Case Title: People v. Pearson

Citation: 

Docket Number: S058157

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2013-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 3/21/13 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S058157 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
  
MICHAEL NEVAIL PEARSON, 
) 
 
) 
Contra Costa County 
 
Defendant and Defendant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 951701-2 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Michael Nevail Pearson of the first degree 
murders of Ruth Lorraine Talley and Barbara Garcia with personal use of a 
firearm and found true the multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation.  (Pen. 
Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd.(a)(3), former § 12022.5, subd. (a).)1  After a penalty 
trial, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The court denied the automatic motion 
to modify the verdict (§ 190.4, subd. (e)) and imposed that sentence.  This appeal 
is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)   
We affirm the judgment. 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
 2 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
a.  Introduction 
On the afternoon of Tuesday, April 25, 1995, defendant, a receptionist with 
the Conventional Housing division of the Richmond Housing Authority (RHA) 
was fired from his job because he had repeatedly threatened to ―do a 101 
California,‖ referring to the infamous 1993 massacre of numerous employees in a 
law office located at 101 California Street in San Francisco committed by Gian 
Luigi Ferri, a disgruntled client of the law firm.2  Minutes later, defendant hunted 
down and fatally shot two of his former coworkers, Lorraine Talley and Barbara 
Garcia.  These facts were undisputed at trial.  The sole issue for the jury to decide 
in the guilt phase was whether defendant premeditated and deliberated the 
murders. 
b.  Defendant’s employment at the RHA and statements to 
coworkers before the murders 
In January 1993, defendant began working in a temporary position for the 
City of Richmond in the Employment and Training Department.  He worked for 
that department for a year and then his employment was terminated.  In July 1994, 
defendant was hired in a temporary position as an office assistant with the Section 
8 division of the RHA, which handled the federal rental subsidy program.  After 
about six months, he was hired by the Conventional Housing division in a 
                                              
2  
Sward, 101 California — Legacy of Horror, Highrise massacre left behind 
change, challenges, S.F. Chronicle (June 30, 1998), available online at 
 
[as of March 21, 2013].) 
 
 
 3 
permanent position as a receptionist.  The terms of his employment included a six-
month probationary period, which was scheduled to terminate three days after the 
murders.  Talley was defendant‘s supervisor.   
Defendant chatted often with coworker Learinza Morris, and complained 
that he was treated unfairly and had a heavier workload than his coworkers.  
Defendant specifically mentioned Talley and Shirail Burton in making these 
complaints.  About two months before the shootings, defendant mentioned to 
Morris that he had received a poor performance evaluation and that it was 
unjustified because ―his work wasn‘t being evaluated properly—truthfully.‖  
Defendant felt he was being ―railroaded to a degree.‖  About three weeks before 
the shootings, defendant told Morris that he wanted to be transferred back to the 
Section 8 division of the RHA and that ―[t]hey better not mess with me because 
there might be a 101 California.‖ 
Some months before the shootings, while commuting to work, defendant 
told coworker Leona Kelly, ―Well, I know one thing, she [Talley] tries to get rid of 
me or they try to get rid of me, it‘s going to be another 101 California.‖  
Defendant complained to Ronald Keeton, a housing project manager at the 
Conventional Housing division of RHA, that he was being treated unfairly at 
work.  About two or three months before the shootings, defendant told Keeton, ―I 
ought to pull a 101‖ or ―if something happens to me, or if they get on me or make 
me quit my job or lose my job[,] there might be another 101 going on here.‖  
Keeton believed defendant was joking.  
On the Friday before the shootings, defendant approached Janet Robinson 
at her desk at the RHA and said, ―Sometimes, you know, I feel like doing a 101 
California Street here.‖  Robinson said, ―No, no, you wouldn‘t do that Michael‖ 
and ―If you do that, I‘ll lock myself in the safe.‖  Defendant assured her that he 
would not shoot her.  He told her to not tell anyone about what he had said, 
 
 4 
claiming it was ―just a joke.‖  Although Robinson was afraid to reveal the threat, 
she mentioned it to Garcia, who became terrified.   
c.  Defendant’s termination 
On the day of the shootings, Art Hatchett, the RHA‘s director, and Talley 
asked defendant to meet with them in Hatchett‘s office.  Hatchett informed 
defendant that a decision had been made to terminate his employment at the end of 
his probationary period because his job performance was unsatisfactory.  
Defendant was asked to return his building keys and identification badge, and he 
did.  Hatchett gave defendant his business card and offered to discuss employment 
opportunities with RHA and the city at some point in the future.  Defendant was 
given his final paycheck, and Hatchett terminated the meeting, which had lasted 
about six minutes.  Defendant was upset and close to tears, but appeared to be ―in 
control of himself‖ and not ―enraged.‖  Hatchett had decided not to discuss the 
true reason for defendant‘s termination, his threats to ―do a 101 California.‖   
After the meeting, Hatchett walked to Patricia Jones‘s office and informed 
Jones that defendant had been fired.  Earlier, Hatchett had told Jones and 
employees of the personnel department that he intended to fire defendant.  They 
had arranged to have a police officer posted outside the building when Hatchett 
and Talley met with defendant to discuss his termination.   
Hatchett returned to the reception area, where defendant was gathering his 
personal items at his desk.  Defendant did not appear to be enraged, and Hatchett 
was not concerned that defendant would become violent.  When defendant walked 
down the hallway, Hatchett followed him.  Defendant confronted Talley in the 
office of Hatchett‘s secretary, Mary Martinez, where Talley had remained after the 
meeting.  Defendant asked Talley if she would speak privately with him.  By this 
point, Hatchett had arrived at Martinez‘s office, and he told defendant that they 
 
 5 
could meet again in his office.  Hatchett, Talley, and defendant went to Hatchett‘s 
office, and defendant asked Talley whether ―that was it.‖  Talley responded that, 
―if you are speaking of this job as a receptionist, yes, this is all.‖  Defendant 
continued to question Talley about his termination, asking her whether she thought 
it was fair.  Talley did not respond to the question but stated that she was 
preparing to take vacation and that if defendant had further questions, he could 
discuss the matter with Hatchett.  Talley spoke firmly but respectfully.  
d.  Talley’s killing 
After the second meeting, Hatchett walked with defendant back to the 
reception area.  Hatchett followed defendant as he moved through the office.  As 
defendant continued to gather his personal belongings, he appeared hurt and sad.  
Meanwhile, Talley returned to Martinez‘s office.   
Defendant left the reception area but Hatchett did not follow him because 
he believed defendant was going to the restroom.  Moments later, Hatchett was 
standing with housing project manager Ronald Keeton when he heard an 
employee screaming that defendant had a gun.  He looked down the hall and saw a 
number of employees scrambling to leave the building.  When Hatchett saw 
defendant running down the hallway holding a gun in his right hand, Hatchett ran 
outside the building to the parking lot.   
Pamela Kime and Eric Spears were working in the conference room when 
they heard loud voices coming from the hallway.  Defendant was arguing with 
Talley.  He told her that he wanted to talk to her again, and she responded that she 
had said everything she wanted to say and that they had nothing further to talk 
about.  Defendant‘s voice became louder as he asked, ―You mean all of this work 
I‘ve done is for nothing?‖  Talley repeated that she had nothing more to say, and 
defendant asked her, ―So are you saying that all of the time I‘ve spent here has 
 
 6 
been for nothing?‖  Talley opened the conference room door and yelled, ―Go get 
Art [Hatchett]!‖  Defendant repeated his question, and Talley ran around the 
conference table and rushed past Kime.    
Spears saw defendant reach for a gun from his coat, and said, ―No, Michael, 
no Michael.‖  Defendant looked at Spears momentarily and shot Talley, who fell 
and slumped across a chair.   
After Kime heard the first gunshot, she turned around in her chair and saw 
defendant standing over Talley, pointing his gun at her and saying,  ―I ain‘t no 
joke.  I ain‘t no joke.‖  Defendant again looked at Spears, shrugged his shoulders, 
and again shot Talley, who had not moved.  Defendant held his arm straight out as 
he fired the shot.  
As defendant left the conference room, Kime stood up.  Defendant 
returned, pointed the gun at her, and told her to get back ―because he wasn‘t no 
joke.‖  Kime sat down.  Defendant lowered his gun and left the conference room.  
Kime checked on Talley, who was still alive with blood spurting from her neck.  
Spears tried unsuccessfully to call 911, and grabbed Kime, telling her they needed 
to get out of there.  Kime decided to remain behind and try to stop the bleeding 
from Talley‘s neck.   
e.  Garcia’s killing 
After hearing the gunshots, Robinson, Garcia and housing specialist Shirail 
Burton ran into Jones‘s office.  Burton climbed out a window.  Another employee 
followed her.  Robinson and Jones hid under the desk.  Garcia ran behind Jones‘s 
desk and became trapped in a corner by a computer table, ―so afraid that she was 
running in place,‖ ―whimper[ing].‖  Defendant fired three shots at Garcia. 
Robinson came up from under the desk and pleaded with defendant, 
―Michael, please don‘t kill me.‖  Defendant said, ―Janet, baby, I told you I wasn‘t 
 
 7 
going to shoot you.‖  Robinson understood defendant as referring to the 
conversation they had had the previous Friday.  Defendant left.  Garcia was 
sprawled on the floor, breathing heavily, and making gurgling sounds.   
On arriving at the scene, police found defendant in the administrative 
offices and took him into custody.    
f.  Other evidence 
Defendant had legally purchased from a pawn shop the Lorcin .380-caliber 
semiautomatic firearm he used in the shootings.  After the mandatory 15-day 
waiting period, he returned to the pawn shop the day before the shootings, picked 
up the gun, and purchased 50 rounds of .380-caliber ammunition.  That evening, 
defendant went to the shooting range and bought targets for shooting practice, as 
well as additional ammunition.   
When police took defendant into custody, an officer performed a patdown 
search for a weapon and found none.  When the officer asked defendant where he 
put his gun, defendant said that he placed it on the ledge outside the window.  The 
gun was recovered from a planter box outside the window.  It had a bullet jammed 
in the ejection port, and the magazine clip contained a single unfired PMC .380-
caliber round.  Three expended .380-caliber shell casings were recovered from 
Jones‘s office.  Two expended .380-caliber shell casings were recovered from the 
floor underneath the table in the conference room.   
 Investigators recovered a lunch box from the reception area that contained 
a type of plastic bag supplied with the purchase of a Lorcin gun of the kind 
defendant purchased.  Hatchett saw the lunch box on defendant‘s desk before he 
shot the victims.  At the police station, an unexpended .380-caliber bullet was 
recovered from defendant‘s coat pocket.   
 
 8 
The day after the shootings, police searched defendant‘s apartment in 
Oakland.  They recovered an empty box of .380-caliber ammunition, targets with 
several bullet holes in them, and a book entitled, ―Madness in Criminal Law‖ by 
Norval Morris.  A receipt dated April 24, 1995, for defendant‘s purchase of a 
Lorcin .380 semiautomatic firearm from United Jewelry Mart was recovered from 
inside one of the empty ammunition boxes.  
Both Talley and Garcia died as a result of gunshot wounds to the head.  
Additional evidence based on the autopsy reports and the testimony of a forensic 
pathologist, Dr. Brian Peterson, is discussed in part II.B.8., post.   
2.  Defense evidence 
 
During voir dire and at various other times throughout trial, including guilt 
phase closing argument, defense counsel conceded that defendant shot the victims 
with an intent to kill, but argued he did not act with the premeditation and 
deliberation required for first degree murder.  The defense presented extensive 
evidence of the acrimonious working environment at the Conventional Housing 
division, the hostility that existed between supervisor Lorraine Talley and her 
coworkers, accusations that Talley showed favoritism toward certain employees, 
and defendant‘s belief that Talley and Burton had treated him unfairly.   
In addition, Dr. Carol B. Walser, a psychologist who evaluated defendant in 
April 1996, testified about his mental state at the time of the shootings.  Dr. 
Walser opined that at the time of the shootings, defendant was delusional and 
suffered from a ―brief psychotic disorder with marked stressors,‖ disorganized 
functioning, chronic posttraumatic stress disorder, an organic ―cognitive disorder 
not otherwise specified,‖ and an impulse control disorder secondary to that 
disorder.  In forming this opinion, Dr. Walser relied on her psychological and 
neuropsychological evaluation of defendant and her review of the analysis of 
 
 9 
defendant‘s Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory II (MMPI-2) prepared 
by Dr. Alex Caldwell; the results of the Rorschach test conducted by a 
psychologist, Dr. John Kincaid; a psychological evaluation of defendant 
performed by Dr. George Wilkinson, a psychiatrist; and the report of defendant‘s 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) results.    
3.  Rebuttal evidence 
Dr. William Hoddick, an expert in radiology and diagnostic medical 
imaging, reviewed defendant‘s brain MRI and testified that it showed tiny fossa in 
the pariventricular and subcortical white matter of his brain.  Such abnormalities 
are seen in brain scans of people over age 50 but generally not those without a 
history of diabetes or cigarette smoking.  Also, tiny fossa are commonly present in 
those who abuse speed, crank, methamphetamine, or cocaine.  Dr. Hoddick opined 
that the fossa were not ―clinically significant‖ abnormalities and would not explain 
a person‘s behavior.   
Dr. Hoddick said the MRI also showed a small amount of cerebral spinal 
fluid on defendant‘s left temporal lobe, consistent with an arachnoid cyst, but 
―[t]here was no mass effect or pressure associated with it.‖  Dr. Hoddick could see 
no reason why this particular finding would cause a change in person‘s behavior.   
Two days after the shootings, at the request of the prosecution, Dr. Paul 
Berg, a psychologist, interviewed defendant while he was in custody in jail.  Dr. 
Berg did not find defendant to be psychotic and disagreed with Dr. Walser‘s 
diagnosis that defendant was delusional and suffering from a brief psychotic 
disorder when he shot the victims.   
Dr. Berg opined that when defendant told Talley ―I ain‘t no joke‖ before he 
fired the fatal shot to the back of her head, he acted out of anger, retribution, and 
revenge.  Defendant exhibited organized behavior ―[w]hen it became apparent to 
 
 10 
him that he could not talk to [Talley], [. . .] and he shot her and then after the first 
shot delivered a lethal shot to her head.‖  In Dr. Berg‘s opinion, defendant‘s 
actions belied any claim that he was delusional.  Defendant had been concerned 
for weeks before the murders that he would be fired from his job and he was in 
fact discharged.  According to Dr. Berg, defendant was ―absolutely‖ oriented in 
reality when he killed Talley.    
Finally, Dr. Berg opined that defendant was organized and had a ―pretty 
good memory‖ when he reminded Robinson, immediately after he fatally shot 
Garcia, that he had promised her he would not shoot her.  The remark indicated 
that defendant selected his victims and had the ability to recall and refer to a 
previous conversation.  In addition, that defendant brought a concealed gun into 
work suggested ―organization . . . in case he got fired.‖     
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
Numerous witnesses testified about the impact of the victims‘ deaths on 
their family, friends, and the community at large.  In addition, several 
eyewitnesses to the murders testified about how they were affected by the crimes 
and the victims‘ deaths. 
2.  Defense evidence 
Defendant helped Gary Reynolds, an acquaintance, overcome his cocaine 
addiction.  Defendant was a positive influence in Reynolds‘s life and taught him 
he could have a better life and be a better person.  
Defendant‘s uncle, Charles Thomas (Charles), was a childhood friend of 
defendant‘s mother, Mary Jane Thomas (Mary Jane), and had known defendant all 
his life.  Charles knew defendant‘s father, ―Junior,‖ who had abandoned defendant 
and his mother shortly after defendant was born.  Charles could not recall anything 
 
 11 
unusual about defendant‘s upbringing, except that when defendant was four or five 
years old, and for unknown reasons, he was sent to live with his biological father‘s 
family.  However, defendant eventually returned to live with his mother.  Within a 
few years of defendant‘s return, Mary Jane and her boyfriend, Pete, had two sons 
together.  Pete abused Mary Jane, and they separated when defendant was six or 
seven years old.  About a year later, Mary Jane married Charles‘s brother, 
Lafayette Thomas.  Thereafter, the couple, defendant, and defendant‘s half 
brothers lived in a housing project in San Francisco.  Sometime in the 1960‘s, they 
moved to Oakland.   
Charles knew defendant to be ―a very nice kid‖ who was always ―very 
respectful towards him.‖  He was ―totally surprised‖ when he learned about the 
shooting and ―figured somebody must have really shoved Michael over the cliff.  
Somebody must have pushed him really hard. . . .  He‘s never been a violent 
person.‖   
Mary Jane described defendant as a normal, happy, playful child and an 
average student, but stated that he was something of a loner.  Defendant had 
seizures in his early childhood years, but was never tested to see if the seizures 
were related to any abnormal brain activity or might cause him any mental health 
problems.   
After defendant served in the military, he often would talk to himself.  He 
developed a drug addiction, sought treatment at a rehabilitation center, and 
overcame his addiction.  Defendant was happy and proud when he was first hired 
by the City of Richmond for a temporary position.  He wanted to buy his mother a 
home with the money he earned.  After he was hired by the Conventional Housing 
division at RHA, he talked with his mother about problems he had with his 
supervisor.   
 
 12 
Robert Young, head chef at the Contra Costa County Jail in Martinez, 
testified that, while defendant awaited trial, he and defendant talked about the 
murders and defendant appeared to express remorse.   
Defendant‘s half brother, William Keith Pearson, recalled that when 
defendant was about 13 years old, he had a seizure while playing in a park.  
Defendant was a good son and brother, rarely had to be disciplined, did well in 
school, and graduated from high school.  Defendant believed he was being treated 
unfairly in his position at the Conventional Housing division, although he never 
identified the person he believed was mistreating him.  
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Jury Selection Issues 
1. Restriction on voir dire  
Defendant contends that the death-qualification portion of voir dire was 
inadequate because the trial court failed to clarify the term ―mitigating 
circumstance‖ or to ask prospective jurors whether they could recognize and 
consider particular facts as mitigating under section 190.3.  The claim lacks merit. 
a.  Factual background 
Before death qualification voir dire commenced, the prospective jurors 
completed a written questionnaire.  In response to a series of multiple choice 
questions, the prospective juror who eventually was seated as Juror No. 4 
(hereafter, Juror No. 4) indicated that the state should ―sometimes‖ (as opposed to 
―always‖ or ―never‖) impose the death penalty on ―everyone‖ who kills 
unlawfully, intentionally, or with deliberate and premeditated intent.  In the 
adjacent explanation section, Juror No. 4 added that ―[t]here could be 
circumstances, such as self defense, fear of life, accidental occurrences, etc. [in 
which the death penalty should not be imposed]‖  The trial court asked Juror No. 4 
 
 13 
whether he could properly consider and weigh evidence offered in aggravation and 
mitigation in deciding penalty, and whether he could vote for a life sentence if the 
mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating and impose the death 
penalty if the opposite were true.  Juror No. 4 stated he could. 
Outside the presence of the panel, defense counsel, Mr. Veale, expressed 
concern that, based on Juror No. 4‘s written responses to the questionnaire, the 
juror did not understand that if a defendant was found not guilty of murder 
because, for example, he killed in self-defense or the killing was the result of an 
accident, then no penalty trial was required.  He asked the court to inquire whether 
the juror would vote for a life sentence only if the case involved self-defense or 
accidental death.  The court denied defense counsel‘s request, finding that the 
mitigating circumstances the juror identified did not represent the only 
circumstances not warranting death, but were merely representative of those in 
which he could vote for life.  In addition, the court precluded counsel from asking 
prospective jurors about case-specific mitigating factors.  After the conference, 
counsel was permitted to clarify for Juror No. 4 and the other panelists that a 
killing committed in self-defense is not murder and that a defendant who killed 
under these circumstances would not face a penalty trial.  At the prosecutor‘s 
request, the court read to the prospective jurors CALJIC No. 8.85, which listed the 
statutory sentencing factors they would later be asked to consider in deciding 
penalty. 
b.  Forfeiture 
The People assert that defendant failed to preserve this claim for review 
because he did not utilize all of his peremptory challenges, express dissatisfaction 
with the jury as sworn, or raise a specific constitutional challenge to voir dire.  We 
disagree.    
 
