
4
support, without the aid of these presumptions, the 
conclusion 
that 
the 
defendant 
in 
fact 
made 
a 
knowledgeable and voluntary choice. 
 
 . . . .  
 
[W]e 
further 
hold 
that 
henceforth 
a 
record 
demonstrating the defendant's willingness and intent 
to give up the right to be tried by a jury must be 
established before the waiver is accepted.  We do not 
at this time adopt a formal procedure to be followed 
in making such a record. 
Krueger, 84 Wis. 2d at 281-82 (citations omitted). 
 
¶39 The court clarified the law in State v. Livingston.  
The 
Krueger 
decision 
had 
made 
no 
reference 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1).  Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 568.  
However, the Livingston court explained that the court's 
"reasoning underlying Krueger and the legislature's reasoning in 
enacting sec. 972.02(1), Stats., are coextensive in relevant 
part.  That is, what was said in Krueger with regard to waiver 
of trial by jury is directly applicable to sec. 972.02(1)."  Id. 
 
¶40 The court then quoted with approval a passage from 
State v. Moore, 97 Wis. 2d at 671-72: "Our supreme court and our 
legislature . . . have taken a strict per se position; that is, 
waiver must be in writing or by oral statement in open court.  
We must abide by that rule."  Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 569. 
 
¶41 Summing up, the Livingston court said that any waiver 
of the defendant's right to trial by jury must be made by an 
affirmative act of the defendant:  
 
The 
defendant 
must 
act 
personally . . . . 
The 
affirmative 
act 
by 
the 
defendant, 
in 
order 
to 
constitute a personal waiver, must be such as to 
comply with at least one of the specific means of 
effecting a waiver provided in sec. 972.02(1). . . . 
If the defendant waives the jury "in writing" under 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
5
the statute when accepting the written waiver, the 
judge still should question the defendant as to the 
voluntariness and understanding of his action. 
Id. at 569-70 (emphasis added). 
 
¶42 The Livingston court described the best practice to 
follow in addition to compliance with the statute.  Now the 
majority goes beyond the articulation and urging of the best 
practice to mandate a new rule that conflicts with the statute. 
II 
 
¶43 Conceivably, this court could have held that the 
United 
States 
Constitution 
or 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
requires a colloquy between a defendant and the court before the 
defendant may waive the right to jury trial.  However, such a 
conclusion would not have been well founded and would have been 
embarrassingly 
inconsistent 
with 
many 
previous 
court 
pronouncements.  Thus, the court did not pursue that path. 
¶44 Alternatively, the court could have reasoned that the 
statute was sufficiently ambiguous that adding new requirements 
for an effective waiver would not conflict with the statutory 
text.  But that position would not have been tenable because the 
statutory language is clear.   
¶45 Finally, the court could have tried to rely upon its 
superintending authority contained in Article VII, Section 3(1) 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.  But this court's superintending 
authority over all courts is case specific, contemplating the 
use of supervisory writs and individual relief.  It does not 
empower this court to rewrite statutes in individual cases to 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
6
effect some judicial objective.13  The supreme court may modify 
or suspend a statute relating to pleading, practice, and 
procedure when the court promulgates a rule pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 751.12.14  But that procedure is entirely different 
                                                 
13 Article VII, Section 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution 
states that "[t]he supreme court shall have superintending and 
administrative authority over all courts."  This language is 
based in large part upon the same section of the 1848 
constitution: 
"The 
supreme 
court 
shall 
have 
a 
general 
superintending control over all inferior courts; it shall have 
power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo 
warranto, certiorari, and other original and remedial writs, and 
to hear and determine the same."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3 
(1849).  See Revised Statutes of Wisconsin (1849) at 28-29. 
Neither the old constitutional language nor the new 
constitutional language empowers this court, as part of its 
superintending authority, to rewrite statutes in individual 
decisions.  The superintending authority over all courts 
embodies 
authority 
"to 
control 
the 
course 
of 
ordinary 
litigation" in inferior courts, State ex rel. Fourth Nat'l Bank 
of Philadelphia v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 613, 79 N.W. 1081 
(1899); it does not authorize the court to erase a valid 
exercise of legislative power in an opinion. 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.12, Rules of pleading and practice, 
provides in relevant part:  
The state supreme court shall, by rules promulgated by 
it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice and 
procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for 
the purpose of simplifying the same and of promoting 
the 
speedy determination 
of 
litigation 
upon its 
merits.  The rules shall not abridge, enlarge or 
modify the substantive rights of any litigant. . . .  
All 
statutes 
relating 
to 
pleading, practice and 
procedure may be modified or suspended by rules 
promulgated under this section.  No rule modifying or 
suspending such statutes may be adopted until the 
court has held a public hearing with reference to the 
rule. 
Wis. Stat. § 751.12 (emphasis added). 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
7
from supplementing statutes with judicial mandates whenever the 
court thinks it can do a better job than the legislature. 
¶46 Hence, the majority simply mandates a new rule without 
explaining its source of authority: 
 
