Case Title: In re Paternity of IC

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-97-8

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Paternity of IC1997 WY 86941 P.2d 46Case Number: C-96-5, C-96-7Decided: 07/02/1997Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the PATERNITY OF IC, Minor Child:

 

KC, Appellant (Respondent),

v.

KM, Appellee (Petitioner). (Two 
Cases)

                              

 

Appeal from District Court, Sheridan County, John C. 
Brackley, J.

   

  

    Bruce P. Badley of Badley 
& Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for Appellant.

     
Fred R. Dollison of Northern Wyoming Law Assoc., Sheridan, for 
Appellee.

 

    Before TAYLOR, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

 

    LEHMAN, 
Justice.  

 [¶1]        From these consolidated cases, KC 
(Mother) appeals the order of summary judgment in favor of KM (Father) on the 
issue of paternity, the subsequent order and judgment regarding visitation and 
support, and the award of attorney fees. We affirm the summary judgment, reverse 
the order regarding visitation and support, and remand for further proceedings the 
issues of visitation, support and attorney fees.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]          Appealing the summary 
judgment of paternity, Mother states the issues as:

 

            I. 
Did the District Court have jurisdiction?

 

            II. 
Did the District Court err when it recognized [Father] as a presumptive father 
pursuant to W.S. § 14-2-102(a)(iv)?

 

  Father argues the 
issues:

 

            I. IC 
was timely and properly made a party to the action, and the District Court was 
properly vested with jurisdiction 
to act.

 

            II. 
The District Court correctly recognized [Father] as the presumptive father of 
IC.

 

            III. 
The District Court committed no error in refusing to grant Appellant relief on 
the issue of W.S. §§ 1-14-119 
through 1-14-122 costs.

 

  With respect to visitation, support and 
attorney fees, Mother posits:

 

            I. 
Can the District Court proceed with litigation on the issues of child support, 
visitation, and custody, when the 
questions of jurisdiction and paternity are before the Supreme Court on 
appeal[?]

  

            II. 
Does an appeal on the question of the District Court's lack of jurisdiction 
preclude the District Court's claim 
of dual jurisdiction pursuant to W.R.A.P. Rule 6.01(b)[?]

 

            III. 
Can the District Court award attorney fees when the District Court unilaterally 
decides that a litigant who 
appealed the issue of jurisdiction "failed to cooperate" in the 
litigation[?]

 

            IV. 
Can the District Court proceed with a hearing on custody, visitation and support 
without giving reasonable notice to 
the parties, when the case is on appeal[?]

 

            V. 
Can the District Court issue visitation, custody and support orders in the 
absence of evidence on the best 
interest of the child[?]

 

VI. Can the District Court penalize a single mother 
in excess of $100,000.00 for defending her opposition to a paternity 
petition[?]

 

  Father avers:

 

            I. 
The District Court was not deprived of jurisdiction to decide the issue of 
support and visitation[.]

 

            II. 
The District Court properly claimed dual jurisdiction pursuant to W.R.A.P. Rule 
6.01(b)[.]

 

            III. 
The District Court properly found that Appellant was uncooperative and that an 
award of attorney's fees was 
appropriate[.]

 

            IV. 
The District Court ordered visitation, custody and support in accordance with 
the evidence produced at the April 
22, 1996 Hearing[.]

 

            V. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in its order regarding child 
support and attorney's fees[.]

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]          Father sought to establish 
paternity as a putative father pursuant to W.S. 14-2-104(c) (1994), which allows 
a person alleged or alleging to be the father to bring an action to determine 
the existence of a father/child relationship where the child has no presumed 
father. Only Mother was served with this petition, not the child (Child). Mother countered by 
moving to dismiss based on the five-year statute of limitations found in W.S. 
14-2-105 (1994). In response, Father filed an amended petition, and subsequently 
a second amended petition, in which he asserted that he was the presumed father 
under W.S. 14-2-102(a)(iv) (1994). Both 
Mother and Child were served with the second amended petition, and a guardian ad 
litem was appointed.

 

[¶4]          Genetic testing of the 
parties was ordered pursuant to W.S. 14-2-109(b) (1994). The results of those 
tests indicated a 99.87 percent probability that Father was the natural father 
of Child.  Based upon the 
presumption of paternity established by the tests and the petition asserting 
presumed fatherhood, the district court 
granted Father's motion for summary judgment.

