Case Title: LaFever v. Kemlite

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84761, 84762

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1998-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
LaFever v. Kemlite, No. 84761 (Ill. S.Ct.) 
Docket Nos. 84761, 84762 cons.-Agenda 28-September 1998.
Opinion filed December 31, 1998.
JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff Carl LaFever sued defendant/third-party plaintiff Kemlite Company 
(Kemlite) for injuries sustained while working on premises owned by Kemlite. 
Kemlite filed a third-party action for contribution (740 ILCS 100/0.01 et 
seq. (West 1996)) against plaintiff's employer, third-party defendant 
Banner Western Disposal (Banner). A jury awarded plaintiff damages and found 
Banner liable for contribution. The appellate court partially affirmed and 
partially reversed the circuit court of Cook County's judgment. 293 Ill. App. 3d 
260. We granted petitions for leave to appeal filed by Kemlite and by Banner 
(166 Ill. 2d R. 315), and plaintiff cross-appealed (155 Ill. 2d R. 318). The 
issues raised for our review are whether (1) the circuit court erred by ruling 
as a matter of law that Kemlite owed a duty of care to plaintiff, (2) the 
circuit court erred by granting Banner's motion to waive its lien on plaintiffs' 
workers' compensation (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1996)) after the 
return of the jury's verdict, and (3) the circuit court abused its discretion by 
instructing the jury on plaintiff's claim for future lost income. We affirm in 
part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
Kemlite operates a manufacturing facility in Joliet, Illinois. Kemlite 
produces a fiberglass reinforced polyester resin panel for transportation and 
building products industries. The product, which is made of chopped fiberglass, 
resin and fillers, starts as a liquid, poured on a manufacturing line, and cures 
on the line into a hardened product.
As the panels are cut to fit customer specifications, the manufacturing 
process produces "edge trim," a waste product. The edge trim is very slippery 
and difficult to grasp by hand. Edge trim is cut into one- to two-foot lengths, 
deposited in containers or buggies and taken to a compactor at the southern edge 
of the facility. The compactor unit is four to five feet wide and four feet 
deep. Kemlite employees activate a ram attached to the compactor, which presses 
the waste into a compactor box or container. The ram retracts until more waste 
is dumped into the compactor, and the process is repeated.
At the time of the accident, Kemlite contracted with Banner to dispose of the 
waste collected in the compactor container. Kemlite is a 24-hour-per-day 
facility, requiring daily pick up of the container, and sometimes multiple pick 
ups in one day. Banner employed "roll-off" drivers, including plaintiff, to pick 
up the debris at the Kemlite facility and dispose of the debris at a dump site. 
Roll-off drivers testifying at the trial of this matter described their duties 
at the Kemlite facility as follows. A roll-off driver backs his truck up to the 
compactor container, gets out of his truck and walks into the compactor box 
containing the debris. Going to the back of the box, the driver secures a wooden 
skid at the end of the container in order to prevent refuse from spilling out of 
the box. The driver then removes a "pinning" bar from the side of the container 
and attaches the container with a cable to the back of the truck. The driver 
loosens and detaches two turn buckles, each weighing 20 to 25 pounds, that 
secure the container to the compactor. The driver returns to the cab of his 
truck and drives the truck forward, pulling the container away from the 
compactor. The driver then gets out of the truck again, in order to shovel and 
clean up any debris that has fallen out of the truck as he moved the container 
away from the compactor. After dumping the container in a landfill, the driver 
returns the container to Kemlite.
While plaintiff and the other drivers testified before the circuit court that 
they, as roll-off drivers, bore the responsibility of cleaning up any debris 
they created or spilled in the course of removing and emptying the waste 
containers at Kemlite, they maintained that considerable debris was often 
already on the ground near the container when they arrived at Kemlite. The 
drivers understood that cleaning up this debris was not Banner's responsibility, 
and that Kemlite had its own maintenance staff to tend to the Kemlite premises. 
The drivers averred that Kemlite employees would fill the compactor container to 
overflowing. Banner drivers, including plaintiff, described occasions when they 
saw open carts sitting near the compactor container, which was too full to 
receive any more edge trim. The carts, used by Kemlite employees to haul trim to 
the compactor container, were themselves open, and the edge trim slid out of the 
sides and back of the carts onto the ground near the compactor container.
All of the drivers complained to Banner personnel about the danger posed by 
the edge trim at Kemlite. Sometimes, they directed their complaints to the 
Banner dispatcher on duty, who they asked to call Kemlite and request help from 
a Kemlite employee in cleaning up the container. Sometimes they complained to 
their superior at Banner, Terry Wilder. According to Wilder, he informed Kemlite 
personnel of the drivers' concerns that they might injure themselves on the 
debris. Banner drivers Jerome Blackwell and Larry Graves testified that they 
informed Kemlite employees of the "mess" at the compactor location. Lynn Smith, 
a dispatcher for Banner, received calls from Banner drivers before June 22, 
1990, concerning "material all over the ground [at Kemlite] that was dangerous 
for the drivers to walk on." Smith would call Kemlite and ask Kemlite employees 
to clean the area around the compactor. Generally, Kemlite would respond that 
"they'd take care of it." Terry Wilder also forwarded complaints to Kemlite 
regarding the area around the compactor container.
Edgar Johnson, production superintendent for Kemlite, also testified below. 
He affirmed that Kemlite employees were responsible for ensuring the orderliness 
of the facility, including the area around the compactor container, and that 
Kemlite had in the past received requests for help from Banner in cleaning 
"major spills" around the compactor area.
While picking up a compactor container at Kemlite on June 22, 1990, plaintiff 
slipped on some edge trim and fell, causing injury to plaintiff's back.
On October 10, 1991, plaintiff filed a single count complaint against 
Kemlite. As amended, the complaint alleged that Kemlite "carelessly and 
negligently caused and permitted [the Kemlite] premises to become and remain in 
a dangerous condition for persons using said premises, although [Kemlite] knew, 
or in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care should have known, of said 
dangerous condition." Specific instances of alleged negligent acts or omissions 
committed by Kemlite included accumulation of fiberglass waste and dust on a 
walkway located "at or near" the compactor container, failure to maintain and 
inspect the walkway, and failure to warn plaintiff of the dangerous condition of 
the walkway.
By order entered June 17, 1992, the circuit court granted Kemlite leave to 
initiate a third-party action against Banner. In pertinent part, Kemlite 
asserted that Banner negligently failed to: provide plaintiff with a safe place 
to work, warn plaintiff of conditions inherent in the work performed, provide 
plaintiff with adequate equipment to complete his work, and properly train 
plaintiff. Kemlite sought recovery pursuant to the Joint Tortfeasors 
Contribution Act (Contribution Act) (740 ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 
1996)) for Banner's alleged liability for plaintiff's injuries.
A jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in his personal injury action, 
awarding him $1,122, 261. 21 in damages. The jury also found for Kemlite in its 
third-party action against Banner. Among the litigants, the jury apportioned 
liability as follows: plaintiff, 5%; Kemlite, 75%; and Banner, 20%. Accounting 
for the jury's finding of plaintiff's comparative negligence, the circuit court 
entered a judgment order awarding plaintiff $1,066,148.15.
