Case Title: State v. Edmonson

Citation: 1999-Ohio-110

Docket Number: 19982603

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 1999-Ohio-110.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. EDMONSON, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Edmonson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324.] 
Criminal law — Penalties and sentencing — R.C. 2929.14(B), construed and 
applied. 
R.C. 2929.14(B) does not require that the trial court give its reasons for its finding 
that the seriousness of the offender’s conduct will be demeaned or that the 
public will not be adequately protected from future crimes before it can 
lawfully impose more than the minimum authorized sentence. 
(No. 98-2603 — Submitted June 9, 1999 — Decided September 8, 1999.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No. 97-P-0067. 
 
Antione T. Edmonson was convicted in 1997 on one count of aggravated 
robbery for violating R.C. 2911.01(A)(1).  Though this was Edmonson’s first 
prison sentence, the trial court sentenced him to the maximum term of 
imprisonment.  Edmonson appealed, arguing that the trial court disregarded the 
mandates of R.C. 2929.14 when sentencing him to the maximum term of 
imprisonment and, therefore, his sentence was contrary to law.  He contended that 
R.C. 2929.14(B) and (C) require a trial court to make certain findings on the record 
(1) when it sentences a defendant who has never served a prison term to a sentence 
other than the minimum sentence, and (2) when it sentences a defendant to a 
maximum prison term. 
 
The Court of Appeals for Portage County agreed that, based on the language 
of R.C. 2929.14(B) and (C), certain findings are to be made on the record by the 
trial court and that a “finding” implies a recitation of the operative facts on which 
the finding is based.  The court of appeals determined that the sentence was 
contrary to law because the trial court failed to make explicit findings that 
“demonstrate why the minimum term of imprisonment should not have been 
 
2 
granted under R.C. 2929.14(B)” and why the maximum sentence should be 
imposed under R.C. 2929.14(C).  The court of appeals, therefore, vacated 
Edmonson’s sentence and remanded the matter for further proceedings. 
 
The court of appeals, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the decisions 
of the Ninth Appellate District in State v. Crangle (Aug. 6, 1997), Summit App. 
No. 18268, unreported, 1997 WL 460161; State v. Miller (Apr. 29, 1998), Summit 
App. No. 18645, unreported, 1998 WL 208830; and State v. Blondheim (May 27, 
1998), Summit App. No. 18594, unreported, 1998 WL 281917, certified the issue 
to this court for review and final determination.  In accordance with S.Ct.Prac.R. 
IV(2)(C) and Whitelock v. Gilbane Bldg. Co. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 594, 613 
N.E.2d 1032, paragraph one of the syllabus, we agreed to accept the case. 
__________________ 
 
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelli K. 
Norman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Hirt & Hirt and David S. Hirt, for appellee. 
 
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and John Fenlon, Assistant Public 
Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Office of the Ohio Public 
Defender. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  Based on the recent changes to the sentencing law in Ohio, 
minimum sentences are favored for first-time imprisonment and maximum 
sentences are disfavored generally.  For instance, R.C. 2929.14(B) requires a trial 
court to impose a minimum sentence for first-time imprisonment unless it specifies 
on the record that the shortest prison term will demean the seriousness of the 
conduct or will not adequately protect the public from future crime by the offender.  
And R.C. 2929.14(C) and 2929.19(B)(2)(d) prevent a court from imposing a 
maximum sentence for a single offense unless the court records findings that give 
 
3 
its reasons for selecting the maximum.  Edmonson’s sentencing raises both of these 
issues because Edmonson was convicted of a single offense, was faced with 
imprisonment for the first time, and was sentenced to the maximum term of 
imprisonment. 
I 
A 
R.C. 2929.14(B) 
 
R.C. 2929.14(B) reads as follows: 
 
“[I]f the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony elects or is 
required to impose a prison term on the offender and if the offender previously has 
not served a prison term, the court shall impose the shortest prison term authorized 
for the offense pursuant to division (A) of this section, unless the court finds on the 
record that the shortest prison term will demean the seriousness of the offender’s 
conduct or will not adequately protect the public from future crime by the offender 
or others.” 
 
The appellate districts in this state currently hold differing opinions about 
what information a trial court must include in a sentencing hearing record when 
imposing a sentence that is longer than the minimum upon an offender expected to 
receive the minimum sentence according to the presumption in R.C. 2929.14(B).  
The appellate debate in this state centers on the scope of the statutory phrase “finds 
on the record.” 
 
We construe this statute to mean that unless a court imposes the shortest 
term authorized on a felony offender who has never served a prison term, the 
record of the sentencing hearing must reflect that the court found that either or both 
of the two statutorily sanctioned reasons for exceeding the minimum term 
warranted the longer sentence. 
 
4 
 
R.C. 2929.14(B) does not require that the trial court give its reasons for its 
finding that the seriousness of the offender’s conduct will be demeaned or that the 
public will not be adequately protected from future crimes before it can lawfully 
impose more than the minimum authorized sentence.  By contrasting this statute 
with other related sentencing statutes, we deduce that the verb “finds” as used in 
this statute means that the court must note that it engaged in the analysis and that it 
varied from the minimum for at least one of the two sanctioned reasons.  With 
other sentencing statutes, the General Assembly explicitly demands that courts 
give reasons.  R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) requires a trial court to “make a finding that 
gives its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed.”  (Emphasis added.)  In R.C. 
2929.19(B)(2)(b), the General Assembly requires a court to provide a finding and 
an explanation by stating that the court shall set forth “the basis of the findings it 
made.”  We discern from the difference in the language of these sections within the 
same chapter and on the same subject — sentencing — that had the General 
Assembly intended the R.C. 2929.14(B) finding to include reasons, it would have 
explicitly expressed that intent as it did in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2). 
 
