Case Title: In re Civil Commitment of T.W. v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 19S-MH-264

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 19S-MH-264 
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of T.W.,  
Appellant (Respondent) 
–v– 
St. Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, Inc.,                                            
d/b/a St. Vincent Stress Center, 
Appellee (Petitioner) 
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of A.M., 
 Appellant (Respondent) 
–v– 
Community Health Network, Inc., 
Appellee (Petitioner) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Decided: April 30, 2019 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court 
No. 49D08-1804-MH-14684 
The Honorable Steven R. Eichholtz, Judge 
The Honorable Kelly M. Scanlan, Commissioner 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,  
No. 18A-MH-1148 
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court 
No. 49D08-1802-MH-7271 
The Honorable Steven R. Eichholtz, Judge 
The Honorable Kelly M. Scanlan, Commissioner 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,  
No. 18A-MH-636 
Per Curiam Opinion 
All Justices concur. 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Apr 30 2019, 1:16 pm
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Per curiam  
The purposes of civil commitment proceedings include protecting the 
public and ensuring the rights of persons whose liberty is at stake. Civil 
Commitment of T.K. v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 27 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 
2015). With such interests involved, we write to underscore the 
importance of proper entry of commitment orders.    
Facts and Procedural History  
St. Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, Inc., d/b/a St. Vincent 
Stress Center, requested the temporary involuntary mental health 
commitment of T.W. The next day, Judge Steven R. Eichholtz of the 
Marion Superior Court, Probate Division, ordered the prehearing 
detention of T.W. and appointed a public defender. Commissioner Kelly 
M. Scanlan presided over the April 20, 2018 evidentiary hearing on St. 
Vincent’s request. Later that day, she signed an “Order for Temporary 
Commitment.” It stated that “the Court now finds by clear and convincing 
evidence” that T.W. suffers from a mental illness, is dangerous to others, 
is gravely disabled, and needs custody, care, and treatment at St. Vincent 
“for a period of time not to exceed ninety (90) days.” Appellant’s App. 
Vol. II at 10. The order committed T.W. to St. Vincent “until July 19, 2018 
unless discharged prior.” Id. at 11. The order is signed, “Kelly M. Scanlan, 
Judge, Marion Superior Court No. 8, Probate Division,” but is not 
countersigned by Judge Eichholtz. Id. The order directed distribution to 
the parties.    
T.W., by counsel, filed a notice of appeal on May 14, 2018, calling the 
temporary commitment order a final judgment. Id. at 3. On August 2, 
2018—after the period of temporary commitment defined in the order 
expired—T.W. filed an appellant’s brief arguing the evidence was 
insufficient to support the order and the order was defective because it 
was signed by the Commissioner only. After the appeal was fully briefed 
and transmitted to the Court of Appeals, T.W. moved for remand to the 
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trial court to enter a final order. St. Vincent objected to the motion and 
argued among other things that T.W. had waived any objection to the 
Commissioner’s authority to enter a final order.    
A divided Court of Appeals rejected T.W.’s arguments and affirmed. 
T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 113 N.E.3d 1257 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2018). Among other things, the majority held that although Indiana 
law barred the Commissioner from entering a final order in the case, T.W. 
waived appellate review of the issue by not objecting earlier. Id. at 1260. It 
also denied the motion for remand.  
A.M.’s case is separate but similar. Community Health Network, Inc., 
sought the temporary involuntary commitment of A.M. Judge Eichholtz 
issued a preliminary order continuing A.M.’s detention until a March 1, 
2018 hearing and appointing a public defender. Commissioner Scanlan 
presided over the March 1, 2018 hearing. Later that day, she signed an 
“Order of Temporary Commitment.” It stated that “the Court now finds 
by clear and convincing evidence” that A.M. is suffering from a mental 
illness, is gravely disabled, and needs custody, care, and treatment. 
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 9. It committed A.M. to Community’s in-
patient psychiatric unit until May 30, 2018, unless discharged earlier. The 
order is signed, “Kelly M. Scanlan, Judge, Marion Superior Court 8,” but is 
not countersigned by Judge Eichholtz. Id. at 10. The order directed 
distribution to A.M. and counsel. 
On March 26, 2018, A.M., by counsel, filed a notice of appeal, calling 
the temporary commitment order a final judgment. Id. at 3. On June 21, 
2018—after the period of temporary commitment defined in the order 
passed—A.M. filed an appellant’s brief arguing the evidence was 
insufficient to support the order and the order was defective because it 
was signed by the Commissioner only. On October 31, 2018, after the 
appeal was fully briefed, A.M. moved to remand the case to the trial court 
to issue a final order. But the Court of Appeals denied A.M.’s motion and 
affirmed. Matter of Civil Commitment of A.M., 116 N.E.3d 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2018). It held among other things that although Indiana law barred the 
Commissioner from entering a final order in A.M.’s case, A.M. had 
waived that issue. Id. at 501.    
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We grant the transfer petitions filed by A.M. and T.W. and consolidate 
their appeals for purposes of this opinion.     
Discussion  
We conduct de novo review of questions of statutory interpretation, 
Ballard v. Lewis, 8 N.E.3d 190, 193 (Ind. 2014), and appellate procedure.  
J.W. v. State, 113 N.E.3d 1202, 1206 (Ind. 2019).   
A threshold issue in these appeals is mootness. “The long-standing rule 
in Indiana courts has been that a case is deemed moot when no effective 
relief can be rendered to the parties before the court.” Matter of Lawrance, 
579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991). When the controversy at issue has been 
ended or settled, or somehow disposed of so as to render it unnecessary to 
decide the question involved, the case will be dismissed. Id. But “Indiana 
recognizes a public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, which 
may be invoked when the issue involves a question of great public 
importance which is likely to recur.” Matter of Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 54 
(Ind. 1991). When this Court elects to address an issue under the public 
interest exception, it need not “address all of the issues in the case as 
presented by the parties.” Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d at 37.  
The records show these appeals of the temporary commitment orders 
are moot. Statutes governing temporary commitment provide that “[i]f, 
upon the completion of the hearing and consideration of the record, the 
court finds that the individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or 
gravely disabled, the court may order the individual to: (1) be committed 
to an appropriate facility; or (2) enter an outpatient treatment program 
under IC 12-26-14 for a period of not more than ninety (90) days.” Ind. 
Code § 12-26-6-8(a); see Ind. Code § 12-26-6-1. The period specified in each 
appealed order has passed.  
Despite the appeals’ mootness, we address an issue of great public 
importance likely to recur: Did the Commissioner lack authority to enter 
orders of civil commitment? In Marion County, a probate commissioner 
may hear evidence and make reports to the court thereon, including 
“reports concerning the commissioner’s findings and conclusions 
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regarding the proceedings.” Ind. Code § 33-33-49-16(a). But all matters 
handled by a commissioner under this subsection “are under the final 
jurisdiction and decision of the judge of the probate division.” Id. The 
same statute provides a “master commissioner appointed by the court 
under this section has the powers and duties prescribed for a magistrate 
under IC 33-23-5-5 through IC 33-23-5-9” and a “master commissioner 
shall report the findings in each of the matters before the master 
commissioner in writing to the judge or judges of the division to which 
the master commissioner is assigned[.]” Ind. Code § 33-33-49-16(e) 
(emphasis added). With exceptions not applicable here, “a magistrate 
shall report findings in an evidentiary hearing, a trial, or a jury’s verdict to 
the court” and “[t]he court shall enter the final order.” Ind. Code § 33-23-
5-9(a); see In re Involuntary Commitment of A.M., 959 N.E.2d 832, 834 n.1 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting commitment order was “defective because it 
lacks a judge’s signature” and was signed only by the magistrate).1 
St. Vincent and Community do not argue the Commissioner had 
authority to issue a commitment order, i.e., a judgment. Nor do they deny 
that a judgment requires a “signature of the judge,” Ind. Trial Rule 
58(B)(5), or that Judge Eichholtz did not sign the commitment orders.  
Instead, they argue Judge Eichholtz approved each order via an 
“Approval Order for Record of Judgments and Daily Orders” entered in 
Probate Court Administrative Orders, No. 49D08-1708-CB-30844 (“CB 
number”). Specifically, St. Vincent relies on an Approval Order dated April 
23, 2018, signed by Judge Eichholtz, wherein he stated the court “being 
advised by the magistrate, commissioner and/or referee of this court 
approves the findings and recommendations of the magistrate, 
commissioner and/or referee and adopts the findings and recommendations 
as the order in all cases heard” on April 20, 2018. Br. of Appellee at 21-23; In 
re T.W., No. 49D08-1804-MH-14684 (chronological case summary (“CCS”) 
entry of Aug. 27, 2018). Community relies on a similarly phrased Approval 
                                                 
1 T.W., A.M., and Community identify Scanlan as “Master Commissioner.” St. Vincent refers 
to her simply as “Commissioner” without disputing her status as “Master Commissioner.” 
