Case Title: State v. Koch. J. Acoba concurring separately. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 05/31/2005 [pdf], 107 Haw. 348. J. Acoba dissenting separately.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘444 FOR PUBLICATION *1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'T

00 —

   

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee,

JOHN JAMES CALEB KOCH, Defendant-Appellant

Wo. 26296

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CR. NOS. 02-1-0558(1) and 03-1-0271(1))

May 9, 2005

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ., AND ACOBA, J.,
CONCURRING SEPARATELY
OPINION OF BY THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

The defendant-appellant John James Caleb Koch appeals
from the consolidated November 24, 2003 judgment of the circuit
court of the second circuit, the Honorable Joel E. August
presiding, in Cr. Nos. 02-1-0558(1) and 03-1-0271(1). In Cr. No.
02-1-0558(1), Koch was convicted of and sentenced for the
following offenses: (1) promoting a dangerous drug in the third
degree, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1243
(1993 & Supp. 2001);! (2) promoting a detrimental drug in the

 

HRS § 712-1243 provided:

(2) A person commits the offense of prencting
rug An the thira degree if the person knowingly posi

Sangerovs rug in any ancunt
(2) Prenoting « dangerous drug in the third degree is
{eontinued...)

 

dangerous
es any

 

 

 

 

t
&
+*4 FOR PUBLICATION *#*
third degree, in violation of HRS § 712-1249 (1993); and (3)
prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia, in violation of
HRS § 329-43.5(a) (1993). In Cr. No. 03-1-0271(1), Koch was

 

1(.. .continued)
is © felony

(3! Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, if the
commission of the offense of promoting « dangerous drug in the
ERTEa degree under this section involved the possession oF
Elstribution of methamphetamine, the person convicted shall be
Sentenced to on indeterminate term of inprisonnent of five years
Sith a mandstory minimum term of imprisonment, the length of which
hal be not less than thirty days and not greater than
fuovand-avhalf years, at the discretion of the sentencing court.
The person convicted shall not be eligible for parole during the
Bundstory period of isprisonment:

 

 

Effective July 1, 2002, the legislature amended HRS § 712-1243 by adding
Nexcept for first time offenders sentenced under section 706-(622.5]" to
subsection (3) after *(nJotwithstanding any law to the contrary.” See 2002
Haw, Sess. L. Act 161, 8 8 at S75. As such, HRS § 712-1243(3) (Supp. 2002)
provided:

 

 

(2) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, gxcept tor

672.5, if
the coamission of the offense of pranoting a dangerous drug
Sn the third degree under this section invcived the
possession or distribution of methamphetamine, the person
Seavieted shall be sentenced to an indeterminate term of
imprisonment of five years with a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment, the length of which shall be not less than
thirty daye and not greater than twovand-a-half years, at
the discretion of the sentencing court. ‘The person convicted
shell not be eligible for parole during the mandatory period
Of imprisonment.

 

 

(emphasis added.) Effective July 1, 2004, the legislature amended HRS § 712-
IEES by Geleting subsection (3) in its entirety. See 2004 Haw. Sess. L. Act

a4, § 7 at zit.

+ gas § 712-1249 provides that “[a) person commits the offense of
promoting @ detrimental drug in the third degree 1f the person knowingly
Possesees any marijuana or any Schedule V substance in any amount.”

2 Rs § 329-43.5(a) provides:

Tt {s unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with

intent to use, drug parsphernalie to plant, propagate, cultivate,

grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, preduce, process,

Prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal,

Tngects ingest, inhale, sr otherwise introduce into the human’ body

s"eentrolled substance in viclation of this chapter. Any person

shovviclates his tection Le gulity of a class © felony and upon
‘eontinved...)

 

 

 
‘+*# FOR PUBLICATION *#*
simultaneously convicted of and sentenced for the following
offenses: (1) promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree, in
violation of HRS § 712-1243 (1993 & Supp. 2002), see supra note
1; and (2) prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia, in
violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a), see supra note 3.

 

on appeal, Koch contends that the circuit court
illegally sentenced him and denied his federal and state
constitutional rights to due process when it imposed a sentence
pursuant to HRS § 712-1243(3), see supra note 1, rather than
pursuant to HRS § 706-622.5 (Supp. 2002)‘ as a first-time drug

>(..scontinued)
Conviction may be inpriscned pursuant to section 706-660 and, if
Sppropriace as provided in section 706-641, fined pursuant to
section 106-640.

 

«ngs § 106-€22.5 provided:

Sentencing for firet-tine drug offenders; expungenent. (1)
Notwithstanding any penalty or sentencing provision under part IV
DL chapter Tidy a person convicted for the firet time for any
GEeense under part IV of chapter 712 involving possession or use,
fot including to distribute or manufacture as defined in section
312-1240) of any dangerous drug, detrimental drug, harmful drvg,
Intoxieating compound, narijuané, or marijuana concentrate, as
Getined in secticn 112-1240, oF involving possession or use of
Srug paraphernalia under section 228-#3.5, who is non-violent, as
Getermined by the court after reviewing the

(2) Criminal history of the defendant,

@ ‘circumstances of the offense for which the

‘dant is being sentenced; and

(c)_ Other information deened relevant by the court:
shall be sentenced in accordance with subsection (2); provided
that the person dose not have a conviction for any violent felony
for five years inmediately preceding the date of the commission of
EXt Gi¥enge for which the defendent is being sentenced.

