Case Title: Patrick Charles Hannon v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC03-893

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC03-893 
____________ 
 
PATRICK CHARLES HANNON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-1662 
____________ 
 
 
PATRICK CHARLES HANNON,  
Petitioner,  
 
vs. 
 
JAMES R. McDONOUGH, etc.,  
Respondent. 
 
 
[August 31, 2006] 
 
 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Patrick Charles Hannon appeals an order of the circuit court denying his 
motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.1  
Hannon also petitions the Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Patrick C. Hannon was convicted of the first-degree murders of Brandon 
Snider and Robert Carter.  See Hannon v. State, 638 So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla. 1994).  
The jury unanimously recommended the death penalty.  See id.  Following that 
recommendation, the trial court imposed separate death sentences on Hannon for 
the murders of Snider and Carter.  See id.  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed 
Hannon’s convictions and sentences.  See id. at 44.  There, the Court detailed the 
facts surrounding the murder: 
 
Around Christmas 1990, Brandon Snider, a resident of Tampa, 
went to Indiana to visit relatives.  While there, he went to the home of 
Toni Acker, a former girlfriend, and vandalized her bedroom.  On 
January 9, 1991, Snider returned to Tampa. 
 
On January 10, 1991, Hannon, Ron Richardson, and Jim Acker 
went to the apartment where Snider and Robert Carter lived.  Snider 
opened the door and was immediately attacked by Acker, who is Toni 
Acker’s brother.  Acker stabbed Snider multiple times.  When Acker 
                                          
 
 
1.  Hannon’s postconviction motion was filed under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.850 on March 17, 1997, and his amended 3.850 
postconviction motion was filed on April 10, 2000.  The current version of the rule, 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, “appl[ies] to all postconviction motions 
filed on or after October 1, 2001.”  Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(a).   
 
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was finished, Hannon cut Snider’s throat.  During the attack, Snider’s 
screams drew the attention of his neighbors.  They also drew the 
attention of Carter, who was upstairs.  Hearing the screams, Carter 
came downstairs and saw what was happening.  He then went back 
upstairs and hid under his bed.  Hannon and Acker followed Carter 
upstairs.  Then Hannon shot Carter six times, killing him. 
 
In July 1991, Hannon was brought to trial for the murders of 
Snider and Carter.  [N.1]  During the trial, Richardson reached an 
agreement with the State.  He pled guilty to being an accessory after 
the fact and testified against Hannon.  Hannon was found guilty of 
both murders.  After a penalty proceeding, the jury unanimously 
recommended death. 
[N.1]  Acker was tried in a separate proceeding, was convicted, and 
was sentenced to two life sentences. 
Id. at 41.   
 
In sentencing Hannon to death, the trial judge found three aggravating 
circumstances applicable to both the murders of Snider and Carter––(1) previous 
conviction of a violent felony (the contemporaneous killings); (2) the murders were 
committed during the commission of a burglary; and (3) the murders were heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  See id.  With regard to Carter, the trial court found the 
additional aggravating factor that the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a 
lawful arrest.  See id.  In mitigation, the trial court considered testimony from 
Hannon’s mother and father that Hannon was not a violent person and also 
considered that Hannon’s original codefendant, Richardson, was no longer facing 
the death penalty.  See id.  The trial court found no statutory mitigating factors.  
See id.  The trial court found that the aggravating factors outweighed the 
 
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mitigating factors and sentenced Hannon to death for each murder.  See id.  On 
direct appeal, this Court upheld Hannon’s convictions and sentences.  See id. at 44. 
 
On direct appeal, Hannon asserted the following issues:  the trial court erred 
in striking prospective jurors Ling and Troxler for cause; the trial court erred in 
admitting certain statements by a prosecution witness, over defense objection; the 
trial court erred in admitting into evidence the bloody shorts and shirt worn by 
Snider when he was murdered and the testimony of Judith Bunker, a forensic 
consultant in the field of blood stain pattern analysis and crime scene 
reconstruction; the HAC instruction given to the jury was unconstitutionally vague; 
the facts of the instant case did not support the finding of HAC; the evidence did 
not support the aggravating circumstance that the murder of Carter was committed 
for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest; Florida’s HAC aggravating 
circumstance itself is unconstitutionally vague, is applied in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner, and does not genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for 
the death penalty; the facts do not support the prior violent felony aggravating 
factor; and the sentencing order was insufficient.  See id. at 41-44.  This Court 
denied all of Hannon’s claims.  See id.   
MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
On March 17, 1997, Hannon filed a shell motion for postconviction relief 
presenting 34 claims.  Hannon filed an amended motion to vacate judgment on 
 
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April 10, 2000, presenting 21 claims.2  A Huff3 hearing was held on November 16, 
2001.4  On that same day, the trial court issued an order reflecting its determination 
                                          
 
 
2.  These claims included:  (I) the lack of funding to investigate 
postconviction claims violated Hannon’s constitutional rights and the dictates of 
Spalding v. Dugger, 526 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1988); (II) requiring Hannon to file a 
motion under Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 one year after his conviction had 
become final violated his due process and equal protection rights; (III) Hannon was 
deprived of his due process rights and rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Amendments because the State withheld evidence that was material and 
exculpatory or presented misleading evidence or both; (IV) Hannon was denied 
effective assistance of counsel pretrial and at the guilt phase in violation of his 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (V) Hannon was deprived of his 
due process rights when unreliable and nonscientific evidence was presented at his 
trial in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Frye v. United 
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); (VI) Hannon’s trial counsel was operating 
under a conflict of interest which violated Hannon’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights; (VII) the State’s use of jailhouse informants violated Hannon’s 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (VIII) the State’s use of 
misleading testimony and improper argument undermined the reliability of 
Hannon’s trial; (IX) Hannon was denied effective assistance of counsel at the 
penalty phase and during sentencing in violation of his Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights; (X) Hannon was denied his rights under Ake v. 
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), when counsel failed to obtain an adequate mental 
health evaluation and failed to provide the necessary background information to 
the mental health experts; (XI) Hannon’s sentencing jury was misled by comments, 
questions, and instructions that unconstitutionally diluted the jury’s sense of 
responsibility; (XII) the trial court erroneously found one of the aggravators to be 
that the murder occurred during the commission of a felony, and that finding was 
an automatic aggravating factor; (XIII) the avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest 
aggravator is unconstitutionally vague, was improperly applied, and the jury 
received inadequate instructions; (XIV) the trial court committed fundamental 
error by instructing the jury regarding the HAC aggravator when the factor did not 
apply, and the jury instruction was unconstitutionally vague; (XV) the jury’s death 
recommendation was tainted by consideration of invalid aggravating 
circumstances; (XVI) Hannon is “innocent of the death penalty”; (XVII) the rules 
prohibiting Hannon’s postconviction counsel from interviewing jurors to determine 
if constitutional error was present during his trial violated Hannon’s constitutional 
 
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that an evidentiary hearing was required to address seven of Hannon’s claims.5  
The evidentiary hearing was conducted on February 18, 2002, and June 21, 2002.  
On February 3, 2003, the trial court issued an order denying Hannon 
postconviction relief.  This appeal followed. 
I.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Pretrial and During the Guilt Phase 
 
Hannon asserts that his trial counsel, Joseph Episcopo, provided ineffective 
assistance in failing to depose Ron Richardson or request a continuance; in failing 
                                                                                                                                        
rights; (XVIII) Florida’s capital sentencing law is unconstitutional on its face and 
as applied because it fails to prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the 
death penalty and violates the due process and cruel and unusual punishment 
clauses; (XIX) newly discovered evidence demonstrates that Hannon’s convictions 
and sentences are constitutionally unreliable in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments; (XX) Hannon’s death sentences violate the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the law shifted the burden of 
proof to Hannon to prove that death was inappropriate, and the trial judge used that 
presumption in rendering a sentence; and (XXI) the cumulative effect of the 
procedural and substantive errors during the trial court proceedings denied Hannon 
of his right to a fair trial.  
 
 
3.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
4.  On March 2, 2001, the trial court entered its first order denying in part 
Hannon’s first amended postconviction motion and granting an evidentiary hearing 
on certain of Hannon’s postconviction claims.  On March 12, 2001, Hannon filed a 
motion for reconsideration, claiming that the trial court had not held a Huff hearing 
to which he was entitled.   On November 6, 2001, the trial court granted Hannon’s 
motion for reconsideration, finding that Hannon was entitled to a Huff hearing, and 
vacated its March 2, 2001 order.   
 
 
5.  Specifically, the trial court determined an evidentiary hearing was 
warranted for claims IV (in part), V (in part), IX, X (in part), XVI (in part), XIX (in 
part), and XXI. 
 
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to adequately prepare for the State’s blood spatter expert, Judith Bunker; and in 
failing to question Michelle Helm with regard to Ron Richardson’s alleged 
jealousy.  Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:  
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 
competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 
demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.  
Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986).  Because both prongs of 
the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a 
mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court’s factual findings (if they 
are supported by competent, substantial evidence), but reviewing the circuit court’s 
legal conclusions de novo.  See Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (Fla. 
1999).   
 
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not 
ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  A fair assessment of attorney 
performance requires that “every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects 
of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and 
to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Id. at 689.  The 
defendant carries the burden to “overcome the presumption that, under the 
 
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circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”  
Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  “Judicial scrutiny of 
counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.”  Id.  It is under this legal 
framework that Hannon’s claims are addressed. 
A.  Failure to Depose Ron Richardson or Request a Continuance 
 
 
Hannon asserts that trial counsel was deficient in failing to depose Ron 
Richardson after discovering during trial that Richardson was to testify against 
Hannon.  Hannon claims that trial counsel had a duty to investigate Richardson’s 
relationship with Hannon and his influence on Hannon, as well as to impeach 
Richardson.  This Court has held that “when a failure to depose is alleged as a part 
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must specifically set 
forth the harm from the alleged omission.”  Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1124 
(Fla. 2003) (citing Magill v. State, 457 So. 2d 1367, 1370 (Fla. 1984)).   
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Hannon’s trial counsel testified that the defense 
theory was an alibi defense, specifically that neither Hannon nor Richardson was at 
the crime scene when the crimes were committed, and that both Hannon and 
Richardson were playing a drinking game at Richardson’s house the night of the 
crimes.6  Trial counsel testified that he did not direct any investigation into 
                                          
 
 
6.  Hannon testified during the guilt phase that at 10 p.m. on January 10, 
1991, the date of the crime, he was at Ron Richardson’s house playing a drinking 
game, Quarters, and that both Ron and Mike Richardson were there.  Hannon 
 
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Richardson’s background and did not remember if he had ever obtained 
Richardson’s criminal history before the trial began.  Trial counsel further testified 
that he did not obtain any additional investigative material concerning 
Richardson’s relationship with Hannon after Richardson, in a surprise move, 
turned to testify for the State during trial.  Trial counsel stated that the trial judge 
offered him an opportunity to depose Richardson after the State disclosed during 
trial that Richardson would be presented as a witness for the State but Hannon’s 
trial counsel decided that he would not conduct a deposition at that point because 
he believed Richardson’s story was totally fabricated, and that his best trial 
strategy was to question Richardson immediately in the presence of the jury 
instead of creating an opportunity for Richardson to rehearse his testimony during 
a deposition.    
 
Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because postconviction 
counsel disagrees with trial counsel’s strategic decisions.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689 (“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be 
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight . . . .”); Cherry v. State, 659 
So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1995) (“The standard is not how present counsel would 
have proceeded, in hindsight . . . .”).  In Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 
                                                                                                                                        
testified that he left Richardson’s house the next morning at 6:30 a.m.  Hannon 
also testified that he was not involved in the homicides.   
 
 
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(Fla. 2000), this Court held that “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and 
counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.” 
 
The record demonstrates important time factors, although not considered by 
the dissent, and shows that on Friday, July 19, 1991, during the guilt phase of the 
trial, the State indicated for the first time to the trial court that it had received 
information that Richardson, who was listed as a defense witness for the trial in 
this case, might reverse himself and decide to be a prosecution witness against 
Hannon.  On the morning of Monday, July 22, 1991, prior to resting its case, the 
State listed Richardson as a witness and at that late date provided Hannon’s 
counsel with a copy of a statement by Richardson that had been taken only hours 
before at 8 p.m. the prior evening.  The State had entered into an agreement with 
Richardson in which he would enter a guilty plea to one count of accessory after 
the fact and in return receive a sentence of only five years in prison in exchange for 
his testimony against Hannon.  
 
At that point, Hannon’s counsel, believing that the evidence would disclose 
to the jury that Richardson’s story was clearly fabricated for purposes of obtaining 
the “deal” with the State, decided that his best strategy was to continue with the 
innocence defense and the alibi basis.  Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that he consciously and strategically decided that he would not depose 
 
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Richardson after this last-minute turn of events because it was his strategy and 
approach to now use the element of total surprise in questioning Richardson with 
regard to the details of the crime and prevent the State from using the deposition to 
better prepare Richardson for his trial testimony.  Moreover, trial counsel related 
that Richardson was an integral part of Hannon’s alibi defense and, thus, his 
strategy and goal after Richardson turned to assist the State was to demonstrate and 
emphasize that Richardson was not familiar with any of the details of the crime 
scene, thereby bolstering Hannon’s argument that neither Richardson nor Hannon 
was at the scene and that Richardson had changed his story to procure his last- 
minute agreement with the State.  Trial counsel also testified that he was not 
interested in attempting to portray Richardson as a bad person or as a guilty party 
before the jury because that would also undermine Hannon’s alibi defense, which 
was predicated on Hannon drinking with Richardson at the time of the murders.  
Hannon’s trial counsel testified that his trial tactic and examination of Richardson 
was in fact ultimately successful, which the dissent does not consider, because on 
cross-examination, the defense elicited that Richardson actually knew very little 
with regard to the victims’ apartment: 
Q.  Please describe Mr. Snider and Mr. Carter’s apartment or house, 
apartment house. 
A.  I’m sorry.  I can’t do that.  I’m not familiar with their apartment 
house.  I’ve only been there one time prior to this––this deal.   
Q.  So you can’t describe any of the rooms? 
 
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A.  Well, as you come in, you come straight into the living room, but 
that’s as far as I’ve ever been in that house. 
Q.  What color was the furniture? 
A.  I––I couldn’t tell you. 
Q.  Did you ever notice any exercise equipment inside that apartment? 
A.  No. 
Q.  What kind of video equipment was in there? 
A.  I––I wasn’t familiar with the apartment. 
. . . .  
Q.  Where was the aquarium located in that apartment? 
A.  I’m not that familiar with that apartment, Joe.  I couldn’t tell you. 
 Further, Richardson conveniently testified that he was leaving the apartment as the 
shooting of Snider occurred.  Hannon’s counsel also testified that it was his 
intention to impeach Richardson with the testimony of his brother, Mike, who was 
expected to testify that Hannon and Richardson were at Richardson’s house at the 
time of the murder playing a drinking game.  Hannon’s counsel further stated that 
he chose not to request a continuance to investigate Richardson after he was 
disclosed to be a witness for the State because he believed a continuance would 
only give the State an edge by affording the State additional time to prepare 
Richardson for trial testimony to the detriment of his client, also a factor not 
considered by the dissent.   
  
The record supports trial counsel’s testimony that Richardson was unable to 
provide any meaningful details of the victims’ apartment for the jury.  The record 
also clearly demonstrates that Hannon’s counsel successfully revealed to the jury 
that Richardson had previously supported Hannon’s alibi by stating that he and 
 
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Hannon were playing a drinking game the night of the murders, and that he was 
not involved with the murder.  Moreover, counsel elicited from Richardson that up 
until even the night before he testified, he denied seeing the wounds to Snider’s 
throat, but within twenty-four hours had completely changed his story.  Richardson 
claimed that he suddenly remembered the wounds; however, it cannot be 
disregarded that Richardson’s memory was restored just in time for him to testify 
for the State in the case against Hannon.  Further, when asked about his drastic 
change in testimony, Richardson affirmatively testified that he had lied not once, 
but several times previously.  Finally, counsel highlighted to the jury that on the 
Sunday morning before Richardson’s new testimony he was facing the death 
penalty for two counts of first-degree murder, but by the evening of that same day, 
in exchange for his testimony against Hannon, Richardson had received a “deal” 
for only five years in prison.  
 
Clearly, the record supports a carefully considered and planned defense 
strategy on behalf of Hannon by his trial counsel and provides a full and proper 
basis for the trial court’s determination that Hannon failed to meet the first prong 
of Strickland in that he has failed to prove that counsel acted deficiently when he 
made a strategic decision not to take further steps with regard to Mr. Richardson, 
look into his background, determine his motive for testifying, or develop further 
information that could have been used to impeach him.  Although current counsel 
 
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may disagree with trial counsel’s strategy at that time and would have chosen to 
abandon the alibi defense when Richardson changed at the last minute to assist the 
State during trial, such current disagreement does not render trial counsel’s 
performance deficient.  Accordingly, we conclude that Hannon has failed to 
demonstrate that trial counsel was deficient in strategically deciding not to depose 
Richardson, not to seek a continuance, or otherwise conduct an investigation into 
Richardson’s background. 
 
Moreover, Hannon has failed to demonstrate any prejudice because he has 
not even suggested what evidence or information trial counsel would have 
procured had he deposed Richardson, or requested a continuance, or conducted 
further investigation, that would have so affected the proceeding that confidence in 
the outcome is undermined, nor does the dissent provide any insight into the 
subject.  See Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932.  Based upon the foregoing analysis, this 
claim has no merit. 
B.  Failure to Adequately Prepare for State’s Blood Spatter Expert 
 
 
Hannon asserts that his trial counsel acted deficiently in failing to investigate 
the credentials of the State’s blood spatter expert, Judith Bunker, as well as failing 
to question her credentials and challenge her testimony at trial.  To satisfy the 
deficiency prong of Strickland, Hannon must demonstrate that trial counsel’s 
 
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representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 688. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he was aware that 
Bunker had been hired as the State’s expert but decided not to conduct an 
investigation into Bunker’s credentials because her testimony regarding the blood 
spatter at the crime scene was totally irrelevant to Hannon’s alibi defense that he 
was not at the crime scene on the night of the murders, a factor not considered by 
the dissent.  Trial counsel stated that he did not obtain Bunker’s personnel file, was 
not aware whether Bunker ever completed high school or attended college, and had 
not seen a group of letters indicating that Bunker had not worked at various places 
or lectured at certain places as represented on her resume.  Trial counsel stated at 
the postconviction evidentiary hearing that he most likely would not have used this 
information regarding Bunker to impeach her at trial.  Although confronting this 
witness with this type of information would have made him look sharp, it would 
not have advanced Hannon’s defense in any way and would have only left the jury 
wondering why counsel was even taking the time to question Bunker if she truly 
had nothing to do with Hannon’s defense.  The dissent provides no explanation for 
this gap.  Trial counsel further testified that he chose not to question Bunker’s 
credentials at trial to avoid giving the jury the impression that he was attempting to 
present an inconsistent defense.  Trial counsel testified that Bunker’s testimony did 
 
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not adversely impact Hannon’s defense because Bunker was never able to confirm 
any of the victims’ blood on Hannon.  He did object to the introduction of crime 
scene photographs because he believed the photographs were being admitted 
simply to emphasize the goriness of the crime but decided not to cross-examine 
Bunker with regard to these photographs.  The defense strategy was to continue 
with the theory that Hannon was not at the crime scene and, therefore, cross-
examining this witness would only confuse the jury with regard to why he was 
attacking a witness that was not at all relevant to Hannon’s case.     
 
Based on trial counsel’s testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, 
Hannon has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel acted deficiently when he made 
these strategic decisions with regard to witness Bunker.  Trial counsel’s 
performance did not fall below a standard of reasonableness in failing to challenge 
the credentials of a witness who was not at all relevant to any aspect of Hannon’s 
defense that he did not commit the murders and was not present at the victims’ 
apartment at the time of the murders.  These reasonable strategic decisions were 
made in an attempt to avoid confusing the jury by attacking a witness that was not 
relevant to the defense case.  Again, current counsel disagrees with the strategy and 
would have made the decision to challenge Bunker’s credentials, but the evidence 
does not support the conclusion that trial counsel’s performance was deficient.  See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Moreover, trial counsel’s tactical decision not to 
 
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challenge or impeach Bunker’s blood spatter testimony was reasonable because 
Bunker’s testimony did not implicate Hannon in the murders, nor was it even an 
element in the State’s case against Hannon.     
 
