Case Title: Ponte v. Investors' Alert

Citation: 382 Md. 689

Docket Number: 17/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2004-08-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 17
September Term, 2003
_________________________________________
R. A. PONTE ARCHITECTS, LTD.
v.
INVESTORS’ ALERT, INC., et al.
________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
        *Eldridge
      
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
                  JJ.
_________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed: August 26, 2004
______________________________________
* Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an active
member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant
to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also
participated in the decision and adoption of this
opinion.
1
The federal statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
(continued...)
The issue in this case is whether Maryland courts may entertain a private cause
of action for damages, under the provisions of the federal Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, for the receipt of unsolicited commercial telephone
facsimile messages.  We shall hold that such actions may be brought in the courts of
this State.
I.
Petitioner, R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. (“Ponte”), is a Maryland corporation
located in Bethesda, Maryland.  According to the allegations of the complain t, Ponte
received unsolicited advertisem ents via facsimile on August 23, 2000, and on several
occasions subs equently.  These advertisem ents consisted of an investment newsletter
entitled “Investors’ Alert,” created by Investors’ Alert, Inc. and Access Financial
Consulting, Inc.  The newsletter promoted its own paid subscription, and the purchase
of the common stock of certain small corporations, and was distributed free of charge
via facsimile broadcas t, which permits the transmission of the facsimile to thousands
of recipients in a single broadcast session.
Ponte filed a complaint and a motion for class certification  in the Circuit Court
for Montgom ery County against Investors’ Alert and Access Financial, alleging
violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227.1  The motion
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1
(...continued)
“47 U.S.C. § 227.  Restrictions on use of telephone equipment
* * *
“(b) Restrictions on use of automated telephone equipment.  (1)
Prohibitions.  It shall be unlawful for any person within the United
States, or any person outside the United States if the recipient is
within the United States — 
* * *
(C) to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or
other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a
telephone facsimile machine; 
* * *
“(3) Private right of action.  A person or entity may, if otherwise
permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an
appropriate court of that State — 
(A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the
regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such
violation,
(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a
violation or to receive $500 in damages for each such
violation, whichever is greater, or
(C) both such actions.”
2
Maryland Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol. ), § 14-1313 of the Commercial Law Article provides:
(continued...)
for class certification was never ruled upon. Following discovery, Investors’ Alert
and Access Financial filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted after oral
argumen t, on the basis  “that no private cause of action exists within the State of
Maryland to allow these claims to proceed. ” The court reasoned that Maryland Code
(1975, 2000 Repl. Vol.), § 14-1313 of the Commercial Law Article, addresses the
issue of unsolicited faxes and makes no provision for private suits.2   
-3-
2
(...continued)
“§ 14-1313. Unsolicited facsimile transmissions.
“(a) Definitions — (1) In this section the following words have the meanings
indicated.
(2) ‘Facsimile device’ means a machine that receives and copies reproductions
or facsimiles of documents or photographs that have been transmitted electronically
or telephonically over telecommunications lines.
(3)(i) ‘Commercial solicitation’ means the unsolicited electronic or telephonic
transmission in the State to a facsimile device to encourage a person to purchase
goods, realty, or services.
(ii) ‘Commercial solicitation’ does not include:
1.  An electronic or telephonic transmission made in the course of prior
negotiations; or
2.  An electronic or telephonic transmission made in the course of a preexisting
Business relationship with the person receiving the transmission.
“(b) Commercial solicitation prohibited. – A person may not make intentionally
an electronic or telephonic transmission to a facsimile device for the purpose of
commercial solicitation.
“(c)Penalty. —  (1) The Attorney General may initiate a civil action against any
person who violates this section to recover for the State a penalty not to exceed
$1,000 for each violation.
(2) For the purposes of this section, each prohibited commercial solicitation is a
separate violation.”
Ponte noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and the
intermediate  appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.  See Ponte
Architects, Ltd. v. Investors’ Alert, 149 Md. App. 219, 238-239, 815 A.2d 816, 827
(2003), where the Court of Special Appeals stated:
“In sum, Maryland has a statute, [Maryland Code § 14-1313 of
the Commercial Law Article], that covers substantially the subject
matter covered by the claim raised in this lawsuit under the
TCPA.  Appellant could not proceed under the Maryland statute,
because it does not permit a private right of action.  By opting not
to create a private right of action for violation of Maryland law,
the legislature has indicated its intent not to permit a private right
of action for violation of the compara ble federal law.” 
-4-
3
The respondents filed a brief and participated in the argument before the Court of Special
Appeals, but they did not file a brief in this Court and did not participate in oral argument.
The amici supporting the position of the respondents, in addition to arguing that the federal
cause of action should not be entertained, make several arguments against having class actions. For
several reasons we do not reach the issue of whether a class action is an appropriate vehicle for suits
alleging violations of the Act.  First, the trial court did not rule upon the motion for class
certification, and neither side raised the issue in the Court of Special Appeals.  Therefore, under
Maryland Rule 8-131 (a), the issue would not ordinarily be decided in appellate proceedings.
Second, the issue was neither raised in the certiorari petition, nor in any cross-petition, nor in the
order granting certiorari.  Consequently, under Rule 8-131 (b), it is not before us.  Third, it is a
settled principle of Maryland appellate procedure that, absent an issue which an appellate court will
address sua sponte or an issue on which the court requests argument, an amicus ordinarily cannot
raise an issue which is not raised by the parties.  See Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 642-643,
805 A.2d 1061, 1083-1084 (2002); Eagle-Picher v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 230-231 n.15, 604 A.2d
445, 470 n.15 (1992); Maryland-National Capital Parks & Planning Comm’n v. Crawford, 307 Md.
1, 15 n.6, 511 A.2d 1079, 1086 n.6 (1986).
Ponte then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.
Ponte v. Investors’ Alert, 374 Md. 358, 822 A.2d 1224 (2003).  The Court also
granted motions to participate as amici curiae to the State of Maryland and to a
private individual on behalf of the petitioner, and to PrimeTV,  LLC and DirecTV,
Inc., on behalf of the respondents.3 
II.
The only question in this case is whether a Maryland trial court is authorized
to entertain the federal cause of action created by Congress in the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C ., § 227.  Before addressing this specific question,
however, it would be useful to review the law concerning the jurisdiction of Maryland
courts over civil causes of action created by the laws of other jurisdictions, and
particularly civil causes of action created by federal law.
-5-
As a general matter, courts in Maryland regularly entertain civil causes of
action arising under the laws of other jurisdictions.  See Ward v. Nationwide Ins., 328
Md. 240, 247, 614 A.2d 85, 88 (1992); Rein v. Koons Ford, 318 Md. 130, 135, 567
A.2d 101, 103 (1989); Kramer v. Bally’s Park Place, 311 Md. 387, 535 A.2d 466
(1988); County Exec., Prince George’s County v. Doe, 300 Md. 445, 453-455, 479
A.2d 352, 356-357 (1984); Pine Street Trading v. Farrell Lines, 278 Md. 363, 379-
380, 364 A.2d 1103, 1114 (1976); Texaco v. Vanden Brosche, 242 Md. 334, 339-340,
219 A.2d 80, 83 (1966); Lambros v. Brown, 184 Md. 350, 356-357, 41 A.2d 78, 81
(1945); B&O Rail Road Co. v. Glenn, 28 Md. 287, 322 (1868); LaChance v. Service
Trucking Co., 215 F. Supp. 162, 165 (D. Md. 1963). 
Moreover, Maryland courts exercise jurisdiction in such actions even when
identical causes of action could not be brought under Maryland law.  See, e.g., Rein
v. Koons Ford, supra, 318 Md. at 133-138, 567 A.2d at 102-104; Kramer v. Bally’s
Park Place, supra, 311 Md. at 392, 535 A.2d at 468; County Exec., Prince George’s
County v. Doe, supra, 300 Md. at 452-456, 479 A.2d at 355-358; Lambros v. Brown,
supra, 184 Md. at 354-355, 41 A.2d at 79-80; B&O Rail Road Co. v. Glenn, supra,
28 Md. at 322.  See also LaChance v. Service Trucking Co., supra, 215 F. Supp. at
162-163. 
 
The principle that Maryland courts will entertain civil causes of action arising
under the laws of other jurisdictions reflects the nature of judicial jurisdiction and the
differences between “‘the political jurisdiction of a State [and] its judicial
-6-
jurisdiction.’” Hansford v. District of Colum bia, 329 Md. 112, 129, 617 A.2d 1057,
1065,  cert. denied, 509 U.S. 905, 113 S.Ct. 2997, 125 L.Ed.2d 690 (1993), quoting
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,  453 U.S. 473, 482,  101 S.Ct. 2870, 2877, 69
L.Ed.2d 784, 794 (1981).  This Court in Hansford continued (329 Md. at 130, 617
A.2d at 1065, quoting the Gulf Offshore opinion, 453 U.S. at 481, 101 S.Ct. at 2877,
69 L.Ed.2d at 793):
“‘“The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its
own local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all
subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction,
though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most
distant part of the globe.”   The Federalist No. 82, p. 514 (H.
Lodge ed. 1908) (Hamilton), quoted in Claflin v. Houseman, 93
U.S. [130] at 138 [23 L.Ed. 833 (1876)].  State courts routinely
exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over civil cases arising from
events in other States and governed by the other States’ laws.
See, e.g., Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11[, 26 L.Ed. 439]
(1881).  Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302[, 101 S.Ct.
633, 66 L.Ed.2d 521 (1981)].’”
See also American Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 338 Md. 560, 578 n.4,
659 A.2d 1295, 1304 n.4 (1995).
This characteristic of judicial jurisdiction is reflected in the statutory
provisions relating to Maryland circuit courts.  Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl.
Vol.), § 1-501 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states:
“§ 1-501.  Jurisdiction and powers in general.
The circuit courts are the highest common-law and equity
courts of record exercising original jurisdiction within the State.
-7-
Each has full common-law and equity powers and jurisdiction in
all civil and criminal cases within its county, and all the
additional powers and jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution
and by law, except where by law jurisdiction has been limited or
conferred exclusively upon another tribunal.”  (Empha sis added).
Conseq uently, unless a civil cause of action under another jurisdiction’s law
is the type which the Maryland General Assemb ly has limited or conferred upon a
different tribunal, Maryland circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over the
cause of action.  Circuit courts do not require expressed statutory authorization to
entertain a particular type of civil action; instead, they have jurisdiction over civil
causes of action generally.  See, e.g., In re R. W. Heilig, 372 Md. 692, 712-721, 816
A.2d 68, 80-86 (2003) (Circuit court has jurisdiction to issue an order changing the
plaintiff’s gender identity, even though, under the circumstances, there was no
statutory basis for the order except the general circuit court jurisdiction statute, § 1-
501 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article); County Exec., Prince George’s
County v. Doe, supra, 300 Md. at 453-454, 479 A.2d at 356-357 (“As the circuit
courts in Maryland generally have jurisdiction over all causes of action except to the
extent the General Assembly or the Constitution limit that jurisdiction or confer it
exclusively upon another tribunal, and as the General Assemb ly has not attempted to
exclude § 1983 actions from the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, we have taken the
position that § 1983 actions may be brought in Maryland circuit courts.  DeBleeker
v. Montgomery County, 292 Md. 498, 500, 511-513, 438 A.2d 1348 (1982)”).  See
also Lambros v. Brown, supra, 184 Md. at 356, 41 A.2d at 80 (“There is ample
-8-
authority, both in this Court and in the Supreme Court of the United States, for the
doctrine that competent state courts should take jurisdiction of suits authorized by
Acts of Congress.  This is sometimes placed . . . upon the theory that where exclusive
power is not given to the United States by the Constitution, the state courts retain
their general jurisdiction over all matters not thus taken away.”  In Lambros, because
of the amount of money involved, this Court held that the federal cause of action
could be brought in the People’s Court of Baltimore City, which was one of the
predecessor courts to the District Court of Maryland). 
There is an exception to the rule that Maryland courts will entertain causes of
action created by the laws of another jurisdiction, namely where such laws or causes
of action are contrary to Maryland public policy.   Nevertheless, “for another state’s
law to be unenforceable, there must be ‘a strong  public policy against its
enforcement in Maryland,’” Bethlehem Steel v. G. C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183,
189, 498 A.2d 605, 608 (1985), quoting Texaco v. Vanden Brosche, supra, 242 Md.
at 340-341, 219 A.2d at 84.  See also, e.g., Ward v. Nationwide Ins., supra, 328 Md.
at 247, 614 A.2d at 88 (referring to the “limited exception where . . . the foreign law
is contrary to a very strong Maryland public policy”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 327
Md. 526, 530, 611 A.2d 100, 102 (1992) (For the exception to apply, “‘the public
policy must be very strong and not merely a situation in which Maryland law is
different from the law of another jurisdiction,’” quoting Kramer v. Bally’s Park
Place, supra, 311 Md. at 390, 535 A.2d at 467).
