Case Title: People v. Nance

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86105

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Opinion filed January 21, 2000.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
Anthony Nance was arrested by Chicago police and charged by complaint with 
violating section 25-1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961, a subsection of the 
mob action statute prohibiting "[t]he assembly of 2 or more persons to do an 
unlawful act." 720 ILCS 5/25-1(a)(2) (West 1996). Following a hearing, the 
circuit court of Cook County dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding 
that the statute violates the first and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. I, XIV). The State appealed the 
dismissal. 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). Because a statute of this state was held 
invalid, the appeal was brought directly to our court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. We 
affirm.
The validity of section 25-1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 
5/25-1(a)(2) (West 1996)) was before this court in People v. Nash, 173 Ill. 2d 423 (1996). As we noted in Nash, the statute is the same one 
declared unconstitutional in 1968 by a three-judge federal district court in 
Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1968). The federal 
court found the law facially invalid under the first amendment to the United 
States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. I) because it is impermissibly vague 
and overbroad. Landry, 280 F. Supp.  at 955. Based on this 
determination, the federal court "perpetually enjoined and restrained" the State 
and the City of Chicago from enforcing or bringing prosecutions under the law. 
Nash, 173 Ill. 2d  at 426.
In Nash, the same circuit judge who invalidated the statute in this 
case declared the law unconstitutional. When the State and the City appealed, 
the Nash defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the appeal was 
barred by the permanent injunction entered by the Landry court. We did 
not address that contention, however, because we found another, more fundamental 
obstacle to the State's prosecution: the charging instruments were fatally 
defective. In light of that disposition, we had no occasion to make our own, 
independent assessment of the law's constitutionality. Nash, 173 Ill. 2d  at 432.
The case before us today parallels Nash in several key respects. 
Most significantly, it has revived the issue as to the effect of the permanent 
injunction entered by the federal court in Landry. Because the 
Landry injunction has become a recurrent source of controversy and because 
it appears that the State and the City of Chicago intend on continuing to 
enforce section 25-1(a)(2) despite the injunction, we believe that sound 
considerations of judicial administration require us to settle the question of 
the injunction's validity.
In this case, the State contends that the Landry decision is void 
because it was overturned on appeal. The State is incorrect. As we pointed out 
in Nash, 173 Ill. 2d  at 426, the United States Supreme Court did 
reverse the district court's rulings with respect to a separate statutory 
provision; however, that portion of the district court's judgment invalidating 
section 25-1(a)(2) and prohibiting its enforcement was never appealed and was 
not before the court. The United States Supreme Court said so plainly and 
unambiguously in its opinion. Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 80, 27 L. 
Ed. 3d 696, 699, 91 S. Ct. 758, 759-60 (1971). The injunction against 
enforcement of section 25-1(a)(2) therefore remained in effect. The district 
court's order following remand from the United States Supreme Court made this 
clear. Nash, 173 Ill. 2d  at 426.
The State argues, in the alternative, that it should not be bound by the 
Landry injunction because that decision is based on a view of the law 
which is no longer sound. The problem with the State's argument is that it 
overlooks basic principles governing injunctions. It is true that an injunction 
can be modified or dissolved when the court finds that the law has changed or 
that equity no longer justifies a continuance of the injunction. An injunction 
remains in full force and effect, however, until it has been vacated or modified 
by the court which granted it or until the order or decree awarding it has been 
set aside on appeal. Unless it has been overturned or modified by orderly 
processes of review, an injunction must be obeyed, even if it is erroneous. 
People ex rel. Illinois State Dental Society v. Norris, 79 Ill. App. 3d 
890, 895-96 (1979).
The implications of these principles are clear. If the State and the City of 
Chicago believed that the Landry injunction was no longer proper or 
fair, it was incumbent on them to have it modified or dissolved. As we noted in 
Nash, 173 Ill. 2d  at 426, they have never sought such relief, and the 
legislature has not amended the statute to cure the constitutional defects cited 
by the Landry court. The Landry court's order perpetually 
enjoining and restraining them from enforcing section 25-1(a)(2) therefore 
remains in effect. The State and the City of Chicago have no valid basis for 
refusing to honor it.
