Case Title: ROY FREDERICK DAVIS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-95

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROY FREDERICK DAVIS V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 93117 P.3d 454Case Number: 04-95Decided: 08/15/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
ROY 
FREDERICK DAVIS,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
            
Ken Koski, Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and 
Marion Yoder, 
Senior Assistant Public Defender.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. 
Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
  

            
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In October 2003, 
a Natrona County jury found Roy Frederick Davis (the appellant) guilty of four 
counts of forgery, all felonies in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-602(a)(ii) 
and (b) (LexisNexis 2005).  This is 
an appeal from the district court's judgment and sentence, wherein the appellant 
alleges several errors.  We 
affirm.

 
 

 
 
1.         
Whether a handwriting expert's testimony prejudiced the appellant to a 
degree that mandates reversal of his forgery convictions?

 
 
2.         
Whether the prosecutor made improper remarks during her closing and 
rebuttal arguments?

 
 
3.         
Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the appellant's forgery 
convictions?

 
 
4.         
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the 
appellant's motion for a new trial based on recanted trial witness 
testimony?

 
 
5.         
Whether the district court abused its discretion in sentencing the 
appellant?

 
 

6.                  
Whether 
cumulative error mandates reversal of the appellant's forgery 
convictions?

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      The instant case 
revolves around four people:  Thomas 
"Ted" Dorr (Dorr), Linda Brown (Brown), Rebecca Burton (Burton), and the 
appellant.  At the time of the 
appellant's trial, Dorr and Brown had been living together for about two and 
one-half years and Burton and her young son had also periodically 
lived with Dorr and Brown.1  Burton is 
Brown's daughter and was also the appellant's girlfriend (Burton apparently married 
the appellant in September 2003, but testified at trial that she was the 
appellant's "girlfriend").  We note, 
for contextual purposes, that Dorr and Brown testified during the prosecution's 
case-in-chief at trial, and Burton and the appellant testified during the 
appellant's case.  We will refer to 
each individual's trial testimony in setting forth the relevant 
facts.

 
 
[¶3]      On May 31, 2003, 
Burton and the appellant stopped at Dorr's and 
Brown's house late in the evening to pick up Burton's son.  Brown had previously informed Burton that the appellant was not welcome in the house, but 
Brown allowed the appellant into the house that evening at Burton's request so that 
the appellant could use the restroom.  
Dorr testified that he always kept his wallet containing his credit cards 
"in plain sight" on a counter located between the living room and the 
kitchen.  Burton took the appellant 
to the restroom's location and the two passed the location of Dorr's wallet on 
the way to the restroom and again on their return.2  Neither Dorr nor Brown actually 
witnessed anyone take anything from Dorr's wallet.

 
 
[¶4]      A Holiday Inn 
night auditor in Casper testified that on May 31, 2003, the 
appellant used the name "Dorr" when he signed a hotel registration card to 
secure a room for the night (the auditor recalled that the appellant verbally 
spelled the name for her) and paid for the room with a credit card.  The hotel registration card listed the 
customer as "Thomas Dorr" with a Casper address 
of 975 East 12th 
Street (Dorr's and Brown's Mountain View address was 
542 Harding).  The appellant signed 
the hotel registration card "Ted Dorr" (which signature authorized the hotel to 
bill the credit card the appellant presented to the night 
auditor).

 
 
[¶5]      Casper Wal-Mart 
receipts indicate that at about 10:21 a.m. on June 1, 2003, someone used a Visa 
credit card (last four digits of the account number 0269) to purchase $163.92 in 
merchandise (including what appear to have been boys clothing, female underwear, 
and a pair of boots).  The purchase 
receipt was signed "Thomas Dorr."  
Natrona County Sheriff's Deputy Chris Poldervaart testified that he 
viewed a Wal-Mart security video of this transaction, in which video he 
observed: (1) Burton, her son, and the appellant checking out of the store; (2) 
their items being placed on the checkstand; (3) the appellant removing a credit 
card from his wallet, swiping the credit card at the checkstand, placing the 
credit card back into his wallet, and signing the credit card transaction slip; 
and (4) the three individuals leaving the store.

 
 
[¶6]      A Casper JC 
Penney store receipt indicates that at 11:03 a.m. on June 1, 2003, someone used 
a Visa credit card (last four digits of the account number 0269) to purchase 
$137.73 in merchandise.  The receipt 
was signed "Ted Dorr."  A store 
employee testified that the appellant purchased some clothing (including an 
adult pair of pants) that day, paid for the items with a credit card bearing the 
name "Thomas Dorr," and signed the credit card receipt "Ted 
Dorr."

 
 
[¶7]      A Casper Target 
store receipt indicates that at 11:15 a.m. on June 1, 2003, someone used a Visa 
credit card (last four digits of the account number 0269) to purchase $37.79 in 
designer fragrances.  The receipt 
was signed "Thomas Dorr."  Deputy 
Poldervaart testified that he viewed a Target security video, in which video he 
observed the appellant, Burton and Burton's son approach a 
checkout register, as well as the presentation of a credit 
card.

 
 
[¶8]      The 
aforementioned account number is that of Dorr's "Camping World" MBNA Visa credit 
card bearing the name Thomas E. Dorr.  
Dorr testified that he did not believe that he used this credit card on 
May 31st, that he did not use this credit card on June 1st 
or on June 2nd, and that he did not incur the charges at the Holiday 
Inn, Wal-Mart, JC Penney, or Target.  
Dorr testified that he had never given anyone permission to use this 
particular credit card, that he did not give Burton or the appellant permission 
to use the credit card, and that Burton did not ask Dorr's permission to use the 
credit card on May 31st.

 
 
[¶9]      On June 2, 2003, 
Burton called 
Brown.  Dorr testified that 
Burton told 
Brown that the appellant had stolen Dorr's credit card; Brown testified that 
based on the telephone call, she knew that the appellant "had the credit card . 
. .."  Brown then arranged to meet 
Burton at a 
local convenience store.  At the 
convenience store, Burton exited her vehicle (the 
appellant remained in Burton's vehicle) and entered the vehicle 
containing Dorr and Brown.  
According to Dorr and Brown, Burton handed 
Dorr his credit card3 and stated that the appellant had 
stolen the credit card and also that Burton had not used the credit 
card.

 
 
[¶10]   Dorr wanted to report the theft to 
law enforcement, and Brown testified that she told Burton that Brown was calling 911 and Burton needed to take the 
appellant to the police department immediately.  When the four individuals arrived at the 
police station, the appellant exited Burton's vehicle and left the area on foot.4  Law enforcement advised Dorr to cancel 
his credit card; Dorr did so and was immediately issued a new credit card 
account number.  Dorr received a 
letter a few days later issuing him a new personal identification number (PIN) 
for the credit card account number he had canceled.  The credit card company informed Dorr 
that a man who identified himself as Dorr had requested a new PIN for that 
credit card account number on June 1, 2003.  Dorr testified that he did not request 
the new PIN.

 
 
[¶11]   Deputy Poldervaart began 
investigating the case and met with the appellant on June 5, 2003.  At that time, the appellant denied that 
he stole Dorr's credit card, denied that he entered the Holiday Inn (he waited 
in the car), and admitted that he was present for the transactions at Wal-Mart, 
JC Penney, and Target.5  In a subsequent interview, the appellant 
initially denied using Dorr's credit card (particularly at Wal-Mart), but when 
Deputy Poldervaart informed the appellant of the Wal-Mart security video, the 
appellant reportedly admitted that he signed the credit card receipts at Target, 
Wal-Mart, and JC Penney.  The 
appellant denied that he entered Dorr's and Brown's house on May 31st and continued to deny that he used Dorr's credit 
card at the Holiday Inn.

