Case Title: Watson v. University of Alabama Health Services Foundation, P.C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1170057

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: April 27, 2018
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2017-2018
____________________
1170057
____________________
Homer L. Watson, as personal representative of the Estate of
Mary Fejeran, deceased
v.
The University of Alabama Health Services Foundation, P.C.,
and Graham C. Towns, M.D.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-14-904645)
SELLERS, Justice.
Homer L. Watson, as personal representative of the estate
of Mary Fejeran, deceased, appeals from the summary judgment
entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court in a wrongful-death
1170057
action in favor of the University of Alabama Health Services
Foundation, P.C., and Graham C. Towns, M.D. (hereinafter
referred to collectively as "the defendants").  We affirm.
The facts are undisputed.  On November 8, 2012, Fejeran
died. Watson thereafter petitioned the Russell Probate Court
for letters of administration, seeking to be appointed the
personal representative of Fejeran's estate.  On August 22,
2013, the probate court issued letters of administration to
Watson.  
In March 2014, Watson petitioned the probate court for a
final settlement of Fejeran's estate, representing that he 
had
discharged in full all legal claims against the estate, that
he had made a final distribution of all the personal assets of
the estate, and that he was requesting a final order
discharging and releasing him and the surety on his bond from
further liability as personal representative of the estate.  
On March 24, 2014, the probate court entered a judgment
of final settlement, indicating that Watson and his surety
were "discharged from all further liabilities."  
On November 7, 2014, Watson, after being discharged and
released as the personal representative of Fejeran's estate,
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filed a wrongful-death action against the defendants under §
6-5-410, Ala. Code 1975.  Watson claimed in that action that
he was "the duly qualified Administrator" of 
Fejeran's estate.
The two-year limitations period for bringing a wrongful-death
action under the statute expired on November 8, 2014.  
On March 7, 2017, the defendants filed a motion for a
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., on the
basis that Watson lacked the representative capacity to bring
the wrongful-death action. In support of their summary-
judgment motion, the defendants attached a copy of the March
24, 2014, final-settlement order indicating that Watson had
been discharged as the personal representative of Fejeran's
estate. 
On March 23, 2017, Watson moved the probate court to
clarify its March 24, 2014, order or, alternatively, to
correct a clerical error in the order pursuant to Rule 60(a),
Ala. R. Civ. P.  Watson specifically alleged in his motion to
clarify and/or to correct that his petition for final
settlement sought relief only for liability arising from
estate-administration activities and 
that 
the 
petition 
did 
not
seek closure of the estate or termination of his letters of
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administration.  On the same day, the probate court entered an
order, dated March 23, 2017, purporting to clarify and/or to
correct its March 24, 2014, order:
"1.  In response to the Administrator's motion
for clarification, the Court declares that the
meaning and intent of its March 24, 2014, order was
to grant a discharge from liabilities for estate
administration activities, but to otherwise leave
Mr. Watson's letters of administration in full force
and effect.  Thus, on November 7, 2014, when an
action for Mary Fejeran's wrongful death was
commenced in Jefferson County, Alabama, Homer L.
Watson was, on that date, the Administrator of Mary
Fejeran's estate with active, open letters of
administration from this Court in full effect.
"2.  To the extent that some other court might
find the clarification stated in paragraph 1, above,
insufficient 
in some way, this Court grants
additional, further, or alternative relief under
Rule 60(a) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.
... Even though the order of March 24, 2014, said
only that the Administrator was discharged from
'liabilities,' to the extent that some other court
might read the ... order to be an ultimate closing
of the Estate and a full termination of the letters
of administration, this Court declares such language
to be a clerical mistake.  To make the order of
March 24, 2014, speak the truth of what was
intended, paragraphs 1 and 3 of the order are hereby
amended to state (amending language underscored):
"'1.  That said Petition for Final
Settlement, 
seeking 
a 
discharge 
from
liabilities for the administration of
estate debts and property, be and is hereby
confirmed; and
"'....
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"'3. 
 
The 
Petitioner, 
the
Administrator and his surety be discharged
from all further estate-administration
liabilities, but that the letters of
administration remain in force ....'"   
On August 15, 2017, Watson filed a motion in opposition
to the defendants' motion for a summary judgment, arguing that
the March 24, 2014, order did not terminate his letters of
administration. In support of his motion, Watson attached the
March 23, 2017, order purporting to clarify and/or to correct
the March 24, 2014, order and, more specifically, stating that
Watson's letters of administration were still in effect on
November 7, 2014, when he filed the wrongful-death action. 
On September 5, 2017, after reviewing the evidence, the
circuit court concluded that the March 24, 2014, order of
final settlement was a final judgment, that the order was
unambiguous, and that the order discharged and 
released Watson
as personal representative of Fejeran's estate for all
purposes.  Accordingly, the circuit court entered a summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that, because
Watson had been discharged as personal representative of
Fejeran's estate, he lacked the representative capacity to
bring a wrongful-death action.  This appeal followed.
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"Because the facts are undisputed and we are presented
with pure questions of law, our standard of review is de
novo."  George v. Sims, 888 So. 2d 1224, 1226 (Ala. 2004). 
Alabama's wrongful-death statute, Ala. Code 1975, § 6–5–410,
provides, in 
pertinent 
part, 
that 
"[a] 
personal 
representative
may commence an action ... for the wrongful act, omission, or
negligence of any person, persons, or corporation ... whereby
the death of his testator or intestate was caused."  In
Alabama, wrongful death is purely statutory, and 
the 
wrongful-
death statute grants only a legally appointed personal
representative "the right to bring a wrongful-death action for
the benefit of, an on behalf of, the decedent's heirs at law
based on the death of the decedent by a wrongful act."
Alvarado v. Estate of Kidd, 205 So. 3d 1188, 1193 (Ala.
2016)(Bolin, J., concurring specially).  Watson does not
dispute that a legally appointed personal representative who
has 
been 
discharged 
and 
released 
as 
the 
personal
representative of a decedent's estate no longer has the
capacity to bring a wrongful-death action. See Northstar
Anesthesia of Alabama, LLC v. Noble, 215 So. 3d 1044 (Ala.
2016)(plurality opinion)(holding that personal representative
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of decedent's estate who had been discharged and released as
the 
personal 
representative 
lacked 
the 
representative 
capacity
to commence a wrongful-death action); see also Ex parte
Hubbard Props., Inc., 205 So. 3d 1211 (Ala. 2016)(holding that
a wrongful-death action brought by a person who was not a
personal representative was a nullity).  Rather, Watson argues
that the probate court's March 23, 2017, order establishes
that he was never discharged in his capacity as personal
representative of Fejeran's estate and that he was serving in
that capacity at the time he commenced the wrongful-death
action. However, as the circuit court concluded, the March 24,
2014, order--"Decree of Final Settlement"--is clearly a final
judgment. The order states that Watson and his surety are
"discharged from all further liabilities." (Emphasis added.) 
Section 12-13-3, Ala. Code 1975, states that a judgment
entered by the probate court "may be set aside or amended and
the case reopened within 30 days after the rendition thereof
by the judge of the court in which the said decree was
rendered."  Accordingly, the probate court's March 23, 2017,
order purporting to clarify its March 24, 2014, final judgment
is void, and the March 24, 2014, order is the operative final
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judgment of the probate court.  See Lett v. Weaver, 79 So. 3d
625 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)(holding that, because more than 30
days had passed since the probate court entered its final-
settlement order, the probate court had no jurisdiction to
enter an amended final-settlement order and, thus, the 
initial
final-settlement order 
was 
the 
operative 
judgment). 
 
Moreover,
Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., which applies to only the
correction of clerical errors in judgments, did not authorize
the probate court to substantively enlarge or modify the
final-settlement order to say something other than what was
originally pronounced.1 In Deramus Hearing Aid Center, Inc. v.
American Hearing Aid Associates, Inc., 950 So. 2d 292, 293-94
(Ala. 2006), this Court explained:
"Rule 60(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a
trial court may correct a clerical mistake in a
judgment at any time own its own initiative. The
Committee Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 60(a),
Ala. R. Civ. P., citing West Virginia Oil & Gas Co.
v. George E. Breece Lumber Co., 213 F.2d 702 (5th
Cir. 1954), state that a 'Rule 60(a) motion can only
be used to make the judgment or record speak the
truth and cannot be used to make it say something
other than what was originally pronounced.' Black's
Law Dictionary 582 (8th ed. 2004), defines 'clerical
1The defendants assert that the March 23, 2017, order is
not recorded, and the only copy of the order in the appellate
record is attached to Watson's opposition to their summary-
judgment motion. 
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error' as '[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake
or inadvertence, 
esp. in writing or copying
something on the record, and not from judicial
reasoning or determination.' (Emphasis added.)"
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Watson, having
been legally discharged as personal representative of 
Fejeran's estate, lacked the representative capacity to bring
the wrongful-death action, and the action is therefore a
nullity.  Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of the
defendants is affirmed. 
AFFIRMED.
Stuart, C.J., and Bolin, Parker, Main, and Mendheim, JJ.,
concur.
Shaw, J., concurs in part and concurs in the result.
Wise and Bryan, JJ., dissent.
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SHAW, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the
result). 
I agree with the main opinion that the probate court had
no authority to amend its initial final-settlement order; that
the appellant, Homer J. Watson, was not the personal
representative of the deceased, Mary Fejeran, at the time the
complaint in the underlying wrongful-death action was filed;
and that the filing of such complaint, therefore, was a
nullity.  See Northstar Anesthesia of Alabama, LLC v. Noble,
215 So. 3d 1044 (Ala. 2016) (plurality opinion); see also Ex
parte Hubbard Props., Inc., 205 So. 3d 1211 (Ala. 2016)
(holding that a wrongful-death action commenced by a person
who was not the personal representative was a nullity), and
Downtown Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pool, 375 So. 2d 465, 466 (Ala.
1979) (holding that because the person who commenced the
wrongful-death action "did not qualify under § 6–5–410 as a
personal representative this suit was a nullity").  However,
as I have previously written, I do not believe that the filing
of a wrongful-death action under Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-410, by
one who is not a "personal representative" presents an issue
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of lack of "capacity."  See Northstar, 215 So. 3d at 1052-54
(Shaw, J., concurring in the result). 
 
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