Case Title: People v. Woodward

Citation: 302 N.E.2d 62, 55 Ill. 2d 134

Docket Number: 45438

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1973-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
55 Ill. 2d 134 (1973)
302 N.E.2d 62
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant,
v.
LARRY WOODWARD, Appellee.
No. 45438.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed September 25, 1973.
*135 WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General, of Springfield (JAMES B. ZAGEL and CHARLES H. LEVAD, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.
ROBERT E. FARRELL, District Defender, Illinois Defender Project, of Mount Vernon, for appellee.
Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court:
The defendant entered a plea of guilty to the crime of attempted burglary in the circuit court of Madison County. Probation was denied and the defendant was sentenced to 1 to 3 years in the penitentiary. The appellate court held on appeal that the indictment to which the guilty plea was entered was fatally defective and reversed the trial court. (7 Ill. App.3d 607.) This court granted the State leave to appeal.
The sole question before this court is that of the sufficiency of the indictment. The indictment charged that:
The offense of attempt is statutorily defined as follows:
In the recent case of People v. Sanders (1972), 7 Ill. App.3d 848, not cited by either party in this case, the court considered the question of the degree to which the elements of the principal offense must be alleged when an inchoate offense has been charged. That court said at page 849:
Section 19-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides:
The appellate court in this case, faced with the identical question, held that "the indictment in this case was fatally defective in not alleging the specific `intent to commit therein a felony or theft' * * *."
Since these decisions, this court in People v. Williams (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 455, addressed generally the question of the degree of specificity required in an indictment charging *137 an inchoate offense. The defendant in Williams likewise contended that the indictment was void. In Williams the defendant alleged that inasmuch as his indictment for attempted kidnapping did not contain lack of parental consent as an element of the principal offense, the indictment was void. We stated in Williams at pages 460 and 461 as follows:
The sufficiency of an indictment for attempt was *138 specifically considered by this court in People v. Richardson (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 497, where at page 502 we said: "All that need be shown in a charge of attempt is the intent to commit a specific offense * * * and an overt act constituting a substantial step toward commission of that offense * * *." The indictment in question charges both of these elements and is therefore sufficient.
The indictment in question here falls directly within the rationale of Williams and the specific holding in Richardson.
The judgment of the appellate court is reversed in accordance with the views expressed herein, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.