Case Title: Davis v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-135

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC10-135 
____________ 
 
RALSTON DAVIS, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[July 3, 2013] 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Ralston Davis was charged by indictment in Broward County with three 
counts of first-degree murder arising from the December 2, 2005 shooting deaths 
of Myosha Proby, Ravindra Basdeo, and Carlos Jones.  Davis entered a plea of not 
guilty by reason of insanity.  The jury rejected Davis’s insanity defense and 
convicted him of each count of first-degree murder.  At the end of the penalty 
phase, the jury recommended life imprisonment for the murders of Basdeo and 
Jones, but recommended death for the murder of Proby by a vote of eight to four.  
The trial court followed the jury’s recommendations, imposing two sentences of 
life imprisonment and one sentence of death. 
 
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Davis now appeals his convictions and sentences.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we 
affirm the convictions for first-degree murder and sentences of life imprisonment, 
but find that the sentence of death is disproportionate.  Accordingly, we vacate the 
death sentence and remand the case to the trial court for imposition of an additional 
sentence of life in prison. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
 
A. 
The Guilt Phase 
The evidence presented at trial established that on the evening of Friday, 
December 2, 2005, between 10:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., appellant Ralston Davis 
engaged in a violent rampage with an AR-15 semiautomatic assault rifle.  
According to the State’s evidence, Davis first went to the home of his friend, 
Myosha Proby, and shot her to death.  Davis then drove to a nearby gas station, 
where he killed Ravindra Basdeo and Carlos Jones, seemingly at random.  The 
defense did not dispute that Davis committed the murders, but presented expert 
witnesses and other evidence to establish that at the time of the offenses, Davis was 
suffering from a brief psychotic disorder and was legally insane. 
 
 
1. 
The State’s Evidence 
 
 As background, the State presented the testimony of Randy Reddick, Jr.  
Reddick testified that he was a gun collector and that the rifle used by Davis 
 
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originally belonged to him.  Reddick stated that on November 30, 2005, he and 
Davis were both at a mutual friend’s house when he mentioned to Davis that he 
was planning to sell the rifle.  Davis asked to see the rifle, Reddick showed it to 
him, and Davis offered to buy it.  Reddick said that when he sold Davis the rifle, 
Davis was “[h]is normal calm, cool, collected self.”  Reddick testified that at that 
time he had known Davis for three years, that they had previously visited a 
shooting range together, that Davis was always a polite and respectful person, and 
that he saw no problem with selling him the rifle. 
The first reported incident on the evening of December 2 occurred shortly 
after 10:30 p.m.  Jerry Nicholson testified that he was working as a chef at a 
barbecue stand on the corner of Northwest 31st Street and Sunrise Boulevard in Ft. 
Lauderdale, when he saw a car stop at a green light in the middle of the 
intersection, blocking traffic.  A man got out of the car, jumped on top of the car’s 
hood, and began firing a gun into the air.  The incident was reported in a call to 9-
1-1 at 10:35 p.m.   Nicholson could not identify the car or the shooter, but shell 
casings that were later recovered from the intersection were identified as having 
been fired from Davis’s gun. 
Shortly after the reported incident at the intersection, Davis arrived at the 
apartment of Myosha Proby.  Hermione Harrell testified that she was at Proby’s 
apartment in Lauderhill on the evening of December 2.  Harrell said that she had 
 
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gone out with Davis several months before, but that she had decided not to 
continue dating him and that she introduced Proby to Davis.  Harrell testified that 
on December 2, she and Proby ate dinner and watched a movie.  Harrell stated that 
she was getting ready to go out with friends later in the evening.  Proby asked to 
use Harrell’s phone, while Harrell took a shower.  When Harrell got out of the 
shower, Proby looked upset.  Proby said that she had called Davis and that he 
sounded irate about something.  Proby called Davis back.  When Davis answered, 
Harrell could hear him yelling through the phone and heard him say the words, 
“come out.”    Proby told Harrell, “[H]e’s going to come kill me.”  Harrell 
responded that Proby should call the police.  Harrell also tried to call Davis’s 
phone again.  When Davis did not answer, Harrell sent him a text message that 
said, “Sorry for disturbing you, this is your homegirl Tish, call me when you get 
this message.”  Harrell testified that Davis knocked on the door of the apartment 
several minutes later and that Proby let him in. 
Jason Rolle testified that he was walking up the stairs to his cousin’s second 
floor apartment when he saw Davis park his car in front of the apartment building.  
Davis left the car door open with the ignition running, and music was blaring 
loudly from the car.  Rolle testified that Davis began walking up the stairs behind 
him.  Davis was carrying a gun, was bleeding from his mouth and nose, and looked 
as if he had just been in a fight.  Rolle stated that Davis “had a serious face, like he 
 
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was in the Army or something” and that Davis looked “pissed off.”  Davis walked 
past Rolle at the top of the stairs and banged his fist on the door of an apartment 
located across the hall from the apartment of Rolle’s cousin.  When Rolle saw 
Davis cock the gun, Rolle walked back down the stairs, called his cousin, and told 
him not to open his apartment door.  Rolle heard gunshots soon after. 
Harrell testified that when Proby let Davis into the apartment, he began 
yelling, “You set me up, you set me up.”  Harrell recalled Proby saying, “That 
wasn’t my brother,” and that Davis responded, “I know.”  However, Davis 
continued yelling, “You set me up, you set me up.”  Harrell said that Davis had a 
slight stagger, seemed unsteady on his feet, had bloodshot eyes, and that he 
appeared to be “on something.”  Harrell said she had “never seen him like that.”  
When Davis entered the apartment, he went directly to Proby and paid no attention 
to Harrell.  After repeatedly telling Proby, “I know it’s not your brother,” Davis 
told Proby to “Get the ‘F’ down.”  Harrell testified that Proby got on her knees 
with her back to Davis, folded her arms, and that Davis “just started shooting her.”  
Davis walked around the coffee table and continued shooting Proby, then stood on 
top of the coffee table while continuing to fire down at her.  Harrell testified that 
she ran, opened a sliding glass door which led onto the balcony, jumped to the 
ground from the second floor and ran into a wall, fracturing her ribs, wrist, and 
ankle.  Harrell hid in a laundry room until she heard emergency sirens. 
 
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After leaving Proby’s apartment, Davis drove back toward the intersection 
of Northwest 31st Street and Sunrise Boulevard.  Jerry Nicholson testified that 
twenty or thirty minutes after observing Davis fire into the air at that intersection, a 
car pulled into the parking lot of the Exxon gas station where Nicholson’s barbecue 
stand was located.  Witnesses testified that at that time, several dozen people were 
standing at or around the barbecue stand.  Nicholson saw Davis get out of his car 
with a rifle.  Farrah Cyprien, Nicholson’s sister, saw Davis tapping on the window 
of another car, and heard him say to the driver, “You don’t know me, you don’t 
know me.”  Christian Gaines and Ebony Deadwyler were also in the parking lot of 
the Exxon station.  Gaines observed a silver Chevy Lumina pull into the parking 
lot, playing music loudly.  Gaines saw Davis get out of the silver car and walk to 
another car nearby.  Gaines heard what sounded like an argument, followed by a 
muffled pop sound.  Deadwyler had a clearer view of the events.  She saw Davis 
pull into the gas station, jump out of his car and walk up to another car.  Deadwyler 
testified, “I heard him yelling and cursing, and he just shot the guy.”  The victim 
was later identified as Ravindra Basdeo. 
John Diggs was also sitting in his car in the parking lot of the Exxon station, 
and observed Basdeo’s shooting.  Diggs said that everyone in the parking lot 
scattered, while he tried to lean his seat back so that Davis would not see him.  
However, Davis noticed Diggs and started walking toward Diggs’ car.  According 
 
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to Diggs, Davis said something indicating that Basdeo had done something to 
offend him.  At that point, another man, Carlos Jones, walked out of the gas 
station.  Diggs saw Davis grab Jones, putting his arm around Jones’s neck and 
shoulder.  Davis then told Jones, “Get on the ground or I’m going to kill you.”  
Jones got on his knees and Davis immediately shot him.  Davis returned to his car 
and drove out of the gas station.  Gaines and Deadwyler also observed the second 
shooting.  They said that Davis drove out of the gas station just as the police were 
driving in. 
Detective Kerri Hagerty testified that she was on road patrol with her 
partner, Detective Jeffrey Jenkins, when they received a dispatch at 10:51 p.m. 
reporting that a black male in a Chevy Lumina was waving an assault rifle out of 
his car window.  As they approached the intersection of 31st and Sunrise, they saw 
Davis leaning out of the window of the silver Lumina.  They pursued the Lumina 
until it turned into the parking lot of a strip mall.  Davis got out of the Lumina and 
the officers got out of their car.  Jenkins observed that Davis was bleeding from the 
mouth.  Hagerty testified that Davis did not appear to be holding a gun when he got 
out of the car, but that she and Detective Jenkins drew their guns and ordered him 
to get on the ground.  Davis yelled back at them, “I ain’t got my f***ing diamond 
earrings on.”  Hagerty said that she was wearing diamond stud earrings at the time, 
but agreed on cross-examination that it was “a pretty disjointed statement under the 
 
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circumstances.”  Davis jumped back in his car and drove out of the parking lot, 
narrowly avoiding Hagerty and Jenkins.  Hagerty and Jenkins returned to their car 
and again pursued Davis as he ran through a red light, drove over a sidewalk, wove 
in and out of traffic, and ran several cars off the road. 
At the intersection of Sunrise Boulevard and the Florida Turnpike, Davis 
stopped his car suddenly, threw his keys out of the window, opened the door, and 
“just sat there.”  Davis began to struggle as Detective Jenkins pulled him from the 
car.  Hagerty and Jenkins attempted to restrain Davis as other officers arrived on 
the scene.  Hagerty said that Davis was very angry, combative, and violent, and 
that he was cursing and spitting blood as the officers attempted to restrain him.  
Officer Adam Willson was following Jenkins and Hagerty as they pursued Davis, 
and assisted them in pulling Davis from the car.  Willson testified that Davis was 
screaming, flailing, and kicking, and appeared extremely angry.  Davis was placed 
in handcuffs but continued flailing.  Willson then used a taser to incapacitate 
Davis.  He said that Davis would calm down as each two-to-three second shock 
was administered, but that Davis would continue flailing and screaming again once 
the shock ended.  Willson said that Davis was laughing as he struggled, and yelled, 
“Jesus is great” numerous times.  Davis was placed in a police car, but started 
screaming again and kicking the windows.  Officer Michael Connor testified that 
even after Davis was restrained, he continued rambling and saying things with 
 
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religious overtones, including that Jesus would forgive him.  Officer Michael 
Bigwood said that Davis’s behavior was “erratic and all over the place.”  He said 
that Davis would change from second to second, “go[ing] from being somewhat 
compliant and quiet, to yelling, to kicking, to spitting, to back to quiet.”  The 
officers testified that Davis eventually calmed down completely. 
Detective Joseph Carmody testified that after Davis was restrained, a man 
identifying himself as Ralston Davis, Sr., Davis’s father, arrived at the scene.  
Detective Carmody told Mr. Davis that his son had to be taken to the hospital, but 
promised that he would call him when they arrived at the sheriff’s office.  Davis 
was transported to the hospital at 1:08 a.m.  He allowed a doctor to clean his 
wounds and agreed to a CAT scan, but would not agree to stitches, antibiotics, a 
blood draw, or anything involving a needle.1
Davis was taken to the Broward County Sheriff’s Office at 3:41 a.m.  
Homicide Detective Frank Ilarazza testified that when he learned Davis was going 
to be transferred to the sheriff’s office, he set up a video camera in an interrogation 
room.  Ilarazza turned on the camera at 3:55 a.m., and turned it off approximately 
  Detective Carmody remained with 
Davis at the hospital for two hours.  He said that Davis seemed normal and did not 
appear to be hallucinating. 
                                         
 
1.  The State’s mental health expert, Dr. Lori Butts, testified that Davis’s 
refusal to allow any medical procedure that punctures the skin was consistent with 
his Rastafarian belief system. 
 
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five hours later at around 9:00 a.m.   An edited DVD of the recording was 
submitted into evidence at trial and was played for the jury.  Davis appears 
disoriented in the video, and much of his speech is transcribed as “unintelligible” 
in the official trial transcript. 
At the beginning of the video, Davis is seen in the interview room with 
Detective Carmody.  Davis was brought a change of clothes and the clothes he 
wore at the time of the offenses were collected.  Davis mentioned that he was in 
ROTC and that his father was in the Army.  He said to Detective Carmody, “I 
almost went into the Army.  I don’t think it was meant to be though.  I was meant 
to fight this war.”  When Detective Carmody removed Davis’s handcuffs, 
Carmody commented, “Bad day, right?”  Davis responded, “It’s been a good day.”  
Detectives Carmody and Ilarraza also collected biographical information from 
Davis.  Davis said that he was twenty-one years old, that his family was Jamaican, 
and that he graduated from Piper High School in 2003. 
Davis’s parents entered the interrogation room at approximately 6:18 a.m.  
Davis’s mother asked Davis if he knew who they were.  He identified his mother 
as “mom,” but said that his father was “the king.”  They asked Davis what 
happened to his face and said that Davis needed medical treatment.  Davis 
responded that he was alright.  Davis’s parents asked him to tell them what 
happened.  Davis said, “God put me out there to subtract somebody.”  He 
 
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continued, “Big sister . . . , she betray me, so I murdered her.”  He also said, “I was 
just on a mission, just taking care of business.”  They again asked what happened 
to Davis’s face, and Davis responded that he was fighting with “[s]ome dudes.”  
Mr. Davis asked about the people Davis was fighting. 
 
MR. DAVIS, SR.:  What you have to fight about? 
RALSTON DAVIS:  For my thrown [sic].  Tell (unintelligible) move 
to the side, I’m going to get mine. 
 
MR. DAVIS, SR.:  Move to the side where? 
RALSTON DAVIS:  Get out the way, it’s my time now, N-O-W, 
move to the side, time for the young man to take it over and run the 
whole city. 
 
MRS. DAVIS:  Run the whole city? 
RALSTON DAVIS:  Run the whole city, live like a king forevermore, 
walking the path of righteousness. 
 
Davis mentioned his assault rifle and Mr. Davis asked why he had a gun.  Davis 
responded, “Because me rod and me staff comfort me, that’s why it’s used.” 
Davis’s parents asked about the people Davis killed.  Davis said that his “big 
sister” was Bahamian.  Mr. Davis asked Davis why he killed her.  Davis said, “She 
pretend—she come into my life like my big sister (unintelligible), a sister real 
close to me.  She was born the day before my birthday.”  Davis’s parents replied 
that Davis had real sisters and that they were worried about him.  Davis said, “I’m 
all right, I’ll get a new one, I feel like I done my job, mission complete, and if 
there’s some more to go, pass me the AR-15.” 
Davis’s father responded, “Let me get back to this big sister thing, we want 
to understand.”  Davis said that she was “phony.” 
 
