Case Title: State v. A.L.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2016AP000880

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 20 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2016AP880 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the interest of  A.L., a person under the age 
of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
A. L., 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 378 Wis. 2d 721, 904 N.W.2d 543 
PDC No:2017 WI App 72 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 7, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 5, 2018 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Christopher T. Dee 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
KELLY, J. concurs (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Jorge R. Fragoso, assistant state public defender. 
There was an oral argument by Jorge R. Fragoso.  
 
For the petitioner-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Luke N. Berg, deputy solicitor general, with whom on the brief 
was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general, and Misha Tseytlin, 
solicitor general. There was an oral argument by Luke N. Berg.
 
 
2019 WI 20
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2016AP880 
(L.C. No. 
2012JV389A) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the interest of  A.L., a person under the 
age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
A.L., 
 
          Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
MAR 7, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
REBECCA 
FRANK 
DALLET, 
J.   The 
Milwaukee 
County 
Circuit Court, T. Christopher Dee presiding, denied the State's 
motion to recall A.L.'s juvenile delinquency proceedings.  We 
review the court of appeals' decision reversing the circuit 
court.1   
¶2 
A.L. seeks review of two issues:  (1) whether a 
circuit 
court 
can 
resume 
suspended 
juvenile 
delinquency 
                                                 
1 State v. A.L., 2017 WI App 72, 378 Wis. 2d 721, 904 
N.W.2d 543. 
No. 
2016AP880   
 
2 
 
proceedings to reexamine the competency of a juvenile who was 
initially found not competent to proceed under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.30(5)(d) (2015-16)2 and not likely to become competent 
within the statutory time limits; and (2) whether the circuit 
court retains competency over juvenile delinquency proceedings 
after an accompanying juvenile in need of protection or services 
(JIPS) order has expired.3   
¶3 
We conclude that a circuit court can resume suspended 
juvenile delinquency proceedings to reexamine the competency of 
a juvenile who was initially found not competent and not likely 
to become competent within the statutory time frame.  We also 
conclude that a circuit court retains competency over juvenile 
delinquency proceedings even after an accompanying JIPS order 
has expired.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals.  
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶4 
The juvenile delinquency petition at issue pertains to 
an incident that occurred in November 2012 when A.L. was 15 
years old.  Milwaukee police officers were dispatched to a 
residence where they found a man lying on the front porch with a 
stab wound to his chest.  During a search of the residence, the 
officers recovered a silver metal knife in the kitchen sink.  
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 A "juvenile in need of protection or services" order, as 
discussed in Wis. Stat. § 938.13, is commonly referred to as a 
"JIPS" order.   
No. 
2016AP880   
 
3 
 
A.L. admitted to an officer that he had stabbed his 25-year-old 
cousin after observing him violently fighting with A.L.'s 16-
year-old brother.   
¶5 
A delinquency petition was filed in November 2012 when 
A.L. was 15 years old, alleging A.L. committed second-degree 
reckless homicide while armed with a dangerous weapon.  At 
A.L.'s 
plea 
hearing, 
defense 
counsel 
challenged 
A.L.'s 
competency to proceed.  The circuit court suspended the 
proceedings and ordered two competency evaluations of A.L.  Both 
psychologists found A.L. not competent and not likely to become 
competent within the statutory time frame, and the circuit court 
agreed.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5)(d), the circuit 
court suspended the delinquency proceedings against A.L., 
entered a JIPS order, and placed A.L. in a residential treatment 
center.  A.L.'s JIPS order was later extended for another year 
and expired in March 2015.   
¶6 
While the JIPS order was pending, the State filed 
additional charges against A.L.:  (1) a June 2014 juvenile 
delinquency petition alleging criminal damage to property; and 
(2) a December 2014 complaint alleging battery, criminal damage 
to property, and disorderly conduct in adult criminal court.4  In 
the 2014 delinquency proceedings, A.L. was found not competent 
and not likely to become competent within the one-year statutory 
                                                 
4 A.L. was 17 years old at the time of the December 2014 
offense and therefore the State filed adult criminal charges.  
A.L. is now 21 years old.   
No. 
2016AP880   
 
4 
 
time frame.  The circuit court suspended the proceedings and 
entered another JIPS order which expired in October 2015.  
However, in the adult criminal proceedings A.L. was found not 
competent but likely to become competent.  A.L. was then sent to 
Mendota Mental Health Facility in March 2015 for competency 
remediation.  In May 2015, a doctor at Mendota found A.L. 
competent to proceed.  A.L. did not challenge this competency 
finding and pled guilty to the battery and criminal damage to 
property charges.   
¶7 
As a result of the competency finding in the adult 
criminal proceedings, the State moved for a reevaluation of 
A.L.'s competency in the 2014 delinquency proceedings.  After 
hearing testimony, the circuit court found A.L. competent and 
resumed proceedings on the June 2014 delinquency petition.   
¶8 
The 
State 
then 
filed 
a 
motion 
to 
recall 
for 
reconsideration of A.L.'s competency in the November 2012 
juvenile delinquency case.  The circuit court held that under 
the circumstances, where A.L. was initially found not competent 
and unlikely to become competent, Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5) did not 
provide a procedure for reinstating the suspended delinquency 
proceedings.  Therefore, the circuit court denied the State's 
motion and ruled that the proceedings remained suspended, and 
"just kind of sit[] in limbo."  The State appealed the circuit 
court's decision.   
¶9 
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter, 
concluding that Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5)(d) allows the circuit 
court to retain authority over delinquency proceedings where the 
No. 
2016AP880   
 
5 
 
juvenile remains not competent such that the circuit court may 
revisit the issue of competency when circumstances warrant 
reevaluation.  See State v. A.L., 2017 WI App 72, ¶36, 378 
Wis. 2d 721, 904 N.W.2d 543.  The court of appeals determined 
that § 938.30(5)(d) was ambiguous and therefore relied upon 
legislative history to determine its meaning.  See id., ¶2.   
¶10 A.L. seeks review of two issues:  (1) whether a 
circuit court can resume suspended delinquency proceedings to 
reexamine the competency of a juvenile who was initially found 
not competent to proceed under Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5)(d) and not 
likely to become competent within the statutory time limits; and 
(2) 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
retains 
competency 
over 
delinquency proceedings after an accompanying JIPS order has 
expired. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 The focus in this case is on the interpretation of 
Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5), the statute that governs competency 
within the Juvenile Justice Code.  Statutory interpretation is a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo.  Noffke ex rel. 
Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶9, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 
N.W.2d 156.  The purpose of statutory interpretation is to 
"determine what the statute means so that it may be given its 
full, proper, and intended effect."  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  Statutory language is "given its common, 
ordinary, and accepted meaning," unless there are technical or 
specially-defined words or phrases.  Id., ¶45.  "A statute's 
No. 
2016AP880   
 
6 
 
purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its plain language 
or its relationship to surrounding or closely-related statutes—
that is, from its context or the structure of the statute as a 
coherent whole."  Id., ¶49.   
III. ANALYSIS  
¶12 This case concerns a circuit court's ability to resume5 
suspended delinquency proceedings to reexamine the competency of 
a juvenile who was initially found not competent and unlikely to 
become competent, and what effect, if any, an expired JIPS order 
has on the circuit court's competency over the delinquency 
proceedings.6  The court of appeals concluded that the language 
of Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5) was ambiguous and therefore turned to 
legislative history.  A.L. and the State disagree with the court 
of appeals' holding that § 938.30(5) is ambiguous.  Instead, 
both parties assert that the language of § 938.30(5) is 
unambiguous and supports their respective positions.  In the 
                                                 
5 The State labelled its motion "State's Motion to Recall 
Suspended Case."  Such a motion would be the procedural 
mechanism triggering a circuit court to order a competency 
evaluation.  If A.L. is ultimately found competent, the circuit 
court could then resume the proceedings in the November 2012 
juvenile delinquency case.  The circuit court would then have 
two options:  dismissal of the action with prejudice or waiver 
of jurisdiction pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 938.18.   
6 Noncompliance with statutory mandates affects a court's 
"competency," which is "not jurisdictional at all, but instead, 
is defined as 'the power of a court to exercise its subject 
matter jurisdiction' in a particular case."  City of Eau Claire 
v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, ¶7, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738 
(quoted source omitted).   
No. 
2016AP880   
 
7 
 
alternative, A.L. asserts that the circuit court retained 
competency over him only for the duration of his JIPS order, 
which had expired at the time the State filed its motion to 
recall.    
A.  The circuit court has authority to resume 
suspended juvenile delinquency proceedings 
to reexamine competency. 
¶13 We interpret Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5) and determine 
whether the statute is ambiguous.  Section 938.30(5)(d) provides 
that if a juvenile is found not competent to proceed, the 
circuit 
court 
"shall 
suspend 
proceedings" 
on 
a 
juvenile 
delinquency petition and order the State to file a petition for 
a Wis. Stat. ch. 51 commitment or a JIPS petition.  Where a 
juvenile is found not competent but likely to become competent 
"within 12 months or within the time period of the maximum 
sentence that may be imposed," § 938.30(5)(e) mandates periodic 
reexaminations with written reports to be filed "every 3 months 
and within 30 days" before the juvenile's commitment or 
dispositional order expires.  If a report indicates that the 
juvenile has become competent, the circuit court "shall hold a 
hearing within 10 days" and "determine whether the juvenile is 
competent.  If the court determines that the juvenile is 
competent, the court shall terminate the juvenile's commitment 
or dispositional order and resume the delinquency proceeding."  
§ 938.30(5)(e)2.  However, § 938.30(5) does not address what 
becomes of the suspended delinquency proceedings for juveniles 
No. 
2016AP880   
 
8 
 
who are found not competent and not likely to become competent 
within the statutory time frame, like A.L.   
¶14 The court of appeals concluded that because Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.30(5)(d) provides no guidance as to a particular procedure 
to follow in cases where a juvenile is found not competent and 
not likely to become competent within the statutory time limits, 
the statute is ambiguous.  See A.L., 378 Wis. 2d 721, ¶2.  The 
court of appeals thus turned to legislative history to resolve 
this perceived ambiguity.   
¶15 Upon examination of the language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.30(5), in conjunction with the language of ch. 938, we 
agree with the parties that there is no ambiguity.  Although 
there is no explicit procedure laid out in § 938.30(5) to 
reinstate the suspended delinquency proceedings in A.L.'s case, 
the language of § 938.30(5)(d) and the surrounding subsections 
are unambiguous.  Ambiguity results where statutory language 
reasonably gives rise to different meanings, and that is not the 
case here.  See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶47.  Instead, reading 
§ 938.30(5) in conjunction with the language of ch. 938 
demonstrates that a circuit court has the authority to resume 
suspended proceedings in cases where a juvenile was initially 
found not competent to proceed under § 938.30(5)(d) and not 
likely to become competent within the statutory time limits.   
¶16 First, the word "suspend" signifies a temporary 
postponement and implies that a circuit court can resume the 
proceedings if the reason for the suspension disappears.  We 
rely on dictionary definitions when the legislature fails to 
No. 
2016AP880   
 
9 
 
provide a definition in the statute.  Wisconsin DOR v. River 
City Refuse Removal, Inc., 2007 WI 27, ¶46, 299 Wis. 2d 561, 729 
N.W.2d 396.  According to Black's Law Dictionary, "suspend" 
means "to interrupt; postpone; defer."  Suspend, Black's Law 
Dictionary 1584 (9th ed. 2009).  See also Oxford English 
Dictionary 318 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "suspend" as "to stop or 
check the action of movement of something temporarily"); 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International 
Dictionary 
2303 
(2002) 
(defining "suspend" as "stop temporarily").  The word suspend 
thus implies that something is postponed until a condition has 
been met.  Here, the precondition of suspension that no longer 
exists is A.L.'s lack of competency.   
¶17 Second, Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5) distinguishes between 
dismissal of a petition where a circuit court finds a juvenile 
not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, and 
suspension of proceedings on the petition where a circuit court 
finds a juvenile is not competent.  Compare § 938.30(5)(c) with 
§ 938.30(5)(d).  "[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the 
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a 
whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
related 
statutes; 
and 
reasonably, 
to 
avoid 
absurd 
or 
unreasonable results."  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46.  When the 
legislature uses different terms in a statute, the terms are 
presumed to have distinct meanings.  See Johnson v. City of 
Edgerton, 207 Wis. 2d 343, 351, 558 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1996).  
The words dismiss and suspend in §§ 938.30(5)(c) and (5)(d) are 
No. 
2016AP880   
 
10 
 
intended to function differently, especially in light of the 
fact that subsections (5)(c) and (5)(d) are otherwise identical.7   
¶18 Further, there is a logical distinction between the 
suspension of a case where a juvenile is not competent to 
proceed and the dismissal of a case where a juvenile's 
affirmative defense is lack of mental responsibility.  The 
latter resolves the case on the merits and there is no matter 
left for the circuit court to decide.  On the other hand, a 
juvenile's lack of competency bears only upon the juvenile's 
current ability to participate in the proceedings; it is not 
related to the merits of the case.  If the circuit court cannot 
resume suspended proceedings once a juvenile becomes competent, 
there would be no means of conclusion or resolution of the case, 
and A.L.'s 2012 delinquency proceedings would be suspended 
indefinitely.  Where a juvenile does not become competent within 
the statutory time frame, suspension would therefore act as the 
functional 
equivalent 
of 
dismissal. 
 
Reading 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.30(5) in such a manner would upend the distinction between 
suspension and dismissal, rendering the terms essentially 
identical in practice.   
                                                 
7 Compare Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5)(c) ("[i]f the court finds 
that the juvenile was not responsible by reason of mental 
disease 
or 
defect, 
as 
described 
under 
[Wis. 
Stat. 
§§] 
971.15(1) and (2), the court shall dismiss the petition with 
prejudice"), with § 938.30(5)(d) ("[i]f the court finds that the 
juvenile is not competent to proceed, as described in [Wis. 
Stat. §§] 971.13(1) and (2), the court shall suspend proceedings 
on the petition").  
No. 
2016AP880   
 
11 
 
¶19 Lastly, reading Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5) in relation to 
the language of a surrounding statute, Wis. Stat. § 938.12(2), 
the 
circuit 
court 
retains 
jurisdiction 
to 
resume 
A.L.'s 
suspended 
delinquency 
proceedings 
to 
reevaluate 
A.L.'s 
competency regardless of the fact that A.L. is currently 21 
years old.  Section 938.12(2) provides:   
If a petition alleging that a juvenile is 
delinquent is filed before the juvenile is 17 years of 
age, but the juvenile becomes 17 years of age before 
admitting the facts of the petition at the plea 
hearing or if the juvenile denies the facts, before an 
adjudication, the court retains jurisdiction over the 
case.   
Here, the petition was filed when A.L. was 15 years old and, 
because A.L. was found not competent, the proceedings were 
suspended.  A.L. neither admitted nor denied the facts of the 
petition before turning 17 years old and therefore the circuit 
court retained jurisdiction over the delinquency proceedings 
pursuant to § 938.12(2).   
¶20 A.L. asserts that Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5)(e)2. is the 
exclusive path to resumption of the delinquency proceedings 
because it is the only subsection that references resumption of 
proceedings.  A.L. points to the following language, "[i]f a 
report under [§ 938.30(5)(e)1.] indicates that the juvenile has 
become competent" and the circuit court agrees, "the court shall 
terminate the juvenile's commitment or dispositional order and 
resume the delinquency proceeding."  § 938.30(5)(e)2.  However, 
there is no support for A.L.'s claim that § 938.30(5)(e)2. is 
the exclusive mechanism for the circuit court to resume 
No. 
2016AP880   
 
12 
 
delinquency proceedings upon a finding of competency.  Section 
938.30(5)(e) does not use limiting language such as "only," or 
"except for," and we will not read limiting language into the 
statute.  See Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 2009 WI 
27, ¶16, 316 Wis. 2d 47, 762 N.W.2d 652; C. Coakley Relocation 
Sys., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68, ¶24, 310 Wis. 2d 
456, 750 N.W.2d 900.   
¶21 A.L. additionally argues that the time frame for 
reexamination and filing of written reports set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 938.30(5)(e)1. for juveniles likely to become competent 
establishes the exclusive authority of the circuit court to 
reexamine juveniles who have been found not competent.  Section 
938.30(5)(e)1. 
dictates 
that 
such 
juveniles 
"shall 
be 
periodically 
reexamined 
with 
written 
reports 
of 
those 
reexaminations to be submitted to the court every 3 months and 
within 
30 
days 
before 
the 
expiration 
of 
the 
juvenile's 
commitment or dispositional order."  There is no statutory 
requirement for how often these reexaminations can or should 
take 
place; 
instead, 
the 
statute 
only 
places 
minimum 
requirements for submission of reports on those reexaminations.  
Therefore, § 938.30(5)(e)1. does not otherwise supplant the 
circuit court's authority to order a reexamination, during or 
after the statutory time frame, especially where the defendant 
has been found competent in more recent cases.   
¶22 Lastly, A.L. asserts that the State's interpretation 
of Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5) is inequitable, as illustrated by the 
hypothetical situation of the State moving to recall suspended 
No. 
2016AP880   
 
13 
 
delinquency proceedings to reevaluate the competency of a 50-
year-old who was found not competent as a 15-year-old.  Under 
A.L.'s hypothetical, any unfairness as a result of the circuit 
court resuming proceedings8 years later would be checked by the 
defendant's constitutional rights to due process and a speedy 
trial.9  A.L. also stresses the purpose of the Juvenile Justice 
Code and the importance of diverting juveniles from the juvenile 
justice system through early intervention.  While that is a 
stated purpose of the Juvenile Justice Code, another stated 
                                                 
8 If A.L. is found competent, the State intends to ask the 
circuit court to waive its jurisdiction so that the case could 
be tried in adult criminal court.  The Juvenile Justice Code 
specifically provides that a circuit court retains jurisdiction 
over a delinquency case, see Wis. Stat. § 938.12(2), and that 
the State may seek waiver, see Wis. Stat. § 938.18(2), even 
after the juvenile becomes an adult.  See State v. Phillips, 
2014 WI App 3, ¶6, 352 Wis. 2d 493, 842 N.W.2d 504.  The circuit 
court would still need to make the discretionary waiver 
determination by applying the criteria listed in § 938.18(5).  
Alternatively, the circuit court could choose to dismiss the 
action with prejudice.  
9 The violation of the right to a speedy trial is a case-by-
case determination that weighs, among other factors, the 
"prejudice to the defendant."  See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 
514, 532 (1972).  Further, the constitutional guaranty of due 
process is a protection against prejudice to the defense caused 
by passage or lapse of time.  See United States v. MacDonald, 
456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982).  An individual's due process rights are 
rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
8 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶17, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 
780 N.W.2d 63.  The question of fairness is addressed as a 
matter of "procedural" due process.  Id.  In A.L.'s posed 
hypothetical 
situation, 
there 
may 
be 
concerns 
about 
the 
defendant's ability to confront and cross-examine witnesses, as 
well as call witnesses in his own defense. 
No. 
2016AP880   
 
14 
 
purpose 
is 
"[t]o 
hold 
each 
juvenile 
offender 
directly 
accountable for his or her acts" and to protect the public.  
Wis. Stat. §§ 938.01(2)(a) and (b).   
¶23 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.30(5), read in conjunction with the language of ch. 938, 
allows a circuit court to resume delinquency proceedings that 
were suspended because a juvenile was initially found not 
competent to proceed under § 938.30(5)(d) and not likely to 
become competent within the statutory time limits.10     
B.  An expired JIPS order is irrelevant to a circuit court's  
competency over juvenile delinquency proceedings. 
¶24 In the alternative, A.L. asserts that the circuit 
court retained competency over A.L. only for the duration of the 
accompanying JIPS order, which expired in March 2015.  A.L. 
contends that the circuit court could have reexamined him only 
through March 2015 because his JIPS order was not extended 
beyond that time.  However, A.L. points to no statutory language 
that supports the position that a circuit court loses competency 
over delinquency proceedings just because an accompanying JIPS 
order expires.   
¶25 On the other hand, the State points to several cases 
where this court has determined that a criminal proceeding is 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 51 allows temporary civil commitment 
for those who are "mentally ill," "proper subject[s] for 
treatment," and "'dangerous' to themselves or to others."  See 
In re Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, ¶20, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 
N.W.2d 179.   
No. 
2016AP880   
 
15 
 
jurisdictionally independent from a civil commitment based on 
lack of competency.  See State ex rel. Porter v. Wolke, 80 
Wis. 2d 197, 257 N.W.2d 881 (1977); see also State ex rel. 
Haskins v. County Court of Dodge Cty., 62 Wis. 2d 250, 214 
N.W.2d 575 (1974).  The State asserts that Porter explicitly 
rejects A.L.'s argument.  Porter, 80 Wis. 2d 197.  In Porter, 
criminal proceedings against a defendant were suspended when the 
defendant was found not competent to stand trial and was later 
civilly committed.  Id. at 200.  Shortly thereafter, the 
defendant was released from civil commitment and the district 
attorney moved for a reexamination of the defendant to determine 
if he was competent to stand trial.  Id. at 201-02.  The 
defendant asserted that the criminal proceedings against him 
could not be resumed.  Id. at 202.  This court held that the 
circuit court did not lose its jurisdiction to proceed on the 
criminal 
charges 
because 
they 
were 
independent 
of 
the 
defendant's commitment.  Id. at 204-05.  However, this court did 
not foreclose the possibility of a defendant's claim of denial 
of the right to a speedy trial.  Id.  We agree with the State 
that 
Porter 
applies 
here 
to 
render 
JIPS 
proceedings 
jurisdictionally independent from delinquency proceedings.   
¶26 A.L. cites to Wis. Stat. § 938.13 for the proposition 
that after a circuit court suspends delinquency proceedings 
because a juvenile is found not competent, a court presiding 
over the JIPS proceedings is granted "exclusive original 
No. 
2016AP880   
 
16 
 
jurisdiction" over the juvenile.11  According to A.L., if the 
JIPS order expires before the juvenile is found competent to 
proceed on the delinquency proceedings, the circuit court loses 
competency over the delinquency proceedings.  However, the JIPS 
court has jurisdiction only over the JIPS proceedings, which are 
separate from the delinquency proceedings.  A JIPS order or ch. 
51 commitment assists only in competency restoration and 
provides services and safety to juveniles.   
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.30(5)(e) further demonstrates 
that the court presiding over the JIPS proceedings does not 
truly have "exclusive original jurisdiction" in the sense that 
A.L. asserts.  Pursuant to § 938.30(5)(e), a juvenile who is 
found not likely to become competent is subject to a separate 
JIPS order, yet the circuit court may continue to exercise 
jurisdiction 
over 
the 
juvenile 
through 
reexamination 
for 
competency and resumption of delinquency proceedings if the 
juvenile becomes competent within the statutory time frame.  
Therefore, the expiration of A.L.'s accompanying JIPS order in 
March 2015 has no bearing on the circuit court's competency to 
proceed with A.L.'s delinquency proceedings.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶28 We conclude that a circuit court can resume suspended 
juvenile delinquency proceedings to examine the competency of a 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.13 reads:  "[e]xcept as provided in 
[Wis. Stat. §] 938.028(3), the court has exclusive original 
jurisdiction over a juvenile alleged to be in need of protection 
or services." 
No. 
2016AP880   
 
17 
 
juvenile who was initially found not competent and not likely to 
become competent within the statutory time frame.  We also 
conclude that a circuit court retains competency over juvenile 
delinquency proceedings even after an accompanying JIPS order 
has expired.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2016AP880.dk 
 
1 
 
¶29 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  We perceived a need 
for Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5) to say more than it actually does.  
And that perception drove us to conjure additional material that 
doesn't really exist in the statute.  That's an understandable 
impulse——we are loath to leave silence alone, to let a voice not 
speak, to leave something unsaid. 
There is a silence where hath been no sound, 
There is a silence where no sound may be, 
In the cold grave—under the deep deep sea, 
Or in wide desert where no life is found, 
Which hath been mute, and still must sleep profound; 
No voice is hush’d——no life treads silently, 
But clouds and cloudy shadows wander free. 
Thomas Hood, Silence (1827).  In conversations, in stories, in 
all manner of communications we nod along as one thought flows 
comfortably into the next.  But when the narrative unexpectedly 
stops, we reflexively rebel against the silence that denies us 
the rest of the story.  So we finish the unspoken thought, 
complete the unfinished plot.  As natural as that reaction might 
be in most affairs of life, we must give it no heed when we 
construe statutes.  It is for the legislature to decide when to 
compose, and when to lay aside the pen.  If that choice brings 
silence earlier than we expect or hope, our disappointment does 
not give us leave to take up the pen and write in its name. 
¶30 But still, we did.  The circuit court suspended A.L.'s 
delinquency proceeding pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5) 
because it found he was not competent, and not likely to regain 
competency within the required timeframe.  Subsequently, Mr. L. 
demonstrated competency in an unrelated proceeding, and thus 
arose the question of whether the circuit court could resume the 
No.  2016AP880.dk 
 
