Case Title: Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

Citation: 2012 WI 57

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP826 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Marco A. Marquez, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
     v. 
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 24, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 8,2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael O. Bohren 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED:       
ROGGENSACK, J. concurs and dissents (Opinion 
filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross respondent briefs by 
Patrick L. Wells, Thomas Armstrong and von Briesen & Roper, 
S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by Patrick L. Wells and Owen 
Thomas Armstrong, Jr. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross appellant there were 
briefs by Timothy J. Aiken, Vincent P. Megna, Susan M. 
Grzeskowiak and Aiken & Scopture, S.C., Milwaukee and oral 
argument by Vincent P. Megna and Timothy J. Aiken. 
 
 
2012 WI 57
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP826 
(L.C. No. 
2005CV2885) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Marco A. Marquez, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 24, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court, 
Michael O. Bohren, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.    Marco A. Marquez, the 
consumer, brought this action against Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 
alleging that his new car was a "lemon," as defined in Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0171(2) (2005-06);1 that he requested a refund and 
provided Mercedes-Benz with the required notice and information; 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise indicated. 
We will refer to Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 in its entirety as 
the "Lemon Law."   
No. 
2010AP826   
 
2 
 
and that Mercedes-Benz failed to provide a refund within the 30-
day statutory period as required by Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c).  
¶2 
The Lemon Law provides that "[i]f a new motor vehicle 
does not conform to an applicable express warranty"2 and the 
nonconformity is not cured after a "reasonable attempt to 
repair," then the consumer may return the vehicle to the 
manufacturer 
and 
elect 
to 
receive 
either 
a 
comparable 
replacement vehicle or a refund.3 
¶3 
A manufacturer violates the Lemon Law if it fails to 
voluntarily provide a refund or replacement vehicle within 30 
days after receipt of the consumer's demand.4  The penalties a 
manufacturer incurs for failure to provide a refund to the 
consumer within the 30-day statutory period are costly.  They 
include "twice the amount of any pecuniary loss, together with 
costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, and any 
equitable relief the court determines appropriate."5  The order 
for 
judgment 
in 
the 
present 
case 
awarded 
the 
consumer 
$117,285.06, (twice his pecuniary loss), $5,833.41 (prejudgment 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(a). 
3 Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b). 
4 Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c) ("To receive a comparable new 
motor vehicle or a refund due under par.(b)1. or 2., a consumer 
described under sub.(1)(b)1., 2. or 3. shall offer to the 
manufacturer of the motor vehicle having the nonconformity to 
transfer title of that motor vehicle to that manufacturer.  No 
later than 30 days after that offer, the manufacturer shall 
provide the consumer with the comparable new motor vehicle or 
refund . . . ."). 
5 Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(7). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
3 
 
interest), 
$45,423.68 
(statutory 
interest), 
$10,216.72 
(statutory costs), $2,105.79 (litigation costs), and $301,707.00 
(attorney fees). 
¶4 
In the present case, no one disputes that the vehicle 
at issue is a lemon under the Lemon Law.  No one disputes that 
the consumer gave Mercedes-Benz proper notice and information to 
start the 30-day statutory period during which Mercedes-Benz was 
required to provide a refund.6  No one disputes that Mercedes-
Benz did not provide the required refund within the 30-day 
statutory period.  The basic issue presented is whether 
Mercedes-Benz has a valid defense to its failure to issue a 
refund within the 30-day statutory period.   
¶5 
The specific issues presented are as follows:   
¶6 
I. To avoid paying the remedies provided by Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171(7) for not issuing a refund within the 30-day 
statutory period, must a manufacturer prove that the consumer 
intentionally prevented it from providing a refund within the 
30-day statutory period,7 or may the manufacturer prove that the 
consumer's conduct was merely unreasonable? 
                                                 
6 The Department of Transportation is charged with putting 
the policies of the Lemon Law into practice.  It produces a 
Lemon Law notice form, which helps ensure that consumers comply 
with the requirements for making a proper request under the 
Lemon Law and that manufacturers have the information they need 
to assess the claim and provide a refund.  See Stephen J. Nicks, 
Lemon Law Practice Pointers, Wis. Law., Nov. 2003, at 21, 22. 
7 We will use some form of the phrase "prevent the 
manufacturer from providing a refund within the 30-day statutory 
period" to encompass the various ways in which the intentional 
consumer conduct at issue was described and could be described 
(e.g., thwart, block, obstruct, undermine, etc.).  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
4 
 
¶7 
II. Does the ordinary burden of proof or the middle 
burden of proof apply to a manufacturer's affirmative defense 
that the consumer intentionally prevented the manufacturer from 
providing a refund within the 30-day statutory period in a Lemon 
Law action?8 
¶8 
III. Did the circuit court err in directing a verdict 
in the consumer's favor? 
¶9 
IV. Is Mercedes-Benz entitled to a new trial because 
the circuit court did not grant it an adjournment on the morning 
of trial to conduct additional discovery relating to the 
paralegal's testimony or because it was not allowed to call the 
consumer's counsel as a witness at trial? 
¶10 For the reasons set forth, we decide the issues as 
follows: 
I.  If a manufacturer raises the affirmative defense that 
the consumer prevented it from providing a refund within 
the 30-day statutory period under the Lemon Law, it must 
prove that the consumer did so intentionally.     
II.  The manufacturer must meet the middle burden of proof 
in its affirmative defense that a consumer intentionally 
prevented it from providing a refund within the 30-day 
statutory period under the Lemon Law.    
                                                 
8 Marquez raised this issue in his cross-appeal.  It is the 
issue that was certified to this court by the court of appeals.  
Issues I, III, and IV were raised in Mercedes-Benz's appeal.   
No. 
2010AP826   
 
5 
 
III.  No credible evidence supports the jury's verdict.  
The circuit court was not clearly wrong in directing the 
verdict in favor of the consumer.   
IV.  The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion 
in 
denying Mercedes-Benz's request for an 
adjournment on the morning of trial to conduct additional 
discovery relating to the paralegal's testimony or in 
denying Mercedes-Benz's request to call the consumer's 
attorney as a witness at trial.   
¶11 Thus, we affirm the judgment and order of the circuit 
court. 
¶12 We begin with a brief procedural history of the case.  
We shall then discuss each issue in turn, setting forth the 
standard of review and the applicable facts relating to that 
issue.  Because the facts and evidence relate predominantly to 
the last two issues, most of the facts are set forth in our 
discussion of these latter two issues.  
¶13 This case originated in the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Paul F. Reilly, Judge.  The circuit court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the consumer.  Mercedes-Benz 
appealed, alleging that the consumer intentionally thwarted its 
attempt to provide a refund within the 30-day statutory period 
by failing to provide necessary information.  The court of 
appeals reversed the summary judgment in favor of the consumer 
and remanded the matter to the circuit court.  It held that a 
consumer who intentionally thwarts a manufacturer's efforts to 
provide a refund within the 30-day statutory period cannot 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
6 
 
recover the Lemon Law's statutory remedies provided in Wis. 
Stat. § 218.0171(7).  The court of appeals further concluded 
that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether 
the consumer intentionally thwarted Mercedes-Benz's attempt to 
provide a refund within the 30-day statutory period by failing 
to provide necessary information.  Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, 
LLC (Marquez I), 2008 WI App 70, ¶3, 312 Wis. 2d 210, 751 
N.W.2d 859. 
¶14 On remand in the Circuit Court for Waukesha County, 
Michael A. Bohren, Judge, the jury found in favor of Mercedes-
Benz after a three-day trial.  The circuit court entered a 
directed verdict in favor of the consumer, finding no credible 
evidence that the consumer intentionally thwarted Mercedes-
Benz's efforts to provide a refund.  Mercedes-Benz appealed, and 
the court of appeals certified the appeal to this court.  
I 
¶15 The first issue is whether a manufacturer who raises 
the affirmative defense that the consumer prevented it from 
providing a refund within the 30-day statutory period must prove 
that the consumer did so intentionally.  Determining the 
elements of a defense, here the mens rea, is a question of law 
that this court decides independently of the court of appeals 
and circuit court but benefiting from their analyses.9   
                                                 
9 Cf. State v. Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶13, 283 Wis. 2d 57, 699 
N.W.2d 508 ("Because determination of the statutory elements of 
a crime is a question of law, our review is de novo."). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
7 
 
¶16 The text of the Wisconsin Lemon Law does not refer to 
either party's obligation to act in good faith or to refrain 
from acting in bad faith, and does not refer to the consumer's 
preventing the manufacturer from providing a refund within the 
30-day statutory period.   
¶17 The court of appeals, however, has introduced the 
concept of good faith into the Lemon Law, noting that "good 
faith is implicit in the Lemon Law" and "[i]t should go without 
saying that the legislature contemplated that all the parties 
covered by the Lemon Law should act in good faith."  Herzberg v. 
Ford Motor Co., 2001 WI App 65, ¶18, 242 Wis. 2d 316, 626 
N.W.2d 67.10   
¶18 In Herzberg, the manufacturer attempted to require the 
consumer to sign forms relating to the condition of the vehicle 
that was being returned.  These forms are not required by the 
Lemon Law.  The consumer refused to sign the forms, thereby 
rejecting the manufacturer's conditional refund offer.  The 
court of appeals held that "the obligations of the consumer who 
has purchased a 'lemon' are limited to those set out in the 
Lemon Law,"11 and that the court "cannot logically rule that the 
                                                 
10 The court of appeals discussed good and bad faith even 
though it had noted in Chariton v. Saturn Corp., 2000 WI App 
148, ¶5, 238 Wis. 2d 27, 615 N.W.2d 209, that "there are no 
excuses" for a manufacturer who violates the 30-day time period.  
11 Herzberg v. Ford Motor Co., 2001 WI App 65, ¶17, 242 
Wis. 2d 316, 626 N.W.2d 67. 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
8 
 
[consumer] engaged in bad faith by rejecting the offer" that 
asked more of the consumer than the Lemon Law requires.12 
¶19 In Marquez I, the court of appeals discussed "good 
faith," "bad faith," and a consumer "intentionally thwarting" a 
manufacturer's attempt to make a refund.  The court of appeals 
stressed that it was not invoking the "amorphous and far-
reaching" contractual doctrine of good faith and fair dealing.  
"Good faith" under the Lemon Law is not grounded in common-law 
contract doctrines; "good faith" is inherent in the statute.13  
The court of appeals held "that a consumer fails to act in good 
faith when he or she intentionally prevents the manufacturer 
from complying with the statute."14  Compliance with the statute 
requires the manufacturer to make the refund within the 30-day 
statutory period.  The court of appeals declared that if the 
consumer "intentionally thwarted [the manufacturer's] attempt to 
make 
a 
refund 
by 
failing 
to 
provide 
necessary 
information . . . [T]he consumer is not entitled to the Lemon 
Law's statutory remedies."15    
¶20 In addition, the court of appeals used the following 
language, all of which establishes that it was not creating a 
negligence-based 
defense 
for 
manufacturers: 
the 
consumer 
                                                 
12 Herzberg, 242 Wis. 2d 316, ¶19.  
13 See Marquez I, 312 Wis. 2d 210, ¶18; Herzberg, 242 
Wis. 2d 316, ¶18. 
14 Marquez I, 312 Wis. 2d 210, ¶22. 
15 Id., ¶3.  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
9 
 
"intentionally 
prevented," 
the 
consumer 
"intentionally 
thwarted," the consumer "intentionally withheld," the consumer's 
"deliberate 
obstruction," 
and 
the 
consumer's 
"deliberate 
refusal."16  Under Marquez I, it is not sufficient for a 
manufacturer to prove that a consumer's careless, unreasonable, 
or unjustifiable conduct caused the manufacturer to violate the 
Lemon Law.  Rather, the manufacturer must prove that the 
consumer intentionally prevented it from making a refund within 
the 30-day statutory period. 
¶21 Mercedes-Benz asks this court to reexamine the holding 
of Marquez I.17  Mercedes-Benz argues that the 30-day statutory 
period for providing the consumer with a refund should be tolled 
from 
the 
point 
at 
which 
the 
consumer 
unjustifiably 
and 
unreasonably fails to provide the manufacturer with the needed 
information, causing the manufacturer to be unable to make the 
refund until such time as the information is provided.18  
Furthermore, Mercedes-Benz seeks a negligence-type standard of 
                                                 
16 Id., ¶¶2, 3, 12, 20, 23. 
17 Mercedes-Benz first argued for a negligence-based defense 
when the case reached the court of appeals for the second time.  
The consumer does not argue that Mercedes-Benz forfeited its 
right to raise this issue on review.  Both parties have briefed 
the issue and we address it.  
18 According to Mercedes-Benz, a consumer's conduct would be 
unreasonable when (1) the manufacturer cannot make a proper 
refund without the consumer's cooperation; (2) the consumer is 
informed of this fact; (3) the consumer fails to provide that 
cooperation in sufficient time to permit the manufacturer to 
make a timely refund; and (4) the consumer has no legitimate 
excuse for his or her failure. 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
10 
 
unreasonable or unjustifiable conduct on the part of the 
consumer rather than the higher standard of intentional conduct. 
¶22 The consumer, on the other hand, argues that the 
manufacturer's affirmative defense should be limited to a 
consumer's intentional conduct preventing the manufacturer from 
making a refund within the 30-day statutory period.  According 
to the consumer, if a consumer's negligence were sufficient to 
bar recovery, manufacturers could "dupe" consumers by making 
onerous requests for information in the hope that the consumer 
would fail to return a phone call or provide the wrong 
information.  Then, the consumer asserts, the manufacturer could 
deter the consumer from filing suit with a credible threat that 
a jury would believe that the consumer's negligence prevented 
the manufacturer from providing a refund within the 30-day 
statutory period. 
¶23 We must determine whether the affirmative defense of a 
consumer's negligent conduct (as the manufacturer urges) or 
whether the affirmative defense of a consumer's intentional 
conduct (as the consumer urges) better achieves the purposes of 
the Lemon Law.  "'Wisconsin's Lemon Law is obviously remedial in 
nature.  As such, we should construe the statute with a view 
towards the social problem which the legislature was addressing 
when enacting the law.'"19   
                                                 
