Case Title: People's Counsel v. Loyola

Citation: 406 Md. 54

Docket Number: 137/07

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
People's Counsel for Baltimore County, et al. v. Loyola College in Maryland, No. 137, September
Term 2007.
ZONING - SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS - SCHULTZ V. PRITTS STANDARD FOR
EVALUATING APPLICATIONS FOR SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS DOES NOT REQUIRE
AN APPLICANT TO PRESENT, AND THE ZONING BODY TO CONSIDER, A
COMPARISON OF THE POTENTIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED USE
AT THE PROPOSED LOCATION TO THE POTENTIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE
PROPOSED USE AT OTHER, LIKE-ZONED LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE
JURISDICTION. 
Circuit Court for Baltimore Cou nty
Case No. 03-C-05-007730
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 137
September Term, 2007
                                                                             
PEOPLE'S COUNSEL FOR BALTIMORE
COUNTY, et al.
v.
LOYOLA COLLEGE IN MARYLAND
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
specially assigned)
Raker, Irma S. (Retired,
specially assigned)
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Harrell, J.,
Murphy, J., Concurs.
                                                                             
Filed:   September 9, 2008
The legacy in Maryland land use law of Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 432 A.2d 1319
(1981), has been beneficial and well-applied for the most part over the ensuing years.  The
synthesis of earlier cases threaded through its reasoning supplies a lucid explanation of the
legislative calculus for why some land uses, at the time of original adoption or later
amendment of the text of a zoning ordinance, are placed in the blessed category of permitted
uses in a zone or zones while other uses in the same zone or zones receive a more measured
imprimatur of presumptive compatibility as allowed only with the grant of a special
exception or conditional use.  Schultz also iterated how special exception uses are useful
zoning tools for fleshing out the grand design of land use planning, as well as postulated an
analytical paradigm for how individual special exception applications are to be evaluated.
In carrying-out the latter goal, however, some of the language of Judge Davidson's opinion
for the Court in Schultz occasionally has been mis-perceived by subsequent appellate courts
and frequently misunderstood by some attorneys, planners, governmental authorities, and
other citizens.  We aim in the present case to greater clarity in explaining the proper
evaluative framework for discrete special exception/conditional use applications and
dispelling any lingering mis-understandings of what the Court truly intended when it filed
the opinion in Schultz twenty-seven years ago.
Facts and Procedural History
In October 2001, Loyola College in Maryland ("Loyola") contracted to purchase a
fifty-three acre parcel (the Property) in northern Baltimore County for the purpose of
constructing several buildings to be used for weekend spiritual retreats.  The Property is
1Petitioners here concede that the proposed Retreat Center falls within the special exception
regulatory scheme as a "college," thus requiring a special exception.
2Prior to the hearing, Loyola entered into a set of restrictive covenants with two community
organizations operating in northern Baltimore County, Maryland Line Area Association and Parkton
Area Preservation, Inc., restricting Loyola's use of the Property.  The agreement provided, inter alia,
that Loyola will not develop the Property beyond the then proposed development plan for a period
(continued...)
2
located in the R.C.2 (Resource Conservation) zone.  According to the Baltimore County
Zoning Regulations (BCZR) § 1A01.1(B), the purpose of the Resource Conservation zone
is "to foster conditions favorable to a continued agricultural use of the productive agricultural
areas of Baltimore County by preventing incompatible forms and degrees of urban uses."
Among the permitted uses allowed as of right in the R.C.2 zone are "one-family detached"
dwellings, "agricultural operations," "open space," and "public schools."  BCZR § 1A01.2.
BCZR § 1A01.2(C) allows "churches or other buildings for religious worship," "camps,
including day camps," and "schools, including but not limited to private preparatory schools,
colleges, business and trade schools, conservatories or other fine arts schools" as special
exceptions in the R.C.2 zone.
 In early 2004, Loyola submitted to Baltimore County a plan to develop the Property
into a Retreat Center.  The plan proposed development of just over ten of the fifty-three acres
of the Property, leaving the balance in an "as is" state.  Loyola concurrently filed a petition
for special exception for the Retreat Center as a school or college, church, or camp.1  The
Baltimore County Zoning Commissioner/Hearing Officer, in April 2004, conducted a three-
day hearing2 on the development plan and special exception petition.  The hearing officer
2(...continued)
of twenty-five years and certain buildings in the development will not be constructed for at least ten
years.  The covenants also restricted the operation of the Retreat Center.  Under the terms of the
agreement, Loyola is prohibited from operating the Retreat Center more than 160 days per year,
hosting weddings or similar events, permitting storage or consumption of alcoholic beverages other
than sacramental wine, or permitting Loyola students to be present on the Property without
supervision from Loyola faculty or staff.  In exchange for these promises, Maryland Line Area
Association and Parkton Area Preservation, Inc. agreed not to oppose Loyola's development plan and
petition for a special exception.  
3There are essentially two parties in the present litigation standing in opposition to Loyola's
initiative,  People's Counsel for Baltimore County ("People's Counsel") and Citizens Against Loyola
Multi-use Center ("Citizens").  Collectively, we shall refer to the opponents as Petitioners.  
4It appears that People's Counsel for Baltimore County participated in the proceedings before
the Board of Appeals in opposition to the development plan.  He did not take a position then with
regard to Loyola's request for a special exception.
5BCZR § 501.6 states that "[a]ppeals from the Zoning Commissioner shall be heard by the
board of zoning appeals de novo."
6The development plan is not before us.
7The evidence presented, or lack thereof, at the hearing regarding the special exception forms
the basis of the controversy in this case.  It will be summarized in some detail infra. 
3
issued an opinion and order on 10 June 2004 approving the development plan and granting
the special exception.  A group of citizens acting individually and collectively as Citizens
Against Loyola Multi-use Center ("Citizens")3 appealed to the Baltimore County Board of
Appeals (Board of Appeals).4  The Board of Appeals held a de novo hearing5 regarding the
special exception and an appeal on the record regarding the development plan.6  The
combined hearing continued over a total of six days between 15 September  2004 and 4
January 2005.7  
Both sides presented voluminous evidence regarding the effect that the proposed
4
special exception use would have on the surrounding neighborhood.  Because Petitioners
narrowed the legal issue before this Court in their Petition for Certiorari, we shall summarize
only the relevant evidence presented at the hearing.  Loyola produced evidence, which the
Board of Appeals credited, that the impacts of the proposed use on agriculture would be
minimal.  Loyola pointed out that the proposed Retreat Center would occupy only 10.18 acres
of land, less than twenty percent of the Property.  The remainder of the Property would be
used for agriculture or open space.  Robert Sheelsey, an environmental consultant and
licensed sanitarian, testified for Loyola that the Property is located "right on the fringe" of
the agricultural zone and within the Interstate 83 corridor.  Based on this evidence, the Board
of Appeals concluded that the Retreat Center "will not harm agricultural activity in the
vicinity."  
Loyola presented evidence that the outdoor lighting at the Retreat Center would
be "dark skies compliant."  Two additional experts testified on behalf of Loyola that the
Retreat Center would not be detrimental to the neighborhood because "it was a very low
intensity use" of the Property.
Substantial testimony at the hearing concerned the onsite septic system and water
usage of the Retreat Center.  Sheelsey testified that there are proper soils for septic discharge
in the proposed septic field.  He further explained that the discharge from the septic system
would undergo "biological/biochemical pretreatment" prior to discharge, making the
discharge "most likely 99% clear and treated."  The proposed septic discharge system would
contain a "flow equalization" mechanism to account for the nature of the use of the Retreat
5
Center (heavy use for a few days followed by no use at all for the remainder of the week).
Regarding water usage, Thomas Mills, an expert geologist, testified for Loyola that the
"supply of groundwater was more than adequate" for the Retreat Center, even under drought
scenarios, and that the Retreat Center's water usage would not affect neighboring wells.  
There was controversy over the "thermal impacts" from proposed stormwater ponds
at the Retreat Center.  Citizens argued that discharges from the stormwater detention ponds
would warm a tributary to the Fourth Mine Branch, described as a local trout stream,
impairing the ability of the trout to reproduce.  Professor Edward J. Bouwer of The Johns
Hopkins University and Charles Gougeon of the Maryland Department of Natural Resources
testified as to their belief that the run-off from the stormwater ponds would warm the
tributary.  Loyola countered with the testimony of an ecologist, Joseph Berg, Jr.  Berg
testified that the tributary would not be a sustainable habitat for trout in any event.  In
addition, he testified that any impact from rain run-off would be minimal.  In its written
opinion, the Board of Appeals stated that it "was not persuaded by the testimony of Professor
Bouwer or Mr. Gougeon . . . ."
The parties also disputed the impact of nitrogen and phosphorous discharges from the
septic system.  Citizens presented the testimony of Professor Brian Reed of the University
of Maryland.  He took the position that guidelines from the Maryland Department of the
Environment required that septic systems that discharged over 5,000 gallons per day needed
further study.  Sheesley, in rebuttal testimony, pointed out that, with the proposed flow
8We will more fully analyze, infra, the particular language in Schultz that prompts the main
(continued...)
6
equalization mechanism in place, the septic system would discharge only 2,881 gallons per
day.  He also identified  a study that indicated that the Retreat Center's nitrogen discharge is
below the threshold deemed safe for drinking water.  The Board found that Loyola met its
burden regarding the nitrogen and phosphorous impacts.  
Petitioners described Stablersville Road, the main ingress/egress public road for the
Retreat Center, as being a narrow country road with no shoulder and steep banks on both
sides.  It was claimed to be impossible for traffic to pass safely around slow-moving farm
vehicles that used the road to move from property to property.  Terrence Sawyer, Vice
President of Administration at Loyola, responded with the various steps Loyola will take to
minimize the traffic impact from the Retreat Center.  Students will arrive in vans or buses
owned by Loyola.  Deliveries and pickups would be made between the hours of 7:00 A.M.
and 4:00 P.M.  Loyola also produced a local Traffic Impact Analysis prepared by Wes
Guckert, an expert on traffic engineering.  Guckert testified that, assuming a worst case
traffic scenario from the Retreat Center use, local critical intersections would continue to
operate "at level A service" (the best volume operation level) without any detrimental effect.
The Board of Appeals found his testimony to be credible and noted that "Loyola has made
a concerted effort to keep traffic to and from the site to a bare minimum." 
Citizens also presented certain evidence that the Board of Appeals chose not to
consider.  Citizens argued that the standard established in Schultz 8 for special exception
8(...continued)
issue in the present case:
We now hold that the appropriate standard to be used in determining
whether a requested special exception use would have an adverse
effect and, therefore, should be denied is whether there are facts and
circumstances that show that the particular use proposed at the
particular location proposed would have any adverse effects above
and beyond those inherently associated with such a special exception
use irrespective of its location within the zone.
Schultz, 291 Md. at 22-23, 432 A.2d at 1331.
9As Loyola noted in its brief to this Court, the exact formulation of Petitioners' argument has
varied somewhat through different stages of this litigation.  Before the Board of Appeals and in the
Circuit Court, Citizens argued that the special exception applicant must show that there are no other
locations within the R.C.2 zone where the proposed use would have less of an adverse impact.  In
this Court, however, Petitioners contend that the Board must consider the effects of the proposed use
as if it were proposed at a reasonable number of other locations within the R.C.2 zone.  The
evolution (or inconsistency) in Petitioners' argument over time is irrelevant to the resolution of the
underlying legal issue.  The core of Petitioners' legal argument remains the same.  They contend that
some comparative geographic analysis of impacts of the proposed use at other R.C.2 sites is required
under Schultz.  The Board of Appeals refused, in error Petitioners argue, to require from Loyola or
consider from Petitioners any comparative geographic analysis evidence.  Thus, the various
permutations of Petitioners' argument do not detract from the distinct and narrow legal issue before
us in the present case.  If Loyola is required to present a comparative geographic impact analysis,
Loyola failed, as a matter of law, to meet its burden before the Board of Appeals.  Thus, if any such
comparative analysis is required, the decision of the Board of Appeals must be reversed. 
7
applicants required Loyola to show that there are no other locations within the R.C.2 zone
in Baltimore County where the proposed use would have less of an adverse effect than on the
local neighborhood of the Property.9  The Board of Appeals dismissed this argument, noting:
We disagree with [Petitioners'] argument that [the
Schultz] standard should be interpreted to mean that, as long as
there are other locations in the zone in which certain adverse
effects would be less adverse, the use should be denied in the
subject location.  The standard is very clear that only the general
vicinity of the subject property is to be taken into account.
Therefore, the fact that there are wider roads in other areas of
10BCZR § 502.1 lists the criteria to be considered by the Board of Appeals in evaluating an
application for a special exception.  Section 502.1 is discussed infra pages 13-14.  
