Case Title: Binaird v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 584, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANDRE BINAIRD, 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 584, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below:  Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0709033236 
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: November 10, 2014 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
December 29, 2014 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 29th day of December 2014, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the 
Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Andre Binaird, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s September 23, 2014 order denying his motion for a rehearing and his 
motion for appointment of counsel.  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to 
affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Binaird’s 
opening brief that his appeal without merit.1  We agree and affirm as to the 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).   
 
2 
Superior Court’s denial of Binaird’s motion for a rehearing.  The remainder of 
Binaird’s appeal is premature and interlocutory.       
(2) 
The record reflects that, in March 2008, a Superior Court jury 
convicted Binaird of Assault in the Second Degree, Possession of a Deadly 
Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, Criminal Trespass in the First 
Degree (as a lesser included offense of the indicted charge of Burglary in the 
Second Degree), Criminal Mischief, and Noncompliance with the Conditions of 
Bond.  The Superior Court found Binaird to be a habitual offender and sentenced 
him to eight years of Level V incarceration for Assault in the Second Degree.  On 
the remaining convictions, the Superior Court sentenced Binaird to a total period of 
eight years and sixty days of Level V incarceration, suspended after seven years 
for probation.  This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment on direct 
appeal.2  
(3) 
Binaird filed his first motion for postconviction relief on August 7, 
2009.  Binaird asserted eight grounds for relief, including ineffective assistance of 
counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.  On April 26, 2010, the Superior Court 
denied the motion.  This Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Binaird’s 
first motion for postconviction relief.3   
                                                 
2 Binaird v. State, 967 A.2d 1256 (Del. 2009). 
3 Binaird v. State, 2010 WL 4320375 (Del. Nov. 1, 2010). 
 
3 
(4) 
Binaird filed his second motion for postconviction relief, again 
asserting ineffective assistance of counsel claims, on January 14, 2014.  Binaird 
also filed a motion for appointment of counsel.  On March 20, 2014, the Superior 
Court denied the motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The Superior Court also denied the motion for 
appointment of counsel because Binaird had not identified any authority entitling 
him to appointment of counsel. 
(5) 
On March 31, 2014 and April 2, 2014, Binaird asked the Superior 
Court to rehear the denial of his motion for postconviction relief.  On April 10, 
2014, Binaird filed a notice of appeal from the Superior Court’s March 20, 2014 
order.  On April 16, 2014, the Superior Court informed Binaird that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider his requests for rehearing as a result of the appeal.  Binaird 
voluntarily dismissed his appeal on April 28, 2014. 
(6) 
On May 12, 2014, Binaird filed his third motion for postconviction 
relief, again based on ineffective assistance of counsel, and a motion for 
appointment of counsel.  On May 29, 2014, Binaird filed another motion for 
rehearing of the Superior Court’s March 20, 2014 order.   
(7) 
On September 23, 2014, the Superior Court denied the May 29, 2014 
motion for rehearing.  The Superior Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the motion because it was filed more than five days after entry of the 
 
4 
Superior Court’s March 20, 2014 order.  The Superior Court denied the motion for 
appointment of counsel on the same grounds.  The Superior Court did not address 
the third motion for postconviction relief.  On October 14, 2014, Binaird filed a 
notice of appeal from the Superior Court’s September 23, 2014 order.   
(8) 
On appeal, Binaird contends that the Superior Court erred “by not 
officially making a ruling on appellants Rule 61 but instead dismissing it as a 
reconsideration request” and in denying his motion for appointment of counsel.4  
Contrary to Binaird’s suggestion, the Superior Court did not rule on Binaird’s third 
motion for postconviction relief.  The Superior Court’s September 23, 2014 order 
addressed the May 29, 2014 motion for rehearing, but did not address the May 12, 
2014 motion for postconviction relief.  The record does not reflect that the 
Superior Court has ruled on Binaird’s third motion for postconviction relief.  In the 
absence of a ruling on the third motion for postconviction relief, any appeal from 
this motion is premature.5 
(9) 
This Court presently lacks jurisdiction to consider the Superior 
Court’s denial of Binaird’s motion for appointment of counsel.  Under the 
Delaware Constitution, only a final judgment may be reviewed by the Court in a 
                                                 
4 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8. 
5 Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(iii) (requiring that notice of postconviction appeal be filed within 30 days after 
entry of order or judgment in proceeding for postconviction relief); Milton v. State, 2014 WL 
4510641, at *1 (Del. Sept. 12, 2014) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction where Superior 
Court had not yet ruled on motion for postconviction relief). 
 
5 
criminal case.6  This Court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an 
interlocutory order in a criminal matter.7   
(10) The Superior Court’s September 23, 2014 order denying Binaird’s 
motion for appointment of counsel is interlocutory.  The denial of the motion for 
appointment of counsel is not appealable as a collateral order before the entry of a 
final judgment on Binaird’s third motion for postconviction relief.8  The Superior 
Court has not ruled on Binaird’s third motion for postconviction relief and 
therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the denial of Binaird’s motion for 
appointment of counsel.   
(11) Finally, to the extent Binaird challenges the denial of his motion for 
rehearing, this claim is without merit.  A motion for reargument must be filed 
within five days of the filing of the Superior Court’s decision.9  All of the motions 
for rehearing that Binaird filed (on March 31, 2014, April 2, 2014, and May 29, 
                                                 
6 Del. Const. art IV, § 11(1)(b).   
7 Robinson v. State, 704 A.2d 269, 271 (Del. 1998); see also Gregory v. State, 2014 WL 
2565705, at *1 (Del. June 4, 2014). 
8 Harris v. State, 2013 WL 4858990, at *1 (Del. Sept. 10, 2013). 
9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 57(d) (“In all cases not provided for by rule or administrative order, the 
court shall regulate its practice in accordance with the applicable Superior Court civil rule or in 
any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or the rules of the Supreme Court.”); Super. 
Ct. Civ. R. 59(e) (“A motion for reargument shall be served and filed within 5 days after the 
filing of the Court’s opinion or decision.”); Boyer v. State, 2007 WL 452300, at *1 (Del. Feb. 13, 
2007) (recognizing that motion for reargument filed more than five days after filing of denial of 
motion for sentence modification was untimely). 
 
6 
2014) were filed more than five days after the filing of the March 20, 2014 order.  
The Superior Court does not have jurisdiction to consider an untimely motion for 
reargument.10  Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err in denying Binaird’s 
motion for rehearing of the March 20, 2014 order.    
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED, in part, and the appeal is DISMISSED, in part as described 
above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
                                                 
10 Id. (citing Preform Bldg. Components, Inc. v. Edwards, 280 A.2d 697, 698 (Del. 1971)).