Case Title: Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc.

Citation: 2011-Ohio-4609

Docket Number: 20101621

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4609.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-4609 
DOHME, APPELLEE, v. EURAND AMERICA, INC., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4609.] 
To satisfy the clarity element of a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy, a terminated employee must articulate a clear public policy 
by citation to specific provisions in the federal or state constitution, 
federal or state statutes, administrative rules and regulations, or common 
law. 
(No. 2010-1621 — Submitted June 7, 2011 — Decided September 15, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 23653,  
189 Ohio App.3d 343, 2010-Ohio-3905. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
To satisfy the clarity element of a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy, a terminated employee must articulate a clear public policy 
by citation to specific provisions in the federal or state constitution, federal 
or state statutes, administrative rules and regulations, or common law. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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__________________ 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal, we consider the tort claim of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy.  We conclude that the discharged 
employee, appellee, Randall J. Dohme, has not established that he meets the 
requirements that are necessary to maintain his claim for wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate 
court. 
I. Facts and Procedure 
{¶ 2} Dohme began working for appellant, Eurand America, in 2001.  He 
held two positions at Eurand America until the termination of his employment in 
March 2003.  His first position was as engineering supervisor.  In this position, 
Dohme “was responsible for supervising the performance of engineering 
technicians and team leaders.”  Thereafter, Dohme was named the facilities 
administrator, and his job responsibilities included maintaining the plant fire-
protection system.  Dohme asserts that although his title or job description never 
changed, his duties with Eurand America during the last three months of his 
employment consisted of merely tracking the tools and parts used by the 
maintenance department. 
{¶ 3} Eurand America fired Dohme in 2003.  Dohme contends that Eurand 
America fired him because he had expressed concerns about the safety of the 
Eurand workplace to outside parties.  One incident occurred in 2002 when Dohme 
discussed with his neighbor, a captain with the local fire department, the design of 
a pump, which Dohme believed had started a fire at the plant. 
{¶ 4} Dohme asserts that in 2003 he also communicated his workplace-
safety concerns to an insurance adjuster who conducted an on-site evaluation of 
Eurand America’s facility to assess the building and its operations.  Dohme 
contends that this particular communication to an outside party underlies his 
January Term, 2011 
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claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy; i.e., he was 
terminated because of his “perceived role in an on-site insurance adjuster’s 
discovery of certain violations relative to [Eurand America’s] fire alarm system, 
which * * * jeopardized workplace safety and placed employees in [an] 
unreasonable and dangerous setting.” 
{¶ 5} For its part, Eurand America states that it terminated Dohme for 
insubordination.  Eurand America states that prior to the insurance adjuster’s visit, 
it sent an interoffice e-mail to all its employees.  This interoffice e-mail explained 
that the facility would be inspected by the adjuster and that only certain 
employees of Eurand America, who were identified by Eurand America in that e-
mail, were to have contact with the adjuster.  Dohme was not identified in the 
interoffice e-mail as one of the employees who would be speaking with the 
adjuster. 
{¶ 6} Dohme spoke with the adjuster nevertheless.  Dohme told the 
adjuster that he could not locate an internal monthly report detailing overdue fire-
alarm inspections.  Dohme stated to the adjuster that “he might want to find out 
what happened with that [fire] inspection [that was removed from the computer 
system].”  Dohme believed that someone at Eurand America purposefully made 
the fire inspection report disappear and someone was “trying to make it look like” 
Dohme was not doing his job, even though he had been told to concentrate on the 
location and labeling of spare parts.  Dohme stated that his interaction with the 
adjuster took place despite, as characterized by Dohme, Eurand America’s active 
attempts to “prevent employee communication with said adjuster pursuant to an 
interoffice email sent by management personnel to all employees, including 
[Dohme], days prior to the adjuster’s arrival, which expressly prohibited 
communication with said adjuster.”  It was Dohme’s plain disregard of this 
express directive from Eurand America that resulted in the allegation of 
insubordination. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 7} The trial court granted summary judgment to Eurand America on 
Dohme’s claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.  The trial 
court based its decision on Dohme’s failure to articulate a specific clear public 
policy that was jeopardized by his termination. 
{¶ 8} The appellate court reversed.  Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc., 170 Ohio 
App.3d 593, 2007-Ohio-865, 868 N.E.2d 701, ¶ 39.  The court concluded that 
because there was a clear public policy generally favoring fire safety in the 
workplace, retaliation against employees who raise concerns over fire safety 
violates public policy.  The court found irrelevant Dohme’s motive for reporting 
the safety concerns.  The appellate court also concluded that the public policy 
favoring workplace fire safety was jeopardized by Dohme’s discharge, id. at ¶ 24, 
contrary to the trial court’s ruling that the issue was moot because Dohme failed 
to articulate a specific public policy. 
{¶ 9} Eurand America appealed, and we first accepted jurisdiction in 
2007.  114 Ohio St.3d 1424, 2007-Ohio-2904, 868 N.E.2d 679.  The propositions 
of law we accepted address the clarity and the jeopardy elements of the tort of 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.  Id.; 119 Ohio St.3d 1471, 2008-
Ohio-4911, 894 N.E.2d 331.  However, prior to issuing an opinion in that appeal, 
we discovered that there was no final, appealable order by the trial court, which is 
a prerequisite for appellate court jurisdiction over an appeal.  Consequently, we 
vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the cause to the trial 
court for further proceedings.  121 Ohio St.3d 277, 2009-Ohio-506, 903 N.E.2d 
1174. 
{¶ 10} On remand, a final, appealable order was issued by the trial court, 
and the case was again appealed to the Second District of the Court of Appeals.  
The appellate court adopted its prior decision in favor of Dohme in its entirety.  
189 Ohio App.3d 343, 2010-Ohio-3905, 938 N.E.2d 417, ¶ 8.  Eurand America 
January Term, 2011 
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appealed, and we again accepted jurisdiction of the same propositions of law.  127 
Ohio St.3d 1502, 2011-Ohio-19, 939 N.E.2d 1266. 
II. Analysis: Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy 
{¶ 11} In Ohio, the common-law doctrine of employment at will governs 
employment relationships.  The act of terminating an at-will employee’s 
relationship with an employer usually does not give rise to an action for damages.  
Collins v. Rizkana (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 65, 67, 652 N.E.2d 653; Mers v. 
Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 19 OBR 261, 483 N.E.2d 150, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  However, if an employee is discharged or 
disciplined in contravention of a clear public policy articulated in the Ohio or 
United States Constitutions, federal or state statutes, administrative rules and 
regulations, or common law, a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation 
of public policy may exist as an exception to the general rule.  Painter v. Graley 
(1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 377, 639 N.E.2d 51, paragraph three of the syllabus; 
Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 
551 N.E.2d 981, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 12} The elements of a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy are: 
{¶ 13} “ ‘1. That clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state 
or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the common law 
(the clarity element). 
{¶ 14} “ ‘2. That dismissing employees under circumstances like those 
involved in the plaintiff's dismissal would jeopardize the public policy (the 
jeopardy element). 
{¶ 15} “ ‘3. The plaintiff's dismissal was motivated by conduct related to 
the public policy (the causation element). 
{¶ 16} “ ‘4. The employer lacked overriding legitimate business 
justification for the dismissal (the overriding justification element).’ ”  (Emphasis 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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sic.)  Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 384, fn.8, quoting Perritt, The Future of Wrongful 
Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self-Interest Lie? (1989), 58 
U.Cin.L.Rev. 397, 398-399.  See also Leininger v. Pioneer Natl. Latex, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 311, 2007-Ohio-4921, 875 N.E.2d 36, ¶ 8-12. 
{¶ 17} The clarity and jeopardy elements of the Painter test are issues of 
law for the court’s determination; the causation and overriding justification 
elements are questions for determination by the factfinder.  Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d 
at 70, 652 N.E.2d 653. 
A. The Clarity Element 
{¶ 18} In an action claiming wrongful termination, the terminated 
employee must assert and prove a clear public policy deriving from the state or 
federal constitutions, a statute or administrative regulation, or the common law.  
