Case Title: Alabama v. Clayton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1130012, 1130013

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2014-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 04/04/2014
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1130012
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: State of Alabama
v.
Jennifer Leigh Clayton)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-11-914;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-11-1867)
____________________
1130013
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: State of Alabama
v.
Justin Andrew Bailey)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-11-913;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-11-1866)
STUART, Justice.
Jennifer Leigh Clayton  and Justin Andrew Bailey  filed
1
2
separate motions requesting that the trial court suppress
evidence seized in a warrantless search of their apartment by
law-enforcement officers on January 7, 2011.  After a hearing,
the trial court granted their motions to suppress the
evidence.  The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal
A Montgomery grand jury issued an indictment charging
1
Clayton 
with 
two 
counts 
of 
first-degree 
unlawful 
manufacturing
of methamphetamine, a violation of § 13A-12-218, Ala. Code
1975, and one count of unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia, a violation of 
§ 
13A-12-260(C), Ala. Code 1975.
A Montgomery grand jury issued an indictment charging
2
Bailey with two counts of first-degree unlawful manufacturing
of methamphetamine, a violation of § 13A-12-218, Ala. Code
1975; one count of unlawful possession of marijuana for
personal use, a violation of § 13A-12-214, Ala. Code 1975; and
one count of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a
violation of § 13A-12-260(C), Ala. Code 1975.
2
1130012 and 1130013
Appeals affirmed the trial court's order as to the January 7
search.   State v. Lee, [Ms. CR-11-1865, October 4, 2013] ___
3
So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2013).   The State petitioned this
4
Court for certiorari review of the decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals.  We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
The following evidence was presented at the suppression
hearing.  On January 7, 2011, between 12 a.m. and 1 a.m.,
Officer James Taylor and Sgt. James Hall, Montgomery law-
enforcement officers, as well as other Montgomery law-
enforcement officers and Montgomery firefighters, received a
dispatch  indicating  that a methamphetamine laboratory was in
5
operation at an apartment on Stonehenge Drive in Montgomery. 
Officer Taylor and Sgt. Hall testified that when they arrived
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court's
3
order as to a later search of the apartment and remanded the
case.
A third codefendant, Natasha Rae Lee, was an appellee in
4
the Court of Criminal Appeals (case no. CR-11-1865), which
issued one opinion addressing all three codefendants.  She
petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision.  This Court denied her petition on
November 15, 2013 (case no. 1130032).
It appears that the dispatcher had received a call from
5
a citizen who identified himself and indicated that a
methamphetamine laboratory was operating in the apartment.
3
1130012 and 1130013
at the apartment complex  they could smell an odor that they
6
knew from their training and experience was consistent with
the chemicals used during the production of methamphetamine. 
Officer Taylor described the odor as a distinct, strong,
"ammonia-like," nauseating odor that is easily recognizable
once one knows it to be consistent with the process of
manufacturing methamphetamine.  Sgt. Hall described the odor
as very strong, pungent, and offensive, explaining that it
almost burned the sinuses when inhaled.     
The officers, in an effort to determine the origin of the
odor, knocked on the door of the apartment.  The officers
testified that when Bailey opened the door the odor they knew
to be consistent with the manufacture of methamphetamine grew
stronger.  The officers informed Bailey that they had received
calls about a strong odor coming from his residence and that
it had been reported that a methamphetamine laboratory was
being operated in the apartment.  Bailey responded that the
calls had to be prank calls because no illegal activity was
going on in the apartment.  Sgt. Hall informed Bailey and
Clayton, who was also present with two small children, that
The apartment complex had eight apartments.
6
4
1130012 and 1130013
law-enforcement officers had to enter the apartment and
conduct a protective sweep to clear the residence of all
occupants so that the fire department could enter and check
the apartment for safety reasons.  
Sgt. Hall and Officer Taylor testified that they then
searched each room of the apartment "to make sure there was
nobody else in the apartment."  Officer Taylor testified that
they spent approximately five minutes in the apartment and
that the apartment "appeared to be safe."  Sgt. Hall testified
that because of the odor he and his officers did not stay in
the apartment long, just "long enough to make sure that the
apartment was clear, long enough to allow the infant to be
properly clothed for the cold weather."  After Officer Taylor
and Sgt. Hall completed the protective sweep and left the
apartment with Bailey, Clayton, and her two children, they
turned the apartment over to the firefighters, who went inside
to "mak[e] sure there [were] no chemicals in there that could
explode endangering the other residents in the building." 
Additionally, law-enforcement officers had the residents of
the other apartments leave their residences until the fire
department determined that they were not in danger from the
5
1130012 and 1130013
process of manufacturing methamphetamine and it was safe to
reenter the apartments.
