Case Title: State v. Shaw

Citation: 289 S.E.2d 325

Docket Number: 5A81

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1982-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
289 S.E.2d 325 (1982) STATE of North Carolina v. Morris Lee SHAW. No. 5A81. Supreme Court of North Carolina. March 30, 1982. *326 Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by Douglas A. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Lucien Capone III, Raleigh, for the State. Adam Stein, Appellate Defender, by James H. Gold, Asst. Appellate Defender, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant. MEYER, Justice. The basic question for review on this appeal is whether the physician-patient privilege against disclosure of confidential communications and information extends to optometrists. We conclude that it does not. Because of the trial judge's erroneous exclusion of testimony of the prosecuting witness's optometrist proffered by defendant, as privileged, defendant is entitled to a new trial. The evidence in brief summary tended to show that on the late night and early morning of 22-23 September 1980 the defendant lived with his wife Glenda and three of her sister's children in the home of her father, Thomas Boswell, age 62. The home was a six-room wood frame single-family house rented by Mr. Boswell located at 645 Elizabeth Street in Burlington. While defendant had his personal possessions there, he stayed there sometimes and sometimes he did not. After the defendant and his wife retired to their bedroom on the night of 22 September, they became embroiled in a heated argument. The argument was so loud that Glenda's father, Mr. Boswell, was disturbed and went to their room, and finding them fighting on the bed, admonished them to be quiet so that he could sleep and so as not to disturb the neighbors. Boswell then went back to his bed, but in about five minutes Glenda started shouting again and continued to shout, asking her father to make the defendant leave her alone. Mr. Boswell tried to ignore the shouting but finally got his single-barrel shotgun from beneath the head of his bed, went to Glenda's door and fired a shot into the floor. He then reloaded his shotgun and threw Glenda's door open and told defendant to get out of the house. He then shut the door. While close to the door, he overheard defendant say to Glenda, "If I can't stay here, I'll fix this mother so can't nobody else stay here." He heard the front door slam and things got quiet. This occurred around midnight. About 12:30 a. m., the defendant came back and crept in through a window and was discovered in the kitchen. He came out of the kitchen with "one of these little box opener tricks with a blade on it" in his hand. Mr. Boswell, shotgun in hand, backed up and told defendant to "get out of here." After some discussion and further shouting, defendant sped away in his burgundy 1978 Thunderbird. Mr. Boswell ordered one of the grandchildren to call the police and then went outside. He saw defendant's car come back up the street and park with its lights off in a church drive behind Boswell's home. About five minutes later defendant drove away with his lights off. Boswell, shotgun still in hand, then crept along the fence of the schoolhouse next door finally to a point about 36 to 40 feet from his back porch. *327 He heard a neighbor's dog barking and saw someone at the porch strike a match which lit a gasoline trail that ran up on the back porch. Flames enveloped that area of the house. This was about 1:15 a. m. or a little before. Boswell testified that he could see the defendant there "just as plain as day" when defendant lit the fire. Defendant was facing him. Then defendant ran and disappeared into the darkness. Boswell testified that he was shocked to see defendant burning the house. Glenda and the children got out of the house. The police arrived. The whole back porch was in a blaze. Firemen arrived later. A one-gallon plastic container with gasoline in it was found at the scene. Other witnesses corroborated much of Boswell's testimony. Boswell testified that he had no trouble with his vision in spite of being blind in his right eye. He wore glasses all the time and was wearing them at the time of the fire. He got them from Dr. Virgil Mewborn. Burlington Police Officer John Gibson testified to the effect that from his home he saw a 1978 or 1979 Thunderbird pull into the church yard which adjoins Boswell's house with its lights off. The car door opened and the interior light came on. The occupant of the car placed an object on the ground and drove away. The officer called headquarters and then investigated and found that the object was a one-gallon plastic container with an orange colored liquid in it that smelled like gasoline. He returned to his home and continued to watch it. He saw a black male walk to the container, pick it up, and walk off into the darkness. Within just two or three minutes, the fire began at Boswell's house. The container found at the fire scene was the one Officer Gibson saw in the church yard. The liquid in the container was subsequently analyzed and determined to be gasoline. A Burlington Fire Department employee took samples of wood from the house and they were analyzed and found to have gasoline on them. There was evidence from several witnesses that wood on the porch and around the window had actually burned or was charred. The defendant testified that he never threatened to burn the house, that he did not set the fire, had nothing to do with the incident, and was, in fact, some twenty or more miles away at the time of the fire. He also offered witnesses who corroborated his alibi evidence. The trial judge refused to allow the defendant to put on certain evidence concerning Boswell's eyesight by way of Boswell's optometrist as hereinafter set forth. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of arson in the first degree and defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant attempted to impeach Mr. Boswell's credibility through the testimony of Boswell's optometrist, Dr. Virgil Mewborn.[1] The pertinent part of the defendant's questioning of Dr. Mewborn, to which the State's objections were largely sustained, was as follows: Record at pages 47-49. In order to preserve the record, Dr. Mewborn testified out of the presence of the jury in summary as follows: He examined Boswell once in November 1975 and again in April 1979. In November 1975 Mr. Boswell's eyesight was corrected to 20/20 in both eyes by glasses. When he saw him on 9 April 1979, Boswell told Dr. Mewborn that he had lost the sight in his right eye three days earlier. That eye had only light perception and was functionally blind. Boswell's vision in his left eye or with both eyes was 20/200 without corrective lenses. Even with glasses, the best vision possible for Boswell through his left eye was between 20/25 and 20/30. With both eyes it was the same. Boswell's night vision would be somewhat reduced. He could not say how much it would be reduced at night. Dr. Mewborn also testified that it would be very difficult to see through Boswell's left lens at night because there was a foreign substance on that lens that would block light from coming through. He also testified that he had nothing in his records signed by Mr. Boswell authorizing the release of any information about Boswell's treatment. The trial court denied the defendant's motion that the jury be allowed to *329 hear Dr. Mewborn's voir dire testimony. The defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in denying this motion and in sustaining the State's objections to Dr. Mewborn's testimony. We agree. In spite of defense counsel's repeated effort to get the trial judge to stake himself out on the record as to his reason for excluding Dr. Mewborn's testimony, he refused to do so. However, we must conclude from the judge's question to counsel, "Aren't you going to run into some confidentiality?" that his reason was his belief that the testimony was barred by a confidential privilege.[2] We do not find in our reports any case in which a privilege has been found to exist in the optometrist-patient relationship. No such privilege existed at common law. In People v. Baker, 94 Mich.App. 365, 288 N.W.2d 430 (1979), the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's murder conviction based on the trial court's refusal to allow an optometrist to testify as to the results of an eye examination he performed on the only eyewitness to the shootings. That court said: 94 Mich.App. 365, 368, 288 N.W.2d 430, 431. No privilege was recognized at common law even for communications between physician and patient. State v. Martin, 182 N.C. 846, 109 S.E. 74 (1921). See also In re Farrow, 41 N.C.App. 680, 255 S.E.2d 777 (1979); 1 Stansbury's North Carolina Evidence § 63 Physician and patient (Brandis rev. 1973). Like numerous other states, North Carolina has by statute created such a privilege. G.S. § 8-53 provides as follows:[3] The physician-patient privilege is limited to those authorized to practice physic (i.e., medicine) or surgery. An optometrist is not a licensed physician and is not authorized to practice medicine or surgery. See G.S. § 90-18. The practice of optometry is clearly defined in G.S. § 90-114 as follows: The practice of optometry as therein defined specifically excludes surgery and does not in any sense include the practice of medicine as that term is defined in G.S. § 90-18. Even in the use or prescription of pharmaceutical agents,[4] other than topical pharmaceutical agents used for the purpose of examining the eye, an optometrist is required to communicate and collaborate with a physician, designated or agreed to by the patient, who is duly licensed to practice medicine in North Carolina. By statutory definition the practice of optometry by a legally licensed optometrist does not constitute the practice of medicine or surgery. G.S. § 90-18 provides in pertinent part as follows: We hold that the statutorily created physician-patient privilege is limited to those authorized to practice medicine or surgery and does not apply to optometrists. The State gave no other reason for the objection to Dr. Mewborn's testimony and we find none. We therefore conclude that the learned trial judge erred in denying the defendant's motion to admit the testimony of Dr. Mewborn taken on voir dire and in sustaining the State's objections to that testimony. Of the other questions brought forward on this appeal, only two present matters which are likely to recur on retrial. First, defendant contends that he was entitled to a directed verdict because he cannot be guilty of arson for the reason that he lived in the dwelling he is accused of burning that is, that the dwelling was not the "dwelling of another." Second, he contends that the trial judge erred in not charging the jury on attempt to commit arson. He argues that he was entitled to such an instruction because there was evidence of that lesser included offense from which the jury could find that, though he attempted to burn the dwelling, no part of the dwelling was ever actually "burned." We will now address those contentions for the benefit of the court and the parties on the retrial. Common law arson is the willful and malicious burning of the dwelling house of another person. State v. White, 288 N.C. *331 44, 215 S.E.2d 557 (1975). 3 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 345 (14th ed. 1980); A. Curtis, The Law of Arson § 1 (1936). Was the dwelling here "the dwelling house of another person"? We conclude that it was. The fact that defendant resided in the house does not, under the circumstances here, prevent his conviction for the arson of that dwelling. The dwelling in question was rented by Thomas E. Boswell. Mr. Boswell lived there with his twenty-two year old daughter, who is defendant's wife, and his three female grandchildren. "Sometimes [the defendant] was there and sometimes he wasn't." Defendant was living there on the evening of the fire and had all of his personal effects in the house. At best defendant can be considered no more than a joint occupant of the Boswell house. Moreover, at the time of the fire defendant had been forced at gunpoint to leave the house by Mr. Boswell. The defendant testified that, after leaving the Boswell house to avoid the police, he "was going to go out to my mother's house because I didn't have anywhere to stay that night." In State v. Jones,[5] Justice Exum said: 296 N.C. 75, 77-78, 248 S.E.2d 858, 860 (1978). See also State v. White, 288 N.C. 44, 215 S.E.2d 557. The rationale expressed by Justice Exum in Jones, to wit, the protection of persons who might be in the dwelling, is equally applicable to joint occupancy of a single dwelling unit as to separate apartments in the same building. The need for protection of Mr. Boswell, Glenda Shaw, and the three grandchildren was just as compelling, and perhaps more so, in this joint occupancy situation as it would have been had they been occupants of an adjoining apartment. The wisdom of applying that rationale to joint occupancy situations is highlighted by the facts of this case. At the time defendant is alleged to have set the fire and the entire rear of the house became engulfed in flames, it was occupied by Glenda Shaw and Boswell's three grandchildren. They were able to escape by running out the front door. Fortunately, police officer Mark Adams saw several females screaming and running towards him, called for help, and used his fire extinguisher in an attempt to extinguish the blaze until fire department personnel arrived. While there is some authority in older cases from other jurisdictions to the contrary,[6] we find the need for protection from willful and malicious burning of a dwelling house so compelling that we hold that the common law arson requirement that the dwelling burned be that of "another" is satisfied by a showing that some other person or persons, together with the defendant, were joint occupants of the same dwelling unit. The defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial judge failed to charge the jury on attempted arson despite defendant's request that he do so. Where there is evidence of defendant's guilt of a lesser degree of the crime set forth in the bill of indictment, the defendant is entitled to have the question submitted to the jury even in the absence of *332 a specific prayer for the instruction. State v. Moore, 300 N.C. 694, 268 S.E.2d 196 (1980). The felony of attempt to commit arson is a lesser included offense of the crime of arson. G.S. § 15-170 provides: "Upon the trial of any indictment the prisoner may be convicted of the crime charged therein or of a less degree of the same crime, or an attempt to commit the crime so charged, or of an attempt to commit a less degree of the same crime." The provisions of this statute in regard to conviction of a lesser degree of the same crime charged in the bill of indictment applies only where there is some evidence that a less degree of the crime has been committed. If there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that there was an actual "burning" of the Boswell house, and if there is no credible evidence from which the jury could find an attempt to burn which failed, defendant would not be entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of attempt to commit arson.[7] The evidence as to the burning came from several sources.[8] Thomas Boswell testified, inter alia, that: Craig Yarborough, a Captain of the Burlington Fire Department, who examined the house the following morning, testified: When asked by the Court "What was burned?" Captain Yarborough answered, "The wall boarding," and also testified: Mark Adams, a Burlington police officer, testified: Specifically with regard to the necessity of showing an actual burning, the trial judge correctly charged the jury in part as follows: To satisfy the proof of a "burning" it is not necessary that the building be wholly consumed or even materially damaged. It is sufficient if any part, however small, is consumed. A building is burned within the common law definition of arson when it is charred. State v. Rogers, 168 N.C. 112, 83 S.E. 161 (1914); State v. Hall, 93 N.C. 571 (1885); State v. Sandy, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 570 (1843). See also 6A C.J.S. Arson § 10; 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arson and Related Offenses § 7; Annot., 1 A.L.R. 1163 (1919); 5A Words and Phrases, "Burning" at 590. In the case before us, we find positive testimony that some of the wooden parts of the dwelling were actually burned or charred. If there is no evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that there was an attempt to burn which failed, defendant is not entitled to an instruction on attempted arson. 4 N.C. Index 3d, Criminal Law § 115 (1976). The principle was very well expressed by Justice Lake in State v. Lampkins[9] as follows: 286 N.C. 497, 504, 212 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1975). See also State v. Moore, 300 N.C. 694, 268 S.E.2d 196; State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 202 S.E.2d 750 (1974); State v. Jarrette, 284 N.C. 625, 202 S.E.2d 721 (1974); State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 551, 187 S.E.2d 111 (1972); State v. Carnes, 279 N.C. 549, 184 S.E.2d 235 (1971); State v. Murry, 277 N.C. 197, 176 S.E.2d 738 (1970); State v. Smith, 201 N.C. 494, 160 S.E. 577 (1931); 4 N.C. Index 3d, Criminal Law § 115. Shaw's defense in this case was an alibi that he was not present when the crime occurred. He testified that on the night in question, at the hour in question, he was at his mother's house, some twenty miles away and that he and his sister's boyfriend, James Graves, did not leave his mother's house until about 1:40 p. m., and then went to a private club in Hillsborough. James Graves took the stand and corroborated defendant's testimony in this regard. The defendant's mother testified that at the critical time he was at her home. His defense was that he could not have committed any degree of the crime charged because he was not even in the area when it happened. If the jury believed defendant's evidence, he could not be guilty of the crime of arson nor any lesser included offense. In State v. Noell, the State's witness testified that the defendant had raped her. Noell testified that he had never even seen her prior to the trial. Justice Moore there said: 284 N.C. 670, 699, 202 S.E.2d 750, 769. State v. Green, 298 N.C. 793, 259 S.E.2d 904 (1979), cited by the defendant, is clearly distinguishable. In Green the defendant told the police that he was at the scene of the fire and in fact attempted to set a fire at the front door of the house. The occupants testified that they discovered the fire at the back door on the porch and that they escaped through the front door. There was no evidence that any fire was found at or near the defendant's location, that is, at the front door. While we find ample evidence of an actual burning, we find no evidence of an attempt to burn which failed. We therefore conclude that there is no evidence in the record from which the jury could have found that defendant was guilty of an attempt to commit arson, and therefore defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on that lesser included offense. The defendant cites two cases, State v. Arnold, 285 N.C. 751, 208 S.E.2d 646 (1974), and, State v. Arnold, 264 N.C. 348, 141 S.E.2d 473 (1965), for the proposition that *335 defendant could be lawfully convicted of attempted arson under facts he considers similar to those of this case. In the Rudolph Arnold case, the defendant was charged only with attempted arson. In the Vesta Ray Arnold case, the defendant was charged with both offenses. The indictment for attempted arson was quashed for several technical errors and defendant was tried on the arson indictment. However, at the beginning of the trial the solicitor announced that the State would seek a verdict of guilty of only the lesser included offense of attempt to commit arson. Both of the Arnold cases concerned the crime of attempt to commit arson. That is not the question here and we do not find those cases apposite. Here we are concerned with whether the evidence supports the verdict of guilty of arson. For the trial judge's error in excluding testimony of the prosecuting witness's optometrist proffered by the defendant to impeach the credibility of Mr. Boswell, the only eyewitness to the actual setting of the fire, defendant is entitled to a NEW TRIAL. MITCHELL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] Dr. Mewborn, a licensed optometrist in North Carolina since 1967, testified that he never studied medicine. [2] Even if such a privilege existed we fail to find in the record any claims of privilege by Mr. Boswell or any inquiry by the court or the District Attorney of Mr. Boswell as to whether he claimed the privilege. The privilege is that of the patient alone and cannot be asserted by any other person. The individual to whom the privilege belongs may of course waive it, either expressly or by implication. Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 22, 116 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1960); see also State v. Martin, 182 N.C. 846, 109 S.E. 74 (1921). [3] For a general synopsis, see 50 N.C.L.Rev. 630 (1972). [4] By the enactment of Chapter 482 of the 1977 Session Laws, the Legislature authorized optometrists, inter alia, to employ pharmaceutical agents for the purpose of "investigating, examining, treating, diagnosing or correcting visual defects or abnormal conditions of the human eye or its adnexa." [5] In Jones, defendant was convicted of arson for the burning of his own apartment, which he shared with another man in a homosexual relationship, and which was located in a building in which there were three other occupied apartments. [6] See A. Curtis, The Law of Arson §§ 42, 43, 49 (1936); R. Perkins, On Criminal Law, ch. 3, § 2 at 226 (2d ed. 1969); Annot., 17 A.L.R. 1168, 1169 (1922); State v. Young, 153 Mo. 445, 55 S.W. 82 (1900); Shepherd v. The People, 19 N.Y. (5 Smith) 537 (1859). See also People v. De Winton, 113 Cal. 403, 45 P. 708 (1896); State v. Kenna, 63 Conn. 329, 28 A. 522 (1893). [7] We find too frequently that the question of whether a part of the structure was actually consumed by the flames arises for the first time in the appellate courts. This could easily be avoided by the prosecutor's eliciting direct testimony that a part of the structure was in fact consumed by the flames, charred, or terms of like meaning. [8] While all of the quoted testimony relates to the fire, those portions underlined refer specifically to areas of the house actually "burned" or "charred." [9] In Lampkins, the prosecutrix testified that she had been raped and the defendant testified he had never had intercourse with her, and that he never touched her after leaving the house at which they were party guests. The Court there held that this was evidence that the defendant committed neither the crime of rape nor any lesser included offense.