Case Title: CHARLES ARTHUR POTE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
CHARLES ARTHUR POTE v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 24695 P.2d 617Case Number: 83-245Decided: 02/14/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
CHARLES ARTHUR POTE, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, ParkCounty, W.J. Nicholas, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Sylvia Lee Hackl, and Martin J. McClain, 
Appellate Counsels, and Denise Nau, Asst. Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public 
Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant. Appellant filed a brief 
pro se.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., John W. Renneisen, 
Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Blonigen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., 
ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ., and HANSCUM, District 
Judge.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Charles 
Arthur Pote was convicted of numerous crimes by a ParkCounty jury. Criminal activity involving 
appellant stemmed from a fracas in a Cody bar. The imbroglio involved appellant, 
his two associates, a barkeep and several bar habitues. One of appellant's 
companions fired shots at various and sundry people in the bar, resulting in a 
death. Appellant and his entourage made a retrograde maneuver out of the bar, 
into a stolen car, thence down the highway whilst shooting and being shot at by 
law enforcement people.

[¶2.]     Appellant's counsel 
raises seven issues:1

I

"Whether the trial court 
erred in admitting evidence concerning Counts VI and VIII, since said offenses 
involved thefts which occurred outside the State of Wyoming.

II

"Whether the trial court 
erred in denying Appellant's motion to sever Counts VI, VII, and VIII and to 
permit separate trials on such counts.

III

"Whether the trial court 
erred in denying Appellant's motions for suppression of evidence, dismissal and 
continuance in light of the prosecution's deliberate failure to preserve 
evidence and to promptly comply with the pre-trial discovery 
order.

IV

"Whether the trial court 
erred in denying Appellant's motion for change of venue, which motion alleged 
inter alia that extensive pre-trial publicity made it impossible to select a 
fair and impartial jury in ParkCounty.

V

"Whether the trial court 
erred in admitting into evidence the testimony of two previously-hypnotized 
witnesses.

VI

"Whether the trial court 
erred in not vacating Appellant's habitual criminal 
`conviction.'

VII

"Whether the trial court 
erred in sentencing Appellant to maximum terms and then failing to give 
Appellant full credit against those maximum terms for all time spent in 
pre-sentence custody."

[¶3.]     Appellant Charles 
Arthur Pote, Connie Zierke Pote and Steve Alloway, with guns in their 
possession, drove into Cody, 
Wyoming, in a Plymouth Reliant. At 
trial there was evidence that appellant had been involved in the theft of the 
automobile and the guns in Oregon and 
Washington in 
the middle of April, 1983.

[¶4.]     Early in the morning of 
April 26, 1983, appellant and his two associates entered the Silver Dollar Bar 
in Cody. Pote and Alloway became involved in an exchange of pleasantries with 
local frequenters of the saloon. An angry dispute escalated; thereupon appellant 
and Alloway exhibited guns. Appellant and his two companions retired from the 
bar while Alloway fired numerous shots, and appellant, with weapon drawn, 
menaced people in the bar. Ron Jensen was shot and killed by one of appellant's 
companions. Connie Pote and Alloway rode as passengers, and appellant drove the 
Plymouth Reliant in a westerly direction with police officers in pursuit. 
Numerous shots were fired from both sides of the Pote vehicle, eventually 
disabling the police automobile. Appellant and his people proceeded west of Cody 
and entered a cabin owned by Evelyn Lewis. Later appellant and his companions 
surrendered to the Cody police department and the ParkCounty sheriff's office. The police 
officers found four guns inside the Lewis cabin, and the Plymouth Reliant 
automobile, which was concealed near the cabin.

[¶5.]     Appellant was initially 
charged with seven felonies as follows:

Count I: Aiding and 
abetting the second-degree murder of Ron Jensen, § 6-4-104, W.S. 
1977.

Count II: Aiding and 
abetting the attempted second-degree murder of Robert Ellis, § 6-4-104, W.S. 
1977.

Count III: Unlawful 
possession of a dangerous weapon with intent to threaten Daniel Brasher, § 
6-11-101, W.S. 1977.

Count IV: Aggravated 
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon upon the patrons and bartender of 
the Silver Dollar Bar, § 6-4-506(b), W.S. 1977.

Count V: Attempted 
first-degree murder of Cody police officer Stan Peglow, § 6-4-101, W.S. 
1977.

Count VI: Concealing 
stolen goods, § 6-7-304, W.S. 1977.

Count VII: Burglary, § 
6-7-201, W.S. 1977.

[¶6.]     An amended complaint 
charged two additional crimes. Count VIII charged appellant with a second count 
of concealing stolen goods; and Count IX alleged that appellant was an habitual 
criminal, as defined in § 6-1-109, W.S. 1977. Appellant was bound over to the 
district court on all nine counts and an information was filed 
accordingly.

[¶7.]     The jury found 
appellant guilty as charged on Counts I, II, III, V, VI and VIII, and guilty of 
the lesser offense of criminal trespass on Count VII. Count IV was dismissed 
during the trial. The jury heard evidence on Count IX, the habitual criminal 
allegation. The jury found that appellant was an habitual criminal in light of 
his two previous felony convictions.

[¶8.]     Appellant was sentenced 
as follows:

Count I, aiding and 
abetting second-degree murder, in violation of § 6-4-104, W.S. 1977. Count II, 
aiding and abetting attempted second-degree murder, in violation of § 6-4-104, 
W.S. 1977. Count III, unlawful possession of deadly weapon with intent to 
threaten, in violation of § 6-1-101, W.S. 1977, a single sentence of life 
imprisonment at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, with eligibility for parole 
after serving twenty-five years and a fine of $1,000.

Count V, attempted 
first-degree murder of a police officer, in violation of § 6-4-101, W.S. 1977, a 
sentence of life imprisonment without parole, such sentence to be served 
consecutive to the sentence imposed on Counts I, II and III, and a fine of 
$1,000.

Count VI, concealing 
stolen goods, in violation of § 6-7-304, W.S. 1977. Count VIII, concealing 
stolen goods, in violation of § 6-7-304, W.S. 1977, a single sentence of ten 
years at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, with eligibility for parole after 
having served seven years and six months, said sentence to be served consecutive 
to the sentences previously imposed, and a fine of $1,000.

Count VII, criminal 
trespass, a sentence of three months in the ParkCounty 
jail in Cody, Wyoming, and a fine of $750. Appellant 
received 92 days credit against this sentence.

