Case Title: Hertz V. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
  
____________
No. SC00-457
____________
GUERRY WAYNE HERTZ,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[November 1, 2001]
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the
death penalty upon Guerry Wayne Hertz.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §
3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment and
sentence.
In the early morning hours of July 27, 1997, the charred bodies of Melanie
King and Robin Keith Spears were found in the victims’ burning home in Wakulla
County, Florida.  Hertz, Jason Looney, and Jimmy Dempsey were each indicted for
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the first-degree murders of the victims, and each codefendant was also charged
with burglary of a dwelling while armed, armed robbery with a firearm, arson of a
dwelling, and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony as a result of this
incident.  Prior to trial, codefendant Dempsey negotiated a plea with the State and
was sentenced to consecutive life sentences in return for providing his testimony at
Hertz and Looney’s joint trial. 
The evidence presented at the trial revealed the following facts.  At
approximately 11 p.m. on July 26, 1997, Hertz and his codefendants left an
acquaintance’s house on foot within walking distance from the victims’ home.  All
three men were armed with guns.  A resident who lived about 500 yards from the
victims testified that Hertz appeared at her door at about 2 a.m. asking to use her
phone because “his truck had broken down.”  When she refused, the trio continued
down the road towards the victims’ home and, upon seeing the victims’ black
Mustang, Looney said, “There's my car right there.  That's the one I want.” 
Dempsey and Hertz went to the victims’ front door as a decoy and asked if
they could use the phone.  King provided them with a cordless phone, and
Dempsey feigned making a phone call.  When Dempsey attempted to return the
phone, Hertz pointed his gun at King and forced his way in.  Looney then entered
and pointed his rifle at Spears.  Spears and King were bound and gagged with duct
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tape and placed face down on their bed.  Hertz and his codefendants removed a
significant amount of the victims’ property, including a VCR, a television, jewelry,
furniture, and CDs, and loaded the victims’ belongings into the victims’ two
vehicles.  Looney also found approximately $1500 of the victims’ money in an
envelope, which was ultimately divided equally among the three.  
Hertz and Looney concluded that they could leave no witnesses and
informed Dempsey of their decision.  Dempsey said Hertz and Looney then poured
accelerants throughout the victims’ home.  All three men, still armed, went to the
bedroom where the victims were bound, side-by-side, face down on their bed.  
When they entered the back bedroom, King said that she would “rather die being
burnt up than shot.”  She stated, “Please, God, don’t shoot me in the head.”  Hertz
replied, “Sorry, can’t do that,” and then he proceeded to open fire; Looney
followed and then Dempsey.  The victims died as a result of the gunshot wounds.
Subsequent to the shootings, the victims’ home was set ablaze.  Hertz drove
away in the victims’ white Ford Ranger, and Looney drove the victims’ black Ford
Mustang, with Dempsey as a passenger.  According to Dempsey, the whole
episode at the victims’ home lasted about two hours.  The trio proceeded to
Hertz’s house and unloaded the stolen items and divided up the money.  Two
employees at the Wal-Mart in Tallahassee testified that the three men made
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purchases at the store at around 5 a.m. the morning of the murders, before
“showing off” their new vehicles, i.e., a black Mustang and a white Ford Ranger, to
both of the employees.  A Wal-Mart receipt for a clothing purchase was later found
in the victims’ Mustang, corroborating the employees’ testimony.
Hertz and his codefendants made their way to Daytona Beach Shores where,
later that day, they were involved in a pursuit and shootout with police.  Looney
and Dempsey were arrested after abandoning and fleeing from the victims’ black
Mustang.  Hertz abandoned the victims’ Ford Ranger after being shot, and he paid
a cabdriver $100 to drive him to his aunt’s house in St. Augustine.  Hertz was
arrested that same day in St. Augustine, and victim Spears’ .9mm gun was
recovered from Hertz’s bag.  
A firearms expert with FDLE testified that one of the bullets recovered from
the area of the victims’ burned bed was fired from the .380 Lorcin handgun
recovered from Looney at the time of his arrest in Daytona Beach, i.e., the same 
handgun owned by Keith Spears and used, according to Dempsey, by Hertz to
shoot the victims.  The other bullet was fired from a .30 caliber carbine rifle, not
inconsistent with .30 caliber rifle used by Looney to shoot the victims, and later
recovered in the victims’ Mustang.  A roll of duct tape, Looney's wallet with $464,
and Dempsey's wallet with $380 were also found in the Mustang.  A fingerprint
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analyst with FDLE analyzed latent fingerprints taken from the Mustang and
concluded that Hertz and his codefendants had all touched the car.  The chemist
found evidence of various accelerants on items of clothing found in the Mustang. 
In addition, a law enforcement investigator with the State Fire Marshal’s Office
testified that the kind of damage that was done by the fire does not happen unless
an accelerant is used. 
The state medical examiner testified that the bodies were severely burned. 
He graphically detailed the condition of the bodies as depicted in the photographs:
the legs were burned off below the knees, the hands were burned to nubs, the
bones of the arms were fractured by the fire, and the skulls were burned partially
away.  The victims had to be positively identified by dental records.  The medical
examiner also testified that there could have been other injuries that were not
detected due to the extensive burns.
King was shot at least two times in the head, which caused her death. 
However, the medical examiner was not able to trace the path of the bullet because
the skull was burned away.  He testified that it was possible that other bullets struck
the body, which could not be determined because of the fire.  King lived one to
two minutes after she was shot.  However, there was no soot in the trachea,
indicating that she was not alive when the fire started.  Spears was shot at least one
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time in the head, which caused his death.  The bullet went in the back of the neck
and exited above the right eye.  Spears also lived one to two minutes after he was
shot, and again, no soot was discovered in his trachea, meaning that he was dead at
the time of the fire.  The defense did not present any evidence.
A jury convicted both Hertz and Looney of the first-degree murders of King
and Spears, burglary of a dwelling while armed with a firearm, armed robbery with
a firearm, arson of a dwelling, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. 
By a majority vote of ten to two, for each murder, the jury recommended and
advised that the death penalty be imposed against Hertz and Looney.  By written
order, the judge imposed a sentence of death for each murder.
With respect to Hertz, the trial court found as aggravating factors that (1) the
capital felony was committed by a person convicted of a felony and who was on
felony probation; (2) the capital felony was committed by a person previously
convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to the person; (3) the capital felony was committed while Hertz was
engaged in the commission of a burglary, arson, and robbery; (4) the capital felony
was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or
effecting an escape from custody; (5) the murder was committed for financial or
pecuniary gain (the court merged this aggravating factor with the fact that the capital
1. In the four noncapital cases, the judge sentenced Hertz to life on the
burglary of a dwelling while armed (count III); life on the robbery with a firearm
(count IV); 30 years on the arson of a dwelling (count V); and 15 years for the use
of a firearm during the commission of a felony (count VI).  All sentences were
ordered to run consecutive to one another.
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felony was committed during the course of a burglary, arson, or robbery); (6) the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and (7) the murder was cold,
calculated, and premeditated without any pretense of moral or legal justification.
In mitigation, the trial court found (1) Hertz’s impaired capacity to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was given some weight; (2) his age of 20, which was given only moderate weight;
(3) as to all other nonstatutory mitigation, (a) Hertz’s difficult childhood was given
significant weight; (b) the fact that Hertz had no significant criminal history or no
history of violence and the fact that he posed no problems since being incarcerated
were given marginal weight; (c) that Hertz’s remorse and the fact that he cried
during some of the testimony and when he made his statement to the court was
given moderate weight; (d) the fact that society would be adequately protected if he
were to be given a life sentence without the possibility of parole was entitled to “no
weight” and (e) the fact that a codefendant, Dempsey, received a life sentence
following a plea, was given significant weight and substantially considered by the
trial court.1  On appeal, Hertz raises a variety of challenges to his convictions and
2. Hertz claims: (1) The trial court improperly excused for cause a venire
member whose opposition to the death penalty did not prevent or substantially
impair her ability to perform her obligations; (2) Hertz was not competent to stand
trial; (3) the trial court erred by admitting gruesome photographs of the bodies at
the crime scene and the autopsy; (4) the details of the collateral crimes in Volusia
county became a feature of the trial causing prejudice that substantially outweighed
the probative value of the evidence; (5) the evidence was insufficient as a matter of
law to sustain the convictions; (6) the statute authorizing the admission of victim
impact evidence is an unconstitutional usurpation of the Court’s rulemaking
authority under article V, section 2, of the Florida Constitution, making the
admission of such testimony unconstitutional and reversible error; (7) the trial court
erred in denying the defense motion to require a unanimous verdict; (8) four of the
seven aggravating factors upon which the jury was instructed and which the trial
court found are legally inapplicable and their consideration was not harmless error;
and (9) the death sentence in this case is disproportionate.
