Case Title: James B. Nutter & Co. v. Estate of Murphy

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12325

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-01-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12325 
 
JAMES B. NUTTER & COMPANY  vs.  ESTATE OF BARBARA A. MURPHY & 
others1 (and two consolidated cases2). 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 2, 2017. - January 18, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Mortgage, Foreclosure.  Real Property, Mortgage. 
 
 
 
 
Civil actions commenced in the Land Court Department on 
October 27, 2015; January 28, 2016; and February 11, 2016, 
respectively. 
 
 
A motion for partial judgment on the pleadings was heard by 
Robert B. Foster, J., and the cases were reported by him to the 
Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the cases from the Appeals Court. 
 
                                                          
 
 
1 Patrick F. Murphy, individually and as personal 
representative of the estate of Barbara A. Murphy; Thomas E. 
Murphy; John F. Murphy; Mary C. Murphy; Internal Revenue 
Service, Technical Service Group; Massachusetts Department of 
Revenue -- Estate Tax Unit; and Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development. 
 
 
2 James B. Nutter & Company vs. Estate of Mary B. Jamieson & 
others; James B. Nutter & Company & another vs. David E. Sweeney 
& others. 
2 
 
 
 
Daniel Bahls (Uri Strauss also present) for Brett Jamieson. 
 
Effie Gikas Tchobanian for the plaintiff. 
 
Elaine Benkoski, for Estate of Barbara A. Murphy & others, 
was present but did not argue. 
 
 
 
GANTS, C.J.  In 2007 and 2008, three elderly homeowners 
obtained loans from James B. Nutter & Company (Nutter), secured 
by reverse mortgages on their homes.  A few years later, two of 
the borrowers died; the third took ill and could no longer live 
in her home.  Alleging default, Nutter now seeks to foreclose on 
the mortgages.  Rather than proceed directly to foreclosure, 
however, Nutter brought separate actions in the Land Court 
against each borrower or the executors of their estate,3 seeking 
in each case a declaratory judgment allowing it to foreclose 
pursuant to the statutory power of sale. 
 
Each of the reverse mortgages adhered to Nutter's standard 
form, which states in paragraph 20 that, in the event of 
default, "[l]ender may invoke the power of sale and any other 
remedies permitted by applicable law."  The issue we must 
resolve is whether this language in the reverse mortgage 
incorporates the statutory power of sale as set forth in G. L. 
c. 183, § 21, and allows Nutter to foreclose on the mortgaged 
                                                          
 
3 While litigation was pending, the third borrower also 
died.  James B. Nutter & Company (Nutter) amended its complaint, 
naming the executors of her estate as defendants. 
3 
 
property in accordance with the requirements in § 21.  We hold 
that it does. 
 
Background.  1.  Reverse mortgages.  For many retirees, one 
of the most reliable potential sources of income in later life 
is the accrued equity in their homes.  See Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, Issue Brief:  The costs and risks of using a 
reverse mortgage to delay collecting Social Security, at 8 
(2017).  In order to secure cash for their living expenses, many 
retirees choose to borrow against their home equity.  Id. at 9. 
 
One way for them to do so is through a home equity 
conversion mortgage, which is a unique kind of loan available to 
homeowners age sixty-two or older. See Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, Reverse Mortgages:  A Discussion Guide, at 1, 
3 (2017).  These mortgages are commonly referred to as "reverse 
mortgages" because, instead of making payments to the lender, 
the borrower receives cash from the lender, either as a line of 
credit, in monthly payouts, or as a lump sum.  Id. at 3, 12. As 
in a traditional mortgage, a reverse mortgage is secured by the 
borrower's home.  Unlike a traditional mortgage, however, the 
loan does not become due until the borrower dies or no longer 
lives in the home; interest and fees are added to the loan 
balance over time and the entire balance is typically paid from 
the sale of the home.  Id. at 3, 7. 
4 
 
 
Another distinctive feature of a reverse mortgage is that 
typically it secures a nonrecourse loan, meaning that the 
borrower is not personally liable for repayment of the debt.  In 
other words, the lender must "look exclusively to the mortgaged 
property for repayment."  Summers v. Financial Freedom 
Acquisition LLC, 807 F.3d 351, 355 (1st Cir. 2015).4 
 
2.  Nutter's actions for declaratory judgment.  Nutter uses 
a standard form for its reverse mortgages.  Paragraph 9 of this 
form states the grounds for acceleration of the debt.  It 
provides that Nutter can require immediate payment in full if, 
among other grounds, the borrower dies, or the mortgaged 
property is no longer the borrower's principal residence.  
Paragraph 10 provides that the borrower shall have no personal 
liability for repayment of the debt and that Nutter cannot 
obtain a deficiency judgment against the borrower in the event 
of foreclosure:  "Lender may enforce the debt only through sale 
of the Property."  Paragraph 20 outlines Nutter's remedies in 
the event of default.  It states, in relevant part: 
                                                          
 
 
4 To give an example of one way a reverse mortgage works, 
suppose a sixty-two year old homeowner has recently retired and 
decides to take out a loan of $250,000, secured by a reverse 
mortgage on her home.  She receives the $250,000 as a lump sum, 
continues to live in her home, and makes no payments to the 
lender during her lifetime.  The entire $250,000 loan becomes 
due, along with the accrued interest and fees, when she dies.  
Her heirs, who have inherited the home, must now repay the loan 
-- which they can do by selling the home.  If they do not repay 
the loan, the lender's only option is to foreclose on the 
mortgage and sell the home. 
5 
 
"Foreclosure Procedure.  If Lender requires immediate 
payment in full under Paragraph 9, Lender may invoke the 
power of sale and any other remedies permitted by 
applicable law. . . .  At this sale Lender or another 
person may acquire the Property.  This is known as 
'foreclosure and sale.'  In any lawsuit for foreclosure and 
sale, Lender will have the right to collect all costs 
allowed by law." 
 
 
In these three actions, Nutter moved for partial judgment 
on the pleadings, seeking a judicial declaration that the 
language in paragraph 20 incorporates the statutory power of 
sale as defined in G. L. c. 183, § 21.  The judge granted 
Nutter's motions, concluding that Nutter's reverse mortgage 
incorporated the statutory power of sale by reference because 
the statutory power of sale is a "remed[y] permitted by 
applicable law."  The judge reported the three cases to the 
Appeals Court pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64 (a), as amended, 
423 Mass. 1403 (1996), and we transferred them to this court on 
our own motion. 
 
Discussion.  The interpretation of a contract is a question 
of law, which we review de novo.  See Balles v. Babcock Power, 
Inc., 476 Mass. 565, 571 (2017).  To determine whether Nutter's 
reverse mortgages incorporate the statutory power of sale, we 
must first examine the nature of the power of sale in 
Massachusetts. 
 
1.  Power of sale.  Massachusetts is a nonjudicial 
foreclosure State, meaning that it "does not require a 
6 
 
[mortgagee] to obtain judicial authorization to foreclose on a 
mortgaged property."  U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 
637, 645-646 (2011) (Ibanez).  Since at least the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, Massachusetts has allowed mortgagees to 
foreclose without a judicial proceeding pursuant to the "power 
of sale," if such power is granted in the mortgage itself.  See 
Eaton v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569, 580 n.16 
(2012).  The power of sale evolved in recognition of "the desire 
to have a more speedy process of foreclosing than was furnished 
by suit or entry."  Id. at 580 n.15, quoting A.L. Partridge, 
Deeds, Mortgages and Easements 201 (rev. ed. 1932).  It soon 
became "a very frequent provision in deeds of mortgage."  Id., 
quoting 1 F. Hilliard, Mortgages 119 (1856). 
 
The Legislature has chosen to regulate the power of sale 
through a detailed statutory framework, set out in G. L. c. 244, 
§§ 11-17C.  See Eaton, 462 Mass. at 581.  Chief among these 
statutory provisions is G. L. c. 244, § 14, which provides that 
any foreclosure by power of sale will be ineffectual unless 
certain notice requirements are met.  See Eaton, supra at 581 & 
n.17; Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 647-648. 
 
The power of sale also is limited by the requirements of 
G. L. c. 183, § 21, which was enacted in 1912 as part of "An Act 
to shorten the forms of deeds, mortgages and other instruments 
relating to real property."  St. 1912, c. 502.  See Pinti v. 
7 
 
Emigrant Mtge. Co., 472 Mass. 226, 235 (2015).  As the title of 
the act suggests, the purpose of § 21 was "to give the power of 
sale [a] 'statutory form to shorten the length of mortgage 
instruments.'"  Id., quoting Eaton, 462 Mass. at 580 n.16.  
Accordingly, § 21 defines the "statutory power of sale" and 
provides that it "may be incorporated in any mortgage by 
reference."5 
 
But the statutory power of sale is far more than a mere 
contractual shorthand; § 21 establishes affirmative requirements 
that a mortgagee must meet in order to foreclose by power of 
                                                          
 
 
5 General Laws c. 183, § 21, provides: 
 
 
"The following 'power' shall be known as the 'Statutory 
Power of Sale', and may be incorporated in any mortgage by 
reference: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
"(POWER.) 
 
 
"But upon any default in the performance or observance of 
the foregoing or other condition, the mortgagee or his 
executors, administrators, successors or assigns may sell the 
mortgaged premises or such portion thereof as may remain subject 
to the mortgage in case of any partial release thereof, either 
as a whole or in parcels, together with all improvements that 
may be thereon, by public auction on or near the premises then 
subject to the mortgage, or, if more than one parcel is then 
subject thereto, on or near one of said parcels, or at such 
place as may be designated for that purpose in the mortgage, 
first complying with the terms of the mortgage and with the 
statutes relating to the foreclosure of mortgages by the 
exercise of a power of sale, and may convey the same by proper 
deed or deeds to the purchaser or purchasers absolutely and in 
fee simple; and such sale shall forever bar the mortgagor and 
all persons claiming under him from all right and interest in 
the mortgaged premises, whether at law or in equity." 
 
8 
 
sale.6  See Eaton, 462 Mass. at 571 ("A foreclosure sale 
conducted pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage must comply 
with all applicable statutory provisions, including in 
particular G. L. c. 183, § 21 . . .").  Failure to strictly 
adhere to the requirements of § 21 renders a foreclosure sale 
void.  Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 646-647. 
 
2.  Nutter's form reverse mortgage.  In order for a 
mortgagee to exercise the statutory power of sale, the mortgage 
must itself grant such a power.  See id. at 646.  We conclude, 
as several Land Court judges have concluded, that there are 
generally three methods of incorporating the statutory power of 
sale into a mortgage:  first, by incorporating the exact 
language defining the statutory power of sale in § 21 into the 
text of the mortgage; second, by referring to this definition, 
generally by use of the term "statutory power of sale"; or 
third, by including language in the mortgage defining a power 
substantially similar to that of the statutory power.  See, 
e.g., Norton v. Joseph, 17 Land Ct. Rptr. 40, 41 (2009), aff'd, 
                                                          
 
6 The Legislature has made this clear in the design of its 
statutory framework, which integrates § 21 into its other 
provisions regulating the power of sale in G. L. c. 244, §§ 11-
17C.  For example, G. L. c. 244, § 15, requires a mortgagee who 
forecloses by power of sale to record an affidavit showing that 
"the requirements of the power of sale and the law have been 
complied with;" such an affidavit serves as "conclusive evidence 
. . . that the sale complied with [G. L. c. 244] and [G. L. 
c. 183, § 21]" (emphasis added).  G. L. c. 244, § 15 (b), (c). 
9 
 
77 Mass. App. Ct. 1120 (2010), citing The Massachusetts Co. v. 
Midura, 3 Land Ct. Rptr. 138, 138 (1995). 
 
We agree with the Land Court judge that Nutter's reverse 
mortgages do not incorporate the statutory power of sale under 
either the first or third method.  The mortgage does not recite 
the exact language of § 21.  Nor does it define a power 
"substantially similar" to the statutory power of sale. 
 
The more difficult question is whether paragraph 20 
adequately refers to the statutory power of sale in § 21 by 
allowing the lender to "invoke the power of sale and any other 
remedies permitted by applicable law," even though it does not 
expressly use the term "statutory power of sale."  This is a 
matter of contract interpretation, to which we apply the 
traditional principles of contract law. 
 
"[W]hen the language of a contract is clear, it alone 
determines the contract's meaning."  Balles, 476 Mass. at 571.  
Contractual language is ambiguous "if it is susceptible of more 
than one meaning and reasonably intelligent persons would differ 
as to which meaning is the proper one."  Citation Ins. Co. v. 
Gomez, 426 Mass. 379, 381 (1998).  When the language is 
ambiguous, it is construed against the drafter, "if the 
circumstances surrounding its use . . . do not indicate the 
intended meaning of the language."  Merrimack Valley Nat'l Bank 
v. Baird, 372 Mass. 721, 724 (1977).  "The author of the 
10 
 
ambiguous term is held to any reasonable interpretation 
attributed to that term which is relied on by the other party."  
Id.  Finally, we construe a contract as a whole, so as "to give 
reasonable effect to each of its provisions."  J.A. Sullivan 
Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 795 (1986). 
 
These familiar principles are supplemented with more 
specific rules of construction where, as here, the contracts at 
issue are standardized contracts of adhesion.  Although 
typically when confronted with ambiguous language a court will 
examine extrinsic evidence to determine what the parties meant 
the contract to say, see Bank v. Thermo Elemental Inc., 451 
Mass. 638, 648-649 (2008), such an inquiry is impracticable 
where the nondrafting party had no ability to influence the 
language of the contract.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 211 comment c (1981) ("The customer [in a standardized 
agreement] . . . is commonly not represented in the drafting").  
Thus, when interpreting adhesion contracts, we seek to 
effectuate, not the actual intentions of the parties in each 
transaction, but instead the meaning an objectively reasonable 
person in the nondrafting party's position would give to the 
language in the contract.  See, e.g., Golchin v. Liberty Mut. 
Ins. Co., 466 Mass. 156, 159-160 (2013) (standard insurance 
policies must be interpreted in light of "what an objectively 
reasonable insured . . . would expect to be covered" [citation 
11 
 
omitted]).  See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra at 
§ 211 comment e ("courts in construing and applying a 
standardized contract seek to effectuate the reasonable 
expectations of the average member of the public who accepts 
it"). 
 
Here, having considered both the language of paragraph 20 
and the form reverse mortgage as a whole, we conclude that the 
mortgage is ambiguous as to whether it incorporates the 
statutory power of sale.  Paragraph 20 of the reverse mortgage 
states that the "[l]ender may invoke the power of sale and any 
other remedies permitted by applicable law."  Because it omits 
the word "statutory," this language is ambiguous on its face as 
to whether it includes the statutory power of sale.  The 
inclusion of the phrase "and any other remedies permitted by 
applicable law" does not eliminate this ambiguity because it can 
reasonably be understood to exclude the statutory power of sale: 
the word "other" indicates that this language refers to remedies 
other than the power of sale, and under standard rules of 
grammar, the modifying phrase "permitted by applicable law" 
would apply only to the immediately preceding term -- that is, 
"any other remedies" -- and not to the term "power of sale."  
See, e.g., Russell v. Boston Wyman, Inc., 410 Mass. 1005, 1006 
(1991) ("The 'rule of the last antecedent' holds that 
'qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrase 
12 
 
immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending 
to others more remote'" [citation omitted]). 
 
This ambiguity is only exacerbated by the surrounding 
language.  See Balles, 476 Mass. at 572 ("To determine whether 
[contractual] language . . . is ambiguous, we look both to the 
contested language and to the text of the contract as a whole").  
The reverse mortgage contains language that appears to 
contemplate judicial foreclosure rather than foreclosure by 
power of sale:  paragraph 11 of the mortgage provides that the 
borrower's right of reinstatement "applies even after 
foreclosure proceedings are instituted" (emphasis added), and 
paragraph 20 states that "[i]n any lawsuit for foreclosure and 
sale, Lender will have the right to collect all costs allowed by 
law" (emphasis added).  Such language is plainly inconsistent 
with the practices of a nonjudicial foreclosure State like ours. 
 
In addition, the notice that Nutter is required to send to 
the borrower under paragraph 20 states, "Borrower has the right 
in any lawsuit for foreclosure and sale to argue that Borrower 
did keep promises and agreements . . . and to present any other 
defenses that Borrower may have" (emphasis added).  In the past, 
we have found substantially similar language contained in a 
notice of default to be seriously misleading to borrowers.  In 
Pinti, 472 Mass. at 241-242, we noted the significant risk of 
confusion that stemmed from such language, explaining: 
13 
 
 
"[I]n a nonjudicial foreclosure jurisdiction like 
Massachusetts, misstating . . . information in a way to 
suggest that a mortgagor with a defense does not need to 
initiate a lawsuit but may wait to respond to a foreclosure 
lawsuit filed by the mortgagee can have disastrous 
consequences for the mortgagor: if the mortgagor has a 
valid defense to the foreclosure sale going forward, but is 
not made aware that he or she must initiate an action in 
court against the mortgagee to raise that defense, the sale 
may well proceed and result in title passing to a bona fide 
purchaser without knowledge of the issue -- at which point 
. . . the mortgagor's right to redeem his or her home may 
well be lost." 7 
 
 
The cases on appeal here are distinguishable from Pinti, 
where the issue was whether the default notice complied with the 
requirements set out in the terms of the mortgage itself.  See 
id. at 243.  But we draw a broader lesson from Pinti, which is 
that in a nonjudicial foreclosure State like ours, generic 
standardized language that does not reflect that fact creates a 
needless risk of misunderstanding and confusion.  Here, the 
facial ambiguity of the phrase "power of sale and any other 
remedies permitted by applicable law," combined with the 
repeated references to judicial foreclosure throughout the 
mortgage, renders the language in paragraph 20 "susceptible of 
more than one meaning."  Citation Ins. Co., 426 Mass. at 381. 
 
Because the language in paragraph 20 has more than one 
potential meaning and is in a contract of adhesion, we construe 
                                                          
 
 
7 The language at issue in Pinti v. Emigrant Mtge. Co., 472 
Mass. 226, 237 (2015), contained in a default notice, stated 
that the borrowers had "the right to assert in any lawsuit for 
foreclosure and sale the nonexistence of default or any other 
defense". 
14 
 
it against the party that drafted it -- here, Nutter -- and 
adopt the interpretation that an objectively reasonable borrower 
of reverse mortgages would give to the language in the contract.  
See Lechmere Tire & Sales Co. v. Burwick, 360 Mass. 718, 720-721 
(1972) ("an 'adhesion' contract [is] to be construed strictly 
against [the party] in whose behalf it ha[s] been drafted").  
See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts, supra at § 211 
comment c ("standard terms . . . are construed against the 
draftsman").  We note that this analysis is necessary only 
because of Nutter's draftsmanship.  If the term "power of sale" 
was meant to refer to the statutory power of sale, Nutter could 
have avoided any ambiguity simply by adding the word 
"statutory."8  Having said that, the rule construing ambiguities 
against the drafter does not require us to adopt the 
interpretation claimed by the estates of the borrowers in these 
                                                          
 
 
8 Nutter could have easily adopted the language in the 
standard form required by the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac) for mortgages executed in 
Massachusetts, which not only provides that the mortgagee may 
invoke "the STATUTORY POWER OF SALE," but also requires notice 
informing the borrower of "the right to bring a court action to 
assert the nonexistence of a default or any other defense" 
(emphasis added).  Massachusetts--Single Family--Fannie 
Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Instrument, Form 3022 (rev. 10/16).  In 
contrast to the standard form mortgages required in judicial 
foreclosure States, it does not contain any language suggesting 
that foreclosure requires a judicial proceeding.  Contrast with, 
e.g., New York--Single Family--Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform 
Instrument, Form 3033 (1/01) ("Lender may bring a lawsuit to 
. . . have the Property sold"). 
15 
 
cases.  "A prerequisite to the application of [that] rule is 
that the alternative interpretation placed upon the alleged 
ambiguity . . . be, under all circumstances, a reasonable and 
practical one" (citation omitted).  Shea v. Bay State Gas Co., 
383 Mass. 218, 225 (1981). 
 
Even construing the ambiguous language against Nutter, we 
conclude that the only "reasonable and practical" interpretation 
of the mortgage is that it incorporates the statutory power of 
sale.  Id.  It matters that this is a contract for a reverse 
mortgage, rather than a traditional mortgage, where the borrower 
makes no monthly payments of principal or interest, where the 
lender cannot hold the borrower personally liable for the debt, 
and where the lender's only recourse on default is to obtain 
repayment through a foreclosure sale.  Without a power of sale, 
the only way that a lender can recover the principal of the 
loan, not to mention interest and fees, is through foreclosure 
by entry -- a process that would take three years -- or 
foreclosure by action, "a method rarely used" in Massachusetts.  
Beaton v. Land Court, 367 Mass. 385, 393 (1975).9  In these 
                                                          
 
9 In a foreclosure by entry, a mortgagee who peaceably 
enters a property and remains for three years, after recording a 
certificate or memorandum of entry, can thereby foreclose the 
borrower's right of redemption.  G. L. c. 244, §§ 1, 2.  In a 
foreclosure by action, the mortgagee must sue to foreclose on 
the property, in accordance with the ordinary rules of procedure 
governing all actions.  G. L. c. 244, §§ 3, 4.  See Beaton v. 
Land Court, 367 Mass. 385, 393 (1975). 
16 
 
circumstances, no reasonable borrower in Massachusetts would 
expect that a lender would enter into a reverse mortgage without 
retaining a power of sale.  See Starr v. Fordham, 420 Mass. 178, 
192 (1995) ("a contract should be construed to give it effect as 
a rational business instrument" [citation omitted]). 
 
Having concluded that the only "reasonable and practical" 
interpretation of this form reverse mortgage is that it grants a 
power of sale, that power of sale necessarily must be a 
statutory power of sale, because in Massachusetts there is no 
power of sale except the statutory power of sale.  The power of 
sale -- that is, the power to foreclose without judicial 
authorization -- cannot be exercised in Massachusetts unless it 
conforms to the statutory requirements of § 21.  The 
Legislature's carefully crafted statutory framework leaves no 
room for parties privately to agree on a purely contractual, 
unregulated power of sale.10 
 
To read the term "power of sale" in paragraph 20 as 
referring to anything other than the statutory power of sale 
would therefore render the provision a nullity, leaving the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
10 Parties do remain free, of course, to include within a 
mortgage specific terms governing the exercise of the power of 
sale that add to the requirements of G. L. c. 183, § 21. This is 
specifically contemplated by § 21, which requires a foreclosure 
by power of sale to "comply[] with the terms of the mortgage" as 
well as the relevant statutes.  See, e.g., Pinti, 472 Mass. at 
243 (default notice violated condition precedent to exercise of 
power of sale contained in mortgage). 
17 
 
lender with no ability to obtain repayment through a power of 
sale.  See Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 476 Mass. 651, 654-655 (2017) 
("the court will prefer an interpretation 'which gives a 
reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations 
of intention, rather than one which leaves a part of those 
manifestations unreasonable, unlawful or [of] no effect'" 
[citation omitted]).  "It is neither reasonable nor practical to 
interpret [a] clause as being meaningless."  Shea, 383 Mass. at 
225.  We therefore conclude that no reasonable borrower in 
Massachusetts would understand that this power of sale would be 
anything other than a statutory power of sale.11 
 
By interpreting Nutter's reverse mortgage to incorporate 
the statutory power of sale, we bring these mortgages fully 
within the regulatory ambit of the statutes and case law that 
govern foreclosures in Massachusetts.  Nutter may not foreclose 
unless it strictly complies with the requirements in § 21, which 
in turn requires strict compliance with all other statutes 
related to the exercise of the power of sale.  G. L. c. 183, 
§ 21.  See Eaton, 462 Mass. at 579-580; Ibanez, 458 Mass. at 
646-648. 
                                                          
 
 
11 Such a reading would also present a contradiction with 
the phrase that follows the term "power of sale":  ". . . and 
any other remedies permitted by applicable law."  Presumably a 
mortgage that requires "other remedies" to be consistent with 
applicable law would not contemplate a power of sale that is 
not. 
18 
 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated above, we conclude that 
the language of paragraph 20 of Nutter's reverse mortgages 
incorporates the statutory power of sale as defined in G. L. 
c. 183, § 21.  We therefore affirm the orders allowing Nutter's 
partial motion for judgment on the pleadings in each case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.