Case Title: STATE OF WYOMING EX REL. MARK A. HOPKINSON v. THE DISTRICT COURT, TETON COUNTY, WYOMING, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT; MARK A. HOPKINSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING; STATE OF WYOMING EX REL. MARK A. HOPKINSON v. THE DISTRICT COURT, TETON COUNTY, WYOMING, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT; MARK A. HOPKINSON v. A.G. McCLINTOCK, WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND DUANE SHILLINGER, WARDEN, WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE OF WYOMING EX REL. MARK A. HOPKINSON v. THE DISTRICT COURT, TETON COUNTY, WYOMING, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT; MARK A. HOPKINSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING; STATE OF WYOMING EX REL. MARK A. HOPKINSON v. THE DISTRICT COURT, TETON COUNTY, WYOMING, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT; MARK A. HOPKINSON v. A.G. McCLINTOCK, WYOMING ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND DUANE SHILLINGER, WARDEN, WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY1985 WY 35696 P.2d 54Case Number: 84-144, 84-151, 84-193, 84-212Decided: 02/28/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
STATE OF WYOMING EX REL. MARK A. 
HOPKINSON, PETITIONER, 

v. 

THE DISTRICT COURT, 
TETON COUNTY, WYOMING, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, RESPONDENT. 

MARK A. HOPKINSON, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF). 

STATE OF WYOMING EX REL. MARK A. 
HOPKINSON, PETITIONER, 

v. 

THE DISTRICT COURT, 
TETON COUNTY, WYOMING, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, RESPONDENT. 

MARK A. HOPKINSON, 
APPELLANT (PETITIONER), 

v. 

A.G. McCLINTOCK, WYOMING 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND DUANE SHILLINGER, WARDEN, WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY, APPELLEES 
(RESPONDENTS).

Motion for Further Oral 
Argument and Rehearing Denied April 19, 1985.

 
 

Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 

Leonard Munker, 
State Public Defender, Martin McClain, Appellate Counsel, State Public Defender, 
and David S. Vogel, Seattle, 
Wash., for appellant 
(petitioner).

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Allen C. Johnson, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for appellees 
(respondents).

Before THOMAS*, C.J., ROSE and CARDINE, JJ., RAPER, J., Retired, 
and McEWAN, District Judge.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

RAPER, Justice, 
Retired.

[¶1.]     This is the fourth time 
the appellant/petitioner has been before this Court seeking to vacate his 
conviction and death sentence. For future reference, this consolidation and 
disposition of original proceedings and appeals is Hopkinson IV. See Hopkinson v. State, 
Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982) [Hopkinson I]; Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43, 
cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 262, 78 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1983) [Hopkinson II]; Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 679 P.2d 1008, 
cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 228, 83 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1984) [Hopkinson III]. Briefly, the facts are 
that appellant was found guilty of four murders and, as a result of the presence 
of statutory aggravating circumstances and upon recommendation of a jury, 
sentenced to death for the murder of Jeff Green. The details of the horrifying 
and inexcusable deaths and appellant's guilt and culpability justifying the 
death penalty can be found in Hopkinson I and II, particularly. Hopkinson III 
affirmed the trial judge's denial of a new trial and in doing so contained many 
facts with supporting references to the record.

[¶2.]     As we view the record 
and filings in these proceedings and appeals, the only issue is whether 
appellant's Consolidated Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, filed in the district court of the county of trial and dismissed by the 
trial judge upon a motion to dismiss,1 is sufficient to state a claim.2 We will not reach the issue raised 
in the appeal of appellant from an order of the trial judge denying his sweeping 
motion for "preparation of all of the Grand Jury evidence and testimony touching 
on any aspect of his case [State v. 
Hopkinson]." The trial judge entered an order requiring appellant to state 
with particularity what it was he was asking for. Appellant filed a response to 
the trial court's order which, while itemized, would appear to demand all grand 
jury proceedings relating to appellant. The district judge then denied it on the 
ground that the request had to do with the substantive issues tried in the two 
previous jury trials and motion for new trial considered in Hopkinson I, II and III, respectively; 
and that no showing was made that these issues should be opened for a fourth 
consideration of the case.3

[¶3.]     We consolidated the 
appeals and original proceedings before this Court for argument, hearing, and 
disposition. At the same time, a peremptory writ of prohibition was issued 
staying execution of appellant's death sentence, subject to later rescheduling 
if the outcome of the appeals and original proceedings before this Court should 
be unfavorable to appellant.

[¶4.]     We will affirm the 
orders of the district court denying post-conviction relief and discovery of all 
grand jury proceedings, deny leave to file petitions for writs of prohibition 
and mandamus, and direct the trial judge, by appropriate proceedings, to set a 
new date to carry out the death sentence.

I

[¶5.]     Writs of habeas corpus 
are governed by §§ 1-27-101 through 1-27-134, W.S. The Wyoming Constitution 
makes little reference to the writ other than recognizing it as a constitutional 
right and that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended unless, when in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may 
require it." Article 1, § 17, Wyoming Constitution. The Wyoming Supreme 
Court is granted original jurisdiction in habeas corpus, Art. 5, § 3, Wyoming 
Constitution, as are district courts, Art. 5, § 10, Wyoming Constitution. 
Habeas corpus may be regulated by statute, provided such regulations do not 
infringe upon the constitutional right of the writ. Miskimins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 404, 58 P. 411 
(1899). There is no appeal from denial by a district court of a writ of habeas 
corpus, but that does not prevent petitioning the Supreme Court by original 
proceedings for issuance of the writ. State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court of Sheridan County, Wyo., 621 P.2d 223 (1980); Foster v. Warden of Wyoming State 
Penitentiary, Wyo., 489 P.2d 1166 (1971); 
Ex parte Brugneaux, 51 Wyo. 103, 63 P.2d 800 
(1937); Miskimins v. Shaver, 
supra.

[¶6.]     Appellant agrees that 
he could have filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 
1-27-104, W.S., with the District Court for CarbonCounty, Second Judicial District, where he 
is incarcerated in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. However, he elected to 
consolidate the petition for habeas corpus with a petition for post-conviction 
relief and file in the district court for the county of trial. The latter 
procedure for post-conviction relief is provided by §§ 7-14-101 through 
7-14-108, W.S. He explained in his petition that the consolidation and filing 
were made in the Ninth Judicial District "in order to facilitate the proceedings 
and promote judicial economy." That is a basic foundation for the modern 
procedure of filing a petition for post-conviction relief in the county of 
trial, conviction, and sentencing as set out in § 7-14-101, W.S.:

"Any person imprisoned in 
the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his 
conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the constitution 
of the United States or of the state of Wyoming, or both, may institute 
proceedings under this act [§§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108]. The proceeding shall 
be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took 
place a petition verified by 
affidavit * * *." (Emphasis added.)

[¶7.]     It is generally 
understood that the type post-conviction statute such as that employed in 
Wyoming, which is analogous to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982), is now considered in 
view of the historical context in which it was adopted as simply providing in 
the sentencing court a remedy commensurate, to a large extent, with that which 
had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district 
where the prisoner was confined. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 10 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1963); and Hill v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 424, 427, 82 S. Ct. 468, 471, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417, reh. denied 369 U.S. 808, 82 S. Ct. 640, 7 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1962), as to 
§ 2255 and principles applicable to the Wyoming version. The post-conviction relief 
statutes, both Wyoming and federal, do not suspend the right 
of habeas corpus by impinging upon prisoners' rights to collaterally attack 
their convictions. Rather, the principal purpose was to minimize the 
administrative difficulties encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording 
the same rights in another and more convenient forum. United 
States v. 
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 72 S. Ct. 263, 96 L. Ed. 232 
(1952)4; Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235, 459 P.2d 1017 
(1969). These concepts, as far as the case now before us is concerned, apply to 
Wyoming's 
post-conviction relief statute.

[¶8.]     The record of the 
conviction is present in the county of trial, and usually the matter can be 
heard by the district judge who presided over the trial, has an intimate 
connection to and knowledge of the files and record, and is less likely to be 
misled by false or misleading allegations as to what occurred. He is thus in a 
better position to consider the petition on an accessibility and knowledgeable 
basis than the district judge of the district wherein is located the 
penitentiary where petitioner is confined, when a stranger to the trial 
proceedings.5

[¶9.]     Appellant indicates he 
must pursue these proceedings before he can access any federal court remedy by 
way of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982) provides that an application for 
habeas corpus cannot be granted unless the applicant has exhausted remedies 
available in the courts of the state. A reason put forth for creating a state 
post-conviction remedy is to cut down the number of federal habeas corpus 
proceedings.6 The rationale is apparently that if 
a more complete means of collateral attack on a judgment and sentence is 
furnished at the state level, federal courts will be more confident with the 
reliability of, and less likely to review, state court convictions. Comity 
between the jurisdictions is thus promoted. There has been complaint made in 
various state government circles that federal courts have usurped and interfered 
with the state judicial function. It has been held that a ground for 
entertaining a petition for habeas corpus seeking relief from a state conviction 
in the federal court establishment is the absence of an effective state 
corrective process and that this may be a denial of due process under the Fourth 
Amendment. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 85 S. Ct. 1486, 14 L. Ed. 2d 422 (1965).7 We acknowledge our obligation, and 
always have, that "[s]tate courts are `equally bound to guard and protect rights 
secured by the [United 
States] Constitution.'" Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3-4, 102 S. Ct. 18, 19-20, 70 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1981). Exhaustion is a federal question we need not decide. We will 
afford appellant the opportunity to meaningfully pursue the courses available 
under Wyoming 
jurisprudence, and we will give it our best attention even though appellant may 
be mistaken about his right to relief.

[¶10.]  There are reasons why appellant's 
petition for writ of habeas corpus is not a proper proceeding to obtain the 
relief he seeks. The proceeding as filed fails to satisfy statutory requirements 
and court precedent established over many years of Wyoming judicial 
interpretation. Statutory regulation and case law so narrow habeas corpus in 
operation that it cannot embrace the latitude of a petition for post-conviction 
relief. For example, § 1-27-125, W.S.,8 provides that habeas corpus cannot 
question the correctness of a verdict of a jury or finding of a judge when they 
are acting within their jurisdiction in a lawful manner. A court's judgment 
cannot be impeached by a writ of habeas corpus except for jurisdictional 
reasons. Hollibaugh and Bunten v. 
Hehn, 13 Wyo. 269, 79 P. 1044 (1905). This is the 
office of an appeal here thrice taken and decided against appellant. 
Furthermore, there is no provision that we can see which authorizes a court in 
habeas corpus to grant a new trial, which appears to be what the appellant is 
really seeking. The court in a post-conviction proceeding can grant a "retrial." 
Section 7-14-106, W.S. We see no need to further explore the nuances of habeas 
corpus when the district court had before it a petition for post-conviction 
relief which raised any question now before us that could be considered in a 
habeas corpus proceeding, and it was decisively, as the court in which the 
conviction took place, an eminently proper court to consider the petition for 
post-conviction relief. This position is particularly applicable here where we 
have no original petition for writ of habeas corpus before us; no appeal lies 
from denial of such a petition by the district court; and an appeal from denial 
of a post-conviction petition for relief is specifically authorized by § 
7-14-107, W.S.9 We, therefore, are going to treat 
the Consolidated Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Writ of Habeas Corpus 
as a petition for post-conviction relief filed as authorized by § 7-14-101, et 
seq., W.S.10 

II

[¶11.]  Of express application in the disposition 
of this appeal, as well as the dismissal of appellant's petition for 
post-conviction relief by the trial judge, is § 7-14-102, W.S.:

"The petition shall 
identify the proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted, give the date of 
the rendition of the final judgment complained of, and shall clearly set forth 
the respects in which petitioner's constitutional rights were violated. The petition shall have attached thereto 
affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting the allegations or shall 
state why the same are not attached. The petition shall identify any previous 
proceedings that the petitioner may have taken to secure relief from his 
conviction. Argument, citations, and discussion of authorities shall be omitted 
from the petition." (Emphasis added.)

This Court has 
had this case before it on three previous occasions and in each instance 
questions were decided which we now see being presented again, some of which 
have been decided twice before. Once a matter is judicially decided, it is 
finally decided unless adequate reason is demonstrated to justify reopening and 
consideration anew.

[¶12.]  We have no argument with appellant's 
point that a previous decision must have reliability, but unreliability must be 
shown in some way other than in terms of mere conclusion. Before a person is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a petition for post-conviction relief, 
there must be set forth in the text of the petition and the required supporting 
attachments a substantial claim plus some specificity in support of the claim. 
Boggs v. State, Wyo., 484 P.2d 711 
(1971). In order to justify a hearing, there must be more than a naked statement 
of a conclusion unsupported by an evidentiary basis. Cook v. State, 220 Kan. 223, 552 P.2d 985 
(1976); State v. Gillihan, 85 N.M. 
514, 514 P.2d 33 (1973). There must not only be verified factual allegations in 
the petition, § 7-14-101, but the statutory requirement is that they must be 
supported, likewise with some specificity, § 7-14-102. Appellant's petition 
lacks specific explanation and is framed in only bald conclusions without 
reference to any evidentiary support.

[¶13.]  The appellant has some notion that the 
filing of a petition for post-conviction relief is comparable to filing a 
complaint in a civil action and notice pleading is sufficient; that the contents 
must be taken as true; and that, in itself, is sufficient to create entitlement 
to a hearing. That is not the law. The petition must have as required by § 
7-14-102 supporting documents attached. Rule 81, W.R.C.P., provides the 
common-sense principle that in "special statutory proceedings any rule shall not 
apply insofar as it is clearly inapplicable." Though we cite W.R.C.P. for the 
rudiment it embraces, a petition for post-conviction relief is not a civil 
action as contended by appellant. It is a petition authorized to be filed in 
connection with a criminal matter. It has no characteristics which identify it 
as a civil case. Under the Wyoming post-conviction statute, no provision 
is made for naming a respondent to the proceeding. Section 7-14-102 only 
provides that the petition identify the proceeding, and § 7-14-101 provides that 
a copy be mailed to the Attorney General who answers for the State, § 7-14-105, 
W.S. The appellant has not named the State as respondent but instead sues the 
Attorney General and warden of the penitentiary. In civil actions, there is no 
provision that we know of for the appointment of an attorney to represent the 
plaintiff or petitioner. Section 7-14-104, W.S., provides for appointment of an 
attorney to represent a poor person seeking post-conviction relief. Criminals 
are ordinarily provided counsel in criminal court proceedings involving them. 
There is no provision for the payment of a filing fee. In civil actions, a 
filing fee must be paid. We are thus led to the logical conclusion that a 
petition for post-conviction relief is a continuation of the criminal case and 
not a civil action, and we so hold. It should be docketed and filed in the 
criminal case to which it refers though that was not done here.11

[¶14.]  The evolution taking place after many 
years of experience with 28 U.S.C. § 2255 prompted the adoption of Rules 
Governing Proceedings in the United States District Courts under Section 2255 of 
Title 28, United States Code. They were put together as a result of conflicts 
between the circuits and pronouncements from the United States Supreme Court in 
an effort to clarify and make uniform the practice with respect to § 2255. Rule 
12 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, supra, provides that the 
district court "may apply the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, whichever it deems most appropriate." This provision, 
according to the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 12, 3A Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d, p. 609 (1982), is because of the nature of 
a § 2255 motion as a continuing part of the criminal proceeding. We construe the 
Wyoming 
post-conviction statute in the same fashion. It is not appropriate to apply the 
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent urged by appellant. We see no 
significance in the fact that under the federal law the remedy is sought with a 
motion rather than a petition.12

III

[¶15.]  While the appellant makes bald 
conclusions of fact in the body of the petition, the only support is an 
affidavit by appellant's counsel "[u]pon information and belief," which 
affidavit contains no additional or fleshing-out facts. An investigator makes a 
similar affidavit containing no explanatory facts but only referring to 
statements in the petition for post-conviction relief as true on "information 
and belief."

[¶16.]  The language of the statutory provisions 
of the Wyoming 
post-conviction statute requires that the proceeding be initiated by "a petition 
verified by affidavit." Section 7-14-101, W.S. The petition "shall have attached 
thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting the allegations." 
Section 7-14-102, W.S. These provisions give no flexibility allowing for an 
affidavit founded on "information and belief." In Blyth & Fargo Co. v. Swensen, 7 Wyo. 
303, 307-308, 51 P. 873 (1898), appears a definition of an affidavit: "`An 
affidavit is a written statement in the name of a person called the affiant or 
deponent, by whom it is voluntarily signed and sworn to or affirmed before an 
officer authorized to administer an oath.'" In Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of 
Town of Buffalo, Wyo., 348 P.2d 76 (1959), it is said that an affidavit 
implies that the person making the affidavit has taken an oath. It was observed 
in Thatcher v. Darr, 27 Wyo. 452, 199 P. 938, 16 A.L.R. 1442 (1921), 
that the making of an affidavit is a voluntary act not under the compulsion of a 
subpoena and given without notice.

[¶17.]  Significantly, however, a characteristic 
of the particular affidavits here furnished "in support" of the petition for 
post-conviction relief is that they were made only on "information and belief." 
Such an affidavit - if it can even be called an affidavit - is of inferior and 
unacceptable quality for the purpose of supporting a petition for 
post-conviction relief unless there is a satisfactory explanation of the 
information upon which the belief is based. An important requirement of an 
affidavit is that the affiant have personal knowledge of the facts set out, even 
though only as to the sources of affiant's information upon which a belief is 
founded. One who acts on information and belief does not have personal knowledge 
of the facts. This Court has had occasion to discuss the phrase "supported by 
affidavit" as it appears in Art. 1, § 4, Wyoming Constitution.13 It was held in State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 P. 342 
(1920), that an affidavit based on information and belief will not satisfy that 
provision of the Constitution. The reason behind the holding is that one making 
such an affidavit is representing facts sworn to by no one. No one is criminally 
liable if the facts should prove to be false. One of the strengths of an 
affidavit is that it is made under penalty of perjury.14

[¶18.]  The affidavits, including the affidavit 
purportedly verifying the petition, do not set out what facts are within the 
personal knowledge of the affiant, if there are any such facts, or even what 
particular information the affiant has that leads him to the belief that such 
facts as are set out are true. Those facts are the ones appellant is maintaining 
on a mysterious level until a hearing is held. As further pointed out in the 
reasoning of State v. Peterson, 
allegations are not verified by an affidavit when somebody is only informed and 
believes they are true. Such is a mere evasion of law. The most improbable 
stories and falsehoods may be believed because someone has passed on that 
information. An affidavit manufactured of such stories and facts, on information 
and belief, cannot elevate them to truth. Such an affidavit is valueless. The 
facts and the source of the information from which they are derived must be 
exhibited before a belief has any weight at all. Verification on information and 
belief, where there is contained in the affidavit statements in positive terms 
setting out the facts upon which the information and belief are founded, may 
furnish support. State v. Bruner, 78 
Wyo. 111, 319 P.2d 863 (1958). The underlying circumstances must be detailed. Croker v. State, Wyo., 477 P.2d 122 
(1970). Facts which lead the affiant to believe must be presented. Bonsness v. State, Wyo., 672 P.2d 1291 
(1983).

[¶19.]  The appellant was convicted on the basis 
of testimony sworn to in open court before a jury convened to test the truth or 
falsity of facts elicited from witnesses from their demeanor and otherwise. The 
witnesses were subjected to cross-examination as a further testing device. The 
right of rebuttal was available. The witnesses were confronted by the accused. 
Against that full-blown judicial process in search of the truth, a person 
convicted as a result, in seeking post-conviction relief, must offer substantial 
grounds to justify the drastic step of upsetting the judgment and sentence. We 
consider that to be a compelling basis for requiring that a petition for 
post-conviction relief be supported by affidavits based on something more solid 
than information and belief.

[¶20.]  We are satisfied that the district court 
and this Court can call upon the appellant to set out facts under oath to show 
how he can prove his allegations before granting an evidentiary hearing. DeVincent v. United 
States, 602 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1979). See 
also McBride v. United States, 446 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 977, 92 S. Ct. 1203, 31 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1972), which held that one seeking post-conviction relief can be required 
to state how he will prove his claim before a hearing is required.

