Case Title: People v. Hasprey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88703

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88703-Agenda 11-September 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
								KEITH V. HASPREY, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 22, 2000.
	JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Keith V. Hasprey, was convicted in the circuit
court of Logan County of reckless driving. The appellate court
affirmed his conviction and sentence (308 Ill. App. 3d 841), and
we granted leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).



BACKGROUND
	On May 10, 1998, while driving in Lincoln, Illinois, defendant
attempted to pass a pickup truck on a two-lane road. As he was
passing, the truck edged over toward defendant and made contact
with his vehicle. After passing the truck, defendant stopped and
exited his vehicle. The driver of the truck also stopped, but then
backed up and drove away. Defendant and a friend, who was
driving another car nearby, decided to chase the truck. They caught
up to the truck and attempted to stop it. In so doing, they caused
further contact between the truck and defendant's vehicle.
	Subsequently, the driver of the truck pled guilty to one count
of reckless driving. Defendant was charged with two counts of
reckless driving. After the State dropped one of the two counts
against defendant, defendant proceeded to trial, and was convicted
by a jury. The court sentenced defendant to 18 months' probation,
a $1,000 fine plus costs, and $1,500 in restitution to the driver of
the truck. The appellate court affirmed.
ANALYSIS
	Defendant first argues that the trial court lacked authority to
order restitution. The appellate court held that section 5-5-6 of the
Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West 1998))
authorizes restitution in this case. Section 5-5-6 provides, in
pertinent part, that "In all convictions for offenses in violation of
the Criminal Code of 1961 in which the person received any injury
to their person or damage to their real or personal property as a
result of the criminal act of the defendant, the court shall order
restitution as provided in this Section." 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West
1998). Defendant contends that restitution is not authorized
because reckless driving, the offense of which he was convicted,
is part of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-503 (West
1998)) and not part of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq.
(West 1998)).
	Defendant is correct. Section 5-5-6 of the Code of
Corrections authorizes restitution only for violations of the
Criminal Code. Defendant has not been convicted of violating the
Criminal Code. While the Vehicle Code has its own restitution
provision for those convicted of vehicle theft (see 625 ILCS
5/4-108(b) (West 1998)), it has no such provision for the offense
of reckless driving. The trial court's order of restitution is
therefore vacated.
	Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion in limine which sought to bar the State from arguing to the
jury that defendant could be found guilty of reckless driving if he
acted either willfully or wantonly. Defendant contends that by
naming the offense "reckless driving," the General Assembly
intended to require that a defendant's actions be both willful and
wanton. The plain language of the statute, however, belies
defendant's contention. The statute specifies that a person is guilty
of reckless driving if he drives a vehicle with "willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property." (Emphasis added.)
625 ILCS 5/11-503 (West 1998). The State thus was correct in
arguing that defendant could be found guilty if he acted either
willfully or wantonly.
	Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing
to declare a mistrial after it received a note from the jury. Prior to
the close of all the evidence, the jurors sent the judge the following
note: "How do you vote if you feel at this point and time both
parties are at fault?" After discussing the matter with the
prosecution and with defense counsel, the judge subsequently
instructed the jury as follows: "Each case is individual, each case
is different, and we deliberate a verdict as jurors after all the
evidence has been presented and after you're instructed as to what
the law is. In this particular case, it is not proper to be discussing
the case before all the evidence is in and before the instructions.
*** [Y]ou have to wait until you have heard all the evidence and
[been] instructed as to the law before you make any determination
on guilt or innocence." Defense counsel did not object to this
admonition and did not move for a mistrial.
	By failing to object to the judge's instructions or to request a
mistrial, defendant waived any objection to the court's handling of
this matter. Furthermore, the court was under no obligation to
declare a mistrial sua sponte, because its response to the jurors'
note sufficiently cured any misunderstanding on the jurors' part.
	The appellate court's judgment is reversed in part and
affirmed in part. The circuit court's order of restitution is vacated.
In all other respects, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed in part 
and affirmed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed in part
 and vacated in part.