11Petitioners, particularly People's Counsel, discuss at length in their briefs to this Court the
additional testimony of a local resident and expert farmer, Wayne McGinnis.  It appears to us,
however, that most of McGinnis's testimony focused on the adverse effects, particularly traffic and
agriculture-related ones, of the Retreat Center on the area immediately surrounding the Property.
He did not compare the adverse effects of the Retreat Center at the Property to adverse effects of the
Retreat Center if it were located at other R.C.2 sites–the heart of the legal issue in this appeal.  His
testimony appears to have been afforded very little weight by the Board of Appeals in this regard.
Petitioners, in their Petition for Writ of Certiorari, did not include any question presented that could
be described fairly as encompassing a challenge to the weight afforded to McGinnis's testimony or
any of the Board's factual findings that were contrary to McGinnis's testimony.  
12None of these areas could be described fairly as belonging to the same "neighborhood" as
the Property.  Each alternative site suggested by Solomon appears to be  at least nine miles away
from the Property.
8
the R.C.2 zone, or other areas of the zone without Class 3 trout
streams, are beside the point.  The Board must examine each
criterion of BCZR Section 502.1[10] and determine whether the
impacts in the subject location are above and beyond those
inherent to the use–in this case, a college facility–itself.  
Accordingly, the Board ignored evidence presented by Petitioners that there were
other areas in the R.C.2 zone in Baltimore County that would be less adversely affected by
the proposed use than the area surrounding the Property.  Paul Solomon11 testified to that
effect on behalf of Petitioners.  After explaining his methodology in searching for alternative
locations, Solomon identified four other areas within the R.C.2 zone where the proposed use
could be located "without the impact on the subject area."  Specifically, Solomon identified
the "Hanover Pike area in the west, the Granite area to the south, the Shawan Road area in
the north central section, and the Bird River area to the southeast."12  Solomon argued that
the proposed use would have the least amount of adverse impact in areas where farms are
13It appears from the record that Jones was referring to pavement width, rather than right-of-
way width.
9
smaller in size, and therefore less productive, and where there already were existing
intrusions or developments within the adjacent farming community.  Solomon surveyed 42
tax maps where the properties predominately were in the R.C.2 zone and where farming
remained the central activity.  He found that the area around the Property had the second
highest number of parcels in agricultural use and the eighth largest average size of individual
parcels.  Therefore, he argued, the adverse effect of the Retreat Center would be particularly
dramatic in its proposed location compared with the alternative R.C.2 sites he found and
surveyed elsewhere in Baltimore County.
Lynne Jones also testified in opposition to the Retreat Center.  She represented that
she surveyed 28 roads traversing areas in largely R.C.2-zoned neighborhoods in Baltimore
County.  She found that the widths of the 28 roads ranged from 20 feet to 24 feet.13  Some
had shoulders extending up to nine feet wide.  By comparison, Stablersville Road in the
vicinity of the proposed Retreat Center is only 17 to 19 feet wide and lacks shoulders.
Loyola did not dispute Jones's testimony.
Richard Klein, an environmental expert, testified regarding other potential sites for
the proposed use in the R.C.2 zone elsewhere in the County.  He identified vacant sites in the
R.C.2 zone that consisted of ten acres or more, were not owned by a government agency, and
were not located in a watershed with trout streams.  He found four parcels in the Bird River
area and 12 in the Granite area.  At these locations, he argued, there would be no possible
14The Circuit Court ultimately noted that the interests and arguments of Citizens and People's
Counsel "overlap substantially."  The Circuit Court addressed the issues raised in both petitions in
a single memorandum opinion and order.  
10
adverse impact from the proposed use on the (nonexistent) local trout populations.
Loyola, by contrast, presented no evidence regarding how its Retreat Center proposal
would operate at other sites in Baltimore County in the R.C.2 zone.  Thus, Solomon's,
Jones's, and Klein's testimonies largely were uncontradicted by the applicant for the special
exception and ignored by the Board.
The Board of Appeals held public deliberations on 24 March 2005.  On 21 June 2005,
the Board, in a written opinion, affirmed the conclusions of the hearing officer with regard
to the development plan and granted Loyola's petition for a special exception as a "college."
Citizens timely filed, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, a Petition for Judicial
Review of the Board of Appeals's decision.  People's Counsel filed a Petition for Judicial
Review as well.14  The Circuit Court remanded the case to the Board of Appeals for further
action.  Specifically, the Circuit Court held that the "appropriate geographic scope of inquiry
is a broad, comprehensive, zone-wide analysis."  Thus, the Circuit Court concluded that the
Board "did err as a matter of law and misapplied the special exception standards of Schultz
in restricting its geographic scope of inquiry."  Loyola appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals.  In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court vacated the Circuit
Court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to affirm the decision of the Board
of Appeals.  We granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by Citizens and People's
15Specifically, the three questions presented by the Petition for Writ of Certiorari were:
1.  Whether the County Board of Appeals erred as a matter of law,
misapplied, undermined, and rendered nugatory the special exception
standards of Schultz v. Pritts and its progeny when it artificially
narrowed its geographic scope of inquiry, refused to consider or
compare area adverse impacts relative to other locations "anywhere
within the zone," or "irrespective of its location within the zone," and
disregarded as irrelevant undisputed testimony of the greater adverse
area impact of Loyola's use at the Parkton site than at other potential
locations in the Agricultural Zone in Baltimore County?
2.  Did Loyola's tactical choice not to do any comparative geographic
evaluation of area adverse impacts, insistence on the irrelevance of
the comparative analysis by the citizens' planning expert, and demand
for approval, regardless, result in a failure to produce evidence legally
sufficient to meet the Schultz standards?  Should the [County Board
of Appeals], therefore, have denied the special exception as a matter
of law?
3.  Did the Court of Special Appeals depart from reported precedents
implementing a reasonable comparative analysis and misstate
People's Counsel's position as demanding an impractical "minimum
impact" criterion and evaluation of every property in the zone in order
to rationalize the [County Board of Appeals's] grant of the special
exception?
16As Citizens candidly noted in their reply-brief, "[t]his appeal presents a purely legal
question concerning the requirements of the Schultz v. Pritts test."
11
Counsel.  403 Md. 612, 943 A.2d 1244 (2008).  Although the Petition presents three
questions for our review,15 all three questions share a common legal theme.16  Thus, the sole
legal issue in this case properly may be distilled into a sole question presented: 
Does Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 432 A.2d 1319 (1981), require
that, before of a special exception may be granted, an applicant
must adduce evidence of, and the zoning body must consider, a
comparison of the potential adverse effects of the proposed use
at the proposed location to the potential adverse effects of the
proposed use at other, similarly-zoned locations throughout the
12
jurisdiction?
We conclude that Schultz imposes no such requirement.  Thus, we affirm the judgment
of the Court of Special Appeals.  
Standard of Review
When we review the final decision of an administrative agency, such as the Board of
Appeals, we look "through the circuit court's and intermediate appellate court's decisions,
although applying the same standards of review, and evaluate[] the decision of the agency."
People's Counsel for Balt. County v. Surina, 400 Md. 662, 681, 929 A.2d 899, 910 (2007).
"Judicial review of administrative agency action is narrow. The court's task on review is not
to substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative
agency . . . ."  United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People's Counsel for Balt. County, 336 Md. 569,
576-77, 650 A.2d 226, 230 (1994) (quotation omitted).  In our review, "we inquire whether
the zoning body's determination was supported by 'such evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion . . . .'"  Surina, 400 Md. at 681, 929 A.2d at 910
(quoting Mayor of Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co., 284 Md. 383, 398, 396 A.2d
1080, 1089 (1979)).  "As we have frequently indicated, the order of an administrative agency,
such as a county zoning board, must be upheld on review if it is not premised upon an error
of law and if the agency's conclusions reasonably may be based upon the facts proven."  Ad
+ Soil, Inc. v. County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County,  307 Md. 307, 338, 513 A.2d 893,
17It is this standard of review that frames the analysis in this case.  Petitioners' sole issue
raised in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is that the Board of Appeals erred in applying the Schultz
v. Pritts standard.  Petitioners abandoned their arguments that the Board of Appeals's factual findings
were incorrect. 
13
909 (1986) (internal quotation omitted).17
There is some dispute mounted in the present case as to the appropriate standard of
review to be afforded the Board of Appeals's legal conclusions.  Loyola argues that the Board
of Appeals's legal analysis is to be afforded some deference.  To support this proposition,
Loyola relies on Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158, 172, 783 A.2d 169, 177 (2001), where we
stated that "[e]ven with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be
accorded the position of the administrative agency.  Thus, an administrative agency's
interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily
be given considerable weight by reviewing courts."  This argument is without merit.  By its
own terms, the deference "often . . . accorded" an agency's interpretation extends only to the
application of the statutes or regulations that the agency administers.  The controversy before
us concerns the proper application and analysis of caselaw, specifically Schultz v. Pritts and
its progeny.  This is a purely legal issue uniquely within the ken of a reviewing court.
"Generally, a decision of an administrative agency, including a local zoning board, is owed
no deference when its conclusions are based upon an error of law."  Belvoir Farms
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. North, 355 Md. 259, 267-68, 734 A.2d 227, 232 (1999).  Thus,
the Board of Appeals's legal conclusions, if erroneous, are entitled to no deference.   
14
Standards Governing Special Exceptions
As noted earlier, § 502.1 of the BCZR provides:
Before any special exception may be granted, it must
appear that the use for which the special exception is requested
will not: 
A.  Be detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare
of the locality involved; 
B.  Tend to create congestion in roads, streets or alleys
therein; 
C.  Create a potential hazard from fire, panic or other
danger; 
D.  Tend to overcrowd land and cause undue
concentration of population; 
E.  Interfere with adequate provisions for schools, parks,
water, sewerage, transportation or other public
requirements, conveniences or improvements; 
F.  Interfere with adequate light and air;
G.  Be inconsistent with the purposes of the property's
zoning classification nor in any other way inconsistent
with the spirit and intent of these Zoning Regulations;
H.  Be inconsistent with the impermeable surface and
vegetative retention provisions of these Zoning
Regulations; nor
I.  Be detrimental to the environmental and natural
resources of the site and vicinity including forests,
streams, wetlands, aquifers and floodplains in an R.C.2,
R.C.4, R.C.5 or R.C.7 Zone.
Within each individual factor, including the general factor in § 502.1(A) of the BCZR,
15
lurks another test, the Schultz v. Pritts standard.  Harford County v. Earl E. Preston, Jr., Inc.,
322 Md. 493, 500, 588 A.2d 772, 776 (1991) (noting that the Schultz v. Pritts test applies
"with respect to a given factor" (quoting Gotach Ctr. for Health v. Bd. of County Comm'rs
of Frederick County,  60 Md. App. 477, 484-85, 483 A.2d 786, 790 (1984))); Mossburg v.
Montgomery County, 107 Md. App. 1, 21, 666 A.2d 1253, 1263 (1995) (noting that the test
announced in Schultz essentially adds language to statutory factors to be considered in
evaluating proposed special exceptions).  In this respect, the Schultz analytical paradigm is
not a second, separate test (in addition to the statutory requirements) that an applicant must
meet in order to qualify for the grant of a special exception.  Rather, the Schultz explication
speaks to two different contexts, one by which a legislative body decides to classify a
particular use as requiring the grant of a special exception before it may be established in a
given zone, and a second one by which individual applications for special exceptions are to
be evaluated by the zoning body delegated with responsibility to consider and act on those
applications in accordance with criteria promulgated in the zoning ordinance.  See Earl E.
Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. at 500, 588 A.2d at 776 (noting that the Schultz test is "normally
regarded as consistent with general legislative intent" (quoting Gotach,  60 Md. App. at
484-85, 483 A.2d at 790)); see also  Earl E. Preston, Jr., Inc., 322 Md. at 503, 588 A.2d at
777 ("Reading all of the provisions which pertain to special exceptions together, as we must
to ascertain the intention of the County Council, we find no intention on the part of the
[Harford] County Council to substitute a Gowl [v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Md. App. 410,
18In Gowl v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Md. App. 410, 417, 341 A.2d 832, 836 (1975), the
Court of Special Appeals held that the adverse effects caused by a proposed use in an "application
for a special exception ought to be measured against that which could arise under permissible use
. . . ."  The Gowl test was rejected by this Court in Schultz. 
16
341 A.2d 832 (1975)][18] test for the test applicable generally for measuring the adverse
impact of a proposed special exception use which we adopted in Schultz.").  We shall explain
how we arrived at this conclusion in some necessary detail.
In The Beginning . . .
In Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S. Ct. 114,
121, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Euclid's (a suburb of Cleveland)
comprehensive zoning ordinance against a challenge brought by a local landowner.  Forever
named Euclidean zoning, the type of zoning regulations enacted by Euclid represented a
"fairly static and rigid form of zoning."  Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises,
Inc., 372 Md. 514, 534, 814 A.2d 469, 480 (2002) (Rylyns).  "Generally, by means of
Euclidean zoning, a municipality divides an area geographically into particular use districts,
specifying certain uses for each district.  'Each district or zone is dedicated to a particular
purpose, either residential, commercial, or industrial,' and the 'zones appear on the
municipality's official zoning map.'"  Rouse-Fairwood Dev. Ltd. P'ship v. Supervisor of
Assessments for Prince George's County, 138 Md. App. 589, 623, 773 A.2d 535, 555 (2001)
(quoting 5 ZIEGLER, RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 63.01 (4th Ed. Rev.
1994)).  "Euclidian zoning is designed to achieve stability in land use planning and zoning
and to be a comparatively inflexible, self-executing mechanism which, once in place, allows
19The terms "special exception" and "conditional use" are essentially interchangeable.  See
Md. Overpak Corp. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 395 Md. 16, 30 n.12, 909 A.2d 235, 243 n.12
(2006) (stating that "a 'conditional use' has an alias by which it is sometimes known elsewhere in
Maryland, a 'special exception,' although the two terms are largely synonymous"); Futoryan v. Balt.,
150 Md. App. 157, 159, 819 A.2d 1074, 1075 (2003) ("Although we will in this opinion be using
the term 'conditional use' some of the case law we cite may use the term 'special exception.'  They
mean exactly the same thing."); 
Lucas v. People's Counsel For Balt. County, 147 Md. App. 209, 227
n.20, 807 A.2d 1176, 1187 n.20 (2002) ("In Maryland, the terms 'special exception' and 'conditional
use' are effectively synonymous.").
17
for little modification beyond self-contained procedures for predetermined exceptions or
variances." Rylyns, 372 Md. at 534, 814 A.2d at 481.
"Baltimore County is a charter county pursuant to Article XI-A of the Maryland
Constitution."  United Parcel Servs., Inc., 336 Md. at 581, 650 A.2d at 232.  As a charter
county, Maryland Code (1957, 2005 Repl. Vol.), Article 25A, § 5(X)(1)(i) authorizes
Baltimore County to enact local laws for the protection and promotion of public safety,
health, morals, and welfare, relating to zoning and planning.  See also Earl E. Preston, Jr.,
Inc., 322 Md. at 501, 588 A.2d at 776 (noting that a charter county was "authorized to divide
the county into use districts and to determine which uses would be permitted within each
district as a matter of right (permitted uses) and which uses would only be permitted under
certain conditions (special exceptions)"); Glascock v. Balt. County, 321 Md. 118, 121, 581
A.2d 822, 824 (1990) (stating that Maryland Code (1957, 2005 Repl. Vol.), Article 25A, §
5(X) "grants Baltimore County its authority to enact a zoning ordinance").
The zoning device at the heart of the present case, the special exception,19 introduces
some flexibility to a "fairly static and rigid" Euclidean zoning scheme.  See Rylyns, 372 Md.
20We should not be thought to understand that special exception uses are only countenanced
in Euclidean zones.  Similar provisions exist in floating zones.  See, e.g., Prince George's County
Code § 27-547 (listing permitted uses and special exception uses for floating mixed-use zones).  
21Several earlier cases mentioned the use of the special exception device, but only in passing,
while addressing the constitutional or legal validity of a zoning ordinance.  See, e.g., Jack Lewis,
Inc., v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 164 Md. 146, 164 A. 220 (1933); Sugar v. N. Balt.
Methodist Protestant Church, 164 Md. 487, 495, 165 A. 703 (1933).
18
at 541, 814 A.2d at 485 (2002) ("Another mechanism allowing some flexibility in the land
use process, without abandoning the uniformity principle, is the 'special exception' or
'conditional use.'").  The special exception adds flexibility to a comprehensive legislative
zoning scheme by serving as a "middle ground" between permitted uses and prohibited uses
in a particular zone.  Permitted and prohibited uses serve as binary, polar opposites in a
zoning scheme.  A permitted use in a given zone is permitted as of right within the zone,
without regard to any potential or actual adverse effect that the use will have on neighboring
properties.  A special exception, by contrast, is merely deemed prima facie compatible in a
given zone.  The special exception requires a case-by-case evaluation by an administrative
zoning body or officer according to legislatively-defined standards.  That case-by-case
evaluation is what enables special exception uses to achieve some flexibility in an otherwise
semi-rigid comprehensive legislative zoning scheme.20
History of the Special Exception in Maryland
One of our earliest cases to mention and discuss meaningfully the special exception
as a zoning tool21 is Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 49 A.2d 799
19
(1946) (Heath I), although the case apparently uses the term in a different sense than it is
used today.  In Heath I, nearby landowners challenged the Baltimore City Board of Zoning
Appeals's decision to permit their neighbor to erect a two-car garage.  At the time, the
Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance permitted the Board of Zoning Appeals to grant special
exceptions to such garages in residential areas.  We noted that an "'exception' within the
meaning of a zoning ordinance is a dispensation permissible where the Board of Zoning
Appeals finds existing those facts and circumstances specified in the ordinance as sufficient
to warrant a deviation from the general rule."  Heath I, 187 Md. at 303, 49 A.2d at 803.  The
Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance "empower[ed] the Board of Zoning Appeals to make
special exceptions or variances only where the proposed building, alteration, or use 'shall not
create hazards from fire or disease or shall not menace the public health, security, or morals.'
It then provides that the board, in passing upon applications for special exceptions or
variances as to use, height, or area, shall give consideration to the various factors enumerated
in [the Zoning Ordinance]."  Heath I, 187 Md. at  302-03, 49 A.2d at 803.  Although we held
that the Board of Zoning Appeals had authority to grant the special exception, we reversed
its decision because it failed to fairly describe the rationale and supporting facts for its
decision.  We noted that 
in passing on an application for a special exception in a
residential use district, the Board of Zoning Appeals must take
into consideration all pertinent factors enumerated in Section 1,
such as fire hazards, traffic problems, transportation
requirements and facilities, streets and paving, and schools,
parks and playgrounds, and its action must be reasonable in the
22"'A variance refers to administrative relief which may be granted from the strict application
of a particular development limitation in the zoning ordinance (i.e., setback, area and height
limitations, etc.).'"  Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enterprises, Inc., 372 Md. 514, 537, 814
A.2d 469, 482 (2002) (quoting STANLEY D. ABRAMS, GUIDE TO MARYLAND ZONING DECISIONS, §
11.1 (3d ed., Michie 1992)).
20
light of these and all other pertinent facts.  In this case the board
announced merely that it had 'made a study of the premises and
neighborhood, and there was no supporting evidence upon
which to base a rational judgment.
Heath I, 187 Md. at  305, 49 A.2d at 804.
From a modern vantage point, the zoning device at the heart of Heath I actually
resembles more the notion of a variance.  When the case again came to the Court of Appeals
after remand, the Court, applying an analysis grounded in hardship consideration, treated the
granting of the special exception as if the applicant were seeking a variance.22  Heath v.
Mayor & City Council of Balt., 190 Md. 478, 483-484, 58 A.2d 896, 898 (1948) (Heath II).
This appears to have been a frequent conflation in cases from that era.  The use of the term
"special exception" in the Heath cases seems to have had a different meaning than the one
given to the phrase by more recent Maryland land use jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Easter v.
Mayor & City Council of Balt., 195 Md. 395, 400, 73 A.2d 491, 492 (1950) ("The burden of
showing facts to justify a[] [special] exception or variance rests upon the applicant, and it
must be shown that the hardship affects the particular premises and is not common to other
property in the neighborhood."); Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Biermann, 187 Md. 514,
50 A.2d 804; Cleland v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 198 Md. 440, 444, 84 A.2d 49, 51
(1951).  For example, in Gleason v. Keswick Imp. Ass'n, 197 Md. 46, 50, 78 A.2d 164, 165
23Merlands Club requires that a special exception applicant show that the proposed use is in
"general harmony with the zoning plan."  Merlands Club, 202 Md. at 290, 96 A.2d at 265.  The
reference to the "zoning plan" in Merlands Club, and later zoning opinions of this Court and others,
(continued...)
21
(1951), the Court repeatedly noted that the applicants in that case were seeking a "special
exception."  Over 50 years later, in analyzing Gleason, we deduced that the opinion actually
addressed a zoning re-classification, variance, or "alternate classification possibility."
Richard Roeser Prof'l Builder, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 368 Md. 294, 299, 793 A.2d
545, 549 (2002); see also Zengerle v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Frederick County, 262 Md.
1, 21, 276 A.2d 646, 656 (1971) (describing Gleason as a variance case).  The distinction
between a variance and special exception was not clarified definitively in our caselaw until
Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, Inc., 202 Md. 279, 96 A.2d 261 (1953) (Merlands
Club).
In Merlands Club,, we reviewed the refusal by the Board of Appeals of Montgomery
County to grant a special exception for a private recreational club.  In reversing the Board's
decision, we held that the special exception provision in the zoning ordinance "delegate[s]
to the Zoning Board a limited authority to permit enumerated uses which the legislative body
finds in effect prima facie properly residential, absent any fact or circumstance in a particular
case which would change this presumptive finding.  The duties given the Board are to judge
whether the neighboring properties and the general neighborhood would be adversely
affected, and whether the use, in the particular case, is in harmony with the general purpose
and intent of the zoning plan.[23]" Merlands Club, 202 Md. at 287-88, 96 A.2d at 264
23(...continued)
appears to have caused some confusion as to with which "plan" a special exception must be in
"general harmony."  Part of this confusion stems from the less than meticulous differentiation of the
variety of treatments of this and similar phrases in zoning ordinances and regulations of different
counties and municipalities Maryland Courts have been called upon to interpret.  In addition, the
language from Merlands Club requiring a special exception applicant to show some level of
relativity to a "zoning plan" has become part of a boilerplate chant frequently and indiscriminately
repeated in later zoning opinions.  That unqualified repetition, occasionally lacking in judicial
precision, is also responsible for the confusion.  We shall endeavor to clarify the point here.
In Merlands Club, a Montgomery County zoning ordinance provision explicitly required that
decisions of the Board of Appeals regarding special exceptions "be in harmony with the general
purpose and intent of the zone plan embodied in these Zoning Regulations and the Zoning Map."
Merlands Club, 202 Md. at 283, 96 A.2d at 262.  Thus, the language in Merlands Club requiring
"general harmony with the zoning plan" is referring to the zoning ordinance text and the legal
document establishing the current zoning of every property in the jurisdiction, the zoning map–not
to a land planning document such as a master plan, general plan, or functional master plan. Most
subsequent cases utilizing this, or similar, language also refer to the zoning ordinance and/or the
zoning map when employing the same or similar term. 
For example, Oursler v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 204 Md. 397, 402,
104 A.2d 568, 570 (1954), cites Merlands Club as support for the assertion that a special exception
applicant "must show only that the exception would be in harmony with the zoning plan." In
describing the statutory authorization for special exceptions in Baltimore County, we noted that "[i]n
1943 the Legislature passed an amendment to the Zoning Enabling Act authorizing the County
Commissioners to provide that the Zoning Commissioner may make special exceptions to the Zoning
Regulations in harmony with their general purposes and intent."  Oursler, 204 Md. at  400, 104 A.2d
at 569.  In Crowther, Inc. v. Johnson, 225 Md. 379, 385, 170 A.2d 768, 771 (1961), we cited to the
language in Oursler and Merlands Club when considering testimony that a proposed special
exception would be "out of step with the comprehensive zoning plan."  See also Crowther, 225 Md.
at 383, 170 A.2d 768, 770 (noting that a zoning body "is given a wide latitude of discretion in
passing upon special exceptions so long as the resulting use is in harmony with the general purpose
and intent of the zoning plan and will not adversely affect the use of neighboring properties and the
general plan of the neighborhood as provided by the zoning ordinance"  (emphasis added)).
In fact, we have characterized a zoning ordinance as a comprehensive plan.  In Huff v. Board
of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 214 Md. 48, 51, 133 A.2d 83, 85 (1957), we held that a
comprehensive zoning ordinance constituted a "comprehensive plan."  We noted the statutory
authority of the county to enact zoning laws, stating that the "statute now found in the Code of Public
Local Laws of Baltimore County, 1955, Title 30, Sec. 532, provided, at the times here material, that
the County Commissioners were empowered to enact zoning regulations '. . . in accordance with a
comprehensive plan.'" Opponents of a zoning reclassification argued that the reclassification was
improper because it was not "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" as required by the statute.
We held that "the Baltimore County zoning regulations of 1955, including the provisions as to
(continued...)
22
23(...continued)
Manufacturing, Restricted zones, constitute a comprehensive plan."  Huff, 214 Md. 48, 59, 133 A.2d
83, 89.
In Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41, 55, 310 A.2d 543, 551 (1973), we noted that a proposed
use could not be approved as a special exception if it caused "disharmony to the functioning of the
comprehensive plan."  The comprehensive plan referred to in Turner was the zoning ordinance.  The
Turner opinion relied on two cases for this language, Merlands Club, discussed supra, and Rockville
Fuel & Feed Co. v. Board of Appeals of City of Gaithersburg, 257 Md. 183, 262 A.2d 499 (1970).
Rockville Fuel, in turn, relied upon Merlands Club and Oursler in its discussion of the requirement
that a special exception conform to a zoning plan.  See also Rockville Fuel, 257 Md. at 190, 262
A.2d at 503 ("The legislative body of the City of Gaithersburg has in effect said that if certain
standards and requirements enumerated in the ordinance are met in a particular case, the various
special exceptions specifically authorized are a part of the comprehensive zoning plan and therefore
promote the health, safety and general welfare, to the same extent as do the uses permitted as of right
in the zone involved."  (emphasis added)).  Thus, the "comprehensive plan" referred to in Turner is
the zoning ordinance.  See also Turner, 270 Md. at 54, 310 A.2d at 550 (noting that "the conditional
use or special exception, as it is generally called, is a part of the comprehensive zoning plan sharing
the presumption that as such it is in the interest of the general welfare and, therefore, valid."
(emphasis added)).
In Anderson v. Sawyer, 23 Md. App. 612, 617, 329 A.2d 716, 720 (1974), Judge Rita
Davidson noted that a proposed use must be in harmony with the "comprehensive plan."  That
reference, as well, was to the county zoning ordinance as a whole.  The Court of Special Appeals
stated:
But in the instant case the legislature of Baltimore County has
determined that as part of its comprehensive plan funeral homes are
to be allowed in residential zones notwithstanding their inherent
deleterious effects.  By defining a funeral home as an appropriate use
by way of special exception, the legislature of Baltimore County has,
in essence, declared that such uses, if they satisfy the other specific
requirements of the ordinance, do promote the health, safety and
general welfare of the community.  As part of the comprehensive
zoning plan this legislative declaration shares in a presumption of
validity and correctness which the courts will honor.
Anderson, 23 Md. App. at 624, 329 A.2d at 724.  It is apparent from this passage that Anderson is
describing the legislative process in enacting or amending a zoning ordinance, where a legislative
body divides those uses permitted in a Euclidean zone as of right from those requiring a special
exception.  In addition, Anderson uses the terms "comprehensive plan" and "comprehensive plan of
zoning" interchangeably in consecutive sentences.  See Anderson, 23 Md. App. at 617, 329 A.2d at
720 ("If the evidence makes the question of harm or disturbance or the question of the disruption of
(continued...)
23
23(...continued)
the harmony of the comprehensive plan of zoning fairly debatable, the matter is one for the Board
to decide. But if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the
zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the operation of the comprehensive plan, a denial
of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal."  (emphasis added)).
To be sure, a legislature validly may require that an applicant for a special exception show
that a proposed use is in conformance, is consistent, or is in harmony with a land planning document,
such as a general plan, master plan, or functional master plan.  For example, in Board of County
Commissioners for Prince George's County v. Luria, 249 Md. 1, 2 n.2, 238 A.2d 108, 109 n.2
(1968), the zoning ordinance then in effect in Prince George's County stated that "[a] special
exception may be granted when the Council finds that . . . proposed use is in harmony with the
purpose and intent of the General Plan for the physical development of the District as embodied in
this Ordinance and in any Master Plan or portion thereof adopted or proposed as part of said General
Plan."  That language from the Prince George's County zoning ordinance was repeated in Cason v.
Board of County Commissioners for Prince George's County, 261 Md. 699, 706-07, 276 A.2d 661,
664 (1971).  Currently, § 27-317(a)(3) of the Prince George's County Code (zoning ordinance)
requires that, in order for a special exception to be approved, the proposed use must "not
substantially impair the integrity of any validly approved Master Plan or Functional Master Plan, or,
in the absence of a Master Plan or Functional Plan, the General Plan."  Thus, typically and at least
in special exception cases originating in Prince George's County, a judicial reference in an appellate
opinion to a requirement that a proposed use conform to a land planning document may not be
referring to the zoning ordinance alone or at all.
24
We further noted that "where a specific use is permitted by the legislative body in a given
area if the general zoning plan is conformed to and there is no adverse effect on the
neighborhood, the application can be granted . . . ."  Merlands Club, 202 Md. at 289, 96 A.2d
at 265.  Describing the presumption afforded special exception uses, we noted that "private
clubs are prima facie to be permitted in a residential use area.  The applicant for such a use
need not show either practical difficulty, unnecessary hardship, or great urgency, but only
that the project is a private club and that it would be in general harmony with the zoning plan
and would not adversely affect the neighboring properties and the general neighborhood."
Merlands Club, 202 Md. at 290, 96 A.2d at 265.  Thus, in Merlands Club, the Court
25
discarded the consideration generally of hardship as part of the special exception analysis,
unless the particular zoning ordinance explicitly injects hardship as a factor. 
We later considered the teachings of Merlands Club in the context of special
exceptions provided for in the zoning ordinance in Baltimore County.  In Oursler v. Board
of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 204 Md. 397, 104 A.2d 568 (1954) (our first
substantial opportunity to examine the regulation of special exceptions in Baltimore County),
we affirmed an order of the Baltimore County Board of Zoning Appeals granting a special
exception (in Oursler it was referred to as a "special permit") to operate a restaurant in a
residential area.  The zoning ordinance section governing special exceptions in effect at that
time was identical to the current version of BCZR § 502.1(a) through (f).  In applying the
zoning ordinance, we noted:
 
It is the function of the Zoning Commissioner, and the Board of
Zoning Appeals on appeal, to determine whether or not any
proposed use for which a special permit is sought would be in
harmony with the general purposes and intent of the Zoning
Regulations, and whether it could be conducted without being
detrimental to the welfare of the neighborhood.  Accordingly, in
Baltimore County, where restaurants are prima facie permissible
in residential zones, an applicant for a permit to conduct a
restaurant in a residential zone is not required to show that denial
of a permit would result in "practical difficulty, or unnecessary
or unreasonable hardship," as in the case of a variance, but must
show only that the exception would be in harmony with the
zoning plan and would not be detrimental to the welfare of the
neighborhood.
Oursler, 204 Md. at 401-02, 104 A.2d at 570;  See also Erdman v. Board of Zoning Appeals
of Balt. County, 212 Md. 288, 295-296, 129 A.2d 124, 127 (1957) (applying and quoting
24Although the Gilmor opinion refers to the granting of a "permit," the case clearly is directed
to what would be considered today a special exception.  The Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance in
effect at the time required a permit for billboards to be erected in "first commercial, second
commercial, and industrial use districts."  The Baltimore City Board of Municipal and Zoning
Appeals was only permitted to issue such a permit following a public hearing.  The permit was to
be denied if "such proposed use" "would menace public health, safety, security or morals . . . ."
26
Oursler).
In Gilmor v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 205 Md. 557, 109 A.2d 739
(1954), the Baltimore City Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals granted a permit24 to
erect a billboard in a "first commercial use" district.  We affirmed and discussed the
legislative presumption afforded special exception "permits": 
The argument of the appellants that the erection of a billboard
in a first commercial use district, in which there are residences,
would lead to slums and, in this way, in the future affect
adversely the public health or safety, is an argument that
billboards should not be permitted at all in a district in which
there are residences or substantial and attractive businesses,
although it is zoned first commercial.  Whatever the merits of
this argument, it is one which should be addressed to the
Legislature or the Baltimore City Council in an effort to have
the law changed.  As the law now stands, the argument is
fanciful.  The legislative branch of the government, in allowing
billboards to be erected in such areas, has said, in effect, that the
likelihood that their presence will bring about the dire
consequences foreseen by the appellant, is not great enough to
forbid generally the use of property to accommodate them.  It
has added a safeguard for the instances contrary to the general
rule in the procedures required by Sections 37, 38 and 39 of the
Ordinance, whereby the Board, as a legislative agent, may
determine in any particular instance that the public health,
safety, welfare, security and morals will be affected–not in the
deterioration of the neighborhood over a period of time because
of the presence of the billboards, but because of some immediate
fact, circumstance or condition which would bring about the
25  In Rylyns, we described the "floating zone":
"This device is the creation of special use districts for these various
uses, which at the time are unlocated districts, but which can be
located by a petition of a property owner desiring to develop his
specific tract for any of these special uses.  Such unlocated special
zoning districts are popularly referred to as 'floating zones,' in that
they float over the entire municipality until by application of a
property owner one of these special zones descends upon his land
thereby reclassifying it for the special use.  The zoning ordinance is
carefully drawn so as to impose restrictive use limitation upon the
owner in these special use zones in order to protect the adjoining
residential areas.  Usually there is a minimum lot requirement with
large set-back restrictions for the structures, both from the streets and
from the adjoining residences."
Rylyns, 372 Md. at 539 n.15, 814 A.2d at 484 n.15 (quoting Eschinger v. Bus, 250 Md. 112,
118-19, 242 A.2d 502, 505-06 (1968)).
27
evils guarded against.
Gilmor, 205 Md. at 565, 109 A.2d at 743.
In 1957, we decided Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 214 Md.
48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957).  Huff was not a special exception case, but is nonetheless helpful to
our analysis here because Huff compared the special exception tool to another, similar zoning
device.  In Huff, the local legislature enacted a zoning tool which would be described in
modern zoning terminology as a "floating zone." 25  A landowner meeting certain statutory
requirements (such as minimum lot size and parking requirements) could petition for his
property to be zoned "Manufacturing, Restricted."  The decision whether to grant a petition
was to be made in the first instance by the Zoning Commissioner with the right of appeal to
the Board of Zoning Appeals.  The statute further stated that such a rezoning was intended
28
"to protect the uses in neighboring residential zones" and that "the building and grounds must
be continuously maintained so that they will not adversely affect vicinal properties."  Huff,
214 Md. at 59, 133 A.2d at 89.
In upholding the legislation creating the "Manufacturing, Restricted" floating zone,
we noted:
We read the provisions of the regulations as to the purpose and
intent in establishing [Manufacturing, Restricted] Zones and as
to the mechanics employed to be sure that the plan approved
will continue to "protect the uses in neighboring residential
zones" and not adversely affect "vicinal properties," to mean
that an area cannot be properly zoned or rezoned Manufacturing,
Restricted unless in actual operation and effect it will be a
harmonious part of the comprehensive plan and serve the
purposes of the enabling act; that is, that the zoning will be not
only in the public good but in the interests of nearby property
owners.  If the regulations be read as we read them, it is clear
that the Manufacturing, Restricted classification is analogous to
a special exception, and the rules which are applicable to special
exceptions would apply, not the general rules of original error
or change in conditions or the character of the neighborhood,
that control the propriety of rezoning.  This is because, as in the
case of a special exception, there has been a prior legislative
determination, as part of a comprehensive plan, that the use
which the administrative body permits, upon application to the
particular case of the specified standards, is prima facie proper
in the environment in which it is permitted. This prior
determination and the establishment of sufficient standards
effectively refute the claim of improper delegation of legislative
power.
Huff, 214 Md. at 62, 133 A.2d at 91.
Merlands Club and Ourlser were cited favorably in Crowther, Inc. v. Johnson, 225
Md. 379, 383, 170 A.2d 768, 770 (1961), another Baltimore County land use case.  In
29
Crowther, we affirmed the Board of Appeals's denial of a special exception to operate a
trailer home park in the "Manufacturing, Light" zone.  We began our analysis by noting the
appropriate standard to be applied in evaluating an application for a special exception by
noting that "conditions upon which a special exception may be granted are set out in the
ordinance, and the board is given a wide latitude of discretion in passing upon special
exceptions so long as the resulting use is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of
the zoning plan and will not adversely affect the use of neighboring properties and the
general plan of the neighborhood as provided by the zoning ordinance."  We determined that
substantial evidence supported the Board's denial of the special exception "(a) because it
would be inconsistent with the continued development of a planned and existing, though only
partly developed, manufacturing area needed for such purposes in this particular locality for
the development of a large area in accordance with a comprehensive plan, and (b) because
it would adversely affect property values in the vicinity."  Crowther, 225 Md. at 385, 170
A.2d at 771.  
