Case Title: Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., Inc.

Citation: 2013 WI 79

Docket Number: 2011AP001158

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 79 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP1158   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Showers Appraisals, LLC, Real Marketing, LLC and 
Mark W. Showers, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Musson Bros., Inc. and West Bend Mutual 
Insurance Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross-
Appellants, 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities Mutual 
Insurance and City of Oshkosh, 
          Defendants-Cross-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 343 Wis. 2d 623, 819 N.W.2d 316 
(Ct. App. 2012 – Published) 
PDC No: 2012 WI App 80  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 18, 2013   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 13, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago   
 
JUDGE: 
Barbara H. Key   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY, J., 
concur. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Daniel J. Posanski and Gerardo Medina Jr. and Dempsey 
Law Firm LLP, Oshkosh, and oral argument by Daniel J. Posanski.   
 
For defendant-cross-respondents, there was a brief by Bree 
A. Madison and Richard J. Carlson, and Silton Seifert Carlson 
S.C., Appleton, with oral argument by Bree A. Madison. 
 
 
 
2
For the defendants-respondents-cross-appellants, there was 
a brief by David G. Dudas and Joseph P. Putzstuck, and McCanna, 
Dudas & Kewley, S.C., Appleton, with oral argument by David G. 
Dudas. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Martha H. Heidt and 
Bye, Goff & Rohde, Ltd., River Falls, on behalf of the Wisconsin 
Association of Justice.  
 
 
 
2013 WI 79
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2011AP1158 
(L.C. No. 
2009CV1438) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Showers Appraisals, LLC, Real Marketing, LLC 
and Mark W. Showers, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Musson Bros., Inc. and West Bend Mutual 
Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Cross- 
          Appellants, 
 
League of Wisconsin Municipalities Mutual 
Insurance and City of Oshkosh, 
 
          Defendants-Cross-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 18, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed the 
Winnebago County Circuit Court's2 grant of summary judgment in 
                                                 
1 Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., Inc., 2012 WI App 
80, 343 Wis. 2d 623, 819 N.W.2d 316. 
2 The Honorable Barbara H. Key presided. 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
2 
 
favor of Musson Bros., Inc. (Musson).  This case arises from 
flood damage to Mark Showers' property in the City of Oshkosh, 
where Musson was conducting sewer removal and installation as a 
contractor for the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT).  
In granting and affirming summary judgment, the circuit court 
and court of appeals concluded that Musson was a governmental 
contractor entitled to immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
(2011–12),3 based on the court of appeals' decision in Estate of 
Lyons v. CNA Insurance Cos., 207 Wis. 2d 446, 558 N.W.2d 658 
(Ct. App. 1996). 
¶2 
We conclude that where a third party's claim against a 
governmental contractor4 is based on the allegation that the 
contractor negligently performed its work under a contract with 
a governmental entity, the governmental contractor must prove 
both that the contractor meets the definition of "agent" under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), as set forth in Lyons, and that the 
contractor's act is one for which immunity is available under 
§ 893.80(4).  Specifically, we conclude that for a contractor to 
come within § 893.80(4)'s shield of immunity, the contractor 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011–12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 The court of appeals in Estate of Lyons v. CNA Insurance 
Cos., 207 Wis. 2d 446, 457, 558 N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1996), used 
the term "governmental contractor" to refer to those independent 
private contractors that it concluded may be entitled to 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), based on the nature of 
their contractual relationships with governmental entities.  We 
continue this usage, but emphasize that the contractors involved 
are private entities whose affiliation with the government is 
through a contractual relationship for a particular project. 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
3 
 
must prove it was acting as the governmental entity's agent in 
accordance with reasonably precise specifications, as set forth 
in Lyons.  In this case, Musson has not shown that it was acting 
as a governmental entity's agent for purposes of the alleged 
injury-causing conduct because Musson was not acting pursuant to 
"reasonably precise specifications." 
¶3 
Moreover, pursuant to the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4), we also conclude that a governmental contractor 
seeking to assert the defense of immunity should clearly allege 
in the pleadings why the injury-causing conduct comes within a 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
function as set out in § 893.80(4).  In the context of this 
case, a governmental contractor would be required to assert that 
it was implementing a decision of a governmental entity that was 
made within the scope of the governmental entity's legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions.5  
Adherence to these statutory requirements for immunity under 
§ 893.80(4) will avoid extending blanket immunity for claims of 
negligently performed work against governmental contractors when 
the sole basis for immunity is that the work was performed 
                                                 
5 In other cases we have used the term "discretionary" to 
refer to those acts that are within Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4)'s 
"legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions."  See, e.g., Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 511–
12, 259 N.W.2d 537 (1977) (citing § 893.80(4)'s predecessor, 
Wis. Stat. § 895.43(3)).  Our use of the statutory terms in this 
case, rather than the designation "discretionary," is not 
intended as a change to the immunity analysis, but rather as a 
recognition that the applicable standard is based on precise 
statutory language.  See infra, ¶35. 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
4 
 
pursuant to a contract with a governmental entity.  Allowing 
governmental contractors to claim immunity in such instances 
would vastly expand the doctrine of governmental immunity.  
¶4 
Therefore, based on Musson failing to meet the 
standard for a Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) agent, Musson is not 
entitled to immunity under § 893.80(4).  Additionally, we 
conclude that the facts set out in support of summary judgment 
would not support a claim of governmental contractor immunity 
because Musson has failed to assert that the acts for which it 
claims immunity were "acts done in the exercise of legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions," as 
required under § 893.80(4).  Accordingly, Showers' claims should 
be analyzed no differently than negligence claims against other 
contractors. 
¶5 
Musson may therefore be liable if Showers is able to 
show that in performing its work under the government contract, 
Musson had a duty of due care to Showers, that Musson breached 
that duty, and that such breach was a cause of Showers' damages.  
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the circuit court for 
further proceedings on Showers' claims against Musson consistent 
with this opinion.  Additionally, because Musson's and the 
City's cross-claims were not fully litigated in the circuit 
court and were not addressed by the court of appeals, those 
claims should be addressed on remand. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶6 
In September 2007, the DOT and the City of Oshkosh 
entered into a state–municipal agreement for a sewer improvement 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
5 
 
project along a stretch of Ohio Street in Oshkosh, which is also 
State Highway 44.  Under the agreement, the State (through the 
DOT) would provide substantial financing for the project, 
although the City was responsible for funding and construction 
of sanitary sewers and water mains, as well as the sealing of 
concrete joints.  The DOT would remain involved in the project, 
including overseeing the bidding process and being onsite during 
construction. 
¶7 
The DOT opened the Ohio Street project for bidding, 
informing potential bidders that, as contractors, they would be 
"responsible for any damages to property or injury to persons 
occurring through their own negligence or that of their 
employees or agents, incident to the performance of work under 
this contract, pursuant to the Standard Specifications for Road 
and Bridge Construction applicable to this contract."  The 
specifications applicable to the project were the State of 
Wisconsin Standard Specifications for Highway and Structure 
Construction.  These Standard Specifications consist of hundreds 
of 
pages 
of 
directions 
and 
specifications 
regarding 
how 
governmental contractors are to perform certain aspects of 
contracted projects.  
¶8 
After completion of the bidding process, the DOT 
awarded the contract to Musson, and the two entered into the 
Contract for Highway Work, which provided that DOT would pay 
Musson $4,393,833.15 for its work.  Musson began work on the 
Ohio Street project in spring 2008.   
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
6 
 
¶9 
Prior to the commencement of the Ohio Street project, 
Mark Showers had contracted for the construction of a new 
building on the property he owned on the corner of Ohio Street 
and Sixth Avenue in Oshkosh.  As part of that construction, 
Showers was required by city code to connect his downspouts, 
sump pump, and parking lot drainage to the municipal storm 
sewer.  The construction of Showers' building was completed on 
or about November 30, 2007, and Real Marketing, LLC and Showers 
Appraisals, LLC,6 began conducting their business at that 
location. 
¶10 When the Ohio Street sewer project commenced in spring 
2008, the City, the DOT, and Musson discussed certain aspects of 
how the project would proceed, one of which was whether the 
roadway was to be removed all at once, or whether it should be 
removed and repaired on a block-by-block basis.  The parties 
purportedly agreed that the block-by-block approach would be 
best; however, there is no formal documentation of the parties' 
alleged agreement on this aspect of the project, and indeed, 
Musson has at times disputed whether there was such an 
agreement. 
¶11 Whatever the parties did or did not agree to, Musson 
removed the entire roadway along Ohio Street, from the storm 
sewer's outlet at the Fox River to the end of the project, 
                                                 
6 Mark Showers is the majority owner of Showers Appraisals, 
LLC, and Real Marketing, LLC.  These entities collectively will 
be referred to throughout the opinion as "Showers" unless 
otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
7 
 
around Ninth Street; disconnected the storm sewers in that 
reach; and placed a bladder at the discharge at the Fox River so 
that water would not flow from the river into the non-
operational sewer system.  Musson's decision to proceed in this 
manner caused some disputes between City officials and Musson, 
based on the City's concern that by removing the entire storm 
sewer, Musson would compromise the City's ability to manage 
storm water. 
¶12 The DOT concluded that Musson's decision to remove the 
storm sewer along the project's reach, rather than on a block-
by-block basis, was allowed under a provision in the Standard 
Specifications, 
referred 
to 
as 
the 
"means 
and 
methods" 
provision.7  That provision states, in pertinent part, that the 
contractor "is solely responsible for the means, methods, 
techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction.  The 
contractor is not responsible for the negligence of others in 
the 
design 
or 
specification 
of 
specific 
means, 
methods, 
techniques, sequences, or procedures of construction described 
in and expressly required by the contract." 
¶13 On June 8, 2008, rain storms inundated the Ohio Street 
project site, dropping approximately 4.25 inches of rain in the 
area of the project site.  The storm left water standing in the 
exposed roadbed outside Showers' property, and a manager with 
                                                 
7 When Musson sought approval to remove the pavement and 
leave the roadbed exposed, Ryan Schanhofer of DOT informed 
Musson that there was nothing in the contract explicitly 
prohibiting that approach.  
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
8 
 
Musson reported that Musson's pumps were unable to maintain 
drainage for the amount of rain that had fallen.  After viewing 
the project site outside his property, Showers noted multiple 
conditions that potentially impeded drainage (as well as other 
conditions that he alleged were contrary to the Standard 
Specifications), including mounds of soil in the roadbed and 
drainage inlets clogged with soil and debris.  When Showers 
spoke with employees from the City and Musson regarding the 
standing water and the potential for damage from another large 
storm that was predicted, Showers was told that there was 
nothing that either entity could do to remedy the situation. 
¶14 Following the substantial rain event of June 8, the 
City and Musson began to prepare a contingency pumping plan for 
the next rain storm that was forecast for June 12.  On the 
evening of June 11, a Musson employee allegedly was placing 
pumps according to the plan; however, Showers and other 
neighbors in the area averred that the pumps either were not 
present or were not operating during the June 12 storm event.  
Marc Miller, a water maintenance officer with the City, could 
not confirm the exact number of pumps that he recalled seeing at 
the Ohio Street project site, nor could he confirm how many 
pumps were running at the relevant times.8 
¶15 By 5:30 p.m. on June 12, water was overflowing from 
the storm sewers in Showers' parking lot, and the Ohio Street 
                                                 
8 Schanhofer also stated that by the morning of June 13, 
there were no pumps present at or near Showers' property at the 
intersection of Ohio Street and Sixth Avenue. 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
9 
 
roadbed was entirely flooded.  Additionally, water had begun to 
overflow from another drainage basin into the stretch of Ohio 
Street near Showers' property.  The June 12 storm was estimated 
to have dropped approximately 4.36 inches of rain on the area 
within 5.5 hours during the evening, in addition to near-
continuous, but less intense rain throughout the entire day. 
¶16 Following the June 12 rains, the basement at Showers' 
property flooded with more than seven feet of water.   Showers 
retained an engineer who concluded that approximately 117,500 
gallons of water had been trapped in the roadbed outside 
Showers' property for 15 to 18 hours, and that the hydrostatic 
pressure caused by that water eventually caused Showers' 
basement floor to rupture, thereby allowing the water to seep up 
into the basement.  Showers' sump pump ran continuously 
following the storm, but because the pump was connected with the 
storm sewers, the discharge of the sump pump merely recycled 
water out into the roadbed, which then seeped back into Showers' 
basement.  Neither the City nor Musson had informed Showers that 
the storm sewers had been disconnected.  Because of the 
flooding, Showers incurred at least $140,000 in damages to his 
business and personal property, and was forced to relocate his 
businesses for four months while the Ohio Street property could 
be cleaned, repaired, and restored.9 
                                                 
9 Notwithstanding these damages, experts averred that Musson 
complied with the Standard Specifications regarding maintenance 
of drainage during all phases of the Ohio Street construction 
project. 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
10 
 
¶17 Showers commenced the present action by serving Musson 
and the City with a summons and complaint on July 23, 2009.10  In 
pertinent part, Showers alleged that "improper drainage, design, 
maintenance, excavation, construction procedures, and failure to 
take corrective measures" caused flooding in Showers' basement 
following the June 8 and 12 storms.  Accordingly, Showers sought 
relief from the City and Musson on the grounds that those 
entities were "jointly and severally liable to [Showers] for 
negligent acts or omissions which caused [Showers'] building to 
flood, resulting in damage to the building and personal 
property, including losses for repairs, replacements, clean up, 
diminished value, and loss of use and related damages and 
losses." 
¶18 The City and Musson moved for summary judgment, each 
arguing that it was entitled to immunity for its acts relating 
to the Ohio Street sewer project; additionally, the City and 
Musson 
brought 
cross-claims 
against 
one 
another 
for 
indemnification.  After considering affidavits and arguments by 
the parties, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the 
City and Musson on the basis that both entities were entitled to 
governmental immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Showers 
appealed the grant of summary judgment as to Musson, but not the 
grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims against the 
City.  Therefore, Showers' claims against the City are no longer 
                                                 
10 Prior to commencing this action, on October 3, 2008, 
Showers served the City with a notice of claim as required under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1) (2007–08). 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
11 
 
a part of this case.  However, Musson did cross-appeal the 
dismissal of its indemnification claim against the City. 
¶19 The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment for Musson.  Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., 
Inc., 2012 WI App 80, ¶1, 343 Wis. 2d 623, 819 N.W.2d 316.  The 
court concluded that under the test set forth in Lyons, Musson 
was entitled to governmental contractor immunity as a statutory 
"agent" under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Id.  Additionally, 
because the court concluded that Musson was entitled to 
immunity, it did not address Musson's or the City's cross-
appeals.  Id. 
¶20 Showers 
filed 
a 
petition 
for 
review, 
which 
we 
granted.11 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶21 The circuit court granted summary judgment for the 
City and Musson on the basis of governmental immunity and 
governmental contractor immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we 
review independently of the circuit court and the court of 
appeals, although we benefit from those courts' analyses.  
                                                 
11 Following summary judgment, the City has appeared in this 
action in response to Musson's cross-appeal against the City for 
indemnification.  The City appeared in the court of appeals, was 
included as a party in Showers' petition for review, and has 
submitted briefs and argument before this court in favor of its 
position that both the City and Musson are entitled to immunity 
in this case. 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
12 
 
Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶14, 309 Wis. 2d 
541, 
749 
N.W.2d 
581. 
 
In 
addition, 
determining 
whether 
governmental immunity exists for particular conduct requires the 
application of legal standards to the facts found, which is also 
a question of law for our independent review.  Estate of Brown 
v. Mathy Constr. Co., 2008 WI App 114, ¶6, 313 Wis. 2d 497, 756 
N.W.2d 417.  Also, when we review a grant of summary judgment, 
we will affirm it if no genuine issue of material facts exists 
and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law."  Wadzinski v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 WI 75, ¶10, 342 
Wis. 2d 311, 818 N.W.2d 819. 
B.  Governmental Contractor Immunity 
¶22 The City and Musson assert that, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4),12 Musson is entitled to immunity from liability for 
Showers' claims.  In order to address that claim, we must 
interpret § 893.80(4).  We therefore begin with the language of 
                                                 
12 The 
statutory 
immunity 
afforded 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) 
has 
been 
referred 
to 
as 
"municipal" 
or 
"governmental" immunity, and is distinct from the sovereign 
immunity that the Wisconsin Constitution grants the State.  See 
Anderson v. City of Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 2d 18, 28 n.11, 559 
N.W.2d 563 (1997).  Nonetheless, we have acknowledged that there 
is overlap in the principles governing whether a governmental 
entity or officer is entitled to immunity.  See C.L. v. Olson, 
143 Wis. 2d 701, 716 n.9, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988).  Therefore, 
although the immunity that Musson claims in this case could be 
the sovereign immunity conferred upon the DOT as a state agency 
(because of Musson's contract with the DOT), principles of 
governmental contractor immunity under § 893.80(4) have been 
raised as being applicable here.  Neither the State nor the DOT 
was sued, so the right of a sovereign to consent to suit was 
never at issue.  See Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 
41, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
13 
 
that statute.  Section 893.80(4) provides, in pertinent part, 
that "[n]o suit may be brought against any [governmental entity] 
. . . or against its officers, officials, agents or employees 
for acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions." 
¶23 Our task when interpreting a statute is to discern the 
statute's meaning, which we presume is expressed in the language 
chosen by the legislature.  Richards, 309 Wis. 2d 541, ¶20.  If 
the meaning of the language is plain, we apply that meaning.  
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "Statutory language is 
given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that 
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their 
technical or special definitional meaning."  Id.  Our analysis 
of statutory language also may be aided by considering prior 
decisions examining the relevant statutory provisions.  See 
DeHart v. Wis. Mut. Ins. Co., 2007 WI 91, ¶15, 302 Wis. 2d 564, 
734 N.W.2d 394. 
¶24 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.80(4) was enacted in response to 
our decision in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 
115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).  See Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 
Wis. 2d 526, 532, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976) (recognizing that what 
is now § 893.80(4) is the codification of Holytz).  In Holytz, 
17 Wis. 2d at 39, we abrogated the common law rule of 
governmental immunity for governmental entities, and stated that 
"henceforward, so far as governmental responsibility for torts 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
14 
 
is concerned, the rule is liability [and] the exception is 
immunity."   
¶25 Holytz excepted from that abrogation the acts of a 
governmental 
entity 
exercising 
its 
legislative, 
quasi-
legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions.  See id. at 
40.  That language carving out an exception to governmental 
liability now appears in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), with the 
addition of immunity for governmental officers, agents and 
employees, thereby including those individuals for whose acts 
the governmental entity would be liable under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior.  See id.; see also Kettner v. Wausau Ins. 
Cos., 191 Wis. 2d 723, 729-30, 530 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(limiting the type of agents for which § 893.80 may provide 
immunity). 
¶26 When analyzing and applying Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), we 
often have used the term "discretionary" as a shorthand to refer 
to decisions of a governmental entity that are legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial. See, e.g., Willow 
Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶25, 235 
Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693; C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 710 
n.5, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988); Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 
511–12, 259 N.W.2d 537 (1977); see also Lyons, 207 Wis. 2d at 
453–54.  Legislative and quasi-legislative functions generally 
refer to those policy choices made in an official capacity, 
e.g., when a governmental entity chooses one project design over 
another.  See Lyons, 207 Wis. 2d at 453.  Quasi-judicial 
functions generally refer to those acts that involve the 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
15 
 
exercise of discretion in coming to a judgment; the availability 
of a public hearing on the judgment before a specialized board; 
and the imposition by a board of an appropriate final decision.  
See Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 534-35. 
¶27 In the present case, the parties' arguments center on 
the application of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) in regard to a 
governmental contractor who claims immunity derived from the 
governmental entity with which the contractor has a contractual 
relationship.13  The court of appeals addressed a similar 
situation in Lyons.  There, the court examined whether a 
governmental 
contractor 
was 
entitled 
to 
immunity 
under 
§ 893.80(4) when the contractor implemented a bridge design that 
had been selected by the contracting governmental entity.  
Because the court of appeals' decision in Lyons was grounded in 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Boyle v. United 
Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 510–13 (1988), it is necessary 
to understand Boyle to place Lyons in proper perspective.   
¶28 In Boyle, a governmental contractor was sued based on 
its sale of a helicopter to the United States Marine Corps.  Id. 
at 502.  The helicopter was alleged to have a design defect in 
the co-pilot's escape system, which prevented the opening of the 
                                                 
13 Musson does not specify whether the immunity it seeks is 
legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial in 
nature.  We need not make that determination because we conclude 
that Showers' allegation that Musson negligently performed its 
construction responsibilities does not implicate any of the 
governmental entity functions excepted from liability pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
16 
 
escape hatch when the helicopter was submerged.  Id. at 503.  
The alleged design defect resulted in the death of a pilot who 
survived a crash into water, but drowned because he could not 
escape from the helicopter.  Id. at 502.  
¶29 In analyzing whether the contractor's governmental-
contractor defense had merit, the Supreme Court focused on 
whether the government contract required the contractor to 
"deliver helicopters with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism 
shown by the specifications" of the helicopter that the Marine 
Corps had chosen.  Id. at 509.  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
"the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment 
to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary 
function."  Id. at 511.  The Court then concluded by setting out 
a three-part test to determine whether the relationship between 
the governmental contractor and the governmental entity was such 
that the contractor should be immune from liability for design 
defects in military equipment chosen by the Armed Forces:  "(1) 
the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; 
(2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the 
supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use 
of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the 
United States."  Id. at 512. 
¶30 In explaining its test, the Supreme Court said, "[t]he 
first two of these conditions assure that the suit is within the 
area where the policy of the 'discretionary function' would be 
frustrated——i.e., they assure that the design feature in 
question was considered by a Government officer, and not merely 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
17 
 
by the contractor itself."  Id. (emphasis added).  In so 
explaining, the Supreme Court made clear that a discretionary 
act of a governmental officer is a necessary component to 
potential 
immunity 
for 
the 
governmental 
contractor.  
Accordingly, a governmental contractor's own "discretionary 
actions" would not have sufficed to afford the contractor 
immunity for its actions in Boyle.    
¶31 In Lyons, the court of appeals also focused on a 
design defect that allegedly was a cause of an accident.  Lyons, 
207 Wis. 2d at 449.  It is important to note that, as was the 
case in Boyle, it was the governmental entity in Lyons that made 
the choice of design that allegedly was a cause of the accident.  
Id.  This design choice was made in the exercise of a 
legislative or quasi-legislative function of the governmental 
entity.  Id. at 453.  Because the governmental contractor 
performed 
its 
contractual 
tasks 
under 
reasonably 
precise 
specifications pursuant to the governmental entity's quasi-
legislative design decision, the contractor functioned as a Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4) agent of the governmental entity when carrying 
out the entity's design decision.  See id. at 457–58, 461.  
Therefore, the governmental contractor was entitled to the same 
level of immunity as would be accorded to the governmental 
entity had it been sued directly for its design choice.  Id. at 
454 (explaining the court's reliance on the rationale of Boyle 
where the governmental contractor defense precluded suit "if the 
challenged design choice was made by military officials").   
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
18 
 
¶32 Lyons adopted Boyle's three-part test.  Id. at 457-58.  
The court of appeals explained that a governmental contractor 
that follows governmental specifications is an "agent" within 
the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) when the contractor meets 
the three-part test of Boyle.  Id.  "This three-part test will 
ensure that state and municipal government, and the public at 
large, is able to make the best use of professional design 
assistance, but that professional contractors are not unfairly 
burdened by lawsuits when they follow governmental directives."  
Id. at 458.   
¶33 Subsequent court of appeals decisions have affirmed 
the Lyons court's rationale regarding contractor immunity, 
stating, for example, that "[i]n Lyons, we expressly held that 
an independent contractor meeting the three-part test was an 
agent within the meaning of § 893.80(4)."  Jankee v. Clark 
Cnty., 222 Wis. 2d 151, 165, 585 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1998), 
rev'd on other grounds, 2000 WI 64, 235 Wis. 2d 700, 612 N.W.2d 
297.  The language of some of these cases may be read to suggest 
that the relevant question is merely whether a contractor 
satisfies the three-part test and is therefore an "agent" 
entitled to immunity.  See id.; see also Woychik v. Ruzic 
Constr. Co., 2001 WI App 280, ¶8, 248 Wis. 2d 983, 638 N.W.2d 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
19 
 
394 (unpublished decision).14  Indeed, the court of appeals' 
decision in the case at hand suggests that satisfaction of the 
elements of the Lyons test will be sufficient to immunize 
governmental contractors' conduct.  See Showers Appraisals, 343 
Wis. 2d 623, ¶22; see also Bronfeld v. Pember Cos., 2010 WI App 
150, ¶12, 330 Wis. 2d 123, 792 N.W.2d 222. 
¶34 However, 
analyzing 
whether 
the 
conduct 
of 
a 
governmental contractor was undertaken as a statutory "agent" 
within the scope of the immunity accorded by Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) solely by reference to the three-part Lyons test may 
lead a court to err.  Rather, an equally dispositive question in 
the § 893.80(4) immunity analysis is whether the relevant 
decision of the governmental entity that the governmental 
contractor implements is, itself, entitled to immunity under 
§ 893.80(4) because it was made through the exercise of a 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
function of the governmental entity.  Stated otherwise, only 
certain types of acts fall within the immunity shield of 
§ 893.80(4).  It was on such a foundation that both the Lyons 
and Boyle decisions stand because the governmental decision in 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 809.23(3) does not prohibit this 
court's discussion of unpublished decisions when such discussion 
relies on the opinion solely to demonstrate that courts have 
used particular language from other cases, and does not rely on 
the decision for authoritative or persuasive value.  See State 
v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 996–97, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991).  
Moreover, because such use of unpublished decisions has such 
longstanding acceptance, see id., we need not decide now whether 
§ 809.23(3) imposes any other limitations on this court's use of 
unpublished decisions in its opinions. 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
20 
 
each case, i.e., the choice of design, was made by a 
governmental entity in the exercise of its legislative or quasi-
legislative function.   
¶35 Immunity is available to a governmental entity only 
for those governmental decisions that are made as an exercise of 
"legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions" as set out in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Any statutory 
immunity to which an agent of the governmental entity may be 
entitled is dependent upon the immunity of the governmental act 
or decision that the agent was implementing when it caused an 
injury.  This immunity inquiry under § 893.80(4)——examining 
whether a governmental entity's conduct was an exercise of a 
"legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
function"——gives 
effect 
to 
the 
legislature's 
prerogative 
regarding the circumstances in which immunity may be available 
under § 893.80(4).  Although some of our cases have equated 
§ 893.80(4)'s 
"legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial" standard with the term "discretionary," see, 
e.g., Olson, 143 Wis. 2d at 710 n.5; Lifer, 80 Wis. 2d at 511–
12, and although our decision is not intended in any way to 
alter that standard, we do emphasize that the legislatively 
selected policy decision regarding immunity under § 893.80(4) is 
best 
honored 
by 
applying 
the 
legislature's 
chosen 
plain 
language, rather than a judicial distillation thereof.  This 
approach comports with fundamental principles of statutory 
interpretation, under which the plain language of a statute is 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
21 
 
presumed to most directly convey what the legislature means.  
See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44.   
¶36 From the foregoing, when a governmental contractor 
seeks immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), the contractor must 
show both that the contractor was an agent as that term is used 
in § 893.80(4), i.e., as is expressed in the Lyons test, and 
that 
the 
allegedly 
injurious 
conduct 
was 
caused 
by 
the 
implementation of a decision for which immunity is available for 
governmental entities under § 893.80(4).  As discussed below, 
Musson has failed to show that it is an agent in accordance with 
Lyons.  Nonetheless, because the plain language of § 893.80(4) 
demonstrates that the immunity analysis requires an element in 
addition to what is required by Lyons' agency test (namely, 
allegations that the injury-causing act was legislative, quasi-
legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial in character), we set 
forth the applicable standard so that litigants and courts may 
engage in a complete analysis of whether immunity may be 
available in future cases. 
¶37 The first and second requirements of the Lyons test, 
i.e., 
whether 
the 
governmental entity approved reasonably 
precise specifications that the governmental contractor adhered 
to when engaging in the conduct that caused the injury, limit 
when a governmental contractor is a statutory agent under Wis. 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
22 
 
Stat. § 893.80(4).15  Stated otherwise, the governmental entity 
must have had the right to control the tasks performed by the 
contractor with "reasonably precise specifications" and the 
contractor must have followed those specifications.  When these 
facts are proved, the contractor is a § 893.80(4) agent of the 
governmental entity.  See, e.g., Kettner, 191 Wis. 2d at 733–37 
(explaining that not all conduct of agents comes within the 
scope of § 893.80; rather, only that conduct that may be imputed 
to a governmental entity as the act of the entity's servant 
comes within § 893.80).16   
¶38 The principles of immunity for particular types of 
agents under Wis. Stat. § 893.80, as discussed in Kettner, 
should be read in harmony with the Lyons test and with the 
principles of governmental immunity enunciated in § 893.80(4).  
For example, the allegation in Lyons that the bridge was 
improperly 
designed 
by 
the 
governmental 
contractor, 
who 
undertook the design at the direction of the governmental 
entity, was the act of a § 893.80(4)–type agent because the 
                                                 
15 We note that the third criterion for statutory agency set 
out in Lyons, that the contractor warned the governmental entity 
about dangers known to the contractor but unknown to the 
governmental entity, does not bear on whether statutory agency 
is present.  Rather, it is grounded in a concern that the 
immunity accorded does not cut off information highly relevant 
to governmental decisions.  Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 
U.S. 500, 512-13 (1988). 
16 The primary consideration in determining whether an act 
was undertaken by one who acts in the capacity of a servant is 
whether the principal had the right to control the conduct of 
the agent.  Pamperin v. Trinity Mem'l Hosp., 144 Wis. 2d 188, 
198-99, 423 N.W.2d 848 (1988). 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
23 
 
governmental entity controlled the design choice and design 
choices are legislative or quasi-legislative functions.  See 
Lyons, 207 Wis. 2d at 452–58; see also Chart v. Dvorak, 57 
Wis. 2d 92, 100–01, 203 N.W.2d 673 (1973) (recognizing that the 
decision to undertake a project, or how to design the project, 
may be immunized as the exercise of a legislative or quasi-
legislative function). 
¶39 However, if the allegation in Lyons were not that the 
design was a cause of the accident, and were instead that the 
contractor did not construct the bridge in a workman-like manner 
and thereby caused injury, such an allegation would not 
implicate a legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial function under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Accordingly, an 
allegation of negligent workmanship would not have the potential 
for immunity under § 893.80(4) for that specific injury-causing 
conduct, and no Lyons inquiry (to determine whether the 
contractor was a § 893.80(4)-type agent) would be necessary.  
This conclusion is based on the scope of immunity contemplated 
by this court in Holytz, and by the legislature's codification 
of Holytz in what is now § 893.80(4).   
¶40 Some cases applying Kettner's agency principles in the 
context of immunity inquiries could be read to suggest that 
"agent" may be interpreted broadly to afford immunity to all 
governmental contractors' conduct.  However, in light of Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4)'s explicit language limiting the scope of 
governmental immunity, immunity will be extended to governmental 
contractors only where the contractor acted as a "servant" for 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
24 
 
the purposes of the challenged conduct.  See Kettner, 191 
Wis. 2d at 734–36.  Indeed, as we explained above, this 
definition of "agent" is manifest in the Lyons test, which 
requires that a governmental contractor adhere to "reasonably 
precise specifications." Cf. Arsand v. City of Franklin, 83 
Wis. 2d 40, 45–46, 264 N.W.2d 579 (1978) (defining servant as 
"one employed to perform service for another in his affairs and 
who, with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of 
the service, is subject to the other's control or right to 
control").   
¶41 Other cases following Lyons also illustrate that care 
in analysis is needed when a claim of governmental contractor 
immunity is made.  For example, in Bronfeld, the court of 
appeals addressed an allegation that a subcontractor negligently 
erected barricades and failed to maintain the construction site 
so as to protect public safety.  The plaintiff claimed that the 
contractor was therefore liable for the plaintiff's injuries, 
which occurred when she tripped over a barricade that the 
contractor had placed at the site.  See Bronfeld, 330 Wis. 2d 
123, ¶¶10, 12.   
¶42 In Bronfeld, the government's general contractor had 
provided a detailed traffic control plan that the City of River 
Falls approved, and the subcontractor followed that plan.  Id., 
¶6.  The court of appeals began by noting that placement of 
barricades is a discretionary duty, and therefore, if the City 
had placed the barricades itself, it would have been immune from 
suit pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Id., ¶19.  This 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
25 
 
cursory determination of whether the governmental entity would 
have been entitled to immunity under the language of § 893.80(4) 
highlights the need for a more thorough immunity analysis for 
claims of governmental immunity. 
¶43 After making this primary determination, the court in 
Bronfeld applied the Lyons test to determine whether the 
contractor was an agent.  The court concluded that the test was 
satisfied, and that the contractor was entitled to immunity, 
because 
(1) 
the 
City 
had 
provided 
reasonably 
precise 
specifications regarding traffic control and barricade placement 
by requiring and approving the traffic control plan the general 
contractor submitted; (2) the subcontractor complied with the 
those specifications; and (3) the subcontractor had not been 
aware 
of 
any 
dangers 
posed 
by 
the 
reasonably 
precise 
specifications.  See id., ¶¶24–33. 
¶44 Bronfeld's cursory analysis of governmental contractor 
immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) may be attributable to 
Brown, where the language used to apply Lyons' reasoning could 
be construed to afford immunity to governmental contractors' 
actions where the alleged injury did not arise from the 
contractor's implementing a governmental entity's decision that 
was made pursuant to a "legislative, quasi-legislative, [etc.] 
function," such as the adoption of a design or plan.  In Brown, 
the court seemed to emphasize the importance of whether there 
existed 
"reasonably 
precise 
specifications," 
without 
acknowledging that, for such specifications to afford immunity 
to a governmental contractor, the contractor's alleged injury-
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
26 
 
causing actions must have been due to its implementation of a 
governmental entity's exercise of one of the functions for which 
immunity is accorded under § 893.80(4).  See Brown, 313 Wis. 2d 
497, ¶11 (stating that "[t]he question is not what other safety 
precautions might have been taken, but whether the safety 
requirements 
provided 
by 
DOT 
were 
reasonably 
precise 
specifications," without analysis of whether the allegedly 
injurious conduct had been undertaken pursuant to a legislative 
or quasi-legislative function of the governmental entity).   
¶45 In sum, in addition to satisfying the Lyons test for 
governmental 
contractor 
immunity, 
a 
contractor 
asserting 
immunity must be able to demonstrate that the conduct for which 
immunity is sought was the implementing of a governmental 
entity's decision made during the exercise of the entity's 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions.  To apply Lyons without analyzing the applicability 
of immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) to the particular act 
for which liability is alleged could grant a governmental 
contractor broader immunity than the governmental entity itself 
would be entitled to under the statute.  Accordingly, in the 
future, when a governmental contractor asserts that it is 
entitled to immunity under § 893.80(4), we encourage litigants 
and courts to adhere to the statutory standard to determine 
whether 
the 
alleged 
immunity-supporting 
functions 
are 
legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial.   
¶46 Our conclusion regarding the intersection of the 
agency principles embodied in the Lyons test and the type of 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
27 
 
acts for which governmental immunity may be afforded under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.80(4) is well-supported nationwide.  For example, 
other jurisdictions have concluded that while governmental 
contractors will not be liable for injuries alleged to have 
arisen from defects in a design the government chose, "it is 
well settled that this rule of non-liability does not exempt a 
contractor from liability where the injury arises from the 
contractor's negligent performance of the work."  Gaunt & 
Haynes, Inc. v. Moritz Corp., 485 N.E.2d 1123, 1126 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1985); Rodriguez v. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 
472 A.2d 146, 149 (N.J. App. Div. 1983) ("A public contractor 
may . . . be held liable when negligent in the execution of the 
contract.").  Furthermore, a legal encyclopedia notes that "the 
courts are practically unanimous" in support of the proposition 
that a governmental contractor is not entitled to governmental 
immunity for injuries arising from negligent performance of the 
contract work.  A.E. Korpela, Annotation, Right of contractor 
with federal, state, or local public body to latter's immunity 
from tort liability, 9 A.L.R. 3d 382 §§ 2(a), 5 (1966); see also 
64 Am. Jur. 2d, Public Works and Contracts § 109 (2013 update) 
(discussing contractors' negligence in performing work; neglect 
or failure to comply with contract).  This understanding of the 
doctrine of governmental contractor immunity has been echoed by 
legal commentators.  See, e.g., Richard Ausness, Surrogate 
Immunity: 
 
The 
Government 
Contract 
Defense 
and 
Products 
Liability, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 985, 995 (1986). 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
28 
 
C.  Application 
¶47 With the above principles in mind, we turn to the 
present case.  Although the parties have framed their arguments 
solely in terms of the Lyons test, we analyze Musson's claim for 
immunity under both requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  
This includes whether Musson is an agent under § 893.80(4), as 
determined by the Lyons test, as well as whether the conduct 
that is alleged to be a cause of injury is entitled to immunity 
under § 893.80(4) as the implementation of a legislative, quasi-
legislative, etc. decision.    We conclude first that, under the 
Lyons tests, Musson has failed to demonstrate that it is an 
agent 
entitled 
to 
governmental 
contractor 
immunity.  
Furthermore, as guidance to future litigants, we examine why 
Musson's allegations in support of summary judgment fail to 
demonstrate that Musson was entitled to immunity as an agent 
implementing 
a 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial function of a governmental entity. 
¶48 Under the Lyons test as applied to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4), Musson was not an agent for which immunity was 
available.  The relevant contractual language (the Standard 
Specifications) demonstrates that Musson was not subject to 
"reasonably precise specifications" as is necessary to invoke 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
29 
 
contractor immunity as an agent of a governmental entity.17  The 
primary provision upon which the parties focus their arguments 
and upon which we rely in concluding that the Lyons test is not 
satisfied is the "means and methods" provision in the Standard 
Specifications.18  The conduct for which Musson was responsible 
under the means and methods provision are, by definition, 
distinguishable from conduct for which immunity may be available 
for agents under § 893.80(4), as set forth in Lyons. 
                                                 
17 As our discussion below should make clear, our reference 
to the Specifications as support for our conclusion that 
immunity is not available should not be read to suggest that the 
terms of a government contract may create immunity where none 
would otherwise exist by virtue of the legislative, quasi-
legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial nature of the activities 
at issue.  Our reference to the Standard Specifications merely 
demonstrates that the parties apparently contemplated that 
Musson's performance of its construction responsibilities would 
not entitle Musson to the immunity that may be afforded to 
agents under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). 
18 Other sections in the Standard Specifications also 
support the contention that the parties contemplated that Musson 
was not subject to reasonably precise specifications under Lyons 
and could be held liable for any negligence in the performance 
of the construction.  For example: 
- § 107.1(2), requiring the contractor to "[p]rovide 
all 
necessary 
safeguards, 
safety 
devices, 
and 
protective equipment.  Take all other actions that 
are reasonably necessary to protect the life and 
health of employees on the project and the safety of 
the public." 
- § 107.11.1(3), requiring the contractor to "[a]ssume 
liability for all damage to public or private 
property 
resulting 
from 
contractor 
operations, 
defective work or materials, or non-execution of the 
contract." 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
30 
 
¶49 The means and methods provision states, in relevant 
part, that Musson "is solely responsible for the means, methods, 
techniques, 
sequences, 
and 
procedures 
of 
construction." 
(Emphasis added.)  In this context, being "responsible" for the 
"means, methods, [etc.]" involves both powers and duties.  That 
is, Musson was not only empowered to take actions involving how 
the construction process was to proceed, Musson also had the 
responsibility for the actions it took, including incurring 
liability if its actions caused injury.  See Black's Law 
Dictionary 1427 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "responsibility" as 
"liability"); see id. (noting that "responsible . . . simply 
means liable to be made to account or pay") (quoting H.L.A. 
Hart, "Changing Conceptions of Responsibility," in Punishment 
and Responsibility  186, 196–97 (1968)). 
¶50 Many of Musson's day-to-day actions at the Ohio Street 
project site are chronicled in the daily logs of onsite activity 
kept by one of the DOT's engineers, Ryan Schanhofer.  These logs 
note numerous instances of Musson taking actions without DOT or 
City approval, pursuant to Musson's independent responsibility 
under the means and methods provision.  Throughout the course of 
the project, there were multiple occasions on which Schanhofer 
had to inform City officials that he could not stop Musson from 
proceeding on a certain course because Musson's action was 
within the "means and methods" provision.  One of these actions 
was the removal of the entire roadbed of Ohio Street, rather 
than removing portions on a block-by-block basis.  Other such 
actions included whatever steps Musson would take to ensure 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
31 
 
proper drainage, as demonstrated by Schanhofer's note that 
Musson's cleaning silt screens in drainage areas was "up to the 
contractor."19 
¶51 As discussed above, the nature of Musson's actions, 
taken pursuant to the means and methods provision, demonstrates 
that 
Musson 
had 
substantial 
independent 
decision-making 
authority 
in 
performing 
its 
tasks, 
such 
that 
Musson's 
relationship with the DOT for the conduct that is alleged to 
have resulted in harm cannot be characterized as that of a 
servant.  See Arsand, 83 Wis. 2d at 45–46 (defining servant as 
one subject to the master's control or right of control).  Such 
independent discretion is also contrary to Lyons' "reasonably 
precise specifications" requirement, in that a contractor may 
not possess such control over the alleged injury-causing action 
                                                 
19 Moreover, the mere fact that DOT personnel were onsite 
during Musson's performance of the Ohio Street sewer work does 
not 
transform 
Musson's 
contractual 
performance 
into 
the 
implementation of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or 
quasi-judicial 
actions 
that 
are 
entitled 
to 
immunity.  
Tellingly, § 105.2(4) of the Standard Specifications provides 
that "[t]he department's review does not relieve the contractor 
of the responsibility for obtaining satisfactory results."   
Similarly, where the Standard Specifications are silent on 
the safety measures or performance standards applicable in a 
given scenario, a contractor may not rely on that silence as a 
license to undertake whatever measures the contractor selects 
without threat of liability.  Governmental contractor immunity 
must be based on the prior exercise of legislative, quasi-
legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions 
by 
a 
governmental entity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), which the 
governmental 
contractor 
implements 
as 
a 
statutory 
agent.  
Silence, without more, does not demonstrate the exercise of 
necessary governmental decision-making. 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
32 
 
and still be considered an agent for purposes of governmental 
contractor immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  Musson thus 
fails to satisfy the Lyons test and is not an agent under 
§ 893.80(4).20   
¶52 Next, having concluded that Musson is not entitled to 
immunity as an agent under the Lyons test, we also examine 
Musson's claim for immunity in light of the injury alleged and 
the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), which limits 
immunity to "acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-
legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions."  Beginning 
with the injury that Showers has alleged, we note that Showers' 
allegations 
are 
different 
in 
kind 
from 
the 
allegations 
underlying the Lyons test for governmental contractor immunity.  
The substance of Showers' claim is not that Musson was negligent 
in its implementation of a decision made in the exercise of a 
governmental entity's legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial 
or quasi-judicial function, as was the case in Lyons.  Rather, 
Showers 
alleges 
that 
Musson 
negligently 
performed 
its 
excavation, construction, and drainage responsibilities under 
the contract.  Specifically, Showers' complaint alleges that 
                                                 
20 Because Musson has failed to demonstrate that there were 
reasonably precise specifications that controlled any alleged 
injury-causing decision or conduct, we have no need to examine 
the second and third requirements of the Lyons test (i.e., 
whether 
the 
contractor 
followed 
such 
reasonably 
precise 
specifications 
and 
whether 
the 
contractor 
warned 
the 
governmental 
entity 
of 
any 
dangers 
associated 
with 
the 
specifications that were known by the contractor, but not by the 
governmental entity). 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
33 
 
Musson is liable for "improper drainage, . . . maintenance, 
excavation, 
construction 
procedures, 
and 
failure 
to 
take 
corrective measures."   
¶53 These assertions are fundamentally different from the 
assertion that a governmental entity negligently selected a 
design that a contractor implemented for a government project.  
Design selection is a type of governmental entity decision that 
we 
have 
determined 
is 
within 
the 
legislative 
or 
quasi-
legislative function immunized under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4).  
See, e.g., Chart, 57 Wis. 2d at 100–01 (recognizing legislative 
or quasi-legislative nature of design decision); Lange v. Town 
of Norway, 77 Wis. 2d 313, 318–20, 253 N.W.2d 240 (1977) (same).   
¶54 In contrast, Showers alleges that Musson's performance 
of its construction duties, such as maintaining drainage at the 
worksite, did not meet the standard of due care for construction 
work.  Cf. Brooks v. Hayes, 133 Wis. 2d 228, 234–35, 395 N.W.2d 
167 (1986) (recognizing that a construction contract implicitly 
imposes a duty on contractors to perform work according to the 
standard of due care).  An allegation such as Showers makes does 
not implicate the types of acts for which Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) 
affords immunity to a governmental entity.  Therefore, they 
cannot form the basis for immunity for a contractor.  For a 
governmental entity to be accorded immunity under § 893.80(4), 
the entity must be able to show that the allegedly injurious act 
was done in the exercise of a legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial function.  Musson has not shown that 
the acts that Showers asserts were a cause of injury——Musson's 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
34 
 
alleged 
improper 
drainage, 
maintenance, 
excavation, 
and 
construction at the Ohio Street project——were the implementation 
of a governmental entity's exercise of legislative, quasi-
legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions.  Therefore, 
immunity under § 893.80(4) is not available for those acts. 
¶55 In future cases, governmental contractors seeking 
immunity should include in their pleadings sufficient facts to 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
governmental 
entity 
from 
which 
the 
contractor would derive immunity was engaged in one of the 
functions for which immunity is available under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4), and that the contractor was an agent with respect 
to injury-causing conduct. 
¶56 Accordingly, Showers' claims, that Musson negligently 
performed the work required by the government contract, should 
be analyzed under standard negligence principles.  See Coffey, 
74 Wis. 2d at 531, 535–40 (setting forth elements of standard 
negligence 
analysis 
and 
applying 
those 
elements 
after 
determining 
that 
municipal 
officer 
was 
not 
entitled 
to 
immunity).  Although ultimately Musson may be found not to have 
been 
negligent 
in 
its 
performance 
of 
its 
construction 
activities, summary judgment was inappropriate based on the 
substance of Showers' complaint. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶57 We conclude that where a third party's claim against a 
governmental contractor is based on the allegation that the 
contractor negligently performed its work under a contract with 
a governmental entity, the governmental contractor must prove 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
35 
 
both that the contractor meets the definition of "agent" under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), as set forth in Lyons, and that the 
contractor's act is one for which immunity is available under 
§ 893.80(4).  Specifically, we conclude that for a contractor to 
come within § 893.80(4)'s shield of immunity, the contractor 
must prove it was acting as the governmental entity's agent in 
accordance with reasonably precise specifications, as set forth 
in Lyons.  In this case, Musson has not shown that it was acting 
as a governmental entity's agent for purposes of the alleged 
injury-causing conduct because Musson was not acting pursuant to 
"reasonably precise specifications." 
¶58 Moreover, pursuant to the plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4), we also conclude that a governmental contractor 
seeking to assert the defense of immunity should clearly allege 
in the pleadings why the injury-causing conduct comes within a 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
function as set out in § 893.80(4).  In the context of this 
case, a governmental contractor would be required to assert that 
it was implementing a decision of a governmental entity that was 
made within the scope of the governmental entity's legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions.  
Adherence to these statutory requirements for immunity under 
§ 893.80(4) will avoid extending blanket immunity for claims of 
negligently performed work against governmental contractors when 
the sole basis for immunity is that the work was performed 
pursuant to a contract with a governmental entity.  Allowing 
governmental contractors to claim immunity in such instances 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
36 
 
would vastly expand the doctrine of governmental immunity. 
Applying this rationale to this case, we conclude that Musson 
would not be entitled to immunity for Showers' claims that 
Musson negligently performed its work under a government 
contract, because Musson has not made a showing that Musson was 
an agent implementing a governmental entity's decision made 
within the scope of the entity's legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.  
¶59 Therefore, based on Musson failing to meet the 
standard for a Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) agent, Musson is not 
entitled to immunity under § 893.80(4).  Additionally, we 
conclude that the facts set out in support of summary judgment 
would not support a claim of governmental contractor immunity 
because Musson has failed to assert that the acts for which it 
claims immunity were "acts done in the exercise of legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions," as 
required under § 893.80(4).  Accordingly, Showers' claims should 
be analyzed no differently than negligence claims against other 
contractors. 
¶60 Musson may therefore be liable if Showers is able to 
show that in performing its work under the government contract, 
Musson had a duty of due care to Showers, that Musson breached 
that duty, and that such breach was a cause of Showers' damages.  
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the circuit court for 
further proceedings on Showers' claims against Musson consistent 
with this opinion.  Additionally, because Musson's and the 
City's cross-claims were not fully litigated in the circuit 
No. 
2011AP1158   
 
37 
 
court and were not addressed by the court of appeals, those 
claims should be addressed on remand. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court. 
 
