Case Title: Commonwealth v. Santana

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12039

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12039 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CESAR SANTANA. 
 
 
 
Essex.     January 10, 2017. - August 17, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, & Gaziano, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement.  Evidence, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Hearsay, Expert 
opinion.  Witness, Expert.  Practice, Criminal, Capital 
case, Motion to suppress, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Mistrial, Argument by 
prosecutor, Plea. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 12, 2008. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence, filed on June 8, 
2009, and amended October 3, 2011, was heard by Kimberly S. 
Budd, J.; a second pretrial motion to suppress evidence, filed 
on April 12, 2012, was heard by Howard J. Whitehead, J.; a third 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence, filed on June 4, 2013, was 
heard by Richard E. Welch, III, J.; and the cases were tried 
before David A. Lowy, J. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. 
 
Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In January, 2014, a Superior Court jury 
convicted the defendant, Cesar Santana, of murder in the first 
degree of Rafael Castro, on the theories of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, and felony-murder with home invasion and armed 
burglary, assault on occupant as the predicate felonies.  On 
appeal, the defendant asserts error in (1) the denial of his 
motion to suppress statements; (2) the admission of hearsay 
testimony from various witnesses; (3) the denial of a requested 
DiGiambattista jury instruction; (4) the denial of the motion 
for a mistrial following the jury's exposure to inadmissible 
evidence; and (5) certain improper statements made in the 
prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant also requests that 
we exercise our authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the murder conviction or to order a new trial.  We affirm 
the defendant's convictions and decline to grant relief under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  1.  The murder.  We summarize the facts the 
jury could have found, reserving certain details for our 
discussion of the alleged errors.  On the night of August 25, 
2004, Norma Cedeno and her stepfather, Rafael Castro, were 
3 
 
 
attacked by a group of men as the two entered Castro's Lawrence 
apartment.1 
 
Cedeno, who entered the apartment first and did not turn on 
any lights, walked to the bathroom, where she was grabbed by a 
man.  Although she could not see the man's face, she felt 
something "like a gun" on her back.  Hearing Cedeno scream, 
Castro ran into the apartment, and two men came out of the 
kitchen.  As the men struggled, Cedeno, who had been pushed down 
to the floor and told to keep her head down, heard a gunshot, 
saw Castro on the floor, and heard men arguing in Spanish, some 
of whom asked, "Why did you shoot him?"  Based on the voices she 
heard and the feet she could see walking around the apartment, 
Cedeno deduced that four men were involved in the incident. 
 
Thereafter, Cedeno was taken into a bedroom and made to lie 
on the floor.  A pillowcase was put over her head.  Although the 
men were initially going to duct tape her hands and feet 
together, they complied with her plea not to tie her up.  
Instead, one man remained in the bedroom with her.  Cedeno could 
hear Castro's voice, which although clear at first, became 
fainter as time passed.  During the time the men were in the 
apartment, Cedeno heard them "screaming," hitting and 
threatening Castro, and demanding that he make a telephone call.  
                     
 
1 Norma Cedeno testified to the details of the attack at 
trial under a grant of immunity concerning her involvement in 
drug dealing with her mother and stepfather. 
4 
 
 
At one point, the men brought Cedeno into the bedroom with 
Castro, removed her shirt, and threatened to burn her with an 
iron unless Castro agreed to make the call. 
 
Eventually, one man said to Cedeno, "Three of us are 
leaving and I'm staying here . . . and after I leave[,] if you 
call the police or someone for help we're just going to come 
back for you."  Although Cedeno did not know the men, they 
seemed to be familiar with Castro.  After all of the men left 
the apartment, Cedeno went to the other bedroom and found 
Castro, taped up, bleeding from the gunshot wound on his head, 
and unable to talk.  Cedeno cut the duct tape binding Castro 
and, eventually, telephoned 911. 
 
Paramedics who arrived in response to the 911 call 
determined that Castro had "no obvious signs of life."  Castro's 
cause of death was the gunshot wound to his head. 
 
2.  The investigation.  The police recovered evidence from 
the apartment including two rolls of duct tape, one of which had 
blood on it, several pieces of duct tape, one piece of which was 
found in the bathroom trash barrel, and samples of bloodstains 
and pools in various areas of the apartment. 
 
 A latent fingerprint from a roll of duct tape recovered 
from the scene was determined to be consistent with the known 
fingerprint of Joonel Garcia.  Also, a deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) swab was taken from a "small indentation" near the torn 
5 
 
 
end of the piece of duct tape found in the bathroom trash 
barrel.  It contained a mixture of the DNA of at least two 
individuals, including the defendant, whose DNA "matched" the 
major profile of the mixture. 
 
The police interviewed Jessica Encarnacion, who was the 
girl friend of Garcia and lived with him in an apartment in 
Lawrence.  At trial, Encarnacion testified that four men -- 
Garcia, the defendant, and two others -- arrived at around 
midnight at Garcia's apartment.  Garcia was covered in blood.  
Ignoring Encarnacion's questions about what was going on, Garcia 
told her to pack because they had to leave the country.  
Thereafter, she and the four men drove to New York, stopping 
only to dispose of the gun.  Once in New York, Garcia and 
Encarnacion purchased one-way tickets to the Dominican Republic 
and left the United States. 
 
