Case Title: Billy Leon Kearse V. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC05-1876

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC05-1876 
____________ 
 
BILLY LEON KEARSE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-942 
____________ 
 
BILLY LEON KEARSE, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[August 30, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Billy Leon Kearse appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to 
vacate his first-degree murder conviction and sentence of death, and also petitions 
this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), 
(9), Fla. Const.  As we explain below, we affirm the circuit court’s order and deny 
Kearse’s petition. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Kearse was convicted of robbery with a firearm and the first-degree murder 
of Fort Pierce police officer, Danny Parrish.  On direct appeal, we summarized the 
facts of the crime as follows: 
After Parrish observed Kearse driving in the wrong direction on a 
one-way street, he called in the vehicle license number and stopped 
the vehicle.  Kearse was unable to produce a driver's license, and 
instead gave Parrish several alias names that did not match any 
driver's license history.  Parrish then ordered Kearse to exit the car 
and put his hands on top of the car.  While Parrish was attempting to 
handcuff Kearse, a scuffle ensued, Kearse grabbed Parrish's weapon 
and fired fourteen shots.  Thirteen of the shots struck Parrish, nine in 
his body and four in his bullet-proof vest.  A taxi driver in the vicinity 
heard the shots, saw a dark blue vehicle occupied by a black male and 
female drive away from the scene, and called for assistance on the 
police officer's radio.  Emergency personnel transported Parrish to the 
hospital where he died from the gunshot injuries. 
 
The police issued a be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) for a black male 
driving a dark blue 1979 Monte Carlo.  By checking the license plate 
that Officer Parrish had called in, the police determined that the car 
was registered to an address in Fort Pierce.  Kearse was arrested at 
that address.  After being informed of his rights and waiving them, 
Kearse confessed that he shot Parrish during a struggle that ensued 
after the traffic stop. 
Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677, 680 (Fla. 1995) (Kearse I).  We affirmed as to 
Kearse’s guilt phase claims, but remanded for a new penalty phase based on errors 
 
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“relate[d] to the penalty phase instructions and the improper doubling of 
aggravating circumstances.”  Id. at 685.1  
 
After the new penalty phase, the unanimous jury recommended death, and 
the trial court again sentenced Kearse to death.  Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119 
(Fla. 2000) (Kearse II), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 945 (2001).  The trial court found in 
aggravation that the crime was committed in the course of a robbery, which it 
afforded “diminished” weight, and found three other aggravating factors that it 
merged into one—that the murder was committed to avoid arrest and to hinder law 
enforcement, and that the victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in official 
duties.  The court found one statutory mitigating factor—the age of the 
defendant—and listed almost forty nonstatutory mitigators to which the court 
assigned some weight.  On appeal, Kearse raised twenty-two issues.  Id. at 1123.2   
We affirmed the death sentence.  Id. at 1135. 
                                          
 
 
1.  Most of the twenty-five issues Kearse raised on appeal concerned the 
penalty phase.  Kearse I, 662 So. 2d at 680-81.  The guilt phase issues alleged error 
as follows:  (1) the giving of the State's special instruction on premeditated murder 
over objection;  (2) the instruction to the jury on escape as the underlying felony of 
felony murder; (3) the denial of Kearse’s cause challenges to prospective jurors; 
(4) the admission of testimony regarding the purpose of a two-handed gun grip; (5) 
the denial of motions to suppress; (6) the instruction on reasonable doubt denied 
Kearse due process and a fair trial; and (7) the admission of hearsay evidence 
during the guilt phase. 
 
2.  Kearse raised the following claims:  (1) the trial court's refusal to return 
venue to the county where the offense occurred; (2) the denial of Kearse's 
objection to a motion to compel a mental health examination; (3) the denial of 
Kearse's motion for a continuance; (4) the proportionality of the death penalty; (5) 
 
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Kearse subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, in which he raised several claims and 
subclaims.3  The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on some of them, and 
subsequently denied relief on all claims. 
                                                                                                                                        
the trial court's evaluation of the mitigating circumstances; (6) the trial court's 
failure to find the statutory mitigating circumstance of emotional or mental 
disturbance; (7) the denial of Kearse's motion to disqualify the prosecutor; (8) the 
denial of Kearse's motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor's comments; (9) the 
trial court informed the jury that Kearse had been found guilty in a previous 
proceeding, but that the case was remanded for resentencing; (10) the denial of 
Kearse's motion to interview jurors to determine juror misconduct; (11) pretrial 
conferences were conducted during Kearse's involuntary absence; (12) the granting 
of the State's cause challenge to a juror; (13) the denial of Kearse's cause 
challenges to two jurors; Kearse's compelled mental health examination (14) 
constituted an unconstitutional rule of discovery, (15) violated the ex post facto 
clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions, and (16) Kearse's Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (17) the victim impact jury 
instruction was vague and gave evidence undue importance; (18) the trial court 
gave little weight to age as a mitigating circumstance; the “committed during a 
robbery” aggravating circumstance (19) should have been merged with the other 
aggravators or (20) should not have been considered; (21) the admission of 
photographs of the victim; and (22) electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment.  
Kearse II, 770 So. 2d at 1123. 
 
