Case Title: State v. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: 119PA18

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 119PA18  
Filed 14 August 2020 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER NATHANIEL SMITH 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous, 
unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, State v. Smith, No. COA17-680, 2018 
WL 1598522 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018), finding no error in part and remanding for 
resentencing a judgment entered on 8 July 2016 by Judge Reuben F. Young in 
Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 8 January 2020. 
 
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Tiffany Y. Lucas, Special Deputy 
Attorney General, for the State. 
 
Yoder Law PLLC, by Jason Christopher Yoder, for defendant. 
 
 
NEWBY, Justice. 
 
In this case we decide whether defendant’s motion to dismiss preserved for 
appellate review all sufficiency of the evidence challenges, and if so, whether 
defendant qualifies as a teacher under N.C.G.S § 14-27.7. Though at trial defendant 
made arguments about only one specific element of the crime with which he was 
charged in support of his motion to dismiss, defendant’s timely motion and his timely 
renewal of that motion preserved for appellate review all sufficiency of the evidence 
issues. Nevertheless, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss 
STATE V. SMITH 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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since, based on the facts of his case, defendant was properly categorized as a “teacher” 
under our criminal statutes prohibiting sexual offenses with students. Thus, we 
modify and affirm the Court of Appeals decision upholding defendant’s convictions.  
The evidence at trial showed the following: though denominated as a 
“substitute teacher,” defendant worked full-time at Knightdale High School, initially 
as an In-School Suspension (ISS) teacher and then as a Physical Education (PE) 
teacher. He worked the same hours as a certified teacher, which included a regularly 
scheduled planning period. He taught at the school on a long-term assignment and 
was an employee of Wake County Public Schools. Defendant began the position with 
hopes of becoming a certified teacher. While defendant did not have his teaching 
certificate, his transition to the PE department was intended for him to “get a feel 
for” the position so he would have experience and “be ready” when he tested to receive 
his certificate and began to serve as a licensed teacher through lateral entry. 
Defendant met minor D.F., a student at Knightdale High, during his time teaching 
at the school. On 29 October 2014 D.F. went to defendant’s home. D.F. alleged the 
two engaged in sexual activity.  
D.F.’s father became suspicious of D.F. and defendant’s relationship, so he 
brought his concerns to the school’s attention. After an internal investigation, the 
school’s resource officer reported the matter to the Raleigh Police Department. 
STATE V. SMITH 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Defendant was thereafter indicted for two counts of engaging in sexual activity with 
a student pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7 (2013)1. The indictment alleged that: 
I. [O]n or about October 29, 2014, in Wake County, the 
defendant 
named 
above 
unlawfully, 
willfully, 
and 
feloniously did engage in vaginal intercourse with 
D.F. . . . At the time of this offense, the defendant was a 
teacher at Knightdale High School and the victim was a 
student at this same school. . . . This act was done in 
violation of N[.]C[.]G[.]S[.] § 14-27.7(B). 
 
II. [O]n or about October 29, 2014, in Wake County, the 
defendant 
named 
above 
unlawfully, 
willfully, 
and 
feloniously did engage in a sexual act with D.F. . . . At the 
time of this offense, the defendant was a teacher at 
Knightdale High School and the victim was a student at 
this same school. . . . This act was done in violation of 
N[.]C[.]G[.]S[.] § 14-27.7(B). 
 
The case proceeded to trial. At the close of the State’s evidence, defense counsel 
made a motion to dismiss based on insufficient evidence. He asserted the following:  
Your Honor, we would like to make a Motion to Dismiss. 
Very briefly, the State hasn’t met every element of the 
charge. I don’t think there are – I know that the Court is to 
take every inference in the light most favorable to the State 
but there’s also case law when the State’s case conflict [sic] 
to such a degree the Court is to take that into 
consideration. We would argue this is that type of case, 
Your Honor. 
 
The victim has stated that sexual intercourse lasted five 
minutes. She then stated the next day it was between 20 
and 30 minutes. She then stated in court it was between 10 
                                            
1 Because the 2013 version of N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7 was the controlling version of the 
statute when the events occurred here, we utilize the 2013 version in this opinion. We note, 
however, that the statute has since been recodified as N.C.G.S. §§ 14-27.31, 14-27.32 (2015).  
STATE V. SMITH 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-4- 
and 15 minutes. There is evidence of the victim not being 
credible, Your Honor. 
 
There is a police report where she told her dad that she 
saved the contact information under “parentheses A.” 
There was evidence that she told the officer that it was 
under “dot dot dot.” There’s evidence that she was 
interviewed by the officer and she didn’t give the officer 
information. At first she said, well, I didn’t, I wouldn’t lie; 
I would just omit information, and then she changed that 
to hide information. She didn’t tell information about 
marijuana. She was interviewed by Officer Emser twice 
and she didn’t give information about alleged oral sex 
occurring on November 11. She was interviewed by two 
officers. But then she comes here in court and says that the 
act did occur. 
 
Your Honor, based on this evidence we would ask that you 
find that the State’s evidence conflicts to such a degree that 
the Motion to Dismiss should be granted.  
 
