Case Title: Maling v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11800

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11800 
 
CHRIS E. MALING  vs.  FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, 
GARRETT & DUNNER, LLP, & others.1  
 
 
 
Suffolk.     September 8, 2015. - December 23, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
 
Patent.  Conflict of Interest.  Attorney at Law, Conflict of 
interest, Attorney-client relationship, Representation of 
differing interests. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
April 25, 2013.  
 
 
A motion to dismiss was heard by Janet L. Sanders, J.  
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Thomas M. Bond for the plaintiff. 
 
Erin K. Higgins (Christopher K. Sweeney with her) for the 
defendants. 
 
Paul A. Stewart, of California, & Sara E. Hirshon, for 
Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear, LLP, & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
                         
 
1 Lawrence R. Robins, Eric P. Raciti, and Matthew R. Van 
Eman.   
2 
 
 
Heather B. Repicky & Lauren E. Ingegneri, for Boston Patent 
Law Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  In this case we consider whether an actionable 
conflict of interest arises under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7, as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1335 (2015), when attorneys in different 
offices of the same law firm simultaneously represent business 
competitors in prosecuting patents on similar inventions, 
without informing them or obtaining their consent to the 
simultaneous representation.2 
 
The plaintiff, Chris E. Maling, engaged the defendant law 
firm Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP 
(Finnegan), including the three individual attorneys named in 
this suit, to represent him in connection with the prosecution 
of patents for Maling's inventions for a new screwless eyeglass. 
After obtaining his patents, Maling learned that Finnegan had 
been simultaneously representing another client that competed 
with Maling in the screwless eyeglass market.  Maling then 
commenced this action, alleging harm under various legal 
theories resulting from Finnegan's failure to disclose the 
alleged conflict of interest.  A judge in the Superior Court 
                         
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the Boston 
Patent Law Association and by Knobbe, Martens, Olson & Bear, 
LLP; Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP; Nixon & Vanderhye 
P.C.; Lewis Roca Rothgerber LLP; Schiff Hardin LLP; Steptoe & 
Johnson LLP; Snell & Wilmer LLP; Barnes & Thornburg LLP; 
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP; Verrill Dana LLP; and 
Morrison & Foerster LLP.  
3 
 
dismissed Maling's complaint for failure to state a claim under 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).  Maling 
appealed, and we transferred the case to this court on our own 
motion.  We conclude that the simultaneous representation by a 
law firm in the prosecution of patents for two clients competing 
in the same technology area for similar inventions is not a per 
se violation of Mass. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7.  We further conclude 
that based on the facts alleged in his complaint, Maling failed 
to state a claim for relief.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of dismissal. 
 
1.  Background.  In 2003, Maling engaged Finnegan to 
perform legal services in connection with the filing and 
prosecution of patents for Maling's inventions for a new 
screwless eyeglass, including a screwless eyeglass hinge block 
design.  Finnegan prepared patent applications for Maling's 
inventions after ordering "prior art" searches.  Over the next 
several years, Finnegan successfully obtained four separate 
patents for Maling.   
 
Attorneys in Finnegan's Boston office represented Maling 
from approximately April, 2003, to May, 2009.3  During this 
period of time, attorneys in Finnegan's Washington, D.C., office 
                         
 
3 Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP 
(Finnegan), withdrew its representation of Chris E. Maling 
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on 
May 20, 2009; however, it is not clear from the record when the 
firm and Maling terminated their relationship. 
4 
 
represented Masunaga Optical Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (Masunaga), 
a Japanese corporation that also sought patents for its 
screwless eyeglass technology.  Upon learning of Finnegan's 
representation of Masunaga, Maling brought suit, asserting 
claims stemming from the alleged conflict of interest that arose 
from Finnegan's simultaneous representation of both clients.4  We 
describe the allegations in Maling's complaint germane to our 
decision.  
 