[¶21.]  Appellant asserts that other affidavits 
and other information are not presently available because investigation is not 
complete. Section 7-14-102 requires that the petitioner in a post-conviction 
relief petition attach "affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting the 
allegations or shall state why the same 
are not attached." (Emphasis added.) The murders of the Vehar family took 
place on August 7, 1977. The murder of Jeff Green occurred on May 19, 1979. 
Appellant was tried in September, 1979, and retried on the penalty phase in May, 
1982. Appellant gives us no clue about what is being investigated or when such 
investigation will be concluded. No good cause is shown why there should be 
further delay. In the absence of more definite information, we can only conclude 
that a seven-year period of knowledge of the circumstances and opportunity for 
investigation is sufficient, in the light of the proven involvement of the 
appellant.

[¶22.]  Appellant's explanation of why other 
materials are not attached is framed in vague generalities. It states other 
facts have been discovered but does not state what they are. It fails to state 
what witnesses are not readily available, though it alleges some are 
unavailable; nor is it stated what evidence they would produce. It states others 
may be legally disqualified from signing affidavits absent a court order, but 
fails to state who they are or what their testimony would be. It is stated that 
others refuse or are reluctant to cooperate because of intimidation by 
prosecutors Spence and Moriarity, but there is no allegations of what could be 
divulged or the nature of the alleged intimidation. A court needs a more 
detailed explanation to excuse failure to supply affidavits.

IV

[¶23.]  This Court in its decisions has 
manifested a point of view that the right to claims for relief by a petition for 
post-conviction relief does not afford the right to have such proceedings heard 
as an appeal from the original trial. The petition will not lie where the 
claimed error could or should have been raised in an appeal. McCutcheon v. State, Wyo., 638 P.2d 650 (1982); Munoz v. Maschner, Wyo., 590 P.2d 1352 (1979). It follows then that when 
claimed errors were once adjudicated in an appeal, finality has attached. Said 
another way, our post-conviction statute does not offer remedies previously 
pursued to completion. Hoggatt v. State, Wyo., 606 P.2d 718 (1980); Johnson v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 285, cert. denied 442 U.S. 932, 99 S. Ct. 2864, 61 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1979); Kennedy v. 
State, Wyo., 443 P.2d 138 (1968); Church v. Gladden, 244 Or. 308, 417 P.2d 993 (1966). Endless repeating must stop. The authority for allowing a petition 
for post-conviction relief does not permit its use as a guise for a second 
appeal on matters already litigated on appeal, nor a guise for a second motion 
for new trial on grounds previously denied and affirmed on appeal. Carstens v. Rans, Iowa, 210 N.W.2d 663 (1973); Roe v. Director, Patuxent 
Institution, 240 Md. 717, 214 A.2d 162 (1965). The petition is 
an extraordinary authorization to seek relief under "extraordinary 
circumstances" which strongly suggest a "miscarriage of justice." The substance 
of a fair trial must be missing. Johnson 
v. State, supra; Munoz v. 
Maschner, supra. The quoted language from Johnson expresses a thought 
enunciated in Davis v. United States, 
417 U.S. 333, 346, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 2305, 41 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1974), with respect to 
post-conviction relief.

[¶24.]  However, if a petitioner makes a showing 
of innocence or probability of a different verdict by appropriate attachments to 
his petition which indicates a need for verification at a hearing, then a 
hearing may be granted. If good cause is shown, a review is available. In oral 
argument, appellant's counsel cloaked in secrecy the basis for his conclusions 
of innocence and charges of unfair trial practices by the prosecution, and 
asserted that the district court need not be enlightened until a hearing is 
held. That is not good enough for the reasons set out in the previous parts of 
this opinion. Those revelations must appear as a part of the petition and 
attachments before the court embarks on a hearing.

[¶25.]  Nor do we say that we need not consider 
some new authority with respect to the state of the law on a material question 
of law requiring a different decision. An intervening change of the law on 
constitutional questions in this state or other acceptable authority will prompt 
us to reconsider and if required reverse a position previously taken. 
United 
States v. Nolan, 571 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 
1978). If the new law would have exonerated the appellant, had it been in effect 
at the time of his conviction and affirmance on appeal, then we must grant him 
relief. In the case now before us, we cannot find that any new constitutional 
law has been discovered requiring a reversal or a new trial.

V

[¶26.]  We now move to a review of each claim 
made in appellant's petition for post-conviction relief filed in the district 
court. Each claim alleges that appellant did not for the reasons stated receive 
a constitutionally fair trial, and due process was denied. We find and hold 
there was no cause present to reconsider any of the claims previously submitted 
to this Court in Hopkinson I, II and 
III. The appellant's claims of constitutional violations, based upon a 
denial of due process and other constitutional provisions, are unfounded in all 
respects. We have the same material present in the record and the opinions that 
were available to the trial judge, and we hold, from an examination on review, 
he did not need a hearing to make that determination.

[¶27.]  In Kennedy v. State, this Court made short 
shrift of an appeal similar to this from a trial court's dismissal of a 
post-conviction petition based upon a motion that (1) it failed to state a cause 
of action; and (2) all issues presented had been raised in an appeal and fully 
adjudicated by this Court. This Court's opinion consisted solely of the 
statement that:

"Our examination of Kennedy v. State, Wyo., 422 P.2d 88 (1967), 
the appeal above-referred to, discloses all issues relied upon in this 
post-conviction proceeding had been fully considered and disposed of by this 
court." 443 P.2d  at 139.

This is what the 
trial judge in the case before us was saying by his brief order of dismissal. 
The trial judge was entitled to rely upon the files, record of trial, and 
opinions of this Court in disposing of the petition without a hearing. We prefer 
to go further in our disposition than this Court did in Kennedy.

[¶28.]  We find no Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments or Art. 1, §§ 6 and 9, Wyoming Constitution, errors. We hold Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, reh. denied 393 U.S. 898, 89 S. Ct. 67, 21 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1968), reaffirmed in 
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1980), is still the law. If a juror is unwilling to follow the law and 
impose the death penalty under statutory guidelines and the case law of the 
land, then he must be excused from sitting for cause. See Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 157-160. We are 
unconvinced by appellant's argument that the jurors ultimately selected to sit 
thereupon became prosecution prone, prejudiced, unrepresentative or unreliable 
because of a willingness to impose the death penalty, if justified. Adequate 
protective instructions were given to the jurors explaining the burden of the 
State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury was to perform 
its duty uninfluenced by passion and prejudice against litigants. Hopkinson III, 679 P.2d  at 1026-1027. 
The appellant is entitled to an impartial jury and not one likely to find him 
not guilty. Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984). In Keeten 
the court was unimpressed by empirical studies concluding that jurors willing to 
impose the death penalty were prosecution prone or biased against the 
defendant.

[¶29.]  Appellant again protests an allegedly 
unfair and prejudicial trial atmosphere. This Court in Hopkinson III thoroughly examined the 
assertions that a general aura of anxiety and fear prevailed during the guilt 
phase of the trial. It was concluded that appellant was not prejudiced by the 
presence of guards, references to witnesses being in protective custody, and the 
wearing of protective garments by counsel. It was there noted that all jurors 
who thought the presence of security measures denoted guilt were excused. Hopkinson III, 679 P.2d  at 1026-1027. 
The prevailing atmosphere during the penalty phase was also discussed in some 
detail in Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 
84-86. One of the reviewing court's statutory duties in reviewing the sentence 
of death is to consider whether it was imposed under the influence of passion, 
prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. Section 6-2-103, W.S. That we have 
done, and we see nothing new in what has been offered which requires us to do it 
again.

[¶30.]  Appellant's Sixth Amendment and Art. 1, § 
10, Wyoming Constitution claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his 
guilt/innocence trial (Hopkinson I) 
is unsupported by any specific facts or references to the record which justify 
reconsideration. It is alleged that it was "believed" that Phyllis Snedden was 
an important witness for the defense, "whose testimony might have shown that 
Mike Hickey did not bomb the Vehars' home," but that the special prosecutors had 
her intimidated so that she would not speak to defense counsel. There is then 
related what this Court on two previous occasions has held to be no error; i.e., 
the purported manipulation of witnesses Kristi King and Jennifer Larchick. Hopkinson III, 679 P.2d at 1025-1026; Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 144-145. It is 
claimed that being deprived of access to these witnesses prevented appellant 
from obtaining effective assistance of counsel.

[¶31.]  We are given no hint at all of the facts 
Phyllis Snedden's testimony would reveal even if she were to testify. Appellant 
must show more to justify a hearing - much more. Blind speculation does not 
satisfy § 7-14-102, which requires a clear statement with attached supporting 
evidence, neither of which is present.

[¶32.]  Being deprived of access to witnesses is 
not ineffective assistance of counsel though it may be, if true, 
constitutionally unfair conduct. Ineffective assistance of counsel has to do 
with the professional performance and competence of an attorney. The standards 
of adequacy by which an attorney is measured are set out in Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 76-79. 
Effective assistance of counsel is that which would reasonably be rendered by a 
reasonably competent attorney under the facts and circumstances of the case; 
appellant makes only bald conclusive statements that his attorneys "failed to 
interview several key witnesses before trial" and failed "to make numerous 
crucial objections during the prosecution's opening statement and throughout the 
trial." Without more, neither the trial court nor this Court can judge the 
competence of defense counsel. Where charges of incompetency of counsel are made 
when seeking post-conviction relief, the appellant has the burden of submitting 
allegations which demonstrate actual incompetency of counsel as reflected in the 
manner of carrying out their duties as trial counsel, and demonstrate 
substantial prejudice resulting therefrom without which the outcome of the case 
would probably have been different. Strickland v. Washington, ___ 
U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, reh. denied ___ U.S. 
___, 104 S. Ct. 3562, 82 L. Ed. 2d 864 (1984); Spilman v. State, Wyo., 633 P.2d 183 (1981); Hoskovek v. State, Wyo., 629 P.2d 1366 (1981); State v. Rogers, 113 Ariz. 6, 545 P.2d 930 
(1976). The dissent in Hopkinson I, 
632 P.2d 199, et seq., had some criticism of appellant's counsel in the 
sentencing phase but not the guilt/innocence trial. The majority did not reach 
any issue of incompetency of counsel in the sentencing phase. The death sentence 
was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial on the sentencing phase 
as to the murder of Jeff Green only, but for other reasons than incompetency of 
counsel.

[¶33.]  In this Court's past reviews of the 
record, no incompetency of counsel appeared. The mere fact, when viewed in 
retrospect, that greater skill might have been employed or better judgment or 
discretion practiced does not spell incompetency. Hoskovek v. State, 629 P.2d  at 1368. We 
cannot see that appellant's trial counsel did any less than could have been 
reasonably expected of them under the pressure of battle, considering all the 
circumstances. It will be recalled that appellant personally elected to put on 
no defense because he did not want it rebutted. This was covered at length in Hopkinson III, 679 P.2d  at 1020. This 
Court decided in Hopkinson III, 679 P.2d  at 1021, that a desire to change strategy or tactics is not a ground for a 
new trial. If it is not a ground for a new trial, neither is it a ground for 
post-conviction relief. It will also be recalled that appellant, when his 
counsel objected during closing argument, interceded and said, "Let him go. I 
would like him to say what he wants to say, your Honor." Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 163. We find no 
factual basis set forth that indicates counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness to justify a hearing on counsel's 
competency. Appellant had effective counsel when measured against the lengthy 
trial proceedings had. The appellant was up against a mass of condemning 
evidence from which even one disposed to creating miracles would have a 
phenomenal task extricating him.

[¶34.]  No factual basis is shown, by affidavit 
or otherwise, that the testimony of Mike Hickey was perjured, or that at the 
time of the trial the prosecutors knew it was perjured, as charged by appellant. 
The testimony of Mike Hickey was examined in Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d, at various places 
and re-examined in Hopkinson III, 679 P.2d  at 1015. There this Court found that there were some 476 pages of testimony 
by Hickey, and he was cross-examined at length by appellant's counsel, "who had 
Hickey's grand jury testimony and the testimony given at Jamey Hysell's trial 
along with other statements made by Hickey." Other evidence and testimony 
corroborated Hickey's testimony that appellant hired him to blow up the Vehar 
home, which he did. Appellant offers nothing new whatsoever.

[¶35.]  The same can be said with respect to the 
testimony of Dorothy Price. This Court disposed of that in Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 128, as well. 
Additionally, appellant has failed to allege with any specificity whatsoever 
wherein the testimony of Dorothy Price would mislead and unfairly prejudice the 
jury or, if so, wherein it would affect the ultimate outcome of the 
case.

[¶36.]  The testimony of John Suesata has been 
litigated on two previous occasions, Hopkinson III, 679 P.2d  at 1023, and Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 141-144. 
Appellant, on "information and belief," states Suesata was a paid informant of 
the state and federal governments. Nowhere does he state what information he has 
which leads him to that belief. The required specificity and support are 
lacking.

[¶37.]  Many of the claims of the appellant, such 
as that with respect to Suesata, are actually matters which are 
characteristically found in motions for a new trial by convicted persons. The 
outcome was not as they wished. Petitions for post-conviction relief are not 
intended to be used as a supplemental motion for new trial on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence. When that is attempted, aside from the fact that it is made 
after the two-year limitation on moving for a new trial on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence, it should be judged by the same standards as applicable to 
motions for a new trial. Some of those standards were set out in Hopkinson III, 679 P.2d  at 1013, citing 
Grable v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 531 
(1983). One requirement is that it must be such as would probably produce an 
acquittal. During oral argument in the case now before us, counsel for appellant 
was asked whether he intended to leave an inference that Suesata was an 
informant paid by the State of Wyoming in the Hopkinson case. Counsel in oral 
argument said he did not know, but he asserted that he knew Suesata was an 
informant in this case and other cases. He could not provide any other facts to 
justify the "information and belief" he had when he signed the petition for 
post-conviction relief. If we do not have specifics, then it is impossible to 
say whether such evidence would probably produce an acquittal. We also note that 
new evidence for the purpose of impeachment is not a ground for new trial. Hopkinson III, 679 P.2d  at 1013. 
Obviously appellant feels that Suesata being a paid informant impeaches someone. 
Since Suesata did not testify, it would not impeach him. It would not impeach 
anyone else who was a witness providing testimony connecting Suesata to the 
hired killers. Paid informants usually come from the criminal society. We 
question the materiality of such information, even if there was any visible 
support for the claim. In any event, appellant fails to show any due process 
error.

[¶38.]  Appellant misconstrues this Court's 
discussion in Browder v. State, 
Wyo., 639 P.2d 889 (1982). Appellant cites the dissent which does not represent the law of the 
case. Browder did not change the rule that prosecutors must not assert their own 
credibility as a basis for conviction of a defendant, express a personal belief 
as to the falsity of testimony, presume to be witnesses through their closing, 
or reverse the holdings of other cases in which prosecutorial misconduct of that 
sort was found to be absent. 639 P.2d  at 893. See also Wheeler v. State, Wyo., 691 P.2d 599 
(1984). Browder was a case of aggravated prosecutorial misconduct in the closing 
argument. It is one thing in closing argument to express a personal belief 
unsupported by evidence in the case and another to express a belief based upon 
the evidence. The prosecutors were here doing the latter. The trial judge took 
special pains to instruct the jury in that regard in the case now before us; 
i.e., that statements of counsel are not evidence. See Donnelly v. De Christoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 40 L. Ed. 2d 431 (1974), which discusses the curative value of such an instruction to defuse 
the potential prejudice of a prosecutor's views of the evidence. Based upon the 
totality of the circumstances, this Court found in Hopkinson I that the prosecutor did not 
overstep his bounds in either the opening statement, 632 P.2d  at 112-120, or the 
closing argument, 632 P.2d  at 145-147. There was no departure from the 
fundamental fairness so essential to justice. We do not retreat from that 
holding.

[¶39.]  Appellant accuses but makes no showing 
that exculpatory evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; there is set out no 
more than a bald statement of conclusion in a charge of wrongdoing in that the 
prosecution did not turn over requested exculpatory material. We see no reason 
to reverse the position set out in Hopkinson III, 679 P.2d  at 1028, wherein 
were found no United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976), or Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), errors of constitutional magnitude or 
otherwise.

[¶40.]  We have in this opinion held that this is 
not basically a civil action but is the continuation of a criminal action, 
though mistakenly filed as a separate action. We hold that the Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, therefore, fittingly apply. Rule 18(b) and (c)(1), 
W.R.Cr.P.,15 provides:

"(b) * * * Except as 
provided in subdivision (a)(2) this rule does not authorize the discovery or 
inspection of reports, memoranda or other internal governmental documents made 
by governmental agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of 
the case, or of statements made by state witnesses or prospective state 
witnesses (other than the defendant) to governmental agents except as provided 
in subdivision (c) of this rule.

"(c) Demands for production of statements and 
reports of witnesses.

"(1) After a witness 
called by the state has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on 
motion of the defendant, order the state to produce any statement (as 
hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the state which relates 
to subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents 
of any such statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the 
witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for 
his examination and use."

It has been held 
that discovery under this rule is available for use at the trial and, as noted 
in the rule, must "relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the 
witness," and is for the purposes of cross-examination. DeLuna v. State, Wyo., 501 P.2d 1021 
(1972). The law as enunciated in DeLuna is based upon federal authority 
cited therein. We understand the prosecutor has a continuing duty to disclose, 
but appellant gives us no factual reason at all to believe the prosecutor did 
not fulfill his duty.

[¶41.]  We think it is interesting to note the 
following from United States v. 
Agurs, after the Court had observed that a general request for "`Brady 
material'" or "`anything exculpatory'" is no request at all:

"* * * If everything that 
might influence a jury must be disclosed, the only way a prosecutor could 
discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow complete discovery of his 
files as a matter of routine practice.

"Whether or not 
procedural rules authorizing such broad discovery might be desirable, the 
Constitution surely does not demand that much. While expressing the opinion that 
representatives of the State may not `suppress substantial material evidence,' 
former Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court has pointed out 
that `they are under no duty to report sua sponte to the defendant all that they 
learn about the case and about their witnesses.' In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 569, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293, 301, 387 P.2d 6, 14 (1963). And this Court recently noted that 
there is `no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and 
detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case.' 
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 2568, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 706 [(1972)]. The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed 
information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of 
the trial, does not establish `materiality' in the constitutional sense." 96 S. Ct.  at 2400 (footnote omitted).

The appellant 
gives us no inkling upon which to form a basis or reason to even suspect that 
the prosecution suppressed or concealed any material exculpatory 
evidence.

[¶42.]  The use of hearsay evidence of which 
appellant again complains, within the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, was covered in 
detail in Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 
127-137. The Sixth Amendment constitutional right of witness confrontation 
within the context of this case was in particular treated in detail, and tests 
of reliability were applied, 632 P.2d  at 132-137. Appellant makes no new showing 
to justify our turning back from that position.

[¶43.]  Appellant continues to assert that he was 
not shown to be responsible for the grisly searing of Green's flesh and burning 
out of an eye by a hot piece of metal. We see no need to further review the 
sufficiency of the evidence in this regard. A majority of the Court found 
extensive evidence, of which the welder was but a small part, connecting 
appellant to the torture of Jeff Green and that it was especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel. That was fully developed in Part II of Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 57-59. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982), was considered and applied by the majority. Appellant's culpability 
was measured. Appellant intended that lethal force be applied. See our 
discussion of Enmund in Osborn v. State, Wyo., 672 P.2d 777, 794 
(1983). We are unconvinced by appellant's unsupported claim in this 
regard.

[¶44.]  Appellant continues to protest use of 
murder to avoid arrest as a proper aggravating circumstance justifying capital 
punishment. The viability of the murder-to-avoid-arrest aggravating circumstance 
was fully explored in Hopkinson II, 
664 P.2d  at 58-59. The murder of Jeff Green took place while appellant was 
incarcerated on a federal offense at appellant's express direction in an effort 
to prevent his arrest for the murders of the Vehar family. Absent the testimony 
of Jeff Green, the prosecution of appellant would be more difficult, if not 
impossible, for less courageous and skilled prosecutors than those who assumed 
the gargantuan task of putting together the evidence against appellant. To 
appellant's way of reasoning, Jeff Green was the essential witness at the time. 
He was unaware of the role Hickey would play, a witness whom appellant probably 
visualized as being under his control because of appellant's knowledge of 
Hickey's murder of the Wyckhuyse girl. Nor did appellant understand the 
subtleties of the hearsay rule. It is sophistry to argue that since appellant 
was already in custody, the murder of Jeff Green, therefore, was not to prevent 
his arrest. He was in custody for an offense against the United States. 
When a grand jury of the State of Wyoming 
returned an indictment against him for the murders of the Vehar family, the 
jurisdiction and custody of the United 
States were relinquished for the purpose of allowing his 
arrest under the Wyoming warrant so he could 
stand trial for multiple murders; his custody was thereupon transferred to the 
State of Wyoming. There is no need to further consider 
the issue on the basis of a different Utah statute, as appellant argues, or on the 
basis of other statutes we do not have. This Court has construed a Wyoming statute under Wyoming jurisprudence, and we see no reason to 
change position.

[¶45.]  We held in Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 68-71, that on 
retrial of the penalty phase, aggravating circumstances not found to exist in 
the first trial may be found to exist in the second. A majority of this Court 
concluded that it is not double jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment or Art. 1, § 
11, Wyoming 
Constitution. Appellant presents no new convincing authority to support his 
position to the contrary as outlined in his petition for post-conviction 
relief.

[¶46.]  On the issue of double jeopardy raised in 
the Consolidated Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Writ of Habeas Corpus 
filed with the district court, and in his brief here, appellant cited Arizona v. Rumsey, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1984), as perhaps a change in the law. It will be 
recalled that in Hopkinson I, this 
Court remanded to the district court for a new trial of the penalty phase. All 
convictions were affirmed but the remand was for only a "new sentencing trial as 
to the murder of Jeff Green." 632 P.2d  at 172. It was there footnoted, n. 46, 
that:

"* * * Only where a judge 
or jury refused to impose the death penalty in the first instance is a state 
barred from seeking it a second time. Bullington v. Missouri, 1981, [451] U.S. [430], 101 S. Ct. 1852, 68 L. Ed. 2d 270. There can be no new penalty trial as to the Vehar 
murders in that the jury failed to impose the death penalty as to those 
crimes."

Arizona v. 
Ramsey 
followed Bullington and held that an 
initial sentence of life imprisonment is the equivalent of an "acquittal" of a 
death sentence and there cannot be a new trial on the appropriateness of the 
death penalty. This Court adhered to that rule. The first jury, Hopkinson I, did impose the death 
sentence as to the murder of Jeff Green, so there was no "acquittal" of a death 
sentence. Jeopardy did not attach to the Jeff Green murder, so there was no 
double jeopardy in the retrial of that issue in Hopkinson II. Jeopardy had attached as 
to the Vehar murders. Arizona v. 
Rumsey has no effect on our holding that aggravating circumstances are not 
the subject of double jeopardy. Appellant insists on disinterring State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 275 S.E.2d 450 (1981), which was buried by the majority in Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 70-71. We see 
no need to disagree with that holding in Hopkinson II and reject appellant's 
argument to the contrary.

[¶47.]  We see no relevance to appellant's 
established guilt that the persons actually torturing and killing Jeff Green 
have not been apprehended or tried or that it was even represented to the second 
jury in this case that they would be. Appellant reasserts his position that it 
was prejudicial to lead the jury to believe that arrests were imminent. The 
trial court instructed the jury by Instructions 3A and 416 that a person who with criminal 
intent "aids, counsels, encourages, hires, commands or otherwise procures the 
illegal act" is to be punished the same as a person who does the act. It is 
farfetched to believe that the outcome of the case would be any different than 
it was if those who administered the killing were caught. The sheriff and the 
prosecutors may have believed that apprehension was imminent, but circumstances 
altered a realization of the belief. That is hardly dishonesty or constitutional 
unfairness. Appellant's arguments in this connection are non sequitur. The following is 
illustrative. Appellant thinks it is unfair to ask the following question: "`So, 
there was no question that the individuals who took him [Jeff Green] had a 
gun?'" The witness replied, "`None whatsoever.'" Appellant then argues no 
evidence was introduced to show Jeff Green was taken at gunpoint. The question 
does not ask if Jeff Green was taken at gunpoint. The individuals must have had 
a gun because Jeff Green ended up with a bullet hole through his neck, severing 
his spinal cord and exiting through the jaw. Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 73. It is a 
reasonable inference that they had a gun. Try as we may, we cannot connect the 
above question with whether the killers were apprehended and, if not 
apprehended, why that infers appellant is innocent. This Court thoroughly 
covered the matter of appellant's guilt in Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 97-100, even 
though he was not present at the death scene.

[¶48.]  Appellant argues that the venue for the 
second sentencing trial should have been changed as requested and, therefore, 
appellant did not receive a fair trial. Then follow some statements, of 
conclusions only, that jurors who sat to try the penalty phase were prejudiced 
because the second trial was in the same county as the first. This question was 
not previously raised in this form, though during this Court's review of the 
record upon appeal of the second trial judgment and sentence, our obligation to 
determine whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of 
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor was met. We examined into all 
the matters of which appellant now complains in that regard, Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d  at 85-86, and 
found no influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor.

[¶49.]  Appellant makes no showing whatsoever, 
and offers nothing to support his statement of a naked conclusion, that (1) 
because of failure to grant a change of venue, he was tried by a prejudiced 
jury; and (2) it was error of constitutional proportions violating the Sixth 
Amendment giving an accused a right to an impartial jury. In order for a change 
of venue to be granted, the burden is on a defendant to show prejudice so great 
or general as to prevent his receiving a fair and impartial trial and the 
decision is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Collins v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1283 
(1979). Rule 23(a), W.R.Cr.P., provides that the court must be satisfied that 
the prejudice is great. The trial judge was not satisfied nor are we. Nothing is 
presented which shows prejudice by any juror. There is no requirement that a 
prospective juror be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved as long 
as he can render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S. Ct. 2031, 44 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1975); 
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961). The voir dire of the jury produced a fair and impartial 
jury.

[¶50.]  Appellant has again challenged the 
constitutionality of Wyoming's death penalty statute. We have on 
two occasions in this same case held it constitutional, Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d at 63-64; Hopkinson I, 632 P.2d  at 149-157. 
Nothing new has been presented to indicate any change in the law as we have 
previously construed it to be. We do not accept the invitation to reverse that 
stand.

[¶51.]  We will apply as appropriate in principle 
Rule 26(b)(1), W.R.C.P., which provides that parties may obtain discovery of 
matter relevant "in the pending action." When an action is dismissed, there is 
no longer a pending action. Since the dismissal of appellant's Consolidated 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Writ of Habeas Corpus leaves no pending 
proceeding, there is no occasion to consider acting on appellant's motion 
seeking discovery of the grand jury proceedings.

[¶52.]  Our fourth review concludes that no new 
evidence in a form qualitatively worthy of consideration has been produced or 
shown to exist, and no new grounds in law or otherwise appear upon which to 
reverse this Court's previous holdings in this case. Appellant received a fair 
trial within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment and its counterpart, Art. 
1, § 6, Wyoming Constitution, and was given the protection of all his other 
constitutional guarantees. The trial judge properly dismissed without prejudice 
the petition for post-conviction relief, without a hearing, such petition having 
failed to conform to necessary threshold requirements.