Banner filed a timely post-judgment motion seeking, among other things, leave 
to waive its lien of $222,267.02 on plaintiff's recovery, an amount equivalent 
to workers' compensation paid by Banner to plaintiff, pursuant to the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 1996). Banner maintained that, by 
waiving the lien, Banner could relieve itself of any liability to Kemlite for 
contribution. Further, and pursuant to Lannom v. Kosco, 158 Ill. 2d 535 
(1994), the $222,267.02 workers' compensation lien acted as full satisfaction of 
Kemlite's $224,452.24 liability for contribution.
The circuit court granted Banner's motion over plaintiff's objection, 
dismissed Kemlite's third-party claim against Banner, and reduced the judgment 
against Kemlite by $222,267.02, to $843,881.13.
On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of 
plaintiff, but reversed the circuit court's order granting Banner's post-trial 
motion. 293 Ill. App. 3d 260. In relevant part, the appellate court ruled that 
the statutory lien on an injured worker's compensation payments could not be 
waived after the entry of a verdict in the worker's personal injury action. The 
appellate court held as well that Kemlite owed plaintiff a duty of care despite 
the open and obvious hazard posed to plaintiff by the edge trim on Kemlite's 
premises, and that the circuit court erred when it instructed the jury on the 
elements of plaintiff's claim for future wages. Consequently, the appellate 
court remanded the action for recalculation of the judgment.
ANALYSIS
1. Whether the Circuit Erred by Ruling That Kemlite Owed a Duty 
of Care to Plaintiff
Kemlite urges that the circuit court erred by refusing to direct a verdict 
for Kemlite on the question of whether Kemlite owed a duty of care to plaintiff. 
Specifically, Kemlite contends that plaintiff encountered an "open and obvious" 
hazard on Kemlite's property in the form of the fiberglass edge trim, and that 
Kemlite owed no duty of care to protect plaintiff from injuries arising from 
open and obvious dangers. Kemlite argues further that, in affirming the judgment 
of the circuit court, the appellate court misapplied four factors controlling 
the imposition of a tort duty in Illinois.
"Unless a duty is owed, there is no negligence." American National Bank 
& Trust Co. v. National Advertising Co., 149 Ill. 2d 14, 26 (1992). 
Whether a duty exists is a question of law. Ward v. K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140 (1990). Whether a duty exists is also an inquiry shaped by 
public policy (Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 525 (1987); Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 140) since we must decide 
whether defendant and plaintiff stand in such a relationship to one another that 
the law imposes on defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit 
of plaintiff (Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 140). Accordingly, we consider not 
only the reasonable (1) foreseeability and (2) likelihood of injury, but also 
(3) the magnitude of the burden on defendant in guarding against injury and (4) 
the consequences of placing that burden on defendant. Ward, 136 Ill. 2d  
at 140-41.
In the case at bar, the appellate court resolved the duty question solely by 
applying the four factors enumerated above. 293 Ill. App. 3d at 270-71. While we 
agree with the appellate court that Kemlite owed plaintiff a duty of care, we 
conclude that the appellate court reached that holding by a flawed analytical 
route. The court improperly discounted the relevance of section 343A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) to the outcome of this case.
When, as here, plaintiff alleges he was injured by a condition on defendant's 
property while on the property as an invitee,(1) 
we decide the foreseeability prong of the duty test by reference to section 343 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 468 (1976); Ward v. K mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 151 
(1990); Deibert v. Bauer Brothers Construction Co., 141 Ill. 2d 430, 
438 (1990). Section 343 states in relevant part:
Despite the duty set forth in section 343, Kemlite insists that the edge trim 
hazard encountered by plaintiff was "open and obvious" and therefore negated any 
duty Kemlite owed to plaintiff. In Ward, this court adopted section 
343A of the Restatement, which states an "open and obvious hazard" exception to 
the duty of care set forth in section 343. American National Bank & 
Trust Co., 149 Ill. 2d  at 26; Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 150-51; 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §343, Comment a, at 216 (1965). Kemlite 
is correct that section 343A relieves possessors and owners of land from 
liability for open and obvious dangers. However, the exception stated in 343A is 
not limitless; section 343A states in relevant part:
See also Ward, 136 Ill. 2d  at 145 ("[T]o the extent that the rule 
may have held that the duty of reasonable care owed by an owner or occupier to 
those lawfully on his premises does not under any circumstances extend 
to conditions which are known or obvious to such entrants, that rule is not the 
law in this State" (emphasis in original)).
No party to the present appeal disputes the danger presented by the edge trim 
at the Kemlite facility, or that it was obvious and known to Kemlite and Banner 
employees alike. Plaintiff and other drivers employed by Banner described the 
edge trim as "slippery" and that walking on the edge trim was like "walking on 
ice." A compressor located near the compactor produced condensation, and water 
was frequently present in the area near the compactor container. As a result, 
the edge trim regularly became wet, thereby increasing its slipperiness. Three 
other roll-off drivers, in addition to plaintiff, testified that they had 
slipped on the edge trim debris near the container prior to June 22, 1990, and 
one testified that he had fallen. Kemlite employee Edgar Johnson stated that he, 
too, was familiar with the slipperiness of the edge trim. Moreover, Johnson 
confirmed that the edge trim was sometimes on the ground around the compactor 
container and that condensation collected at that site.
Whether the possessor of the premises should guard against harm to the 
invitee, despite the obviousness of the hazard, depends on two considerations. 
According to committee comments appended to section 343A (Restatement (Second) 
of Torts §343A, Comment f, at 220 (1965)), the possessor of the 
premises should anticipate harm to an invitee when the possessor "has reason to 
expect that the invitee's attention may be distracted, so that he will not 
discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to 
protect himself against it." Ward, 136 Ill. 2d  at 149-50. Similarly, 
harm may be reasonably anticipated when the possessor "has reason to expect that 
the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a 
reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the 
apparent risk." Restatement (Second) of Torts §343A, Comment f, at 220 
(1965). Some courts refer to the second exception as the "deliberate encounter 
exception." Jackson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 277 Ill. App. 3d 457, 464 
(1995).
In the present appeal, the appellate court correctly found no proof of a 
foreseeable distraction that would place a duty of care on Kemlite. In fact, 
plaintiff testified that, although he was carrying a metal bar at the time of 
his fall, he was not distracted and could see where he was going. However, the 
appellate court errantly concluded that the "deliberate encounter" exception to 
the open and obvious doctrine is inapplicable to this case. Retrieving edge trim 
from the Kemlite facility was plaintiff's job. In order to unhook and load the 
container onto his truck, plaintiff had to walk through any edge trim that was 
on the ground, as it frequently was. Despite Johnson's testimony that Kemlite 
never received any complaints from Banner employees about the area around the 
compactor, he admitted that drivers had to traverse the Kemlite premises in 
order to do their jobs and that calls had been made to Kemlite by Banner when 
drivers were seeking "assistance *** cleaning up" a "major spill." Kemlite knew 
that the edge trim posed a hazard, and knew, at least implicitly, that edge trim 
collected in the area around the compactor, since Johnson testified that Kemlite 
utility workers would clean it up whenever Kemlite was aware of it. We find that 
Kemlite could have reasonably foreseen that plaintiff would risk walking through 
the edge trim, because it was necessary for plaintiff to fulfill his employment 
obligations.
