Case Title: Hoffer v. City of Boise

Citation: 

Docket Number: 37901

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2011-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 37901 
 
 
RANDY HOFFER, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF BOISE, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
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Boise, June 2011 Term 
 
2011 Opinion No.  82 
 
Filed:  July 11, 2011 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
   
    
 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County.  Hon. Darla Williamson, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the District Court is affirmed.  No attorney fees are awarded. 
Costs are awarded to respondent. 
 
Law Offices of Jacob Deaton, PLLC, Eagle, for appellant. Jacob Deaton 
argued. 
 
Boise City Attorney, Boise, for respondent.  Scott Muir argued. 
____________________________ 
 
W. JONES, Justice 
I.  NATURE OF THE CASE 
Randy Hoffer challenges the district court’s dismissal of three of his five tort claims 
against the City of Boise (the City).  The district court dismissed Hoffer’s claims of tortious 
interference with contract and defamation against the City because it held as a matter of law that 
under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and this Court’s holding in Sprague v. City of Burley, 
109 Idaho 656, 710 P.2d 566 (1985), a governmental entity cannot be held liable for the torts of 
its employees when a complainant alleges malice and/or criminal intent.  We affirm the decision 
of the district court on the alternative ground that I.C. § 6-904(3) as a matter of law exempts 
government entities from liability for the intentional torts at issue here.  
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
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On appeal, Hoffer only challenges the district court’s ruling on the City’s motion to 
dismiss Hoffer’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted brought 
under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).  Therefore, the facts are presented here as Hoffer alleged them in his 
complaint.  Hoffer owned a trailer park located at 5631 West Overland Road in Boise, Idaho.  On 
September 15 and 18, 2006, the City issued notices to Hoffer that required him to make electrical 
improvements to his trailer park because of fire safety concerns.  When Hoffer failed to do so, 
the City, through its agents or employees, posted notices around the trailer park threatening to 
disconnect electrical service to the trailer park.  Hoffer alleges that the City, through its agents or 
employees, made false statements to the Idaho Statesman newspaper regarding Hoffer’s 
compliance with the City requirements.  On November 3, 2006, the City terminated electrical 
service to the park.   
Hoffer filed a complaint against the City, alleging (1) tortious interference with contract 
(for his lease contracts with his tenants); (2) tortious interference with contract (for his sale 
contracts with prospective buyers of the trailer park); (3) negligence; (4) intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; and (5) defamation.  The City answered and subsequently brought a motion 
to dismiss the complaint, arguing that because Hoffer had alleged that the City employees acted 
with malice and/or criminal intent, under I.C. § 9-604(c) and Sprague the City could not be 
subject to liability.  The district court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to the two 
tortious interference with contract counts as well as the defamation count, and denied the motion 
as to the other two counts.       
The City filed a motion to reconsider that the district court treated as a motion for 
summary judgment on the remaining claims.  The district court granted summary judgment on 
the remaining claims.  Judgment was entered in favor of the City on June 12, 2009, and Hoffer’s 
complaint was dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.  Hoffer timely appealed from the 
judgment.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision in an unpublished opinion.  
Hoffer petitioned for, and was granted, review from this Court.  Hoffer does not argue on appeal 
that the summary judgment was improperly granted, but rather limits his arguments to the claims 
dismissed by the grant of the motion to dismiss.      
III.  ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court properly dismissed Hoffer’s claims for tortious interference 
with contract and defamation under the ITCA. 
2. Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.  
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IV.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“When a case comes before this Court on a petition for review from a Court of Appeals 
decision, serious consideration is given to the views of the Court of Appeals, but this Court 
reviews the decision of the lower court directly.”  Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 
1277, 1281 (2010).  “[A] district court’s dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) shall be 
reviewed de novo.”  Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010).  The 
Court on appeal must determine “whether the non-movant has alleged sufficient facts in support 
of his claim, which if true, would entitle him to relief.”  Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618, 
213 P.3d 398, 403 (2009) (quoting Rincover v. Dep’t of Fin., 128 Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 
1296 (1996)).  The Court must “draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving 
party.”  Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 257, 127 P.3d 156, 160 (2005) (citation omitted).  “After 
drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the Court then examines whether a 
claim for relief has been stated.”  Id.  The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject 
to free review by this Court.  Kimbrough v. Idaho Bd. of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417, 420, 247 
P.3d 644, 647 (2011).  
V.  ANALYSIS 
A. 
We Affirm the District Court’s Dismissal of Hoffer’s Claims on the Alternative 
Basis that I.C. § 6-904(3) Exempts Governmental Entities From Liability for the 
Torts at Issue Here: Interference with Contract and Defamation.  
The ITCA establishes that governmental entities are subject to liability for their own 
negligent or wrongful acts, and those of their employees who were acting within the course and 
scope of their employment.  Grant v. City of Twin Falls, 120 Idaho 69, 76, 813 P.2d 880, 887 
(1991) (citing I.C. § 6-903); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 471, 716 P.2d 1238, 1243 (1986).  
It states:  
Except as otherwise provided in this act, every governmental entity is 
subject to liability for money damages arising out of its negligent or otherwise 
wrongful acts or omissions and those of its employees acting within the course 
and scope of their employment or duties . . . where the governmental entity if a 
private person or entity would be liable for money damages under the laws of the 
state of Idaho.   
I.C. § 6-903(a).  However the ITCA also expressly exempts certain causes of action from the 
general rule that the entity is subject to liability.   Grant, 120 Idaho at 76–77; 813 P.2d at 887–
88.  Relevant here is I.C. § 6-904(3).  That section states:  
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A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course 
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent shall not be 
liable for any claim which . . . [a]rises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.       
The plain language of the first clause of that section exempts governmental entities from liability 
for the torts it lists, whether or not there has been an allegation of malice or criminal intent.  
White v. Univ. of Idaho, 118 Idaho 400, 400–01, 797 P.2d 108, 108–09 (1990).   
In White, this Court affirmed the decision of the district court, which held that the 
University of Idaho as a governmental entity was immune as a matter of law under I.C. § 6-
904(3) from liability for an alleged battery committed by its employee because “a governmental 
entity has no liability ‘for any claim which . . . [a]rises out of . . . battery’ committed by an 
employee.”  Id. at 400, 797 P.2d at 108 (quoting I.C. § 6-904(3)).  The requirement that an 
employee have acted “within the course and scope of their employment” plainly applies to the 
act of the employee and not of the governmental entity.  Therefore, the language “and without 
malice or criminal intent” that follows the statute’s requirement that the employee have acted 
within the course and scope of employment, also by its plain language only applies to the 
employee.  Thus, “[a] governmental entity . . . shall not be liable for any claim which arises out 
of . . . libel, slander . . . or interference with contract rights.”  I.C. § 6-903(3); accord 
Intermountain Constr., Inc. v. City of Ammon, 122 Idaho 931, 933, 841 P.2d 1082, 1084 (1992) 
(affirming the grant of summary judgment to the City of Ammon on a claim of misrepresentation 
against it because “[t]he plain language of § 6-904(3) excludes liability for misrepresentation, 
and appellant’s own evidence has shown this is a case involving misrepresentation by an 
employee of a governmental entity.”)   
Although here the district court based its dismissal of Hoffer’s claims on the holding of 
Sprague v. City of Burley,1 we affirm the dismissal based on the alternative ground that the plain 
                                                 
1 Hoffer argues that Sprague was erroneously decided and should be overruled by this Court.  We decline to 
overrule Sprague because we believe that, similar to the district court’s dismissal of Hoffer’s claims here, Sprague 
reached the correct result in dismissing the claims for assault and battery, consistent with I.C. § 6-904(3).  However, 
we agree with Hoffer’s contention that Sprague’s reliance on I.C. § 6-903(c) to support its conclusion that “where a 
governmental employee acts with malice or criminal intent, the governmental entity for whom the employee works 
may not be held liable” was misguided.  Sprague, 109 Idaho at 669, 710 P.2d at 579.  While we agree that acts 
committed with malice and/or criminal intent are generally outside the scope of employment, § 6-903(c) does not 
provide immunity to the entity when the employee acts with malice and/or criminal intent.  Rather, it concerns the 
entity’s duties to the employee established in the subsection immediately preceding it, § 6-903(b), which requires 
the governmental entity to provide a defense for its employee and to pay its employee’s judgment when the 
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language of I.C. § 6-904(3) exempts governmental entities from liability for tortious interference 
with contract rights and defamation.  Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 382, 
234 P.3d 699, 706 (2010) (“Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous 
theory, this Court will affirm the order on the correct theory.” (quotation omitted)).  Because 
Hoffer only appeals the dismissal of claims that are included within that section, and because he 
did not name any individual employee as a defendant, as a matter of law under I.C. § 6-904(3) he 
could not recover against the City.  The district court was correct in dismissing those claims.  If 
he had included an employee as a defendant, his claims against that employee alleging malice or 
criminal intent would have survived under I.C. § 6-904(3) because an employee is only immune 
from suit for those intentional torts if there is no allegation of malice and/or criminal intent.  See 
Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, --- Idaho ---, 252 P.3d 1274, 1287 (2011). 
Hoffer requests attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-117.  However, Hoffer is not the 
prevailing party in this appeal, and thus no fees are awarded to him.  Gibson v. Ada Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Office, 147 Idaho 491, 496, 211 P.3d 100, 105 (2009).  The City requests attorney fees 
on appeal under the same section and also under I.C. § 6-918A.  To be entitled to an award of 
fees under I.C. § 12-117, the prevailing party must show that “the nonprevailing party acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law.”  Idaho Code § 6-918A allows the court to award 
attorney fees in a tort action against a governmental entity if the party against whom the award is 
sought “is guilty of bad faith in the commencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the 
action.”  The City has not shown that Hoffer acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact or 
that he acted in bad faith.  Therefore, we decline to award fees to the City on appeal.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hoffer’s claims for tortious interference with 
contract and defamation. Under I.C. § 6-904(3), a governmental entity is not liable for those 
torts.  No attorney fees are awarded.  Costs to the City.   
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and HORTON CONCUR. 
                                                                                                                                                             
employee has been sued for a tort he or she committed.  Under § 6-903(c), if the employee has acted with malice or 
criminal intent, the entity may “refuse a defense or disavow and refuse to pay any judgment” for its employee.  
Section 6-903(c) does not speak to the entity’s own liability.