Case Title: PASENELLI v. PASENELLI

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
PASENELLI v. PASENELLI2002 WY 15957 P.3d 324Case Number: 02-11Decided: 10/21/2002
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                
   

KATHRYN 
PASENELLI,

Appellant(Petitioner) ,

 
 

v.

 

ROBERT 
PASENELLI,

Appellee(Respondent) .

 
 

The Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
    

Representing 
Appellant:

Tammy A. Burt of Harris Law Firm, P.C., Evanston, 
Wyoming.

 
 
        

Representing 
Appellee:

Mike Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming.

 
 
  

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN*, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

*Chief Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
     

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
  

[¶1]      Appellant, 
Kathryn Pasenelli (Mother), filed a petition in the district court seeking to 
modify a divorce decree so as to increase the child support payments due her by 
Robert Pasenelli (Father).  The district court denied that motion and Mother contends the district 
court abused its discretion both in interpreting the parties' stipulation 
regarding child support, as well as in applying the statutory child support 
guidelines.

 
 
            
          
          

[¶2]      We will modify, but 
will otherwise affirm, the district court's order and remand for entry of a 
revised order consistent with this opinion.

 
   
              
     

[¶3]      Mother states 
these issues:

I.          
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in improperly denying Kathryn 
Pasenelli's petition to modify child support?

II.          
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the manner in which [it] 
applied the child support guidelines?

Father 
abbreviates that statement of the issues to this terse phrase:  "Did the trial court abuse its discretion [in] denying the 
modification?"

 
      
    

[¶4]      Proceedings in 
this matter commenced on December 5, 1997, when Father filed a complaint for 
divorce.  A stipulation settling the 
issue extant between the parties was filed in the district court on March 18, 
1998.  That stipulation revealed 
that the parties were the parents of four children, who were, at the time, ages 
ten, eight, three, and nine months.  
Mother was awarded primary physical custody of the children and has been 
their primary caretaker throughout their lives.  Father was required to pay Mother 
$950.00 per month in child support for the four children.  The 
stipulation contained this provision:

 
    

". 
. . It is agreed that the parties' income shall be reviewed forty-eight (48) 
months from the date of this agreement, however, no change in support shall be 
made unless the support amount will change by twenty percent (20%) or more per 
month from the amount existing in this agreement.  However, pursuant 
to sections 20-6-302 and 20-6-306, W.S.A (1997) as amended, either party may 
petition for a review and adjustment of the child support order under the 
procedure provided for therein."

 
     
             
            

The 
stipulation also provided that Father would pay Mother rehabilitative alimony in 
the amount of $400.00, for 48 months.1  The alimony was to be paid to Mother so 
that she could complete a four-year college degree, thus enabling her to better 
provide for herself and her children.  
The terms of the stipulation were "approved, 
confirmed and incorporated" into the divorce decree which was entered on March 
20, 1998.

 
          
          

[¶5]      On September 14, 
2000, Mother filed a petition to modify the decree of divorce, alleging that the 
incomes of both Mother and Father had changed to such an extent that it would 
change the child support due her by 20% or more per month.  On September 26, 2000, Father answered 
that petition contending that the parties' stipulation and the decree of divorce 
prohibited Mother from seeking a modification of child support until at least 
March 20, 2002.  The district court 
held a hearing at which both parties testified.  There was no disagreement about what 
Father's income was (approximately $45,000.00 per year) and what the presumptive 
support for the four children would be (approximately $1,350.00 per month).  The only disagreement was what income 
should be attributed to Mother.  
Mother did not work, as she was going to college and caring for the four 
children.  However, Mother agreed 
that a minimum wage income should be attributed to her for purposes of the child 
support computation.  That 
attribution of income to Mother did not change Father's presumptive support 
level of $1,350.00.  Father 
contended that Mother should be able to earn a lot more than minimum wage and 
that the district court should take into account the fact that Mother's parents 
contributed to paying many, if not most, of her household expenses.  Father also contended that the district 
court should consider that Father had remarried and that he and his new wife had 
a child together, and wife had two other children from previous 
relationships.  Complicating matters for Father, his new wife 
had returned to Mexico because of a problem with her visa and he was having to 
send her as much as $800.00 a month for support (though she too lived with 
parents and/or relatives).