 
 
[¶12]   Deputy Poldervaart also met with 
Burton.  At first, Burton said that she did not sign the credit 
card receipts at issue because she did not know that they were using Dorr's 
credit card.  Burton stated at another 
time that she (and not the appellant) took Dorr's credit card, with Dorr's 
permission.  Deputy Poldervaart also 
testified that he learned that as a result of discussions between Burton and the 
appellant, Burton was willing to "take a misdemeanor charge for the theft of the 
card and state that she told [the appellant] that she had permission which could 
eliminate [the appellant's criminal] charges" because the "penalty would be less 
for her than it would be for [the appellant]."6

 
 
[¶13]   Burton provided her own version of these events 
during her trial testimony.  On May 
30, 2003, she asked Brown for money to purchase clothing for Burton, her son, and the 
appellant on June 1st.  
According to Burton, Dorr offered to give 
Burton his 
credit card for that purpose.  On 
May 31st at about 11:45 p.m., Burton 
retrieved her son from Dorr's and Brown's house and began to drive back to 
Douglas.  
Burton 
returned to the house because she had forgotten to print off a resum© on Brown's 
computer.  When they arrived at the 
house, the appellant needed to use the restroom and Brown granted the appellant 
permission to enter the house for that purpose.  Burton 
and the appellant passed Dorr on the way to the restroom, and Burton returned to Brown's 
location to print the resum©.  The 
appellant rejoined Burton and Brown, and Dorr was "right behind" 
the appellant.7

 
 
[¶14]   According to Burton, Brown suggested that due to the late hour of the 
day and the fact that Dorr had already agreed to give Burton his credit card the next day, Burton should take Dorr's credit card immediately and stay 
at a hotel in Casper rather than drive back to 
Douglas.  
Dorr directed Burton to his wallet's 
location and instructed Burton to retrieve the "Camping World" credit 
card from the wallet.8  Burton 
told the appellant that she had permission to use Dorr's credit card and they 
went to the Holiday Inn in Casper.  
The appellant used Dorr's credit card to obtain a room at the Holiday Inn 
because Burton thought it best that a male sign Dorr's name when using the 
credit card due to past signature problems she had experienced in attempting to 
use Dorr's credit cards.  The 
appellant then proceeded to use Dorr's credit card to purchase items for 
Burton, Burton's son, and the appellant at Wal-Mart, JC 
Penney, and Target.

 
 
[¶15]   Burton further testified that Dorr 
had previously allowed her to use his credit cards (although not the credit card 
at issue in the instant case) six or seven times and that she told the appellant 
that she had the authority to use Dorr's credit cards.  For example, in January 2003, Dorr gave 
Burton a credit card to purchase a tire for 
Burton's car; the merchant would not allow 
Burton to use 
the credit card and Dorr came to the merchant personally to sign for the 
transaction.  In April 2003, Dorr 
gave Burton a credit card to pay for a hotel room 
at the Casper Hearthside Inn; the hotel would not accept the credit card because 
neither Burton 
nor the appellant's name was on the card, so Dorr came to the hotel personally 
to sign for the transaction.  
According to Burton, Dorr also gave her 
(and the man she was dating at the time) a credit card to use during a trip to 
Ohio.9

 
 
[¶16]   The appellant, who had prior felony 
convictions for obtaining money by check fraud and providing a false statement 
on a loan application, testified that he did not steal Dorr's credit card.  Burton took the credit card and told the 
appellant that she did so with Dorr's permission.  The appellant admitted that he then used 
Dorr's credit card at the Holiday Inn, Wal-Mart, JC Penney, and Target; the 
appellant signed the credit card receipts at these locations because he thought 
he had permission to do so and Burton wanted him to do so because of his 
gender.  The appellant also claimed 
to have been present when Dorr had previously permitted Burton to use Dorr's credit 
cards, but acknowledged that Dorr never personally gave the appellant permission 
to use Dorr's credit cards.

 
 
[¶17]   The appellant was ultimately 
charged with four counts of forgery, all felonies, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-602(a)(ii) and (b).  In 
October 2003, a jury found the appellant guilty of all four counts.  The district court sentenced the 
appellant to serve five to eight years in prison for each conviction, the 
sentences to run concurrently.  The 
appellant now appeals from the district court's judgment and 
sentence.

 
 

 
 

Expert 
Witness Testimony

 
 

[¶18]   The appellant claims that the 
district court abused its discretion in admitting the expert trial testimony of 
Chris Reed (Reed), a self-described "document examiner . . .."  In particular, according to the 
appellant, Reed lacked the training and experience to qualify as an expert 
witness and to offer her expert opinion as to whether the appellant executed the 
credit card documents at issue.  The 
appellant objected to Reed's testimony at trial; however, the district court 
(citing our opinion in Williams v. 
State, 2002 WY 184, 60 P.3d 151 (Wyo. 2002)) 
ultimately allowed Reed to testify as a "trained handwriting expert analyst . . 
.."  Reed proceeded to testify that 
she compared several "question" documents (credit card receipts from the Holiday 
Inn,10 Wal-Mart, JC Penney, and Target) 
with known handwriting samples obtained from Dorr, Burton, and the 
appellant.  Reed concluded that, 
based on these comparisons, it was "highly probable" that the appellant executed 
the Wal-Mart, JC Penney, and Target receipts and that the appellant "probably" 
executed the Holiday Inn receipt.

 
 

[¶19]   We typically review "matters 
pertaining to the admission of testimony of expert witnesses" for an abuse of 
discretion.  Id. at ¶ 5, 60 P.3d  at 153-54. 
However, we need not address the specifics of Reed's testimony or the district 
court's ruling in great detail because even if we were to assume, for purposes 
of this appeal, that the district court erred in admitting Reed's testimony, the 
appellant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by such testimony to a 
degree that would require a reversal of his convictions.  An error

 
 
must be 
"injurious or prejudicial" to warrant a reversal, and it is the burden of the 
party appealing to establish the injurious or prejudicial nature of the 
error.  Spilman v. State, 633 P.2d 183 
(Wyo.1981).  We have said that for 
an error to be regarded as harmful, there must be a reasonable possibility that 
in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the 
defendant.  Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 550 
(Wyo.1993): White v. State, 2003 WY 
163, ¶ 7, 80 P.3d 642, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2003).

 
 

Condra 
v. State, 2004 
WY 131, ¶ 29, 100 P.3d 386, 394 (Wyo. 2004).  See also Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, 
¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 766-67 (Wyo. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 994 
(2002).

 
 
[¶20]   Reed's testimony only encompassed 
whether the appellant executed the credit card documents at issue.  We have previously set forth the 
overwhelming evidence that the appellant executed these documents (including the 
appellant's own trial testimony that he did so), and the appellant did not 
dispute that he executed such documents at trial.  The appellant's trial counsel stated in 
her opening statement that the appellant "has never said that he didn't do these 
things  he did sign for the hotel room at the Holiday Inn" and further: "So you 
need to know every time [the appellant] signed that credit card, we offer to 
stipulate to that.  He signed for 
this credit card; he did get items; and [Burton] got some items."  The appellant's trial counsel similarly 
stated the following during her closing argument:

 
 
So what 
evidence did you see or hear?  Well, 
we talked all about these credit card receipts and people deciding who signed 
what.  That's uncontradicted.  [The appellant] signed the credit card 
receipts; so you've got that element.  
He did it; he said he did it.  
We don't need all that stuff.  
You already know that.  So 
you can review those all you want.  
That's a done deal.  He 
signed them.

 
 
[¶21]   Clearly, admission of Reed's 
testimony did not prejudice the appellant, and reversal of his convictions is 
not appropriate on that basis.

 
 
Closing 
Argument

 
 
[¶22]   The appellant asserts that during 
the State's closing argument, the prosecutor misstated key facts to the jury, 
improperly personalized her argument, improperly commented on, or vouched for, 
the credibility of trial witnesses, and implied that the appellant's testimony 
was not credible simply because he had been charged with crimes in the instant 
case.

 
 

[¶23]   We review allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct "by reference to the entire record . . ..'"  Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 
542 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 1999)).  Such allegations "hinge on whether a 
defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute denial of a fair 
trial.'"  Id.

 
 
Prosecutorial 
misconduct "has always been condemned in this state."  Valerio v. State, 527 P.2d 154, 
156 (Wyo.1974).  Whether such 
misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and 
W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 
9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error . . . affected the accused's 
"substantial rights."  The accused's 
right to a fair trial is a substantial right.  Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6, 9, and 10; and 
see, e.g., Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Wyo.1978).  Before we hold that an error has 
affected an accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a 
conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable 
possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to the accused.  
Jones v. State, 735 P.2d 699, 703 (Wyo.1987).  We read this standard to be in 
consonance with the standard followed by the United States Supreme 
Court[.]

 
 

Earll v. 
State, 2001 
WY 66, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 787, 789-90 (Wyo. 2001).  See also Lancaster v. State, 2002 
WY 45, ¶ 31, 43 P.3d 80, 93-94 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

[¶24]   The appellant bears the burden of 
establishing prosecutorial misconduct.  
Id. at ¶ 32, 43 P.3d  at 94.  Because the appellant did not object to 
the alleged incidents of misconduct at trial, "it is incumbent upon him to 
demonstrate plain error" in that "the record clearly shows an error that 
transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a 
substantial right."  Condra, 2004 WY 131, ¶ 6, 100 P.3d  at 
389; 
Compton v. State, 931 P.2d 936, 939 
(Wyo. 
1997).

 
 
[¶25]   Closing 
arguments

 
 
must be 
based upon the evidence submitted to the jury.  The purpose of closing argument is to 
allow counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence.  Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 
145 (Wyo.1981).  Prosecutors, just 
like defense counsel, may review the evidence and suggest to the jury inferences 
based thereon.  . . .  There are limits, however, on 
prosecutor's closing arguments that are designed to insure the fairness of the 
trial and prevent compromise of the judicial system.

 
 

Dysthe 
v. State, 2003 
WY 20, ¶ 24, 63 P.3d 875, 884-85 (Wyo. 2003).  In Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 
27, 49 P.3d 975, 986-87 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting I A.B.A., Standards for Criminal 
Justice 3-5.8 at 3.87 to 3.88 (2d ed. 1980)), we 
stated:

 
 
            
In Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d 22, ¶ 5 (Wyo.2002), 
this court set forth the following broad guidelines found in the Standards for 
Criminal Justice which are applicable to a prosecutor's arguments to a 
jury:

 
 
"(a)      The prosecutor 
may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record.  It is unprofessional conduct for the 
prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the 
inferences it may draw.

 
 
(b)       It is 
unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief 
or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt 
of the defendant.

 
 
(c)        The 
prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or 
prejudices of the jury.

 
 
(d)       The 
prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its 
duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the 
guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making 
predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict.

 
 
(e)       It is the 
responsibility of the court to ensure that final argument to the jury is kept 
within proper, accepted bounds."

 
 
[¶26]   The appellant claims that the 
prosecutor misstated three "key facts" to the jury.  First, the prosecutor argued that Reed 
"determined that it's a high degree of probability that [the appellant] did sign 
that credit card receipt at the Holiday Inn," but Reed actually testified that 
she had "lowered" her opinion "a level" from "highly probable" to 
"probably."  It does not appear from 
the context of the prosecutor's argument that this was an attempt intentionally 
to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury and the appellant has not 
demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's argument because he 
admitted during his own trial testimony that he signed the credit card receipt 
at the Holiday Inn in Casper.

 
 
[¶27]   Second, the prosecutor argued as 
follows:

 
 
And the 
other store was the Wal-Mart store.  
We heard testimony that Mr. Dorr's credit card was used at the Wal-Mart 
store on June 1, 2003.  We had 
testimony of a video which showed Mr. Davis in the checkout 
line.

 
 
[Appellant's 
trial counsel]:  Objection, Your 
Honor.  We didn't see a 
video.

 
 
[The 
district court]:  Counsel, I'm going 
to limit your argument to what evidence was introduced.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  We had testimony that a video was 
viewed.  And through that video, we 
were told that Mr. Davis was seen in the checkout line.  He pulls out of his wallet a credit 
card, and he pulls out the credit card and signs the 
receipt.

 
 
We heard 
testimony that that was the receipt signed and the name on there shows Thomas 
Dorr's signature.  From the video 
and from the receipts, the date and the time are the same.  That came from testimony of viewing the 
video.  So clearly Mr. Dorr's credit 
card was used at Wal-Mart.

 
 
The 
appellant claims that this argument was improperly based on "some unadmitted 
video" and therefore lacked evidentiary support in the record.  However, the prosecutor's argument 
clearly was not improper because it accurately conveyed Deputy Poldervaart's 
testimony as to what he viewed on the Wal-Mart security video.  The appellant did not object to this 
witness testimony at trial and has not raised any issue with respect to such 
testimony on appeal.

 
 
[¶28]   Third, during her rebuttal 
argument, the prosecutor referred to trial witness "Westfall" in discussing a 
photo lineup identification of the appellant when it was actually witness 
"Albertson" who testified in that regard.  
Yet, it was the appellant's trial counsel who first referred 
(inaccurately) to witness "Westfall" during her closing argument.  The prosecutor merely followed suit in 
responding to the appellant's argument during her rebuttal argument and the 
appellant does not claim that the prosecutor misstated the substance of the 
trial testimony at issue.  Needless 
to say, we find no error here.

 
 
[¶29]   The appellant next asserts that the 
emphasized remarks contained in the following excerpts of the prosecutor's 
closing argument were improper because the prosecutor personalized her argument, 
commented on, or vouched for, the credibility of trial witnesses, and implied 
that the appellant's testimony was not credible simply because he had been 
charged with crimes in the instant case.11  In arguing the merits of the appellant's 
defense and the credibility of each of the primary trial witnesses, the 
prosecutor stated the following:

 
 
            
When you apply that theory to the facts of this case, you have to ask 
yourself, does that make sense?  Ms. 
Burton testified in this case that she told Mr. Davis it's probably better to 
sign as "Thomas Dorr."  So Mr. Davis 
did sign the receipts as "Thomas" or "Ted Dorr."  Why would she do that?  Why did he do that?  If 
he truly believed he had permission to use Thomas Dorr's credit card, he 
could have signed his name to it.  
And if he truly believed he had 
permission and if, for some reason, the cashiers or the clerks did not 
accept that credit card because he was not Thomas Dorr, worst case scenario, he 
would call Mr. Dorr to sign the receipt and get what they wanted.  And that did not happen because 
permission was never given.

