Case Title: In Re: Anthony W.

Citation: 388 Md. 251

Docket Number: 136/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
In Re:   Anthony W.
No. 136, September Term, 2004
HEADNOTE:
JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS — EVIDENCE — CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICE
TESTIMONY — In the interest of fundamental fairness, juveniles may be adjudged delinquent
only upon trustworthy evidence that satisfies the reasonable doubt standard.  To that end, the
common law accomplice corroboration rule, which requires that the testimony of an accomplice
be corroborated by some independent evidence, applies in juvenile proceedings.   
In the Circuit Court for Frederick County
Criminal No. 10-J-02-013767DELQ DP
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 136
September Term, 2004
__________________________________
IN RE:   ANTHONY W.
__________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene,
   JJ.
__________________________________
Opinion by Greene, J.
__________________________________
Filed: August 1, 2005
1 The malicious destruction of property offense codified in Md. Code (2002), § 6-301(a), (b)
and (c) of the Crim. Law Article provides: 
“(a) Prohibited. A person may not willfully and maliciously destroy, injure, or deface
the real or personal property of another.
(b) Penalty – Property damage of at least $500. A person who, in violation of this
section, causes damage of at least $500 to the property is guilty of a misdemeanor and
on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or a fine not
exceeding $2,500 or both.
(c) Penalty – Property damage of less than $500. A person who, in violation of this
section, causes damage of less than $500 to the property is guilty of a misdemeanor
and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 60 days or a fine not
exceeding $500 or both.”
Anthony W., respondent, was charged in juvenile court with the malicious destruction
of property.1  During the trial, respondent moved for dismissal, alleging that the State’s case
consisted only of the testimony of two accomplices that was not corroborated in any manner.
The motion to dismiss was denied.  On November 14, 2002, the Circuit Court for Frederick
County, sitting as a juvenile court, found that Anthony W. was involved in the delinquent act.
Anthony W. filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and the intermediate
appellate court reversed the juvenile court.
We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari, which contains two questions
combined into one. For purposes of clarity, we separate and reword the two questions:
1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that the
accomplice corroboration rule applicable in criminal cases applies
in juvenile cases?
2. Did the Court of Special Appeals improperly hold that the
evidence was insufficient to find that Anthony W. committed the
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act of malicious destruction of property because there was no
corroboration of the testimony of the two alleged accomplices?
We hold that the common law rule, applicable in criminal proceedings, requiring
independent evidence to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, also applies in juvenile
cases. As to the second question, however, we reverse the Court of Special Appeals. We hold
that the trial judge was not clearly erroneous in finding that the State’s two witnesses were
not accomplices whose testimony needed to be corroborated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Sometime during the late evening of May 10 and early morning of May 11, 2002, Jose
Gonzales, Keith Steers, and Anthony W. were driving around the area of Kemptown Church
Road in Frederick County with no particular destination in mind.  According to the testimony
of Keith Steers, the front seat passenger and one of two witnesses for the State, Anthony W.
told Jose Gonzales, the driver, to stop the car in the parking lot of Kemptown Elementary
School.  After Gonzales stopped the car, Anthony W. exited the car from the back seat and
went toward a school bus.  Shortly thereafter, Steers and Gonzales also got out of the car and
went to the rear of the school bus, which was about fifteen feet from the car.  Steers testified
that the respondent entered the bus by breaking the glass in the front door of the bus.
According to Steers, Anthony W. smashed a number of windows with a fire extinguisher
stored in the bus and sprayed the interior.  Steers and Gonzales testified that they entered the
bus shortly after Anthony W. and attempted to stop him from breaking additional windows.
2
Md. Rule 4-248. “On motion of the State’s Attorney, the court may indefinitely postpone trial
of a charge by making the charge ‘stet’ on the docket.”
-3-
Neither Steers nor Gonzales broke any windows. They did, however, remove a box of road
flares as all three left the bus. 
On cross-examination, Steers testified that he had been charged with misdemeanor
theft for taking the box of flares from the bus, and that the charge was stetted2 in exchange
for his testimony against the respondent.
In a series of questions, the defense attorney for Anthony W. asked Steers:
Q. Now you say that your case was placed on the stet docket?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And was that, what was the agreement that your case be placed on the
stet docket, Mr. Steers? Did you make an agreement with the, with the
State’s Attorney’s Office?
A. That I stay out of trouble.
Q. Did you also make an agreement that if your case, your theft case was
placed on the stet docket, that you would testify against –
A. Oh –
Q. – Tony.
A. Yes sir.
Q. Now at the time that your case was . . . and you, you said you were
charged with misdemeanor theft?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And that’s what was placed on the stet, stet docket?
A. Yes sir.
Q. So, and do you know what the penalty for misdemeanor theft is?
A. It’s a $5000 fine and up to a year and a half in jail, I think.
Q. All right. So you knew that by testifying against, against Tony, you          
    could avoid being prosecuted and potentially facing that penalty and jail. Is   
    that correct?
A. Yes sir.
3
 “A nolle prosequi is an official declaration by the State, announcing that it will not pursue the
charges in a particular charging document.  The nolle prosequi essentially wipes out the
charges pending against the defendant and precludes the State from prosecuting the defendant
under the charging document that was nolle prossed.”  In re Darren M., 358 Md. 104, 112,
747 A.2d 612, 616 (2000) (citations omitted).  See also, Md. Rule 4-247, which provides: 
(a) Disposition by Nolle Prosequi.  The State's Attorney may terminate a
prosecution on a charge and dismiss the charge by entering a nolle prosequi
on the record in open court.  The defendant need not be present in court when
the nolle prosequi is entered, but in that event the clerk shall send notice to the
defendant, if the defendant's whereabouts are known, and to the defendant's
attorney of record.
