Case Title: White v. Law

Citation: 454 So. 2d 515

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1984-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
454 So. 2d 515 (1984)
Janice M. WHITE
v.
Mr. Jarrett C. LAW, Mrs. Jarrett C. Law, et al.
82-1265.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 18, 1984.
Rehearing Denied July 6, 1984.
*516 William H. Brittain, II of Ball, Ball, Duke & Matthews, Montgomery, for appellant.
William J. Donald and William J. Donald, III of Zeanah, Donald & Hust, Tuscaloosa for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
This case involves the appropriateness of a summary judgment for the defendants in a dog bite case.
On the afternoon of March 5, 1981, plaintiff White went to her daughter's residence to pick up her granddaughter. Upon arrival, White was informed by the granddaughter's babysitter that a neighbor's dog had dug under the backyard fence and was chasing the family's female dog around the backyard. When she opened the gate leading to her daughter's backyard, White was knocked to the ground and bitten at least once on the knee by the intruding dog. As a result of the injury, White required emergency medical treatment and later physical therapy.
On February 16, 1982, White filed a complaint against Mr. and Mrs. Jarrett C. Law, the owners of the dog, and in her original *517 complaint she alleged negligence and/or wanton conduct on the part of the Laws. On December 8, 1982, the Laws filed an answer in which they denied the general allegations of the complaint. On May 3, 1983, the Laws filed a motion for summary judgment. White amended her complaint on May 24, 1983, adding a count for trespass under Code 1975, § 3-1-5, and responded to the summary judgment motion. The defendants relied upon two affidavits and the depositions of White and Mrs. Law to support their claim to summary judgment. The trial court granted the Laws' summary judgment on August 17, 1983, as to all counts of the complaint.
We note initially that the plaintiff does not appeal that part of the summary judgment relating to the trespass count, the wantonness count, or the denial of injunctive relief. Where the appellant does not raise issues on appeal, we will not review them. Barrett v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Piedmont, 451 So. 2d 257 (Ala.1984).
The issue is: Was there a scintilla of evidence that the Laws had knowledge prior to this incident, either express or implied, that this dog had a propensity for such an attack?
Our examination of the record on appeal, in its factual context, reveals the following: White's deposition regarding any knowledge the Laws may have had is set out below (in regard to a telephone conversation between White and Mrs. Law, White summarized the conversation thusly):
The statements made in the two affidavits offered by White regarding any knowledge or scienter on the part of the Laws are set out below:
Pat Crawford, a neighbor, in her affidavit, stated:
White's daughter also gave a statement by affidavit:
The pertinent portion of the deposition of Mrs. Law which was submitted by White reads in full:
This is the total evidence before the trial court as to whether the defendants actually knew or should have known of their dog's possible vicious propensities.
This Court recently summarized the law in cases where a dog has attacked someone off its owner's premises.
Allen v. Whitehead, 423 So. 2d 835, 836-838 (Ala.1982). The law in Alabama is clear; a motion for summary judgment may be granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fountain v. Phillips, 404 So. 2d 614 (Ala.1981), Ala.R.Civ.P. 56. All reasonable inferences from the facts are to be viewed most favorably to the non-moving party. Chiniche v. Smith, 374 So. 2d 872 (Ala.1979). Finally, the summary judgment rule is to be read in the context of the "scintilla evidence" rule. Ala.R.Civ.P. 56 and comments, Barrett v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Piedmont, 451 So. 2d 257 (Ala.1984). In Allen v. Whitehead, supra, this Court stated:
We must decide whether there was any evidence that the Laws had prior knowledge of facts from which they could infer that their dog was likely to commit an act similar to that committed on White. Affidavits and other evidence offered in *520 response to a summary judgment motion must present facts that would be admissible into evidence, and must be more than a mere statement of allegations contained in the pleadings. Ala.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Morris v. Morris, 366 So. 2d 676 (Ala.1979); Whatley v. Cardinal Pest Control, 388 So. 2d 529 (Ala.1980).
The affidavits and depositions reveal that the Laws' dog had been observed in the Laws' fenced backyard, that the dog would bark, growl, and charge the fence, including occasions in which the Laws were present, and that two young children had "teased" the dog by thrusting a stick through the fence. However, the most important evidence presented is the fact that Mrs. Law was apparently concerned about how the dog would react to Mrs. White's granddaughter. The testimony indicates that Mrs. Law feared that the action of the previous neighbor's children in teasing the dog might cause the dog to harm Mrs. White's granddaughter. She had taken steps to acquaint Mrs. White's granddaughter with the dog.
In Allen we reiterated that the crucial issue is "whether the owner knows, or has reason to know, of the animal's dangerous propensities." 423 So. 2d  at 838. The testimony in this case presents at least a scintilla of evidence that the Laws knew, or had reason to know, of the dog's dangerous propensities. Here, unlike in Allen, there is evidence that the dog owners were concerned about the animal's past behavior and had taken some steps to avoid problems in the future. The measures the Laws took to acquaint the dog with the new neighbors to avoid problems are commendable, but those actions, together with the other evidence concerning the dog's previous behavior, creates an inference that the owners knew of the dog's dangerous propensities.
We conclude that there was at least a scintilla of evidence that the dog had exhibited dangerous propensities, and that the Laws knew of these propensities.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
TORBERT, C.J., and FAULKNER, SHORES, EMBRY, BEATTY and ADAMS, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents, with whom JONES and ALMON, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
The dog involved in this case was fenced. He dug out under the fence to get into the neighbor's yard. The Court, in Allen v. Whitehead, 423 So. 2d 835 (Ala.1982), specifically pointed out in that case "that the dog was not confined." Yet, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment there and reverses this case where the dog was confined.
I realize that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in a negligence action; nevertheless, it appears to me that Allen v. Whitehead would mandate the same treatment for the dog owner here that was accorded the dog owner in that case; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
JONES and ALMON, JJ., concur.