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RALSTON DAVIS:  She said she was my big sister, she claimed to 
be my big sister, oh (unintelligible), this, that, and the other.  She take 
me and like (unintelligible), call me bro, me start calling her big sis, 
she said (unintelligible) like a brother, she act like I’m like her brother 
(unintelligible), I ain’t real, he gangster.  I really recommend 
(unintelligible). 
MRS. DAVIS:  She don’t have a little brother? 
RALSTON DAVIS:  (Unintelligible).  The one who beat me. 
MRS. DAVIS:  Her brother beat you? 
RALSTON DAVIS:  (Unintelligible).  The same, you know, the same 
people me end up fight (unintelligible).  I park across the street and 
(unintelligible), I park across the street, I watched them, and the AR-
15 comes out, four of them, four.  (Unintelligible) send them across 
the street— 
MR. DAVIS, SR.:  What street? 
RALSTON DAVIS:  —while me watch, straight across the street.  By 
Sunrise Boulevard.  (Unintelligible).  That’s the test, them OG’s, they 
done walked up and walked down the road already.  They beat me up, 
but it’s all good, I feel that love, I feel the love, love, one love; black, 
white, Arab, Chinese, Indian, Jamaican, Haitian. 
 
Davis’s mother said that she loved him, but that she did not support what he did. 
The conversation continued: 
 
RALSTON DAVIS:  How about the Arab man? 
 
MRS. DAVIS:  The Arab man? 
 
RALSTON DAVIS:  Like Indian boy, or whatever him is. 
MRS. DAVIS:  I don’t know about him.  You didn’t tell me about 
him. 
RALSTON DAVIS:  I follow my instinct, and he disrespect me, I 
swerved on 31st. 
MRS. DAVIS:  Yeah. 
RALSTON DAVIS:  Before we get behind the king, when me cut 
across the lane, boy disrespect me and go around me. 
MRS. DAVIS:  Oh yeah? 
MR. DAVIS, SR.:  But since when do you go— 
RALSTON DAVIS:  So me follow him in a gas station, me make him 
open his mouth. 
MRS. DAVIS:  Oh yeah? 
 
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RALSTON DAVIS:  And then (unintelligible) people at the barbecue, 
barbecue shopping, and I dump in they mouth, and everyone that shot 
not living anymore.  I murdered his ass cause he tried me.  I be a 
snake out there, pure snake. 
 
Shortly afterward, Detective Carmody entered the room and informed Davis’s 
parents that they would have to leave.  Davis’s mother told Davis that they would 
pray for him.  Davis replied, “Yeah, pray for me.  Tell—tell—tell the man I did my 
mission, and if he got more missions for me to do, I’m ready, it’s my time.”  The 
video concluded after several officers arrived to take Davis to jail. 
At trial, several witnesses for the State testified concerning the 
documentation of evidence.  Shell casings recovered from all locations matched 
Davis’s rifle.  The State also presented the testimony of Dr. Reinhard Motte, the 
medical examiner who conducted the victims’ autopsies.  Motte testified that there 
were twenty-three entrance gunshot wounds on Myosha Proby’s head, back, and 
buttocks.  Motte concluded that a single gunshot to the head was most likely the 
first shot fired and would have killed Proby instantly.  He said that the angle of the 
entrance wounds indicated that Proby fell down onto the floor after being shot in 
the head, and that the other wounds were inflicted subsequently.  Motte’s 
examination of Ravindra Basdeo indicated that Basdeo was shot once while seated 
in his car and that the gun was fired from inside Basdeo’s mouth.  Motte testified 
that Basdeo would have died instantly.  Motte found that Carlos Jones was shot 
four times, once each in the head, the right arm, the left side of the back, and the 
 
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right shoulder.  Motte determined that Jones’ head wound was inflicted at close 
range and would have been fatal; although, Motte could not determine the order in 
which the wounds were inflicted. 
 
 
2. 
The Defense’s Evidence 
Defense counsel did not dispute the essential facts of the case, but sought to 
establish that at the time of the offenses, Davis was suffering from a temporary 
psychotic disorder and was legally insane.  In support of this argument, the defense 
presented three mental health experts: Dr. Allan Ribbler, Dr. Abbey Strauss, and 
Dr. Dennis Day.  Each expert testified to his belief that Davis was suffering from a 
stress-induced psychotic disorder at the time of the murders.  In addition, the 
defense presented witnesses establishing Davis’s unusual behavior in the period 
leading up to and following the murders. 
The defense’s first witness was Davis’s mother, Marcia Davis.  Mrs. Davis 
testified that Davis is one of six children, that she and her husband are both 
ministers, and that the family is very religious.  She testified that Davis first started 
behaving uncharacteristically withdrawn around November 2005.  On Wednesday, 
November 30, Davis got into a fight with his father, who threw him out of the 
house.  When Davis had not returned by 3:00 a.m., Mrs. Davis called Davis and 
told him to come home.  She found him asleep at the kitchen table the next 
morning at 6:00 a.m.  He then went to bed fully dressed.  Mrs. Davis testified that 
 
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when Davis got up approximately three hours later, wearing the same clothes, he 
seemed energetic and excited, and told her that he wanted to be a “singer for God.”  
He also asked her, “How do you know when God is talking to you?”  Mrs. Davis 
asked if he thought God was talking to him.  Davis replied, “Yes,” but would not 
say anything else.2
Mrs. Davis testified that on Friday morning, Davis was wearing the same 
clothes he had been wearing since Wednesday.  He gave his mother roses and told 
her that he wanted to be involved in her church.  Davis’s phone rang and he 
answered it.  After getting off of the phone, he said that the girl he talked about 
before had invited him to breakfast.  Mrs. Davis said that Davis was fidgeting and 
constantly looking behind him.  She asked if he was on drugs, and he said he was 
not.  Mrs. Davis saw Davis again later that evening.  Davis went to his parents and 
  Later in the day, Davis told his mother that he had met a girl 
who would be his “big sister.”  He said that he had known her for several weeks, 
and that if his father kicked him out he could come live with her.  Mrs. Davis left 
for an appointment and did not see Davis again until Friday. 
                                         
2.  Davis’s sister, Ruth Davis, testified that she was present at that time and 
largely confirmed Mrs. Davis’s account of Davis’s behavior.  Ruth Davis said that 
her brother was fidgeting, would not make eye contact, and was talking about God, 
which was unusual for him.  She observed Davis tell their mother that he wanted to 
be a “DJ for God.”  
 
 
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said that his father was “the king.”  Mr. and Mrs. Davis began to talk to him, but 
Davis’s phone rang and he left the house.   
Later that night, some people came to the door and told Davis’s parents that 
they had seen Davis surrounded by policemen near the Florida Turnpike.  Mrs. 
Davis drove there with her husband and saw Davis on the ground, restrained by 
several officers.  She and her husband spoke to one of the officers and later visited 
Davis at the police station.  She said that when they arrived, Davis seemed 
disoriented.  Mrs. Davis asked Davis whether he recognized them, because when 
they entered the room he did not seem to know who they were. 
The defense also presented several witnesses who described Davis’s 
behavior following the shootings.  Victoria Oldag was an emergency medical 
technician at the Broward County Jail.  Oldag evaluated Davis when he was 
brought to the jail on December 3, the morning after his arrest.  Davis was talking 
to himself, giggling, and would not make eye contact.  At times he would stare off 
into space.  Oldag wrote, “violent, unable to sign,” on Davis’s medical intake form, 
and checked boxes for “hallucinations” and “bizarre behavior.” 
Curtis White testified that he was a correctional deputy at the jail.  White 
testified that Davis was “totally rowdy” when he was brought in and that Davis 
was kicking and yelling.  White could not understand many of the things Davis 
was saying.  Davis would talk to himself and recite scripture.  Davis remained at 
 
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White’s unit for approximately one week.  White said that Davis’s behavior slowly 
improved over that time, but Davis was still acting bizarrely and made comments 
about God talking to him. 
Dorothy Ferraro testified that she was an assistant public defender in 
Broward County.  She went to see Davis on the week of December 20, 2005.  
When Ferraro was brought to Davis’s holding cell, Davis was jumping up and 
down and yelling gibberish.  Ferraro felt that Davis was mentally unstable, and 
based on that meeting had him evaluated for competency to stand trial. 
 
The defense’s three mental health experts—Dr. Ribbler, Dr. Strauss, and Dr. 
Day—testified that Davis was suffering from a brief psychotic disorder and was 
legally insane.  Dr. Ribbler testified that under the DSM-IV manual, a brief 
psychotic disorder requires the presence of one of four symptoms: delusions, 
hallucinations, disorganized speech, or grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior.  
In Davis’s case, Dr. Ribbler found that Davis exhibited both hallucinations and 
delusions, manifested as the voice of God speaking to him.  According to Dr. 
Ribbler, brief psychotic disorders are stress-induced and, while rare, typically 
occur in individuals in their late-teens to early-twenties. 
 
Each expert interviewed Davis several times and essentially learned the 
same information.   A short time before the offenses, Davis had been a witness for 
the prosecution in a murder trial concerning a stabbing at Piper High School.  The 
 
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trial arose out of an incident where one of Davis’s friends was assaulted and 
stabbed to death in Davis’s presence.  Davis attempted to perform CPR, but the 
friend died in his lap.  Dr. Strauss found that Davis was extremely stressed 
following the trial because he was afraid that he was not a strong enough witness.   
On the evening of Wednesday, November 30, 2005, Davis had a fight with 
his father, who threw him out of the house.  Davis reported that he spent that night 
in his car and awoke the next morning with a euphoric feeling.  That day, Davis 
came to believe that he had been chosen by God to fulfill a mission.  Davis spent 
the day being charitable to people, visited a friend in the hospital, and forgave his 
father for their fight.  In addition, a man approached Davis on the street and began 
speaking to him about the Bible and King Solomon, which Davis felt was not a 
coincidence.  On Friday morning, Davis received a call from Myosha Proby, who 
invited him to breakfast.  However, Davis’s mother convinced him not to go 
because he did not know Proby very well. 
On Friday evening, Davis went to a music studio with friends, where they 
smoked marijuana.  Davis returned to the studio alone later in the evening.  Davis 
reported that he was talking on his phone and a group of men told him to be quiet.  
This resulted in an altercation; the men threw Davis out of the studio and beat him 
up.  One of the men threatened Davis with a gun, causing Davis to go to his car 
and retrieve his rifle.  At that point, Davis received a call from Proby.  He came to 
 
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believe that the call was not a coincidence, and that his “mission” was to kill her.  
Davis went to Proby’s apartment and shot her to death.  As Davis was driving 
away from Proby’s apartment, another car swerved around Davis’s car on the road.  
Davis took this as a sign of disrespect for God and concluded that the driver was 
evil.  Davis then followed the car into a gas station and shot the driver, Ravindra 
Basdeo.  Davis could not explain what caused him to kill Carlos Jones. 
Dr. Strauss testified that the video recording of Davis’s conversation with 
his parents supported a conclusion that Davis was psychotic.  Davis was able to 
speak with his parents in a safe environment and seemed committed to the idea that 
he had completed a mission.  Although Davis appeared calm in the video, Dr. 
Strauss noted that psychoses fluctuate and that individuals with psychotic disorders 
can have periods of greater and lesser lucidity.  Dr. Strauss testified that his 
conclusions were further supported by medical records from Davis’s time at the 
Broward County Jail.  On a medical intake form dated December 3, the evaluator 
concluded that Davis should be placed under psychological observation.  On 
December 6, the reviewing physician wrote that Davis exhibited bizarre behavior 
and “remain[ed] psychotic.”  Davis continued to exhibit symptoms of psychosis, 
and was eventually placed on Risperdal, an antipsychotic.  The medication was not 
discontinued until March 13.  Dr. Strauss found this timeline consistent with his 
 
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diagnosis of a brief psychotic disorder, which generally remits within one to two 
months, but may sometimes last longer. 
On cross-examination, Dr. Strauss agreed that behavior similar to psychosis 
can be caused by cocaine use.  However, Dr. Strauss explained that he ruled out 
drugs as a cause of Davis’s behavior.  Dr. Strauss noted that cocaine-induced 
psychoses are extremely rare.  Further, while cocaine leaves a person’s system 
within four to five hours, Davis was found incompetent to stand trial on January 
26, 2006.  Dr. Strauss also noted that Davis remained on Risperdal until March 13, 
indicating that there was a clinical need for it. 
The defense’s final mental health expert, Dr. Day, agreed with Dr. Strauss 
that the time frame surrounding Davis’s symptoms was inconsistent with a drug-
induced psychosis.  Dr. Day stated that while there was no evidence Davis had 
used cocaine, there was significant evidence that Davis had suffered several major 
stressors in the period leading up to the offenses.  Dr. Day noted that Davis had 
been a witness in a murder trial, which caused him to feel a tremendous amount of 
fear and paranoia.  Davis came to believe that there was a curse on him or that an 
evil power was trying to hurt him.  Dr. Day thought getting kicked out of his house 
may have been “the final straw that broke the camel’s back.”  Dr. Day noted that 
Davis had no history of mental illness, so the episode appeared to be a brief 
 
- 21 - 
psychotic disorder.  All three mental health experts testified that they believed 
Davis was legally insane at the time of the murders. 
3. 
The State’s Rebuttal 
In rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of psychologist Dr. Lori Butts.   
In contrast to the defense’s experts, Dr. Butts concluded that Davis was not insane.  
Dr. Butts found several sources of information that indicated Davis was 
malingering, including jail medical records, notes by Davis’s girlfriend, a 
competency evaluation by Dr. Trudy Block-Garfield, and psychological testing 
conducted by Dr. Brannon.  With regard to the jail records, Dr. Butts concluded 
Davis’s reported symptoms were exaggerated and were inconsistent with real 
mental illness.  Dr. Butts also stated that she had reviewed a diary written by 
Davis’s girlfriend.  In the diary, Davis’s girlfriend wrote that she heard Davis’s 
mother tell Davis that he should convince authorities that he was “crazy.”  In 
addition, Dr. Butts cited a mental health evaluation conducted in April 2006, in 
which a psychiatrist concluded that Davis was malingering. 
Dr. Butts believed that Davis was not suffering from a stress-induced 
psychosis, but rather that he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the 
murders.  She found that Davis’s behavior could have been consistent with the use 
of cocaine, ecstasy, or amphetamines.  Other information indicated that Davis may 
have been using drugs.  Davis had admitted using marijuana, which Dr. Butts 
 
- 22 - 
testified could have been laced.  Hermione Harrell reported that she knew Davis 
used ecstasy, and Davis’s girlfriend wrote that he went to get pills on the day of the 
murders.  Additionally, Davis was known to sell drugs, and crack cocaine was 
found in his car following his arrest.  Dr. Butts also observed that Davis’s behavior 
fluctuated in the period leading up to the shootings, from peaceful in the morning 
to violent in the evening.  Dr. Butts testified that taking all data into account, she 
believed the most likely explanation for Davis’s behavior was that he was using 
substances.  Dr. Butts concluded that Davis’s behavior indicated that even if he 
was mentally ill, he knew that his actions were wrong. 
 
Following Dr. Butts’ testimony, the State rested.  The jury subsequently 
convicted Davis of all three counts of first-degree murder. 
 
B. 
The Penalty Phase 
At the penalty phase, the State largely relied on the evidence presented 
during the guilt phase.  However, the State introduced photographs of Myosha 
Proby and Ravindra Basdeo, as well as victim impact statements by Tabitha James, 
the sister of Myosha Proby, Sandra Basdeo, the sister of Ravindra Basdeo, and 
Elsa Jones, the mother of Carlos Jones.  After the reading of the victim impact 
statements, the State rested. 
 
Marcia Davis, the defendant’s mother, testified again at the penalty phase.  
Mrs. Davis said that she moved to New York City from Jamaica in 1982.  In New 
 
- 23 - 
York, she met Ralston Davis, Sr., the defendant’s father, who was also from 
Jamaica.  Ralston Davis, Jr., the defendant, was their first child.  Due to financial 
problems, they decided to move the family to Ft. Lauderdale, Florida when Ralston 
was five years old.  Mrs. Davis brought Ralston and his two younger sisters to live 
with one of her cousins in Jamaica, while she and Mr. Davis established 
themselves in Florida.  The children remained in Jamaica for approximately one 
year.  Mrs. Davis learned from a friend that the children were not being fed, were 
essentially being left to take care of themselves, and that Ralston was being beaten.  
She was told about an incident where Ralston ran away and was eventually 
discovered under a house, where he had been hiding for two or three days.  Mrs. 
Davis went to Jamaica and brought the children to live with her husband’s family.  
However, Mrs. Davis later learned that the children were being treated the same 
way.  The children were not being fed or cared for and were being forced to sleep 
on the floor.  She also learned that the children were largely being left in the care 
of an ex-girlfriend of Mr. Davis, who was beating Ralston. 
Mr. and Mrs. Davis moved the children to Florida when Ralston was six 
years old.  Mrs. Davis said that Ralston was picked on in school because of his 
Jamaican accent.  When he was eight years old, he once came home with a broken 
nose and a missing tooth.  Mrs. Davis said that Ralston was a kind and loving child 
and that he did not like to fight.  She said that the family owned a grocery store and 
 
- 24 - 
restaurant in Miami.  The business was robbed in 1992, which destroyed the family 
financially.  At that point, the children were taken back to Jamaica to live with 
another cousin.  However, Mrs. Davis learned that the children again were not 
being taken care of and were being beaten.  She said that Ralston still has a scar on 
his upper arm from being whipped.   
Mrs. Davis and her husband were not able to support themselves in Florida, 
so they decided to move back to Jamaica.  They and their six children moved into a 
two bedroom shack with no running water.  Mrs. Davis eventually decided to 
return to Florida to find a job, while the family remained in Jamaica.  While the 
children were with their father, she learned that Ralston was being molested by a 
preacher’s assistant.  At this point, Ralston was twelve or thirteen years old.  Mrs. 
Davis decided to send Ralston to live with his paternal grandmother in New York 
when he was fourteen or fifteen.  However, Ralston did not have a good 
relationship with his grandmother, who would sometimes not feed him and at one 
point kicked him out of her house.  
Eventually, Mrs. Davis brought all of the children back to Florida.  When 
Ralston was in high school and close to graduation, he came home and told her that 
one of his friends had died.  Ralston said that his friend had been stabbed and that 
he tried to resuscitate him and bring him to the hospital, but that the friend died in 
his arms.  Mrs. Davis said that prior to that incident Ralston was always outgoing 
 
- 25 - 
and would bring friends over to their house.  After his friend’s death, Ralston 
became much more withdrawn.  She said that he was especially upset around the 
time of the trial on the stabbing because he believed that the other boys involved in 
the incident were lying about what happened.  Mrs. Davis said that when she saw 
Ralston after the shootings on December 2, 2005, he looked like a different person.  
She said that she should have taken Ralston to see a doctor when he began acting 
strangely the preceding Wednesday. 
Ralston Davis’s younger sister, Ruth Davis, testified about the children’s 
experience in Jamaica when she was three years old and Ralston was five.  She 
said that they were not fed and that the people they were living with would beat 
Ralston with a switch.  Later, when they lived in Florida, Ralston was picked on 
and beaten by other children because of his accent.  She recalled one incident when 
he came home with his nose bloodied and a tooth missing.  On another occasion, 
several other children broke his arm.  Ruth testified that Ralston was always a 
loving and kind person, that he was very outgoing, and that he considered everyone 
he met to be his friend.  She testified that he was behaving very abnormally in the 
days leading up to the shootings. 
Marjorie Morrison-Smith testified that she was a friend of the Davis family 
and had known Ralston for ten years.  She testified that Ralston was always a kind, 
sweet, loving kid, that he was very reliable, and that she could always call him if 
 
- 26 - 
she needed help with something.  Daren Davis testified that he was Ralston’s 
younger brother.  He testified that Ralston was a good brother.  Ralston encouraged 
him to go to school and stay out of trouble, and once paid the fees for him to play 
little league football.  Kerron Matthew testified that he and Ralston were friends in 
high school.  Matthew testified that whenever he did not have money for lunch, 
Ralston would split his food or give him money.  He said that Ralston was never 
violent and tried to stay out of trouble.  Pamela Richardson testified that she was 
friends with Ralston and his mother.  She said that Ralston was always a good 
person to her and that she could always call him if she needed anything.  Charesse 
Sanford testified that she had known Ralston for six years and that he was the 
father of her son, who was three years old.  She testified that Ralston was never 
violent with her and that she brings their son to see him often.  Ralston Davis also 
testified, describing the events leading up to the murders.  Davis said that the 
person who committed the murders was not him and that he felt horrible about 
what happened. 
As its final witness, the defense presented Dr. Michael Brannon, a 
psychologist.  Dr. Brannon testified that he was initially retained in 2006 to 
evaluate Davis’s competency to proceed.  In January 2006, Dr. Brannon 
administered a test for malingering and the results indicated that Davis was not 
faking.  Davis scored highly on testing for paranoia, and his scores were similar to 
 
- 27 - 
those of individuals suffering from paranoid delusions.   Dr. Brannon also 
reviewed documentation of the offenses and Davis’s family history, and met with 
Davis approximately ten times.  Dr. Brannon found that Davis’s childhood was 
chaotic, that he had moved frequently, and that he suffered significant physical 
abuse as well as sexual abuse.  Despite Davis’s childhood, Dr. Brannon found that 
Davis did not show any characteristics of having a psychopathic personality.  Dr. 
Brannon stated that in more recent testing, Davis no longer scored highly for 
paranoid delusions and his scores were in the normal range.   
Dr. Brannon concluded that Davis was suffering from a brief psychotic 
reaction at the time of the offenses.  He believed that based on Davis’s history, “he 
was predisposed to have some mental health issues under undue stress or 
pressure.”  Dr. Brannon found that the period before the murders was particularly 
stressful based on a number of factors, including the death of Davis’s friend, the 
fact that his father had thrown him out, and that his girlfriend was pregnant.  Dr. 
Brannon concluded that Davis was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance, acted under extreme duress, and was substantially impaired 
in his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of the law. 
 
- 28 - 
At the end of the penalty phase, the jury recommended a sentence of death 
for the murder of Proby by a vote of eight to four.  The jury recommended life 
imprisonment for the murders of Basdeo and Jones. 
 
C. 
The Spencer Hearing 
The trial court held a Spencer3
The defense next presented Dr. Alan Ribbler.  Dr. Ribbler reaffirmed his 
belief that Davis was insane at the time of the offense.  Dr. Ribbler also testified 
that he believed Davis’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the law was substantially impaired.  The defense’s third 
witness was forensic psychologist Dr. Michael Brannon.  Dr. Brannon testified that 
Davis was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the 
 hearing on September 10, 2009.  The defense 
first presented Dr. Lori Butts, who testified on behalf of the State during the guilt 
phase.  At the Spencer hearing Dr. Butts testified that Davis’s behavior at the time 
of the offenses was inconsistent with his behavior both before and after the 
incident.  While she could not rule out the possibility that Davis was suffering from 
an organic psychotic disorder, she believed it was more likely that Davis was 
suffering from a substance-induced psychosis at the time of the offenses.  
Regardless, Dr. Butts believed that Davis was suffering from some type of 
psychosis and that his ability to make decisions was impaired. 
                                         
 
3.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
- 29 - 
time of the offense, and that Davis’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired.     
The defense’s fourth witness was Dr. Abbey Strauss.  Dr. Strauss reaffirmed his 
position that Davis was legally insane at the time of the crimes, and testified that 
he believed both statutory mental health mitigators were met as to the murder of 
Myosha Proby.  Finally, the defense presented Dr. Dennis Day, who also 
reaffirmed his conclusion that Davis was legally insane at the time of the crimes, 
and testified that he believed both statutory mental health mitigators applied. 
D. 
Sentencing 
The trial court issued its sentencing order on January 7, 2010.  As to the 
murders of Ravindra Basdeo and Carlos Jones, the trial court followed the jury’s 
recommendations and imposed two sentences of life imprisonment.  As to the 
murder of Myosha Proby, the trial court found and assigned weight to the 
following aggravating circumstances:  (1) Davis was contemporaneously convicted 
of another capital felony (i.e., the contemporaneous murders of Basdeo and Jones) 
(great weight); (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC) 
(great weight); (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP) 
(great weight); and (4) the crime was committed in the course of a burglary (slight 
weight). 
 
- 30 - 
The trial court further found and assigned weight to the following statutory 
mitigating circumstances: (1) Davis has no significant history of prior criminal 
activity (little weight); (2) the crime was committed while Davis was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (moderate weight); (3) 
Davis’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired (moderate 
weight); (4) Davis’s age (twenty-one) at the time of the crime (slight weight).  The 
trial court also found ten nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, which it assigned 
little or slight weight.4
II. 
ANALYSIS 
    The court concluded that the aggravating circumstances 
outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and imposed a sentence of death. 
 
A. 
Guilt Phase Issues 
 
Davis raises the following challenges on appeal pertaining to the guilt phase 
of his trial:  (1) the trial court erred in allowing Hermione Harrell to testify over a 
                                         
 
4.  The trial court found as nonstatutory mitigation: (1) Davis grew up in a 
poor environment (slight weight); (2) Davis was abandoned as a child several 
times (little weight); (3) Davis was physically and mentally abused as a child (little 
weight); (4) Davis comes from a broken home (slight weight); (5) Davis has shown 
compassion and generosity (slight weight); (6) Davis has displayed proper 
courtroom behavior (slight weight); (7) the victim was rendered unconscious 
immediately (slight weight); (8) Davis loves and cares for his mother, his son, and 
his brothers and sisters (little weight); (9) Davis lacked support and guidance from 
his parents as a child (slight weight); and (10) Davis can be rehabilitated, has an 
average IQ, does not suffer from a learning disability, is not a psychopath and does 
not have an anti-social personality disorder (slight weight). 
 
- 31 - 
hearsay objection that Myosha Proby said to her, “He’s going to come kill me”; (2) 
reversible error occurred when the jury viewed a DVD on which Davis invoked his 
right to remain silent; (3) the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the 
DVD of Davis and his parents; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to view 
a state-prepared transcript of the recorded conversation between Davis and his 
parents; and (5) the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Butts to testify about the cause 
of Davis’s behavior when Public Defender Dorothy Ferraro visited him in the jail.  
We also review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Davis’s convictions for 
first-degree murder.  As discussed below, we find each challenge to be either 
without merit or harmless, and affirm Davis’s convictions. 
 
 
1. 
Hermione Harrell’s Testimony 
We first review Davis’s hearsay challenge to the testimony of witness 
Hermione Harrell.  At trial, Harrell described the circumstances leading up to the 
shooting of Myosha Proby.  Harrell explained that she took a shower while Proby 
called Davis.  When Harrell got out of the shower, Proby looked upset.  Proby told 
Harrell that she had called Davis, and that Davis was irate and seemed upset about 
something.  They called Davis back.  Harrell said that she could hear Davis yelling 
at someone else through the phone.  As Proby was on the phone with Davis, she 
was mouthing words to Harrell.  Over a hearsay objection by the defense, Harrell 
 
- 32 - 
was allowed to tell the jury what Proby told her.  Harrell said, “He told her, she 
repeated, he’s going to come kill me.” 
Section 90.802, Florida Statutes (2009), states:  “Except as provided by 
statute, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.”  Davis argues that the trial court erred in 
overruling the defense’s hearsay objection to Harrell’s testimony.  The State 
counters that although the trial court did not identify the basis for its ruling, the 
court could have admitted the statement either as a “spontaneous statement,” or as 
an “excited utterance.”  The two exceptions are defined as follows: 
The provisions of s. 90.802 to the contrary notwithstanding, the 
following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant 
is available as a witness: 
 
(1) Spontaneous statement.—A spontaneous statement describing or 
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was 
perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter, except 
when such statement is made under circumstances that indicate its 
lack of trustworthiness. 
 
