Case Title: LUIS A. JANDRO v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-252

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
LUIS A. JANDRO v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 186781 P.2d 512Case Number: 87-252Decided: 10/11/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
LUIS A. JANDRO, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Harry E. Leimback, 
J.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Donald M. Gerstein, Legal Intern, for appellee.

Wyoming Public Defender Program: 
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Thomas B. Jubin, Asst. State Public 
Defender, and Mike Cornia, Asst. State Public Defender, for appellant.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and 
THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The principal question 
presented in Luis Jandro's appeal relates to the admissibility of statements of 
co-conspirators in a prosecution for conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, 
particularly with respect to the impact upon Jandro's right of confrontation. 
Other issues which are presented involve whether there was probable cause to 
arrest Jandro so that money taken from him in a search incidental to his arrest 
was properly admitted into evidence and whether the failure of the arresting 
officers to furnish the information required pursuant to § 7-1-111, W.S. 1977 
(since repealed), in writing or to otherwise record it, and to obtain the 
statutorily required form of waiver according to § 7-1-113, W.S. 1977, made 
Jandro's statements to a law enforcement officer inadmissible. The trial court 
admitted the evidence taken from Jandro pursuant to a search incidental to his 
arrest; ruled that no error existed with respect to the failure to furnish 
advice in writing or otherwise record it or to obtain a waiver in writing from 
Jandro; and admitted the statements of co-conspirators over Jandro's objection. 
We are satisfied that no reversible error exists, and we affirm Jandro's 
conviction.

[¶2.]     Jandro was convicted of 
conspiring to deliver methamphetamine, as defined in Schedule II, § 
35-7-1016(d)(ii), in violation of §§ 35-7-103(a)(ii) and 35-7-1042, W.S. 1977 
(June 1988 Repl.).1 Following his conviction, after a 
trial by a jury, Jandro was sentenced to a term of not less than four nor more 
than six years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary with credit given for 240 days 
of pre-trial confinement. Jandro has appealed that judgment and 
sentence.

[¶3.]     In his Brief of 
Appellant, Jandro advises the court of the following issues for 
review:

"I. There was 
insufficient probable cause to arrest appellant, and evidence obtained pursuant 
to that unlawful arrest was erroneously admitted into evidence at 
trial.

"II. Upon arresting 
appellant, the law enforcement officers failed to obtain a written or recorded 
waiver of Miranda rights and 
appellant's subsequent statements should have been 
suppressed.

"III. It was error to 
admit the hearsay statements of alleged co-conspirators because the State never 
made a prima facie showing of conspiracy involving 
appellant."

[¶4.]     The State of Wyoming, as appellee, 
identifies substantially the same issues, but restates them to 
be:

"I. Did probable cause 
for appellant's arrest exist and was evidence obtained pursuant to that arrest 
properly admitted?

"II. Does failure to 
obtain a written waiver of Appellant's Miranda rights amount to harmless 
error?

"III. Did the State make 
a prima facie showing of a conspiracy involving 
appellant?"

[¶5.]     A summary of the events 
disclosed by the record, which culminated in the arrest and conviction of 
Jandro, among others, commences with the furnishing to John Downing of $1,500 in 
recorded $100 bills by a Casper detective. This money was to pay for an 
ounce of methamphetamine that Downing had obtained from a Mrs. Noveline Miles. 
Mrs. Miles was a resident of California and was determined to be one of 
Jandro's coconspirators. Earlier, Downing had promised Gene Nordgren, another 
co-conspirator, that later, on the same afternoon or evening, he would pay 
Nordgren for the methamphetamine after he had collected from his "customer." 
Downing made the promised payment, using the identified bills, and then dropped 
out of the picture. Nordgren handed the recorded money to Miles and sometime 
later, around 10:30 P.M., Nordgren and Miles rented a car, picked up Nordgren's 
brother, Steve, another known narcotics dealer, and drove to Rawlins. The 
purpose of that trip was to arrange for the purchase of a fresh supply of 
controlled substances, including methamphetamine, for resale. They were not 
aware that the bills which they were carrying were the recorded bills the 
detective had given to Downing, nor did they know that they were being followed 
by a surveillance team. This surveillance team had monitored the earlier 
transaction between the detective and Downing, and the team also had monitored 
continuously the activities of Nordgren and Miles during the 
day.

[¶6.]     The following morning, 
January 16, 1987, the two Nordgrens and Miles, still under surveillance, met 
with an individual named Marco Macias (Marco) at a Rawlins motel where Jandro 
and Marco were staying. The Casper police and the 
Wyoming Department of Criminal Investigation (DCI) earlier had obtained 
information from a previously reliable informant that Marco, a resident of 
California, had brought methamphetamine into 
the Casper area 
on at least one prior occasion. Their belief was that he had done the same thing 
on other occasions. The reliable informant had told the authorities that Marco 
and a partner, who was not identified, again were engaged in delivering 
methamphetamine into Wyoming.

[¶7.]     In the motel room in 
which Marco and Jandro were staying, Gene Nordgren and Marco discussed terms and 
other arrangements for the purchase of controlled substances. Miles simply 
watched and listened. Apparently, she was simply to serve as a middleperson or 
introducer and be an observer, and Gene Nordgren was to do the actual dealing. 
At the trial, her testimony was that she had gone along on this trip only 
because she was bored in Casper. Even so, she helped with computations 
and the determination of prices. She denied any past drug dealings with Marco, 
but she testified that she had known him from various meetings back in 
California. 
Even given her prior acquaintance with Marco, it appears that Steve Nordgren, 
not Miles, was the primary contact person between Marco and Gene 
Nordgren.

[¶8.]     Marco wanted some "good 
will" money before he would agree to release any controlled substances. Miles 
gave the $1,500 in recorded bills to Gene Nordgren who then handed it over to 
Marco. This was understood to be a short-term loan due later the same day with 
"interest" amounting to $500. Gene Nordgren added another $150 of his own. This 
seemed to satisfy Marco who then "fronted" the three, Gene Nordgren, Steve 
Nordgren, and Miles, with eight ounces of methamphetamine, four ounces of 
cocaine, and a pound of marijuana. The agreed price was $11,650, so the $1,650 
paid at this time really was nothing more than "good will." The balance of 
$10,000 was to be paid the next day after the three dealers had resold the 
controlled substances. During these events, except for a brief interlude when he 
woke up and rubbed his eyes before falling back down on the bed, Jandro was 
asleep in the room. He did not participate in the conversations or negotiations 
relating to this transaction.

