Case Title: Commonwealth v. Fernandes

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12429

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-09-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12429 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STEPHANIE A. FERNANDES. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     September 6, 2018. - September 4, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Dismissal, Indictment, Grand jury 
proceedings.  Grand Jury.  Evidence, Grand jury 
proceedings, Exculpatory, Self-defense.  Self-Defense. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 16, 2015. 
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Janet Kenton-Walker, J., 
and a motion for reconsideration was also heard by her. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Ellyn H. Lazar, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Peter L. Ettenberg for the defendant. 
 
Chauncey B. Wood, K. Neil Austin, Caroline S. Donovan, 
& Joanna McDonough, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
BUDD, J.  Until recently, we provided only limited guidance 
regarding legal instructions furnished to grand juries.  We had 
2 
 
 
held, for example, that "it is the duty of the district attorney 
in appropriate instances to advise [the grand jury] concerning 
the law," Attorney Gen. v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 307 (1922), 
and that an appropriate instance for such instructions is when 
the grand jury request them, Commonwealth v. Noble, 429 Mass. 
44, 48 (1999).  Then, in Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808 
(2012), we held that where the Commonwealth seeks to indict a 
juvenile for murder, and substantial evidence of mitigating 
circumstances or defenses (other than lack of criminal 
responsibility) is presented to a grand jury, the Commonwealth 
must instruct the grand jury on the elements of murder and on 
the legal significance of those mitigating circumstances or 
defenses.  Id. at 810.  We are called on in this case to 
determine whether the Commonwealth's failure to provide 
instructions to the grand jury regarding the significance of the 
mitigating evidence it presented requires dismissal of an 
indictment against an adult for murder in the first degree. 
As reflected in this plurality opinion and in the separate 
opinions that follow, six Justices are of the view that it is 
generally advisable for prosecutors to instruct grand juries on 
the elements of lesser offenses and defenses whenever such 
3 
 
 
instructions would help the grand jury to understand the legal 
significance of mitigating circumstances and defenses.1 
The Justices disagree, however, as to the consequences of 
failing to provide such instructions.  The three Justices who 
subscribe to this plurality opinion would hold that the 
                     
 
1 In Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 219 (2017), the 
court announced that it would convene a special committee to 
review "current practices employed by the various district 
attorneys and the Attorney General before considering an 
extension of the rule adopted in [Walczak, 463 Mass. 808,] to 
similar types of grand jury proceedings involving adults."  The 
committee, which consisted of judges (both sitting and retired), 
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and a law school professor, 
submitted a report to the court.  See Supreme Judicial Court 
Committee on Grand Jury Proceedings:  Final Report to the 
Justices, at 37 (June 2018).  The report summarized interviews 
with representatives from the Commonwealth's prosecutors' 
offices regarding grand jury practices, and proposed six "best 
practices" for prosecutors making grand jury presentments.  Id. 
at 11-14, 32-36. 
 
 
The committee found that practices varied among districts.  
Some interviewees reported that the assistant district attorneys 
in their offices instruct grand juries on affirmative defenses 
or mitigating circumstances only where required to do so under 
our case law; others go beyond the requirements we have 
established.  Id. at 34. 
 
 
One of the best practices that the committee proposed, no. 
5(B), is to "consider instructing the grand jury [where the 
defendant is not a juvenile] on the elements of lesser offenses 
and/or defenses, where such instructions would be in the 
interest of justice or would assist the grand jurors to 
understand the legal significance of mitigating circumstances 
and defenses."  Id. at 13.  Although we decline to hold that the 
integrity of grand jury proceedings are impaired whenever 
substantial exculpatory evidence is unaccompanied by 
instructions, we strongly encourage district attorneys making 
grand jury presentments to adopt this and the other best 
practices outlined in the report. 
4 
 
 
integrity of a grand jury is impaired, and the dismissal of an 
indictment due to the lack of instructions is therefore 
appropriate, only when the instructions likely would have given 
effect to a complete defense -- in other words, only where the 
exculpatory evidence2 presented to the grand jury was so 
compelling that giving instructions on that evidence probably 
would have resulted in the grand jury returning a no bill.  Two 
Justices -- Chief Justice Gants and Justice Lenk -- would hold 
that a prosecutor's failure to give a grand jury appropriate 
instructions on mitigating circumstances and defenses ought to 
result in the dismissal of an indictment if the absence of 
instructions probably influenced the grand jury's decision to 
return an indictment for murder as opposed to manslaughter or a 
no bill.  Two other Justices -- Justice Cypher and Justice Lowy 
-- would hold that the integrity of a grand jury is impaired by 
a prosecutor's failure to give instructions only in cases where 
there has been affirmative prosecutorial misconduct, i.e., only 
if and when the facts known to the prosecutor clearly establish 
that the instruction would result in a complete exoneration, yet 
the prosecutor withholds appropriate instructions. 
                     
 
2 The words "mitigating" and "exculpatory" appear throughout 
this opinion to distinguish between evidence that would reduce 
the gravity of an offense (mitigating evidence) and that which 
would exonerate a defendant altogether (exculpatory evidence). 
5 
 
 
Because this case fails to satisfy the standards for 
dismissal set forth in this plurality opinion and in Justice 
Cypher's concurring opinion, five Justices (those who subscribe 
to this opinion and Justice Cypher's opinion) agree that, here, 
the indictment should not have been dismissed. 
Background.  The evidence presented to the grand jury was 
as follows.  On the evening of May 7, 2014, the defendant banged 
on her neighbors' door and asked for help.  The neighbors 
followed the defendant to her home and discovered the victim 
(the defendant's fiancé) on the floor in the kitchen covered in 
blood.  His carotid artery had been cut; efforts to resuscitate 
him failed.  When asked what had happened, the defendant 
responded, "[H]e hit me, so I hit him." 
Later that night, the defendant gave a recorded interview 
to police in which she stated that, on the night of the killing, 
both she and the victim had been drinking when he became 
"physical."  The victim began choking and beating the defendant; 
he then pulled out "knives and guns."  At one point it appears 
that both had knives, and that the victim was choking the 
defendant.  When the defendant tried to protect herself, the 
victim told her that he had been stabbed and that he felt dizzy.  
The defendant observed the stab wound to the victim's neck.  
After being unable to find her cellular telephone (cell phone), 
she went to the neighbors' house for help.  The detective who 
6 
 
 
interviewed the defendant stated that he could "see the bruises" 
on her. 
Witnesses testified to seeing bruises on the defendant at 
various times during the relationship.  The defendant told one 
witness that the victim had put a gun to the defendant's mouth 
on multiple occasions, and she told police that the victim had 
been abusive toward her.3  The police seized the defendant's cell 
phone and recovered a text message from the victim in which he 
threatened to kill the defendant's former boyfriend; that 
message was accompanied by a photograph of the victim holding a 
gun. 
There also was evidence of the defendant's history of 
violence, including against the victim.  A neighbor had heard 
the defendant yelling at the victim two or three times per week.  
Another witness observed the defendant berating the victim and 
"throwing closed fist punches" at him.  The defendant's former 
boyfriend testified that the defendant told him that she had 
anger issues and that when she gets upset she could "actually 
murder somebody."  The defendant admitted to him that she had 
stabbed the victim on a previous occasion.4  Moreover, during an 
                     
3 The grand jury were presented with evidence that the 
police found two firearms in the residence. 
 
 
4 On the victim's cellular telephone (cell phone), police 
discovered a photograph of the victim's arm with a stab wound. 
7 
 
 
argument with the former boyfriend, the defendant pulled a knife 
out, but he was able to knock it out of her hand. 
Prior proceedings.  The defendant initially was arraigned 
in the District Court on a charge of manslaughter.  Over the 
course of a year, four different grand juries heard evidence 
pertaining to the homicide, the last of which issued indictments 
against the defendant charging her with murder and assault and 
battery with a dangerous weapon.5  The defendant moved to dismiss 
the murder charge, arguing among other things that the 
Commonwealth had failed to provide the grand jury with 
instructions regarding the mitigating circumstances that it 
presented.  A judge in the Superior Court allowed the motion, 
concluding that although there was probable cause to return an 
indictment for murder, the Commonwealth's failure to provide 
instructions on the mitigating factors impaired the integrity of 
the grand jury proceedings.  After a motion for reconsideration 
was denied, the Commonwealth appealed.  We granted the 
defendant's application for direct appellate review. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard.  The grand jury are an 
investigatory body with a dual function:  "determining whether 
                     
 
5 The fourth grand jury received the evidence presented to 
the prior grand juries in the form of exhibits, including 
transcripts of the prior proceedings.  After being presented 
with some additional evidence, the fourth grand jury voted to 
indict the defendant. 
8 
 
 
there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been 
committed and . . . protecting citizens against unfounded 
criminal prosecutions."  Lataille v. District Court of E. 
Hampden, 366 Mass. 525, 532 (1974).  See Jones v. Robbins, 8 
Gray 329, 342, 350 (1857) (under art. 12 of Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, grand jury indictment is required for 
crimes punishable by term in State prison). 
 
The role of a grand jury is vastly different from that of 
the petit jury.  "[A] grand jury indictment depends only on the 
existence of evidence sufficient to warrant a finding of 
probable cause to arrest [the defendant]" (quotations omitted), 
Commonwealth v. Maggio, 414 Mass. 193, 198 (1993), quoting 
Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 451 (1984).  "As the 
standard is most often formulated, probable cause exists where, 
at the moment of arrest, the facts and circumstances within the 
knowledge of the police are enough to warrant a prudent person 
in believing that the individual arrested has committed or was 
committing an offense."  Commonwealth v. Storey, 378 Mass. 312, 
321 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 955 (1980), and cases cited.  
See Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 Mass. 238, 241 (1992), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rivera, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 45 (1989) ("The 
officers must have entertained rationally 'more than a suspicion 
of criminal involvement, something definite and substantial, but 
not a prima facie case of the commission of a crime, let alone a 
9 
 
 
case beyond a reasonable doubt'").  Grand jury proceedings are 
secret and nonadversary in nature, and thus the person under 
investigation is not entitled to be represented by counsel, "to 
present witnesses, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, or even 
to be present."  Commonwealth v. Gibson, 368 Mass. 518, 525 n.2 
(1975), S.C., 377 Mass. 539 (1979) and 424 Mass. 242, cert. 
denied, 521 U.S. 1123 (1997), citing United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 343-346 (1974). 
 
"Because of . . . the availability of an unprejudiced petit 
jury at trial, the safeguards deemed necessary to protect an 
accused before a petit jury are not implicated to the same 
degree in grand jury proceedings."  Commonwealth v. McLeod, 394 
Mass. 727, 733 (1985).  See Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 
487, 499, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959).  That is, the 
dismissal of an indictment is not required "[a]s long as the 
evidence before the grand jury was sufficient to warrant a 
conclusion of probable cause and the integrity of the 
proceedings was unimpaired."6  Noble, 429 Mass. at 48, citing 
Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 615, 619-620 (1986).  See 
                     
 
6 Even where the integrity of the proceedings are determined 
to have been impaired, indictments are usually dismissed without 
prejudice unless the Commonwealth has engaged in willful 
misconduct.  See Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 447 
(1984).  See also Commonwealth v. Manning, 373 Mass. 438, 439 
(1977) (dismissal of indictment with prejudice is appropriate 
remedy where Federal officers and prosecutor willfully 
interfered with defendant's right to counsel). 
10 
 
 
Commonwealth v. McGahee, 393 Mass. 743, 746-747 (1985).  See 
also Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 451 (1984) (standard 
for evidence in grand jury proceedings is "considerably less 
exacting than a requirement of sufficient evidence to warrant a 
guilty finding"). 
 
