Case Title: Conley v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, JJ., 
and Russell and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
DONALD JOSEPH CONLEY 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 120139 
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
 
 
 
November 1, 2012 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This appeal presents the question whether an equally 
divided Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, may reverse a 
judgment previously entered by a panel of that Court.1  The 
question arises in the context of a petition for a writ of 
actual innocence brought within the original jurisdiction of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
In February 2004, Donald Joseph Conley was convicted in the 
General District Court of the City of Chesapeake of driving 
under the influence (DUI).  He was convicted in the same court 
of a second DUI offense in April of that year.  In November of 
that year, he was convicted in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Chesapeake of a felony third offense, DUI after being twice 
convicted of the same offense within ten years.  He was 
sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with three years 
suspended.  His appeals were unsuccessful. 
                     
 
1 In the present case, the Court of Appeals en banc 
effectively reversed a panel's judgment by ordering that it be 
"withdrawn."  
 
2 
 
In 2005, Conley filed in this Court a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus with respect to his second (April 2004) 
misdemeanor DUI conviction, one of the two predicate offenses 
underlying his felony conviction.2  He claimed that he had asked 
his attorney to appeal the April 2004 conviction to the circuit 
court but that his attorney had failed to do so.  At the 
Commonwealth's request, this Court, in March 2006, granted him a 
belated appeal of the second DUI conviction.  No further action 
was taken in that case until counsel was appointed to represent 
Conley in November 2009.  In February 2010, the circuit court 
granted Conley's motion to dismiss the second DUI case for 
denial of Conley's right to a speedy trial. 
 
In March 2010, Conley filed a petition in the Court of 
Appeals for a writ of actual innocence with respect to his 
felony conviction.  That petition is the subject of this appeal.  
Conley contended that he was innocent of the felony because one 
of the requisite predicate misdemeanor convictions had been 
dismissed with prejudice because of a violation of his speedy 
trial rights. 
 
The case was heard by a three-judge panel.  On June 15, 
2011, the panel, one judge dissenting, granted Conley's petition 
and remanded the case to the circuit court for resentencing on 
                     
 
2 Conley did not file a petition for habeas corpus as to his 
felony conviction.  
 
3 
the lesser-included offense of DUI, second conviction.  The 
Commonwealth filed a petition for a rehearing en banc, which the 
Court granted, staying the panel decision. 
 
On November 15, 2011, the Court of Appeals, with ten judges 
sitting en banc, heard arguments on the petition.  On 
December 16, 2011, the Court entered an order stating:  "Upon 
rehearing en banc, the petition for writ of actual innocence is 
dismissed without opinion by an equally-divided Court.  
Accordingly, the order previously entered by a panel of this 
Court on June 15, 2011 is withdrawn."  The order identified the 
five judges voting to grant the writ and the five judges who had 
voted to refuse it.  We awarded Conley an appeal. 
Analysis 
 
This appeal presents a pure question of law to which we 
apply a de novo standard of review.  Courtney v. Commonwealth, 
281 Va. 363, 366, 706 S.E.2d 344, 345 (2011).  In deciding 
petitions for writs of actual innocence, the Court of Appeals 
acts as a court of original jurisdiction.  Haas v. Commonwealth, 
283 Va. 284, 292, 721 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2012).  Therefore, there 
was no decision of another tribunal before the Court of Appeals 
for appellate review in the present case.  Rather, the Court 
sitting en banc had before it for review only the decision of 
its own panel. 
 
4 
 
Code § 17.1-402(E) is dispositive of the question before 
us.  It provides:  
The court may sit en banc with no fewer than 
eight judges.  In all cases decided by the court 
en banc, the concurrence of at least a majority 
of the judges sitting shall be required to 
reverse a judgment, in whole or in part. 
 
This language is plain and unambiguous.  It applies to all cases 
decided by the Court of Appeals en banc, without any distinction 
between the Court's appellate or original jurisdiction.  The 
panel's decision was a "judgment" within the terms of the 
statute because it disposed of all issues in the case and 
ordered the issuance of a writ of actual innocence.  See, e.g., 
McLane v. Vereen, 278 Va. 65, 72, 677 S.E.2d 294, 298 (2009) 
(final judgment "disposes of the entire matter before the court, 
giving all the relief contemplated . . . .").  Pursuant to Code 
§ 17.1-402(E), that judgment could only have been withdrawn and 
thus reversed by a majority of the judges sitting in the Court 
en banc.  The proceedings of the Court en banc, therefore, had 
no effect on the panel's decision.3 
 
 
                     
 
3 In addition to his assignment of error with respect to the 
lack of an en banc majority, Conley also assigns error to the 
Court of Appeals' failing, in consideration of the merits, to 
find him guilty of a misdemeanor second DUI in lieu of a felony 
third DUI conviction.  Because his first assignment of error is 
dispositive, we do not reach the second. 
 
5 
Conclusion 
 
For the reason stated, we will reverse and annul the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals en banc and remand the case to 
that Court with direction to vacate the stay and reinstate the 
judgment of the panel. 
Reversed and remanded.