Case Title: YVONNE SNIDER; SHERRY FIELDS AND LEE FIELDS V. FRED KIRCHHEFER AND DONITA KIRCHHEFER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
YVONNE SNIDER; SHERRY FIELDS AND LEE FIELDS V. FRED KIRCHHEFER AND DONITA KIRCHHEFER2005 WY 71115 P.3d 1Case Number: No. 04-140Decided: 06/30/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
YVONNE 
SNIDER; SHERRY FIELDS and LEE FIELDS,           

Appellants 
(Petitioners),       

 
 
v.

 
 
FRED 
KIRCHHEFER and DONITA KIRCHHEFER,        

Appellees 
(Respondents).   

 
 
 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofConverseCounty

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge 

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

F. Scott 
Peasley, Douglas, Wyoming

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Peter C. 
Nicolaysen and Pamela M. Brondos of Peter C. Nicolaysen & Associates, P.C., 
Casper, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Nicolaysen.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, and KITE, JJ., and GRANT, D.J., and STEBNER, D.J., 
Retired

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Fred and Donita 
Kirchhefer (the Kirchhefers) filed a petition for the abandonment of a water 
right attached to lands owned by Yvonne Snider and Sherry and Lee Fields 
(Appellants).  The board of control 
granted that petition and ordered the water right abandoned.  On appeal Appellants claim that they did 
not voluntarily abandon their right and that the Kirchhefers did not prove that 
they had standing to file a petition for abandonment.  We reverse.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Appellants assert 
four issues:

 
 
I.  Did the Appellants/Contestees 
voluntarily abandon their water right?

 
 

II. Does a 
contestee in a water abandonment case have a right of resuscitation 
after five (5) years of non-use and prior to the date a contestant files a 
petition of abandonment?

 
 

III. Can a 
contestant in a water abandonment action involving allegations of non-use, who 
has always received his appropriated share of water, prevail without 
offering volumetric data or simulations to show the affect of reactivating 
contestees' water right?

 
 

IV.  Was there substantial evidence to 
support the Board of 
Control's orders of abandonment.  

 
 
 
 
The 
Kirchhefers respond with the following two issues:

 
 

1. Whether 
the Board of 
Control erred in determining Appellants voluntarily abandoned their water 
right.

 
 

2. Whether 
the Board of 
Control erred in determining that [the Kirchhefers'] junior water right might be 
injured upon reactivation or benefited by abandonment of the senior water right. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The Kirchhefers 
and the Appellants own land in Converse 
County, Wyoming. The 
Kirchhefers ' land is just south of Appellants' land.  The Kirchhefers purchased their land in 
1989.  Appellant Snider purchased 
her land (Snider land) in 1995 and in 1999 sold a portion of that land to her 
daughter and son-in-law, Sherry and Lee Fields. Six Mile Creek, a tributary to 
the North Platte River, flows in a northeasterly direction through the northern 
portion of the Kirchhefers' land.  
Six Mile Creek does not cross Snider land.  

 
 
[¶4]      However, the 
Snider land has a 1915 water appropriation right to receive .33 cubic feet per 
second (c.f.s.) from Six Mile Creek for irrigation purposes.  This appropriation, known as the Minnie 
F. Barrow appropriation, permits the diversion of water from Six Mile Creek at a 
point on the Kirchhefers' land.  The 
water then travels through the Budget No. 2 Ditch, a portion of which is on the 
Kirchhefers' land, to reach Snider land. Accompanying the Minnie F. Barrow 
appropriation, by order of the Converse County District Court, is an easement 
and right of way across the Kirchhefers' land to construct, maintain, and repair 
the Budget No. 2 Ditch.  There has 
been no beneficial use of the water under the Minnie F. Barrow appropriation for 
at least five years.  Indeed, before 
August 30, 2001, portions of the Budget No. 2 Ditch had fallen into such a state 
of disrepair that the ditch could not convey the water to the appropriated 
lands.