Maling alleges that he engaged Finnegan to "file and 
prosecute a patent for [his] inventions for a new screw-less 
eyeglass, including without limitation, his invention of a 
'screwless' eyeglasses hinge block design," and that in 
September, 2003, Finnegan ordered prior art searches relating to 
Maling's inventions.5  Maling alleges that Finnegan "belatedly" 
                         
 
4 The original complaint was filed by Maling and his 
company, The Formula, LLC, in the United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts in April, 2012.  It was 
dismissed following the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013), which held that 
legal malpractice claims arising from representation in patent 
proceedings are not within the exclusive subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Federal courts.  Maling refiled his case in 
the business litigation section of the Massachusetts Superior 
Court in April, 2013.  After judgment entered dismissing the 
complaint on October 29, 2013, notices of appeal were filed by 
both plaintiffs, but no filing fee was paid in the Appeals court 
on behalf of The Formula, LLC.  Therefore, Maling is the sole 
appellant.   
 
 
5 Prior art is "the collection of everything in a particular 
art or science that pre-dates the patent-in-suit."  Princeton 
Biochemicals, Inc. vs. Beckman Coulter, Inc., No. 96-5541 
5 
 
commenced preparation of a patent application for his inventions 
in or about May, 2004, and that it "[inexplicably] took 
[fourteen] months" to do so.  Maling also alleges that Finnegan 
filed patent applications for Masunaga more quickly than it did 
for him.  At the same time, Maling acknowledges that Finnegan 
successfully obtained patents for his inventions.  Maling 
further claims that he paid Finnegan in excess of $100,000 for 
its services, and that he invested "millions of dollars" to 
develop his product.  He claims he would not have made this 
investment had Finnegan "disclosed its conflict of interest 
and/or its work on the competing Masunaga patent."  He further 
alleges that the Masunaga applications are very similar to the 
Maling applications, and that Finnegan knew it was performing 
work in the "same patent space" for both clients.  Maling also 
alleges that he was harmed when Finnegan, in 2008, declined to 
provide him with a legal opinion addressing similarities between 
the Masunaga patents and the Maling patents.  Because Finnegan 
did not provide the legal opinion Maling claims, he was unable 
to obtain funding for his invention, and his product was 
otherwise unmarketable on account of its similarities to the 
Masunaga device; as a result, his patents and inventions have 
diminished in value.  In sum, Maling contends, Finnegan's 
                                                                               
(D.N.J. June 17, 2004), aff'd, 411 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).  
6 
 
simultaneous representation of both clients, as well as its 
failure to disclose the alleged conflict, resulted in "great 
harm" and "tremendous financial hardship" for Maling. 
 
Finnegan moved to dismiss Maling's complaint for failure to 
state a claim under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6).  The motion was 
granted in October, 2013, and Maling appealed.  We then 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion.   
 
2.  Discussion.  We review the sufficiency of Maling's 
complaint de novo, taking as true the factual allegations set 
forth therein and drawing all inferences in his favor.  Curtis 
v. Herb Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011).  "[W]e 
look beyond the conclusory allegations in the complaint and 
focus on whether the factual allegations plausibly suggest an 
entitlement to relief."  Id., citing Iannacchino v. Ford Motor 
Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635–636 (2008).   
 
Maling's complaint sets forth four bases for relief:  (1) 
breach of fiduciary duty; (2) legal malpractice; (3) unfair or 
deceptive practices in violation of G. L. c. 93A; and (4) 
"inequitable conduct" before the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO).  Because each count hinges on the 
existence of an undisclosed conflict of interest arising from 
Finnegan's representation of both Maling and Masunaga, we focus 
our inquiry on whether, under the facts alleged, an actionable 
7 
 
conflict arose in violation of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
 
Rule 1.7 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which applies to conflicts of interests between current 
clients, governs the issues in this case.6  By its terms, rule 
1.7, with limited exceptions, provides that a lawyer shall not 
represent a client if the representation is "directly adverse to 
another client," Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 (a) (1), or where "there 
is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's 
responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third 
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer."  Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 1.7 (a) (2).  The purpose of rule 1.7 is twofold.  It serves 
as a "prophylactic [measure] to protect confidences that a 
client may have shared with his or her attorney . . . [and] 
safeguard[s] loyalty as a feature of the lawyer-client 
relationship."  SWS Fin. Fund A v. Salomon Bros. Inc., 790 F. 
Supp. 1392, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 7 
                         
 
6 Since Maling's complaint was filed in 2012, the 
Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct have been revised 
and updated.  Because the substance of rule 1.7 remains 
unchanged, we analyze Maling's claims against the most recent 
version of the rules, published in 2015.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.7, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1335 (2015).   
 
 
7 The USPTO also sets standards of conduct for attorneys who 
practice before it.  In 2013, the USPTO adopted new ethics rules 
based on the American Bar Association's Model Rules of 
8 
 
                                                                               
Professional Conduct.  See 78 Fed. Reg. 20,180, 20,180 (2013).  
The current regulation on concurrent conflicts of interest, 37 
C.F.R. § 11.107 (2013), is virtually identical in language to 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7.  
 
 
At the time this action was brought, concurrent conflicts 
of interest were governed by 37 C.F.R. § 10.66 (2012) (entitled, 
"Refusing to accept or continue employment if the interests of 
another client may impair the independent professional judgment 
of the practitioner"), which provided: 
 
 
"(a) A practitioner shall decline proffered employment 
if the exercise of the practitioner's independent 
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is 
likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the 
proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve 
the practitioner in representing differing interests, 
except to the extent permitted under paragraph (c) of this 
section. 
 
 
"(b) A practitioner shall not continue multiple 
employment if the exercise of the practitioner's 
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client 
will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the 
practitioner's representation of another client, or if it 
would be likely to involve the practitioner in representing 
differing interests, except to the extent permitted under 
paragraph (c) of this section. 
 
 
"(c) In the situations covered by paragraphs (a) and 
(b) of this section a practitioner may represent multiple 
clients if it is obvious that the practitioner can 
adequately represent the interest of each and if each 
consents to the representation after full disclosure of the 
possible effect of such representation on the exercise of 
the practitioner's independent professional judgment on 
behalf of each.  
 
 
"(d) If a practitioner is required to decline 
employment or to withdraw from employment under a 
Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other 
practitioner affiliated with the practitioner or the 
practitioner's firm, may accept or continue such employment 
unless otherwise ordered by the Director or Commissioner." 
9 
 
 
In the practice of patent law, the simultaneous 
representation of clients competing for patents in the same 
technology area is sometimes referred to as a "subject matter 
conflict."  See, e.g., Dolak, Recognizing and Resolving 
Conflicts of Interest in Intellectual Property Matters, 42 IDEA 
453, 463 (2002); Hricik, Trouble Waiting to Happen: Malpractice 
and Ethical Issues in Patent Prosecution, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 385, 412 
(2003) (Hricik).  Subject matter conflicts do not fit neatly 
into the traditional conflict analysis.  Maling advocates for a 
broad interpretation of rule 1.7 that would render all subject 
matter conflicts actionable, per se violations.  We disagree.  
Rather, we conclude that although subject matter conflicts in 
patent prosecutions often may present a number of potential 
legal, ethical, and practical problems for lawyers and their 
clients, they do not, standing alone, constitute an actionable 
conflict of interest that violates rule 1.7.   
 
a.  Adverse representation under rule 1.7 (a) (1).  
Representation is "directly adverse" in violation of rule 
1.7 (a) (1) when a lawyer "act[s] as an advocate in one matter 
against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, 
even when the matters are wholly unrelated."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.7 comment 6.  In other words, "[a] law firm that represents 
client A in the defense of an action may not, at the same time, 
be counsel for a plaintiff in an action brought against client 
10 
 
A, at least without the consent of both clients."  McCourt Co. 
v. FPC Props., Inc., 386 Mass. 145, 145 (1982).   
 
In the instant case, Maling and Masunaga were not 
adversaries in the traditional sense, as they did not appear on 
opposite sides of litigation.  Rather, they each appeared before 
the USPTO in separate proceedings to seek patents for their 
respective screwless eyeglass devices.   
 
Maling contends, however, that he and Masunaga were 
directly adverse within the meaning of rule 1.7 (a) (1) because 
they were competing in the "same patent space."  We disagree 
that the meaning of "directly adverse" stretches so far.  The 
rules of professional conduct make clear that  
"simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of 
clients whose interests are only economically adverse, 
such as representation of competing economic 
enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not 
ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus 
may not require consent of the respective clients."   
 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 comment 6.  Put differently, "[d]irect 
adverseness requires a conflict as to the legal rights and 
duties of the clients, not merely conflicting economic 
interests."  American Bar Association Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-434, at 
140 (Dec. 8, 2004) (ABA Op. 05-434).   
 
Curtis v. Radio Representatives, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 729 
(D.D.C. 1988), a case involving broadcast licenses, offers a 
11 
 
useful example.  In Curtis, the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia found that no actionable conflict of 
interest existed where a law firm simultaneously represented 
clients in the preparation and prosecution of applications for 
radio broadcast licenses from the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC).  Id. at 731-32, 737.8  The court reasoned that 
"the fact that an attorney is simultaneously representing two 
companies that are competitors in the same industry does not 
itself establish an actionable breach of an attorney's fiduciary 
duty."  Id. at 736, quoting D.J. Horan & G.W. Spellmire, Jr., 
Attorney Malpractice:  Prevention and Defense 17-1 (1987).  It 
went on to explain that a conflict of interest could develop 
between clients seeking broadcast licenses under circumstances 
where "objectionable electrical interference existed between two 
stations."  Curtis, supra.  However, because the defendant 
failed to assert such interference, or even the potential for 
such interference, the court could not conclude that a conflict 
of interest existed in violation of the rules of professional 
conduct adopted by the District of Columbia.  Id. at 736-37.   
 
The analysis undertaken by the court in Curtis is 
instructive in our evaluation of Maling's claims.  Finnegan's 
                         
 
8 There are very few appellate court decisions that deal 
with the issues raised in this case.  The most instructive cases 
are those decided by judges in the Federal District Courts.  See 
generally Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, discussed in note 4, 
supra. 
12 
 
representation of Maling and Masunaga is analogous to that 
undertaken by the law firm in Curtis.  Finnegan represented two 
clients competing in the screwless eyeglass device market in 
proceedings before the USPTO.  As Maling acknowledges, Finnegan 
was able successfully to obtain patents from the USPTO for both 
his device and Masunaga's, in the same way that the law firm in 
Curtis was able to obtain radio broadcast licenses for each of 
its clients from the FCC.  Maling and Masunaga were not 
competing for the same patent, but rather different patents for 
similar devices. 
 
Like the court in Curtis, we acknowledge that an actionable 
conflict of interest could arise under different factual 
circumstances.  For example, where claims in two patent 
applications filed prior to March 16, 2013, are identical or 
obvious variants of each other, the USPTO can institute an 
"interference proceeding" to determine which inventor would be 
awarded the claims contained in the patent applications.  35 
U.S.C. § 135(a) (2002).9,10  If the USPTO had called an 
                         
 
9 Under the America Invents Act, inventorship of patents and 
patent applications that do not contain any claims entitled to a 
priority date before March 16, 2013, must be challenged through 
a derivation, rather than interference, proceeding.  See 35 
U.S.C. § 135 (2012); United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2159 (rev. Nov. 
2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/ 
mpep-2100.pdf [http://perma.cc/8TB2-B5RN].  Derivation 
proceedings permit a true inventor to challenge a first-to-file 
inventor's right to a patent by demonstrating that claims 
13 
 
interference proceeding to resolve conflicting claims in the 
Maling and Masunaga patent applications, or if Finnegan, acting 
as a reasonable patent attorney, believed such a proceeding was 
likely, the legal rights of the parties would have been in 
conflict, as only one inventor can prevail in an interference 
proceeding.  In such a case, rule 1.7 would have obliged 
Finnegan to disclose the conflict and obtain consent from both 
                                                                               
contained in the first application derived from those in the 
true inventor's patent application.  35 U.S.C. § 135.   
 
 
Because the Maling and Masunaga Optical Manufacturing Co., 
Ltd. (Masunaga), patents were filed prior to the effective date 
of the relevant provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 135, the applications 
would have been subject to an interference proceeding had a 
question arisen as to whether the patent applications contained 
conflicting claims.     
 
 
10 Interference proceedings are meant to assist the director 
of the USPTO in determining priority, that is, which party first 
invented the commonly claimed invention.  See MPEP, supra at 
§ 2301 (rev. Oct. 2015) at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/ 
mpep/mpep-2300.pdf [http://perma.cc/T2D9-G52D].  This first-to-
invent system was supplanted by the enactment of the America 
Invents Act, which updated various provisions of the patent 
code, and which gives priority to the first party to file an 
application.  See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2012).  Prior to the American 
Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2006) provided, in relevant 
part: 
 
 
"Whenever an application is made for a patent which, 
in the opinion of the Director [of the USPTO], would 
interfere with any pending application, or with any 
unexpired patent, an interference may be declared and the 
Director shall give notice of such declaration to the 
applicants, or applicant and patentee, as the case may be.  
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall 
determine questions of priority of the inventions and may 
determine questions of patentability." 
14 
 
clients or withdraw from representation.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.7 comments 3 & 4.   
 
Maling's conclusory allegations as to the high degree of 
similarity between his device and the Masunaga device are 
contradicted by his acknowledgment elsewhere in the complaint 
that patents issued for both his applications and the Masunaga 
applications.  Although Maling alleges that the Masunaga and 
Maling applications are "similar . . . in many important 
respects," he does not allege that the claims are identical or 
obvious variants of each other such that the claims in one 
application would necessarily preclude claims contained in the 
other.  Additionally, we appreciate that the claims comprising a 
patent application may be sufficiently distinct so as to permit 
the issuance of multiple patents for similar inventions, or 
components of an invention, as was the case here.  Accordingly, 
Maling's allegations do not permit any inference as to whether 
the similarities between the inventions at the time Finnegan was 
retained to prepare and prosecute Maling's patent applications 
were of such a degree that Finnegan should have reasonably 
foreseen the potential for an interference proceeding.11  
Maling's conclusory statement that the inventions were very 
                         
 
11 Maling's allegation that he and Masunaga competed in the 
"same patent space," without more, fails to demonstrate 
entitlement to relief.  Maling cites no authority, and we have 
found none, that gives this term special meaning in the context 
of patent jurisprudence.   
15 
 
similar is precisely the type of legal conclusion that we do not 
credit.  See Iannacchino, 451 Mass. at 636.  Moreover, Maling 
makes no allegations that an interference proceeding was 
instituted, nor has he alleged facts supporting the inference 
that Finnegan took positions adverse to Maling and favorable to 
Masunaga in the prosecution of their respective patents.  
 
We also recognize that subject matter conflicts can give 
rise to conflicts of interest under rule 1.7 (a) (1) in 
nonlitigation contexts.  Comment 7 to rule 1.7 explains that 
directly adverse conflicts may also arise in the course of 
transactional matters.  For example, "a lawyer would be 
precluded . . . from advising a client as to his rights under a 
contract with another client of the lawyer . . . .  Such 
conflict involves the legal rights and duties of the two clients 
vis-[à]-vis one another."  ABA Op. 05-434, supra at 140.   
 
Here, such a conflict likely arose in 2008 when Maling 
sought a legal opinion from Finnegan regarding the likelihood 
that he might be exposed to claims by Masunaga for patent 
infringement.  Finnegan declined to provide the opinion, and 
Maling alleges that he lost financing as a result.  Providing 
the opinion arguably would have rendered the interests of Maling 
and Masunaga "directly adverse" within the meaning of rule 
1.7 (a) (1), and either declining representation or disclosing 
the conflict and obtaining consent would have been the proper 
16 
 
course of action.12  But there is no allegation that Finnegan had 
agreed to provide such opinions in its engagement to prosecute 
Maling's patents.  Without such a claim, we cannot conclude that 
a conflict based on direct adversity has been adequately 
alleged. 
 
b.  Material limitation under rule 1.7 (a) (2).  We turn 
next to the question whether Finnegan's representation of 
Masunaga "materially limited" its representation of Maling in 
contravention of rule 1.7 (a) (2), which prohibits 
representation where "there is no direct adverseness . . . [but] 
there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, 
recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the 
client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's 
other responsibilities or interests."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 
comment 8.  The "critical inquiry" in analyzing potential 
conflicts under rule 1.7 (a) (2), "is whether the lawyer has a 
competing interest or responsibility that 'will materially 
interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in 
considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that 
reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.'"  Matter 
of Driscoll, 447 Mass. 678, 686 (2006) (quoting comment 4 to 
                         
 
12 The record does not reflect Finnegan's rationale for 
declining to provide the opinion.   
 
17 
 
previous version of Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 [b], which contained 
language now in rule 1.7 [a] [2]).   
 
 
In his complaint, Maling alleges in conclusory terms that 
Finnegan was unable to protect both his interests and Masunaga's 
and ultimately chose to protect Masunaga at his expense in the 
patent prosecution process.  In Maling's view, Finnegan "pulled 
its punches" and got more for Masunaga than for Maling before 
the USPTO.  He has failed, however, to allege sufficient facts 
to support such a proposition.  
 
The case of Sentinel Prods. Corp. vs. Platt, U.S. Dist. 
Ct., No. 98-11143-GAO (D. Mass. July 22, 2002) (Sentinel), 
illustrates how a subject matter conflict resulting from the 
prosecution of patents for competing clients could give rise to 
a conflict of interest under rule 1.7 (a) (2).  In the Sentinel 
case, a law firm prosecuted patents for two clients, a company 
(Sentinel), and one of Sentinel's former employees.  Id. at 1.  
Sentinel brought suit, claiming that because of the simultaneous 
representation, its patent applications "were denied, delayed, 
or otherwise impeded" and that it suffered economic losses as a 
result.  Id. at 5.  On a motion for summary judgment, the court 
concluded that the law firm filed applications with the USPTO 
for Sentinel, and then two weeks later for the former employee.  
Id. at 1-2.  The firm's attorneys testified that they thought 
the applications "overlapped" and that they were unable "to 
18 
 
discern a patentable difference between" the applications.  Id. 
at 5.  A patent for the employee's application was issued first, 
and Sentinel's application was rejected after the USPTO found it 
conflicted with claims contained in the employee's patents.  Id. 
at 2-3.  The firm subsequently narrowed the claims in Sentinel's 
application to avoid conflict with the former employee's 
application, and the USPTO issued Sentinel patents containing 
the narrower claims.  Id. at 3, 6-7.   
 
The so-called "claim shaving," see Hricik, supra at 415, 
that occurred in Sentinel clearly implicates rule 1.7 (a) (2).  
Altering the claims in one client's application because of 
information contained in a different client's application at 
least creates a question of fact as to whether "courses of 
action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the 
client" were foreclosed.  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.7 comment 8.  
 