During the firefighters' search of the apartment, they
located a methamphetamine "laboratory" inside a cooler in a
closet.  The laboratory was not operating at the time.  After
the firefighters showed the laboratory to Sgt. Hall,  Sgt.
Hall notified the on-call narcotics officer, Detective Joel
Roberson.  Sgt. Hall testified that even after the
methamphetamine laboratory was found he and the officers
continued to secure the area because "people can get hurt from
the odors" and "meth labs are known to explode."  
Detective Roberson testified that when he arrived at the
apartment complex he could smell an  odor that, based on his
training and experience, he knew to be consistent with the
odor created during the manufacture of methamphetamine. 
Detective Roberson stated that when he entered the apartment
with 
the 
Montgomery 
Fire 
Department's 
hazardous-materials 
crew
a member of the crew showed him a foam cooler, which contained
"everything you needed to [manufacture] methamphetamine." 
Detective Roberson also found other materials in the 
apartment
known to be associated with manufacturing methamphetamine,
6
1130012 and 1130013
including lithium batteries, a funnel hidden under a bed, and
small plastic bags. 
 
After 
Detective Roberson had photographed
the methamphetamine laboratory, a crew from the Drug
Enforcement Administration collected and disposed of the
materials.
When questioned at the hearing on the motion to suppress
about the reason for conducting a warrantless entry into and
search 
of 
the 
apartment, 
Sgt. 
Hall 
testified 
that
"[m]eth[amphetamine] labs are known to explode as well as
produce noxious fumes that can harm people" and that his
intent in going into the apartment was "to make sure that the
public remain safe."  Sgt. Hall further stated that when he
was "clearing" the apartment he felt like he was in danger and
could be harmed by the odor.  He stated that he limited the
number of officers who entered the apartment because of the
adverse health effects breathing the chemicals used in the
manufacture of 
methamphetamine 
can cause.  Sgt. Hall testified
that he filed a letter of notice with his supervisor
documenting that he had been exposed to a methamphetamine
laboratory in case health issues later arose from the
exposure.  When defense counsel asked Sgt. Hall if he felt
7
1130012 and 1130013
like he was in immediate danger, Sgt. Hall responded:  "Yes,
sir. I did. ... Due to the odor that I was smelling, and I
knew ... what those odors can cause, harmful to me, so yes,
sir, I did feel like that I was in danger and could be
harmed."
Likewise, Officer Taylor testified that, because of the
odor, he did not want to enter the apartment.  He explained
that, although the odor in the apartment did not appear to
hurt him, Sgt. Hall, Clayton, Bailey, or the children, an
emergency situation existed because "there was still the
odor."   
Detective Roberson testified that the manufacture of
methamphetamine creates a high risk of explosion because the
chemicals used in the process become extremely volatile when
combined and can react violently, bursting into flames.  He
further testified that the manufacture of methamphetamine
creates a health hazard for anyone who is near the
methamphetamine laboratory.  He explained:
"If you can smell it, you're at risk.  The proper
way 
to 
handle 
this 
[investigation 
of 
a
methamphetamine laboratory is] ... anybody that goes
anywhere near this lab should have on a respirator,
protective clothing, protective suit and that kind
of stuff. ...  You know, it can –- anywhere that
8
1130012 and 1130013
there is air ducts, air vents that the chemicals can
travel, it can affect those areas, too."
The trial court concluded that no exigent circumstances
existed to justify entry into, or the search of, the apartment
because "there was no outward sign that danger was imminent"
and because one officer testified that "he entered the
apartment and did not feel he was in any type of danger."  The
trial court granted Clayton's and Bailey's motions to
suppress.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial
court's order as to the January 7 search.
Standard of Review
"'"'This Court reviews pure questions of law in criminal
cases de novo.'"'  Ex parte Brown, 11 So. 3d 933, 935 (Ala.
2008) (quoting Ex parte Morrow, 915 So. 2d 539, 541 (Ala.
2004), quoting in turn Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056, 1059
(Ala. 2003))."  Hiler v. State, 44 So. 3d 543, 546 (Ala.
2009).
Discussion
The State contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals
erred in holding that the trial court properly granted
Clayton's and Bailey's motions to suppress the evidence 
seized
9
1130012 and 1130013
from the January 7, 2011, warrantless entry into and search of
their apartment.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states:
"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized."
Article I, § 5, Ala. Const. of 1901, states the same
fundamental principle and also applies to this case.
In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), the
United States Supreme Court recognized that there are
situations 
where 
the 
requirement 
that 
law-enforcement 
officers
secure a warrant before entry into a person's residence may be 
obviated.  The Supreme Court explained:
"Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters,
is, of course, of grave concern to society, and the
law allows such crime to be reached on proper
showing.  The right of officers to thrust themselves
into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the
individual but to a society which chooses to dwell
in 
reasonable 
security 
and 
freedom 
from
surveillance.  When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a
rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or Government enforcement agent.
10
1130012 and 1130013
"There are exceptional circumstances in which,
on balancing the need for effective law enforcement
against the right of privacy, it may be contended
that a magistrate's warrant for search may be
dispensed with."
333 U.S. at 14-15.
In Cameron v. State, 861 So. 2d 1145, 1149 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2003), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals recognized
one of the exceptional circumstances that justifies a
warrantless entry and search of a residence, stating:
"'It is well settled that warrantless
entries to and searches of a residence are
presumptively unreasonable and that the
burden is on the government to demonstrate
exigent 
circumstances 
justifying 
a
warrantless entry and search.  Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Landreth v.
State, 600 So. 2d 440 (Ala. Cr. App. 1992). 
To justify a warrantless entry and search,
the state needs to show both the existence
of 
probable 
cause 
and 
exigent
circumstances.  United States v. Rodgers,
924 F.2d 219 (11th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1221, 111 S.Ct. 2834, 115
L.Ed. 2d 1003 (1991), appeal after remand,
981 F.2d 497 (11th Cir. 1993); Etheridge v.
State, 414 So. 2d 157 (Ala. Cr. App.
1982).'
"A.A.G. v. State, 668 So. 2d 122, 126 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1995) (some internal citations altered)."
In Wedgeworth v. State, 610 So. 2d 1244, 1247-48 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1992), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that law-
11
1130012 and 1130013
enforcement officers may conduct a warrantless search of a
motel room if the officers have probable cause to believe that
an illegal activity had been or was being committed and there
is an exigent circumstance, stating:
"This court has ... held ... that probable cause
combined with the existence of exigent circumstances
justifies a warrantless search. Cooper v. State, 480
So. 2d 8 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985). See also Blaine v.
State, 366 So. 2d 353 (Ala. Cr. App. 1978). 
Moreover, an officer has probable cause to conduct
a search if a reasonably prudent person based on the
facts and circumstances that the officer knows would
be justified in concluding that the object of the
search or items sought are connected with criminal
activity, and that they will be found in the place
to be searched.  Gord v. State, 475 So. 2d 900 (Ala.
Cr. App. 1988).
"... [T]his court has ruled that exigent
circumstances exist to justify a warrantless search
upon a reasonable cause to believe that those
premises contain individuals in imminent danger of
death or severe bodily harm.  Ash v. State, 424 So.
2d 1381 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982). Moreover, where
exigent circumstances exist and there is probable
cause to believe that evidence of a crime may be
found, an immediate warrantless search is justified
as an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement.  Hancock v. State, 368 So. 2d 581 (Ala.
Cr. App.), writ denied, 368 So. 2d 587 (Ala. ...
1979).
"... The Fourth Amendment does not require
police officers to delay in the course of an
investigation of a serious crime if to do so would
endanger the lives of others. Jones v. State, 49
Ala. App. 438, 272 So. 2d 910 (1973)."
12
1130012 and 1130013
Mindful of these principles of law, this Court now 
considers whether the law-enforcement officers had probable
cause to believe that an illegal activity had been or was
being 
committed in Clayton and Bailey's apartment coupled with
an exigent circumstance so as to justify the warrantless entry
and search of  the apartment.  
A.  Probable Cause
The State contends that the law-enforcement officers had
probable cause to enter and search Clayton and Bailey's
apartment because, 
it argues, when Bailey opened the apartment
door the odor known to them to be consistent with the process
of manufacturing methamphetamine grew stronger in intensity,
indicating that the occupants of the apartment were engaging
in an illegal activity –- the manufacture of methamphetamine
–- inside the apartment.  
In Adams v. State, 815 So. 2d 578, 580-81 (Ala. 2001),
this Court recognized the standard for determining the
existence of probable cause, stating:
"In Woods v. State, 695 So. 2d 636 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1996), the Court of Criminal Appeals explained
the standard for determining the existence of
probable cause:
13
1130012 and 1130013
"'"Whether there is probable
cause [to] merit a warrantless
search and seizure is to be
determined by the totality of the
circumstances. 
 
Illinois 
v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct.
2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). 
'Probable cause exists where all
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances
within the officer's knowledge
are 
sufficient to 
warrant a
person of reasonable caution to
conclude that an offense has been
or is being committed and that
contraband would be found in the
place to be searched.'  Sheridan
v. State, 591 So. 2d 129, 130
(Ala. Crim. App. 1991)."
"'State v. Stallworth, 645 So. 2d 323, 325
[(Ala. Crim. App. 1994)]....  "When we
speak of probable cause, we are dealing
with probabilities which are factual and
practical 
considerations 
of 
everyday
experience."  [Sterling v. State, 421 So.
2d 1375, 1381 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982)].'
"695 So. 2d at 640 (citations omitted)."
In Johnson v. United States, supra, law-enforcement
officers had received information from a confidential
informant that a person was smoking opium, an illegal
controlled substance, in a hotel room.  The law-enforcement
officers, who had been sent to investigate the odor, were
experienced in narcotics, recognized the 
odor of burning opium
while they were in the hall, and determined that the odor was
14
1130012 and 1130013
emanating from a certain room.  The officers knocked and
informed 
the 
occupant 
that 
they 
were 
law-enforcement 
officers. 
When the occupant opened the door, one of the officers stated
that he wanted to discuss the opium smell in the room.  The
occupant denied that there was such a smell.  The law-
enforcement officers then arrested the occupant, searched the
room, and seized opium and its smoking apparatus.  Although
the United States Supreme Court held that the warrantless
entry and search of the room was unconstitutional because an
exigent circumstance did not exist to excuse the need for a
warrant, the Court did state that the odor known to the
officers as the odor of burning opium could constitute
probable cause for issuing a warrant, stating:
"At the time entry was demanded the officers
were possessed of evidence which a magistrate might
have found to be probable cause for issuing a
warrant.  We cannot sustain defendant's contention,
erroneously made, on the strength of Taylor v.
United States, 286 U.S. 1 [(1932)], that odors
cannot be evidence sufficient to constitute probable
cause grounds for any search.  That decision held
only that odors alone do not authorize a search
without [a] warrant.  If the presence of odors is
testified to before a magistrate and he finds the
affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one
sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden
substance, this Court has never held such a basis
insufficient to justify issuance of a search
15
1130012 and 1130013
warrant.  Indeed it might very well be found to be
evidence of most persuasive character."
333 U.S. at 13.  See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 
468 
(1971)("Incontrovertible 
testimony 
of 
the 
senses 
that
an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal
suspect may establish the fullest possible measure 
of 
probable
cause."). 
In Cameron v. State, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals
held that the overwhelming odor of marijuana emanating from a
house, combined with the law-enforcement officer's testimony
explaining his ability, based on his training and experience,
to identify the odor of marijuana established that probable
cause existed for the officer to believe that an illegal
substance was located inside the residence.  Cf.  Blake v.
State, 772 So. 2d 1200, 1205 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (holding
that the odor of drugs emanating from a vehicle provided
probable cause to search the vehicle); Adams v. State, 815 So.
2d at 581 ("A police officer's detecting the smell of raw or
burned marijuana coming from a particular place or person is
sufficient to provide probable cause to search that place or
person.").
16
1130012 and 1130013
In this case, the evidence establishes that the law-
enforcement officers had probable cause to believe that an
illegal 
activity 
–- 
the 
unlawful 
manufacturing 
of
methamphetamine –- –- was or had been occurring inside Clayton
and Bailey's  apartment.  The law-enforcement officers
testified that when Bailey opened the door to the apartment
the odor that they knew, based on their training and
experience, 
to be consistent with the process of 
manufacturing
of methamphetamine became stronger.   Because the evidence
7
established that the odor consistent with the process of
manufacturing methamphetamine emanated from Clayton and
Bailey's apartment and that the officers, based on their
training and experience, had the ability to recognize the
odor, the law-enforcement officers had probable cause to
believe that the occupants of the apartment were engaged in
the illegal activity of manufacturing methamphetamine inside
the apartment.  A.A.G. v. State, 668 So. 2d 122, 127 (Ala.
Crim. 
App. 
1995)("The 
establishment 
of 
probable 
cause 
requires
A police officer is not required to have a warrant to
7
approach a residence and knock because that is "no more than
any private citizen might do."  Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S.
___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011).
17
1130012 and 1130013
only that facts available to the officer at the moment of
[entry] would warrant a person of reasonable caution to
believe 
that 
the 
action 
taken 
by 
the 
officer 
was
appropriate.").  Cf.  Adams v. State, supra.  
B.  Exigent Circumstance
The State contends that the dangers to the public 
created by the process of manufacturing methamphetamine
constitute an exigent circumstance that requires immediate
action from law-enforcement 
officers to protect the public and
that overcomes the delay incident to obtaining a warrant. 
Clayton and Bailey disagree, arguing that the statements and
actions 
of the law-enforcement officers in this case establish
that there was no danger of harm to themselves or the public. 
