Case Title: Keys Citizens v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-411

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-411
____________
KEYS CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, INC.,
Appellant,
vs.
FLORIDA KEYS AQUEDUCT AUTHORITY,
Appellee.
[July 12, 2001]
HARDING, J.
Keys Citizens for Responsible Government, Inc., (Citizens) appeals a circuit
court judgment validating a proposed bond issue by the Florida Keys Aqueduct
Authority (Authority).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(2), Fla. Const.
The Authority was created by a special act of the Legislature in 1976, which
has subsequently been amended and supplemented.  See chs. 76-441, 77-604, 77-
605, 80-546, 83-468, 84-483, 84-484, 86-419, 87-454, 98-519, Laws of Fla.  The
Authority’s purpose is to obtain, supply, and distribute an adequate water supply
-2-
for the Florida Keys and to collect, treat, and dispose of wastewater in the Keys. 
See ch. 76-441, § 1, at 305, Laws of Fla.; ch. 77-605, § 1, at 197, Laws of Fla.; ch.
98-519, § 1, at 294, Laws of Fla.  The 1998 amendment also expanded the
Authority’s powers to include exclusive jurisdiction over wastewater system
services in Monroe County, with the exception of specified incorporated areas. 
See ch. 98-519, § 6, at 298, Laws of Fla.
To counter the environmental dangers to the Florida Keys’ ecosystem and
water supply, Monroe County’s Year 2010 Comprehensive Plan, which was
completed in June 2000, calls for the development of a countywide sanitary
wastewater master plan.  In Executive Order 98-309, then-Governor Buddy Mac-
Kay charged various state and local agencies and governmental entities to
coordinate with Monroe County to execute the Year 2010 Comprehensive Plan,
including the planning and implementing of an improved wastewater management
system.  See Fla. Exec. Order No. 98-309 (Dec. 30, 1998).
To assist in the implementation of the Master Plan after its adoption, Monroe
County entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Authority in May
1998, whereby the Authority would finance and operate a wastewater system
throughout the Florida Keys similar to the water supply system that the Authority
has operated for many decades.  On January 19, 2000, Monroe County  enacted an
1. Section 381.00655, Florida Statutes (2000), provides that property owners
must connect to available sewer systems within one year after receiving notification
of availability.  However, the Legislature has authorized local governments within
the Florida Keys area of critical state concern to enact an ordinance requiring
connection to a central sewer system within thirty days.  See ch. 99-395, § 4, at
4068, Laws of Fla.
-3-
ordinance requiring mandatory connection to any central sewer system thirty days1
after notification of availability for use and permitting payment of the required
connection charges by monthly installments.  See Monroe County, Fla., Ordinance
No. 04-2000 (Jan. 19, 2000).
On October 18, 2000, the Authority adopted a resolution authorizing the
issuance of sewer revenue bonds in various series to finance sewer projects in the
Florida Keys.  See Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority Resolution No. 00-20 (Oct.
18, 2000).  In a second resolution, the Authority authorized the issuance of sewer
revenue bonds in the amount of $4,500,000 to finance the first wastewater system
to be constructed in the Little Venice area of the Marathon Wastewater District. 
See Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority Resolution No. 00-21 (Oct. 18, 2000).  The
bonds will be repaid by the fees of the users who will be required to connect to the
system.  The Authority filed a complaint in circuit court pursuant to chapter 75,
Florida Statutes (2000), requesting validation of the bonds.  The circuit judge
issued a show cause order and scheduled a hearing for December 21, 2000.  Notice
-4-
of the hearing was published in the Key West Citizen newspaper on November 30
and December 7, 2000.  Although the notice listed the wrong case number, it did
contain the text of the circuit court’s order.  Citizens moved for a continuance of
the hearing on December 20, which the court denied.  However, Citizens was
granted intervenor status, and its counsel appeared by telephone at the bond
validation hearing on December 21.
Following the hearing, the court entered final judgment validating the bonds. 
The court’s order included two paragraphs requiring all sewer system customers to
permit access for connection without payment by the Authority and requiring all
property owners in the Authority’s geographical jurisdiction to  connect to the
sewer systems at their own expense.  Citizens’ motion for reconsideration and
amendment of the final judgment was denied.
Citizens has appealed the matter to this Court under our mandatory bond
validation jurisdiction.  The Authority filed a motion to expedite the appeal and to
waive oral argument.  The Authority argued that the timing of the project financed
by the bonds is critical in order to receive over $4 million from a federal grant. 
This Court granted the Authority’s motion to expedite resolution of the case and 
accepted the case without oral argument.
Bond validation proceedings are governed by chapter 75, Florida Statutes. 
-5-
As this Court explained in State v. City of Miami, 103 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1958),
the statutes governing bond validation proceedings provide for speedy disposition
of these cases.  Further, the rules of this Court also recognize the necessity for the
prompt disposition of these cases.  Compare Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(i) with Fla. R.
App. P. 9.110(f) (providing that the appellant’s initial brief in a bond validation
appeal shall be served within twenty days of filing the notice of appeal whereas
initial briefs in other appeals must be served within seventy days of filing the
notice).  Thus, the “speedy and efficient disposition of bond validation
proceedings,” which is the purpose of both the statute and the rules, would be
seriously impaired if collateral matters were injected into the proceedings.  City of
Miami, 103 So. 2d at 188.  This Court has reiterated its position that:
It was never intended that proceedings instituted under the authority of
this chapter to validate governmental securities would be used for the
purpose of deciding collateral issues or those issues not going directly
to the power to issue the securities and the validity of the proceedings
with relation thereto.
Id.; see also Noble v. Martin County Health Facilities Auth., 682 So. 2d 1089, 1090
(Fla. 1996); City of Gainesville v. State, 366 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Fla. 1979).
The scope of this Court's inquiry in bond validation hearings is limited to the
following considerations:  (1) determining whether the public body has the authority
to issue the bonds; (2) determining whether the purpose of the obligation is legal;
-6-
and (3) ensuring that the bond issuance complies with the requirements of law.  See
Murphy v. Lee County, 763 So. 2d 300, 302 (Fla. 2000).  Citizens does not
question the Authority’s power to issue the bonds or that the purpose of the
obligation is legal.  Instead, Citizens argues that the court’s validation of the
mandatory connection requirement was beyond the scope of the bond validation
proceeding.  Citizens raises three issues relating to the mandatory connection
requirement in this appeal.  Citizens argues that (1) validation of the mandatory
connection requirement was not a proper part of the chapter 75 bond validation
proceeding and should be stricken from the final judgment; (2) even if the
mandatory connection provisions are not removed, the final judgment still should
not have a res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on further challenges to the
mandatory connection requirement; and (3) the validation proceeding violated its
rights to due process.
Section 75.01, Florida Statutes (2000), vests the circuit courts with
“jurisdiction to determine the validation of bonds and certificates of indebtedness
and all matters connected therewith.”  (Emphasis added.)  It is the meaning of the
phrase “all matters connected therewith” which is the crux of the instant appeal. 
Section 75.09, Florida Statutes (2000), provides that the final judgment in a bond
validation proceeding is “conclusive as to all matters adjudicated against plaintiff
-7-
and all parties affected thereby, including all property owners, taxpayers and
citizens of the plaintiff, and all others having or claiming any right, title or interest in
the property to be affected by the issuance of said bonds . . . and the validity of
said bonds . . . shall never be called in question in any court by any person or
party.”  If the Court determines that the mandatory connection requirement was a
proper matter connected with the bonds, then the final judgment will be conclusive
as to that issue and the requirement cannot be challenged in a subsequent
proceeding.
Thus, the Court’s resolution of issue one necessarily will determine issue
two.  If the consideration of the mandatory connection requirement is collateral to
the bond validation proceeding, then the provisions relating to mandatory
connection should be reversed with instructions that they be deleted from the final
judgment and further challenges would not be foreclosed.  See City of Miami, 103
So. 2d at 190 (reversing portions of the judgment addressing two collateral issues
with directions that the trial court delete them).  If the matter was a proper part of
the bond validation proceeding, then the final judgment will necessarily foreclose
any further challenges.  See § 75.09, Fla. Stat. (2000) (explaining effect of final
judgment).
In those instances where issues have been deemed collateral and not the
-8-
proper subject of a bond validation proceeding, this Court has noted that “the
interested parties” to the collateral issue were not parties to the bond validation
action and thus the trial court had no jurisdiction to decide the collateral issue in the
proceeding.  See, e.g., McCoy Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 392 So. 2d
252, 254 (Fla. 1980) (finding that validity of airline-aviation authority lease
agreements was collateral to bond validation because airlines and other interested
parties were not parties to action and trial court had no jurisdiction to determine
validity of leases in bond validation proceeding); State v. Sunrise Lakes Phase II
Special Recreation Dist., 383 So. 2d 631, 633 (Fla. 1980) (same as to validity of
operating contract for recreational facilities with condominium association); City of
Miami, 103 So. 2d at 190 (finding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine
Dade County’s power to acquire waterworks system of the City of Miami and to
rule on tax exempt status of the property of the City’s waterworks system; stating
that bond validation statute did not give the court power to bring other parties into
the proceedings).  Section 75.02, Florida Statutes (2000), provides that the party
seeking bond validation can file a complaint in circuit court “against the state and
the taxpayers, property owners, and citizens” of the area affected by the bonds. 
Section 75.05 further provides that the court shall issue an order “directed against
the state and the several property owners, taxpayers, citizens and others having or
2. Section 75.05(3), Florida Statutes (2000), requires independent special
districts such as the Authority to also serve a copy of the complaint for bond
validation on the Division of Bond Finance of the State Board of Administration.
-9-
claiming any right, title or interest in property to be affected by the issuance of
bonds or certificates” requiring them to appear at the bond validation hearing to
show why the complaint should not be granted and the bonds validated.2  Thus, the
citizens and property owners in the area affected by the sewer bonds were parties
to the bond validation proceeding and the circuit court had jurisdiction over them.
The real question here is whether approval of the mandatory connection
ordinance was collateral to the bond validation proceeding or not.  In State v. City
of Port Orange, 650 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1994), this Court explained that “[s]ubsumed
within the inquiry as to whether the public body has the authority to issue the
subject bond is the legality of the financing agreement upon which the bond is
secured.”  In Port Orange, the City enacted a transportation utility ordinance
whereby a transportation utility fee was imposed on the owners and occupants of
developed property within the City.  Id. at 2.  The City pledged the proceeds of
these fees to pay the transportation utility bonds issued to finance city
transportation facilities.  Id. at 3.  This Court concluded that the “fee” was actually
an impermissible tax and thus the City was not authorized to issue the bonds and
the bonds could not be validated.  Id. at 4.  Similarly, in GRW Corp. v.
-10-
Department of Corrections, 642 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1994), in addition to validating a
lease-purchase agreement between the Department of Corrections and a private
company for the construction of a correctional facility, the trial court ruled that a
losing bidder was barred from renewing any bid protest in the matter.  On appeal,
the losing bidder argued that this issue was collateral to the chapter 75 proceeding. 
This Court held that the issue was not collateral “because it goes directly to the
legality of the special type of financing method at issue here.”  Id. at 721.  The
Court further explained that the bid procedure was “clearly a basic part of this
unique financing arrangement” and thus the trial court had jurisdiction to find the
loser bidder was barred from further protest against the bid award.  Id.
Citizens argues that this Court has previously ruled that a mandatory sewer
connection ordinance is “not a matter of judicial concern in a bond validation
proceeding.”  DeSha v. City of Waldo, 444 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 1984).  DeSha
involved a bond validation proceeding in which the citizen intervenors sought to
invalidate proposed municipal bonds for the improvement of the City of Waldo’s
water supply and waste water collection and treatment systems.  The citizens
argued that the circuit court could not approve the municipal borrowing until the
City enacted a mandatory water and sewer connection ordinance in order to ensure
sufficient revenues to meet the bond obligations.  See id. at 17.  The citizens
-11-
questioned the financial stability of the bonds based on the lack of a valid
mandatory connection ordinance.  This Court noted that the financial strength of
the project was not a matter within the scope of its review.  See id. at 18.  Further,
the Court stated that even if the ordinance were relevant to its review, the Court
would presume that the city would enact a valid ordinance.  See id.
The instant case presents the flip side of DeSha.  Pursuant to Florida law,
Monroe County has enacted a mandatory connection ordinance.  See Monroe
County Ordinance No. 04-2000 (Jan. 19, 2000); see also § 381.00655, Fla. Stat.
(2000) (providing that property owners must connect to available sewer systems
within one year of receiving notification of availability); ch. 99-395, § 4, at 4068,
Laws of Fla. (authorizing local governments within the Florida Keys area of critical
state concern to enact an ordinance requiring connection to a central sewer system
within thirty days).  Further, the Authority’s bond resolution, which authorizes the
issuance of sewer revenue bonds in various series to finance the Authority’s sewer
projects in the Florida Keys, includes a provision requiring compulsory connection
by every property owner in the area of operation in order that the connection fees
and service charges may “secure the prompt payment of principal and interest on
the Bonds.”  Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority Resolution No. 00-20, at 51 (Oct.
18, 2000).  Thus, unlike DeSha, the validity of an existing connection ordinance
-12-
was squarely before the circuit court as part of the bond validation proceeding.
Contrary to Citizens’ assertion, we do not find that DeSha stands for the
broad proposition that a mandatory connection ordinance will always be a collateral
issue in a bond validation proceeding.  In the instant case, as in Port Orange and
GRW, the mandatory connection fees and rates charged for the service rendered to
the properties connected to the central sewer system are tied to the financing
agreement upon which the bonds will be secured.  Thus, the validity of the
mandatory connection ordinance was not a collateral issue, but part of the trial
court’s inquiry into whether the public body has the authority to issue the bonds. 
See Port Orange, 650 So. 2d at 3.  As this Court explained in State v. Manatee
County Port Authority, 171 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla. 1965), “[t]he function of a
validation proceeding is merely to settle the basic validity of the securities and the
power of the issuing agency to act in the premises.  Its objective is to put in repose
any question of law or fact affecting the validity of the bonds.”  Additionally, at the
bond validation hearing in the instant case the trial court heard evidence that
mandatory connection is required both by Florida statute and by Monroe County
ordinance, and that both the economic feasibility of the central sewer system and
the public purpose for this project are predicated on the hook-up of all property in
the area of operation.  Thus, the mandatory connection was an appropriate issue
-13-
for this bond validation proceeding.
Having determined that the validation of the mandatory connection
requirement was a proper part of the bond validation proceeding, we find that issue
two is moot and that the final judgment will necessarily foreclose any further
challenges.  See § 75.09, Fla. Stat. (2000) (explaining effect of final judgment). 
Further, there is little doubt that all residents of the Florida Keys can be required to
connect to a central sewer system by virtue of the mandatory connection
ordinance.  See, e.g., Stern v. Halligan, 158 F.3d 729, 734 (3d Cir. 1998) (“It
cannot escape our notice that from the inception of such sanitary programs . . .
courts have routinely rejected constitutional challenges to mandatory connection
requirements.”).  As discussed above, Florida law provides that property owners
with existing onsite sewage treatment and disposal systems must connect to a
central sewerage system within a specified time of being notified that the central
system is available for connection.  See § 381.00655, Fla. Stat. (2000).  As early as
1976, the Legislature gave the Authority power to prohibit the use of septic tanks
and other sanitary structures, provided that adequate alternate facilities are available. 
See ch. 76-441, § (9)(a), at 312, Laws of Fla.  In 1998, the Legislature gave the
Authority power to require mandatory hookup to specific wastewater treatment
plants in order to manage effluent disposal and wastewater matters.  See ch. 98-
-14-
519, §6, at 298, Laws of Fla.  The Governor’s Executive Order 98-309 also
provides that onsite treatment systems in the Florida Keys will be abandoned when
central sewage systems become available and that connection to such systems shall
be mandatory.  Additionally, in 1999 the Legislature gave local governments within
the Florida Keys area the power to enact ordinances requiring connection to a
central sewage system within thirty days after notice of the availability of service. 
See ch. 99-395, § 4, at 4068, Laws of Fla.  This is exactly what Monroe County
did in County Ordinance 04-2000.
Finally, even though the Court finds that the validity of the mandatory
connection requirement was a proper part of the bond validation proceeding, we
still address Citizens’ argument that the circuit court’s consideration of the issue
violated procedural due process.
The basic due process guarantee of the Florida Constitution provides that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law."  Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.  The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees the same.  As this Court explained in Department of Law
Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957, 960 (Fla. 1991), “[p]rocedural due
process serves as a vehicle to ensure fair treatment through the proper
administration of justice where substantive rights are at issue.”  Procedural due
-15-
process requires both fair notice and a real opportunity to be heard.  See id.  As the
United States Supreme Court explained, the notice must be “reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.  The notice must
be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must
afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.”  Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citations omitted). 
Further the opportunity to be heard must be "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner."  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); accord
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (stating that procedural due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner).
The specific parameters of the notice and the opportunity to be heard
required by procedural due process are not evaluated by fixed rules of law, but
rather by the requirements of the particular proceeding.  See Gilbert v. Homar, 520
U.S. 924 (1997); see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313 (stating that notice and
opportunity for hearing need only be appropriate to the nature of the case).  As the
Supreme Court has explained, due process, "unlike some legal rules, is not a
-16-
technical concept with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." 
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961).  Instead, “due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”  Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
In order to determine what process is constitutionally required, the Court 
“must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action.”  Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, 367 U.S. at 895.  Three factors
are relevant in determining what process is constitutionally due:  (1) the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's
interest.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335; Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. at
924.
In bond validation proceedings, the Legislature has provided that a copy of
the bond validation complaint and the court’s order to show cause why the
complaint should not be granted and the bonds validated must be served on the
state attorney in the circuit where the proceeding is pending.  See § 75.05(1), Fla.
-17-
Stat. (2000).  The clerk of the court is also required to publish a copy of the order
for two consecutive weeks at least twenty days before the hearing in a newspaper
of the county where the complaint is filed.  See § 75.06(1), Fla. Stat. (2000).  “By
this publication all property owners, taxpayers, citizens, and others having or
claiming any right, title or interest in the county, municipality, or district, or the
taxable property therein, are made parties defendant to the action and the court has
jurisdiction of them to the same extent as if named as defendants in the complaint
and personally served with process.”  Id.  Thus, the Legislature has authorized
constructive notice of property owners or other interested parties in bond validation
proceedings.
Citizens complains that the Authority should have given actual notice to each
property owner that validation of the mandatory connection ordinance would be
considered during the bond validation proceeding.  However, in Penn v. Florida
Defense Finance & Accounting Service Center Authority, 623 So. 2d 459, 462
(Fla. 1993), this Court held that the statutory twenty-day period between
publication of notice and the bond validation hearing did not violate the Florida and
federal guarantees of due process.  Thus, the Court necessarily concluded that
such constructive notice by publication is appropriate in bond validation
proceedings.
-18-
Citizens also complains that the published constructive notice was not
satisfactory because there was no mention that the circuit court would consider the
validity of the mandatory connection ordinance and also because the notice
referenced the wrong case number.  However, in Washington Shores Homeowners'
Ass'n v. City of Orlando, 602 So. 2d 1300, 1302 (Fla. 1992), this Court concluded
that a newspaper advertisement of a bond validation hearing for an unspecified
“roadway project” provided adequate notice and “ complied with the requirements
of law.”  Nor do the pertinent bond validation statutes require the specificity of
published notice urged by the Citizens.  See §§ 75.05, 75.06, Fla. Stat. (2000).
Under the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis, the private interest that will be
affected by the proceeding here is mandatory connection to the central sewer
system at the property owners’ expense.  The risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used is very low as section 381.00655,
chapter 99-395, and Executive Order 98-309 already require mandatory connection,
as discussed above.  Further, the additional procedural safeguard of actual notice
urged by Citizens would add a tremendous burden and expense to the validation of
bonds like these and would have little value as all Florida property owners are
already on notice that mandatory connection is required by law.  Moreover, the
government's interest here is to protect public health and safeguard water quality in
-19-
an area of critical state concern.  See Hutchinson v. City of Valdosta, 227 U.S.
303, 308 (1913) (“It is the commonest exercise of the police power of a state or
city to provide for a system of sewers, and to compel property owners to connect
therewith.”).
Finally, the evidence presented at the hearing showed the following: Monroe
County developed a Sanitary Waste Master Plan over the course of three years
during which there was extensive public outreach.  This process included a series
of forums and workshops throughout the Florida Keys; meetings between the
planning group and various civic, environmental, and business groups; and monthly
televised public meetings of a citizens’ task force on waste water during the last
two years of the planning period.  Cf. State v. City of Boca Raton, 172 So. 2d 230,
234 (Fla. 1965) (finding that the resolution authorizing the issuance of  special
obligation capital improvement bonds and the evidence adduced at the bond
validation hearing, together with the plans and specifications prepared by the city’s
advisory committee and referred to in the bond resolution and a part of the city’s
public records, were sufficient to give the citizens and taxpayers adequate
knowledge concerning the purposes for which the bonds were to be issued).  This
process gave citizens adequate notice of the mandatory sewer connection
requirement.
-20-
For the reasons discussed above, we find no merit to the arguments raised
on appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm the order validating the sewer revenue bonds to
be issued by the Authority.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LEWIS, J., concurring and dissenting in part.
I concur in part and dissent in part.  I concur to the extent that we affirm the
order validating the revenue bonds under review; however, I respectfully dissent to
the inclusion of that which has been previously identified by this Court as a
collateral issue in the validation process.  In my view, the majority today has not
and cannot adequately distinguish prior decisions of this Court which directly
address the issue concerning the prohibition of including collateral matters in bond
validation proceedings.  If we are to expand the scope of bond validation
proceedings, we should, in my view, do so in clear and precise terms rather than
attempting to rely on distinctions without any real difference to reach the result.
If bond validation proceedings are to also include expedited validation of
disputed matters upon which the underlying repayment plan for such bonds is
-21-
premised, we should particularly recede from both  McCoy Restaurants, Inc. v.
City of Orlando, 392 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1980), and DeSha v. City of Waldo, 444 So.
2d 16 (Fla. 1984).  The failure to do so only unnecessarily adds confusion in
another area of Florida law.
In McCoy, this court remained consistent in the approach to bond validation
proceedings that we would only:  (1) determine whether the public body had
authority to issue the bonds; (2) determine whether the purpose of the obligation
was legal;  and (3) ensure that the bond issuance complied with the requirements of
the law.  See  Murphy v. Lee County, 763 So. 2d 300, 302 (Fla. 2000);  Noble v.
Martin County Health Facilities Auth., 682 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 1996); .  There,
the repayment or financing of the bonds for airport construction and expansion was
to be based exclusively on funds received from the rental and lease of airport areas. 
Thus, the validity of the underlying lease agreements for such areas would be the
essential part of the repayment or financing plan.  Notwithstanding such essential
position in the financing plan for the bonds, this Court held:
We find that appellants’ first point concerning the validity of the
lease agreement is clearly a collateral issue and not properly the subject
of a bond validation proceeding.  The sole purpose of a validation
proceeding is to determine whether the issuing body had the authority
to act under the constitution and laws of the state and to ensure that it
exercised that authority in accordance with the spirit and intent of the
law.  State v. City of Miami, 379 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1980);   State v.
-22-
Sarasota County, 372 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1979);  State v. City of
Sunrise, 354 So. 2d  1206 (Fla. 1978).  As the court stated in State v.
City of Miami, 103 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1958):
It was never intended that proceedings instituted
under the authority of this chapter to validate
governmental securities would be used for the purpose of
deciding collateral issues or those other issues not going
directly to the power to issue the securities and the
validity of the proceedings with relation thereto.
Id. at 188.  Accord, State v. Sunrise Lake Phase II Recreation District,
383 So.  2d 631 (Fla. 1980);  City of Gainesville v. State, 366 So. 2d
1164 (Fla. 1979).
392 So. 2d at 253-54.
In a similar manner, and more closely on point, in DeSha, this Court
considered the validity of bonds to be utilized to finance the improvement and
expansion of water supply and wastewater collection and treatment systems just as
the proceeds from the proposed bonds here will be used for wastewater projects. 
In DeSha, the proposed bonds were to be repaid, in part, from revenue generated
by the operation of the water and sewer system, just as repayment here will flow
from the fees paid by users.  In holding that ordinances related to the mandatory
connection to such systems were collateral matters beyond the scope of judicial
review in bond validation proceedings, this Court clearly stated:
The appellants’ argument pertains to a matter to be resolved by
future decision-making on the part of the City in operating and
-23-
governing its expanded water and sewer system.  As such it is a
collateral matter beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny in bond
validation proceedings.  See City of Gainesville v. State, 366 So. 2d
1164 (Fla. 1979).  The appellants say that a mandatory connection
ordinance is subject to being challenged on numerous substantive and
procedural grounds and that, if the City adopts a substantively invalid
ordinance or departs from procedural regularity in enacting the
ordinance, the financial viability of the project will be undermined. 
The financial strength of the project, however, is not a matter within
the scope of this Court’s review.  Our review is limited to the question
of “whether the issuing body has the power to act and whether it
exercised that power in accordance with law.”  Town of Medley v.
State, 162 So. 2d 257, 259 (Fla. 1964).  The fact that prospective
bond purchasers might find the project questionable because of the
lack of a valid mandatory connection ordinance is not a matter of
judicial concern in a bond validation proceeding.  “It was never
intended that proceedings instituted under the authority of this chapter
to validate government securities would be used for the purpose of
deciding collateral issues of those issues not going directly to the
power to issue the securities and the validity of the proceedings with
relation thereto.”   State v. City of Miami, 103 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla.
1958).  
Desha at 17-18 (emphasis added).
 
The majority seeks to justify its further expansion of chapter 75 proceedings
through reliance on the phrase “all matters connected therewith” contained within
section 75.01, Florida Statutes.  This provision has remained virtually unchanged
since 1967, and was certainly part of the statute in 1980 and 1984 when McCoy 
and DeSha were rendered.  Further, the issue here is not whether a mandatory
connection ordinance may meet constitutional standards, nor is it whether there
-24-
may be statutory authority for the requirement.  The issue here is whether this Court
has established such matters as being collateral issues beyond the purview of
expedited and limited bond validation proceedings.  In my view, the Court has
today adopted the dissenting opinion of Justice Adkins in McCoy, without so
stating, and the majority should do so clearly and directly rather than artificially
distinguishing the existing decisions which, most certainly, require a different result. 
The parameters of bond validation proceedings should be more clearly defined for
Florida citizens. 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Monroe County - Bond Validations
Susan Vernon, Judge - Case No. CA-K-00-1525
Kendall Coffey, Miami, Florida, and Charles P. Tittle of Tittle & Tittle, Chartered,
Tavernier, Florida,
for Appellant
Robert T. Feldman, General Counsel, Florida Keys Aqueduct Authority, and Grace
E. Dunlap and Kenneth A. Guckenberger of Bryant, Miller and Olive, P.A., Tampa,
Florida,
for Appellee
-25-
Joseph A. Morrissey, Assistant County Attorney, Clearwater, Florida,
for Pinellas County, Florida, Amicus Curiae