19 Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 983, 
542 N.W.2d 148 (1996) (quoting Hartlaub v. Coachmen Indus., 
Inc., 143 Wis. 2d 791, 801, 422 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1988)); see 
also Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 979 (holding that remedial statutes 
should be liberally construed to advance the remedy the 
legislature intended to provide). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
11 
 
¶24 Lemon laws began to appear in the early 1980s, and by 
1993 all 50 states had adopted a lemon law.20  Wisconsin's Lemon 
Law took effect in 1983.   
¶25 For most purchasers, not only is the vehicle a 
monumental purchase, but for many it is also a practical 
necessity.  Before the adoption of lemon laws, existing remedies 
under state and federal law were inadequate to protect people 
who purchased lemons.  Consumers of vehicles are particularly 
vulnerable if their purchase does not comport with the warranty.  
They understandably would balk at litigating warranty claims 
against an experienced and financially powerful manufacturer or 
dealership and at incurring the costs of any such litigation.21  
Frequently the consumer's only realistic option was repeated 
trips to the dealership for repairs.   
                                                 
20 Clifford P. Block, Note, Arkansas's New Motor Vehicle 
Quality Assurance Act——A Branch of Hope for Lemon Owners, 16 U. 
Ark. Little Rock L.J. 493, 493-94 & n.2 (1994). 
21 See Stephen J. Nicks, Lemon Law II, Wis. Bar Bull., July 
1987, at 48:  
Automobile manufacturers include some of the largest 
and most powerful corporations in the world.  The 
Legislature clearly recognized that it was necessary 
to make the potential recovery large enough to give 
vehicle owners the incentive to bring suit against 
them.  These corporations not only have the wealth and 
will to exhaust an individual litigant, but also 
control vast amounts of technical expertise on the 
very mechanical aspects the consumer is challenging.  
Without 
the 
sweetener 
of 
double 
damages 
in 
a 
sufficient amount and reasonable attorneys' fees, few 
consumers would bring such actions.  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
12 
 
¶26 Legislatures intended the lemon laws to ensure that 
purchasers 
stuck 
with 
lemons 
could 
promptly 
be 
put 
in 
approximately the same position they were in before purchasing 
the lemon and that they could reach this position without the 
hassle, expense, and risk of litigation.  "Wisconsin's lemon law 
was created to be a self-enforcing consumer law that provides 
'important rights to motor vehicle owners.'"22  As the court of 
appeals explained in its certification memorandum, the Lemon Law 
"was intended to encourage consumers to act as private attorneys 
general in pursuing claims and to provide attorneys with 
incentives to represent those consumers." 
¶27 This court described the underlying purpose of lemon 
laws as protecting purchasers of defective vehicles who, without 
the protection of a statute, would have no recourse other than 
to bring their cars in repeatedly for repair: 
For the average person, the purchase of an automobile 
was one of the most important of all consumer 
purchases 
in 
terms 
of 
significance 
and 
price.  
However, for thousands of purchasers each year, this 
highly significant purchase became a virtual nightmare 
when the automobile refused to function properly, and 
the seller was unable, or unwilling to take action to 
remedy the situation.  
Prior to the enactment of lemon laws, the only kinds 
of remedial relief available to consumers were the 
statutory remedies of revocation of acceptance and 
breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code.  
Federal remedies also existed through the Magnuson-
                                                 
22 Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 982-83 (citing Memorandum from 
Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General, to Members of the 
Legislature, Re: AB 434, Auto "Lemon Law" Changes, Oct. 14, 
1985, Wis. Act 205). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
13 
 
Moss Warranty Act.  These state and federal remedies, 
however, did not adequately protect the interests of 
consumers 
in 
a 
typical 
lemon 
vehicle 
claim.  
Purchasers of defective cars had no recourse other 
than to repeatedly bring their cars in for repairs.23   
¶28 Wisconsin's Lemon Law has been praised as particularly 
attuned to the difficulty of adequately protecting vehicle 
purchasers.24  Even among lemon laws, all of which are geared 
toward 
consumer 
protection, 
Wisconsin's 
Lemon 
Law 
is 
particularly pro-consumer in a number of ways.  At the time of 
its creation, no other lemon law allowed for double damages.25  
The Wisconsin Lemon Law also favors consumers by allowing 
victorious consumers to recover attorneys' fees and costs.  
Additionally, while some states' lemon laws expressly include 
affirmative defenses26 or sanctions against consumers who bring 
claims in bad faith,27 the Wisconsin Lemon Law includes neither.  
¶29 The principle motivation for the exacting remedies in 
the Wisconsin Lemon Law, the court has explained, is not to 
punish the manufacturer because a lemon escaped from the plant.28  
Rather, the principle motivation for the remedies is "to provide 
                                                 
23 See Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 980-81 (citations omitted).  
24 See Joan Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws, Consumer 
Warranties, and a Proposal for Reform, 1985 Ariz. St. L.J. 589, 
662-63; Julie A. Vergeront, Note, A Sour Note: A Look at the 
Minnesota Lemon Law, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 846, 879-80 (1984). 
25 See Vogel, supra note 24, at 662. 
26 See, e.g., 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 380/3(d) (2008). 
27 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 681.106 (2010). 
28 Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 986-87.   
No. 
2010AP826   
 
14 
 
an incentive to th[e] manufacturer to promptly return those 
unfortunate consumers back to where they thought they were when 
they first purchased that new automobile."29  
¶30 The exacting statutory remedies demonstrate that the 
Wisconsin legislature has expressed a strong preference for the 
interests of a consumer who purchased a lemon over the interests 
of the manufacturer who produced the lemon.  The Wisconsin 
legislature intended to provide a compelling incentive for 
manufacturers to cooperate with the demands of the purchasers.   
¶31 When a consumer establishes that he or she is stuck 
with a lemon and provides notice and an offer of title to the 
manufacturer, the legislature intends the consumer to receive a 
refund or replacement promptly, without resorting to litigation.  
The Wisconsin Lemon Law squarely places the burden on the 
manufacturer to provide a refund within the 30-day statutory 
period.  By imposing this burden on the manufacturer, by 
imposing a strict 30-day time limit, and by providing exacting 
statutory remedies for a violation, the legislature intended to 
encourage cooperation from manufacturers and to make the 
prospect of litigation unattractive to manufacturers. 
                                                 
29 Hughes, 197 Wis. 2d at 987; see also Dieter v. Chrysler 
Corp., 2000 WI 45, ¶23 (explaining the intent of the Lemon Law 
and quoting Hughes with approval); Vergeront, supra note 24, at 
880 ("The lemon law attempts to encourage efficient and low cost 
settlement of disputes over defective automobiles by defining 
more clearly when a consumer is entitled to a refund or 
replacement.  Only by raising the costs of ignoring these 
guidelines can the goals of the lemon law be realized.").    
No. 
2010AP826   
 
15 
 
¶32 No 
affirmative 
defenses 
for 
manufacturers 
are 
explicitly stated in the Lemon Law.  Any affirmative defenses or 
potential "excuses" for a manufacturer make a consumer's 
recovery more uncertain and make litigation more likely and more 
time-consuming.  Manufacturers are better equipped to manage 
uncertainty, delay, and expense surrounding Lemon Law claims and 
may even prefer uncertainty and delay.  A timely remedy for the 
consumer is a critical component of the Lemon Law.  Therefore, 
any affirmative defenses or "excuses" for a manufacturer should 
be narrow, in keeping with the statutory purposes of aiding the 
purchaser.  If affirmative defenses or excuses proliferate or 
are easy to establish, the purpose of the Lemon Law will be 
undermined.30   
¶33 We thus reject Mercedes-Benz's invitation to broaden 
the manufacturer's affirmative defense to encompass a consumer's 
unintentional 
conduct. 
 
Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
a 
manufacturer may avoid Lemon Law penalties for failing to 
provide a refund within the 30-day statutory period if it proves 
that the consumer intentionally prevented the manufacturer from 
providing a refund within the 30-day statutory period.  Marquez 
I used the phrases "good faith" and "bad faith."  It limited its 
definition of good faith to not intentionally preventing the 
manufacturer from complying with the 30-day statutory period or 
not intentionally thwarting its efforts to do so.  Accordingly, 
                                                 
30 Cf. Vogel, supra note 24, at 664 ("Bad faith provisions 
mainly give manufacturers a club to wield against a consumer who 
tries to litigate a claim.").  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
16 
 
we need not use the phrases "good faith" or "bad faith."  We can 
avoid any confusion about the meaning of the phrases "good 
faith" and "bad faith" that may come from the use of these 
phrases in other contexts.  In keeping with Marquez I and the 
jury instructions, we need address only whether the consumer 
intentionally prevented the manufacturer from providing a refund 
within the 30-day statutory period. 
¶34 Our holding gives manufacturers an incentive to gather 
the information needed to provide refunds within the 30-day 
statutory period, but it does not unfairly place manufacturers 
at the mercy of consumers.  We recognize that situations might 
arise in which a consumer does not intentionally prevent a 
manufacturer from complying with the 30-day statutory period but 
in which it is nevertheless impossible for a manufacturer to 
gather the necessary information to make a refund.  For example, 
a consumer provides adequate notice to the manufacturer, thereby 
starting the 30-day period, but then falls into a coma or gets 
lost in the wilderness and the manufacturer, without needed 
information from the consumer, cannot comply with the statutory 
refund requirements within 30 days.  In such unlikely scenarios, 
a manufacturer might very well have to take creative steps to 
protect against the exacting penalties.  The present case does 
not, however, pose a situation in which the manufacturer tried 
to comply with great diligence and unlikely events outside of 
its control or outside of the control of a consumer made the 
manufacturer's compliance impossible.  We need not, and do not, 
address such scenario here.   
No. 
2010AP826   
 
17 
 
II 
¶35 The second issue requires us to determine whether the 
lowest, ordinary burden of proof or the middle burden of proof 
applies to the manufacturer's affirmative defense described 
above.  Determining the burden of proof is essentially a 
question of statutory interpretation, a question of law that 
this court decides independently of the court of appeals and 
circuit court but benefiting from their analyses.31 
¶36 There are three burdens of proof.  The highest burden 
of proof applies in criminal cases, where the state has the 
burden of convincing the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
defendant's guilt.32  In certain civil cases, a middle burden of 
proof is used, which is commonly described as requiring "clear 
and convincing" evidence.  To meet the middle burden in 
Wisconsin, a party must convince the jury to a reasonable 
                                                 
31 See Carlson & Erickson Builders, Inc., v. Lampert Yards, 
Inc., 
190 
Wis. 2d 650, 
658, 
529 
N.W.2d 905 
(1995) 
("Determination of the appropriate burden of proof in this case 
presents a question of statutory interpretation, a question of 
law which this court determines independently of other courts, 
benefitting from their analyses.").  Cf. Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) ("Where Congress has not 
prescribed 
the 
appropriate 
standard 
of 
proof 
and 
the 
Constitution does not dictate a particular standard, we must 
prescribe one.").  
32 Wis JI——Criminal 140 (2000) ("The burden of establishing 
every fact necessary to constitute guilt is upon the State.  
Before you can return a verdict of guilty, the evidence must 
satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
guilty.").  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
18 
 
certainty 
by 
evidence 
that 
is 
clear, 
satisfactory, 
and 
convincing.33   
¶37 In most civil cases, the lowest, ordinary burden of 
proof applies, requiring what is commonly referred to as a 
"preponderance of the evidence."  In Wisconsin, the jury must be 
satisfied to a reasonable certainty by the greater weight of the 
credible evidence."34   
¶38 Because the text and history of the statute are silent 
on this specific question, the parties devote substantial energy 
to surveying cases in which the middle or lowest burden of proof 
applies and arguing about the extent to which these cases either 
are analogous to or diverge from the present case.35    
¶39 We do not find an examination of other cases arising 
in 
different 
contexts 
particularly 
enlightening. 
 