[¶9.]     Appellant was also 
given sixty-five days credit "against all the minimum and against the fixed 
period maximum sentences" imposed on the felony counts. The court also ordered 
appellant to reimburse the state for his attorneys' and investigators' fees, and 
to work off any unpaid fines by serving additional time in prison "at the 
statutory rate."

I

[¶10.]  In the first issue on appeal appellant 
contends "that it was error for the court to admit evidence relating to the 
out-of-state theft offenses, and that his convictions on Counts VI (automobile) 
and VIII (guns) are improper."

[¶11.]  Appellant was charged with two counts of 
concealing stolen property defined in § 6-7-304, W.S. 
1977:

"Whoever buys, receives, 
conceals or aids in the concealment of anything of value, which has been stolen, 
embezzled or obtained by false pretense, knowing the same to have been stolen, 
embezzled or obtained by false pretense, shall, if the goods are of the value of 
one hundred dollars ($100.00) or upwards, suffer the punishment prescribed for 
grand larceny, and if the goods are worth less than one hundred dollars 
($100.00), shall suffer the punishment prescribed for petit 
larceny."

[¶12.]  The trial court instructed the jury that 
the elements of the offense charged in Count VI of the information 
were:

"1. That the defendant, 
Charles Arthur Pote

"2. concealed, or aided 
in the concealment

"3. of property having a 
value greater than $3,000, particularly a brown Plymouth Reliant 
automobile,

"4. which had been 
stolen,

"5. knowing the same to 
have been stolen;

"6. all in Park County, Wyoming,

"7. on April 26, 
1983."

[¶13.]  The court's instruction on the elements 
of the offenses charged in Count VIII of the information were identical to the 
charge on Count VI except element No. 3 made reference to the guns. Under the 
instructions of the court the state was required to prove that the automobile 
and guns were stolen. Furthermore, the state had the burden to prove that 
appellant knew that these items had been stolen. The strongest possible evidence 
to prove that the automobile and guns were stolen was to show that appellant was 
involved in the thefts. Therefore, evidence of out-of-state thefts was highly 
relevant, and it was not error to admit such into evidence. There is no merit to 
appellant's objection to evidence related to out-of-state 
thefts.

[¶14.]  In both Count VI (automobile) and Count 
VIII (guns) of the information, appellant was charged in the language of the 
statute, that is, (appellant) "did * * * receive, conceal or aid in the concealment. 
* * *" (Emphasis added.)

[¶15.]  Appellant cites considerable authority to 
the effect that a thief cannot be convicted of receiving property that he had 
initially stolen. This may be correct, but the state's case against appellant in 
Counts VI and VIII is concealment of a stolen automobile and guns, not receiving 
stolen property. The state's focus on concealment is evident from the bill of 
particulars, opening statement, proofs and instructions to the 
jury.

[¶16.]  Appellant does not contend that a 
perpetrator of larceny cannot also be convicted of concealing the property he 
stole. In fact appellant cites us cases in support of a thief being convicted of 
concealing property that he stole. State 
v. Para, 120 Ariz. 26, 583 P.2d 1346 
(1978); Sutton v. Commonwealth, 
Ky., 623 S.W.2d 879 (1981); State v. McPherson, 
250 Or. 601, 444 P.2d 5 (1968). In Tageant v. State, Wyo., 673 P.2d 651 
(1983), there was strong evidence that Tageant had committed certain thefts. He 
was, nevertheless, convicted on one count of concealing the same 
property.

[¶17.]  Finally, in this first assignment of 
error appellant says, "In the usual case, the concealment is in effect a 
continuing larceny - a deliberate action to deprive the rightful owner of his 
property. In this case, however, the `concealment' alleged by the State was of 
an entirely different non-larcenous nature." Appellant makes a novel argument 
that the concealment here was not the type of concealment proscribed by the 
statute. However, he cites no authority nor does he make any cogent argument in 
support of this theory; therefore, we need not address this matter in detail. Britton v. State, Wyo., 643 P.2d 935 
(1982).

[¶18.]  Wyoming's concealment statute, § 6-7-304, W.S. 
1977, is not as narrow as appellant suggests. The Plymouth Reliant was concealed 
near the Lewis cabin with brush and debris. There was evidence that the guns 
were concealed on appellant's person, in the car and in the Lewis cabin. We hold 
that Wyoming's 
statute on concealment proscribed the manner of concealment in this 
case.

II

[¶19.]  In appellant's second assignment of error 
he contends that Counts VI, VII and VIII of the information should have been 
severed and separate trials had on those counts. These counts involve property 
offenses (two concealment charges and one burglary) and appellant contends that 
they were fundamentally different from the offenses against the person charged 
in the other five counts of the information. Additionally, appellant argues that 
"The sheer mass of evidence introduced on the multitude of charges against 
appellant irreparably prejudiced his right to a fair 
trial."

[¶20.]  Rule 11(a), Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure governs the joinder of offenses in one information and 
provides:

"Two (2) or more offenses 
may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for 
each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, 
are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or 
transaction, or on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or 
constituting part of a common scheme or plan."

[¶21.]  Generally, joinder of offenses is proper, 
absent compelling reasons for severance. Linn v. State, Wyo., 505 P.2d 1270 (1973), cert. denied sub nom. Lucas v. Wyoming, 411 U.S. 983, 93 S. Ct. 2277, 36 L. Ed. 2d 959, reh. denied 412 U.S. 944, 93 S. Ct. 2780, 37 L. Ed. 2d 405 
(1973).

"* * * Joint trials serve 
the public interest by expediting the administration of justice, reducing docket 
congestion, conserving judicial time as well as that of jurors along with 
avoiding the recall of witnesses to duplicate their performances." Jasch v. State, Wyo., 563 P.2d 1327, 1335 
(1977).

Granting or 
denying a motion for severance is discretionary with the trial court. Jasch v. State, 
supra.

[¶22.]  Rule 11(a), W.R.Cr.P., provides for 
joinder when the offenses arise out of "two (2) or more acts or transactions 
connected together. * * *" The connection in this case is clear and easy to 
understand. The concealed guns played a prominent part in the murder count and 
the several assault counts. The concealment of the car and burglary count were 
connected with the flight of appellant and his associates from the scene of the 
shooting. We hold that Rule 11(a) permits joinder of the several offenses in 
this case.

[¶23.]  Even if joinder is permissible under Rule 
11(a), we must also examine the facts here, applying Rule 13, W.R.Cr.P., and 
determine if a severance should have been granted. Rule 13 
provides:

"If it appears that a 
defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants 
in an indictment or information, or by such joinder for trial together, the 
court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of 
defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. * * 
*"

[¶24.]  In United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 
673 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Scott v. United States, 409 U.S. 888, 93 S. Ct. 195, 34 L. Ed. 2d 145, (1972), the court acknowledged the general rules 
regarding severance:

"* * * If, as a practical 
matter, the natures of the offense or of the evidence are of such a character or 
are so complicated that a jury could not reasonably be expected to separate the 
indictments or the defendants and to evaluate the evidence properly and 
individually against each separate defendant on each separate charge, then the 
trial judge should sever the trials. * * *"

Generally, a 
denial of a motion for severance is a matter of discretion with the trial court 
and will not be reversed except for a clear abuse of discretion. The burden was 
on the appellant here to present facts demonstrating that prejudice resulted 
from the trial of several offenses and denied him fair trial. Dobbins v. State, Wyo., 483 P.2d 255 
(1971). Appellant did not meet this burden. A naked assertion of prejudice is 
insufficient; likewise, an assertion that the sheer mass of evidence created 
prejudice is not persuasive.

[¶25.]  We held in the first part of this section 
that a joinder of the several offenses was proper because of their 
interrelation. Furthermore, the facts of this case were uncomplicated and 
relatively easy to understand. There was no indication that the jury could not 
separate the evidence in support of one crime from the evidence in support of 
other crimes charged.

[¶26.]  In giving the instructions the trial 
court carefully defined in clear and understandable language each crime charged 
and the necessary proofs that the state must make. The jury was specifically 
instructed that each charge must be considered separately. The trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to sever the various counts in the 
information.

III

[¶27.]  In the third issue on appeal appellant 
contends that evidence should have been suppressed, the case against him 
dismissed or a continuance granted because the state did not promptly comply 
with the pre-trial discovery order.

[¶28.]  In ruling on appellant's pre-trial 
discovery motion the court ordered the state to open its file to the appellant. 
The state was reluctant to comply with this order and continued to argue with 
the court about it. The state's hesitancy to obey the court's order is not 
commendable, and the most charitable characterization of the state's conduct is 
that it did not obey the court's order promptly.

[¶29.]  At 11:30 a.m. the day trial began the 
trial judge received a six-page letter from assigned standby counsel. The letter 
set out in detail the difficulty that Pote and his counsel had experienced in 
dealing with the police and prosecutor. The main complaint was that witnesses 
would not talk to them on instructions from the police or prosecutor. Also, it 
was alleged in the letter that they had not been able to obtain certain reports, 
letters and statements. These numerous complaints were untimely; however, 
standby counsel cannot be faulted since he did not know up to the time of trial 
whether appellant would allow the public defender to represent 
him.

[¶30.]  A complicating factor in pre-trial 
discovery (also at trial and on appeal) was that the state was not sure who it 
was supposed to communicate with. The office of the public defender was 
appointed stand-by counsel in the beginning and was always available to 
appellant. However, appellant persisted with the notion that he wanted to 
represent himself. The public defender's office did not know the morning of 
trial whether Pote would allow the public defender's office to represent him. 
Appellant finally consented to representation by the public defender's 
office.

[¶31.]  In his brief appellant's counsel reminded 
this court that the prosecuting attorney has a duty to see that a defendant has 
a fair trial and a duty to disclose and preserve evidence. Counsel cites us 
numerous cases that recite broad constitutional principles regarding a fair 
trial, the state's duty to make discovery, suppression and destruction of 
evidence. The deficiency in appellant's argument is that these broad 
constitutional principles are never applied to the facts in the case before us. 
The only specific matter that appellant addressed is the vehicle that the police 
used in pursuing him and his associates. The vehicle was damaged in the chase, 
then repaired, and the damaged parts lost or destroyed.

[¶32.]  Recently the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the prosecutor's duty to preserve evidence and identified factors to 
be considered to see if a defendant's right to a fair trial was violated. In California v. Trombetta, ___ U.S. ___, 
104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413, 422 (1984), the court 
said:

"* * * Whatever duty the 
Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be 
limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the 
suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. [97] at 
109-110, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342, 96 S. Ct. 2392 [at 2400-2401 (1976)] evidence must both 
possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was 
destroyed, and also be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to 
obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means * * 
*."

[¶33.]  Appellant never told the trial court nor 
this court what evidence the patrol car may have provided for his defense. He 
does not contend that anything about the vehicle was exculpatory or that the car 
was apparently exculpatory to the prosecution. Photographs of the vehicle were 
taken and admitted into evidence without objection. We do not have the slightest 
idea what evidentiary purpose appellant wanted to use the vehicle 
for.

[¶34.]  Appellant's summary of the law on the 
prosecutor's duty to insure a fair trial and disclose and preserve evidence is 
well written and supported by impeccable authority; however, we fail to see how 
those noble principles apply here. Appellant has not told us of any way he was 
inhibited from discovering or presenting evidence. He does not complain that the 
state produced any surprise witnesses or evidence, nor does he suggest that he 
was impaired in his ability to cross-examine the state's witnesses because of 
tardy discovery.

[¶35.]  Appellant contends that "The cumulative 
effect of these actions (denial of fair trial and failure to disclose and 
preserve evidence) violated fundamental principles of due process." We have 
never been much impressed with a naked allegation of cumulative error. See Shaffer v. State, Wyo., 640 P.2d 88, 31 
A.L.R.4th 166 (1982).

[¶36.]  In summary, appellant has not shown any 
advantage the state gained by late disclosure nor has he shown how he was 
disadvantaged. While the prosecutor's conduct regarding discovery was not 
exemplary, appellant has failed to show a single instance of how he was 
prejudiced or inhibited in presenting his defense. Appellant has argued lofty 
constitutional principles in a vacuum.

IV

[¶37.]  Appellant made two motions for a change 
of venue, alleging that he could not get a fair trial because of pre-trial 
publicity. His motions were denied. Ordinarily the prosecution is to be 
conducted in the county where the offense is alleged to have been committed. 
Art. 1, § 10, Wyoming Constitution; and Rule 21, W.R.Cr.P. Rule 23(a), 
W.R.Cr.P., provides that venue may be changed if there exists prejudice against 
the defendant so great that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the 
county where the offense occurred. It is the burden of a defendant to show that 
prejudice is so great that it precludes a fair trial. Collins v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1283 
(1979). The defendant must show actual prejudice in the minds of the prospective 
jurors. Wilcox v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1116 (1983). 

