Case Title: Sullivan v. Robertson Drug Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 060647

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
WILLIAM C. SULLIVAN, D.O. 
 
v. Record No. 060647    OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
  
 
  January 12, 2007 
ROBERTSON DRUG CO., INC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG  
J. Leyburn Mosby, Jr., Judge 
 
This case is an appeal of a judgment entered in a 
contribution action involving joint tortfeasors.  We consider 
whether the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that it 
could apportion damages based on the jury’s assessment of the 
degree to which a defendant’s negligence contributed to the 
injuries that were the subject of the underlying tort action.  
We also consider whether the circuit court erred in instructing 
the jury that it could consider the reasonableness of the 
settlement reached in the underlying tort action. 
In 1997, David M. Hopper filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia 
against his physician, William C. Sullivan, D.O., alleging that 
Dr. Sullivan improperly prescribed excess amounts of 
Triamcinolone, a corticosteroid.  Hopper alleged that his use of 
those excessive amounts of Triamcinolone caused him to develop 
 
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severe medical conditions including Cushing’s Syndrome1 and 
osteoporosis.  Hopper further alleged that Dr. Sullivan failed 
to monitor Hopper’s use of Triamcinolone, improperly 
administered an injection of testosterone, and subjected Hopper, 
a known recovering narcotics abuser, to a “foreseeable dangerous 
home regime of self-administered drugs.” 
In his complaint, Hopper additionally alleged that Dr. 
Sullivan had written Hopper prescriptions for Cortisone, 
Prednisone, and other corticosteroids and medications, and that 
Dr. Sullivan had “disavowed to other health care providers 
knowledge” of Hopper’s drug regimen.  Hopper sought $1 million 
in compensatory damages and $350,000 in punitive damages from 
Dr. Sullivan.  Hopper and Dr. Sullivan later entered into an 
agreement settling the federal court action for the amount of 
$735,000.  In the agreement, Hopper released all claims he may 
have had against Dr. Sullivan and against Robertson Drug and its 
employees. 
After the settlement, Dr. Sullivan filed the present motion 
for judgment against Michael S. Robertson, a pharmacist, and 
Robertson’s employer, Robertson Drug Co., Inc. (Robertson Drug), 
                                                 
1 Cushing’s Syndrome is a condition caused by excessive 
cortisone in the body.  The symptoms may include a rapid 
increase in fat cells in the face, neck, and trunk, curvature of 
the back caused by osteoporosis of the spine, hypertension, 
diabetes, pain in the abdomen and back, and muscular wasting and 
weakness.  Richard Sloane, The Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-
Legal Dictionary 690 (1987). 
 
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seeking contribution for Dr. Sullivan’s payment in settlement of 
Hopper’s claim.  In the contribution action, Dr. Sullivan 
alleged that Robertson, in his individual capacity and as owner 
of Robertson Drug, negligently “refilled” Hopper’s Triamcinolone 
prescriptions, thereby contributing to Hopper’s injuries. 
Dr. Sullivan further alleged that because Hopper could have 
pursued an action for damages against Robertson and Robertson 
Drug, Dr. Sullivan was authorized under Code §§ 8.01-34 and -
35.1 to pursue the contribution action.  Thus, Dr. Sullivan 
asserted that Robertson and Robertson Drug were indebted to Dr. 
Sullivan for “their share of the total settlement paid by 
Sullivan for their release.”  In their grounds of defense, 
Robertson and Robertson Drug denied that they caused any injury 
to Hopper or were joint tortfeasors with Dr. Sullivan. 
At trial, the evidence showed that Hopper initially sought 
medical treatment from Dr. Sullivan for multiple injuries he 
sustained in an automobile accident.  In June 1993, Dr. Sullivan 
provided Hopper with his first dose of Triamcinolone for “pain 
management.”  Hopper reported that his headaches were less 
severe after the injection.  Thereafter, Dr. Sullivan gave 
Hopper two or three additional Triamcinolone injections between 
August and September of 1993. 
Dr. Sullivan also wrote Hopper a prescription for 
Triamcinolone.  Instead of writing “0” as the number of refills 
 
