Case Title: State v. Lopez

Citation: 2014 WI 11

Docket Number: 2011AP002733-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 11 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP2733-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Minerva Lopez, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 (No Cite)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 7, 2014   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 3, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Nicholas J. McNamara   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, GABLEMAN, JJ., concur. (Opinion filed.)   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents. (Opinion filed.) 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Aaron O’Neil, with whom on the briefs was J.B. Van 
Hollen, attorney general.    
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Patricia 
A. FitzGerald, Mount Horeb, and oral argument by Patricia A. 
FitzGerald. 
  
 
 
2014 WI 11
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP2733-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF1835) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Minerva Lopez, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 7, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.   Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Lopez, 
No. 2011AP2733-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 
2012), reversing the Dane County Circuit Court's1 denial of 
Minerva Lopez's ("Lopez") presentence motion to withdraw her 
pleas.  
¶2 
We address how appellate courts should review a 
circuit court's denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw a 
plea before sentencing.  In general "a circuit court should 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Nicholas McNamara presided. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
2 
 
'freely allow a defendant to withdraw his plea prior to 
sentencing for any fair and just reason, unless the prosecution 
[would] be substantially prejudiced.'"  State v. Jenkins, 2007 
WI 96, ¶2, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24 (citing State v. 
Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶28, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199; see 
also State v. Rushing, 2007 WI App 227, 305 Wis. 2d 739, 740 
N.W.2d 894). 
¶3 
The State does not argue that Lopez failed to present 
a fair and just reason to withdraw her pleas.2  Thus, our 
analysis in this case focuses on whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in concluding that the 
State would be substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to 
withdraw her pleas. 
¶4 
Lopez contends that the State has not shown that it 
would be substantially prejudiced if she were allowed to 
withdraw her pleas.  She argues that the State offered no 
evidence that the victim is unable to testify or that the 
victim's memory has faded.  Lopez further asserts that the State 
failed to demonstrate that the case against Lopez would be more 
difficult to prove, and that, in fact, significant evidence 
against Lopez could still be admitted at trial. 
¶5 
The State contends that the circuit court properly 
exercised its discretion in determining that the State would be 
                                                 
2 Lopez contended that her pleas were rushed, and that she 
entered her pleas unknowingly due to her limited English. 
Because the State conceded this issue, this opinion assumes, 
without deciding, that these facts constitute a "fair and just 
reason" for Lopez to withdraw her pleas. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
3 
 
substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her 
pleas.  The State argues that, because the victim is now over 16 
years of age, allowing Lopez to withdraw her pleas would prevent 
it from presenting important audiovisual interviews of the 
victim at trial.  The State asserts that the circuit court was 
correct to conclude that the State would be substantially 
prejudiced because, without the audiovisual evidence, it would 
be more difficult for the State to prove its case, the victim's 
memory had faded during the pendency of the action, and it was 
in the best interests of the victim not to be forced to testify. 
¶6 
We hold that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it determined that the State would 
be substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw 
her pleas.  We sustain the discretionary determination of the 
circuit court because the record reflects that it was "the 
product of a rational mental process by which the facts of 
record and law relied upon are stated and are considered 
together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable 
determination."  State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, 580, 469 
N.W.2d 163 (1991) (citations omitted).  Accordingly, we reverse 
the court of appeals. 
I. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
¶7 
In a trial against Lopez, the State would have to 
prove 22 felony counts of physical abuse of a child.  The 
State's burden of proof is the highest standard in the law, 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The record reflects that the State 
would have sought to prove the facts alleged in the criminal 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
4 
 
complaint in part, by using audiovisual interviews of the 
victim.  The State contends that it would be substantially 
prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas because 
it is now precluded from introducing video evidence under Wis. 
Stat. § 908.08(3) (2009-10)3 as the victim is now over 16 years 
of age.  Thus, we turn to the factual basis for the allegations 
against Lopez and describe the audiovisual recordings at issue 
in this case.  
¶8 
On September 25, 2008, Madison Police Detective Robert 
Hale ("Detective Hale") was "dispatched to [an address] in the 
Town of Madison, Dane County, Wisconsin, in reference to a child 
abuse investigation."  Detective Hale was sent to investigate a 
report of "an emaciated female child in the closet . . . [with] 
some type of injury to her head."  Upon arrival, Detective Hale 
identified A.O., the primary victim in this case.  Detective 
Hale described the injuries to A.O. as follows:  
[Hale] immediately identified [A.O.]4 as a victim 
of a horrendous crime inasmuch as she was virtually 
covered from head to toe with bruises [and] with 
various bloody wounds to the top scalp of her head, an 
open gash to her right cheek, various generations of 
bruises ranging in color from purple to green to 
yellow, and injuries that were consistent with what 
[Hale] later found were breaks in her right hand and a 
broken right kneecap. 
Detective Hale identified two suspects in the case, Lopez and 
Porfirio Olivas-Lopez ("Olivas"), the victim's parents. 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 The criminal complaint refers to the victim as "AOL." 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
5 
 
¶9 
After rescuing A.O. from her home, Detective Hale 
transported her to the University of Wisconsin Children's 
Hospital.  Upon examination, A.O. was found to have "two breaks 
to the fingers of her right hand, one of which was an older 
break, the second of which was a newer break."  A.O.'s broken 
right kneecap "was going to need surgical treatment." 
¶10 A child abuse specialist concluded that "the multiple 
bruises and fractures present [on A.O.] are not consistent with 
any medical cause."  The specialist also noted that A.O. 
"appeared malnourished," and was "potentially going to be 
suffering from life-long disabilities due to injuries sustained 
from the abuse, including but not limited to scarring resulting 
in 
permanent 
disfigurement 
and 
injuries 
leading 
to 
limb 
immobility."  The specialist medically diagnosed A.O. with:  
1.  Definite physical abuse of a child.  
2.  Serial child torture.  
3.  Physical neglect of a child.  
4.  Medical neglect of a child.  
5.  Educational neglect of a child.  
6.  Consistent with causation of great mental harm. 
¶11 On September 26, 2008, Detective Hale spoke with Lopez 
at the Town of Madison Police Department.  During the 
discussion, which was conducted through the assistance of a 
State-certified English-Spanish interpreter, "Lopez admitted to 
causing the majority of the injuries sustained by [A.O.] and 
observed by Detective Hale."  Lopez admitted to having "hit 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
6 
 
[A.O.] on the head with a [broomstick]."  "The broom was 
described as a metal broom, and it was bent from the attack." 
¶12 The criminal complaint, filed October 2, 2008, relates 
that Detective Hale elicited further admissions from Lopez 
during the interview: 
When asked how often she would hurt [A.O.], 
[Lopez] said she would [use] Defendant Olivas' belt. 
She said that she used the belt on [A.O.'s] buttocks 
area. When asked if she ever punched [A.O.] with a 
fist, she said yes, and also said that she would slap 
[A.O.].  Detective Hale asked if [she] had ever bitten 
[A.O.] as [A.O.] looked like she had some bite marks 
on the inside of her legs.  Lopez said that she did 
not bite her on the inside of her leg, and when asked 
where she did bite her, Lopez pointed to the right 
side of her face by the jaw line and said "Here." 
 . . .  
Detective Hale asked her what the worst thing she 
had done to [A.O.] was, she responded by saying "Well, 
hitting her on the head."  When asked if it was when 
she hit her on the head with the metal broom or other 
times, Lopez responded there were other times.  When 
asked specifically what she used to strike [A.O.] on 
the head with, she said she once had used "a frying 
pan." 
Lopez admitted that police would be able to identify the frying 
pan she had used to strike A.O. because "it got kind of dented 
on the bottom."  When Detective Hale asked her how many times 
she had struck A.O. on the head, Lopez replied, "[l]ately it has 
been quite often." 
¶13 Lopez also admitted to Detective Hale that she had 
poured hot water on A.O., and stated "'[y]eah, it was hot from 
being on the stove and we were both in the kitchen and she 
wasn't hurrying enough.'"  Lopez continued by saying that she 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
7 
 
would "'lose it' and have this 'stupid reaction,' saying 'I 
threw it on her clothes' with [A.O.] responding 'You're burning 
me, you're burning me.'" 
¶14 Detective Hale also asked if Lopez had ever cut A.O. 
with a knife.  Lopez said that, in fact, "she had used a knife 
to cut [A.O.] with. . . .  When asked if [A.O.] screamed, she 
said yes.  When asked if there was a lot of blood, she said 
'Yes.'" 
¶15 When asked what other ways she abused A.O., Lopez 
admitted to strangling her.  "[Lopez] said 'Be quiet, be quiet 
or I'll make you be quiet.'  At that point, she would press down 
on [A.O.'s] neck . . . .  Lopez said that she would leave red 
marks on [A.O.'s] neck and that those would go away and then 
bruises would come later."  Lopez noted that A.O. would try to 
defend herself, but "'[t]hat would make me angrier and I would 
just say to her, you're not going to beat me.'" 
¶16 On October 6, 2008, and again on October 16, 2008, 
A.O. gave statements about her abuse in the form of recorded 
audiovisual interviews.5  In these audiovisual recordings, A.O. 
recounts detailed descriptions of the abuse.  The circuit court 
reviewed the audiovisual recordings as part of its determination 
of whether the State would be substantially prejudiced if Lopez 
were allowed to withdraw her pleas. 
                                                 
5 Any audiovisual recordings beyond these two are not the 
subject of this court's review. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
8 
 
¶17 In the audiovisual recordings, A.O. related how Lopez 
hit her on the knee "with a metal baseball bat" on the day that 
she was rescued.6  A.O. gestured to her fully braced and 
immobilized right leg while she said "it hurt a lot" and that 
she was barely able to walk.  Subsequent medical diagnosis 
revealed that her kneecap had been broken.  
¶18 A.O. described that, three days before the attack with 
the bat, Lopez hit her twice in the back of the head with a 
piece of metal tube from a scooter, tearing her scalp.  A.O. 
pointed to the location of the injury to her scalp and described 
that she was "bleeding a lot" and that she had to clean her own 
bloodstains out of the carpet.  A.O. then described a "piece of 
flesh" detaching from her scalp while in the bath and being able 
to "feel a hole" in the back of her head.  A.O. also related 
that Lopez refused to seek medical attention for A.O.'s 
injuries. 
¶19 About "three weeks" before the interviews, A.O. 
further described seeing that Lopez "had something behind her 
back," so she knew that Lopez "had something to hit me with."  
Lopez hit her in the face with the metal bar from a drawer, 
causing what A.O. described as a "hole" underneath her eye.  
A.O. pointed to the dark circle under her eye.  A.O. said that 
Lopez forced her to wear "dark glasses and [her] hat" in public 
to conceal the injury. 
                                                 
6 All quotations from the audiovisual recordings are A.O.'s 
own words, as translated in the audio track of the recording. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
9 
 
¶20 A.O. 
also 
described 
an 
attack, 
which 
occurred 
approximately four weeks before the interviews, where Lopez 
choked A.O. for accidentally dropping pizza on the floor during 
dinner. 
 
A.O. 
lost 
consciousness 
and 
"peed 
her 
pants."  
According to A.O., Lopez stopped the attack because she feared 
that the "pigs would be here any minute."  A.O. was then forced 
to "stand in the corner [of her parents' bedroom] for the whole 
night."  As A.O. began to fall asleep, Olivas threw ice water on 
her face. 
¶21 A.O. described "being careful to make sure teachers 
didn't see the bandages" as she pointed to scars on her wrists 
from Lopez cutting her with a kitchen knife.  She recalled that 
Lopez cut her so deep "it opened me up [to where] I could see 
white, and I said 'it's my bone.'"  A.O. recalled that Lopez 
would "sometimes throw the knife at me."  Lifting up her shirt, 
A.O. showed scars left when the knife hit her. 
¶22 A.O. related that if Lopez noticed "that the frying 
pan had a little speck of beans on it" after A.O. did the 
dishes, Lopez would hit her on the head with the pan.  This 
abuse occurred "about five times."  Because of being struck in 
this way, the handle of one pan broke off, while another became 
"bent."  A.O. described that these beatings caused her "a lot of 
pain, and [she] felt like something burst." 
¶23 A.O. described an instance when she was crying as a 
result of the repeated beatings and Lopez "bit her on the face" 
in an effort to get her to "shut up before someone hears."  
Lopez left "teeth mark bruises" on A.O.'s skin. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
10 
 
II. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶24 On October 2, 2008, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Lopez, and she made her initial appearance 
with counsel.  Lopez's bail was initially set at $25,000 cash.  
The criminal complaint, which also served as the factual basis 
for Lopez's eventual pleas, alleged 27 separate counts against 
Lopez and Olivas for the physical abuse A.O. suffered.  The 
complaint included 25 counts of intentionally causing bodily 
harm to a child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.03(2)(b) (2007-
08), a class H felony, and two counts of intentionally causing 
great bodily harm to a child, contrary to § 948.03(2)(a) (2007-
08), a class C felony.  Lopez was charged with 16 of the 27 
counts, including both counts of causing great bodily harm. 
¶25 On October 8, 2008, the State notified Lopez of its 
intent to use the October 6 audiovisual recording of A.O. at 
trial under Wis. Stat. § 908.08.7  The notice came just six days 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.08 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) In any criminal trial or hearing . . . the 
court or hearing examiner may admit into evidence the 
audiovisual recording of an oral statement of a child 
who is available to testify, as provided in this 
section. 
(2)(a) Not less than 10 days before the trial or 
hearing, or such later time as the court or hearing 
examiner permits upon cause shown, the party offering 
the statement shall file with the court or hearing 
officer an offer of proof.  . . .  That party shall 
give notice of the offer of proof to all other 
parties, including notice of reasonable opportunity 
for them to view the statement before the hearing 
under par. (b). 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
11 
 
after Lopez's initial appearance and two days after the 
interview was recorded.  At the time A.O. was 14 years old.  The 
State filed a similar notice relating to the October 16, 2008 
audiovisual recording on July 3, 2009.  
¶26 On October 9, 2008, Lopez, represented by a different 
attorney, waived her right to a preliminary hearing and was 
bound over for trial.  On November 3, 2008, Lopez was arraigned 
on the Information, which charged Lopez and Olivas with 49 
counts of felony child abuse.  Lopez entered pleas of not guilty 
and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.  On 
December 1, 2008, an Amended Information was filed, which added 
penalty enhancers to certain counts for use of a dangerous 
weapon. 
¶27 On December 4, 2008, the State and Lopez filed a 
"Stipulation and Agreement Regarding Audiovisual Recording."  
The agreement acknowledged that "the State has provided the 
defense with a copy of an audiovisual recording of a child." The 
parties agreed that "neither party will make additional copies 
of the videotaped statement, nor will either party allow 
additional copies to be made by any other entity or individual." 
¶28 On January 27, 2009, Lopez's attorney filed a motion 
to withdraw from representation.  In the motion, counsel stated 
that he was seeking to withdraw at the request of Lopez.  On 
January 29, 2009, the court granted the motion to withdraw.  On 
February 6, 2009, the State Public Defender appointed a new 
attorney for Lopez. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
12 
 
¶29 On March 23, 2009, the court held a status conference 
in the case.  The court set a trial date of July 14, 2009.  
¶30 On April 10, 2009, Lopez's attorney filed a motion to 
withdraw from representation because Lopez "no longer wants me 
to represent her."  The court granted the motion to withdraw the 
same day.  
¶31 On June 19, 2009, Lopez, now represented by a third 
attorney, filed a motion to sever her trial from Olivas'.  On 
June 23, 2009, the court held a hearing and granted Lopez's 
motion to sever, concluding that there was a possibility that 
Lopez and Olivas would pursue "mutually antagonistic" defenses.  
After granting Lopez's motion, the court kept the July 14 trial 
date for Olivas,8 but did not set a trial date for Lopez due to a 
pending plea offer.  
¶32 On July 22, 2009, Lopez's third attorney filed a 
motion to withdraw as Lopez's counsel.  Counsel noted that Lopez 
had written to both the public defender's office and to the 
court requesting new appointed counsel.  Counsel argued that 
"[t]his matter currently has no dates scheduled for trial and 
neither Ms. Lopez nor the state will be prejudiced by any delay 
in appointment of new counsel."  
¶33 On July 31, 2009, the court9 held a hearing on the 
motion to withdraw and stated: 
                                                 
8 Olivas' trial date was later postponed to December 1, 
2009. 
9 The Honorable Stuart Schwartz presided over both this 
hearing and the September 18, 2009 motion hearing. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
13 
 
There is nothing in the law that says the 
defendant has to like her attorney.  What the 
defendant is entitled to under the law is effective 
representation and counsel who is diligent in pursuing 
in this case his obligations as it relates to Ms. 
Lopez. 
You, [Counsel], are the third attorney who's been 
on this case.  As I listened to Ms. Lopez's comments, 
half of her comments had to do with her background and 
her upbringing and had nothing to do with whether or 
not she could get along with you for purposes of 
representation. 
¶34 At the motion hearing, the State referenced the need 
to timely proceed.  Indeed, the court referenced the potential 
prejudice to the State if the trial did not occur before A.O. 
turned 16 years old: 
The State has made reference to the potential 
prejudice that it runs into in this matter.  I realize 
May of next year is still ten months away.  But, at 
that point in time, the alleged victim in this matter 
would be turning sixteen, which would impact on the 
use of the Safe Harbor tapes.  Also, we are talking 
here about a child who was fourteen when these events 
allegedly occurred, which means this case has been 
pending over and hanging over the head of this child 
for a substantial period of time. 
The court then evaluated Lopez's arguments and indicated it was 
unwilling to allow counsel to withdraw and delay the matter 
further: 
I don't see the delay here being for really any 
legitimate purpose. . . .  
I don't see that there's been an argument 
presented here that allows me to say that counsel has 
done anything other than act professionally in this 
matter.  The fact that Ms. Lopez may not like what she 
hears is not counsel's fault. 
. . .  
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
14 
 
I don't find any basis here to allow counsel to 
withdraw, and I'm going to deny the motion. 
¶35 On August 13, 2009, the court held a scheduling 
conference.  Lopez's trial was set for December 15, 2009, with a 
motion hearing to be held in September. 
¶36 On September 18, 2009, the court heard various 
motions, including the State's motion to admit the audiovisual 
recordings of A.O. at trial.  Prior to the court's ruling, 
Lopez's attorney briefly asked how the State planned to use the 
recordings: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Is it their intention to try 
to use those instead of live testimony? 
THE COURT:  No. I don't think the law allows 
that. 
[THE STATE:]  No.  We use -- We use the tapes in 
conjunction with live testimony. 
THE COURT:  That's what I said.  I don't think 
the law allows that.  At preliminary hearing --  
[THE STATE:]  Yes. 
THE COURT:  But not for purposes of the trial. 
[THE STATE:]  No.  The witness will be on the 
stand and we'll play it. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Then I guess to the extent 
that it would be a prior consistent statement, if 
there is those kind of challenges to the testimony, I 
think it would be appropriate under that theory.  But, 
I just don't understand what they're going to gain out 
of it, if the witnesses are going to show up in court 
and testify as one would expect. 
¶37 The court immediately clarified, however, that it was 
addressing 
the 
State's 
motion 
to 
admit 
the 
audiovisual 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
15 
 
recordings under Wis. Stat. § 908.08, and not as a prior 
consistent statement:  
We're talking here about audio visual recordings of a 
statement of a child coming in under 908.08 of the 
statutes. 
More specifically, the statute indicates under 
the law that in this particular case, the audio visual 
statement can be used before the child's 16th birthday 
and if the interests of justice warrant its admission 
under subsection (4) of the statutes.10 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.08(4) provides: 
(4)  In determining whether the interests of 
justice warrant the admission of an audiovisual 
recording of a statement of a child who is at least 12 
years of age but younger than 16 years of age, among 
the factors which the court or hearing examiner may 
consider are any of the following 
(a)  The child's chronological age, level of 
development 
and 
capacity 
to 
comprehend 
the 
significance of the events and to verbalize about 
them. 
(b)  The child's general physical and mental 
health. 
(c)  Whether the events about which the child's 
statement is made constituted criminal or antisocial 
conduct against the child or a person with whom the 
child had a close emotional relationship and, if the 
conduct constituted a battery or a sexual assault, its 
duration and the extent of physical or emotional 
injury thereby caused. 
(d)  The child's custodial situation and the 
attitude of other household members to the events 
about which the child's statement is made and to the 
underlying proceeding. 
(e)  The 
child's 
familial 
or 
emotional 
relationship to those involved in the underlying 
proceeding. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
16 
 
[A.O.] is fifteen now, I believe. So, she meets 
the first criteria. 
¶38 The court then granted the State's motion and deemed 
the audiovisual statements admissible, citing to the statutory 
factors of Wis. Stat. § 908.08(4): 
If you look at subsection (4), it indicates that 
in determining whether the interests of justice 
warrant the admission of an audio visual recording of 
a statement of a child who is at least 12 years of age 
but younger than 16 years of age, there are various 
factors the Court looks at.  The child's chronological 
age, the level of development, capacity to comprehend 
the significance of the events and to verbalize about 
them.  
                                                                                                                                                             
(f)  The child's behavior at or reaction to 
previous interviews concerning the events involved. 
(g)  Whether the child blames himself or herself 
for the events involved or has ever been told by any 
person not to disclose them; whether the child's prior 
reports to associates or authorities of the events 
have been disbelieved or not acted upon; and the 
child's subjective belief regarding what consequences 
to himself or herself, or persons with whom the child 
has a close emotional relationship, will ensue from 
providing testimony. 
(h)  Whether 
the 
child 
manifests 
or 
has 
manifested 
symptoms 
associated 
with 
posttraumatic 
stress disorder or other mental disorders, including, 
without limitation, reexperiencing the events, fear of 
their 
repetition, 
withdrawal, 
regression, 
guilt, 
anxiety, stress, nightmares, enuresis, lack of self-
esteem, mood changes, compulsive behaviors, school 
problems, delinquent or antisocial behavior, phobias 
or changes in interpersonal relationships. 
(i)  Whether admission of the recording would 
reduce the mental or emotional strain of testifying or 
reduce the number of times the child will be required 
to testify. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
17 
 
I've viewed the video tapes, as I've indicated, 
in this matter.  Although the child does have the 
capacity 
to 
verbalize 
about 
them, 
my 
sense 
of 
recollection from looking at those tapes was that she 
was, first of all, more comfortable talking in Spanish  
than she was in English regarding these.  She 
certainly 
has 
chronological 
age 
and 
level 
of 
development, capacity to understand the significance 
of the events. 
She seemed to be, despite the allegations that 
were put forth by the State and as a result of what I 
saw on the tape, physically and mentally healthy 
enough to testify both in person and as was presented 
on the tape, particularly since she's now been living 
in a different environment. 
The events about which this child's statement is 
made certainly constitute, assuming she is believed, 
the criminal or antisocial conduct perpetrated against 
the child.  And that [A.O.] had a close emotional 
relationship with the defendant in this matter.  And 
the conduct constitutes a battery at a minimum, and 
the allegations clearly are physical abuse.  And its 
duration and the extent of that are set forth in the 
tape. 
I think that it's also fairly clear here that the 
child's emotional relationship to those involved in 
the underlying proceeding were set forth in the tape.  
Her behavior or reaction to the previous events that 
occurred to her were all set forth in the tape. 
There are other considerations set forth in the 
statute that I did take into account as well.  The 
child's behavior, attitude, demeanor during the course 
of the interview I took into account.  How the child 
responded to various questions.  And when I say how, I 
don't mean the substance of the answers other than 
that they were related to the questions that were 
asked but whether or not she seemed hysterical or 
straightforward in her presentation, things of that 
type.  Whether or not she evinced any signs of fear, 
guilt, anxiety, stress and so forth. 
I 
found 
the 
tapes 
to 
be 
pretty 
much 
straightforward.  They were interviewed.  The person 
conducting the interview attempted to put [A.O.] at 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
18 
 
ease as much as possible.  Explained the purpose of 
the proceedings.  [A.O.] clearly understood the 
difference between truth and lying.  She will be 
testifying as well in this matter. 
I believe that under the considerations that the 
Court needs to look at, that allowing the audio visual 
tapes to be introduced is appropriate.  However, 
[A.O.] would need to testify first.  And I believe 
these tapes then come in under 908.01 sub (4)(a)2, 
which provides that a prior consistent statement of a 
witness is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at 
trial 
and 
is 
subject 
to 
cross-examination; 
the 
statement 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
declarant's 
testimony, which I assume it will be; and the 
statement is offered to rebut any express or implied 
charge against the declarant of a fabrication or 
improper influence or motive. 
In addition to being allowed by statute, there is 
case law that allows the tapes to be used in that 
regard.  I would simply note to the parties that one 
of the more recent cases was Ansani vs. Cascade 
Mountain, Inc., at 223 Wis. 2d 39.  That's a 1998 
case. 
The videotape also, as I've indicated, clearly 
shows the understanding on the part of the child 
regarding the importance of telling the truth and that 
the content, circumstances of the statement contained 
within the tape on their face provide an indicia of 
trustworthiness.  
So, I'll allow the videotape to come in. 
¶39 On November 19, 2009, Lopez pled no contest to six of 
the 22 counts against her.11  The remaining counts were dismissed 
                                                 
11 While there is no indication in the record that Lopez's 
testimony at Olivas' trial was part of her plea agreement, she 
did admit to physically abusing A.O. in her testimony.  The 
State described Lopez's plea agreement as "substantially the 
same offer that has been available to her since the middle of 
summer [2009]. It's just that now she wishes to accept 
it . . . ." 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
19 
 
but read in pursuant to her plea agreement.  The court accepted 
Lopez's pleas and ordered a presentence investigation report 
("PSI").  
¶40 On December 2, 2009, both Lopez and A.O. testified 
against Olivas at his trial.12  The State presented the 
audiovisual recordings of A.O. as evidence against Olivas.  On 
December 4, the jury returned a guilty verdict against Olivas on 
21 counts and found him not guilty on three. 
¶41 On March 9, 2010, the PSI for Lopez's sentence was 
filed with the circuit court.  The PSI recommended a maximum 
term of 37 years imprisonment with between 22 and 25 years of 
initial confinement to be followed by 12 years of extended 
supervision.  Further, the PSI described an "Anticipated 
Supervision Plan" that would preclude Lopez from having contact 
with any of her five children. 
¶42 On March 18, 2010, Olivas was sentenced to 57 years 
imprisonment, with 20 years of initial confinement to be 
followed by 37 years of extended supervision.  
¶43 On March 19, 2010, Lopez moved the court pro se to 
withdraw her pleas.  On March 22, Lopez's third attorney 
petitioned the court a second time to be allowed to withdraw as 
Lopez's counsel.  This time counsel argued that, because he had 
advised Lopez to accept her plea agreement, her motion to 
                                                 
12 The Honorable Stephen E. Ehlke presided over Olivas' 
trial and subsequent sentencing. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
20 
 
withdraw her pleas placed her "in a posture essentially 
adversarial to counsel." 
¶44 On March 23, 2010, the court held a hearing on Lopez's 
pro se motion to withdraw her pleas.  The court addressed the 
standard to be applied to Lopez's motion: 
I have concluded based on our discussion here on the 
record, and my review of the case law, that we will 
have to have a specific hearing to give the defendant 
an opportunity to present evidence in support of her 
motion to withdraw.  If she doesn't present evidence 
supporting that, it would essentially have to be 
denied outright.  If she has evidence, then the burden 
shifts back to the State I think on whether or not the 
State is prejudiced.  And if the State presents 
evidence of prejudice to them as a result of the plea 
that was entered and now asked to be withdrawn, then 
Ms. Lopez would have to produce evidence rebutting the 
prejudice, or the alleged prejudice.  And I think 
necessarily given the substance of what Ms. Lopez is 
apparently alleging in her filing just recently, it 
may well be that [Counsel] would have to be a witness.  
So we're going to do this in steps. 
The court then addressed Lopez's attorney's petition to withdraw 
as counsel: 
I think I have to grant -- I will grant 
[Counsel's] motion to withdraw as counsel.  We're 
going to have a status conference on April 6th, which 
was the date that we had scheduled for the sentencing 
hearing.  That will be a status conference hopefully 
with new counsel for Ms. Lopez. 
¶45 On April 6, 2010, the court held a status conference.  
Lopez was represented by her fourth appointed attorney.  Counsel 
requested 30 days to prepare to argue Lopez's motion to withdraw 
her pleas.  The court agreed and scheduled a hearing for May 4, 
2010.  
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
21 
 
¶46 On May 4, 2010, the court held the hearing on Lopez's 
motion to withdraw her pleas.  At the outset, counsel requested 
that he be allowed to withdraw as Lopez's attorney because she 
had expressed that "she doesn't want me to proceed on this 
case."  The court considered the significant delay, denied 
counsel's request, and stated: 
This is clearly at this point reaching absurdity and 
obvious 
delaying 
and 
obstruction. 
 
[Counsel's] 
retention is limited.  The question, the only question 
that we're addressing today is the motion to withdraw 
Ms. Lopez' pleas.  And if she has a fair and just 
reason to withdraw those pleas, then the burden will 
shift to the State to prove whether they would be 
substantially prejudiced by allowing her to withdraw 
the pleas.  There's no reason why counsel and the 
defendant shouldn't be ready for this hearing today.  
The Court granted them exactly the time that they 
requested to be ready for this.  Again, it's a very 
limited inquiry right now and I'm not about to allow 
Ms. Lopez to dismiss her fourth attorney and try to 
have a fifth one appointed.  Not at this stage, not at 
this time, and not for the reasons cited, not any of 
those are adequate by either counsel or Ms. Lopez.  So 
the motion to withdraw is denied. 
¶47 The court then addressed Lopez's motion to withdraw 
her pleas and heard testimony from Lopez and her former attorney 
concerning the circumstances of Lopez's plea agreement.13  On 
May 11, 2010, Lopez's attorney filed a formal motion to withdraw 
her pleas. 
                                                 
13 The testimony on May 4, 2010, went to showing whether 
Lopez 
entered 
her 
pleas 
"knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily."  The parties did not address the fair and just 
reason for Lopez's plea withdrawal or the substantial prejudice 
to the State until May 18. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
22 
 
¶48 On May 18, 2010, the court reconvened the continued 
motion hearing to determine if Lopez knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily pled, and if so, whether she should be allowed 
to withdraw her pleas.  The State introduced Lopez's plea 
questionnaire and waiver into evidence.  The State also called 
Detective Hale to testify with respect to the substantial 
prejudice the State would face should Lopez be allowed to 
withdraw her pleas: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY [THE STATE]: 
Q 
Good afternoon, Detective.  
A 
Good afternoon. 
Q 
Please state and spell your name for the record. 
A 
It's Robert J. Hale, H-a-l-e. 
Q 
Detective Hale, what is your occupation? 
A 
I'm a detective for the Town of Madison Police 
Department. 
Q 
What is your connection to this case? 
A 
I was the lead detective investigating the crime. 
Q 
Did you interact with the victim in this case? 
A 
Yes, on numerous occasions. 
Q 
Or more specifically the victim [A.O.]? 
A 
That's correct, yes. 
Q 
When did you first meet her? 
A 
I met her on the initial call back in, I believe 
'08, October, I think of '08.  It was in '08 when 
the case was reported. 
Q 
I think it was September.  
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
23 
 
A 
September, sorry. 
Q 
How did you find her at that time, in what 
condition? 
A 
I won't forget that.  I found her coming out of a 
bathroom, trying to coax her out of the bathroom 
and saw her in a horrible, horrible condition. 
She was emaciated, weak, full of blood.  She was 
just -- she was just a mess.  I likened her to a, 
dare I say, Holocaust victim, just completely 
beaten up and fragile. 
Q 
Sometime after that [A.O.] was interviewed at 
Safe Harbor; is that correct? 
A 
Yes, that's correct. 
Q 
Do you recall how long after you first met her 
that interview took place? 
A 
I don't recall exactly.  I'm surmising about two 
weeks. 
Q 
And how did she -- well, tell us please about 
that interview process and what happened there? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Your Honor, I'm going to 
object.  I think we're getting far away from the focus 
of this motion. 
[THE STATE:]  Actually -- 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  We -- it's an attempt to re-
try the case, or try the case I should say. 
¶49 The court clearly considered the substantial prejudice 
prong of the analysis, and stated: 
THE COURT:  Well, the State does have the burden 
to establish substantial prejudice.  I would assume 
that that's what this testimony is going to.  I'm not 
sure it's -- I mean, for the record as I mentioned at 
our last hearing I have actually viewed the Safe 
Harbor tapes.  I've read the transcripts as I was 
viewing them.  So in terms of content goes I do agree 
with [Counsel] that I'm not sure all of that's really 
necessary. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
24 
 
[THE STATE:]  That being the case, Judge, I would 
ask then, Judge, that you take judicial notice of the 
fact that the Safe Harbor tape was used in evidence at 
[Porfirio] Olivas' trial, that a recorded copy is part 
of the record in this case along with a transcript, 
and that as you indicated that you have reviewed both. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Any objection to me taking 
judicial notice of those items, particularly the 
transcript, which is really the best documentary piece 
of evidence we have, of what I actually viewed and 
read? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  No, sir. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  I will take judicial notice of 
that and for purpose of this hearing the tape and the 
transcript of the Safe Harbor tape are part of this 
record. 
¶50 After hearing the evidence and testimony, the court 
briefly recessed and then reconvened to hear argument from 
counsel: 
We're going to go back on the record.  And I'm 
prepared to hear summary arguments now from counsel.  
I'm still -- as I said at the last hearing I'm still 
viewing this as essentially three separate issues.  
The first is whether the plea by Ms. Lopez was entered 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.  The second 
is whether she has a fair or just reason to withdraw 
her plea.  And the third would be considering whether 
the State has proven substantial prejudice if she were 
to be allowed to withdraw her plea. 
¶51 Lopez's counsel first argued that Lopez's pleas were 
deficient.  Next, he argued that Lopez's desire to put on a 
mental disorder defense, which she claimed was never addressed 
by her prior attorneys, constituted a fair and just reason for 
withdrawal of her pleas.  Finally, counsel argued the subject of 
this appeal——whether the State showed substantial prejudice: 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
25 
 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  And as far as a substantial 
prejudice to the State, they have tapes on most of 
this evidence.  They've been through this evidence 
once, that makes it the second time even easier.  So 
the prejudice to the State I think is minimal.  All 
present -– all witnesses are available.  There are 
transcripts, as I said videotape testimony, so the 
argument that this would be an undo [sic] burden to 
re-try -- or to try this case, I think that evidence 
doesn't hold up.  That argument doesn't hold up. 
THE COURT:  And do you acknowledge that under 
Section 908.08(3) that the State would not be allowed 
to use the Safe Harbor tapes at trial in this case? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Because of the age? 
THE COURT:  Yes. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  I believe that would be the 
case. 
¶52 The State then argued against Lopez's plea withdrawal.  
The State first contended that Lopez's pleas were entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntary.  The State then 
asserted that Lopez had presented no fair and just reason for 
her plea withdrawal.  Rather, the State argued that Lopez merely 
"desire[d] to have a trial," which is insufficient under 
Wisconsin law.  Finally, the State addressed how it would be 
substantially prejudiced by Lopez's plea withdrawal: 
If in the alternative the Court were to find that 
Ms. Lopez has shown a fair and just reason to withdraw 
her plea, there is the next prong of analysis.  The 
burden shifts to the State to show that the State 
would be substantially prejudiced by allowing the 
withdrawal of this plea.  And the seminole [sic] case 
on the matter is State v. Bollig, I gave the citation 
earlier, that says that's the case and if Ms. Lopez 
were able to withdraw her plea the State would indeed 
be substantially prejudiced because central to this 
trial and central to the evidence in this case are the 
video recorded statements taken by detectives at Safe 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
26 
 