 14 
―A defendant‘s failure to raise a for-cause challenge or to exhaust all 
peremptory challenges is relevant to the question whether he has preserved a claim 
on appeal that members of his jury were unacceptable to him.‖  (People v. Taylor 
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 606.)  But without an adequate voir dire, ―the defense is 
denied information upon which to intelligently exercise both its challenges for 
cause and its peremptory challenges.  Because the exercise of peremptory 
challenges cannot remedy the harm caused by inadequate voir dire, we have never 
required, and do not now require, that counsel use all peremptory challenges to 
preserve for appeal issues regarding the adequacy of voir dire.‖  (People v. Bolden 
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 537-538.)  In addition, as discussed below, defense counsel 
made multiple requests to question the prospective jurors regarding their ability to 
properly consider the statutory mitigating factors.  Under these circumstances, the 
claim is not forfeited on appeal.  (See People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 
606.) 
c.  Discussion 
Defendant contends that the trial court was obligated to ask prospective 
jurors whether they were able to identify and consider specific circumstances as 
mitigating.  He contends that questioning along these lines was necessary to 
ensure that the prospective jurors would not limit their consideration of mitigating 
circumstances to those identified by Juror No. 4, self-defense and accident, which 
did not apply in this case.  We disagree. 
A prospective juror may be excused for cause when the juror‘s views on 
capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or 
her duties as a juror.  (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.)  A 
prospective juror is substantially impaired within the meaning of Witt and may 
properly be excused for cause if he or she is unable to follow the trial court‘s 
 
 15 
instruction and ―conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, 
including the death penalty where appropriate.‖  (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 
Cal.4th 318, 340.)  ― ‗Our decisions have explained that death-qualification voir 
dire must avoid two extremes.  On the one hand, it must not be so abstract that it 
fails to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or 
substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in the case being 
tried.  On the other hand, it must not be so specific that it requires the prospective 
jurors to prejudge the penalty issue based on a summary of the mitigating and 
aggravating evidence likely to be presented.  [Citation.]  In deciding where to 
strike the balance in a particular case, trial courts have considerable discretion.‘ ‖  
(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 47). 
Keeping these principles in mind, this court has held that ―either party is 
entitled to ask prospective jurors questions that are specific enough to determine if 
those jurors harbor bias, as to some fact or circumstance shown by the trial 
evidence, that would cause them not to follow an instruction directing them to 
determine penalty after considering aggravating and mitigating evidence.‖  
(People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 720-721.)  In other words, a trial court errs 
in precluding all counsel ―[from] ask[ing] jurors if they would automatically vote 
for or against death ‗in cases involving any generalized facts, whether pleaded or 
not, that were likely to be shown by the evidence‘ [citation].‖  (Id., at p. 720.)  
Here, defense counsel was permitted to ask prospective jurors whether they 
could weigh all the evidence before deciding penalty in a case involving multiple 
murder and whether they could consider a defendant‘s lack of criminal history as 
mitigating.  Counsel was also permitted to clarify for the prospective jurors that a 
defendant who killed in self-defense did not commit murder and would not face a 
penalty trial.  Indeed, as this court has recognized, ―it would be ‗rare . . .‘ to find 
mitigating evidence in a capital case which could justify or excuse the defendant‘s 
 
 16 
conduct.‖  (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 884.)  Counsel informed the 
prospective jurors that defendant would not rely on a defense of either self-defense 
or accidental death.  Therefore, the trial court did not err by precluding counsel 
from further questioning the prospective jurors regarding these specific 
circumstances.   
Defense counsel also sought to describe for the prospective jurors various 
circumstances other than self-defense and accidental death that could properly be 
considered among the statutory mitigating factors, and to ask whether they would 
consider such factors mitigating.  But counsel are not entitled to indoctrinate the 
jurors as to a particular view of the facts and ask whether they would cause him or 
her to vote for a specific penalty.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 991.)  
The court did not err in precluding counsel from pursuing this line of questioning.  
Further, to the extent defendant contends the trial court was required to 
inform the prospective jurors that they must give mitigating effect to a defendant‘s 
lack of prior criminal history, he is mistaken.  ―The absence of prior violent 
criminal activity and the absence of prior felony convictions are significant 
mitigating circumstances in a capital case, where the accused frequently has an 
extensive criminal past.‖  (People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 884.)  
However, what import, if any, a juror assigns to relevant aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances is solely for the juror to decide.  (See People v. Clark 
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 165; CALJIC No. 8.88.)   
2.  Comments regarding the penalty of life without possibility of parole   
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously informed prospective jurors 
during death qualification that they were permitted, but not required, to vote for a 
life sentence if the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating 
circumstances.  We disagree.  
 
 17 
During voir dire of the third panel of prospective jurors, one panelist 
indicated that he would never be able to vote for the death penalty under any 
circumstances, and thus would be unable to participate in penalty phase 
deliberations.  The trial court told him that ―it isn‘t the duty of a juror to vote for 
death or life without the possibility of parole, but it‘s the obligation of the jury to 
at least be able to consider those things.‖  It then asked whether it was ―getting the 
[correct] impression from your comments you could not do that?‖  He responded, 
―That‘s correct.‖  Thereafter, this panelist was excused.  Two of the remaining 
panelists eventually served on the jury, as Jurors No. 6, the foreperson, and No. 
11. 
While examining the prospective jurors of the fourth panel, the court stated, 
―If you find that . . . the mitigating evidence outweighs the aggravating evidence, 
you could vote for life without the possibility of parole.  As a matter of fact, the 
instructions as I would indicate to you [] suggest that that should be a 
consideration [. . .] [as] part of [. . . ] [your] analysis . . . .  [¶]  But as you can see 
there is no burden of proof in that particular portion of the case.  It is very much a 
decision that‘s made by each juror after they weigh and consider the aggravating 
and mitigating factors.‖  One member of that panel sat on the jury as Juror No. 1. 
Preliminarily, defendant forfeited his ability to challenge the court‘s 
explanation by failing to make a specific and timely objection.  (People v. Mills 
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 170.)  In any event, the claim lacks merit.  
Defendant contends that the court‘s comments to the third and fourth panels 
erroneously ―instructed‖ the prospective jurors that they were not required to vote 
for a life sentence under any circumstances, and that this information contravenes   
 
 18 
section 190.3.3  Even assuming the court‘s comments were error as defendant 
suggests, any error was harmless.   
The court‘s statements during jury selection were not the full instructions 
regarding the jury‘s deliberative process.  The full jury instructions came only 
after the evidence portion of trial, when the court instructed the actual jury 
regarding its obligations.  (See People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 840-
841.)  Before deliberations, the court instructed the jurors to follow its penalty 
phase instructions and ―[d]isregard all other instructions that were given to you in 
other phases of this trial.‖  Additionally, the jurors were instructed under CALJIC 
No. 8.84.2 (now 8.88) as follows:  ―To return a judgment of death, each of you 
must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in 
comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life 
without parole.‖  (CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (1986 rev.).)  We presume that jurors 
understand and follow the court‘s instructions.  (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 93, 139.) 
Further, we reject defendant‘s related contention that in the absence of an 
―instruction‖ to the prospective jurors that they must vote for life if the mitigating 
evidence outweighed the aggravating evidence, the voir dire process failed to 
identify pro-death jurors who would disregard the law and vote for death 
regardless of the weight of mitigating evidence.  He asserts that the court‘s 
examination of the panelist who became Juror No. 11, for example, failed to 
obtain an assurance from this juror that he could vote for life based on the weight 
                                              
3  
Section 190.3 provides in relevant part:  ―If the trier of fact determines that 
the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of 
fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life 
without the possibility of parole.‖ 
 
 19 
of mitigating evidence presented.  The record reveals that, although this juror 
initially indicated that he would hesitate to vote for life in such a scenario, he did 
so only in response to inartfully phrased questions posed by the court.  In context, 
this juror made clear that he could keep an open mind during the penalty phase 
and consider all of the evidence offered in aggravation and mitigation in 
determining the appropriate penalty.  Defendant identifies no juror who indicated 
he or she would impose a death sentence without regard to the weight of any 
mitigating evidence presented.  As we have repeatedly stated: ― ‗[t]he only 
question the court need resolve during this stage of the voir dire is whether any 
prospective juror has such conscientious or religious scruples about capital 
punishment, in the abstract, that his views would ― ‗prevent or substantially impair 
the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his 
oath.‘ ‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖  (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 47; People v. Clark 
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 597.)  The court‘s voir dire was adequate in this regard. 
3.  Comments regarding aggravating circumstances   
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it stated to prospective 
jurors during the death qualification portion of jury selection that they could 
consider the bare elements of murder (e.g., intent to kill, premeditation, 
deliberation) and ―all‖ of the crime facts as aggravating factors under section 
190.3, factor (a), which permits jurors to consider the ―circumstances of the 
crime‖ in deciding penalty.  As a result, defendant claims the court‘s examination 
of prospective jurors was inadequate to reveal a potential inability or 
unwillingness to follow CALJIC No. 8.88, which defines the term ―aggravating 
factor‖ as ―any fact, condition or event attending the commission of a crime which 
increases its severity or enormity, or adds to its injurious consequences which is 
above and beyond the elements of the crime itself.‖  (Italics added.)  Defendant 
 
 20 
maintains that because neither the court nor counsel could identify jurors who 
were disqualified on this basis, the jury as sworn was ―tainted.‖  We disagree.   
According to defendant, the court erroneously defined ―aggravating 
circumstances‖ while it conducted individual voir dire of certain pro-life or pro-
death prospective jurors, none of whom were selected to serve on the jury.  For 
example, in qualifying a member of the first panel, the court stated:  ―In phase two 
you are going to be asked to evaluate mitigating and aggravating factors.  
Certainly one of the aggravating factors may be the crime facts themselves, such 
as whether or not this was deliberate and premeditated murder.‖   To a member of 
the third panel, the court commented on the standard instruction defining 
deliberate and premeditated murder (CALJIC No. 8.20), as follows:  ―Based on 
the instruction[] I have just given you, I can tell you that a first degree murder is a 
murder that is committed with premeditation and deliberation.  All right.  That is 
one of the crime facts you consider in the penalty phase of this trial.‖  It then asked 
this prospective juror, ―Do you feel based on your current frame of mind you 
would be able to evaluate possible mitigating circumstances as well as the crime 
facts before you determined what penalty to impose?‖ 
Preliminarily, defendant‘s failure to make a timely and specific objection 
on the ground he now raises forfeits the claim on appeal.  (See People v. Foster 
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1324.)  In any event, the claim fails on the merits. 
We have repeatedly rejected related arguments that a penalty phase jury is 
precluded from considering in aggravation ―any aspect of the crimes that was part 
and parcel of the elements of first degree murder.‖  (People v. Coddington (2000) 
23 Cal.4th 529, 640, italics added; see also Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 
231, 246 [―the fact that the aggravating circumstance duplicated one of the 
elements of the crime does not make [the death] sentence constitutionally infirm‖]; 
People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 164 [the jurors‘ consideration of the bare 
 
 21 
―elements‖ required for conviction of first degree murder in aggravation as a 
―circumstance‖ of the crime did not ―preclude[] any meaningful distinction 
between first degree murderers who receive death and those who do not‖]; People 
v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 945-946 [the ―triple use‖ of the same crime 
facts does not offend the cruel and unusual punishments clause].)  ―All 
circumstances of the crime or crimes may be considered.‖  (People v. Coddington, 
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 640; see § 190.3, factor (a).) 
Here, the court preliminarily informed the prospective jurors in each panel 
that the purpose of the death qualification portion of jury selection was to ensure 
that their personal views would not preclude them from voting for either penalty.  
By its questions and comments, the court stressed that at the beginning of any 
penalty trial, a juror must have an open mind on the question of punishment and 
consider all the evidence offered in aggravation and mitigation before deciding 
penalty.  Moreover, the court repeatedly emphasized that a juror could not vote for 
death simply because the defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated 
murder and a special circumstance was found true.  As indicated above, however, 
the court‘s remarks varied slightly on occasion, and some may have been 
understood to mean that the elements of the crimes and the facts were themselves 
aggravating factors.  Nonetheless, any error was harmless because any improper 
statements amounted to minor discrepancies when compared with the court‘s 
otherwise accurate description of a capital juror‘s duties.  Additionally, neither the 
court nor the parties otherwise were precluded from asking additional questions in 
assessing whether a potential juror was disqualified. 
4.  Prospective jurors’ ability to follow the law   
Defendant contends that the trial court was not evenhanded in conducting 
death qualification voir dire.  Specifically, he contends that, with respect to 
 
 22 
prospective jurors whose questionnaire responses indicated strong support for the 
death penalty, the court‘s questions focused on their willingness to properly 
consider and weigh evidence offered in aggravation and mitigation in deciding 
penalty, and avoided the issue of whether the prospective juror could vote for life 
without possibility of parole.  In contrast, in questioning prospective jurors whose 
questionnaire responses indicated strong opposition to capital punishment, the 
court inquired about their ability to impose a death sentence, but not whether they 
would consider all the evidence before deciding penalty.  As a result, defendant 
asserts the jury selection process was unfair.  
Preliminarily, because defendant did not object to the adequacy of voir on 
the ground he raises on appeal, the claim is forfeited.  (People v. Harris (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 310, 330.)  It also lacks merit. 
―Decisions concerning the qualifications of prospective jurors to serve rest 
within the ‗ ―wide discretion‖ ‘ of the trial court, and the manner of the court‘s 
conduct of voir dire is ‗ ―seldom disturbed on appeal.‖ ‘  (People v. Thornton 
[(2007)] 41 Cal.4th [391,] 420.)‖  (People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 
445.)   
While trial courts ―should be evenhanded in their questions to prospective 
jurors during the ‗death-qualification‘ portion of the voir dire, and should inquire 
into the jurors‘ attitudes both for and against the death penalty to determine 
whether these views will impair their ability to serve as jurors‖ (People v. 
Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908–909), they are not required to examine each 
prospective juror in the same manner, ―lest the court feel compelled to conduct a 
needlessly broad voir dire, receiving answers to questions it does not need to ask‖ 
(People v. Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 425). 
We disagree that the court‘s voir dire predisposed the selected jury to favor 
the death penalty.  The court examined each prospective juror individually and 
 
 23 
fairly in determining whether his or her attitudes would prevent him or her from 
performing the duties of a capital juror, and properly inquired of each prospective 
juror whether he or she was able and willing to follow the law, weigh the 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and vote for either penalty.  There is no 
indication in the record that the court questioned prospective jurors differently 
based on their death penalty views.  Counsel were permitted to pose questions 
designed to expose jurors‘ bias in favor of or against the death penalty that would 
undermine their ability to perform their duties.  Furthermore, defendant does not 
now contend that the court erroneously excluded or retained a particular 
prospective juror.  Thus, ―[t]he trial court‘s questions caused no prejudice, and 
therefore do not warrant reversal of defendant[‘s] convictions.‖  (People v. 
Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 909.) 
5.  Group voir dire on attitudes toward the death penalty  
Defendant contends that the trial court did not exercise informed discretion 
in denying his request to conduct the death qualification portion of voir dire with 
each prospective juror individually and in sequestration.  The claim lacks merit. 
―In Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80, this court decided that 
in capital prosecutions the death-qualification portion of each prospective juror‘s 
voir dire should be sequestered, meaning that it should be conducted out of the 
presence of other prospective jurors.  This court did not hold that sequestered voir 
dire was constitutionally required; instead, we mandated this practice as a rule of 
procedure.  [Citations.]  In 1990, however, the voters abrogated this aspect of 
Hovey by enacting Proposition 115, which added section 223 to the Code of Civil 
Procedure.  That statute provides, in part, that ‗where practicable‘ the trial court 
must conduct voir dire ‗in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, 
 
 24 
including death penalty cases.‘  (Code Civ. Proc., § 223.)‖  (People v. Jurado 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 100.)4   
During pretrial proceedings, the court informed counsel of its experience 
using a modified Hovey voir dire of prospective jurors in groups of six, and 
solicited counsel‘s suggestions regarding the procedure to apply in this case.  The 
prosecutor asked for nonsequestered voir dire because, among other things, 
individual sequestered voir dire would require an additional two weeks to select a 
jury.  Defense counsel requested individualized voir dire, expressing concern that 
group voir dire would inhibit a juror‘s ―full disclosure‖ of his or her views on the 
death penalty.  The court acknowledged that group voir dire may not be 
appropriate in all cases but stated that, in its experience, jurors were more candid 
in responding to questions ―by having other [jurors] present who could talk about 
their fears and anxieties and concerns about sitting on the jury.‖  The court 
solicited and received additional comments from counsel and thereafter ruled that 
it would conduct the death qualification voir dire in groups of 25 prospective 
jurors.   
                                              
4  
At the time of defendant‘s 1996 trial, section 223 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure provided:  ―In a criminal case, the court shall conduct the examination 
of prospective jurors.  However, the court may permit the parties, upon a showing 
of good cause, to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it deems 
proper, or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors upon such a showing, such 
additional questions by the parties as it deems proper.  Voir dire of any 
prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other 
jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases.  [¶]  Examination of 
prospective jurors shall be conducted only in aid of the exercise of challenges for 
cause.  [¶]  The trial court‘s exercise of its discretion in the manner in which voir 
dire is conducted shall not cause any conviction to be reversed unless the exercise 
of that discretion has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, as specified in Section 13 
of Article VI of the California Constitution.‖  (Code Civ. Proc., former § 223, 
added by Prop. 115, § 7, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990).) 
 
 25 
Preliminarily, we disagree with the People‘s assertion that defendant failed 
to preserve his claim for review because he did not formally object to the court‘s 
procedure on the grounds he asserts on appeal.  During the discussions regarding 
death qualification, defense counsel indicated his opposition to the court‘s 
intention to conduct group voir dire and offered justification for individualized 
voir dire.  The issue is cognizable.  (See People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 
606 [defendant who timely objects to group voir dire and proposes that the trial 
court conduct individually sequestered voir dire ―has done all that is necessary‖].) 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for 
individual, sequestered voir dire because it misunderstood the scope of its 
discretion under Code of Civil Procedure former section 223.  Specifically, he 
asserts that the court erroneously assumed the statute limited its discretion to 
conduct Hovey voir dire in only highly publicized cases or cases presenting 
unusual circumstances.  Defendant also complains that the court erred by deciding 
the voir dire issue before it reviewed the prospective jurors‘ written responses to 
the juror questionnaire.  
An appellate court reviews a trial court‘s denial of a motion for individual 
and sequestered voir dire for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 415, 494.) 
Defendant fails to show an abuse of discretion.  Viewed in context, the 
court‘s comments, described above, do not show that it misunderstood its 
discretion under Code of Civil Procedure former section 223.  Instead, the 
statements reveal the court‘s correct understanding that whether Hovey voir dire 
was required was a matter falling solely within its broad discretion and that it 
might order such voir dire when warranted by the circumstances of a particular 
case, for example, when there had been substantial pretrial publicity.  (See People 
 
 26 
v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 513-514.)  Nowhere did the court express an 
understanding that it could exercise its discretion only under such circumstances. 
Additionally, the court invited counsel to comment on its proposed 
approach and solicited suggestions for any alternative procedures they cared to 
propose.  The court‘s actions suggested it was well aware of its discretion under 
Code of Civil Procedure former section 223.  Furthermore, the trial court‘s 
rejection of defense counsel‘s argument that individualized voir dire would yield 
more candid responses was reasonable.  (See People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th 
at p. 607.)  The court, moreover, conducted individual, sequestered voir dire when 
a prospective juror expressed concerns about the death penalty and also permitted 
counsel to question prospective jurors about their responses to the written 
questionnaire.  
We have held that ―[g]roup voir dire may be ‗impracticable‘ when it has 
resulted in ‗actual, rather than merely potential, bias.‘ ‖  (People v. Taylor, supra, 
48 Cal.4th at p. 606, quoting People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 288.)  
Defendant has not established that the trial court‘s comments or the prospective 
jurors‘ responses to the trial court‘s questions negatively affected any prospective 
juror.  Also, defendant fails to ―describe any specific example of how questioning 
prospective jurors in the presence of other jurors prevented him from uncovering 
juror bias.‖  (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 490.)  Finally, defendant 
has not shown that the court‘s failure to review the jury questionnaires before 
ruling in this regard resulted in the participation of any biased jurors. 
Finally, defendant contends that the court‘s denial of his request for Hovey 
voir dire deprived him of his rights to a fair trial and impartial jury.  We disagree.  
(See, e.g., People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 633; People v. Avila (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 491, 559.) 
 
 27 
6.  Batson/Wheeler   
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion under Batson 
v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson ) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 
258 (Wheeler) based on the prosecutor‘s exercise of a peremptory challenge to 
excuse an African-American prospective juror.  We disagree. 
During jury selection, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor‘s excusal 
of Prospective Juror S.G., an African-American, on the ground that there were ―so 
few‖ African-Americans on the panel.  The trial court denied the motion, finding 
defendant failed to show ―systematic exclusion.‖  
―Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory 
challenges to remove prospective jurors based solely on group bias.  (Batson, 
supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277.) . . . ‗[T]he 
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that Batson states the procedure and 
standard to be employed by trial courts when challenges such as defendant‘s are 
made.  ―First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by ‗showing that the 
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.‘  
[Citations.]  Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the 
‗burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion‘ by offering 
permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.  [Citations.]  Third, ‗[i]f a 
race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . .  whether 
the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.‘  
[Citation.]‖ ‘  (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 66-67, quoting Johnson v. 
California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted (Johnson).)‖  (People v. Guerra 
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1100.)  ―[A] defendant satisfies the requirements of 
Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to 
draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.‖  (Johnson v. California, 
supra, 545 U.S. at p. 170.) 
 
 28 
― ‗When a trial court denies a Wheeler motion without finding a prima facie 
case of group bias, the appellate court reviews the record of voir dire for evidence 
to support the trial court‘s ruling.  [Citations.]  We will affirm the ruling where the 
record suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have 
challenged the jurors in question.‘ [Citation.]‖  (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 1101.) 
Preliminarily, defendant asserts that, because the trial court did not 
articulate the standard it used in denying his Batson/Wheeler motion, we must 
assume that it applied the ―strong likelihood‖ standard that Johnson disapproved, 
instead of the correct ―reasonable inference‖ standard under Batson.  Defendant 
contends that because the court failed to properly determine whether he 
established a prima facie case of racial bias, it‘s ruling should be accorded no 
deference and reversal is required.  We disagree. 
―Regardless of the standard employed by the trial court, and even assuming 
without deciding that the trial court‘s decision is not entitled to deference, we have 
reviewed the record and, like the United States Supreme Court in Johnson, supra, 
545 U.S. 162, are able to apply the high court‘s standard and resolve the legal 
question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a 
juror on the basis of race.‖  (People v. Cornwall, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 73.)   
Defense counsel sought to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
based solely on the circumstance that the prosecutor exercised his second 
challenge against one of three African-American prospective jurors on the 24-
member panel.  On appeal, defendant contends that a prima facie case is 
established because, in excusing Prospective Juror S.G., the prosecutor had used 
50 percent of his peremptory challenges against a group comprising only 12.5 
percent of the 24-member panel.   
 
