Case Title: Youngstown v. Traylor

Citation: 2009-Ohio-4184

Docket Number: 20081460

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Youngstown v. Traylor, 123 Ohio St.3d 132, 2009-Ohio-4184.] 
 
 
CITY OF YOUNGSTOWN, APPELLANT, v. TRAYLOR, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Youngstown v. Traylor, 123 Ohio St.3d 132, 2009-Ohio-4184.] 
Criminal liability — Vicious dogs — Youngstown Codified Ordinances 505.19 is 
rationally related to the city’s legitimate interest in protecting citizens 
from vicious dogs and therefore is constitutional — Conviction reinstated. 
(No. 2008-1460 — Submitted May 19, 2009 — Decided August 26, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, No. 07 MA 102,  
2008-Ohio- 2971. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Youngstown Codified Ordinances 505.19 is rationally related to the city’s 
legitimate interest in protecting citizens from vicious dogs and therefore is 
constitutional. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} Today we must decide whether a Youngstown ordinance that 
requires vicious dogs to be confined and requires the state to prove at trial that the 
dog is vicious or dangerous as an element of the offense violates procedural due 
process.  Because we hold that the ordinance does not violate due process, we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the conviction. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} On April 18, 2007, at 8:00 a.m., David Roch was walking his 16-
pound wire fox terrier in Mill Creek Park in Youngstown, Ohio, when he was 
approached by two unaccompanied Italian mastiff/Cane Corso dogs, one male and 
one female.  The Mahoning County dog warden estimated the male dog to be 
about 170 to 180 pounds, and the female was slightly smaller. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 3} Roch restrained his dog and attempted to calm the larger dogs, 
which were becoming increasingly agitated.  One of the dogs attacked Roch’s 
dog, and when Roch attempted to rescue his dog from the skirmish, Roch was 
attacked, sustaining an injury to his hand.  Roch’s dog required surgery and 
stitches for injuries to her ear and head. 
{¶ 4} After the attack, Roch’s dog, which had been taken off her leash, 
fled, and Roch sought shelter in the garage of Maureen Cronin, a neighbor who 
witnessed the attack.  Cronin called Mill Creek Park Police Officer Carolyn 
Grimaldi, who arrived to find two dogs standing in Cronin’s driveway.  Officer 
Grimaldi shot and killed one of the dogs as it ran toward her.  The other dog fled, 
and a few minutes later, Youngstown Police Officer Matthew Willis spotted it.  
Officer Willis testified that when the dog saw him, it looked agitated and 
aggressive.  When the dog fast approached him, Officer Willis shot and killed it. 
{¶ 5} After a joint investigation involving the Mill Creek Park Police 
Department, the Youngstown Police Department, and the Mahoning County dog 
warden’s office, investigators learned that the owner of the dogs was Jammie 
Traylor, defendant-appellee.  Traylor confirmed that he had two dogs that were 
missing, but when shown the remains of the dogs, he admitted owning only the 
female.  Witnesses testified that they had seen Traylor with both dogs several 
weeks before the attack.  Traylor admitted at his sentencing hearing that he owned 
the female and that the male had been present at his home for breeding purposes. 
{¶ 6} Traylor was charged with two first-degree misdemeanors, 
violations under Youngstown Codified Ordinances (“YCO”) 505.19(b), entitled 
“Vicious Dogs.”  Traylor filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that YCO 505.19 is 
unconstitutional.  The trial court denied Traylor’s motion.  A jury ultimately 
convicted Traylor on the lesser included offense to count one and of the offense as 
charged in count two.  The trial court sentenced Traylor to 90 days in jail and 
ordered him to pay restitution to Roch, complete two years of intensive 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
supervised probation upon his release, pay fines and costs, and own “nothing 
bigger than a Chihuahua” as a condition of his probation. 
{¶ 7} The Mahoning County Court of Appeals vacated Traylor’s 
convictions and discharged him, holding that YCO 505.19 was unconstitutional.  
Youngstown v. Traylor, Mahoning App. No. 07MA102, 2008-Ohio-2971, 2008 
WL 2441368.  The city appealed, and this court accepted jurisdiction.  
Youngstown v. Traylor, 120 Ohio St.3d 1415, 2008-Ohio-6166, 897 N.E.2d 651. 
Analysis 
{¶ 8} The issue before this court is whether YCO 505.19 violates 
procedural due process by failing to give notice to a dog owner that his dog will 
be considered vicious for purposes of criminal prosecution and/or by failing to 
allow the owner a meaningful opportunity to be heard on his dog’s classification 
as vicious.  The right to procedural due process is found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the 
Ohio Constitution.  State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 
N.E.2d 502, ¶ 6.  “Although the concept is flexible, at its core, procedural due 
process under both the Ohio and United States Constitutions requires, at a 
minimum, an opportunity to be heard when the state seeks to infringe a protected 
liberty or property right.”  State v. Cowan, 103 Ohio St.3d 144, 2004-Ohio-4777, 
814 N.E.2d 846, ¶ 8, citing Boddie v. Connecticut (1971), 401 U.S. 371, 377, 91 
S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113. 
{¶ 9} Although dogs are “private property to a qualified extent, they are 
subject to the state police power, and ‘might be destroyed or otherwise dealt with, 
as in the judgment of the legislature is necessary for the protection of its citizens. 
* * * [L]egislatures have broad police power to regulate all dogs so as to protect 
the public against the nuisance posed by a vicious dog.’ ”  State v. Anderson 
(1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 170, 566 N.E.2d 1224, quoting Sentell v. New Orleans 
& Carrollton RR. Co. (1897), 166 U.S. 698, 701-704, 17 S.Ct. 693, 41 L.Ed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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1169.  Thus, in this case, as in other animal-control cases, we are balancing the 
state’s interest in protecting its citizens from vicious animals with the dog owner’s 
due process rights. 
{¶ 10} The text of the ordinance at issue is as follows: 
{¶ 11} “YCO 505.19 Vicious Dogs. 
{¶ 12} “(a) 
No person owning or harboring or having the care of a 
vicious dog shall suffer or permit such animal to go unconfined on the premises of 
such person. 
{¶ 13} “(b) No person owning or harboring or having the care of a vicious 
dog shall suffer or permit such dog to go beyond the premises of such person 
unless such dog is securely leashed or otherwise securely restrained. 
{¶ 14} “(c) Definitions. 
{¶ 15} “(1) A vicious dog is ‘unconfined’ as the term is used in this 
section, if such dog is not restrained by a secure fence, other secure enclosure or 
any other security device which effectively prevents such dog from going beyond 
the premises of the person described in subsection (a) hereof. 
{¶ 16} “(2) ‘Vicious dog’ as used in this section means: 
{¶ 17} “A. 
Any dog with a propensity, tendency or disposition to 
attack, to cause injury to or to otherwise endanger the safety of human beings or 
other domestic animals; and 
{¶ 18} “B. 
Any dog which attacks a human being or another domestic 
animal without provocation. 
{¶ 19} “(d) 
Subsections (a) and (b) hereof are necessary controls on the 
unrestrained activity of vicious animals which threaten the safety and pleasantness 
of streets, parks, sidewalks, yards and all areas of the City and lack of knowledge 
or lack of intent is not a defense to a violation thereof.” 
{¶ 20} In examining the constitutionality of this ordinance, we look to two 
recent vicious-dog cases.  In Cowan, 103 Ohio St.3d 144, 2004-Ohio-4777, 814 
January Term, 2009 
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N.E.2d 846, this court examined whether R.C. 955.22, a state statute requiring 
confinement of dangerous or vicious dogs, violated procedural due process.  We 
held that the statute was unconstitutional because it failed to provide the dog 
owner with a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the dog’s classification and 
labeled dogs dangerous or vicious because of their breed only.  Id. at ¶ 13.  Once 
the dog warden had made the unilateral decision to classify Cowan’s dogs as 
vicious, R.C. 955.22 placed restrictions and requirements on Cowan and her dogs, 
such as purchasing liability insurance, without the right to an appeal or an 
administrative hearing.  Id. 
{¶ 21} Traylor relied on Cowan to support his position that YCO 505.19 
is unconstitutional.  However, as the trial court held, Traylor was charged under 
the vicious-dog ordinance not because of the breed of his dogs, but rather, 
because his dogs had allegedly attacked a human and/or another domestic animal 
without provocation, as prohibited by YCO 505.19(c)(2)B.  Here, the trial court 
concluded that there was no presumption that the dogs were vicious; rather, their 
viciousness was an element of the crime that the state had the burden of proving 
— i.e., that the dogs had attacked a human being or another domestic animal 
without provocation.  Thus, the trial court found that the facts in this case 
separated it from the analysis in Cowan. 
{¶ 22} Between the trial court’s ruling and the court of appeals’ decision 
in this case, we decided Toledo v. Tellings, 114 Ohio St.3d 278, 2007-Ohio-3724, 
871 N.E.2d 1152, in which we considered a Toledo Municipal Code section as 
well as two state statutes, R.C. 955.11 and 955.22.  The municipal code section 
limited ownership of vicious dogs, as defined in R.C. 955.11, or dogs commonly 
known as pit bulls or pit bull mixed breeds, to one in each household, and the 
Revised Code required an owner of a pit bull to obtain liability insurance for 
damages, injuries, or death that might be caused by the dog.  Id. at ¶ 2. 
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{¶ 23} In upholding the three provisions, this court concluded that the 
state and the city of Toledo possess the constitutional authority to exercise police 
powers that are rationally related to a legitimate interest in public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare.  We determined that the evidence proved that pit bulls 
cause more damage than other dogs when they attack, cause more fatalities in 
Ohio than other dogs, and cause Toledo police officers to fire their weapons more 
often than do other breeds.  Thus, we held that the state of Ohio and the city of 
Toledo had a legitimate interest in protecting citizens from the dangers associated 
with pit bulls and that R.C. 955.11(A)(4)(a)(iii) and 955.22 and Toledo Municipal 
Code 505.14 are rationally related to that interest.  Therefore, these provisions are 
constitutional.  Id. at ¶ 35. 
{¶ 24} The court of appeals held that Tellings was inapplicable to this 
case because the case at bar does not involve pit bulls and because YCO 505.19 
does not contain a classification of this breed as a definition of “vicious.”  
Youngstown v. Traylor, 2008-Ohio-2971, ¶ 27.  Rather, the court of appeals found 
the facts of Cowan to be “virtually identical” to those in this case.  Id. at ¶ 14.  
Thus, the court of appeals held that YCO 505.19 violated procedural due process 
because of the “imposition of additional legal duties and restrictions on the dog 
owner.”  Id. at ¶ 23.  We disagree. 
{¶ 25} In holding that R.C. 955.22 was not unconstitutional as applied to 
owners of pit bulls in Tellings, we clarified that in Cowan, it was the unilateral 
classification of the dogs as vicious by a state actor that trampled the defendant’s 
due process rights by failing to give him notice and opportunity to be heard.  
Tellings, 114 Ohio St.3d 278, 2007-Ohio-3724, 871 N.E.2d 1152, ¶ 32.  YCO 
505.19 simply shifts the risk of dog ownership to the dog owner in order to 
protect the public. 1 
                                                          
 
1.  Between 4.5 and 4.7 million people are bitten by dogs in the United States each year.  
American 
Veterinary 
Medical 
Association 
(“AVMA”), 
Dog 
Bite 
Prevention, 
January Term, 2009 
7 
 
{¶ 26} As for the opportunity to be heard, YCO 505.19 does not permit 
any unilateral, unreviewable, precharge determination by a state actor, unlike the 
statute involved in Cowan.  Moreover, YCO 505.19 does not create prehearing 
burdens on dog owners, such as requiring liability insurance for particular breeds.  
In Cowan, we rejected the statute’s failure to provide the owner an opportunity to 
challenge the vicious label before trial.  However, YCO 505.19 does not classify 
or label dogs as vicious.  Dogs are rendered vicious under the ordinance by their 
propensity to attack or by their attack, and dog owners are merely required to 
keep such dogs confined. 
{¶ 27} Traylor’s dogs were alleged to be vicious in his criminal 
complaint, and Traylor was given an opportunity for meaningful review in front 
of the trial court.  Notably, Traylor did not present any evidence regarding the 
temperament or disposition of his unlicensed dogs at the hearing on the motion to 
dismiss.  YCO 505.19 does not place any responsibilities on the dog owner until 
the state proves its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  Rather, YCO 505.19 simply 
requires dog owners to keep their dogs on their property. 
{¶ 28} The Tenth District Court of Appeals considered a similar case in 
which a German shepherd had attacked a dog on a leash, and the owner was 
charged under a local ordinance.  State v. Conte (Nov. 6, 2007), 10th Dist. No. 
07AP-33, 2007-Ohio-5924.  The court made two observations that are applicable 
in this case:  first, the city ordinance in Conte did not involve an “unreviewable, 
unilateral determination that the animal was ‘vicious or dangerous.’  Rather, [the 
state] must prove at trial that appellee’s dog is vicious or dangerous as an element 
of the offense.  [The owner] has the opportunity to contest that allegation.”  Id. at 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
http://www.avma.org/public_health/dogbite/; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Dog 
Bite 
Prevention, 
www.cdc.gov/HomeandRecreationalSafety/Dog-Bites/biteprevention.html.  
According to the AVMA, almost 900,000 people require medical attention for dog-bite-related 
injuries each year.     
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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¶ 15.  Second, the city ordinance “does not impose any additional obligations on a 
dog owner.”  Id. at ¶ 17. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 29} Traylor’s dogs, unprovoked, attacked Roch and his dog while the 
dogs were off their property.  Traylor argues that an owner cannot know that his 
dog is vicious until he is convicted under the ordinance.  To hold otherwise, 
however, would be to permit each dog “one free bite,” a result that would clearly 
leave society at risk.  A responsibility of dog ownership is to maintain and control 
the animal.  This ordinance requires no more and no less, and, therefore, it does 
not violate procedural due process. 
{¶ 30} We hold that Youngstown Codified Ordinances 505.19 is 
rationally related to the city’s legitimate interest in protecting citizens from 
vicious dogs and therefore is constitutional.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the convictions. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER and LANZINGER, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 31} In State v. Cowan, 103 Ohio St.3d 144, 2004-Ohio-4777, 814 
N.E.2d 846, at syllabus, we stated that R.C. 955.22, the statute addressing 
“vicious” dogs, “violates the constitutional right to procedural due process insofar 
as it fails to provide dog owners a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue 
of whether a dog is ‘vicious.’ ”  This conclusion answers the issue before us.  
Traylor was charged with not restraining a “vicious” dog, but he had no notice 
that his dog was “vicious.”  In Cowan, the dog owner was aware that her dogs had 
been labeled vicious; she had merely not been given an opportunity to challenge 
that determination.  Id. at ¶ 15.  This case is even more egregious because Traylor 
January Term, 2009 
9 
 
not only doesn’t have an opportunity to challenge the “vicious” label, he had no 
way to know that his dog is “vicious.” 
{¶ 32} The outcome of this case is morally repugnant.  The owner of a 
dog is being sent to jail for 90 days based on his failure to do something he could 
not know he was supposed to do.  “Vicious” dogs must be restrained.  
Youngstown Codified Ordinances (“YCO”) 505.19.  But Traylor’s dog was not 
“vicious” until the moment it bit a human, at which point it was too late for 
Traylor to restrain his dog.  YCO 505.19 imposes obligations on dog owners that 
they do not know they need to comply with until they have no opportunity to 
comply.  The most troubling part of this case isn’t that a municipality would pass 
such an ordinance; it’s that this court is sanctioning it.  See State v. Price, 118 
Ohio St.3d 144, 2008-Ohio-1974, 886 N.E.2d 852, at ¶ 38 (“[defendant] is owed 
what every criminal defendant is owed: notice that his conduct is illegal”). 
{¶ 33} This court is turning a blind eye to basic tenets of fundamental 
fairness.  See R.C. 2901.21(A)(1) (a “person’s [criminal] liability is based on 
conduct that includes either a voluntary act, or an omission to perform an act or 
duty that the person is capable of performing”).  Traylor was not capable of 
restraining his “vicious” dog until he knew it was vicious.  Allowing Youngstown 
to impose criminal liability based on a contemporaneous labeling of a dog as 
“vicious” is not different from imposing criminal liability on an “accident-prone” 
driver and defining “accident-prone” as anyone who gets in a car accident.  It just 
doesn’t make sense.  And it’s unconstitutional.  See Papachristou v. Jacksonville 
(1972), 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110, quoting United States v. 
Harriss (1954), 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (an ordinance 
violates due process when it “ ‘fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair 
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute’ ”). 
{¶ 34} Furthermore, Youngstown should not be able to define what 
constitutes a “vicious” dog because the General Assembly has already done so.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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R.C. 955.11(A)(4)(a).  The parties did not address this issue, and the record is not 
fully developed, so it is difficult to determine whether YCO 505.19 would survive 
a home-rule analysis.  See Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Clyde, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 96, 2008-Ohio-4605, 896 N.E.2d 967, ¶ 24.  Based on what the record does 
reveal, it seems likely that YCO 505.19 would not survive.  YCO 505.19 is an 
exercise of local self-government.  Id. at ¶ 23.  But, R.C. Chapter 955 appears to 
be a general law, and R.C. 955.11(A)(4)(a) and YCO 505.19(c)(2) are clearly in 
conflict.  See Clyde at ¶ 25.  Pursuant to this, admittedly cursory, analysis, R.C. 
955.11(A)(4)(a) would prevail over YCO 505.19(c)(2). 
{¶ 35} This court did not engage in a home-rule analysis, in large part 
because the parties did not argue the issue.  By avoiding that issue, however, this 
court is sanctioning the imposition of criminal liability for something that the 
General Assembly has determined is not a crime.  According to R.C. 955.22, the 
owner of a dog cannot be criminally liable for acts of that dog unless the dog has 
already been determined to be “vicious.”  Unlike YCO 505.19, R.C. 955.22 and 
related statutes do not allow a dog to be labeled vicious and its owner to be 
criminally liable based on the same act. 
{¶ 36} YCO 505.19 violates the Constitution by not providing 
fundamental due process protections.  I would affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals.  I dissent. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 37} I join Justice Pfeifer’s dissent.  With respect to the majority’s 
concern over “one free bite,” a dog owner cannot totally evade responsibility for 
the consequences of failure to restrain a dog—there is always the potential for 
civil liability.  We held in State v. Cowan, 103 Ohio St.3d 144, 2004-Ohio-4777, 
814 N.E.2d 846, syllabus, that a statute requiring the confinement of vicious dogs 
January Term, 2009 
11 
 
violates the constitutional right to procedural due process if it fails to provide dog 
owners a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether a dog is 
vicious. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that the reasoning in 
Cowan controls the outcome of this case. 
__________________ 
 
Joseph R. Macejko, Youngstown Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
James E. Lanzo, for appellee. 
______________________