-9-
This “public policy” exception, however, has no application where the law of
the “other jurisdiction” is federal law.  This Court explained in County Exec., Prince
George’s County v. Doe, supra, 300 Md. at 454, 479 A.2d at 357, quoting Mondou
v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57, 32 S.Ct. 169, 178, 56 L.Ed. 327, 349
(1912), as follows:
“‘The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony
with the policy of the state . . . is quite inadmissible, because it
presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist.  When
Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the
Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all
the States, and thereby established a policy for all.  That policy is
as much the policy of [the state] as if the act had emanated from
its own legislature, and should be respected according ly in the
courts of the State.’”
We continued in the Doe case (300 Md. at 445, 479 A.2d at 357):
“Moreove r, and contrary to the defendants’ argument in the
present case, a state court exercising jurisdiction in a federal
cause of action may not refuse to apply federal law in one
particular respect where such law is deemed inconsistent with
‘state policy.’  Instead, the entire federal substantive law is
applica ble.”
In Lambros v. Brown, supra, 184 Md. at 357, 41 A.2d at 81, Chief Judge Ogle
Marbury for the Court, quoting from Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137, 23 L.Ed.
833, 838 (1876), stated:
“‘The fact that a State court derives its existence and functions
from the State laws is no reason why it should not afford relief;
because it is subject also to laws of the United States, and is just
as much bound to recognize these as operative within the State as
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it is to recognize the State laws.  The two together form one
system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for
the State . . . .  The disposition to regard the laws of the United
States as emanating from a foreign jurisdiction is founded on an
erroneous view of the nature and relations of the State and the
Federal governments.’”
See also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 275, 117 S.Ct. 2028,
2037, 138 L.Ed.2d 438, 452 (1997) (“The Constitution and laws of the United States
are not a body of law external to the States, acknowledged and enforced simply as a
matter of comity”); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm ’n v.
Crawford, 307 Md. 1, 14, 511 A.2d 1079, 1085-1086 (1986) (“[I]f Congress . . .
intended” that the federal cause of action should be entertained by state courts, “then
the ‘Maryland policy’ . . . would be immaterial”); Ordway v. Central Nat. Bank, 47
Md. 217, 248 (1877) (Judge Alvey for the Court stated: “[T]herefore, whether the
right to maintain this action be placed upon the express terms of the [federal] statute
giving cognizance to the State courts, or simply upon the non-exclusion of State
jurisdiction, in either case the action is maintainable.  And that the [federal] cause of
action is a penal ty, to be recovered in a civil action . . . by the party grieved,
constitutes no objection to the State courts taking cognizance of it, and enforcing the
right”); Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 2 (“The Constitution of the Untied
States, and the Laws made, or which shall be made, in pursuance thereof, . . . are, and
shall be the Supreme Law of the State . . .”).
Moreover, the authority of a state to preclude its courts from entertaining
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4
Article VI, Cl. 2, of the Constitution of the United States.
federal causes of action is quite limited.  Gen erally, a state law “discriminating
against federal causes of action” violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution.4  Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 366, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 2437, 110
L.Ed.2d 332 (1990).  The Supreme Court in Howlett v. Rose continued (496 U.S. at
367, 110 S.Ct. at 2438, 110 L.Ed.2d at 347):
“Federal law is enforcea ble in state courts not because
Congress has determined that federal courts would otherwise be
burdened or that state courts might provide a more convenient
forum – although both might well be true – but because the
Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in
the State as laws passed by the state legislature.  The Supremacy
Clause makes those laws ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ and
charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce
that law according to their regular modes of procedure.  ‘The laws
of the United States are laws in the several States, and just as
much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws
are . . . .’  Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-137, [23 L.Ed.
833] (1876).”
The Howlett opinion, reviewing numerous earlier cases, reiterated that “[a] state court
may not deny a federal right, when the parties and controversy are properly before it,
in the absence of ‘valid excuse,’” 496 U.S. at 369, 110 S.Ct. at 2439, 110 L.Ed.2d at
348.  The Court pointed out that state law “disagreem ent” with federal law “is not a
valid excuse ,” 496 U.S. at 371, 110 S.Ct. at 2440, 110 L.Ed.2d at 350, but that a state
may ordinarily apply to the federal cause of action “a neutral state rule regarding the
administration of the courts” or its “own neutral procedural rules to federal claims,
-12-
unless those rules are pre-empted by federal law,” 496 U.S. at 372, 110 S.Ct. at 2440-
2441, 110 L.Ed.2d at 351.  The Supreme Court in Howlett invalidated Florida law
which precluded Florida courts, on governmental immunity grounds, from
entertaining actions under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
McKe nnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 54 S.Ct. 690, 78 L.Ed.
1227 (1934), involved an Alabama statute granting to Alabama courts jurisdiction
over suits against foreign corporations based on causes of action arising under the
laws of other states, but the statute did not encompass such causes of action arising
under federal law.  Relying on the statute, the Alabama courts refused to entertain a
cause of action against a foreign corporation under the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act (FELA).  The refusal to exercise jurisdiction was defended on the ground that the
statute did not single out just FELA cases but applied to all federal causes of action
against foreign corporations which did not arise out of Alabama law.  The defendant
relied on the principle that “a state may determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its
courts, [and] the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them,”
McKe nnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., supra, 292 U.S. at 232, 54 S.Ct. at 691, 78
L.Ed at 1228.  The Supreme Court, however, in an opinion by Justice Brandeis,
reversed the refusal to entertain the action and reviewed some of the limits upon a
state’s authority over the jurisdiction of its courts (292 U.S. at 233-234, 54 S.Ct. at
691-692, 78 L.Ed. at 1229):
“The power of a State to determine the limits of the
-13-
jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies
which shall be heard in them is, of course, subject to the
restrictions imposed by the Federal Constitution. The privileges
and immunities clause requires a state to accord to citizens of
other states substantially the same right of access to its courts as
it accords to its own citizens. . . .  The full faith and credit clause
requires a state court to take jurisdiction of an action to enforce
a judgment recovered in another state, although it might have
refused to entertain a suit on the original cause of action as
obnoxious to its public policy. . . .  By Mondou v. New York, N.
H. & H. R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, [32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38
L.R.A .(N.S.) 44,] an action in a Connecticut court against a
domestic corporation, it was settled that a state court whose
ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate  for
the occasion, may not refuse to entertain suits under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.