(b) Effect of Nolle Prosequi.  When a nolle prosequi has been entered on a
charge, any conditions of pretrial release on that charge are terminated, and
any bail bond posted for the defendant on that charge shall be released.  The
clerk shall take the action necessary to recall or revoke any outstanding
warrant or detainer that could lead to the arrest or detention of the defendant
because of that charge.
-4-
The State’s second witness, Gonzales, after being advised of his rights, declined to
testify until the State entered a “nol pros with prejudice”3 on his theft charge, which also
stemmed from the taking of the box of flares from the bus. After a recess, the State agreed to
either enter a nolle prosequi with prejudice or dismiss the case with prejudice. 
According to Gonzales, he was “just driving around cuz . . . there was nothing to do,”
when they all decided to drive down the road past the elementary school. After parking on
the left-hand side of the building where the school buses were parked, he then testified that
the following occurred:
Tony got out of the car and just tried to find a way into the bus. We
circled the bus around one time to see if there was [sic] any windows open.
And then he got through the [passenger] door [of the bus] like I said at the first
time. He’d broken in from the inside somehow. I don’t know how he did it. 
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* * * *
[Anthony W.] [g]ot on the bus, started looking around, went up and
down the aisle found a fire extinguisher, looked at it for a minute, then
apparently brought it back outside the emergency exit in the back of the bus.
He bashed out the windows with his foot at the time.  And then had opened
after he’d broken the glass and then went inside with the fire extinguisher and
just squirted all of the inside of it, and then just randomly started bashing out
windows.  And at the time I was in the driver seat of my car saying what are
you doing? Get out. Don’t do that. You know, someone’s gonna come and find
out . . . .  I was trying to get him off the bus, telling him not to do that, and he
kept doing that. So at the time I was saying this from my car.  Then I got onto
the bus and tried to grab a hold of him. I told him to get off the bus.
* * * *
Keith was in the . . . passenger side . . . [n]ext to me.  We were both
telling him to get off the bus. Get off the bus.  And Keith was telling me
constantly what is he doing. Tell him to get off the bus. Get him off the bus.
We, at the same time, we were just telling him to get off the bus.  He wouldn’t
listen.  So Keith got on the bus and tried to pull him off.  He wouldn’t do it so
Keith got back off the bus. Then I tried to get him off.  He wouldn’t budge.
And then I got off the bus.
Gonzales admitted that while he and Steers were on the bus he stole the box of flares and that
Steers took one from the box.
At the conclusion of the State’s case, respondent moved for dismissal, alleging that
the State’s case consisted of the testimony of two accomplices that was not corroborated in
any manner.  The juvenile court judge denied the motion.  The court found that the State’s
two witnesses were not accomplices for the purposes of the accomplice corroboration rule.
In a written order issued the day of the adjudicatory hearing, the court stated that the State
had proven “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Anthony W. was involved as alleged for the
4Rule 8-131(c) Action tried without a jury.  
When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will
review the case on both the law and the evidence.  It will not set aside the
judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and
(continued ...)
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charge of malicious destruction of property. On November 14, 2002, respondent was placed
on probation and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $250.00.
In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the
Circuit Court. In re Anthony W., 159 Md. App. 514, 859 A.2d 679 (2004). The majority
reasoned that, 
they [the three youths] drove to the scene and drove around looking for
open windows on a bus, from which one may reasonably infer they intended
to enter. Finding no easy access, [Anthony W.] broke the door of a bus and
entered. The alleged accomplices voiced no objections until the window
breaking ensued. The offense was committed when the door was broken
open; the window breaking was not a separate offense, it was an
acceleration of the illegal activity in which all three were engaged. 
In re Anthony W., 159 Md. App. at 519, 859 A.2d at 682.  In conclusion, the Court of
Special Appeals stated that, “as a matter of sound policy,” the rule requiring corroboration of
accomplice testimony applies in juvenile proceedings.”  Id.  The Court of Special Appeals
then held that Anthony W. was wrongly adjudicated as being involved based on the
uncorroborated testimony of two witnesses who were, “in [the court’s] view” both
accomplices.  Thereafter, we granted certiorari. 385 Md. 161, 867 A.2d 1062 (2005).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of appellate review that we apply in a juvenile delinquency matter is
mandated by Maryland Rule 8-131 (c).4  The first question presented to this Court is whether
4(...continued)
will give due regard to tle opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.
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the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the accomplice corroboration rule applies
in juvenile cases.  As a pure question of law, the appropriate standard of review is de novo.
When the trial court’s decision “involves an interpretation and application of Maryland . . .
case law, [we] must determine whether the [trial court’s] conclusions are legally correct . . .”.
 Nesbit v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 382 Md. 65, 72, 854 A.2d 879, 883
(2004).  See Helinski v. Harford Mem. Hosp., Inc., 376 Md. 606, 614, 831 A.2d 40, 45
(2003) (noting that we must apply the law as we discern it to be); Ferris v. State, 355 Md.
356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999). 
The second question is whether the intermediate appellate court erred in concluding
that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile judge’s finding of involvement
because there was no corroboration of the testimony of the two alleged accomplices.  In the
case, In re Timothy F., 343 Md. 371, 380, 681 A.2d 501, 505 (1996), we said: 
Appellate review of the [trial] court’s judgment on the evidence
is limited to determining whether there is a sufficient evidentiary 
basis for the court’s underlying factual findings.  In a criminal case, 
the appropriate inquiry is not whether the reviewing court believes 
that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but 
rather, whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
We have applied the same standard of review in  juvenile delinquency cases.  In re Antoine
H., 319 Md. 101, 107-108, 570 A.2d 1239, 1242 (1990).  Consistently, we have held that the
5 The July 1, 1969 version of Md. Rule 912(c) also provides that, “[t]he rules of evidence
applicable to civil cases shall apply to all other hearings.”
-8-
judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unless the trial judge’s findings of fact are
clearly erroneous.  In re Timothy, 343 Md. at 380, 681 A.2d at 505.
DISCUSSION
I.
Whether the accomplice corroboration rule applies to juvenile proceedings is a matter
of first impression in this Court.  The State relies on In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 646 A.2d
1012 (1994), as well as the legislative history of the juvenile causes law, to support its
assertion that the accomplice corroboration rule, applicable in criminal cases, does not apply
in juvenile proceedings. 
In 1969, on the recommendation of the Rules Committee, we adopted Md. Rule
912(c), which specified that, “[t]he rules of evidence applicable to criminal cases shall apply
to [juvenile] delinquency hearings.” Md. Rule 912(c) (effective July 1, 1969).5 The State
argues that if the history of the law of juvenile causes was complete as of July 1, 1969, an
argument could be made that the corroboration requirement applies in juvenile proceedings.
The language of Md. Rule 912(c), however, no longer exists and its language has not
survived. See In re Delric H., 150 Md. App. 234, 246, 819 A.2d 1117, 1124 (2003)  (“As a
result of the amendment to Chapter 900 of the Maryland Rules, there is no present
counterpart to former Rule 912(c), nor has there been since the passage of the Juvenile
Causes Act in 1975.”). 
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In 1975, Chapter 900 of the Maryland Rules was completely revised.  The new
evidence rule regarding adjudicatory hearings stated that, “[t]he allegations of a juvenile
petition alleging delinquency must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before a respondent
may be adjudged delinquent.  An uncorroborated confession made by a child out of court is
not sufficient proof of delinquency.”  Md. Rule 914(e)(1).  In an Order of this Court dated
June 5, 1996, effective January 1, 1997, we renumbered this rule.  It is currently Md. Rule
11-114 (2005).  Language with respect to the proof in a petition alleging delinquency has
remained the same throughout the subsequent revisions to Rule 914(e)(1).  It is the State’s
position that silence on the issue of accomplice testimony compels the conclusion that the
rule requiring corroboration was never intended to be applied in juvenile proceedings, and it
should not be said to apply now. 
The State further argues that the rule requiring the corroboration of accomplice
testimony has never been constitutionally compelled, and, therefore, it is not necessary for
this Court to adopt the rule to juvenile proceedings as we have done in the adoption of other
constitutional procedural safeguards.  See In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 811 A.2d 310 (2002)
(holding that the right to a speedy trial extends to juvenile delinquency proceedings, as one of
“the essentials of due process and fair treatment” required by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87
S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)); In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 786 A.2d 684 (2001)
(extending the double jeopardy prohibition to juvenile proceedings); In re Parris W., 363
Md. 717, 770 A.2d 202 (2001) (extending the right to counsel to juvenile proceedings).
6  An alleged delinquent can lose his freedom, both prior to and following adjudication. See
Md. Code (2002 Repl.Vol.),   §§ 3-8A-15 of the Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art. (describing the
protocol for detention and shelter care of juveniles prior to a hearing); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.,
§§ 3-8A-19(d)(1) (2002) (“In making a disposition on a petition under this subtitle, the court
may . . . (ii) commit the child to the custody or under the guardianship of the Department of
Juvenile Justice, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, or a public or licensed
private agency on terms that the court considers appropriate . . . .”).  A court may also order
a juvenile to pay restitution.  See Crim. Proc. Art. § 11-603 (“A court may enter a judgment
of restitution that orders a defendant or child respondent to make restitution in addition to
any other penalty for the commission of a crime or delinquent act,” if as a direct result of the
crime, specific qualifications are met.). 
7 See Md. Code (2002 Repl.Vol.),  § 3-8A-18(c) of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art. which states
“(1) Before a child is adjudicated delinquent, the allegations in the petition that the child has
committed a delinquent act must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt (2) Before a child is
found to have committed the violation charged in a citation, the allegations in the citation
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
-10-
Respondent adopts the position taken by the Court of the Special Appeals that the
accomplice corroboration rule applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings.  Respondent also
notes the similarities between criminal and juvenile proceedings,6 including the common
applicability of the reasonable doubt standard.7 In addition, the respondent recognizes that
the accomplice corroboration rule is a product of case law promulgated by this Court. While
it is true that no Maryland Rule or statute imposes the accomplice corroboration rule to
juvenile cases, the respondent asserts that it is equally true that no Maryland Rule or statute
imposes such a requirement in adult prosecutions. Furthermore, according to the respondent,
the rationale for the accomplice corroboration rule in adult proceedings is to provide
evidentiary protection to the accused and to provide such protection is a legitimate concern
present in juvenile proceedings.
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The Accomplice Corroboration Rule
In order to sustain a conviction of an adult based upon the testimony of an accomplice,
that testimony must be corroborated by some independent evidence.  Williams v. State, 364
Md. 160, 179, 771 A.2d 1082, 1093 (2001) (“The longstanding law in Maryland is that a
conviction may not rest on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.”); Collins v.
