Case Title: Harvey v. Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0194

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
RONALD A. HARVEY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2011 WY 72Case Number: NO. S-10-0194Decided: 04/25/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2011

 
 
RONALD A. 
HARVEY,

Appellant 
(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

Appellee 
(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellant:

R. Michael Vang, 
Fleener & Vang, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce A. Salzburg, 
Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Kenneth J. 
Miller, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.  

 
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Ronald Harvey, challenges an order from the district court affirming the 
suspension of his driver's license under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102 (LexisNexis 
2009).1  Appellant contends the trooper who 
stopped him did not have probable cause to justify the stop.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]      
Mr. Harvey presents 
the following issue:

 
 
Did the arresting 
officer present sufficient facts to find that Mr. Harvey violated the elements 
of Wyoming's Implied Consent law, specifically that the officer presented 
sufficient "admissible" evidence to support that he observed a valid violation 
of Wyoming Statute § 31-5-921(d)?

 
 
The Department 
phrases the issue as follows:

 
 
Did the hearing 
examiner correctly find that [the highway patrolman] had reasonable suspicion to 
contact Appellant for failure to equip his forklift with a slow moving vehicle 
emblem?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
On June 19, 2009, a 
Wyoming highway patrolman observed a forklift traveling at approximately five 
miles per hour on the shoulder of Highway 70 near Encampment, Wyoming.  Upon passing the forklift, the trooper 
noticed that no "slow moving vehicle" emblem was displayed on the vehicle.  The trooper initiated a traffic stop and 
Appellant identified himself as the driver.

 
 

[¶4]        
The trooper issued a 
written warning to Appellant for failing to display a slow moving vehicle emblem 
on the forklift in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-921(d).  While issuing the warning, the trooper 
smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from Appellant.  When asked how much he had to drink that 
day, Appellant responded that he had "one beer" half an hour earlier.  The trooper asked Appellant to step down 
from the forklift so that he could make sure Appellant was not impaired.  While the trooper was administering 
field sobriety tests, another trooper arrived to assist with the stop.  The second trooper found an open 
container of beer in the forklift sitting next to the driver's seat.  When the trooper who had stopped 
Appellant asked him about the beer, Appellant said that it was his second beer. 
 After Appellant performed poorly on 
two of three field sobriety tests and registered a .18% blood alcohol 
concentration on a portable breath test, the trooper placed him under arrest for 
driving while under the influence in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-233(b).  Appellant was 
subsequently transported to the Carbon County Detention Center, where he 
consented to a second breath test after the trooper read the implied consent 
advisement pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(a)(ii).  The second breath test, which was 
administered using an Intoximeter EC/IR, showed that Appellant had a .135% blood 
alcohol concentration.

 
 

[¶5]        
Based on the results 
of the breath test, the Department of Transportation sent Appellant notice of 
its intent to suspend his driver's license pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-102(e).  Appellant requested a 
contested case hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), but 
he subsequently waived his right to present oral argument and instead submitted 
written argument to the hearing examiner.  
Appellant argued that the trooper did not have probable cause to justify 
the traffic stop because no statute or regulation required him to display a slow 
moving vehicle emblem on the forklift.  He also argued that the field sobriety 
tests were not properly administered and should not be considered in determining 
whether the trooper had probable cause for the arrest.  The hearing examiner subsequently issued 
an order upholding the suspension of Appellant's driver's license, concluding 
that the stop was justified based upon a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-921(d) and that the field sobriety tests were properly administered.  Appellant filed a petition for review in 
district court.  The district court 
affirmed the OAH's order and this appeal followed.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶6]        
We review an 
administrative agency's decision in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act, which provides that the reviewing court 
shall:

 
 
(ii) Hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be: 

 
 
(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;          
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or 
limitations or lacking statutory right;           
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law; 
or(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the 
record of an agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c); Dale v. S & S Builders, 
LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 9, 188 P.3d 554, 
557-58 (Wyo. 2008).  We apply the 
substantial evidence standard of review to the hearing examiner's factual 
findings concerning whether the trooper had probable cause to initiate the 
traffic stop, but review the constitutionality of the particular seizure de novo.   Batten v. Wyo. DOT Drivers' License 
Div., 2007 WY 173, ¶ 16, 170 P.3d 1236, 1242 (Wyo. 
2007).  This case requires 
interpretation of the statute relating to the display of emblems on slow moving 
vehicles.  Statutory interpretation 
is a question of law and is reviewed de 
novo.  Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Wyo. Dep't of 
Revenue, 2010 WY 122, ¶ 7, 238 P.3d 568, 570 (Wyo. 
2010).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶7]        
Appellant 
asserts the only issue in this case is "whether or not the officer could 
legitimately stop Mr. Harvey for allegedly failing to have a slow moving vehicle 
emblem on his forklift.'"2  Appellant does not dispute that he failed 
to display a slow moving vehicle emblem on the forklift while operating it on 
the highway.  Rather, he argues that 
the failure to display such an emblem was not a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-921(d) and, accordingly, did not provide the trooper with probable cause to 
initiate the traffic stop.  

 
 

[¶8]        
The Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution 
protect persons from unreasonable searches and seizures.   Appellant does not indicate 
whether his argument is based on the protections of the Fourth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution or Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  In Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1999), we noted 
that "a litigant must provide a precise, analytically sound approach when 
advancing an argument to independently interpret the state constitution."  Id. at 484 (citing Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 909 (Wyo. 1992); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 621-24 (Wyo. 1993) 
(Golden, J., concurring)).  
Appellant does not argue that Article 1, § 4 provides greater protection 
than the Fourth Amendment under the circumstances of this case.  Accordingly, we do not conduct a 
separate analysis under Article 1, § 4.

 
 

[¶9]        
A routine traffic 
stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "even 
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite 
brief."  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d 700, 704 
(Wyo. 2003). The reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under the two-part 
test established in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  That test asks (1) whether the initial 
stop was justified, and (2) whether the officer's actions during the detention 
were "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first instance."  Damato, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d  at 705.  A decision to stop an automobile is 
reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic 
violation has occurred.  Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 27, 146 P.3d 492, 501 (Wyo. 2006); 
see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996).

 
 

[¶10]     
As 
indicated in the trooper's incident report and in the written warning issued to 
Appellant, the trooper stopped Appellant for failing to display a slow moving 
vehicle emblem on his forklift, believing that was a violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-5-921(d). That statute provides 
as follows:

 
 
§ 
31-5-921.  Farm and other vehicles and equipment; slow moving vehicle 
emblems.

 
 
. . 
.

 
 
(d) Every farm tractor and every self-propelled 
unit of farm equipment or implement of husbandry and special mobile equipment 
designed for operation at speeds not in excess of twenty-five (25) miles per 
hour shall at all times be equipped with a slow moving vehicle emblem mounted on 
the rear except as provided in subsection (e) of this 
section.

 
 
Appellant contends 
that application of this statute was improper because he was not operating a 
farm vehicle as contemplated by the statute and because a forklift is not 
"special mobile equipment designed for operation at speeds not in excess of 
twenty-five (25) miles per hour."  We disagree.

 
 

[¶11]     
The issue raised is 
one of statutory interpretation.  We 
apply our usual rules relating to statutory interpretation:

 
 
Statutory 
interpretation is a question of law. Our paramount consideration is the 
legislature's intent as reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words 
used in the statute. Initially, we determine whether the statute is clear or 
ambiguous. 

 
 
A statute is clear 
and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree 
on its meaning with consistency and predictability. Conversely, a statute is 
ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations. If we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we 
give effect to the plain language of the statute. 

Parks v. State, 2011 WY 19, ¶ 11, 247 P.3d 857, 859 (Wyo. 2011) 
(quoting Sorensen v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 2010 WY 101, ¶ 13, 234 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Wyo. 
2010)).

 
 

[¶12]     
We 
find the phrase "special mobile equipment designed for operation at speeds not in 
excess of twenty-five (25) miles per hour," unambiguously includes 
forklifts.  Although the Legislature did not define the 
term "special mobile equipment," the plain and ordinary meaning of the words 
used indicates that a forklift is included under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-921(d).  First, it is clear 
that a forklift is "mobile equipment" as contemplated by the statute and it is 
unnecessary to resort to dictionary definitions of those terms.  Second, the word "special," in 
the sense in which it is used to describe "special mobile equipment," is defined 
as "distinguished by some unusual quality," or "designed or selected for a 
particular purpose, occasion, or other end."  Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 2186 (3d ed. 
2002).  Looking to the definition of 
a forklift, which is "a machine for hoisting heavy objects . . . by means of a 
row of steel fingers," we find that a forklift falls squarely within the broad 
connotations associated with the phrase "special' mobile equipment." Id. 
at 892.  Turning next to the second 
part of the phrase used in the statute, we have no difficulty determining 
that a forklift is "designed for operation at speeds not in excess of 
twenty-five (25) miles per hour."  
Appellant has presented no evidence relating to the speed of the 
particular forklift he was driving or forklifts in general.  Despite the fact that a forklift may be 
capable of speeds greater than 25 miles per hour, however, the principal virtue 
for which a forklift is designed is lifting capacity, not speed, and we can 
safely conclude that a forklift is not designed to transport heavy objects at 
speeds greater than 25 miles per hour.  
In sum, we find that reasonable persons can agree with consistency and 
predictability that a forklift is "special mobile equipment designed for 
operation at speeds not in excess of twenty-five (25) miles per hour" under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-921(d).