Therefore, they maintain that an exigent circumstance did not
exist that authorized the warrantless entry into and search of
their apartment by law-enforcement officers.
"'The exigent circumstances doctrine applies only when
the inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give
way to an urgent need for immediate action.'" Youtz v. State,
494 So. 2d 189, 193 (Ala.  Crim. App. 1986)(quoting United
States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 844 (11th Cir. 1984)).
18
1130012 and 1130013
"The burden rests on the State to prove the
existence of an exigent circumstance to overcome the
presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to
warrantless 
residential 
entries 
and 
searches. 
McCammon v. State, 499 So. 2d 811 (Ala. Crim. App.
1986)(citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104
S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984)).  See also Vale
v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26
L.Ed.2d 409 (1970)('The burden rests on the State to
show 
the 
existence 
of 
such 
an 
exceptional
situation.').
"'"[N]o exigency is created simply because
there is probable cause to believe that a
serious crime has been committed." Welsh
[v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct.
2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984)]; Mincey [v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408,
57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)].  "[T]he mere
presence of narcotics, without more, is not
such an exigent circumstance as would
permit entry into private premises without
a proper warrant."  People v. Lee, 83 A.D.
2d 311, 444 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102-103 (1981),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct.
1443, 75 L.Ed.2d 798 (1983).  See also
People v. Ouellette, 78 Ill. 2d 511, 36
Ill. Dec. 666, 669-70, 401 N.E.2d 507,
510-11 (1979).  "The presence of contraband
without more does not give rise to exigent
circumstances."  United States v. Torres,
705 F.2d 1287, 1297 (11th Cir. 1983).
"'There have been various attempts to
formulate 
an 
all 
encompassing 
definition 
of
exigent circumstances.  See Harbaugh and
Faust, "Knock on Any Door" -- Home Arrests
After Payton and Steagald, 86 Dick. L. Rev.
191 (1982); Donnino and Girese, Exigent
Circumstances 
For 
A 
Warrantless 
Home
Arrest, 45 Alb. L. Rev. 90 (1980); Comment,
Warrantless 
Arrests: 
Justification 
By
19
1130012 and 1130013
Exigent Circumstances, 6 Hamline L. Rev.
191 (1983); W. LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure
§ 6.5 (1978).  However, "[t]he exigent
circumstances doctrine applies only when
the inevitable delay incident to obtaining
a warrant must give way to an urgent need
for immediate action."  United States v.
Satterfield, 743 F.2d [827, 844 (11th Cir.
1984)].'"
Cameron v. State, 861 So. 2d at 1150-51 (quoting Youtz, 494
So. 2d at 193.  See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331
(2001)(defining 
exigent 
circumstances 
as 
a 
"specially 
pressing
or urgent law enforcement need"); Brigham City, Utah v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006)(noting that any warrantless
search entry based on exigent circumstances must be supported
by a genuine exigency).
The United States Supreme Court has held that "'[t]he
need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is
justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an
exigency or emergency.'"  Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
392-93 (1987) (quoting  Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205,
212 (D.D.C. 1963)).  
For 
example, law-enforcement officers can
enter a residence without a warrant to render emergency
assistance to an injured person or to protect a person from
immediate injury.  Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392.  Moreover, the
20
1130012 and 1130013
state of mind of the law-enforcement officer is immaterial "as
long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the
officer's] action."  Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138
(1978).
 
Courts have recognized the dangers created during the
process of manufacturing methamphetamine, and numerous cases
have upheld warrantless searches by law-enforcement officers
who had probable cause to believe that they had located an
active methamphetamine-manufacturing operation.  See Williams
v. State, 995 So. 2d 915 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); Kleinholz v.
United States, 339 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 2003)(noting that the
volatile 
nature 
of 
an 
operating 
methamphetamine 
laboratory 
can
create a danger supporting the finding of an exigent
circumstance justifying an immediate search); Louisiana v.
Shumaker, 914 So. 2d 1156, 1167-68 (La. Ct. App.  2005)
(holding the chemical smell known to be associated with the
illegal manufacture of methamphetamine and the dangers of the
manufacture of methamphetamine established an immediate need
for the officers to enter the residence without a warrant to
protect the public); United States v. Lloyd, 396 F.3d 948, 954
(8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 734
21
1130012 and 1130013
(8th Cir. 2002)("[P]otential hazards of methamphetamine
manufacture are well documented, and numerous cases have
upheld 
limited 
warrantless searches by police officers who had
probable cause to believe they had uncovered an on-going
methamphetamine manufacturing operation.");  United States v.
Wilson, 865 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Brock, 667 F. 2d 1131, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982); and
People v. Messina, 165 Cal. App. 3d 937, 212 Cal. Rptr. 75
(1985).  At least one state has codified the exigent
circumstance 
created 
by 
the 
process 
of 
manufacturing
methamphetamine.  Ohio Revised Code Section 2933.33 provides:
"If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to
believe that particular premises are used for the
illegal manufacture of methamphetamine, for the
purpose of conducting a search of the premises
without a warrant, the risk of explosion or fire
from the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine
causing injury to the public constitutes exigent
circumstances and reasonable grounds to believe that
there is an immediate need to protect lives, or
property, of the officer and other individuals in
the vicinity of the illegal manufacture." 
In Williams, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals held
that 
the 
observation 
of 
an 
operating 
methamphetamine
laboratory by law-enforcement officers constituted an exigent
22
1130012 and 1130013
circumstance justifying a warrantless search.  The Court of
Criminal Appeals stated:
"The 
State 
contends 
that 
the 
methamphetamine 
lab
itself created an exigent circumstance that enabled
law-enforcement officials to conduct a warrantless
search of Williams's mobile home.  The appellate
courts of Alabama have not previously addressed the
narrow issue whether the threat posed by an
operating methamphetamine lab constitutes an exigent
circumstance allowing a warrantless search of a
residence 
law-enforcement 
officials 
suspect 
contains
a methamphetamine lab.
"Jurisdictions that have tackled the issue have
held that the dangers posed by an operating
methamphetamine lab are sufficient to constitute an
exigent circumstance for purposes of conducting a
warrantless search of a residence.  For example, in
United States v. Layne, 324 F.3d 464, 468–69 (6th
Cir. 2003), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit noted that the production of
methamphetamine '"poses serious dangers to both
human life and to the environment ... [and] these
chemicals 
and 
substances 
are 
utilized 
in 
a
manufacturing process that is unstable, volatile,
and highly combustible.  Even small amounts of these
chemicals, 
when 
mixed 
improperly, 
can 
cause
explosions and fires."'  Id., quoting H.R. Rep.
106–878, pt. 1 at *22 (September 21, 2000).
"The Maine Supreme Court also has held that
discovery of an operating methamphetamine lab can
provide an exigent circumstance that would allow a
warrantless search.  State v. Bilynsky, 932 A.2d
1169 (Me. 2007).  In its opinion, the Maine court
included a catalog of those jurisdictions that have
held that discovery of an operating methamphetamine
lab constitutes an exigent circumstance, beginning
with United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 1115 (8th
Cir. 2005), in which the United States Court of
23
1130012 and 1130013
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
discovery of an operating methamphetamine lab in the
defendant's home rendered a protective sweep of the
home necessary to protect the safety of the officers
and local residents.
"The Bilynsky court then cited other cases
consistent with Williams, stating that
"'the Eighth Circuit noted that "[t]he
potential 
hazards 
of 
methamphetamine
manufacture 
are 
well 
documented, 
and
numerous 
cases 
have 
upheld 
limited
warrantless 
searches 
by 
police 
officers 
who
had probable cause to believe they had
uncovered 
an 
ongoing 
methamphetamine
manufacturing 
operation." 
 
United 
States 
v.
Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 2002). 
The court cited five cases [in Walsh] from
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits to support
that proposition. Id.  Courts outside the
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have
reached the same result.  See, e.g., United
States v. Denson, No. 1:05–CR–088 ... (E.D.
Tenn. Feb. 2, 2006)[(not reported in F.
Supp.)]; People v. Duncan, 42 Cal. 3d 91,
227 Cal. Rptr. 654, 720 P.2d 2, 10–11
(1986); Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930,
939–40 (Ind. 2006); State v. Castile, No.
M2004–02572–CCA–R3–CD 
... 
(Tenn. 
Crim. 
App.
June 28, 2006)[(not reported in S.W.3d)].'
"State v. Bilynsky, 932 A.2d 1169, 1175–76 (Me.
2007).
"The Iowa Supreme Court has found that '[t]he
volatile 
nature 
of 
the 
dangers 
created 
by
methamphetamine labs can be exigent circumstances
justifying an immediate limited search of premises
harboring such a lab.'  State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d
264, 273 (Iowa 2006); see also Kleinholz v. United
States, 339 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 2003)(explaining
24
1130012 and 1130013
that the volatile nature of methamphetamine labs
presents 
exigent 
circumstances 
justifying 
an
immediate limited search when officers smelled odor
associated with the production of methamphetamine);
and State v. Chapman, 107 Or. App. 325, 332–33, 813
P.2d 557, 560–61 (1991)(concluding that a working
methamphetamine lab provided exigent circumstances
for warrantless search).
