Case Title: State v. Sodergren

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Sodergren1984 WY 62686 P.2d 521Case Number: 83-110Decided: 06/26/1984THE STATE OF WYOMING, PETITIONER, 

v. 

BARRY SODERGREN, RESPONDENT.

Supreme Court of Wyoming
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
PETITIONER, 

v. 

BARRY SODERGREN, 
RESPONDENT.

 
 
A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Allen C. Johnson (argued), and John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Attys. 
Gen., and Michael L. Hubbard, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

Harry E. 
Leimback (argued), and Susan K. Overeem, Casper, 
for respondent; Gerald M. Gallivan 
(argued), Laramie, amicus curiae.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This matter is before 
us on a Writ of Certiorari. The issue presented by Petitioner 
is:

"Did the trial court err 
in dismissing the information for lack of jurisdiction maintaining that the 
respondent could not be prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter in a vehicular 
homicide not involving alcohol?"

[¶2.]     Respondent adds as an 
issue:

"Does a writ of 
certiorari lie to review the district court decision dismissing the charges 
based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction?"

[¶3.]     We answer both 
questions in the affirmative, but set some perimeters with reference to the 
second one, remanding the case for additional proceedings.

[¶4.]     Barry Sodergren 
(Respondent) was charged with two counts of involuntary manslaughter for the 
August 23, 1982 vehicular deaths of Mia L. Olsen and Evelyn Olsen. After being 
bound over to the district court, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, based on 
an alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the district court. The 
district court granted the motion and dismissed the case, explaining in a 
decision letter that the vehicular homicide statute (§ 31-5-1117, W.S. 1977, 
infra) and the involuntary manslaughter statute (§ 6-4-107, W.S. 1977, infra) 
prescribe substantially the same conduct with different penalties (one being a 
felony and the other a misdemeanor); that they are repugnant and inconsistent; 
and that a later specific statute controls over a general statute. Therefore, 
the court reasoned, the Respondent must be prosecuted under the vehicular 
homicide statute and not under the manslaughter statute, and thus the district 
court did not have jurisdiction to try the case.1

[¶5.]     This court entered its 
Order Denying Application to File Bill of Exceptions on June 8, 1983, and its 
Order Granting Certiorari on June 28, 1983.

MANSLAUGHTER 
CHARGE

[¶6.]     We must address two 
aspects of this issue: (1) the relationship between the manslaughter statute and 
the vehicular homicide statute, and (2) the constitutionality of the vehicular 
homicide statute.

I

[¶7.]     The confusion over the 
relationship between the two statutes has gone on for many years. In State v. Cantrell, 64 Wyo. 132, 186 P.2d 539 
(1947), a vehicular death involving alcohol, we said that the negligent homicide 
statute did not impliedly repeal the involuntary manslaughter statute. However, 
starting in 1977, in a line of cases from Thomas v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1287 (1977), through Bartlett v. State, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1235 (1977), and then to Lopez v. State, Wyo., 586 P.2d 157 
(1978), we finally held at page 160:

"* * * that all vehicular 
homicides, short of murder and voluntary manslaughter, are prosecutable 
exclusively as a violation of § 31-5-1115, W.S. 1977. We overrule all decisions 
of this court to the contrary. * * *"

[¶8.]     7A Am.Jur.2d 
Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 340, p. 524, states, with reference to 
vehicular homicide statutes:

"* * * They are the 
product of comparatively recent legislation prompted by the frequency of 
tragedies on the highways and the difficulty of obtaining convictions of 
motorists under the general statutes on homicides, juries being loath to attach 
the onus of `manslaughter' to those causing the death of a person through the 
operation of a motor vehicle."

[¶9.]     The "carnage on the 
highways" can lead to speculation as to whether or not a proper and reasonable 
classification was invoked when a distinction was made relative to involuntary 
homicide on the basis of the instrument used to cause the death, i.e., a motor 
vehicle as distinguished from a club, poison, knife, gun, etc., with a lesser 
penalty attaching to the use of one of the instruments.2

[¶10.]  In 1977, § 31-5-1115, W.S. 1977, 
provided:

"(a) When the death of 
any person ensues within one (1) year as a proximate result of injury received 
by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the 
person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent 
homicide.

"(b) Any person convicted 
of negligent homicide shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one 
(1) year or by fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or by 
both such fine and imprisonment.

"(c) The director shall 
revoke the license or permit to drive and any nonresident operating privilege of 
any person convicted of negligent homicide."

[¶11.]  The manslaughter statute, § 6-4-107, W.S. 
1977, provided:

"Whoever unlawfully kills 
any human being without malice, expressed or implied, either voluntarily, upon a 
sudden heat of passion, or involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful 
act, or by any culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, is guilty of 
manslaughter, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than twenty 
(20) years."

As a result of 
our suggestion that the legislature clarify its intent in this area, it 
responded in 1979 with amendments to both statutes, causing them to read as 
follows:

[¶12.]  Section 6-4-107, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1979):

"Whoever unlawfully kills 
any human being without malice, expressed or implied, either voluntarily, upon a 
sudden heat of passion, or involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful 
act, except as provided in W.S. 31-5-1117, or by any culpable neglect or 
criminal carelessness, is guilty of manslaughter, and shall be imprisoned in the 
penitentiary not more than twenty (20) years."

[¶13.]  Section 31-5-1117(a), (b), W.S. 1977 
(Cum.Supp. 1979):

"(a) Whoever, except when 
the violation of law involves culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, 
unlawfully and unintentionally, but with a conscious disregard of the safety of 
others, causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any 
state law or ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the 
regulation of traffic is guilty of homicide by vehicle when the violation is the 
proximate cause of death.

"(b) Any person found 
guilty of homicide by vehicle shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars 
($2,000.00) or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than one (1) year, or 
both."

[¶14.]  In 1982 the legislature added aggravated 
vehicular homicide to § 31-5-1117 so that it read as follows at the time Barry 
Sodergren was charged with involuntary manslaughter:

"(a) Whoever, while 
driving any vehicle under the influence of either intoxicating liquor or a 
controlled substance, or a combination of both, to a degree which renders him 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle, causes the death of another person shall 
be guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle, and upon conviction thereof, shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) 
years.

"(b) Whoever, except when 
the violation of law involves culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, 
unlawfully and unintentionally, but with a conscious disregard of the safety of 
others, causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any 
state law or ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the 
regulation of traffic, except those laws or ordinances relating to conduct set 
forth in subsection (a) of this section, is guilty of homicide by vehicle when 
the violation is the proximate cause of death and upon conviction thereof, shall 
be fined not more than two thousand ($2,000.00) dollars or imprisoned in the 
county jail for not more than one (1) year, or both." Section 31-5-1117(a), (b), 
W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982).

[¶15.]  Petitioner, the State of Wyoming, argues 
that the 1979 and 1982 amendments were passed to change the law as it existed 
after Lopez, supra, (i.e., to change 
the holding that all vehicular deaths, short of murder and voluntary 
manslaughter were to be charged as vehicular homicide and not as involuntary 
manslaughter). Petitioner argues that it is presumed that when an amendment is 
enacted to an existing statute that some change in the existing state of the law 
was intended and that the court should endeavor to make such amendment 
effective, Brown v. State, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1312, 1314 (1979); that it is not reasonable that the legislature would 
enact a law to declare what is already the law, DeHerrera v. Herrera, Wyo., 565 P.2d 479, 483 (1977); and that amendment of the statutes presumes an intention to 
change the existing law and the courts should endeavor to give some effect to 
the amendment, Stolldorf v. 
Stolldorf, Wyo., 384 P.2d 969, 972 (1963).

[¶16.]  Respondent argues that the amendments 
were passed to bring the statutes into line with the case law, but if this was 
not the intent, then the legislature failed to accomplish any other result, 
there being no discernible distinction between the standards of "reckless 
disregard of the safety of others"3 and "conscious disregard of the 
safety of others"4, which were the substantive changes 
between the 1977 vehicular homicide statute on the one hand and the 1979 and 
1982 vehicular homicide statutes on the other.

[¶17.]  This court had held earlier, in State v. Thomas, supra, that there was 
no operative distinction between the standards of "culpable neglect or criminal 
carelessness"5 and "reckless disregard of the 
safety of others." In Thomas, supra, 
562 P.2d  at 1289, the question was:

"Did § 31-232(a) 
[vehicular homicide] and earlier related enactments impliedly repeal that part 
of § 6-58 [manslaughter], which states, `or by any culpable neglect or criminal 
carelessness,' insofar as it affects deaths resulting from the operation of a 
motor vehicle?"