State, 318 Md. 269, 280, 568 A.2d 1, 6 (1990) (“The rule in Maryland that a person accused
of a crime may not be convicted based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is
well established.”).
The accomplice corroboration rule was created by this Court in the case of Luery v.
State, 116 Md. 284, 81 A. 681 (1911), which noted:
[T]he undoubted fact is that the experience of the courts, which is
certainly much greater than that of juries, is that it is unsafe, at least
in the great majority of cases, to rest a conviction upon the
uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice . . . .  As the reason for
the rule, as adopted by most courts, is that the testimony of an
accomplice alone and unsupported is regarded as too doubtful to be
safe, the important matter is to have him supported in at least some
of the material points involved tending to show the guilt of the
accused.
Luery, 116 Md. at 293-94, 81 A. at 684. 
The necessity for the rule was later explained and emphasized in Watson v. State, 208
Md. 210, 117 A.2d 549 (1955), in the following terms:
The reason for the rule requiring the testimony of an accomplice to
be corroborated is that it is the testimony of a person admittedly
contaminated with guilt, who admits his participation in the crime
for which he particularly blames the defendant and it should be
regarded with great suspicion and caution, because otherwise the
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life or liberty of an innocent person might be taken away by a
witness who makes the accusation either to gratify his malice or to
shield himself from punishment, or in the hope of receiving
clemency by turning State’s evidence.
Watson, 208 Md. at 217, 117 A.2d at 552 (citations omitted).
In Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241, 378 A.2d 1104 (1977), the defendant appealed a
murder conviction contending that it rested solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice.  On certiorari, the parties addressed whether the long-standing rule that a person
accused of a crime may not be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice
should be abandoned.  We stated:
“[T]he evidence of an accomplice is universally received with
caution and weighed and scrutinized with great care . . . .  When
such a one has as a motive the prospect of freedom, a milder
sentence or the favor of the officers who have him in charge, an
innocent one may undoubtedly be made to suffer, if great caution
is not used.  Hence, it would seem to be safer to require some
corroboration.” 
Brown, 281 Md. at 243-244, 378 A.2d at 1106-1107 (quoting Luery, 116 Md. at 292-93, 81
A. at 684).  Not much in the way of evidence is required to corroborate the testimony of an
accomplice.  Brown, 281 Md. at 244, 378 A.2d at 1107.  This Court saw the need to retain
the accomplice corroboration requirement due to the escalating prosecutorial trend to freely
utilize accomplices as State witnesses.  Brown, 281 Md. at 246, 378 A.2d at 1108.  In Brown,
we also noted that, “[even] those jurisdictions which . . . do not require corroboration of an
accomplice’s testimony all reflect concern about the reliability of accomplice testimony,”
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and recognize that the “testimony should be received with caution and scrutinized with care.”
Brown, 281 Md. at 245, 378 A.2d at 1107. 
Juvenile Causes Law
“Prior to the beginning of the twentieth century, under the common law view
prevalent throughout the country, children above the age of seven were tried as adults,” and
they “were afforded the same legal protections and received the same punishments as adult
criminal offenders.”  In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 90, 646 A.2d 1012, 1014 (1994) (citing In
re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 521, 255 A.2d 419, 421 (1969), appeal dismissed, 403 U.S. 926,
91 S.Ct. 2257, 29 L.Ed.2d 706 (1971)).  Following a national trend for reform, due to an
acknowledgment of the inherent differences between adults and children, jurisdictions
throughout the country began creating separate systems of courts that addressed the needs of
juvenile offenders. In re Victor B., 336 Md. at 90, 646 A.2d at 1014.  “In contrast to the
adversarial nature of the adult system . . . juvenile proceedings were informal and flexible in
nature, psychiatric and psychological assistance was sought, the rules of evidence relaxed,
and many proceedings were not open to the public.”  In re Victor B., 336 Md. at 91, 646
A.2d at 1014 (citations omitted). 
Over the next century, however, delinquency proceedings began to take on the more
rehabilitative and retributive nature of adult criminal proceedings.  In re Victor B., 336 Md.
at 90-91, 646 A.2d at 1014.  Whether specific protections provided to adult defendants would
also be provided to juveniles was first discussed in depth in 1967 by the United States
Supreme Court in In re Gault, 587 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.E.2d 527 (1967).  Because of
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the increasingly penal overtones of juvenile court systems, Gault held that juvenile
proceedings which may lead to commitment in a state institution must measure up to the
“essentials of due process and fair treatment.”  These essentials include written notice of the
charges to the child and parents in advance to allow for preparation, notification of the right
to either retained or appointed counsel, awareness of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination, and, absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and an order of
commitment based only on sworn testimony subject to the opportunity for cross-examination
in accordance with constitutional requirements.  In re Gault, 587 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18
L.E.2d 527.
“We have previously noted that juvenile proceedings are civil and not criminal in
nature . . . .”  In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 57, 811 A.2d 310, 314 (2002) (quoting In re
Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 69, 763 A.2d 136, 146 (2000)).  Nonetheless, we recognize that
only a prosecutor can initiate juvenile delinquency proceedings.  See Md. Code (1974, 2002
Repl. Vol.) § 3-8A-10(c)(4)(ii) of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article. The juvenile delinquency
proceeding is a prosecution in lieu of criminal proceedings.  See In re William A. 313 Md.
690, 694, 548 A.2d 130, 132 (1988); see also Lopez-Sanchez v. State, __ Md. __, __ A.2d __
(2005) (acknowledging that “so many rights enjoyed by criminal defendants have been held
to apply in juvenile proceedings that many of the procedural distinctions between the two
types of proceedings . . . have all but disappeared”) (citations omitted).  In that case we said:
The raison d’etre of the Juvenile Causes Act is that a child does
not commit a crime when he [or she] commits a delinquent act
and therefore is not a criminal.  [The child] is not to be punished
8 In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 185, 786 A.2d 684, 687 (2001) (prohibition against double
jeopardy); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724, 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001) (right to effective
assistance of counsel); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 76, 763 A.2d 136, 150 (2000) (statute
of limitations equivalent to that for criminal misdemeanor offenses); In re Montrail M., 325
Md. 527, 532-538, 601 A.2d 1102, 1104-1107 (1992) (doctrine of merger); In re William A.,
313 Md. 690, 698, 548 A.2d 130, 133-134 (1977) (infancy defense).
9 See Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241, 245, 378 A.2d 1104, 1107 n.2 (1977) (noting that in 1977
only Maryland and Tennessee required corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony as a
matter of case law, and that at that time, 17 other states had statutes requiring corroboration
of an accomplice’s testimony).
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but afforded supervision and treatment to be made aware of what
is right and what is wrong so as to be amenable to the criminal
laws. 
313 Md. at 695, 548 A.2d at 132 (1988) (citations omitted).
Although the proceedings are civil in nature, “[t]his does not mean that a juvenile
gives up all rights that a person would be entitled to in a criminal proceeding.”  Id.  As such,
this Court has recognized that some, but not all, rights granted to a criminal defendant are
applicable in juvenile proceedings.  See, e.g., In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 58-59, 811 A.2d
310, 315 (2002) (holding that juveniles must be afforded a speedy trial in delinquency
proceedings as a matter of fundamental fairness); see also Lopez-Sanchez, __ Md. at __, __
A.2d at __ (2005) (listing rights that are applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings).8  
In Maryland, the accomplice corroboration rule as applied to adults was developed
under the common law, rather than by constitutional or statutory mandate.9 Although we
have addressed the application of constitutional protections to juveniles, we have not
addressed whether this specific common law evidentiary rule applies.  Several other
jurisdictions, however, have discussed the issue with the majority holding in favor of
10 Georgia (T.L.T. v. State, 212 S.E.2d 650 (1975), Iowa (In re Dugan, 334 N.W.2d 300
(1983)), Minnesota (In re D.S., 306 N.W.2d 882 (1981)), Nevada (A Minor v. Juvenile Dep’t
Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 608 P.2d 509 (1980)), New York (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 343.2
(McKinney 1962)), North Dakota (496 N.W.2d 31 (1933)), and Oklahoma (Smith v. State,
525 P.2d 1251 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974)) have extended the accomplice corroboration rule
to juvenile proceedings.
11O.C.G.A. § 24-4-8 ( 2004), formerly O.C.G.A. § 38-121 (1933) provides, 
The testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact.  However,
in certain cases, including prosecutions for treason, prosecutions for perjury, and
felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single
witness is not sufficient. Nevertheless, corroborating circumstances may dispense
with the necessity for the testimony of a second witness, except in prosecutions for
treason.
12The Georgia code was revised after the T.L.T. opinion was reported.  The current language
relating to juvenile proceedings is located at Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-65(a) (2004).  The
statute provides, “[i]f the court finds on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the child
committed the acts by reason of which he or she is alleged to be delinquent or unruly, it shall
proceed immediately or at a later time to conduct a dispositional hearing for the purpose of
hearing evidence as to whether the child is in need of treatment, rehabilitation, or supervision
and shall make and file its findings thereon.” 
-16-
extending the rule. 10 
Under the Georgia statute,11 conviction of an adult based upon the testimony of an
accomplice may only be sustained if corroborating facts or circumstances connect the
defendant to the crime or lead to an inference of his or her guilt, and such corroboration must
be independent of the accomplice’s testimony.  T.L.T. v. State, 212 S.E.2d 650, 653 (Ga.
App. 1975) (citing West v. State, 209 S.E.2d 195 (Ga. 1974); Quaid v. State, 208 S.E.2d 336
(Ga. App. 1974)).  In the juvenile context, the Georgia statute12 “requires that a court must
find on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the acts by reason of which
13NRS § 175.291  (2004). Testimony of accomplice must be corroborated; sufficiency of
corroboration; accomplice defined. 
1.  A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless
he is corroborated by other evidence which in itself, and without the aid of
the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense; and the corroboration shall not be sufficient if
it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.
2.  An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution, for
the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in
which the testimony of the accomplice is given.
-17-
he is alleged to be delinquent.” T.L.T., 212 S.E.2d at 654. The Georgia court emphasized
Georgia’s statutes requiring, inter alia, proof beyond a reasonable doubt and United States
and Georgia Supreme Court decisions extending criminal rights to juveniles.  Id.  The
Georgia court then concluded that a “juvenile charged with ‘delinquency’ is entitled by right
to have the court apply those common law jurisprudential principles which experience and
reason have shown are necessary to give the accused the essence of a fair trial,” including
independent corroborative evidence of an accomplice’s testimony. Id.
In _____, A Minor v. Juvenile Dept. Fourth Judicial District, 608 P.2d 509 (Nev.