            

Once 
again, you have the burden to evaluate which story makes sense.  And it's your burden to determine which 
story is more likely to be correct.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
            
You need to ask yourself, did Mr. Davis honestly and reasonably believe 
he had permission to use Mr. Dorr's credit card.

 
 
            
We heard testimony from Mr. Dorr and Ms. Brown that Mr. Davis was not 
welcome in that house; he had not been welcome in that house.  You heard testimony from Ms. Burton that 
Mr. Davis was not welcome in their house.  
You heard testimony from the defendant, Mr. Davis; he knew he was not 
welcome in Ted Dorr and Linda Brown's house.  The defendant knew that.  The defendant knew, pursuant to his 
testimony, that Ms. Burton's family did not like him.  You heard testimony they had no 
relationship.  They didn't pal 
around.  They didn't do 
anything.

 
 
            
In fact, you heard testimony that Mr. Davis had to request permission to 
enter the house to use the rest room.  
He was not welcome in that house.

 
 
            
That theory makes no sense.  Somebody he barely knows, somebody who 
does not let him into his house, somebody he has to ask permission to use the 
rest room, would give him permission to use his credit card?  If believed, generally what that means 
is anybody could use another's credit card, and when confronted, can say I 
thought I had permission.

 
 
            
Based upon that information, Mr. Davis knew he was not right; he 
was not allowed in the house; he did not honestly and reasonably believe 
he had permission to use that credit card.

 
 
            
Now you have the opportunity and it's in the jury instructions to look at 
the credibility of the witnesses.  
You can look at your life experiences and you can look at their demeanor 
in the court, their intelligence, their motives.  That's open for you to decide who is 
credible in this case.

 
 
            
And Mr. Dorr, does he have a motive in the case?  Possibly.  He's a victim.  His credit cards  his credit card was 
used without his permission.  Does 
he have a personal stake  in the 
action?  Maybe.  I 
don't know.  Does he have 
anything to gain from it?  No.

 
 
            
Ms. Brown, does she have a motive in the case?  She was with Mr. Dorr  she is with Mr. 
Dorr.  His credit card was used 
without his permission.  She's a 
witness to the action.  Does 
she have a motive  I don't know  to seek justice?  Does she have anything personally to 
gain from it?  No.

 
 
            
You've got Ms. Burton  her motive.  
Does she have any?  Yes.  Mr. Davis has been her boyfriend.  They still communicate on a regular 
basis.  She has a vested interest in 
the outcome of this case.  Is she 
biased?  Yeah, that is her 
boyfriend.  And with Ms. Burton, 
let's look at her inconsistent information.  She told Detective Poldervaart one 
story.  She told you yesterday that 
that was a false report, and what she told you yesterday was the 
truth.

 
 
            
You can decide what's the truth and what's not the truth.  The reason she said yesterday she gave a 
false report was because Mr. Dorr threatened her.  Then later on, her story changes because 
Detective Poldervaart threatened her.  
Then you heard statements that her mother threatened her.  

 
 
            
So Ms. Burton has changed her story to 
fit her needs and the needs of Mr. Davis.  You can weigh that when you decide her 
credibility.  And if you decide her 
testimony is not credible, you don't have to consider it.

 
 
            
Then there's Mr. Davis.  Does 
Mr. Davis have a motive?  Yeah, he 
does.  He's a defendant in this 
case.  He's been charged with four 
charges.  Does he have a 
personal stake in the matter?  Yes, 
he does.  Is 
he biased?  Yes, he is.  Once again, he is a 
defendant.

 
 
            
More importantly, you need to look at Mr. Davis's inconsistent 
statements.  Initially when he met 
with Detective Poldervaart, he denied everything.  Pursuant to testimony from Detective 
Poldervaart, he denied everything; he wasn't in the house; he had nothing to do 
with the credit cards; didn't sign anything; he did 
nothing.

            

            
The next time he met with Detective Poldervaart, he changed his 
story.  Well, I didn't sign the 
Holiday Inn and I didn't go to the house, but I signed Wal-[M]art, Target, and 
JC Penney.

            

            
We had a preliminary hearing in this case.  Mr. Davis took the stand; he took an 
oath.  Under oath he told the judge, 
I was not in the house on May 31st; told the judge, I did not sign 
the credit card receipt at the Holiday Inn.  He did tell the judge, I did sign the 
receipt at Target, Wal-Mart, and JC Penney.

            

            
Yesterday, Mr. Davis takes the stand under oath.  He tells you, I did sign the receipt at 
the Holiday Inn and the JC Penney store and Wal-Mart and Target.  And I did go into the house on May 
31st.  He's changed his 
story.  Do you have to believe him 
today?  What makes you believe him 
today?  He admitted that he did not 
tell the truth at the preliminary hearing.  
You get to decide whether he's credible or not on the witness 
stand.

 
 
            
This is a man, through his testimony, has a high school education and at 
least three years of college.  This 
is a man who read his Miranda Rights.  
He read them twice.  He was 
read them twice on two separate days, and he signed them two separate days.  So when you go in to decide his 
credibility, also look at Exhibit 13.

            

            
Mr. Davis testified that he's got two prior felony convictions.  . . .  And both of those crimes involved crimes 
of dishonesty.  One was obtaining 
money by fraud; one was false reporting.  
. . .

 
 
            
Now, you cannot use those convictions to prove that Mr. Davis committed 
these crimes.  You cannot do 
that.  But you can use those 
convictions to weigh his credibility.  
You cannot use them to say, he did it before; he'll do it now.  But you can certainly look at his 
credibility and the totality of factors.  

 
 
            
And the State argues to you that Mr. Davis did not have permission.  Mr. Davis knew what he was doing.  He had no permission whatsoever from Mr. 
Dorr nor from Rebecca Burton.

 
 
[¶30]   In the absence of a more particular 
appellate analysis, or the citation to more pertinent legal authority,12 we fail to see how the emphasized 
remarks amounted to the prosecutorial misconduct claimed by the appellant.  Instead, the remarks appear to be the 
prosecutor's legitimate argument as to what particular inferences the jury 
should (and should not) make based on the evidence produced at trial, and what 
evidence and other factors the jury should weigh in evaluating the credibility 
of Dorr, Brown, Burton, and the appellant.  
The prosecutor also repeatedly emphasized during her argument that it was 
the jury's role to decide which theory of the case made the most "sense" based 
on the evidence and to decide which witnesses were 
credible.

 
 
[¶31]   The only potentially objectionable 
remark was the prosecutor's argument that the jury should consider whether the 
appellant had a motive or bias due to his interest in the outcome of the 
case.  However, the appellant has 
not demonstrated that this remark violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law 
under the particular circumstances of the instant case.  The district court instructed the jury 
that the jury was "the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and of 
the weight to be given their testimony" and that the jury "should take into 
consideration . . . the interest, if any, which any witness may have in the 
outcome of this trial . . .."  The 
Illinois Supreme Court has stated the following regarding a defendant's interest 
in the outcome of a criminal case:

 
 
            
Where, as here, a prosecutor suggests to the members of the jury that a 
defendant's testimony is biased because he has an interest in the outcome of the 
case, the prosecutor is not telling them anything they do not know and are not 
already thinking.  The notion that 
the possibility of conviction may color a defendant's testimony is so basic, so 
rooted in common experience and human nature, that it would be taken into 
account by the jurors whether the prosecutor mentioned it or not.  When the prosecution makes the point 
during closing argument, it is merely stating the obvious.  The complexion of the case is 
unchanged.

