Case Title: Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP001493

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 71 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1493 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
The Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance 
Corporation (the "Segregated Account") and Ambac 
Assurance Corporation ("Ambac"), 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 370 Wis. 2d 788, 882 N.W.2d 871 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 30, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 28, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Peter Anderson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: KELLY, J. did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Thomas M. Pyper, Lisa M. Lawless, and Husch Blackwell 
LLP, Madison, with whom on the briefs were Joseph M. McLaughlin 
and Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York.  Oral argument by 
Joseph M. McLaughlin. 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants, there was a brief filed by 
Erik H. Monson, Karen M. Gallagher, and Coyne, Schultz, Becker & 
Bauer, S.C., Madison, with whom on the brief were Barbara A. 
Neider, Jeffrey A. Mandell, and Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison.  
Oral argument by Barbara A. Neider. 
 
 
2 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Civil 
Procedure Law Professors by John Franke and Gass Weber Mullins 
LLC.  Oral argument by John Franke. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Manufacturers and Commerce Association and The Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America by Kevin M. St. John 
and Bell Giftos St. John LLC, Madison, with whom on the brief 
were Daniel Domenico and Kittredge LLC, Denver. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The Coalition 
for Litigation Justice by Kathryn A. Keppel and Gimbel, Reilly, 
Guerin & Brown LLP, Milwaukee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 71
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1493 
(L.C. No. 
2014CV3511) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
The Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance 
Corporation (the "Segregated Account") and 
Ambac Assurance Corporation ("Ambac"), 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. ("Countrywide"), 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
JUN 30, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   This case implicates the 
authority of Wisconsin courts to exercise general jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation.  Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. 
petitioned this court for review of an unpublished decision of 
the court of appeals,1 which held that Countrywide consented to 
general personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin when it appointed a 
                                                 
1 Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide 
Home Loans, Inc., No. 2015AP1493, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. June 23, 2016) (per curiam). 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
2 
 
registered agent pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 180.1507 (2015-16).2  
Because 
the 
text 
of 
§ 180.1507 
does 
not 
even 
mention 
jurisdiction, much less consent, Countrywide's compliance with 
the statute does not, on its own, confer jurisdiction.  We 
therefore hold that compliance with § 180.1507 does not subject 
Countrywide to general jurisdiction in Wisconsin; accordingly, 
we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the 
matter 
to 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
for 
further 
proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.3 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
Countrywide is a New York corporation with its 
principal place of business in California.  Prior to the Great 
Recession, Countrywide was a leading home mortgage loan insurer, 
but its home mortgage activity ended after the housing market 
collapsed.  Authorized to do business in Wisconsin since 1986, 
Countrywide 
appointed 
CT 
Corporation 
System, 
a 
Wisconsin 
corporation, as its registered agent for service of process in 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated.  
3 In the court of appeals, Ambac and the Segregated Account 
raised two additional issues:  (1) whether Countrywide consented 
to 
personal 
jurisdiction 
by 
appearing 
in 
rehabilitation 
proceedings in Wisconsin; and (2) whether Countrywide is subject 
to personal jurisdiction under Wisconsin's long-arm statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1).  The court of appeals did not address 
these other issues because it reversed the circuit court's 
decision based on the consent to general jurisdiction argument 
raised by Ambac and the Segregated Account.  Consequently, we 
remand the matter so the court of appeals can decide these 
unresolved issues. 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
3 
 
2014.  Prior to commencement of this action, Countrywide did not 
maintain any offices, employees, or business presence within the 
state. 
¶3 
Ambac Assurance Corporation is a Wisconsin corporation 
with its principal place of business in New York.  As an insurer 
of financial instruments, Ambac issued polices in 2005 insuring 
against 
losses 
stemming 
from 
residential 
mortgage-backed 
securities containing Countrywide mortgage loans.  Neither the 
policies nor the contracts were negotiated in Wisconsin, but the 
underlying securities did include mortgage loans made to 
Wisconsin residents and secured by property here.  When many of 
the mortgage loans underlying the securities defaulted during 
the Great Recession, the policies obligated Ambac to pay claims 
worth hundreds of millions of dollars.  Because of Ambac's 
significant liabilities under the policies, the Wisconsin 
Commissioner of Insurance approved a plan in March 2010 
establishing 
the 
Segregated 
Account 
of 
Ambac 
Assurance 
Corporation.  Ambac transferred its policies into the Segregated 
Account, which now owns the policies.  The Segregated Account 
entered 
statutory 
rehabilitation 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 645.31-32,4 and rehabilitation proceedings remain ongoing.5 
                                                 
4 For helpful background on rehabilitation proceedings, see 
generally Nickel v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2013 WI App 129, ¶¶12-15, 
351 Wis. 2d 539, 841 N.W.2d 482. 
5 In re Rehabilitation of Segregated Account of Ambac 
Assurance Corp., No. 2010CV1576 (Dane Cty. Cir. Ct.).  Appeals 
related 
to 
the 
rehabilitation 
proceedings 
have 
generated 
published opinions by this court and the court of appeals.  In 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
4 
 
¶4 
Ambac and the Segregated Account6 filed this suit 
against Countrywide in December 2014 and served CT Corporation 
System with the summons and complaint in January 2015.  The 
complaint alleged that Ambac incurred substantial liability 
under 
the 
insurance 
policies 
only 
because 
Countrywide 
fraudulently 
misrepresented 
the 
quality 
of 
the 
mortgages 
underlying the securities.7  Countrywide moved to dismiss the 
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Ambac opposed the 
motion, 
arguing 
that 
Countrywide 
consented 
to 
general 
jurisdiction in Wisconsin when it appointed a registered agent 
under Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1507 and 180.1510. 
¶5 
Dismissing 
the 
complaint 
for 
lack 
of 
personal 
jurisdiction, the Dane County Circuit Court8 concluded that 
Wisconsin courts cannot exercise general jurisdiction over 
Countrywide.9  The circuit court reasoned that "merely having a 
                                                                                                                                                             
re Rehabilitation of Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance 
Corp., 2012 WI 22, 339 Wis. 2d 48, 810 N.W.2d 450; Nickel, 351 
Wis. 2d 539. 
6 To facilitate readability, we will refer to Ambac and the 
Segregated Account collectively as "Ambac" for the remainder of 
the opinion. 
7 Ambac also filed suit against Countrywide in New York for 
alleged 
fraudulent 
representations 
regarding 
residential 
mortgage-backed securities. 
8 The Honorable Peter C. Anderson presiding. 
9 The circuit court also rejected Ambac's arguments that 
Countrywide consented to personal jurisdiction by appearing in 
the rehabilitation proceedings and that Wisconsin's long-arm 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1), allowed the court to exercise 
specific jurisdiction over Countrywide. 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
5 
 
