Case Title: State v. Sauve

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                           Nos. 92-568 and 92-571


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

 Larry Sauve                                  December Term, 1992



 David Reid, Acting J. (92-568) (denial of bail)
 Paul F. Hudson, J. (92-571) (revocation of bail)


 E.M. Allen, Defender General, and William Nelson, Appellate Defender,
    Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      JOHNSON, J.   In State v. Sauve, No. 92-457 (Oct. 22, 1992) (Sauve I),
 we reversed and remanded orders revoking defendant's bail for violating
 conditions of release and denying him bail on new charges.  These matters
 were reheard in two separate proceedings below.  Defendant again appeals,
 asserting that his constitutional right to bail has been violated.  We again
 reverse and remand.
      Defendant and the complaining witness became acquainted in January
 1992.  In April 1992, they began an intimate relationship and lived together
 in her apartment.  In May 1992, defendant choked the complaining witness
 during an argument.  At about the same time, she discovered she was pregnant
 with their child; defendant was adamant that she not have an abortion.
      On or about July 4, 1992, defendant and the complaining witness had an
 argument while they were driving his dog to the veterinarian.  He struck
 her, but she never reported the incident to the police.  On the same day,
 however, the police stopped defendant for driving the wrong way down a one-
 way street and charged him with two misdemeanors, driving under the
 influence and unlawful mischief.  He was released on conditions, including
 that he abstain from alcohol.  On December 29, 1992, these charges were
 dismissed with prejudice.
      On August 4, 1992, the complaining witness filed for relief from
 abuse, and a restraining order was served on defendant, ordering him to stay
 away from her, her home, and her children.  At that point, the witness had
 been discouraging defendant from continuing their relationship; defendant
 nonetheless wanted to pursue it and threatened to kill her if she obtained
 an abortion.  On August 6, 1992, defendant was charged with burglary,
 unlawful mischief, and trespass for allegedly having entered the
 complaining witness's residence.  Defendant was released on additional
 conditions, including that he not associate with nor harass the complaining
 witness, nor enter her premises without being accompanied by a police
 officer.
      After the court imposed the no-contact condition, defendant continued
 to contact the complaining witness and remained intimate with her.  She had
 a couch on her back porch and, because he was homeless, she occasionally
 allowed him to sleep there.  On September 11, 1992, she was awakened in the
 early hours of the morning by defendant at her door asking to sleep on the
 porch.  She told him to leave and, when he refused, she called the police.
 He was charged with trespassing and violating two of his conditions of
 release: being charged with trespass, an offense similar to the August 6
 charge, and purchasing or consuming alcoholic beverages.
      On September 11, 1992, the court ordered defendant held without bail
 on both the new charges and the two earlier sets of charges because of
 violations of conditions.  On September 17, 1992, defendant's motion for
 bail review was heard and denied on the grounds that defendant would not
 comply with the conditions of release, in particular that he would not obey
 the condition that he stay away from the complaining witness.  Both rulings
 were based on the court's files and at neither hearing was live testimony of
 witnesses presented.
      Both rulings were appealed to, and reversed and remanded by, this
 Court.  On remand, they were heard in separate hearings, this time with live
 testimony by both defendant and the complaining witness.  Defendant was
 again denied bail on the new charges and had his bail revoked for the old
 charges.
                             I.  Denial of Bail
      Defendant argues that denial of bail on the new charges violated his
 statutory and constitutional right to bail.  We agree that the denial of
 bail violated 13 V.S.A. { 7554(a)(2)(C) and do not, therefore, reach the
 constitutional issue.  The trial court found that defendant had a history
 of "assaultive threats" and "assault or abusive behavior" toward the
 complaining witness and that, despite conditions of release on prior
 charges, "he was not able to leave her alone."  The court found that on
 September 11, 1992, defendant had appeared on her porch, and had a
 conversation with her in the middle of the night, and stated it "assum[ed]
 although I don't believe she testified to it, that that is a frightening
 experience for her."  Nonetheless, the witness testified against defendant
 in this proceeding and expressed no fear of him.  The court's findings fall
 far short of supporting its conclusion that "extraordinary circumstances"
 required "physically restrictive conditions" to protect the community and
 the alleged victim.  13 V.S.A. { 7554(a)(2)(C).
                           II.  Revocation of Bail
      Defendant also asserts that revoking his bail violated his right to
 bail under chapter II, { 40 of the Vermont Constitution.  The trial court
 concluded revocation was warranted under three separate prongs of 13 V.S.A.
 { 7575.  It stated that on September 11, defendant intimidated and harassed
 the complaining witness, 13 V.S.A. { 7575(1), that defendant had repeatedly
 violated conditions of release, 13 V.S.A. { 7575(2), and that defendant's
 actions of September 11 had threatened the integrity of the judicial system,
 13 V.S.A. { 7575(3).  The trial court held that a breach of conditions alone
 was sufficient to hold defendant without bail and urged this Court to
 overrule State v. Fales, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 599 A.2d 1046, 1047 (1991)
 (verbal and physical battering of complaining witness too attenuated from
 integrity of criminal proceedings to justify denial of bail), stating that {
 7575 does not require "that defendant's breach of conditions be the
 proximate cause of witness reluctance to testify."
      The central issue raised by this appeal is the meaning of 13 V.S.A. {
 7575: whether and under what circumstances the statute allows for preventive
 detention, that is, imprisoning accused but unconvicted defendants because
 they may endanger the public.  This is not merely a matter of legislative
 intent.  What threatens the integrity of the judicial process is a question
 of constitutional dimension.  Likewise, although { 7575(2) appears on its
 face to allow revocation merely on a finding of repeated violations of
 conditions, this provision must be construed in light of our constitutional
 provision on bail.  In re Certain Juvenile, 129 Vt. 185, 189,