The trial court denied the motion. At the end of all the evidence, defense 
counsel renewed the motion to dismiss: 
Your Honor, at the end of all the evidence the Defendant 
would like to renew his Motion To Dismiss. There’s no 
physical evidence. We would argue the eight pillows, the 
bottom sheet, the comforter, the blanket and the Toshiba 
laptop were not tested. There’s been conflict in the victim’s 
own testimony. Based on that we would renew our Motion 
to Dismiss. 
 
The trial court again denied the motion. Ultimately, the jury convicted 
defendant of two counts of sexual activity with a student.  
Defendant appealed, arguing to the Court of Appeals, inter alia, that the trial 
court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss because the evidence at trial did not 
STATE V. SMITH 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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establish that he was a “teacher” within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7(b). In the 
alternative, defendant argued that his motion to dismiss should have been granted 
because there was a fatal variance between the indictment and proof at trial since 
the indictment alleged defendant was a “teacher,” but his status as a substitute 
teacher made him “school personnel” under section 14-27.7(b).  
The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant had failed to preserve either 
argument for appellate review. State v. Smith, 2018 WL 1598522, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. 
Apr. 3, 2018). The Court of Appeals reasoned that, though a general motion to dismiss 
preserves for appellate review all arguments on the sufficiency of the evidence, id. at 
*2 (citing State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 383, 93 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1956)), when a 
defendant makes a more specific motion to dismiss, he only preserves for appellate 
review a sufficiency of the evidence argument for that specific element argued, id. at 
*3. Thus, it opined that any other sufficiency of the evidence argument pertaining to 
other elements of the crime would not be preserved by a defendant’s motion to 
dismiss. Id. (citing State v. Walker, 252 N.C. App. 409, 411–12, 798 S.E.2d 529, 530–
31 (2017), abrogated by State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238, 839 S.E.2d 782 (2020)). The 
Court of Appeals noted that defendant’s initial motion to dismiss “focused on the 
veracity of D.F.’s testimony and the lack of physical evidence supporting the 
allegations that any sexual conduct had occurred,” which defendant narrowed in his 
renewed motion to dismiss when he referenced the preceding arguments and stated 
that his renewed motion was “based on [those arguments.]” Id. at *3. Thus, because 
STATE V. SMITH 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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it believed defendant had limited his motion to a single element, “whether sexual 
activity had occurred,” the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant had not 
preserved appellate review of any argument based on whether he qualified as a 
teacher under the applicable statute. Id.2 The Court of Appeals also concluded that 
defendant’s fatal variance argument was not preserved because it was not expressly 
presented to the trial court. Id. 
Before this Court, defendant first asserts that he sufficiently preserved for 
appellate review all sufficiency of the evidence issues through his motion to dismiss 
at trial. At the time that the Court of Appeals decided this case, this Court had not 
addressed the specific issue of when a motion to dismiss preserves all sufficiency of 
the evidence issues for appellate review. Subsequently, this Court examined that 
question in State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238, 839 S.E.2d 782 (2020). In Golder, we held 
that “Rule 10(a)(3) provides that a defendant preserves all insufficiency of the 
evidence issues for appellate review simply by making a motion to dismiss the action 
at the proper time.” Id. Thus, as set forth in Golder, under Rule 10(a)(3), so long as a 
defendant moves to dismiss a case at the appropriate times, his motion preserves “all 
issues related to the sufficiency of the evidence for appellate review.” Id. Because 
                                            
2 The Court of Appeals also addressed defendant’s argument that “if his trial counsel 
failed to preserve th[e substantive] issue for appeal, then he received ineffective assistance 
of counsel.” Smith, 2018 WL 1598522, at *4. Because we ultimately conclude that defendant 
preserved his argument through the motion to dismiss at trial, we need not reach defendant’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
STATE V. SMITH 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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defendant here made a general motion to dismiss at the appropriate time and 
renewed that motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence, his motion properly 
preserved all sufficiency of the evidence issues.   
On the merits of his case, defendant argues there was not substantial evidence 
that he was a “teacher” under the statute. He claims his position is better 
denominated as “substitute teacher,” which falls under “school personnel.” Thus 
defendant’s argument requires us to evaluate the language of several statutes. 
N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7(b) (2013) provides that 
If a defendant, who is a teacher, school administrator, 
student teacher, school safety officer, or coach, at any age, 
or who is other school personnel, and who is at least four 
years older than the victim engages in vaginal intercourse 
or a sexual act with a victim who is a student, at any time 
during or after the time the defendant and victim were 
present together in the same school, but before the victim 
ceases to be a student, the defendant is guilty of a Class G 
felony . . . . For purposes of this subsection, the terms 
“school”, “school personnel”, and “student” shall have the 
same meaning as in G.S. 14-202.4(d).  
 
Section 14-202.4, which criminalizes taking indecent liberties with a student, 
states that “ ‘[s]chool personnel’ means any person included in the definition 
contained in G.S. 115C-332(a)(2), and any person who volunteers at a school or school-
sponsored activity.” N.C.G.S. § 14-202.4(d)(3) (2013). The statute referenced in 
section 14-202.4 is not within the chapter of the North Carolina General Statutes 
relating to criminal law but falls under a section about criminal history checks within 
STATE V. SMITH 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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North Carolina’s education statutes. Section 115C-332 casts a wide net defining the 
identity of individuals who should be subjected to criminal history checks in a 
seeming attempt to require background checks for all those who interact with 
students in the school system. Therefore, section 115C-332 provides that  
(2) “School personnel” means any: 
 
a. Employee of a local board of education whether 
full-time or part-time, or 
 
b. Independent contractor or employee of an 
independent contractor of a local board of education, 
if the independent contractor carries out duties 
customarily performed by school personnel,  
 
whether paid with federal, State, local, or other funds, who 
has significant access to students. School personnel 
includes substitute teachers, driving training teachers, bus 
drivers, clerical staff, and custodians. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 115C-332(a)(2) (2013).  
Here we are asked to construe these statutes and determine what the General 
Assembly intended by the reference to teachers in N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7(b). It is a well-
established principle of statutory construction that “the intent of the Legislature 
controls.” In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 95, 240 S.E.2d 367, 371 (1978). In evaluating all 
of the above statutes, it is evident that the General Assembly intended to cast a wide 
net prohibiting criminal sexual conduct with students by any adult working on school 
property. It is clear that the legislature intended that each category be read broadly 
with a common-sense understanding. A person’s categorization as a “teacher” should 
STATE V. SMITH 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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be based on a common-sense evaluation of all the facts of the case, not a hyper-
technical interpretation based solely on the individual’s title. Such a case-by-case 
analysis involves evaluating, among other circumstances, whether the individual is 
serving in a full-time or truly part-time position, and whether the individual is in fact 
teaching students on a regular basis. Taking into account all circumstances in a 
specific case to determine whether an individual is a “teacher” under N.C.G.S. § 14-
27.7 serves the intended purpose by giving a common-sense interpretation of the word 
“teacher” and protecting students from sexual offenses by adults serving within the 
school system.  
This reasoning is supported by the fact that N.C.G.S. § 115C-332(a)(2) makes 
clear that the legislature intended to subject anyone working in a school-related role, 
even ones with less face-to-face access to students such as custodians and non-
employees of the school system, to criminal history checks to ensure the protection of 
students. Therefore, the statutory reference to “substitute teacher” under “school 
personnel” does not preclude someone with the title of substitute teacher from 
actually being a “teacher” for purposes of the criminal statute, N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7. To 
the contrary, whether an individual is a teacher under the criminal statute depends 
on the facts of the case and the nature of the position in which the individual served.  
Thus, the facts of this case, not merely defendant’s title, determine whether he 
was a “teacher” under the statute. The evidence indicated that defendant was in a 
full-time position. Defendant testified that in serving as a PE teacher, his 
STATE V. SMITH 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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understanding of the job was that he would work full-time and “be a teacher without 
my certification.” Defendant served as an ISS teacher for a month on a regular basis 
before moving into the PE spot, which also provided a full-time schedule. This move 
to the PE department was intended for defendant to “get a feel for” the position so he 
would have experience and “be ready” when he qualified to receive his certificate and 
serve as a licensed teacher through lateral entry. Despite his lack of certification, 
defendant was at the school on a long-term assignment, an employee of Wake County 
Public Schools, and held to the same standards as a certified teacher. Defendant 
taught at the school daily, had a planning period, and had full access to students as 
any certified teacher would. The only difference between defendant and other 
teachers was his title based on his lack of a teaching certificate at that time.  
Given the statute’s clear intent to protect students from sexual encounters 
with adults working in their schools, it is evident that the various titles set forth in 
the relevant statutory language should be interpreted functionally, taking into 
account the nature in which an individual served, as opposed to simply considering 
the individual’s title in a hyper-technical manner. The position defendant fulfilled 
falls within the “teacher” category as described by N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7. While every 
substitute teacher may not qualify as a “teacher” under the statute, given the 
circumstances and facts of this case, defendant fell within the “teacher” category 
under the statute.  
STATE V. SMITH 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Because we conclude that defendant was correctly deemed a teacher in this 
case, the same analysis would apply to defendant’s secondary argument—that the 
trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because there was a fatal 
variance between the indictment, alleging that defendant was a teacher, and the 
evidence at trial, which he asserts showed that defendant was actually “school 
personnel.” Therefore, assuming without deciding that defendant’s fatal variance 
argument was preserved, defendant’s argument would not prevail for the same 
reasoning. 
Since defendant moved to dismiss at the appropriate time at trial and timely 
renewed his motion, he sufficiently preserved for appellate review whether the State 
presented sufficient evidence of each element of the crime for which he was convicted. 
Nonetheless, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss as 
defendant falls within the teacher category as defined in N.C.G.S. § 14-27.7. The 
Court of Appeals decision is therefore modified and affirmed.   
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.