 

[¶5]      Although Six Mile 
Creek runs through their land, the Kirchhefers do not have a surface 
appropriation right for Six Mile Creek.  
However, the Kirchhefers have a ground water permit for six gallons per 
minute from the Kirchhefer Spring No. 1, a well located on the Kirchhefers' 
land. The well has a permit dated December 5, 1995. This well is built into the 
creek bank of Six Mile Creek and is approximately 100 feet upstream from the 
point of diversion for the Budget No. 2 Ditch. The well is used for watering the 
Kirchhefers' livestock, yard, garden, and trees and for other domestic purposes. 
The Kirchhefers have actively used the water from this well since its creation. 
Prior to the Kirchhefers' ownership a small duck pond was constructed on the 
creek. The construction of the pond and several spillways altered the original 
flow of Six Mile Creek so that it did not flow past the historical Budget No. 2 
Ditch point of diversion. 

 

[¶6]      On August 29, 
2001, Appellants entered the Kirchhefers' property with a backhoe and began 
repairing the Budget No. 2 Ditch in order to repair the ditch so that it could 
convey water from Six Mile Creek. The work progressed towards the point on Six 
Mile Creek that David Andrews, the local hydrographer-commissioner, had 
indicated was the point of diversion. 1 However, shortly before the work 
was completed, the Kirchhefers began to object to the construction 
activities.  The Kirchhefers stated 
reason for concern was they believed the Appellants were outside their easement 
and at the wrong point of diversion. 

 
 
[¶7]      In order to stop 
the activities, the Kirchhefers called the sheriff, and Donita Kirchhefer stood 
in front of the backhoe. As a result, the construction activities were delayed 
for the rest of the day.  The 
following day the Kirchhefers filed a temporary restraining order to stop the 
construction activities.  This order 
was granted and presented to the backhoe operator as he was resuming the 
construction activities, once again halting the activities.  Then on August 31, 2001, the Kirchhefers 
filed a petition for abandonment of the Minnie F. Barrow appropriation alleging 
that the appropriators had not used the appropriation for more than five 
years.  Following this filing, the 
Appellants did not try to complete their construction activities and beneficial 
use was never restored.   

   

[¶8]      On January 25, 
2002, the board of control held a hearing to consider the matter, and both sides 
presented evidence.  On May 9, 2002, 
the board ordered the abandonment of the Minnie F. Barrow appropriation.  The Appellants appealed this order to 
the district court.  The district 
court found that the board's order contained no findings of fact or conclusions 
of law to establish a reasonable likelihood that abandonment would benefit or 
injure the Kirchhefers' water right.  
The district court therefore remanded for the board to reconsider the 
matter.  

 
 
[¶9]      On remand, the 
board met again to discuss the issue.  
The board did not receive any further evidence, but the parties were 
allowed to submit written closing arguments. On August 28, 2003, the board by 
written order found that the Kirchhefers established that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that their water right would be injured by reactivation and benefited 
by abandonment.  The Appellants 
again sought review from the district court. This time the district court found 
that the appropriate findings had been made and affirmed that decision.  Appellants then appealed to this Court. 

 
 
 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   We review administrative actions 
pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114 (LexisNexis 2003).  In this 
instance the substantial evidence test is the proper standard of review.   

 
 
The 
substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of review in appeals from 
Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act contested case proceedings when factual 
findings are involved and both parties submit evidence. [Kuntz-Dexter v. 
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 101, 49 P.3d 190 
(Wyo. 2002)] at ¶10 (citing Newman v. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. 
Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶22, 49 P.3d 163, ¶22 (Wyo. 2002)). Because both parties 
presented cases-in-chief, we apply the substantial evidence standard. We afford 
respect and deference to a hearing examiner's findings of fact if they are 
supported by substantial evidence. Kuntz-Dezter, ¶10. Our task is to 
examine the entire record to determine whether substantial evidence supported 
the hearing examiner's findings. We will not substitute our judgment for that of 
the hearing examiner when substantial evidence supports his decision. Id.

Substantial 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of 
the agency's conclusions. Id. When only the party with the burden 
of proof submits evidence in the contested case proceeding and that party does 
not ultimately prevail, the arbitrary or capricious standard governs the 
judicial review of that agency decision. Id. Even if the factual findings are 
found to be supported by substantial evidence, the ultimate agency decision may 
be found to be arbitrary or capricious for other reasons. Id.