Harbor of [A.O.], the principal victim, though not the 
only victim in these charges, the principal victim in 
these charges. 
She was 14 years old at the time that she was 
found.  She was interviewed days after she was rescued 
and the video recordings are now close to 20 months 
old. She was a child witness.  And those video 
recordings are precluded from being admitted because 
she turned 16 a few days ago.  Those video recordings 
are the most accurate testimony available of what 
happened of her view at that point in time.  Over the 
nearly two years that have elapsed, or to be more 
accurate, 20 months that have elapsed since the 
recordings were made, memories do fade.  Those 
recordings include the description of incidents that 
took place close to six months in some cases even 
before the recordings were made as the information 
alleges that some of this conduct was alleged to have 
taken place as early as April of 2008, so the 
incidents occurred as early as in some cases as two 
years ago. 
Not only the issue of accuracy and accurate 
reflection of memory that is preserved in those tapes, 
but also those tapes are demonstrative of [A.O.'s] 
state, her physical state and her emotional state at 
the time that they were made.  Her demeanor, which is 
essential to credibility determination, which is an 
essential function of course of a jury, or trier of 
fact, are lost if we cannot present those recordings. 
In those recordings she looks like a terribly abused 
child that she was.  Fortunately for her now, she's 
doing very well and looks great and that's not the 
same presentation that would be made at trial at this 
point in time.  It wouldn't accurately reflect how she 
appeared at the time and that is a substantial 
prejudice that the State would suffer. 
¶53 Having heard argument from both parties, the court 
ruled on the motion.  First, the court concluded that Lopez's 
pleas were entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  
The court then addressed whether Lopez had presented a fair and 
just reason to withdraw her pleas.  The court expressed concern 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
27 
 
about Lopez's conduct, but in the end concluded that Lopez had 
shown a fair and just reason to withdraw her pleas: 
I'm confused on the record, I'm confused on this case 
generally 
as 
to 
whether 
at 
times 
Ms. 
Lopez 
misunderstands 
the 
proceedings 
or 
completely 
understands them and is using the process and the 
claim of misunderstanding to delay and frustrate the 
basic administration of justice here.  She certainly 
did not expeditiously seek to withdraw her plea.  She 
waited until the trial and conviction and sentencing 
of her husband.  She waited until approximately ten 
days 
after 
the 
Court 
received 
the 
presentence 
investigation report with a recommendation for a 
sentence by the Department of Corrections.   . . .  
Again, I think that's a really close call.  I 
think 
kind 
of 
taking 
all 
of 
the 
circumstances 
together, the real language issues that Ms. Lopez 
obviously is dealing with and all of the other factors 
that are on the record, I think she probably has met 
that burden of proof and that she has proven by 
preponderance of the evidence a fair and just reason 
for me to allow her to withdraw her plea. 
¶54 The court then concluded, however, that allowing Lopez 
to withdraw her pleas would substantially prejudice the State: 
But as in the Bollig case and many of the others, 
that conclusion does not end the [inquiries] as to 
whether the plea withdrawal should be granted.  It 
then becomes the State's burden to prove that allowing 
the defendant to withdraw her plea would result in 
substantial prejudice to the State.  The Bollig case 
is directly on point for that as well as a case called 
State v. Rushing, which is 305 Wis. 2d 739.  It's a 
Court of Appeals case.  The Rushing case also involved 
accusations of injuries to child, in this case it was, 
in the case of the Rushing that case it was a sexual 
assault and the defendant frequently changed his 
lawyers [sic].  The defendant changed his pleas at 
different times or attempted to and there was a 
videotape that was subject of the evidence against the 
defendant and was one of the reasons cited by the 
trial court and the Court of Appeals as to why the 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
28 
 
State had shown substantial prejudice.  In other words 
that they would be in that case not be allowed to use 
the tape. 
In this case the Safe Harbor tapes taken of the 
victim [A.O.] are lengthy.  If I remember correctly 
they're about three-and-a-half hours long.  They are 
compelling.  The testimony in the tape is credible.  
It's recent to when the events occurred.  The 
testimony is specific.  Clear.  The age of the victim 
as reflected in the tapes is significant.  And today 
if she was forced to testify of the passage of time 
from when the events occurred is significant here.  I 
think this is an absolutely clear and easy call on my 
part to find that if the State was not allowed to use 
the Safe Harbor tapes it would result in substantial 
prejudice to the State. 
I have to believe that part of [A.O.'s] therapy 
and recovery from everything that happened to her has 
included a need to forget somewhat, to move on, to 
move forward, to try to make the best of the future 
life in an attempt to overcome the harm that was done 
to her.  If she is indeed successful in her recovery 
and therapy, then hopefully some of the things she's 
already forgotten.  I hope for her sake that's the 
case.  But because I think there's a real risk that 
she has, in fact, again just given the passage of time 
and the clarity and specificity of her testimony 
there's no way that she could ever be expected to 
reproduce the testimony she gave in the Safe Harbor 
tapes and she shouldn't be forced to, and so like the 
finding by the trial court in the Bollig case and the 
Rushing case that I referred to, because the State 
would face substantial prejudice to not be allowed to 
use the Safe Harbor tapes, the defendant's motion to 
withdraw her plea is denied. 
¶55 On June 1, 2010, the court sentenced Lopez to 30 years 
imprisonment, comprised of 20 years of initial confinement to be 
followed by 10 years of extended supervision.  Lopez moved for 
postconviction relief on September 1, 2011, and the court denied 
her motion on November 16, 2011.  Lopez appealed. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
29 
 
¶56 A divided panel of the court of appeals summarily 
reversed in an unpublished opinion and order.  Lopez, No. 
2011AP2733-CR, unpublished slip op. at 2.  The court of appeals 
agreed with the circuit court that Lopez had shown a fair and 
just reason to withdraw her pleas, but it held that that State 
would not be substantially prejudiced.  Id. at 3.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the circuit court had erroneously 
exercised discretion in denying Lopez's motion to withdraw her 
pleas.  Id. 
¶57 The court of appeals reasoned that the age limit in 
Wis. Stat. § 908.08(3)(a) is a legislative determination and, 
therefore, the limit cannot be prejudicial to the State.  Id. at 
4-5.  The court of appeals also held that any assertion of faded 
memory on the part of A.O. was purely speculative and, 
therefore, the State did not meet its burden to show prejudice.  
Id. at 6.  Finally, the court appeals concluded that the State 
was not substantially prejudiced because it could still use the 
video portion of the audiovisual recordings to show A.O.'s 
physical condition.  Id. 
¶58 Judge Paul Lundsten dissented.  Id. at 7.  He 
concluded 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
exercised 
its 
discretion.  He reasoned that the "loss of detail" that would 
result from excluding the audiovisual recordings would result in 
substantial prejudice.  Id. at 7, 9.  He concluded that there is 
"no requirement that the State prove that the prejudice be such 
that the State is substantially less likely to obtain a 
conviction."  Id. at 10-11. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
30 
 
¶59 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on February 11, 2013. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶60 "A decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw [a 
plea] is within the discretion of the trial court."  State v. 
Rhodes, 2008 WI App 32, ¶7, 307 Wis. 2d 350, 746 N.W.2d 599.  "A 
circuit court's discretionary decision to grant or deny a motion 
to withdraw a plea before sentencing is subject to review under 
the erroneous exercise of discretion standard."  Jenkins, 303 
Wis. 2d 157, ¶30 (citing State v. Kivioja, 225 Wis. 2d 271, 284, 
592 N.W.2d 220 (1999)).  All that "this court need find to 
sustain a discretionary act is that the circuit court examined 
the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using 
a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach."  Id. (quoting Loy v. Bunderson, 
107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982)). 
IV. 
ANALYSIS 
¶61 "Withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing is not 
an absolute right."  Jenkins, 303 Wis. 2d 157, ¶32 (citing 
Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 583).  "[A] circuit court should 'freely 
allow a defendant to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing for 
any fair and just reason, unless the prosecution [would] be 
substantially prejudiced.'"  Id., ¶2 (citing Bollig, 232 
Wis. 2d 561, ¶28).  "[T]he burden is on the defendant to offer a 
fair and just reason for withdrawal of the plea" by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 583-84.  
"[O]nce the defendant presents a fair and just reason, the 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
31 
 
burden shifts to the State to show substantial prejudice so as 
to defeat the plea withdrawal."  Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶34. 
¶62 Because the State has conceded that Lopez has shown a 
fair and just reason for withdrawing her pleas, the burden is on 
the State to show that granting the withdrawal would cause it 
substantial prejudice.  If the State meets this burden, Lopez 
"must rebut evidence of substantial prejudice to the State." 
Jenkins, 303 Wis. 2d 157, ¶43. 
¶63 The State argues that it would be substantially 
prejudiced by Lopez's plea withdrawal in three ways.  First, the 
State claims that its inability to introduce A.O.'s audiovisual 
recordings under Wis. Stat. § 908.08 constitutes substantial 
prejudice.  Second, the State argues that A.O.'s faded memory as 
a witness constitutes substantial prejudice.  Finally, the State 
asserts that it would be substantially prejudiced by the harm to 
A.O. that would result from forcing her to testify. 
¶64 Lopez argues that the State has not shown that it 
would be substantially prejudiced if she were allowed to 
withdraw her pleas.  She contends that the State offered no 
evidence that A.O. is unable to testify or that her memory has 
faded.  Lopez asserts that the State did not show that it would 
be more difficult to prove its case and that, in fact, 
significant portions of the evidence could still be admitted at 
trial.  Lopez also argues that the trial court did not actually 
find the audiovisual recordings admissible under Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08, but rather, erroneously found them admissible as prior 
consistent statements under Wis. Stat. § 908.01(4)(a)2.  Thus, 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
32 
 
Lopez argues that A.O.'s age is irrelevant to the evidentiary 
determination 
and 
therefore, 
substantial 
prejudice 
cannot 
result. 
¶65 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
found 
the 
audiovisual recordings admissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.08, and 
did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it determined 
that the State would be substantially prejudiced if Lopez were 
allowed to withdraw her pleas.  Therefore, we reverse the court 
of appeals. 
A. Admission of A.O.'s Audiovisual Recordings 
¶66 On October 8, 2008, just six days after the filing of 
the criminal complaint, the State provided notice to Lopez of 
its intent to use the audiovisual recordings of A.O.14  The State 
sought admission of A.O.'s audiovisual recordings as the 
"Audiovisual Recording of Child's Statement" pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 908.08.  Because A.O. was over 12 but under 16 years of 
age, the statute required that the circuit court find that the 
"interests of justice warrant" the admission of the recorded 
statement.  Wis. Stat. § 908.08(3)(a)2.  In weighing the 
admissibility of the recorded statement, the circuit court was 
required to consider the factors listed in § 908.08(4). 
¶67 On September 18, 2009, the circuit court heard 
argument and deemed the audiovisual recordings admissible.  The 
                                                 
14 At that time, only the October 6, 2008 recording had been 
made.  On July 3, 2009, the State provided notice to Lopez of 
its intent to use the October 16, 2008 recording. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
33 
 
court specifically referenced Wis. Stat. § 908.08(4) in granting 
the motion: 
We're talking here about audio visual recordings of a 
statement of a child coming in under 908.08 of the 
statutes. 
More specifically, the statute indicates under 
the law that in this particular case, the audio visual 
statement can be used before the child's 16th birthday 
and if the interests of justice warrant its admission 
under sub-section (4) of the statutes. 
[A.O.] is fifteen now, I believe. So, she meets 
the first criteria. 
¶68 The circuit court began its discussion of how the 
audiovisual recordings met the requirements for admission by 
noting that the court had personally viewed the recordings:   
I've viewed the video tapes, as I've indicated, 
in this matter. Although the child does have the 
capacity 
to 
verbalize 
about 
them, 
my 
sense 
of 
recollection from looking at those tapes was that she 
was, first of all, more comfortable talking in Spanish 
than she was in English regarding these. 
¶69 The court then discussed how the recordings satisfied 
Wis. Stat. § 908.08(4)(a): 
She certainly has the chronological age and level of 
development, capacity to understand the significance 
of the events. 
¶70 The court went further, addressing her physical and 
mental health, as required by Wis. Stat. § 908.08(4)(b): 
She seemed to be, despite the allegations that 
were put forth by the State and as a result of what I 
saw on the tape, physically and mentally healthy 
enough to testify both in person and as was presented 
on the tape, particularly since she's now been living 
in a different environment. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
34 
 
¶71 The court also discussed the factors in Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08(4)(c), (d), and (e), including the alleged criminal 
assault by a family member and its emotional impact on A.O.:  
The events about which this child's statement is 
made certainly constitute, assuming she is believed, 
the criminal or antisocial conduct perpetrated against 
the child.  And that [A.O.] had a close emotional 
relationship with the defendant in this matter.  And 
the conduct constitutes a battery at [a] minimum, and 
the allegations clearly are physical abuse.  And its 
duration and the extent of that are set forth in the 
tape. 
I think that it's also fairly clear here that the 
child's emotional relationship to those involved in 
the underlying proceeding were set forth in the tape.  
Her behavior or reaction to the previous events that 
occurred to her were all set forth as I looked at the 
tape. 
¶72 The court also explained its consideration of Wis. 
Stat. § 908.08(4)(f), (g), and (h), and A.O.'s manifestations in 
the interview:  
There are other considerations set forth in the 
statute that I did take into account as well.  The 
child's behavior, attitude, demeanor during the course 
of the interview I took into account.  How the child 
responded to various questions.  And when I say how, I 
don't mean the substance of the answers other than 
that they were related to the questions that were 
asked but whether or not she seemed hysterical or 
straightforward in her presentation, things of that 
type.  Whether or not she evinced any signs of fear, 
guilt, anxiety, stress and so forth. 
¶73 The court determined that the recordings were reliable 
and deemed them admissible: 
I 
found 
the 
tapes 
to 
be 
pretty 
much 
straightforward.  They were interviewed.  The person 
conducting the interview attempted to put [A.O.] at 
ease as much as possible.  Explained the purpose of 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
35 
 
the proceedings.  [A.O.] clearly understood the 
difference between truth and lying.  She will be 
testifying as well in this matter. 
I believe that under the considerations that the 
Court needs to look at, that allowing the audio visual 
tapes to be introduced is appropriate.  However, 
[A.O.] would need to testify first. 
¶74 Finally, 
the 
court 
reemphasized 
that 
the 
video 
recordings were trustworthy: 
The videotape also, as I've indicated, clearly 
shows the understanding on the part of the child 
regarding the importance of telling the truth and that 
the content, circumstances of the statement contained 
within the tape on their face provide an indicia of 
trustworthiness. 
¶75 Having ruled that the audiovisual recordings of A.O. 
were admissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.08, the court then 
addressed, presumably in response to argument from Lopez's 
attorney, 
the 
admissibility 
of 
the 
recordings 
as 
prior 
consistent statements: 
And I believe these tapes then come in under 908.01 
sub (4)(a)2, which provides that a prior consistent 
statement of a witness is not hearsay if the declarant 
testifies 
at 
trial 
and 
is 
subject 
to 
cross-
examination; the statement is consistent with the 
declarant's testimony, which I assume it will be; and 
the statement is offered to rebut any express or 
implied charge against the declarant of a fabrication 
or improper influence or motive. 
In addition to being allowed by statute, there is 
case law that allows the tapes to be used in that 
regard.  I would simply note to the parties that one 
of the more recent cases was Ansani vs. Cascade 
Mountain, Inc., at 223 Wis. 2d 39.  That's a 1998 
case. 
Although it is unclear whether the court's determination 
regarding admissibility of the recordings as a prior consistent 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
36 
 
statement was proper, the fact remains that the court first 
properly deemed the recordings admissible pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08. 
¶76 The court's intent to admit the audiovisual recordings 
under Wis. Stat. § 908.08 can be found elsewhere in the record.  
During the pretrial proceedings, the court referenced the 
importance of conducting a timely trial so that this evidence 
could be admitted under § 908.08.  For example, in response to a 
July 2009 request by Lopez's third attorney to withdraw as 
counsel, the court stated "I realize May of next year is still 
ten months away.  But, at that point in time, the alleged victim 
in this matter would be turning sixteen, which would impact on 
the use of the Safe Harbor tapes."  At that time, the court 
refused to allow further delay in the proceedings.  The court's 
concerns regarding a delay reflect that A.O.'s sixteenth 
birthday would impact the admission of this evidence under 
§ 908.08.  The court's admission determination was not focused 
on admission of the recordings as prior consistent statements.  
Appellate courts are not quick to reverse a reasoned evidentiary 
determination of the circuit court.  See, e.g.,  State v. 
Ringer, 2010 WI 69, ¶24, 326 Wis. 2d 351, 785 N.W.2d 448. 
¶77 In sum, the State clearly gave notice that it sought 
to admit the audiovisual recordings of A.O. under Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08.  The court made clear on the record that it deemed the 
recordings admissible under § 908.08.  The record demonstrates 
that the State had every intention of introducing this powerful 
audiovisual evidence at Lopez's trial under that section.  In 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
37 
 
fact, the State introduced the recordings at Olivas' trial under 
§ 908.08.  Regardless of the court's earlier comment that the 
recordings "come in under 908.01 sub (4)(a)2," the court clearly 
deemed 
the 
recordings 
admissible 
under 
§ 908.08, 
and 
it 
understood that A.O. turning 16 years old would impact their 
admissibility.  Thus, once A.O. turned 16 years old the State's 
most compelling piece of evidence was no longer admissible at 
trial in the same way, if at all.  The fact that the State would 
be precluded from introducing the recorded statements of the 
child victim under § 908.08 is of great significance to a 
substantial prejudice analysis. 
B. Substantial Prejudice To The State 
¶78 At the outset, we note that the circuit court did not 
decide Lopez's motion to withdraw her pleas in a vacuum.  In 
reaching its conclusion, the court, which would be conducting 
the trial in this case, considered the value of the audiovisual 
evidence and the effect that allowing Lopez to withdraw her 
pleas would have on the victim and the State.  Ultimately, the 
court concluded that substantial prejudice would befall the 
State if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas.  The court 
was thus in a particularly good position to reasonably conclude 
that "this is an absolutely clear and easy call on my part to 
find that if the State was not allowed to use the Safe Harbor 
tapes it would result in substantial prejudice to the State."  
We sustain the court's determination and now turn to the facts 
which underlie that conclusion. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
38 
 
