Case Title: Mills v. Campbell County Canvassing Bd.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mills v. Campbell County Canvassing Bd.1985 WY 171707 P.2d 747Case Number: 84-302Decided: 10/18/1985RON MILLS, APPELLANT (COUNTER DEFENDANT), 

WILLIAM FITCH AND PERRY STUDY (COUNTER DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

CAMPBELL COUNTY CANVASSING BOARD COMPRISED OF VIVIAN ADDISON, COUNTY CLERK IN AND FOR CAMPBELL COUNTY, DARYL OLDS AND MAJORIE RAINWATER, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT AND COUNTER PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

BILL L. BARKLEY (PLAINTIFF AND COUNTER DEFENDANT).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
RON MILLS, APPELLANT 
(COUNTER DEFENDANT), 

WILLIAM FITCH AND PERRY 
STUDY (COUNTER DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

CAMPBELL COUNTY 
CANVASSING BOARD COMPRISED OF VIVIAN ADDISON, COUNTY CLERK IN AND FOR CAMPBELL 
COUNTY, DARYL OLDS AND MAJORIE RAINWATER, APPELLEE (DEFENDANT AND COUNTER 
PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

BILL L. BARKLEY 
(PLAINTIFF AND COUNTER DEFENDANT).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty, Terrence L. 
O'Brien, J.

 
 
James L. Edwards 
of Sheehan, Stevens & Sansonetti, Gillette, for appellant (counter 
defendant).

Martell 
Hilderbrand, Gillette, and Jack Vreeland (argued), DeputyCountyAtty.CampbellCounty, for appellee (defendant and counter 
plaintiff).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1.]     In this appeal we are 
asked to determine whether appellant was disenfranchised for the 1984 election 
in Wyoming as a result of his felony check 
fraud convictions in Kansas. Appellant challenges the district 
court's order directing that a special primary election be held on October 2, 
1984, to determine a Republican nominee for CampbellCounty commissioner. The basis for the 
district court's action was the appearance of appellant's name on the ballot for 
the primary election held September 11, 1984, even though he was a convicted 
felon in the state of Kansas. Appellee contests this court's 
jurisdiction and asserts that the case is now moot.

[¶2.]     We affirm but order a 
modification.

[¶3.]     In January 1977 
appellant pled guilty in a Kansas district court to two counts of felony 
check fraud, a violation of § 21-3707, Kan. Stat. Ann. (1969). The dollar 
amounts involved on the two counts were $221.32 and $231.75. Following his 
guilty plea, appellant was sentenced and placed on probation for a period of two 
years. Because appellant was not incarcerated, he was not disenfranchised in the 
state of Kansas. See, § 21-4603(5), Kan. Stat. Ann. 
(Cum.Supp. 1984).

[¶4.]     According to 
appellant's brief, he was released from probation on January 21, 1979. Prior to 
that date he had moved to Campbell 
County, Wyoming, where 
he currently resides. The parties stipulated below that appellant has never 
received a pardon from the governor of Kansas, 
nor has he received a certificate of restoration of rights from the governor of 
Wyoming.

[¶5.]     On September 11, 1984, 
a primary election was held to determine the Republican nominee for CampbellCounty commissioner. Appellant was listed 
on the ballot as a candidate for that office. He received 338 votes and finished 
fourth in a field of four candidates. The top two candidates finished within 69 
votes of each other. Had appellant not been on the ballot, the 338 votes he 
received would, in all probability have gone to the other candidates. With just 
69 votes separating the top two candidates, these votes could have affected the 
outcome of the election. Therefore, on September 18, 1984, the Campbell County 
Canvassing Board for the Primary Election (hereinafter Board) declared "the 
County Commissioners race on the Republican ticket null and void due to one of 
the candidates being an unqualified elector." The Board then called a special 
election to be held on October 2, 1984.

[¶6.]     Following the calling 
of the special election by the Board, Bill Barkley, the candidate who had 
received the largest number of votes, filed a Notice of Contest in the Campbell 
County District Court. Mr. Barkley sought to have the election results declared 
valid and to stop the scheduled special election.

[¶7.]     The Board, in its 
answer and counter petition to Mr. Barkley's lawsuit, asserted that the other 
three primary candidates, including appellant, were necessary parties, should be 
joined as such, and that the court should enter a declaratory judgment finding 
that the Board had acted properly in declaring the primary election of a 
Republican nominee for county commissioner void.