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death sentence.2
Voir Dire
First, Hertz argues venireperson Free was impermissibly struck from the jury
venire on the erroneous grounds that her opposition to the death penalty rose to the
level justifying exclusion under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).  The United States Supreme Court has
articulated the standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded
for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment:
[The] standard is whether the juror’s view would “prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath.” . . . [T]his standard
likewise does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with
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“unmistakable clarity.”
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (footnote omitted) (quoting Adams
v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).  “The trial judge has the duty to decide if a
challenge for cause is proper, and this Court must give deference to the judge’s
determination of a prospective juror’s qualifications.”  Castro v. State, 644 So. 2d
987, 989 (Fla. 1994) (citing Witt, 469 U.S. at 426).  
The decision to deny a challenge for cause will be upheld on appeal if there
is support in the record for the decision.  See Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 1328, 1332
(Fla. 1997).  “It is within a trial court’s province to determine whether a challenge
for cause is proper, and the trial court’s determination of juror competency will not
be overturned absent manifest error.”  Fernandez v. State, 730 So. 2d 277, 281
(Fla. 1999) (citing Mendoza v. State, 700 So. 2d 670, 675 (Fla. 1997)).  “A trial
court has latitude in ruling upon a challenge for cause because the court has a better
vantage point from which to evaluate prospective jurors’ answers than does this
Court in our review of the cold record.”  Mendoza, 700 So. 2d at 675. 
In Hannon v. State, 638 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1994), this Court stated that “[t]he
inability to be impartial about the death penalty is a valid reason to remove a
prospective juror for cause.”  In the instant case, venireperson Free unequivocally
3. The transcript reports the following exchange:
 
[Prosecutor]: If you do a verdict of guilty of first-degree
murder, then the death penalty is a possibility.  Could you vote to
impose -- to convict somebody when the death penalty is a
possibility?
[Venireperson Free]: No, sir.
. . . . 
[Defense Counsel]: Ms. Free, you saying you can’t even vote in
the guilt phase whether the person is guilty or innocent because you
know that there is a possibility of the death penalty, is that correct?
[Venireperson Free]: Yeah.
. . . .
[Defense Counsel]: So assuming you have all this discussion, an
open discussion about the possibility of one sentence or the other, are
you going to tell us today that you still couldn’t participate in that
discussion if you were on a jury?
[Venireperson Free]: I just don’t believe that I could actually be
-- take a person life.  Even if they were found guilty of killing someone,
I would just rather them spend the rest of their life in jail because its
not going to bring the person back, anyway.
. . . .
[Defense Counsel]: You would try.  But you don’t necessarily
want to be in that position, do you?
[Venireperson Free]: Well, I mean, if I am, it wouldn’t matter. 
My opinion is I just would not want to take someone else’s life, just
because -- I mean, I know it’s bad that they killed someone or
anybody kills anybody, but it wouldn’t bring that person back.
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stated during three separate responses that she could not impose the death penalty.3 
Moreover, counsel for the defendants attempted to rehabilitate Free under a
misconceived notion that because a juror may be willing to convict a defendant of
first-degree murder, there is no need for that juror to have an open mind with regard
4. Furthermore, Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1996), sentence
vacated, 763 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 2000), on which Hertz relies, is inapposite.  The juror
in question in Farina stated that she would try to be fair and that she would “fairly
consider the imposition of the death penalty, depending on the evidence [she] heard
in the courtroom,” and, in fact, could impose a death sentence in a murder case,
depending on the circumstances presented.  Farina, 680 So. 2d at 396-98.  Thus,
although she had “mixed feelings” about capital punishment, she never expressed
uncertainty about her ability (or unwillingness) to vote for it in a proper case,
according to the appropriate legal standards.  See id.  Moreover, the prosecutor in
Farina never stated the ground on which he was challenging this juror, and the
Farina trial court apparently granted the State’s challenge “because it had just
granted a defense challenge.” Id. at 398.  Therefore, none of the bases supporting
this Court’s reversal in Farina apply to the instant case.  
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to both the aggravation and mitigation to be presented in the penalty phase of a
case.  The record is clear, however, that Free was not willing to consider all of the
penalties provided by state law, i.e., the death penalty, and, therefore, the State’s
challenge for cause was properly upheld.  See Gore, 706 So. 2d at 1332; see also
Castro, 644 So. 2d at 989.4  For the foregoing reasons, we find no manifest error
by the trial court in excusing venireperson Free for cause and, therefore, deny
Hertz’s claim.
Competency
Hertz next argues the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial. 
“In determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, the trial court must
decide whether the defendant ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his
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lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a
rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’”  Hardy
v. State, 716 So. 2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 402 (1960)); see also § 916.12(1), Fla.Stat. (1993); Fla.R.Crim.P.
3.211(a)(1).  “The reports of experts are ‘merely advisory to the [trial court], which
itself retains the responsibility of the decision.’”  Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244,
247 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Muhammad v. State, 494 So. 2d 969, 973 (Fla.1986)).  “In
situations where there is conflicting expert testimony regarding the defendant’s
competency, it is the trial court’s responsibility to consider all the evidence relevant
to competency and resolve the factual dispute.”  Hardy, 716 So. 2d at 764 (citing
Hunter, 660 So. 2d at 247, and Watts v. State, 593 So. 2d 198, 202 (Fla. 1992)). 
“The trial court’s competency decision will be upheld absent a showing of abuse
of discretion.”  Hardy, 716 So. 2d at 764 (citing Hunter, 660 So. 2d at 247, and
Watts, 593 So. 2d at 202). 
The record reflects that a competency hearing was held April 7, 1999.  At the
conclusion of said hearing, the trial court, after reviewing all three doctors’ reports,
reviewing the rules, and observing Hertz, concluded that Hertz had sufficient
present ability to consult with his attorney if he chose to do so and had a factual
understanding as well as a rational understanding of what was occurring at trial. 
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Accordingly, the trial court found Hertz competent to stand trial.  
Although two defense experts found Hertz incompetent, Dr. Thomas
Conger, a licensed clinical psychologist with over 29 years of neuropsychology
experience, testified that, in his expert opinion, Hertz was competent to stand trial. 
Dr. Conger testified that his opinion was based upon interviews and evaluations
conducted with Hertz during two separate meetings lasting a total of approximately
seven hours.  At this time, Dr. Conger administered a comprehensive 
neuropsychological test battery as well as some additional testing that goes along
with the comprehensive battery.  Although Dr. Conger did find some evidence of
learning disabilities and verbal difficulties, the results from four tests (designed to
determine whether Hertz might be malingering) led Dr. Conger to question whether
Hertz was putting forth his maximum effort during the testing. 
Moreover, the fact that Hertz had performed within normal limits on most of
the tests administered to him would suggest that he was able to sustain his attention
effectively.  It was Dr. Conger’s conclusion that if Hertz wanted to assist his
attorney, he certainly had the abilities and memory of events in order to do so.  He
observed that Hertz, based on the tests given, can and does sustain performance at
a normal level whether on medication or not.  Accordingly, Dr. Conger testified that
it was his opinion that Hertz was competent to stand trial.
5. In addition, the State presented evidence that, while unknowingly being
recorded during transport from Volusia County, Hertz  said he would “bang his
head into the cell” and “make a bloody mess” if it “became necessary.”