[¶18.]  In reaching the holding of that case, we 
said that the conduct which is made criminal by the challenged portion of § 6-58 
[manslaughter] has as an element carelessness which is gross implying an 
indifference to consequences:

"`* * * and the term 
"gross negligence" means something more than mere negligence. It means 
wantonness and disregard of the 
consequences which may ensue, and indifference to the rights of others that 
is equivalent to a criminal intent. (Emphasis supplied.) 
[Citations.]'

"Also * * * when 
discussing gross negligence it was said:

"`* * * In civil cases 
the courts of this state define it as such negligence as evinces a reckless disregard of human life or 
bodily injury.' (Emphasis supplied.)" 562 P.2d  at 
1290.

"Because § 31-232(a) 
proscribes substantially the same behavior as does the questioned portion of § 
6-58, and because the penalty provided in § 31-232(a) is substantially less, we 
must hold that these two statutes are repugnant and conflicting insofar as the 
latter portion of the involuntary manslaughter statute is concerned and that 
therefore § 31-232(a) does repeal by implication the last phrase in § 6-58 
insofar as it is applied to deaths occasioned by negligent operation of a motor 
vehicle." 562 P.2d  at 1291.

[¶19.]  Legislative intent aside,6 one of the questions in this case 
thus must be whether the reasoning of this court in Thomas and related cases is 
applicable under the statutes in effect at the time Respondent was charged. Or, 
in other words, do the two statutes in question provide different punishments 
for identical acts and are they therefore repugnant and inconsistent? And, if 
so, which controls?

"Repeals by implication 
are not favored, State v. Cantrell, 
supra, 186 P.2d  at 543; but this court has not hesitated to apply this in a 
proper case, Longacre v. State, Wyo., 
448 P.2d 832, 834; Blount v. City of 
Laramie, Wyo., 510 P.2d 294, 296; Tucker v. State ex rel. Snow, 35 Wyo. 
430, 251 P. 460, 465. If the statutes cannot stand together and if they are 
repugnant by virtue of relating to the same subject and are directed at a 
distinct offense with the same object, the earlier cannot stand, State v. Cantrell, supra. In Haines v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 167, 13 P. 8, 11, 
the court recognized the rule that a later specific statute controls over a 
general statute." Thomas v. State, 
supra, 562 P.2d  at 1290.

[¶20.]  We later said in Bartlett v. State, supra, 569 P.2d at 
1241: 

"* * * As in Thomas v. State, supra, our task is to 
determine if the statutes can stand together, or if they are repugnant by virtue 
of relating to the same subject and are directed at a distinct offense with the 
same object. State v. Cantrell, 
supra, [186 P.2d] at 542. We approach with a full realization that repeals by 
implication are not favored. Thomas v. 
State, supra. * * *"

[¶21.]  The standards in the statutes at issue in 
this case are the following: Respondent was charged, in the criminal complaint, 
with two counts of "* * * kill[ing] a human being * * * without malice express 
or implied, by culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, in violation of W.S. 
1977, § 6-4-107 * * *." The district court, in its Decision Letter of November 
16, 1982, phrases the question as:

"* * * [W]hether a charge 
can be brought under the Manslaughter Statute, W.S. § 6-4-107, in a case not 
involving driving under the influence or whether such prosecutions must be 
restricted to the misdemeanor penalty of § 31-5-1117(b), which would remove the 
offense from the jurisdiction of this Court. * * *"

The district court judge 
goes on to say: "The State argues that a higher level of culpability is required 
under the manslaughter statute, where the standard is involving culpable neglect 
or criminal carelessness, as opposed to the vehicular homicide statute, which 
requires a conscious disregard of the safety of others. There is no meaningful 
distinction between the two. In State v. 
Rideout, 450 P.2d 452, the Court found that there was no operative 
distinction between `careless disregard of the safety of others' and the 
definition of negligence necessary to support a manslaughter conviction. In the 
Thomas case, the Court found that there was no meaningful distinction between 
`reckless disregard' and `culpable neglect or criminal carelessness.' Similarly, 
there is no reason to believe that the offense is distinguished by the use of 
the language `conscious disregard.'"

[¶22.]  The logic of the district court judge is 
in accordance with our former holdings. There is no discernible difference 
between the standard of "reckless disregard" (which was held to be the 
equivalent of "culpable neglect or criminal carelessness") and "conscious 
disregard" which is used in the context of "unlawfully and unintentionally" 
doing that which is proscribed by the vehicular homicide statute. Therefore, if 
this were the only aspect of this issue, we would uphold the district court's 
ruling.

II

[¶23.]  However, the second aspect of this issue 
involves the constitutionality of the vehicular homicide statute in view of the 
ambiguity and internal inconsistency of subsection (b) of it. Section 
31-5-1117(b) read in pertinent part:

"Whoever, except when the 
violation of law involves culpable neglect or criminal carelessness * * * but 
with a conscious disregard of the safety of others * * *."

[¶24.]  As "culpable neglect or criminal 
carelessness" is equivalent to "a conscious disregard of the safety of others," 
it is difficult to comprehend how you can have one "except" when the other 
exists. The legislature has created an element of the crime and then cancelled 
out that element. The legislature cannot be presumed to intend the elements 
remaining in the act to constitute a crime, i.e., death caused by an 
unintentional violation of a state law or ordinance applying to the operation or 
use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, such as improper parking, 
failure to have license plate in place, or any act of simple negligence relative 
to a state law or ordinance concerning the operation or use of a vehicle. The 
statute is obviously unclear on its face. It is susceptible of more than one 
meaning. It is ambiguous. State ex rel. 
Albany County Weed and Pest District v. Board of County Commissioners of Albany 
County, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1154 (1979).

[¶25.]  When a statute is ambiguous, the court 
resorts to general principles of statutory construction in an effort to 
ascertain legislative intent. Wyoming 
State Department of Education v. Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982); and Sanches v. Sanches, Wyo., 
626 P.2d 61 (1981). In doing so, we must give effect to every word, clause and 
sentence and, if possible, construe the statute so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous. State Board of Equalization v. Cheyenne 
Newspapers, Inc., Wyo., 611 P.2d 805 (1980); State ex rel. Albany County Weed and Pest 
District v. Board of County Commissioners of Albany County, supra; and Haddenham v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 648 P.2d 551 (1982). Legislative intent is the primary consideration in ascertaining 
the meaning of a statute. Sanches v. 
Sanches, supra; Longacre v. 
State, Wyo., 448 P.2d 832 (1968). Statutes are not to 
be given meaning which would have the effect of nullifying their operation if 
they are capable of any other interpretation, Hayes v. State, Wyo., 599 P.2d 558 
(1979). But statutes are not to be interpreted to produce absurd results. In re Romer, Wyo., 436 P.2d 956 (1968); Woolley v. State Highway 
Commission, Wyo., 387 P.2d 667 (1963); and 
Huber v. Thomas, 45 Wyo. 440, 19 P.2d 1042 
(1933).

[¶26.]  Applying these principles to § 
31-5-1117(b) as it was in effect at the time of the deaths, the two conflicting 
clauses cannot both be given effect inasmuch as such is the very cause of 
ambiguity. Also, as already noted, both clauses cannot be disregarded without an 
absurd result and one obviously not intended by the legislature. If the first 
clause were declared superfluous, i.e., if "except when the violation of law 
involves culpable neglect or criminal carelessness" were declared to be null and 
void, the obvious intent of the legislature to have the vehicular homicide 
statute be violated when such is involved would be thwarted.7 If the second clause were declared 
superfluous, i.e., if with a "conscious disregard of the safety of others" were 
declared to be null and void, the obvious intent of the legislature to have such 
be the necessary state of mind for a violation of the statute would be 
thwarted.

[¶27.]  Since the statute is ambiguous and 
inconsistent as it stands, and thus inapplicable to a given situation, and since 
it cannot be given coherent meaning without thwarting the obvious legislative 
intent, there is no alternative to declaring the entire subsection, § 
31-5-1117(b), as it existed at the time of the deaths, to have been 
unconstitutional and inoperative.

[¶28.]  Although we do not ordinarily inquire 
into the constitutionality of a statute on our own motion, we do so where a case 
cannot be completely and effectively disposed of without such inquiry and 
decision. Gorrell v. City of Casper, Wyo., 
371 P.2d 835 (1962); Markey v. Connelly, Wyo., 367 P.2d 964 (1962); and Eastwood v. Wyoming 
Highway Department, 76 Wyo. 247, 301 P.2d 818 (1956). Such is this 
case.

[¶29.]  Requirement of a reasonable degree of 
certainty in legislation, especially in criminal law, is a well established 
element of due process. Sanchez v. 
State, Wyo., 567 P.2d 270 (1977); and State v. Gallegos, Wyo., 
384 P.2d 967 (1963).

[¶30.]  Inasmuch as the Respondent could not be 
properly prosecuted under § 31-5-1117(b), the court erred in dismissing the 
prosecution for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis that 
prosecution was proper only under § 
31-5-1117(b). The only statute under which prosecution could be had was the 
manslaughter statute under which Respondent was charged.

CERTIORARI

[¶31.]  The propriety of a writ of certiorari in 
matters such as this was decided in City 
of Laramie v. Mengel, Wyo., 671 P.2d 340 (1983), and in State v. Heiner, 680 P.2d 478 (Wyo. 
1984). The fallacies there set out in my specially concurring opinion in regard 
to Justice Rose's dissenting opinion are equally applicable to his dissenting 
opinion in this case. The issue in this case involves a constitutional question 
and is of great public import. However, we do serve notice on the bar that we 
will exercise our discretion to grant certiorari only in unusual circumstances 
and upon rare occasions.

[¶32.]  The legislature has changed the statutes 
here involved by the enactment of a new criminal code. It has advised us that it 
is considering appropriate changes in the code in recognition that a new 
enactment of its magnitude will need some "shaking down."

[¶33.]  The recent changes in the two pertinent 
statutes cause them to read:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills any human being without malice, expressed 
or implied, either:

"(i) Voluntarily, upon a 
sudden heat of passion; or

"(ii) Involuntarily, 
but:

"(A) In the commission of 
some unlawful act except as provided in W.S. 6-2-106; or

"(B) 
Recklessly.

"(b) Manslaughter is a 
felony punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty 
(20) years." Section 6-2-105, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement).

"(a) Except as provided 
in subsection (b) of this section, a person who unlawfully and with criminal 
negligence causes the death of another person while operating a vehicle is 
guilty of homicide by vehicle and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not 
more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) or imprisoned in the county jail for 
not more than one (1) year, or both. Evidence of a violation of any state law or 
ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of 
traffic, except for evidence of a violation of W.S. 31-5-233, is admissible in 
any prosecution under this subsection.

"(b) A person is guilty 
of aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, if, while driving a motor 
vehicle in violation of W.S. 31-5-233, he unlawfully causes the death of another 
person while driving a motor vehicle and the violation is the proximate cause of 
the death.

"(c) The division of 
motor vehicles shall revoke the license or permit to drive and the nonresident 
operating privilege of any person convicted of aggravated homicide by vehicle or 
of homicide by vehicle." Section 6-2-106, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement).

"Recklessly" as 
used in § 6-2-105 is defined in § 6-1-104(a)(ix), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement) as follows:

"`Recklessly' means done 
with a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
person's conduct will result in the harm he is accused of 
causing."

"Criminal 
negligence" as used in § 6-2-105 is defined in § 6-1-104(a)(iii), W.S. 1977 
(June 1983 Replacement) as follows:

"`Criminal negligence' 
means a great or excessive deviation from that standard of care which a 
reasonable, prudent person would exercise under the same or similar 
circumstances to avoid a substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
harm."

[¶34.]  Section 31-5-233, W.S. 1977, referred to 
in § 6-2-106, makes it a crime to drive a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of intoxicants or controlled substances.

[¶35.]  As noted supra, the distinction between 
"culpable neglect or criminal carelessness," "reckless disregard for the safety 
of others," "conscious disregard for the safety of others," "gross negligence," 
"disregard of consequences which may ensue," "wantonness," "indifference to the 
rights of others that is equivalent to criminal intent," "evincing a reckless 
disregard of human life or bodily injury," is de minimus for the purpose of 
defining a criminal act.

[¶36.]  There seems to be no distinction between 
"recklessly" as used in the present manslaughter statute and "criminal 
negligence" as used in the vehicular homicide statute. The present manslaughter 
statute precludes the consideration of death resulting from driving under the 
influence as the commission of an unlawful act, but it does not do so for death 
resulting from "reckless" action. Both statutes were enacted at the same 
time.

[¶37.]  Finally, attention is directed to the 
language in the current subsection (b) of § 6-2-106, supra, which indicates that 
one could not be prosecuted thereunder if the resulting death is of a pedestrian 
or of a passenger in a motor vehicle. It provides that the crime is committed by 
one "while driving a motor vehicle" causing death of a "person while driving a 
motor vehicle."

[¶38.]  We may be able to ascertain legislative 
intent relative to these two current statutes. We are not now required to do so, 
but our comments may be helpful in obtaining an unquestioned expression of 
legislative intent on the problem which has persisted for so long relative to 
these statutes. We urge the legislature to make such 
expression.

[¶39.]  Reversed and 
remanded.

1 Both the vehicular 
homicide and the involuntary manslaughter statutes in question here were 
substantially amended by the new criminal code which went into effect on July 1, 
1983. See infra.

2 It has been held that a 
motor vehicle may constitute a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 231 S.C. 184, 98 S.E.2d 259 (1957).

3 Section 31-5-1115, W.S. 
1977.

4 Section 31-5-1117, W.S. 
1977 (Cum.Supp. 1979 and Cum.Supp. 1982).

5 The terms "culpable 
neglect" and "criminal carelessness" are synonymous and proscribe behavior which 
is not only more than ordinary negligence but which is criminal or culpable in 
character. Brown v. State, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1024 (1983); State v. Thomas, supra; State v. McComb, 33 Wyo. 346, 239 P. 526, 41 
A.L.R. 717 (1925).

6 One law review Case 
Notes author, in analyzing Thomas v. 
State, supra, refers to legislative intent as follows:

"* * * Determining the 
specific legislative intent behind a particular law is somewhat akin to 
searching for the Loch Ness monster; submerged, lurking beneath the surface of 
the statute, the intent might be there - but then again, probably not. * * *" 
Case Notes, 13 Land & Water L.Rev. 595, 601 (1978).

7 "Culpable neglect or 
criminal carelessness" is the language of the vehicular homicide statute, § 
31-5-1117(b), W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1982).

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶40.]  I agree that this case must be returned 
to the district court so that Barry Sodergren can be tried for manslaughter. I 
am not satisfied that the appropriate way to achieve that result is to declare 
that § 31-5-1117(b), W.S. 1977, is unconstitutional. Rather than being ambiguous 
and internally inconsistent, the statute can be read together with the 
manslaughter statute, § 6-4-107, W.S. 1977, to the end that both may stand. This 
would honor our usual reluctance to inquire into the constitutionality of a 
statute on our own motion. At the same time it would give effect to the 
intention of the legislature.

[¶41.]  It seems very clear to me that the 
legislature excepted from the reach of § 6-4-107, W.S. 1977, those unlawful acts 
"as provided in W.S. 31-5-1117." The unlawful acts provided in that statute are 
those which are encompassed by the phrase, "but with a conscious disregard of 
the safety of others, * * * while engaged in the violation of any state law or 
ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of 
traffic." Excepted from § 31-5-1117(b), W.S. 1977, are those instances "when the 
violation of law involves culpable neglect or criminal carelessness." A 
legislative intent that some homicides flowing from the operation of a motor 
vehicle could be prosecuted under the manslaughter statute is discernible from 
these reciprocatory exceptions.

[¶42.]  The Supreme Court of Maine, concededly 
examining a different statutory framework, concluded that a statute proscribing 
"depraved indifference" homicide required an objective evaluation of the 
defendant's conduct in the eyes of a reasonable person. The court contrasted 
other crimes requiring reckless action which the Maine statute in part defined as a "conscious 
disregard" of a risk. The court stated that "conscious disregard" is a 
subjective state of mind, and that while the objective inquiry required no 
evidence of the defendant's subjective state of mind, the other offenses did. State v. Goodall, Me., 
407 A.2d 268 (1979).