 
 

[¶13]     
In 
addition, as the district court noted, the term "special mobile equipment" is 
widely used and generally defined in other states to mean "a vehicle not 
designed for the transportation of persons or property upon a highway and only 
incidentally operated or moved over a highway."  Arias v. Geisinger, 126 Conn. 
App. 860, 871 n.7 (2011) (emphasis omitted) (discussing Connecticut definition); 
Boyd v. State, 210 P.3d 1229, 1231 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009) (discussing 
Alaska definition); Harris v. State, 686 S.E.2d 777, 780 (Ga. 2009) 
(discussing Georgia definition); People v. Metamora Water Serv., Inc., 
741 N.W.2d 61, 67 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing Michigan definition); S 
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Spears, 200 S.W.3d 436, 439-40 (Ark. 2004) 
(discussing Arkansas definition); Harding v. Allen-Laux, Inc., 559 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (assuming that a forklift is "special mobile 
equipment" under the Florida definition).  
A forklift would also be included under this broad definition of "special 
mobile equipment" because a forklift is not designed to transport materials on a 
highway.

 
 

[¶14]     
Finally, 
Appellant argues that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-921(d) should be interpreted in 
light of Section 921(h), which provides that "[t]he emblem required in 
subsections (d) and (e) of this section shall comply with current standards and 
specifications of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers."  Appellant does not cite to or provide 
any part of the Agricultural Engineers standards in his brief.  He claims, however, that there is 
nothing in the Agricultural Engineers standards which indicates that forklifts 
are covered by those standards.  
Regardless of whether forklifts are mentioned in the Agricultural 
Engineers standards, Appellant's argument misses the mark.  Whether a slow moving vehicle emblem is 
in compliance with the standards and specifications of the American Society of 
Agricultural Engineers has no bearing on the issue of whether forklifts are 
governed by Section 921(d).  If 
Appellant's argument is that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-921(d) governs only 
agricultural equipment, this proposition is refuted by the plain language of the 
statute.  The statute does not 
confine its application only to agricultural equipment, as indicated by the fact 
that the statute is titled "Farm and 
other vehicles and equipment," and the fact that Section 921(d) 
expressly applies to "farm equipment or implement[s] of husbandry and special mobile equipment."  In other words, the fact that the 
Agricultural Engineers standards may not provide particular specifications 
relating to the display of a slow moving vehicle emblem on a forklift does not 
warrant the conclusion that forklifts are excluded from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-921(d).

 
 

[¶15]     
We 
conclude the trooper had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation 
occurred based on Appellant's failure to display a slow moving vehicle emblem on 
the forklift.  
Affirmed.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-6-102 provides as follows:

 
 

§ 
31-6-102.  Test to determine alcoholic or controlled substance content 
of blood; suspension of license. 

 
 
(a)  If arrested for an offense as defined by 
W.S. 31-5-233:   
(i)   Any person 
who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public 
street or highway in this state is deemed to have given consent, subject to the 
provisions of this act, to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath or 
urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration or controlled 
substance content of his blood. The test or tests shall be:       

            
(A)  Incidental to a lawful 
arrest;        

            
(B)  Given as promptly as 
possible after the arrest;   

      (C)  Administered at the direction of a peace 
officer who has probable cause to believe the person was driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway in this 
state in violation of W.S. 31-5-233(b) or any other law prohibiting driving 
under the influence as defined by W.S. 31-5-233(a)(v). . . 
.

 
 
(e)  If a person submits to chemical testing 
and the test result indicates the person has an alcohol concentration of eight 
one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more, the peace officer shall submit 
his signed statement to the department. Based upon the statement the department 
shall suspend the person's Wyoming driver's license or his privilege to operate 
a motor vehicle in this state for ninety (90) days.

 
 

2Although Appellant's 
issue statement appears to raise an issue as to whether the hearing examiner's 
decision was supported by substantial evidence, he provides no argument that the 
factual findings were unsupported.  
To the contrary, Appellant states that "[t]he facts supporting 
[Appellant's] claim for relief come directly from the district court's Decision 
Letter and are not disputed."