Leininger, 115 Ohio St.3d 311, 2007-Ohio-4921, 875 N.E.2d 36, ¶ 16.  See also 
id. at ¶ 9, quoting Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d at 384, 639 N.E.2d 51, fn.8, quoting 
Perritt, 58 U.Cin.L.Rev. at 398-399; Sutton v. Tomco Machining, Inc., 129 Ohio 
St.3d 153, 2011-Ohio-2723, 950 N.E.2d 938, ¶ 11 (identifying R.C. 4123.90 as 
the source of Ohio’s public policy against retaliatory employment actions after an 
injury on the job).  “Clear public policies” have been recognized in a variety of 
circumstances.  Cf. 2 Perritt, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice (5th Ed.2006) 
7-32 to 7-32.8, Section 7.05[A] (listing public policies asserted by plaintiffs in 
other jurisdictions to support a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy, including assisting investigations, permitting Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (“OSHA”) complaints, ensuring public safety, and 
eliminating unsafe working conditions).  Other states have similarly required that 
the clear public policy supporting the wrongful-discharge claim must be plainly 
manifested within a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative 
regulations, or in the common law and that the plaintiff must identify the specific 
expression of public policy.  See, e.g., Turner v. Mem. Med. Ctr. (2009), 233 
January Term, 2011 
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Ill.2d 494, 502-503, 911 N.E.2d 369; Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc. (1996), 
128 Wash.2d 931, 941, 913 P.2d 377; Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Servs., Corp. 
(1992), 188 W.Va. 471, 377, 424 S.E.2d 606. 
{¶ 19} In this case, we conclude, as did the trial court, that Dohme failed 
to meet his requisite burden to articulate, by citation to its source, a specific public 
policy that Eurand America violated when it discharged him.  Dohme’s complaint 
simply alleged that Eurand America’s actions “jeopardized workplace safety.”  
Eurand America asserted in its motion for summary judgment that Dohme has not 
identified a public policy applicable to the incident.  Dohme, the nonmoving 
party, then had the reciprocal burden of articulating, by citation to its source, a 
specific clear public policy.  See Mitseff v. Wheeler (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 
526 N.E.2d 798, syllabus (“A party seeking summary judgment must specifically 
delineate the basis upon which summary judgment is sought in order to allow the 
opposing party a meaningful opportunity to respond”). 
{¶ 20} In Dohme’s materials opposing summary judgment, he recited 
syllabus language from Pytlinski v. Brocar Prods., Inc. (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 77, 
760 N.E.2d 385: “Ohio public policy favoring workplace safety is an independent 
basis upon which a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy may be prosecuted.”  Although Dohme contended that under Pytlinski, no 
further articulation, by citation to its source, of a clear public policy was required, 
he additionally cited the plurality opinion of Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. 
(1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134, 152, 677 N.E.2d 308, which cites several statutes 
outlining an employer’s general duty to provide a safe workplace. 
{¶ 21} As the nonmovant, Dohme must show that the issue to be tried is 
genuine and may not rely merely upon the pleadings or upon unsupported 
allegations.  Shaw v. J. Pollock & Co. (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 656, 659, 612 
N.E.2d 1295.  The mere citation to the syllabus in Pytlinski is insufficient to meet 
the burden of articulating a clear public policy of workplace safety.  Further, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Dohme only generally mentioned or identified any legal basis for a statewide 
policy for workplace health and safety.  Dohme did not cite any specific statement 
of law in support of his claim of public policy that was drawn from federal or 
state constitutions, federal or state statutes, administrative rules and regulations, 
or common law.  In contrast, the Pytlinski and Kulch plaintiffs both alleged that 
their respective employers had violated federal OSHA regulations.  Pytlinski, 94 
Ohio St.3d at 78, 760 N.E.2d 385 (the terminated employee alleged that he had 
delivered a memorandum to his employer detailing the violations of OSHA 
regulations that were occurring at the workplace); Kulch, 78 Ohio St.3d at 135, 
677 N.E.2d 308 (the terminated employee alleged that after his verbal complaints 
of the health violations within the workplace were rebuffed by the employer, he 
had filed a written report with OSHA, which resulted in an on-site inspection and 
OSHA finding several violations of its standards).  Thus, Dohme failed to 
establish the existence of a clear public policy applicable to him in this matter.  
Cf. Lesko v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 10th App. No. 04AP-1130, 2005-Ohio-
3142, ¶ 35. 
{¶ 22} Similarly unavailing is Dohme’s reliance on the appellate court’s 
sua sponte articulation of a public policy favoring workplace fire safety, which 
was supported by citation to various state and federal statutes and regulations.  
Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc., 170 Ohio App.3d 593, 2007-Ohio-865, 868 N.E.2d 
701, ¶ 24.  As the plaintiff, Dohme has the obligation to specify the sources of law 
that support the public policy he relies upon in his claim.  Because Dohme did not 
back up his assertion of a public policy of workplace safety in his summary-
judgment documents with specific sources of law, he has not articulated the 
clarity element with specificity. 
{¶ 23} Unless the plaintiff asserts a public policy and identifies federal or 
state constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, or common law that support 
the policy, a court may not presume to sua sponte identify the source of that 
January Term, 2011 
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policy.  There may be valid reasons for a plaintiff’s failure to identify and assert a 
specific public policy or a specific source for that public policy.  An appellate 
court may not fill in the blanks on its own motion. 
{¶ 24} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that to satisfy the clarity 
element of a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, a 
terminated employee must articulate a clear public policy by citation to specific 
provisions in the federal or state constitution, federal or state statutes, 
administrative rules and regulations, or common law.  A general reference to 
workplace safety is insufficient to meet the clarity requirement.  Dohme has not 
asserted or proven for the purposes of satisfying the clarity element the existence 
of a clear Ohio public policy supported by specific citations so as to overcome a 
motion for summary judgment. 
{¶ 25} Dohme has failed to establish that his discharge was in 
contravention of a clear public policy articulated in the Ohio or United States 
Constitution, federal or state statutes, administrative rules and regulations, or 
common law, and his action must fail because establishment of the clarify 
element is essential to the survival of his remaining claims.  Because Dohme’s 
claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy fails for lack of proof of 
a specific clear public policy, Eurand America is entitled to summary judgment in 
its favor. 
{¶ 26} Although Dohme has asserted two additional propositions of law in 
this appeal, we do not reach those issues because our determination on the 
proposition of law involving the clarity element has fully resolved this matter. 
Because the court does not need to reach the issue of whether Eurand America’s 
termination of Dohme jeopardized a public policy, we decline to do so.  See 
Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 104, 2009-Ohio-2463, 909 
N.E.2d 106, ¶ 53; PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration (C.A.D.C.2004), 362 F.3d 786, 799 (Roberts, J., concurring in part 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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and concurring in the judgment) (“if it is not necessary to decide more, it is 
necessary not to decide more”). 
{¶ 27} It is well settled that this court does not issue advisory opinions.  
State ex rel. White v. Kilbane Koch, 96 Ohio St.3d 395, 2002-Ohio-4848, 775 
N.E.2d 508, ¶ 18, citing State ex rel Baldzicki v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections 
(2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 238, 242, 736 N.E.2d 893 and Egan v. Natl. Distillers & 
Chem. Corp. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 176, 25 OBR 243, 495 N.E.2d 904, syllabus.  
Accordingly, we dismiss, sua sponte, the propositions of law concerning the 
jeopardy element of the claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy 
as having been improvidently accepted. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 28} In sum, Dohme has not articulated a clear public policy applicable 
to his claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.  Because Dohme 
failed to establish the clarity element of his claim, the appellate court erred in 
reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Eurand America.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is hereby reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
Duwell Law, David M. Duwel, and Todd T. Duwel, for appellee. 
Scheuer Mackin Breslin, L.L.C., and Todd D. Penney, for appellant. 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Donald R. Keller, and Vladimir P. Belo, urging 
reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Management Lawyers Association. 
______________________