 
3.  Kearse claimed the following:  (1) that public records were withheld; (2) 
that defense counsel failed vigorously to advance Kearse’s position, to cross-
examine witnesses at trial and at the motion to suppress hearing, to consult with 
crime scene, firearm, and medical experts, to request co-counsel at the second 
penalty phase, to prepare witnesses to testify at the resentencing, to object to the 
admission of evidence, to argue the age mitigating factor, to present evidence 
regarding the victim’s prior misconduct, to obtain Kearse’s consent to concede 
aggravating factors, and cumulative error; (3) that the trial court erred in denying a 
cause challenge, in denying trial counsel’s motion for co-counsel, and in rejecting 
two statutory mental health mitigating factors; (4) that the State knowingly 
withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (5) that 
 
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II.  THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
Kearse raises the following four issues on appeal: (A) that trial counsel 
provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, (B) that the circuit court erred in 
denying Kearse’s claim of newly discovered evidence warranting a new penalty 
phase, (C) that the trial court erred in denying Kearse’s public records requests, 
and (D) that the trial court erred in summarily denying several of his 
postconviction claims.  We address each in turn below. 
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
Kearse first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  In 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court established a two-
pronged standard for determining whether counsel provided constitutionally 
ineffective assistance.  First, a defendant must point to specific acts or omissions of 
counsel that are "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687.  Second, the 
defendant must establish prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a reasonable 
                                                                                                                                        
newly discovered evidence demonstrates the State’s expert was biased for the 
prosecution; (6) that Kearse’s rights under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), 
were denied through the ineffective assistance of counsel and inadequate assistance 
of mental health experts; (7) that Kearse’s death sentence is fundamentally unfair; 
(8) that Kearse was denied the right to a fair trial because of pretrial publicity, the 
lack of adequate venue, and events in the courtroom at trial; (9) that Florida’s death 
penalty scheme violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); (10) that his death 
sentence is unconstitutionally based on an automatic aggravator; and (11) that 
Kearse is insane to be executed. 
 
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probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”  Id. at 694.  A reasonable probability is a “probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id.  Claims of ineffective 
assistance present mixed questions of law and fact subject to plenary review.  
Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1045 (Fla. 2000).  This Court independently 
reviews the trial court's legal conclusions and defers to the trial court's findings of 
fact. 
 
Kearse argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for (1) 
failing vigorously to advocate for him, (2) failing adequately to prepare the defense 
experts, (3) failing to investigate and prepare for the State’s mental health expert, 
(4) failing to present victim misconduct evidence, and (5) failing to prepare lay 
witnesses to testify.   
1.  Vigorous Advocacy 
 
Kearse’s claim that counsel did not sufficiently advocate for him is based 
largely on various statements made by his counsel during the guilt phase and 
resentencing, most of which the jury did not hear.  Kearse has lifted many of the 
statements from their context and ascribed to them both importance and meaning 
not present when they are viewed in context.  We agree with the trial court that, 
when viewed in context, the statements and arguments constitute defense counsel’s 
 
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candid representations to the court.  Accordingly, Kearse has demonstrated neither 
deficiency nor prejudice. 
 
Kearse’s allegation that defense counsel did not understand the mental 
health issues at resentencing is similarly based on statements taken out of context.  
Defense counsel was an experienced death penalty attorney.  He represented 
Kearse at the guilt phase and original sentencing and again at resentencing.  At 
both sentencing proceedings, he presented the expert testimony of the same 
neuropsychologist, a number of professionals who had worked with Kearse when 
he was in a school for emotionally disturbed children, and family members.  At the 
postconviction hearing, defense counsel testified that he understood the issues and 
was prepared at trial.  We conclude that Kearse has failed to demonstrate either 
deficiency or prejudice. 
2.  Preparation of Experts 
 
Kearse first argues that defense counsel failed adequately to prepare Dr. 
Lipman, a neuropharmacologist, to testify by failing to provide him with necessary 
information and did not provide Dr. Lipman with the defense neuropsychologist’s 
assistance in preparing part of an analysis in support of Dr. Lipman’s testimony.  
Competent, substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s finding that defense 
counsel provided Dr. Lipman with necessary materials.  Further, Dr. Lipman 
testified at resentencing that counsel inundated him with information, and at the 
 
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postconviction hearing testified that he would not change his testimony now that 
he had seen further information.  Finally, Dr. Lipman testified that when he needed 
expert assistance, he simply consulted another neuropsychologist.  Accordingly, 
Kearse failed to establish either deficiency or prejudice. 
 
Kearse raises another ineffective assistance claim regarding Dr. Lipman’s 
testimony.  At the resentencing, Lipman testified that Kearse suffered from fetal 
alcohol effect, explained Kearse’s resulting neurodevelopmental problems, and 
related these factors to Kearse’s actions on the day of the murder.  Kearse alleges 
that Dr. Lipman was not qualified to testify regarding his consultations with other 
experts about Kearse’s psychological testing.  The resentencing record 
demonstrates, however, that as a neuropharmacologist, in making his diagnoses Dr. 
Lipman always relies on medical doctors and psychologists.  We agree with the 
circuit court that Dr. Lipman was not barred from testifying about his reliance on 
other experts.  Thus, Kearse fails to meet either requirement of Strickland. 
3.  Preparation for Expert Testimony 
 
Kearse argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to depose and 
investigate Dr. Martell, the State’s mental health expert, and was thus unprepared 
to cross-examine him.  He also claims that counsel failed to present a number of 
mental health experts in mitigation.  To address this claim, we first place it in 
context by summarizing the mitigation testimony presented at resentencing. 
 
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Dr. Fred Petrilla, a neuropsychologist, evaluated Kearse in 1991 and again in 
1996 for the resentencing.  Petrilla testified for the defense that although Kearse 
had an IQ of 79 and was not mentally retarded, he had moderate brain dysfunction.  
Kearse had auditory, concentration, and behavioral problems, and severe learning 
problems.  Kearse also tended to be hyperactive and react impulsively when 
confronted, and he was culturally deprived. The expert concluded Kearse was not 
malingering on testing and that two statutory mitigators were supported:  extreme 
emotional disturbance and because of emotional disturbance, Kearse was incapable 
of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law. 
 
Dr. Lipman testified that Kearse had neurodevelopmental problems from an 
early age due to his mother’s alcohol abuse during pregnancy.  This alcohol abuse 
caused Kearse to suffer from fetal alcohol effect (FAE), one of the effects of which 
is brain dysfunction.  The expert testified that his finding of FAE is consistent with 
Kearse’s hyperactivity, impulsivity, and slow physical and subnormal educational 
development and is consistent with the findings of other experts who tested Kearse, 
such as Dr. Petrilla.  Further, Dr. Lipman testified that Kearse confabulated (i.e., 
rationalized what happened) in retelling the crime and thus was not “lying” about 
it.  Dr. Lipman opined that at the time of the murder Kearse “exploded” without 
thought and did not kill the officer to avoid arrest.  He also concluded that Kearse 
 
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had a verbal memory disorder and was not malingering on the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). 
 
Various teachers and school officials taught Kearse at a school for severely 
emotionally disturbed children, where Kearse was placed based on psychological 
evaluations.  These education professionals testified that Kearse suffered from 
severe emotional dysfunction and functioned below grade level.  Kearse had 
learning disabilities and was unable to master the skills of a normal student.  He 
previously had failed in school, repeating the first and second grades twice and 
being socially promoted through several grades based solely on his age.  At age 
fifteen, Kearse was in the seventh grade when he scored in the .8 percentile (i.e., 
the bottom one percent of all students) on the Wide Range Achievement Test.  
Functioning at a third-grade level, Kearse then dropped out at the end of that 
school year.  The educators testified that Kearse had a genuine desire to learn, but 
was unsuccessful because of his limitations, and over time Kearse became 
increasingly disruptive in school.  Further, his mother’s neglect was apparent.  
Kearse came to school dirty, hungry, unkempt, and malnourished.  His mother 
failed to respond to school requests for information or consultation.  
 
Kearse’s relatives—two aunts, an uncle, and Kearse’s mother—testified that 
Kearse’s mother was fifteen when he was born, and that his mother drank 
excessively during and following the pregnancy.  Kearse’s father left when he was 
 
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two, and his mother failed to show him affection and neglected him.  She also 
physically abused him, and as he grew older, was unable to control him.  Kearse 
was slow to develop both physically and emotionally.  As a child, he had slurred 
speech and difficulty pronouncing words.  He also was delayed in learning skills, 
such as tying his shoes.  Kearse had difficulty understanding and following through 
on directions and had significant difficulties with school work.  He frequently ran 
away for days at a time and lived on the street. 
 
