Case Title: State v. Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP000774-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 63 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP774-CR 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Courtney C. Brown, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 161,931 N.W.2d 890 
PDC No:2019 WI App 34 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 3, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 21, 2020   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Nuss   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, and KELLY, JJ., 
joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion 
in which KELLY, J., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation. BRIAN 
HAGEDORN, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Elizabeth Nash, assistant state public defender. There 
was an oral argument by Elizabeth Nash.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Michael C. Sanders, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Michael C. Sanders.  
 
 
2 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of The American 
Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Wisconsin by Kendall W. 
Harrison, Linda S. Schmidt, Maxted M. Lenz, and Godfrey & Kahn, 
S.C., Madison. With whom on the brief was Karyn Rotker and ACLU 
of Wisconsin Foundation, Milwaukee.  
 
 
 
 
 
2020 WI 63
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2017AP774-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF428) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
: 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Courtney C. Brown, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 3, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of 
the Court, in which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ZIEGLER, and KELLY, JJ., 
joined.  REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion 
in which KELLY, J., joined.  DALLET, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion. 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., withdrew from participation. 
 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J., did not participate. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   Courtney Brown failed to 
fully stop his car at a stop sign, prompting a police officer to 
initiate 
a 
traffic 
stop. 
 
Brown 
contends 
the 
officer 
impermissibly extended the stop after writing a ticket for the 
traffic violation by asking Brown to exit the car, inquiring 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
2 
 
about anything concerning in Brown's possession, and requesting 
consent to search him.  Brown seeks suppression of the cocaine 
the officer found in Brown's possession when he searched him, 
claiming that in the absence of reasonable suspicion, the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the officer's actions after he wrote the 
traffic ticket, which Brown argues should have ended the mission 
of the stop.  We conclude the Constitution permits law 
enforcement to ask a driver to exit the vehicle, inquire about 
the presence of weapons, and request consent to search the 
driver, all of which are negligibly burdensome actions relating 
to officer safety, a well-established part of a traffic stop's 
mission.1  We affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
At about 2:44 a.m. on August 23, 2013, Fond du Lac 
Police Officer Christopher Deering, while on regular patrol, 
noticed a car coming from a dead end street containing only 
closed commercial properties.  A record check revealed the car 
belonged to a car rental company.  After observing the car fail 
to make a complete stop at a stop sign, Deering initiated a 
traffic stop.  He approached the car and observed that the 
driver, identified as Brown, was not wearing a seatbelt. 
                                                 
1 Because we conclude that the officer did not impermissibly 
extend the traffic stop, we need not decide whether he had 
reasonable suspicion to do so.  See Gross v. Hoffman, 227 
Wis. 296, 300, 277 N.W. 663 (1938) ("As one sufficient ground 
for support of the judgment has been declared, there is no need 
to discuss the others urged."). 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
3 
 
¶3 
Officer Deering asked Brown questions about his 
whereabouts and destination that evening.  Brown stated he was 
going "nowhere really."  Deering learned that Brown was from 
Milwaukee, which Deering testified was a "source city for drugs" 
because dealers can sell them at a higher price in the suburbs.  
Brown told Deering he was visiting a friend in Fond du Lac.  
Brown claimed to have been at this friend's house before Deering 
pulled him over, although Brown was unable to provide the last 
name of the friend or the street address of the house.  Brown 
also indicated that he came directly from Speedway, although 
Deering had just witnessed Brown come from a dead end street of 
closed businesses.  During Deering's initial encounter with 
Brown, two other officers arrived on the scene to provide safety 
assistance, although neither made contact with Brown and 
remained outside of his car on the passenger side. 
¶4 
Upon returning to his squad car, Officer Deering wrote 
Brown a ticket for failing to wear a seat belt.  While writing 
the ticket, Deering ran a records search, which revealed Brown 
had multiple prior arrests for drug crimes and an armed robbery 
arrest.  Based on Brown's suspicious story and these prior 
arrests, Deering asked the dispatcher if any canine units were 
available to perform a dog sniff of Brown's vehicle for drugs.  
No dogs were available.  Deering then re-approached Brown's car 
with the completed traffic ticket in hand. 
¶5 
After making contact with Brown for a second time, 
Officer Deering asked him to step out of the car.  Deering led 
Brown from the driver's side of Brown's car to the front of 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
4 
 
Deering's squad car.  Deering testified he "had [Brown] walk 
back to [the] squad car."  Brown claimed Deering "placed 
[Brown's] hands behind [his] back and walked [him] to the front 
of [Deering's] car."  Both agreed that Deering did not handcuff 
Brown while leading him back to Deering's squad car.  Deering 
then asked Brown if there was anything on Brown's person that 
Deering "needed to know about" or "be concerned about."  Deering 
testified he asked this question to see if Brown "had any 
illegal weapons or drugs" although he did not subjectively 
consider the traffic stop to be high-risk and no "specific 
factors" caused concern that Brown had weapons.  Deering 
testified Brown "could have [had weapons]."  Brown answered that 
he had nothing, but Deering asked for consent to search Brown's 
person in order to verify Brown's response and then searched 
him.2  The search uncovered 13 bindles, or approximately 4 grams, 
of crack cocaine plus cash over $500.  During this exchange and 
search, Deering remained in possession of the traffic ticket and 
Brown's driver's license.  At no point prior to the search did 
Deering return these documents or instruct Brown that he was 
free to leave. 
                                                 
2 The parties dispute whether Brown gave consent.  Officer 
Deering testified that he asked Brown "mind if I search you to 
double check" and Brown answered "no."  Brown testified that 
Deering asked "could he search me," to which Brown responded 
"no."  The circuit court did not resolve this factual dispute 
and we conclude it is not necessary to address it.  See infra 
n.8. 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
5 
 
¶6 
The State charged Brown with possession with intent to 
deliver cocaine as a repeater, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 961.41(1m)(cm)1r (2017-18).  Brown moved to suppress the drugs 
and money found during Deering's search, arguing they were 
fruits 
of 
an 
unlawful 
search 
because 
Deering's 
actions 
unlawfully extended the stop and he lacked reasonable suspicion.  
The circuit court denied the suppression motion.3  It found "the 
scope of the stop and length of the stop were extended due to 
the officer's suspicions of drug possession or drug activity[,]" 
but the extension was supported by reasonable suspicion.  Brown 
thereafter pled no contest to one count of possession with 
intent to deliver cocaine.  The circuit court sentenced him to 
two years of initial confinement and two years of extended 
supervision.4  Brown appealed.5 
¶7 
The court of appeals concluded that the officer's 
requests for Brown to exit the vehicle and consent to search, as 
well as the search itself, were part of the mission of the 
traffic stop and not an unlawful extension under the Fourth 
                                                 
3 The Honorable Dale L. English presided over this hearing. 
4 The Honorable Richard J. Nuss presided over the plea 
hearing and sentencing, and entered the conviction. 
5 The court of appeals certified the following question to 
this court:  "[A]fter a ticket has been written but before 
delivery, and in the absence of reasonable suspicion, does 
asking a lawfully stopped motorist to exit the car, whether he 
or she possesses anything of concern, and to consent to a search 
unlawfully extend a traffic stop?"  State v. Brown, No. 
2017AP774-CR, unpublished slip op., *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 
2018).  We declined review.  State v. Brown, 2019 WI 21, 385 
Wis. 2d 611, 926 N.W.2d 499. 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
6 
 
Amendment.  See State v. Brown, 2019 WI App 34, ¶¶17, 25, 388 
Wis. 2d 161, 931 N.W.2d 890.  Brown filed a petition for review, 
which we granted. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶8 
A 
party 
seeking 
suppression 
based 
on 
a 
Fourth 
Amendment violation presents a question of constitutional fact.  
State v. Smith, 2018 WI 2, ¶9, 379 Wis. 2d 86, 905 N.W.2d 353 
(citing State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶11, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 
N.W.2d 560).  "We review the circuit court's findings of 
historical fact under the clearly erroneous standard.  But the 
circuit 
court's 
application 
of 
the 
historical 
facts 
to 
constitutional principles is a question of law we review 
independently."  Id. (quoting Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶11). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Fourth Amendment General Principles 
¶9 
The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment is "indispensable 
to the full enjoyment of the rights of personal security, 
personal 
liberty, 
and 
private 
property." 
 
