Case Title: Ex parte Theresa Lawson. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: Angela M. Saunders and Philip Saunders v. Theresa Lawson)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1060664

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel 10/05/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
_________________________
1060664
_________________________
Ex parte Theresa Lawson
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re:  Angela M. Saunders and Philip Saunders
v.
Theresa Lawson)
(Madison Circuit Court, CV-04-869;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2041111)
COBB, Chief Justice.
WRIT QUASHED.
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See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, and Bolin, JJ.,
concur.
Parker, J., dissents.
Murdock, J., recuses himself.
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PARKER, Justice (dissenting).
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the judgment of the
trial court by a vote of 3 to 2. Judge Murdock and Judge Bryan
each dissented with an opinion. Saunders v. Lawson, [Ms.
2041111, Dec. 1, 2006] __ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2006).
Because I agree with the rationale in their dissents, I
respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to quash the
writ, thus leaving the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in
place. 
The majority opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals
improperly glosses over the distinction between an original
contractor and a subcontractor made in Ala. Code 1975, § 35-
11-210. A supplier is an original contractor when the supplier
has "any contract with the owner or proprietor" of the land.
§ 35-11-210. In that situation, the statute states that the
supplier "shall have a lien" for the full price of the
materials provided. § 35-11-210. If, however, the supplier's
contract is with a contractor and not directly with the owners
of the land, the supplier is considered a subcontractor. The
subcontractor can generally obtain only an "unpaid-balance
lien,"  which is limited to the amount still owed the original
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contractor by the owner. For the subcontractor to obtain a
full-price lien, the subcontractor is required to give the
owners notice of the material provided and the price, prior to
the delivery of the material. There is, however, no such
notice requirement for an original contractor to secure a
materialman's lien. See Keith Kantack, A Guide to Mechanics'
Liens in Alabama, 61 Ala. Law. 202, 203 (2000). Theresa Lawson
contracted directly with the owner of the property, Brian
Homes, Inc. Therefore, Lawson was an original contractor, and
she should not be required to comply with the notice
requirements of § 35-11-210.  
The majority opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals relies
heavily on Davis v. Gobble-Fite Lumber Co., 592 So. 2d 202
(Ala. 1991), to reach the opposite result, i.e., that Lawson
was not entitled to a full-price lien because she failed to
give notice to the ultimate owners of the property. That
reliance in misplaced. Davis addressed only the requirements
for a subcontractor materialman's lien. In fact, the Court in
Davis explicitly stated that the purpose of this type of
materialman's lien is "to protect one who supplies labor or
materials for any building or improvement on land when he does
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5
so at the request of the contractor rather than at the request
of the landowner." 592 So. 2d at 205 (emphasis added). Any
attempt to apply the rule announced in Davis to the situation
of an original contractor stretches the scope of that
decision. 
Therefore, the Court of Civil Appeals either improperly
expanded the scope of Davis in holding that Lawson, as an
original contractor, was bound by the notice requirements, or
it found that she was in fact a subcontractor. Though not
stated explicitly, the Court of Civil Appeals does appear to
work under the assumption that Lawson was a subcontractor.
Lawson, ___ So. 2d at ___ n.4. This assumption is necessarily
based on an inference that Brian Homes was a contractor during
the construction of the house and is not properly considered
the owner of the land on which the house was built.
It 
is 
undisputed 
that 
at 
all 
times 
during 
the
construction of the house Brian Homes owned the house and the
land. No contract existed between Brian Homes and the eventual
purchasers. The very word "contractor" means someone working
under a contract. Black's Law Dictionary 351(8th ed. 2004)
defines a general contractor as "one who contracts for the
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completion of an entire project ...." See also Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 271 (11th ed. 2003)(defining
a contractor as "1: one that contracts or is a party to a
contract: as a: one that contracts to perform work or provide
supplies...."). Applying the term "contractor" to Brian Homes,
which was under no contractual obligation to build the house,
stretches the definition of contractor well beyond its
ordinary meaning. 
Instead, it is clear that Brian Homes is best considered
as the "owner or proprietor" of the land. Section 35-11-232,
Ala. Code. 1975, provides that "[e]very person ... for whose
use, benefit or enjoyment any building or improvement shall be
made, is embraced within the words 'owner or proprietor,' as
used in this division." Though Brian Homes did not intend to
live in the house, it was nonetheless built by Brian Homes for
its own benefit, i.e., a sale for profit. Judge Murdock
therefore provides a much more accurate description of the
relationship of the parties in his dissent, when he states:
"Lawson contracted directly with Brian Homes to perform work
and to provide materials and ... Brian Homes was the owner of
the property in question." __ So. 2d at __. 
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Lawson is properly considered an original contractor, and
she is therefore entitled to a full-price lien under Ala. Code
1975, § 35-11-210. Because the majority is quashing this writ,
leaving in place an opinion that inappropriately applied to
her the law as concerns a subcontractor, I respectfully
dissent.