Case Title: ALBERTSON'S, INC. v. CITY OF SHERIDAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
ALBERTSON'S, INC. v. CITY OF SHERIDAN2001 WY 9833 P.3d 161Case Number: 00-258Decided: 10/17/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                
     

 

ALBERTSON'S, 
INC., a Delaware

corporation, 
licensed to do business

in 
Wyoming; and JACKSON ELECTRIC,

INC., a 
Wyoming corporation, 

Appellants(Petitioners),

 

v.

 

THE CITY 
OF SHERIDAN, WYOMING;

and the 
CITY COUNCIL OF THE

CITY OF 
SHERIDAN, WYOMING, 

Appellees(Respondents).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant Albertson's, Inc.:

            
Anthony T. Wendtland of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, Wyoming  

 Representing 
Appellant Jackson Electric, Inc.:

            
Virgil G. Kinnaird, Sheridan, Wyoming

 Representing 
Appellees:

Stephen 
K. Gregersen, City of Sheridan, Sheridan, Wyoming; Theodore E. Lauer, Director 
of the Prosecution Assistance Program; and Joseph J. Simola and Craig Trummel, 
Student Interns

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  
            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]      Jackson Electric, 
Inc. assigned its liquor license to Albertson's, Inc. pending transfer approval 
by the licensing authority, the City Council of the City of Sheridan.  Albertson's made application for the 
transfer, a public hearing was held, and the City Council voted to deny the 
request.  Albertson's and Jackson 
Electric appealed to the district court and demanded a trial de novo pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-4-104 (LEXIS 1999).1  The City of Sheridan filed a motion to 
dismiss asserting there is no legal right to appeal from the denial of a request 
to transfer a liquor license.  The 
district court dismissed the appeal, and we affirm.  

 

 

 

[¶2]      Albertson's 
presents the following issue:

 

Whether 
Albertson's, Inc. and Jackson Electric, Inc. can be denied judicial review of 
the City of Sheridan's December 6, 1999 denial of their Application to transfer 
an existing retail liquor license?

 

Jackson 
Electric phrases the issue:

 

Did the 
District Court err by granting the motion of Appellee City of Sheridan, Wyoming 
and City Council of the City of Sheridan, Wyoming to dismiss Appellant 
Albertson's, Inc. and Appellant Jackson Electric, Inc.['s] appeal of City of 
Sheridan's denial of application to transfer liquor 
license?

 

The City 
of Sheridan and the City Council responsively submit two questions for 
review:

 

I.  Does 
the holder of a liquor license or the prospective transferee of that license 
have a right to appeal to the district court from the City Council's denial of 
an application to transfer the license?

 

II.  Did the Sheridan City Council's denial 
of the transfer of the liquor license constitute a taking of the licensee's 
property without due process of law?

 

 

 

[¶3]      In January of 
1999, Jackson Electric assigned to Albertson's its rights to retail liquor 
license no. 11 issued by the City of Sheridan.  The assignment was made subject to 
approval of the City of Sheridan and all provisions and conditions of the 
Wyoming statutes relating to retail liquor licenses.  It is uncontested that Jackson Electric 
held a valid City of Sheridan liquor license during 1999, which was renewed in 
November of 1999.

 

[¶4]      On or about November 
2, 1999, Albertson's submitted a "License and/or Permit Application" to the City 
Clerk-Treasurer's office for the transfer of both the location and the ownership 
of the Jackson Electric liquor license.  A "Notice of Application for Transfer of 
Location and Ownership of a Regular Retail Liquor License" setting the matter 
for hearing on December 6, 1999, was published by the City Clerk-Treasurer.

 

[¶5]      At the hearing, 
counsel for both Albertson's and Jackson Electric were permitted to make 
comments and answer questions.  Comments were also taken from members of the 
public, including Sheridan business owners and other liquor dealers.  Subsequently, upon 
motion and vote, the City Council denied the requested transfer.  The proceedings were 
memorialized in the minutes of the City Council meeting as follows:

 

A public hearing on transfer of ownership and location of a 
retail liquor license from Jackson Electric dba XL, 661 Broadway to Albertson's, 
Inc. dba Albertson's #832, 1865 Coffeen Avenue was opened at 7:10 P.M.  After comments by 
proponents and opponents the public hearing was closed at 8:37 P.M.  

 

Councilor Tyra moved, seconded by Webster, to table the 
approval of the transfer.  Council defeated the motion; voice vote, 
Councilors Tyra and Webster affirming.

 

Councilor Blank moved, seconded by Severs, approval of the 
transfer of ownership and location of a retail liquor license from Jackson 
Electric dba XL, 661 Broadway to Albertson's, Inc. dba Albertson's #832, 1865 
Coffeen Avenue.  
Council disapproved the motion; roll call vote, aye 1, nay 5, Councilor 
Blank affirming.

 

[¶6]      Pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
1.04 and § 12-4-104, Albertson's and Jackson Electric filed a joint "Notice of 
Appeal of Denial of Application to Transfer Renewal Liquor License and Demand 
for Trial De Novo" with the district court.  Thereafter, the parties entered into a 
stipulation to certify the key issue to this court and framed it in the 
following manner:

 

If a City denies a request pursuant to W.S. 12-4-104 (1999) 
to transfer an existing and recently renewed liquor license from an entity 
holding it to another entity, does W.S. 12-4-104(e) (1999) provide or preclude 
the entity seeking transfer of the license or the entity seeking to transfer the 
license an appeal of the denial and obtain a trial de novo in District 
Court?

 

The district court certified the question to the Wyoming 
Supreme Court, but this court declined to answer the question.  The City of Sheridan 
then filed a motion to dismiss in district court asserting that Wyoming law 
provided no right to appeal from the City Council's denial of the requested 
liquor license transfer.  The district court issued a decision letter 
and order dismissing the appeal, and Albertson's and Jackson Electric jointly 
appealed.    

 

 

 

[¶7]      The issue to be 
addressed is whether the district court properly ruled that Wyoming statutes do 
not provide a right to appeal from the denial of a transfer request.  "The question is one 
of statutory interpretation.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law; 
therefore, our standard of review is de novo." Anderson Highway Signs and Supply, Inc. v. Close, 6 P.3d 123, 124 (Wyo. 2000).  
As we have noted:  "In interpreting statutes, we primarily 
determine the legislature's intent.  If the language is sufficiently clear, we do 
not resort to rules of construction.  We apply our general rule that we look to the 
ordinary and obvious meaning of a statute when the language is 
unambiguous."  
Kirbens v. Wyoming State Board of Medicine, 
992 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Wyo. 1999) (citations omitted).  We construe together 
all parts of the statutes in pari materia, and, in ascertaining the meaning of a 
given law, we consider and construe in harmony all statutes relating to the same 
subject or having the same general purpose.  Thunderbasin Land, Livestock 
& Investment Co. v. County of Laramie County, 5 P.3d 774, 779 (Wyo. 
2000).

 

When the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court 
must look to the mischief the statute was intended to cure, the historical 
setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the 
conclusions of law, and other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, 
making use of the accepted rules of construction to ascertain a legislative 
intent that is reasonable and consistent.

 

State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. 
Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983).  When the legislature 
adopts a statute, we presume it does so with full knowledge of the existing 
state of the law with reference to the statute's subject matter.  Thunderbasin Land, Livestock & Investment 
Co., 5 P.3d  
at 780.

 

All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature 
with full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference thereto and 
statutes are therefore to be construed in harmony with the existing law, and as 
a part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and 
effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the 
constitution, but also with reference to the decisions of the courts.

 

Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo. 1976); see 
also Fosler v. Collins, 13 P.3d 686, 689 (Wyo. 2000).

 

 

 

[¶8]      "The right to judicial 
review of an administrative decision is entirely statutory.  Said another way, 
judicial review is not available unless made so by statute."  Industrial Siting Council of State of Wyoming v. Chicago and 
North Western Transportation Company, 660 P.2d 776, 778 (Wyo. 1983).  Therefore, we must 
determine whether judicial review from a city's denial of a liquor license 
transfer application is made available by statute.  "We have adopted the 
view that when we are analyzing the availability of judicial review of 
administrative decisions the interests of Wyoming are best served by a policy 
which leads to reviewability in most instances." Pisano 
v. Shillinger, 835 P.2d 1136, 1138-39 (Wyo. 1992).  In harmony with the 
"presumption of reviewability" is the concept that the right to review is not 
precluded unless legislative intent to preclude judicial review is clear and 
convincing.  835 P.2d  at 1139.  
As explained by the United States Supreme Court:

 

"Whether and to what extent a particular statute precludes 
judicial review is determined not only from its express language, but also from 
the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, 
and the nature of the administrative action involved."  [Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,] 467 U.S. [340,] 
345, 104 S.Ct. [2450,] 2453[, 81 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1984)].  See also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 
476 U.S. 667, 106 S. Ct. 2133, 90 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1986).

 

Id.  On this authority, we will evaluate the applicable statutes 
to determine whether they preclude judicial review of a city council's denial of 
a liquor license transfer request.