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Despite Hertz’s alleged Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD),
defense expert Dr. D’Errico agreed that Hertz understood the charges (and
potential penalties) against him, was aware of the roles and functions of the
courtroom personnel, and had a full-scale IQ score of 91, and it was a possibility
that Hertz’s self-abusive behavior (i.e., banging his head against the wall) could be
evidence of malingering.5  Dr. D’Errico also indicated that everything Hertz said
was coherent and understandable.  Along the same lines, defense expert Dr. Sesta
also indicated that Hertz understood the charges (and associated penalties) against
him, was aware of the roles and functions of courtroom personnel, and had a full-
scale IQ score of 94 with no evidence of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or any
other major mental illness.  He indicated that Hertz was clearly able to understand
the “waiver” discussion the two engaged in and, at times, exhibited “disingenuous
qualities” during his interviews.
Finally, the trial court’s ruling clearly indicates that the trial court considered
and, based upon its own observations, reasonably rejected the defense experts’
opinions that Hertz’s alleged distractability and hyperactivity would impede Hertz’s
ability to assist his attorney during trial:
6. The trial court’s finding was echoed in the court’s Order Declaring the
Defendant Competent:  “Based upon in court observation the Court finds the
Defendant does have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer if he so
chooses.”  
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[T]he Court began to pay more attention to the activities of the
defendant and it does not appear to the Court that there is sufficient
indication of any hyperactivity.  The Court would specifically note that
on one occasion when the witness Hathcock [fellow inmate] was
presented the defendant’s attention became immediately focused and
attentive.6
Although there were conflicting opinions from experts on the issue of
competency, we find it was in the sound discretion of the trial court to resolve the
dispute and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Hertz
competent to stand trial.  See Hardy, 716 So. 2d at 764 (holding trial court did not
abuse discretion in finding defendant competent where there was conflicting expert
testimony regarding the defendant’s competency).
Gruesome Photographs
Next, Hertz argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence several
particularly gruesome photographs of the victims’ bodies.  In Czubak v. State, 570
So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1990), this Court discussed the admissibility of gruesome
photographs:
   This Court has long followed the rule that photographs are
admissible if they are relevant and not so shocking in nature as to
defeat the value of their relevance.  Where photographs are relevant,
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“then the trial judge in the first [instance] and this Court on appeal
must determine whether the gruesomeness of the portrayal is so
inflammatory as to create an undue prejudice in the minds of the jury
and [distract] them from a fair and unimpassioned consideration of the
evidence.”  We have consistently upheld the admission of allegedly
gruesome photographs where they were independently relevant or
corroborative of other evidence. 
Id. at 928 (citations omitted).
With respect to the first photograph at issue, i.e., State’s Exhibit 1-C
(depicting the charred bodies of the victims as found at the crime scene), this Court
has found no abuse of discretion in admitting allegedly inflammatory photographs
when relevant “to assist the crime scene technician in explaining the condition of the
crime scene when the police arrived.”  Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla.
1996).  We find State’s Exhibit 1-C is relevant to show the position and location of
the bodies when they were found by police and assisted the crime scene technician
in describing the crime scene.  See Pope, 679 So. 2d at 713-14; see also Pangburn
v. State, 661 So. 2d 1182, 1188 (Fla. 1995) (finding no abuse of discretion in
admitting gruesome photographs when “introduced to assist a law enforcement
officer in documenting the scene where the victims were found”); Nixon v. State,
572 So. 2d 1336, 1342 (Fla. 1990) (finding no abuse of discretion in admitting
seven gruesome photographs of victim in charred state when “introduced to aid the
7. Moreover, this Court has also said, “[r]elevant evidence which is not so
shocking as to outweigh its probative value is admissible.”  See Pope, 679 So. 2d
at 714.  Although undeniably a gruesome photograph, Exhibit 1-C is probative of
other material issues in this case.  First, because the picture depicts the bodies lying
side-by-side and face down on the victims’ bed, it corroborates Dempsey’s
testimony that the victims were shot execution-style in the backs of their heads
while bound face down on their bed.  Second, the position of the victims’ bodies is
also relevant (and, thus, so is Exhibit 1-C) because it assisted crime scene
investigator Yao in describing how the victims’ bodies “protected” some of the
victims’ clothing from fire debris and, thus, how such evidence was recoverable for
testing of accelerants.  Third, the photo assisted the State Fire Marshal investigator
during his testimony in describing areas of the bedroom where accelerant was likely
poured, e.g., on the flooring immediately surrounding the bed where the photo
depicts flooring as completely missing.  Fourth, the photo depicted for the jury the
massive damage done by the fire to the victims and the area immediately
surrounding them such that, as investigator Yao opined, it significantly interfered
with the recovery of projectiles and other forensic evidence.  Finally, and although
not argued by the parties, Exhibit 1-C is also probative of the avoid arrest
aggravating circumstance, where it is clear from the photo that the defendants
sought to leave no shred of evidence linking them to this crime by torching the
victims and their immediate surroundings.  See Gudinas v. State, 693 So. 2d 953,
963 (Fla. 1997) (holding allegedly gruesome photos relevant to proving aggravating
circumstance).  Nor can State’s Exhibit 1-C be called cumulative.  Although State’s
Exhibits 1-T and 1-U are photographs of the victims’ charred bed area, these
pictures do not provide nearly as clear a depiction of the position of the victims’
bodies, nor do they illustrate the burned out flooring immediately surrounding the
bed, as does Exhibit 1-C.
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detective in explaining the condition of the crime scene when the police arrived”).7
Hertz next argues the gruesome autopsy photos, i.e., State’s Exhibits 39-A
through 39-E, were not used by the medical examiner to illustrate his opinion of the
8. Although Hertz argues the jury was improperly shown State’s Exhibits 39-
A, 39-B, 39-C, 39-D, and 39-E, the record indicates that State’s Exhibits 39-B, 39-
C, and 39-E were not shown to the jury and were subsequently withdrawn from
evidence at the request of the State:
[Prosecutor]: Your honor, yesterday our medical examiner testified, I
had introduced five photographs anticipating that he would use those
in his testimony and three of those photographs were not used or
displayed to the jury.  They are State’s Exhibit Number 39B, 39C and
39E.
And at this point -- I’ve discussed this with counsel for the
defendants – the State would request that these be removed from the
evidence.  The jury has not seen them and we’d ask that these exhibits
not be part of the evidence.  So I’d like to withdraw those from
evidence.
Without objection, 39-B, 39-C, and 39-E were removed from evidence. 
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cause of death and were, therefore, irrelevant.8  This Court has stated that autopsy
photographs may be admissible when used to “illustrate the medical examiner’s
testimony and the [victim’s] injuries,”  Pope, 679 So. 2d at 714, or when “relevant
to the medical examiner’s determination as to the manner of the victim’s death,”
Mansfield v. State, 758 So. 2d 636, 648 (Fla. 2000).  Moreover, “[t]o be relevant, a
photo of a deceased victim must be probative of an issue that is in dispute.” 
Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922, 929 (Fla. 1999).
In this instance, the jury viewed two gruesome autopsy photographs showing
9. It was the medical examiner’s opinion that the deaths were caused by
gunshot wounds and that there was no evidence that the fire caused the deaths, as
there was no evidence of soot in either of the victims’ tracheas. 
10. Exhibit 39-A is an autopsy photograph depicting the torso and abdomen
of the male victim’s body.  The medical examiner testified that the photograph
revealed that there were “extensive burns on the right side and intestinal material
coming out of the right side as a result of the burns”; that “a large portion of the
arm [was] burned away and . . . intestines [were] coming out.”  (Emphasis added.) 
Exhibit 39-D is an autopsy photograph depicting the central part of the female
victim’s body.  The medical examiner testified that the photograph revealed that the
body was “severely burned”; that there were “extensive burns on the side and
extending into the buttock area”; and that “on the left side . . . the intestines are
coming out of the body cavity as a result of the burns.”  (Emphasis added.)
11. In fact, when describing the actual cause of death, i.e., the gunshot
wounds, it appears from the record the medical examiner pointed to his own head
to demonstrate the entry and exit wounds of the male victim--and not to any of the
autopsy photos offered by the State.
