Case Title: Ronald J. Cavanaugh v. Skil Corporation, et als.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-30-99

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). VERNIERO, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this products liability case, the issues on appeal deal with the propriety of the trial court's jury charges in respect of the state-of-the-art defense and its ruling that comparative negligence could not be used as a defense in products liability cases involving certain workplace injuries. Plaintiff, Ronald J. Cavanaugh, suffered injuries, including loss of a toe, after he put down a portable circular saw, which then traveled about eighteen inches across the floor and ran over his foot. The saw was manufactured by Skil Corporation. Ultimately, he filed suit against Skil, alleging, among other things, that the saw was defective in its design. The matter was tried before a jury over several days. At the close of the evidence, the trial court held a charge conference. During that conference, counsel for Cavanaugh requested that the court give a state-of-the-art defense charge. The state-of-the-art defense, which has been codified in N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3, absolves a product manufacturer from liability for injuries or damages caused by its product if the manufacturer can establish that at the time the product left its control, there was not a practical and technically feasible alternative design that would have prevented the harm without substantially impairing the reasonably anticipated or intended function of the product. Skil objected to the proposed state-of-the-art defense charge, maintaining that Skil did not wish to assert the defense and that it had offered no evidence on the defense. Ultimately, the trial court decided to give the charge, finding that Skil had asserted the defense at least in principle, if not by name. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Cavanaugh in the amount of $160,000. Skil appealed on several grounds. In respect of the jury instructions, Skil maintained that it was prejudiced by the state-of-the-art defense charge because Cavanaugh had argued to the jury that Skil had not met its burden of proof on the defense after Skil rested without offering any proofs on it. In addition, Skil maintained that the charge confused the jury on the issue of which party bore the ultimate burden of proof and denied Skil a fair trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding, among other things, that because Skil had asserted the defense in principle, the trial judge's decision to charge the jury on the defense was not erroneous. The Supreme Court granted Skil's petition for certification. HELD: Although the trial court committed error in charging the jury on the state-of-the-art defense when defendant had not asserted it, that error did not unfairly prejudice the defendant-manufacturer because the jury correctly understood that plaintiff had the ultimate burden to prove that defendant's product was defective. The judgment of the Appellate Division, as modified, is affirmed substantially for the reasons set forth in its opinion. 1. When contending that the state of the art rendered the technology urged by a plaintiff unfeasible, the defendant must prove the technological state-of-the-art at the time the product left its control. However, to overcome what is otherwise an absolute bar to recovery, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that when the product was manufactured, it did not conform to whatever may have been the feasible technology. (pp. 2-8) 2. Under New Jersey's notice-pleading rules, a defendant is obliged to properly interpose the state-of-the-art defense when seeking its protection. The mere presentation of rebuttal evidence concerning a product's reasonable design, without more, does not automatically equate with an assertion of the state-of-the-art defense. (p. 8) 4. Although the complex wording of N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3 may be subject to different interpretations, under a sensible reading of the statute, the absence of both a practical and technically feasible alternative device is a necessary predicate to barring liability under the state-of-the-art defense. (p. 12) 5. Although it was error on the part of the trial court to charge the jury in the fashion that it did, viewing the record and instructions as a whole, the trial court's action did not unfairly prejudice Skil or produce an unjust result. The jury correctly understood that Cavanaugh had the ultimate burden to prove that Skil's product was defective, and its verdict should not be disturbed. (pp. 12-14) As modified, the judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN, STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, and LAVECCHIA join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion. RONALD J. CAVANAUGH, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SKIL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant, and JOHN DOE 1 through 20, (fictitious names of persons and/or business organizations more fully described herein); jointly, severally, and in the alternative, Defendants. Argued February 28, 2000 -- Decided May 24, 2000 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at ____ N.J.Super.