3 
J. 
Story 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1895 
(1833).  Although many treat the warrant requirement as the 
heart of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against searches and 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
7 
 
seizures, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
repeatedly 
characterizes 
the 
reasonableness of searches and seizures as its "ultimate 
touchstone."  See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) 
("[T]he 
ultimate 
touchstone 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
'reasonableness.'"  (quoted source omitted));  Elkins v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) ("[W]hat the Constitution 
forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable 
searches and seizures."). 
¶10 Searches or seizures without a warrant are generally 
"per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."  Arizona v. 
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).  Although the Supreme Court has 
carved out certain exceptions to the warrant requirement, these 
exceptions 
remain 
subject 
to 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
reasonableness requirement.  Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 
(2011) (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 
(2006)).  One such exception exists for short investigative 
stops if law enforcement has "a particularized and objective 
basis" to suspect a person of criminal activity.  Navarette v. 
California, 572 U.S. 393, 396-97 (2014) (quoted source omitted); 
see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (investigatory 
stop is reasonable when police have "specific and articulable 
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion").  This exception is 
well-known as a "Terry" stop and "reasonable suspicion" renders 
it constitutionally reasonable even without a warrant.  See 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-31 (1990); Smith, 379 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
8 
 
Wis. 2d 86, ¶13.  While a traffic stop constitutes a seizure 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment, 
it 
requires 
only 
reasonable 
suspicion of a legal violation.  See Rodriguez v. United States, 
575 U.S. 348, 354-55 (2015); Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶¶20-21.  
The reasonable length of a traffic seizure depends on the 
"mission" of the stop, including law enforcement's "ordinary 
inquiries" and "related safety concerns."  Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 
at 354; State v. Wright, 2019 WI 45, ¶9, 386 Wis. 2d 495, 926 
N.W.2d 157; Smith, 379 Wis. 2d 86, ¶12 (citing Rodriguez, 575 
U.S. at 355).  A stop's length becomes unreasonable if extended 
past the point "when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are——
or 
reasonably 
should 
have 
been——completed." 
 
Floyd, 
377 
Wis. 2d 394, ¶21 (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354). 
B.  Floyd & Wright 
¶11 In State v. Floyd and State v. Wright, we recently 
addressed constitutional challenges similar to the one Brown 
presents.  These cases control the resolution of Brown's case. 
1.  State v. Floyd 
¶12 In Floyd, this court considered "where we draw the 
line separating traffic stops of acceptable duration from those 
that have been impermissibly extended."  377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶15.  
In that case, law enforcement conducted a traffic stop of Lewis 
Floyd, Jr., and upon initial contact, learned Floyd did not have 
a driver's license or insurance information.  Id., ¶4.  The on-
scene deputy took Floyd's identification card and returned to 
his squad car to write a ticket and inquire about available 
canines; in the interim, another police officer arrived for 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
9 
 
safety assistance.  Id.  When the on-scene deputy returned to 
Floyd's 
car 
and 
while 
still 
in 
possession 
of 
Floyd's 
identification card and completed ticket, the deputy asked 
Floyd:  (1) to exit the car; (2) if he had "any weapons or 
anything that could harm him"; and (3) if the deputy could 
search Floyd.  Id., ¶5.  The deputy found illegal drugs during 
the search.  Id.  Floyd moved to suppress the evidence, arguing 
on appeal that the search occurred after the traffic stop should 
have been completed.  Id., ¶¶7-9, 14.  Floyd argued the 
Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable seizures bars an 
officer who has completed a traffic ticket from doing anything 
beyond delivering the ticket and explaining it to the driver.  
Id., ¶¶16, 25.  Because the search of Floyd's person occurred 
after this point, Floyd argued the stop was impermissibly 
extended.  Id. 
¶13 The court explained "an officer is on the proper side 
of the line so long as the incidents necessary to carry out the 
purpose of the traffic stop have not been completed, and the 
officer has not unnecessarily delayed the performance of those 
incidents."  Id., ¶22 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 353-55).  
An officer crosses the line when he continues the traffic 
seizure "after he has completed all the necessary functions 
attendant on the traffic stop."  Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶22.  
We then concluded the purpose of the stop included "tak[ing] the 
time reasonably necessary to draft" the tickets and explain 
them.  Id., ¶23.  "Until that is done, and so long as [law 
enforcement] does not unnecessarily delay the process," the 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
10 
 
stop's duration remains permissible.  Id.  We recognized that 
Supreme Court precedent, as well as our own, rendered the 
deputy's request to have Floyd exit the vehicle of "no 
constitutional moment[.]"  Id., ¶24 (citation omitted). 
¶14 Turning to the search request, Floyd made clear that 
the mission of a traffic stop includes actions taken pursuant to 
officer safety, so long as those actions are "negligibly 
burdensome."  Id., ¶¶26-27.  Because both questions——whether 
Floyd had weapons on him and whether the deputy could search to 
verify their absence——"related to officer safety and were 
negligibly burdensome," we determined "they were part of the 
traffic stop's mission, and so did not cause an extension."  
Id., ¶28 (footnote omitted).  Floyd reaffirmed the "request to 
perform a search of [one's person] was part of the stop's 
mission."  Id., ¶43. 
2.  State v. Wright 
¶15 Wright addressed whether law enforcement violated the 
Fourth Amendment when police officers, without reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity:  (1) asked about the presence of 
weapons in the car; (2) asked whether the driver was a concealed 
carry weapon permit ("CCW") holder; and (3) conducted a CCW 
check.  Wright, 386 Wis. 2d 495, ¶6.  In that case, Milwaukee 
police officers stopped John Patrick Wright for a broken 
headlight.  Id., ¶15.  During the stop, an officer asked Wright 
for his driver's license, whether he had a CCW permit, and 
whether he had weapons in the car.  Id., ¶16.  Wright disclosed 
the existence of a firearm in the glove compartment, which the 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
11 
 
officers retrieved.  Id., ¶17.  One of the officers ran a CCW 
check and discovered Wright did not have a valid permit.  Id., 
¶18.  The officers arrested Wright for unlawfully carrying a 
concealed weapon.  Id.  Wright moved to suppress the evidence.  
Id., ¶19.  The circuit court granted Wright's motion, concluding 
that the questions about having a CCW permit and the presence of 
weapons impermissibly extended the traffic stop.  Id.  The court 
of appeals agreed with the circuit court and affirmed.  Id., 
¶20. 
¶16 On review in this court, we repeated in Wright what we 
stated in Floyd:  a traffic stop's permissible duration depends 
on the stop's "mission," which includes "(1) addressing the 
traffic violation that warranted the stop; (2) conducting 
ordinary inquiries incident to the stop; and (3) taking 
negligibly burdensome precautions to ensure officer safety."  
Wright, 386 Wis. 2d 495, ¶¶23-24 (footnotes omitted).  We held 
that a stop is impermissible if it extends past the point when 
the mission is, "or reasonably should have been, completed."  
Id., ¶24.  We explicitly stated that questions related to an 
officer's 
safety 
"are 
part 
of 
the 
traffic 
stop's 
mission . . . [and] those questions do not cause an extension of 
the stop."  Id., ¶26 (citing Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶28).  We 
noted the Supreme Court "concluded that the Fourth Amendment 
tolerate[s]" even those investigations unrelated to the stop's 
mission, "so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend 
the duration of the stop."  Wright, 386 Wis. 2d 495, ¶27; see 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) ("A seizure that 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
12 
 
is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket 
to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the 
time reasonably required to complete that mission."). 
¶17 This court concluded that the question regarding the 
presence of weapons was "part of the stop's mission because the 
question [was] a negligibly burdensome precaution taken to 
ensure officer safety."  Wright, 386 Wis. 2d 495, ¶29.  "Floyd 
controls."  Id., ¶34.  We next determined that the CCW question 
and permit check were "[i]nquiries unrelated to the original 
justification for the stop" or officer safety, but were 
nevertheless "permissible under the Fourth Amendment 'so long as 
those inquiries [did] not measurably extend the duration of the 
stop.'" Id., ¶38 (footnote omitted).  Applying Caballes and 
Rodriguez, we concluded neither the CCW question nor the permit 
check "measurably extended the duration of the traffic stop."  
Id., ¶¶45, 50. 
¶18 In Caballes, the Supreme Court held a dog sniff of a 
vehicle performed by one officer while another was writing a 
traffic ticket did not unjustifiably extend the duration of the 
stop and was constitutionally permissible.  See Caballes, 543 
U.S. at 406, 408-09.  The stop in Caballes was not extended 
because the "dog sniff occurred while the traffic stop's mission 
was still being completed."  Wright, 386 Wis. 2d 495, ¶40.  In 
contrast, Rodriguez held that a dog sniff performed after law 
enforcement returned the driver's license and his traffic ticket 
to 
the 
driver 
violated 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
because 
it 
"exceed[ed] the time needed to handle the matter for which the 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
13 
 
stop was made" and "prolonged beyond the time reasonably 
required to complete th[e] mission" of the stop.  Rodriguez, 575 
U.S. at 350-52; see also Wright, 386 Wis. 2d 495, ¶41 ("The 
Rodriguez Court reached this conclusion because . . . the dog 
sniff . . . prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably 
required to complete the mission of the stop.").  The key 
distinction between Caballes and Rodriguez centered on the 
timing of the dog sniff.  "[I]n Caballes, the dog sniff added no 
time" to the stop because it "was conducted simultaneously with 
mission-related activities[,]" whereas "[i]n Rodriguez, all 
mission-related activities had been completed[.]"  Wright, 386 
Wis. 2d 495, ¶43. 
C.  Application to Brown 
¶19 Brown challenges the constitutionality of every action 
by Officer Deering after he re-approached Brown's vehicle 
without simply handing the completed seatbelt ticket to Brown.  
We address each action in turn. 
1.  Asking/Ushering Brown Out of His Vehicle 
¶20 First, Officer Deering asked Brown to step out of the 
vehicle.  This action is "of no constitutional moment."  See 
Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶24.  When a motorist is "lawfully 
detained for a traffic violation . . . officers may order the 
driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth 
Amendment[.]"  Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 
(1977).  This is a per se rule allowing officers to order 
drivers out of the vehicle during a lawful traffic stop.  See 
State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶23, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
14 
 