1980), the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the accomplice corroboration requirement,
mandated by statute,13 applies to proceedings wherein minors are adjudged juvenile
delinquents.  The court opined that, “[a]lthough the Nevada statute by its terms forbids only
‘convictions’ upon uncorroborated accomplice testimony, this Court has not interpreted this
language mechanically.” ______, A Minor, 608 P.2d at 510. In addition, the statute
governing juvenile adjudications requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt upon competent,
14 NRS § 62D.040(4) (2004), formerly NRS 62.193(4), provides,
If the child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act, the allegations
in the petition must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt
based upon competent, material and relevant evidence.
15 Cal. Penal Code § 1111 (2004).
A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless
it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the
defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is
not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the
circumstances thereof.
An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for
the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause
in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.
-18-
material, and relevant evidence that a child has committed the acts by reason of which he is
alleged to be delinquent.14  Id.  The court held that the corroboration requirement should be
applied in juvenile proceedings  consistent with Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S. Ct. 1779,
44 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1975) (holding that in the interest of fundamental fairness, the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, attaches to a juvenile’s adjudicatory hearing).  Id.
Although Georgia and Nevada have recognized that applying the accomplice
corroboration rule to juvenile proceedings comports with “common law jurisprudential
principles” and “fundamental fairness,” two jurisdictions have declined to extend the rule.
The California Supreme Court held that, although a conviction statutorily requires
corroboration of accomplice testimony,15 a finding of juvenile delinquency does not
16 Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-111(e)(1)(A) (1987).
A conviction cannot be had in any case of felony upon the testimony of
an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect
the defendant with the commission of the offense. The corroboration is
not sufficient if it merely shows that the offense was committed and the
circumstances thereof.
-19-
constitute a conviction.  Therefore, the court held that the statute does not require application
of the rule to juvenile proceedings.  In re Mitchell P., 587 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Cal. 1978).  As a
matter of constitutional due process, the court noted that “the essentials of due process and
fair treatment,” as stated in Gault, “[do] not compel the accomplice corroboration rule in
either criminal or juvenile proceedings.”  In re Mitchell P., 587 P.2d at 1147. Consequently,
the court was not compelled to extend the rule as a matter of constitutional due process. The
court also remarked that, although the accomplice corroboration rule has been codified by the
California Legislature to apply to adults in criminal proceedings, equal protection does not
require that the rule also apply in juvenile proceedings.  In re Mitchell P., 587 P.2d at 1148-
49.  The court concluded that the disparities between juveniles and adults were reasonably
related to the purpose of keeping juvenile proceedings sufficiently informal and distinct from
adult criminal proceedings. Id.
In Munhall v. State of Arkansas, 986 S.W.2d 863 (Ark. 1999), the Arkansas Supreme
Court agreed with the California court and declined to apply the Arkansas statute16 requiring
corroboration of accomplice testimony to juvenile proceedings.  The Arkansas court
explained that the clear legislative intent as evidenced by the plain language of the statute
-20-
limits its applicability to adults.  The words “conviction,” “felony,” and “defendant” do not
apply in juvenile proceedings.  Munhall, 986 S.W.2d at 864.  The court concluded that “[i]f
the accomplice-corroboration rule . . . is to be extended to juvenile hearings, it must be by
legislative enactment.” Munhall, 986 S.W.2d at 865.  Subsequently, in 2001 the Arkansas
legislature amended their statute to reflect that in felony cases the accomplice corroboration
rule applies in juvenile proceedings.  See  Ark. Code Ann., § 16-89-111(e)(1)(A) (1987, 2003
Supp.) (“A conviction or an adjudication of delinquency cannot be had in any case of felony
upon testimony of an accomplice including in juvenile court, unless corroborated by other
evidence tending to connect the defendant or the juvenile with the commission of the
offense.”).
Similar to juvenile court statutes in both Georgia and Nevada, Maryland Rule 11-
114(e)(1), which governs adjudicatory hearings in juvenile proceedings, requires that
allegations that a juvenile committed a delinquent act be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
See also Md. Code (2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-8A-18(c)(1) of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art. (stating
that before a child is adjudicated delinquent, the standard of proof for allegations in the
petition that the child has committed a delinquent act must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt).  The right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been held to apply to both adults
and juveniles by the United States Supreme Court.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90
S.Ct. 1068, 1075, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (“[T]he constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency
-21-
proceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault,” such as the right to
counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination.).
Because the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile cases is the same
standard applied in adult criminal cases, the same concerns regarding the potentially
untrustworthy nature of an accomplice’s testimony in adult criminal proceedings, as noted in
Watson, are also present in juvenile cases.  In the present case, the Court of Special Appeals
pointed out that, “a juvenile faced with the possibility of removal from his home and
placement in some state facility for rehabilitation or treatment is no less entitled to the benefit
of the accomplice-corroboration rule than an adult faced with possible incarceration for
committing an identical offense.  That analogy supports the concept of fundamental
fairness.”  In re Anthony W., 159 Md. App. 514, 524, 859 A.2d 679, 685 (2004). And as the
respondent notes in his brief, the interest of trustworthy evidence applies with equal force
regardless of the age of the person accused.  We agree. 
The State relies on the case of In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 646 A.2d 1012 (1994), in
which we addressed the question of whether the Criminal Rules of Procedure, under Title 4
of the Maryland Rules, apply to an adjudicatory proceeding in a juvenile case.  The
respondent in that case argued that the rules of Title 4 are applicable to juvenile proceedings
when there is no guidance within the juvenile rules themselves.  In re Victor B., 336 Md. at
89-90, 646 A.2d at 1014.  After considering “the pertinent procedural rules in light of the
history and underlying policies of the juvenile court,” we held that juvenile delinquency
proceedings are governed exclusively by Chapter 900 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure
-22-
and the criminal rules under Title 4 do not apply to juvenile proceedings.  In re Victor B., 336
Md. at 90, 646 A.2d at 1014.
