Case Title: Mottesheard v. Castern

Citation: 

Docket Number: 971373

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1998-06-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
 
CHARLES BURKETT MOTTESHEARD 
 
 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
v.  Record No. 971373 
June 5, 1998 
 
LOUIS JOSEPH CASTERN, M.D., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SALEM 
Willis A. Woods, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this action alleging physician negligence, the sole 
question is whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit 
a party to offer evidence of his general reputation for truth 
and veracity. 
 
In July 1995, appellant Charles Burkett Mottesheard filed 
this action for damages against appellees Louis Joseph Castern, 
M.D., Robert O. McGuffin, M.D., and Sears Curtiss Mull, M.D.  In 
a November 1996 amended motion for judgment, plaintiff alleged 
defendants were negligent during a period in September 1993 when 
they failed promptly to diagnose and treat the condition of 
septic arthritis of plaintiff's left hip.  According to the 
record, septic arthritis of the hip is an infectious process in 
which bacteria attacks the cartilage in the joint.  An 
"extraordinarily difficult diagnosis," the condition causes the 
hip joint to sustain "irreversible and significant damage" 
unless treatment is rendered within five to seven days of the 
onset of symptoms. 
 
Responding to plaintiff's allegations, defendants admitted 
they were involved in plaintiff's care but denied they committed 
any negligence that was a proximate cause of plaintiff's alleged 
injuries or damages. 
 
Following a lengthy trial, a jury found in favor of the 
defendants.  Overruling plaintiff's motion to set the verdict 
aside and to award a new trial, the court entered judgment on 
the verdict.  The plaintiff appeals. 
 
A summary of the evidence will set the stage for discussion 
of the issue of law presented.  On September 17, 1993, the 
plaintiff, 36 years of age, was employed by the State Department 
of Corrections in Roanoke as a probation and parole officer.   
After escorting an offender through an office security door, he 
turned and felt a "pop . . . around the left groin area."  He 
"just walked it off" and continued working.  His hip did not 
"bother" him during the next three days. 
 
During the early morning hours of September 21, plaintiff, 
a diabetic, was unable to sleep because he "didn't feel what 
you'd call exactly great."  His "temperature" was above normal, 
and he felt like he "had the flu" but reported to work.  While 
working "seeing offenders" in his office, the plaintiff felt 
progressively worse.  He left the office near midday and called 
his Blacksburg physician "and told him my leg was hurting."  The 
physician "called in a prescription" for pain relief. 
 
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The plaintiff's condition continued to worsen and he was 
taken by a friend to the Lewis-Gale Clinic in Salem where he was 
seen during the morning of September 22 by defendant Castern, 
who practices occupational medicine.  Castern took a medical 
history from plaintiff.  The physician testified that an 
accurate history is "absolutely essential" and "of ultimate 
importance" to a proper diagnosis. 
 
In addition, Castern examined plaintiff, who complained of 
pain of the left thigh.  He was "concerned" about plaintiff's 
condition because he "had a lot of confusing symptoms and 
physical findings."  Upon consideration of the medical history 
and the examination, Castern formed a "diagnostic impression" 
that plaintiff's left thigh pain was due to muscle spasm or 
muscle strain.  Castern prescribed medications for plaintiff and 
released him.  The plaintiff stayed at home for the next two 
days and "went through living hell" due to pain in his leg. 
 
On September 24, plaintiff was brought back to the Clinic 
where he was seen again by Castern.  The physician found 
plaintiff "was in more pain and . . . it was further down his 
leg."  Following testing of plaintiff's blood, Castern became 
concerned that his problems were caused by either "an infectious 
or an inflammatory process."  The plaintiff "still had this left 
thigh pain" and the physician "tender[ed]" a diagnosis of acute 
myositis, an inflammatory process that was related to the 
 
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plaintiff's "injury" on September 17 when he felt the "pop."  
The physician prescribed additional medication and instructed 
him to see his Blacksburg physician. 
 
Pain in plaintiff's hip and leg "continued to build" to 
such a degree he "would go ballistic" whenever he had to move. 
Near midnight on September 24, the plaintiff was carried to the 
emergency room at Lewis-Gale Hospital, a separate entity from 
the Clinic although in the same facility.  Plaintiff was seen by 
defendant McGuffin, who practices emergency medicine.  Following 
examination, the physician concluded:  "Leg pain of uncertain 
etiology possibly related to muscle spasm." 
 
Plaintiff's condition did not improve and on September 25, 
a Saturday, he presented to Dr. William T. Hendricks, Jr., a 
family medicine practitioner in Blacksburg, who took a history 
and examined plaintiff.  The physician "thought something was 
seriously wrong with him."  Hendricks "did not suspect an 
infectious process going on."  He made a "differential 
diagnosis" of aseptic (absence of infection) necrosis of the 
femoral head, a herniated disk, a torn ligament, or a femoral 
hernia.  He recommended to plaintiff that he report to a 
hospital emergency room "immediately." 
 
Plaintiff understood that, because the condition may be 
work related, state regulations required him to return to 
"Lewis-Gale."  His parents attempted to transport him by vehicle 
 
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to Salem, but the trip had to be interrupted due to plaintiff's 
pain.  At that point, he "didn't feel like living a whole lot 
longer."  Eventually, he was carried to the Clinic. 
 
Defendant Castern saw plaintiff in the Clinic on 
September 27 and, after examination, referred him to defendant 
Mull, an orthopedic surgeon, who admitted plaintiff to the 
Hospital.  Due to his condition, plaintiff did not recall seeing 
Castern on the 27th and remembered little of his "encounter" with 
Mull.  While hospitalized, the plaintiff "went into some sort of 
septic shock."  Later, surgery was performed on plaintiff's left 
hip, and the diagnosis of septic arthritis was made. 
 
During the trial, plaintiff's recollection of the symptoms 
he had related when his medical history was being taken and the 
nature of his examinations was different, in many instances, 
from what the medical records and the physicians' recollections 
established.  In rebuttal, the plaintiff proffered testimony of 
his office supervisor who stated that plaintiff's reputation for 
truth and veracity in the community in which he lives and works 
is "outstanding."  The trial court sustained defendants' 
objection to this testimony and disallowed it, ruling "that this 
gentleman's character and reputation has not been put in 
dispute, is not in evidence, and consequently . . . is not 
admissible." 
 
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On appeal, the plaintiff argues that his "disability 
resulted from a failure of those attending to timely diagnose 
and treat an infected hip.  At trial, the key questions were 
whether the diagnosis should have been made; and, should the 
condition have been diagnosed in time to save the Plaintiff's 
hip.  The answers to these key questions depended in large 
measure on what the Plaintiff had told his treating physicians; 
specifically, did he accurately identify the area of his pain?" 
 
Continuing, plaintiff contends that his "character was 
repeatedly put in issue by contrary evidence as to the material 
fact of his history.  For example, Defendant Castern testified 
directly to the jury, 'I know [the Plaintiff] described hip pain 
to us here in his testimony, but when he was with me I did not 
get a complaint of hip pain.'  Defendant McGuffin; I 'know' I 
did a straight leg raising test.  The Plaintiff testified 
emphatically to the contrary.  Defendant Mull told the jury, 'I 
am surprised at [the Plaintiff's] testimony; he told me he was 
having pain in his back.'  The Plaintiff testified emphatically 
and unequivocally to the contrary.  Doctor Castern's expert 
testified that 'there is an obligation on the patient to be 
truthful' in connection with the giving of a history.  The 
Plaintiff, of course, testified emphatically that he was 
truthful."  (Alterations in original.) 
 
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Summarizing, plaintiff argues his "character was also 
repeatedly put in issue by extensive cross-examination about 
prior inconsistent statements.  Simply put, as a matter of law, 
'imputation on [the Plaintiff's] veracity results from the fact 
of his having contradicted himself,' as time-honored evidence 
treatises consistently note.  Among other things, the Plaintiff 
testified that his progressively painful symptoms started on the 
21st of September.  The defense sought to prove, by prior 
inconsistent statements, that his symptoms commenced on the 
17th."  (Alteration in original.) 
 
Finally, plaintiff contends he "was denied his one 
opportunity to rehabilitate his credit with the jury:  that is, 
by proof that his reputation and character for truthfulness was 
'outstanding.'  This was prejudicial error."  We disagree. 
 
Generally, in civil actions evidence of the reputation of 
the parties for truth and veracity is not admissible.  S. H. 
Kress & Co. v. Roberts, 143 Va. 71, 77, 129 S.E. 244, 246 
(1925).  As an exception to the general rule, Virginia permits 
evidence of the general reputation of a party or a witness for 
truthfulness whenever such person's character for truth is 
attacked either directly or by cross-examination, or by proof of 
inconsistent statements regarding material facts, or by 
disproving through other witnesses material facts stated by such 
person during testimony.  Luck v. Miller, 240 Va. 445, 447, 397 
 
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S.E.2d 869, 871 (1990) (quoting George v. Pilcher, 69 Va. (28 
Gratt.) 299, 315 (1877)). 
 