[¶38.]  The trial judge should consider the 
totality of the circumstances in deciding whether the defendant's right to a 
fair trial can be preserved. Weddle v. 
State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 231 (1980). Since a court's ruling on a motion for a 
change of venue is the result of a factual determination, it will not be 
overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. Chavez v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1341 
(1980), cert. denied 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1980). A 
court's ruling on a motion for a change of venue is subject to review only for 
an abuse of discretion. Murray v. 
State, Wyo., 671 P.2d 320 (1983). The most significant indication of 
prejudice or lack of prejudice is revealed upon voir dire examination of the 
jury panel. Shaffer v. State, 
supra.

[¶39.]  In determining whether a change of venue 
should have been granted we consider the nature and extent of publicity. We also 
consider the difficulty or ease in selecting a jury and whether the prejudice 
claimed actually appears during jury selection. Murray v. State, 
supra.

[¶40.]  In support of his motions for a change of 
venue appellant presented to the trial judge seventeen newspaper articles from 
April 27, 1983 to June 24, 1983. These articles were from two Park County 
newspapers and a Montana newspaper. Appellant does not point out anything in 
these articles that is nonfactual, inflammatory or prejudicial. There were no 
editorials suggesting guilt. The "Editorial type cartoon" referred to in 
appellant's brief makes no reference to appellant. "Extensive news coverage does 
not automatically require a change of venue." Shaffer v. State, supra, at 103. 
Appellant refers us to Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966), and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S. Ct. 1628, 14 L. Ed. 2d 543, reh. denied 382 U.S. 875, 86 S. Ct. 18, 15 L. Ed. 2d 118 
(1965), for the proposition that the publicity so pervaded the proceeding here 
as to give rise to a presumption of prejudice against the defendant. These cases 
are factually entirely different. Those trials were conducted in an atmosphere 
of a "Roman holiday." Nothing like that happened here.

[¶41.]  As would be expected, most of the jury 
panel had heard about this case; however, there is no requirement that a juror 
be ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a case. Chavez v. State, supra. Contrary to the 
contention of appellant, there was no great difficulty in selecting a jury. Part 
of the voir dire was conducted individually in chambers as a precaution against 
contaminating the panel, and the jury was impaneled in less than a day and 
one-half. Appellant tells us that there were fifteen jurors challenged for cause 
and several challenges denied. Those excused had pre-conceived opinions about 
the case.

[¶42.]  Appellant does not contend on appeal that 
the jurors not excused should have been excused or that the judge abused his 
discretion in not excusing certain jurors. Appellant seems to argue that because 
of the number excused for cause it was demonstrated that there was deep 
community sentiment and prejudice against him.

[¶43.]  We do not know that fifteen jurors is an 
unusual number to be excused for cause in this type of case. Even if fifteen is 
a large number, that alone is not significant. There is no indication that the 
fifteen reflected the opinions and attitudes of the other members of the jury 
panel or that the fifteen excused jurors influenced the remaining panel members. 
U.S. v. Faul, CA 8, 748 F.2d 1204 (1984). Appellant has not demonstrated that 
there was prejudice against him in Park County so great that he could not obtain 
a fair and impartial trial. The judge did not abuse his discretion in not 
granting a change of venue.

V

[¶44.]  Two Cody police officers who had been 
hypnotized testified at trial. On appeal appellant objects to this testimony on 
the basis of inadequate pretrial disclosure of the hypnotic sessions, and also 
that his right of confrontation was violated. 

[¶45.]  The record does not clearly indicate when 
appellant became aware that two police officers had been hypnotized. He knew 
about it before the state's case in chief commenced, but we do not know exactly 
how much advance notice he had. The record is not entirely clear, but apparently 
appellant had the officers' reports of the incident as reference was made to the 
reports when one of the officers was being cross-examined.

[¶46.]  In the hypnotic session involving officer 
Gene P. Plambeck an attempt was made to tape the session, but the tape did not 
record. The hypnotic session of officer Stanley Peglow was taped. Appellant was 
furnished a partial transcript of the tape, but the actual tape was not located 
for use at the trial. Appellant does not charge the state with suppressing 
evidence, nor is there any indication that evidence was suppressed. Appellant 
argues that there was an inadequate disclosure. He contends that the state did 
not comply with Gee v. State, Wyo., 
662 P.2d 103 (1983), by arguing that Gee requires the state to notify a 
defendant that a witness has been hypnotized and furnish the defendant with 
statements and evidence relative to the hypnosis.

[¶47.]  Appellant became aware that two witnesses 
had been hypnotized before trial. He received a partial transcript of one of the 
hypnotic sessions, and he also had the officers' report regarding the incident 
that gave rise to the criminal charges. Appellant had all the statements and 
evidence relative to the hypnosis that was available. Gee v. State, supra, does not require 
that the state produce tapes and transcripts of the hypnotic sessions. In 
summary, Gee requires that evidence 
be preserved but not that evidence be created.

[¶48.]  This case is similar to Chapman v. State, Wyo., 638 P.2d 1280 
(1982). In Chapman tapes were made of 
a hypnotic session, but were inaudible. This court held that hypnotically 
induced testimony was nevertheless admissible since defense counsel had other 
adequate means to determine what happened at the hypnotic session. In this case 
the officers were cross-examined in detail, and their reports were available to 
impeach them if their in-court testimony differed from their 
reports.

[¶49.]  We hold that under Wyoming law as 
articulated in the Chapman and Gee cases, appellant's right to confront 
witnesses was not violated.

[¶50.]  In Gee this court further emphasized what 
we had said in Chapman, holding that 
"[a]n attack on credibility is the proper method to determine the value of the 
testimony of a previously hypnotized witness rather than an attack on the 
competency of such testimony." The credibility of the witnesses who had 
previously been hypnotized was attacked in this case by cross-examination and 
also by the use of the partial transcript of one hypnotic session and the 
reports of the officers.

[¶51.]  It is significant to note that actually 
there was no hypnotically induced testimony admitted at trial here. Extensive 
cross-examination revealed that hypnosis had not enhanced the memory of the 
officers who testified at trial nor had there been any alteration in their 
testimony at trial compared to their reports. Hypnosis had no effect on the 
officers' testimony one way or another. We find no error in allowing officers 
Plambeck and Peglow to testify.

VI

[¶52.]  In the second part of a bifurcated trial 
the jury determined that appellant was an habitual criminal. At sentencing the 
court recognized that the current habitual criminal statute, § 6-10-201, et 
seq., W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), was controlling, but that under the 
facts of this case the habitual criminal statute had no application. The 
sentences finally imposed did not reflect an enhanced sentence nor were they 
influenced in any way by the habitual criminal statute.

[¶53.]  Appellant asks us to address several 
interesting questions about the habitual criminal statute and its application to 
the facts of this case. Because the trial court determined that the habitual 
criminal statute was inappropriate in this case and did not enhance any 
sentences, we deem the issues raised by appellant to be 
moot.

[¶54.]  Appellant contends that the trial court 
"should have directed a judgment of acquittal as to the habitual criminal guilty 
verdict." The jury's finding that appellant was an habitual criminal did not 
make him guilty of any crime. "[B]eing an habitual criminal is not a crime - it 
is a status." Schuler v. State, Wyo., 
668 P.2d 1333 (1983); and Evans v. 
State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1214 (1982). An habitual criminal status is 
significant only in sentencing.

[¶55.]  The trial court's determination that a 
sentence under the habitual criminal statute was inappropriate, effectively 
nullified the jury's determination that appellant was an habitual 
criminal.

VII

[¶56.]  Appellant was convicted of six felonies 
and one misdemeanor and received four separate sentences. The court considered 
several of the offenses to have merged, resulting in single 
sentences.

[¶57.]  The court imposed a single sentence of 
life imprisonment, with eligibility for parole after serving twenty-five years 
and a fine of $1,000, for Counts I, II and III, the aiding and abetting 
second-degree murder charge, the aiding and abetting attempted second degree 
murder charge, and the unlawful possession of a deadly weapon with intent to 
threaten charge. For Count V, the attempted first-degree murder of a police 
officer, the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, such 
sentence to be served consecutive to the previous life sentence, and a fine of 
$1,000. The court imposed a single sentence of ten years imprisonment, with 
eligibility for parole after seven years and six months, and a fine of $1,000, 
for the two concealment crimes, Counts VI and VIII. In each instance, the 
sentence imposed was the maximum permitted by law for the offense involved. The 
court also ordered that appellant serve three months and pay a fine of $750 on 
the misdemeanor criminal trespass count.

[¶58.]  The court noted that appellant had spent 
157 days in pre-sentence custody, and ordered that 92 of those days be credited 
against the three-month criminal trespass sentence. The remaining 65 days were 
credited "against all the minimum and against the fixed period maximum 
sentences" imposed for the felony offenses.

[¶59.]  On appeal, appellant contends that the 
trial court erred in not granting credit against the maximum sentences imposed 
for the entire time he spent in pre-sentence custody.

[¶60.]  The seventh issue raised by appellant is 
governed by our holding in Jones v. 
State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378, 381 (1979):

"* * * We hold that a 
trial judge has discretion to deny or grant credit for time served in 
pre-sentence custody where: (1) the pre-sentence custody is not due to the 
defendant's indigency, and (2) the sum of the time spent in pre-sentence custody 
plus the sentence does not exceed the maximum allowable 
sentence."

[¶61.]  We will not be concerned with whether 
appellant was indigent prior to sentencing. The trial court found specifically 
that he was not, yet he was represented at trial and on appeal by the office of 
the public defender. Our concern is whether the sum of the time spent in 
pre-sentence custody plus the sentence exceeds the maximum allowable 
sentence.

[¶62.]  We cannot see how receiving credit for 
time served makes any sense on a life sentence. If appellant were to receive 157 
days credit on his first life sentence, as he insists he should, he would still 
have a life sentence to serve. If he were to receive 157 days credit on each of 
his two consecutive life sentences he would still have two consecutive life 
sentences to serve. Appellant's argument for receiving credit for time served on 
a life sentence is sophistry.

[¶63.]  On the two concealment crimes, Counts VI 
and VIII, the court imposed a single maximum sentence of ten years of 
imprisonment. This sentence was the statutory maximum. One hundred fifty-seven 
days spent in pre-trial confinement plus the ten year sentence exceeds the 
statutory limit of ten years. Therefore, appellant is technically entitled to 
receive a full 157 days credit on the upper limits of his sentence for 
concealing stolen property. Although not practical, the result of our 
determination is that after appellant has served two consecutive life sentences 
he will be entitled to 157 days credit on his maximum ten year sentence. In 
order to comport with Jones v. State, supra, we direct the trial court to modify 
the judgment and sentence to give appellant a full 157 days credit on his ten 
year sentence.

VIII

[¶64.]  Appellant raises five additional issues, 
pro se:

A. "Whether the trial 
court erred in letting the Appellant's trial continue when there was reasonable 
cause to believe that Appellant was incompetent.

B. "Whether the Park 
County Prosecutor unduly and unethically denied Appellant his right to a fair 
trial influencing the Jurors to regard Appellant as being `unholy' and 
acquainting Appellant to `satan' and thereby conferring upon the Prosecution the 
correlative position that `they' (the Prosecution) were on the side of 
God.

C. "Whether the trial 
Court erred in denying Appellant's motion challenging the entire panel as being 
unconstitutional.

D. "Whether there was 
reversable error committed, in that the Deputy Prosecutor was not a member of 
the Wyoming Bar and the trial Court ordered the Public Defender to violate Rule 
20 of the Ethical Standards.

E. "Whether the Trial 
Court erred by not disqualifying himself for prejudice, upon motion of the 
Appellant and the State."

A

[¶65.]  Pote contends that during the course of 
the trial it became obvious that there was a problem with his competency and 
that the trial should have been discontinued. Section 7-11-303(a), W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"If it appears at any 
stage of a criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court's own motion, that 
there is reasonable cause to believe that the accused has a mental illness or 
deficiency making him unfit to proceed, any further proceedings shall be 
suspended. * * *"

In support of 
appellant's contention that he may have been incompetent he directs our 
attention to dialogue between him and his defense lawyer at the instruction 
conference.

Defense 
counsel:

"You must admit the fact 
that you are crazy."

Mr. 
Pote:

"Well, yeah that's 
true."2

[¶66.]  At the instruction conference appellant 
mentioned that he had been in a mental institution. In further support of his 
incompetency contention appellant directs our attention to his "running battle 
with the public defender's office," and his desire that he proceed pro se. He 
further complains about his treatment in the Park County jail and a painful 
tooth condition. He says, "The cumulative effect of * * * the `maltreatment' was 
to induce temporary insanity."

[¶67.]  At no time did appellant claim lack of 
capacity to stand trial as provided for in § 7-11-302, W.S. 1977, nor did he 
enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency, according 
to § 7-11-304(d), W.S. 1977. So far as we can tell, neither the public 
defender's office nor Pote made a motion or request that the trial be 
discontinued. Pote does not bring to our attention any authority in support of 
this contention nor is his argument convincing. 

[¶68.]  At the instruction conference the trial 
judge summed up Mr. Pote's mental condition as follows:

"And the court has not 
ever and does not now know of any apparent symptoms that would suggest mental 
illness or mental incompetency or irresistible mental personality traits and so 
forth. On the contrary, the Court would observe that the Defendant is very 
stable, he might be uneducated in school formally, but he has a very great and 
tremendous perception and insight and ability to comprehend, to understand, and 
to analyze, to anticipate rather fairly complex legal concepts that many lawyers 
are not able to comprehend or handle with a dexterity that he does. He has an 
ability to not only anticipate but then to design evasive and parrying type 
actions; and at the same time, to comprehend and prepare for a secondary course 
of action in case the primary course of action does not seem to achieve the end 
that he wants. He thinks quickly on his feet, he thinks quickly when under 
challenge, as if he might have one day been an expert chess player, and the 
techniques of chess if he is well adapted to other pursuits in life, 
particularly to manipulation and legal procedures. And so this Court finds him 
to be astute and competent."

We cannot 
disagree with that determination, and would add that appellant's pro se brief is 
better than some we have seen.

B

[¶69.]  In his closing argument the prosecutor 
referred to appellant as the leader of the "Unholy Trinity."3 No objection was made at trial to 
this characterization, but appellant objects on appeal. The prosecutor also 
referred to appellant as the "Patriarch." Apparently appellant is comfortable 
with the appellation "Patriarch." At least this is about the only thing he does 
not complain about.

[¶70.]  In his pro se brief appellant makes a one 
page argument to the effect that characterizing him as the leader of an "Unholy 
Trinity" raises a separation of church and state issue. We cannot make any sense 
out of appellant's separation of church and state 
argument.

[¶71.]  The most that can be said for the 
prosecutor's characterization of appellant is that it may have been a poor 
choice of words. In Ostrowski v. 
State, Wyo., 665 P.2d 471 (1983), the prosecutor characterized defendant as 
a criminal. In that case we said the characterization was "ill-considered" and 
"improper," but did not require a reversal. Likewise there is no reversible 
error in this case.

[¶72.]  In appellant's one page argument on 
separation of church and state he objects to a letter sent to him by the 
prosecuting attorney after his conviction and incarceration. This letter was 
sent on the county attorney's letterhead, and the stationery had a quotation 
from Isaiah on it. The letter quoted extensively from the new testament and 
strongly urged appellant to repent. We do not wish to discourage those who cry 
repentence, but we remind the county attorney of the separation of the offices 
of prosecuting attorney and prison chaplain.

C

[¶73.]  Prior to trial appellant challenged the 
entire jury panel because it did not include felons. He asserts that because 
felons were excluded from the jury it was unconstitutionally 
selected.

[¶74.]  Section 6-10-106, W.S. 1977, provides 
that a person convicted of a felony is incompetent to be a juror. Appellant 
contends that this statute is unconstitutional. Appellant refers us to the 13th 
and 15th amendments to the United States Constitution, but does not relate those 
amendments to the facts or legal issues of this case.

[¶75.]  In Meyer v. Kendig, Wyo., 641 P.2d 1235, 
1238-1239, (1982), we said:

"When the 
constitutionality of a statute is assailed, we are governed by the following 
standards: 

"`Statutes are presumed 
to be constitutional unless affirmatively shown to be otherwise, and one who 
would deny the constitutionality of a statute has a heavy burden. The alleged 
unconstitutionality must be clearly and exactly shown beyond any reasonable 
doubt. [Citation.] One who assails a classification must carry the burden of 
showing that it does not rest on a reasonable basis, but is essentially 
arbitrary, and if any state of facts can be reasonably conceived which sustain 
the classification, such facts will be assumed. 
[Citations.]'

"`Courts have a duty to 
uphold the constitutionality of statutes which the legislature has enacted if 
that is at all possible, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of 
constitutionality. [Citations.]' [Citation.]"

[¶76.]  Appellant cites no authority nor does he 
make any logical argument in support of his contention that § 6-10-106, W.S. 
1977, is unconstitutional. He has totally failed in his burden to demonstrate 
unconstitutionality.

D

[¶77.]  Appellant complains that the deputy 
county attorney, Chris White, was not a member of the Wyoming Bar Association at 
the time of trial and that Mr. White participated in the trial. The record does 
not reflect appellant's contention; however, taking judicial notice of our own 
files and records, we note that Mr. White is currently a member of the Wyoming 
Bar in good standing, although he had not been admitted at the time of 
appellant's trial. The circumstances under which Mr. White was permitted to 
practice in the courts in ParkCounty are not mentioned in the record. 
Mr. White's alleged unauthorized practice of law was not before the trial court 
and is not properly before this court. Appellant has not shown how this 
circumstance prejudiced him.

[¶78.]  Appellant also contends that the public 
defender, acting in his capacity as advisory counsel or standby counsel for him 
at and before trial, violated Rule 20, Canon 3, DR 3-101(A), Bar Association 
Organization and Government. This disciplinary rule 
provides:

"A lawyer shall not aid a 
nonlawyer in the practice of law."

This is a 
spurious contention and does not merit comment.

E

[¶79.]  Appellant's last pro se assignment of 
error is that the trial judge did not remove himself from the case because of 
prejudice.

[¶80.]  Rule 23(e), W.R.Cr.P., 
provides:

"(e) Disqualification for 
cause. - After the time for filing a motion for peremptory disqualification of 
the presiding judge has expired, the state or the defendant may move for a 
change of district judge on the ground that the presiding judge is biased or 
prejudiced against the state, the prosecuting attorney, the defendant or his 
attorney. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit or affidavits of any 
person or persons stating sufficient facts to show the existence of such ground 
together with an affidavit of the prosecuting or defense attorney showing that 
the facts stated were unknown to him and could not have been discovered by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence prior to expiration of the time for filing a 
motion for peremptory disqualification. Prior to hearing on the motion any party 
may file counter-affidavits. The presiding judge shall rule on the motion, and 
if he grants the same shall immediately call in another district judge to try 
the action. A ruling on a motion for a change of district judge shall not be an 
appealable order, but the ruling shall be entered on the docket and made part of 
the record, and may be assigned as error in an appeal of the 
case."

[¶81.]  In an affidavit in support of his motion 
for a change of judge, appellant says Judge Nicholas was prejudiced because 
Judge Dixon, whom appellant had removed from the case, assigned the case to 
Judge Nicholas. We cannot follow that reasoning. It would appear that if Judge 
Nicholas was annoyed at anyone it would be Judge Dixon for assigning him Pote's 
case. In the affidavit appellant also talks about adverse pre-trial rulings, 
forcing upon him standby counsel, failure to answer letters, and a toothache. 
Affiant further sayeth that he thought the state had disqualified Judge 
Nicholas. On the strength of this belief Mr. Pote says he asked Judge Nicholas 
to take over his defense and revealed to him (Judge Nicholas) certain 
information. Finally, Pote says in his affidavit that if Judge Nicholas was not 
prejudiced against him before the affidavit, he would be now after reading 
it.

[¶82.]  Appellant's affidavit in support of his 
motion for a change of judge does not minimally comply with Rule 23(e), W.R. 
Cr.P. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion 
for a change of judge.

[¶83.]  We have carefully examined the seven 
issues raised on appeal by the public defender and the five issues by appellant 
pro se. We find no reversible error in this case.

[¶84.]  Affirmed.

1 Since appellant's 
arrest, up to and including his appeal, he has alternately tolerated assigned 
counsel's representation and expressed dissatisfaction. During a period of 
dissatisfaction this court permitted appellant to file a supplemental brief pro 
se. In his supplemental brief appellant raised five additional issues which we 
will address in part VIII of this opinion.

2 It was held in Baird v. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 44 N YS. 
926, 16 A.D. 490 (1897), that the fact that a person is nicknamed "Crazy" is not 
evidence that he is a lunatic.

3 The Trinity alluded to 
was appellant, Connie Zieke Pote and Steve Alloway.

BROWN, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶85.]  In writing for the court I supported Part 
V of the opinion by referencing Gee v. 
State, Wyo., 662 P.2d 103 (1983), and Chapman v. State, Wyo., 638 P.2d 1280 
(1982). These two cases set out the law in Wyoming regarding testimony of previously 
hypnotized witnesses. I dissented in both Chapman and Gee, and reaffirm my disagreement with 
those two cases.

[¶86.]  I have no problem, however, concluding 
that the testimony of officers Plambeck and Peglow was properly admitted into 
evidence in the case here. I make this determination without regard to the 
authority of Chapman and Gee. The so-called hypnotism of the two 
officers was a nullity. Extensive cross-examination revealed that hypnosis had 
not enhanced or altered the memory of the officers; and hypnosis had no effect 
on the officers' testimony one way or another.

[¶87.]  I repeat the admonition expressed in my 
dissent in Chapman. People who do not know what they are doing ought not "monkey 
around" with hypnotism lest they jeopardize an important case and cost the state 
a lot of money. Chapman and Gee represent a rapidly shrinking 
minority view and will not live forever. See People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162, 690 P.2d 635 (1984); State 
v. Martin, 101 Wn.2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984); State v. Laureano, 101 Wn.2d 745, 682 P.2d 889 (1984); People v. Rex, 
Colo. App., 689 P.2d 669 
(1984).

HANSCUM, District Judge, 
concurring.

[¶88.]  I concur in the result reached by the 
majority affirming the appellant's judgment and conviction. I am compelled, 
however, to comment upon the allegations raised by the appellant of 
prosecutorial misconduct which were not detailed in the majority 
opinion.

[¶89.]  The appellant raises several allegations 
of prosecutorial misconduct which are insufficient to warrant reversal in this 
case; but it seems the prosecutor was not entirely mindful of the standards by 
which the prosecutorial function properly should be performed. The prosecutor 
exhibited an inattentiveness towards many of the standards relating to the 
prosecution function during the course of proceedings in this 
case.

[¶90.]  The prosecution function is surrounded by 
the general obligation of the prosecutor to "seek justice, not merely to 
convict." American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice 3-1.1(c) (2d. 
ed. 1980) (hereinafter referred to as "ABA Standards"). It is this general duty 
with which the prosecutor in any criminal proceeding is 
charged.

[¶91.]  The prosecutor in this case permitted a 
deputy county attorney who was not admitted to the Wyoming State Bar to 
participate in the prosecution. It is axiomatic that the prosecution authority 
should be vested in a public official. The prosecution function should be 
performed by a public prosecutor who is a lawyer subject to the standards of 
professional conduct and discipline (ABA Standard 3-2.1). Moreover, by statute 
the county attorney must be a member of the Wyoming State Bar (W.S. 18-3-301, as 
amended); hence anyone acting on behalf of the county attorney should be 
qualified in a similar manner. Similarly, the Amended Rules Adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Wyoming Providing for the Organization and Government of the 
Bar Association of the Attorneys at Law of the State of Wyoming provide at Rule 
19 as follows:

"No attorney from any 
other state shall be permitted to enter his appearance in, prosecute or defend, any action pending 
in any court or before any tribunal, commission, board or other governmental 
agency of the state, whose rulings are subject to review by the courts of this 
state, unless he shall have associated with him in such action or proceeding an 
active member of the Wyoming State Bar." (Emphasis added.)

[¶92.]  The record on appeal reveals the 
participation in the prosecution of this case of an individual who was not a 
member of the Wyoming State Bar. While W.S. 33-5-111 permits the admission of a 
foreign attorney for all purposes in a particular case provided that he shall 
have associated with him during the proceeding an active member of the Wyoming 
State Bar, the record reveals no such admission of the deputy county attorney. 
See also Dorador v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 839 
(1978). While there is some suggestion that the trial court acquiesced in the 
deputy county attorney's participation in the prosecution, it has been ruled, ". 
. . no court is justified in permitting an appearance before it by persons 
outside its jurisdiction and control or unaccountable for acts committed in 
processes before that court. . . ." Brown 
v. Riner, Wyo., 
496 P.2d 907, 908 (1972).

[¶93.]  In reviewing the record on appeal, 
however, I am unable to discern or ascertain any showing or prospect of 
prejudice to the appellant arising in connection with the ultra vires aspect of 
the prosecution in this regard.

[¶94.]  The record on appeal suggests that the 
prosecuting attorney may have encouraged prosecution witnesses not to discuss 
possible testimony with the appellant or appellant's counsel. The ABA Standards 
provide:

"(c) A prosecutor should 
not discourage or obstruct communication between prospective witnesses and 
defense counsel. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to advise any 
person or cause any person to be advised to decline to give to the defense 
information which such person has the right to give." ABA Standard 
3-3.1(c).

In the comments 
to ABA Standard 3-3.1 the reasons for the rule are explored wherein it is 
stated:

"Prospective witnesses 
are not partisans. They should be regarded as impartial and as relating the 
facts as they see them. Because witnesses do not `belong' to either party, it is 
improper for a prosecutor, defense counsel, or anyone acting for either to 
suggest to a witness that the witness not submit to an interview by opposing 
counsel. It is not only proper but it may be the duty of the prosecutor and 
defense counsel to interview any person who may be called as a witness in the 
case (except that the prosecutor is not entitled to interview a defendant 
represented by counsel). In the event a witness asks the prosecutor or defense 
counsel, or a member of their staffs, whether it is proper to submit to an 
interview by opposing counsel or whether it is obligatory, the witness should be 
informed that, although there is no legal obligation to submit to an interview, 
it is proper and may be the duty of both counsel to interview all persons who 
may be witnesses and that it is in the interest of justice that the witness be 
available for interview by counsel.

"Counsel may properly 
request an opportunity to be present at opposing counsel's interview of a 
witness, but counsel may not make his or her presence a condition of the 
interview. It is proper to call the attention of the witness to the problem of 
subscribing to a statement prepared by another person. In the event that a 
written statement is signed or otherwise acknowledged by the witness as a 
correct representation of facts known to the witness, a copy of the statement 
should be furnished the witness upon request.

"This standard does not 
impose any obligation upon a prosecutor to disclose the identity of prospective 
witnesses. The prosecutor's obligation in this respect is governed by the 
applicable law pertaining to discovery and the furnishing of the names of 
witnesses who are intended to be called."

[¶95.]  It should be observed that this duty is a 
"two-way street." It is unprofessional conduct for a defense attorney to advise 
a person, other than a client, to refuse to give information to the prosecutor 
or counsel for co-defendants. ABA Standard 4-4.3(c). The same reasons are 
advanced in support of the reciprocal obligation of defense counsel to act in 
congruity with the prosecution standard.

[¶96.]  The record on appeal reveals numerous 
instances in which the prosecutor appeared to evade discovery on the part of the 
appellant. While it has been said that there is no constitutional right to 
discovery in a criminal case (Dobbins v. 
State, Wyo., 483 P.2d 255 (1971)) and Rule 18, W.R.Cr.P., limits discovery, 
it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to intentionally fail to disclose 
to the defense at the earliest feasible opportunity evidence which would tend to 
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the degree of the offense or reduce 
the punishment. ABA Standard 3-3.11(a). The Standard further 
provides that "[t]he prosecutor should comply in good faith with discovery 
procedures under the applicable law." ABA Standard 3-3.11(b).

[¶97.]  Moreover, the constitutional standards of 
due process require certain disclosures, i.e. of exculpatory materials, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); of evidence regarding complaining witness, Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 87 S. Ct. 793, 17 L. Ed. 2d 737 (1967); and of evidence of promise of leniency to a witness, 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972). The prosecutor may have perceived that 
the trial judge imposed a greater obligation to disclose information to the 
defense than the law requires. Yet, the trial judge must be vested with wide 
discretion in interpreting and applying the appropriate constitutional standards 
of due process to the particular set of circumstances before the trial court. In 
the furtherance of due administration of justice, the trial court possesses the 
inherent power to define the general parameters of discovery in a criminal case. 
State ex rel. Mahoney v. SuperiorCourtofMaricopaCounty, 78 Ariz. 74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954). It is the 
obligation of the prosecutor to comply. In this case the prosecutor appeared to 
evade numerous attempts at discovery by the appellant and appellant's counsel; 
although, the level of non-compliance does not rise to a sufficient degree as to 
warrant reversal in this case.

[¶98.]  The record on appeal reveals a comment by 
the prosecution in closing argument that the appellant was a member of an 
"unholy trinity." The appellant contends that this reference constituted an 
impermissible injection of religion into the prosecution. While the phrase 
itself may be given a secular connotation, the question arises as to the 
permissibility of injecting the element of religion and invoking it on the side 
of the prosecution. The comments to the ABA Standards categorically disapprove 
of such remarks. The Commentary of ABA Standard 3-5.8(c) 
states:

"Arguments that rely on 
racial, religious, ethnic, political, economic, or other prejudices of the 
jurors introduce into the trial elements of irrelevance and irrationality that 
cannot be tolerated. . . ."

[¶99.]  While the arguments of counsel in this 
case could carry religious connotations, the court finds that the use of the 
phrase carries secular connotations so as to constitute permissible argument and 
not warrant reversal. This comment in and of itself might be construed as being 
innocuous if it were not for the later communication between the prosecutor and 
the appellant which revealed the fervor of the prosecution in this 
case.

[¶100.]            
The fervor of which I speak is exemplified by a letter which was written 
directly to the appellant by the prosecutor. The letter was written after the 
trial but at a time when the prosecutor knew that the appellant was represented 
by counsel. Thus, the communication was an unauthorized communication under the 
Canons of Ethics (See DR 7-104(A)(1)). The tone of the letter, which bears the 
printed biblical verse on the prosecutor's letterhead, "`he will not be 
disheartened or crushed until he has established justice in the earth. . . .' 
Isaiah 42:4," gives rise to an inference of the messianic zeal of the prosecutor 
in this case. The letter, which is attached to the supplemental brief of the 
appellant as Appendix M, is replete with biblical verses and personal opinions 
of the prosecutor and was improper in form and content. It should not be 
approved.

[¶101.]            
All told, I do not find prosecutorial misconduct sufficient to warrant 
reversal. At the most, it constitutes harmless error. However, the acts of the 
prosecutor were in several respects improper and were not sufficiently 
admonished in the majority opinion.