Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Tim Osicka

Citation: 2009 WI 38

Docket Number: 2006AP002931-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 38 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP2931-D 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Tim Osicka, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Tim Osicka, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DICIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST OSICKA 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 28, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
January 2, 2009   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: BRADLEY, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there was a brief by Ryan D. 
Lister, Wausau, and oral argument by Ryan D. Lister. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Robert 
G. Krohn and Roethe Krohn Pope LLP, Edgerton, and oral argument 
by Robert G. Krohn. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 38
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP2931-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Tim Osicka, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tim Osicka, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 28, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   
Attorney 
publicly 
reprimanded.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Attorney Tim Osicka has appealed from 
the report and recommendation of the referee that Attorney 
Osicka's license to practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for a 
period of 60 days, that Attorney Osicka be ordered to pay 
restitution to a former client in the amount of $150, and that 
he be required to pay the full costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding.  
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
2 
 
¶2 
After consideration of the parties' briefs and our 
independent review of the matter, we conclude that the referee's 
findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.  We also agree with 
the referee's conclusions of law, which included determinations 
that the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) had not proven two of 
the four counts alleged in its complaint.  In light of the fact 
that Attorney Osicka was shown to have committed only two 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 
willfully failing to disclose information to the OLR during a 
grievance investigation and failing to comply promptly with a 
client's requests for information, we conclude that a public 
reprimand is the appropriate level of discipline in this case.  
We further determine that Attorney Osicka should be required to 
pay restitution in the amount of $150 to a former client, and 
that he should be required to pay the full costs of this 
disciplinary proceeding, with the exception of the costs related 
to 
the OLR's 
preparation and filing of its motion for 
reconsideration/clarification. 
¶3 
Attorney 
Osicka 
has 
been 
the 
subject 
of 
prior 
professional discipline.  In 2002 he agreed to the imposition of 
a public reprimand.  Public Reprimand of Tim Osicka, 2002-02.  
The reprimand addressed four separate instances of professional 
misconduct.  In the first matter, Attorney Osicka acknowledged 
that he had failed to communicate adequately with his client, in 
violation of former SCR 20:1.4(a), and that he had failed to act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness, in violation of SCR 
20:1.3.  In the second matter, Attorney Osicka was found to have 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
3 
 
violated 
SCR 
20:1.1 
(failure 
to 
provide 
competent 
representation), SCR 20:8.2(a) (making statements regarding 
integrity of a judge with reckless disregard for truth or 
falsity), and SCRs 40.15 and 20:8.4(g) (violating the attorney's 
oath by disrespecting courts).  In the third matter, Attorney 
Osicka was again found to have failed to respond to requests for 
information from his client, in violation of former SCR 
20:1.4(a).  Finally, in the fourth matter, Attorney Osicka 
failed to subpoena a treating physician until an hour prior to a 
hearing and failed to present any testimony or evidence in 
support of a motion, in violation of former SCR 20:1.1.  He also 
again violated former SCR 20:1.4(a) by failing to advise his 
client that she needed to obtain reports from a counselor or she 
would face contempt sanctions. 
¶4 
The following facts relate to Counts 1 and 2 in the 
current complaint.  L.A. owned and operated a bridal shop under 
the form of a limited liability company, Lynne's of Wausau, LLC.  
L.A. was the sole member of the limited liability company.  
Peoples State Bank (the Bank) held a security interest in 
certain inventory and assets of Lynne's of Wausau, LLC.  In 
November 2004 the Bank seized certain inventory and assets of 
the bridal shop pursuant to a replevin order.1 
¶5 
L.A. hired Attorney Osicka to recover some of the 
seized items.  L.A. immediately signed an affidavit prepared by 
                                                 
1 The replevin action was handled by Judge Dorothy Bain, 
with the exception of a hearing on March 2, 2005, which was 
handled by Judge Raymond Thums. 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
4 
 
Attorney Osicka, in which she stated that Lynne's of Wausau, 
LLC, had been dissolved in March 2004 in connection with a 
bankruptcy petition that had been filed by Attorney John Craven 
on behalf of both the LLC and L.A. personally.  The bankruptcy 
action filed by Attorney Craven, however, was, in reality, only 
for L.A. individually, and did not include Lynne's of Wausau, 
LLC. 
¶6 
The affidavit further stated that after the alleged 
dissolution of Lynne's of Wausau, LLC, L.A. had started a new 
business called "Lynne's" or "Lynne's LLC."  L.A.'s affidavit 
asserted that the Bank had improperly seized assets of the new 
business 
as 
well 
as 
her 
own 
personal 
items, 
including 
medications, contact lenses, and medical records. 
¶7 
By the time of the seizure, however, L.A. had taken 
only a few steps toward establishing a new business entity.  Her 
business cards still read "Lynne's of Wausau, LLC," and she had 
not registered a new business entity with the Wisconsin 
Department of Financial Institutions.  Moreover, the bankruptcy 
court had issued an order or judgment that had not eliminated 
the Bank's security interest in the assets of Lynne's of Wausau, 
LLC.  L.A. acknowledged that the Bank was entitled to obtain 
possession of the inventory of Lynne's of Wausau, LLC.  She 
believed, however, that Attorney Craven had taken care of 
establishing the new business properly, although she was unaware 
as to whether he had ever filed anything with the State of 
Wisconsin in that regard. 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
5 
 
¶8 
Based on what L.A. had told him and sworn to in her 
affidavit, Attorney Osicka sent a letter on November 12, 2004, 
to the Bank's counsel, Attorney Timothy Kostka.  The letter 
demanded a return of all inventory that belonged to the new 
business and of all personal items.  Attorney Kostka refused, 
asserting that the Bank was entitled to seize assets of the new 
business under the doctrine of successor liability. 
¶9 
Approximately one week later, Attorney Osicka filed a 
motion in the pending replevin action to vacate or modify the 
court's replevin order.  The OLR alleged that the motion 
contained a false factual statement, which was that Lynne's of 
Wausau, LLC, had filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and that L.A. had 
established a new business entity with a new tax identification 
number.  Attorney Osicka asked that this motion be heard as soon 
as possible because the Bank's seizure of the assets and 
inventory of the new business had left L.A. unable to conduct 
her new business. 
¶10 Apparently in support of the claim that some inventory 
had belonged to a new business not subject to the Bank's 
security interest, Attorney Osicka provided to Attorney Kostka 
certain inventory order forms, envelopes, and tuxedo rental 
forms that contained the name Lynne's instead of Lynne's of 
Wausau, LLC. 
¶11 One day before the motion to reopen the replevin order 
was to be heard, Attorney Osicka wrote to the circuit court and 
asked that the hearing not go forward.  He argued that L.A. 
should be able to litigate the alleged destruction of her new 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
6 
 
business due to the Bank's allegedly improper seizure of its 
assets in a separate and distinct lawsuit.  The circuit court 
acceded to Attorney Osicka's request and rescheduled the hearing 
on his motion for March 2, 2005, nearly three months later. 
¶12 On January 20, 2005, Attorney Osicka filed a complaint 
on behalf of L.A. in a new action.2  The complaint named as 
defendants both the Bank and Attorney Kostka.  It alleged that 
the defendants had improperly seized and converted L.A.'s 
personal property, certain assets exempted from seizure due to 
the prior bankruptcy, and certain inventory items belonging to 
the new business.  The complaint sought replevin of the 
allegedly wrongly seized items, as well as both compensatory and 
punitive damages. 
¶13 The circuit court went forward with the rescheduled 
hearing in the underlying replevin action on March 2, 2005, with 
Judge Thums presiding.  The court told Attorney Osicka that it 
needed L.A. to identify the items that she believed should be 
returned to her.  The court ordered that an inventory of the 
seized items should take place on March 14, 2005.  L.A. was to 
pay a representative to conduct the inventory.  The parties were 
then to exchange inventory lists and other materials.  L.A. and 
Attorney Osicka, however, never went forward with the inventory 
because 
L.A. 
did 
not 
have 
sufficient 
funds 
to 
pay 
a 
representative to conduct the inventory. 
                                                 
2 The new case, which will be denominated in this decision 
as the "conversion action," was also assigned to Judge Dorothy 
Bain. 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
7 
 
¶14 Because the conversion complaint had named Attorney 
Kostka as a defendant, the Bank retained new counsel, Attorney 
Gregory Stacker, to represent it in the conversion action.  On 
March 3, 2005, one day after the hearing in the replevin case, 
the Bank filed a motion to dismiss the conversion action.  The 
motion to dismiss was set for hearing on March 16, 2005. 
¶15 Neither Attorney Osicka nor L.A. appeared at the 
March 16, 2005, hearing on the motion to dismiss.  Attorney 
Osicka and his secretary later testified that Attorney Osicka 
had instructed his secretary on the morning of March 16, 2005, 
to obtain a postponement of the hearing due to a health problem 
that Attorney Osicka was experiencing, but the secretary failed 
to contact the court.  The referee did not make explicit 
findings regarding whether this was in fact what had occurred, 
but he did "find as a fact that the excuses [given by Attorney 
Osicka for missing the hearing] are unacceptable." 
¶16 The circuit court went forward with the hearing in 
Attorney Osicka's absence.  The court orally granted the motion 
to dismiss and concluded that the complaint filed by Attorney 
Osicka had been frivolous, although it did not explain the 
reasons for this finding.  The court decided to award judgment 
to the Bank for its attorney fees and costs against both L.A. 
and Attorney Osicka, jointly and severally.   
¶17 On March 17, 2005, Attorney Osicka filed a motion to 
vacate the order dismissing the conversion action and to 
consolidate the conversion action with the replevin action.  He 
did not, however, schedule a hearing on the motion.  On 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
8 
 
April 22, 2005, the circuit court issued a written order that 
dismissed the conversion action.  The order found the action was 
frivolous and imposed attorney fees and costs against L.A. and 
Attorney Osicka. 
¶18 On May 17, 2005, Attorney Osicka wrote to the circuit 
court and asked to schedule his motion to vacate the judgment in 
the conversion action for a date in July.  On May 17 he also 
wrote to Attorney Kostka about rescheduling the review and 
inventory of the materials seized by the Bank, although Judge 
Thums had ordered in the replevin action that this should be 
accomplished by the end of March.  Attorney Kostka refused to 
produce the seized documents and materials.  Attorney Osicka 
then filed a motion to compel in the replevin action. 
¶19 On July 20, 2005, the circuit court heard Attorney 
Osicka's motion to vacate the judgment in the conversion action.  
The hearing focused on whether Attorney Osicka's failure to 
appear at the March 16, 2005, hearing had constituted excusable 
neglect.  The court found that it had not been excusable neglect 
and denied the motion to vacate the judgment, also stating again 
that it believed the complaint had been frivolous.  Although 
Attorney Osicka stated at the conclusion of the hearing that he 
had consulted other attorneys in the relevant areas of the law 
and felt that he was on solid ground in filing the conversion 
action, the court rejected that assertion. 
¶20 On July 22, 2005, the circuit court heard the motion 
to compel in the original replevin action and denied that 
motion.  The court stated that it had been Attorney Osicka, not 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
9 
 
the Bank, who had failed to comply with the March 2, 2005, order 
regarding the production and inventory of the seized documents. 
¶21 With respect to the L.A. matter, the OLR alleged that 
Attorney Osicka had violated SCR 20:3.1(a)(1)3 (Count 1) by 
knowingly advancing an unwarranted claim, and SCR 20:3.1(a)(2)4 
(Count 2) by knowingly advancing frivolous factual positions 
that L.A. had created a new business and that the Bank had 
improperly seized inventory belonging to that new business.   
¶22 Although the referee acknowledged that Attorney Osicka 
had been aware of the pending replevin action and had recognized 
that he had not been required to name Attorney Kostka as a party 
to the conversion action in order to prove that Attorney Kostka 
had acted as an agent for the Bank during the seizure of items 
from L.A.'s place of business, and although the circuit court 
had stated on two occasions that the conversion complaint had 
been frivolous, the referee found that the OLR had failed to 
meet its burden of proof on Counts 1 and 2.  The referee relied 
primarily on the fact that Attorney Osicka's client, L.A., had 
                                                 
3 SCR 20:3.1(a)(1) provides as follows: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not:  
(1) knowingly advance a claim or defense that is 
unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer 
may advance such claim or defense if it can be 
supported by good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law; . . . .  
4 SCR 20:3.1(a)(2) provides that in representing a client, a 
lawyer shall not "knowingly advance a factual position unless 
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous; . . . ." 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
10 
 
stated in her affidavit that she had created a new business 
entity with separate inventory prior to the Bank's seizure, 
thereby providing a good-faith basis for Attorney Osicka's 
complaint.  The referee further stated that Attorney Kostka "may 
have had personal knowledge before the execution that [L.A.] had 
separated items between her two entities . . . and personally 
informed [Attorney] Kostka [of this fact] during the execution 
itself." (Emphasis in original.)  In addition, the referee 
pointed to the fact that Attorney Kostka acknowledged at the 
disciplinary hearing that L.A.'s new business could have been 
established 
as 
a 
sole 
proprietorship 
without 
filing 
any 
documents with the state and that he was not familiar with 
Wisconsin case law regarding successor liability.  Further, the 
referee emphasized that the conversion claim filed by Attorney 
Osicka had alleged that the Bank's seizure had improperly 
included 
L.A.'s 
personal 
items, 
including 
medication, 
eyeglasses, personal bills, and her son's school records.  The 
referee stated that the OLR had not provided sufficient evidence 
to disprove this allegation, indicating that there was a valid 
basis to the conversion claim drafted and filed by Attorney 
Osicka.   
¶23 Count 3 of the OLR's complaint related to its 
investigation 
of 
the 
grievance 
concerning 
the 
L.A. 
representation.  On August 1, 2005, the OLR sent a letter to 
Attorney Osicka advising him that the OLR was commencing a 
formal investigation regarding the L.A. matter based on a 
grievance by Attorney Stacker.  In addition to reminding 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
11 
 
Attorney Osicka of his duty to cooperate, the OLR's letter asked 
Attorney Osicka to respond to 14 specific questions and to 
provide 11 specific documents.   
¶24 After receiving several extensions of time, Attorney 
Osicka submitted his written letter response on October 4, 2005.  
The first paragraph of the letter stated: 
Thank you for the numerous extensions you have 
given me.  I feel it would be unproductive for me to 
answer all of your questions as you have laid out in 
your 
earlier 
correspondence.  Therefore, I will 
respond as follows, noting that I have provided you 
file contents from both cases. 
The letter then directed the OLR investigator to review the 
transcript of the March 2, 2005, hearing before Judge Thums.  
The letter asserted that L.A.'s affidavit had been truthful and 
that the grievance was actually the result of Attorney Kostka's 
personal animus toward Attorney Osicka.  Accompanying the 
October 4, 2005, letter was a large packet of documents.  The 
materials were unorganized and did not respond to the OLR's 
specific requests. 
¶25 The OLR informed Attorney Osicka that his letter was 
not responsive to its requests, but Attorney Osicka failed to 
provide a further response to the grievance.  The OLR then filed 
a motion seeking the temporary suspension of Attorney Osicka's 
license to practice law in Wisconsin.  After this court issued 
an order to show cause why his license to practice law in this 
state should not be suspended due to his willful failure to 
cooperate, Attorney Osicka finally submitted an additional 
response 
to the grievance.  The OLR then reported his 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
12 
 
cooperation, and its motion for a temporary suspension was 
voluntarily dismissed. 
¶26 Based on these facts, the referee concluded that 
Attorney Osicka had violated both SCR 22.03(2),5 which requires 
an attorney to fully and fairly disclose all facts relating to 
alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served with a 
written request for a response to a grievance, and SCR 22.03(6),6 
which prohibits an attorney from willfully failing to provide 
relevant information, to answer questions fully or to furnish 
documents in the course of a grievance investigation.  By 
violating these rules, Attorney Osicka also violated SCR 
                                                 
5 SCR 22.03(2) states:  Investigation. 
Upon commencing an investigation, the director 
shall notify the respondent of the matter being 
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the 
investigation of the matter requires otherwise.  The 
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts 
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct 
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail a 
request for a written response.  The director may 
allow additional time to respond.  Following receipt 
of the response, the director may conduct further 
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer 
questions, 
furnish 
documents, 
and 
present 
any 
information deemed relevant to the investigation. 
6 SCR 22.03(6) states: 
In 
the 
course 
of 
the 
investigation, 
the 
respondent's 
wilful 
failure 
to 
provide 
relevant 
information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish 
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a 
disclosure are misconduct, regardless of the merits of 
the matters asserted in the grievance. 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
13 
 
20:8.4(f),7 which states that it is professional misconduct to 
violate, among other things, a supreme court rule regulating the 
conduct of attorneys. 
¶27 Count 4 of the complaint pertained to an entirely 
different representation.  In that count the OLR alleged that 
Attorney Osicka had failed to respond to reasonable requests for 
information from his client, B.W., in violation of former SCR 
20:1.4(a).8 
¶28 B.W. retained Attorney Osicka in February 2005 to file 
a motion seeking a change in visitation and placement regarding 
her son.  She gave Attorney Osicka a retainer of $1,200.  The 
retainer agreement that she signed stated that Attorney Osicka's 
hourly rate was $150, that the retainer amount covered eight 
hours of work, that she was responsible for paying further fees 
when the retainer was exhausted, and that the initial retainer 
was "nonrefundable."  The referee found that although B.W. 
signed the retainer agreement in Attorney Osicka's office, she 
was not given a copy of the agreement at that time.  A copy was 
later sent to her, which, according to B.W., was the first time 
                                                 
7 SCR 20:8.4(f) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "violate a statute, supreme court rule, supreme 
court order or supreme court decision regulating the conduct of 
lawyers; . . . ." 
8 Former SCR 20:1.4(a) (effective through June 30, 2007) 
provided:  "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable 
requests for information." 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
14 
 
that she became aware of the "nonrefundable" nature of the 
initial retainer. 
¶29 Attorney Osicka prepared the requested motion and a 
supporting affidavit, which B.W. signed on March 18, 2005.  
Attorney Osicka also arranged for the appointment of a guardian 
ad litem for B.W.'s son.   
¶30 On June 20, 2005, B.W. told Attorney Osicka to put on 
hold over the summer any further proceedings regarding the 
motion.  In September B.W. left a telephone message for Attorney 
Osicka indicating that she did not intend to go forward with the 
motion and asking that he telephone her regarding his fees.  
When Attorney Osicka did not respond, B.W. left another 
telephone message.  In November B.W. sent a letter to Attorney 
Osicka in which she requested an itemized billing statement and 
an accounting of her retainer.  B.W. contacted Attorney Osicka's 
office on five additional dates in November and December 2005, 
but she did not receive the information she was requesting.  The 
referee found that any responses by Attorney Osicka or his 
office staff were either untimely or were inadequate.  On 
January 11, 2006, B.W. sent another letter to Attorney Osicka 
requesting a refund of a portion of her retainer.  When Attorney 
Osicka still failed to respond, B.W. filed a grievance with the 
OLR. 
¶31 After the grievance was filed, Attorney Osicka told 
the OLR that he intended to refund $600 to B.W.  When the 
promised refund had not been made a month later, the OLR 
requested a written response to B.W.'s grievance.  Attorney 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
15 
 
Osicka then mailed a check for $600 to B.W.  He did not provide 
any billing statement or any indication as to how he had 
determined the amount he was refunding to B.W. and the amount he 
was retaining as a fee. 
¶32 In a subsequent communication with the OLR, Attorney 
Osicka stated that although he was entitled to keep the entire 
retainer since it was "nonrefundable," his practice was to 
refund a portion of the money "based on the time invested."  
Attorney Osicka did not produce any documentation showing the 
amount of time he had spent on B.W.'s case, except for a 
March 4, 2005, time slip showing three hours of work.  He never 
provided B.W. with any billing statement to show the work that 
he had done and the time he had spent on her matter. 
¶33 The referee concluded that by failing to respond to 
numerous communications from B.W. inquiring about Attorney 
Osicka's fees, and by failing to provide a billing statement in 
response to her requests, Attorney Osicka had violated former 
SCR 20:1.4(a). 
¶34 The OLR requested that Attorney Osicka's license be 
suspended for a period of 60 days. 
¶35 The 
referee 
discussed 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating 
factors in line with the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Discipline.  On the aggravating side, the referee noted that 
Attorney Osicka had been publicly reprimanded for similar 
conduct in 2002.  That prior disciplinary matter had included 
three violations of former SCR 20:1.4(a) for failing to keep a 
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter.  The 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
16 
 
referee 
found 
that 
there 
was 
a 
pattern 
of 
a 
lack 
of 
communication with clients, which was a concern.  The referee 
also stated that Attorney Osicka had exhibited a negative, 
unremorseful attitude in his October 4, 2005, letter to the OLR, 
in which he stated that it would be "unproductive" to answer the 
OLR's questions.  The referee further noted that this court has 
expressed a policy of progressive discipline.  See, e.g., In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ray, 2004 WI 45, ¶22, 270 
Wis. 2d 651, 678 N.W.2d 246. 
¶36 On the mitigating side, the only factor the referee 
noted was that there was no evidence of a dishonest or selfish 
motive in the misconduct. 
¶37 In the end, the referee made an initial recommendation 
that the court should suspend Attorney Osicka's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin for 30 days.  He also recommended, 
without explanation, that the court order Attorney Osicka to pay 
an unspecified amount of restitution to B.W.  Finally, the 
referee recommended that Attorney Osicka pay the full costs of 
the disciplinary proceeding. 
¶38 The OLR filed a motion for reconsideration and 
clarification regarding the referee's recommendations.  It 
informed the referee that, except in the context of reciprocal 
discipline, this court does not impose 30-day disciplinary 
suspensions.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Grady, 
188 
Wis. 2d 98, 
108-09, 
523 
N.W.2d 564 
(1994); 
In 
re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schnitzler, 140 Wis. 2d 574, 
578, 412 N.W.2d 124 (1987).  It argued that since the referee 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
17 
 
apparently believed that a short suspension was appropriate, the 
recommendation should be for a 60-day suspension.  The motion 
for reconsideration/clarification also argued that the referee 
should either remove the recommendation for restitution to B.W. 
or provide a specific amount of restitution. 
¶39 The 
referee 
subsequently 
issued 
an 
amended 
recommendation in which he now recommended a 60-day suspension 
as discipline for Attorney Osicka's misconduct.  In addition, 
since the referee found that the only evidence submitted to the 
OLR showed a total of three hours of work on the B.W. matter, 
which would equal a total of $450 at the $150 hourly rate 
specified in the retainer agreement, the referee recommended 
that 
the 
court require Attorney Osicka to pay $150 in 
restitution to B.W. 
¶40 Before turning to the challenges that Attorney Osicka 
makes to the referee's report and recommendation in his appeal, 
we note the standard of review that we apply in attorney 
disciplinary proceedings.  We affirm a referee's findings of 
fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 
Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125.  We review the referee's conclusions 
of law, however, on a de novo basis.  See In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, ¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 
636 N.W.2d 718.  Finally, we determine the appropriate level of 
discipline given the particular facts of each case, independent 
of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from it.  See In 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
18 
 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶41 Only Attorney Osicka appealed from the referee's 
report and recommendation.  The OLR did not appeal.  Attorney 
Osicka's appellate brief does not allege that the referee's 
factual findings are clearly erroneous.  We do not discern that 
any of the factual findings are clearly erroneous, and we adopt 
them. 
¶42 Although neither party has appealed from the referee's 
conclusions that the OLR did not prove by clear, satisfactory, 
and convincing evidence that Attorney Osicka had knowingly 
advanced a claim that was unwarranted under existing law, or 
that he had knowingly advanced a frivolous factual position, we 
comment on the referee's determination that there were no 
violations of former SCRs 20:3.1(a)(1) and (2) with respect to 
Attorney Osicka's representation of L.A.  It should be noted in 
this regard that there is a difference between a finding in a 
civil action that an attorney has advanced a frivolous claim or 
defense in violation of the rules of civil procedure, such as 
former Wis. Stat. § 814.025, and a finding that an attorney 
should be subject to professional discipline for knowingly 
advancing a frivolous claim or defense in violation of SCR 
20:3.1(a)(1) or knowingly advancing a frivolous factual position 
in violation of SCR 20:3.1(a)(2).  A violation of the rules of 
civil procedure is to be determined using an objective standard, 
while a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys is to be determined under a subjective standard.  In 
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19 
 
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lauer, 108 Wis. 2d 746, 757-
58, 324 N.W.2d 432 (1982); see also Widule, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 
¶¶29-31.  Thus, the finding of frivolousness by the circuit 
court in the conversion and replevin actions does not, by 
itself, establish violations of the disciplinary rules by 
Attorney Osicka. 
¶43 The tests that we apply in this disciplinary matter 
are whether there was clear, satisfactory, and convincing 
evidence that Attorney Osicka knowingly advanced a claim or 
defense that was unwarranted under existing law or could not be 
supported 
by 
a 
good-faith 
argument 
for 
an 
extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law (SCR 20:3.1(a)(1)), and 
whether there was clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence 
that Attorney Osicka knowingly advanced a factual position 
without a basis for doing so that was not frivolous (SCR 
20:3.1(a)(2)).  See Widule, 261 Wis. 2d 45, ¶31.  In other 
words, the OLR was obligated to show that Attorney Osicka, in 
fact, knew the claim or factual position he was advancing was 
unwarranted.  Lauer, 108 Wis. 2d at 758.   
¶44 The referee concluded that the OLR had not met these 
standards.  This is supported by the referee's finding that the 
OLR, through the testimony of the attorneys for the Bank, never 
disproved that the Bank had improperly seized L.A.'s personal 
property and records that were not subject to its security 
interest.  Similarly, the referee made no finding that Attorney 
Osicka knew that L.A. had not started a new, legally separate 
business, but nonetheless went forward with his claim that the 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
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Bank had improperly seized assets belonging to the new business.  
To the contrary, the referee pointed out that L.A. had stated in 
her affidavit that she had created a new business entity with 
separate inventory.  Moreover, the referee found that Attorney 
Kostka may have had personal knowledge before the execution of 
the replevin order that L.A. had separated inventory items 
between her two business entities, but nonetheless participated 
as an agent of the Bank in the execution of a replevin order 
that resulted in a seizure of assets without consideration of 
which entity owned the assets.  We agree with the referee that 
the evidence presented in this proceeding simply did not meet 
the 
rather 
high 
burden 
of 
showing 
that 
Attorney 
Osicka 
subjectively knew he did not have a good-faith basis for 
advancing his factual assertions or claims, but nonetheless went 
forward with those factual assertions and claims. 
¶45 With respect to Count 3 of the OLR's complaint, 
Attorney Osicka acknowledges that the referee was justified in 
determining that he had violated SCR 22.03(2) by failing to 
fully and fairly disclose all facts and circumstances pertaining 
to his alleged misconduct within 20 days after being served by 
ordinary mail with a request for a written response to a 
grievance.  There is no dispute with respect to that part of 
Count 3. 
¶46 Attorney Osicka does argue on appeal, however, that 
although his responses to the OLR's requests for information and 
documents in its investigation of the L.A. matter were not 
timely, he should not be found to have violated SCR 22.03(6) 
No. 
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because he ultimately did answer all questions and did provide 
all of the requested documents that were still in existence.  He 
essentially asserts that, even though this court was forced to 
issue an order to show cause why his license should not be 
temporarily suspended due to a willful lack of cooperation with 
the OLR's investigation, there can be no violation of SCR 
22.03(6) if the attorney provides the requested information and 
documents before the actual order of temporary suspension is 
issued.   
¶47 This is another version of the argument we rejected in 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Lister, 2007 WI 55, ¶¶74-
76, 300 Wis. 2d 326, 731 N.W.2d 254.  Attorney Osicka's 
contention would allow attorneys to stonewall and delay the 
OLR's investigation without fear of discipline so long as they 
complied with the OLR's information requests the day before 
their license would be temporarily suspended.  The rule, 
however, does not require compliance only after this court 
issues an order to show cause.  It demands cooperation with the 
OLR throughout an investigation.  Consequently, we agree with 
the referee's conclusion that Attorney Osicka violated both SCR 
22.03(2) and SCR 22.03(6), as alleged in Count 3 of the 
complaint. 
¶48 Attorney Osicka's second argument on appeal is that he 
did not violate former SCR 20:1.4(a) in his representation of 
B.W.  He contends that former SCR 20:1.4(a) required an attorney 
to keep a client informed only about the status of the client's 
legal matter.  According to Attorney Osicka, because B.W. was 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
22 
 
