Case Title: Cleveland Heights. v. Lewis

Citation: 2011-Ohio-2673

Docket Number: 20101203

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2673.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-2673 
CITY OF CLEVELAND HEIGHTS, APPELLANT, v. LEWIS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2673.] 
Criminal procedure — Mootness of misdemeanor appeal after sentence is served. 
(No. 2010-1203 — Submitted March 23, 2011 — Decided June 8, 2011.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 92917, 
187 Ohio App.3d 786, 2010-Ohio-2208. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  The completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not make an appeal 
moot if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the appellant 
neither acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right to appellate 
review, that the appellant has a substantial stake in the judgment of 
conviction, and that there is subject matter for the appellate court to 
decide. 
2.  The expiration of an inactive period of probation during the pendency of an 
appeal does not render the appeal moot because the misdemeanant failed 
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to file a motion for stay in the appellate court where the misdemeanant 
unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution from the trial court to prevent an 
intended appeal from being declared moot and subsequently filed a notice 
of appeal to challenge the conviction. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The Eighth District Court of Appeals certified that a conflict exists 
between its decision in this case and decisions of the Second and Seventh District 
Courts of Appeals on the following question: “Whether an appeal is rendered 
moot when a misdemeanor defendant serves or satisfies his sentence after 
unsuccessfully moving for a stay of execution in the trial court, but without 
seeking a stay of execution in the appellate court.” 
{¶ 2} The Second District Court of Appeals in Dayton v. Huber, 
Montgomery App. No. 20425, 2004-Ohio-7249, 2004 WL 3561217, and the 
Seventh District Court of Appeals in Carroll Cty. Bur. of Support v. Brill, Carroll 
App. No. 05 CA 818, 2005-Ohio-6788, 2005 WL 3489763, concluded that when 
a trial court denies a stay of execution of sentence, an appellant must also seek a 
stay in the appellate court to avoid a determination that the appeal is moot upon 
completion of the sentence.  In its conflicting decision in this case, the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals held that an appellant who has been denied a stay of 
execution in the trial court is not required to seek an additional stay in the 
appellate court to prevent the matter from becoming moot upon completion of the 
sentence pending appeal. 
{¶ 3} Strong evidence of intent to challenge the criminal charge exists in 
the instant case because Warren Lewis elected to be tried on the matter in the trial 
court, which resulted in a conviction on only one count and a sentence consisting 
of a fine, court costs, a suspended three-day jail term, and a period of inactive 
probation.  Thereafter, he sought a stay of execution of sentence to avoid the 
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appeal becoming moot, but the trial court denied the stay.  Lewis then paid the 
fine and costs and filed a notice of appeal, but did not seek a stay from the 
appellate court.  These circumstances demonstrate that Lewis neither acquiesced 
in the judgment nor abandoned his right to appeal and thus did not voluntarily 
complete the sentence pending appeal.  Accordingly, Lewis had a substantial 
interest in the appeal and the appellate court had subject matter to decide, and the 
appeal did not become moot. 
{¶ 4} Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative and 
affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 5} On June 21, 2008, Officer Duane Clayborn of the Cleveland 
Heights Police Department responded to a fight involving three female teenagers. 
After questioning each to determine who had started the fight, he ultimately 
decided to charge all three with disorderly conduct because of hostile responses 
he received from parents of the girls. 
{¶ 6} When Warren Lewis arrived home from work, he noticed police 
cruisers parked in front of his house.  His wife told him that his daughter had been 
attacked by two girls, and he saw the police talking to their parents down the 
street.  Lewis and his wife approached the officers with a copy of a police report 
showing that his daughter had been attacked several days earlier by these same 
girls; Officer Clayborn, however, ordered Lewis and his wife to return to their 
home and told them that his daughter would also be charged in the incident. 
{¶ 7} When Officer Clayborn approached Lewis for the information 
needed to file the charge against his daughter, Lewis refused to talk to him 
because, in his view, the officer had treated his daughter as an assailant rather 
than a victim.  The officer then approached Lewis’s wife, who had started to leave 
for work.  According to Officer Clayborn, Lewis told his wife not to provide any 
information to him, but Lewis maintained that he told his wife only that the 
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officer could not detain her.  Officer Clayborn returned to Lewis and demanded 
his daughter’s address, but Lewis refused to cooperate.  Officer Clayborn then 
arrested Lewis and charged him with obstructing official business by “refus[ing] 
to give information on his daughter who was being charged” and for resisting 
arrest by allegedly struggling with the officer as he attempted to place Lewis in 
the patrol car. 
{¶ 8} At a bench trial, the court acquitted Lewis of resisting arrest but 
convicted him of obstructing official business, and it sentenced him to a 
suspended term of three days in jail, placed him on inactive probation for six 
months, and imposed a $100 fine and court costs, which he paid. 