(2) A person eligible under subsection (1) shall be
sentended to probation to undergo and complete 2 drug treatment
Program. Tf the person fails co complete the drug treatment
Erogram end if no other suitable treatment is amenable to the
Eftender, the person shell be returned to court and subject to
Sentencing under the applicable section under thie part. As @
SSnaiicn of probation under thie subsection, the court’ shall
Fequire an assesenent as to the treatnent needs of the defendant,

(continced.

 

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 
+4# FOR PUBLICATION ***
offender.

We hold that the circuit court did not err in
sentencing Koch pursuant to HRS $ 712-1243(3), inasmuch as he did
not qualify for sentencing under HRS § 706-622.5 as a first-time
drug offender. Nonetheless, for reasons we discuss infra in
Section IIT, we vacate Koch's sentences with respect to the
mandatory minimum terms of inprisonnent that the circuit court
imposed and remand this matter for redetermination of the

mandatory minimum terms.

1. BACKGROUND
on October 14, 2002, a Maui grand jury returned an
indictment against Koch in Cr. No, 02-1-0558(1), charging him

 

with the following offenses:' (1) promoting @ dangerous drug in

 

“(.. continued)
conducted by @ person certified by the department
ESnduct the aseesemente. The drug treatment program for the
Gofendant shail be based upon the assessment. The court may
Sequire the person to contrisute to the cost of the drug treatment
Brose:

 

 

 

 

13) For the purposes of this section, “drug treatment
progran” means drug of substance abuse services provided cutside 2
Ebrrectional facility, but the services do not require the
expenditure of state moneys beyond the limits of available
‘Sppropriations.

14) The Court, upon written application fron a person
sentenced under this part, shall issue 2 court order to expunge
ine record of arrest for that particular conviction; provided that
2 person.

 

 

   

Nothing in this section shall be construed to give rise
‘of action against the State, state employee, or
treatment. provider

 

Effective July 1, 2004, the legislature amended HRS § 706-€22.5 in respects.
hot to pertinent to the present matter. See 2004 Haw. Sess, L. Act #4, § 12
ae 2ie-as

* A codefendant, Kurtis Leo Steger, was algo charged in the same
Andletment, Under Ce. No, 02-1-088711).

4
*#* FOR PUBLICATION *#*
the first degree (Count I), in violation of HRS § 712~
1241(2) (a) (4) (Supp. 2002); (2) five counts of prohibited acts
related to drug paraphernalia (Counts II, IV, VI, VII, and XI),
in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a), see supra note 3; (3)
attempted promotion of a dangerous drug in the first degree
(Count III), in violation of HRS § 712-1241(1)(b) (4) (Supp. 1997)
and HRS § 705-500 (1993); (4) promoting a dangerous drug in the
third degree (Count V), in violation of HRS § 712-1243; (5)
promoting a detrimental drug in the third degree (Count x), in
violation of HRS § 712-1249, see supra note 2; and (6) acquiring

 

a firearm without registration (Count XII), in violation of HRS
§ 134-3(b) (Supp. 1999). The indictment alleged that Koch
committed the foregoing offenses on or about April 12, 2002.

on July 8, 2003, the cirevit court granted the motion

 

of the State of Hawai'i (hereinafter, the “prosecution”] to
dismiss Counts V and XII in Cr. No. 02-1-0958(1).

The circuit court conducted a jury trial in Cr. No. 02-
1+0558(1). On July 18, 2003, the jury returned the following
verdicts: (1) as to Count 1, guilty of the included offense of
promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree, in violation of
HRS § 712-1243; (2) guilty as charged in Count X of promoting a
detrimental drug in the third degree, in violation of HRS § 712-
1249; (3) guilty as charged in Count XI of prohibited acts
related to drug paraphernalia, in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a);
and (4) not guilty as to Counts 12, III, IV, VI, and VII.

Meanwhile, on June 8, 2003, @ Maui grand jury returned

an indictment against Koch in Cr. No. 03-1-0271(1), charging him

 
+ FOR PUBLICATION ***
with (1) promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree (Count
1), in violation of HRS § 712-1243, see supra note 1, (2)
prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia (Count I1), in
violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a), see supra note 3, and (3) place
to keep pistol or revolver (Count 111), in violation of HRS
§ 134-6(c) (1993 & Supp. 1999). The indictment alleged that Koch
committed the foregoing offenses on or about February 17, 2003.

on October 27, 2003, Koch entered no contest pleas to
count I, promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree, and
Count If, prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia. On
January 21, 2004, the circuit court granted the prosecution's
notion to dismiss Count III, place to keep pistol or revolver.