seeking information about only fee-related matters, former SCR 
20:1.4(a) did not apply.  He asserts that fee-related inquiries 
should be treated differently because clients have the right to 
seek arbitration of fee disputes through the State Bar of 
Wisconsin. 
¶49 Attorney 
Osicka's 
argument 
ignores 
half 
of 
the 
relevant rule.  It is true that former SCR 20:1.4(a) did require 
attorneys "to keep a client reasonably informed about the status 
of a matter."  Even if one would interpret that clause narrowly 
to limit a "matter" to only the merits and progress of a legal 
representation, which we do not decide, B.W.'s requests for 
information to establish the amount of Attorney Osicka's fees 
and for an accounting for her prepayment of fees were clearly 
covered by the second clause of former SCR 20:1.4(a), which 
required attorneys to "promptly comply with reasonable requests 
for information."  That clause has no modifier arguably limiting 
it to requests concerning "the status of a matter."  Attorney 
Osicka had an obligation to respond to B.W.'s fee-related 
inquiries, even if he believed that he had earned all of the 
advance fees she had paid to him.  His failure to respond was a 
violation of the rule. 
¶50 Attorney Osicka's appellate brief makes two sanction-
related arguments.  First, on the assumption that he did not 
violate SCR 22.03(6) by failing to provide information and 
documents to the OLR in its investigation of the L.A. matter, he 
contends that his license to practice law in Wisconsin should 
not be suspended for 60 days merely because he did not respond 
No. 
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23 
 
to the grievance within 20 days, as required by SCR 22.03(2).  
He claims that it would be unjust to impose now the sanction of 
suspension that would have been imposed on him if he had not 
cooperated before the deadline in this court's order to show 
cause. 
¶51 Attorney Osicka's assumption is erroneous because we 
have determined that he did violate SCR 22.03(6).  Moreover, 
this argument is yet another attempt to assert that there is no 
substantial violation of the cooperation rules in SCR 22.03 
until this court is forced to temporarily suspend an attorney's 
license due to a willful failure to cooperate.  The rule, 
however, imposes a duty to provide information within 20 days 
(SCR 22.03(2)) or when requested to do so by the OLR (SCR 
22.03(6)).  There is no prohibition from imposing a suspension 
for violations of these rules if the facts of the case warrant a 
suspension. 
¶52 Attorney Osicka's second sanction-related argument is 
simply that prior case law and the ABA Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Discipline support imposing a public reprimand.  The only 
case that Attorney Osicka cites, however, is In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Nussberger, 2006 WI 111, 296 Wis. 2d 47, 719 
N.W.2d 501, in which we imposed a 60-day suspension on an 
attorney who advised his client that she could obtain additional 
funds from an estate if he misrepresented the amount of his 
fees.  Attorney Osicka merely argues that his professional 
misconduct 
is 
not 
as 
egregious 
as 
Attorney 
Nussberger's 
misconduct, which could have resulted in criminal charges, and 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
24 
 
therefore should result in a less severe sanction.  We do not 
find the Nussberger decision to be particularly helpful in this 
situation, however, because the circumstances and nature of the 
misconduct in that case are very different from Attorney 
Osicka's misconduct. 
¶53 On the other hand, the OLR contends that a 60-day 
suspension of Attorney Osicka's license to practice law in this 
state is supported by this court's policy of progressive 
discipline and certain aggravating factors.  For instance, the 
OLR contends that in Attorney Osicka's prior disciplinary 
proceeding he was found in multiple instances to have failed to 
keep his client reasonably informed, in violation of former SCR 
20:1.4(a), just as he did here with respect to B.W.  Moreover, 
his failure to cooperate with the OLR's investigation caused 
additional work for the OLR staff.  Further, the OLR points to 
the frustration and anger that B.W. expressed because of 
Attorney Osicka's failure to respond to her inquiries. 
¶54 The OLR cites two disciplinary matters as support for 
a 60-day suspension:  Public Reprimand of Ross R. Kinney, 2005-
09, and Public Reprimand of Donald Hahnfeld, 2003-07.  Although 
both of these matters were consensual public reprimands, the OLR 
contends that Attorney Osicka should receive a 60-day suspension 
because of his prior public reprimand in 2002.  
¶55 We do not believe that either one of these two 
consensual public reprimands supports imposing a suspension on 
Attorney Osicka.  Both cases cited by the OLR involved 
situations in which an attorney was found to have pursued claims 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
25 
 