[¶8.]     A hearing was held on 
September 29, 1984. At that time the district court indicated that it believed 
the primary election must be declared a nullity because of the presence of 
appellant's name on the ballot. On October 1, 1984, the court issued a writ of 
mandamus directing the CampbellCounty clerk to hold the special primary 
election October 2, 1984.

[¶9.]     On October 11, 1984, 
appellant filed a motion to amend the writ of mandamus pursuant to Rule 59(e), 
W.R.C.P. This motion was denied on October 23, 1984. Subsequently, on November 
2, 1984, appellant filed his notice of appeal.

[¶10.]  The first issue we address is appellee's 
contention that we are without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Appellee 
maintains that the notice of appeal, filed November 2, was not timely because it 
was filed more than fifteen days after the issuance of the writ of 
mandamus.

[¶11.]  Appellee's position is not well taken. 
Appellant's motion to amend pursuant to Rule 59, W.R.C.P. tolled the time for 
filing the notice of appeal. The district court had sixty days to act on the 
motion once it was filed. Rule 59(f), W.R.C.P. The court denied the motion 
within the sixty-day period. Upon the district court's denial of the motion, 
appellant had fifteen days in which to file his notice of appeal. Rule 2.01, 
W.R.A.P.; Sun Land & Cattle Co. v. 
Brown, Wyo., 387 P.2d 1004 (1964). Appellant's notice 
of appeal was filed within fifteen days of the denial of his motion to amend and 
designated with sufficient specificity the October 1, 1984 Writ of Mandamus as 
the order appealed from. See Rules 2.01 and 2.02, W.R.A.P. This appeal is 
timely.

[¶12.]  Appellee's second contention is that the 
case is now moot. This court has previously stated:

[¶13.]  "It is settled beyond question in this 
jurisdiction that when no judgment rendered can be carried into effect the cause 
is moot and will not be considered." Belondon v. State, ex rel. Leimback, Wyo., 379 P.2d 828, 829 
(1963).

Yet, the court 
noted in its opinion there that this rule could be relaxed when a question of 
great public importance was present.

[¶14.]  Here we believe the issue is not moot. 
Though the election is over, the district court's ruling still affects 
appellant. The court's ruling was that appellant was disenfranchised and thus 
ineligible to run for public office. Because the ruling continues to operate as 
to appellant, we will address the merits of this appeal.

[¶15.]  Appellant claims it was error for the 
district court to conclude that the Kansas 
felony convictions cost him his ability to vote and run for political office in 
Wyoming. 
Appellant's analysis of the issue assumes that the case presents a 
conflicts-of-law question. He argues that since he did not lose his civil rights 
under Kansas law by virtue of the convictions, 
Wyoming has no 
interest in depriving him of those rights.

[¶16.]  He also claims that Wyoming would treat 
appellant's convictions as misdemeanors if they had occurred here. The crimes 
with which appellant was charged in Kansas occurred in 1977; and the statutes in 
effect at that time control. In 1977, § 6-39, W.S. 1957 (recodified and 
renumbered as § 6-3-110, W.S. 1977), provided that it was a high misdemeanor 
(maximum penalty being one year in the county jail and a $1,000 fine) to issue a 
fraudulent check in a dollar amount of fifty dollars or more. Arguably appellant 
might have been charged with a felony under § 6-17, W.S. 1957 (recodified and 
renumbered as § 6-2-101, W.S. 1977), which provided:

"Every person who shall 
falsely make, alter, forge or counterfeit any * * * check or draft * * * with 
intent to prejudice, damage or defraud any person * * shall be deemed guilty of 
forgery, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by confinement in the 
penitentiary for a term not more than fourteen (14) 
years."

We need not 
decide that question here, for he was not charged with anything in Wyoming. He was charged 
with check fraud in Kansas and the crimes charged were felonies 
under the statute charged. It would be administratively impossible for 
Wyoming to review the facts of each alleged 
offense in a foreign state to determine what crime would or might be charged in 
Wyoming and then determine in each individual 
case the effect under Wyoming law. The legislature did not 
contemplate nor provide for such procedure in its legislative enactments, and we 
cannot find it was intended.