We do not 
examine the record only to determine if there is substantial evidence to support 
the hearing examiner's decision, but we must also examine the conflicting 
evidence to determine if the hearing examiner could have reasonably made its 
finding and order upon all of the evidence before it. Id. A hearing 
examiner's conclusions of law are afforded no special deference and will be 
affirmed only if truly in accord with law. Id.; State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 
1159 (Wyo. 
1999).

Iverson 
v. Frost Construction, 2003 WY 162, ¶¶11-13, 81 P.3d 190, ¶¶11-13 (Wyo. 
2003).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   The abandonment of a water right is 
governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-401 (LexisNexis 2003).  The relevant portion of this statute 
provides:

 
 

(a) Where 
the holder of an appropriation of water from a surface, underground or reservoir 
water source fails, either intentionally or unintentionally, to use water 
therefrom for the beneficial purposes for which it was appropriated, whether 
under an adjudicated or 
unadjudicated right, during any five (5) successive years, he is considered as 
having abandoned the water right and shall forfeit all water rights and 
privileges appurtenant thereto. . . .

 
 
* * * 
*

(b) When 
any water user who might be benefitted by a 
declaration of abandonment of existing water rights or who might be injured by 
the reactivation of the water right, desires to bring about a legal declaration 
of abandonment, he shall present his case in writing to the board of control. . 
. . The following persons have standing to petition the state board of control 
to declare the abandonment of existing water rights under this 
section:

(i)  Any person who has a valid adjudicated 
water right or is the holder of a valid permit from the same source of supply 
which is equal to or junior in date of priority to the right for which 
abandonment is sought[.]  

 
 
We have 
interpreted § 41-3-401(b) to mean that in order to have standing to petition for 
abandonment, a water user must allege and prove three essential elements: 1) 
that he possesses a valid water right of equal or junior status to the water 
right sought to be abandoned; 2) that the water right relied upon by the 
petitioner and the water right for which a declaration of abandonment is sought 
are from the same source of supply; and 3) that the petitioner stands to benefit 
from a declaration of abandonment or to sustain injury by reactivation of the 
contested water right.  
Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 557 (Wyo. 1992); see also Joe Johnson Co. v. 
WyomingState Board of Control, 857 P.2d 312, 316-17 
(Wyo. 
1993).  At issue in the instant 
appeal is the third element.  

 
 
[¶12]   In considering the third element 
further, we have held that the petitioner is required to have a "tangible" 
rather than simply a "theoretical" interest at stake.  Schulthess, at 559.  While the potential injury need not be a 
certainty, it must be one that is not too remote or speculative.  Goshen Irrigation Dist. v. 
WyomingState Board of Control, 926 P.2d 943, 948 
(Wyo. 
1996).  Indeed, although the statute 
uses the word "might," the "tangible interest at stake" requirement dictates 
that the petitioner allege and prove a reasonable likelihood that 
the abandonment will benefit or resuscitation will injure the petitioner's water 
right.  Schulthess, at 559 
(emphasis added).  We hold, in this 
instance, there was not sufficient evidence to show a reasonable likelihood that 
the Kirchhefers' water right would be benefited by abandonment or injured by 
Appellants' resuscitation.  

 
 
[¶13]   Regarding the Kirchhefers' benefit 
or injury, the board originally found:

 
 
11.  THAT petitioners might be injured by 
contestees'  reactivated use of the 
Budget No. 2 Ditch.  A call for 
regulation by the reactivated senior priority Budget No. 2 Ditch could cause the 
junior priority Kirchhefer Spring to be denied water, and thus cause injury to 
the petitioners (Wyoming Statutes 41-3-401, 1977).  At the public hearing, the petitioners 
testified that they might be injured by the reactivation of the Budget No. 2 
Ditch due to the junior priority of their spring development, and that they 
would be benefited by the declaration of abandonment.  Hydrographer Commissioner, Dave Andrews 
testified under subpoena that if the Kirchhefer Spring were determined to be a 
common source with the creek he might have to regulate it if a call for 
regulation were received (Transcript page 224).  Gordon W. Fassett corroborated Mr. 
Andrews' testimony (Transcript page 287).  
Fred Kirchhefer provided unchallenged testimony that his wells in that 
area have gone dry in the past (Transcript pages 51 and 52).  

 
 
After 
remand from the district court, the board incorporated the first findings and 
made the following additional findings:

 
 

a.  THAT the Kirchhefer Spring No. 1 is of 
the same source and in close enough proximity to the Budget No. 2 Ditch, 
and that Six Mile Creek is limited enough in supply, that it is "very realistic 
that this junior water right could be regulated." (Testimony of former State 
Engineer, Gordon Fassett corroborating other testimony, Transcript pages 
286-287.) 

b. THAT the 
Kirchhefer Spring's six gallons per 
minute is significant enough to legitimately belong to the downstream senior's 
claim. (Testimony of Hydrographer Commissioner, David Andrews, Transcript pages 
256-257.)  

c. THAT the 
water commissioner has a duty, when called, to regulate a junior  ground water right which is interfering 
with fulfillment of a senior surface water right. (Testimony of Hydrographer 
Commissioner, David Andrews, Transcript page 254).  

d. THAT the 
water commissioner would 
regulate 
Petitioners' junior water right if a senior appropriator made a call for 
regulation. (Testimony of Hydrographer Commissioner, David Andrews, Transcript 
page 224.)   

e. THAT Six 
Mile Creek has experienced historical water shortages and potential shortages 
are likely to continue due to limited precipitation, 
runoff and spring flow; and due to reliance upon return flows.  (Testimony of Fred Kirchhefer, 
Transcript page 45; Testimony of Don Nolan, Transcript page 176; Testimony of 
Donita Kirchhefer, Transcript page 211; and Testimony of Gordon Fassett, 
Transcript pages 287.)  

f. THAT 
there is no provision in the law that exempts a relative small ( de 
minimus) junior 
water right from regulation if a senior water right places a legitimate call for 
delivery of the senior appropriation.  
If the flow contributes to, even if that contribution is bank storage, 
and is in such proximity that it would reach the calling diversion, the senior 
is entitled to the regulation of the junior.  When there is a call for regulation, a 
water commissioner cannot choose to regulate the junior appropriations based on 
their size, but must regulate junior appropriations based on their date of 
priority.

g. THAT the 
testimony from the hearing and the record as a whole clearly establishes that 
the Kirchhefer Spring No. 1 would be subject to priority 
administration when the Budget No. 2 Ditch appropriation places a valid call for 
regulation.

h. THAT it 
is reasonably likely that injury will result to the Petitioner's junior 
appropriation when a call is placed for regulation of Six Mile Creek for 
the Budget 
No.  2 Ditch appropriation.  Likewise, the Petitioners' junior water 
right will be benefited if a call by the downstream Budget No. 2 Ditch cannot be 
made as a result of abandonment.  

 
 
The 
majority of these findings focus on concluding that the Kirchhefers'  de minimus appropriation would be 
subject to regulation if a senior appropriator made a call for regulation.  Our review of the record indicates that 
the evidence supports these findings, and the Kirchhefers' appropriation would 
be subject to regulation if there was a call for regulation.  However, the inquiry does not end 
there.  Regulation is always a 
possibility on such a body of water, and it is clear that in this instance the 
Kirchhefers will only be injured if a senior appropriator actually makes a call 
for regulation.   Consequently, 
in this instance, there must be a finding supported by sufficient evidence that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that regulation will actually occur.  Such evidence is absent.  

 

[¶14]   Indeed, of the above findings, only 
a and e appear to relate to the reasonable likelihood of regulation.  In finding a, the board concludes that 
the Kirchhefers' well is from the same source of supply as Appellants' 
appropriation and that Six Mile Creek is limited enough in supply that it is 
"very realistic" that the Kirchhefers could be regulated.  The Kirchhefers' expert, Gordon Fassett, 
testified that the well was from the same source of supply.  In fact, he determined the well was 
built into the creek bank and, even though the well was a groundwater facility, 
it was capturing surface water.  The 
only other witness testifying about the source of supply of the Kirchhefers' 
well was Mr. Andrews.  He was not 
willing to conclude that the well was using the same source of supply because he 
thought further testing was required to reach that conclusion.  He did however admit it was 
possible.  This evidence is 
sufficient to conclude that both appropriations are from the same source of 
supply.  Certainly, Mr. Fassett's 
testimony combined with the fact that the well is built into the creek bank 
presents sufficient evidence to reasonably conclude the water rights are from 
the same source of supply.    