Kemlite urges the court to adjudge foreseeability from the perspective of 
what the landowner may "reasonably expect of the entrant in terms of knowledge 
of the danger, rather than *** focusing on what the entrant expected or desired 
the landowner to do to protect him." Kemlite is correct. The Restatement directs 
that with regard to open and obvious hazards, liability stems from the knowledge 
of the possessor of the premises, and what the possessor "ha[d] reason to 
expect" the invitee would do in the face of the hazard. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §343A, Comment f, at 220 (1965); R. Ferrell, Emerging Trends 
in Premises Liability Law, 21 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 1121, 1137 (1995).
Nonetheless, Kemlite abandons the Restatement's directives when Kemlite next 
contends that a "deliberate encounter" like plaintiff's cannot give rise to 
liability unless "there is no reasonable alternative available to the worker 
other than encountering the dangerous condition and the worker's continued 
employment is at stake if he doesn't encounter the condition," citing 
Jackson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 277 Ill. App. 3d 457, 465 (1995), and 
Burse v. CR Industries, Inc., 288 Ill. App. 3d 48 (1997). The test 
proposed by Kemlite would require a court to decide foreseeability by measuring 
the reasonableness of the entrant's actions, and not those of the 
landowner, even though the Restatement plainly requires otherwise.
Further, to the extent Kemlite suggests that a plaintiff cannot raise the 
deliberate encounter exception without furnishing proof of an actual threat of 
termination, we believe that Kemlite confuses evidence relevant to a 
determination of duty with evidence material to an entirely distinct concept, 
i.e., whether plaintiff assumed the risk of the danger encountered. An 
illustration furnished by the Restatement is instructive on the difference:
Implicit in the example is the assumption that, if the employee fails to go 
to work because of the condition on the stairway, she will suffer negative 
consequences in terms of her employment. Those consequences could include 
termination, but might also entail discipline that falls short of termination. 
In any event, the employee will conclude that the risks of encountering the 
hazard are outweighed by the external motivating factor of her employment. 
Knowing that individuals will make this deliberate choice when fueled by 
concerns such as employment, the drafters of the Restatement have concluded that 
the encounter with the hazard is reasonably foreseeable.
Whether an employee will in fact lose his job if he refuses to proceed in 
face of the danger cannot be known, absent an individual interview by the 
premises owner with every business invitee that comes on to the premises. The 
court finds nothing in the Restatement imposing such a requirement on the owners 
and occupiers of land. Moreover, while the actual consequences to the employee 
for refusing to "encounter" a danger may be of material concern, those 
consequences are relevant only to the question of whether the employee 
unnecessarily assumed the risk of the encounter.
In Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 
(1984), two employees of a hotel sued their employer, Holiday Inns, Inc., for 
injuries incurred when security gates owned by the hotel fell on the employees. 
The employees worked in the hotel gift shop, and, in order to open the shop each 
day, the employees had to unlock, fold and move the gates.
Although the Idaho Supreme Court declined to adopt sections 343 and 343A in 
support of its holding, the court cited with approval a prior Idaho Supreme 
Court decision that affirmed use of section 343A as a jury instruction. 
Critically, too, the court concluded that, in light of the "economic compulsion" 
on an employee to perform his or her job, the landowner/employer had reason to 
expect that an employee would encounter the obvious danger rather than face the 
prospect of losing the job.(2) 
See also Konicek v. Loomis Brothers, Inc., 457 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Iowa 
1990) (evidence raised jury question of whether contractor owed a duty to a 
construction worker who fell through a skylight because contractor could 
anticipate that workers would proceed in face of obvious danger so as to avoid 
the risk of losing their jobs); Cihon v. Cargill, Inc., 293 Ill. App. 
3d 1055, 1064 (1997); Kosinski v. Inland Steel Co., 192 Ill. App. 3d 
1017, 1024 (1989).
At bar, Kemlite, through Edgar Johnson, admitted that it knew that the Banner 
drivers inevitably encountered the edge trim spilled by Kemlite employees in 
order to haul away the compactor container. Kemlite also could reasonably 
foresee an "economic compulsion" (Keller, 107 Idaho at 596, 691 P.2d at 
1210-11) imposed on the roll-off drivers to perform the work they were hired to 
do. Kemlite therefore had reason to know that these same drivers would 
deliberately encounter the hazard in order to fulfill their obligations and, 
consequently, keep their jobs.
We find Jackson, 277 Ill. App. 3d 457, and Burse, 288 Ill. 
App. 3d 48, on which plaintiff relies, unpersuasive. Burse is 
distinguishable from the present case because the appellate court there found 
that the premises in question held no "open and obvious" hazard which could be 
"deliberately encountered." Burse, 288 Ill. App. 3d 48. For this 
reason, the defendant by definition could not anticipate such an encounter. 
Jackson is flawed because its analysis of the "deliberate encounter" 
exception turns almost exclusively on the knowledge of the injured party 
(Jackson, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 464-65 ("The plaintiffs did not plead in 
the second amended complaint, or aver in the affidavit, the absence of any 
reasonable alternative to lifting the fully loaded gang box by hand, such as 
lightening it by removing some of its contents, making sufficient inquiry into 
the possibility of using the chained and locked portable dockplate, or seeking 
assistance from the defendant's employees. Moreover, *** [plaintiffs do not 
allege that] James Jackson took the necessary precaution of investigating the 
weight of the gang box before attempting to lift it. *** Nor are there any 
factual allegations *** sufficient to establish that James Jackson's continued 
employment was at stake if he refused to heft the gang box")), a perspective 
incompatible with the Restatement view.
We emphasize that, by our formal adoption of the deliberate encounter 
exception to the open and obvious doctrine,(3) 
we do not render property owners insurers of invitees' welfare. See 
Ward, 136 Ill. 2d  at 156. Our finding that a landowner may reasonably 
be expected in certain instances to predict that an invitee may suffer harm from 
an open and obvious danger is conclusive only of the possessor's duty, and then 
only partially so, since foreseeability alone is not determinative of duty. 
Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 457 (1996). The 
existence of a duty is not the equivalent of a breach of duty. Any plaintiff 
claiming that a premises owner owed plaintiff a duty of care cannot prevail 
unless plaintiff also proves that the owner's efforts to protect invitees from 
harm were inadequate. Deibert, 141 Ill. 2d  at 441. Nor is this opinion 
intended to dilute or minimize the relevance of comparative negligence or any 
other concept that may be applied when proof exists that the possessor of the 
property is not wholly responsible for the invitee's injury. The openness or 
obviousness of a hazard will have a bearing on the plaintiff's ultimate recovery 
(Ward, 136 Ill. 2d  at 143; Restatement (Second) of Torts §343A, Comment 
f, at 220 (1965)), but will never be wholly determinative of the 
landowner's liability. As this court has stated on several prior occasions, duty 
and liability are distinct concepts that must be separately considered. See 
Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d  at 447 ("where there is no duty there is no 
liability, and therefore no fault to be compared"); Ward, 136 Ill. 2d  
at 148; Deibert, 141 Ill. 2d  at 442-43.
