Case Title: City of Cheyenne Policemen Pension Bd. v. Perreault

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
City of Cheyenne Policemen Pension Bd. v. Perreault1986 WY 198727 P.2d 702Case Number: 86-75Decided: 11/05/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
CITY 
OFCHEYENNE POLICEMEN PENSION BOARD, 
Appellant (Respondent),

v.

David D. PERREAULT, 
Appellee (Petitioner).

Appeal from District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

R. Walter 
Connell, Deputy City Atty., and Nancy S. Tabor, Legal Intern, Cheyenne, for appellant 
(respondent).

Rhonda Sigrist 
Woodard of Woodard, Epps and Hecox, Cheyenne, for appellee 
(petitioner).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     David Perreault, a 
Cheyenne police 
patrolman, was injured in an on-duty automobile accident. His subsequent 
application to the City of Cheyenne Policemen Pension Board (Board) for a disability 
retirement pension was denied. The district court reversed the Board's decision 
as not supported by case law or the medical testimony on record. We 
affirm.

[¶2.]     On July 1, 1980, 
Perreault was injured in an automobile accident while on duty and was 
hospitalized for four days with neck, shoulder, hip, knee, and ankle pain. His 
condition improved so considerably that he returned to work and volunteered for 
strenuous SWAT team training, completed a physical training course, and engaged 
in other physically demanding activities. However, during this time, he began 
experiencing lower back pain and pain and numbness in his legs. The pain 
intensified, and he was again hospitalized in December of 1980. A myelogram 
revealed possible indications of nerve-root pressure from abnormal disc 
degeneration. After treatment, his physician concluded that he could return to 
light work at the police department, but that he was totally unable to perform 
the normally assigned duties of a patrolman.

[¶3.]     Perreault was visited 
on January 19, 1981 by a lieutenant with the police department who advised him 
that he had run out of paid work leave. The lieutenant discussed his available 
options, including worker's compensation and disability retirement pension, but 
did not discuss the possibility of a light-duty assignment. A few days later, 
Perreault filed a request with the Board for a disability retirement pension1 accompanied by a letter from his 
attending physician stating that Perreault was "100% impaired as far as police 
work is concerned, however there is some other type of work he can 
do."

[¶4.]     During a hearing, held 
February 3, 1982, the Board received testimony from Perreault's physician and 
another physician retained by the City to examine him. The City's examining 
physician testified that Perreault probably had a herniated disc or a 
chronically sprained back, and generally substantiated the testimony of the 
attending physician. The City's examining physician did, however, testify that 
to categorize his disability as permanent was inappropriate "at this time." 
Other testimony revealed the extent of Perreault's vigorous, physical activities 
between the time of the automobile accident in July and his hospitalization in 
December.

[¶5.]     The Board reviewed the 
testimony and issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law, denying 
Perreault's application for a disability pension. The Board found (1) that the 
testimony regarding his demanding, physical activities disaffirmed his claim 
that he was physically disabled; (2) that there was little objective, physical 
evidence to support his claim; (3) that other police officers who had suffered 
with back problems had remained on active duty; and (4) that Perreault was still 
capable of performing most of his duties.

[¶6.]     Perreault filed a 
petition for review with the district court. Upon review, the district court 
determined that the Board's decision was neither supported by case law nor by 
the introduced medical testimony. Consequently, the district court reversed the 
Board's findings and remanded the case to the Board with instructions to award a 
disability pension.

[¶7.]     The City now appeals 
the district court's decision, claiming that:

(I) The district court 
erred in holding that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial 
evidence and was arbitrary and capricious; and

(II) The district court 
committed reversible error when it substituted its judgment for that of the 
trier of fact.

An issue 
originally raised by Perreault regarding the restriction of voir dire at the 
Board hearing was not considered by the district court in the last decision 
letter, and since no cross-appeal was taken will not now be considered in this 
appeal.

ISSUE 
I

[¶8.]     The parties have 
accurately stated the standard which guides court review of administrative 
decisions. 

"In determining whether 
the action of an agency is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, the 
court ascertains whether the decision is supported by the evidence contained in 
the record." Holding's Little America v. Board of CountyCommissioners of Laramie County, Wyo., 670 P.2d 699, 703 
(1983).

The court must 
accept the agency's finding of fact when it is supported by substantial 
evidence. First National Bank of Worland v. Financial Institutions Board, 
Wyo., 616 P.2d 787, 793-794 (1980); § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E), W.S. 1977, 1982 Replacement. 
Substantial evidence is

"* * * such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 662 P.2d 878 (1983); Board of Trustees, Laramie County 
School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, Wyo., 549 P.2d 1161 (1976). Such evidence may 
be less than the weight of the evidence but cannot be contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence. Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Public 
Service Commission of Wyoming, supra." Big Piney Oil & Gas Company v. 
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 
Wyo., 715 P.2d 557, 561-562 (1986).

[¶9.]     We apply the above 
standard of review of the Board's decision together with this court's 
established procedure for review of agency decisions. This court recently 
restated that procedure in Walker v. Karpan, Wyo., 726 P.2d 82, 89 
(1986):

"When the case comes to 
us from a district court acting as an intermediate appellate court we review the 
case as if it had been appealed directly to this court without affording special 
deference to the rulings of the district court."

[¶10.]  In applying these standards, we agree 
with the district court: the Board's decision is not supported by substantial 
evidence. The uncontroverted testimony of both Perreault's physician and the 
City's physician who examined him substantiated his claim that he was disabled 
from performing the normal duties of a patrolman.

[¶11.]  Perreault's physician concluded that he 
could return to light duty, but the record reveals that light duty was not an 
option which was made available to him. The City contends that light duty could 
have been made available upon request. The record reveals that Perreault did ask 
his sergeant for light duty, but "at the time of the request he was told that he 
would have to use up his sick leave since there was no light duty work available 
for him to do at that time." Following directions, Perreault exhausted his sick 
leave, after which he was visited by the police department lieutenant, who 
discussed only his worker's compensation and disability pension options. Thus, 
the police chief's testimony at the hearing that "I think I could probably say 
without question we would have reassigned him," had the employee requested light 
duty, is unsubstantiated by the account in the record of what actually 
happened.2

[¶12.]  An excellent analysis in a similar 
circumstance is found in Cloud v. Fort Dodge Police Pension Board, Iowa App., 
372 N.W.2d 313 (1985). In that case a police officer was injured in an 
automobile accident. His treatment involved the removal of a herniated disc from 
his neck and the fusion of the vertebrae, resulting in the loss of 15 percent of 
his neck motions and the loss of strength and the ability of his neck to absorb 
shocks. The Police Pension Board of Trustees denied the officer's claim for 
accidental disability benefits, determining that the plaintiff was "not totally 
incapacitated for further duty." Id., 372 N.W.2d  at 314. The officer petitioned 
the district court, which annulled the Board's decision as illegal, arbitrary 
and not supported by substantial evidence. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court, stating:

"This is not a case where 
the board could resolve a conflict of the evidence. It is a case where the board 
misapplied the law to uncontroverted facts." 372 N.W.2d  at 
316.

[¶13.]  In this case, both physicians who 
examined Perreault testified that he was disabled from performing the normal 
duties of a patrolman. Like Cloud, this case is not one where the Board could 
resolve a factual conflict. Rather, it is a case where the Board misapplied the 
law to uncontroverted facts.

[¶14.]  The examining physician for the City 
testified that he would not categorize Perreault's disability as permanent, but 
permanent disability is not the statutory standard which qualifies a policeman 
for a disability retirement pension.

[¶15.]  Section 15-5-308(a), W.S. 1977, 1980 
Replacement, provides:

"If any person, while 
serving as [a] policeman is physically disabled as a result of any bodily injury 
received in the immediate or direct performance or discharge of his duties, the 
board, upon his written request filed with the secretary of the board, or 
without the written request if it deems it to be for the benefit of the public, 
shall retire that person from the department and order that he be paid from the 
fund during his lifetime a monthly pension equal to sixty-two and one-half 
percent (62-1/2%) of the amount of his regular monthly salary, effective at the 
time of his retirement. If the officer's disability is off-duty related, the 
officer shall receive a monthly pension equal to fifty percent (50%) of his 
monthly salary effective at the time of his retirement. If the disability 
ceases, the pension shall cease, and the person shall be restored to active 
service at the existing salary of his position or rank at the time he is 
reinstated."

The word 
"permanent" does not appear in the statute.3 Furthermore, the last sentence of 
the statute provides a mechanism for terminating the pension of a policeman 
whose disability ceases, clearly indicating that the disability need not be 
permanent to qualify an officer for retirement payments.

[¶16.]  The City also emphasizes in its brief 
that Perreault's strenuous physical activities after the automobile accident 
make his "claim that his alleged back problems were caused by the accident very 
questionable." This statement is supported by the testimony of the City's 
examining physician that "most herniated discs and/or back sprains are not 
caused by automobile accidents, but rather normal everyday activity that's done 
in the home or athletics." Had the Board used this evidence to support a 
conclusion that the disability was "off-duty related" § 15-5-308(a), and had 
other evidence been introduced to corroborate that conclusion, their argument 
would be more persuasive. However, the Board concluded that Perreault was not 
disabled as a matter of law. The evidence does not support that conclusion. The 
fact of some disability was not in question; the factual controversy related 
only to the cause of the disability. The legal issue decided by the Board and 
reversed by the district court on appeal was whether Perreault's disability was 
compensable under the statute. The district court's opinion letter 
stated:

"The issue in the instant 
case is whether or not Mr. Perreault is in fact disabled within the meaning of 
W.S. § 15-5-308(a). None of the cases cited stand for the proposition that a 
disabled petitioner can be denied a pension if no light duty position is 
available or if no such position has been offered to him.

"Issue No. 2: Whether the 
board's decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.

"Issue No. 3: Whether the 
board's decision to deny petitioner a pension was unsupported by substantial 
evidence.

* * * * * 
*

"Briefly, a review of the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the Policemen's Pension 
Board reveals the following:

"1. The board hints that 
it felt Mr. Perreault was malingering, that he was not disabled at all. * * * 
They seem to place considerable emphasis on the fact that evidence relating to 
petitioner's injury was `subjective and symptomatic in nature.' In addition, the 
board cites various physical activities which petitioner engaged in between 
July, 1980 and November 1980.

"2. The board stops short 
of saying that Mr. Perreault was not suffering from a back injury, finding that 
if such an injury did exist, Mr. Perreault was capable of performing 90-95% of a 
police officer's duties, and that as a matter of law, such an injury was not a 
disability by W.S. 15-5-308(a).

"3. The board also found 
that if Mr. Perreault was suffering from a disability, it was not the result of 
`injury received in the immediate or direct performance or discharge of his 
duties.'

* * * * * 
*

"Given that the Board, as 
triers of fact, were in a position to make a determination as to the credibility 
of witnesses, it seems rather strange that they should disregard not only the 
testimony of Mr. Perreault and Dr. Kline, but of Dr. Preston as well. The source 
of results reached by the Board appear to be inferences from the testimony 
regarding Mr. Perreault's activities, and the vague testimony by members of the 
police department that other officers have `lived with' back 
problems.

"If the Board had based 
their determination entirely on a belief that Mr. Perreault was in fact making 
up his problems, that would be one matter. However, they do not go that far, 
buttressing their conclusion with the finding that, if petitioner is in fact 
injured, such an injury is not a disability under W.S. § 15-5-308(a). That 
result is not supported either by case law or medical testimony received at the 
hearing."

