Case Title: Jett v. Wooten

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1110731

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 09/14/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2012
____________________
1110731
____________________
Rodgetta Colvin Jett n/k/a Octavia R. Cantelow-Jett
v.
James M. Wooten and the Law Offices of James M. Wooten, P.C.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-10-904616)
STUART, Justice.
Rodgetta Colvin Jett n/k/a Octavia R. Cantelow-Jett
("Jett") appeals the summary judgment entered against her by
the Jefferson Circuit Court in her legal-malpractice action
against attorney James M. Wooten and his law firm, the Law
1110731
2
Offices of James M. Wooten, P.C. ("Wooten P.C.").  We reverse
and remand.
I.
On approximately March 13, 2006, Jett was injured when
she fell down the stairs while leaving a YMCA facility in
Birmingham.  On approximately May 6, 2006, she was injured
again when a door struck her toe at Brookwood Medical Center
("Brookwood") in Birmingham.  Jett sought and received medical
treatment for injuries suffered in both incidents.
Jett thereafter contacted Wooten, who had represented her
in approximately 10 other legal matters over the previous 12-
year period, including at least one personal-injury action, to
discuss possible claims based on the injuries she had suffered
in her accidents at the YMCA and at Brookwood.  On February
20, 2007, Jett executed two substantially identical contracts
for legal services with Wooten P.C. -- one for the claim
against the YMCA and one for the claim against Brookwood -- in
which Jett agreed to pay Wooten P.C. a percentage of any
settlement or judgment obtained in connection with the claims,
and Wooten P.C. in return agreed "to make immediate
investigation of the claim or claims," while reserving the
1110731
3
right to "withdraw at any time from the case if investigation
discloses that there is no liability or no assets or no
insurance coverage on the part of the defendant."  The legal-
services contracts further provided that Wooten P.C. made no
promise or representation "as to the outcome of the claim,
claims, or litigation, or as to what sums of money, if any,
[Jett] may be entitled to recover."
On October 25, 2007, Wooten sent Brookwood a letter
demanding $25,000 to settle any and all claims Jett had
against it as a result of her May 2006 accident.  On November
15, 2007, Brookwood responded with a letter denying liability.
Wooten asserts that he decided not to pursue a legal action
against Brookwood based on the weakness of the case and that
he promptly informed Jett via telephone that Brookwood had
denied her claim and that he would not be pursuing her claim
further; Jett denies that she was notified of either fact.
On February 26, 2009, Wooten sent a letter to the claims
administrator for the YMCA's insurance provider demanding
$100,000 to settle any and all claims Jett had against the
YMCA as a result of her March 2006 accident.  On March 31,
2009, Wooten received a response denying liability and
1110731
4
asserting that the statute of limitations applicable to
personal-injury claims barred any claims asserted by Jett as
a result of her accident.  Wooten asserts that he decided not
to pursue legal action against the YMCA based on the weakness
of the case and that he so informed Jett at approximately this
same time.  He also asserts that he had previously made the
strategic decision to pursue Jett’s case against the YMCA as
a breach-of-contract claim instead of a negligence or
premises-liability claim and that he accordingly informed Jett
at the time he told her he would not pursue legal action that
she would have six years from the date of her accident to
initiate a breach-of-contract action against the YMCA if she
decided to do so.  Jett denies ever being told by Wooten that
the YMCA had denied her claim or that he had decided not file
any action against the YMCA.  She also denies ever discussing
his decision to pursue her case as a breach-of-contract claim
and asserts that she was not a member of the YMCA at the time
of her accident and accordingly had no contract with the YMCA
that was capable of being breached.
On approximately March 13, 2009, Jett was at the
Jefferson County courthouse with regard to an unrelated case
1110731
5
when she learned for the first time that Wooten had not filed
actions against either the YMCA or Brookwood.  By this time,
the statute of limitations applicable to personal-injury
claims barred any negligence or premises-liability actions
against either the YMCA or Brookwood because the two-year
period in which to file those claims had expired on March 13,
2008, and May 6, 2008, respectively.  In a subsequent
deposition, Jett stated that Wooten had previously led her to
believe that legal actions against the YMCA and Brookwood had
been filed and that her cases were proceeding, testifying:
"Wooten kept assuring me that 'Oh, I filed things; don't worry
about it; everything is going to be fine; you know me, you
know me; I filed.'  Giving me the assurances that things had
been filed and they haven't."  On June 4, 2009, Jett wrote
Wooten to notify him that she was terminating their attorney-
client relationship because of his "poor performance and
misleading information," including his failure to file
"papers" in several cases.  Jett subsequently contacted the
claims administrator who had responded to Wooten's letter
regarding her claim against the YMCA to investigate Wooten's
efforts regarding that claim; in response, she was sent a copy
1110731
6
of the letter that had been sent to Wooten denying the YMCA's
liability based upon, among other things, the fact that the
two-year statute of limitations for filing a personal-injury
action had elapsed.
On December 30, 2010, Jett sued Wooten, asserting breach-
of-contract, 
negligence, 
and 
negligent-infliction-of-
emotional-distress claims against him based on his failure to
file lawsuits on her behalf against the YMCA and Brookwood.
However, it appears that Jett failed to serve Wooten for some
time.  Wooten eventually responded to Jett's lawsuit on April
12, 2011, by moving for a summary judgment, and, on April 26,
2011, he filed his answer to her complaint.  Wooten noted in
his 
answer 
that 
Jett's 
claims 
against 
him, 
however
denominated, were essentially legal-malpractice claims and
therefore were governed by the Alabama Legal Services
Liability Act, § 6-5-570 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the
ALSLA").  See Sessions v. Espy, 854 So. 2d 515, 522 (Ala.
2002) ("[T]he ALSLA applies to all actions against 'legal
service providers' alleging a breach of their duties in
providing legal services."), and Cunningham v. Langston,
Frazer, Sweet, & Freese, P.A., 727 So. 2d 800, 803 (Ala. 1999)
1110731
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("[F]rom a plaintiff's perspective, the ALSLA applies to any
claim originating from his receipt of legal services.").  Jett
thereafter 
filed 
a 
response 
opposing 
Wooten’s 
summary-judgment
motion as well as an amended complaint naming Wooten P.C. as
a defendant.  On July 7, 2011, the trial court denied Wooten's
motion for a summary judgment.
The two sides thereafter engaged in discovery, serving
interrogatories upon each other and taking each other's
deposition.  On December 28, 2011, Wooten and Wooten P.C.
(hereinafter 
referred 
to 
collectively 
as 
"the 
Wooten
defendants") again moved the trial court to enter a summary
judgment in their favor, this time arguing that Jett's claims
against them were themselves barred by the two-year statute of
limitations that generally applies to ALSLA claims.  See § 6-
5-574, Ala. Code 1975 ("All legal service liability actions
against a legal service provider must be commenced within two
years after the act or omission or failure giving rise to the
claim, and not afterwards ....").  Jett filed a response
opposing that motion.  A hearing was held on February 2, 2012,
and, on February 15, 2012, the trial court entered a summary
judgment for the Wooten defendants, stating:
1110731
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"The Court finds that the statute of limitations
to file [Jett's] suits expired on March 13, 2008,
(YMCA) and May 6, 2008, ([Brookwood]).  Therefore,
she had until March 13, 2010, and May 6, 2010, to
file suit against [the Wooten defendants].  This
suit was not filed until December 30, 2010."
On March 8, 2012, Jett filed her notice of appeal to this
Court.
II.
Jett argues that the trial court erred by entering a
summary judgment in favor of the Wooten defendants.  We review
her claim pursuant to the following standard of review:
"This Court's review of a summary judgment is de
novo.  Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
886 So. 2d 72, 74 (Ala. 2003).  We apply the same
standard of review as the trial court applied.
Specifically, we must determine whether the movant
has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the movant is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  Rule
56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala.
2004).  In making such a determination, we must
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant.  Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758
(Ala. 1986).  Once the movant makes a prima facie
showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to
produce 'substantial evidence' as to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v.
SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794,
797-98 (Ala. 1989); § 12-21-12, Ala. Code 1975.
'[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight
and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise
of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the
1110731
9
existence of the fact sought to be proved.'  West v.
Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So. 2d 870,
871 (Ala. 1989)."
Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038–39
(Ala. 2004).
III.