[¶53.]  The dismissal of the Consolidated 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Writ of Habeas Corpus is affirmed as is 
the order denying discovery of grand jury proceedings. Removal of the trial 
judge as prayed for is denied. The petitions for leave to file petitions for 
writs of mandamus and prohibition are denied, and the trial court is directed to 
set a new date for appellant's execution.

1 The State's Motion to 
Dismiss was of the speaking variety, replete with reasoning and citation of 
authority.

2 Appellant not only 
appeals the dismissal, but also has filed an original proceeding seeking leave 
to file a petition for writ of prohibition/mandamus for an order from this Court 
vacating the dismissal and requesting that all matters relating to petitioner be 
assigned to a judge other than Judge Ranck.

3 Appellant not only 
appeals the trial court's order, but also filed a motion for leave to file a 
petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district judge to expunge his 
order denying carte blanche access to grand jury proceedings and that the motion 
be transferred for disposition to the district judge in whose district the grand 
jury sat. Appellant was tried in the Ninth Judicial District by a judge of that 
district on a change of venue. The grand jury which returned the indictment upon 
which he was tried sat in the Third Judicial District, having been called by a 
judge of that district. The Third and Ninth Districts geographically adjoin each 
other in western Wyoming.

4 This case contains a 
wealth of history and background showing need for a post-conviction relief 
remedy such as § 2255. The following is illustrative and applicable to the 
Wyoming 
judicial system, as well:

"* * * In addition to the 
problems raised by a large volume of applications for habeas corpus that are 
repetitious and patently frivolous, serious administrative problems developed in 
the consideration of applications which appear meritorious on their face. Often, 
such applications are found to be wholly lacking in merit when compared with the 
records of the sentencing court. But, since a habeas corpus action must be 
brought in the district of confinement, those records are not readily available 
to the habeas corpus court." 72 S. Ct.  at 269 (footnotes omitted).

5 Section 1-27-104, W.S., 
provides that a petition for writ of habeas corpus shall be made to the judge 
most convenient in point of distance to the applicant; a sufficient reason must 
be stated to do otherwise. Post-conviction proceedings provided by § 7-14-101, 
et seq., W.S., in the court of conviction relieve the Carbon County District 
Court, Second Judicial District, at Rawlins, of a heavy burden of handling 
habeas corpus proceedings related to convictions throughout the 
state.

6 This reason is set out 
in Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 
11 U.L.A. 479 (1974). Wyoming has not adopted 
the Uniform Act, but the Wyoming procedure is adequate for a 
post-conviction examination of appellant's claims, all of which charge 
constitutional error.

7 In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447, 
73 S. Ct. 397, 402, 97 L. Ed. 469 (1953), it was held that the exhaustion doctrine 
does not foreclose federal habeas relief whenever a state remedy is available; 
once a prisoner has presented his claim to the highest state court on direct 
appeal and certiorari has been denied by the United States Supreme Court, he 
need not seek collateral relief from the state. We see no need for the appellant 
to collaterally attack his conviction on the same grounds as disposed of by 
direct appeal before he can seek federal relief, if that is his purpose in 
filings which are repetitious in content.

8 Section 1-27-125, 
W.S.:

"Habeas corpus is not 
permissible to question the correctness of the action of a grand jury in finding 
a bill of indictment, or a petit jury in the trial of a cause nor of a court or 
judge when acting within their jurisdiction and in a lawful manner."

9 Even if an original 
petition for writ of habeas corpus were on file here, the posture would be 
similar to that in Albert v. Meacham, 
Wyo., 458 P.2d 728 (1969), where, while an appeal from a post-conviction relief 
proceeding was pending, the appellant filed a separate petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. The appellant there made it clear that the reason for pursuing 
habeas corpus was to exhaust his state remedies. The Court held habeas corpus 
unnecessary because appellant could urge any points he had in the 
post-conviction appeal. Appellant in the case now before us has stated that he, 
likewise, is trying to exhaust all of his state remedies before taking the 
federal route. Even though that may be his purpose, we have no intention of 
brushing off the appeal without a close examination into the merits.

10 We note that the federal 
courts follow this same practice. A petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in 
the sentencing United States district court is treated as a § 2255 motion. Hilderbrand v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 205 
(10th Cir. 1964); Ray v. United States, 
295 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 369 U.S. 875, 82 S. Ct. 1146, 8 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1962).

11 We note that the 
district court clerk identified and docketed this as a civil action. We can 
understand the clerk doing that in this case because the petition was labeled 
"Consolidated Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Writ of Habeas Corpus." A 
habeas corpus petition is filed as a civil action. The clerk was unaware of the 
difference, as are others. Our examination of other Wyoming cases discloses that 
petitions for post-conviction relief have been filed in the criminal actions to 
which they pertain, with the exception of Munoz v. Maschner, infra. Maschner was 
the warden of the penitentiary and it was a pro se filing. Substance, not form, 
governs. There is no direction in the statute as to how the proceeding shall be 
docketed or titled. Section 7-14-107, W.S., states that appeals shall be as 
prescribed in the rules of civil procedure, but criminal appeals have been in 
accordance with civil procedure. See Rule 38, W.R.Cr.P., Wyo.Rep. 442-445 P.2d 
LV, before abrogated by Rule 27, W.R.A.P. It makes no difference how it is 
captioned or in which filing slot it is placed in the clerk's office; it is an 
adjunct to the criminal proceeding to which it refers.

12 Even habeas corpus is 
not the civil action many have thought it was. In Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 89 S. Ct. 1082, 22 L. Ed. 2d 281, reh. denied 394 U.S. 1025, 89 S. Ct. 1623, 23 L. Ed. 2d 50 
(1969), the Court observed that while habeas corpus proceedings have been 
characterized as "`civil,'" that designation is "gross and inexact." The Court 
categorized them as "unique" and held that the discovery provisions of the 
F.R.C.P. are not completely and automatically applicable to habeas corpus, but a 
court may fashion, from rules available, suitable relief to fit the 
circumstances. We also note that habeas corpus can be utilized in a civil 
context when custody of a child is sought, State ex rel. Klopotek v. District Court of 
Sheridan County, supra; Peters v. 
Campbell, 80 Wyo. 492, 345 P.2d 234 (1959), and can have other civil aspects 
where private restraint is an issue.

13 Article 1, § 4, Wyoming 
Constitution:

"The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause, supported by 
affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or 
thing to be seized." (Emphasis added.)

14 Section 6-5-301, 
W.S.:

"(a) A person commits 
perjury if, while under a lawfully administered oath or affirmation, he 
knowingly testifies falsely or makes a false affidavit, certificate, 
declaration, deposition or statement, in a judicial, legislative or 
administrative proceeding in which an oath or affirmation may be required by 
law, touching a matter material to a point in question.

"(b) Perjury is a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, a fine of not more 
than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or both."

15 This rule is practically 
identical to Rule 16(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, prior to amendment 
of the federal rule in 1975.

16 Copies of instructions 
given the jury on the retrial of the case are attached as an exhibit to 
appellant's petition for post-conviction relief.