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Order, signed by Judge Eichholtz and dated March 2, 2018, which states the 
court was advised by the magistrate, commissioner, and/or referee and was 
adopting their findings and recommendations as the order in all cases heard 
March 1, 2018. Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 27.2  
The Approval Orders do not constitute valid commitment orders for 
these two mental health cases. The letters “CB” in the CB number, which 
appears on each of the Approval Orders, signifies a “Court Business 
record—i.e. court orders that refer to non-case matters such as the 
appointment of judge pro tem, drawing the jury, etc.” Ind. Administrative 
Rule 8(B)(3) (emphasis added). The Approval Orders do not cross-
reference any specific mental health case by title or number. Nor do they 
direct the clerk to enter the Approval Orders on the CCS for the mental 
health cases or direct distribution to parties or their counsel. And the 
Approval Orders are ambiguous in this context: they purport to adopt 
findings and recommendations of the “magistrate, commissioner and/or 
referee” for matters heard on a particular day, yet the temporary 
commitment orders, on their face, purport to be those of a “Judge,” not a 
commissioner, magistrate, or referee.3 In short, the Approval Orders 
provide inadequate assurance that Judge Eichholtz was presented with (in 
writing), reviewed, and approved the temporary commitment orders in 
the cases of T.W. and A.M. See L.J. v. Health & Hosp. Corp., 113 N.E.3d 274, 
277-78 & n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (disapproving of same court’s “peculiar” 
use of court business record and explaining that the “use of a business 
record order to summarily affirm multiple unspecified decisions by a 
commissioner in no way suggests the trial judge considered the merits of 
                                                 
2 We judicially notice the CCS for T.W.’s case in the trial court and the CCS for Probate Court 
Administrative Orders, No. 49D08-1708-CB-30844, both accessed through Odyssey, our 
electronic case management system. The latter CCS shows several orders appointing Scanlan 
as judge pro tempore but not for the dates she signed the orders concerning T.W. and A.M.      
3 As these cases show, the Commissioner’s signature on orders identifying herself as “Judge” 
is confusing. It clouds the signer’s role and prevents court staff and the clerk from reliably 
ascertaining if the “order” should be promptly recorded and processed as an order or 
judgment, or, instead, treated as a report of findings and recommended order and presented 
to the judge for decision. And, as to the parties, it obscures whether the petitioner has 
obtained relief and leaves the respondent not knowing how, when, and where to seek review.   
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-MH-264 | April 30, 2019 
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those decisions.”); see also In re Hawkins, 902 N.E.2d 231, 240 (Ind. 2009) 
(“Review of final orders by the presiding judge is not a mere 
technicality.”).4  
Conclusion 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Commissioner lacked 
authority to enter the commitment orders. Under these circumstances, 
though, where the orders concern periods that have expired, remanding 
those orders to the trial court for its review serves no apparent purpose.5 
Therefore, we dismiss the appeals as moot, without addressing sufficiency 
of the evidence or waiver.   
All Justices concur.  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L A N T T . W.   
Joel M. Schumm 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
Valerie K. Boots 
Marion County Public Defender Agency 
Appellate Division  
Indianapolis, Indiana  
                                                 
4 To the extent St. Vincent or Community implies the trial court’s approval of the commitment 
orders occurred later—when these appeals were pending and the court “corrected” or 
“modified” the records under Ind. Appellate Rule 32 to make the Approval Orders part of the 
trial court records in the cases of T.W. and A.M.—we disagree. By then, jurisdiction had 
vested in the Court of Appeals with the filing of the notice of completion of clerk’s record. See 
Ind. Appellate Rule 8. Also, the trial court’s CCS in T.W.’s case suggests it was Commissioner 
Scanlan, not Judge Eichholtz, who signed the order to “correct” the record. In re T.W., No. 
49D08-1804-MH-14684 (CCS entries for August 27, 2018); St. Vincent’s Appellee’s Resp. to 
Appellant’s Mot. for Limited Remand (attachment p.3).    
5 T.W. and A.M. contend that despite expiration of the commitment periods specified in the 
appealed orders, the orders allow potentially harmful collateral consequences. But we have 
declared the Commissioner lacked authority to order civil commitment, and T.W. and A.M. 
are free to ask the trial court for any relief they believe appropriate to avoid alleged collateral 
consequences.      
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A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E S T.  V I NC EN T  H OS PI TA L  A N D 
H E AL TH  C A RE  C ENT E R,  I N C.  D /B/ A S T. V IN CE N T S T RE SS 
C E NT E R 
Andrew B. Howk 
Matthew M. Schappa 
Hall Render Killian Heath & Lyman 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L A N T A .M.   
Joel M. Schumm 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
Valerie K. Boots 
Marion County Public Defender Agency 
Appellate Division  
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  A M IC US CU R IA E,  I ND I A NA P OL IS BA R  
A SS OC IA TI O N , A P PE LL A T E P RA CT I CE S EC TI O N     
Libby Y. Goodknight 
Krieg DeVault LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
Tyler D. Helmond 
Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin & Webb  
Indianapolis, Indiana  
Paul L. Jefferson  
McNeely Stephenson 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
Josh S. Tatum 
Plews Shadley Racher & Braun LLP  
Indianapolis, Indiana 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL L E E C OMM UN IT Y  HE AL TH  N E T W OR K ,  I N C.  
Jenny R. Buchheit 
Stephen E. Reynolds 
Gregory W. Pottorff 
Ice Miller, LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana