Case Title: Dolan v. Steele

Citation: 207 Kan. 640, 485 P.2d 1318

Docket Number: 46,328

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1971-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
207 Kan. 640 (1971)
485 P.2d 1318
VICTOR J. DOLAN, Appellant,
v.
H.W. STEELE, d/b/a STEELE OIL COMPANY, and UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, Appellees.
No. 46,328

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed June 12, 1971.
George E. McCullough, of McCullough, Parker, Wareheim, LaBunker and Rose, of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellant.
James P. Mize, of Clark, Mize, Graves, Linville and Miller, Chartered, of Salina, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HARMAN, C.:
This is an appeal from a district court's denial of a workmen's compensation claim for disability based on cerebrovascular injury.
Claimant-appellant, Victor J. Dolan, fifty-three years of age, had been for about twenty years in the employ of respondent-appellee, H.W. Steele, a Texaco oil distributor in Salina, Kansas. Claimant's principal job was to make deliveries by truck of gas, oil and grease. He also unloaded freight cars of oil products when they were shipped to respondent's bulk plant. Respondent's only other employee was a female bookkeeper.
Claimant testified that on the morning of July 6, 1967, he unloaded a freight car and set up fifteen or twenty fifty-five gallon drums of oil products, which was heavy work. After unloading the car claimant made several deliveries; while en route to another delivery that afternoon he sustained a stroke, went off in the ditch with his truck, and was hospitalized; his duties were primarily making small deliveries; he would help unload carloads of oil whenever *641 they came in; Mr. Steele frequently helped out but claimant often handled the barrels alone; about once a month claimant would help unload freight cars. A restaurant owner testified she recalled seeing claimant unloading a car the same day upon which he was later hospitalized.
A general medical practitioner testified on claimant's behalf: He had examined claimant but had not treated him; claimant could have had a cerebral vascular accident as a result of the exertion of unloading the freight car and that would be a logical assumption; claimant's work probably precipitated his condition; what he was really saying was there was a possibility claimant's unloading work precipitated the accident.
On respondent's behalf documentary evidence from the Union Pacific railroad was produced indicating the freight car in question was unloaded prior to July 6, 1967, the car having been "spotted" on that company's tracks for unloading; records from the Santa Fe railroad, which had had the car brought in and against whom claim for freight damage had been made, also indicated the car was unloaded prior to July 6, 1967. Respondent Steele testified the freight car was not on the siding on that date.
Mr. Steele also testified that in June, 1967, claimant had delivered about six or seven thousand gallons of oil; claimant frequently loaded and unloaded thirty or fifty-five gallon drums of oil, principally the latter size; claimant unloaded oil drums from freight cars two or three times per month; he delivered barrels of oil to respondent's customers.
The physician who treated claimant, Dr. Weber, was a specialist in internal medicine. He first examined claimant when he was hospitalized July 6, 1967. He testified claimant had a preexisting arteriosclerosis; claimant had sustained a cerebral thrombosis; the cerebral thrombosis was not related to claimant's work; claimant's exertion did not have any effect upon his disease.
The workmen's compensation examiner found that claimant's pre-existing disease was precipitated into a disability by "work more than claimant performed on a day to day basis" and he awarded compensation.
Upon review the workmen's compensation director likewise awarded compensation, finding that claimant's exertion in unloading the freight car was more than his usual work in the course of *642 his regular employment and further that his cerebral vascular accident was causally related to the exertion of the work he was performing for respondent.
Upon respondent's appeal the district court denied compensation and entered the following order:
"The 1967 amendment of KSA 44-501 provides:
*643 Claimant's sole contention of error presented to this court in his statement of points is:
Claimant argues that legislative intent in enacting the 1967 amendment to K.S.A. 44-501, expressing the obligation under the workmen's compensation act, must have been to define the term "usual work" as used therein to mean "standard regular day-to-day work." In presenting his contention for reversal and remand claimant would have us disregard the trial court's statements respecting the medical aspect of the case. We are unable so to do. Actually the trial court made two separate findings, either of which, if proper, would preclude award of compensation. First, the court found under the evidence that it was "usual work" for claimant to unload barrels from a freight car. This finding was not in harmony with those made by the examiner and director, which latter findings embody standards of statutory interpretation claimant would have us adopt on appeal. However, as indicated, the trial court did not stop with the nature of the work aspect but it found, additionally, that giving credit to the testimony of the treating physician, the exertion of claimant's work was not a significant causative factor in claimant's injury. This amounted to a positive finding which we may not with propriety ignore, supported as it is by the clear and unequivocal opinion of Dr. Weber that claimant's work had no effect upon his disease and the cerebral thrombosis was not related to his work.
Our law has always been that whether a heart attack is causally related to the employee's work is a question of fact (see Hanna v. Edward Gray Corporations, 197 Kan. 793, 421 P.2d 205). Nothing in the 1967 amendment has eliminated this element of causation in fact, essential for disability to become compensable. Under the amendment the causal relation of the exertion to the cerebrovascular injury remains a question of fact. With respect to this issue of causation the usualness of the exertion is irrelevant. This was the import of our recent holding in Muntzert v. A.B.C. Drug Co., 206 Kan. 331, 478 P.2d 198, in which compensation was sought by *644 the widow of a workman who died from a heart attack shortly after leaving his place of employment. Upon conflicting medical testimony the district court found there was no causal relation between the decedent's employment and the coronary occlusion which caused his death. On appeal the claimant's argument was directed toward a finding of the district court that the evidence did not establish any "unusual activity" on decedent's part within the contemplation of the 1967 amendment to 44-501. Appellant there contended that the term "unusual activity" has a dissimilar connotation than the phrase "more than the workman's usual work" as used in the statute, arguing that "unusual" implies a greater variation from the norm than "more than usual". Appellant there sought, as does claimant in the case at bar, to have this court declare a particular standard applicable to the work aspect of the case. In response this court stated:
We see no reason to depart from this approach.
The factual findings on causation is supported by substantial competent evidence and under the familiar rule may not be set aside upon appellate review.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPROVED BY THE COURT.