 
 
[¶15]   However, the second part of finding 
a, that Six Mile Creek is limited in supply, is not similarly supported by 
sufficient evidence.  While Mr. 
Fassett did testify there was the "opportunity" for there not to be enough water 
in Six Mile Creek to satisfy the needs of Budget No. 2 Ditch because Six Mile 
Creek depended on return flows, this opinion was not based on any volumetric 
tests, measurements, or historical data of Six Mile Creek.   Mr. Fassett did not conduct any 
such tests but instead simply observed the creek for about half a day.  Mr. Fassett did not make any estimate 
about the volume of Six Mile Creek, other than that there was the "opportunity" 
for there not to be enough water.  

 
 
[¶16]   Fred Kirchhefer, who observes Six 
Mile Creek every day, testified regarding the creek as 
follows:

 
 
Q.        . . . Since 
you have been living on the property since 1989, has Six Mile Creek ever dried 
up?

A.        
No.

Q.        In 
the last five years, has there been enough water to divert for irrigation 
purposes where Six Mile Creek enters your property?

A.        
Yes.

Q.        In 
the last five years, has there been enough water to divert for irrigation 
purposes where Six Mile Creek exits your property?

A.        Yes, 
there has.

Q.        And 
finally, in the last five years, has there been enough water to divert for 
irrigation purposes from any point along where Six Mile Creek is flowing across 
your property?

A.        
Yes.  

 
 
He also 
testified the amount of water in Six Mile Creek varied year round like any other 
stream, but he did not indicate that this supply was limited.  He additionally testified that he had 
never had trouble getting the water he was entitled to from the well.  At one point in his testimony, he 
testified there was at least half an acre-foot of water in the creek year round, 
but it is clear that this was not an estimate of the supply of Six Mile 
Creek.  Instead, this was a response 
to the question of whether there was enough water to fill his application for 
half an acre-foot stock pond.  Mr. 
Kirchhefer, like Mr. Fassett, indicated he did not know the volume of Six Mile 
Creek because he had never measured it or had it measured.  

 
 
[¶17]   Appellant Sherry Fields testified 
that her understanding was that when there was enough water in Six Mile Creek it 
would flow down the Budget No. 2 Ditch, but there wasn't enough water so they 
simply left the ditch dry.  However, 
Ms. Fields testimony was not based on any observation of Six Mile Creek but 
simply on her own assumption of how the Budget No. 2 Ditch was supposed to 
work.  By the time Fields owned the 
property, the flow of Six Mile Creek had been altered so that it no longer 
flowed past the historical point of diversion.  

 
 
[¶18]   Don Nolan, the previous owner of 
Appellants' property, testified there was only water in the Budget No. 2 
Ditch  "at times."  He stated that any time there was a 
"good gully washer" or "hard rains" water would flow down the ditch. Mr. Nolan 
did not testify about the supply or volume of Six Mile Creek.  Although the Budget No. 2 Ditch is 
supplied by Six Mile Creek and therefore the flow of water in Budget No. 2 Ditch 
might indicate a lack of supply in Six Mile Creek, Mr. Nolan, like Sherry 
Fields, observed the Budget No. 2 Ditch after the flow of Six Mile Creek had 
been altered.    

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Andrews was then the only 
witness to testify about some sort of actual volume for Six Mile Creek.  He placed the volume of Six Mile Creek 
at two c.f.s. based on his observations of the creek.  Although the Kirchhefers claim on appeal 
that Mr. Andrews ' observation took place at a point after Six Mile Creek was 
joined with another creek, it is clear from his testimony that Mr. Andrews 
thought two c.f.s to be the volume at the point of diversion.  Mr. Andrews further testified as 
follows:

 
 
Q.        You 
testified in your deposition that you're vaguely familiar with the water flows 
of Six Mile Creek over the past five years.