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the effects of the fire, which, all parties agree, occurred after the victims’ deaths.9 
Because the victims’ bodies were so damaged by the fire, neither of the admitted
autopsy photos (each depicting close-ups of the charred remains of the victims) are
probative of the medical examiner’s determination as to the manner of the victims’
deaths.  The photographs at issue were only used by the medical examiner to
describe the damage done to the victims’ bodies by the ensuing fire.10  Said another
way, the damage caused to the deceased victims’ bodies by the fire after their
deaths was not an issue in dispute.  Moreover, the medical examiner’s testimony
about the cause of death did not rely at all on the photographs.11  
12. We also find no error by the trial court in  permitting the State to publish
the photographs before the jury on the television-like “DOAR” system.  First, the
trial court here looked at the monitor and its position in the courtroom and found
that the pictures were not inordinately enlarged.  The trial court even had the 36-
inch monitor moved further away from the jury so that they were given the proper
perspective.  Second, in Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1999), upon which Hertz
relies, this Court found error in the introduction of the blown-up photo because,
unlike in the instant case, “the standard-size photo from which the blow-up was
made had already been shown to the jury during the guilt phase.”  743 So. 2d at 8. 
That was not the case in this instance and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting the State to publish the photos on the DOAR system.
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Because the photographs were not relevant, that is, not probative of any fact
in issue, we find it was error to admit the autopsy photographs.  See Almeida, 748
So. 2d at 930.  However, given Dempsey’s direct evidence implicating Hertz, the
physical and testimonial evidence corroborating Dempsey’s account of the events,
and the minor role the autopsy photos played in the State’s case, we find any error
harmless.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986); see also Almeida,
748 So. 2d at 930 (finding admission of irrelevant autopsy photo harmless “in light
of the minor role the photo played in the State’s case”); Thompson v. State, 619
So. 2d 261, 266 (Fla. 1993) (finding error in admission of irrelevant autopsy
photographs harmless).12
Collateral Crime Evidence
Hertz next claims the trial court erred in admitting evidence of collateral
crimes committed in Volusia County.  This Court has stated that the admission of
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evidence is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be reversed unless
defendant demonstrates an abuse of discretion.  See Medina v. State, 466 So. 2d
1046 (Fla. 1985); Jent v. State, 408 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1981).  “Even if the evidence
in question tends to reveal the commission of a collateral crime, it is admissible if
found to be relevant for any purpose save that of showing bad character or
propensity.”  Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186, 189 (Fla. 1984).  
The law is well settled that “[w]hen a suspected person in any manner
attempts to escape or evade a threatened prosecution by flight,
concealment, resistance to lawful arrest, or other indications after the
fact of a desire to evade prosecution, such fact is admissible, being
relevant to the consciousness of guilt which may be inferred from such
circumstance.” Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 1981).
However, we have held that in order to admit this evidence, there must
be a nexus between the flight, concealment, or resistance to lawful arrest
and the crime for which the defendant is being tried in that specific case. 
See Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1997). Moreover, such an
interpretation should be made with a sensitivity to the facts of the
particular case.  See Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985) (citing
United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir.1982)).
In prior cases, we have upheld the introduction of similar flight
evidence as consciousness of guilt where the defendant flees from
police after committing a murder. See Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837,
840 (Fla. 1997) (even though defendant committed several robberies
between the murder and his arrest, evidence that defendant resisted
arrest the day after the murder was admissible as consciousness of guilt
of the murder); Duest v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1990) (even
though defendant escaped after being arrested for misdemeanor traffic
warrants, evidence of escape could be used as consciousness of guilt of
the murder); Bundy, 471 So. 2d at 20 (evidence of defendant's attempt
to flee officers six days after the murder was admissible as
consciousness of guilt even though defendant was wanted for several
13. In Thomas, this Court found a “strong nexus” between the defendant’s
flight and the victim’s murder such that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the flight evidence to show consciousness of guilt: 
[T]he evidence established that police spotted Thomas eleven days
after the murder driving at speeds in excess of 90 miles per hour. After
being pursued for a while, Thomas eventually stopped and the officers
instructed him and his passenger to show their hands. When Thomas
did not respond to this request, one of the officers approached the
car, opened the door, and grabbed Thomas.  Thomas immediately
sped away, and the officer let go of his arm to avoid being dragged
down the interstate. A high-speed chase ensued for several miles and
ended when Thomas crashed into a ditch, exited the vehicle and fled
on foot before eventually being arrested. 
Id. at 982-83 (emphasis added).
14. The sum total of that testimony reflects that Officer Rooney testified that
Hertz was driving the Ford Ranger and he saw the truck turn around and start
-22-
murders in other states). In these cases, we upheld the introduction of
the flight evidence even though the flight could have been attributed to
different crimes or warrants.
Thomas v. State, 748 So. 2d 970, 982 (Fla. 1999).13
In the instant case, the nexus between the flight or resistance to lawful arrest
and the murders appears as strong as, if not stronger than, that in Thomas.  The only
collateral crime testimony that was introduced was the testimony of Daytona Beach
Shores police officers Shawn Rooney and Greg Howard regarding how, on the day
of the murders, Hertz attempted to hit Officer Howard and knock him down with the
Ford Ranger.14   The facts and circumstances surrounding the pursuit and
coming back at him and then make a right turn on Hickory Lane.  At that point the
truck was headed in Officer Howard’s direction, and Officer Rooney said he heard
a thump and saw a mike go flying into the air.  He walked over to Hickory Lane and
saw Officer Howard fall down; he got back in his vehicle and then saw the Ford
Ranger coming at a high rate of speed in reverse towards his car.  He jumped out
and watched as the Ranger backed up past him.  He positively identified the Ranger
being driving by Hertz.  At that point, the officer fired his weapon and Hertz drove
away.  On cross-examination, Officer Rooney testified that the Ranger did not hit
him or Officer Howard and he never saw anyone in the Ranger fire a weapon.
Officer Howard testified that he heard a vehicle coming up from behind him
and saw a white Ford pickup.  The truck hit him and knocked him down.  He
testified that he could not get out of the way.  He positively identified Hertz as the
driver of the Ford Ranger and said that as a consequence of being hit he lost his
radio and he, too, started shooting at the vehicle.  On cross-examination, he
testified that the truck hit him from behind; but he sustained no serious injuries.  
15. The cases cited by Hertz as examples of inadmissible collateral crimes
do not involve evidence of flight or resistance to arrest.  See Gore v. State, 719 So.
2d 1197, 1199 (Fla. 1998) (holding collateral crime evidence of defendant’s
“reprehensible action of leaving a two-year-old child naked in a burned and
abandoned house in thirty-degree weather” had no relevance in trial and was highly
prejudicial); Pope v. State, 679 So. 2d 710, 714 (Fla. 1996) (finding fact that
defendant battered wife in the past irrelevant to the issue of her murder); Czubak v.
State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1990) (holding collateral crime evidence that
defendant was an escaped convict not relevant).
-23-
subsequent arrest of Hertz, Looney, and Dempsey were “relevant to the
consciousness of guilt which may be inferred from such circumstance.”  Straight,
397 So. 2d at 908.15
Hertz also argues that he was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of such
evidence because it became the “feature” of this capital murder trial and, thus, this
Court should reverse his conviction as it did for the defendant in Steverson v. State,
16. In Steverson, 
the jury heard virtually every detail of the [police officer shooting]
case, including every emotional aspect of the shooting, the detective's
injuries, his bloodied face, his staggering, his yelling, the frantic
"officer down" response by numerous law enforcement officers and
undercover agents, the hospital treatment, and the time he had to take
off work due to the "deadly force" situation. In addition to a lengthy
recitation about the shooting, [the officer] personally and graphically
described his injuries; and twelve photographs of his injuries were
admitted over objection for review by the jurors. [The officer] went on
to narrate how blood dripped over his eyeglasses and face, how he
awaited help, staggered down the street and yelled into his radio. He
described his medical treatment at the hospital and the birdshot that
remained in his body. [The officer’s  partner] then gave his own
"blow-by-blow" recounting of the details surrounding the shooting;
and further testified about [the officer’s] condition--how he saw his
partner down on the sidewalk, startled, bloody, and yelling. In
addition, two other officers who arrived at the scene shortly after the
shooting, but did not witness it, also reiterated for the jury in great
detail the nature of [the officer’s] injuries, and how police and
emergency personnel aided him at the scene.  
Steverson, 695 So. 2d at 690.  
