Case Title: Wyoming Coalition v. Wyoming Game & Fish Com'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wyoming Coalition v. Wyoming Game & Fish Com'n1994 WY 63875 P.2d 729Case Number: 93-168Decided: 06/06/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
WYOMING 
COALITION, a Wyoming non-profit association; Jackson Hole Outfitters' 
Association, a Wyoming non-profit association; Star Valley Chamber of Commerce, 
a Wyoming non-profit corporation; Cody Country Outfitters & Guides' 
Association, a Wyoming non-profit association; Meeteetse Multiple Use 
Association, a Wyoming non-profit association; Lincoln County Outfitters' 
Association, a Wyoming non-profit association; Sublette County Outfitters & 
Guides' Association, a Wyoming non-profit corporation; and Wyoming Outfitters' 
Association, a Wyoming non-profit association,

Appellants 
(Petitioners),

 

v.

 

WYOMING 
GAME & FISH COMMISSION,

Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Robert 
R. Ranck and William P. Schwartz, Ranck & Schwartz, 
Jackson.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Deputy Atty. Gen., Ron Arnold, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen.

William 
Perry Pendley and Joanne Herlihy, Denver, for amicus curiae, Mountain States 
Legal Foundation.

 

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The issue in this 
case focuses upon the constitutionality of the delegation of rulemaking 
authority to the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 
23-1-302 (Supp. 1992). The debate is over the question of sufficient constraint 
of the delegated authority by identifiable standards. The Wyoming Game and Fish 
Commission (Commission) adopted rules and regulations reducing the September 
bull elk hunting season in Teton County for the hunting season of 1992. Upon 
judicial review, the district court of the Ninth Judicial District in and for 
Teton County upheld the Commission's regulations. We agree with the district 
court that the policy statement articulated in WYO. STAT. § 23-1-103 (1991) is 
an adequate identifiable legislative standard to justify the regulations adopted 
relating to the hunting season. The Mountain States Legal Foundation 
(Foundation), having sought permission to participate in this case as amicus 
curiae, endeavored to present new issues in its brief, and we disregard and 
strike the portion of the brief of the Foundation directed to that end. The 
decision of the district court of the Ninth Judicial District is 
affirmed.

[¶2]      The Wyoming 
Coalition and the other parties appearing as appellants, hereinafter Coalition, 
articulate the issues in the Brief of Appellants as 
follows:

I. 
The Commission's authority under W.S. § 23-1-302 (Supp. 1992) is not constrained 
by any identifiable legislative standards and is therefore violative of the 
Wyoming Constitution.

II. 
The district court erred in concluding that W.S. § 23-1-302 (Supp. 1992) is a 
constitutional delegation of authority by the Wyoming 
legislature.

In 
the Brief Amicus Curiae of Mountain States Legal Foundation, the issues 
are said to be:

I. 
The Wyoming legislature has unconstitutionally abdicated its appropriation 
authority to the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission.

II. 
To uphold a delegation of authority, this court must determine that the 
legislature provided, at a minimum, broad or general standards to guide agency 
action.

III. 
The Wyoming legislature has unconstitutionally delegated legislative function to 
the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission.

A. 
No standards control the establishment of hunting season.

B. 
The Commission cannot proscribe conduct because that is a legislative 
function.

The 
Commission, in its Brief of Appellee/Respondent sets forth the issues in this 
way:

I. 
Whether the legislature properly delegated the authority to set hunting seasons 
to the Game and Fish Commission.

II. 
Whether the court should entertain the new issues raised in the amicus 
brief.

[¶3]      The issue pressed 
by the Coalition is entirely one of law. Consequently, the relevant facts serve 
only as a framework for the generation of that legal issue. In May of 1992, the 
Commission held a hearing to consider a recommendation by the Wyoming Game and 
Fish Department (Department) to shorten the bull elk hunting season in 
northwestern Wyoming. The Coalition appeared at the hearing and presented 
arguments against adopting the recommendation of the Department. The Coalition 
contended that no sound biological reason supported the recommendations of the 
Department; the Department should have analyzed the economic impact of its 
recommendation on the State of Wyoming; and viable alternatives, other than 
shortening the September hunting season, were available to accomplish the goal 
of the Department to increase the quality of bull elk hunting. After the 
hearing, contrary to the arguments of the Coalition, the Commission adopted the 
recommendation by the Department, and the 1992 season was modified by shortening 
it.

