Case Title: STATE v OSTEEN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1985-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 84-516 I N THE SUPmME C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 1985 STATE O F M O N T A P J A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs- NARVIIJ E. OSTEEN, Defenaant and Respondent. APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l ~ i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Lincoln, The Honorable Robert M. H o l t e r , Judge p r e s i d i n g . COUNSEL O F RECORD: For Appellant: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana W i l l i a m A. Douglas,(Susan Loehn, Deputy), County Attorney, Libby, Montana For Respondent : Law O f f i c e )of David W. Harman, Libby, Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : Jan. 18, 1985 Decided: May 3 0 , 1985 - Clerk M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. The S t a t e o f Montana a p p e a l s from an o r d e r o f t h e Lincoln County D i s t r i c t Court suppressing evidence s e i z e d a f t e r o f f i c e r s e n t e r e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s home without a warrant and a l s o suppressing d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t s made p r i o r t o r e c e i v i n g a Miranda warning. W e a f f i r m . The i s s u e s a r e : 1. Did t h e District Court err i n suppressing evidence seized a f t e r o f f i c e r s e n t e r e d d e f e n d a n t ' s home without a warrant? 2 . Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err j.n suppressing defen- d a n t ' s statements made p r i o r t o r e c e i v i n g Miranda warnings? Around 10:15 p.m. on April 6 , 1984, a man r e p o r t e d t o t h e Lincoln County S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e t h a t he had been a s s a u l t - ed. H e r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e d r i v e r o f a Lincoln Continental automobile w i t h l i c e n s e p l a t e s b e a r i n g t h e name "Osteen" had pointed a handgun a t him and t h r e a t e n e d him. The v i c t i m s t a t e d he d i d n o t know t h e d r i v e r , b u t had followed t h e c a r t o a house where it was parked. S h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e r s interviewed t h e victim a t t h e Sher- i f f ' s O f f i c e a s h o r t t i m e l a t e r . The v i c t i m agreed t o show t h e o f f i c e r s where t h e v e h i c l e was parked. H e gave t h e o f f i c e r s t h e following information about t h e suspect: t h e s u s p e c t ' s v e h i c l e was a grey Lincoln C o n t i n e n t a l ; t h e v e h i c l e bore t h e personalized l i c e n s e p l a t e s "Osteen;" t h e s u s p e c t was male, 40-50 y e a r s o l d and had greying h a i r . The v i c t i m l e d t h r e e o f f i c e r s t o t h e house where he had seen t h e s u s p e c t ' s v e h i c l e parked. The c a r was i n t h e d r i v e - way when they a r r i v e d . The house had a s i g n on t h e o u t s i d e which read " O s t e e n . " While t h e v i c t i m and one o f f i c e r waited a c r o s s t h e street i n a p a t r o l c a r , two armed and uniformed o f f i c e r s approached t h e house. One o f f i c e r looked through t h e windows of t h e Lincoln and saw a p i s t o l ammunition box on t h e r e a r f l o o r . Without an a r r e s t o r s e a r c h w a r r a n t , t h e t w o o f f i c e r s went t o t h e f r o n t porch o f t h e house and knocked on t h e d o o r . The d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s d i d n o t announce themselves b u t began banging l o u d l y on t h e door. T h i s was around 10:40 p.m. and it was d a r k o u t s i d e . Defendant testi- f i e d he had been a s l e e p f o r a b o u t one hour. H e was wearing h i s b a t h r o b e when he came t o t h e door. One o f f i c e r t e s t i f i e d t h e y t o l d d e f e n d a n t , " W e would l i k e t o t a l k t o you, w e a r e from t h e S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e " and t h e d e f e n d a n t r e p l i e d , "Come on i n . " The d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he opened t h e f r o n t d o o r , t h e o f f i c e r s simply came a l l t h e way i n t o h i s l i v i n g room w i t h o u t any i n v i t a t i o n by word o r g e s t u r e . One o f f i c e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had been d r i n k - i n g , was u p s e t and d i d n o t a p p e a r t o u n d e r s t a n d what t h e o f f i c e r s w e r e doing. The d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d h e had been sound a s l e e p and t h a t when he went t o t h e d o o r , h e was " s t i l l a s l e e p , v e r y s l e e p y . " H e t e s t i f i e d h e had no i d e a why t h e o f f i c e r s w e r e t h e r e , b u t t h o u g h t maybe someone had d i e d . The o f f i c e r s d i d n o t t e l l d e f e n d a n t h e had a r i g h t t o r e f u s e them e n t r y . A f t e r t h e o f f i c e r s e n t e r e d d e f e n d a n t ' s l i v i n g room, t h e y saw a p i s t o l l y i n g on a t a b l e n e x t t o t h e couch. T h i s gun was n o t v i s i b l e from t h e f r o n t door. One o f f i c e r t h e n began q u e s t i o n i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t . The o f f i c e r asked d e f e n d a n t where he had been t h a t