 
 

            
Defendant contends that a prosecutor's reference to an accused's interest 
in acquittal is nevertheless improper because of an overriding consideration, 
the presumption of innocence.[13]  We note, however, that assailing a 
defendant's testimony by pointing out his interest in being acquitted no more 
erodes the presumption of innocence than any other attempt by the State to prove 
its case and refute the evidence presented by the defense.  The presumption of innocence 
remains.  Arguing bias is merely one 
means for the State to try to rebut that presumption.

 
 
            
When the defendant contends that the State should not be allowed to argue 
that he is biased because he has an interest in avoiding conviction, what he is 
really suggesting is that his testimony should be cloaked with a presumption of 
veracity.  No such presumption 
exists.  As Illinois Pattern Jury 
Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.02 (3d ed.1992), recognizes, the testimony of a 
criminal defendant is entitled to no greater deference than the testimony of any 
other witness.  This court made that 
clear nearly 40 years ago when it expressly held:

 
 
"When a 
defendant elects to testify in his own behalf, his credibility is to be tested 
by the usual rules applicable to other witnesses.  In determining the credibility of a 
witness, including a defendant, the jury may take into consideration, among 
other things, the probability or improbability of the truth of his statements in 
the light of human experience.  . . 
.  The jury are not entitled to 
disregard the accused's testimony merely because he is the defendant in the 
case, but it may consider his interest in the result of the trial in weighing 
his testimony."  People v. Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d 52, 59, 
150 N.E.2d 806 (1958).

 
 

People 
v. Barney, 176 Ill. 2d 69, 223 Ill.Dec. 30, 678 N.E.2d 1038, 1040-41 (1997).  See generally also United States v. Larsen, 525 F.2d 444, 
448-49 (10th Cir. 1975); People v. Bunyard, 45 Cal. 3d 1189, 249 Cal. Rptr. 71, 756 P.2d 795, 816-17 (1988); Walls v. State, 560 A.2d 1038, 1049 
(Del.Supr.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 967 (1989); State v. Apilando, 79 Hawai'i 128, 900 P.2d 135, 149 (1995); State v. Googins, 255 N.W.2d 805, 806 
(Minn. 1977); State v. Thompson, 293 N.C. 713, 239 S.E.2d 465, 469 (1977); and 
75A Am.Jur.2d Trial § 694 (1991 & 
Cum. Supp. 2005).

 
 
[¶32]   When the prosecutor's argument is 
viewed in context, it is apparent that the instant case is not one in which the 
prosecutor suggested that the appellant was guilty solely because he was being 
prosecuted, but appropriately asked the jury to consider whether the appellant 
(a trial witness) had a "motive," "personal stake," or "bias" arising from his 
interest in the outcome of the case.  
Significantly, after this very brief argument, the prosecutor continued 
by stating that "[m]ore importantly," the jury should consider the appellant's 
prior inconsistent statements, prior inconsistent preliminary hearing testimony, 
and prior felony convictions in evaluating the credibility of his trial 
testimony.

 
 
[¶33]   The appellant also contends in a 
one-sentence argument that the prosecutor vouched for Deputy Poldervaart's 
credibility during her rebuttal argument when she stated that the officer "did . 
. . nothing unethical, nothing illegal" in conducting his investigation.  The appellant's trial counsel stated the 
following during her closing argument:

 
 
            
You also heard about the testimony of Officer Poldervaart and he 
conducted this investigation and told you all about that.  And he alsoyou learned a little bit 
from all the testimony of the other people that were involved that he used some 
improper tactics and some improper techniques and some force to do this 
investigation, which is improper.  

 
 
            
[Burton] 
told you on the stand he called her a textbook liar and threatened to throw her 
in Lusk.  That doesn't seem very 
proper to me.  He also interrogated 
Roy and, of 
course, their versions of that situation are a little bit different.  Roy said he asked for an attorney; Poldervaart 
said he didn't ask for one.  
Roy had 
to talk without an attorney.

 
 
            
Further, you remember the testimony of Brittney Westfall.  She did a lineup; she was handed a 
lineup and she told me when I asked her in cross-examination, is this the actual 
lineup were these names on this  and the names are clearly listed on each of 
the pictures on there  and she said yes.  
And Poldervaart said no.

 
 
            
So remember, you're the ones that are to judge who's telling the truth up 
there and who has had reason to lie and who doesn't and who used proper 
techniques and who didn't.  It's 
clearly improper to show six pictures with names on them to somebody who is 
supposed to identify someone on their own.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
            
[The jury instructions] also discuss for you voluntariness of Mr. Davis's 
confession . . ..  That's for you to 
look at and you weigh his credibility and you weigh what the law enforcement 
officer did to get him to say whatever it is he said.

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
            
Remember, too, that if you find there's any inappropriate influence on 
anybody here, it could be Detective Poldervaart's influence and nobody else's . 
. ..

 
 
[¶34]   The prosecutor responded as follows 
during her rebuttal argument:

 
 
            
There's been a lot of statements made regarding investigation 
techniques.  And I want to bring 
your attention, once again, to State's Exhibit 13.  Two separate occasions Detective 
Poldervaart met with defendant Roy Davis on two separate days, advised him of 
his rights, he waived those rights.  
Mr. Davis testified he's a high school educated person.  He's got three years of college; he can 
read, and he can write.  He's had 
two prior contacts with law enforcement that we know of.

 
 
            
Based upon that information, you can decide whether Mr. Davis knowingly 
waived those rights.  You can decide 
whether Mr. Davis knowingly told the truth to Detective Poldervaart.  Plus, he lied under oath.  He stated he did at the prelim, he gave 
one story; yesterday, he gave a different story.  You decide his 
credibility.

 
 
            
You have an officer who's doing an investigation on forgery; he's trying 
to get all the information.  
Wouldn't you want him to get all the information?  And when you talk to somebody, wouldn't 
you want him to realize they have a right to talk to counsel?  That's what Mr. Poldervaart did; nothing 
unethical, nothing illegal regarding the photo lineup.

 
 
            
Yes, Ms. Westfall did testify that maybe, yes, she saw the names on the 
photo lineup.  And Mr. Poldervaart 
testified that, no, he folds it under when he gives it to them.  And in this event, if you saw the names 
on this photo lineup, did you recognize any names?  No, she didn't.  She was also asked at that photo lineup, 
did anybody, including Detective Poldervaart, make any statements or suggestions 
to you on who to pick.  She said, 
no, he didn't.  So you can judge the 
credibility on the photo lineup.

 
 

[¶35]   The appellant's trial counsel 
clearly opened the door to the prosecutor's argument by questioning Deputy 
Poldervaart's investigative tactics.  
"Since [the appellant] opened the door and raised this issue, he cannot 
now be heard to object when the State properly responds."  Moore v. State, 2003 WY 153, ¶ 32, 80 P.3d 191, 199 (Wyo. 2003).  We fail to see how the prosecutor 
vouched for the officer's credibility in responding to the appellant's argument, 
especially considering the entire context of the prosecutor's argument, the 
officer's trial testimony on how he conducted his investigation, and the 
pertinent jury instructions given by the district court.  Both the appellant's trial counsel and 
the prosecutor also repeatedly noted that it was the jury's role to evaluate the 
witnesses' credibility.