Our deduction is buttressed by other language in the sentencing statutes.  
The phraseology in R.C. 2953.08(A)(2), for example, supports the view that the 
statutory purpose is fulfilled when a court notes that it has considered the statutory 
criteria and specifies which of the given bases warrants its decision to vary from 
the preferred minimum sentence.  It reads that a defendant may appeal as a matter 
of right if “the court did not specify at sentencing that it found one or more 
factors.”  (Emphasis added.)  And likewise, the text of R.C. 2953.08(G)(1)(b) 
ratifies the view that in enacting the new sentencing laws, the General Assembly 
only sought to confirm that courts considered the statutory requirements by stating 
that a defendant may obtain certain relief if “the court did not specify in the finding 
it makes at sentencing that it found one or more of the factors specified.”  
 
5 
(Emphasis added.)  The structure of the various sentencing statutes suggests that 
the General Assembly approached felony sentencing by mandating a record 
reflecting that judges considered certain factors and presumptions to confirm that 
the court’s decision-making process included all of the statutorily required 
sentencing considerations. 
 
Edmonson contends that construing the statute to require findings without 
also requiring the court to articulate its reasoning will hamper appellate review, 
and that the appellate courts will be unnecessarily forced to review the entire 
record.  But because R.C. 2953.08(F) explicitly obligates the appellate courts to 
review the record, we discount this argument. 
B 
 
Having determined that a trial court sentencing an offender to his first 
imprisonment must specify on the record that one or both reasons allowed by R.C. 
2929.14(B) justify a sentence longer than the minimum, we next assess whether 
the trial court did so in this case.  The record shows that prior to imposing the 
maximum sentence, the court noted the following: 
 
“I read the record that [sic] you have had problems, been locked down in a 
lock-down facility on two different occasions.[1] 
 
“I find you to be a very dangerous offender and you to commit a crime again 
[sic].  This was a terrible incident with a person who has [sic] a gun, robbing 
people. 
 
“Therefore, it is the sentence of this Court, that you be confined * * * [for] 
the sentence of ten years.” 
 
In the judgment entry, the trial court stated: 
 
“The Court has considered the record, oral statements, any victim impact 
statement and presentence report prepared, as well as the principles and purposes 
 
6 
of sentencing under Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.11, and has balanced the 
seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.12. 
 
“ * * * 
 
“The Court further finds that [Edmonson] is a dangerous offender, that 
recidivism is likely, and that a gun was used during this incident.” 
 
Although one or more of the remarks by the trial court might be argued to 
support a finding that the three-year minimum sentence would demean the 
seriousness of Edmonson’s conduct or that the public would not be adequately 
protected from his future crime, the trial court did not specify either of these 
reasons listed in R.C. 2929.14(B) as supporting its deviation from the minimum 
sentence of three years.  With this record, there is no confirmation that the court 
first considered imposing the minimum three-year sentence and then decided to 
depart from the statutorily mandated minimum based on one or both of the 
permitted reasons.  Accordingly, we agree with the judgment of the court of 
appeals vacating the trial court’s sentence and remanding this cause to the trial 
court for resentencing. 
II 
A 
R.C. 2929.14(C) and 2929.19(B)(2)(d) 
 
In Part I of this opinion, we considered the challenge to the sentencing 
decision that denied Edmonson the statutorily mandated minimum sentence  
without the record finding necessary to impose a longer one.  In Part II, we 
consider Edmonson’s claim on appeal that the sentencing decision also fails to 
meet the statutory requirements for imposing a maximum sentence. 
 
The statutes to be construed are R.C. 2929.14(C) and 2929.19(B)(2)(d).  The 
first establishes the public policy disfavoring maximum sentences except for the 
most deserving offenders and reads as follows: 
 
7 
 
“[T]he court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony may impose 
the longest prison term authorized for the offense * * * only upon offenders who 
committed the worst forms of the offense, upon offenders who pose the greatest 
likelihood of committing future crimes, upon certain major drug offenders * * *, 
and upon certain repeat violent offenders * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
2929.14(C). 
 
The other statute at issue, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d), sets the procedure that a 
trial court must follow when imposing the maximum sentence on an offender for a 
single offense.  As applicable to Edmonson, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) requires a trial 
court to “make a finding that gives its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed” 
if the sentence is for one offense and is the maximum term allowed for that 
offense, and requires a trial court to set forth its “reasons for imposing the 
maximum prison term.”  (Emphasis added.) 
B 
 
Considering, then, whether the record in Edmonson’s case fulfills the 
statutory requirements outlined in Part II, subpart A above, we hold that it does 
not.  As recounted above, the Edmonson sentencing fails to record a finding that 
Edmonson fits within one of the categories of offenders in R.C. 2929.14(C).  
Obviously, without the finding itself, the court also fails to provide the necessary 
“finding that gives its reasons.”  R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d).  With this record, we 
cannot confirm that the trial court heeded the enacted policy of the General 
Assembly meant for curtailing the imposition of maximum terms.  In order to 
lawfully impose the maximum term for a single offense, the record must reflect 
that the trial court imposed the maximum sentence based on the offender satisfying 
one of the listed criteria in R.C. 2929.14(C). 
 
We agree with the court of appeals that this cause should be remanded for 
resentencing. 
 
8 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in judgment only. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
The lock-down facility was a jail, not a prison.  See R.C. 2929.01(CC) 
(defining “prison”); R.C. 2929.01(V) (defining “jail”).