Case Title: State v. Passino

Citation: 161 Vt. 515, 640 A.2d 547

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_PASSINO.92-078; 161 Vt. 515; 640 A.2d 547

[Opinion Filed 18-Mar-1994]

[Motion for Reargument Denied 08-Apr-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-078


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit


 Arthur Passino                               January Term, 1994


 Ronald F. Kilburn, J.

 James A. Hughes, Franklin County Deputy State's Attorney, St. Albans, for
    plaintiff-appellee

 Robert Appel, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney,
     Montpelier, and Arthur Passino, pro se, Swanton, for defendant-appellant



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant Arthur Passino appeals his conviction for
 involuntary manslaughter.  He alleges that the trial court denied him his
 constitutional right to present evidence and confront witnesses against him.
 We agree and reverse.
      On the evening of January 20, 1990, Shirley LeClerc was found dead in a
 vacant apartment, across the hall from the apartment she shared with her
 husband in Enosburg.  She had been severely beaten and strangled, and
 evidence indicated that the victim had engaged in sex before her death.
 Soon after her husband, Urbain LeClerc, found the body, defendant was
 discovered in an adjacent apartment.  After speaking with LeClerc, defendant

 

 went to his mother's nearby home where he showered and, uncharacteris-
 tically, put several articles of clothing through the washing machine,
 including a pair of blue pants he had been wearing that day.
      Defendant was charged with felony murder, allegedly having killed the
 victim with malice aforethought during a sexual assault.  The nature of the
 crime made it likely that the perpetrator's clothes would have come in
 contact with the victim's blood.  Pursuant to warrant, police seized the
 pants to conduct tests on stains in the material.  A state police chemist
 identified four distinct stains containing human blood, which were cut from
 the pants and individually marked.
      These blood samples and other evidence were forwarded to the Federal
 Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C., along with hair, blood and
 other body fluid specimens taken from the victim, defendant, and the
 victim's husband.  The FBI subjected the samples to DNA profiling analysis,
 to determine whether any of the evidence could be traced to the individuals
 tested.  Tests on semen found on the victim showed defendant to be the
 source, and positively excluded the husband.  The FBI tested two of the
 four blood stains taken from defendant's pants; one produced inconclusive
 results, but the victim was positively excluded as the source of the other.
      As required by discovery rules, the State notified the defense of its
 intent to use the DNA evidence at trial to establish that defendant was the
 source of the semen found on the victim's body.  In response, defendant
 filed a motion in limine to preclude counsel from informing the jury of the
 DNA results in opening statements, contending that it was "unlikely that
 the DNA evidence for inclusion [will] be admitted."  The court heard testi-
 mony on the DNA evidence in four days of hearings held on May 6-9, 1991.

 

      To support introduction of the DNA profiling evidence identifying
 defendant as the source of semen, the State offered testimony from three
 expert witnesses:  Dr. Dwight Adams, an FBI biologist with expertise in DNA
 analysis of forensic samples and the application of the FBI's methods in
 population genetics; Dr. Eric Buel, a forensic chemist with the Vermont
 State Police also qualified as an expert in DNA analysis and its application
 to population genetics; and Dr. Charles Kilpatrick, a professor of zoology
 at the University of Vermont and expert in population genetics and DNA
 profiling.  The witnesses offered detailed testimony about the technique of
 DNA profiling and the procedures employed and results obtained in this
 particular case.(FN1)
      In essence, DNA profiling seeks to determine whether genetic material
 unique to an unknown source, such as evidence from a crime scene, matches
 genetic material from a known source, thereby linking the known source to
 the crime.  The process comprises two stages.  In the first stage, an x-ray
 image, or "autorad," of the DNA from the known and unknown sources is
 produced.  If the DNA from those sources does not match, then the test is
 either deemed inconclusive or the known source is positively excluded as the
 source of the unknown DNA.  If the DNA matches, the profiling proceeds to
 the second stage, wherein a statistical analysis of population frequencies
 is performed to determine that the known and unknown DNA match because they
 came from the same person, not because two unrelated individuals happen to
 have some identical DNA.

 

      In summarizing its position regarding admissibility of the DNA test
 results purportedly showing defendant as the source of semen, the State
 argued, and the record supports, that the only issue was the validity of the
 second stage of the DNA profiling, the FBI's statistical analysis.  In its
 argument on the DNA admissibility, the defense asserted that "D.N.A.
 evidence for inclusion, as offered in this case, is not proper evidence and
 the population frequency analysis is not proper evidence."  Defense counsel
 also argued, "It's our position that [V.R.E.] 401 and 403 are violated by
 receiving D.N.A. evidence for inclusion.  Exclusion is a substantially
 different matter.  Certainly when the exclusions are clear and unequivocal."
      In the suppression hearing, Dr. Adams testified that "an exclusion is
 absolute," in that the known source could not be the source of a particular
 body fluid.  He also reported that of two blood samples taken from
 defendant's pants, one produced no DNA results, and the other showed "no DNA
 profiles which resembled the victim's blood whatsoever."  In corroboration
 of this testimony, Dr. Kilpatrick opined that the one bloodstain that gave a
 result matched defendant's DNA, effectively ruling out the victim as the
 source of the blood.
      The court's order excluding the DNA evidence expressly acknowledged
 that defendant contested only the FBI's probability calculations, which
 purportedly ruled out a coincidence in the match between defendant and semen
 found on the victim's body.  The discussion was confined to the composition
 of the comparison database and the assumptions made about defendant's
 ancestry, two critical components of an accurate probability assessment.
 The court found the FBI probability analysis flawed, and held that
 "[b]ecause the probability estimates are such an integral part of the FBI's

 

 DNA profiling, the test results in this case must be suppressed," and added
 that results showing a match are not admissible without reliable statistics.
      On June 4, 1991, the eighth day of a sixteen-day trial, the defense
 moved for compensation and expenses for the testimony of Dr. Kilpatrick as
 an expert witness.  This came the day after the court decided to admit
 defendant's pants into evidence.  In argument on the motion held that same
 day, defense counsel explained that Dr. Kilpatrick's testimony was needed to
 introduce the test results that had excluded the victim as the source of
 blood taken from one of the stains on defendant's pants.  The State
 vigorously protested presentation of any DNA evidence.  The prosecution
 pointed to the court's ruling in limine, the lack of requisite advance
 notice, and the fact that the defense counsel had made every effort to cull
 from the venire anyone with knowledge of DNA testing.
      The defense countered that the motion in limine and hearings on the DNA
 evidence dealt only with the propriety of DNA evidence purportedly including
 defendant as the source of semen; the court's order did not preclude tests
 excluding the victim as the source of blood.  The defense noted that,
 despite the lack of formal notice, Dr. Kilpatrick was listed as a State's
 witness, and had testified at length in the in limine hearing on the DNA
 evidence.  The defense contended that a fair trial hinged on the ability to
 present this exculpatory evidence.  The motion was denied, and defendant was
 precluded from presenting the exculpatory DNA evidence.
      Later in the trial, the State introduced the results of traditional
 blood serology tests conducted on one of the blood stains not subjected to
 DNA analysis.  The spot tested as type "A," the victim's blood type.
 Defendant attempted to cast doubt on the results by suggesting that the

 

 bloodstain could in fact have been "AB," defendant's blood type.  The
 defense also contended that defendant and the victim had engaged in
 consensual intercourse, and that the victim's husband had killed his wife in
 a jealous rage after discovering her affair with defendant.  After three
 days of deliberation, the jury delivered a verdict of guilty on the lesser-
 included offense of involuntary manslaughter.  On appeal, defendant contends
 he deserves a new trial because the trial court denied him his
 constitutional right to present the exculpatory DNA evidence.
                                     I.
      The trial court excluded the DNA evidence as a sanction for failure to
 notify the State of the intended use of the scientific evidence and expert
 witnesses, Drs. Kilpatrick and Buel.  Rule 16.1 of the Rules of Criminal
 Procedure empowers the trial court to require the defendant to disclose
 proposed scientific or expert evidence.  V.R.Cr.P. 16.1(b).  The rule also
 provides that, "[o]n request of the prosecuting attorney, the defendant's
 attorney shall disclose the names and addresses of persons whom he intends
 to call as witnesses at the trial."  V.R.Cr.P. 16.1(c).  In this context,
 Rule 16.1 strives to ensure the prosecution ample opportunity for pretrial
 preparation to respond to evidence involving medical or scientific
 expertise.  See Reporter's Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 16.1(b).
      The trial court may order appropriate sanctions for violations of
 discovery rules.  See V.R.Cr.P. 16.2(g).  Our review of the sanctions
 imposed, including exclusion of expert testimony, is limited to an abuse of
 discretion.  State v. Meyers, 153 Vt. 219, 223, 569 A.2d 1081, 1084 (1989).

 

 The discovery sanction aside, "[a] court's determination of whether to
 exclude expert testimony is discretionary and will not be disturbed" absent
 "a clear abuse of discretion."  Id. at 224, 569 A.2d  at 1085.
      Nevertheless, the exclusion of a defendant's proffered evidence
 implicates the constitutional right to present a defense and confront
 adverse witnesses.(FN2)  Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (1991); see
 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,