{¶ 9} The next day, Lewis moved to stay execution of his sentence, 
stating that he intended to appeal the finding of guilt because it could affect his 
employment and arguing that “without a stay, or at least a request for a stay, the 
Court of Appeals could find the appeal moot.” The trial court nonetheless denied 
the stay. 
{¶ 10} Lewis then appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, but he 
did not seek a stay of execution of his sentence from the appellate court.  Because 
he had paid his fine and costs, and due to the inactive status of his probation, he 
completed the sentence during the pendency of his appeal.  Although neither 
Lewis nor the city of Cleveland Heights addressed whether the expiration of the 
term of probation rendered the appeal moot, the court of appeals raised that issue 
at oral argument.  Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 187 Ohio App.3d 786, 2010-Ohio-
2208, 933 N.E.2d 1146, ¶ 7-8. 
{¶ 11} The appellate court sua sponte convened an en banc conference to 
consider the issue, and in its opinion, the court noted its prior holding that “ ‘ 
“[u]nless one convicted of a misdemeanor seeks to stay the sentence imposed 
pending appeal or otherwise involuntarily serves or satisfies it, the case will be 
dismissed as moot unless the defendant can demonstrate a particular civil 
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disability or loss of civil rights specific to him arising from the conviction.” ’ ”  
Id. at ¶ 10, quoting Oakwood v. Pfanner, Cuyahoga App. No. 90664, 2009-Ohio-
464, 2009 WL 270500, ¶ 4, quoting Cleveland v. Martin, Cuyahoga App. No. 
79896, 2002 WL 568302, *3.  The Eighth District determined that although Lewis 
had not demonstrated a collateral consequence stemming from the conviction, he 
had not voluntarily served his sentence, because he had sought a stay in the trial 
court.  As a result, the appellate court declined to require Lewis to seek an 
additional stay in the court of appeals in order to preserve the justiciability of his 
appeal. 
{¶ 12} Regarding the merits of the appeal, the Eighth District reversed 
Lewis’s conviction for obstructing official business because it was not supported 
by the evidence, in that Lewis had not taken affirmative action to impede the 
investigation and Officer Clayborn admitted that Lewis’s refusal to answer his 
questions had not prevented him from performing his duties.  Id. at ¶ 37-39. 
{¶ 13} The appellate court then certified that its decision conflicted with 
decisions from the Second District in Dayton v. Huber, Montgomery App. No. 
20425, 2004-Ohio-7249, 2004 WL 3561217, and from the Seventh District in 
Carroll Cty. Bur. of Support v. Brill, Carroll App. No. 05 CA 818, 2005-Ohio-
6788, 2005 WL 3489763.  We agreed to resolve the conflict. 
Positions Regarding Mootness 
{¶ 14} Cleveland Heights asserts that a misdemeanant voluntarily serves a 
sentence by not seeking a stay of execution in both the trial court and the 
appellate court.  Thus, according to the city, Lewis’s appeal became moot because 
he had paid the fine and court costs, the six-month period of inactive probation 
had expired during the pendency of his appeal, and Lewis had neither moved for a 
stay in the appellate court prior to completion of the sentence nor demonstrated 
the existence of any collateral consequences resulting from the conviction.  For 
these reasons, the city urges that his conviction should be reinstated. 
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{¶ 15} Lewis contends that the appeal of a misdemeanor conviction is 
never rendered moot by serving the sentence, even if the defendant fails to allege 
that the conviction will subject him to a collateral consequence and even if he 
does not move for a stay in the trial court or in the appellate court.  Lewis 
maintains that a misdemeanant who is tried by a judge or jury and is convicted 
does not voluntarily serve the sentence imposed, but rather does so by order of the 
court. Also, he points out that he did not accept his conviction or voluntarily serve 
his sentence, because he asked the trial court to stay execution of sentence and he 
appealed the judgment of conviction.  Further, he indicates that no decision of the 
Eighth District Court of Appeals requires him to take the additional step of 
seeking a stay in the appellate court in order to maintain his appeal and prevent it 
from being declared moot. 
{¶ 16} Thus, we are called upon to clarify the law regarding a convicted 
misdemeanant who unsuccessfully sought a stay from the trial court and thereafter 
paid the fine and costs while on inactive probation that expired during the 
pendency of the appeal. 
The Mootness Doctrine 
{¶ 17} At common law, courts considered appeals in criminal cases to be 
moot if the appellant had completed the sentence prior to a ruling on the appeal on 
the basis that if a sentence had been served, a favorable judgment could not 
“operate to undo what has been done or restore to petitioner the penalty of the 
term of imprisonment which he has served.”  St. Pierre v. United States (1943), 
319 U.S. 41, 42-43, 63 S.Ct. 910, 87 L.Ed. 1199; see generally 7 Lafave, Isreal, 
King & Kerr, Criminal Procedure (3d Ed.2007), Section 27.5(a). 
