Case Title: Global Knowledge Training, L.L.C. v. Levin

Citation: 2010-Ohio-4411

Docket Number: 20091543

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Global Knowledge Training, L.L.C. v. Levin, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4411.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-4411 
GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE TRAINING, L.L.C., APPELLANT, v. LEVIN,  
TAX COMMR., APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Global Knowledge Training, L.L.C. v. Levin,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4411.] 
Taxation — Use tax on computer training — First Amendment, due process, and 
equal protection challenges were not properly raised — Record did not 
support taxing two courses — Decision affirmed in part and reversed in 
part. 
(No. 2009-1543 — Submitted May 11, 2010 — Decided September 23, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2006-V-471. 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Global Knowledge Training, L.L.C., a self-described “world leader 
in education in the areas of information technology, telecommunications, and 
broadband,” appeals from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), 
which affirmed a determination of the tax commissioner to impose a use tax on 34 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
computer-related training courses that Global provides to employees of its 
corporate clients in Ohio based on the commissioner’s conclusion that the courses 
were actually taxable computer services training. 
{¶ 2} On appeal, Global raises constitutional challenges, asserting that 
the taxing statutes violate free speech by taxing speech based on content and that 
they deny equal protection of law by taxing certain types of training courses and 
not others without a compelling reason for the distinction.  Global further claims 
that the regulatory language is unconstitutionally void for vagueness, as it fails to 
clarify definitions such as “computer equipment” and “computer systems.”  
Global also challenges the tax imposed on training courses involving routers and 
switches, which it asserts are not computer equipment; courses involving 
nontaxable application-software training as opposed to systems-software training; 
and beginning courses taught to employees who do not, in Global’s view, qualify 
as “computer programmers and operators.”  The tax commissioner posits that the 
constitutional claims presented by Global are not properly raised in this court and 
that Global has not demonstrated that the decision of the BTA with respect to the 
other challenges is unreasonable or unlawful. 
{¶ 3} We lack jurisdiction over Global’s free speech and equal 
protection claims because Global failed to raise them in its notice of appeal to the 
BTA, and we lack jurisdiction over its void-for-vagueness claim because Global 
failed to specify it in its notice of appeal to this court.  Regarding its 
nonconstitutional claims, Global has not demonstrated that the decision of the 
BTA was unreasonable or unlawful except with respect to two courses, which 
involved nontaxable application-software training, erroneously characterized as 
taxable by the commissioner. 
{¶ 4} Accordingly, except for its decision regarding tax assessed on two 
courses, the decision of the BTA is affirmed. 
Facts and Procedural History 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 5} According to its Senior Vice President for Product Management 
and Enterprise Solutions, Global “provide[s] training for courses on a variety of 
topics to corporate employees, funded by the corporation, [and] to professionals 
in that corporation employed by the corporation.”  The tax commissioner 
performed an audit of Global as a vendor of such services for the period July 1, 
1997, through June 30, 2000, and determined that Global had improperly failed to 
collect and remit use tax on a number of courses taught in various business 
locations in Ohio during that period.  The commissioner determined that the 
courses at issue constituted taxable “computer services” under the “training” 
provision of R.C. 5739.01(Y)(b).  With preassessment interest and penalty, the 
assessment amounted to $103,269.45.  In his final determination, the tax 
commissioner remitted the penalty, resulting in a final assessment of $91,872.15. 
{¶ 6} When purchased for use in business, computer services are subject 
to sales or use tax in Ohio.  R.C. 5739.01(B)(3)(e); 5739.02; 5741.02(A)(1) and 
(C)(2).  The definition of “computer services” includes “training of computer 
programmers and operators” when the training is “provided in conjunction with 
and to support the sale, lease, or operation of taxable computer equipment or 
systems.”  R.C. 5739.01(Y)(1)(b). 
{¶ 7} The tax commissioner promulgated an administrative rule to 
clarify the statutory language.  The version of the rule in effect during the audit 
period defined “computer services” as “[t]raining computer programmers and 
operators,” subject to the additional definitions for “programming” and “training.”  
Former Ohio Adm.Code 5703-9-46(A)(2), (5), and (6), 1992-1993 Ohio Monthly 
Record 824-825, effective March 21, 1993. 1  
                                                 
1.  Revisions to Ohio Adm.Code 5703-9-46 occurred in 2004. 
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{¶ 8} The rule defined “training” to mean “instructing computer 
programmers and operators in the use of computer equipment and its system 
software.” Id. at 825. The rule then defined “systems software” as “all 
programming that controls the basic operations of the computer, such as 
arithmetic, logic, compilation or similar functions whether it is an integral part of 
the computer hardware or is contained on magnetic media.”  Id.  Explicitly 
excluded from “training” was “instruction in the use of application software or 
other result-oriented procedures.”  Id.  Reinforcing the same point, the rule stated 
that “the service of writing, changing, or debugging of application software” was 
not included in “programming.”  Id.  Finally, the rule defined “application 
software” to include “programs that are intended to perform business functions or 
control or monitor processes.”  Id.  Thus, with respect to software training, the 
rule in effect during the audit period extended the tax to training on “systems 
software” but not to application software.  Id.  However, with respect to the types 
of equipment involved in the training or the persons attending the training, the 
rule relied more broadly upon the terms “computer equipment” and “computer 
programmers and operators.”  Id. 
{¶ 9} Global appealed the tax commissioner’s final determination to the 
Board of Tax Appeals, arguing that the services it provided did not qualify as 
“taxable computer services” because (1) it involved training on routers and 
switches, not “computer equipment,” (2) several classes involved nontaxable 
application software rather than taxable systems software, and (3) some of those 
attending courses often did not qualify as “computer programmers and operators” 
as required by statute.  Its notice of appeal to the BTA, however, did not raise any 
constitutional challenges to R.C. 5739.01(Y)(1)(b). 
{¶ 10} In its hearing before the BTA, Global presented the testimony of 
Michael Kevin Fox, a vice-president of Global, and offered ten exhibits in support 
of its contentions.  The BTA rejected Global’s claims, finding that routers and 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
switches qualified as “computer equipment,” the courses challenged pertained to 
systems software, except with respect to two challenged courses, and the persons 
trained qualified as “computer programmers and operators” as used in R.C. 
5739.01(Y)(1)(b). 
{¶ 11} Global appealed the BTA’s decision to this court, challenging the 
constitutionality of R.C. 5739.01(Y)(1)(b) with respect to free speech and equal 
protection and urging that the statute as utilized with the tax commissioner’s rule 
is void for vagueness.  Global also presents three propositions of law contesting 
matters raised before the BTA. 
Standard of Review 
{¶ 12} In Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 90 
Ohio St.3d 496, 497, 739 N.E.2d 783, we reiterated that our standard of review 
from a decision of the BTA is whether it is “reasonable and lawful.”  While we 
“will not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal 
conclusion,” Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 
93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789, we will affirm the BTA’s resolution of 
factual issues if the record contains reliable and probative evidence that supports 
the BTA’s findings.  Am. Natl. Can Co. v. Tracy (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 150, 152, 
648 N.E.2d 483; Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 856 
N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14.  As we noted in Nusseibeh v. Zaino, 98 Ohio St.3d 292, 2003-
Ohio-855, 784 N.E.2d 93, ¶ 10, the tax commissioner’s findings “are 
presumptively valid, absent a demonstration that those findings are clearly 
unreasonable or unlawful.”  Consequently, the taxpayer carries the burden “to 
show the manner and extent of the error in the Tax Commissioner’s final 
determination.” Stds. Testing Laboratories, Inc. v. Zaino, 100 Ohio St.3d 240, 
2003-Ohio-5804, 797 N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 30.  Specifically, “when an assessment is 
contested, the taxpayer has the burden ‘ “to show in what manner and to what 
extent” ’ the commissioner’s investigation and audit, and the findings and 
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assessments based thereon, were faulty and incorrect.”  Maxxim Med., Inc. v. 
Tracy (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 337, 339, 720 N.E.2d 911, quoting Federated Dept. 
Stores, Inc. v. Lindley (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 213, 215, 5 OBR 455, 450 N.E.2d 
687, quoting Midwest Transfer Co. v. Porterfield (1968), 13 Ohio St.2d 138, 42 
O.O.2d 365, 235 N.E.2d 511, syllabus. 
Constitutional Claims 
{¶ 13} Global presents three propositions of law challenging R.C. 
5739.01(Y)(1)(b), asserting that it infringes on constitutionally-protected speech, 
violates its constitutional right to equal protection, and is void for vagueness.  The 
tax commissioner contends that these claims are jurisdictionally barred because 
they either were not specified in the notice of appeal to the BTA or were not 
sufficiently specified in the notice of appeal to this court. 
Free Speech and Equal Protection Challenges 
{¶ 14} Global asserts that R.C. 5739.01(Y)(1)(b) violates the free-speech 
guarantees of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 
11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution because the definition of “training” 
provided in former Ohio Adm.Code 5703-9-46(A)(6), 1992-1993 Ohio Monthly 
Record 825, impermissibly distinguishes between training in systems software 
and application software based on the content of speech.  Global also advances an 
equal-protection claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Section 2, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, arguing that 
because otherwise similarly situated communicators are taxed or not taxed based 
on the content of their speech, the tax discriminates based on whether or not a 
person has exercised a fundamental right.  In response, the tax commissioner 
contends that we lack jurisdiction to consider these claims because Global failed 
to raise them in its notice of appeal to the BTA.  Relying on our decision in 
Cleveland Gear Co. v. Limbach (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 229, 520 N.E.2d 188, 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
Global urges that these constitutional challenges are properly presented to this 
court in the first instance. 
{¶ 15} R.C. 5717.02 provides that a notice of appeal to the BTA “shall * * 
* specify the errors therein complained of.”  It is well settled that these 
requirements are jurisdictional prerequisites to the exercise of authority by the 
BTA or this court on appeal.  See, e.g., Newman v. Levin, 120 Ohio St.3d 127, 
2008-Ohio-5202, 896 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 26 (jurisdiction of the BTA is “limited to 
errors specified in the notice of appeal”); Osborne Bros. Welding Supply, Inc. v. 
Limbach (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 175, 178, 523 N.E.2d 739 (where error was not 
specified, the BTA and the court on appeal lack jurisdiction over it). 
{¶ 16} However, we recognized an exception to this rule in Cleveland 
Gear Co. v. Limbach (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 229, 520 N.E.2d 188, in which we 
explained that “[t]he question of whether a tax statute is unconstitutional on its 
face may be raised initially in the Supreme Court or the courts of appeals, 
although not previously raised before the Board of Tax Appeals.” (Emphasis 
added).  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.  A facial challenge may therefore be 
raised for the first time in this court because the “Board of Tax Appeals is an 
administrative agency, a creature of statute, and is without jurisdiction to 
determine the constitutional validity of a statute.”  Id. at paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 17} Pursuant to Cleveland Gear, “the facial unconstitutionality of the 
legislation * * * is to be decided by considering the Act itself without regard to 
extrinsic facts.”  Id. at 231, 520 N.E.2d 188; see also ComTech Sys., Inc. v. 
Limbach (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 96, 100-101, 570 N.E.2d 1089 (a taxpayer’s 
constitutional challenge to the “one subject rule” involved facial attacks and could 
be considered by this court in the first instance because the court needed to review 
only the act and its history alone, without considering extrinsic facts). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 18} While Global argues in its brief that its free-speech and equal-
protection claims are facial challenges to R.C. 5739.01(Y)(1)(B), permitting it to 
raise them in the first instance in this court, the focus of Global’s challenge does 
not involve the text of R.C. 5739.01(Y)(1)(B), which merely defines “computer 
services”; rather, Global contends that the statute as construed by the 
administrative rule violates its rights to free speech and equal protection.  
Specifically, Global challenges the distinction made in former Ohio Adm.Code 
5703-9-46(A)(5), 1992-1993 Ohio Monthly Record at 825, between course 
content involving systems software and course content involving application 
software as exemplifying the content-based distinction that offends free-speech 
and equal-protection principles.  However, unlike former Ohio Adm.Code 5703-
9-46(A), R.C. 5739.01(Y)(1)(b) contains no explicit tax-related distinction 
between systems-software training and application-software training.  While 
federal courts sometimes consider administrative practice when evaluating facial 
challenges to a statute, see Forsyth Cty., Georgia v. Nationalist Movement (1992), 
505 U.S. 123, 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (“In evaluating respondent’s 
facial challenge, we must consider the county’s authoritative constructions of the 
ordinance, including its own implementation and interpretation of it”), for 
purposes of the Cleveland Gear exception, only the text of the statute itself may 
be considered when evaluating a “facial” challenge.  Cleveland Gear, 35 Ohio 
St.3d at 231, 520 N.E.2d 188. 
{¶ 19} To the extent that Global seeks to challenge the constitutionality of 
former Ohio Adm.Code 5703-9-46(A)(5), Global could have challenged the 
administrative rule before the BTA, which does have jurisdiction to invalidate an 
administrative rule, but did not do so.  See R.C. 5703.14(C) (affected person may 
file an application for review with the BTA to determine the reasonableness of an 
administrative rule promulgated by the tax commissioner); see also Stone v. 
Limbach (June 30, 1988), BTA No. 1985-C-931, at 21 (invalidating tax rule, 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
noting that “while O.A.C. Rule 5703-25-01 was properly promulgated, it is 
unreasonable as it conflicts with R.C. Section 5727.15”).2   
{¶ 20} Based on the foregoing, Global’s free-speech and equal-protection 
claims are not facial challenges to R.C. 5739.01(Y)(1)(b) as contemplated by 
Cleveland Gear.  Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider them because they 
were never presented to the BTA. 
Vagueness Challenge 
{¶ 21} Global also argues that the terms “computer equipment” and 
“computer systems” [sic] in R.C. 5739.01(Y)(1)(b) are “impermissibly vague” 
and therefore violate the due process guarantees of the Ohio and United States 
Constitutions.  The tax commissioner responds that Global failed to raise its 
vagueness claim in its notice of appeal filed in this court. 
{¶ 22} R.C. 5717.04 provides that a notice of appeal from the BTA to the 
court “shall set forth the decision of the board appealed from and the errors 
therein complained of.”  As this court stated in Newman v. Levin, 120 Ohio St.3d 
127, 2008-Ohio-5202, 896 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 28, quoting Norandex, Inc. v. Limbach 
(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 26, 31, 630 N.E.2d 329, fn. 1, “when a litigant fails to raise 
a particular argument in the notice of appeal to the court, the court ‘do[es] not 
have jurisdiction to consider the argument.’ ”  See also Lawson Milk Co. v. 
Bowers (1961), 171 Ohio St. 418, 420, 14 O.O.2d 217, 171 N.E.2d 495 
(dismissing an appeal from the BTA because the notice did “not sufficiently set 
forth ‘the errors therein complained of’ ”). 
{¶ 23} In its notice of appeal to the court, Global argues that the BTA 
“erroneously and unjustifiably applied R.C. 5739.01(B)(3)(e) and R.C. 
5739.01(Y)[1](b) to Appellant’s training courses at issue based upon the content 
                                                 
2.  In any event, Global failed to challenge the constitutionality of the administrative rule in the 
notice of appeal to this court, and we therefore lack jurisdiction to consider this claim.  See 
Newman v. Levin, 120 Ohio St.3d 127, 2008-Ohio-5202, 896 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 26. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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of and the pedagogical methods used in the courses in violation of Sections 2 and 
11 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution.”  Notably, Global does not expressly allege that 
the statutory definitions of “computer equipment” and “computer systems” are 
unconstitutionally vague and therefore constitute a deprivation of due process.  
Nor does a reference to the Fourteenth Amendment itself sufficiently assert that 
these statutory provisions violate due process and are void for vagueness.  
Accordingly, Global’s notice of appeal does not adequately set forth a 
constitutional vagueness challenge, and we, therefore, lack jurisdiction to consider 
it. 
Statutory Claims 
{¶ 24} Global does raise three separate claims pertaining to the 
application of R.C. 5739.01 and former Ohio Adm.Code 5703-9-46 to its training 
courses, arguing that the commissioner impermissibly assessed tax on several of 
its courses.  In its brief, Global urges that 24 of its courses should not be taxed: 17 
that involved instruction in the use of routers and switches, six that involved 
nontaxable application software, and ten that Global claims involved introductory 
courses not attended by “computer programmers and operators.”  The tax 
commissioner maintains that each of these courses is properly taxed as “computer 
services.” 
Routers and switches as “computer equipment” 
{¶ 25} Global argues that several courses effectuated training on routers 
and switches, not “computer equipment” as that term is used in R.C. 
5739.01(Y)(1)(b), and are therefore not taxable.  Specifically, Global urges that 
training may be subject to the use tax only if the equipment involved in the 
training is a computer.  The tax commissioner responds that training on routers 
and switches involves training on “computer equipment” or “computer systems” 
and is therefore taxable. 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
{¶ 26} R.C. 5739.01(Y)(1)(b) does not limit taxation to courses involving 
training on computers.  Rather, the statute levies the tax on instruction “provided 
in conjunction with and to support the * * * operation of taxable computer 
equipment or systems.”  (Emphasis added.)  The evidence presented to the BTA 
indicates that the instruction provided by Global in training employees on routers 
and switches would support the operation of computer systems.  Significantly, 
Global’s vice president testified at the BTA hearing that “in today’s network, the 
routing and switching environment is used in a more complex way to attach 
telephones, computers and printers.”  In addition, the course manual for 
“Understanding Network Fundamentals,” introduced at the BTA, shows that 
Global’s courses focus on “information technology” training and that such 
training includes instruction relating to routers and switches.3   
{¶ 27} Accordingly, the BTA reasonably and lawfully applied the law as 
to routers and switches, its findings are supported by reliable and probative 
evidence, and we affirm this part of its decision.  See HIN, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Bd. of Revisions, 124 Ohio St.3d 481, 2010-Ohio-687, 923 N.E.2d 1144, ¶ 13 
(a BTA decision is to be affirmed if it correctly applied the law). 
Application software v. systems software 
{¶ 28} Global also argues that six of its training courses involved training 
in non-taxable application software as opposed to taxable systems software: # 
6950 PERL Scripting, # 6980 PERL Scripting with CGI, # 8700 Nortel Hub 
Activity, # 8800 Router Installation & Basic Configuration, # 8900 Router 
Configuration & Management, and # 9300 Troubleshooting TCP/IP Networks. 
                                                 
3.  To the extent that Global argues that routers and switches might be used as part of 
telecommunications or cable networks, as distinct from computer networks or systems, Global has 
not shouldered its burden as the taxpayer to offer proof that any particular course that the tax 
commissioner assessed was not taxable because it pertained to telecommunications systems, as 
opposed to computer systems.  See Maxxim Med., Inc. v. Tracy (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 337, 339-
340, 720 N.E.2d 911. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
{¶ 29} With respect to the BTA’s tax determination involving # 6950 
PERL Scripting and # 6980 PERL Scripting with CGI, Global asserts that PERL 
and PERL with CGI are programming languages that are “used in web and 
network applications” and further argues that this instruction is not taxable 
because the programming language is used to write programs in the nature of 
application software, not systems software.  The tax commissioner, on the other 
hand, relies on testimony that “operating systems administrators” use the 
programming language.  However, that testimony does not by itself establish 
whether these languages primarily involve systems software or application 
software. 
{¶ 30} In this case, the BTA determined that the PERL courses involved 
application software because “Mr. Fox testified that both courses cover systems 
software and that VMS stands for a software operation.”  However, that testimony 
was relative to the course Open VMS Fundamentals, not the PERL courses.  
Contrary to the BTA’s determination, Fox did not provide any testimony as to 
whether the PERL courses related to systems software.  Rather, Global 
characterized PERL and PERL with CGI as “used in web and network 
applications” before the commissioner and the BTA.  Given the uncontroverted 
evidence that the courses at issue involve programming languages that are “used 
in web and network applications,” we note that the record simply does not support 
a finding that these courses qualify as taxable training.  Therefore, we reverse the 
BTA’s determination with respect to these courses.  See NFI Metro Ctr. II Assoc. 
v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 105, 107, 676 N.E.2d 881 
(reversing a BTA decision that “reached the factual conclusions” that “the 
testimony and evidence [did] not support”), citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 513, 516, 660 N.E.2d 440. 
{¶ 31} With respect to # 8700 Nortel Hub Activity, # 8800 Router 
Installation & Basic Configuration, # 8900 Router Configuration & Management, 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
and # 9300 Troubleshooting TCP/IP Networks, Global failed to properly 
challenge these courses as systems software in the BTA,4 and therefore, they were 
not considered by the BTA.  We decline to address the propriety of the tax 
assessed in conjunction with these courses in the first instance.  Neil House Hotel 
Co. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, (1946), 147 Ohio St. 231, 34 O.O. 127, 70 
N.E.2d 646, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
Individuals attending introductory level courses as 
“computer programmers or operators” 
{¶ 32} Global next argues that the attendees of some of its courses were 
not “computer programmers and operators.”  As noted previously, taxable 
“computer services” include “training of computer programmers and operators, 
provided in conjunction with and to support the sale, lease, or operation of taxable 
computer equipment or systems.”  R.C. 5739.01(Y)(1)(b). 
{¶ 33} Global argues that the introductory-level courses were so basic in 
their content that the people attending the training did not qualify as either 
“computer programmers” or “operators” as referenced in the statute.  The tax 
commissioner believes that the training course attendees qualified, and therefore, 
the courses are taxable. 
{¶ 34} The dispute as to the scope of the term “operators” stems from a 
prior decision of the BTA, Mentor Technologies Ltd. Partnership v. Tracy (Aug. 
25, 1995), BTA No. 94-A-1058, 1995 WL 514159, which the BTA relied on in 
the instant case.  In Mentor Technologies, the commissioner argued that 
“computer operators” means those individuals who “operated computers in the 
performance of their duties for their employers.”  Id. at *2.  The BTA rejected the 
                                                 
4.  In its decision and relying on an exhibit provided by Global to the BTA, the BTA noted that 
Global had challenged only four courses as involving nontaxable training in systems software.  
Global has not corrected the BTA’s characterization of its claims to the BTA. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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commissioner’s position, holding that a “computer operator” must possess “a 
higher level of training and understanding of the computer.” Id. at *3. 
{¶ 35} We disagree.  First, despite Global’s claim that beginners taking 
introductory courses cannot be “computer programmers and operators,” the 
General Assembly neither limited these terms to those with computer experience 
and knowledge nor further defined them.  A plain reading of R.C. 
5739.01(Y)(1)(b) reveals that “computer services” includes training of individuals 
who are not yet computer programmers or operators and is not limited to those 
already trained.  In fact, an “operator” is defined simply as “a worker who 
operates a * * * specified machine or device as his regular trade.”  Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary (1986) 1581. 
{¶ 36} Second, it was unnecessary for the General Assembly to further 
define these terms, as it expressly limited the scope of the tax in a manner that is 
relevant to the question of who may qualify as a “computer programmer or 
operator” by directing that computer services are subject to tax only when they 
are purchased “for use in business.”  (Emphasis added.) R.C. 5739.01(B)(3)(e).  
In other words, training becomes subject to the tax when an employer purchases 
the training to enable its employees to operate computers in the context of their 
employment.  See Compuserve, Inc. v. Limbach (1994), 93 Ohio App.3d 777, 
780, 639 N.E.2d 1227 (when R.C. 5739.01(B)(3)(e) was enacted, “the provision 
of computer services to business customers became a taxable transaction,” while 
the “provision of computer services to nonbusiness customers remained 
nontaxable”).  The record in this case demonstrates that the commissioner 
assessed the tax with respect to employer-purchased training that enabled its 
employees to operate computers and computer systems in the course of their 
employment.  Thus, the “for use in business” requirement of R.C. 
5739.01(B)(3)(e) assures that the persons being trained qualify as computer 
operators. 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
{¶ 37} Accordingly, the BTA reasonably and lawfully applied the law as 
to the status of the trainees, its findings are supported by reliable and probative 
evidence, and we affirm this part of its decision.  See HIN, L.L.C., 124 Ohio St.3d 
481, 2010-Ohio-687, 923 N.E.2d 1144, ¶ 13. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 38} Based on the foregoing, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider 
Global’s constitutional claims because they either were not properly presented to 
the BTA or were not incorporated into the notice of appeal filed in this court.  
With respect to its other claims, Global has not demonstrated that the 
determination made by the BTA in connection with routers and switches, 
application software, and the status of trainees was unreasonable or unlawful, and 
we therefore affirm the decision, except that we reverse with respect to the PERL 
and PERL with CGI courses, as they involve nontaxable training on application 
software. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Buckingham, Doolitle & Burroughs, L.L.P., Steven A. Dimengo, and 
David Hilkert; and Ropes & Gray, L.L.P., William I. Sussman, and Michael P. 
Robotti, for appellant. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Damion Clifford, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
______________________