 29 
We have held that ―[a]lthough the prosecutor‘s excusal of all members of a 
particular group may give rise to an inference of impropriety, especially if the 
defendant belongs to the same group, that inference . . . is not dispositive.‖  
(People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 119; cf. People v. Guerra, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 1101 [no prima facie showing where the prosecutor excused the only 
Hispanic sitting in the jury box, with only two other Hispanics remaining on the 
entire panel].)  The prosecution did not excuse all African-American prospective 
jurors.  Defense counsel acknowledged that ―[his motion] was probably [too] 
early‖ to succeed.  Indeed, defendant points to no ―suspicious‖ appearance created 
by the prosecutor‘s use of his second peremptory challenge against S.G.  (See 
People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 76 [the percentage of African-American 
women excused by the prosecutor was not ― ‗suspicious,‘ ‖ nor had it ―reached a 
level that suggested an inference of discrimination‖].)  In any event, the record 
suggests that the prosecutor had several race-neutral reasons for challenging this 
juror.    
During voir dire, Prospective Juror S.G. described herself as very religious 
and indicated she would find voting for the death penalty ―hard‖ because of her 
religious beliefs.  (See People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 902-903 [a 
prospective juror‘s equivocation about the death penalty and strong religious 
beliefs against capital punishment provide race-neutral reasons for a prosecutor‘s 
decision to exercise a peremptory challenge].)  In addition, like defendant, S.G. 
was a ―governmental‖ employee and ―responsible to a supervisor.‖  One of S.G.‘s 
neighbors, who was employed by the City of Richmond, first informed her about 
the case.  Also, S.G. indicated in her questionnaire that psychologists and 
psychiatrists ―are good,‖ that they ―would have a good opinion‖ in court, and that 
either she or a close relative had seen a psychologist or psychiatrist.  Further, S.G. 
was acquainted with the prosecutor from prior employment in which she had 
 
 30 
cleaned his office, and also knew defense witness Connie Taylor.  Each of these 
responses individually would provide an adequate reason other than racial 
discrimination to support the prosecutor‘s challenge. 
Finally, defendant contends that a prima facie case is established based on 
the circumstance that Prospective Juror S.G. would not have been excusable for 
cause.  However, ―the circumstance that a juror is not subject to exclusion for 
cause does not, on its own, support an inference that group bias motivated the 
peremptory challenge.‖  (People v. Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 902; People v. 
Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 70.) 
7.  Asserted error in granting defendant’s challenge for cause of a 
prospective juror   
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly granted his request to 
exclude a prospective juror for cause.  Defendant challenged the juror due to 
concern that she would automatically favor the death penalty.  The court granted 
defendant‘s challenge based on her death penalty views and in doing so, expressed 
concern that the prospective juror stated ―she would vote according to certain 
feelings she had about race.‖    
Defendant now claims that the trial court applied the Witt standard in a 
racially discriminatory manner.  However, ―defendant is not free to contend on 
appeal that the trial court erred in granting his motion to excuse the prospective 
juror for cause.‖  (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 265.)  In Schmeck, 
the trial court granted the defendant‘s challenge for cause of a prospective juror on 
the ground that the prosecutor had made an assertedly impermissible comment to 
that juror that might later improperly infect the jury‘s penalty deliberations.  (Id. at 
pp. 264-265.)  We held the defendant forfeited the claim that the trial court erred 
by granting his challenge because he failed to pursue a remedy by other methods 
available at trial short of excusal (e.g., a clarifying instruction) for any 
 
 31 
misunderstanding arising from the assertedly improper comment.  (Id. at p. 265; 
see also People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1003 [defendant‘s joinder in the 
prosecution‘s challenge for cause forfeited his claim that the trial court erred in 
granting the challenge].)  Defendant maintains that the claim is properly before us 
because, as the high court has explained, a discriminatory jury selection process 
inflicts harm on not only the defendant but also the excluded juror and community 
at large.  (See Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 87; Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 
400, 406.)  However, whatever harm an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause 
may inflict on the excluded juror and community at large, a defendant may waive 
his right to complain.  In People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, a local 
television station had requested extensive media coverage of the entire trial.  (Id. 
at p. 812.)  The defendant objected, and the court denied the request at least during 
part of jury selection.  (Ibid.)  On appeal, the defendant argued that the ruling 
violated the public‘s right to a public trial.  We held that the defendant could not 
assert the public‘s right to a public trial.  ―[D]efendant‘s objection to the media 
request waived his right to complain of the court‘s ruling on appeal.‖  (Id. at p. 
813.)  Similarly, here, defendant waived his right to complain of asserted error in 
granting his own challenge for cause.  ―Defendant is not entitled to the windfall of 
a reversal of a conviction‖ because the court did what he requested.  (Ibid.) 
Further, to the extent defendant frames his claim as one of judicial bias or 
racial discrimination by the trial court in deciding his challenge for cause, it is 
forfeited on appeal because he failed to alert the court to the perceived bias.  (See 
People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 572 [defendant forfeited the claim that the 
trial court exhibited racial bias during the jury selection process by failing to raise 
the issue at trial].)   
 
 32 
8.  The prosecutor’s assertedly argumentative question   
During jury selection, defense counsel told the prospective jurors that 
defendant did not dispute having killed two people unlawfully and ―the questions 
that you will be confronted with in this case do not have to do with ballistics or 
who shot what and when.‖  Thereafter, the prosecutor asked a prospective juror 
whether he heard defense counsel state, ―You don‘t have to know anything about 
ballistics‖ and whether ―[it] might make a difference if somebody got shot in the 
head and died of arterial damage, shot in the [] back of the head, execution style.  
It might tell you somebody‘s [] state of mind at the time he pulls the trigger, 
right?‖  Counsel objected without stating a legal basis.  Instead, he disputed the 
prosecutor‘s assertion, stating ―[t]hat doesn‘t sound like ballistics to me.  It has to 
do with medical evidence.‖  The trial court overruled the objection.  Here, 
defendant contends the court‘s ruling was erroneous because the question was 
argumentative.   
Defendant forfeited the issue by failing to object on this basis.  In any 
event, the court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to respond 
in kind to an argument defense counsel had made earlier in jury selection.   
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Alleged prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous trial court rulings   
Defendant contends that, during the guilt and penalty phases, the prosecutor 
engaged in many instances of misconduct and the trial court made numerous 
erroneous evidentiary rulings.5  
                                              
5  
Here, and in most other claims, defendant contends the asserted error or 
misconduct infringed various of his state and federal constitutional rights.  ―In 
most instances, insofar as defendant raised the issue at all in the trial court, he 
failed explicitly to make some or all of the constitutional arguments he now 
advances.  In each instance, unless otherwise indicated, it appears that either (1) 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
 33 
Except in a few instances specifically identified below, defendant did not 
object to the alleged instances of misconduct or trial court error or, when an 
objection was sustained, request that the court admonish the jury to disregard the 
impropriety.  Nor did defendant complain that any admonition the trial court did 
give was ineffective.  Therefore, defendant forfeited these claims of misconduct 
and trial court error.  (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820.) 
Citing People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pages 820-821, defendant 
acknowledges that his counsel did not always enter timely and specific objections, 
but claims that failure should be excused because an objection would have been 
futile and counterproductive.  This case, however, is far removed from the 
circumstances presented in Hill.  That ―was an extreme case‖ in which ―the 
prosecutor‘s ‗continual misconduct, coupled with the trial court‘s failure to rein in 
[the prosecutor‘s] excesses, created a trial atmosphere so poisonous‘ that continual 
objections ‗would have been futile and counterproductive to his client.‘ ‖  (People 
v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1212.)  The record in this case does not support 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
the appellate claim is of a kind (e.g., failure to instruct sua sponte; erroneous 
instruction affecting defendant‘s substantial rights) that required no trial court 
action by the defendant to preserve it, or (2) the new arguments do not invoke 
facts or legal standards different from those the trial court itself was asked to 
apply, but merely assert that the trial court‘s act or omission, insofar as wrong for 
the reasons actually presented to that court, had the additional legal consequence 
of violating the Constitution.  To that extent, defendant‘s new constitutional 
arguments are not forfeited on appeal.  [Citations.]  [¶]  In the latter instance, of 
course, rejection, on the merits, of a claim that the trial court erred on the issue 
actually before that court necessarily leads to rejection of the newly applied 
constitutional ‗gloss' as well.  No separate constitutional discussion is required in 
such cases, and we therefore provide none.‖  (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
412, 441, fn. 17.) 
 
 34 
defendant‘s claim, for example, that the court ―was quick to find fault in defense 
counsel‘s objections‖ and discouraged him from making appropriate objections. 
Nothing in the record suggests any objections or request for an admonition would 
have been futile.  Accordingly, as indicated below, defendant has forfeited most of 
the claims. 
Moreover, each claim is without merit. 
a.  The prosecutor’s assertedly leading questions   
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by 
improperly asking leading questions of several witnesses.   ― ‗[A] defendant may 
not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion—
and on the same ground—the defendant made an assignment of misconduct and 
requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety. [Citation.]‘ ‖ 
(People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 952; accord, People v.  Fuiava (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 622, 679.) 
― ‗A ―leading question‖ is a question that suggests to the witness the answer 
that the examining party desires.‘  (Evid. Code, § 764.)  Questions calling for a 
‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ answer are not leading unless they are unduly suggestive under the 
circumstances.  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 672; 3 Witkin, Cal. 
Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Presentation at Trial, § 165, pp. 229–230.)  Furthermore, 
leading questions are not always impermissible on direct examination.  ‗Evidence 
Code section 767, subdivision (a)(1), provides that leading questions ―may not be 
asked of a witness on direct or redirect examination‖ except in ―special 
circumstances where the interests of justice otherwise require.‖  Trial courts have 
broad discretion to decide when such special circumstances are present.  
[Citations.]‘  (Williams, at p. 672.)‖  (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 
1285.) 
 
 35 
On direct examination, the prosecutor asked RHA Director Art Hatchett, 
―So at least in terms of his performance on the job, [defendant] had no difficulty 
premeditating and deliberating?‖  Defense counsel objected on the ground the 
question was leading, and the court sustained the objection.  Thereafter, the 
prosecutor rephrased the question:  ―Did you perceive any difficulty on the part of 
[defendant] to think out in advance the things that he needed to do to get the job 
done at the Housing Authority? ‖  Hatchett answered, ―No.‖   
Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object to the question as 
rephrased, and in any event, he fails to demonstrate the question was improper.  
The claim is therefore without merit.   
Next, defendant cites as ―leading‖ the following question that the 
prosecutor posed to Hatchett regarding a letter defendant wrote to Talley in which 
he described his ―improvement goals‖:  ―So at least as of March of 1995, did you 
perceive any kind of defect, mental or otherwise, in the mind of [defendant] that 
would prevent him from thinking about things in the future?‖  Defendant forfeited 
the contention by failing to object.  In any event, the question did not suggest any 
particular answer.  Instead, it permitted Hatchett to describe his perception of any 
aspect of defendant‘s mental state that would hinder his ability to think 
prospectively.  There was no misconduct. 
Defendant next complains about the prosecutor‘s question to coworker 
Janet Robinson concerning defendant‘s perceptions of reality while he and she 
occasionally discussed current events and social issues at work.  Specifically, the 
prosecutor asked Robinson, ―And during these conversations did you ever detect 
any kind of defect or oddity that [caused] [defendant] to not really perceive reality 
at all . . .?‖  Robinson responded, ―No, I don‘t think there was any defect or 
anything.  I just think that he had a different perspective and things, he seemed to 
dislike—.‖  As defendant concedes, he did not object to this question as leading.  
 
 36 
Therefore, the claim is not cognizable on appeal.  In any case, the question was not 
improper.  The prosecutor did not attempt to elicit a particular response from 
Robinson.  Rather, he offered her an opportunity to relate her observations, if any, 
based on her experience working and conversing with defendant at RHA, of 
defendant‘s inability to perceive reality.  The same is true of the prosecutor‘s 
follow-up question to Robinson, ―Did he seem to be speaking with you in an 
appropriate way about these issues that you talked about?‖  As the court indicated 
in overruling defense counsel‘s ―leading‖ objection, the prosecutor was merely 
confirming Robinson‘s previous testimony that she did not perceive defendant as 
unable to communicate rationally during their conversations.  There was no 
misconduct.  
Thereafter, Robinson testified that, on the first day of defendant‘s 
employment at the Conventional Housing division at RHA, he told her he had 
―heard a lot about the department‖ when he worked at the Section 8 division.  The 
prosecutor asked the witness, ―But if I understand you correctly at least at that 
time he didn‘t share with you what [he had heard]?‖  On defense counsel‘s 
objection to the question as leading, the court conducted a sidebar conference and 
explained that it would allow the attorneys to ask leading questions for the purpose 
of laying a foundation or clarifying earlier testimony.  Thereafter, the court 
sustained defense counsel‘s objection and, thus, contrary to defendant‘s contention 
here, he suffered no prejudice.  Defendant‘s additional complaint that the court 
failed to admonish the prosecutor is forfeited because he failed to request an 
admonition. 
Next, after Robinson testified that at times defendant violated office 
protocol by permitting applicants to access areas of the office restricted to 
employees, the prosecutor asked a series of leading questions about defendant‘s 
compliance with other office procedures.  The court sustained defense counsel‘s 
 
 37 
objections to these questions.  When the prosecutor next asked the witness, ―Were 
there times when [defendant] called you to tell you that there was [an applicant] 
waiting,‖ counsel objected on the same ground.  In overruling the objection, the 
court suggested that in the future, counsel preface their questions in terms of 
―whether or not.‖  The prosecutor rephrased the question, ―Can you tell us whether 
or not there were times when you would look up all of a sudden much to your 
surprise an applicant would be standing there?‖  Counsel complained that this 
question also was leading, and the court overruled the objection.  Defendant now 
complains that the court‘s ruling was erroneous because the prosecutor 
embellished the question by suggesting the witness was ―surprised‖ when 
defendant allowed applicants to enter restricted areas in the office.  The question 
was not improper, however, because it did not suggest any particular answer.  
There was no error. 
Next, the prosecutor asked Robinson, ―There — was there at least in your 
perception as a Housing Specialist some unnecessary and repetitive work being 
done as a result of the way [defendant]—,‖ and defense counsel objected that the 
question was leading.  The court did not rule on the objection, and the prosecutor 
immediately rephrased his question, ―Can you tell us whether or not there was 
some unnecessary work that was being done as a result of the way [defendant] was 
doing his job?‖      
Defendant complains that the question was leading.  The claim is forfeited, 
however, because he failed to object to the question as rephrased.  In any event, 
the question complied with the court‘s guidelines.  Further, assuming the question 
suggested defendant performed unnecessary work, no prejudice ensued, as the 
question called for testimony cumulative of other evidence that defendant 
performed his job poorly.  
 
 38 
Next, defendant contends that the court erroneously overruled defense 
counsel‘s objection that the prosecutor was improperly suggesting to Robinson 
that when defendant said, ―I ain‘t no joke,‖ he was ―leaning over‖ Talley‘s body in 
a particular position.  Not so.  The witness had already testified that defendant was 
standing over Talley when he made the statement.  In compliance with the court‘s 
guidelines, the prosecutor properly sought clarification on the point.  The court did 
not err.  
Next, defendant contends the prosecutor improperly questioned Ronald 
Keeton, a housing project manager at RHA, about defendant‘s statement that ―he 
ought to pull a 101.‖  Specifically, Keeton was asked, ―you had seen publicity 
about just how much harm a 101 California could cause‖ and the ―101 California‖ 
―affected a lot of people?‖  Defense counsel initially objected that the question 
was leading, but then asserted that ―it‘s not even a question.‖  After the court 
overruled the objection, the prosecutor repeated his inquiry, ―I ask you it‘s harmed 
a lot of people, publicity was great because it affected a lot of people, the 101 
California?‖  Keeton answered, ―That‘s correct.‖  Here, in addition to his 
contention that the question did not fall within the court‘s stated parameters 
concerning permissible leading questions, defendant argues that the prosecutor‘s 
posing the question was particularly reprehensible because he improperly used this 
examination as a dress rehearsal for his penalty phase argument that, when 
defendant threatened to do a ―101 California,‖ he intended the aftermath of the 
massacre to send ―shockwaves‖ through the community and affect ―a lot of 
people.‖  Even assuming the question was improper, it was harmless.  The 
evidence overwhelmingly showed that for months in advance of the murders, 
defendant repeatedly threatened coworkers that, if his supervisors were to fire him, 
―I ought to do a 101,‖ ―there might be another 101 California,‖ and ―it‘s going to 
be another 101 California.‖  That is, defendant began publicizing his intentions in 
 
 39 
a likely effort to have as many coworkers as possible fear and be affected by the 
massacre that he planned and believed would be justified by a wrongful 
termination of his employment.  In addition, before deliberations, the court 
instructed the jury that statements and arguments by counsel were not evidence.  
The questions or remarks did not affect the trial‘s outcome under any standard. 
Next, defendant complains of the following questions posed to Dr. Berg:  
(1) ―do you have an opinion as to what a statement like ‗I ain‘t no joke‘ might 
mean in terms of the psychiatric condition of the person who is speaking it?‖; (2) 
does a crime such as Talley‘s murder speak of ―revenge?‖; (3) ―Is there anything 
delusional or hallucinatory in a crime like [Talley‘s murder] in your judgment?‖;  
(4) ―is [defendant‘s statement to coworker Learinza Morris that he felt as if his 
boss was going to stab him in the back] [the] kind of information you‘re referring 
to when you suggest that especially since Mr. Pearson knew for weeks that his job 
was in jeopardy, there was nothing delusional about what was going on in his 
mind on the [the day of the shootings]‖; (5) ―would a person who engages in an 
act of work place violence necessarily be delusional or psychotic?‖; and (6) 
―would any of those personality disorders [(‗obsessive compulsive and schizoid 
and paranoid‘)] in any way prevent a person from committing deliberate and 
premeditated murder?‖  However, because defendant did not object on the ground 
the questions were leading, the claim is not preserved for appellate review. 
Additionally, none of the questions was impermissibly leading.  Each was 
framed in accordance with the court‘s guidelines and none of them suggested a 
particular answer.  Rather, each question permitted the expert to offer his opinions 
on matters based on his knowledge of the existence of specific facts.  The 
questions involved the application of specific diagnoses to hypothetical scenarios 
that permitted the presentation of the experts‘ testimony in a practical, efficient 
manner.  Contrary to defendant‘s contention, the fourth question properly called 
 
 40 
for the expert to clarify the type of information that would form the basis of his 
opinion that there is nothing ―delusional or hallucinatory‖ in a crime like 
defendant‘s murder of Talley.  
b.  Speaking objections  
On several occasions during defense counsel Veale‘s cross-examinations of 
Art Hatchett and Shirail Burton and direct examination of Toni Lawrence, he 
attempted to elicit testimony related to the purportedly ―poisonous‖ working 
environment that existed at RHA before defendant‘s employment there.  The court 
sustained most of the prosecutor‘s objections to defense counsel‘s questions on 
grounds of relevance and hearsay, and defendant does not challenge those rulings 
here.  Rather, defendant claims that the prosecutor, Mr. Jewett, repeatedly posed 
improper speaking objections and, in doing so, attacked defense counsel‘s 
integrity and motives.  Also, defendant asserts that the court ―added to the 
problem‖ by admonishing counsel in front of the jury.  The claim is without merit. 
(1)  Art Hatchett   
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Hatchett, ―[H]a[ve] you heard 
[of] complaints that [Burton] didn‘t do her work?‖  The prosecutor objected to 
admission of the testimony as follows:  ―MR. JEWETT:  Judge, to suggest that 
this is not being offered for the truth of the matter is disingenuous.  This is an 
effort to prove that Shirail Burton doesn‘t do the work that she—[¶]  MR. 
VEALE: Judge, I‘m sorry.  [¶]  MR. JEWETT:  [] somehow—[¶]  MR. VEALE:  
I‘m sorry.  If there‘s an objection, it seems to me there should be an objection, not 
more than an objection.  []  MR. JEWETT:  And it‘s hearsay again.  [¶]  THE 
COURT:  I‘m going to sustain hearsay at this point.‖  Counsel proceeded without 
comment and subsequently asked Hatchett to confirm the existence of additional 
employee complaints at RHA.  The prosecutor interjected, ―It‘s calling for 
 
 41 
hearsay.  Essentially it‘s like defense counsel is asking the witness to confirm 
rumors.‖  Counsel asked ―if we could have an objection,‖ and the prosecutor 
rephrased, ―Objection, irrelevant.  Calls for hearsay.‖  The court sustained the 
objection, and counsel complained no further.  
Defense counsel asked Hatchett whether he was aware of any memorandum 
concerning disputes between housing managers and Patricia Jones that circulated 
during the six-month period preceding the murders when defendant was employed 
by the Section 8 division.  The prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds, and 
counsel responded that he was not offering the evidence for the truth of the matter.  
Before the court ruled on the objection, the prosecutor interposed a relevance 
objection, which the court sustained, commenting, ―If you are not worried about 
whether or not they are true, it sounds like so much rumor mongering.‖  Counsel 
did not respond, and resumed cross-examination.  The prosecutor thereafter made 
numerous objections without comment, many of which were sustained, and a 
speaking objection based on speculation.  Counsel did not complain about the 
latter, and the court sustained the objection.  During counsel‘s further cross-
examination of Hatchett, the prosecutor made several speaking objections, without 
any protest by counsel, and numerous objections without comment that the court 
sustained. 
Defense counsel then asked Hatchett whether, at any time ―throughout your 
life,‖ he had ever heard a person express an intention to harm someone but 
actually intended only to ―express[] displeasure at something the [person] has 
done‖ or joke about what the person did.  The court sustained the prosecutor‘s 
objection that the question called for irrelevant matter.  ―Counsel, we‘re dealing 
with a case here, it‘s not relevant.‖  Outside the presence of the jury, the court 
granted counsel‘s request to make a record of his intention to continue objecting to 
any speaking objections by the prosecutor.  Counsel also stated he felt that 
 
 42 
comments the court had made in ruling on previous objections were demeaning.  
In response, the court agreed with counsel that speaking objections were 
inappropriate and directed the prosecutor to state only a legal basis in support of 
any objection.  With regard to counsel‘s second concern, the court stated:  ―Mr. 
Veale, the only reason I make comments is because I feel an attorney does not 
understand, because you or Mr. Jewett continue to do something after an objection 
has been sustained on a topic which has already been ruled upon, so to the extent 
that I feel you need the correction and need the clarification, I will do so to make 
sure you understand what the court‘s ruling was.‖  
Preliminarily, defendant did not object to the majority of the prosecutor‘s 
speaking objections or otherwise request an assignment of misconduct in each 
instance.  When defendant did object, he did not also request an assignment of 
misconduct or ask that the jury be admonished to disregard the prosecutor‘s 
remarks.  Because an admonition would have cured any harm, defendant is not 
excused from complying with the objection requirement.  Therefore, the claims 
were not preserved for appeal.  (People v. Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 679.)  In 
any event, the claim lacks merit. 
We first address defendant‘s contention that the prosecutor‘s speaking 
objections denigrated defense counsel‘s integrity.  ―When a prosecutor denigrates 
defense counsel, it directs the jury‘s attention away from the evidence and is 
therefore improper.  [Citation.]  In addressing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
that is based on the denigration of opposing counsel, we view the prosecutor‘s 
comments in relation to the remarks of defense counsel, and inquire whether the 
former constitutes a fair response to the latter.‖  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 
894, 978.)  Here, the focus of the prosecutor‘s comment that counsel was being 
disingenuous was on counsel‘s attempt to elicit hearsay testimony, not on 
counsel‘s integrity, and it was not improper.  (See ibid. [the prosecutor‘s 
 