In August, 2004, the defendant initiated a conversation 
with his probation officer,2 during which he stated that he would 
be willing to provide information about a shooting in Lawrence 
in exchange for financial compensation.  The defendant told this 
officer that a man named "Joonie" shot someone in the head, and 
that the defendant knew the location of the firearm used in the 
shooting.  The probation officer passed the information on to 
                     
 
2 At the time, the defendant was on probation for an 
unrelated matter. 
6 
 
 
the Boston police department.3  In March, 2005, the defendant 
initiated a second conversation with his probation officer about 
the shooting in Lawrence.  This time he told the officer that he 
had significant legal concerns and added that the shooting in 
Lawrence was actually a drug-related "homicide." 
 
On March 4, 2005, the police interviewed the defendant.  At 
that time, the defendant was being held in a house of correction 
on unrelated charges.  Present were Trooper Robert LaBarge of 
the State police and Detective Carlos Cueva of the Lawrence 
police department.  Although the defendant indicated that he 
spoke and understood English, LaBarge asked Cueva to serve as a 
Spanish translator because Spanish was the defendant's primary 
language.4  Initially, the defendant agreed to allow the police 
to audio record the interview.  His demeanor was "cautious," but 
he did not exhibit signs of emotional distress.  The tone of the 
interview was conversational.  During the recorded portion of 
the interview, the defendant was provided Miranda warnings in 
Spanish and the defendant read the warnings out loud in Spanish.  
After the defendant acknowledged that he understood and signed 
                     
 
3 The trial record lacks evidence of the Boston police 
department's response to the probation officer's first report. 
 
 
4 Detective Carlos Cueva spoke both English and Spanish, and 
considered Spanish to be his native language.  Although Cueva 
grew up speaking Spanish in his family home and studied Spanish 
in high school, he had no formal training in Spanish 
translation. 
7 
 
 
the written warnings, LaBarge began questioning the defendant 
about the murder of Castro. 
 
During the interview, in response to the suggestion that he 
was inside the apartment at the time of Castro's murder, the 
defendant stated that he was actually outside the apartment, 
arriving only after the incident occurred.  The defendant told 
the police that after he received a call from Garcia requesting 
a ride, he drove to an apartment building, picked up Garcia and 
two other men, and dropped them off at Garcia's Lawrence 
apartment.  During the drive to the Lawrence apartment, the men 
discussed the fact that Garcia had shot Castro.  After remaining 
in Garcia's apartment for a period of time, the defendant drove 
Garcia and Encarnacion to Boston.  The firearm used in the 
murder was buried before Garcia and Encarnacion left for the 
Dominican Republic.  The day before the murder, the defendant 
had transported a bag of firearms to Garcia's Lawrence 
apartment.  In exchange, the defendant received money and drugs.  
At the conclusion of the interview, LaBarge asked the defendant 
to sign the contemporaneous handwritten notes transcribing the 
conversation, but the defendant refused. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant filed 
three motions to suppress statements he made during the March 4, 
2005, interview with the police.  Insofar as relevant here, in 
2013, the defendant filed a third motion to suppress, 
8 
 
 
reasserting the voluntariness issue that had not been reached in 
any previous ruling.  A judge (motion judge) denied this motion, 
ruling that "[a]ny understanding that [the] statements would be 
confidential and not used in court, was completely dissipated" 
after the defendant was given the Miranda warnings and 
voluntarily waived those rights.  The defendant challenges only 
the motion judge's ruling denying the motion to suppress on the 
ground that his statement was voluntary. 
 
We recite the facts as found by the motion judge who "fully 
[i]ndorsed and incorporate[d]" the facts found by a different 
judge who had denied one of the defendant's earlier motions to 
suppress.  We supplement the facts "with evidence in the record 
that is uncontroverted and that was implicitly credited by the 
motion judge."  Commonwealth v. Melo, 472 Mass. 278, 286 (2015). 
 
The defendant met with the police at the jail where he was 
being held on unrelated charges.  The officers were in 
plainclothes and did not have their credentials or firearms with 
them during the interview.  The tone of the interview was 
conversational.  Because the defendant did not always understand 
English, Cueva translated.  However, the translation of 
LaBarge's statements was neither word for word nor always 
accurate.  Cueva also communicated information in Spanish to the 
defendant without translating it into English for LaBarge.  When 
LaBarge asked the defendant if he would consent to having the 
9 
 
 
interview recorded, Cueva did not translate the defendant's 
response: "Okay, no problem . . . okay . . . as long as it is 
not used in court . . . better if not used in court . . . 
whatever I say to you be confidential."  Instead, Cueva replied 
to the defendant, "No, do not worry," in Spanish. 
 
After this colloquy between the defendant and Cueva and 
prior to asking any questions about the murder, LaBarge inquired 
whether the defendant could read and write Spanish.  When the 
defendant replied, "Yeah, perfect," LaBarge provided him with 
Miranda warnings written in Spanish.  LaBarge asked the 
defendant to read aloud each warning and say whether he 
understood it.  The defendant did so and indicated that he 
understood the warnings. 
 
Following the Miranda warnings, LaBarge stated to the 
defendant, "We are going to use the information . . . I have to 
be honest, my goal is not to, to save you and to help you out.  
My goal is to find the truth."  Cueva translated this statement 
as follows:  "Any information that you give us now, [LaBarge 
would] go to the court and they'd talk with the judge and the 
lawyer and to say that 'look, Cesar came, talked to me, gave me 
that and, we're going to try to help you, but he wouldn't give 
you er . . . er, you know."  Near the end of the recorded 
portion of the interrogation, the defendant said in Spanish, 
10 
 
 
"Tell him that it was me who had him come over, it wasn't him 
who looked for me -- it was me who asked for him to come over." 
 
Relying on the transcript of the recorded portion of the 
interview, the motion judge also found that the tone of the 
interview was "conversational," the defendant was "relaxed 
throughout," and "appeared to be chuckling or laughing" on 
occasion.  Regarding the defendant's language skills, the judge 
found that the defendant "plainly can speak and understand a 
fair amount of English," although Spanish is "obviously" his 
"primary language."  The judge further found that "the defendant 
plainly understood each [Miranda] right," provided to him in 
Spanish, and "at times [he] corrected LaBarge as to the 
numbering of these rights."  Last, the judge determined that 
although "Cueva's translation, obviously, could have been much 
better," the defendant nevertheless "fully understood what was 
going on." 
 
a.  Standard of review.  In this case where the motion 
judge's findings were based in part on his review of the 
transcript of the defendant's interview with the police and in 
part on a different judge's findings after an evidentiary 
hearing, we apply the appropriate standard of review to each in 
our review of the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.  
To the extent that the motion judge's findings are based on the 
documentary evidence available to this court in the appellate 
11 
 
 
record, our review is de novo.  We give no deference to those 
findings as "this court stands in the same position as . . . the 
[motion] judge, and reaches its own conclusion unaffected by the 
findings made by the [motion] judge."  Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 
Mass. 262, 266 (2004), quoting Berry v. Kyes, 304 Mass. 56, 57 
(1939).  Insofar as the motion judge's findings incorporate the 
other judge's findings, "we accept [those] findings of fact and 
will not disturb them absent clear error. "  Commonwealth v. 
Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 205 (2011).  However, "[w]e make an 
independent determination as to the correctness of the judge's 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found."  
Id. 
 
b.  Analysis.  In deciding the issue of voluntariness, the 
motion judge acknowledged that the defendant's initial statement 
that he would speak to the officers "as long as it was not used 
in court" was "concerning," and Cueva's response, "No, don't 
worry," was "even more concerning."  Nonetheless, the motion 
judge concluded that, "[a]ny understanding that his statements 
would be confidential and not used in court, was completely 
dissipated after Trooper LaBarge requested that the defendant 
read his Miranda rights and when the defendant voluntarily 
waived those rights."  Additionally, the motion judge concluded 
that LaBarge further dispelled the notion that the defendant's 
statements would not be used against him when he "went out of 
12 
 
 
his way to explain to the defendant, who obviously understood 
some English, that he was not making any promises to the 
defendant," and that he would report the defendant's statements 
to the prosecutor and or the court.  On this basis, the motion 
judge concluded that the defendant's statement was voluntary and 
a product of the defendant's "free will."  There was no error. 
 
"It is well established that a confession or an admission 
is admissible in evidence only if it is made voluntarily."  
Tremblay, 460 Mass. at 206.  A statement is voluntary when it is 
"the product of a 'rational intellect' and a 'free will,' and 
not induced by psychological coercion."  Commonwealth v. Monroe, 
472 Mass. 461, 468 (2015), quoting Tremblay, supra at 207.  The 
burden is on the Commonwealth to "prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that 'in light of the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement, the will of the 
defendant was [not] overborne,' but rather that the statement 
was 'the result of a free and voluntary act.'"  Commonwealth v. 
Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 256 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Durand, 
457 Mass. 574, 595-596 (2010), S.C., 475 Mass. 657 (2016). 
 
Because "the issue of voluntariness turns on 'all the 
surrounding circumstances,'" Baye, 462 Mass. at 256, quoting 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000), we have 
declined to adopt a "'bright-line rule[]' that the use of 
improper interrogation techniques [such as promises of 
13 
 
 
confidentiality] will always result in suppression of a 
defendant's incriminating statements as involuntary."  Baye, 
supra, quoting Tremblay, 460 Mass. at 210-211.  However, we have 
warned, "assurances that a suspect's statements will not be used 
to prosecute him will often be sufficiently coercive to render 
the suspect's subsequent admissions involuntary even when the 
suspect shows no outward signs of fear, distress[,] or mental 
incapacity" (quotations omitted).  Baye, supra at 262.  We 
conclude, as did the motion judge, that the assurance of 
confidentiality in the particular circumstances of this case was 
dissipated by the timing of the Miranda warnings and other 
factors tending to show that the defendant did not rely on that 
assurance in making his statement to the police. 
 
