Case Title: State v. Fanger

Citation: 164 Vt 48, 665 A.2d 36

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_FANGER.94-262; 164 Vt 48; 665 A.2d 36

[Opinion Filed 30-Jun-1995]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 26-Jul-1995]


NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 


                                 No. 94-262



State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Bruno Fanger                                      March Term, 1995



Robert Grussing III, J.

Christopher C. Moll, Windham County Deputy State's Attorney, Brattleboro, for
 plaintiff- appellant 

David G. Reid, Brattleboro, for defendant-appellee


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


     DOOLEY, J.   The State of Vermont appeals the Windham District Court's
dismissal of one count of unlawful trespass in violation of 13 V.S.A. 
3705(d) against defendant, Bruno Fanger.   The State argues that the trial
court erred by concluding that the State failed to make a prima facie case.  
We reverse. 

     Defendant is the manager and chief caretaker of eight buildings and 350
acres of property located in Jamaica, Vermont.  The owners of the property
reside out-of-state, and in 1993 they were looking for a housekeeper to live
on the property.  Defendant recommended Gary and Jessica Clay for the job,
who were hired on a trial basis and permitted to reside temporarily in the
building, which also housed defendant's office.  The Clays did not perform
their job satisfactorily, and defendant asked them to leave the property,
although he allowed them to remain until they could find alternative
accommodations. 

     Shortly after defendant asked the Clays to leave, defendant informed
Mrs. Clay by 

 

telephone that she and her husband had to vacate the apartment that day. 
Defendant then contacted the state police to inform them that he had a
problem with a tenant and that he needed to go into the tenant's apartment. 
The State did not present any specific evidence regarding the content of this
conversation, other than that the police officer "advised the Defendant of
the consequences if he did not abide by the laws."  After this conversation
with the state police, defendant went to the building where the Clays
resided, and again told Mrs. Clay that she and her husband had to leave the
apartment that day.  When Mrs. Clay responded that defendant should discuss
the issue with her husband, defendant forced his way into the apartment
despite Mrs. Clay's efforts to prevent him from doing so. 

     Defendant moved to dismiss the information, alleging the inability of
the State to establish a prima facie case.  See V.R.Cr.P. 12(d).  In support
of the motion, defendant filed an affidavit describing his version of what
occurred when he entered the apartment the Clays occupied.  A hearing was
held, and Mrs. Clay testified on behalf of the State.  The court had before
it her testimony and affidavit, and the affidavits of the investigating
officer(FN1) and the defendant.  See id. 12(d)(2) (motion to be decided on
basis of "affidavits, depositions, sworn oral testimony, or other admissible
evidence").  The court ruled that the State failed to show that defendant
knew he was not privileged to enter the apartment, an essential element of
the crime, based on defendant's explanation that he entered to turn on the
heat in other apartments and that he believed the Clays' tenancy had ended. 

     The crime with which defendant is charged is defined as follows: "A
person who enters a dwelling house, whether or not a person is actually
present, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so shall be
imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not more than $2,000 or
both."  13 V.S.A.  3705(d). There is no question that defendant entered a
dwelling house.  The question before us relates solely to the knowledge
element. 

 

     The standard for addressing a motion to dismiss for lack of a prima
facie case is the same as the standard for a motion for judgment of
acquittal.  State v. Norton, 147 Vt. 223, 229,