 43 
characterization of counsel‘s challenge to the witness‘s credibility as ― ‗ludicrous‘ 
and ‗a smoke screen‘ ‖ was not objectionable].) 
Next, we reject defendant‘s contentions that the court ―added to the 
problem‖ of the prosecutor‘s alleged improprieties by commenting that defense 
counsel appeared to be ―rumor mongering.‖  In stating that counsel appeared to be 
trying to elicit evidence of ―rumors,‖ the court was expressing its apparent 
frustration with counsel‘s repeated attempts to introduce evidence of complaints 
about RHA employees made long before defendant was hired at the agency.  
When counsel asked Hatchett whether, sometime ―throughout [his] life,‖ he had 
heard anyone state an intention to harm someone that he or she did not actually 
intend to act on, the court, with understandable exasperation, commented,   ―We‘re 
dealing with a case here.‖  As the court later explained to counsel outside the 
presence of the jury, it expected counsel to abide by its rulings and would continue 
to remind counsel when it perceived counsel as needing ―correction‖ and 
―clarification.‖  The claim fails on the merits. 
(2)  Shirail Burton 
On cross-examination, Shirail Burton testified that while defendant was 
employed at RHA, the employees in the Conventional Housing division spoke 
cordially to Section 8 division employees, whereas Section 8 division employees 
expressed ―animosity toward the Conventional [Housing] department.‖  Defense 
counsel then asked the witness ―was it true [that] you walked into the Section 8 
[division] and said I am going to get the FBI in here and ha[ve]  Toni [fired].‖  
The prosecutor objected to the question as argumentative and vague as to time, 
and said, ―Mr. Veale is trying to prejudice this jury with that last remark.‖  The 
court sustained the objection, stating, ―Seems to be.  I am going to sustain the 
objection, counsel.‖  Counsel did not comment on the prosecutor‘s speaking 
 
 44 
objection, but requested an opportunity to demonstrate the relevance of the discord 
that allegedly existed between the Section 8 and Conventional Housing division 
employees before defendant was hired by the latter.  Subsequently, in the absence 
of the jury, counsel made his offer of proof, and the court again ruled that the 
evidence was irrelevant:  ―[I]t‘s totally foreign to this particular litigation 
inasmuch as [defendant] was not present at any of the time[s] discussed by these 
event[s].‖ 
Defendant forfeited his claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
remarking that defense counsel was trying to prejudice the jury against Burton by 
failing to object and request an assignment of misconduct.  In any event, the 
comment was directed at the nature of the question being asked, and did not 
impugn counsel‘s integrity.  Further, that the court appeared to agree with the 
prosecutor‘s comment that counsel was trying to bias the jury against Burton may 
have been improper, but we disagree that the brief, fleeting remark gave the jury 
the impression that the court condoned the accusatory nature of the objection.   
(3)  Toni Lawrence 
On direct examination, defense counsel asked Toni Lawrence a series of 
questions related to her observations of Talley‘s interactions with the employees 
she supervised.  When the court sustained the prosecutor‘s objection based on 
―hearsay,‖ ―[g]ossip,‖ and ―[r]umor,‖ counsel did not respond.  Here, defendant 
claims the prosecutor‘s speaking objection constituted prejudicial misconduct.  By 
failing to object, however, defendant forfeited the claim on appeal.  In any event, 
the isolated, stray remarks were harmless.  
c.  Defense witness Celia Gardner 
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly attempted to impeach 
defense witness Cecilia Gardner, a former employee of RHA, by asking her 
 
 45 
whether she was aware of the existence of a felony bench warrant for her arrest on 
charges of grand theft, perjury, and check fraud. 
After Gardner initially denied knowledge of an outstanding warrant for her 
arrest on the above noted charges, defense counsel objected and the prosecutor 
specifically asked the witness whether she had fraudulently misappropriated a 
―social services check.‖  The court interrupted and indicated the witness should be 
advised of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.  When the 
prosecutor commenced to do so, counsel objected.  The court excused the jury and 
conducted a hearing on the matter.  The prosecutor informed the court that ―we 
have very conclusive evidence showing on May 5th, 1996, that this witness cashed 
a Social Services or Social Security check, she left her thumb print on that check.  
[¶]  The following day she filed an application under penalty of perjury that the 
check had been lost.  The check was then replaced and on May 10th, she then 
cashed that check.  [¶]  A felony complaint charging check fraud, perjury, and 
grand theft has been filed against her.  There is a $30,000 bench warrant for her 
arrest.  It‘s that incident that I want to inquire into.‖  The court stated that it would 
―take the [prosecutor] at his word that there is a complaint filed,‖ and advised the 
witness of her rights. 
After briefly describing his intent to offer the evidence to establish the 
witness‘s bias, the prosecutor conceded that he did not have independent proof 
that Gardner had knowledge of the warrant ―other than this is an incident that 
happened four months ago.‖  The prosecutor represented that the warrant had 
issued two weeks earlier and ―FA‖ appeared on its face, which he interpreted as 
―failure to appear.‖  The court responded that it was unclear whether Gardner was 
aware of the warrant, whether the warrant ordered her to appear in court, or 
whether she failed to do so.  The court did not rule explicitly on defense counsel‘s 
objection, but gave the prosecutor the option to pursue the matter in rebuttal.  The 
 
 46 
prosecutor declined to do so.  The court twice admonished the jury to disregard the 
evidence of the outstanding warrant.     
Preliminarily, we disagree with the People that defendant has forfeited the 
claim of misconduct.  Defense counsel‘s objections to the admissibility of the 
evidence for impeachment purposes sufficed to preserve this issue for appeal.  
(See, e.g., People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1186.)  Nonetheless, the claim 
fails on the merits. 
A prosecutor may not ask questions of a witness suggesting facts harmful to 
a defendant without a good faith belief that such facts exist.  (People v. Bolden, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 562.)  Fraud is a crime of moral turpitude.  (People v. 
Cadogan (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1514.)  Under People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 284, 295-296, evidence of nonfelonious conduct reflecting moral turpitude 
may be admitted for purposes of impeachment.  (See also Evid. Code, § 788.)  The 
proponent of the impeachment evidence must have a good faith basis for asking 
the question.  (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1185-1186; People v. 
Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 562.)  
Here, the court did not find the prosecutor lacked a good faith belief for his 
question concerning the warrant.  To the contrary, the court accepted as true that 
the prosecutor was reading from a complaint filed approximately four months 
earlier charging Gardner with fraud, and impliedly found the prosecutor had a 
good faith basis in asking about the charge.  We find nothing in the record from 
which to conclude the court‘s decision was an abuse of discretion.  Therefore, to 
the extent the prosecutor sought to impeach the witness with evidence that she had 
engaged in the alleged fraud, we cannot say the prosecutor acted improperly.  
Further, even if the prosecutor should not have questioned Gardner about 
the warrant, the misconduct was harmless.  The witness admitted that she was 
suspended from the RHA for improperly giving individuals priority on the waiting 
 
 47 
list for housing, and was ultimately terminated because she was found in 
possession of laundry tokens that had been stolen from RHA.  Finally, the court 
admonished the jury to disregard any mention of the arrest, and we presume it 
followed the court‘s instructions.  There is no reasonable probability that any 
misconduct affected the outcome.  
d.  Cross-examination of Dr. Walser   
On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Dr. Walser about her 
consideration of the reports prepared by Drs. Kincaid, and Wilkinson, in forming 
her opinion of defendant‘s mental state at the time he killed the victims.  Defense 
counsel had consulted with Drs. Kincaid and Wilkinson before trial, but did not 
call them to testify.  Defendant contends that the prosecutor‘s questions, discussed 
below, were argumentative and that the trial court abused its discretion in 
permitting the prosecutor to pose them.  We disagree. 
Defendant complains about the following portion of cross-examination:   
―[The prosecutor:]  Essentially the three of you were getting your 2 [sic] stories 
together before you formalized in a report, is it not?  [¶]  [Defense counsel:]  
That‘s truly objectionable.  I object to — [¶]  [The prosecutor:]  It‘s a question.  
[¶]  THE COURT:  I will overrule the objection.  [¶]  You could answer the 
question if you have an answer.  [¶]  [The prosecutor:]  You were all getting your 
diagnoses, your opinions, whatever you want to call it, together so everybody 
lined up saying basically the same thing before any of you wrote a report; isn‘t 
that true?  [¶]  [Dr. Walser:]  I could say very clearly to that that I came to my own 
opinions independently.‖  
Defendant also finds fault with the following portion of the prosecutor‘s 
recross-examination:  ―[The prosecutor:]  So the points that I‘ve tried to bring up 
during a fairly lengthy cross-examination at every opportunity you‘ve taken, you 
 
 48 
have taken, described [] a defensive posture to protect your opinion, right?  [¶]  
DR. WALSER:  No, I feel like I‘m trying to explain what I understand.  And at 
times the questions have only offered me or tried to have me offer only a part of it 
and it‘s an inaccurate representation.  [¶]  What I am dedicated to is making sure 
that it‘s my opinion and the test data and everything that I have done are 
represented accurately.  [¶] . . . [¶]  [The prosecutor:]  When [defendant] actually 
went about the process of killing people, he actually did it very efficiently, didn‘t 
he?  [¶]  [Defense counsel:]  That‘s argumentative.  Argumentative, judge, 
objection.  [¶]  THE COURT:  Overruled.  [¶]  [The prosecutor:]  It was actually a 
very efficient job in his—job in his mind, it was to kill people, he actually did it in 
a very organized and efficient way, didn‘t he?  [¶]  DR. WALSER: I guess I would 
have to think about the word efficient.‖ 
 ―An argumentative question is designed to engage a witness in argument 
rather than elicit facts within the witness‘s knowledge.‖  (People v. Guerra, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 1125.)  Here, Dr. Walser testified that she considered the pretrial 
evaluations by Drs. Wilkinson and Kincaid in forming her opinion that defendant 
was psychotic and experiencing disorganized thinking when he shot the victims.  
The questions quoted above, though barbed and accusatory at times, were not 
inappropriate because they were designed to elicit additional facts to clarify the 
degree to which Dr. Walser relied on or was influenced by the reports of Drs. 
Wilkinson and Kincaid.  ―An expert may be cross-examined regarding the subject 
to which his testimony relates, the matter on which he bases his opinion, and the 
reasons for his opinion.‖  (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 532; see also Evid. 
Code, § 721, subd. (a).)  In addition, cross-examination of Dr. Walser on whether 
defendant killed Talley and Garcia in an efficient manner properly probed her 
opinion that defendant was experiencing disorganized thinking at the time he shot 
the victims.  No misconduct occurred. 
 
 49 
e.  The prosecutor’s remarks at the bench 
Defendant contends that the court permitted the prosecutor to make 
inappropriate remarks ―in earshot of the jury.‖  The claim fails. 
During counsel‘s redirect examination of Dr. Walser, defense counsel 
informed the court that he might have to testify regarding a matter he discussed 
with defendant.  Counsel said he had made no notes of the communication and 
provided no discovery on the matter to the prosecution.  The prosecutor 
responded, ―I look forward to the opportunity to cross-examine [defense counsel] 
because I assume he will be laying a foundation.‖     
Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel complained that the 
prosecutor ―[stood] back two or three feet‖ and spoke ―so that the Court could hear 
it . . . as well as everybody else in the [court]room‖ and that ―what [the 
prosecutor]‘s doing is trial lawyering, but he‘s not doing it fairly.‖  Counsel also 
said he had previously complained that the prosecutor spoke loudly at times, the 
prosecutor did not ―play by the rules and play fairly,‖ and the prosecutor prefaced 
each question with argument.  The prosecutor denied he had raised his voice as he 
stepped away from the bench.  
The court acknowledged that the prosecutor made the above statement as he 
stepped away from the bench but noted that he was ―facing away from the jury.‖  
The court stated that it did not detect any difference in the tone of the prosecutor‘s 
voice but accepted the fact that it ―may have carried further.‖ 
The claim lacks merit.  Defendant offered no evidence that the jury actually 
heard the prosecutor‘s remark, and he therefore cannot show prejudice.  Even 
assuming the jury heard the comment, they would have appreciated it for what it 
was, that is, simply a display of an attorney‘s competitive spirit during adversarial 
litigation.  Further, in making the remark, the prosecutor neither directly nor 
inferentially questioned counsel‘s motives or integrity.  (People v. Price (1992) 1 
 
 50 
Cal.4th 324, 448.)  There is no reasonable probability that the remark could have 
affected the verdict.   
f.  State of mind evidence 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to 
the admission of Rodney Ferguson‘s testimony that he saw defendant nod while 
sitting in the patrol car after the shootings and Robinson‘s, Garcia‘s, and Burton‘s 
testimony that they feared defendant.  On appeal, defendant maintains the 
evidence was irrelevant and the court‘s failure to sustain these objections 
―discouraged other appropriate objections and, in cumulative effect, denied 
[defendant] due process of law.‖  We reject the claim. 
Prosecution witness Ferguson was employed by the City of Richmond 
when defendant worked in the Employment and Training Department.  Ferguson 
was acquainted with defendant and testified that he had a conversation with him 
about two hours before the murders.  Ferguson said defendant told him that he was 
afraid he would be fired and that he felt ―his boss‖ was ―doing him in‖ and 
―stabbing him in the back.‖  Defendant turned his back to Ferguson and made a 
stabbing motion. Defendant then said that he could ―shoot‖ his boss for ―doing 
him in.‖  After the shootings, Ferguson saw defendant in custody in the backseat 
of a police car, and defendant turned his head toward Ferguson and nodded.  
Ferguson interpreted this to mean, ―[Y]ou know, I said I was going to do it and I 
did it.‖  Defense counsel objected that the testimony was irrelevant and 
speculative.  The court sustained the objection except to the extent that Ferguson 
testified that he saw defendant nod.  The prosecutor then asked him whether he 
thought that by nodding, defendant was alluding to their earlier conversation.  
Over counsel‘s objection that the question called for irrelevant and speculative 
 
 51 
testimony, Ferguson agreed that at that moment, he thought of his conversation 
with defendant.     
On direct examination, Janet Robinson testified without objection that, four 
days before the murders, defendant told her, ―[s]ometimes, you know, I feel like 
doing a 101 California Street in here‖ and that she told Garcia about defendant‘s 
threats.  Robinson also testified that she feared defendant would kill her if he 
learned she had told anyone of his threats.  Over defense counsel‘s hearsay 
objection, Robinson stated that both before the day defendant made the threat and 
after she reported the threat to Garcia, Garcia told her that she feared defendant 
―was going to kill her [(Garcia)].‖     
On direct examination by the prosecutor, Shirail Burton testified over a 
relevance objection that after she learned on the day of the murders that defendant 
was to be fired in the afternoon, she was ―very afraid, very nervous‖ throughout 
the day.     
Defendant contends that evidence of Ferguson‘s interpretation of  
defendant‘s nod while he sat in the backseat of the patrol car, and of Robinson‘s, 
Garcia‘s, and Burton‘s fear of defendant, was irrelevant, and that the court abused 
its discretion in overruling defense counsel‘s objections to admission of this 
evidence.  As a consequence, defendant maintains that his attorney was 
discouraged from making ―other appropriate objections.‖    
―A judgment will not be reversed on grounds that evidence has been 
erroneously admitted unless ‗there appears of record an objection to or a motion to 
exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make 
clear the specific ground of the objection or motion . . . .‘  (Evid. Code, § 353, 
subd. (a), italics added.)  Specificity is required both to enable the court to make 
an informed ruling on the motion or objection and to enable the party proffering 
 
 52 
the evidence to cure the defect in the evidence.‖  (People v. Mattson (1990) 50 
Cal.3d 826, 853-854.)  
As discussed above, with respect to the admission of Robinson‘s testimony, 
defendant did not object on relevance grounds.  Therefore, his claim that the court 
erred in overruling defense counsel‘s objection is forfeited on appeal.  Defendant‘s 
remaining contentions that the court erred by overruling counsel‘s objections 
regarding the admission of Ferguson‘s and Burton‘s testimony are preserved for 
review but lack merit.  
―Evidence Code section 210 defines ‗relevant evidence‘ as ‗evidence, 
including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, 
having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action.‘  (Italics added.)‖  (People v. 
Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1263.)  ―Evidence is relevant when no matter how 
weak it is it tends to prove a disputed issue.‖  (In re Romeo C. (1995) 33 
Cal.App.4th 1838, 1843.)   
In this case, Ferguson‘s testimony that when he saw defendant nod his 
head, he thought about defendant‘s statement that he could ―shoot‖ his boss was 
relevant to show premeditation.  Under the circumstances, it was not overly 
speculative for Ferguson to give his interpretation of defendant‘s nonverbal 
communication, and therefore the evidence was admissible.  The court did not 
abuse its discretion in overruling defendant‘s objection on that ground.   
Next, we agree that evidence Burton was scared after learning defendant 
would be fired was not probative of any issue of fact.  Nonetheless, any error in 
admitting the evidence, considered individually or collectively, was harmless 
given the overwhelming evidence that defendant premeditated and deliberated the 
murders.  Defendant repeatedly told his coworkers months in advance that he 
intended to kill anyone who tried to fire him.  He told Robinson he would spare 
 
 53 
her life, reminded her of his promise after he shot Talley and Garcia, and told 
police that he did not shoot Robinson because she had not ―screwed with him.‖  
Defendant bragged about going to the shooting range the evening before the 
murders.  Eyewitnesses described how he hunted down the victims and fired 
multiple shots execution style into each victim.  Defendant admitted he looked for 
a third victim.  Weeks before the murders, he purchased a .380-caliber handgun.  
The day after the killings, police recovered from defendant‘s apartment an empty 
box of .380-caliber ammunition, targets with bullet holes, and a book entitled 
―Madness in Criminal Law.‖  
We also reject defendant‘s derivative claim that the court‘s rulings on 
defense counsel‘s objections to the admission of this evidence deterred counsel 
from making additional proper objections and ―in cumulative effect‖ deprived him 
of due process.  The court sustained these objections in part and, at times, 
sustained other defense objections.  Nothing in these or other rulings would have 
deterred a reasonable attorney from making appropriate objections, and nothing in 
the record suggests that counsel was actually deterred.    
Finally, defendant perfunctorily contends the evidence was inadmissible 
because the prosecutor offered it for the improper purpose of appealing for 
sympathy for the victims.  (See People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057 
[―[A]n appeal for sympathy for the victim is out of place during an objective 
determination of guilt.‖].)  Because defense counsel failed to object to the 
admission of any of the evidence on this ground, the claim is forfeited on appeal.  
Defendant also fails to persuade us of its merits.  
g.  Deliberation requirement 
During guilt phase closing argument, the prosecutor defined the 
―deliberation‖ element of first degree murder as follows:  ―Deliberation is in 
 
 54 
essence . . . . It‘s the weighing and considering.  It‘s the thinking about am I going 
to do it?  Am I not going to do it?  Okay?  Which precedes the decision to kill.‖  
The prosecutor urged that, among other evidence, Ferguson‘s testimony that 
defendant said, ―I could shoot her [(Talley)]‖ and Ferguson‘s characterization of 
defendant‘s behavior as ―like he was talking to himself. . . . like a self-query‖ was 
sufficient proof that defendant deliberated the murders.  Here, defendant contends 
that the prosecutor misstated the definition of ―deliberation‖ by omitting the 
requirement that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant also 
weighed and considered the reasons against killing the victims.  As a result, the 
jury assertedly applied an erroneous definition of this element of first degree 
murder, rendering the verdicts constitutionally invalid.  For the reasons stated 
below, the claim lacks merit. 
 ― ‗[D]eliberate‘ means ‗formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result 
of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed 
course of action.‘ ‖  (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767; see also 
People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080; People v. Bender (1945) 27 
Cal.2d 164, 183.)  
Defendant asserts that when the prosecutor paraphrased the deliberation 
requirement for first degree murder as, ―[i]t‘s the thinking about am I going to do 
it. . . [a]m I not going to do it,‖ he erroneously omitted the requirement that the 
killer consider the reasons against killing.  Defendant maintains that absent this 
specific thought process, one has not engaged in ―deliberation.‖  The claim is 
forfeited, however, because defendant made no objection, which could have easily 
cured any harm.   
Even if the prosecutor‘s paraphrase did not refer specifically to the 
weighing and consideration of the reasons against making a particular choice, the 
prosecutor correctly referred to this requirement elsewhere in his argument.  He 
 
 55 
told the jury that ―deliberation is . . . the thought and weighing of considerations 
for and against a proposed course of action.‖  Thereafter, he argued, ―[Defendant] 
talks to [Rodney] Ferguson and what is he, reflective and pensive.  These are not 
descriptions of a person who is enraged.  These are not descriptions of a person 
who is suffering from passion.  These are descriptions of a person who is in 
deliberation.  Who is in reflection.  Who is weighing and considering the choices 
for and against and he has the means readily at hand at the time that he makes that 
statement.‖  Further, the court properly instructed the jury on the law, as follows:  
―The word ‗deliberate,‘ which relates to how a person thinks, means formed or 
arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of 
considerations for and against the proposed course of action.‖  (See CALJIC No. 
8.20.)  We presume the jury followed this instruction, and therefore, any 
misstatement was harmless.  
h.  The prosecutor’s closing argument 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jury‘s 
sympathy and passion for the surviving RHA employees when he (1) summarized 
the testimony of certain witnesses and (2) commented on, and displayed 
photographs of, the shoes left behind by the coworkers who fled the building 
during defendant‘s rampage.  Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by commenting on defense counsel‘s decision not to call Drs. Kincaid 
and Wilkinson to testify about the results of defendant‘s Rorschach test results and 
MRI, respectively. 
Preliminarily, the claim is not preserved for appeal because defendant did 
not object during argument and request an admonition.  In any event, the claim 
lacks merit.   
 
