Case Title: KIRK J. MILLER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-33

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
KIRK J. MILLER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 17127 P.3d 793Case Number: 05-33Decided: 01/26/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
KIRK J. 
MILLER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLincolnCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mike 
Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Causey.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury found Kirk 
Miller guilty of three counts of delivery of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine).  On appeal, 
Miller asks this Court to review whether he was denied his constitutional right 
to confront an adverse witness, whether he was denied a fair trial by the 
admission of a witness' out of court statements and the witness' guilty plea to 
a drug-related crime, and whether his convictions are supported by sufficient 
evidence.  Finding no reversible 
error, we affirm the judgment and order of the district 
court.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Miller presents 
the following issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Did denying [Miller] the ability to question the State's only witness 
regarding his recent conviction violated [sic] [Miller's] right to 
confrontation?

 
 
II.          
Whether the admission of Justin Miller's statements to the circuit court 
judge implicating [Miller] was error requiring reversal?

 
 
III.         
Was the presentation of evidence and argument involving Justin Miller's 
guilty plea as [sic] plain error?

 
 
IV.        Was 
there sufficient evidence presented to support [Miller's] convictions, under the 
alternate theories of delivery presented to the jury?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On January 25, 
2003, Deputy Shawn Whitmore of the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office was on 
routine patrol on Highway 189 south of Kemmerer when he observed Justin Miller's 
(hereinafter Justin) car traveling in the southbound lane.  Aware that Justin was wanted for a 
probation violation, Deputy Whitmore executed a stop of the vehicle and arrested 
him. A search of Justin's vehicle revealed several small baggies of 
methamphetamine that were hidden in the steering wheel.1 

 
 
[¶4]      Justin was 
charged with possession of a controlled substance.  On January 27, 2003, Justin pled guilty 
to the possession charge.  In 
response to questioning by the circuit court, Justin stated that he had received 
the methamphetamine from his uncle, Kirk Miller.  Later that day, Deputy Whitmore and 
Sergeant Jerry Glasscock interviewed Justin and confirmed that Miller was the 
source of the methamphetamine found in the vehicle.  That interview also revealed that Miller 
had supplied the drug to Justin on prior occasions in January 2003.  Based on the information provided by 
Justin, Deputy Whitmore obtained a search warrant for Miller's home. 

 
 
[¶5]      During the search 
of Miller's residence on January 27, 2003, law enforcement officers seized 
several items linking Miller to the drug business, including a mortar and a 
scale containing methamphetamine residue, a heat-sealing device, numerous small 
baggies of the type used to sell the drug and a few packets of methamphetamine, 
most of which were found in Miller's bedroom.  Based on the evidence discovered during 
the search and Justin's statements concerning Miller's drug dealings, the State 
charged Miller with three counts of delivery of a controlled substance. After a 
two-day trial that commenced on August 30, 2004, a jury found Miller guilty of 
the charged offenses.   The 
district court sentenced Miller to concurrent terms of imprisonment of three to 
six years but suspended execution of the sentences in favor of four years of 
supervised probation.   This 
appeal followed. 

 
 
[¶6]      We will set forth 
as necessary additional facts as we address the issues raised by Miller. 

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Issue 
One -- Denial of Right to Confrontation

 
 
[¶7]      Miller alleges 
that he was denied his constitutional right to effectively confront Justin 
Miller during trial.  Miller's 
constitutional claim presents a question of law.  We review questions of law de novo.  Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶8]      The primary right 
secured by the Confrontation Clause of the United States 
and Wyoming Constitutions is the right of cross-examination.  Hannon, ¶ 16, 84 P.3d  at 329 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 
94 S.Ct 1105, 1110, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974)).  In order for there to be a violation of 
the right of confrontation, a defendant must show more than just a denial of the 
ability to ask specific questions of a particular witness.  Rather, a defendant must show that he 
was prohibited "from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination 
designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness . . . 
to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately 
draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.'"  Hannon, ¶ 18, 84 P.3d  at 330 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436, 
89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986)).  The 
Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant an "opportunity for effective 
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and 
to whatever extent, the defense might wish."  Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.  at 679, 106 S. Ct.  at 1435 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S. Ct. 292, 295, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985) (per curriam) 
(emphasis in original)).  A 
defendant's right to cross-examination of a witness is not unfettered, but is 
subject to the trial court's "discretion to reasonably limit cross-examination 
to prevent, among other things, questioning that is repetitive or of marginal 
relevance."  Hannon, ¶ 22, 84 P.3d  at 331-32 (quoting 
United States v. DeSoto, 950 F.2d 626, 629-30 (10th Cir. 1991)); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232, 109 S. Ct. 480, 483, 
102 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1988) (per 
curiam).

 
 
[¶9]      Two weeks before 
trial, the State filed a motion in limine to prohibit the defense from inquiring 
into criminal charges then pending against Justin Miller.  In that motion, the State revealed that 
two charges of battery and one charge of assault on a peace officer had been 
filed against Justin on July 6, 2004.  
The State contended that evidence of those charges was neither admissible 
nor relevant to any issue at Miller's trial.  During a hearing on the motion on August 
26, the prosecutor indicated that the charges arose out of a domestic dispute 
Justin had been involved in during the 4th of 
July weekend.  The prosecutor 
explained:

 
 
[PROSECUTOR]:     Basically, what 
happened  it's alleged that [Justin] was assaulting his girlfriend.  A citizen tried to intervene.  It's alleged that he assaulted the 
citizen and then left.  The police 
went looking for him, found him hiding under a truck.  They tried to get him to come out from 
under the truck.  When he came out, 
he charged the police officer.  And 
when he hit the police officer, then they went to the ground in a fight, and he 
was arrested and taken to jail.  

 
 
[¶10]   The prosecutor revealed that, 
pursuant to a plea agreement not yet approved by the district court in charge of 
the case, Justin would be entering a plea of guilty to one count of felony 
interference with a peace office later that day, that the disposition of that 
charge would be pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301 (LexisNexis 2005), and 
that he did not expect the district court to accept or reject the plea agreement 
until after a presentence investigation report had been completed in the 
case.  The prosecutor also noted 
that, even if the district court accepted the plea agreement, Justin would not 
be convicted of the felony offense.  
Additionally, the prosecutor reported that law enforcement found no drugs 
on Justin when he was arrested, and there was no evidence suggesting Justin was 
under the influence of any drug at the time.  

 
 
[¶11]   In response, defense counsel 
stated:

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:      * 
* * Certainly, his behavior is so out of the ordinary and bizarre as to indicate 
a continuation of his drug habit.

 
 
That has 
some importance, because his allegations against his uncle, my client, Kirk 
Miller, is that he obtained his drugs from Mr. Miller.  And he's indicated by his activities 
that he may be continuing his drug habit, which indicates he's getting his drugs 
from somewhere else.  My only 
connection  my only concern is that this appears to me to be drug-induced 
activity.  It certainly is out of 
the ordinary, and I want to be able to look at his drug habits and where he gets 
his drugs. 

 
 
Defense 
counsel, however, had no direct evidence that Justin's behavior was drug 
induced.  The district court refused 
to accept defense counsel's speculation as to the relevancy of Justin's criminal 
conduct:

 
 
THE 
COURT: Well, unless there is something 
more in the assault case that would indicate drug usage, other than the criminal 
activity itself of assaulting a police officer, I don't see where that would 
take you, [Defense Counsel].  You 
say it's unusual or his behavior was unusual; but unless you've got something 
more to tie it to drug usage, I'm failing to see how that fits into your theory 
that he continues to use drugs or buys his drugs from somebody else or still is 
 still has the habit. 

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
So I'm 
going to deny the motion  or I guess I'm granting the motion for the 
State.  That kind of testimony will 
not come in, unless there's something further that would lead me to change my 
mind.  Otherwise, I just think it's 
too far of a stretch, and it would be highly prejudicial. 

 
 
[¶12]   On appeal, Miller contends that the 
district court erred in granting the State's motion. Miller argues that, given 
Justin's admission at trial "that methamphetamine made him violent," and given 
Justin's violent behavior that weekend, "the conclusion could be drawn that, 
contrary to his testimony, he was using drugs again."  Miller also suggests that evidence of 
the lenient disposition of the charges against Justin under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-301 could have "affected the jury's view of his credibility."  According to Miller, the district 
court's liminal ruling prohibiting him from inquiring into the criminal charges 
against Justin deprived him of the opportunity to present evidence relevant to 
Justin's truthfulness and his possible motives for testifying in favor of the 
State and, thus, denied him his constitutional right to confront a witness 
against him.

 
 
[¶13]   Miller's argument misses the 
mark.  Miller's argument approaches 
the issue from hindsight and is based on matters never brought to the attention 
of the district court.  The district 
court's ruling was premised solely on the argument presented at the hearing on 
the motion in limine, several days prior to trial.  At that time, the district court simply 
told defense counsel that, given the argument presented, it could find little 
relevancy in Justin's criminal conduct to the charges pending against 
Miller.  The district court 
expressly stated that it would revisit the issue if defense counsel could 
produce a more significant reason for the introduction of the evidence.  The record discloses that defense 
counsel never availed himself of this opportunity before or during trial.  Under the circumstances, we fail to see 
how Miller's right to effectively cross-examine Justin was impaired by the 
district court's liminal ruling.

 
 

Issue 
Two  Justin Miller's Statements in the Circuit Court

 
 
[¶14]   Miller asserts that reversible 
error occurred when the prosecutor elicited testimony from Justin Miller and 
Deputy Whitmore concerning Justin's statement in circuit court that he had 
obtained the methamphetamine underlying his guilty plea from Miller.  Miller also faults the prosecutor for 
referencing Justin's circuit court statement in his opening statement and 
closing arguments.  He claims that 
such amounted to the improper admission into evidence of a prior consistent 
statement before there was an attack on Miller's credibility, in violation of 
W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).

 
 
[¶15]   Because Miller did not object at 
trial to the evidence challenged on appeal, we apply our plain error standard of 
review to his claim.  Plain error 
exists when (1) the record clearly reflects the alleged error; (2) the party 
claiming the error demonstrates a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law; and (3) the party proves that the violation adversely affected a 
substantial right resulting in material prejudice.  Brown v. State, 2005 WY 37, ¶ 8, 109 P.3d 52, 55 (Wyo. 2005); Blakeman v. 
State, 2004 WY 139, ¶ 18, 100 P.3d 1229, 1234 (Wyo. 2004); Fortner v. State, 932 P.2d 1283, 1286 
(Wyo. 
1997).  To establish material 
prejudice, Miller must show a reasonable possibility that he would have received 
a more favorable verdict in the absence of the error.  Humphrey v. State, 962 P.2d 866, 870 
(Wyo. 1998). 

 
 
[¶16]   The first prong of the plain error 
test is met because the record clearly reflects the testimony and the 
prosecutor's comments alleged as error.  
After careful review of the record, we seriously doubt that the second 
prong of the plain error test is met.  
However, we need not determine if the tenets of W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) were 
transgressed because we find that Miller has failed to establish material 
prejudice.

[¶17]   At trial, Justin testified that 
Miller supplied him with methamphetamine and provided details about the 
deliveries with which Miller was charged.  
Justin's claim that Miller had supplied him with methamphetamine was 
corroborated by Deputy Whitmore.  
According to Deputy Whitmore, Justin stated during an interview that he 
had obtained the drug from Miller on multiple occasions.  Additionally, the State's evidence 
detailed the drug-related items recovered during a search of Miller's residence, 
most of which were found in Miller's bedroom.  Those items included packets of 
methamphetamine, packaging materials, a heat-sealing device, a scale and a 
mortar, both of which contained methamphetamine residue.  The State presented the jury with ample 
evidence from which it could convict Miller of delivery of methamphetamine on 
the dates charged.  We do not think 
under the facts of this case that the challenged testimony had a substantial 
impact on the verdict of the jury.

 
 
[¶18]   Nor do we believe that the 
prosecutor's comments at issue on appeal had any effect on the jury's 
determination of Miller's guilt.  
The challenged comments were not extensive.  The district court instructed the jury 
that the prosecutor's statements were not evidence to be considered in 
evaluating Miller's guilt or innocence on the charged offenses.  We presume the jury followed the court's 
instruction.  Brown, ¶ 24, 109 P.3d  at 
58.

 
 
[¶19]   A careful review of the record 
leads us to conclude that no reasonable possibility exists that the jury's 
verdict would have been different in the absence of the challenged testimony and 
the prosecutor's comments.  Because 
plain error has not been established, we reject Miller's complaint on this 
issue.

 
 

Issue 
Three  Evidence of Justin Miller's Guilty Plea

 
 
[¶20]   Miller next argues that reversible 
error occurred when the district court allowed Justin and Deputy Whitmore to 
testify about Justin's guilty plea to possessing the methamphetamine supplied by 
Miller, and when it allowed the prosecutor to reference that plea during his 
opening statement and closing arguments.  
Miller acknowledges that he did not object to the testimony or to the 
prosecutor's statements at issue and, consequently, must demonstrate plain error 
to succeed on his claim.  As 
discussed above, plain error requires Miller to show both a violation of a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law and a denial of a substantial right resulting in 
material prejudice.  Brown, ¶ 8, 109 P.3d  at 55.  We find that Miller has not satisfied 
his burden.

 
 
[¶21]   Miller finds the clear and 
unequivocal rule of law he claims was violated in Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 
(Wyo. 1979), 
and the line of cases following it.  
The evidentiary rule upon which Miller relies states that "when two 
persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out of the same circumstance, 
the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against the other."  Id. at 1375; see also KP v. State, 2004 WY 165, ¶ 14, 102 P.3d 217, 221-22 (Wyo. 2004); Adams v. 
State, 2003 WY 152, ¶ 27, 79 P.3d 526, 534 (Wyo. 2003); Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 535 (Wyo. 
2000); Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 969 (Wyo. 1996).  The rationale 
for the rule is that the evidence "is irrelevant and incompetent because it 
suggests that since the confederate is guilty, the defendant must also be 
guilty, and this inference violates the defendant's right to have his trial on 
its own merits."  Kwallek, 596 P.2d  at 
1375-76.

 
 
[¶22]   The Kwallek rule is inapplicable under the 
particular facts and circumstances of this case.  As indicated above, that rule precludes 
the State from presenting evidence of guilty pleas of accomplices and 
co-conspirators in its case-in-chief under circumstances that might tend to 
implicate the defendant's guilt by association.  KP, ¶ 18, 102 P.3d  at 223; Mazurek, 10 P.3d  at 535.  Here, Justin was not, in any sense of 
the word, an accomplice or a co-conspirator in the crimes for which Miller was 
on trial.  Justin's guilty plea did 
not concern any participation in the distribution of a controlled substance but, 
rather, involved his possession of methamphetamine, conduct dissimilar in nature 
to the criminal conduct underlying the charges against Miller.  Although Justin's plea pertained to the 
methamphetamine Miller was charged with supplying, that fact alone does not 
bring evidence of that plea under the realm of the Kwallek rule.  Because Miller has not shown a violation 
of the Kwallek rule, he cannot 
demonstrate plain error.

 
 

Issue 
Four  Evidentiary Sufficiency

 
 
[¶23]   Miller was convicted of three 
counts of delivery of a controlled substance under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2005).  
With respect to each count, the district court instructed the jury that, 
in order to find Miller guilty, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, 
on or about the date specified, Miller delivered methamphetamine to another 
individual in Lincoln 
County, Wyoming.  Instruction No. 19 defined the term 
"deliver" as an "actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to 
another of a controlled substance." 

 
 
[¶24]   Citing to the language of 
Instruction No. 19, Miller asserts that his convictions cannot stand under the 
principles espoused in Bush v. State, 
908 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 1995), and its progeny.  Miller claims that, because Instruction 
No. 19 contained three alternative theories for satisfying the delivery element, 
and because the general verdict form did not specify which alternative the jury 
based its verdict, sufficient evidence on all three alternatives must exist to 
sustain his conviction on each count.  
According to Miller, the evidence supports a finding of an "actual" 
delivery of methamphetamine to Justin on the dates in question, but fails to 
show a "constructive" or "attempted" delivery.  Miller contends that the absence of 
evidence proving a "constructive" or "attempted" delivery mandates reversal of 
his convictions.  Miller misreads 
the holding of those cases.

 
 
[¶25]   In the Bush line of cases, we held that when a 
crime may be committed in alternative ways, and the jury is instructed on each 
alternative and returns a general verdict of guilt, the verdict must be set 
aside unless sufficient evidence exists to support a finding of guilt as to each 
alternative.  Bush, 908 P.2d at 966-67; Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, ¶ 42, 67 P.3d 1207, 1224 (Wyo. 2003); May v. 
State, 2003 WY 14, ¶ 13, 62 P.3d 574, 579 (Wyo. 2003); Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, ¶ 8, 57 P.3d 1242, 1244 (Wyo. 2002); King v. 
State, 2002 WY 27, ¶ 24, 40 P.3d 700, 706 (Wyo. 2002).  The holding of those cases pertain to 
elements instructions which quote directly from a criminal statute containing 
alternative grounds for conviction of the crime charged.  For example, Bush and Tanner concerned Wyoming's burglary 
statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) (LexisNexis 2005).2  In each case, the jury was instructed 
that it could find the defendant guilty of the crime of burglary if the evidence 
showed he entered a building without authority with the intent to commit larceny 
or the intent to commit a felony.  
Because the evidence was not sufficient to show entry with the intent to 
commit both larceny and a felony, we reversed the burglary conviction in each 
case.

 
 
[¶26]   The problem that existed in Bush and the other cases, however, does 
not exist in this case.  Here, the 
elements instruction given to the jury on the charged offense did not contain 
alternative elements upon which Miller's convictions could be based.  Miller's jury was only required to 
determine if the evidence proved Miller delivered a controlled substance to 
Justin Miller, nothing more.  
Instruction No. 19 merely defined the term "deliver" and did not have the 
effect of charging an alternative ground for conviction.  Bush and its progeny simply are 
inapplicable to the definitional instruction given in this 
case.

 
 
[¶27]   Our review of the record in this 
case discloses ample evidence from which the jury could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Miller delivered a controlled substance to Justin on the 
dates charged.  We will not 
second-guess the jury's guilty verdict.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶28]   Miller has failed to convince this 
Court that any reversible error exists with respect to any of the issues raised 
in this appeal.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The search 
was conducted after Deputy Whitmore received information that Justin 
occasionally kept methamphetamine in his car. 

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301(a) 
states:

 
 
(a)  A person is guilty of burglary if, 
without authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied structure or 
vehicle, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to 
commit larceny or a felony therein.