Sentencing in connection with Cr. No. 02-1-0558(1) was
originally scheduled for Septenber 17, 2003, but was continued to
November 19, 2003 pending the outcone of Cr. No, 03-1-0271(1),
which had been set for trial commencing on October 27, 2003. The
prosecution did not object te the continuance of the sentencing
hearing in Cr. No. 02-1-0558(1).

on Novenber 5, 2003, the prosecution filed a motion for
consecutive terms of imprisonment, or in the alternative,
extended terms of imprisonment in both criminal numbers. On
Novenber 18, 2003, Koch filed a memorandum in support of
eligibility for sentencing under HRS § 706-622.5, gee supra note
4, also in both criminal numbers.

on November 21, 2003, the circuit court conducted a
sentencing hearing and a hearing on the prosecution's motions for

extended terms of imprisonment, or in the alternative,
s** FOR PUBLICATION *#*
consecutive terms of imprisonment, in both criminal numbers. The

circuit court initiated the hearing with the following statement:

THE COURT: Before we go into this, I want to indicate
that not only hes the (cJoure reviewed the ost recent
Feport, but the (court has also had the opportunity of
iewing the notion for consecutive terms of Imprisonsent
and/or memorandum in support under {HRS § }706-622-5.

 

i am familiar with Mr. Koch's background and did at
least one trial (that) he was involved an. +. 7 think
[nvolving for all intents and purposes a codeféndant Mr
Btelgeri; he has got sone cases pending oF some mattere
Pending in this courtroom, and I’ve heard the testimony of
saat Mr. Koch's trial:

 

 

 

‘gaat on" ber
whether Mz. Koch was dealing of nob, —L mean, ics oretty
uae deel

“and tiere’s been an acknowledgment of that from at
Least two people who were somehow caught up in this, and I'm
familiar with what ae found in the place where Mr. Koch was
ifeing.

_ IMly general impression is that as between Mr:
ste(ger) and Mrs Roch, Me- Koch was sort of nore the
follower than the leader betwesn the two of thes.

[olne telling point is that the reason that they were able
fo get a search warrant for the lecation of the place where
he was living in Kihei(, Maui] in the matters we're dealing
With. . = I'believe se would be [Cr. No. Oz-1-]0588 ~~
‘the’ fact that the confidential informant had purchased

 

 

 

 

 

drugs from Hr. Koch.
Seer ot completa fe the charges that

 

 

‘End ny inclination is to indicate to counsel that 1 do
not think he is eligible for sentencing under Act 161 [(HRS
§ 106-622.5)]., I mean(,] Act 161 was... not designed to
Geel with people like Mr. Roch. That's not where the
legislature was going. x, Koch may have a drua oxcblen.
bot think he's got nore Of a sales problem anda
nexchandisina problem than he's cot; drug prcblen as
percray
(Emphases added.)
‘Thereafter, defense counsel argued as follows:
[Deputy Public Defender (OFD)]: . . - I'm familiar

with all the information you discussed{, 1 ahd accepted at
Hace value, I reach the conclusion that you have reached.

 

 
‘+## FOR PUBLICATION *#*

However, . . . the Jury had the chance to convict Mr.
Koch of tho counts Of promoting a dangerous drug in the
Hizse degree and approximately 11 other counts.” What they
Convicted him of wee poseession in any amount. And they had
a choice between Ry By of Cl felonies] there, paraphernalia
and pot. That was --/is the jury's verdict. - «

 

im arguing that based on the jury's decision, he
should be sentences for possessory c¥ines because those are
fhe crimes that a Jury of 12 people convicted him of, and
they had the chance to throw the book at him. He was
Testing at 20 (years) to lifel.) + «

As for consecutive and extended, that would be totally
Anappropriate ina case like this, Again, the jury found
that whatever his involvenent uae, was Less’

As to Cr. No. 02-1-0558(1), the circuit court sentenced

 

 

 

Koch as follows: (1) in Count I, promoting a dangerous drug in

 

the third degree, a five-year indeterminate maximum prison tern,
subject to a mandatory minimum term of two years and six months;
(2) in Count X, promoting a detrimental drug in the third degree,
thirty days in prison; and (3) in Count XI, prohibited acts
related to drug paraphernalia, a five-year indeterminate maximum
prison term to run concurrently with the term in Count I. As to
cr. No. 03-1-0271(1), the circuit court sentenced Koch as
follows: (1) in Count I, promoting a dangerous drug in the third

degree, a five-year indeterminate maximum prison tern, subject to

 

a mandatory minimum term of two years and six months; and (2) in
count II, prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia, a five-
year indeterminate maximum prison term to run concurrently with
the term in Count I, The circuit court imposed all terms and the
nendatory minimum term in Cr. No. 03-1-0271(1) te run

concurrently with those imposed in Cr. No. 02-1-0558(1).*

 

«the eireult court presumably imposed the mandatory ainiaun terms

of inpriconnent of two years and six nonthe ae to Count I in Cr. No. OZ-1-

Bése(d) and Count I sn Ce. No. O3-1-0211(1) pursuant to HRS § 7i2-1243(3), sae
(continued. +1

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
On Novenber 24, 2003, the circuit court entered its
Judgments of conviction and sentences in both criminal numbers.

on December 19, 2003, Koch timely filed notices of appeal.

