Case Title: PAUL DEBROW V CENTURY 21 GREAT LAKES INC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 114615

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JANUARY 17, 2001  
PAUL DeBROW,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 114615  
CENTURY 21 GREAT LAKES INC., 
CENTURY FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION, 
and KATHY MILLER,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
PATRICIA COMBS and DENNIS DROPIC,  
Defendants.  
PER CURIAM  
After the plaintiff was fired from his job, he sued his  
former employer and others.  He alleged seven species of  
misconduct, including age discrimination. The circuit court  
granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, and  
the Court of Appeals has twice affirmed. 
Because the  
plaintiff has shown enough to prosecute a claim of age  
discrimination, we reverse in part the judgments of the Court  
of Appeals and the circuit court.  
I  
At the age of forty-eight, plaintiff Paul DeBrow was  
removed from an executive position in the Century 21 real  
estate network.1
 He sued his former employer,2 alleging  
wrongful discharge and unlawful discrimination.3  
When the employer moved for summary disposition, the  
circuit court granted the motion and denied rehearing.  The  
Court of Appeals affirmed4 over the partial dissent of Justice  
YOUNG, who was a member of the panel.  
On application to this Court, we remanded the case to the  
Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Lytle v  
Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153; 579 NW2d 906 (1998).5  
1 Mr. DeBrow was employed by Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc. 
From materials at hand, it appears the Century 21 has a three­
tiered organizational structure.  Century 21 Real Estate 
Corporation 
is 
a 
nationwide company that franchises its system 
and trademarks to regional organizations such as Mr. DeBrow’s 
former employer.  In turn, Century 21 Great Lakes arranges for 
individual brokers to become Century 21 franchisees. We are  
told that Century 21 Great Lakes handled franchises in 
Michigan, Ohio, and parts of two other states.  
2 The plaintiff was apparently offered other employment 
by Century 21 Great Lakes.  He declined the offer, however, 
and proceeded on the basis that his employment had been 
terminated.  
3 In an amended complaint, he added claims against four 
other defendants (three individuals and an association of 
Century 21 franchisees).  The Court of Appeals has affirmed 
the circuit court’s decision to grant summary disposition in 
favor of these additional defendants.  
4 Unpublished per curiam opinion, issued August 13, 1996 
(Docket No. 161048).  
5 459 Mich 899 (1998).  In this opinion, the portions of  
Lytle on which we rely were supported by a majority of this  
2  
 
After the Court of Appeals again affirmed,6 the plaintiff  
filed another application for leave to appeal in the Supreme  
Court.  
II  
This opinion will focus on a single issue.  Did the  
circuit court err when it granted the former employer’s motion  
for summary disposition7 with regard to the claim that it  
unlawfully 
discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of  
age?  
In this instance, summary disposition was granted under  
MCR 2.116(C)(10).  Such a motion tests the factual support of  
a plaintiff’s claim, and is subject to de novo review. Harts  
v Farmers Ins Exchange, 461 Mich 1, 5; 597 NW2d 47 (1999);  
Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28  
(1999).  
In its initial opinion of affirmance, the Court of  
Appeals discussed this case in light of the shifting burdens  
of proof commonly applied in employment-discrimination cases.  
The second opinion of the Court of Appeals used a similar  
analysis.  This approach has its roots in McDonnell Douglas  
Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 802-805; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d  
Court.  See the partial concurrence of former Chief Justice  
MALLETT, 458 Mich 186.  
6 Unpublished per curiam opinion, issued April 13, 1999 
(Docket No. 161048).  
7 MCR 2.116(C)(10).  
3  
 
 
 