[¶17.]  Contrary to appellant's arguments, we 
believe the proper analysis to use in this case is one of statutory 
construction. The statute, § 22-1-102(k), infra, is operative as to one 
convicted of a felony. Appellant was convicted of a felony in this area of law, 
and it is undisputed that where the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, there is no need to go further. "The plain, ordinary and usual 
meaning of words used in a statute controls in the absence of clear statutory 
provisions to the contrary." Board of 
CountyComm'rs of CampbellCounty v. Ridenour, Wyo., 
623 P.2d 1174, 1184 (1981).

[¶18.]  Here, § 22-1-102(k), W.S. 1977, Cum. 
Supp. 1984, provides:

"The term `qualified 
elector' includes every citizen of the United 
States who is a bona fide resident of Wyoming, has registered 
to vote and will be at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of the 
election at which he may offer to vote. No person is a qualified elector who is 
a mentally incompetent person, or who has been convicted of a felony and his 
civil rights have not been restored. A literacy test shall not be imposed as a 
condition to voting in any election."

Section 
18-3-501, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1984, provides in pertinent part: "Each board of 
county commissioners shall consist of three (3) qualified electors who shall be 
elected * * *." These provisions have remained unchanged in their pertinent 
language since before 1977.

[¶19.]  Appellant seeks to find ambiguity by 
relying on § 7-13-107, W.S. 1977, which, before its 1981 amendment, provided as 
follows:

"The governor of the 
state of Wyoming shall, upon receiving a statement of good conduct of a convict, 
whose term is aobut to expire, from the warden of the state penitentiary, 
immediately issue a certificate for the discharge of such convict; such 
certificate shall in all cases restore the said convict his rights the same as 
though full pardon had been granted. The said certificate to be delivered to the 
convict by the warden of the state penitentiary at the expiration of his 
term."

The amended 
version of this section reads:

"(a) Upon receipt of a 
written application, the governor may issue to a person convicted of a felony 
under the laws of a state or the United States a certificate which restores the 
rights lost pursuant to W.S. 6-1-104 [§ 6-10-106] when:

"(i) His term of sentence 
expires; or

"(ii) He satisfactorily 
completes a probation period." § 7-13-107, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1984.

[¶20.]  Appellant argues that prior to the 1981 
amendment a probationer could not be deprived of his civil rights because there 
were no means specifically provided for restoring them. Accordingly, appellant 
contends that since he was a felon who was placed upon probation, he never lost 
his civil rights in Wyoming.

[¶21.]  We cannot agree. Section 22-1-102(k), 
W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1984, is clear on its face. Appellant, as a convicted felon 
who had not had his rights restored, was not a qualified elector. The failure of 
§ 7-13-107, W.S. 1977, to set out a means of obtaining restoration of rights for 
a successful probationer does not constitute a clear statutory provision which 
would compel us to look beyond the obvious meaning of § 22-1-102(k). Wyoming has a legitimate 
interest in setting certain base qualifications for its electors and candidates 
for public office. The legislature has seen fit to disenfranchise those who 
violate the laws of the society in which they live and, as a result, are 
convicted of a felony. The fact that the state of Kansas has set different standards does not alter 
Wyoming law. 
The Wyoming legislature is not free to overrule 
the Kansas legislature as to matters concerning 
the state of Kansas. So, too, the Kansas legislature cannot override the Wyoming legislature's decision to disenfranchise those 
convicted of a felony unless they receive a restoration of their rights from the 
governor of Wyoming.

[¶22.]  A felony conviction carries with it a 
judicial determination that the individual who is convicted has chosen not to 
abide by the laws of society. It is reasonable for our legislature to rule that 
convicted felons are unfit to vote or hold public office until they have 
convinced the governor of this state otherwise. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the district court correctly ruled that appellant was unqualified to run for 
county commissioner.

[¶23.]  However, we do believe that the district 
court erred in issuing a writ of mandamus. Section 1-30-104, W.S. 1977, provides 
that a writ of mandamus "must not be issued when there is an adequate remedy at 
law." Section 22-17-108, W.S. 1977, provides that where a petition contesting an 
election has been filed and answered the court "shall confirm or annul the 
election" in its judgment. The court here should have issued a judgment 
annulling the September primary election; under Wyoming law such a judgment was the 
appropriate remedy. Accordingly, the writ of mandamus is vacated, and the 
district court is ordered on remand to enter a judgment annulling the September 
11, 1984 primary election of a Republican nominee for county 
commissioner.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶24.]  I understand that the trial court made a 
very careful effort to not decide the question of Mr. Mills' right to vote, and 
did its best to limit the issue to the question of his right to hold public 
office. Under those circumstances I would say that the case is moot because the 
general election has been held. State ex 
rel. Willis v. Larson, Wyo., 
539 P.2d 352 (1975). I do not believe that we should treat with the undecided 
question of the appellant's right to vote on the ground that it is a question of 
great public importance. I do not have any difference with the conclusion of 
substantive law which is reached by the majority opinion on that score, but I 
believe that the concepts of judicial restraint indicate that the point should 
not be addressed or decided. 

ROSE, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶25.]  By constitutional and statutory 
provisions, Wyoming denies the election franchise to any 
person convicted of an infamous crime or felony unless his civil rights have 
been restored. Article 6, § 6 of the state Constitution 
provides:

"All idiots, insane 
persons, and persons convicted of infamous crimes, unless restored to civil 
rights, are excluded from the elective franchise."

Section 
6-10-106, W.S. 1977, reads:

"(a) A person convicted 
of a felony is incompetent to be an elector or juror or to hold any office of 
honor, trust or profit within this state, unless:

"(i) His conviction is 
reversed or annulled;

"(ii) He receives a 
pardon; or

"(iii) His rights are 
restored pursuant to W.S. 7-13-107."

Section 
22-1-102(k), W.S. 1977, provides in part:

"* * * No person is a 
qualified elector who is a mentally incompetent person, or who has been 
convicted of a felony and his civil rights have not been 
restored."

[¶26.]  The controlling question in this appeal 
is whether this court, in construing Wyoming's voter qualification laws, is 
bound by Kansas' classification of an offense as a felony, when the same conduct 
amounts to a misdemeanor under Wyoming law. The majority answer this question in 
the affirmative. In my opinion, however, the legislature of this state is the 
appropriate body to define those acts which constitute a crime so serious as to 
result in the denial of the perpetrator's fundamental rights to vote and to seek 
elective office. The policies of a foreign state may diverge from the interests 
and concerns of this state and, therefore, should not determine Wyoming's acceptable code 
of conduct for qualified electors.

[¶27.]  In interpreting the election laws quoted 
above, we are bound by the principle that the right to vote and the right to 
seek election to public office are fundamental rights entitled to the strict 
protection of the courts. Brimmer v. 
Thomson, Wyo., 521 P.2d 574 (1974); Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 50 P. 819, 38 
L.R.A. 773 (1897). We said in the early case of Rasmussen v. Baker, supra, 50 P. at 
822:

"* * * [A]ny provision 
which excludes any class of citizens from the exercise of the elective franchise 
ought to receive a strict construction, without, however, doing violence to or 
distorting the language, to the end that none shall be held excluded who are not 
clearly designated." (Emphasis added.)

Courts in other 
jurisdictions have held that voter qualification laws substantially similar to 
ours do not disenfranchise a person convicted of an offense in another 
jurisdiction, unless that offense would be a felony in the voting jurisdiction. 
Gutterman v. State, Fla.App., 141 So. 2d 21 (1962); State ex rel. Arpagaus 
v. Todd, 225 Minn. 91, 29 N.W.2d 810, 175 
A.L.R. 776 (1947); Melton v. Oleson, 
165 Mont. 424, 530 P.2d 466 (1974); Yocham v. Horn, 201 Okla. 647, 207 P.2d 919 
(1948). The Montana Supreme Court in Melton v. Oleson, supra,1 overruled its prior decision 
denying public office to a convicted felon whose crime constituted a misdemeanor 
under Montana 
law. The Melton court set out its earlier holding and discussed the flaws in 
that position:

"* * * This Court held 
[in State ex rel. Anderson v. Fousek, 91 Mont. 448, 455, 8 P.2d 791 
(1932)]:

"`* * * The character of 
an offense, i.e., whether a felony or a misdemeanor, must be determined by the 
laws of the jurisdiction where the crime was committed.'