 56 
―A prosecutor is allowed to make vigorous arguments and may even use 
such epithets as are warranted by the evidence, as long as these arguments are not 
inflammatory and principally aimed at arousing the passion or prejudice of the 
jury.‖  (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1251; People v. Fields (1983) 
35 Cal.3d 329, 362-363.)  ―[A]n appeal for sympathy for the victim[, however] is 
out of place during an objective determination of guilt.‖ (People v. Stansbury, 
supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1057.) 
Here, defendant complains that the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to 
sympathize with certain witnesses when he summarized their testimony and 
commented that they were also victims of defendant‘s massacre.  For example, the 
prosecutor identified RHA employee Barbara Walther as a victim.  Walther 
testified that after the shootings, she shook Garcia and told her that ―she could get 
up now,‖ and Garcia did not move.  
The prosecutor‘s characterization of Walther as a victim was not an 
improper appeal to the jury‘s sympathy.  The prosecutor was reminding the jury of 
the unique accounts of the shooting spree offered by those who survived.  The 
prosecutor‘s similar characterizations of other witnesses‘ testimony were not 
improper on this basis.   
Next, defendant contends the prosecutor improperly appealed to the 
sympathies of the jury when he stated that the victims‘ shoes recovered at the 
crime scene were ―a reflection of the people who chose to wear them.‖  For 
example, the prosecutor commented that Talley‘s shoes brought to mind that she 
was a ―gregarious, outgoing, stylish person,‖ ―a black woman, single parent, who 
worked her way up just on her own guts and determination and intelligence to get 
where she was‖ and that Garcia‘s shoes showed the ―youthful‖ style of someone 
―trying to get ahead and . . . do the right thing.‖  
 
 57 
Even assuming the statements were improper, they were harmless.  The 
remarks about the victims‘ shoes were relatively brief and isolated.  Defendant, 
moreover, did not deny shooting the victims and only claimed he did not 
premeditate and deliberate the killings.  The evidence, however, overwhelmingly 
established both premeditation and deliberation.  (See discussion, pt. II.B.1.f, 
ante.)  Therefore, it is not reasonably probable a result more favorable to 
defendant would have been reached absent the prosecutor‘s fleeting appeal to the 
jury‘s sympathy for the victims.  
Defendant also contends the prosecutor improperly argued that defense 
counsel attempted to mislead the jury in calling only Dr. Walser to testify about 
defendant‘s MRI results.  Specifically, after referring to portions of their reports, 
the prosecutor suggested Drs. Kincaid and Wilkinson would have been called to 
testify if they ―could even offer an outside possibility that [the detected 
abnormalities] might have an effect on behavior. . . . [¶]  But, no, what we‘re 
going to do is put a neuropsychologist who didn‘t even know how to read an MRI 
to try to leave you with the impression now [sic] this variant in the brain has 
something to do with behavior.‖   
―A prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of 
defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel.‖  (People v. Hill, supra, 
17 Cal.4th at p. 832.)  ―[H]arsh and colorful attacks on the credibility of opposing 
witnesses[, however,] are permissible.  [Citations.]  Thus, counsel is free to remind 
the jurors that a paid witness may accordingly be biased and is also allowed to 
argue, from the evidence, that a witness‘s testimony is unbelievable, unsound, or 
even a patent ‗lie.‘ ‖  (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 162.)  But ―[i]f there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury would understand the prosecutor‘s 
statements as an assertion that defense counsel sought to deceive the jury, 
 
 58 
misconduct would be established.‖  (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 
1302.) 
Here, the prosecutor properly argued that the evidence established Dr. 
Walser‘s evaluation and test results were uncorroborated, and suggested to the 
jurors that had other evidence in support of her opinion existed, it would have 
been presented.  The argument did not impugn defense counsel‘s integrity.  There 
was no misconduct. 
2.  Defense mental health expert testimony  
On direct and redirect examination of defense expert Dr. Walser, defense 
counsel asked whether the evidence of defendant‘s threats to do a ―101 California‖ 
indicated he ―thought‖ about committing a ―101 California‖ before the murders.  
The prosecutor objected that counsel was improperly trying to elicit the expert‘s 
opinion on an ultimate question of fact for the jury—i.e., whether defendant killed 
the victims with premeditation and deliberation, an element of the crimes charged.  
(See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1143; CALJIC No. 8.20)  
Defense counsel explained that he intended to have the expert distinguish between 
the existence of a thought and these mental states.  The trial court sustained the 
objection.  
Defendant contends the trial court erred in precluding defense counsel from 
posing the question because the thought of committing homicide does not 
necessarily result in the formation of premeditation and deliberation.  Specifically, 
he asserts that, although the existence of prior thoughts about killing may evince 
premeditation, evidence of such thoughts, standing alone, is not dispositive on the 
issue of whether defendant killed with the required specific intent because the jury 
must also find that the premeditation and deliberation preceded the formation of 
 
 59 
the intent to kill.  (See People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 543.)  We find no 
abuse of discretion. 
―Section 28, subdivision (a) provides that evidence of mental illness ‗shall 
not be admitted to show or negate the capacity to form any mental state.‘  
Subdivision (b) of section 28 states that as a ‗matter of public policy there shall be 
no defense of diminished capacity, diminished responsibility, or irresistible 
impulse in a criminal action . . . .‘  Section 29 prohibits expert witnesses from 
directly stating their conclusions regarding whether a defendant possessed a 
required mental state.  It provides, ‗[i]n the guilt phase of a criminal action, any 
expert testifying about a defendant's mental illness, mental disorder, or mental 
defect shall not testify as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required 
mental states . . . . The question as to whether the defendant had or did not have 
the required mental states shall be decided by the trier of fact.‘ ‖  (People v. San 
Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 662.)  A trial court‘s decision to admit or exclude 
expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (Id. at p. 663.) 
―Murder that is premeditated and deliberated is murder of the first degree.‖  
(People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1232.)  The very definition of 
―premeditation‖ encompasses the idea that a defendant thought about or 
considered the act beforehand. ― ‗ ―[P]remeditation‖ means thought over in 
advance,‘ ‖ and ― ‗ ―[d]eliberation‖ refers to careful weighing of considerations in 
forming a course of action.‘ ‖  (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 812, 
quoting People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1080.)  ―An intentional killing is 
premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and 
reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.‖  (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 
Cal.4th at p. 543.)  The court instructed the jury that the ―word ‗deliberate,‘ which 
relates to how a person thinks, means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a 
result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the 
 
 60 
proposed course of action.  [¶]  ―The word ‗premeditated‘ relates to when a person 
thinks and means considered beforehand.  One premeditates by deliberating before 
taking action.‖  (See CALJIC No. 8.20.)  
The trial court acted within its discretion in finding that the question at 
issue here essentially asked the expert to provide an opinion about the required 
mental state (premeditation and deliberation) and thus was improper under section 
29.  (See also People v. Rangel (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 291, 298 [trial court 
properly excluded psychiatrist‘s expert testimony that ― ‗in that state of 
intoxication, the person is not able to think rationally and deliberate, which means 
weigh consequences, think about things in logical sequences,‘ ‖ on the issue 
whether the defendant premeditated and deliberated the killing].)   
Next, defendant contends that the trial court‘s explanation that defense 
counsel‘s question ―called for one of the elements of the offense‖ improperly 
―equated‖ homicidal thought with premeditation and deliberation and removed 
from the jury‘s determination the ―vigorously disputed‖ question whether the 
evidence of his homicidal thoughts constituted premeditation and deliberation.  
We disagree.    
―A trial court may comment on the evidence (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10), but 
such comments ‗must be accurate, temperate, nonargumentative, and scrupulously 
fair.‘ ‖  (People v. Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1232.)  In Sturm, we held that 
the trial judge prejudicially erred by stating ―that premeditation was a ‗gimme‘ and 
that the issue of premeditation was ‗all over and done with‘ ‖  (Ibid.)  The 
comment unfairly bolstered the prosecutor‘s argument that the murders were 
premeditated and also undermined the defense strategy that the murders were 
committed under the influence of drugs and therefore were not premeditated.  
(Ibid.)   
 
 61 
In this case, the court‘s brief and neutral remark expressly affirmed that the 
question whether defendant premeditated and deliberated the murders was for the 
jury to decide.  Although the court also impliedly, and correctly, informed the jury 
that defendant‘s ―101 California‖ threats could be considered evidence of these 
elements, by doing so it did not, as defendant contends, improperly tell the jury 
that evidence of the threats constituted sufficient proof of the elements.  
Additionally, unlike Sturm, in which the erroneous comment was left uncorrected, 
the jury subsequently was properly instructed under CALJIC No. 8.20 and would 
not have misunderstood the court‘s comments as removing the issue of 
premeditation and deliberation from its purview.  
Accordingly, the claim fails.  
3.  Testimony of Radiologist William Hoddick 
Defendant contends that the court erred by admitting over objection the 
radiologist‘s testimony that, in essence, the presence of premature fossa on  
defendant‘s brain white matter would not affect his behavior because the witness 
was not qualified to render such an opinion.  (Evid. Code, § 720.)  The error was 
prejudicial, he argues, because the radiologist‘s opinion discouraged or precluded 
the jurors from considering Dr. Walser‘s testimony that defendant‘s psychological 
and neuropsychological test results indicated he was mentally impaired when he 
shot the victims.  The contention is without merit. 
―A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on 
the subject to which his testimony relates.‖  (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).)  ― ‗We 
are required to uphold the trial judge‘s ruling on the question of an expert‘s 
qualifications absent an abuse of discretion.  [Citation.]  Such abuse of discretion 
will be found only where ― ‗the evidence shows that a witness clearly lacks 
 
 62 
qualification as an expert . . . .‘ ‖ [Citation.]‘ ‖  (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 1032, 1062-1063.) 
At the time of trial, Dr. Hoddick had been in practice since 1979, 
specializing in diagnostic medical imaging, and had been board certified since 
1983.  He was on active staff at John Muir Medical Center and Mount Diablo 
Medical Center and also was the Medical Director of Contra Costa County MRI in 
Pleasant Hill.  Dr. Hoddick had been a member of the faculty at the University of 
California, San Francisco, Medical Center since 1984 and had published widely in 
the area of radiology.  His research had won national prizes.  Dr. Hoddick had 
testified as an expert in medical imaging in at least 12 trials, three or four of which 
involved criminal matters.  He explained that the MRI utilizes ―a very specialized 
camera for looking inside the human body to evaluate structural anatomy inside 
the body‖ that ―uses two physical properties[,] . . . [a] high frequency image and 
radio frequency wave [] [that are] used . . . with the MRI to take exquisitely 
detailed pictures.‖  Dr. Hoddick stated that he evaluates MRI results by reviewing 
the images produced to determine ―what‘s going on inside the body.‖   
Here, defendant acknowledges that Dr. Hoddick was qualified to testify as 
an expert in diagnostic medical imaging but maintains he was not competent to 
opine whether the abnormalities he identified had any impact on defendant‘s 
behavior.  Specifically, he asserts that Dr. Hoddick did not establish that his 
experience and training in diagnostic medical imaging enabled him to opine 
whether fossa abnormalities such as those he detected on defendant‘s MRI results 
could affect human behavior.  Based on our review of the record, we agree with 
defendant that the prosecution failed to demonstrate the radiologist was qualified 
under Evidence Code section 720 to testify regarding the effect of fossa 
abnormalities on human behavior, a subject that is clearly beyond a juror‘s 
common knowledge.  Evidence of this nature is ordinarily admitted through the 
 
 63 
testimony of a qualified psychiatrist or neuropsychiatrist.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 286-287 [testimony of neuropsychiatrist offered to 
show that the defendant‘s brain abnormalities affected his impulse control].)  
Because Dr. Hoddick‘s competence to testify on this particular subject was not 
established, the trial court erred in admitting his testimony to the extent he opined 
defendant‘s premature fossa did not affect his behavior.     
Nonetheless, ―[t]he erroneous admission of expert testimony only warrants 
reversal if ‗it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing 
party would have been reached in the absence of the error.‘ ‖  (People v. Prieto 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247, citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)  
Here, the erroneous admission of Dr. Hoddick‘s testimony was harmless. 
As stated, defendant‘s sole defense was that due to a myriad of mental 
disorders, he did not premeditate and deliberate the murders.  Dr. Walser, the 
defense neuropsychologist, testified to this effect and stated that in forming her 
opinion, she relied extensively on the results of her psychological and 
neuropsychological evaluation of defendant and the results of the MMPI-2.  Dr. 
Walser did not rely heavily on the brain abnormalities in forming her opinion 
regarding defendant‘s psychopathology, and hence Dr. Hoddick‘s testimony that 
the fossa had no effect on defendant‘s behavior would not greatly have affected 
the jury‘s assessment of her opinion.  Further, as discussed in part II.B.1.f, ante, 
the prosecution‘s evidence that defendant premeditated and deliberated the 
murders was overwhelming.  Accordingly, we conclude that it is not reasonably 
probable that the erroneous admission of the prosecution‘s expert testimony 
affected the judgment.   
 
 64 
4.  Application of exclusionary rules   
Defendant contends that several evidentiary rulings involving the testimony 
of the defense expert, Dr. Walser, and the People‘s experts, Dr. Berg, Dr. 
Hoddick, and Dr. Peterson, reflected pro-prosecution bias on the court‘s part.  
Assertedly, the court‘s rulings, each of which we address below, ―were less then 
[sic] evenhanded,‖ and facilitated the prosecution‘s presentation of its case.  We 
disagree.  
―[A] trial court‘s numerous rulings against a party—even when 
erroneous—do not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are 
subject to review.  [Citations.]  [¶]  On appeal, we assess whether any judicial 
misconduct or bias was so prejudicial that it deprived defendant of ‗ ―a fair, as 
opposed to a perfect, trial.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1112.) 
Preliminarily, because defense counsel did not complain or otherwise 
object during trial that the evidentiary rulings discussed below reflected judicial 
bias, defendant forfeited the claim on appeal.  (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 1112.)  We also note that the court made many rulings in favor of 
defendant during the course of the trial.  Due to the nature of the appellate process 
in criminal cases, those rulings are not before us on appeal and we do not review 
or, generally, even mention them.  But the fact that on appeal we discuss only 
rulings against defendant does not mean the court‘s rulings were other than 
evenhanded.  (See People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 376-377.) 
a.  Dr. Walser’s qualifications to opine on brain tissue 
abnormalities 
Defendant contends that the court applied different standards in qualifying 
Dr. Walser, the defense expert psychologist, and Dr. Hoddick, the prosecution‘s 
expert radiologist, to opine whether the abnormalities detected on defendant‘s 
MRI could affect his behavior.  
 
 65 
As discussed above, whether a witness qualifies as an expert under 
Evidence Code section 720, subdivision (a), comes within the trial court‘s 
discretion.  (People v. Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1062-1063)  
During the defense case-in-chief, defense counsel sought to qualify Dr. 
Walser as an expert in the fields of forensic psychology, neuropsychology, 
psychology, and clinical psychology, and offered her testimony on the issue of 
defendant‘s mental state during the shooting spree.  After counsel elicited 
information about her education, skills, and experience in each subject, the 
prosecutor accepted the court‘s offer to voir dire the witness.  He asked Dr. Walser 
additional questions about her qualifications in each of the subjects identified.  She 
stated that she administered the Halstead-Reitan test, which is specifically 
designed to detect neurological brain damage, to in-custody defendants on five to 
10 occasions during the five years preceding defendant‘s trial and on two or three 
occasions during the preceding two years.  In the six years preceding defendant‘s 
trial, Dr. Walser testified for the defense in three to five criminal trials.  During 
one or two of those trials, she testified about the results of the Halstead-Reitan test 
after having personally administered the test.  The court found Dr. Walser 
qualified to offer expert testimony in the areas of neuropsychology, psychology, 
and clinical psychology.     
Thereafter, on direct examination, Dr. Walser testified that the results of 
neuropsychological tests she administered to defendant indicated mild impairment, 
and that this level of impairment would have a noticeable effect on a person‘s 
personality and behavior.  Before Dr. Walser tested defendant, she had been 
provided an oral report of defendant‘s EEG results and MRI findings.  The EEG 
results indicated there was a ―questionable‖ abnormality in the left temporal 
region of defendant‘s brain, and the MRI findings indicated focal atrophy or a 
small cyst in the posterior temporal lobe.  When defense counsel asked Dr. Walser 
 
 66 
whether brain abnormalities could cause problems with brain function, the 
prosecutor objected that she was not qualified in the fields of neurology and 
radiology.  The court permitted the parties to voir dire Dr. Walser in these areas, 
and thereafter accepted her qualifications to testify to the MRI and EEG results.  
Dr. Walser stated the results of defendant‘s EEG and MRI supported her 
conclusion that defendant suffered from organic brain damage, although she also 
clarified that these results were not essential to her conclusion. 
As discussed in the preceding part, defendant objected to Dr. Hoddick‘s 
qualification to opine whether the abnormalities he detected on defendant‘s MRI 
could affect defendant‘s behavior.  The court overruled the objection without 
comment, and Dr. Hoddick testified that the abnormalities would have no effect on 
defendant‘s behavior.  We concluded that the court erred in overruling the 
objection.  Nonetheless, nothing in the record suggests its manner of determining 
the qualifications of either expert was unfair or biased.   
b.  Nontestifying experts   
The pathologist who performed the autopsies on the victims in this case, 
Aaron Lipton, was unavailable to testify at trial.  During the prosecution‘s case-in-
chief, over objection, Dr. Peterson was permitted to testify about each victim‘s 
cause of death based on the contents of Dr. Lipton‘s autopsy reports. 
During presentation of the defense case, counsel attempted to elicit 
testimony from Dr. Walser concerning Dr. Caldwell‘s analysis of defendant‘s 
MMPI-2 and ―Rey-15-Item Test‖ results.  Dr. Caldwell interpreted and analyzed 
the MMPI-2 results, explained why the results were valid, and concluded that the 
results of the ―Rey-15 Item Test‖ showed no evidence defendant was 
malingering.  The prosecutor objected to admission of the testimony under People 
v. Campos (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 304, 308.  Campos held that ―[o]n direct 
 
 67 
examination, the expert witness may state the reasons for his or her opinion, and 
testify that reports prepared by other experts were a basis for that opinion,‖ but 
―[the] expert witness may not, on direct examination, reveal the content of reports 
prepared or opinions expressed by non-testifying experts.‖  (Ibid., italics added.)  
The trial court sustained the prosecutor‘s objection in part, barring Dr. Walser 
from revealing the contents of Dr. Caldwell‘s report or opinions expressed by Dr. 
Caldwell as they may have related to or affected her evaluation of defendant. 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court‘s rulings ―created imbalance 
in expert testimony, and reduced the coherence of the defense.‖  We disagree.  
Assuming the rulings were unbalanced, the prosecution gained no significant 
advantage thereby.  In part II.B.8, post, we discuss defendant‘s contention that Dr. 
Peterson‘s testimony was admitted in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation and conclude his testimony had little or no significance in this case. 
c.  Evidence of disorganized thinking   
In surrebuttal, defense counsel asked Dr. Walser whether ―on the 
Rorschach test Michael Pearson . . . tested positive for disorganized thinking.‖  
Defendant contends the court exhibited bias when it sustained the prosecutor‘s 
objection that the question called for testimony cumulative of that of Dr. Walser‘s 
testimony on direct examination because the court ruled on the objection before it 
asked counsel whether the expert had indeed already testified on this point.  
Defendant asserts that evidence of defendant‘s disorganized thinking, as suggested 
by the Rorschach test results, was elicited only on counsel‘s cross-examination of 
the prosecution‘s mental health expert, Dr. Berg.  To the contrary, as counsel 
conceded during the hearing on this matter, he developed this testimony on direct 
examination of Dr. Walser.  Dr. Walser testified, for example, that the results 
suggested defendant had a ―coping deficit‖ and explained that people with such a 
 
 68 
deficit are ―easily disorganized by stress‖ and that in this context, ―disorganized‖ 
means, among other things, the person ―may not be able to think or think clearly.‖  
Defendant‘s suggestion of bias is entirely unfounded.  The court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding the testimony as cumulative.  
d.  Dr. Berg’s qualification as an expert in workplace violence 
Defendant contends the court was biased because it did not address his 
objection that the prosecution‘s proposed expert testimony from Dr. Berg 
concerning workplace violence was irrelevant on the issue of defendant‘s state of 
mind.  
Here, the expert testified he had evaluated over two dozen employees for 
their potential for violence in the workplace environment.  He testified that 
defendant‘s conduct at work on the day of the murders was relevant to his state of 
mind at the time of the murders, and that his experience in evaluating others who 
have committed violence in the workplace would assist him in diagnosing 
defendant‘s personality.  Defendant does not establish why or how the testimony 
was irrelevant.  The claim therefore fails.   
e.  Permissible scope of expert testimony regarding defendant’s 
state of mind  
Defendant contends the court unfairly assisted the prosecution in presenting 
its case by permitting the People‘s mental health expert, Dr. Berg, to opine about 
ultimate facts relating to defendant‘s mental state at the time of the murders, while 
precluding his own expert, Dr. Walser, from providing similar testimony.  As 
explained below, defendant failed to preserve most of his arguments for appeal, 
and in any event, the testimony of the two experts differed in ways that affected 
their admissibility under section 29.   
Under section 29, an expert may testify ―about a defendant‘s mental illness, 
mental disorder, or mental defect,‖ but ―shall not testify as to whether the 
 