In Deen v. Baltimore Gas & Electric. Co., 240 Md. 317, 330-31, 214 A.2d 146, 153
(1965), we addressed a utility's request for a special exception to place overhead transmission
lines in Baltimore County.  The Zoning Commissioner granted the special exception for only
part of the utility company's five-mile right-of-way.  The remainder of the power
transmission lines would be required to be buried.  BG&E appealed to the County Board of
Appeals.  The Board of Appeals, after a six-day de novo hearing, granted the special
30
exception in part, requiring still that some of the power transmission lines be buried.  The
company appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which held that the special
exception should have been granted for the entire right-of-way.  In reversing the judgment
of the Circuit Court, resulting in affirmance of the Board of Appeals's decision, the Court of
Appeals noted that "[s]ection 502.1 implies that the effect on health, safety or general welfare
must be in some sense unique or else a special exception could never be granted in such an
area . . . ."  Deen, 240 Md. at 331, 214 A.2d at 153.  See also Brouillett v. Eudowood
Shopping Plaza, Inc., 249 Md. 606, 608-609, 241 A.2d 404, 405 (1968) ("A further reason
in support of the Board's action in denying the special exception was the appellees' failure
to adduce sufficient evidence that the requested use would not 'be detrimental to the health,
safety or general welfare of the locality involved.'  In a hearing for a special exception where
the requested use is permitted under the existing zoning classification the applicant need only
show that the use is consistent with the existing classification and that it would not be
adverse to the welfare of the neighborhood."); Bd. of County Comm'rs for Prince George's
County v. Luria, 249 Md. 1, 3, 238 A.2d 108, 109 (1968) ("[T]he requisites for the granting
of a special exception are a finding that the proposed use is in harmony with the general plan
and a finding that the proposed use will not have an adverse effect on health and safety nor
be detrimental to adjacent properties or the general neighborhood."); Rockville Fuel & Feed
Co. v. Board of Appeals of City of Gaithersburg, 257 Md. 183, 190-91, 262 A.2d 499, 503
(1970) ("If [the applicant] shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would
26Cason, as noted earlier, is a Prince George's County special exception case.  The burden of
the applicant in that case was defined with particular reference to the Prince George's County Zoning
(continued...)
31
be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not actually adversely
affect the public interest, [the applicant] has met his burden." (citing 
Merlands and Ourlser)).
In Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41, 55, 310 A.2d 543, 551 (1973), a special
exception case emanating from Wicomico County, we again had occasion to describe the
burden of the applicant seeking a special exception:
While the applicant has the burden of adducing testimony
which will show that his use meets the prescribed standards and
requirements he does not have the burden of showing
affirmatively that his proposed use accords with the general
welfare. If he shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the
proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the
neighborhood and would not actually adversely affect the public
interest, he has met his burden.  The extent of any harm or
disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is, of course,
material but if there is no probative evidence of harm or
disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of
factors causing disharmony to the functioning of the
comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special
exception is arbitrary, capricious and illegal.
In Anderson v. Sawyer, 23 Md. App. 612, 617, 329 A.2d 716, 720 (1974), Judge Rita
Davidson (seven years later to become the author of Schultz), then writing for the Court of
Special Appeals, examined an order of the Baltimore County Board of Appeals denying an
application for a special exception to operate a funeral home within a residential zone.
Relying on Turner, 270 Md. 41, 310 A.2d 543, Cason v. Board of County Commissioners,
261 Md. 699, 276 A.2d 665 (1971),26 Rockville Fuel, 257 Md. 183, 262 A.2d 499, and
26(...continued)
Ordinance.
"In Board of County Commissioners for Prince George's County v.
Luria, 249 Md. 1, 238 A.2d 108 (1968), the Court held that in a
zoning case involving a special exception in Prince George's County,
the applicant has the burden of proof in establishing both
requirements of Section 28.2 already set forth, i.e., that (a) the
proposed use is in harmony with the general plan and (b) that the
proposed use will not have an adverse effect on health and safety nor
be detrimental to adjacent properties or to the general neighborhood."
Cason, 261 Md. at 706-707, 276 A.2d at 664 (quoting Malmer Assocs. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs
for Prince George's County, 260 Md. 292, 303, 272 A.2d 6, 11 (1971)).
32
Merlands Club, 202 Md. 279, 96 A.2d 261, she described the special exception and the
evaluative standard attendant to it thusly:
The conditional use or special exception is a part of the
comprehensive zoning plan sharing the presumption that, as
such, it is in the interest of the general welfare, and therefore,
valid.  The special exception is a valid zoning mechanism that
delegates to an administrative board a limited authority to allow
enumerated uses which the legislature has determined to be
permissible absent any fact or circumstance negating the
presumption.  The duties given the Board are to judge whether
the neighboring properties in the general neighborhood would
be adversely affected and whether the use in the particular case
is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the plan.
Anderson, 23 Md. App. at 617, 329 A.2d at 720.  
The intermediate appellate court in Anderson held that the Board of Appeals
erroneously denied the special exception.  The court noted that "in order to deny the right of
the property owner to enjoy the requested special exception, the Board needed before it
probative evidence that the proposed use would, in fact, create traffic congestion on Sunberry
33
Road, and would, in fact, be detrimental otherwise to the general welfare of the locality
involved.  In this case there was no such probative evidence presented."  Anderson, 23 Md.
App. at 617-18, 329 A.2d at 720.  In an often-quoted section, the court concluded:
There can be no doubt that an undertaking business has
an inherent depressing and disturbing psychological effect
which may adversely affect persons residing in the immediate
neighborhood in the enjoyment of their homes and which may
lessen the values thereof.  Indeed, it is precisely because of such
inherent deleterious effects that the action of a local legislature
in prohibiting such uses in a given zone or zones will be
regarded 
as 
promoting 
the 
general 
welfare 
and 
as
constitutionally sound.  But in the instant case the legislature of
Baltimore County has determined that as part of its
comprehensive plan funeral homes are to be allowed in
residential zones notwithstanding their inherent deleterious
effects.  By defining a funeral home as an appropriate use by
way of special exception, the legislature of Baltimore County
has, in essence, declared that such uses, if they satisfy the other
specific requirements of the ordinance, do promote the health,
safety and general welfare of the community.  As part of the
comprehensive zoning plan this legislative declaration shares in
a presumption of validity and correctness which the courts will
honor.
The presumption that the general welfare is promoted by
allowing funeral homes in a residential use district,
notwithstanding their inherent depressing effects, cannot be
overcome unless there are strong and substantial existing facts
or circumstances showing that the particularized proposed use
has detrimental effects above and beyond the inherent ones
ordinarily associated with such uses.  Consequently, the bald
allegation that a funeral home use is inherently psychologically
depressing and adversely influences adjoining property values,
as well as other evidence which confirms that generally accepted
conclusion, is insufficient to overcome the presumption that
such a use promotes the general welfare of a local community.
Because there were neither facts nor valid reasons to support the
conclusion that the grant of the requested special exception
27Although she was still serving on the Court of Special Appeals at the time the opinion in
Gowl was filed, Judge Davidson was not a member of the panel that decided Gowl.  Her subsequent
elevation to the Court of Appeals placed her in a position to play an important role in euthanizing
Gowl
34
would adversely affect adjoining and surrounding properties in
any way other than would result from the location of any funeral
home in any residential zone, the evidence presented by the
protestants was, in effect, no evidence at all. 
 
. . . .
 . . .  The protestants have shown nothing more than that they
would suffer the same degree of harm as would be suffered by
any homeowner if a funeral home were permitted on land
adjacent or in close proximity to their residences.  If the
residents of Baltimore County do not want funeral homes in
residential use districts, they should prevail upon the local
legislature to change the ordinance.  (citations omitted)
Anderson, 23 Md. App. at 624-25, 329 A.2d at 724. 
Less than a year after Anderson, in Gowl v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Md. App. 410,
341 A.2d 832 (1975), the Court of Special Appeals27 purported to inject a new twist to the
standards for evaluating special exceptions.  Gowl held that, in deciding whether to grant a
special exception, the zoning body should compare the adverse effects of a proposed special
exception use to the adverse effects of permitted uses allowed in the zone at the site proposed
for the special exception.  For example, the potential for adverse effect of a proposed use on
traffic congestion at a critical intersection in the neighborhood was to be compared to the
effect on traffic congestion of permitted uses within the zone.  The Court of Special Appeals
noted that 
traffic impact on an application for a special exception ought to
35
be measured against that which could arise under permissible
use, and not merely on existing traffic loads around the
undeveloped premises.  Where, as here, the potential volume of
traffic under the requested use would appear to be no greater
than that which would arise from permitted uses, we believe it
arbitrary, capricious and illegal to deny the application for
special exception on vehicular traffic grounds.  
Gowl, 27 Md. App. at 417-18, 341 A.2d at 836.
Schultz v. Pritts
In 1981, we decided Schultz v. Pritts, a case all parties to this litigation acknowledge
as a bellwether case regarding special exceptions in Maryland.  See Trail v. Terrapin Run,
LLC, 403 Md. 523, 551, 943 A.2d 1192, 1208 (2008) (noting that "some have called
[Schultz] the seminal case in the Maryland law of special exceptions"); E. Outdoor Adver.
Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 146 Md. App. 283, 307-08, 807 A.2d 49, 63 (2002)
(describing Schultz as "the seminal case in Maryland concerning conditional uses or special
exception uses"); Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 107 Md. App. 1, 8, 666 A.2d 1253, 1257
(1995) (describing Schultz as the "modern seminal case"); Lawton T. Sharp Farm, Inc. v.
Somerlock, 52 Md. App. 207, 210, 447 A.2d 500, 502 (1982) (describing Schultz as "a
landmark interpretation").  
In Schultz, Robert and Ann Pritts petitioned for a special exception to operate a
funeral home in an area zoned for single-family residential homes in Carroll County.  The
Carroll County Board of Zoning Appeals denied the special exception.  On judicial review,
the Circuit Court for Carroll County remanded the case to the Board of Zoning Appeals on
28The Circuit Court held that, by accepting and considering evidence after the conclusion of
the public hearing, the Board of Zoning Appeals violated the Prittses' right to due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
36
due process grounds unrelated to the special exception standard.28  The Court of Special
Appeals dismissed an appeal and cross-appeal as premature.  Thus, the proper evaluative
standard to be applied in special exception cases was not considered until the case reached
us.  The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari to consider all issues raised in the case.
Judge Davidson, now writing for the Court of Appeals, first cleared the way to reach
the merits, holding that the Circuit Court's order remanding the case was an appealable final
judgment and that the Board's actions did not violate the Prittses' due process rights.  Judge
Davidson then proceeded to the merits of the Prittses' other arguments.
The Prittses argued that the Board of Zoning Appeals erred because it declined to
apply the Gowl standard in evaluating their application for the special exception.
Specifically, they contended that their proposed use, a funeral home, would generate less
traffic than several permitted uses allowed in the zone in which the subject property was
placed.  Thus, they contended, the Board of Zoning Appeals should have approved the
special exception to operate a funeral home.
In finding no merit in the Prittses' argument, the Court unequivocally rejected the
Gowl standard.  The Court began its analysis by reviewing the proper standard to be applied
by a zoning body in reviewing an application for a special exception.
This Court has frequently expressed the applicable
standards for judicial review of the grant or denial of a special
37
exception use.  The special exception use is a part of the
comprehensive zoning plan sharing the presumption that, as
such, it is in the interest of the general welfare, and therefore,
valid.  The special exception use is a valid zoning mechanism
that delegates to an administrative board a limited authority to
allow enumerated uses which the legislature has determined to
be permissible absent any fact or circumstance negating the
presumption.  The duties given the Board are to judge whether
the neighboring properties in the general neighborhood would
be adversely affected and whether the use in the particular case
is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the plan.
Whereas, the applicant has the burden of adducing
testimony which will show that his use meets the prescribed
standards and requirements, he does not have the burden of
establishing affirmatively that his proposed use would be a
benefit to the community.  If he shows to the satisfaction of the
Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real
detriment to the neighborhood and would not actually adversely
affect the public interest, he has met his burden.  The extent of
any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is, of
course, material.  If the evidence makes the question of harm or
disturbance or the question of the disruption of the harmony of
the comprehensive plan of zoning fairly debatable, the matter is
one for the Board to decide.  But if there is no probative
evidence of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the
zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the operation
of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a
special exception use is arbitrary, capricious, and illegal.  Turner
v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41, 54-55, 310 A.2d 543, 550-51 (1973);
Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. Board of Appeals of Gaithersburg,
257 Md. 183, 187-88, 262 A.2d 499, 502 (1970); Montgomery
County v. Merlands Club, Inc., 202 Md. 279, 287, 96 A.2d 261,
264 (1953); Anderson v. Sawyer, 23 Md. App. 612, 617, 329
A.2d 716, 720 (1974).  These standards dictate that if a
requested special exception use is properly determined to have
an adverse effect upon neighboring properties in the general
area, it must be denied.
Schultz, 291 Md. at 11-12, 432 A.2d at 1325.  The Court then surveyed prior caselaw,
38
focusing on Deen and Anderson.  The Court concluded in an often-quoted paragraph:
These cases establish that a special exception use has an
adverse effect and must be denied when it is determined from
the facts and circumstances that the grant of the requested
special exception use would result in an adverse effect upon
adjoining and surrounding properties unique and different from
the adverse effect that would otherwise result from the
development of such a special exception use located anywhere
within the zone.  Thus, these cases establish that the appropriate
standard to be used in determining whether a requested special
exception use would have an adverse effect and, therefore,
should be denied is whether there are facts and circumstances
that show that the particular use proposed at the particular
location proposed would have any adverse effects above and
beyond those inherently associated with such a special exception
use irrespective of its location within the zone.
Schultz, 291 Md. at 15, 432 A.2d at 1327.  After summarizing the facts and analysis in Gowl,
the Court stated that "[i]n reaching this conclusion, the trial court cited only Deen, 240 Md.
at 330-31, 214 A.2d at 153, and the Court of Special Appeals cited no authority at all.
Indeed, there is no persuasive authority that applies the Gowl standard or supports this
conclusion."  Schultz, 291 Md. at 19, 432 A.2d at 1329.  We concluded that "the Gowl
standard is logically inconsistent and in conflict with the standards established in Turner as
explicated by Deen and Anderson."  Schultz, 291 Md. at 19, 432 A.2d 1319, 1329.  Finally,
the Court articulated the standard to govern special exception cases:
We now hold that the appropriate standard to be used in
determining whether a requested special exception use would
have an adverse effect and, therefore, should be denied is
whether there are facts and circumstances that show that the
particular use proposed at the particular location proposed
would have any adverse effects above and beyond those
39
inherently associated with such a special exception use
irrespective of its location within the zone.  Turner, 270 Md. at
54-55, 310 A.2d at 550-51; Deen, 240 Md. at 330-31, 214 A.2d
at 153; Anderson, 23 Md. App. at 617-18, 624-25, 329 A.2d at
720, 724.
Schultz, 291 Md. at 22-23, 432 A.2d at 1331.
Schultz's Progeny
Schultz has been cited in over 100 reported Maryland appellate decisions.  Both sides
in this litigation have sifted through this vast body of law and highlighted particular
applications of parts of the relevant language in Schultz that, they contend, support their
respective positions.  Petitioners, for example, point to Lucas v. People's Counsel For
Baltimore County, 147 Md. App. 209, 807 A.2d 1176 (2002).  In Lucas, a horse farm owner
in Baltimore County applied for a special exception to operate an "airport" on his property
so that a part owner of a thoroughbred business located at the farm could commute to and
from the property via airplane.  A helicopter pad already was in operation on the property.
The Board of Appeals denied the request for special exception, concluding that the proposed
use constituted an "airstrip," "heliport," or "helistop," which were not permitted by special
exception in the zone.  As an alternative holding, the Board of Appeals relied on its
interpretation of the Schultz standard.  
In reaching that determination, the Board used the following
standard: "The question is one of whether or not the adverse
effects are greater at the proposed site than they would be
elsewhere in the County where they may be established, i.e., the
other areas within the R.C. 2 zones." The Board noted that it
believed that "the appellant has the burden of establishing that
40
the impact factor caused by the proposed use is not greater at the
site than the same use elsewhere in the zone (R.C. 2 zone)."
Lucas, 147 Md. App. at 223, 807 A.2d at 1184.  
The Board of Appeals thus found that
the impact upon the National Historic District would be greater
in the Greenspring Valley than if located in other northern areas
of the R.C. 2 zones.  Relying considerably on the expertise of
(expert witnesses) Messrs. Dillon, Solomon and Gerber, there
are individual areas in the Northern part of the county that
would be less impacted than at the present site.  The Board
concludes that it is not a matter of finding a better site for the
proposed use in the R.C. 2 zone, but rather the question is one
of total impact; and the Board concludes that the Appellants
have not established that fact by the preponderance of the
evidence to the Board's satisfaction.  Acknowledging that
airports and helicopter uses have inherent negative impacts, the
detrimental effects upon the smaller Greenspring Valley district
would clearly have a greater negative impact than if located
elsewhere in the vast acreage constituting the R.C. 2 zone of
Baltimore County.
Lucas, 147 Md. App. at 223-24, 807 A.2d at 1184-85.  The Circuit Court for Baltimore
County affirmed the Board's actions with regard to the scope of the definition of an "airport"
and the articulation of the Schultz standard.  
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court with regard
to the definition of "airport."  The intermediate appellate court acknowledged that, in light
of its first holding, there remained issues that the court "need not reach for the purposes of
deciding this case."  Lucas, 147 Md. App. at 235, 807 A.2d at 1192.  The court nonetheless
29This alone brands, at best, as considered dicta, the Lucas court's consideration of how
Schultz was applied in that case by the Board and Circuit Court.  We note, as we recently had
occasion to do, that withholding unnecessary comment on matters not required to be addressed
frequently is the better course.  Garner v. Archers Glen Partners, Inc., 405 Md. 43, __, 949 A.2d
639, 641 (2008) (noting that "an appellate court should use great caution in exercising its discretion
to comment gratuitously on issues beyond those necessary to be decided").
 
41
elected to address those issues "for completeness." 29  Id. 
The Court of Special Appeals proceeded to write approvingly of the Board of
Appeals's application of Schultz, noting that
the question is not whether the proposed facility will have some
adverse effect on the Greenspring Valley area; it will because
there are inherently detrimental effects associated with such
facilities.  The Board must determine whether the adverse
effects of the special exceptions use in the particular location in
which it is sought to be located would be greater or more
detrimental than they would be generally at other locations
within the R.C. 2 zone.
Lucas, 147 Md. App. at 238-39, 807 A.2d at 1193-94 (emphasis added).  The intermediate
appellate court concluded that
the Board determined that, at Helmore Farm, the adverse effects
inherently associated with the proposed facility would be above
and beyond the adverse effects associated with an airport
elsewhere in the R.C. 2 zone.  The record clearly indicates that
there are other parcels within the R.C. 2 zone where an airport
would provide a lesser adverse impact than at Helmore Farm,
and the Board recognized that finding a better site was not the
issue.  We believe that the Board applied the appropriate
standard.
Lucas, 147 Md. App. at 240, 807 A.2d at 1194 (emphasis added).
Petitioners also point to Board of County Commissioners for Cecil County v.
42
Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 212, 550 A.2d 664, 665 (1988).  In Holbrook, a landowner sought
a special exception to locate a mobile home in an area zoned for agricultural use.  The Cecil
County Board of Appeals denied the special exception request.  "We granted the Board's
petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether the intermediate appellate court's decision
comported with the applicable zoning ordinance and with the standard for judicial review of
a special exception set forth in Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 432 A.2d 1319 (1981)."
Holbrook, 314 Md. at 214, 550 A.2d at 667 (1988).  The Court there summarized the Schultz
standard:
In summary, where the facts and circumstances indicate
that the particular special exception use and location proposed
would cause an adverse effect upon adjoining and surrounding
properties unique and different, in kind or degree, than that
inherently associated with such a use regardless of its location
within the zone, the application should be denied.  Furthermore,
if the evidence makes the issue of harm fairly debatable, the
matter is one for the Board's decision, and should not be
second-guessed by an appellate court.
Holbrook, 314 Md. at 217-18, 550 A.2d at 668.  Applying that standard to the evidence
before the Cecil County Board of Appeals, we concluded that
[t]he evidence revealed that the Peters built their $147,000
house in a uniquely valuable, heavily forested, low-growth area.
Moreover, photographs clearly depicted the direct and proximate
view of the mobile home from the Peters's home.  The Board
found that this evidence "vividly indicate[d] the dehabilitating
(sic) effect of the mobile home on the value of [the Peters's]
property," inferring thereby that the trailer's continued presence
would create "significantly greater adverse effects in this
location than were it located in other areas in the zone."
43
Holbrook, 314 Md. at 219-20, 550 A.2d at 669.  In reaching that conclusion, however, the
Court appeared to shift the focus from the particular adverse effects on the properties
neighboring the proposed use to the availability of other areas where the mobile home would
have less of an adverse effect.
We find no cause to question the Board's conclusion that
the mobile home, in this particular location, would impair
neighboring property value to a greater extent than it would
elsewhere in the zone.  Countless locations exist within the
zone, and indeed, within Holbrook's own property, where the
presence of a mobile home would have no effect whatsoever
upon adjoining property values.  If, for example, trees or
topography hid the mobile home from the view of the
neighboring property owners, there would remain, as the Board's
counsel conceded, absolutely no grounds for denying a special
exception permit.  The Court of Special Appeals failed to
acknowledge these potential scenarios.  Instead, the intermediate
appellate court based its holding on the mistaken premise that,
regardless of a mobile home's particular location within a zone,
its negative impact on adjacent properties would remain the
same.
At any rate, in light of the mobile home's high degree of
visibility in this particular location, its proximity to the Peters's
home, and the markedly disparate values of the Holbrook and
Peters residences, we hold that the Board reasonably concluded
that the permanent presence of the Holbrook mobile home
would create significantly greater adverse effects in this location
than were it located elsewhere in the zone.
Holbrook, 314 Md. at 220, 550 A.2d at 669.  Petitioners argue that Holbrook, particularly the
passage previously quoted, supports the proposition that Schultz compels a district-wide
comparative geographic analysis of effects in each special exception.  The most sympathetic
statement to that effect in the Court's opinion in Holbrook is that "[c]ountless locations exist
44
within the zone, and indeed, within Holbrook's own property, where the presence of a mobile
home would have no effect whatsoever upon adjoining property values."  Holbrook,
however, subsequently has been interpreted in a much different light than Petitioners argue
here.  
There is not necessarily a comparative analysis requirement imbedded in Holbrook.
In a bit of rhetorical flourish, the Court actually was dismissing the intermediate appellate
court's "mistaken premise that, regardless of a mobile home's particular location within a
zone, its negative impact on adjacent properties would remain the same."  Holbrook, 314 Md.
at 220, 550 A.2d at 669.  The Court did not compare the location of the proposed use to other
locations within the zone, or require such an analysis in every case.  Instead, it highlighted
characteristics of the particular neighborhood that exacerbated the problems inherent to the
placement of a mobile home there.  See E. Outdoor Adver. Co., 146 Md. App. at 309, 807
A.2d at 64 (noting that in Holbrook "the Court considered the deleterious impact of a mobile
home on the value of adjacent properties in the 'neighborhood'"); Sharp v. Howard County
Bd. of Appeals, 98 Md. App. 57, 83, 632 A.2d 248, 261 (1993) (discussing Holbrook and
stating that "the Court [in Holbrook] construed the relative lack of vegetative screening
between the two structures and the apparently level topography as sufficient localized
circumstances that rendered the adverse property value impact, arguably always inherent in
this particular use, uniquely adverse"). 
Petitioners also point to the Court of Special Appeals's decision in Futoryan v. Mayor
45
& City Council of Baltimore, 150 Md. App. 157, 819 A.2d 1074 (2003).  In Futoryan, a
landowner appealed the denial of a special exception to operate an automobile service station
in the B-3-2 zone.  The subject property of the special exception application was the only
property within the jurisdiction zoned B-2-3.  The intermediate appellate court described the
problem this situation presented with the application of its view of the Schultz standard.
The B-3-2 zone in this case is a tiny island, measuring a mere
64' by 122.5' and completely surrounded by residential zoning.
Futoryan's property is the entire zone.  The conditional use here
cannot, by definition, have a greater adverse impact at this
location than it would have at some other location within the
zone because there is no such thing as "some other location
within the zone."  There can be no comparative degree, no
greater adverse impact and no lesser adverse impact, when
there is nothing with which to compare the location in question.
Futoryan, 150 Md. App. at 178, 819 A.2d at 1086. 
To solve this perceived quandary, the Court of Special Appeals divided the Schultz
test into what the court considered to be its elements, noting that "[a]lthough in their
articulation the tests are sometimes telescoped together into a single compound test, there are
actually two tests inherent in the Schultz v. Pritts guidelines."  Futoryan, 150 Md. App. at
178, 819 A.2d at 1086.  The court continued that "[t]he more prominent and high profile of
the two is that which assumes an adverse impact from the conditional use and then compares
the relative severity of the adverse impact at the location in question with its likely severity
at other locations within the zone."  Futoryan, 150 Md. App. at 178-79, 819 A.2d at 1086.