¶79 On November 19, 2009, Lopez pled no contest to several 
counts.  The court found her guilty and ordered a PSI.  In 
exchange for her pleas, the State agreed to dismiss but read in 
16 of the 22 counts against her.  The dismissed counts could be 
considered for sentencing purposes.  The State did not otherwise 
agree to any limitations regarding sentencing. 
¶80 At the time of Lopez's pleas, the court had already 
deemed the audiovisual recordings of A.O. admissible under Wis. 
Stat. § 908.08, and had already discussed the need to proceed to 
trial before A.O. turned 16 years old.  Thus the court, the 
State, and Lopez were all aware of the significance of having a 
trial before that date.  Even defense counsel had acknowledged 
that the recordings would not be admissible once A.O. reached 
her sixteenth birthday.15 
¶81 On March 19, 2010, four months after Lopez entered her 
pleas, she moved the court pro se to withdraw her pleas.  As 
A.O.'s biological mother, Lopez would have known that her motion 
came less than two months before A.O.'s sixteenth birthday, at 
                                                 
15 On May 18, 2010, at the hearing on Lopez's request to 
withdraw her pleas, the court engaged in the following exchange 
with counsel: 
THE COURT:  And do you acknowledge that under 
Section 908.08(3) that the State would not be allowed 
to use the Safe Harbor tapes at trial in this case? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  Because of the age? 
[THE COURT:]  Yes. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:]  I believe that would be the 
case. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
39 
 
which time A.O.'s age would then render her audiovisual 
interviews inadmissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.08.  Lopez's 
motion also came just ten days after the PSI was filed.  The PSI 
recommended that Lopez be sentenced to a maximum of 37 years 
imprisonment, with 25 years of initial confinement followed by 
12 years of extended supervision.  The PSI also recommended 
Lopez have no contact with her children.  On March 18, 2010, 
just one day before Lopez's change of heart, Lopez's husband, 
Olivas, had been sentenced to 57 years imprisonment. 
¶82 The 
contrast 
between 
Lopez's 
dilatory 
pre-trial 
conduct and her more recent post-plea enthusiasm for putting the 
State to its burden of proof at a trial does not escape our 
notice.  While not jugular in our review of the substantial 
prejudice analysis, we note that Lopez's delayed request to 
withdraw her pleas was also commented on by the trial court on 
May 4, 2010.  The court stated that "[t]his is clearly at this 
point reaching absurdity and obvious delaying and obstruction," 
and that Lopez "certainly did not expeditiously seek to withdraw 
her plea[s]."  Certainly, the court understood that Lopez's PSI 
recommended that she receive a lengthy prison sentence and have 
no contact with her children, and her motion was made just one 
day after her husband, Olivas, had been sentenced to 57 years 
imprisonment.  The timing of her motion at least raises a 
question regarding the motivation underlying her change of 
heart. 
¶83 Specifically, in any of the approximately 13 months 
before she entered her pleas, Lopez had every opportunity to 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
40 
 
request a timely trial.  In fact, she could have demanded, but 
did not demand, a speedy trial.  Wis. Stat. § 971.10(2)(a).  
Instead of insisting on a more expeditious trial date, the 
record reflects that Lopez seemed to prefer delay.  For example, 
on December 17, 2008, two days before her final pretrial 
conference, Lopez sought and received a continuance.  On 
January 27, 2009, Lopez's first attorney moved to withdraw as 
counsel at Lopez's request.  The court granted the motion.  On 
April 10, 2009, Lopez's second attorney moved the court to 
withdraw as counsel, again at Lopez's request.  The court 
granted the motion.  On July 7, 2009, Lopez filed a pro se 
motion with the court seeking to dismiss her third attorney.  On 
July 22, 2009, Lopez's third attorney followed up on that 
request by formally moving the court to withdraw as counsel.  
Clearly, the court believed that Lopez was seeking delay, rather 
than the opportunity to bring her case to trial.  When the court 
denied Lopez's third attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel on 
July 31, 2009, it stated "I don't see the delay here being for 
really any legitimate purpose."  Lopez ultimately entered into a 
plea agreement just weeks before her long delayed trial date. 
¶84 Thereafter, Lopez moved to withdraw her pleas, and her 
third attorney moved the court to withdraw as counsel.  The 
court granted counsel's motion.  However, when Lopez requested 
that her fourth attorney withdraw on May 4, 2010, the court 
stated, "I'm going to deny counsel's motion to withdraw.  This 
is clearly at this point reaching absurdity and obvious delaying 
and obstruction."  The circuit court also noted that the timing 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
41 
 
of Lopez's request to withdraw her pleas was suspect.  The court 
determined that Lopez might be "using the process and the claim 
of 
misunderstanding 
to 
delay 
and 
frustrate 
the 
basic 
administration 
of 
justice 
here. 
 
She 
certainly 
did 
not 
expeditiously seek to withdraw her plea[s]."  It is not 
unreasonable for the court to reference how the impact of these 
delays and the timing of the motion would cause substantial 
prejudice to the State if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her 
pleas. 
¶85 Ultimately, on May 18, 2010, the court denied Lopez's 
motion to withdraw her pleas.  Because we afford the circuit 
court deference when we review its determination, our focus is 
on the circuit court's findings and conclusions.  Indeed, the 
record reflects that the circuit court appropriately considered 
the arguments of counsel, the language of the rule, the 
audiovisual recordings themselves, and the pertinent case law.  
The court did not deem the audiovisual recordings to be just one 
more, cumulative, piece of evidence.  Instead, the court 
concluded they were "compelling" and that proceeding to trial 
without being able to admit them as Wis. Stat. § 908.08 evidence 
would cause the State substantial prejudice. 
¶86 The test for substantial prejudice that Lopez espouses 
is whether the State might still be able to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt without admitting the audiovisual recordings 
under Wis. Stat. § 908.08.  The test, however, is not as Lopez 
wishes.  The test is whether the State would be substantially 
prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas.  The 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
42 
 
substantial prejudice that would result in this case is that the 
State would lose the ability to admit significant, persuasive, 
"compelling" evidence that would otherwise have been admissible 
under § 908.08 at trial.  The circuit court did not find Lopez's 
arguments compelling, and neither do we. 
¶87 Simply stated, Lopez now argues that the State is not 
substantially prejudiced.  Lopez opines that the State has 
enough other evidence and that the State does not need the 
audiovisual recordings to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Lopez concludes that the audiovisual recordings would 
otherwise be partially admissible and that, in that limited 
form, they are sufficient.  Conveniently, Lopez's defense 
strengthens as the quantity and quality of the State's evidence 
weakens.  Notably, even though the recordings were played as 
Wis. Stat. § 908.08 audiovisual recordings at Olivas' trial, the 
jury in that case still returned a verdict of not guilty on 
three counts.  Lopez's assertion that the State's case is strong 
enough without the § 908.08 recordings is simply not the 
applicable legal standard. 
¶88 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 908.08 should mean 
something.  Section 908.08 makes no room for admission of the 
recordings once the child turns age 16.  If audiovisual 
recordings could otherwise be deemed admissible and presented to 
the jury in the same way regardless of age, the limitations and 
the 
factors 
listed 
in 
§ 908.08(4) 
would 
be 
of 
little 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
43 
 
significance.16  While it is true that portions of the recordings 
could be deemed admissible at trial, that outcome is far from 
certain.  Even if they were so admitted, the fact remains that 
once A.O. turned age 16, the recordings would no longer be 
admissible in their entirety, both aurally and visually, without 
interruption 
and 
without 
limitation, 
as 
would 
have 
been 
permitted under § 908.08 pursuant to the court's ruling.  No 
other evidentiary provision allows for these recordings to be 
viewed and heard by the jury in the manner envisioned under 
§ 908.08.  When the State lost the ability to introduce the 
recordings under § 908.08, it was substantially prejudiced. 
¶89 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.08 was enacted in response to 
"epidemic levels of child abuse in Wisconsin."  7 Daniel D. 
Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence § 808.1, 
at 884 (3d ed. 2008).  The purpose of the law was to "allow 
children to testify in criminal [proceedings] . . . in a way 
which minimizes the mental and emotional strain of their 
participation in those proceedings."  Id., at 884-85; 1985 
Wisconsin Act 262 § 1.  If Lopez were allowed to withdraw her 
                                                 
16 While audiovisual recordings of children that do not meet 
certain requirements of Wis. Stat. § 908.08 may be deemed 
admissible under hearsay exceptions, see, e.g., § 908.08(7), 
State v. Snider, 2003 WI App 172, 266 Wis. 2d 830, 668 
N.W.2d 784, this does not mean that such recordings are 
automatically admissible, nor does it mean that the recordings 
would be played in the same manner as allowed under § 908.08.  
No guaranty of admissibility applies to the other hearsay 
exceptions.  Audiovisual evidence admitted outside of § 908.08 
would be presented in a manner consistent with the hearsay 
exceptions, which are not likely to permit a party to simply 
play the recording in its entirety for the jury. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
44 
 
pleas, 
the 
State 
could 
no 
longer 
admit 
the 
audiovisual 
recordings under § 908.08 and, thus, the purpose of the statute 
would be frustrated.  Contrary to the purpose of the law, if 
Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas, A.O.'s "mental and 
emotional strain" would be maximized rather than minimized. 
¶90 Conveniently, it is Lopez who now wishes to put the 
State to its burden to prove each and every element of the 
offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.  While putting the 
State to its proof was her absolute right before she entered her 
pleas of no contest, once she entered her pleas she no longer 
automatically has the right to proceed to trial.  See Jenkins, 
303 Wis. 2d 157, ¶32.  Rather, now that Lopez has entered her 
pleas, the court is endowed with discretion to decide whether 
Lopez had shown a "fair and just reason" for the withdrawal, and 
whether 
allowing 
her 
to 
withdraw 
her 
pleas 
would 
cause 
"substantial prejudice" to the State.  Id., ¶2. 
¶91 We conclude that the circuit court indeed applied the 
appropriate test to the case at issue when it stated "[it is] 
the State's burden to prove that allowing the defendant to 
withdraw her plea would result in substantial prejudice to the 
State."  The court personally viewed the recordings and had 
concluded that they were admissible.  The court concluded that 
the recordings were lengthy, compelling, timely, and credible: 
In this case the Safe Harbor tapes taken of the 
victim [A.O.] are lengthy.  If I remember correctly 
they're about three-and-a-half hours long.  They are 
compelling.  The testimony in the tape is credible.  
It's recent to when the events occurred.  The 
testimony is specific.  Clear. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
45 
 
¶92 The circuit court considered whether the passage of 
time would impact A.O.'s ability to convey the same message at 
trial.  The State argued that the significant passage of time 
caused it substantial prejudice because, in part, memories fade: 
Over the nearly two years that have elapsed, or to be 
more accurate, 20 months that have elapsed since the 
recordings 
were 
made, 
memories 
do 
fade. 
Those 
recordings include the description of incidents that 
took place close to six months in some cases even 
before the recordings were made as the information 
alleges that some of this conduct was alleged to have 
taken place as early as April of 2008, so the 
incidents occurred as early as in some cases as two 
years ago. 
The State further asserted that it would be substantially 
prejudiced because A.O. could not now present herself as the 
terribly abused child reflected in the recordings: 
Not only the issue of accuracy and accurate 
reflection of memory that is preserved in those tapes, 
but also those tapes are demonstrative of [A.O.'s] 
state, her physical state and her emotional state at 
the time that they were made.  Her demeanor, which is 
essential to credibility determination, which is an 
essential function of course of a jury, or trier of 
fact, are lost if we cannot present those recordings.  
In those recordings she looks like a terribly abused 
child that she was. 
¶93 Seeming to track the State's argument, the court 
concluded that the State was substantially prejudiced because 
the victim would not now be able to replicate the recorded 
testimony at trial: 
I think there's a real risk that she has, in fact, 
again just given the passage of time and the clarity 
and specificity of her testimony there's no way that 
she could ever be expected to reproduce the testimony 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
46 
 
she gave in the Safe Harbor tapes and she shouldn't be 
forced to, . . . . 
¶94 In addition to the passage of time, the court 
reasonably considered how A.O.'s therapy would impact her 
ability to testify at trial, and thus prejudice the State.  The 
State argued that A.O.'s progress in therapy meant that she 
would not present the same testimony at trial: 
Fortunately for her now, she's doing very well and 
looks great and that's not the same presentation that 
would be made at trial at this point in time.  It 
wouldn't accurately reflect how she appeared at the 
time and that is a substantial prejudice that the 
State would suffer. 
¶95 The court apparently agreed with the State and 
concluded: 
I have to believe that part of [A.O.'s] therapy 
and recovery from everything that happened to her has 
included a need to forget somewhat, to move on, to 
move forward, to try to make the best of the future 
life in an attempt to overcome the harm that was done 
to her.  If she is indeed successful in her recovery 
and therapy, then hopefully some of the things she's 
already forgotten.  I hope for her sake that's the 
case.  
¶96 The 
State 
further 
argued 
that 
it 
would 
be 
substantially prejudiced 
if it lost these contemporaneous 
recordings, as they are the most accurate testimony available:  
She was 14 years old at the time that she was 
found.  She was interviewed days after she was rescued 
and the video recordings are now close to 20 months 
old.  She was a child witness.  And those video 
recordings are precluded from being admitted because 
she turned 16 a few days ago.  Those video recordings 
are the most accurate testimony available of what 
happened of her view at that point in time. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
47 
 
¶97 The circuit court agreed that, given her age, A.O. 
would not appear to be the same victim at trial: 
The age of the victim as reflected in the tapes is 
significant.  And today if she was forced to testify 
of the passage of time from when the events occurred 
is significant here. 
¶98 Thus, the court did weigh and consider whether the 
State would be substantially prejudiced if it were required to 
rely on A.O. as a witness without being able to present the 
recordings under Wis. Stat. § 908.08.  The court determined that 
these recordings were compelling and powerful.  The court 
concluded that substantial prejudice would befall the State if 
it were required to proceed without being able to introduce the 
recordings under § 908.08.  The court found that A.O. would be 
unable to convey the same message at trial without the § 908.08 
presentation.  The passage of time and the State's inability to 
introduce the audiovisual recordings under § 908.08 constituted 
substantial prejudice.  The court concluded that it was "an 
absolutely clear and easy call" that the State would be 
substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her 
pleas.  The court's conclusions regarding the impact on the 
victim were reasonable.  Losing the ability to introduce the 
recordings under § 908.08 would not merely result in the same 
testimony being presented in a different form, but the State 
would be substantially prejudiced because, as the State put it: 
"central to this trial and central to the evidence in this case 
are the video recorded statements taken by detectives at Safe 
Harbor of [A.O.], the principal victim, . . . ."  Without 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
48 
 
admitting the recordings as envisioned under § 908.08, the State 
was left with a completely different and less compelling 
presentation of its evidence. 
¶99 Indeed, 
as 
part 
of 
its 
determination 
regarding 
substantial prejudice, the court considered relevant case law, 
and correctly concluded that the State would be substantially 
prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas: 
[L]ike the finding by the trial court in the Bollig 
case and the Rushing case that I referred to, because 
the State would face substantial prejudice to not be 
allowed to use the Safe Harbor tapes, the defendant's 
motion to withdraw her plea is denied. 
¶100 In Bollig and Rushing, the trial court determinations 
of substantial prejudice to the State were upheld by this court 
and the court of appeals respectively.  The substantial 
prejudice in Bollig and Rushing did not occur because the State 
lost the ability to introduce an audiovisual recording of the 
victim taken at a time nearly contemporaneous with the alleged 
offenses.  The substantial prejudice in Bollig and Rushing 
resulted from the fact that the victim's memory would likely 
have faded given a delay.  In the case at issue, not only does 
the State suffer the kind of prejudice which results from a 
delay impacting the victim's memory, but here the State suffers 
the additional loss of significant, persuasive, "compelling," 
audiovisual evidence that would otherwise have been admitted 
under Wis. Stat. § 908.08. 
¶101 In Bollig the defendant pled guilty to attempted 
sexual contact with a child under the age of 13 in violation of 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
49 
 
Wis. Stat. §§ 939.32(1) and 948.02(1) (1995-96).  Bollig, 232 
Wis. 2d 561, ¶3.  Seven months later, prior to sentencing but 
after having learned that he would be required to register as a 
sex offender, the defendant moved the court to withdraw his 
plea.  Id., ¶¶6-7.  The circuit court concluded that the 
defendant's misunderstanding regarding sex offender registration 
did constitute a "fair and just reason" for plea withdrawal.  
The court went further, however, to explain that even if this 
did constitute such a reason, the State would still be 
substantially prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to 
withdraw his plea.  Id., ¶¶6-7, 31-33.  The circuit court found 
substantial prejudice in that it would: 
soon be 2 years since the event occurred, and one, 
that has been a long time hanging over the head of the 
victim, secondly, the victim is a child, long time to 
expect evidence and testimony recollections to remain 
fresh, so that any trial that would be held at this 
late date might not, would not be fair to the victim, 
would not be fair to the state. 
State v. Bollig, 224 Wis. 2d 621, 640, 593 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 
1999).17 
¶102 On appeal, this court agreed that the State would be 
substantially prejudiced because the defendant's plea withdrawal 
"would hamper the victim's ability to recall pertinent events."  
Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶43.  As in the case at issue, the 
child victim in Bollig was available to testify, but the passage 
                                                 
17 The quotation of the trial court record is included in 
the court of appeals decision, but not in the opinion of this 
court. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
50 
 
of time would have rendered the victim's testimony less 
persuasive and, therefore, constituted substantial prejudice to 
the State.  Unlike the case at issue, however, in Bollig the 
State did not lose the ability to introduce an audiovisual 
recording of the child victim under Wis. Stat. § 908.08.  Here, 
the State would not only be prejudiced by the delay's impact on 
the testimony, as in Bollig, but in the case at issue, the State 
would also lose the ability to introduce the audiovisual 
recordings under § 908.08. 
¶103 In Rushing the substantial prejudice to the State was 
not due to the State losing the ability to admit audiovisual 
evidence, but rather, as in Bollig, it was due to the likely 
impact the delay would have on the victim's testimony.  The 
defendant in Rushing pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault 
of a child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (2004-05).  
Rushing, 305 Wis. 2d 739, ¶1.  Ten months later, but still 
before sentencing, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea.18  
The circuit court denied the defendant's motion, concluding that 
allowing the defendant to withdraw his plea would cause 
substantial prejudice to the State.  The court noted that a 
                                                 
18 The substantial time between the entry of the defendant's 
plea and his plea withdrawal is accounted for by an unusual 
procedural issue.  Two months after his plea hearing, the 
defendant proclaimed his innocence during 
the presentence 
investigation interview.  On learning this, the circuit court 
vacated the defendant's plea sua sponte.  Six months later, 
acknowledging that the vacatur was improperly entered, the court 
reinstated the defendant's plea.  It was at this point that the 
defendant filed his formal plea withdrawal motion. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
51 
 
video interview of the child, which the State intended to 
introduce at trial, was "'reflective of a [sic] extremely 
difficult child,' who 'appeared to be very reluctant, very hard 
to interview, very hyperactive, very unwilling to engage in the 
facts and circumstances in an——any substantial way.'"  Id., ¶9.  
Considering the passage of time, the court stated "'[w]e're now 
more than a year and a half away from the actual incident, and 
according to the affidavit provided by the State, his memory has 
clearly been impaired, and that's easy to understand, when one 
sees the videotape.'"  Id.  The court concluded that, despite 
the fact that the video recording would still have been 
admissible at trial, forcing the State to put this victim on the 
stand for cross-examination after the passage of such a 
substantial 
amount 
of 
time 
would 
constitute 
substantial 
prejudice to the State. 
¶104 The court of appeals agreed, concluding that the faded 
memory of a victim could result in less persuasive testimony, 
and thus cause substantial prejudice to the State.  Rushing, 305 
Wis. 2d 739, ¶16.  Like the case at issue, in Rushing the State 
had a fairly contemporaneous audiovisual recording of the 
victim.  Unlike the case at issue, however, the State in Rushing 
would not have been precluded from introducing that video at 
trial if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea.  
Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
determination that the State would be substantially prejudiced, 
even though, unlike the case at issue, the State would not 
otherwise lose the ability to present Wis. Stat. § 908.08 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
52 
 
evidence.  Compare State v. Nelson, 2005 WI App 113, 282 
Wis. 2d 502, 701 N.W.2d 32.19 
¶105 In sum, the substantial prejudice to the State in the 
case at issue encompasses not only the same kind of prejudice 
found in Bollig and Rushing, but unlike those cases, the State 
here also loses the ability to introduce audiovisual recordings 
of the victim under Wis. Stat. § 908.08.  Thus, the circuit 
court's conclusion that "this is an absolutely clear and easy 
call . . . to find that if the State was not allowed to use the 
Safe Harbor tapes it would result in substantial prejudice to 
the State" is quite defensible. 
¶106 Here, the circuit court's determination that the State 
would be substantially prejudiced is reasonable, consistent with 
Wisconsin 
precedent, 
and 
supported 
by 
the 
record. 
 
The 
substantial prejudice to the State in this case would result not 
only from the delay and faded memory of the victim, but also the 
loss of significant, persuasive, "compelling," and admissible 
audiovisual evidence under Wis. Stat. § 908.08.  The circuit 
court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it 
                                                 
19 In State v. Nelson the State alleged that it would be 
substantially prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to 
withdraw his pleas because it had "lost contact" with the 
victim.  2005 WI App 113, ¶19, 282 Wis. 2d 502, 701 N.W.2d 32.  
The State conceded that "at some point we probably would be able 
to locate [the victim] again."  Id.  The court concluded that, 
while the State "may have been somewhat inconvenienced" by the 
withdrawal of the defendant's pleas, the State "failed to meet 
its burden" to show substantial prejudice.  Id., ¶22.  These 
facts are dramatically different than the case at issue here. 
No. 
2011AP2733-CR   
 
53 
 
concluded that the State would be substantially prejudiced if 
Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
¶107 We hold that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it determined that the State would 
be substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw 
her pleas.  We sustain the discretionary determination of the 
circuit court because the record reflects that it was "the 
product of a rational mental process by which the facts of 
record and law relied upon are stated and are considered 
together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable 
determination."  Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 580.  Accordingly, we 
reverse the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶108 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  
This case 
presents issues arising from a defendant's motion to withdraw 
her no contest pleas before sentencing.  Current law on plea 
withdrawal before sentencing is summed up in paragraph 61 of the 
majority opinion: 
"Withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing is 
not an absolute right."  Jenkins, 303 Wis. 2d 157, ¶32 
(citing Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 583).  "[A] circuit 
court should 'freely allow a defendant to withdraw his 
plea prior to sentencing for any fair and just reason, 
unless 
the 
prosecution 
[would] 
be 
substantially 
prejudiced.'" 
 
Id., 
¶2 
(citing 
Bollig, 
232 
Wis. 2d 561, ¶28).  "[T]he burden is on the defendant 
to offer a fair and just reason for withdrawal of the 
plea" by a preponderance of the evidence.  Canedy, 161 
Wis. 2d at 583-84.  "[O]nce the defendant presents a 
fair and just reason, the burden shifts to the State 
to show substantial prejudice so as to defeat the plea 
withdrawal."  Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶34. 
Majority op., ¶61 (brackets in original). 
¶109 In Jenkins, this court observed that the state did not 
argue that it would be substantially prejudiced by Jenkins' plea 
withdrawal.  State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, ¶2, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 
736 N.W.2d 24.  "Therefore, the issues are whether Jenkins had a 
fair and just reason to withdraw his plea and how a reviewing 
court should review the circuit court's denial of Jenkins' 
motion."  Id.  The Jenkins court then provided a lengthy 
discussion of the fair and just reason rule, including its 
general principles and standard of review, its evolving history, 
its application in general, and its application to the facts of 
the Jenkins case.  Id., ¶¶28-91. 
¶110 Here, by contrast, "The State does not argue that 
Lopez failed to present a fair and just reason to withdraw her 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
pleas."  Majority op., ¶3.  Thus, the majority opinion "focuses 
on 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion in concluding that the State would be substantially 
prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas."  Id. 
¶111 In my view, three courts (including this court) have 
been forced to struggle with whether the defendant's plea 
withdrawals would substantially prejudice the State because they 
have tried to apply an obsolete rule.  Although I join the 
majority opinion, I write separately to suggest that the fair 
and just reason rule should be reexamined and revised so that a 
defendant is required to meet a higher burden for plea 
withdrawal before sentencing than the burden under current law.  
The fair and just reason rule is outmoded because it fails to 
account for nearly a half century of criminal justice reforms 
and because it often has no relation to fairness toward or 
prejudice to the defendant who is seeking to withdraw a plea.  
Circumstances today are different from circumstances existing 
when the fair and just reason rule was adopted.  The fair and 
just reason rule warrants reconsideration because it lacks a 
sound policy basis and minimizes important protections for 
defendants in the criminal justice system. 
I. FAIR AND JUST REASON RULE 
¶112 As stated in Jenkins, 303 Wis. 2d 157, ¶¶37-41, this 
court adopted the fair and just reason rule in 1967.  See State 
v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967).  The rule was 
derived from the American Bar Association (ABA) Project on 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
3 
 
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice——Pleas of Guilty § 2.1 
(Tentative Draft, Feb. 1967). 
¶113 Most of § 2.1 dealt with the withdrawal of guilty 
pleas after sentencing.  Section 2.1(a) of the tentative rule 
read in part as follows: "(a) The court should allow the 
defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere 
whenever the defendant, upon a timely motion for withdrawal, 
proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest 
injustice."  Id. (emphasis added). 
¶114 The 
language 
in 
paragraph 
(a) 
included 
three 
significant words or phrases: (1) "should"; (2) "timely"; and 
(3) "manifest injustice."  All three terms implicate judicial 
discretion following judicial fact-finding.  The rule used 
"should," not "shall," signaling discretion.  The rule pointed 
to "timely" motions to withdraw a plea, meaning that there was 
no admonition to the court to grant untimely motions.  "Manifest 
injustice" was a concept requiring development, some of which 
the ABA spelled out in several subparagraphs of paragraph (a).1 
                                                 
1 A court should allow a defendant to withdraw his plea due 
to a manifest injustice when the defendant proves: 
(1) he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel guaranteed to him by constitution, statute, or 
rule; 
(2) the plea was not entered or ratified by the 
defendant or a person authorized to so act in his 
behalf; 
(3) the plea was involuntary, or was entered 
without knowledge of the charge or that the sentence 
actually imposed could be imposed; or 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
4 
 
¶115 Paragraph (b) of the rule then provided: 
In the absence of a showing that withdrawal is 
necessary to correct a manifest injustice, a defendant 
may not withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere 
as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted 
by the court.  Before sentence, the court in its 
discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his 
plea 
for 
any 
fair 
and 
just 
reason 
unless 
the 
prosecution 
has 
been 
substantially 
prejudiced 
by 
reliance upon the defendant's plea. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
¶116 The last sentence in paragraph (b) appears almost as 
an afterthought.  The sentence clearly established more lenient 
criteria for plea withdrawal before sentencing, as though 
neither the state nor the defendant had much of a stake in a 
defendant's plea before sentencing, but the sentence did include 
the word "may" and the phrase "in its discretion." 
¶117 In February 1968 the ABA issued an Approved Draft of 
the Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty.  This court applied 
the Approved Draft in Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 121, 128-29, 
208 N.W.2d 331 (1973) and Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 482, 
247 N.W.2d 105 (1976), except that the court substituted the 
word "should" for the word "may" in each case. 
¶118 In effect, the court reworded the ABA rule to read: 
"Before sentence, the court should allow the defendant to 
                                                                                                                                                             
(4) he did not receive the charge or sentence 
concessions contemplated by the plea agreement and the 
prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not oppose 
these concessions as promised in the plea agreement. 
American Bar Association (ABA) Project on Minimum Standards for 
Criminal Justice——Pleas of Guilty § 2.1(a)(ii)(1)-(4) (Tentative 
Draft, Feb. 1967). 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
5 
 
withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason unless . . . ."  
In Dudrey, the court not only removed the words "in its 
discretion may" but also added the adverb "freely"——e.g., plea 
withdrawal "should be freely granted prior to sentencing."  
Dudrey, 74 Wis. 2d at 482 (emphasis added).2 
¶119 Wisconsin had a limitation, however, that did not 
appear in the ABA rule.  In 1969 the Wisconsin Legislature 
revised the Wisconsin criminal procedure code.  The revision 
created a new Wis. Stat. § 971.08(2) that read, "The court shall 
not permit the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or no contest 
later than 120 days after conviction."  § 63, ch. 255, Laws of 
1969.  This limitation was later deemed regulatory, not 
mandatory, in State v. Lee, 88 Wis. 2d 239, 246-47, 276 
N.W.2d 268 (1979), but the court still noted that it was not 
"inappropriate for the state to object to the consideration of a 
motion to withdraw a plea that was brought beyond the time 
prescribed by statutory regulation. . . .  [E]ntertaining an 
untimely motion to withdraw a plea would ordinarily constitute 
an abuse of discretion."  Id. at 247. 
                                                 
2 "In 1979 the ABA standard was revised to read as follows: 
'After entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and before 
sentence, the court should allow the defendant to withdraw the 
plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has 
been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's 
plea.'"  State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, ¶40, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 
N.W.2d 24 (quoting State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, 581, 469 
N.W.2d 163 (1991)). 
Thus, this court adopted "should" six years before the ABA, 
and it added the adverb "freely," which does not appear in the 
ABA rule. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
6 
 
¶120 In 
1984 
the 
legislature 
repealed 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(2).  1983 Wis. Act 219, § 43.  This removed any 
explicit time limitation between a defendant's plea and a 
defendant's sentence during which a defendant could move to 
withdraw a plea. 
¶121 In sum, since 1967, Wisconsin law has often appeared 
to be moving to make it ever easier for a defendant to withdraw 
a plea before sentencing at the same time it was making the 
process of taking a plea more complex and more difficult.  This 
inconsistency is too blatant to ignore. 
II. CHANGES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
¶122 When the ABA adopted its rule on plea withdrawal in 
1967, it stated that the "process [of taking pleas before a 
trial] has received relatively little attention as compared to 
the actual trial of criminal cases."  ABA Project on Minimum 
Standards for Criminal Justice——Pleas of Guilty 5 (Tentative 
Draft, Feb. 1967).  As a result, "the practices in cases which 
are disposed of without trial are far from uniform."  Id.  Thus, 
the objective of the proposed rule on plea withdrawal——designed 
for the entire nation——was not "to bring about a substantial 
shift away from the practice whereby trial-avoiding pleas are 
obtained and accepted.  Rather, the attempt is to formulate 
procedures which will maximize the benefits of conviction 
without trial and minimize the risks of unfair or inaccurate 
results."  Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
7 
 
¶123 Preservation of Wisconsin's "any fair and just reason 
rule" disregards the sea changes in criminal procedure since the 
late 1960s.3  Some of these changes are noted below. 
A. Defendant's Right to Counsel 
¶124 Section 1.3 (Aid of counsel; time for deliberation) of 
the ABA's Tentative Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty 
provided in part that:  
(a) A defendant should not be called upon to 
plead until he has had an opportunity to retain 
counsel or, if he is eligible for appointment of 
counsel, until counsel has been appointed or waived.  
A defendant with counsel should not be required to 
enter a plea if his counsel makes a reasonable request 
for additional time to represent the defendant's 
interests. 
                                                 
3 The current state of criminal procedure makes a lenient 
plea withdrawal standard unnecessary.  Detailed plea colloquies 
seemed to influence the federal rule's shift [former Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 32(d), present Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B)] from 
allowing plea withdrawal unless the government could show 
prejudice to allowing withdrawal only if the defendant could 
show a fair and just reason. 
Given the great care with which guilty pleas are now 
taken——including placing the plea agreement on the 
record, making full inquiry into the voluntariness of 
the plea, advising the defendant in detail concerning 
his 
rights 
and 
the 
consequences 
of 
his 
plea, 
determining 
that 
the 
defendant 
understands 
these 
matters, and determining that the plea is accurate——
there is no reason to view pleas so taken as merely 
"tentative," subject to withdrawal before sentence 
whenever the government cannot establish prejudice. 
5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.5(a), at 868 
(3d ed. 2007) (internal footnote omitted).  The view that pleas 
are merely "tentative" until after sentencing is inconsistent 
with contemporary practice. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
8 
 
¶125 These principles, which appear so fundamental today, 
were not nationally recognized until the 1960s and 1970s.  It 
must be remembered that in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), 
the United States Supreme Court determined that even though an 
indigent defendant requested counsel, the law did not require 
that defendants be appointed an attorney in all cases.  Id. at 
457, 473.  The Supreme Court reconsidered the issue and 
overruled Betts in 1963.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
339 (1963).  In Gideon, the Supreme Court determined that a 
defendant has the right to an attorney, even if he cannot afford 
one.  Id. at 344 ("[I]n our adversary system of criminal 
justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a 
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him.  This seems to us to be an obvious truth.").  
The right to counsel spans the spectrum of criminal offenses for 
which a defendant may be imprisoned, from felony to misdemeanor, 
and no defendant may be imprisoned if he has been denied the 
right to counsel.  Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 
(1972). 
¶126 Argersinger 
(involving 
the 
right 
to 
counsel 
in 
misdemeanor cases) was not decided until five years after the 
tentative ABA rule on plea withdrawal was issued.  See id. 
¶127 In sharp contrast, Wisconsin has recognized a criminal 
defendant's right to counsel for more than 150 years.  See 
Carpenter v. Cnty. of Dane, 9 Wis. 249 (*274) (1859).  "Section 
7 of art. I., of the constitution of this state, and § 2 of 
chap. 164, R. S., 1859, humanely and wisely provide that in all 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
9 
 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be 
heard by himself and counsel . . . ."  Id. at 251 (*275-76); see 
also State ex rel. Traister v. Mahoney, 196 Wis. 113, 122, 219 
N.W. 380 (1928) ("The right of any one accused of a criminal 
offense 
to 
be 
heard 
by 
counsel 
is 
guaranteed 
by 
our 
constitution, art. 1, sec. 7.").  Carpenter determined that 
circuit courts have the power and the duty to appoint an 
attorney for a defendant who cannot afford one, and the attorney 
may recover his fees from the county.  Carpenter, 9 Wis. at 252-
53 (*277-78).  The court in Carpenter reasoned that "it would be 
a reproach upon the administration of justice, if a person, thus 
upon trial, could not have the assistance of legal counsel 
because he was too poor to secure it."  Id. at 251 (*275). 
¶128 Reference in the 1967 ABA standards to the right to 
counsel helps to place the plea withdrawal rule in historical 
context.  Today, failing to provide counsel to an indigent 
defendant or ineffective assistance of counsel to a defendant 
would provide compelling reasons to withdraw a plea before or 
after sentencing.  However, these sound reasons are not present 
in this case. 
B. Defendant's Right to Make Plea Decision 
¶129 Section 3.2 (Relationship between defense counsel and 
client) of the 1967 ABA standards reads in part: "(a) Defense 
counsel should conclude a plea agreement only with the consent 
of the defendant, and should ensure that the decision whether to 
enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is ultimately made by 
the defendant." 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
10 
 
¶130 In Wisconsin, the decision to plead guilty or no 
contest must be made personally by the defendant.  State v. 
Burns, 226 Wis. 2d 762, 771, 594 N.W.2d 799 (1999), and normally 
a defendant will be asked on the record how she pleads so that 
her decision is expressly and personally stated on the record.  
As will be noted below, these principles do not help the 
defendant in this case. 
C. Plea Questionnaire and Waiver of Rights Form 
¶131 This court has attempted to assure that criminal 
defense attorneys conscientiously represent their clients.  One 
effective tool is the plea questionnaire.  Plea questionnaires 
and waiver of rights forms serve as checklists for attorneys and 
defendants, in an effort to provide reasonable certainty that 
all critical issues will be discussed during the attorney-client 
relationship before the defendant enters a plea. 
¶132 In all probability, plea questionnaires were not 
widely used in the 1960s.  The first reference to a plea 
questionnaire in a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision did not 
appear until 1986.  State v. Carter, 131 Wis. 2d 69, 73, 389 
N.W.2d 1 (1986) (referring to a 1983 Milwaukee County form).  
The Wisconsin Court Records Management Committee appears not to 
have developed a uniform form for the state until June of 1998. 
¶133 Today's plea questionnaires are very detailed and may 
include parallel text in a different language to assist a 
defendant who is not fluent in English.  The Spanish language 
questionnaire used by Minerva Lopez (Lopez) was first published 
in January 2006. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
11 
 
D. Comprehensive Plea Colloquies 
¶134 Notwithstanding a defendant's representation by an 
attorney and the defendant's likely use of a plea questionnaire, 
this court has supplemented the plea requirements of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08 
and 
mandated 
an 
extensive, 
time-consuming 
plea 
colloquy, State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶35, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906; State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986), 
to 
reinforce 
a 
defendant's 
understanding 
of 
the 
circumstances with respect to his case, court procedure, and the 
law, and to assure that any plea he makes is knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary. 
¶135 The Brown court hailed the importance of the landmark 
Bangert decision and quoted heavily from it.  The Brown court 
explained: 
To 
head 
off 
postconviction 
hearings 
on 
plea 
withdrawals, the [Bangert] court said:  
We reiterate that the duty to comply 
with 
the 
plea 
hearing 
procedures 
falls 
squarely on the trial judge. We understand 
that 
most 
trial 
judges 
are 
under 
considerable calendar constraints, but it is 
of paramount importance that judges devote 
the time necessary to ensure that a plea 
meets the constitutional standard. The plea 
hearing colloquy must not be reduced to a 
perfunctory exchange. It demands the trial 
court's "utmost solicitude." 
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶33 (quoting Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
278-79). 
 
