Case Title: Wickham v. Byrne

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92048, 92135

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 92048, 92135 cons.-Agenda 26-January 2002.
VIRGINIA WICKHAM, Appellee, v. PAUL MICHAEL BYRNE, 
Appellant.-BRENT LANGMAN et al., Appellants, v. AMY
LANGMAN, Appellee.
Opinion filed April 18, 2002.


	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	At issue in these consolidated cases is whether certain
provisions of section 607 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution
of Marriage Act (Act), commonly called the grandparent visitation
statute, violate a parent's due process rights. See 750 ILCS
5/607(b)(1), (b)(3) (West 2000).



BACKGROUND
The Wickham Petition
	Paul Michael Byrne (Paul) and Lizabeth Wickham Byrne
(Lizabeth) were married and had one child, J.B., born November
7, 1997. Lizabeth died September 14, 1998. In her last will and
testament, Lizabeth expressed a wish for frequent visitation
between J.B. and her mother, Virginia Wickham (Virginia). After
Lizabeth's death, Paul agreed to maintain the relationship between
Virginia and J.B., often driving J.B. 50 minutes to Virginia's
home. Virginia, however, requested more time with J.B. and asked
Paul to allow unsupervised overnight visits. Paul offered to drive
J.B. for visits when his schedule permitted, but refused to leave
J.B. with Virginia unsupervised and overnight. Unable to resolve
the conflict, Virginia filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook
County for grandparent visitation under section 607(b)(1) of the
Act. In her petition, Virginia requested mandatory overnight
visitation with J.B. two full weekends a month.
	Initially, Paul moved to dismiss the petition based upon
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and this court. See
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000) (plurality opinion); Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455
(2000). Paul argued that section 607(b)(1) of the Act violated the
due process clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions.
U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§1, 2. The trial
court denied the motion.
	At the hearing on Virginia's petition, the court heard
testimony from Paul, Virginia, and J.B.'s pediatrician. Prior to
ruling, the court stated that "[t]he standard to be used in
grandparent's visitation is the best interest of the child. Generally,
it's presumed that a relationship with a grandparent is in the best
interest of the child." However, the court held that Virginia's
attempts to undermine the relationship between Paul and J.B. by
filing frivolous and unfounded complaints with the Department of
Children and Family Services and interfering with J.B.'s pediatric
care without Paul's consent warranted limited visitation. Thus, the
court denied overnight visitation, but ordered supervised visitation
with J.B. at Paul's home four hours a week. The trial court
appointed a child representative and set the case for status in 60
days.
	Following the trial court order, Paul filed an "Amended
Motion to Dismiss Complaint" and renewed his argument based
upon Troxel and Lulay. The trial court again denied the motion,
finding that:
			"[T]he state may have a compelling interest in ordering
visitation between J.B. and Ms. Wickham over Mr.
Byrne's objection.
* * *
			Mr. Byrne has not shown that the asserted state interest
in requiring him to permit Ms. Wickham to visit with J.B.
is either illusory or not compelling. Under these
circumstances, this court holds that, as applied to the facts
of this case as developed thus far, Section 607(b)(1) does
not violate Mr. Byrne's constitutional parental rights."
	Paul filed an application for an interlocutory appeal under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 308. The
appellate court denied Paul's application. We granted Paul's
petition for leave to appeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).


The Langman Petition
	Amy and Rhett Langman were married and had two children,
T.L., born September 3, 1995, and P.L., born June 25, 1998. Rhett
died on September 20, 1998. Prior to Rhett's death, his parents,
Rita and Brent Langman (Rita and Brent), maintained a close
relationship with their grandchildren, seeing the children two to
three times a month. Immediately after Rhett's death, Rita and
Brent continued this relationship by baby-sitting the children each
Tuesday night so that Amy could attend social activities. Rita and
Brent asked Amy for more time with the children, including
overnight visits. Amy rejected the idea and told Rita and Brent that
she was unhappy with their refusal to follow her directions when
they baby-sat the children. Amy also explained to Rita and Brent
that she was uncomfortable with their home environment and the
children's exposure to their uncle's lifestyle. Amy agreed to
visitation, but she demanded Rita and Brent visit the children at
her home, while she was present.
