Case Title: Collier v. Necaise

Citation: 285 So. 2d 778

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1973-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
285 So. 2d 778 (1973) Vivian Taconi COLLIER et al. v. Mrs. Elolse Collier NECAISE. No. 47306. Supreme Court of Mississippi. December 3, 1973. Cornelius J. Ladner, Bay St. Louis, for appellants. William M. Frisbie, Bay St. Louis, for appellee. WALKER, Justice: This is an attempted appeal from a decree of the Chancery Court of Hancock County, Mississippi. The question before the Court is whether an attorney who has a contract with his clients which provides for a fee contingent upon the success of the litigation can appeal from an adverse ruling of a lower court to the Supreme Court against the express wishes and instructions of his client. The appellants in this case entered into the following contract with the Honorable Cornelius J. Ladner: Pursuant to said contract, the attorney instituted suit to have the deed from Vivian Collier to Mrs. Eloise Collier Necaise set aside on the ground that said deed had been fraudulently obtained. The cause was heard on its merits by the chancellor in the lower court who found that the allegations of the bill of complaint had not been proved and entered a decree dismissing same with prejudice. This final decree was entered on June 19, 1972. Thereafter on June 22, 1972, Mr. Ladner filed a petition for appeal to the Supreme Court on behalf of his clients. On that same day the chancellor entered an order allowing the appeal. On June 23, 1972, the attorney gave notice to the court reporter advising him to transcribe his notes. On that same day, June 23, 1972, Vivian Taconi Collier, Norma C. Stiglet and Harold Stiglet advised Mr. Ladner by letter that they did not desire to take an appeal stating that they were willing to abide by the decision of the chancery judge. That letter reads as follows: A carbon copy of this letter was sent to Judge Hewes, Austin Malley, court reporter, and John Rutherford, Sr., chancery clerk. The record shows that a copy of the letter was filed by the chancery clerk in his office on June 23, 1972. On that same date, June 23, 1972, Mr. Rutherford sent the following letter to Mr. Ladner: Dear Mr. Ladner: Although the letter from the chancery clerk to the Honorable Cornelius C. Ladner indicated that only two of the complainants had signed the aforementioned letter, a review of the record reveals that all three of the complainants had signed said letter. Thereafter, Mr. Ladner sent the following letter dated June 30, 1972, to Mr. Rutherford demanding that he proceed to prepare the record of appeal: Dear Mr. Rutherford: The chancery clerk, pursuant to the demand of the above letter, prepared the record for appeal and sent same in due course to the Supreme Court. The question here is whether the attorney, by the contract with his clients, has such interest in the cause of action or in the property in litigation as to give him a right to proceed with the appeal against the express wishes and instructions of his clients. In Pollard v. Joseph, 210 Miss. 828, 50 So. 2d 546 (1951), the Court had before it a contract between an attorney and his client similar to the contract here in question, and the Court there stated: The Court in that opinion discussed the case of Cochran v. Henry, 107 Miss. 233, 65 So. 2d 213 (1914), and said: The contract in question which Mr. Ladner had with his clients provided for payment of a fee to him of one-third of all sums recovered by suit for having a deed set aside. The fee was to be based on the actual cash value of the property which was the subject matter of the lawsuit and was contingent upon the success of the lawsuit. This did not give the attorney a vested interest in the litigation. A contingent fee is one depending upon the success of services to be performed and is purely speculative in nature. 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 186, page 1062 (1937). A valid agreement for the payment to the attorney of a proportion of a sum recovered in case of success does not give the attorney such an interest in the cause of action as to prevent the client, without consulting his attorney, from dismissing the suit or compromising it. Moreover, where the adverse party obtains a judgment, the client is under no obligation to his attorney by reason of such contract to prosecute an appeal. 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 187, page 1070-1071 (1937). In 91 A.L.R.2d 623 (1963) it is stated: We are of the opinion that the contract between the litigants and the attorney in this case was simply a contingent fee contract and did not give the attorney such an interest in the outcome of the litigation that would permit him to prosecute the appeal without the consent and against the express wishes of his clients. We are of the opinion that this appeal should be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice. Appeal dismissed with prejudice. RODGERS, P.J., and INZER, ROBERTSON, and BROOM, JJ., concur.