 
 

 
 
[¶36]   The appellant argues that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove that he signed the credit card receipts with 
the "intent to defraud," or that Dorr did not authorize the appellant to sign 
the receipts.  According to the 
appellant, Burton told the appellant that they had Dorr's permission to use 
Dorr's credit card, and the appellant had no reason to believe that he did not 
have that authority when he executed the credit card receipts at issuethe 
appellant executed the receipts because Burton told him that he could do so and 
because he was male and Burton wanted to avoid having to call Dorr to come and 
personally sign the receipts.  The 
appellant adds that "there was no question" that Dorr had also granted 
Burton (and by 
extension, the appellant) the authority to use his credit cards in the "recent 
past."

 
 
[¶37]   Our standard of review on this 
issue is as follows:

 
 
When 
reviewing an appeal based on sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence, 
and any applicable inferences based on the evidence, in a light most favorable 
to the State.  Nixon 
v. State, 
994 P.2d 324, 329 (Wyo.1999); and see 
Pool v. State, 
2001 WY 8, 17 P.3d 1285 (Wyo.2001).  
In conducting such a review, we do not substitute our judgment for that 
of the jury; rather, we determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have found the essential elements of the crime 
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Id.

 
 

McFarlane 
v. State, 2001 
WY 10, ¶ 4, 17 P.3d 31, 32 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶38]   The district court separately 
instructed the jury on the elements of forgery for each of the four counts 
alleged in the charging document.  
For example, the district court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, 
as follows with respect to Count I:

 
 
Instruction 
No. 13

 
 
            
The elements of the crime of Forgery, as charged in Count I of this case, 
are:

 
 
            
1.         
On or about the 1st day of June, 2003,

 
 
            
2.         
In Natrona County, 
Wyoming,

 
 
            
3.         
The Defendant, Roy Frederick Davis,

 
 
            
4.         
With the intent to defraud,

 
 
            
5.         
Execute[d], any writing, specifically a credit card receipt at the 
Holiday Inn, so that it purported to be the act of another, Thomas Dorr, who did 
not authorize that act.

 
 

See 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-602(a)(ii).

 
 
[¶39]   Our review of the record reveals 
sufficient evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, from 
which a jury reasonably could infer that the appellant executed the credit card 
receipts at issue without Dorr's authority, and with the requisite intent to 
defraud.  That evidence included the 
following:

 
 
1.         
The appellant had the opportunity to steal Dorr's credit card the evening 
of May 31, 2003.

 
 
2.         
Dorr and Brown testified that Burton told them that the appellant stole 
Dorr's credit card.

 
 
3.         
The appellant used Dorr's credit card to procure a motel room and to 
purchase other items for himself, Burton, and 
Burton's 
son.  The appellant signed Dorr's 
name to the credit card receipts at issue.

 
 
4.         
Dorr testified that he did not give Burton or the appellant permission to use the 
credit card.

 
 
5.         
Dorr testified that he does not normally sign the back of his credit 
cards and that he thought that he had written "see ID" on the back of this 
particular credit card.  When 
Burton returned 
the credit card to Dorr, the signature line had been "completely scratched off" 
and was not in the same condition as it had been when the card was last in 
Dorr's possession.

 
 
6.         
Dorr's credit card company informed Dorr that a man who identified 
himself as Dorr had requested a new PIN for the credit card at issue on June 1, 
2003; Dorr testified that he did not request the new PIN.

 
 
[¶40]   It is worth noting that a jury 
may

 
 
find the 
requisite intent through reasonable inferences from circumstantial 
evidence.  Lopez v. State, 788 P.2d 1150, 1153 
(Wyo.1990).  The rule, as we have 
expressed it, is that the state of mind of a defendant can be inferred from his 
acts, his conduct, his words, and other circumstances in the case.  Schiefer v. State, 774 P.2d 133, 135 
(Wyo.1989).  If the requisite intent 
to defraud could not be inferred from circumstantial evidence, it often would be 
impossible to establish that intent, because those intent on defrauding others 
are not likely to tell the victims what their intentions are at the time of the 
criminal act.

 
 

Henderson v. 
State, 976 P.2d 203, 208 (Wyo. 1999).

 
 

[¶41]   The appellant's argument rests 
primarily on his particular view of his own trial testimony and Burton's trial 
testimony.  To the extent such 
testimony admittedly conflicted with that given by Dorr and Brown, the jury 
obviously resolved the resulting credibility issues in favor of Dorr and 
Brown.  "This Court has made it 
abundantly clear that weighing the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive 
province of the trier of fact, and we will not substitute our judgment for 
theirs."  Contreras v. State, 7 P.3d 917, 921 
(Wyo. 2000).  Further, even "though other inferences 
may be drawn from the evidence presented, the trier of fact has the 
responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence."  Wetherelt v. State, 864 P.2d 449, 452 
(Wyo. 
1993).

 
 

 
 
[¶42]   The appellant's trial counsel filed 
a Motion For New Trial in October 2003, alleging that Burton testified falsely to 
material facts at trial.  The 
district court held a hearing on the appellant's motion on October 31, 2003, 
during which hearing the district court heard testimony from Burton and Brown.  In an October 13, 2003, sworn statement, 
and in her testimony at the motion hearing, Burton claimed:

 
 
1.         
That she testified falsely during the appellant's 
trial;

 
 
2.         
That she stole the credit card from Dorr's wallet without Dorr's 
permission in the middle of May 2003;

 
 
3.         
That she informed the appellant that Dorr gave her permission to take the 
credit card and the appellant therefore "had no idea we had no permission to use 
the credit card"; and

 
 
4.         
That Dorr and Brown testified falsely at trial because Burton informed 
Brown "right away" (on June 2, 2003) and "several times" thereafter that Burton 
(and not the appellant) stole Dorr's credit card, because Dorr and Brown told 
Burton to blame the appellant or Burton "would end up going down with him," and 
because Dorr told Burton that if she did not "hang" the appellant, Burton would 
never see her son again.

 
 
Brown 
maintained that Burton initially implicated the 
appellant for stealing Dorr's credit cardit was two weeks before the 
appellant's trial (and apparently just after Burton married the appellant) when Burton told Brown that Burton had stolen the credit 
card.

 
 
[¶43]   The district court denied the 
appellant's motion for a new trial.  
On appeal, the appellant contends that the district court erred in 
denying his motion because this Court cannot "have confidence in the outcome of 
[the appellant's] trial."  According 
to the appellant, Burton recanted her trial 
testimony and there was a reasonable likelihood that "the jury's judgment could 
have been affected by" Burton's false trial testimony.  The appellant further argues that 
Burton's 
post-trial recantation "seriously" questioned the credibility of Dorr's and 
Brown's trial testimony.

 
 
[¶44]   W.R.Cr.P. 33(a) states that the 
"court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if 
required in the interest of justice."  
A district court has

 
 
discretion 
in determining whether to grant a motion for new trial.  In determining whether the trial court 
abused its discretion, we must decide whether the court could have reasonably 
concluded as it did.  Baumgartner v. State, 7 P.3d 912, 915 
(Wyo.2000) . . ..  Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  Anderson v. State, 2002 WY 46, ¶ 25, 43 P.3d 108, ¶ 25 (Wyo.2002) (citing Vaughn 
v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998)); also see State v. Vinson, 183 Wis.2d 
297, 515 N.W.2d 314, 320-21 (App.1994).

 
 

Morganflash 
v. State, 2003 
WY 120, ¶ 11, 76 P.3d 830, 835 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶45]   A defendant who seeks a new trial 
based on newly discovered evidence typically must demonstrate the 
following:

 
 
(1) 
[t]hat the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial; (2) that it was 
not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner; (3) that it 
is so material that it would probably produce a different verdict, if the new 
trial were granted; and (4) that it is not cumulative, viz., speaking to facts 
in relation to which there was evidence at the trial.