Unlike the facts in Sentinel, Maling's complaint provides 
little more than speculation that Finnegan's judgment was 
impaired or that he obtained a less robust patent than if he had 
been represented by other, "conflict-free" counsel.  Maling does 
not allege that the claims contained in his applications were 
altered or narrowed in light of the Masunaga applications, as 
the plaintiffs demonstrated in Sentinel, or, importantly, that 
his client confidences were disclosed or used in any way to 
19 
 
Masunaga's advantage.13  Nor does he allege that Finnegan delayed 
filing his patent application to ensure the success of 
Masunaga's application over his own.  Ultimately, Maling's bare 
assertions that Masunaga was given preferential treatment and 
was "enrich[ed]" to his "detriment" as a consequence do not 
support an inference that Finnegan was "materially limited" in 
its ability to obtain patents for Maling's inventions.  
 
Finnegan's subsequent inability or unwillingness to provide 
a legal opinion regarding the similarities between the Maling 
and Masunaga inventions also raises a question whether the 
simultaneous representation "foreclose[d] [a] course[] of 
action" that should have been pursued on Maling's behalf.  Mass. 
R. Prof. C. 1.7 comment 8.  As previously discussed, rendering 
such an opinion would likely have created a direct conflict 
between Maling and Masunaga in violation of rule 1.7 (a) (1).  
To the extent that such a conflict was foreseeable, because, as 
Maling alleges, the Masunaga and Maling inventions were so 
similar, it is possible that Finnegan should have declined to 
represent Maling from the outset of his case so as to also avoid 
a violation of rule 1.7 (a) (2).  This, however, depends in 
                         
 
13 Contrast Tethys Bioscience, Inc. v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, 
Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., No. C09-5115 CW, slip op. at 4, 
10 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2010) (allegations that defendant law 
firm's use of "nearly identical" language in patent applications 
for plaintiff and plaintiff's competitor were sufficient to 
plead actionable conflict of interest because court could draw 
inference of the improper disclosure of client information). 
20 
 
large measure on the nature of Finnegan's engagement by Maling 
in 2003.   
 
Before engaging a client, a lawyer must determine whether 
the potential for conflict counsels against undertaking 
representation.  Comment 8 to rule 1.7 elaborates:  
"The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not 
itself require disclosure and consent.  The critical 
questions are the likelihood that a difference in 
interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it 
will materially interfere with the lawyer’s 
independent professional judgment in considering 
alternatives or foreclose courses of action that 
reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client."  
 
 
Maling's complaint does not contain any allegations as to 
the services or scope of representation agreed upon by Maling 
and Finnegan other than that Finnegan "agreed to file and 
prosecute a patent for Maling's inventions."  Nor is it 
adequately alleged that Finnegan should have reasonably 
anticipated that Maling would need a legal opinion that would 
create a conflict of interest.  There are simply too few facts 
from which to infer that Finnegan reasonably should have 
foreseen the potential conflict in the first place.  See, e.g., 
Vaxiion Therapeutics, Inc. v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 593 F. Supp. 
2d 1153, 1173 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (deciding that expert testimony 
created question of fact as to likelihood that conflict of 
interest would develop from firm's simultaneous representation 
of competitor clients in patent prosecution).  Based on these 
21 
 
inadequacies, we agree with the motion judge that the complaint 
does not sufficiently allege that Finnegan violated its duties 
under rule 1.7 (a) (2) by undertaking representation of both 
Maling and Masunaga.   
 
Because Maling's claims hinge on the existence of a 
conflict of interest, and because we conclude there was none 
adequately alleged in this case, he fails to state a claim on 
each of the counts in his complaint.14,15 
                         
 
14 At oral argument, Maling's counsel implied that 
Finnegan's failure to discover and disclose Masunaga's patents 
in the course of its prior art searches constituted malpractice 
or negligence.  Because Maling's complaint contains no 
allegations to this effect, we do not decide the question 
whether an attorney has an ongoing obligation to discover prior 
art.   
 