registered agent and merely having . . . one or two foreclosure 
actions [does] not make you a resident of this state in the same 
sense that [anyone] . . . from Wisconsin could be sued in 
Wisconsin and could not be heard to complain."  Absent explicit 
contractual consent, the court determined that "the registered 
agent 
and 
the 
very 
modest 
participation 
in 
foreclosure 
proceedings at the time of the filing . . . would not sustain 
jurisdiction under [Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 
(2014)]." 
¶6 
Ambac appealed, and the court of appeals reversed.  
Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., No. 2015AP1493, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
June 23, 2016) (per curiam).  Quoting language from this court's 
decisions in Punke v. Brody, 17 Wis. 2d 9, 115 N.W.2d 601 
(1962), and Hasley v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 70 
Wis. 2d 562, 235 N.W.2d 446 (1975), the court of appeals held 
that appointing a registered agent for service of process 
constituted consent to general jurisdiction in Wisconsin.  
Segregated Account, unpublished slip op., ¶¶11-13.  It therefore 
agreed with Ambac that, "by maintaining a Wisconsin agent to 
receive 
service 
of 
process . . . , 
Countrywide 
'subjected' 
itself to the 'general jurisdiction' of Wisconsin courts, and 
actually consented to personal jurisdiction."  Id., ¶9.  The 
court of appeals rejected Countrywide's argument that the 
Supreme Court's Daimler decision either directly or indirectly 
undermined Punke and Hasley.  Id., ¶¶18-20.  Countrywide filed a 
petition for review, which we granted. 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
6 
 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
Whether Wisconsin courts have personal jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation is a question of law we review de 
novo, although we benefit from the analyses of the circuit court 
and court of appeals.  Rasmussen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2011 WI 
52, ¶14, 335 Wis. 2d 1, 803 N.W.2d 623 (first citing Kopke v. A. 
Hartrodt 
S.R.L., 
2001 
WI 
99, 
¶10, 
245 
Wis. 2d 396, 
629 
N.W.2d 662; then citing State v. Aufderhaar, 2005 WI 108, ¶10, 
283 Wis. 2d 336, 700 N.W.2d 4). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Personal Jurisdiction over Corporations 
¶8 
A brief review of personal jurisdiction doctrine 
places our statutory interpretation question in the appropriate 
context.  Shortly after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court decided 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), which tied personal 
jurisdiction to a defendant's presence within the forum state.  
At the time, service of process on a defendant within the forum 
cemented 
personal 
jurisdiction. 
 
Id. 
at 
722-24. 
 
This 
territorial 
approach, 
however, 
limited 
jurisdiction 
over 
corporations; because 
corporations were not people, their 
"presence" within a forum state was statutorily defined by the 
legislature.  In most forums, corporations were subject to suit 
only if incorporated in that state.  Cf. State ex rel. Drake v. 
Doyle, 40 Wis. 175, 197 (1876) ("The corporation, being the mere 
creation of local law, can have no legal existence beyond the 
limits of the sovereignty where created." (quoting Paul v. 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
7 
 
Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, (1869))); see also Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) ("[A] 
corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of 
the sovereignty by which it is created.  It exists only in 
contemplation of law, and by force of the law; and where that 
law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the 
corporation can have no existence."). 
¶9 
Consequently, foreign corporations could be immune 
from suit, even if they carried out significant operations 
within a state.  Registration statutes thus arose in part to 
permit the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign corporations.  
See Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U.S. 405, 408-09 
(1929) ("The purpose of state statutes requiring the appointment 
by foreign corporations of agents upon whom process may be 
served is primarily to subject them to the jurisdiction of local 
courts in controversies growing out of transactions within the 
State.").  The corporation's in-state agent satisfied Pennoyer's 
local presence requirement, and some courts discovered an 
implicit 
"consent" 
to 
personal 
jurisdiction 
within 
the 
appointment of the agent.  See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 
495 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1990) (plurality). 
¶10 In 
1945, 
however, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
decided 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), 
dispensed with the "purely fictional" notions of implied consent 
and presence-by-agent, and redirected personal jurisdiction 
doctrine away from the territorial approach that prevailed under 
Pennoyer.  Burnham, 495 U.S. at 618 (plurality).  Two categories 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
8 
 
of personal jurisdiction have emerged since then.  A corporation 
may be subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum state under a 
theory of "specific jurisdiction" if it has "certain minimum 
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit 
does 
not 
offend 
'traditional 
notions 
of 
fair 
play 
and 
substantial justice.'"  Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  Exercise of 
specific jurisdiction requires a nexus between the defendant's 
activities in the state and the suit against it.  Availability 
of specific jurisdiction obviates the need for states to use 
registration statutes to secure personal jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations' activities. 
¶11 By 
contrast, 
a 
state 
may 
exercise 
"general 
jurisdiction" over a corporation if its "continuous corporate 
operations within [the] state [are] . . . so substantial and of 
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action 
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities."  
Id. at 318; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colum., S.A. v. 
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).  If a defendant is subject 
to general jurisdiction in a forum, it may be sued there even in 
the absence of any relationship between the litigation and the 
defendant's contacts with the state.  In recent years, the 
Supreme Court clarified the limits the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause places on the scope of general jurisdiction:  
"A 
court 
may 
assert 
general 
jurisdiction 
over 
foreign . . . corporations to hear any and all claims against 
them when their affiliations with the State are so 'continuous 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
9 
 
and systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the 
forum State."  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (alteration omitted; 
emphasis added) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. 
v. 
Brown, 
564 
U.S. 
915, 
919 
(2011)). 
 
Critically, 
a 
corporation's "in-state business" sufficient to support a forum 
state's exercise of specific personal jurisdiction "does not 
suffice to permit the assertion of general jurisdiction over 
claims . . . that are unrelated to any activity occurring in" 
the forum state.  BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 
(2017). 
¶12 "With 
respect 
to 
a 
corporation, 
the 
place 
of 
incorporation 
and 
principal 
place 
of 
business 
are 
'paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction'" because they 
are "unique" and "easily ascertainable."  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 
760 (alterations in original) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 
924).  In corralling "exorbitant exercises of all-purpose 
jurisdiction," the Supreme Court recognized the value in having 
a "clear and certain forum in which a corporate defendant may be 
sued on any and all claims."  Id. at 760-61.  Identifying "at 
least one" definite forum where corporate defendants are subject 
to general jurisdiction benefits plaintiffs but also enables 
defendants "to structure their primary conduct with some minimum 
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them 
liable to suit."  Id. at 760-62 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
10 
 
B.  Appointment of a Registered Agent in Wisconsin 
¶13 The question before this court is whether compliance 
with Wis. Stat. § 180.1507, without more, constitutes consent to 
general jurisdiction in Wisconsin.  Interpretation of this 
statute is a matter of first impression.  As always, "statutory 
interpretation begins with the language of the statute."  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 663, 681 N.W.2d 110, 124 (internal quotation mark 
omitted) (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  We give statutory text its 
"common, ordinary, and accepted meaning."  Id.  Because both 
context and structure are "important to meaning," we interpret 
statutory text "in the context in which it is used; not in 
isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of 
surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results."  Id., ¶46. 
¶14 To conduct business in Wisconsin, foreign corporations 
must 
comply 
with 
certain 
registration 
and 
appointment 
requirements.  Among other conditions found in Chapter 180, Wis. 
Stat. § 180.1507 requires that "[e]ach foreign corporation 
authorized to transact business in this state shall continuously 
maintain in this state a registered office and registered 
agent."10  Ambac now argues that appointment of a registered 
agent 
under 
§ 180.1507 
amounts 
to 
consent 
to 
general 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.1507 also specifies characteristics 
of permissible registered agents, which we need not reproduce. 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
11 
 
jurisdiction.  In support of its position, Ambac points out that 
Wis. Stat. § 180.1510(1) designates a foreign corporation's 
registered agent as the corporation's agent for service of 
process.11 
¶15 We disagree with Ambac's interpretation.  Consent to 
general jurisdiction cannot be read into Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1507 
and 180.1510 without "expand[ing] the meaning of the statute[s] 
to the point that we engage in rewriting the statute[s], not 
merely interpreting [them]."  State v. Briggs, 214 Wis. 2d 281, 
288, 571 N.W.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1997).  We will not rewrite the 
statute to create jurisdiction where the legislature has not.  
The text of Wis. Stat. § 180.1507 is devoid of any language 
regarding either consent or jurisdiction.  Section 180.1507 
merely requires that every foreign corporation authorized to do 
business 
in 
Wisconsin 
maintain 
a 
registered 
office 
and 
registered agent in the state.  Subsections (1) through (3) then 
describe 
the 
persons 
and 
entities 
eligible 
to 
serve 
as 
registered agents.  The language is straightforward, and none of 
the words——independently or taken together——suggest consent to 
jurisdiction.12  Because Chapter 180 in no way telegraphs that 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.1510(1) provides, in full:  "Except 
as provided in subs. (2) and (3), the registered agent of a 
foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this 
state is the foreign corporation's agent for service of process, 
notice or demand required or permitted by law to be served on 
the foreign corporation." 
12 Because the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1507 and 
180.1510 is clear, we do not consider the legislative history 
and model act materials that Ambac brings to our attention. 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
12 
 