"Such 
solicitude 
will 
serve 
to 
forestall 
postconviction motions, which have an even more detrimental 
effect on a trial court's time limitations than do properly 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
12 
 
conducted plea hearings."  Id. (quoting Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
279). 
¶136 Plea colloquies of great length and detail simply did 
not exist at the time the guilty plea withdrawal rule was 
adopted.  Today it is counterproductive to require circuit 
courts to adhere to the comprehensive plea colloquy outlined in 
Brown and then to instruct them that plea withdrawals should be 
freely granted prior to sentencing for any fair and just reason. 
¶137 If a defendant's plea is not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary, the plea constitutes a "manifest injustice" and the 
defendant may withdraw the plea before or after sentencing.  If 
the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, 
the defendant may withdraw the plea before or after sentencing.  
State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 311, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996); 
State v. Rock, 92 Wis. 2d 554, 558-59, 285 N.W.2d 739 (1979).  
Grounds for "manifest injustice" enumerated in the original ABA 
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice——Pleas of 
Guilty § 2.1 (Tentative Draft, Feb. 1967) or in the revised ABA 
Standards 
for 
Criminal 
Justice——Pleas 
of 
Guilty 
§ 14-
2.1(b)(i)(A)-(D)4 (3d ed. 1999), and any "manifest injustice" 
found in Wisconsin case law justifying plea withdrawal after 
sentencing would permit plea withdrawal before sentencing. 
¶138 In my view, the court should not permit a defendant to 
withdraw a plea before sentencing unless the defendant is able 
to prove a manifest injustice, provided that the defendant has 
                                                 
4 The grounds for manifest injustice in ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice——Pleas of Guilty § 14-2.1(b)(i)(E)-(F) (3d ed. 
1999) are inapplicable under Wisconsin law. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
13 
 
been accorded the rights and procedural protections in relation 
to pleas that have been enshrined in our law.  Our system should 
always seek to promote the fair treatment of defendants, but it 
should not be captive to manipulation by defendants. 
III. LOPEZ'S PLEA WITHDRAWAL 
¶139 The facts in this case undermine the claim of a fair 
and just reason for the defendant to withdraw her pleas. 
¶140 On October 2, 2008, the State issued a complaint 
charging Lopez with 15 counts of various forms of child abuse.  
Lopez waived the preliminary examination and was bound over for 
trial. 
¶141 The State filed an information and Lopez was arraigned 
on November 3, 2008. 
¶142 On July 24, 2009, the State amended the information so 
that Lopez was charged with 22 counts of criminal conduct 
related to her daughter. 
¶143 On November 19, 2009, the defendant accepted a plea 
bargain and entered pleas of no contest to six counts of the 
information, namely, Counts 1, 8, 12, 15, 18, and 21.  Counts 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 22 were 
dismissed and read in, and one sentence enhancer was dismissed. 
¶144 The court conducted multiple hearings following the 
defendant's initial appearance.  The court engaged interpreters 
for all these hearings.  The defendant was represented by three 
attorneys——Taavi McMahon, Andrew Martinez, and Mark Maciolek——
all of whom spoke Spanish and all of whom sought to withdraw 
from the case because of alleged dissatisfaction by the 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
14 
 
defendant.5  Attorney Maciolek represented Lopez from April 17, 
2009, through her plea hearing on November 19, 2009, until March 
23, 2010.  In short, Attorney Maciolek represented Lopez for 
seven months before Lopez entered a plea. 
¶145 The defendant had more than a year to think about her 
case prior to her plea.  The court set a date for trial at a 
scheduling hearing on August 13, 2009——three months before the 
plea——and 
it 
informed 
the 
parties 
then 
that 
no 
further 
continuances would be permitted.  The defendant knew for two 
months before her plea that the State would be able to use the 
Safe Harbor videotapes of interviews with her daughter if the 
case went to trial. 
¶146 After Judge Stuart Schwartz retired on October 2, 
2009, the Lopez case was assigned to Circuit Judge Stephen 
Ehlke.  The defendant promptly filed a motion for substitution.  
When a new judge, Nicholas J. McNamara, was assigned, he denied 
the defendant's motion for a 30-day extension.  The defendant 
suddenly pled the next day. 
¶147 As noted above, Attorney Maciolek and the defendant 
went over a four-page plea questionnaire in Spanish as well as 
English.  Lopez signed the document.  She indicated that she was 
33 years old, had 12 years of schooling, and had reviewed the 
entire document with her attorney.  She signed her name 
immediately below the statement: "Pido al juez que acepte mi 
                                                 
5 Attorney Maciolek was not permitted to withdraw until well 
after the plea. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
15 
 
declaración y me declare culpable."  (I am asking the court to 
accept my plea and find me guilty). 
¶148 At Lopez's plea hearing, Judge McNamara conducted a 
textbook plea colloquy.6  He read the six counts to which she 
pled, one at a time, and accepted the defendant's plea on each 
charge, asking follow-up questions to ensure that the defendant 
understood the implications of the pleas. 
¶149 The defendant was responsive to the court's questions.  
She once spoke up saying that she did not understand, and the 
court rephrased the question.  The defendant acknowledged that 
she had gone over the Spanish language plea questionnaire with 
her attorney.  "[A]re you confident that you understood all of 
the questions and the information contained on the plea 
questionnaire and waiver of rights form?" the court asked.  
"Yes, Your Honor," she replied. 
¶150 Another time, the court asked: "Right now of course 
you're receiving a translation.  Are you satisfied with the 
                                                 
6 At a motion hearing May 10, 2010, Judge McNamara made the 
following comment: 
As counsel well knows I'm not only a relatively new 
judge to the bench, but relatively new to the world of 
criminal cases.  And as such I can honestly say that 
in such things as taking a plea, it's been my absolute 
effort and intention to be very conscientious about 
the sufficiency, the legality of the pleas that I've 
taken. . . .  I can say in all of the pleas that I've 
taken since I've taken the bench, . . . I have never 
intend[ed] to cut corners and go quickly . . . , and I 
know . . . with every plea I've taken I've intended to 
make sure that I was technically doing everything that 
I was obligated to do to have a fair and sufficient 
plea.  Not just for the record, but really in fairness 
to all the parties involved. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
16 
 
translation that you are receiving?"  "Yes, Your Honor," the 
defendant replied. 
¶151 There were other pertinent questions: 
THE COURT: And have you entered your pleas today 
freely and voluntarily? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 . . . . 
THE COURT: And are you satisfied that this plea is 
being 
made 
voluntarily, 
intelligently 
and 
with 
understanding? 
MR. MACIOLEK: I am. 
¶152 Four months later, on March 19, 2010, the court 
received a pro se motion from the defendant to withdraw her 
pleas.  She accused Attorney Maciolek of wantonly taking 
advantage 
of 
her 
emotional 
distress, 
confusion, 
and 
disorientation, 
and 
forcing 
her 
to 
accept 
pleas 
without 
explanation.  She claimed that her attorney never advised her to 
reject pleas if she did not fully understand the charges and 
penalties. 
¶153 On May 10, 2010, almost six months after her pleas, 
the defendant's fourth attorney filed a formal motion for plea 
withdrawal.  The motion claimed, in part:  
1. 
That the defendant was unable to make a 
knowing plea as a result of the failure of previous 
counsel to fully explain the elements of the crime, 
maximum penalties, and likely outcome of the plea; 
2. 
That during the colloquy with [the] court, 
the defendant was excessively compliant and overly 
deferential to the court to the extent that her 
answers were made out of respect and deference to the 
court rather than actual understanding of the meaning 
of the court's questions;  
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
17 
 
3. 
That the defendant was rushed into making a 
decision 
regarding 
the 
plea 
without 
adequate 
opportunity to consult and confer with people in her 
support network who had been supporting her and 
advising her since the beginning of her incarceration;  
 . . . . 
6. 
As a result of one or all of the above 
assertions, 
the 
defendant's 
pleas 
were 
not 
intelligent, knowing, or voluntary. 
¶154 The majority opinion sums up the defendant's fair and 
just reasons: "Lopez contended that her pleas were rushed, and 
that she entered her pleas unknowingly due to her limited 
English."  Majority op., ¶3 n.2.   
¶155 The defendant's contention that she did not understand 
what she was doing when she entered the pleas disregards both 
the length of time that passed between the initial charges and 
the plea colloquy and the extensive efforts throughout to 
accommodate the defendant's language deficiencies.  If the court 
interpreters, 
Spanish 
language 
forms, 
and 
Spanish-speaking 
attorneys were insufficient, one wonders what more could have 
been done and what sort of disturbing precedent would be set by 
this case. 
¶156 The claim that Lopez was "rushed" into making her 
pleas may find superficial support in Judge McNamara's comment 
that "of course all the parties know that this plea hearing came 
very quickly"——namely, the day after a status conference.  
However, the prosecutor, Corey Stephan, commented during the 
plea hearing that "[w]e didn't think that there was ever going 
to be a plea in this case."   
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
18 
 
¶157 In explaining to the court why the plea was in the 
public interest, Stephan stated: 
I don't think this is letting this defendant off easy.  
I think that this is giving her an opportunity to 
accept 
responsibility 
for 
the 
offense 
and 
I 
think . . . any time a defendant asks for a plea 
agreement, I think that we're to come in and make a 
good faith effort to resolve the case and I will tell 
you that this offer that we are presenting here today 
is 
substantially 
the 
same 
offer 
that 
has 
been 
available to her since the middle of the summer.  It's 
just that she now wishes to accept it, and there were 
some minor detail changes that I don't think that we 
need to get into here, but it's substantially the same 
offer, nothing really changed, but she is now in a 
place where she wishes to accept it and I think it's 
in the best interest of the State and the child to 
step forward and accept the offer on behalf of the 
State and to re-extend our offer. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶158 There is no evidence that the defendant's attorney 
pressured her into entering a plea against her will, and the 
circuit court so found.  In all probability, Attorney Maciolek 
counseled the defendant to reflect on the strength of the 
State's evidence and the possibility that contrition and remorse 
on her part would play better than defiance, blame-shifting, and 
unwarranted claims that extreme child abuse was a "family matter 
not criminal in nature."  (See Defendant's Pro Se Motion filed 
March 19, 2010.) 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
19 
 
¶159 Finally, the motions to withdraw the defendant's pleas 
were untimely under any reasonable standard.7 
¶160 Judge McNamara determined that the defendant had 
offered a fair and just reason for withdrawing her pleas,8 but he 
concluded 
that 
plea 
withdrawal 
would 
be 
substantially 
prejudicial to the State. 
¶161 It would be hard for this court to conclude that Judge 
McNamara's first determination was an erroneous exercise of 
                                                 
7 Judge McNamara noted that Lopez "certainly did not 
expeditiously seek to withdraw her plea.  She waited until the 
trial and conviction and sentencing of her husband.  She waited 
until approximately ten days after the Court received the 
presentence investigation report with a recommendation for a 
sentence by the Department of Corrections." 
8 Although Judge McNamara determined that Lopez established 
a fair and just reason for withdrawing her pleas, he astutely 
noted that a defendant's burden to establish a fair and just 
reason is quite low: 
The second aspect as to whether or not Ms. Lopez 
has shown a fair or just reason to withdraw her plea 
is a little trickier.  I do believe that the law on 
that is at times conflicting.  As was noted by Mr. 
Glinberg there needs to be something more than just a 
desire to have a trial, at the same time all of the 
cases really indicate that there just needs to be a 
mere showing or adequate reason for the defendant's 
change of heart.  And it's clearly a relatively low 
burden of proof for the defendant to show that she has 
a fair and just reason to withdraw her plea.  In the 
various cases such as Shanks or Libke, the kinds of 
things that would constitute a fair and just reason 
for withdrawing the plea includes an assertion of 
innocence, a genuine misunderstanding of the pleas' 
consequences, and hasty entry of the plea, confusion 
on the defendant's part, coercion by trial counsel, 
and also whether the defendant sought to withdraw the 
plea 
expeditiously 
or 
efficiently 
or 
relatively 
quickly. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.dtp 
 
20 
 
discretion, given the current state of the law.  However, Judge 
McNamara, whose performance was absolutely superior, was trying 
to apply law that no longer makes any sense. 
¶162 That is why the fair and just reason rule must be 
reconsidered. 
¶163 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶164 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this concurrence. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶165 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I join 
Justice Bradley's dissent.   
¶166 I write separately to put into perspective Justice 
Prosser's concurrence on the continued use of the "fair and just 
reason" standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to 
sentencing.  The concurrence asserts that it is inconsistent to 
impose stringent plea colloquy requirements on circuit courts to 
ensure knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty pleas and to 
apply simultaneously the "fair and just reason" standard to 
allow 
withdrawal 
of 
a 
guilty 
plea 
prior 
to 
sentencing.  
Concurrence, ¶121. 
¶167 This issue has not been addressed by the parties. 
¶168 The concurrence's comments on the "fair and just 
reason" standard, in my opinion, should be read in the following 
contexts:  
(A) National and state authorities proposing criminal 
procedure 
rules 
and 
standards 
have 
simultaneously 
recognized refinements to guilty plea colloquy requirements 
while retaining the "fair and just reason" standard for 
withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing;  
(B) The policies favoring the "fair and just reason" 
standard for withdrawal of guilty pleas prior to sentencing 
remain salient;  
(C) Wisconsin case law on the "fair and just reason" 
standard 
has 
evolved 
to 
meet 
the 
changing 
criminal 
procedure landscape;  
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
(D) The "fair and just reason" standard supplements 
the defendant's remedies for arguably deficient plea 
colloquies under State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986); and  
(E) The concurrence advocates the manifest injustice 
standard to replace the "fair and just reason" standard for 
guilty plea withdrawal, despite the concurring justice's 
criticism of the "manifest injustice" standard as unclear 
and difficult.1 
A 
¶169 Much of the concurrence's reasoning for rejecting the 
"fair and just reason" standard rests upon the notion that there 
has been a sea change in the requirements for the colloquy 
before a circuit court accepts a plea of guilty since Wisconsin 
adopted the "fair and just reason" standard based on the ABA's 
1967 standards.2  Concurrence, ¶123.   
¶170 I agree that this court should be open to reexamining 
case law to conform to changes in the law.   
¶171 Yet entities that propose and codify rules of criminal 
procedure continue to urge use of the "fair and just reason" 
standard.  See, for example, the American Bar Association's 1999 
                                                 
1 State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, ¶71, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 
N.W.2d 482 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
2 American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal 
Justice, 
Standards 
Relating 
to 
Pleas 
of 
Guilty 
§ 2.1(b) 
(Approved Draft 1968); Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 121, 128-29, 
208 N.W.2d 331 (1973) (rejecting the manifest injustice standard 
in favor of the "fair and just reason" standard based on the 
1967 ABA standards). 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
revised criminal justice standards,3 the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure,4 the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure,5 
and the Wisconsin Judicial Council's most recent proposed 
revisions to criminal procedure. 
¶172 The ABA reaffirmed its commitment to the "fair and 
just reason" standard when it revised its criminal justice 
standards in 1999.6  This comprehensive reworking of the ABA's 
criminal justice standards incorporated changes in criminal 
procedure since 1967, including increased protections for 
defendants at guilty plea colloquies.7  Nonetheless, the ABA 
continues to use the "fair and just reason" standard, noting 
that "[t]his test frequently has been applied to presentence 
plea withdrawal motions in the federal courts and in many state 
courts."8   
                                                 
3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice:  Pleas of Guilty (3d 
ed. 1999). 
4 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2). 
5 Unif. R. Crim. P. 444(g), 10 U.L.A. 123 (1987). 
6 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pleas of Guilty Std. 
14-2.1 (3d ed. 1999) ("After entry of a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere and before sentence, the court should allow the 
defendant to withdraw the plea for any fair and just reason."). 
7 See, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice:  Pleas of 
Guilty Std. 14-1.4 at 35-39 (3d ed. 1999) (historical note and 
commentary) (requiring that defendants understand not only the 
nature and elements of the offense, but also the "terms and 
conditions of any plea agreement"). 
8 See, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice:  Pleas of 
Guilty Std. 14-2.1 at 85-86 (3d ed. 1999) (historical note and 
commentary). 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶173 The most recent version of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure sets forth numerous requirements for a plea 
colloquy prior to court acceptance of a guilty plea,9 while 
                                                 
9 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) states: 
(b) Considering and Accepting a Guilty or Nolo 
Contendere Plea. 
(1) 
Advising 
and 
Questioning 
the 
Defendant. 
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere, the defendant may be placed under 
oath, and the court must address the defendant 
personally in open court.  During this address, 
the court must inform the defendant of, and 
determine that the defendant understands, the 
following: 
(A) the government's right, in a prosecution for 
perjury or false statement, to use against the 
defendant any statement that the defendant gives 
under oath; 
(B) the right to plead not guilty, or having 
already so pleaded, to persist in that plea; 
(C) the right to a jury trial; 
(D) the right to be represented by counsel——and 
if necessary have the court appoint counsel——at 
trial and at every other stage of the proceeding; 
(E) the right at trial to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses, to be protected from 
compelled 
self-incrimination, 
to 
testify 
and 
present evidence, and to compel the attendance of 
witnesses; 
(F) the defendant's waiver of these trial rights 
if the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere; 
(G) the nature of each charge to which the 
defendant is pleading; 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
continuing to affirm a commitment to the "fair and just reason" 
standard.  Federal Rule 11(d)(2)(B) states:  "A defendant may 
withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere . . . after the 
court 
accepts 
the 
plea, 
but 
before 
it 
imposes 
sentence 
                                                                                                                                                             
(H) 
any 
maximum 
possible 
penalty, 
including 
imprisonment, 
fine, 
and 
term 
of 
supervised 
release; 
(I) any mandatory minimum penalty; 
(J) any applicable forfeiture; 
(K) the court's authority to order restitution; 
(L) the court's obligation to impose a special 
assessment; 
(M) in determining a sentence, the court's 
obligation 
to 
calculate 
the 
applicable 
sentencing-guideline range and to consider that 
range, possible departures under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, and other sentencing factors under 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a); 
(N) the terms of any plea-agreement provision 
waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally 
attack the sentence; and 
(O) that, if convicted, a defendant who is not a 
United States citizen may be removed from the 
United States, denied citizenship, and denied 
admission to the United States in the future. 
(2) Ensuring That a Plea Is Voluntary.  Before 
accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the 
court must address the defendant personally in open 
court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did 
not result from force, threats, or promises (other 
than promises in a plea agreement). 
(3) Determining the Factual Basis for a Plea.  Before 
entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must 
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
if . . . the defendant can show a fair and just reason for 
requesting the withdrawal." 
¶174 The Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure also use the 
"fair and just reason" standard,10 despite extensive plea 
colloquy requirements similar to those in the ABA standards and 
the federal rules.11   
 
¶175 The Wisconsin Judicial Council, which for over ten 
years has considered changes to criminal procedure, has recently 
proposed a bill that imposes the "fair and just reason" standard 
for plea withdrawal prior to sentencing, with a remedy that 
restores both the State and the defendant to the positions they 
were in prior to the plea.12 
                                                 
10 Unif. R. Crim. P. 444 (g), 10 U.L.A. 123 (1987). 
11 Unif. R. Crim. P. 444(c), 10 U.L.A. 120-21 (1987). 
12 2013 Wis. Assembly Bill 383, § 732, reads in relevant 
part: 
SECTION 732.  971.093 of the statutes is created to 
read: 
971.093  Withdrawal of a plea of guilty or no contest.    
(1)  BEFORE SENTENCING.  The court shall grant a 
motion that is made before sentencing to withdraw a 
plea of guilty or no contest if a fair and just reason 
for doing so is established. 
. . . . 
(3)  REMEDY.  When the court grants a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest under this 
section, the judgment of conviction is vacated, the 
original charge or charges reinstated, and the parties 
are restored to the position they were in before the 
plea and any related plea agreement was accepted. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
 
¶176 Thus, it appears that the entities and organizations 
that propose and codify new criminal procedure standards have 
not taken the concurrence's suggestion to reject the "fair and 
just reason" standard.  On the contrary, they have repeatedly 
affirmed the "fair and just reason" standard for withdrawal of 
guilty pleas prior to sentencing. 
B 
¶177 Important policy rationales underlie the continued 
application of the "fair and just reason" standard for guilty 
plea withdrawal prior to sentencing: (1) judicial efficiency in 
reducing appeals; and (2) fairness to the defendant.  These 
rationales have not been undermined by more rigorous plea 
colloquy requirements. 
¶178 As the concurrence rightly notes, any standard must 
"formulate procedures which will maximize the benefits of 
conviction without trial and minimize the risks of unfair or 
inaccurate results."  Concurrence, ¶122 (quoting American Bar 
Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice——
Pleas of Guilty 5 (Tentative Draft, Feb. 1967)).   
¶179 Regarding the rationale of judicial efficiency, courts 
have noted that "[t]he liberal rule for withdrawal of a guilty 
plea 
before 
sentence 
is 
consistent 
with 
the 
efficient 
administration of criminal justice":13 
• It reduces the number of appeals contesting the 
'knowing and voluntariness' of a guilty plea.  
                                                 
13 United States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276, 1279 (3d Cir. 
1970). 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
• It avoids the difficulties of disentangling such 
claims.14  
¶180 Regarding the rationale of fairness to the defendant, 
the 1999 ABA commentary to its use of the "fair and just reason" 
standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing 
explains that the standard balances the goals of maximizing the 
benefits of conviction without trial while minimizing the risks 
of unfairness as follows: 
• The conviction is not yet final.  
• The court has not taken the time to weigh an 
appropriate sentence.  
• No appeal from the judgment is possible.   
• If the defendant has second thoughts before 
sentencing about having pleaded guilty, this fact 
may suggest that the plea was entered without 
sufficient understanding and contemplation.   
• Given the considerable care pursuant to which 
pleas are required to be taken, it is difficult 
to justify allowing a defendant to withdraw a 
plea without any reason at all.15 
¶181 The ABA's reasoning for using a "fair and just reason" 
standard is spot-on, even if plea colloquies now better ensure 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty pleas. 
¶182 Additionally, courts have persuasively explained a 
distinction between the policy for a "fair and just reason" 
standard for guilty plea withdrawal prior to sentencing and the 
                                                 
14 These bullet points are stylized from Young, 424 F.2d at 
1279.   
15 These bullet points are stylized from ABA Standards for 
Criminal 
Justice: 
 
Pleas 
of 
Guilty 
Std. 
14-2.1 
at 
85 
(commentary) (3d ed. 1999). 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
policy for a more stringent standard after sentencing.  State v. 
Olish, 266 S.E.2d 134 (W. Va. 1980), summarizes three reasons 
for applying a more stringent standard for post-sentencing plea 
withdrawal: 
• First, once sentence is imposed, the defendant is 
more likely to view the plea bargain as a 
tactical mistake and therefore wish to have it 
set aside.  
• Second, at the time the sentence is imposed, 
other portions of the plea bargain agreement will 
often be performed by the prosecutor, such as the 
dismissal of additional charges or the return or 
destruction of physical evidence, all of which 
may be difficult to undo if the defendant later 
attacks his guilty plea.  
• Finally, a higher post-sentence standard for 
withdrawal is required by the settled policy of 
giving 
finality 
to 
criminal 
sentences 
which 
result from a voluntary and properly counseled 
guilty plea.16 
¶183 The Olish court's reasoning matches up with the 
reasoning in our case law justifying the "fair and just reason" 
standard for guilty plea withdrawal prior to sentencing and the 
more stringent standard for guilty plea withdrawal after 
sentencing.  Our court has stated that a more stringent post-
sentence standard "reflects the State's interest in the finality 
of convictions, and reflects the fact that the presumption of 
innocence no longer exists."  State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, ¶48, 
                                                 
16 These bullet points are stylized from the Olish case.  
State v. Olish, 266 S.E.2d 134, 136 (W. Va. 1980).   
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
347 Wis. 2d 30, 62, 829 N.W.2d 482 (internal quotation marks and 
quoted source omitted).17  
¶184 In trying to support its position that increased 
protection 
for 
defendants 
during 
plea 
colloquies 
renders 
unnecessary the "fair and just reason" standard for plea 
withdrawal prior to sentencing, the concurrence quotes 5 Wayne 
R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.5(a), at 868 (3d ed. 
2007).  Concurrence, ¶123 n.3.  It is not clear why the 
concurrence refers to Professor LaFave.  LaFave does not support 
the concurrence's position that the "fair and just reason" 
standard should now be discarded.   
¶185 The concurrence correctly notes in its footnote 3, 
however, that LaFave explains that the shift in federal cases is 
towards a "fair and just reason" for plea withdrawal and away 
from an earlier view that only prejudice was at issue.   
¶186 LaFave documents the gradual transition from the view 
espoused in United States v. Savage, 561 F.2d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 
1977), that no "fair and just reason" is needed and a defendant 
should be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea absent prejudice, 
towards a more restrictive view that there is "no occasion to 
                                                 
17 See also State v. Nawrocke, 193 Wis. 2d 373, 379-80, 534 
N.W.2d 624 (Wis. App. 1995) (citing Olish, 266 S.E.2d at 136, 
for the policy reasons distinguishing the "fair and just reason" 
standard for guilty plea withdrawal prior to sentencing and the 
"manifest injustice" standard for guilty plea withdrawal after 
sentencing); 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure 
§ 21.5(a) (3d ed. 2007) (same).  Cf. State v. Handy, 391 
S.E.2d 159, 161 (N.C. 1990) (same). 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
inquire into the matter of prejudice unless the defendant first 
shows a good reason for being allowed to withdraw his plea."18   
¶187 There is no shift by LaFave or in federal and state 
law away from the "fair and just reason" standard. 
¶188 In fact, LaFave explicitly supports the "fair and just 
reason" standard for presentencing guilty plea withdrawal even 
in the face of plea colloquy requirements.  Adopting the 
reasoning of the Olish case discussed above, LaFave writes:  
"The prevailing approach of utilizing a more demanding standard 
after imposition of sentence than when the motion comes before 
sentencing is sound."19    
¶189 LaFave concludes that the rules governing withdrawal 
of a guilty plea prior to sentencing on the ground that the plea 
colloquy was defective do not supplant the "fair and just 
reason" standard.  LaFave states:  "[I]t is erroneous for a 
court to conclude 'that a defendant's reason for seeking to 
withdraw his plea is not "fair and just" unless the reason 
renders the plea invalid.'"20   
 
¶190 The concurrence is not persuasive in abandoning the 
well-reasoned rationales (in Olish and LaFave, for example) for 
using a "fair and just reason" standard for withdrawal of a 
guilty plea prior to sentencing in the present era of more 
rigorous plea colloquies. 
                                                 
18 5 LaFave et al., supra note 17, § 21.5(a) at 868.   
19 Id. § 21.5(a), at 867. 
20 Id. § 21.5(a), at 871-72 (quoting United States v. 
Ortega-Ascanio, 376 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
C 
¶191 Adherence to the "fair and just reason" standard is of 
long standing in Wisconsin law, see Libke v. State, 60 
Wis. 2d 121, 128, 208 N.W.2d 331 (1973).  Instead of rejecting 
the standard, the court has continuously applied it.  Indeed, as 
recently as last year, Justice Prosser wrote that "[w]hen a 
defendant moves to withdraw his plea before sentencing, the 
circuit court should freely allow the withdrawal if the 
defendant supplies any 'fair and just reason' unless withdrawal 
would substantially prejudice the prosecution."  State v. 
Taylor, 2013 WI 34, ¶62, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482 
(Prosser, J., concurring) (citing State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, 
¶24, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177). 
¶192 Our case law over the years has developed the contours 
of the "fair and just reason" standard.  
¶193 The concurrence erroneously treats the "fair and just 
reason" standard as so low a bar that the circuit courts become 
"captive to manipulation by defendants."  Concurrence, ¶31.  Yet 
in practice, the "fair and just reason" standard is far from an 
automatic pass for defendants.  "Despite the language of this 
standard that suggests a low burden for plea withdrawal before 
sentencing, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted the difficulty 
that defendants encounter in practice."21   
                                                 
21 9 Christine M. Wiseman & Michael Tobin, Wisconsin 
Practice Series:  Criminal Practice & Procedure § 23:31, at 941-
42 (2d ed. 2008) (footnotes omitted) (citing State v. Jenkins, 
2007 WI 96, ¶43, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24). 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
¶194 For example, in State v. Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d 565, 469 
N.W.2d 163 (1991), this court explicitly rejected the approach 
of some courts that "determined that any desire to withdraw the 
plea before sentence is 'fair and just' as long as the 
prosecution would not be prejudiced."  Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 
583.  Canedy noted that Wisconsin law requires "something other 
than the desire to have a trial"; the defendant has the burden 
to prove a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  Canedy, 161 Wis. 2d at 583-
84.   
¶195 In Canedy, the defendant alleged that he misunderstood 
the meaning of "depraved mind" and the consequences of his 
guilty plea, even though he entered the guilty plea after a 
colloquy explaining the "depraved mind" element of the crime.  
An appellate court uses the "erroneous exercise of discretion" 
standard for reviewing a circuit court's grant or denial of a 
defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea under the "fair and 
just reason" standard.  Because the circuit court found the 
defendant's allegations not credible by a preponderance of the 
evidence, this court held that denial of the defendant's motion 
to withdraw his plea was not an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  See also State v. Kivioja, 225 Wis. 2d 271, 288-89, 
592 N.W.2d 220 (1999) (holding that a "fair and just reason" 
must be "credible" and "plausible" and deferring to the circuit 
court's finding of credibility).   
¶196 The court also recognized the "fair and just reason" 
standard as a bar to withdrawal of a guilty plea in State v. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24, noting that 
a defendant must meet two standards prior to demonstrating a 
"fair and just reason": 
First, the defendant must proffer a fair and just 
reason for withdrawing his plea.  Not every reason 
will qualify as a fair and just reason.  Second, the 
defendant must proffer a fair and just reason that the 
circuit court finds credible.  In other words, the 
circuit court must believe that the defendant's 
proffered reason actually exists.   
State v. Jenkins, 303 Wis. 2d 157, ¶43 (citations omitted) 
(citing Canedy).   
¶197 In 
Jenkins, 
the 
defendant's 
allegations 
of 
misunderstanding were rejected as failing these requirements.22  
The Jenkins court stated:  "As long as circuit courts follow the 
court 
mandated 
and 
statutory 
requirements 
during 
plea 
colloquies, defendants will ordinarily have difficulty showing a 
fair and just reason for plea withdrawal if the reason is based 
on grounds that were adequately addressed in the plea colloquy."  
Jenkins, 303 Wis. 2d 157, ¶60. 
¶198 Although the concurrence implies that the "fair and 
just reason" standard is no meaningful bar to plea withdrawal, I 
can find no Wisconsin Supreme Court case reversing a circuit 
                                                 
22 State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, ¶88, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 
N.W.2d 24. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
court's denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
prior to sentencing since Libke.23   
¶199 Contrary to the concurrence's concerns, our case law 
has conformed the "fair and just reason" to our contemporary 
criminal procedure requirements for guilty plea colloquies. 
D 
¶200 The concurrence implies that defendants wishing to 
withdraw their guilty pleas prior to sentencing can use State v. 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), which enumerates 
guilty plea colloquy requirements, as a replacement for the 
"fair and just reason" standard.  Concurrence, ¶136. 
¶201 Yet the concurrence fails to note that the court has 
made it increasingly difficult to get a Bangert hearing, at 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 
605 N.W.2d 199 (upholding the circuit court where it denied the 
defendant's motion for a new trial because of substantial 
prejudice to the State, even though the circuit court initially 
denied the motion on grounds that the defendant did not allege a 
"fair and just reason"); State v. Kivioja, 225 Wis. 2d 271, 592 
N.W.2d 220 (1999) (holding that even though the circuit court 
applied the incorrect "manifest injustice" standard for guilty 
plea withdrawal prior to sentencing, the circuit court's denial 
of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should not 
be reversed as an erroneous exercise of discretion when the new 
evidence admitted was deemed unreliable and therefore was not a 
"fair and just reason" for guilty plea withdrawal); State v. 
Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 863, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995) (holding 
that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea, deeming the defendant's reason to be incredible); 
Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 485, 247 N.W.2d 105 (1976) 
(requiring 
evidence 
"that 
the 
misunderstanding 
actually 
existed"); State v. McKnight, 65 Wis. 2d 582, 223 N.W.2d 550 
(1974) (holding that the defendant's allegations were incredible 
because the defendant acknowledged how much time he had spent 
deliberating over his plea change). 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
which the defendant can show that he or she did not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily enter a guilty plea.  Thus, 
Bangert cannot function as a replacement for the "fair and just 
reason" standard. 
¶202 Bangert sets out two requirements that a defendant 
must fulfill to get an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that 
the plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made:   
A Bangert motion warrants an evidentiary hearing if 
(1) the motion makes "a prima facie showing that [the] 
plea 
was 
accepted 
without 
the 
trial 
court's 
conformance with [Wis. Stat.] § 971.08 or other 
mandatory procedures," and if (2) the motion alleges 
that in fact the defendant did not know or understand 
the information that should have been provided at the 
plea colloquy. 
State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, ¶26, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48 
(quoting Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274) (footnotes omitted). 
¶203 In recent years, however, this court has made this 
hearing increasingly difficult to get, even though a prima facie 
showing of a Bangert violation should be relatively easy to 
allege.24   
¶204 In State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 
N.W.2d 482, the defendant was denied a Bangert hearing, despite 
meeting all the requirements set forth in Bangert and subsequent 
                                                 
24 "The requirements for a Bangert motion are relatively 
relaxed because the source of the defendant's misunderstanding, 
the plea colloquy defect, should be clear from the transcript of 
the hearing at which the plea was taken.  We require less from 
the allegations in a Bangert motion because the circuit court 
bears the responsibility of preventing failures in the plea 
colloquy."  State v. Howell, 301 Wis. 2d 350, ¶28. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
cases.25  Taylor states that when a defendant shows an 
"insubstantial 
defect" 
in 
the 
plea 
colloquy, 
a 
Bangert 
evidentiary hearing is unnecessary.  Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 
¶39.   
¶205 The increased barriers to defendants to get a Bangert 
hearing make the value of a "fair and just reason" standard for 
presentencing guilty plea withdrawal more important, contrary to 
the concurrence's assertions.  A defect that might not meet the 
current standard for getting a Bangert hearing might still be a 
"fair and just reason" justifying a guilty plea withdrawal prior 
to sentencing.  Put differently, Bangert does not provide a 
sufficient safety net. 
¶206 Similarly, in State v. Negrete, 2012 WI 92, 343 
Wis. 2d 1, 819 N.W.2d 749, the court simply opted not to apply 
Bangert at all.  Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶3.  Negrete held that 
when the defendant failed to make "'a pointed showing' of an 
error in the plea colloquy by reference to the plea colloquy 
transcript," 
Negrete, 
343 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶20 
(quoted 
source 
omitted), the Bangert test did not apply.  Negrete, like many 
cases involving Bangert, involved a defendant's motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing.  
¶207 Although the defendant in Negrete asserted that the 
circuit court failed to inform him of collateral consequences of 
his plea during the colloquy, the court held that the 
defendant's "equivocal" affidavit in support of his Bangert 
                                                 
25 State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 
N.W.2d 906; State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 
N.W.2d 64. 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
motion did not demonstrate a "pointed showing of an error."  
Negrete, 343 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶6, 20.  The bar to get a hearing was 
set high; indeed the defendant in Negrete did not get a Bangert 
hearing.  But the defendant might have made a sufficient showing 
of a "fair and just reason" to withdraw the guilty plea, had the 
defendant made his plea withdrawal motion prior to sentencing. 
¶208 Thus, 
although 
Bangert 
provides 
substantial 
protections for defendants at plea colloquies, such protections, 
as LaFave explains, do not usurp all potential fair and just 
reasons for withdrawing a guilty plea prior to sentencing.  The 
court's recently imposed limitations on Bangert illustrate the 
necessity of retaining the "fair and just reason" standard for 
withdrawal of guilty pleas prior to sentencing. 
E 
¶209 The concurrence asserts that "the court should not 
permit a defendant to withdraw a plea before sentencing unless 
the defendant is able to prove a manifest injustice, provided 
that the defendant has been accorded the rights and procedural 
protections in relation to pleas that have been enshrined in our 
law."  Concurrence, ¶138 (emphasis added).   
¶210 In Taylor, Justice Prosser urged the court "to 
carefully 
update 
the 
'manifest 
injustice' 
test, 
with 
a 
comprehensive catalog of fact situations requiring withdrawal, 
when a defendant satisfies his burden of proof, along with 
citations supporting these situations."  Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 
¶71 (Prosser, J., concurring). 
No.  2011AP2733-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶211 Justice Prosser's concurrence in the instant case 
seeks to replace the "fair and just reason" standard, which it 
perceives 
as 
unclear 
and 
difficult, 
with 
the 
"manifest 
injustice" standard, which Justice Prosser has already noted is 
unclear and difficult. 
¶212 In sum, I join Justice Bradley's dissent and write 
separately to put Justice Prosser's concurrence in perspective. 
 
 
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
1 
 
¶213 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
opinion ultimately concludes that because the videotapes would 
no longer be admissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.08, the State 
would be substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to 
withdraw her pleas.  It maintains that without the videotapes 
the State would be left with a less compelling presentation of 
evidence due to A.O.'s loss of memory. 
¶214 Its analysis, however, fails to address the argument 
that there was no evidence in the record supporting the circuit 
court's speculation or belief that A.O. suffered from memory 
loss.  It further ignores the strong evidence against Lopez, 
which may still include the recordings or substantial portions 
of them admitted under other evidentiary rules.  In essence, the 
majority fails to give any meaning to the word "substantial."   
¶215 I am mindful of the appalling facts of this case. 
Nevertheless, I determine, as did the court of appeals, that 
neither the record nor the law supports a conclusion of 
substantial 
prejudice 
here. 
 
Accordingly, 
I 
respectfully 
dissent. 
                               I 
¶216 At the outset the majority correctly states the 
standard for plea withdrawal:  "a circuit court should 'freely 
allow a defendant to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing for 
any fair and just reasons, unless the prosecution [would] be 
substantially 
prejudiced.'" 
Majority 
op., 
¶2 
(citations 
omitted).  
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
2 
 
¶217 It acknowledges that the State has conceded that Lopez 
presented a fair and just reason for withdrawing her pleas. 
Majority op., ¶3. Accordingly, it announces what is the 
essential issue in this case: "our analysis in this case focuses 
on 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion in concluding that the State would be substantially 
prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas." Id. It 
follows the announcement by listing the defendant's arguments. 
Majority op., ¶4.  Among them is Lopez's argument that "the 
State failed to demonstrate that the case against Lopez would be 
more difficult to prove."  Id. 
¶218 The majority later characterizes this argument as 
"whether the State might still be able to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Majority op., ¶86.  It determines that this 
is not the test for substantial prejudice and proceeds to set 
forth 
its 
own 
somewhat 
circuitous 
test 
for 
substantial 
prejudice.  It explains that the test for substantial prejudice 
is "whether the State would be substantially prejudiced if Lopez 
were allowed to withdraw her pleas." Id.   
¶219 In reaching its conclusion that there was substantial 
prejudice in this case, the majority quotes the circuit court's 
findings that the tapes were "compelling" and "credible," its 
belief that due to the passage of time there would be a  "risk" 
that A.O. would not be able to reproduce the testimony she gave 
on the tapes, and its "hope" that with therapy some of the 
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
3 
 
things A.O. has forgotten.  Majority op., ¶¶91-95.1  Ultimately, 
the majority determines that the State would be substantially 
prejudiced here because "[w]ithout admitting the recordings as 
envisioned under § 908.08, the State was left with a completely 
different and less compelling presentation of its evidence."  
Id., ¶98. 
II 
¶220 I begin by considering the purported evidence and case 
law that forms the basis of the majority's conclusion and 
examine them in light of Lopez's arguments.  First, Lopez argues 
that the State has failed to show substantial prejudice because 
it offered no evidence that the victim is unable to testify or 
that the victim's memory has faded.  Second, she contends that 
there is no showing of substantial prejudice because there 
remains significant evidence against her, including alternative 
grounds for the admission of significant portions of the video 
recordings.  I address each in turn. 
A. 
¶221 Absent from the majority's analysis is any evidence of 
record that would support its speculative conclusion that the 
State would be substantially prejudiced due to A.O.'s memory 
loss.  It asserts that she would be unable to convey the same 
                                                 
1 The majority also suggests that Lopez intentionally waited 
until after receiving the presentence investigation ("PSI") 
report to withdraw her plea and included such "dilatory" conduct 
in its discussion of prejudice. Majority op., ¶¶81-82.  This 
suggestion is not supported by the record as the record 
indicates that Lopez had not received a copy of the PSI report 
prior to submitting her motion to withdraw her pleas. 
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
4 
 
message as the video recordings due to the passage of time and 
her therapy.  
¶222 I agree with the majority that a circuit court's 
decision to grant or deny a plea withdrawal is entitled to 
deference.  However, that does not mean that we simply accept 
the circuit court's determination.  This court conducts a review 
which looks at whether the determination was "made and based 
upon the facts appearing in the record and in reliance on the 
appropriate or applicable law."  State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, 
¶30, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24 (quoting State v. Canedy, 
161 Wis. 2d 565, 579, 469 N.W.2d 163 (1991)); see also State v. 
Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶41, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199. 
¶223 Here, there are no facts in the record indicating that 
A.O.'s memory has faded.  The circuit court's belief or "hope" 
that A.O. has forgotten is not the same thing as a finding based 
on evidence that she has forgotten or her memory has faded. 
Rather than relying on evidence, both the circuit court and the 
majority rest on the circuit court's speculation, belief, and 
hope about A.O.'s therapy to conclude that she may have 
difficulty recalling details of what happened. 
¶224 In the absence of any evidence of record, the majority 
relies instead on two plea withdrawal cases, Bollig and State v. 
Rushing, 2007 WI App 227, 305 Wis. 2d 739, 740 N.W.2d 894.  I 
find its reliance misplaced.  The majority fails to acknowledge 
the significant distinguishing factor in those cases.  Both 
cases involved significantly younger victims.  Bollig, 232 Wis. 
2d 561, ¶¶43-46 (victim was four-and-a-half years old at the 
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
5 
 
time of the assault, and a motion for plea withdrawal occurred 
two years later); Rushing, 305 Wis. 2d 739, ¶¶2, 7 (victim was 
five years old at the time of the assault and defendant moved to 
withdraw his plea two years later).  Although it may be a 
reasonable inference that a four- or five-year-old victim's 
memory would be affected by the passage of two years, that 
inference is much more tenuous when applied to the victim here, 
who was 14 years old at the time of the incidents.   
¶225 In both cases there were facts of record in addition 
to the passage of time that supported a conclusion of 
substantial prejudice.  In Rushing, the assistant district 
attorney entered an affidavit indicating that the victim's 
memory of the event had changed.  305 Wis. 2d 739, ¶8.  In 
addition, the child's videotaped statement indicated that he 
"appeared to be very reluctant, very hard to interview, very 
hyperactive, 
very 
unwilling 
to 
engage 
in 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances in an -- any substantial way."  Id., ¶9. 
¶226 In Bollig, this court likewise stressed facts of 
record, noting that it would be improper for the circuit court 
to rely on "personal assumptions." 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶46.  
Relying on "the facts of the record, as well as the recognition 
of the effects of protracted criminal proceedings on the 
victim's memory" this court agreed that there was substantial 
prejudice.  Id. 
¶227 Here, the majority does not point to facts of record 
to support the circuit court's conclusion of substantial 
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
6 
 
prejudice.  The absence of such evidence from the majority's 
discussion undermines its analysis.   
¶228 Mere passage of time does not support the conclusion 
of substantial prejudice due to loss of memory.  Neither do 
speculation, belief, and hope support such a conclusion.  
Rather, it must be based on evidence of record.  Contrary to the 
majority, I would conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it determined, without evidence of 
record, that A.O. suffered from memory loss and would be unable 
to present substantially the same information as provided in the 
video recordings. 
B. 
¶229 I turn next to Lopez's second argument, that the State 
failed to prove that it was substantially prejudiced because 
there was still significant evidence against her. 
¶230 Missing from the majority's analysis is a meaningful 
discussion of what constitutes substantial prejudice and our 
relevant precedent that would inform such a discussion.   
¶231 The 
majority's 
analysis 
of 
this 
issue 
consists 
primarily of its determination that the test for substantial 
prejudice is not "whether the State might still be able to prove 
guilt 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
without 
admitting 
the 
audiovisual recordings," rather, "[t]he test is whether the 
State would be substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to 
withdraw her pleas."  Majority op., ¶86.  However, if the State 
can still prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it is 
unclear how the State would be substantially prejudiced.  The 
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
7 
 
majority's discussion does not indicate what State interest 
would be prejudiced and fails to clearly define substantial 
prejudice. 
 
Fashioning 
a 
circuitous 
test 
(the 
test 
for 
substantial prejudice is whether the State was substantially 
prejudiced) provides little illumination on the subject. 
¶232 An examination of State v. Nelson, 2005 WI App 113, 
282 Wis. 2d 502, 701 N.W.2d 32, would assist the majority in 
shedding light on what constitutes substantial prejudice.  In 
that case, the circuit court had denied the defendant's motion 
to withdraw his plea because it determined that the State would 
be prejudiced as it had lost track of the victim.  Id., ¶6.  The 
court of appeals, however, determined that this was error 
because "the trial court failed to consider the strength of the 
State's case against Nelson."  Id., ¶20.   
¶233 After noting that little case law touches upon the 
issue of substantial prejudice, the Nelson court relied upon a 
dictionary definition of "substantial."  Id., ¶17. ("The 
dictionary definition of 
'substantial' includes the words 
'important' 
and 
'essential.' 
See 
Webster's 
Third 
New 
International Dictionary 2280 (1993)").    Noting that there was 
DNA evidence and that the defendant had confessed to the crimes, 
the court determined that even without the victim's testimony 
the evidence would be sufficient to find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id., ¶21.  Accordingly, the court 
concluded that although the State "may have been somewhat 
inconvenienced by the withdrawal," it had failed to establish 
substantial prejudice.  Id., ¶22. 
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
8 
 
¶234 It is difficult to reconcile the majority's decision 
today with Nelson.  Here, Lopez admitted much of the abuse in an 
interview with a detective the day after A.O. was rescued from 
her home.  Lopez also admitted the abuse in another interview 
shortly after entering her plea.  She admitted the abuse again 
when she testified at Olivas' trial.  In addition to these 
statements, there are photographs of A.O.'s injuries and 
detailed 
medical 
reports. 
 
Indeed, 
the 
circuit 
court 
acknowledged that "the wounds on [A.O.]'s body alone speak to 
the reality of what she went through.  Even if she had been 
killed and she had no voice left to explain what harm [Lopez] 
had done to her, the wounds on her body would still tell us."  
Further, there is no indication in the record that A.O. would be 
unable to reproduce her statements about the abuse. 
¶235 As in Nelson, even absent the audiovisual recordings 
of A.O.'s statements, there is significant evidence against 
Lopez.  Thus, it seems that any inconvenience or prejudice that 
the State may incur by not being able to admit the recordings 
under Wis. Stat. § 908.08 does not rise to the level of 
substantial prejudice.  By concluding otherwise, the majority 
ignores the fact that a circuit court must find more than mere 
prejudice in order to deny a motion to withdraw a plea, it must 
find substantial prejudice. 
C 
¶236 In furtherance of her argument that the State was not 
substantially prejudiced, Lopez advances that portions of the 
tapes could still be shown even though admissibility under Wis. 
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
9 
 
Stat. § 908.08 is no longer available.  Yet, the majority pays 
short shrift to the relevant law that would allow for the 
admission of the tapes.  
¶237 Lopez argues, and both the majority and dissenting 
opinions in the court of appeals agree, that the visual portions 
of the tapes are not hearsay and thus need not fall under a 
hearsay exception in order to be admissible at trial.  The 
majority specifically rejected the State's argument that it 
would be prejudiced by not being able to show A.O.'s physical 
conditions, noting that the State "does not explain why it would 
be precluded from displaying images of A.O.'s injuries without 
playing the audio portion of the recordings."  State v. Lopez, 
No. 2011AP2733-CR, unpublished slip op. at 6 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Sept. 26, 2012).  The dissent agreed with this analysis, stating 
that "A.O. turning 16 does not interfere with the State's 
ability at trial to use the video of the interviews to show 
A.O.'s injuries."  Id. at 7 (Lundsten, P.J., dissenting).       
¶238 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 908.08(7)2 specifically 
permits the admission of audiovisual recordings of children 
under other relevant evidentiary rules even where the hearsay 
exception in Wis. Stat. § 908.08(3) does not apply.  "Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08(7) permits the admission of a child's videotaped 
statement under any applicable hearsay exception regardless of 
whether the requirements of subsections (2) and (3) have been 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.08(7) provides in relevant part that 
"a court or a hearing examiner may also admit into evidence an 
audiovisual recording of an oral statement of a child that is 
hearsay and is admissible under this chapter as an exception to 
the hearsay rule." 
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
10 
 
met."  State v. Snider, 2003 WI App 172, ¶12, 266 Wis. 2d 830, 
668 N.W.2d 784. 
¶239 Lopez suggests that one such applicable hearsay 
exception is the residual hearsay exception in Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.03(24).  That section permits the admission of "[a] 
statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness."  Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24). 
¶240 In Snider, the court upheld the use of the residual 
exception to admit an audiovisual recording of a child victim's 
statement that did not meet the requirements set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 908.08.  266 Wis. 2d 830, ¶16.  There, the State sought 
to admit the recording after the victim testified because the 
victim's testimony was significantly less detailed than the 
account she had previously given.  Id., ¶5.  The defendant 
objected as the taped statement was not made under oath and he 
had not received 10 days prior notice as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.08.   
¶241 On appeal, the Snider court concluded that the circuit 
court had appropriately considered the factors enumerated in 
State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d 226, 245-46, 421 N.W.2d 77 
(1988), and State v. Huntington, 216 Wis. 2d 671, 687-88, 575 
N.W.2d 268 (1998), and determined that the recording was 
admissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.03(24).  Snider, 266 Wis. 2d 
830, ¶19.  Those factors include: 
[T]he child's age, ability to communicate and familial 
relationship with the defendant; the person to whom 
the statement was made and that person's relationship 
to the child; the circumstances under which the 
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
11 
 
statement was made, including the time elapsed since 
the alleged assault; the content of the statement 
itself, including any signs of deceit or falsity; and 
the existence of other corroborating evidence. 
Id., ¶17 (citing Sorenson, 143 Wis. 2d at 245-46). 
¶242 Here, 
those 
same 
factors 
may 
militate 
towards 
admission of A.O.'s recorded statements.  A.O. was 14 at the 
time of the recordings.  As the circuit court concluded, she had 
the age and level of development to understand the significance 
of the events and verbalize them.  A.O. had a close personal 
relationship with Lopez, her mother.  A.O. made the statements 
to a social worker soon after the events occurred.  Further, the 
circuit court determined that A.O. clearly understood the 
difference between the truth and a lie and did not evince any 
signs of fear, guilt, anxiety, or stress.  Lastly, her 
statements were corroborated by the medical reports of her 
injuries. Accordingly, based on the factors in Snider, there 
arguably are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to admit the 
recordings under the residual exception.   
 
¶243 Overall, the ability of the State to admit portions, 
if not the entirety, of the audiovisual recordings under 
relevant law other than Wis. Stat. § 908.08 undermines the 
majority's determination that the State would suffer substantial 
prejudice.  
III 
¶244 In sum, the majority opinion, though lengthy, does 
very little to clarify the test for substantial prejudice.  Its 
analysis ignores not only the lack of evidence in the record 
supporting its conclusion of substantial prejudice, but also the 
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
12 
 
strong evidence remaining against Lopez, which may still include 
portions, if not the entirety, of the videotapes.  As a result, 
the majority strips any meaning from the word "substantial" as 
used in our substantial prejudice analysis.   
¶245 For the reasons set forth above, I determine, as did 
the court of appeals, that the record and the law do not support 
a conclusion of substantial prejudice here.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶246 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.   
 
No.  2011AP2733.awb 
 
1