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permitted, Dr. Sullivan circled “PRN,” which allowed Hopper to 
receive unlimited “refills” for 24 months.  According to Dr. 
Sullivan, he did not intend to allow unlimited “refills” of the 
drug because its long-term use can cause suppression of the 
immune system, bone deterioration, diabetes, and weight gain.  
Dr. Sullivan admitted that he acted negligently in prescribing 
Triamcinolone to Hopper. 
From June 1993 through July 1993, based on the prescription 
written by Dr. Sullivan, Hopper obtained Triamcinolone on five 
occasions from Westover Pharmacy.  After Westover Pharmacy 
permanently closed its business at the end of July 1993, Hopper 
obtained “refills” of his prescription at Robertson Drug three 
times between early August 1993 and the middle of September 
1993.  Robertson was the pharmacist who provided these last 
three “refills” and, at that time, he had access to Westover 
Pharmacy’s prescription records. 
The jury heard conflicting testimony on the issue whether 
Robertson’s conduct constituted a breach of the standard of care 
applicable to pharmacists.  Edgar R. Gonzales, who qualified as 
an expert in pharmacology, testified that because of the drug’s 
serious long-term effects, Robertson breached the standard of 
care for pharmacists by supplying the additional Triamcinolone 
without contacting Dr. Sullivan.  In contrast, Timothy W. Lucas, 
who also qualified as an expert in pharmacology, testified that 
 
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Robertson did not breach the standard of care for pharmacists by 
failing to contact Dr. Sullivan before “refilling” Hopper’s 
prescription. 
The evidence further revealed that in the middle of 
September 1993, Hopper became ill, was admitted to a hospital 
for 20 days, and was diagnosed as having Cushing’s Syndrome.  In 
1995, Dr. Eugene J. Barrett began treating Hopper for Cushing’s 
Syndrome, osteoporosis, and several other related problems, 
including a compression back fracture, a rib fracture, and a 
risk of spinal collapse.  Dr. Barrett attributed these 
conditions to Hopper’s overuse of corticosteroids. 
Dr. Barrett could not identify any specific condition as 
being caused solely by a particular steroid prescribed by Dr. 
Sullivan.  However, Dr. Barrett concluded that Hopper’s use of 
Triamcinolone was the dominant, contributing factor in his 
development of Cushing’s Syndrome and osteoporosis, and that 
each injection of that drug had a cumulative effect. 
At the close of Dr. Sullivan’s evidence, Robertson and 
Robertson Drug (collectively, Robertson) moved to strike the 
evidence, arguing that Dr. Sullivan was required to apportion 
the damages and quantify Robertson’s share of the injury because 
Dr. Sullivan was responsible for a “big measure” of Hopper’s 
injury, while Robertson was only responsible for a “very small 
area” of damages.  Robertson argued that Dr. Sullivan’s 
 
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settlement did not reflect such an apportionment, and further 
noted that neither Dr. Barrett nor Gonzales was able to 
apportion the amount of damage attributable to the actions of 
either Dr. Sullivan or Robertson.  The circuit court denied 
Robertson’s motion, stating that the jury should decide what 
damages, if any, Robertson caused. 
At the close of all the evidence, Dr. Sullivan argued that 
he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of 
reasonableness of the settlement, arguing that Robertson had 
failed to present any evidence to rebut the presumption that the 
settlement was reasonable.  The circuit court denied Dr. 
Sullivan’s request. 
Over Dr. Sullivan’s objections, the circuit court gave the 
following jury instructions: 
Instruction A: 
 
The Court instructs the jury that where there is damage 
from several causes, for a portion of which the defendants 
cannot be held liable, a plaintiff must present evidence 
that will show within a reasonable degree of certainty the 
share of the damages for which the defendants are 
responsible.  If the plaintiff fails to do so, then he 
cannot recover for that item. 
 