-24-
695 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1997).16  In contrast to Steverson, however, the record in the
instant case reflects that the collateral crime evidence that was introduced at the guilt
phase of Hertz and Looney’s trial was a de minimis part of the evidence presented in
support of the murder, robbery, and arson charges.  Only three of the State’s thirty-
five witnesses discussed the Volusia County pursuit and capture.  More importantly,
the evidence in the instant case was not nearly as “unnecessary and inflammatory” as
-25-
this Court concluded was the evidence surrounding the shooting of the police officer
in Steverson.  See Steverson, 695 So. 2d at 690 (finding “the twelve photographs of
[the police officer’s] injuries alone were so unnecessary and inflammatory that they
could have unfairly prejudiced the jury against Steverson”).  Accordingly, because
the evidence of the defendants’ actions in Volusia County was relevant to
consciousness of guilt and did not become an impermissible feature of the trial, we
deny Hertz’s claim.
Sufficiency of Evidence
Hertz next argues that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
sustain the convictions.  In Williams v. State, 437 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1983), this Court
enunciated its proper role in evaluating sufficiency of the evidence arguments in
capital cases:
[A]n appellate court should not retry a case or reweigh
conflicting evidence submitted to a jury or other trier of
fact.  Rather, the concern on appeal must be whether, after
all conflicts in the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom have been resolved in favor of the verdict on
appeal, there is substantial, competent evidence to support
the verdict and judgment.  
It is our function, then, to see if there is substantial, competent evidence
to support the verdict.
Id. at 134 (quoting Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981)) (alterations in
original) (citations omitted).
17.   See Davis v. State, 90 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1956) (“Direct evidence is
that to which the witness testifies of his own knowledge as to the facts at issue.”);
see also Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 401.1 (2000 ed.) (“Direct evidence is
evidence which requires only the inference that what the witness said is true to
prove a material fact; e.g., ‘I saw A shoot B’ is direct evidence that A shot B.”). 
Accordingly, this case is unlike those cases based wholly on circumstantial
evidence and thus would require a special standard of review where a conviction
cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable
hypothesis of innocence.  See, e.g., Thorp v. State, 777 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 2000);
State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1989).
-26-
In the present case, the State sought first-degree murder convictions on
alternative theories of premeditated murder and felony-murder with the underlying
offenses of armed robbery, burglary, or arson.  Thus, because a general verdict form
was used in this case, in order to affirm Hertz’s first-degree murder convictions,
there must be substantial, competent evidence supporting either premeditated or
felony murder (predicated on armed robbery, burglary, or arson). 
In this instance, there is direct evidence that Hertz killed the victims in both a
premeditated manner and during the course of a robbery, burglary, or arson.17 
Dempsey’s testimony places Hertz together with him and Looney at Tommy Bull’s
house a few hours before the murder.  This testimony was corroborated by Bull
himself at trial.  Bull also testified that Hertz, Looney, and Dempsey sought a ride
from Bull but, after he refused, they “left walking” around 11 p.m. that evening.  A
resident who lived about 500 yards from the victims’ home identified Hertz as the
18. “Premeditation is defined as more than a mere intent to kill; it is a fully
formed conscious purpose to kill.”  Green v. State, 715 So. 2d 940, 943 (Fla.
1998).  This purpose to kill must exist for such a time before the homicide “to
permit reflection as to the nature of the act to be committed and the probable result
of that act.”  Id. at 944.
-27-
person standing at her door at approximately 2 a.m. seeking to use a phone.  
Dempsey testified that it was Hertz who was first to force himself into the
victims’ home brandishing a .357 gun and subsequently taping up the victim King.  
In addition, Dempsey testified that, after Looney and Hertz told him the victims had
to be killed, Hertz led Looney and Dempsey in the execution-style shooting of the
victims.   Under these facts, there was clearly sufficient time before the killing for
Hertz to have formed a premeditated design to kill. 18
Dempsey also testified that Hertz participated in the armed robbery of the
victims, which occurred contemporaneously with the killings and prior to the arson
of their dwelling.  Hertz broke a ceiling fan light trying to scare the victims into
disclosing where they kept their valuables and, subsequently, took an active part in
removing items from the victims’ trailer, including approximately $1500 of the
victims’ cash.  Hertz poured accelerants throughout the victims’ home and fled the
scene in the victims’ Ford Ranger truck.  Hertz and his codefendants then unloaded
19. Hertz argues that this Court should disregard Dempsey’s testimony. 
Determining the credibility of witnesses, however, is within the province of the jury. 
See Carter v. State, 560 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (Fla. 1990) (noting that credibility of
accomplice’s version of murder is question for jury).  Thus, it is the jury’s duty to
weigh the evidence and resolve any factual conflicts, and its findings will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of error.  See Jent v. State, 408 So. 2d
1024, 1028 (Fla. 1981).  It is not within the province of this Court to pass on the
credibility of a witness presented at trial.  After hearing all of the evidence in this
case, the jury clearly chose to believe Dempsey’s version of the facts, as much of
his testimony was corroborated by testimonial and physical evidence. 
-28-
the stolen items at Hertz’s residence. 19
Dempsey’s direct testimony is corroborated by other State witnesses and
evidence.  Two Wal-Mart employees each independently identified Hertz as being
among the three men who came into Wal-Mart shortly after the time of the murders. 
Both witnesses specifically recalled seeing Hertz and the others drive off in a black
Mustang and the white Ford Ranger.  A Wal-Mart receipt later recovered in the
Mustang also corroborates Hertz’s presence at the Wal-Mart the morning of the
murders.  Hertz’s girlfriend testified that, when she arrived at Hertz’s home the day
of the murders, she noticed a television, microwave, furniture, and “all different kinds
of stuff” that were not there the previous day.
Moreover, a Volusia County Sheriff’s Deputy testified that Hertz abandoned
the victims’ white Ford Ranger while being pursued in Daytona.  A Daytona cab
20. Hertz’s attempt to flee from police can be considered circumstantial
evidence of guilt.  See Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 1981).  
-29-
driver testified that Hertz paid her $100 to drive him to St. Augustine that same day.20 
Moreover, when Hertz was arrested later that day at his aunt’s house in St.
Augustine, the victim Spears’ .9mm gun was recovered from Hertz’s bag.  In
addition, fingerprints belonging to Hertz, Looney, and Dempsey were all found on
the victims’ Mustang when it was recovered in Daytona.  Therefore, we find there
was substantial, competent evidence to sustain Hertz’s convictions.
Finding no reversible error as the guilt phase of Hertz’s trial, we affirm his
convictions.
Victim Impact Evidence
Hertz raises seven issues relating to the penalty phase proceedings.  First,
Hertz argues that section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), allowing the
admission of victim impact evidence, is a usurpation of this Court’s rulemaking
authority vested in it by the Florida Constitution.  See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.  This
issue, however, is procedurally barred.  There is no evidence in this record (nor does
Hertz allude to any portion of the record) that reflects that the trial court entertained
any motion from Hertz concerning the constitutionality of the victim impact statute. 
See Bertolotti v. Dugger, 514 So. 2d 1095, 1096 (Fla. 1987); Tillman v. State, 471
-30-
So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985).
Jury Verdict
Hertz next argues that, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), the trial court erred in denying
Hertz’s motion to require unanimity in the jury’s sentencing recommendation.  This
Court, however, recently addressed whether Florida’s death penalty sentencing
scheme violates the principles espoused in Apprendi.  See Mills v. Moore, 786 So.
2d 532 (Fla. 2001).  In holding that it does not, this Court stated, “[T]he plain
language of Apprendi indicates that the case is not intended to apply to capital
schemes.”  Id. at 537.  Thus, “Apprendi preserves the constitutionality of capital
sentencing schemes like Florida’s.”  Id.  This Court’s decision in Mills forecloses
Hertz’s claim and, therefore, it is denied.  See id.
Avoid Arrest Aggravator
Hertz next argues the trial court erred in finding that the murder was committed
for the purpose of avoiding arrest.  We have said the facts supporting commission of
murder to avoid arrest must focus on the defendant's motivation for the crime.  See
Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 48 (Fla. 2000).  In order to establish that the
murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or
effecting an escape from custody, the evidence must prove that the sole or dominant
-31-
motive for the killing was to eliminate a witness.  See Zack v. State, 753 So. 2d 9, 20
(Fla. 2000); Consalvo v. State, 697 So. 2d 805, 819 (Fla. 1996).  Mere speculation
on the part of the state that witness elimination was the dominant motive behind a
murder cannot support the avoid arrest aggravator. See Bates v. State, 465 So. 2d
490, 492-93 (Fla. 1985).  Likewise, the mere fact that the victim knew and could
identify defendant, without more, is insufficient to prove this aggravator.  See
Consalvo, 697 So. 2d at 819. 