(A) sentencing judge generally has broad
discretion in imposing a sentence. State e Gaylord,
Ge Hawas's 127, 1¢3-44, 890 P.2d 1367, 1183-64 (1995)
States, Valera, 74 Haw. 424, 435, 848 P.2d 376,
SEPT 553) . “me applicable’ standara of review
For Sentencing of resentencing metters is whether the
Court committed plain and manifest abuse of discretion
Seite Geciaion.” Gawiorg, 78 Hawai'i at 184, 890 P.20

 

at 1164; tate ¢. Kumukau, 72 Haw. 218, 227-28, 767
Pi2a 682, e87-98 (1380); State vs Murzavl.) 62"Haw.

i, 25, 621. P.24 334, 342-43. (1980); Seate wv, Exy, 61
Wow, 226, 231, 602 Pr2d 13, 16 (1979).
Keaue v. State, 79 Hawai'i 201, 284, 901 P.2a 401, 404
TTS Flaccors which indicate s plain and manifest
abuse of discretion are arbitrary of capricicus action by
the judge end a rigid refusal to consider the defendant’ s
contentions.” “gry, 61 Haw. at 231, 602 P.2d at 17. And,
SSigieneraliy, £0 conststute an abise it must appear thet
the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or
Gisregarded rules or principles of law or practice to, the
Substencie! deteiment of a party 1itigant.' Keawe,
ARSE We bot Sore. 2a at Gee cquctine Gavan 38 wows’
at i44, 890 P.2d at T10¢ (quoting Kumukau, 72 Hom, at
227-28, 187 P.2 at 6BE)).

State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1, 7, 72 P.3d 473, 479 (2003) (quoting
State v, Rauch, 94 Hawai'i 315, 322, 13 P.3d 324, 331 (2000)

  

 

 

 

 

(brackets and ellipsis points in original).
B. Questions of Constitutional Law

we answer questions of constitutional law ‘by:
‘exercising cur own independent. judgnent based on the facts
Gf the case,’” snd, thus, questions of constitutional law
are reviewed on appeal “under the “right/wrong" standard.”
Stece vs Jenkins, 99 Hewai'i 87, 100, 997 F.2d 13, 26 (2000)
Teitations omitted) «

 

 

“(. continued!
sunca note I, elthcugh st did not state the basis for the mandatory minimum
femme either’ at the sentencing nearing cr in the Judgment.

 

 

°
+*# FOR PUBLICATION **

Kaua, 102 Hawai'i at 7, 72 P.3d at 479 (quoting State v. Aplaca,
96 Hawai'i 17, 22, 25 P.3d 792, 797 (2001).

c.

Statutory Interpretation

“(t]he interpretation of a statute...
ks a question of law reviewable de novo." uate

 

   

‘EcBrses, 04 Hawal't 2, 20, 928 P.2d 843, 952,
(7986) “(quoting State v. Camara, $1 wawas's 324,
328, 916 F.2d 1225, 1230 (1996) (citations
onitced)).” See alao 0

‘State v. Tovenura,

Havas €, 16, 904 F.2d 855; 505 i988) seat
Higa, "79 Hawal't i, 3,

: 76 hawaii 360, 365,

  

‘Giostiy" state vs Makita,
678 P.26' 695, 708 (1994).
Gray vi Administrative Director of the court, 64 Hawai'i
Tie, Ii, S31 P.20 560, S8€ 11997) (some brackets added and
sont in original). Set also State v. Soto, nt 229,
23, 933 F.20 66, 73 (1997). Furthermore, our statutory
Construction ie guided by established rul
‘When construing 2 ststute, our foremost obligation is
fo ascertain and give effect co the intention of the
legislature, which 1s to be obtained primarily from
the language contained in the statute itself. And we
must read statutory language in the context of the
Entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent
sath tes purpose

‘iben there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or
indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression Used
ina statute, an ambiguity exists.

Im construing an ambiguous statute, “(t}he
meaning of the ambiguous words nay be sought by
Seanining the context, wich wich the ambiguous words,
Phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to
Secereain their true meaning.” BRS § 1-15(1)
((2993)]. Moreover, the courts may resort to
extrinole aids in determining legislative intent. One
Svense is the use of legislative history as an
Interpretive tool.

