Case Title: State v. Boysaw

Citation: 

Docket Number: 112834

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 112,834 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
KENNETH BOYSAW, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
The State may rely on circumstantial evidence to meet its burden of proving that a 
defendant's conduct was motivated by the intent to arouse or satisfy the defendant's 
sexual desires. 
 
2. 
The constitutionality of a statute is presumed, all doubts must be resolved in favor 
of its validity, and before a statute may be stricken down it must clearly violate the 
defendant's rights secured by the constitution. 
 
3. 
A statute violates federal constitutional due process rights when it offends a 
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the people as to be 
ranked as fundamental. The primary guide in determining whether a principle in question 
is fundamental is historical practice. 
 
 
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4. 
Kansas has a long history of allowing the admission of evidence tending to show a 
propensity to engage in sexual misconduct or illegal sexual activities. 
 
5. 
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455(d) does not offend any principle of justice so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of the people of Kansas that it must be deemed 
fundamental. 
 
6. 
When a party does not preserve or adequately argue an issue on appeal, the issue is 
deemed waived. 
 
7. 
When a party seeks to introduce evidence showing that the defendant committed 
another act or offense of sexual misconduct, the material fact that the evidence is 
introduced to prove must be disputed and the probative value of the evidence must 
outweigh its potential for producing undue prejudice. 
 
8. 
In evaluating the probative value of evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs, the 
district court should consider, among other factors:  how clearly the prior act was proved; 
how probative the evidence is of the material fact sought to be proved; how seriously 
disputed the material fact is; and whether the government can obtain any less prejudicial 
evidence. 
 
3 
 
 
 
9. 
In evaluating the possible prejudicial effect of evidence of other crimes or civil 
wrongs, the district court should consider, among other factors:  the likelihood that such 
evidence will contribute to an improperly based jury verdict; the extent to which such 
evidence may distract the jury from the central issues of the trial; and how time 
consuming it will be to prove the prior conduct. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 52 Kan. App. 2d 635, 372 P.3d 1261 (2016). 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; STEPHEN J. TERNES, judge. Opinion filed April 19, 2019. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. The judgment of the district 
court is affirmed.  
 
Corrine E. Gunning, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, 
and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  Kenneth Boysaw challenges his conviction and sentence for one count 
of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Finding no error, we affirm his conviction. 
 
FACTS 
 
The relevant history of this case began almost four decades ago. In 1979, Boysaw 
pleaded guilty in Shawnee County, Kansas, to attempted indecent liberties with a child. 
Then, in 1987, he was convicted in Nebraska of sexual assault on a nine-year-old 
4 
 
 
 
neighbor girl, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Boysaw, 228 Neb. 316, 
422 N.W.2d 346 (1988). 
 
 
Boysaw subsequently moved to Wichita, Kansas. On April 21, 2013, six-year-old 
G.E.M. was visiting her grandfather's house with her mother, her mother's fiancé, and 
G.E.M.'s sister. Boysaw, a neighbor of the grandfather, was also present. The family had 
known Boysaw for about a year and considered him a friend, referring to him as "Uncle 
Kenny." Boysaw owned a scooter, and the girls spent part of the day riding around the 
block on it. G.E.M. was riding the scooter and collided with a trash can, resulting in a 
small scratch on her shoulder. Boysaw asked her if she wanted to have some popcorn 
and, when she said yes, invited her into his house.  
 
G.E.M.'s mother went to check on her, and, not finding her outside, walked over to 
Boysaw's house. The front door was open, and, seeing that her daughter was in the house, 
she started to walk in. From the doorway she realized that G.E.M. was sitting on 
Boysaw's lap, facing away from him. G.E.M.'s mother shouted for her fiancé, and G.E.M. 
stood up; G.E.M.'s mother then told her to go get the fiancé, and G.E.M. walked out the 
door. About 15 seconds after G.E.M. left, Boysaw stood up and fastened his pants. 
G.E.M.'s mother then called 911, and police showed up at the scene.  
  
G.E.M.'s mother took G.E.M. to a nearby hospital, where a nurse specializing in 
sexual assault victims examined the girl. G.E.M. told the nurse that Boysaw touched her 
"down here" and pointed to her vaginal area. G.E.M. also told the nurse that the 
encounter with Boysaw "hurt." The nurse conducted a full-body examination, including 
swabs for genetic material, and, except for a slight scratch, discovered no physical 
evidence of bodily injury or foreign biological fluids.  
 
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On April 24, 2013, the State filed a complaint charging Boysaw with one 
count of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 
21-5506(b)(3)(A), (c)(3). On September 16, 2013, Boysaw filed a motion in limine 
asking that the State be barred from introducing any evidence of his criminal history or 
uncharged conduct. In response, the State filed a motion to admit evidence of prior 
conduct under K.S.A. 60-455 in order to show Boysaw's propensity to commit the 
charged offense. Following a hearing, the court granted the State's motion in part. The 
court specifically found that the probative value of the proffered evidence was not 
outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the evidence. The court allowed the State to 
introduce evidence of the Nebraska crime for the purposes of showing both propensity 
and motive or intent and absence of mistake. The court barred the State from introducing 
evidence of the Shawnee County conviction.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Although the defense presented no witnesses, Boysaw's counsel asserted a theory 
that Boysaw was merely checking G.E.M. for injuries from the fall from the scooter and 
that any touching of her private parts was accidental. A jury found Boysaw guilty as 
charged, and the court sentenced him to a term of life without parole. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the conviction in State v. Boysaw, 52 Kan. App. 2d 635, 372 P.3d 1261 
(2016). 
 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5506(b)(3) defines aggravated indecent liberties with a 
child as "engaging in any of the following acts with a child who is under 14 years of age:  
(A) Any lewd fondling or touching of the person of either the child or the offender, done 
6 
 
 
 
or submitted to with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child 
or the offender, or both." 
 
The jury was instructed to find these elements, in particular, that Boysaw 
"engaged in lewd fondling or touching of GEM, with the intent to arouse or to satisfy the 
sexual desires of the defendant." Boysaw argues on appeal that the State failed to provide 
evidence showing that his conduct was intended to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires. 
He suggests that any contact with G.E.M.'s body could have been inadvertent or 
accidental, and the State never proved the contact was intentional and intended to satisfy 
his sexual desire. 
 
The evidence of intent was generally circumstantial. The State may rely on 
circumstantial evidence to meet its burden of proving that a defendant's conduct was 
motivated by the intent to arouse or satisfy the defendant's sexual desires. State v. Clark, 
298 Kan. 843, 850, 317 P.3d 776 (2014).  
 
Boysaw's contention notwithstanding, the record contained substantial evidence 
from which a rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Boysaw 
was seeking to arouse or to satisfy his sexual desires. G.E.M. testified at the trial. She 
told the jury that she was sitting on the couch facing away from Boysaw, and he "was 
messing with me." He "was doing something bad to me." She explained that this meant 
he was "touching where he shouldn't be touching," which was her "private part," the 
place "[w]here we go potty at." He was "rubbing" her potty with his whole hand.  
 
G.E.M.'s mother testified at trial that G.E.M. was sitting on Boysaw's lap, with her 
pants and underwear down around her ankles. His hands were positioned on G.E.M.'s 
waist, one hand on each hip. When G.E.M. stood up, her mother noticed that Boysaw's 
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pants were undone and she could see his undershorts. When he stood up, she observed 
him adjust his penis through his undershorts so that he could fasten his pants.  
 
When G.E.M. had suffered an injury to her shoulder, it was reasonable for the jury 
to conclude that her sitting on Boysaw's lap with her pants and underwear pulled down 
would serve no purpose other than to provide him with sexual gratification. "Rubbing" 
her genitals would be inconsistent with incidental contact. G.E.M.'s mother's testimony 
that she saw Boysaw having to "adjust" his penis before he could fasten his pants 
reinforces the circumstantial evidence that he was engaging in conduct that he found 
sexually arousing. The evidence may have been circumstantial, but it was compelling. 
And it was far more than sufficient to prove the elements of the crime. 
 
Constitutionality of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455(d) 
 
 
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455 governs the admissibility of evidence of other crimes or 
civil wrongs. Subsection (a) states that evidence showing that a person committed a crime 
or civil wrong on one occasion "is inadmissible to prove such person's disposition to 
commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that the person committed 
another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion."  
 
This was the core of the law in effect in 2009, when this court issued State v. 
Prine, 287 Kan. 713, 200 P.3d 1 (2009) (Prine I). In Prine I, the State introduced 
evidence that the defendant had engaged in sexual abuse of the victim's half-sister. The 
Prine I court held that such evidence was not admissible under K.S.A. 60-455 because it 
tended to show propensity to commit the crime at issue and it did not satisfy other valid 
statutory grounds for admitting prior bad acts evidence. The court suggested, however, 
that such evidence could be valuable to a jury and that the Legislature might provide an 
exception to the exclusion of propensity evidence:   
8 
 
 
 
 
"It is at least ironic that propensity evidence can be part of the support for an indefinite 
civil commitment, but cannot be part of the support for an initial criminal conviction in a 
child sex crime prosecution. 
 
"Of course, the legislature, rather than this court, is the body charged with study, 
consideration, and adoption of any statutory change that might make K.S.A. 60-455 more 
workable in such cases, without doing unconstitutional violence to the rights of criminal 
defendants. It may be time for the legislature to examine the advisability of amendment 
to K.S.A. 60-455 or some other appropriate adjustment to the statutory scheme." 287 
Kan. at 737. 
 
Prine I was issued in January 2009. That same year, the Legislature amended the 
statute to include a new section (d), which governs prior acts of sexual misconduct:   
 
"Except as provided in K.S.A. 60-445, and amendments thereto, in a criminal 
action in which the defendant is accused of a sex offense under articles 34, 35 or 36 of 
chapter 21 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto, evidence of the 
defendant's commission of another act or offense of sexual misconduct is admissible, and 
may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant and probative." 
L. 2009, ch. 103, § 12. 
 
The effect of this provision is to allow a jury to consider similar prior conduct for 
the purpose of determining whether a defendant has a propensity to engage in the conduct 
charged in the case on trial.  
 
Prine was retried, and the evidence was admitted under the newly enacted 
paragraph of K.S.A. 60-455. He again appealed, and this court addressed federal 
constitutional claims in State v. Prine, 297 Kan. 460, 303 P.3d 662 (2013) (Prine II). The 
court upheld the conviction over claims that the newly amended statute violated federal 
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ex post facto prohibitions. The court examined the conditions that could render a 
procedural change unconstitutional and concluded that new section (d) did not attach 
criminality to any act previously done that was innocent when it was done, did not 
aggravate any crime theretofore committed, did not provide greater punishment than was 
prescribed at the time the crime was committed, and did not alter the degree or lessen the 
quantity or measure of the proof necessary for conviction when the crime was committed. 
297 Kan. at 470-71 (citing Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 543, 120 S. Ct. 1620, 146 L. 
Ed. 2d 577 [2000]; Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 381, 18 S. Ct. 922, 43 L. Ed. 
204 [1898]). The court noted that the fact that a change in the law may work to the 
defendant's disadvantage does not, by itself, make the amendment unconstitutional. 297 
Kan. at 471. 
 
In his pretrial motion in the present case, Boysaw argued that admission of the 
propensity evidence would violate his right to a fair trial guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution. He also mentioned, in passing, that such evidence would violate state 
constitutional protections. Although the appellate briefing interweaves the federal and 
state constitutional arguments, we choose to address the objections under the two 
constitutions separately. Our review on both grounds is de novo. See State v. Limon, 280 
Kan. 275, 283, 122 P.3d 22 (2005). The constitutionality of a statute is presumed, all 
doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity, and before a statute may be stricken 
down it must clearly violate the defendant's rights secured by the constitution. See, e.g., 
State v. Hill, 189 Kan. 403, 407, 369 P.2d 365 (1962).  
 
A. Federal Constitutional Due Process 
 
To establish a federal due process violation, a party has the burden of 
demonstrating that the challenged statute or rule violates those "'fundamental conceptions 
of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions . . . and which define 
10 
 
 
 
"the community's sense of fair play and decency."'" Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 
342, 352-53, 110 S. Ct. 668, 674, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1990); United States v. Lovasco, 
431 U.S. 783, 790, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977). 
 
The Supreme Court has not decided and has expressly reserved the question of 
whether a state law admitting propensity evidence violates the federal Due Process 
Clause. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 
(1991). Most state and federal courts that have considered the question have found no 
violation of essential federal constitutional rights in the admission of propensity evidence. 
See, e.g., People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal. 4th 903, 915-22, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 847, 986 P.2d 182, 
(1999) (state statute admitting propensity evidence of sex crimes does not violate due 
process); People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 179-82, 788 N.E.2d 707 (2003) (state statute 
admitting propensity evidence of sex crimes constitutional under the federal and Illinois 
Constitutions); State v. Williams, 357 Or. 1, 346 P.3d 455 (2015) (no federal due process 
violation in admitting propensity evidence when procedural safeguards screen out 
evidence of relatively little probative and relatively great prejudicial danger); Belcher v. 
State, 474 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App. 2015) (procedural safeguards suffice to satisfy 
constitutional requirements). 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 permits a court to exclude relevant evidence if the 
probative value of that evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Federal Rule 413 broadly allows the 
admission of evidence of other sexual assaults by the defendant when the defendant is 
accused of sexual assault. In matters of child molestation, Federal Rule 414(a) similarly 
allows, for consideration of any matter to which it is relevant, evidence that the defendant 
committed any other child molestation.  
 
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These rules have consistently withstood due process challenges. See, e.g., United 
States v. Schaffer, 851 F.3d 166, 179-80 (2nd Cir. 2017) (admission of evidence of prior 
sexual assaults on minors does not violate defendant's due process rights in prosecution 
for coercing minor to engage in illegal sexual activity:  weighing of probative value 
against unfair prejudice provides adequate safeguard); Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 
829 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 545 U.S. 1105 (2005) (admission of other acts evidence 
renders trial fundamentally unfair when evidence "goes only to character and 'there are no 
permissible inferences the jury may draw' from it"; such evidence does not in itself 
necessarily render trial so fundamentally unfair as to deny due process); United States v. 
LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2001) (admission of defendant's other instances 
of molestation does not violate his due process rights; "[a]s long as the protections of 
Rule 403 remain in place to ensure that potentially devastating evidence of little 
probative value will not reach the jury, the right to a fair trial remains adequately 
safeguarded"); United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881-83 (10th Cir. 1998) (Rule 414 
does not violate due process because of Rule 403 safeguards and because history of 
admitting sexual propensity evidence suggests its exclusion is not so rooted in legal 
custom as to be regarded fundamental); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 
(10th Cir. 1998) (Rule 413 does not on its face violate the due process rights of a 
defendant because of built-in safeguards). 
 
Keeping in mind the widespread acceptance of special rules allowing propensity 
evidence in prosecutions for sex crimes, we look to whether the Kansas statute in 
particular violates constitutional fairness requirements. 
 
A statute violates due process when it offends a principle of justice so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of the people that it must be deemed fundamental. See 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1977). 
The primary guide in determining whether a principle in question is fundamental is 
12 
 
 
 
"historical practice." Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43-44, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 135 L. 
Ed. 2d 361 (1996). 
 
Kansas has a long history of allowing propensity evidence in these kinds of cases.  
 
In State v. Borchert, 68 Kan. 360, 361, 74 P. 1108 (1904), the court held that 
evidence showing "a course of illicit commerce between the sexes" is an exception to the 
rule that a prior conduct is not admissible for the purpose of enabling the jury to infer 
that, because the defendant "had committed one crime he would be likely to commit 
another." 68 Kan. at 361. The court qualified that statement by arguing that such evidence 
essentially goes to prove the commission of the crime at issue, when many sex crimes 
lack concrete evidence that a crime was committed, and the propensity evidence therefore 
is more demonstrative and necessary than propensity evidence in other kinds of 
prosecutions. 68 Kan. at 362. 
 
In State v. Waldron, 118 Kan. 641, 649, 236 P. 855 (1925), the court allowed the 
admission of letters demonstrating the defendant  
 
"had the mind of a vulgar libertine, so far removed from the mental and moral standards 
required of a minister of the gospel as light is from darkness, and of course, the letters 
tended to discredit his asseverations of innocence by revealing with damning clarity his 
grossly indelicate attitude towards young women of his congregation with whom his 
ministerial calling gave him special and trusted social contacts." 
 
In State v. Funk, 154 Kan. 300, 302, 118 P.2d 562 (1941), the defendant was 
convicted of forcible rape after he induced his victim to go for a ride in his car. This court 
found no error in the admission of the testimony of other young women who stated that 
the defendant followed them and attempted to induce them to get into his car. The 
evidence was "designed to show his lustful disposition." 154 Kan. at 301. 
13 
 
 
 
 
The common law history of admitting propensity evidence in sex crime 
prosecutions suggests that the principle of excluding such evidence is not so imbedded in 
the Kansas legal tradition as to take on a constitutional dimension. As the Tenth Circuit 
noted in Castillo,  
 
"[T]he history of evidentiary rules regarding a criminal defendant's sexual propensities is 
ambiguous at best, particularly with regard to sexual abuse of children. The existence of 
this ambiguity does not leave us uncertain of the constitutional result, however; rather, it 
favors the government. As the Supreme Court stated in Egelhoff, [518 U.S. at 47], 'It is 
not the [government] which bears the burden of demonstrating that its rule is "deeply 
rooted," but rather [the defendant] who must show that the principle of procedure 
violated by the rule (and allegedly required by due process) is "so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' 140 F.3d at 881-82. 
 
It thus was not common law or constitutional considerations that led to a bar on 
admitting sexual propensity evidence; it was legislative action. In 1963, the Legislature 
placed limitations on the purposes for which evidence of prior misconduct could be used 
when it enacted K.S.A. 60-455. L. 1963, ch. 303. See State v. Taylor, 198 Kan. 290, 292, 
424 P.2d 612 (1967) (K.S.A. 60-455 made "lustful disposition" evidence inadmissible, 
notwithstanding its admissibility at common law.). In 2009, the Legislature reversed its 
earlier ban on propensity evidence in sex crime prosecutions. What the Legislature gave, 
the Legislature may take away. 
 
Boysaw urges this court to follow the lead of two other states, Iowa and Missouri, 
which have held that the use of propensity evidence violated constitutional fair-trial 
mandates based on long-standing state bars to the admission of such evidence. See State 
v. Cox, 781 N.W.2d 757 (Iowa 2010); State v. Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603, 607-08 (Mo. 
2007). In Cox, the Iowa Supreme Court traced a different history of the use of propensity 
14 
 
 
 
evidence in that state. It therefore serves as an inapt precedent for this court. Likewise, 
the Missouri Supreme Court has construed its constitution to prohibit propensity evidence 
because such evidence violates a defendant's right to know the nature of the crime of 
which the defendant is accused. Kansas does not have a similar history of locating a bar 
to propensity evidence in its constitution.  
 
The history of the use of propensity evidence in Kansas, coupled with the 
procedural safeguard of weighing the probative against the prejudicial effect of the 
evidence, leads us to conclude that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455(d) does not offend any 
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the people of this state 
that it may be deemed fundamental. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455(d) does not violate federal 
constitutional protections. 
 
B. Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights 
 
Boysaw also couched his argument in terms of the Kansas Constitution. Although 
he urges this court to rely on our state Constitution to strike down K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 
60-455(d), he does not explain what distinguishes analysis under our state constitutional 
provisions from analysis under similar federal constitutional provisions. When arguing 
his cause in district court, he made only passing mention of the Kansas Constitution 
without elaborating on what sections he considered to be offended by the propensity 
evidence statute. 
 
On appeal, he directs our attention to sections 10 and 18 of the Kansas  
Constitution Bill of Rights. 
 
Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights states:   
 
15 
 
 
 
"In all prosecutions, the accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person, 
or by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him; to meet the 
witness face to face, and to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of the 
witnesses in his behalf, and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. No person shall be a 
witness against himself, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." 
 
Section 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights states:  "All persons, for 
injuries suffered in person, reputation or property, shall have remedy by due course of 
law." 
 
Boysaw points to nothing in the history of the Kansas Constitution or in our 
caselaw that would suggest a different analytic framework for questions of fundamental 
fairness, due process, or double jeopardy. He points to analysis of the Iowa Constitution 
in Cox, but Cox applied federal rules for construing the dimensions of due process. In 
short, Boysaw does not articulate grounds explaining why a different result should follow 
if state, rather than federal, guidelines are to govern the constitutionality of propensity 
evidence.  
 
Boysaw did not give the state constitutional argument sufficient substance for the 
district court to consider it, and, on appeal, he conflates the state argument with the 
federal one. When a party does not preserve or adequately brief an issue, we deem it 
waived. See, e.g., State v. Kingsley, 299 Kan. 896, 900, 326 P.3d 1083 (2014); see also 
State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 159-60, 199 P.3d 1265 (2009) (merely mentioning 
constitutional concepts without elaborating on them and changing the constitutional 
theory on appeal precludes effective appellate review). We therefore do not decide this 
question at this time. 
 
16 
 
 
 
As possible considerations for any future argument on this issue, we note that the 
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, including sections 10 and 18, was largely modeled on 
the Ohio Constitution. Brown v. Wichita State University, 219 Kan. 2, 12, 547 P.2d 1015 
(1976); In re Oberst, 133 Kan. 364, 367, 299 P. 959 (1931). Ohio has a statute that 
resembles K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455 in allowing evidence of prior misconduct for the 
purpose of showing motive, intent, absence of mistake, or scheme or plan. See Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 2945.59. Ohio does not, however, have a statutory provision allowing such 
evidence strictly for the purpose of demonstrating propensity. See State v. Williams, 134 
Ohio St. 3d 521, 524-26, 983 N.E.2d 1278 (2012); State v. Hart, 118 N.E.3d 454 (Ohio 
App. 2018). Furthermore, our cursory research fails to disclose any common law 
exception in Ohio allowing evidence akin to "lustful disposition" for purposes of 
establishing propensity to commit sex crimes. 
 
We also note that section 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights did not 
create new rights but merely recognized systems of laws established prior to the adoption 
of the Constitution. Brown, 219 Kan. at 10. 
 
Historically, our courts have analyzed sections 10 and 18 as coextensive with their 
federal counterparts. See, e.g., State v. Wilkinson, 269 Kan. 603, 608-09, 9 P.3d 1 (2000) 
(applying same analysis to federal due process challenge and section 18 challenge); 
Murphy v. Nelson, 260 Kan. 589, 597-98, 921 P.2d 1225 (1996) (court declines to 
construe section 18 differently from federal constitutional due process protections and 
applies federal law to section 18 challenge); State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, 981, 880 P.2d 
1244 (1994) (provisions of section 10 "grant no greater protection against self-
incrimination than is afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution"); State v. Busse, 231 Kan. 108, 110, 642 P.2d 972 (1982); State v. Haze, 
218 Kan. 60, 62, 542 P.2d 720 (1975); Hill, 189 Kan. at 411-12; State v. Blanchette, 35 
17 
 
 
 
Kan. App. 2d 686, 699, 134 P.3d 19 (2006) (caselaw demonstrates "the protections given 
under both constitutions with regard to confronting witnesses are the same"). 
 
Any future challenge to the admission of propensity evidence under K.S.A. 2018 
Supp. 60-455(d) that is based on state constitutional provisions will need to explain why 
this court should depart from its long history of coextensive analysis of rights under the 
two constitutions.  
 
Probative Value of Prior Conviction Versus Prejudicial Effect 
 
 
At a separate, pretrial motions hearing, the district court took up the question of 
the admissibility of the evidence of the two previous convictions. The court engaged in 
an extensive comparison of the earlier crimes with the allegations made in the present 
case. The court then analyzed whether the evidence was more probative than prejudicial 
and concluded that the Shawnee County conviction lacked sufficient probative value to 
be admitted but that the Nebraska conviction was similar enough to be helpful to the jury 
in determining whether Boysaw was guilty.  
 
After the completion of witness testimony, the district court read a stipulation to 
the jury:   
 
"The following facts have been agreed to and stipulated to by the parties and are 
to be considered by you as true:  One, that the defendant, Kenneth Boysaw, was 
convicted of the crime of sexual assault of a child on February 12, 1987. 
 
"Two, specifically the defendant, Kenneth Boysaw, on August 25th, 1986, a date 
when he was 36 years of age, touched a child by the initials of BJH, in a sexual manner. 
BJH was a female, age nine years at the time of the touching. In the basement of his 
home he removed BJH's panties and touched her vagina with his hand in a rubbing 
motion. He did not penetrate her. Mr. Boysaw opened his pants exposing his penis and 
touched himself. 
18 
 
 
 
 
"And the stipulation was made on December 12, 2013, by counsel and Mr. 
Boysaw. Again those are to be considered as proven and true facts by the jury."  
 
Boysaw argues on appeal that the district court improperly concluded that the 
prejudicial effect of the stipulation did not outweigh its probative value. 
 
This court reviews for abuse of discretion a district court determination that the 
probative value of evidence outweighs its potential for producing undue prejudice. A 
district court abuses its discretion when:  (1) no reasonable person would take the view 
adopted by the judge; (2) a ruling is based on an error of law; or (3) substantial competent 
evidence does not support a finding of fact on which the exercise of discretion is based. 
State v. Bowen, 299 Kan. 339, 348-49, 323 P.3d 853 (2014). 
 
Paragraph (d) of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455 permits admission of evidence that the 
defendant committed another act or offense of sexual misconduct for the bearing that the 
evidence has "on any matter to which it is relevant and probative." The language is 
expansive and places little limitation on admitting such evidence.  
 
This court has established safeguards limiting the introduction of K.S.A. 60-455 
evidence:  the material fact that the evidence is introduced to prove must be disputed, and 
the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its potential for producing undue 
prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 48, 144 P.3d 647 (2006). This rule 
closely resembles Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which states:  "The court may exclude 
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or 
more of the following:  unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."  
 
19 
 
 
 
No Kansas statute expressly provides for the exclusion of unduly prejudicial 
evidence in the same way that Rule 403 does, and K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455(d) allows 
the admission of any propensity evidence that is relevant and probative. See State v. 
Moyer, 306 Kan. 342, 365, 410 P.3d 71 (2017) ("as long as it is 'relevant and probative,'" 
propensity evidence under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-455[d] is admissible in sexual abuse 
cases). The only limitation similar to Rule 403 is contained in K.S.A. 60-445, which 
allows discretionary exclusion if the trial judge finds that the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk that the evidence will "unfairly and 
harmfully surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such 
evidence would be offered." This limitation is less restrictive than the federal rule and 
addresses only surprise. 
 
The plain statutory language of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455(d) appears to allow 
such evidence without requiring a weighing of probity versus prejudice. A similar 
reading of the federal rules allowing propensity evidence has been raised. See Judicial 
Conference of the United States, Report of the Judicial Conference on the Admission of 
Character Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct Cases, 159 F.R.D. 51, 53 (1995) 
(noting that the advisory committee believed the above position to be "arguable"). 
 
Nevertheless, without specifically deciding the issue, this court has continued to 
require a weighing of probative value versus prejudicial effect. See, e.g., State v. Dern, 
303 Kan. 384, 394, 362 P.3d 566 (2015); State v. Dean, 298 Kan. 1023, 1033, 324 P.3d 
1023 (2014); State v. Remmert, 298 Kan. 621, 628, 316 P.3d 154 (2014), disapproved of 
on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313, 342 P.3d 935 (2015); State v. Spear, 
297 Kan. 780, 789, 304 P.3d 1246 (2013) (trial judge must weigh probative value of 
propensity evidence against threat of undue prejudice).  
 
20 
 
 
 
This position is consistent with the position taken by federal courts, although the 
federal analysis is grounded in the language of the rules, while the Kansas weighing rule 
is a judicial construct. See, e.g., United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th 
Cir. 1997). It should be noted that such a weighing process has been an integral part of 
the analysis of those courts that have upheld the admissibility of propensity evidence, as 
the exclusion of unduly prejudicial prior acts evidence has been deemed a protection of 
due process rights. See, e.g., United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001) 
("As long as the protections of [the balancing test] remain in place to ensure that 
potentially devastating evidence of little probative value will not reach the jury, the right 
to a fair trial remains adequately safeguarded."); State v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th 
Cir. 1998); Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205, 212 (Tex. App. 2016). 
 
No set test exists for weighing probative value against prejudicial effect. The 
Tenth Circuit has suggested certain factors to be considered, such as the similarity of the 
prior acts to the acts charged, the closeness in time of the prior acts to the charged acts, 
the frequency of the prior acts, the presence or lack of intervening events, and the need 
for evidence beyond the testimony of the defendant and alleged victim. See, e.g., United 
States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998).  
 
In Prine II, 297 Kan. at 478, this court referred favorably to United States v. 
Benally, 500 F.3d 1085, 1090-91 (10th Cir. 2007), which incorporated other tests into the 
weighing test for propensity evidence in sex crimes. Citing prior decisions, the Benally 
court recommended considering specific factors in analyzing the two elements to be 
weighed. 
 
In evaluating the probative value of evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs, the 
district court should consider, among other factors:  how clearly the prior act was proved; 
how probative the evidence is of the material fact sought to be proved; how seriously 
21 
 
 
 
disputed the material fact is; and whether the government can obtain any less prejudicial 
evidence. In evaluating the possible prejudicial effect of evidence of other crimes or civil 
wrongs, the district court should consider, among other factors:  the likelihood that such 
evidence will contribute to an improperly based jury verdict; the extent to which such 
evidence may distract the jury from the central issues of the trial; and how time 
consuming it will be to prove the prior conduct. Benally, 500 F.3d at 1090-91. 
 
In this case, the district court undertook a careful and meticulous examination of 
the factors to be weighed, giving both parties additional time to supplement their 
arguments. Far from committing error, the district court provided a model for conducting 
analysis of the admissibility of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455(d) evidence. It listed factors on 
both sides of the equation and explained in detail why it was admitting the evidence over 
Boysaw's objection. 
 
Boysaw complains that the evidence of his Nebraska conviction was weakly 
probative and strongly prejudicial. Keeping in mind that the standard of review is abuse 
of discretion, we deem the probative value of the Nebraska conviction to be great.  
 
The prior act was proved by Boysaw's stipulation to his conviction. The Nebraska 
incident involved a girl nine years of age; the current case involved a girl six years of age. 
In each incident, the girl's underwear was removed or pulled down, and in each incident, 
Boysaw rubbed the girl's vaginas with his hand. In each incident, Boysaw opened up his 
pants. The Nebraska conviction therefore suggested both a propensity to engage in 
certain conduct with a particular class of victims and a lack of mistake or inadvertence in 
the conduct toward G.E.M.  
 
To be sure, Boysaw points out factors that somewhat undermine the value of the 
evidence:  the Nebraska conviction was entered 26 years before the current case, and, in 
22 
 
 
 
the intervening years, Boysaw spent time in prison and experienced a decline in health. 
Nevertheless the probative evidence was material and valuable, and we cannot conclude 
that no reasonable person would have weighed the evidence in the manner that the district 
court did or that the admission of the evidence was improper as a matter of law. The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. 
 
Sentencing Challenges 
 
 
Boysaw complains that the district court improperly sentenced him as an 
aggravated habitual sex offender when his Nebraska conviction did not qualify as a 
sexually violent crime in Kansas. The Court of Appeals analyzed this issue at length, 
concluding that the Nebraska conviction was for a sexually violent crime. Boysaw, 52 
Kan. App. 2d at 651-52. In his petition for review, Boysaw conceded that he had 
misconstrued which Nebraska statute was at issue but, without further argument, 
nevertheless urged this court to reverse. 
 
When a party fails to support an argument with relevant authority or show why the 
argument is sound despite a lack of supporting authority or in the face of contrary 
authority, this court deems the argument waived and abandoned for failure to brief the 
issue. State v. Tappendick, 306 Kan. 1054, Syl. ¶ 2, 400 P.3d 180 (2017). Here, the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeals was sound and Boysaw provided no authority or 
analysis to challenge it. We therefore conclude that he abandoned this argument and there 
are no grounds for reversal on this issue. 
 
Boysaw, finally, asks us to decide that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6626, which imposes 
mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole on aggravated sex offenders, 
violates the federal constitutional right to trial by a jury because a judge, not a jury, 
decides whether a defendant has been convicted of two or more sexually violent crimes. 
23 
 
 
 
This court has repeatedly upheld the predecessor statute, K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 21-4642, 
against similar constitutional challenges. See State v. Weber, 297 Kan. 805, 818, 304 P.3d 
1262 (2013) (setting out cases finding no constitutional error in statute). He also asks us 
to reconsider our holding in State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 45-47, 41 P.3d 781 (2002) (right 
to a factual determination by a jury does not apply when sentence based in part on 
defendant's criminal history score). Boysaw offers no new grounds for reconsidering 
those holdings, and we decline to find any constitutional violation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We find no error in the conduct of the trial, and we are not persuaded that the 
statute allowing the introduction of evidence of propensity to commit sex crimes is 
unconstitutional. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the 
judgment of the district court.