 69 
defendant had or did not have the required mental states, which include, but are 
not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, for the crimes 
charged.‖  Section 28, subdivision (a) precludes evidence showing diminished 
capacity, although it permits evidence of mental disease to be admitted ―solely on 
the issue of whether or not the accused actually formed a required specific intent, 
premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent 
crime is charged.‖  Subdivision (d) of section 28, however, recognizes the court‘s 
―discretion, pursuant to the Evidence Code, to exclude psychiatric or 
psychological evidence on whether the accused had a mental disease, mental 
defect, or mental disorder at the time of the alleged offense.‖   
Contrary to defendant‘s assertions, on numerous occasions Dr. Walser 
offered opinions that went to defendant‘s state of mind at the time he shot the 
victims.  When defense counsel asked the expert what was ―disorganized‖ about 
defendant‘s attempt to talk further with Talley about the reasons for his 
termination, Dr. Walser responded:  ―Well, that‘s not.  It‘s probably an appropriate 
thing to do.‖  She then gratuitously added, ―But he was—I think he was escalating 
in terms of the stress he was experiencing.  When that was not fulfilled and he 
didn‘t have that opportunity and he felt very wrong, then he—then it tipped the 
balance and he became —.‖  Counsel then asked Dr. Walser a series of questions 
about defendant‘s ―101 California‖ statements and specifically whether, sometime 
before the day of the murders, defendant was ―thinking about just what he said, 
doing a 101 California?‖  As we concluded in part II.B.2, ante, this question, like 
the question about any disorganization defendant may have experienced, asked the 
expert to opine directly about defendant‘s state of mind at the time of the offense, 
a question within the jury‘s exclusive province.  (See People v. San Nicolas, 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 663 [the trial court did not err by excluding forensic 
psychiatrist‘s opinion relating the concept of ―spillover rage‖ to the defendant‘s 
 
 70 
mental state at the time of the crimes].)  Thus, the trial court properly sustained the 
prosecutor‘s objections to these questions.  The court also properly sustained 
prosecutorial objections to the following portions of Dr. Walser‘s testimony on the 
same ground:  (1) ―[defendant] seemed to be [in] a reactive kind of state, rather 
than . . . cold and calculated‖; (2) ―[At the time of the crimes, defendant] didn‘t 
seem to know what he was doing‖; and (3) ―defendant‘s impairment [at the time of 
the commission of the crimes] definitely needs to be taken into consideration here.  
It‘s part of why he couldn‘t handle the stress he was under.‖   
On the other hand, the court properly permitted the prosecution‘s expert, 
Dr. Berg, to interpret defendant‘s comment, ―I ain‘t no joke,‖ made before and 
after shooting Talley, as expressing ―anger,‖ ―retribution,‖ and ―revenge.‖ 
―[S]ections 28 and 29 in fact leave an expert considerable latitude to express an 
opinion on the defendant‘s mental condition at the time of offense, within the 
confines, of course, of its twin prohibitions: no testimony on the defendant‘s 
capacity to have, or actually having, the intent required to commit the charged 
crime.‖  (People v. Cortes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 873, 910, citing People v. 
Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 583.)  Dr. Berg‘s testimony properly related to 
defendant‘s general mental condition during his killing spree and did not express 
an opinion on his criminal intent when he shot the victims.  In any event, defense 
counsel‘s failure to object forfeited any claim with regard to Dr. Berg‘s 
interpretation of defendant‘s ―I ain‘t no joke‖ comment.   
For the same reason, under sections 28 and 29, Dr. Berg was permitted to 
testify that defendant‘s conduct could be explained by the termination of his 
employment, and that what he ―believed was going to be happening to him for 
weeks before [the murders]‖ could not be explained by ―anything delusional or 
hallucinatory.‖  The expert did not describe defendant‘s mental state at the time he 
shot the victims, but rather, his diagnosed mental condition.  And while defense 
 
 71 
counsel initially objected to admission of this testimony, his claim is forfeited 
because the court admitted the evidence subject to a motion to strike, which 
counsel never made.  Indeed, counsel was even amenable to opening up this area, 
suggesting, ―If you want to go there, that‘s all right with me . . . .‖  
Further, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Dr. Berg to offer 
the abstract opinion that the personality disorders defendant suffered from, i.e., 
―obsessive compulsive and schizoid and paranoid,‖ would not ―in any way prevent 
a person from committing deliberate and premeditated murder.‖  As the court 
recognized, Dr. Berg‘s opinion was merely ―descriptive of the condition that [the 
expert] diagnosed.‖  Dr. Berg‘s comments did not go to defendant‘s mental state at 
the time of the events but, rather, gave jurors an abstract description of defendant‘s 
diagnosed condition that they could consider when deciding the ultimate issue of 
whether he premeditated and deliberated the murders.  Unlike Dr. Walser, Dr. 
Berg was never asked to opine on defendant‘s mental state at the time of the 
murders.  The court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the testimony.   
Finally, defendant contends that the court erred by precluding defense 
counsel from asking Dr. Walser leading questions such as ―whether a person who 
misperceives reality on a regular basis [is psychotic].‖  Although the court 
suggested it would begin to sustain the prosecutor‘s objections on this ground, it 
permitted defendant‘s counsel to elicit Dr. Walser‘s explanation of the term 
―psychotic.‖  In addition, elsewhere during Dr. Walser‘s direct examination, 
counsel was permitted to ask leading questions.  Defendant fails to show any bias 
in the court‘s actions with respect to leading questions.  
5.  Cross-examination of a prosecution rebuttal witness 
Defendant contends that the trial court violated his rights to confront 
witnesses in precluding the defense from cross-examining Dr. Berg regarding 
 
 72 
Medi-Cal fraud charges brought against him sometime in the early 1980‘s.  
Defense counsel purportedly had a copy of the complaint in the fraud case, a 
record of the subsequent legal adjudication of Dr. Berg‘s actual innocence by ―a 
court in Alameda County,‖ an affidavit of an investigator in the case, and ―the 
name of the victim.‖  Counsel, however, did not identify the case number or 
provide other specifics about the matter, including the year the charges were 
purportedly filed and the time period during which the conduct assertedly 
occurred.  Nonetheless, we presume, as the parties do, that the Medi-Cal 
allegations and charges at issue here are the same as those involved in a nearly 
identical claim raised in People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, which we rejected 
on the merits.  Our opinion in Sapp indicates that the allegations involved conduct 
between 1982 and 1987.  (See id. at p. 289.)  Dr. Berg was found actually innocent 
of the charges before defendant‘s trial.  (See id. at p. 293, fn. 3.)  
For the reasons discussed below, the claim is without merit.  
a.  Factual and procedural background 
After cross-examining prosecution rebuttal witness Dr. Berg regarding his 
evaluation of defendant, defense counsel asked the witness whether he had ―been a 
thief‖ in his ―time.‖  The prosecutor objected to the question as argumentative, and 
the trial court sustained the objection.  Counsel then followed up with a question 
insinuating that Dr. Berg stole ―in the neighborhood of $10,000‖ in a Medi-Cal 
fraud case during the ―early 1980‘s.‖  The prosecutor again objected and the court 
held a hearing on the matter outside the presence of the jury.   
The prosecutor complained that defense counsel‘s line of inquiry was 
improper and unethical, asserting counsel knew Dr. Berg had been found factually 
innocent of the charges.  Counsel conceded he was aware of the factual innocence 
finding, but argued the finding ―means nothing about the reality of fraud.‖  
 
 73 
Counsel argued that, although the charges were dismissed after Dr. Berg prevailed 
on a suppression motion, the sequence of events leading to his exoneration ―goes 
to his bias and goes to his desire to do what he can to keep in[] the system, to keep 
his viability as a product for the District Attorney‘s Office and for the criminal 
defense bar.‖  Counsel stated also that he had ―obtained a number of [actual 
innocence findings] in the course of his career‖ and ―happen[ed] to know how 
easy it can be to get a declaration of factual innocence.‖  Counsel thus wanted to 
question Dr. Berg about the circumstances under which he obtained the actual 
innocence finding and whether the prosecuting agency opposed his efforts in this 
regard.    
Further, defense counsel asserted that Dr. Berg invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination in an unrelated criminal case in 
response to a question by the defendant‘s attorney, a public defender, as to 
whether he was innocent of the charges.  Also, in response to a news reporter‘s 
question about that case, Dr. Berg was quoted as saying, ―I was never convicted of 
any crime in this State or any other state and a story like this would be very 
harmful to my reputation.  This is going to be ruinous to me and I feel ripped off.‖  
Counsel urged that these events were relevant to prove Dr. Berg was biased 
against all public defenders when he testified for the prosecution in defendant‘s 
trial, and therefore, was biased against defendant‘s counsel, also a public defender.  
Counsel said he had a copy of the newspaper in which the article appeared.  The 
trial court sustained the prosecutor‘s objection, finding that, under Evidence Code 
section 352, the proposed cross-examination involved a collateral matter and 
would necessitate an undue consumption of time.   
The court thereafter instructed the jury as follows:  ―Ladies and gentlemen, 
with regard to the last two questions that were posed by [defense counsel,] Mr. 
Veale, I will tell you they were inappropriate questions.  There was no factual 
 
 74 
basis for those questions.  And I would ask you to erase that from your mind as not 
having been said at all.‖ 
b.  Discussion 
In Sapp, the prosecution called Dr. Berg in the penalty phase to rebut 
defense evidence that the defendant suffered from brain abnormalities and organic 
dysfunction at the time of the offenses.  (People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal. 4th at pp. 
287-289.)  The defendant there sought to impeach Dr. Berg‘s credibility by cross-
examining him regarding charges of Medi-Cal fraud brought against him four 
years earlier and subsequently dismissed.  (Id. at p. 289.)  The trial court 
disallowed the cross-examination under section 352, concluding it involved a 
collateral matter that was more prejudicial than probative and would ―consume too 
much time‖ and ― ‗divert[] the jury, from its primary purpose of deciding the 
appropriate penalty.‖  (At p. 289.)  In rejecting the defendant‘s claim that the court 
erred by disallowing the proposed cross-examination, we explained that trial 
courts have broad discretion ― ‗to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into 
nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues . . . . [¶] . . . 
[I]mpeachment evidence other than felony convictions entails problems of proof, 
unfair surprise, and moral turpitude evaluation which felony convictions do not 
present.  Hence, courts may and should consider with particular care whether the 
admission of such evidence might involve undue time, confusion, or prejudice 
which outweighs its probative value.‘ ‖  (Ibid., quoting People v. Wheeler, supra, 
4 Cal.4th at pp. 296-297.)   
We also concluded the defendant‘s argument under the Sixth Amendment 
lacked merit:  ―The federal Constitution‘s confrontation right is not absolute; it 
leaves room for trial courts to impose reasonable limits on a defense counsel's 
cross-examination of a witness.  (Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 
 
 75 
679; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1203.)  We discern no violation of 
defendant‘s right to confront and cross-examine Dr. Berg in the trial court‘s ruling 
here.  Whether Dr. Berg had or had not filed false claims with Medi Cal was, at 
most, nominally relevant to the subject matter of his testimony: expert opinion that 
defendant‘s criminal behavior was attributable to antisocial personality disorder, 
not brain abnormalities or family dysfunction.‖  (People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th 
at p. 290.) 
Defendant claims the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses.  He seeks to distinguish Sapp in that, here, even if 
Dr. Berg was not guilty of the fraud charges, impeachment on the subject was 
admissible to show that he was biased in favor of the prosecution and against 
public defenders whose clients opposed him.  Specifically, Dr. Berg‘s ―remarkable 
success in obtaining suppression of the fraud evidence, dismissal of fraud charges, 
and a finding of factual innocence‖ constituted impeachable bias.  The sequence of 
events leading to the actual innocence finding purportedly ―could well be linked—
in [Dr. Berg‘s] own mind if not in the minds of the prosecuting agency and the 
courts that provided the relief he sought—to his service as a witness for the 
prosecution.‖  Also, defendant asserts his counsel should have had the opportunity 
to uncover any bias the expert harbored against public defenders as a result of the 
negative publicity surrounding the criminal case in which he invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, discussed above.   
―As a general matter, a defendant is entitled to explore whether a witness 
has been offered any inducements or expects any benefits for his or her testimony, 
as such evidence is suggestive of bias.  (People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 
294; Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f) [‗the court or jury may consider in determining 
the credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or 
disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing, including . . . [¶] . . .  [¶] 
 
 76 
(f) The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive‘].)  ―[A 
defendant‘s] . . . right to cross-examination is not a matter of ‗absolute right.‘ 
Although we have said that ‗[c]ross-examination to test the credibility of a 
prosecuting witness in a criminal case should be given wide latitude‘ (Curry v. 
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 715, such latitude does not ‗prevent the trial 
court from imposing reasonable limits on defense counsel‘s inquiry based on 
concerns about harassment, confusion of the issues, or relevance‘ (People v. Box 
[, supra,] 23 Cal.4th [at p.] 1203; see Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 
p. 679).‖  (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 544-545 (Brown).) 
―Moreover, reliance on Evidence Code section 352 to exclude evidence of 
marginal impeachment value that would entail the undue consumption of time 
generally does not contravene a defendant‘s constitutional rights to confrontation 
and cross-examination.‖  (Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 545.)  ―[A] criminal 
defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was 
prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to 
show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby ‗to expose 
to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences 
relating to the reliability of the witness.‘ ‖  (Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 
U.S. at p. 680, quoting Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 318.)  ― ‗[U]nless the 
defendant can show that the prohibited cross-examination would have produced ―a 
significantly different impression of [the witness‘s] credibility‖ ([Delaware v.] 
Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680), the trial court‘s exercise of its discretion 
in this regard does not violate the Sixth Amendment.‘  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 
Cal.4th 894, 946.)‖  (Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 545-546.) 
We find no abuse of discretion here.  No evidence was presented or 
proffered that Dr. Berg attributed the granting of his suppression motion, dismissal 
of the fraud charges, and subsequent declaration of his actual innocence to special 
 
 77 
treatment accorded him because of his prior service as an expert witness for the 
prosecution, rather than to a just outcome of the judicial process.  In addition, 
defense counsel offered no proof in support of his suggestion that the favorable 
resolution of the fraud charges was payback for Dr. Berg‘s service as a witness for 
the prosecution.  
For similar reasons, the court did not err in preventing counsel also from 
questioning Dr. Berg about the fraud charges for the purpose of showing his 
asserted bias against public defenders.  There was no showing that Dr. Berg had 
expressed any hostility towards the public defender in the case discussed above, or 
public defenders in general, or otherwise indicated he held any public defender 
responsible for the negative publicity about that case.  In addition, counsel 
conceded he did not know whether the news article was accurate.  Absent such 
facts, counsel‘s proffer that Dr. Berg was biased against all public defenders was 
speculative.  Further, ―[t]he jury may not draw any inference from a witness‘s 
invocation of a privilege.  (Evid. Code, § 913, subd. (a); People v. Mincey (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 408, 441.)‖  (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 441-442.) 
6.  Evidence of complaints about RHA management 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of 
various complaints about RHA managers, most of which purportedly were 
circulating before defendant was hired by the agency.  The excluded evidence 
included, for example, testimony that there was ―some talk‖ about how Burton 
obtained her position; that Donald Richmond, a ―close friend‖ of defendant‘s and 
former director of personnel administration for the City of Richmond, had 
received a report from the Inspector General working with the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that indicated Talley and 
a coworker ―did not possess the skills, knowledge, ability to be in their jobs‖; that 
 
 78 
employees complained to Toni Lawrence, a supervisor at RHA, that Talley, who 
supervised Burton, allowed Burton to do ―virtually little or no work‖ because they 
were friends; that Connie Taylor, a housing specialist at RHA, had heard from 
coworkers prior to 1995 that Talley showed favoritism towards certain employees, 
including Burton; that Hatchett was aware that employees felt they had been 
mistreated by Talley, Burton, and others and ―d[id] nothing to stop it‖; and that a 
RHA employee began to cry when Patricia Jones spoke harshly to her.   
Defense counsel offered the evidence as proof of defendant‘s state of mind 
when he shot the victims.  ―I think the poisonous atmosphere bears upon the state 
of mind of the defendant.  He has certainly an emotional and intellectual 
psychological deficit that is exacerbated by being treated poorly, which he was, 
and it gives him all kinds of reasons to think there is in fact a conspiracy, that 
people are wanting to do[], things like that.‖  The court ruled that the evidence was 
inadmissible hearsay and lacked relevance, and that its probative value was ―far 
outweighed‖ by its ―possible inappropriate prejudicial effect.‖ 
Defendant contends the evidence was critical to his mental state defense 
and although he did not offer the evidence in the penalty phase, now asserts the 
evidence was also admissible on the question of punishment to show that he 
believed his actions were morally justified.  (See § 190.3, factor (f) [in 
determining penalty, the trier of fact may consider ―[w]hether or not the offense 
was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to 
be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.‖].)  
― ‗It is within a trial court‘s discretion to exclude evidence if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would 
create a substantial danger of undue prejudice.  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  Our review 
on this issue is deferential.  A trial court‘s decision whether to exclude evidence 
 
 79 
pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.‘ ‖  
(People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 488.) 
Defendant‘s contention fails.  Many, if not all, of the conversations and 
complaints to which the excluded evidence related occurred before defendant was 
hired at RHA.  Defense counsel made no showing that defendant was aware of 
these matters.  Indeed, defendant here concedes that counsel intended ―to 
illuminate what he was likely to have heard and believed about the Housing 
Authority employees with whom he had hostile interactions.‖  Absent proof of  
this preliminary fact, counsel could not show the evidence was relevant as bearing 
on defendant‘s state of mind or his belief that the killings were morally justified.  
The record indicates that the court found counsel‘s showing to be insufficient in 
this respect.  (See People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 165 [―When . . . the 
relevance of proffered evidence depends upon the existence of a foundational fact, 
the proffered evidence is inadmissible unless the trial court determines it ‗is 
sufficient to permit the jury to find the preliminary fact true by a preponderance of 
the evidence.‘ ‖]; Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)(1).)  And counsel made no showing 
that the evidence was relevant on any other basis.  Accordingly, there was no 
abuse of discretion. 
7.  Exclusion of portion of videotaped confession to police   
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to admit a 
videotape of his confession to police made within hours of the murders.  Defense 
counsel offered the evidence to impeach the prosecution‘s expert psychologist, Dr. 
Berg, whose testimony, in turn, was offered to rebut the evidence that defendant 
was delusional and suffering from a brief psychotic break when he shot the 
victims. For the reasons stated below, the claim fails on the merits. 
 
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a.  Factual and procedural background 
On direct examination, Dr. Berg testified that within two days of the 
murders he interviewed defendant in jail and later, within a few weeks of the 
commencement of trial, reviewed the various reports by Drs. Walser, Wilkinson, 
and Kincaid regarding defendant‘s psychological and neuropsychological tests and 
MRI results.  Dr. Berg opined that, at the time of the murders, defendant acted out 
of anger, retribution, and revenge, and was neither delusional nor psychotic. 
During cross-examination, Dr. Berg testified that he had not reviewed the two-
and-one-half-hour videotape of defendant‘s confession to police in forming his 
opinion, but instead had reviewed an interrogating officer‘s written summary of 
the confession and the circumstances under which it was made.  Thereafter, 
defense counsel sought to admit and play for the jury the videotaped confession in 
order to test Dr. Berg‘s credibility.  Counsel acknowledged defendant‘s videotaped 
statements were inadmissible for their truth under the hearsay rule, and instead 
offered the evidence under the state of mind exception as circumstantial proof that 
when defendant gave his confession, he continued to exhibit the disorganized 
thinking that Dr. Walser opined he experienced when he shot the victims.  (Evid. 
Code, § 1250.) 6  Counsel did not identify specific portions of the videotape that 
he wanted to admit.   
The prosecutor objected on the grounds that the evidence was irrelevant and 
unreliable hearsay and that he would be denied an opportunity to cross-examine 
defendant.  The court denied counsel‘s request to play the entire videotape on the 
                                              
6  
As relevant, Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a) permits 
―evidence of a statement of the declarant‘s then existing state of mind, emotion, or 
physical sensation . . . when:  [¶]  (1)  The evidence is offered to prove the 
declarant‘s state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or any other 
time when it is itself an issue in the action; or  [¶]  (2) The evidence is offered to 
prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.‖   
 
 81 
ground that the consumption of time involved in doing so would outweigh the 
probative value of the evidence.  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  It permitted counsel to play 
only specific excerpts from the videotape to buttress the defense evidence that 
defendant was delusional at the time of the murders.  When counsel resumed 
cross-examination, counsel played for the expert and jury a seven-minute excerpt 
of the videotape in which defendant discussed the murders and talked about Talley 
laughing at him on the day of the murders.  Counsel asked Dr. Berg whether 
defendant‘s statements were evidence that defendant hallucinated hearing Talley‘s 
laughter, and the expert answered they were ―less than weak‖ evidence that 
defendant was hallucinating.  
During redirect examination, the prosecutor played an excerpt that 
purportedly showed defendant was engaged in a rational, matter-of-fact discussion 
of the murders with investigators and suggested he shot the victims because they 
had ―screwed with him.‖  On recross-examination, defense counsel again sought 
to admit and play the entire videotaped confession or, in the alternative, additional 
excerpts that purportedly evidenced defendant‘s disorganized thinking and 
remorse during the interview.  For example, in one excerpt defendant asked 
investigators, ―Where is Lorraine?‖ and ―Where is Barbara?‖ and said ―I am sorry 
about that,‖ evidently referring to the shootings.  In another, defendant stated, ―I 
mean, I really say that I‘m truly I am sorry that I done this now. . . . You know, the 
family is tore up just like my family is tore up.‖  Counsel sought admission of the 
evidence of defendant‘s remorse to rebut Dr. Berg‘s implication, on cross-
examination, that defendant assassinated the victims, asserting the evidence was 
unlike what one would reasonably expect the typical coldhearted and detached 
assassin would feel after committing a murder.  The prosecutor conceded the 
additional evidence of defendant‘s delusional state was admissible state of mind 
evidence but objected that defendant‘s statements expressing remorse and 
 