Here, the Miranda warnings were given orally and in writing 
after Cueva's response, "No, don't worry," to the defendant's 
expressed concern that his statement not be used against him in 
court.  The motion judge found that the defendant understood the 
warnings because they were written in Spanish, the defendant's 
native language.  To ensure that the defendant understood the 
warnings, LaBarge required him to read each warning out loud, 
and verbally indicate whether he understood after each.  The 
defendant did so as to each, and signed the Miranda waiver form.  
Further, the defendant's familiarity with the warnings and his 
correction of the officer's recitation of the warning supports 
14 
 
 
this finding.5  There is no suggestion in this record that the 
defendant did not understand the warnings, which plainly 
informed the defendant that his statements could not be held 
confidential.  LaBarge's caution that the defendant's statement 
would be conveyed to the prosecutor and the court sufficiently 
dispelled any assurance that the defendant's statements would 
not be used against him.  Thus, the plain language of the 
Miranda warnings, which the defendant understood, communicated 
that the statements could not be held confidential. 
 
We recognize, however, that the recitation of Miranda 
warnings is not dispositive.  See Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 
Mass. 37, 41 (2015) ("Whether made in a custodial or 
noncustodial setting, and even where there has been a valid 
waiver of Miranda rights, we must consider the voluntariness of 
a defendant's statement").  Rather, it is only one of several 
factors we consider when reviewing the voluntariness of a 
statement.  See Monroe, 472 Mass. at 468.  Apart from the 
language of the Miranda warnings disavowing any promise of 
confidentiality, we are persuaded by the judge's findings that 
the defendant could not have believed that his statement would 
                     
 
5 The third warning (translated into English) read, 
"Anything that you say can be employed against you."  After 
reading the warning out loud in Spanish, Trooper Robert LaBarge 
asked him if he understood "number two," to which defendant 
responded "Yes," clarified, "That's number three," and indicated 
he also understood number two. 
15 
 
 
be confidential and that the defendant did not rely on that 
promise of confidentiality in making his statement. 
 
After Cueva's, "No, do not worry," statement to the 
defendant and after the Miranda warnings, the police 
communicated in unambiguous terms that the statement would not 
be confidential and the precise manner in which the statement 
would be used.  Although Cueva's translation of LaBarge's 
statements was far from perfect, he nevertheless communicated to 
the defendant that the police were making no promise to keep the 
defendant's statement confidential.  In fact, Cueva told the 
defendant that they would report the information to "the 
[prosecuting] attorney that is going to be against [him] when 
[he] goes to court."6  Cueva also explained to the defendant that 
LaBarge was not there to promise that if he made a statement, 
the police would let him go or that his case would "come out 
well without problems." 
 
Further, Cueva's statement to the defendant that the 
officers would speak of his cooperation with the court and try 
to help him does not undermine our conclusion.  We have 
                     
 
6 Although we conclude that the defendant's statement was 
voluntary, we stress that Cueva's inaccurate translation, 
particularly his failure to translate for LaBarge the 
defendant's request for confidentiality and Cueva's response to 
the request, brought this case close to the line that otherwise 
would require suppression.  This case makes plain the need for 
law enforcement to use capable, trained translators who will 
report verbatim the question asked and the response given. 
16 
 
 
recognized that an officer is not prohibited from "suggest[ing] 
broadly that it would be 'better' for a suspect to tell the 
truth, [and] may indicate that the person's cooperation would be 
brought to the attention of public officials or others involved, 
or may state in general terms that cooperation has been 
considered favorably by the courts in the past."  Tremblay, 460 
Mass. at 209, quoting Commonwealth v. Meehan, 377 Mass. 552, 564 
(1979), cert. dismissed, 445 U.S. 39 (1980).  See Commonwealth 
v. Tolan, 453 Mass. 634, 643 (2009) (officer's statement 
indicating police would help defendant and that defendant could 
help herself by telling truth did not constitute assurance 
forbidden by Meehan, supra); Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 
410, 414 (1986) (statement not involuntary where defendant 
initiated discussion of leniency and affirmatively sought deal, 
and where officer indicated only that prosecutor would "discuss 
leniency"). 
 
Moreover, as the Commonwealth points out, the defendant's 
request to cease audio recording shortly after being provided 
his Miranda rights and his refusal to sign Trooper LaBarge's 
contemporaneous transcription at the conclusion of the interview 
because he "didn't know where he stood in the case," suggest 
that the defendant understood the statement could be used 
against him.  Thus, this case is distinguishable from Baye, 462 
Mass. at 257, where the officers "employed multiple problematic 
17 
 
 
tactics" throughout the ten-hour interrogation, including 
exaggerating the strength of the evidence and dissuading the 
defendant from speaking with an attorney by "clearly implying" 
that his statements would not be used against him. 
 
Last, the defendant was motivated by self-interest and the 
fear of repercussions from Garcia when he approached his 
probation officer offering to provide information about the 
murder.  As the judge found, the defendant was not concerned 
about providing information to the police, he was particularly 
concerned with retaliation from "that young [nineteen year old] 
guy, that little guy has about [four] deaths under his belt."  
The defendant added, "that young guy has me, he has me, you 
know, he has me under a lot of pressure and terrified." 
 
Accordingly, in light of the totality of the circumstances, 
we conclude that the Commonwealth met its burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statement was 
made voluntarily.  Therefore, any initial promise of 
confidentiality that Cueva conveyed to the defendant did not 
render his statement involuntary. 
 
2.  Evidentiary rulings.  a.  Bite mark testimony.  The 
defendant argues LaBarge's testimony that the duct tape found in 
the bathroom trash barrel of Castro's apartment "had . . . what 
was believed to be a bite mark or dental impression, where it 
looked like -- I was told maybe somebody had bit it, when they 
18 
 
 
were ripping it" constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated 
his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.  The testimony was admitted in the direct 
examination of LaBarge regarding forensic evidence that the 
police processed during the investigation in an effort to 
identify possible suspects.  LaBarge's response constituted 
impermissible hearsay and should not have been admitted. 
 
Because there was no objection at trial, our inquiry is 
"'whether the impropriety created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.'"7  Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. 341, 
351 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. 569, 579-
580 (2002).  We conclude that it did not.  The defendant's 
                     
 
7 Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine 
that sought to exclude evidence of the "tooth mark."  This 
motion, however, does not properly preserve the defendant's 
claim of error with respect to LaBarge's inadmissible hearsay 
testimony.  In Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715, 719 (2016), 
we concluded that we would no longer require an objection to the 
admission of evidence at trial where the defendant sought to 
preclude the admission of the evidence through a motion in 
limine.  However, we cautioned that our ruling "is not as broad 
as it may seem."  Id.  Specifically, "[a]n objection at the 
motion in limine stage will preserve a defendant's appellate 
rights only if what is objectionable at trial was specifically 
the subject of the motion in limine."  Id.  In his motion in 
limine, the defendant objected to the admission of the "tooth 
mark" evidence because "the Commonwealth does not intend to call 
any expert with sufficient education, training, or familiarity 
with the subject matter of the anticipated testimony."  Because 
LaBarge's hearsay testimony was not the subject of the motion in 
limine and the defendant failed to object at trial, the error 
was not properly preserved. 
19 
 
 
defense was that he was not in the apartment at the time of 
Castro's murder, and that his DNA was possibly inadvertently 
left on an indentation near the ripped edge of an approximately 
twelve-inch piece of duct tape when he brought the bag of guns 
to Garcia's Lawrence apartment.  This explanation strains 
credulity, as it required the jury to believe one of two 
scenarios:  (1) that a piece of duct tape with the defendant's 
DNA near the ripped edge was transported in a bag along with the 
guns to Garcia's apartment and then placed in the bathroom trash 
barrel of Castro's apartment; or (2) that the defendant's DNA 
was inadvertently transferred to the roll of duct tape and 
remained on the tape after it was handled, ripped, and placed in 
the bathroom trash barrel by someone else.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice resulted from the impermissible hearsay testimony. 
 
b.  Testimony regarding the defendant's presence at the 
scene.  The defendant argues that the trial judge erred when he 
permitted LaBarge to testify that he told the defendant that he 
had information that the defendant was in the apartment at the 
time of the crime because it constituted inadmissible hearsay 
and violated his confrontation rights.8  The defendant's argument 
is unavailing. 
                     
 
8 Specifically, the following colloquy between the 
prosecutor and Trooper LaBarge was admitted at trial: 
20 
 
 
 
It is well established that "if a defendant is charged with 
a crime and unequivocally denies it, that denial is not 
admissible in evidence."  Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 472 Mass. 
827, 838 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Morse, 468 Mass. 360, 
375 n.20 (2014).  But, we have also recognized that "accusatory 
statements shed their hearsay character when they are offered 
not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to provide context 
for admissible statements of the defendant."  Bonnett, supra at 
838 n.13.  Such was the case here. 
 
As the trial judge pointed out, the accusation was not 
offered for its truth, but rather to contextualize the 
defendant's statement that is "arguably exculpatory."  Absent 
the prefatory statement to contextualize the defendant's 
response (that he was outside the apartment that night), it 
improperly suggests that the defendant, without any prompting, 
generously put himself at the scene of the murder.  Because the 
statements were not introduced for the truth of the matter 
asserted, their admission did not violate the defendant's right 
                                                                  
 
 
The prosecutor:  "Trooper, did you . . . tell Mr. Santana 
that you believe that he was inside the apartment that night, 
and that you had information that he was there that night?" 
 
 
The witness:  "Yes." 
 
 
The prosecutor:  "What was his response to that?" 
 
 
The witness:  "He denied being in the apartment." 
21 
 
 
to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.  See Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) ("The [Confrontation] 
Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial statements for 
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter 
asserted"). 
 
To ensure that the jury did not use the statements for an 
improper purpose, the judge instructed the jury that LaBarge's 
statement was not admissible for its truth, or for any 
information that the trooper did or did not have.  See Bonnett, 
472 Mass. at 838 n.13 (it may be appropriate for defendant to 
request instruction "limiting the jury's consideration of the . 
. . [accusatory] statements to its nonhearsay purpose").  
Additionally, the judge emphasized that the jury were to use the 
statement only for the purpose of understanding, weighing, and 
considering the answer that the defendant gave in response to 
the trooper's question.   Accordingly we conclude that the judge 
committed no error in admitting LaBarge's statement. 
 
c.  Substitute medical examiner testimony.  The defendant 
maintains that the judge erred in allowing the admission of the 
testimony of a substitute medical examiner, who did not conduct 
the autopsy of Castro and who based her testimony, in part, on 
22 
 
 
the drawings of the nontestifying medical examiner.9  The 
defendant filed a motion in limine seeking exclusion of the 
testimony, and also objected at trial.  The defendant argues 
that the admission of the testimony violated his confrontation 
rights under the Sixth Amendment and under art. 12.  We 
disagree. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Reavis, 465 Mass. 875 (2013), we 
outlined the parameters of the opinion testimony that a 
substitute medical examiner may offer at trial.  Specifically, 
we instructed that "[a] substitute medical examiner who did not 
perform the autopsy may offer an opinion on the cause of death, 
based on his review of an autopsy report by the medical examiner 
who performed the autopsy and his review of the autopsy 
photographs."  Id. at 883.  We allow the substitute medical 
examiner to opine on this issue because autopsy reports by other 
medical examiners and autopsy photographs "are documents upon 
which experts are accustomed to rely, and which are potentially 
independently admissible through appropriate witnesses."  Id. 
 
Here, the substitute medical examiner's testimony remained 
largely within the parameters we set forth in Reavis.  The 
medical examiner opined on Castro's cause of death (gunshot 
wound), how the gunshot likely led to his death, and the amount 
                     
 
9 The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy of Castro 
in August, 2004, was no longer employed by the office of the 
chief medical examiner at the time of trial. 
23 
 
 
of time that could have elapsed between the gunshot wound and 
his death, all of which were permissible areas of inquiry under 
Reavis.  See Reavis, 465 Mass. at 883.  To the extent that the 
substitute medical examiner's opinion ventured into inadmissible 
territory -- specifically, the location of the gunshot wound -- 
it was limited when the judge sua sponte paused the direct 
examination of the witness, held a colloquy between the parties 
at sidebar, and struck the improper testimony from the record. 
 
Nevertheless, the defendant contends that he could not 
meaningfully cross-examine the substitute medical examiner about 
the reliability of the drawings produced by the medical examiner 
responsible for performing Castro's autopsy; thus, the admission 
of the testimony was inconsistent with Commonwealth v. 
Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 595, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 166 
(2013).  We are not persuaded.  In Greineder, we reiterated that 
where the pathologist responsible for performing the autopsy was 
unavailable to testify at trial, the substitute expert witness 
was prohibited from testifying to the pathologist's autopsy 
findings.  Id. at 585.  However, consistent with previous cases, 
we reaffirmed that independent expert opinion testimony, even 
where based on facts and data originating from a nontestifying 
examiner's report, does not infringe on a defendant's right of 
confrontation because the defendant has the opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness on "the foundation of [her] opinion."  
24 
 
 
Id. at 584-589.  Here, the substitute medical examiner testified 
to her independent opinion and was available for cross-
examination on the foundation of that opinion.  Thus, the 
testimony was consistent with this court's mandates in Reavis 
and Greineder, and its admission was not error. 
 
3.  DiGiambattista instruction.  At trial, the defendant 
asked the judge to instruct the jury pursuant to Commonwealth v. 
DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423 (2004).  The judge denied the 
request, reasoning that because defendant requested the audio 
recording device to be turned off, he was not entitled to the 
instruction.  The defendant argues that the trial judge erred in 
declining to give a DiGiambattista instruction where a portion 
of the defendant's interview with the police was not audio 
recorded.  We agree. 
 
In DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. at 447, we held, "when the 
prosecution introduces evidence of a defendant's confession or 
statement that is the product of a custodial interrogation or an 
interrogation conducted at a place of detention . . . , and 
there is not at least an audiotape recording of the complete 
interrogation, the defendant is entitled (on request) to a jury 
instruction."  We further determined that "the instruction is 
appropriate for any custodial interrogation, or interrogation 
conducted in a place of detention, without regard to the alleged 
reasons for not recording that interrogation."  Id. at 448.  
25 
 
 
Although it would have been permissible for the prosecution to 
raise as a justification for the incomplete recording the 
defendant's affirmative request to cease recording, it "[did] 
not obviate the need for a cautionary instruction."  Id. at 449.  
See Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 721 n.15, cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2655 (2014) (defendant entitled to 
DiGiambattista instruction "even where . . . the defendant 
affirmatively requests that that the interview not be 
recorded").  Thus, it was error for the judge to deny the 
defendant's request for a DiGiambattista instruction. 
 
Because the error was preserved, we must determine "whether 
'the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight 
effect,'" and thus was nonprejudicial.  Commonwealth v. 
Christian, 430 Mass. 552, 563 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994).  Applying this standard, we 
conclude that the error was nonprejudicial.  We have noted that 
"the value of [a DiGiambattista] instruction is lessened where 
. . . the defendant's statements, dubious as they may be, were 
largely exculpatory."  Woods, 466 Mass. at 721.  Here, the 
defendant's statement was at least partially exculpatory, as the 
defendant claimed that he was not at the apartment at the time 
of the murder, and only went to the apartment because Garcia 
called him for a ride.  In fact, the defendant's defense 
strategy was, at least in part, dependent on the jury believing 
26 
 
 
his statement.10  Therefore, we conclude that the denial of the 
DiGiambattista instruction constituted nonprejudicial error, and 
thus does not warrant reversal. 
 