In the present case, however, the trial court made the following findings
pertaining to this aggravating circumstance:
The evidence clearly established that after the defendant and the co-
defendants had entered the dwelling and subdued the victims that it was
realized that the victim Melanie King had gone to school with the
defendants Hertz and Dempsey.  At one time, the victim King and her
family lived across the street from the Hertz family.  The defendants
discussed and determined, especially the defendant Hertz, that they
would leave no witnesses.  The methodical execution of the victims by
the defendant and his co-defendants with multiple shots to the head and
destruction of the victims’ home and bodies by fire to eliminate
evidence establishes a dominant motive to eliminate witnesses and
evidence for the purpose of avoiding or preventing arrest.  This
aggravating factor was proven beyond all reasonable doubt and
accorded great weight in determination of any appropriate sentence.
Sentencing Order at 3-4, State v. Hertz, No. 97-214 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Feb. 18, 2000).
 At trial, Dempsey testified that after examining King’s license, he concluded
he had gone to school with King and was “pretty sure” that Hertz had as well.  
-32-
Moreover, King’s mother testified that she had lived in the same area for
approximately 27 years and that Hertz lived across the street, giving rise to the
inference that King would have known Hertz.  Dempsey also testified that neither he
nor Hertz was wearing anything to cover their faces and that he believed the victim
had seen his face while he was standing on the porch (and implied it was possible
she had also seen Hertz’s face).  This evidence is unrebutted by any testimony
presented by Hertz.  So while it is possible the victim knew (and could possibly
identify) the defendants, Hertz is correct in asserting that this, alone, is not enough to
support establishment of this aggravator.  See  Consalvo, 697 So. 2d at 819.
In this case, however, there is other competent substantial evidence to support
establishment of this aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt.  First, the avoid arrest
aggravator “has been applied to cases in which . . . the defendant had expressed an
apprehension regarding arrest.”  Zack, 753 So. 2d at 20.  In this case, there is direct
testimony from Dempsey that the defendants told Dempsey, while the victims were
bound and restrained, that “we can’t have no witness to all this stuff . . . so we’re
going to have to do this here.”  This appears to be exactly the type of apprehension
regarding arrest this Court finds determinative of establishing the avoid arrest
aggravator.  See Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1056 (Fla. 2000) (finding avoid
arrest aggravator was supported by witness’s testimony that “Trease told her that the
21. This case is not unlike the circumstances in Riley v. State, 366 So. 2d 19
(Fla. 1978).  In Riley, the defendant and an accomplice entered the business where
the defendant worked for the purpose of robbing it.  See 366 So. 2d at 20.  The
-33-
victim had to be killed because he could identify them, in addition to evidence that
the victim would have been able to identify Trease if he had lived because he and
Trease were acquaintances”).
This Court has also said this factor may be proved by circumstantial evidence
from which the motive for the murders may be inferred.  See  Preston v. State, 607
So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla. 1992).  Had the sole motive for the murders in this case been
for financial gain, the defendants’ purpose would have been accomplished upon
receipt of the stolen property.  See Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 435 (Fla. 1998). 
In addition, Hertz and his codefendants were not prevented in any manner from
leaving the premises without injuring or killing, as they had access to both of the
victims’ vehicles while both victims were immobilized and, therefore, unable to resist. 
See id.  Once the defendants had obtained the victims’ property and secured an
uncontested getaway, there was no reason for the victims to be killed--except to
eliminate them as witnesses.  See Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d 692, 695 (Fla.
1994) (upholding avoid arrest aggravator where “[o]nce Thompson had obtained the
$1,500 check from [the victims], there was little reason to kill them other than to
eliminate the sole witnesses to his actions”).21  Accordingly, we find competent,
pair then threatened several of the defendant’s coworkers with pistols, forced them
to lie on the floor, bound and gagged them, and then shot each of them in the head. 
See id.  In light of the fact the victims knew the defendant and were immobilized
and rendered helpless, coupled with one perpetrator’s expressed concern for
subsequent identification, this Court found that the record supported the
conclusion that the victims were killed to avoid identification.  See id. at 22.
-34-
substantial evidence to the support the trial court’s finding that, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the dominant motive for the murders of the two victims was the elimination of
witnesses in order to avoid prosecution.
CCP Aggravator 
Hertz next argues the trial court erred in finding the murder was committed in a
cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) manner. 
[I]n order to find the CCP aggravator factor . . . the jury must determine
that the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an
act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold), and that
the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit
murder before the fatal incident (calculated), and that the defendant
exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated), and that the
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification.  
Jackson v. State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994) (citations omitted); accord Walls v.
State, 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994).
Additionally, a murder may be both CCP and committed to avoid arrest
as long as distinct facts support each circumstance.  The facts
supporting CCP must focus on the manner in which the crime was
executed, e.g., advance procurement of weapon, lack of provocation, 
killing carried out as a matter of course, whereas the facts supporting
the commission to avoid arrest must focus on the defendant’s
22.  This case is unlike those cases based entirely on circumstantial evidence
where evidence regarding premeditation is “susceptible to  . . . divergent
interpretations.”  Geralds v. State, 601 So. 2d 1157, 1164 (Fla. 1992).  Here, the
evidence regarding the actions of the defendants during the night of the murder was
supplied by Dempsey’s direct testimony.
-35-
motivation for the crime.  
Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 48 (Fla. 2000) (citation omitted) (citing Stein v.
State, 632 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1994)).
“The ‘cold’ element generally has been found wanting only for ‘heated’
murders of passion, in which the loss of emotional control is evident from the facts .
. . .” Walls, 641 So. 2d at 387-88.  Here the calm and deliberate nature of the
defendants’ actions against the victims establish this element beyond any reasonable
doubt.  In this instance, the victims were bound and gagged for two hours and, thus,
were unable to offer any resistance or provocation.  More importantly, during this 
time the defendants had ample opportunity to calmly reflect upon their actions,
following which they mutually decided to shoot the victims execution-style in the
backs of the their heads.  See Walls, 641 So. 2d at 388 (holding “execution-style
slaying . . . by its very nature is a ‘cold’ crime”).22
With respect to the “calculated” prong, Hertz correctly argues that the “plan to
kill cannot be inferred solely from a plan to commit, or the commission of, another
felony.”  Geralds v. State, 601 So. 2d 1157, 1163 ( Fla. 1992).  Although it appears
23. Hertz cites Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1995), where this
Court concluded that “the evidence presented does not demonstrate that Barwick
had a careful plan or prearranged design to kill the victim . . . [and, therefore,] the
murder was not committed in a calculated manner.”  See id. at 696.  Barwick,
however, is distinguishable because, unlike that in the instant case, the murder in
Barwick occurred after the victim resisted and during an unexpected struggle.  See
id. at 689, 696.  In this instance, however, there was no victim resistance or struggle
provoking the murder, and it is clear that the defendants had a “prearranged design
to commit murder” before the execution of the victims and subsequent arson of
their home.  See Jackson, 648 So. 2d at 89.
-36-
the defendants initially only sought to steal a vehicle, there is competent substantial
evidence that the defendants armed themselves in advance, discussed killing the
victims, did so by killing them execution-style, and deliberately poured accelerants
throughout the home before lighting the home on fire.  See Knight v. State, 746 So.
2d 423, 436 (Fla. 1998) (holding “[e]ven if Knight did not make the final decision to
execute the two victims until sometime during his lengthy journey to his final
destination, that journey provided an abundance of time for Knight to coldly and
calmly decide to kill”).23  
With respect to the “heightened premeditation” prong, this Court stated in
Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1998):
We have previously found the heightened premeditation required to
sustain this aggravator where a defendant has the opportunity to leave
the crime scene and not commit the murder but, instead, commits the
murder.  In this case, as the trial court properly pointed out, appellant
had ample opportunity to release [the victim] after the robbery.  Instead,
after substantial reflection, appellant “acted out the plan [he] had
24. In Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29, 46 (Fla. 2000), this Court reviewed
a strikingly analogous situation and found CCP:
[The defendant] planned a ruse to enter the apartment but
formulated a back-up plan to force his way into the
apartment if the plan failed; [the defendant] armed himself
with a loaded handgun and two pairs of latex gloves so as
to not to leave any fingerprints in the apartment if the
initial plan did not work; [the defendant] fired an
additional shot into each victim from close range to make
sure they were dead; none of the elderly victims offered
any resistance; each victim was shot while seated and
fully compliant . . . .
