Case Title: Com. v. Hilbert

Citation: 382 A.2d 724, 476 Pa. 288

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1978-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
476 Pa. 288 (1978) 382 A.2d 724 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Clara Marie HILBERT, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued March 8, 1977. Decided January 26, 1978. *289 *290 Charles M. Schwartz, Pittsburgh, for appellant. Robert E. Colville, Dist. Atty., Robert L. Eberhardt, Charles W. Johns, Asst. Dist. Attys., Pittsburgh, for appellee. Before EAGEN, C.J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. In 1972, appellant, Clara Marie Hilbert, was convicted of murder of the second degree in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. The evidence establishes that during the evening of December 20, 1971, Hilbert appeared at a police station in Pittsburgh and reported that a man was badly hurt nearby. Officers accompanied her to the scene and found one Lawrence Burr in a car. Burr was badly injured as a result of several stab wounds. He was taken to a hospital and pronounced dead on arrival. An autopsy confirmed that the stab wounds were the cause of death. Police investigation further revealed that there were jimmy marks on Burr's car when the police first came upon it. The marks tended to show a break-in attempt. A screwdriver was found nearby and determined to have caused the marks. A brick was thrown through the car's rear window. Burr's watch and wallet were missing when Burr was discovered by the police but were later found in the vicinity. The officers on the scene arrested Hilbert. After being given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), she admitted having stabbed Burr. Hilbert made the same admission at trial but claimed to have acted in self-defense. She testified that Burr picked her up in her professional capacity as a prostitute and then attacked her. She described a struggle during which Burr choked her and prevented her from leaving the scene. She stated that the attack caused her to *291 stab Burr with a knife she carried for protection. The trial court instructed the jury that Hilbert was required to prove by a preponderance of evidence that she was acting in self-defense. Appellant argues that the court below erred in charging the jury that she was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was acting in self-defense when she stabbed Lawrence Burr. We agree. Initially, we must decide whether the above issue was preserved for appellate review. The Commonwealth contends that appellant's failure to orally argue the burden of proof issue at post-verdict motions precludes her from raising it on appeal. We do not agree. The record in the instant case reveals that defense counsel specifically objected to the burden-of-proof charge at trial and continued this objection in his written post-verdict motions. While the record also shows that counsel did not orally argue the issue during the argument on the post-verdict motions, the trial court decided the merits of this issue adversely to appellant. The Commonwealth contends that this failure to orally argue bars appellant from raising this issue on appeal. We do not agree. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123, in effect at the time that appellant filed her post-verdict motions, provided: Subsection (b) of the Rule provides that only those grounds included in the written motions may be argued to the court. There is nothing in Rule 1123, either the 1972 version or the 1977 version, which requires the oral argument in addition to written enumeration of a ground advanced in post-verdict motions in order to preserve an issue for appellate review. Moreover, in Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A.2d 213 (1975), this court required that the post-verdict court only consider those allegations of error that were included in the written motions. See also Commonwealth v. Roman, 465 Pa. 515, 351 A.2d 214 (1976). The issue concerning the burden of proof was included in the written post-verdict motions and decided by the trial court on the merits. Therefore, this issue is properly preserved for appellate review. Appellant argues that the court below erred in charging the jury that she was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was acting in self-defense when she stabbed Lawrence Burr. We agree.[2] *293 In the instant case, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:[3] The United States Supreme Court, in In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970), stated: In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975), the Supreme Court, following the dictates of Winship, supra, reversed a criminal defendant's conviction of a homicide committed in Maine because the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant carries the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion or sudden provocation to reduce the crime charge from murder to manslaughter.[4] *294 In interpreting the Maine homicide statutes, the Supreme Court determined that the concept of "heat of passion or sudden provocation" negated "malice aforethought," an element of the definition of murder and, therefore, the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits placing a burden of proof upon a criminal defendant to negate an element of the crime with which he or she is charged. Mullaney, supra, continued the Winship mandate that the prosecution must prove all the elements of the crime charged as defined by the crimes statutes of a state or at common law. In Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 97 S. Ct. 2339, 53 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1977), the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction for murder where the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant carries the burden of proof "to your satisfaction" that he acted in self-defense. The defendant in Hankerson was tried prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney, supra. The court, however, determined the burden of proof standard articulated in Winship, supra, and Mullaney, supra, was applicable to all persons on direct appeal regardless of the date of trial. The Hankerson court determined that the North Carolina Supreme Court erred in failing to apply Mullaney to persons tried before the date of that decision. The court held that Mullaney did not announce new law but rather was an application of Winship. Having determined that Winship was, in fact, the controlling precedent, the court further held: After Mullaney and Hankerson, the Supreme Court has made eminently clear that the government has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to prove all elements of the crime charged and that standard is to be given "complete retroactive effect."