____ (1999). Joseph Di Rienzo, Sr., argued the cause for appellant (Di Rienzo & Di Rienzo, attorneys; Mr. Di Rienzo and Joseph Di Rienzo, Jr., on the briefs). Bruce H. Zamost argued the cause for respondent (Colton, Stein & Zamost attorneys). Eric J. Ludwig argued the cause for amicus curiae, The Association of Trial Lawyers of America-New Jersey (Stark & Stark, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by This is a products liability action. Plaintiff suffered injuries, including the loss of a toe, after he put down defendant's portable circular saw, which then traveled about eighteen inches across the floor and ran over his foot. A jury awarded plaintiff $160,000. The principal issues in this appeal are whether the trial court erred (1) in charging the jury on the state-of-the-art defense, thereby improperly shifting the burden of proof to defendant; and (2) in ruling that comparative negligence could not be used as a defense in products liability cases involving certain workplace injuries. With one modification, we are satisfied to affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division upholding the jury's verdict substantially for the reasons expressed in the opinion below. Cavanaugh v. Skil Corp., ____ N.J. Super. ____ (App. Div. 1999). The modification concerns the state-of-the-art defense. We emphasize the importance of correctly allocating the burden of proof whenever that defense is asserted. The state-of-the-art defense has been codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3, which states in relevant part: a. In any product liability action against a manufacturer or seller for harm allegedly caused by a product that was designed in a defective manner, the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if: (1) At the time the product left the control of the manufacturer, there was not a practical and technically feasible alternative design that would have prevented the harm without substantially impairing the reasonably anticipated or intended function of the product; . . . . c. No provision of subsection a. of this section is intended to establish any rule, or alter any existing rule, with respect to the burden of proof. Until today, this Court has never stated directly and definitively that, (1) when contending that the state of the art rendered the technology urged by the plaintiff unfeasible, the defendant must prove the technological state-of-the-art at the time the product left its control, and (2) the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that when the product was manufactured, it did not conform to whatever may have been the feasible technology. The Court approves those allocations of the burden of proof on the basis of the Appellate Division's opinion, which includes this passage: The statutory state-of-the-art defense is available to all defendants in cases filed after July 22, 1987. State-of-the-art refers to the existing level of technological expertise and scientific knowledge relevant to a particular industry at the time a product is designed. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 182 (1983). State-of-the-art or the very safest product of that type which [an] industry could define at the time of manufacture is defined as a product for which there was no reasonable alternative design. Dreier, Goldman & Katz, New Jersey Products Liability & Toxic Torts Law 14:2 at [349 50] (Gann 1999). Of course, '[w]hen an affirmative defense is raised [in a civil case], the defendant normally has the burden of proving it.' Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 139 N.J. 365, 378 (1995) (quoting Biunno, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 2 on Evid.R. 101(b)(1) (1994-95)). However, [t]he burden on a defendant who claims a state-of the-art defense is to prove only the technological state-of-the-art when the product was manufactured. Fabian v. Minster Mach. Co., 258 N.J. Super. at 274. The defendant ha[s] no burden to prove its conformity with the state-of-the-art. Ibid. It remains plaintiff's burden, unaffected by the Product Liability Act, to prove non-conformity. Ibid. [Cavanaugh, supra, ____ N.J. Super. at ____ (slip op. at 32-33) (first citation omitted.)] Part of the confusion in this area of the law stems from the interplay between the statutory language and a plaintiff's general burden of proof in a civil action. As noted, the statute refers to a practical and technically feasible alternative design that would have prevented the harm without substantially impairing the reasonably anticipated or intended function of the product[.] N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3. In considering that language, we observed in Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co., 155 N.J. 544, 571 (1998), that under the state-of-the-art defense the manufacturer bears the burden of proving that its design of the [product] represented the state of the art. Moreover, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (the Restatement (Third) ) provides: A product . . . is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe[.] [Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 2(b) (1998).] Comment f of the Restatement (Third) describes the plaintiff's burden and instructs that [t]o establish a prima facie case of defect, the plaintiff must prove the availability of a technologically feasible and practical alternative design that would have reduced or prevented the plaintiff's harm. Thus, in looking at both the statute and Comment f to the Restatement (Third), it might appear that the plaintiff and defendant share the same burden of proof, or at least that the burdens overlap to some significant degree. Today's decision should clarify the discrete differences in the burdens of proof placed on the parties in a design-defect case in which the state-of-the-art defense is interposed. In a recent commentary, Judge Dreier explained the differences between the Restatement (Third) approach and our New Jersey statute as follows: NO. A-30 RONALD J. CAVANAUGH, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SKIL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant, and JOHN DOE 1 through 20, etc., Defendants. DECIDED May 24, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz