Case Title: DEWEY v. STATE ex. rel. OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION & RETIREMENT SYSTEM

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92726

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
DEWEY v. STATE ex. rel. OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION & RETIREMENT SYSTEM  DEWEY v. STATE ex. rel. OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION & RETIREMENT SYSTEM 2001 OK 40 28 P.3d 539 72 OBJ 1783 Case Number: 92726 Decided: 05/08/2001 Mandate Issued: 07/11/2001 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY HONORABLE CAROLYN R. RICKS, JUDGE ¶0 Appellant seeks review of the trial court's February 12, 1999 postjudgment order. In its appeal appellant questions the trial court's (1) jurisdiction, (2) imposition of prejudgment interest and (3) determination of when appellees' cause of action accrued. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS REVERSED IN PART AND SUSTAINED IN PART James R. Moore and Patrick Hunt, James R. Moore and Associates, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Appellees. Marc Edwards and Dionna D. Deardorff, Phillips McFall McCaffrey McVay & Murrah, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Appellant. Lavender, J. ¶1 Resolution of today's cause requires the Court to assess in what capacity a district court acted when in a single case it both (1) reviewed an administrative agency's order entered in an individual proceeding and (2) entered judgment in favor of a certified class of litigants whose substantive claim included the same legal subject as that encompassed in the appealed agency-order. Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement Board's [appellant or Board] appeal challenges the district court's authority to enter an order I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2 Dewey first became eligible for retirement as a firefighter on August1, 1991. On February 4, 1994 Board received Dewey's claim brought as a "war veteran" under the terms of 72O.S.1991 § 67.13a to have included in his accrued credited service (as a firefighter) his earlier military service, i.e., military service completed before he entered the firefighters retirement system. ¶3 On July 7, 1995 Dewey [and Riddle], individually and as class representative for those firefighters who met the statutory-definition of "war veteran," brought both a suit and an appeal [under a single case number] from the Board's denial (of a military-service credit) to the district court. The class was certified on July 18, 1996 by an order approved by all parties. Judgment was entered on March 5, 1997 directing that firefighters who were "war veterans" under the terms of 72O.S.1991 §67.13a and retired after its effective date (June 29, 1981) were entitled to enhancement of their accrued credited service through consideration of their military service, regardless whether the pensioner's military service occurred before or after entry into the retirement system. The matter was remanded to the Board to perform the necessary recalculation of retirement benefits for Dewey and other affected class members. While an appeal was taken from the district court's March 5, 1997 decision by one class representative (Thomas J. Riddle) on grounds different from those asserted today, ¶4 Upon remand Board recalculated class members' retirement benefits. Eligible pensioners' retirement benefits were enhanced both retrospectively and prospectively from February 5, 1995 ¶5 The trial court's February 12, 1999 postjudgment enforcement order directs that corrected benefits for Dewey and all eligible class members, plus prejudgment interest, be [ 28 P.3d 544 ] paid from February 4, 1991 [a date which is three years antecedent to the filing date of Dewey's administrative claim] until February 5, 1997 the trial court's "ruling date." II THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7 In today's cause the Board questions the district court's jurisdiction; and Dewey and the class members raise issues of adjective law concerning application of the appropriate limitations period and entitlement to interest on their judgment. The primary focus of today's appeal is the district court's resolution of these issues through its postjudgment enforcement order and as such essentially presents questions of law which are reviewed de novo. 9 An appellate court has plenary, independent and non-deferential authority to reexamine a trial court's legal rulings.10 III AS TO DEWEY'S INDIVIDUAL CLAIM, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO ENTER ITS ENFORCEMENT ORDER WHICH ADDRESSED ISSUES OUTSIDE THE RECORD SUBMITTED OF THE INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDING ¶9 The Court begins its analysis by assessing the nature of the legal proceedings prosecuted by the parties before the district court. This is made difficult by the fact that the district court's March 5, 1997 judgment, which is final and now absolute, simultaneously addresses under a single case-number two different proceedings on the same subject [the availability of a military-service credit for firefighters who are war veterans and also possess vested interests in the firefighter-retirement system]. The parties' failure to comprehend the judgment's dual nature i.e., as (1) a judgment which embodies an appellate opinion and (2) a decision on a class' application for declaratory relief results [ 28 P.3d 545 ] in a failure to understand the full nature of the district court's March 5, 1999 postjudgment enforcement order. ¶10 Dewey, as an individual, brought a petition for review of Board's June 16, 1995 order entered in the individual proceeding on his administrative claim. His appeal from the agency's final order under the OAPA's provisions invokes the district court's appellate jurisdiction.12 In response to his appeal the district court entered its March 5, 1997 judgment and the same is final and today beyond the reach of the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Neither Dewey nor the Board can now be heard for the first time to appeal the judgment, its terms and provisions. ¶11 Dewey's appeal to the district court from the Board's order denying his claim was necessarily brought under the terms of 12O.S.Supp.1992 § 318 (A)(1).13 The district court's March 5, 1997 judgment addressed the sole issue presented by the administrative hearing's record, i.e., Dewey's legal entitlement to a military-service credit. The district court remanded the cause to the agency for recalculation of Dewey's retirement benefits in a manner consistent with the reviewing court's legal conclusions. The March 5, 1997 judgment [qua appellate opinion] became final and absolute when no appeal from its provisions was prosecuted within thirty (30) days after it was filed. ¶12 There are no OAPA provisions which authorize the district court to re-open appellate proceedings for enforcement purposes once they become final. Further, the issues of (1) entitlement to prejudgment interest and (2) the proper limitations period are not part of the administrative record which was forwarded to the district court for review. Extant jurisprudence requires that when considering an appeal brought under the OAPA's provisions the district court must confine its review to the record made before the administrative tribunal.14 Hence, the district court was acting outside its authority when it attempted to enter its February 12, 1999 enforcement order as part of the appellate proceedings brought from the Board's June 16, 1995 adjudicative order. Insofar as the district court's February 12, 1999 order addresses Dewey's §318(A)(1)15 individual appeal, the same is reversed. IV THE DISTRICT COURT RETAINED JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE ITS MARCH 5, 1997 JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE CLASS' FAVOR ¶13 We begin with a statement of the obvious. Persons who are not parties to an administrative adjudication from which the appealed agency order emanates have no standing to seek review of that order in an appellate proceeding.16 The record demonstrates that class members other than Dewey and Riddle were not named, nor did they participate, in the Board's adjudication of Dewey's administrative claim. Hence, under the OAPA's relevant provisions17 the class members do not qualify as "parties" to the "individual proceeding" on the claim and cannot seek appellate review of the agency's [ 28 P.3d 546 ] final order entered in the same. This is not to say that firefighters like-situated to Dewey have no avenue of redress for perceived harm to their rights to receive statutorily-authorized, military-service credits. ¶14 The record demonstrates that class members except Dewey and Riddle did not file administrative claims seeking the benefit of the statutorily-prescribed, military-service credit even though they held vested interests in the firefighters retirement system and were potentially entitled to the credit. They can with certainty be said not to have exhausted available administrative remedies before bringing their district court action. Nonetheless, while the common law requires parties to first exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking redress in the district courts,18 exhaustion is not required in all cases, such as when administrative remedies are inadequate, ineffective or unavailable.19 ¶15 The court's analysis in Allen v. State, 1988 OK 99, 769 P.2d 1302 , is instructive in understanding the essence of the class' district-court petition. The Allen Court recognized a class' right to bring a district-court-declaratory-judgment suit20 under the OAPA's provisions from a de facto agency rule i.e., a rule which is definite enough to represent the agency's position on a particular subject but is not the product of the formal rulemaking process.21 A general prerequisite for bringing such a suit is substantial harm to the class' rights by the (de facto) agency rule. In Allen the Court found that an agency's "obedience" to the legal advice of the Attorney General whether considered binding or merely advisory effected adoption of the Attorney General's opinion as a rule.22 This is understandable when one comprehends that a state agency is deemed protected from liability when it proceeds upon the basis of the state's chief law officer's advice.23 Here, the record documents that Board relied upon informal advice from the Attorney General24 to support its denial of military-service credits to firefighters who held vested interests in the retirement system. After Board's adoption of the Attorney General's advice as a basis for its legal response to claims for military-service credits, the procedural remedy of a declaratory-relief suit afforded by the OAPA §306 was available to the class to test the validity of the agency's de facto rule. To require class members to file individual claims as a predicate to seeking redress from Boards asserted legal position on military-service credits would have in essence required class members to do a vain and useless act.25 This neither the law nor equity will do.26 [ 28 P.3d 547 ] ¶16 The above characterization of the class members' petition is critical to resolution of today's appeal. We have undertaken our analysis not to revisit the provisions of the district court's March 5, 1997 declaratory judgment but rather to afford insight into the true nature of, and hence jurisdictional basis for, the district court's February 12, 1999 order. It is only when the latter's character as a postjudgment enforcement order [as to the class' rights] is understood that the district court's authority to enter the same becomes apparent. Oklahoma extant jurisprudence teaches that if a trial court possesses the jurisdiction needed to render judgment, it has authority and power to enforce the same and give it effect.27 Since the district court was vested with jurisdiction over the class' declaratory-relief suit, it has the power to enter a postjudgment order enforcing its judgment in the same. V. CLASS' ACTION ACCRUED THREE YEARS BEFORE THE FILING DATE OF ITS PETITION SEEKING DECLARATORY RELIEF ¶17 Since the parties agreed at trial that the case in controversy is governed by the three-year statute of limitations governing actions upon a liability created by statute,28 the Court need not, and does not, revisit the issue whether or not this is the correct limitation period. Rather today's appeal draws the Court's attention to when the class' claim accrued. It is from this temporal marker that the limitations period is measured. This sets the period for which Board must recalculate eligible class members' enhanced retirement benefits i.e., by giving credit for allowed military service. Class [using an "incorporation" theory] assert that its cause accrued (on the Board's ongoing monthly obligation to each eligible member) three years before Dewey filed his administrative claim with Board. Board contends the marker antecedent to which it should recalculate enhanced benefits is the expiration date of 11O.S.Supp.1994 § 49-100.3G [H.B. 2228]. Neither position is sustainable. ¶18 Oklahoma's class action statute 12 O.S.1991 § 2023 bears great similarity to the provisions of Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P. Earlier case law recognizes the insight which can be garnered through consideration of federal court decisions addressing federally-evolved concepts reflected in Oklahoma's procedural regime.29 The U.S. Supreme Court's seminal decision addressing the relationship between filing a class-action suit and a statute of limitations is American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 , 94 S. Ct. 756, 38 L. Ed. 2d 713 (1974). There the Court held that "commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class . . . ." Id. at 414 U.S. at 554, 94 S. Ct. at 766. ¶19 Dewey's filing of his administrative claim alone does not afford Board notice of the class' identity or the extent of its members' claims, thereby depriving Board of the fundamental fairness which is its due. It is the filing of the class action which gives the defendant/Board notice not only of the class members' substantive claims but also of the "number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs".30 Hence, it is Dewey's filing of the declaratory-relief suit on behalf of himself and like-situated firefighters which tolls the running of the applicable statute of limitations for the class' members.31 VI CLASS FAILED TO MEET THE STATUTORILY-DECLARED PRECONDITION FOR RECEIPT OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND, HENCE, IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE SAME ¶21 Board contests the district court's award of prejudgment interest under the provisions of 23 O.S.1991 § 6 . VII SUMMARY ¶22 Today's pronouncement addresses the nature of two proceedings combined into a single case before the district court and used by the litigants to challenge the denial of military-service credits to themselves as holders of vested interests in the firefighters retirement system. Dewey filed an individual claim with the retirement system and appealed when Board denied him the requested military-service credit. On the other hand the class of which Dewey was but one member pursued the remedy of a declaratory judgment before the district court to secure enhanced retirement benefits. ¶23 As the district court's appellate jurisdiction is conferred by statute [specifically the OAPA], its "reviewing"authority is circumscribed by the statutory provisions granting the same. The OAPA does not give the district court authority to enforce its appellate opinions and further confines the scope of its review to issues presented by the record of the "individual proceeding" conducted by the agency. These conclusions compel the reversal of the February 12, 1999 "postjudgment enforcement order" to the extent that it addresses issues identification of the proper statute of limitations and entitlement to prejudgment interest not fairly comprised in the Board's June 16, 1995 order. ¶24 Unlike when it sat in review of Dewey's appeal from the agency's adjudication, the district court was sitting as a court of first instance when it considered the class' application for declaratory relief. As a trial court it possessed authority not only to render judgment but also to enforce the same. Hence, its consideration of the issues of limitations and prejudgment interest as to the class were entirely within the scope of its authority. Nonetheless, the trial court's enforcement order failed to give proper effect to the bringing of the class-action suit. It is the action's filing which suspends the running of the statute of limitation, and it is the three-year period antecedent to this temporal marker for which vested, retired firefighters are entitled to enhancement of retirement benefits by consideration of military-service credits. The February 12, 1999 postjudgment enforcement order errs also in its award of prejudgment interest. We need not reach the issue of entitlement to the same for the class failed to satisfy an indispensable statutory precondition to receipt of such interest. The record does not disclose that class sought prejudgment interest within thirty (30) days after the judgment was filed as is required by the terms of 12O.S.1991 § 696.4 . Sans the required filing the district court was without authority to make the prejudgment-interest award and the same is reversed. ¶25 For the above reasons, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS REVERSED IN PART AND SUSTAINED IN PART . ¶26 HARGRAVE, C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, OPALA, KAUGER, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur. ¶27 WATT, V.C.J., concurs in result. FOOT