Pamela Baker, a licensed mental health counselor and at one time Kearse’s 
teacher, first encountered Kearse in 1981 when at age eight he was referred to the 
Suspect Child Abuse and Neglect program.  She testified regarding his 
documented school and psychological history and Kearse’s home life.  According 
to Baker, Kearse’s mother neglected and frequently “whipped” him.  At one time 
Kearse was reluctant to leave the youth home in which he was placed because he 
was fed better there.  She said that Kearse was classified as severely emotionally 
disturbed and was placed in special classes.  At age twelve, his approximate IQ 
was 69.  He failed grade levels and was usually promoted socially based on age.  
Neurological testing in 1981 revealed that Kearse had problems related to brain 
damage, including poor memory, motor skills, and planning skills, an inability to 
do abstract thinking, and poor comprehension.  His mental age was lower than his 
chronological age.  She noted that Kearse became involved in smoking and 
 
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drinking at an early age and committed petty thefts and burglaries, but there was 
little aggressive behavior involved in these crimes.  Baker visited Kearse in prison 
and found that he had learned how to read and write while there.  She further stated 
that Kearse exhibited symptoms of panic attacks and conduct disorder.  Finally, 
she testified that although Kearse was sometimes a bully at school, he was not 
violent, and she never thought he would kill anyone. 
 
The State presented Dr. Martell, who testified that neither statutory mental 
health mitigator applied, that FAE is not a mental disorder, and that Kearse had no 
brain damage.  He opined that Kearse was depressed, which could account for 
Kearse’s low verbal IQ, and that Kearse had a conduct disorder and chose not to 
apply himself in school.  He opined that Kearse had an antisocial personality 
disorder and scored within the range for psychopathy.  Further, Martell said that 
Kearse’s MMPI results evidenced malingering.  Martell concluded that Kearse is a 
pathological liar, who consciously shot the officer, took the gun with him because 
of the fingerprints, extinguished his headlights to escape, and then lied to evade 
responsibility. 
 
Having summarized the evidence at the resentencing, we now address 
Kearse’s claim that defense counsel was deficient for failing to depose Dr. Martell, 
the State’s mental health expert.  The record shows that Dr. Martell examined 
Kearse on the Thursday before the resentencing proceedings began the following 
 
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Monday, and that defense counsel’s motion for a continuance was denied.  Upon 
receipt of Dr. Martell’s raw data and report, defense counsel forwarded these to his 
experts and consulted with them about the information.  He also consulted the state 
attorney regarding Martell’s upcoming testimony.  At the postconviction hearing, 
defense counsel testified that despite not having deposed Martell, he knew what 
Dr. Martell’s testimony would be regarding statutory mitigators, what his test 
results supposedly revealed, and where Martell’s testimony would differ from his 
own experts’ testimony.  As evidenced from the foregoing summary, the evidence 
shows that Udell correctly anticipated Martell’s testimony.  Kearse thus has not 
demonstrated anything material that defense counsel did not anticipate or could 
have done differently had he deposed Dr. Martell. 
 
Kearse also claims that defense counsel should have presented more 
mitigation or chosen different experts.  This claim simply ignores the extensive 
mental health mitigation outlined above that was presented at resentencing through 
a psychologist, a neuropharmacologist, a licensed mental health counselor, several 
educators, and family members.  Further, as the trial court pointed out, and Kearse 
does not dispute, Kearse’s experts at the postconviction hearing largely testified in 
conformity with the testimony defense counsel presented at the resentencing.  We 
can think of no other case—and Kearse has not cited one—in which defense 
counsel has presented so much expert testimony and other mitigation, but has been 
 
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found ineffective for failure to present mitigation.4  Accordingly, we hold that 
Kearse’s claim fails to meet Strickland’s requirements. 
4. Failure to Investigate and Present Victim Misconduct Evidence 
 
Kearse next claims that defense counsel was ineffective for insufficiently 
investigating and by failing to use a mitigation strategy to vilify the victim.  Kearse 
argues that evidence of Officer Parrish’s prior misconduct suggested that he 
provoked the incident resulting in his death and that presentation of this mitigation 
would have resulted in a life sentence.  Defense counsel considered this strategy 
and investigated citizen complaints against Officer Parrish.  Counsel testified that 
after considering several factors—including the refusal of some witnesses to 
testify, the lack of substance of some testimony, and determinations by the Fort 
Pierce police that formal complaints against the officer were unfounded—he 
ultimately decided not to use this strategy.  In addition, he considered the potential 
that the strategy would backfire, especially in light of the facts, such as Kearse’s 
firing thirteen bullets into the officer as the officer pled for his life and Kearse’s 
passenger’s testimony that at all times Officer Parrish was friendly and polite.  
                                          
 
 
4.  In fact, when we affirmed the death sentence in this case, three members 
of this Court found the mitigation so compelling that they dissented, opining that 
“[t]he bottom line is that this is clearly not a death case.  It is not one of the most 
aggravated and least mitigated or among the worst of the worst for which we have 
reserved death as the only appropriate response.”  Kearse II, 770 So. 2d at 1138 
(Anstead, J., dissenting). 
 
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Defense counsel admitted that he did not request the officer’s personnel file.  
However, the evidence at the postconviction hearing showed that any evidence in 
the file supporting the vilification mitigation could have been countered at trial by 
other evidence in it of Officer Parrish’s good reports and commendations.  We find 
that counsel’s decision not to present this mitigation strategy was reasonable.  
Further, Kearse has not demonstrated prejudice from counsel’s failure to obtain the 
personnel record.  Accordingly, we affirm denial of relief on this claim. 
5. Failing to Prepare Lay Witnesses 
 
Kearse alleges that defense counsel failed to prepare him, Pamela Baker, and 
his aunt and uncle to testify.  Kearse’s claim that counsel failed to prepare him is 
based on an exchange at resentencing in which defense counsel asked Kearse 
where he had been incarcerated before his arrest for the murder.  Kearse answered 
that he had been on death row at Raiford, which is where he was incarcerated after 
the trial.  This answer was unresponsive to the question.  Accordingly, Kearse fails 
to demonstrate that counsel was deficient.  Kearse’s claim regarding his relatives 
was not raised in his postconviction motion and thus it is unpreserved for appeal.  
Further, in his brief the claim is conclusory, meeting neither prong of Strickland.  
Kearse’s claim that counsel was ineffective for allowing Ms. Baker to testify 
regarding his juvenile record is also conclusory and meritless.  He claims without 
explanation that the evidence was not admissible.  As the testimony at the 
 
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postconviction hearing made clear, the evidence was admissible and defense 
counsel chose to admit it through Ms. Baker who could present it in context with 
Kearse’s mental health and social services history.  Accordingly, the trial court was 
correct to deny relief on all of these claims.5 
B. Newly Discovered Evidence 
 
Kearse argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that information he 
alleges could have been used at resentencing to impeach the States’s mental health 
expert does not constitute newly discovered evidence.  We disagree. 
 
Kearse claims that evidence about Dr. Martell’s conduct as an expert witness 
for the federal government in a criminal case in New Mexico demonstrates that he 
gave biased testimony in favor of the State at resentencing.  In Jones v. State, 709 
So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1998), this Court articulated a two-part test for establishing newly 
discovered evidence:  (1) The evidence must have existed but have been unknown 
by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and must not have been 
discoverable through the use of due diligence, and (2) the newly discovered 
                                          
 
 
5.  Kearse also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 
cross-examine two witnesses at the motion to suppress hearing.  He claims that on 
the day of the murder the eyewitness passenger (Rhonda Pendleton) was his 
girlfriend who was staying at her brother’s home.  Kearse argues that the police 
search of that house was invalid because he was an overnight guest there.  This is 
not the argument Kearse made in his postconviction motion, and it is thus not 
preserved.  Second, we held in Kearse I that exigent circumstances provided 
probable cause for the warrantless arrest and that physical evidence seized at the 
scene was not subject to suppression.  Kearse I, 662 So. 2d at 684.   
 
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evidence must be of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on 
retrial.  Jones, 709 So. 2d at 521.  The evidence shows that Kearse’s penalty phase 
commenced on December 9, 1996, and sentence was imposed on March 25, 1997.  
Both Dr. Martell’s actions in the federal criminal case and allegations regarding his 
conduct postdated Kearse’s sentencing.  Thus, the evidence did not exist at the 
time of the resentencing, and Kearse fails to meet the first prong of the test.  The 
evidence also fails to meet the second prong. 
C.  The Public Record Requests 
 
Kearse next argues that he was denied due process because certain public 
records pertaining to his case were not provided to him, in violation of Chapter 
119, Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852.  Each 
of his claims is addressed below. 
 