Gray, 64 Bawas't ae 168, 932 P.2d at 590 (quoting state vy,
Tovomura, 60 Hawai 6, 16-19, 904 P.2d 893, 903-04 (1995))
(brackets and ellipais points in original) '(foctnote
omitted). This court may also consider “(t]he reason and
Gpizit of the law, and the cause which induced th
legislature to enact it... to discover its true meaning
hike § 12512) (2998). "tawe dp part materia, oF upon the
Sane subject matter, shall be construed with reference to
Gach other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon
Gn aie to explain wat is doubtful in another.” HRS § 1-16
(2383)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Kaua, 102 Hawai'i at 7-8, 72 P.3d at 479-480 (quoting Rauch, 94
Hawai'i at 322-23, 13 P.3d at 331-32 (quoting State v. Kotis, 91

20
s#* FOR PUBLICATION ***
Hawai'i 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (quoting State v
Dudoit, 90 Hawai'i 262, 266, 978 P.2d 700, 704 (1999) (quoting
State v. Stocker, 90 Hawai'i 85, 90-91, 976 P.2d 399, 404-05
(1999) (quoting Ho vs Leftwich, 88 Hawai'i 251, 256-57, 965 P.2d
793, 798-99 (1998) (quoting Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v.
Sullivan, @7 Hawai'i 217, 229-30, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327-28
(2998)))))9).

 

Koch argues that, based on the plain language of HRS
§ 706-622.5, see supra note 5, the circuit court was required to
sentence him to probation as a first-time drug offender, rather
than pursuant to HRS § 712-1243(3), see supra note 1. Koch
maintains that he “met all the qualifications for, and did not
suffer any of the disqualifications from, sentencing under HRS
§ 706-622.51,]” inasmuch as all of his convictions constituted
offenses under part IV of chapter 712 or offenses involving
possession or use of drug paraphernalia. (Emphases in original).
Koch avers that the circuit court's convictions, entered
simultaneously on November 24, 2003, “constituted his first
convictions for drug and paraphernalia possession{,]” and that,
as such, the circuit “court’s sole duty was to effectuate the
mandatory sentencing provisions of HRS § 706-622.5: probation
with mandatory drug treatment.” Koch insists that the circuit
court’s sentences to terms of imprisonment are, therefore,

illegal. We disagri

 

a
*** FOR PUBLICATION +#*
‘The circuit court indicated that it did not believe
1 upon,

 

‘that Koch was “eligible for sentencing under Act 161” b
its interpretation from the record that Koch “was not just using,
but was dealing.” Nevertheless, the prosecution argues that Koch
was not 2 first-time drug offender at the time of sentencing, a
fact that rendered him ineligible for sentencing under HRS § 706
622.5. The prosecution emphasizes that Koch “does not explain
+ +. why drug offenses committed on two different dates, nine
months apart, and under two different indictments leading to two
different determinations of guilt should be considered to be a

Koch does not respond to the

 

single first-time drug offen
prosecution's position, but merely insists that the only correct
sentence was to probation pursuant to the plain language of HRS
§ 706-622.5.

Separate and apart from Koch’s argunent on appeal and
the prosecution's rebuttal, we note that Act 161, which created
HRS § 706-622.5, did not become effective until July 1, 2002.
See 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 161, $§ 3 and 12 at 572, 575.

1 4s whether Koch was

 

Therefore, the threshold question on appt
entitled to sentencing under the provisions of HRS § 706-622.5,
which were in effect at the time of his sentencing but not on the

date that he committed the offenses of which he was convicted in

 

connection with Cr. No. 02-1-0558(1), see supra section I.

Me note, by way of introduction, that no new punitive
measure may be applied £0 a crine already consummated, where
Tee application would work to the detrinent or material
disadvantage of the wrongdoer. Such legislation would be ex
ost facto law as to the offender. 7
S01 v.S. 387, 57 S.ct. 797, £1 1.84. 162 (1937). See alse
State vi Bund, 50 law, 351, 440 F.2d 528 (1966).

State v. Von Geldern, 64 Haw. 210, 212, 638 P.2d 319, 321 (1981).

a2
+64 FOR PUBLICATION *#*
In Yon Geldern, this court held that an amendment to
the mandatory minimum sentencing statute, which provided
sentencing courts with discretionary authority to impose a lesser
mandatory minimum sentence than that statutorily prescribed where
“strong mitigating circumstances” were found to warrant such
action, applied retrospectively to sentences imposed prior to the
effective date of the amendment because the provisions were
ameliorative and remedial. The defendant in Yon Geldern had been
sentenced prior to the effective date of Act 284, which amended
HRS § 706-606.5, the mandatory minimum sentencing statute. This
court nonetheless concluded that the judgment and sentence of the

 

trial court had not become final, inasmuch as his appeal was
pending, and held that “the Act’s ameliorative provisions were
still capable of application in (the defendant's] case.” 64 Haw.

at 215, 638 P.2d at 323.

Act 284, . , is aneliorative in its intent and effect end
Tes application in this case would neither be detrimental
hor materially disedvantageous to the defendant. Te
Duthorizes the trial court to impose less than the mandatory
Rinimin sentence of imprisonment where strong mitigating
Eiscunstances are shown to exist. It is not, therefore, ex
post facto lew, That being the case, the only possible
Ebstecie to its application in this Case would be HRS § 1-3
{(1993)) wach provides that "(nJo law has any retrospective
Sheraton, unless stherwise expressed or obviously
Sheended.*

 

Id. This court further noted that

RS § 1-3 {2 only a rule of statutory construction and where
the legisietive intent may be ascertained, it is no longer
dete And while st ie true that there is nothing
{nthe language of Act 264 to indicate, one wa
ctners that its ameliorative provisions may
Fetrospectively, we think that such application where they
ey still be applied was obviously the intent of the
Legisiature
Past legislative conduct has dencnstrated an

inclinstien on the part of the legislature to vest in the
Sentencing court the discretionary authority to apply the

ii penal Code's more enlightened sentencing provisions

  

    

 

 

 

3
*## FOR PUBLICATION ***

where such application would further the penological
objectives of the statute.

Id. at 214, 638 P.2d at 323.
This court likewise held in State v. Nakata, 76 Hawai'l
360, 375, 878 P.2d 699, 715 (1994), that
[the Yon Geldern) constitutional test. The
Act reduees, not increases, possible punishment. Te reduces
the maximum sentence from thirty to five days and eliminates
a provision for an ignition interlock system... «Thus,
Fetroactive application of HRS § 291-4, as amended by Act
126, 1s clearly not prohibited,
See also Roxas v, Marco, 69 Hawai'i 91, 156, 969 P.2d 1209, 1274
(1998) (citing Yon Geldern with approval and noting that “we
believe that HRS § 636-16 should be afforded retroactive effect

‘Act 128 pas

   

 

 

because it is a remedial statute designed to clarify and
encourage the exercise of judicial discretion in the award of
prejudgment interest”).

Furthermore, “[t]here has been ‘an inclination on the
part of the legislature to vest in the sentencing court the
discretionary authority to apply the Hawaii Penal Code’s more
enlightened sentencing provisions where such application would
further the penological objectives of the statute.’” State va
Gamulo, 69 Haw. 424, 425, 744 P.2d 1208, 1209 (1987) (quoting Yon
Geldern, 64 at 214, 638 P.2d at 322). See also State v. Grav, 77
Hawai'i 476, 479, 888 P.2d 376, 380 (App. 1995), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Bolosan, 78 Hawai'i 66, 890 P.2d 673
(1995) (“The basis for the decision in Yon Geldern was the

reasonable assumption that, unless expressly stated otherwise,

 

the legislature always intends its new flexible sentencing
alternatives to apply retroactively. That precedent applies to

this case.”).

as
+## FOR PUBLICATION ***
In the present matter, Koch committed the offenses
underlying Cr. No. 02-1-0558(1) on April 12, 2002. Act 161
became effective on July 1, 2002. Koch was sentenced on November
21, 2003. Analytically, the reasoning of the foregoing cases
extends to the application of HRS § 706-622.5 to Koch’s
sentencing in Cr. No. 02-1-0558(1). Similarly to Act 284 at
issue in Yon Geldern, HRS § 706-622.5 is “ameliorative in its
intent and effect and its application in this case would neither
be detrimental nor materially disadvantageous to the defendant.”
64 Haw. at 213, 638 P.2d at 322. “Despite the presumption
against retrospective laws, we have repeatedly validated the
retrospective application of several remedial statutes on the
basis of express or implied legislative intent.” Id, at 216, 638
P.2d at 323. Accordingly, retrospective application of HRS
§ 706-622.5, as established by Act 161, is “clearly not
prohibited.” Nakata, 76 Hawai" at 375, 878 P.2d at 715.7

 

+ our holding that HRS § 706-622.5 has retrospective application to
sentencing that occurs after the statute’s July 1, 2002 effective date,
Because of its ameliorative intent and effect, 48’ consonant with our decisions
in State y. Snéeh, 103 Hawel't 228, 61 P.3d 408 (2003), and State va Walker,
ioe Revert 1, 100 P.34 $98 (2004). In Smith, we held’ that, pursuant to their
plein language, the repeat offender statute, HRS § 706-é06.5, trumps the
Piree-tine drug offender statute, HRS § 706-622.5. More specifically, we held
thet “in all eeses in wndch HRS § 706-606.5 is applicable, including those in
Which e defendant would otherwise be eligible for probation under HRS
3°566-€22.5; the chreuit courte must sentence defendants pursuant to the
Brovisions of BRS § 706-606.5." 103 Hawai'i at 234, 81 P.ad at 41d. In

soe evaluated the effects of Act 44s anendnents to HRS § 706-622.5 and
held that

bly ite plain language, Act 44 prospectively permits

Gkeetioh te sentencing courts confronted with confiiets between

fins $5 70€-c06.5 and 706-€22.5 than they previcusly possessed

Thus, based on the legislative intent reflected in Act 44, the

Shet 161" version of HRS § 706-622.5, uncer which Walker was

sentenced, did not trunp the repeat offender statute.
106 Hawai's at 10, 300 F.3d at 604. (Emphasis in original). In the present
matter, we are simply extending retrospective application of the “Act 161”

(continue

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

as
 

FOR PUBLICATION **#

Thus, having determined that HRS § 706-622.5 was part
of the statutory sentencing arsenal available to the circuit
court with respect to the offenses that Koch committed on or
about April 12, 2002, in connection with Cr. No. 02-1-0558(1),
the question becomes whether, as of November 21, 2003, Koch was a
“£ixst-time drug offender” so as to qualify for sentencing under
HRS § 706-622.5. We hold that Koch did not qualify as a first-
time drug offender, and, therefore, that the circuit court did
not err in sentencing him pursuant to HRS § 712-1243(3).