(2) Excited utterance.—A statement or excited utterance relating to a 
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 
 
§ 90.803, Fla. Stat. (2009). 
A trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  See Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 107 (Fla. 2008).   “The 
trial court’s discretion is constrained, however, by the application of the rules of 
evidence and by the principles of stare decisis.”  Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 
 
- 33 - 
29 (Fla. 2009) (citations omitted).  Additionally, “the trial court’s ruling on an 
evidentiary matter will be affirmed even if the trial court ruled for the wrong 
reasons, as long as the evidence or an alternative theory supports the ruling.”  
Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343, 359 (Fla. 2001). 
We find that the statement at issue qualifies as an excited utterance.  This 
Court has described the exception as follows: 
The excited utterance exception contained in section 90.803(2) 
requires that the “statement or excited utterance” relate to “a startling 
event or condition” and be made while the declarant was under the 
stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.  We have 
explained that to qualify as an excited utterance, the statement must be 
made: (1) “regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous 
excitement”; (2) “before there was time to contrive or misrepresent”; 
and (3) “while the person was under the stress or excitement caused 
by the event.”  Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 251 (Fla.1996).  This 
Court has observed that “[i]f the statement occurs while the exciting 
event is still in progress, courts have little difficulty finding that the 
excitement prompted the statement.”  State v. Jano, 524 So.2d 660, 
662 (Fla.1988) (quoting Edward W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 
§ 297 at 856 (3d ed.1984)).  “While an excited utterance need not be 
contemporaneous to the event, it must be made while the declarant is 
under the stress of the startling event and without time for reflection.”  
Hutchinson v. State, 882 So.2d 943, 951 (Fla.2004) [abrogated on 
other grounds by Depravine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2008)]; see 
also Rogers v. State
 
, 660 So.2d 237, 240 (Fla.1995). 
Hudson
In this case, Proby’s statement satisfies the three prongs of the exception.  
First, the statement must be made “regarding an event startling enough to cause 
nervous excitement.”  
, 992 So. 2d at 107. 
Henyard, 689 So. 2d at 251.  Here, Harrell testified that 
 
- 34 - 
when she emerged from the shower, Proby looked upset.  When they called Davis, 
Harrell could hear Davis yelling at another person through the phone.  Other 
witnesses testified that Davis was not a violent person and that this behavior would 
have been out of character for him.  After the phone call, Harrell encouraged Proby 
to call the police.  Thus, the trial court could have properly found that the phone 
call was “startling enough to cause nervous excitement.”  
As to the second and third prongs, the statement must be made “before there 
was time to contrive or misrepresent” and “while the person was under the stress or 
excitement caused by the event.”  
Id. 
Id.  Here, Harrell testified that Proby made the 
statement as she was on the phone with Davis.  “If the statement occurs while the 
exciting event is still in progress, courts have little difficulty finding that the 
excitement prompted the statement.”  Jano, 524 So. 2d at 662.  In Hudson, for 
example, this Court held that a witness was permitted to testify concerning a phone 
conversation he had with a murder victim just before the victim’s death.  The 
victim told the witness that the defendant was in his house with a gun and that the 
defendant had announced his intent to kill the victim.  See Hudson, 992 So. 2d at 
108.  We found the statements admissible, explaining, “The statements were made 
while the event was ongoing, rather than being related after the event, negating the 
likelihood that [the victim] had time to contrive or misrepresent; and the statements 
 
- 35 - 
were made while [the victim] was under the continuing stress or excitement caused 
by the event.”  
Similarly, in this case, Proby reported that Davis had announced his intent to 
kill her while she was still on the phone with him.  The fact that the statement was 
made while the conversation was ongoing indicates that she did not have time to 
contrive or misrepresent, and that she was still under the stress of Davis’s death 
threat.  Accordingly, we find that the trial court could have properly admitted the 
statement under section 90.803(2).
Id. 
5
 
 
2. 
Evidence of Davis’s Right to Remain Silent 
 
 
We next address whether the jury was improperly presented with evidence 
that Davis invoked his right to remain silent.  The factual basis for this claim arises 
from the video recording of Davis’s time at the sheriff’s office.  After Davis was 
arrested but before he was brought into the interrogation room, Detective Frank 
Ilarraza set up a video camera, which was switched on at 3:55 a.m.  At 
approximately 4:35 a.m., Detective Ilarraza informed Davis of his Miranda6
                                         
 
5.  Because we find the statement admissible as an excited utterance, it is 
unnecessary for us to determine whether the statement would also be admissible as 
a spontaneous statement, as defined under section 90.803(1).  See Hudson, 992 So. 
2d at 109 n.7. 
 rights.  
Davis then invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. 
 
6.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
- 36 - 
 
Prior to trial, Davis filed a motion asking the trial court to exclude the 
portion of the recording in which he invoked his rights.  The motion asserted that 
Dr. Lori Butts had been retained by the court to evaluate Davis’s mental condition 
at the time of the crimes.  The motion further asserted that in the defense’s 
deposition of Dr. Butts, she had expressed her opinion that Davis was not legally 
insane at the time of the crimes, basing her opinion in part on the fact that Davis 
asked for an attorney and invoked his right to remain silent.  The trial court granted 
the motion.  In its order, the court observed that Davis had filed a Notice of 
Insanity.  Citing State v. Burwick, 442 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1983), the trial court found 
that it was impermissible to rely on a defendant’s invocation of his or her rights as 
evidence of the defendant’s mental condition at the time of an offense.  
Accordingly, the trial court prohibited the State “from showing those portions of 
the audio/visual recording of the Defendant, while in custody, where he invokes 
his right to remain silent and asks for his attorney.” 
 
A DVD of the recording was introduced at trial on June 29, 2009.  Prior to 
the DVD’s admission, the State assured the trial court that the offending portions 
of the recording had been deleted.  On that basis, the court allowed the DVD to be 
played to the jury.  At first the recording proceeded without any difficulties.  At the 
beginning of the recording, an analog clock on the wall of the interrogation room 
shows the time as 3:53 a.m.  Davis is brought into the room approximately one 
 
- 37 - 
minute later.  Approximately forty-two minutes into the recording, Davis is seen 
speaking with several police officers, including Detective Ilarraza.  Shortly 
thereafter, the clock on the wall changes from 4:35 a.m. to 4:40 a.m.  At 4:40 a.m., 
Detective Ilarraza is seen exiting the room, leaving Davis alone.  Thus, the State 
properly deleted the portion of the recording in which Davis was informed of and 
invoked his Miranda rights. 
 
However, a difficulty with the DVD was encountered during its exhibition at 
trial.  In the DVD, Davis is seen alone in the room from 4:40 a.m. until 5:14 a.m.  
At 5:14 a.m., the clock on the wall changes to 4:25 a.m., returning to a section of 
the recording in which Davis was speaking with the officers.  The trial record 
indicates that when the DVD returned to this earlier portion of the recording at 
trial, the parties and the court thought an error had occurred with the trial court’s 
video system.  The prosecutor fast-forwarded the DVD to 5:55 a.m., shortly before 
Davis’s parents were brought into the room. 
 
In fact, an error had occurred in the editing of the DVD itself.  In the process 
of preparing the recording for trial, the State seemingly re-recorded a portion of 
Davis’s conversation with the police officers onto a later section of the DVD.  In 
that time, Davis is seen speaking with the police officers from 4:25 a.m. until 4:35 
a.m.  Unlike the first time this conversation appears on the DVD, the recording 
does not immediately skip forward from 4:35 a.m. to 4:40 a.m.  Instead, the 
 
- 38 - 
recording continues for several additional seconds.  In that time, Detective Ilarraza 
is seen explaining that he will advise Davis of his rights: 
DET. ILARRAZA: . . . [B]efore we go on to talking about what 
happened tonight, I have to go over your rights.  You know what your 
rights are, right, under the law? 
RALSTON DAVIS:  Remain silent? 
DET. ILARRAZA:  Well, yeah.  Let me go over them and then you 
can decide what you want to do, okay, it will be up to you. 
 
At this point in the DVD, the screen freezes, and the clock skips forward to 4:40 
a.m.  Although the prosecutor fast-forwarded over this portion of the DVD at trial, 
the DVD was sent to the jury during its deliberations.  The error was not 
discovered until the case was being prepared for appeal. 
 
Davis now argues that the submission of the challenged portion of the DVD 
to the jury violates the holding of Burwick and its progeny.  In Burwick, this Court 
addressed following issue: 
[W]hether the state may introduce evidence of a defendant’s post-
arrest conduct, including silence and the request to see an attorney 
after receiving Miranda warnings, as it relates solely to the issue of 
mental condition near the time of the offense when the defendant has 
asserted the insanity defense and the evidence is presented by the state 
in rebuttal. 
 
442 So. 2d at 945 (citation omitted).  In that case, the defendant was charged with 
sexual battery and burglary with assault.  Id.  At trial, the defense presented 
evidence that Burwick was insane at the time of the offenses.  In rebuttal, the State 
was allowed to present the testimony of the police officers who arrested Burwick.  
 
- 39 - 
The officers testified that after Burwick was read his rights, he told the officers that 
he did not want to make a statement and shortly thereafter requested an attorney.  
Id. at 946-47. 
 
This Court held that it was error to allow the State to use evidence of the 
defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent to rebut the defense of insanity.  
We explained, “There is no dispute that it is reversible error for the prosecution to 
attempt to impeach a defendant’s alibi testimony by asking on cross-examination 
why he remained silent at the time of his arrest.”  Id. at 947 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 
426 U.S. 610 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975)).  Discussing the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hale, we concluded that just as evidence of a 
defendant’s silence may not be used as evidence of guilt, such evidence is similarly 
impermissible as evidence of the defendant’s mental condition.  Id. at 948.  We 
concluded: 
It is fundamentally unfair for the state to lure Burwick into remaining 
silent and then impeach the man with this very same silence.  To 
permit the state to benefit from the fruits of its own deceptions 
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and 
article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution. 
 
Id.  We also observed that in Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986), the 
United States Supreme Court had similarly held that “because Miranda warnings 
carry an implied promise that ‘silence will carry no penalty,’ use of a defendant’s 
 
- 40 - 
post-Miranda silence as evidence of sanity . . . violates due process.”  Garron v. 
State, 528 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. 1988) (quoting Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 295)). 
The question before us is whether the recording of Detective Ilarraza 
informing Davis that he will be read his Miranda rights is “fairly susceptible” of 
being interpreted as a comment on Davis’s silence.  See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 
2d 1129 (Fla. 1986) (“In Florida, we have adopted a very liberal rule for 
determining whether a comment constitutes a comment on silence: any comment 
which is ‘fairly susceptible’ of being interpreted as a comment on silence will be 
treated as such.”) (citing State v. Kinchen, 490 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1985); David v. 
State, 369 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1979)).  As we have explained, “commenting on the 
silence of an accused is not a viable strategy for obtaining convictions, and any 
comment—direct or indirect—by anyone at trial on this right is constitutional error 
that should be avoided.”  Ventura v. State, 29 So. 3d 1086, 1088-89 (Fla. 2010) 
(original emphasis). 
On the record in this case, however, we conclude that the rule of Burwick 
and its progeny was not violated.  First, the reading and invocation of Davis’s 
Miranda warnings were not in fact recorded on the DVD that was submitted to the 
jury.  While the DVD shows Detective Ilarraza explaining that Davis will be read 
his Miranda rights, that section of the recording stopped before the warnings were 
actually read.  Second, no one commented on Davis’s invocation of his rights at 
 
- 41 - 
trial.  The trial court granted the defense’s motion to prohibit Dr. Butts from 
explaining that her conclusion regarding Davis’s sanity was based in part on his 
invocation of rights, and this ruling was adhered to by the prosecution and by all 
witnesses at trial.  On this basis, we find that reversible error did not occur.  
Nonetheless, we caution that trial courts must be exceedingly careful in ensuring 
that a defendant’s invocation of his or her right to remain silent is not used against 
him or her as evidence of guilt. 
 
 
3. 
Conversation Between Davis and His Parents 
 
Next, we review the trial court’s decision to admit the portion of the 
interrogation room recording in which Davis spoke with his parents.  At trial, 
Detective Joseph Carmody testified that when Davis was being arrested, a man 
approached identifying himself as Davis’s father.  Mr. Davis asked to speak with 
his son.  Detective Carmody told Mr. Davis that Davis had to be taken to the 
hospital, but promised to call him when Davis arrived at the sheriff’s office.  Later, 
Detective Carmody called Mr. and Mrs. Davis, who subsequently arrived at the 
sheriff’s office and requested to see their son.  The conversation between Davis 
and his parents, which lasted approximately forty minutes, was recorded on a video 
camera previously set up by Detective Frank Ilarraza.  The trial court denied 
Davis’s motion to suppress the recording, which was played to the jury at trial. 
 
- 42 - 
 
On appeal, Davis argues that the recording was obtained in violation of “a 
clear expectation of privacy . . . deliberately fostered by police officers.”  See State 
v. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).  “A trial court’s ruling on a 
motion to suppress comes to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of 
correctness and the court must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and 
deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial 
court’s ruling.”  Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 291 (Fla. 1997).  We find that the 
trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. 
 
Davis’s challenge is based on his contention that the police officers’ 
recording of the conversation was an unreasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Under normal circumstances, 
individuals do not have any expectation of privacy while within police custody.  
As the Fourth District Court of Appeal has explained: 
A citizen’s right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States is determined by a two prong test: 1) 
whether the citizen had a subjective expectation of privacy; and 2) 
whether that expectation was one that society recognizes as 
reasonable.  State v. Smith, 641 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla.1994) (citing 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 
576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).  Under this test, a prisoner does 
not have a right to privacy because areas of confinement do not share 
the same attributes as a private car, home, office, or hotel room.  Id. 
 
Surreptitiously made recordings of voluntary jailhouse 
conversations between inmates are admissible, “at least in the absence 
of any factor diminishing the trustworthiness of the conversation such 
 
- 43 - 
as coercion or trick.”  Allen v. State, 636 So.2d 494, 496–97 
(Fla.1994). 
 
Williams v. State, 982 So. 2d 1190, 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008); see also Hudson v. 
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528 (1984) (finding that the Fourth Amendment proscription 
against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of a prison cell); 
Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394, 405 (Fla. 1996) (recognizing that “a person 
loses much of the right to an expectation of privacy during incarceration”). 
 
However, we have also recognized that the recording of an inmate’s 
conversations may be improper if officers “deliberately fostered an expectation of 
privacy in the inmate’s conversation . . . especially where the obvious purpose was 
to circumvent a defendant’s assertion of the right to remain silent.”  Allen, 636 So. 
2d at 497.  In Allen, an inmate argued that it was error for a trial court to admit 
evidence of a conversation between himself and another inmate that was obtained 
through electronic eavesdropping of their prison cells.  Id. at 496.  We affirmed the 
trial court’s decision to admit the evidence, finding that there was no expectation 
of privacy in the communications.  Id.  However, we cautioned that our conclusion 
“rest[ed] on the fact that there was no improper police involvement in inducing the 
conversation nor any intrusion into a privileged or otherwise confidential or private 
communication.”  Id. at 497.  We cited State v. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1985), as an example of a case in which the surreptitious recording was not 
permissible. 
 
