Case Title: WALTER v PUBLIC AUCTION YARDS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1979-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 14323 I N THE S U P I i E M E COUIiT OF THE STATE: OF MONTANA 1978 c l m u m J 2 L . BOICHERS, Petitioner ard Respondent, -VS- JOHN R A Y M O N D McCARTEFt, J R . , Respondent and Appellant. m a 1 frm: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eleventh Judicial D i s t r i c t , Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: m d e n , Walterskirchen & Christiansen, Kalispell, bbntana Richard DeJana argued, Kalispell, Montana For Respondent: Patrick Springer, County Attorney, Kalispell, Wntana Russell K. Jones argued, Deputy County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana Fbbert Allison, Kalispell, Montana Filed : Submitted: November 17, 1978 Decided: MAR 2 . 1979 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. On September 14, 1976, p e t i t i o n e r , Charlene L. Borchers, f i l e d a p e t i t i o n and o r d e r i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l District, Flathead County, pursuant t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e "Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support A c t (1968)" [URESA], s e c t i o n s 93-2601-41 through 93- 2601-82, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n s 40-5-101 through 40-5-142 MCA. On December 1 3 t h e D i s t r i c t Court ordered t h a t t h e matter be h e l d i n abeyance pending a n a d j u d i c a t i o n of t h e p a t e r n i t y i s s u e . Respondent, John Raymond McCarter, Jr., was subsequently found t o be t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r of p e t i - t i o n e r ' s daughter following a jury t r i a l commencing March 6, 1978. H e appeals. P e t i t i o n e r and respondent m e t i n June 1965 w h i l e work- i n g a t a r e t i r e m e n t home i n t h e S t a t e of Oregon. A t t h e t i m e they m e t , p e t i t i o n e r was married t o C a r l Borchers, b u t they p a r t e d i n December 1965. H e r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h respon- d e n t then developed r a p i d l y , and s h e became pregnant. I n June 1966, respondent moved t o D e t r o i t , Michigan, b u t con- t i n u e d t o correspond w i t h p e t i t i o n e r . On November 1, 1966, p e t i t i o n e r gave b i r t h t o a baby g i r l . A t t h e t i m e of t h e b i r t h , p e t i t i o n e r w a s l a w f u l l y married t o C a r l Borchers. H i s name appears on t h e c h i l d ' s b i r t h c e r t i f i c a t e as t h e f a t h e r . P e t i t i o n e r subsequently obtained a d i v o r c e from him on November 30, 1966, having waited u n t i l a f t e r t h e baby's b i r t h t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e d i v o r c e proceedings. Over t h e course of t h e n e x t s e v e r a l y e a r s , p e t i t i o n e r made a number of a t t e m p t s t o o b t a i n c h i l d support payments from respondent pursuant t o URESA. I n 1967, she f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r support i n Marion County, Oregon. I t was forwarded t o Lake County, Montana, b u t never prosecuted. A second U R E S A p e t i t i o n w a s f i l e d i n Oklahoma County, Okla- homa, and forwarded t o Lake County, Montana, i n 1969. Again, no a c t i o n w a s taken on t h e p e t i t i o n . After 1969 p e t i t i o n e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t she l o s t t r a c k of respondent f o r some years. During t h i s t i m e she was remar- r i e d , i n 1971, and l a t e r divorced, i n 1973. The next U R E S A p e t i t i o n was f i l e d i n Benton County, Oregon, i n 1975, and forwarded t o Denver County, Colorado. A l i t t l e more than a year l a t e r a f o u r t h p e t i t i o n was f i l e d i n Benton County, Oregon, and forwarded t o Boulder County, Colorado. Then, on September 3, 1976, a f i f t h p e t i t i o n was f i l e d i n Benton County, Oregon, and forwarded t o Flathead County, Montana. This l a s t p e t i t i o n forms t h e b a s i s of t h e i n s t a n t case. N o evidence was introduced t o show t h a t respondent was served with process u n t i l 1976. After he had been served i n 1976, a hearing was held a t which time respondent moved t o dismiss t h e c i t a t i o n and a s s e r t e d a s a defense t h a t he was n o t t h e f a t h e r of t h e c h i l d named i n t h e p e t i t i o n . On December 13, 1976, t h e Honorable James M. Salansky ordered: "1. That t h i s matter be held i n abeyance u n t i l P e t i t i o n e r , through her own counsel, b r i n g s an a c t i o n f o r p a t e r n i t y a g a i n s t Respondent. "2. That upon judgment being entered i n any ac- t i o n f o r p a t e r n i t y brought by P e t i t i o n e r a g a i n s t Respondent t h e Court w i l l again consider t h e above matter." O n August 2 4 , 1977, t h e deputy county a t t o r n e y f o r Flathead County f i l e d a " P e t i t i o n f o r Determination of P a t e r n i t y " i n t h e same c o u r t and under t h e same cause number a s t h e a c t i o n which had previously been held i n abeyance. Following a f l u r r y of p r e t r i a l motions, t h e t r i a l began on March 6, 1978, and r e s u l t e d i n a jury v e r d i c t finding: "1. The presumption t h a t Carl H. Borchers i s t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r of Jayne Eliazabeth [ s i c ] Borchers has been rebutted. - "2. John Raymond McCarter, Jr., i s t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r of Jayne Elizabeth ~ o r c h e r s . " Respondent appeals from t h i s jury v e r d i c t , and p e t i - t i o n e r has moved t o dismiss t h e appeal a s premature. A number of i s s u e s a r e presented f o r review b u t w e f i n d two i s s u e s t o be d i s p o s i t i v e of t h i s case: 1. Whether t h e appeal should be dismissed f o r absence of a f i n a l determination from which an appeal may be taken. 2. Whether f a i l u r e t o r e b u t t h e presumption t h a t C a r l Borchers was t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r of t h e c h i l d w i t h i n f i v e years of t h e c h i l d ' s b i r t h b a r s a p a t e r n i t y a c t i o n a g a i n s t a nonpresumed person. On May 4 , 1978, respondent f i l e d h i s n o t i c e of appeal i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court. On May 23, p e t i t i o n e r moved t h i s Court t o dismiss t h e appeal on t h e grounds t h a t ". . . no f i n a l , appealable judgment and order of support [had] been entered i n t h i s a c t i o n . . ." The motion was submitted without b r i e f . Respondent argued i n opposition t o t h e motion t o dismiss t h a t t h e p a t e r n i t y determination and t h e support determination a r e , i n e f f e c t , s e p a r a t e a c t i o n s and t h a t t h e jury v e r d i c t i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e i s an appealable f i n a l judgment under Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P. Section 93-2601-67, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-5-128 MCA, provides: " I f t h e o b l i g o r asserts a s a defense t h a t he i s n o t t h e f a t h e r of t h e c h i l d f o r whom support i s sought and it appears t o t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e defense i s n o t f r i v o l o u s , and i f both of t h e p a r t i e s a r e p r e s e n t a t t h e hearing o r t h e proof required i n t h e c a s e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e presence of e i t h e r o r b o t h of t h e p a r t i e s i s n o t neces- s a r y , t h e c o u r t may a d j u d i c a t e t h e p a t e r n i t y i s s u e . Otherwise t h e c o u r t may adjourn t h e hearing u n t i l t h e p a t e r n i t y i s s u e has been ad- judicated." C i t i n g B l a c k ' s Law Dictionary (Rev. 4 t h Ed. 1968), t h e Oregon Supreme Court found a n " a d j u d i c a t i o n " t o be " t h e g i v i n g o r pronouncing a judgment o r decree i n a cause." Vasquez v. Courtney (1975), 272 O r . 477, 537 P.2d 536, 537. See a l s o , Leonard v. Leonard (1965), 88 Idaho 485, 401 P.2d 541, 545; and, S t a t e v. Hoffman (1963), 230 O r . 98, 385 P.2d 741, 743-44. The District C o u r t ' s o r d e r of December 13, 1976, i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i n providing " [ t l h a t upon judgment being e n t e r e d - i n any a c t i o n f o r p a t e r n i t y brought by P e t i t i o n e r a g a i n s t Respondent t h e Court w i l l a g a i n con- s i d e r t h e above m a t t e r . " (Emphasis added.) Therefore, w e f i n d t h a t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t r e t u r n e d March 7, 1978, amounted, i n substance, t o a f i n a l judgment from which a n appeal may be taken pursuant t o Rule 1, M.R.App.Civ.P. W e a r e l e f t , then, w i t h t h e t a s k of determining whether f a i l u r e t o r e b u t t h e presumption t h a t C a r l Borchers w a s t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r of t h e c h i l d w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s of t h e c h i l d ' s b i r t h should have b a r r e d t h i s p a t e r n i t y a c t i o n a g a i n s t a nonpresumed person. W e f i n d t h a t it should have. I n 1950 t h e National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform S t a t e Laws approved t h e Uniform Reciprocal Enforce- ment of Support A c t . The A c t was subsequently amended i n 1952, 1958, and 1968. Montana f i r s t adopted URESA i n 1951, Ch. 222, Laws of Montana (1951). That a c t w a s replaced i n 1961 when Montana adopted t h e 1958 v e r s i o n of URESA, Ch. 208, Laws of Montana (1961). Then, i n 1969, Montana adopted t h e ~ e v i s e d Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support A c t , ~ h . 237, Laws of Montana (1969). W e n o t e s e c t i o n 93-2601- 81, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-5-142 MCA, provides t h a t " [ t l h i s act s h a l l be s o construed a s t o e f f e c t u a t e i t s g e n e r a l purpose t o make uniform t h e law of t h o s e s t a t e s which e n a c t i t . " A number of r e c e n t c a s e s , a r i s i n g i n j u r i s d i c t i o n s which have n o t adopted t h e 1968 r e v i s e d a c t , have affirma- t i v e l y answered t h e i s s u e of whether URESA, a b s e n t t h e 1968 amendment e x p r e s s l y providing f o r p a t e r n i t y determination, i m p l i c i t l y a u t h o r i z e s c o u r t s t o determine p a t e r n i t y . See G r e e n s t r e e t v . Clark (Iowa 1976), 239 N.W.2d 143; Clarkston v. Bride (1975), 273 O r . 68, 539 P.2d 1094; and, Yetter v. Comrneau (1974), 84 Wash.2d 155, 524 P.2d 901. Montana has adopted t h e c l e a r s t a t u t o r y language of s e c t i o n 27 of t h e Revised Uniform A c t , l e a v i n g no q u e s t i o n a s t o whether a c o u r t can determine p a t e r n i t y a s p a r t of a URESA a c t i o n i n t h i s s t a t e , s e c t i o n 93-2601-67, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40- 5-128 MCA. However, s p e c i f i c procedures f o r addressing t h e p a t e r n i t y i s s u e are n o t set f o r t h i n t h e r e v i s e d uniform a c t . Our l e g i s l a t u r e has, though, provided a s t a t u t o r y method of determining p a t e r n i t y under t h e Uniform Parentage A c t , s e c t i o n 61-301 e t s e q . , R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-6- 101 e t seq. MCA. When faced w i t h s t a t u t e s which a d d r e s s t h e same s u b j e c t , w e "must harmonize [them], i f p o s s i b l e , and g i v e e f f e c t t o each." S t a t e ex rel. I r v i n v. Anderson (1974), 164 Mont. 513, 524, 525 P.2d 564, 570. "where s t a t u t e s r e l a t e t o t h e s a m e g e n e r a l s u b j e c t they should be s o construed t o g e t h e r , where t h e r e i s no i n c o n s i s t e n c y between them, s o as t o g i v e e f f e c t t o both where p o s s i b l e . " City of B i l l i n g s v. Smith (1971), 158 Mont. 197, 212, 490 The c o u r t i n Clarkston, supra, noting s i m i l a r circum- s t a n c e s , s t a t e d : "Since t h e i s s u e s involved i n e s t a b l i s h i n g pater- n i t y i n a U R E S A proceeding p r e c i s e l y p a r a l l e l those r a i s e d i n a f i l i a t i o n proceeding, w e b e l i e v e t h a t , a b s e n t some d i s t i n g u i s h i n g p o l i c y , p a r a l l e l proce- dures should be followed. "The U R E S A i s a remedial s t a t u t e designed t o equal- i z e t h e r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n s of residence and non- r e s i d e n t p l a i n t i f f s i n support proceedings. While it r e f l e c t s a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e r e s t i n minimizing t h e a d d i t i o n a l burdens and expenses which would otherwise be incurred by nonresident p l a i n t i f f s , t h i s i n t e r e s t must be balanced a g a i n s t a l e g i s l a t i v e concern f o r t h e s e n s i t i v i t y of p a t e r n i t y adjudica- t i o n s and t h e corresponding l e g i s l a t i v e policy of providing procedural p r o t e c t i o n s f o r such determina- t i o n s . . ." Clarkston, 539 P.2d a t 1099. The Uniform Parentage A c t recognizes t h i s connection i n s e c t i o n 61-309(1), R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-6-109 (1) MCA, which provides: "The d i s t r i c t c o u r t has j u r s i d i c t i o n of an a c t i o n brought under t h i s a c t . The a c t i o n may be joined with an a c t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n , annulment, s e p a r a t e maintenance, support, o r adoption." (Emphasis added. ) W e hold then t h a t t h e i s s u e of p a t e r n i t y i n a U R E S A a c t i o n s h a l l be determined according t o t h e provisions