N.W.2d 182.  In establishing this bright-line rule decades ago, 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
weighed 
the 
"legitimate 
and 
weighty" 
consideration of officer safety as well as "[t]he hazard of 
accidental injury from passing traffic to an officer standing on 
the driver's side of the vehicle" against "the intrusion into 
the driver's personal liberty . . . by the order to get out of 
the car."  Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-11.  Concluding that the 
latter "hardly rises to the level of a 'petty indignity'" the 
Supreme Court concluded that "[w]hat is at most a mere 
inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced against legitimate 
concerns for the officer's safety."  Id. at 111 (quoted source 
and footnote omitted). 
¶21 Brown argues Rodriguez narrowed the per se rule of 
Mimms to allow removal from a vehicle only if attendant to the 
mission of the stop.  Not quite.  With respect to Mimms, 
Rodriguez said only that a dog sniff did not serve the same 
"highway and officer safety . . . interests" as those justifying 
ordering the driver to exit the vehicle, while emphasizing that 
the officer safety interest "stems from the mission of the stop 
itself."  Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356-57.  As Brown conceded at 
oral argument, issuing a traffic ticket is part of the traffic 
stop.  At the time Deering directed Brown to exit the vehicle, 
Deering still had the ticket and Brown's driver's license in his 
possession, 
leaving 
part 
of 
the 
traffic 
stop's 
mission 
uncompleted.  See Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶23 ("Until [drafting 
the tickets and explaining them to the driver] is done, and so 
long as [law enforcement] does not unnecessarily delay the 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
15 
 
process, the permissible duration of the traffic stop has not 
elapsed."  (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354-55)).  Finally, 
Brown argues the stop "reasonably should have been completed" 
because Deering had completed writing the ticket, so all that 
remained was handing the ticket to Brown and ending the seizure.  
We rejected this argument in Floyd and have no reason to 
reconsider it.  Id., ¶¶25, 28.  Because the mission of the stop 
continued, officer safety remained a viable concern and the per 
se rule of Mimms fully applies. 
2.  Walking Brown to the Front of Officer Deering's Squad Car 
¶22 We 
next 
consider 
Brown's 
challenge 
to 
the 
constitutionality of Officer Deering guiding Brown to the front 
of his squad car.  While the parties dispute whether Brown's 
hands were behind his back during this movement, it is 
undisputed that Brown was not handcuffed.  Deering testified 
that he "had [Brown] walk back to [his] squad car," while Brown 
claims Deering "placed [his] hands behind [his] back and walked 
[him] to the front of [Deering's squad] car."  The circuit court 
did not make any finding regarding this factual dispute, instead 
noting it was a question of whether one believes Deering or 
Brown. 
 
As 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded, 
this 
factual 
determination is irrelevant.  Under either scenario, Brown was 
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but the 
placement of his hands is immaterial to whether the stop was 
impermissibly extended. 
¶23 Officer Deering did not impermissibly extend the stop 
by moving Brown to the front of his squad car.  In determining 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
16 
 
that law enforcement may request a driver to exit the vehicle 
during a lawful traffic stop, Mimms recognized the inherent 
danger of the driver and officer standing a few feet from 
passing traffic: 
The hazard of accidental injury from passing traffic 
to an officer standing on the driver's side of the 
vehicle may also be appreciable in some situations.  
Rather than conversing while standing exposed to 
moving traffic, the officer prudently may prefer to 
ask the driver of the vehicle to step out of the car 
and off onto the shoulder of the road where the 
inquiry may be pursued with greater safety to both. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111 (emphasis added).  In past cases with 
similar facts, we have never declared any constitutional 
infirmity with ordering a driver to exit the vehicle during a 
lawful traffic stop.  See Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶¶6, 48 
(driver led to the back of his vehicle, then to the curb; court 
held search of person impermissible on other grounds); State v. 
Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶¶7, 47, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1 
(driver asked to step out of the vehicle and led behind it; 
court held law enforcement conduct reasonable).  There is no 
distinction 
for 
Fourth 
Amendment 
purposes 
between 
law 
enforcement directing a driver to stand next to his car, at the 
curb, or behind his car, and leading a driver to the front of 
the officer's squad car. 
3.  Asking About Anything on Brown's Person 
¶24 While Brown stood in front of the squad car, Officer 
Deering asked if Brown had anything on his person about which 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
17 
 
Deering should be concerned.6  While the parties dispute the 
exact wording of the question, they agree on the material point:  
Deering did not specify "weapon" or anything similar.  At the 
suppression hearing, Dearing indicated he asked the question to 
see if Brown "had any illegal weapons or drugs."  Deering did 
not subjectively believe the stop was high-risk or that a weapon 
was present. 
¶25 Deering's subjective beliefs do not play any role under 
Fourth Amendment analyses.  Under the Fourth Amendment, we 
review law enforcement actions with an objective lens.  See 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996) ("Not only 
have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or 
administrative 
inspection . . . , 
that 
an 
officer's 
motive 
invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth 
Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the 
contrary."; "[Our] cases foreclose any argument that the 
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the 
actual motivations of the individual officers involved."; 
"Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause 
Fourth Amendment analysis."). 
                                                 
6 The testimony differed as to the exact wording, with 
Officer Deering testifying he asked if there "was anything on 
[Brown] I needed to know about," while Brown testified the 
question was "did [Brown] have anything on [him] that [he] 
shouldn't have."  Brown then clarified the exact question was 
"did [Brown] have anything that [Deering] should be concerned 
about."  Regardless, the general gist of each variation of the 
question is the same. 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
18 
 
¶26 Our inquiry instead examines whether an officer has a 
constitutionally 
reasonable 
safety 
concern 
regarding 
the 
presence of a weapon after hearing a story inconsistent with the 
officer's observations, from a driver with prior arrests for 
drug crimes and armed robbery, who was driving a rental car,7 and 
who was unclear about his whereabouts after leaving his 
residence in a city the officer knew to be a source for drugs.  
We conclude that he does. 
¶27 In Floyd, we said an officer asking whether Floyd "had 
any weapons or anything that could harm him" was a negligibly 
burdensome question posed pursuant to officer safety and within 
the mission of the stop.  Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶28; see also 
Wright, 386 Wis. 2d 495, ¶¶29, 34 (holding the same).  Brown 
argues that the Constitution requires law enforcement to 
specifically mention "weapons" as the officer did in Floyd.  The 
law generally rejects imposing "magic words" requirements.  See 
State v. Lepsch, 2017 WI 27, ¶36, 374 Wis. 2d 98, 892 N.W.2d 682 
(rejecting in the context of a circuit court inquiring about 
juror bias); Elections Bd. v. Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, 227 
Wis. 2d 650, 654, 669-70, 597 N.W.2d 721 (1999) (rejecting in 
the context of what is required to be "express advocacy"); see 
also Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (noting that 
the Supreme Court refrains from reading statutes to "incant 
magic words" (quoted source omitted)). 
                                                 
7 At the suppression hearing, Officer Deering testified that 
in his experience, drug dealers "often use rental cars." 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
19 
 
