Case Title: In re Town of Sherburne

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1989-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                No. 89-076


In re Petition of                            Supreme Court
Town of Sherburne
                                             On Appeal from
                                             Rutland Superior Court

                                             November Term, 1989


Arthur J. O'Dea, J.

Langrock Sperry Parker & Wool, Middlebury, and John H. Marshall and Dale A.
  Rocheleau of Downs Rachlin & Martin, Burlington, for appellants

Witten, Saltonstall & Woolmington, P.C., Bennington, for appellees


PRESENT:  Morse, J., and Martin, Supr. J., Barney, C.J. (Ret.), and
          Springer, D.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned


     MORSE, J.   The Town of Sherburne and Killington, Ltd. appeal a
superior court decision reversing a ruling of the Vermont Water Resources
Board.  The Board ruled that the existing classification of a 200-foot
portion of the Ottauquechee River as Class B is contrary to the public
interest.  See 10 V.S.A. {{ 1253(c), (e).  The superior court determined
that the Board acted arbitrarily, unreasonably and contrary to law.  See id.
{ 1270.   We reverse and reinstate the Board's decision.
                                    I.
     The Ottauquechee River flows through Sherburne Center, Bridgewater,
Woodstock, Taftsville, and Quechee before it converges with the Connecticut
River about forty miles from its headwaters.  The river is managed
according to the provisions of 10 V.S.A. chapter 47 and is classified under
{{ 1252 and 1253 as both Class B and Class C waters at certain intervals
along its length.  The portion of the river at issue is currently managed as
Class B waters. (FN1)
     The Town of Sherburne has undergone extensive development in the past
two decades.  Sherburne is noted for ski areas that attract both state
residents and non-residents.  Its population increases ten-fold during ski
and recreational seasons.  Most of the early housing developments in
Sherburne were built with individual on-site sewage disposal facilities
that have proven to be unsuitable for that area due to the soil's poor
natural drainage. Some of these on-site systems have malfunctioned and
threaten to pollute the waters at issue.
     To permit continued growth, especially in "cluster" developments called
for by town and regional plans, the Town proposed to construct and operate a
central sewage disposal facility that would discharge effluents into the
portion of the Ottauquechee River in question.  Because the state's water
pollution control scheme does not allow for the discharge of treated
effluents into Class B waters, (FN2) the Town sought to reclassify the subject
waters as Class C waters.
     Accordingly, in late 1986, the Town petitioned the Board to reclassify
a 200-foot portion of the river located within Sherburne Center.  The Town
requested that "the waters of the Ottauquechee River, from a point at the
easterly side of Route #4 as it crosses above the river southerly of the
confluence of Falls Brook and continuing downstream for a distance of 200
feet, be reclassified as Class C waters."  The petition was submitted
pursuant to 10 V.S.A. { 1253(c) which then required the Board first to
determine whether the existing classification is contrary to the public
interest. (FN3)  See In Re Classification of Ranch Brook, 146 Vt. 602, 606, 508 A.2d 703, 705 (1986).  The Town contended in its petition that "it suffers
injustice and inequity as a result of the established classification of the
proposed Class C zone of the Ottauquechee River and . . . that the
established classification . . . is contrary to the public interest,"
arguing that a central sewage treatment facility would provide for the
orderly development of planned growth within the Town and would abate
existing and potential pollution sources within the area.
     The Board convened a public hearing on April 27 and 28, 1987, at which
it heard testimony and admitted exhibits.  In its extensive findings of
fact and conclusions of law, the Board found, in sum, that "B" uses  --
namely, swimming, recreation involving extended water contact or ingestion,
and public water supply -- do not occur and will not be attained in the
subject waters.  The Board concluded that "[t]he current classification of
the waters in question is contrary to the public interest in that it
establishes water quality management goals that are inconsistent with
existing and attainable uses."  The Board announced in its decision that it
planned to propose a rule reclassifying this section of the Ottauquechee as
Class C waters.  However, it is the decision that the existing classifica-
tion is contrary to the public interest which is here appealed, not the
reclassification rule which was later proposed and adopted by the Board.

     The following parties, appellees here, filed an appeal in Rutland
Superior Court pursuant to 10 V.S.A. { 1270 (FN4) Vermont Natural Resources
Council, Connecticut River Watershed Council, North Hartland Cooperative
Water Company, Trout Unlimited, Two-Rivers Ottauquechee Regional Planning
Commission, Town of Bridgewater Planning Commission, Town of Bridgewater,
and George Turner.  On January 19, 1989, that court reversed the Board,
holding that the Board had acted arbitrarily, unreasonably and contrary to
law by failing to enforce the legislation's antidegradation policy and to
give "due consideration" to the ten factors enumerated in { 1253(e). (FN5) The
present appeal followed.

                                             II.
     This case arises in the context of a complex relationship between the
federal and state water pollution control schemes.  Congress enacted the
Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33
U.S.C.A. {{ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990), to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."  Id. {
1251(a).  The federal scheme allows states to adopt water quality standards,
provided the standards meet the approval of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency and are at least as stringent as the federal standards. (FN6)
Id. { 1313(a); 40 C.F.R. {{ 131.4, 131.5 (1989).  In particular, states must
adopt water uses consistent with the objectives of the Clean Water Act, and
water quality criteria sufficient to protect those uses.  40 C.F.R. {
131.5(a)-(b) (1989).
     Congress also mandated that states "develop and adopt a statewide
antidegradation policy." Id. { 131.12(a); see also 33 U.S.C. {
1313(d)(4)(B).  The antidegradation policy
          shall, at a minimum, be consistent with the following:
          (1) Existing instream water uses and the level of water
          quality necessary to protect the existing uses shall be
          maintained and protected[; and] (2) Where the quality of
          the waters exceed levels necessary to support
          propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
          recreation in and on the water, that quality shall be
          maintained and protected unless the State finds . . .
          that allowing lower water quality is necessary to
          accommodate important economic or social development in
          the area in which the waters are located.

40 C.F.R. {{ 131.12(a)(1)-(2) (1989).
     The federal regulations distinguish between "designated uses" and
"existing uses."  A "designated use" is one that is specified in the state
water quality standards regardless of whether it has actually been
attained.  Id. { 131.3(f).  An "existing use" is one that has actually been
attained on a given body of water after November 28, 1975.  Id. { 131.3(e).
This distinction is significant here because the regulations permit a state
to reclassify waters and remove a designated use if the state demonstrates
that attainment of the designated use is not "feasible" because, inter alia,
"low flow conditions or water levels prevent the attainment of the use."
Id. { 131.10(g).
     The Vermont standards have been approved by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency as satisfying the federal requirements.   The general
policy of the state is to manage the state's waters so as to protect,
maintain, and improve water quality.  Vermont Water Quality Standards { 1-
02(A)(1).  The state also recognizes that, although the discharge of wastes
into waters may adversely affect water quality, such discharges are a
legitimate use of waters when conducted according to law.  Id. { 1-02(B).
"It is the policy of the State of Vermont to provide for those legitimate
uses of waters which are necessary for existing or future social and
economic development . . . ."  Id.  Consistent with federal requirements,
the state antidegradation policy seeks to maintain "[e]xisting instream uses
and the level of water quality necessary to protect those existing uses,"
id. { 1-03(A), as well as to protect "high-quality" waters by allowing "a
limited reduction" in water quality only under certain circumstances, id.
{1-03(B). (FN7)
                                            III.
     An appeal in the superior court from a decision of the Water Resources
Board is to be "based solely upon the record of the proceedings before the
board."  10 V.S.A. { 1270.  The statute directs the superior court to
"determine whether the board acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or contrary to
law and [to] issue its findings and order accordingly."
     Section 1270 also provides for appeals from the decision of the
superior court to the Supreme Court, but does not clarify what standard of
review should govern appeals in the Supreme Court.  Because the superior
court did not take evidence but functioned solely as an appellate body in
this context, and because, unlike the Board, it has no special expertise on
the question of water pollution and the management of the state's waters,
we conclude that this Court's function on review in this case is the same as
that specified for the superior court -- that is, to determine whether the
Board acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or contrary to law.  This is
consistent with the approach taken by other courts when there is an
intermediate level of appeal from an administrative body.  In Sierra Club v.
Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 871-72 (1st Cir. 1985), for example, the court reasoned
as follows:
          [A] court of appeals review of a district court review
          of an administrative agency's record is an awkward legal
          animal.  Are we to set aside such a district court
          decision only if it is "clearly erroneous"?  Fed. R.
          Civ. P. 52(a).  Or, are we to ignore the district court
          and simply conduct our own review of the administrative
          record? . . .  We believe our answer to this type of
          question should be practical.  We should be more
          willing, or be less willing, to differ with a district
          court about the 'reasonableness' or 'arbitrariness' of
          an agency decision, depending upon the particular
          features of the particular case that seem to make a more
          independent, or a less independent, appellate court
          scrutiny of the administrative record appropriate.
          Where, for example, the district court's judgment turns
          on matters of fact that it has determined, or upon
          evidence presented by witnesses in court, or even upon
          lengthy district court proceedings in which
          knowledgeable counsel explain the agency's
          decisionmaking process in detail, we will show
          appropriate hesitation to overturn that judgment.  But,
          where the district court simply reviews a set of agency
          documents and, applying the same legal standard as we
          apply here, reaches a particular legal conclusion about
          the 'reasonableness' of an agency's action, we have
          greater legal freedom to differ with the district
          court's ultimate characterization of agency behavior.

(Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)
     In the present case, accordingly, we do not review the superior court's
decision with the degree of deference we usually pay a trial court when it
has taken evidence and made findings of fact in the ordinary civil context
under V.R.C.P. 52(a).  Rather, as the superior court was charged to do, we
also review the Board's decision.   The statute simply gives parties two
appeals, and the standard of review in each is identical: to determine
whether the Board acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or contrary to law. (FN8)
     To determine whether the Board acted "arbitrarily," we must decide
whether the decision makes sense to a reasonable person -- even if the
reviewing court might have weighed the factors differently.  See State Dept.
of Taxes v. Tri-State Industrial Laundries, Inc., 138 Vt. 292, 294,