{¶ 18} In accordance with this rule, we held in State v. Wilson (1975), 41 
Ohio St.2d 236, 70 O.O.2d 431, 325 N.E.2d 236, that “[w]here a defendant, 
convicted of a criminal offense, has voluntarily paid the fine or completed the 
sentence for that offense, an appeal is moot when no evidence is offered from 
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which an inference can be drawn that the defendant will suffer some collateral 
disability or loss of civil rights from such judgment or conviction.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  Id. at the syllabus.  Moreover, in State v. Berndt (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 3, 
4, 29 OBR 173, 504 N.E.2d 712, we determined that it is reversible error for an 
appellate court to consider the merits of an appeal that has become moot after the 
defendant voluntarily satisfied the sentence, holding that “[w]here the appellate 
court hears and decides an appeal that is moot, the judgment of the appellate court 
will be reversed and the trial court's judgment reinstated, as if the appeal had been 
dismissed.” 
{¶ 19} Nonetheless, recognizing the various statutory and societal 
consequences attaching to a felony conviction, the court in State v. Golston 
(1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 643 N.E.2d 109, adopted a conclusive presumption 
that “[a] person convicted of a felony has a substantial stake in the judgment of 
conviction which survives the satisfaction of the judgment imposed upon him or 
her. Therefore, an appeal challenging a felony conviction is not moot even if the 
entire sentence has been satisfied before the matter is heard on appeal.”   Id. at 
syllabus.  We thus limited the holdings in Wilson and Berndt to appeals from 
misdemeanor convictions in which the appellant voluntarily completed the 
sentence and in which no collateral consequences resulted from the conviction.  
Id. at 227. 
{¶ 20} We have not yet considered what it means to “voluntarily” 
complete a sentence for purposes of the mootness doctrine, and the question of 
whether a misdemeanant must seek to stay execution of sentence both in the trial 
court and in the appellate court to preserve the justiciability of the appeal in these 
circumstances appears to be one of first impression for this court. 
{¶ 21} The Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, recently addressed a 
similar issue in State v. Malone (La.2009), 25 So.3d 113, which is instructive.  
The court noted that Louisiana had continued to follow the traditional rule that  
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“the satisfaction of the sentence renders the case moot so as to preclude review.” 
Id. at 116.  However, it also explained that completion of the sentence is not 
voluntary and will not moot the appeal if the circumstances show that the 
appellant did not intend to “acquiesc[e] in the judgment or abandon[] [the] right to 
review.” Id. at 123-124.  The court further stated that seeking appellate review 
prior to completing the sentence, moving for a stay of the sentence or for 
postconviction bail, and making a record that the sentence has been completed 
under protest each support a determination that the misdemeanant did not 
voluntarily satisfy the sentence.  Id. at 124-125.  Notably, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana emphasized: “The defendant could * * * have requested a stay of the 
execution of the sentence pending appellate review * * *. Even if his request had 
been denied, the completion of the sentence would have been involuntary, thus 
indicating an intent to retain his right to appellate review.”  Id. at 124. 
{¶ 22} This analysis complements that employed by Ohio courts in 
determining questions regarding mootness on appeal. 
{¶ 23} Thus, a misdemeanant who contests charges at trial and, after 
being convicted, seeks a stay of execution of sentence from the trial court for the 
purpose of preventing an intended appeal from being declared moot and thereafter 
appeals the conviction objectively demonstrates that the sentence is not being 
served voluntarily, because no intent is shown to acquiesce in the judgment or to 
intentionally abandon the right of appeal.  These circumstances also demonstrate 
that the appellant has “a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction,” Wilson, 
41 Ohio St.2d at 237, 70 O.O.2d 431, 325 N.E.2d 236, so that there is “subject 
matter for the court to decide.”  In re S.J.K., 114 Ohio St.3d 23, 2007-Ohio-2621, 
867 N.E.2d 408, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 24} Here, Lewis contested the state’s case at trial.  Although the court 
acquitted him of resisting arrest, it convicted him of obstructing official business 
for refusing to give the officer information about his daughter.  Following his 
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conviction, Lewis paid the fine and costs imposed but unsuccessfully sought a 
stay of execution from the trial court to prevent the intended appeal from 
becoming moot. He then appealed his conviction, but the six-month term of 
inactive probation expired during the pendency of that appeal.  Notably, however, 
Lewis’s sole assignment of error related to the court’s finding of guilt, and the 
appellate court could have provided redress of his claim that he had been 
wrongfully convicted notwithstanding the completion of the sentence. 