[¶9.]     The two Nordgren 
brothers and Miles then took their new supply of controlled substances and drove 
to Riverton where they left Gene Nordgren to dispose of their stock. Gene 
Nordgren had told the other two that he believed he could sell it all to Mike 
Etheridge, another known dealer in controlled substances, in one transaction. 
Steve Nordgren and Miles returned to Casper.

[¶10.]  Etheridge, although quite willing to 
sample the merchandise, was not able to dispose of an amount as large as this, 
and he and Gene Nordgren decided to drive around the state in an effort to sell 
it in other locations. While pursuing this plan, Etheridge and Gene Nordgren got 
involved in a high speed chase between Powder River and Casper at the culmination 
of which they were arrested. During the latter part of the chase, they 
jettisoned amounts of marijuana and methamphetamine from the vehicle, together 
with various other objects, some of which were recovered by the arresting 
officers. Those officers were members of the same surveillance team that had 
monitored the Downing transaction in Casper and had then followed the two Nordgren 
brothers and Ms. Miles to Rawlins. After he had been arrested, Gene Nordgren 
agreed to assist the officers in their continuing 
investigation.

[¶11.]  While these other events were 
transpiring, Marco and Jandro had moved to Douglas where they rented another motel room. During the 
course of the day, Marco called Miles, who by then was now back in Casper, to inquire about 
Gene Nordgren and the rest of his money. Both of them were unaware of Gene's 
arrest. Around 7:00 P.M., Miles, at the suggestion of Marco, went from Casper to Douglas where 
there was, supposedly, no "heat" (a slang term for police interest). On this 
journey, Miles was accompanied by her brother, Nick Dennis, and a friend of the 
brother, Jose Olquin. When they arrived in Douglas, she was not permitted to go directly to the motel 
room occupied by Jandro and Marco. Instead, she was directed to meet Jandro in a 
nearby field with the understanding that he then would lead her to the motel 
room. This was Jandro's first direct contact with Miles. The outdoor meeting 
occurred as planned, and those two, leaving Dennis and Olquin in the car, 
proceeded to the motel room where they met with Marco. Miles was without funds, 
and she asked Marco for the money she had fronted for the controlled substances. 
Her contention was that she was not responsible for any losses because she was 
simply a middle-person. Marco refused the request, advising her that Jandro had 
the money. Miles testified that Jandro exploded at that point, yelling that he 
"had $30,000 in this and Gene had better come back with his money, that he would 
break his arms and legs or do whatever he had to do to get his $10,000." She 
also testified that when Marco asked Jandro to return the money to her, Jandro 
laughed, waved a wad of money and refused, saying "[T]his is our money now, it 
is not yours." Jandro did lend Miles $30 for a motel room so that she would not 
return to Casper 
that night. She left and rented a room across the street in which she spent the 
night while awaiting the return of Gene Nordgren and her 
money.

[¶12.]  On the next morning, January 17, 1987, 
Gene Nordgren, in furtherance of his agreement to cooperate and under electronic 
surveillance, met Jandro and Marco in their motel room. After leaving, he 
advised the detectives that only two men, Marco and Marco's partner, were in the 
room. Marco soon left the room and, after walking around the lobby for a short 
time, returned. Minutes later, Jandro left and walked to the lobby. He was 
looking out the front window when he noticed a Douglas police car driving up. He immediately picked up a 
house phone and started to dial. At this point, one of the DCI investigators who 
had monitored the original Downing transaction in Casper approached Jandro, identified himself, 
and proceeded to question him. The investigator first asked Jandro if he was a 
guest. Jandro said that he was, but balked when he was asked his name and room 
number. Jandro stated this was private information although he did produce a 
California 
driver's license for identification. Then the investigator asked him if he knew 
someone named Marco, and Jandro denied that acquaintance. Jandro also denied 
knowing anyone named Noveline or Nordgren.

[¶13.]  The investigator, knowing these latter 
answers were false, then placed Jandro under arrest for conspiracy to deliver a 
controlled substance. Miles had been arrested a few minutes earlier, and Marco 
was arrested a few minutes later. The investigator advised Jandro of his 
constitutional rights and then searched him. He found eleven of the original 
marked bills in Jandro's shirt pocket. Jandro had agreed to this search, but he 
had not given a written consent nor had he waived his rights under the 
constitution in writing. In response to questions by the arresting officer, 
Jandro first said he had not been in Rawlins but, when advised that the officer 
knew he had been, Jandro agreed that he had been in Rawlins and had come from 
California to Wyoming to look at cars. He said he was not a 
car dealer, but was a car broker and had a couple hundred dollars on his person. 
After $252 was found in his billfold, he denied having any other money but, upon 
being searched incidental to his arrest, $1,652 was found in his shirt pocket. 
He made no response when asked why he had lied about how much money he had, but 
then later he said he had brought the money with him from California.

[¶14.]  Jandro was interviewed again the next day 
and discussed some scale weights with the arresting officer. Jandro said that 
they were his and he had brought them from California. He said they were used in his 
employment as a hazard waste disposal operator for IBM Company, and he had 
brought them along in case he had a job interview in Wyoming. He again 
explained that he had come to Wyoming looking for car deals, and he also 
advised that the money had been obtained from Marco when they were in Rawlins. 
He further explained that he rented motel rooms under an alias in case the car 
deals in which Marco was involved turned out to be illegal. While not 
incriminating him directly, Jandro's statements, under the circumstances, 
clearly were less than candid and quite suspicious in some 
respects.

[¶15.]  As the case was wound up, Noveline Miles 
entered pleas of guilty to two conspiracies to deliver controlled substances. 
One of those involved Gene Nordgren and arose out of the original sale to 
Downing in which Jandro was not implicated. The other involved Jandro because of 
her advance of the $1,500 and the subsequent events. Miles testified to these 
facts at trial and also to the fact that she had received a reduced sentence in 
exchange for her pleas of guilty and, one would assume, her 
cooperation.

[¶16.]  Marco Macias was determined to be an 
alien of Columbian origin. He was deported prior to Jandro's trial and, for that 
reason, was not available as a witness. At Jandro's trial, statements made by 
Marco prior to trial were offered and received in 
evidence.

[¶17.]  We address the issues in the order raised 
by Jandro, a chronological development. Jandro contends that it was error to 
admit the eleven marked $100 bills found in his shirt pocket because they were 
the product of a search incidental to an unlawful arrest. He argues that the 
record does not demonstrate sufficient probable cause to justify his arrest 
without a warrant and that the recorded $100 bills should not have been part of 
the evidence against him. We agree with the trial judge who ruled that this 
evidence was admissible.

[¶18.]  There is no question in this case about 
whether the arresting officer had an arrest warrant or a search warrant at the 
time the recorded bills were taken from Jandro. He had neither. A warrantless 
arrest is justified by § 7-2-103, W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 1986), which provides, in 
that part here pertinent:

"(a) A peace officer may 
arrest a person without a warrant and detain him until a legal warrant can be 
obtained when:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) He has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a felony, as defined by section 6-2 [§ 6-1-102] of the 
statutes has been committed and he has reasonable grounds for believing that the 
person to be arrested has committed it; * * *."

We note that the 
wording of the statute, in effect at the time of Jandro's arrest, refers to 
"reasonable grounds" instead of the more commonly used phrase "probable cause." 
However, we discern a legislative intent to equate these two phrases, and we 
accordingly treat them as interchangeable. Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478 (Wyo. 1988); Neilson 
v. State, 599 P.2d 1326 (Wyo. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980). Jandro's arrest was permissible under this statute provided the 
arresting officer was possessed of sufficient information to constitute probable 
cause.

[¶19.]  This court last visited the concept of 
search incidental to a lawful arrest in Roose. In that case, we quoted the 
following language from Neilson:

"`A peace officer may 
arrest a person without a warrant if, at the moment the arrest is made, he has 
probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed by the person to be 
arrested, or he has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime is being 
committed in his presence by the person to be arrested. Stated another way, the 
determination of probable cause to arrest without a warrant depends upon whether 
the facts and circumstances within the peace officer's knowledge and of which he 
has reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a reasonably 
cautious or prudent man to believe that the person arrested has committed or is 
committing an offense. The constitutional standard governing probable cause is 
grounded upon reasonableness. Thus, an appellate court's inquiry into whether or 
not an arrest is legal in a given case is restricted to an objective 
consideration of the evidence in the record.'" Roose, 759 P.2d  at 
481.

The standard 
articulated in Neilson is consistent 
with that adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S. Ct. 854, 861, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975), in which the court said that probable 
cause consists of "facts and circumstances `sufficient to warrant a prudent man 
in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an 
offense.'"

[¶20.]  This court also has defined probable 
cause as "`the facts and circumstances within the peace officer's knowledge and of which 
he had reasonably trustworthy 
information * * * sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent man 
to believe that the person arrested has committed * * * an offense (emphasis 
added).'" Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 476 (Wyo. 1983); Neilson. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879, reh. denied, 338 U.S. 839, 70 S. Ct. 31, 94 L. Ed. 513 (1949). It is recognized that the standard is an 
objective one which is not subject to police discretion, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 
13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964), but, even so, the matter of probable cause "is to be 
viewed from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer 
on the scene at the time of the arrest guided by his experience and training." 
United 
States v. 
Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The experience and expertise possessed by the 
arresting officer is to be taken into account. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 95 S. Ct. 2585, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1975); 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948).

[¶21.]  The facts and circumstances which justify 
a determination that probable cause was present must amount to more than mere 
suspicion, but they need not rise to the level of proof of guilt, nor even to 
the level of prima facie evidence of guilt. Ostrowski; Raigosa v. State, 562 P.2d 1009 (Wyo. 
1977); Brinegar. The determination of 
whether the standard was met must be made upon an evaluation of the record. Ostrowski; Neilson. In applying the 
standard, we evaluate the record, with a practical view using good sense. Vrooman v. State, 642 P.2d 782 
(Wyo. 
1982).

[¶22.]  We also recognize that it is not 
necessary that the arresting officer personally have all of the information 
about all of the elements which constitute probable cause. He is entitled to 
rely on the collective knowledge of the other investigating officers. Williams v. State, 557 P.2d 135 
(Wyo. 1976). 
In this regard, the court adopts the doctrine expressed in United States v. Stratton, 453 F.2d 36, 
37 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1069, 92 S. Ct. 1515, 31 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1972), in which the court held:

"We think the knowledge 
of one officer is the knowledge of all and that in the operation of an 
investigative or police agency the collective knowledge and the available 
objective facts are the criteria to be used in assessing probable cause. The 
arresting officer himself need not possess all of the available 
information."

In applying this 
doctrine, the arresting officer should consider and weigh the totality of the 
circumstances when making a decision as to probable cause. He need not proceed 
on the basis of only isolated facts or circumstances.

[¶23.]  In Jandro's case, the record demonstrates 
that the arresting officer had credible and reliable knowledge of the following 
facts and circumstances. He was aware that Marco Macias was a methamphetamine 
supplier from the west coast; that he was reported to have been coming out to 
Wyoming with a 
fresh supply of controlled substances; and that he would be accompanied by a 
partner who had not been identified at that point. This information was 
furnished by a previously reliable informant. From personal observation, the 
arresting officer knew that Jandro was the only individual accompanying Marco. 
That matched the report of the informant. The arresting officer, by virtue of 
the team surveillance and communication, knew that Jandro was present in the 
motel room in Rawlins at the time that Miles and the Nordgren brothers arranged 
to purchase controlled substances for resale. In addition, he knew that Marco 
and his partner had moved on to Douglas and that Gene Nordgren was to meet Marco 
there to pay for the controlled substances Marco had fronted for him and the 
other co-conspirators. Immediately following Gene Nordgren's meeting with Marco 
and his partner, the officer knew, not only through the electronic surveillance 
but through the information furnished by Gene Nordgren, that there were only two 
men in the motel room, Marco, the known dealer in controlled substances, and 
Marco's partner. The officer personally observed Jandro leave the room. He also 
watched Jandro hurrying to use a telephone when he observed a police car arrive 
at the motel.

[¶24.]  Considering the totality of these 
circumstances, sufficient probable cause was present to justify Jandro's arrest. 
Given the facts and circumstances available to the arresting officer, any 
reasonably prudent police officer, especially one with this officer's experience 
and expertise, would conclude that it was probable that Jandro was involved in a 
conspiracy to deliver controlled substances. We hold that Jandro's arrest was 
lawful under the statute and that the search was incidental to the arrest. Such 
a search is lawful and, indeed, recommended for assuring the safety of the 
arresting officers and others in the vicinity. It was appropriate to search for, 
and seize, evidence on Jandro's person in order to prevent its concealment or 
destruction. Nothing indicates that this search was not routinely accomplished 
as incidental to the lawful arrest. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974); 
United 
States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 
94 S. Ct. 467, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969); Roose, 759 P.2d 478.

[¶25.]  We then turn to Jandro's contention that 
the failure of the law enforcement officers to obtain a written or recorded 
waiver of his constitutional rights must be applied to void his conviction. In 
this regard, the state concedes that § 7-1-113, W.S. 1977, was not followed. 
That statute provided:

"A person who has been 
appropriately informed under W.S. 7-9.21 [§ 7-1-111] may waive in writing, or by 
other record, any right provided by this act if the court concerned, at the time 
of or after waiver, finds of record that he has acted with full awareness of his 
rights and of the consequences of a waiver and if the waiver is otherwise made 
according to law. The court shall consider such factors as the person's age, 
education, familiarity with the English language and the complexity of the crime 
involved."

This waiver 
provision now is found in § 7-6-107, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), and the 
requirement that a waiver be in writing or otherwise recorded no longer is 
present.

[¶26.]  Jandro also points to § 7-1-111, W.S. 
1977, which provided in pertinent part:

"(a) If a person who is 
being detained by a law enforcement officer * * * is not represented by an 
attorney under conditions in which a 
person having his own counsel would be entitled to be so represented, the 
law enforcement officers concerned, upon commencement of detention * * * shall 
clearly inform him of the right of a needy person to be represented by an 
attorney at public expense, and if the person detained or charged does not have 
an attorney, notify the * * * trial court concerned * * * that he is not so 
represented [emphasis added].

* * * * * 
*

"(e) Information given to 
a person under this section is effective only if: 

"(i) It is in writing or 
otherwise recorded;

"(ii) He records his 
acknowledgment of receipt and time of receipt, or, if he refuses to make this 
acknowledgment, the person giving the information records that he gave the 
information and that the person informed refused so to acknowledge it; 
and

"(iii) The material so 
recorded under paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this subsection is filed with the 
court next concerned."

It is clear 
these statutory provisions were not followed. It also is clear that the material 
circumstances did not encompass any requirement that they be 
followed.

[¶27.]  Jandro asserts that the failure to comply 
with the statute makes the statements that he gave to law enforcement officers 
inadmissible. It is clear from the record that there was no violation of the 
rights preserved to Jandro under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States as articulated in Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 
(1966). This court has subscribed to the doctrine of Miranda not only under the Fifth 
Amendment but under Article 1, § 11 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming. E.g., 
Dryden v. State, 535 P.2d 483 
(Wyo. 1975). 
We perceive Jandro's argument, however, as an unwarranted effort to expand upon 
the legislative intent represented by the statutory enactments upon which he 
relies. Those statutes are a part of the Public Defender Act and, read in pari 
materia with other provisions, it is clear that the legislative effort was 
designed to secure for those needy persons defined in the statute the 
constitutional right to be represented by counsel as provided by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article 1, § 10 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming.

[¶28.]  This court has held consistently that the 
right to counsel attaches only upon the commencement of adversary criminal 
proceedings. Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739 (Wyo. 1987); Charpentier v. State, 736 P.2d 724 
(Wyo. 1987); State v. Heiner, 683 P.2d 629 
(Wyo. 1984); Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024 
(Wyo. 1983). 
In this instance, the adversary criminal proceedings had not commenced at the 
time of Jandro's interrogation by the law enforcement officers. We call 
particular attention to the language in § 7-1-111, W.S. 1977, which provides for 
pursuing the statute "if a person * * * is not represented by an attorney under 
conditions in which a person having his own counsel would be entitled to be so 
represented, * * *." We are cognizant of the language of the statute that refers 
to a person being detained by a law enforcement officer, and simply point out 
that detention by a law enforcement officer can occur after the initiation of 
adversary criminal proceedings. It is clear that Jandro's responses to the law 
enforcement officers were voluntary in the context of the preservation of his 
rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 
Article 1, § 11 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming. He had been told 
that he had a right to consult with an attorney and did not insist upon the 
exercise of that right.

[¶29.]  Furthermore, we can discern no impact 
upon Jandro's right to a fair trial resulting from the failure to comply with 
the statutes. Jandro must assume the burden of demonstrating the possibility 
that the verdict of the jury might have been more favorable to him in the 
absence of even a technical error. Trujillo v. State, 750 P.2d 1334 (Wyo. 1988); Jones 
v. State, 735 P.2d 699 (Wyo. 1987). The responses that Jandro made at 
the times he was interrogated were not incriminatory. They were evasive and 
contrary to fact. In the context of the trial, the jury might well have believed 
that he was lying to the law enforcement officers at the time he made the 
statements. Nevertheless, in the light of all the other evidence in this case, 
we can perceive no reasonable possibility that the jury might have decided to 
find Jandro guilty because he had lied to the law enforcement officers. 
Obviously, the jury responded to the testimony of the other witnesses which 
clearly provided direct and circumstantial evidence of Jandro's 
guilt.

[¶30.]  The last question to be resolved is 
Jandro's claim of error relating to the admission of out of court statements 
made by co-conspirators. Jandro concedes that the prosecution established 
adequate independent proof of the existence of a conspiracy, but he contends 
that there was a failure to demonstrate his membership in the conspiracy so that 
statements implicating him, even though made in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
were hearsay and were admitted in error. In presenting this argument, Jandro 
urges that we consider the issue, not in the light of our prior cases, but under 
what he contends are the more stringent federal standards requiring proof of 
both the existence of a conspiracy and the defendant's participation in it by a 
preponderance of the evidence, not by a prima facie showing, before the 
statements of co-conspirators can be admitted. He also urges that, under any 
standard, there must be sufficient independent proof of this foundation 
introduced prior to the time the statements can be offered. Jandro also argues 
that, even if the statements of co-conspirators were properly admitted, the 
introduction of the statements attributed to Marco violate his right of 
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
under Article 1, § 10 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming.

[¶31.]  Essentially, Jandro's claim is that, 
without the requisite foundation, the statements of co-conspirators are simply 
statements made by an out of court declarant which are hearsay and inadmissible 
at trial. Rules 801 and 802, W.R.E.; Kelly v. State, 694 P.2d 126 (Wyo. 1985). With respect 
to statements of co-conspirators, Rule 801(d)(2)(E), W.R.E., provides as 
follows:

"(d) Statements which are 
not hearsay. - A statement is not hearsay if:

* * * * * 
*

"(2) Admission by 
Party-Opponent. - The statement is offered against a party and 
is

* * * * * 
*

"(E) a statement by a 
co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy."

If the 
statements which were admitted fit under this rule, they are not hearsay, and 
any objection to their admission into evidence based upon Rule 802, W.R.E. 
(which generally excludes hearsay), was properly 
overruled.

[¶32.]  This rule, now so recurrent in criminal 
prosecutions, had its origin, and finds its justification, in the laws of 
agency. Indeed, the statements of co-conspirators often were referred to as 
vicarious admissions. Bigelow v. 
State, 768 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1989). In Hitchman Coal & Coke Company v. 
Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 249, 38 S. Ct. 65, 72, 62 L. Ed. 260 (1917), the court explained:

"* * * The rule of 
evidence is commonly applied in criminal cases, but is of general operation; 
indeed, it originated in the law of partnership. It depends upon the principle 
that when any number of persons associate themselves together in the prosecution 
of a common plan or enterprise, lawful or unlawful, from the very act of 
association there arises a kind of partnership, each member being constituted 
the agent of all, so that the act or declaration of one, in furtherance of the 
common object, is the act of all, and is admissible as primary and original 
evidence against them."

[¶33.]  Three elements must be demonstrated 
before a statement can be admitted as non hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), 
W.R.E. There must be evidence of a conspiracy; evidence that the declarant and 
the defendant both were involved in the conspiracy; and a showing that the 
proffered statements were made during the course of, and in furtherance of, the 
conspiracy. Bourjaily v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987); Lutwak 
v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 73 S. Ct. 481, 97 L.Ed 593, 
reh. denied, 345 U.S. 919, 73 S. Ct. 726, 97 L. Ed. 1352 
(1953); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963); Bigelow; Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852 
(Wyo. 1987). 
The first two requirements insure that the statements were in fact made by a 
co-conspirator, and the last introduces a measure of relevance and 
trustworthiness. 

[¶34.]  We previously have held that these 
elements may be demonstrated by prima facie evidence. Burke; Dorador v. State, 711 P.2d 417 
(Wyo. 1985); Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327 
(Wyo. 1977). 
We concluded that such a showing is adequate, and we required neither a 
preponderance of the evidence nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Jasch. In 
addition, we have recognized that because of the covert nature of the crime of 
conspiracy, the foundation may be established with circumstantial evidence. Bigelow; Burke; Jasch. Whether the 
standard has been met is a matter that, similar to other rulings as to the 
admissibility of evidence, is within the proper discretion of the trial court. 
Rule 104, W.R.E.; Bourjaily. Our rule 
is that we do not disturb evidentiary rulings in the absence of a clear abuse of 
discretion. The proper exercise of discretion is demonstrated if the record 
encompasses sufficient evidence to permit the trial court to infer the existence 
of a conspiracy and the identity of its members.

[¶35.]  We conclude that adequate foundation 
evidence is present in this record. Jandro does not question the sufficiency of 
the evidence as to the existence of the conspiracy. His dispute is with the 
sufficiency of the proof of his membership. Miles testified that Jandro was in 
the room where, and at a time when, the drug transactions took place. That was 
consistent with the observations of the surveillance team. The record also shows 
that Jandro met Miles in the field in Douglas 
and conducted her to the motel room where he was staying with Marco. Jandro was 
present during her discussion with Marco. He had possession of the marked bills 
originally given to Downing to purchase methamphetamine. Conceding that the 
thrust of this evidence is circumstantial only, it is sufficient to sustain an 
inference of Jandro's membership in the conspiracy for the purpose of 
introducing the statements of co-conspirators. Jasch. It may be true that those facts 
would not alone suffice to convict Jandro of conspiracy to deliver a controlled 
substance, because conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but we 
are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to permit the trial court, in 
the exercise of its discretion, to infer the existence of a conspiracy and 
appellant's membership in it for purposes of making its ruling. See Bourjaily. The additional proof of 
Jandro's guilt then is found in the statements of the 
co-conspirators.

[¶36.]  We recognize that a preferred order of 
proof may well exist. It is far easier to analyze contentions such as Jandro's 
when the existence of a conspiracy and membership in it is established before 
any statements of co-conspirators are offered. Nevertheless, we consistently 
have held that the order of proof relative to the introduction of the statements 
is not significant if the record does contain facts from which the conspiracy, 
and the defendant's membership in it, appropriately may be inferred. Rule 
104(b), W.R.E.; Dorador, 711 P.2d 417; Jasch. While the preferred order 
of proof should be utilized whenever possible, the failure to do so is not 
reversible error. See United States v. 
DuFriend, 691 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1173, 103 S. Ct. 820, 74 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1983). Jandro has not demonstrated any compelling reason for us to adjust 
these rulings.

[¶37.]  As we have indicated, our rule requires 
proof of the first two elements independent of the co-conspirators' statements. 
See Bourjaily; Jasch. We do not 
permit "bootstrapping." See United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974); see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 
(1942). Under our rule, the statements of the co-conspirators cannot be 
considered in determining whether the conspiracy existed or the defendant was a 
member. Jasch, 563 P.2d  at 1334; see 
Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of 
Independent Evidence of Conspiracy to Allow Admission of Extrajudicial 
Statements of Coconspirators, 46 A.L.R.3d 1148 (1972). In this instance, 
that limitation was not transgressed.

[¶38.]  Jandro argues vigorously that Wyoming should embrace 
the preponderance of the evidence standard articulated in Bourjaily in resolving the question of 
admissibility of the co-conspirators' statements. In Bourjaily, 483 U.S.  at 176, 107 S. Ct.  at 2779, the United States Supreme Court said, "when the preliminary facts 
relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are disputed, the offering party must prove them 
by a preponderance of the evidence." In our judgment, this is not a proper case 
to resolve this argument. The requirement suggested by the Supreme Court of the 
United 
States is viable only in the context of a 
contest with respect to the foundation. That contest well could be found in a 
pre-trial motion to suppress. It is even possible that the court could interrupt 
the trial and conduct a trial within the trial on the question of admissibility. 
When as here, however, the challenge is made simply by way of objection, the 
description of the standard becomes only a matter of semantics. In such an 
instance, the only evidence before the court is that which has been presented by 
the prosecution. Whether the court invokes a prima facie standard of proof or a 
preponderance of evidence standard of proof, exactly the same evidence is 
considered. Consequently, it is not material in our consideration of this case 
whether the standard invoked by the trial court was a preponderance of the 
evidence or a prima facie case. So long as the record discloses evidence of a 
conspiracy and evidence of Jandro's membership in the conspiracy, the requisite 
foundation has been established.