753 So. 2d at 46;  see also Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 696 (Fla. 1997)
(finding CCP where defendant bound victim, obtained a can of gasoline from the
garage, doused victim with gasoline, and set victim on fire).
-37-
conceived during the extended period in which [the] events occurred.”
Id. at 162 (quoting Jackson, 704 So. 2d at 505) (citation omitted).  In this case, with
the victims bound and rendered harmless, the robbery of the victims’ valuables
complete, and having uncontested access to the victims’ vehicles, it is clear the
defendants had “the opportunity to leave the crime scene and not commit the murder
but, instead, commit[ed] the murder[s].”  Id.; cf. Mahn v. State, 714 So. 2d 391, 398
(Fla. 1998) (finding no heightened premeditation when “rash and spontaneous killing
evidenced no analytical thinking, no conscious and well-developed plan to kill”).24
Finally, there is no evidence, much less a colorable claim, establishing a
pretense of moral or legal justification for these murders.  As to Hertz, there is no
-38-
construction of the facts that would support even a fragmentary claim of excuse or
justification, or of a defense to homicide, because the victims here were bound and
helpless when killed.  See Walls, 641 So. 2d at 388.  Because there is competent,
substantial evidence in the record supporting the finding that the murder was cold,
calculated, and premeditated without any pretense of moral or legal justification, we
hold that the trial court did not err in its finding of the CCP aggravating circumstance. 
HAC Aggravator
Next, Hertz argues the trial court erred in finding the murders were committed
in a heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) manner.  To qualify for the HAC
circumstance, “the crime must be both conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily
torturous to the victim.”  Richardson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 1992). 
On the other hand, this Court has held that “‘an instantaneous or near-instantaneous
death by gunfire’ does not satisfy the HAC aggravating factor.”  Donaldson v. State,
722 So. 2d 177, 186 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Robinson v. State, 574 So. 2d 108, 112
(Fla. 1991)).  Moreover,  “[e]xecution-style killings are not generally HAC unless the
state has presented other evidence to show some physical or mental torture of the
victim.”  Hartley v. State, 686 So. 2d 1316, 1323 (Fla. 1996).  
Along these lines, this Court has held that “the actions of the defendant
preceding the actual killing are relevant to this aggravator. . . .  [T]he fear and
25. Dempsey testified there was an odor of gasoline in the mobile home and
that King cried that she “would rather die being burnt up in flames than being shot.”
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emotional strain of the victim from the events preceding the killing may contribute to
its heinous nature.”    Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 1328, 1335 (Fla. 1997) (citations
omitted) (citing Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988)).  Accordingly,
the HAC aggravating circumstance has been repeatedly upheld where the victims
were “acutely aware of their impending deaths.”  Zakrzewski v. State, 717 So. 2d
488, 492-93 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d 1336, 1341 (Fla. 1994));
see also Donaldson, 722 So. 2d at 187; Scott v. State, 494 So. 2d 1134, 1137 (Fla.
1986).
In this case, the record reveals that aside from holding the victims at gunpoint
for over two hours, bound and taped while lying face down in bed, the codefendants
poured gasoline, lighter fluid, and turpentine throughout the dwelling prior to
shooting the victims.  Moreover, the record supports the conclusion that Melanie
King was aware that accelerants were being poured throughout the trailer.25  Although
the fire was ultimately determined not to be the cause of the victims’ death, the
record provides factual proof that, prior to being shot, the victims were tormented
with the prospect of being killed by fire or gunshots and, thus, were “acutely aware
of their impending deaths.”  Accordingly, and based upon the aforementioned
26. Moreover, and although finding the pecuniary gain aggravator was
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial judge expressly stated in his sentencing
order that he gave “due regard against inappropriate double consideration” and
found that this aggravator merged with another aggravator, i.e., that the murders
were committed during the course of a burglary, arson or robbery; therefore, both
aggravators were only “considered as one” by the trial court.  See Sentencing
Order at 4, 11, State v. Hertz, No. 97-214 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Feb. 18, 2000).  Having
merged the two, the trial court was correct in setting forth the basis for doing so, as
there is ample evidence in the record to prove Hertz benefitted financially from
these murders. 
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reasons, we find that there is competent, substantial evidence in the record to
support the trial court’s finding that this murder was committed in an especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. 
Pecuniary Gain Aggravator
Hertz next argues the trial court erred in finding the murder was committed for
pecuniary gain.  This Court, however, has previously rejected Hertz’s argument that
the pecuniary gain aggravator in inconsistent with a concurrent finding of the avoid
arrest aggravator.  See Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d 692, 695 (Fla. 1994) (citing
Preston v. State, 607 So. 2d 404, 409 (Fla. 1992)); see also Hildwin v. State, 727 So.
2d 193, 195 (Fla. 1998) (holding that “in order to establish this aggravator the state
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that ‘the murder was motivated, at least
in part, by a desire to obtain money, property or other financial gain.’”) (quoting
Finney v. State, 660 So. 2d 674, 680 (Fla. 1995)).26
-41-
Proportionality
Finally, Hertz argues that his death sentences are impermissibly disparate from
Dempsey’s sentences of life imprisonment.  “A trial court’s determination
concerning the relative culpability of the co-perpetrators in a first-degree murder case
is a finding of fact and will be sustained on review if supported by competent
substantial evidence.”  Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 935 (Fla. 2000) (quoting
Puccio v. State, 701 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. 1997)).
Although Hertz urges equal culpability with codefendant Dempsey in the
present case, the trial court resolved this issue against Hertz in discussing Dempsey’s
disparate life sentence as a mitigating factor:
Finally, the defendant argues that the life sentences of co-
defendant, Dempsey, mitigate and require life sentences for this
defendant.  
Although in his cross-examination testimony Dempsey testified
that he “guessed” he was equally responsible for the acts committed by
the three defendants on the night they committed their crimes and that he
could have left several times during the course of the defendants’
activity and chose not to do so, the totality of the facts and
circumstances in the record competently and substantially show that his
dastardly culpability and role in this night of terror was less than either
of his co-defendants.
Apparently, Dempsey was the brightest and best educated of the
three but after the initial violence and hostile entry into the victims’
dwelling his role was more of a follower of Hertz and Looney who
made the decisions concerning killing the victims and burning down
their dwelling in which he reluctantly participated.  When advised by
Hertz that he and Looney had decided to kill the victims he was told by
27. Moreover, any argument that this Court should unilaterally reject
Dempsey’s testimony is also without merit. See Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274,
282 (Fla. 1998) (holding “[t]he question of whether an accomplice is credible and
-42-
Hertz that if he did not participate with them there was a bullet for him
also.
The State also points out that when Hertz and Looney came over
to the place where Dempsey working [sic] on the day of the crimes
Looney was armed with a 357 pistol he was displaying.  When the three
left to go steal a car, Dempsey took duct tape to tape the car window
they would break in stealing a car.  Dempsey was never seen driving
either of the stolen vehicles of the victims.  At Wal-mart, only one and a
half hours after the murders, Dempsey was quiet and withdrawn while
Hertz and Looney were festive and showing off the stolen pickup and
Mustang respectively, to the store clerks as their new cars.  When
Dempsey and Looney were questioned in Daytona, Looney was armed
with one of the murder weapons on his person while Dempsey was not
armed.  Dempsey gave a detailed confession consistent with the
evidence less than 24 hours after the murders.  According to Major
Crum of the Wakulla Sheriff’s Department who heard both, Dempsey
gave the same consistent statement to him that he gave in his testimony
to the jury.  In both, Dempsey expressed genuine remorse.  Prior to
their killing, Dempsey had shown some compassion for the victims in
loosening the tape cutting off their circulation and placing a pillow under
one of the victims’ head.  Dempsey was the last to fire his weapon
according to his testimony and believed Keith Spears was already dead
when he fired.  This factor, ably argued to the jury for its significant
consideration and weight is entitled to and has been given substantial
consideration and weight by the Court herein.