Hannon has also failed to demonstrate prejudice with regard to these 
strategic decisions.  This Court on direct appeal determined that Bunker’s 
testimony relating to the blood spatter evidence was properly admitted at Hannon’s 
trial only to assist the jury in understanding the facts.  See Hannon, 638 So. 2d at 
43.  Furthermore, this Court has previously determined in other cases that the 
presentation of Bunker’s allegedly exaggerated credentials to a jury has little effect 
on the outcome, given that she has been recognized as a blood spatter expert in 
numerous other cases.  See Correll v. State, 698 So. 2d 522, 523-24 (Fla. 1997); 
see also Gorby v. State, 819 So. 2d 664, 677 (Fla. 2002).  In Correll, this Court 
stated: 
[T]he discrepancies between the level of education, training, and 
experience Bunker testified to at trial and the asserted level of 
education, training, and experience she actually had were not so great 
as to make any difference in the outcome of the case.  Moreover, 
Bunker’s vita, which among other things, falsely set forth that Bunker 
had a high school diploma, was never seen by the jury.  Thus, any 
misrepresentations contained in the vita are irrelevant to Correll’s 
claim. 
 
The only alleged misrepresentation of any import was Bunker’s 
assertion that she had worked as an assistant and technical specialist 
for the medical examiner’s office from 1970 through 1982, when in 
reality she was a secretary at the medical examiner’s office from 1970 
to 1974, an assistant to the medical examiner from 1974 to 1981, and 
a technical specialist for the last five months of her employment with 
 
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the medical examiner’s office.  In view of the fact that it is undisputed 
that she worked on thousands of cases while in the employ of the 
medical examiner, even this discrepancy becomes less serious. 
 
However, assuming for the sake of argument that Bunker’s 
testimony did contain serious discrepancies . . . we are convinced that 
these discrepancies did not have any impact on the outcome of the 
case in light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial in 
support of Correll’s guilt. 
698 So. 2d at 524.  During Hannon’s trial, Bunker made misrepresentations with 
regard to her credentials similar to those this Court addressed in Correll.  
Specifically, Bunker testified that from 1970 to 1982 she was employed by the 
Office of the District Nine Medical Examiner with jurisdiction in Orange, Osceola, 
and Seminole counties.  She testified that as an assistant to the medical examiner 
one of her primary responsibilities was to assist the medical examiner in the 
medical/legal investigation of death.  She also testified that she had presented 
courses on blood stain evidence and conducted workshops and lectured at various 
colleges and institutions.  Similar to this Court’s conclusion in Correll, any 
discrepancies in Bunker’s testimony in the instant case did not “so affect[] the 
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.”  Maxwell, 490 So. 2d 
at 932.  Additionally, Bunker’s testimony with regard to the blood spatters did not 
link Hannon to the crime scene.  The dissent fails to address this area of concern, 
 
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but is critical without substantive support.  Accordingly, this claim is also without 
merit.7 
 
Hannon further claims that the trial court erred in summarily denying the 
following claims with regard to Bunker:  trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
investigate Bunker’s background, the State presented unreliable and nonscientific 
blood spatter testimony through Bunker, and the State’s failure to disclose 
Bunker’s qualifications and misrepresentations of Bunker’s qualifications as an 
expert in the field of blood spatter constituted a Brady and Giglio violation.  A 
criminal defendant alleging a Brady violation bears the burden to show prejudice, 
i.e., to show a reasonable probability that the undisclosed evidence would have 
produced a different verdict.  See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 n.20 
(1999).  To demonstrate prejudice under Giglio it must be established that “there is 
any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment 
of the jury.”  United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).  Hannon has failed 
to demonstrate prejudice relating to any aspect of Bunker’s testimony sufficient to 
establish either a Brady or Giglio violation.  Therefore, the trial court’s rejection of 
these claims was not improper.   
                                          
 
 
7.  Hannon also claims that the trial court did not address the significance of 
Bunker’s testimony on the penalty phase of trial and thus overlooked the relevance 
of Bunker’s testimony as it pertains to the HAC aggravator.  However, this Court 
upheld the application of HAC as to both murders without relying on Bunker’s 
blood spatter testimony.  See Hannon, 638 So. 2d at 43. 
 
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C.  Failure to Question Michelle Helm 
 
 
 
Hannon contends that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to question 
Michelle Helm, the former girlfriend of Ron Richardson, regarding her July 9, 
1991, deposition testimony.  Hannon asserts that Helm testified in her deposition 
that Richardson was a very jealous person who was violent and had threatened to 
kill her, often accusing her of sleeping with other men, especially Robbie Carter 
and Jim Acker.  At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he was 
present at Helm’s deposition but was not concerned with this information to attack 
Richardson’s testimony at trial because Richardson’s specific bad acts were not 
only irrelevant to Hannon’s alibi defense, such specific bad act evidence would not 
have been admissible at trial.  Trial counsel testified that it was his strategy to 
lessen the focus on anything negative with regard to Richardson because it would 
be beneficial to Hannon’s case with Richardson being Hannon’s alibi witness until 
he altered his position at the end of the trial.  Moreover, trial counsel’s main focus 
when cross-examining Richardson after the change in testimony at the last moment 
was to show the jury that Richardson did not remember the details of the victims’ 
apartment, and this negative information was not necessary to bolster the argument 
that Richardson’s story was fabricated.     
 
Based on the foregoing, Hannon has not demonstrated that trial counsel 
acted deficiently when he made the strategic decisions with regard to the 
 
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interrogation of Helm concerning her deposition testimony and chose not to use 
her to attack Richardson.  Hannon was not prejudiced by these decisions and 
accordingly, this claim has no merit. 
II.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty Phase 
To succeed in an ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel claim, the 
claimant must demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently and that such 
deficiency prejudiced his defense.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Pursuant to 
Strickland, trial counsel has an obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation 
into mitigation.  See id. at 691; see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).  
Counsel’s decision to not present mitigation evidence may be a tactical decision 
properly within counsel’s discretion.  See Brown v. State, 439 So. 2d 872, 875 
(Fla. 1983) (“The choice by counsel to present or not present evidence in 
mitigation is a tactical decision properly within counsel’s discretion.”); Valle v. 
State, 705 So. 2d 1331, 1335 n.4 (Fla. 1997) (same); Gorham v. State, 521 So. 2d 
1067, 1070 (Fla. 1988) (same).  When evaluating claims that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate or present mitigating evidence, this Court has 
phrased the defendant’s burden as showing that counsel’s ineffectiveness 
“deprived the defendant of a reliable penalty phase proceeding.”  Asay v. State, 
769 So. 2d 974, 985 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 
 
- 21 -
(Fla. 1998)).  Further, as the United States Supreme Court recently stated in 
Wiggins:  
[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or 
to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary.  . . . [A] particular decision 
not to investigate must be directly assessed for 
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy 
measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.  
 
 
. . . . 
. . . [O]ur principal concern in deciding whether [counsel] 
exercised “reasonable professional judgmen[t]” is not whether counsel 
should have presented a mitigation case.  Rather, we focus on whether 
the investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce 
mitigating evidence . . . was itself reasonable.  In assessing counsel’s 
investigation, we must conduct an objective review of their 
performance, measured for “reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms,” which includes a context-dependent 
consideration of the challenged conduct as seen “from counsel’s 
perspective at the time.”  
539 U.S. at 521-23 (citations omitted) (fifth alteration in original) (first emphasis 
supplied) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 691).   
 
Contrary to the critical dissenting view, the counsel provided was neither 
standardless nor empty.  As evidence of trial counsel’s deficiency, Hannon asserts 
that trial counsel advanced an invalid lingering doubt argument during the penalty 
phase, hopeful that the jury would believe Hannon did not have the type of 
character to be involved in these crimes, and that trial counsel failed to investigate 
and present mitigation during the penalty phase.  Specifically, Hannon asserts that 
trial counsel was ineffective in pursuing the innocence/alibi defense even after 
 
- 22 -
Hannon’s alibi, Richardson, had changed his testimony to assist the State at the end 
of the trial and the jury had found Hannon guilty.   
 
The nature of our bifurcated system in Florida places an onerous burden on 
death penalty counsel to be informed when making strategic and tactical decisions 
throughout both the guilt and penalty phases.  Such is neither standardless nor an 
empty promise.  We require and encourage death penalty counsel to conduct 
reasonable investigations as are appropriate to ensure that he or she can properly 
counsel and inform a defendant with regard to the nature and extent of the 
mitigation that may be viable in the case.  However, not every death penalty 
investigation will find mitigating evidence, and an investigation into mitigation 
will run the gamut from discovering latent superficial mental disabilities to very 
open and evident brain damage.  In addition, Strickland does not require defense 
counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case.  See Wiggins, 
539 U.S. at 533.  However, if defense counsel decides not to investigate mitigation, 
that “particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to 
counsel’s judgments.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521-22 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 691); see also Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567, 572 (Fla. 1996) (stating that in 
evaluating the competence of counsel “the actual performance of counsel in 
 
- 23 -
preparation for and during the penalty phase proceedings, as well as the reasons 
advanced therefor,” must be considered).   
 
 
Investigating and presenting mental health mitigation is not always but 
certainly at times may be inconsistent with presenting an innocence defense during 
the penalty phase.  However, failing to investigate and present mental health 
mitigation is not the sine qua non of ineffective assistance of counsel.  We 
therefore must determine whether trial counsel’s particular decision in this case not 
to investigate and develop mitigation was reasonable under the circumstances.  See 
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521-22.  Based on the record in this case, Hannon has not and 
cannot demonstrate that his trial counsel was deficient during the penalty phase 
because, under these circumstances, Hannon’s trial counsel at the time had specific 
tactical and calculated reasons for the strategy adopted.  Counsel did not default in 
his obligation, as characterized by the dissent, but strategically adopted a different 
path.  Further, the path taken was one with which Hannon agreed and which he 
fully supported. 8  
                                          
 
 
8.  The dissent asserts that when trial counsel initially stated that he would 
not be offering evidence in mitigation, the trial court “directed [counsel] to 
reconsider” his decision, see dissenting op. at 95-96; however, the trial court 
merely gave Hannon’s trial counsel overnight to review pertinent case law and 
“thoroughly discuss whether or not the defendant should put on mitigating 
evidence.”  With regard to the initial decision not to present mitigation, trial 
counsel stated, “We have discussed it, but I was expressing [Hannon’s] wishes.  I 
will continue to discuss it.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  Even the trial judge expressly 
 
- 24 -
 
At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that 
Hannon, as well as Hannon’s parents, adamantly maintained Hannon’s innocence 
throughout the guilt and penalty phases.  Trial counsel therefore decided to focus 
on obtaining an acquittal during the guilt phase, arguing that Hannon was totally 
innocent and not present at the crime scene, and then only if necessary proceed to 
establish during the penalty phase that Hannon did not have the type of character to 
commit such murders.  Trial counsel testified that Hannon assisted in every aspect 
                                                                                                                                        
noted that “[i]f Mr. Hannon knowingly and intelligently waives his right to present 
mitigating evidence or circumstances, he has that right under the law.”   
In Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246, 250 (Fla. 1993), this Court 
acknowledged the “problems inherent in a trial record that does not adequately 
reflect a defendant’s waiver of his right to present any mitigating evidence” and 
announced the following prospective rule to be applied in such situations: 
 
When a defendant, against his counsel’s advice, refuses to permit the 
presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, counsel must 
inform the court on the record of the defendant’s decision.  Counsel 
must indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably 
believes there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and 
what that evidence would be.  The court should then require the 
defendant to confirm on the record that his counsel has discussed 
these matters with him, and despite counsel’s recommendation, he 
wishes to waive presentation of penalty phase evidence. 
Id. at 250.  Hannon’s trial preceded this Court’s decision in Koon.  Therefore, 
counsel could not benefit from the aforementioned rule in memorializing on the 
record that Hannon had knowingly and voluntarily waived the presentation of any 
type of mitigation that would detract from Hannon’s assertion that he was not at 
the crime scene and he did not possess the type of character to commit the 
murders. 
 
- 25 -
of his defense,9 including testifying in his own defense during the guilt phase, and 
agreed to continue with the presentation of the innocence theme defense during the 
penalty phase, even after he was convicted.   Trial counsel stated that he explained 
mitigation to Hannon and advised Hannon that he could change his position and 
admit his involvement in the murders during the penalty phase, but Hannon said he 
did not wish to do so.  Cf. Cummings-El v. State, 863 So. 2d 246, 252 (Fla. 2003) 
(concluding that counsel was not ineffective in limiting mitigation investigation 
where defendant was adamant about not wanting his family to “beg for his life,” 
and the defendant understood the nature and consequences of his decision not to 
present mitigating evidence).10   
Trial counsel further testified that he had discussions with Hannon’s parents 
and his sister Moreen, and he sought their input with regard to Hannon’s defense. 
According to counsel, Hannon’s parents and Moreen also agreed with a penalty 
phase strategy of character and to continue maintaining Hannon’s innocence.  Trial 
counsel stated that Hannon’s parents “continued to believe their son did not and 
could not do this.”  Therefore, the dissent’s assertion that counsel “blindly 
                                          
 
 
9.  Trial counsel testified that Hannon understood the jury process and his 
rights in the criminal proceedings, that he paid attention to the progress of his case, 
and that he exhibited no signs of mental impairment.   
 
10.  Hannon’s decision not to present evidence in mitigation is demonstrated 
by Mrs. Hannon stating as she testified at the penalty phase that Hannon “didn’t 
want us to [testify] because he knows how badly we’re hurting.”   
 
 
- 26 -
follow[ed] his client’s desire to limit mitigation,” see dissenting op. at 102, is 
unsupported by the postconviction record.  Rather, counsel’s adoption of a strategy 
that focused on Hannon’s character was the product of discussions with not only 
Hannon, but with his most intimate family members.  According to counsel, 
Hannon and his family agreed not to pursue a strategy where, after proceeding 
during the guilt phase on the theory that Hannon was not present at the time of the 
murders, Hannon at the penalty phase would suddenly admit he committed the 
crimes and begin offering evidence in mitigation of the murders.  Counsel stated 
that he, Hannon, and his family “decided that [changing tactics] wasn’t what it was 
going to be because Mr. Hannon was adamant.  I can’t tell you how much he was 
adamant he wasn’t there.”  Neither Hannon nor any of his family members 
suggested any mitigation matters for the penalty phase.  Rather, Hannon, his 
parents, and his sister consistently urged the strategy that counsel ultimately 
adopted and pursued; that is, “keep[ing] a consistent defense and a consistent 
position.”  
 
Trial counsel further testified that he was fully aware that lingering doubt 
was not a statutory mitigator.  However, trial counsel stated that providing 
evidence during the penalty phase that Hannon did not have the type of character 
to commit the murders, and continuing to support the underlying innocence 
defense, had a real and practical jury effect that would mitigate in favor of the jury 
 
- 27 -
sparing Hannon’s life.11   It was the character and demeanor of Hannon that trial 
counsel advanced in a very practical way.  Even an expert in capital cases 
presented by Hannon during the postconviction evidentiary hearing admitted that 
the consistent approach had a practical and real impact factor in the juror’s vote in 
terms of whether to vote for life imprisonment, notwithstanding that lingering 
doubt is not a recognized and valid statutory mitigating factor.   
 
The record supports trial counsel’s postconviction testimony that a defense 
based on the notions that Hannon did not commit the murders and was not even the 
type of person who could have committed the murders was developed from the 
beginning of trial.  Even during the guilt phase, trial counsel presented Rusty Horn 
and Paul Kilgore to show that Hannon did not have the type of character to commit 
the murders and moved all of their guilt phase testimony into evidence during the 
penalty phase.  Horn, Hannon’s roommate and supervisor at his stucco job, 
described Hannon as a “teddy bear” type who had a reputation for nonviolence.  
Kilgore, another of Hannon’s roommates, testified that Hannon was a nice person.  
                                          
 
 
11.  Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we have not “transformed counsel’s 
continuing innocence strategy into a lingering doubt strategy” or a “reasonable 
doubt” strategy.  Dissenting op. at 93-94.   We reiterate that counsel’s strategy was 
to demonstrate to the jury that Hannon in no way possessed the type of character to 
commit the crimes.  Counsel also testified at the postconviction hearing that it was 
his strategy to persuade the jurors to recommend life over death by virtue of the 
fact that Hannon, who had already been found guilty of two murders, was not 
“begging for his life” but instead addressed and emphasized demeanor and 
character to continue to insist that he did not and could not commit the crimes. 
 
- 28 -
Trial counsel decided it was not necessary, and likely would not have made any 
difference, to recall Horn and Kilgore during the penalty phase to reiterate that to 
which they had already testified.  The record also demonstrates that trial counsel 
presented mitigation during the guilt phase through Hannon, who testified that he 
attended high school through the eleventh grade; wanted to work, earn money, and 
learn a trade; was a hard worker; obtained a job with Rusty Horn where he 
received an extra fifty cents an hour if he did not drink; worked at a gas station; 
delivered auto parts and pizza; and visited his sister’s house on Christmas and 
celebrated with his nieces and nephews.   
 
Trial counsel presented further evidence that Hannon did not have the type 
of character to commit these murders through the penalty phase testimony of Toni 
Acker and Hannon’s mother and father.  Acker testified that Hannon was “a good-
time guy, carefree, liked to have fun”; that Hannon had cared for her child; and that 
Hannon was incapable of conduct such as these murders.  Hannon’s mother 
testified that Hannon had never hurt anyone in his entire life and that Hannon 
could not hurt any animal or person.  Hannon’s mother also pleaded with the jury, 
“Please, you’ve taken away his freedom for something he didn’t do.  Don’t take 
away his life.  Give us a chance, please, to prove that he never did anything like 
this.  He couldn’t.”  Hannon’s father testified that Hannon had never been a violent 
person, and that he was always a “teddy bear.”  Hannon’s father also testified that 
 
- 29 -
“[Hannon] says he’s innocent.  I believe he’s innocent, and I think he ought to be 
given a chance to prove that he is innocent.  That’s it.”  The record supports trial 
counsel’s postconviction evidentiary hearing testimony that his penalty phase 
strategy was to establish that Hannon did not have the type of character to commit 
the murders.   
 
Contrary to the dissent’s misdirected charge, we have not failed to recognize 
our legal precedent with regard to “lingering doubt” and have expressly factored 
that consideration into our decision today.  This Court has repeatedly observed that 
residual doubt is not legally appropriate as a mitigating circumstance, see, e.g., 
Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 162 (Fla. 2002), and has consistently concluded 
that it is not error to deny an instruction that would allow a jury to consider 
lingering doubt or exclude evidence of lingering doubt during the penalty phase.  
See Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 40 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that the trial court 
did not err in denying an instruction that the jury could consider lingering doubt in 
rendering its advisory sentence). 
 
Although this Court has previously rejected an argument that trial counsel 
was ineffective in the penalty phase for failing to argue lingering doubt as a 
mitigating circumstance, see Trepal v. State, 846 So. 2d 405, 434 (Fla. 2003), it has 
never expressly determined that trial counsel is per se ineffective for pursuing the 
practical impact that character evidence may create jury doubt and the impact it 
 
- 30 -
may have during the penalty phase.  But see Parker v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 331 
F.3d 764, 787 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Parker’s attorneys were not deficient in focusing 
their time and energy on acquittal at trial and focusing their arguments at 
sentencing on residual doubt instead of other forms of mitigation.” (parentheses 
omitted)).  Further, contrary to the dissent’s claim that we are ignoring United 
States Supreme Court case law, see dissenting op. at 92, that Court has never 
resolved the issue advanced by the dissent either, not even in its most recent 
decision touching upon lingering doubt.  See Oregon v. Guzek, 126 S. Ct. 1226 
(2006).12  However, trial counsel’s strategy in the instant case of presenting 
                                          
 
12.  In none of the cases cited by the dissent does the United States Supreme 
Court address the effectiveness of counsel for arguing that the commission of a 
murder was completely out of line with a defendant’s character.  Hence, contrary 
to the dissent’s claim that we are ignoring Supreme Court case law on lingering 
doubt, see dissenting op. at 92, we instead conclude that such case law is not 
dispositive as to the issue that we decide today.   
Moreover, to the extent the dissent asserts that in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510 (2003), the United States Supreme Court, and in Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 
567 (Fla. 1996), this Court “explicitly disapproved” of a continuing assertion of 
innocence defense, see dissenting op. at 92, this statement is misdirected.  In 
neither Wiggins nor Rose did the Court hold that counsel was ineffective for 
pursuing an innocence strategy, nor prohibit a defense based on the character of the 
defendant.  Rather, in both cases the Courts found that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to adequately investigate into mitigation that could have been discovered 
had counsel conducted a reasonable investigation.  The instant case is 
distinguishable from Wiggins and Rose in that Hannon’s counsel made a reasoned 
decision to limit his investigation into mitigation based on Hannon’s express desire 
that he pursue a strategy that Hannon did not possess the type of character to 
commit the murders.  Further, the instant case is distinguishable from Rose in that, 
while counsel in Rose pursued a penalty phase strategy that he believed to be ill-
 
- 31 -
evidence to demonstrate that Hannon did not have the type of character to commit 
the murders was a tactical method used by trial counsel in an attempt to sway the 
jury’s recommendation in favor of life over death.  See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (concluding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, 
any aspect of a defendant’s character that the defendant proffers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death).13  It is certainly logical that a jury of laypersons is less 
likely to recommend death if they have some lingering concerns about guilt than if 
there is absolute certainty on the issue of guilt.  See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 
162, 181 (1986) (“[J]urors who decide both guilt and penalty are likely to form 
residual doubts or ‘whimsical’ doubts . . . about the evidence so as to bend them to 
                                                                                                                                        
conceived, counsel in the instant case agreed with his client that maintaining a 
consistent position during the penalty phase was a viable strategy.    
 