668 (1973), and has been employed in countless subsequent  
decisions.  
The McDonnell Douglas approach was adopted because many  
plaintiffs in employment-discrimination cases can cite no  
direct evidence of unlawful discrimination. 
The courts  
therefore allow a plaintiff to present a rebuttable prima  
facie case on the basis of proofs from which a factfinder  
could infer that the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful  
discrimination.8  
The present case falls outside that common pattern,  
8 Writing in the context of a plaintiff’s claim that an 
employer refused to rehire a laid-off employee because of 
racial animus, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated in McDonnell  
Douglas four elements that compose a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination.  411 US 802. 
The four factors have  
been restated, in more general terms, for use in cases 
involving, inter alia, claims of age discrimination:  
To establish a prima facie case of [age] 
discrimination, 
plaintiff 
must 
prove 
by 
a  
preponderance of the evidence that (1) she was a 
member of the protected class;  (2) she suffered an 
adverse employment action, in this case, demotion 
and then discharge; (3) she was qualified for the 
position; 
but 
(4) 
she 
was 
discharged 
under  
circumstances that give rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination.  [Lytle, 458 Mich 172-173, 
177.]  
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have cautioned that 
these factors are “not to be applied mechanically, but with 
due deference to the unique facts of the individual case.” 
458 Mich 173, n 19; see also 411 US 802, n 13.  
If the plaintiff submits such a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. 458 Mich 173-174; 
411 US 802.  Upon such a showing, the burden returns to the 
plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason for its 
action was actually a mere pretext.  458 Mich 174; 411 US 804.  
4  
however.  Here, the plaintiff has direct evidence of unlawful  
age discrimination. 
The plaintiff testified during his  
deposition that, in the conversation in which he was fired,  
his superior told him that he was “getting too old for this  
shit.”
 We recognize that this remark may be subject to  
varying interpretations.  It might reasonably be taken as  
merely an expression of sympathy that does not encompass a  
statement that the plaintiff’s age was a motivating factor in  
removing him from his position as an executive. However, it  
is well established that, in reviewing a decision on a motion  
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we must  
consider 
the 
documentary evidence presented to the trial court  
“in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Harts  
v Farmers Ins Exchange, supra at 5. 
According to the  
plaintiff’s deposition testimony, the remark was made during  
the conversation in which the plaintiff’s superior informed  
him that he was being fired.  Considered in the light most  
favorable to the plaintiff, this remark could be taken as a  
literal statement that the plaintiff was “getting too old” for  
his job and this was a factor in the decision to remove him  
from his position. While a factfinder might be convinced by  
other evidence regarding the circumstances of the plaintiff’s  
removal that it was not motivated in any part by the  
plaintiff’s 
age 
and 
that the facially incriminating remark was  
no more than an expression of sympathy, such weighing of  
evidence is for the factfinder, not for this Court in  
5  
  
reviewing a grant of a motion for summary disposition.  
The shifting burdens of proof described in McDonnell  
Douglas are not applicable if a plaintiff can cite direct  
evidence of unlawful discrimination.  Trans World Airlines,  
Inc v Thurston, 469 US 111, 121; 105 S Ct 613; 83 L Ed 2d 523  
(1985).  
This point was well explained by Justice YOUNG in his  
dissent from the first opinion of the Court of Appeals.  We  
agree with his analysis, set forth below, and adopt it as our  
own.  
Intentional discrimination can be proven by 
direct and circumstantial evidence. 
Lytle v  
Malady, 209 Mich App 179, 185; 530 NW2d 135 
(1995).[9]  Where direct evidence is offered to prove 
discrimination, a plaintiff is not required to 
establish a prima facie case within the McDonnell  
Douglas1 framework, and the case should proceed as 
an ordinary civil matter.  Trans World Airlines v  
Thurston, 469 US 111, 121; 105 S Ct 613; 83 L Ed 2d 
523 (1985); Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675,  
683-684; 385 NW2d 586 (1986); Lytle, supra, 209 
Mich App 186, n 3.  The shifting burden of proofs 
as contemplated in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine2  
only apply to discrimination claims based solely on 
indirect 
or 
circumstantial 
evidence 
of  
discrimination.3 
Thurston, supra, 469 US 121; 
Lytle, supra, 209 Mich App 185.  
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that  
when he was being removed as president, his  
superior, Century 21’s Great Lakes Executive Vice 
President, 
Robert 
Hutchinson, 
told 
plaintiff 
“you’re too old for this shit.” This statement is  
direct evidence of age animus.  Moreover, because  
9 Justice YOUNG’s partial dissent was authored in 1996, 
before this Court decided Lytle on appeal, 456 Mich 1; 566 
NW2d 582 (1997), and on rehearing, 458 Mich 153; 579 NW2d 906 
(1998).  
6  
 
