Case Title: Burma Hills Development Co. v. Marr

Citation: 229 So. 2d 776

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1969-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
229 So. 2d 776 (1969)
BURMA HILLS DEVELOPMENT CO., Inc., a Corp., and City of Mobile, etc.
v.
Thomas M. MARR.
1 Div. 404.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
December 11, 1969.
*777 Fred G. Collins, Collins, Galloway & Murphy, Mobile, for City of Mobile.
Gaillard, Wilkins & Smith, Mobile, for Burma Hills Development Co., Inc.
Tyson, Marr & Friedlander and Charles S. Street, Mobile, for appellee.
LIVINGSTON, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, in Equity.
The original bill of complaint filed in this case asked that the trial court decree that the complainant (appellee) had a valuable property right in Lot #14 of High Point Estates Subdivision which must be condemned if said lot were used for public purposes, and praying for a temporary injunction enjoining respondents Burma Road Development Company, Inc., and City of Mobile, from constructing or building a public street on said lot pending a determination of the property rights of the parties to the bill of complaint. On the date set for hearing the application for a temporary injunction, Burma Road Development Company, Inc., filed a demurrer and answer. The demurrer was sustained and the application for a temporary injunction denied. The complainant then filed an amended bill of complaint, to which demurrers were filed by the respondents; both demurrers were overruled and respondents were given twenty days in which to file an answer. Burma Road Development Company, Inc., made a motion to amend its demurrer as theretofore filed. Before the court ruled on said motion, complainant amended his bill of complaint, changing the name of respondent Burma Road Development Company, Inc., to Burma Hills Development Corporation. The amended demurrer then filed by Burma Hills Development Corporation was overruled. Each of the respondents then filed an answer. The court issued its decree on April 14, 1966, in favor of complainant. From said decree, respondents filed timely notice of appeal.
The complainant owns an undivided one-half interest in Lot #13 of High Point Estates Subdivision; said lot is adjacent to and east of Lot #14 of said subdivision. Both lots are burdened with mutual restrictive covenants providing, inter alia, that "No lot shall be used except for residential purposes." Appellant Burma Hills Development Corporation is the owner, in fee, of Lot #14. On July 15, 1964, appellant City of Mobile filed a condemnation proceeding against Burma Hills Development Corporation seeking to condemn a portion of Lot #14 for purposes of a public road. The condemnation proceeding resulted in an award of one dollar ($1.00). No part of that portion of Lot #14 condemned for the purpose of a public road touches or abuts on complainant's property, Lot #13. The complainant herein was not named as a respondent in the condemnation proceeding instituted by the City of Mobile.
After stating the facts as determined from the evidence presented, that part of the trial court's decree pertinent to our consideration of the questions presented on this appeal is as follows:
Assignments of error 1 and 2 are closely related; both question the action of the trial court in ruling that the construction of a public road across Lot #14 would violate the restrictive covenants limiting the use of the lots in High Point Estates Subdivision to "residential purposes." Appellant adopts and incorporates the argument in support of assignment of error 1 for assignment of error 2. What we say in answer to assignments of error 3, 4, 5 and 6 is basic to our disposition of assignments of error 1 and 2. Therefore, we withhold further comment on assignments of error 1 and 2 pending our disposition of assignments of error 3, 4, 5 and 6. Appellant adopts and incorporates his argument under assignment of error 3 in support of assignments of error 4, 5 and 6.
Assignments of error 3, 4, 5 and 6 are predicated upon the ruling of the trial court that the complainant has a right, title and interest in Lot #14 of High Point Estates Subdivision which must be obtained by condemnation proceedings before any public street may be constructed on said lot. We are thus confronted with the following question:
The courts of this state hold that restrictive covenants create equitable easements in favor of the several lots subject to such covenant which may be enforced by any one of the lot owners. Stringer Realty Co. v. City of Gadsden, 256 Ala. 77, 53 So. 2d 617; Scheuer v. Britt, 218 Ala. 270, 118 So. 658. However, Alabama courts have never expressly held that restrictive covenants create property rights which must be condemned upon a taking or acquisition of the servient estate. The question is one of first impression in this state and is far from settled in other jurisdictions.
The problems encountered where a tract of land is subdivided into lots, each of which is burdened with a mutual restrictive covenant, are treated in detail in 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 5.73. Also see 4 A.L.R.3d 1137. We quote rather extensively from 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, supra:
Nichols then sets out the positions taken on the above-stated question, to wit:
"[1] Majority view.
We have considered carefully those cases cited in support of the "Majority view" and the "Minority view," as categorized in Nichols, supra. We are of the opinion that the better-reasoned cases are those based upon one or more of the arguments set forth in Nichols, supra, in support of the "Minority view." We note that the Supreme Court of Florida in Board of Public Instruction of Dade County v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637, disagreed with the textual statement in Nichols, supra, as to that which constituted the "Majority view"; that is, that such a restriction as is here under consideration constitutes property in the constitutional sense for which compensation must be paid if taken.
In Friesen v. City of Glendale, 209 Cal. 524, 288 P. 1080 (1930), all of the deeds conveying the lots in question contained a provision that "* * * said premises *780 shall be used for residence purposes only." The plaintiffs were attempting to enjoin the City of Glendale from constructing a public street across a portion of another lot in the subdivision, contending that such a use did not constitute a "residential purpose," within the meaning of the language of the covenant. Denying the injunction, the California court stated:
The Court of Appeals of Louisiana, in Gremillion v. Rapides Parish School Board, 134 So. 2d 700 (La.App.1961), focused its attention primarily on the public policy considerations involved in construing restrictive covenants and the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The suit was for the specific performance of an agreement to buy certain realty. The school board contended that the plaintiff did not have a merchantable title because of restrictions in the deed to the plaintiffs. The substantial question considered by the court was whether the owner of land in whose favor there is a covenant restricting adjoining land to residential purposes has a property right such as requires compensation when such adjoining land is taken by an educational agency of the state for educational purposes. The court held that restrictive covenants affecting property which is acquired for governmental purposes do not, as against a governmental agency, constitute a property right of owners of land which is not taken in favor of which the covenants run. The court observed:
The Supreme Court of West Virginia applied similar reasoning in State ex rel. Wells v. Dunbar, 142 W.Va. 332, 95 S.E.2d *781 457 (1956), holding that covenants of this nature should not be construed so as to require the government, in the taking or acquiring of private property for governmental use, to respond in damages either on the theory of the taking of a vested right, or for breach of the restrictive covenant. That court stated:
In Anderson v. Lynch, 188 Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d 85, 122 A.L.R. 1456 (1939), the Supreme Court of Georgia directed its attention to the practical problems potentially involved and resulting from a holding that a restrictive covenant creates in each and every party thereto a property interest such that the parties thereto must be impleaded in a condemnation proceeding prior to the use of the land for public purposes. That court quoted from City of Houston v. Wynne, Tex.Civ.App., 279 S.W. 916, 919, as follows:
That which was said by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Anderson v. Lynch, supra, was cited with approval in Board of Public Instruction of Dade County v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637, a Florida case involving a condemnation of property for a school building in a subdivision wherein the lots were burdened with a restrictive covenant limiting the use of said property to residential purposes. In its opinion, the court cited numerous authorities in support of each of the views set forth in Nichols, supra. We quote at length from that opinion:
That which we have quoted from the above-cited authorities is representative of the position of those jurisdictions which follow what Nichols, supra, labels the "Minority view." These authorities are persuasive to our conclusion that the question presented herein for decision should be answered in the negative. We hold that a restrictive covenant or the right to enforce a restrictive covenant does not constitute such a property right, title and interest as requires the payment of compensation or damages to those persons entitled to enforce the restrictions of said covenants where the restricted land is taken for and devoted to public purposes. Assignments of error 3, 4, 5 and 6, each of which is predicated upon complainant having a right, title and interest in Lot #14 by virtue of the mutual restrictive covenants, are therefore meritorious.
Assignments of error 1 and 2 are to the effect that the trial court erred in ruling that the construction of a public street on Lot #14 of High Point Estates Subdivision would be a violation of the mutual restrictive covenants limiting the use of said property to residential purposes. The question presented by these assignments of error is rendered moot by our holding as to assignments of error 3, 4, 5 and 6. That is, regardless of whether the construction of a public street across Lot #14 would be a violation of the mutual restrictive covenants, complainant has no right, title and interest in said lot such as requires the payment of compensation or damages when a public street is constructed on said lot.
The decree of the lower court is due to be, and is, reversed and rendered.
Reversed and rendered.
LAWSON, MERRILL, HARWOOD and MADDOX, JJ., concur.