In considering the claim that the Commonwealth's failure to 
provide the grand jury with instructions on the legal 
significance of the mitigating evidence prevented that body from 
properly evaluating the evidence, the starting point is the 
general principle that "[t]he extent of the [prosecutor]'s 
obligation to instruct the [g]rand [j]ury . . . must be defined 
with reference to the role of that body," Walczak, 463 Mass. at 
824 (Lenk, J., concurring), quoting People v. Valles, 62 N.Y.2d 
36, 38 (1984); that is, "to protect the innocent, and bring to 
trial those who may be guilty," State v. Hogan, 336 N.J. Super. 
319, 341 (2001).  See Lataille, 366 Mass. at 532.  As noted 
supra, the evidence required to indict is significantly less 
than that which is required to warrant a finding of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  Commonwealth v. Moran, 453 Mass. 880, 883 
(2009).  Because the Commonwealth's burden of proof for 
indictment is relatively low, see Lataille, supra, "the 
defendant bears a heavy burden to show impairment of the grand 
jury proceeding," see Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 414 Mass. 146, 
11 
 
 
150 (1993), citing Commonwealth v. Shea, 401 Mass. 731, 734 
(1988). 
The treatment of exculpatory evidence withheld from the 
grand jury is particularly instructive in determining whether a 
prosecutor has an obligation to instruct the body on certain 
possible defenses.  See Hogan, 336 N.J. Super. at 341 ("a 
prosecutor's obligation to instruct the grand jury on possible 
defenses is a corollary to his [or her] responsibility to 
present exculpatory evidence").  "Prosecutors are not required 
in every instance to reveal all exculpatory evidence to a grand 
jury."  McGahee, 393 Mass. at 746, citing O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 
447.  Rather, the integrity of the grand jury proceedings has 
been impaired and dismissal is warranted where the omitted 
exculpatory evidence "would likely have affected the grand 
jury's decision to indict."  Commonwealth v. Clemmey, 447 Mass. 
121, 130 (2006).  See Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 854 
(1984) ("If the grand jury were not made aware of circumstances 
which undermine the credibility of evidence that is likely to 
have affected their decision to indict, then the appropriate 
remedy may be dismissal of the indictment").  See also O'Dell, 
supra at 447 ("the withholding of a portion of the defendant's 
statement distorted the portion that was repeated to the grand 
jury in a way that so seriously tainted the presentation to that 
body that the indictment should not have been allowed to 
12 
 
 
stand").  Similarly, the presentation of false or misleading 
evidence only requires the dismissal of an indictment where the 
evidence was presented with the knowledge that it was false, 
with the express purpose of obtaining an indictment, and 
"probably influenced the grand jury's determination to hand up 
an indictment."  Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621. 
It stands to reason, then, that the same is true for 
instructions regarding exculpatory evidence; that is, the 
integrity of the grand jury proceedings would be impaired by the 
lack of instructions only where providing them "would likely 
have affected the grand jury's decision to indict."  Clemmey, 
447 Mass. at 130.  The defendant must establish that such 
instructions likely would have given effect to a complete 
defense, resulting in a no bill.  See Hogan, 336 N.J. Super. at 
341-342 (adopting rule that prosecutors are required to instruct 
on possible defenses only where, if believed, defense would 
result in finding of no criminal liability).  See also Bank of 
Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 (1988), quoting 
United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986) ("dismissal of 
[an] indictment is appropriate only 'if it is established that 
the [omission] substantially influenced the grand jury's 
decision to indict,' or if there is 'grave doubt' that the 
decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of 
such [omission]"). 
13 
 
 
Any showing by the defendant that a grand jury might have 
determined that a lesser charge was more appropriate would not 
by itself render the entire prosecution unwarranted, nor does it 
negate probable cause for the offense as charged, see Moran, 453 
Mass. at 883-884.  Thus, this is not a basis for holding that 
the integrity of a grand jury proceeding was impaired. 
This is so for two interrelated reasons.  First, as 
discussed supra, the role of the grand jury is limited.  They 
are no more than an investigatory and accusatory body.  See 
Lataille, 366 Mass. at 532.  Unlike the petit jury, who are 
tasked with determining whether a defendant is guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the crime charged or of a lesser offense, 
the grand jury "cannot and do[] not determine guilt."  
Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 437 Mass. 33, 39 (2002), quoting Brunson 
v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 106, 120 (1975).  See Commonwealth v. 
Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 549 (1990) ("The grand jury . . . is 
not the appropriate forum for determining guilt or innocence").  
Instead, the grand jury need only "hear sufficient evidence to 
establish the identity of the accused . . . and probable cause 
to arrest him" in order to indict (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982). 
Second, as a general rule, "[t]he Commonwealth is not 
required to present evidence of so-called defenses or otherwise 
disprove such matters before the grand jury."  Commonwealth v. 
14 
 
 
Silva, 455 Mass. 503, 511 (2009).  Nor is a prosecutor required 
to instruct the grand jury on the elements of any lesser 
included offenses.  Noble, 429 Mass. at 48.  Indeed, prosecutors 
are permitted to use the same indictment for charging the 
various degrees of homicide.  See Commonwealth v. DePace, 442 
Mass. 739, 743 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 980 (2005) 
(statutory form of indictment alleging murder is sufficient to 
charge murder under any theory and in any degree, as well as 
manslaughter).  Indeed, the degree of murder is properly 
determined by the petit jury, not the grand jury.  Noble, supra 
at 48.  McLeod, 394 Mass. 733, quoting Brunson, 369 Mass. at 
120; G. L. c. 265, § 1 ("The degree of murder shall be found by 
the [petit] jury").  As the defendant is neither entitled to 
have the grand jury instructed on the differences between the 
degrees of homicide, nor to have the lowest possible homicide 
charge returned, it follows that the defendant is not entitled 
to have the grand jury instructed on the significance of 
mitigating evidence presented that might cause the body to find 
probable cause for manslaughter rather than murder. 
The dissent and Justice Cypher's concurrence represent very 
different views of the function of the grand jury and what it 
means for that function to be impaired.  Those views -- which 
occupy different ends of the spectrum of possible resolutions to 
15 
 
 
this issue -- are unnecessarily extreme in comparison to the 
more moderate, and more appropriate, approach laid out supra. 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Gants contends that the 
"relevant inquiry is . . . whether the grand jury's decision to 
return an indictment for murder, rather than manslaughter, was 
'probably influenced' by the absence of legal guidance."  Post 
at    .  Thus, in the dissent's view, the integrity of the 
process was impaired here because the omitted instructions on 
the excessive use of force in self-defense probably would have 
led to a charge of manslaughter.  See post at    .  This view is 
flawed for a number of reasons. 
First, and foremost, it does not comport with our case law.  
As explained supra, the conclusion that the grand jury process 
is impaired only if the omitted legal instructions likely would 
have resulted in a no bill is based on prior holdings of this 
court pertaining to withheld exculpatory evidence.  And these 
prior decisions have held that the failure to present 
exculpatory evidence impairs the integrity of the process only 
where the omitted information "would likely have affected the 
grand jury's decision to indict," Clemmey, 447 Mass. at 130, 
not, as the dissent contends, if the omitted evidence might have 
caused the grand jury to indict for a lesser offense.  See 
Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621 (presentation of false or misleading 
evidence only impairs integrity of grand jury process if, among 
16 
 
 
other things, it "probably influenced the grand jury's 
determination to hand up an indictment").7 
Citing to dicta in the concurring opinions in Walczak, the 
dissent reasons that "[b]ecause mitigating evidence tends to 
cast doubt on the Commonwealth's proof regarding an essential 
element of a crime for which the Commonwealth seeks an 
indictment, it is exculpatory as to that crime."  Post at    , 
citing Walczak at 822-823 (Lenk, J., concurring); id. at 839 
(Gants, J., concurring).  Granted, there are important 
consequences to the degree of the charge, but the court 
heretofore has held that the question for the purposes of the 
impairment analysis is whether withheld evidence "would likely 
have affected the grand jury's decision to indict," not whether 
they would have preferred to indict for a lesser version of the 
offense.  Post at    .  See Clemmey, 447 Mass. at 130.  See also 
Noble, 429 Mass. at 48.  The dissent's reasoning is also 
directly contradicted by the practice in this Commonwealth of 
                     
 
7 In his dissent, Chief Justice Gants quotes the phrase 
"probably influenced" from Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621, multiple 
times to make his point that the failure to explain the legal 
relevance of the mitigating evidence presented to the grand jury 
led to an impairment of the proceedings.  See post at    ,   ,   
,   ,   .  This use of the language is problematic, given the 
context in which the phrase is used in Mayfield.  According to 
Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621, the relevant inquiry is "whether, if 
a grand jury had been told the true facts, it probably would not 
have indicted the defendant" (emphasis added), not whether it 
would have indicted the defendant for a lesser offense. 
17 
 
 
using the statutory form murder indictment to charge both 
degrees of murder (unless otherwise specified) and also 
manslaughter as a lesser included offense, see DePace, 442 Mass. 
at 743, and then leaving to the petit jury questions of the 
actual degree of culpability, whether it be murder in the first 
or second degree, manslaughter, or not guilty.  Noble, 429 Mass. 
at 48. 
Moreover, the dissent relies on Walczak as support for its 
position that mitigating evidence should receive the same 
treatment as exculpatory evidence when determining impairment, 
post at , but this reliance is misplaced.  The majority in 
Walczak, 463 Mass. at 809-810, held that this was true with 
respect to juvenile defendants, but did not hold it to be so for 
adult defendants.  Only then Justice Gants and the two Justices 
who joined him in his concurrence would have applied this 
proposition to adult defendants.  Id. at 841 (Gants, J., 
concurring).  Justice Lenk's concurring opinion in that case, 
which was necessary to arrive at the holding of the majority, 
was firmly grounded in the unique consequences for juveniles 
facing indictments for murder rather than manslaughter; she did 
not subscribe to the view of Justice Gants in that case, that 
mitigating and exculpatory evidence should receive the same 
18 
 
 
treatment in all cases.8  See id. at 822-823 (Lenk, J., 
concurring).  It is therefore incorrect to claim that the 
holding in Walczak supports the proposition that grand jury 
proceedings for adult defendants are impaired where the omitted 
instructions relate to evidence that is merely mitigating and 
not wholly exculpatory.9 
In addition, the dissent's view conflates the roles of the 
grand jury and the petit jury.  The duty of the grand jury is to 
determine whether there is probable cause to believe the crime 
alleged in the indictment has been committed.10  See McCarthy, 
385 Mass. at 163.  The petit jury, by contrast, uniquely are 
                     
 
8 Justice Lenk reasoned that because an indictment for 
murder has added significance for juveniles who would lose the 
protections attendant with proceeding in the Juvenile Court, 
juvenile defendants facing potential murder charges are entitled 
to extra safeguards at the grand jury stage.  Commonwealth v. 
Walczak, 463 Mass. 808, 824, 832-833 (2012) (Lenk, J., 
concurring).  Id. at 823 (Lenk, J., concurring) (juveniles are 
"a class of defendants long given special consideration"). 
 