registration equals consent to general jurisdiction, a foreign 
corporation would be understandably surprised to learn, perhaps 
before it even conducts any business here, that registration 
automatically subjects it to being hauled into a Wisconsin court 
in a case having no connection whatsoever to Wisconsin.   
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.1510(1) does mention "service of 
process"——a term generally associated with the initiation of a 
lawsuit——but service of process is an act distinct from the 
grounds necessary to confer general jurisdiction.13  A registered 
agent's role is to receive service of process, notice, or demand 
on behalf of a foreign corporation, and the agent's mere receipt 
of process does not empower Wisconsin courts to exercise either 
specific or general personal jurisdiction without compromising 
the due process rights of the foreign corporation.  The fact 
that Wis. Stat. § 180.1510(1) assigns the registered agent 
responsibility to receive process therefore cannot transform 
appointment of an agent under Wis. Stat. § 180.1507 into consent 
to 
general 
jurisdiction. 
 
To 
conclude 
differently 
would 
resurrect the "purely fictional" notions of "implied consent" 
and "presence" associated with designated agents during a bygone 
era when foreign corporations would otherwise elude justice in 
proper forums.  That period of time has passed, and those 
                                                 
13 See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.11 
(grounds 
for 
personal 
jurisdiction are a prerequisite to its exercise, implying that 
the basis for personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation 
exists independently from the means by which the plaintiff 
effects service). 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
13 
 
defunct concepts were appropriately discarded, having been 
superseded by long-arm statutes. 
¶17 Adopting 
Ambac's 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 180.1507 and 180.1510(1) as effecting consent to general 
jurisdiction 
would 
render 
Wisconsin's 
long-arm 
statute 
superfluous with respect to all foreign corporations authorized 
to transact business in this state——the very entities the long-
arm statute was designed to reach: 
[T]he objective of the statute was to give citizens of 
Wisconsin the right to make use of the courts of this 
state in instituting causes of action against any 
foreign corporation, which actually is carrying on 
business activities within the state, subject only to 
such limitations as are imposed by the United States 
constitution. 
Vt. Yogurt Co. v. Blanke Baer Fruit & Flavor Co., 107 
Wis. 2d 603, 609-10, 321 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis 
added; original emphasis omitted) (quoting Huck v. Chi., 
St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry., 4 Wis. 2d 132, 137, 90 
N.W.2d 154 (1958)).  In interpreting the scope of the long-arm 
statute, Wisconsin courts have long recognized that "[t]his 
state does not have the same interest in providing a forum for 
nonresidents whose injuries by nonresidents have no connection 
to this state as it does in protecting its residents from 
nonresidents doing business here."  Id. at 612 (emphasis added).  
The long-arm statute reaches foreign corporations doing business 
in Wisconsin, which are required to register an agent for 
service of process.  If such registration were sufficient to 
expose foreign corporations to general, all-purpose jurisdiction 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
14 
 
of Wisconsin courts, the long-arm statute would effectively 
serve no purpose.  "Statutory interpretations that render 
provisions meaningless should be avoided."  Belding v. Demoulin, 
2014 WI 8, ¶17, 352 Wis. 2d 359, 843 N.W.2d 373; accord Kalal, 
271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; State ex rel. Smith v. City of Oak Creek, 
139 Wis. 2d 788, 796, 407 N.W.2d 901 (1987); Harrington v. 
Smith, 28 Wis. 43, 67 (1871); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. 
Garner, Reading Law 174-79 (2012) ("[A statute] should [not] 
needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to 
duplicate another provision or to have no consequence."). 
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.05(1)(d) gives Wisconsin courts 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant "engaged in substantial 
and not isolated activities within this state, whether such 
activities are wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise."  
But if we equate appointment of a registered agent under Wis. 
Stat. § 180.1507 with consent to general jurisdiction, Wisconsin 
courts would not need to establish grounds for specific 
jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 801.05(1)(d), except with 
respect to foreign corporations prohibited from transacting 
business in this state under Wis. Stat. § 180.1501——entities the 
long-arm statute is unlikely to reach.14  A foreign corporation's 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Gen. Motors. Corp., 2011 WI 52, 
¶44, 
335 
Wis. 2d 1, 
803 
N.W.2d 623 
(declining 
to 
impute 
subsidiary's 
substantial 
and 
not 
isolated 
activities 
in 
Wisconsin to foreign parent company); Vt. Yogurt Co. v. Blanke 
Baer Fruit & Flavor Co., 107 Wis. 2d 603, 605-06, 613, 321 
N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1982) (declining to exercise jurisdiction 
over defendant where "the dispute between the parties had [no] 
connection to this state" and defendant was "not licensed to do 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
15 
 
contacts with Wisconsin would be irrelevant so long as it 
registered an agent for service of process——which all foreign 
corporations authorized to transact business in this state must 
do.15  We will not interpret Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1507 and 
180.1510(1) in a manner that makes the long-arm statute "idle and 
nugatory."  Scalia & Garner, supra, at 174 (internal quotation 
mark omitted) (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the 
Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power 
of the States of the American Union 58 (1868)).16 
                                                                                                                                                             
business in Wisconsin").  But see, e.g., Capitol Fixture & 
Woodworking Grp. v. Woodma Distribs., Inc., 147 Wis. 2d 157, 
159-63, 432 N.W.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.05(5)(e), which confers jurisdiction in any action that 
relates to goods received by plaintiff in Wisconsin from 
defendant, 
conferred 
jurisdiction 
over 
defendant, 
despite 
argument that Wisconsin lacked jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.05(1)(d) because defendant was "not licensed to do 
business in Wisconsin"). 
15 See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 636 (2d 
Cir. 2016) ("[I]f the mere maintenance of a registered agent to 
accept 
service 
under 
[Connecticut's 
registration 
statute] 
effected an agreement to submit to general jurisdiction, it 
seems to us that the specific jurisdiction provisions of the 
long-arm statute . . . wouldn't be needed except with regard to 
unregistered corporations:  Registered corporations would be 
subject to jurisdiction with regard to all matters simply by 
virtue of process duly served on its appointed agent."). 
16 We also recognize the perverse incentive created by 
reading consent into the registered agent statute.  A foreign 
corporation could elect non-compliance with Chapter 180 in order 
to evade the general jurisdiction of Wisconsin courts, while a 
fully compliant foreign corporation would expose itself to suits 
having nothing whatsoever to do with Wisconsin.  If registering 
an agent for service of process is tantamount to consent to 
general, all-purpose jurisdiction, foreign corporations that 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
16 
 
¶19 Ambac also relies on Wis. Stat. § 180.1505(2), under 
which a corporation certified to do business in Wisconsin "has 
the same but no greater rights and has the same but no greater 
privileges 
as, 
and . . . is 
subject 
to 
the 
same 
duties, 
restrictions, penalties and liabilities . . . imposed on, a 
domestic corporation of like character."  Ambac argues that 
because foreign corporations "enjoy[] the privilege of using the 
Wisconsin courts and [are] placed on equal footing with domestic 
companies," § 180.1505(2) operates with Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1507 
and 180.1510(1) to imply that certified foreign corporations 
consent to personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin for any claim, 
regardless of the claim's relationship to the state. 
¶20 Once again, Ambac disengages from the plain language 
of Chapter 180.  Like Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1507 and 180.1510(1), 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 180.1505(2) 
mentions 
neither 
consent 
nor 
jurisdiction; thus, its plain language undermines Ambac's 
argument.17  It is too great a leap to characterize consent to 
                                                                                                                                                             
comply with our laws would be penalized for doing so.  See 
Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 140-41 (Del. 2016). 
17 Because the dissent faults our discussion of Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.1507 in conjunction with Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1510(1), 
180.1505(2), and 801.05(1)(d) for purportedly "employ[ing] a 
misguided framework of statutory interpretation" that places 
§ 180.1507 "in isolation from the wider embrace of the statutory 
scheme," dissent, ¶36, we pause to note the appropriate role of 
the "whole-text" canon for using context to assess the meaning 
of statutory language: 
Properly applied, it typically establishes that only 
one of the possible meanings that a word or phrase can 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
17 
 
general jurisdiction as a "duty" imposed on every foreign 
corporation 
that 
registers 
to 
do 
business 
in 
Wisconsin, 
particularly where the actual statutory language offers no 
warning that exposure to suits in Wisconsin for claims arising 
elsewhere is a consequence of registration. 
¶21 Treating general jurisdiction as a "duty" of domestic 
corporations that extends to all registered foreign corporations 
by 
default 
would 
extend 
Wisconsin's 
exercise 
of 
general 
jurisdiction beyond the tapered limits recently described by the 
Supreme Court.  Because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment controls the circumstances under which a state may 
exercise personal jurisdiction, we must consider the due process 
implications 
of 
exercising 
jurisdiction 
over 
a 
foreign 
corporation.  This court generally avoids interpreting statutes 
in a way that places their constitutionality in question.  Blake 
v. Jossart, 2016 WI 57, ¶27, 370 Wis. 2d 1, 884 N.W.2d 484 
                                                                                                                                                             
bear is compatible with use of the same word or phrase 
elsewhere in the statute; or that one of the possible 
meanings would cause the provision to clash with 
another portion of the statute.  It is not a proper 
use of the canon to say that since the overall purpose 
of the statute is to achieve x, any interpretation of 
the text that limits the achieving of x must be 
disfavored. . . .  [L]imitations on a statute's reach 
are as much a part of the statutory purpose as 
specifications of what is to be done. 
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 168 (2012).  As we 
have made clear, there is no ambiguity of meaning for context to 
clarify in Wis. Stat. § 180.1507 because that section mentions 
neither consent nor jurisdiction, and we will not concoct 
meaning from "context" where the legislature has not spoken. 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
18 
 
("[I]f any doubt exists about the statute's constitutionality, 
the court must resolve that doubt in favor of upholding the 
statute." (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 669 
(2017); accord State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 
58 Wis. 2d 32, 46, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973); see also Scalia & 
Garner, supra, at 247-51 ("A statute should be interpreted in a 
way that avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt."). 
¶22 In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 
564 U.S. 915 (2011), the Supreme Court addressed the proper 
scope of general jurisdiction within the bounds of due process, 
holding 
that 
a 
corporation 
may 
be 
subject 
to 
general 
jurisdiction only in a forum where it "is fairly regarded as at 
home."  Id. at 924.  In Daimler, the Court later clarified the 
circumstances 
under 
which 
a 
corporation 
has 
sufficiently 
continuous and systematic contacts to be "at home" in a forum 
state.  Rather than focusing "solely on the magnitude of the 
defendant's in-state contacts," a court must conduct "an 
appraisal of a corporation's activities in their entirety, 
nationwide 
and 
worldwide," 
because 
"[a] 
corporation 
that 
operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of 
them."  134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20 (quoting id. at 767 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring)).  A forum state denies defendants due process 
of law if it "subject[s] foreign corporations to general 
jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or 
affiliate."  Id. at 759-60.  Within this framework, the Daimler 
Court explained that "Goodyear did not hold that a corporation 
may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
19 
 
is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it 
simply typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums."  Id. at 
760.   
¶23 Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that 
Goodyear and Daimler strictly confine the exercise of general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations within the bounds of due 
process. 
 
In 
a 
comprehensive 
opinion 
reversing 
its 
own 
precedent, which previously held that appointment of an agent 
for service of process conferred general jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation,18 the Delaware Supreme Court reconsidered 
Delaware's registration statute in light of the altered due 
process framework: 
Our duty is to construe a statute of our state in 
a manner consistent with the U.S. Constitution, when 
it is possible to do so with no violence to its plain 
meaning. 
 
Nothing 
in 
the 
registration 
statutes 
explicitly says that a foreign corporation registering 
thereby consents to the personal jurisdiction of this 
state.  Nothing in the statutes explicitly says that 
by having to register in order to "do any business in 
this State, through or by branch offices, agents or 
representatives located in this State," and to appoint 
a registered agent in the state to receive service of 
process, that meant a foreign corporation was waiving 
any objection to personal jurisdiction for causes of 
action not arising out of the conduct in Delaware that 
gave rise to the registration requirement. 
In light of Daimler, [Delaware's registration 
statute] can be given a sensible reading by construing 
it as requiring a foreign corporation to allow service 
of process to be made upon it in a convenient way in 
                                                 
18 See Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988). 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
20 
 
proper cases, but not as a consent to general 
jurisdiction. 
Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 142 (Del. 2016) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 371(b)).  
In construing a Connecticut statute with language mirroring Wis. 
Stat. § 180.1510's, the Second Circuit similarly observed that 
[i]f 
mere 
registration 
and 
the 
accompanying 
appointment of an in-state agent——without an express 
consent to general jurisdiction——nonetheless sufficed 
to confer general jurisdiction by implicit consent, 
every 
corporation 
would 
be 
subject 
to 
general 
jurisdiction in every state in which it registered, 
and Daimler's ruling would be robbed of meaning by a 
back-door thief. 
Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 
2016).19 
¶24 The shade of constitutional doubt that Goodyear and 
Daimler cast on broad approaches to general jurisdiction informs 
our assessment of this court's older cases.  Ambac argues that 
State ex rel. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Fowler, 196 Wis. 451, 220 N.W. 
534 (1928), stands for the proposition that "appointing a 
                                                 
19 See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. LeMaire, ___ P.3d ___, 
¶13, 2017 WL 1954809 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) ("Because the modern 
doctrine of specific jurisdiction amply ensures that a state has 
jurisdiction when a corporation's conduct allegedly causes harm 
in that state, there is no need to base personal jurisdiction 
solely upon a murky implication of consent to suit——for all 
purposes and in all cases——from the bare appointment of an agent 
for service."); State ex rel. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Dolan, 512 
S.W.3d 41, 46-47 (Mo. 2017) (en banc) ("The Supreme Court held 
[in Daimler] that the mere conduct of . . . systematic and 
continuous business activities in the state was not sufficient 
to subject the corporation to general jurisdiction in the state 
for all causes of action not related to that state."). 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
21 
 
Wisconsin agent for service, without limiting the scope of such 
agency, subjected foreign corporations to general personal 
jurisdiction."  The Aetna court held that 
foreign 
insurance 
corporations 
are 
bound 
[by 
statute] . . . to hold themselves amenable to the 
jurisdiction of our courts for a cause of action which 
may . . . be properly brought against them for a cause 
of action arising outside of this state . . . , [] 
though the cause of action may not affect the property 
of such insurance corporation. 
196 Wis. at 457.  The court cited Pennsylvania Fire Insurance 
Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 
93 (1917), in support of that holding.  Importantly, the statute 
at 
issue 
in 
Aetna 
was 
interpreted 
to 
require 
insurance 
corporations to consent to jurisdiction by service of process on 
the insurance commissioner, which "clearly put[] the foreign 
insurance 
corporation[s] 
outside 
of 
the 
general 
foreign 
corporation statute."  Aetna, 196 Wis. at 457.  Aetna does not 
control our interpretation of Wisconsin's modern corporate 
registration 
statute 
because 
Aetna 
interpreted 
a 
statute 
regulating insurance corporations. 
¶25 Significantly, 
the 
Daimler 
Court 
cautioned 
that 
"cases . . . decided 
in 
the 
era 
dominated 
by 
Pennoyer's 
territorial thinking should not attract heavy reliance today."  
134 S. Ct. at 761 n.18 (citation omitted).  Although the Supreme 
Court never expressly overruled the Pennsylvania Fire decision 
relied upon by the Aetna court,20 both cases reflect the 
                                                 
20 Recently, the Supreme Court specifically declined to 
discuss consent to general personal jurisdiction in BNSF Ry. Co. 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
22 
 
reasoning of an era when states could not exercise jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation absent the appointment of an agent 
for service of process.  Because Aetna and Pennsylvania Fire 
represent a disfavored approach to general jurisdiction, we 
instead give preference to prevailing due process standards when 
interpreting a contemporary statute for the first time. 
¶26 Turning to this court's opinions in Punke and Hasley, 
we begin by observing that neither case interpreted the 
registered agent statute; therefore, like Aetna, they do not 
control 
our 
interpretation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 180.1507.  
Furthermore, 
subjecting 
foreign 
corporations 
to 
general 
jurisdiction wherever they register an agent for service of 
process 
would 
reflect 
the 
"sprawling 
view 
of 
general 
jurisdiction" rejected by the Supreme Court in Goodyear.  
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929).  
Accordingly, Ambac's and the court of appeals' heavy reliance on 
language from these opinions is unfounded.   
¶27 Importantly, Punke addressed whether an individual 
could 
consent 
to 
personal 
jurisdiction 
in 
Wisconsin 
by 
appointing an agent to accept service on his behalf.  See Punke, 
17 Wis. 2d at 13-14.  But whether an individual consents to 
personal 
jurisdiction 
by 
appointing 
an 
agent 
presents 
a 
different question than whether a corporation's appointment of a 
registered agent——as required by law——automatically subjects the 
                                                                                                                                                             
v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017), because the court 
below had not addressed the issue. 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
23 
 
corporation to general jurisdiction.  We will not infer the 
existence 
of 
implied 
consent 
to 
general 
jurisdiction 
in 
Wisconsin's business corporations statutes from an opinion 
basing consent to personal jurisdiction on an individual's 
appointment of an agent to receive service of summons.  Punke is 
inapposite to this case. 
¶28 Hasley, on the other hand, did explore whether 
Wisconsin courts could exercise jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation, but "[i]t [was] agreed between the parties that 
statutory personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] by the 
Wisconsin trial court would adhere only under the 'long-arm' 
statute."  70 Wis. 2d at 574.  The court's analysis accordingly 
focused on whether the nature, quality, and extent of the 
defendant's contacts in Wisconsin satisfied the statutory basis 
for asserting 
specific jurisdiction without offending due 
process.  Within the context of its due process analysis, the 
Hasley court only surmised that "a defendant entity might be 
subject to personal jurisdiction . . . by its consent evidenced 
by appointment of an agent for service of process."  Id. at 582 
(emphasis added).  The Hasley court's examination of whether 
Wisconsin courts could exercise specific jurisdiction over the 
foreign corporation did not consider consent to jurisdiction via 
appointment of a registered agent or otherwise.  Because consent 
to jurisdiction by appointment of a registered agent arose only 
as an aside when relaying International Shoe's rules governing 
personal jurisdiction over corporations——and then only as a 
possibility, rather than a certainty——Hasley does not control 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
24 
 
our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 180.1507.  The court of 
appeals erred in determining otherwise, particularly in light of 
Daimler and Goodyear. 
¶29 Ultimately, Aetna, Punke, and Hasley are unhelpful in 
determining whether Countrywide's compliance with Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.1507 is tantamount to consent to general jurisdiction in 
Wisconsin.  Notably, each of these cases predate the 1989 
enactment of Chapter 180 and reflect outmoded jurisdictional 
approaches that should not be fused with modern statutes, 
particularly when such concepts are irreconcilable with the due 
process 
rights 
of 
corporate 
defendants. 
 
Absent 
express 
statutory language asserting general jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation based on its appointment of an agent for service of 
process, we will not depart from the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.1507, which serves merely as a registration statute, not a 
conferral of consent to general jurisdiction. 
¶30 Finally, we note that our holding does not bar the 
courtroom door to plaintiffs with claims against foreign 
corporations.  Under the doctrine of specific jurisdiction, 
plaintiffs 
may 
seek 
relief 
from 
foreign 
corporations 
in 
Wisconsin courts when a nexus exists between the cause of action 
and the corporation's in-state activities.  Indeed, we remand to 
the court of appeals to consider whether Wisconsin courts may 
exercise specific jurisdiction over Countrywide in this case.  
But the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause restricts the 
exercise of general jurisdiction over foreign corporations to 
those cases in which the nature of a foreign corporation's 
No. 
2015AP1493   
 
25 
 
operations render it "at home" in this state.  Because 
Countrywide is incorporated and maintains its principal place of 
business elsewhere, it is not "at home" in Wisconsin. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶31 We hold that appointing a registered agent under Wis. 
Stat. § 180.1507 does not signify consent to general personal 
jurisdiction.  The statute's plain language does not mention 
jurisdiction, and Ambac's proffered deviation from the text 
would place the statute's constitutionality into doubt.  Foreign 
corporations principally operating outside of Wisconsin may 
rightly be subject to suit in our courts for claims arising out 
of their activities in this state, but the Supreme Court has 
made clear that the Due Process Clause proscribes the exercise 
of 
general 
jurisdiction 
over 
foreign 
corporations 
beyond 
exceptional circumstances not present here. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause remanded to the court of appeals. 
¶32 DANIEL KELLY, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
1 
 
¶33 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority's 
reasoning evinces a misunderstanding of the concept of consent 
to personal jurisdiction set forth both in Wisconsin statutes 
and case law.  Ambac, a Wisconsin plaintiff, filed a lawsuit in 
its home state against a foreign corporation that is registered 
to conduct business in Wisconsin and has assigned an agent to 
receive service of process here. 
¶34 Countrywide, a foreign corporation, has used Chapter 
180 of the Wisconsin Statutes to file over one hundred 
foreclosure lawsuits against Wisconsin homeowners in Wisconsin 
courts.  But now that the shoe is on the other foot, it contends 
that Wisconsin courts no longer have jurisdiction under that 
same chapter when lawsuits are filed against it.  And, a 
majority of this court agrees. 
¶35 The majority concludes that "[b]ecause the text of 
[Wis. Stat.] § 180.1507 does not even mention jurisdiction, much 
less consent, Countrywide's compliance with the statute does 
not, on its own, confer jurisdiction."  Majority op., ¶1 
(emphasis added).  This myopic lens through which the majority 
focuses gives rise to its folly. 
¶36 I address two significant flaws upon which the 
majority rests it conclusion.  First, it employs a misguided 
framework of statutory interpretation by examining a statute "on 
its own."  Majority op., ¶1.  Individual statutes do not exist 
in isolation from the wider embrace of the statutory scheme.  
They must be examined in context.  Second, the majority fails to 
recognize the distinction between cases where general personal 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
2 
 