2 
 
delinquency proceeding to evaluate his competency.  We looked to 
§ 938.30(5) to see what it might say about such a possibility.  
There we discovered that "§ 938.30(5) does not address what 
becomes of the suspended delinquency proceedings for juveniles 
who are found not competent and not likely to become competent 
within the statutory time frame, like A.L."  Majority op., ¶13.  
Alas, a double-edged silence:  the statute said nothing about 
how 
proceedings 
might 
resume, 
nor 
did 
it 
require 
their 
termination.  The apparent result, as the circuit court 
observed, was a procedural "limbo" in which the proceeding could 
neither progress nor be dismissed. 
¶31 We could not abide the statute's silence, so we said 
that our "reading of § 938.30(5) in conjunction with the 
language of ch. 938 demonstrates that a circuit court has the 
authority to resume suspended proceedings in cases where a 
juvenile was initially found not competent to proceed under 
§ 938.30(5)(d) and not likely to become competent within the 
statutory time limits."  Id., ¶15.  Within the space of two 
paragraphs, we transformed Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5) from a statute 
that does not even address resumption of suspended delinquency 
proceedings, into a statute that definitively provides the 
necessary authority to resume.  I think the first iteration was 
right.  If the statute has something to say in paragraph 15 that 
it did not say in paragraph 13, it's only because we used the 
legislature's pen to finish the story we thought we should have 
heard. 
No.  2016AP880.dk 
 
3 
 
¶32 This intrusion into legislative silence was not just 
unwarranted, 
it 
was 
completely 
unnecessary. 
 
When 
the 
legislature adopted Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5), it was composing 
against the background of our pre-existing authority.  We have 
already recognized that the authority to suspend and resume 
proceedings based on a defendant's incompetency pre-dated this 
statute.  In fact, our competency statutes are actually 
codifications of principles and practices that were already old 
before we even became a state.  In State v. Seward, we recalled 
the practice of English courts when competency was an issue: 
Also if a man in his sound memory commits a capital 
offense, and before arraignment for it he becomes mad, 
he ought not to be arraigned for it, because he is not 
able to plead to it with that advice and caution that 
he ought.  And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner 
becomes mad, he shall not be tried, for how can he 
make his defense?  If, after he be tried and found 
guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment 
shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he 
becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed; 
for peradventure, says the humanity of the English 
law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might 
have 
alleged 
something 
in 
stay 
of 
judgment 
or 
execution. 
124 Wis. 623, 630, 102 N.W. 1079 (1905) (quoting 4 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries ch. 2 *24-25).  "Our statute," we said, 
"is an affirmance of these humane principles of the common law, 
and the reason upon which it rests makes manifest the intention 
of the Legislature."  Id. at 630-31. See also Crocker v. State, 
60 Wis. 553, 556, 19 N.W. 435 (1884) ("At common law, if a 
person, after committing a crime, became insane, he was not 
arraigned during his insanity, but was remitted to prison until 
such incapacity was removed."). 
No.  2016AP880.dk 
 
4 
 
¶33 The authority to regulate our proceedings is not, of 
course, 
exclusive 
to 
us——the 
legislature 
may 
make 
its 
contribution as well:  "[T]he power to regulate procedure has 
been regarded not as an exclusively legislative power, nor yet 
as an exclusively judicial power, but certainly as a power 
properly within the judicial province when not otherwise 
directed by the legislature."  Rules of Court Case, 204 
Wis. 501, 510, 236 N.W. 717 (1931).  So the real question is 
whether the legislature, in adopting Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5), 
removed 
our 
pre-existing 
authority 
to 
resume 
juvenile 
delinquency proceedings to determine whether the defendant has 
regained his competency.  The court's opinion does a convincing 
job of demonstrating there is no such prohibition, and I agree.  
Therefore, in the absence of any statutory prohibition the court 
may resume the suspended juvenile delinquency proceedings.  But 
it may do so not because of any authority granted by 
§ 938.30(5), but because the legislature did not remove the 
authority we already had. 
¶34 When the legislature stops writing, "There is a 
silence where hath been no sound / There is a silence where no 
sound 
may 
be . . . ." 
 
We 
should 
not 
surmise 
it 
is 
unintentional, or accidental.  No sound belongs there because it 
is the silence of the people's representatives choosing not to 
speak.  "No voice is hush'd" there because there is no voice 
wishing to be heard.  And in that stillness, "no life treads 
silently" in hopes we will give it expression.  The quietness 
following the period in the statute's last sentence is the 
No.  2016AP880.dk 
 
5 
 
oracular pronouncement that all has been said that will be said.  
We may no more compel the legislature to speak than we may 
ignore it when it does.  For these reasons, I join the court's 
opinion except to the extent it discovers authority to resume 
Mr. L.'s delinquency proceedings in Wis. Stat § 938.30(5).  The 
authority to resume those proceedings both pre-dated and 
survived enactment of that statute. 
No.  2016AP880.dk 
 
1