Sentencing Order at 9-11, State v. Hertz, No. 97-214 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Feb. 18,
2000).  This thorough analysis by the trial court indicates that not only was the issue
of the codefendant’s life sentence presented to the jury as a mitigating factor, but
also that the trial court carefully considered relative culpability.27 
the weight to be given to the testimony are issues for the jury to determine”).  Here,
the judge and the jury were made aware of Dempsey’s guilty plea and sentence, and
it was within the judge’s and jury’s discretion whether to believe Dempsey’s
testimony.  See Brown, 721 So. 2d at 282.  
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Furthermore, Ray v. State, 755 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2000), upon which Hertz
relies, is distinguishable.  In Ray, this Court reduced Ray’s death sentence to life
because his more culpable codefendant received a life sentence.  Id. at 611-12.  This
Court did so, however, because “[m]uch of the evidence points to [the codefendant]
as the dominant player in the crimes.”  Id. at 612 (emphasis added).  Moreover, the
codefendant “did nearly all the talking during the robbery and appeared to be in
command of the operation.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The same cannot be said for the
relative actions of Dempsey with respect to Hertz.  Indeed, and further unlike the
instant case, the trial judge’s own remarks in sentencing the codefendant in Ray
reflected that “he believed Ray and [the codefendant] to be equally culpable in the
shooting.” Id. (emphasis added).  
Hazen v. State, 700 So. 2d 1207, 1214 (Fla. 1997), upon which Hertz also
relies, is also distinguishable.  In Hazen, this Court vacated the defendant’s death
sentence on disparate proportionality grounds because the codefendant who received
life sentence was found to be the “prime instigator” of murder and was, therefore,
more culpable.  See Hazen, 700 So. 2d at 1214 (emphasis added).  In Hazen, only
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the codefendant carried a gun and was the first to enter the home; moreover, the
codefendant was not sure “if [the defendant] even knew what was going on.” Id. 
Finally, and in contrast to the instant case, the majority in Hazen also specifically
relied upon the defendant not doing the actual killing in reaching its conclusion of
disparate treatment.  We do not have those facts here.  Accordingly, we find that the
trial court’s finding of relative culpability is supported by competent, substantial
evidence and, thus, hold that Dempsey’s life imprisonment does not render Hertz’s
death sentence disproportionate.  
Furthermore, in light of the circumstances of this case, including the existence
of six aggravating circumstances (i.e., commission while on felony probation;
previous conviction of a violent felony; commission during robbery and arson and
for pecuniary gain; commission to avoid arrest; CCP; and HAC) and only two
statutory mitigating circumstances, we find the imposition of the death penalty to be
proportionate when compared to other similar cases.  See Brown v. State, 721 So.
2d 274 (1998) (affirming death penalty where evidence established four aggravating
factors--prior violent felony conviction; murder committed during robbery and
pecuniary gain, merged; HAC; and CCP--and two nonstatutory mitigating factors);
Gordon v. State, 704 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1997) (affirming death penalty where evidence
established four aggravating factors--murder during commission of burglary;
-45-
pecuniary gain; HAC; and CCP--and only minimal evidence in mitigation for
drowning murder and robbery of victim); Bryan v. State, 533 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1988)
(affirming death penalty for execution-style shooting where evidence established six
aggravating factors--previous violent felony; committed during robbery and
kidnaping; avoid arrest; pecuniary gain; HAC; and CCP--and only minimal
nonstatutory mitigation).
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Hertz’s convictions and sentences.
It is so ordered.  
SHAW, HARDING, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only.
QUINCE, J., concurs as to the conviction and concurs in result only as to the
sentence.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result and dissents in part with an opinion, in which WELLS,
C.J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF
FILED, DETERMINED.
LEWIS, J., concurring in result and dissenting in part.
I concur in result only and dissent in part because, in my view, the majority’s
analysis of the admissibility of the autopsy photos here is far too restrictive, and
incorrect in its conclusion that it was error and an abuse of discretion to admit such
photographs into evidence.  The majority’s analysis arguably accepts the defense
position that if autopsy photos are not specifically used by a medical examiner to
-46-
illustrate the precise cause or manner of the victim’s death, such photographs are,
therefore, rendered irrelevant.  Further, the majority seems to voice and approve the
defense argument that the photos here addressed only the damage inflicted upon the
victims by fire after the infliction of gunshot wounds, and such matters were not an
issue in the case.  
The primary defense objection to the admissibility of these photos at trial was
that the photographs were not necessary for the medical examiner to describe the
wounds and injuries inflicted upon the victims.  The admissibility of photographs,
even if gruesome, is not predicated on “necessity.”  See Bush v. State, 461 So. 2d
936, 939 (Fla. 1984) (holding “necessity” is not the test for the admissibility of
allegedly gruesome photos);  Bauldree v. State, 284 So. 2d 196, 197 (Fla. 1973)
(same);  State v. Wright, 265 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 1972) (same).  It is clear that
photographs are admissible, notwithstanding objections of gruesomeness, where the
photos assist the medical examiner in explaining his testimony as to an issue in the
case, even though such issue may not be the ultimate disputed fact.
Here, all parties were aware that the evidence would be presented through the
testimony of the only alleged eyewitness concerning certain specific events and
specific gunshots that were disputed and challenged by the defendants.  The next
and natural sequence of the evidence would be to examine the results of the crime
-47-
(the bodies) to determine whether the testimony of the alleged eyewitness could be
either confirmed or refuted and, if so, the basis for such conclusion.  A proper
presentation of the evidence would require no less.  We would certainly look to a
pathologist or medical examiner to provide testimony related to the presence or
absence of a correlation between the testimony and the ultimate scientific findings
along with any reasons which would explain the conclusions.  The existence of
consistencies or discrepancies would be material issues to be developed and
explored during trial.  No less material and relevant would be the reasons for the
presentation of such conclusions or the unavailability or inability to produce such
evidence.  Thus, in my view, matters related to the gunshot wounds (such as
position, number, location, angles, and trajectories) were certainly legitimate issues to
be addressed in the evidence as well as matters which would explain why such
evidence was not presented or not available, if any.  I respectfully suggest that we
have previously rendered a decision in Peterka v. State, 640 So. 2d 59, 69 (Fla.
1994), involving facts and issues sufficiently similar to those presented here, which is
directly contrary to the majority’s determination of the issue concerning photos.  I
would follow and apply Peterka.
In Peterka, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder in connection
with the gunshot death of his roommate.  The defendant provided a statement that
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the victim had initiated a shoving match which had innocently escalated into a fight. 
According to the defendant, while he was holding a handgun it had accidentally
discharged across the room and struck the victim as he was attempting to rise from a
couch.  
A medical examiner presented a contrary version of the facts in the form of an
opinion that the victim had been shot at close range from behind.  The medical
examiner was, however, unable to present certain evidence to support this testimony. 
In affirming the admission of an alleged gruesome photo into evidence depicting the
victim’s decomposed skull over the same objection voiced by the defendant here, we
held:
As to Peterka’s relevance argument, we find the photograph relevant to
the medical examiner’s testimony that not enough tissue remained on the
skull to determine the proximity of the gun to the victim’s head.  Thus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photograph
into evidence.
Id. at 69.
In my view, just as the disputed photo depicting the victim’s decomposed
skull was relevant and related to the inability of the medical examiner to present
certain scientific evidence to confirm a version of the facts and was therefore
admissible in Peterka, the decision of the trial court here to admit the photos used by
the medical examiner to explain why the disputed testimony of an alleged eyewitness
-49-
concerning gun shots and wounds could be neither confirmed nor refuted upon
examination due to the condition of the victims’ bodies was not error, and certainly
not an abuse of discretion.  Therefore, I concur in the result and dissent as to the
majority’s analysis and decision concerning the autopsy photos.
WELLS, C.J., concurs.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Wakulla County,
N. Sanders Sauls, Judge - Case No. 97-214CF
Steven L. Seliger of Garcia and Seliger, Quincy, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Appellee