 

A.        Express 
Language of "Local Licenses" Provisions of Title 12, Chapter 4

 

[¶9]      Section 12-4-104 is 
entitled "Publication of notice; grant or denial; renewal preference; copy of 
application and notice to commission; judicial review" and provides in relevant 
part:

 

            
(a)  When an application for a license, permit, renewal or any 
transfer of location or ownership thereof has been filed with a 
licensing authority, the clerk shall promptly prepare a notice of application, 
place the notice conspicuously upon the premises shown by the application as the 
proposed place of sale and publish the notice in a newspaper of local 
circulation once a week for four (4) consecutive weeks.  The notice shall 
state that a named applicant has applied for a license, permit, renewal or transfer thereof, and that protests against the issuance, 
renewal or transfer of the 
license or permit will be heard at a designated meeting of the licensing 
authority.  Each 
applicant shall, at the time of filing his application, pay the clerk an amount 
sufficient to cover the costs of publishing notice.  Notices may be 
substantially in the following form:

 

NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR A ....

 

            
Notice is hereby given that on the .... day of .... (year) (name of 
applicant) filed an application for a .... license (permit), in the office of 
the clerk of the city (or town or county) of .... for the following described 
place (and room) (insert description) and protests, if any there be, against the 
issuance (transfer or renewal) of the license (permit) will be heard at 
the hour of ....M., on the .... day of .... (year), in the (meeting place of the 
governing body).

 

Dated ........                                                
Signed ............

 

            
(b)  Any license or permit authorized under this title shall 
not be issued, renewed or transferred until on or 
after the date set in the notice for hearing protests.  If a renewal or transfer hearing, the hearing shall be held no later than thirty 
(30) days preceding the expiration date of the license or permit.  A license or permit 
shall not be issued, renewed or transferred if the 
licensing authority finds from evidence presented at the hearing:

 

(i)  The welfare of the people residing in the 
vicinity of the proposed license or permit premises shall be adversely and 
seriously affected;

 

(ii)  The purpose of this title shall not be 
carried out by the issuance, renewal or transfer of the license or permit;

            

(iii)  The number, type and location of existing 
licenses or permits meet the needs of the vicinity under consideration;

 

(iv)  The desires of the residents of the county, 
city or town will not be met or satisfied by the issuance, renewal or transfer of the license or 
permit; or

 

(v)  Any other reasonable restrictions or 
standards which may be imposed by the licensing authority shall not be carried 
out by the issuance, renewal or transfer of the license or permit.

 

            
(c)  The owner and holder of an expired liquor license or 
permit or one due for expiration has a preference right to a new license for the 
same location.  
After the required notice and a public hearing, each application claiming 
renewal preference shall be promptly considered and acted upon by the licensing 
authority.

 

            
. . . .

 

            
(e)  An applicant 
for a renewal license or permit may appeal to the district court from an adverse 
decision by the licensing authority.  No applicant for a new license shall have a 
right of appeal from the decision of the licensing authority denying an 
application.

 

            
(f)  Upon an appeal the person applying for a license and 
claiming renewal preference shall be named as plaintiff, with the licensing 
authority named as defendant.  During the pendency of an appeal, a renewal 
license denied by a licensing authority shall not be granted to any other 
applicant.  Upon 
notice of appeal the clerk shall transmit to the clerk of the district court a 
certified copy of the application, of each protest if any, and of the minutes 
recording the decision appealed from.  The appeal shall be heard as a trial de novo 
with evidence taken and other proceedings had as in the trial of civil 
actions.  The 
court may accept and consider as part of the record certified documents 
forwarded to the court by the clerk of the licensing authority.  The case shall be 
heard promptly and the procedure shall conform to the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure unless other procedures are provided for or required.

 

(Emphasis added.)  The express language of § 12-4-104(e) only 
grants a right of appeal to applicants for renewal licenses or permits, and 
appeals by new applicants are categorically denied.  The appeal procedure 
set forth in § 12-4-104(f) notably does not refer to appeals in a generic 
context.  On the 
contrary, the first sentence of the subsection expressly limits the parties to 
an appeal:  
"Upon an appeal the person applying for a license and claiming renewal 
preference shall be named as plaintiff, with the licensing authority named as 
defendant." Section 12-4-104(f).

 

[¶10]   Neither § 12-4-104(e) nor § 12-4-104(f), 
which specifically set out appeal rights and procedures, mentions the term 
"transfer" or its derivations.  This is relevant because the term is 
referenced at least ten separate times throughout the other subsections of § 
12-4-104.  
Further, all the "Local Licenses" provisions of Title 12, Chapter 4 (§§ 
12-4-101 to -702) taken together mention the term "transfer" or its derivations 
over thirty times.  
The frequent usage of the term throughout the "Local Licenses" 
provisions, and § 12-4-104 itself, makes the absence of its use in § 12-4-104(e) 
and § 12-4-104(f) conspicuous.  We conclude the exclusion of the term 
"transfer" from the provisions governing appeals is not a mere oversight, but 
rather it evidences an affirmative legislative choice to limit such 
appeals.  

