Case Title: World Mart, Inc. v. Ditsch

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92-52

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
World Mart, Inc. v. Ditsch1993 WY 85855 P.2d 1228Case Number: 92-52Decided: 06/21/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
WORLD 
MART, INC., a Missouri Corporation, d/b/a American Handicapped Workers of 
Colorado; and Disadvantaged Workers of America, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation, 
successor in interest to World Mart, Inc., a Missouri Corporation, 

Petitioner 
(Respondent),

v. 

James 
A. DITSCH, 

Respondent 
(Complainant).

 

Jane 
A. Villemez, Graves, Santini & Villemez, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
petitioner.

Daniel 
E. White, Gusea & White, P.C., Cheyenne, and Philip White Jr., Laramie, 
for respondent.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The essential 
issue presented by this Petition for Judicial Review of the Findings of Facts, 
Conclusions of Law and Order by the Wyoming Fair Employment Commission of the 
Department of Employment of the State of Wyoming (Commission) is the sufficiency 
of the evidence and other matters of record to justify the relief ordered in 
favor of James A. Ditsch (Ditsch), a handicapped worker. The hearing officer for 
the Commission found Ditsch had been passed over for promotion and, 
subsequently, demoted because of unlawful handicap discrimination. American 
Handicapped Workers (AHW), as employer, contends that, because the person 
selected for the promotion also was handicapped, Ditsch did not sustain his 
burden of proof, and the employer is entitled to select the person most 
qualified for a position so long as there was no discrimination against a 
handicapped person. In addition, collateral issues are presented relating to 
proof of damages and the propriety of that aspect of the order requiring AHW to 
implement an affirmative action plan. We are satisfied there is no error in this 
proceeding that would justify a reversal of the order of the Commission. We 
affirm the Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Order by the 
Commission.

[¶2]      The issues 
assigned by AHW in its brief are:

1. 
Whether Respondent James A. Ditsch failed to establish a prima facie case of 
handicap discrimination, since Petitioner American Handicapped Workers hired a 
handicapped person for the disputed position.

2. 
Whether the Administrative Hearing Officer's personal determination regarding 
the applicants' qualifications sufficiently supports a conclusion of handicap 
discrimination.

3. 
Whether the Administrative Hearing Officer erred in shifting the burden of proof 
to Petitioner to prove non-discrimination.

4. 
Whether the Administrative Hearing Officer improperly awarded back pay of $66.81 
per day, plus interest, with no basis in the record, no relationship to the 
findings of fact, and no requirement for mitigation of losses. 

5. 
Whether the Administrative Hearing Office abused his discretion in ordering 
Petitioner to develop and implement an affirmative action program to eliminate 
the preferential hiring of handicapped or disabled 
individuals.

The 
issue as articulated by Ditsch in his Answer Brief of Appellee is:

A. 
Whether the Department of Employment's December 2, 1991 Final Order is 
unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, in excess of 
statutory authority, or otherwise unlawful.

[¶3]      In January of 
1988, Ditsch, a quadriplegic confined to a wheelchair, was employed as a 
telemarketer by AHW in its Cheyenne office. AHW is a private, for-profit, 
telemarketing company that hires only handicapped telemarketers to sell light 
bulbs and other products to the public. Ditsch was paid $3.35 plus a commission 
as a telemarketer. On August 27, 1988, Ditsch was promoted to supervisor and 
assigned the functions of collecting delinquent accounts, verifying orders, 
returning packages, and training other telemarketers. As a supervisor, Ditsch 
was given a pay raise from $4.50 to $5.00 an hour. He was the recipient of a 
performance award by his supervisor, the branch manager.

[¶4]      In January of 
1989, the branch manager decided to relocate, and Ditsch applied for the vacant 
position. Ditsch was one of three finalists selected for consideration for 
branch manager. Neither of the other two finalists, one male and the other a 
female, had a visible, physical handicap, but both had a history of alcohol 
abuse. The history of the female finalist included a sentence of sixteen months 
in the Iowa Women's Prison for driving under the influence of alcohol. She was 
the only one of the three finalists who was formally interviewed for the 
position of branch manager and, subsequently, she was hired as a manager 
trainee. Two weeks later, she was promoted to the position of branch manager. On 
February 6, 1989, the new branch manager removed Ditsch from his supervisor's 
position. Ditsch declined a reassignment to his previous position of 
telemarketer, and the new branch manager, on behalf of AHW, then terminated 
Ditsch's employment.

