Case Title: Pitcher v. Lakes Amusement Co.

Citation: 236 N.W.2d 333

Docket Number: 2-57158

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1975-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
236 N.W.2d 333 (1975) Barbara Sue PITCHER, a minor, by her father and next friend, Arlo Pitcher, and Arlo Pitcher, Individually, Appellants, v. LAKES AMUSEMENT COMPANY, a corporation, et al., Appellees. No. 2-57158. Supreme Court of Iowa. December 17, 1975. *334 Fitzgibbons Brothers, Estherville, and Grathwol, Ploetz, Oberhauser & Nodland, Wayzata, Minn., for appellants. James, Greer, Hoover, Nelson & Bertell, Spencer, and Erickson, Zierke, Kuderer & Utermarck, Fairmont, Minn., for Gerald R. Anderson, d/b/a Bloomquist Bus Service, appellee. Wilson, Rhinehart & Bikakis, Sioux City, for Lakes Amusement Co., appellee. Pendleton & Pendleton, Storm Lake, for Cabot Welchlin, appellee. Considered en banc. HARRIS, Justice. This appeal challenges the constitutionality of a procedural rule providing for nonunanimous jury verdicts. The challenge is based on Article I, § 9, of the Iowa Constitution which the trial court found was not offended by the rule. We agree and affirm the trial court. The facts are of limited significance in determining this appeal. On June 6, 1970 Barbara Sue Pitcher, then age 12, was injured while riding on a roller coaster in an amusement park. Her father brought this action in her behalf and his own against the amusement park, a bus service which supervised the excursion group in which Barbara was a member, and a youth involved in the incident. A jury trial resulted in a verdict for defendants. The sole issue on appeal is plaintiffs' challenge to rule 203(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows nonunanimous jury verdicts. The rule provides as follows: It is agreed the case must be affirmed if the foregoing rule can withstand plaintiffs' claim that it violates Article I, § 9 of the Iowa Constitution. It provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the General Assembly may authorize trial by a jury of a less number than twelve men in inferior courts; * * *." I. The provision for a five-sixths jury verdict in this state is of rather recent origin. It was included in our report to the first regular session of the 65th G.A. in 1973. Under the procedure outlined in §§ 684.18 and 684.19, The Code, we report to the legislature changes in the rules of pleading, practice and procedure. Rules so reported, together with any changes thereafter *335 enacted by the legislature, take effect the following July 1. Under this scheme the last sentence of rule 203(a), R.C.P. was enacted by the legislature. Acts of the 65th G.A., 1973 Regular Session, ch. 315, § 4. Background for the question presented was well described in an annotation at 47 A.L.R.3d 895, 896 (1973): The essential elements in the right to a trial by jury were described by the United States Supreme Court in Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288, 50 S. Ct. 253, 254, 74 L. Ed. 854, 858 (1930) as follows: We approved and adopted the foregoing language verbatim in State v. Sereg, 229 Iowa 1105, 1115, 296 N.W. 231, 236 (1941). In Sereg we held the presence and superintendence of a judge to be essential. Similarly we have five times held a verdict by a jury of less than 12 is unconstitutional under Article I,§ 9 of our constitution. State v. Walker, 192 Iowa 823, 185 N.W. 619 (1921); Kelsh v. The Town of Dyersville, 68 Iowa 137, 26 N.W. 38 (1885); Eshelman v. The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R'y Co., 67 Iowa 296, 25 N.W. 251 (1885); Higgins v. Farmers Ins. Co., 60 Iowa 50, 14 N.W. 118 (1882); and Cowles v. Buckman & Son, 6 Iowa 161 (1858). These opinions show our views on the essentials of a jury trial traditionally have echoed those of the United States Supreme Court. As we have seen, dicta in some cases indicated a nonunanimous verdict would be improper. Walker, supra; Sereg, supra. It is understandable why concepts of a jury trial under the federal and various state constitutions settled on the developed understanding of the common law. Those first called upon to interpret and constitutionally define a jury trial had recent, almost current, experience with the common law concepts on juries. These concepts had been centuries in their development. Time has increasingly demonstrated it was illogical to freeze forever our conception of a jury trial. The features of a jury trial had been developed, not perfected. As observed by the United States Supreme Court one of the features " * * * appears to have been a historical accident, unrelated to the great purposes which gave rise to the jury in the first place. * * *. " Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 89-90, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 1900, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446, 454 (1970). Passing time increased the tension between the rigid and fixed definition of a jury trial and changing views on the validity of its various essentials. This tension was but one example of the broader experience in American constitutional law. From obvious necessity a carefully limited flexibility was developed in the construction of constitutions. See 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 61, pp. 234-236. Constitutions must have enough flexibility so as to *336 be interpreted in accordance with the public interest. This means they must meet and be applied to new and changing conditions. We eventually freed ourselves from the private views of the constitution's framers which were in many cases but accidents of history: Those interested in judicial administration have long challenged the holdings and dicta which thus froze the features of jury trial. An influential article, reflecting unusual scholarship, appeared in 1918. Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 Harv.L.Rev. 669 (1918). Scott demonstrated the common law definition of a jury trial was a moving target. After identifying the constitutional provisions which preserved the right to a jury trial the study pointed out: "Two propositions are fundamental: The article then described the individual classic features of a jury trial. As to unanimity it said: Though valid, these challenges to the freezing of jury trial features were long in bearing fruit. Finally, in 1970, Williams v. Florida, supra, held the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution did not require twelve member juries in state courts. Although it dealt with the federal and not a state constitution the opinion at last renounced the rigidity of the fixed features of jury trial. A re-examination of the origin of our jury trial system in Williams is beginning to have an impact on state courts as well. For example a statute providing for a six man jury was held not to violate the Massachusetts constitution. That constitution contained the following provision: "And the legislature shall not make any law, that shall subject any person to a capital or infamous punishment * * * without trial by jury." Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, Article XII. See Opinion of the Justices, 360 Mass. 877, 271 N.E.2d 335 (1971). The movement begun in the Williams opinion was continued in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 92 S. Ct. 1628, 32 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1972). It was there held the federal constitution does not require unanimous jury verdicts in state courts. Apodaca overruled dicta to the contrary in Patton v. United States, supra. Plaintiff's challenge is based on Article I, § 9 of the Iowa Constitution and not upon any provision in the federal constitution. It is for us to decide whether we choose a similar reinterpretation of the state provision. We of course are not bound to do so. Advisory Opinion to Senate, 108 R.I. 628, 278 A.2d 852, 47 A.L.R.3d 878 (1971). But, though not bound, we feel we should reinterpret the provision for the same reasons that were expressed in Williams and Apodaca. Plaintiffs point to the following language in the provision: " * * * [B]ut the General Assembly may authorize trial by a jury of a less number than twelve men in inferior courts; * * *." This language provides an express variance from what were then thought to be the three essentials of a jury trial. It is suggested this expression *338 thereby prohibits any additional variance from the common law jury. We reject the suggestion. We believe the first phrase of Article I, § 9 protects the general concept of a right to a jury trial. Reference in the provision to a jury of less than twelve immediately allowed a change in one of the essential elements as they were then understood. There is no reason to believe the allowance was intended for a limitation. We subscribe entirely to the view expressed in Apodaca, supra, 406 U.S. at 410-411, 92 S. Ct. at 1632-1633, 32 L.Ed.2d at 191-192: We therefor reject and overrule our prior holdings that the jury under Article I, § 9 of the Iowa Constitution is necessarily the jury recognized at common law. Higgins, 60 Iowa at 51, 14 N.W. at 118; Eshelman, 67 Iowa at 297, 25 N.W. at 252; Walker, 192 Iowa at 835, 185 N.W. at 625; Sereg, 229 Iowa at 1112, 296 N.W. at 234. We expressly overrule any inference contained in Walker and Sereg that a unanimous verdict is an essential element of the constitutional right to a jury trial. We believe and hold Article I, § 9 protects the right to a jury trial and not any particular feature thereof. Cf. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 155-156, 93 S. Ct. 2448, 2452, 37 L. Ed. 2d 522, 528 (1973). There was perhaps some anticipation of the move we take in this opinion which found expression in Walker, supra, 192 Iowa at 835, 185 N.W. at 625-626: In Walker we held the presence of women on a jury did not violate a defendant's right even though the common law jury was composed entirely of males. Rule 203(a), R.C.P. does not offend Article I, § 9 of the Iowa Constitution. The judgment of the trial court is Affirmed. All Justices concur except RAWLINGS and MASON, JJ., who dissent. RAWLINGS, Justice (dissenting). Art. I, § 9, Constitution of Iowa says: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the General Assembly may authorize trial by a jury of a less number than twelve men in inferior courts." We are thus called upon to evaluate Art. I, § 9, of our Constitution in light of its peculiar wording. In this regard it is to me evident the first provision thereof, quoted above, must be read in the context of the second coordinated condition. In other words, specific reference to permissible juries of less than 12 in inferior courts must mean there may not be less than 12 in any other courts. *339 By the same token no leave is granted to provide for other than unanimous 12 member verdicts in all cases tried to a jury in this jurisdiction, save and except those so litigated in inferior courts. See Power v. Williams, 53 N.D. 54, 205 N.W. 9 (1925); In re Advisory Opinion to the Senate, 108 R.I. 628, 278 A.2d 852, 854-859 (1970). See generally 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 67, 70. Implicit in the majority opinion is a holding to the effect a less than unanimous verdict will suffice in criminal prosecutions. This I cannot accept. I submit we today impermissibly amend Article I, section 9 of our state constitution by judicial fiat. I therefore respectfully dissent. MASON, J., joins this dissent.