 

[¶11]   Also relevant to the interpretation of 
the language of § 12-4-104 is the express language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
12-4-601(a) (LexisNexis 2001), which provides in pertinent part:  
"(a)  After public hearing and with the approval of the 
licensing authority, a license or permit may be transferred to or renewed on 
different premises on the same 
basis as the original application."  (Emphasis added.)  The language chosen 
for this provision clearly establishes a transfer applicant for a different 
location is on the same footing as a new applicant.  A renewal applicant, 
on the other hand, has a preference right, pursuant to § 12-4-104(c), which 
is not provided to a transfer applicant.  This statute is consistent with authority 
holding a transfer license is to be treated in the same manner as an original 
application.

 

An application to a licensing board by the holder of a 
liquor license and a proposed transferee thereof for approval of the transfer is 
in effect an application by the proposed transferees for a license and should be 
dealt with as if it were an original application. . . .Whether to 
approve a transfer is at the discretion of the agency. 

 

45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating 
Liquors § 172 at 701 (1999).

 

[T]he requirements for change of license location are the 
same as those for obtaining a license, and the duties and authority of the 
[liquor licensing authority] are the same.  It is urged . . . that the holder of 
a license is entitled to more favorable consideration than an applicant for a 
new license and that the same is true of an applicant for change of 
location.  We 
cannot so adjudge.  
We have repeatedly held that it was the intention of the legislature to 
vest a wide discretion in local licensing authorities.  In the case of Board of County Commissioners of Gunnison County v. Buckley, 121 Colo. 108, 213 P.2d 608, 
612, involving an application for renewal of a license, we stated:  "The defendant board 
was not bound by any prior action of any licensing authority with relation to 
the facts pertaining to the issuance of any license for former years, but was 
called upon to exercise its own discretion as of the date of the new 
application.  
Conceivably the licensing authority passing upon the new application, in 
the exercise of its discretion, might with propriety reject an application which 
a former board, upon the same facts, had approved, and in so doing the board 
would not, of necessity, be guilty of an abuse of discretion, or an arbitrary 
and capricious exercise thereof.  There is no vested right in a licensee to 
continue in the liquor business beyond the expiration of the date of the license 
under which he operates."  Equally, there is no vested right in a 
licensee to move the location of his license, and, upon application so to do, 
the court may, and should, consider the same as in [the] case of [an] 
application for a new license.  The statute requires it be given like 
consideration.

 

MacArthur v. Martelli, 255 P.2d 969, 969-70 (Colo. 1953) (en banc).

 

[¶12]   Likewise, in Whitesides v. Council of City of Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 
319 P.2d 520 (1957), this court indicated transfer applications should be 
considered as original applications.  At the time Whitesides 
was decided, § 53-205, W.C.S.1945, the 
predecessor of § 12-4-104, did not reference the term "transfer."  The applicant, who 
had a liquor license for a number of years at the Frontier Hotel, applied for a 
new license to be issued for another location.  He did so by completing the regular form but 
marked it "Retail Liquor License and renewal thereof at new location."  319 P.2d  at 
521.  Addressing 
the question of whether this license had the characteristics of a "renewal" with 
rights of appeal, Chief Justice Blume stated in relevant part: 

 

Unlike the provisions in many other states, the legislature 
in this state has seen fit not to grant the right of appeal in all cases.  Such right is 
distinctly limited.  
It is not given when an applicant wants an original license and which is 
denied.  It is 
limited to those applying for a renewal. . . .Counsel for 
applicant contends, if we understand him correctly, that the right of renewal 
granted by statute means a new license without reference to its terms, that is 
to say, even though a location different from that mentioned in the license 
sought to be renewed is asked for, the change of location makes no difference 
whatever.  Of 
course that cannot be true, particularly in view of the importance attached by 
various provisions of our statutes to the place for dispensing liquor.  We cannot follow 
counsel's reasoning.  
When oxygen is combined with hydrogen, the former loses its 
identity.  An 
entirely different element arises.  So when the demand for a new license which is 
limited to a certain place is combined with a demand for a change of location, 
an entirely new situation comes into existence. . . .

 

. . . When, accordingly, the statute speaks of the 
renewal of a license, it speaks of one which contains the same terms and 
conditions of the old license, namely, one which permits the sale of 
intoxicating liquor at the same place as permitted in the old license.  It is the denial of 
that kind of license from which an appeal may be taken to the district court and 
not from the denial of another kind. . . .

