Case Title: Randolph v. Hays

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5841

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Randolph v. Hays1983 WY 68665 P.2d 500Case Number: 5841Case Number: 5841Decided: 06/16/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
Archie Laverne RANDOLPH, Jr., Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Michael HAYS; Gilpatrick Construction Company, Inc., aWyoming corporation; and City of Riverton, Appellees 
(Defendants), 

State of Wyoming, and John Does, 
One through Five, (Defendants). No. 5841

Appeal from District 
Court, FremontCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

James R. 
McCarty, Casper, 
signed the brief on behalf of 
appellant.

Glenn Parker, of 
Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, signed the brief on behalf of appellee Michael 
Hays.

Cameron S. 
Walker, of Schwartz, Bon, McCrary & Walker, Casper, signed the brief on behalf of appellee Gilpatrick Const. 
Co., Inc.

James W. Owens, 
of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, signed the 
brief on behalf of appelleeCity of 
Riverton.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The district court 
dismissed this case for inaction pursuant to Rule 14 of the Uniform Rules for 
the District Courts of the State of Wyoming.1 Appellant-plaintiff appeals from 
the automatic denial of his motion to reinstate the case. The automatic denial 
was pursuant to Rule 2 of the Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State 
of Wyoming.2 Appellant words the only issue on 
appeal as follows:

"Whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying appellant's Motion to Reinstate this action 
after it had been dismissed for lack of substantial and bona fide action toward 
disposition for more than six months even though discovery was in progress 
during the six month period."

[¶2.]     We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3.]     The record before the 
district court reflected that appellant's complaint was filed November 19, 1980, 
alleging damages as a result of an automobile accident which occurred on 
November 21, 1976, and which was alleged to have been occasioned by negligence 
of defendants-appellees. Three of the appellees filed answers. DefendantState of Wyoming moved to dismiss the complaint as to 
it, and such was done pursuant to stipulation on January 19, 1981. Appellant 
conducted discovery in January through March of 1981. AppelleeCity of Riverton filed a motion for 
summary judgment. It was heard on August 19, 1981, and denied on August 31, 
1981. The next action reflected in the record before the district court was the 
entrance of an appearance on March 1, 1982, of co-counsel for appellant and 
notice to appellees of the taking of three depositions on March 19, 1982. 
Appellee Gilpatrick Construction Company, Inc. also gave notice that it would 
take appellant's deposition on March 19, 1982.

[¶4.]     On this state of the 
formal record, the district court judge3 signed the order of dismissal for 
lack of prosecution over a period of six months. The order was signed on 
September 16, 1982 and filed September 20, 1982.

[¶5.]     On September 24, 1982, 
appellant moved to have the action reinstated. The motion was supported by an 
affidavit which recited the taking of depositions4 within the six months preceding the 
dismissal of the action. Appellant took three depositions on March 19, 1982. Two 
of them were completed on April 14, 1982, with the deponents waiving review and 
signature. The other was signed by the deponent on May 3, 1982. Appellee 
Gilpatrick Construction Company, Inc. took a deposition on March 19, 1982. 
Appellee Hays served interrogatories and request for production of documents in 
April of 1982. Responses were mailed May 13, 1982. In the affidavit, appellant's 
counsel indicated that he was prepared for a pretrial 
conference.

[¶6.]     On November 10, 1982, 
appellant's counsel directed a letter to the judge in which he inquired 
concerning the setting of his motion to reinstate, calling attention to the fact 
that the sixty-day limit for setting of the motion under Rule 2 of the Uniform 
Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming (see n. 2) was 
approaching. Nonetheless, the sixty-day period passed, and the motion was deemed 
denied. The appeal is from this denial.

[¶7.]     The notice of appeal 
was not timely (within fifteen days) as to the order dismissing the action for 
lack of prosecution, but it was timely as to the denial of the motion to 
reinstate. The motion to reinstate is treated as a motion seeking relief from a 
final judgment, order or proceeding made pursuant to Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P.5 Randolph v. Hays, et al., Wyoming Supreme Court, 
No. 5841, January 11, 1983, re Order Denying Motion to Dismiss. See Turnbough v. Campbell County Memorial Hospital, Wyo., 
499 P.2d 595 (1972). Several federal courts have treated motions to reinstate 
cases dismissed for lack of prosecution as motions made pursuant to Rule 60(b), 
F.R.C.P., which is similar to Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P. Silas v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Company, Inc., 586 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1978); Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522 
(9th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Inter-American Shipping Corporation, 455 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1972); Vindigni v. Meyer, 441 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 
1971); West v. Gilbert, 361 F.2d 314, 
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 919, 87 S. Ct. 229, 17 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1966); 
and Daly v. Stratton, 304 F.2d 666 
(7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 934, 83 S. Ct. 306, 9 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1962), 
reh. denied 371 U.S. 965, 83 S. Ct. 540, 9 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1963). The availability 
of a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b), F.R.C.P., to correct an inadvised 
dismissal for lack of prosecution was recognized, although not used, in Link v. Wabash Railroad Company, 370 U.S. 626, 632, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1390, 8 L. Ed. 2d 734 (1962). Accordingly, only the 
question of the propriety of the automatic denial of appellant's Rule 60(b) 
motion is before us.