Jett argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
her claims against the Wooten defendants were barred by the
statute of limitations because, she argues, the trial court
failed to give effect to § 6-2-3, Ala. Code 1975, which
generally provides that, if a defendant has acted fraudulently
to conceal a claim, the statute of limitations applying to
that claim will not begin to run until the plaintiff
discovers, or should have discovered, the claim.  The ALSLA
specifically provides that § 6-2-3 applies to legal-
malpractice claims, as the Court of Civil Appeals explained in
Rutledge v. Freeman, 914 So. 2d 364, 368-69 (Ala. Civ. App.
2004):
"Section 
6-5-574(a) 
sets 
out 
a 
two-year
limitations period for the commencement of all
legal-service-liability actions. Section 6-5-574(b)
states that
"'[s]ubsection (a) of this section shall be
subject to all existing provisions of law
relating to the computation of statutory
1110731
10
periods of limitations for the commencement
of actions, namely, Section[] ... 6-2-3
...; provided, that notwithstanding any
provisions of such section[], no action
shall be commenced more than four years
after 
the 
act, 
omission, 
or 
failure
complained of ....'
"The supreme court has recognized that the savings
provision of § 6-2-3 applies in ALSLA actions.  See
Dennis [v. Northcutt], 887 So. 2d [219,] 221 n. 4
[(Ala. 2004)]; Ex parte Seabol, 782 So. 2d [212,]
214-15 [(Ala. 2000)]; and Leighton Ave. Office
Plaza, Ltd. v. Campbell, 584 So. 2d 1340, 1344 (Ala.
1991).  Section 6-2-3 reads as follows:
"'In actions seeking relief on the
ground of fraud where the statute has
created a bar, the claim must not be
considered as having accrued until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the
fact constituting the fraud, after which he
must have two years within which to
prosecute his action.'
"Although the wording of § 6-2-3 indicates that it
applies only to fraud actions, that section and its
predecessor have long been held to apply to any
cause of action that has been fraudulently concealed
from a plaintiff.  See Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire, 285
Ala. 454, 457, 233 So. 2d 465, 467 (1970); Van
Antwerp v. Van Antwerp, 242 Ala. 92, 5 So. 2d 73
(1941); and Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 133, 194
So. 147, 149 (1940), superseded by statute on other
grounds, as noted in Ex parte Sonnier, 707 So. 2d
635, 638 (Ala. 1997); see also Dennis, 887 So. 2d at
221 n. 4 (indicating that § 6-2-3 applies to toll
the statute of limitations in legal-malpractice
claims, but not deciding whether § 6-2-3 applied
because the six-month tolling provision of § 6-5-
574(a) applied to make the plaintiff's claim
timely)."
1110731
11
Jett accordingly argues that § 6-2-3 applies in this case and
that her action against the Wooten defendants was timely filed
because, she argues, there is evidence in the record ––
specifically her deposition testimony –– indicating that
Wooten concealed from her the fact that he had not initiated
legal actions on her behalf against the YMCA and Brookwood and
because she initiated her action against the Wooten defendants
on December 30, 2010, within the two-year period following the
date (March 13, 2009) she alleges she first learned of his
failure to file those actions. 
The Wooten defendants argue that § 6-2-3 should not be
applied in this case for two reasons.  First, they argue that
Jett failed to raise this argument or to produce any evidence
of fraudulent concealment in the trial court; thus, they
argue, the issue is outside the scope of this Court's review.
See Norman v. Bozeman, 605 So. 2d 1210, 1214 (Ala. 1992)
("[A]n issue raised on appeal must have first been presented
to and ruled on by the trial court.").  However, even while
making this argument, the Wooten defendants acknowledge that
Jett did in fact raise this argument in the trial court,
because they state in their brief that "the word 'fraud'
1110731
12
appears nowhere in the record until [Jett] realized in
responding to [our] second motion for summary judgment of the
fatal flaw."  Wooten defendants' brief, p. 21.  In fact,
Jett's response to the Wooten defendants' second motion for a
summary judgment contained the following argument urging the
trial court to apply § 6-2-3:
"[Jett] learned on or about March 2009 that
[Wooten] had not timely commenced a lawsuit against
the YMCA and/or Brookwood Medical Center before the
statute ran ....  When [Jett] learned of the
misrepresentation of the material fact, [Jett] had
two years from the date of the discovery of the
material fact and/or fraud or deception to commence
an action in court.  Here, [Jett] learned of this
deception in March of 2009; the statute would have
run on or about March 2011.  [Jett] commenced this
action in December 2010, which is within the time
frame for this case to be filed.