 82 
acknowledging the harm he had caused the victims‘ families were hearsay and an 
impermissible appeal to the sympathies of the jury.  The court admitted, and 
permitted defense counsel to play, the videotape excerpts offered as circumstantial 
proof of defendant‘s disorganized thinking (i.e., his asking where Lorraine and 
Barbara were) and excluded the remainder of the proffer on hearsay grounds.  
b.  Discussion 
We first address defendant‘s contention that the court erred in denying his 
counsel‘s request to play for the jury the entire videotaped confession to police in 
order to contradict Dr. Berg‘s opinion that defendant was not psychotic when he 
shot the victims.  ― ‗The courts have traditionally given both parties wide latitude 
in the cross-examination of experts in order to test their credibility.  [Citations.]  
Thus, a broader range of evidence may be properly used on cross-examination to 
test and diminish the weight to be given the expert opinion than is admissible on 
direct examination to fortify the opinion.  [Citation.]‘ ‖  (People v. Montiel (1993) 
5 Cal.4th 877, 923-924.)  ―It is common practice to challenge an expert by 
inquiring in good faith about relevant information, including hearsay, which he 
may have overlooked or ignored.‖  (Id. at p. 924; People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 
Cal.4th 894, 923-924.)   
Here, the videotaped confession consisted of statements of a declarant made 
out of court and therefore was admissible only if it was offered for a nonhearsay 
purpose or fell within an exception to the hearsay rule.  The trial court properly 
permitted counsel to play the above identified excerpts under the state of mind 
hearsay exception and to inquire whether the prosecution‘s expert considered the 
evidence in forming his opinion.  Although the court offered to consider any 
additional excerpts that counsel identified as potentially relevant to test the 
expert‘s opinion, counsel did not avail himself of this opportunity.  Consequently, 
 
 83 
defendant cannot now complain that the court erroneously excluded any remaining 
portion of the videotape that was relevant to test the expert‘s opinion.  In addition, 
because counsel offered the video excerpts of defendant‘s expressions of remorse 
solely for their truth, that is, to establish he was sorry for his crimes, the court did 
not err by excluding them under the hearsay rule.    
Finally, defendant asserts for the first time on appeal that the excerpts 
depicting his expressions of remorse were also admissible pursuant to the rule of 
completeness under Evidence Code section 356.7  ―The purpose of this section is 
to prevent the use of selected aspects of a conversation, act, declaration, or 
writing, so as to create a misleading impression on the subjects addressed.‖  
(People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 156; People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
96, 130.)  The excerpts were admissible, he contends, in order to avoid leaving 
jurors with the misleading impression created by the excerpt introduced by the 
prosecutor, in which defendant appeared to be rational while conversing with the 
detectives and suggested he killed the victims because they had ―screwed with 
him.‖  Defense counsel intended to accomplish this by showing the outpouring of 
grief that assertedly followed defendant‘s ―screwed with them‖ statement.  
Defendant, however, did not object on this ground at trial, and thus forfeited the 
claim on appeal.  (See e.g., People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435-438.)  In 
any event, defendant fails to demonstrate that the excerpt introduced by the 
prosecutor was misleading, much less that defendant‘s expressions of remorse 
                                              
7  
Evidence Code section 356 provides: ―Where part of an act, declaration, 
conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same 
subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; . . . and when a detached act, 
declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, 
declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may 
also be given in evidence.‖ 
 
 84 
during the police interview were relevant to his state of mind at the time of the 
murders.  
8.   Admission of the autopsy reports and Dr. Peterson’s testimony 
Aaron Lipton, a pathologist then employed by Contra Costa County, 
performed the autopsies on Lorraine Talley and Barbara Garcia.  At the time of 
defendant‘s trial, Dr. Lipton was no longer employed by the county.  The 
prosecutor represented that he did not know where he could be found and that a 
forensic pathologist, Brian Peterson, now routinely performed the autopsies for the 
county.8  At the prosecutor‘s request, Dr. Peterson reviewed the contents of the 
certified copies of Dr. Lipton‘s autopsy reports and the photographs taken of their 
bodies during the autopsies.  Relying on these reports and photographs, Dr. 
Peterson described in detail the conditions of Talley‘s and Garcia‘s bodies and 
also conveyed Dr. Lipton‘s opinions as to the cause of death of each victim:  
Talley‘s death was caused by ―brain destruction due to a gunshot wound to the 
head with a contributory cause[] of gunshot wound to the abdomen,‖ and the cause 
of Garcia‘s death was a gunshot wound to the head with a contributory cause of 
two gunshot wounds to the abdomen.  Dr. Peterson testified that he agreed with 
these opinions.   
Defendant contends that the autopsy reports and Dr. Peterson‘s testimony 
constituted testimonial hearsay, and that under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 
541 U.S. 36, 59 (Crawford), admission of the evidence violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront and cross-examine Dr. Lipton.9  
                                              
8  
Defendant did not dispute that Dr. Lipton was not available to testify at 
trial. 
9  
Defendant does not contend the autopsy photographs were erroneously 
admitted. 
 
 85 
a.  Forfeiture 
The People contend that defendant forfeited his claim because defense 
counsel objected only on hearsay grounds to Dr. Peterson‘s testimony and failed to 
object on any basis to admission of the autopsy reports.  We disagree.   
This case was tried before Crawford overruled Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 
U.S. 56, which for 24 years governed the admissibility of statements from 
witnesses unavailable at trial.  Roberts held that admission of an unavailable 
witness‘s statement does not violate the Sixth Amendment‘s confrontation 
requirement ―so long as [the statement] has adequate indicia of reliability — i.e., 
falls within a ‗firmly rooted hearsay exception‘ or bears ‗particularized guarantees 
of trustworthiness.‘ ‖  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 42.)  In People v. Clark, 
supra, 3 Cal.4th at page 159, a case decided before defendant was tried, this court 
held that admission of the contents of an autopsy report prepared by a 
nontestifying pathologist did not violate the defendant‘s confrontation rights 
where the contents of the report ―were admitted under a ‗firmly rooted‘ exception 
to the hearsay rule that carries sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the 
requirements of the confrontation clause.‖  (See also People v. Beeler (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 953, 979-980 [same].)  As shown below, ―Crawford dramatically departed 
from prior confrontation clause case law.‖  (People v. Giles (2007) 40 Cal.4th 833, 
840.)  Thus, we find it represents an unforeseen change in the law ―that competent 
and knowledgeable counsel reasonably could [not] have been expected to have 
anticipated‖ at defendant‘s 1996 trial, and excuse his failure to object.  (People v. 
Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 812; see also People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 
663, 667, fn. 4 [recognizing an exception to the objection requirement where 
counsel cannot be faulted for failing to anticipate change in the law].) 
 
 86 
b.  Discussion 
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that admission of 
testimonial out-of-court statements offered against a defendant violates the Sixth 
Amendment confrontation clause unless the witness is unavailable at trial and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  (Crawford, supra, 541 
U.S. 36.)  ―Crawford did not define the term ‗testimonial,‘ but it mentioned 
several possible definitions, by several sources, of statements that are testimonial 
in nature, including ‗ ―extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or 
confessions,‖ [citation]; [and] ―statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial . . . ‖ [citation].‘  (Id. at pp. 51–52.)‖  
(People v. Rutterschmidt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 650, 657.)  The high court has since 
held examples of testimonial evidence include certificates of laboratory analyses 
created to prove a fact in a criminal proceeding.  (See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico (2011) __ U.S. __ [131 S.Ct. 2705, 2709] [laboratory report certified by 
nontestifying analyst stating the defendant‘s blood-alcohol level was above the 
legal limit]; Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, 308 
[certificates of analysis prepared by nontestifying analysts stating that the 
substance seized from the defendant was cocaine].)  In contrast, testimonial 
evidence does not include a laboratory report that was produced for the primary 
purpose of catching a rapist who was still at large and not to obtain evidence for 
use against the defendant, who not under suspicion at that time.  (Williams v. 
Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. __ [132 S.Ct. 2221, 2243-2244] (plur. opn. of Alito, J.) 
Recently, in People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608, we held that 
statements in an autopsy report describing a nontestifying pathologist‘s 
observations of the condition of the victim‘s body were not testimonial.  
 
 87 
―[S]tatements, which merely record objective facts, are less formal than statements 
setting forth a pathologist‘s expert conclusions.  They are comparable to 
observations of objective fact in a report by a physician who, after examining a 
patient, diagnoses a particular injury or ailment and determines the appropriate 
treatment.‖  (Id. at p. 619.)  In addition, the primary purpose of recording the facts 
in question did not pertain to a criminal investigation.  (Id. at pp. 619-620.)   
This case is distinguished from Dungo because the Crawford issues involve 
the admission at trial of entire autopsy reports prepared by a nontestifying 
pathologist (Dr. Lipton) and the testimony of another pathologist (Dr. Peterson) 
who described the objective facts and opinions expressed in the reports.  However, 
we need not decide whether, following our decision in Dungo, the evidence here is 
testimonial because any error in the admission of the autopsy reports and Dr. 
Peterson‘s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Chapman v. 
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; see People v. Rutterschmidt, supra, 55 Cal.4th 
at p. 661 [any erroneous admission of the lab reports indicating the presence of 
alcohol and three sedating drugs in the victim‘s blood samples was harmless].) 
―The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman ‗requir[es] the 
beneficiary of a [federal] constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.‘  ([Ibid.])  
‗To say that an error did not contribute to the ensuing verdict is . . . to find that 
error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in 
question, as revealed in the record.‘  (Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403.)  
Thus, the focus is on what the jury actually decided and whether the error might 
have tainted its decision.  That is to say, the issue is ‗whether the . . . verdict 
actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.‘  (Sullivan v. 
Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279.)‖  (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86.) 
 
 88 
The cause of death of each victim was undisputed.  Defendant admitted he 
fired multiple bullets into Talley and Garcia.  Each victim died at the scene.  
Defense counsel conceded to the jury that defendant intended to kill Talley and 
Garcia and that the sole contested issue was whether defendant killed them with 
premeditation and deliberation.  The prosecution‘s evidence, apart from the 
autopsy evidence, overwhelmingly established these elements.  (See discussion, 
ante, pt. II.B.1.f.) 
The jury also viewed numerous photographs depicting, among other things, 
the gunshot wounds that defendant inflicted on each victim, the positions and 
condition of the victims, and a spent bullet under Garcia‘s head.  The photographs 
were authenticated by Kime, Spears, and Jones, who were in the rooms where 
defendant shot the victims, as well as law enforcement personnel who responded 
to the crime scene.   
In sum, in light of the above evidence, the significance of the contents of 
the autopsy reports and Dr. Peterson‘s testimony on the question of premeditation 
and deliberation was slight.  As a result, any error in the admission of this 
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Victim impact evidence   
Defendant contends the court erred in admitting the victim impact 
testimony, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment.  We disagree.  
Over defendant‘s objection, the prosecution presented victim impact 
evidence through the testimony of numerous family members and friends of the 
victims and several eyewitnesses to the crimes. 
 
 89 
Gladys Dean, Lorraine Talley‘s mother, described Lorraine, her only child, 
as ―bubbly‖ and ―jolly.‖  Mrs. Dean said that when she learned of Lorraine‘s 
death, ―something just left me . . . . I was empty.‖   
Lorraine‘s 23-year-old daughter, Tenisha Talley, described how her world 
―has been turned upside down, inside out‖ since her mother was murdered.   
Tenisha described how her grandmother had become ―more of a cold person‖ after 
Lorraine‘s death.  ―[S]he wakes up every day and knows she doesn‘t have a 
daughter to talk to.  She can‘t go over and see Lorraine.  She can‘t hear Lorraine‘s 
voice anymore.‖  
Lorraine‘s 22-year-old daughter, Nakia Talley, said it was ―was like a 
movie‖ when she learned of her mother‘s death.  She was with her grandmother at 
the time, whom she described as ―look[ing] just dead‖ and ―hollow.‖  When Nakia 
tried to console her grandmother, ―she just looked up at me and her eyes were all 
glassy and she was just crying and shaking and I couldn‘t stop that.  I couldn‘t 
make it go away.  I could not make her not hurt.‖  
Harriette Langston was a lifelong friend of Lorraine‘s.  ―[Lorraine] was like 
a sister to me. She was so much a part of my life and I miss her very much.‖  
Langston was on the telephone with Lorraine moments before defendant shot her.  
When Lorraine told her that she had to fire defendant that day, Langston suggested 
that she call the police.  Lorraine responded, ―Harriette, I don‘t want to embarrass 
him.  That would just be awful for him to be carted out of here by the police.‖  
When Langston was informed that Lorraine had been fatally shot, she became 
―numb.‖  
Sam Burns, a deputy sheriff with the Contra Costa County Sheriff‘s 
Department, was once married to Lorraine; they had a child together.  When Burns 
told their son that his mother was dead, he started crying and asked if it ―was the 
 
 90 
man at work.‖  Within a week after the murders, Burns was on duty at the county 
jail and was upset to see defendant in the courtyard ―laughing and smiling.‖   
Maurice Mims had known Lorraine for 13 years and had been romantically 
involved with her for the five years preceding her death.  Since Lorraine‘s death, 
Mims‘s life had been ―totally hell‖ and ―miserable.‖   
Pamela Kime, who was in the conference room when defendant shot 
Lorraine, had to leave her job at RHA in July 1995.  She was no longer able to go 
to places with noisy crowds, including stores and concerts, because they scared 
her.  Kime described how there were times when she was afraid to leave her house 
and for a month had to arrange for somebody to take her daughter to school.  She 
testified that when she went to bed, she could still see the shootings and hear 
gunshots.   
Shirail Burton and Lorraine were very close friends.  Lorraine was her labor 
coach and saw both of her children born.  Since Lorraine‘s murder, Burton had 
been ―walking around with a broken heart that you know [is] never going to get 
mended . . . . ‖  There had not been ―a minute of the day‖ that she had not thought 
of Lorraine.  
Patricia Jones described emerging from under her desk after the shooting 
and recalled seeing Barbara Garcia ―lying there gurgling.‖  Despite her fear that 
defendant might still be in the building, she ran down the hall to get help.  Jones 
saw people ―hysterically standing around screaming,‖ Kime with blood all over 
her hands, and Talley‘s body.  Jones said she ―broke down‖ just prior to attending 
the memorial service for Barbara after thinking about the ―horror of the whole 
episode, the thought of being crouched there under the desk, not knowing what 
was going to happen . . . .‖  
Janet Robinson described Barbara as someone who was ―funny‖ and ―full 
of life,‖ and who had a lot of hopes and dreams for the future.  In the 17 months 
 
 91 
between the murders and the time of trial, Robinson‘s ―[whole] life completely 
stopped.‖  She lived like a recluse for about a year after the murders and left her 
home only to go to appointments with her psychologist and chiropractor.  
Robinson lived with ―a lot of fear‖ and feared for her children and husband 
because she believed ―if this could happen once, it could happen again.‖  
Robinson was terminated from her job at the RHA, which she attributed to 
her experience of having witnessed the murders.  She twice tried to go back to 
work but found it impossible to return to the place where her friends had been 
killed.  Robinson felt guilty because her friends died and wished she could have 
done more to protect Lorraine and Barbara.  
Irma Abarca, Barbara‘s aunt, had known Barbara since she was a child and 
described Barbara as ―a happy person, real loving.‖  She described how Barbara‘s 
father, Guillermo Garcia, became angry when he learned that Barbara was dead 
and the police would not let him see Barbara at the crime scene.   
Abarca‘s 15-year-old daughter, Celia, testified Barbara was like a sister to 
her and described the emotional impact of Barbara‘s death.  
Genoveva Calloway, Barbara‘s aunt, drove Barbara‘s father to the crime 
scene, where he became very upset because police would not allow him to see 
Barbara‘s body.  Calloway described how Barbara‘s parents were very emotional 
during the memorial service and cremation of Barbara‘s body.  Barbara‘s parents 
―still have the ashes in the house in the living room.  They talk with her.  And 
they‘re still in a lot of pain.‖  For several months after Barbara‘s death, her parents 
could not go back to work.  Mrs. Calloway described seeing Guillermo hold the 
urn with Barbara‘s ashes and cry, ―[A]ll he can do is just cry and cry and just talk 
with her . . . . [H]e cannot let go of her.‖   
Defendant contends the quantity of victim impact evidence introduced 
exceeded that permitted under Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825 
 
 92 
(Payne).  He also complains that the admission of testimony about the effect of the 
victims‘ deaths on the community and from nonrelatives ―went far beyond‖ that 
authorized by Payne.    
―The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the admission of evidence 
showing how a defendant‘s crimes directly impacted the victim‘s family, friends, 
and the community as a whole, unless such evidence is ‗so unduly prejudicial‘ that 
it results in a trial that is ‗fundamentally unfair.‘  (Payne[, supra,] 501 U.S. [at p.  
825 . . .); see People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 235-236.)  Likewise, under 
state law, victim impact evidence is admissible as a circumstance of the crime 
under section 190.3, factor (a), so long as it ‗is not so inflammatory as to elicit 
from the jury an irrational or emotional response untethered to the facts of the 
case.‘  (People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1180; see People v. Zamudio 
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327.)‖  (People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 645-646.) 
The victim impact evidence fell within permissible parameters.  (People v. 
Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1180.)  The overall number of victim impact 
witnesses was not excessive, given that there were two murder victims, and the 
testimony included three generations of the victims‘ families.  (See People v. 
Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 646 [finding no error in the admission of the victim 
impact testimony of six family members representing four generations of the 
victim‘s close family].)  The evidence was ―very typical of the victim impact 
evidence we routinely permit.‖  (People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 300.)   
Defendant additionally challenges as improper evidence that Talley showed 
compassion toward defendant when she decided to spare him the embarrassment 
of having police escort him from RHA upon his termination.  But evidence that 
described Talley‘s uniqueness, e.g., her compassion towards others including, 
ironically, defendant, is of the type specifically permitted under Payne.  (Payne, 
 
 93 
supra, 501 U.S. at p. 823 [victim impact evidence ―is designed to show . . . each 
victim‘s ‗uniqueness as an individual human being‘ ‖].)   
To the extent defendant argues that victim impact evidence from a close 
friend or companion is inadmissible, we have rejected this argument.  (People v. 
Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 792.) 
Finally, defendant insists that Deputy Burns‘s testimony that he observed 
defendant laughing and smiling in the jail courtyard shortly after the murders was 
an improper subtle plea for a death sentence and was also prejudicially ―massive[] 
and emotional[]‖ because the prosecutor referred to it in arguing that the jury 
should return a death verdict in order to deprive defendant of the opportunity to 
enjoy himself while in custody.  We disagree.  Burns‘s testimony was not unduly 
emotional, and the jury reasonably understood Burns was expressing anger about 
having observed defendant enjoying himself in custody within days after killing 
the victims.  Further, it was not improper for the prosecutor to refer to Burns‘s 
testimony to argue death was the appropriate punishment on the basis that 
defendant should be ―deprive[d] . . . of what he deprived his victims of‖ — all the 
pleasures of life.   
2.  Photographs of the victims   
Defendant contends that the trial deprived him of a fair trial by permitting 
the prosecutor to keep ―the frames of the photographs‖ of the victims face down 
on a chair that were pushed under the counsel table during presentation of 
defendant‘s penalty phase case-in-chief and closing argument.  Assertedly, the 
photographs generated juror sympathy and, because only the frames were 
revealed, ―h[e]ld the power to distract.‖  The claim fails on the merits.   
Before presentation of the defense evidence, photographs of the victims 
that the prosecutor had used during presentation of the People‘s case-in-chief were 
 
 94 
placed face down on chairs that had been pushed under the counsel table.  
Subsequently, defense counsel testified on defendant‘s behalf.  After counsel 
concluded presentation of the defense case, he informed the court that:  ―As I was 
up on the witness stand, it became apparent to me that even though photographs 
may have been on the chairs, they were visible to the jury and have been—at least 
to some members of the jury, from my perspective, and so I‘d like to make a 
record of that fact.‖  The court observed that the photographs were on the chair 
―pushed underneath the counsel table‖ and that, from its perspective, it could not 
see them.  At defense counsel‘s request, the trial judge sat in various juror seats 
and stated he could see from ―side glances‖ the bottom or a portion of the bottom 
of the chairs on which the photographs had been placed.   
The court thereafter denied defense counsel‘s motion to remove the 
photographs from the courtroom, ruling the prosecutor could use demonstrative 
evidence during argument.  Subsequently, the prosecutor displayed the 
photographs during his closing argument.  After the prosecutor concluded his 
argument, defense counsel renewed his request to remove the photographs from 
the courtroom on the ground that they were constant reminders of the victims.  
The court denied the request, but asked the prosecutor to turn the photographs over 
during the defense argument.  The record shows that, during the defense closing 
argument, the photographs were again placed face down on a chair under the 
counsel table.  
To the extent defendant contends the court erred in permitting the 
prosecutor to display photographs of the victims during his closing argument, the 
claim fails on the merits.  (See, e.g., People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 
401 [photographs of the victims of the charged offenses are generally 
admissible‖]; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 688 [photographs of the victim 
 
 95 
while alive ―visually depicted a ‗circumstance of the crimes,‘ portraying the 
victims as defendant saw them seconds before he killed them‖].) 
To the extent defendant contends that during presentation of the defense 
evidence and the defense closing argument, the court improperly permitted the 
prosecutor to keep the photographs face down on the chair underneath the counsel 
table with the frames visible, he fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.  At 
most, the frames, not the photographs, could be viewed from several juror seats. 
Even assuming the jurors did see the frames under the counsel table, defendant 
does not demonstrate how this might have affected their penalty decision.  Nor 
does defendant establish that counsel was distracted in presenting the defense case.  
3.  The 33 letters   
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously excluded the contents of 
33 character reference letters offered during direction examination of defendant‘s 
mother, Mary Jane Thomas.  Mary Jane testified that she had solicited the letters 
on defendant‘s behalf.  Defense counsel offered the letters ―as probative of 
something that has to do with this case and the issues before the jury‖ or ―simply 
for their existence, not as hearsay.‖    
Upon reviewing the letters, which the court described as generally 
―character reference type letters, or testimonials of [defendant],‖ it excluded them 
as cumulative of evidence that had been introduced either in the guilt or penalty 
phase.  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  Also, the authors of several of the letters had already 
testified about ―their feelings [] as to [defendant] as an individual and his worth as 
a person.‖  In addition, the court found that counsel failed to lay an adequate 
foundation for admission of the letters under an exception to the hearsay rule or in 
an alternate form of proof, noting that all of the letters were authored by people 
who apparently resided in the Bay Area and could have been summoned to testify.  
 
 96 
Finally, with respect to all but three of the letters, the court found their contents 
lacked trustworthiness because defendant‘s mother had solicited them during the 
pendency of a trial in which defendant‘s ―character [would be] called into question 
in the actual heat of litigation.‖     
Defendant maintains that exclusion of the evidence violated his federal due 
process right to have the jury consider in mitigation any aspect of his character 
that would allow it to return a life sentence.  Citing Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 
U.S. 95, 97, defendant maintains that even assuming the evidence was excludable 
under our state rules of evidence, it should have been admitted because the 
evidence was relevant to an issue in the penalty phase of a capital trial.  The claim 
lacks merit. 
―In Green, although the [hearsay] statement was not otherwise admissible, 
the Supreme Court permitted the admission of a declaration against penal interest 
that the declarant shot the victim after ordering Green to leave because it was 
‗highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial‘ and 
‗substantial reasons existed to assume its reliability.‘  ([Green v. Georgia, supra, 
442 U.S.] at p. 97, 99.)‖  (People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 150.)  
Although we recognize a defendant‘s right under our state rules to introduce 
reliable mitigating evidence at the penalty trial, we have repeatedly declined to 
give Green the broad reading that defendant urges.  (See ibid.; People v. Weaver 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 980-981 (Weaver).)  Here, as in Eubanks and Weaver, we 
conclude that with the exception of the three letters that were not solicited by 
defendant‘s mother, the proffered evidence ― ‗bore no special indicia of reliability, 
so the rule [set forth in Green v. Georgia] did not require the trial court to dispense 
with the hearsay rule.‘  (Weaver, at p. 981.)‖  (Eubanks, at p. 150.) 
Defendant argues that the reliability of the contents of the letters is shown 
by their authenticity, which was undisputed, and their uniqueness, because each 
 
 97 
appears to represent the writer‘s own opinion of defendant‘s character.  He asserts 
that to the extent that some of the contents contradict evidence introduced at trial, 
such discrepancies reflect the writers‘ limitations of perspective and personal 
knowledge.  But like the trial court, we cannot ignore the fact the letters had been 
solicited by defendant‘s mother during the pendency of his trial, when his 
character would be at issue, and we therefore cannot conclude under Green that 
they are particularly reliable.10  (See also Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 980-
981.)   
With regard to the remaining three letters, which were not solicited in 
anticipation of trial, the trial court did not err by excluding this evidence 
notwithstanding Green.  Each of the letters was an employment reference letter 
written before defendant committed the murders, and each stated in fairly general 
terms that he was reliable and hard-working.  To the extent that they were 
relevant, they were, as the trial court held, cumulative of other testimony regarding 
defendant‘s character presented during the penalty phase.  Thus, they were not the 
sort of testimony ―highly relevant to a critical issue‖ in the penalty phase such that 
admission of this evidence was compelled by the federal Constitution.   (Green v. 
Georgia, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 97.)  For the same reasons, their exclusion was 
harmless under any standard.   
 
                                              
10  
Because we conclude the letters lack trustworthiness, defendant‘s 
contention that they were admissible under the state of mind exception to the 
hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1250), as evidence that each author was fond of him, 
necessarily fails.  (See People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 819, quoting 
Evid. Code, § 1252 [―Evidence of a statement is inadmissible . . . if the statement 
was made under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.‖].)  
Additionally, defendant‘s failure to raise this theory of admissibility at trial 
forfeited the claim on review.  (Evid. Code, § 354.)   
 
 
 98 
Finally, defendant was not precluded from presenting this evidence, only 
from introducing it in the form of proof offered.  As the court suggested, defense 
counsel could have sought to compel the authors‘ in-court testimony through the 
subpoena process.  
4.  Counsel’s testimony  
During the penalty trial, defense counsel informed the court and the 
prosecutor outside the presence of the jury that he intended to testify as the last 
defense witness.  Counsel proffered that he would explain the circumstances under 
which defendant said ―I smoked that bitch,‖ during an interview on September 6, 
1995, with counsel in which Drs. Kincaid and Wilkinson also were present and 
would describe defendant‘s related behavior during a confidential interview with 
counsel on September 3, 1995.  The court overruled the prosecutor‘s objection to 
the admission of this testimony, allowing counsel to testify regarding both 
interviews.  The court, however, expressed concern that counsel may have violated 
a canon of judicial ethics by proffering the evidence near the close of the defense 
case in the penalty phase and where other witnesses might have been available to 
testify.  
Defense counsel also requested permission to testify and describe that 
during his initial interviews with defendant, defendant ―basically . . . would break 
down and start crying.‖  Because counsel was alone with defendant when 
defendant purportedly displayed remorse, he did not know how otherwise to 
introduce the evidence.     
Objecting that defense counsel had failed to provide discovery of the 
proffered testimony, the prosecutor asked the court to exclude it.  (§ 1054 et seq.)  
In response, counsel explained that he did not take notes of his conversations with 
defendant and that there was ―nothing in writing‖ he could provide in discovery.  
 
 99 
The court noted that defense counsel had not included his name on the 
defense witness list at any time during trial, and stated it assumed that counsel‘s 
decision was made ―last minute based upon something that occurred in the course 
of the trial.‖  It continued:  ―What I believe is appropriate under the circumstances 
is I will allow you to testify as you initially indicated to [the September 3 and 
September 6 interviews].  To go beyond that, I believe would call upon you to 
divulge matters of discovery which you have not divulged and you have not given 
me any reason why you have not divulged matters in discovery.‖  The court 
precluded counsel from testifying about defendant‘s alleged displays of remorse 
during his initial interviews with counsel.  When counsel repeated that he had no 
notes from those interviews and argued there was no discovery to provide, the 
court responded:  ―All right.  I think there are certainly things if you anticipated 
you were going to be a witness on this matter that you as a witness could have 
prepared for the other side so that they would know the scope and nature of your 
testimony regarding these matters, rather than [offer] some sort of free-flowing 
state of consciousness type of [testimony].  I believe that‘s only fair.  That‘s 
appropriate.‖   
On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in precluding counsel 
from testifying about defendant‘s displays of remorse.  Specifically, he contends 
that the exclusion of the evidence was an unauthorized sanction under the 
discovery rules.  (See § 1054 et seq. [reciprocal discovery statutes].)  Here, 
because any error was harmless, we need not decide whether the trial court erred 
by limiting counsel‘s testimony, or under what circumstances it may be 
permissible for trial counsel to testify as a witness in the case.   
State law error occurring during the penalty phase requires reversal if there 
is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.  (People v. Gonzalez 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 960-961.)  This standard ―is the same, in substance and 
 
 
100 
effect‖ as the ―reasonable doubt‖ test under Chapman v. California, supra, 386 
U.S. 18.  (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1264, fn. 11, italics omitted.) 
In this case, defendant planned his massacre for months in advance and 
boasted to Robinson and Ferguson how he practiced at the shooting range the 
night before the murders.  He hunted down his victims and shot each execution 
style, and the evidence strongly suggests that as he exited the building, he intended 
to shoot a third victim.  The improperly excluded evidence that defendant 
appeared to be sobbing and ―tore up‖ during his initial interviews with counsel 
would not have appreciably strengthened his case in mitigation.  Defendant did not 
offer into evidence the statements of remorse he purportedly made during these 
emotional outbursts, conceding they were inadmissible hearsay.  Absent this 
evidence, however, the jury could only speculate that he was expressing remorse 
for his crimes instead of concern for his own fate.  The omitted evidence, 
therefore, was no more compelling than the evidence of defendant‘s other claim of 
remorse — that while in custody awaiting trial, he talked with the head chef at 
Contra Costa County jail about the murders and appeared to be sorry.  Under these 
circumstances, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury would have returned 
a different verdict had the jury been presented with defense counsel‘s testimony 
that defendant appeared remorseful.     
5.  Asserted misstatements of the law  
a.  Section 190.3, factor (c), the presence or absence of any prior 
felony conviction 
During penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that 
defendant‘s lack of a violent criminal history and felony convictions was neither 
mitigating nor aggravating, but neutral.  The court sustained defense counsel‘s 
objection and instructed the jury that ―[w]ith regard to Factor C, the presence or 
absence of any prior felony conviction other than the crimes for which the 
 
 
101 
defendant has been tried in the present proceedings, the presence of such 
convictions are an aggravating factor, the absence of such convictions are a 
mitigating factor in all other matters as has been suggested, the presence may be 
an aggravating factor, the absence may be a mitigating factor.  [¶]  Or it may be 
considered by you to be neutral with regard to B and C, the presence is an 
aggravating factor, the absence of such factor is a mitigating factor.‖  
Thereafter, the prosecutor argued that the question before the jury in 
considering the applicability of section 190.3, factor (c) required ―[the jury] to 
decide how much weight to give to any alleged mitigating circumstance.  So it‘s 
up to you to decide how much you should favor [defendant] because he doesn‘t 
have a felony conviction.  How special he should be because of that, how many 
blue ribbons you want to paint on his chest because he doesn‘t have a felony 
conviction or he didn‘t commit a crime of violence.‖   
Defendant contends that the court‘s corrective action in providing the jury 
with an explanation of section 190.3, factor (c) was insufficient and that it should 
have admonished the prosecutor for misstating the law.  Also, defendant contends 
the prosecutor‘s argument telling the jurors how they should apply factor (c) was 
improper.  The contentions are without merit. 
Preliminarily, by failing to request an admonition, defendant forfeited his 
claim that the court should have admonished the prosecutor.  (See People v. 
Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th 728.)  Defendant also forfeited his claim that the 
prosecutor‘s argument misstated the law because he failed to object and ask that 
the jury be admonished.  In any event, the claims are without merit. 
―We have concluded in prior decisions that a trial court need not instruct 
that the absence of prior felony convictions is necessarily mitigating.  [Citations.]  
We reasoned that a jury instructed that it may consider the absence of prior felony 
convictions [citations] and any ‗ ―aspect of the defendant‘s character or record that 
 
 
102 
the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death‖ ‘ [citation] will 
necessarily understand that it may consider in mitigation a defendant‘s lack of 
prior felony convictions.‖  (People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1194.)  
Nothing in the court‘s instruction prevented jurors from according whatever 
mitigating weight they believed appropriate to defendant‘s lack of prior felony 
convictions.  The trial court did not err. 
In addition, the prosecutor‘s argument did not ask the jury to misapply 
section 190.3, factor (c) in deciding penalty.  His suggestion that the jury not 
consider defendant special or worthy of ―blue ribbons‖ merely because he did not 
have any prior convictions did not contravene the law.  Instead, the prosecutor 
properly argued this circumstance was not worthy of mitigating weight.  ―Since 
the crux of the jury‘s decision is the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
factors, a prosecutor may properly comment on the absence of mitigating factors 
so long as the prosecution refrains from suggesting that absence of mitigation is to 
be equated with aggravation.‖  (People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 706.)  
The prosecutor did not cross this line.   
b.  Section 190.3, factor (h), lack of capacity to conform conduct to 
requirements of law as a result of mental disease or defect 
Section 190.3 provides that, in deciding penalty, the jury shall consider 
under factor (h) ―[w]hether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the 
affects of intoxication.‖  Defendant contends that the court erred in refusing 
counsel‘s request to instruct the jury that factor (h) was applicable in this case.  
We disagree.     
 
 
103 
During argument, the prosecutor incorrectly asserted that ―this factor is the 
definition of insanity‖11 and that Dr. Walser had conceded that defendant was not 
insane.  The court overruled without comment counsel‘s objection to the 
prosecutor‘s misstatements.  Thereafter, the prosecutor asserted that section 190.3, 
factor (h) was ―an insanity thing, maybe it‘s not quite there, but pretty close.  You 
can still consider the evidence, though it doesn‘t rise to the level of insanity.‖  He 
contrasted factor (h) with ―the mental duress or emotion, the stress‖ that is 
―already covered under [section 190.3, factor] (d)‖ and ―if one thing applies to two 
separate things, you just consider it where it best belongs.‖  The court overruled 
counsel‘s objection to this line of argument, stating, ―It‘s argument.‖  
Subsequently, outside the presence of the jury, the court conducted a 
hearing on the definition of insanity and the application of section 190.3, factor 
(h).  Defense counsel stated, ―I think the Court should indicate the objection was 
properly made and should have been sustained at that time, that the District 
Attorney, his comments misled this jury into believing that factor (h) had no 
application in this case when, in fact, it does because there is evidence of impaired 
mental capacity in this case.  That is what I now request the Court to say to the 
jury.‖  In essence, counsel wanted the court not only to correct itself and properly 
instruct the jury as to the terms ―factor (h)‖ and ―insanity‖ but also to inform the 
                                              
11   
―CALJIC No. 4.00, the standard instruction on the insanity defense . . . 
states:  ‗A person is legally insane when by reason of mental disease or mental 
defect he was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his 
act or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission 
of the crime.‘ ‖  (People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 830-831; see also 
People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 721 [―Whereas the insanity instruction 
requires that a defendant lack ‗substantial capacity‘ to appreciate the criminality of 
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law, subdivision (h) requires only that 
his capacity to do so be ‗impaired.‘].) 
 
 
104 
jury that ―there is evidence of impaired mental capacity in this case,‖ i.e., that 
factor (h) was applicable. 
The court responded that it was ―unable to tell a jury that this evidence is 
aggravating, this evidence is mitigating.‖  It then correctly instructed the jury that 
―[f]actor (h) includes other states which impair mental capacity‖ and properly 
described section 190.3, factor (h) and defined insanity in accordance with the 
law.  
The court‘s corrective action was adequate to cure any harm from the 
prosecutor‘s mischaracterization of section 190.3, factor (h).  Defendant had the 
opportunity to argue the evidence he offered was mitigating under factor (h).  The 
prosecutor was entitled to argue the opposite.  Whether his recollection that Dr. 
Walser testified defendant was not insane was correct was a question for the trier 
of fact, and the argument was a proper comment on the evidence.  Additionally, 
the prosecutor did not argue that the evidence was aggravating.  (People v. 
Kaurish, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 706.) 
6.  Alleged instructional error regarding aggravating evidence   
Defendant contends that when the court instructed jurors with CALJIC No. 
8.88, it was required to identify on its own motion the elements of first degree 
murder and admonish jurors that they were not themselves aggravating 
circumstances.  Defendant complains that, absent such an instruction, the jury was 
permitted to consider impermissible factors in deliberating the penalty question. 
Defendant‘s concern essentially is that the jury based its death verdict on 
their findings in the guilt phase that he murdered Talley and Garcia with 
premeditation and deliberation.  He contends the jurors misapplied the penalty 
phase instructions in this manner because the court instructed them during voir 
dire that premeditation and deliberation could be considered circumstances of the 
 
 
105 
crime under section 190.3, factor (a).  Defendant maintains that as a result, in the 
absence of an express prohibition on their doing so, he was condemned in 
violation of the rule against labeling as aggravating any circumstance common to 
all murders or applicable to every defendant eligible for the death penalty.   
In support, defendant cites the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Arave v. Creech (1993) 507 U.S. 463, which states in relevant part:  ―When the 
purpose of a statutory aggravating circumstance is to enable the sentencer to 
distinguish those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not, the 
circumstance must provide a principled basis for doing so.  [Citations.]  If the 
sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every 
defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally 
infirm.‖  (Id. at p. 474.)  Under these circumstances, defendant contends the court 
was required to provide an instruction that clarified that premeditation and 
deliberation were elements of the capital crimes in this case, and thus could not be 
considered in aggravation. 
 ―In deciding whether an instruction is erroneous, we ascertain at the 
threshold what the relevant law provides.  We next determine what meaning the 
charge conveys in this regard.  Here the question is, how would a reasonable juror 
understand the instruction. (E.g., California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 541.)  
In addressing this question, we consider the specific language under challenge 
and, if necessary, the charge in its entirety.  ([Ibid].)  Finally, we determine 
whether the instruction, so understood, states the applicable law correctly.‖  
(People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 487.)  ―The test is whether there is a 
‗reasonable likelihood that the jury . . . understood the charge,‘ in a manner that 
violated defendant‘s rights.‖  (People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1191, 
quoting People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 801; Boyde v. California (1990) 
494 U.S. 370, 380.) 
 
 
106 
We readily rejected defendant‘s contention that the trial court‘s comments 
during voir dire regarding aggravating circumstances rendered voir dire 
inadequate to reveal a potential inability or unwillingness to follow CALJIC No. 
8.88.  (See discussion, pt. II.A.3, ante.)  CALJIC No. 8.88, which was given 
before penalty deliberations, provides in relevant part:  ―An aggravating factor is 
any fact, condition or event attending the commission of a crime which increases 
its severity or enormity, or adds to its injurious consequences which is above and 
beyond the elements of the crime itself.‖  Here, before the jurors began their 
penalty deliberations, the court properly instructed that they were required to 
―accept and follow the law that [the court] state[s] to you and disregard all other 
instructions given to you in other phases of this trial.‖  In the absence of any 
showing to the contrary, we presume the jurors followed this instruction.  (See 
People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 34 [the jury is presumed to follow the trial 
court‘s instructions].)   
In instructing the jurors on their task of determining penalty, the court 
never mentioned the terms ―premeditation,‖ ―deliberation,‖ or ―elements of the 
crime.‖  On the other hand, the arguments guided the jurors on how they should 
view aggravating circumstances.  Defense counsel explained that an aggravating 
circumstance under section 190.3, factor (a) is not ―simply‖ a fact that establishes 
defendant‘s guilt of the capital crimes but instead is ―something beyond [the 
capital offense] that is so horrible.‖  The prosecutor, too, correctly informed the 
jurors that aggravating circumstances under factor (a) consisted of ―all of those 
other little details that go beyond the fact of killing with malice aforethought, 
premeditation, deliberation and includes other things as well.‖  He appropriately 
told them to use only ―those aggravating circumstances beyond the element of the 
offense itself.‖  For example, the prosecutor encouraged the jurors to consider as 
an aggravating factor the proof of defendant‘s intent to kill a third victim, based on 
 
 
107 
evidence showing that after he killed Talley and Garcia, he kept his gun at his side 
and chased Shirail Burton, who was running shoeless in the parking lot.  For these 
reasons, there is no reasonable possibility that the jurors viewed the instructions as 
allowing them to consider in aggravation the fact that defendant committed 
premeditated and deliberate murder in aggravation.  Therefore, we reject 
defendant‘s claim that the court was obligated to apprise jurors of the elements of 
the capital charges. 
7.  Constitutional Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Law  
Defendant argues that California‘s death penalty law and related 
instructions are unconstitutional on various grounds that we have previously 
rejected.  He offers no persuasive reason to reconsider our prior decisions.  
Therefore, we continue  to hold as follows: 
―As we recently observed in People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 
99, 208, ‗ ―[W]e reiterate that the death penalty statutes adequately narrow the 
class of murderers eligible for the death penalty, are not impermissibly vague or 
overbroad, and do not result in an ‗arbitrary and capricious‘ or ‗wanton and 
freakish‘ penalty determination.  [We] also have held that the statutes do not 
require that the prosecution carry the burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty 
phase, that the jury make written findings or reach unanimous decisions regarding 
aggravating factors, or that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the 
aggravating factors have been proved [(except for other crimes)], (2) the 
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, or (3) death is the appropriate 
sentence.‖ ‘ ‖  (People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 123-124.)  Recent high 
court decisions do not affect these conclusions.  (Id. at p. 124.) 
― ‗The absence of procedural safeguards utilized by other states in the 
operation of their death penalty laws does not render California‘s law 
 
 
108 
unconstitutional under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.‖  
(People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 697.)   ― ‗ ―There is no need to 
instruct the jury at the penalty phase (1) regarding a burden of proof, except as to 
section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), or the absence of a burden of proof, (2) 
regarding the meaning of the term ‗mitigation,‘ (3) that mitigating factors can be 
considered only in mitigation, (4) that if the mitigating evidence outweighs the 
aggravating evidence, the jury must impose a sentence of life without the 
possibility of parole, or (5) that the jury is not required to impose the death penalty 
even if it finds the aggravating evidence outweighs the mitigating evidence.  The 
trial court need not omit from the instructions any mitigating factors that appear 
not to apply to the defendant‘s case.‖  [Citation.] [¶]  ―There is no requirement that 
the trial court or this court engage in intercase proportionality review when 
examining a death verdict.  A sentence of death that comports with state and 
federal statutory and constitutional law does not violate international law or 
norms . . . .‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖  (People v. Bivert, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 124.) 
―The terms ‗extreme‘ and ‗substantial‘ as used in section 190.3 have 
commonsense meanings that the jury may be expected to use in applying the 
instructions.  [Citation.]  ‗The use of the word ‗extreme‘ in section 190.3, factor 
(d) (‗extreme mental or emotional disturbance‘) does not preclude consideration of 
mitigating evidence in violation of the Constitution.‘ ‖  (People v. Tafoya, supra, 
42 Cal.4th at p. 197.) 
―The availability of certain procedural protections in noncapital 
sentencing—such as a burden of proof, written findings, jury unanimity and 
disparate sentence review—when those same protections are unavailable in capital 
sentencing, does not signify that California‘s death penalty statute violates 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principles.  [Citations.]‖  (People v. 
Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 510.)  
 
 
109 
Finally, the asserted flaws in our death penalty statute, whether considered 
individually or together, do not render it unconstitutional.  (See People v. 
Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 45.)  
8.  Cumulative Error 
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the guilt and penalty phase 
errors require reversal of his conviction and death sentence even if none of the 
errors individually compels reversal.  We find no cumulative prejudice. 
III.  DISPOSITION 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Pearson 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S058157 
Date Filed: March 21, 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Contra Costa 
Judge: Richard S. Flier 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Jeanne Keevan-Lynch, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler and Ronald S. Matthias, Assistant Attorneys General, Alice B. Lustre, 
Glenn R. Pruden and Gregg E. Zywicke, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Jeanne Keevan-Lynch 
P.O. Box 2433 
Mendocino, CA  95460 
(707) 895-2090 
 
Gregg E. Zywicke 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5961