"Based on the inherent dangers of an operating
methamphetamine 
lab, 
we 
now 
hold 
that 
[the
observation] of such a lab by law-enforcement
officials 
constitutes 
an 
exigent 
circumstance
justifying a warrantless search."
995 So. 2d at 920-21.
In 
Williams, 
the 
law-enforcement 
officers 
were
investigating a tip from a confidential informant that a
methamphetamine laboratory was being operated at a certain
location. When the officers arrived at the location, they
smelled an odor known to them, based on their training and
experience, 
to 
be consistent with the process of manufacturing
methamphetamine coming from a shed and a mobile home on the
premises.  Additionally, one of the officers observed the
operating methamphetamine laboratory in the shed.  The Court
of 
Criminal 
Appeals 
held 
that 
the 
totality 
of 
the
circumstances 
established 
that 
an 
exigent 
circumstance 
existed
making the law-enforcement officers' warrantless entry into
and search of the mobile home proper.  Williams establishes
25
1130012 and 1130013
that the observation of a methamphetamine laboratory in the
process of making methamphetamine, as evidenced by the law-
enforcement officer's testimony that he saw the laboratory in
operation, creates an exigent circumstance. 
In this case, the question presented is whether the
process of manufacturing methamphetamine, evidenced by the
odor known by law-enforcement officers to be generated during
the manufacturing process, establishes a sufficient risk of
danger to the public, creating an exigent circumstance
justifying an immediate entry into and search of a residence
by law-enforcement officers.
In United States v. Clarke, 564 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2009),
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
confronted this same issue.  In Clarke, law-enforcement
officers had received an anonymous tip that methamphetamine
was being produced at Clarke's residence.  When the officers
arrived at the residence, they smelled a chemical odor around
the house that they knew, based on their training and
experience, to be associated with the manufacture of 
methamphetamine.  When no one responded to their knocks on the
door, the officers entered the residence to ensure the safety
26
1130012 and 1130013
of any occupants.  After determining that the officers had
probable cause, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
exigent circumstances existed, stating: 
"Because the officers had probable cause to believe
methamphetamine was being produced in Clarke's home,
the officers reasonably concluded there was a
potential threat to the safety of the officers,
anybody inside the home, and anyone in the
surrounding area.  See United States v. Walsh, 299
F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 2002)(declaring, '[o]ur
court has consistently considered safety factors in
determining whether exigent circumstances existed,'
and '[t]he potential hazards of methamphetamine
manufacture are well documented, and numerous cases
have upheld limited warrantless searches by police
officers who had probable cause to believe they had
uncovered an on-going methamphetamine manufacturing
operation')."  
564 F.3d at 959
In United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th
Cir. 2003), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit noted that it had, in an earlier decision, determined
that the 
"'basic aspects of the "exigent circumstances"
exception [with regard to the manufacturing of
methamphetamine] are that (1) law enforcement
officers must have reasonable grounds to believe
that there is immediate need to protect their lives
or others or their property or that of others, (2)
the search must not be motivated by an intent to
arrest and seize the evidence, and (3) there must be
some reasonable basis, approaching probable cause to
27
1130012 and 1130013
associate an emergency with the area or place to be
searched.'" 
(Quoting United States v. Weeks, 995 F.2d 964, 970 (10th Cir.
1993).)  See also People v. Doll, 21 N.Y.3d 665, 998 N.E.2d
384, 975 N.Y.S.2d 721 (2013).   
The record in this case establishes that an exigent
circumstance existed requiring immediate action by the law-
enforcement officers to protect themselves, the occupants of
the apartment, and the public.  Here, when the law-enforcement 
officers arrived at the apartment complex in response to a
dispatch informing them that it had been reported that
methamphetamine 
was 
being 
manufactured 
in 
Bailey 
and 
Clayton's
apartment, they smelled an odor they recognized, based on
their training and experience, to be consistent with the
process of manufacturing methamphetamine.  The officers
testified that when Bailey opened the apartment door the odor
grew stronger.  The record establishes that the inhalation of
the odor of the chemicals used in the manufacturing of
methamphetamine has adverse health effects, that the process
of manufacturing methamphetamine creates a high risk of
explosion, and that the officers believed that they, the
occupants of the apartment, and the public were in immediate
28
1130012 and 1130013
danger.  The immediacy of the situation is evidenced not only
by the officers' expeditious protective sweep of the
apartment, but by the presence of the firefighters at the
apartment complex and the evacuation of the other residents of
the complex.  Additionally, the record establishes that the
purpose of the officers' entry into and search of the
apartment was to remove any occupants from the potential harm
manufacturing methamphetamine can cause and to secure the
apartment for the firefighters to investigate the source of
the odor, not to search for evidence.   Here, exigent
circumstances 
existed, 
requiring 
immediate 
action, 
because 
the
law-enforcement 
officers 
reasonably 
believed 
that
methamphetamine 
was 
being 
manufactured 
in 
Clayton 
and 
Bailey's
apartment 
and 
because 
the 
process 
of 
manufacturing
methamphetamine constitutes an emergency, life-threatening
situation that requires immediate action to protect the law-
enforcement officers and the public. 
Here, the law-enforcement officers were justified in
entering and searching the apartment because the officers,
acting on probable cause and in good faith, reasonably
believed from the totality of the circumstances that the
29
1130012 and 1130013
nature of the manufacture of methamphetamine posed a risk of
danger to them and the public.  See Moore v. State, 650 So. 2d
958, 
962-63 
(Ala. 
Crim. 
App. 
1994)("Whether 
exigent
circumstances exist depends upon whether an 'emergency
situation' exists.  An emergency situation exists 'when the
officers in good faith believe that they or someone within are
in peril of bodily harm ....").  
This Court does not find persuasive Clayton and Bailey's
argument that the behavior of the officers indicated that
there was no need for immediate action.  A fair reading of the
record establishes that, in light of the odor the law-
enforcement officers recognized to be consistent with the
process of manufacturing methamphetamine, the law-enforcement
officers were concerned about their safety and the safety of
the occupants of the apartment and the public.  The fact that
Sgt. Hall remained in the apartment to allow Clayton to dress
her two-year-old child before escorting them outside into the
cold temperature does not extinguish the urgency of the
situation or the concern for public safety; rather, it
exhibits Sgt. Hall's desire not to cause additional risk to
the child's health.  Additionally, the record clearly
30
1130012 and 1130013
demonstrates that the officers remained inside the apartment
just long enough to remove its occupants and then left as
quickly as possible.  Cf.  United States v. Echegoyen, supra
(rejecting defendant's argument that the behavior of the
officers before, during, and after the search indicated that
the alleged exigent circumstance was pretextual and holding
that the evidence supported the conclusion that there was a
potentially 
dangerous 
fire 
hazard 
based 
on 
testimony 
regarding
the chemical smell and the risk of fire posed by the illegal
manufacturing of narcotics). 
Moreover, to hold, as Bailey and Clayton urge, that the
law-enforcement officers had to secure a warrant before
entering the residence would have placed the safety of all in
the vicinity of the odor in danger.  This Court finds it
immaterial 
in 
our 
determination 
whether 
an 
exigent
circumstance 
existed 
that 
the 
methamphetamine 
laboratory 
found
in the apartment was inactive.  The pivotal consideration is
that the record establishes that at the time the law-
enforcement officers entered the apartment they had a good-
faith belief, based on the odor known to them to be consistent
with the process of manufacturing methamphetamine, that
31
1130012 and 1130013
methamphetamine was being manufactured in the apartment and
that the process of manufacturing methamphetamine posed a
danger to the occupants of the apartment, the officers, and
the public.  
Conclusion
Because the law-enforcement officers had probable cause
to believe that methamphetamine was being manufactured inside
the apartment and because the process of manufacturing
methamphetamine, in light of its explosive nature, creates an
exigent 
circumstance, 
the 
law-enforcement 
officers'
warrantless entry into and search of Bailey and Clayton's
apartment on January 7, 2011, was proper.  Therefore, the
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals holding otherwise is
reversed, and this case is remanded to that court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1130012 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1130013 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
Moore, C.J., concurs in the result. 
32
1130012 and 1130013
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
It appears that the police had a right to be in the
hallway outside the apartment in question.  When the door to
the apartment was voluntarily opened by one of its occupants,
two things happened:  (1) the police became aware of a strong
smell consistent with the operation of an illegal "meth lab"
inside the apartment and (2) the occupants became aware that
the police were aware of the foregoing.  Although I concur in
the main opinion, I write separately to note that the only
argument made by the State is that the health risks associated
with the possible presence of a meth lab constituted an
exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search of the
apartment by members of the fire department.  The State does
not argue in this case that the prospect for the destruction
of evidence of a crime given items (1) and (2) above would
constitute an exigency justifying the immediate search of the
apartment by the police without the necessity of a warrant or
the involvement of the fire department acting in the interest
of public safety.  See generally Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S.
___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011) ("[W]arrantless 
searches
are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within
33
1130012 and 1130013
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the
warrant requirement. Therefore, the answer to the question
before us is that the exigent circumstances rule justifies a
warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding
the exigency is reasonable in the same sense.  Where, as here,
the police did not create the exigency by engaging or
threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth
Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of
evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.").
 
34