Case Title: Davis v. Dillmeier Enter., Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-11-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cynthia DAVIS v. DILLMEIER ENTERPRISES, INC.

97-360                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 13, 1997


1.   Action -- work-related injury -- filing in circuit court -- availability 
     of statutory remedy considered. -- In determining whether an action
     involving a work-related injury may be filed in circuit court,
     an important consideration is whether the Workers'
     Compensation Act provides a remedy to the plaintiff.

2.   Statutes -- construction -- plain language of Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-
     505(a)(1) concerns benefits in addition to workers' compensation benefits.
     -- The supreme court construed the plain language of Ark. Code
     Ann.  11-9-505(a)(1) (Repl. 1996) in the Workers'
     Compensation Act as providing benefits in addition to workers'
     compensation benefits already being received by the claimant;
     such construction, the court noted, was evident because the
     statute provided to the injured employee the difference
     between the compensation benefits being received and the
     average weekly wages lost during the period of refusal; the
     combination of compensation benefits and additional benefits
     were designed to pay the employee a total amount equal to his
     or her average salary, thus making the employee whole.

3.   Action -- work-related injury -- no remedy available under Ark. Code Ann.
      11-9-505. -- The supreme court concluded that appellant would
     not have qualified for additional benefits under Ark. Code
     Ann.  11-9-505 because she was no longer receiving any
     compensation benefits for her injury; moreover, the facts of
     this case did not describe a situation where the employer had
     refused to return the injured employee to work; it was only
     upon appellant's reporting to work after having been released
     from treatment, but having sustained a permanent impairment to
     both upper extremities, that appellee terminated her;
     appellant's termination could not be viewed as a refusal by
     appellee to return her to work; rather, it could be viewed
     only as a termination; accordingly, the benefits contemplated
     by section 11-9-505 did not offer appellant any remedy for her
     injuries.           

4.   Action -- work-related injury -- no remedy available under Ark. Code Ann.
      11-9-107. -- The supreme court held that Ark. Code Ann.  11-
     9-107 (Repl. 1996), which provides for administrative and
     criminal penalties against an employer who engages in
     discrimination, did not provide a remedy to appellant where
     appellant did not allege, nor did appellee contend, that she
     was fired in retaliation for having sought workers'
     compensation benefits; to the contrary, the information
     provided in the complaint demonstrated that appellant's
     injuries were accepted as compensable by appellee and that
     benefits were completed by joint petition to the Workers'
     Compensation Commission. 
5.   Workers' compensation -- no remedy under Act for employee terminated on
     basis of disability. -- The supreme court held that there is no
     remedy under the Workers' Compensation Act for an employee who
     is terminated from his or her job on the basis of a
     disability.  

6.   Action -- discrimination -- termination on basis of disability -- appellant
     not precluded from bringing claim under Civil Rights Act. -- The
     exclusive-remedy provision of the Act did not preclude
     appellant from bringing an action under the Arkansas Civil
     Rights Act of 1993 based upon appellee's alleged
     discrimination in terminating her on the bases of her
     permanent restrictions and impairments; it matters not how the
     disability came about; rather, the focus should be upon the
     subsequent deliberate action by the employer in terminating
     the employee based upon a disability. 
 
7.   Action -- rights and remedies provided by Workers' Compensation Act and
     Civil Rights Act serve different purposes. -- The rights and remedies
     provided by the Workers' Compensation Act and the Arkansas
     Civil Rights Act of 1993 are considerably different and serve
     to fulfill different purposes; where appellant alleged two
     separate injuries, one being a work-related physical injury
     for which she has received workers' compensation benefits and
     the other being a subsequent nonphysical injury arising from
     appellee's action in terminating her based upon her physical
     disability, the first injury was exclusively cognizable under
     the Workers' Compensation Act, while the subsequent injury was
     of the type envisioned by the Civil Rights Act.

8.   Action -- dismissal reversed -- case remanded -- appellant permitted to
     proceed with claim under Civil Rights Act. -- The supreme court
     reversed the decision of the trial court dismissing with
     prejudice appellant's complaint and remanded the case for
     further proceedings, holding that appellant could proceed with
     her claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.


     Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court, Fort Smith District; John
G. Holland, Judge; reversed and remanded.
     Sexton & Fields, P.L.L.C., by: William J. Kropp III, for
appellant.
     Gary W. Udouj, for appellee.
     
     Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
     Appellant Cynthia Davis appeals the judgment of the Sebastian
County Circuit Court dismissing with prejudice her complaint
against Appellee Dillmeier Enterprises, Inc., for discrimination in
violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, Ark. Code Ann.
 16-123-101 to -108 (Supp. 1995).  The trial court dismissed
Appellant's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
holding that Appellant's claim was covered by the Workers'
Compensation Act, Ark. Code Ann.  11-9-101 to -1001 (Repl. 1996). 
This case presents an issue of first impression requiring statutory
interpretation; hence, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup.
Ct. R. 1-2(a)(17)(i) & (vi).  The sole issue raised by Appellant is
whether an employee who is discriminated against based upon a
disability resulting from a work-related injury may sue her
employer under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.  We find that such
suit is permissible, and we reverse.
     The relevant facts, which are not in dispute, are set out in
the complaint as follows.  Appellant was employed by Appellee at
its facility in Fort Smith beginning in September 1993.  In
October 1993 and also in April 1994, Appellant sustained bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome, which was caused by the rapid and
repetitive motion in Appellant's work-related environment. 
Appellant's injuries were accepted as compensable, and she
completed her rights under the workers' compensation laws by joint
petition filed with the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission
on November 28, 1995.  After her injuries were accepted as
compensable, Appellant was placed under active treatment from two
physicians and underwent epineurolysis and decompression for her
injuries in both March and May 1995.  During the time she was under
active treatment, Appellant continued working for Appellee and was
able to perform the essential functions of her job, with or without
reasonable accommodations, under limited duties or restrictions. 
Specifically, in a status report dated June 21, 1995, Appellant was
instructed by her primary physician to wear a splint, sling, or
brace and was restricted from performing any repetitive motion and
any gripping, pulling, pushing, or lifting of items weighing in
excess of zero pounds for a period of four weeks.  Similarly,
Appellant was advised by Dr. Kenneth Rosenzweig on that same date
as follows:
     I would like for her to continue her rehab[ilitation]
     efforts and try some light duty job if available -- that
     should be with her padded gloves on, no excessive
     pressure in the palm of her hand, and avoiding any heavy
     gripping, pushing, pulling and/or repetition for at least
     another month and at that time, things should be well
     enough to go back to her regular job.  This should be on
     a trial basis and if she is unable to tolerate it despite
     surgical repair, then she may be forced to do something
     less intensive. 
     Two months later, on August 22, 1995, Appellant was given a
full and complete release from treatment and rehabilitation by both
physicians, with noted permanent restrictions.  Particularly,
Appellant was advised to refrain from any repetitive motion of any
activity seventy-one degrees, to continue restrictive activities,
and to pursue job rotation to avoid any overuse in any one
particular mode.  Appellant was assigned a rating of five percent
permanent physical impairment in each upper extremity.  On that
same date, after having obtained her release from treatment,
Appellant reported to work, where she was immediately terminated
from employment by Appellee.  
     As a result of her termination, Appellant brought an action
against Appellee for discrimination based upon a physical
disability, in violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. 
Appellant asserted in her complaint that Appellee terminated her
despite the fact that she had been previously performing the
essential functions of her job and despite the fact that her
permanent impairments were less restrictive and less severe than
those initially indicated by her treating physicians.  Appellant
claimed damages in the form of lost wages, mental anguish, and loss
of dignity.  She also asked for punitive damages in the amount of
$200,000.      
     Appellee filed a motion to dismiss Appellant's complaint on
the ground that exclusive jurisdiction of her claim was clearly
vested in the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission,
specifically pursuant to section 11-9-505(a)(1).  After hearing
argument from both sides, the trial court dismissed with prejudice
Appellant's complaint, reasoning that it was the General Assembly's
intent that the remedies provided under the Workers' Compensation
Act were to be exclusive.  
     On appeal, Appellant argues that her claim is cognizable under
the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.  She contends that workers who are
discriminated against because of a disability from a work-related
injury are not entitled to less protection under the law than are
workers who are disabled by other means.  She contends further that
the Workers' Compensation Act was never intended to be a vehicle
for protecting a worker's civil rights, and that the damages