- 44 - 
In Calhoun, defendant Calhoun, an inmate, was brought to an interview 
room.  After speaking with officers about a case in which he was a suspect, and 
after being advised of his Miranda rights, Calhoun asked to speak with his brother 
privately.  The brother, who was also an inmate, was brought into the room and 
their conversation was recorded.  When officers returned to the room, Calhoun 
invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.  Although the officers 
terminated the interview, they then returned Calhoun’s brother to the interview 
room so that the brothers’ conversation could be recorded for investigative 
purposes.  Calhoun, 479 So. 2d at 242-43.  The Fourth District affirmed the trial 
court’s decision to suppress the recorded conversations, explaining: 
We agree with the state that the defendant usually would not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the “jailhouse” or even in the 
interview room.  However, we agree with the trial judge that the cases 
cited by the state are distinguishable on this record.  The facts of this 
case reveal that the defendant had a clear expectation of privacy 
because such an expectation was deliberately fostered by the police 
officers.  In this case, the defendant’s response to hearing his Miranda 
rights was that he would like to talk to his brother privately before 
talking to the officers.  The police ostensibly complied with his 
request, brought in his brother, and exited the room giving every 
indication that the conversation was to be secure and private.  
Consequently, it was a justified expectation of privacy. 
 
Id. at 243.  The Fourth District also found it significant that the second 
conversation was recorded after Calhoun invoked his Miranda rights.  The court 
observed, “Not only were these rights totally ignored by the police but the officers 
 
- 45 - 
circumvented them by bringing the brother back into the room and then taping the 
conversation which is the subject of the motion to suppress.”  Id. 
 
Davis cites several cases in which similar results were reached.  In Cox v. 
State, 26 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), the defendant was placed in an 
interrogation room, where he invoked his Miranda rights.  Citing Calhoun, the 
Fourth District held that the trial court erred in failing to suppress a recorded phone 
conversation between the defendant and his codefendant, which occurred after the 
defendant was repeatedly assured by officers that he was not being recorded.  Id. at 
675-76.   
The Tennessee Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in State v. 
Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486 (Tenn. 2001).  The defendant, a suspect in the murder of his 
college roommate, arrived at the police station accompanied by his parents and was 
placed in an interview room with a tape recorder on the table.  The room was also 
equipped with a hidden video camera and hidden microphones.  Id.at 488-89.  
After being questioned, the defendant asked the interrogating officers to turn off 
the tape recorder, which they did.  The officers then asked the defendant’s mother 
if she wanted to speak with the defendant “by himself.”  When she said yes, the 
officers excused themselves from the room and closed the door, leaving the 
defendant and his mother alone.  The defendant subsequently made incriminating 
statements, which were secretly recorded.  Id. at 494-96.  The Tennessee Supreme 
 
- 46 - 
Court held that the officers’ actions created a subjective, reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the interview room, and that the trial court erred in failing to suppress 
the recorded statements.  Id. at 496, 502.   
Finally, in People v. A.W., 982 P.2d 842, 848-49 (Colo. 1999), the Colorado 
Supreme Court held that a juvenile suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when he was left alone in an interrogation room with his father, where a detective 
had assured the suspect that “nothing or nobody was behind the two-way mirror” 
and that the detective would not be listening in on the suspect’s communications 
with his father. 
 
Here, Davis argues that Detective Carmody fostered a sense of privacy in the 
interrogation room by excusing himself from the room, telling Davis’s parents to 
knock if they wanted him, and closing the door.  Unlike the cases cited above, 
however, Detective Carmody never assured Davis and his parents that their 
conversation was private and took no actions designed to lead them to believe that 
the room was not under surveillance.  In Williams, 982 So. 2d at 1191-92, the 
defendant was placed in an interrogation room, where he invoked his rights, and 
was subsequently left alone.  The defendant was then recorded having several 
conversations on his cell phone, in which he made incriminating statements.  Id.  
The Fourth District held that the statements were not improperly admitted at trial, 
observing that the defendant was in police custody, and that “[t]he defendant did 
 
- 47 - 
not ask for privacy, and there was no suggestion that he had any.”  Id. at 1194.  
Similarly, in Johnson v. State, 730 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), the Fifth 
District held that the trial court did not err in failing to suppress a conversation 
between the defendant and his wife that occurred when they were left alone in an 
interview room at a police station.  The court found no expectation of privacy 
where the husband and wife were never assured that their conversation was private, 
and the wife conceded that she did not know whether the room was being 
monitored.  Id. at 370. 
 
As in Williams and Johnson, the officers in this case did not take any action 
designed to “deliberately foster[] an expectation of privacy” in Davis’s 
conversation with his parents.  See Allen, 636 So. 2d at 497.  We reject Davis’s 
contention that Detective Carmody’s simple act of closing the door was sufficient 
to create such an expectation.  Because this case did not involve any specific or 
deliberate assurances of privacy, the general rule that suspects have no expectation 
of privacy in police custody controls.  See Larzelere, 676 So. 2d at 405.  
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Davis’s motion to 
suppress the recording. 
 
 
4. 
Admission of a State-Prepared Transcript 
Davis also challenges the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to view a 
State-prepared transcript while watching the DVD.  Prior to the publication of the 
 
- 48 - 
DVD, defense counsel objected to the use of the transcript on the grounds that 
while he had read an earlier version of the transcript that was partially inaccurate, 
he had not been given the opportunity to verify the accuracy of the State’s revised 
transcript.  The trial court responded that the defense would be permitted to voir 
dire the State’s authenticating witness.  The State then presented the testimony of 
Detective Frank Ilarraza.  Detective Ilarraza testified that he was in the interview 
room when certain portions of the DVD were recorded.  When he was not in the 
room, he was watching the interview from a monitoring room.  Detective Ilarraza 
said that he checked the transcript that was created by a transcription service 
against the DVD and made corrections.  He confirmed that the current transcript 
reflected what he heard on the DVD when it was recorded.  On cross-examination, 
Detective Ilarraza conceded that he had no special training or expertise in 
transcription.  When asked how he verified the accuracy of the transcript, he 
responded, “I just listened to it on a DVD player and I read the transcript and then 
made any corrections.”  When correcting the transcript, Detective Ilarraza listed 
words that did not make any sense to him as, “unintelligible.”  Based on Detective 
Ilarraza’s testimony, the court ruled that the transcript was properly authenticated. 
 
Before copies of the transcript were distributed to the jury, the trial court 
gave the following instruction: 
Exhibit 44A has been identified as a typewritten transcript of the 
video statement that can be heard on the DVD recording received in 
 
- 49 - 
evidence as Exhibit 44.  I have admitted the transcript for the limited 
and secondary purpose of aiding you in following the content as you 
listen and view the DVD recording.  However, you are specifically 
instructed that whether the transcript correctly or incorrectly reflects 
the content of the recording is entirely for you to determine based 
upon your own examination of the transcript in relation to your 
hearing of the DVD recording itself as the primary evidence of its 
own contents; and if you should determine that the transcript is in any 
respect incorrect or unreliable, you should disregard it to that extent.  
Furthermore, since this is a limited and secondary exhibit, you will 
not have that – this will not go back with you to the jury room during 
your deliberations.  In other words, you will not be able to just rely on 
the transcript.  Should you wish to access or watch the video and you 
want to use the transcript, it will be done in open court with everyone 
here, it’s not going to be back in the jury room. 
 
 
The transcript was subsequently distributed to the jury.  While the DVD was 
being played, defense counsel again objected to the use of the transcript.  Counsel 
explained that the jurors were looking only at the transcript.  The trial court denied 
the objection, but instructed the jury: 
Let me emphasize to you again, each of you have transcripts that you 
are utilizing in viewing and hearing the DVD, but remember, the 
transcripts are secondary, they are there to aid you.  The evidence that 
you are to rely upon is the actual DVD, the video, as well as the audio.  
A lot of you are looking down a lot and listening to it, but you need to 
watch and listen and use the transcript as an aid, but it is no more than 
an aid.  The evidence itself, that you are to rely upon, is the DVD. 
 
 
In arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the transcript, Davis asserts 
that the court failed to follow the requirements of Martinez v. State, 761 So. 2d 
1074 (Fla. 2000), in which this Court set out the procedures that trial courts must 
follow in authenticating and publishing a transcript of an audio or video recording.  
 
- 50 - 
“The standard of review for the use of a demonstrative aid at trial is abuse of 
discretion.”  Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735, 752 (Fla. 2007).  While we agree 
that the trial court in this case failed to follow the requirements of Martinez
In 
, we 
hold that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Martinez
[T]rial courts should exercise extreme caution before allowing 
transcripts of recordings to be viewed by the jury.  The preferred 
approach is for the parties to stipulate to the accuracy of the transcript.   
If there is a dispute as to the accuracy, the trial court should make an 
independent pretrial determination of the accuracy of the transcript 
after hearing from persons who can properly testify as to its accuracy.   
Those who may be able to verify the accuracy of the transcript are: (1) 
the actual participants to the conversation; or (2) those who listened to 
or overheard the conversation as it was being recorded, so long as 
such persons can establish that the quality of the conversation that 
they overheard or listened to was better at the time they overheard it 
than the quality of the tape recording. 
, 761 So. 2d 1074, this Court directed trial courts to follow 
certain procedures when a party seeks to use a transcript as a demonstrative aid to 
an audio or visual recording.  We stated: 
 
We emphasize that there may be a difference between tape 
recordings that are difficult to hear and of poor quality and those that 
contain inaudible portions.  Where the tapes are partially inaudible, 
jurors will be unable to make an intelligent comparison between the 
recording and the transcript.  Under such circumstances, “[t]he 
practical effect of using an aid to comprehend unintelligible matter is 
that the aid becomes the evidence.”  Accordingly, if the trial court 
determines that there are inaudible portions of the tape, the trial court 
should delete the inaudible portions from the transcript before 
submitting the transcript to the jury. 
 
 
- 51 - 
Martinez, 761 So. 2d at 1086 (quoting United States v. Robinson
In addition . . . where a transcribed version of an audio-video 
tape is used as an aid to the jury and there is no stipulation as to its 
accuracy, trial courts should give a cautionary instruction to the jury 
regarding the limited use to be made of the transcript. . . . The federal 
circuits that have considered this issue agree that whenever a 
transcript is allowed by the trial court, it is “important that the judge 
instruct the jurors that their personal understanding of the tape 
supersedes the text in a transcript.” 
, 707 F.2d 872, 
878 (6th Cir. 1983)) (footnote and citations omitted).  The Court continued: 
 
Id. at 1086-87 (quoting United States v. Slade
In 
, 627 F.2d 293, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) 
(footnotes and citations omitted). 
Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 2007), this Court held that a 
transcript of a 9-1-1 call was not improperly admitted at trial.  Reviewing the 
record, the Court held that the trial court sufficiently complied with the guidelines 
announced in Martinez
During trial, the 911 operator who received the call from Dyke 
testified that she had compared the tape with the transcript, and 
concluded that the transcript was “a fair and accurate transcription of 
the recording.”  Thus, the accuracy of the transcript was verified in 
court by an actual participant to the conversation.  
.  We observed: 
See Martinez
 
, 761 
So. 2d at 1086.  Further, because the parties did not stipulate to the 
accuracy of the transcript, the judge provided the following cautionary 
instruction to the jury:  “State’s 41 is in evidence, that is the tape.  The 
transcript is not in evidence.  So, if there’s a conflict between the 
transcript that is not in evidence, and the tape that is in evidence, you 
are to rely on the tape that is in evidence.” 
 
- 52 - 
Williams, 967 So. 2d at 752.  We concluded that the record did not support the 
defendant’s argument that the trial court’s decision to admit the transcript was an 
abuse of discretion.  
 
Similarly, in 
Id. 
McCoy v. State, 853 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 2003), the defense filed a 
pretrial motion to exclude both an audiotape and a transcript of a recorded 
conversation between the defendant and his girlfriend.  Id. at 402.  The trial court 
listened to the tape and reviewed the transcript.  The court ruled that the relevant 
portions of the tape were audible, and informed the defense that it would be 
permitted to argue to the jury that the transcript was not accurate.  The court also 
instructed the jury that the transcript was not evidence and that the jurors should be 
bound by what they heard on the tape.  The court further instructed the State to 
amend portions of the transcript that the court determined, based upon its own 
review, to be inaccurate.  Additionally, the defendant’s girlfriend testified that she 
participated in the conversation recorded on the tape, verified that the tape 
accurately reflected the conversation, and testified that she helped prepare the 
transcript.  Id. at 402-03.  We held that the trial court did not err in admitting the 
transcript, observing:  “It is clear that the trial court scrupulously followed the 
guidance promulgated by this Court in Martinez, and we commend the court below 
for its fair and reasoned approach to the issues surrounding the audiotape and 
transcript at issue here.”  Id. at 405. 
 
- 53 - 
 
In the instant case, we agree with Davis that in contrast to the trial judge in 
McCoy, the trial court did not “scrupulously follow[] the guidance promulgated by 
this Court in Martinez . . . .”  Id.  As we explained in Martinez, “The preferred 
approach is for the parties to stipulate to the accuracy of the transcript.”  761 So. 
2d at 1086.   In the absence of such a stipulation, “the trial court should make an 
independent pretrial determination of the accuracy of the transcript after hearing 
from persons who can properly testify as to its accuracy.”  Id.
 
Second, it is not clear from the trial record that Detective Ilarraza was 
competent to verify the accuracy of the entire transcript.  We stated in 
  Here, the parties did 
not agree that the transcript was accurate.   Defense counsel in fact objected on the 
grounds that he had not been given the opportunity to verify the transcript’s 
accuracy.   
Martinez: 
“Those who may be able to verify the accuracy of the transcript are: (1) the actual 
participants to the conversation; or (2) those who listened to or overheard the 
conversation as it was being recorded, so long as such persons can establish that 
the quality of the conversation that they overheard or listened to was better at the 
time they overheard it than the quality of the tape recording.”  761 So. 2d at 1086 
(emphasis added).  Detective Ilarraza was present for certain portions of the video, 
and was clearly able to authenticate those parts of the conversation in which he 
was an actual participant.  See McCoy, 853 So. 2d at 404.  As to the parts of the 
 
- 54 - 
video in which he was not present, Ilarraza testified only that he observed the 
conversation from a “monitoring room.”  Notably, he did not explain whether he 
was watching the conversation live, for example, through a two-way mirror, or 
whether he was watching the conversation through a video feed.  Nor did he 
explain whether the audio and video quality of the conversation, as he perceived it, 
was better than the quality of the recording submitted at trial. 
This case may be contrasted with the circumstances in Martinez.  There, we 
found that the challenged transcript was properly authenticated by a detective who 
listened to the conversation as it was being recorded, and verified at trial that 
“Martinez ‘sounded so much clearer’ from the surveillance van than on the audio-
video taped recording.”  Id.
[W]e caution that the trial court should not allow the validity of the 
transcript to be bolstered by testimony from those who simply listened 
to the tape after it was made.
 at 1087.  We explained, however, that under other 
circumstances a witness may not be able to properly authenticate a recording: 
 . . .
 
