Case Title: State ex rel. Gemind v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1998-Ohio-214

Docket Number: 19952592

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. GEMIND, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, 
APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Gemind v. Indus. Comm. (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission’s order denying application for 
permanent total disability compensation an abuse of discretion when Noll 
requirements not met — Cause returned to commission for further 
consideration and amended order. 
(No. 95-2592 — Submitted May 26, 1998 — Decided July 29, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD12-1745. 
 
On April 19, 1989, appellant, Michael T. Gemind, sustained injuries in the 
course of and arising from his employment as a concrete finisher with Parsons 
Cement Contractor.  Appellant’s injuries occurred when a floor where he was 
working collapsed, causing him to fall two stories to a floor below.  A workers’ 
compensation claim resulting from the fall was recognized for “fractured vertebra 
T11-12, multiple contusions and abrasions entire body.” 
 
In 1994, appellant filed an application for permanent and total disability 
compensation.  In the application, appellant noted, among other things, that he had 
not worked since the date of his injuries and that he had been a cement finisher 
since the age of thirteen.  In support of his application, appellant submitted a letter 
from Harry O’Dell, M.D., dated August 20, 1993.  Dr. O’Dell concluded that 
appellant’s injuries have rendered him “permanently and totally disabled.”  Dr. 
O’Dell also stated that “I do not anticipate that he [appellant] will return to gainful 
occupation.” 
 
On September 21, 1994, appellant was examined by George A. Hunter, 
M.D., on behalf of appellee, Industrial Commission of Ohio.  In his report, Dr. 
Hunter found that appellant was incapable of returning to his former job duties.  
 
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However, Dr. Hunter concluded that appellant “would be able to work at a more 
sedentary type of occupation not requiring long periods of standing, walking, or 
bending.  This would be a position requiring sitting with intermittent periods of 
short standing.”  Dr. Hunter assessed the medical impairment for appellant’s 
injuries at thirty-four percent. 
 
Appellant was also examined by Zouhair C. Yassine, M.D.  In his report, 
dated August 19, 1993, Dr. Yassine concluded that appellant’s medical condition 
was permanent, that he had reached maximum medical improvement with respect 
to his injuries, and that appellant would not benefit from additional rehabilitation 
efforts.  Dr. Yassine also opined that appellant could not return to his former job, 
but could engage in sustained remunerative employment of a sedentary nature. 
 
On November 10, 1994, the commission conducted a hearing on appellant’s 
application for permanent total disability compensation.  Thereafter, the 
commission denied the application, stating, in part: 
 
“The reports of Drs. O’Dell and Hunter were reviewed and evaluated.  This 
order is based particularly upon the report(s) [sic] of Dr. Hunter. 
 
“Dr. Hunter examined the claimant and found that the claimant 
demonstrated decreased range of motion in the dorsal and lumbar spine.  The 
lumbar muscles were noted to be tight and with forward bending, there was more 
spasm in the muscles on the right side than on the left side.  Straight leg raising 
was negative bilaterally and the claimant had normal range of motion of the hip.  
Dr. Hunter opined that the claimant would be unable to return to his former 
position of employment as a cement finisher.  The claimant would be able to 
engage in more sedentary occupations not requiring long periods of standing, 
walking or bending.  Suitable occupations would require sitting with intermittent 
or short standing. 
 
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“The claimant submitted the report of Dr. O’Dell, dated 8-20-93.  This 
report was not signed, therefore, it does not constitute evidence upon which the 
Staff Hearing Officers can rely upon in making this decision. 
 
“Claimant is 48 years old and he completed the 9th grade.  He does not have 
a G.E.D.  He cannot read, write or do basic math well.  The Statement of Facts 
indicates that the claimant cannot read or write at all, however, his Permanent and 
Total Application says he can. 
 
“Based upon the report of Dr. Hunter, the Hearing Officers find that the 
claimant is capable of sedentary-to-light work activities.  His primary limitations 
are with standing and bending.  Because the medical proof indicates that the 
claimant is capable of some work activity, consideration of his non-medical 
vocational factors is required. 
 