¶28 We have expressly declined to impose a "magic words" 
requirement in the Fourth Amendment context as well.  See State 
v. Wantland, 2014 WI 58, ¶33, 355 Wis. 2d 135, 848 N.W.2d 810 
(rejecting "particular 'magic words'" in assessing whether 
consent is withdrawn).  Officer Deering testified the reason for 
this question was to inquire about any possible weapons on 
Brown's person.  During a traffic stop, knowledge of weapons 
carried by occupants of a vehicle is integral to officer safety.  
See Wright, 386 Wis. 2d 495, ¶¶25, 29-34 (asking about the 
presence of weapons is a less burdensome intrusion than other 
authorized intrusions such as requesting persons out of the 
vehicle; "traffic stops are 'especially fraught with danger to 
police officers'" (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 
(1983)).  Deering's question was negligibly burdensome and 
pursuant to the stop's mission because it concerned officer 
safety. 
¶29 The Fourth Amendment allows unrelated investigative 
inquiries not related to the mission of the stop, provided such 
inquiries do not "measurably extend the duration of the stop."  
Wright, 386 Wis. 2d 495, ¶38 (quoted source omitted).  Deering's 
question regarding Brown's possession of any concerning items 
did not "measurably extend the duration of the stop" because it 
was posed "concurrently with mission-related activities."  See 
id., ¶¶45, 47, 49, 50 (holding a question about a CCW permit and 
an ensuing check did not violate the defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights because they were done "concurrently with 
mission-related activities" and did not "measurably extend the 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
20 
 
duration of the traffic stop"); Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶23 
("Until [drafting the tickets and explaining them to the driver] 
is done, and so long as [law enforcement] does not unnecessarily 
delay the process, the permissible duration of the traffic stop 
has not elapsed."  (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354-55)). 
¶30 Wright and Floyd control; the Constitution does not 
require law enforcement to use the word "weapon" when asking a 
driver about his possessions during a traffic stop.  Deering's 
inquiry was part of the stop's mission because it was a 
"negligibly 
burdensome 
precaution[] . . . to 
complete 
his 
mission safely."  Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357. 
4.  Asking for Consent to Search Brown's Person 
¶31 Finally, Brown challenges Officer Deering's request to 
search Brown's person.  As we discussed in Floyd, while a frisk 
can be a severe intrusion, "a request to conduct such a search 
cannot."  377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶28.  Deering's request for consent 
to search Brown in order to verify that Brown had no weapons was 
constitutionally permissible as a negligibly burdensome inquiry 
related to officer safety. 
* * * 
¶32 We hold that Officer Deering's actions did not 
impermissibly extend the stop and were reasonable within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Officer Deering's actions and 
inquiries each related to officer safety, which is part of any 
stop's mission.  At the time Deering undertook them, the mission 
of the stop had not been completed, nor should it reasonably 
have been completed because Deering had not issued the seatbelt 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
21 
 
ticket, explained it, or released Brown from the seizure.  See 
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) ("The temporary 
seizure of [a] driver . . . continues, and remains reasonable, 
for the duration of the stop.  Normally, the stop ends when the 
police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the 
driver . . . they are free to leave."  (citing Brendlin v. 
California, 
551 
U.S. 
249, 
258 
(2007) 
(discussing 
law 
enforcement's control over the stop includes giving permission 
or indication before one is free to leave and the stop ends))); 
Floyd, 
377 
Wis. 2d 394, 
¶23 
(stop's 
permissible 
duration 
includes drafting and explaining tickets to a driver). 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶33 Our determination in this case is governed by Floyd 
and Wright.  We tread no new ground.  Consistent with our 
precedent, and the Supreme Court cases on which those precedents 
rely, we conclude that Officer Deering did not impermissibly 
extend Brown's traffic stop beyond constitutional boundaries.  
Asking Brown to step out of the vehicle, ushering him a few feet 
away from the road, asking Brown whether he possessed anything 
that could harm Deering, and requesting consent for a search, 
were all negligibly burdensome actions directly related to 
officer safety and therefore part of the stop's mission.  
Because the mission of the stop had yet to be completed, there 
No. 
2017AP774-CR   
 
22 
 
was no impermissible extension.  The stop and Deering's actions 
in conducting it were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.8 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶34 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. withdrew from participation. 
¶35 BRIAN HAGEDORN, J. did not participate. 
 
                                                 
8 Brown argues this case should be remanded because there is 
an unresolved factual issue of consent to Officer Deering's 
request to search.  The circuit court did not decide the consent 
issue, but assumed Brown consented for the suppression hearing 
and noted a determination on consent was "an issue for a 
different day[.]"  Brown later pled no contest pursuant to a 
plea agreement with the State.  During the plea hearing, Brown 
acknowledged that he was giving up certain constitutional 
rights.  At no point did Brown or the circuit court raise the 
consent issue.  Nor did Brown raise the unresolved consent issue 
in the sentencing hearing. 
On appeal, Brown did not make an argument regarding the 
factual issue of consent to the search until his reply brief.  
He indicated "suppression issues regarding whether there was 
consent need to be argued in the trial court if they are to be 
raised in the appellate court; however, he has not raised said 
issue on appeal."  In a footnote, Brown also indicated "[t]he 
factual matter whether Brown consented to the search is moot" 
given his arguments on appeal. 
Under the guilty-plea-waiver rule, Brown abandoned the 
issue of whether he consented to the search.  See State v. 
Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶18 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886 ("The 
general rule is that a guilty, no contest, or Alford plea 
'waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including constitutional 
claims[.]'"  (quoted source and footnote omitted)).  We also 
note that Brown abandoned his consent argument in the circuit 
court.  See State v. Woods, 144 Wis. 2d 710, 716, 424 N.W.2d 730 
(1988) (explaining that an undecided motion to suppress was 
abandoned where it was not raised or pursued before final 
judgment). 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶36 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  In his 
concurrence below, Court of Appeals Judge Paul Reilly asserts 
that under Wright and Floyd,1 "our Fourth Amendment protection 
against warrantless searches and seizures when stopped on the 
roadway has been eliminated[,]" suggesting that a police officer 
must have reasonable suspicion that the driver "has committed or 
is committing an offense" separate from the traffic violation 
precipitating the stop in order to conduct a search unrelated to 
the reason for the stop.  State v. Brown, 2019 WI App 34, ¶¶26-
27, 388 Wis. 2d 161, 931 N.W.2d 890 (Reilly, J., concurring).  
Justice Rebecca Dallet repeats this error in her dissent, 
asserting that "ordering Brown out of the vehicle initiated a 
Terry2 stop requiring independent reasonable suspicion that 
criminal activity was in progress."  Dissent, ¶55.  Judge 
Reilly's and Justice Dallet's perceptions of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence are unmoored from the Constitution.  In Caballes 
and Johnson,3 the United States Supreme Court "concluded that the 
Fourth Amendment tolerated certain unrelated investigations that 
did not lengthen the roadside detention."  Rodriguez v. United 
States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015).  Reasonable suspicion must be 
                                                 
1 See State v. Wright, 2019 WI 45, 386 Wis. 2d 495, 926 
N.W.2d 157; State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 
N.W.2d 560.  Wright was a unanimous decision of this court, 
authored by Justice Shirley Abrahamson. 
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
3 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Arizona v. 
Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009). 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
present only if the traffic stop "is prolonged beyond the time 
reasonably required to complete the mission" of issuing a 
ticket.  Id. at 354-55 (quoted source omitted). 
¶37 After misstating the law, Judge Reilly accuses this 
court of not only approving discriminatory police practices, but 
also "authorizing and condoning the profiling of persons."  See 
Brown, 388 Wis. 2d 161, ¶32 (Reilly, J., concurring).  He 
suggests that "all persons stopped for a traffic violation 
should be required to exit their vehicle and be searched so as 
to eliminate the profiling that is made necessary by the 
reasoning of Wright and Floyd."  Brown, 388 Wis. 2d 161, ¶32 
(Reilly, J., concurring).  After hyperbolically likening those 
decisions to Dred Scott,4 Judge Reilly claims they "continue, 
albeit implicitly, the bias that not all people are created 
equal by authorizing police to pick and choose who they will 
pull from cars for minor traffic violations."  Brown, 388 
Wis. 2d 161, ¶33 (Reilly, J., concurring).  Judge Reilly does 
not offer any basis for his accusation that law enforcement 
officers conduct their duties in a biased manner, much less that 
this court requires them to do so. 
¶38 Reasonable judges may disagree about the meaning or 
application of the law.  However, intentionally inciting racial 
tensions while demeaning the integrity of Wisconsin's highest 
court erodes public confidence in the judiciary and damages the 
institution of the court.  The Code of Judicial Conduct requires 
judges to "respect and honor the judicial office as a public 
                                                 
4 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal 
system" and "uphold the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary."  Code of Judicial Conduct, SCR ch. 60.  Suggesting 
that this court approves discriminatory police practices does 
not "maintain confidence in our legal system[,]" nor does it 
"respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust."  Id.  
Rather, such inflammatory rhetoric, particularly with the 
imprimatur 
of 
a 
published 
judicial 
opinion, 
impugns 
the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary. 
¶39 Comparing recent decisions of this court to one of the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
most 
abhorrent 
cases 
also 
questions the integrity of this court.  So too does the 
suggestion that this court knowingly allows profiling against 
protected groups of people.  The Code of Judicial Conduct 
requires judges to "act at all times in a manner that promotes 
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary."  SCR 60.03(1).  Such "attacks unnecessarily tear at 
the fabric of institutional legitimacy."  Chief Justice Patience 
Roggensack, Tough Talk and the Institutional Legitimacy of Our 
Courts, Hallows Lecture (Mar. 7, 2017), in Marquette Lawyer, 
Fall 2017, at 47.  "It is a privilege to be a member of the 
judiciary, 
but 
with 
that 
privilege 
comes 
considerable 
responsibility. When we speak, . . . we need to choose language 
that 
expresses 
our 
concerns 
about 
court 
opinions . . . .  
However, we can do so by choosing language that maintains the 
institutional legitimacy of our courts[.]"  Id. at 51. 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
¶40 Rather than focusing on the Constitution, Justice 
Dallet deplores "the real-world consequences" of the court's 
decision.  Dissent, ¶74.  Citing nothing but social science 
research, Justice Dallet posits "[t]he influence of implicit 
bias is particularly problematic in the policing context" and 
"'translate[s] most readily into discriminatory behavior'" and 
"racial profiling" by the police.  Dissent, ¶77 (quoted source 
omitted).  Although expressed in less provocative terms than 
Judge Reilly's concurrence in the court of appeals, Justice 
Dallet claims "the majority opinion turns a blind eye to the 
disparities 
caused 
by 
implicit 
bias." 
 
