Case Title: Southside Community Development Corporation, by Frank C. GAlloway III as guardian ad litem. v. Jeffrey White

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070989

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 12/5/08
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2008-2009
____________________
1070989
____________________
Southside Community Development Corporation, by Frank C.
Galloway III as guardian ad litem
v.
Jeffrey White
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court 
(CV-07-2446)
SEE, Justice.
Frank C. Galloway III, as guardian ad litem for Southside
Community Development Corporation ("Southside"), appeals from
1070989
Section 6-6-562 provides that "[o]n the filing of a
1
complaint as authorized under Section 6-6-560, ... should the
identity of some, or all, of said defendants be unknown, the
court shall forthwith appoint a guardian ad litem to represent
and defend the interest of such ... unknown parties in the
proceeding."
2
a judgment in favor of Jeffrey White in an in rem action
seeking to quiet title to a parcel of real property.
Facts and Procedural History
Southside is the owner of record of a certain parcel of
real property in Birmingham ("the property").  Diane Vandiver
was the addressee who received tax notices for the property.
The State took title to the property in 1997 after Southside
failed to pay the annual tax assessment.  White acquired title
to the property from the State on February 23, 2007, by paying
the tax lien and, on July 16, 2007, brought an in rem action
to quiet title in his name.  White moved the trial court to
appoint a guardian ad litem under § 6-6-562, Ala. Code 1975,1
to protect the interests of Southside and Vandiver because he
could not locate the parties.  The trial court appointed
Galloway.  Galloway located Vandiver, who stated that she was
associated with Southside and that she was designated to
receive the property-tax bills.  Vandiver disclaimed all
1070989
Section 40-10-82 provides that "[n]o action for the
2
recovery of real estate sold for the payment of taxes shall
lie unless the same is brought within three years from the
date when the purchaser became entitled to demand a deed
therefor ...."
Three owners of adjoining properties sought to intervene
3
in the case, alleging that they had an interest in the
property through adverse possession and through a deed
3
interest in the property, and, accordingly, she had no
interest for Galloway to represent at trial.  Galloway also
located Betty Bock, an officer of Southside, who testified at
trial that Southside still existed as a legal entity but that
it was no longer in the development business and currently had
no assets to use to redeem the property.  Southside moved for
a judgment as a matter of law at the close of White's case and
renewed that motion at the end of its case, arguing that White
had not adversely possessed the property for the requisite
three years as provided in § 40-10-82, Ala. Code 1975.   The
2
trial court denied both motions.  The trial court found that
the three-year statutory period within which Southside could
redeem the property under § 40-10-82 commenced when "the State
took the property for back taxes" as opposed to when White
obtained his tax deed to the property and entered a judgment
quieting title in the property in White.  Southside appeals.3
1070989
purportedly executed by Southside on the day of the trial.
The trial court found that the deed was void and that the
interveners had no valid interest in the property.  These
parties have not appealed the trial court's judgment;
therefore, we do not express any opinion on the correctness of
the trial court's judgment as to this matter. 
4
Issue
The issue presented by this case is whether the three-
year statutory period of § 40-10-82 begins to run when the
property is transferred to the State for failure to pay taxes,
or, instead, begins to run when the tax purchaser becomes
entitled to a deed. 
Standard of Review
The trial court entered its judgment after hearing ore
tenus testimony.
"'"'[W]hen a trial court hears ore tenus
testimony, its findings on disputed facts are
presumed correct and its judgment based on those
findings will not be reversed unless the judgment is
palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust.'"' Water
Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd. v. Parks, 977 So. 2d 440,
443 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Fadalla v. Fadalla, 929 So.
2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2005), quoting in turn Philpot v.
State, 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2002)). '"The
presumption of correctness, however, is rebuttable
and may be overcome where there is insufficient
evidence presented to the trial court to sustain its
judgment."'  Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d 1083,
1086 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Dennis v. Dobbs, 474 So.
2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1985)).  'Additionally, the ore
tenus rule does not extend to cloak with a
1070989
5
presumption 
of 
correctness 
a 
trial 
judge's
conclusions of law or the incorrect application of
law to the facts.'  Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d at
1086."
Retail Developers of Alabama, LLC v. East Gadsden Golf Club,
Inc., 985 So. 2d 924, 929 (Ala. 2007). 
Analysis
Section 40-10-82 provides that "[n]o action for the
recovery of real estate sold for the payment of taxes shall
lie unless the same is brought within three years from the
date when the purchaser became entitled to demand a deed
therefor ...."  Southside argues that the three-year adverse-
possession period in § 40-10-82 did not begin to run until
White acquired the tax deed from the State.
