Case Title: Cockburn v. Terra Resources, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cockburn v. Terra Resources, Inc.1990 WY 69794 P.2d 1334Case Number: 89-161Decided: 06/29/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
MICHAEL DEAN COCKBURN AND 
MELINDA "MICKIE" K. COCKBURN, 

APPELLANTS 
(PLAINTIFFS),

v.

TERRA RESOURCES, INC., A 
DELAWARE CORPORATION; AND GEORGE OGDEN, APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Park County, Gary P. Hartman, J.

Daniel M. Hesse, 
Meyer & Williams, P.C., Jackson, for 
appellants.

Michael K. 
Davis, Redle, Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, for appellee 
Terra.

Robert D. Olson 
and James M. Guill, Goppert, Olson & Guill, Cody, for appellee 
Ogden.

Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The question 
common to all the errors asserted in this appeal is whether the record 
demonstrates genuine issues of material fact that require a jury trial. The 
claimed issues of material fact relate to the retention of control by an 
operator of an oil and gas lease over the premises or the details of the work, 
resulting in its liability to an injured worker employed by the drilling firm, 
and the culpable negligence of a supervising co-employee of the injured worker. 
Michael Dean Cockburn and his wife, Melinda "Mickie" K. Cockburn, (Cockburn) 
contended that there were genuine issues of material fact relating to the 
retention of control by Terra Resources, Inc. (Terra), the operator of the oil 
and gas lease, arising out of the provisions of the drilling contract and the 
actual assumption of the power to direct the details of the work of employees of 
the driller. Cockburn also asserted that the record demonstrated genuine issues 
of material fact with respect to the culpable negligence of George Ogden 
(Ogden), the driller on the rig on which Cockburn was employed. The district 
court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to either 
the retention or exercise of control by Terra or the culpable negligence on the 
part of Ogden, and it entered a summary judgment in favor of both defendants. 
Our examination of the record in the light of pertinent authority persuades the 
court that the district court properly entered the summary judgment in favor of 
both Terra and Ogden. We affirm the summary judgment.

[¶2]      In the Cockburn 
brief, the following issues are stated:

"Is it error for the 
trial court to grant summary judgment to the operator of an oil well where the 
operator of the well, who has employed an `independent contractor,' retains 
control over the details of operations performed on a daywork 
basis?

"Is summary judgment 
precluded where the operator of an oil well departs from an independent 
contractor relationship and assumes the power to direct the details of the work 
of employees of the independent contractor?

"Where a co-employee 
charged with supervisory duties has knowledge of a hazardous condition and fails 
to correct it, does a genuine issue of material fact exist regarding his 
culpable negligence, and is the granting of summary judgment in his favor 
proper?"

Terra, as 
appellee, rephrases those issues that pertain to it in this 
way:

"Is a well owner or 
operator such as Terra who contracts with an independent drilling contractor 
responsible to the drilling contractor's employees for defects in the drilling 
contractor's equipment causing injury to the employees?"

Ogden restated 
the issue pertaining to him as follows:

"Did any genuine issue of 
material fact exist regarding whether or not appellee was culpably negligent 
which precluded the Court from granting Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Judgment?"

[¶3]      On April 30, 
1986, Cockburn was working for Shelby Drilling, Inc. (Shelby) as a drilling hand 
on "Shelby Rig 56" in Park County, Wyoming. Cockburn and the other members of 
the crew on the rig were "tripping out" the drilling pipe in the well. This 
process involves drawing the drilling pipe from the well hole; unscrewing it 
into appropriate lengths; and then "stacking" the sections of drill pipe 
vertically in a rack on the drilling rig with the bottom end placed in a device 
called an "alligator tail" or "gator back." Each "stand" of pipe is normally 
between eighty-five to ninety feet in length and weighs approximately a ton. In 
colder climates such as Wyoming, the pipe is stacked on "alligator tails" so 
that the bottom end is kept open to permit drainage of water and drilling fluids 
from the pipe. If this vertical stacking does not occur, ice can form in a stand 
of pipe, resulting in a dangerous condition when the pipe is later inserted into 
the well hole and re-pressurized. The procedure of "tripping out" the pipe is a 
routine operation for experienced oil field workers, and it normally creates 
very little danger or concern.

[¶4]      "Alligator tails" 
are most often made from sections of pipe that have been split longitudinally. 
Metal rods, called "ears" or "tri-pegs," then are welded to the upturned 
circumference of the pipe. The name is derived from the resemblance of these 
devices to the bumpy back of an alligator when the racks are laid with the 
"ears" up. The "alligator tails" on Shelby Rig 56 were of a different design, 
however. Instead of using pipe that had been split in half, those alligator 
tails utilized a full pipe. Two pieces of the pipe were welded together, and the 
metal "ears" were attached on one side of the welded device. This style of 
"alligator tail" does not have the rough contact points that the split pipe 
version has and, apparently, is more prone to sliding.

[¶5]      At the time of 
Cockburn's accident, he was on the floor of the rig approximately sixteen feet 
above the ground. A section of drill pipe was being "stabbed," that is stacked, 
onto one of these modified "alligator tails;" the device slipped; and it pinned 
Cockburn's leg between the "alligator tail" and the pipe. The "alligator tails," 
which were owned and maintained by Shelby, were not secured to the rig floor in 
any fashion. Cockburn, the "alligator tail," and the entire "stand" of pipe then 
slid approximately nineteen feet down the "beaver slide" to the ground. The 
"beaver slide" is a metal access ramp running from the ground up to the floor of 
the rig. A set of doors, known as "V-doors," was installed at the top of the 
beaver slide, but was open at the time of Cockburn's injury. Cockburn suffered 
injuries to his shoulder and knee in the accident.

[¶6]      On April 30, 
1987, Cockburn, with his wife as co-plaintiff, filed his action against Terra 
and Ogden. The complaint alleged that Terra had retained control over the 
operation of the drilling rig and over the Shelby employees and that both Terra 
and Ogden were culpably negligent. On January 9, 1989, Terra filed a motion for 
summary judgment contending that it owed no duty of care to Cockburn that would 
justify a finding of liability under the circumstances of the case. Ogden filed 
a motion for summary judgment as well in which he contended that his conduct did 
not rise to the level of culpable negligence. The district court, upon reviewing 
the materials submitted by all parties in support of, and opposition to, the 
motions for summary judgment, found no genuine issue of material fact and ruled 
that both Terra and Ogden were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Cockburn's appeal is from the summary judgment that was 
entered.

[¶7]      The materials in 
the record demonstrate that Shelby was hired as an independent contractor by 
Terra and that Shelby's obligations under the contract included the duty to 
provide a drilling rig, all related equipment, and the materials and labor 
necessary to operate the rig. Terra, according to the record, is an investment 
company engaged in the business of obtaining oil and gas leases, contracting for 
the completion of drill holes, and producing oil and gas from wells where those 
minerals are found.

[¶8]      Terra, as 
Operator, and Shelby, as Contractor, entered into a written drilling contract. 
It spoke to the relationship between Shelby and Terra in this 
language:

"14. INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIP:

"14.1 Contractor shall be 
an independent contractor with respect to all work hereunder and neither 
contractor nor anyone employed by contractor shall be deemed for any purpose to 
be the employee, agent, or representative of Operator in the performance of any 
work or service or any part thereof in any manner dealt with hereunder. Operator 
shall have no direction or control of Contractor or its employees and agents 
except in the results to be obtained. The work contemplated herein shall meet 
the approval of the Operator and be subject to the general right of inspection 
herein provided for Operator to secure the satisfactory completion 
thereof.

"14.2 The actual 
performance and superintendence of all work hereunder shall be by Contractor, 
but Operator or its representatives shall have unlimited access to the premises 
to determine whether work is being performed by Contractor in accordance with 
all of the provisions of this agreement."

The contract 
also provided that Shelby was required to maintain worker's compensation 
coverage. Shelby was to be paid for its services under the contract on either a 
"footage" or a "daywork" basis. With respect to the payment for "footage" or 
"daywork," a segment of the contract that is pertinent to Cockburn's argument, 
the contractual language reads:

"3. BASIS OF 
COMPENSATION:

* * * * * 
*

"3.2 The term `daywork' 
shall be defined as, and apply to, the work performed by Contractor at direction 
of Operator (* * *) at a stipulated rate per day as distinguished from work for 
which Contractor is compensated at a stipulated rate per foot of hole drilled. 
For purposes hereof and subject to Paragraph 14 of the Drilling Contract, the 
term `daywork basis' means Contractor shall furnish equipment and labor and 
perform services as herein provided, for a specified sum per day. When operating 
on a daywork basis, Contractor shall be fully paid at the applicable rates of 
payment and assumes only the obligations and liabilities stated herein. Except 
for liabilities and obligations specifically assumed by Contractor, Operator 
shall be solely responsible and assumes liability for all consequences of 
operations of both parties while on a daywork basis, including results and all 
other risks or liabilities incurred in or incident to such operations. When work 
is performed on daywork basis, provisions of this Agreement applicable to 
drilling on a footage basis shall not apply.

"3.3 For purposes hereof, 
the term `footage basis' means Contractor shall furnish the equipment and labor 
and perform services as herein provided to drill a well or wells to the contract 
footage depth specified to earn and be paid at the stipulated price per foot of 
hole drilled. While drilling on a footage basis, Contractor shall direct, advise 
and control drilling operations and assumes certain liabilities to the extent 
specifically provided for herein. For work performed on a footage basis, 
contractor's compensation shall be calculated by multiplying the rate agreed 
upon by linear footage or hole drilled. Such linear footage or hole drilled 
shall be determined in the manner specified in the drilling order. 
Notwithstanding the above provisions, while drilling on a footage basis, the 
following work shall nevertheless be performed on a daywork 
basis.

"a. All drilling below 
the contract footage depth, * * *."

Shelby further 
agreed to carry insurance that would protect any of its employees who were not 
covered by the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

[¶9]      Cockburn and 
Terra are in accord that Shelby had reached the contract footage depth and was 
being compensated for "daywork" at the time Cockburn was injured. Cockburn 
contends, and Terra disputes, that this shift from "footage" to "daywork" 
compensation adjusts responsibility under the contract for the safety of 
Shelby's employees while Shelby was being compensated for "daywork." The 
contract does not address this subject specifically, but it does include a 
clause pursuant to which Shelby, without regard to the negligence of any party, 
agrees to indemnify Terra against all claims arising in connection with injury 
or death accruing to any of its employees. A similar clause was incorporated in 
favor of Shelby with respect to claims asserted by Terra 
employees.

[¶10]   It is customary in the oil business 
for operators to leave a "company man" on the job site to monitor the progress 
of drilling activities. This case is no exception, and Terra had a 
representative present at the drilling site. The record does not disclose that 
this representative ever took any affirmative action with regard to the drilling 
rig or, specifically, the "alligator tails" or that he ever gave any instruction 
or guidance to the rig hands. Furthermore, the record does not demonstrate that 
the Terra representative assumed, or indicated that he would assume, any duty to 
conduct safety inspections. It is clear that he was not at the drill site when 
Cockburn was injured.

[¶11]   Ogden was the "tool pusher" on this 
particular job. He was a Shelby employee, and his position was similar to that 
of a "lead man" or a "foreman." In his capacity, he maintained overall 
supervisory responsibility with respect to the crew and had discretionary 
authority to hire or fire workers as necessary. One of his primary 
responsibilities was to be aware of any unsafe conditions and to remedy those 
conditions as soon as possible. The deposition testimony and the other materials 
in the record demonstrate that Ogden attempted to carry out his duties by making 
periodic safety inspections. At the time of Cockburn's injury, Ogden was 
Cockburn's supervisor and was familiar with the modified "alligator tails" that 
were in use. Cockburn contends that Ogden had been advised prior to the accident 
of the dangers surrounding these devices, but he kept them in service despite 
this advice. The crew which was on the job, known in the oil fields as a 
"tower," consisted entirely of competent and experienced 
workers.

[¶12]   Cockburn endeavored to establish 
liability on the part of Terra by two separate, but related, theories. The first 
theory advances the proposition that, when an operator retains or exercises a 
degree of control over the premises where the work is being performed, the 
operator is liable for its own negligence with respect to an injured worker even 
though the injured worker is directly employed and supervised by an independent 
contractor in performing the work that he was hired to do. See Ruhs v. Pacific 
Power & Light Company, 671 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1982); Stephenson v. Pacific 
Power & Light Company, 779 P.2d 1169 (Wyo. 1989); Jones v. Chevron USA, 
Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986). Cockburn claims that Terra retained the control 
alluded to in the cited cases and was negligent by failing to provide him with a 
safe place to work. Cockburn argues that liability attaches to Terra under these 
circumstances even though, concededly, he was employed and by an independent 
contractor and was performing the work the contractor was hired to do. The 
second theory relies upon vicarious liability and suggests that the retention, 
or exercise, of control over the details of the operations by Terra results in 
it not only being liable for its independent negligence, but also vicariously 
liable for the negligence of Shelby. See Stephenson; Jones. Under either of 
these contentions, actual control, or a retained right of control, is essential 
to liability and, in the absence of evidence of such control, the Cockburns' 
case against Terra fails as a matter of law. Hill v. Pacific Power & Light 
Company, 765 P.2d 1348 (Wyo. 1988); Jones.

[¶13]   In arguing that there exist genuine 
issues of fact with respect to the retention of control by Terra, Cockburn first 
relies upon the provisions of the contract between Terra and Shelby. The crux of 
the argument is that, whatever the situation might be with respect to the 
"footage" provisions of the contract, whenever Shelby was being compensated on a 
"daywork" basis, the contract provided that Terra retained the right, and is 
charged with the obligation, to control the work and the rig. Cockburn points to 
the material in the record in which Terra's representative admitted to 
maintaining "complete control" over the rig under "daywork" conditions. Cockburn 
also relies upon the provision in the drilling contract that defined when the 
parties were operating on a "daywork" basis and insists that the "daywork" 
provision of the contract imposed affirmative duties for safety upon Terra 
whenever work was being accomplished as "daywork."

[¶14]   We have scrutinized the drilling 
contract and have failed to discover a provision applicable while "daywork" 
operations were being conducted that, even implicitly, retained the right of 
control over the details of the work for Terra, or imposed any duty upon it in 
favor of Cockburn, that was any different from the situation during "footage" 
operations. Neither is there anything that demonstrates an independent duty of 
Terra to provide for the safety of Shelby employees. We are in accord with the 
ruling of the district court, contrary to the Cockburn position, that the 
"footage" and "daywork" clauses of the contract demonstrate nothing more than a 
mechanism from which the compensation due Shelby was to be determined, and they 
do not manifest any intention to assign control over the details of the work to 
Terra.

[¶15]   Cockburn identifies particular 
phrases in the agreement that, in his view, serve to indicate that Terra 
retained, or was responsible for, control over the details of the work allocated 
to Shelby. Cockburn specifically relies upon paragraph 3.2, under the title 
"Basis of Compensation," which states that the "[t]erm `daywork' shall be 
defined as, * * *, the work performed by Contractor at direction of 
Operator (* * *) at a stipulated rate per day as distinguished from work for 
which Contractor is compensated at a stipulated rate per foot of hole drilled" 
(emphasis added by Cockburn). In addition, Cockburn points to the language that 
states "[e]xcept for liabilities and obligations specifically assumed by 
Contractor, Operator shall be solely responsible and assumes liability for all 
consequences of operations of both parties while on a daywork basis." The 
material first quoted that Cockburn relies upon does nothing more than define a 
method of compensation, and the reasonable interpretation of the emphasized 
language within that phrase is that the language clarifies that the work to be 
performed at "daywork" rates specifically is only that work ordered or requested 
and, therefore, "directed" by Terra. See Marathon Oil Company v. Kleppe, 407 F. Supp. 1301 (D.Wyo. 1975), aff'd 556 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1977) (common sense and 
good faith essential elements of contract construction). Considering the 
drilling contract as a whole, as our rules demand, the contention by Cockburn 
that the four words taken out of context granted to Terra some right, or imposed 
some obligation, to control the details of the operation is untenable. In 
effect, it structures a conflict with other terms found in the agreement. See 
Hensley v. Williams, 726 P.2d 90 (Wyo. 1986); Rossi v. Percifield, 527 P.2d 819 
(Wyo. 1974). If Cockburn's analysis was strictly applied, the "daywork" 
provisions would be in effect only when work was being conducted under the 
control of Terra, but paragraph 3.3, which defines the conditions under which 
"daywork" compensation accrues, mandates numerous circumstances, including the 
event actually occurring, that is attainment of the total footage depth provided 
for in the contract, pursuant to which the "daywork" compensation base would be 
triggered although no control was exercised by Terra. We recognize this 
conflict, and we also recognize that the better construction of a contract is 
one pursuant to which each provision is given a reasonable meaning in light of 
the parties' purpose and intent. Hensley; State v. Moncrief, 720 P.2d 470 (Wyo. 
1986); Rouse v. Munroe, 658 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1983). We reject Cockburn's argument 
in this regard.

[¶16]   In addition, we conclude that the 
second part of paragraph 3.2 alluded to by Cockburn speaks for itself in 
including the phrase, "[e]xcept for liabilities and obligations specifically 
assumed by Contractor." In the rest of the drilling contract, Shelby has agreed 
to provide all necessary labor and has agreed to maintain adequate insurance, 
both worker's compensation and private, to protect the workers it hires. In 
addition, Shelby has agreed to indemnify Terra for any claims brought by its 
employees. These terms, among others, manifest a clear intention of the parties 
that Shelby was to assume the liabilities and obligations pertaining to workers 
for this job. See Marathon.

[¶17]   We have not ignored the testimony 
by Terra's representative, in his deposition, that he maintained "complete 
control" over the rig during "daywork" operations. Beyond this comment, the 
record does not contain any evidence of any measure of actual control over the 
details of the work assumed by Terra. The testimony, again out of context, does 
not serve to structure any genuine issue of material fact. We recognize a very 
clever course of questioning addressed to the "company man" but, instead of 
eliciting any fact, that questioning simply evoked an opinion addressing an 
ultimate issue of law. Under Rule 704, W.R.E., the fact that opinion testimony 
addresses an ultimate issue no longer serves as an absolute bar to its 
admissibility, or to consideration by this court in the context of a summary 
judgment, because opinion is admissible at trial if it is reliable and helpful. 
McCabe v. R.A. Manning Construction Company, Inc., 674 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 1983). The 
context of this questioning, however, suggests a somewhat unique problem, and 
likely would preclude that testimony from being admitted at trial for the 
purposes which it allegedly serves in the context of summary judgment. The 
problem is significant because, in considering whether a genuine issue of 
material fact is demonstrated by the record in a case in which a summary 
judgment has been granted, we consider only evidence that would be admissible at 
trial and thus have some impact upon a factual determination. Hayes v. American 
National Bank of Powell, 784 P.2d 599 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶18]   In this case, control is relevant 
only insofar as it serves to establish a duty owed by Terra to Cockburn that, in 
turn, will support liability if the duty is breached. The existence of such a 
duty is a question of law to be determined by the court. Pickle v. Board of 
County Commissioners of County of Platte, 764 P.2d 262 (Wyo. 1988); Ely v. Kirk, 
707 P.2d 706 (Wyo. 1985); Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276 
(Wyo. 1983). The existence of control, or a right of control, is tantamount to 
establishing a duty in the context of cases like this, and testimony which 
simply offers a conclusion on that aspect of the duty, even if perceived as 
reliable, does nothing more than invade the province of the court. Opinion 
testimony that invades the province of the court is not to be counted as 
helpful. Notwithstanding the provision of Rule 704, W.R.E., a conclusion such as 
the one offered in the testimony by Terra's "company man" cannot be considered 
as evidence that tends to establish a genuine issue of material 
fact.

[¶19]   Essentially, the same testimony is 
relied upon to demonstrate an actual rather than a retained, or reserved, right 
of control by Terra. The testimony is not helpful in that regard for the same 
reason that we have articulated with respect to its impact upon the contractual 
interpretation.

[¶20]   The language of the drilling 
contract is clear and unambiguous and, thus, no genuine issues of material fact 
arise from it that demand determination by a jury. See Cliff & Company, Ltd. 
v. Anderson, 777 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1989); Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1987). 
We then consider the appropriate construction of the contractual language and 
hold that it does not demonstrate any retained control over the details of the 
operation by Terra. We note again that these parties agreed that "[c]ontractor 
shall be an independent contractor with respect to all work hereunder * * *." 
When the plain language of this term of the contract is applied, this agreement 
demonstrates the intent and understanding of the parties that Shelby was to be 
an independent contractor for all work performed without regard to whether it 
was performed on a "daywork" or a "footage" basis. Marathon; True Oil Company v. 
Sinclair Oil Corporation, 771 P.2d 781 (Wyo. 1989); State v. Pennzoil Company, 
752 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1988). The effect of this feature of the contract was to 
assign to Shelby the control over the details of the work that it agreed to 
perform pursuant to the contract.

[¶21]   In addition, the parties expressly 
agreed that "neither contractor nor anyone employed by contractor shall be 
deemed for any purpose to be the employee, agent, or representative of Operator 
in the performance of any work or service or any part thereof in any manner 
dealt with hereunder" and that "[o]perator shall have no direction or control of 
Contractor or its employees and agents except in the results to be obtained." 
The record contains no evidence that is contrary to the faithful observance of 
these conditions by Shelby and Terra, and the situation thus fits our earlier 
cases that hold that a contract such as this drilling contract defines the 
relationship actually existing between the parties and that the relationship was 
that of an employer and an independent contractor. See Stephenson; Noonan v. 
Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160 (Wyo. 1986); Combined Insurance Company of America v. 
Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034 (Wyo. 1978).

[¶22]   Our examination of this record 
results in agreement with the district court that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact with respect to the retention by Terra of control over the details 
of the work performed by Shelby. Further, Terra did not retain or exercise such 
control as a matter of fact. Consequently, we hold, as a matter of law, that the 
district court committed no error in granting summary judgment on the Cockburn 
claim of direct liability on the part of Terra. Ramsey v. Pacific Power & 
Light Company, 792 P.2d 1385 (1990).

[¶23]   Addressing Cockburn's claim that 
Terra was vicariously liable for Shelby's negligence, we follow our 
consideration of a similar issue in Hill v. Pacific Power & Light Company, 
765 P.2d 1348 (Wyo. 1988). In that case, Pacific Power & Light Company had 
hired an independent contractor to furnish specified services under an express 
contract. PP & L was to identify the work to be accomplished and to instruct 
North American Energy Services Corporation (NESCO), the independent contractor, 
on how PP & L wanted the work completed. NESCO was to employ and direct the 
workers needed to accomplish the work and to retain the right to control the 
workers it hired. Further, NESCO was obligated to maintain worker's compensation 
coverage. PP & L did retain the right to inspect the work performed by the 
employees of the independent contractor. There were some factors of the 
situation in that instance that involved PP & L more in the work being 
accomplished than Terra was in this instance. Even so, this court, having 
afforded every beneficial inference to the injured workman, see Matter of 
Larsen, 770 P.2d 1089 (Wyo. 1989), affirmed a summary judgment in that case 
holding that the actions attributed to PP & L, as a matter of law, were 
sufficient indicators of control over the sub-contractor or its employees nor 
adequate evidence of an assumption of affirmative duties regarding safety. The 
situation disclosed by the record did not present facts sufficient to refute the 
general rule that the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for 
the negligence of the contractor. Stephenson, 779 P.2d 1169; 
Jones.

[¶24]   In the Pacific Power & Light 
case, we affirmed the proposition that "the owner of the workplace, who employs 
an independent contractor and `retains the right to direct the manner of an 
independent contractor's performance or assumes affirmative duties with respect 
to safety owes a duty of reasonable care to an employee of the independent 
contractor even if the employee is injured doing the very work the [independent] 
contractor was hired to perform.'" Hill, 765 P.2d  at 1349 (emphasis added), 
quoting Jones, 718 P.2d  at 896; Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189 
(1933). We clarified, however, this proposition by also invoking the rule that 
the owner "must retain more than the general right to order the contractors to 
stop work, to inspect the progress of the work, to make recommendations thereon, 
or to prescribe alterations or deviations in the work" in order to impose 
liability under that rule. Hill, 765 P.2d  at 1350; Stockwell v. Parker Drilling 
Company, Inc., 733 P.2d 1029 (Wyo. 1987). The product of our precedent is that 
an employer of an independent contractor, although potentially responsible for 
injuries to employees of the contractor, must assume a controlling and pervasive 
role in the work being done in order to generate any duty of care sufficient to 
establish vicarious liability for the negligence of the independent contractor. 
See Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶25]   Under the standard that is applied, 
we discern no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the question of 
vicarious liability for the conduct of Shelby in this instance and conclude that 
summary judgment appropriately was granted to Terra as a matter of law. See 
Larsen, 770 P.2d 1089; Robinson v. Bell, 767 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1989); Baldwin v. 
Dube, 751 P.2d 388 (Wyo. 1988). In arriving at our holding, we agree that Hill 
is controlling with respect to vicarious liability accruing to an employer of an 
independent contractor. The control essential to a finding of liability on a 
theory of vicarious liability differs in that the control must exist with 
respect to the worker involved in the injury. Our search of the record in this 
regard then is only for genuine issues of fact relating to any right retained by 
Terra to assume control over the details of the work that Shelby agreed to 
perform in the sense that it could direct the actions of Shelby employees. See 
Noonan, 713 P.2d 160; Scott v. Fagan, 684 P.2d 805 (1984). Ordinarily, such a 
question "is a question of fact for the jury and becomes one of law only when 
but one inference can be drawn." Stephenson, 779 P.2d 1176; Noonan; Combined; 
and Holly Sugar Corporation v. Perez, 508 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 
1973).

[¶26]   We note that, in asserting the 
vicarious liability theory, Cockburn relies upon the same factual contentions 
invoked in support of the issue of independent negligence. The only difference 
is the argument that the control retained by Terra resulted in its being a 
vicarious employer of Shelby workers. This is a distinction without any 
difference and does not justify the conclusion that a genuine issue of fact is 
presented under either theory. We have not been able to identify from the record 
any retention of control by Terra beyond a "general right to order the 
contractors to stop work, to inspect the progress of the work, to make 
recommendations thereon, or to prescribe alterations or deviations to the work." 
Hill, 765 P.2d 1350; Stockwell. We agree with the district court that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Terra's vicarious liability. 
We premise that conclusion upon the absence of evidence that Terra had a 
controlling and pervasive role in the work being accomplished. We hold, as a 
matter of law, that summary judgment appropriately was entered in favor of Terra 
on the theory of vicarious liability.

[¶27]   This leaves Cockburn's claim that 
there exist genuine issues of material fact with respect to culpable negligence 
on the part of Ogden. In this claim also, Cockburn must demonstrate either a 
genuine issue of material fact or that summary judgment was not proper as a 
matter of law. See Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188 (Wyo. 1989); Poulos v. HPC, Inc., 
765 P.2d 364 (Wyo. 1988). Cockburn's claim is that there exists a genuine issue 
of material fact. In resolving this contention, we do afford Cockburn the 
benefit of every favorable inference, and the benefit of every reasonable doubt, 
regarding the existence of such a fact. Larsen; Roth v. First Security Bank of 
Rock Springs, 684 P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶28]   As Cockburn's supervisor, Ogden had 
a duty to provide a safe workplace. Stephenson; Case; Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981). Cockburn still must demonstrate more than ordinary lack 
of due care resulting in a breach of that duty to justify a recovery. 
Stephenson. Cockburn must demonstrate that Ogden was culpably negligent. Section 
27-12-103(a), W.S. 1977; Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1989); Case; 
Poulos.

[¶29]   Culpable negligence invokes 
standards much more rigorous than the requirements for approving mere negligence 
and has been commonly defined as willful and serious misconduct. Brebaugh v. 
Hales, 788 P.2d 1128 (Wyo. 1990); Case; Stundon v. Sterling, 736 P.2d 317 (Wyo. 
1987); Barnette. In the context of this definition, "willful" means conduct that 
"is done purposely, with knowledge - or misconduct of such a character as to 
evince a reckless disregard of consequences." Case, 776 P.2d  at 191; Bryant v. 
Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Wyo. 1986), quoting Hamilton v. Swigart Coal 
Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203, 206, 149 A.L.R. 998 (1943). The factor that is 
most significant in distinguishing willful misconduct from ordinary negligence 
is the state of mind of the accused tortfeasor. Brebaugh; Baros; Case. "[T]o 
prove that an actor has engaged in willful misconduct, one must demonstrate that 
he acted with a state of mind that approaches intent to do harm." Bryant, 728 P.2d  at 1136. Willful misconduct has to be "more than mere mistake resulting 
from inexperience, excitement or confusion, and more than mere thoughtlessness 
or inadventure, or simple inattention." Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 191 
(Wyo. 1979); Mitchell v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 317, 100 P.2d 102 
(1940).