	Unable to resolve their differences, Rita and Brent filed a
petition in the circuit court of Kankakee County for grandparent
visitation under section 607(b)(1). The petition stated, in part:
"That it is in the minor children's best interest that the Petitioners
[Rita and Brent] be allowed specific visitation with them outside
of the presence of the Respondent [Amy] in order to further and
foster the close family relationship that they previously shared and
in order that they grow up sharing the love and concern of their
father's family as well as that of their mother." After Rita and
Brent filed their petition for visitation, Amy moved to Missouri,
six hours away from Rita and Brent, with the children to make a
fresh start, telling Rita and Brent, "I don't come back for my own
family and I don't come back for my friends."
	On March 17, 1999, at the hearing on the petition for
visitation, 17 witnesses testified. Additionally, the parties
submitted written closing arguments to the court, which included
suggested visitation schedules. On August 2, 2000, the trial court
issued its order with an accompanying memorandum. In its
memorandum, the trial court stated:
			"[T]estimony revealed the mother is a loving caring
mother who wishes to protect her children from exposure
to things she feels are in appropriate [sic].
* * *
			All of the parties are responsible, moral and caring
people. The children's mother does not object to visitation
but only on her terms, which appear to be supervised
visits in her presence. 
			This is a particularly difficult case because all of the
parties believe they are doing what is in the best interest
of the children. The Court can not do more than balance
the right of the parent and grandparents. The State of
Illinois has sought to protect relationships children have
with their grandparents yet it also must protect the rights
of a parent to whose preliminary right and responsibility
it is to care for and nurture their children. 
			The real test, in the best interest of the children, is the
test that must be applied here. It has been the law of
Illinois for over 30 years that when considering the best
interest of the children the Court must look at 'all matters
that have a bearing upon the welfare of the child.' "
The trial court continued: "[T]here is a strong indication that
unsupervised grandparental visitation would be of great benefit to
the children. Their father is deceased, his surviving family is the
only connection the children can have with those who had an
intimate and close family relationship." The trial court ordered
visitation, beginning gradually with afternoon visits, and
eventually leading to unsupervised visits one full weekend each
month. The trial court ordered that Amy split the costs of
transportation with Rita and Brent. Further, the trial court ordered
telephone contact one day a week for up to 15 minutes. Amy
appealed.
	The appellate court reversed the trial court order. 325 Ill. App.
3d 101, 108. Citing to Troxel and Lulay, the appellate court held
that section 607(b)(1) of the Act, as applied in this case,
unconstitutionally infringed on Amy's fundamental right to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her children.
325 Ill. App. 3d at 107. The appellate court declined to consider
whether section 607(b)(1) is facially unconstitutional. 325 Ill. App.
3d at 107.
	We granted Rita and Brent's petition for leave to appeal and
consolidated these cases.

ANALYSIS
	Less than two years after our decision in Lulay, we are asked
again to consider the constitutionality of the Act. In Lulay, we held
that section 607(b)(1), as applied to the parents' joint decision to
deny grandparent visitation, unconstitutionally infringed on their
"well-established fundamental liberty interest in making decisions
regarding the upbringing of their children." Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d  at
479. In the instant matter, we address the constitutionality of
sections 607(b)(1) and (b)(3) in the context of a single parent's
decision concerning visitation with a deceased spouse's parents.
	Citing to Troxel, and Lulay, Paul and Amy argue that sections
607(b)(1) and (b)(3) as applied to a single parent's decision
regarding grandparent visitation violate a parent's fundamental
constitutional right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of his or her children. Additionally, Paul
argues that sections 607(b)(1) and (b)(3) are facially
unconstitutional.
	Section 607(b) states, in pertinent part:
			"(b)(1) The court may grant reasonable visitation
privileges to a grandparent, great-grandparent, or sibling
of any minor child upon petition to the court by the
grandparents or great-grandparents or on behalf of the
sibling, with notice to the parties required to be notified
under Section 601 of this Act, if the court determines that
it is in the best interests and welfare of the child, and may
issue any necessary orders to enforce such visitation
privileges. Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection (b), a petition for visitation privileges may be
filed under this paragraph (1) *** if one or more of the
following circumstances exist:
				(A) the parents are not currently cohabiting on a
permanent or an indefinite basis;
				(B) one of the parents has been absent from the
marital abode for more than one month without the
spouse knowing his or her whereabouts;
				(C) one of the parents is deceased;
				(D) one of the parents joins in the petition with the
grandparents, great-grandparents, or sibling; or
				(E) a sibling is in State custody.
* * *
			(3) When one parent is deceased, the surviving parent
shall not interfere with the visitation rights of the
grandparents." 750 ILCS 5/607(b) (West 2000).
	Under Illinois law, statutes carry a strong presumption of
constitutionality. People ex rel. Ryan v. World Church of the
Creator, 198 Ill. 2d 115, 120 (2001); People v. Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d 524, 528 (1998). Whenever reasonable, courts must construe a
statute to uphold its constitutional validity. World Church of the
Creator, 198 Ill. 2d  at 120; Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d  at 528. A statute
is facially invalid only if the party challenging the enactment can
establish " 'that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid.' " In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994),
quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987). We review de novo the
constitutionality of the Act. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d  at 469.
	The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. Const., amend. XIV,
§1. The due process clause grants "heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720,
138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 787, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997). One of the
fundamental rights protected under the fourteenth amendment is
the right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children without unwarranted state
intrusion. Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 66, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 57, 120 S. Ct. 
at 2060; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599,
606, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d 101, 118, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2504 (1979);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 54 L. Ed. 2d 511, 519, 98 S. Ct. 549, 554-55 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651,
31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212-13 (1972); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 35, 92 S. Ct. 1526,
1541-42 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66,
88 L. Ed. 645, 652, 64 S. Ct. 438, 442 (1944); Pierce v. Society of
the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 1078, 45 S. Ct. 571, 573 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 1045, 43 S. Ct. 625,
626 (1923). Decisions concerning care, custody, and control
include, for example, decisions about a child's education, religion,
and general upbringing. See Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d  at 471-72. State
interference with fundamental parental childrearing rights is
justified in limited instances to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of children. See, e.g., Prince, 321 U.S.  at 166-67, 88 L. Ed.  at 653, 64 S. Ct.  at 442 ("the state has a wide range of power
for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the
child's welfare"). Under Illinois law, examples of these limited
instances include: required testing for phenylketonuria at birth
(410 ILCS 240/1 (West 2000)); required immunization for
diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (410 ILCS 315/2 (West 2000));
required hearing and visual examinations (410 ILCS 205/1 et seq.
(West 2000)); and prohibited child labor (820 ILCS 205/1 et seq.
(West 2000)).
	The petitioning grandparents argue that the under the Act, the
trial judge steps into the shoes of the deceased parent to protect
and maintain the children's family heritage. This argument
overlooks the clear constitutional directive that state interference
should only occur when the health, safety, or welfare of a child is
at risk. The issue we address does not involve a threat to the
health, safety, or welfare of children. Unlike the statutes
concerning inoculation or immunization, sections 607(b)(1) and
(b)(3) involve visitation and a parent's decision to control who
may interact with his or her children. Additionally, the United
States Supreme Court does not limit the fundamental right to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of children to
decisions made by joint parents: "this Court's decisions have by
now made plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a
parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody,
and management of his or her children' is an important interest
that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection.' " Stanley, 405 U.S.  at 651, 31 L. Ed. 2d  at 558, 92 S. Ct.  at 1212-13. To the contrary, the United
States Supreme Court recently recognized the changing
demographics of the average American family, including the
increasing number of single-parent households. Troxel, 530 U.S. 
at 64, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 55, 120 S. Ct.  at 2059 ("In 1996, children
living with only one parent accounted for 28 percent of all children
under age 18 in the United States"). We, therefore, reject any
argument that single parents are entitled to less constitutional
liberty in decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children.
	Although the appellate court examined the constitutionality of
section 607(b)(1) as applied to a single parent's decision to limit
grandparent visitation, we are compelled to examine the overall
constitutional validity of the statute. We begin with the
presumption that a fit parent's decision to deny or limit visitation
is in the child's best interests. See Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 68, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 58, 120 S. Ct.  at 2061 ("there is a presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children"); see Parham,
442 U.S.  at 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at 118, 99 S. Ct.  at 2504; Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455.
			" 'The law's concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required
for making life's difficult decisions. More important,
historically it has recognized that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children.' " Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 68, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 58,
120 S. Ct.  at 2061, quoting Parham, 442 U.S.  at 602, 61 L. Ed. 2d  at 118, 99 S. Ct.  at 2504.
	In Troxel, a mother limited visitation between her children
and their paternal grandparents, after the father of her children
committed suicide. The paternal grandparents petitioned for
visitation under a Washington state visitation statute, and the
United States Supreme Court examined the constitutional validity
of that statute. Ultimately, the Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional because it allowed "any third party seeking
visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation
of the parent's children to state-court review." (Emphasis added.)
Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 67, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 57, 120 S. Ct.  at 2061.