[¶8.]     The grant of relief 
under Rule 60(b) is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and our 
determination is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing the automatic denial of the motion to reinstate. Herring v. Welltech, Inc., Wyo., 660 P.2d 361, 367 (1983); Gifford v. Casper 
Neon Sign Co., Inc., Wyo., 639 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1982); McBride v. McBride, Wyo., 598 P.2d 814, 
816 (1979). However, in the context of this case, the denial of a Rule 60(b) 
motion:

"* * * raises the same 
questions and requires virtually the same analysis as would an appeal from an 
order of dismissal for failure to prosecute or for disobedience of a court 
order. * * *" Silas v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Company, Inc., supra, 586 F.2d  at 386.

Cf. Westring v. Cheyenne National Bank, 
Wyo., 393 P.2d 119, 122 (1964). 

[¶9.]     Rule 14 of the Uniform 
Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming (see n. 1) and Rule 
41(b)(2), W.R.C.P.,6 authorize the district courts to 
dismiss an action for lack of prosecution. Beyond that, a court has inherent 
power to dismiss an action upon its own motion for lack of prosecution. Link v. Wabash Railroad Company, supra; 
Johnson v. Board of Commissioners of 
Laramie County, Wyo., 588 P.2d 237, 238 (1978); and Moshannon Nat. Bank v. Iron Mountain Ranch 
Co., 45 Wyo. 265, 18 P.2d 623, 629 (1933). While no precise rule may be laid 
down as to what circumstances justify a dismissal for lack of prosecution, the 
circumstances surrounding each case must be examined, keeping in mind the 
conflict between the need for the court to manage its docket for the purpose of 
preventing undue delay on the one hand, and the policy favoring disposition of 
cases on the merits on the other hand. Gaudina v. Haberman, Wyo., 644 P.2d 159, 
169 (1982); Ace Novelty Co., Inc. v. 
Gooding Amusement Co., Inc., 664 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1981); Citizens Utilities Company v. American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company, 595 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied 444 U.S. 931, 100 S. Ct. 273, 62 L. Ed. 2d 188 (1979); Davis v. Operation 
Amigo, Inc., 378 F.2d 101, 103 (10th Cir. 1967).7

[¶10.]  In this case, appellant was undertaking 
discovery and responding to appellees' discovery efforts during the six months 
immediately preceding the order of dismissal for lack of prosecution. Three 
depositions were taken within those six months. They were transcribed and one of 
them was approved after corrections. The record also reflects that two of the appellees undertook discovery during 
that six-month period.

[¶11.]  Additionally, it is noted that there are 
potentially two time periods during the course of this case at which, according 
to that reflected in the record, the six-month interval could be pertinent: One, 
on August 31, 1981, a motion for summary judgment was denied and the next action 
was on March 1, 1982, when entry of appearance was made and when notice was 
given for the taking of three depositions - the elapsed period was one day short 
of six months during which no action "has been taken"8; and, two, on March 19, 1982, 
depositions were scheduled to be taken and the next action was on September 16, 
1982, when the order of dismissal for lack of prosecution was signed - the 
elapsed period was four days short of six months during which no action "has 
been taken."

[¶12.]  Because of the questionable mathematical 
basis for the dismissal of the case for non-prosecution; because of the actual 
activity within the six-month period preceding the dismissal; because appellant 
was at the pretrial stage in his preparation; because appellant reminded the 
judge of the approaching sixty-day limit under which his motion to reinstate 
would be deemed denied; and because there was no showing that appellees had been 
prejudiced, the allowance by the court of the automatic denial of appellant's 
motion to reinstate his action exceeded the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances and effected an unreasonable conclusion. This is an abuse of 
discretion. 

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *" Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980).

[¶13.]  Appellant's action is reinstated and the 
case is remanded for regular proceedings resulting 
therefrom.

[¶14.]  Reversed and 
remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 14 
provides:

"Cases on the docket in 
which no substantial and bona fide action towards disposition has been taken for 
six (6) months are subject to dismissal for lack of 
prosecution."

2 Rule 2 
provides:

"Each motion filed, 
except motions for summary judgment, shall set out the specific point or points 
upon which the motion is brought, and may be accompanied by a concise brief. No 
answer brief is required. There will be no specific motion day. When required, 
hearing of motions will be set on request of counsel or by motion assignment 
issued by the court. Motions may be submitted on brief if desired. All motions 
not called up or set for hearing within 60 days after filing will automatically 
be denied, with 10 days then allowed for pleading."

3 The order was made by a 
judge who had recently taken the case from the judge who had previously handled 
it.

4 A uniform rule of court 
dispensed with the filing of depositions and other discovery material unless 
used at trial.

5 Rule 60(b) provides in 
pertinent part:

"(b) * * * On motion, and 
upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party * * * from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; * * * or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. * * * A motion under this 
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. * * *"

6 Rule 41(b)(2) 
provides:

"Upon its own motion the 
court may dismiss without prejudice any action not prosecuted or brought to 
trial with due diligence."

7 A practice by the trial 
court of giving notice that dismissal for lack of prosecution will occur unless 
good cause is shown why such should not be done would provide means by which the 
attorneys can inform the court of the fact that action not reflected in the 
record, such as discovery, is being taken.

8 Rule 6(a), W.R.C.P., 
provides in pertinent part:

"In computing any period 
of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local rules of any district 
court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, 
event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall 
not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, 
unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period 
runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal 
holiday. * * *"

February 28, 
1982, was a Sunday.