evening and whether h e had been a t a s p e c i f - i c l o c a t i o n . The d e f e n d a n t s a i d h e had n o t been t h e r e and could n o t t e l l them where he had been o r what h e had been doing. The o f f i c e r asked d e f e n d a n t i f t h e p i s t o l was h i s and whether he had had it w i t h him t h a t n i g h t . The d e f e n d a n t r e p l i e d t h e p i s t o l was h i s , t h a t he k e p t it i n t h e house f o r p r o t e c t i o n and never took it o u t s i d e t h e house. A f t e r f u r - t h e r q u e s t i o n i n g , t h e defendant admitted he had been o u t i n h i s c a r t h a t evening and t h a t he had t h e handgun w i t h him. A f t e r e l i c i t i n g t h e s e admissions, t h e o f f i c e r a r r e s t e d defen- d a n t and read him t h e Miranda warnings. The o f f i c e r t o l d him t o g e t dressed t o go t o t h e S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e , followed him t o h i s room, watched him w h i l e he d r e s s e d , then handcuffed him and took him t o t h e p a t r o l c a r . The defendant was charged w i t h aggravated a s s a u l t under 45-5-202, MCA. The defendant p l e d n o t g u i l t y and f i l e d a motion t o suppress evidence o f t h e weapon found i n h i s home and t h e s t a t e m e n t s made i n response t o t h e o f f i c e r ' s ques- t i o n i n g . The District Court held a suppression h e a r i n g and granted t h e motion t o suppress. The S t a t e appeals. I Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n suppressing evidence s e i z e d a f t e r o f f i c e r s e n t e r e d d e f e n d a n t ' s home without a warrant? The S t a t e argues i n substance t h a t t h e S h e r i f f ' s o f f i - cers a c t e d reasonably i n e n t e r i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s house without a warrant. The S t a t e contends t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s lacked proba- b l e cause t o b e l i e v e defendant committed an o f f e n s e u n t i l t h e y found t h e weapon i n h i s home and he admitted t h e weapon was i n h i s c a r w i t h him t h a t n i g h t . The S t a t e argues t h e o f f i c e r s were merely i n v e s t i g a t i n g a r e p o r t e d o f f e n s e , t h a t they d i d n o t know t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e s u s p e c t , t h a t t h e y d i d n o t want t o accuse t h e defendant prematurely, and t h a t t h e y d i d n o t intend t o a r r e s t t h e defendant when t h e y went t o t h e door o f t h e house. The S t a t e contends t h a t t h e defendant v o l u n t a r i l y admitted t h e o f f i c e r s , t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s w e r e p r o p e r l y w i t h i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s home when they saw t h e weap- on, and t h a t s e i z u r e o f t h e weapon was proper under t h e p l a i n view exception to the warrant requirement. The State there- fore argues that the District Court erred in suppressing the weapon seized from defendant's home. Under certain circumstances, peace officers may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. State v. Sorenson (1979), 180 Mont. 269, 272, 590 P.2d 136, 139. The plain view doctrine may be relied on if two threshold requirements are met: the officers must have a prior justification for the intrusion and the incriminating evidence must be discov- ered inadvertently in the course of the justified intrusion. Sorenson, 180 Mont. at 272, 590 P.2d at 139. The officers' initial intrusion in this case was not under authority of a warrant. Thus, the intrusion must be justified under one of the recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. "Searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576. Those exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn," and those seeking an exemption from the warrant requirement have the burden of showing "that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative." Sorenson, 180 Mont. at 273, 590 P.2d at 139, citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, reh. den. 404 U.S. 874, 92 S.Ct. 26, 30 L.Ed.2d 120. Here, the State seeks to justify the initial intrusion into defendant's home under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. The State contends that the officers' entry was proper because the defendant invited them into his home. The D i s t r i c t Court found a s follows: "Here, w e f i n d t h e s e f a c t o r s : " (1) Uniformed, armed o f f i c e r s appeared a t t h e d o o r o f d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i v a t e home a t n i g h t and sought e n t r a n c e . " ( 2 ) Defendant f e l t a compulsion t o l e t them i n . " ( 3 ) The purpose o f t h e i n t r u s i o n was n o t a p p a r e n t , h e t h o u g h t maybe someone had d i e d . " ( 4 ) The d e f e n d a n t was j u s t aroused from s l e e p by t h e o f f i c e r s . " (5) Defendant p r e v i o u s l y had consumed l i q u o r and was u p s e t . "And, whether t h e r e was a 'come i n ' o r j u s t h o l d i n g a s i d e t h e d o o r o r whatever under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e e n t r y was n o t proper." I n o r d e r t o show t h a t v o l u n t a r y c o n s e n t t o s e a r c h was g i v e n , t h e S t a t e must show t h a t t h e c o n s e n t was