“While Congress has not attempted to compel states to provide
courts for the enforcement of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act,  . . . the Federal Constitution prohibits state courts of general
jurisdiction from refusing to do so solely because the suit is
brought under a federal law. The denial of jurisdiction by the
Alabama court is based solely upon the source of law sought to be
enforced. The plaintiff is cast out because he is suing to enforce
a federal act. A state may not discriminate  against rights arising
under federal laws.”
See also, e.g., National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
515 U.S. 582, 587, 115 S.Ct. 2351, 2355, 132 L.Ed.2d 509, 516 (1995) (“When they
have jurisdiction, state courts have been compelled to provide federal remedies,
notwithstanding the existence of less intrusive state-law remedies”); Felder v. Casey,
487 U.S. 131, 150, 151, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2313, 2314, 101 L.Ed.2d 123, 146 (1988)
(“Federal law takes state courts as it finds them only insofar as these courts employ
rules that do not ‘impose unnecessary burdens upon the rights of recovery authorized
-14-
by federal laws.’ * * * Just as federal courts are constitutiona lly obliged to apply state
law to state claims, . . . so too the Supremacy Clause imposes on state courts a
constitutional duty ‘to proceed in such manner than all the substantial rights of the
parties under controlling federal law [are] protected’”); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386,
394, 67 S.Ct. 810, 814, 91 L.Ed. 967, 972 (1947) ( A state has no “right . . . to deny
enforcement to claims growing out of a valid federal law”); Maryland-National
Capital Parks & Planning Comm ’n v. Crawford, supra, 307 Md. at 14, 511 A.2d at
1085.
III.
Against the above-summarized background, we now turn specifically to the
private federal cause of action created by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 
A.
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act was enacted in response to what
Congress perceived to be the growing problem of the use of automated telephone
equipment to make unsolicited telephone calls and faxes.  The Act imposed
restrictions on the use of such equipme nt, and made it illegal, inter alia,  “to use any
telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited
advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine.”  47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(C).   The
Act also created a private right of action in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (emphas is added):
“A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or
-15-
rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that
State -
(A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the
regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such
violation,
(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a
violation, or receive $500 in damages for each such violation,
whichever is greater, or
(C) both such actions.”
The issue in this case concerns the Congressional intent underlying the phrase “if
otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State,” along with the
relationship between the language of the federal statute and state law.  Among the
petitioner, the amici, the Court of Special Appeals, and cases in other states, four
different interpretations have been advanced.
First, the petitioner and the individual amicus supporting the petitioner argue
that the phrase simply allows the states, in the enforcement of the federal cause of
action, to apply neutral state laws or rules regarding the administration of the state
courts or neutral procedural laws or rules.  The language does not, in their view,
allow a state to discriminate  against the federal cause of action or refuse to enforce
it because it is a federal cause of action.  In other words, the petitioner and amicus
contend that the statutory language was simply designed to reflect the Supremacy
Clause holdings of Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S. 356, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110
L.Ed.2d 332; Testa v. Katt, supra, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S.Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967;
-16-
McKe nnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry Co., supra, 292 U.S. 230, 54 S.Ct. 690, 78
L.Ed.1227; Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R., supra, 223 U.S. 1,
32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327, and similar cases.  Several state appellate courts appear
to have adopted this position.  See Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., 855 So.2d 644, 647
(Fla. App. 2003) (“[W]e interpret the language ‘if otherwise permitted’ to
acknowledge the principle that states have the right to structure their own court
systems and that state courts are not obligated to change their procedural rules or to
create courts to accomm odate TCPA claims,”  relying upon Howlett v. Rose, supra);
Mulhern v. MacLeod, 441 Mass. 754, 757, 808 N.E.2d 778, 780 (2004) (“The ‘if
otherwise permitted’ language was more likely intended to reflect that Federal claims
remain subject to State procedural law,” also relying on Howlett v. Rose, supra);
Zelma v. Market U.S.A., 343 N.J. Super. 356, 362, 778 A.2d 591, 595 (2001) (“[T]he
courts of this State have always embraced the principle that unless the federal act
itself expressly or impliedly precludes states from assuming jurisdiction, the general
jurisdiction of our courts will encompass federal statutory causes of action”);
Schulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 268 A.D.2d 174, 177, 179, 710 N.Y.S.2d 368,
371, 372 (2000) (The defendant’s “interpretation of the statute is inconsistent with
established principles governing State court jurisdiction over claims based on Federal
laws. * * * We therefore conclude that the phrase ‘if otherwise permitted by the laws
or rules of court of a State’ merely acknowledges the principle that States have the
right to structure their own court systems and that State courts are not obligated to
-17-
5
This was not the issue before the court in the International Science case.  Instead, the issue was
whether a federal district court had concurrent jurisdiction to entertain private actions under the Act,
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that federal district courts lacked
such jurisdiction and that exclusive jurisdiction over private actions under the federal statute was in
the state courts.  Other federal courts have also held that Congress vested exclusive jurisdiction over
private actions under the Act in the state courts.  See Murphey v. Lanier, 204 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir.
2000) (“the conclusion that there is no federal jurisdiction over private actions under the TCPA does
not hang on the meaning of the word "may," but on the statute's express mention of state court
jurisdiction and its silence on the matter of federal jurisdiction”);  Erienet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc.,
156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir. 1998) (accepting the holding of International Science, supra, that the federal
statute “intended to authorize private causes of action only in state court”);  Foxhall Realty Law
Offices, Inc. v. Telecommunications Premium Services, Ltd., 156 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1998)
(“Congress intended to confer exclusive state court jurisdiction over private rights of action” under
the Act); Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1289, modified 140 F.3d 898 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“Congress intended to assign the private right of action [under the Act] to state courts
exclusively”); Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action
provision of the Act).
change their procedural rules to accomm odate TCPA claims”). 
Second, the State of Maryland, as amicus curiae urging a reversal, argues that
the language of the federal statute does authorize a state to prohibit private suits
under the statute but that the state legislature must do so affirmative ly and expressly.
According to the State of Maryland, the General Assembly’s inaction subsequent to
the enactment of the federal statute means that Maryland courts are authorized to
entertain the federal cause of action.  The petitioner also advances this position as an
alternative argumen t. In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in International Science & Technology Institute v. Inacom Communications,
106 F.3d 1146, 1155-1158 (4th Cir. 1997), seemed to share this view that a state
legislature could affirmative ly prohibit the state’s courts from entertaining private
actions for damages under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 5  Those
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6
An earlier Texas intermediate appellate court case had taken the position that the federal private
cause of action could not be entertained by state courts unless the state legislature authorized the
action.  Autoflex Leasing, Inc. v. Mfrs. Auto Leasing, 16 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. App. 2000).  That earlier
case, however, has been discredited by an enactment by the state legislature and the most recent
Texas appellate opinion.
states which have not adopted the first interpretation of the federal statute, as set
forth above, have at least taken this position.  See Lary v. Flasch Bus. Consulting,
Inc., ___ So.2d ___ (Ala. App. 2003); Kaufman v. ACS Systems, Inc., 110 Cal. App.
4th 886, 2 Cal. Rptr.3d 296 (2003); Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Nicholson, 245 Ga.
App. 363, 537 S.E.2d 468 (2000); Reynolds v. Diamond Foods & Poultry, Inc., 79
S.W.3d 907 (Mo. 2002); Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135
S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App. 2004). 6
Third, the Court of Special Appea ls held, and one of the amici supporting an
affirmance argues, that the private action provision of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act does authorize a state to prohibit private actions under the federal
statute, that the state legislature need not do so affirmative ly and expressly, and that
the role of a court is to ascertain the state legislature’s intent as reflected in existing
state statutes.  As earlier indicated, the Court of Special Appeals went on to hold that
Maryland Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol.), § 14-1313 of the Commercial Law Article,
authorizing a civil action by the Maryland Attorney General when unsolicited
facsimile transmissions are made in violation of the state statute, and subsequent
inaction, indicated a state legislative intent that private actions under the federal
statute could not be entertained by Maryland courts.
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Fourth, one of the amicus favoring an affirmance suggests, at one point in its
brief, “that an ‘express’ or affirmative action must be taken [by a state legislature]
in order to ‘permit’” private actions under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection
Act.  (Brief of amicus curiae, DirecTV, Inc., at 15).  The Court of Special Appeals
also discussed this position, but the appellate court held that it was “unnecessary for
us to decide in this case whether the General Assemb ly must expressly ‘opt in’ to the
jurisdiction granted the states in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3),” because of the court’s
holding that § 14-1313 of the Commercial Law Article evidenced the General
Assembly’s intent to preclude private actions.  Ponte Architects v. Investors Alert,
supra, 149 Md. App. at 237-238, 815 A.2d at 827.
We agree with the petitioner’s basic position in this case.  The phrase “if
otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of a court of a State” simply expresses the
congressional recognition that neutral state laws and rules concerning the general
jurisdiction of state courts and procedures therein are applicable to the federal cause
of action.  This view is supported by the pertinent language of the federal statute, the
legislative histo ry, the principles of statutory construction governing state court
jurisdiction over federal causes of action, and decisions by other state courts.
Moreover, even if Congress had intended to authorize a state legislature to
discriminate  against the federal private cause of action created by 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(3) and preclude any of that state’s courts from entertaining such cases –
something that perhaps would be unprecedented in American history – we disagree
-20-
with the Court of Special Appea ls that the General Assemb ly did so by enacting § 14-
1313 of the Comm ercial Law Article and by not subseque ntly enacting legislation
concerning unlawful unsolicited telephone facsimile transmissions.
B.
Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act in November 1991,
and it was signed into law in December of that year.  The purpose of the Act was to
address telemarketing practices that were made possible by technological changes
that resulted, inter alia, in a substantial increase in unsolicited commercial telephone
calls and faxes, and the resulting expense and disruption imposed on the recipients.
At that point in time, some states had begun to take action to restrict such
telemarketing practices.   See S. Rep. No. 102-178 at 3; H.R. Rep. No. 102-317, 1st
Sess., at 25 (1991). Maryland had enacted its own statute prohibiting such “junk
faxes” two years prior to the passage of the federal Act.  See § 14-1313 of the
Commercial Law Article.  State laws, however, had limited effect because states did
not have jurisdiction over interstate calls.  The federal law was primarily intended to
reach unsolicited facsimile and other telephone communications that crossed state
lines, and fell outside the jurisdiction of the states.  See S. Rep. No. 102-178 at 5;
H.R. Rep. No. 102-317, 1st Sess. at 25 (1991).
The proposed legislation which became the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act was favorably reported by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, and considered on the floor of the Senate on November 7, 1991.  See
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137 Cong. Rec. 30820.  The proposal was in the form of two separate bills.  One bill,
sponsored by Senator Hollings of South Carolina, contained regulations covering
automatic telephone dialing system calls and unsolicited advertisem ents by telephone
facsimile machines.  137 Cong. Rec. 30820-30821.  The other bill, sponsored by
Senator Pressler of South Dakota, dealt with calls from “live persons.”  137 Cong.
Rec. 30824.  When the proposed legislation reached the Senate floor, neither bill
contained a provision for private causes of action.
On the floor of the Senate on November 7, 1991, two “amen dments,” or
“substitute bills” as they are sometimes referred to, were offered.  Senator Hollings,
the chief sponsor of one of the bills, offered Amendment No. 1311 to his bill relating
to telephone calls using automated equipment and unsolicited advertisem ents by
telephone facsimile machines.  137 Cong. Rec. 30821-30824.  The other
“amend ment” or “substitute bill,” offered by Senator Pressler, was to his bill
concerning unwanted telephone calls from “live person s.”  137 Cong. Rec. 30824.
Both Senator Hollings’s amendment to the bill regulating automated telephone
calls and facsimile transmissions, and Senator Pressler’s amendment to the bill
regulating certain live unwanted telephone calls, provided for private causes of action
in state courts.  The private cause of action provision concerning automatic telephone
calls and facsimile transmissions was enacted and is now codified as 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(3).  It is the provision before us today.  The private cause of action
subsection relating to certain live unwanted telephone calls was also enacted and is
-22-
7
Interestingly, the Court of Special Appeals in Worsham v. Nationwide, 138 Md. App. 487, 772
A.2d 868, cert. denied, 365 Md. 268, 778 A.2d 383 (2001), decided that the Circuit Court for
Harford County should entertain a private cause of action under 47 U.S.C. § 227 (c)(5).  Moreover,
the opinion in the Worsham case drew no distinction between § 227(b)(3) and § 227(c)(5).  The
Court of Special Appeals stated in Worsham, 138 Md. App. at 496-497, 772 A.2d at 874:
“‘In the absence of a [s]tate statute declining to exercise the
jurisdiction authorized by the [TCPA], a [s]tate court has jurisdiction
over TCPA claims.’  Kaplan v. Democrat & Chronicle, 266 A.D.2d
848, 698 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); see Int’l Science
& Tech. Inst. v. Inacom Communications, 106 F.3d 1146, 1158 (4th
Cir. 1997).  Thus far, Maryland has not refused to exercise such
jurisdiction.  Accordingly, our state courts are faced with the
extraordinary situation of having exclusive jurisdiction over a private
right of action brought under federal law.  See, e.g., Murphey v.
Lanier, 204 F.3d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 2000) (joining Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in ‘ “the somewhat unusual
conclusion that state courts have exclusive jurisdiction over a cause
of action created by a federal statute, the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991” ’) (citations omitted).”  
In the instant case, however, the Court of Special Appeals did attempt to draw a distinction
between the two private causes of action, stating that “it is evident that our legislature has chosen
to treat telephone and facsimile solicitations differently, providing for a private cause of action for
one, but not the other, in our Commercial Law Article.”  Ponte Architects v. Investors’ Alert, 149
Md. App. 219, 237, 815 A.2d 816, 827 (2003).  Moreover, the Court of Special Appeals in the
present case seemed to view the distinction between 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)
as a distinction between facsimile transmissions and telephone calls.  See Ponte, 149 Md. App. at
236-239, 815 A.2d at 826-828.  Actually, the distinction is between automated telephone calls and
facsimile transmissions on the one hand, and telephone calls from “live persons” on the other.  The
brief of one of the amici urging an affirmance also confuses the distinction between the two private
action provisions.
codified as 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).  The critical language in both provisions, i.e. the
phrase “if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state,” is identical. 7
In introducing the “amendm ent” or “substitute bill” containing the private
cause of action codified as 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), Senator Hollings initially set forth
some of the background for the provision (137 Cong. Rec. 30821):
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“The telemarketing industry appears oblivious to the harm it
is creating.  Two months ago, a representative of the Direct
Marketing Association said on television that telemarketers have
a right to call us in our homes.  This is absurd.  I echo Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who wrote 100 years ago that ‘the
right to be left alone is the most comprehensive of rights and the
one most valued by civilized man.’”
“Mr. President, I originally introduced this bill on July 11 of
this year.  Since then, my constituents in South Carolina and
citizens around the country have deluged my office with letters of
support for this bill.  Senator INOUYE, the chairman of the
Communications Subcommittee, held a hearing on the bill on
July 24.  Not one party at that hearing testified in opposition to
the bill.  Because of the enormous public support, the bill was
ordered reported by the Commerce Committee, which I chair, and
without objection on July 31.
“Mr. Steve Hamm, administrator of the Department of
Consumer Affairs in South Carolina, informed me that his office
receives more complain ts about computerized telephone calls and
900 numbers than any other problems.  Despite the fact that South
Carolina recently passed legislation to protect consumers from
unwanted computerized calls within our State, South Carolina
consumers continue to suffer from computerized calls made from
out-of-State.  The State law does not, and cannot, regulate
interstate calls.  Only Congress can protect citizens from
telephone calls that cross State boundaries.  That is why Federal
legislation is essentia l.”
Senator Hollings next addressed the private cause of action provision (137
Cong. Rec. 30821-30822, emphasis added):
“The substitute bill contains a private right-of-action provision
that will make it easier for consumers to recover damages from
receiving these computerized calls.  The provision would allow
consumers to bring an action in State court against any entity that
violates the bill.  The bill does not, because of constitutional
-24-
constraints, dictate to the States which court in each State shall
be the proper venue for such an action, as this is a matter for
State legislators to determine.  Nevertheless, it is my hope that
States will make it as easy as possible for consumers to bring
such actions, preferably in small claims court.  The consumer
outrage at receiving these calls is clear.  Unless Congress makes
it easier for consumers to obtain damages from those who violate
this bill, these abuses will undoub tedly continue.
“Small claims court or a similar court would allow the
consumer to appear before the court without an attorney.  The
amount of damages in this legislation is set to be fair to both the
consumer and the telemarketer.  Howeve r, it would defeat the
purposes of the bill if the attorneys’ costs to consumers of
bringing an action were greater than the potential damages.  I
thus expect that the States will act reasonab ly in permitting their
citizens to go to court to enforce this bill.”
The above-quoted statements by Senator Hollings contain essentially the whole
legislative history underlying the private cause of action provision in 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(3).
The language of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), coupled with the sponsor’s explanation
of the provision, leaves little doubt concerning its meaning.  The phrase “if otherwise
permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state” certainly appears to refer to the
neutral general jurisdictional and procedural laws and rules governing each state’s
court system.  If Congress were referring to substantive telemarketing legislation
enacted by state legislatures, it is doubtful that it would have referred to such
legislation as laws or rules “of court.”  The word “otherwise” suggests state laws and
rules other than the telemarketing law which was the subject of the federal
legislation.  Moreover, the phrase seems to contemp late laws or rules in effect among
-25-
all of the several states.  In 1991, however, some states had not regulated automated
telephone calls and unsolicited commercial messages to telephone facsimile
machines.  
Senator Hollings’s explanation of the provision makes it clear that the critical
language simply reflected the constitutional principles set forth in Claflin v.
Houseman, supra, 93 U.S. 130, 23 L.Ed. 833; Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Co., supra, 223 U.S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327; McKennett v. St. Louis & S. F.
Ry. Co., supra, 292 U.S. 230, 54 S.Ct. 690, 78 L.Ed. 1227, and their prog eny.
According to Senator Hollings, the language, “because of constitutional constra ints,”
did not “dictate to the States which court in each state shall be the proper venue for
such action, as this is a matter for State legislators to determ ine.”  (Empha sis added).
What Congress did not mandate  was which court in a particular state had jurisdiction
over the cause of action.  What was left for the determination of state legislators was
the “proper venue .”
The substantive issue of whether the federal cause of action should be
entertained in the appropriate  state court was not a matter left to state legislators.
While leaving to the states the determination of “the proper venue ,” the sponsor of
the federal statute hoped that state legislatures would allow injured consumers to
bring the actions in small claims or similar courts rather than in superior courts of
general jurisdiction with their higher costs and substantial attorneys’ fees.  See
Mulhern v. MacLeod, supra, 441 Mass. at 758-759, 808 N.E.2d at 781, where the
-26-
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently, after quoting Senator Hollings’s
statements, reached the same conclusion.  See also Condon v. Office Depot, Inc.,
supra, 855 So.2d at 648 (“Senator Hollings thus expected state legislation to address
issues such as venue”).