Dissent, 
¶78.  
Considering the consequences of a decision for certain groups of 
people conflicts with the judicial oath to "administer justice 
without respect to persons"5 and inappropriately assumes a role 
in developing policy more appropriate for the political branches 
of government than an impartial judiciary tasked with declaring 
what the law is rather than what it should be.  See Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of 
Legal Texts 353 (2012).  Social science research has nothing 
whatsoever to say about the meaning of the Fourth Amendment or 
any other provision of the constitution and "cannot form the 
basis upon which we decide matters of constitutional principle."  
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114, 119-20 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
¶41 The odious outcomes of decisions grounded in social 
science or majoritarian beliefs should cause jurists to recoil 
                                                 
5 Wis. Stat. § 757.02. 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
from 
tethering 
their 
opinions 
to 
anything 
but 
the 
law.  
"Historically, when courts contaminate constitutional analysis 
with then-prevailing notions of" social scientists professing 
what is "best" for society, the constitutionally-guaranteed 
rights of the people have been trampled.  State v. Roberson, 
2019 WI 102, ¶¶84-86, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 (Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring). 
 
"Departures 
from 
constitutional text have oppressed people under all manner of 
pernicious pretexts: 
[T]he notion of "social harm" supporting the police 
power was completely untethered from constitutional 
text and ripe for misuse in the hands of a Justice 
such as Holmes, who believed that the Constitution 
could be reduced to ad hoc balancing.  Eugenics was 
built upon the notion of harm; indeed, it thrived on a 
sense of imminent doom: that society was degenerating 
because of what were called its "weaklings" and 
"discards."  The idea that society was being swamped 
by incompetents was a common trope for eugenicists:  
the unfit were a "menace." . . . Like the great 
popular eugenicists of the day, Holmes wrote in Buck[6] 
that 
eugenics 
would 
prevent 
society 
from 
being 
"swamped" by incompetents, that fewer criminals would 
be executed, and that fewer imbeciles would starve. 
Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy from a 
Lost World, 39 Pepp. L. Rev. 101, 114-15 (2011) (emphasis added; 
footnotes omitted)."  Roberson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶84 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring). 
¶42 In her dissent, Justice Dallet assigns an "important 
role" to "social science research in guiding the United States 
Supreme Court to correct course when the law has allowed 
government infringement of protected civil liberties."  Dissent, 
                                                 
6 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶74 n.7.  Social science research should guide policymakers in 
the legislature.  The judiciary's guide should be the law alone.  
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) was rightly decided 
because an original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
equal protection clause forbids racial segregation, not because 
psychological studies revealed its damaging effects on school 
children.  See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The 
Political Seduction of the Law, 74-83 (1990).  It is the 
Constitution itself, not the application of social science 
research, that protects the people from violations of their 
civil rights.  "In rebuking his colleagues for upholding 
segregation, Justice John Marshall Harlan rightly relied solely 
upon the Constitution: 
But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the 
law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, 
ruling class of citizens.  There is no caste here. Our 
constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil 
rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The 
humblest is the peer of the most powerful.  The law 
regards man as man, and takes no account of his 
surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as 
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are 
involved. 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)."  Roberson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶85 (Rebecca Grassl 
Bradley, J., concurring (emphasis added)). 
¶43 More often than not, an opinion dependent upon social 
science research for its conclusions is written to reach the 
outcome desired by a majority of justices rather than the result 
compelled by the Constitution, illustrating "how far beyond any 
cognizable constitutional principle the Court has reached to 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
ensure that its own sense of morality and . . . justice pre-
empts that of the people and their representatives."  Graham v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 124 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  For 
example, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the United 
States Supreme Court held that executions of "mentally retarded" 
criminals were "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by 
"evolving standards of decency" the Court grafted onto the 
Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 321.  The Court's conclusion had "no 
support in the text or history of the Eighth Amendment" and 
constituted "an opinion of this Court rest[ing] so obviously 
upon nothing but the personal views of its Members."  Id. at 337 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  Because the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment did not support the Court's preferred outcome, it 
resorted to relying on the "views of assorted professional and 
religious 
organizations, 
members 
of 
the 
so-called 
'world 
community,' and respondents to opinion polls."  Id. at 347, 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
¶44 Similarly, in another case cited in Justice Dallet's 
dissent, "[t]o support its opinion that States should be 
prohibited from imposing the death penalty on anyone who 
committed murder before age 18, the Court looks to scientific 
and sociological studies, picking and choosing those that 
support its position.  It never explains why those particular 
studies are methodologically sound; none was ever entered into 
evidence or tested in an adversarial proceeding."  Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616-17 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Justice 
Dallet 
commits 
the 
same 
errors, 
ostensibly 
"to 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
illustrate empirically how far our jurisprudence has strayed 
from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment."  Dissent, 
¶74.  Conflating correlation and causation, Justice Dallet 
proceeds to selectively cite a litany of research but neglects 
to explain how contemporary social science studies could 
possibly inform the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
¶45 Justice Dallet says I "disregard[] the important role 
of social science research in guiding" judicial decision-making.  
Dissent, ¶74 n.7.  I don't disregard it; I emphatically reject 
it.  Embracing social science research as a methodology of 
constitutional interpretation is a license for judges to inject 
their subjective views into opinions rather than applying the 
law as it is written.  A judicial philosophy of interpreting the 
Constitution to mean whatever a majority of justices wants it to 
mean renders our supreme law pointless and transforms the 
judiciary from adjudicators into policymakers.  "By what 
conceivable 
warrant 
can 
nine 
lawyers 
presume 
to 
be 
the 
authoritative conscience of the Nation?  The reason for 
insistence on legislative primacy is obvious and fundamental: 
'[I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are 
constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral 
values of the people.'"  Roper, 543 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) 
(footnote 
omitted; 
formatting 
altered; 
quoted 
sources omitted). 
¶46 We should be particularly wary of courts invoking 
social science research as the basis for judicial opinions 
because "[d]eplorable decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson and 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
Buck v. Bell were rooted in evil concepts supported by 
social science and 
elitist 
mores 
antithetical 
to 
the 
Constitution."  Roberson, 389 Wis. 2d 190, ¶86.  A faithful 
application of the Constitution's original meaning "precludes 
appalling social science-based notions of the day from infecting 
constitutional analysis.  Only the Constitution can serve as a 
reliable bulwark of the rights and liberty of the people."  Id.  
When applied by courts in the past, theories derived from social 
science have been fraught with error, at best, and have 
repeatedly resulted in grave abuses of individual rights and 
liberty.  That reason alone should suffice to persuade jurists 
to reject social science when interpreting the Constitution. 
¶47 Judge Reilly's concurrence in the court of appeals and 
Justice Dallet's dissent both rest on legal fallacies.  Justice 
Reilly lodges baseless accusations against law enforcement and 
this court, and Justice Dallet's analysis rests heavily on 
social science research rather than the actual meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.  I write separately to underscore the dangers 
of employing inflammatory rhetoric that erodes the institutional 
legitimacy of the judiciary and to decry the tainting of 
constitutional analysis with social science research. 
¶48 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY 
joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶49 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (dissenting).  Officer 
Christopher Deering could have safely returned Courtney Brown's 
license and warned him of the need to wear a seat belt, thus 
completing the remaining tasks tied to a traffic stop made on 
August 23, 2013.  Instead, Officer Deering ordered Brown out of 
the car for the express purpose of requesting consent to search 
him 
for 
illegal 
drugs. 
 
Because 
the 
traffic 
stop 
was 
unreasonably extended without independent reasonable suspicion 
that a crime had been committed, the subsequent search of 
Brown's person contravenes the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.1  By upholding the constitutionality of this 
search, the majority sanctions unrestricted officer discretion 
to prolong a traffic stop in search of other crimes, and turns a 
blind eye to the discriminatory consequences of unchecked 
implicit bias.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
                                                 
1 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
I 
¶50 The Fourth Amendment's constitutional bar against 
unreasonable searches and seizures is well understood to defend 
"against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials," Camara 
v. Mun. Court of City and Cty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 
528 (1967), including "arbitrary invasions solely at the 
unfettered discretion of officers in the field," Brown v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).  The United States Supreme Court has 
held that "[t]he essential purpose of the proscriptions in the 
Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' 
upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, 
including law enforcement agents, in order to safeguard the 
privacy 
and 
security 
of 
individuals 
against 
arbitrary 
invasions . . . ."  Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 
(1979) (footnote and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marshall 
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)).  The primacy of 
this guarantee, that government searches and seizures will be 
judged on their reasonableness, is a longstanding bedrock of 
constitutional jurisprudence.  See Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more 
sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of 
every individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraint or interference by others, 
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."). 
¶51 The warrantless seizure here is a routine traffic 
stop, characterized as "a relatively brief encounter . . . more 
analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
arrest."  Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (second 
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)).  In 
Terry, the United States Supreme Court held that officers may 
conduct a brief investigatory seizure and carefully limited 
search of a person, a "Terry stop," if the officer has 
reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot."2  
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  The reasonableness of a 
Terry stop turns on the "specific and articulable facts" and 
"rational inferences from those facts," as contrasted with an 
officer's "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch."  
Id. at 20-21, 27. 
¶52 While similar to a Terry stop, a traffic stop 
implicates a distinct body of jurisprudence.  Relevant here is 
the permissible scope and duration of a traffic stop's mission, 
as well as the tasks the officer may lawfully undertake during 
that mission.  In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court 
established that "the tolerable duration of police inquiries in 
the 
traffic-stop 
context 
is 
determined 
by 
the 
seizure's 
'mission' . . . ."  Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 
354 (2015).  That mission includes:  "(1) addressing the traffic 
violation that warranted the stop; (2) conducting ordinary 
inquiries incident to the stop; and (3) taking negligibly 
                                                 
2 Terry 
involved 
a 
highly 
experienced 
officer 
whose 
particularized observations of two men blatantly "casing" a 
storefront led him to suspect a robbery was imminent and to 
intervene by seizing and searching them.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1968). 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
burdensome precautions to ensure officer safety."  State v. 
Wright, 2019 WI 45, ¶24, 386 Wis. 2d 495, 926 N.W.2d 157 
(footnotes omitted) (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354). 
¶53 There are several recognized "negligibly burdensome" 
measures an officer might take during a traffic stop to address 
certain safety concerns.  In Mimms, the United States Supreme 
Court held that it is negligibly burdensome for an officer to 
order the driver out of a vehicle for the duration of the 
traffic stop.  Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).  
The Court reasoned that this measure is a de minimis additional 
intrusion into the driver's personal liberty that would reduce 
the risk that an officer will be shot or subject to accidental 
injury from passing traffic.  Id. at 110-11.  Likewise, this 
court has concluded that the lesser intrusion of asking about 
weapons on the driver's person or in the car, or requesting 
consent to frisk the driver can be permissible safety-related 
tasks.  State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶28, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 
N.W.2d 560. 
¶54 The officer's lawful authority for the seizure ends 
when all mission-related tasks are or "reasonably should have 
been" 
completed. 
 
Wright, 
386 
Wis. 2d 495, 
¶24 
(quoting 
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354).  In other words, the traffic stop 
ends once an officer "has completed all the necessary functions 
attendant on the traffic stop."  Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶22 
(emphasis added) (citing State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶26, 274 
Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1).  Whether the traffic stop reasonably 
should have been completed is assessed based on the totality of 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
the circumstances.  Id. (citing United States v. Everett, 601 
F.3d 484, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2010)).  With these principles in 
mind, I turn to the circumstances of this traffic stop. 
II 
¶55 Officer Deering's mission was to address Brown's 
alleged failure to come to a complete stop at a stop sign.  The 
question is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, 
Officer Deering reasonably should have completed the stop by 
returning Brown's license and warning him to wear a seatbelt.3  
See Wright, 386 Wis. 2d 495, ¶24.  If the stop reasonably should 
have been completed, then ordering Brown out of the vehicle 
initiated 
a 
Terry 
stop 
requiring 
independent 
reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity was in progress.  Terry, 392 
U.S. at 30. 
¶56 The majority opinion concludes that Floyd controls on 
this 
question. 
 
Majority 
op., 
¶21 
(citing 
Floyd, 
377 
Wis. 2d 394, ¶¶25, 28).  Floyd involved a traffic stop for a 
suspended vehicle registration.  Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶2.  
The officer asked Floyd to exit the vehicle for the purpose of 
explaining citations for registration, license, and insurance 
violations, and to prevent Floyd from unlawfully driving away 
since he did not have a valid license.  Id., ¶¶4-5, 7.  
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 347.48(2m)(b) prohibits operation of a 
motor vehicle unless the person is properly restrained in a 
safety belt.  There is no evidence that Officer Deering ever 
observed Brown operating his vehicle without a seatbelt.  In 
fact, as the majority acknowledges, Officer Deering first 
noticed Brown was not wearing a seatbelt after Brown's vehicle 
was stopped.  Majority op., ¶2. 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
Remaining at Floyd's vehicle, the officer then inquired about 
weapons and asked for consent to frisk, which Floyd gave.  Id., 
¶5.  The Floyd court held that the request for consent to frisk 
did not extend the traffic stop because it was negligibly 
burdensome and related to one of the ongoing missions of the 
traffic stop, officer safety.  Id., ¶28. 
¶57 The majority reads Floyd as a per se rule that the 
mission of a traffic stop is ongoing until the officer chooses 
to hand over a traffic ticket or warning, thereby allowing that 
officer to continue to take all "negligibly burdensome" safety 
measures.  The majority's reading conflicts with recognized 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relied upon in Floyd:  "[W]e draw 
the line between traffic stops of proper duration and those that 
extend into unconstitutional territory according to functional 
considerations.  We assess those considerations in the context 
of the 'totality of the circumstances.'"  Id., ¶22 (citing 
Everett, 601 F.3d at 493-94); see also Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 
357 ("The critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff 
occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket, . . . but 
whether conducting the sniff 'prolongs'——i.e., adds time to——
'the stop[.]'" (cross-references omitted)). 
¶58 The majority opinion's rejection of a reasonableness 
test to determine whether the tasks related to the mission 
should have been completed leaves the duration of a traffic 
stop, and any subsequent search for officer safety, up to the 
"arbitrary" and "unfettered discretion of officers in the 
field."  Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.  After all, the issuance of a 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
citation or warning is an event wholly controlled by the 
officer.  However, it is this court's job to mitigate arbitrary 
exercises of police authority by examining whether an officer 
unnecessarily delayed the process of drafting or explaining any 
appropriate citations.  Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶23.  I 
therefore apply the requisite reasonableness test to the facts 
of Brown's case and conclude that Officer Deering unreasonably 
delayed the traffic stop. 
¶59 Unlike in Floyd, Brown's seat belt warning required no 
explanation on how to pay or dispute it, and Officer Deering did 
not face the additional task of preventing a license-less driver 
from driving away.  Moreover, unlike in Floyd, where the officer 
asked Floyd out of the vehicle for the purpose of safely 
explaining a ticket, Officer Deering's testimony and conduct 
demonstrate that he did not order Brown out of the car based on 
the safety reasons manufactured by the majority opinion.  
Majority op., ¶23.  Instead, Officer Deering delayed the process 
of giving Brown a warning in order to investigate his hunch that 
Brown had committed a drug offense. 
¶60 Officer Deering's testimony confirms that he asked 
Brown out of the vehicle to search him: 
Q:  Why did you have Mr. Brown exit the vehicle? 
A:  Again, that would be an awkward encounter to ask 
for someone's consent when they're sitting in a 
vehicle and then reach through the window to search 
them.  That's not police practice. 
Q:  So you already knew you were going to ask to 
search him before you even re-approached him? 
A:  Correct. 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
Officer Deering's actions further demonstrate that he delayed 
giving the warning in order to investigate his hunch that Brown 
committed a drug offense.  First, Officer Deering called for two 
officers to assist with a mere stop sign violation.  Officer 
Deering further made both a city and county-wide request for a 
canine to sniff Brown's vehicle for drugs.  As Officer Deering 
later testified: 
Q:  And why do officers request canines? 
A:  The canines that us –- or the city and the county 
have are trained in drug detection.  So they can smell 
the vehicle from the outside and detect any drugs 
therein. 
Q:  So you initially had a suspicion of drugs then in 
the case? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  And that was part of the whole stop to begin with, 
correct? 
A:  With everything.  His statements and all the 
totality which we've already gone over. 
¶61 Any alleged safety concerns under these circumstances 
are illusory.4  Officer Deering maintained this was not a "high-
risk" traffic stop and that there were "no specific factors" 
                                                 
4 Escalating the stop by ordering Brown out of the vehicle 
likely put Officer Deering in a less safe situation than if he 
had returned Brown's items and the completed warning.  See State 
v. Smith, 2018 WI 2, ¶82, 379 Wis. 2d 86, 905 N.W.2d 353 (Kelly, 
J., dissenting) ("Is it really necessary to point out that 
concerns over the officer's safety would vanish if he ended the 
seizure?"); United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 868 (9th 
Cir. 2019) ("Extending the stop, and thereby prolonging the 
officers' exposure to Landeros, was, if anything, 'inversely 
related to officer safety.'" (quoting United States v. Evans, 
786 F.3d 779, 787 (9th Cir. 2015))). 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
that led him to conclude Brown had any weapons.  When he re-
approached the car to give Brown a warning to wear his seatbelt, 
there were a total of three officers standing outside of Brown's 
vehicle, two of whom had been continuously watching Brown.  At 
that point any remaining safety concerns could have been 
dissipated by letting Brown go on his way.  The hazard of 
passing traffic was also not of concern to Officer Deering given 
the location of the stop and the early morning hour.  Cf. Mimms, 
434 U.S. at 111.  By leading Brown to the squad car and, as 
Brown testified, "plac[ing] [Brown's] hands behind [his] back," 
Officer Deering further indicated that a separate investigation 
was beginning.5 
¶62 In view of the totality of the circumstances, Officer 
Deering's decision to order Brown out of the vehicle and walk 
him back to the squad car "unnecessarily delayed the performance 
of the incidents" necessary to the traffic stop.  Floyd, 377 
Wis. 2d 394, ¶22.  Consequently, whether Officer Deering had 
reasonable suspicion for the ensuing Terry stop must be 
considered. 
III 
¶63 In order to seize Brown following the reasonable 
conclusion 
of 
the 
traffic 
stop, 
Officer 
Deering 
needed 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was in progress 
                                                 
5 Brown testified that as soon as he stepped out of the 
vehicle, Officer Deering placed Brown's hands behind his back 
"in a motion like they were handcuffed" and walked him back to 
the squad car.  Officer Deering denied this allegation and 
testified that he just told Brown to follow him back to the 
squad car. 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
10 
 
based upon specific and articulable facts.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 
21, 30.  Under the totality of the circumstances presented by 
this case, I conclude that Officer Deering's articulated facts 
were only generalizations or uncorroborated criminal inferences 
that, even in consideration of Brown's criminal history, did not 
amount to reasonable suspicion. 
¶64 According 
to 
Officer 
Deering's 
testimony, 
the 
following facts led him to reasonably believe a drug violation 
was in progress: 
 Brown drove a rental car which Officer Deering 
said he knew to be commonly used by drug 
traffickers; 
 Brown resided in Milwaukee, a "source city for 
drugs"; 
 The time was 2:44 a.m.; 
 Brown 
was 
coming 
from 
a 
dead-end 
street 
containing closed businesses; 
 Brown said he was coming directly from a Speedway 
gas station, which Officer Deering interpreted as 
a lie because there was no Speedway down the 
dead-end street; 
 Brown stated he was visiting a recent online 
acquaintance's residence, offering the cross-
streets but not the full address or her last 
name; 
 Brown stated he was not headed anywhere in 
particular at the time Officer Deering stopped 
him; and 
 Brown had prior drug-related arrests. 
¶65 The first three factors sweep in more law-abiding 
citizens than those who violate the law and should carry little 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
11 
 
if 
any 
weight 
in 
an 
individualized 
suspicion 
analysis.  
According to Officer Deering's testimony, Brown was in a rental 
car which "people that traffic drugs often use . . . for a 
variety of reasons."  However, the prevailing use of rental cars 
in Wisconsin is for lawful travel on its roads and highways.  
See United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 247 (4th Cir. 2015) 
("[T]he Defendants' use of a rental car . . . is of minimal 
value 
to 
the 
reasonable-suspicion 
evaluation. . . . [T]he 
overwhelming majority of rental car drivers on our nation's 
highways 
are 
innocent 
travelers 
with 
entirely 
legitimate 
purposes."); United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1109 (11th 
Cir. 2003) ("[T]he fact that [the defendant] was driving a 
rental car on a widely used interstate that also happens to be a 
known drug corridor, does not create a reasonable suspicion in 
this case.  These factors 'would likely apply to a considerable 
number of those traveling for perfectly legitimate purposes' and 
'do[] 
not 
reasonably 
provide . . . suspicion 
of 
criminal 
activity.'" (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 
United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 707 (11th Cir. 1986))). 
¶66 As for being a Milwaukeean, this court should not 
embrace factors that dilute an entire city's Fourth Amendment 
protections.  Officer Deering did not testify to any training or 
experience as support for his statement that Milwaukee is a 
"source city for drugs."  It is not reasonable to assume that 
every person who resides in the municipal boundaries of 
Milwaukee and drives through a different city in Wisconsin is a 
drug dealer.  See United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1270 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
12 
 
(10th Cir. 2001) ("Standing alone, a vehicle that hails from a 
purported known drug source area is, at best, a weak factor in 
finding suspicion of criminal activity."). 
¶67 The time of day likewise carries little weight in an 
individualized suspicion analysis.  Officer Deering never 
explained how the time, 2:44 a.m., particularly connected to 
drug activity.  See United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 
F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding "the time of day has 
very little, if any, probative value" where there is no 
proffered evidence that the particular time is connected to the 
suspected criminal activity).  The rental car, Brown's residence 
in Milwaukee, and the early morning hour contribute little to an 
analysis of reasonable suspicion. 
¶68 Several of the other factors are uncorroborated 
inferences and similarly offer weak support for reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity was in progress.  Brown turned 
from a dead-end street of closed businesses.  There was no 
testimony that this particular street was known to police as a 
frequent location for drug deals, or that another car or person 
was observed leaving the area to corroborate a drug transaction, 
which of course requires more than one person. 
¶69 Brown's perceived "lie" about coming directly from a 
Speedway gas station hinges on Officer Deering's interpretation 
of the word "directly."  According to Officer Deering's 
testimony, Brown's vehicle was coming from the same direction as 
the Speedway when Officer Deering first observed it.  Brown 
testified he was going to Speedway when he turned onto the dead-
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
13 
 
end street to change direction.  Brown could have reasonably 
interpreted Officer Deering's question as asking whether he was 
coming from the Speedway without making any additional stops. 
¶70 Likewise, Brown's response that he did not know the 
last name or exact street address of an online acquaintance does 
not suggest criminal activity in progress.  Brown lived in 
Milwaukee and testified that he was unfamiliar with Fond du Lac.  
It is just as reasonable that he either did not recall or did 
not want to give officers his acquaintance's full street address 
or name. 
¶71 Lastly, Brown's lack of specific travel plans may have 
been vague, but they did not conflict with his prior answers 
such that it corroborated Officer Deering's criminal suspicions.  
In total, Officer Deering's uncorroborated inferences drawn from 
Brown's consistent and innocuous responses amounted to nothing 
more than an insufficient hunch.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 
("[D]ue weight must be given, not to [an officer's] inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific 
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the 
facts in light of his experience."). 
¶72 The most individualized, suggestive evidence of any 
wrongdoing is a propensity inference from Brown's prior drug-
related arrests.  But criminal history alone is an insufficient 
basis for reasonable suspicion: 
Under the Fourth Amendment our society does not allow 
police officers to round up the usual suspects.  An 
officer relying on his or her knowledge of [an 
individual's] criminal record is required to pair that 
knowledge with concrete factors to demonstrate that 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
14 
 
there [is] a reasonable suspicion of current criminal 
activity. 
 
In 
other 
words, 
knowledge 
of 
an 
individual's criminal history can corroborate[], but 
not substitute for objective indications of ongoing 
criminality. 
United States v. Castle, 825 F.3d 625, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and quoted 
sources omitted); see also United States v. Santos, 403 
F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Even people with prior 
convictions retain Fourth Amendment rights; they are not roving 
targets for warrantless searches."). 
¶73 Here, Brown's history of prior arrests is not paired 
with concrete observations of a drug crime.  Officer Deering 
testified that he did not smell drugs or see any physical signs 
of drug use.  See State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶31, 234 
Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795; Malone, 274 Wis. 2d 540, ¶36.  
There was no testimony regarding Brown being nervous or making 
any furtive movements.  See McGill, 234 Wis. 2d 560, ¶29 
(considering overt nervousness); State v. Buchanan, 2011 WI 49, 
¶19, 334 Wis. 2d 379, 799 N.W.2d 775 (considering furtive 
movements).  There were no inconsistencies in Brown's responses.  
Instead, this case involves a criminal history paired with 
sweeping 
generalizations 
and 
uncorroborated 
inferences.  
"Circumstances must not be so general that they risk sweeping 
into 
valid 
law-enforcement 
concerns 
persons 
on 
whom 
the 
requisite individualized suspicion has not focused."  State v. 
Gordon, 2014 WI App 44, ¶12, 353 Wis. 2d 468, 846 N.W.2d 483.  I 
conclude that Officer Deering did not have reasonable suspicion 
to seize Brown after the reasonable conclusion of the traffic 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
15 
 
stop and therefore the seizure and subsequent search of Brown 
were unconstitutional.6 
IV 
¶74 Lastly, in addition to highlighting the majority's 
disregard of recognized Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
misapplication of Floyd, I must also address one of the real-
world consequences of the majority opinion's rejection of the 
reasonableness inquiry:  unchecked implicit bias.  I discuss 
social science research on implicit bias not to depart from 
constitutional text as the concurrence postulates, but instead 
to illustrate empirically how far our jurisprudence has strayed 
from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.7 
                                                 