“The hearing officers find that the claimant’s past employment has consisted 
of heavy work as a cement finisher only.  This work did not yield any skills which 
could be transferable to sedentary work activities.  In light of the claimant’s 
relatively young age of 48, some consideration, the claimant’s ability to be 
retrained is appropriate.  There is no vocational report in file or any other evidence 
addressing the claimant’s ability to be retrained.  There being no evidence to the 
contrary, the Staff Hearing Officers conclude that the claimant is capable of 
obtaining his G.E.D. and undertaking retraining so as to qualify for a more 
sedentary-type of work.  There are machine operator positions in existence which 
allow the operator to stand for short periods but sit most of the time.” 
 
On December 14, 1994, appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the 
Court of Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the commission had abused its 
discretion in denying his application for permanent total disability compensation.  
The matter was initially heard by a referee (now magistrate), who concluded that 
 
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the commission’s order did not satisfy the requirements of State ex rel. Noll v. 
Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245.  The court of appeals, 
in a split decision, disagreed with the referee’s recommendation and denied the 
writ, finding that the commission set forth sufficient medical and nonmedical 
disability factors in its order to support a denial of the application and that the 
commission adequately explained the basis for its decision. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Shapiro, Kendis & Associates Co., L.P.A., and Rachel B. Jaffy, for 
appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Sandra L. Nimrick, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  The central question presented for our consideration is 
whether the court of appeals erred in determining that the commission’s order 
satisfied the requirements of Noll, supra.  For the reasons that follow, we find that 
the commission’s order failed to comply with Noll.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
Permanent total disability is the inability to engage in sustained 
remunerative employment.  State ex rel. Lawrence v. Am. Lubricants Co. (1988), 
40 Ohio St.3d 321, 322, 533 N.E.2d 344, 345, citing State ex rel. Jennings v. 
Indus. Comm. (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 101, 1 OBR 135, 438 N.E.2d 420.  Thus, in 
determining whether a claimant is permanently and totally disabled, the 
commission must consider all pertinent factors, both medical and nonmedical, that 
may impact on the claimant’s ability to continue to work.  In State ex rel. 
Stephenson v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 173, 31 OBR 369, 374, 
 
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509 N.E.2d 946, 951, we held that the commission must “look at the claimant’s 
age, education, work record, and all other factors, such as physical, psychological, 
and sociological, that are contained within the record in making its determination 
of permanent total disability.”  The commission’s consideration of the Stephenson 
factors is essential to the determination of permanent total disability, where the 
medical evidence indicates that the claimant is capable of some work and the 
nonmedical disability factors indicate that the claimant cannot realistically engage 
in sustained remunerative employment.  See, also, State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm 
(1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 315, 320, 626 N.E.2d 666, 671 (“A thorough consideration 
of the Stephenson factors is indispensable to the determination of permanent total 
disability, where a claimant’s medical capacity to do work is not dispositive and 
the claimant’s nonmedical disability factors indicate that the claimant cannot 
realistically return to the job market.”). 
 
In Noll, syllabus, we held:  “In any order of the Industrial Commission 
granting or denying benefits to a claimant, the commission must specifically state 
what evidence has been relied upon, and briefly explain the reasoning for its 
decision.”  The mandate of Noll that the commission must explain the basis for its 
decisions includes the duty of the commission to explain, in its orders, how the 
Stephenson factors, if pertinent, support the commission’s determination granting 
or denying requested benefits.  Gay, 68 Ohio St.3d at 321, 626 N.E.2d at 671.  The 
failure to comply with Noll “is equivalent to an abuse of discretion.”  State ex rel. 
Ranomer v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 134, 137, 642 N.E.2d 373, 376. 
 
In the case at bar, the commission’s order does not adequately explain how 
appellant’s nonmedical disability factors comport with the decision denying 
permanent total disability compensation.  To be sure, the commission’s findings 
 
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are inconsistent with its ultimate determination that appellant’s application be 
denied. 
 
In its order, the commission states that “the claimant’s past employment has 
consisted of heavy work as a cement finisher only” and that “[t]his work did not 
yield any skills which could be transferable to sedentary work activities.”  The 
commission also states that “[c]laimant is 48 years old and he completed the 9th 
grade.  He does not have a G.E.D.  He cannot read, write or do basic math well.”  
The commission also noted that appellant’s file does not contain a vocational 
report.  Based on the foregoing information, the commission then concluded that 
“claimant is capable of obtaining his G.E.D. and undertaking retraining so as to 
qualify for a more sedentary-type of work.” 
 
Notably, the commission cites appellant’s age and the fact that the record 
does not contain a vocational report as evidence that appellant is capable of 
obtaining his G.E.D.  According to the commission’s order, once appellant has 
obtained his G.E.D., he would then be in a position to retrain for sedentary-type 
employment. 
 
Appellant’s age may be a vocationally favorable factor.  See, generally, 
State ex rel. Wilson v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 250, 253, 685 N.E.2d 
774, 777.  However, age alone should not be the ultimate determinant as to 
whether a person has the needed proficiency to obtain a G.E.D.  Appellant does 
not have a G.E.D.  He only completed the ninth grade and he cannot read, write, or 
do basic math well.  In this regard, the commission has provided no explanation 
how appellant, given his present limited abilities, is qualified to obtain a G.E.D.  
Further, there is no vocational report within the record upon which a proper 
determination can be made that appellant has the skills necessary to provide him 
with the opportunity to return to the job market.  Id., citing State ex rel. Speelman 
 
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v. Indus. Comm. (1992), 73 Ohio App.3d 757, 762, 598 N.E.2d 192, 195 (“[T]he 
relevant vocational inquiry is ‘whether the claimant may return to the job market 
by using past employment skills or those skills which may be reasonably 
developed.’ ”).  Indeed, the specific findings by the commission with respect to 
appellant’s limited abilities are inconsistent with its ultimate conclusion that 
appellant can in fact obtain a G.E.D. and eventually return to sustained 
remunerative employment.  Clearly, the commission’s order does not satisfy the 
requirements of Noll. 
 
Having concluded that the commission’s order violates Noll, we next 
consider whether appellant is entitled to the issuance of a writ directing the 
commission to find that he is permanently and totally disabled.  In many cases 
involving Noll noncompliance, we have elected to return the cause to the 
commission for further consideration and amended order.  However, Gay offers a 
different alternative in circumstances where returning the cause to the commission 
would serve no useful purpose.  In Gay, at the syllabus, we held: 
 
“In a workers’ compensation case involving permanent total disability, 
where the facts of the case indicate that there is a substantial likelihood that a 
claimant is permanently and totally disabled, courts are not and will not be 
precluded from ordering the Industrial Commission, in a mandamus action, to 
award permanent total disability benefits notwithstanding the so-called ‘some 
evidence’ rule.” 
 
Thus, having the option of deciding between Noll and Gay relief, we 
reluctantly choose the former.  We are particularly interested in any insight the 
commission may provide if it determines that appellant is not entitled to 
permanent total disability compensation.  Of course, to adequately justify its 
decision denying appellant’s application, the commission, in its order, would be 
 
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required to explain how it is that a forty-eight-year-old claimant, who has worked 
his entire working life as a cement finisher, who has not worked since 1989, who 
is incapable of returning to his former job duties, who has no transferable job 
skills, and who has limited reading, writing, and math abilities, can realistically 
return to the job market to perform some type of sedentary work. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, 
and a limited writ is issued that returns the cause to the commission for further 
consideration and amended order. 
Judgment reversed 
and limited writ allowed. 
 
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  The appropriate standard for this 
court’s review is to determine whether there is “some evidence” in the record to 
support the stated basis for the commission’s order.  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil 
Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936.  I believe the 
commission’s order adequately explained how nonmedical factors, in combination 
with Gemind’s medical impairments, permit sustained remunerative employment.  
The order discussed nonmedical factors such as his age and his ability to read and 
write as evidence of his ability to be retrained.  Gemind produced no vocational 
report or other evidence that he is incapable of being retrained. 
 
Because the record below contains “some evidence” in support of the 
commission’s order, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.