[¶30]   Even so, the standard is not so 
demanding that it is necessary to demonstrate that the act was committed with an 
actual intent to cause injury or damage before recovery can be granted. 
Danculovich. Recklessness that manifests a callous disregard for the 
consequences is sufficient. In accordance with this last articulation and, 
further, because a state of mind is generally difficult to prove, willful 
misconduct can be established by "demonstrating that an actor has intentionally 
committed an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious 
risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow." 
Bryant, 728 P.2d  at 1136. Cockburn argues that Ogden was advised well prior to 
the accident that the "alligator tails" presented a dangerous condition and that 
he chose to ignore these warnings. Cockburn insists that, in so doing, Ogden 
"committed an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious 
risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that harm will follow." 
Bryant, 728 P.2d  at 1136.

[¶31]   The record that Cockburn points to 
in support of his contention includes Cockburn's deposition testimony as 
follows:

"Q. Did you ever complain 
to anybody about the alligator tails?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. To 
whom?

"A. George 
Ogden.

"Q. When was that? 

"A. I can't tell you the 
exact date. While I was drilling for him, though.

"Q. Tell me as best you 
can what you said to Mr. Ogden.

"A. George, the alligator 
tails are like a sled. Set a pipe down on them and they take off on you. They 
need to be cut in half.

"Q. What was his 
response?

"A. You let me take care 
of the rig."

Cockburn's 
answers to interrogatories are consistent with his 
testimony.

[¶32]   In addition, another co-employee 
testified that he had commented to Ogden about the "alligator tails" before the 
accident occurred and that Ogden ignored his comments. A third co-employee 
testified that he had complained to Ogden that the "alligator tails" were 
troublesome, heavy, and awkward. Ogden agreed in his deposition that he was 
responsible for recognizing unsafe conditions on the rig and rectifying them. It 
was also established, however, that these "alligator tails" were used on many 
occasions throughout this same period of time without any incident or injury. In 
light of our duty to afford every favorable inference to Cockburn, we conclude, 
for the purpose only of reviewing the grant of summary judgment, that Ogden was 
aware of a dangerous condition relating to the "alligator tails" prior to the 
accident, and he failed to remedy the problem in fulfillment of his 
duty.

[¶33]   This conclusion is not sufficient 
to mandate a reversal in favor of Cockburn, however. A situation in which a 
supervisory co-employee has knowledge of a hazardous condition and fails to 
correct it, although certainly sufficient to indicate ordinary negligence, is 
not sufficient to satisfy the much more stringent test of culpable negligence. 
See Brebaugh (in which is included an extensive summary of recent cases 
involving standards for culpable negligence). Furthermore, Cockburn has 
presented no evidence serving to indicate that Ogden's actions were 
unreasonable, or that he intentionally "committed an act of unreasonable 
character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make 
highly probable that harm will follow." Bryant, 728 P.2d  at 1136. We perceive no 
genuine issue of material fact for resolution by a jury in light of this record. 
See Brebaugh. This ruling may be particularly appropriate since the "alligator 
tails" had been repeatedly used without any incident. In light of that factual 
background, Ogden hardly can be said to have acted in disregard of a known or 
obvious risk. We hold there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect 
to the absence of culpable negligence, and we affirm, as a matter of law, the 
summary judgment in favor of Ogden.

[¶34]   Our scrutiny of this record has 
resulted in no manifestation of any genuine issue of material fact with respect 
to any of Cockburn's claims. The summary judgment awarded to the respective 
defendants was appropriate as a matter of law. The judgment of the district 
court is affirmed.