Our 
determination of the appropriate burden of proof is influenced 
                                                 
33 Wis JI——Civil 205 (2004) ("The burden is to convince you 
by evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing, to a 
reasonable certainty, that 'yes' should be the answer to 
(that)(those) question(s).").  
34 Wis JI——Civil 200 (2003) ("Th[e] burden is to satisfy you 
by the greater weight of the credible evidence, to a reasonable 
certainty, that 'yes' should be your answer to the verdict 
questions."). 
35 The consumer, arguing for the middle burden of proof, 
points to (1) an affirmative defense of arson in the insurance 
context; (2) intentional bad faith in the insurance context; and 
(3) estoppel.   
Mercedes-Benz, arguing for the lowest burden of proof, 
points to (1) general contractual duties of good faith; and (2) 
actions for property damage caused by crime under Wis. Stat. 
§ 895.446 (2009-10).    
No. 
2010AP826   
 
19 
 
by the purposes and policies of the statute rather than by 
abstract analogies.36     
¶40 In Carlson & Erickson Builders, Inc., v. Lampert 
Yards, Inc., 190 Wis. 2d 650, 529 N.W.2d 905 (1995), this court 
was asked to determine whether to apply the lowest or middle 
burden to private, civil antitrust actions for treble damages.  
The defendant urged the court to require the plaintiff to meet 
the middle burden because the defendant faced damages that 
clearly had a punitive element and because the alleged conduct 
could also expose the defendant to criminal penalties.37  Despite 
the aptness of the defendant's analogies, the court determined 
that imposing the ordinary burden of proof on the plaintiff 
would appropriately further the legislative goal of encouraging 
plaintiffs' "'vigorous private enforcement of antitrust laws.'"38  
Imposing a heightened burden of proof on the plaintiff, on the 
other hand, would "express[] a preference for the defendant's 
interests" and "impede the private litigant."39 
¶41 Applying the teachings of Carlson & Erickson, we 
strive to interpret the Lemon Law to advance, rather than 
hinder, its purposes.  
                                                 
36 Carlson & Erickson, 190 Wis. 2d at 661-62. 
37 Id. at 660-61. 
38 Id. at 664 (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 
U.S. 720, 745 (1977)).  
39 Carlson & Erickson, 190 Wis. 2d at 664. 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
20 
 
¶42 This case is the mirror image of Carlson & Erickson.40  
In that case, we held that requiring a plaintiff-consumer to 
prove antitrust violations by a heightened burden "would impede 
the private litigant and might undermine the enforcement of the 
antitrust laws by private litigants."41  In the present case, we 
address 
whether 
a 
defendant-manufacturer 
may 
prove 
an 
affirmative defense by the lowest burden.  
¶43 Imposing 
the 
lowest 
burden 
of 
proof 
on 
the 
manufacturer would be contrary to the remedial, consumer-
friendly purpose of the Lemon Law.  If the manufacturer's 
affirmative defense were governed by the ordinary burden, the 
parties would "'share the risk of error roughly in equal 
fashion.'"42  Making it easier for manufacturers to assert and 
prove the affirmative defense makes it more tempting for 
manufacturers to circumvent the 30-day requirement.  The lowest 
burden of proof would undermine the statute's purpose of 
protecting 
consumers, 
encouraging 
manufacturers 
to 
provide 
                                                 
40 The circuit court relied on Carlson & Erickson to reach 
the opposite result, namely that Mercedes-Benz had to meet only 
the lowest burden in proving its affirmative defense.  The 
circuit court reasoned that Carlson & Erickson involved treble 
damages and the ordinary burden was applied, so the ordinary 
burden of proof should apply in this case involving double 
damages.  The circuit court did not expressly consider that 
Carlson & Erickson addressed the burden of proof for a 
plaintiff's claim and this case addresses the burden of proof 
for a defendant's affirmative defense.   
41 Carlson & Erickson, 190 Wis. 2d at 664. 
42 Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 
(1979).  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
21 
 
refunds within the 30-day statutory period, and discouraging 
litigation.  
¶44 Requiring 
manufacturers 
to 
prove 
the 
affirmative 
defense by the middle burden of proof expresses a preference for 
the consumer's interests and acknowledges the imbalanced playing 
field on which Lemon Law disputes unfold.  Although the prospect 
of resorting to litigation is unpleasant to a manufacturer, it 
is feasible.  Litigation may be impossible for many consumers.43 
¶45 Manufacturers might argue that our two holdings will 
allow savvy consumers to use the Lemon Law as a get-rich-quick 
scheme.  We see no such risk.  As this court observed in Dieter 
v. Chrysler Corp., 2000 WI 45, ¶26, 234 Wis. 2d 670, 610 
N.W.2d 832, the Lemon Law "is hardly fertile territory for 
fortune hunters."  The road to double damages and attorneys' 
fees is an arduous one.  A consumer must establish that his or 
her car is a lemon, which requires four or more failed repair 
attempts or 30 or more days of lost use.  Remedies beyond a 
refund or a replacement are still not available unless the 
manufacturer fails to comply with the Lemon Law within the 30-
day statutory period after receiving proper notice from the 
consumer.  Our holdings today encourage manufacturers to use 
their resources, as the legislature intended, to respond 
diligently to Lemon Law claims by providing a refund or a 
                                                 
43 Vogel, supra note 24, at 663 ("Unlike the consumer, the 
manufacturer is not so readily deterred by the costs of 
defending claims."). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
22 
 
replacement within the 30-day statutory period rather than 
search for excuses to avoid responding to consumers. 
III 
¶46 We 
shift 
gears 
at 
this 
point 
and 
address 
the 
particular facts of the instant case to determine whether the 
circuit court erred in directing a verdict in the consumer's 
favor.  The circuit court granted the consumer's post-verdict 
motion for a directed verdict, overturning the jury verdict in 
favor of Mercedes-Benz.  
A 
¶47 A motion for a directed verdict challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence.  A circuit court may grant the 
motion if the "court is satisfied that, considering all credible 
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, there is 
no credible evidence to sustain a finding in favor of such 
party."44  The court has stated that "[w]hen there is any 
credible evidence to support a jury's verdict, 'even though it 
be contradicted and the contradictory evidence be stronger and 
more convincing, nevertheless the verdict . . . must stand.'"45   
¶48 An appellate court conducts the same search for 
credible evidence to sustain the jury's verdict.46  Thus, the 
                                                 
44 Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1). 
45 Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 365, 389-90, 
541 N.W.2d 753 (1995) (citations omitted). 
46 Id. at 388, 398.  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
23 
 
circuit court's decision to grant the consumer's motion for a 
directed verdict will be upheld if the appellate court agrees 
that there was no credible evidence to support the jury's 
verdict in favor of Mercedes-Benz.   
¶49 An appellate court should not "overturn a circuit 
court's decision to dismiss for insufficient evidence unless the 
record reveals that the circuit court was 'clearly wrong.'"47  A 
circuit court's decision to change the jury's answer is "clearly 
wrong" if the jury's verdict is supported by "any credible 
evidence."48     
¶50 We conclude that no credible evidence was presented at 
trial that supported a finding of intentional conduct and that 
there was no credible evidence from which a jury reasonably 
could have inferred that the consumer acted intentionally. 
¶51 Because we conclude that the circuit court did not err 
in finding that no credible evidence supports Mercedes-Benz's 
                                                 
47 Id. at 389 (citing Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 122 
Wis. 2d 94, 110, 362 N.W.2d 118 (1985); see also Trogun v. 
Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 585, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973) (quoting 
Slam v. Lake Superior Terminal & Transfer Ry. Co., 152 Wis. 426, 
432, 140 N.W. 30 (1913)) ("'[W]hen the trial judge rules, either 
on motion for nonsuit, motion for a directed verdict, or motion 
to set aside the verdict, that there is or is not sufficient 
evidence upon a given question to take the case to the jury, the 
trial court has such superior advantages for judging of the 
weight of the testimony and its relevancy and effect that this 
court should not disturb the decision merely because, on a 
doubtful balancing of probabilities, the mind inclines slightly 
against the decision, but only when the mind is clearly 
convinced that the conclusion of the trial judge is wrong.'"). 
48 Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 2004 WI 97, ¶17, 274 
Wis. 2d 143, 682 N.W.2d 389. 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
24 
 
affirmative defense under the ordinary burden of proof, it 
necessarily 
follows 
that 
no 
credible 
evidence 
supported 
Mercedes-Benz's affirmative defense under the middle burden of 
proof.  Stated another way, because the circuit court correctly 
found that Mercedes-Benz did not establish its affirmative 
defense by a mere preponderance of evidence, clearly Mercedes-
Benz did not establish its affirmative defense by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Therefore, although the circuit court 
mistakenly applied the lowest burden of proof to the affirmative 
defense instead of the middle burden of proof, remand is 
unnecessary.   
B 
¶52 A review of a directed verdict depends heavily on the 
facts of the particular case.  The trial lasted three days.  We 
search for credible evidence from which the jury may have 
reasonably 
inferred 
that 
the 
consumer 
or 
his 
attorney 
intentionally prevented Mercedes-Benz from providing a refund 
within the 30-day statutory period.  We view the credible 
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to Mercedes-Benz, the party against whom the motion 
for a directed verdict was made.  We also explain why those 
facts are insufficient to support the inference that the 
consumer or his attorney intentionally prevented Mercedes-Benz 
from providing a refund within the 30-day statutory period. 
¶53 On April 30, 2005, the consumer purchased a new 2005 
Mercedes-Benz E320.  He financed the purchase with a loan from 
Waukesha State Bank (the Bank).  The consumer experienced 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
25 
 
various problems with the vehicle that were not satisfactorily 
resolved, and he decided to seek relief under the Lemon Law.49 
¶54 The consumer retained Attorney Vincent P. Megna, a 
Lemon Law specialist at the law firm of Jastroch & LaBarge, S.C.  
On October 25, 2005, the consumer met with Attorney Megna, and 
Attorney Megna drafted a "Motor Vehicle Lemon Law Notice," which 
he sent to Mercedes-Benz that same day.   
¶55 The consumer had previously discussed the possibility 
of 
obtaining 
a 
replacement 
vehicle 
with 
Mercedes-Benz 
representatives, but in this notice, the consumer checked a box 
indicating he would like a refund, not a comparable new vehicle.  
The consumer provided the name of the bank that financed his 
vehicle and provided the loan account number.  The notice 
stated, 
"By 
providing 
this 
information, 
I 
authorize 
the 
manufacturer to contact this financial institution for financing 
information needed to calculate a refund."  The consumer 
attached a consumer note that included the terms of his loan and 
the name of his loan officer, John Gray.  
¶56 The 
notice 
also 
stated 
that 
the 
consumer 
was 
represented by counsel and stated that "the manufacturer should 
communicate with the consumer only through Jastroch & LaBarge, 
S.C."  It was signed by Attorney Megna.     
                                                 
49 The parties stipulated that there was at least one 
"nonconformity" that was not resolved after a "reasonable 
attempt to repair," making the vehicle a lemon.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 281.0171(1)-(2). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
26 
 
¶57 Mercedes-Benz received the notice on October 28, 2005.  
That same day, Wade Messing, a Mercedes-Benz representative, 
contacted the consumer directly to discuss the possibility of 
the consumer exchanging his lemon for a different vehicle.  The 
consumer testified that Messing also asked him to drop his suit 
and fire his attorney so that they could "fix this amongst men."   
¶58 The special verdict question asked the jury only 
whether the consumer failed to act in good faith on November 28.  
As explained in the jury instructions, the jury was being asked 
whether, on November 28, the consumer intentionally prevented 
the manufacturer from making the refund within the 30-day 
period, which the manufacturer must do to comply with the Lemon 
Law.  Conduct on dates earlier than November 28 may be relevant 
to the extent it allows the jury to draw reasonable inferences 
about conduct on November 28.  We therefore examine the 
communications between Messing and the consumer on November 23 
and between the consumer and the Bank on November 23.  The 
directed verdict centers on three telephone calls Messing made 
on November 28: to the Bank, to the consumer, and to Attorney 
Megna.   
¶59 Messing communicated with the consumer on November 23, 
2005.  During this conversation, the consumer explained that he 
was not interested in another vehicle and preferred a refund.  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
27 
 
Messing told the consumer that he would call again the "week of 
the 28th" to arrange the refund.50   
¶60 Also on November 23, the consumer called the Bank and 
authorized John Gray to release to Mercedes-Benz any financial 
information it requested relevant to his Lemon Law claim.  The 
consumer also authorized John Gray to release the information to 
his attorneys.  That day, the consumer's attorneys requested the 
loan information from John Gray and John Gray provided it. 
¶61 From the first notice through the communications on 
November 23, Mercedes-Benz was given full information upon which 
to fulfill its responsibilities under the Lemon Law.  No 
credible evidence supports an inference that on or before 
November 23, the consumer intentionally prevented Mercedes-Benz 
from providing a refund within the 30-day statutory period. 
¶62 According to the jury instruction, the consumer's 
cooperation was required to the extent that it was "necessary 
for the manufacturer to fulfill its obligations to provide a 
refund."  By November 28, the consumer had cooperated with and 
assisted Mercedes-Benz to allow Mercedes-Benz to provide a 
refund within the 30-day statutory period.   
¶63 The 
special 
verdict 
question 
thus 
focuses 
on 
occurrences on November 28, the only date subsequent to November 
                                                 
50 On November 21, another Mercedes representative, Joe 
Tolfa, spoke with the consumer about replacement vehicles, but 
the parties focus primarily on the interactions between the 
consumer and Messing.  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
28 
 