[5] Subsequent to Mullaney and Hankerson, the Supreme Court decided Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281, 45 L.W. 4708 (June 17, 1977). In Patterson, the court determined that it was constitutionally permissible to place a burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence on a criminal defendant if that defendant was attempting to raise an "affirmative defense" to criminal charges. The court determined that an affirmative defense was one that excused or justified the crime but did not negate an element of the criminal offense charged. The relevant facts in Patterson were: The Supreme Court determined that affirmative defense of "extreme emotional disturbance" did not negate either of the two statutory elements of murder of the second degree and, therefore, the dictates of Winship, Mullaney and Hankerson did not apply. The court in Patterson stated: Since Patterson, the law is clear that a state carries a never-shifting burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt of all the elements of crime, such elements being contained in either statutory or common-law definitions. See Winship, Mullaney and Hankerson. As we read Patterson, however, a State which chooses to do so may constitutionally impose a "burden of proof" on a criminal defendant in relation to an *298 "affirmative defense" which relieves the accused of criminal responsibility, but does not negate an element of the crime as it is defined in that jurisdiction. See Patterson, supra. We must now apply the above burden-of-proof cases to the definition of the crime of murder which existed in Pennsylvania prior to enactment of our 1972 Crimes Code.[6] In Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868), we defined murder as: "In this case we have to deal only with that kind of murder in the first degree described as `wilful, deliberate, and premeditated.' Many cases have been decided under this clause, in all of which it has been held that the intention to kill is the essence of the offence. Therefore, if an intention to kill exists, it is wilful; if this intention be accompanied by such circumstances as evidence a mind fully conscious of its own purpose and design, it is deliberate; and if sufficient time be afforded to enable the mind fully to frame the design to kill, and to select the instrument, or to frame the plan to carry this design into execution, it is premeditated. The law fixes upon no length of time as necessary to form the intention to kill, but leaves the existence of a fully formed intent as a fact to be determined by the jury, from all the facts and circumstances in the evidence." In 1860, the Legislature modified common law to provide two degrees of murder. Murder in the first degree, in addition to the above enumerated elements, was redefined so as to require an intentional killing. Murder of the second degree was then all other murders. Having established the elements of murder in the first degree and second degree, we must now determine whether "self-defense" negates any of the definitional elements. In Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 460 Pa. 201, 331 A.2d 488 (1975), we defined the necessary elements of self-defense as: We are of the opinion that "self-defense" negates two elements of the common-law definition of murder: unlawfulness and malice. In Commonwealth v. Mahoney, supra, we stated that a killing committed in self-defense is an excusable homicide and, therefore, is not "unlawful". See also Mullaney, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 684, 95 S. Ct. 188. Moreover, we are of the opinion that self-defense also negates the element of malice in the common-law definition of murder. A claim of self-defense, if believed, would negate any element of "ill-will, wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty or recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty" necessary to constitute malice. We are, therefore, of the opinion that self-defense negates specific elements of the crime of murder as it existed in this State at common law, i.e., unlawfulness and malice, and it is in contravention of the United States Constitution, as interpreted by Winship, Mullaney and Hankerson, to require a criminal defendant to carry a burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence concerning this defense. Appellant raises other allegations of error we need not discuss because of our resolution of the above issue. Judgment of sentence reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. EAGEN, C.J., files a concurring opinion. ROBERTS, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ., concur in the result. EAGEN, Chief Justice, concurring. I agree self-defense is inconsistent with an element of murder, namely an unlawful killing, as defined under the applicable law of Pennsylvania. Accordingly, I believe Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1975) as explained in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977), is applicable instantly. Since Hankerson v. North Carolina, 423 U.S. 233, 97 S. Ct. 2339, 53 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1977) held Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, was to be given complete retroactive effect, the judgment of sentence must be reversed and a new trial granted. But, in concurring in the reversal of the judgment of sentence, I express no view on whether Patterson v. New York, supra, can be logically reconciled with Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. *302 790, 72 S. Ct. 1002, 96 L. Ed. 1302 (1952). Compare Commonwealth v. Ernst, 476 Pa. 102, 381 A.2d 1245 (1977) (opinion in support of affirmance). [1] The above Rule of Criminal Procedure has since been amended. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123 [1977 Pamphlet] adopted June 8, 1973, effective in forty-five days. [2] The homicide from which the instant appeal arose occurred on December 20, 1971; therefore, the applicable criminal statute is the Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 701, amended by the Act of December 1, 1959, P.L. 1621, § 1. Appendix to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 101 at Former Title 18 P.S. 4701; rather than the Crimes Code, December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, eff. June 6, 1973. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 101, et seq. [3] At the time of appellant's trial the instant charge was in conformity with Commonwealth v. Winebrenner, 439 Pa. 73, 265 A.2d 108 (1970). [4] The relevant Maine murder statute provided: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life." Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 17, § 2651 (1964). The Maine manslaughter statute provided: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought. . . shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years . . .." Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., Tit. 17, § 2551 (1964). [5] This is not a case where this court must face the issue of whether a prior decision should be applied to persons tried prior to that decision, but whose direct appeal to this court is not final. Hankerson has decided the issue for us. [6] As noted previously, the criminal incident upon which this prosecution is based occurred prior to the effective date of the Crimes Code and, therefore, the 1939 Penal Code is applicable.