 

[¶5]          The court then scheduled and 
conducted a hearing on child support and visitation. Although the record denotes 
all parties were notified of the hearing, neither Mother nor her attorney 
attended. The court ordered that Father pay child support in an amount almost 
$25 per month less than the presumptive support based on Father's maintenance of health insurance for 
Child and Father's cost of transportation. It further ordered that all past-due 
obligation for support was waived, in part because "of the other than usual 
expenses he has incurred in asserting his rights herein." Father was awarded 
visitation on alternate weekends and specified holidays and 60 consecutive days 
each summer. The order further awarded attorney fees in the amount of $1,000 to 
Father because the court found that Mother's lack of cooperation caused Father 
to incur extra attorney fees. In this consolidated appeal, Mother contests: 1) 
the summary judgment establishing paternity, and 2) the visitation and support 
order, including the award of attorney fees.

 

DISCUSSION

 

  I. Preliminary 
Matters

 

[¶6]          Aside from her substantive 
challenges, Mother raises two collateral matters which we address at the 
outset.

 

    A. 
Jurisdiction

 

[¶7]          Mother asserts that the 
district court lacked personal jurisdiction because Child was initially not 
properly served pursuant to W.R.C.P. 3. She contends that, as a result, Child 
was not made a party within the five-year statutory period provided by W.S. 
14-2-105(a)(ii) to determine the existence of a father/child relationship where 
no presumed father exists. Father, however, amended his petition to alter his 
position from a putative father to a presumed father, taking the action outside 
the scope of the statute of limitations. See W.S. 14-2-104(b). Mother argues the 
amendments were improper and thus the statute of limitations expired before 
the court attained personal jurisdiction 
over Child.

 

[¶8]          Father amended his petition 
in response to Mother's motion to dismiss. A party may amend its pleading once 
as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.  W.R.C.P. 15. Mother maintains that her 
motion to dismiss is a responsive pleading and, therefore, Father could not 
amend without leave of the court. We 
disagree. In addressing this issue, we find guidance in federal precedent 
inasmuch as our rules of civil procedure parallel the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See, e.g., Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509, 517 (Wyo. 1995). Federal 
courts have uniformly held that motions to dismiss are not responsive 
pleadings:

 

            Rule 
[15(a)] must be read in conjunction with Rule 7(a), F.R.Civ.P., which indicates 
that an answer is a responsive 
pleading to the complaint. * * * [T]he law in this Circuit and elsewhere is 
clear: filing a motion to dismiss * 
* * will not prevent a party from subsequently amending without leave of 
court.

 

Gipson v. Township of Bass 
River, 82 F.R.D. 122, 124 (D.C.N.J. 1979); see also Adams v. Campbell County 
Sch. Dist., 483 F.2d 1351, 1353 (10th Cir. 1973); Move Org. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 89 F.R.D. 521, 523 (E.D.Pa. 1981); Kelly v. Delaware River Joint 
Comm'n, 187 F.2d 93, 94 (3rd Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 812, 72 S. Ct. 25, 96 L. Ed. 614 (1951). Thus, 
Father was free to amend once as a matter of course since Mother had not filed 
her answer. As with the original petition, however, it does not appear from the 
record that this first amendment was properly served on Child. Father then 
requested and was granted leave of the 
court to amend a second time.

 

 [¶9]        With regard to the court's 
decision to allow Father leave to file a second amended petition, the law in 
this jurisdiction is well settled:

 

            [T]he 
decision to allow amendment, when required by justice, is within the discretion 
of the district court and that 
decision will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. The guideline 
on review is whether or not 
the adverse party was prejudiced by allowance of the amendment.

 

Hernandez v. Gilveli, 626 P.2d 74, 77 (Wyo. 1981) (emphasis added). We hold the court acted within its 
discretion in allowing Father to amend; Father had a legitimate claim as a 
presumptive father, and W.S. 14-2-104(b) gives any interested party the right to 
bring an action at any time "for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child 
relationship presumed under W.S. 14-2-102(a)(iv)." Had the court dismissed the 
action based upon the statute of limitations, Father could simply have refiled 
as a presumed father. Thus, allowing Father to amend had no real prejudicial 
effect on Mother.

 

[¶10]       Mother additionally 
challenges the district court's subject matter jurisdiction regarding visitation 
and support. Upon entry of summary judgment establishing paternity, Mother 
timely filed an appeal. Mother now avers that since there was a pending appeal 
contesting paternity, the district court could not proceed to determine visitation and support. 