Kearse requested production of pictures and videotape that Fort Pierce 
police took from the perspective of the apartments of two witnesses on the crime 
scene.  The police produced more than two hundred pictures.  At a hearing on 
Kearse’s public records request, however, the police explained they did not have 
the videotape and that no records showed a videotape ever was placed in the 
evidence locker.  The police suggested the possibility it did not exist due to 
malfunction.  On appeal, Kearse argues that the postconviction court erred in 
denying an evidentiary hearing on his claim regarding the failure to produce the 
 
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videotape.  We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  The 
undisputed evidence demonstrates that the police did not have a videotape and at 
the hearing on the request, postconviction counsel apparently accepted the 
explanation given by the police and never again requested the tape or listed it as an 
outstanding request. 
 
Kearse next contends the circuit court abused its discretion by denying his 
request for the personnel files of a state investigator and two assistant state 
attorneys.  He claims that under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.852, he must 
be given the records because the circuit court did not timely deny the request.  Rule 
3.852(g)(3) provides that the trial court “shall hold a hearing and issue a ruling 
within 30 days” ordering production if the “additional public records sought are 
relevant to the subject matter . . . or appear reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”  The rule also provides the trial court with 
discretion to conduct in-camera inspections and extend the time specifications in 
the rule.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.852(k).  The record shows that after an in-camera 
inspection, the court denied the request for the personnel files, finding they were 
not relevant and could not reasonably be calculated to lead to evidence helpful to 
Kearse’s postconviction motions.  Accordingly, the court issued a ruling making 
the requisite finding and had discretion with regard to the date of issuing its order.  
Kearse has not demonstrated an abuse of that discretion. 
 
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Finally, Kearse argues that a letter the assistant state attorney sent to 
Kearse’s trial counsel regarding the ineffective assistance claims against him in the 
postconviction proceedings is not privileged work product.  The State responds 
that under section 119.071, Florida Statutes (2005), the letter is exempt from 
disclosure as work product prepared in anticipation of litigation. We review the 
claim under the abuse of discretion standard.  See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 
137 (Fla. 2003) (“A circuit court's ruling on a public records request filed pursuant 
to a rule 3.850 motion will be sustained on review absent an abuse of discretion.”). 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Kearse’s trial counsel stated that the assistant 
state attorney sent him a letter regarding the issues at the hearing.  Kearse’s 
postconviction counsel asked to see the letter.  Upon the State’s objection, the 
circuit court sealed the letter and examined it in camera.  After hearing argument, 
the trial court ruled that given the nature of the witness—Kearse’s trial counsel—in 
a postconviction proceeding and that trial counsel was listed as a witness for the 
State as well as the defense, the letter was work product not subject to disclosure. 
 
Section 119.071(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), provides as follows in 
pertinent part: 
 
(d)1. A public record that was prepared by an agency attorney 
(including an attorney employed or retained by the agency or 
employed or retained by another public officer or agency to protect or 
represent the interests of the agency having custody of the record) or 
prepared at the attorney's express direction, that reflects a mental 
impression, conclusion, litigation strategy, or legal theory of the 
 
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attorney or the agency, and that was prepared exclusively for civil or 
criminal litigation or for adversarial administrative proceedings, or 
that was prepared in anticipation of imminent civil or criminal 
litigation or imminent adversarial administrative proceedings, is 
exempt from s. 119.07(1) and s. 24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution 
until the conclusion of the litigation or adversarial administrative 
proceedings. For purposes of capital collateral litigation as set forth in 
s. 27.7001, the Attorney General's office is entitled to claim this 
exemption for those public records prepared for direct appeal as well 
as for all capital collateral litigation after direct appeal until execution 
of sentence or imposition of a life sentence. 
The assistant state attorney’s letter containing his mental impressions about the 
case clearly fits within the exemption of attorney work product prepared with 
regard to the ongoing postconviction proceedings.  See § 119.071(1)(d), Fla. Stat. 
(2005); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(g)(1) (“Disclosure shall not be required of 
legal research or of records, correspondence, reports, or memoranda to the extent 
that they contain the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the prosecuting or 
defense attorney or members of their legal staffs.”); State v. Kokal, 562 So. 2d 324, 
327 (Fla. 1990) (“Of course, the state attorney was not required to disclose his 
current file relating to the motion for postconviction relief because there is ongoing 
litigation with respect to those documents.”).  Accordingly, we hold that the circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kearse’s request for the letter. 
D.  Miscellaneous Claims 
 
Kearse argues that the circuit court erred in summarily denying a number of 
his claims.  We disagree, and affirm the trial court’s order. 
 