of t h e "Uniform Parentage Act," s e c t i o n 61-301 e t seq., R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-6-101 e t seq. MCA. See Matter of Marriage of Gridley (1977), 28 Or-App. 145, 558 P.2d 1277, I n applying t h e Uniform Parentage Act a s adopted i n Montana, t o t h e f a c t s of t h e i n s t a n t case, w e f i r s t note t h a t s e c t i o n 61-305, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-6-105 MCA, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : " ( 1 ) A man i s presumed t o be t h e n a t u r a l f a t h e r of a c h i l d i f : " ( a ) he and t h e c h i l d ' s n a t u r a l mother a r e o r have been married t o each o t h e r and t h e c h i l d i s born during t h e marriage, o r within t h r e e hundred (300) days a f t e r t h e marriage i s terminated by death, annulment, d e c l a r a t i o n of i n v a l i d i t y , o r divorce, o r a f t e r a decree of separation i s entered by a c o u r t ; " ( 2 ) A presumption under t h i s s e c t i o n may be r e b u t t e d i n an appropriate a c t i o n by a preponder- ance of t h e evidence." Thus, according t o our s t a t u t e , C a r l Borchers i s t h e presumed f a t h e r of t h e c h i l d . Section 61-307, R.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-6-107 MCA, addresses who may bring an a c t i o n t o determine a f a t h e r and c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p . " ( 1 ) Any i n t e r e s t e d p a r t y may bring an a c t i o n f o r t h e purpose of determining t h e e x i s t e n c e o r non- e x i s t e n c e of t h e f a t h e r and c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p presumed pursuant - t o s e c t i o n 61-305. " ( 2 ) A n a c t i o n t o determine t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e f a t h e r and c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p with r e s p e c t t o a c h i l d who has no presumed f a t h e r under s e c t i o n 61-305 may be brought by t h e c h i l d , t h e mother o r personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e c h i l d , t h e department of s o c i a l and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n ser- v i c e s o r its appropriate l o c a l a f f i l i a t e , t h e personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o r a p a r e n t of t h e mother i f t h e mother has died, a man a l l e g e d o r a l l e g i n g himself t o be t h e f a t h e r , o r t h e personal repre- s e n t a t i v e o r a p a r e n t of t h e a l l e g e d f a t h e r i f t h e a l l e g e d f a t h e r has died o r is a minor." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, i n Montana, a person wishing t o e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e f a t h e r and c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p between a c h i l d and a nonpresumed person, where t h e c h i l d has a pre- sumed f a t h e r pursuant t o s e c t i o n 61-305, X.C.M. 1947, now s e c t i o n 40-6-105 MCA, must f i r s t r e b u t t h e s t a t u t o r y pre- sumption of p a t e r n i t y i n another. A s a r e s u l t , s e c t i o n 61-308(1), R.C.M. 1947, now sec- t i o n 40-6-108(1) MCA, a p p l i e s t o t h e i n s t a n t case and b a r s an a c t i o n t o e s t a b l i s h t h e f a t h e r and c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p between respondent and t h e minor daughter. " ( 1 ) Limitation when f a t h e r and c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p i s presumed. " (a) A n a c t i o n may be commenced a t any t i m e f o r t h e purpose of d e c l a r i n g t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e f a t h e r and c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p presumed under paragraph ( a ) , ( b ) , o r ( c ) of s e c t i o n 61-305(1); o r I " ( b ) For t h e purpose of d e c l a r i n g t h e nonexistence -- of -- t h e f a t h e r and c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p presumed under paragraph (a), (b), o r (c) of s e c t i o n 61-305(1) only i f t h e a c t i o n i s brought w i t h i n a reasonable --- t i m e a f t e r ~ b t a i n i n g k n o w l e d ~ e of r e l e v a n t f a c t s , b u t i n no event l a t e r than f i v e (5) y e a r s a f t e r - - --- t h e c h i l d ' s b i r t h . A f t e r t h e ~ r e s u m ~ t i o n has been rebutted, p a t e r n i t y of t h e c h i l d by another man may be determined i n t h e same a c t i o n , i f he has been made a party." (Emphasis added.) Reversed and remanded with d i r e c t i o n s t o e n t e r an o r d e r dismissing t h e a c t i o n . W e concur: J u s t i c e s