Case Title: Knappmiller v. Bove

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2011-326

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Knappmiller v. Bove, Bove and Vaillancourt Tree-Landscape
Service, Inc. (2011-326)
 
2012 VT 038
 
[Filed 16-May-2012]
 
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2012 VT 38
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2011-326
 
FEBRUARY TERM, 2012
 
Leonard C. Knappmiller
}
APPEALED FROM:
 
}
 
 
}
 
     v.
}
Superior Court, Rutland Unit, 
 
}
Civil Division
 
}
 
Joseph Bove, Carolyn J. Bove and
  Vaillancourt Tree-Landscape Service, Inc.
}
}
DOCKET NO. 820-10-08
  Rdcv
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout
 
In
the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Defendant Vaillancourt Tree and Landscape Service appeals a trial court
decision denying its post-trial motion for attorney's fees and costs under a
theory of implied indemnification.  The issue on appeal is whether
indemnity for attorney's fees is appropriate where a jury has found the
putative indemnitor not liable in the underlying suit.  We
affirm.  
¶ 2.            
Plaintiff Leonard Knappmiller owns a commercial property directly
abutting a property owned by defendants Joseph and Carolyn Bove.  This
case grew from a dispute between Knappmiller and the Boves regarding the Boves'
decision to cut down and remove a row of white cedar
trees that allegedly straddled their property line.  The Boves hired
Vaillancourt to cut and remove the trees.  Following the removal,
Knappmiller filed a claim against the Boves for wrongful cutting of trees,
alleging that the trees were located on Knappmiller's property and were removed
without his consent.  Knappmiller later amended his complaint, adding
Vaillancourt as a codefendant.  Vaillancourt
consequently cross-claimed against the Boves for negligence, breach of
contract, and indemnity.  Vaillancourt's cross-claim alleged that
it had entered into a contract with the Boves, and that the Boves did not, but
should have, informed Vaillancourt about tree ownership issues with Knappmiller
before the trees were cut down and removed.  Vaillancourt's cross-claim
demanded "judgment against the Boves . . . for indemnity, if Vaillancourt is
found liable to Plaintiff and for any other damages suffered by Vaillancourt
resulting from the Boves' negligence and breach of contract."  
¶ 3.            
After a two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for defendants,
finding that Knappmiller had not proven a claim for wrongful cutting of trees
against the Boves or Vaillancourt.  Because the jury found no wrongful
cutting on the part of the defendants, it never reached Vaillancourt's
indemnity cross-claim since the jury instructions and special verdict form
required the jury to reach the issue only if Vaillancourt was found liable to
Knappmiller.  Approximately two weeks later, Vaillancourt filed a
post-trial motion seeking litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, under
a theory of implied indemnity from the Boves.  The trial court denied
Vaillancourt's motion, stating that indemnity was not available absent any
finding of wrongdoing on the part of the Boves.  The court also noted that
Vaillancourt's cross-claim had not put the Boves on notice that it would seek
attorney's fees from them in the event that Vaillancourt and the Boves
prevailed in the underlying suit.  On appeal, Vaillancourt argues that the
trial court's ruling is inconsistent with Windsor School District v. State,
2008 VT 27, 183 Vt. 452, 956 A.2d 528, and that our case law does not require a
finding of wrongdoing before attorney's fees and litigation expenses may be
awarded based on a theory of implied indemnity.  
¶ 4.            
In general, awards for attorney's fees are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.  Spooner v. Town of Topsham, 2010 VT 71, ¶ 7, 188
Vt. 293, 9 A.3d 672.  Vermont normally requires
parties to bear their own attorney's fees and costs of litigation, absent a
statutory or contractual provision to the contrary.  Windsor,
2008 VT 27, ¶ 10.  Our standard for departing from this rule
is demanding.  Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Woods, 2003 VT 33,
¶ 18, 175 Vt. 212, 220, 824 A.2d 572, 579.
¶ 5.            
This Court has recognized an exception to the rule when "the wrongful
act of one person has involved another in litigation with a third person or has
made it necessary for that other person to incur expenses to protect his
interests."  Albright v. Fish, 138 Vt. 585, 591,
422 A.2d 250, 254 (1980).  Some underlying culpability must appear
from the record before attorney's fees can be awarded under the Albright
exception.*  See Blanchard
v. Villeneuve, 142 Vt. 267, 271-72, 454 A.2d 1235, 1237-38 (1982); see also
Bull v. Pinkham Eng'g Assocs., Inc., 170 Vt. 450, 460-61, 752 A.2d 26,
34 (2000) (noting that, although jury found no liability in underlying suit,
trial court's later findings supported its conclusion that defendant's
wrongdoing was proximate cause of plaintiff's litigation costs).  The
party requesting indemnification for attorney's fees has the burden to
demonstrate the would-be indemnitor's culpability.  See White v.
Quechee Lakes Landowners' Ass'n, Inc., 170 Vt. 25, 31, 742 A.2d 734, 738
(1999) (noting that third-party plaintiff "had the
burden of establishing its right to equitable indemnification").
¶ 6.            
Vaillancourt vaguely asserts that the Boves are more responsible
because, as the property owners, they should have been aware of, and alerted
Vaillancourt to, the fact that the trees straddled the boundary line. 
Citing Windsor, 2008 VT 27, ¶ 13, Vaillancourt's principal argument
is that the trial court does not need to make a finding on fault, and that
indemnity may be awarded "as a matter of comparative responsibility and
fairness."
¶ 7.            
In Windsor, the town of Windsor bought land that was previously
owned and polluted by the Department of Corrections (DOC).  2008 VT 27, ¶ 2.  The town retained various
experts and an attorney to protect its interests while cleanup took place and
later sued the DOC, seeking reimbursement for money spent investigating and remediating
the pollution.  Id. ¶¶ 3-4.  The trial court concluded
that both the town and the DOC were strictly liable as responsible parties
under 10 V.S.A. § 6615(a), a provision of the Vermont Waste Management
Act, and therefore both were liable for cleanup.  Nevertheless the trial
court awarded the town reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, under §
6615(i) of the statute, which provides for "contribution or
indemnification."  Id. ¶ 5.  We
affirmed, concluding that the town was entitled to attorney's fees; however,
our award was based on common-law indemnification under Albright, not §
6615(i) of the Waste Management Act.  We held that because the DOC alone
polluted the property and the town was a mere purchaser, the town was
potentially subject to great financial liability for the costs incurred during
remediation, and therefore, that there was a significant difference in the
"kind or quality of conduct."  Id. ¶¶ 10-12,
18.  
¶ 8.            
Contrary to Vaillancourt's contention, Windsor does not abandon
the wrongful act element, but merely explains the rationale behind prior case
law and notes that a finding of fault is not a necessary predicate to an award
of attorney's fees in the context of that case with its distinct premise of
strict liability.  Id. ¶ 13. 
Our reference to lack of fault was prompted by the Waste Management Act's
imposition of liability regardless of fault.  See 10 V.S.A. §
6615(c).  We do not extend Windsor to cases such as this where the
jury specifically found no fault, no liability, and no underlying
responsibility.
¶ 9.            
Moreover, in Windsor, unlike in this case, there was an obvious
and vast gap between the kind and quality of the parties' conduct.  There,
the trial court found that the DOC polluted the land, while the town merely
purchased it.  Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 11; see also Bull, 170 Vt. at
460-61, 752 A.2d  at 34 (awarding attorney's fees where trial court concluded
indemnitor breached duty to indemnitee, proximately causing indemnitee's legal
costs); Welch v. LaGue, 141 Vt. 644, 647, 451 A.2d 1133, 1135 (1982)
(awarding attorney's fees where indemnitor breached covenant to convey
marketable title, involving indemnitee in litigation with third party). 
Because the court found that the DOC wholly caused the pollution and the town
"played virtually no role," there was a basis under Albright for an
award of attorney's fees.  2008 VT 27, ¶¶ 11-13.
¶ 10.        
Even if we were to dispense with a requirement of finding fault on
behalf of the Boves, the jury specifically found neither the Boves nor
Vaillancourt liable for any wrongful act.  The jury did not reach
Vaillancourt's cross-claim against the Boves because Vaillancourt requested
attorney's fees only if Vaillancourt was found liable in the underlying
suit.  More importantly, Vaillancourt did not object to the jury charge or
the special verdict formboth of which unequivocally instructed the jury to
reach Vaillancourt's indemnity claim only if Knappmiller
prevailed.  We therefore cannot discern any support for an award of
attorney's fees, other than Vaillancourt's conclusory allegations that the
Boves knew the trees straddled the boundary line and had a duty to inform
Vaillancourt of that fact.  The court's exercise of discretion is
affirmed.    
Affirmed.
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber, Chief
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Beth Robinson, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 

*  We do not
address the scope or applicability of other exceptions not at issue in this
appeal.