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During the 1996 resentencing proceeding, Kearse’s defense counsel told the 
court that at the 1991 trial the courtroom was full of uniformed law enforcement 
officers.  Based solely on this statement, Kearse argued in his postconviction 
motion that he was deprived of a fair trial in 1991.  The circuit court summarily 
denied relief, finding the claim legally insufficient because the mere presence of 
the officers was insufficient to demonstrate a hostile courtroom and Kearse failed 
to demonstrate prejudice.  We agree.  Kearse does not allege any other facts that in 
the “totality of the circumstances” would entitle him to relief.  See Woods v. 
Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454, 1455 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying a totality of the 
circumstances test to a similar claim). 
 
Finally, in conclusory fashion and without any argument, Kearse alleges the 
following: (1) that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine or impeach 
witnesses, failing to consult crime scene and firearms experts, failing to prepare 
defense witnesses, failing to argue age as a statutory mitigator, and for conceding 
aggravating factors without Kearse’s consent; (2) that the trial court erred in 
denying cause challenges and rejecting mental health mitigation; (3) that Brady6 
violations occurred; (4) that nonstatutory aggravators were presented; and (5) that 
pretrial publicity, the venue, and events in the courtroom denied him a fair trial.  
We hold these claims are waived and affirm the denial of relief.  See Cooper v. 
                                          
 
 
6.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring State disclosure of 
material information favorable to the defense). 
 
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State, 856 So. 2d 969, 977 n.7 (Fla. 2003) (“Cooper has chosen to contest the trial 
court's summary denial of various claims, by contending, without specific 
reference or supportive argument, that the ‘lower court erred in its summary denial 
of these claims.’ We find speculative, unsupported argument of this type to be 
improper, and deny relief based thereon.”); see also Duest v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 
849, 852 (Fla. 1990) (“The purpose of an appellate brief is to present arguments in 
support of the points on appeal.  Merely making reference to arguments below 
without further elucidation does not suffice to preserve issues, and these claims are 
deemed to have been waived.”). 
III.  THE HABEAS PETITION 
 
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Kearse contends (A) that appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise two meritorious claims, and (B) that 
both his death sentence and lethal injection are unconstitutional.  We address these 
claims below and deny the petition. 
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
 
The requirements for establishing a claim based on ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel parallel the standards announced in Strickland.  “[The] 
[p]etitioner must show 1) specific errors or omissions which show that appellate 
counsel’s performance deviated from the norm or fell outside the range of 
professionally acceptable performance, and 2) the deficiency of that performance 
 
- 22 -
compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in 
the fairness and correctness of the appellate result.”  Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 
So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 1985).  Counsel ordinarily is not deemed ineffective under 
this standard for failing to raise issues that are procedurally barred because they 
were not properly raised during the trial court proceedings.  See Rutherford v. 
Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000).  Moreover, appellate counsel cannot be 
deemed ineffective for failing to raise nonmeritorious claims on appeal.  See id. 
1.  Denial of a Cause Challenge 
 
Kearse alleges first that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
the trial court’s denial of Kearse’s cause challenge to juror Matthews.  Kearse’s 
resentencing, like the 1991 trial, was held in Indian River County instead of St. 
Lucie County.  During jury selection, defense counsel moved to strike Matthews 
for cause based on her knowledge of facts of the case and her relationship to a 
testifying detective.7  After the court denied the strike, defense counsel took the 
necessary steps to preserve the issue by requesting additional peremptories and 
renewing the motion before the jury was sworn.  See Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 
691 (Fla. 1990) (explaining the requirements for preserving a cause challenge).  On 
direct appeal, appellate counsel raised the denials of other cause challenges, but did 
                                          
 
 
7.  Kearse’s contention on appeal that the juror was not qualified because 
she was the prosecutor’s insurance agent was not preserved for review. 
 
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not raise the preserved claim regarding Matthews, who actually served on the jury.  
See Kearse II, 770 So. 2d at 1128-29.  Accordingly, contrary to the State’s 
argument, this claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is properly 
raised by habeas petition in this Court.  Nevertheless, we deny the claim. 
 
During individual questioning by the attorneys, Matthews indicated that she 
remembered a media report from several years before in which a Fort Pierce 
officer was “shot about 14 times” and “[t]here was like a trail where he tried to get 
away.”  She repeated that she was uncertain these facts concerned this case and had 
made the tentative connection based on the questioning during jury selection. 
Matthews also volunteered that, the night before, she learned from her husband’s 
parents that her father-in-law’s half brother, a retired Fort Pierce police officer, 
was coming to Florida for Christmas and to testify at a trial involving the murder 
of an officer.  Matthews stated that she had not seen Detective Raulerson in three 
years and did not know him well.  She assured the court that this would have no 
effect on her impartiality in the resentencing proceeding.  At the resentencing, 
Raulerson, who was lead crime scene detective in the investigation of Officer 
Parrish’s murder, testified regarding the gathering of physical evidence in the case. 
 