u n e q u i v o c a l , s p e c i f i c , and uncontaminated by d u r e s s o r c o e r c i o n . The Court d i s c u s s e d c o n s e n t a t some l e n g t h i n S t a t e v. LaFlamme ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 202, 204-05, 551 P.2d 1011, 1012-13, where we s t a t e d : ". . . There i s a heavy burden o f proof r e q u i r e d t o show t h a t t h e r e was a con- s e n t . The United S t a t e s Supreme Court i n Bumper v. North C a r o l i n a , 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 502, set f o r t h t h e b a s i c requirement: "'When a p r o s e c u t o r s e e k s t o r e l y upon c o n s e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e l a w f u l n e s s o f a s e a r c h , he h a s t h e burden o f p r o v i n g t h a t t h e c o n s e n t was, i n f a c t , f r e e l y and v o l u n t a r i l y g i v e n . * * * ' "The Ninth C i r c u i t Court o f Appeals g i v e s a more e l a b o r a t e s t a t e m e n t o f t h i s re- quirement i n Channel v. United S t a t e s , 285 F.2d 217, 219 (1960), s a y i n g : " 'A s e a r c h and s e i z u r e may b e made with- o u t a s e a r c h w a r r a n t i f t h e i n d i v i d u a l f r e e l y and i n t e l l i g e n t l y g i v e s h i s un- e q u i v o c a l and s p e c i f i c c o n s e n t t o s e a r c h , uncontaminated by any d u r e s s o r c o e r c i o n , a c t u a l o r i m p l i e d . The Government h a s t h e burden o f proving by c l e a r p o s i t i v e evidence t h a t such consent was given. ' "The q u e s t i o n t o be answered i n t h i s c a s e is whether t h e words and a c t i o n s o f t h e defendant w e r e such t h a t a f r e e l y given, unequivocal, and s p e c i f i c consent i s shown by c l e a r p o s i t i v e evidence." I n examining t h e surrounding circumstances, w e must c o n s i d e r any s u b t l y c o e r c i v e p o l i c e a c t i o n s and q u e s t i o n s a s w e l l a s t h e v u l n e r a b l e s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e o f t h e person a l l e g e d t o have consented. The testimony on t h e p a r t o f t h e defen- d a n t and t h e o f f i c e r s s u p p o r t s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s conclu- s i o n t h a t t h e defendant f e l t a compulsion t o l e t them i n . Their testimony a l s o s u p p o r t s t h e c o u r t ' s conclusion t h a t t h e purpose o f t h e i n t r u s i o n was n o t a p p a r e n t , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e defendant had j u s t been aroused from s l e e p a f t e r having consumed some l i q u o r . There i s c l e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support t h e conclusion t h a t t h e r e was n o t a s p e c i f i c consent t o s e a r c h and t h a t t h e r e was coercion, e i t h e r a c t u a l o r implied. W e p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s i n t h i s c a s e had ample grounds and o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b t a i n a w a r r a n t b e f o r e seeking e n t r y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s home. There i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e record t h a t t o have done s o would have i n any way impaired t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . A s we r e i t e r a t e d i n S t a t e v. Kao (Mont. 1985), 697 P.2d 903, 907-08, 4 2 "The Fourth Amendment t o t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t i c l e 11, s e c t i o n 11 o f t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n provide f o r t h e r i g h t o f t h e people t o be s e c u r e i n t h e i r persons, p a p e r s , homes and e f f e c t s from unreasonable s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s . . . . "The physical invasion of t h e home i s t h e c h i e f e v i l t o which t h e Fourth Amendment i s h i s t o r i c a l l y d i r e c t e d . "'In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. ' Pryton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639. ' I . . . [Tlhe fact that an entry is made at night raises particular concern over its reasonableness. Although crime has become an increasingly serious problem, . . . the right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance." Here, the officers failed to obtain a warrant and the State has failed to demonstrate any other valid basis for the officers' entry into defendant's home. We conclude there was no consent given under the stan- dard set forth in LaFlamme, and that there was no justifica- tion or exigency allowing a warrantless entry into the defendant's home. The officers' entry under the facts of this case was unreasonable and their observation of the weapon was an unreasonable, warrantless search. We therefore reject the State's argument that the weapon seized by the officer is admissible under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. We hold that the District Court did not err in suppress- ing evidence seized after the officers entered defendant's home without a warrant. Did the District Court err in suppressing defendant's statements made prior to receiving Miranda warnings? After entering defendant's home without a warrant or other authorization and finding defendant's weapon, the officers interrogated the defendant at some length without g i v i n g Miranda warnings. I n t h e course o f t h i s i n t e r r o g a - t i o n , t h e o f f i c e r s e l i c i t e d i n c r i m i n a t i n g admissions from t h e defendant regarding t h e weapon, t h e v e h i c l e and d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i v i t i e s t h a t n i g h t . The D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h a t t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n was done i n a c u s t o d i a l atmosphere and ordered suppression of d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t s made during t h i s i n t e r - rogation. W e f i n d t h e record c o n t a i n s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s conclusion. C u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n i s defined a s " q u e s t i o n i n g i n i t i a t e d by law enforcement o f f i c e r s a f t e r a person has been taken i n t o custody o r otherwise deprived - - o f h i s freedom - o f a c t i o n - i n any s i g n i f i c a n t way." S t a t e v. Lapp (Mont. 1983), 658 P.2d 400, 402, 40 St.Rep. 120, 122, quoting Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 4 4 4 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706 (emphasis i n Lapp). A s t h e S t a t e contends, an i n t e r r o g a t i o n becomes c u s t o d i a l and i s s u b j e c t t o Miranda requirements i f t h e circumstances i n which t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n t a k e s p l a c e a r e such t h a t a reasonable person being i n t e r r o - gated would f e e l he was i n custody o r otherwise s i g n i f i c a n t l y deprived o f h i s freedom. Lapp, 658 P.2d a t 403, 40 St.Rep. a t 123. The S t a t e argues under t h i s standard t h a t t h e i n t e r - r o g a t i o n i n t h i s c a s e was n o t c u s t o d i a l and t h a t Miranda warnings were n o t r e q u i r e d . W e d i s a g r e e . Courts c o n s i d e r a number o f f a c t o r s i n determining whether a s u s p e c t i s i n custody o r h a s been s i g n i f i c a n t l y deprived of h i s freedom o f a c t i o n f o r purposes o f Miranda warnings. These f a c t o r s i n c l u d e t h e p l a c e o f i n t e r r o g a t i o n , t h e t i m e o f i n t e r r o g a t i o n , persons p r e s e n t d u r i n g i n t e r r o g a - t i o n , whether Miranda warnings w e r e g r a t u i t o u s l y given, and whether o r n o t t h e s u s p e c t was a r r e s t e d following question- ing. Lapp, 658 P.2d a t 403, 40 St.Rep. a t 122. It i s n o t necessary t h a t i n t e r r o g a t i o n occur a t t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n i n order to invoke the Miranda requirements. Interrogation which occurs in the suspect's home is subject to Miranda where it occurs in a coercive environment in which the suspect's freedom of action has been significantly restricted. State v. Ryan (1979), 182 Mont. 130, 133-35, 595 P.2d 1146, 1147-48; Orozco v. Texas (1969), 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311. Here, two armed and uniformed police officers appeared at defendant's door at night and sought entry. Meanwhile, another officer and the alleged victim waited in a vehicle outside defendant's home. The two officers entered defen- dant's home without a warrant or other authorization, and began to interrogate the defendant regarding the weapon, his vehicle and his activities that night. The defendant was alone in his home at the time. The questioning apparently exceeded ten minutes in length. The officers repeated their questioning until receiving satisfactory answers. Both officers testified that, at first, the defendant denied having the gun in his car that night. After additional questioning, the defendant admitted the gun was with him in the car and he was formally arrested. These facts establish that the defendant was significantly deprived of his freedom of action. The State attempts to characterize the officers' visit and questioning as a general investigative inquiry. The record establishes that prior to actually knocking at the door, the officers had been given a description of the sus- pect and his weapon, the suspect's vehicle and its license plate. The officers were led by the victim to the home, which was identified by the same name as that which appeared on the license plate. The vehicle was in the driveway and the officers observed a pistol ammunition box inside the v e h i c l e . A t t h i s p o i n t , t h e o f f i c e r s c l e a r l y had s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n t o o b t a i n a s e a r c h o r a r r e s t w a r r a n t . V i e conclude t h a t t h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i - b l e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e District C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was i n t e r r o g a t e d i n a c u s t o d i a l atmosphere r e q u i r i n g Miranda warnings. The f a i l u r e o f t h e o f f i c e r s t o p r e f a c e t h e i r q u e s t i o n s w i t h Miranda warnings r e n d e r s inad- m i s s i b l e t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t s made d u r i n g t h a t i n t e r r o g a t i o n . W e h o l d t h a t t h e District Court c o r r e c t l y suppressed d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t s made p r i o r t o r e c e i v i n g t h e Miranda warning. The D i s t r i c t Court i s a f f i r m e d . W e concur: , /