[¶5]      The following 
month, Ditsch filed a complaint against AHW alleging he was passed over for 
promotion to the position of branch manager and then discharged because of his 
handicap, in violation of Wyo. Stat. §§ 27-9-101 to -108 (1991 & Supp. 
1992), the Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act of 1965 (WFEPA). Ditsch alleged 
he was not promoted because of his handicap, quadriplegia, and the decision to 
hire the new branch manager was based on a discriminatory consideration of the 
effects of his handicap. Ditsch asserted that the nine objective factors AHW 
claimed to have used to support its decision to hire the new branch manager were 
not really applied. Ditsch claimed, instead, AHW impermissibly relied upon 
subjective personality traits to determine that the new branch manager had a 
greater ability to motivate telemarketers which made her the best choice for the 
position. AHW contended, before the Commission, that it hires and promotes 
individuals with disabilities pursuant to an affirmative action program, and the 
new branch manager who was considered and selected for that position was 
disabled because she was a recovered alcoholic. AHW asserted that motivation of 
the telemarketers is the most important aspect of the branch manager's position, 
and the new branch manager was hired on the basis of her superior 
qualifications.

[¶6]      After 
investigating Ditsch's complaint, the Commission held a fact-finding conference 
on August 24, 1989. At that time, AHW offered to reinstate Ditsch as a manager 
trainee if he would withdraw his claim for unpaid overtime wages and his claim 
of discrimination. Ditsch declined this offer of settlement and, on October 12, 
1990, the Commission sent a letter to counsel for both sides in which it found 
reasonable cause to believe Ditsch's allegations of discrimination. The 
Commission proposed a conciliation agreement that was rejected by both parties, 
and Ditsch then requested that a contested case hearing be scheduled. A two-day 
hearing was held on June 7 and 8 of 1991. 

[¶7]      The 
administrative hearing officer found the new branch manager was not a recovered 
alcoholic, and Ditsch was more qualified for the position by virtue of the 
policies of AHW. As a conclusion of law, the hearing officer ruled AHW had not 
established by a preponderance of the evidence that Ditsch was denied the 
position of branch manager or terminated for legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reasons. The hearing officer also ruled Ditsch was not promoted and then was 
terminated because of his handicap.

[¶8]      The order for 
relief issued by the hearing officer directed AHW to reinstate Ditsch in the 
position of Cheyenne Branch Manager Trainee; awarded back pay and interest to 
Ditsch of $57,267.12, based on $66.81 per day from February 6, 1989 to December 
2, 1991; ordered AHW to cease and desist its discriminatory employment 
practices; and ordered AHW to implement an affirmative action program within 
twelve months which would offer equal employment opportunities to all persons 
regardless of handicap or disability. AHW sought judicial review of this order, 
and the case then was certified to this court pursuant to Wyo.R.App.P. 12.09.1

[¶9]      We have a settled 
standard with respect to review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the decision of an administrative agency. Wyo. Stat. § 16-3-114(c) (1990). If we 
can identify substantial evidence in the record to support the findings of the 
agency, in this instance the Commission, we do not substitute our judgment for 
that of the agency. Rather, we affirm the administrative agency's findings. 
Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept 
as adequate to support the findings of the agency. Sinclair Trucking v. Bailey, 
848 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1993); Devous v. Wyoming State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1993); Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Div., 842 P.2d 1077 (Wyo. 1992); Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' Sch., 813 P.2d 185 
(Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 872, 116 L. Ed. 2d 777 
(1992).

[¶10]   Our review of agency orders focuses 
on the sufficiency of the evidence and also considers the reasonableness of the 
judgment of the hearing officer. We examine the entire record to determine 
whether substantial evidence supports these findings of fact. Casper Iron & 
Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n of the Dep't of Employment of the State 
of Wyoming, 845 P.2d 387 (Wyo. 1993); Amax Coal Co. v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Equalization, 819 P.2d 825 (Wyo. 1991). The burden of establishing the lack of 
substantial evidence is assigned to the petitioner or the appellant. Union Tel. 
Co., Inc. v. Wyoming Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 821 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1991). We rely upon, 
and give deference to, the agency's expertise in weighing the evidence, and 
agency decisions are left undisturbed unless they are "clearly contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence on record." Casper Iron & Metal, Inc., 
845 P.2d  at 392; Mekss, 813 P.2d  at 201 (quoting State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 833 (Wyo. 1991)).

[¶11]   In addition, we must determine 
whether any errors of law were committed or any constitutional rights were 
violated. In our review of the conclusions of law by an agency, we determine 
whether they are in accord with existing law, and we reverse only for errors in 
applying the law. Amax Coal; Union Telephone. If the agency misapplies the 
correct rule of law to its findings of fact, or if the agency applies the wrong 
rule of law, we cannot defer to those findings. Casper Iron & Metal, Inc.; 
Wyoming Dep't of Employment, Div. of Unemployment Ins. v. Secrest, 811 P.2d 733 
(Wyo. 1991). The issues raised by AHW in this case address both the sufficiency 
of the evidence and the application of the law.

[¶12]   AHW's initial assignment of error 
is that Ditsch failed to establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination 
because the new branch manager also was handicapped as a recovered alcoholic. In 
submitting this argument, AHW relies on federal cases requiring the complainant 
to prove that a person who was not in the protected class was hired instead of 
the complainant. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), on remand, 390 F. Supp. 501 (E.D.Mo. 1975), aff'd, 
528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544 
(10th Cir. 1988). AHW contends that, since alcoholics are a protected class 
under state and federal law, Ditsch could not establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination because a member of a protected class, rather than someone 
outside the protected class, was hired. In making this argument, AHW relies on 
the State of Wyoming Substance Abuse Policy and Guidelines for its contention 
that the new branch manager was handicapped and a member of the protected class. 
The guidelines provide in pertinent part:

Drug 
addiction and alcoholism are "physical or mental impairments" within the meaning 
of state and federal laws and therefore employees addicted to drugs and/or 
alcohol are handicapped if their impairment substantially limits one of their 
major life activities and have a record of such impairment or are regarded as 
having such an impairment.

State 
of Wyoming Substance Abuse Policy Guidelines at 2, Executive Order 1990-2 (March 
8, 1990).

[¶13]   Conversely, Ditsch relies on the 
federal rule of law that a complainant establishes a prima facie case of 
discrimination by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
complainant was qualified for a position, but was rejected under circumstances 
giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Pushkin v. Regents 
of Univ. of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981). Ditsch also submits AHW 
failed to establish the new branch manager was a handicapped person under the 
definitions contained in the administrative regulations adopted by the 
Commission, which provides, in pertinent part:

(a) 
"Handicapped person" means any person who has a physical or mental impairment 
which substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of 
such impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment.

(b) 
"Physical or mental impairment" means any * * * mental retardation, organic 
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, or specific learning 
disabilities.

Rules 
of Practice and Procedure Before the Wyoming Fair Employment Commission 
Concerning Handicap Discrimination Complaints Filed Pursuant to the Fair 
Employment Practices Act of 1965 as Amended, Ch. X, § 3 (Jan. 14, 
1986).

[¶14]   The hearing officer found the new 
branch manager was a practicing alcoholic, rather than a recovered one, and 
AHW's claim that she was handicapped within the definitional section of the 
regulations was rejected. Whether or not the new branch manager was 
"handicapped" either as a recovering or practicing alcoholic, or because she had 
a criminal record based on alcohol abuse, is not controlling. We hold, in either 
event, substantial evidence is present in the record to justify a prima facie 
finding that Ditsch was not promoted to branch manager and was terminated from 
his supervisor's position was attributable to handicap 
discrimination.

[¶15]   AHW relies on evidence the new 
branch manager had the ability to motivate a room full of telemarketers, and its 
perceived lack of this ability in Ditsch, as the main reason the new branch 
manager was chosen over Ditsch for the position. There was testimony, however, 
from four other telemarketers that they could be motivated by Ditsch. AHW's vice 
president and management sales director, who made the final decision to hire the 
new branch manager, described her as a "very vivacious, outgoing, excitable, 
enthusiastic person." The district manager for AHW testified the new manager 
would fulfill the management position more like her predecessor, who had been 
"charming, up on top of the tables, keeping the room charged all of the time." 
Ditsch, on the other hand, was described by AHW as "low key," "rigid," and as 
having a "slowness with his personality." The outgoing branch manager testified 
she believed Ditsch was too slow "because he had to write with both hands," 
instead of having an ability to write with one hand, as she did. Another witness 
testified Ditsch's handicap made him slow, and he also had a slow personality. 
That witness went on to describe Ditsch in this way:

I 
don't think he is a motivating person that way. He is a very knowledgeable 
person. Especially, about the products and the company. But, as far as being 
fast and quick to do certain things, no, I don't think he is fast that 
way.

[¶16]   From the testimony that Ditsch had 
to write with both hands and was unable to be as fast or quick as others in 
doing certain things, the hearing officer reasonably could conclude Ditsch was 
passed over for the vacancy of branch manager based on the "slowness" engendered 
by his physical handicap, rather than any "slowness" with his personality, which 
ostensibly would prevent Ditsch from being able to motivate others. The hearing 
officer indeed had substantial evidence to find Ditsch was denied the position 
as branch manager because of handicap discrimination.

[¶17]   A similar rationale can be applied 
to Ditsch's removal from his supervisor's position some two weeks after the new 
branch manager was appointed. AHW contends it wanted to reassign Ditsch because, 
based on the observations of the new branch manager, Ditsch simply lacked the 
ability to motivate the office and he failed to encourage new people or generate 
enthusiasm. There was contrary testimony by four telemarketers who testified at 
the hearing that Ditsch was able to motivate them. We also note Ditsch not only 
had received a raise in pay, but he had received a performance reward as a 
supervisor prior to his removal and reassignment from that position. AHW also 
contends the reassignment was necessary because Ditsch's collections were down, 
and the new branch manager was carrying much of his work load. The record 
demonstrates, however, that the collection information on Ditsch was not 
available at the time he was terminated. Furthermore, there is no dispute that, 
even if the collection information indirectly reflected on Ditsch's performance 
as a supervisor, no one at AHW attempted to determine whether Ditsch's handicap 
may have contributed to a lower collection percentage and, if so, whether a 
reasonable accommodation could have been made to improve Ditsch's 
collections.

[¶18]   At the hearing, the vice president 
and management sales director stated that a supervisor has to be dialing while 
he is writing and the phone is ringing. When asked whether Ditsch's handicap 
would impact his ability to hold the phone, dial quickly, or write with a pen, 
the witness stated:

Not 
from what I have heard. I mean he is able to do all of the things that, they 
mentioned he was able to dial a phone, write up the order. I really, I wouldn't 
say the handicap was a problem. I never, from what I understood, he was just 
slow.

[¶19]   Since Ditsch had to use both hands 
to write, it would be physically impossible for him to meet the job description 
articulated by the vice president and management sales director for AHW, which 
included the ability to write and dial the phone at the same time. Obviously, 
Ditsch would not be able to get "on top of the tables" to motivate others. From 
these statements and other evidence, the hearing officer reasonably could 
conclude that Ditsch's lower collection rate and the criticism by the vice 
president and management sales director that Ditsch "was just slow" were 
functions of his physical handicap, rather than a "slow personality." It follows 
that the hearing officer had before him substantial evidence to find the reasons 
given by the vice president and management sales director for terminating Ditsch 
were unlawful because they were based on impermissible handicap 
discrimination.

[¶20]   In arguing its second issue, AHW 
contends the hearing officer made a personal determination that Ditsch was the 
better qualified of the applicants and then concluded AHW must have 
discriminated against Ditsch when it picked the new branch manager for the 
position of manager trainee to be followed by the promotion to branch manager. 
In support of its proposition that the Commission is not empowered to exercise 
an independent judgment as to the merits of qualifications of the applicants, 
AHW cites Shenefield v. Sheridan County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 544 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 
1976). We do not agree that the record or the finding of the hearing examiner 
supports the claim that the hearing officer made an independent judgment in this 
regard. The last sentence in Finding of Fact Number 7 states:

The 
evidence of record indicates that Complainant was more qualified than [the new 
branch manager] by virtue of Respondent's policies * * *.

[¶21]   Some of the testimony taken at the 
hearing concerned certain letters and documents which identified nine factors 
that AHW, at various times, claimed supported the decision to hire the new 
branch manager instead of Ditsch. These factors included the following: (1) 
Wonderlic test; (2) past telemarketing experience; (3) past telemarketing 
management experience; (4) ability to train, motivate, supervise, and discipline 
telemarketers; (5) performance record; (6) stability in private life; (7) 
ability to maintain accurate records; (8) ability to maintain good customer 
relations; and (9) ability to act as liaison between AHW and the community in 
which the branch office is located. AHW admitted Ditsch and the new branch 
manager were equally qualified as to the last three factors. Because the other 
six were at issue before the hearing officer, it was necessary that he weigh the 
evidence presented for each of the factors in order to determine the relative 
qualifications of the new branch manager and Ditsch and whether the new branch 
manager actually was more qualified than Ditsch. Since AHW advanced these 
criteria for comparison of the qualifications of the new branch manager and 
Ditsch for that position, AHW cannot now complain simply because the hearing 
officer took the evidence based on its criteria and then found the evidence 
indicated Ditsch was better qualified for the position of branch manager. In 
addition, Finding of Fact Number 7 must be read in conjunction with the third 
Conclusion of Law of the hearing officer:

Discrimination 
on the basis of handicap is prohibited by the WFEPA, and the weight of evidence 
supports Complainant's allegation that he was not promoted and terminated 
because of his handicap.

[¶22]   When these statements are taken 
together and in context, the conclusion is that the evidence demonstrated AHW 
hired the new branch manager in contravention of its own policies (the six 
objective factors AHW relied upon) and, thus, violated the WFEPA, which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap. There was no personal 
determination by the hearing officer that Ditsch was more qualified for the 
position of branch manager. The ruling demonstrates only that the hearing 
officer found the evidence indicates Ditsch was more qualified, and the weight 
of the evidence supports handicap discrimination against him.

[¶23]   AHW next argues error occurred 
because the hearing officer shifted to it the burden of proof to demonstrate 
non-discrimination against Ditsch. This assertion is premised on the final 
Conclusion of Law by the administrative hearing officer, which 
states:

[AHW] 
has not established by a preponderance of evidence that Complainant was denied 
the position of Branch Manager or terminated for a legitimate non-discriminatory 
reason.

[¶24]   The Wyoming Rules of Practice 
Governing Hearings on Discrimination Complaints before the Commission assigned 
the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory or unfair 
employment practice to the complainant, in this case, Ditsch. Once such a prima 
facie showing is made, it then is appropriate to shift to the employer the 
burden of establishing any affirmative defense. The employer, AHW, must rebut 
the prima facie case of a discriminatory or unfair employment practice. We 
stated above our conclusion that the hearing officer had substantial evidence to 
determine Ditsch had established a prima facie case of handicap discrimination 
without regard to whether the alcoholism of the new branch manager was to be 
considered as a handicap. Under the Commission's rules, the hearing officer did 
not err in requiring that AHW rebut Ditsch's prima facie case by demonstrating 
the new branch manager was more qualified because of her personality, which 
provided a superior ability to motivate telemarketers.

[¶25]   Even if AHW need only demonstrate a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for hiring the new branch manager, under a 
burden of going forward with the evidence, Ditsch ultimately established that 
AHW's explanations of why the new branch manager was more qualified were simply 
a pretext for handicap discrimination. Cooper, 836 F.2d 1544; Furr v. AT & T 
Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 842 F.2d 253 
(10th Cir. 1988); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981). The first six factors out of the identified 
nine AHW originally invoked, in support of its decision to hire the new branch 
manager over Ditsch, eventually were discarded by AHW because they failed to 
prove the new branch manager was more qualified than Ditsch for that position. 
Once the sixfactor analysis was abandoned, AHW formulated still another 
justification for hiring the new branch manager. It asserted Ditsch's "slow 
personality" and inability to motivate telemarketers made the other person the 
better qualified for the branch manager's position. The record, however, 
demonstrates the alleged "slow personality" and inability to motivate others 
simply was a pretext for not hiring Ditsch based on his physical "slowness" 
engendered by his handicap. This pretext also was invoked to reassign Ditsch 
from a supervisor to a telemarketer. However the burden of proof might be 
allocated, we hold that the administrative hearing officer made no error in his 
findings.

[¶26]   The fourth claim of error presented 
by AHW relates to the award by the hearing officer of back pay to Ditsch of 
$66.81 per day plus interest. AHW urges that this was erroneous in the following 
respects:

1. 
The hearing officer abused his discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
as the back pay award is not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record;

2. 
The award does not take into consideration Ditsch's duty to mitigate losses and 
does not deduct Ditsch's unemployment benefits or any actual earnings received; 
and

3. 
An award of prejudgment interest cannot be recovered on an unliquidated 
claim.

AHW 
argues two reasons why the back pay award is not supported by substantial 
evidence: (1) the $66.81 was gleaned by Ditsch's counsel from AHW's pre-hearing 
trial brief, which is not sworn testimony and certainly was not admitted in 
evidence to support the determination of the hearing officer; and (2) the award 
was determined based on comment made in written closing argument by Ditsch's 
counsel that AHW branch managers earn $66.81 per day. It appears the hearing 
officer believed the evidence was sufficient to establish back pay because the 
hearing officer denied Ditsch's request to reopen the hearing to present 
additional proof of damages.

[¶27]   We set forth a definition of 
"substantial evidence" in Mekss, 813 P.2d  at 200 (citations 
omitted):

"Such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion." Findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence if, from the 
evidence preserved in the record, [the reviewing court] can discern a rational 
premise for the findings.

There 
is a rational premise for the finding of the hearing officer with respect to the 
back pay award. We hold the hearing officer could rely on AHW's trial brief and 
on Ditsch's written closing statement for this purpose. Both AHW's brief and 
Ditsch's closing argument agree that $14,765.58 is the amount the new branch 
manager and her predecessor earned over a period of 221 days as branch managers, 
which can be computed at the average daily rate of $66.81. After he had itemized 
the compensation of the new branch manager during this period at $8,719.96 and 
her predecessor's at $6,045.62, the trial brief of AHW states:

Thus, 
those persons who actually managed Respondent's Cheyenne Branch Office from 
February 4, 1989, through September 15, 1989, earned a total of 
$14,765.58.

[¶28]   This language in Ditsch's closing 
argument demonstrates that he accepted, concurred with, and relied upon, AHW's 
calculations:

Mr. 
Ditsch agrees that [the new branch manager] and [the old branch manager] earned 
$14,765.58 in the period of time from February 6, 1989 through September 15, 
1989. * * * Mr. Ditsch's actual pay as manager might have either exceeded or 
been less than the pay earned by [the old and new branch managers]. * * * Under 
these circumstances, it might be more appropriate to figure back pay in 
accordance with the figures submitted by AHW * * * which reflect the average pay 
of all managers during this period of time.

[¶29]   Courts have held that statements by 
an attorney concerning the scope of his employment may be admissible against 
that attorney's client. For example, an attorney's opening statement and an 
administrative claim filed by an attorney have been identified as admissions of 
the clients. United States v. Margiotta, 662 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1981) cert. 
denied, 461 U.S. 913, 103 S. Ct. 1891, 77 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1983); United States v. 
McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Flores, 628 F.2d 521 (9th 
Cir. 1980). In Nichols v. Nichols, 98 N.M. 322, 648 P.2d 780 (1982), the court 
ruled admissions in briefs can substitute for facts in the record. It is clear 
that counsel for both AHW and Ditsch were authorized to act for, and speak on, 
behalf of their clients. As admissions by a party, the statements of counsel in 
the trial brief and in closing argument can be considered under the Wyoming 
Rules of Evidence. We hold a hearing officer or a trial judge acts within the 
ambit of discretion in relying upon the evidentiary value of such 
admissions.

[¶30]   We need not decide, however, 
whether the agreements of counsel to the $14,765.58 figure are binding as 
admissions of their clients or whether the hearing officer might have taken them 
as such. In administrative agency hearings, hearsay evidence is admissible, and 
neither party took any opportunity to refute this critical evidence by 
presenting the sworn testimony of witnesses who might be able to do so. This is 
not a case in which the hearing officer impermissibly relied on written hearsay 
evidence to refute conflicting testimony from reliable witnesses on both sides 
of the controversy. See Jadallah v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Employment Serv., 
476 A.2d 671 (D.C.Ct.App. 1984). Instead, the hearing officer reasonably could 
conclude, because there was no evidence at odds with the $14,765.58 figure 
presented by either side at the administrative hearing, that the parties 
justifiably relied upon, and stipulated to, the accuracy of the back pay figure. 
There is no difficulty then in discerning a rational premise for the award of 
back pay by the hearing officer in the amount of $66.81 per day.

[¶31]   The hearing officer could 
accurately and readily compute Ditsch's back pay award based upon the parties' 
written evidence submitted at the hearing. It follows that there was no error in 
the grant by the hearing officer of prejudgment interest on the liquidated sum 
of $66.81 per day. Holst v. Guynn, 696 P.2d 632 (Wyo. 1985); Rissler & 
McMurry Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 559 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1977).

[¶32]   We also hold the ancillary 
contention by AHW, that the back pay award was not appropriately reduced by an 
amount equal to Ditsch's failure to mitigate his losses or that the award should 
be reduced by his unemployment benefits or other earnings received, is without 
merit. We agree with the Supreme Court of the United States in its assessment of 
the controlling law in such an instance. Only AHW's unconditional offer of 
reinstatement would have tolled AHW's liability for back pay as of September 15, 
1989, and AHW's offer was clearly contingent on Ditsch's withdrawal of his 
handicap discrimination claims. Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm'n, 458 U.S. 219, 102 S. Ct. 3057, 73 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1982), on remand, 688 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1982). We also conclude the refusal of the hearing officer to 
deduct Ditsch's unemployment benefits from the back pay award was based on the 
majority rule and did not result in making Ditsch "more whole" than he would 
have been if he had not been the victim of a handicap discrimination. Nat'l 
Labor Relations Bd. v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 71 S. Ct. 337, 95 L. Ed. 337 
(1951). The hearing officer's refusal to require these deductions from the back 
pay award was lawful and was not otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

[¶33]   AHW's final claim of error is that 
there was an abuse of discretion by the hearing officer when he ordered AHW to 
develop and implement an affirmative action program to eliminate the 
preferential hiring of handicapped individuals. AHW relies on the general powers 
and duties of the Department of Employment as delineated in Wyo. Stat. § 
27-9-104(a) (1991) found in WFEPA. Specifically, AHW relies on subsection (iii), 
which provides that the Commission shall have the power and duty "to receive, 
investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging discrimination in employment * * 
* by a person, an employer * * * or the employees or members thereof." The 
operative portion of the statute, however, is Wyo. Stat. § 27-9-106(g) (1991), 
which provides (emphasis added):

Order 
of commission. 
- If upon all the evidence at a hearing, the commission may find that a 
respondent has engaged in or is engaging in any discriminatory or unfair 
employment practice as defined in this chapter, the commission shall * * * issue 
* * * an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist * * * and to take 
affirmative action, including hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees, 
with or without back pay * * * as in the judgment of the commission will 
effectuate the purposes of this chapter.

[¶34]   It is uncontroverted on the record 
that AHW hired only handicapped individuals for telemarketer positions. In 
response to this "reverse discrimination," the hearing officer ordered AHW to 
implement an affirmative action program not based on quotas, but upon good faith 
efforts to achieve equal employment opportunities for all persons. The language 
of Wyo. Stat. § 27-9-106(g) quoted above, is sufficiently broad to justify this 
aspect of the administrative hearing officer's order, and there was no abuse of 
his discretion.

[¶35]   We hold the Commission's final 
order of December 2, 1991 is supported by substantial evidence and is not 
arbitrary, capricious, in excess of statutory authority, or otherwise unlawful. 
The hearing officer correctly applied the law to the facts which appropriately 
were found.

[¶36]   The Findings of Facts, Conclusions 
of Law and Order by the Wyoming Fair Employment Commission of the Department of 
Employment of the State of Wyoming are affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 
Authority for certification now is encompassed by Wyo.R.App.P. 12.09(b) 
(effective November 1, 1992).