We find that neither Matthews’s vague memories about the crime, nor her 
attenuated relationship to a testifying detective, either separately or cumulatively, 
raises a reasonable doubt about her ability to be fair and impartial in light of her 
 
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unwavering statements during voir dire of the need for a fair sentencing proceeding 
and her ability to be impartial.  See Lusk v. State, 446 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 
1984) (“The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay 
aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence 
presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court.”); Singer v. 
State, 109 So. 2d 7, 24 (Fla. 1959) (announcing test for juror competency).  
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the cause challenge, and 
appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the preserved claim. 
2.  The Motion for Appointment of Co-Counsel 
 
Kearse next argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
on appeal the trial court’s denial of defense counsel’s motion for appointment of 
co-counsel at the 1991 trial.  Shortly after his appointment, defense counsel moved 
for appointment of co-counsel on numerous grounds. After a hearing, the trial 
court denied the motion and denied the renewed motion before the first penalty 
phase. 
 
In Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730, 737 (Fla. 1994), we stated that the 
question of appointment of additional counsel rests within the discretion of the trial 
court “and is based on a determination of the complexity of a given case and the 
attorney’s effectiveness therein.”  The record shows that trial counsel agreed with 
the trial court that the case was not complex, and Kearse does not claim here that it 
 
- 25 -
was.  Accordingly, Kearse has not established that the motion for co-counsel 
would have been found meritorious on direct appeal and thus has failed to establish 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
B.  Constitutional Claims 
 
Kearse claims that his death sentence is unconstitutional on various grounds.  
First, he argues that because of his age, low level of intellectual functioning, and 
mental and emotional impairments he cannot be executed under Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304 (2002), which prohibited execution of people with mental 
retardation.  However, Kearse’s own expert at the resentencing testified that he 
was not mentally retarded, and he presented no evidence at his postconviction 
hearing that he was.  Thus, his sentence is not unconstitutional under Atkins.  See 
Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1441 (2006). 
 
Next, he argues that because he was only eighteen years and three months 
old at the time of the crime and had low level intellectual functioning and mental 
and emotional impairments, he cannot be executed under Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005).  Roper prohibited execution of any defendant who was under age 
eighteen at the time of the crime.  Accordingly, Kearse does not qualify for 
exemption from execution under Roper.  See Hill, 921 So. 2d at 584. 
 
Kearse also argues that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), because instructions 
 
- 26 -
diminish the role of the jury, all elements are not charged in the indictment, a 
unanimous jury is not required, and the jury does not decide all the elements.  First, 
Ring is not retroactive to Kearse’s case.  See Johnson v. State, 904 So. 2d 400, 402 
(Fla. 2005) (“We hold that . . . the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring 
v. Arizona . . . does not apply retroactively in Florida.”).  We also note that 
Kearse’s resentencing jury returned a unanimous recommendation of death. 
Further, this Court has rejected all of these claims previously.  See Parker v. State, 
904 So. 2d 370, 383 (Fla. 2005) (listing claims and citing cases in which the Court 
denied these and other claims). 
 
Finally, Kearse argues that Florida’s lethal injection statute and procedure 
are unconstitutional.  This Court has previously upheld the statute against this 
challenge in other cases.  See Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2000); accord 
Thompson v. State, 796 So. 2d 511, 515 (Fla. 2001); Bryan v. State, 753 So. 2d 
1244, 1254 (Fla. 2000).  We have also previously rejected the claims Kearse raises 
here regarding the lethal injection procedure.  See Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 
1144 (Fla.) (citing cases), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 850 (2006).  Accordingly, we 
deny relief on these claims.8 
                                          
 
 
8.  As a result of the execution of Angel Diaz, litigation concerning the 
constitutionality of Florida’s lethal injection procedures is ongoing in Lightbourne 
v. McCollum, No. SC06-2391 (Fla. petition filed Dec. 14, 2006).  We do not 
consider those issues here and express no opinion regarding the merits of any 
subsequent challenge Kearse may bring related to lethal injection. 
 
- 27 -
 
- 28 -
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for St Lucie County,  
Marc A. Cianca, Senior Judge - Case No. 561991CF000136A 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Paul Kalil and Christina L. 
Spudeas, Assistant CCRC – South, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Leslie T. Campbell, 
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent