Case Title: In re Ferrell

Citation: 

Docket Number: S265798

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re TYREE FERRELL 
on Habeas Corpus. 
 
S265798 
 
 
 
 
April 6, 2023 
 
Justice Jenkins authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, 
Groban, and Evans concurred. 
 
 
1 
In re TYREE FERRELL  
S265798 
 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
Jury instructions erroneously permitted the second degree 
murder conviction of petitioner Tyree Ferrell based on a felony-
murder theory invalidated by People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
1172 (Chun).  The jury’s unadorned guilty verdict does not show 
it avoided this now-invalid theory.  The Secretary of the 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation nevertheless 
argues the instructional error was harmless and asks us to 
uphold Ferrell’s conviction.  The Secretary argues the jury’s 
additional finding — that Ferrell intentionally discharged a 
firearm and caused death in committing his offense (Pen. Code, 
§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) — along with the evidence adduced at 
trial, show that any rational jury would have found Ferrell 
guilty under a valid theory of second degree murder, implied 
malice.   
We conclude that, whether viewed in isolation or in light 
of the entire record, the jury’s additional finding fails to 
establish the mental component of implied malice, which 
requires a defendant to act with a conscious disregard for life, 
knowing his act endangers another’s life.  The jury could have, 
consistent with its additional finding, concluded Ferrell shot 
Lawrence Rawlings, his childhood friend, while trying to stop a 
fight without believing he was shooting towards any person.  
This scenario would not demand a finding of implied malice.  We 
therefore cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury 
properly instructed without the erroneous felony-murder 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
2 
instructions would have still returned a second degree murder 
verdict.  We accordingly grant Ferrell relief pursuant to his 
petition for habeas corpus. 
I. 
FACTS 
A. 
Rawlings Is Killed. 
A gambling dispute incited a fist fight between two Blood 
gang subsets, “All For Crime” (AFC) and “40 Piru.”  These two 
subsets were “kind of alright” and could “get along” while 
gambling, but sometimes arguments arose that spilled into 
fights in the nature of “athletic contests” with “bloody lips, that’s 
all.”  On this occasion, Ferrell, Ferrell’s friend Lawrence 
Rawlings, and Henry Keith fought for AFC.  Rawlings’ girlfriend 
and cousin both observed the fight.   
Cussondra Davis, Rawlings’ girlfriend, believed the 
fighting was “completely over” and saw gang members shaking 
hands, hugging, and making up.  Rawlings, according to Davis’ 
testimony, had finished hugging a 40 Piru nicknamed Diggum 
when she observed Ferrell shoot a gun in the direction of the 40 
Pirus.  She described Ferrell as holding his shooting arm at a 
right angle to his body — that is, parallel to the ground — and 
moving his arm back and forth.  Davis saw Ferrell fire a second 
shot with his arm in this same position.  No 40 Pirus, however, 
were struck.  Instead, Davis saw her boyfriend, Rawlings, lying 
on the ground, bloodied.  Davis watched Ferrell drop the gun 
and flee. 
Latesha Rawlings, meanwhile, saw Ferrell pointing a gun 
toward her cousin, Rawlings.  She too thought the fighting had 
stopped.  She then saw Ferrell discharge “maybe three shots” — 
his shooting arm outstretched, “bouncing” or “going all kinds of 
ways like he couldn’t handle the gun.”  Rawlings fell to the 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
3 
ground, and Ferrell ran to him, saying “he was sorry, that he 
didn’t mean to do it.”   
Ferrell fled the state after the shooting, but when police 
located him, he voluntarily spoke to officers.  He admitted being 
at the fight and firing the gun but claimed he “shot one time into 
the air, and the second time it just went off.”  He “was trying to 
break up the fight.”  In particular, he hoped to stop a skirmish 
his friend Rawlings had been losing.  Ferrell asserted he “didn’t 
point” the gun “at anybody.”  Rather, he kept the gun barrel 
pointed to “the air” the “whole time,” even as he brought his arm 
down from over his head.  Rawlings, explained Ferrell, could 
only have been shot by “accident.”  When asked how Rawlings 
could get shot if Ferrell had been pointing in the air, Ferrell 
responded, “I don’t know, I just seen him standing there, then 
he just fell, that’s when I ran to him and I was holding him, and 
everybody told me I hit him and I left.”  Asked a second time, 
Ferrell said, “accident, ‘cause he was running and everything 
was just . . . I don’t know it was just.”   
Henry Keith, who had fought alongside Ferrell, believed 
Ferrell’s first shot was into the air.  He heard the first shot, saw 
Ferrell’s arm coming down, and heard a second shot.  He “didn’t 
see nothing aimed at nobody.”  Keith then saw Rawlings on the 
ground.  Ferrell went over to Rawlings and said he “didn’t mean 
it.”  Keith believed some fighting was still ongoing when the 
shooting occurred.   
B. 
Ferrell Is Convicted. 
Though Ferrell was 17 years old at the time he shot 
Rawlings, the juvenile court deemed Ferrell unfit for 
rehabilitation in that system and transferred him to a court of 
criminal jurisdiction.  (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.)  The 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
4 
People then charged Ferrell with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, 
subd. (a)) and alleged sentencing enhancements related to his 
use of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds., (b)–(d)).1  Davis 
and Latesha Rawlings testified for the prosecution while Keith 
testified for the defense.  Ferrell did not testify, but his 
statements to police were admitted into evidence.  Amongst 
other witnesses, a medical examiner testified that assuming 
Rawlings was upright when shot, the bullet that struck him 
travelled parallel to the ground.  Only if Rawlings’ head had 
been angled such that its left side faced skyward could the bullet 
have come from the sky.  
The prosecutor, in closing argument, told jurors they could 
find Ferrell guilty of first or second degree murder, or, at 
minimum, involuntary manslaughter.  The prosecutor offered 
three possible theories of second degree murder: (1) express 
malice murder, requiring an intent to kill; (2) implied malice 
murder, 
requiring 
an 
intentional 
act 
whose 
natural 
consequences are dangerous to human life, and which was 
deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and 
with conscious disregard for, human life; and (3) felony murder, 
premised on the killing occurring during a felony, namely the 
willful discharge of a firearm in a grossly negligent manner in 
violation of Penal Code section 246.3.  The court instructed the 
jury on each of these theories of second degree murder, as well 
as first degree murder (see Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (a) [a “willful, 
 
1 
The People also charged Ferrell with assault with a 
firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)) based on him, two weeks 
before he killed Rawlings, shooting another victim in the groin 
after a fight that started over a possibly stolen bicycle.  Ferrell 
was convicted of this charge, but does not challenge that 
conviction here.   
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
5 
deliberate, and premeditated killing”]) and involuntary 
manslaughter (id., § 192 [“Manslaughter is the unlawful killing 
of a human being without malice”]), providing versions of 
CALJIC Nos. 8.10, 8.11, 8.20, 8.30, 8.31, 8.32, and 8.45.  The 
court also explained the doctrine of transferred intent, whereby 
one who “attempts to kill a certain person, but by mistake or 
inadvertence kills a different person” is guilty as if “the person 
originally intended to be killed, had been killed.”   
The jury acquitted Ferrell of first degree premeditated 
murder but found him guilty of second degree murder.  Jurors 
did not specify which theory or theories of second degree murder 
supported their verdict.  They did, however, find that Ferrell, in 
killing Rawlings, had “personally and intentionally discharged 
a firearm, to wit, a handgun, which proximately caused great 
bodily injury and death to the victim within the meaning of [the] 
Penal Code Section 12022.53(d)” sentencing enhancement.  The 
trial court imposed a sentence of 40 years to life for the murder 
of Rawlings and the true finding on the enhancement.   
The Court of Appeal affirmed Ferrell’s second degree 
murder conviction.  (People v. Ferrell (Sep. 27, 2004, B168679) 
[nonpub. opn.].)  It rejected his argument that the trial court 
erroneously instructed jurors on a felony-murder theory.  It 
invoked the then-current rule of People v. Robertson (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 156, that an assaultive felony, such as willful discharge 
of a firearm under section 246.3, could support a felony-murder 
conviction so long as the felonious act had a purpose “collateral” 
to the killing.  Because Ferrell’s “jury could reasonably 
conclude” he fired his gun “intentionally as a warning . . . the 
felony-murder instruction was proper.”  We denied review.  
(People v. Ferrell, supra, review den. Dec. 22, 2004, S129037.)   
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
6 
C. 
Ferrell’s Petitions for Habeas Corpus 
 
Five years after Ferrell’s direct appeal, we overruled 
Robertson and concluded assaultive felonies, “such as a violation 
of section 246 or 246.3, . . . cannot be the basis of a felony-murder 
instruction.”  (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1200; see also id. at 
pp. 1200–1201.) 
 
Ferrell, relying on Chun, has sought a writ of habeas 
corpus.  He asserts that his jury received felony-murder 
instructions predicated on a section 246.3 violation, that these 
instructions allowed the jury to convict on an invalid theory of 
second degree murder, and that, therefore, his murder 
conviction cannot stand.  Ferrell first filed a petition for habeas 
corpus in the trial court, which was summarily denied, and a 
petition in the Court of Appeal, which was denied on its merits.  
(In re Ferrell (Oct. 22, 2020, No. B303028) [nonpub. opn.].)  
Ferrell then filed a petition for habeas corpus in this court.  We 
ordered the Secretary to show cause why relief should not be 
granted and now address the merits of Ferrell’s claim. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
Jurors at Ferrell’s Trial Received Instructions on 
an Invalid Second Degree Felony-murder Theory. 
 
Second degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice 
aforethought, but without the premeditation or deliberation 
required for first degree murder.  (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 139, 151.)  Malice may be express or implied.  (Ibid.)  
Malice is express when a defendant intends to kill and implied 
when a defendant consciously disregards danger to human life.  
(Id. at pp. 151, 156–157.)  Implied malice requires proof of both 
a physical act and a mental state.  Physically, a defendant must 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
7 
perform an act whose natural consequences are dangerous to 
life, or put another way, defendant must perform “an act that 
involves a high degree of probability” of death.  (Id. at p. 156; see 
also People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 111.)  To 
establish the mental state required for implied malice, the 
defendant must deliberately perform the act with a conscious 
disregard for life, knowing the act endangers another’s life.  
(Knoller, at p. 143 [malice is implied when the act dangerous to 
life “ ‘ “was deliberately performed by a person who knows that 
his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with 
conscious disregard for life.” ’ ”]; Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 
1181; Nieto Benitez, at p. 104 [explaining the evolution of the 
phrasing of the implied malice components].)  
 
Under the second degree felony-murder rule, as our cases 
have described it, commission of a felony “ ‘inherently dangerous 
to human life’ ” can substitute for malice.  (Chun, supra, 45 
Cal.4th at p. 1182.)  This rule curtails the malice inquiry, 
obviating the need for the jury to “further examin[e] the 
defendant’s mental state.”  (Ibid.; see People v. Patterson (1989) 
49 Cal.3d 615, 626 [“The felony-murder rule generally acts as a 
substitute for the mental state ordinarily required for the offense 
of murder”]; People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 43 [describing 
the rule as a “short-circuit”]; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 
522, 538 [“[A] second degree felony-murder instruction” relieves 
“ ‘the jury of the necessity of finding one of the elements of the 
crime of murder’ [citation], to wit, malice aforethought”].)   
 
Pursuant to the second degree felony-murder rule, 
Ferrell’s jury was instructed to convict him of second degree 
murder if Ferrell intentionally committed the felony of willfully 
discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner and, during 
that offense, Rawlings was unlawfully killed, whether 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
8 
intentionally, unintentionally, or accidentally.  The Legislature 
enacted section 246.3’s prohibition on grossly negligent firearm 
discharges specifically to dissuade celebratory, skyward 
gunshots in an urban setting.  (See People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 
Cal.4th 980, 987–988; People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 
363.) 
 
After Ferrell’s conviction became final, we revisited the 
scope of the second degree felony-murder rule.  We held in Chun 
that when the underlying felony is assaultive, such as the willful 
discharge felony in section 246.3, that felony always “merges 
with the homicide” and cannot support a felony-murder 
conviction.  (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1200.)  We overruled 
cases taking a contrary approach to merger, including those that 
had allowed felony-murder prosecutions if assaultive felonies 
were committed with a purpose collateral to the killing.  (Id. at 
pp. 1199–1201.)  Applying the felony-murder rule to any assault, 
we said, would stretch the rule “beyond its required application.”  
(Id. at p. 1200.)  It would impute malice aforethought to every 
assault, merging every assault resulting in death — a great 
majority of all killings — into murder.  (Id. at p. 1189.)  Such 
“ ‘bootstrapping finds support neither in logic nor in law.’ ”  
(Ibid.)  More recently, our Legislature has gone farther than 
Chun, saying without varnish that “[m]alice shall not be 
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a 
crime.”  (Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) § 2; Pen. 
Code, § 188, subd. (a)(3).)  
B. 
Alternative-Theory Error Calls for Harmless Error 
Analysis. 
 
In light of Chun, which as the Secretary concedes applies 
retroactively in postconviction proceedings because it alters the 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
9 
conduct punishable as second degree murder (see In re Martinez 
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1222, 1224–1225), the parties agree 
Ferrell’s jury should not have received instructions on felony 
murder, and Ferrell’s conviction would be improper if based 
solely on that theory.  Ferrell’s jury, however, also received 
instructions on valid theories of second degree murder:  express-
malice murder and implied-malice murder without the felony-
murder shortcut.   
 
Ferrell’s case, then, presents the type of “alternative-
theory error” that occurs when “ ‘a trial court instructs a jury on 
two theories of guilt, one of which was legally correct and one 
legally incorrect.’ ”  (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 12 
(Aledamat); see id. at p. 7, fn. 3 & p. 10; see People v. Chiu (2014) 
59 Cal.4th 155, 167, superseded by statute on another ground, 
as noted in People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 849.)  We 
acknowledged in Aledamat that when a theory of guilt is 
factually incorrect, meaning the facts put in evidence do not 
support it, jurors are equipped to detect the shortcoming in proof 
and reject the unsupported theory.  (Aledamat, at p. 7.)  When a 
theory of guilt is legally incorrect, however, we confront an 
incorrect statement of law.  Jurors are not equipped to detect 
and account for such errors; instead, jurors are told to take the 
law only from the court’s instructions.  (Id. at pp. 7–8.)  When, 
as here, an alternative theory is legally incorrect, instructions 
on that theory violate a defendant’s constitutional right to “a 
jury properly instructed in the relevant law.”  (In re Martinez, 
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1224.)  We evaluate the prejudice of such 
errors under the heightened standard of Chapman v. California 
(1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman), the same standard of prejudice 
applicable to other instructional errors that misdescribe 
criminal offenses.  (Aledamat, at pp. 7–13.)  
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
10 
Under Chapman’s familiar standard, we reverse a 
conviction “unless, after examining the entire cause, including 
the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances,” the 
reviewing court “determines the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 13.)  In the 
context of alternative-theory errors, this means we reverse 
“ ‘unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 10, quoting Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1201.)   
Harmlessness can be shown “ ‘if the jury verdict on other 
points effectively embraces’ ” the valid theory, “ ‘or if it is 
impossible, upon the evidence, to have found what the verdict 
did find without finding’ ” the facts underlying the valid theory 
as well.  (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1204; see Aledamat, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 10, 15.)  “In determining this 
impossibility or, more generally, whether the error was 
harmless, the reviewing court is not limited to a review of the 
verdict itself.”  (Aledamat, at p. 13.)  “[I]f ‘ “[n]o reasonable jury” ’ 
would have found in favor of the defendant on the” valid theory, 
“given the jury’s actual verdict and the state of the evidence, the 
error may be found harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”   (In 
re Lopez (April 3, 2023, S258912) __ Cal.5th __ [p. 23], quoting 
Aledamat, at p. 15; accord Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 
1, 19 [“[A] court, in typical appellate-court fashion, asks whether 
the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a 
contrary finding with respect to the omitted element”].) 
We have applied these harmless error principles when 
reviewing alternative-theory error on both direct appeal and, as 
here, on habeas corpus.  (In re Martinez, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 
1218, 1222–1225; accord Hedgpeth v. Pulido (2008) 555 U.S. 57, 
61.)   
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
11 
C. 
The Section 12022.53, subdivision (d) Finding, 
Combined with the Evidence at Trial, Does Not 
Render the Error Harmless. 
We now turn to whether the erroneous felony-murder 
instructions given to Ferrell’s jury were harmless.  The 
Secretary argues they were, because the jury’s true finding on 
the Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d) sentencing 
enhancement, combined with the evidence presented at trial, 
establishes implied malice murder.  
Generally speaking, a sentencing enhancement finding is 
some “other point[]” or “other aspect[]” of a jury’s verdict that 
could “effectively embrace[]” findings necessary to maintain a 
conviction.  (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 1204–1205; see In re 
Lopez, supra, __ Cal.5th __ [pp. 32–35] [assessing the impact of 
a gang-murder special circumstance]; People v. Covarrubias 
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 902, fn. 26 [verdicts on other crimes and 
special circumstance findings conclusively established first 
degree felony murder].) 
The enhancement here, section 12022.53, subdivision (d), 
increases the sentence of anyone who “in the commission of a 
felony specified,” murder included, “personally and intentionally 
discharges a firearm and proximately causes . . . death.”  (Pen. 
Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d); see id. at subd. (a).)  The trial court 
instructed Ferrell’s jury on this enhancement using a version of 
CALJIC No. 17.19.5, telling jurors if they found him guilty of 
murder, they had to “determine whether the defendant 
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm and 
proximately caused death to a person in the commission of that 
felony.”  The court’s instructions described the intent required 
as the intent to discharge a firearm.  And the court’s instructions 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
12 
defined an act proximately causing death as one that “sets in 
motion a chain of events that produces” death “as a direct, 
natural and probable consequence of the act,” “without which 
the death would not have occurred.”  (See People v. Bland (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 313, 333–338 [discussing proximate cause].)   
As the Secretary acknowledges, findings under section 
12022.53, subdivision (d), do not, on their own, encompass the 
definition of implied malice murder.  (See People v. Offley (2020) 
48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598.)  Recall that implied-malice murder 
has a physical component: an act whose natural consequences 
are dangerous to life.  And it has a mental component: 
defendant’s deliberate performance of the act with conscious 
disregard for life, knowing the act endangers another’s life.  
(Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1181.)  The mental component 
calls for a subjective inquiry into a defendant’s state of mind and 
requires “a determination that the defendant actually 
appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard.”  
(People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296–297.)  The mental 
component may be absent even if defendant’s intentional acts 
are inherently dangerous in the abstract or would appear risky 
to a reasonable person.  (Ibid.; People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 
1199, 1210; People v. Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 107.)   
Section 12022.53, subdivision (d), requires only an intent 
to discharge a firearm, not subjective awareness of a risk or 
disregard for life.  (See People v. Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 598; People v. Lucero (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 750, 759–760; 
see generally In re Tameka C. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 190, 199 
[“[W]hen the Legislature intends to require proof of a specific 
intent in connection with a sentence enhancement provision, it 
has done so explicitly.”].)  Thus, a finding under this section is 
no proxy for the mental component of implied malice murder. 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
13 
The Secretary contends that even if the jury’s findings 
under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), are not themselves 
“dispositive” of whether Ferrell harbored malice, the jury’s 
findings are nonetheless “informative” on the issue.  The jury’s 
finding, says the Secretary, of an intentional gunshot 
proximately causing death during commission of murder, when 
considered with the evidence presented at trial, establish that 
Ferrell not only intentionally shot a firearm, but must have 
intentionally shot towards people, which the Secretary equates 
with malice.  We disagree. 
The evidence of how Ferrell shot Rawlings as well as 
Ferrell’s mental state in doing so was in conflict.  Given the 
standard of review for alternative-theory error, we do not view 
the evidence supporting the valid theory in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, but instead consider whether a 
reasonable jury, given the findings actually made and the state 
of the evidence, could have found in favor of the defendant.  (In 
re Lopez, supra, __ Cal.5th __ [pp. 23, 39, fn. 8, 41–42]; 
Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 10, 15.)  To be sure, 
prosecution witnesses testified that Ferrell shot Rawlings after 
the fight was over and that Ferrell only shot towards Rawlings 
and the gang members, not skyward.  Ferrell, however, and his 
fellow gang member, Keith, both asserted the fighting was 
ongoing when Ferrell shot.  In Ferrell’s statement to police, 
which the jury considered as evidence, Ferrell stated he only 
intentionally fired once into the sky to stop the fighting and the 
gun “went off” a second time; he kept the gun barrel pointing 
skyward “the whole time,” including as he lowered his arm; he 
never pointed the gun at anybody; and he shot his friend 
accidentally.  Keith’s testimony corroborated Ferrell’s statement 
to police in that Keith agreed Ferrell’s first shot was “straight 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
14 
up in the air.”  In addition, one of the prosecution witnesses 
testified that Ferrell had trouble controlling the gun.  This 
witness and Keith both agreed that Ferrell expressed surprise 
after the killing, saying he “didn’t mean it.”  Indeed, the 
prosecution never suggested a motive for Ferrell to kill his 
childhood friend and fellow gang member and, furthermore, 
conceded, in argument, the rivalry between the gang subsets 
“wasn’t strong,” suggesting there was similarly no clear motive 
for Ferrell to have aimed at members of the other subset.    
Looking at this conflicting evidence, jurors could have, 
consistent with the intentional discharge finding, reasonably 
rejected the factual premise — a gunshot intentionally fired at 
people — that the Secretary equates with malice.  Even if jurors 
ultimately rejected the youthful Ferrell’s story that the second 
discharge simply “went off” by accident, jurors could have 
concluded Ferrell intentionally discharged his weapon but 
credited Ferrell’s subjective belief he was pointing the gun to 
“the air” the “whole time,” never at people, and the shooting was 
accidental in this way.2  Although Ferrell’s jurors were 
instructed, per CALJIC No. 2.21.2, that they could reject a 
witness’s testimony in its entirety if a witness was “willfully 
false in a one material part,” the instruction did not so require.  
Jurors remained free to pick and choose those portions of 
evidence they found credible, “ ‘weaving a cloth of truth’ ” from 
available materials.  (Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 
 
2 
The Court of Appeal, when affirming Ferrell’s conviction, 
adopted this view.  It concluded instructions on felony murder 
had been proper given the evidence at trial, because “although 
Ferrell claimed the shot that killed Rawlings was fired 
accidentally, the jury could reasonably conclude it was fired 
intentionally as a warning.” 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
15 
Cal.3d 51, 68; People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1182 [noting 
jurors may believe truth lies “between” the differing testimony 
of witnesses]; Estate of Gilliland (1971) 5 Cal.3d 56, 60 [the 
“trier of fact was not required to make a selection between the 
respective testimony of the witnesses on one side or the other in 
its entirety”]; People v. Robinson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 373, 389 
[jurors may “accept one portion of a witness’s testimony while 
rejecting another”].) 
Assuming the jury took the view that Ferrell intentionally 
discharged the fatal shot believing he was aiming skyward, the 
jury could have readily found Ferrell guilty under the second 
degree felony-murder theory Chun invalidated, premised on 
him violating section 246.3.3  Under this view, a second degree 
felony-murder conviction would also harmonize with the jury’s 
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) finding, because Ferrell would 
have, in the commission of that crime, intentionally discharged 
a firearm and proximately caused death.4  In addition, a second 
 
3 
The parties do not dispute that if Ferrell intentionally 
discharged a warning shot amidst a gang fist fight it could 
violate Penal Code section 246.3.  The parties’ closing 
arguments and jury instructions allowed this possibility.  We do 
not address the question further. 
4 
Ferrell, pressing the theory that the fatal shot was instead 
an accidental discharge that more plainly lacked malice because 
it simply “went off,” argues jurors could have, consistent with 
this theory and as instructed, found the section 12022.53, 
subdivision (d) enhancement true by finding Ferrell’s first, 
intentional discharge caused the second, fatal shot, and, in this 
way, proximately caused Rawlings’ death.  Ferrell also argues 
jurors could have found the enhancement true if they found he 
fired the first, intentional shot and then, without any 
relationship to that first shot, proximately caused death by 
 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
16 
degree felony-murder theory would comfortably fit between, on 
the one hand, the jury’s rejection of first degree murder — a 
murder with intent to kill and deliberation or premeditation — 
and the jury’s rejection of an accidental shooting without malice 
warranting either an involuntary manslaughter conviction or an 
outright acquittal. 
At the same time, the jury would have avoided the 
requirement to consider malice, and its verdict, standing alone, 
would not have “effectively embrace[d]” that concept.  (Chun, 
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1204.)  Moreover, because a rational jury, 
consistent with a finding under section 12022.53, subdivision 
(d), could find Ferrell intended to shoot only skyward, it would 
not have been “impossible, upon the evidence,” for such a jury to 
reject implied malice and a second degree murder verdict based 
on that theory.  (Ibid.; People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 
827, 832; accord Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 
19–20.)  Putting aside the question of whether a skyward 
shooting carries a “high probability of death” and thus satisfies 
the physical component of implied malice (People v. Knoller, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 156), such a jury could have found Ferrell 
 
accidentally discharging the second.  According to Ferrell, when 
jurors were instructed to find the enhancement true if 
“defendant intentionally and personally discharged a firearm 
and proximately caused death to a person in the commission of 
that felony,” they were not asked to decide, and so did not decide, 
whether an intentional discharge itself directly caused death.  
We do not address what precise causal link the jury instructions 
here required, the instructions’ adequacy, or the plausibility of 
a first, intentional warning shot proximately causing an 
accidental but fatal discharge.  As we explain in the main text, 
a jury could have concluded Ferrell lacked the mental state 
necessary for implied malice murder even if the fatal shot was 
deemed intentional. 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
17 
to be lacking the mental component of implied malice — a 
conscious disregard for life, knowing one’s act endangers 
another’s life (see id. at p. 143).   
We have held that when evidence allows the conclusion 
that a defendant “shot to frighten . . . but had no intention of 
killing or injuring anyone and did not aim at them, the jury 
could 
have 
found 
defendant 
guilty 
of 
involuntary 
manslaughter” — a killing without malice — and instructions 
on that theory had to be given upon prosecution for murder.  
(People v. Carmen (1951) 36 Cal.2d 768, 772, 774; see People v. 
McGee (1947) 31 Cal.2d 229, 238 [discharging a pistol with 
intent to frighten could be involuntary manslaughter]; cf. People 
v. Pshemensky (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 154, 155–156 [involuntary 
manslaughter conviction affirmed when defendant shot a rifle 
“in the heavily populated Hollywood area” but intending to shoot 
birds in an avocado tree]; People v. Nuno (1928) 89 Cal.App. 1 
[affirming grant of new trial after manslaughter conviction 
where evidence showed defendant only intended to shoot gun 
into ground to scare boys stealing fruit from his orchard and 
never aimed at them or pointed his gun in their direction].)  In 
Chun, by contrast, we concluded that because a jury found 
defendant had the “specific intent” to “shoot[] at an occupied 
vehicle,” and did so at close range in violation of Penal Code 
section 246, the jury would have necessarily found defendant 
had the mental state, in addition to having performed the 
physical act, required for implied malice murder.  (Chun, supra, 
45 Cal.4th at p. 1205, italics omitted.)  
Here, unlike in Chun, it is not clear Ferrell was ever 
aiming at a specific target and may have only believed, as he 
claimed, that he was shooting skyward.  We acknowledge 
shooting into the air has its dangers, which the Legislature 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
18 
recognized in adopting Penal Code section 246.3.5  (See People 
v. Ramirez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 987–988.)  But it is the jury’s 
province, in a homicide case, to assess that danger, probe 
defendant’s state of mind, and determine whether or not a 
defendant killed with implied malice.  Whether jurors might 
have, if directly asked, found Ferrell harbored implied malice is, 
as we have noted, a separate question, and it is not the one 
before us.  (See People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417–419 
[distinguishing between substantial evidence of a mental state 
and evidence of a mental state so convincing that no rational 
factfinder would reject it].)  If we look at the evidence, the 
question for us — in walking the “tightrope” of this aspect of 
harmless error review where we must avoid “displacing the jury 
as finder of fact” on contested issues (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th 
at p. 17 (conc. & dis. opn. of Cuéllar, J.); see Neder v. United 
States, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 17–19) — is whether it was 
“impossible, upon the evidence, to have found what the verdict 
did find,” namely an intentional discharge, without also finding 
implied malice (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1204).  It was not.  
Because a rational factfinder, consistent with a finding under 
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), could have rejected malice and 
 
5 
Assuming Ferrell’s jury found he committed the willful 
discharge felony necessary for a felony murder verdict, the 
Secretary has not argued that such a finding would equate with 
malice, but instead acknowledges the willful discharge felony 
requires the lesser mental state of gross negligence.  (See Pen. 
Code, § 246.3, subd. (a) [“any person who willfully discharges a 
firearm in a grossly negligent manner”]; People v. Watson, 
supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 296 [“Implied malice contemplates a 
subjective awareness of a higher degree of risk than does gross 
negligence, and involves an element of wantonness which is 
absent in gross negligence.”].) 
In re FERRELL 
Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. 
 
19 
rendered a different verdict but for the erroneous felony murder 
instructions, Ferrell’s second degree murder conviction cannot 
be affirmed by looking to the evidence.  (In re Lopez, supra, __ 
Cal.5th __ [p. 23].)  
Ultimately, the Secretary has not demonstrated the 
harmlessness of instructing Ferrell’s jury with a now-invalid 
theory of felony murder.  Neither the section 12022.53, 
subdivision (d) finding nor the evidence cure this error.  Ferrell, 
therefore, is entitled to reversal of his second degree murder 
conviction. 
III. DISPOSITION 
 
Ferrell has established entitlement to habeas corpus relief 
on his claim that his jury received instruction on an invalid 
theory of second degree murder.  We therefore grant relief and 
vacate the judgment against Ferrell in Los Angeles County 
Superior Court Case No. BA212763 insofar as it rests on 
Ferrell’s conviction for second degree murder.  Upon finality of 
our opinion, the Clerk of the Supreme Court is to remit a 
certified copy of the opinion to the Los Angeles County Superior 
Court for filing, and respondent is to serve a copy of the opinion 
on the prosecuting attorney.  (See Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. 
(a)(2).) 
JENKINS, J. 
We Concur: 
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
EVANS, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re Ferrell 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding XX 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S265798 
Date Filed:  April 6, 2023 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles  
Judge:  Marsha N. Revel 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Clifford Gardner, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Petitioner Tyree Ferrell. 
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, 
Louis W. Karlin, David W. Williams, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Respondent Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Clifford Gardner 
Attorney at Law 
1448 San Pablo Avenue 
Berkeley, CA 94702 
(510) 524-1093 
 
Lindsay Boyd 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 897-2000