Instruction O: 
 
The Court instructs the jury that on the issue of damages 
if you find [both Robertson and Robertson’s Drug were] 
negligent, and their negligence was a proximate cause of 
David Hopper’s injuries, which were the basis of his 
lawsuit and settlement with Dr. Sullivan, then you shall 
determine how much of the amount of that settlement is 
 
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related to negligence of [the] Robertson[s] and apportion 
that amongst all the wrongdoers on a pro-rata basis. 
 
Instruction 13: 
 
The Court instructs the jury that there is a presumption 
that the $735,000.00 settlement made by Dr. Sullivan is 
reasonable, that the defendants are not bound by the 
compromise settlement since they were not a party to the 
settlement, and that the burden of proof is upon the 
defendants to prove that compromise settlement was 
unreasonable and excessive. 
 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Sullivan, 
awarding him damages in the amount of $73,500.  Dr. Sullivan 
made a motion to set aside the verdict, arguing that because the 
jury decided that Dr. Sullivan and Robertson were joint 
tortfeasors, Robertson was required to pay half the $735,000 
settlement.  The circuit court denied the motion and entered 
final judgment in accordance with the jury verdict.  Dr. 
Sullivan appeals. 
Dr. Sullivan argues that the circuit court erred in giving 
Jury Instructions A and O, which permitted the jury to apportion 
the amount of damages based on the jury’s assessment of 
Robertson’s degree of negligence in causing Hopper’s injury.  
Dr. Sullivan maintains that Hopper’s injuries were not 
susceptible to apportionment because the evidence showed that 
his injuries were indivisible.  Thus, Dr. Sullivan contends that 
Robertson was a joint tortfeasor who was equally liable for half 
the damages caused by his concurrent negligence and that the 
 
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circuit court should have instructed the jury that if it 
returned a verdict in Dr. Sullivan’s favor, the jury must award 
him $367,500. 
In response, Robertson argues that Jury Instructions A and 
O were correct based on the evidence presented.  Robertson 
asserts that the evidence showed that Hopper suffered multiple 
divisible injuries, some of which were caused solely by Dr. 
Sullivan.  Robertson contends that, therefore, the jury was 
properly instructed that Dr. Sullivan could recover only for 
injuries proximately caused by the concurrent negligence of 
Robertson and Dr. Sullivan, and that the jury was required to 
determine what portion of the $735,000 settlement was 
attributable to that concurrent negligence.  We disagree with 
Robertson’s arguments. 
The right of contribution is based on the equitable 
principle that when two or more persons are subject to a common 
burden, their responsibility shall be borne equally.  Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Minnifield, 213 Va. 797, 800, 196 S.E.2d 75, 
77-78 (1973); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co., 202 Va. 
527, 531-32, 118 S.E.2d 646, 649 (1961); Wiley N. Jackson Co. v. 
City of Norfolk, 197 Va. 62, 66, 87 S.E.2d 781, 784 (1955).  A 
right of contribution against a joint tortfeasor lies when one 
wrongdoer has paid or settled a claim not involving moral 
turpitude for which other wrongdoers also are liable.  
 
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Minnifield, 213 Va. at 798, 196 S.E.2d at 76; Bartlett v. 
Roberts Recapping, Inc., 207 Va. 789, 793, 153 S.E.2d 193, 196 
(1967); Jewel Tea, 202 Va. at 532, 118 S.E.2d at 649; see Code 
§ 8.01-34.  The party seeking contribution has the burden of 
proving that the concurring negligence of the other parties was 
a proximate cause of the injury for which damages were paid.  
Jewel Tea, 202 Va. at 531, 118 S.E.2d at 649. 
When a contribution action is based on a settlement 
agreement reached between an injured person and one tortfeasor, 
the remaining tortfeasors may defend against the contribution 
action on various grounds.  Such defenses, which are subject to 
adjudication in a contribution action, include that the settling 
tortfeasor was not negligent, that the remaining tortfeasors 
were not concurrently negligent with the settling tortfeasor, 
that the remaining tortfeasors’ negligence was not a proximate 
cause of the damages compromised, or that the settlement 
agreement was unreasonable, excessive, or made in bad faith.  
Id. 
If separate and independent acts of negligence of two 
parties directly cause a single indivisible injury to a third 
person, either or both wrongdoers are responsible for the whole 
injury.  Maroulis v. Elliott, 207 Va. 503, 511, 151 S.E.2d 339, 
345 (1966); Murray v. Smithson, 187 Va. 759, 764, 48 S.E.2d 239, 
241 (1948).  Thus, in determining the liability of a person 
 