[¶39.]  With respect to Jandro's claim that he 
was denied his right, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, § 10 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, to 
confront witnesses against him, we adopt the rule articulated by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. While hearsay rules are designed to protect the 
constitutional guarantee. California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970); Dutton 
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S. Ct. 210, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213 
(1970), the out-of-court statements of a co-conspirator are not hearsay. The 
United States Supreme Court rejected the challenge Jandro presents in Delaney v. United States, 263 U.S. 586, 
44 S. Ct. 206, 68 L. Ed. 462 (1924), holding that there can be no challenge under 
the confrontation clause to the admission of a co-conspirator's out-of-court 
statement. Such statements clearly fall "outside the compass of the general 
hearsay exclusion." Bourjaily, 483 U.S.  at 183, 107 S. Ct.  at 2783. 
Furthermore, the court in Dutton 
ruled that evidentiary issues relating to the statements of a co-conspirator are 
more properly addressed under due process claims pursuant to the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments than under the confrontation clause of the Sixth 
Amendment. We hold that the constitutional right to confrontation was not 
unlawfully denied or abridged.

[¶40.]  The judgment and sentence is 
affirmed.

1 Section 35-7-1031, W.S. 
1977 (June 1988 Repl.), provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows:

"Except as authorized by 
this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with 
intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance. Any person who 
violates this subsection with respect to:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) Any other 
controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of a crime 
and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, fined 
not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both; * * 
*."

Section 
35-7-1042, W.S. 1977, provides:

"Any person who attempts 
or conspires to commit any offense under this article within the state of 
Wyoming or who conspires to commit an act beyond the state of Wyoming which if 
done in this state would be an offense punishable under this article, shall be 
punished by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum 
punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the object of 
the attempt or conspiracy."

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶41.]  I dissent for two reasons. First, this 
majority removes from the Wyoming Confrontation Clause1 our right to cross-examine an 
accuser2 and does so without examining the 
Reserved Rights Clause.3 This majority adopts for Wyoming the meaning assigned to the federal Confrontation 
Clause by Bourjaily v. 
United States4 in order to remove a previous state 
constitutional right to cross-examine our accusers.5 I would preserve our right to 
confront an accuser and would hold the court is directed by our state 
constitution to consult the Reserved Rights Clause before decreasing the 
protective terrain surrounding Wyoming's Confrontation Clause. Second, after 
removing our right to cross-examine an accuser, this majority then insists on 
reaffirming the "inference standard"6 rather than adopting the federal 
preponderance of the evidence standard7 to decide when it is correct to 
admit against an accused citizen the testimony of an accuser who cannot be 
cross-examined. I would adopt for Wyoming the federal 
standard.

[¶42.]  Luis A. Jandro is not the only person in 
Wyoming who 
lost the right to cross-examine his accusers when his conviction was affirmed. 
All of us have lost that right today. We are capable of better jurisprudence.8 I dissent.

[¶43.]  The chief controversy with which I am 
concerned questions the constitutionality of reducing the bulwark of an 
enumerated state right9 without examining the relation 
between that reduction and the Reserved Rights Clause. I would argue here the 
Reserved Rights Clause shifts the burden of proof to the government to establish 
the new enumeration of the Wyoming Confrontation Clause, accomplished by 
reassigning to it a new and smaller scope, does not deny, impair, or disparage any right 
reserved to the people of Wyoming. The mistake made by the majority is 
in assuming that if the right to cross-examine an accuser in open court is 
located in our Confrontation Clause, then that right is extinguished when it is 
removed from the Confrontation Clause by adopting for Wyoming the federal 
Confrontation Clause which openly extinguishes that right under Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775. 
That assumption is false unless the propositions of law (rights) involved do not 
exhaust the logical space (amendments) they occupy.10 Since there are other 
possibilities, I would argue the right to cross-examine an accuser in open court 
can also be located in the Reserved Rights Clause of the Wyoming Constitution.11

[¶44.]  In this case, the majority adopts for 
Wyoming the 
new meaning assigned to the federal Confrontation Clause and supposes in the 
process to have annihilated the right to cross-examine an accuser by deleting it 
from the state's constitutional Confrontation Clause. This is done under the 
assumption that no right to confrontation can be located simultaneously within 
other open-textured provisions such as Due Process, Equal Protection, or 
Reserved Rights Clauses. The result in this case affirms Jandro's conviction for 
conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine in violation of W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 
35-7-1042 by a procedure denying his counsel the opportunity to cross-examine 
the "confidential informant" whose words were put into the mouth of Detective 
Stuhlmiller for court presentation against the accused. Permitting that 
testimony stands in stark contrast to our previous holdings that the Wyoming 
Confrontation Clause requires the prosecutor demonstrate the "unavailability" of 
a witness and there be an "indicia of reliability"12 prior to its current use as 
testimony.13

[¶45.]  This court has jurisprudential 
responsibilities to the people of Wyoming which foreclose "selecting Supreme 
Court precedent on an ad hoc basis with the negative result-oriented appearance 
that accompanies such an approach." Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, XXILand & Water L.Rev. 527, 549 (1986). 
We should develop and incorporate "a principled basis for evaluating and 
incorporating Supreme Court precedent into state constitutional jurisprudence" 
if we feel incapable of developing our own interpretive model for understanding 
the Wyoming Constitution. Id. at 549.

[¶46.]  First, this court adopts the basic 
liberty-right denial thesis and then goes on to reject the Bourjaily14 preponderance of the evidence 
standard for admitting alleged conspiracy statements against the federally 
accused under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E). Consequently, this court reaffirms the most 
base evidentiary standard15 possible, which serves to 
strengthen the power of the prosecutor by concurrent destruction of a 
constitutional protection to any accused. After first rejecting the federal 
preponderance of the evidence standard, the majority then adopts for Wyoming the newest 
construction of the federal Confrontation Clause. This newest adaptation of 
confrontation and cross-examination diminishes severely the ability of the 
Wyoming 
judiciary to position itself between the power of the prosecutor and the 
constitutional protection of the accused citizen. We pick the worst of two 
worlds and fuse them into Wyoming law. We choose neither reliability nor 
necessity as the touchstone.16 Likewise, we serve not to preserve 
"the basic purpose of the [confrontation] clause, assuring the accused the right 
to confront and cross-examine his accusers in the presence of the fact finder 
which must determine his guilt or innocence."17

[¶47.]  The Bourjaily preponderance requirement 
established at least some definable decisions by the trial court for admission 
of any statement allegedly made to further the course of a conspiracy between 
the accused and an alleged co-conspirator before that statement becomes part of 
the evidentiary menu served up to the jury.18 The Bourjaily court rested that standard on 
concerns voiced when Congress "enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975."19 While that standard does not bind 
the Wyoming 
courts, we should not forget entirely the admission of a conspiracy statement 
alleged by the prosecutor does not allow an "accused to confront the witness"20 if the accuser cannot be 
cross-examined. The fundamental right to confront and cross-examine the witness 
should be beyond question.21

[¶48.]  The common argument advanced to 
circumvent the right to confront an accuser during a charge of conspiracy 
becomes a legal fiction busy chasing its own tail. Because Confrontation Clause 
concerns once forbade the general use of hearsay by a prosecutor against an 
accused,22 we declared not to be hearsay23 the alleged conspiracy statement 
when the declarant is unavailable. If we did not declare the alleged conspiracy 
statement is not hearsay, that statement could be mistaken for hearsay because 
it meets the definition of hearsay.24 But since we declared it not 
hearsay, the Confrontation Clause need not be consulted.25

[¶49.]  Having rejected the only Bourjaily safeguard for the accused 
citizen, the majority then imports wholesale the current construction and 
interpretation assigned the Confrontation Clause by the United States 
Supreme Court26 and requires that meaning be 
understood as intended27 by the Wyoming Confrontation 
Clause. That requirement does not bridge the questions which surround it and 
requires a leap of faith I will not attempt across the abyss which now separates 
the old interpretation assigned our state Confrontation Clause from our newly 
adopted Bourjaily interpretation.28 

[¶50.]  I accept for now the established legal 
fiction that admits into the presence of the jury an alleged conspiratorial 
statement made by an unavailable declarant.29 I do so only to preserve the 
stability of stare decisis.30 But I do not accept any more 
erosion of our public right to confront our accusers openly in court. When a 
constitutional provision is newly construed to impair the previous scope of an 
enumerated right, as is done when the Bourjaily construction of the 
Confrontation Clause becomes our own, we should not neglect the Reserved Rights 
Clause located in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 36.31 What if we discover that 
enumerated rights are indeed located within a field of unenumerated rights? 
What do we then do as jurists if we are in pursuit of our own interpretive model 
to understand best the Wyoming Constitution?32

[¶51.]  Perhaps we could put away quietly our 
sword of advocacy for the prosecution33 and devote fidelity to the Wyoming 
Constitution which, of course, includes the Reserved Rights Clause.34 While such an "inclusive"35 provision can "never be 
complete,"36 perhaps we can make of Wyoming law the best it can be by including in our state's 
jurisprudence all provisions of the 
Wyoming 
constitution and by continuing the reasonable process and providing substantive 
protection.37

[¶52.]  I would hold the Wyoming Confrontation 
Clause continues to contain the right to cross-examine the accuser and that this 
court is directed by our state constitution to consult the Reserved Rights 
Clause before we decrease the legal landscape which surrounds Wyoming's 
Confrontation Clause. Also to be noted are that inferences, as a sufficiency 
level for decision making, come clothed with all kinds of factual 
characteristics. We should beware of an innocuous adaptation of the thinking 
climate that the world is flat as an inference from our inability to visually 
observe the curvature. I would adopt for Wyoming the federal and otherwise generally 
accepted preponderance of the evidence requirement to decide when it is correct 
to admit against an accused citizen the testimony of an accuser who cannot be 
cross-examined, rather than the inference determination methodology articulated 
by this majority.

[¶53.]  I regretfully and respectfully dissent in 
observing this accusatorial process where constitutional rights are denied to 
the charged defendant, but more expressively from this creation of a standard 
for future cases where the difference between guilt and innocence may be less 
distinctly drawn.

1 Right of accused to 
defend.

In all criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation, to have a copy thereof, to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him, * * *.

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 
(emphasis added).

2 Reaffirmed in Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663, 673 
(Wyo. 
1982).

3 Rights not enumerated 
reserved to people.

The enumeration in this 
constitution, of certain rights shall not be construed to deny, impair, or 
disparage others retained by the people.

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
36.

4 483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775, 97 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1987).

5 "Today, we conclude that the second 
inquiry, independent indicia of reliability, is also not mandated by the 
Constitution." Bourjaily, 483 U.S.  at 182, 107 S. Ct.  at 2783, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 157 (emphasis added). See n. 28 and then n. 12, infra.

6 See n. 15, infra.

7 F.R.E. 
801(d)(2)(E).

8 If the majority were to 
argue there has been no change to Wyoming's Confrontation Clause, then the 
decision below could be affirmed on the basis of Grable, 649 P.2d  at 672-73 and that 
would foreclose the need to adopt for Wyoming the construction assigned the 
Confrontation Clause under Bourjaily, 
483 U.S. 171, 107 S. Ct. 2775. Cf. Bigelow 
v. State, 768 P.2d 558 (Wyo. 1989). See also Burke v. State, 746 P.2d 852 
(Wyo. 1987) 
(Urbigkit, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

9 See n. 1, supra.

10 See Dworkin, No Right Answer? 53 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1 
(1978).

11 I would also argue the 
Reserved Rights Clause shifts the burden to the government to demonstrate that 
that possibility is foreclosed. It would be extraordinary to require Wyoming constitutional 
"history to confirm the plain 
meaning" of the Reserved Rights Clause. Bourjaily, 483 U.S.  at 178, 107 S. Ct.  at 2780, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 154 (emphasis in original). Requiring an accused 
citizen to prove the state constitution mandates an "indicia of reliability" is 
to deny or disparage the proposition. For if it is accepted, there is no need 
for proof.

12 "The indicia of reliability is satisfied 
when the prior testimony was under oath, when defendant was represented by 
counsel, when the counsel could and did cross-examine the witness, and when the 
cross-examination which would be conducted at the trial would not touch upon any 
new and significantly material line of inquiry." Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 837 
(Wyo. 1980) 
(emphasis added).

13 Rodriguez v. State, 711 P.2d 410, 415 
(Wyo. 1985); 
Grable, 649 P.2d 663.

14 483 U.S.  at 176, 107 S. Ct.  at 2779, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 152.

15 The majority states 
"[t]he proper exercise of discretion is demonstrated if the record encompasses 
sufficient evidence to permit the trial court to infer the existence of a conspiracy and 
the identity of its members." (Emphasis added.) Sometimes we label this "prima 
facie evidence." In Dorador v. State, 
711 P.2d 417, 418-19 (Wyo. 1985), we explained "prima facie in this 
context" can only be defined in terms which permit a reasonable inference that a 
conspiracy existed.

But the 
"inference" characterization restated by the majority advances no claim for 
quality of proof and thus does no work. An inference is a thought process for 
determination and not a standard of evidence for decision. The reasonableness of 
the inference addresses the logic of the decision and the stability of 
establishment of the underlying facts. "Inferences are deductions or conclusions 
which with reason and common sense lead the jury to draw from facts which have 
been established by the evidence in the case." Black's Law Dictionary 700 (5th 
ed. 1979). As this court in Matter of 
Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028, 1034 (Wyo. 1988) quoted:

"Guess-work cannot be 
substituted for evidence or inference, for `an inference is the conclusion drawn 
on reason from premises established by proof. In a sense it is the thing proved. 
Guess-work is not.' Whitehouse v. 
Bolster, 95 Me. 458, 50 A. 240 [1901]." Wright v. Conway, 34 Wyo. 1, 241 P. 369, reh. 
denied, 34 Wyo. 42, 51, 242 P. 1107, 1110 
(1926).

* * * * * 
*

"An inference is a 
deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact 
or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action." Cal.Evidence 
Code § 600(b) (West 1966).

Of course, the 
trial court must determine a conspiracy may have existed. The question begged by 
the majority and asked by Jandro is what is an acceptable "quantum of proof on 
which such determinations must be based," Bourjaily, 483 U.S.  at 173, 107 S. Ct.  at 2778, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 151, in order to build a reasonably valid 
inference?

The validity of 
inference decision making is controlled by the adequacy and accuracy of the 
underlying facts, Kobielusz v. 
Wilson, 701 P.2d 559 (Wyo. 1985), and the logical relationship of 
those facts to the derived conclusion. For example, it is cloudy - ergo, it may 
rain; it is cloudy - it will rain; it is cloudy - it did rain. The second is an 
invalid inference and the last is no inference at all since it only constitutes 
a statement of historical fact. The prohibition against an inference built upon 
an inference, 1A Wigmore, Evidence § 41 (Tillers rev. 1983), recognizes as 
invalid an escalation of stacked possibilities to reach a less likely 
probability. Matter of Estate of 
Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028.

16 Halpern, The Confrontation Clause and the Search for 
Truth in Criminal Trials, 37 Buffalo L.Rev. 165, 200 
(1988-89).

17 Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause, the Right Against 
Self-Incrimination in the Supreme Court: A Critique and Some Modest 
Proposals, 20 Duq.L.Rev. 429, 461 (1982).

18 Bourjaily, 483 U.S.  at 176 n. 1 and 186 
n. 1, 107 S. Ct.  at 2779 n. 1 and 2784 n. 1, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 153 n. 1 and 159 n. 
1.

19 Bourjaily, 483 U.S.  at 177, 107 S. Ct.  at 2780, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 154.

20 Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
10.

21 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970); 
Pointer v. State of Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965); 
People v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306 (1987).

22 Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth 
Amendment, 35 UCLA L.Rev. 557 (1988); Note, Richardson v. Marsh: Codefendant Confessions and the 
Demise of Confrontation, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 1876 (1988). See also Note, Bourjaily v. United States: A 
New Rule for Admitting Coconspirator Hearsay Statements Under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), 1988 Wis.L.Rev. 577 (1988) and Sixth Amendment - The Co-Conspirator 
Exemption to the Hearsay Rule: The Confrontation Clause and Preliminary Factual 
Determinations Relevant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), 78 
J.Crim.L. & Criminology 915 (1988).

23 W.R.E. 
801(d).

24 Hearsay is defined in 
W.R.E. 801(c) as a "statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted."

25 Quod erat 
demonstrandum?

26 See n. 28, infra.

27 "[C]reative 
interpretation takes its formal structure from the idea of intention, not (at 
least not necessarily) because it aims to discover the purposes of any 
particular historical person or group but because it aims to impose purpose over 
the text or data or tradition being interpreted." R. Dworkin, Law's Empire, at 228 
(1986).

28 While a literal interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause could bar the use of any out-of-court statements when the declarant 
is unavailable, this Court has rejected that view as "unintended and too extreme." * * * Rather, we have attempted to harmonize the goal of 
the Clause - placing limits on the kind of evidence that may be received 
against a defendant - with a societal 
interest in accurate factfinding, which may require consideration of 
out-of-court statements. To accommodate 
these competing interests, the Court has, as a general matter only, required the prosecution to demonstrate 
both the unavailability of the 
declarant and the "indicia of reliability" surrounding the 
out-of-court declaration. * * * Last 
Term * * *, we held that the 
first of these two generalized inquiries, unavailability, was not required when 
the hearsay statement is the out-of-court declaration of a co-conspirator. Today, we conclude that the second 
inquiry, independent indicia of reliability, is also not mandated by the 
Constitution.

Bourjaily, 483 U.S.  at 182, 107 S. Ct.  at 2783, 97 L. Ed. 2d  at 157 (emphasis added). See Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme 
Court: Some Good News and Some Bad News, 17 Hofstra L.Rev. 51 (1988). See also Note, Barker v. Morris and the Right? to 
Confrontation, 14 Hastings Const. L.Q. 839 
(1987).

Under what 
jurisdiction does the Rehnquist court privately amend the "goal of the Clause?" 
This is what the majority transforms into future Wyoming law? For historical perspective, see 
Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted": 
Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L.Rev. 1 
(1987).

29 W.R.E. 
801(d)(2)(E).

30 Bigelow, 768 P.2d 558; Burke, 746 P.2d 852; Rodriguez, 711 P.2d  at 
415.

31 See n. 3, supra.

32 See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra, at 
227-28.

33 "`Courts have been 
sympathetic to this problem [of the prosecutor], * * *.'" Bigelow, 768 P.2d  at 562 (quoting Burke, 746 P.2d at 855). "`Courts have 
been sympathetic to this problem [of the prosecutor], * * *.'" Burke, 746 P.2d  at 855 (quoting W. 
LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal Law at 460-61 (1972).

34 "Anyone who professes to 
take rights seriously, and who praises our Government for respecting them, must 
have some sense of what that point is." R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at 198 
(1978).

35 See Gezzi v. State, 780 P.2d 972 
(Wyo. 
1989).

36 Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 
Cornell L.Rev. 1, 42 (1988). See also 
Symposium, Interpreting The Ninth 
Amendment, 64 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 37 (1988).

37 Burke, 746 P.2d 852 (Urbigkit, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313 
(10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905, 100 S. Ct. 2985, 64 L. Ed. 2d 854 
(1980).