* * * * * * 

"Several weaknesses are 
apparent in this holding and the statutory construction supporting it. It is the 
responsibility of the Montana legislature to establish 
qualifications for holding public office (as in Fousek) and voting qualifications (as in 
the instant case). On what basis are we to imply that they delegated this 
responsibility to another legislative body, be it Congress or the legislature of 
another state, absent explicit statutory language to that effect? Yet that would 
be the result of the holding in Fousek - that Montana is bound by foreign classifications of 
crimes.

"Glaring injustices would 
result in many cases. For example, by federal definition the following federal 
offenses are felonies: Using profanity in a `ham' radio transmission, 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1464; purchasing a field jacket from a member of the Armed Forces, 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1024; attempting to mail a letter using a stamp which has already 
been cancelled if committed by a postal employee, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1720. Did our 
Montana 
legislature intend to deny its citizens the right to vote for offenses like 
these?

"In the instant case none 
of the three violations of which Melton was convicted would constitute a felony 
under our statutory definition and classification of crime. The more recent and 
persuasive authorities from our sister states hold that persons violating 
federal liquor laws are not disqualified from voting or holding public office 
where, as here, the offenses would not be felonies under state law. See Elder v. CountyElection Board, (Okla. 1958), 326 P.2d 776; Yocham v. Horn, 201 Okla. 647, 207 P.2d 919; State ex rel. Arpagaus v. Todd, 225 
Minn. 91, 29 N.W.2d 810." 530 P.2d  at 469-470.

I find this 
reasoning compelling. The policies of Wyoming 
in denying the vote to convicted felons would hardly be advanced by ignoring the 
nature of the offense under Wyoming law and 
mechanically accepting the classification deemed appropriate in Kansas.

[¶28.]  Appellant pled guilty in a Kansas 
district court to issuing worthless checks in the amount of $221.32 and $231.75, 
in violation of § 21-3707, K.S.A.2 The Wyoming legislature has determined that such 
conduct constitutes a misdemeanor in this state. Section 6-39(a), W.S. 1957, 
1975 Cum.Supp. (now § 6-3-110, W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum. Supp.).3 Therefore, our election laws which 
disenfranchise those persons convicted of felonies do not prohibit appellant 
from voting and seeking public office. I would have reversed the ruling of the 
district court.

1 Section 23-3014, R.C.M. 
1947, at issue in Melton v. Oleson, 
provided in part:

"`(1) The registrar 
[county clerk and recorder] shall cancel any [voter] registration 
card:

"`* * * (e) If a 
certified copy of a final judgment of conviction of any elector of a felony is 
filed * * *.' (Bracketed words added.)" 530 P.2d  at 469.

2 Section 21-3707(1) and 
(4), K.S.A., provided at the time pertinent here:

"(1) Giving a worthless 
check is the making, drawing, issuing or delivering or causing or directing the 
making, drawing, issuing or delivering of any check, order or draft on any bank 
or depository for the payment of money or its equivalent with intent to defraud 
and knowing, at the time of the making, drawing, issuing or delivering of such 
check, order or draft as aforesaid, that the maker or drawer has no deposit in 
or credits with such bank or depository or has not sufficient funds in, or 
credits with, such bank or depository for the payment of such check, order or 
draft in full upon its presentation.

* * * * * 
*

"(4) Giving a worthless 
check is a class E felony if the check, draft or order is drawn for fifty 
dollars ($50) or more. Giving a worthless check is a class A misdemeanor if the 
check, draft or order is drawn for less than fifty dollars 
($50)."

3 Section 6-39(a), W.S. 
1957, 1975 Cum.Supp. (now § 6-3-702, W.S. 1977, 1985 Cum.Supp.), 
provided:

"(a) Whoever, with intent 
to defraud by obtaining money, merchandise, property, credit, or other thing of 
value, although no express representation is made in reference thereto, or who, 
in the payment of any obligation, shall make, draw, utter or deliver any check, 
draft or order for the payment of money in the sum of $50 or upwards upon any 
bank, depository, person, firm or corporation, knowing at the time of such 
making, drawing, uttering or delivering that the maker or drawer has not 
sufficient funds in such bank, depository, person, firm or corporation for the 
payment of such check, draft or order in full upon its presentation, shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not more than 
$1,000 or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than one year or both."