A.        
Correct.

Q.        Six 
Mile Creek has had fairly constant year-round flow; is that 
correct?

A.        
Correct.

Q.        No 
drought conditions occurring in the last five years or have occurred in the last 
five years; is that correct?

A.        
No.

Q.        With 
regard to Six Mile Creek stream flow?

A.        
Nothing that has significantly impacted Six Mile Creek.  

 
 
[¶20]   Looking at the evidence as a whole 
we conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to reasonably find that Six Mile 
Creek was limited in supply such that would indicate a reasonable likelihood of 
regulation.  If anything, the 
evidence seems to indicate more than adequate supply.  In reaching this conclusion, it is also 
helpful to consider the volume of Six Mile Creek and amount of each 
appropriation.  This is considerably 
easier if we convert the relevant numbers to the same unit of measurement, in 
this instance gallons per minute.  
One cubic foot per second equals 449 gallons per minute. 2  The testified volume of Six Mile Creek 
is two c.f.s., which equals 898 gallons per minute (2 x 449).  Appellants' appropriation right is .33 
c.f.s, which equals 148.17 gallons per minute (.33 x 449).  Therefore, there are 749.83 gallons per 
minute available to fulfill the Kirchhefers' six gallon per minute right (898  
148.17).  While we understand that 
volume does not equal flow, when looking at the appropriations in these terms 
along with the other evidence, it appears clear that Six Mile Creek is not 
limited in supply.  Instead, the 
evidence as a whole indicates that there is enough water in Six Mile Creek to 
satisfy both rights.  Therefore, we 
conclude that there was not sufficient evidence to support finding 
a.

 
 
[¶21]   Next we consider finding e, that 
there were historical shortages which were likely to continue.  We likewise conclude there is not 
sufficient evidence to support this finding.  As noted above, there were no drought 
conditions on Six Mile Creek, Six Mile Creek had never dried up, the Kirchhefers 
never had trouble getting water from the well, and although it varied, water 
flowed in Six Mile Creek year round.  
While there was testimony the Kirchhefers had several deeper wells go 
dry, there was no indication that Six Mile Creek supplied these wells.  In fact, these wells were considerably 
deeper and were not built into the bank of Six Mile Creek like the Kirchhefer 
Spring No. 1.  Furthermore, while 
the testimony did indicate that Six Mile Creek relied on return flow, there was 
no indication that these flows were historically short.  We therefore conclude that there was not 
sufficient evidence that Six Mile Creek experienced historical shortages.  

 
 
[¶22]   Absent these two findings, there 
are no findings that there is a reasonable likelihood of regulation.  Without that, the Kirchhefers' injury is 
too speculative to indicate a reasonable likelihood of injury or benefit.  We therefore conclude that the 
Kirchhefers failed to meet the standing requirements for filing a petition of 
abandonment because they did not show that their water right would be affected 
in some discernible manner.  Joe 
Johnson, 857 P.2d  at 316.  
Having concluded that the Kirchhefers do not provide sufficient evidence 
of standing, we need not address the voluntariness of Appellants' non-use.  

            

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   As explained above, the Kirchhefers 
did not present sufficient evidence of standing to prevail on a petition for 
abandonment.  Therefore, the 
district court order upholding the abandonment is reversed, and the case is 
remanded with directions that the petition for abandonment be denied.      

FOOTNOTES

1Andrews 
had shown Appellants what he believed to be the point of diversion and proper 
location of the ditch but advised Appellants to get a survey to assure that he 
was correct.  Appellants did not do 
so.   Later surveys revealed 
that Appellants had strayed from the easement in some areas.   

 
 
 
 

2One 
cubic foot per second can be converted to gallons per minute using the following 
equation:

 
 

1 
  ft3   X  7.48gal    X  60sec   =     448.8 gal    

   sec         
ft3                    
min              
min

 
 
Leonard 
Rice and Michael White, Engineering Aspects of Water Law 169, 185 (John 
Wiley and Sons 1987).