 
  
               
                
       

[¶6]      Mother's appeal 
challenges the reasoning contained in the district court's decision letter, as 
well as the order denying her motion to modify child support.  First, the district court reasoned that 
the alimony was really more in the nature of child support and, therefore, 
Mother was already receiving the equivalent of $1,350.00 in child support. The 
district court also concluded that the stipulation recited above meant "that 
there was no modification of child support contemplated or intended by the 
parties during the forty-eight month period following the divorce unless for 
some reason there [weren't] four children to support and even then the amount of 
child support was specifically stated.  
There would be no review or change of the child support."  Continuing, the district court found 
that Father was "over employed, in that he works two jobs and 80 hours a week to 
generate his current income.  
[Mother] has chosen to go to school and currently is under employed.  She has finished three years of college 
and expects to earn a Bachelor of Science degree in the spring of 2002, 
approximately 48 months after the decree of divorce.  The Court finds that the imputed income 
of $750.00 per month based upon minimum wage as suggested by [Father], is 
unrealistically low considering that she has completed three years of 
college.  She is certainly capable of earning at least 
the amount earned by [Father] in his janitorial service job."

 
    
             

[¶7]      The district 
court also found grounds on which to deviate from the presumptive child support 
level established by the governing statute.  Those grounds were:  "That [Father] has found time outside of 
his eighty-hour work week to woo and wed a new wife and as a result has another 
wife and child to support;" and also "[t]he children are getting older, some in 
their teens, and it requires more to support them.  On the other hand, [Mother] is receiving 
the benefit of a home with expenses paid by her parents.  The foregoing factors would result in a 
reduction of the amount of child support set forth in the guidelines of 
$1,350.00 per month to $1,150.00.  
However[,] because 
of the agreement, no increase will be awarded."

 
         

[¶8]      The district 
court viewed its role, in deciding the issues presented to it, as being governed 
by rules of contract construction.  
We view agreements with respect to child support with favor; however, we 
have held that child support agreements are not contracts and contract law has 
no place in the consideration of child support agreements.  The primary consideration regarding 
child support agreements is the best interests of the child, and we will not 
turn to contract law to abrogate this controlling consideration.  Sharpe v. Sharpe, 902 P.2d 210, 
213-14 (Wyo. 1995).  Moreover, a 
custodial parent may not bargain away a child support obligation.  That obligation inures to the benefit of 
the child, not the custodial parent.  
Whitt v. State ex rel. Wright, 2001 WY 128, ¶ 19, 36 P.3d 617, ¶ 19 (Wyo. 2001); Hurlbut v. Scarbrough, 957 P.2d 839, 842 
(Wyo. 1998); Bellamy v. Bellamy, 949 P.2d 875, 877 (Wyo. 1997); also 
see Wright v. Wright, 5 P.3d 61, 62-64 (Wyo. 2000); and Garver v. 
Garver, 981 P.2d 471, 474 (Wyo. 
1999).

 
   

[¶9]      Our methodology in 
analyzing cases such as these has been well summarized by Justice 
Thomas:

 
  
            

We 
have had occasion to consider the statutory provisions in the context of 
petitions to modify child support in several instances.  Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345 (Wyo.1994); Smith v. Smith, 863 P.2d 624 (Wyo.1993); Pauling v. 
Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073 (Wyo.1992);  
Hasty v. Hasty, 828 P.2d 94 (Wyo.1992);  Roberts v. Roberts, 816 P.2d 1293 
(Wyo.1991);  and Morehead v. 
Morehead, 811 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1991).  
In Morehead, we articulated the proposition that the guidelines 
structure a rebuttable presumption that constitutes a goal upon which judicial 
discretion remains in place to deviate from the guidelines.  In Roberts, we noted the twenty 
percent deviation establishes a change of circumstances sufficient to justify a 
modification, but we held the court may deviate from the guidelines if it 
articulates a finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would 
be unjust or inappropriate.  In 
Hasty, we identified an abuse of discretion by the district court in 
concluding it had to apply the guidelines strictly and could not deviate from 
them by considering support obligations to later-born minor children.  In Pauling, we rejected an 
argument that the statute requires modification of child support upon a finding 
there would be a twenty percent change by application of the guidelines.  There, we rearticulated the concept of a 
rebuttable presumption that modification would be warranted when application of 
the guidelines demonstrated the twenty percent deviation.  We held the trial court's discretion to 
deviate with respect to modification of an existing support order refuted the 
argument that the legislature had interfered with the discretion of the 
court.  In Smith, we held 
there had been no abuse of discretion in ordering a change in child support 
which resulted in nearly a threefold increase.  We held there was no abuse of discretion 
even though the increase inhibited the father from qualifying for a home 
mortgage loan.  Most recently, in 
Cranston, our ruling stated the trial court had not abused its discretion 
in light of evidence demonstrating a lack of substantial contributions by the 
father beyond the monetary child support which would justify deviation from the 
guidelines.