"....
"Therefore, in the present action [Jett] has
filed this action within the allowed time frame
provide[d] by Code of Alabama [1975,] § 6-2-3: 'In
actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where
the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be
considered as having accrued until the discovery by
the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the
fraud, after which he must have two years within
which to prosecute his action.'
"[Jett's] time of action would have run on or
about 
March 
2011. 
 
Therefore 
[the 
Wooten
defendants'] assertion that [Jett's] case was filed
erroneously is grossly incorrect and is due to be
denied."
1110731
13
The Wooten defendants appear to believe that Jett's invocation
of § 6-2-3 in her response to their second motion for a
summary judgment somehow came too late; however, because they
did not assert a statute-of-limitations defense until that
second motion for a summary judgment, Jett's citation of § 6-
2-3 for the first time in her response to that motion was
appropriate.  Moreover, the Wooten defendants have cited no
authority that would indicate that Jett waived the right to
invoke § 6-2-3 by failing to cite it earlier.  Finally, Jett's
argument that § 6-2-3 applies in this case is supported by her
deposition testimony indicating that Wooten misled her with
regard to whether legal actions had been filed against the
YMCA and Brookwood.  The issue whether § 6-2-3 should be given
effect is accordingly properly before this Court.
The Wooten defendants next argue that § 6-2-3 should not
apply because Jett acknowledges that she discovered on March
13, 2009, that Wooten had not filed actions on her behalf
against the YMCA or Brookwood –– at which point she still had
approximately a year in which to file a legal-malpractice
claim against the Wooten defendants before the limitations
period of § 6-5-574 expired.  However, as the Court of Civil
1110731
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Appeals explained in Rutledge when it rejected a similar
argument, the savings provision of § 6-2-3 extends the statute
of limitations for two years after the discovery of a cause of
action even if the statute of limitations has not yet run on
that cause of action when it is discovered:
"Despite [the appellee's] argument to the
contrary, § 6-2-3 does not require the applicable
limitations 
period 
to 
have 
expired 
on 
the
plaintiff's claim; rather, it provides an additional
two years for the plaintiff to file an action when
the plaintiff discovers the cause of action less
than two years before the expiration of the
applicable limitations period.  See Butler v.
Guaranty Sav. & Loan, 251 Ala. 449, 451, 37 So. 2d
638, 639 (1948); Van Antwerp [v. Van Antwerp], 242
Ala. [92,] 100, 5 So. 2d [73,] 80 [(1941)].  The
Supreme Court stated the purpose of the predecessor
to § 6-2-3, which granted plaintiffs an additional
one year after the discovery of the fraud to file an
action, as follows:
"'Section 42, Title 7, Code of 1940
[the predecessor to § 6-2-3], does not fix
a limitation in the first instance.  It
does not cut down the limitation fixed in
some other statute.  It serves no purpose
where plaintiff discovered the existence of
his right of action as much as one year
before it was barred by an appropriate
statute.  But when plaintiff discovered the
existence of his right of action after it
has become completely barred or within one
year before it is so barred, this statute
makes provision for a limitation of one
year from the date of such discovery,
provided its discovery was concealed by
1110731
15
some activity of defendant, amounting to a
fraud.'
"Van Antwerp, 242 Ala. at 100, 5 So. 2d at 80.  In
1985, § 6-2-3 was amended to provide an additional
two years during which a plaintiff could file an
action.  Thus, to paraphrase Van Antwerp, under §
6-2-3 a plaintiff who does not discover his cause of
action until two years before its being barred by
the applicable statute of limitations has two years
from 
the 
date 
he 
discovers, 
or 
should 
have
discovered, the fraud to file his action.