6 An unconstitutional seizure taints any evidence recovered 
during that seizure, even if the search leading to the evidence 
was conducted upon otherwise valid consent.  See United States 
v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 544 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding the 
taint of a driver's unconstitutional seizure invalidates any 
consent to a search made during that seizure). 
7 Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's belief that invoking 
social science research in judicial decisionmaking leads to 
violations of civil rights is ironic as it is her majority 
opinion that broadens government discretion at the expense of 
individual liberty.  Concurrence, ¶¶40-46. 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
16 
 
¶75 The concept of implicit bias has been well-researched8 
and can best be described as follows.  In order to effectively 
function in a complex world, the human brain makes associations 
implicitly, or "outside conscious attentional focus."  See 
Greenwald & Krieger, supra ¶75 n.8, at 947.  These associations, 
which can be beneficial and helpful, also include observations 
sorted by social categories like race or gender, which in turn 
trigger implicit stereotypes and attitudes.  See id. at 948-952; 
see also L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth 
Amendment, 87 Ind. L.J. 1143, 1147 (2012). 
¶76 Problematically, these subconscious stereotypes and 
attitudes 
may 
operate 
in 
direct 
contradiction 
to 
one's 
"consciously and genuinely held thoughts and feelings."  L. Song 
                                                                                                                                                             
Besides the irony in the concurrence, it disregards the 
important role of social science research in guiding the United 
States Supreme Court to correct course when the law has allowed 
government infringement of protected civil liberties.  See State 
v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶¶102-03, 389 Wis. 2d 190, 935 
N.W.2d 813 (Dallet, J., dissenting) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); and Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).  The Constitution was not drafted 
in a social vacuum, nor does it operate in one.  Our decisions 
interpreting the Constitution have real-world consequences.  If 
social science research can assist this court in assessing how 
faithfully our decisions protect constitutional rights, then we 
would only reinforce the institutional legitimacy of the 
judiciary by taking such research into consideration. 
8 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The 
Implicit 
Revolution: 
 
Reconceiving 
the 
Relation 
Between 
Conscious 
and 
Unconscious, 
72 
Am. 
Psychol. 
861 
(2017) 
(synthesizing the significant research efforts and findings in 
the field of implicit cognition); Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:  Scientific Foundations, 94 
Cal. L. Rev. 945 (2006). 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
17 
 
Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police Character, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 44 Ariz. St. L.J. 267, 271-72 (citing Jerry Kang & 
Kristin Lane, A Future History of Implicit Social Cognition and 
the 
Law 
8 
(Aug. 
12, 
2009) 
(unpublished 
manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458678); see also Heather M. Kleider 
et al., Looking Like A Criminal:  Stereotypical Black Facial 
Features Promote Face Source Memory Error, 40 Memory & Cognition 
1200, 
1204 
(2012) 
("Overall, 
these 
findings 
support 
our 
hypotheses that the association between stereotypical facial 
features and criminality is likely automatic and/or reflexive, 
and not reliant on one's individual perceptions of Black men as 
a whole.").  A wealth of data collected by Harvard University's 
Project Implicit confirms that implicit biases can influence our 
decisions without any awareness that these biases even exist.9  
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education.html. 
¶77 The 
influence 
of 
implicit 
bias 
is 
particularly 
problematic in the policing context, where officers are tasked 
with 
rapidly 
judging 
stressful 
and 
potentially 
dangerous 
                                                 
9 Project Implicit collects this data through its online 
Implicit Association Tests that measure implicit attitudes 
across social categories like age, gender, race, and sexuality.  
See 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/takeatest.html; 
see 
also Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the 
Implicit Association Test:  III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive 
Validity, 97 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 17 (2009); Brian A. 
Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting 
Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web 
Site, 6 Group Dynamics:  Theory, Research, & Practice 101 
(2002); Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L.K. 
Schwartz, 
Measuring 
Individual 
Differences 
in 
Implicit 
Cognition:  The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. Personality & 
Soc. Psychol. 1464 (1998). 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
18 
 
situations based upon limited information that is largely 
ambiguous.10  See Richardson, supra ¶76, at 270-71.  Research 
demonstrates that "[i]mplicit biases translate most readily into 
discriminatory behavior . . . when people have wide discretion 
in making quick decisions with little accountability."  Jerry 
Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 
1124, 1142 (2012).  Social psychologists have thus come to 
understand that much of what has been labeled "racial profiling" 
is likely to instead be spontaneous and unintended.  See Megan 
Quattlebaum, Let's Get Real:  Behavioral Realism, Implicit Bias, 
                                                 
10 For example, empirical evidence suggests Black and 
Hispanic drivers are stopped more frequently, for longer, and 
searched more often than White drivers.  See Sean Hecker, Race 
and Pretextual Traffic Stops:  An Expanded Role for Civilian 
Review Board, 28 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 551, 558-65 (1997); 
see also Emma Pierson et al., A Large-scale Analysis of Racial 
Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States, 4 Nature 
Human Behaviour (May 4, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s
41562-020-0858-1.pdf.  One explanation is that officers are more 
likely to infer criminality from a Black driver's ambiguous 
behavior——like pulling out of a dead-end street——than when a 
White driver engages in that same ambiguous behavior.  See 
Richardson, supra ¶75, at 1148-50; see also Jennifer L. 
Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black:  Race, Crime, and Visual 
Processing, 87 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 876, 883 (2004) 
(interpreting data showing participants' selective attention 
more quickly focused on a Black male face when primed to think 
about crime to mean "[n]ot only are Blacks thought of as 
criminal, but also crime is thought of as Black."). 
I do not intend this dissent to suggest police officers 
generally, or Officer Deering specifically, act in bad faith or 
intentionally abuse their discretion to achieve these observed 
disparities.  After all, "[a]n officer may feel genuinely 
suspicious, without realizing that those feelings were affected 
by non-conscious biases and that identical behaviors of a white 
individual may not have attracted his attention."  Richardson, 
supra ¶76, at 278. 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
19 
 
and the Reasonable Police Officer, 14 Stan. J. Civ. Rts. & Civ. 
Liberties 1, 5 (2018). 
¶78 The Terry decision instructs courts to differentiate 
police hunches based on general, unparticularized information 
from reasonable inferences based on articulable and specific 
facts, thereby mitigating the influence of any implicit bias on 
discretionary searches and seizures.  The promised protection of 
the reasonable suspicion standard, however, has been diluted by 
this court's growing acceptance of weakly-correlated criminal 
inferences from generic or generalized factors in direct 
contrast to the particularized circumstances required under 
Terry.  See Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶¶84-91 (Ann Walsh Bradley, 
J., dissenting).  And now, under the majority's interpretation 
of Floyd, courts will no longer even reach the question of 
reasonable suspicion.  Police may simply delay issuing a traffic 
citation until they have exhausted their investigative tools to 
explore hunches in the name of safety.  Without inquiring into 
the reasonableness of these delays, the duration of a traffic 
stop falls solely to the unfettered discretion of an officer 
whose judgments, like all human beings, are susceptible to 
implicit bias.  By disavowing any meaningful review of officer 
discretion during a traffic stop, the majority opinion turns a 
blind eye to the disparities caused by implicit bias, despite 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
20 
 
the seemingly even-handed promise of the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.11 
¶79 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
                                                 
11 The Fourth Amendment sets "the minimal constitutional 
standards," and this court can and has interpreted Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution to afford greater 
protections.  See State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 132, 423 
N.W.2d 823 (1988); State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶60, 245 
Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625 ("Indeed, herein, we find that 
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution guarantees 
more protection than the Fourth Amendment provides under the 
good faith exception as adopted in [United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897 (1984)].").  After all, "[i]t is always conceivable 
that the Supreme Court could interpret the [F]ourth [A]mendment 
in a way that undermines the protection Wisconsin citizens have 
from unreasonable searches and seizures under [A]rticle I, 
[S]ection 11, Wisconsin Constitution."  Eason, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 
¶60 (quoted source omitted).  As the late Justice William J. 
Brennan, Jr. advocated: 
[T]he decisions of the [United States Supreme] Court 
are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions 
regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions 
of state law.  Accordingly, such decisions are not 
mechanically applicable to state law issues, and state 
court judges and the members of the bar seriously err 
if they so treat them.  Rather, state court judges, 
and 
also 
practitioners, 
do 
well 
to 
scrutinize 
constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only 
if they are found to be logically persuasive and well-
reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the 
policies 
underlying 
specific 
constitutional 
guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight 
as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state 
guarantees.  I suggest to the bar that, although in 
the past it might have been safe for counsel to raise 
only federal constitutional issues in state courts, 
plainly it would be most unwise these days not also to 
raise the state constitutional questions. 
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection 
of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 502 (1977) (footnote 
omitted). 
No.  2017AP774-CR.rfd 
 
 
 
1