Case Title: Tyler v. Common School District No. 76

Citation: 177 Kan. 387, 279 P.2d 302

Docket Number: 39,653

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1955-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
177 Kan. 387 (1955)
279 P.2d 302
E.M. TYLER, E.C. JOHNSON, J.C. LeBOW, G.R. KRAMER, M.E. McCARTHY, W.J. TURNER, H.J. TAYLOR, G.A. BERGSTEDT, A.L. HALE, W.D. HOOKER, C.T. JONES, A.T. KRAMER, J.V. ZIMMERMAN, GERALD F. THOMPSON, JOHN R. KIRK, J.R. SPENCER, R.K. VOSS, MARY F. HULSE, LAWRENCE THOMPSON, MURRELL GRAHAM, ALMA HAMILTON, MILDRED MILLER, VERN SCARROW, GLENN S. WILEY, LENDELL GRAHAM, D.S. HAMILTON, DALLAS R. MILLER and ED LOOMIS, Appellants,
v.
COMMON SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 76, a body corporate; and FRANCIS W. FRYE, CLARENCE SMITH and L.E. NELSON, as members of the School Board of Common School District No. 76, Appellees.
No. 39,653

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 22, 1955.
Geo. E. Teeple and J.R. White, both of Mankato, and A.W. Relihan, T.D. Relihan and T.E. Relihan, all of Smith Center, were on the briefs for the appellants.
Melvin R. Quinlan, of Topeka, argued the cause, and John S. Dean, Jr., of Topeka, and L.E. Weltmer, Roderick E. Weltmer and L.M. Weltmer, all of Mankato, were with him on the briefs for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.:
This is an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to a petition in an injunction action.
The parties named as appellants (plaintiffs below) in the title of this opinion commenced the action against the persons named therein as appellees (defendants below) by filing a petition in the district court of Jewell County. In due time the defendants attacked such pleading by a lengthy motion to strike. For present purposes it may be said this motion contained fourteen grounds, seven of which were sustained and seven overruled by the trial court. Following this action defendants demurred to the petition on grounds (1) the plaintiffs lacked legal capacity to maintain the action; (2) failure of such pleading to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and (3) of misjoinder of several causes of action. Prior to argument the defendants withdrew the third ground of their demurrer. After argument the trial court overruled *388 the first ground of such demurrer but sustained the second ground thereof on the basis the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants. Thereupon plaintiffs perfected an appeal from the ruling on the demurrer and from the order sustaining portions of the motion to strike.
The petition, like the motion to strike, is also lengthy. Nevertheless the allegations remaining therein, after deleting allegations stricken as a result of the ruling on the motion, serve a multiple purpose which cannot be accurately reflected without quoting them at length. Thus limited the allegations of such pleading read:
...............
...............
"`SHALL THE FOLLOWING BE ADOPTED?
"`YES ( )
"`NO ( )
...............
On November 18, 1954, more than two months after appellants had filed their abstract and brief, appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appellants' appeal, predicated on a material change in circumstances. This motion was passed with leave to renew on the hearing of the cause on the merits and appellants were granted permission to submit a brief reflecting their views with respect thereto. Following this action appellees filed their brief, approximately one-third of which relates to such motion and appellants filed a reply brief consisting of twenty-two typewritten pages, eighteen pages of which deal with claims advanced by appellees in connection therewith. It will not be necessary to here detail or discuss questions raised by the parties in connection with the foregoing matter.
It suffices to say that the motion, the brief in support thereof, *392 and the brief in opposition thereto, present new and disputed issues of fact which were not involved or considered by the trial court in ruling on the demurrer to the petition and which an appellate court is in no position to determine on an appeal from that ruling. Under like circumstances this court is committed to the rule (see Wahl v. Walsh, 177 Kan. 176, 277 P.2d 623; Whitaker v. Douglas, 177 Kan. 154, 277 P.2d 641; Southard v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 177 Kan. 26, 276 P.2d 299; Lee v. Beutel, 170 Kan. 54, 223 P.2d 692; Elam v. Bruenger, 165 Kan. 31, 193 P.2d 225; American Glycerin Co. v. Freeburne, 157 Kan. 22, 25, 138 P.2d 468) that it cannot reach out and make additional facts a part of a petition for purposes of determining the propriety of a ruling on a demurrer. By the same token where  as here  the propriety of a ruling on a demurrer is the sole appellate issue involved it will not reach out and consider new and controverted factual issues, brought into the case by a motion to dismiss in an attempt to dispose of the appeal on the basis of such issues. Under the confronting circumstances our view is the new and disputed questions of fact on which appellees rely to sustain their motion to dismiss must be brought into the action by proper pleadings and that such disputed factual issues, as well as questions of law arising when they have been determined, must be disposed of by the trial court before their legal effect can be determined on appellate review. We therefore turn to the ruling on the demurrer.