or propounded factual positions that were without basis or that 
were pursued merely to harass or maliciously injure another.  We 
have determined, however, based on the referee's findings, that 
Attorney 
Osicka 
cannot 
be 
found 
to 
have 
violated 
SCRs 
20:3.1(a)(1) or 20:3.1(a)(2).  Thus, those cases are not helpful 
in determining the appropriate sanction for Attorney Osicka's 
professional misconduct. 
¶56 Although it is this court's general policy to impose 
progressive discipline, we conclude that a public reprimand is 
the appropriate discipline in this case.  The only violations 
found by the referee were a temporary failure to cooperate with 
the OLR and a failure to respond to a client's requests for 
information about an advance fee.  While these violations are 
not insignificant, we do not believe that they justify a 
suspension of Attorney Osicka's license to practice law in this 
state. 
¶57 Two 
recent 
consensual 
public 
reprimands 
provide 
support for imposing a public reprimand in this case.  In Public 
Reprimand 
of 
Michael 
W. 
Steinhafel, 
2008-04, 
Attorney 
Steinhafel, among other things, affirmatively misrepresented the 
status of an action to the client on several occasions, failed 
to respond to the client's repeated attempts to communicate, 
failed to provide a file to a client, failed to return any 
portion of a client's advance fee payment, and failed to 
cooperate with the OLR's grievance investigation.  In Public 
Reprimand of James Moldenhauer, 2008-01, Attorney Moldenhauer 
had previously received a public reprimand and was found to have 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
26 
 
failed to close an estate diligently, to have failed to obey a 
court order, and to have failed to communicate with his client.  
The two violations actually committed by Attorney Osicka appear 
to be no more severe than the misconduct by Attorneys Steinhafel 
and Moldenhauer that supported public reprimands. 
¶58 In addition to the imposition of a public reprimand, 
we determine that Attorney Osicka should be required to pay $150 
in restitution to B.W.  The referee believed that this was 
appropriate given the fact that the evidence showed that 
Attorney Osicka had spent at most only $450 worth of time on 
B.W.'s representation.  Attorney Osicka has not challenged that 
part of the referee's recommendation, and we adopt it. 
¶59 Finally, we conclude that Attorney Osicka should be 
responsible for paying the full costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding, less any amounts related to the OLR's motion for 
reconsideration/clarification 
of 
the 
referee's 
original 
recommendation.  The OLR's motion and the referee's amended 
recommendation were necessitated by the referee's error of law 
in recommending a sanction that is not available under our case 
law.  Because of this error, the referee has indicated that he 
did not include any charges for the preparation of the amended 
recommendation, and the OLR has indicated that it is not seeking 
reimbursement for the $377.50 that it expended in counsel time 
and 
disbursements 
for 
its 
motion 
for 
reconsideration/clarification.  According to the OLR's initial 
statement of costs, the total costs of this proceeding prior to 
Attorney Osicka's appeal were $10,493.67.  Subtracting the 
No. 
2006AP2931-D   
 
27 
 
$377.50 from that amount would show pre-appeal costs in the 
amount of $10,116.17.  The OLR's supplemental statement of costs 
indicates that the OLR incurred an additional $2,384.47 in costs 
related to Attorney Osicka's appeal, as of January 21, 2009.  We 
note that Attorney Osicka has not objected to the OLR's 
statements of costs. 
¶60 IT IS ORDERED that Tim Osicka is publicly reprimanded 
for his professional misconduct. 
¶61 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Tim Osicka pay to the Office of Lawyer Regulation 
the costs of this proceeding, less the $377.50 incurred in 
connection with the motion for reconsideration/clarification 
filed by the Office of Lawyer Regulation.  If the costs are not 
paid within the time specified and absent a showing to this 
court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, the 
license of Tim Osicka to practice law in Wisconsin shall be 
suspended until further order of the court. 
¶62 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Tim Osicka shall pay restitution to client B.W. 
in the amount of $150.  If restitution to B.W. is not paid 
within the time specified and absent a showing to this court of 
his inability to pay the restitution amount within that time, 
the license of Tim Osicka to practice law in Wisconsin shall be 
suspended until further order of this court. 
¶63 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that restitution to client B.W. 
is to be completed prior to paying costs to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation. 
No. 
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¶64 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
No. 
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