Case Title: Kiago-Wilson v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12766

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12766 
 
HELLEN KIAGO-WILSON  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
November 12, 2019. 
 
 
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior 
courts.  Practice, Criminal, Sentence. 
 
 
 
Hellen Kiago-Wilson appeals from a judgment of the county 
court denying her petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.  
After a jury trial in the Superior Court, she was convicted of 
making false Medicaid claims and of larceny by false pretenses 
and was sentenced to a term of incarceration.  Before 
sentencing, Kiago-Wilson, stating that she was the primary 
caretaker of a dependent child, filed a motion requesting that 
the judge consider the provisions of G. L. c. 279, § 6B.1  In her 
petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, she argued that the judge 
violated § 6B by sentencing her to a term of incarceration 
without making the necessary findings, and she requested that 
                     
 
1 General Laws c. 279, § 6B, provides in relevant part: 
 
"Unless a sentence of incarceration is required by law, the 
court may, upon conviction, consider the defendant's status 
as a primary caretaker of a dependent child before imposing 
a sentence.  A defendant may request such consideration, by 
motion supported by an affidavit, not more than [ten] days 
after the entry of judgment.  Upon receipt of such a motion 
supported by an affidavit, the court shall make written 
findings concerning the defendant's status as a primary 
caretaker of a dependent child and alternatives to 
incarceration.  If such a motion has been filed, the court 
shall not impose a sentence of incarceration without first 
making such written findings." 
2 
 
she be released immediately.  A single justice of this court 
denied relief on the ground that Kiago-Wilson had an adequate 
alternative remedy.  We affirm. 
 
 
Kiago-Wilson has filed a memorandum and appendix pursuant 
to S.J.C. Rule 2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001), which 
requires a party challenging an interlocutory ruling of the 
trial court to "set forth the reasons why review of the trial 
court decision cannot adequately be obtained on appeal from any 
final adverse judgment in the trial court or by other available 
means."  S.J.C. Rule 2:21 (2).  That rule does not apply, as 
Kiago-Wilson is not challenging an interlocutory ruling.  
Rather, she is challenging her sentence, which is part of the 
final judgment of the trial court.  Nonetheless, it is clear on 
the record that she has a remedy in the ordinary appellate 
process, as she can raise her claims under G. L. c. 279, § 6B, 
on direct appeal from her convictions.  Moreover, although it 
appears that Kiago-Wilson unsuccessfully moved for a stay of her 
sentence in the Superior Court, it does not appear on the record 
that she has sought a stay of execution of sentence (or any 
other type of relief) from a single justice of the Appeals 
Court, the court in which her direct appeal will be entered.  
See Mass. R. A. P. 6 (b), as appearing in 454 Mass. 1601 (2009); 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 31 (a), as appearing in 454 Mass. 1501 (2009).  
Where she had these ordinary means to challenge her sentence 
and, if warranted, to be released pending appeal, the single 
justice did not err or abuse her discretion by denying 
extraordinary relief. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the papers filed, accompanied by 
a memorandum of law. 
 
 
S. James Boumil, Jr., for the petitioner.