Having decided that Kemlite could reasonably have anticipated plaintiff's 
deliberate encounter with the edge trim at the Kemlite site, we now decide 
whether the remaining elements of Illinois' duty test have been satisfied. The 
likelihood of plaintiff's injury is our next consideration, and we find that 
that factor does not weigh heavily in favor of finding a duty. The slipperiness 
of the edge trim was well known to plaintiff, as was the fact he needed to 
proceed cautiously when walking on it. In such instances, the law presumes that 
the plaintiff will "appreciate and avoid" the risk, thereby reducing the 
potential for harm. Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d  at 448. We concur with the 
appellate court, however, that this prong of the duty test must be discounted: 
even though he was clearly aware of the edge trim, plaintiff "could not avoid 
it." 293 Ill. App. 3d at 270.
The appellate court also correctly found that the magnitude of the burden on 
Kemlite of guarding against edge-trim-related injuries was slight. The Kemlite 
plant operated 24 hours a day and had its own maintenance staff, which evidence 
indicated sometimes fell short of all of its maintenance obligations. We 
conclude that only a slight increase in personnel, or perhaps a shifting of a 
few responsibilities for "utility" workers would have been sufficient to keep 
the container area free of potentially hazardous matter. Evidence presented at 
trial showed as well that Kemlite scheduled at least one pick up a day from 
Banner, and sometimes more, if necessary. The record also demonstrated that the 
compactor container was frequently filled to overflowing. Since Kemlite knew 
additional trips could be made by Banner to the Kemlite facility, an increase in 
the number of requested pick ups by Kemlite during the course of a day might 
also have increased the safety of conditions at Kemlite.
Finally, we believe that the consequences of placing that burden on Kemlite 
would be unremarkable. We explained in the preceding paragraph that Kemlite was 
not only aware of the hazard posed by the edge trim, but had already initiated 
maintenance measures, albeit inadequate ones, to address the problem. Satisfying 
their duty of care as land owners, therefore, would likely require only a 
refinement or intensification of existing procedures, as opposed to the creation 
of safety measures that otherwise would not have existed.
For these reasons, we affirm the appellate court's holding that Kemlite owed 
plaintiff a duty of care at the Kemlite premises. Neither the appellate court 
nor the circuit court erred in resisting Kemlite's request for a directed 
verdict on this element of plaintiff's negligence claim.
B. Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Granting Banner's Motion 
to Waive its Workers' Compensation Lien After the Return of the Jury's 
Verdict
The Illinois Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 (West 1996)) enables 
an injured worker to institute legal proceedings against tortfeasors responsible 
for causing the worker injury, and for which the worker receives workers' 
compensation. If the worker prevails in his personal injury lawsuit, the 
settlement or judgment received by the worker is dedicated to repaying workers' 
compensation paid by his employer. 820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 1996). The employer 
may claim a lien on the worker's recovery, in an amount equal to the amount of 
workers' compensation due the worker. 820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 1996). Section 
5(b) of the Workers' Compensation Act provides further that, should the worker's 
third-party action prevail, then, from the compensation reimbursed to the 
employer, the employer must pay its pro rata share of the worker's 
costs of bringing the litigation and, unless otherwise agreed, 25% of 
plaintiff's counsel's legal fees. 820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 1996); Ramsey v. 
Morrison, 175 Ill. 2d 218, 237 (1997). The legislature enacted the costs 
and fee provisions of section 5(b) to ensure that "an employer *** contribute[s] 
to the necessary costs of the employee's recovery against a negligent third 
party where the employer is to receive reimbursement from the recovery for 
[workers'] compensation payments made or to be made to the employee." Reno 
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 27 Ill. 2d 245, 247 (1962).
Additionally, an employer can choose not to seek reimbursement of its 
workers' compensation obligation. An employer can waive the lien it holds on the 
worker's recovery in his personal injury action. Under the authority of 
Lannom v. Kosco, 158 Ill. 2d 535 (1994), moreover, by waiving its 
section 5(b) lien, the employer may avoid liability for contribution to the 
other tortfeasors allegedly responsible for the worker's injury.
The controversy at bar arises from Banner's decision to waive its workers' 
compensation lien after the jury returned its verdict in plaintiff's personal 
injury lawsuit. The trial court granted Banner's motion to waive its lien, but 
the appellate court reversed. The appellate court held that an employer may not 
waive its workers' compensation lien "posttrial" and thereby "avoid its fees and 
costs obligation" to its employee. 293 Ill. App. 3d at 275. The appellate court 
ruled that "an employer's workers' compensation lien constitutes a right to 
reimbursement" and that "[a]fter plaintiff recovers from a third party, the 
employer's right to reimbursement is statutorily reduced under section 5(b) by 
the employee's entitlement to a proportionate share of fees and costs." 293 Ill. 
App. 3d at 275. Accordingly, "the employer should not be allowed to circumvent 
payment of its section 5(b) fees and costs, after the cause has proceeded 
through trial." 293 Ill. App. 3d at 275.
Section 5(b) plainly predicates the employer's obligation to pay costs and 
fees on actual reimbursement of workers' compensation payments from the 
"fund" created by the employee. See Ramsey, 175 Ill. 2d at 237-38; 820 
ILCS 305/5(b) (West 1996). Section 5(b) states in pertinent part:
"Out of any reimbursement received by the employer pursuant to this 
Section the employer shall pay his pro rata share of all costs and reasonably 
necessary expenses in connection with such third-party claim, action or suit and 
where the services of an attorney at law of the employee or dependents have 
resulted in or substantially contributed to the procurement by suit, settlement 
or otherwise of the proceeds out of which the employer is reimbursed, then, in 
the absence of other agreement, the employer shall pay such attorney 25% of the 
gross amount of such reimbursement." (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 
305/5(b) (West 1996).
In this case, Banner waived its right to the lien without ever seeking 
reimbursement of its workers' compensation payments. The express, statutory 
condition precedent (Corley v. James McHugh Construction Co., 266 Ill. 
App. 3d 618, 622 (1994)) to payment of costs and fees under section 5(b) was 
never fulfilled. Ipso facto, Banner's obligation to pay costs and fees 
was never triggered. Corley, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 621 ("in the 
absence of a waiver of the workers' compensation lien, the employer 
must pay his pro rata share of costs and expenses and, unless otherwise 
agreed, must pay as fees to the employee's attorney 25% of the gross amount of 
such reimbursement" (emphasis in original)).
In fact, Corley v. James McHugh Construction Co., 266 Ill. App. 3d 
618, 621 (1994), a case on which the appellate court relies, expressly rejected 
a suggestion that the plaintiff should receive section 5(b) costs and fees even 
when the employer waived the workers' compensation lien. The Corley 
court would not shift responsibility for the section 5(b) costs and fees to the 
defendants in the underlying personal injury suit. According to the appellate 
court, the terms employed in section 5(b) left no question as to who should pay 
the expenses and out of what funds:
In Silva v. Electrical Systems, Inc., 183 Ill. 2d 356 (1998), we 
recently reaffirmed that section 5(b) should be interpreted according to its 
text. There, the employer accepted reimbursement of it workers' compensation 
payments after plaintiff obtained a successful verdict in his personal injury 
suit. Rather than pay the statutory fees and costs from the gross distribution 
as prescribed by section 5(b), the employer insisted that it could deduct its 
contribution liability from the reimbursement and calculate section 5(b) costs 
and fees on the difference. 
This court rejected the employer's reading of section 5(b). The employer's 
plan would force plaintiff's counsel to "subsidize [an employer's] lack of due 
care," since the greater the employer's contribution liability, the more the 
employer could deduct from the reimbursement and, correspondingly, the smaller 
the amount employer would owe to plaintiff, particularly in terms of attorneys 
fees. The court found that justification for its holding lay in the unadorned 
terms of section 5(b). Silva, 183 Ill. 2d  at 366; see also 
Ramsey, 175 Ill. 2d at 237-38; Branum v. Slezak Construction 
Co., 289 Ill. App. 3d 948, 966 (1997) (obligation to pay fees and costs 
dependent on reimbursement).
In the instant case, the appellate court characterized the timing of Banner's 
lien waiver as a "gamble" and stated that Banner only decided to waive the lien 
after plaintiff won the underlying lawsuit and it became apparent that, absent 
waiver of the lien, Banner would be liable for litigation expenses under section 
5(b). 293 Ill. App. 3d at 275. The appellate court implied too that, by waiting 
until after the verdict to waive its lien, Banner essentially received the 
benefit of the employee's lawsuit (i.e., a money judgment against the 
defendants), while avoiding the price demanded for that benefit by statute. 
According to this reasoning, whether the employer actually demands reimbursement 
for its workers' compensation payments or not is irrelevant: merely having the 
right or possibility of reimbursement following a verdict for the injured 
employee is enough to trigger the obligations of the employer under section 
5(b).
We think that the appellate court misconstrued section 5(b). The "benefit" 
that obligates an employer to pay section 5(b) fees and costs is actual 
reimbursement, not merely the possibility of reimbursement. Stated 
differently, the premise animating section 5(b) is that an employer should not 
get "something" (a reimbursement on workers' compensation payments) for 
"nothing." Yet if the employer never demands the "something," then no unfairness 
occurs.
Also, we find nothing inherently unfair in Banner's strategy. Nothing in 
section 5(b) required Banner to waive the lien by a date certain if it wanted to 
forgo payment of statutory fees and costs. There is no record evidence, either, 
that plaintiff relied on Banner's potential liability for fees and costs in 
making his own decision to file the underlying personal injury lawsuit. Indeed, 
plaintiff must have known from the outset that, if plaintiff's own "gamble" in 
filing suit failed, plaintiff would have borne the sole responsibility for the 
cost of bringing the suit. Further, although plaintiff's expenses, including 
attorney fees, presumably increased with the return of a favorable jury verdict, 
the fund from which plaintiff would have to pay those expenses was greater, as 
well.
Plaintiff also characterizes Banner's decision as a calculated venture that 
allowed Banner to minimize its liability for plaintiff's injury. Specifically, 
plaintiff maintains that Banner did not want to waive its lien before trial even 
though waiver would have won Banner dismissal from Kemlite's third-party action 
for contribution. Lannom, 158 Ill. 2d  at 543. According to plaintiff, 
Banner decided to waive the lien only after the jury returned a contribution 
verdict against Banner that exceeded the amount of Banner's lien, and Banner 
decided that it would be most advantageous to waive the lien, exploit the 
Kotecki cap placed on liability for contribution, and avoid fees and 
costs prescribed by section 5(b).
As stated previously, plaintiff cites no authority that would bar plaintiff 
from minimizing its exposure in a lawsuit. We are reluctant to dictate trial 
strategy to any litigant when that strategy is entirely consistent with 
controlling statutes and prior decisions of this court. We note as well that 
regardless of when Banner waived its lien, its contribution liability was always 
capped at the same amount. Whether Banner waived its lien before or after the 
verdict, Kotecki and its progeny limited the maximum contribution 
liability for Banner to the amount paid by Banner in workers' compensation.
Without citation to authority, plaintiff argues that a result affirming the 
circuit court will frustrate the Contribution Act. However, the result we reach 
today is consistent with prior decisions of this court. In Kotecki v. 
Cyclops Welding Corp., 146 Ill. 2d 155, 162-65 (1991), we stated that the 
Contribution Act and Workers' Compensation Act are distinct statutory schemes 
and the operation of one may not always compliment the operation of the other. 
Sometimes, we will tolerate a result that partially frustrates the legislative 
purpose underlying the Contribution Act if, by doing so, we allow the workers' 
compensation statute to operate as intended. Kotecki, 146 Ill. 2d  at 
164 (capping contribution liability at the amount of the employer's workers' 
compensation obligation "arguably strikes a balance between the competing 
interests of the employer, as a participant in the workers' compensation system, 
and the equitable interests of the third-party plaintiff in not being forced to 
pay more than its established fault"). The implementation of section 5(b) in 
this case is one of those instances in which we will knowingly curtail operation 
of the Contribution Act.
Plaintiff further views a post-verdict waiver of a workers' compensation lien 
as a disincentive to settlement. Plaintiff apparently means that he could not 
have settled with Kemlite until he knew absolutely how much money he could 
obtain from his employer for his injuries, without fear of having to pay back 
that money in the event the plaintiff prevailed in his personal injury action. 
Plaintiff's premise is flawed, however, since nothing legally prevented 
plaintiff from settling with Kemlite, regardless of Banner's refusal to waive 
its lien. Moreover, there was no assurance that, if the lien was waived, the 
plaintiff would have automatically settled with the defendant. Depending on the 
degree of confidence plaintiff had in his case, plaintiff could have accepted 
the waiver and still proceeded to trial against Kemlite. Just because plaintiff 
could not negotiate from his most advantageous pretrial position, plaintiff was 
not precluded from settling with Kemlite, if he wanted to.
Finally, we note practical difficulties latent in the appellate court's 
holding. If an employer could no longer waive its lien after verdict, up to what 
point in the litigation would waiver still be acceptable? Before trial begins? 
On the eve of the jury verdict? If an employer wants to waive the lien at the 
close of the plaintiff-employee's case, has plaintiff so committed himself (by 
retaining a lawyer, for example, and hiring expert witnesses) in terms of "fees 
and costs" that the employer should no longer be allowed to disentangle himself 
from the litigation by waiving its lien? What if, by waiving the lien, the 
employer will eliminate the need for a third-party contribution action and 
thereby reduce the time devoted to trial? We believe that these hypotheticals 
illustrate why we should be reluctant to depart form the text of section 5(b), 
and why we should interpret the statute according to its clearly stated 
terms.
C. Whether the Circuit Court Abused its Discretion by 
Instructing the Jury on Plaintiff's Claim of Future Lost Income
Of the $1,122,261.21 damage award returned by the jury, $292,026.40 was 
allocated for plaintiff's claimed future lost earnings. On appeal to the 
appellate court, Kemlite urged the court to reverse and vacate that award. 
Kemlite maintained that the trial court erred "by instructing the jury regarding 
future lost earnings and by allowing the jury to calculate [plaintiff's] future 
lost earnings." 293 Ill. App. 3d at 272. The appellate court ruled that the 
evidence yielded no "reasonably certain proof as to [plaintiff's] continued 
incapacity" (293 Ill. App. 3d at 273) and reversed the jury award as to this 
element of damages. On cross-appeal before this court, plaintiff argues that the 
appellate court erred in vacating plaintiff's future lost income award.
"A litigant has the right to have the jury clearly and fairly instructed upon 
each theory which [is] supported by the evidence." Leonardi v. Loyola 
University, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 100 (1995); Ervin v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 65 Ill. 2d 140, 145 (1976); see also Shaheed v. Chicago Transit 
Authority, 137 Ill. App. 3d 352, 360 (1985). " `Whether the jury would 
have been persuaded is not the question. All that is required to justify the 
giving of an instruction is that there be some evidence in the record to justify 
the theory of the instruction.' " Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d  at 101, 
quoting Lowe v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 118 
(1984); Wrighthouse v. Brown, 52 Ill. App. 2d 191, 196 (1964). The 
evidence may be insubstantial; a reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or 
decide whether a particular result is warranted. Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d  
at 100. "The question of what issues have been raised by the evidence is within 
the discretion of the trial court." Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d  at 100.
A future lost earnings award compensates plaintiff for impairment of 
plaintiff's earning capacity. Antol v. Chavez-Pereda, 284 Ill. App. 3d 
561, 573 (1996). Impairment of earning capacity is calculated by deducting the 
amount plaintiff is capable of earning after his injury from the amount he was 
capable of earning prior to his injury (Antol, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 573; 
Patel v. Brown Machine Co., 264 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1061 (1st Dist. 
1994)), and awarding plaintiff the difference. Expert testimony is not necessary 
to establish loss of future earning ability. Patel, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 
1061. The plaintiff "may testify that his injuries diminished his capacity to 
work, and the appearance of [the] plaintiff on the witness stand and his 
testimony as to the nature of his injuries and their duration is sufficient to 
take the question of impaired earning capacity to the jury." Shaheed, 
137 Ill. App. 3d at 360; see also Antol, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 574. 
"[E]vidence that plaintiff's injury [is] permanent and that it prevented him 
from continuing employment [is] generally sufficient to permit a jury to arrive 
at a calculation of lost future wages." Antol, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 574; 
Lewis v. Cotton Belt Route-St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 217 Ill. 
App. 3d 94, 117 (1991) ("once plaintiff introduces evidence of permanent injury, 
the jury should be instructed as to loss of future earnings").
The appellate court vacated the award for lack of "reasonably certain proof" 
to sustain the claim of lost future earnings. 293 Ill. App. 3d at 273. The 
appellate court derived this standard from Brown v. Chicago & 
North Western Transportation Co., 162 Ill. App. 3d 926 (1987), in which the 
appellate court was asked to decide whether evidence adduced at trial sustained 
the jury award. Brown, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 927. The quantum of proof 
necessary to prevail on a claim is different, however, from the measure 
of evidence needed merely to send an issue to the jury. See Patel v. Brown 
Machine Co., 264 Ill. App. 3d at 1062. As stated above, plaintiff need only 
furnish "some evidence" probative of his claim to earn a jury instruction on 
that claim, and neither the trial court nor a court of review must be convinced 
of the persuasiveness of that evidence before the issue may be submitted to the 
jury for its deliberations. Indeed, after ruling that damages for lost future 
income would be awarded only on a showing that the loss was reasonably certain 
to occur (Brown, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 936-37), the Brown court 
stated: "In addition, there must be an evidentiary basis in order for a court to 
give a jury instruction on future disability and lost wages." Brown, 
162 Ill. App. 3d at 937. Thus, even the Brown court recognized, albeit 
implicitly, the narrower margin of proof required at the instruction 
conference.
We note as well that the Brown court's estimation of proof necessary 
to justify the damage award arose in the context of a discussion about 
conjectural and speculative evidence. The Brown court quoted 
authorities ruling that " `[m]ere surmise or conjecture' " is 
insufficient proof of an existing fact or future condition. Brown, 162 
Ill. App. 3d at 936-37, quoting Stevens v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 
306 Ill. 370, 377 (1922). We agree. Our conclusion that "some evidence" of a 
claim will get that claim to a jury does not mean that the evidence can be 
untrustworthy and still earn an instruction. While only "some evidence" is 
needed to warrant an instruction, inherently that evidence must be reliable and 
grounded in more than mere possibilities. See Lewis, 217 Ill. App. 3d 
at 117.
In support of his claim in this case, plaintiff introduced the testimony of 
Dr. Timothy Payne, an orthopedic surgeon and physician. He first treated 
plaintiff on June 29, 1990. At that visit, plaintiff reported that he had 
slipped and fallen on some fiberglass and injured his lower back. At the time 
Payne saw plaintiff, plaintiff was not working. Plaintiff relayed a history of a 
single, prior back injury to Payne, and also indicated he had had occasional 
aches and pains in his back prior to the fall of June 1990, although he did not 
indicate that prior to 1990, he had any difficulty functioning.
Upon examination, Payne found plaintiff had limitation in the range of motion 
in his lumbosacral spine. Plaintiff complained of pain on palpitation in the 
midline of the lower back, as well on the right and left sides of the spine. He 
had decreased sensation in his left foot and ankle.
Payne concluded from X rays that plaintiff had a "long-standing, significant 
degenerative condition in his low back at the time he presented to [Payne] on 
June 29, 1990." Payne opined that the degenerative process "facilitated 
[plaintiff's] complaints of pain and enhanced his discomfort" following the fall 
in June 1990. The fall triggered protracted pain, which resulted in plaintiff's 
receiving treatment.
Payne initially treated plaintiff with anti-inflammatory medications and 
epidural injections in an attempt to relieve plaintiff's pain. After 
approximately two years, Payne determined that his conservative treatment of 
plaintiff's back-therapy, medication, injections, myelogram, rigid external back 
brace-was inadequate, so he sent him to Dr. Kamal Ibrahim for a surgical 
consultation. Dr. Ibrahim performed a spinal fusion on plaintiff.
Following the surgery, plaintiff wore a brace for a period of time, 
progressed to "conventional therapy" to promote flexibility in and strengthen 
the lower back, and then went to a work-hardening program. When Payne saw 
plaintiff in October 1993, he found that plaintiff had "done well" in the 
work-hardening program. Based on plaintiff's performance there, Payne felt 
plaintiff could return to his original job if it was available: plaintiff had 
good flexibility, he could lift 25 pounds and intermittently 50 pounds, and 
plaintiff did not have the complaints of pain he had prior to surgery. Payne 
also believed that these weight restrictions on plaintiff are permanent.