 
15 Maling also alleges that Finnegan failed to disclose 
information to the USPTO such that it engaged in "inequitable 
conduct."  "Inequitable conduct" in the USPTO occurs when a 
party withholds information material to patentability, or 
material misinformation is provided to the USPTO, with the 
intent to deceive or mislead the patent examiner into granting 
the patent.  Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, 
Inc., 695 F.3d 1285, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
 
 
Even if this claim arises from conduct unrelated to the 
alleged conflict of interest, Maling nonetheless fails to state 
a claim.  First, it is unsettled whether the "inequitable 
conduct" doctrine is merely a defense or whether it provides an 
independent cause of action against counsel.  See ShieldMark, 
Inc. v. Creative Safety Supply, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-221, slip op. 
at 12-13 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2012), report and recommendation 
adopted, No. 1:12-CV-221 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2013) (describing 
"the dearth of case law on the issue").  We need not decide the 
issue, however, as Maling failed to plead sufficient facts to 
state a claim for inequitable conduct.  "To successfully prove 
inequitable conduct, the accused infringer must provide evidence 
that the applicant (1) made an affirmative misrepresentation of 
22 
 
 
c.  Identifying conflicts of interest.  This case also 
raises important considerations under Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.10, as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1363 (2015), which prohibits lawyers 
associated in a firm from "knowingly represent[ing] a client 
when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from 
doing so by Rule[] 1.7."  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.10 (a).16  To 
ensure compliance with both rules 1.7 and 1.10, firms must 
implement procedures to identify and remedy actual and potential 
conflicts of interest.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 5.1 comment 2, as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1445 (2015) (requiring firms to make 
"reasonable efforts to establish internal policies . . . 
designed to detect and resolve conflicts of interest").  
 
What constitutes an adequate conflict check is a complex 
question.  As a member of this court observed, "[a]gainst a 
backdrop of increasing law firm reorganizations and mergers, 
                                                                               
material fact, failed to disclose material information, or 
submitted false material information, and (2) did so with intent 
to deceive the [USPTO]."  Cancer Research Tech. Ltd. v. Barr 
Labs., Inc., 625 F.3d 724, 732 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 499 (2011).  Maling, at a minimum makes no 
allegations as to Finnegan's intent to deceive the USPTO, and 
therefore fails to state a claim of inequitable conduct.   
 
 
16 The lawyers working on Masunaga's patent prosecution 
worked out of a different office than the lawyers working on the 
prosecution of Maling's patents.  Although the risks of 
inadvertent confidential client information disclosure or misuse 
may be reduced in such circumstances, this makes little 
difference from a disciplinary rules standpoint as conflicts are 
generally imputed to all members of the firm regardless of their 
geographical location or work assignments. 
23 
 
lateral transfers, and the rise of large-scale firms that 
transcend State and national borders, the issue of dual 
representation is one of multifaceted overtones and novel 
complexity."  Coke v. Equity Residential Props. Trust, 440 Mass. 
511, 518 (2003) (Cowin, J., concurring).  Nothing we say here 
today, however, should be construed to absolve law firms from 
the obligation to implement robust processes that will detect 
potential conflicts. 
 
This court has not defined a minimum protocol for carrying 
out a conflict check in the area of patent practice, or any 
other area of law.  However, no matter how complex such a 
protocol might be, law firms run significant risks, financial 
and reputational, if they do not avail themselves of a robust 
conflict system adequate to the nature of their practice.  
Although Maling's complaint does not plead an actionable 
violation of rule 1.7 sufficiently, the misuse of client 
confidences and the preferential treatment of the interests of 
one client, to the detriment of nearly identical interests of 
another, are serious matters that cannot be reconciled with the 
ethical obligations of our profession.    
 
3.  Conclusion.  As noted throughout this opinion, there 
are various factual scenarios in the context of patent practice 
in which a subject matter conflict may give rise to an 
actionable violation of rule 1.7.  On the facts alleged in 
24 
 
Maling's complaint, however, we find that no actionable conflict 
of interest existed.  The dismissal of the complaint is 
affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.