13.  See also King v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 355, 360 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., 
dissenting) (“I believe that a jury is entitled to, and often does, mitigate a sentence 
because of ‘lingering doubt’ about the defendant’s guilt.”); Melendez v. State, 498 
So. 2d 1258, 1263 (Fla. 1986) (Barkett, J., specially concurring) (“There is 
certainly nothing irrational––indeed, there is nothing novel––about the idea of 
mitigating a death sentence because of lingering doubts as to guilt.”) (quoting 
Heiney v. Florida, 469 U.S. 920, 921 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari)); see also Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 924 (Fla. 2000) (Pariente, J., 
concurring) (“I urge the Legislature [to] consider including evidence of residual 
doubt as a statutory mitigating factor that could be considered by juries in making 
a sentence recommendation, the trial court in imposing the death sentence, and this 
Court in determining whether the death penalty should be affirmed.”).  Although 
the dissent criticizes the reference to these views, they are presented not for 
authority, but for the common sense and grounded logic they set forth. 
 
 
- 32 -
decide against the death penalty.  Such residual doubt has been recognized as an 
extremely effective argument for defendants in capital cases.”) (quoting Grigsby v. 
Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 247-48 (8th Cir. 1985) (Gibson, J., dissenting)); Parker, 331 
F.3d at 787-88 (“Creating lingering or residual doubt over a defendant’s guilt is not 
only a reasonable strategy, but is perhaps the most effective strategy to employ at 
sentencing.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissent refuses to even 
consider that lawless conduct related to illegal drugs or alcohol at times may even 
itself operate to be aggravating in the eyes of a lay jury rather than mitigating, as 
the dissent portrays those factors present.  See generally Cummings-El, 863 So. 2d 
at 267 (“Counsel acknowledged that drug abuse can have a double-edged sword 
effect on the jury, as juries are not sympathetic to junkies generally.”) (quoted from 
trial court’s denial order attached to opinion). 
 
The conduct of Hannon’s trial counsel does not constitute per se ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1997), this 
Court determined that conduct similar to that of Hannon’s counsel did not 
constitute ineffective assistance.  See id. at 471.  At the evidentiary hearing in 
Haliburton, trial counsel testified that, although he was aware that Haliburton had 
suffered physical and sexual abuse as a child and that he had a history of substance 
abuse, and that these factors would be considered mitigating in many cases, they 
were more harmful than helpful in the case.  See id.  This information would have 
 
- 33 -
been more mitigating than any factor in the present case.  Trial counsel in 
Haliburton testified that he elected not to call the mental health expert, even though 
she could have testified that there was a strong indication of brain damage, because 
she would have also testified that Haliburton was an extremely dangerous person 
and that he was likely to kill again.  See id.  According to trial counsel, testimony 
that Haliburton’s emotional problems and deprived upbringing caused him to 
commit the crime or lessened his culpability would have conflicted with the picture 
of charity and pacifism painted by the other defense witnesses and would have 
been inconsistent with Haliburton’s strategy.  See id.  The testimony that the 
defense witnesses offered in Haliburton is similar to the character evidence 
presented by trial counsel in the instant case.  Trial counsel’s penalty phase 
strategy was to humanize Haliburton by dwelling upon his close family ties and on 
the positive influence he had on his family and fellow inmates.  See id.  This Court 
held that “[e]ven though this strategy was unsuccessful in persuading the court and 
jury to sentence Haliburton to life imprisonment, we cannot conclude that he was 
ineffective.  In light of the substantial, compelling aggravation found by the trial 
court, there is no reasonable probability that had the mental health expert testified, 
the outcome would have been different.”  Id.; see also Henry v. State, 862 So. 2d 
679, 686 (Fla. 2003) (determining there was no deficient performance in counsel’s 
decision to humanize defendant rather than use mental health testimony); Shere v. 
 
- 34 -
State, 742 So. 2d 215, 223-24 (Fla. 1999) (determining that counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to request a neuro-psychological or neurological exam by a 
qualified expert even though trial counsel had obtained evidence of defendant’s 
“severe head injury as a youth and his subsequent headaches” where counsel’s 
penalty phase strategy was to portray the defendant as “a kind, gentle, God-fearing 
man”); Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998) (determining there was 
no error where retrial counsel was aware of mental mitigation “but made a strategic 
decision under the circumstances . . . to instead focus on the ‘humanization’ of 
Rutherford through lay testimony”); Bryan v. Dugger, 641 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 
1994) (determining that trial counsel was not ineffective for choosing a mitigation 
strategy of humanizing the defendant and not calling a mental health expert). 
 
Similar to trial counsel’s evidentiary hearing testimony in Haliburton, trial 
counsel in this case testified that his primary goal was to convince the jury that 
Hannon was not at the crime scene and that he was not the type of person to 
commit these murders, and that counsel intentionally sought to avoid contradicting 
that defense by presenting witnesses to testify that Hannon had used illegal drugs, 
was unstable, failed at school, or was abused.14  Trial counsel’s strategy in this case 
                                          
 
 
14.  The dissent proclaims that counsel was “unfamiliar with the prevailing 
death penalty case law on mitigation, such as Ake v. Oklahoma,” see dissenting op. 
at 109; however, this statement is hugely conclusory and not supported by the 
postconviction evidentiary transcript.  The dissent takes counsel’s statement that he 
was not familiar with the Ake case “off the top of my head,” and untenably uses 
 
- 35 -
from the beginning of trial and through the penalty phase was to emphasize 
Hannon’s good character traits.  According to trial counsel, attempting to present 
testimony that Hannon may have had drug and alcohol problems that may have 
influenced him to commit the murders, or hiring a mental health expert attempting 
to discuss possible mental health mitigation to lessen his culpability would have 
been in total conflict with the picture of the nonviolent, “teddy bear” image of 
Hannon and would have been inconsistent with his innocence/alibi defense.  Even 
though ultimately this strategy was unsuccessful in convincing the court and the 
jury to sentence Hannon to life imprisonment, we conclude, as in Haliburton, that 
trial counsel was not ineffective in this case. The dynamics of a jury and a jury trial 
may often place practical considerations of human nature and citizen interaction on 
a level that cannot be simply ignored notwithstanding guiding statutory 
considerations when issues of life or death are involved. 
 
An analogy can also be drawn to Straight v. Wainwright, 422 So. 2d 827 
(Fla. 1982), a case in which the defendant challenged his trial counsel’s failure to 
                                                                                                                                        
this one statement to reach the sweeping conclusion that counsel lacked knowledge 
about case law concerning mitigation in death penalty cases.  Indeed, it is a 
conclusory statement in itself to presume that any particular case is “prevailing” in 
a particular legal area.  Further, the Ake case is not even relevant to the instant 
proceedings because counsel’s strategy during the penalty phase––a strategy that 
Hannon himself approved––was to present evidence that Hannon did not possess 
the character to commit the murders and that he was innocent of the crimes––not 
that he suffered from some sort of brain injury or mental illness at the time of the 
murders.   
 
- 36 -
investigate for the purpose of developing evidence of mitigating circumstances.  
See id. at 832.  There, trial counsel, as did trial counsel in this case, stated that he 
did not present mitigating circumstances because he felt them to be, even after the 
verdict of guilt, fundamentally inconsistent with the entire defense.  See id.  This 
Court concluded that trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective where trial 
counsel viewed evidence of mitigating circumstances as fundamentally damaging 
to the integrity of his client’s case.  See id.  Similar to trial counsel in Straight, 
Hannon’s counsel here believed that any evidence of mitigating circumstances 
available would only damage the integrity of Hannon’s case.  Further, Hannon 
agreed with counsel in this case that mitigation evidence should not be presented 
during the penalty phase.  Under the totality of the circumstances at the time of 
trial, counsel was not deficient in strategically choosing not to present mitigation 
evidence that would be in conflict with and contradict Hannon’s innocence/alibi 
defense.  See Parker, 331 F.3d at 788 (counsel not ineffective for failing to 
introduce evidence of mental defects and personality disorder where counsel did 
not see any signs of brain damage or mental disorder, and counsel further thought 
such evidence would be inconsistent with the defendant’s alibi defense and would 
undermine defendant’s credibility); Cummings-El, 863 So. 2d at 252 (determining 
that counsel’s performance was not deficient where penalty phase strategy was to 
present defendant in a positive light and not to present evidence of defendant’s 
 
- 37 -
drug use, poor upbringing, and family members’ criminal backgrounds; counsel 
believed that such evidence would have an adverse effect on the jury and, further, 
introducing any evidence of mental illness would have been inconsistent with the 
aforementioned strategy); Brown v. State, 439 So. 2d 872, 875 (Fla. 1983) 
(concluding that under the totality of the circumstances at the time of trial, counsel 
was reasonably effective where he testified that in his opinion presentation of 
mitigation evidence during the penalty phase was contradictory to the alibi defense 
and the defendant did not assist in pursuing mitigating evidence). 
Neither the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510 (2003), nor its recent decision in Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 
(2005), compels a different conclusion.  In Wiggins, the Court concluded that 
defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
where counsel abandoned their investigation into mitigation even though their 
limited investigation revealed information that would have led a “reasonably 
competent attorney to investigate further.” 539 U.S. at 527.  The Supreme Court 
noted that defense counsel’s investigation included a review of reports which noted 
that Wiggins had spent most of his life in foster care and had displayed emotional 
difficulties while there and that Wiggins’ mother was a chronic alcoholic who on at 
least one occasion left her children alone for days without food.  See id. at 523, 
525.  The Supreme Court concluded that a reasonable attorney would have realized 
 
- 38 -
the need to pursue these leads further, but defense counsel abandoned the 
investigation at this juncture.  See id. at 527.15  The Supreme Court determined that 
counsel’s failure to investigate further into Wiggins’ background resulted from 
inattention rather than reasoned strategic judgment, in part because during opening 
statements, counsel informed the jurors, “You’re going to hear that [Wiggins] has 
had a difficult life,” but then failed to provide the jury with any details of Wiggins’ 
life history.  See id. at 526.   In holding that counsel’s performance was deficient, 
the Supreme Court nonetheless noted that “Strickland does not require counsel to 
investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely 
the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing,” id. at 533, and 
distinguished Wiggins’ case from others where the High Court had concluded that 
limited investigations into mitigation were reasonable.  See id. at 535.   
In the recently decided Rompilla, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
defense counsel’s conduct in preparation for the sentencing phase fell below the 
level of reasonable performance that is required by Wiggins and Strickland where 
defense counsel failed to review a court file on the defendant’s prior conviction.  
See 125 S. Ct. at 2463-64.  The Court stressed that it was not creating a per se rule 
requiring defense counsel to “do a complete review of the file on any prior 
                                          
 
 
15.  The Supreme Court noted in part that further inquiry likely would have 
revealed repeated incidents of sexual abuse suffered by Wiggins that could have 
been offered in mitigation.  See id. at 525.   
 
- 39 -
conviction.”  Id. at 2467.  Rather, the High Court found that counsel’s performance 
fell below a level of reasonable performance because  
counsel knew that the Commonwealth intended to seek the death 
penalty by proving Rompilla had a significant history of felony 
convictions indicating the use or threat of violence, an aggravator 
under state law.  Counsel further knew that the Commonwealth would 
attempt to establish this history by proving Rompilla’s prior 
conviction for rape and assault, and would emphasize his violent 
character by introducing a transcript of the rape victim’s testimony 
given in that earlier trial.   
Id. at 2464.  The Supreme Court in its conclusion emphasized that “the prior 
conviction file was a public document, readily available for the asking at the very 
courthouse where Rompilla was to be tried,” yet “counsel did not look at any part 
of that file, including the transcript, until warned by the prosecution a second 
time,” the day before the evidentiary sentencing phase began.  Id.  Although the 
facts of Rompilla led the Court to the conclusion that defense counsel’s 
performance was unreasonable, the Court held that “[o]ther situations, where a 
defense lawyer is not charged with knowledge that the prosecutor intends to use a 
prior conviction in this way, might well warrant a different assessment.”  Id. at 
2467. 
 
A careful reading of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wiggins and  
Rompilla reveals that those decisions are inapplicable to the facts of the instant 
matter.  Unlike Wiggins, in the instant case there were no reports containing 
evidence of Hannon’s life history which should have prompted trial counsel to 
 
- 40 -
conduct a deeper investigation into Hannon’s background.   In fact, trial counsel 
testified that during the criminal proceedings neither Hannon, his father, his 
mother, nor his sister Moreen ever mentioned that Hannon might suffer from some 
form of brain injury, that Hannon was abused or neglected, or that he had a 
traumatic childhood or a substantial drug problem.  According to counsel, when 
asked if Hannon had been born with any problems, Hannon’s parents stated that 
they had “no problem with him.”   Moreover, unlike Rompilla, there is no 
indication here that the State planned to rely on particular material in aggravation 
that was not obtained and reviewed by trial counsel prior to the penalty phase trial.   
Finally, and most distinguishing, unlike the defendants in Wiggins and Rompilla, 
Hannon adamantly expressed his wish to proceed consistent with the innocence 
defense during the penalty phase.  The dissent’s assertion that we have “ignore[d] 
the mandate for defense counsel’s duty to investigate,” dissenting op. at 92, does 
not accommodate these critical facts.  Consistent with his client’s wishes, trial 
counsel sought to demonstrate that Hannon did not have the type of character to 
commit the murders rather than offering evidence on Hannon’s drug use, his 
mental fitness, or his family history.  Therefore, unlike defense counsel’s deficient 
performances in Wiggins and Rompilla, trial counsel’s limited investigation into 
mitigation under the specific facts of the instant case, which was based on the 
 
- 41 -
express wishes of Hannon, was within the level of reasonable performance that is 
required by Strickland and Wiggins.  
Hannon has also failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice.  Contrary 
to the dissent’s view that a per se rule of reversal is required, upon application of 
all applicable authorities, including Wiggins and Rompilla, relief is not available 
here.  In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the 
totality of the mental health mitigation presented during the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing to determine if our confidence in the outcome of the penalty 
phase trial is undermined.  See Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216, 223 (Fla. 1998) 
(stating that in assessing prejudice “it is important to focus on the nature of the 
mental mitigation” now presented); see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534 (“In 
assessing prejudice, we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of 
available mitigating evidence.”).  We conclude that it does not.  There is no 
reasonable probability that had any of the mental health experts who testified at the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing testified at the penalty phase, Hannon would 
have received a life sentence.  Our confidence has not been undermined in this 
outcome or proceeding. 
 
At the evidentiary hearing, Hannon presented the testimony of Drs. Barry 
Crown, Faye Sulton, and Jonathan Lipman.  Dr. Crown, an expert in clinical and 
forensic psychology and neuropsychology as well as substance abuse, testified that 
 
- 42 -
he performed a neuropsychological evaluation of Hannon and had reviewed 
background materials, as well as a cognitive test that had already been performed 
by Dr. Sulton.  Dr. Crown testified that Hannon scored within normal limits on 
most of the tests that were administered and opined that Hannon’s overall 
cognitive processing was “squarely within the heartland of what we would 
consider to be a typical person,” but he demonstrated some difficulty with rapidly 
retrieving stored information and applying it to a new situation.  Dr. Crown also 
testified that Hannon may have had some brain damage but he could not state that 
the brain damage in any way affected Hannon’s behavior on the date of the crime 
because Dr. Crown had not been asked to consider or determine that in his 
evaluation.     
 
Dr. Sulton, an expert in clinical psychology, testified that Hannon’s thinking 
was not disturbed, nor was he having hallucinations or so deeply depressed that his 
thinking would be distorted.  She opined that Hannon did not have any obvious 
major mental illness and that his behavior did not make much sense in light of his 
normal intelligence.  She also testified that by January of 1991, Hannon had 
experienced many failures personally and professionally, worked several jobs, had 
been unsuccessful in the military, used vast amounts of illegal substances over a 
long period of time, and that his ability to function on a day-to-day basis, reason, 
use good judgment, and logically and sequentially plan activities were all 
 
- 43 -
compromised.  She also testified that she found only nonstatutory mitigation 
through her interviews with family members and Hannon.  These included areas of 
general parental neglect, lack of structure, and lack of discipline and guidance in 
his early environment; a childhood history of illness that interfered with his school 
life at a crucial time; extreme dependence on other people to assist him in basic 
living skills; dependence on Ron Richardson for employment and drugs; substance 
abuse over many years; extraordinary impulsivity at times and great lack of 
concentration; and an inability to formulate goal-directed behavior and to live as an 
adult.  Dr. Sulton further testified that Hannon’s personality changes, impulsivity, 
irritability, difficulty with concentration, and paranoid thinking would have 
impacted his day-to-day life.  Ultimately, Dr. Sulton testified that in her opinion 
Hannon was not incompetent to stand trial at any point, was not insane at the time 
of the incident, and was of average intelligence.16  Dr. Sulton agreed with Dr. 
Crown’s overall picture of Hannon’s normalcy with only some areas of deficit.   
 
Dr. Lipman, a neuropharmacologist, testified that Hannon’s degree of 
intoxication at the time of the offenses would not suggest to him that Hannon was 
unable to remember what occurred or would have rendered him unable to know 
what he was doing at the time of the crime.  Dr. Lipman, however, admitted that he 
                                          
 
 
16.  Dr. Sulton testified that Hannon had a verbal IQ of 112, which is bright 
to average, a performance IQ of 102, which is average, and full scale IQ of 108, 
which is average.   
 
- 44 -
probably underestimated Hannon’s drug burden at the time of the offense because 
he was not aware that Hannon had used cocaine the night of the crimes.  Dr. 
Lipman basically agreed with the State’s expert’s conclusions, which included a 
polysubstance abuse diagnosis.   
 
The State’s expert, Dr. Merin, an expert in the fields of neuropsychology and 
forensic psychology, testified that he reviewed Drs. Sulton and Crown’s testing 
and administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III test to Hannon.  Dr. 
Merin testified that he agreed with Dr. Crown’s conclusions with the exception of 
Dr. Crown’s finding of prefrontal lobe impairment.  Dr. Merin explained the 
discrepancy was based on Dr. Crown using a shorter version of the Category Test.  
Dr. Merin testified that when he did the longer version of the test, three years after 
Dr. Crown, there was no indication of any prefrontal lobe impairment.  Dr. Merin 
testified that he did not find any significant brain injury.  Dr. Merin also opined 
that because Hannon was heavily into drugs and alcohol, he probably had 
destroyed some neurons in his brain, but not to the extent that it interfered with his 
ability to reason, to make decisions on his own behalf, to maintain goal-directed 
behavior, or to think logically.  Dr. Merin further testified that he found no 
indication of any thought disorder or suggestion of psychosis or brain-related 
problems.   
 
- 45 -
The postconviction testimony presented failed to establish the existence of 
statutory mental health mitigation (and indeed underscored Hannon’s average 
intelligence and ability to reason), no expert was able to identify any significant 
brain damage, and there was contrary evidence.  Even Dr. Crown, who arguably 
provided the most favorable testimony for Hannon, could not translate any brain 
damage as having any conceptual or actual impact on Hannon’s behavior, and 
there was no evidence to establish any nexus between Hannon’s mental health and 
his behavior or as it related to the crimes.  Therefore, portraying Hannon as a 
drugged-out individual who had been involved in prior bad acts would have been 
more harmful, especially considering that the mental health implications were so 
equivocal. 
Moreover, contrary to the dissent’s claim that an investigation by trial 
counsel would have revealed “voluminous evidence of mitigation,” see dissenting 
op. at 119, the mitigation provided by witnesses during the postconviction 
evidentiary hearing was not compelling.17  Indeed, the dissent offers what is 
                                          
 
 
17.  At the evidentiary hearing, information regarding Hannon’s drug and 
alcohol abuse as well as his upbringing and family situation was presented through 
the testimony of Hannon’s family.  Hannon’s mother, father, and two sisters 
(Hellen Coker and Moreen Hannon) testified that their home life was difficult, 
especially when Stephanie, another of Hannon’s sisters, had scoliosis, at which 
time the parents were barely home.  Hannon’s mother and father both testified with 
regard to the problems they had with Moreen, who began abusing drugs and 
alcohol at age thirteen and had a close relationship with Hannon.  Moreen also 
testified with regard to her running away from home as well as her alcohol and 
 
- 46 -
actually a very one-sided presentation of postconviction witness testimony which 
creates a distorted view of Hannon’s home life in an effort to bolster its assertion 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct further investigation into 
mitigation.18  Further, in sentencing Hannon to death, the trial judge found 
                                                                                                                                        
drug use.  Hannon’s mother testified that Hannon was a very good kid, had many 
friends, had developed rheumatic fever when he was seven or eight and was out of 
school for a few months, and was a pretty good student.   
 
Moreen seemed to have more specific information with regard to Hannon’s 
substance abuse than the rest of his family. Moreen testified that she was aware of 
Hannon’s drug and alcohol use while growing up, that Hannon’s drug use 
escalated over the years, that Hannon drank on a regular basis in 1990, and that 
she, Hannon, Ron Richardson, and Mike Richardson all drank alcohol as well as 
used cocaine.  Moreen also testified that Hannon was a good worker and did not 
have any trouble getting a job although he moved around from job to job, and she 
described Hannon’s behavior as agitated and irritated in 1990 during the time 
leading up to the murders.  Hellen also testified that Hannon drank frequently 
when he was a teenager, and that Hannon was drinking and doing drugs 
excessively in 1990.  Hannon’s mother and father testified that they were unaware 
of the existence and extent of the substance abuse problem that emerged during 
Hannon’s youth. 
18.  For example, the dissent references Hellen Coker’s testimony wherein 
she alleges physical abuse and emotional indifference by her parents.  However, 
contrary to Hellen’s testimony, Hannon’s mother testified that she told her children 
that she loved them and hugged them, bought them birthday and Christmas 
presents, and that she never “smashed their face[s] into the wall.”  Hannon’s father 
testified that he never spanked his children or struck them with a belt.  While Mrs. 
Hannon admitted that she drank “a lot of wine,” she also believed that it did not 
affect her ability to take care of the house and her children because “the kids 
looked terrific.  The house was great.”  Despite the fact that Hannon developed 
rheumatic fever as a child, Hannon’s mother testified that he did not have to make 
up the time he missed from school because his illness occurred partly during the 
summer, and further, “[Hannon] was a pretty good student, so he was okay.”  The 
dissent further takes out of context Hellen’s statement that she left home five days 
after she turned eighteen because she “hated it.”  A review of her full testimony 
reveals that her home situation was not the only factor that led to her departure: “I 
 
- 47 -
substantial aggravation in this case.   Specifically, the trial court found three 
aggravating circumstances applicable to both the murders of Snider and Carter––
(1) previous conviction of a violent felony (the contemporaneous killings); (2) the 
murders were committed during the commission of a burglary; and (3) the murders 
were heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  See Hannon, 638 So. 2d at 41.  As to Carter, the 
trial court found the additional aggravating factor that the murder was committed 
to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest.  See id.19  On direct appeal, we affirmed the 
court’s findings of aggravation.  See Hannon, 638 So. 2d at 43.    
                                                                                                                                        
hated it.  I didn’t like my home life.  I didn’t like the town we lived in.  I mean you 
couldn’t sneeze without somebody calling.  They knew everything that went on.  I 
just wanted to get away from there.  Something different.”  Finally, Dr. Merin 
testified that when he asked Hannon about his relationship with his father, Hannon 
stated, “I got along great with him.  My only regret was that he was away so 
much.”  As to his mother, Hannon stated that they “[g]ot along great” and that he, 
as the Hannons’ only son, received lenient treatment.  In noting such testimony, we 
do not seek to present a lopsided view of Hannon’s childhood in an effort to 
demonstrate that any existing mitigation was minimal.  Rather, we only do so to 
demonstrate that the evidence in mitigation presented during the postconviction 
proceedings was equivocal and not “abundant,” as the dissent proclaims.  See 
dissenting op. at 116.  The dissent characterizes our discussion of these elements of 
Hannon’s background as mere “lip service,” see dissenting op. at 103; however, 
the dissent lacks any basis for this assertion other than its subjective disagreement 
with our conclusion regarding the insignificance of the mitigation evidence 
presented at the postconviction hearing. 
 
19.  Hannon asserts he was denied effective assistance of counsel because 
his trial counsel failed to adequately challenge the aggravators.  However, once 
Hannon was convicted of the murders based on the facts in evidence, regardless of 
what trial counsel would have argued, the prior violent felony aggravator 
(contemporaneous killings) and the committed during a burglary aggravator were 
applicable as a matter of law.  Although trial counsel in the instant case arguably 
could have more effectively challenged the HAC and the avoiding or preventing a 
 
- 48 -
With regard to the HAC aggravator, we have previously noted that it is one 
of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme, see 
Everett v. State, 893 So. 2d 1278, 1288 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1865 
(2005), and a review of the trial record demonstrates that the murders of Snider and 
Carter were particularly cruel.  Hannon grabbed Snider, who had been stabbed by 
Acker fourteen times, from behind and slit his throat with such force that it nearly 
severed his head.  Prior to that, Snider’s screams could be heard throughout the 
apartment complex.  An individual who was outside the apartment heard Snider 
gurgling on his own blood.   At one point during the attack, Snider called to his 
roommate, “Call 911--my guts are hanging out.”  Upon hearing Snider’s screams, 
Carter came downstairs and witnessed Snider’s brutal stabbing.  Carter pleaded 
with the attackers to spare his life, at one point saying to Acker, “[L]et me get out 
of here,” and then retreated to a bedroom upstairs, hiding under a bed.  Despite 
these pleas, Hannon went upstairs and proceeded to fire six shots into the huddled, 
defenseless Carter with a semiautomatic pistol.  Hannon fired two shots into Carter 
at close range, and four shots with the pistol placed in contact with, or nearly up 
                                                                                                                                        
lawful arrest aggravators during the penalty phase, the nature of the murders and 
facts in evidence in this case support the application of these aggravators, which 
were both challenged and upheld on direct appeal.  See id. at 43-44.  Thus, 
assuming without deciding whether trial counsel was deficient in challenging the 
aggravators, this claim is meritless because Hannon has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice.     
 
 
- 49 -
against, Carter’s body.  Despite the number of gunshot wounds, Carter did not die 
instantaneously.  An officer who responded to the 911 call testified that when he 
arrived at the upstairs bedroom, Carter was still gasping for breath––Carter stopped 
breathing only just before the paramedics reached the bedroom.   Based on the 
brutal and disturbing nature of these murders, there is no reasonable possibility that 
Hannon would have received a life sentence.  Therefore, Hannon has failed to 
demonstrate that if the mental health and lay witness testimony presented during 
the postconviction evidentiary testimony had been offered at trial “the result of the 
proceeding would have been different,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, and we 
fundamentally disagree with the dissent’s assertion to the contrary.  See dissenting 
op. at 116.  Our confidence in the outcome of this case has not been undermined.  
See id.  Accordingly, this claim is without merit.   
III.  Summary Denial of Several of Hannon’s Postconviction Claims 
 
 
Hannon challenges the trial court’s summary denial of several claims, which 
he argues warranted an evidentiary hearing.  In Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055 
(Fla. 2000), this Court provided the following standard for determining whether an 
evidentiary hearing is required in a postconviction proceeding:  
[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction 
relief motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case 
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the 
motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.  The defendant 
bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a 
legally valid claim.  Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to 
 
- 50 -
meet this burden.  However, in cases where there has been no 
evidentiary hearing, we must accept the factual allegations made by 
the defendant to the extent that they are not refuted by the record.  We 
must examine each claim to determine if it is legally sufficient, and, if 
so, determine whether or not the claim is refuted by the record.  
Id. at 1061 (citations omitted); see also State v. Williams, 797 So. 2d 1235, 1237-
38 (Fla. 2001).  Each of Hannon’s claims must, therefore, be considered under 
application of these concepts. 
A.  Voluntary Intoxication Defense 
 
Hannon claims that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that 
trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for failing to present a voluntary 
intoxication defense.  Generally, under the law applicable to these murders, when 
trial counsel makes a tactical decision not to pursue a voluntary intoxication 
defense, “a trial court’s finding that such a decision was tactical usually is 
inappropriate without an evidentiary hearing.”  Williams, 797 So. 2d at 1239 
(quoting Kitchen v. State, 764 So. 2d 868, 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)).  However, 
this Court has recognized that when it is so obvious from the face of the record that 
trial counsel’s strategy not to present a voluntary intoxication defense is very 
clearly a tactical decision well within the discretion of counsel, no evidentiary 
hearing is necessary.  See id.   
 
In Williams, the defendant claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to present the voluntary intoxication defense at trial.  See id. at 1238-39.  
 
- 51 -
The defendant in Williams testified during the trial that he did not commit the 
crime.  See id. at 1239.  This Court concluded that “counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to pursue the voluntary intoxication defense as such a 
defense would have been inconsistent with Williams’ theory of the case [that he 
did not commit the murder].”  Id.; see also Brown v. State, 894 So. 2d 137, 146 
(Fla. 2004) (“Failure to present an intoxication defense cannot constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel when the defendant asserts his innocence.”); 
Rivera v. State, 717 So. 2d 477, 485 (Fla. 1998) (concluding that guilt phase 
counsel was not ineffective in foregoing a voluntary intoxication defense strategy 
because, “since a voluntary intoxication defense is, in effect, an admission that you 
did the crime but lacked the specific intent to be held criminally responsible, 
Rivera’s unwavering professions of innocence short-circuited any credible 
voluntary intoxication defense during the guilt phase”) (footnote omitted).  
 
Similar to the defendant in Williams, Hannon testified during the trial 
proceedings that he did not commit the crime.  Had trial counsel presented an 
intoxication defense, it would have been totally inconsistent with Hannon’s 
defense that he did not commit the murder.  In accordance with our decision in 
Williams, we conclude that Hannon’s trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective 
for failing to pursue the voluntary intoxication defense because such a defense 
would have been inconsistent with Hannon’s innocence theory.  Trial counsel’s 
 
- 52 -
strategy in this case amounted to a tactical decision well within his discretion that 
was so obvious from the record that no evidentiary hearing was necessary.  
Accordingly, the trial court’s summary denial of this claim was proper.    
B.  Trial Counsel’s Failure to Adequately Prepare for Trial 
 
Hannon claims that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that 
trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately prepare for trial.  Hannon’s 
argument on this issue consists of a single paragraph in which he merely lists the 
following allegations––counsel’s failure to obtain Hannon’s “rap sheet,” failure to 
review photographs before trial, failure to cross-examine and impeach state 
witnesses, and failure to adequately question jurors regarding their views on capital 
punishment––and then simply concludes that he was entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing.  Hannon in effect has chosen to contest the trial court’s summary denial of 
this claim by merely listing these allegations without any supportive argument or 
authority with regard to the manner in which trial counsel’s conduct was deficient 
or the prejudice he sustained.  This Court has previously determined that similar 
speculative, unsupported arguments of this type are improper and for which no 
relief is available.  See Cooper v. State, 856 So. 2d 969, 977 n.7 (Fla. 2003) 
(rejecting similar argument as insufficient for consideration); Sweet v. State, 810 
So. 2d 854, 870 (Fla. 2002) (“[B]ecause on appeal Sweet simply recites these 
claims from his postconviction motion in a sentence or two, without elaboration or 
 
- 53 -
explanation, we conclude that these instances of alleged ineffectiveness are not 
preserved for appellate review.”); see also Duest v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 849, 852 
(Fla. 1990) (“The purpose of an appellate brief is to present arguments in support 
of the points on appeal.  Merely making reference to arguments below without 
further elucidation does not suffice to preserve issues . . . .”).  Therefore, we 
conclude that Hannon’s unsupported claim is improper and deny relief on this 
claim.   
C.  Brady/Giglio claim 
 
Hannon asserts that the trial court erred in denying his claim that the State 
violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),20 by failing to disclose that 
Richardson’s testimony was presented in exchange for lenient treatment.  Hannon 
also claims that the State violated Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),21 
by presenting false testimony at trial that Richardson would spend time in prison 
for his role in the case when he did not, and by presenting Richardson’s fabricated 
                                          
 
 
20.  To demonstrate a Brady violation, Hannon must allege specific facts 
that, if accepted as true, establish a prima facie case that (1) the State possessed 
evidence favorable to the accused because it was either exculpatory or impeaching; 
(2) the State willfully or inadvertently suppressed the evidence; and (3) the 
defendant was prejudiced.  See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); 
Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 2003).   
 
 
21.  To establish a Giglio violation, Hannon must demonstrate that (1) the 
testimony given was false; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) 
the statement was material.  See Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2003); 
Ventura v. State, 794 So. 2d 553, 562 (Fla. 2001). 
 
- 54 -
testimony with regard to what occurred on the night of the murders.  Hannon has 
failed to establish either a Brady or Giglio violation because he has not 
demonstrated that the evidence was suppressed by the State or that the State 
presented false testimony.   
 
The record reveals that on Friday, July 19, 1991, the trial court inquired of 
Richardson and his attorney, Mr. Sinardi, whether Richardson would testify in 
Hannon’s case.  Richardson stated to the court that he planned to invoke his Fifth 
Amendment right not to incriminate himself and would not voluntarily testify on 
Hannon’s behalf.  Later that same day, the trial court informed the State that 
Richardson’s attorney had sent a message that the State should not rest its case 
until Sinardi had an opportunity to speak with the State.  At that point, the State 
indicated that it had received information that Richardson might change his 
position and be a prosecution witness against Hannon.  On Monday, July 22, 1991, 
the trial court and Hannon’s trial counsel were apprised that Richardson had finally 
made an agreement with the State, and a copy of Richardson’s statement was 
provided to Hannon’s counsel.  Subsequently, Richardson became a willing 
witness and answered questions with regard to the voluntariness of his statement.  
It was revealed at that time that Richardson had agreed to provide the voluntary 
sworn statement to the State based on the assumption that he would be adjudicated 
guilty of only accessory after the fact and be sentenced to five years in prison.  
 
- 55 -
During the State’s direct examination of Richardson, he stated that he had the 
advice of his attorney, they approached the State, and an agreement had been 
entered.  Richardson also testified that he intended to testify truthfully regardless of 
whether it was the State or the defense that called him as a witness.   
 
There is no indication that the State suppressed evidence relating to its 
agreement with Richardson.  The record reveals that Richardson approached the 
State to negotiate an agreement, the State came to an agreement with Richardson 
on a Sunday evening, and the next morning the State informed Hannon’s trial 
counsel and the trial court of the plea agreement.  The record facially reflects that 
Hannon’s trial counsel knew of the agreement at the time of the trial, it was 
disclosed the following morning, and the existence of a Brady violation is 
conclusively refuted.  See Tompkins v. State, 872 So. 2d 230, 239 (Fla. 2003) 
(“Because defense counsel knew of the report . . . a Brady violation is conclusively 
refuted.”); see also Foster v. State, 810 So. 2d 910, 916 (Fla. 2002); Bryan v. State, 
748 So. 2d 1003, 1008 (Fla. 1999). 
 
Hannon has not shown that the State presented false testimony at trial that 
Richardson would spend time in prison for his role in the case when he did not.  In 
fact, with regard to the agreement, Hannon’s trial counsel elicited from Richardson 
during cross-examination:  that the previous morning (Sunday) Richardson was 
facing two possible death penalty convictions and by the previous (Sunday) 
 
- 56 -
evening he had received an agreement to limit a sentence to five years; and that 
Richardson’s attorney had not advised Richardson of a specific release date from 
the sentence due to his gain time.  Thus, the jury learned of the State’s arrangement 
with Richardson and was able to judge the credibility of Richardson’s testimony at 
trial.  Based on the foregoing, the record facially supports the conclusion that the 
jury was in fact informed that with his gain time, Richardson might not actually 
spend five years in prison.  Hannon has not shown that the State suppressed any 
evidence that Richardson might not serve time in jail after his gain time was 
calculated or that it misrepresented to the jury the length of time Richardson was 
expected to actually serve for his participation in the murders.   
 
Hannon has also failed to demonstrate a Giglio violation with regard to 
Richardson’s testimony relating to what occurred on the night of the murders.  
Hannon simply asserts that Richardson’s testimony was fabricated without 
additional facts, or any facts that the State knew Richardson’s testimony was false.  
Hannon has not provided a factual basis that the State instructed Richardson to lie 
with regard to what occurred on the night of the murders, or that Richardson did 
lie.  Accordingly, the circuit court’s denial of Hannon’s Brady and Giglio claims 
was proper. 
D.  Conflict of Interest 
 
- 57 -
 
Hannon asserts that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that 
trial counsel had an undisclosed conflict that prevented him from rendering 
effective assistance.  Specifically, Hannon claims that because his trial counsel was 
endeavoring to also obtain codefendant Richardson as a client in connection with 
his representation of Hannon, trial counsel was blinded to pursuing avenues of 
investigation that may have pointed to Richardson’s role in these killings.  Further, 
Hannon alleges that this conflict clouded trial counsel’s ability to effectively cross-
examine Richardson.  However, the facts that formed the basis for this alleged 
conflict of interest were known to Hannon at the time of his trial and, therefore, 
could have been and should have been presented on direct appeal.  See Thompson 
v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 661 (Fla. 2000) (concluding that the trial court correctly 
found that the defendant’s conflict of interest postconviction claim was 
procedurally barred because the facts that formed the basis for this alleged conflict 
of interest were known to the defendant at the time of his direct appeal and thus 
should have been presented on direct appeal); Jackson v. Dugger, 633 So. 2d 1051, 
1055 (Fla. 1993) (determining that the defendant’s claim that trial counsel had a 
conflict of interest was procedurally barred in 3.850 motion).  Therefore, the trial 
court’s summary denial of this claim was proper.   
E.  State’s Use of Jailhouse Informants 
 
 
- 58 -
 
Hannon asserts that the trial court also erred in summarily denying his claim 
relating to the State’s allegedly improper use of jailhouse informants.  Specifically, 
Hannon claims that nonrecord evidence supports his assertion that Keith Fernandez 
had no information to provide when the State first contacted him but informed an 
officer that he could obtain more information from Hannon.  Hannon further 
alleges that nonrecord information reveals that Fernandez’s assistance in Hannon’s 
case was considered when Fernandez was sentenced for his crime, notwithstanding 
Fernandez’s testimony that he was not given anything in exchange for his 
testimony.  Hannon also claims that his trial counsel was not aware that in 
exchange for Jonathon Ring’s testimony against Hannon, State investigator Scott 
Hopkins wrote a letter on September 6, 1991, to the superintendent of the prison 
where Ring was housed requesting that gain time Ring lost while waiting to testify 
be reinstated.  Hannon contends that to the extent trial counsel failed to discover 
this information, Hannon was denied the effective assistance of counsel, and to the 
extent the State failed to disclose this information, violations of Brady and Giglio 
occurred.   
 
Hannon has failed to provide a factual basis that the State made undisclosed 
concessions or guarantees of favors to either Fernandez or Ring in return for 
information against Hannon, or that either Fernandez or Ring were agents of the 
State.  Based on the record, the trial court properly found that Hannon was not 
 
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entitled to relief and therefore, summary denial of postconviction relief was 
appropriate:   
The letter written [by Scott Hopkins] on September 6, 1991, 
was written subsequent to July 23, 1991, the date the guilt phase of 
Defendant’s trial ended.  Therefore, the fact that Mr. Hopkins wrote 
this letter after the trial, does not prove that Mr. Ring was promised 
anything in exchange for his testimony in Defendant’s case.  As such, 
no relief is warranted with respect to this portion of claim VII. 
 
 
. . . . 
 
Third, Defendant claims Mr. Fernandez and other informants 
were acting as agents of the State and Defendant’s right to counsel 
was violated.  However, Mr. Fernandez testified that he was asked by 
a deputy or detective if he had any information, and he replied, 
“Yeah,” but he was never offered anything for his cooperation in the 
case, nor was he aware that Mr. Hellickson and Mr. Lewis told his 
prosecutor that they had no objection to him being released from 
custody.  (See Trial Transcript, Volume VII, pages 773-774, 776-779, 
attached).  Moreover, during the deposition of Mr. Fernandez, 
Defendant’s counsel was made aware that Mr. Fernandez and 
Defendant had talked about Defendant’s case, but Mr. Fernandez 
never stated, either at the deposition or at trial, that Defendant 
confessed to him.  (See Trial Transcript, Volume VII, pages 769-788, 
Deposition of Mr. Fernandez, attached).  Therefore, Defendant has 
failed to prove that Mr. Fernandez and the other inmates who testified 
against Defendant were agents of the State.  Since Defendant has 
failed to prove Mr. Fernandez and the other inmates were agents of 
the State, no relief is warranted with respect to this portion of claim 
VII. 
 
Fourth, Defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel to 
the extent that counsel failed to discover the aforementioned 
information.  However, since Mr. Fernandez and the other inmates 
were not agents of the State, counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
raise nonmeritorious issues.  See Parker v. State, 611 So. 2d 1224, 
1227 (Fla. 1993).  Moreover, Defendant’s counsel attempted to 
discredit the six informants of the State with testimony from several 
inmates that they never heard Defendant talk to anyone in the jail 
regarding his case.  (See Trial Transcript, Volume XII, pages 1305-
 
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1316, 1333-1335, attached).  As such, no relief is warranted with 
respect to this portion of claim VII.  (PCR6/1134-1136) 
See Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1101 n.6 (Fla. 2002) (finding no error in 
trial court summarily denying legally sufficient claims where claims were 
conclusively refuted by trial record).  Accordingly, this claim was properly denied 
by the trial court. 
F.  State’s Use of Misleading and Improper Argument 
 
Hannon claims that the State’s case was permeated with improper innuendo 
and argument based on facts not in evidence and that were false.  First, Hannon 
asserts that the following “slaughterhouse” arguments made by the State during the 
guilt phase closing argument were not supported by any factual basis: 
If I had to think of a name for this case, something to summarize what 
this case is all about, the name I would choose would be “The 
Slaughterhouse.  The Slaughterhouse.”  Because on January 10, 1991, 
a man sitting in this very courtroom, turned the home of Brandon 
Snider and Robbie Carter into a slaughterhouse.   
 
 
. . . . 
Hannon worked at a slaughterhouse.  Hannon had access to 
knives.  He had access to knives.  He used knives in the past to kill.  
He testified on the stand that he killed before, killed animals before. 
 
However, the record demonstrates that the State’s “slaughterhouse” 
arguments were supported by the evidence.  Specifically, John Ring testified at 
trial that Hannon stated the following: 
[Hannon] said that the cops were trying to pin a murder on him, that 
they had––they wanted to pin him because he had worked in a 
slaughterhouse and he was cutting throats for a living, because that 
 
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made him a violent person, that they were trying to pin that on him 
and that he had shot this guy six times. 
Moreover, at trial Hannon testified that he worked in a slaughterhouse in 
Okeechobee slaughtering cows, and in Brooksville slaughtering pigs and hogs.  
Hannon described that he would shock the animals, make an incision in them, and 
hang them upside down to bleed them.  Hannon testified in detail with regard to 
what occurred on certain days at the slaughterhouse, including that Mondays and 
Wednesdays were slaughter days when they killed the hogs.  Hannon described the 
different functions related to cutting, specifically that if you were right-handed you 
would have the knife in your right hand and grab the meat with your left hand.  
Hannon also testified that he had taken a pork loin to Robbie Carter’s house, boned 
it out, and cut some pork chops.  Hannon further testified that during the time 
January 14 through 16, he had attempted to secure work with Richardson at the 
slaughterhouse but could not because business was slow.  Based upon our review 
of the record, we determine that there was testimony regarding Hannon’s work in 
the slaughterhouse to support the State’s analogy.  Accordingly, the trial court’s 
rejection of this claim was proper.   
 
Additionally, Hannon asserts that trial counsel’s failure to object to the  
following argument made by the State during closing argument was unreasonable:  
“[S]ometimes you need to make a deal with a sinner in order to get the devil.  
That’s what we did in this case.  Ron Richardson did wrong.  He was a sinner.  We 
 
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dealt with him to get the devil.”  Irrespective of whether trial counsel was 
deficient, Hannon has failed to show prejudice.  In Moore v. State, 820 So. 2d 199 
(Fla. 2002), Moore claimed that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the following remarks made by the prosecutor during the State’s guilt and 
penalty phase arguments:  
Crime conceived in hell will not have any angels as witnesses.  And, 
ladies and gentleman, as true as that statement is, Grand Park is hell. 
And that man right there is the devil. . . . 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, deals.  Yes, ma’am, yes, ma’am, yes, sir, 
to all of you.  I have dealt with [co-defendant 1] and I have dealt with 
[co-defendant 2].  I did that as an Assistant State Attorney.  I did that 
the best I knew how.  But, ladies and gentlemen, sometimes you have 
to deal with sinners to get the devil.  And I would submit to you what 
the State did was we dealt with this sinner and we dealt with this 
sinner to get this devil. 
Id. at 207 (emphasis supplied).  This Court concluded: 
 
[T]he two isolated references to Moore as “the devil” in this instance, 
although ill advised, appear to be less problematic than the pervasive 
and extensive conduct condemned in Brooks [v. State, 762 So. 2d 879 
(Fla. 2000),] and Urbin [v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998)].  Rather, 
this case appears to be more akin to Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 
191 n.5 (Fla. 1997), where this Court held that a prosecutor’s isolated 
comments that defense counsel engaged in “cowardly” and 
“despicable” conduct and that the defendant was a “malevolent . . . a 
brutal rapist and conscienceless murderer” was not so prejudicial as to 
vitiate the entire trial. 
Id. at 208.  Similar to Moore, the State’s comment during closing in the instant 
case that they made a deal with the sinner to get the devil was not so prejudicial as 
 
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to undermine our confidence in the case.  Accordingly, this claim is also without 
merit. 
G.  Constitutional Errors 
 
The trial court summarily denied Hannon’s claims that trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to object to what he contends were constitutional errors. 
Hannon now asserts the following:  (1) the burden of proof was improperly shifted 
to Hannon during the penalty phase; (2) Hannon’s jury was repeatedly instructed 
by the court and the prosecutor that its role was advisory and simply a 
recommendation, diminishing the jury’s sense of responsibility in violation of 
Caldwell v.  Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); and (3) instructing the jury that they 
could find as an aggravating circumstance the fact that Hannon was engaged in the 
commission of the crime of burglary based upon the State’s alternative theory of 
felony murder rendered him automatically eligible for the death penalty.  The trial 
court properly denied this claim because all of the individual assertions fail 
because they are procedurally barred or without legal merit.  See Power v. State, 
886 So. 2d 952, 956 (Fla. 2004); Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1067 (Fla. 
2000); Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 11 (Fla. 1997); Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 
637, 647-48 (Fla. 1995).  All of these claims were properly denied by the trial 
court. 
H.  Newly Discovered Evidence 
 
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To obtain postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence, 
Hannon must demonstrate  
first, that the newly discovered evidence was unknown to the 
defendant or defendant’s counsel at the time of trial and could not 
have been discovered through due diligence and, second, that the 
evidence is of such a character that it would probably produce an 
acquittal on retrial. 
Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 2001).  Hannon asserts that codefendant 
Jim Acker’s subsequent life sentence constitutes newly discovered evidence and 
that, had trial counsel known what was revealed at Acker’s trial, it is more than 
likely that trial counsel would have been able to prove that Hannon’s role in the 
crime was that of the least culpable codefendant.22  Hannon directs our attention to 
Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992), to support this claim.  In Scott, this 
Court addressed whether “a codefendant’s subsequent life sentence constitutes 
newly discovered evidence which would permit collateral relief.”  Id. at 468.  This 
Court held that “in a death case involving equally culpable codefendants the death 
sentence of one codefendant is subject to collateral review under rule 3.850 when 
another codefendant subsequently receives a life sentence.”  Id. at 469.   
 
Unlike Scott, which involved equally culpable codefendants, this Court on 
direct appeal determined Hannon to be the most culpable defendant in this case: 
                                          
 
 
22.  Hannon has failed to identify what specific information was revealed 
during Acker’s trial that would have shown that Hannon was not the most culpable 
defendant. 
 
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In the instant case, the record reflects that Hannon murdered both 
victims.  Hannon delivered the fatal blow to Snider, slashing Snider’s 
throat after Acker had stopped stabbing him.  Also, it was Hannon 
who shot Carter.  Clearly, Hannon is the most culpable of the three 
accomplices in this case, and the two death sentences are justified. 
Hannon, 638 So. 2d at 44.  Contrary to Hannon’s assertion, this Court’s decision in 
Scott is not persuasive because the instant case does not involve equally culpable 
codefendants.  Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly denied this 
claim. 
 
Next, Hannon alleges that the testimony of Kelly Reynolds, a niece of Ron 
and Mike Richardson, constitutes newly discovered evidence.  Specifically, 
Hannon claims that testimony Reynolds presented at an evidentiary hearing for 
codefendant Jim Acker demonstrates that Richardson provided materially false 
information at Hannon’s trial.  The material included the following:  that after Ron 
Richardson was released from jail he returned to Indiana and lived in the same 
house as Reynolds; that during that time, Ron Richardson discussed this case on 
more than one occasion, and Richardson admitted that Jim Acker was not present 
when the murders occurred; and that Reynolds overheard Ron Richardson on the 
phone with his brother Mike telling him to forget the money he owed Ron because 
Mike saved Ron from going to prison.  Hannon has failed to show that Reynolds’ 
testimony proves Ron Richardson’s testimony at Hannon’s trial with regard to the 
night of the murders was false.  Reynolds’ statements do not make any reference to 
 
- 66 -
Hannon or the testimony that Richardson provided at Hannon’s trial.  Thus, the 
alleged statements are not of such nature that they would probably produce an 
acquittal on retrial.  See Mills, 786 So. 2d at 549.  Accordingly, this claim is 
without merit.   
 
Hannon next asserts that FBI Special Agent Michael Malone provided 
unreliable and false testimony during trial.  Hannon further claims that the State 
withheld an FBI Crime Laboratory investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice, 
wherein Malone was criticized for conducting incomplete tests and exaggerating 
testimony to fit the government’s case, and the report recommended that Malone 
be subject to disciplinary action.  The record indicates that Malone testified during 
the trial here that there “were no hairs like Mr. Hannon anywhere in the residence 
or on the victims.”  Malone testified that he compared a fabric impression made on 
a door with a pair of Hannon’s trousers, which were taken from Hannon when he 
was arrested, and that Hannon’s pants did not match the impression on the victims’ 
door.  Malone further testified that the particular pattern of the impression made on 
the door was consistent with the type that would be made by an item such as a blue 
jean fabric.  However, Malone did not testify that Hannon was wearing a blue jean 
fabric or that he tested any blue jean fabric belonging to Hannon.   
 
Hannon has not presented any facts to show that Malone’s testimony was 
unreliable or false.  Moreover, Hannon was not prejudiced by Malone’s testimony 
 
- 67 -
because his testimony––that hair and fiber collected at the scene did not match 
Hannon’s, and that Hannon’s pants did not match the fabric impression made on 
the victim’s door––was not damaging to Hannon.  Hannon, however, claims that 
Malone’s testimony was significant because of its implication that Hannon was in 
the victims’ apartment the night of the murders, but failed to leave any hairs as 
evidence.  Hannon highlights that the State during its closing argument emphasized 
Malone’s testimony that the fiber impression on the outside of the victims’ front 
door was consistent with a blue jean type material, and that all the witnesses 
identified the three who left the victims’ apartment as wearing blue jeans.  The 
State further argued during closing that Richardson identified Hannon as wearing 
blue jeans on the night of the crimes.  Notwithstanding these arguments, it is not 
likely that had trial counsel had the FBI report relating to Malone, trial counsel 
would have used it to challenge Malone’s expertise or testimony.  During the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that in his view Malone 
had in fact helped or advanced Hannon’s alibi defense.  Therefore, it is not likely 
that evidence that Malone was investigated would have been presented even if it 
was available.  Moreover, even if the jury had heard the information found in the 
FBI report, it is not of such a character that it would probably produce an acquittal 
on retrial.  See Mills, 786 So. 2d at 549.  There is no merit to this claim and it is 
also denied.   
 
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IV.  Avoiding Arrest Aggravator 
 
 
Hannon claims that the instruction given on the committed-to-avoid-arrest 
aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague and was improperly applied in his 
case.  This claim is procedurally barred because it could have been, and should 
have been, presented on direct appeal.  See Lopez v. Singletary, 634 So. 2d 1054, 
1056 (Fla. 1993) (concluding that challenge to the avoid arrest aggravator was 
procedurally barred in postconviction proceedings because it could have been 
presented on direct appeal).  Procedural bar notwithstanding, this claim is meritless 
because this Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of the standard jury 
instruction for the avoid arrest aggravator.  See Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 16 
(Fla. 2003); Sweet v. Moore, 822 So. 2d 1269, 1274 (Fla. 2002); see also Whitton 
v. State, 649 So. 2d 861, 867 n.10 (Fla. 1994) (concluding that the standard jury 
instruction for avoid arrest aggravator is not unconstitutionally vague and did not 
require a limiting instruction to make this aggravator constitutionally sound).  
Therefore, this claim is denied. 
 
Hannon also alleges that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
application of the avoid arrest aggravator.  This claim was rejected by this Court on 
direct appeal:   
 
Hannon next argues that the evidence did not support the 
aggravating circumstance that the murder of Carter was committed for 
the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest.  When a murder 
victim is not a law enforcement officer, “[p]roof of the requisite intent 
 
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to avoid arrest and detection must be very strong.”  Riley v. State, 366 
So. 2d 19, 22 (Fla. 1978).  In the instant case, the record reflects that 
Hannon, Acker, and Richardson went to the home of Snider and 
Carter to kill Snider.  The motive was the conflict between Snider and 
Jim Acker’s sister.  Carter was not a party to this conflict.  Carter, 
however, lived with Snider, and witnessed Snider’s murder.  Carter 
knew, and could identify, Hannon and the others.  After his arrest and 
incarceration, Hannon told a cellmate that one of the victims was a 
“real jerk,” but that the other was a “pretty nice guy” who was just in 
the wrong place at the wrong time.  In the course of discussing 
another cellmate’s crime, Hannon told him that he should not have left 
any witnesses.  Clearly, the murder of Carter was ancillary to the 
primary purpose of obtaining revenge against Brandon Snider.  See 
Troedel v. State, 462 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 1984).  The finding that 
Carter was murdered for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful 
arrest is fully supported by the record.  
Hannon, 638 So. 2d 43-44.  Accordingly, this claim also has no merit. 
 
V.  Applicability of Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravator 
 
Hannon asserts that the facts of the instant case do not support the finding of 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.  On direct appeal, this Court rejected this claim.  See 
Hannon, 638 So. 2d at 43.  Accordingly, we hold that this claim is procedurally 
barred because it was addressed and denied on direct appeal.   
VI.  Innocent of the Death Penalty Claim 
 
 
 
To prevail on a claim of being innocent of, or ineligible for, the death 
sentence received, Hannon must demonstrate constitutional error invalidating all of 
the aggravating circumstances upon which the sentence was based.  See Vining v. 
State, 827 So. 2d 201, 216 (Fla. 2002).  Hannon has not made such a showing here.  
Hannon’s contention regarding the sufficiency of aggravation was decided 
 
- 70 -
adversely to Hannon on direct appeal and is not cognizable de novo in this 
postconviction proceeding.  Specifically, this Court on direct appeal concluded that 
the facts of Hannon’s case supported the finding of HAC and the prior violent 
felony aggravator with regard to both victims, and that the murder of Carter was 
committed for the purpose of preventing lawful arrest.  See Hannon, 638 So. 2d at 
43-44.  This Court determined that Hannon’s two sentences of death were 
proportionate and affirmed the convictions and sentences.  See id. at 44.  
Accordingly, Hannon’s “innocent of the death penalty” claim has no merit.  See 
Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 788 (Fla. 2004) (rejecting the defendant’s 
“innocent of the death penalty” claim because the Court determined on direct 
appeal that the evidence supported the existence of three aggravating 
circumstances). 
VII.  Constitutionality of Florida Capital Sentencing Statute 
 
Hannon asserts that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional 
under the holding of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  This Court addressed 
the contention that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates the United States 
Constitution under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring in 
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 
143 (Fla. 2002), and denied relief.  See also Jones v. State, 845 So. 2d 55, 74 (Fla. 
2003).  Hannon is likewise not entitled to relief on this claim.  Furthermore, one of 
 
- 71 -
the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court in this case was Hannon’s 
prior conviction of a violent felony, “a factor which under Apprendi and Ring need 
not be found by the jury.”  Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003); see also 
Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting Ring claim where one 
of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge was defendant’s prior 
conviction for a violent felony), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 962 (2003); Johnson v. 
State, 904 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2005) (holding that Ring does not apply retroactively).  
Accordingly, this claim is also rejected. 
VIII.  Cumulative Error 
 
Hannon’s claim of cumulative error is without merit.  As all of Hannon’s 
individual claims are either procedurally barred or without merit, his cumulative 
error claim must fail.  See Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003) (“[W]here 
individual claims of error alleged are either procedurally barred or without merit, 
the claim of cumulative error must fail.”); Vining v. State, 827 So. 2d 201, 219 
(Fla. 2002) (“Because the alleged individual errors are without merit, the 
contention of cumulative error is similarly without merit.”); see also Downs v. 
State, 740 So. 2d 506, 509 n.5 (Fla. 1999).  Therefore, this claim is also rejected. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately 
presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.  See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 
 
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1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000).  Consistent with the Strickland standard, to grant habeas 
relief based on ineffectiveness of counsel, this Court must determine:  
[W]hether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to 
constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably 
outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, 
second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the 
correctness of the result.  
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986); see also Freeman, 761 So. 
2d at 1069; Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 660 (Fla. 2000).  “The defendant 
has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based.”  Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 
1069; see also Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 1981).  Claims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may not be used to camouflage issues 
that should have been presented on direct appeal or in a postconviction motion.  
See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000); Thompson, 759 So. 2d 
at 660.  “If a legal issue ‘would in all probability have been found to be without 
merit’ had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel 
to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel’s performance 
ineffective.”  Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643 (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 
So. 2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)).  It is under this legal framework that Hannon’s habeas 
claims will be addressed. 
I.  Fundamental Error 
 
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Hannon asserts that he is entitled to a new trial due to fundamental error 
because he was convicted of a crime not charged in the indictment.  The grand jury 
indicted Hannon, charging him with two counts of murder from a premeditated 
design for the deaths of Brandon Snider and Robert Carter.  The indictment did not 
charge Hannon with felony murder, burglary, or any other felony.  The trial judge 
in the instant case instructed the jury on first-degree premeditated murder and first-
degree felony murder and defined the crime of burglary.  The jury returned a 
general verdict finding Hannon guilty of first-degree murder.  Hannon argues that 
reversal of his conviction is warranted because the jury just as likely found Hannon 
guilty of felony murder, which he was not charged with, as premeditated murder.   
 
We have repeatedly held that there is no error in permitting the State to 
proceed on a theory of felony murder when the indictment charges the defendant 
with first-degree premeditated murder.  See Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 404 
(Fla. 2003) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in 
permitting the State to proceed on the theory of felony murder when the indictment 
only charged first-degree murder); Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 677, 682 (Fla. 1995) 
(“The State need not charge felony murder in an indictment in order to prosecute a 
defendant under alternative theories of premeditated and felony murder when the 
indictment charges premeditated murder.”); Knight v. State, 338 So. 2d 201, 204 
(Fla. 1976) (“We find appellant’s allegation that the court erred in allowing the 
 
- 74 -
State to prosecute the charges [sic] under a theory of felony murder when the 
indictment charged premeditated murder to be absolutely contrary to established 
precedent.”).  Therefore, we conclude that appellate counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to present this meritless issue on appeal.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643. 
 
Hannon further alleges that he is entitled to relief pursuant to this Court’s 
decision in Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000), where this Court held that 
the phrase “remaining in,” which is found in the burglary statute, was limited to 
situations where the “remaining in” was done surreptitiously.  See id. at 240.  
However, the Delgado Court specifically stated that its “opinion will not, however, 
apply retroactively to convictions that have become final.”  Id. at 241.  Hannon’s 
convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal on June 2, 1994, and 
therefore had become final prior to the release of Delgado.  See Jimenez v. State,  
810 So. 2d 511, 512 (Fla. 2001) (determining Delgado is not subject to retroactive 
application and that Jimenez was not entitled to relief pursuant to Delgado since 
Jimenez’s convictions were final prior to the release of Delgado).  Accordingly, 
Hannon is not entitled to relief pursuant to Delgado. 
 
Hannon asserts that this Court recently confronted a similar question in 
Fitzpatrick v. State, 859 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2003); however, Hannon’s reliance on 
Fitzpatrick is misplaced.  In Fitzpatrick, this Court invoked the principle that “a 
general verdict is invalid when it rests on multiple bases, one of which is legally 
 
- 75 -
inadequate,” and reversed for a new trial because the jury had been given an 
erroneous burglary instruction.  Id. at 490 (emphasis added) (citing Yates v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1957)).  Since Fitzpatrick’s conviction had not 
become final at the time Delgado was released, Delgado was applicable to 
Fitzpatrick, and thus the general verdict in his case was invalid because it rested on 
multiple bases, one of which at the time of Fitzpatrick’s direct appeal was 
inadequate due to Delgado’s applicability.  Hannon’s claim is different from 
Fitzpatrick because, as previously explained above, Delgado is not applicable to 
Hannon’s case.  
 
Finally, Hannon claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing 
to present on direct appeal that Hannon was convicted of a crime for which he was 
not charged in the indictment.  This Court rejected this claim in Freeman v. State, 
761 So. 2d 1055, 1071 (Fla. 2000) (rejecting Freeman’s claim that “appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred in denying the 
pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment because it did not specifically charge 
felony murder”); see also Gudinas v. State, 693 So. 2d 953, 964 (Fla. 1997) (“We 
have repeatedly rejected claims that it is error for a trial court to allow the State to 
pursue a felony murder theory when the indictment gave no notice of the theory.”).  
Thus, we conclude that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to present 
this meritless issue on appeal.  See Rutherford, 774 So. 2d at 643. 
 
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II.  Constitutionality of Florida’s Capital Sentencing Statute 
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Hannon argues that under Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Florida’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional 
and that the Ring decision applies retroactively to him.  We have previously 
rejected each of the claims Hannon presents in his habeas petition.  See Johnson v. 
State, 904 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2005) (holding that Ring does not apply retroactively); 
Monlyn v. State, 894 So. 2d 832, 839 (Fla. 2004) (concluding that the defendant 
lacked standing to assert any error with regard to lack of jury unanimity because 
the jury returned a unanimous recommendation of death); Duest v. State, 855 So. 
2d 33, 48-49 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting a claim that the jury must unanimously specify 
each aggravator found), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 993 (2004); Doorbal v. State, 837 
So. 2d 940, 963 (Fla.) (stating that the prior violent felony aggravator based on 
contemporaneous crimes charged by indictment and on which defendant was found 
guilty by unanimous jury “clearly satisfies the mandates of the United States and 
Florida Constitutions”), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 962 (2003).  Finally, we deny 
Hannon’s habeas claim that he is entitled to relief based on a hybrid claim under 
Ring and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), as we did in Robinson v. 
State, 865 So. 2d 1259, 1266 (Fla. 2004).  Accordingly, we deny habeas relief on 
this claim.    
CONCLUSION 
 
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Hannon’s rule 
3.850 motion and deny Hannon’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
QUINCE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
ANSTEAD, J., dissenting. 
 
The United States Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly 
emphasized that counsel in death penalty cases must investigate first and then 
develop strategy that is informed by actual knowledge.  See, e.g., Blanco v. 
Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1503 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The ultimate decision that was 
reached not to call witnesses was not a result of investigation and evaluation, but 
was instead primarily a result of counsel’s eagerness to latch onto Blanco’s 
statements that he did not want any witnesses called.”).  The point is that one 
cannot develop strategy in a vacuum.  In fact, Hannon’s counsel repeatedly 
conceded that he failed to investigate Hannon’s background because he had 
decided on a continuing not guilty strategy before doing a proper investigation.  In 
accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s and this Court’s controlling 
 
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decisions regarding ineffectiveness of counsel, I would remand this case for a new 
penalty phase with new and competent counsel. 
 
I cannot concur in the majority’s determination that Hannon’s counsel was 
not ineffective in failing to pursue any investigation into mitigating circumstances 
for the penalty phase of the trial and, instead, even in the face of a unanimous jury 
determination of guilt, continuing to express his disagreement with the jury’s 
verdict.23  Instead of honoring his obligation to investigate and present a case for 
                                          
 
 
23.  Defense counsel’s conduct during the guilt phase was also deficient.  
However, the State’s strong case on guilt has convinced me that no prejudice can 
be demonstrated by counsel’s neglect.  The following questionable conduct 
deserves mention, however.   
 
Even though Hannon’s alibi defense fell completely apart when his bloody 
palm print was found at the murder scene, Hannon’s counsel did not change his 
alibi strategy at the guilt phase.  Critically, Hannon’s counsel failed to depose or 
authorize an investigation into the background of Ron Richardson, the accessory 
after the fact of the murder who was scheduled to testify in Hannon’s defense, even 
when the State advised Hannon’s counsel that Richardson had changed his story 
and was now going to testify against Hannon.  The trial judge gave Hannon’s 
counsel the opportunity to depose Richardson after the State disclosed that 
Richardson would be a witness for the State, but Hannon’s counsel asserted, “Your 
Honor, I don’t intend to take a discovery deposition.”  When the court asked 
Hannon’s counsel again if he intended to take a discovery deposition of 
Richardson, he replied, “Absolutely not.”  When asked a third time if he was sure 
he did not want to take Richardson’s deposition, Hannon’s counsel said, “I don’t 
need to take his discovery deposition, Your Honor.”   
 
The majority accepts Hannon’s counsel’s explanation for failing to depose 
Richardson––that he believed Richardson’s story was fabricated and the best 
strategy would be simply to question him in front of the jury without a 
deposition―and calls this “a carefully considered and planned defense strategy.”  
Majority op. at 13.  The majority states that Hannon’s counsel’s tactics concerning 
Richardson’s testimony were “ultimately successful” because “Richardson actually 
knew very little with regard to the victims’ apartment,” and he “conveniently 
 
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mitigation to the jury in accord with Florida law, counsel continued to challenge 
the jury’s verdict.  Moreover, Hannon’s counsel testified at the postconviction 
hearing that he failed to investigate Hannon’s background because he irrationally 
                                                                                                                                        
testified that he was leaving the apartment as the shooting of Snider occurred.”  
Majority op. at 11-12.  However, Richardson testified that he was not familiar with 
the apartment because he had only been there once before the murders for no 
longer than fifteen minutes, making it very plausible that Richardson could not 
answer Hannon’s counsel’s detailed questions about the contents of the apartment.  
Also, Richardson gave detailed credible testimony about the murders themselves, 
contrary to the majority’s assertion that defense counsel’s tactics were “ultimately 
successful.”  Majority op. at 11.   
 
Hannon’s counsel thought that he could discredit Richardson because he had 
Richardson’s brother on tape affirming Hannon’s alibi.  However, Hannon’s 
counsel also neglected to fully prepare or investigate Richardson’s brother, and 
when Hannon’s counsel called Richardson’s brother to the stand, Richardson’s 
brother stated that he lied on the tape, asserted that he was “not going to get 
[him]self in trouble for someone else,” and changed his story to discredit Hannon’s 
alibi even more.  The majority’s only mention of this disastrous direct examination 
is: “Hannon’s counsel also testified that it was his intention to impeach Richardson 
with the testimony of his brother, Mike, who was expected to testify that Hannon 
and Richardson were at Richardson’s house at the time of the murder playing a 
drinking game.”  Majority op. at 12.  The majority also states that Hannon’s 
counsel successfully revealed that Richardson had given statements to Hannon’s 
counsel supporting Hannon’s alibi, but Richardson also testified during the trial 
that he had lied in all these previous statements.  Pretrial depositions would have 
prepared Hannon’s counsel for Richardson’s and his brother’s damaging trial 
testimony, and surely would have indicated to Hannon’s counsel that Hannon’s 
alibi defense vanished the moment Richardson decided to testify for the State.  
Instead, Hannon’s counsel continued with the alibi defense without adequate 
investigation while ignoring all other possible defenses.  Hannon’s counsel also did 
not investigate Richardson’s drug dealings with Hannon or his influence over 
Hannon because “[t]hat wasn’t the [alibi] strategy.”   
 
Additionally, Hannon’s counsel did not investigate the State’s blood spatter 
expert Judith Bunker’s educational background.  Bunker’s testimony was used by 
the State to prove that the murders were heinous, atrocious, and cruel.  If Hannon’s 
counsel had investigated, he would have found numerous falsities on her 
curriculum vitae, which would have discredited the State’s case.   
 
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“expected this case to go back to trial.  [He] expected that someone could come 
forward or there’d be a confession in jail just like you read about all the time.  It 
happens all the time.  [He] said this is going to happen in this case and [they’ve] 
preserved his ability to go to trial again.”  Hannon’s counsel was also convinced 
“that perhaps with the passage of time Ron Richardson would come in and change 
his story . . . [e]specially knowing the guys up there are going to get killed for 
this.”  Such naiveté would be surprising anywhere, but it is shocking and 
inexcusable on the part of a lawyer charged with defending a capital offense.  It is 
not surprising however, that such a tactic was rejected by the jury by a unanimous 
vote recommending the imposition of the death penalty.   
RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COMPETENT COUNSEL 
As the majority notes, “[a]n ineffective assistance claim has two 
components: A petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and 
that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.”  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 
(2003) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).  
Unfortunately, since the United States Supreme Court first recognized that the 
United States Constitution not only provided a right to counsel for indigent 
criminal defendants but also a right to “competent” counsel, this recognition has 
been honored all too often in its breach.  The case before us today presents a 
classic example of legal incompetency where it hurts the most––by counsel’s 
 
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blatant failure to investigate or present a case for life for a defendant already found 
guilty of capital first-degree murder.  The majority essentially treats the guarantee 
of competent counsel articulated in Strickland as a standardless empty promise, 
based upon a lowest common denominator assessment under which any 
performance by a licensed attorney meets the constitutional guarantee.   
I cannot agree that the Supreme Court has failed to provide meaningful 
standards to this most sensitive category of cases, those involving the death 
penalty, especially in its most recent decisions.  See Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510; 
Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S. Ct. 2456 (2005); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 
(2000).  In Strickland the Supreme Court stressed that because we have an 
adversarial system of justice which relies heavily on the competence of counsel to 
ensure a just result, capital defendants are entitled to genuine adversarial testing at 
both the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial.   
In this case there was no adversarial testing in the penalty phase, and, 
consequently, there was no justice.  After the State presented its case for the death 
penalty in the penalty phase, the jury essentially turned to defense counsel to ask 
why it should not accept the prosecution’s case for the death penalty.  At this 
critical juncture, with his client’s life on the line, instead of presenting evidence 
and arguments as to why the death penalty was not appropriate, defense counsel 
essentially defaulted.  His only defense was that his client was not really guilty.  
 
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However, the jury had already decided this issue against the defense, and the jury 
was left with no choice but to again unanimously reject this innocence defense and 
accept the State’s argument that the death penalty was the appropriate punishment.  
That is why this case constitutes a classic case of ineffectiveness of counsel.  There 
was absolutely no adversarial testing of the appropriateness of the death penalty in 
this case. 
I. 
Deficient Performance 
The majority makes no serious effort to distinguish Wiggins and the other 
United States Supreme Court decisions both emphasizing defense counsel’s 
fundamental duty to investigate and rejecting the use of a continuing innocence 
defense at the penalty phase.24  Specifically, in finding counsel ineffective in 
Wiggins, the Supreme Court held that the “principal concern . . . is not whether 
counsel should have presented a mitigation case.  Rather, we focus on whether the 
investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of 
[the defendant’s] background was itself reasonable.”  Id. at 522-23.  In Wiggins the 
Court determined that, as in Hannon’s case, counsel’s decision not to pursue 
mitigation was made prematurely when trial counsel “decided to focus their efforts 
                                          
 
 
24.  In our recent decision on rehearing in Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 
1252 (Fla. 2005), we noted the essential facts of Wiggins while distinguishing 
them from the situation in Rodriguez: “This case is distinguishable from Wiggins, 
in which counsel curtailed their investigation of mitigating evidence in favor of the 
alternative strategy of convincing the jury that the defendant was not directly 
responsible for the murder.”  Id. at 1264 (citation omitted). 
 
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on ‘retry[ing] the factual case’ and disputing Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the 
murder,” even though extensive mitigation was available to present to the jury.  Id. 
at 517.  This is precisely what defense counsel did in Hannon’s case and why the 
outcome should be the same as in Wiggins.  Noting the prevailing professional 
norms at the time of Wiggins’ trial, the Supreme Court held that “[d]espite these 
well-defined norms, . . . counsel abandoned their investigation of petitioner’s 
background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from 
a narrow set of sources.”  Id. at 524 (citing ABA Guidelines for the Appointment 
and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.8.6, at 133 (1989) 
[hereinafter “ABA Guidelines”]).  Therefore, “counsel chose to abandon their 
investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision with 
respect to sentencing strategy impossible.”  Id. at 527-28.  Again, that is precisely 
what happened here.  
 
In Wiggins the Court pointed out that counsel’s responsibility to investigate 
was comprehensive and “should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably 
available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that 
may be introduced by the prosecutor.”  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (quoting ABA 
Guidelines 11.4.1(C), at 93).  The topics to be considered include “medical history, 
educational history, employment and training history, family and social history, 
prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural 
 
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influences.”  Id. (citing ABA Guidelines 11.8.6, at 133).  In Wiggins the Court 
found counsel’s failure to investigate both deficient and prejudicial and directed 
that a new penalty phase with competent counsel be conducted.  Id. at 535-36. 
 
Hannon’s counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase first, because, as 
in Wiggins, he continued to present an “alibi” and “not guilty” strategy even 
though the jury had already unanimously rejected that strategy and found Hannon 
guilty of the crimes in this case; and second, because he fundamentally failed to 
investigate and present the substantial mitigating circumstances available.  The 
United States Supreme Court’s analysis and conclusion in Wiggins clearly apply 
here and mandate the same outcome.   
 
A. 
“Nice Guy” mitigation 
 
In approving defense counsel’s conduct as competent, the majority ignores 
the United States Supreme Court’s Wiggins analysis and its strict emphasis on 
counsel’s obligation to investigate and prepare, as well as this Court’s own case 
law on the duty to investigate, and instead concludes that “trial counsel’s strategy 
in the instant case of presenting evidence to demonstrate that Hannon did not have 
the type of character to commit the murders was a tactical method used by trial 
counsel in an attempt to sway the jury’s recommendation in favor of life over 
death.”  Majority op. at 31-32.  Essentially, the majority has written counsel a 
blank check to do anything counsel chooses without any judicial check on the 
 
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effectiveness of counsel’s “strategy.”  Hence, the outcome in this case represents 
another in the long line of appellate cases recognizing the right to competent 
counsel by its breach.  If anything, the conduct of counsel here was even more 
deficient than that of counsel in Wiggins.   
 
Even a cursory examination of defense counsel’s testimony at the 
postconviction evidentiary hearing reflects his fundamental failure to understand 
defense counsel’s obligation to investigate his client’s background and prepare in 
advance for the penalty phase of a capital trial.  Hannon’s counsel asserted during 
the evidentiary hearing that the purpose of the penalty phase in this case “[w]as to 
try to save [Hannon’s] life so that we could find the killers.” (Emphasis supplied.)  
The following exchange during the direct examination of Hannon’s trial counsel at 
Hannon’s rule 3.851 evidentiary hearing further illustrates this fundamental failure: 
Q.  [T]he jury didn’t believe your alibi defense, did it? 
A.  No, they did not. 
Q.  And so when you came back the next day, you were pretending 
perhaps or going on the theory that you still needed to convince them 
that Mr. Hannon was innocent? 
A.  I don’t know about pretending, but you always have another 
chance to appeal to them in that phase, you know.  They didn’t 
believe it.  Maybe they’ll believe it now. 
He also testified: 
And we had decided that this was the position we were going to take.  
And then in the event that he was convicted, if we were to change 
that, if we were now to get up there and say I was there.  I’m sorry.  I 
 
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didn’t do it or any of that kind of stuff--which I felt in those cases I 
prosecuted, I often felt those defense attorneys didn’t handle that 
phase right.  You know, they find somebody’s convicted.  Now they 
completely change their defense and get up there and take another 
tactic.  We decided that wasn’t what it was going to be because Mr. 
Hannon was adamant.  I can’t tell you how much he was adamant that 
he wasn’t there.  He didn’t do this.  He would never do this. 
The sparse evidence that Hannon’s counsel presented during the penalty phase of 
the trial focused solely on Hannon’s claim of innocence and that Hannon was not 
the type of person to commit murder.  For example, the entire testimony of Toni 
Acker, the sister of Hannon’s co-assailant, was as follows: 
Well, he was a good-time guy, carefree, liked to have fun.  I can’t 
believe that you have convicted him on this.  He has even babysat my 
kid.  He’s even partied with [the victims], and I just don’t believe that 
he could—he would do anything—nothing like that.  I feel that it was 
drug related because of the way—the way they were killed, and why 
would they go and kill their own friends? 
Hannon’s mother testified that “[h]e couldn’t hurt anybody.”  Hannon’s father 
testified that he believed Hannon was innocent and that “he ought to be given a 
chance to prove that he is innocent.”  Even during Hannon’s counsel’s closing 
argument in the penalty phase, he argued only innocence.  Concerning Hannon’s 
position that he was innocent, Hannon’s counsel stated to the jury,  
You don’t agree with it, fine.  But you have an opportunity to at least 
allow  
him to spend the rest of his life trying to clear his name. . . . 
Yes, we continue to maintain our not guilty, and we’ll always 
continue to maintain not guilty.  And what we’re asking you to do is 
to give him a chance to clear his name and he’s going to need a lot of 
time.  If you put him on death row, he’s got six years.  That’s not 
enough time.   
 
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What the majority fails to recognize in approving this strategy is the extensive 
legal precedent from this Court and other courts, including Wiggins, recognizing 
counsel’s fundamental duty to investigate and prepare, and holding that an attempt 
to retry the guilt phase is not relevant or appropriate in a penalty phase proceeding.   
 
What the prevailing law tells us, and tells defense lawyers, is that once a jury 
has determined that a defendant is guilty, then the issue of guilt or innocence is 
over, and such issue cannot be the appropriate focus of a penalty phase proceeding.  
In other words, counsel is charged with knowing the law and, under that law, he 
must move on in his obligation to investigate and provide an effective defense to 
the prosecution’s case for the death penalty after the jury has rejected his 
innocence defense and convicted the defendant.  
 
As in Wiggins, and directly on point to the issue now before us, this Court 
held in Rose v. State, 675 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1996), that counsel’s failure to 
investigate while latching onto an “accidental death” strategy during the penalty 
phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 572-73.  This Court 
stated that the “accidental death strategy” “appears to be closely akin to a claim of 
residual or lingering doubt, a claim which this Court has repeatedly held is not an 
appropriate matter to be raised in mitigation during the penalty phase proceedings 
of a capital case.”  Id. at 572 n.5 (citing King v. State, 514 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1987); 
Aldridge v. State, 503 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 1987); Burr v. State, 466 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 
 
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1985)); see also Trepal v. State, 846 So. 2d 405, 434, 437 (Fla. 2003) (finding that 
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present lingering doubt evidence 
even though the State stipulated and the trial court would have permitted its 
introduction); Darling v. State, 808 So. 2d 145, 162 (Fla. 2002) (“This Court has 
followed the holding of the United States Supreme Court that there is no 
constitutional right to present ‘lingering doubt’ evidence.”); Way v. State, 760 So. 
2d 903, 916 (Fla. 2000) (“[T]his Court has previously rejected the argument that 
evidence that would serve only to create a lingering doubt of the defendant’s guilt 
is admissible as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.”).  Similarly, the United 
States Supreme Court has explained: 
 
Finding a constitutional right to rely on a guilt-phase jury’s 
“residual doubts” about innocence when the defense presents its 
mitigating case in the penalty phase is arguably inconsistent with the 
common practice of allowing penalty-only trials on remand of cases 
where a death sentence––but not the underlying conviction––is struck 
down on appeal.   
 
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173 n.6 (1988) (plurality opinion) (citing Scott 
v. State, 529 A.2d 340, 352 (Md. 1987); Stringer v. State, 500 So. 2d 928, 946 
(Miss. 1986); Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 569 (Del. 1985); Lockhart v. 
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 205 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).25  As in Florida, the 
                                          
 
 
25.  The majority points to Lockhart’s majority opinion as supporting the 
notion that it is reasonable strategy to rely on a jury’s “residual doubts” during the 
penalty phase of a capital trial.  See majority op. at 32-33 (citing Lockhart, 476 
U.S. at 181.  However, the Lockhart majority was adopting the State’s argument in 
 
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United States Supreme Court noted that its “prior decisions . . . fail to recognize a 
constitutional right to have [residual] doubts considered as a mitigating factor.”  
487 U.S. at 174 (plurality opinion).  The Court has recently reaffirmed its 
adherence to these views.  See Oregon v. Guzek, 126 S. Ct. 1226 (2006).  While 
the majority states that the Supreme Court has never resolved the issue of whether 
counsel is per se ineffective for pursuing a lingering doubt strategy in the penalty 
phase, Guzek is indeed instructive on the issue.  In Guzek, the Court made the 
following observation regarding a defendant’s desire to introduce new evidence at 
the penalty phase that he was not present at the scene of the crime: 
That evidence is inconsistent with [the defendant]’s prior conviction.  
It sheds no light on the manner in which he committed the crime for 
which he has been convicted.  Nor is it evidence that [the defendant] 
contends was unavailable to him at the time of the original trial. And, 
to the extent it is evidence he introduced at that time, he is free to 
introduce it now, albeit in transcript form.  We can find nothing in the 
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments that provides a capital defendant a 
right to introduce new evidence of this kind at sentencing. 
                                                                                                                                        
favor of a unitary jury system, and admitted that there is some justified “skepticism 
as to the extent to which . . . States are willing to go to allow defendants to 
capitalize on ‘residual doubts.’ ”  Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 181.  In his dissent, Justice 
Marshall pointed out that when a defendant’s sentence is set aside on appeal, he is 
routinely resentenced by a completely different jury than the one that found him 
guilty, making it impossible for the defendant to benefit from a “residual doubt” 
theory during the penalty phase because the jury members were not present for the 
guilt phase and there is no reassessment of culpability.  Id. at 205 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  If “residual doubts” were such an important aspect of our death 
penalty scheme, such resentencing procedures would be invalid.   
 
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Id. at 1230-31 (citation omitted).  The Court differentiated cases in which it had 
held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required that a defendant not be 
precluded from introducing “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and 
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death,” id. at 1231 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 
(1978) (plurality opinion)), by stating that the evidence in those prior cases “was 
traditional sentence-related evidence, evidence that tended to show how, not 
whether, the defendant committed the crime.  Nor was the evidence directly 
inconsistent with the jury’s finding of guilt.”  Id. at 1231.  The Court also noted, 
“[T]his Court’s previous cases had not interpreted the Eighth Amendment as 
providing a capital defendant the right to introduce at sentencing evidence 
designed to cast ‘residual doubt’ on his guilt of the basic crime of conviction.  The 
Franklin [v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988),] plurality said it was ‘quite doubtful’ 
that any such right existed.”  Id. at 1231-32.  Finally, the Court stated that 
“sentencing traditionally concerns how, not whether, a defendant committed the 
crime,” and that “the parties previously litigated the issue to which the evidence is 
relevant––whether the defendant committed the basic crime.  The evidence thereby 
attacks a previously determined matter in a proceeding at which, in principle, that 
matter is not at issue.  The law typically discourages collateral attacks of this 
kind.”  Id. at 1232 (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).  Based on 
 
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the Court’s reasoning in Guzek, it is logical to infer that counsel would be deemed 
per se ineffective for relying solely on evidence concerning whether the defendant 
had the character to commit the crime during the penalty phase, as Hannon’s 
counsel did in this case.   
 
In ignoring this case law and approving of counsel’s performance here, the 
majority appears to adopt a three-step approach.  First, it ignores the mandate for 
defense counsel’s duty to investigate set out in cases like Wiggins and Rose; 
second, it transforms counsel’s continuing assertion of innocence defense 
(explicitly disapproved of in Wiggins and Rose), into a “reasonable doubt” 
strategy; and, third, it approves of this freshly coined strategy as reasonable and 
effective even in the face of this Court’s consistent holdings to the contrary.   
 
In fact, the record reflects that counsel did not actually assert “lingering 
doubt” as that term is commonly understood.  To say he did gives him way too 
much credit.  “Lingering doubt” usually refers to the assertion of certain 
weaknesses in the State’s case for guilt.  Defense counsel did not do that.  Rather, 
as noted above, he simply continued his claim, in the face of overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, that his client was innocent and should receive a life 
sentence so he could continue to attempt to prove his innocence.  This is, however, 
precisely the kind of conduct that this Court and the United States Supreme Court, 
in cases like Rose and Wiggins, have found to constitute ineffectiveness under 
 
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Strickland.  Any attempt by the majority to classify this strategy differently 
involves superficial semantics.  See majority op. at 28 n.11 (“We reiterate that 
counsel’s strategy was to demonstrate to the jury that Hannon in no way possessed 
the type of character to commit the crimes.”).26 
 
Contrary to this overwhelming precedent, some of which the majority sets 
out in its opinion, and as exemplified by the holdings in Wiggins and Rose, the 
majority holds that “[i]t is certainly logical that a jury of laypersons is less likely to 
recommend death if they have some lingering concerns about guilt than if there is 
absolute certainty on the issue of guilt.”  Majority op. at 32-33.  While this writer 
may agree with this statement in the abstract, it ignores and says nothing about 
what actually happened in this case or the state of our law on the issue and its 
relationship to counsel and his obligation to thoroughly investigate and present 
mitigation during the penalty phase of a capital case.  In essence, the majority has 
                                          
 
 
26.  The majority cites to Parker v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 331 F.3d 764, 
787 (11th Cir. 2003), stating that the Eleventh Circuit held that there was no 
deficiency in counsel’s focusing on acquittal at trial and focusing on residual doubt 
instead of other forms of mitigation at sentencing.  Majority op. at 31.  However, in 
Parker, previous counsel had retained a psychiatrist who evaluated the defendant 
and investigated thoroughly into the defendant’s family background, discovering 
that the family members were “unconcerned or uncooperative.”  Parker, 331 F.3d 
at 781-82.  Counsel also decided not to introduce drug abuse evidence because it 
was inconsistent with the defendant’s participation in a drug treatment program in 
prison.  Id. at 782.  This type of strategy was hardly the case in Hannon’s penalty 
phase.  Also, in Parker, the defendant had been convicted of two prior murders, 
making the aggravating factors substantial and the prejudice for not introducing 
mitigation very minimal.  Id. at 788-89. 
 
 
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transformed counsel’s continuing innocence strategy into a lingering doubt strategy 
and then approved conduct by counsel that this Court and the United States 
Supreme Court have expressly forbidden.27    
In addition to the wealth of legal precedent stating that lingering doubt 
evidence is not appropriate as mitigation during the penalty phase of a capital trial, 
it is apparent that it does not make sense in practice to rely blindly on a “my guy is 
too nice to have done it” theory after a jury has unanimously determined beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did do it.  Maintaining such a head-in-the-sand 
                                          
 
27.  In attempted support of the choice of strategy theory, the majority cites 
dissenting and concurring opinions from this Court stating the beliefs of individual 
justices regarding the effect of lingering doubt on a penalty phase jury.  Majority 
op. at 33 n.13 (citing King v. Dugger, 555 So. 2d 355, 360 (Fla. 1990) (Barkett, J., 
dissenting); Melendez v. State, 498 So. 2d 1258, 1263 (Fla. 1986) (Barkett, J., 
specially concurring); Way, 760 So. 2d at 924 (Pariente, J., concurring)).  
Obviously, the individual minority views of some members of this Court do not 
constitute the prevailing law on the issue, especially as that law affects counsel’s 
conduct and obligation to investigate and present genuine mitigation evidence.  I 
concurred with Justice Pariente’s concurrence in Way, in which she stated, “I 
believe that the nature and strength of the evidence of guilt should be considered in 
deciding whether to impose the death sentence and in whether to uphold a death 
sentence.”  760 So. 2d at 924 (Pariente, J., concurring).  Justice Pariente urged the 
Legislature to consider implementing lingering doubt as a statutory mitigating 
factor in order to ensure justice.  Id.  I share this belief because evidence that may 
be strong enough to convict a defendant of first-degree murder might not rise to the 
level of supporting the death penalty; this could be pointed out convincingly, along 
with other mitigation, by a skillful defense attorney during the penalty phase of a 
capital trial.  However, once again, the belief that lingering doubt could constitute 
valid mitigation does not reflect the law as it now stands.  And, of course, the issue 
we face is whether Hannon’s counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and 
prepare, and instead relying exclusively on a claim of innocence during the penalty 
phase of the trial. 
 
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posture after the jury has rejected it is akin to asking jury members to reverse 
themselves on the finding of guilt, after they have obviously anguished over such 
an important decision.   
In other words, the penalty phase of a capital trial is not a second trial on 
guilt, but is rather a proceeding to determine the appropriate punishment, death or 
life in prison without parole, for someone who has already been adjudicated guilty.  
And, as the United States Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly 
emphasized, the penalty phase is the time for counsel to investigate and prepare an 
effective defense of the State’s case for the death penalty, by both rebutting the 
State’s claims of aggravation and by putting on an effective claim of mitigation.  
That is what the trial judge explicitly tells the jury it must focus on by the court’s 
instructions, and that is what defense counsel must focus on if it expects the jury to 
respond and to follow the trial judge’s instructions.   
B. 
Failure to Investigate Mitigation 
 
Shockingly, the record reflects that Hannon’s counsel did no investigation 
for mitigation, and, in fact, initially was not going to present any form of 
mitigation during the penalty phase, even a continuing claim of not guilty.  
Hannon’s counsel stated at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, “Well, we had 
nothing to mitigate.  He was not guilty.  He didn’t do it.  That was it.”  However, at 
the penalty phase the trial judge actually directed him to reconsider this irrational 
 
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strategy; thereafter, Hannon’s counsel presented the evidence relating to the “my 
client is too nice to have done this” strategy.  The following exchange at Hannon’s 
postconviction evidentiary hearing aptly reflects Hannon’s trial counsel’s attitude 
and absolute default as to any investigation into mitigation: 
Q.  And so what did you do between the time when you said you 
weren’t going to present any mitigation to the time that you said you 
were going to present mitigation?  Did you do any investigation into 
Mr. Hannon’s background whatsoever as to mitigation? 
A.  Well, no.  The decision was made by him that we’re not going to 
do that and I agreed with it.  So what are we going to do a background 
investigation for?  What’s the point?   
Hannon’s counsel was also asked, “You hadn’t provided any investigation, though, 
into his background as to what he could possibly be waiving, did you?”  Hannon’s 
counsel replied, “He knew what he was waiving.”   
The United States Supreme Court has continually reaffirmed the critical 
nature of counsel’s duty to thoroughly investigate into mitigating factors that are to 
be presented during the penalty phase of capital cases.  See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 
524, 536 (“[C]ounsel were not in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice” 
regarding the presentation of mitigating evidence because “counsel abandoned 
their investigation of petitioner’s background after having acquired only 
rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources.”); Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000) (stating that because “counsel did not begin to 
prepare for [the penalty phase] until a week before the trial” and failed to present 
 
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the “voluminous amount of [mitigating] evidence . . . , trial counsel did not fulfill 
their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s 
background”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make 
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary.”).   
In its recent decision in Rompilla, for example, the United States Supreme 
Court held that trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective because no reasonable 
efforts were made to review a prior rape conviction file when it was known that the 
State would introduce the prior conviction as aggravation through the notice of 
conviction as well as testimony from the rape victim in that case.  125 S. Ct. at 
2464.  The Court noted that this was “not a case in which defense counsel simply 
ignored their obligation to find mitigating evidence”; in fact, counsel had 
interviewed the defendant and members of his family, and also examined three 
mental health experts’ opinions.  Id. at 2462.  The file contained, in addition to the 
conviction material, information about the defendant’s childhood and mental 
disorders that would have served as helpful mitigation.  Id. at 2468.   
As in Wiggins, and directly on point to the case before us today concerning 
defense counsel’s choice to continue only with an innocence strategy through the 
penalty phase, the Rompilla Court expressly rejected counsel’s “few naked pleas 
 
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for mercy” as inadequate and determined counsel’s failure to investigate to be both 
ineffective and prejudicial.  Id. at 2469.  The Court explained: 
This evidence adds up to a mitigation case that bears no relation to the 
few naked pleas for mercy actually put before the jury, and although 
we suppose it is possible that a jury could have heard it all and still 
have decided on the death penalty, that is not the test.  It goes without 
saying that the undiscovered “mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, 
‘might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal’ of [Rompilla’s] 
culpability,” Wiggins, 539 U.S., at 538, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (quoting 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S., at 398, 120 S. Ct. 1495), and the 
likelihood of a different result if the evidence had gone in is 
“sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” actually reached 
at sentencing, Strickland, 466 U.S., at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052. 
 
Id. at 2469.  Rompilla constitutes one in a long line of cases finding counsel’s 
representation ineffective where mitigation was not thoroughly investigated and 
presented.  In addition to Rompilla, Hannon’s case is also similar in facts and 
circumstances to the United States Supreme Court cases in Williams and Wiggins.  
In Williams counsel did not begin preparing for the sentencing phase of the 
proceeding until a week before trial.  529 U.S. at 395.  Counsel failed to present 
evidence of the defendant’s horrific childhood or of his borderline mental 
retardation and insufficient schooling.  Id.  The United States Supreme Court held 
that the defendant “had a right––indeed, a constitutionally protected right––to 
provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that his trial counsel either failed to 
discover or failed to offer.”  Id. at 393.  “[T]rial counsel did not fulfill their 
obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”  Id. 
 
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at 396 (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, commentary, at 4-55 
(2d ed. 1980)).   
 
In Wiggins, discussed above, trial counsel, “well in advance of trial, decided 
to focus their efforts on ‘retry[ing] the factual case’ and disputing [the defendant’s] 
direct responsibility for the murder.”  539 U.S. at 517.  Trial counsel ignored 
substantial mitigation, including a “bleak life history” involving sexual and 
physical abuse and a chronically alcoholic mother who neglected the defendant and 
his siblings.  Id. at 516.  As in this case, trial counsel in Wiggins “attempt[ed] to 
justify their limited investigation as reflecting a tactical judgment not to present 
mitigating evidence at sentencing and to pursue an alternative strategy instead.”  
Id. at 521.  However, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he record of the actual 
sentencing proceedings underscores the unreasonableness of counsel’s conduct by 
suggesting that their failure to investigate thoroughly resulted from inattention, not 
reasoned strategic judgment.”  Id. at 526.   
 
This Court has also consistently recognized counsel’s duty to investigate 
into mitigating factors, and has reversed sentences where investigations into 
mitigating factors proved inadequate and prejudice resulted.  Recently, in State v. 
Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2002), we declared: 
[T]he obligation to investigate and prepare for the penalty portion of a 
capital case cannot be overstated––this is an integral part of a capital 
case.  Although a defendant may waive mitigation, he cannot do so 
blindly; counsel must first investigate all avenues and advise the 
 
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defendant so that the defendant is able to make an informed, 
intelligent decision. 
Id. at 1113 (footnote omitted); see also Ragsdale v. State, 798 So. 2d 713, 720 (Fla. 
2001) (holding that counsel was ineffective when trial counsel failed to investigate 
into or present significant available mitigating evidence at the penalty phase); 
Rose, 675 So. 2d at 570-74 (finding that counsel was ineffective at the penalty 
phase when failing to present evidence of severe mental disturbance and evidence 
of the defendant’s alcoholism and mistreatment as a child); Deaton v. Dugger, 635 
So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1993) (finding that despite defendant’s waiver, counsel was still 
ineffective for failure to investigate and prepare for penalty phase); Stevens v. 
State, 552 So. 2d 1082, 1085-87 (Fla. 1989) (finding ineffective assistance of 
counsel when counsel failed to investigate defendant’s background, failed to 
present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase, and failed to argue on 
defendant’s behalf).   
The federal and state courts are uniform in their holdings that it is essential 
for counsel to fully investigate available mitigation in order to make an informed 
choice regarding whether to present the information or not.  See Porter v. 
Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 557 (11th Cir. 1994) (“An attorney has a duty to conduct a 
reasonable investigation, including an investigation of the defendant’s background, 
 
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for possible mitigating evidence.”).28  A reasonable investigation did not occur in 
this case.  In fact, trial counsel failed to pursue any investigation, and the 
subsequent failure to present any mitigation evidence was unreasonable in light of 
all the circumstances of this case.  See Rose, 675 So. 2d at 572-73 (finding 
counsel’s performance deficient because, due to “counsel’s incompetency and lack 
of experience,” counsel “never attempted to meaningfully investigate mitigation” 
                                          
 
 
28.  The majority argues that Hannon’s counsel could not benefit from this 
Court’s decision in Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993), in which this 
Court announced a prospective rule that a defendant must inform the trial court on 
the record that he refuses to present any mitigating evidence.  Majority op. at 24-25 
note 8 (quoting Koon, 619 So. 2d at 250).  However, the case that Koon 
differentiates, Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir. 1991), is more 
similar to the facts of the present case.  In Blanco, the Eleventh Circuit stated that  
 
a defendant’s desires not to present mitigating evidence do not 
terminate counsels’ responsibilities during the sentencing phase of a 
death penalty trial: “The reason lawyers may not ‘blindly follow’ such 
commands is that although the decision whether to use such evidence 
is for the client, the lawyer first must evaluate potential avenues and 
advise the client of those offering potential merit.”   
Id. at 1502 (quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1451 (11th Cir. 
1986)).  Counsel in Blanco had not investigated into mitigation until the end of the 
guilt phase, and the Eleventh Circuit held, “The ultimate decision that was reached 
not to call witnesses was not a result of investigation and evaluation, but was 
instead primarily a result of counsels’ eagerness to latch onto Blanco’s statements 
that he did not want any witnesses called.”  Id. at 1503.  Similarly, Hannon’s 
counsel reiterated continuously that it was Hannon’s choice not to present 
mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of his case.  However, Hannon’s 
decision could not have been made without adequate investigation by his counsel 
and consultation between Hannon and his counsel. 
 
 
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when there was such mitigation available and “no investigation of options or 
meaningful choice”).29   
 
1. 
Failure to Prepare Adequately for Penalty Phase 
In this case counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigation as 
mandated by case law was complete.  The inadequacy of Hannon’s counsel’s 
performance included a failure to prepare adequately for the penalty phase, a 
failure to consider the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases and other resources available to him, a failure to 
investigate available drug and alcohol abuse mitigation, a failure to investigate 
mental health mitigation, and a failure to investigate Hannon’s family background.  
Importantly, the majority fails to even acknowledge capital counsel’s 
fundamental obligation to investigate his client’s background and counsel’s failure 
to meet this obligation, but rather continuously cites trial counsel’s self-serving 
postconviction testimony and version of his discussions with Hannon’s family to 
                                          
 
 
29.  The majority attempts to distinguish Rose, stating that in the present 
case, Hannon’s counsel made a reasoned decision to limit his investigation into 
mitigation based on Hannon’s desire to do so.  However, as stated in Blanco, 
counsel has a duty not to blindly follow his client’s desire to limit mitigation 
before evaluating potential mitigation.  943 F.2d at 1502.  In addition, the majority 
distinguishes Rose because counsel in Rose pursued a strategy that he believed to 
be ill-conceived, whereas Hannon’s counsel did not possess this belief.  See 
majority op. at 31-32 n. 12.  Whether a defendant’s counsel admits his strategy is 
faulty or falsely believes it to be valid should be of no moment in this Court’s 
evaluation of whether counsel’s performance was deficient in a capital case with 
consequences as severe as death. 
 
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support its holding that trial counsel’s strategy during the penalty phase was not 
faulty, without paying more than lipservice to Hannon’s family’s testimony 
regarding trial counsel’s conduct.  As noted above, Hannon’s counsel claimed his 
strategy was only that Hannon was not the type of character to be involved in the 
crime that occurred.  The majority cites penalty phase testimony from Toni Acker 
and Hannon’s mother and father that he did not have the type of character to 
commit the crime, and holds that this testimony supports trial counsel’s strategy.  
However, even as to this misguided and uninformed tactic, the majority fails to 
note that trial counsel’s “investigation” and “preparation” consisted only of brief 
discussions with Hannon at the jail, brief discussions with his mother and father at 
the trial during breaks, and a brief discussion with Maureen Hannon outside the 
courtroom when she was called as a defense witness during the guilt phase.  
Hannon’s counsel prepared Mr. and Ms. Hannon by simply telling them to “get up 
there––and remember this is our defense and basically you’ve just got to look at 
the jury and tell them what you feel from your heart.  That was it.”   
Although Hannon’s counsel stated that he had asked Hannon’s family 
members if Hannon was “born with any problems” and the family members did not 
bring any mental health issues to his attention, the testimony of Hannon’s family 
members tells a different story.  Hannon’s sister stated that Hannon’s counsel 
never asked her about his life before the murders, his drug and alcohol use, or his 
 
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home life.  She asserted, “I had actually tried to contact [Hannon’s counsel] on 
more than one occasion and he absolutely refused to listen to what I had to say or 
contribute.  He did not want to talk to me at all.  I never had a phone call returned.”  
She was also listed as a witness for the penalty phase by Hannon’s attorney but 
was never called during the penalty phase.  Hannon’s attorney erroneously had her 
listed as living in a different state even though she lived in Florida.  She stated at 
the evidentiary hearing, “[Hannon’s counsel] told me I had nothing to contribute 
and he didn’t need me for anything.”   
Hannon’s mother testified that Hannon’s counsel did not prepare his family 
for their testimony at the penalty phase and did not explain the purpose of a penalty 
phase.  At the evidentiary hearing, the following exchange occurred: 
Q.  Did [Hannon’s counsel] ever tell you what a penalty phase was 
for? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Did [Hannon’s counsel] ever discuss the purpose of mitigation in a 
death penalty phase? 
A.  I don’t understand mitigation. 
Q.  Have you ever heard that word before?  Mitigation? 
A.  No.   
Q.  Okay.  Did you have any idea that the purpose of the penalty 
phase  
was to mitigate what the jury had—the jury’s verdict? 
A.  Oh, I understand.  No. 
 
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Q.  Did he ever explain to you that the jury didn’t believe his alibi 
defense? 
A.  No. 
Q.  And that he now had to present something?  That was never 
explained to you? 
A.  No. 
Hannon’s father testified that there was not even a discussion concerning the 
innocence defense, and Hannon’s wife stated that Hannon’s counsel never 
consulted with any family members about the penalty phase.   
 
2. 
Failure to consult the American Bar Association (ABA)   
 
 
 
Guidelines and Other Resources 
 
 
In its death penalty jurisprudence, and especially in its most recent decisions 
in Wiggins, Rompilla and Williams, the United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly cited ABA standards to measure counsel’s duty.  When Hannon’s 
counsel was asked if he had attended any death penalty seminars where defense 
attorneys are taught how to conduct a death penalty trial in accord with ABA 
standards, he expressed disdain for such professional activities: 
No.  And I’m not sure that you teach them that.  You give them 
suggestions on what to do.  But teach them?  You know, you’ve got 
to—you’ve got to—when you’re in the game, when you’re in the heat 
of battle, you’ve got to—you’ve got to fight the way you think it’s 
supposed to be done.  And, you know, you can go to a school, but I 
had a lot of practical experience in these cases [as a prosecutor]. 
Hannon’s counsel had never tried a capital case as a defense attorney, and he did 
not consult with any experienced lawyers in capital cases.   
 
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Hannon’s counsel had prosecuted capital cases before, but was unfamiliar 
with the ABA Guidelines for defense counsel conducting death penalty cases, 
which would have provided guidance to Hannon’s counsel and which have 
consistently been cited by the United States Supreme Court as representative of 
prevailing standards for competent counsel.30  These guidelines stress the 
importance of not only defense counsel’s duty to investigate into mitigating 
factors, but also the idea that strategy can often shift between the guilt and penalty 
phases of a capital trial.  ABA Guidelines 11.7.1(A) (stating that in forming a 
defense theory, “counsel should consider both the guilt/innocence phase and the 
penalty phase, and seek a theory that will be effective through both phases”).  ABA 
Guideline 11.4.1 states that investigation for the preparation of the sentencing 
phase should occur immediately even if the client initially asserts that no 
mitigation is to be offered.  ABA Guidelines 11.4.1(C).  In addition, “[i]f 
inconsistencies between guilt/innocence and penalty phase defenses arise, counsel 
should seek to minimize them by procedural or substantive tactics.”  ABA 
Guidelines 11.7.1(B).  Moreover, counsel should consider interviewing “witnesses 
familiar with aspects of the client’s life history that might affect the likelihood that 
the client committed the charged offense(s), possible mitigating reasons for the 
offense(s), and/or other mitigating evidence to show why the client should not be 
                                          
 
 
30.  The 1989 ABA Guidelines were superseded by a revision in 2003, but 
the 1989 version of the guidelines were in effect at the time of Hannon’s trial.   
 
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sentenced to death.”  ABA Guidelines 11.4.1(D)(3)(B).  Also, counsel should 
consider presenting witnesses at the sentencing phase that “relate[] to the client’s 
life and development,” as well as “[e]xpert witnesses to provide medical, 
psychological, sociological or other explanations for the offense(s) for which the 
client is being sentenced, to give a favorable opinion as to the client’s capacity for 
rehabilitation, etc. and/or to rebut expert testimony presented by the prosecutor.”  
ABA Guidelines 11.8.3(F)(1), (2).   
 
As with his disdain for professional education, when asked about the ABA 
guidelines, Hannon’s counsel replied, “I don’t care what the . . . American Bar 
Association says.  I don’t care what anybody says.  This is a decision I made.  I’m 
the guy that makes those decisions [with the input of] the client, the parents, the 
sister, my co-counsel.”   
 
 
3. 
Drug and Alcohol Abuse Mitigation  
 
The majority glosses over the fact that Hannon’s counsel did not investigate 
any of Hannon’s prior drug use because “[i]t had nothing to do with our defense.”  
Hannon’s counsel stated that “[h]e didn’t have a cocaine problem” when asked if 
Hannon had cocaine problems before the trial, even though Hannon’s counsel was 
aware of both Hannon’s previous conviction for cocaine possession and delivery of 
cocaine, and of a charge of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.  He did not know that 
Hannon began using drugs and alcohol at age eleven and had a history of using 
 
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LSD on a regular basis at the age of fifteen, as well as crystal methamphetamine, 
hallucinogenic mushrooms, and crack cocaine, nor did he know that Hannon was 
paranoid when under the influence of drugs.  He did not question Hannon’s parents 
concerning Hannon’s expulsion from school for smoking marijuana.  He did not 
know that Hannon’s daily alcohol consumption before the murders was half a case 
of beer and a fifth of bourbon, and that on the night of the murders, Hannon drank 
almost two cases of beer.31  Hannon’s sister testified at the evidentiary hearing that 
Hannon’s behavior was irritated and edgy leading up to the murders.  He would 
drink excessively and use cocaine on a daily basis without sleeping at night.  He 
also used acid a couple of times a month.   
 
When asked about these issues, Hannon’s counsel responded that “[i]t didn’t 
come up because it wasn’t an issue. . . .  We weren’t exploring those things,” even 
though he knew that Hannon had been arrested for owning drug paraphernalia and 
marijuana plants.  Of course, as noted above, that was only the tip of the iceberg 
concerning Hannon’s drug use. 
 
 
4. 
Mental Health Mitigation 
 
Hannon’s counsel was also unfamiliar with the prevailing death penalty case 
law on mitigation, such as Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), and, critically, 
                                          
 
 
31.  Hannon’s counsel did not present a voluntary intoxication defense 
because “he wasn’t intoxicated at the crime scene.  It was irrelevant [because] he 
wasn’t there.” 
 
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he did not have Hannon evaluated for any mental health issues prior to trial.  See 
id. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971), and stating 
that defendants must have “basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal” and that 
such tools should be provided if a defendant cannot pay for them).  In Ake, the 
Court held: 
[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at 
the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State 
must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent 
psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in 
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. 
 
Id. at 83.  Of course, counsel’s lack of knowledge of the law cannot constitute 
tactical maneuvers.  Nero v. Blackburn, 597 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1979).   
 
The majority asserts that the present case is similar to the facts of Haliburton 
v. Singletary, 691 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1997).  In Haliburton, this Court held that 
counsel was not ineffective for failing to call a mental health expert, even though 
the expert “could have testified that there was a strong indication of brain 
damage.”  Id. at 471.  However, the facts in Haliburton and this case are dissimilar.  
In Haliburton the decision not to present a mental health expert’s testimony was 
deemed strategic “because she would have also testified that [the defendant] was 
an extremely dangerous person and that he was likely to kill again.”  Id.  In 
Haliburton counsel made a strategic choice concerning the presentation of 
mitigating factors after investigating into them.  Id.  In the present case, however, 
 
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counsel failed to conduct any reasonable investigation.  Counsel could not have 
made a strategic choice concerning information unknown to him, and contrary to 
Haliburton, there is a reasonable probability in this case that the lack of meaningful 
mitigation undermined confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase. 
 
No investigation into Hannon’s mental state or possible brain damage 
occurred.  Psychiatric mitigating evidence “has the potential to totally change the 
evidentiary picture.”  Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 495 (11th Cir. 1988).  
This case stands in contrast to those cases where this Court has rejected claims of 
ineffective assistance when counsel decides not to present medical expert 
testimony after preparing properly and investigating into mitigating factors.  See 
Rutherford v. State, 727 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1998) (“[W]e find no error in the trial 
court’s finding that trial counsel was aware of possible mental mitigation, but made 
a strategic decision under the circumstances of this case to instead focus on the 
‘humanization’ of [the defendant] through lay testimony.”); Bryan v. Dugger, 641 
So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 1994) (“This is not a case which defense counsel failed to 
prepare.  Counsel had [the defendant] examined by seven mental health experts 
[but did not call a doctor] as a witness after the doctor told him that his testimony 
would not be helpful and that it suggested the possibility of malingering.”).  No 
investigation occurred in this case; therefore, Hannon’s counsel could not have 
 
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been in a position to make a strategic decision not to present mental health experts 
in mitigation. 
According to the testimony of Robert Norgard, a criminal defense expert, it 
was standard practice for an effective capital defense attorney to hire a mental 
health expert for the penalty phase of a capital trial because brain damage is not 
always apparent to a lay person; it requires neurological testing.  But Hannon’s 
counsel did not do so.  Instead, he stated, “And, why would I do that anyway?  
We’re going to get up there and say he’s crazy and, therefore, he shouldn’t be 
killed?  He wasn’t crazy.”  He did not believe that Hannon had “a mental problem. 
. . .  I think I know it when I see it.”  Hannon’s counsel stated that he did not 
investigate Hannon’s mental state or possible brain damage because he had no 
indication of it; he could “determine whether somebody’s whacked,” in his own 
words.  Dr. Crown testified that in terms of general overall cognitive processing 
Hannon is within the average range; Hannon was, however, impaired on “the most 
critical subtest that relates to the possibility of brain damage. . . .  [W]hat is very 
apparent is that [Hannon] has processing defects.”  But Hannon’s counsel “didn’t 
see anything . . . .  Never heard of it until just now.”   
The evidence presented at Hannon’s evidentiary hearing established that 
Hannon had a history of severe drug and alcohol abuse “to the point of blacking 
out and passing out,” parental neglect, and neurological impairments resulting in 
 
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poor impulse control and flawed decision-making.  Drs. Crown and Sulton testified 
that Hannon’s impairments impacted his daily functioning.  Dr. Crown, board 
certified in neuropsychology, stated that Hannon was “having difficulty with 
cognitive processing” and that there was evidence of “head trauma from accidents, 
from being kicked, from falls.”  He also testified, 
In terms of drug [e]ffects the greatest exposure to drugs and the 
greatest absorption level is in the frontotemporal area and actually the 
subcortical area relating to the limbic system.  And these are areas that 
are responsible for concentration, attention, control of impulsivity, 
understanding the long-term consequences of immediate behavior and 
processing immediate memory, and also it aids in restoring memory 
function. 
 
Dr. Crown also noted that Hannon suffered from rheumatic fever at age seven; its 
impact on his health was severe and he missed months of schooling.  Hannon also 
suffered various head injuries, including losing consciousness at football practice 
in the ninth grade, getting kicked in the head by a bull, being hit by scaffolding at 
work, and being involved in several car accidents.  “[R]apidly retrieving . . . 
information and applying it in a new situation is extremely difficult for him, and 
that’s where he falls apart.”  Hannon was distracted very easily and has 
“difficulties under stress, pressure, drugs, lack of sleep, in fully comprehending 
information and attending to tasks.” 
 
Drs. Crown and Sulton both performed the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale Revised, which resulted in a very low score on the subtest that is most 
 
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indicative of brain damage.32  Also, Hannon told Dr. Sulton that he had gone 
AWOL from the military on three separate occasions.  Dr. Sulton found several 
nonstatutory mitigators such as parental neglect, lack of structure, lack of 
discipline, lack of guidance in his childhood environment, and serious childhood 
illnesses.  Dr. Sulton also termed him an “extreme follower” and found that 
Hannon had severe and chronic substance abuse problems, was impulsive, lacked 
concentration, and had personality changes due to his cocaine addiction.  His score 
of global intelligence was average, but he scored an 8 out of 100 on the “digit 
symbol subtest” relating to “the rate of speed with which he is capable of learning 
symbol relationships,” which could indicate a learning disability.  Dr. Lipman, a 
neuropharmacologist, stated that Hannon would combine “smoking, drinking, 
taking acid and Quaaludes” as a teenager and this could have had a long-term 
effect on his brain, even before he moved on to crystal meth and cocaine.  Even the 
State’s witness, Dr. Sidney Merin, agreed that Hannon had “a polysubstance abuse 
disorder.”  Therefore, if he had performed an investigation, Hannon’s counsel 
could have presented substantial and persuasive testimony concerning Hannon’s 
mental health to establish a case of mitigation. 
                                          
 
 
32.  Dr. Crown testified that, concerning the many subtest scores involved in 
the Wechsler test of a normal individual, a great deal of homogeneity is expected 
between the scores.  However, Hannon’s scores were greatly scattered from 
“roughly the 8th or 9th percentile all the way up to the roughly 98th percentile.”  
He scored lowest on the “battery most sensitive to the identification of brain 
damage.” 
 
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5. 
Family Background Mitigation 
 
Counsel did not question Hannon’s parents about his background because 
“[he] had no indication that it was bad.”  Regarding Hannon’s school, military, or 
medical records, the following colloquy took place at the postconviction hearing: 
Q:  [D]id you obtain any of Mr. Hannon’s school records? 
A:  No. 
Q:  Did you obtain his military records? 
A:  No. 
Q:  Did you know he was in the army? 
A:  I don’t recall.  
Hannon’s counsel could not remember if he knew that Hannon dropped out of 
school when he was sixteen.  The evidence presented below established that 
Hannon’s parents were constantly absent during Hannon’s childhood because 
Hannon’s sister suffered from scoliosis, which required treatment in another town.  
Hannon’s sister testified that their parents drank to excess often and the children 
“got some real good beatings.”  Concerning the beatings, Hannon’s sister stated, 
“My mother had two favorite things she did.  One was just grab you by the back of 
your hair and slam your head in the wall.”  Hannon’s sister also testified, “I can’t 
ever remember my parents ever saying the words I love you to my face, not ever.”  
Hannon’s sister left home five days after she turned eighteen because she “hated 
 
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it.”  Also, a cousin that Hannon considered a father figure committed suicide.  
Hannon’s sister stated that Hannon went from “job to job, place to place.”   
There was also substantial evidence presented that Hannon needed approval 
from his sister and friends, and Dr. Sulton and Maureen Hannon both testified that 
Hannon was a follower.  Hannon’s mother stated that Hannon had a very close 
relationship with his sister Maureen, who began using drugs and alcohol, running 
away, and cutting school at the age of thirteen.  Hannon’s parents kicked her out of 
the house when she was sixteen.  There was evidence that he also sought approval 
from his codefendant Richardson, but Hannon’s counsel stated, “Nobody 
substantially dominated Pat Hannon.  He was an imposing presence himself.”   
The majority has sub silentio chosen to treat this case as one where counsel 
did do a thorough job of investigation but then made a “strategic” choice as to what 
mitigation to present.  However, it goes without saying that counsel must first be 
informed as to available mitigation to be in a position to make a reasonable 
strategic choice as to what to focus on in mitigation, and the obligation to 
investigate mitigation before making the choice is fundamental to the role of 
defense counsel.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536.  In Hannon’s case, counsel’s failure to 
carry out this fundamental obligation was not based on strategy.  None of the 
mitigation evidence set out above was discovered by Hannon’s defense counsel or 
presented as mitigation during the penalty phase of the proceedings.  Counsel was 
 
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not aware of and did not present any of the abundant mitigating evidence that has 
been demonstrated without dispute to have been available; instead, he simply 
continued with his “nice guy” strategy by asking vague questions on direct 
examination of the defense penalty phase witnesses concerning their feelings about 
whether Hannon could have committed the crime.  This questioning simply 
indicates that Hannon’s counsel failed completely to prepare for the penalty phase 
of the trial except to continue with his “nice guy” strategy. 
II. 
Prejudice 
 
There can be no doubt that the quantity and quality of the mitigation 
evidence established without dispute at the postconviction hearing was of the 
nature contemplated in Williams that “might well have influenced the jury’s 
appraisal of [the defendant’s] moral culpability” or was of the kind that “may alter 
the jury’s selection of penalty.”  Williams, 529 U.S. at 398.  This substantial 
evidence of mitigation stands in stark contrast to the legally indefensible position 
taken by counsel at the penalty phase.   
 
To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
The defendant is not required to show that the deficient performance “more likely 
 
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than not altered the outcome in the case.”  Id. at 693.  He must only show that 
unpresented available evidence “might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal of 
[the defendant’s] moral culpability” or “may alter the jury’s selection of penalty.”  
Williams, 529 U.S. at 398; see also Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 985 (Fla. 2000) 
(“When evaluating claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to present 
mitigating evidence, this Court has phrased the defendant’s burden as showing that 
counsel’s ineffectiveness ‘deprived the defendant of a reliable penalty phase 
proceeding.’ ”).     
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the jury must weigh 
mitigating evidence that meets a “low threshold for relevance.”  Smith v. Texas, 
543 U.S. 37, 44 (2004) (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004)).  In 
Smith, the Court held, “Because petitioner’s proffered evidence was relevant, the 
Eighth Amendment required the trial court to empower the jury with a vehicle 
capable of giving effect to that evidence.”  Id. at 45.  The Court in Tennard spoke 
of its broad view regarding the defendant’s presentation of mitigating evidence:   
 
When we addressed directly the relevance standard applicable 
to mitigating evidence in capital cases in McKoy v. North Carolina, 
494 U.S. 433, 440-441 (1990), we spoke in the most expansive terms. 
We established that the “meaning of relevance is no different in the 
context of mitigating evidence introduced in a capital sentencing 
proceeding” than in any other context, and thus the general 
evidentiary standard—“ ‘ “any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence” ’ 
”―applies.  Id., at 440 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
 
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345 (1985)).  We quoted approvingly from a dissenting opinion in the 
state court: “ ‘Relevant mitigating evidence is evidence which tends 
logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-
finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.’ ”  494 U.S., 
at 440 (quoting State v. McKoy, 372 S.E.2d, 12, 45 (1988) (opinion of 
Exum, C. J.)).  Thus, a State cannot bar “the consideration of . . . 
evidence if the sentencer could reasonably find that it warrants a 
sentence less than death.”  494 U.S., at 441.  
 
Once this low threshold for relevance is met, the “Eighth 
Amendment requires that the jury be able to consider and give effect 
to” a capital defendant’s mitigating evidence.  Boyde v. California, 
494 U.S. 370, 377-378 (1990) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 
(1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Penry [v. 
Lynaugh], 492 U.S. 302 (1989)); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 
U.S. 808, 822 (1991) (“We have held that a State cannot preclude the 
sentencer from considering ‘any relevant mitigating evidence’ that the 
defendant proffers in support of a sentence less than death. . . . 
[V]irtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a 
capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances” 
(quoting Eddings, [455 U.S.] at 114)). 
542 U.S. at 284-85 (parallel citations omitted).  Moreover, Florida’s Standard Jury 
Instructions state, “A mitigating circumstance need not be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt by the defendant.  If [the jury is] reasonably convinced that a 
mitigating circumstance exists, [it] may consider it as established.”  Fla. Std. Jury 
Inst. (Crim.) 7.11.  “A mitigating circumstance can be defined broadly as ‘any 
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense’ that reasonably may serve as a basis for imposing a sentence less than 
death.’ ”  Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415, 419 n.4 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Lockett 
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).   
 
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The trial court did not reach the issue of prejudice because it determined that 
counsel was not deficient, and the majority expresses a belief “that the evidence in 
mitigation presented during the postconviction proceedings was equivocal and not 
‘abundant.’ ”  Majority op. at 47-48 note 18.  However, it is apparent from the 
testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that there was voluminous 
evidence of mitigation that the jury should have been given the opportunity to 
consider in determining Hannon’s sentence.  That is the fundamental purpose of a 
penalty-phase proceeding.  That fundamental purpose cannot be achieved in cases 
where defense counsel, as here, essentially defaults in carrying out his 
responsibility to investigate and present available mitigation so as to give the jury 
no meaningful choice in its penalty phase deliberations.  No choice was presented 
here.   
CONCLUSION 
Under Strickland, Wiggins, and other United States Supreme Court and 
Florida decisions discussed above, Hannon was entitled to an adequate defense and 
an adversarial testing of the State’s prosecution of the death penalty.  In our 
adversarial system of justice, the jury may only utilize that evidence of mitigation 
supplied to it by defense counsel when making a decision concerning punishment.  
No material mitigation was supplied to the jury in Hannon’s penalty phase; instead 
Hannon’s counsel chose to continue arguing innocence, an argument the jury had 
 
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emphatically already rejected.  Hence, in the face of this default by counsel, the 
jury was left with no choice but to impose the death penalty.  Absolutely no 
mitigation was presented on behalf of Hannon, thereby resulting in a breakdown of 
our adversarial system as discussed by the Supreme Court in Strickland and 
Wiggins, and which resulted in the defendant being deprived of a reliable penalty-
phase proceeding. 
Having demonstrated both deficient performance and prejudice at the 
evidentiary hearing below, Hannon should be entitled to a new sentencing 
proceeding in which he will be represented by competent counsel prepared to 
contest the State’s case for the death penalty by presenting the voluminous 
evidence of mitigation presented at the postconviction hearing. 
PARIENTE, J., concurs. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,  
J. Rogers Padgett, Judge - Case No. 91-1927 
And an Original Proceedings – Habeas Corpus  
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and Suzanne Myers Keffer, 
Assistant CCRC-South, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and  Katherine V. 
Blanco, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent 
 
 
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