In State v, Rodrigues, 68 Haw. 124, 706 P.2d 1293
(1985), this court held that two offenses committed a month apart
but sentenced on the same day constituted separate convictions
for purposes of the repeat offender statute, HRS $ 706-606.5.

 

(Supp. 1984). The defendant, Rodrigues, had argued on appeal
that, for the purposes of the repeat offender statute, his second
and third convictions could only be counted as one conviction by
virtue of his being sentenced for the two offenses on the same
day. 68 Haw. at 128, 706 P.2d at 1296. Following a discussion
of the term “conviction,” this court concluded that, for the
purposes of HRS § 706-606.5, “a mere finding of guilt by a jury

or a court does not constitute a ‘conviction’ within the meaning

 

of the section; a judgment entered upon the finding does.” 68
Haw. at 132, 706 P.2d at 1299. Nevertheless, this court

clarified that “[t]hough we have decided a ‘conviction’ for the
purposes of HRS § 706-606.5 refers to the judgment rather than

 

(continues)
version of RS § 70€-622.5 to cases in which it would otherwise apply.

a6
 

‘444 FOR PUBLICATION
the finding of guilt, whether two sentences pronounced on the
same day for separate offenses charged in two indictments
constitute @ single ‘conviction’ renains for decision.” Id. We

therefore concluded the following:

Here, the two convictions Rodrigues would have us consider
as one were for offenses comitted a nonth apart, charged in
Separate indictments, and for which findings of quilt were
enteres arate proceedings... . We see no basis for
S'paling th olgeents entered on Decesber 10, 1979
oniy Fe ‘single conviction for purpost

Sentence enhancement pursuant to the repeat of!

68 Haw. at 133, 706 P.2d at 1299.
the following table sets forth the history of Koch’s

 

      

drug offenses at issue in the present matter:

 

Date plea
pate Date entered oF pate
criminal offense was indictment verdict pate Sudgment
somitted filed rstumed sentenced filed
oa-i-osse(1) 04/12/02 t0/t4/o2_——7/18/03, 31/21/03 11/24/03
Gury
verdict)
os-t-0262(1) 02/27/03 06/09/03 10/27/03, 1/21/03. 11/24/03
(no. contest,
plea)

Similarly to Rodrigues, the circuit court imposed two
sentences upon Koch in distinct criminal prosecutions on the same
date, November 21, 2003. The sentences and judgments related to
separate offenses that Koch had committed ten months apart, which
were charged in two separate indictments, and for which findings
of guilt were entered in separate proceedings.

At issue in the present matter are two distinct
criminal proceedings in which sentencing was imposed on the sane
day. On September 17, 2003, sentencing in Cr. No. 02~1-0558(1)
was continued until after trial in Cr. No. 03-1-0261(1), which

7
 

'* FOR PUBLICATION ***
was scheduled for October 27, 2003. Although it is unclear from
the record whether Koch moved to continue sentencing in Cr. No.
02-1-0558(1), it appears that the circuit court postponed
sentencing at Koch’s request, given the sole notation that “no
objection by the State” was registered.

Nonetheless, at the time of sentencing in 03-1-0271(1),
the benefits of first-time offender sentencing under HRS § 706-
622.5 had been wiped out for Koch. Sentencing Koch in succession
on the same date did not transform the two separate adjudications
of guilt into a single criminal offense, thereby rendering him a

first-time drug offender. Thus, “[wle

 

eno basis for a ruling

 

that the judgments entered on [Novenber 21, 2003] only resulted
in a single conviction for purposes of” the first-time drug
offender sentencing. See Rodrigues, 68 Haw. at 133, 706 P.2d at
1299, Simply stated, on November 21, 2003, Koch was a second-
time drug offender whom the circuit court was required to
sentence pursuant to the terms of HRS § 712-1243(3).

Because Koch was not a first-time offender within the
meaning of HRS § 706-622.5, he was not entitled to the benefits
of first-time drug offender sentencing. Therefore, it matters
not what the circuit court’s thought processes were with respect
to why it believed Koch to be ineligible for sentencing under HRS
§ 706-622.5, inasmuch as the circuit court was required to
sentence him pursuant to HRS § 712-1243(3) in both criminal

numbers. “In any event, . . . the trial court reached the right
result for the wrong reasons.” State v. Propios, 76 Hawai'i 474,

486, 679 P.2d 1057, 1069 (1994). See also Lee v. Heftel, 61
Hawai'i 1, 5 n.2, 911 P.2d 721, 725 n.2 (1996); State v. Pinero,

1s
*#* FOR PUBLICATION ***
75 Haw. 282, 290, @59 P.2d 1369, 1373 (1993). Accordingly, we
hold that the circuit court did not err in sentencing Koch
purauant to HRS § 712~1243(3) in both criminal nunbs
B. The Circuit Court Erred in Imposing Two Maximum
Mandatory Ninimun Terms Of Imprisonment Based Upon
Conduct For which Koch Was Found Not Guilty.