The 
right 
to 
a 
jury 
trial 
is 
a 
fundamental 
right. . . . As noted previously, this court has held 
that "[t]he right to a trial by jury is one of the 
rights that is 'so fundamental to the concept of fair 
and 
impartial 
decision 
making, 
that 
their 
relinquishment must meet the standard set forth in 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).'"  [State v.] 
Resio, [148 Wis. 2d 687, 694, 436 N.W.2d 603 (1989)].  
The waiver of a jury trial therefore must be an 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilege.  Id.  While Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) 
establishes the procedure for waiving the right to a 
jury 
trial, 
the 
statutory 
requirements 
are 
not 
sufficient to determine whether a defendant's waiver 
is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Therefore, 
based on our recognition that a jury trial involves a 
fundamental right, we mandate the use of a personal 
colloquy in every case where a criminal defendant 
seeks to waive his or her right to a jury trial. 
Majority op. at ¶23. 
 
¶47 In this passage, the majority seeks to draw a sharp 
distinction between the procedure for making a waiver (waiver 
"in writing" or waiver "by statement in open court") and a 
requirement that the waiver be knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.  In the process, it disregards Article I, Section 5, 
and it renders Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) meaningless. 
 
¶48 In this new regimen, there is no presumption that a 
written waiver or a waiver by statement in open court by the 
defendant is adequate.  Standing alone, neither is deemed 
adequate.  In fact, a waiver "in writing" and a waiver by 
"statement in open court" together are inadequate because, 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
8
according to the majority, "we mandate the use of a personal 
colloquy in every case."  Majority op. at ¶23. 
 
¶49 This holding elevates ritual over common sense.  It 
places past convictions in jeopardy, and it creates landmines 
for future cases. 
¶50 First, 
as 
noted, 
the 
decision 
makes 
Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) irrelevant because compliance with the 
statute means absolutely nothing.  This is contrary to our 
decision in Livingston and other cases. 
¶51 Second, the decision appears to change the law with 
respect to knowing and voluntary waiver of a jury trial.  In 
State v. Resio, 148 Wis. 2d 687, 691, 436 N.W.2d 603 (1989), the 
court reviewed a case in which there was a colloquy with the 
defendant in connection with his waiver of a jury trial, but the 
defendant was not made aware of the requirement that a verdict 
in a jury trial must be unanimous.  The court affirmed the 
waiver, saying: 
 
We agree with the Seventh Circuit in United States ex 
rel. Williams v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1072 (1984), that a 
defendant's waiver of the right to a trial by jury is 
valid when he or she understands the basic "purpose 
and function" of a jury trial. . . .  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 . . . [T]he key feature of the right to a jury 
trial is that the defendant's case is tried before a 
group of twelve fellow citizens in the community 
rather than by a single state judicial official.  When 
a 
defendant 
waives 
the 
right 
to 
a 
jury 
trial 
understanding that his or her guilt or innocence will 
be determined by a single judge rather than by a group 
of twelve lay persons, that waiver is valid and 
effective. 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
9
Id. at 695-96 (emphasis added).  The emphasized language in 
Resio cannot be viewed as a correct statement of law after 
today's decision. 
¶52 Third, the majority's new rule is at odds with recent 
precedent.  For example, in State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 
230, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998), the court held that Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution guarantees the right to 
a jury of 12 persons in all criminal cases, striking down a 
state statute that mandated six-person juries in misdemeanor 
cases.  The court reversed Hansford's conviction for obstructing 
an officer because he had timely filed a motion for a 12-person 
jury.  But then in State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶26, 235 Wis. 
2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727, the court held that a defendant waived 
his right to a 12-person jury because both the defendant and his 
counsel failed to request a 12-person jury or to object to a 
six-person jury.  They took no affirmative action; their silence 
constituted waiver.  Was the Huebner decision incorrect? 
¶53 In another case, State v. Burns, 226 Wis. 2d 762, 594 
N.W.2d 799 (1999), this court considered the question whether 
Wis. Stat. § 972.13(1) requires that a defendant expressly and 
personally articulate a plea of guilty or no contest on the 
record in open court in order for a judgment of conviction to be 
entered on the plea.  The record in Burns was clear that the 
defendant was never directly asked the question: "How do you 
plead?" and that he never stated his plea to the charged offense 
on the record.  Id.  Nonetheless, the court affirmed his 
conviction because it concluded that the only inference possible 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
10
from the totality of the facts and circumstances in the record 
was that the defendant intended to plead no contest.  Id. at 
764. 
¶54 The court spoke of its concerns about pleas: 
 
[T]his court has deep and continuing concerns about 
affirming a conviction based on a plea of guilty or no 
contest when the defendant has not expressly and 
personally articulated the plea on the record in open 
court.  Pleading guilty or no contest is a serious 
event, a "serious and sobering occasion."  By entering 
such pleas, defendants relieve the state of the heavy 
burden of proving their guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  They also give up important constitutional 
rights [such as trial by jury] . . . .  A defendant 
expressly and personally pleading guilty or no contest 
on the record in open court is the best way for a 
circuit court to assure itself that the defendant has 
personally made the decision to so plead. 
Id. at 764-65.  Nonetheless, the Burns court did not rely on 
ritualistic words.  It looked to the totality of the facts and 
circumstances to determine the defendant's intent to plead.15 
 
¶55 In Burns, the court spoke of the best practice for the 
circuit court in taking a plea: 
 
 
Recognizing the circuit courts' responsibility to 
do justice and to manage caseloads efficiently, this 
court urges circuit courts to follow the usual and 
strongly 
preferred 
practice 
of 
asking 
defendants 
directly and personally in open court and on the 
record how they plead to the charged offenses and of 
entering the pleas on the record. 
Id. at 765.  The court offered a similar admonition on jury 
waivers in Livingston, 159 Wis. 2d at 570, as previously 
discussed in this dissent.  
                                                 
15 As here, the defendant in Burns had a competent attorney 
at his side during the relevant proceedings.  That is one of the 
facts and circumstances that ought to be considered. 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
11
 
¶56 There are sound policy reasons for plea colloquies and 
jury waiver colloquies on the record in open court.  This court 
is 
authorized 
to 
utilize 
the 
rule-making 
procedures 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 751.12 to require these colloquies as a matter of 
statutory law.  That is very different, however, from overriding 
the terms of a statute in judicial opinions whenever the court 
is moved to do so. 
 
¶57 In 
my 
view, 
this 
court 
ought 
to 
follow 
Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) by giving a presumption of validity to a 
jury waiver "in writing" or a jury waiver "by statement in open 
court."  I agree with the proposition that a colloquy to 
determine whether the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary is desirable and should be encouraged.  But a 
defendant who waives the right to trial by jury "in writing" or 
"by 
statement 
in 
open 
court" 
while 
benefiting 
from 
the 
assistance of counsel——and then has a bench trial——should be 
required to make a prima facie showing that his or her waiver 
was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary before he or she is 
entitled to a hearing.  The defendant should not be given an 
automatic new trial, as was afforded in Hoffman. 
III 
 
¶58 The totality of facts and circumstances in this case 
leaves no doubt that Tyran Anderson's waiver of a jury trial was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.  Hence, no additional 
hearing is required.  The circuit court's findings should be 
affirmed. 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
12
 
¶59 Anderson 
was charged 
with 
disorderly 
conduct on 
December 9, 1998, for an incident that occurred the previous 
November 18.  The charge was later amended to battery.  From 
Anderson's initial appearance on December 9, 1998, to November 
10, 1999, when Anderson's case was tried to the court, Anderson 
appeared in court at least 11 times.  He was always represented 
by counsel. 
 
¶60 The 
record 
reveals 
that 
the 
presiding 
judicial 
officers 
mentioned 
jury 
trial 
repeatedly 
during 
these 
appearances.  On January 26, 1999, Anderson's attorney requested 
a jury trial date.  The court scheduled jury trials for March 
25, 1999, then June 23, 1999, then September 16, 1999, but all 
had to be rescheduled for various reasons, with discussion and 
explanation in the presence of the defendant. 
 
¶61 On October 13, 1999, Circuit Judge Mary Kuhnmuench 
scheduled a jury trial for November 10, 1999.  The court engaged 
in an extensive colloquy with the defendant.  The following 
passages are part of that colloquy: 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I am sorry the Court has to deal with 
something 
like 
this, 
even 
though 
it 
is 
fictitious. . . .  I intend going to trial with it.  
Even if the case was reissued as a battery, I still 
intend on going on with the case to prove my 
innocence . . . .  I haven't gathered everything I 
need yet.  The conflicting statements that [the 
complainant] 
made 
in 
my 
revocation 
hearing, 
conflicting statements that she made on the police 
report, on the victim/witness report, and things like 
that.   
 
I intend on pursuing this case to the full 
extent, battery, disorderly or whatever. . . .  
 
. . . .  
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
13
 
THE COURT: 
All right.  We will give you a jury 
trial date, and Mr. Connors remains as your attorney 
of record and will represent you in this matter at 
jury. . . .  
 
. . . [Y]ou are to have absolutely no contact 
with 
[the 
complainant] . . . until 
this 
case 
is 
resolved through either a jury trial or with a guilty 
or not guilty verdict. 
 
 
. . . .  
 
. . . If you violate that, don't come back to me 
and say, "I didn't understand what you meant, Judge."  
You seem to be an articulate and intelligent man.  You 
understand fully what I am saying to you here. . . .  
 
THE DEFENDANT: No contact will be made. 
 
THE COURT: 
All right.  Very good.  We will give 
you a jury trial date. 
 
¶62 On the date set for jury trial, all parties appeared 
before Judge Kuhnmuench.  Attorney Scott Connors had been given 
additional time to confer with the defendant before the pre-
trial hearing.  Attorney Connors said he expected to call the 
defendant in his own defense, necessitating a discussion of the 
defendant's 
criminal 
record 
in 
relation 
to 
anticipated 
impeachment before the jury.  Anderson had two convictions for 
robbery, 
two 
convictions 
for 
burglary, 
a 
conviction 
for 
receiving 
stolen 
property, 
and 
a 
felony 
conviction 
for 
intimidation of a witness.  There was no dispute about the 
number of convictions, which Connors said he had discussed with 
the defendant.  Counsel also discussed jury instructions. 
 
¶63 Then, in the presence of the defendant, the following 
exchange occurred: 
 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
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ATTORNEY CONNORS: 
One quick matter.  There is——I've 
discussed the possibility with Mr. Anderson of having 
a bench trial instead of a jury trial, and it's my 
understanding there's a very good possibility at 1:00 
that we could have a bench trial.  Would that be a 
problem? 
 
THE COURT: 
Not at all, but I'm bringing the jury 
up anyway, and I'm going to require you to have a 
waiver of the jury trial form in the file (emphasis 
added). 
 
¶64 After a recess, court reconvened.  The defendant had 
submitted a signed form that read as follows: 
 
 
And now comes the above named defendant, and in 
his own proper person hereby expressly waives trial by 
a jury and consents to immediate trial before the 
court without a jury. 
 
 
I will be giving up my right to have my case 
decided by 12 people sitting as a jury; I understand 
that all 12 of those people would have to agree in 
order to reach a verdict. 
 
¶65 In the presence of Tyran Anderson and his attorney, 
the court then stated: 
 
The Court is in receipt of a waiver of trial by 
jury that is signed and dated today's date.  The court 
will receive it and enter it in the trial as a knowing 
and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial.  We 
will 
proceed 
with 
a 
bench 
trial 
at 
1:30 
this 
afternoon.  Are there any questions of the court? 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
¶66 There were no questions or protestations.  After a 
lunch break, the case went to trial before the court. 
 
¶67 The defendant now argues to this court that although 
he complied with the requirements of the jury waiver statute, 
his actions did not satisfy the minimum requirements of other 
law.  The majority responds that it cannot tell on this record 
whether 
Anderson's 
waiver 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, 
and 
No. 00-1563.dtp 
 
 
 
15
voluntary.  Ironically, it makes this statement at the same time 
it concludes that by silently going forward, the state clearly 
demonstrated its consent to waive a jury trial. 
 
¶68 I disagree with the majority's conclusion.  Tyran 
Anderson was an experienced participant in the criminal justice 
system with six criminal convictions and a revocation of 
probation.  After his eleventh court appearance in this case, 
with counsel at his side through every step of the proceedings, 
Anderson signed an explicit jury waiver form that had been 
developed for use in the courts of Milwaukee County in 
compliance with Wis. Stat. § 972.02(1) and case law.  His 
counsel represented on the record to the court that he and the 
defendant had discussed the possibility of waiving a jury trial.  
Anderson never disputed that assertion.  On the contrary, he 
affirmed 
his 
attorney's 
statement 
by 
signing 
the 
form.  
Thereafter, in the defendant's presence, the circuit court found 
the waiver knowing and voluntary.  The defendant was asked if he 
had questions and he had none.  One likely motive for the 
defendant's jury waiver was his intent to testify, recognizing 
that six criminal convictions would tend to undercut the 
credibility of his testimony before a jury. 
 
¶69 The record in this case contains overwhelming evidence 
that Tyran Anderson made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver of his right to a jury trial.  See Resio, 148 Wis. 2d at 
695-96.  Because the majority reaches a different conclusion and 
because the majority initiates other actions that I cannot 
support, I respectfully dissent. 
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