9 In his dissent, Chief Justice Gants cites to his own 
concurrence in Walczak as support for the proposition that 
mitigating and exculpatory evidence should receive the same 
treatment.  See post at    .  However, as stated, the majority 
of the court in Walczak did not accept that proposition with 
respect to adult defendants; there was simply no majority 
consensus on that point, one way or the other, in that case.  
See Walczak, 463 Mass. at 809-810.  Therefore, the proposition 
asserted in Walczak cannot be treated as if it were supported by 
binding precedent. 
 
 
10 Although the grand jury could return an indictment on a 
lesser (or greater) offense, see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 
254, 263 (1986), it is nevertheless the Commonwealth that 
controls the charges presented to the grand jury. 
19 
 
 
responsible for making the determination whether the defendant 
is guilty of the crime charged in the indictment, of a lesser 
included offense, or not at all.  See Noble, 429 Mass. at 48; 
Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. at 549.  Given this division of 
responsibility, the fact that a possible outcome of the grand 
jury process is that a defendant might be indicted for murder, 
only to be convicted of a lesser offense (e.g., manslaughter) at 
trial, does not call the integrity of that process into 
question. 
 
Further, although the dissent purports to limit its rule to 
requiring instructions on mitigating evidence in murder cases, 
see post at    ,   , where the failure to provide instructions 
might result in an indictment for murder rather than 
manslaughter, see post at    , there exists no principled reason 
for such a restriction.  Taken to its logical conclusion, the 
dissent's rule would appear also to require prosecutors to 
provide grand juries instructions for all lesser included 
offenses in all criminal cases to avoid impairing the integrity 
of the grand jury process.  See Noble, 429 Mass. at 48 
(excessive judicial regulation of grand jury "would add delay 
and complexity without serving any significant purpose"). 
 
The dissent agrees, as does Justice Lowy in his 
concurrence, that, as a matter of best practices, instructions 
on both defenses and mitigating circumstances should be provided 
20 
 
 
to grand juries, including instructions that might possibly 
affect the decision whether to indict for manslaughter as 
opposed to murder.  See note 1, supra.  However, the operative 
question on a motion to dismiss an indictment is whether the 
integrity of the grand jury proceedings has been impaired, not 
whether a prosecutor has conformed to the best practices, and 
the question whether the proceedings have been impaired is 
determined only by asking whether, had there been appropriate 
instructions, the grand jury would have returned no indictment 
at all.  See, e.g., Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621-622 (presentation 
of false or misleading evidence, even if intentional, by itself 
does not require dismissal; defendant also must show that 
presentation of such evidence probably influenced decision to 
indict).  See also Clemmey, 447 Mass. at 130; McGahee, 393 Mass. 
at 746-747 (same). 
 
At the other end of the spectrum from the dissent, the 
concurrence by Justice Cypher suggests that the integrity of the 
grand jury process should be considered impaired only where the 
prosecutor intentionally withholds instructions and providing 
them probably would result in a complete exoneration.  Post at    
.  This position, like that of the dissent, is not supported by 
our case law. 
It is true that the intent of the prosecutor presenting the 
case to the grand jury is an important factor in determining 
21 
 
 
whether dismissal of an indictment is required in circumstances 
like this.  In reviewing grand jury proceedings where false 
information was provided, or exculpatory evidence was withheld, 
we have required a showing that the conduct of the prosecutor 
was intentional and done for the purpose of obtaining an 
indictment.  See Clemmey, 447 Mass. at 130, and cases cited; 
Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621, and cases cited.  In other words, 
the court must consider whether the prosecutor had actual 
possession or knowledge of the evidence, see Wilcox, 437 Mass. 
at 37, and, if so, whether the prosecutor withheld the evidence 
for valid reasons unrelated to the indictment.  See LaVelle, 414 
Mass. at 150 (1993) (disclosure would have revealed identity of 
police informant). 
However, reviewing grand jury proceedings where 
instructions on the law have been withheld does not lend itself 
to an inquiry regarding intentionality.  For example, in 
Walczak, 463 Mass. at 808, although we held that a prosecutor is 
obligated to provide instructions on the significance of any 
substantial mitigating evidence presented to the grand jury when 
seeking to indict a juvenile for murder, we did not require 
consideration whether the prosecutor committed misconduct in 
withholding such instructions.  Instructions on the law, unlike 
exculpatory evidence, are always available to the prosecution, 
so there is no question to be raised regarding the prosecutor's 
22 
 
 
knowledge and intent.  See Commonwealth v. Kelcourse, 404 Mass. 
466, 468-469 (1989). See also Commonwealth v. Reddington, 395 
Mass. 315, 319-320 (1985) (defendant failed to establish that 
law enforcement knew or should have known that evidence was 
false or inaccurate).  Moreover, prosecutors should be prepared 
to furnish instructions if the grand jury request them.  See 
Noble, 429 Mass. at 48. 
Therefore, the relevant question is not whether the 
prosecution intentionally withheld the instructions, but instead 
whether the failure to give such instructions, regardless of 
intent, results in an indictment where otherwise the grand jury 
would have returned a no bill.  It is the result of the omission 
of the instructions, not the motive behind it, that determines 
whether the process has been impaired to the point that a 
dismissal is necessary. 
 
This approach does not, as Justice Cypher contends, 
"establish another mechanism to dismiss an indictment."  Post at    
.  Instead, it does no more (or less) here than to undergird the 
court's duty to review grand jury proceedings where there is a 
claim that the integrity of the proceedings has been impaired, 
Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 619-620, and determine, consonant with 
the court's case law, what constitutes an impairment requiring 
dismissal.  Nor does this approach represent a "fundamental and 
significant change to grand jury practice in the Commonwealth."  
23 
 
 
Post at    .  To the contrary, it likely would change very 
little.  The only cases affected by this approach will be those 
in which the exculpatory evidence is compelling enough that the 
absence of instructions on a complete defense probably would 
make a difference in the grand jury's decision to hand up an 
indictment; and as to those, one trusts that an indictment would 
not be sought -- at least it should not be sought -- in the 
first place.11  Limiting judicial intervention to those 
indictments that enable "needless or unfounded" prosecutions is 
consonant with the role of the grand jury.  Walczak, 463 Mass. 
at 849 (Spina, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
See Lataille, 366 Mass. at 532.  See also Hogan, 336 N.J. Super. 
at 341-342. 
2.  Application.  In this case, the Commonwealth presented 
sufficient evidence to the grand jury for them to find probable 
                     
 
11 Justice Lowy's concurring opinion misses the mark for 
essentially the same reasons.  Moreover, his prediction that 
this approach will prove unwieldy and unworkable is unwarranted.  
Just as prosecutors are able to meet the various obligations 
that are currently imposed on them by cases such as O'Dell, 
Mayfield, Clemmey, and Walczak, prosecutors who present evidence 
before grand juries will be able to meet the fundamental and 
fairly straightforward obligations that this approach would 
require of them, namely, to discern where substantial 
exculpatory evidence they have presented gives rise to a defense 
that could reasonably result in a no bill, and to instruct the 
grand juries accordingly. 
 
24 
 
 
cause to believe that the defendant committed murder.12  See 
McCarthy, 385 Mass. at 160, 163.  That evidence included the 
fact that the victim was found with a fatal stab wound to the 
neck, that the defendant and the victim were fighting just prior 
to the stabbing, and that they were the only adults in the house 
at the time of the stabbing.  The Commonwealth also presented 
substantial evidence that could have been seen as exculpatory, 
comprising testimony from witnesses who observed bruises on the 
defendant, including on the night of the killing; statements 
from the defendant regarding the victim's abusive behavior 
toward her during their relationship; and the defendant's 
statement that she acted in self-defense. 
When coupled with instructions from the judge at trial, the 
evidence presented may result in a petit jury finding the 
defendant guilty only of voluntary manslaughter (or not guilty 
                     
 
12 Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with 
malice aforethought.  See Commonwealth v. Kane, 388 Mass. 128, 
133 (1983), citing Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, 303 
(1850).  To prove malice, the Commonwealth need not prove that 
the defendant intended to kill the victim; it also may prove 
malice by showing that the defendant intended to cause grievous 
bodily harm or that, in circumstances known to the defendant, 
the defendant intended an act creating a plain and strong 
likelihood that death would follow.  See Commonwealth v. Azar, 
435 Mass. 675, 682 (2002); S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005).  
Admittedly, not each of these prongs of malice is compatible 
with each of the three theories of murder in the first degree. 
 
25 
 
 
of any offense).13  See McLeod, 394 Mass. at 733 (availability of 
unprejudiced petit jury at trial obviates need for in-depth 
appellate scrutiny of all aspects of grand jury process).  See 
also Geagan, 339 Mass. at 499 (inadmissible evidence before 
grand jury can be remedied at petit jury stage).  However, in 
order for the defendant to prevail on a claim that the integrity 
of the grand jury proceedings was impaired here, she must 
demonstrate that, had the Commonwealth provided instructions on 
the legal significance of the exculpatory evidence presented, it 
would have resulted in a "complete exoneration" by the issuance 
of a no bill.  See Clemmey, 447 Mass. at 130.  See also Hogan, 
336 N.J. Super. at 342. 
The requisite showing is particularly difficult to make 
here for at least two reasons.  First, the exculpatory evidence 
was weakened substantially by the contrasting evidence of the 
defendant's violent temper and controlling behavior toward -- 
and physical abuse of -- the victim, including a prior occasion 
                     
 
13 The defendant's assertion that she acted in self-defense 
does not necessarily absolve her from culpability.  Although the 
use of self-defense negates the element of malice, see Connolly 
v. Commonwealth, 377 Mass. 527, 529 (1979), only the proper use 
of self-defense exonerates a defendant from all criminal 
liability.  Commonwealth v. Carlino, 429 Mass. 692, 694 (1999), 
S.C., 449 Mass. 7 (2007).  Excessive force in self-defense, on 
the other hand, constitutes manslaughter.  Id. 
 
26 
 
 
in which the defendant stabbed the victim.14  Second, a grand 
jury are required to find only that the evidence was sufficient 
"to establish the identity of the accused and probable cause to 
arrest [her]."  See O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 451.  "The mere 
existence of some evidence that could suggest self-defense does 
not negate probable cause . . . probable cause can well exist 
(and often does) even though ultimately, a jury is not persuaded 
that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt."  Yousefian v. 
Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 135 (2015).  See Morris v. Lexington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1325 
(11th Cir. 2014) (evidence of self-defense does not negate 
probable cause to arrest for assault). 
Contrary to the dissent's assertion, this approach does not 
necessarily ask prosecutors to "distinguish between evidence of 
lawful self-defense and evidence of excessive use of force in 
self-defense," post at    .  Prosecutors would be well advised 
to err on the side of presenting exculpatory and mitigating 
evidence, as well as instructions that give legal meaning to 
that evidence.15  See note 1, supra.  This is all the more so 
                     
 
14 In fact, the other indictment issued by this same grand 
jury was for the previous instance of the defendant's assault 
and battery of the victim with a knife. 
 
15 There is no merit to the dissent's concern that the rule 
announced today will likely have the unintended consequence of 
discouraging prosecutors from providing instructions because 
they will know there will rarely be consequences for failing to 
27 
 
 
because, as the dissent notes, evidence showing lawful self-
defense overlaps with that showing excessive force.  But an 
indictment should not be disturbed on the basis that, had the 
grand jury received instructions on the different types of 
homicide, they would have indicted the defendant for some lesser 
crime. 
Given that the purpose of the grand jury is to determine 
probable cause and not guilt, the process here appears to have 
worked as designed.  That is, the grand jury determined that 
there was sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to 
believe that the defendant committed the crime alleged in the 
indictment:  murder.  At trial, a petit jury will weigh the 
mitigating and exculpatory evidence, along with all the other 
evidence, to determine whether the defendant is guilty beyond a 
                     
do so.  Post at    .  First, the duty of the prosecution is "not 
that it shall win a case, but [instead, to see] that justice 
shall be done."  Commonwealth v. Keo, 467 Mass. 25, 35 (2014), 
quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  The 
Commonwealth's prosecutors can be trusted to operate in this 
spirit and to provide instructions in all appropriate instances.  
Further, as noted supra, prosecutors are required to provide 
instructions when so requested by the grand jury.  See 
Commonwealth v. Noble, 429 Mass. 44, 48 (1999).  Finally, to 
help ensure that grand juries are instructed appropriately, 
Superior Court judges are strongly encouraged to inform grand 
jurors at the outset of their service that they may request 
instructions on the elements of crimes alleged in the 
indictments presented to them, as well as instructions on lesser 
included offenses. 
2 
 
 
reasonable doubt of murder or voluntary manslaughter, or not 
guilty of any offense.  See Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. at 549. 
Conclusion.  Because the integrity of the grand jury 
process was not impaired, the order dismissing the indictment 
against the defendant must be vacated and the case remanded to 
the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J. (concurring).  Although I join Justice Cypher's 
concurrence, I write separately for three reasons.  First, in my 
view prosecutors should instruct a grand jury on affirmative 
defenses and on mitigation whenever the evidence supports such 
instructions.  It is good practice to do so, and a number of 
district attorneys' offices follow this approach.  I would not 
require such instructions, however, for the compelling reasons 
outlined in Justice Cypher's opinion. 
 
Second, I believe that Justice Budd's conclusion is 
unwieldy at best, and perhaps even unworkable.  I agree with the 
dissent that the grand jury in this case "heard substantial 
evidence . . . that the defendant acted in lawful self-defense."  
Post at    .  How then does a judge rule on what Justice Cypher 
is calling a "Fernandes motion," post at    , where exculpatory 
evidence, if believed, would result in a no bill?  Does the 
Commonwealth have to delay its grand jury presentation until the 
Commonwealth retains an expert on battered woman syndrome?  What 
if the exculpatory evidence is a defendant's statement to police 
made during custodial interrogation?  What if that statement 
cannot be reconciled with forensic and medical evidence?  What 
if, in a rape case, there is overwhelming evidence that the 
alleged victim was too impaired to consent and the defendant's 
own statement, inconsistent with a video recording of the 
incident, is that he was too impaired to recognize the victim's 
2 
 
 
impairment?  See Commonwealth v. Blache, 450 Mass. 583, 597 
(2008) ("Commonwealth must prove that the defendant knew or 
reasonably should have known that the complainant's condition 
rendered her incapable of consenting").  Must a grand jury be 
instructed on Blache at the risk of a "Fernandes dismissal"?  
What if the defense is entrapment, accident, or selective 
prosecution?  Does the result in these circumstances depend on a 
motion judge's determinations of credibility?  That seems akin 
to adjudication. 
 
Third, once this court intrudes on grand jury practice, 
absent insufficient evidence or impairment of the grand jury, we 
alter the function of the grand jury and detract from its 
historic role.  The grand jury are not an adjudicatory body.  
The more the grand jury's vote becomes an adjudication, the less 
the grand jury act as an investigatory body and a shield. 
 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part, with 
whom Lowy, J., joins).  I agree with the court that the evidence 
presented to the grand jury supports the indictment for murder 
and that the lack of instruction on mitigating circumstances did 
not impair the integrity of the grand jury.  I would, however, 
stop there and not establish another mechanism to dismiss an 
indictment.  I do not agree with the dissent, which would hold 
that in all cases where the Commonwealth seeks an indictment for 
murder and there is substantial evidence of mitigating 
circumstances or defenses (except lack of criminal 
responsibility) the grand jury must be instructed on the effect 
of mitigating circumstances and defenses.1  In my opinion, the 
usual instructions on the elements of a crime are all that need 
to be given.2 
 
I write separately because I do not think that it is proper 
or necessary for the court to intrude further into grand jury 
practice.  I am of the view that although it may be best 
practice to instruct grand juries on the elements of lesser 
                     
1 I agree with the distinction between mitigating and 
exculpatory evidence set forth in Justice Budd's opinion -- the 
former term refers to evidence that, if believed, could reduce 
the gravity of the offense, while the latter refers to evidence 
that, if believed, could absolve the defendant from guilt 
altogether.  See ante at note 2. 
 
 
2 Unless, of course the grand jury request further 
instruction. 
2 
 
 
offenses and defenses, a new rule would result in delay, add 
nothing to the assurances of a fair trial, and be an 
encroachment on the traditional grand jury practice and 
function. 
As the United States Supreme Court observed when discussing 
whether to adopt a change to grand jury practice to determine 
whether indictments were supported by competent evidence, 
"[n]o persuasive reasons are advanced for establishing such 
a rule.  It would run counter to the whole history of the 
grand jury institution, in which laymen conduct their 
inquiries unfettered by technical rules.  Neither justice 
nor the concept of a fair trial requires such a change.  In 
a trial on the merits, defendants are entitled to a strict 
observation of all the rules designed to bring about a fair 
verdict.  Defendants are not entitled, however, to a rule 
which would result in interminable delay but add nothing to 
the assurance of a fair trial." 
 
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956).  See 
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 368 Mass. 518, 524 (1975), S.C., 377 
Mass. 539 (1979), and 424 Mass. 242, cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1123 
(1997), quoting Costello, supra. 
It has been long-settled law that the Commonwealth is not 
required to present evidence of so-called defenses or otherwise 
disprove such matters before the grand jury, Commonwealth v. 
Silva, 455 Mass. 503, 511 (2009); inform a grand jury of the 
differences between murder and manslaughter or the relevance of 
intoxication, Commonwealth v. Bousquet, 407 Mass. 854, 860 
(1990); or inform grand jury as to a lesser included offense of 
3 
 
 
the crime for which it seeks indictment, unless requested, 
Commonwealth v. Noble, 429 Mass. 44, 48 (1999).  See generally 
Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808, 847 (2012) (Spina, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The grand jury committee referenced in Justice Budd's 
opinion consisted of prosecutors and defense attorneys who 
worked diligently to review the grand jury practices of the 
various district attorneys and the Attorney General.  Ante at 
note 1. The committee developed six proposed "best practices" 
for prosecutors when making grand jury presentments.  See 
Supreme Judicial Court Committee on Grand Jury Proceedings:  
Final Report to the Justices, at 11-14 (June 2018).  One of the 
best practices the committee proposed is no. 5(B), advising 
prosecutors to "consider instructing the grand jury [where the 
defendant is not a juvenile] on the elements of lesser offenses 
and/or defenses, where such instructions would be in the 
interest of justice or would assist the grand jurors to 
understand the legal significance of mitigating circumstances 
and defenses."  Id. at 13.  Best practices are, however, just 
that.  After hundreds of years of grand jury practice, there is 
nothing in the record or in the report of the committee that 
indicates that there is a problem in the Commonwealth with 
instructions to the grand jury.  See Walczak, supra at 844-856 
(Spina, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
4 
 
 
To better understand my position, it is helpful to review 
briefly some of the fundamental principles that have guided 
grand jury practice in Massachusetts.  In his concurring opinion 
in Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202 (2017), Justice Lowy 
wrote:  "For the past 236 years the grand jury [have] been an 
investigatory and accusatory body in this Commonwealth."  Id. at 
221 (Lowy, J., concurring), citing Commonwealth v. Moran, 453 
Mass. 880, 884 n.7 (2009). Justice Lowy correctly anticipated 
that the "convening of the study group [would] be but a first 
step in the erosion of that vital and historic function."  
Grassie, supra (Lowy, J., concurring). 
 
The institution of the grand jury is one of the oldest in 
our criminal justice system, dating back to the rule of King 
Henry II in 1164.  Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury:  Is 
There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 
B.U. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2002).  Years later, the concept of the grand 
jury was imported to the American colonies along with the rest 
of the common law.  Id. at 10.  The Massachusetts grand jury 
practice was established by art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights and occupies a unique place in our 
jurisprudence.  See Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray 329, 342 (1857).  
"Comprised of citizens who sit independently and in secrecy, the 
grand jury determine[] whether sufficient cause exists to 
justify requiring a person to undergo the 'public accusation of 
5 
 
 
crime, and . . . the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public 
trial before a jury of his peers.'"  Commonwealth v. Riley, 73 
Mass. App. Ct. 721, 726 (2009), quoting Jones, supra at 344.  In 
Massachusetts, with respect to "crimes of great magnitude" the 
right to a grand jury is firmly rooted in and protected by art. 
12.  Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 474 Mass. 372, 375 (2016), 
quoting Jones, supra at 347. 
 
Notwithstanding their historic and important role, the 
grand jury have a limited function -- they are an investigatory 
and accusatory body only.  See Matter of R.I. Select Comm'n 
Subpoena, 415 Mass. 890, 895 (1993).  A grand jury's purpose is 
not to adjudicate guilt or degrees of guilt.  Moran, 453 Mass. 
at 884 n.7.  See Walczak, 463 Mass. at 845 (Spina, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Wilcox, 437 Mass. 33, 39 (2002).  In order to indict, a grand 
jury need only hear sufficient evidence to establish the 
identity of the accused and to support a finding of probable 
cause to arrest the accused for the offense charged.  
Commonwealth v. Rex, 469 Mass. 36, 40 (2014).  "The standard of 
sufficiency has been defined as whether the grand jury heard 
reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient to warrant a 
prudent man in believing that the defendant had committed or was 
committing an offense" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Goldstein, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 863, 866 (2002). 
6 
 
 
 
A finding of probable cause, however, requires considerably 
less evidence than that which is required to support a finding 
of guilt by the petit jury.  Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 
445, 451 (1984).  See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 
152, 154 (2007) (evidence insufficient to overcome motion for 
required finding of not guilty may support probable cause for 
issuance of indictment).  In fact, "[p]robable cause to sustain 
an indictment is a decidedly low standard."  Commonwealth v. 
Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 311 (2013), overruled on another ground 
by Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 805 (2017).  Not only is the 
standard for indictment low, but when reviewing the sufficiency 
of an indictment, the grand jury evidence must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth v. 
Barbosa, 477 Mass. 658, 675 (2017), citing Moran, 453 Mass. at 
885. 
 
Grand jury proceedings are not conducted in accordance with 
the same standards applied to protect a defendant's rights at 
trial.  Grand juries are not strictly bound by the rules of 
evidence.  A grand jury may rely on hearsay in determining 
whether there is probable cause to indict, Commonwealth v. 
Washington W., 462 Mass. 204, 210 (2012), and "[i]naccurate 
testimony made in good faith does not require dismissal of an 
indictment," Silva, 455 Mass. at 509.  There is no duty to 
7 
 
 
present all exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.  Commonwealth 
v. McGahee, 393 Mass. 743, 746 (1985). 
Traditionally, this court has maintained a limited role in 
reviewing grand jury proceedings.  We have not, however, 
permitted the grand jury to become a mere arm of the 
prosecution.  Although the general rule is that a court should 
not inquire into the adequacy or competency of the evidence upon 
which an indictment is based, we have held that "at the very 
least the grand jury must hear sufficient evidence to establish 
the identity of the accused . . . and probable cause to arrest 
him" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 
160, 163 (1982). 
We also have exercised a greater supervisory role -- on a 
case-by-case basis -- over the substance of grand jury 
proceedings in circumstances where the integrity of the grand 
jury has been impaired.  Stevenson, 474 Mass. at 375-376.  For 
example, a prosecutor must "present exculpatory evidence 'that 
would greatly undermine either the credibility of an important 
witness or evidence likely to affect the grand jury's decision,' 
as well as evidence the withholding of which would cause the 
presentation to be seriously tainted."  Commonwealth v. Clemmey, 
447 Mass. 121, 130 (2006), quoting Wilcox, 437 Mass. at 37.  The 
standard is stringent, and even when a prosecutor intentionally 
withholds evidence, the defendant must demonstrate that the 
8 
 
 
prosecutor's decision "likely affected the grand jury's decision 
to indict."  Clemmey, supra at 131.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Mayfield, 398 Mass. 615, 634 (1986) (integrity of grand jury 
proceeding would be impaired if defendant is "put to trial on an 
indictment which the Commonwealth knows is based in whole or in 
part on false testimony"); O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 446–447 
(dismissing indictment where grand jury proceeding was impaired 
when grand jurors were presented with portion of statement 
attributed to defendant, seemingly inculpating him, without 
exculpatory portion of purported statement that had been 
excised).  These protections are limited by the grand jury's 
independence, and the defendant bears a heavy burden to show 
impairment of the grand jury proceeding.  Stevenson, 474 Mass. 
at 376. 
 
As noted, the purpose of the grand jury is to determine 
probable cause, not guilt and degrees of guilt.  See Rex, 469 
Mass. at 40; Moran, 453 Mass. at 884 n.7.  Requiring prosecutors 
to give instructions where appropriate invites "Fernandes 
motions" to dismiss indictments for failure to instruct the 
grand jury on the use and relevance of exculpatory evidence or 
defenses.  See generally Commonwealth v. Perkins, 464 Mass. 92, 
106-109 (2013) (Gants, J., concurring).  Such a requirement 
would encourage prosecutors to introduce more evidence than 
necessary to establish probable cause and to rebut the 
9 
 
 
exculpatory evidence and anticipated defenses to avoid being 
challenged for impairing the integrity of the grand jury.  This 
has the potential to create a "mini trial," which would defeat 
the purpose of a grand jury.  Costello, 350 U.S. at 363–364. 
 
A requirement that the grand jury be instructed on 
mitigation or defenses is "a significant departure from the 
historic and practical nature of the grand jury[;] it calls on 
the grand jury to perform more than an accusatory or 
investigative function, and it needlessly and unfairly burdens 
police and prosecutors to develop murder cases before learning 
about a defendant's case through reciprocal discovery.  It is 
more consonant with public justice to sort out these issues at a 
subsequent trial."  Walczak, 463 Mass. at 850–851 (Spina, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  For the court to 
require such instruction represents a fundamental and 
significant change to grand jury practice in the Commonwealth. 
This court has held consistently that any perceived error 
at the grand jury stage can be cured by the petit jury at trial.  
See Commonwealth v. McLeod, 394 Mass. 727, 733 (1984), cert. 
denied sub nom. Aiello v. Massachusetts, 474 U.S. 919 (1985) 
(availability of unprejudiced petit jury at trial obviates need 
for appellate review of grand jury); Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 
Mass. 487, 499, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959) (inadmissible 
evidence before grand jury can be remedied at petit jury stage).  
10 
 
 
See also Clemmey, 447 Mass. at 131 ("Whether the question of the 
exemption's inapplicability [or invalidity] may appropriately 
reemerge at trial has little bearing on the prosecutor's 
obligation to present to the grand jury certain forms of 
exculpatory evidence [in his possession] the withholding of 
which would seriously taint or distort the proceedings").  With 
this remedy available, creating another layer of procedure at 
the grand jury stage adds nothing of value. 
 
Much like the case in Walczak, the question here is not 
whether the integrity of the grand jury was impaired by 
prosecutorial misconduct that unfairly resulted in an 
indictment.  Rather, the question is whether the failure to 
instruct the grand jury on potential mitigating factors in the 
adult defendant's killing of her boyfriend impaired the 
integrity of the grand jury.  A petit jury, which determine 
guilt, normally would be instructed to return a verdict for the 
highest crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt against the 
defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 372 Mass. 783, 797 
(1977), overruled on another ground by Commonwealth v. Paulding, 
438 Mass. 1 (2002).  The grand jury, which are merely an 
accusatory body that does not determine guilt, do not have 
greater power than a petit jury in this regard.  Walczak, 463 
Mass. at 847–848 (Spina, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
11 
 
 
Failing to instruct a grand jury about defenses or the 
impact of mitigating evidence, for which a prosecutor has no 
legal duty, has not and should not be analyzed under an impaired 
integrity standard.  The impaired integrity standard suggests 
the presence of intentional prosecutorial misconduct that could 
result in sanctions.  Commonwealth v. Salman, 387 Mass. 160, 167 
(1982) (integrity impaired when prosecutor knowingly used false 
testimony to procure indictment).  See Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 
639 (Liacos, J., dissenting); O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 446-447.  
This standard should apply only "when the facts known to the 
prosecutor . . . clearly establish," see Walczak, 463 Mass. at 
849 (Spina, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
quoting State v. Hogan, 336 N.J. Super. 319, 343 (App. Div. 
2001), that the instruction would result in "a complete 
exoneration," yet the prosecutor withholds the instruction, see 
Walczak, supra, quoting Hogan, supra at 342.  The decision to 
further instruct a grand jury is, like the decision to call a 
particular witness or introduce more or less evidence, a 
judgment call determined by the unique circumstances presented 
at the moment. 
Here, there is probable cause to support the defendant's 
indictment for murder and assault and battery with a deadly 
weapon.  The evidence presented to the grand jury shows that the 
victim died of a stab wound to the neck.  The defendant, who was 
12 
 
 
the last person with the victim, ran for help and said to a 
neighbor, "Well, he hit me, so I hit him."  That same neighbor 
witnessed a clean knife in the kitchen sink.   A witness 
testified that the defendant had admitted to stabbing the victim 
on a previous occasion.  The Commonwealth also presented 
significant mitigating evidence, comprising testimony from 
witnesses who observed bruises on the defendant, including on 
the night of the killing; testimony from the defendant regarding 
the victim's abusive behavior toward her during their 
relationship; and the defendant's statement that she acted in 
self-defense. 
"The only question for the grand jury should be whether the 
evidence was sufficient to support a decision to arrest for 
murder.  Any inquiry and decision beyond that is in the nature 
of an adjudicatory decision and appropriately should be reserved 
for the petit jury."  Walczak, 463 Mass. at 849 (Spina, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J. (dissenting, with whom Lenk, J., joins).  The 
grand jury in this case heard substantial evidence that the 
defendant killed the victim in self-defense or used excessive 
force in self-defense.  But the prosecutor provided the grand 
jury with no legal guidance that would have enabled them to 
understand the legal significance of this evidence in deciding 
whether to return an indictment for murder, an indictment for 
manslaughter, or no indictment at all.  The plurality contends 
that the absence of any such instructions does not require the 
dismissal of the murder indictment without prejudice because 
instructions would likely not have resulted in the grand jury 
issuing a no bill.  I believe that the relevant inquiry is not 
whether the omitted legal instructions likely would have 
resulted in a no bill, but whether the grand jury's decision to 
return an indictment for murder, rather than manslaughter, was 
"probably influenced" by the absence of legal guidance.  
Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 615, 621 (1986).  Because I 
conclude that the grand jury's decision to indict this defendant 
for murder was probably influenced by the lack of legal 
instructions concerning self-defense and the excessive use of 
force in self-defense, I believe that that the indictment should 
be dismissed without prejudice so that a properly instructed 
grand jury may consider the evidence.  Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent. 
2 
 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  The grand jury process.  After presenting 
evidence to a grand jury, a prosecutor offers the grand jury a 
proposed indictment charging the defendant with a specific 
crime.  The grand jury must then evaluate the presented evidence 
and decide whether there is probable cause to believe that the 
defendant committed the crime charged.  In doing so, the grand 
jury must determine whether there is probable cause supporting 
each required element of the crime.  See Commonwealth v. Moran, 
453 Mass. 880, 884 (2009) (grand jury must be presented with 
evidence on each element of crime charged).  See also 
Commonwealth v. Washington W., 462 Mass. 204, 212-213 (2012) 
(considering whether withheld evidence was material to grand 
jury's finding of probable cause as to one required element of 
crime).  Where the grand jury so finds, they should return the 
proposed indictment charging that crime.  Where they do not, the 
grand jury must return a no bill or an indictment charging a 
lesser crime for which they do find probable cause.  
Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982) ("A grand 
jury finding of probable cause is necessary if indictments are 
to fulfil their traditional function as an effective protection 
against unfounded criminal prosecutions" [quotation and citation 
omitted]). 
 
Here, the prosecutor presented the grand jury with an 
indictment charging murder.  The language of some indictments 
3 
 
 
sets forth all of the elements of the crime charged, and 
therefore provides the grand jury with legal guidance regarding 
the required elements for which probable cause must be found.  
Compare, e.g., G. L. c. 277, § 79 (form indictment for breaking 
and entering in nighttime with intent to commit felony) with 
Commonwealth v. Cabrera, 449 Mass. 825, 827 (2007) (describing 
elements of breaking and entering in nighttime with intent to 
commit felony).  But the language of a murder indictment, as 
authorized by statute, does not.  See G. L. c. 277, § 79.  The 
indictment here simply alleged that the defendant, on May 7, 
2014, "did assault and beat [the victim] with intent to murder 
him and by such assault and beating did kill and murder [the 
victim]."  In the absence of legal guidance, a reasonable grand 
juror would understand this language to mean that the required 
elements of murder are:  (1) that the defendant committed an 
assault and battery against the victim; (2) that, in doing so, 
the defendant intended to kill the victim; and (3) that the 
assault and battery caused the victim's death. 
 
But this reasonable understanding, based on the language of 
the standard murder indictment, is legally incorrect:  a 
required element of the crime of murder is that the defendant 
committed the killing with malice.  See Commonwealth v. Sires, 
413 Mass. 292, 296 (1992) ("malice is what makes an unlawful 
killing murder").  Malice may be proved by establishing any one 
4 
 
 
of three prongs:  (1) that the defendant intended to kill the 
victim; (2) that the defendant intended to inflict grievous 
bodily harm on the victim; or (3) that the defendant intended 
"to do an act which, in the circumstances known to the 
defendant, a reasonable person would have known created a plain 
and strong likelihood that death would follow" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Williams, 475 Mass. 705, 712 (2016).  
But a killing is not committed with malice where it is committed 
in the heat of passion on reasonable provocation, where it is 
induced by sudden combat, or where the defendant uses excessive 
force in self-defense.  See Commonwealth v. Camacho, 472 Mass. 
587, 602 (2015).  Because a grand jury must be presented with 
evidence supporting a finding of probable cause with regard to 
each element of the crime charged, see Moran, 453 Mass. at 884, 
a grand jury may not return a murder indictment unless they find 
probable cause to believe that the defendant killed the victim 
with malice.  If the grand jury were to conclude that the 
defendant intended to kill the victim but that there was not 
probable cause to believe that she did so with malice, either 
because she used excessive force in self-defense or because she 
acted in the heat of passion on reasonable provocation or in 
5 
 
 
sudden combat, they could indict the defendant for manslaughter 
but not for murder.1 
 
Moreover, the language of the indictment does not inform 
the grand jury that lawful self-defense is a complete defense. 
This means that even if there is probable cause to believe (1) 
that the defendant committed an assault and battery against the 
victim; (2) that, in doing so, the defendant intended to kill 
the victim; and (3) that the assault and battery caused the 
victim's death, the defendant may not be indicted for any 
homicide offense if the grand jury conclude that the defendant 
committed the killing in lawful self-defense (or, more 
precisely, conclude that there is not probable cause to believe 
that the defendant was not acting in lawful self-defense when 
she killed the victim).  See Commonwealth v. Little, 431 Mass. 
                     
 
1 I recognize, as does the plurality, see ante at    , that 
the statutory form of an indictment for murder, G. L. c. 277, 
§ 79, is sufficient to charge murder in the first degree under 
any theory, and "encompasses lesser included offenses such as 
murder in the second degree and manslaughter."  Commonwealth v. 
DePace, 442 Mass. 739, 743 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 980 
(2005).  But that does not mean that the Legislature intended 
that a murder indictment be brought where there is probable 
cause only of manslaughter.  There is a separate statutory form 
for a manslaughter indictment.  See G. L. c. 277, § 79 ("That 
A.B. did assault and beat C.D., and by such assault and beating 
did kill C.D.").  In fact, the statutory form of a murder 
indictment distinguishes between first- and second-degree 
murder, identifying additional language that may be used where 
the prosecutor seeks an indictment for murder in the second 
rather than in the first degree.  Id.  The language used in the 
indictment in this case charged murder in the first degree. 
6 
 
 
782, 787 (2000) ("self-defense, if warranted by the 
circumstances and carried out properly, constitutes a complete 
defense"). 
 
2.  Exculpatory evidence.  The grand jury in this case 
heard substantial evidence to support a finding that the 
defendant acted in lawful self-defense or, alternatively, that 
she used excessive force in self-defense.  The grand jury 
learned that the defendant was engaged to be married to the 
victim, that she immediately reported the stabbing to her 
neighbors, that she appeared hysterical following the stabbing, 
and that, when asked what had happened, she told her neighbor 
that "he hit me, so I hit him."  The grand jury further learned 
that the defendant, soon after the victim was stabbed, informed 
police officers that the victim had threatened her with a gun 
and choked her immediately prior to the stabbing.  And the grand 
jury heard substantial evidence in support of this self-defense 
claim:  police officers located a gun on the couch at the 
residence; an officer noticed fresh bruises on the defendant's 
face and arm; the defendant had previously disclosed that the 
victim was physically abusive and had placed a gun in her mouth 
on multiple occasions; and the victim, days before the killing, 
had sent text messages to the defendant saying "I'm going to 
fucking kill you" and "You're dead." 
7 
 
 
 
The significance of this exculpatory evidence is reflected 
in the fact that the Commonwealth, which was familiar with the 
circumstances of this case and with the law of murder and 
manslaughter, decided to charge the defendant with manslaughter 
in its complaint. 
 
3.  Impairment of the integrity of the grand jury.  If the 
Commonwealth had sought an indictment for murder without 
disclosing any of the above-described surrounding circumstances 
to the grand jury (which, to the Commonwealth's credit, did not 
take place here), I believe there can be no doubt that the 
prosecutor would have impaired the integrity of the grand jury 
by failing to present to them exculpatory evidence "'likely to 
affect the grand jury's decision,' as well as evidence the 
withholding of which would cause the presentation to be 
seriously tainted."  See Commonwealth v. Clemmey, 447 Mass. 121, 
130 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 437 Mass. 33, 37 
(2002).  See also Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 449 
(1984) (dismissing indictment where failure to introduce 
exculpatory evidence impaired integrity of grand jury).  Yet the 
plurality opinion concludes that even where the prosecutor 
sought an indictment for murder despite substantial evidence of 
self-defense and the excessive use of force in self-defense, the 
prosecutor had no obligation to provide the grand jury with any 
legal guidance regarding lawful self-defense or the excessive 
8 
 
 
use of force in self-defense, or regarding the required elements 
of the crime of murder.2 
 
I believe that the prosecutor's obligation to furnish the 
grand jury with exculpatory evidence likely to affect the grand 
jury's decision includes the obligation to provide instructions 
enabling them to understand the legal significance of that 
evidence.3  See Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 Mass. 808, 839 
(2012) (Gants, J., concurring) ("Evidence of mitigating 
circumstances . . . is meaningless to a grand jury that have not 
been provided with the guidance necessary to understand its 
legal significance").  In other words, I believe that if it 
would be an O'Dell violation for a prosecutor to conceal 
significant exculpatory evidence from the grand jury in a murder 
                     
 
2 The plurality does not address whether it would have 
impaired the integrity of the grand jury for the prosecutor in 
this case not to present the above-described evidence of the 
victim's abuse of the defendant.  The plurality therefore 
implicitly assumes that legal instructions would not have been 
necessary even if the substantial evidence of self-defense and 
excessive use of force in self-defense was required to be 
presented to the grand jury. 
 
 
3 I note, as the court did in Commonwealth v. Walczak, 463 
Mass. 808, 810 (2012), that the Commonwealth need not present 
grand juries with evidence or legal instructions concerning a 
defendant's mental impairment or lack of criminal 
responsibility.  This is because a prosecutor during grand jury 
proceedings is unable to obtain a court order requiring the 
defendant to submit to a psychiatric examination.  See id. at 
842 n.4 (Gants, J., concurring), citing Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) 
(2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1518 (2004); Blaisdell v. 
Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 765-766 (1977). 
9 
 
 
case, it should be a Fernandes violation for a prosecutor to 
fail to explain the legal significance of that evidence, and I 
believe that either violation warrants dismissal of the 
indictment without prejudice.  I reach this conclusion because, 
where mitigating or exculpatory evidence is so significant that 
it must be introduced to avoid impairing the integrity of the 
grand jury proceedings, failure to explain the legal relevance 
of this evidence "probably influenced" the grand jury's decision 
to indict the defendant for murder and not manslaughter.4  
Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621. 
                     
 
4 The plurality contends that the language in Commonwealth 
v. Mayfield, 398 Mass. 615, 621 (1986), which asks whether the 
grand jury's decision to indict was "probably influenced" by a 
prosecutor's actions, does not support my position because in 
that case, "the relevant inquiry [was] 'whether, if a grand jury 
had been told the true facts, it probably would not have 
indicted the defendant,' (emphasis added), not whether it would 
have indicted the defendant for a lesser offense."  Ante at note 
7, quoting Mayfield, supra.  In Mayfield, supra at 619, however, 
there was no reason for the court to consider the possibility of 
indictment for a lesser offense -- Mayfield argued that the 
integrity of the grand jury was impaired by the presentation of 
false inculpatory evidence relevant to the question whether he 
killed the eleven year old victim; he did not claim to have 
acted in self-defense or under any mitigating circumstance.  
Therefore, an indictment for manslaughter would have been 
entirely unsupported by the evidence, and the defendant could 
show "probable prejudice in the grand jury proceedings" only by 
demonstrating the likelihood of a no bill.  Id. at 622.  Here, 
in contrast, there was abundant evidence before the grand jury 
that the defendant was responsible for the victim's death, but 
there was also considerable evidence that she acted in self-
defense or used excessive force in self-defense.  In light of 
that evidence, whether the grand jury's decision was "probably 
influenced" by the failure to present instructions, and 
10 
 
 
 
In reaching the contrary conclusion that instructions need 
to be provided only where they would likely result in a no bill, 
the plurality makes five errors. 
 
a.  Overstatement of existing case law.  First, the 
plurality contends that my definition of what probably 
influences a grand jury's decision to indict "does not comport 
with our case law."  Ante at    .  In fact, however, a majority 
of this court has never decided whether instructions on 
mitigating circumstances and defenses are necessary where the 
Commonwealth seeks to indict an adult defendant for murder and 
where there is substantial evidence that the defendant acted in 
self-defense or used excessive force in self-defense.  See 
Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 219 (2017) (declining to 
address this issue).  As the plurality acknowledges, "we 
provided only limited guidance regarding legal instructions 
furnished to grand juries" prior to holding in Walczak, 463 
Mass. at 810, that prosecutors are required to instruct the 
grand jury on the elements of murder and on the significance of 
mitigating circumstances and defenses where the Commonwealth 
seeks to indict a juvenile for murder despite substantial 
evidence of mitigating circumstances or defenses.  Ante at    . 
                     
therefore whether the lack of instructions "probably made a 
difference" and resulted in "probable prejudice," depends not 
only on the possibility of a no bill, but also on the 
possibility of an indictment for manslaughter.  Id. at 621-622. 
11 
 
 
The question presented here, therefore, cannot be answered 
simply by applying our existing case law.  It is presumably for 
this reason that the plurality relies in large part on an out-
of-state case, State v. Hogan, 336 N.J. Super. 319 (2001), 
decided by the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior 
Court, in arguing that instructions need be provided only when 
they would likely result in a no bill.  See ante at    ,   ,   . 
 
b.  Oversimplification of grand jury's decision.  Second, 
the plurality treats the grand jury's decision as binary:  
whether to indict the defendant for a crime or to return a no 
bill.  The indictment presented to a grand jury, however, does 
not charge a generic crime -- it charges a specific crime, with 
specific required elements.  See Commonwealth v. Fryar, 414 
Mass. 732, 744 (1993), S.C., 425 Mass. 237, cert. denied, 522 
U.S. 1033 (1997) (Commonwealth must present grand jury with 
"enough evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the 
defendant committed the crime charged" [emphasis added]).  It is 
therefore up to the grand jury to determine not only whether the 
defendant committed a crime, but which, if any, particular crime 
is supported by probable cause.  See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 
U.S. 254, 263 (1986) ("In the hands of the grand jury lies the 
power to charge a greater offense or a lesser offense"). 
 
The plurality's oversimplified approach to the grand jury's 
role leads it to conclude that a lack of instructions "would 
12 
 
 
likely have affected the grand jury's decision to indict," 
Clemmey, 447 Mass. at 130, only where such instructions would 
have informed the grand jury of what likely would have been a 
complete defense.  Ante at    .  This standard fails to 
recognize the immense difference between a manslaughter and a 
murder indictment where the grand jury finds that only the 
former is supported by probable cause.  If convicted of murder, 
the defendant will be sentenced to life in prison and, if 
convicted of murder in the first degree, will have no 
possibility of parole.  See G. L. c. 265, § 2 (a), (c).  In 
contrast, if the defendant is convicted of manslaughter, she 
faces a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison, with no 
minimum mandatory sentence.  See G. L. c. 265, § 13.  Of course, 
a murder indictment will not necessarily result in a murder 
conviction.  But the stark difference between murder and 
manslaughter may affect not only the defendant's sentence upon 
conviction, but also the defendant's decision whether to plead 
guilty or go to trial.  Some defendants, even if they are not 
guilty, may be unwilling to risk a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole where the Commonwealth is willing to 
accept a guilty plea to murder in the second degree or 
manslaughter.  They may be more willing to risk trial, however, 
where the grand jury indict them for manslaughter rather than 
murder. 
13 
 
 
 
Furthermore, an indictment for manslaughter as opposed to 
murder is likely to yield more favorable plea options for a 
defendant, as the Commonwealth will no longer possess the threat 
of a life sentence as a negotiating tool.  "In today's criminal 
justice system," where "the negotiation of a plea bargain, 
rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the 
critical point for a defendant," Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 
144 (2012), this calculus is critical.  And importantly, it 
takes place before the petit jury enter the equation to "weigh 
the mitigating and exculpatory evidence" and "determine whether 
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder or 
voluntary manslaughter, or not guilty of any offense."  Ante at    
.  I therefore believe that the grand jury's decision to indict 
is affected not only where legal instructions likely would have 
resulted in a no bill, but also where the grand jury's decision 
to issue an indictment for murder (as opposed to manslaughter) 
was "probably influenced" by the lack of legal guidance.  
Mayfield, 398 Mass. at 621.  This standard reflects the grand 
jury's responsibility to decide whether the particular crime 
charged is supported by probable cause.  See Vasquez, 474 U.S. 
at 263. 
 
c.  Distinction between mitigating and exculpatory 
evidence.  Third, the plurality contends that grand jury 
proceedings are not impaired where omitted instructions relate 
14 
 
 
to evidence that is "merely mitigating and not wholly 
exculpatory."  Ante at    .  I agree with the plurality that 
mitigating evidence is evidence that might reduce the gravity of 
the offense, while exculpatory evidence is evidence that might 
absolve the defendant from guilt altogether.  See ante at note 
2.  But when it comes to the Commonwealth's duty to disclose 
evidence to a grand jury considering an indictment for murder, I 
believe that this is a distinction without a meaningful 
difference. 
 
Because mitigating evidence tends to cast doubt on the 
Commonwealth's proof regarding an essential element of a crime 
for which the Commonwealth seeks an indictment, it is 
exculpatory as to that crime, and may cause a grand jury to 
conclude that only a lesser crime is supported by probable 
cause.5  See Walczak, 463 Mass. at 822-823 (Lenk, J., concurring) 
                     
 
5 It is perhaps for this reason that we have always included 
mitigating evidence within the over-all rubric of exculpatory 
evidence, and imposed obligations on the prosecutor to reveal 
both.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 485 (2007) 
(exculpatory evidence extends "beyond alibi and proof of 
innocence" to "all evidence that is of significant aid to [the 
defendant's] case, 'whether it furnishes corroboration of the 
defendant's story, calls into question a material, although not 
indispensable, element of the prosecution's version of the 
events, or challenges the credibility of a key prosecution 
witness'" [citations omitted]); Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d), as 
appearing in 473 Mass. 1301 (2016) (prosecutor in criminal case 
must "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or 
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the 
guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense"); Rule 
15 
 
 
(requirement that significant, probably influential mitigating 
or exculpatory evidence be presented to grand jury "assures that 
it can be considered by them in evaluating whether there is 
probable cause to return either the indictment sought or one for 
a lesser offense, or to return a no bill"); id. at 839 (Gants, 
J., concurring) ("A grand jury are entitled to hear such 
evidence where it is substantial and may be important to their 
decision whether to indict for murder or voluntary 
manslaughter").  Here, where the prosecutor presented a murder 
indictment to the grand jury, so-called mitigating evidence 
suggesting that the defendant did not commit the killing with 
malice because she acted in self-defense or used excessive force 
in self-defense is exculpatory as to the crime of murder.  It 
must therefore be presented and explained to the grand jury 
where, as here, failure to do so probably influenced their 
decision to indict the defendant for murder. 
 
d.  Grand jury's role in the criminal process.  Fourth, the 
plurality's opinion fails to honor the constitutional and 
statutory role of the grand jury.  See Jones v. Robbins, 8 Gray 
329, 342-349 (1857) (under art. 12 of Massachusetts Declaration 
                     
116.2(a)(1) of the Local Rules of the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts (eff. Feb. 1, 2012) 
("Exculpatory information is information that is material and 
favorable to the accused and includes . . . information that 
tends to . . . cast doubt on defendant's guilt as to any 
essential element in any count in the indictment . . ."). 
16 
 
 
of Rights, crimes punishable by term in State prison require 
grand jury indictment); G. L. c. 263, § 4.  The plurality, of 
course, is correct that the grand jury determine only probable 
cause, leaving it to the petit jury to determine whether the 
evidence at trial proves the defendant guilty of the crime 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.  The plurality is also 
correct that a defendant is not entitled to have the grand jury 
return the lowest possible charge; rather, the Commonwealth may 
instruct the grand jury to return an indictment for the charge 
presented, provided they find that the required elements of that 
charge are supported by probable cause.  See Walczak, 463 Mass. 
at 841 n.3 (Gants, J., concurring); id. at 847-848 (Spina, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  And the plurality 
also is correct that, where the grand jury indict a defendant 
for murder, the petit jury may find the defendant not guilty of 
murder in the first degree but guilty of the lesser included 
crimes of murder in the second degree or manslaughter. 
 
But the grand jury are not a mere rubber stamp required to 
approve any indictment brought by the Commonwealth.  The 
prosecutor controls which indictment to present to the grand 
jury, but the grand jury control whether to return that 
indictment.  See Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263.  Where they find that 
there is not probable cause to support a required element of a 
proposed charge, they should return a no bill or an indictment 
17 
 
 
for a lesser included offense.  In the context of this case, 
this means that if the grand jury found that there was not 
probable cause to support a finding of malice because the 
defendant used excessive force in self-defense, the grand jury 
could return an indictment for manslaughter but not for murder. 
 
The grand jury cannot perform their constitutional or 
statutory role of determining probable cause if they are 
deprived of important exculpatory evidence or of the legal 
guidance they need to understand that exculpatory evidence.  "In 
contrast to a reviewing court's evaluation of the sufficiency of 
the evidence, which views the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, a grand jury need not view the 
evidence in so favorable a light in deciding probable cause."  
Walczak, 463 Mass. at 841 n.3 (Gants, J., concurring).  Even 
where the evidence is legally sufficient to support an 
indictment for murder, as it was here, the circumstances of the 
killing may cause a grand jury to conclude that the credible 
evidence is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause 
as to the element of malice.  See id.  Where they so find after 
being properly instructed, the highest crime supported by 
probable cause is voluntary manslaughter.  See id.  A grand jury 
cannot reasonably decide whether there is probable cause to 
support a finding of malice, however, where substantial 
exculpatory evidence is unaccompanied by instructions explaining 
18 
 
 
the elements of murder and, as relevant here, the legal 
consequences of acting in self-defense or using excessive force 
in self-defense. 
 
It is true, as the plurality acknowledges, that prosecutors 
are required to provide the grand jury with legal instructions 
when the grand jury so requests.  See ante at    , citing 
Commonwealth v. Noble, 429 Mass. 44, 48 (1999).  But there is no 
reason to expect grand jurors to recognize that the elements in 
the murder indictment are not the required elements of murder, 
or to know enough about the law of homicide to ask the 
prosecutor to explain the element of malice.  "It . . . makes no 
sense for a prosecutor to owe a duty to provide such a legal 
instruction only where the grand jury know enough about the law 
of homicide to ask for such an instruction."  Walczak, 463 Mass. 
at 839 (Gants, J., concurring).  "The law of homicide," after 
all, "is too complex reasonably to expect a grand jury to know 
the legal significance of reasonable provocation or sudden 
combat [or excessive use of force in self-defense] without 
instruction by a prosecutor, or even to recognize that it may be 
an issue for which they should seek legal guidance."  Id. at 
839-840. 
 
e.  Exculpatory evidence related to self-defense.  Fifth, 
the plurality acknowledges that there may be circumstances where 
"the absence of instructions on a complete defense would make a 
19 
 
 
difference in the grand jury's determination to hand up an 
indictment," and therefore where a prosecutor must instruct the 
grand jury on self-defense.  Ante at    .  But the plurality 
goes on to determine that in this case, no instruction on self-
defense was required because its absence likely did not make a 
difference in the grand jury's determination to return an 
indictment.  This is troubling, first, because the grand jury 
heard substantial evidence of self-defense -- namely, that the 
victim had a history of physically abusing the defendant, that 
the victim had beaten the defendant leading up to the stabbing, 
and that the victim was stabbed only after he attacked the 
defendant with weapons.  If this type of evidence does not 
suffice to require prosecutors to provide the grand jury with 
instructions on the issue of self-defense, it is not apparent 
what circumstances would.6 
                     
 
6 The plurality acknowledges that such evidence "could have 
been seen as exculpatory," but goes on to conclude that the 
grand jury's decision to indict the defendant was probably not 
affected by a lack of instructions because the "exculpatory 
evidence was weakened substantially by the contrasting evidence 
of the defendant's own violent temper and controlling behavior 
toward -- and physical abuse of -- the victim."  Ante at    ,   
.  Although evidence of the defendant's previous actions may 
have been relevant to the grand jury's probable cause 
determination, the evidence of self-defense presented to the 
grand jury was significant enough that the grand jury should 
have been allowed to evaluate it in light of the law governing 
self-defense. 
 
20 
 
 
 
Equally troubling is the fact that the plurality, by 
requiring instructions only on complete defenses, asks 
prosecutors to do the impossible:  clearly distinguish between 
evidence of lawful self-defense and evidence of excessive use of 
force in self-defense.  See ante at note 11 (prosecutors 
obligated "to discern where substantial exculpatory evidence 
they have presented gives rise to a defense that could 
reasonably result in a no bill, and to instruct the grand juries 
accordingly").  As the plurality acknowledges, however, 
exculpatory evidence showing that the defendant acted in lawful 
self-defense necessarily overlaps with exculpatory evidence 
showing that the defendant used excessive force while acting in 
self-defense.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 412 Mass. 368, 372 
(1992) ("self-defense is not an all or nothing proposition . . . 
once the issue of self-defense has been fairly raised, the jury 
should be instructed on the legal consequence of using 
manifestly disproportionate violence in the supposed exercise" 
                     
 
The plurality also cites to out-of-State cases to argue 
that a complete exoneration was not likely here because "[t]he 
mere existence of some evidence that could suggest self-defense 
does not negate probable cause."  Ante at    , quoting Yousefian 
v. Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2015).  Of course, I 
agree that the grand jury may find probable cause that the 
defendant committed murder even after hearing evidence of self-
defense.  This decision should be left for the grand jury to 
make, however, after they have been properly instructed. 
21 
 
 
of self-defense [quotations, citations, and alteration 
omitted]). 
 
4.  Implications of proposed standards.  The plurality 
declares that, unless the defendant is a juvenile, prosecutors 
have no obligation to instruct the grand jury on the elements of 
the charged offense and lesser offenses even where there is 
powerful exculpatory evidence that likely would make a 
difference in the grand jury's determination to return an 
indictment for murder rather than manslaughter.  Yet, the 
plurality then "strongly encourage[s] district attorneys making 
grand jury presentments" to consider instructing the grand jury 
"on the elements of lesser offenses and/or defenses, where such 
instructions would be in the interest of justice or would assist 
the grand jurors to understand the legal significance of 
mitigating circumstances and defenses."  Ante at note 1, quoting 
Supreme Judicial Court Committee on Grand Jury Proceedings, 
Final Report to the Justices, at 13 (June 2018) (Grand Jury 
Report).  I, too, strongly encourage district attorneys to 
provide these instructions, but I do so because I recognize that 
failing to provide instruction where there is substantial 
exculpatory evidence may impair the integrity of the grand jury. 
 