 [I]f the authenticating witness neither 
participated in nor overheard the recorded conversation as it was 
taking place, the authenticating witness would be “in no better 
position than the jury to determine the contents of the tape recording.” 
Id. at 1087 (quoting Harris v. State, 619 So. 2d 340, 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)).  
Similarly, in the absence of verification that the conversation Detective Ilarraza 
observed was of better quality than the recording itself, he was not in any better 
position to authenticate the recording than any other person who simply viewed the 
recording after it was made. 
 
- 55 - 
 
Although the admission of a demonstrative aid is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, Williams, 967 So. 2d at 752, “[t]he trial court’s discretion is constrained 
. . . by the application of the rules of evidence and by the principles of stare 
decisis.”  Hayward v. State
 
This finding, however, does not end our inquiry.  Having determined that the 
trial court erred in its admission of a demonstrative aid, we must review whether 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   “The harmless error test . . . 
places the burden on the tate, as the beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, 
alternatively stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed 
to the conviction.”  
, 24 So. 3d 17, 29 (Fla. 2009).  In failing to follow this 
Court’s instructions in admitting the transcript as a demonstrative aid, we find that 
the trial court abused its discretion. 
State v. DiGuilio
 
Davis alleges only one specific inaccuracy in the transcript.  In the recorded 
conversation between Davis and his parents, Davis spoke at one point about how 
he was tasered by the police during his arrest.  He stated that he had read 
newspaper articles about cocaine users being tasered by police officers and 
subsequently dying from the electrical shock.   On the State-prepared transcript, 
Davis then states:  “What, you know what?  You might be right.  That’s why they 
did that – 
, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986). 
‘cause I have cocaine in my system.  That’s why they tase me three times 
 
- 56 - 
– I mean, I shake it off, like this.”  As transcribed by the State, therefore, the 
conversation was evidence that Davis was under the influence of drugs at the time 
of the offenses.  Davis, by contrast, contends that he did not state “I have cocaine 
in my system,” but rather that he said: “they have cocaine in their
 
The accuracy of this portion of the transcript was heavily disputed at trial.  
Dr. Butts, the State’s mental health expert, testified that she thought Davis may 
have been on drugs in part because she believed she heard him admit on the DVD 
that he had cocaine in his system.  Davis’s mother, the person he was speaking to 
at the time he made the statement, denied that he admitted using cocaine.  Rather, 
she stated that he was talking about people who are tasered while on cocaine.  In 
his closing argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Davis admitted to using 
cocaine on the DVD, which he maintained supported a finding that Davis was on 
drugs at the time of the offenses and was not insane.  In response, defense counsel 
argued that Davis did not say that he used cocaine, citing the testimony of Davis’s 
mother.  Defense counsel also cited the testimony of other witnesses who said that 
Davis adamantly denied using drugs. 
 system,” in 
reference to the individuals who had died from being tasered.  Thus, he maintains 
that he was explaining why the police used a taser on him (because they thought he 
was under the influence of cocaine), and why he was able to “shake it off” 
(because he was not on drugs). 
 
- 57 - 
As discussed above, the trial court instructed the jury on more than one 
occasion that it was to rely on the video, not the transcript.   
“[It is] the almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow 
their instructions.”  Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 
S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987).  “[We] presum[e] that 
jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the 
particular language of the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case 
and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions 
given them.”  Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324, n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 
1965, 1976, n. 9, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985).  See also Strickland v. 
Washington
 
, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984) (in assessing prejudice for purposes of ineffective-
assistance claim, “a court should presume . . . that the judge or jury 
acted according to law”). 
United States v. Olano
Ultimately, we find that the erroneous admission of the transcript did not 
impact the jury’s ability to resolve for itself the meaning of Davis’s statement on 
the recording.  The jury was instructed to rely on the video, not the transcript, in 
reaching its conclusions; the statement was heavily disputed by both witnesses and 
attorneys for both sides at trial; and the jury itself requested the DVD during 
deliberations, when it did not have access to the transcript.  Thus, the jury was 
provided with accurate instructions as well as the means to evaluate Davis’s 
recorded statements.  Because it is “presume[d] that jurors . . . attend closely the 
, 507 U.S. 725, 740-41 (1993) (alterations in original).  
Further, the transcript was not provided to the jury during deliberations.  During 
deliberations, however, the jury asked to view the DVD, and was provided with the 
DVD and a DVD player. 
 
- 58 - 
particular language of the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case and strive to 
understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them[,]” Franklin
 
 
5. 
Dr. Butts’ Testimony 
, 
471 U.S. at 324 n.9, we find that the erroneous admission of the transcript was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Davis next argued that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Butts, the 
State’s mental health expert, to testify concerning possible causes of Davis’s 
behavior when Public Defender Dorothy Ferraro saw him in jail.  During the 
defense’s presentation of evidence, Ferraro testified that she visited Davis in jail 
several weeks after his arrest.  When she was brought to Davis’s holding cell, 
Davis was jumping up and down and yelling gibberish.  Ferraro heard Davis say 
something about a lawyer, but the statement was out of context and unintelligible.  
Ferraro testified that she felt Davis was mentally unstable.  In rebuttal, the State 
presented the testimony of Dr. Butts, who believed that Davis was malingering in 
the period after his arrest.  Dr. Butts was asked whether she observed Ferraro’s 
testimony.  Dr. Butts testified that based on her review of notes by Davis’s 
girlfriend, Davis may have been behaving erratically not because he was mentally 
ill, but because he was angry because he did not want a public defender. 
 
Prior to Dr. Butts’ testimony, the State proffered her testimony.  Dr. Butts 
discussed her conclusions regarding Ferraro’s testimony.  She stated: 
 
- 59 - 
What I gleaned from Ms. Ferraro’s testimony was that [] Davis was 
very upset in the holding cell when she initially came to talk with him.  
After reviewing the records, including the DVD, there’s a logical 
conclusion that is separate and apart from mental illness as to why [] 
Davis’ behavior appeared to be irrational.  From the DVD, he said he 
would recommend to anyone to invest in a lawyer instead of hoping a 
public defender would help you.  And also, from his girlfriend’s notes, 
she wrote in her notes that he told her that he was upset because they 
sent him a public defender and he didn’t want a public defender, he 
wanted a private attorney. 
 
Based on Dr. Butts’ proffered testimony, the prosecutor asked that the court allow 
her to testify to her conclusion that Davis was angry because he did not want a 
public defender.  The prosecutor explained that he would not ask Dr. Butts any 
questions regarding Davis’s invocation of his right to counsel.  In response, 
defense counsel argued that Dr. Butts’ testimony as to Davis’s motivations was 
speculative.  The trial court overruled the defense’s objection, finding that the 
testimony was relevant under sections 90.401 and 90.403, Florida Statutes (2009), 
and that “any objection regarding the nature of the evidence, particularly whether it 
is speculation or the like, goes to the weight and not to the admissibility.” 
 
Davis argues that the trial court’s decision was error because Dr. Butts’ 
opinion was speculative in nature.  “A trial judge’s ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”  Alston v. State, 723 
So. 2d 148, 156 (Fla. 1998).  We find that the trial court was within its discretion in 
admitting Dr. Butts’ testimony.   Section 90.704, Florida Statutes (2009), provides: 
 
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The facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference 
may be those perceived by, or made known to, the expert at or before 
the trial.  If the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the subject to support the opinion expressed, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence. 
 
Here, Dr. Butts was admitted as an expert in forensic psychology.  She 
testified that she had reviewed documents and records related to Davis’s case, 
including the DVD, and concluded that Davis was not mentally ill at the time of 
the offense to such an extent that he would have been unaware of the wrongfulness 
of his conduct.  In voir dire, Dr. Butts testified that she was relying on the DVD 
recording of Davis at the sheriff’s office, as well as notes by Davis’s girlfriend, in 
determining that Davis may not have been mentally ill when he was visited by 
Dorothy Ferraro.  Davis has not argued that the data on which Dr. Butts relied in 
forming her opinion—the DVD and the notes of Davis’s girlfriend—was not “of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in [her] subject to support the opinion 
expressed.”  § 90.704, Fla. Stat. (2009).  Accordingly, we find that Davis has not 
demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion. 
 
 
6. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
Finally, we review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Davis’s 
convictions for first-degree murder.  This issue has not been addressed by either 
party.  In death penalty cases, however, regardless of whether the appellant raises 
the issue, this Court must conduct an independent review to determine whether 
 
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sufficient evidence exists to support a first-degree murder conviction.  See Fla. R. 
App. P. 9.142(a)(6); Phillips v. State, 39 So. 3d 296, 308 (Fla. 2010).  The 
evidence in a capital case is judged to be sufficient when it is both competent and 
substantial.  See Phillips, 39 So. 3d at 308.  In conducting its review, this Court 
“view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether 
‘a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  Rodgers v. State, 948 So. 2d 655, 674 (Fla. 2006) 
(quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)). 
In this case, Davis was charged with three counts of first-degree murder, in 
violation of section 782.04(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes (2009).  Under section 
782.04(1)(a)1, murder in the first degree is defined as the unlawful killing of a 
human being “perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the 
person killed or any human being.”  Davis did not contest at trial that he killed the 
three victims, but contended that he was insane at the time of the offenses.  Davis 
has not argued that the jury was not entitled to reject the insanity defense, and 
competent substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict on the three counts of 
first-degree murder.  Hermione Harrell testified that she observed Davis shoot 
Myosha Proby with an assault rifle.  Ebony Deadwyler and John Diggs both 
testified that they saw Davis shoot Ravindra Basdeo as Basdeo was sitting in his 
car in front of the Exxon gas station.  Deadwyler and Diggs also saw Davis shoot 
 
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the third victim, Carlos Jones, as Jones exited the gas station.  Elaine Consuegra-
Rodriguez, the firearm examiner, testified that the shell casings recovered from the 
crime scenes were fired from the rifle recovered from Davis’s vehicle.   
Based on the evidence submitted at trial, a reasonable trier of fact could have 
found that the elements of first-degree premeditated murder were proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  See Rodgers, 948 So. 2d at 674.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
three convictions for first-degree murder. 
 
B. 
Penalty Phase Issues 
 
In its sentencing order, the trial court imposed sentences of life 
imprisonment for the first-degree murders of Ravindra Basdeo and Carlos Jones, 
and a sentence of death for the first-degree murder of Myosha Proby.  On appeal, 
Davis raises several challenges to his death sentence.  We find three of these 
challenges to be dispositive and reverse the sentence of death. 
 
 
1. 
CCP 
We first review the trial court’s finding that the murder of Myosha Proby 
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any 
pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP).  See § 921.141(5), Fla. Stat. (2009).  
When this Court evaluates a trial court’s decision finding an aggravating 
circumstance to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the following 
standard of review applies: 
 
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[I]t is not this Court’s function to reweigh the evidence to determine 
whether the State proved each aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt – that is the trial court’s job.  Rather, [this Court’s] 
task on appeal is to review the record to determine [1] whether the 
trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating 
circumstance and, if so, [2] whether competent substantial evidence 
supports its finding. 
 
Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997) (footnotes omitted).  
“Competent, substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence.”  
Blackwood v. State, 946 So. 2d 960, 973 (Fla. 2006) (quoting State v. Coney, 845 
So. 2d 120, 132-33 (Fla. 2003)). 
“A court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining 
whether a murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.”  
McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 793 (Fla. 2010).  For a trial court’s CCP finding 
to be considered legally sufficient, the evidence must satisfy a four-part test: 
(1) [T]he killing must have been the product of cool and calm 
reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit 
of rage (cold); and (2) the defendant must have had a careful plan or 
prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident 
(calculated); and (3) the defendant must have exhibited heightened 
premeditation (premeditated); and (4) there must have been no 
pretense of moral or legal justification. 
 
Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 371 (Fla. 2003) (citing Evans v. State, 800 So. 2d 
182, 192 (Fla. 2001)).   
“The CCP aggravator pertains specifically to the state of mind, intent, and 
motivation of the defendant.”  Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 298 (Fla. 2009).    
 
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“‘CCP involves a much higher degree of premeditation’ than is required to prove 
first-degree murder.”  Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351, 381-82 (Fla. 2008) 
(quoting Foster v. State, 778 So. 2d 906, 921 (Fla. 2000)).  For a murder to be 
CCP, the defendant must have committed the murder in a “deliberate, professional, 
and coldly calculating manner.”  Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 197 (Fla. 2010) 
(quoting Mahn v. State, 714 So. 2d 391, 398 (Fla. 1998)).  “The CCP aggravator 
can ‘be indicated by circumstances showing such facts as advance procurement of 
a weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and the appearance of a killing carried 
out as a matter of course.’ ”  Franklin, 965 So. 2d at 98 (quoting Swafford v. State, 
533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla.1988)). 
The record in this case does not support the trial court’s CCP finding.  
Concerning the heightened premeditation element of CCP, this Court has stated: 
Simple premeditation of the type necessary to support a conviction for 
first-degree murder is not sufficient to sustain a finding that a killing 
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner.  A 
heightened form of premeditation is required which can be 
demonstrated by the manner of killing.  To achieve this heightened 
level of premeditation, the evidence must indicate that a defendant’s 
actions were accomplished in a calculated manner, i.e., by a careful 
plan or a prearranged design to kill. 
 
Besaraba v. State, 656 So. 2d 441, 444 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Holton v. State, 573 
So. 2d 284, 292 (Fla. 1990)) (emphasis added). 
The facts of this case are inconsistent with a finding that the murder was 
committed as part of a “careful plan or prearranged design to kill.”  Id.  In finding 
 
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CCP, the trial court relied on the fact that Davis purchased the rifle several days 
before the murders.  However, witness Reddick, who sold Davis the rifle, testified 
that he was the one who mentioned to Davis that he had a rifle he was planning to 
sell; Davis did not ask him for a rifle.  In Williams v. State, 37 So. 3d 187, 195 
(Fla. 2010), we reversed a trial court’s finding of CCP that was based in part on the 
defendant’s purchase of a hasp and lock on the day of the murder, which the trial 
court found was done “with the intent to secure the eventual crime scene.”  In 
finding this conclusion not supported by the record, we stated: 
While it is true that the hasp and lock could have been 
purchased with the intent to secure the scene of a murder that had yet 
to occur, that conclusion is speculative.  While circumstantial 
evidence can be used to support CCP, “the circumstantial evidence 
must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis which might 
negate the aggravating factor.” 
 