The key words in the exception are "whenever such person's 
character for truth is attacked."  In the present case, contrary 
to plaintiff's contention, his character for truthfulness never 
was attacked.  This was made abundantly clear throughout the 
trial.  While the plaintiff's recollection of past events was 
challenged, there was no attempt to portray him as a liar. 
 
For example, one of defendants' expert witnesses, having 
reviewed the recorded medical history, stated there was "no 
reason to believe" that plaintiff had been "other than 
completely candid with the physicians who examined him."  That 
witness also testified, "I'm not accusing him of not telling the 
truth."  Also, defendant Mull testified, "I believe that he was 
giving me accurate information . . . I absolutely believed it."  
Additionally, defendant Castern stated he never believed the 
plaintiff "was malingering or falsely exaggerating his pain or 
anything of that nature just to make a workers' compensation 
claim."  Indeed, during plaintiff's rebuttal, defendants' 
attorney stated before the jury, "We will stipulate, if it will 
help, that Mr. Mottesheard didn't intentionally try to mislead 
anyone."  
 
The theme of the defense, in part, was that the plaintiff, 
because of his physical condition during some of the seven-day 
 
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period in question, was unable to give an accurate medical 
history and that, at trial, his recollection differed from what 
other evidence revealed.  For example, plaintiff testified that 
when he saw defendant McGuffin, he was "so spaced out" that he 
did not "know really what planet" he was on.  Also, he testified 
that when he saw Dr. Hendricks he was "a mumbling fool" and that 
the physician may have misunderstood his statements. 
 
This challenge to plaintiff's recollection, and not to his 
character, was accentuated during closing argument of 
defendants' counsel.  Among other things, he told the jury, 
"There is no question that a bad thing happened to a good person 
. . . He is a very admirable person in a lot of ways.  He is 
admirable in the way that he dealt with this.  He continued to 
perform his job and he performed it at a high level.  He is 
rated as high as he can be rated and I think that is 
significant.  We have never suggested to you that he is 
untruthful.  The evidence does not show that and we have never 
argued that for a minute."  Later during argument, counsel said:  
"[W]e are not suggesting to you that Mr. Mottesheard did not 
testify truthfully.  I'm sure that he testified the way that he 
thinks these things happened." 
 
Our conclusions based upon study of the trial proceedings 
are confirmed by the trial judge's comments made when he denied 
the motion to set the verdict aside.  He said:  "Mr. 
 
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Mottesheard's integrity was never questioned.  I sat here for 
two weeks listening to testimony, listening to argument of the 
counsel on both sides; and I never got the impression that the 
Plaintiff's reputation in the community [in] which he lived was 
other than -- or anyone was hinting or implying his reputation 
was other than -- impeccable."  The judge also stated:  
"Testimony concerning memory skills of all the parties would 
have been more appropriate [than] testimony as to their 
character because no one questions their character or ever did." 
 
The plaintiff's reliance upon Luck, supra, and Redd v. 
Ingram, 207 Va. 939, 154 S.E.2d 149 (1967), is misplaced.   In 
Luck, a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle 
accident, we held the trial court erred in refusing to admit 
testimony regarding the plaintiff's reputation for truth and 
veracity "after her character for truthfulness had been 
impeached."  240 Va. at 446, 397 S.E.2d at 870-71.  However, in 
that case, unlike the present case, cross-examination of the 
plaintiff "was structured to secure statements that admitted or 
implied" that plaintiff's injuries were the result of a prior 
accident, that plaintiff had withheld information from attorneys 
in a previous suit, and that plaintiff misrepresented 
information about her injuries sustained in the prior accident.  
Id. at 447-48, 397 S.E.2d at 871. 
 
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In Redd, another personal injury case arising from a 
vehicular accident, this Court held the trial court properly 
admitted evidence concerning the plaintiff's reputation for 
truth and veracity.  There, defendant attempted to impeach 
plaintiff's character for truth by cross-examination of 
plaintiff and by introducing testimony to contradict him.  207 
Va. at 943, 154 S.E.2d at 152.  In that case, however, defendant 
attempted to impeach the truth of plaintiff's testimony 
respecting matters "about which [the plaintiff] could not have 
been honestly mistaken."  Id., 154 S.E.2d at 153.  Here, in 
contrast, impeachment of plaintiff dealt with matters about 
which he honestly could have been mistaken. 
 
Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in 
refusing to permit plaintiff to offer evidence of his general  
reputation for truth and veracity.  Thus, the judgment below  
 
will be                                     
 
                                                  Affirmed. 
 
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