Case Title: Wylie v. Wyoming Dept. of Transp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wylie v. Wyoming Dept. of Transp.1998 WY 164970 P.2d 395Case Number: 98-83Decided: 12/21/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Thomas 
Elton WYLIE, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

                         
Appeal from the District Court, Teton County, D. Terry Rogers, 
J.

 

James K. Lubing, Jackson, 
Wyoming, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General; Clinton D. Beaver, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Retired November 2, 1998.

 

GOLDEN, Justice.

 [¶1] WYO. STAT. § 31-7-127(a)(ii) provides that the 
Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) shall revoke for three years the 
driver's license of any person upon receipt of a record of conviction of that 
person under WYO. STAT. § 31-5-233 or "other law prohibiting driving while under 
the influence" if that person has been previously convicted two or more times 
under WYO. STAT. § 31-5-233 or other law prohibiting driving while under the 
influence within the preceding five year period. Appellant Thomas Elton Wylie 
concedes that he has two previous convictions under WYO. STAT. § 31-5-233 within 
the preceding five-year period and also that within that period he was recently convicted in 
Montana of a violation of MONT. CODE. ANN. § 61-8-406 (1995) which proscribes 
driving while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. WYDOT revoked 
Wylie's Wyoming driver's license for three years, after a contested case 
hearing, because it considered the Montana statute under which Wylie was 
recently convicted to be a "law prohibiting driving while under the influence" 
even though that statute does not contain the terminology "driving while under 
the influence." A companion Montana statute, MONT. CODE. ANN. § 61-8-401 (1995), 
does contain that terminology.

 

[¶2] On Wylie's appeal from 
the WYDOT driver's license revocation action, we must decide whether MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 61-8-406, under which Wylie was convicted and which proscribes driving 
while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, is a "law prohibiting 
driving while under the influence" for purposes of WYO. STAT. § 31-7-127(a)(ii). 
If it is, we will affirm WYDOT's action; if it is not, we will reverse that 
action. We hold that the pertinent Montana statute fits the requirement of 
Wyoming law and affirm the order of the district court.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] Wylie presents this 
issue for our review:

 

1. 
May the Wyoming Department of Transportation revoke the driving privileges of a 
driver licensed to drive by the State of Wyoming, in response to that driver's 
guilty plea in another state, when the charge plead to is substantially 
different from Wyoming's counterpart?

 

WYDOT restates the issue as:

 

Is 
Mont.Code Ann. § 61-8-406 (1995) a statute of another state, which prohibits 
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, alcohol, controlled 
substances, or drugs?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶4] On April 8, 1995, while 
driving in the state of Montana, Wylie was stopped and arrested for violating 
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 61-8-401 (1995) which proscribes motor vehicle operation by a 
driver who because of drinking alcohol has diminished ability to safely operate 
the vehicle. In January 1996, he pled guilty to a violation of MONT. CODE ANN. § 
61-8-406 (1995) which proscribes motor vehicle operation by a driver having an 
alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. Wylie has a Wyoming driver's license and 
had two other convictions for driving under the influence in the past five 
years. On July 8, 1996, WYDOT notified Wylie that it would revoke his 
driving privileges from August 3, 1996 
through August 2, 1999. A contested case hearing was held at Wylie's request 
and, on March 28, 1997, a final order issued upholding the revocation. Wylie 
appealed to the district court, and it affirmed the order.

 

                                           
DISCUSSION

 

[¶5] The standard of 
judicial review for administrative actions is governed by WYO. R.APP. P. 12.09 
and WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c) (1997). WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) states the 
court shall set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 

          
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

 

          
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

 

          
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or 
lacking statutory right;

 

          
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or

 

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

[¶6] We examine the entire 
record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support an agency's 
findings. McGuire v. State, Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 809 P.2d 271, 273 
(Wyo. 1991). If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we 
will not substitute our judgment for that of the agency and will uphold the 
findings on appeal. Id. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which is more 
than a scintilla of evidence and which a reasonable mind might accept in support 
of the conclusions of the agency. Id. at 273-74. We review the decision of an 
administrative agency as if we were a reviewing court of the first instance; a 
petitioner has the burden of proving that the agency's actions are arbitrary, 
capricious or an abuse of discretion; the reviewing court must examine whether 
the decision made by an administrative agency has been reached on relevant 
factors and was rational; agency decisions are to be reversed only for errors of 
law; and a court will not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative 
agency. Id. at 274.

 

[¶7] WYO. STAT. § 
31-7-127(a)(ii) (1997) requires WYDOT to revoke a person's driver's license in 
the following circumstances:

 

(ii) A conviction under W.S. 31-5-233 or other law 
prohibiting driving while under the influence, if the person has been previously 
convicted two (2) or more times under W.S. 31-5-233 or other law prohibiting 
driving while under the influence within the five (5) year period 
preceding;

 

The statutory phrase "other 
law prohibiting driving while under the influence" is defined as meaning "a 
statute of another state . . . which prohibits driving while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor, alcohol, controlled substances or drugs." WYO. STAT. § 
31-7-102(a)(xxxi) (1997). Wylie contends that his recent 1996 conviction under 
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 61-8-406 (1995) is not a conviction under "other law 
prohibiting driving while under the influence" and cannot be the basis for 
revocation of his license. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-406 (1995) 
states:

 

Operation of vehicle by a person with alcohol 
concentration of 0.10 or more. It is 
unlawful and punishable as provided in 61-8-722 and 61-8-723 for any person to 
drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle upon the ways of this state 
open to the public while the person's alcohol concentration, as shown by 
analysis of the person's blood, breath, or urine, is 0.10 or more. Absolute 
liability as provided in 45-2-104 will be imposed for a violation of this 
section.

 

Wylie contends that Section 
406 does not state that its purpose is to prohibit driving while under the 
influence and is, therefore, too dissimilar to Wyoming's statutory prohibition 
of driving under the influence. WYDOT contends that Montana has enacted a 
comprehensive statutory scheme for the purpose of combating the problem of drunk 
driving and that an examination of all of the Montana statutes concerning drunk 
driving demonstrates that the legislature intended to prohibit driving under the 
influence when it enacted Section 406.

 

[¶8] In interpreting 
statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the legislature's intent. 
State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983). All 
statutes must be construed in pari materia; and in ascertaining the meaning of a 
given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or have the same general 
purpose must be considered and construed in harmony. Id. at 735. Holtz explained 
our statutory construction rules:

 

If 
the language is sufficiently clear, there is no need to resort to rules of 
construction. When the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must 
look to the mischief the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting 
surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of 
law, and other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of 
the accepted rules of construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is 
reasonable and consistent.

 

Holtz, 674 P.2d  at 736. We 
begin reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute by examining the 
language and giving to that language its plain and ordinary meaning in light of 
its objective and purpose. McGuire, 809 P.2d  at 274.

 

[¶9] MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 
61-8-401 through 61-8-422 compose that part of the Montana Statutory Code 
devoted to "Driving Under Influence of Alcohol or Drugs." Concerning this 
statutory scheme, the Montana Supreme Court has said:

 

Montana has a compelling interest to remove drunk 
drivers from our roadways. This compelling interest is embodied in both § 
61-8-401, MCA (prohibiting driving while under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs), and § 61-8-406, MCA (making driving with an alcohol concentration of 
0.10 or more per se illegal), as well as §§ 61-8-714, -722 and -723, MCA (1995) 
(providing escalating penalties for repeat offenders of §§ 61-8-401 and -406, 
MCA).

 

[¶10] Hulse v. State, Dept. 
of Justice, 961 P.2d 75, 85 (Mont. 1998). The companion statute to § 61-8-406 is 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-401 (1995) which states:

 

Persons under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs. (1) It is unlawful and 
punishable as provided in 61-8-714 and 61-8-723 for any person who is under the 
influence of:

 

(a) alcohol to drive or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle upon the ways of this state open to the 
public;

 

          
* * *

 

(3) "Under the influence" means that as a result of 
taking into the body alcohol, drugs, or any combination thereof, a person's 
ability to safely operate a motor vehicle has been 
diminished.

 

(4) Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or 
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person 
driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, the concentration of alcohol in the person at the time alleged, as 
shown by analysis of the person's blood, urine, or breath, shall give rise to 
the following inferences:

 

          
* * *

 

(c) If there was at that time an alcohol 
concentration of 0.10 or more, it may be inferred that the person was under the 
influence of alcohol. The inference is rebuttable.

 

          
* * *

 

          
(7) Absolute liability as provided in 45-2-104 will be imposed for a 
violation of this section.

 

           

 

[¶11] The plain language 
from sections 401 and 406 informs that they are distinct criminal offenses. 
Horton v. State, 221 Mont. 233, 717 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Mont. 1986). The definition 
of "driving while under the influence" found in Section 401 evidences a 
legislative intent to allow consideration of the driver's ability to drive and 
not just his alcohol content. Montanye v. State, 262 Mont. 258, 864 P.2d 1234, 
1237 (Mont. 1993). Section 401 establishes that a person is presumed under the 
influence of alcohol when his blood alcohol content is 0.10 or greater. In 
contrast, Section 406 is violated when blood, urine or a breath test establishes 
an alcohol content of 0.10 or greater 
without consideration of whether the driver's ability to drive is impaired by 
the intoxicant. As the district court noted when it affirmed WYDOT's revocation 
action, Wyoming criminalizes these two distinct acts in one statute. WYO. STAT. 
§ 31-5-233(b) (1997) states:

 

          
(b) No person shall drive or have actual physical control of any vehicle 
within this state if the person:

 

          
(i) Has an alcohol concentration of ten one-hundredths of one percent 
(0.10%) or more; or

 

          
(ii) To a degree which renders him incapable of safely 
driving;

 

          
(A) Is under the influence of alcohol;

 

          
. . .

 

[¶12] The Montana Supreme 
Court considered the issue of whether a driving under the influence (DUI) 
conviction under § 61-8-401 and a second conviction for a blood alcohol 
concentration (BAC) violation under § 61-8-406 within a five year period 
required revoking driving privileges for one year. Horton, 717 P.2d  at 1109. 
Under the civil penalty statute, MONT. CODE. ANN. § 61-5-208(2), the penalty was 
six months for the first violation of either statute and one year for a 
subsequent conviction within five years of the first offense. Horton contended 
that a BAC conviction was not equivalent to a DUI conviction and the 
dissimilarity of the two statutes made 
it unreasonable to enhance the civil penalty. Horton ruled that, for civil 
penalty purposes, the operation of a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration 
of 0.10 or more is clearly similar in nature to the offense of driving under the 
influence of alcohol. It held that it was the legislative intent that a one year 
license revocation was required upon a BAC conviction within a five year period 
of a DUI conviction. Horton, 717 P.2d  at 1109-1110.

 

[¶13] As shown by decisions 
by the Montana Supreme Court and the plain language of the statutes, Montana 
considers a BAC violation to be a driving under the influence of alcohol 
violation. WYO. STAT. § 31-7-127's mandate to revoke a driver's license when the 
licensee is convicted of driving under the influence either in this state or in 
other jurisdictions shows a legislative intent to remove drunk drivers from 
Wyoming roadways. In addition, Wyoming is a member of the Driver License 
Compact, as is Montana, and is obligated to consider this Montana conviction as 
part of a license revocation procedure if the offenses are of a "substantially 
similar nature." WYO. STAT. § 31-7-201 
(1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-5-401 (1995). Given this legislative mandate by 
Wyoming's statutory scheme, WYDOT had an obligation to determine if the Montana 
statute's intent was to impose a prohibition against driving under the influence 
and, if so, apply that conviction towards mandatory license revocation. See 
McGuire, 809 P.2d  at 274. We hold WYDOT correctly determined that the recent 
Montana conviction was to be considered a third conviction within five years 
and, consequently, a revocation was mandated.

 

                                           
CONCLUSION

 

[¶14] The revocation was not 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Wylie does not dispute the 
agency's finding that he had three convictions within a five year period, and we 
hold that the revocation of his driver's license under the statute was proper. 
We affirm the district court's order upholding the revocation 
order.