Payne admitted that there is a trade off with the surgery of the type 
performed on plaintiff. While the fusion relieved his pain, it also resulted in 
a loss of motion in the back. After reviewing Banner's written description of 
the activities required of a roll-off driver, including lifting requirements, 
Payne agreed that plaintiff was "on the cusp or border of [the] physical 
requirements" of the job. He also stated that he recommended a trial return to 
work to see if plaintiff could tolerate it.
Based on plaintiff's performance in the work-hardening program, Payne 
believed that the lifting aspects of plaintiff's job "would be no problem," 
although Payne did admit that he could not predict what would happen if 
plaintiff was back in his job and faced with a situation where "he might have to 
do more". Payne believed that "there is always [the] possibility" that plaintiff 
might not be able to perform the duties of a roll-off driver, but based on 
Payne's exam of plaintiff on January 12, 1994, [plaintiff's] weightlifting 
capabilities fell within the parameters of the job, [plaintiff] had no 
complaints of back or leg pain," and Payne could not say that plaintiff could 
not do the job. The last time Payne saw plaintiff, plaintiff had no complaints 
of pain in his back or legs, "other than some aches and pains." Payne said these 
aches and pains were no major problem. Payne's notes of that visit also 
indicated that plaintiff had "done quite nicely since he had surgery."
Payne testified that the fusion of plaintiff's spine would not preclude him 
from engaging in "everyday activities" like sitting, standing, walking, carrying 
suitcases upstairs, yard work, helping someone move or shoveling snow.
Payne admitted that if plaintiff should come back to him after attempting to 
perform as a roll-off driver and told Payne that, despite plaintiff's ability to 
perform in the controlled setting of a work-hardening program, plaintiff could 
not do the work of a roll-off driver, then Payne would say, "Fine, then 
obviously you can't do it. I wouldn't pursue it."
Dr. Payne stated that plaintiff was a good patient who followed his 
directions. Payne agreed that, during the presurgery period, plaintiff was 
"working hard to try and get himself back to work."
Beginning in October 1992, Dr. Kamal Ibrahim, an orthopedic surgeon, treated 
plaintiff. Plaintiff came to see Ibrahim at the recommendation of Dr. Payne. 
Ibrahim testified that plaintiff complained of lower back pain with occasional 
radiation and numbness down both legs, all the way to the ankles. Dr. Ibrahim 
determined that plaintiff had degenerative changes in his lower back that 
predated his fall. However, prior to June 1990, plaintiff had been "functioning 
without symptoms." The injury of June 1990 aggravated the preexisting condition, 
so that "[t]he fall brought on the symptoms that he complained of." He performed 
surgery on plaintiff, which included an internal fixation of the affected area 
of the spine, with rods and screws. He also fused several vertebrae of 
plaintiff's spine together, from L-3 to the sacrum, using bone grafts from 
plaintiff's hip.
In Dr. Ibrahim's opinion, plaintiff had exhausted all other, more 
conservative alternatives to surgery before surgery was performed in February 
1993.
After the surgery, plaintiff went through a period of physical therapy, a 
rehabilitation program and a work-hardening program. Dr. Ibrahim last saw 
plaintiff in October 1993, after plaintiff completed work hardening. The fact he 
completed the work-hardening program indicated to Dr. Ibrahim that the surgery 
had been a success. "It fused very well and it eliminated his symptoms." He said 
he had no plan to remove the hardware from plaintiff's back.
Dr. Ibrahim had no record of restrictions or limitations that he specifically 
placed on plaintiff post-surgery. However, he testified that he generally tells 
his patients not to lift more than 50 pounds above the waist or 20 pounds over 
the head. This is to avoid putting extra pressure on the nonfused spine. Dr. 
Ibrahim's records do indicate that he told plaintiff to go back to work after 
plaintiff reported the results of the work-hardening program.
Plaintiff is 51 years old and currently lives in a trailer park. Six months 
before trial, he sold his home in Joliet and moved into the trailer park in 
Tennessee. At the time of trial, he was living off of the proceeds of the sale 
of his home.
Plaintiff left his family's home in Tennessee when he was 17. He started 
working for Banner in 1969, when he was 24 years old. Before that, he briefly 
worked as a laborer for a glass company, an automobile bumper manufacturer, a 
roofing materials manufacturer and a bakery. Each of those jobs required 
lifting.
At Banner, plaintiff worked first as a garbage man on a residential route. 
After three years, plaintiff became roll-off driver. On the day of the accident, 
June 22, 1990, plaintiff slipped and fell as he was attempting to remove the 
compactor container from the Kemlite site. He felt a sharp pain radiating across 
his back and down both legs to his feet. He hauled that container and two more 
that day, despite feeling pain in his back; the pain got worse during the course 
of the day. He went to a clinic for treatment on both June 22 and June 25, 1990. 
He never went back to work for Banner after June 22, 1990. Prior to the fall, he 
had three injuries to his back, but he would not characterize any of them as a 
major problem, nor were they incidents that in and of themselves caused him any 
pain. He received treatment from Dr. Payne for two years, but still experienced 
difficulties with his back and legs. Plaintiff suffered from numbness in his 
legs, difficulty sleeping and inability to walk one block. Plaintiff testified 
that he "couldn't do anything."
Prior to his surgery, plaintiff obtained employment as a security guard for 
two or three months. The job required him to walk rounds around the facility he 
was guarding, and the pain and numbness in his legs and back prevented him from 
doing the necessary walking.
Following his surgery, plaintiff was incapacitated for two months. 
Thereafter, he wore a back brace for four months, and then completed physical 
therapy. After completing a work-hardening program, plaintiff believed he was 
ready to return to work. Both Drs. Payne and Ibrahim released plaintiff to 
return to work without restrictions. However, Banner would not allow him to work 
because he had been off of work for more than one year.
Plaintiff averred that he has tried to return to work since his surgery. 
Plaintiff tried bartending but was unsuccessful. He stated that his back still 
bothers him too much to "do a day's work." He has also tried to do work similar 
to that of a roll-off driver. His brother owns a junkyard and plaintiff tried 
for two months to drive a tow truck for his brother's business. Driving the tow 
truck, or "wrecker," is similar to being a roll-off driver, because it requires 
the driver to do many of the same activities-getting in and out of the cab, 
bending over, lifting. He said he lacked the flexibility necessary to do the job 
and could not drive for long periods of time.
He would like to return to work as a roll-off driver. Before his injury, he 
had planned on retiring at age 60 or 62. Currently, however, he has no other 
plans for employment. He does nothing on a day-to-day basis other than yard work 
around his home. Plaintiff stated that he is trained only for "plant work" and 
driving a truck. As for his back, he still has pain there, but he can live with 
it. He cannot bend over as he could in the past. He no longer has pain in his 
legs and he is not regularly taking any prescription medications. He is not 
regularly seeing any doctor for back treatment.
Prior to his injury on June 22, 1990, plaintiff earned $13.77 per hour, or 
$35,000 per year, as a roll-off driver. He also worked overtime, for which he 
received time and a half. Plaintiff said that he received no pay for the work he 
performed as a tow truck driver for his brother. He was "trying to see if he 
could give [his brother] a hand and help out." As a bartender, he earned $5 to 
$6 dollars per hour. He received approximately the same salary as a security 
guard.
The "some evidence" standard controlling our inquiry requires plaintiff to 
scale only a modest evidentiary threshold. We hold that plaintiff satisfied that 
standard in this case. Admittedly, Banner refused to re-employ plaintiff for 
reasons only indirectly related to plaintiff's back injury, and plaintiff did 
not indicate that he has approached his union, the Teamsters, for help in 
obtaining employment. Further, plaintiff produced no proof that he has actually 
applied elsewhere for employment as a roll-off driver. Nonetheless, plaintiff 
testified that he unsuccessfully tried to drive a wrecker for his brother, a job 
that plaintiff said required essentially the same tasks required of a roll-off 
driver. Although his attempt to work as a security guard occurred before the 
surgery that plaintiff said relieved some of his symptoms, plaintiff stated he 
was equally unsuccessful in his attempts to hold a job as a bartender.
The testimony of the medical witnesses indicated that plaintiff had permanent 
lifting restrictions placed on him as a result of the injury and subsequent 
surgery. The process of fusing portions of plaintiff's spine also forever 
limited his mobility. Even though plaintiff's treating physicians placed no 
restrictions on his ability to return to work, plaintiff's primary treating 
physician based his opinion solely on plaintiff's performance in a 
work-hardening program; he could not testify how plaintiff would perform in 
response to the exigencies of the real workplace.
Whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to actually prevail on this 
aspect of his damages case is not before us. The sole question presented to the 
appellate court, and on appeal to this court, is whether adequate proof existed 
to warrant a jury instruction for lost future earnings. We find that plaintiff 
produced at least some evidence of a permanent injury that has prevented him 
from continuing his prior employment. The circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion by instructing the jury to consider whether plaintiff could recover 
this measure of damages, and if so, how to calculate those damages.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the finding of the circuit and 
appellate courts on the question of Kemlite's duty of care to plaintiff. We 
reverse the appellate court's ruling that invalidated Banner's post-trial waiver 
of its workers' compensation lien, and we reverse the appellate court's 
determination that the jury should not have been instructed on the question of 
plaintiff's alleged lost future wages and the calculation of those damages. The 
judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part
and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE BILANDIC took no part in the consideration or decision of this 
case.
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
While performing his job, the plaintiff, a trash collector, slipped and 
injured himself when he walked on a piece of fiberglass refuse (called edge 
trim) which he knew to be dangerously slippery. A jury found the defendant 
premises owner, Kemlite, liable for the plaintiff's injuries, and the appellate 
court affirmed.
Although a premises owner is not ordinarily liable for injuries caused by an 
"open and obvious" hazard (Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 447-48 (1996)), the majority holds that the "deliberate encounter" 
exception to the open and obvious danger doctrine applies because Kemlite "could 
reasonably foresee the 'economic compulsion' [citation] imposed on the roll-off 
drivers to perform the work they were hired to do." Slip op. at 11. This 
"deliberate encounter" exception provides that a landowner may be liable for 
injuries sustained from open and obvious hazards when he should reasonably 
foresee that an entrant "will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger 
because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so would 
outweigh the apparent risk." Restatement (Second) of Torts §343A, Comment 
f, at 220 (1965).
While I have no objection to the majority's formal adoption of the deliberate 
encounter exception, I disagree with the majority's application of the doctrine 
here. Specifically, the majority holds that the deliberate encounter exception 
applies because Kemlite should have foreseen that the plaintiff was somehow 
economically compelled to traverse upon the dangerous trash. The facts in this 
case clearly reveal that the plaintiff was under no compulsion, economic or 
otherwise. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The plaintiff and other trash collectors testified that when refuse prevented 
them from performing their job safely, they would sometimes contact the Banner 
dispatcher. The dispatcher would then contact Kemlite and ask it to have the 
area around the compactor cleaned. Nothing indicates that the plaintiff would 
suffer adverse economic consequences if he did not deliberately encounter the 
debris on the ground. Indeed, past practice indicates that the trash collectors 
requested that Kemlite clean up the compactor site, and the collectors were 
never disciplined by Banner for making such a request. Rather, the 
collectors could, and did, avoid the danger by requesting that Kemlite 
clean the area around the compactor. Given that the plaintiff had a 
reasonable alternative available to him which he in fact availed 
himself of in the past, it strains logic and good sense to hold that he was 
under some compulsion to put himself in harm's way. Consequently, Kemlite should 
not be required to foresee an illusory compulsion.
Moreover, the case to which the majority cites for support actually 
illustrates why the plaintiff in this case was not under any 
compulsion. In Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 (1984), the plaintiffs worked at a hotel gift shop. When opening and 
closing the shop, the employees, as part of their jobs, were 
required to move and store a hazardous security gate. Because the 
employees had to handle this gate or lose their jobs, the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that the employer should have foreseen this economic compulsion. 
Keller, 107 Idaho at 595, 691 P.2d  at 1210. Thus, the plaintiffs in 
Keller, unlike the plaintiff here, had no reasonable 
alternative to encountering the hazard.
Finally, finding a duty under the circumstances of this case is bad public 
policy. See Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 525 (1987) (stating that whether a duty exists is also an inquiry 
shaped by public policy). Whenever a hazard is open and obvious, the danger is 
known to both the plaintiff and the defendant. Thus, the central inquiry is who, 
among the two parties aware of the risk, should bear the responsibility for 
injury. Where, as here, reasonable alternatives to encountering the hazard are 
available to the plaintiff, finding a duty makes the defendant responsible for 
the plaintiff's decision which was freely made. Consequently, I would find that 
Kemlite owed no duty to the plaintiff, and, thus, I would not reach the 
remaining issues in this case.
Footnotes:
1. The common law distinction between invitees 
and licensees is no longer dispositive of the liability of landowners. Pursuant 
to the Illinois Premises Liability Act (740 ILCS 130/1 et seq. (West 
1996)), an owner or occupier of premises owes invitees and licensees the same 
"duty of reasonable care under the circumstances regarding the state of the 
premises or acts done or omitted on them."
2. Contrary to the interpretation drawn by the 
dissent, the Keller decision is silent as to whether Holiday Inn would 
have actually fired the Keller plaintiffs for refusing to move the 
security gates, or whether the plaintiffs ever requested aid from the defendant 
in moving the gates. Regardless, it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
plaintiffs would attempt to move the gates in order to do their jobs and that, 
because Holiday Inn knew the gates were "prone to fall" (Keller, 107 
Idaho at 594, 691 P.2d at 1209), the plaintiffs might be injured in the 
process.
3. Although recognized by our appellate court for 
years, this court has never before applied the exception in a decision. 
Jackson, 277 Ill. App. 3d at 464.