ISSUE 
II

[¶17.]  Appellant cites Atchison v. Career Service Counsel of the State of 
Wyoming, Wyo., 664 P.2d 18, 21 (1983) for the 
proposition that

"* * * This court will 
not substitute its judgment on these matters for that of the administrative 
agency, nor will this court perform duties assigned by law to administrative 
boards. McGuire v. McGuire, 
Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278 
(1980)."

[¶18.]  Appellant also cites this court's most 
recent pronouncement on that subject:

"If there is substantial 
evidence to support a finding, * * * the ultimate weight to be given that 
evidence is to be determined by the agency in light of its expertise and the 
experience of its members in such matters. Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. 
Public Service Commission of Wyoming, 
[Wyo., 662 P.2d 878 (1983)]. If the agency's decision is found to be supported by 
substantial evidence, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the agency, 
but we are required to uphold its findings upon appeal. McCulloch Gas 
Transmission Company v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 627 P.2d 173 (1981)." Big Piney Oil 
& Gas Company v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Commission, supra, 715 P.2d  at 
562.

[¶19.]  The problem appellant faces with this 
argument is obvious - we have already affirmed the district court's decision 
that the record lacked substantial evidence to support the Board's refusal to 
award a retirement pension.

Appellant's Final 
Argument

[¶20.]  Appellant's final argument is that this 
decision will create an unfair result inconsistent with the intent of the 
legislature as expressed in § 15-5-308. Appellant contends that the ultimate 
conclusion to be drawn from this case is that a policeman who can perform 90 to 
95 per cent of the duties of a patrolman, and who could have been assigned 
duties which would have enabled him to continue working, is nevertheless 
entitled to a full disability pension under § 15-5-308. To the contrary, the 
conclusion which should be drawn from this case is that a police department 
cannot first inform an injured police officer that no light duty is available at 
the time the officer requests it, and thereby require him to use up his sick 
leave; later inform the officer that his options are either to apply for 
worker's compensation or a disability pension; and ultimately obtain the Board's 
denial of the disability pension, in part because he could have requested light 
duty but did not do so at a time when light duty was available. See Cloud v. 
Fort Dodge Police Pension Board, supra.

[¶21.]  We do no harm to this court's earlier 
decision in Hoy v. Firemen's Pension Fund, Wyo., 540 P.2d 531 (1975), wherein a 
fireman's request for a pension was denied because light duty was available to 
him and he was capable of performing it. In that case, the petitioner was in 
fact offered a light-duty job, and "[t]he pension denial was predicated on Hoy's 
refusal to accept this position of permanent floor-watch duty." 540 P.2d  at 
532.

[¶22.]  The order of the district court is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The retirement 
application has encountered a complex and delayed pathway to this juncture of 
final resolution.

The first application, 
submitted on January 22, 1981, was denied without a hearing at a regular Board 
meeting on April 21, 1981. Following a petition for review, the parties 
stipulated to dismiss the petition upon an agreement to conduct a formal 
hearing. The hearing was held on February 3, 1982, the Board rendered its second 
adverse decision on April 23, 1982, and Perreault filed a petition for review 
before the district court. The district court remanded the case to the Board to 
enter adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. On March 24, 1983, the 
Board filed a revised decision containing findings and conclusions of law. On 
April 25, 1983, Perreault again petitioned the district court for review of the 
Board's decision. After extensive briefing, the district court finally issued a 
decision letter on January 16, 1986, followed by an order of February 3, 1986 
remanding the case to the Board for an award of permanent disability. This 
appeal is now taken from that order entered more than five years after the 
original application was filed, and about five years after the date of the 
medical documentation in the record.

2 Actually, no documented 
offer of "limited duty" is included in the record for the period between January 
22, 1981 and March 25, 1986 when this appeal was filed. If there was a City 
strategy involved, its denomination and effectuation is less than obvious. 
Perhaps, in fact, claimant was a persona non grata at the police 
station.

3 The Wyoming statutory 
standard is different from the statute involved in Cloud v. Fort Dodge Police 
Pension Board, supra, which invokes a "likely to be permanent" 
criterion.