The plurality's approach -- encouraging prosecutors to 
provide legal instructions where there is substantial 
exculpatory and mitigating evidence but not penalizing a failure 
22 
 
 
to do so unless instructions would likely have resulted in a no 
bill -- is unlikely to have its intended effect.  Previously, we 
had left to another day the question whether an adult defendant 
indicted for murder could have his or her indictment dismissed 
due to a lack of legal instructions on mitigating circumstances 
and defenses.  See Grassie, 476 Mass. at 219.  A prudent 
prosecutor thus may have thought that providing instructions was 
the safer route.  Now, however, prosecutors will know that there 
will rarely be consequences for failing to instruct on 
mitigating circumstances and defenses, even where substantial 
evidence of self-defense or excessive use of force in self-
defense is presented.  I am therefore skeptical that the number 
of prosecutors who choose to provide legal guidance without 
being requested to do so by the grand jury will increase, 
despite the plurality's suggested best practice. 
 
Moreover, if prosecutors come to the grand jury unprepared 
to furnish legal instructions, grand jurors will be less able to 
fulfill their constitutional function, and the risk that a 
prosecutor will inadvertently misstate the law in answer to a 
grand juror's question will be greater.  And that error itself 
creates a risk that the indictment will be dismissed.  After our 
decision in Grassie, 476 Mass. at 220, the entirety of the grand 
jury proceeding apart from deliberations must "be recorded in a 
manner that permits reproduction and transcription."  This 
23 
 
 
includes "any legal instructions provided to the grand jury by a 
judge or a prosecutor in connection with the proceeding."  Id.  
If the prosecutor's legal instructions are substantially 
incorrect or misleading, the error might require dismissal of 
the indictment without prejudice upon review of the recorded 
proceeding.  See Noble, 429 Mass. at 48 (where information was 
requested, "prosecutor should have provided the appropriate 
information" [emphasis added]); United States v. Stevens, 771 F. 
Supp. 2d 556, 567 (D. Md. 2011) ("where a prosecutor's legal 
instruction to the grand jury seriously misstates the applicable 
law, the indictment is subject to dismissal if the misstatement 
casts grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the 
substantial influence of the erroneous instruction" [quotation 
and citation omitted]); United States v. Peralta, 763 F. Supp. 
14, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (dismissing indictment where prosecutor, 
among other errors, presented grand jury with "misleading 
statements of law"). 
 
My conclusion that the integrity of the grand jury 
proceedings was impaired and that the murder indictment must 
therefore be dismissed does not mean that the Commonwealth may 
not again obtain a murder indictment.  In the absence of 
egregious prosecutorial misconduct, which has not been alleged 
here, the remedy would be a dismissal without prejudice.  See 
O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 447.  This means that the Commonwealth, 
24 
 
 
which has already presented evidence in this case to multiple 
grand juries, could present the evidence and appropriate legal 
instructions to another grand jury, and then ask that grand jury 
to return a murder indictment. 
 
The obligation to provide guidance regarding the legal 
significance of mitigating or exculpatory evidence imposes only 
a modest burden on prosecutors.  See Walczak, 463 Mass. at 833 
(Lenk, J., concurring) ("instructional requirement imposes scant 
burden on the Commonwealth").  It applies only where there 
exists exculpatory or mitigating evidence of such significance 
that withholding it from the grand jury would impair the 
proceeding's integrity.  See id. at 822 (Lenk, J., concurring); 
id. at 839 (Gants, J., concurring).  The Supreme Judicial Court 
Committee on Grand Jury Proceedings, which was created to help 
the court "gain[] a better understanding of current practices 
employed by the various district attorneys and the Attorney 
General" in grand jury proceedings, Grassie, 476 Mass. at 219, 
noted in its final report that "[m]any District Attorney offices 
currently instruct the grand jury on the elements of the 
offense, especially where the elements are not apparent from the 
25 
 
 
language of the indictment or are not offenses commonly 
presented to the grand jury."7  Grand Jury Report, supra at 28. 
 
The burden on prosecutors is even less when one recognizes 
that a prosecutor should already be prepared to provide 
appropriate legal instructions if a grand juror were to ask 
about the legal significance of exculpatory or mitigating 
evidence.  See Noble, 429 Mass. at 48.  And the frequency of 
such grand juror questions may increase after the issuance of 
this opinion, because I join the plurality in their conclusion 
that Superior Court judges during the empanelment of grand 
juries can and should inform prospective grand jurors that they 
are entitled to ask prosecutors about the elements of the crime 
charged in each indictment, as well as to request guidance on 
lesser included crimes and defenses when they are presented by 
the evidence.  See ante at note 15.  If grand jurors' requests 
for instructions increase, the modest burden imposed by a 
                     
 
7 According to the report, two out of twelve offices provide 
individual instructions as to the elements of the offense 
charged in every case.  Supreme Judicial Court Committee on 
Grand Jury Proceedings, Final Report to the Justices, at 33 
(June 2018) (Grand Jury Report).  Four offices describe the 
elements of common crimes at the outset of the grand jury's 
term; two rely on the language of the indictment to describe the 
elements; two provide instructions only when required under 
Walczak, 463 Mass. at 810, or Commonwealth v. Noble, 429 Mass. 
44, 48 (1999); and one has no set practice.  Grand Jury Report, 
supra.  The remaining office's practices are not described in 
the Grand Jury Report. 
26 
 
 
requirement that instructions be presented in certain limited 
circumstances would only decrease. 
 
Furthermore, when presenting before the grand jury, the 
prosecutor need not provide legal guidance "with the same degree 
of precision that is required when a petit jury [are] instructed 
on the law" (citation omitted).  Walczak, 463 Mass. at 835 
(Lenk, J., concurring).  Instead, "use of the Model Jury 
Instructions on Homicide, modified as appropriate for use before 
the grand jury, to define the elements of the crime charged and 
set out the legal requirements of defenses or mitigating 
circumstances raised by the evidence will ordinarily be 
sufficient."  Id. 
 
Nor can it fairly be said that imposing this obligation 
constitutes an unwarranted intrusion on the discretion of a 
prosecutor.  The grand jury is "an integral part of the court," 
and judges have a "duty to prevent interference with [grand 
jurors] in the performance of their proper functions, to give 
them appropriate instructions, and to assist them in the 
performance of their duties" (citation omitted).  Matter of 
Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 613 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  We have long recognized that a 
prosecutor does not have the discretion to conceal important 
exculpatory or mitigating evidence where doing so would impair 
the integrity of the grand jury.  See Walczak, 463 Mass. at 822 
27 
 
 
(Lenk, J., concurring); Wilcox, 437 Mass. at 37; Mayfield, 398 
Mass. at 620-621; O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 449.  We recognized more 
recently that a prosecutor, at least in juvenile murder cases, 
does not have the discretion to impair the integrity of a grand 
jury by failing to provide legal instructions necessary for the 
grand jury to recognize the legal significance of such evidence.  
See Walczak, 463 Mass. at 810.  "By providing legal 
instructions[,] the prosecutor enables the grand jury to 
meaningfully apply the facts to the law, thus assisting the 
grand jury to fulfill its role as a 'bulwark of individual 
liberty and a fundamental protection against despotism and 
persecution.'"  Grand Jury Report, supra at 22, quoting Wilcox, 
437 Mass. at 34.  I therefore do not believe that requiring 
prosecutors to provide legal instructions in the narrow 
circumstances described herein improperly encroaches on the 
Commonwealth's role in the indictment process. 
 
There is little reason to fear that application of my 
proposed standard will yield a floodgate of motions to dismiss 
indictments, or will otherwise significantly burden Superior 
Court judges.  No doubt, comparable fears were aired when this 
court allowed defendants to challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence of probable cause in McCarthy, 385 Mass. at 162-163, 
and the concealment of exculpatory evidence in O'Dell, 392 Mass. 
at 449, and those fears ultimately proved groundless.  There are 
28 
 
 
at least three reasons to believe that comparable fears will 
prove equally groundless here. 
 
First, as already noted, a prosecutor's obligation to 
provide guidance regarding the legal significance of important 
exculpatory or mitigating evidence is triggered only in that 
fraction of cases where such evidence exists. 
 
Second, such motions to dismiss are unlikely to prevail.  
So long as prosecutors provide the grand jury with proper legal 
guidance where necessary, there is little risk of error 
warranting dismissal of the indictment.  In fact, the risk of 
error will be diminished if prosecutors initiate such legal 
instructions themselves rather than wait for a legal question 
from the grand jury, which they may be less prepared to answer. 
 
Third, in the absence of egregious prosecutorial 
misconduct, the allowance of a motion to dismiss will result 
only in the dismissal of the indictment without prejudice; the 
Commonwealth may seek the same indictment from a different grand 
jury by presenting the same evidence and furnishing the required 
legal guidance.  See O'Dell, 392 Mass. at 447.  Consequently, 
unless there is a significant chance that a new grand jury will 
return a no bill or indict the defendant on a lesser charge if 
properly instructed, defendants will incur little benefit from 
bringing such a motion. 
29 
 
 
 
Finally, the Commonwealth contends that the Superior Court 
judge improperly relied on Walczak to dismiss the murder 
indictment because our decision in Walczak obligated the 
Commonwealth to provide legal instructions only in future 
juvenile murder cases where there was substantial evidence of 
mitigating circumstances or defenses presented to the grand 
jury.  See Walczak, 463 Mass. at 810.  This obligation, the 
Commonwealth argues, did not apply to cases such as this one, 
where the Commonwealth sought to indict an adult for murder.8  In 
Walczak, however, we affirmed the judge's dismissal of the 
juvenile's murder indictment even though we applied the court's 
newly-created rule regarding required legal instructions only to 
future juvenile cases.  Id.  There would be nothing unfair about 
doing the same here with respect to an adult murder indictment. 
 
In fact, the importance of such legal guidance to the 
interests of justice was demonstrated in the Walczak case.  
                     
 
8 I note that the argument in my concurring opinion in 
Walczak -- that legal instruction should be required where there 
is evidence of mitigating circumstances that is so substantial 
that its omission would impair the integrity of the grand jury, 
regardless of whether the defendant is a juvenile or an adult -- 
was joined by two other Justices, and that a fourth Justice, 
Justice Lenk, declined to address whether the holding in Walczak 
should extend to adult murder cases.  Walczak, 463 Mass. at 837 
(Gants, J., concurring, with whom Botsford and Duffly, JJ., 
joined).  See id. at 833 (Lenk, J., concurring).  In 
Commonwealth v. Grassie, 476 Mass. 202, 219 (2017), the court 
left to another time the question whether to expand the Walczak 
holding to adults. 
30 
 
 
Without legal instruction, the grand jury indicted the juvenile 
for murder.  See Walczak, 463 Mass. at 809.  After the 
indictment was dismissed without prejudice due to the absence of 
instructions on the law distinguishing murder from manslaughter, 
the grand jury indicted the juvenile for manslaughter.  The 
defendant was subsequently found not guilty of this charge 
following a Juvenile Court jury trial. 
 
Conclusion.  I would hold that the integrity of the grand 
jury proceedings was impaired by the Commonwealth's failure to 
provide legal instructions concerning self-defense and the 
excessive use of force in self-defense.  Because the grand 
jury's decision to return an indictment for murder was "probably 
influenced" by the absence of this legal guidance, see Mayfield, 
398 Mass. at 621, I would dismiss the indictment without 
prejudice and allow a grand jury with proper legal instruction 
to decide whether the defendant should be indicted and, if so, 
whether the indictment should be for murder or manslaughter.  
For these reasons, I dissent.