{¶ 25} These facts demonstrate that Lewis neither acquiesced in the 
judgment nor abandoned the right to appellate review. Therefore, it cannot be said 
that he voluntarily completed the sentence imposed by the court, and his appeal 
did not become moot, because the circumstances demonstrate that Lewis 
maintained a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction and there is subject 
matter for the appellate court to decide. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 26} The completion of a sentence is not voluntary and will not moot an 
appeal if the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate that the appellant neither 
acquiesced in the judgment nor abandoned the right to appellate review, that the 
appellant has a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction, and that there is 
subject matter for the appellate court to decide. Thus, the expiration of an inactive 
period of probation during the pendency of an appeal does not render the appeal 
moot because the misdemeanant failed to file a motion to stay in the appellate 
court where the misdemeanant unsuccessfully sought a stay of execution from the 
trial court to prevent an intended appeal from being declared moot and 
subsequently filed a notice of appeal to challenge the conviction. 
{¶ 27} Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the negative and 
affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, CUPP, and MCGEE 
BROWN, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurring. 
{¶ 28} While I concur in the majority’s decision, I write separately to 
highlight the extent of the collateral consequences of a misdemeanor conviction in 
today’s world. 
{¶ 29} Employment rights may be affected, including the ability to obtain 
and maintain licenses for dozens of activities from teaching (R.C. 3319.31 and 
3319.39(B)(1)), to practicing law (Gov.Bar R. 1), to auctioneering (R.C. 
4707.02), to transporting inmates (Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-35(G)), to 
embalming (R.C. 4717.14), to cosmetology (Ohio Adm.Code 4713-1-07) to 
operating bingo games (R.C. 2915.09), and everything in between. 
{¶ 30} In addition to affecting licensure and employment, misdemeanor 
convictions also affect civil, political, and legal rights.  This category of collateral 
consequences includes effects on qualifications for approval as an adoptive parent 
(Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-48-10) or foster caregiver (Ohio Adm.Code 5101:2-7-
02) and loss of rights related to firearms (R.C. 2923.13). 
{¶ 31} In addition to these direct consequences, there are also dozens of 
provisions of the Ohio Revised Code that use a prior misdemeanor conviction to 
enhance the severity of a later criminal charge or penalty.  Examples of 
misdemeanors that can result in penalty enhancement include nonsupport (R.C. 
2919.21(G)(1)), gambling (R.C. 2915.02(F) and 2915.03(B)), telecommunications 
harassment (R.C. 2917.21(C)(2)), and election falsification (R.C. 3599.11(B)(2) 
and (C)). 
{¶ 32} In addition to collateral consequences under state law, a 
misdemeanor conviction can lead to many consequences under federal law, such 
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as loss of financial aid for education (Section 1091(r), Title 20, U.S.Code), 
ineligibility for public housing (Sections 5.854, 5.855, and 960.203, Title 24, 
C.F.R.), and effects on immigration status (Sections 1182(a)(2) and 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), Title 8, U.S.Code) and government employment (Section 
44936, Title, U.S.Code). 
{¶ 33} In addition to the government realm, collateral consequences can 
also arise in the private realm.  Because anyone may obtain the criminal history of 
another under Ohio Adm.Code 109:5-1, private employers, landlords, insurers, 
educational institutions, and others may obtain information on misdemeanor 
convictions and use it in their decision-making processes. 
{¶ 34} Gone are the days when a misdemeanor conviction resulted in little 
or no real collateral consequences.  Rather, the collateral consequences resulting 
from a misdemeanor conviction today are real and significant.  Accordingly, I 
concur in the judgment of the majority in holding that the completion of a 
misdemeanor sentence will not make an appeal moot if the appellant sought a 
stay. 
 
MCGEE BROWN, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 35} I concur in judgment only. 
{¶ 36} We have never explicitly required that a misdemeanor appellant 
must request a stay in the court of appeals to prevent a sentence from taking effect 
before an appeal may be considered.  App.R. 8(B) allows, but does not require, an 
application for suspension of the execution of a sentence pending appellate 
review.  The completion of Lewis’s sentence of inactive probation may have 
mooted the appellate court’s consideration of sentencing issues, but, given the 
facts of this case, it did not moot the consequences of his conviction.  And, as 
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detailed in the concurrence by Justice Stratton, the collateral consequences of a 
conviction can be significant. 
__________________ 
Kim T. Segebarth, Cleveland Heights Prosecuting Attorney, and Brendan 
D. Healy, Assistant Law Director, for appellant. 
Kenneth D. Myers, for appellee. 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Cullen Sweeney 
and Nathaniel J. McDonald, Assistant Public Defenders, and Mark S. Gallagher, 
urging affirmance on behalf of amici curiae Cuyahoga County Public Defender, 
Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Towards Employment. 
D. Jim Brady, urging affirmance on behalf of amicus curiae D. Jim Brady. 
______________________