Id. at 196-97 (quoting Harris v. State, 843 So. 2d 856, 866 (Fla. 2003)) (original 
emphasis).  We went on to observe that the purchase of the hasp and lock was “the 
only piece of evidence that could be construed as advance planning,” and that 
“[a]ll of the other evidence presented establishes that the provocation for the 
murder arose at the time of the [defendant’s] argument” with the victims.  Id. at 
197.   
 
Similarly, in this case, all other evidence established that Davis’s decision to 
kill Proby was spontaneous, occurring while Davis was in the midst of a psychotic 
episode.  Davis’s mother and sister testified concerning Davis’s apparent mental 
 
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breakdown in the days leading up to the murder.  The defense’s mental health 
experts—Dr. Ribbler, Dr. Brannon, Dr. Strauss, and Dr. Day—testified that Davis 
was suffering from a temporary organic psychotic disorder at the time of the 
offenses.  The State’s expert, Dr. Butts, believed that Davis’s psychosis was drug 
induced rather than organic, but nonetheless agreed that Davis was suffering from 
some type of psychosis and that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially 
impaired.  Davis testified during the penalty phase that he was beaten on the night 
of the murders, which was supported by the testimony of numerous witnesses who 
observed that Davis was bleeding from the mouth and looked as if he had been in a 
fight.  When Proby called him shortly thereafter, Davis testified that he took it as a 
sign from God that his “mission” was to kill her.  Davis’s statements both to 
Proby—that she “set [him] up”—and to his parents after his arrest—that he killed 
Proby because she “betrayed” him—indicated that Davis killed Proby because he 
believed she was responsible for his beating.  Regardless, it is undisputed that 
Davis did not threaten to kill Proby until Proby first called him. 
 
Further, Davis’s behavior was inconsistent with a careful plan or 
prearranged design to murder Proby.  On the way to Proby’s apartment, Davis was 
observed stopping his car at a green light in the middle of an intersection and firing 
his gun in the air.  When Davis arrived at Proby’s apartment minutes after speaking 
 
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to her on the phone, he made no attempt to conceal his presence, but rather left his 
car running with music blaring from the speakers, as he walked past witness Jason 
Rolle with the gun in hand.  Before and after his murder of Proby, Davis made no 
effort to eliminate Hermione Harrell, who was in the room at the time of the 
murder.  After leaving the scene of Proby’s murder, a 9-1-1 call reported that a 
man was waving a gun out of his car window.  Davis subsequently murdered two 
men, apparently at random, in the middle of a crowded parking lot.  The law 
enforcement officers involved in Davis’s pursuit and arrest testified concerning his 
erratic, strange, and uncontrolled behavior following the murders. 
This case is comparable to Besaraba v. State, 656 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1995).  
There, the defendant, a homeless man, was yelled at by a bus driver for having an 
alcoholic beverage on the bus.  The driver, Granger, told Besaraba to dispose of the 
beverage or leave the bus.  Besaraba left the bus. 
Besaraba then rode another bus to the Young Circle transfer site in 
Hollywood, and sat on a bench.  After approximately a half-hour, 
Granger’s bus pulled into the site.  Besaraba walked up to Granger’s 
bus with a drawn handgun, fired a volley into the side of the bus, 
walked to the front door and fired a shot into Granger’s neck, killing 
him.  Besaraba then fired another shot into passenger Wesley 
Anderson’s back, killing him.  Besaraba walked away from the 
transfer site, approached a car waiting at a red light, and ordered the 
driver, Scott Yaguda, out of the vehicle.  As Yaguda walked away, 
Besaraba shot him in the back three times. 
 
Besaraba, 656 So. 2d at 442.  A mental health expert testified at trial that Besaraba 
had a history of health problems, including paranoid tendencies, psychotic or 
 
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paranoid behavior, and delirium.  Id.  In finding that the evidence did not support 
the trial court’s finding of CCP, we stated: 
[T]he random nature of Besaraba’s acts during the crimes belies a 
careful plan. . . . The shootings of Anderson and Yaguda were entirely 
indiscriminate; neither person posed a threat of any kind to Besaraba 
or acted to interfere in his actions.  Each was shot in the back.  
Besaraba’s acts were undertaken in front of numerous witnesses and 
he made no attempt to conceal his identity.  
 
Id. at 445.   
In addition, we noted “the presence of strong mental health mitigating 
circumstances that weigh against the formulating of a careful plan to kill Granger.”  
Id.  In its sentencing order, the trial court had found that Besaraba was under the 
influence of great mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murders.  The 
trial court noted the testimony of a mental health expert who opined that Besaraba 
was experiencing a psychotic episode, triggered by his confrontation with the bus 
driver.  The trial court also took note of evidence that Besaraba was drinking 
alcohol at the time of the crimes.  We concluded that, based on this evidence, the 
record did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder of Granger was 
part of a careful plan.  We stated:  “Although the record may reflect a suspicion 
that such a plan existed, this is insufficient to support this aggravating 
circumstance.”  Id. at 445-46. 
Here, the record reflected, at best, a suspicion that Davis planned to kill 
Proby in advance.  As we explained in Williams, however, “While circumstantial 
 
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evidence can be used to support CCP, ‘the circumstantial evidence must be 
inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis which might negate the aggravating 
factor.’ ”  37 So. 3d at 196-97 (quoting Harris, 843 So. 2d at 866).  We hold that 
the CCP aggravator is not supported by competent, substantial evidence, and strike 
the trial court’s finding. 
 
 
2. 
HAC 
 
We also review the trial court’s finding that the murder in this case was 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. 
(2009).  HAC has been defined by this Court as follows: 
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or 
shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; 
and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with 
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.  
What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the 
actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such 
additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital 
felonies—the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily 
torturous to the victim. 
 
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973).   
This Court has emphasized that in order to qualify as HAC, “the crime must 
be both conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the victim.”  
Richardson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 1992).  The aggravator “is proper 
only in torturous murders–those that evince extreme and outrageous depravity as 
exemplified either by the desire to inflict a high degree of pain or utter indifference 
 
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to or enjoyment of the suffering of another.”  Rimmer v. State, 825 So. 2d 304, 329 
(Fla. 2002) (quoting Shere v. State, 579 So. 2d 86, 95 (Fla. 1991)).  Additionally, 
this Court has held that even in the absence of physical suffering on the part of the 
victim, “fear, emotional strain, and terror of the victim during the events leading up 
to the murder may make an otherwise quick death especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel.”  James v. State
As part of an evaluation of whether the defendant’s act and conduct is cruel 
by being designed to inflict a high degree of pain or utter indifference to, or even 
enjoyment of, the suffering of others, we have also emphasized that “the focus 
should be upon the victim’s perceptions of the circumstances as opposed to those 
of the perpetrator.”  Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 369 (Fla. 2003) (emphasis 
supplied); see also Oyola v. State, 99 So. 3d 431, 433 (Fla. 2012) (“In evaluating 
whether HAC is present, a trial court focuses on the victim’s perception of the 
circumstances—not the perpetrator’s viewpoint.” (emphasis in original)). 
, 695 So. 2d 1229, 1235 (Fla. 1997). 
[T]o support this aggravator, the evidence must demonstrate that the 
victim was conscious and aware of impending death.  Douglas v. 
State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1261 (Fla. 2004).  However, we have 
explained that the actual length of the victim’s consciousness is not 
the only factor relevant to this aggravating circumstance.  Beasley v. 
State, 774 So. 2d 649, 669 (Fla. 2000).  “[F]ear, emotional strain, and 
terror of the victim during the events leading up to the murder may 
make an otherwise quick death especially heinous, atrocious, or 
cruel.”  James v. State, 695 So. 2d 1229, 1235 (Fla. 1997).  We have 
further held that the actions of the defendant preceding the actual 
killing are also relevant.  Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 1328, 1335 (Fla. 
 
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1997) (citing Swafford, 533 So. 2d [270, 277 (Fla. 1988)], and Smith 
v. State, 424 So.2d 726, 733 (Fla. 1982)). 
 
Hernandez v. State, 4 So. 3d 642, 669 (Fla. 2009) (emphasis supplied).  See also 
Zakrzewski v. State, 717 So. 2d 488, 492-93 (Fla. 1998); Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 
2d 1336, 1341 (Fla. 1994).  Additionally, this Court must evaluate the victim’s 
mental state “in accordance with common-sense inferences from the 
circumstances.”  Hernandez, 4 So. 3d at 669 (citing Swafford, 533 So. 2d at 277).  
 
According to Hermione Harrell, who was in Proby’s apartment at the time of 
the incident, Proby spoke with Davis approximately fifteen minutes before he 
arrived at the apartment.  During this phone conversation, some of which Harrell 
overheard, Davis threatened Proby that he was coming to kill her.  Harrell stated 
that she advised Proby to call the police.   
 
Even if Proby did not initially fully believe the sincerity of Davis’s threat 
during the phone call, most assuredly it is reasonable to conclude that she believed 
him once she opened the front door of her apartment and saw Davis ready to enter 
with an automatic weapon.  Davis entered the apartment holding an AR-15 assault 
rifle, and according to Harrell, immediately directed his attention toward Proby.  
Harrell stated that the appearance of Davis’s eyes suggested that he had been 
smoking or drinking, and that she had “never seen [Davis] like that.”  He was 
dressed in all black—a black pullover hoodie, black pants, and black shoes.  Jason 
Rolle, who was walking to his cousin’s apartment in the complex at the same time 
 
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as Davis arrived at Proby’s door, testified that he noticed Davis was bleeding from 
the mouth and nose.  Rolle also testified Davis looked “pissed off” and as if he had 
just been in a fight.  Although Rolle stated that the sight of a man carrying a gun 
with “two clips” in the apartment building did not disturb him, he quickly retreated 
to the back of the building and called his cousin to tell him to stay inside once 
Rolle heard Davis cock his gun and “bang” on Proby’s apartment door.   
Harrell testified that once inside the apartment, Davis began yelling at 
Proby, “[y]ou set me up, you set me up,” to which Proby stated “[t]hat wasn’t my 
brother,” and Davis responded, “I know.”  Harrell stated that Davis continued to 
yell at Proby “you set me up” before eventually ordering Proby to “[g]et the f*** 
down.”  In response to Davis’s orders, Proby got on her knees.  She had her arms 
folded and her back to Davis as she awaited her ultimate fate.   She was in that 
execution-style position when Davis began firing the weapon at her.   
An HAC determination is analyzed from the victim’s perspective—not the 
defendant’s.  A court evaluating the HAC aggravating circumstance considers 
whether the victim was conscious and aware of her impending death.  An HAC 
determination may be found even if the victim did not experience a protracted 
death.  This Court has consistently held that a quick death is not determinative of 
whether the victim suffered unnecessarily.  See Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 369; James, 
 
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695 So. 2d at 1235; Hartley v. State, 686 So. 2d 1316, 1323 (Fla. 1996); 
Richardson v. State, 604 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (Fla. 1992)).   
Based on Harrell’s and Rolle’s descriptions of Davis and the events 
preceding the murder, it seems clear that Proby experienced “ ‘real and 
excruciating’ mental anguish and [had an] acute awareness of her impending 
death” to justify the trial court’s finding of HAC.  Farina v. State, 801 So. 2d 44, 
53 (Fla. 2001).  Regardless of whether Proby was fully convinced that Davis would 
kill her following their earlier phone conversation, it is most reasonable to 
conclude that she understood the sincerity of his threat upon seeing Davis—who 
was dressed in all black, bleeding from the face, carrying an assault rifle, and 
yelling accusations at her—at her door.  Davis’s words and actions clearly 
indicated he was enraged and intent on killing Proby.  We have no doubt this was 
not lost on her before she died.   
Before her death from Davis’s first gunshot, Proby had sufficient time to 
reflect on her circumstances and thereby experience intense emotional terror and 
strain.  We therefore conclude that the record sufficiently supports the trial court’s 
finding of the HAC aggravator. 
  
 
 
 
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3. 
Proportionality 
Finally, we must determine whether Davis’s death sentence is proportionate.  
See Wade v. State, 41 So. 3d 857, 879 (Fla. 2010).  The purpose of this Court’s 
proportionality review is “to prevent the imposition of ‘unusual’ punishments 
contrary to article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution.”  Parker v. State, 873 
So. 2d 270, 291 (Fla. 2004).  In conducting this review, this Court conducts a two-
pronged inquiry to “determine whether the crime falls within the category of both 
(1) the most aggravated, and (2) the least mitigated of murders.”  Almeida v. State, 
748 So. 2d 922, 933 (Fla. 1999) (original emphasis).   However, the proportionality 
analysis “is not a comparison between the number of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.”  Sexton v. State, 775 So. 2d 923, 935 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Porter 
v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990)).  “Rather, [the analysis] entails ‘a 
qualitative review by this Court of the underlying basis for each aggravator and 
mitigator.’ ”  Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 1148 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Urbin v. 
State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998)) (original emphasis).  This analysis requires 
us to “consider the totality of the circumstances of the case and compare the case to 
other capital cases.”  Offord v. State
 
Following our determination that the trial court erred in finding CCP, three 
aggravators remain applicable to the murder of Myosha Proby.  In finding the first 
aggravator, HAC, the trial court concluded “[t]here can be no doubt that Ms. Proby 
, 959 So. 2d 187, 191 (Fla. 2007). 
 
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suffered immeasurable fear and terror as the events played out, from the inception 
when Defendant stated on the phone that he was going to come kill her, to the 
point when he showed up at the door with the rifle in hand . . . followed by the 
Defendant, while still armed, making accusatory statements . . . and then ordering 
her to the floor.”  The trial court accorded this factor “great weight.”  The second, 
that Davis “has been previously or contemporaneously convicted of another capital 
felony,” was based upon the contemporaneous first-degree murders of Ravindra 
Basdeo and Carlos Jones.  The trial court assigned this aggravating circumstance 
“great weight.”  As to the third aggravator, that the murder “was committed while 
[Davis] was engaged in the commission of a burglary,” the trial court 
acknowledged that “while the facts of this case technically meet the requirements 
of a burglary, the facts are not such that he broke into Ms. Proby’s apartment or 
was lying in wait for her to come home.”  The court assigned the burglary 
aggravator “slight weight.” 
 
Although the contemporaneous murders and HAC are significant and 
weighty aggravation, the mitigating evidence in this case was also substantial.  As 
statutory mitigation, the trial court considered Davis’s age of twenty-one years old, 
as well as the fact that “he had never been previously arrested or convicted of any 
crimes, and has no history of violent criminal activity.”  Furthermore, the trial 
court found both of the statutory mental health mitigating circumstances.  The 
 
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court concluded that the murder was committed while Davis was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and that Davis’s capacity to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law was substantially impaired.  See § 921.141(6)(b), (f), Fla. 
Stat. (2009).  These mitigators were based on the unanimous testimony of five 
mental health experts that Davis was suffering from some type of psychosis at the 
time of the offenses. 
 