 

 [¶11]     District courts are entitled to 
the presumption of regularity when exercising their general jurisdiction. First 
Wyoming Bank, N.A. Cheyenne v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 628 P.2d 1355, 
1362 (Wyo. 1981). We have previously held that during the pendency of an appeal, 
the district court has the right and power to enforce its decrees and orders and to protect the 
parties as to any rights they acquired in the district court proceedings.  Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 255, 258 (Wyo. 
1991). Cf. Coones v. F.D.I.C., 848 P.2d 783, 796 n. 18 (Wyo. 1993) (district 
court retains jurisdiction over portion of litigation not affected by summary 
judgment); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 895 P.2d 441, 444 (Wyo. 1995) (district court 
retained jurisdiction to hear request for relief under W.R.C.P. 60(b)).

 

[¶12]       Wyoming Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 6.01(b) provides:

 

            The 
appellate court shall acquire jurisdiction over the matters appealed when the 
case is docketed. In all cases, the 
trial court retains jurisdiction over all matters and proceedings not the 
subject of the appeal * * 
*.

 

[¶13]       Mother provides no authority 
for her contention that the jurisdictional nature of her challenge affects the 
application of W.R.A.P. 6.01(b). It is an oft-stated rule that we need not 
consider issues that are unsupported by proper citation to legal authority. See, 
e.g., Hamburg v. Heilbrun, 889 P.2d 967, 968 (Wyo. 1995); Doctors' Co. v. 
Insurance Corp. of America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1028 (Wyo. 1993). Accordingly, we 
hold the district court retained 
jurisdiction under W.R.A.P. 6.01(b) to decide issues of custody, support and 
visitation.

 

    B. Security of 
Costs

 

 [¶14]     Mother contends that, pursuant to 
W.S. 1-14-120 (1988), the district court had a nondiscretionary duty to order 
security of costs from the nonresident Father. Statutory interpretation is a 
question of law. Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993). We review all parts of a legislative act as a whole, and division of a law 
into sections has no substantive meaning. V-1 Oil Co. v. State, 934 P.2d 740, 745 (Wyo. 1997) (citing France v. Connor, 3 Wyo. 445, 454, 27 P. 569, 572 
(1891)).

 

[¶15]       Wyoming Statute 1-14-120 
provides that "[i]f security for costs is not given as required by W.S. 1-14-119 
* * * the court shall * * * on a motion of the defendant and notice to the 
plaintiff, dismiss the action * * *." The phrase "as required by W.S. 1-14-119" 
indicates a limit on the application of -120. Section 1-14-119 gives discretion 
to the clerk to decide what amount is reasonable for security of 
costs:

 

            If a 
nonresident of the state * * * brings an action, the plaintiff must furnish 
sufficient security for costs * * * 
such sum of money as the clerk deems sufficient for the purpose. Upon motion of 
the defendant, the court may 
require the deposit to be increased, that personal security be given or 
that the nonresident plaintiff pay 
all costs as fast as they accrue.

 

Reading -120 in conjunction 
with -119, the plain language demonstrates that the court does not have a duty 
to dismiss the action unless the clerk has required, and the plaintiff has not 
complied with, the posting of security. The court may require a deposit, upon 
motion by the defendant under -119, but this is clearly discretionary. In the 
instant case, the clerk did not require Father to post security for 
costs.

 

  II. Paternity

 

 [¶16]     Summary judgment is appropriate 
when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Matter of Paternity of TS, 917 P.2d 183, 185 (Wyo. 1996); W.R.C.P. 56(c). We examine the record in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, and to that party we give the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which may be fairly drawn from the record. Paternity of TS, at 
185.

 

[¶17]       The district court found as 
a matter of law that Father was the   presumptive father under W.S. 
14-2-102(a)(iv), which provides:

 

            A man 
is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:

 

            
 * * *

 

                        
(iv) While the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child 
into his home and openly holds out 
the child as his natural child.

 

Once the presumption is 
established, it may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. W.S. 
14-2-102(b). Bare assertions that questions of fact remain will not deflect a 
prima facie case for summary judgment. Garcia v. UniWyo Fed. Credit Union, 920 P.2d 642, 645 (Wyo. 1996). The following facts are uncontroverted: Child was 
born on February 2, 1990; Mother and Father lived together and shared expenses 
and rent from November 1989 to June 1990; Mother was exclusively having sexual 
relations with Father during the time 
Child was conceived; Mother willingly named Father as the father on Child's 
birth certificate; and, while they lived together, Father openly acknowledged 
that Child was his child.

