Case Title: State ex rel. Lanham v. DeWine

Citation: 2013-Ohio-199

Docket Number: 2012-0203

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Lanham v. DeWine, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-199.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-199 
THE STATE EX REL. LANHAM v. DEWINE, ATTY. GEN., ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Lanham v. DeWine,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-199.] 
Mandamus—Public 
records—Attorney-client 
privilege—Motion 
to 
strike 
statements in affidavit denied because statements made were sufficiently 
based on affiant’s personal knowledge—Documents covered by attorney-
client privilege were properly withheld—Writ denied. 
(No. 2012-0203—Submitted January 9, 2013—Decided January 29, 2013.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an action for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents, 
Attorney General Michael DeWine and his office (“the attorney general’s 
office”), to provide unredacted copies of records relating to the claim that State 
Representative Danny R. Bubp simultaneously held the public offices of state 
representative and mayor’s court magistrate.  Because relator, Kent Lanham, has 
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not established his entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief, we deny the 
writ. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} Danny R. Bubp was a state representative for the 88th house 
district in the General Assembly.  In 2009 and 2010, Bubp served as state 
representative and also served as mayor’s court magistrate for the villages of 
Ripley and Winchester, Ohio.  Thereafter, Bubp continued to serve as state 
representative and mayor’s court magistrate for Ripley. 
{¶ 3} In October 2009, a Cincinnati television station reported that the 
Democratic Party chairmen of the three counties comprising the 88th Ohio house 
district had filed complaints with then Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray 
and the county prosecuting attorneys claiming that by holding the public offices 
of state representative and mayor’s court magistrate simultaneously, Bubp 
violated Ohio Constitution, Article II, Section 4 and R.C. 101.26. 
{¶ 4} Relator, Kent Lanham, is a taxpayer and resident of Clermont 
County, Ohio, which is within the 88th Ohio house district.  On November 17, 
2011, Lanham, through his counsel, Curt C. Hartman, hand delivered to the 
attorney general’s office a written request for copies of the following records 
concerning any report, complaint, claim, or other communication to that office 
relating to Bubp’s simultaneously holding and exercising the public offices of 
state representative and mayor’s court magistrate: 
 
all records that document any report, complaint, claim, 
request for investigation or request for legal action relating to the 
fact that State Representative Danny R. Bubp was simultaneously 
holding and/or continues to simultaneously hold the public offices 
of state representative and magistrate in a mayor’s court; 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
all records documenting all actions taken by the office or 
employees of the Ohio Attorney General in response to any report, 
complaint, claim, request for investigation or request for legal 
action relating to the fact that State Representative Danny R. Bubp 
was simultaneously holding and/or continues to simultaneously 
hold the public offices of state representative and magistrate in a 
mayor’s court; 
all records documenting any communication to or from the 
office or employees of the Ohio Attorney General in response to 
any report, complaint, claim, request for investigation or request 
for legal action relating to the fact that State Representative Danny 
R. Bubp was simultaneously holding and/or continues to 
simultaneously hold the public offices of state representative and 
magistrate in a mayor’s court; 
any records documenting any investigation undertaken by 
the Office of the Attorney General, or its designee, concerning any 
report, complaint, claim, request for investigation or request for 
legal action relating to the fact that State Representative Danny R. 
Bubp 
was 
simultaneously 
holding 
and/or 
continues 
to 
simultaneously hold the public offices of state representative and 
magistrate in a mayor’s court; 
all records documenting any discussions, assessments, 
evaluation or decision by the Office of the Attorney General to 
pursue vel non any report, complaint, claim, request for 
investigation or request for legal action relating to the fact that 
State Representative Danny R. Bubp was simultaneously holding 
and/or continues to simultaneously hold the public offices of state 
representative and magistrate in a mayor’s court; 
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all records documenting any discussions, assessments, 
evaluation or decision by the Office of the Attorney General to 
pursue vel non a quo warranto action against Danny R. Bubp for 
the forfeiture of the office of state representative in light due to the 
fact that Danny R. Bubp was simultaneously holding and/or 
continues to simultaneously hold the public offices of state 
representative and magistrate in a mayor’s court; 
any evaluation or analysis by the Office of the Attorney 
General concerning the provision of Article II, Section 4 of the 
Ohio Constitution that provides that “[n]o member of the general 
assembly shall, during the term for which he was elected * * * hold 
any public office under * * * or this state, or a political subdivision 
thereof”; 
any evaluation or analysis by the Office of the Attorney 
General concerning the provision of Section 101.26 of the Ohio 
Revised Code that provides that “[n]o member of either house of 
the general assembly * * * shall knowingly do any of the 
following:  * * * (C) Accept any * * * office * * * that is 
authorized or created by the general assembly and that provides 
other compensation than actual and necessary expenses * * *.  Any 
member of the general assembly who accepts any appointment, 
office, or employment described in division (A), (B), or (C) of this 
section immediately shall resign from the general assembly, and, if 
he fails or refuses to do so, his seat in the general assembly shall be 
deemed vacant.” 
 
{¶ 5} In his request, Lanham stated that the time period for responsive 
documents may be limited to July 1, 2009, through the date of the request.  By 
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5 
 
letter dated November 22, 2011, the attorney general’s office acknowledged its 
receipt of the request.  On December 1, 2011, the attorney general’s office mailed 
a CD containing 172 pages of responsive documents. Several documents were 
withheld and parts of other documents were redacted based on the claim that they 
were covered by the attorney-client privilege. 
{¶ 6} On December 7, 2011, Lanham’s attorney e-mailed a request to the 
attorney general’s office seeking clarification and confirmation of the attorney-
client-privilege claim.  Specifically, Lanham requested that the attorney general’s 
office clarify, for each redaction, the identities of the attorney and client for 
purposes of invoking the privilege and how communications between Holly 
Hollingsworth, the director of media relations for the former attorney general, and 
Kevin McIver, an assistant attorney general and chief of the opinions section for 
the office, were covered by the privilege.  In its response, the attorney general’s 
office noted that Lanham’s questions concerning its reliance on the attorney-client 
privilege went beyond the scope of the public-records inquiry. 
{¶ 7} On February 2, 2012, Lanham filed this action for a writ of 
mandamus to compel the attorney general’s office to provide access to those 
portions of the requested public records that were withheld, including the records 
for which it claimed attorney-client privilege.  Lanham also requested an award of 
statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.  The case was referred to mediation, 
131 Ohio St.3d 1448, 2012-Ohio-520, 961 N.E.2d 685, but it was subsequently 
returned to the regular docket, 131 Ohio St.3d 1506, 2012-Ohio-1666, 965 N.E.2d 
308.  The attorney general’s office then filed a motion to dismiss, and Lanham 
filed a motion to strike the exhibits attached to the motion to dismiss.  Lanham 
also requested recusal of the court in this and a public-records mandamus case 
filed by him against Bubp, and two of the seven justices then sitting recused 
themselves. 
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{¶ 8} In June 2012, the court granted Lanham’s motion to strike the 
exhibits from the motion to dismiss, denied the motion to dismiss, granted an 
alternative writ, and issued a schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs.  
132 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2012-Ohio-2729, 969 N.E.2d 268.  The court dismissed 
Lanham’s public-records mandamus case against Bubp.  State ex rel. Lanham v. 
Bubp, 132 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2012-Ohio-2729, 969 N.E.2d 268. 
{¶ 9} Of the 172 pages of documents produced by the attorney general’s 
office, Lanham now identifies six redacted documents that remain at issue.  The 
attorney general’s office redacted these documents on the basis of attorney-client 
privilege; Lanham challenges the validity of these redactions. 
{¶ 10} In addition to the six redacted documents, Lanham wants two 
additional documents.  In the discovery responses provided to Lanham in the 
Bubp case, a log of the items withheld on the ground of attorney-client privilege 
noted two letters from Michael Lenzo, the majority legal counsel for the Ohio 
House of Representatives, to Assistant Attorney General McIver.  These records 
were also not provided by the attorney general’s office in response to Lanham’s 
request, nor were they mentioned in the summary of the records it was not 
producing on the basis of attorney-client privilege. 
{¶ 11} The parties submitted evidence and briefs.  Lanham also filed a 
motion to strike portions of the affidavits submitted by the attorney general’s 
office. 
{¶ 12} This cause is now before the court for its consideration of the 
motion to strike and the merits. 
Analysis 
Motion to Strike 
{¶ 13} In his motion, Lanham seeks to strike parts of the affidavit of 
Assistant Attorney General Erin Butcher-Lyden, who works with the public-
records unit of the attorney general’s office.  Lanham argues that Butcher-Lyden’s 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
statements could not have been made based on her personal knowledge.  Lanham 
also requests that paragraph 7 of the affidavits of Assistant Attorneys General 
Damian W. Sikora and Sarah Pierce be stricken.  Along with paragraph 13 of 
Assistant Attorney General Butcher-Lyden’s affidavit, these paragraphs refer to 
the parties’ agreement at the conclusion of mediation.  Lanham argues that 
communications in mediation are confidential and should not be disclosed. 
{¶ 14} For the following reasons we deny the motion to strike portions of 
the affidavits. 
{¶ 15} First, Butcher-Lyden had sufficient personal knowledge to satisfy 
the requirements of former S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.7 (now S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.06).  Under 
that rule, affidavits must be made on personal knowledge: “Affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, setting forth facts admissible in evidence, and 
showing affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to all matters stated 
in the affidavit.”  See State ex rel. Dawson v. Bloom-Carroll Local School Dist., 
131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, ¶ 20.  However, personal 
knowledge can be inferred from the nature of the facts in the affidavit and the 
identity of the affiant.  See State ex rel. Corrigan v. Seminatore, 66 Ohio St.2d 
459, 467, 423 N.E.2d 105 (1981); see also Bank of Am., Natl. Assn. v. Ly, 9th 
Dist. No. 25360,  2011-Ohio-437, 2011 WL 345946, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 16} Here, Butcher-Lyden, as an assistant attorney general, is familiar 
with the internal procedures and workings of the attorney general’s office.  She 
personally reviewed the documents identified as responsive to the public-records 
request and made a legal assessment for any potential exceptions to the Public 
Records Act, R.C. 149.43.  The contested portions of her affidavit are sufficiently 
based on her personal knowledge, gained through firsthand observation of the 
documents as well as experience with the procedures at the attorney general’s 
office, to satisfy the “personal knowledge” requirement of former S.Ct.Prac.R. 
10.7 (now S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.06). 
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{¶ 17} Second, while the affidavits of Butcher-Lyden, Sikora, and Pierce 
do mention mediation, they do not disclose any details of the mediation itself but 
mention only those documents that were still at issue after the mediation was 
complete.  In other words, they indicate the outcome of the mediation, but not 
how the parties got to that outcome.  Moreover, knowledge of exactly what is still 
in contention is obviously needed by the court to continue this litigation. The 
comments in the affidavits about mediation do not violate former S.Ct.Prac.R. 
17.2 (now S.Ct.Prac.R. 19.02). 
{¶ 18} Therefore, we deny Lanham’s motion to strike. 
Mandamus—Preliminary Matters 
{¶ 19} Mandamus is the proper action to compel adherence to R.C. 
149.43, the Public Records Act, and courts construe the act liberally in favor of 
broad access, resolving any doubt in favor of disclosure of public records.  State 
ex rel. McCaffrey v. Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 133 Ohio St.3d 139, 
2012-Ohio-4246, 976 N.E.2d 877, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 20} The attorney general’s office claims that the records at issue here 
are excepted from disclosure.  In State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-
Kelley, 118 Ohio St.3d 81, 2008-Ohio-1770, 886 N.E.2d 206, at paragraph two of 
the syllabus, we set forth the standard of proof for public-records custodians 
attempting to establish an exception: 
 
Exceptions to disclosure under the Public Records Act, 
R.C. 149.43, are strictly construed against the public-records 
custodian, and the custodian has the burden to establish the 
applicability of an exception.  A custodian does not meet this 
burden if it has not proven that the requested records fall squarely 
within the exception. 
 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
{¶ 21} Before assessing whether the attorney general’s office met this 
burden here, we first address Lanham’s preliminary contention that due process 
forbids the court from deciding this case based on its in camera inspection of the 
documents that the attorney general’s office claims are excepted from disclosure.  
Lanham also contends that the log provided in discovery listing items that the 
attorney general’s office claimed were covered by the attorney-client privilege is 
insufficient. 
{¶ 22} First, the court has consistently required an in camera inspection of 
records before determining whether the records are excepted from disclosure: 
 
 
When a governmental body asserts that public records are 
excepted from disclosure and such assertion is challenged, the 
court must make an individualized scrutiny of the records in 
question.  If the court finds that these records contain excepted 
information, this information must be redacted and any remaining 
information must be released. 
 
State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co. v. Cleveland, 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 N.E.2d 
786 (1988), paragraph four of the syllabus; see also State ex rel. McCaffrey v. 
Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 128 Ohio St.3d 1451, 2011-Ohio-1702, 944 
N.E.2d 1176 (court denied a motion for in camera review in a public-records 
mandamus case because it had already ordered the respondents to submit an 
unredacted copy of the records for which they claimed exemptions for in camera 
review); State ex rel. Besser v. Ohio State Univ., 87 Ohio St.3d 535, 541-542, 721 
N.E.2d 1044 (2000) (court noted that it has applied the Natl. Broadcasting 
“general rule to require in camera inspections in [public-records mandamus] cases 
in which a public entity’s claim that records are exempt * * * is challenged”). 
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{¶ 23} In challenging this longstanding procedure, Lanham cites cases 
from other jurisdictions that do not involve public-records requests. See, e.g., In 
re Application of Eisenberg, 654 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir.1981), and Vining v. Runyon, 
99 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir.1996).  These authorities are manifestly inapplicable 
because the sealed records at issue here are the specific subject of a mandamus 
action under R.C. 149.43.  If the court were to require the disclosure of the subject 
records in discovery to permit relator to contest the applicability of a claimed 
exception, it would render the case moot.  State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. 
Toledo–Lucas Cty. Port Auth., 121 Ohio St.3d 537, 2009-Ohio-1767, 905 N.E.2d 
1221, ¶ 14.  And Lanham can still contest the applicability of a claimed exception 
by challenging the validity of unsealed evidence that the public-records custodian 
submits to support its reliance on the exception.  In fact, he did so here—although 
unsuccessfully—through his motion to strike.  Thus, due process does not prevent 
the court’s consideration of the pertinent records submitted under seal for in 
camera review. 
{¶ 24} Moreover, Lanham’s challenge to the sufficiency of the log 
supplied by the attorney general’s office, which listed the items it claimed are 
protected by attorney-client privilege, is not cognizable in this public-records 
mandamus case.  The attorney general’s office was under no duty under R.C. 
149.43 to submit a privilege log to preserve their claimed exception.  State ex rel. 
Nix v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 383, 700 N.E.2d 12 (1998). 
{¶ 25} With these preliminary issues resolved, we now consider the 
exception claimed by the attorney general’s office for the requested records. 
Attorney-Client Privilege 
{¶ 26} The attorney general’s office claims that the pertinent records are 
excepted from disclosure under the Public Records Act because they are covered 
by the attorney-client privilege.  R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) exempts “[r]ecords the 
release of which is prohibited by state or federal law” from the definition of 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
“public record.”  “The attorney-client privilege, which covers records of 
communications between attorneys and their government clients pertaining to the 
attorneys’ legal advice, is a state law prohibiting release of those records.”  
Besser, 87 Ohio St.3d at 542, 721 N.E.2d 1044.  “In Ohio, the attorney-client 
privilege is governed both by statute, R.C. 2317.02(A), which provides a 
testimonial privilege, and by common law, which broadly protects against any 
dissemination of information obtained in the confidential attorney-client 
relationship.”  Dawson, 131 Ohio St.3d 10, 2011-Ohio-6009, 959 N.E.2d 524, 
¶ 27. 
{¶ 27} This court has previously addressed when the attorney-client 
privilege arises.  “(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a 
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating 
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance 
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) 
unless the protection is waived.”  State ex rel. Leslie v. Ohio Hous. Fin. Agency, 
105 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005-Ohio-1508, 824 N.E.2d 990, ¶ 21, quoting Reed v. 
Baxter, 134 F.3d 351, 355–356 (6th Cir.1998); Perfection Corp. v. Travelers Cas. 
& Sur., 153 Ohio App.3d 28, 2003-Ohio-2750, 790 N.E.2d 817, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 28} The six e-mails are communications between a client—in this case, 
members of the administration of the attorney general’s office who asked for legal 
advice—with an attorney—in this case, members of the opinions section of the 
attorney general’s office.  They contain legal analysis and conclusions—that is, 
legal advice—from the attorneys in the opinions section to their clients in the 
administration.  They do not appear to have been shared with anyone outside the 
attorney general’s office; the privilege has thus not been waived.  The six e-mails 
were properly withheld from a public records release as attorney-client privileged 
materials. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 29} The documents sent from House Majority Counsel Lenzo to 
Assistant Attorney General McIver are not quite as obvious.  However, we have 
held,   
 
“[T]he privilege is not narrowly confined to the repetition of 
confidences that were supplied to the lawyer by the client. That 
cramped view of the attorney-client privilege is at odds with the 
underlying policy of encouraging open communication; it poses 
inordinate practical difficulties in making surgical separations so as 
not to risk revealing client confidences; and it denies that an 
attorney can have any role in fact-gathering incident to the 
rendition of legal advice and services.”  (Citations omitted.) 
 
(Emphasis deleted.)  State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Toledo–Lucas Cty. Port 
Auth., 121 Ohio St.3d 537, 2009-Ohio-1767, 905 N.E.2d 1221, ¶ 26, quoting 
Spectrum Sys. Internatl. Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 78 N.Y.2d 371, 379, 575 N.Y.S.2d 
809, 581 N.E.2d 1055 (1991).  The attorney-client privilege does not require that 
the communication contain purely legal advice, but “ ‘if a communication 
between a lawyer and client would facilitate the rendition of legal services or 
advice, the communication is privileged.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 27, quoting Dunn v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 927 F.2d 869, 875 (5th Cir.1991). 
{¶ 30} In particular, in Toledo Blade, we held that an attorney’s factual 
investigation, if incident to or related to any legal advice that the attorney would 
give on a particular issue, is covered by the privilege.  Id. at ¶ 28-31. 
{¶ 31} Here, the two documents Lanham asserts are improperly withheld 
are asserted by the attorney general’s office to have been gathered by Assistant 
Attorney General McIver as part of his investigation into the matter on which he 
was advising his client.  Our in camera inspection of the documents reveal that 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
they contain material pertinent to such an investigation and were transferred to 
Assistant Attorney General McIver during the time period that he would have 
been investigating the Bubp matter for the attorney general.  Therefore, we agree 
with the attorney general’s office that the documents are covered by attorney-
client privilege and were properly withheld. 
Statutory Damages and Attorney’s Fees 
{¶ 32} The attorney general’s office established the applicability of the 
attorney-client privilege and therefore did not fail to comply with R.C. 149.43.  
An award of statutory damages and attorney fees is therefore not appropriate.  See 
R.C. 149.43(C)(1). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 33} Because Lanham has failed to establish his entitlement to the 
requested extraordinary relief, we deny a writ of mandamus to compel the 
attorney general’s office to provide unredacted copies of the requested records.  
We deny Lanham’s request for statutory damages and attorney fees. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, SADLER, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, 
and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
LISA L. SADLER, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for 
O’DONNELL, J. 
__________________ 
 
The Law Firm of Curt C. Huffman and Curt C. Hartman, for relator. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Damian W. Sikora and Sarah 
Pierce, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondents. 
_______________________