[¶4]      In July of that 
year, the Coalition presented to the district court a motion to set aside agency 
action based on the procedural aspects of the Commission's proceedings. The 
motion was denied by the district court, and the ruling was not further pursued 
by the Coalition. Then, in December of 1992, at a time following the actual 
implementation of the order reducing the hunting season, the Coalition filed a 
second motion in which it sought to set aside the agency's action by contesting 
the constitutionality of the delegation of rulemaking authority to the 
Commission by the Wyoming legislature. The district court denied this motion and 
entered its Final Order Affirming Administrative Action. This appeal is taken 
from that order. The Coalition seeks to have this court determine that 
delegation of rulemaking authority to the Commission is 
unconstitutional.

[¶5]      The temptation is 
strong to dismiss this case under our doctrine of mootness. E.g., Mari v. 
Rawlins Nat'l Bank, 794 P.2d 85 (Wyo. 1990); Foster v. Wicklund, 778 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 1989); Graham v. Wyoming Peace Officer Standards and Training 
Comm'n, 737 P.2d 1060 (Wyo. 1987); In Interest of AJ, 736 P.2d 721 
(Wyo. 1987); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 
693 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1985); Walker v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Albany 
County, 644 P.2d 772 (Wyo. 1982); Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n of Wyoming, 620 P.2d 139 (Wyo. 1980); Northern Utilities, 
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 617 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1980). The doctrine of 
mootness is one aspect of the concept of justiciable controversies. Reiman 
Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182 (Wyo. 1992). The parties have 
satisfied us, however, that the dispute represented in this case is an ongoing 
dispute of sufficient public import to justify our decision of the issues. They 
assure the Court that the issues undoubtedly would arise in the future. 
Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Langdon, 626 P.2d 1032 (Wyo. 1981); 
Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 (Wyo. 1974). Consequently, we shall 
address the issues on the merits.

[¶6]      The statutory 
basis for judicial review with respect to the adoption of the regulations in 
question is articulated in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA), WYO. 
STAT. § 16-3-101 to -115 (1990 & Supp. 1993), stating that the reviewing 
court shall:

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

* 
* * * * *

(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right; * * *.

WYO. 
STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1990).

[¶7]      These parties do 
not contend in their arguments that the rules promulgated by the Commission were 
in excess of its statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or lacking 
statutory right but, instead, the focus is upon whether the degree of delegation 
is constitutionally permissible. For that reason, we do not consider the 
sufficiency of the statute to justify the action of the Commission. Since no 
effort was made to obtain review of the first order entered by the district 
court attacking the regulations on procedural grounds, we do not further 
consider that aspect other than to note how it fits into the general framework 
of constitutional delegation.

[¶8]      In this regard, 
this case does not call for us to articulate standards of review with respect to 
the process of promulgating a rule, which is defined as an "agency statement of 
general applicability that implements, interprets and prescribes law, policy or 
ordinances of cities and towns * * *." WYO. STAT. § 16-3-101(b)(ix) (1990). The 
rulemaking process, being prospective in nature and impacting the rights of a 
large number of individuals, is obviously different from the process relating to 
contested cases. While some of the principles relating to review of contested 
cases may be applied in rulemaking proceedings, the nature of such proceedings 
must be conceded to be substantially different.

[¶9]      In addressing the 
attack upon the constitutionality of the statutes, we must remember statutes are 
presumed to be constitutional, and one who challenges a statute on the ground of 
unconstitutionality must demonstrate the statute is unconstitutional and do so 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291 (Wyo. 
1991); O'Brien v. State, 711 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1986); Meyer v. 
Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235 (Wyo. 1982). This court has the duty to maintain the 
constitutionality of a statute when that is possible, but we cannot deny the 
balancing duty to declare a statute unconstitutional "if it transgresses the 
state constitution." Washakie County Sch. Dist. Number One v. Herschler, 
606 P.2d 310, 319 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 
66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980). The burden of proof of unconstitutionality remains with 
the challenging party.

[¶10]   In several cases, this court has 
determined that a delegation of authority to an administrative agency was 
unconstitutional. In State v. Grimshaw, 49 Wyo. 192, 53 P.2d 13 (1936), 
we decided an agency may not define a standard of conduct pursuant to which an 
individual might be adjudged a criminal. Next, we concluded the power to revoke 
a driver's license without reason or cause amounts to an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative authority to the revoking agency. Eastwood v. 
Wyoming Highway Dep't, 301 P.2d 818 (Wyo. 1956). Later, we held it 
unconstitutional for the legislature to delegate to private parties the 
authority to establish retail prices in accordance with the Wyoming Fair Trade 
Act. Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409 (Wyo. 
1962). More recently, this court declared the legislative delegation of power to 
an agency to establish a rule for ad valorem taxation is contrary to the Wyoming 
Constitution. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 749 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 1987). The thrust of these cases is that 
explicit legislative standards are required when an individual is deprived of a 
liberty or property interest. Express constitutional legislative power cannot be 
delegated in such instances. While these cases furnish insight with respect to 
the invalidity of the delegation of legislative authority, they must be 
distinguished from this case.

[¶11]   In WYO. STAT. § 23-1-103, we find a 
policy and mission statement for the Wyoming Game and Fish Act (WYO. STAT. §§ 
23-1-101 to -6-207 (1991 & Supp. 1993)):

For 
the purpose of this act, all wildlife in Wyoming is the property of the state. 
It is the purpose of this act and the policy of the state to provide an adequate 
and flexible system for control, propagation, management, protection and 
regulation of all Wyoming wildlife. There shall be no private ownership of live 
animals classified in this act as big or trophy game 
animals.

The 
delegation of the powers challenged is found in WYO. STAT. § 23-1-302 providing 
in the part addressed by the parties:

(a) 
The commission is directed and empowered:

(i) 
To fix season and bag limits, open, shorten or close seasons on any species or 
sex of wildlife for any type of legal weapon, except predatory animals, 
predacious birds, protected animals, and protected birds, in any specified 
locality of Wyoming, and to give notice thereof;

* 
* * * * *

(xvi) 
To provide for the enforcement of this act;

* 
* * * * *

(xxii) 
To promulgate such orders as the commission considers necessary to carry out the 
intent of this act;

* 
* * * * *

(xxiv) 
To approve and make public budgets and establish policy for the 
department.

Contrary 
to the contentions and arguments by the Coalition that the statute is an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, we hold these sections, 
read together, provide sufficient general standards for the action by the 
Commission.

[¶12]   We recognize the proposition that a 
legislature must define standards in as reasonably precise a fashion as the 
subject matter permits. The will of the legislature must be clear, which we find 
it is in this case. The agency is not permitted to follow its own course in 
articulating rules. The standards found in the Wyoming Game and Fish Act in the 
statement of its purpose are sufficient to support the delegation challenged by 
the Coalition. It is incumbent upon the Commission "to provide an adequate and 
flexible system for control, propagation, management, protection and regulation 
of all Wyoming wildlife." WYO. STAT. § 23-1-103.

[¶13]   In this context, we cannot overlook 
the fact that the action of the Commission must be tested in the cauldron of 
administrative rulemaking proceedings. The rules and regulations promulgated by 
the Commission must be adopted in accordance with WAPA, WYO. STAT. § 16-3-103, 
which articulates the minimum requirement for rulemaking by agencies. While this 
proceeding is less formal in its nature than that of a contested case, the 
agency must comply with extensive procedural requirements before rules are 
adopted. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. Envtl. Quality 
Council, 590 P.2d 1324 (Wyo. 1979).