The State and the City cannot justify their continued enforcement of section 
25-1(a)(2) on the grounds that the relief afforded by the Landry 
injunction was limited to the particular individuals who initiated that 
litigation. The litigation in Landry was brought on behalf of "all 
negroes in the City of Chicago." Landry, 280 F. Supp.  at 944. The 
defendant in this case is African-American who resides and was arrested in the 
City of Chicago. Moreover, the Landry decision was not confined to the 
law as applied to the particular conduct of the plaintiffs in that case. The 
court found the law invalid on its face because it was "impermissively vague and 
overbroad" in violation of the first amendment. Landry, 280 F. Supp.  at 
955. A statute which is facially invalid has no force and effect upon any person 
or entity regardless of their specific circumstances. In re Marriage of 
Lappe, 176 Ill. 2d 414, 439 (1997) (Freeman, J., dissenting). If the 
State's theory were correct and the Landry decision could only be 
invoked by the individual plaintiffs from that case, it would defeat the purpose 
behind overbreadth challenges, which is to protect the first amendment rights of 
other parties in situations not before the court. Desnick v. Department of 
Professional Regulation, 171 Ill. 2d 510, 520 (1996).
Finally, the State and the City cannot evade the Landry injunction 
by arguing that the state courts of Illinois are not bound by decisions of lower 
federal courts. As a general rule, the interpretation given to Illinois statutes 
by the lower federal courts is not conclusive on the courts of this state. 
Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 277 (1996). That rule, however, 
is addressed to the situation where the federal court's decision is being 
invoked as precedent on a point of law. In the case before us, the 
Landry decision is not being cited for its legal analysis. Whether the 
federal court's analysis is correct is irrelevant. Whatever one thinks of the 
federal district court's reasoning, its decision is binding because it 
constitutes a valid judgment by a duly-constituted tribunal on the same question 
presented here and prohibits the same prosecuting officials involved in this 
case from enforcing the same statute against the same class of defendants to 
which the defendant in this case belongs.
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel a party is precluded from 
relitigating an issue decided in a prior proceeding. The doctrine is applicable 
where, as here, the issued decided in the prior adjudication is identical with 
the one presented in the suit in question, there was a final judgment on the 
merits in the prior adjudication, and the party against whom estoppel is 
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. 
Talarico v. Dunlap, 177 Ill. 2d 185, 191 (1997).
No possible claim can be made that application of the doctrine would be 
unfair in this case. In Landry, the State had the opportunity and 
incentive to litigate the matter fully (see Talarico, 177 Ill. 2d at 
192) and did so. Having litigated and lost, it is not entitled to a "second bite 
of the apple." There would be no question of this had the original proceeding 
taken place in the courts of Illinois. The result should not be different merely 
because the Landry judgment was entered by a court of the United 
States. Although states are free to allocate decisionmaking authority among 
their own tribunals as they please, they are not free to prefer their processes 
to those of the federal courts and to decline to respect federal judgments. 
In re Cook, 49 F.3d 263, 266 (7th Cir. 1995).
The same conclusion is mandated by principles of state and federal comity. 
Where a federal court has declared a state statute invalid and enjoined the 
state from enforcing it, courts of review in other jurisdictions have recognized 
that they are bound by the federal court's injunction (see State ex rel. 
Department of Human Resources, Adult & Family Services Division v. Northland 
Insurance Co., 139 Or. App. 92, 100, 911 P.2d 942, 947 (1996)) and that 
"until such time as the federal court's decision is reversed by the appropriate 
appellate court, the permanent injunction issued by the federal district court 
will be binding on the State *** and its instrumentalities." Unborn Child 
Amendment Committee v. Ward, 318 Ark. 165, 167-68, 883 S.W.2d 817, 818 
(1994).
In sum, the attempt by the State to relitigate the viability of section 
25-1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 constitutes an impermissible collateral 
attack on the federal court's judgment. If the State seeks relief from that 
judgment, its recourse is with the federal courts, not the courts of this state. 
Until the federal courts modify or dissolve the injunction, the courts of 
Illinois cannot permit the State to prosecute defendants in violation of the 
injunction's commands. Our judiciary will not be the agent for contumacious 
conduct.
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court of Cook County was correct in 
once again dismissing a complaint filed by the State under section 25-1(a)(2) of 
the Criminal Code of 1961. The circuit court's judgment is therefore 
affirmed.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
Anthony Nance was charged in Cook County circuit court with violating section 
(a)(2) of the mob action statute, which prohibits "the assembly of 2 or more 
persons to do an unlawful act." 720 ILCS 5/25-1(a)(2) (West 1996). The trial 
court declared the mob action statute unconstitutional and dismissed the charges 
against defendant. The State appealed directly to this court, and the majority 
affirms, holding that in the interests of state and federal comity, this court 
should defer to a 30-year-old injunction issued by a federal district court 
which permanently enjoined enforcement of section (a)(2) of the mob action 
statute in Cook County. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill. 
1968) (holding mob action statute vague and overbroad). The district court's 
injunction, however, should not be enforced by this court because it is an 
illegitimate federal intrusion into state criminal prosecutions and is based on 
an inaccurate construction of the mob action statute. Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent.
The majority holds that this court should enforce the district court's 
injunction based on state and federal comity. Slip op. at 4-5. Comity, this 
court has noted, is not a constitutional command. Schoeberlein v. Purdue 
University, 129 Ill. 2d 372, 377 (1989). Comity, therefore, gives effect to 
the judicial decisions of another jurisdiction " 'not as a matter of 
obligation, but out of deference and respect.' " Rollins v. 
Ellwood, 141 Ill. 2d 244, 256 (1990), quoting Schoeberlein, 129 Ill. 2d  at 378; see also 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws §17 (1998) 
(describing comity as a rule of practice, convenience and expediency, not a rule 
of law). This court will not enforce law from another jurisdiction on the basis 
of comity if it is clearly contrary to Illinois public policy or the "general 
interest of the citizens of this State." Schoeberlein, 129 Ill. 2d  at 
379.
Any discussion of whether the district court's decision in Landry is 
worthy of deference is sorely missing from the majority opinion. An examination 
of both federal and Illinois law reveals that the Landry court's 
injunction should not be enforced by this or any other Illinois state court.
Landry was a class action filed in federal district court in which 
the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of several provisions of the 
Illinois Criminal Code, including the mob action and intimidation statutes. Some 
of the plaintiffs in Landry faced criminal prosecutions in the circuit 
court of Cook County. The remainder of the plaintiffs, purporting to represent 
"the class of all negroes in the City of Chicago," faced no criminal charges. 
The district court granted plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief, holding 
that section (a)(2) of the mob action statute was unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad. Landry, 280 F. Supp.  at 955. The court also held that 
section (a)(3) of the intimidation statute was overbroad. Landry, 280 F. Supp.  at 964. The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of both 
statutes.
The defendants appealed, but they appealed only the portion of the district 
court's decision regarding the intimidation statute. Defendants did not appeal 
the district court's holding that section (a)(2) of the mob action statute was 
unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding the 
plaintiffs failed to make a showing of irreparable injury necessary to justify 
federal interference in state criminal prosecutions. Boyle v. Landry, 
401 U.S. 77, 80-81, 27 L. Ed. 2d 696, 699, 91 S. Ct. 758, 760 (1971). Noting 
that not a single plaintiff had been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution 
under the intimidation statute, the Court stated:
In a case decided the same day as Landry, the Court reemphasized 
that, except in "extraordinary circumstances," even a defendant actually facing 
criminal prosecution in state court cannot not seek federal injunctive relief 
because the defendant can challenge the constitutionality of the statute at his 
trial in state court. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 675-76, 91 S. Ct. 746, 750-51 (1971). Granting injunctive relief under 
such circumstances, the Court concluded, would constitute an illegitimate 
interference with state criminal prosecutions. Younger, 401 U.S.  at 
43-45, 27 L. Ed. 2d  at 675-76, 91 S. Ct.  at 750-51. In Younger, the 
Court held that this rule applies even in cases where the defendant alleges in 
federal court that the state criminal statute on its face violates the first 
amendment. Younger, 401 U.S.  at 53, 27 L. Ed. 2d  at 680-81, 91 S. Ct. 
at 755.
Although the Court noted in Landry that its holding was limited to 
the intimidation statute (Landry, 401 U.S.  at 80, 27 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 
91 S. Ct. at 760), an examination of the Court's analysis in Landry and 
Younger raises serious questions about the continued viability of the 
rationale underlying the district court's injunction enjoining the state from 
enforcing the mob action statute. Indeed, if the plaintiffs in Landry 
filed their constitutional challenge to the mob action statute in federal court 
today, it is highly likely that it would be summarily dismissed. This court 
should not enforce the injunction in Landry because it is highly 
questionable whether even the federal courts would enforce it.
The injunction in Landry is even more problematic because the 
district court's holding that the mob action statute is unconstitutionally vague 
and overbroad is based on an inaccurate construction of the mob action statute. 
The district court in Landry held that the phrase "unlawful act" in the 
mob action statute is "not limited to criminal illegality; it includes city 
regulatory ordinances, quasi-criminal ordinances, torts, or other civil wrongs." 
Landry, 280 F. Supp.  at 955. This court, however, has limited the scope 
of such phrases solely to violations of the Criminal Code. People v. 
Williams, 133 Ill. 2d 449, 454 (1990)(holding that the phrase "other than a 
lawful purpose" in child abduction statute applies only to violations of the 
criminal code and not to violations of administrative regulations or city 
ordinances).
The majority's analysis in this case is even more problematic because, 
despite its protestations to the contrary, the majority does indeed defer to the 
district court's constitutional analysis in Landry. The majority 
states:
The import of this language is that the mob action statute, since it has been 
declared facially unconstitutional by the federal district court, cannot be 
applied to anyone in this state. It bears repeating, however, that a federal 
district court exercises no appellate jurisdiction over any Illinois court, and 
the district court's ruling on the constitutionality of the mob action statute 
is not binding on this court. See People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235, 292-93 (1989) (refusing to follow federal district court's holding that 
Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional). The majority essentially 
transforms the defendants' failure to appeal the portion of the Landry 
court's injunction which covered the mob action statute into binding federal 
constitutional law. In its zeal to show the proper "deference and respect" to 
the district court's decision in Landry, the majority has precluded 
this court from performing one of its primary functions, namely, to interpret 
the constitution.
The majority's decision to defer to the federal district court's analysis 
that the mob action statute is unconstitutional is even more unfortunate because 
the mob action statute does not violate any provisions of either the federal or 
Illinois Constitution. As mentioned above, the district court's constitutional 
analysis is premised on an inaccurate construction of the mob action statute. 
Limiting the phrase "unlawful act" in the mob action statute to violations of 
the Criminal Code resolves the vagueness problem identified by the district 
court. The mob action statute sufficiently informs persons as to the forbidden 
conduct (assembling with the intent to violate the Illinois Criminal Code) and, 
therefore, is not vague. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 453 (1997), aff'd, 527 U.S. ___, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67, 119 S. Ct. 1849 
(1999) (stating antiloitering laws not unconstitutionally vague when joined with 
a second specific intent element such as intent to solicit an unlawful act).
Nor is the mob action statute overbroad. The mob action statute does not have 
a sufficiently substantial impact on conduct protected by the first amendment to 
render it unconstitutional. See Morales, 527 U.S. at ___, 144 L. Ed. 2d  
at 78, 119 S. Ct.  at 1857 (holding gang loitering ordinance which prohibited 
gang members from loitering with one another not overbroad). The mob action 
statute does not criminalize speech or any form of conduct that is intended to 
convey a message. The circuit court in this case concluded that the mob action 
statute criminalizes "the act of assembling to contemplate or consider 
'unlawful' conduct." The mob action statute, however, does no such thing. By its 
very terms the mob action statute criminalizes only assembly to do an 
unlawful act. The statute does not criminalize advocacy of ideas.
Defendant's argument that the mob action statute violates the Illinois 
Constitution also fails. Article I, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution 
provides, "The people have the right to assemble in a peaceable manner, 
to consult for the common good, to make known their opinions to their 
representatives and to apply for redress of grievances." (Emphasis added.) Ill. 
Const. 1970, art. I, §5. An assembly is certainly not peaceable if those 
assembled have done so with the purpose of committing a crime. The conduct 
prohibited by the mob action statute, therefore, is not protected by the 
Illinois Constitution.
I would reverse the circuit court's order declaring the mob action statute 
unconstitutional and dismissing the complaint against defendant. I respectfully 
dissent.
JUSTICE MILLER joins in this dissent.