Case Title: Kenneth W. Hornback v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee

Citation: 2008 WI 98

Docket Number: 2006AP000291

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2008 WI 98 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP291 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Kenneth W. Hornback, Dennis L. Bolton, Ronald W. 
Kuhl, David W. Schaeffer and Glenn M. Bonn, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee and Diocese of Madison, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Commercial Union Insurance Company, 
          Intervening Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A COURT OF APPEALS DECEISION 
Reported at: 298 Wis. 2d 248, 726 N.W.2d 357 
(Ct. App. 2006-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 13, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Francis T. Wasielewski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
filed by James S. Smith, Wendy G. Gunderson, and Smith, 
Gunderson & Rowen, S.C., Brookfield, and J. Andrew White and J. 
Andrew White & Associates, Louisville, Ky., and oral argument by 
Marci A. Hamilton, appearing Pro Hac Vice. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 
there was a brief by John A. Rothstein, David P. Muth, and 
Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by John A. 
Rothstein. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Diocese of Madison, there was 
a brief by Donald L. Heaney, Kenneth B. Axe, Carrie Benedon, and 
Lathrop & Clark LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Donald L. 
Heaney. 
 
 
 
2008 WI 98
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP291  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV8815) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kenneth W. Hornback, Dennis L. Bolton, Ronald 
W. Kuhl, David W. Schaeffer and Glenn M. Bonn, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee and Diocese of 
Madison, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Commercial Union Insurance Company, 
 
          Intervening Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Kenneth W. Hornback, Dennis 
L. Bolton, Ronald W. Kuhl, David W. Schaeffer and Glenn M. Bonn 
(the plaintiffs) seek review of a court of appeals decision1 that 
affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' 
complaint against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee (the Archdiocese) 
                                                 
1 Hornback v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 2006AP291, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2006). 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
2 
 
and the Diocese2 of Madison (the Diocese), along with their 
insurance companies.   
¶2 
The plaintiffs' complaint against the Archdiocese and 
the Diocese alleged that the plaintiffs were sexually abused by 
Gary R. Kazmarek from 1968 to 1973, during the time when 
Kazmarek taught at Our Mother of Sorrows School in Louisville, 
Kentucky.  Kazmarek had previously taught at Catholic schools in 
Milwaukee and Middleton run by the Archdiocese and Diocese, and 
the plaintiffs claimed the Archdiocese and the Diocese "knew or 
should have known of Kazmarek's propensity for sexually abusing 
children," and were negligent for failing to take certain steps 
to prevent Kazmarek's future sexual abuse.  In oral argument to 
this court, plaintiffs specified that their claims included a 
negligent failure to warn unforeseeable third parties of 
Kazmarek's propensity for sexual abuse. 
¶3 
A 
significant 
difference 
between 
the 
plaintiffs' 
claims against the Archdiocese and the Diocese is that the 
plaintiffs' complaint alleges that when the sexual abuse of 
students in Milwaukee was brought to the attention of the 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, the Archdiocese promised two dozen of 
the victims' parents "that Kazmarek would be sent to a treatment 
center and that he would never have contact with children 
                                                 
2 Although the plaintiffs alternatively refer to the Diocese 
of 
Madison 
as 
an 
"Archdiocese," 
their 
caption 
correctly 
identifies it as the "Madison Diocese," which is also the title 
most frequently used by the parties in this case, and the title 
we will use.  The correct title of the Diocese of Madison is not 
at issue and has no substantive bearing on our decision. 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
3 
 
again," and "pleaded with parents to not report Kazmarek's 
crimes to the police."  However, the complaint alleges, instead 
of subsequently referring Kazmarek to the police or alerting 
others about the abuse, the Archdiocese simply told Kazmarek "to 
leave Milwaukee quietly."  Similar claims were not alleged as to 
the Diocese. 
¶4 
In a response to motions to dismiss brought by the 
Archdiocese and Diocese, the circuit court, the Honorable 
Francis T. Wasielewski presiding, dismissed the complaint as to 
both.  The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court order. 
¶5 
This court is equally divided on whether to affirm or 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals' dismissing the 
plaintiffs' complaint against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee.  
Justice N. Patrick Crooks, Justice Patience D. Roggensack, and 
Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler would affirm; Chief Justice 
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, and Justice 
Louis B. Butler would reverse.3  Consequently, we affirm the 
court of appeals' decision to affirm the circuit court's 
dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against the Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee, without further analysis of that issue. 
¶6 
In 
addition, 
we 
do 
not 
reach 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations question in this case regarding the dismissal of 
claims against the Diocese of Madison because we conclude that 
the plaintiffs have failed to articulate a claim upon which 
relief could be granted, rendering our consideration of the 
                                                 
3 Justice David T. Prosser did not participate in this case. 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
4 
 
statute of limitations issue unnecessary.  We further conclude 
that the plaintiffs have not alleged an actionable claim for 
negligence against the Diocese under which relief could be 
granted under Wisconsin law.  We finally conclude that even if a 
viable 
negligence 
claim 
had 
been 
made, 
recovery 
would 
nonetheless be precluded on the public policy ground that 
allowing recovery would send this court down a slippery slope 
with no sensible or just stopping point.  We therefore affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals, on different grounds. 
I 
¶7 
On October 3, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a complaint 
against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, the Diocese of Madison, 
and their insurance companies.  In the complaint, each of the 
plaintiffs alleges being a child victim of sexual abuse at some 
point between the years of 1968 and 1973 at the hands of Gary 
Kazmarek, who was a teacher at the Catholic school the 
plaintiffs attended in Louisville, Kentucky, Our Mother of 
Sorrows.  The complaint describes an ongoing pattern of sexual 
abuse of children by Kazmarek over the years.  The plaintiffs 
allege that prior to 1964, he had engaged in inappropriate 
sexual conduct while at a Catholic seminary; that between 1964 
and 1966, he abused more than two dozen children while a teacher 
at St. John de Nepomuc School in the Milwaukee Archdiocese; that 
he subsequently admitted to sexually abusing up to ten more 
children at St. Bernard School in the Madison Diocese; and that 
the pattern of sexual abuse continued while he was a teacher at 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
5 
 
Our Mother of Sorrows for approximately five years, beginning in 
1967.  
¶8 
The complaint alleges that the Diocese "knew or should 
have known of Kazmarek's propensity for sexually abusing 
children and, despite this knowledge, did not refer Kazmarek to 
the police or take any other action to prevent Kazmarek from 
continuing his pattern of sexually abusing children."  The 
complaint further alleges that the failure of the Diocese to 
refer Kazmarek to the police and/or to take "other action to 
prevent Kazmarek's continuation of his pattern of sexually 
abusing children"4 constitutes negligence, and that the Diocese's 
negligent conduct was a substantial factor in causing Kazmarek's 
sexual abuse of and resulting injuries to the plaintiffs.  The 
complaint adds that discovery of Kazmarek's sexual abuse of 
children in Wisconsin and of the Diocese's negligent conduct did 
not occur until October 2002.   
¶9 
The Archdiocese filed a motion to dismiss parallel 
claims against it on October 21, 2005, arguing that the 
plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations.  
In the alternative, the Archdiocese argued that public policy 
considerations regarding the delay in bringing this case 
                                                 
4 At oral argument to this court, the plaintiffs specified 
that 
such 
negligence 
in 
failing 
to 
take 
other 
action 
specifically included a negligent failure to warn unforeseeable 
third parties——including "other dioceses within the United 
States, the parochial school systems . . . or the parents of 
unforeseeable victims"——of Kazmarek's propensity for sexual 
abuse.  
No. 
2006AP291   
 
6 
 
preclude the liability for the plaintiffs' claims, maintaining 
that such public policy concerns "strongly militate against 
permitting 32 year old claims based on alleged assaults, where 
most other witnesses and relevant evidence are dead."  On 
October 27, 2005, the Diocese also filed a motion to dismiss, 
adopting the Archdiocese's memorandum in support of dismissal.   
¶10 The plaintiffs responded that the motions to dismiss 
should be denied because the plaintiffs' claims were not barred 
by the statute of limitations and because public policy favors 
litigation of the issues presented in the case rather than 
encouraging the concealment of information by employers about 
sexual abusers in their midst.  
¶11 The circuit court held a motion hearing on December 
19, 2005.  In a ruling based on statute of limitations grounds, 
the court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, and an 
order dismissing the case was filed on January 4, 2006.  
¶12 The plaintiffs appealed, and on November 28, 2006, the 
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order, also 
confining its discussion to the statute of limitations issue.  
Hornback v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 2006AP291, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2006).  Review was granted on 
October 11, 2007. 
II 
¶13 "A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
'tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.'"  John Doe 67C 
v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 123, ¶19, 284 Wis. 2d 307, 
700 N.W.2d 180.  We review a circuit court's dismissal of a 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
7 
 
complaint for failure to state a claim de novo.  Id.  Without 
drawing unreasonable interferences from the pleadings, we will 
accept as true the facts pled in the complaint for purposes of 
review.  See id., ¶¶19-20.  
¶14 Whether Wisconsin courts recognize an alleged duty and 
how far the scope of such a duty extends may be questions of law 
determined judicially rather than questions of fact.  Hoida, 
Inc. v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶23 n.12, 291 Wis. 2d 
283, 717 N.W.2d 17.   
¶15 Whether a defendant failed to exercise ordinary care 
and is negligent as a matter of law ("'i.e., based on the facts 
presented, no properly instructed, reasonable jury could find 
the defendant [exercised] ordinary care'") is a question of law.  
Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 87, ¶60, 
236 Wis. 2d 435, 613 N.W.2d 142 (citations omitted).  As with 
our review of the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the 
determination of whether public policy considerations preclude 
liability in a negligence case is also a question of law that 
this court determines without deference to any other court.  See 
Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶27, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 
N.W.2d 906.   
III 
¶16 In Wisconsin, the sufficiency of a negligence claim 
depends 
on 
whether 
a 
complaint 
alleges 
facts 
adequately 
establishing the following four required elements:  "(1) the 
existence of a duty of care on the part of the defendant, (2) a 
breach of that duty of care, (3) a causal connection between the 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
8 
 
defendant's breach of the duty of care and the plaintiff's 
injury, and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the 
injury."  Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶19 (citing Miller v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 219 Wis. 2d 250, 260, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998); 
Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 418, 541 N.W.2d 742 
(1995)).  The first two elements, duty and breach, are often 
presented to juries in the form of a question about whether the 
defendant 
was 
negligent, 
with 
the 
causation 
and 
damages 
questions asked separately.  See Nichols v. Progressive N. Ins. 
Co., 2008 WI 20, ¶12, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 746 N.W.2d 220 (citing 
Wis JI——Civil 1005 (2006)).  
¶17 In Nichols, we stated that the court of appeals' 
decision in that case 
could be read as, at least, implicitly suggesting that 
Hoida had overturned or backed away from cases such as 
Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶1, and Rockweit v. 
Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995).  
Hoida was not intended to overturn prior case law, but 
to resolve the case presented.  See also Baumeister v. 
Automated Prods., Inc., 2004 WI 148, 277 Wis. 2d 21, 
690 N.W.2d 1. 
For example, the majority in the court of appeals 
stated that Hoida held that "[d]uty has not become 
just another policy factor. . . .  In a nutshell, 
Hoida returned Wisconsin negligence law to its pre-
Bowen [Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 
627, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994)] analysis. . . . " Nichols, 
No. 2006AP364, unpublished slip op., ¶22.  The court 
of appeals did recognize that Hoida required, as part 
of the analysis used in a negligence determination, 
the application of "public policy factors to the 
specific facts presented."  Id., ¶31. 
Where the majority in the court of appeals may 
have caused some confusion in its reading of Hoida is 
that it seemed to believe that this court had somehow 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
9 
 
returned to an emphasis on duty and foreseeability as 
a way of limiting liability in a negligence case.  
While that has been a legitimate inquiry, liability in 
negligence cases in Wisconsin more often has been 
limited by consideration of public policy factors, as 
shown in the Rockweit and Gritzner [lead opinion5] 
decisions. 
In Hoida, we held that a subcontractor who 
incurred losses on a construction project, when the 
general contractor and the property owner fraudulently 
misappropriated 
about 
$650,000 
of 
the 
project's 
construction 
loan 
proceeds, 
had 
not 
provided 
sufficient facts to controvert the defendant-lenders' 
"prima facie showing that it did not breach the duty 
of ordinary care under the circumstances. . . . " 
Hoida, Inc., 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶1.  Hoida claimed that 
the defendant-lenders breached their duty of care by 
failing to perform certain project oversight tasks 
that Hoida claimed they were obligated to perform.  
Hoida argued that such a failure was contrary to the 
"'basic industry standards'" of conduct for such 
lenders, such as verifying that "sufficient work on 
the 
project 
had 
been 
completed 
to 
'justify 
disbursement. . . . '"  Id., ¶20.  Hoida claimed that, 
by the defendant-lenders failing to perform such 
tasks, 
it 
was 
"reasonably 
foreseeable 
that 
subcontractors and materialmen [would] be harmed."  
Id. 
We disagreed with Hoida's claims and held that 
Hoida's negligence claim against M & I Midstate Bank 
was precluded because the bank did not breach the duty 
of ordinary care under the circumstances.  We also 
held that, "Hoida's negligence claim [against McDonald 
Title] 
would 
be 
precluded 
by 
judicial 
public 
policy[,]" even if we were to conclude that McDonald 
Title had breached its duty of ordinary care under the 
circumstances.  Id., ¶2.  This court went on to hold 
that 
allowing 
Hoida's 
claims 
"would 
place 
too 
unreasonable a burden on McDonald Title, who acted 
                                                 
5 A majority of this court agreed with the failure to warn 
holding of Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence in Gritzner, 
rather than the lead opinion's public policy approach to failure 
to warn.  See Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶86, 235 Wis. 
2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).   
No. 
2006AP291   
 
10 
 
solely at the direction of M & I."  Id., ¶43.  We so 
held in addition to holding that the defendant-lenders 
did not owe a duty of care to Hoida.  Id., ¶¶44-45.  
As noted previously in this decision, a court may 
preclude a negligence claim on public policy grounds, 
even if all elements of a negligence claim have been 
appropriately pled or even if we assume, as we did on 
some 
claims 
in 
Hoida, 
that 
a 
claim 
has 
been 
appropriately pled so that the case can then be 
decided on public policy grounds. 
Nichols, ____ Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶34-38 (citations omitted).   
¶18 As we summarized the law in Nichols, we said that 
although "liability has been limited in a negligence case based 
on the absence of a duty, liability in the vast majority of 
negligence cases in Wisconsin is guided, when determining 
whether to limit liability, by consideration of public policy 
factors, as Gritzner [lead opinion] and Rockweit demonstrate."  
Id., ¶47.  
¶19 Negligence and liability are two distinct concepts.  
See Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶25.  Even if the elements of 
negligence are established or assumed in a case, liability is 
not guaranteed, but may still be restricted by Wisconsin courts 
on the basis of judicially recognized policy factors.  Id., ¶24 
(citing Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, ¶39, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 
682 N.W.2d 923).  Even though we can consider the public policy 
factors to preclude liability, such an analysis generally first 
requires a determination of whether the elements of negligence 
have been sufficiently alleged, or at least an assumption that 
negligence exists.  See Nichols, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶18, 19.  
¶20 In this case, we proceed to first examine the claims 
under a standard motion to dismiss inquiry focusing on the 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
11 
 
elements of the claim alleged.  For the reasons below, we 
conclude that the plaintiffs have not set forth a claim against 
the Diocese upon which relief may be granted because the 
plaintiff has not alleged that the defendant has failed to 
exercise ordinary care under the circumstances of the case; the 
failure to warn alleged by the plaintiffs does not constitute 
negligence in the instant case.  We then separately examine 
whether, even assuming negligence had been sufficiently claimed, 
public policy factors would nonetheless preclude liability. 
A 
¶21 As a starting point of a negligence analysis, we 
recognize in Wisconsin that everyone has a duty to act with 
reasonable and ordinary care under the circumstances.  See 
Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶30.  This "first element, a duty of 
care, is established under Wisconsin law whenever it was 
foreseeable to the defendant that his or her act or omission to 
act might cause harm to some other person."  Gritzner, 235 Wis. 
2d 781, ¶20 (citations omitted).   
¶22 Our state's recognition of a general duty to act with 
ordinary care, following the famous minority opinion of Palsgraf 
v. Long Island Railroad Co., is that "[everyone] owes to the 
world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may 
unreasonably threaten the safety of others."  Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting).  See also Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55, ¶13, 262 
Wis. 2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350.  Thus, as we explained in Gritzner,  
No. 
2006AP291   
 
12 
 
Wisconsin does not follow the majority view in 
Palsgraf . . . under which the existence of a duty of 
care depends upon whether injury to the particular 
victim was foreseeable.  See Schilling v. Stockel, 26 
Wis. 2d 525, 531, 133 N.W.2d 335 (1965)(discussing 
this court's adoption and subsequent rejection of the 
majority "no-duty" formula in Palsgraf).   
Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶20 n.3.  This general duty has also 
been described as an "obligation of due care to refrain from any 
act which will cause foreseeable harm to others even though the 
nature of that harm and the identity of the harmed person or 
harmed interest is unknown at the time of the act."  A.E. Inv. 
Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 483, 214 N.W.2d 
764 (1974).  Under this framework, a person is negligent "'if 
the person, without intending to do harm does something (or 
fails to do something) that a reasonable person would recognize 
as creating an unreasonable risk of injury or damage to a person 
or property.'"  Alvarado, 262 Wis. 2d 74, ¶14 (quoting Gritzner, 
235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶22; Wis JI——Civil 1005). 
¶23 The more specific component of a standard negligence 
inquiry involves whether there has been a breach of that 
ordinary care under the circumstances of the case.  As we 
explained in Hoida, "what is comprised within ordinary care may 
depend on . . . whether the alleged tortfeasor assumed a special 
role in regard to the injured party."  Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 
¶32.  In Gritzner, we recognized that the specific type of 
negligence alleged, a negligent failure to warn, "depending on 
the circumstances, may be a breach of the duty of ordinary 
care."  See Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶76 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring).  
No. 
2006AP291   
 
13 
 
¶24 Thus, in the vast majority of cases, whether a 
defendant has acted negligently "'is not examined in terms of 
whether or not there is a duty to do a specific act, but rather 
whether the conduct satisfied the duty placed upon individuals 
to exercise that degree of care as would be exercised by a 
reasonable person under the circumstances.'"  Nichols, ___ Wis. 
2d ___, ¶45.  See also Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 
238 n.3, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988)(citations omitted): 
Under Wisconsin's broad definition of duty, we 
need not engage in analytical gymnastics to arrive at 
our result by first noting that at common law, a 
person owes no duty to control the conduct of another 
person or warn of such conduct, and then finding 
exception to that general rule where the defendant 
stands in a special relationship to either the person 
whose 
conduct 
needs 
to 
be 
controlled 
or 
in 
a 
relationship to the foreseeable victim of the conduct.  
¶25 In this case, the plaintiffs' complaint alleges that 
the elements constituting negligence include the facts that the 
Diocese "knew or should have known of Kazmarek's propensity for 
sexually abusing children and, despite this knowledge, did not 
refer Kazmarek to the police or take any other action to prevent 
Kazmarek from continuing his pattern of sexually abusing 
children."   
¶26 The plaintiffs' description of the "other action" the 
Diocese failed to take, thereby constituting negligence, has 
varied.  In their brief to this court, the plaintiffs alleged 
that the Diocese: 
(1) knew or should have known of the dangerous 
propensities of Kazmarek, (2) attempted to conceal the 
sexual assaults from authorities, (3) represented to 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
14 
 
parents that Kazmarek would be sent for treatment, 
[and] (4) represented to parents [that] Kazmarek would 
never have contact with children again, yet despite 
this knowledge and these representations, failed to 
report 
Kazmarek 
to 
authorities, 
send 
him 
for 
treatment, or take any other action consistent with 
their duty of care.  
However, during oral arguments, the plaintiffs acknowledged that 
it had been the Milwaukee Archdiocese only that had, as the 
complaint claims, made representations that Kazmarek would be 
sent for treatment, and that he would never have contact with 
children again.  The plaintiffs asserted at oral argument that 
it made no difference to their negligence claim that only the 
Archdiocese had made an affirmative promise, because the 
specific breach of duty claim they allege in this case emanated 
from the knowledge that both the Diocese and Archdiocese had of 
Kazmarek's propensity.  The plaintiffs then reframed their 
negligence claim, clarifying that the complaint's reference to a 
failure to take "other action" is, more specifically, a failure 
to warn unforeseeable third parties——including "other dioceses 
within the United States, the parochial school systems . . . or 
the parents" of unforeseeable victims——of Kazmarek's propensity 
for sexual abuse.   
 
¶27 Viewing 
the 
complaint 
in 
conjunction 
with 
the 
plaintiffs' 
clarification 
of 
their 
arguments 
during 
oral 
argument, we conclude that the plaintiffs' negligence claim is 
premised on an alleged failure to warn unforeseeable third 
parties, including any potential future employers of Kazmarek at 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
15 
 
dioceses and parochial school systems everywhere in the country, 
as well as parents of unforeseeable victims.6  
¶28  Incorporating the arguments made in the Archdiocese's 
brief to this court, the Diocese argues that common law tort 
rules do not impose a duty on employers to seek out and disclose 
information to an employee's subsequent employers or the public 
at large concerning a former employee's history of misconduct or 
antisocial behavior.  The Diocese argues that under the law of 
"negligent referral or duty to warn," unless an employer gives a 
favorable reference to a subsequent employer or third party 
about 
the 
former 
employee 
while 
withholding 
negative 
information, there is no breach of duty established by the 
employer's failure to seek out subsequent employers and alert 
them to prior negative history of the former employee.  
¶29 Although 
acknowledging 
that 
this 
has 
not 
been 
expressly adopted in Wisconsin case law, the Diocese cites as an 
analogous case Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 2000 WI App 48, 
234 Wis. 2d 1, 608 N.W.2d 331, in which the court of appeals 
declined to recognize a duty of employers to disclose to 
employees possible negative corporate events and developments.  
The Diocese suggests that in Wisconsin, we should follow the 
                                                 
6 During oral argument, upon conceding that it was the 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee only and not the Diocese of Madison 
that made affirmative promises to report Kazmarek to the police 
and keep him from children, and upon reframing the claimed 
breach of duty as a failure to warn dioceses, schools and 
parents, the plaintiffs also appeared to drop their claim that 
the failure to report Kazmarek to the police also constituted 
negligence.   
No. 
2006AP291   
 
16 
 
rationale of a California negligent referral case, Randi W. v. 
Muroc Joint Unified School District, 929 P.2d 582, 591-93 (Cal. 
1997), and recognize that absent a positive job reference, mere 
knowledge of an employee's negative personal history is not 
enough to create a duty of notification to subsequent employers.  
As such, in this case, there should be no such duty imposed on 
the defendants, argues the Diocese, considering how far removed 
the plaintiffs are from the relationships between Kazmarek and 
the Diocese of Madison.  The Diocese emphasizes that it never 
spoke to the Archdiocese of Louisville about Kazmarek, that the 
plaintiffs never allege such communication occurred, and that 
there is therefore no negligence under these circumstances.  
¶30 The plaintiffs respond that this case fits squarely 
within the duty of ordinary care all persons owe one another, 
and should be guided by passages from two specific Wisconsin 
precedents addressing negligent failure to warn, Gritzner, 235 
Wis. 2d 781, ¶¶23, 43, and Schuster, 144 Wis. 2d at 235.  The 
plaintiffs argue that because the Diocese in this case knew 
Kazmarek abused up to ten children at one of its schools, it 
should have deduced Kazmarek's continued danger to other 
children; and that its failure to warn constituted negligence.  
¶31 A proper analysis of this issue is framed in terms of 
the ordinary care all persons owe one another under the 
circumstances, as opposed to a particular "duty to warn."  
However, we also recognize that in some cases, the failure to 
warn may be a breach of duty of ordinary care.  Gritzner, 235 
Wis. 2d 781, ¶76 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).   
No. 
2006AP291   
 
17 
 
¶32 We conclude that the third party failure to warn 
claims recognized in this state do not encompass the type of 
failure to warn claimed by the plaintiffs.  We do not decide 
today whether to adopt the negligent referral approach of Randi 
W.  We emphasize that even if we did recognize such negligent 
referral claims, the general rule under Randi W. is that 
employers who actively provide recommendations of employees 
"should not be held accountable to third persons for failing to 
disclose 
negative 
information 
regarding 
a 
former 
employee. . . . "  Randi W., 929 P.2d at 584 (emphasis added).  
Randi W. provides only a narrow exception allowing that tort 
liability for fraud or negligent misrepresentation may be 
created "if, as alleged here, the recommendation letter amounts 
to an affirmative misrepresentation presenting a foreseeable and 
substantial risk of physical harm to a third person."  Id.7  
(Emphasis in original.) 
¶33 We observe that Randi W. has been criticized by some 
as going too far in extending liability in employer warning 
contexts.  See J. Bradley Buckhalter, Speak No Evil:  Negligent 
Employment Referral and the Employer's Duty to Warn (Or, How 
                                                 
7 In Randi W., an employer alleged to have knowingly 
concealed 
material 
facts 
about 
a 
past 
employee's 
sexual 
misconduct with students wrote a letter of reference for the 
employee that "allegedly extolled Gadams's [the employee's] 
'genuine concern' for and 'outstanding rapport' with students, 
knowing that Gadams had engaged in inappropriate physical 
contact with them.  [The former employer] declared in the letter 
that he 'wouldn't hesitate to recommend Mr. Gadams for any 
position!'"  Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 
P.2d 582, 592-93 (Cal. 1997). 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
18 
 
Employers Can Have Their Cake and Eat it Too), 22 Seattle U. L. 
Rev. 265, 267 (1998)("The [Randi W.] decision both generated 
academic debate and triggered dismayed commentary in legal trade 
journals.")(citations omitted).  In contrast with Randi W.'s 
approach recognizing tort claims for employers' failure to 
disclose information about past employees, most states stand by 
a traditional "no duty to act" approach in employment referral 
contexts.  See id. at 274.  
¶34 In this case, no affirmative misrepresentation of the 
type recognized under a negligent referral analysis has been 
alleged, let alone any type of communication about Kazmarek from 
the Diocese of Madison to the Archdiocese of Louisville.  The 
Diocese's mere knowledge of Kazmarek's past sexual abuse, or a 
presumed knowledge of a continued sexual propensity for abuse, 
is not enough to establish negligence.  Reasonable and ordinary 
care does not require the Diocese to notify all potential 
subsequent 
employers within dioceses and parochial school 
systems across the country, along with all parents of future 
unforeseeable victims.  Requiring such notification under these 
circumstances 
would 
create a vast obligation dramatically 
exceeding any approach to failure to warn recognized either in 
this state or in other jurisdictions.   
¶35 As to the plaintiffs' reliance on Gritzner and 
Schuster, it is true that these cases affirm the potential 
viability of negligent failure to warn claims, but they do so in 
different contexts.  See Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶¶1-9; 
Schuster, 144 Wis. 2d at 226-29, 263.  The failure to warn is 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
19 
 
not 
without 
limitations 
and 
parameters. 
 
This 
court's 
recognition of such potential claims in Gritzner included the 
disclaimer, "[f]ailure to warn, depending on the circumstances, 
may be a breach of the duty of ordinary care."  Gritzner, 235 
Wis. 2d 781, ¶76 (emphasis added)(Abrahamson, C.J. concurring). 
¶36 In Gritzner, this court was confronted with the 
question of whether the defendant had negligently failed to warn 
the plaintiffs of a third party's propensity toward sexual 
abuse.  Id., ¶2.  Gritzner involved the sexual abuse of a four-
year-old girl by her neighbor Michael, who himself was ten years 
old.  Id., ¶1.  The plaintiffs in the case were the girl's 
parents, who sued a caretaker of the boy (Roger Bubner, the 
live-in boyfriend of the boy's mother) for failure to control 
Michael and failure to warn the girl's parents of the boy's 
propensity for inappropriate sexual acts.  Id., ¶¶1-2.  
¶37 Although the plaintiffs in Gritzner, as in this case, 
alleged a negligent failure to warn of a known propensity for 
sexual abuse, there are critical differences between Gritzner 
and this case.  The complaint in Gritzner alleged in relevant 
part that Bubner knew of previous inappropriate sexual acts by 
Michael, including acts with his half-sister, and that Bubner 
knew or should have known that Michael would engage in 
inappropriate sexual acts again if left unsupervised with the 
girl.  Id., ¶¶7, 9.  In this case, there was no comparable 
allegation of such knowledge that Kazmarek would engage in 
sexual abuse again, either generally or toward the plaintiffs 
specifically.  The only knowledge attributed to the Diocese by 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
20 
 
the complaint in this case is that it "knew or should have known 
of Kazmarek's propensity for sexually abusing children."  
¶38 More importantly, in this case, the specific victims 
were unforeseeable.  Foreseeability of specific victims becomes 
relevant when an affirmative obligation is argued, such as the 
obligation to warn.  See Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶¶32, 34.  
Moreover, the Diocese did not assume a special role in regard to 
the injured parties. 
¶39 Thus, the rationale in Gritzner for recognizing a 
potential negligence failure to warn claim does not extend to 
this case in part because there is no direct contact of any sort 
alleged between the plaintiffs and defendants in this case.   
¶40 Furthermore, although parents may have a duty to warn 
other parents when there is a special role or relationship among 
the parties in a case,8 Gritzner did not hold that the parents in 
that case also have a duty to warn every child that the parents 
encounter for the indefinite future about the perpetrator's 
propensity for sexual abuse.   
¶41 Schuster, 
the 
other 
case 
relied 
upon 
by 
the 
plaintiffs, also does not describe negligent failure to warn 
claims as extending to circumstances such as those in the 
present case.  In Schuster, this court recognized that a claim 
for relief was stated when the complaint set forth allegations 
of a psychiatrist's failure to warn a patient's family of the 
                                                 
8 See Hoida, Inc., v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶¶32, 
34, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17. 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
21 
 
patient's dangerous condition.  Schuster, 144 Wis. 2d at 226-29, 
263. 
 
The 
discussion 
focused 
on 
the 
extent 
to 
which 
psychotherapists specifically have a duty to warn others about 
dangerous patients in contexts when the information about the 
danger they have is so certain and specific that it supports 
initiation of detention or commitment proceedings.  See id. at 
257-62.   
¶42 The plaintiffs here claim a much broader type of 
failure to warn breach.  Unlike the breach claim in Schuster 
which emanated from knowledge of such a certain and specific 
danger, the plaintiffs in this case do not allege that when the 
Archdiocese of Louisville hired Kazmarek, the Diocese had 
knowledge of such a specific and immediate danger as that 
described in Schuster. 
¶43 Although we agree with the Diocese that Gritzner and 
Schuster do not make the plaintiffs' case, we disagree with the 
Diocese that MacKenzie is directly applicable to this case in 
the way the Diocese claims.  MacKenzie, unlike the present case, 
addresses 
an 
employer's 
obligation 
to 
disclose 
certain 
information to an employee in the context of an intentional 
misrepresentation claim.  MacKenzie, 234 Wis. 2d 1.  In 
contrast, this case involves a failure to warn third parties, in 
the context of a negligence claim.  Nevertheless, we agree that 
because this case involves questions about an employer's breach, 
it warrants taking a closer look at any special roles and, 
consequently, obligations, created by the former employment 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
22 
 
relationship between the Diocese and Kazmarek.  See Hoida, 291 
Wis. 2d 283, ¶32.   
¶44 On the one hand, the plaintiffs in this case had 
virtually 
no 
relationship 
with 
the 
Diocese. 
 
There 
are 
significant 
gaps 
temporally 
and 
geographically, 
with 
the 
plaintiffs separated from the Diocese by several state lines and 
their abuse separated from Kazmarek's employment with the 
Diocese by a number of years, and the complaint never indicated 
that their paths crossed at all prior to the plaintiffs filing 
this action.  Thus, the relationship between the parties in this 
case is quite attenuated.   
¶45  There is no state in which employers are recognized 
as being negligent for failing to seek out, find, and warn 
future employers of sexually dangerous former employees.  Even 
those states that have recognized a negligent referral doctrine 
do not impose liability when a referral letter is sent by a past 
employer to a future employer of such an employee unless actual 
misrepresentations are made in such a letter.  See Randi W., 929 
P.2d at 584.  
¶46 Thus, we conclude that the plaintiffs' complaint fails 
to 
allege 
negligence 
(duty 
of 
care 
and 
breach 
thereof) 
sufficiently to survive a motion to dismiss.  Although the 
plaintiffs allege that the Diocese knew that Kazmarek had a 
propensity for sexual abuse, what is more pertinent is what the 
plaintiffs did not allege.  They did not allege that the Diocese 
knew that Kazmarek was in Kentucky, still teaching children, or 
working for the Archdiocese in Louisville.  They did not allege 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
23 
 
any knowledge that the children at the Mother of Sorrow School 
in Louisville were in any danger.  They did not allege that the 
Archdiocese of Louisville asked the Diocese for a reference, 
that the Diocese made a reference recommending Kazmarek, or that 
the 
Diocese 
had 
any 
communication 
whatsoever 
with 
the 
Archdiocese of Louisville regarding Kazmarek.  
¶47 The plaintiffs also fail to provide legal authority 
supporting their arguments.  They argue that the duty of 
ordinary care in this case encompasses a specific obligation to 
warn all parochial schools and dioceses in this country, as well 
as future parents of unforeseeable victims, but have cited no 
cases in which the failure to warn third parties has been 
described in such sweeping terms.   
¶48 Consequently, the plaintiffs have not stated a claim 
for negligence.  They have not alleged that the defendant fell 
below the standard of care under the circumstances.  We decline 
to rule that under the general duty of ordinary care recognized 
in Wisconsin, an employer may be found negligent for failing to 
warn unforeseen third parties of a dangerous former employee.  
Such a ruling would extend an employer's obligation to warn 
indefinitely into the future to a sweeping category of persons, 
thereby requiring employers to warn nearly all potential future 
employers or victims, as the plaintiffs in this case argue. 
B 
¶49 We next address the public policy concerns generated 
by this case.  In Wisconsin, we recognize six public policy 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
24 
 
grounds upon which this court may deny liability even in the 
face of proven or assumed negligence:  
(1) "the injury is too remote from the negligence"; 
(2) the recovery is "'wholly out of proportion to the 
culpability of the negligent tort-feasor'"; (3) the 
harm 
caused 
is 
highly 
extraordinary 
given 
the 
negligent 
act; 
(4) 
recovery 
"would 
place 
too 
unreasonable a burden" on the negligent tort-feasor; 
(5) recovery would be "too likely to open the way to 
fraudulent claims"; and (6) recovery would enter into 
"'a field that has no sensible or just stopping 
point.'" 
Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶41.  This court may refuse to impose 
liability on the basis of any of these factors without full 
resolution of a cause of action by trial.  Stephenson v. 
Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, ¶¶42-43, 251 Wis. 2d 171, 
641 N.W.2d 158.   
¶50 In Nichols, we stated that in Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 
425, 
[w]e held that "'once it is determined that a 
negligent act has been committed and that the act is a 
substantial factor in causing the harm, the question 
of duty is irrelevant and a finding of nonliability 
can be made only in terms of public policy.'"  Id. 
(citations omitted).  A finding of nonliability on the 
basis of "public policy is a question of law which the 
court alone decides."  Id.  (citations omitted).  Our 
decision "to deny liability is essentially one of 
public policy rather than of duty or causation."  Id. 
(citation omitted).  We stated that this approach 
represents the minority viewpoint of Palsgraf v. Long 
Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) 
(Andrews, J., dissenting), that we adopted in Pfeifer 
v. Standard Gateway Theater, 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 
29 (1952), and Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 
Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956).  We declined to adopt 
the "no-duty, no-liability concept of the majority in 
Palsgraf."  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 420, 541 N.W.2d 
742. 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
25 
 
Nichols, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ¶41.  We also stated, "liability in 
negligence cases in Wisconsin more often has been limited by 
consideration 
of 
public 
policy 
factors" 
rather 
than 
by 
emphasizing "duty and foreseeability as a way of limiting 
liability in a negligence case."  Id., ¶36.  We explained in 
Nichols that 
Gritzner and Rockweit are still good law in Wisconsin.  
Nothing in Hoida was intended to overrule or change 
the principles of law expressed in Gritzner and 
Rockweit.  While liability has been limited in a 
negligence case based on the absence of a duty, 
liability in the vast majority of negligence cases in 
Wisconsin is guided, when determining whether to limit 
liability, by consideration of public policy factors, 
as Gritzner [lead opinion] and Rockweit demonstrate. 
Id., ¶47.   
¶51 As a matter of best practice, we will refrain from a 
public policy consideration of liability until after a trial of 
the facts, but we may make a public policy determination without 
first remanding for an analysis of the negligence claim where 
the facts presented are simple to ascertain and the public 
policy questions have been fully presented.  See Alvarado, 262 
Wis. 2d 74, ¶18; Miller, 219 Wis. 2d at 265.   
¶52 We conclude in this case that the public policy issues 
are fully presented by the complaint and motions to dismiss.  
There 
are 
no 
remaining 
factual 
questions 
that 
would 
substantively alter our public policy analysis.   
¶53 The factor of greatest concern here is the final 
public policy ground recognized under Wisconsin law, namely, 
whether allowing "recovery would enter into 'a field that has no 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
26 
 
sensible or just stopping point.'"  Hoida, 291 Wis. 2d 283, ¶41 
(citations omitted).  The Diocese warns of a slippery slope that 
a decision allowing the claims against the Diocese to proceed 
would create, in essence requiring employers to warn all 
prospective employers about any bad acts of ex-employees.   
¶54 Even assuming the complaint in this case stated a 
claim for negligence, the plaintiffs' claims would nonetheless 
be precluded because allowing recovery would be the beginning of 
a descent down a slippery slope with no sensible or just 
stopping point.  A decision to the contrary would create 
precedent suggesting that employers have an obligation to search 
out and disclose to all potential subsequent employers, which 
could include in an employment context every school in the 
country or beyond, all matters concerning an ex-employee's 
history.  In Gritzner, this court contrasted its decision to 
remand the case for further fact-finding with a decision in 
another case to deny liability on public policy grounds, Kelli 
T-G v. Charland, 198 Wis. 2d 123, 542 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 
1995).9  The difference, a majority of this court explained in 
                                                 
9 In Gritzner, this court also emphasized that the reason 
for remanding for fact-finding rather than deciding that case on 
public policy grounds was because we knew  
very little of the circumstances and facts of this 
case.  We do not know, for example, about Michael's 
prior 
"inappropriate 
sexual 
acts" 
with 
female 
children, or how many victims were involved.  We do 
not know whether Michael was adjudged a delinquent.  
We 
do 
not 
know 
whether 
Michael's 
previous 
inappropriate sexual act or acts were the subject of 
any juvenile court proceedings.   
No. 
2006AP291   
 
27 
 
Gritzner, is that in Kelli T-G, there was not the same kind of 
special relationship as there was between the defendant in 
Gritzner and the children who had been entrusted into his care.  
Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶77 n.2, 86 (Abrahamson, C.J., 
concurring).10  
                                                                                                                                                             
Gritzner, 
235 
Wis. 
2d 
781, 
¶81 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring)(citations omitted).  Such is not the case here.   
10 We clarify here that the following passage from a 2004 
court of appeals decision is an incorrect reading of both Kelli 
T-G and of Gritzner: 
Kelli T-G. v. Charland, 198 Wis. 2d 123, 129, 542 
N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1995), appeared to establish a 
bright-line rule that, as a matter of public policy, 
there can never be a common law duty to warn third 
persons of potential dangers in the absence of a 
special relationship.  In Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 
WI 68, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906, both the 
supreme court majority and the minority rejected this 
bright-line rule in favor of a case-by-case approach.  
Thus, to the extent that Kelli T-G announced a bright-
line rule, Gritzner sub silentio has overruled Kelli 
T-G. 
Estate of Paswaters v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI App 
233, ¶18 n.2, 277 Wis. 2d 549, 692 N.W.2d 299.  The above 
passage is incorrect because Kelli T-G articulated no such 
bright-line rule.  Quite to the contrary, the court in Kelli T-G 
explicitly explained:   
The 
parties 
offer 
excellent 
arguments 
over 
whether Wisconsin law imposes a common law duty to 
warn third persons of potential dangers in the absence 
of 
a 
special 
relationship. . . .  
We 
conclude, 
however, that we need not confront the common law 
duty/special relationship questions because the issue 
in this case is clearly resolved on public policy 
grounds. 
Kelli T-G, 198 Wis. 2d at 129 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
28 
 
 
¶55 This case is more akin to Kelli T-G than to Gritzner.  
Kelli T-G was a case involving negligence claims brought by the 
guardian ad litem of a child who had been sexually abused and 
the child's mother.  Kelli T-G, 198 Wis. 2d at 125-26.  The 
mother argued that the one of the defendants, who was formerly 
married to the perpetrator at the time, had failed to warn the 
mother that her ex-husband was a pedophile who posed a danger to 
the child.  Id.  In that case, the defendant testified in 
deposition that even though she was concerned at the time and 
felt that she had an obligation to warn the child's mother about 
her ex-husband's pedophile offenses, she did not follow up with 
the mother after initially giving the mother her phone number.  
See id. at 127-28.   
¶56 The court of appeals concluded in that case that 
liability was precluded by the judicially recognized public 
policy ground that "allowance of recovery would enter a field 
that has no sensible or just stopping point."  Id. at 130 
(citation omitted).  Specifying its concerns in that case, the 
court explained that the plaintiffs' failure to warn arguments 
left unresolved such questions as whether an obligation to warn 
depended on specific types of knowledge about a person's 
proclivity to pedophilia, how the obligation would vary if the 
defendant were a mental health or criminal justice professional, 
whether an obligation to warn exists regardless of whether a 
believed pedophile had been charged but never criminally 
convicted, whether a person could be liable for issuing a 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
29 
 
warning about someone who was not actually a pedophile, and to 
whom warnings must be given beyond the parties.  Id. at 130-32. 
¶57 Such questions remain unanswered in this case as well.  
It appears that the plaintiffs here would require that every 
individual with knowledge about a former employee potentially 
posing a danger to unforeseen future victims must warn thousands 
of individuals and organizations across the country, from 
dioceses to parochial school systems to even a broad and 
undefined category of parents of unforeseen future victims.  The 
plaintiffs offer no parameters or guidance about how to make 
such 
a 
warning 
requirement 
feasible. 
 
Feasibility 
notwithstanding, there are other serious policy concerns which 
we share with the Kelli T-G court.  The court of appeals in 
Kelli T-G explained: 
Tragically, sexual abuse has brought devastating 
consequences to countless children and their families.  
Sadly, our society has discovered that many pedophiles 
elude the control of the criminal justice system.  
Many 
seem 
unchanged 
despite 
psychotherapeutic 
intervention 
and 
the 
rehabilitation 
efforts 
of 
corrections, probation, and parole.  As pedophiles 
sexually abuse children again and again, some state 
legislatures, in a desperate effort to locate new 
methods to stop the assaults, debate whether to enact 
"neighborhood notification" laws to warn citizens of 
paroled child molesters living in their communities.  
Thus, legislatures debate the appropriate scope of 
government's duty to warn and they struggle to define 
sensible 
starting 
and 
stopping 
points. 
 
For 
government, the struggle is extremely difficult as a 
matter of public policy.  For an individual citizen, 
the struggle is extremely difficult as a matter of 
morality, and virtually impossible as a matter of law. 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
30 
 
Kelli T-G, 198 Wis. 2d at 131-32 (emphasis in original).  We 
agree.   
¶58 We emphasize that this court finds abhorrent any type 
of facilitation of sexual abuse by third parties.  It is 
critical that sexual abuse victims receive full justice through 
our criminal and civil laws to the extent legally possible.  In 
this case, the plaintiffs are not being denied compensation for 
their alleged injuries at the hands of Kazmarek.  To the 
contrary, 
the 
record 
in 
this 
case 
contains 
undisputed 
information that prior to filing this lawsuit, the plaintiffs 
had already received compensation for a settlement received in a 
lawsuit 
directly 
against 
Kazmarek 
and 
the 
Louisville 
Archdiocese.  
¶59 Furthermore, 
unlike 
the 
allegation 
against 
the 
Milwaukee Archdiocese, there was no similar allegation that the 
Madison Diocese made affirmative statements to parents in 
Wisconsin about steps it would take to try to prevent future 
abuse by Kazmarek.  Without concluding one way or another what 
effect the statements made by the Milwaukee Archdiocese would 
make on our determination of their liability,11 we conclude that 
as to the Diocese, the plaintiffs ask us to grant liability on 
                                                 
11 This court is equally divided on whether to affirm or 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals dismissing the 
plaintiffs' complaint against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee.  
Consequently, we affirm the court of appeals' decision to affirm 
the circuit court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against 
the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, without further analysis of that 
issue. 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
31 
 
the basis of nothing more than a breach of duty created by the 
Diocese's knowledge of Kazmarek's propensity for sexual abuse 
combined with the Diocese's failure to warn a broad group of 
potential future employers of Kazmarek and parents of unforeseen 
victims about Kazmarek. 
¶60 The primary public policy problem with recognizing the 
claim as presented by the plaintiffs is that there is no 
sensible stopping point to recognizing negligence claims for 
such an open-ended and ill-defined sweeping claim.  Recognizing 
the plaintiffs' claim against the Diocese in this case could 
result in requiring all employers to warn all unforeseen 
potential future employers of any number of problems related to 
any number of past employees.  It could further result in all 
parents who become aware that their child was sexually abused 
then facing potential liability for not warning every other 
parent who might also have children at risk of being in contact 
with the perpetrator.  
¶61 At 
the 
close 
of 
oral 
arguments 
in 
this 
case, 
plaintiffs' counsel on rebuttal was asked to respond to the 
possibility that even if the Louisville Archdiocese had in fact 
been 
warned, 
the 
plaintiffs' 
abuse 
might 
not 
have 
been 
prevented.  Plaintiffs' counsel responded, "well in that case, 
then we would have an additional tortfeasor on that theory."  
And therein lies the crux of the slippery slope problem.  The 
plaintiffs appear to interpret Wisconsin's duty of ordinary care 
as creating automatic negligence and liability for any person 
even tangentially connected in a causal chain of injury, with 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
32 
 
little concern about the relationship among those sued, or how 
many years have passed between causal events.   
¶62 There must be limits.  We draw one here. 
IV 
¶63 This court is equally divided on whether to affirm or 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals dismissing the 
plaintiffs' complaint against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee.  
Consequently, we affirm the court of appeals' decision to affirm 
the circuit court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims against 
the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, without further analysis of that 
issue. 
¶64 We further conclude that the plaintiffs have not 
alleged an actionable claim for negligence against the Diocese 
of Madison under which relief could be granted under Wisconsin 
negligence law.  The type of failure to warn claim recognized 
under Wisconsin law does not extend as far as the plaintiffs 
argue.  We finally conclude that even if a viable negligence 
claim had been made, recovery against the Diocese would be 
precluded on the public policy ground that allowing recovery 
would send this court down a slippery slope with no sensible or 
just stopping point.  We therefore affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals, on different grounds. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶65 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No. 
2006AP291   
 
 
 
1