 

            
. . . .

 

In this case we should probably consider the application of 
the applicant as an original application for a license.  There are many cases 
holding that where the statute provides for no appeal to the courts, or forbids 
it, as our state does except to a limited extent, the action of the governing 
board is final.  
Scott v. Township Board of Arcada Tp., 268 
Mich. 170, 255 N.W. 752; State ex rel. Renner v. 
Noel, 346 Mo. 286, 140 S.W.2d 57; Marsh v. Alcoholic 
Beverage Commission, 54 R.I. 57, 169 A. 747; Duncan 
v. Superior Court of Pinal County, 65 Ariz. 193, 177 P.2d 374; Minkoff v. Payne, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 210 F.2d 689; Appeal of Zeltner, 174 Pa.Super. 98, 100 A.2d 132; Jones 
v. Kellogg, Tex.Civ.App., 140 S.W.2d 592;  State of Texas v. 
Lemaster, Tex.Civ.App., 275 S.W.2d 164; Ziebell v. 
Hall, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W.2d 899. 

 

319 P.2d  at 523-25.

 

[¶13]   As we noted in Walker v. Board of County Commissioners, Albany County, 
644 P.2d 772, 776 (Wyo. 1982), although the Whitesides court "questioned the propriety of an appeal" 
from the denial of a transfer request, it nevertheless went on to examine the 
record and concluded there was no abuse of discretion or arbitrary action on the 
part of the city council. In the instant appeal, the issue of whether the denial 
of a transfer request by the governing body of a city can be appealed is now 
squarely before us for definitive resolution. 

 

[¶14]   The express language of the statutes 
provides only a right of appeal from a denial of a renewal request.  No express right of 
appeal is made available from a denial of a transfer application.  Further, the 
statutes mandate a transfer request be treated on the same basis as an original 
application for a liquor license.  An appeal from the denial of an original 
application is specifically precluded.  Therefore, through deductive reasoning, no 
appeal is available from the denial of a transfer application.  In this case, 
Albertson's application was clearly for a transfer and not a renewal.  The license in 
question had been renewed immediately prior to the hearing on the application to 
transfer the license.

 

 

[¶15]   

It is a fundamental principle that there is no inherent 
right in a citizen, or any one, to sell intoxicating liquors by retail, and that 
there is not a vested right in any person to have a liquor license.  Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 11 Sup. Ct. 13; Ex parte Levy, 43 Ark. 42.  "As it is a business 
attended with danger to the community, it may . . . be entirely 
prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost 
its evils.  The 
manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing 
authority.  That 
authority may vest in such officers as it may deem proper the power of passing 
upon applications for permission to carry it on, and to issue licenses for that 
purpose.  It is 
a matter of legislative will only."  Crowley v. 
Christensen, supra.

 

State ex rel. Noble v. City Council of City of 
Cheyenne, 7 Wyo. 417, 52 P. 975, 979 (1898); see also Berry v. Arapahoe and 
Shoshone Tribes, 420 F. Supp. 934, 941 (D. Wyo. 1976). 

 

[¶16]   It has been long established that the 
legislature may control and regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors for the 
protection of the people. "The purpose of the local licensing provisions found 
in §§ 12-4-101 to -702, W.S.1977, is the exercise of regulatory control by 
licensing authorities over those who engage in the retail sale of intoxicating 
liquors in Wyoming."  
Sterner v. United States, 774 P.2d 639, 643-44 
(Wyo. 1989).  In 
this regard, the "Local Licenses" provisions (§§ 12-4-101 to -702) supply 
the regulatory framework and procedural requirements for issuance of liquor 
licenses.

 

A part of that [regulatory] control is to limit the period 
for which a license may be in existence and to periodically require licensees to 
justify their continuing privilege to engage in the business of retail liquor 
sales.  Thus, a 
limitation upon the right to transfer, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the 
particular license . . . is consistent with state policy.

 

774 P.2d  at 644.  This court has specifically acknowledged the 
regulatory purpose and nature of  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-4-601 (LexisNexis 
2001).

 

The requirement that liquor licenses only be transferred 
according to W.S. 12-4-601 serves to assure that the regulatory authorities can 
administer the licensing process in an orderly fashion and that "the operator of 
[a] retail liquor establishment . . . be exposed to the scrutiny 
of the licensing process including a public hearing."  Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Dev. Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 46 (Wyo. 1985).  

 

Dubray v. Howshar, 884 P.2d 23, 28 (Wyo. 1994).

 

[¶17]   A liquor license is a mere privilege, 
which is at all times in the control of the legislature.  45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 177 (1999).  We conclude 
§ 12-4-104(e), which grants the right of appeal only to applicants denied 
renewal of a license, and § 12-4-601(a), which requires a transfer applicant be 
considered "on the same basis as the original application," are consistent with 
the legislature's broad authority and the regulatory purpose of the "Local 
Licenses" provisions.    

 

 

[¶18]   In 1933, the legislature repealed the 
prohibition statutes and enacted regulatory legislation governing the issuance 
of liquor licenses.2  1933 Wyo. Sp. Sess. Laws ch. 61.  This legislation 
gave incorporated cities and towns the authority to regulate or prohibit the 
sale of liquor.  
This authority encompassed the right to revoke any license at any time 
for good and sufficient reason for any act committed by the licensee which might 
seem to them incompatible with the aim and purpose of the act3 and the right 
to cancel any license if public dancing was permitted in the establishment.  1933 Wyo. Sp. Sess. 
Laws ch. 61, § 5.  
No right of appeal under any circumstance was provided, nor was the 
concept of transfer mentioned.

 

[¶19]   In 1935 the statutes were significantly 
amended and, as relevant to this appeal, reflected a more explicit application 
procedure and added a section addressing transfer in limited circumstances.  The application 
procedure section contained the following language:  "No appeal shall lie 
from the decision of a governing body denying an applicant a license, nor shall 
any person have an action against the governing body or its members by reason of 
the denial of a license."  1935 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 87, § 5.  At this juncture, 
the legislative intent to totally bar any right of appeal in all circumstances 
was clear and convincing.  In addition, a new section entitled "License 
Regulations" provided only a very limited right to transfer a license to a new 
location:

 

A license shall be a personal privilege, good for one year 
unless sooner revoked, provided the executor or administrator of the estate of 
any deceased licensee, when such estate consists in whole or in part of the 
business of selling alcoholic and/or malt beverages under a license, may 
exercise the privilege of the deceased licensee under such license or licenses 
until the expiration of the same, and provided further, that in the event of a 
major loss or damage to the licensed premises by an unforeseen natural cause, 
the license may be renewed on different premises on the same basis as an original application, except 
for the payment of the license fee, which renewed license shall expire as of 
even date as the original license.

 

            
Except as above provided, 
no license shall be transferred or sold, nor shall it be used for any 
place not described in the license at the time of issuance 
. . . .

 

1935 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 87, § 8 (emphasis added).

 

[¶20]   Thereafter, the transfer provision was 
modified to permit the executor or administrator of the estate of any deceased 
licensee, by an actual bona fide sale made in good faith, to assign and transfer 
the license in qualified circumstances and with the approval of the governing 
body.  1941 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws ch. 90, § 8.  The renewal preference was also established, and denial of an appeal was modified to 
give the right of appeal to applicants denied a renewal.  1945 Wyo. Sess. Laws 
ch. 133, § 5.

  

[¶21]   Further substantial amendments did not 
occur until 1978.  
This lengthy period without amendment is remarkable in light of the 1957 
Whitesides decision, in which this court stated 
transfer applications should be treated as original applications with no right 
of appeal.  319 P.2d 520.  If 
Chief Justice Blume had incorrectly interpreted the legislature's intended 
treatment of transfer applications, legislative action to clarify the statutes 
and correct the court's decision would seem a likely result.  However, no 
responsive legislative action was taken. 

 

All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature 
with full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference thereto and 
statutes are therefore to be construed in harmony with the existing law, and as 
a part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and 
effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the 
constitution, but also with 
reference to the decisions of the courts.

 

Voss, 550 P.2d  at 486 (emphasis added).

 

[¶22]   The 1978 amendments created the 
following transfer language:

 

(b)  With the approval of the licensing authority, 
a license may be transferred to or 
renewed on different premises on the same basis as the original 
application except that no new license fee is required during the 
term of the license.  
A transferred license shall expire on the same date as the original 
license.  

 

1998 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 51, § 1 at 374; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
12-4-601(b) (Michie 1978) (emphasis added).  Here, the legislature plainly established that 
a transfer license was to be considered on the same basis as an original license 
application without benefit of the renewal preference or right of appeal.  The appeal provision 
language was also amended as follows:  "An applicant for a renewal license or permit 
may appeal to the district court from an adverse decision by the licensing 
authority.  No 
applicant for a new license shall have a right of appeal from the decision of 
the licensing authority denying an application."  1998 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 51, § 1 at 368; Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 12-4-104(d) (Michie 1978).

 

[¶23]   Additional changes in 1979 added the 
phrase "license, permit, renewal or any transfer" and inserted the term 
"transfer" in various subsections of § 12-4-104, making the statute read very 
much as it does today.  
1979 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 156, § 2; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-4-104 (Michie 
Supp. 1979).  
Further, language was added to preclude the issuance of a license if it 
is found from evidence presented at a hearing that any one of five circumstances 
existed.  Id.  The transfer provision was further amended to 
read:

 

(a)  After public hearing 
and with the approval of the licensing authority, a license or permit may be transferred to or renewed on 
different premises on the same basis as the original application except that no 
additional license fee is required during the term of the license or 
permit.  A 
transferred license or permit shall expire on the same date as the original 
license or permit.  

 

1979 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 156, § 2 at 439; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
12-4-601(a) (Michie Supp. 1979) (emphasis added).  The amendment clarified that those seeking a 
transfer were entitled to a hearing.  However, none of the 1979 amendments provided 
the right of appeal to transfer applicants.  Since 1979, no significant amendments have 
been enacted which are pertinent to the issue on appeal.

 

[¶24]   The statutes as originally enacted did 
not provide either a right of appeal or a right to transfer a liquor 
license.  
Subsequent modifications supplied only highly qualified appeal and 
transfer provisions.  
Despite many amendments since the original enactment, the legislature has 
never afforded the express right of appeal from the denial of a transfer 
request.  
Furthermore, since the original enactment in 1933, the right to renew or 
transfer a license to a different location has been consistently modified by the 
phrase "on the same basis as the original application."  This statutory 
history leads us to the conclusion a transfer application must be treated as if 
it were an original application with no right of appeal. 

 

 

[¶25]   The liquor license process is 
administrative in nature.  However, we must dispel any misperception that 
an appeal right might be available indirectly by application of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA).  By legislative design, the WAPA does not apply 
to cities:4 

 

The Administrative Procedure Act provides only for judicial 
review of action or inaction taken by an agency.  Section 16-3-114(a), W.S.1977.  An agency is

 

"any authority, bureau, board, commission, department, 
division, officer or employee of the state, a county, city or town or other 
political subdivision of the state, except the governing 
body of a city or town, the state legislature and the judiciary."  Section 
16-3-101(b)(i), W.S.1977.

 

Administrative decisions by a city council are not 
reviewable pursuant to the procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act 
because a city council is not an agency.  City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, Inc., Wyo., 647 P.2d 1378 
(1982).  

 

Foster's Inc. v. City of Laramie, 718 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 1986).  For this reason, a 
license transfer request made to a city council, as the licensing authority, 
does not constitute a contested case under the WAPA, and neither the appeal 
rights of the WAPA nor the requirements for clearly delineated findings of fact 
and conclusions of law pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 (LexisNexis 2001) 
are applicable to the City Council's final decision.5

 

[¶26]   Despite the provisions of § 12-4-104 
which preclude the licensing authority from issuing, renewing, or transferring a 
license if it finds from evidence presented at the hearing that any one of five 
circumstances exists,6 no express language requires any such finding to 
be made by a city denying a permit or a transfer.  Whitesides, 319 P.2d  at 526.  
The licensing authority is only prohibited from approving a transfer 
request if one of the five conditions exists.  As the WAPA does not apply to the governing 
bodies of cities, there is no mechanism to compel cities to conduct 
administrative proceedings and issue administrative findings in compliance with 
the more formal requirements of the WAPA.  Foster's Inc., 718 P.2d  at 872.  If 
we were to extend the WAPA to these circumstances, such a result would arguably 
impose the procedural requirements of the WAPA on all administrative proceedings.  This would be 
contrary to legislative intent.  Although we agree that providing a full 
explanation of their actions would benefit the public, we also acknowledge that 
cities are not compelled by law to do so.  We decline to impose such a requirement 
without a legislative mandate.  Further, we note, in the absence of a 
requirement for written findings and conclusions, the actions of the licensing 
authority cannot be construed as arbitrary and capricious merely because no 
reasons for the actions were given.  Whitesides, 319 P.2d  at 526.

 

[¶27]   No party contends the City Council 
failed to abide by the procedural requirements of § 12-4-104(e) and § 
12-4-601(a).  
The record reflects notice was properly given, a hearing was held, and 
the parties and all other interested persons were allowed a sufficient 
opportunity to address the City Council.  Adequate due process was afforded to the 
parties. 