"Section 40-10-82 has been construed as a 'short'
statute of limitations (Williams v. Mobil Oil
Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc., 457 So. 2d
962 (Ala. 1984)), and does not begin to run until
the purchaser of the property at a tax sale has
become entitled to demand a deed to the land; and
the tax purchaser is entitled to 'quiet title'
relief only after being in exclusive, adverse
possession for the statutory three-year period.
Gulf Land Co. v. Buzzelli, 501 So. 2d 1211 (Ala.
1987)."
Reese v. Robinson, 523 So. 2d 398, 400 (Ala. 1988).  
White argues that he should not have to adversely possess
the property for three years after acquiring his tax deed in
1070989
6
order to bring a quiet-title action because, in this case, the
record owner was not in possession and because he acquired
title from the State and not from the tax commissioner.
However, neither the plain language of § 40-10-83, Ala. Code
1975, which confers a right of redemption, nor our application
of the rule as set forth in Reese provides such an exception.
Moreover, we have held that § 40-10-83 "applies to cases where
the land is purchased from the State, as well as to instances
where the purchase is made from the tax collector."  Gulf Land
Co. v. Buzzelli, 501 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Ala. 1987) (citing
Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Lott, 255 Ala. 133, 50 So.
2d 406 (1951)).  See also McGuire v. Rogers, 794 So. 2d 1131,
1136 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) ("[The] Supreme Court [of Alabama]
has applied the rule in Gulf Land to require the purchasers of
a tax deed to show that they have maintained continuous
adverse possession of the tax-sale property for three years to
defeat a right of redemption under 40-10-83 without regard to
possession by the redemptioner." (citing Reese, 523 So. 2d at
398)).  In this case, the State issued White a tax deed on
February 23, 2007, and White sued on July 16, 2007, well short
of the three-year limitations period for redemption in § 40-
1070989
7
10-82.  We hold that White's action to quiet title is
premature because "the owner's right of action is not
extinguished until the tax purchaser has retained adverse
possession for three years."  Karagan v. Bryant, 516 So. 2d
599, 601 (Ala. 1987).
White argues that Almon v. Champion International Corp.,
349 So. 2d 15 (Ala. 1997), supports his argument that a tax-
deed purchaser can bring a quiet-title action before the
three-year statute of limitations in § 40-10-82 has run.  In
Almon, Champion had failed to pay taxes on a piece of its
property because the tax notice had been sent to the previous
owner.  The State bought the property for taxes owed, and
Almon 
purchased 
the 
property 
from 
the 
State 
land 
commissioner.
Champion brought an action to have title quieted in itself,
arguing that the tax deed was void.  In holding that Almon's
tax deed was void, this Court stated:
"[T]he legislature has provided a beacon light by
which the purchaser at a tax sale can be assured he
has found a 'safe harbour.'  This it does through
the special short statute of limitations which
enables the purchaser, who enters into adverse
possession for a period of three years, to acquire
good title without regard to the deficiencies
underlying the proceedings.  Tit. 51, § 295, Code.
1070989
White also argues that Southside is no longer entitled
4
to be represented by the guardian ad litem because it is not
now an unknown party as designated in § 6-6-562; however, a
review of the record before the trial court reveals that White
did not raise this issue in the court below; therefore, we
will not address it on appeal.  Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co.,
612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992).  We also note that neither
party has challenged the propriety of the initial appointment
8
"It appears from the record before us that Almon
first acquired his tax deed on February 20, 1974.
A few months later, Champion instituted this action
and thereby foreclosed any possibility that Almon
could perfect a good title under the three year
statute.  If Almon is to prevail, it must be on the
strength of the title he acquired from his tax
deed."
Almon, 349 So. 2d at 17.  White argues that this implies that
the holder of a valid tax deed need not wait until the
expiration of the three-year limitations period before
bringing a quiet-title action.  However, although the above-
quoted language indicates that the prior owner can bring an
action to quiet title prior to the running of the § 40-10-82
three-year period, it does not stand, either expressly or by
implication, for the proposition that a tax purchaser can
bring an action to quiet title prior to the running of the
three-year statutory period of § 40-10-82. Almon is,
therefore, distinguishable, and White's argument with regard
to that case is without merit.4
1070989
of the guardian ad litem under § 6-6-562.
Southside also argues that White has not shown that he
5
adversely possessed the property.  Because White's action to
quiet title was premature, we do not address this argument.
9
Conclusion
Because the owner's right of redemption has not yet been
extinguished, title cannot be quieted in White based on his
tax deed.   Therefore, we reverse the trial court's judgment
5
and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.