Case Title: DORSETT v. MOORE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-98

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
DORSETT v. MOORE2003 WY 761 P.3d 1221Case Number: 02-98Decided: 01/17/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                
   

 

FRANK 
W. DORSETT,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

TIM 
MOORE,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Crook County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Mary 
S. Garman, Sundance, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
G. Davidson of Daly Law Associates, P.C., Gillette, 
Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

Hill, 
Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant Frank 
W. Dorsett (Dorsett) challenges the portion of a district court judgment that 
required him to reimburse a neighboring landowner, appellee Tim Moore (Moore), 
for one-half of the cost of rebuilding a partition fence.  Dorsett claims the district court erred 
in applying estoppel against him.  
We disagree and affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Dorsett presents 
one issue for our review:

 

Did 
the trial court err when it sustained the objection by the plaintiff that 
defendant was estopped by his conduct from complaining that the fence plaintiff 
had built between the defendant's and plaintiff's deeded land was not a 
partition fence pursuant to W.S. Section 11-28-106? 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      The parties own 
neighboring ranches in Crook County.  
Both ranches consist of deeded property as well as lands used pursuant to 
grazing permits issued by the United States Bureau of Land Management.  By early 1999, the fence between the 
parties' lands had deteriorated and would no longer hold livestock in a number 
of places.  On October 12, 1999, 
Moore mailed to Dorsett the first in a series of letters addressing 
fence-related problems.  Dorsett 
received the letter but did not respond.  
Another letter, dated January 14, 2000, detailed, among other things, 
problems caused by cattle straying onto Moore's lands.  Moore indicated that he was 
contemplating fence repairs and that he was "looking to share the costs equally" 
with Dorsett.  Dorsett did not 
respond to this letter.

 

[¶4]      The next letter 
was dated January 24, 2000.  In that 
letter, Moore detailed the repairs needed on the fence, indicated he intended to 
hire a fencing contractor, and stated that he expected Dorsett to pay one-half 
the cost.  Moore's letter also 
provided:

 

If 
you will not enter a formal agreement with me to pay for one-half of these 
repairs, I will give you the opportunity to arrange for your share of the labor 
on one-half of each project.    If you do not take the opportunity to do 
your share of these projects, which I have outlined, I will do them for you 
after July 1, 2000.

 

Although 
Dorsett received this letter, he did not respond.  The next letter from Moore was dated 
March 3 and suggested the parties hire a reputable fencing contractor to do the 
work.  Again, Dorsett received this 
letter but did not respond.

 

[¶5]      In August of 
2000, Moore contracted with a fencing company to rebuild the fence.  The fencing company began work on 
September 10, 2000, and completed the project on October 6.  The contractor rebuilt the fence where 
it had always been located.  On 
October 26, 2000, Moore mailed a letter to Dorsett requesting payment for 
one-half of the cost of the fencing project.  There was no response to this 
letter.

 

[¶6]      In March of 2001, 
following a demand letter that went unanswered, Moore, relying on Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 11-28-106,1 filed this suit to recover, among 
other things, one-half of the cost of the fencing project.  The case was tried to the bench.  Dorsett offered testimony that, sometime 
after the complaint was filed, he hired a local engineer to perform a 
survey.  The survey revealed that 
the fence was not on the property boundary line in places, although the record 
is somewhat confusing regarding where the fence deviates.  When Moore objected to this testimony 
regarding deviation from the boundary line, the district court sustained the 
objection on the ground that Dorsett was estopped from presenting such 
evidence.  The district court 
allowed Dorsett to make an offer of proof.  
The district court found generally in favor of Moore.  It ordered Dorsett to pay Moore 
$10,159.71 as one-half of the cost of rebuilding the fence.  The district court also ordered Dorsett 
to pay Moore $954.00 for grazing fees, but Dorsett does not challenge that 
portion of the judgment.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      Dorsett contends 
that the district court erred in applying equitable estoppel against him.  This Court has defined equitable 
estoppel in this fashion:

 

Equitable 
estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is 
absolutely precluded from asserting rights which might otherwise have existed as 
against another person who has in good faith relied upon such conduct and has 
been led thereby to change his position for the worse.

 

Snake 
River Brewing Company, Inc. v. Town of Jackson, 
2002 WY 11, ¶28, 39 P.3d 397, ¶28 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance Company v. Petsch, 261 F.2d 331, 335 (10th Cir. 1958)).  Dorsett asserts that equitable estoppel 
is inapplicable because Moore never changed his position in reliance on 
Dorsett's conduct.  Dorsett claims 
that Moore was going to repair the fence regardless of Dorsett's action or 
inaction.  Moore responds that, if 
the district court did apply estoppel, it merely estopped Dorsett from his 
attempt, at trial, to establish that the fence was not a partition fence because 
it is not located on the true boundary line.  Moore contends that Dorsett was properly 
estopped from arguing the fence should be located other than where it has always 
been located.

 

[¶8]      In its oral 
ruling, the district court stated:

 

I 
don't know whether estoppel is the proper word or not.  But certainly Mr. Moore saw a problem, 
tried to fix it, wrote letters to his neighbor.  Maybe they weren't the best letters you 
could write, but they were certainly efforts to reach out.  And what was the response?  Well, clearly the response was no 
response.

So 
he still has a problem.  And Mr. 
Dorsett says that there was a problem with cattle going back and forth.  But Mr. Dorsett does nothing to solve 
the problem other than rebuild a fence.

And 
when it's suggested that maybe it's time for something more than just a band-aid 
on what's been going on over the years because that's not working, Mr. Dorsett 
doesn't come in and say, "Wait a minute.  
I like this band-aid approach and I don't want to do it this way.  I don't think you've got good bids.  I don't think you are going to put the 
fence in the right place."  A lot of 
things he could have said, but he didn't say anything.  

And 
you do have the right to remain silent.  
But in civil matters, your silence can be used against you.  In criminal cases, your silence can't be 
used against you.

So 
your silence is being used against you.  
You've had the right to remain silent, but it's been used against you 
because you used the ostrich approach:  
I'll just ignore the problem.  
I'll ignore the forays of someone trying to solve that problem, and so 
you did nothing.

Well, 
Mr. Moore I think is entitled under the statute to do something about that and 
he did something.  And maybe he went 
a little bit more than, quote, just the bare minimum legal fence, but he didn't 
have any input from his neighbor even though he tried to get it.  So he did what sounds fairly reasonable, 
at least it sounds reasonable for the Court from the testimony I've 
heard.

 

[¶9]      Although the 
district court did not specify the equitable doctrine it applied, we do not 
agree with Dorsett that the district court applied the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel.  Instead, we conclude the 
district court's ruling is properly characterized as an application of the 
doctrine of laches, which is simply a form of equitable estoppel.  Thompson v. Board of County 
Commissioners of the County of Sublette, 2001 WY 108, ¶6, 34 P.3d 278, ¶6, 
(Wyo. 2001); Goshen Irrigation District v. Wyoming State Board of 
Control, 926 P.2d 943, 949 (Wyo. 1996); Squaw Mountain Cattle Company v. 
Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1297 (Wyo. 1991).  Laches is defined as such delay in 
enforcing one's rights that it works to the disadvantage of another.  Thompson, ¶17; Big Piney Oil 
& Gas Company v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 715 P.2d 557, 561 (Wyo. 1986).  A claim of 
laches is comprised of two elements--inexcusable delay and injury, prejudice, or 
disadvantage to the defendants or others.  
Thompson, ¶17.

 

[¶10]   The district court ruled that 
Dorsett's delay in enforcing his rights precluded him from asserting rights he 
would otherwise have been able to assert had he acted more promptly.  Dorsett's delay worked a disadvantage to 
Moore, who completed the fencing project with his own funds, then was required 
to resort to litigation to recoup one-half of the costs from Dorsett.  In addition, had Dorsett come forward 
earlier with his concerns, any current problems could likely have been 
avoided.  The district court 
properly applied the form of equitable estoppel known as 
laches.

 

[¶11]   The district court's ruling finds 
further support in the equitable maxim that "[e]quity aids the vigilant, not 
those who slumber on their rights."  
Application of Beaver Dam Ditch Company, 93 P.2d 934, 939, 54 Wyo. 
459, 482 (Wyo. 1939); Moncrief v. Sohio Petroleum Company, 775 P.2d 1021, 
1025 n.5 (Wyo. 1989).  Here, despite 
Moore's repeated attempts to resolve the fence problems in a neighborly fashion, 
Dorsett did not respond.  Having 
slumbered on his rights, Dorsett was in no position to complain about Moore's 
resolution of the problem or the placement of the fence where it had always 
been.2  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's ruling.  
Thompson, ¶7.  
("Whether laches or, by analogy, equitable estoppel is available as a 
defense is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the district 
court.")

 

[¶12]   We must also address Moore's 
requests that this appeal be summarily affirmed and/or that this Court certify 
no reasonable cause for this appeal.   
Moore argues that (1) the appeal should be summarily affirmed because 
appellant's brief violates various rules of appellate procedure; (2) the appeal 
should be summarily affirmed because the appellant has not presented a cogent 
argument; and (3) the Court should certify that there was no reasonable cause 
for appeal and award costs and attorney fees.  We decline all of Moore's 
invitations.

 

[¶13]   Although Dorsett's brief fails to 
comply with a number of requirements regarding format of appellant's brief found 
in W.R.A.P. 7.01, we do not, in our discretion, find that these deficiencies 
require summary affirmance.  
W.R.A.P. 1.03.  In addition, 
we find Dorsett's argument is supported by authority and cogent enough, although 
misguided.  Thus, we will not 
summarily affirm on that basis or certify no reasonable cause for appeal.  Normally, we will certify no reasonable 
cause for appeal "only in those rare circumstances where an appeal lacks cogent 
argument, where there is an absence of pertinent authority to support the claims 
of error, and/or when there is a failure to adequately cite to the record."  Baker v. Reed, 965 P.2d 1153, 
1154-55 (Wyo. 1998) (citing Amen, Inc. v. Barnard, 938 P.2d 855, 858 
(Wyo.1997)); Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 891 (Wyo. 2000).  This appeal does not meet those 
requirements.

 

[¶14]   In addition, sanctions under 
W.R.A.P. 10.05 are usually not available when the appeal challenges a 
discretionary ruling made by the district court.  Russell v. Russell, 948 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Wyo.1997); Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259, 1268 (Wyo. 
1998).  This Court has departed from 
this general rule in certain circumstances.  See, e.g., Barnes v. 
Barnes, 998 P.2d 942, 946 (Wyo. 2000) (only purpose served by appeal was 
"continued harassment of appellee and the waste of judicial resources"); 
Meyer v. Rodabaugh, 982 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Wyo. 1999) (appellant waived any 
claim of error); and Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 
1996) (appellant failed to provide a record to review).  However, none of those circumstances are 
presented in this case.  Therefore, 
because we find the argument to be cogent and supported by authority and because 
Dorsett challenged a discretionary ruling, we deny Moore's request that we 
certify no reasonable cause for appeal.

 

[¶15]   The district court's Order and 
Judgment is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 11-28-106 (LexisNexis 2001) provides:

 

The 
owner of any lawful fence which is or becomes a partition fence separating the 
owner's land from that belonging to some other person may require the person to 
pay for one-half (1/2) of what it would or does actually cost to construct the 
partition fence.  In case of 
refusal, the owner may maintain a civil action against the person refusing and 
is entitled to recover one-half (1/2) of what it would or did actually cost to 
construct that portion of the partition fence used by the person and costs of 
suit.  The joint users of a 
partition fence shall contribute to the cost of maintenance in proportion to 
their respective interests and if either refuses to pay his share of the cost of 
maintenance, the other may recover maintenance costs in the manner provided for 
recovering the cost of construction.

2Our 
ruling is limited to location of the fence for recovery of costs of repair under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-28-106.  We 
offer no opinion on whether the fence is a "boundary fence" or a "fence of 
convenience."  See Hillard v. 
Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Wyo.1995), and Kimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303, 306 (Wyo. 1999).