Case Title: Summers v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 195, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILLIAM GREGORY SUMMERS, 
 
Defendant-Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff-Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 195, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below:  Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID 9704012286 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 8, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
  Decided: July 17, 2014 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, and BERGER, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 17th day of July 2014, upon consideration of the opening brief and the 
appellee’s motion to affirm under Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the 
Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, William Gregory Summers, filed this appeal 
from the Superior Court’s summary denial of his sixth motion for postconviction 
relief.  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on 
the ground that it is manifest on the face of Summers’ opening brief that his appeal 
is without merit.1  We agree and affirm.  
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Summers was found guilty of first degree 
robbery, third degree assault, and misdemeanor theft on January 25, 1999.  
Summers was declared a habitual criminal under 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) and 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Summers’ 
sentencing as a habitual criminal, but reversed the misdemeanor theft conviction.2  
Since his direct appeal, Summers has filed unsuccessful motions and petitions 
seeking state postconviction, state habeas, and federal habeas relief. 3   
(3) 
Summers filed his sixth postconviction motion for relief under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 in May 2014, arguing “[t]he trial court abused its 
discretion by admitting into evidence an incriminating statement without 
establishing if the defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to 
attorney in violation of the 5th and 6th amendment.”4  In the accompanying 
document titled “Request for Evidentiary Hearing in Show of Cause,” Summers 
conceded that his claim was procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(1), (i)(2), and (i)(3) 
because it was untimely, because he failed to raise it in any of his five prior 
postconviction motions, and because he failed to raise it at trial or on direct 
                                                 
2 Summers v. State, 2000 WL 1508771, at *1 (Del. Sept. 15, 2000). 
3 E.g., Summers v. State, 2011 WL 3211105 (Del. July 27, 2011); Summers v. State, 2010 WL 
2635090 (Del. July 1, 2010); Summers v. State, 2007 WL 221522 (Del. Jan. 29, 2007); Summers 
v. State, 2004 WL 220327 (Del. Jan. 27, 2004); Summers v. State, 2003 WL 21456669 (Del. June 
19, 2003); Summers v. Carroll, 2006 WL 1338770 (D. Del. 2006). 
4 Summers v. State, Cr. No. 9704012286 D.I. 135 at 3. 
3 
 
appeal.5  Nonetheless, Summers argued that he had overcome these procedural 
hurdles by asserting a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice due to a 
constitutional violation under Rule 61(i)(5).  The Superior Court denied Summers’ 
postconviction motion as procedurally barred without explicitly addressing Rule 
61(i)(5).  This appeal followed.   
(4) 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction 
relief for abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.6  The Court must 
consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive 
issues.7  The miscarriage of justice exception under Rule 61(i)(5)  is very narrow 
and “has been applied only in limited circumstances, such as when the right relied 
upon has been recognized for the first time after the direct appeal.”8  Summers 
bears the burden of proving the existence of a constitutional violation under Rule 
61(i)(5).9   
(5) 
Summers’ sixth postconviction motion and accompanying submission 
only pled that the trial judge erred by accepting a recording of an incriminating 
                                                 
5 Summers v. State, Cr. No. 9704012286 D.I. 136 at 1. 
6 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
8 Younger, 580 A.2d at 555. 
9 Gattis v. State, 955 A.2d 1276, 1290 (Del. 2008).  
4 
 
statement10 without conducting an inquiry into whether Summers was read his 
Miranda rights or invoked his right to counsel.  His cursory motion is devoid of 
any facts suggesting that the recording of the statements he made during his 
interrogation by the police that was introduced at his trial was in any way altered.  
Nor does Summers allege that the transcription of that recording, which was 
prepared at the direction of Summers’ own counsel and is consistent with the 
recording, was altered.  Nor does Summers allege any facts suggesting his 
statement was coerced.   
(6) 
The record reflects that Summers’ trial counsel did not ultimately 
pursue a motion to suppress Summers’ statement that counsel had filed at his 
request and did not object to admission of the statement at trial.  The reason for the 
decision not to object is easy to discern.  The recording and transcription of 
Summers’ interrogation by the police both indicate that Summers was specifically 
informed of his right to counsel, did not invoke that right, and instead gave an 
extensive statement to the police.  Given this record, and the failure of Summers to 
allege any facts suggesting the transcript or tape were altered or that his statement 
was the product of coercion, there was no basis for the trial court to conduct an 
                                                 
10 Summers admitted in this statement to displaying a gun to the victim and taking drugs from 
her, but denied stealing money from her or hitting her.   
5 
 
inquiry into Summers’ waiver of his Miranda rights.  Summers has thus failed to 
state a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice under Rule 61(i)(5).   
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice