Case Title: Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84776

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jackson v. TLC 
Assoc., No. 84776 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket No. 84776-Agenda 29-September 
1998.
Opinion filed December 31, 1998.
JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the 
court:
The issue in this case is whether the owner of a commercial 
bathing beach had a duty to protect one of its adult patrons, who was an 
experienced swimmer, from the risks associated with diving into the water from 
the shoreline near a submerged and unmarked pipe that was not visible from the 
surface. The circuit court held that the owner owed no such duty and entered 
summary judgment in the owner's favor. The appellate court affirmed with one 
justice dissenting. No. 3-97-0159 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 
23). We granted leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse and remand 
for further proceedings.
The events which gave rise to this litigation took place on 
June 16, 1993, when Jonathan Jackson went swimming at Timberview Lake. 
Timberview is a "public bathing beach" within the meaning of the Swimming Pool 
and Bathing Beach Act (210 ILCS 125/1 et seq. (West 1992)). It is owned 
and operated by defendant, TLC Associates, Inc. (TLC). On the date in question, 
TLC possessed a valid license from the Illinois Department of Public Health to 
operate the facility.
Timberview Lake is a relatively small body of water. It is 
more a pond than a lake and is man-made. Its shape resembles an elongated 
triangle with rounded edges. A buoyed rope separates its narrower upper portion 
from its wider lower portion. A sandy beach runs along the narrow end, and the 
water there is shallowest.
As one proceeds through the sandy beach area and past the 
buoyed rope, the depth of the lake increases. The water eventually becomes deep 
enough to accommodate two platforms, one of which is equipped with a diving 
board. Near the rope, however, the drop off is negligible. The area adjacent to 
the shoreline also remains relatively shallow. Even as far out as 16 feet the 
water is only 44 inches deep.
Throughout the portion of the lake beyond the buoyed rope, 
referred to by the parties as the "deep end," the lake bottom is composed of 
silt. This gives the water a murky appearance and makes it impossible to see 
beneath the surface. A swimmer standing on the shore has no way to gauge the 
lake's depth or detect the presence of any submerged obstructions.
Jonathan Jackson was a 19-year-old adult and an experienced 
swimmer. He had been to Timberview on previous occasions and had recently 
witnessed a Timberview employee dive into the lake from the shoreline on the 
"deep" end of the lake. When Jonathan arrived at the lake on the day in 
question, he attempted to do the same thing. After paying his admission fee and 
proceeding to a concrete shelter next to the lake, Jonathan ran to a point on 
the shoreline a few feet past the buoyed rope on the "deep" side of the lake. He 
extended his arms and dove in. A witness described the dive as "just kind of a 
belly flop deal."
The same witness testified in his deposition that during 
previous visits Jonathan had executed similar dives from the shoreline without 
incident. This time, Jonathan was not so fortunate. When he surfaced from the 
dive he called for help and had to be pulled to shore by other swimmers. He was 
transported to the hospital, where examination revealed that he had sustained 
cervical and thoracic spine fractures resulting in quadriplegia. He later died 
from complications related to those injuries.
Barbara Jackson, Jonathan's mother and the administrator of 
his estate, subsequently brought this action against TLC in the circuit court of 
McDonough County to recover damages for her son's injuries. In her complaint, 
Jackson alleged that TLC had been negligent in the way it maintained the lake; 
in not providing lifeguards; in failing to adequately warn swimmers that they 
should not dive into or enter the water in areas where hidden hazards might be 
present; and in "allow[ing] a dangerous obstruction to remain in an area where 
persons were allowed to swim and dive, when [TLC] knew or should have known of 
the dangerous obstruction."
Jackson's theory of the case was that her son's injuries 
were caused when he hit his head on a submerged section of plastic pipe used by 
TLC to adjust the level of the water. The pipe was black in color and 
approximately two inches in diameter. It was not anchored down, its location was 
variable, and it did not always remain in the water. Sometimes the pipe was laid 
across the grass on the shoreline. On the day in question, however, it extended 
into the "deep" end of the lake from the buoy post near the point where Jonathan 
dove into the water. A witness present at the scene reported that the pipe ran 
along the shore for a short distance, then entered the water. It disappeared 
from view a few feet to the left of where Jonathan made his dive. An inspector 
with the Illinois Department of Public Health testified in his deposition that 
if the pipe were in place in the area of Jonathan's accident, as Jackson claims 
it was, it would have been a likely cause of his injuries.
After conducting discovery, TLC moved for summary judgment 
pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 
(West 1992)). As grounds for its motion, the company argued that it was entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law because it had no duty to prevent Jonathan from 
diving into the water and had no duty to warn him of the risk attendant to 
making such a dive. No duty was owed, in the company's view, because Jonathan 
was an experienced, adult swimmer who should have known better than to dive into 
murky water. According to TLC, the danger was open and obvious.
Following a hearing, the circuit court granted TLC's motion 
and entered summary judgment in favor of the company and against Jackson. As 
indicated at the outset of this disposition, the appellate court affirmed, with 
one justice dissenting. The appellate court reasoned that TLC owed no duty to 
Jonathan because, under this court's decision in Bucheleres v. Chicago Park 
District, 171 Ill. 2d 435 (1996), an adult is expected to appreciate the 
risks of diving into a body of water that is murky and of uncertain depth, as 
the water here was. Although the court recognized that the existence of such an 
open and obvious danger is not an automatic bar to the finding of a legal duty 
on the part of the defendant who owns, operates or controls the property, the 
court held that this case did not present a situation where the landowner should 
have anticipated the harm despite its open and obvious nature. The court further 
held, in the alternative, that Jackson had failed to establish that her son had 
actually come into physical contact with a submerged pipe.
In reviewing the appellate court's judgment, we begin by 
noting that Jackson was not, in fact, required to establish the cause of her 
son's injuries in order to turn aside TLC's summary judgment motion. At the 
summary judgment stage, plaintiffs are not required to prove their cases. 
Allegro Services, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 
172 Ill. 2d 243, 256 (1996). The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a 
question of fact, but simply to determine whether one exists. Watkins v. 
Schmitt, 172 Ill. 2d 193, 203 (1996). A motion for summary judgment should 
only be granted when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits demonstrate that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1992).
Because summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of 
litigation, the court has a duty to construe the record strictly against the 
movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Espinoza v. Elgin, 
Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). Summary judgment 
should not be allowed unless the moving party's right to judgment is clear and 
free from doubt. In re Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 410 (1993). 
Accordingly, where reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences from the 
undisputed material facts or where there is a dispute as to a material fact, 
summary judgment should be denied and the issue decided by the trier of fact. 
Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 114. Our review of an order granting summary 
judgment is de novo. Espinoza, 165 Ill. 2d  at 113.
In the case before us today, there is a genuine issue of 
fact as to how Jonathan sustained his injuries. He undoubtedly hit his head on 
something when he dove into the lake. No other explanation can account for the 
severity of the damage to his spine. The real dispute concerns what exactly it 
was that he hit. It is possible that he merely struck the lake's bottom. At this 
stage of the proceedings, however, that is by no means certain. The reported 
presence of the submerged plastic pipe and Jonathan's proximity to that pipe 
when he entered the water support Jackson's claim that the pipe was responsible 
for what happened to her son. To the extent that the appellate court's judgment 
is based on the view that no genuine issue of fact remains, it must therefore be 
set aside.
Somewhat more problematic is the appellate court's 
conclusion that TLC owed no duty to Jonathan as a matter of law because the 
risks of diving into a body of water that is murky and of uncertain depth are 
open and obvious. The appellate court's analysis is founded on the principle of 
Illinois law which holds that persons who own, occupy, or control and maintain 
land are not ordinarily required to foresee and protect against injuries from 
potentially dangerous conditions that are open and obvious. Obvious dangers 
include fire, height, and bodies of water. Bucheleres v. Chicago Park 
District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 447-48 (1996); Mt. Zion State Bank & 
Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 110, 118 (1995). 
The existence of an open and obvious danger is not a per se bar to 
finding that a defendant who owns, occupies or controls land has a duty to 
exercise reasonable care. In assessing whether a duty is owed, the court must 
still apply traditional duty analysis to the particular facts of the case. The 
factors relevant to the courts' imposition of a duty include the likelihood of 
injury, the reasonable foreseeability of such injury, the magnitude of guarding 
against the injury, and the consequences of placing that burden on the 
defendant. Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d  at 456, citing Ward v. K mart 
Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140-41 (1990).
A body of water is deemed to present an open and obvious 
danger whether it is natural (see, e.g., Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d 435 (Lake Michigan); Dowen v. Hall, 191 Ill. App. 3d 903, 907 (1989) 
(Fox Lake)) or artificial (see, e.g., Mt. Zion State Bank & 
Trust, 169 Ill. 2d 110 (above-ground pool); Cope v. Doe, 102 Ill. 2d 278 (1984) (man-made retention pond); Osborne v. Claydon, 266 Ill. 
App. 3d 434 (1994) (in-ground pool); Wingate v. Camelot Swim Club, 
Inc., 193 Ill. App. 3d 963 (1990) (man-made duck pond)), clear or murky 
(see, e.g., Mostafa v. City of Hickory Hills, 287 Ill. App. 3d 
160, 167 (1997) (danger posed by lagoon open and obvious even though murkiness 
prevented decedents from ascertaining its depth); Dowen, 191 Ill. App. 
3d at 907 (danger involved in "a flat dive off a pier into muddy waters of 
uncertain depth in a natural lake is open and obvious to a reasonable adult"). 
In addition, the water's danger is considered to be apparent not only to 
experienced swimmers (Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d 435), but even to very 
young children (see, e.g., Englund v. Englund, 246 Ill. App. 
3d 468, 476 (1993) (danger of drowning in swimming pool obvious to 
three-year-old child)).
Although a body of water was involved in this case, we do 
not believe that the open and obvious doctrine is dispositive of Jackson's 
claims. Cases addressing the open and obvious danger of water are premised on 
the notion that bodies of water pose two particular types of risk: the risk of 
drowning and the risk of injury from diving into water that is too shallow. 
Neither of those risks is at issue here. The danger in this case, according to 
Jackson, stemmed from the presence of the submerged pipe, whose location was 
variable and could not be detected by swimmers. The existence of that hazard had 
nothing to do with the inherent characteristics of bodies of water; it stemmed 
solely from TLC's conduct.
We note, moreover, that in contrast to the Lake Michigan 
beaches in Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d  at 457, this is not a situation 
where the condition, by its nature, carried its own warning of potential harm. 
Under the record before us now, there is no reason Jackson's son or any other 
patron of Timberview Lake should reasonably have anticipated the presence of the 
underwater obstruction or the injuries it could produce. To the contrary, 
Timberview Lake was designed, intended, and used solely for recreational 
swimming. When TLC opened it to the public and charged admission fees for that 
purpose, patrons had the right to assume that the facility was properly prepared 
for their use and that TLC had taken appropriate measures to make it 
safe.
Compounding the danger posed by the submerged pipe was that 
fact that TLC personnel would periodically alter the pipe's location. One day a 
particular section of the lake might be free of obstruction, enabling patrons 
and employees to enter and exit there without incident. Witnessing that, a 
patron might naturally believe that the area was perfectly safe. The next day, 
however, the pipe might be moved to that spot, making even "belly flops" of the 
kind attempted by Jonathan tragically dangerous. Without any markings or 
warnings, patrons would have no way to assess that the risks had changed. 
Indeed, they would have no way of knowing that the risks even 
existed.
Under these circumstances, the likelihood of injury was 
great and the risk of injury reasonably foreseeable. TLC had no justification 
for imposing such a risk on its patrons. The threat of injury from the pipe 
could have been completely eliminated at virtually no cost or expense to TLC. 
Although the pipe once served a purpose in maintaining the lake, it was rendered 
unnecessary by the lake's permanent plumbing system, which was in place and 
operational at the time of Jonathan's accident. All that TLC needed to do was 
disconnect it and stow it on shore. It is difficult to see how any adverse 
consequences could result from requiring a landowner such as to TLC to bear such 
an insignificant burden.
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit and appellate courts 
were wrong to hold that TLC was entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that 
it owed no duty to Jackson's son. The judgments of the circuit and appellate 
courts are therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and 
remanded.