23 on which Mercedes-Benz communicated with the consumer, the 
Bank, and the consumer's lawyer.   
¶64 Monday, November 28 was the first day on which Messing 
attempted to obtain financial information from the Waukesha 
State Bank. (The information was needed to calculate how 
Mercedes-Benz would divide the refund between the consumer and 
the Bank.) It was the final day of the 30-day statutory period 
in which Mercedes-Benz could provide a timely refund to the 
consumer.51     
¶65 On November 28, Messing spoke to a representative in 
the Bank's call center in the morning and was told that the 
information could not be released without the consumer's verbal 
authorization.  Messing did not ask to speak to the consumer's 
loan officer, John Gray, the loan officer listed on documents in 
Mercedes-Benz's possession as the consumer's loan officer.   
¶66 Messing's second call on November 28 was around noon 
to the consumer, who was driving to work.  Messing testified 
that he told the consumer to provide authorization to the Bank 
and that the consumer told Messing he would do so and call 
Messing back later that day to confirm that the authorization 
had been provided.  The consumer, on the other hand, testified 
that Messing did not ask him to contact the Bank, and that the 
consumer directed Messing to contact his attorney.  The consumer 
and Messing agree that they did not speak again on November 28. 
                                                 
51 The 30th day after the consumer's notice fell on a Sunday 
and the parties agree that Mercedes-Benz had until the next day.  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
29 
 
¶67 Messing's third call on November 28 was at around 2:30 
P.M. to the consumer's attorneys.  Messing spoke to a paralegal, 
Nancy Haselwood.  The paralegal's notes from the conversation 
state that Messing called on behalf of Mercedes-Benz and wanted 
to speak to Attorney Megna.  The paralegal informed Messing that 
Attorney Megna was not available, offered to take a message, and 
also suggested that it would be best if he put any requests for 
Attorney Megna in a letter and fax it to the office.  The notes 
indicate that Messing did not leave a message and said he would 
rather "chat" with Attorney Megna.  The paralegal testified that 
Messing did not leave a phone number at which he could be 
reached.  
¶68 Messing testified that the paralegal told him that he 
had to put any request to Attorney Megna in writing.  Messing 
never wrote or faxed anything to Attorney Megna or attempted to 
call the consumer or Attorney Megna or the Bank again.  Messing 
did not make any additional efforts to provide the consumer with 
a refund on the afternoon of November 28. 
¶69 The complaint against Mercedes-Benz was signed by the 
consumer's counsel on November 28.  The consumer's attorneys 
filed the complaint against Mercedes-Benz and the dealership, 
Concours Motors, Inc.,52 on November 29.   
C 
                                                 
52 The parties later stipulated that the consumer would drop 
his claims against the dealership and proceed only against 
Mercedes-Benz. 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
30 
 
¶70 The only issue presented for the circuit court and 
this court is whether there was any credible evidence from which 
the jury could reasonably infer that on November 28 the consumer 
or his attorney intentionally prevented Mercedes-Benz from 
complying with the statute by providing a refund to the consumer 
within the 30-day statutory period.   
¶71 The jury was instructed that the consumer acted 
intentionally to prevent the manufacturer from complying with 
the Lemon Law if the consumer "had the mental purpose to cause 
the result of his action or was aware that such conduct was 
practically certain to cause the result of the action," namely 
preventing Mercedes-Benz from providing a refund within the 30-
day statutory period.   
¶72 The jury was instructed as follows: 
A consumer has a duty to act in good faith in pursuing 
a Lemon Law refund.  A consumer fails to act in good 
faith when he or she intentionally prevents the 
manufacturer from complying with the statute.  If the 
consumer's 
cooperation 
is 
necessary 
for 
the 
manufacturer 
to . . . fulfill 
its 
obligations 
to 
provide a refund, the duty of good faith requires the 
consumer to give the necessary cooperation. 
The requirement that a party act intentionally means 
that the party had the mental purpose to cause the 
result of his action or was aware that such conduct 
was practically certain to cause the result of his 
action. 
You may determine intent directly or indirectly from 
all the facts in evidence.  You may also consider any 
of the party's statements or conduct, which indicate 
state of mind (emphasis added). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
31 
 
¶73 The jury was asked a single special verdict question: 
"On November 28, 2005 did [the consumer] fail to act in good 
faith in his dealings with Mercedes-Benz?"  A failure to act in 
good faith, for purposes of the Lemon Law, was explicitly 
defined by Marquez I and the jury instructions to mean the 
consumer "intentionally prevents the manufacturer from complying 
with the statute."53  Thus, the concept of good faith, in the 
                                                 
53 See Marquez I, 312 Wis. 2d 210, ¶22.  
The jury instructions explained that "[a] consumer fails to 
act in good faith when he or she intentionally prevents a 
manufacturer from complying with the statute" (emphasis added). 
The jury instruction further explained that "the requirement 
that a party act intentionally means that the party had the 
mental purpose to cause the result of his action or was aware 
that such conduct is practically certain to cause the result of 
his action."  
Thus, when the jury was asked whether the consumer failed 
to act in good faith on November 28, it was asked to determine 
whether, on November 28, the consumer intentionally prevented 
the manufacturer from complying with the Lemon Law.  In other 
words, it was asked whether the consumer had the mental purpose 
on November 28 to prevent Mercedes-Benz from providing a refund 
within the 30-day statutory period or was aware that his conduct 
was practically certain to cause the intended result that the 
manufacturer not make a refund within the 30-day statutory 
period. 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
32 
 
context of the Lemon Law, "is not imported from contract law."54  
With two dissents, the jury answered "yes." 
¶74 To answer the question "yes," that on November 28 the 
consumer failed to act in good faith, and to adhere to the jury 
instructions defining good faith, the jury had to find that the 
consumer had the mental purpose on November 28 to prevent 
Mercedes-Benz from complying with the Lemon Law by making a 
refund within the 30-day statutory period or was aware that his 
conduct on November 28 was practically certain to cause this 
result.  For the consumer to have the mental purpose or to be 
aware that his conduct on November 28 was practically certain to 
prevent Mercedes-Benz from complying with the statute, as the 
jury instruction commands, the jury had to find that the 
consumer knew that November 28 was the last day upon which 
Mercedes-Benz could act.  If the consumer was unaware that 
November 28 was the final day of the 30-day statutory period, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Contrary to the concurrence/dissent's assertions, see, 
e.g., concurrence/dissent, ¶152, the special verdict question 
asking whether the consumer failed to act in good faith, the 
jury instructions defining a failure to act in good faith as the 
intentional prevention of the manufacturer's compliance with the 
statute, and Part III of this opinion are all consistent with 
the court of appeals' holding in Marquez I and our holding in 
Part I of this opinion.  See Marquez I, 312 Wis. 2d 210, ¶22 
("We hold only that a consumer fails to act in good faith when 
he or she intentionally prevents the manufacturer from complying 
with the statute.").  The concurrence/dissent's belief that this 
opinion inserts additional factual requirements that Mercedes-
Benz should not have to prove is based on a misunderstanding of 
the meaning of "intentional," as we describe below.  See infra 
¶¶84-86.  
54 Marquez I, 312 Wis. 2d 210, ¶22. 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
33 
 
the jury could not reasonably infer from the consumer's conduct 
on November 28 that the consumer intended——had the mental 
purpose——to prevent Mercedes-Benz from making a timely refund 
within the 30-day statutory period.55  
¶75 The parties appear to agree that the jury had to 
conclude that the consumer knew that November 28 was the final 
day for a refund.56  Mercedes-Benz argues that the jury could 
properly infer from the evidence that the consumer knew that 
November 28 was the date Mercedes-Benz was required to make the 
                                                 
55 The concurrence/dissent argues that the jury did not need 
to find that the consumer knew that November 28 was the final 
day in order to conclude that the consumer intentionally 
prevented 
the 
manufacturer 
from 
complying. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
concurrence/dissent, ¶¶149-151.  We disagree with the dissent.  
If the consumer was unaware that November 28 was the final day, 
the jury could not reasonably infer from the consumer's failure 
to return a phone call on November 28 that the consumer had the 
mental purpose of preventing the manufacturer from complying 
with the Lemon Law within the 30-day statutory period or knew 
that his conduct was practically certain to cause that result. 
56 The concurrence/dissent takes issue with this statement 
that Mercedes-Benz agrees that the jury needed to find that the 
consumer 
knew 
November 
28 
was 
the 
final 
day.  
Concurrence/dissent, ¶159.  One of Mercedes-Benz's arguments was 
that it could prevail merely by proving that the consumer acted 
unreasonably.  Under that lower bar, which we rejected in Part I 
of this opinion, Mercedes-Benz believed that it was not 
necessary for the jury to infer that the consumer knew November 
28 was the final day.   
However, Mercedes-Benz accepts that if it was required to 
prove 
that 
the 
consumer 
intentionally 
prevented 
it 
from 
complying, then the jury had to have inferred that the consumer 
knew November 28 was the final day in which to make a refund 
under the statute.  See Brief and Appendix of Defendant-
Appellant-Cross-Respondent Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC at 10-11, 32, 
34-36.  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
34 
 
refund.  Mercedes-Benz argues that a jury could reasonably infer 
that the consumer had this knowledge because the consumer's 
attorney would have informed the consumer when his refund was 
due and would have informed the consumer about the potential 
financial benefit if Mercedes-Benz failed to make a refund 
within the 30-day period, and because it is "undisputed that 
[the consumer] offered no reasonable justification for not 
immediately providing Messing" with information on November 28.57  
Mercedes-Benz also urges that a jury could infer from the 
evidence that the consumer's failure to inform Mercedes-Benz 
that the needed information was available from John Gray or from 
the consumer's attorneys, as well as the consumer's failure to 
call Messing back, was intended to prevent Mercedes-Benz from 
complying with the statute within the 30-day statutory period.   
¶76 Declaring it a close case and viewing the evidence 
"most favorable to the verdict and most favorable to Mercedes-
Benz," the circuit court concluded that there was no credible 
evidence from which to establish that the consumer was aware 
that November 28, 2005 was the date Mercedes-Benz was required 
to make the refund and that absent such evidence or inferences, 
the jury could not reasonably find that the consumer intended to 
prevent Mercedes-Benz from complying with the Lemon Law by 
providing a refund within the 30-day statutory period.  
                                                 
57 Brief 
and 
Appendix 
of 
Defendant-Appellant-Cross-
Respondent Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC at 28, 29.  The consumer did 
explain his conduct, and the reasonableness of his conduct was 
disputed.   
No. 
2010AP826   
 
35 
 
¶77 The circuit court found "a gap" between the facts 
presented and the inferences that Mercedes-Benz argues the jury 
drew, "that is, that there was . . . knowledge, intent on the 
part of the [consumer] through his attorney to subvert the 
system and to thwart Mercedes-Benz."   
¶78  Although a jury is allowed to draw reasonable 
inferences and determine intent "indirectly," the circuit court 
determined that the facts presented did not support the 
inferences drawn by Mercedes-Benz and the jury that the consumer 
intentionally prevented Mercedes-Benz from complying with the 
30-day statutory period.     
¶79 The circuit court explained that there was no evidence 
of "communications or environment" between the consumer and 
Attorney Megna demonstrating "the decision to intentionally 
thwart Mercedes.  That evidence is lacking in the case."  The 
circuit court reasoned that had Messing told Attorney Megna's 
office that he needed the payoff numbers in a few hours, that 
would have presented a different case.  The circuit court 
emphasized that Messing failed to state any urgency in any of 
his November 28 conversations.  To the circuit court, "[t]hat's 
the gap."  
¶80 This gap, declared the circuit court, "removes the 
foundation or the underlying premises permitting the jury to 
make the claim that——or draw the conclusions or inferences that 
Mercedes-Benz contends that they should and that perhaps they 
did and . . . that this was a deal between the attorney and 
client to obstruct and thwart . . . that there was a concept in 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
36 
 
[the consumer's] mind and in [Attorney] Megna's mind that we are 
going to drag this out and get past the 30-day limit, lay in the 
weeds, hide in the water, whatever it is, and not participate 
with the intent to undermine Mercedes effort to comply with the 
law."   
¶81 According to the circuit court, a "nexus did not exist 
for a reasonable jury to draw the conclusion, to draw the 
reasonable inference that [the consumer]/attorney intentionally 
thwarted 
and 
intentionally 
prevented 
[Mercedes-Benz] 
from 
complying with the law."   
¶82 The 
circuit 
court 
observed 
that 
no 
reasonable 
inference regarding the consumer's or attorney's intent to 
prevent Mercedes-Benz from providing a refund within the 30-day 
statutory period could be drawn from the responses of the 
consumer or Attorney Megna's paralegal on November 28 or from 
the consumer's failure on November 28 to call Messing or to call 
the Bank.  The consumer was working that day, had already 
communicated his authorization to the Bank, and had given 
information about the bank loan and loan officer to Mercedes-
Benz in the written notice that Mercedes-Benz had received.   
¶83 After reviewing the record in the light most favorable 
to Mercedes-Benz, we conclude, as did the circuit court, that 
there is no credible evidence from which reasonable inferences 
can be drawn to support Mercedes-Benz's affirmative defense.  
Thus, the circuit court was not "clearly wrong."  
¶84 The concurrence/dissent asserts that "[a]ll that was 
needed was a jury finding that Marquez intentionally did not 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
37 
 
call the bank and that without his call, he knew that Mercedes-
Benz could not make a refund that day."  Concurrence/dissent, 
¶154. 
 
The 
concurrence/dissent 
misunderstands 
the 
legal 
significance of the word "intentional."  "[Intentional conduct] 
is one of the most basic, organizing concepts of legal thinking.  
'Intent' is also one of the most often misunderstood legal 
concepts."58   
¶85 Even if the consumer "intentionally" did not call the 
bank in the sense that his conduct was volitional, the voluntary 
act or the failure to act does not amount to intentional conduct 
in a legal sense.  In understanding the legal concept of 
intentional conduct, "[a]n act is to be distinguished from its 
consequences."59  Intentional conduct means the actor intends the 
consequences.  
¶86 "The three most basic elements of th[e] most common 
usage of 'intent' are that (1) it is a state of mind (2) about 
consequences of an act (or omission) and not about the act 
itself, and (3) it extends not only to having in the mind a 
purpose (or desire) to bring about given consequences but also 
                                                 
58 Dan B. Dobbs et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 8, at 
33 (5th ed. 1984).  
59 Id., § 8, at 34. 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
38 
 
to 
having 
in 
mind 
a 
belief 
(or 
knowledge) 
that 
given 
consequences are substantially certain to result from the act."60 
¶87 Unless the consumer knew that November 28 was the 
final day on which Mercedes-Benz could comply with the statute, 
the jury could not reasonably conclude that the consumer's 
failure to return a phone call amounts to intentionally 
preventing the manufacturer from complying with the statute. 
¶88 No evidence in the record supports a reasonable 
inference that the consumer knew, either from counsel or from 
Messing, that November 28 was the last day for a refund.  
Mercedes-Benz fills this gap with speculation that the consumer 
knew the significance of the date and the urgency of Messing's 
request for information.  The jury would be speculating about 
what information passed between counsel and client, and Messing 
gave no clue to the consumer that November 28 had any special 
significance. 
¶89 With regard to the consumer's attorney, the only call 
Messing ever made to Attorney Megna was on the afternoon of 
November 28.  The undisputed evidence was that Messing did not 
leave his telephone number for a return call, Messing did not 
write or fax Attorney Megna requesting the needed information, 
                                                 
60 Id.  Prosser and Keeton's definition of "intentional" is 
drawn from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Wisconsin's 
criminal 
statutes 
define 
"intentionally" 
as 
follows: 
"'Intentionally' means that the actor either has a purpose to do 
the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or 
her conduct is practically certain to cause that result."  Wis. 
Stat. § 939.23(3). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
39 
 
and Messing expressed no urgency.  Attorney Megna did not return 
a 2:30 P.M. phone call by the end of the business day when the 
message had no return number and was simply a request "to chat."  
The evidence is undisputed that one of the consumer's lawyers 
signed a Lemon Law complaint by the consumer against Mercedes-
Benz on November 28. 
¶90 Viewing the telephone call of November 28 to Attorney 
Megna in the context of the other evidence and in the light most 
favorable to Mercedes-Benz, we conclude that the conduct of 
Attorney Megna on November 28 does not support a reasonable 
inference that Attorney Megna intentionally prevented Mercedes-
Benz from complying with the Lemon Law by issuing a refund 
within 
the 
30-day 
statutory 
period. 
 
It 
would 
require 
unsubstantiated speculation by the jury to infer from such 
seemingly innocuous conduct that Megna had a devious plan.   
¶91 The evidence viewed as a whole in a light favorable to 
Mercedes-Benz does not support a reasonable inference that on 
November 28 the consumer failed to act in good faith by 
intentionally preventing Mercedes-Benz from complying with the 
Lemon Law by intentionally preventing Mercedes-Benz from making 
the refund within the 30-day statutory period.    
¶92 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
circuit court was not "clearly wrong" in determining that there 
was no credible evidence to support the jury's answer to the 
special verdict question.  We conclude, as did the circuit 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
40 
 
court, 
that 
the 
jury's 
verdict 
impermissibly 
rests 
on 
"conjecture and speculation."61  
¶93 We further point out that the jury could not have 
considered evidence that was not admissible to find intentional 
conduct on the part of the consumer.  
¶94 First, the jury might have been aware that the 
consumer stood to receive double damages and Attorney Megna 
stood to recover substantial attorneys' fees if Mercedes-Benz 
failed to comply with the 30-day deadline.  However, prior to 
trial, 
the 
circuit 
court 
"preclude[d] . . . discussion 
or 
presentation of the statutory damage formula" because there was 
no "hint as to the connection between . . . double damages and 
allegations of bad faith."  Absent some direct evidence of 
intent, the circuit court declined to allow the jury "to 
speculate what the plaintiff's position was" based on the 
statutory remedies that were available.  
¶95 Second, the jury might have been aware that Attorney 
Megna was an experienced, successful Lemon Law specialist and 
might have inferred intent based on his history of winning Lemon 
Law suits.  Again, this inference was prohibited by the circuit 
court before trial.  The court proclaimed that "how the attorney 
practices . . . is 
not 
probative 
of 
issues 
in 
the 
lawsuit. . . . There are attorneys that focus on Lemon Law 
                                                 
61 See 
Foseid 
v. 
State 
Bank 
of 
Cross 
Plains, 
197 
Wis. 2d 772, 791, 541 N.W.2d 203 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Herbst 
v. Wuennenberg, 83 Wis. 2d 768, 774, 266 N.W.2d 391 (1978)). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
41 
 
litigation. . . . That type of testimony and that type of 
historical background is not apparently probative in this case."  
¶96 Third, the jury might have inferred intent from the 
fact that the complaint was dated November 28, the final day of 
the 30-day statutory refund period, and was filed the very next 
day.  The complaint was signed by one of the consumer's counsel, 
not by the consumer.  An inference about intent would be 
improper for two reasons.   
¶97 That the complaint was dated November 28 cannot 
reasonably support an inference of intent.  The consumer's or 
the attorneys' readiness and willingness to file a complaint 
immediately cannot support an inference that the consumer or 
attorney intentionally prevented Mercedes-Benz from providing a 
timely refund.  As counsel for the consumer argued before trial, 
"the plaintiff had a right and his lawyers had a right to file 
[the complaint] the minute that deadline was blown."  
¶98 The filing of the complaint on November 29 cannot 
reasonably support an inference of intent.  The circuit court 
ruled before trial that testimony regarding "communications or 
conduct that occurred . . . after November 28, 2005" was barred 
because it was not probative of the consumer's intent during the 
30-day refund period.  Thus, the filing of the complaint on 
November 29 was not properly considered by the jury.62 
                                                 
62 Counsel 
for 
the 
consumer 
objected 
to 
counsel 
for 
Mercedes-Benz referring to the November 29 filing in his closing 
statement; the objection was sustained.  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
42 
 
¶99 Fourth, perhaps the jury inferred the consumer's 
intent from evidence that the consumer initially entertained 
Mercedes-Benz's suggestion that he select a replacement vehicle 
before firmly requesting a refund on November 23.  Allowing an 
inference 
that 
a 
consumer 
intentionally 
prevented 
the 
manufacturer from complying with the Lemon Law based on a 
consumer's negotiations would undermine the statute.  The courts 
have held that manufacturers are required to comply with the 30-
day refund period "regardless of the status of negotiations."63   
¶100 The 30-day period is rigidly enforced even when a 
consumer's negotiations "undoubtedly complicate[] the process," 
despite the fact that it puts the manufacturer "in a difficult 
position with attendant risk."64  The consumer could have 
negotiated up until the deadline without sacrificing his right 
to recover statutory remedies.  In fact, he ceased negotiations 
and made a clear request for a refund on November 23.  The 
consumer's earlier negotiations cannot support a finding that 
the consumer, on November 28, intentionally prevented Mercedes-
Benz from providing a refund within the 30-day statutory period.  
¶101 The jury's finding that on November 28 the consumer 
intentionally prevented Mercedes-Benz from complying with the 
Lemon Law was impermissibly speculative.  The record in the 
present 
case 
contains 
no 
credible 
evidence 
of 
any 
such 
                                                 
63 Chariton, 238 Wis. 2d at 32. 
64 Church v. Chrysler Corp., 221 Wis. 2d 460, 468-69, 585 
N.W.2d 685 (Ct. App. 1998). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
43 
 
intentional conduct by the consumer or his lawyer to bar a 
manufacturer from the Lemon Law's remedies.  We agree with the 
circuit court that there was a gap between the facts presented 
and the jury's verdict.65  The jury cannot fill that gap with 
speculative inferences.    
IV 
¶102 Finally, we must address whether Mercedes-Benz is 
entitled to a new trial because either (1) it was not granted an 
adjournment on the morning of trial to collect non-privileged 
documents relating to the testimony of the paralegal, one of the 
consumer's witnesses; or (2) it was not permitted to call 
Attorney Megna as a witness. 
¶103 For the circuit court's error to warrant reversal and 
a new trial, the error must be prejudicial.  Wis. Stat. § 805.18 
(2009-10).   
¶104 With regard to each of these issues we set forth the 
standard of review, the relevant facts, and our decision. 
(1) 
¶105 Whether 
to 
grant 
an 
adjournment 
is 
within 
the 
discretion of the circuit court.66  We will set aside a circuit 
                                                 
65 As explained above, the same result would necessarily 
follow if the appropriate middle burden had been applied to 
Mercedes's defense.  Thus, remand is unnecessary despite the 
application of the incorrect burden.  
66 Rechsteiner 
v. 
Hazelden, 
2008 
WI 
97, 
¶92, 
313 
Wis. 2d 542, 753 N.W.2d 496 (citing Robertson-Ryan & Assocs., 
Inc. v. Pohlhammer, 112 Wis. 2d 583, 586-87, 334 N.W.2d 246 
(1983)).  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
44 
 
court's denial of an adjournment only if the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  An erroneous exercise of 
discretion exists "'if the trial court failed to exercise its 
discretion or if there was no reasonable basis for its 
decision.'"67  
¶106 Here are the facts relating to the adjournment and the 
testimony of the paralegal.   
¶107 On July 27, 2006, Mercedes-Benz served a subpoena 
duces tecum on Jastroch & LaBarge, S.C., requesting access to 
any and all documents related to the matter at issue.  The 
consumer moved to quash the subpoena on the ground that the 
requested materials were subject to the work product doctrine 
and the attorney-client privilege.  The first circuit court 
granted the consumer's motion for a protective order foreclosing 
the deposition of Jastroch & LaBarge, S.C., the attorneys of 
record, and foreclosing discovery of documents in the law firm's 
possession that would be protected by the attorney-client 
privilege or the work product doctrine.68 
¶108 The case then proceeded as outlined above:  the 
circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the consumer, 
the court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial on the 
                                                 
67 Rechsteiner, 313 Wis. 2d 542, ¶92 (quoting Robertson-
Ryan, 112 Wis. 2d at 587). 
68 During the hearing before the first circuit court, the 
circuit court stated that Mercedes-Benz could obtain more 
limited discovery from Attorney Megna without violating the work 
product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege.  It suggested 
the possibility of a written interrogatory.  
No. 
2010AP826   
 
45 
 
issue of the affirmative defense, and the case was tried before 
a different circuit court judge than the judge who quashed the 
subpoena.  
¶109 The circuit court conducted a pretrial conference on 
October 27, 2008, and scheduled trial for March 17, 2009.  On 
January 29, 2009, the consumer submitted a two-page affidavit of 
the paralegal, Nancy Haselwood, describing the November 28 
conversation she had with Messing.   
¶110 On the first morning of trial, the circuit court 
decided a number of motions in limine, including Mercedes-Benz's 
argument that allowing the consumer to call the paralegal to 
testify would constitute "trial by ambush" because Mercedes-Benz 
had not conducted discovery relevant to her testimony or deposed 
her.   
¶111 The 
circuit 
court 
outlined 
the 
history 
of 
the 
litigation and found that Mercedes-Benz should have moved to 
reopen discovery at some point during the 11 months between the 
remand from the court of appeals and the first day of trial.  
The circuit court explained that the affidavit, which was 
provided more than one month before trial, provided notice to 
Mercedes-Benz of the limited content of her testimony.  The 
circuit court also observed that the paralegal's testimony would 
not involve any privileged matters and that allowing her to 
testify would not conflict with the earlier circuit court's 
decision to quash Mercedes-Benz's subpoena.  The circuit court 
determined that there was no surprise and that "trial by ambush" 
was "an overstatement and an exaggeration" of what had occurred.   
No. 
2010AP826   
 
46 
 
¶112 Mercedes-Benz's brief argues that its hands were tied 
by the circuit court's initial decision to quash its subpoena.  
We note, however, that the circuit court's order did not 
restrict all discovery.  It quashed the overly broad subpoena.  
The circuit court advised Mercedes-Benz that there were other 
routes to get the non-privileged information and that it could 
have attempted to obtain more tailored discovery.  Indeed the 
consumer offered documents before trial, which Mercedes-Benz 
refused.69  
¶113 The circuit court's denial of Mercedes-Benz's request 
for an adjournment was not an erroneous exercise of discretion.  
The circuit court carefully considered the history of the 
litigation.  It found that Mercedes-Benz had opportunities 
between the time when the case was remanded and the morning of 
trial to file a motion asking the court "to modify the 
scheduling order or pretrial order or to permit further 
discovery."  The circuit court reasonably determined that an 
adjournment was not warranted on the basis of the facts on 
record.  There was no erroneous exercise of discretion.       
                                                 
69 Attorney Megna wrote a letter dated January 28, 2009, to 
Attorney Wells (counsel for Mercedes-Benz) offering to provide 
documents that related to the paralegal's testimony, but 
Attorney Wells declined the offer, declaring it to be self-
serving and strategic.  In response to Attorney Megna's motions 
in limine, Attorney Wells argued that Attorney Megna should 
either waive the attorney-client privilege and work product 
doctrine entirely or be precluded from presenting evidence that 
the consumer and Attorney Megna acted in good faith.  In his 
reply to the defendant's response, Attorney Megna argued that 
there was no legal support for Attorney Wells's argument. 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
47 
 
(2) 
¶114 The circuit court concluded that "there is not 
probative value to calling Attorney Megna or other attorneys 
from the office of Jastroch & LaBarge relative to the merits of 
the issues in this case."   
¶115 With regard to the circuit court's ruling denying 
Mercedes-Benz permission to call Attorney Megna as a witness, 
the standard for review of this ruling is whether the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion.  "A circuit court 
has 
broad 
discretion 
in 
determining 
the 
relevance 
and 
admissibility of proffered evidence."70  We will sustain this 
exercise of discretion if we conclude that "the circuit court 
examined the relevant facts; applied a proper standard of law; 
and using a demonstrative rational process, reached a conclusion 
that a reasonable judge could reach."71 
¶116 Counsel's arguments at the hearing on the day of trial 
on Mercedes-Benz's motion regarding Attorney Megna were very 
brief.  Mercedes-Benz did not make a clear argument regarding 
the probative value of Attorney Megna's potential testimony.  
Instead, Mercedes-Benz argued that the first circuit court's 
protective order had prevented it from doing any discovery on 
Attorney Megna.  The consumer appeared to argue that Attorney 
Megna's testimony about the November 28 telephone call is of no 
                                                 
70 State v. Brecht, 143 Wis. 2d 297, 320, 421 N.W.2d 96 
(1988). 
71 State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 780-81, 576 N.W.2d 30 
(1998). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
48 
 
import because it is undisputed that Messing left no return 
number and indicated no urgency.        
¶117 In its brief to this court, Mercedes-Benz argues that 
there 
was 
probative 
value 
to 
Attorney 
Megna's 
testimony 
regarding whether he actually received Messing's message on 
November 28 and whether he was actually too busy to return the 
phone call.  Mercedes-Benz asserts that Attorney Megna's conduct 
is relevant to proving intentional obstruction.  Mercedes-Benz 
reasons that if Attorney Megna was available on November 28 to 
talk with Messing but did not do so because the standard office 
procedure was to demand a faxed written request from the 
manufacturer, the jury could infer intentional obstruction from 
these facts coupled with Attorney Megna's knowledge that 
November 28 was the last day for the refund.  Mercedes-Benz did 
not make this kind of statement about the potential probative 
value of Attorney Megna's testimony to the circuit court. 
¶118 The consumer's brief argues that it was undisputed 
that Attorney Megna could not return the call because Messing 
left no return number; that Messing left no message with 
Attorney Megna's office seeking information about the consumer; 
and that Messing expressed no urgency that his call be returned 
and said that he merely sought to "chat."   
¶119 The circuit court explained that the record reflected 
no "communications done pertinently between the attorney and 
Mercedes-Benz."  Thus, the circuit court concluded that "that 
there is not probative value to calling Attorney Megna."  With 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
49 
 
regard to Attorney Megna's conversations with the consumer, 
these conversations would be privileged.     
¶120 Based on the arguments at trial, the circuit court's 
decision denying Mercedes-Benz request to call Attorney Megna as 
a witness was not an erroneous exercise of discretion.  The 
circuit court examined the relevant facts and applied a proper 
standard of law, which was to assess whether Attorney Megna's 
testimony would have probative value.72  Considering that 
Mercedes-Benz did not present the circuit court with a clear 
argument why Attorney Megna's testimony would have probative 
value, we conclude that the circuit court's decision that 
Attorney Megna's testimony would not be probative because he had 
                                                 
72 See Wis. Stat. § 904.01 (2009-10) ("'Relevant evidence' 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.").  
This court has noted that "[t]he determination of relevancy 
can never be an exact science because it necessarily involves 
the trial court's considered judgment whether a particular piece 
of evidence tends to establish a fact of consequence in a given 
set of circumstances.  The issue of relevancy 'must be 
determined by the trial judge in view of his or her experience, 
judgment and knowledge of human motivation and conduct.'"  State 
v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 344, 340 N.W.2d 498 (1983) (quoting 
United States v. Williams, 545 F.2d 47, 50 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
50 
 
no conversations with the consumer or Mercedes-Benz on November 
28 was one that a reasonable circuit court could reach.73   
* * * * 
¶121 In conclusion, we hold that a manufacturer has an 
affirmative defense to avoid Lemon Law penalties if it proves 
that the consumer intentionally prevented the manufacturer from 
providing a refund within the 30-day statutory period.  It is 
not sufficient to argue that a consumer was unreasonable or 
careless 
in 
responding 
to 
a 
manufacturer's 
requests 
for 
additional information.  We also hold that a manufacturer must 
prove its affirmative defense by the middle burden of proof.  
Our first two holdings are strongly motivated by the purpose of 
the Lemon Law, which is to encourage manufacturers to provide 
prompt, hassle-free refunds to consumers whose vehicles turn out 
to be lemons.  The imbalance of power between manufacturers and 
                                                 
73 As we have explained, Mercedes-Benz made no specific 
argument to the circuit court on the morning of trial regarding 
the potential probative value of Attorney Megna's testimony.  
Although Mercedes-Benz argued that it could not make a proper 
offer of proof because it had been denied discovery regarding 
Attorney Megna, Mercedes-Benz could have provided a more 
thorough explanation to the circuit court of the potential 
probative value of Attorney Megna's testimony.  
Regarding the importance of such offers of proof, Professor 
Daniel Blinka notes:  "[T]he offer serves to educate the trial 
judge about what the evidence is, what it is being used to show, 
and why it is admissible under the rules of evidence.  Trial 
judges have neither time nor opportunity to immerse themselves 
as deeply into a case as the trial lawyers who are responsible 
for presenting it.  The offer, then, may provide the judge with 
the perspective and background necessary to make an informed 
decision on admissibility."  Daniel D. Blinka, 7 Wisconsin 
Practice Series:  Wisconsin Evidence § 103.4 (3d ed. 2008). 
No. 
2010AP826   
 
51 
 
consumers 
makes consumers particularly vulnerable, and we 
interpret the Lemon Law in a manner that counteracts rather than 
exacerbates this legislative concern.   
¶122 We uphold the circuit court's decision to grant the 
consumer's motion for a directed verdict.  There was no credible 
evidence to support the jury's verdict, even under the ordinary 
burden of proof that was incorrectly applied at trial.  We also 
hold that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion by denying Mercedes-Benz's request for an adjournment 
on the morning of trial or by denying Mercedes-Benz the 
opportunity to call Attorney Megna to testify. 
¶123 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court's 
judgment and order.  
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the circuit court 
are affirmed. 
 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶124 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (concurring in part; 
dissenting in part).   I concur with the majority opinion's 
conclusion that it is the middle burden of proof that applies to 
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC's affirmative defense that Marco A. 
Marquez did not act in good faith as Mercedes-Benz attempted to 
provide a statutory refund to him on November 28, 2005.1  I also 
concur with the majority opinion's conclusion that the circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying 
adjournment of the trial as Mercedes-Benz had requested.2  
However, I write in dissent because there is credible evidence 
to sustain the jury's finding that Marquez did not act in good 
faith in his dealings with Mercedes-Benz on November 28, 2005, 
which is the only question the jury was asked.  Therefore, while 
I would have sustained the jury's verdict had the middle burden 
of proof been applied, because it was not, I would reverse the 
circuit court's decision and remand the matter for a new trial 
where the middle burden of proof would be applied to Mercedes-
Benz's affirmative defense. 
I.  BACKGROUND3 
¶125 This case arises from Marquez's purchase of a new 
Mercedes-Benz E-series automobile that turned out to be a lemon.  
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶10. 
2 Id.  
3 The facts in this introductory narration are taken from 
the jury trial testimony of Wade Messing, the Mercedes-Benz 
representative who dealt with Marquez, on November 28, 2005, and 
from Marquez's complaint, signed by Marquez's attorneys on 
November 28, 2005.  
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
2 
 
When Mercedes-Benz could not fix the problems that the car 
exhibited, Marquez exercised his rights under Wis. Stat. 
§ 218.0171, commonly known as Wisconsin's Lemon Law.  He did so 
by retaining a lawyer, Vincent P. Megna, who sent Mercedes-Benz 
a document entitled "Motor Vehicle Lemon Law Notice" and "Demand 
for relief under s. 218.0171(2)(b)" that requested a statutory 
refund. 
¶126 Mercedes-Benz received the notice on October 28, 2005.  
At that time, Mercedes-Benz had acknowledged that the E-series 
automobile could not be repaired to Marquez's satisfaction, and 
the sales representative was discussing Marquez's request to be 
provided another new Mercedes-Benz.  As the conversations 
between the parties continued subsequent to October 28, 2005, 
Marquez 
decided 
that 
he 
did 
not 
want 
another 
E-series 
automobile.  Instead, he asked to be placed in a 2007 S-series 
Mercedes-Benz.  However, because the 2007 S-series automobiles 
had not yet been released to dealers, there would have been a 
wait of several months to get the vehicle he wanted.   
¶127 Mercedes-Benz was willing to do as Marquez asked and 
obtain a 2007 S-series automobile for him, but on Wednesday, 
November 23, 2005, Marquez decided that due to the wait for a 
2007 S-series vehicle, he preferred to obtain the statutory 
refund that he had requested in the October 28, 2005, notice his 
attorney sent.  Wade Messing, the Mercedes-Benz representative 
who was handling this matter, testified that on November 23, 
2005, Marquez told him that he had decided on a refund rather 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
3 
 
than another new Mercedes-Benz.  Messing told Marquez that he 
would be back in touch to finalize payment.   
¶128 November 23, 
2005, 
was 
the 
Wednesday 
before 
Thanksgiving.  Messing was out of the office on Friday, 
November 24, for the Thanksgiving break, so he called Marquez in 
the morning on Monday, November 28, 2005.  When Messing 
telephoned Marquez, Messing already had driven to Wisconsin from 
his Chicago office; retrieved Marquez's file from Concours 
Motors, Inc., the local dealership from which Marquez purchased 
his car; made arrangements with Concours Motors to cut checks on 
November 28 to both Marquez and the Waukesha State Bank, where 
Marquez had his car loan; and called the bank to attempt to 
learn what amount was due to it.   
¶129 Messing 
testified 
that 
when 
he 
spoke 
with 
a 
representative of Waukesha State Bank to obtain the auto loan 
payout figure, the bank's loan department refused to give him 
the amount needed to pay off Marquez's loan on the E-series 
Mercedes-Benz.  He said that he was told to have Marquez call 
the bank and authorize release of the necessary information.   
¶130 Messing also testified that when he called Marquez, he 
told Marquez that the bank needed to hear from him because it 
had refused to provide Messing with the loan payout amount that 
Messing needed in order to finalize payments to the bank and to 
Marquez.  Marquez said that he would contact the bank and call 
Messing back.  However, Marquez did not call the bank to 
authorize it to release payout information to Messing and he did 
not call Messing back, as he promised that he would.  Also, 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
4 
 
Marquez did not tell Messing that he had given John Gray, 
Marquez's loan officer at the bank, permission to release the 
payout figure for his auto loan.   
¶131 Later in the day, when Messing had not heard from 
Marquez, he called Attorney Megna's office to ask Attorney Megna 
to call Marquez.  Messing hoped that Attorney Megna would get 
Marquez to call the bank so Messing could get the information he 
needed.  Attorney Megna was unavailable.  The paralegal who took 
the call did not tell Messing that Attorney Megna's office had 
the payout number from the bank, although she did note that 
Messing was calling on behalf of Mercedes-Benz.  Instead, she 
told Messing that if he needed something from Attorney Megna, it 
was office policy that Messing put his request in writing.   
¶132 November 28, 2005, was two business days after Marquez 
decided on November 23, 2005, to elect a refund rather than the 
replacement vehicle that he had been discussing with the 
dealer's sales representative.  November 28, 2005, also was the 
last day on which Mercedes-Benz could fulfill its statutory 30-
day obligation to pay the bank that held the loan and also pay 
Marquez the refund to which he was due.   
¶133 November 28, 2005, was also the date on which Attorney 
Megna's office signed the summons and complaint that commenced 
this action.  The complaint, which was trial exhibit A-2, 
alleges that Mercedes-Benz "failed or refused to provide the 
relief provided for by the Lemon Law."4  Based on the alleged 
violation, Marquez requested "twice the amount of all pecuniary 
                                                 
4 Complaint, ¶10.  
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
5 
 
losses incurred heretofore or hereafter."5  The complaint was 
prepared by Marquez's lawyers before Mercedes-Benz had failed to 
comply with its statutory obligation.  The complaint was filed 
on November 29, 2005. 
¶134 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a 
verdict favorable to Mercedes-Benz.  Marquez had moved for a 
directed verdict before the case was sent to the jury, and he 
renewed that motion after the jury verdict.  In his motions 
after verdict, Marquez also requested that the circuit court 
change the answer to Special Verdict Question 1 from "yes" to 
"no."  Special Verdict Question 1 stated:  "On November 28, 
2005, did Marco Marquez fail to act in good faith in his 
dealings with Mercedes-Benz?"  The circuit court granted both of 
Marquez's motions after verdict and awarded him $482,661.66.6  
Mercedes-Benz appealed and the court of appeals certified the 
appeal. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶135 On appeal, we review the record to determine whether 
there is any credible evidence from which the jury could have 
answered "yes" when asked, "On November 28, 2005, did Marco 
Marquez fail to act in good faith in his dealings with Mercedes-
Benz?"  See D'Huyvetter v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., 164 
Wis. 2d 306, 320, 475 N.W.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1991).  Whether there 
is any credible evidence to support a jury's verdict is a 
                                                 
5 Id., prayer for relief. 
6 Final Judgment. 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
6 
 
question of law subject to our independent review; however, we 
benefit from the circuit court's discussion.  See State v. 
Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).   
B.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
¶136 A motion for a directed verdict and a motion to change 
the answer to a question in a verdict test the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the jury's verdict.  D'Huyvetter, 164 
Wis. 2d at 320; Wis. Stat. § 805.14(1) & (5)(c).  The method for 
review of the sufficiency of evidence is set out in § 805.14(1): 
Test 
of 
Sufficiency 
of 
Evidence. 
 
No 
motion 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as a 
matter of law to support a verdict, or an answer in a 
verdict, 
shall 
be 
granted 
unless 
the 
court 
is 
satisfied that, considering all credible evidence and 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion is 
made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a 
finding in favor of such party. 
¶137 Accordingly, when a jury is the trier of fact, its 
determination where facts are disputed is not to be set aside if 
there is any credible evidence to support the verdict.7  Millonig 
                                                 
7 There are a few cases that opine that because a circuit 
court is better positioned to decide the weight and relevancy of 
testimony, we should give "substantial deference to the trial 
court's better ability to assess the evidence."  See, e.g., 
James v. Heintz, 165 Wis. 2d 572, 577, 478 N.W.2d 31 (Ct. App. 
1991); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 585, 207 N.W.2d 297 
(1973).  However, those cases in the final analysis rely on the 
conclusion that there was credible evidence to support the 
nonmoving party's position, see James, 165 Wis. 2d at 577, or 
that there was not such credible evidence, see Trogun, 58 
Wis. 2d at 589.  They do not give the circuit court the option 
of dismissing a nonmoving party's case when there is any 
credible evidence to support it.  Rather, "[a] great deal of 
credence is given to the jury's determinations."  Helmbrecht v. 
St. Paul Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 94, 110, 362 N.W.2d 118 (1985).  
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
7 
 
v. Bakken, 112 Wis. 2d 445, 449, 334 N.W.2d 80 (1983); Giese v. 
Montgomery Ward, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 392, 408, 331 N.W.2d 585 
(1983); May v. Skelley Oil Co., 83 Wis. 2d 30, 35, 264 N.W.2d 
574 (1978).  Stated otherwise, a directed verdict may be granted 
only when the evidence is so clear and convincing that no 
reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party.  Millonig, 
112 Wis. 2d at 451.   
¶138 The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be 
given their testimony are the province of the jury, and when 
more than one reasonable inference may be drawn from the 
testimony, inferences that support the jury's verdict must be 
sustained.  Roach v. Keane, 73 Wis. 2d 524, 536, 243 N.W.2d 508 
(1976).  Furthermore, it is long settled law that a circuit 
court has no authority to change a jury's answer to a special 
verdict question: 
If there is any credible evidence which, under any 
reasonable view fairly admits of an inference that 
supports the jury's finding, the trial court has no 
authority to change the jury's answer.  Only if the 
record is devoid of evidence that would sustain the 
verdict, or if the evidence were incredible, is it 
within 
the 
prerogative 
of 
the 
trial 
court 
to 
substitute its view of the evidence for that of the 
jury. 
Maichle v. Jonovic, 69 Wis. 2d 622, 626, 230 N.W.2d 789 (1975) 
(citing Lueck v. Janesville, 57 Wis. 2d 254, 262, 204 N.W.2d 6 
(1973); Longville v. Leusman, 48 Wis. 2d 251, 255, 179 N.W.2d 
823 (1970); Lehman v. Sentry Ins. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 96, 98, 150 
N.W.2d 333 (1967)).  Moreover, it is this court's duty to search 
for credible evidence to sustain the jury's verdict.  Meurer v. 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
8 
 
ITT Gen. Controls, 90 Wis. 2d 438, 450-51, 280 N.W.2d 156 
(1979).  
C.  Credible Evidence 
¶139 In order to comply with its statutory obligations 
under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171, Mercedes-Benz had to provide a 
refund or a replacement vehicle, at Marquez's choice, within 30 
days of its receipt of the Motor Vehicle Lemon Law Notice.  
Furthermore, because there was an outstanding loan, the loan 
also had to be paid off with a separate check to Waukesha State 
Bank within 30 days of Mercedes-Benz's receipt of Marquez's 
notice.  Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2008 WI App 70, ¶10, 
312 Wis. 2d 210, 751 N.W.2d 859.8  Giving Marquez a two-party 
check made out to him and to the bank would not have satisfied 
Mercedes-Benz's obligations under § 218.0171.  Id.   
¶140 The court of appeals explained that a person who 
purchases an automobile that turns out to be a lemon has a duty 
to act in good faith when the manufacturer attempts to provide a 
refund.  Id., ¶3 (concluding that if Marquez "intentionally 
thwarted [Mercedes-Benz's] attempt to make a refund by failing 
                                                 
8 This is the second time that the circuit court has 
declared that Marquez prevailed in his lawsuit against Mercedes-
Benz.  The first time around, the circuit court granted summary 
judgment to Marquez on his claim that Mercedes-Benz violated its 
obligations under Wisconsin's Lemon Law.  The summary judgment 
was reversed by the court of appeals when the court concluded 
that there were material issues of fact in regard to whether 
Marquez proceeded in good faith in his dealings with Mercedes-
Benz at the time of Mercedes-Benz's attempted payout.  Marquez 
v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2008 WI App 70, ¶24, 312 Wis. 2d 210, 
751 N.W.2d 859.  
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
9 
 
to provide necessary information about the consumer's auto 
loan," he did not act in good faith).   
¶141 At trial, in accord with the court of appeals 
decision, Mercedes-Benz's affirmative defense was based on the 
assertion that on November 28, when it attempted to provide a 
refund to Marquez, Marquez did not act in good faith because he 
failed to call the bank so that Mercedes-Benz could access bank 
information that Mercedes-Benz needed to make the refund.  
Therefore, the testimony regarding Messing's attempts to obtain 
a payout figure on what Marquez owed to the bank on November 28, 
2005, is critical to understanding the jury's verdict.   
¶142 Messing explained what occurred during his attempts to 
determine what was needed to pay off Marquez's bank loan on 
November 28, 2005: 
Q. 
And when you contacted the bank, what did you 
tell the person that you spoke with? 
A. 
I told the person——I identified myself as an 
employee of Mercedes-Benz USA and that one of 
their customers had an account with them, a bank 
loan on a Mercedes-Benz vehicle that had had some 
mechanical problems and that because of these 
mechanical problems Mercedes-Benz was being pro-
active, wanted to get them out of the car and 
give him a refund of his money.  I needed their 
financial 
payment 
information 
so 
I 
could 
calculate the refund that was due to them and to 
pay the loan off to the bank. 
Q. 
. . .  Do you know in what department you——
another 
person 
you 
were 
speaking 
with 
was 
employed? 
A. 
Yes.  They were in the loan department. 
. . . . 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
10 
 
Q. 
And the person you spoke with in the loan 
department, what were you told in response to 
your request? 
A. 
I was told because of privacy laws they could not 
give me the financial information.  That had to 
be released specifically by the owner of the 
account, Mr. Marquez, and I says, well, it was a 
time sensitive issue and I needed to get it done 
today.  What's the quickest way I can get this 
done.  That person indicated it would just be a 
phone call, have Mr. Marquez call us and give a 
verbal permission that a member of Mercedes-Benz 
yourself can get this information and we will be 
able to release to you. 
Q. 
And armed with that information, what did you do? 
A. 
At that point in time then I called Mr. Marquez, 
and had a discussion with him and let him know, 
hey, I'm up here trying to get your pay-off done, 
to give you your refund.  I said I would give you 
a call back.  Last piece of information I need is 
from the pay-off from the bank, but they will not 
release that information to me because of the 
privacy laws.  I just need you to give the bank a 
call and verbally give them a call.  They will 
release the information to me.  That will be the 
last piece of puzzle that I need to get this done 
and he indicated he would give me a call back 
with the information. 
. . . . 
Q. 
Did he tell he was too busy working to help you? 
A. 
No, he specifically stated he would call me back 
with the information.  
. . . . 
Q. 
Now, you asked him to contact the bank? 
A. 
Yes, I did. 
Q. 
Did he say he would not contact the bank? 
A. 
No, he did not. 
Q. 
Did he ever say the name John Gray to you? 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
11 
 
A. 
He did not. 
. . . . 
Q. 
Did he say to you, my lawyers have a pay-off? 
A. 
He did not. 
. . . . 
Q. 
So, the only thing he said was that he would call 
you back? 
A. 
That he would call me back. 
Q. 
And is that put in your notes anywhere? 
A. 
Yes, it is. 
Q. 
And so it's accurate, what exactly did you put in 
your notes that he said to you? 
A. 
Client stated that he would call back that 
afternoon with the information, but he did not. 
Q. 
What 
does 
that 
mean, 
"call 
back 
with 
the 
information?" 
A. 
I interpreted that to mean he was going to call 
back, call the bank, I've let them know you need 
this, I've given them verbal permission for you 
to get the information.  
Q. 
Did anyone from the bank contact you? 
A. 
No. 
Q. 
Did Marco Marquez ever call you back? 
A. 
No, he did not. 
. . . . 
Q. 
Did you have any reason to believe that he would 
not follow through with his promise? 
A. 
I did not. 
Q. 
At some point I think your notes indicate you 
contacted the lawyer, is that right? 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
12 
 
A. 
That is correct. 
Q. 
And why did you contact the attorneys? 
A. 
Well, my intent in contacting his attorney was to 
get a hold of the attorney who knows how 
important it is that we get this done today and 
say please give your customer a call and say call 
me back, you need to call him because he needs to 
call the bank to give me the release permission 
so I can get the information on the bank. 
. . . . 
Q. 
A lot has been made of the fact that you didn't 
ask for a pay-off statement from the law firm.  
Why didn't you ask the law firm for their pay-off 
statement? 
A. 
Because nobody indicated to me that they had it.  
Mr. Marquez in my conversation didn't say they 
had it, he didn't direct me to get it from them. 
Q. 
You're accused of intentionally dragging your 
feet in this case.  What does Mercedes-Benz have 
to gain to support these statements that you are 
intentionally dragging your feet? 
A. 
We have absolutely at this point in time——we have 
absolutely nothing to gain and everything to lose 
at this point in time.  We've already admitted I 
wanted to get the guy out of the car.  I have 
nothing to battle about.  I freely told him I was 
willing to get him out of that car.  If I delay, 
drag my feet, it just is going to expose me to 
further penalties.  So, I've got nothing to gain 
and everything to lose. . . . 
Q. 
On November 28th, 2005 when you were at CM, did 
you stand ready to issue refund checks to Mr. 
Marquez and the bank had you had the pay-off 
statement? 
A. 
Yes, I did. 
Q. 
Had you been told that Mr. John Gray had 
apparently 
been 
pre-authorized 
to 
give 
this 
information to you would you have contacted Mr. 
Gray? 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
13 
 
A. 
Yes, I would. 
. . .  
Q. 
Whose job was it if you couldn't get the bank to 
release the information to you without Mr. 
Marquez' authorization, whose job was it to 
authorize the bank to release it to you? 
A. 
The only person that could authorize that release 
was Mr. Marquez as stated by the bank.     
¶143 From the above testimony, the jury could have found 
that "On November 28, 2005, [] Marco Marquez fail[ed] to act in 
good faith in his dealings with Mercedes-Benz" by "failing to 
provide necessary information about [his] auto loan."  Marquez, 
312 Wis. 2d 210, ¶3.   
¶144 Marquez knew that Messing had traveled to Wisconsin to 
make the requested Lemon Law refund to him; Marquez knew that 
Messing had called the bank and the person in the loan 
department with whom Messing spoke would not give Messing the 
information needed to pay off Marquez's car loan without 
Marquez's call; and Marquez knew that the payout figure from the 
bank was the last piece of information that Messing needed to 
complete the refund that Marquez had chosen on his Lemon Law 
claim.  Notwithstanding having been told that the bank would not 
provide the necessary information without communication from 
him, Marquez did not cooperate with Mercedes-Benz's attempted 
refund.  He never called the bank as he told Messing he would; 
he never called Messing back as he promised to do; he never told 
Messing that he had already authorized John Gray to release the 
payout information on his car loan; and he never said that his 
attorneys had a payout figure.  Any one of these acts by Marquez 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
14 
 
would have permitted Messing to cut the checks to the bank and 
to Marquez on November 28, 2005.   
¶145 Mercedes-Benz satisfied the standard set by the court 
of appeals because Messing's testimony showed that Marquez 
"fail[ed] to provide necessary information about [his] auto 
loan."  Id.  However, contrary to the majority opinion herein, 
the jury was never asked to determine whether Mercedes-Benz had 
proved that Marquez knew that Wis. Stat. § 218.171 would be 
violated if Mercedes-Benz did not make a payout to him and to 
the bank on November 28, 2005.  
¶146 The jury was instructed in relevant part: 
 
A consumer has a duty to act in good faith in 
pursuing a Lemon Law refund.  A consumer fails to act 
in good faith when he or she intentionally prevents 
the manufacturer from complying with the statute.  If 
the 
consumer's 
cooperation is necessary for the 
manufacturer to . . . fulfill its obligations to 
provide a refund, the duty of good faith requires the 
consumer to give the necessary cooperation.    
 
The requirement that a party act intentionally 
means that the party had the mental purpose to cause 
the result of his action or was aware that such 
conduct was practically certain to cause the result of 
his action. 
 
You may determine intent directly or indirectly 
from all the facts in evidence.  You may also consider 
any of the party's statements or conduct, which 
indicate state of mind. 
¶147 There is credible evidence that Marquez knew Messing 
was trying to provide a Lemon Law refund on November 28, 2005, 
because that is what Marquez requested on November 23, 2005.  
During their November 23 conversation, Messing said he would be 
back in touch to finalize payment.  As described by Messing's 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
15 
 
testimony, Marquez said that he would call the bank, but he 
failed to do so when he had been told that Mercedes-Benz could 
not get the necessary information about his auto loan without 
his call.  There is credible evidence that Marquez had the 
mental purpose to thwart payment on November 28.9   
¶148 Accordingly, under the jury instructions and in 
response to the special verdict question, "On November 28, 2005, 
did Marco Marquez fail to act in good faith in his dealings with 
Mercedes-Benz?," the jury answered "yes."  Messing's testimony 
is credible evidence to support the jury's answer because 
Marquez did not provide necessary information about his auto 
loan.  Therefore, the circuit court was clearly wrong when it 
set aside the jury's verdict.  Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 
197 Wis. 2d 365, 389-90, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995); see also  
Millonig, 112 Wis. 2d at 449 (concluding that when there is 
credible evidence to sustain a jury's verdict, it cannot be set 
aside); Giese, 111 Wis. 2d at 408 (same); May, 83 Wis. 2d at 35 
(same); Roach, 73 Wis. 2d at 536 (same); Maichle, 69 Wis. 2d at 
626 (same).  
D.  Majority Opinion's Fundamental Error 
¶149 The majority opinion is based on a fundamental error, 
and it is this error that then permits it to affirm the circuit 
court's change to the special verdict and the circuit court's 
grant of a directed verdict to Marquez.  To explain, the jury 
                                                 
9 The majority opinion emphasizes Marquez's view of the 
facts, see, e.g., majority op., ¶¶55-57, 60-62, however, it is 
apparent that the jury rejected these facts by its answer to the 
special verdict. 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
16 
 
was asked, "On November 28, 2005, did Marco Marquez fail to act 
in good faith in his dealings with Mercedes-Benz?"  The jury 
answered, "yes," because Marquez promised he would call the bank 
and he did not make the call.  Marquez's intentional failure to 
act prevented a Lemon Law payment on November 28, 2005, and 
Marquez had been told no payment could occur that day if he did 
not call the bank.10   
¶150 The jury never was asked whether Marquez knew that 
November 28, 2005, was the last date on which Mercedes-Benz 
could make payment in compliance with Wisconsin's Lemon Law.  
Stated otherwise, the jury never was asked whether Marquez knew 
that Mercedes-Benz was required to "refund within the 30-day 
statutory period" provided by Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 and that 
                                                 
10 I agree with the majority opinion's statement that 
conduct is intentional if it has the purpose to bring about 
intended consequences.  Majority op., ¶86.  However, the 
majority opinion misperceives the intended consequences that the 
jury found in this case.  Here, the intended consequences were 
that no payout would occur on November 28, 2005.  That Marquez's 
intentional conduct also occurred on the last day upon which 
Mercedes-Benz could make a payment without incurring Lemon Law 
penalties may well have been an unintended consequence of 
Marquez's denial of access to loan payout information.  Not 
every consequence of an intentional act is an anticipated 
consequence.  See E-L Enters., Inc. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage 
Dist., 2010 WI 58, ¶23, 326 Wis. 2d 82, 785 N.W.2d 409 
(explaining 
that 
the 
removal 
of 
the 
groundwater 
was 
intentionally done, but the effect on the wood pilings was 
unexpected). 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
17 
 
November 28, 2005 was the 30th day, as the majority opinion 
repeatedly asserts.11   
¶151 Furthermore, the jury instructions did not inform the 
jury that Marquez's conduct was not intentional unless it caused 
Mercedes-Benz to fail to make the "refund within the 30-day 
statutory period."  There is no mention of the requirement of 
thwarting a "refund within the 30-day statutory period" in the 
jury instructions.  A manufacturer can comply with the statute 
on any of the 30 days in which a refund is due, once a proper 
request for refund is made. 
¶152 The majority opinion has added the factual requirement 
that Marquez had to know that November 28, 2005, was the last 
day of the "30-day statutory period."  This is the fundamental 
error that underlies its reasoning.  This added factual 
requirement changes the case that was tried and the question 
that the jury was asked to decide.   
¶153 In addition, the majority opinion will effectively 
eliminate the affirmative defense raised in this case from 
subsequent Lemon Law cases.  This is so because under the 
majority 
opinion's 
reasoning, 
no 
affirmative 
defense 
of 
thwarting a refund will lie unless the manufacturer can prove 
                                                 
11 The majority opinion repeatedly inserts the phrase 
"refund within the 30-day statutory period" into what it says 
the jury was asked to find.  Majority op., ¶¶1, 4, 6, 7, 10, 13, 
15-16, 19-20, 22, 31, 33, 52, 61-62, 71, 74, 76, 82, 90-91, 100, 
121.  As I explain below, this insertion adds a fact to what the 
special verdict and the jury instructions actually asked the 
jury to determine.  However, I understand the majority opinion's 
need to insert this additional fact.  It is the foundation that 
is necessary for the majority opinion to reach its conclusion. 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
18 
 
that the plaintiff had the requisite knowledge of the legal 
effect of his conduct on the statutory obligations that the 
Lemon Law places on the manufacturer.  Most auto purchasers do 
not have law degrees and many do not consult a lawyer until just 
before a law suit is filed.  The requisite knowledge of the 
manufacturer's statutory obligations will be absent for most 
Lemon Law plaintiffs and therefore, beyond proof at trial.   
¶154 Inserting "refund within the 30-day statutory period" 
may seem such a small addition to what the jury actually was 
asked to decide, but by inserting "refund within the 30-day 
statutory period" into its rationale, the majority assumes that 
the jury had to find two facts:  (1) that Marquez intentionally 
did not provide necessary information about his auto loan; and 
(2) that Marquez also knew that if Mercedes-Benz did not make a 
refund on November 28, Mercedes-Benz would violate the Lemon 
Law, thereby entitling him to significant damages well beyond 
the price Marquez paid for his auto.  However, knowledge of 
statutory requirements was not necessary for the jury to find 
that Marquez did not act in good faith on November 28.  All that 
was needed was a jury finding that Marquez intentionally did not 
call the bank and that without his call, he knew that Mercedes-
Benz could not make a refund that day.  
¶155 The majority opinion's addition also adds a new 
requirement to the decision of the court of appeals that said 
that a lack of good faith is shown when, "the consumer 
intentionally thwart[s the manufacturer's] attempt to make a 
refund by failing to provide necessary information about the 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
19 
 
consumer's auto loan."  Marquez, 312 Wis. 2d 210, ¶3.  The court 
of appeals overturned a prior summary judgment because it 
concluded there was a material issue of fact about what the bank 
required in order to provide the loan information Mercedes-Benz 
needed to make a refund.  Id., ¶11 n.4 ("We conclude that on 
this record it is a question of fact whether and under what 
circumstances the bank would have released Marquez's loan 
information to MB.")  There is nothing in the court of appeals 
opinion indicating that Mercedes-Benz was required to prove that 
Marquez knew the legal effect of his conduct on Mercedes-Benz's 
legal obligations under the Lemon Law.  
¶156 In addition, Marquez was required to act in good faith 
with regard to Mercedes-Benz as it attempted to make a Lemon Law 
refund, no matter whether it was the 30th day, the 29th day or 
some other day of the statutory 30-day period.  The duty of good 
faith was not limited to the 30th day.  As the court of appeals 
explained in its prior decision, "If MB stood ready to comply on 
the thirtieth day, and only Marquez's deliberate refusal to 
provide the necessary information prevented it from doing so, we 
can see no reason why the fact that it was the thirtieth day 
should make any difference."  Id., ¶23 (emphasis added).  
Therefore, the breach of the duty of good faith was Marquez's 
deliberate refusal to call the bank to authorize Messing's 
access to the necessary information, which Marquez had been told 
would prevent a Lemon Law refund on November 28, 2005.  
¶157 Notwithstanding the question that was presented to the 
jury, which the jury answered, the majority opinion asserts: 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
20 
 
 
To answer the question "yes," that on November 28 
the consumer failed to act in good faith, and to 
adhere to the jury instructions defining good faith, 
the jury had to find that the consumer had the mental 
purpose on November 28 to prevent Mercedes-Benz from 
complying with the Lemon Law by making a refund within 
the 30-day statutory period or was aware that his 
conduct on November 28 was practically certain to 
cause this result. . . .12   
 
The parties appear to agree that the jury had to 
conclude that the consumer knew that November 28 was 
the final day for a refund.13 
¶158 The 
majority opinion's major premises are again 
fundamentally wrong in several respects.  First, the jury was 
never asked whether "on November 28 the consumer intentionally 
prevented Mercedes-Benz from providing a "refund within the 30-
day statutory period," as the majority opinion asserts.  As I 
have explained above, there was no question put to the jury that 
required it to find that Marquez knew that November 28, 2005, 
was the last date on which Mercedes-Benz could make payment and 
comply with the 30-day statutory period for refunds under the 
Lemon Law.  Marquez's failure to call the bank as he said he 
would prevented the refund on November 28, 2005, and he had been 
told that no payment could be made that day without his call.  
That is the issue that was before the jury.  
¶159 Second, Mercedes-Benz does not "agree that the jury 
had to conclude that the consumer knew that November 28 was the 
final day for a refund," as the majority opinion also asserts.  
Mercedes-Benz repeatedly has explained that it was not necessary 
                                                 
12 Id., ¶74 (emphasis added). 
13 Id., ¶75. 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
21 
 
for it to prove Marquez's knowledge about the 30-day window in 
which to comply with the Lemon Law in order to prove that 
Marquez did not act in good faith on November 28, 2005.14  Why 
would Mercedes-Benz "agree" to that fact?  It would be agreeing 
to the existence of a fact that the jury was never asked to 
find.   
¶160 In addition, requiring Mercedes-Benz to prove, after 
the trial is over, that Marquez knew that November 28, 2005, was 
the last day on which Mercedes-Benz could meet its 30-day refund 
obligation under the Lemon Law, contravenes notions of fairness 
and ignores the fundamental fact-finding nature of the jury.  
Marquez made no such request at trial, and if that were a fact 
he believed Mercedes-Benz was required to prove, he should have 
requested a jury question on it.  He also should have requested 
a jury instruction that said that preventing the manufacturer 
from complying with the statute meant that the consumer knew 
that 
November 28, 
2005, was the last day on which the 
manufacturer could make a refund without incurring a penalty.  
He did neither.  By slipping in the phrase, "refund within the 
30-day statutory period," the majority opinion has constructed a 
question that the jury was never asked.  Without that addition, 
the majority opinion has no basis upon which it can invalidate 
the finding of the jury.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶161 I concur with the majority opinion's conclusion that 
it is the middle burden of proof that applies to Mercedes-Benz's 
                                                 
14 Mercedes-Benz's brief, e.g., pp. 10, 23-24, 27-28. 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
22 
 
affirmative defense that Marquez did not act in good faith as 
Mercedes-Benz attempted to provide a statutory refund to him on 
November 28, 2005, and I also concur with the majority opinion's 
conclusion that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise 
its discretion in denying adjournment of the trial as Mercedes-
Benz had requested.  However, I write in dissent because there 
is credible evidence to sustain the jury's finding that Marquez 
did not act in good faith in his dealings with Mercedes-Benz on 
November 28, 2005, which is the only question the jury was 
asked.  Therefore, while I would have sustained the jury's 
verdict had the middle burden of proof been applied, because it 
was not, I would reverse the circuit court's decision and remand 
the matter for a new trial where the middle burden of proof 
would be applied to Mercedes-Benz's affirmative defense. 
¶162 For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part and 
dissent in part. 
 
 
No.  2010AP826.pdr 
 
1