The statute was held unconstitutional because it was
"breathtakingly broad." Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 67, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at
57, 120 S. Ct.  at 2061.
	The Court also discussed a second statutory flaw: "the
Washington statute places the best-interest determination solely in
the hands of the judge." Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 67, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at
57, 120 S. Ct.  at 2061. The Court criticized the considerable
discretion the judge could exercise under the statute, stating that
"it gave no special weight at all to [the mother's] determination of
her daughters' best interests." Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 69, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 58, 120 S. Ct.  at 2062. The Washington statute undermined
the parent's fundamental right to make decisions regarding the
care and custody of her child because the parent's decision
regarding visitation was no longer presumed to be in the child's
best interests. Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 69-70, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 59, 120 S. Ct.  at 2062. Instead, that decision was debated by the parties to
the litigation before a judge, with the parent placed on equal
footing with those seeking visitation privileges. Troxel, 530 U.S. 
at 69, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 58, 120 S. Ct.  at 2062. In making visitation
decisions, however, the parent is not on equal footing with those
seeking visitation privileges.
		"In an ideal world, parents might always seek to cultivate
the bonds between grandparents and their grandchildren.
Needless to say, however, our world is far from perfect,
and in it the decision whether such an intergenerational
relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for
the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit
parent's decisions of the kind at issue here becomes
subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least
some special weight to the parent's own determination."
Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 70, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 59, 120 S. Ct.  at
2062.
The Court did not reject the significance of the relationship
between grandparents and their grandchildren; it simply
acknowledged the presumption that a parent's decision regarding
visitation is in the children's best interest.
	Section 607(b)(1) contains a similar flaw to the statute at issue
in Troxel. Section 607(b)(1) permits grandparents, great-grandparents, or the sibling of any minor child visitation if "the
court determines that it is in the best interests and welfare of the
child." 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1) (West 2000). Like the statute in
Troxel, section 607(b)(1), in every case, places the parent on equal
footing with the party seeking visitation rights. Further, like the
statute in Troxel, section 607(b)(1) directly contravenes the
traditional presumption that parents are fit and act in the best
interests of their children. The statute allows the "State to infringe
on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions
simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be
made." Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 72-73, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 61, 120 S. Ct. 
at 2064. Section 607(b)(1) exposes the decision of a fit parent to
the unfettered value judgment of a judge and the intrusive micro-managing of the state. Because we can conceive of no set of
circumstances under which section 607(b)(1) of the Act would be
valid, we hold that it is unconstitutional on its face. For the same
reasons, we hold that section 607(b)(3) is facially unconstitutional.
	Our holding does not depart from the previous decision of this
court in Lulay. In Lulay, we held that section 607(b)(1) was
unconstitutional as applied to the parents' joint decision to deny or
limit visitation. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d  at 479-80. Our decision rested
upon the principle that parents maintain an established
fundamental liberty interest in making decisions regarding the
care, custody, and control of their children. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455.
We declined to address facial invalidity merely because the issue
was "outside the scope of the certified question." Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 
at 480. Yet, importantly, we recognized the presumption that fit
parents act in the best interest of their children. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 
at 479. In the instant matter, we are expressly asked to consider
whether the statute is invalid on its face.
	Furthermore, our holding does not disregard the value of a
meaningful relationship between a grandparent and grandchild. In
most cases, the relationship between a child and his or her
grandparents is a nurturing, loving relationship that provides a
vital connection to the family's history and roots. However, as
with all human relationships, conflicts may arise between a child's
parents and grandparents. In many cases, this conflict will concern
disagreements about how a parent is raising his or her children.
Yet, this human conflict has no place in the courtroom. This is true
even where the intrusion is made in good conscience, such as the
request for visitation to preserve the child's only connection to a
deceased parent's family. Parents have the constitutionally
protected latitude to raise their children as they decide, even if
these decisions are perceived by some to be for arbitrary or wrong
reasons. The presumption that parents act in their children's best
interest prevents the court from secondguessing parents' visitation
decisions. Moreover, a fit parent's constitutionally protected
liberty interest to direct the care, custody, and control of his or her
children mandates that parents-not judges-should be the ones to
decide with whom their children will and will not associate.



CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, we hold that sections 607(b)(1) and
607(b)(3) of the Act are facially unconstitutional. For this reason,
we need not address the appellate court's holding that section
607(b)(1) is unconstitutional as applied. We affirm the judgment
of the appellate court in Langman, No. 92135, and reverse the
order of the trial court in Wickham, No. 92048.
