Case Title: REAGAN v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99-322

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
REAGAN v. STATE2000 WY 21314 P.3d 925Case Number: 99-322Decided: 12/26/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming

CHARLES KENNETH REAGAN, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

                                 

Appeal from the District Court 
of Sheridan County, The Honorable John

C. BRACKLEY, 
Judge.

 

    
Representing Appellant: John Fadala, Casper, 
WY.

    Representing 
Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy 
Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and 
Kimberly A. Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 

    
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, 
JJ.

 

    
HILL, Justice.

  [¶1]      Charles Kenneth Reagan (Reagan) was 
sentenced to three concurrent terms of not less than three years and not more 
than nine years1 on three counts of indecent 
liberties with a minor2 (Counts I, II, and III) and to a 
term of not less than three years and not more than five years on one count of 
soliciting a minor for sexual relations (Count VII)3. The sentences on Counts I, II, and 
VII were ordered to run consecutively to Count III and, in addition, the 
sentencing court ordered, "the sentence for Count III shall be and is hereby 
suspended, and upon the Defendant's termination from parole, he shall be placed 
on supervised probation for nine (9) years."  After the revocation of his probation on 
Count III, Reagan complains that the above sentencing scheme violates his right 
to be sentenced within a reasonable time as set forth by this Court in Yates v. 
State, 792 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1990).  We 
conclude that Reagan was sentenced within a reasonable time, and that the 
sentencing imposed by the district court is in compliance with our decision in 
Yates. Therefore, we affirm the revocation of Reagan's 
probation.

 

                                     
ISSUES

 

   
[¶2]   Reagan presents a 
single issue for review:

 

Does the sentence of the Appellant violate this 
court's holding in the case of Yates v. State, 792 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1990) and 
thus, require that the Order of the District Court imposing sentence upon the 
Appellant's probation revocation be vacated?

 

    The State's statement of the 
issue is substantially similar:

 

    Whether Appellant's right to 
be sentenced without unreasonable delay was violated?

 

                                     
FACTS

 

 [¶3]        After his sentencing in 1990, 
Reagan served the time imposed on Counts I, II, and VII and was ultimately 
discharged from parole, thus triggering his probationary term on Count III.  On August 7, 1998, Reagan filed a motion 
to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) (LEXIS 1999), which 
claimed that his sentence was improper under the Yates decision.  That motion was denied on August 17, 
1998, and Reagan did not appeal.4

 

 [¶4]       Unable to change his predatory habits, 
Reagan was charged again with taking indecent liberties with a minor.  Reagan subsequently pleaded guilty to 
one count of the charge and was sentenced to a term of not less than four years 
and not more than six years in the state penitentiary.  Based on the incident underlying that 
conviction, the State petitioned for revocation of Reagan's probation.  Reagan resisted the petition based on 
his contention that his original sentence violated the Yates standards.  The district court rejected Reagan's 
position, revoked the probation, reimposed the suspended sentence on Count III 
and set it to run consecutively to his most recent conviction.  Reagan now appeals to this Court.5

 

                               
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

  [¶5]      Our decisions in Yates and in subsequent 
cases have not explicitly set forth a standard for reviewing claims that a 
sentence was not imposed within a reasonable time. Yates v. State, 792 P.2d 187 
(Wyo. 1990); Jones v. State, 811 P.2d 284 (Wyo. 1991); Davila v. State, 815 P.2d 848 (Wyo. 1991).  However, this 
Court has consistently held that sentencing matters are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  See 
Hodgins v. State, 1 P.3d 1259 (Wyo. 2000); Brower v. State, 1 P.3d 1210 (Wyo. 
2000); and Smith v. State, 985 P.2d 961 (Wyo. 1999).  Accordingly, we adopt abuse of 
discretion as the standard for reviewing claims arising under 
Yates:

 

Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, 
among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 
(1985).

 

  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986)).

 

                                   
DISCUSSION

 

  [¶6]      Reagan argues that the structure of his 
sentences violates the precept that a defendant is entitled to have his sentence 
imposed within a reasonable time of the entry of his conviction as set forth by 
this Court in the Yates decision.  
Reagan contends that by suspending the second of two consecutive 
sentences and by placing him on a term of probation that does not commence until 
he has been discharged from parole on the first sentence, an impermissible delay 
in the imposition of his sentence is the result.  A close review of our decision in Yates 
and subsequent cases shows that Reagan's contention is incorrect, and that the 
sentence imposed was within the permissible bounds established in that 
decision.

 

  [¶7]      In Yates, the defendant had been 
convicted on three counts of delivering a controlled substance to a minor and 
one count of possession of marijuana and LSD with intent to deliver. 792 P.2d  at 
188.  On three counts (Counts 1, 2, 
and 4) Yates was sentenced to concurrent terms of two to four years. Id.  On Count 3, the trial court provided 
"that imposition of the sentence on Count 3 be suspended for a period of ten 
(10) years, Defendant to be placed on probation during that ten (10) year 
period, said probation to be served consecutively to the sentence previously 
imposed on Counts 1, 2, and 4." Id.  
The trial court stated that if there was a violation of probation, then 
"the suspension of imposition of sentence shall be terminated and sentence shall 
be imposed."  Id.  After serving his time on the first 
three counts, Yates violated the terms of his probation. Id. at 189.  The trial court revoked Yates' probation 
and imposed a sentence of two to eight years on the  previously suspended Count 3. Id.  Yates then appealed from the order 
revoking his probation. Id.

 

  [¶8]      We held that a delay in sentencing in 
excess of a calendar year from the date guilt is established, whether by trial 
to a jury or the court or by plea, is presumptively unreasonable.  Yates, 792 P.2d  at 191.  We explained the rationale behind our 
holding:

 

The rule that we espouse protects important rights of 
the convicted defendant.  It serves 
to prevent the possibility that a greater punishment than is deserved will be 
imposed because of subsequent conduct that results in a violation of the 
probation. Commonwealth v. Tiryung, 709 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1986).  It also serves to ensure that any 
vagaries of memory will not interfere with the imposition of a sentence 
appropriate to the individual and the crime. State v. Fedder, 1 Utah 2d 
117,  262 P.2d 753 (1953).  Although these issues are not before us, 
we note in support of our policy that the punishment for a violation of 
probation is the imposition of the sentence for which the defendant was placed 
on probation and, further, as a general rule, any sentence imposed and then 
suspended during a period of probation may not be increased because of the 
conduct that serves as the basis for the revocation.  The punishment for that conduct is the 
revocation itself.  If the 
revocation is justified by the commission of a separate crime, the defendant may 
be convicted of that crime and then sentenced to the full extent permitted by 
law for it.  See Annotations, 
Propriety of Increased Sentence Following Revocation of Probation, 23 A.L.R.4th 
883 (1983), and Propriety, in Imposing Sentence for Original Offense after 
Revocation of Probation, of Considering Acts Because of Which Probation was 
Revoked, 65 A.L.R.3d 1100 (1975).

 

792 P.2d  at 192.  Yates' sentence for Count 3 was not 
imposed until after the revocation of his probation, approximately four years 
after his conviction.  Therefore, we 
concluded that the trial court had failed to impose sentence within a reasonable 
time, and the court's order imposing sentence upon revocation of Yates' 
probation was vacated. Id.

 

    [¶9]  We had an opportunity to explain our 
decision in Yates in a case decided shortly thereafter.  In Jones, the defendant pleaded no 
contest to fourth degree sexual assault and guilty to larceny.  811 P.2d  at 285.  Jones was sentenced to serve sixty days 
on the assault count and was placed on two years probation on the larceny 
count.  Id. The two counts were to 
be served concurrently. Id.  
Nineteen months after Jones' plea on the larceny count was entered, an 
order revoking his probation was entered. Id. at 286.  In rejecting Jones' contention that his 
sentencing violated our rule laid out in Yates, we 
replied:

 

There are no meaningful similarities between Yates, 
and the problems identified there which caused us to vacate the sentence 
imposed, and this case.  In Yates, 
prison sentences were imposed which made it virtually impossible to ascertain when the subsequent 
term of probation of ten years duration was to begin or end.  Our principal concerns were that where 
sentence is suspended and probation allowed, and the possibility exists that the 
actual sentence could be imposed some fourteen years after the fact, a greater 
punishment may be meted out than is deserved because of subsequent conduct that 
results in a violation of the probation. Yates, 792 P.2d  at 192.  Jones does not raise such an issue here, 
nor do we perceive a problem in that regard. See generally, Annotation, 
Propriety of Increased Sentence Following Revocation of Probation, 23 A.L.R. 4th 
883 (1983).  Additionally, we were 
concerned that vagaries of memory could serve to interfere with the imposition 
of a sentence appropriate to the individual and the crime after the passage of 
so much time. Yates, 792 P.2d  at 192.  
Again, Jones raises no such issue, nor do we perceive 
one.

 

Most importantly, in Yates, we indicated that where 
sentence is imposed on several counts, the district court may not use the 
sentencing option outlined in W.S. 7-13-302 (1987 Repl.) in the same way 
it might on a single count.  We 
indicated that that was not possible where a penitentiary sentence is 
involved because the statute contemplates that the term of probation will begin 
to run immediately upon imposition of sentence. Yates, 792 P.2d  at 191.  We were also concerned that any such 
sentence must allow for the possibility that a criminal will be granted parole, 
which is supervised by the executive branch of government, and that probation 
should not commence until after any such term of parole is completed. Here a 
sixty-day jail sentence was imposed and that was to be served immediately.  But the probation period also began 
immediately.  Thus, the potential 
problems to be cured by our decision in Yates simply are not present.  Jones knew, as do we, precisely when the 
term of probation was to begin and end.

 

  Jones, 811 P.2d  at 286. (Emphasis in 
original.)  Accordingly, we affirmed 
Jones' sentence.

 

  [¶10] 
The key problem with the sentence in Yates is that the trial court 
imposed consecutive sentences and then suspended the latter sentence in favor of 
a term of probation without imposing a specified time of penitentiary service 
for a violation of the probation. The sentence imposed on Reagan does not 
possess the fatal flaw that was present in Yates and, consequently, none of the 
concerns we noted in that case are applicable here.  Like Yates, Reagan was sentenced to 
consecutive terms of imprisonment with the latter sentence being suspended.  Unlike Yates, however, Reagan was 
sentenced to a specified term of imprisonment, three to nine years, that would 
be imposed upon a revocation of his term of probation.  Thus, there is no concern that Reagan 
would have his punishment increased as a result of the acts underlying his 
probation revocation. Yates, 792 P.2d  at 192; Jones, 811 P.2d  at 286.  Nor is there any concern that the 
vagaries of memory would interfere with the imposition of an appropriate 
sentence. Id.

 

  [¶11] 
  An additional concern noted 
by the Yates and Jones courts was that in situations where a term of probation 
was imposed consecutively to a term of incarceration, the term of probation 
should not commence until any term of parole had been completed. Yates, 792 P.2d 
at 191-92; Jones, 811 P.2d  at 286.  
As we noted in Yates:

 

If the trial court wants to adopt a sentencing mix 
along these lines, it must select a term of imprisonment and then suspend the 
execution of that sentence placing the defendant on probation following any term 
of imprisonment.  We add only a 
caveat that, if such a sentence should be imposed, a court should be careful 
that the probation under the judicial department of government does not begin 
until parole, which is controlled by the executive branch of government, has 
terminated.

 

792 P.2d  at 191-92.  The trial court in imposing sentence on 
Reagan followed the procedure outlined in Yates exactly as we suggested.  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
trial court's sentencing of Reagan and, therefore, his sentence is affirmed in 
all respects.

 

                                   
CONCLUSION

 

  [¶12] 
  Reagan's sentence was 
imposed within a reasonable time.  
The order revoking his probation and reimposing the suspended sentence is 
hereby affirmed.

 

          

FOOTNOTES

1Pursuant 
to a motion to reduce his sentence, the maximum term of Reagan's sentences on 
Counts I and II were later reduced to six years.

  

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 (Michie 1977, Republished Ed.).  The acts giving rise to the charges of 
taking indecent liberties with a minor and for soliciting a minor for sexual 
relations occurred between 1984 and 1986 and in 1989.

  

3Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-104 (Michie 1977, Republished Ed.).  See Note 2 above.

  

4This 
certainly raises the specter of a collateral estoppel defense.  However, the State did not raise the 
defense as a grounds for decision, and we decline to do so sua 
sponte.

  

5Reagan 
did not file a direct appeal from the imposition of his sentence.  Instead, he has raised the issue for the 
first time on an appeal from the revocation of his probation.  The same procedural history occurred in 
Yates, and in that case we said:

 

When 
properly imposed according to the statute, we recognize that a sentence of 
probation is a final and appealable order.  
State v. Kinney, 217 Neb. 701, 350 N.W.2d 552. See Annotation, 
Appealability of Order Suspending Imposition or Execution of Sentence, 51 
A.L.R.4th 939 (1987). Certainly, the issues that we have discussed could, or 
should, have been raised in the original appeal.  We address them here only as collateral 
to, and perhaps of necessity involved in, Yates' appeal from the revocation of 
his probation.

 

792 P.2d  
at 190.  Certainly, the better 
practice is for these issues to be raised in a direct appeal, or, perhaps, as a 
motion to correct an illegal sentence under W.R.Cr.P. 35(a).  However, like the court in Yates, we 
will endeavor to determine the issue raised by Reagan as it is related, at least 
collaterally, to the revocation of his probation.