 
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it was allegedly made in the context of the 
discussion in which plaintiff was informed that he 
was being removed as president, it bears directly 
on the intent with which his employer acted in 
choosing to demote him.  
The [Court of Appeals] majority ignores this 
evidence as unworthy of credibility. Neither this  
court nor the trial court can make factual findings 
or weigh credibility in deciding a motion for 
summary disposition.  Manning v Hazel Park, 202  
Mich App 685, 689; 509 NW2d 874 (1993).  This  
evidence cannot be ignored in the context of a 
motion for summary disposition and precludes, in my 
judgment, dismissal of the plaintiff’s age claim. 
See Lytle, supra, 209 Mich App 187-188. Clearly, 
the statement by Vice President Hutchinson, if 
believed by the trier of fact, suggests that 
plaintiff’s age was a factor in the mind of his  
employer at the point plaintiff was removed from 
his position. See Matras, supra, 424 Mich 682.  
1 McDonnell Douglas v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 
L Ed 2d 668 (1973).  
2 Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v Burdine, 450 US 248;  
101 S Ct 1089; 67 L Ed 2d 207 (1981).  
3  As such, I disagree with the majority’s statement that 
plaintiff failed to set forth a prima facie case of age 
discrimination due to insufficient evidence that he was replaced 
by a younger person. 
As the United States Supreme Court 
recently stated, discrimination laws protect persons not  
classes. 
O’Connor v Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp, 517 US 
308; 116 S Ct 1307; 134 L Ed 2d 433 (1996).  
The plaintiff’s former employer argues that the disputed  
statement was a “stray remark[]” that cannot give rise to  
liability. See Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228, 277;  
109 S Ct 1775; 104 L Ed 2d 268 (1989) (opinion of O’CONNOR, J.,  
concurring in the judgment).  In the circumstances of the  
present case, however, that is an argument for the finder of  
fact to consider.  
7  
 
 
 
For these reasons, we reverse in part the judgments of  
the Court of Appeals and the circuit court.  We remand this  
case to the circuit court for further proceedings limited to  
the plaintiff’s claim that his former employer unlawfully  
discriminated against him on the basis of age.10
 MCR  
7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, KELLY, and TAYLOR, JJ.,  
concurred.  
10 In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied.  
8  
 
 
 
     
____________________________________ 
v
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PAUL DeBROW,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 114615  
CENTURY 21 GREAT LAKES, INC, 
CENTURY FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION, 
and KATHY MILLER,  
Defendants-Appellees,  
and  
PATRICIA COMBS and DENNIS DROPIC  
Defendants.  
MARKMAN, J. (concurring).  
The only evidence of age discrimination presented by  
plaintiff consists of a single comment allegedly made to him  
by his superior during a meeting at which he was terminated.  
During 
this 
meeting, 
Robert Hutchinson, an official of Century  
21 Great Lakes, told plaintiff that he was “getting too old  
for this sh—.” 
There are at least two conceivable  
interpretations of this comment: (1) that it constitutes what  
the majority describes as “direct evidence” of age animus in  
the context of an adverse employment decision taken by  
defendant, or (2) that it represents a colloquial expression  
 
which 
does 
not 
necessarily 
communicate 
the 
speaker’s  
perspective that the object of his remark is literally too  
aged to perform a particular task, but rather empathizes with  
the other person by indicating that, on the basis of his  
experience, education, or level of achievement, he should not  
have to tolerate certain difficult circumstances in which he  
has become enmeshed.  
I concur in the result reached by the majority because I  
agree that it is ultimately for the factfinder to determine  
which of these alternative interpretations best describes  
Hutchinson’s 
remarks, to wit, whether these remarks are better  
understood in their literal or in their colloquial senses.  
However, I write separately to express my concern that,  
particularly 
in 
the 
context 
of 
discrimination 
cases 
predicated  
upon age, there are a wide variety of innocent comments that,  
taken out of context and divorced from their meaning in common  
parlance, could be used by a plaintiff to defeat a motion for  
summary disposition.  For example, if made in rough proximity  
to an adverse employment action and if construed literally,  
the following comments might be understood to constitute  
evidence of age discrimination:  
-
“That’s just old hat” 
-
“You can’t teach an old dog new tricks” 
-
“He’s an old hand at this sort of thing” 
-
“Your thinking is just old school” 
-
“You’re old enough to know better.” 
-
“You belong to the good-old-boys network”  
Each of these phrases, similar to the one uttered in the  
2  
  
present case, have colloquial meanings in the contemporary  
language that are distinct from their literal meanings and  
that are generally unconnected with any serious intimation of  
age animus.  I join here with the majority because we lack any  
specific information concerning the context of defendant’s  
comment, and because there may be circumstances in which it is  
not 
unreasonable 
to 
accord the comment a literal construction.  
However, I do not believe that the requirements of MCR  
2.116(C)(10) will invariably be satisfied by a plaintiff who  
alleges remarks of this kind by an employer or a supervisor.  
Although an employer or a supervisor’s comments must be viewed  
in “the light most favorable” to a plaintiff at the summary  
judgment stage, the proofs nevertheless must be sufficient to  
allow the trier of fact to reasonably conclude that age animus  
was a motivating factor resulting in an adverse employment  
action. Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 176; 579  
NW2d 906 (1998).  Whether a comment removed from the ordinary  
vernacular 
would 
constitute 
“direct 
evidence” 
of  
discrimination or merely circumstantial evidence does not, in  
my judgment, alter the validity of this proposition.  
YOUNG, J., took no part in the decision of this case.  
3