[¶43.]  I am persuaded that the Wyoming 
legislature intended that result in the contemperaneous adoption of amendments 
to the vehicular homicide statute and the manslaughter statute in 1979, and that 
the legislative intent was not adjusted by the 1982 amendment to the negligent 
homicide statute. Thus, conduct which would match the Wyoming Pattern Jury 
Instruction defining "culpable neglect" and "criminal carelessness," that is of 
"a gross or flagrant character, such as would show wantonness or recklessness, 
and would demonstrate a reckless disregard of human life or the safety of 
others, or an indifference to consequences equivalent to criminal intent" would 
be objectively evaluated by the jury. Conversely a subjective evaluation of 
"conscious disregard of the safety of others" while violating a state law or 
ordinance relating to the operation of a motor vehicle would be required in 
order to convict of negligent homicide. That verdict would have to be based upon 
evidence of the defendant's subjective state of mind. 

[¶44.]  The district judge in dismissing this 
case relied upon State v. Rideout, 
Wyo., 450 P.2d 452 (1969), and concluded that because this court in that case 
ruled that "careless disregard of the safety of others" was not distinguishable 
from the definition of negligence necessary to support a manslaughter conviction 
the offenses are not now distinguished by the use of the language "conscious 
disregard." Recognizing the holdings of our earlier cases involving the 
manslaughter statute and the negligent homicide statute, we were in those cases 
considering the concept of implied repeal. Because of the contemporaneous action 
by the legislature I would not accept those as binding precedents in the instant 
case which assumes a different statutory scheme articulated by the legislature. 
The question of unconstitutionality is different from the question of implied 
repeal, and as the majority opinion would indicate we are foreclosed from a 
conclusion of implied repeal.

[¶45.]  It is my view that when the operation of 
a motor vehicle involving culpable neglect or criminal carelessness causes a 
death the legislature intended that the case be prosecuted under the 
manslaughter statute, even though the evidence might disclose an incidental 
violation of a state law or ordinance applying to the operation or use of a 
vehicle or to the regulation of traffic. The legislature adopted the method it 
used and the phrase "conscious disregard" in order to avoid the pitfalls which 
the earlier decisions of this court seem to present. The elements of proof under 
the two statutes would not be exactly the same, and consequently they do not 
proscribe substantially the same conduct. See Bell v. State, Alaska, 598 P.2d 908 
(1979); and State v. Modica, 58 Haw. 
249, 567 P.2d 420 (1977). Recognizing the viability of both statutes is the 
better approach to acknowledging the legislative intent, and does offer some 
advantage to the defendant. Even taking into account our holding in Balsley v. State, Wyo., 668 P.2d 1324 
(1983), it seems to me that in a prosecution for manslaughter if the evidence 
disclosed the commission of an unlawful act involving the operation of a motor 
vehicle, and there was evidence of the subjective state of mind of the defendant 
which would demonstrate conscious disregard, the defendant would be entitled to 
claim an instruction on the offense of negligent homicide. In such an instance 
the matter then would be left to the jury to determine which of the statutes the 
defendant had violated as a matter of fact. In my judgment this would be a 
satisfactory approach.

[¶46.]  I agree that the case should be reversed 
and remanded to the district court for trial under the manslaughter statute, but 
I would do so under the foregoing rationale rather than declaring the negligent 
homicide provision unconstitutional.

ROSE, Justice, dissenting from 
the majority opinion and joining in Justice CARDINE'S dissenting opinion.1

[¶47.]  In the case at bar, I would dissent from 
what the Chief Justice holds as he authors the majority opinion. But I would 
hold with him when he wrote in State v. Selig, Wyo., 
635 P.2d 786, 788 (1981):

"A bill of exceptions is 
the exclusive means for the prosecution to seek review of an adverse ruling made 
during the trial. State v. Heberling, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1043 (1976); State v. Benales, Wyo., 365 P.2d 811 (1961); State v. Ginther, 53 
Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803 (1938); State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 14 
Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977 (1906). It is now a statutory proceeding, and the statutory requirements 
must be met. State v. Ginther, supra, 
and State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 
supra."

And I would hold 
with Chief Justice Raper (now retired) when he wrote in State v. Heberling, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1043 
(1976):

"A bill of exceptions is 
the only way by which the State may challenge and have reviewed any adverse 
ruling of the district court in criminal prosecutions. State v. Benales, Wyo. 1961, 365 P.2d 811; State v. Ginther, 1938, 53 Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803. 
Even then, as provided in § 7-291, W.S. 1957 [now § 7-12-105, W.S. 
1977]:

"`The judgment of the 
court in the case in which the bill was taken shall not be reversed nor in any 
manner affected, but the decision of the supreme court shall determine the law 
to govern in any similar case which may be pending at the time the decision is 
rendered, or which may afterwards arise in the state.'"

[¶48.]  It is, therefore, my judgment in this 
appeal that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted. I say this for the 
reason that it is my firm opinion, as I have previously expressed in State v. Heiner, 680 P.2d 478 No. 83-83, 
decided May 15, 1984, that this court lacks jurisdiction to in criminal 
proceedings consider trial-court rulings in criminal proceedings which are 
adverse to the State of Wyoming unless they are presented here through the 
statutory bill-of-exceptions procedure.2

[¶49.]  In State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 14 
Wyo. 526, 85 P. 977 (1906), Chief Justice Potter, speaking for a unanimous court, 
wrote:

"* * * It is only upon a compliance with the 
provisions of the statute in question [bill of exceptions] that this court 
obtains jurisdiction to review any ruling of the District Court adverse to the 
state in criminal prosecutions." (Emphasis added.) 85 P.  at 
979.

[¶50.]  Originally, in the case at bar, the 
Attorney General petitioned for a bill of exceptions in reliance upon §§ 
7-12-102 through 7-12-105, W.S. 1977, Wyoming's bill-of-exceptions statutes. 
Thereafter, and for reasons which remain undisclosed - at least to me - he 
withdrew the petition and, in its stead, filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari - a request which calls for the employment of an appellate remedy 
with respect to which only a bill of exceptions furnishes this court with 
jurisdiction and for which there is no other constitutional implementing 
authority contained anywhere in the criminal statutes of the State of 
Wyoming.

[¶51.]  In Mau v. Stoner, 14 Wyo. 183, 83 P. 218 
(1905), discussed infra, we held that the appellate authority contemplated for 
this court under Art. 5, § 2 must be implemented by legislatively enacted rules 
and regulations as conceived by Art. 5, § 2 and Art. 5, § 18.3 Mau holds unequivocally for the 
proposition that it was the intention of the legislature that rights and methods 
of appeal would be left to the legislature and that - absent implementing 
legislation - a litigant is possessed of no right of appeal. This would include 
the exercise of this court's constitutional certiorari authority since 
certiorari is an instrument of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under 
Art. 5, § 3, supra n. 2.

[¶52.]  On June 28, 1983, and by authority of a 
majority of the court, the Chief Justice - again without implementing statutory 
authority and in spite of the exclusory characteristics of the 
bill-of-exceptions statutes, and thus without jurisdiction - signed an order 
granting certiorari in the case at bar to which I appended this dissenting 
statement:

"I would deny the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari and would have voted to grant the Petition for 
Bill of Exceptions which was first submitted by the Attorney General and later 
withdrawn."

[¶53.]  In the majority opinion, the author 
writes:

"This matter is before us 
on a Writ of Certiorari,"

and one of the 
issues is identified as follows:

"`Does a writ of 
certiorari lie to review the district court decision dismissing the charges 
based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction?'"

Concerning the 
propriety of granting certiorari, the majority say:

"The propriety of a writ 
of certiorari in matters such as this was decided in City of Laramie v. Mengel, Wyo., 671 P.2d 340 (1983), and in State v. 
Heiner, 680 P.2d 478 (Wyoming Supreme Court, No. 83-83, decided May 15, 
1984). * * * The issue in this case involves a constitutional question and is of 
great public import. However, we do serve notice on the bar that we will 
exercise our discretion to grant certiorari only in unusual circumstances and 
upon rare occasions."

[¶54.]  I take issue (a) with the part of the 
above-quoted conclusion which says:

"The propriety of a writ 
of certiorari in matters such as this was decided in City of Laramie v. Mengel, * * * and in 
State v. Heiner * * 
*,"

because, in the 
case at bar, the petitioner is the State of Wyoming and not the City (as was the case in City of Laramie v. Mengel, Wyo., 
671 P.2d 340 (1983)), and, therefore, the bill of exceptions is the State's only 
avenue of appeal, and (b) with the implication that this court is possessed 
of

"* * * discretion to 
grant certiorari * * in unusual circumstances [such as those presented by the 
facts of this appeal by the State of Wyoming],"

because the 
court cannot exercise "discretion" where it has no 
jurisdiction.

[¶55.]  City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, did not hold, as the majority 
assert, that this court would or could entertain writs of certiorari where the 
petitioner is the State of Wyoming as it is here. In the City of Laramie case, the City petitioned for a 
bill of exceptions - not the State - and we entertained the petition as though 
it were for certiorari. Where, however, the State seeks relief through 
certiorari, this court has no appellate jurisdiction since the State's only 
method of reviewing a trial court's ruling which is adverse to the State in a 
criminal prosecution is by way of the bill-of-exceptions procedure, supra n. 
2.

[¶56.]  We held in State v. Ginther, 53 Wyo. 17, 77 P.2d 803, 807 
(1938):

"Our view of the law accordingly is that the 
prosecution in a criminal case in this state is given by statute no method of 
review of adverse rulings except through the medium indicated in the four above 
cited sections [the bill of exceptions proceeding], with the limitations there 
imposed." (Emphasis added.)

In reliance upon 
Ginther, supra, we held to the same 
effect in State v. Heberling, Wyo., 
553 P.2d 1043 (1976) and also in State v. 
Benales, Wyo., 365 P.2d 811 (1961).

[¶57.]  In State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra, 
85 P.  at 979, Chief Justice Potter said:

"* * * But it is obvious, 
we think, that the bill * * * is the 
basis of the jurisdiction of this court. It is not perceived that we would have 
authority to decide any question arising upon exceptions of the prosecuting 
attorney in a criminal case, without a bill of exceptions containing the same, 
taken and filed as prescribed by the statute." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶58.]  Therefore, under previously unassailed 
and well-reasoned authority of this court, where the State of Wyoming seeks certiorari 
in a criminal appeal,4 it must be denied for lack of 
jurisdiction. Even though there was no statutory implementing authorization for 
granting certiorari in City of Laramie v. 
Mengel, supra,5 we granted the writ under the 
precedent contained in City of Sheridan 
v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 P. 892 (1916).6 In the City of Sheridan case, the petitioner was the City 
and therefore was at least not precluded from seeking appellate relief by reason 
of the exclusory aspects of the bill-of-exceptions 
proceeding.

[¶59.]  Calling up City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra, as our 
authority, we said, in City of Laramie v. 
Mengel, supra, that the bill-of-exceptions provisions of the 
statute

"* * * were not 
applicable in an instance in which the accused is not charged with an offense 
against the laws of the State of Wyoming and this statutory proceeding [bill of 
exceptions] was not available with respect to a prosecution in a municipal court 
for violation of an ordinance." Citing City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra. 671 P.2d  at 343.

In City of Laramie v. Mengel, we then went 
on to assume that we had certiorari jurisdiction as we relied upon the following 
language from the opinion in City of 
Sheridan v. 
Cadle:

"This not being a civil 
case, there seems to be no provision giving the city a right of appeal to this 
court. We think, therefore, that the writ might be issued to determine the 
question of the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain the appeal in 
which the order complained of was made." 157 P.  at 
895-896.

[¶60.]  I do not for a moment suggest that this 
court may never exercise its certiorari appellate authority under the present 
condition of the Constitution, statutes and case authority of this state. We 
approved the following concept in Call v. 
Town of Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 
(1954):

"* * * In 14 C.J.S., 
Certiorari § 40, p. 189, it is said: `It seems to be the general rule that in a 
proper case a party entitled to appeal or to pursue some other remedy, who has 
lost the right through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, may have a remedy by 
certiorari, provided there is a showing of probable merits and freedom from 
fault.' See also 10 Am.Jur. 531, 532, § 7." 278 P.2d  at 
275.

[¶61.]  Consistent with this proposition, I would 
hold that, in the circumstances described and where jurisdiction is conceded in 
that the right of appeal is statutorily authorized, this court could and should 
- in the furtherance of justice - call upon its discretionary authority to 
consider the utilization of certiorari.

[¶62.]  I would refer to Bosler v. Morad, Wyo., 555 P.2d 567 
(1976) as presenting an example of the situation in which the writ might well 
have been utilized instead of reversing the district court's order denying a 
motion for an extension of time under Rule 73(a), W.R.C.P. This rule provides 
that the court may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon a showing 
of neglect. In Bosler, the notice was 
timely mailed but not received until after the expiration of the time permitted 
for appeal and therefore the appellant was possessed of a right of appeal which 
he had lost through no fault of his own. In these circumstances, a writ should 
issue rather than testing the trial court's discretionary denial of the motion 
to extend the time for the filing of the notice of appeal on the grounds of 
excusable neglect.

[¶63.]  I would, therefore, emphasize that, in 
the case at bar, it is with the majority's assumption that this court is 
possessed of jurisdiction to issue 
writs of certiorari in spite of the exclusive remedy provided by the 
bill-of-exceptions statutes, supra n. 2, and the fact that no other 
certiorari-implementing statutes are in place, that I take issue with the 
majority opinion, and I do not address the question which asks whether or not - 
assuming jurisdiction - the writ was otherwise lawfully employed.7 It is, therefore, in the 
jurisdictional context of our difference that I charge the majority with taking 
unwarranted liberty with our holding in City of Laramie v. Mengel when the 
majority opinion in the case at bar says:

"The propriety of a writ 
of certiorari in matters such as this was decided in City of Laramie v. Mengel * * * and in 
State v. Heiner * * 
*."

[¶64.]  This court is having a problem with writs 
of certiorari in criminal prosecutions right now and the reason is that the 
majority of the members - for whatever reason - have decided that the statutory 
bill of exceptions furnishes an inadequate State appellate remedy in any given 
prosecution in which an adverse decision to the State's position is announced. 
It is, of course, conceded by all concerned that the defendant in whose 
prosecution the question is raised will be affected by this court's holding in 
response to a writ of certiorari, while this is not so where we respond to 
issues presented to us within the framework of the bill of exceptions. This has 
led the court to wander off into the horse latitudes8 in its effort to impress its 
appellate decisions upon the particular defendant in whose prosecution the State 
has received its adverse ruling. The majority have pursued this course even 
though the court lacks jurisdiction since the bill-of-exceptions procedure is an 
exclusive remedy in these circumstances, State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra, 
and for the further reason that other necessary statutes implementing the 
court's constitutional certiorari authority are not in place as required by Art. 
5, §§ 2 and 18 and articulated by Mau v. 
Stoner, supra, discussed infra.

[¶65.]  The bedrock concept which this court has 
ignored in the course of contemplating the proper utilization of its 
constitutional certiorari authority is the tenet which says that - given the 
provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, statutes and case law - a right of 
appeal to this court, even though constitutionally authorized, may not be given 
effect unless the constitutional authority is implemented by statute and, when 
so implemented, the right is exclusive and must be followed with 
particularity.

[¶66.]  This court noted long ago that the 
common-law rule is that the State has no 
right to appeal adverse criminal rulings unless the right is expressly 
given. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1659 holds the common-law rule to 
be:

"Under the common law as 
generally understood and administered in the United States, the state or federal 
government has no right to a writ of 
error, to an appeal, or to exceptions in a criminal case unless it is expressly 
conferred by * * * statute * * *" (emphasis added),

citing Wyoming's State v. Benales, supra, and 
State v. Ginther, supra, for the 
proposition that Wyoming is one of the states that holds to 
this rule of the common law.

[¶67.]  In State v. Ginther we 
said:

"It seems generally held 
under the common law as administered in this country that the State may not 
bring a writ of error or take an appeal or have exceptions in a criminal case 
unless the right thereto has been expressly granted by statute * * *." 77 P.2d  
at 803.

[¶68.]  The rule is reported in Annot., 91 
A.L.R.2d 1095, 1096, "Right of prosecution to writ of certiorari in criminal 
case," where it is said:

"As a general rule the 
prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of 
the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring 
that right." (Emphasis added.)

To the same 
effect see 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error § 268, pp. 
762-763.

[¶69.]  I find the applicable constitutional 
provisions, supra n. 3, in this state to say that the Wyoming Supreme Court 
possesses the "power" to issue writs of certiorari "in the exercise of its 
appellate * * * jurisdiction," however, and except in those circumstances where 
the civil appellate process is legislatively in place, the "power" lives in a 
vacuum since there is no constitutional requirement for the issuance of such 
writs and no other statutory implementing "rules" and/or "regulations"9 have been 
adopted.

[¶70.]  The Wyoming Supreme Court has 
historically - and with good reason - refused to even consider the merits of the 
State's appeals in a criminal case, where the proffered appeal does not comply 
with the bill-of-exceptions procedure, on the oft-repeated ground that there is 
no common-law right of appeal (State v. 
Benales, supra; State v. Ginther, 
supra; Mau v. Stoner, supra), and, 
the bill-of-exceptions statutes, §§ 7-12-102 through 7-12-105, supra n. 2, being 
an exception to the common law, provide the only source of this court's 
jurisdiction to review the State of Wyoming's adverse criminal trial-court 
rulings, State v. Heberling, supra; 
State v. Benales, supra; State v. Ginther, supra; State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 
supra.

[¶71.]  As early as 1905, when Wyoming 
Constitution Art. 5, §§ 2, 3 and 18 and the bill-of-exceptions statutes were in 
place, this court said in Mau v. 
Stoner, supra, 83 P.  at 219, that unless the Constitution requires 
("requirement") an appeal "as a matter of right,"10 it is the legislature that has the 
appellate implementing authority as contemplated by Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18 of the 
Wyoming 
Constitution. We said:

"* * * It is well settled 
that, in the absence of a direct 
constitutional requirement, the right of appeal does not exist unless expressly 
conferred by statute. The right to have a judgment of an inferior tribunal 
reviewed by writ of error or appeal is not a natural or inherent right. It 
pertains merely to the mode of judicial procedure or the remedy. Unless it is 
guaranteed as a matter of right in the Constitution, the Legislature has power 
to pass laws not only regulating the mode of proceeding, but limiting the cases 
in which the right may be exercised. The remedy by appeal was unknown to the 
English common law, hence it may be said that in both England and the United States 
the whole matter of appellate review is regulated almost entirely by statute 
law." (Emphasis added.)

[¶72.]  This court again embraced this concept in 
1975 where, in Geraud v. Schrader, 
Wyo., 531 P.2d 872, 875, cert. denied, Wind River Indian Educ. Association, Inc. v. 
Ward, 423 U.S. 904, 96 S. Ct. 205, 46 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1975), Justice Raper, 
writing for the court, quoted the above rule from Mau v. Stoner and 
observed:

"* * * The right of an 
appeal is a privilege rather than a right."

Writing for a 
unanimous court, he went on to observe:

"The legislature has 
authority to abridge or extend the right of appeal at its discretion and can 
determine in what cases and under what circumstances appeals may be taken, as 
well as regulate the manner of appeal. 4 Am.Jur.2d, (Appeal and Error), § 6, pp. 
536-537."

[¶73.]  It was the court's task in Mau v. Stoner to decide whether a right 
of appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court was denied by a statute which provided 
that a trial court's decision would be "final" where it was contended that the 
Constitution of the state guaranteed appellant access to this court. We 
said:

"Since the Legislature 
has declared that the judgment of the district court shall be final * * *, it 
becomes important to determine whether, under the Constitution of this state, 
the right of appeal is guaranteed in all cases." 83 P.  at 
218.

[¶74.]  The author of the Mau opinion wrote that Art. 5, § 2 of 
our Constitution, supra, defines the appellate jurisdiction of this 
court

"* * * without attempting 
to define the manner of appeal or the class of cases in which appeals may be 
taken," 83 P.  at 219,

and the court 
then held that the supreme court's jurisdiction is limited by the following Art. 
5, § 2 language:

"* * * under such rules 
and regulations as may be prescribed by law."

[¶75.]  The court said:

"* * * We think the 
expression `under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law' refers 
to and limits all the powers conferred by the section, in other words, 
prescribes how the exercise of these powers may be regulated and limited." 83 P. 
at 219.

[¶76.]  It was one of the court's conclusions in 
Mau that it was the intention of the 
framers of our Constitution that the subject of appeals to this court would be 
left to the legislature, the court saying:

"* * * It is quite clear 
from the provisions of Sections 18 and 20 that the framers of the fundamental 
law intended to leave the power over the subject of appeals to the Legislature, 
to be exercised in such manner as public policy and the best interests of the 
people might require.'" Quoting from McClain v. Williams, 10 S.D. 332, 73 N.W. 72, 43 L.R.A. 287 (1897). 83 P.  at 220.

[¶77.]  In emphasizing that the right of appeal, 
even though constitutionally authorized as an appellate tool, must nevertheless 
be "prescribed by law" (i.e., by the legislature), the Mau court referred to an earlier 
decision in In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 
263, 39 P. 875 (1895), where the court said:

"* * * [W]e have no 
direct constitutional provision allowing appeals as a matter of right in 
criminal cases, except that this court is clothed with appellate jurisdiction in 
criminal as well as in civil causes, and is vested with a general 
superintendence and control over all inferior courts, under such rules and 
regulations as are prescribed by law (Const.Wyo., art. 5, § 2) * * *." 39 P.  at 
878.

[¶78.]  It was the court's conclusion in Mau that, since there had been no rules 
or regulations promulgated by the legislature under Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18, the 
respondent had no right of appeal.

Bill of Exceptions Is An 
Exception to the Common-Law Rule

[¶79.]  In State v. Ginther, supra, the defendant 
was charged with the theft of a cow, with receiving the animal knowing it to 
have been stolen, but no value of the property was alleged. Trial was had and 
the defendant found guilty, whereupon a motion in arrest of judgment was made 
and sustained. The State appealed and we held that this court had no 
jurisdiction since there was no statutory provision for the appeal. In 
dismissing the appeal, we said:

"It seems generally held 
under the common law as administered in this country that the State may not 
bring a writ of error or take an appeal or have exceptions in a criminal case, 
unless the right thereto has been expressly granted by statute * * *" 
(emphasis added), 77 P.2d  at 803.

and while noting 
that the courts of some states permit such review in limited circumstances - 
either by case rule or statute - we held that we would adhere to the common law 
in Wyoming.

[¶80.]  We noted in Ginther that Wyoming has a statutory 
exception to this common-law rule which appears as our bill-of-exceptions 
statutes according to which the State's attorney may take "any opinion or 
decision of the court" to this court for review. We then went on to hold, and 
cite with approval cases which hold that, where an appellate right is granted 
and is based upon specific statutes, such statutes are to be strictly construed 
and are not to be enlarged by construction. It is said in 24 C.J.S. Criminal 
Law, § 1659, wherein the states' right of appeal in criminal cases is discussed, 
that the common-law rule is as this court identified it in Ginther, supra. The encyclopedia then 
goes on to say that

"* * * it is generally 
held that, being in derogation of the common law, they [statutes granting 
appellate rights] should be strictly construed, and that the authority conferred 
thereby should not be enlarged by construction. [Citations.]"11

[¶81.]  In State v. Weathers, 13 Okla. Cr. 92, 162 P. 239 (1917), cited in Ginther for 
the proposition that criminal-appeals statutes which are in derogation of the 
common law must be strictly construed, the Oklahoma Supreme Court said: 

"* * * In many 
jurisdictions the state has no right of appeal at all, and its right to appeal, 
where the right is granted, is based upon specific statutes, which statutes are 
not to be enlarged by construction." 162 P.  at 240.

See also State v. Arnold, 144 Ind. 651, 42 N.E. 1095 (1895), cited in Ginther, where, 
in referring to a statute similar to that considered in State v. Weathers, supra, it was 
said:

"These statutes, it is 
urged, deny the right of the State to appeal in other instances than those 
enumerated; and this, we have no doubt, is correct, as shown by the cases cited 
to that proposition. State v. 
Bartlett, 9 Ind. 570; State v. 
Hamilton, 62 Ind. 409; State v. 
Hallowell, 91 Ind. 377; State v. 
Evansville & T.H. Ry. Co., 107 Ind. 581, 8 N.E. 619."

[¶82.]  This court then held in Ginther:

"Our view of the law 
accordingly is that the prosecution in a criminal case in this state is given by 
statute no method of review of adverse rulings except through the medium 
indicated in the four above cited sections [the bill of exceptions proceeding], 
with the limitations there imposed." (Emphasis added.) 77 P.2d  at 
807.

To the same 
effect see State v. Heberling, supra, 
and State v. Benales, 
supra.

Bill of 
Exceptions

The Exclusive Source of 
This Court's Jurisdiction

[¶83.]  Since it is not possessed of a common-law 
right of appeal, the State has no right to appeal a district court's adverse 
ruling or judgment in a criminal prosecution without strictly adhering to the 
bill-of-exceptions provisions of the statute, § 7-12-102 through § 7-12-105, 
supra n. 2. This being so, this court, except by bills of exceptions, has no 
jurisdiction to review any such rulings or judgments. State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, supra, 
85 P. 977. As has been previously noted, in Gibson, Chief Justice Potter, 
writing for the court, said:

"* * * It is only upon a compliance with the 
provisions of the statute in question [bill of exceptions] that this court 
obtains jurisdiction to review any ruling of the district court adverse to the 
state in criminal prosecutions." (Emphasis added.) 85 P.  at 
979.

[¶84.]  In State ex rel. Gibson, the Attorney 
General argued that an exception to the ruling of the court should be sufficient 
to preserve the issue for this court's consideration. This court rejected the 
contention, saying:

"* * * But it is obvious, 
we think, that the bill in a case like this * * * is the basis of the jurisdiction of this 
court. It is not perceived that we would have authority to decide any question 
arising upon exceptions of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal case, without 
a bill of exceptions containing the same, taken and filed as prescribed by the 
statute." (Emphasis added.) 85 P.  at 979.

Having said 
this, the court struck the bill since it was not sealed as provided by what is 
now our § 7-12-102, W.S. 1977, 1983 Cum.Supp.

CONCLUSION

[¶85.]  In summary, I call attention to these 
following propositions:

[¶86.]  The Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming 
authorizes this court to issue writs of certiorari in the exercise of its 
appellate power, Art. 5, § 3, supra, but this authority is restricted by such 
rules and regulations as "may be prescribed by law." Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18. It is 
the legislature that has been given the authority to limit and define the 
appellate process, Mau v. Stoner, 
supra. The writ of certiorari being in aid of this court's appellate 
jurisdiction, Art. 5, § 3, supra, in a criminal prosecution, statutory authority 
must exist to invoke the court's certiorari authority, Annot., 109 A.L.R. 793, 
794-795, since, in criminal matters, the State has no common-law right of appeal 
from adverse trial-court decisions. State 
v. Benales, supra; State v. 
Ginther, supra; Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1095, 1096; 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and 
Error § 268, pp. 762-763; 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1659.

[¶87.]  In Wyoming, the legislature has carved out an 
exception to the common-law rule of nonappealability of the State's adverse 
criminal rulings through the passage of the bill-of-exceptions statutes. Since 
these statutes are in derogation of the common law, they must be strictly 
construed and their authority cannot be enlarged by construction. State v. Ginther, supra; State v. Weathers, supra; State v. Arnold, supra; 24 C.J.S. 
Criminal Law § 1659; and see State v. 
Stovall, Wyo., 648 P.2d 543, 547-548 (1982) for reaffirmation of the rule 
pertaining to the necessity for strict construction of statutes in derogation of 
the common law.

[¶88.]  This court has held that, based upon 
these above propositions, the prosecution in Wyoming has "no method of review of 
adverse rulings except through [the bill-of-exceptions procedure]," State v. Ginther, supra, and, finally, 
we have said that it is only upon compliance with the bill-of-exceptions 
provisions that this court has "jurisdiction to review any ruling of the 
District Court adverse to the state in criminal prosecutions." State ex rel. Gibson v. Cornwell, 
supra.

[¶89.]  For the reasons given, I would hold that 
the majority commit grievous error in granting the writ of certiorari in this 
appeal because - this being a criminal prosecution - this court has, through 
certiorari, no jurisdiction to review a ruling or a judgment of the district 
court adverse to the State of Wyoming.

[¶90.]  The writ was improvidently 
granted.

1 Since this dissenting 
opinion was written, State v. Heiner, 
680 P.2d 478, No. 83-83, decided May 15, 1984, has been published. I herewith, 
therefore, support the dissenting position that I took in Heiner with some of the same and with 
additional reasons.

Even though I 
hold in these opinions that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain writs of 
certiorari, by reason of the majority opinions in Heiner and the case at bar my position 
is no longer the law of this state, and, therefore, I will look to the merits of 
the instant matter by joining with Justice Cardine in his dissent and I will 
hereafter vote with the other members of the court on the merits of each 
petition for a writ of certiorari.

2 The bill-of-exceptions 
statutes provide:

"§ 7-12-102 [W.S. 1977]. 
Exceptions by prosecuting attorney; generally.

"The prosecuting attorney 
may take exceptions to any opinion or decision of the court during the 
prosecution of the cause; and the bill containing the exceptions upon being 
presented, shall, if it be conformable to the truth, be signed and sealed by the 
court, which shall be made a part of the record, and be in all respects governed 
by the rules established as to bills of exceptions in civil cases, except as 
herein provided."

"§ 7-12-103 [W.S. 1977]. 
Same; proceedings on exceptions.

"The prosecuting attorney 
may present such bill of exceptions to the supreme court and apply for 
permission to file it with the clerk thereof, for the decision of such court 
upon the points presented therein; but prior thereto he shall give reasonable 
notice to the judge who presided at the trial in which the bill was taken, of 
his purpose to make such application, and if the supreme court shall allow such 
bill to be filed, such judge shall appoint some competent attorney to argue the 
case against prosecuting attorney, which attorney shall receive for his service 
a fee not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100.00), to be fixed by such court, 
and to be paid out of the treasury of the county in which the bill was 
taken."

"§ 7-12-104 [W.S. 1977]. 
Same; when bill to be filed and decision rendered.

"If the supreme court 
shall be of the opinion that the questions presented should be decided upon, 
they shall allow the bill of exceptions to be filed and render a decision 
thereon."

"§ 7-12-105 [W.S. 1977]. 
Same; effect of decision of supreme court.

"The judgment of the 
court in the case in which the bill was taken shall not be reversed nor in any 
manner affected, but the decision of the supreme court shall determine the law 
to govern in any similar case which may be pending at the time the decision is 
rendered, or which may afterwards arise in the state."

3 Article 5, §§ 2, 3 and 
18 of the Wyoming Constitution provide:

"§ 2 Supreme court 
generally; appellate jurisdiction.

"The supreme court shall 
have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive with the state, in both civil 
and criminal causes, and shall have a general superintending control over all 
inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by 
law."

"§ 3. Same; original 
jurisdiction.

"The supreme court shall 
have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus as to all state 
officers, and in habeas corpus. The 
supreme court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, review, 
prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, and other writs necessary and proper to 
the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction. Each of 
the judges shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus to any part of the 
state upon petition by or on behalf of a person held in actual custody, and may 
make such writs returnable before himself or before the supreme court, or before 
any district judge of the state."

"§ 18. Appeals from 
district courts to supreme court.

"Writs of error and 
appeals may be allowed from the decisions of the district courts to the supreme 
court under such regulations as may be prescribed by law." (Emphasis 
added.)

4 Certiorari is a writ 
"necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate * * * 
jurisdiction." Article 5, § 3, Wyoming Constitution.

5 The necessity for which 
was, I suggest, overlooked by all justices of this court. I also call attention 
to Call v. Town of Afton, 73 
Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954), which was not a criminal prosecution, but in which opinion 
another questionable statement is to be found where the court 
said:

"* * * We held in effect 
in City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 
293, 157 P. 892, that a writ of certiorari might issue in some cases in which an 
inferior tribunal has no jurisdiction or acts in excess of jurisdiction. See 
also State ex rel. Loomis v. Dahlem, 
37 Wyo. 498, 
263 P. 708. And such writ would seem ordinarily not to be improper in cases in 
which no appeal has been provided from proceedings before a judicial as quasi 
judicial tribunal, at least in cases in which such tribunal had no jurisdiction 
or acted in excess of jurisdiction. 10 Am.Jur. 527, § 5, see annotation in 174 
A.L.R. 194. Whether or not we should go beyond cases of that kind in face of the 
statute above mentioned is another question." 278 P.2d  at 
273.