jurisdiction is conferred by consent and cases that looked 
instead to contacts with a forum state to establish such 
jurisdiction. 
¶37 As did the court of appeals, I conclude that the 
circuit court has general personal jurisdiction over Countrywide 
in this action.  Under Wisconsin's statutory scheme, Countrywide 
consented 
to 
personal 
jurisdiction 
in 
Wisconsin 
when 
it 
appointed a registered agent in order to accept service of 
process pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1507 and 180.1510(1).  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶38 At the center of the majority's plain language 
analysis 
lies 
its 
search 
for 
the 
words 
"consent" 
or 
"jurisdiction" in Wis. Stat. § 180.1507.  Examining the statute 
in isolation, the majority contends that "[a]bsent express 
statutory language asserting general jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation based on its appointment of an agent for service of 
process, we will not depart from the plain meaning of 
§ 180.1507, which serves merely as a registration statute, not a 
conferral of consent to general jurisdiction."  Majority op., 
¶29. 
¶39 Over and over, it repeats this plain language refrain.  
See, e.g., Majority op., ¶15 ("The text of Wis. Stat. § 180.1507 
is 
devoid 
of 
any 
language 
regarding 
either 
consent 
or 
jurisdiction."); see also id. ("The language is straightforward, 
and none of the words——independently or taken together——suggest 
consent to jurisdiction."); Id., ¶20 ("Ambac disengages from the 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
3 
 
plain language of Chapter 180.  Like Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1507 and 
180.1510(1), Wis. Stat. § 180.1505(2) mentions neither consent 
nor jurisdiction; thus, its plain language undermines Ambac's 
argument."). 
¶40 Indeed, 
the 
absence 
of 
the 
words 
"consent" 
or 
"jurisdiction" proves to be a double-edged sword for the 
majority.  True, Wis. Stat. § 180.1507 does not expressly state 
that consent to general personal jurisdiction is conferred.  On 
the other hand, it does not expressly negate it either, as do 
some jurisdictions discussed below.1 
¶41 By narrowing the scope of its search and focusing on 
each statute in isolation, the majority misses the proverbial 
forest for the trees.  It is only by examining Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.1507 in the context of the statutory scheme that we see 
the full picture and can discern its plain meaning.  State ex 
rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110 
("[s]tatutory 
language 
is 
interpreted in the context in which it is used . . . in relation 
to 
the 
language 
of 
surrounding 
or 
closely-related 
statutes . . . ."). 
¶42 Chapter 180, Wisconsin's Business Corporations Law, 
governs foreign corporations conducting business in Wisconsin.  
The first statutory requirement relevant to this analysis is set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 180.1501, which instructs that foreign 
corporations conducting business in Wisconsin must obtain a 
                                                 
1 See infra, ¶18 n.8. 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
4 
 
certificate of authority.2  If a foreign corporation does not 
obtain a certificate of authority, then it is unable to sue in 
Wisconsin courts.  Wis. Stat. § 180.1502(1).3   
¶43 It is in this context that Wis. Stat. § 180.1507 
requires that a foreign corporation "authorized to transact 
business in this state shall continuously maintain in this state 
a registered office and registered agent."  Pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 180.1510(1), 
a 
registered 
agent 
"is 
the 
foreign 
corporation's agent for service of process, notice or demand 
required or permitted by law to be served on the foreign 
corporation."4  Even though neither § 180.1507 nor § 180.1510(1) 
expressly contain the words "consent" or "jurisdiction," when 
read 
together 
they 
plainly 
provide 
that 
when 
a 
foreign 
corporation has a registered agent, among its acknowledged 
functions is the receipt of the service of process (i.e. receipt 
of a summons and complaint). 
                                                 
2 Wis. Stat. § 180.1501(1) provides: "A foreign corporation 
may not transact business in this state until it obtains a 
certificate of authority from the department." 
 
3 Wis. Stat. § 180.1502(1) provides:  "A foreign corporation 
transacting business in this state without a certificate of 
authority, if a certificate of authority is required under s. 
180.1501, may not maintain a proceeding in any court in this 
state until it obtains a certificate of authority." 
4 Wis. Stat. § 180.1510(1) provides:  "Except as provided in 
subs. (2) and (3), the registered agent of a foreign corporation 
authorized to transact business in this state is the foreign 
corporation's agent for service of process, notice or demand 
required or permitted by law to be served on the foreign 
corporation."   
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
5 
 
¶44 What reason exists for the appointment of a registered 
agent to receive service of a summons and complaint other than 
the purpose of being subject to a lawsuit?  The majority offers 
none.  When read together, the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 180.1507 and 180.1510(1) is that appointment of a registered 
agent to receive service of process constitutes consent to 
jurisdiction. 
¶45 This plain meaning interpretation is further made 
manifest by examining Wis. Stat. § 180.1505(2), which is part of 
the statutory scheme.  It provides that once a foreign 
corporation obtains a certificate of authority, it is not only 
able to sue in Wisconsin courts, but is placed on equal footing 
with domestic corporations.  Pursuant to § 180.1505(2), a 
foreign corporation with a valid certificate of authority has 
the same privileges and duties as a domestic corporation: 
A foreign corporation with a valid certificate of 
authority has the same but no greater rights and has 
the same but no greater privileges as, and, except as 
otherwise provided by this chapter, is subject to the 
same duties, restrictions, penalties and liabilities 
now or later imposed on, a domestic corporation of 
like character. 
Significantly, the duties of domestic corporations include being 
subject to general jurisdiction in Wisconsin.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.05(1)(c).5 
                                                 
5 Wis. Stat. § 180.05(1)(c) provides that: "A court of this 
state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction 
over a person served in an action pursuant to s. 801.11 under 
any of the following circumstances . . . [i]n any action whether 
arising within or without this state, against a defendant who 
when the action is commenced . . . [i]s a domestic corporation 
or limited liability company . . . ." 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
6 
 
¶46 The legislative history further confirms this plain 
meaning interpretation.  Drafting file for 1989 Wis. Act 303, 
Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau of 1989 A.B. 780, 
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis.  Prior to the 
adoption of the Wisconsin Business Corporation Act by the 
Wisconsin Legislature in 1989, the State Bar of Wisconsin 
established the Corporate and Business Law Committee to review 
and 
recommend 
to 
the 
Wisconsin 
Legislature 
revisions 
to 
Wisconsin's Business Corporations law.  See Christopher S. 
Berry, Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Frank C. DeGuire and Clay R. 
Williams, Wisconsin Business Corporation Law intro.-2 (State Bar 
of Wis. CLE Books 1992).  In drafting the proposed revisions of 
the Business Corporations Law, the Wisconsin State Bar Committee 
selected appropriate provisions from the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act.6  Id. at intro.-3.  
¶47 The selected provisions included § 15.07, upon which 
Wis. Stat. § 180.1507 is based.  See Christopher S. Berry, 
Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Frank C. DeGuire and Clay R. Williams, 
Wisconsin Business Corporation Law 15-30 to 15-31 (State Bar of 
Wis. CLE Books 1992).  The Official Comment to § 15.07 of the 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act explains the rationale 
for requiring the appointment of a registered agent when a 
foreign corporation obtains a certificate of authority.  It 
provides that:  "[a] foreign corporation that obtains a 
certificate of authority in a state thereby agrees that it is 
                                                 
6 Revised Model Business Corporations Act § 15.07 cmt. (Am. 
Bar Ass'n 1984).   
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
7 
 
amenable to suit in the state."  Revised Model Business 
Corporations Act § 15.07 cmt. (Am. Bar Ass'n 1984).  Thus, when 
the legislature enacted § 180.1507 in conformity with the 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, it intended that a 
foreign corporation consent to jurisdiction when it complied 
with the registration statute.7 
¶48  Finally, I observe that the majority's protestations 
that it will not rewrite the statute ring hollow.  See Majority 
op., ¶15.  That is exactly what the majority is doing here.  It 
writes into the statute an interpretation never adopted by the 
Wisconsin Legislature.   
¶49 The Model Registered Agent Act provides that "[t]he 
designation or maintenance in this state of a registered agent 
does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction 
over the represented entity in this state."  Model Registered 
Agents Act § 15 (Unif. L. Comm'n 2015).  
                                                 
7 The legislative reference bureau's analysis to 1989 
Assembly Bill 180 explained, "[m]any of the bill's provisions 
parallel the revised model business corporation act, as adopted 
in 1984 by the corporate laws committee of the American Bar 
Association." 
 
1989 
Assembly 
Bill 
780, 
Analysis 
by the Legislative Reference Bureau ¶1 (LRB-1540/2); see also 
Fergus, Scott et al., The New Wisconsin Business Corporation 
Law, iii (1990) ("the overall goal of AB 780 was to provide as 
much uniformity as possible with the ABA Model Act.").   
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
8 
 
¶50 At least eleven jurisdictions have chosen to enact 
this Model Act limitation——but not Wisconsin.8  Never mind, the 
majority has done it instead.  Mimicking the words of the Model 
Act, the majority concludes "compliance with the statute [Wis. 
Stat. § 180.1507] does not, on its own, confer jurisdiction." 
Majority op., ¶1. 
¶51 There is nothing in the text of Chapter 180 indicating 
that the legislature intended to limit Wisconsin's registration 
statute as a basis for general personal jurisdiction.  Because 
there is no such statutory language limiting Wisconsin's 
registration requirement, the majority errs when it takes it 
upon itself to rewrite the statute in contravention of the 
actual language chosen by the legislature. 
¶52 Pursuant to the statutory scheme set forth above, 
Countrywide not only obtained a certificate of authority, but it 
also appointed a registered agent and exercised its privilege to 
use Wisconsin courts.  Accordingly, I conclude that Countrywide 
consented 
to 
personal 
jurisdiction 
in 
Wisconsin 
when 
it 
appointed a registered agent in order to accept service of 
process pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1507 and 180.1510(1). 
II 
                                                 
8 See Ark. Code Ann. § 4-20-115 (2016); D.C. Code § 29-
104.14 (2016); Idaho Code § 30-21-414 (2016); 2017 Ind. ALS 118, 
SECTION 12 (Apr. 21, 2017); Me. Stat. tit. 5, § 115 (2016); 
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-35-15(2016); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-7-115 
(2017); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 77.440 (2016); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-
01.1-15 (2015); S.D. Codified Laws § 59-11-21 (2015); Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-17-401 (2016). 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
9 
 
¶53 In 
an 
attempt 
to 
support 
its 
"plain 
language" 
statutory interpretation, the majority relies heavily on United 
States Supreme Court precedent addressing jurisdiction over a 
non-consenting defendant.  The majority's reasoning evinces a 
misunderstanding 
of 
the 
concept 
of 
consent 
to 
personal 
jurisdiction. 
 
In 
reaching 
its 
conclusion, 
the 
majority 
conflates two lines of United States Supreme Court cases that 
separately address personal jurisdiction over consenting and 
non-consenting defendants. 
¶54 Central to the majority's analysis is the contention 
that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Int'l Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), "dispensed with the 
'purely fictional' notions of implied consent and presence-by-
agent . . . ."  Majority op., ¶10.  In Int'l Shoe, the Supreme 
Court addressed personal jurisdiction under a long-arm statute.  
326 U.S. 310 (1945).  It concluded that due process requires 
that a defendant have certain minimum contacts in a forum in 
which it may be sued so as not to offend "traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice."  Id. at 316 (quotation marks 
and quoted source omitted).    
¶55 Likewise, the majority relies on Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) and Daimler 
AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 759-60 (2014), which analyzed the 
due process implications of effecting general jurisdiction over 
non-consenting defendants.  See Majority op., ¶22.  In Daimler, 
the Supreme Court reasoned that a court may assert general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations when "their affiliations 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
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with the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render 
them essentially at home in the forum State."9  Daimler, 134 
S. Ct. at 754 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). 
¶56 The majority errs, however, in failing to distinguish 
the above non-consensual cases with cases that have long-
established consent as a basis for establishing personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.  Although the majority 
acknowledges 
that 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
never 
overruled 
Pennsylvania Fire, it refuses to follow controlling precedent.10  
Majority op., ¶25. 
¶57 In Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining and 
Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917), an Arizona corporation obtained 
a license to conduct business in Missouri and consented to 
service of process in the state in compliance with certain 
statutory requirements.  Id. at 94.  It asserted that consent to 
service of process was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction 
without violating the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process 
of law.  Id. at 94-95.  The Pennsylvania Fire court rejected 
                                                 
9 The United States Supreme Court continues to revisit the 
issue of non-consenting personal jurisdiction, most recently in 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 377 P.3d 874 
(Cal. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 827 (2017). 
10 There 
are 
other 
jurisdictions 
that 
have 
similarly 
conflated these two lines of cases.  See e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Lemaire, No. 1 CA-SA 17-0003 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 11, 
2017).  However, still other recent decisions have concluded, as 
I do, that appointment of a registered agent constitutes consent 
to personal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Senju Pharm. Co. v. 
Metrics, 
Inc., 
96 
F. Supp. 3d 
428, 
438-40 
(D.N.J. 
2015) 
(determining that Daimler "did not disturb the consent by-in-
state service rule."). 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
11 
 
this argument, explaining that "[t]he construction of the 
Missouri statute thus adopted hardly leaves a constitutional 
question open."  Id. at 95.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
unequivocally determined that registration under state business 
statutes is a voluntary act that leaves "no doubt of the 
jurisdiction of the state court." 
¶58 The Supreme Court reaffirmed Pennsylvania Fire in 
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 175 
(1939), concluding that where a corporation designated an agent 
for 
service 
of 
process 
in 
conformity 
with 
the 
General 
Corporation Law of New York, "service on the agent shall give 
jurisdiction of the person."  Quoting Judge Cardozo, Neirbo 
explained that the appointment of a registered agent pursuant to 
a state statute is consent to a "true contract," where "[t]he 
contract deals with the jurisdiction of the person":   
The stipulation is, therefore, a true contract.  The 
person designated is a true agent.  The consent that 
he 
shall 
represent 
the 
corporation 
is 
a 
real 
consent . . . .  The contract deals with jurisdiction 
of the person.  It does not enlarge or diminish 
jurisdiction of subject-matter.  It means that, 
whenever 
jurisdiction 
of 
the 
subject-matter 
is 
present, service on the agent shall give jurisdiction 
of the person. 
Id. (quoting Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 217 
N.Y. 432, 436-37).  Thus, Nierbo concluded that a statute 
calling for designation of a registered agent to accept service 
of process "is constitutional, and the designation of the agent 
'a voluntary act.'"  Id. (quoting Pa. Fire. Ins. Co., 243 
U.S. at 96). 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
12 
 
¶59 Additionally, the majority uses cases involving non-
consenting defendants to overrule Wisconsin precedent regarding 
consenting defendants.  In State ex rel. Aetna Ins. Co. v. 
Fowler, 196 Wis. 451, 457, 220 N.W. 534 (1928), this court 
concluded that although the registration statute at issue never 
mentioned the word "jurisdiction," defendants were "bound by 
their acceptance of such license to hold themselves amenable to 
the jurisdiction of our courts."  Over the years, this basic 
understanding that appointment of a registered agent to accept 
service of process evinces consent to jurisdiction has been 
reaffirmed.  See also, Punke v. Brody, 17 Wis. 2d 9, 13-14, 115 
N.W.2d 601 (1962); Hasley v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 70 
Wis. 2d 562, 582, N.W.2d 446 (1975). 
¶60 In Punke, this court reaffirmed Aetna, reasoning that 
"[a] state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over an 
individual who consents to such exercise of discretion." 17 
Wis. 2d at 13 (quoting Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws 
§ 81 (1934)).  Punke explained appointment of a registered agent 
to 
receive 
service 
of 
process 
is 
considered 
consent 
to 
jurisdiction: 
The consent here considered as a basis of jurisdiction 
is actual assent to the exercise of jurisdiction. 
 . . .  Consent . . . may be given generally with 
respect to actions which may thereafter be brought.  
Illustrations:  A appoints an agent in state X and 
authorizes him to receive service of process in any 
action brought against A in a court of X.  B brings an 
action against A in a court of X and process is served 
upon the agent.  The court has jurisdiction over A. 
Id. 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
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¶61 Contrary to the majority's assertion, there is no 
rationale for limiting Punke's reasoning to cases only where an 
individual, rather than a corporation, consents to jurisdiction.  
See majority op., ¶27.  Indeed, the majority provides no support 
for the arbitrary distinction it draws here.  This court's 
decision in Punke relied on the principles set forth in the 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws that apply to consent to 
personal jurisdiction.   
¶62 Consistent with the rational of the Restatement relied 
on by Punke, the Second Restatement Conflict of Laws more 
recently explained that a state may exercise jurisdiction when a 
foreign corporation consents by appointing a registered agent 
for service of process: 
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation which has authorized an 
agent or a public official to accept service of 
process in actions brought against the corporation in 
the state as to all causes of action to which the 
authority of the agent or official to accept service 
extends. 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 44 (Am. Law Inst. 
1970); see also id. § 43 cmt. B ("Most commonly . . . consent by 
a corporation takes the form of the appointment of a statutory 
agent to receive service of process in compliance with the 
statutory requirements of a state in which the corporation 
desires to do business."). 
¶63 Likewise, in Halsey, this court again reaffirmed that 
consent by appointment of a registered agent for service of 
process is a basis for personal jurisdiction.  70 Wis. 2d at 
582.  Halsey differentiated between various bases for consent, 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
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explaining that "a defendant entity might be subject to personal 
jurisdiction by its actual presence in a state via incorporation 
there, or by its consent evidenced by appointment of an agent 
for service of process, or by the presence evidenced in 
continual and substantial operations."  Id.  Thus, Halsey 
concluded that there would be no burden on due process by a 
forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction in such circumstances.  
Id. 
¶64 According to the majority, however, "[t]he shade of 
constitutional doubt that Goodyear and Daimler cast on broad 
approaches to general jurisdiction informs our assessment of 
this court's older cases."  Majority op., ¶24.  The majority 
reasons that Pennsylvania Fire and Aetna reflect outdated 
reasoning and represent a disfavored approach to general 
jurisdiction.  Majority op., ¶25.  Thus, the majority asserts 
that "we instead give preference to prevailing due process 
standards . . . ."  Id. 
¶65 The majority fails to recognize that cases like Int'l 
Shoe 
and 
Daimler 
maintained 
a 
clear 
distinction 
between 
consenting and nonconsenting defendants.  There is nothing 
outdated or disfavored about the approach taken in Pennsylvania 
Fire, Nierbo or Aetna.  Instead, they address an entirely 
separate issue from the question presented in the cases relied 
on by the majority. 
¶66 Int'l Shoe limited its analysis to cases where "no 
consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept 
service of process has been given."  326 U.S. at 317.  This 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
15 
 
distinction has been consistently recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (analyzing minimum contacts 
"[w]here a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an 
out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there"); 
Ins. Corp. of Ir. V. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 
U.S. 694, 712-13 (1982) (describing Int'l Shoe as establishing 
that 
"'minimum 
contacts' 
represent[s] 
a 
constitutional 
prerequisite to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over an 
unconsenting defendant"); Kopke v. A. Hartrodt S.R.L., 2001 WI 
99, ¶22, 245 Wis. 2d 396, 629 N.W.2d 662 ("The Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the exercise of 
jurisdiction by a state over a nonconsenting nonresident.").  
Likewise, Daimler distinguishes its analysis of contacts in a 
forum state from cases involving consent to jurisdiction.  See 
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755-65 (describing "the textbook case of 
general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign 
corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum."). 
¶67 In both Int'l Shoe and Daimler, there is no mention of 
either Pennsylvania Fire or Neirbo, much less any indication 
that the Supreme Court intended to overrule those cases.  
Further, the rational in cases such as Int'l Shoe and Daimler is 
wholly consistent with the rule that a foreign corporation can 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
16 
 
consent to personal jurisdiction by registering to do business 
in a state.11 
¶68 Concerns justifying the narrowing scope of general 
jurisdiction are not present when a corporation voluntarily 
registers to do business and designates an agent in the state.  
For example, Daimler expressed concern that foreign corporations 
be able "to structure their primary conduct with some minimum 
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them 
liable to suit."  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 (quoting Burger 
King Corp. 471 U.S. at 472).  However, when a foreign 
corporation voluntarily consents to jurisdiction by complying 
with a registration statute, there is no uncertainty that this 
conduct will subject it to general jurisdiction in that forum.  
These concerns are certainly not present in this case, where 
Countrywide has long enjoyed the privilege of using Wisconsin 
courts and in exchange consented to the general jurisdiction of 
these same courts. 
¶69 The majority's failure to distinguish between cases 
involving consenting and non-consenting defendants pervades its 
analysis.  For example, the majority analyzes Wis. Stat. 
§ 180.1507 in the context of Wisconsin's long-arm statute, 
                                                 
11 The United States Supreme Court continues to distinguish 
between consenting and non-consenting defendants.  In BNSF Rwy. 
Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558-60 (2017), it analyzed the 
railroad's minimum contacts with the forum state under Daimler.  
However, 
it 
recognized 
consent 
as 
a 
separate 
issue 
and 
specifically declined to address it.  Id. at 1560.   
 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
17 
 
rather than in the context of the statutory scheme where it is 
located.  According to the majority, if Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1507 
and 180.1510(2) were interpreted as effecting consent to general 
jurisdiction, 
then 
Wisconsin's 
long-arm 
statute 
would 
be 
rendered superfluous.  Majority op., ¶17. 
¶70 Wisconsin's 
long-arm 
statute, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 801.05(1)(d) gives Wisconsin courts personal jurisdiction over 
a defendant "engaged in substantial and not isolated activities 
within 
this 
state, 
whether 
such 
activities 
are 
wholly 
interstate, intrastate, or otherwise."  The majority asserts 
that if registration pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 180.1507 "were 
sufficient to expose foreign corporations to general, all-
purpose jurisdiction of Wisconsin courts, the long-arm statute 
would effectively serve no purpose."  Majority op., ¶17. 
¶71 This argument is unpersuasive, however, because the 
long-arm statute does not provide an exclusive means by which 
Wisconsin courts can obtain personal jurisdiction.  Where there 
is consent to jurisdiction, there is no need to establish 
jurisdiction under the long-arm statute.  See Kohler Co. v. 
Wixen, 204 Wis. 2d 327, 336, 555 N.W.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1996) ("In 
Wisconsin, courts may obtain personal jurisdiction over a party 
through any one or more of the grounds stated in Wisconsin's 
long-arm statute or by consent.") (emphasis added). 
¶72 In sum, I conclude that the circuit court has personal 
jurisdiction over Countrywide in this action. Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
No. 2015AP1493.awb   
 
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¶73 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
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