"[The appellee] calls our attention to Williams
v. Mertz, 549 So. 2d 87 (Ala. 1989), in which the
supreme court stated that '[s]ection 6-2-3 does not
even apply to an action until the expiration of the
time 
allowed 
by 
the 
applicable 
statute 
of
limitations would appear to have created a bar to
the suit,' Williams, 549 So. 2d at 88, and that '[§
6-2-3] does not act as a limit upon an action when
the applicable limitations period has not run.'  Id.
at 89.  Those statements run counter to the purpose
and operation of the statute as expressed in Van
Antwerp.  In addition, and even more importantly,
based on the fact that § 6-2-3 did not apply to toll
the statute of limitations in Williams because there
was no statute of limitations to toll in that action
to quiet title, id. at 88-89, the statements quoted
above are dicta.
"Ryan v. Charles Townsend Ford, Inc., 409 So. 2d
784 (Ala. 1981), illustrates how the savings
provision of § 6-2-3 works.  In Ryan, the plaintiff,
who on January 8, 1980, had purchased a previously
leased 
automobile 
relying 
on 
the 
salesman's
representation that it delivered a certain gas
mileage, sued the car dealership on February 13,
1981.  Ryan, 409 So. 2d at 785.  The dealership
argued that the then one-year statute of limitations
for fraud barred her action.  Id. at 786.  The
plaintiff alleged that she had discovered that she
1110731
16
had been defrauded on February 19, 1980, after
having the car serviced because she originally
thought it might have a mechanical problem. Id. at
786.  She said that she did not realize that the
salesman's statements were false until the mechanic
told her that the automobile was not designed to and
would 
never 
get 
the 
mileage 
that 
had 
been
represented to her.  Id.  The Supreme Court reversed
the 
summary 
judgment 
based 
on 
the
statute-of-limitations defense that the trial court
had entered in the dealership's favor.  Id.  The
Court noted that there existed a question of fact
regarding when the plaintiff discovered that her
cause of action for fraud existed.  Id.
"Notably, the one-year statute of limitations
had not yet run when the plaintiff in Ryan
discovered her cause of action.  'Alabama does
recognize that a fraudulent concealment by a
defendant tolls the running of the statute until the
tort or injury is discovered or could have been
discovered by due diligence.'  Garrett v. Raytheon
Co., 368 So. 2d 516, 521 (Ala. 1979), superseded by
statute on other grounds, as noted in Johnson v.
Garlock, Inc., 682 So. 2d 25, 26 (Ala. 1996).  Thus,
based 
upon 
that 
general 
principle 
and 
the
construction of § 6-2-3 and its predecessor found in
cases like Van Antwerp and Ryan, the savings
provision of § 6-2-3 extends the statute of
limitations for a period of two years after the
discovery of the cause of action even if the statute
of limitations has not yet run on that cause of
action.  The reading of the statute urged by [the
appellee] –– that the savings provision of § 6-2-3
is not applicable until the statute of limitations
has already expired –– would make filing suit
impossible 
for 
a 
plaintiff 
who 
discovers 
a
fraudulently concealed cause of action mere hours
before the applicable limitations period is due to
expire.  Certainly, such a result would not comport
with the purposes of tolling principles generally.
1110731
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Thus, we reject [the appellee's] argument that §
6-2-3 has no application here."
914 So. 2d at 369-70.  Thus, the Wooten defendants' argument
that § 6-2-3 should not apply in this case because the
limitations period had not yet run when Jett discovered her
cause of action is without merit.
IV.
Jett filed a legal-malpractice action against the Wooten
defendants as a result of their failure to initiate legal
actions on her behalf against the YMCA and Brookwood before
the limitations period expired on those claims on March 13,
2008, and May 6, 2008, respectively.  The trial court
thereafter entered a summary judgment in favor of the Wooten
defendants, holding that Jett's claims against them were
themselves barred by the two-year statute of limitations that
applies to ALSLA claims because Jett did not initiate her
action until December 30, 2010, more than two years after
March 13, 2008, and May 6, 2008.  We now reverse that
judgment, holding that § 6-2-3 tolled the statute of
limitations and that the two-year period in which Jett could
initiate an action against the Wooten defendants based on
Wooten's failure to file actions against the YMCA and
1110731
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Brookwood did not begin to run until March 13, 2009, when Jett
discovered that Wooten had not filed the legal actions she
alleges he told her he had filed.  Accordingly, her lawsuit
against the Wooten defendants, initiated December 30, 2010,
was timely filed.  The judgment of the trial court is
accordingly reversed and the cause remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Malone, C.J., and Parker, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.