 

[¶28]   A limited argument was made that the 
process was insufficient because a property right was involved.  This is an 
inaccurate portrayal of the nature of the right as between the licensing 
authority and the applicants for transfer.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-4-106(a) (LexisNexis 
2001) provides in relevant part:  "A license or permit is considered a personal 
privilege to the holder and the term of the license or permit is for one (1) 
year unless sooner revoked."  We have previously held, as between third 
parties, a liquor license is considered property.  Johnson v. Smith, 
455 P.2d 244, 251 (Wyo. 1969), reflects, "as between the mortgagor and 
mortgagee, we deem the liquor license within the description of the property 
mortgaged, which upon foreclosure and sale . . . would give the 
purchaser the first chance' or opportunity to apply to the licensing authority 
for continuation or renewal."  Similarly, in Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Development Company, Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 46 (Wyo. 1985), we held:

 

[T]he provision of the lease containing the requirement that 
appellants transfer the liquor license to Northwestern at the conclusion of the 
lease is valid and enforceable as between the 
parties.  
Any such transfer is, however, subject to the provisions of § 
12-4-601(b), W.S.1977, requiring public hearing and approval by the licensing 
authority.

 

[¶29]   The nature of this unique right has been 
succinctly described in the following terms:  "[A] liquor license is not property as between 
the licensing authority and the license holder, but it has sufficient attributes 
of property to be considered property as between private individuals."  Dodds v. Shamer, 663 A.2d 1318, 1326 (Md. 1995).  In the context of 
this case, as between the City of Sheridan and the transferee applicants, the 
liquor license was merely a privilege to be granted or denied.  We therefore 
conclude the process provided by the City Council, although not as formal or 
complete as the WAPA requires, was adequate for this action affecting a 
privilege granted by the City Council.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶30]   The express language of § 12-4-104(e) 
and § 12-4-601(a) does not provide for judicial review from the denial by a city 
council of a liquor license transfer application.  The "Local Licenses" provisions are structured 
to provide regulation of the retail sale of alcohol and have the objective of 
permitting local licensing authorities to make these determinations.  The legislative 
history demonstrates the right of appeal was incrementally developed to be a 
limited and qualified right afforded only to those with a renewal 
preference.  The 
administrative procedure is intended to and does afford sufficient due process 
to ensure a fair hearing of a request for this governmental privilege.  As between the 
licensing authority and applicants, there is no property right at issue which 
would require a higher standard of due process.  We conclude the legislature's intent to 
preclude judicial review in these circumstances is clear and convincing.  Pisano, 835 P.2d  at 1139.

  

[¶31]   Albertson's and Jackson Electric have 
urged us to consider the apparent purpose of the City Council's actions, namely 
to suppress competition particularly when it comes in the form of a large 
multistate corporation. We do not discount in any manner the legitimate policy 
concern raised.  
We have long recognized that the statutes are not designed to suppress 
competition among license holders other than the lack of competition that 
naturally results from the limitation of the number of retail liquor licenses 
the licensing authorities are authorized to grant.  Glenn v. Board of County Commissioners, Sheridan County, 
440 P.2d 1, 5 (Wyo. 1968).  However, we are restrained from considering an 
appeal on the merits in this case and believe such a policy issue is more 
appropriately addressed to the legislature.

 

[¶32]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Section 12-4-104(e) 
provides:

 

(e) An applicant for a renewal license or permit may 
appeal to the district court from an adverse decision by the licensing 
authority.  No 
applicant for a new license shall have a right of appeal from the decision of 
the licensing authority denying an application.

 

            

2This was accomplished 
through amendment and reenactment of Chapter 92 of the 1933 Wyoming Session 
Laws.

 

3"The Board shall further 
have the power to revoke any license granted at any time for good and sufficient 
reasons for any act committed by the licensee which may seem to them to be 
incompatible with the aim and purpose of this Act, namely; to promote true 
temperance."  
1933 Wyo. Sp. Sess. Laws ch. 61, § 5.

 

4The WAPA did apply to 
cities as originally enacted in 1965.  However, with subsequent amendments in 1977 
and 1979, cities were no longer subject to the act.  City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, Inc., 647 P.2d 1378, 
1384-85 (Wyo. 1982), provides a full discussion of this legislative 
history.   

 

5Whether the WAPA would 
apply to county actions regarding liquor licenses is not at issue in this case, 
and we make no determination in that regard herein.

 

6

(i) The welfare of the people residing in the vicinity of 
the proposed license or permit premises shall be adversely and seriously 
affected;

 

(ii) The purpose of this title shall not be carried out by 
the issuance, renewal or transfer of the license or permit;

            

(iii) The number, type and location of existing licenses or 
permits meet the needs of the vicinity under consideration;

 

(iv) The desires of the residents of the county, city or 
town will not be met or satisfied by the issuance, renewal or transfer of the 
license or permit;  
or

 

(v) Any other reasonable restrictions or standards 
which may be imposed by the licensing authority shall not be carried out by the 
issuance, renewal or transfer of the license or permit.

 

Section 12-4-104(b).