available under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act are more complete
than those offered under the Workers' Compensation Act.  In support
of her argument, Appellant relies on this court's holding in Malone
v. Trans-States Lines, Inc., 325 Ark. 383, 926 S.W.2d 659 (1996). 
     In Malone, the appellant had filed a complaint in circuit
court against his employer for retaliatory discharge under the
Workers' Compensation Act and for discrimination in violation of
the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.  The trial court dismissed the
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  There, as in the
present case, the appellant argued that his civil rights claim was
cognizable in circuit court and that the trial court had thus erred
in dismissing with prejudice his complaint for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction.  This court did not directly address the
merits of that argument, but nonetheless held that the complaint
should have been dismissed without prejudice, to allow the
appellant to amend his complaint to include the specific facts, as
opposed to bare conclusions of law, in support of his claim.  This
court stated:
     While we are somewhat sympathetic to appellant's
     contention that he has asserted two distinct causes of
     action based on two distinct statutes, on this limited
     record we cannot fully discuss the merits of appellant's
     arguments for reversal of the trial court's rulings
     regarding subject-matter jurisdiction.  Suffice it to say
     that because appellant has asserted a cause of action in
     circuit court based in part on the Arkansas Civil Rights
     Act of 1993, we reverse that part of the order dismissing
     the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Id. at 386-87, 926 S.W.2d  at 662 (emphasis added).  It is this
language that Appellant relies on in support of her assertion that
her claim is actionable in circuit court.  Additionally, Appellant
points to a concurring opinion in Malone.  It was stated
unequivocally that the exclusive-remedy doctrine of the Workers'
Compensation Act "in no way conflicts with or bars a properly
established or alleged claim under the Civil Rights Act."  Id. at
387-88, 926 S.W.2d  at 662.
     Appellee, on the other hand, asserts that Appellant's claim is
limited to the remedy provided under section 11-9-505, which
addresses an employee's rights when the employer refuses to return
the injured employee to work.  Appellee asserts further that while
the Arkansas Civil Rights Act generally addresses the rights of
disabled persons to obtain and hold employment, the Workers'
Compensation Act specifically addresses the rights of employees who
were injured on the job to return to work.  Accordingly, Appellee
asserts that the specific remedies provided in the Workers'
Compensation Act must prevail over the general remedies available
under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act.  
     In response to Appellee's argument, Appellant contends that
the issue in this case is not that Appellee refused to return her
to work after her injury; rather, she contends that the action
filed in circuit court under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act is a
separate and distinct cause of action based upon Appellee's
decision to terminate her because of her physical disability. 
Appellant contends that this is not a case of Appellee's refusal to
return her to work, because she had been allowed to return to work
after her injuries, during the time she was receiving physical
rehabilitation and was under medical restrictions.  
     The initial question then is whether this case is one of
discrimination on the part of the employer in terminating an
employee based upon her disability or, rather, whether it is one of
the employer's refusal to return the employee to work after having
suffered a work-related injury.  Should we determine that this case
presents an issue of employer discrimination, we must next
determine whether there is an adequate remedy for such
discrimination available to Appellant under the Workers'
Compensation Act.  If, on the other hand, we should determine that
this case concerns the employer's refusal to return the injured
employee to work, we should affirm the trial court's dismissal with
prejudice of Appellant's complaint, as her exclusive remedy would
be found in section 11-9-505 of the Act.  For the reasons set out
below, we conclude that this case presents an issue of employer
discrimination, rather than a situation where the employer has
refused to return the injured employee to work.   
     Section 16-123-107(a) of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993
provides in pertinent part:
          The right of an otherwise qualified person to be
     free from discrimination because of race, religion,
     national origin, gender, or the presence of any sensory,
     mental, or physical disability is recognized as and
     declared to be a civil right.  This right shall include,
     but not be limited to: 

          (1) The right to obtain and hold employment without
     discrimination[.] 

     As previously noted, the issue presented by this appeal is one
of first impression in this State.  As such, we look to cases from
other jurisdictions for guidance.  The Supreme Court of Washington
recognized that, in addition to obtaining workers' compensation
benefits, an employee has the right to file suit against the
employer for discrimination based upon a physical disability. 
Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,