 
 

Opie v. 
State, 422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo. 1967).  See also Griswold v. State, 2001 WY 14, 
¶ 8, 17 P.3d 728, 731 (Wyo. 2001).  We have said the following in an opinion 
involving a motion for a new trial based on recanted 
testimony:

 
 
We see 
no reason for deviating from the basic rule for evaluating district court 
decisions on motions for new trial.  
Opie v. State, 422 P.2d [84] 
at 85 [(Wyo.1967)].  However, we 
will enlarge on that general rule somewhat to provide additional guidance in 
cases, such as this, which involve recanted testimony.  To that purpose, we agree with the 
Supreme Court of Montana that granting a person of questionable credibility and 
motive carte blanche to overturn the determination of a jury operating within 
the bounds of our constitutional  
protections is not conducive to the sound administration of justice.  State v. Perry, 232 Mont. 455, 758 P.2d 268, 
275 (1988).  Therefore, we adopt the 
following rule espoused by that court, as well as several 
others:

 
 
"In 
light of the inherent suspicion surrounding recanted testimony and the public 
interest in swift and sure justice, we believe the better reasoned approach to 
be that adopted by the Supreme Court of Kansas:

 
 
"When a 
new trial is sought on the basis of recanting testimony of a prosecution 
witness, the weight to be given such testimony is for the trial judge passing on 
the motion for a new trial to determine.  
The trial judge is required to grant a new trial only when he [or she] is 
satisfied the recantation of the witness is true.'"  . . .  Id. 758 P.2d  at 275; 
(quoting State v. Norman, 232 
Kan. 102, 652 P.2d 683, 689 (1982)).  See also Thacker v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Ky.1970).

 
 

Brown v. 
State, 816 P.2d 818, 822 (Wyo. 1991).  Recanted testimony

 
 
should 
be viewed with the utmost suspicion, Sims 
v. State, Wyo.1972, 495 P.2d 256, and when a motion for a new trial, based 
upon recantation, is denied by the trial court, this court will ordinarily be 
bound by that decision.  Espy v. State, 1939, 54 Wyo. 291, 92 P.2d 549, 
559.  In Flaim v. State, Wyo.1971, 488 P.2d 153, 
this court quoted the following language which is most appropriate to this case: 
"There is no form of proof so unreliable as recanting testimony.  * * * Those experienced in the 
administration of the criminal law know well its untrustworthy character.'"  488 P.2d 155.

 
 

Jones v. 
State, 568 P.2d 837, 854 (Wyo. 1977).

 
 

[¶46]   Considering the applicable standard 
of review, and the record before us, we cannot find that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for a new trial.  It is apparent from the district court's 
comments during the motion hearing that it did not find Burton's post-trial 
recantation to be particularly credible.  
Furthermore, the district court also concluded (pursuant to Opie) that Burton's post-trial 
testimony was not so material that it would probably produce a different verdict 
if the appellant were granted a new trial.14  The appellant has not sufficiently 
articulated on appeal how the district court abused its discretion in this 
regard, especially considering:  (1) 
that the only deviation of any significance between Burton's trial testimony and 
her alleged recantation is whether Dorr actually gave Burton permission to take 
the credit cardBurton's testimony about what she communicated to the appellant 
thereafter has not changed; and (2) that the appellant's defense was (and 
apparently remains) that he reasonably believed that he had the authority to use 
Dorr's credit card because Burton told the appellant that Dorr had given her 
permission to use the credit card and the appellant was aware that Dorr had 
previously allowed Burton to use Dorr's credit cards.  We add that the district court is 
usually "best situated to assess the probable impact of the evidence on a jury 
based on all the evidence presented at trial."  Griswold, 2001 WY 14, ¶ 21, 17 P.3d  at 
734.

 
 

[¶47]   As for the appellant's argument 
that Burton's post-trial sworn statement and hearing testimony also "seriously" 
questioned the credibility of Dorr's and Brown's trial testimony, we "have held 
that a new trial will not be granted if the defendant's newly discovered 
evidence merely impeaches a witness" or "contradicts evidence produced at the 
trial . . ..'"  Keser v. State, 737 P.2d 756, 760 
(Wyo. 1987); Griswold, 2001 WY 14, ¶ 14, 17 P.3d at 
732 (quoting Salaz v. State, 561 P.2d 238, 
243 (Wyo. 
1977)).  See also Terry v. State, 2002 WY 162, ¶ 
19, 56 P.3d 636, 642 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

 
 

[¶48]   The appellant argues that the 
district court abused its discretion and violated the appellant's due process 
rights in imposing its sentence.  
According to the appellant, the district court considered the appellant's 
"character,'" "motives,'" and "selfishness'" in imposing a five- to 
eight-year prison sentence, which factors were not admitted by the appellant or 
found by a jury as required by Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 
(2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004).  The appellant claims that "[h]ad [the 
district court] relied upon the actual, uncontested facts in the PSI, its 
conclusion would most likely have been more consistent with the defense's 
recommended sentence of two to four years, . . . if even that much time."15

 
 
[¶49]   Prior to sentencing, the 
appellant's trial counsel filed a motion requesting that the district court 
correct thirteen items in the presentence investigation report due to alleged 
inaccurate or incomplete information, as well as alleged clerical errors.  The appellant also claimed that a 
purported victim impact statement included in the report was not made by a 
"victim" as that term is statutorily defined.  At sentencing, the district court either 
corrected, or stated that it would not consider, six of these items and also 
would not consider the purported victim impact statement.  The appellant's trial counsel was 
"unable to verify" the balance of the disputed items, and at sentencing withdrew 
her request that the district court address these items.

 
 
[¶50]   The district court proceeded to 
hear argument from the prosecution and the appellant, noted that it had not 
"considered any materials outside the PSI in passing upon or considering issues 
of sentencing," and stated the following in imposing its 
sentence:

 
 
            
Based upon a review of the PSI, the other information, considering all 
sentencing options including that of probation, as well as all other sentencing 
options were considered, and under the facts and circumstances, the Court finds 
that those options are inappropriate in this case.

 
 
            
They're inappropriate for a number of reasons; one of which and most 
predominantly is it's apparent that Mr. Davis' past history with respect to 
abiding by conditions of supervised release of probation is, shall we say, 
poor.  He has not been able to, by a 
number of instances, abide by those conditions.  So, therefore, the Court does not feel 
that it would be an appropriate consideration.

 
 
            
Taking into consideration Mr. Davis' criminal history, it has 

 
 
            
It's puzzling, Mr. Davis, you come across as a very meek and mild 
individual.  I don't know whether 
that's part of the game face or whether it's part of your personality.  But the bottom line is, based upon your 
history, sir, you have lived a life based upon victimizing others in a lot of 
ways.

 
 
            
You take advantage of the kindness that the people in society have 
offered you.  You appear to have not 
been able to learn anything from [a prior probation officer] because then we end 
up here.  . . 
.

 
 
            
. . .

 
 
            
. . . But the bottom line is that you have not been able to conform your 
conduct to the laws of society.  The 
issues concerning whether or not Ms. Burton misrepresented things to you or told 
you, we've already passed that water under the bridge . . ..  But the bottom line is a jury of 12 
found you guilty of the charges.

 
 
            
There were four counts of forgery in this matter.  And based upon your history, this Court 
finds that a sentence of 5 to 8 years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary as to 
Count I, Count II, Count III, and Count IV is appropriate.  Those sentences will be 
concurrent.