4.  Motions for a mistrial.  The defendant contends that 
the denial of his motions for a mistrial constituted error where 
the jury were repeatedly exposed to inadmissible evidence.  
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking 
to prevent reference to his prosecution in a later Superior 
Court case in Suffolk County involving some of the same 
individuals involved in Castro's killing.  The trial judge did 
not explicitly rule on the motion after the prosecutor indicated 
that she was not seeking to introduce the evidence.  At trial, 
when asked about another trooper's role in the investigation of 
Castro's murder, Trooper LaBarge explained that he asked the 
other trooper to compare the latent print found from the roll of 
duct tape in Castro's apartment against "four individuals that 
were arrested in the city of Boston."  Defense counsel 
immediately objected, requested to go to sidebar, and moved for 
a mistrial, arguing that the testimony, at least by inference, 
implicated the defendant.  After a colloquy outside the presence 
of the jury, the judge denied the motion, but indicated he would 
                     
 
10 A major theme of defense counsel's closing was the fact 
that the defendant, unlike the other people involved, cooperated 
with the police and gave a statement because the defendant did 
not commit the crime, and had no idea that the guns he 
previously delivered to Garcia would be used in the robbery. 
27 
 
 
strike the testimony from the record and give a curative 
instruction. 
 
Following the sidebar, the judge instructed the jury that 
the trooper's testimony regarding four individuals being 
arrested in the city of Boston was not evidence in the case as 
it was struck from the record, and not for the jury to consider 
"in any regard to this case."  The judge further instructed: 
"When an answer is stricken from the record, it doesn't 
exist.  When you determine what the facts are from the 
case, you are sworn to determine those facts solely and 
exclusively from the evidence presented in the case, and 
you may never consider evidence anything that's been 
stricken from the record." 
 
Despite the judge's instruction, on the resumption of LaBarge's 
direct testimony, in response to the prosecutor's question 
regarding the fingerprints he asked the other trooper to 
compare, LaBarge responded, "The four individuals I previously 
spoke of."  Again, defense requested a sidebar, and renewed his 
motion for a mistrial.  The judge again denied the motion, 
struck the testimony, and gave a curative instruction.  In his 
instruction, the judge not only reminded the jury of his 
previous instruction, he also reiterated that when an answer has 
been struck, "it doesn't exist in the evidence, and you may not 
consider it in anyway." 
 
The defendant argues that LaBarge's testimony constituted 
"prejudicial subsequent bad acts evidence" that carried the risk 
28 
 
 
of "distracting the jury from the main issue."  The denial of a 
motion for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 408 Mass. 510, 517 (1990).  Given the 
trial judge's "broad discretion in deciding whether to declare a 
mistrial," we have instructed that "'this court should defer to 
that judge's determination of whether [there was] prejudicial 
error, how much any such error infected the trial, and whether 
it was possible to correct that error through instruction to the 
jury.'"  Commonwealth v. Amran, 471 Mass. 354, 359 (2015), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 146, 157 (1999).  This 
is because "[a] trial judge is in the best position to determine 
whether a mistrial, an extreme measure available to a trial 
judge to address error, is necessary, or whether a less dramatic 
measure, such as a curative instruction, is adequate."  Amran, 
supra at 360. 
 
Here, Trooper LaBarge's two references to "four individuals 
that were arrested in the city of Boston" were improper.  
Although the trial judge noted during the colloquy outside the 
presence of the jury that the trooper's comment was "entirely 
inappropriate," he also pointed out that the jury did not 
actually learn that the defendant was arrested for home invasion 
in Suffolk County.  Nor were the jury ever made aware that the 
defendant was prosecuted and served time in prison for the home 
invasion.  Thus, the judge ultimately determined that the error 
29 
 
 
could be cured by striking both responses and giving a "strong 
cautionary instruction."  See id. ("Where the judge promptly 
struck the improper testimony and gave a highly specific 
curative instruction, the judge acted appropriately and within 
her discretion").  The curative instruction made clear that the 
trooper's response was not evidence, and thus not to be 
considered.  Moreover, as the Commonwealth points out, the trial 
judge previously had instructed the jury that the defendant "is 
on trial for the indictments before the court, and those 
indictments only."  It is well settled that "[t]he jury are 
presumed to follow the judge's instruction" to disregard the 
evidence, id., and the record in this case does not suggest 
otherwise.  Accordingly, we conclude that the judge did not 
abuse his discretion in denying the motions for mistrial. 
 
5.  The prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant 
argues that certain remarks by the prosecutor during her closing 
argument were prejudicial.  "Remarks made during closing 
arguments are considered in the context of the whole argument, 
the evidence admitted at trial, and the judge's instructions to 
the jury."  Commonwealth v. Whitman, 453 Mass. 331, 343 (2009). 
 
a.  Witness's "enhanced" hearing.  The defendant first 
contends that it was error for the prosecutor to argue that 
Cedeno's hearing was enhanced because she was blindfolded.  
According to the defendant, there were neither facts in evidence 
30 
 
 
nor expert testimony to support such a claim.  Because the 
defendant did not object to this statement at trial, we must 
determine whether the statement was improper, and "if so whether 
[it] created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice."  Commonwealth v. Fritz, 472 Mass. at 351, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Gentile, 437 Mass. at 579-580. 
 
"A prosecutor must limit comment in [the] closing statement 
to the evidence and fair inferences that can be drawn from the 
evidence" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Carriere, 470 
Mass. 1, 22 (2014).  Although "a prosecutor may argue zealously 
in support of inferences favorable to the Commonwealth's case," 
the requirement that the inferences "reasonably may be drawn 
from the evidence" remains.  Id.  Such was not the case here.  
The record is devoid of evidence, much less expert evidence, 
suggesting that Cedeno had enhanced hearing due to her temporary 
blindfolding. 
 
Although impermissible, we conclude that no substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice arose from the 
prosecutor's statement.  We have observed, "[i]n [certain] 
circumstances, [an] isolated remark does not warrant a new 
trial.  'Excusable hyperbole is not a ground for reversal, and 
the jury are presumed to have a certain measure of 
sophistication in sorting out excessive claims on both sides.'"  
Commonwealth v. Sylvia, 456 Mass. 182, 195 (2010), quoting 
31 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 442 Mass. 826, 835 (2004).  Moreover, as 
the Commonwealth points out, the prosecutor's enhanced hearing 
statement was cumulative of other evidence suggesting that there 
were four assailants present in the apartment with Cedeno and 
Castro, including Cedeno's testimony that she knew four people 
were present because she saw "feet walking around the 
apartment."  Last, when raising his objections to the 
prosecutor's closing argument, defense counsel neither objected 
nor requested a curative instruction on this ground.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ahart, 464 Mass. 437, 442 (2013) ("the absence 
of any objection or request for a curative instruction by 
experienced defense counsel is some indication that the comment 
by the prosecutor could not have created a substantial 
likelihood of miscarriage of justice"). 
 
b.  Bite mark on the duct tape.  The defendant next 
contends that the prosecutor improperly argued that the 
indentation in the duct tape found in the bathroom trash bin was 
a bite mark.  The Commonwealth argues that, based on the 
evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have 
inferred that the indentation on the duct tape found in Castro's 
bathroom was a tooth mark produced by someone who tore the tape.  
We agree.  Three pieces of evidence presented at trial support 
our conclusion:  (1) the end of the duct tape was torn, (2) the 
presence of DNA was detected on the duct tape, and (3) saliva is 
32 
 
 
among the human biological fluids that provides a source of DNA.  
Therefore, we conclude that no prejudicial error arose from the 
prosecutor's statement. 
 
c.  Characterization of DNA testimony.  The defendant last 
argues that the prosecutor improperly equated the DNA statistics 
of a 99.999 per cent match with the proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard.  We disagree.  As pointed out by the trial 
judge, a close reading of the record reveals that the 
Commonwealth's remarks regarding the DNA statistics did not 
equate reasonable doubt to a percentage.  Rather, the 
prosecutor's remarks focused on the certainty, described in 
terms of percentages, of the defendant's DNA matching the major 
profile in the DNA mixture on the piece of duct tape found in 
the bathroom trash bin.  Accordingly, the prosecutor's remarks 
did not constitute error. 
 
Even if the remarks were error, they did not create a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  Here again, 
that fact that defense counsel neither objected nor sought a 
curative instruction provides some indication that the remarks 
did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Ahart, 464 Mass. at 442.  Indeed, in raising his objections 
to the prosecutor's closing argument, defense counsel stated 
that because of the way the prosecutor characterized the DNA 
statistics, he did not believe it mischaracterized the 
33 
 
 
reasonable doubt standard, and thus did not object.  
Additionally, the trial judge twice instructed the jury -- 
before and after closing arguments -- on the purpose of closing 
arguments, noting they are an opportunity for the attorneys to 
be zealous advocates for their respective clients, and 
cautioning that the judge, not the attorneys, instruct on the 
law that applies to the case.  As we have observed, in cases 
where "close questions arise whether the prosecutor has gone 
over the line between fair and improper argument," we recognize 
that "closing argument is identified as argument, the jury 
understands that, instructions from the judge inform the jury 
that closing argument is not evidence, and instructions may 
mitigate any prejudice in the final argument."  Commonwealth v. 
Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 517 (1987). 
 
6.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
conducted a complete review of the record pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, and we discern no basis to grant relief.  The 
defendant argues that we should exercise our powers under § 33E 
to reduce his murder in the first degree conviction to a 
conviction of manslaughter or murder in the second degree.  In 
support of this request, the defendant points out that during 
trial, the Commonwealth, for the second time, offered him a plea 
to the lesser included offenses of manslaughter with a term of 
imprisonment of from fifteen years to fifteen years and one day, 
34 
 
 
which the defendant declined.  That the Commonwealth offered the 
defendant a plea arrangement does not provide grounds on which 
to grant relief pursuant to § 33E and "is irrelevant to our 
inquiry."  Commonwealth v. Cintron, 435 Mass. 509, 525 (2001), 
overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 
230, 242 (2009).  Thus, the defendant's argument is unavailing, 
and we decline to exercise our power pursuant to § 33E on this 
ground. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.