Koch argues that the circuit court’s “conclusion that

 

[he] vas dealing drugs and therefore disqualified from sentencing
under HRS § 706-622.5 violated [his] constitutional rights to due
process because it completely disregarded the specific offenses
of which [he] was convicted{.]" Inasmuch as we have determined
that Koch did not qualify for sentencing under HRS § 706-622.5,
Koch's argument that the circuit court erred in failing to
sentence him as a first-time offender is without merit.
Nevertheless, we agree that the circuit court erred in factoring
its belief that Koch was dealing drugs into its imposition of the
two maximum statutorily prescribed mandatory minimum terms of
imprisonment of two years and six months, see supra note 1.

“In determining the particular sentence to be imposed,
the court must consider a variety of factors [enumerated in HRS

§ 706-606 [(1993)"]] in exercising its discretion in fitting the

 

+ Rs § 706-606 prove

 

Factors to be considered in imposing @ sentence. The court,
in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall
consider!

 

(d) me nature and cizcunstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) The nead for the sentence inpos
ia) “To reflect the seriousness of the offense, to

promote respect for lew, and to provide just
Punishaent for the offense;
() To afford adequate deterrence to criminal
(continued...)

as
‘*## FOR PUBLICATION *#*
punishment to the crime ‘as well as the needs of the individual
defendant and the community.’ State v. Nunes, 72 Hawai'i $21,
524-25, 824 P.24 637, 839 (1992) (quoting State v, Kumukau, 71
Haw, 218, 225, 787 P.2d 682, 687 (1990)) (footnote omitted) (some
brackets added and some in original).

We recently held in State v. Vellina, 106 Hawai'i 441,
106 P.3d 364 (2005), that consecutive sentencing based solely
upon the deputy prosecuting attorney's unsubstantiated allegation
of uncharged misconduct, to wit, that Vellina sold the firearms
he had stolen to a drug dealer for drugs, constituted plain

In a manner analogous to Yellina, in sentencing Koch,
the circuit court assumed that Koch had engaged in unlawful
conduct of which he had been expressly acquitted. The circuit
court specifically noted that it believed Koch had been dealing
drugs, even though the offenses before it were not “dealing
charges.” See supra section I.

We have long considered mandatory minimum terms of

Amprisonment to be enhanced sentences subject to the full panoply

 

of constitutional protection:

 

"1. continued)
conduct
(e) To'protect the public from further crines of the
defendant; and
(a) To provide the defendant with needed educational
of tocationsl training, sedical care, or other
Correctional treatment in the most effective

 

 

 

(3) The kinds of sentences available and
(4) The need to evola unwarranted sentence disparities

azong defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct.

20
‘*** FOR PUBLICATION *#*

We have previously held that there is no substantive
Gifference between the procedures required for the
{nposition cf s mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and
an extended term of imprisonment. See (State v. IRobinson,
BE Mawes {304,] 215,922 P-24 (388,] 369 (996)] (TDLe
Court has not deemed ‘the characterization of a sentence 3
extenand’ oF “enhanced” determinative of the procedures
gequired.")- =

 

 

lie reaffirm that, for constitutional purpo
there is'no distinction between extended and mandatory
ninimum enhanced sentencing. Both constrain the discretion
Bf the sentencing judge and fix the term of incarceration
Ynposed upon the defendant ase result of the conviction.

State v. Tafova, 91 Hawai'i 261, 274, 982 P.2d 890, 903 (1999).
Notwithstanding that the circuit court had the

 

 

authority to sentence Koch pursuant to the terms of HRS § 712~
1243(3), it did not have the discretion to consider alleged
conduct of which Koch was acquitted in sentencing him. As .such,
it appears that the circuit “court clearly exceeded the bounds of
reason.” Kaua, 102 Hawai'i at 7, 72 P.3d at 479 (citations
omitted) «

Inasmuch as there is a possibility that the circuit

court's imposition of the maximum mandatory minimum terms allowed

 

by HRS § 712-1243(3) -- two years and six months -- was a
function of its belief that Koch was dealing drugs, we must
vacate the circuit court’s imposition of the two-year-six-month
mandatory minimum terms in both criminal numbers and remand this
matter for a redetermination of the appropriate mandatory minimum

terns.

IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing analysis, we affirm the
circuit court's indeterminate maximun prison sentences imposed

pursuant to HRS § 712-1243(3), vacate the mandatory minimum terms

2
 

FOR PUBLICATION +4
of imprisonment of two years and six months in both Cr. No. 02-1-
0558 (1) and Cr. No. 03-1-0271(1), and remand for a

redetermination of the appropriate mandatory minimum terns

I concur in the result only.

pom

on the briefs:

Artemio C. Baxa,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,
for the plaintiff-appellee
State of Hawai'i

Phyllis J. Hironaka,
Beputy’ Public Defender,
for the defendant-appeilant
John James Caleb Koch

22