Case Title: SMITH v JOHNSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-407

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 97- 1 : THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA ALEX E. SMITH and TRUDY L. SMITH, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Respondents, ROBERT L. JOHNSON and ANITA A. JOHNSON, husband and wfe. Defendants and Appellants APPEAL FROM: District Courl of the Tenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Fergus, Honorable Wm. Nels Swandal, Judge Presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellants: Robert L. Johnson, Attorney at Law, Lewistown, Montana For Respondents: Michael Ridgcway, Attorney at Law, Hubble & Ridgeway, Stanford, Montana Submitted on Briefs: December 23, 1997 Decided: December 30, 1 9 9 7 Justice L t ' . W~lliam Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court. P~trsuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public document with the Clerk of the Supren~e Court and by a report of its result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Group. This is an appeal from the Tenth Judicial District Court's February 23, 1997 order dismissing Count 11 and its May 2, 1997 order striking the Appellants Robert L. and Anita A. Johnson's (Johnsons') amended answer, cross-claim, and demand for jury trial and denying their request to expunge certain portions of the court's "Explanatory Comment." Respondents Alex and Trudy Smith (Smiths) purchased real property on a contract for deed fi.oni the Johnsons. The Johnsons contracted to provide "guaranteed access" to the property. However, at the time of the transaction, there was no guaranteed access to the property. The only access onto the property was via a road crossing over property owned by a neighbor of the Smiths. The Johnsons took the position that they were only required to provide the access once the contract had been paid in full. To obtain the guaranteed access, the Smiths sued the Johnsons, requesting that the court allow them to prepay the contract and require the Johnsons to provide the guaranteed access (Count I). In Count 1 1 of the complaint, the Smiths sought to quiet title to a separate road which the Johnsons were using to access the Johnsons' residence and which crossed property owned by the Smiths. The parties filed cross-motions for sulnmary judgment. At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the Johnsons represented that they had the necessary easement which would provide the access that the Smiths were demanding. The Smiths reviewed the easement document and determined that it was satisfactory. Mr. Johnson then prepared a stipulation dismissing Count I. There was no request by either party for fees or costs at that time. Mr. Johnson, an attorney representing himself and his wife, and counsel for the Smiths signed the stipulation and, pursuant to this stipulation, the court dismissed Count I with prejudice. With regard to Count 11, the court denied the Johnsons' motion for summaiy judgment and ordered the parties to mediate. When the parties were unable to mediate Count 11, the Smiths offered the Johnsons an easement over the road in question. However, the Johnsons would not accept the easement unless the Smiths agreed to pay the Johnsons' costs and attorney fees. The Smiths refused to agree to pay the fees and costs. Instead they, on their own motion, dismissed Count I1 with prejudice. The Johnsons objected and requested fees and costs relating to both Counts I and 11. The District Court granted the Smiths' motion to dismiss Count 1 1 with prejudice and denied the Johnsons' claim for costs and fees with an explanatory comment which stated, inter alia: "With the settlement [on Count I], plaintiffs prevailed on the easement issue, and defendants prevailed on the prepayment issue." The Johnsons' various post-judgment motions to expunge this language were denied, and the Johnsons appealed to this Court. On appeal, the Johnsons appear to contend that they are entitled to attorney fees as prevailing partics under the provisios~s of the contract for deed. The stipulation of dismissal, however, does not provide that either party prevailed nor does it provide that either party is entstled to attorney fees. The partles are bound by that stipulahon and order of d~smtssal. The Distrlct Court's denial of the Johnsons' request for costs and attorney fees as to Count I is affirmed. Count I1 of the amended complaint is a quiet title claim. As such, it does not come within the purview of the contract provision allowing attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action to enforce the terms of the agreement. The District Court did not e n in denying attorney fees in the dismissal of Count 11. The Johnsons also ask this Court to remand to the District Coart with instructions to expunge that part of the "Explanatory Comment" in which the court, notlng that the Sm~ths prevailed on the easement issue and the Johnsons prevailed on the prepayment issue, concluded there was no prevailing party entitled to attorney fees. Johnson is apparently concerned that the court's explanatory comment might give nse to further litigation. The Johnsons have cited no authority whereby this Court can edit or dictate the terms of the District Court's rationale. We can affirm decisions of thc district court regardless of whether the court reached the decision for the right reasons. Clark v. Eagle Systems, lnc. (1906), 279 Mont. 279,927 P.2d 995. Since we have affirmed the District Court's denial of attorney fees, it matters not why the court denied the fees. At worst, the court's comments could be considered dicta. Furthermore, since the court dismissed both counts of the complaint with prejudice, the Johnsons' fears of futui-c litigation are unfounded. The Johnsons' request for a remand is denied. The Smiths have requested that, pursuant to Rule 32, M.R.App.P., we Impose reasonable attorney fees upon the Johnsons for filing an appeal without substantla1 or reasonable grounds. That request IS denied, and the appeal is affirmed with each party to pay their own costs and fees. We concur: Justice" December 30, 1997 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that the followrng certified order mas sent bq United States mail, prepaid. to the follo\\ing named: Robert L. Johnson Attorney at Law SUITE 507 MONTANA BUILDING LEWISTOWN M1 59457 Michael Ridgeway Attomeq at Law PO BOX 556 STANFORD MT 59479-0556 ED SMITH CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF MONTANA BY:. +& Deputy