[¶14]   Furthermore, any person who is 
adversely affected by the adoption of a rule by an agency is entitled to 
judicial review of agency action. WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114. These rulemaking 
proceedings furnish adequate safeguards to protect citizens from the adoption of 
rules and regulations by the Commission that do not comport with the standards 
articulated in WYO. STAT. § 23-1-103. That protection extends to any potentially 
arbitrary or capricious actions by the Commission.

[¶15]   Our sister states have adopted 
parallel resolutions of such issues. The courts have held consistently that a 
legislative delegation, in the context of protection of natural resources, is 
valid if general standards together with adequate procedural safeguards are 
present. In Washington, a legislative delegation enabling an agency to regulate 
fishing was upheld because the statute defined "what is to be done and who is to 
do it, and procedural safeguards exist to control arbitrary administrative 
action." Northwest Gillnetters Ass'n v. Sandison, 95 Wn.2d 638, 628 P.2d 800, 804 (1981). In Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural and Economic 
Resources, 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978), the North Carolina court 
concluded it was permissible to declare a legislative delegation valid by 
examining general standards accompanied by procedural safeguards. In Michigan, 
standards and adequate procedural safeguards were held to be sufficient to 
justify the validity of a legislative delegation. Westervelt v. Natural 
Resources Comm'n, 402 Mich. 412, 263 N.W.2d 564 
(1978).

[¶16]   On the issue presented, we hold the 
Coalition has not met its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the 
unconstitutionality of WYO. STAT. § 23-1-302. In fact, we are satisfied the 
legislative scheme is constitutional. The requisites essential for the 
delegation of rulemaking authority to an administrative agency are 
satisfied.

[¶17]   We conclude with the criticism of 
the effort of the Foundation to participate as amicus curiae. The 
Foundation sought leave to participate in this appeal as amicus curiae, 
but in its brief, the Foundation argues the question of the unconstitutionality 
of the delegation of the legislature's appropriation authority to the 
Commission, and also the unlawfulness of the authority of the Commission to 
create criminal offenses. Neither of these issues were presented by the 
Coalition. The Foundation's presentation of an argument that it entitles, "The 
Wyoming Legislature Has Unconstitutionally Abdicated Its Appropriation Authority 
To The Wyoming Game And Fish Commission," is completely apart from the issues 
argued by the Coalition.

[¶18]   An effort to inject extraneous 
issues is not helpful to this court and it subverts the purpose of an amicus 
curiae participation. The appropriate purpose generally "is to aid the court 
on questions of law, * * *." 4 AM.JUR.2D Amicus Curiae § 3, at 110-111 
(1962). That means the amicus is called to assist the court in the case 
or call attention to facts, laws, or circumstances pertaining to the 
issues the court may overlook. It is clear the amicus may "present 
facts or arguments in a different context from those presented by the parties" 
(ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, Ch. 10.19, at 309 (2d 
ed. 1989)), but the presentation of entirely novel issues is not justified. Our 
sister jurisdictions have consistently held that raising new issues is beyond 
the allowable scope of participation by an amicus curiae. See, e.g., Montana 
Dep't of Social and Rehabilitation Services v. Angel, 176 Mont. 293, 577 P.2d 1223 (1978); Matter of Shields' Estate, 1 Kan. App. 2d 688, 574 P.2d 229 (1977); John Deere Indus. Equip. Co. v. Moorehead, 38 Colo. App. 220, 
556 P.2d 91 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 194 Colo. 398, 572 P.2d 1207 
(1977); State in Interest of Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.2d 110 
(1963). Consequently, we disregard and strike parts I and III of the Brief 
Amicus Curiae of Mountain States Legal Foundation together with its 
conclusions. We trust that, in the future, amici curiae will not yield to 
the temptation to emulate this approach.

[¶19]   We are satisfied the challenged 
statute, WYO. STAT. § 23-1-302, is constitutional, and it does not manifest an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. It is justified by 
sufficiently identifiable general standards together with procedural safeguards 
that inhibit any unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious rulemaking by the 
Commission. The Final Order Affirming Administrative Action entered in the 
district court is affirmed.