The court, setting the stage for application of its view, concluded its analysis of the Schultz
46
test, stating that "[i]f . . . the adverse effect were weightier than the beneficial purpose [of the
proposed use], the assessment of the relative severity [of the adverse effect] at different
locations would then be called for."  Futoryan, 150 Md. App. at 180, 819 A.2d at 1087.  It
then held that where no other properties assigned to the particular zone are available for a
comparative analysis, the zoning body should compare the adverse effect of the proposed use
on the neighboring properties with the "likely adverse influences [of the proposed use] at
other locations in other similar zones."  Futoryan, 150 Md. App. at 181, 819 A.2d at 1087.
Petitioners also rely on Hayfields, Inc. v. Valleys Planning Council, Inc., 122 Md.
App. 616, 716 A.2d 311 (1998).  In Hayfields, a landowner sought a special exception to
build a golf course in the R.C.2 zone in Baltimore County.  Opponents of the golf course
argued that the geological formation underlying the golf course, known as the Cockeysville
Marble formation, would increase the adverse effects of contaminant runoff.  The Board of
Appeals rejected their concerns, noting that there were other areas in the R.C.2 zone that
were part of the Cockeysville Marble formation.  Therefore, the Board of Appeals found,
there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the effects of the golf course would be
greater at the proposed location than other areas within the R.C.2 zone.  The Court of Special
Appeals held that "this finding does not comport with the test set forth in Schultz.  Assuming
that Cockeysville Marble is more susceptible to contamination, the mere fact that some of the
land elsewhere in the R.C. 2 zone is underlain with Cockeysville Marble does not mean that
the effect would be no worse at this locality than elsewhere in the zone."  Hayfields, 122 Md.
47
App. at 653-54, 716 A.2d at 330.  The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case to the
Board of Appeals:
If all or a substantial portion of the off-site R.C. 2 land is
underlain by Cockeysville Marble then it is at least possible that
the Board could fairly conclude that the golf course, at its
proposed site, would cause no more contamination to the aquifer
than if it were located elsewhere in the R.C. 2 zone.
Conversely, if the Board finds that only a relatively small
portion of the off-site R.C. 2-zoned land is underlain with
Cockeysville Marble, and if it also finds that the Cockeysville
Marble formation makes the aquifer more susceptible to
contamination, then it cannot be said that the golf course at the
intended site would pose no greater danger to groundwater than
if it were located elsewhere in the R.C. 2 zone.
Hayfields, 122 Md. App. at 654-55, 716 A.2d at 330 (footnote omitted).  Petitioners contend
that Hayfields required a comparison of the geology and hydrology of the site of the proposed
special exception to other properties within the R.C.2 zone elsewhere in Baltimore County.
Loyola's attempt to distinguish Hayfields is not persuasive.  Loyola argues that, in the
present case, there are no "truly unique" factors, such as a "Cockeysville Marble" formation,
that would affect the Property.  According to Loyola, all of the potential adverse effects of
the proposed Retreat Center at issue (traffic impact, agricultural impact, and environmental
impact) are adverse effects inherent from the operation of any school or college use.  The
"Cockeysville Marble" formation in Hayfields, however, is not an adverse effect.  The
adverse effect at issue in Hayfields was runoff from the operation and maintenance of the
golf course, containing groundwater contaminants.  Contaminated runoff is a potential
adverse effect inherent in the operation of a golf course.  The characteristics of the locality
48
involved, notably the "Cockeysville Marble" geology, arguably increased or amplified those
adverse effects or made the locality more sensitive to those adverse effects.  This is similar
to the evidence adduced by Petitioners in the present case of arguably narrow roads
frequently used by automobiles, trucks, and farm equipment and an assertedly
environmentally-sensitive trout stream near the Property.  Petitioners here contended before
the Board of Appeals that those characteristics of the local neighborhood increased the
debatable adverse effects attributed to the proposed Retreat Center.  Thus, if the reasoning
in Hayfields is good law, Hayfields squarely supports Petitioners' contention here.
Petitioners also point to Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 107 Md. App. 1, 8-9, 666
A.2d 1253, 1257 (1995).  In Mossburg, the Montgomery County Board of Appeals denied
a landowner's request for a special exception to operate a solid waste transfer station in "an
I-2 Industrial Zone."  The Board denied the request for two reasons: "traffic safety" and the
"environment." With regard to the environment, the "Board found that there would be
adverse impact from runoff from the subject site into a tributary that ultimately drains into
Rock Creek, the Potomac River, and the Chesapeake Bay."  Mossburg, 107 Md. App. at 13,
666 A.2d at 1259.  The intermediate appellate court rejected this rationale, noting that "we
know of no areas in Montgomery County where storm water runoff does not ultimately drain
into the Chesapeake Bay."  Mossburg, 107 Md. App. at 13, 666 A.2d at 1259.  
But even more important, as we indicated earlier, there
is absolutely no evidence, in respect to environmental concerns,
that the environmental impact of appellants' use at the subject
site would be greater, or above and beyond, that impact
49
elsewhere within the I-2 Zone in this industrial corridor or other
I-2 Zones in that part of the regional district situated in
Montgomery County.  In fact, all of the evidence indicates that
the impact would be the same anywhere within this I-2 industrial
corridor; from the evidence, the entire area appears to be in the
Southlawn Creek watershed. 
Mossburg, 107 Md. App. at 24-25, 666 A.2d at 1265.  The panel of the Court of Special
Appeals described its view of the Schultz standard thusly:
Moreover, it is not whether a use permitted by way of a special
exception will have adverse effects (adverse effects are implied
in the first instance by making such uses conditional uses or
special exceptions rather than permitted uses), it is whether the
adverse effects in a particular location would be greater than the
adverse effects ordinarily associated with a particular use that is
to be considered by the agency. . . .  The question in the case sub
judice, therefore, is not whether a solid waste transfer station has
adverse effects.  It inherently has them.  The question is also not
whether the solid waste transfer station at issue here will have
adverse effects at this proposed location.  Certainly, it will and
those adverse effects are contemplated by the statute.  The
proper question is whether those adverse effects are above and
beyond, i.e., greater here than they would generally be elsewhere
within the areas of the County where they may be established,
i.e., the other few I-2 Industrial Zones.  In other words, if it must
be shown, as it must be, that the adverse effects at the particular
site are greater or "above and beyond," then it must be asked,
greater than what? Above and beyond what?  Once an applicant
presents sufficient evidence establishing that his proposed use
meets the requirements of the statute, even including that it has
attached to it some inherent adverse impact, an otherwise silent
record does not establish that that impact, however severe at a
given location, is greater at that location than elsewhere.
Mossburg, 107 Md. App. at 8-9, 666 A.2d at 1257.  Petitioners contend that the
environmental analysis discussed in Mossburg invites the type of comparative multiple site
30People's Counsel points out that, before the Board of Appeals in People's Counsel for
Baltimore County v. Mangione, 85 Md. App. 738, 751-52, 584 A.2d 1318, 1324-25 (1991), it
presented comparative multiple site evidence in a successful opposition to a request for a special
exception to build and operate a nursing home.  The reported opinion of the Court of Special
Appeals omitted any mention of this evidence.  The Court of Special Appeals, in reinstating the
Board's decision, relied only on the evidence presented regarding the effects on the neighborhood
surrounding the proposed location.
Before the Board were various facts and circumstances which,
we believe, satisfy the Schultz standard of particular adverse impact.
The Board, under the Schultz standard, reviewed the evidence for the
required particular adverse impact.  There was testimony that the
proposed convalescent home would sit on the prominent or dominant
terrain above the neighborhood, which would block out light from the
west; and with prevailing breezes from the west, would generate
odors from the central kitchen as well as from the dumpster.  There
(continued...)
50
analysis demanded here.  
Loyola, on the other hand, argues that the holdings of Lucas, Holbrook, Futoryan,
Hayfields, and Mossburg, to the extent that they endorse a comparative, multiple site analysis
in special exception cases, are outliers.  Loyola notes correctly that the majority of cases
discussing Schultz do not address, much less imply, such a requirement.  See,  e.g., Singley
v. County Comm'rs of Frederick County, 178 Md. App. 658, 679-80, 943 A.2d 636, 648-49
(2008); Handley v. Ocean Downs, LLC, 151 Md. App. 615, 646, 827 A.2d 961, 979 (2003);
Evans v. Shore Commc'ns, Inc., 112 Md. App. 284, 303-05, 685 A.2d 454, 463-64 (1996),
Moseman v. County Council of Prince George's County, 99 Md. App. 258, 266, 636 A.2d
499, 503 (1994); Sharp v. Howard County Bd. of Appeals, 98 Md. App. 57, 86-89, 632 A.2d
248, 263-64 (1993); People's Counsel for Baltimore County v. Mangione, 85 Md. App. 738,
751-52, 584 A.2d 1318, 1324-25 (1991)30; Gotach Ctr. for Health v. Bd. of County Comm'rs
30(...continued)
was testimony concerning the effects of the development along the
York Road corridor and the erosion created by the development and
storm water runoff.  There was testimony concerning the effects of
the intrusion of the project into the residential neighborhood presently
existing around that location. There was testimony about small
arterial streets whose only access to York Road from the community
was by way of Green Ridge Road, and that the narrow, winding
nature of those streets, with the increased traffic, would jeopardize the
safety of the children playing in the streets.  Furthermore, there was
testimony concerning the overflow of contaminated medical waste
and storm water management.
The Board, as finder of fact, said it was "obligated to judge the
credibility of each witness and apply each Board member's own
knowledge, developed through experience and training, to the
evidence presented."  In sum, the Board concluded that the proposed
project would "overwhelm and dominate the surrounding landscape,"
and that it would represent "the deepest intrusion into the residential
community of Dulaney Valley."  The Board found that the project
would "clearly exacerbate an already worsening storm water runoff
situation" within that community.  Further, the Board was
unconvinced that the "traffic generated by the home's employees and
visitors would not overtax an interior community road system
designed to accommodate residential traffic."  The Board then held
that the appellees failed to meet its burden as provided under
B.C.Z.R. Section 502.1.
Mangione, 85 Md. App. at 751-52, 584 A.2d at 1324-25.
51
of Frederick County, 60 Md. App. 477, 486, 483 A.2d 786, 791 (1984).
Analysis
Evaluation of a special exception application is not an equation to be balanced with
formulaic precision.  See Sharp, 98 Md. App. at 73, 632 A.2d at 256  (rejecting "appellants'
interpretation of the holding of Schultz as if it were the atomic chart of elements from which
a formula for divining inherent and peculiar adverse effects could be derived").  That lack
of a precise rubric is reflected in the standard of judicial review applied to zoning decisions.
52
Courts are to defer to the conclusions of the zoning body where the "evidence makes the
question of harm or disturbance or the question of the disruption of the harmony of the
comprehensive plan of zoning fairly debatable."  Schultz, 291 Md. at 26, 432 A.2d at 1333
(emphasis added); see also Alviani v. Dixon, 365 Md. 95, 107-08, 775 A.2d 1234, 1241
(2001); Holbrook, 314 Md. at 217-18, 550 A.2d at 668.
It is clear in examining the plain language of Schultz, and the cases upon which
Schultz relies, that the Schultz analytical overlay for applications for individual special
exceptions is focused entirely on the neighborhood involved in each case.  The requirement
for such an analysis focused on the local neighborhood is apparent in the often-quoted
Schultz holding:
We now hold that the appropriate standard to be used in
determining whether a requested special exception use would
have an adverse effect and, therefore, should be denied is
whether there are facts and circumstances that show that the
particular use proposed at the particular location proposed
would have any adverse effects above and beyond those
inherently associated with such a special exception use
irrespective of its location within the zone.
Schultz, 291 Md. at 22-23, 432 A.2d at 1331.
The Schultz standard requires an analysis of the effects of a proposed use "irrespective
of its location within the zone."  "Irrespective of" is defined by WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1993) as "regardless of."  The same dictionary defines "regardless of"
as "without taking into account."  Petitioners' argument urges the opposite result.  Petitioners
contend that Schultz requires an applicant for a special exception to compare, and
53
concomitantly the zoning body to consider, the adverse effects of the proposed use at the
proposed location to, at least, a reasonable selection or representative sampling of other sites
within the same zone throughout the district or jurisdiction, taking into account the particular
characteristics of the areas surrounding those other test sites.  The Schultz standard requires
no such evidentiary burden be shouldered by an applicant nor analysis undertaken by the
zoning decision-maker.
Schultz speaks pointedly to an individual case analysis focused on the particular
locality involved around the proposed site.  See Schultz, 291 Md. at 15, 432 A.2d at 1327
("These cases establish that a special exception use has an adverse effect and must be denied
when it is determined from the facts and circumstances that the grant of the requested special
exception use would result in an adverse effect upon adjoining and surrounding properties
unique and different from the adverse effect that would otherwise result from the
development of such a special exception use located anywhere within the zone."  (emphasis
added)); Schultz, 291 Md. at 11, 432 A.2d at 1324 ("The duties given the Board are to judge
whether the neighboring properties in the general neighborhood would be adversely affected
and whether the use in the particular case is in harmony with the general purpose and intent
of the plan."  (emphasis added)); id. ("If [the applicant] shows to the satisfaction of the Board
that the proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and
would not actually adversely affect the public interest, he has met his burden.  The extent of
any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is, of course, material."  (emphasis
54
added)); Schultz, 291 Md. at 12, 432 A.2d at 1325 ("These standards dictate that if a
requested special exception use is properly determined to have an adverse effect upon
neighboring properties in the general area, it must be denied."  (emphasis added)).  
Furthermore, the cases on which Schultz relies also focus on an analysis of the locality
involved in the specific proposal.  Schultz largely relies on five cases: Turner, 270 Md. 41,
310 A.2d 543; Rockville Fuel, 257 Md. 183, 262 A.2d 499; Deen, 240 Md. 317, 214 A.2d
146;  Merlands Club, 202 Md. 279, 96 A.2d 261; and Anderson, 23 Md. App. 612, 329 A.2d
716.  Each case contains language that directs that the special exception impact analysis
focus on the properties surrounding the location of the proposed use, in whatever zone they
be placed.  See Turner, 270 Md. at 55, 310 A.2d at 551 ("If [the special exception applicant]
shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real
detriment to the neighborhood and would not actually adversely affect the public interest, he
has met his burden.  The extent of any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses
is, of course, material but if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light of
the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the functioning of the
comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception is arbitrary, capricious
and illegal."  (emphasis added)); Rockville Fuel, 257 Md. at 190-91, 262 A.2d at 503 ("If [the
applicant] shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted
without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not actually adversely affect the public
interest, [the applicant] has met his burden. (emphasis added)); Deen, 240 Md. at 331, 214
31BCZR § 502.1 still reads, in pertinent part, "Before any special exception may be granted,
it must appear that the use for which the special exception is requested will not . . . [b]e detrimental
to the health, safety or general welfare of the locality involved . . . ." 
32The other cases upon which Schultz relies do not employ the term "inherent" in their
explication of what factors bear upon a proper analysis of the legislative factors provided in a
particular zoning ordinance for a special exception.    
55
A.2d at 153 ("Section 502.1 states that a special exception may be granted if the use
requested will not 'be detrimental to the health, safety, or general welfare of the locality
involved.'"31  (emphasis added));  Merlands Club, 202 Md. at 287-88, 96 A.2d at 264 (1953)
("The duties given the Board are to judge whether the neighboring properties and the general
neighborhood would be adversely affected, and whether the use, in the particular case, is in
harmony with the general purpose and intent of the zoning plan."(emphasis added); id.
("[W]here a specific use is permitted by the legislative body in a given area if the general
zoning plan is conformed to and there is no adverse effect on the neighborhood, the
application can be granted . . . ."  (emphasis added)).
The use of the descriptive term "inherent" in Schultz comes directly from Judge
Davidson's opinion for the Court of Special Appeals in Anderson.32  Thus, Anderson is
particularly important to a proper understanding of what Judge Davidson and the Court
meant in Schultz in defining what adverse effects are "inherent" in a proposed use.  As
discussed above, Anderson involved a request for a special exception to operate a funeral
home in a residential area.  The Court of Special Appeals in Anderson discussed at length
two particular adverse effects inherent in the operation of a funeral home.  First, the Court
56
rejected the argument that the special exception request should be denied because of the
depressing psychological effects deemed inherent to the operation of a funeral home.  There
was no probative evidence offered that the depressing effect of the funeral home would be
any greater at the proposed location than in any other residential area in the same zone where
it was allowed by special exception.  Second, the Court of Special Appeals discussed the
effect of traffic, also inherent to operation of a funeral home.  The intermediate appellate
court's discussion of the increase in traffic that may be caused by the funeral home focused
only on the potential for an adverse effect at the particular location.  No comparative,
multiple site impact analysis was performed or called for to determine what adverse effects
were in excess of those "inherent" in a funeral home establishment.  Thus, the Schultz
standard, as presaged in Anderson, requires that the adverse effect "inherent" in a proposed
use be determined without recourse to a comparative geographic analysis.  Any language to
the contrary in Holbrook, Lucas, Futoryan, Hayfields, and Mossburg is disapproved. 
But what sense is to be made of Schultz's language referring to consideration of
whether "the particular use proposed at the particular location proposed would have any
adverse effects above and beyond those inherently associated with such a special exception
use irrespective of its location within the zone"?  Is it to be declared surplusage?  Is it to be
stricken or disapproved because the 2008 composition of this Court simply has had a change
of mind twenty-seven years later?  The answer is "no."  The language retains vitality and
sense as long as the raison d'etre for its inclusion in Schultz is understood.
33In the HARRY POTTER series of books, the "Sorting Hat" is a magical artifact that is used
to determine in which house (Gryffindor, Hufflepuff, Ravenclaw or Slytherin) first-year students at
Hogwarts School of Wizardry and Witchcraft are to be assigned.  After being placed on a student's
head, the Sorting Hat measures the inherent qualities of the student and assigns him or her to the
appropriate house.  J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE (1998).
57
As noted previously and frequently, a 
special exception is a valid zoning mechanism that delegates to
an administrative board a limited authority to permit enumerated
uses which the legislative body has determined can, prima facie,
properly be allowed in a specified use district, absent any fact or
circumstance in a particular case which would change this
presumptive finding.
Merlands Club, 202 Md. at 287, 96 A.2d at 264; see also Creswell v. Balt. Aviation Serv.
Inc., 257 Md. 712, 719, 264 A.2d 838, 842 (1970); Rockville Fuel, 257 Md. at 188, 262 A.2d
at 502.
The local legislature, when it determines to adopt or amend the text of a zoning
ordinance with regard to designating various uses as allowed only by special exception in
various zones, considers in a generic sense that certain adverse effects, at least in type,
potentially associated with (inherent to, if you will) these uses are likely to occur wherever
in the particular zone they may be located.  In that sense, the local legislature puts on its
"Sorting Hat"33 and separates permitted uses, special exceptions, and all other uses.  That is
why the uses are designated special exception uses, not permitted uses.  The inherent effects
notwithstanding, the legislative determination necessarily is that the uses conceptually are
compatible in the particular zone with otherwise permitted uses and with surrounding zones
and uses already in place, provided that, at a given location, adduced evidence does not
58
convince the body to whom the power to grant or deny individual applications is given that
actual incompatibility would occur.  With this understanding of the legislative process (the
"presumptive finding") in mind, the otherwise problematic language in Schultz makes perfect
sense.  The language is a backwards-looking reference to the legislative "presumptive
finding" in the first instance made when the particular use was made a special exception use
in the zoning ordinance.  It is not a part of the required analysis to be made in the review
process for each special exception application.  It is a point of reference explication only.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
O F 
SPECIA L  
A P P E A LS
AFFIRMED; 
PETITIONERS
TO 
DIVIDE 
THE 
COSTS
EQUALLY.
0
Circuit Court for Baltimore Cou nty
Case No. 03-C-05-007730
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 137
September Term, 2007
                                                                             
PEOPLE'S COUNSEL FOR BALTIMORE
COUNTY, et al.
v.
LOYOLA COLLEGE IN MARYLAND
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
specially assigned)
Raker, Irma S. (Retired,
specially assigned)
JJ.
                                                                             
Concurring Opinion by Murphy, J.
                                                                             
Filed:  September 9, 2008
1
I agree “that the Schultz analytical overlay for applications for individual special
exceptions is focused entirely on the neighborhood involved in each case,” and that “the
Schultz standard . . .  requires that the adverse effect ‘inherent’ in a proposed use be
determined without recourse to a comparative geographic analysis.”  I write separately,
however, to emphasize that (1) the “neighborhood involved” in a particular case may well
have a different zoning classification than the property that is the subject of the application,
and (2) our disapproval of “language to the contrary in Holbrook, Lucas, Futoryan,
Hayfields, and Mossburg” should not be misinterpreted as a disapproval of the “bottom line”
decisions made in each of those cases.  
In Harris v. State, 81 Md. App. 247, 567 A.2d 476 (1989), rev’d on other grounds,
324 Md. 490, 597 A.2d 956 (1991), Judge Moylan stated:
The Maryland decisional law on the subject that some
call “other crimes evidence” . . .  gives no occasion for
complaint.  The language and the framework of analysis used by
both appellate courts of this state to describe and to explain that
law, however, leave much to be desired in terms of current
usage.  Our decisions are better than our opinions.  
Id. at 254, 576 A.2d at 479.  As the majority opinion makes clear, the same may be said about
appellate opinions on the subject of special exceptions.  
In Holbrook, this Court correctly upheld the conclusion of the Cecil County Board of
Appeals that the applicant should not be granted a special exception to place a mobile home
in a particular location on his property because the presence of the mobile home at that
location would have an adverse effect upon adjoining property values.  
2
In Lucas, the Court of Special Appeals correctly upheld the conclusion of the
Baltimore County Board of Appeals that the applicant should not be granted a special
exception to operate an airport on his property because the operation of an airport would have
a negative impact on the Greenspring Valley properties located nearby.  
In Futoryan, the Court of Special Appeals correctly upheld the conclusion of the
Baltimore City Board of Zoning Appeals that the applicant should not be granted a
“conditional use” permit to operate an auto repair shop on property zoned as a B-3-2
Business District, surrounded on all sides by residential zoning, because the operation of an
auto repair shop would be (in the words of the Board) “a detriment to the general welfare of
the adjoining residential community.”
The decisions in Holbrook, Lucas and Futoryan are consistent with the majority
opinion in the case at bar, as well as with this Court’s holding in Brouillett v. Eudowood
Shopping Plaza Inc., supra.  In that case, (1) the Baltimore County Board of Appeals denied
a petition requesting a special exception for the operation of a self-service carwash on the
parking lot of the Eudowood Shopping Plaza, which was zoned Business-Local, (2) the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County reversed the Board, and (3) this Court reversed the
Circuit Court, noting that “the proposed use would be clearly visible to a residential area
[containing dwellings zoned as group houses] with home values [in 1967 and 1968] of
$45,000.00 and more.”  249 Md. at 609, 241 A.2d at 405.
In Mossburg, the Court of Special Appeals correctly held that a special exception to
3
operate a solid waste transfer station should not have been denied by the Montgomery
County Board of Appeals on “speculation” that, at the particular location of the transfer
station, there would be adverse impacts from (1) runoff into a tributary that ultimately drains
into the Chesapeake Bay, and (2) a serious traffic hazzard created by truck traffic.
As to Hayfields, which involved a special exception to operate a golf course, the Court
of Special Appeals remanded with directions that the Baltimore County Board of Appeals
resolve certain questions relating to whether the particular location of the proposed course
would adversely affect ground water in wells on or near the course.  I am persuaded that the
decision to remand was (1) correct, and (2) not inconsistent with the majority’s analysis of
Schultz.  
It may be helpful to restate the rules of engagement in special exception litigation, and
review how those rules were applied in the case at bar.  Although it is of no real consequence
whether we say that an applicant “is entitled to a special exception, provided that,” or that
an applicant “is not entitled to a special exception, unless,” the applicant for a special
exception bears both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion on the issue of
whether the special exception should be granted.  If the zoning authority is presented with
evidence that generates a genuine question of fact as to whether the grant of a special
exception would violate the applicable legislation and/or the requirements of Schultz, the
applicant must persuade the zoning authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the
special exception will conform to all applicable requirements.  
4
In the case at bar, the petitioners presented evidence that generated a genuine question
of fact as to whether (1) an adverse “thermal” impact would result from stormwater ponds
draining into a trout stream near the property, and (2) there would be an adverse “traffic
impact” on the main public road used by persons traveling to and from the proposed Retreat
Center.  Respondent was not entitled to a special exception unless it persuaded the Board of
Appeals that neither of those adverse impacts would result if the special exception was
granted.  The Board, applying the correct burden of persuasion,  found in favor of respondent
on both of these issues.  Under the applicable standard of review, this Court must affirm the
Board’s decision.