Mental health evidence of this type is significant to our proportionality 
determination.  In order for a sentence of death to be proportionate, the capital 
offense must be among the most aggravated and the least mitigated of first-degree 
murders.  See Almeida, 748 So. 2d at 933.  When presented with “substantial and 
uncontroverted evidence” that the defendant’s actions were the product of mental 
illness, “[w]e have consistently recognized such mitigation as among the most 
compelling.”  Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1081, 1088 (Fla. 2008). 
We have previously vacated sentences of death in cases where the capital 
crime was committed spontaneously and as a result of mental illness.  In Green, for 
example, the evidence established that after being invited into the home of a friend, 
the defendant grabbed his friend’s handgun, demanded the keys to the friend’s car, 
and then shot him in the head.  Green drove to a nearby pasture, where he shot a 
bull that was grazing there.  On his way back from the pasture, Green passed a 
 
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retired police officer, whom he asked for directions and then also shot.  Green 
returned to his mother’s home, where he showed a friend the car he had stolen and 
confessed to shooting two people.  Id. at 1083-84.  In finding the sentence of death 
disproportionate, we observed that Green had a substantial history of mental 
illness; the trial court described Green’s life since age thirteen as “a psychological, 
emotional, and antisocial free fall into an abyss of aberrational, delusional and 
psychotic behavior.”  Id. at 1089. 
Similarly, in Almeida, 748 So. 2d 922, we overturned a death sentence based 
upon substantial mental health mitigation.   The defendant in that case was thrown 
out of a bar by the bar’s manager for drinking while underage.  Several hours later, 
the defendant obtained a handgun, returned to the bar, and shot the manager.  Id. at 
924-25.  The defendant described the killing to police “as an impulsive act 
committed shortly after he had left his friends and got drunk by himself.”  Id. at 
933.  The trial court found both mental health mitigators were established, and we 
found that the record was “replete with testimony of witnesses attesting to 
Almeida’s lack of impulse control due to his brutal childhood in Brazil.”  Id.  In 
addition, “witnesses testified that Almeida was particularly unstable at the time of 
the crime because of his recent marital separation and pending divorce.”  Id.  
Based upon this evidence, we held the death sentence disproportionate.  Id. at 934. 
 
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We have held sentences of death to be disproportionate in a large number of 
other cases involving substantial mental health mitigation.  See, e.g., Offord v. 
State, 959 So. 2d 187, 193 (Fla. 2007) (vacating death sentence based on 
“extensive documented history of Offord’s lifelong mental illness and repeated 
institutionalization”); Robertson v. State, 699 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (Fla. 1997) 
(vacating death sentence “in light of the substantial mitigation present,” which 
included the defendant’s age, impaired capacity, abused and deprived childhood, 
history of mental illness, and borderline intelligence); Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 
274 (Fla. 1993) (vacating death sentence, finding that “[t]he factors establishing 
alcoholism, mental stress, severe loss of emotional control, and potential for 
productive functioning in the structured environment of prison are dispositive”); 
see also Green, 975 So. 2d at 1089 n.3 (identifying additional capital cases in 
which sentences of death have been vacated due to extensive mental mitigation). 
In evaluating the proportionality of the death sentence in this case, we also 
take note of Davis’s extensive history of abuse and neglect.  Evidence presented 
during the penalty phase established that due to strained finances, Davis’s parents 
sent him to live with relatives in Jamaica on several occasions.  These relatives 
failed to properly care for Davis and physically abused him.  Evidence was also 
presented that Davis was subjected to sexual abuse when he was twelve or thirteen 
years old.  When Davis was in high school, a close friend was stabbed in front of 
 
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him and died in his lap.  Dr. Brannon testified during the penalty phase that this 
incident likely contributed to Davis’s mental deterioration in the period leading up 
to the capital offenses. 
The record demonstrates that this case is not among the most aggravated and 
least mitigated of first-degree murders.  On that basis, we vacate the sentence of 
death. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the appellant’s convictions 
for first-degree murder, but reverse the sentence of death and remand the case to 
the trial court for the imposition of an additional sentence of life imprisonment. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
LEWIS and LABARGA, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
CANADY, J., concurs. 
QUINCE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which 
PARIENTE and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
POLSTON, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm Davis’ convictions for first-
degree murder.  However, unlike the majority, I would affirm Davis’ death 
sentence for Ms. Proby’s murder because the cold, calculated, and premeditated 
(CCP) aggravator was also properly applied.  See Evans v. State, 800 So. 2d 182, 
 
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192 (Fla. 2001) (explaining that CCP is properly applied when “the killing was the 
product of cool and calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, 
panic, or a fit of rage (cold), and that the defendant had a careful plan or 
prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated), and 
that the defendant exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated), and that the 
defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification”) (quoting Jackson v. 
State, 648 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 1994)) (emphasis omitted).    
 
In its sentencing order, the trial court found the CCP aggravator after 
applying the correct rule of law and concluding that Davis had a premeditated plan 
to kill Ms. Proby which he ruthlessly carried out: 
 
The Defendant set about to kill Ms. Proby in a methodic 
manner with substantial reflection and thought.  He carried out the 
murder as a matter of course.  The Defendant purchased the assault 
rifle two days before the commission of this offense.  The evidence 
indicated that the Defendant spoke with Ms. Proby prior to his arrival 
to her home and explicitly told her that he was going to come kill her.  
He showed up at her apartment with weapon in hand and a vast 
amount of ammunition.  The Defendant coldly and calmly walked 
from his car to her apartment.  He accused Ms. Proby of setting him 
up, and then told her to “get the f[***] down,” to which she offered no 
resistance.  The Defendant then proceeded to shoot Ms. Proby twenty-
three times. 
 
. . . . 
 
The Defendant had the opportunity to reflect on his actions and 
abort his intent to kill.  However, he chose to remain inside Ms. 
Proby’s apartment, confronting her with accusations of setting him up, 
and ordered her to the floor before proceeding to shoot her twenty-
three times. 
 
 
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These statements are an accurate reflection of the sequence of events of Ms. 
Proby’s murder.  There is competent, substantial evidence in this record to support 
the trial court’s finding of CCP.  See Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 298 (Fla. 
2009) (“When an aggravating factor is challenged on appeal, we review the record 
to determine whether the trial court applied the correct rule of law for each 
aggravating circumstance, and, if so, whether competent, substantial evidence 
supports the trial court’s finding.”).  Moreover, this Court has made clear that “[a] 
defendant can be emotionally and mentally disturbed or suffer from a mental 
illness but still have the ability to experience cool and calm reflection, make a 
careful plan or prearranged design to commit murder, and exhibit heightened 
premeditation.”  Evans, 800 So. 2d at 193; see also Owen v. State, 862 So. 2d 687, 
701 (Fla. 2003) (“Owen’s claim that his mental illness must negate the CCP 
aggravator is unpersuasive.”).  In fact, this Court has explained in a case where the 
defendant had mental health issues that, “[b]y their very nature, execution-style 
killings satisfy the cold element of CCP.”  Wright, 19 So. 3d at 299 (explaining 
that, despite mental health issues, “Wright had ample opportunity during the ten-
mile abduction drive to the orange grove to reflect on his actions and abort any 
intent to kill” but that instead “Wright chose to shoot each victim in the head at 
close range”). 
 
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Accordingly, because the evidence in this case supports the trial court’s 
findings, the trial court did not err in finding CCP.  And given the CCP and HAC 
aggravators (as well as the committed during the course of a burglary and the prior 
violent felony aggravators) and the statutory mental health mitigators (as well as 
the other mitigation), Davis’ death sentence is proportionate.  See, e.g., Wright, 19 
So. 3d 277; Smithers v. State, 826 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2002); Evans, 800 So. 2d 182; 
Singleton v. State, 783 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 2001); Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062 
(Fla. 1996).  Therefore, I would affirm Davis’ death sentence. 
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.  
CANADY, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
Quince, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I concur in upholding the murder conviction and in reducing the penalty to a 
life sentence.  Because I conclude that the record does not sufficiently support the 
trial court’s finding of HAC, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision 
regarding this aggravator.   
The trial court’s finding that Proby “suffered immeasurable fear and terror as 
the events played out, from the inception when [Davis] stated on the telephone that 
he was going to come kill her,” is not supported by the record.  It is not clear from 
the record that Proby believed, or had any reason to believe, that Davis’s threat 
 
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was legitimate.  Several witnesses testified that Davis had never been a violent 
person before these events.  Randy Reddick said during the guilt phase that Davis 
was normally “cool, calm, [and] collected.”  Davis’s friend, Kerron Matthew, 
testified at the penalty phase that even though Davis was bullied in school, he 
never initiated any confrontations, and in several instances managed to diffuse 
situations that might have degenerated into violence.  The trial court also found as 
a mitigating circumstance that although Davis had admitted to selling cocaine, “he 
had never been previously arrested or convicted of any crimes, and has no history 
of violent criminal activity.” 
Moreover, Proby and Harrell’s behavior after the threat indicates that they 
did not believe Davis was in fact on his way to Proby’s apartment to kill her.  
When Proby told Harrell about Davis’s threat, Harrell advised her to call the 
police, but there is no evidence that Proby did so.  Rather than leave the apartment, 
Harrell tried to call Davis.  When he did not answer, she sent him a text message 
asking him to call her.  Harrell testified that when Davis arrived less than fifteen 
minutes later, Proby let him into the apartment and closed the door behind him.  
When Davis told Proby to get on the floor, Proby did so without resisting.  It is not 
clear whether she believed, even at that point, that Davis was really going to kill 
her.  The medical examiner testified that Proby died instantly from the first 
 
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gunshot.  The trial court found as a mitigating circumstance that “the victim was 
rendered unconscious immediately.” 
 
While this Court has upheld the HAC aggravator based upon the emotional 
suffering of the victim, we have done so only when specific evidence has 
demonstrated that the victim suffered extreme fear and terror.  In Preston v. State, 
for example, the victim was a convenience store clerk who was abducted during 
the course of a robbery.  607 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1992).  The victim’s “nude, 
mutilated body was found the next day in an open field a few miles from the store.  
She had sustained multiple stab wounds and lacerations resulting in her near 
decapitation.”  Preston, 607 So. 2d at 406.  We found the trial court’s HAC finding 
to be supported by the evidence where “Preston forced the victim to drive to a 
remote location, made her walk at knifepoint through a dark field, forced her to 
disrobe, and then inflicted a wound certain to be fatal.”  Id. at 409. 
The trial court in this case also cited Parker v. State, 873 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 
2004).  There, as in Preston, the victim was abducted from her job at a convenience 
store, driven to a remote location, and murdered with a knife.  In upholding HAC, 
we cited the following evidence: 
The victim, an eighteen year old girl, was afraid to work on the night 
of her abduction.  She experienced great fear and terror during the 
robbery and during the thirteen mile, twenty minute ride to her death.  
She was frightened and was asking what the defendants were going to 
do to her, in effect begging that her life not be taken.  Hair from the 
victim, consistent with being ripped from her head, was found inside 
 
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[the abductors’] car.  The victim’s bladder was completely voided 
while she was alive, prior to being shot.  While she was alive she 
suffered an excruciatingly painful stab wound to her abdomen from a 
filleting type of fishing knife.  The evidence clearly established that 
the stab wound was inflicted while she struggled.  A defensive injury 
received during a struggle was found on her hand. 
 
Id. at 287. 
 
In Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d 1336, 1341 (Fla. 1994), the defendant and his 
accomplice robbed a Domino’s Pizza restaurant and murdered three employees.  In 
upholding HAC, this Court described the circumstances of the case: 
The evidence shows that the victims were subjected to at least twenty 
minutes of abuse prior to their deaths.  Wyatt pistol-whipped William 
Edwards when the safe did not contain enough money for his 
satisfaction.  Wyatt also undressed Frances Edwards completely and 
raped her a short distance from where the other two employees were 
being held.  Wyatt then killed his victims in front of each other.  
William Edwards begged for his life and stated that he and Frances, 
his wife, had a two-year-old daughter at home.  Wyatt shot him in the 
chest.  Upon seeing her husband shot, Frances Edwards began to cry 
and Wyatt then shot her in the head while she was in a kneeling 
position.  Having witnessed the shooting of his co-workers, Michael 
Bornoosh started to pray.  Wyatt put his gun to Bornoosh’s ear and 
before he pulled the trigger told him to listen real close to hear the 
bullet coming.  When Wyatt realized William Edwards was still alive 
he went back and shot him in the head. 
 
Id. at 1340-41. 
 
In Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1988), as in Parker and Preston, 
the victim was abducted from the gas station where she worked, driven to a remote 
area, and murdered.  The victim in that case was also sexually abused prior to her 
death.  In upholding HAC, this Court observed: “In addition to factors based on 
 
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events preceding the shooting—abduction, fear, mental anguish, and sexual 
abuse—the killing itself occurred in such a way as to show a wanton atrocity.  
Swafford fired nine bullets into the victim’s body, most of them directed at the 
torso and extremities.”  Id. at 277.   
Finally, the trial court cited Hannon v. State, 638 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1994).  
There, the defendant and his accomplices broke into a house and murdered two 
roommates.  We upheld HAC as to the murder of the first roommate based on the 
specific facts surrounding his brutal death by stabbing.  As to the second 
roommate, we stated: “Carter witnessed his friend and roommate being savagely 
stabbed.  When the attackers turned on Carter, he pled for his life as he retreated to 
an upstairs bedroom.  There, he hid under a bed until Hannon entered the room, 
and fired six shots into the huddled, defenseless Carter.”  Id. at 43.  In finding the 
circumstances sufficient to support HAC, we explained that “the victim 
undoubtedly suffered great fear and terror prior to being murdered.”  Id. 
The murder of Myosha Proby was unlike any of the cases cited by the trial 
court.  There was no evidence that the victim suffered extreme fear or terror prior 
to Davis’s arrival at her apartment.  Unlike Preston, Parker, and Swafford, this case 
did not involve the victim being abducted and driven to a remote area where death 
was certain to occur.  Unlike Wyatt and Hannon, the victim did not first witness 
the death of a relative, friend or coworker.   
 
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Based on the absence of any evidence concerning Proby’s mental state, I 
would find that HAC is not supported by competent, substantial evidence, and 
strike the trial court’s finding as to this aggravator.   
PARIENTE and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,  
Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge - Case No. 05-19630CF10A 
 
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul E. Petillo, Assistant Public 
Defender, West Palm Beach, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,  
 
 
for Appellee