 
 
            
I put the 8 years there because, frankly, it's my hope after 5 years that 
the 3 years that you will be on some type of probation and parole that we will 
be able to verify that you've changed your ways, sir, because in the past you 
have not been able to.

 
 
            
Based upon your history and based upon all the facts and circumstances as 
set forth in the PSI, this Court finds that that is an appropriate sentence 
given the charges and given the situation you find yourself in before this 
Court.

 
 
[¶51]   We have said that 
when

 
 
imposing 
sentence, the trial court is given broad discretion to consider a wide variety 
of factors about the defendant and his crimes.  Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 
1115 (Wyo.1993); Griebel v. State, 763 P.2d 475, 477 (Wyo.1988).  We will not disturb a sentencing 
decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Jones v. State, 771 P.2d 368, 371 
(Wyo.1989).  In sentencing, due 
process provides a right to be sentenced only on accurate information.  Mehring, 860 P.2d  at 1117; 
Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Wyo.1989).  On appeal, the defendant must 
demonstrate that the trial court relied upon the statements in sentencing to 
prevail.  Mehring, at 
1115.  "However, when no objection 
is made concerning the consideration of a particular factor, review is 
necessarily confined to a search for plain error.  Plain error, as we have often stated, 
occurs when the record clearly shows an error that transgressed a clear and 
unequivocal rule of law which adversely affected a substantial right."  Hornecker v. State, 977 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Wyo.1999); see also Craver v. State, 942 P.2d 1110, 1115 
(Wyo.1997).  . . . "W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a) specifically permits information about the prior criminal record of the 
defendant and his characteristics to be considered by the trial court before 
imposing sentence.  In evaluating 
character, the trial court, in exercising its discretion, may consider a broad 
range of reports and information."  
[Mehring, 860 P.2d at 
1116-17]; see also Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Wyo. 
1987).

 
 

Manes v. 
State, 2004 
WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 2004).  The "abuse of discretion" standard has 
been previously set forth herein.

 
 

[¶52]   We conclude that the appellant has 
not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing the 
appellant.  After the district court 
either corrected, or stated that it would not consider, many of the disputed 
items contained in the presentence investigation report, the appellant's trial 
counsel withdrew her objection to the balance of the disputed items.  The district court proceeded to sentence 
the appellant based on the remaining undisputed information contained in the 
presentence investigation report (particularly the appellant's criminal history 
and the nature of the crimes in the instant case).  The information contained in the 
presentence investigation report supports the district court's view of the 
appellant's crimes, their attendant circumstances, and the appellant's 
character, and the district court's sentence did not exceed the maximum penalty 
provided for by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-602(b).  Beyond that, Apprendi and 
Blakely do not seem to apply to the circumstances of the instant case 
because both cases involved the determination of facts that would enhance a 
criminal penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.  See Brown v. Greiner, 409 F.3d 523, 
530-535 (2nd Cir. 2005) and People v. Rivera, 2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 
04614, 2005 WL 1362184, 1-6, ___ N.E.2d ___, ___ (N.Y. 2005).

 
 
Cumulative 
Error

 
 
[¶53]   The appellant also presents a 
cumulative error argument; however, given our resolution of the issues raised 
herein, we need not address this issue further.

 
 
[¶54]   We affirm.

 
 
 
 

FOOTNOTES

  1By October 2003, Brown had married 
another man and was in the process of moving out of the house she shared with 
Dorr, although she and Dorr remained "friends."

 
 
  2Dorr testified that he was in his 
computer room at the time, and Burton and the appellant passed by him on their 
way to the restroom.

 
 
  3Dorr testified that he does not 
normally sign the back of his credit cards and that he thought that he had 
written "see ID" on the back of this particular credit card.  The signature line of the credit card 
Burton handed 
Dorr had been "completely scratched off" and was not in the same condition as it 
had been when the card was last in Dorr's possession.

 
 
  4The appellant testified that 
Burton told him that "it didn't pertain" to the 
appellant, so the appellant left to price a bus ticket to Ohio so that he could 
visit a sick relative.

 
 
  5The appellant testified that he did 
not deny entering the Holiday Inn or signing the credit card receipt at the 
Holiday Inn.  There is some 
indication in the record that the appellant testified at the preliminary hearing 
in this matter that he denied that he "signed anything at the Holiday Inn" when 
speaking with Deputy Poldervaart.

 
 

  6Burton 
testified that she gave Deputy Poldervaart "substantially different" statements 
that were not under oath because he threatened to "make sure that [Burton] would spend five years in Lusk" and because Dorr 
threatened Burton.  
Dorr testified that he did not threaten to take Burton's son away from her and that he did not "believe" 
that he threatened to have Burton arrested for the use of his credit 
card.  Brown testified that she 
never threatened to have Burton arrested for the 
use of Dorr's credit card because Burton stated that she did not use the credit 
card.  However, Brown had told 
Burton at some point that Burton's son would be taken 
from her if she did not "straighten up . . .."

 
 
  7According to Burton, Dorr drinks "every 
day" and had been drinking that day.

 
 
  8Burton also signed an affidavit on July 7, 
2003, for the appellant's trial counsel stating that she took the credit card 
from Dorr's wallet with his express permission.

 
 
  9Dorr testified that in May he 
allowed Burton to use a different credit card for 
"basic emergencies" when Burton needed to take a 
trip to retrieve her car in Ohio.  
Dorr believed that the appellant used Dorr's credit card on that trip, 
without Dorr's permission.  Burton testified that another male (not the 
appellant) used Dorr's credit card on the trip with Dorr's express 
permission.  Dorr also acknowledged 
that he purchased a tire for Burton with a credit 
card, but that he did not give Burton permission to use the credit 
card.

 
 
  10The appellant claims that the 
Holiday Inn receipt was never admitted into evidence.  However, the record reveals that the 
Holiday Inn receipt, or an identical copy thereof, was admitted into evidence 
(without objection) as State's Exhibit 1 during the testimony of Holiday Inn 
night auditor Amanda Albertson.  
Reed referred to a separate copy of that receipt labeled State's Exhibit 
7 during her testimony.  Exhibit 7 
apparently was not admitted into evidence.

 
 
  11We have omitted some of the 
excerpts referenced in the appellant's appellate brief because we are unable to 
discern the basis upon which they were objectionable.

 
 
  12The remarks at issue in the instant 
case are not comparable to, and do not rise to the level of, those at issue in 
the legal authority cited in the appellant's appellate 
brief.

 
 
  13The appellant makes no such 
argument in the instant case.

 
 
  14We note that the instant case is 
not one in which the victim, or even a prosecution witness, is alleged to have 
recanted his or her trial testimony after the trial; interestingly, this is a 
case in which the appellant has asserted that a "critical" defense witness who 
testified favorably for the appellant claims to have testified falsely at 
trial.

 
 

  15In a one-sentence argument, the 
appellant (citing Manes v. 
State, 2004 WY 70, ¶ 9, 92 P.3d 289, 292 (Wyo. 2004)) also suggests that the prosecutor 
used an improper "community outrage" argument at sentencing.  The appellant does not attempt to 
identify the argument at issue on appeal, or in Manes, with any 
particularity.  In the absence of a 
more cogent appellate argument, we are unable to establish a nexus between the 
prosecutor's sentencing argument in the instant case and whatever argument was 
at issue in Manes.  The 
appellant also has not directed us to anything in the record to indicate that 
the district court relied upon any such argument in sentencing the 
appellant.