            
These constructions of the statute have evolved in view of our standard 
proposition that modification of divorce decrees is appropriate only in limited 
circumstances.  

The 
party seeking modification must establish there has been a material and 
substantial change in circumstances which outweighs the interest of society in 
applying the doctrine of res judicata.  Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073 
(Wyo.1992);  Crawford v. 
Crawford, 828 P.2d 1192 (Wyo.1992);  
Dorr v. Newman, 785 P.2d 1172 (Wyo.1990);  Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156 
(Wyo.1981).  The trial court is 
vested with discretion to modify the provisions of the divorce decree and, 
absent a grave abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb its decision.  Parry v. Parry, 766 P.2d 1168 
(Wyo.1989);  Manners v. 
Manners, 706 P.2d 671 (Wyo.1985).  
The standard we apply in review of cases asserting abuse of discretion as 
an issue is whether the trial court reasonably could have concluded as it did. 
Rude v. State, 851 P.2d 20 (Wyo.1993), and Parry (both citing 
Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831 (Wyo.1980)).

Jones 
v. Jones, 
858 P.2d 289, 291 (Wyo.1993).

This 
policy manifests a balance between the doctrine of finality of judgments which 
is supported by the doctrine of res judicata and the statutes providing 
for modification of the provisions of a decree relating to child custody, 
support, and alimony.  The trial 
court is charged with resolving that tension, and it must do so in the exercise 
of discretion.  The discretion 
afforded the trial judge is encompassed in WYO.STAT. § 20-6-302(b).  The discretion is guided by a list of 
thirteen factors, but the final one, "[o]ther factors deemed relevant by the 
court * * *," is a classic acknowledgment of judicial 
discretion.

            
The child support guidelines identify a base from which the judge must 
invoke the exercise of discretion.  
In the absence of an agreement with respect to child support, the 
guidelines will have a more significant controlling impact.  When an agreement as to child support is 
involved, however, more weight may be given to the agreement.  Child support agreements entered into by 
the parties are favored by the courts.  
Beard v. Beard, 368 P.2d 953 
(Wyo.1962).

 
 

Smith 
v. Smith, 
895 P.2d 37, 40-41 (Wyo. 1995).

 
   

[¶10]   This matter was heard by the trial 
court and findings of fact and conclusions of law are of record:

 
       
           

The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict.  While the findings 
are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly 
admissible evidence in the record.  
Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing 
disputed evidence.  Findings of fact 
will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous.  A finding is clearly erroneous when, 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.

Hammond 
v. Hammond, 
14 P.3d 199, 203 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Fremont Homes, Inc., v. Elmer, 974 P.2d 952, 958 (Wyo.1999) (citations omitted)).  This court reviews the trial 

court's 
conclusions of law de novo.  
Hammond, 14 P.3d  at 201.

 
    

Jessen 
v. Jessen, 
2002 WY 33, ¶ 7, 41 P.3d 543, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 
2002).

 
    

[¶11]   Of course, a district court has 
broad discretion in determining the proper amount of a child support award, and 
we will not disturb the trial court's ruling unless there is a clear showing of 
an abuse of discretion.  
Sharpe, 902 P.2d  at 213.  
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously.  
Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).

 
   

[¶12]   To the extent we are called upon to 
construe the agreement between the parties, we would apply these 
principles:  Our primary focus in 
construing or interpreting a contract is to determine the parties' intent, and 
our initial inquiry centers on whether the language of the contract is clear and 
unambiguous.  If the language of the 
contract is clear and unambiguous, then we secure the parties' intent from the 
words of the agreement as they are expressed within the four corners of the 
contract.  Common sense and good 
faith are leading precepts of contract construction, and the interpretation and 
construction of contracts is a matter of law for the courts.  We also have recognized that the 
language of a contract is to be construed within the context in which it was 
written, and the court may look to the surrounding circumstances, the subject 
matter, and the purpose of the contract to ascertain the intent of the parties 
at the time the agreement was made.  
Williams Gas Processing--Wamsutter Company v. Union Pacific Resources 
Company, 2001 WY 57, ¶¶ 11-12, 25 P.3d 1064, ¶¶ 11-12 (Wyo. 2001).

 
    

[¶13]   Father contends, and the district 
court found, that it was the parties' intent that there was to be a "moratorium" 
on modification of child support for a period of 48 months.  Of course, under many circumstances, 
such an agreement would run afoul of our rule that a custodial parent may not 
waive child support.  However, in 
this case, we need not cross that bridge as we view the stipulation to be 
unambiguous.  Mother was to receive 
$950.00 in child support.  She was 
to receive $400.00 in alimony, for 48 months, so that she could pursue her 
education.  During that 48-month 
period, either parent could petition to modify child support if there was a 20% 
difference involved, as required by the governing statute.  However, the parties did agree that at 
the end of the 48-month time period, during which Mother received alimony, there 
definitely would be a review of child support if the Mother's increase in income 
(because by then she would have achieved a college degree and be working in a 
higher paying job) had created a 20% change in the presumptive support 
level.  Therefore, we hold that the 
agreement did not prohibit, or in any other way inhibit, Mother's statutory 
right to pursue a modification of child support under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-311 
(LexisNexis 2001).2

 

[¶14]   The district court determined that 
Father's presumptive support obligation would be $1,350.00, according to the 
agreement of the parties and as established by the evidence of record.  Furthermore, the district court 
determined that Mother, in effect, was receiving $1,350.00 in child support 
payments.  The district court 
applied the standards set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307 (LexisNexis 2001) 
and determined that he would deviate from presumptive support down to the level 
of $1,150.00 and thus, no additional support was appropriate.  We agree with the district court in 
part.  However, the record is clear 
beyond cavil that wife was only receiving $950.00 in child support.  A conclusion that the rehabilitative 
alimony awarded to Mother should be treated as child support is incontrovertibly 
wrong.  The district court found, 
and the parties agreed, that the presumptive support level, given Father's 
income, was $1,350.00, a change of well over 20% from $950.00.  In the exercise of its discretion, the 
district court determined that because Father had four new mouths to feed, 
because he often worked as much as 80 hours per week, and because Mother should 
be working and earning more than $750.00 per month, in addition to going to 
school full-time and caring for four small children, it would deviate3 from the child support guidelines and reduce 
Father's child support obligation to $1,150.00.

 
      
       

[¶15]   We cannot agree that the alimony 
payment can be transformed into child support when there is no evidence in the 
record to support such a conclusion, other than Father's self-serving, parol 
contradiction of what the parties' stipulation specifically provided.  We take note, as well, that to the 
extent Father believed the alimony was intended to be child support, he was, at 
best, very uncertain.  It seems 
clear that Father's "theory" was one in search of some supporting evidence, and 
the only such evidence was that Father thought maybe it might be so.  In addition, the district court's 
conclusion that Mother should have been working full-time and earning more than 
$750.00 a month, going to school full-time, and caring for four small children 
is misguided.4

 

[¶16]   Time is wasting, for Mother and the 
four children, as well as for Father and his new family.  This Court may affirm a judgment or 
order on any legal ground appearing in the record.  Jessen, ¶ 7; City of 
Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 202 (Wyo.1991).  We affirm the district court's order to 
the extent that it found a 20% change would result if the petition to modify 
child support were considered by the district court.5  We affirm the district court's finding 
that the presumptive support level here is $1,350.00.  We also affirm the district court's 
exercise of its discretion to deviate in a downward fashion to a support level 
of $1,150.00 per month.  We modify 
the district court's order to delete the finding that the alimony was child 
support.  We 
remand the matter to the district court to modify its order so as to direct 
Father to pay child support in the amount of $1,150.00 per month to Mother, 
retroactive to October of 2000, as well as to consider other matters that may 
now be ripe for consideration or reconsideration at this juncture.

 
     
               
             
               
     

FOOTNOTES

1The period during which 
alimony was due expired on February 5, 2002.

 
 
          

2An 
additional factor underlying the stipulation may have been that that the 
presumptive support schedule is subject to revision every four 
years:

§ 
20-2-306. Revision of presumptive child 
support.

On 
or before December 1, 1996, and at least once every four (4) years thereafter, 
the department of family services shall review the presumptive child support 
established under this article to ensure that application results in the 
determination of appropriate child support award amounts and shall submit a 
report to the joint labor, health and social services interim committee and 
shall recommend any proposed changes.

            
Although the district court took parol evidence from both parties in its 
effort to "clarify" the "48 month" provision in the stipulation, it is readily 
apparent from the transcript of the hearing that neither party fully understood 
or had given much thought to the provisions the lawyers put into that 
stipulation. 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-306 (LexisNexis 2001).

 
      

3§ 20-2-307. 
Presumptive child support to be followed; deviations by court.

            
(a) The presumptive child support established by W.S. 20-2-304 shall be 
rebuttably presumed to be the correct amount of child support to be awarded in 
any proceeding to establish or modify temporary or permanent child support 
amounts.  Every order or decree 
providing for the support of a child shall set forth the presumptive child 
support amount and shall state whether the order or decree departs from that 
amount.

            
(b) A court may deviate from the presumptive child support established by 
W.S. 20-2-304 upon a specific finding that the application of the presumptive 
child support would be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case.  In any case where the court has deviated 
from the presumptive child support, the reasons therefor shall be specifically 
set forth fully in the order or decree.  
In determining whether to deviate from the presumptive child support 
established by W.S. 20-2-304, the court shall consider the following 
factors:

            
(i) The age of the child;

            
(ii) The cost of necessary child day care;

            
(iii) Any special health care and educational needs of the 
child;

            
(iv) The responsibility of either parent for the support of other 
children, whether court ordered or otherwise;

            
(v) The value of services contributed by either 
parent;

            
(vi) Any expenses reasonably related to the mother's pregnancy and 
confinement for that child, if the parents were never married or if the parents 
were divorced prior to the birth of the child;

            
(vii) The cost of transportation of the child to and from 
visitation;

            
(viii) The ability of either or both parents to furnish health, dental 
and vision insurance through employment benefits;

            
(ix) The amount of time the child spends with each 
parent;

            
(x) Any other necessary expenses for the benefit of the 
child;

            
(xi) Whether either parent is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed.  In such case the 
child support shall be computed based upon the potential earning capacity 
(imputed income) of the unemployed or underemployed parent.  In making that determination the court 
shall consider:

            
(A) Prior employment experience and 
history;

                        
(B) Educational level and whether additional education would make the 
parent more self-sufficient or significantly increase the parent's 
income;

                        
(C) The presence of children of the marriage in the parent's home and its 
impact on the earnings of that parent;

                        
(D) Availability of employment for which the parent is 
qualified;

                        
(E) Prevailing wage rates in the local 
area;

                        
(F) Special skills or training; and

                        
(G) Whether the parent is realistically able to earn imputed 
income.

            
(xii) Whether or not either parent has violated any provision of the 
divorce decree, including visitation provisions, if deemed relevant by the 
court; and

            
(xiii) Other factors deemed relevant by the court.

            
(c) If the parties fail to agree that the presumptive child support 
amount under W.S. 20-2-304 is appropriate, the court may order the party seeking 
to deviate from the presumptive child support amount to pay reasonable attorney 
fees and court costs to the other party unless, after hearing the evidence and 
considering the factors contained in subsection (b) of this section, the court 
deviates from the presumptive support amount.

            
(d) Agreements regarding child support may be submitted to the 
court.  All such agreements shall be 
accompanied by a financial affidavit as required by W.S. 20-2-308.  The court shall use the presumed child 
support amounts to review the adequacy of child support agreements negotiated by 
the parties.  If the agreed amount 
departs from the presumed child support, the parties shall furnish statements of 
explanation which shall be included with the forms and shall be filed with the 
court.  The court shall review the 
agreement and inform the parties whether or not additional or corrected 
information is needed, or that the agreement is approved or disapproved.  No agreement which is less than the 
presumed child support amount shall be approved if means tested sources of 
income such as aid under the personal opportunities with employment 
responsibilities (POWER) program, health care benefits under Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act, food stamps, supplemental security income (SSI) or other 
similar benefits are being paid on behalf of any of the 
children.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307 (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis 
added).

§ 
20-2-303. Definitions.

            
(a) As used in this article:

            
(i) "Age of majority" means as defined in W.S. 14-1-101(a) or 
14-2-204(a), whichever is applicable;

            
(ii) "Income" means any form of payment or return in money or in kind to 
an individual, regardless of source.  
Income includes, but is not limited to wages, earnings, salary, 
commission, compensation as an independent contractor, temporary total 
disability, permanent partial disability and permanent total disability worker's 
compensation payments, unemployment compensation, disability, annuity and 
retirement benefits, and any other payments made by any payor, but shall not 
include any earnings derived from overtime work unless the court, after 
considering all overtime earnings derived in the preceding twenty-four (24) 
month period, determines the overtime earnings can reasonably be expected to 
continue on a consistent basis.  In 
determining income, all reasonable unreimbursed legitimate business expenses 
shall be deducted.  Means tested 
sources of income such as Pell grants, aid under the personal opportunities with 
employment responsibilities (POWER) program, food stamps and supplemental 
security income (SSI) shall not be considered as income.  Gross income also means potential 
income of parents who are voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed;

            
(iii) "Net income" means income as defined in paragraph (ii) of this 
subsection less personal income taxes, social security deductions, cost of 
dependent health care coverage for all dependent children, actual payments being 
made under preexisting support orders for current support of other children, 
other court-ordered support obligations currently being paid and mandatory 
pension deductions.  Payments 
towards child support arrearage shall not be deducted to arrive at net 
income;

            
(iv) "This article" means W.S. 20-2-301 through 
20-2-315.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-303 (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added).

 
        

4As 
set out by Father, the argument basically was that Mother, who had worked only 
twice in her life for brief periods of time, at minimum wage jobs, and who had 
been unemployed for the preceding six years, should get a full-time job earning 
more than the minimum wage because she had completed two years of college  and 
at the same time go to school full-time and care for the four children.  We take note that, as a general rule, the 
high-paying job comes after the college degree is completed and the worker is 
available to work full-time.

 
        
             
    

5§ 20-2-311. 
Adjustment of child support orders.

            
(a) Any party, or the department of family services in the case of child 
support orders being enforced by the department, may petition for a review and 
adjustment of any child support order that was entered more than six (6) months 
prior to the petition or which has not been adjusted within six (6) months from 
the date of filing of the petition for review and adjustment.  The petition shall allege that, in 
applying the presumptive child support established by this article, the support 
amount will change by twenty percent (20%) or more per month from the amount of 
the existing order.  The court 
shall require the parents to complete a verified financial statement on forms 
approved by the Wyoming supreme court, and shall apply the presumptive child 
support set out in this article in conducting the review and adjustment.  If, upon applying the presumptive 
child support to the circumstances of the parents or child at the time of the 
review, the court finds that the support amount would change by twenty percent 
(20%) or more per month from the amount of the existing order, the court shall 
consider there to be a change of circumstances sufficient to justify the 
modification of the support order.  
The provisions of this section do not preclude a party or assignee from 
bringing an action for modification of a support order, based upon a substantial 
change of circumstances, at any time.  
Every three (3) years, upon the request of either parent or, if there is 
a current assignment of support rights in effect, upon the request of the 
department, the court, with respect to a support order being enforced under this 
article and taking into account the best interests of the child involved, shall 
review and, if appropriate, adjust the order in accordance with the guidelines 
established pursuant to this article.  
Any adjustment under the three (3) year cycle shall be made without a 
requirement for a showing of a change in circumstances.  The commencement of aid under the 
personal opportunities with employment responsibilities (POWER) program, medical 
benefits under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, food stamps and 
supplemental security income (SSI) shall be considered a substantial change of 
circumstances requiring modification of child 
support.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-311 (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis 
added).