In view of the fact the issue about to be considered reaches us on a demurrer, it should be pointed out and must be kept in mind, that in determining the sufficiency of the petition we have no alternative but to assume the facts are as pleaded and not as they might appear at a trial after the joinder of issues by proper pleadings.
Resort to the petition, giving them the benefit of inferences to which they are entitled, discloses, among others, allegations to the effect that the appellee district is a common school district in which is located a city of the third class; that other appellees named are duly elected members of the district board; that the appellants are taxpayers within its bounds and at the time of the institution of the action were entitled to maintain it under the provisions of G.S. 1949, 60-1121; that on all dates in question the district owned a common school site on which was a school building; that no additional site for the construction of a new school was ever designated *393 by ballot at any annual school meeting or special school meeting called for that purpose as provided in G.S. 1953 Supp. 72-406 and 72-406a, nor has there been an election submitted to the qualified electors of the district for a change in such school house site as provided by G.S. 1949, 72-501; that notwithstanding the school board called a special bond election and at the election so held submitted the proposition quoted at length in the petition; that such proposition so presented to the electors of the district by ballot was dual and violative of G.S. 1953 Supp., 72-2018, in that more than one question was submitted on the ballot and that such questions were not separately numbered and printed and were not separated by a broad, solid line one-eighth of an inch wide, as required by the provisions of such section; that at all times since such election the school board has relied thereon as constituting a change of school sites as provided by G.S. 1949, 72-501, or as the designation of an additional site in lieu of the exercise of that function at an annual or special meeting of the qualified electors of such district as provided by G.S. 1953, Supp. 72-406 and 72-406a, and as authorizing the school board to issue and sell general obligation bonds of the district in the sum of $209,000.00 for the purpose of providing funds to pay the costs of acquiring and improving such site and the erecting and equipping of a building thereon; and that on the strength of such bond election the appellees intend to and, unless enjoined from doing so, will change the present common school site from its present location to the location described in the election ballot, namely; to the location immediately north and adjacent to the high school site; issue and sell bonds to procure funds for the purchasing of such site and the constructing of a building thereon; and use and expend the funds so obtained from the sale of such bonds for such purpose.
Appellants contend the foregoing allegations, and others appearing in the petition as heretofore quoted, are sufficient to state a cause of action for injunctive relief. Boiled down the paramount contention advanced by them is that when all the allegations of their petition are considered together and accepted as true they establish that the question submitted to the electors by the ballot at the special bond election was dual in character in that it contained two questions, which were submitted to the electors in one proposition, in violation of G.S. 1953 Supp., 72-2018, with the result the election was illegal and gave the school district board no *394 power or authority to issue or sell bonds or to expend money derived therefrom for the purpose set forth in the single proposition submitted at such election to the electors of the district.
G.S. 1953 Supp., 72-2018, which appellants claim was violated by the ballot submitted to the electors of the district, relates to elections required for the issuance of bonds for any purpose by a common school district and deals with the procedure to be followed in holding the election. Among other things it requires that the vote at a bond election, such as is here involved, shall be by ballot, specifies what shall be printed upon the ballot, and finally provides:
The foregoing section of the statute is comparatively new, having been first enacted by the Legislature in 1951, and we know of no case specifically holding that allegations of a petition disclosing a dual question has been submitted at a bond election in violation of its terms state a cause of action for injunctive relief on the basis its submission vitiates the election. However, we have decisions (See, e.g., Kansas Utilities Co. v. City of Paola, 148 Kan. 267, 80 P.2d 1084, and cases there cited) holding that the submission of such a question in violation of a like requirement in a similar statute has that effect. We know of no reason why a violation of the same requirement in G.S. 1953, 72-2018 should not be given the same force and effect.
Thus it becomes apparent the decisive factor in the case at bar is whether the allegations of the petition disclose facts which, if accepted as true, establish that two questions were submitted to the electors in one proposition at the involved bond election.
We now direct attention to matters which we believe must be considered and are entitled to weight in determining the question decisive of the appellate issue involved.
G.S. 1949, 72-501, dealing with common school districts, such as the one here involved, provides that a school house site of any such district shall not be changed until the question shall have been submitted by the school board to the qualified electors of the district at an election called for that purpose and a majority of all the qualified electors voting on the proposition shall have declared by their ballots in favor of changing the same. In addition *395 G.S. 1953, Supp., 72-406, provides that the qualified electors of such a school district at any annual meeting by a majority vote of those voting shall have the power to designate by ballot the site for a school house, and G.S. 1953, Supp., 72-406a grants like power to the qualified electors of any such district at a special meeting if action is taken as specified in the notice of that meeting. To say the least the sections of the statute just cited definitely indicate that propositions to change a school house site from one place to another or for the designation of an additional site for a school house on a particular site must be classified as propositions of a type separate and distinct from a proposition presented at a school bond election for the issuing of bonds to supply funds for the construction of a building and the purchase of a site without specifying where it is to be located.
Resort to the proposition submitted at the bond election, particularly the language "for the purpose of providing funds to pay the cost of acquiring a site on the North and immediately adjacent to the site of the present High School building," leads to the inescapable conclusion that it either contemplated the selection of a particular site through the medium of the proposition submitted or assumed that the site designated had been theretofore legally selected in the manner contemplated by the selections of the statute last above referred to. If it be contended such proposition contemplated a change of the site or the selection of a new site we have no doubt the inclusion of that question in the proposition as submitted made it dual in character and called for the separate submission of such question in the manner required by the heretofore quoted portion of G.S. 1953, Supp., 72-2018. This, we may add, is so even though it be conceded, as appellees contend, G.S. 1949, 72-1023, authorizes the submission of such a question at a bond election. It is to be noted such section has no application to a question relating to duality of a proposition submitted at such an election. In fact resort thereto discloses that it makes provision for the submission of numerous questions at a bond election, which no one would have the audacity to suggest are other than separate and distinct. On the other hand, if it be contended the proposition submitted assumes that a site had been legally selected it must be remembered the allegations of the petition are specific to the effect that that had not been done.
Finally it can be stated that in the face of the allegations of the *396 petition the proposition submitted, in and of itself, is subject to the construction that some electors of the district may have voted for or against the proposition submitted on the basis of the particular site to be selected; others may have voted for or against it on the theory the site had already been legally selected; others may have voted for or against it with the belief the proposition submitted was to supply funds for the purchase of a site and the construction of a building thereon; with the site to be subsequently selected in conformity with sections of the statute to which reference has heretofore been made; and still others may have refrained from voting at all due to the fact they could not make a choice between the two propositions or did not desire to vote for both of them.
Based on what has been heretofore stated and when all the facts as pleaded are accepted as true and then considered in connection with the proposition submitted at the bond election we are impelled to the conclusion the petition states a cause of action for injunctive relief, under the provisions of G.S. 1949, 60-1121, on the basis such proposition was dual in character, i. e., that two questions were actually submitted therein as one without complying with the clear and unequivocal provisions of G.S. 1953, Supp., 72-2018, heretofore quoted. With the petition so construed it necessarily follows that the trial court's ruling on the demurrer was erroneous and cannot be upheld.
In reaching the conclusion just announced it should be stated that in this opinion we have purposely refrained from discussing or even mentioning contentions, and the authorities relied on as upholding them, advanced by the parties in connection with matters which might have a bearing on, or be decisive of, their respective rights on a trial of this cause on its merits. All we here hold is that from the standpoint of stating a cause of action for injunctive relief, under the provisions of 60-1121, supra, the allegations of the petition must be deemed to be sufficient.
One point remains to be mentioned. An appeal was perfected from the trial court's ruling in sustaining certain portions of the motion to strike allegations from the petition. Appellants state that if, as we have decided, the petition, as deleted by order of the trial court, states a cause of action, no ruling of this court on the propriety of the lower court's ruling on appellees' motion to strike is invited or required. Under the circumstances the appeal *397 from that ruling is to be regarded as abandoned and requires no discussion or decision on appellate review.
The order of the trial court sustaining the demurrer to the petition is reversed with directions to set it aside.
ROBB, J., not participating.