No. 92048-Reversed.
No. 92135-Affirmed.
	When this court last considered the constitutionality of this
statute, three justices would have found the statute
unconstitutional on its face. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d  at 480-82 (Heiple,
J., specially concurring); Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d  at 482-83 (Rathje, J.,
specially concurring, joined by Heiple and Freeman, JJ.)
(concluding that the statute is facially unconstitutional because the
"fatal flaw *** will be present in every section 607(b)(1) case"
(emphasis omitted)). Thus, at the time this court considered Lulay,
we were aware that each subsection of section 607(b) was
vulnerable to the same criticism-that the state lacked a compelling
interest to justify this significant intrusion into the decision
making of fit parents. The majority reaches the question left
unanswered in Lulay, whether the entire section must be found
unconstitutional on its face, and answers that question in the
affirmative. 
	A statute is facially unconstitutional if " ' "no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." ' " In
re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 297 (2001), quoting In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 210-11 (1994), quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 707, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2100 (1987). I
agree with the majority that section 607(b)(3) is unconstitutional
on its face. This provision states that when one parent has died, the
surviving parent "shall not interfere" with the grandparents' rights
to visitation. 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(3) (West 2000). Because a fit
parent is constitutionally entitled to the presumption that he or she
is acting in the child's best interest (Troxel, 530 U.S.  at 69-70, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 59, 120 S. Ct. at 2062), this provision, which purports
to limit the decisionmaking capability of a fit parent in order to
protect "rights" of grandparents, without first requiring rebuttal of
the presumption, is unconstitutional on its face. 
	Section 607(b)(1), however, is another matter. While this
section defines a rather narrow class of persons who may bring
petitions for visitation-grandparents, great-grandparents, and
siblings-it does not limit the class of persons who may be named
respondents in such actions. 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1) (West 2000).
Logically, any person who exercises guardianship or custody over
a minor child might be named a respondent in a petition for
visitation brought pursuant to this section. Thus, it is easily
possible to conceive of a set of circumstances in which this section
could be validly applied. See slip op. at 10.
	Consider, for example, the case of a young family involved in
a tragic automobile accident that kills the father and leaves the
mother so severely injured that her parents seek and are given
custody and guardianship of the child. Perhaps blaming their late
son-in-law for the accident, the maternal grandparents refuse to
permit visitation with the paternal grandparents. Section
607(b)(1)(C) confers standing upon the paternal grandparents to
seek visitation by filing a petition naming the maternal
grandparents as respondents. 750 ILCS 5/607(b)(1)(C) (West
2000). Yet, by declaring the statute unconstitutional on its face, the
majority has implicitly held that the custodial grandparents in this
example have the same fundamental rights to the care, custody,
and control of the child as natural or adoptive parents, that they are
constitutionally entitled to the benefit of the presumption that they
are acting in the best interests of the child, and that the state may
not interfere in their decisionmaking unless the interference is
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. This implicit
holding, moreover, has implications far beyond visitation disputes.
	In my opinion, when the respondent in the visitation action is
a nonparent, the statute could be constitutionally applied because
the nonparent respondent would not be exercising a fundamental
constitutional right and, thus, strict scrutiny would not apply. In
other words, unlike a natural or adoptive parent, a nonparent
custodian or guardian is not constitutionally entitled to the
presumption that he or she is acting in the best interest of the child.
Without necessarily concluding that section 607(b)(1), as applied
to nonparent respondents, meets the rational basis test, I am
unwilling to prejudge this issue by finding this provision
unconstitutional on its face. 
	The majority is inclined to resolve the constitutional question
once and for all so that piecemeal litigation is not required to
invalidate the statute. However, by declaring this section facially
invalid, the majority has implicitly declared that nonparent
custodians or guardians have fundamental constitutional rights
equal to those of parents. This question was not presented by
either of the consolidated cases, nor was it briefed or argued.
There is no need for the court to go so far.
	On the other hand, a good reason exists for narrowing our
holding to declaring the statute unconstitutional as applied. At
some future date, a nonparent custodian or guardian will stand
before an Illinois court asserting a fundamental constitutional right
to the care, custody, and control of a child and demanding the
benefit of the presumption. That litigant will cite this case as
support and we may, at that time, have to undo what was done
here. 
	I firmly believe that we should go only so far as is necessary
to resolve the question presented to us in the present case and no
further. I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the portion of the
opinion that would declare section 607(b)(1) unconstitutional on
its face. I would find this provision unconstitutional as applied to
any fit parent.