C.
The amici supporting an affirmance argue that the word “laws” in the
“otherwise permitted” clause of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) has a “plain” meaning and
refers to substantive state laws concerning unsolicited commercial telephone
facsimile transmissions.  PrimeTV contends (brief at 21): “Just as ‘rules of court’
refers to procedure, ‘laws’ clearly refers to substance – particularly when juxtaposed
with ‘rules of court.’”
The language of § 227(b)(3), however, does not have this “plain” meaning.
Amici overlook the fact that, with respect to both the federal government and the
states, the monetary jurisdiction of different courts is determined by statutes enacted
by legislative bodies.  The same is true, subject to state constitutional requirements,
concerning the general types of actions that may be brought in particular courts, the
nature of the relief available in different courts, the availability of jury trials in some
courts but not in others, etc.
Furthermore, in many states the state supreme courts do not have constitutional
legislative authority, on their own, to promulg ate rules of practice and procedure.
Prior to the adoption of Article IV, § 18(a), of the Maryland Constitution in 1944, this
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8
The Constitution of South Carolina, the State represented by Senator Hollings, in Article V, §§ 4
and 4A, grants to the Supreme Court of South Carolina authority to promulgate rules of practice and
procedure for that State’s courts, but requires that the Supreme Court submit such proposed rules to
the General Assembly.  Section 4A states in part: “Such rules or amendments shall become effective
ninety calendar days after submission unless disapproved by concurrent resolution of the General
Assembly . . . .”
Court did not have broad constitutiona lly based power to adopt rules of practice and
procedure.  Moreover, even today, Article IV, § 18(a), grants to the General
Assemb ly concurrent jurisdiction over matters of procedure.8
Even if Congress was using the word “laws” to mean enactmen ts by state
legislatures, there is no basis in the language of the statute or its legislative history
to conclude that it was referring to statutes dealing with automatic telephone calls and
unsolicited advertisem ents to telephone facsimile machines.  Instead, particularly in
light of Senator Hollings’s explanation, it seems clear that the word “laws” covered
matters such as the monetary jurisdiction of state courts and procedure in those
courts.
There is another reason militating against construing “laws” to mean state laws
regulating automated telephone calls and advertisem ents to telephone facsimile
machines.  Such state laws, to the extent that they existed in 1991, and the federal
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, were primarily aimed at different activities.
The legislative history shows that the purpose of the federal statute was to fill a void
which could not be covered by state statutes.  As Senator Hollings stated, “State law
does not, and cannot, regulate interstate calls.  Only Congress can protect citizens
from unwanted telephone calls that cross State bound aries.”  137 Cong. Rec. 30821.
-28-
9
In pointing out that the federal statute was focussed upon interstate activity, we do not suggest
that the statute does not also encompass intrastate activity.  See, e.g., Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v.
Nicholson, 245 Ga. App. 363, 366-367, 537 S.E.2d 468, 471 (2000).
10
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 247(b) and Section 2(5) of Pub. L. 104-155 (“Congress has authority,
pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, to make acts of destruction to religious
property a violation of Federal law”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (Commerce Clause basis for federal
Public Accommodations law).
It is highly unlikely that Congress intended to incorporate  by reference state laws
concerning intrastate activity in a federal statute chiefly aimed at interstate activ ity.9
The federal statute was designed to fill a void in state laws; it was not intended to be
a statute limited by state laws which Congress deemed inadequate.
The amici urging an affirmance also contend that, if the “otherwise permitted”
clause of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) simply refers to the constitutional principles set forth
in Supreme Court opinions such as Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S. 356, 110 S.Ct.
2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332; Testa v. Katt, supra, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S.Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed.
967,  and similar cases, the clause would be “surplusage” because those constitutional
principles would still be applicable in the absence of the clause.  Nevertheless,
legislative bodies often refer to the pertinent constitutional principles underlying
legislation even though such references may not, strictly, be required.  For example,
when Congress enacts legislation under its Commerce Clause power,  it will often
refer to the underlying constitutional principle or the constitutional provision.10
Legislation in the criminal law field sometimes will recite that it applies only to
offenses committed after the effective date of the statute, even though constitutional
-29-
11
See, e.g., Laws of Maryland 1978 at 2503-2504, Ch. 849 of the Acts of 1978, § 7, (“[T]his Act
shall be construed only prospectively and the provisions of this Act apply only to offenses committed
on or after the effective date of this Act, and may not be applied or interpreted to have any effect
upon or application to any event or happening occurring prior to the effective date of this Act”);
Laws of Maryland 1976 at 1540, Ch. 573 of the Acts of 1976, § 4 (same).
ex post facto principles would require the same result. 11  
Furthermore, there are situations where neutral state jurisdictional or
procedural rules have been held inapplicable to federal causes of action in state
courts.  See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, supra, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d
123.  Thus, the insertion of the state “laws or rules of court” clause may have been
an exercise of caution rather than “surplusage.”  In light of the sponsor’s concern
over the “proper venue” for actions under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)((3), and his deference
to state legislators concerning the proper venue and procedure for the federal cause
of action, the reference to state “laws or rules of court” is understandable.
D.
Typically when Congress creates a civil cause of action, it authorizes federal
trial courts to entertain the cause of action.  It sometimes expressly grants concurrent
jurisdiction to state trial courts.  When Congress is silent concerning state court
jurisdiction over federal causes of action, there is a “deeply rooted presumption in
favor of concurrent state court jurisdiction,” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459, 110
S.Ct. 792, 795, 107 L.Ed.2d 887, 894 (1990).  See also Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., supra, 453 U.S. at 478, 101 S.Ct. at 2875, 69 L.Ed.2d at 791 (“In considering
the propriety of state-court jurisdiction over any particular federal claim, the Court
-30-
begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction”).  In all
of these instances of concurrent state court jurisdiction over federal civil causes of
action, the Supremacy Clause principles set forth in Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S.
356, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332; Testa v. Katt, supra, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S.Ct.