This statement 
is subject to the same criticism that causes City of Laramie v. Mengel to be 
questionable - i.e., while the opinion properly identifies the common-law 
utilization of certiorari, it ignores the necessity of certiorari-implementing 
statutory authority as contemplated by Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18 and mandated by Mau v. Stoner, 
supra.

6 Which is a questionable 
decision also, since certiorari was considered there without the implementing 
statutory authority required by Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18, which statutory 
implementation requirement is articulated in Mau v. Stoner, supra, discussed 
infra.

7 I here preserve the 
position I took in my concurring opinion in City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, 
to the effect that, where the parameters of the writ are not specified by the 
Constitution, the common-law writ applies. See also my dissenting opinion in Wright v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090, 1099 
(1983).

8 Defined by Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary as:

"[E]ither of two 
belts or regions in the neighborhood of 30° N. and 30° S. latitude characterized 
by high pressure, calms, and light baffling winds."

9 See Art. 5, §§ 2 and 18, 
supra n. 3.

10 City of Laramie v. Mengel, supra, holds that the 
grant or denial of certiorari is discretionary with this 
court.

11 We recently expressed 
the derogation-of-common-law rule for Wyoming 
when we said in State v. Stovall, Wyo., 648 P.2d 543, 547-548 
(1982):

"* * * A statute designed 
to change the common law must be strictly construed. Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 
Wyo., 426 P.2d 442 (1967). It must speak in clear and unequivocal terms, for the 
presumption is that no change is intended unless the statute is 
explicit."

CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom ROSE, Justice, 
joins.

[¶91.]  I dissent.

[¶92.]  Respondent, while operating a motor 
vehicle, was involved in an accident resulting in the death of two persons. 
There was no charge of drinking or intoxication, although there was evidence of 
the violation of traffic laws which might rise to the level of culpable neglect 
or criminal carelessness or conscious disregard of the safety of 
others.

[¶93.]  Respondent was charged with involuntary 
manslaughter under § 6-4-107, W.S. 1977, which provided:

"Whoever unlawfully kills 
any human being * * * involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act, 
except as provided in W.S. 31-5-1117, or by any culpable neglect or criminal 
carelessness, is guilty of manslaughter, and shall be imprisoned in the 
penitentiary not more than twenty (20) years."

[¶94.]  Respondent contended that he could only 
be charged with homicide by vehicle pursuant to § 31-5-1117(b), W.S. 1977, which 
provided:

"(b) Whoever, except when 
the violation of law involves culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, 
unlawfully and unintentionally, but with a conscious disregard of the safety of 
others, causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any 
state law or ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the 
regulation of traffic, except those laws or ordinances relating to conduct set 
forth in subsection (a) of this section, is guilty of homicide by vehicle when 
the violation is the proximate cause of death and, upon conviction thereof, 
shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) or imprisoned in 
the county jail for not more than one (1) year, or both."

[¶95.]  The trial court granted respondent's 
motion to dismiss, holding that he could only be charged with homicide by 
vehicle under § 31-5-1117(b), W.S. 1977, supra, citing in support of its 
decision our previous holdings in Thomas 
v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1287 (1977) and Lopez v. State, Wyo., 586 P.2d 157 
(1978). The majority opinion acknowledges the correctness of the district 
court's ruling when it states:

"The logic of the 
district court judge is in accordance with our former holdings. There is no 
discernible difference between the standard of `reckless disregard' (which was 
held to be the equivalent of `culpable neglect or criminal carelessness') and 
`conscious disregard' which is used in the context of `unlawfully and 
unintentionally' doing that which is proscribed by the vehicular homicide 
statute. Therefore, if this were the only aspect of this issue, we would uphold 
the district court's ruling."

[¶96.]  For me the case should end here. The 
decision of the district court should be affirmed. No other issues were raised 
for our determination.

[¶97.]  The majority, however, proceeds from here 
to consider the constitutionality of § 31-5-1117(b). This is an issue not 
raised, nor briefed, nor argued, nor contended for by any of the parties to this 
appeal. We have long held that we will not ordinarily inquire into the 
constitutionality of a statute on our own motion, nor will we declare a statute 
unconstitutional unless it is absolutely necessary. State, ex rel. Keefe v. McInerney, 63 
Wyo. 280, 182 P.2d 28 (1947). Nor will we inquire upon our own motion where the case can be 
completely and effectively disposed of without such a decision. Markey v. Connelly, Wyo., 
367 P.2d 964 (1962). This case has been decided in accordance with the law we 
have stated in our prior decisions. It has been disposed of completely and 
effectively. There is no justification under our existing rules for undertaking 
a determination of the constitutionality of this 
statute.

[¶98.]  The majority, however, has chosen in this 
case, upon their own motion, to determine the constitutionality of the statute. 
I find myself in disagreement also with the determination that § 31-5-1117(b), 
supra, is unconstitutional. It is clear from the legislative history of these 
enactments that the legislature long ago determined that it would treat homicide 
by vehicle separately and differently from manslaughter. It enacted at different 
times several successive separate statutes providing different penalties for 
"negligent homicide" and "homicide by vehicle" where death resulted from the 
operation of a motor vehicle. These special statutes were entirely proper and 
within the enacting authority of the legislature. This court has a duty, in 
construing the statutes, to attempt to effectuate the intent and purpose of the 
legislature. Nimmo v. State, 
Wyo., 603 P.2d 386 (1979). Thus, I would construe the exception found in § 31-5-1117(b), supra, 
"when the violation of law involves culpable neglect or criminal carelessness" 
to be applicable only to violations of law not involving the use or operation of 
a motor vehicle. I would hold the statute constitutional, giving effect to the 
clear intent of the legislature that where death results from the use or 
operation of a motor vehicle with conscious disregard for the safety of others, 
the penalty upon conviction is one year in jail and a $2,000 fine as provided by 
the statute. This result satisfies the following general rules of 
construction:

"In the construction of 
statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to 
enact an effective law * * *. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts 
should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision 
being construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An 
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or 
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, 
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, 
meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. * * *" (Footnotes omitted.) 73 Am.Jur.2d 
Statutes § 249.

The result I 
suggest means respondent cannot be tried for manslaughter but only for vehicular 
homicide with the resultant effect that respondent, upon conviction, can be 
imprisoned for not more than one year and fined not more than $2,000. Perhaps 
the penalty for conviction of vehicular homicide is not as severe as some think 
it should be. That is for the legislature; not for this court to determine, for 
it is said that:

"The power to prescribe 
the penalty to be imposed for commission of a crime rests with the legislature, 
not with the courts. This power is not a special grant or limited authority; it 
is part of the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order and to take 
life and liberty and the rights of both when necessary. As the Supreme Court has 
stated, whatever views may be entertained regarding the severity of punishment, 
whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility, these are peculiarly 
questions of legislative policy." (Footnotes omitted.) 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law 
§ 589.

[¶99.]  There was an obvious intent by the 
legislature to treat death resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle in 
violation of traffic laws separately and differently from death resulting from 
other causes such as the use of a gun or knife. The different treatment accorded 
by the legislature should be given considerable weight in determining the status 
of these statutes. Drivers are licensed at sixteen years of age and can receive 
a special permit to drive before that age. Almost everyone drives or wants to 
drive an automobile. It is often considered a necessity for traveling to work 
and in everyday living.

"* * * [N]egligent 
homicide statutes were adopted after the manslaughter acts had proved 
ineffective as a means of repressing the negligence in motor vehicle operation 
which was causing deaths upon the public thoroughfares. Possibly the success of 
the new legislation, if it in truth achieved any, resulted from the fact that in 
common understanding manslaughter acts deal with brutal killings by a debased 
type of individual, whereas the motorist is generally a reputable citizen, and 
the wrong committed by him which brought someone to his death finds its 
counterpart in the driving of many others. * * *" State v. Wojahn, 204 Or. 84, 282 P.2d 675, 701 (1955).

[¶100.]            
The different treatment accorded by the legislature is reasonable. These 
penal statutes, therefore, should be

"* * * construed with 
such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the defendant. If the statute 
contains a patent ambiguity and admits of two reasonable and contradictory 
constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its 
provisions is to be preferred. * *" (Footnote omitted.) 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 
295.

[¶101.]            
It would be a gross injustice that this defendant, upon § 31-5-1117(b) 
being found unconstitutional, be tried for manslaughter when the legislature 
obviously intended that not occur where death results from a violation of a 
statute or ordinance while operating a motor vehicle.