 

[¶18]       The court also considered 
the genetic test results which indicated a 99.87 percent probability that Father 
was Child's father.

 

            If 
the experts conclude that the genetic tests show that the alleged parent is not 
excluded and that the probability 
of the alleged parent's parentage is ninety-seven percent (97%) or higher, the 
alleged parent is presumed to be the 
parent and this evidence shall be admitted. This presumption may be rebutted 
only by clear and convincing evidence.

 

  W.S. 14-2-109(e)(iv). We find as a 
matter of law that Father was entitled to the two statutory presumptions of 
fatherhood. Because the statutory presumptions were unrebutted, we affirm 
summary judgment on the issue of paternity.

 

  III. Visitation, Support and Attorney 
Fees

 

 [¶19]     Visitation, child support, 
apportionment of attorney fees and cost allocation are all committed to the 
sound discretion of the district court. Basolo v. Basolo, 907 P.2d 348, 352 
(Wyo. 1995). "The definition of rights of visitation is an aspect of the 
determination of custody, and it has been our consistent principle that in 
custody matters the welfare and needs of the children are to be given paramount 
consideration." Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 890 (Wyo. 1990); see also Gurney v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995) and 
Fink v. Fink, 685 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1984) ("In all instances in which the care 
and rearing of a minor child is a matter of concern, the paramount consideration 
is the best interests of the child."). The determination of the best interest of 
the child is a question for the trier of fact. "We do not overturn the decision 
of the trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the 
presence of a violation of some legal principle." Fink, 685 P.2d  at 36. A court does not abuse its discretion 
unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances, as is said to mean an error of law committed by the court under 
the circumstances. Pinther v. Pinther, 888 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

 [¶20]     As the appointed attorney for the 
minor, a guardian ad litem is obligated to participate as an advocate for the 
child. "[T]he guardian ad litem has the same ethical responsibilities in the 
proceeding as any other attorney," Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 264 (Wyo. 
1991), and has a responsibility to ensure that the record contains information relative to the child's 
best interest and welfare, factors essential to the court's final determination. See Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 
215 (Wyo. 1995); Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Wyo. 1992). The 
guardian ad litem here, however, produced no evidence on behalf of the Child at the visitation and support hearing. 
While Father did present evidence regarding his fitness and finances, he 
likewise presented no evidence relating to the Child's best interest and 
welfare. Neither Mother nor her attorney attended the 
hearing.

 

 [¶21]     The district court was 
understandably displeased by Mother's failure to appear. In similar situations 
we have stated:

 

            The 
apparent anger of the district court obligates our inquiry as to whether * * * 
"such a condition of the mind 
[exists] which sways judgment and renders the judge unable to exercise his 
functions impartially in a given 
case or which is inconsistent with a state of mind fully open to the 
conviction which evidence might 
produce." Of course, the mere fact of restricted visitation does not 
necessarily     indicate motive to punish or 
bias. Rather, our threshold inquiry remains whether the 
evidence presented fairly supports 
the decision of the district court.

 

Basolo, 907 P.2d  at 353 
(citations omitted); see also Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 616 (Wyo. 1993) and 
Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo. 1979). The prime judicial objective in 
dealing with visitation and support is to serve the best interest of the child  
not to punish or reward one parent for real or supposed derelictions. Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 430 (Wyo. 1985); Henson v. Henson, 384 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo. 1963).  "Visitation is primarily for the benefit 
of the child * * * [and] [t]he custodial parent's misconduct cannot destroy the 
child's right to support * * *." Hester v. Hester, 663 P.2d 727, 729 (Okla. 
1983). We hold that given the complete absence of any evidence representing the 
best interest and welfare of Child, the 
court abused its discretion in ruling on visitation and support, and we remand 
this matter for an evidentiary hearing.

 

[¶22]       In reviewing the award of 
attorney fees, we have recognized that the district court has extremely broad 
discretion with which we will not interfere except upon proof that such 
discretion was gravely abused. Haltom v. Haltom, 755 P.2d 876, 879-80 (Wyo. 
1988). In the instant case, we are unwilling to find a grave abuse of discretion. Given our decision regarding the 
issues of visitation and support, however, we find it appropriate that the 
district court revisit the issue of attorney fees following the evidentiary 
hearing.

 

CONCLUSION

 

 [¶23]     We affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment on the issue of paternity. We reverse the Order and 
Judgment Regarding Visitation and Support and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.

 

[¶24]       Affirmed in part, reversed 
in part and remanded.