10
whose concurrent negligence results in such an injury, 
comparative degrees of negligence shall not be considered and 
both wrongdoers are equally liable irrespective whether one may 
have contributed in a greater degree to the injury.  Maroulis, 
207 Va. at 510, 151 S.E.2d at 344; Von Roy v. Whitescarver, 197 
Va. 384, 393, 89 S.E.2d 346, 352 (1955); Murray, 187 Va. at 764, 
48 S.E.2d at 241; Richmond Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. 
Andrews, 173 Va. 240, 250-51, 3 S.E.2d 419, 423 (1939).  
Accordingly, each such wrongdoer is responsible for an 
equal share of the amount paid in damages for a single injury.  
Only when there are multiple, divisible injuries covered by a 
compromise settlement is the finder of fact required to attempt 
an allocation of the amount in contribution a wrongdoer must pay 
for his negligent act or acts causing one or more of those 
divisible injuries.  See Tazewell Oil Co. v. United Virginia 
Bank, 243 Va. 94, 115, 413 S.E.2d 611, 622 (1992). 
In the present case, Dr. Barrett testified that the effect 
of the Triamcinolone was cumulative and, therefore, it was 
impossible to determine what effect any particular dose had on 
Hopper.  According to Dr. Barrett, Hopper’s use of Triamcinolone 
was the dominant contributing factor in Hopper’s development of 
Cushing’s syndrome and osteoporosis.  Dr. Barrett also stated 
that several of Hopper’s other conditions, including sepsis, 
pneumonia, and empyema, were caused by the immunosuppressive 
 
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effect of the Triamcinolone.  Dr. Barrett further explained that 
Hopper received other corticosteroids, and stated that this 
entire group of drugs, including the Triamcinolone, “all cause 
the same issues when given in high doses and given repeatedly.” 
By this medical testimony, which was not refuted, Dr. 
Sullivan established that the cumulative effect of the doses of 
Triamcinolone given to Hopper caused him an indivisible injury.  
Thus, if Robertson’s actions breached the standard of care, 
Robertson was liable for the whole injury to Hopper, 
irrespective whether doses of that drug not supplied by 
Robertson, or whether other drugs, contributed in a greater 
degree to Hopper’s injury.  See Maroulis, 207 Va. at 510, 151 
S.E.2d at 344; Von Roy, 197 Va. at 393, 89 S.E.2d at 352; 
Murray, 187 Va. at 764, 48 S.E.2d at 241; Richmond Coca-Cola 
Bottling Works, 173 Va. at 250-51, 3 S.E.2d at 423. 
Viewed in this context, Instruction A was erroneous because 
it improperly suggested that Robertson could not be found liable 
for the whole, indivisible injury caused by the various doses of 
Triamcinolone and other medications supplied to Hopper from 
different sources.  This instruction further was improper 
because Robertson failed to present any evidence that Hopper 
suffered injuries separate and divisible from those resulting 
from his use of Triamcinolone.  Hopper’s various allegations in 
the underlying tort action that he suffered injury resulting 
 
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from medications other than Triamcinolone plainly were not 
evidence in the present action that Hopper had sustained a 
divisible injury.  Thus, the record before us lacked evidence of 
a separate, divisible injury for which Robertson was not liable. 
We also conclude that the circuit court erred in giving 
Instruction O.  This instruction was erroneous because it 
directed the jury to apportion damages based on the joint 
tortfeasors’ relative degrees of negligence.  By improperly 
directing the jury to compare the negligence of the wrongdoers, 
Instruction O violated the established principle that 
comparative degrees of negligence are not to be considered in 
determining the liability of persons whose concurrent negligence 
results in an injury.  Maroulis, 207 Va. at 510, 151 S.E.2d at 
344; Murray, 187 Va. at 764, 48 S.E.2d at 241. 
We next consider Dr. Sullivan’s argument that the circuit 
court erred in allowing the jury to consider the issue whether 
the settlement between Dr. Sullivan and Hopper was reasonable.  
Dr. Sullivan contends that although Instruction 13 was a correct 
statement of law, Robertson presented no evidence to rebut the 
presumption that the settlement was reasonable and, thus, the 
circuit court should not have given that instruction. 
In response, Robertson argues that the circuit court did 
not err in allowing the jury to consider the reasonableness of 
the settlement.  Robertson contends that although the settlement 
 
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may have been reasonable with regard to Dr. Sullivan and 
Hopper’s several claims against Dr. Sullivan, the settlement was 
unreasonable with regard to Robertson because it included 
claims, injuries, and damages that were not the product of the 
concurrent negligence of Dr. Sullivan and Robertson.  We find no 
merit in Robertson’s arguments. 
When a tortfeasor enters into a settlement agreement with a 
claimant that also releases other tortfeasors, the settling 
tortfeasor is entitled to obtain contribution from the remaining 
tortfeasors for reasonable amounts paid to settle the claim.  
Code § 8.01-35.1.  Under this statute, a fact finder may 
consider the reasonableness of the settlement agreement only 
with regard to the indivisible injury sustained and may not 
consider, as part of the reasonableness analysis, whether the 
remaining tortfeasors caused the injuries that were not the 
basis for the settlement.  Robertson’s argument addressing the 
reasonableness of the settlement is unpersuasive because it 
confuses these two concepts. 
The terms of settlement of a claim constitute prima facie 
evidence of reasonableness, and a defendant in a contribution 
action bears the burden of producing evidence that the 
compromise reached was unreasonable or excessive.  See Jewel 
Tea, 202 Va. at 531, 118 S.E.2d at 648-49.  Thus, Robertson, as 
the defendant in the contribution action, had the burden of 
 
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producing evidence that the settlement was unreasonable before 
he was entitled to Instruction 13 submitting that issue for the 
jury’s determination. 
Robertson, however, failed to present any evidence 
indicating that the settlement was unreasonable or excessive.2  
Therefore, having failed to produce more than a scintilla of 
evidence on the subject, Robertson was not entitled to have the 
jury instructed on the issue of reasonableness of the 
settlement.  Monahan v. Obici Med. Mgmt. Servs., 271 Va. 621, 
636, 628 S.E.2d 330, 339 (2006); Schlimmer v. Poverty Hunt Club, 
268 Va. 74, 78, 597 S.E.2d 43, 45 (2004); Pollins v. Jones, 263 
Va. 25, 28, 557 S.E.2d 713, 714 (2002).  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the circuit court erred in giving Instruction 13 
and in submitting that issue for the jury’s consideration. 
Our holding that the circuit court improperly instructed 
the jury requires us to reverse the circuit court’s judgment.  
Because the circuit court’s improper instructions addressed 
issues of liability as well as issues of damages, those 
instructions may have exerted a material influence on the jury 
in reaching its conclusions on both issues.  Therefore, a new 
                                                 
2 Likewise, Robertson failed to present any evidence that 
the settlement agreement included compensation for injuries 
involving willful and wanton acts of negligence or moral 
turpitude or compensation for punitive damages.  Therefore, we 
do not address further his argument that these alleged factors 
were reflected in the settlement. 
 
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trial on all issues is appropriate.  See Wright v. Estep, 194 
Va. 332, 337-38, 73 S.E.2d 371, 375 (1952); Rawle v. McIlhenny, 
163 Va. 735, 750, 177 S.E.2d 214, 221 (1934). 
For these reasons, we will reverse the circuit court’s 
judgment and remand the case for a new trial on all issues. 
Reversed and remanded.