 
 
No.  2011AP1158.npc 
 
1 
 
¶61 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (concurring).  This case is 
about whether Musson Bros., Inc. (Musson) is an agent of a 
governmental entity under the test established in the Lyons 
case.  See Estate of Lyons v. CNA Ins. Cos., 207 Wis. 2d 446, 
558 N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1996).  I agree with the majority that 
under the Lyons test, Musson is not an agent because Musson has 
not shown that it was acting pursuant to "reasonably precise 
specifications" as the first prong of the Lyons test requires.  
Musson is therefore not entitled to immunity.  The grant of 
summary judgment should therefore be reversed.  Although I do 
not join the majority opinion, I respectfully concur for reasons 
stated herein. 
¶62 In past cases, we have not focused on whether the 
governmental 
entity's 
decisions 
were 
legislative, 
quasi-
legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial as a first step in 
answering the Lyons question.  Even if the court chooses to 
adopt that framework for the Lyons test, I am concerned that the 
majority may have taken an approach to the Lyons immunity 
analysis itself that could be read as changing the law on 
governmental contractor immunity.  If that is the majority's 
intent, the best way to do so is to acknowledge that, and to 
offer more guidance to litigants, lawyers, and courts. 
¶63 While the majority opinion (at ¶2 n.5) says that there 
is no intention to adopt a fundamental change in our immunity 
jurisprudence, I am also concerned that, due to some notable 
similarities, the majority opinion could be read as endorsing 
the type of fundamental change that Justice Gableman advocates 
No.  2011AP1158.npc 
 
2 
 
in a concurrence in an unrelated governmental immunity case.1  
While I share Justice Gableman's dismay with some aspects of 
this court's immunity jurisprudence, I favor an incremental 
approach to correcting the problems.  A good place to start 
would be to recognize that our prior cases have construed the 
ministerial duty exception to immunity too narrowly.2 
¶64 The majority's approach provides little guidance as to 
how the showing it requires could be met.  The majority 
concludes that "[T]he facts set out in support of summary 
judgment would not support a claim of governmental contractor 
immunity because Musson has failed to assert that the acts for 
which it claims immunity were 'acts done in the exercise of 
                                                 
1 See Bostco, LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2013 
WI 78, ¶103, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Gableman, J., 
concurring): 
I would . . . do away with the ministerial duty and 
known danger exceptions and restore our immunity 
jurisprudence to conform with § 893.80(4) and Holytz. 
That 
is, 
governmental 
entities, 
officials, 
and 
employees should be entitled to immunity only for  
"acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-
legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions."  
Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4); see also [Holytz v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 40, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962)]. 
2 A brief definition of a "ministerial duty" is something 
that is  "absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the 
execution of a set task, and when the law which imposes it 
prescribes and defines the time,  mode and occasion for its 
performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion."  This definition is cited in Lister v. 
Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976), 
which takes language from Meyer v. Carman, 271 Wis. 329, 332, 73 
N.W.2d 514 (1955) (quoting 18 Eugene McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations § 53.33, at 225 (3d ed.)). 
No.  2011AP1158.npc 
 
3 
 
legislative, 
quasi-legislative, 
judicial 
or 
quasi-judicial 
functions.'"  Majority op., ¶4.   
¶65 In cases involving immunity, the analysis has usually 
focused on whether the alleged negligent acts were discretionary 
or non-discretionary, and immunity determinations often turned 
on such analysis.  Here, the majority holds that Musson must 
make an initial showing before application of the three prongs 
of 
the 
Lyons 
test 
for 
governmental 
contractors 
claiming 
immunity.  Specifically, the majority faults Musson for failing 
to "assert that the acts for which it claims immunity were 'acts 
done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial 
or quasi-judicial functions' . . . ."  See majority op., ¶59.  
Litigants may be unable to discern from this opinion what sort 
of facts they must allege in order to establish that immunity 
applies.  When this court crafts a somewhat different analytical 
framework, the best practice is to clearly lay out the reasons 
for the change, and articulate what litigants must show to 
satisfy the standard. 
¶66 There are striking similarities between the language 
of the majority and the language of Justice Gableman's Bostco 
concurrence.  Both opinions read the statute as requiring 
parties who would claim immunity to show that the alleged 
negligent act was related to the exercise of "legislative, 
quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions."  In 
Justice Gableman's Bostco concurrence, he advocates "restor[ing] 
Holytz by placing the burden on the government to show that it 
is entitled to immunity, as opposed to the status quo in 
No.  2011AP1158.npc 
 
4 
 
Wisconsin, where it is now the plaintiff's responsibility to 
prove that immunity was pierced."  Bostco, LLC v. Milwaukee 
Metro. Sewerage Dist., 2013 WI 78, ¶113, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ 
N.W.2d ___ (Gableman, J., concurring).  The Bostco concurrence 
endorses a test under which "[t]he governmental entity seeking 
to establish immunity bears the burden of proving" certain 
facts.  Id.  Similarly, under the majority's holding in this 
case, a governmental contractor who seeks to invoke statutory 
immunity bears at least the initial burden of establishing that 
the government entity's decisions were legislative, quasi-
legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial.  Majority op., ¶2.  
Compare 
Bostco, 
___ 
Wis. 
2d 
____, 
¶103 
(Gableman, 
J., 
concurring) ("governmental entities, officials, and employees 
should be entitled to immunity only for 'acts done in the 
exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-
judicial functions'"), with majority op., ¶27 n.13 ("Musson does 
not specify whether the immunity it seeks is legislative, quasi-
legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial in nature.").   
¶67 Further, in this case, there was extensive briefing on 
the potential application of the ministerial duty exception to 
immunity, and yet the majority does not address the arguments or 
acknowledge its potential application.  This might be viewed by 
some as consistent with Justice Gableman's suggestion that in 
immunity cases analysis of ministerial duty should be "do[ne] 
away with."  Bostco, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶103 (Gableman, J., 
concurring). 
No.  2011AP1158.npc 
 
5 
 
¶68 An incremental approach that would be more consistent 
with our jurisprudence would be one that addresses the problem 
of this court's overly narrow interpretation of ministerial 
duty.  Our ministerial duty analysis at times turns into a 
search to find any discretion that could have been exercised, 
and then declaring immunity is required.  Ruling out liability 
wherever 
any 
discretion 
is 
exercised 
essentially 
creates 
immunity for almost all actions.  As an influential treatise 
noted:  
Stating the reasons for the discretionary-ministerial 
distinction is much easier than stating the rule.... 
[T]he 
difference 
between 
"discretionary" 
and 
"ministerial" is artificial. An act is said to be 
discretionary when the officer must exercise some 
judgment in determining whether and how to perform an 
act. The problem is that "[i]t would be difficult to 
conceive of any official act, no matter how directly 
ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in 
the manner of its performance, even if it involved 
only the driving of a nail."  
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 53.04.10 (3d ed.) (quoted in 
Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶136, 
235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693 (Prosser, J., dissenting)). 
¶69 The fact that even a "directly ministerial" act 
involves "some discretion in the manner of its performance" can 
make it easy for courts to decline to find a ministerial duty 
where one in fact exists.  Like Justice Gableman, I believe our 
cases have sometimes failed to recognize this and have employed 
too restrictive an interpretation of ministerial duty.  (See 
Bostco, ¶109 (Gableman, J., concurring).  While I do not favor a 
fundamental shift in our jurisprudence, we should be mindful of 
the fact that declining to determine that a ministerial duty 
No.  2011AP1158.npc 
 
6 
 
exists where any exercise of discretion can be detected leads to 
immunizing too much government conduct.  We should apply the 
test concerning ministerial duty in a way that serves the 
important public policy objectives that underlie the reasons for 
permitting liability where a ministerial duty exists.  We must 
do a better job of striking the balance between too much 
immunity, which creates a heavy burden for those who suffer harm 
from negligent government acts, and too much liability, which 
creates a heavy burden for taxpayers. 
¶70 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur. 
¶71 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion. 
 
No.  2011AP1158.npc 
 
 
 
1