810, 91 L.Ed. 967, and similar cases have been held applicable, and states have been
precluded from discriminating against the federal cause of action.  It would be an
extreme anomaly, in the unusual situation where state courts have apparently been
given exclusive jurisdiction over the federal cause of action, for Congress to have
intended that states could discriminate  against the federal cause of action.  Moreover,
several state appellate courts have relied upon the presumption of state court
jurisdiction over federal causes of action in holding that private causes of action
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C . § 227, may be brought in
the courts of those states.  See, e.g., Condon v. Office Depot, Inc., supra, 855 So.2d
at 647 (“There is a presumption of state court jurisdiction over claims arising under
federal law”); Mulhern v. MacLeod, supra, 441 Mass. at 756, 808 N.E.2d at 780
(“The obligation on State courts to hear Federal causes of action is not self-imposed
by enabling legislation, but arises under the supremacy clause. . . .  We therefore
begin with the presumption that Federal causes of action are enforcea ble in the courts
of the Commo nwealth”); Schulman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, supra, 268 A.D.2d at
177, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 371 (“State courts are courts of general jurisdiction and are
presumed to have jurisdiction over Federally created causes of action unless Congress
-31-
dictates otherwise”); Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., supra, 135
S.W.3d at 381.
When Congress has enacted social or econom ic programs to be administered
by the executive branches of the federal and state governments, it has sometimes
provided that a state may “opt out” of the program.  On the other hand, Congress has
been creating federal causes of action, which can be brought in state courts, since
1789.  See Pine Street Trading v. Farrell Lines, supra, 278 Md. at 379-380, 364 A.2d
at 1114, and cases there collected, involving federal maritime causes of action in state
courts pursuant to § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.  Neither the parties nor the amici
nor the courts below have cited a single instance where Congress has created a
federal cause of action, which can be brought in state courts, where there exist
jurisdictionally appropriate  state courts, and where state law has been permitted to
discriminate  against the federal cause of action.  Although such an instance might
have occurred, it would be extremely rare.  The Supreme Court’s opinions from
Claflin v. Houseman, supra, 93 U.S. 130, 23 L.Ed. 833, until the present, all indicate
that state law cannot discriminate  against federal causes of action.  If Congress were
to authorize such an unusual and unprecedented result, one would expect that it
would do so expressly and unequiv ocally.  Absent such a clear congressional
statement, the normal rule precluding state law discrimination against federal causes
of action should apply.
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E.
Fina lly, even if Congress in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) had intended to authorize
a state legislature to discriminate  against the federal private cause of action created
by that statute (and, as we have held above, we reject such an interpretation), the
result in the case at bar would be no different.  The Court of Special Appeals, in our
view, erred in attributing to the Maryland General Assemb ly an intent to disallow the
federal private cause of action.
The Court of Special Appeals relied on the facts that § 14-1313 of the
Commercial Law Article does not provide for a private cause of action, and that the
General Assemb ly has chosen neither to amend it nor to take other action allowing
a private cause of action for unsolicited commercial facsimile transmissions.
Section 14-1313 of the Commercial Law Article was enacted two years prior
to the enactment of the federal statute, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).  Con sequ ently, § 14-
1313 could hardly show a state legislative intent to preclude the private cause of
action created by the federal statute.  Furthermore, no enactment by the General
Assemb ly since that time has reflected any legislative policy hostile to a private cause
of action on behalf of individuals aggrieved by conduct prohibited by the federal
Telephone Consumer Protection Act.  In addition, no other viable appellate opinion
supports the Court of Special Appeals’ view that a state legislature’s inaction
precludes state courts from entertaining a private civil action under 47 U.S.C.
§ 227(b)(3).
-33-
12
Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides as follows:
(continued...)
If we were to construe the federal statute, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), as authorizing
a state legislature to “opt out” of the private cause of action created by that statute,
and if we were to construe § 14-1313 of the Commercial Law Article, coupled with
the legislative inaction after the enactment of § 14-1313, as a decision by the General
Assemb ly to preclude Maryland courts from entertaining the federal cause of action,
the consequences would be quite strange.
The result of such interpretations would be a private federal cause of action by
an injured person for money damages without any forum in Maryland authorized to
entertain that cause of action.  The aggrieved individual could not sue in a federal
district court because Congress apparently vested exclusive jurisdiction in the state
courts over the cause of action.  He or she could not bring the action in Maryland
state courts because, under this interpretation of the federal and state statutory
enactments, the General Assemb ly would have directed Maryland courts to refrain
from entertaining the cause of action.  Fina lly, neither Congress nor the General
Assemb ly have provided for an adjudicatory administrative proceeding which the
injured party may bring.
This result might well present serious constitutional problems under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and/or Articles 2 and 19 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Cf. Robinson v. Bunch, 367 Md. 432, 442-447, 788
A.2d 636, 642-645 (2002). 12
-34-
12
(...continued)
“Article 19. Remedy for injury to person or property.
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person or property, ought
to have remedy by the course of the Law of the land, and ought to have justice and
right, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay,
according to the Law of the land.”
“We have consistently followed ‘the principle that a court will, whenever
reasonab ly possible, construe and apply a statute to avoid casting serious doubt upon
its constitu tionality.’” Becker v. State, 363 Md. 77, 92, 767 A.2d 816, 824 (2001),
quoting Yangming Transport v. Revon Produc ts, 311 Md. 496, 509, 536 A.2d 633,
640 (1988).  Or, stated another way by Chief Judge Murphy for the Court in Curran
v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 172, 638 A.2d 93, 104-105 (1994), “[i]f a statute is susceptible
of two reasonab le interpretations, one of which would involve a decision as to its
constitutionality, the preferred construction is that which avoids the determination of
constitu tionality.”  See also Edwards v. Corbin, 379 Md. 278, 293-294, 841 A.2d 845,
854 (2004); State v. Smith, 374 Md. 527, 565, 823 A.2d 664, 686 (2003) (Raker, J.,
concurring); Montrose Christian School v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 594-595, 770 A.2d
111, 128 (2001); Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 714, 725, 580 A.2d 176, 181 (1990), and
cases there cited.  This principle furnishes an additional strong reason for rejecting
the Court of Special Appeals’ interpretations of the federal and state statutes.
F.
 We hold, therefore, that Maryland trial courts have jurisdiction over the
private cause of action created by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).  Whether a particular case
-35-
under § 227(b)(3) should be brought in a circuit court or the District Court of
Maryland will depend upon the amount of money involved and the monetary
jurisdictional provisions, for civil actions at law for money damages, set forth in the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code.  See Lambros v.
Brown, supra, 184 Md. 350, 41 A.2d 78.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
AP P EALS 
R E V E R SE D  
A N D  
C A SE
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH
D I R E C T IO N S  
T O  
R E V E R S E  
T H E
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCU IT COURT
FOR 
MONTGOMERY 
COUNTY 
AND
REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCU IT
COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY
FOR 
FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS 
NOT
INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE
PAID BY THE RESPONDENTS.