Case Title: Drew v. LeJay's Sportmen's Cafe, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90-38

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Drew v. LeJay's Sportmen's Cafe, Inc.1991 WY 25806 P.2d 301Case Number: 90-38Decided: 03/04/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Wauneta DREW, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Eddie Drew, Deceased,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

LeJAY'S SPORTSMEN'S CAFE, 
INC., a Wyoming Corporation,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Teton County, D. Terry Rogers, J.

Affirmed.

 

Cardine, J., dissented and filed 
opinion joined by Urbigkit, C.J.

 

Bernard Q. 
Phelan, Cheyenne, for appellant.

G.G. Greenlee 
and Kathleen B. Simon of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for 
appellee.

 

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      In this appeal we 
determine the nature and scope of the duty of care which a restaurant owner owes 
to a customer who chokes on food and is in imminent need of medical attention. 
Appellant Wauneta Drew filed a wrongful death action against LeJay's Sportsmen's 
Cafe, Inc. (LeJay's) of Jackson, Wyoming, alleging that her thirty-seven year 
old son, Eddie Drew, died on July 5, 1986, because of the restaurant's 
negligence in failing to render first aid and summon emergency help after 
restaurant employees knew or had reason to know that Eddie, a customer, was in 
imminent need of medical attention.

[¶2]      Following 
discovery and before trial, the restaurant moved for summary judgment contending 
that as a matter of law the restaurant owed its customer neither a duty to 
summon emergency medical help nor a duty to render first aid until emergency 
medical help arrived. The trial court granted the restaurant partial summary 
judgment, holding that the restaurant did not owe its customer a duty to render 
first aid until emergency medical help arrived. At trial, over Mrs. Drew's 
objection, the trial court instructed the jury that the restaurant owed its 
customer a duty to summon medical assistance within a reasonable time, but that 
it did not owe a duty to provide medical training to its food service personnel 
or medical rescue services to its customers. The jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the restaurant.

[¶3]      Mrs. Drew appeals 
both the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment and the judgment 
entered on the jury's verdict based on the trial court's jury instruction on the 
duty owed by the restaurant to its customer.

[¶4]      We affirm in all 
respects.

[¶5]      Mrs. Drew states 
the issues in this way:

1. Whether the court 
erred in granting Partial Summary Judgment wherein the court determined, as a 
matter of law, what specific conduct would be reasonable under the 
circumstances.

2. Whether the court 
erred in rejecting the general duty of care owed to invitees set forth in 
Section 314A of the Restatement of Torts, Second.

[¶6]      The restaurant 
restates the issues as follows:

I. What is the duty of a 
restaurant owner or his employee to a patron who becomes ill or incapacitated 
while an invitee at the restaurant?

II. Did the trial court 
properly define and instruct the jury on the defendant's legal 
duty?

[¶7]      The record from 
which we work consists only of the summary judgment materials since no trial 
transcript was submitted. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the 
restaurant submitted the transcript of the deposition of Ted Gonzales, the 
deceased's friend who was with him at the restaurant; the transcript of the 
deposition of Howard Hutchings, director of the environmental health program in 
the Division of Health and Medical Services, State of Wyoming; and a portion of 
the transcript of the deposition of Gretchen Zuber, executive director of the 
Wyoming Heart Association. In opposition to the restaurant's motion, Mrs. Drew 
submitted excerpted portions of the transcripts of the depositions of Leland 
Walter, the restaurant's owner; Claudette Schlauger, the restaurant's waitress 
that served the deceased; Kathy Collet, another of the restaurant's waitresses; 
Howard Hutchings and Gretchen Zuber.

[¶8]      Because the trial 
court's holding as to the nature and scope of the restaurant's duty of care was 
the same for the purposes of both the summary judgment motion and the jury 
instruction, our task is to determine whether that holding was correct as a 
matter of law. We shall summarize the facts framing the presentation of this 
legal question in the light most favorable to Mrs. Drew. The evidence describing 
the events of the incident in which Mrs. Drew's son choked on his food comes, in 
large measure, from the transcript of the deposition of Ted Gonzales, the son's 
companion during the incident. The parties do not dispute the essential 
facts.

FACTS

[¶9]      Eddie Drew and 
Ted Gonzales drove from Rock Springs to Jackson on July 3, 1986, to "party" over 
the Independence Day weekend. After frequenting the bars for several hours on 
the 4th of July and continuing into the early hours of the 5th, they arrived at 
LeJay's restaurant about 1:30 a.m., July 5, where they continued to drink while 
waiting for a table and after they were seated. Drew started choking after only 
a few bites of his meal.

[¶10]   Gonzales' testimony about his 
reaction to Drew's choking demonstrates that he was slow to realize the 
seriousness of the situation. When Drew could no longer talk and did not move, 
Gonzales finally sought help. Gonzales' testimony is confusing about the 
sequence of those he spoke to for help and what kind of help he asked for. 
Initially, he simply asked three or four times for a cloth to wipe Drew's mouth, 
but he testified that he also said several times, "This man is dying over here." 
After several efforts to get the attention of restaurant employees regarding 
Drew's choking, a threat was made to Gonzales that the police would be called 
and Gonzales said to call them. From the testimony Gonzales talked to 
waitresses, the cashier, and the cook. It is not clear how many times Gonzales 
asked these employees for help, or in what order, but he did ask more than 
once.

[¶11]   Some time during all of this 
activity, Gonzales had asked customers near Drew for help, and they placed Drew 
on the floor and gave him mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. When the police arrived, 
they continued giving mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to Drew. Although Gonzales 
told the police Drew was dying and to call an ambulance, this was not done right 
away. It is not clear from the record how long the wait was for an ambulance to 
be called or who made the call.

[¶12]   By 2:38 a.m. the ambulance was en 
route to the restaurant; it began its return trip to the hospital by 2:52 a.m., 
arriving at 2:55 a.m. Efforts during the ambulance ride and at the hospital 
failed to revive Drew. At the hospital a two-inch by two-inch chunk of meat was 
removed from Drew's trachea. That chunk had caused Drew to have 
cardiorespiratory arrest. Despite a flight for life to a Denver hospital and 
further medical attention there, Drew was pronounced dead at 5:51 
p.m.

DISCUSSION

[¶13]   At the jury trial, Mrs. Drew's 
counsel offered two jury instructions, "C" and "D," purporting to correctly 
state the law as found in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 314A (1965). The 
Restatement section provides:

§ 314A. Special Relations 
Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect

(1) A common carrier is 
under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action

(a) to protect them 
against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and

(b) to give them first 
aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or injured, and to 
care for them until they can be cared for by others.

(2) An innkeeper is under 
a similar duty to his guests.

(3) A possessor of land 
who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to members of the public 
who enter in response to his invitation.

(4) One who is required 
by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under 
circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for 
protection is under a similar duty to the other.

[¶14]   The trial court rejected Mrs. 
Drew's proposed jury instructions "C" and "D."

Instruction 
C

You are instructed that a 
possessor of land who holds it open to the public has a duty to the members of 
the public, who enter the premises in response to its invitation, to take 
reasonable action to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know 
that they are ill or injured and to care for them until they can be cared for by 
others.

Instruction 
D

To prevail in its cause 
of action against the defendant, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence the following:

1. That the defendant was 
a possessor of land and held it open to the public;

2. That Eddie Drew, 
deceased, entered defendant's land in response to defendant's 
invitation;

3. That Eddie Drew, 
deceased, became ill or injured while he was in the premises of the 
defendant;

4. That the defendant 
through its agents or employees was negligent by failing to take reasonable 
action to give first aid to Eddie Drew after it knew or had reason to know that 
he was ill or injured, and to care for him until he could be cared for by 
others.

5. That, as approximate 
cause of defendant's failure to take reasonable action to give first aid and 
care for Eddie Drew, he died.

6. That Wauneta Drew, 
Glenn Drew, Gary Drew, Dennis Drew and Marvena Houke have suffered damages in 
the form of lost pecuniary support and lost companionship, society and 
comfort.

In determining whether an 
issue has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you should consider 
all of the evidence bearing upon that issue regardless of who produced it. The 
existence of such proposition must be more probable than its 
nonexistence.

[¶15]   The trial court instructed the jury 
about the restaurant's duty of care to Drew in this 
language:

A restaurant whose 
employees are reasonably on notice that a customer is in distress and in need of 
emergency medical attention has a legal duty to come to the assistance of that 
customer. However, a restaurant does not have a duty to provide medical training 
to its food service personnel, or medical rescue services to its customers who 
become ill or injured through no act of omission of the restaurant or its 
employees. A restaurant in these circumstances meets its legal duty to a 
customer in distress when it summons medical assistance within a reasonable 
time.

[¶16]   In her appeal Mrs. Drew argues that 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A is the appropriate rule of law. She 
claims that a customer who becomes ill or injured inside a business 
establishment is virtually in the custodial care of those persons operating the 
business. She asserts that the business invitor-invitee relationship is a 
special relationship that gives rise to a duty on the invitor's part to render 
first aid to the invitee.

[¶17]   First, she notes that in Mostert 
v. CBL & Associates, et al., 741 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1987), this court 
considered § 314A when it determined the nature and scope of the duty of care 
owed by a theater owner to its patron. Against the factual backdrop of the 1985 
severe thunderstorm and ensuing 100-year flood which hit the City of Cheyenne, 
this court held that the theater owner as business-invitor owed its patron as 
business-invitee an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary care for the patron's 
safety which includes an obligation to advise the patron of off-premises danger 
that might reasonably be foreseeable. Mostert, 741 P.2d  at 
1096.

[¶18]   However, this court did not adopt § 
314A or any part of it in Mostert. The majority simply agreed with the 
principle that, on the unusual facts of that case, the business-invitor owed a 
duty to its patrons to protect them against unreasonable harm by warning of an 
external risk of which it possessed superior knowledge. The holding in 
Mostert reached only the duty addressed by § 314A(1)(a) and did not adopt 
the Restatement section to achieve its result. Mrs. Drew argues for adoption of 
the duty addressed by § 314(1)(b), concerning the provision of first aid to ill 
or injured patrons. Since Mostert does not speak to this issue or adopt 
or endorse Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A, it is of little 
help.

[¶19]   Additionally, Mrs. Drew presents 
cases from other jurisdictions which discuss the duty of protection and aid owed 
by a business-invitor to an invitee. We will compare those cases to Mrs. Drew's 
claims.

[¶20]   In Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs 
Moose Lodge No. 1483, 165 W. Va. 689, 271 S.E.2d 335 (1980), a 
bartender instructed friends of a customer who became ill and collapsed to take 
the customer to his car outside in the parking lot to "sleep it off." No one 
checked on the customer that night. He was found the following evening, having 
died of a heart attack within two to five hours after being placed in his car. 
Citing § 314A, the court held that the business-invitor owes an ordinary duty to 
render aid to its invitee after he knows or has reason to know that the invitee 
is ill or injured. Id., 271 S.E.2d  at 338.

[¶21]   We fail to see the significance of 
Hovermale for this case in connection with Mrs. Drew's position that the 
duty of care owed by the business-invitor encompasses more than promptly calling 
for qualified medical assistance and includes the actual administration of first 
aid until qualified medical assistance arrives. In Hovermale the invitee 
did not allege that the business-invitor owed a duty to administer first aid or 
direct medical care to the ill invitee. That case concerned only whether the 
duty to render aid was breached by the business-invitor's failure to recognize 
that Hovermale was ill and needed assistance.

[¶22]   Similarly, we find no value in 
Personal Representative Estate of Starling v. Fisherman's Pier, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1981), arising from the drowning of a drunk customer who had 
passed out, was left lying on a pier near the ocean, and had rolled off the pier 
and into the water. Echoing Hovermale, the court simply recognized the business 
proprietor's ordinary duty to render aid to a person exposed to a known 
condition of danger. There was no discussion relating to first aid and medical 
assistance.

[¶23]   Having considered Mrs. Drew's 
authorities, we now turn to examine the restaurant owner's position that its 
duty of care to its customer is fulfilled if, after having notice of the 
customer's illness or injury, the business proprietor summons medical assistance 
within a reasonable time. One case offered by LeJay's, Breaux v. Gino's, 
Inc., 153 Cal. App. 3d 379, 200 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1984), is particularly 
instructive. There, the California court focused on the nature and extent of 
restaurants' duty to come to the assistance of their customers who become ill or 
need medical attention. The California court observed that loss compensability 
is an "essentially political" question which the courts may decide if neither 
the constitution nor the legislature has spoken on the subject. The court 
recognized a duty existed, and held that the legislature had already decided the 
question of the extent of duty in that by statute restaurants meet their legal 
duty to a customer in distress when they summon medical assistance within a 
reasonable time. Id., 200 Cal. Rptr.  at 262.

[¶24]   We agree with the analysis offered 
by the California court. Neither the Wyoming Constitution nor our statutes speak 
to this duty, nor have we been directed to any applicable regulations. 
Consequently, this issue is appropriately decided in Wyoming by court decision. 
We find no basis in this jurisdiction for disagreeing with the extent of the 
duty as declared by the able trial judge, the summoning of medical assistance 
within a reasonable time. We are concerned that a specific requirement of first 
aid, rather than aid in the form of a timely call for professional medical 
assistance, would place undue burdens on food servers and other 
business-invitors.

[¶25]   In the first instance, the 
likelihood of an invitee requiring first aid in this sort of circumstance is 
remote. LeJay's argues persuasively that approximately 270 billion meals are 
consumed annually in the United States, while only 3,000 choking deaths occur 
each year. These deaths are not further subdivided into categories such as 
eating or objects placed in the mouth, but it is apparent in any case that the 
likelihood of a food server being faced with this circumstance is very remote. 
Beyond the basic numbers involved, the chance of first aid succeeding in this 
circumstance is even more remote. Eddie Drew's condition was caused by a 2-inch 
by 2-inch chunk of meat lodged in his trachea. It is open whether any maneuver 
short of a surgical procedure would have made a 
difference.

[¶26]   Offset against the slim chance of 
this sort of event occurring on its premises are the burdens placed on the food 
server such as LeJay's by being required to provide first aid. Courses in first 
aid techniques require both time and money. Annual recertification classes are 
required in CPR and the Heimlich maneuver. Because employee turnover in the food 
service industry is high, continual training efforts might be required to 
provide a staff capable of providing first aid. This duty would apply to every 
food server, regardless of size, across the state. The same duty that rests on 
large scale restaurants would apply to the 24-hour convenience store, grocery 
stores, movie theaters, and corner newsstand. It would apply as well to all 
business-invitors, whatever products or services they offer to the 
public.

[¶27]   We note one further practical 
limitation. Ms. Zuber, of the Wyoming Heart Association, testified that lay 
persons receiving CPR training are advised that they may exercise their own 
discretion in choosing to administer CPR in any given situation. Clearly a 
business-invitor's employees remain lay persons and cannot be compelled to 
perform first aid against their better judgment. It would not be appropriate to 
either remove the employee's discretion or hold the employer liable if it is 
exercised. The only persons expected to perform rescue techniques regardless of 
circumstances are the professional medical responders called for just that 
purpose. Whether that call is made within a reasonable time is the appropriate 
factual issue for jury consideration.

[¶28]   Our prior decisions have held the 
duty to an invitee is that of reasonable care under all the circumstances. 
Ruhs v. Pacific Power & Light, 671 F.2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 1982). 
Nothing has been said previously in Wyoming about the extent of that duty in 
these circumstances. While we agree with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A to 
the extent that we acknowledge reasonable care must be exercised in this 
circumstance, we are satisfied that duty is met when medical assistance is 
summoned within a reasonable time, and decline to adopt § 
314A.

[¶29]   Affirmed.

CARDINE, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which URBIGKIT, C.J., joined.

CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, joins.

[¶30]   My problem is with the following 
instruction:

"A restaurant whose 
employees are reasonably on notice that a customer is in distress and in need of 
emergency medical attention has a legal duty to come to the assistance of that 
customer. However, a restaurant does not have a duty to provide medical training 
to its food service personnel, or medical rescue services to its customers who 
become ill or injured through no act or omission of the restaurant or its 
employees. A restaurant in these circumstances meets its legal duty to a 
customer in distress when it summons medical assistance within a reasonable 
time."

This 
instruction, which purports to set forth a restaurant owner's duty, is a poor 
statement of law because of the inclusion of the last sentence, "A restaurant in 
these circumstances meets its legal duty to a customer in distress when 
it summons medical assistance within a reasonable time." (emphasis added) The 
sentence is argumentative, confusing, and is tantamount to a directed verdict 
for defendant. It is never proper for an instruction on the law to inform 
a jury that a party has or has not "met" its duty. See Bush v. Jackson, 
191 Colo. 249, 552 P.2d 509 (1976) and Durrant v. Pelton, 16 Utah 2d 7, 
394 P.2d 879 (1964); cf. Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032 (Wyo. 
1983). The court's comment conveys to the jury the idea that the court has 
concluded that defendant met (satisfied) its legal duty. Jurors properly give 
considerable weight to comments and instructions from the judge - who is viewed 
as impartial and unbiased. This type of statement in an instruction on the law 
should, thus, be assiduously avoided.

[¶31]   If the above statement must be 
included in the instruction, then to provide balance and be fair to plaintiff 
the court should also add:

"On the other hand, if 
the restaurant employees failed reasonably to notice that the customer was in 
distress or to come to his assistance or to summon medical assistance within a 
reasonable time, then the restaurant has failed to meet the duty imposed upon it 
by law and your verdict should be for the plaintiff."

Neither of these 
are statements of law. Both are argument and should not be part of an 
instruction. It is enough to instruct the jury on the law - describe the duty 
imposed and stop without suggesting to the jury that either party has or has not 
"[met] its legal duty" in the case before the jury.

[¶32]   I am troubled also by the statement 
that trained restaurant personnel may choose whether to administer CPR or not in 
any given situation and that, as the court states in its opinion, a 
"business-invitor's employees remain lay persons and cannot be compelled to 
perform first aid against their better judgment." I am not sure what is meant by 
this statement, but assume that negligence in the exercise of better judgment 
will result in restaurant liability. If the assumption is correct, I am in 
agreement with the sentence in the opinion.

[¶33]   A lay person, trained in first aid 
- CPR - traveling down the highway who comes upon an accident has no legal duty 
to stop and help injured persons even though he may be able to help. 
Restatement, Second, Torts § 314, comment c (1965). He can travel on, leaving 
the injured to bleed and die. At most, there may be a moral obligation to stop 
and give assistance. On the other hand, an innkeeper who invites guests to his 
place of business which he operates for a profit may not refuse to give 
assistance to his patrons as is within his ability to provide. Restatement, 
Second, Torts § 314A comment f and see illustrations 1 and 5. Thus, if 
the innkeeper has an employee trained in CPR, there is a duty "to come to the 
assistance of that customer" as stated in the above instruction. Said another 
way, the business proprietor is not a stranger who can stand idly by, refuse to 
provide assistance that is available, and let his customer die. Personal 
Representative of Starling's Estate v. Fisherman's Pier, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Fla.App. 1981) and Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge No. 
1483, 165 W. Va. 689, 271 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1980). So too if a major resort 
hotel or casino carries a doctor on its staff, it may not refuse reasonable 
medical assistance to patrons in distress. Cf. Stahlin v. Hilton Hotels 
Corp., 484 F.2d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1973). In short, I would hold that a 
business proprietor must exercise reasonable care in serving its patrons and 
when in the exercise of that reasonable care the proprietor knows or reasonably 
ought to know that a customer is in distress and in need of assistance, the 
proprietor must come to the assistance of the customer and provide such 
assistance, aid and help as is within his present ability to provide.