Although Chapter 900 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure exclusively governs
juvenile delinquency proceedings, it is also within our authority to develop or extend
common law rules.  As stated in In re Victor B., “[j]uvenile proceedings are governed by a
separate, pervasive scheme of specific statutes and rules developed by the Maryland General
Assembly and the Court of Appeals.”  In re Victor B., 336 Md. at 96, 646 A.2d at 1017.
Pursuant to this authority and in the interest of fundamental fairness, we extend the rule
requiring accomplice corroboration to juvenile proceedings.
II.
Having concluded that the accomplice corroboration rule applies in juvenile
proceedings, we consider the question of whether the rule applies in this case.  The juvenile
court concluded that Steers and Gonzales were not accomplices, and, therefore, their
testimony did not require independent corroboration. 
The juvenile court’s analysis was as follows:
[It had been argued that] fundamentally . . . an individual cannot
be convicted on the basis of uncorroborated accomplice testimony.
* * * *
The fact that they drove the Respondent away, I don’t believe
makes anyone accomplices or accessories under any form of analysis
because there was not, at least on the evidence I have, whatever we might
assume, there’s not evidence that the intent was to conceal the act or the
perpetrator. 
-23-
* * * *
I think Jose Gonzales testified rather sincerely that they pulled into
the school parking lot and that while they were there, when they were in
the parking lot, the Respondent, Tony W., got out of the car, broke into
the bus, and started to break out windows and sprayed the fire
extinguisher.  At some point after he started that, both Gonzales and
Steers got onto the bus.  To one extent or another, how vehemently and
how sincerely they, they told him it was time to get, to stop it. Or not
whether to stop it or not, but to leave.  And I accept that when they got
off they committed these thefts.
* * * *
It seems to me that this misdemeanor destruction of property
began with the Respondent [Anthony W.] alone on the school bus.  The
fact that Gonzales and Steers at some point in this continuum may have
committed independent crimes, misdemeanors, does not make them
accomplices to this in the sense of the word for purposes of the
evidentiary rule.  For that reason I’m . . . going to find that Tony is
involved as to [the] charge of malicious destruction of property.
“To be an accomplice a person must participate in the commission of a crime
knowingly, voluntarily, and with common criminal intent with the principal offender, or must
in some way advocate or encourage the commission of the crime.”  State v. Raines, 326 Md.
582, 597, 606 A.2d 265, 272 (1992) (quoting Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 219, 117 A.2d
549, 553 (1955)); State v. Foster, 263 Md. 388, 393, 283 A.2d 411, 413 (1971)).  The act for
which the respondent was adjudged, malicious destruction of property, is a misdemeanor. As
such, all accessories are chargeable as principals.  Roddy v. Finnegan, 43 Md. 490, 503-504
(1876); Seward v. State, 208 Md. 341, 346, 118 A.2d 505, 507 (1955); Watson v. State, 208
Md. 210, 217, 117 A.2d 549, 552 (1955).  “The test commonly applied as to whether a
witness is an accomplice is whether he himself could have been indicted and punished for the
-24-
offense, either as a principal or as an accessory.”  Harriday v. State, 228 Md. 593, 596, 182
A.2d 40, 42 (1962) (citing Coleman v. State, 209 Md. 379, 386, 121 A.2d 254, 257 (1956)).
In Coleman, the defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him
because he was convicted solely as the result of the uncorroborated testimony of a witness he
considered to be an accomplice.  During the alleged accomplice’s testimony, she stated that
she knew nothing about the intent of the defendant to steal property, and there was no
evidence that she served in the participatory role as a lookout.  Coleman, 209 Md. at 387, 121
A.2d at 258.  We stated, “[t]his case was tried by the trial judge without a jury.  This Court
should not reverse a judgment of conviction in a nonjury case unless it finds that the trial
court’s conclusion was clearly erroneous.”  Id.  We held in that case that the trial judge was
not clearly erroneous in finding that the witness was not an accomplice to the crime for
which the defendant was convicted because there was evidence that the alleged accomplice
sat outside in a truck while the breaking and entry occurred and that she had no knowledge
that a crime was planned.  Id.
In Seward, the defendant was convicted of malicious destruction of property for
destroying a water tower and screen door with a bomb while associating with a group of
boys. The defendant appealed based on the trial judge’s finding that the defendant
encouraged the commission of the crime and was therefore chargeable as a principal to the
delinquent act.  Seward, 208 Md. at 346, 118 A.2d at 506-507.  Again, this Court stated that a
judgment of conviction in a nonjury case should not be reversed unless the trial court’s
conclusion was clearly erroneous.  Seward, 208 Md. at 346, 118 A.2d at 506-507.  The
-25-
defendant admitted to the police that all of the participants in the act discussed setting off the
bomb, that he knew who was making the bomb, and who was setting it off.  Seward, 208 Md.
at 349, 118 A.2d at 508. Knowing that the placing of the bomb was contemplated, the
defendant continued association with the group of boys and arrived at the locations with the
intention of detonating a bomb and watching it explode.  Seward, 208 Md. at 349-350, 118
A.2d at 508.  We there concluded that, from the evidence or from proper inference from the
evidence, the trial judge was not clearly wrong in finding that the appellant in some way
encouraged the commission of the crime and was therefore an accomplice.  Seward, 208 Md.
at 350, 118 A.2d at 509.
In Watson, the defendant was convicted for the murder of a baby.  The defendant
claimed that one of the witnesses was an accomplice and that he could not be convicted
based on the witness’s uncorroborated testimony.  Watson, 208 Md. at 216-217, 117 A.2d at
552.  There was no evidence that the witness knew that the defendant intended to kill the
child until he got the tub of water and put the child in it.  Watson, 208 Md. at 219, 117 A.2d
at 553. There was no evidence that she aided or abetted the crime or encouraged it.  Id.  In
holding that she was not an accomplice we stated: “To be an accomplice a person must
participate in the commission of the crime . . . with common criminal intent with the
principal offender, or must in some way advocate or encourage the commission of the
crime.”  Watson, 208 Md. at 219, 117 A.2d at 553. 
17 The Court of Special Appeals gave significant weight to the notion that the two witnesses
sought to bolster their credibility by admitting that they stole a box of flares from the bus.
In re Anthony W., 159 Md. App. at 518, 859 A.2d at 682.  “At the time of their testimony,
the charges against Steers had been stetted by the State, and Gonzales had refused to testify
until his charges were nol prossed.  The trial court expressed reservations about Steers’s
credibility due to his lying to a different judge about the theft of the flares.  Gonzales blamed
[respondent] for the entire breaking into the bus despite the fact that he drove the car to the
school property.”  In re Anthony W., 159 Md. App. at 518-519, 859 A.2d at 682. 
-26-
Returning to the present case, the Court of Special Appeals held that Anthony W.,
Steers, and Gonzales were all participants in the misdemeanor offenses of malicious
destruction of the bus and the theft of the property inside.  The court said:
Finding no easy access, [respondent] broke the door of a bus and entered.
The alleged accomplices voiced no objection until the window breaking
ensued.  The offense was committed when the door was broken open; the
window breaking was not a separate offense, it was an acceleration of the
illegal activity in which all three engaged.  We know of no authority for
defining and accomplice based on who did what after an illegal entry is
gained.  The objective was to enter the bus by whatever means was
required. 
In re Anthony W., 159 Md. App. 514, 519-520, 859 A.2d 679, 682 (2004).  Due to this
finding and the requirement that the accomplice corroboration rule applies to juvenile
delinquency proceedings, the Court of Special Appeals held that Steers’s and Gonzales’s
testimony needed independent corroboration, thereby reversing the judgment of the juvenile
court.17  In re Anthony W., 159 Md. App. at 519, 859 A.2d at 682. 
The question of whether the Circuit Court, sitting as a juvenile court, properly found
that the two witnesses were not accomplices, is a mixed question of law and fact. 
If there is no conflict in the evidence as to a witness’s participation in a
crime, or where his participation is conceded, the question whether the
witness is an accomplice is one of law for the trial judge to determine.
-27-
Conversely, where there is a conflict in the evidence as to the witness’s
participation in the crime either as a principal or as an accessory before
the fact, the question of whether he is an accomplice is one of fact . . . .
Rivenbark v. State, 58 Md. App. 626, 635, 473 A.2d 1329, 1333 (1984), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 311 Md. 147, 533 A.2d 271 (1987).  See also, Maryland Rule 8-131(c).  “This Court
determines whether there was any evidence, or proper inference from the evidence, upon
which the trial court could find the defendant guilty.  If the record shows such evidence or
proper inference, the Court of Appeals cannot find that the decision of the trial court was
clearly erroneous.”  Seward, 208 Md. at 346, 118 A.2d at 507 (citations omitted). 
The burden of proving that Steers and Gonzales were accomplices rested on the
respondent.  “[The courts] have consistently recognized as the rule that the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that a witness is an accomplice is on the defendant
asserting it. They have applied it, and we have not repudiated it . . . .  We deem it to be the
rule in this State.”  Bennett v. State, 283 Md. 619, 623, 392 A.2d 76, 78 (1978). 
Respondent contends that, as a matter of law, Steers and Gonzales were accomplices
whose testimony required independent corroborative evidence.  Where the trial judge has
ruled that the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, for the appellate court to reverse
that decision, the proof must be so clear and decisive that reasonable minds could not differ
in coming to the same conclusion.  Burroughs v. State, 88 Md. App. 229, 240, 594 A.2d 625,
630 (1991).  See also, Bishop v. State, 39 Md. App. 384, 390, 385 A.2d 1206, 1210 (1978)
(“[T]he court must find, in effect, that the testimony was so conclusive that, were a directed
-28-
verdict of guilty available in a criminal trial, and had the witness been the party charged with
the crime, it would have been the witness’s fate to have such entered against him.”). 
The State argues, and we agree, that the evidence respecting whether Steers and
Gonzales were accomplices is capable of being determined either way.  While we may agree
with the Court of Special Appeals that there was sufficient evidence to determine that Steers
and Gonzales were, in fact, accomplices to the delinquent act charged, the evidence does not
demand or require that an appellate court make such a finding.  In addition, “[w]e have held
repeatedly that when evidence relating to whether a witness is an accomplice is capable of
being determined either way and justifies different inferences in respect thereto, the question
is for the determination of the trier of fact . . . .”  State v. Foster, 263 Md. 388, 393-394, 283
A.2d 411, 413-414 (1971) (citing, with approval, the Court of Special Appeals in Foster v.
State, 11 Md. App. 40, 46, 272 A.2d 810, 813 (1921)).  Therefore, the clearly erroneous
standard of review is appropriate for this question.
The rationale behind the clearly erroneous standard is settled.  The trial judge is
physically present during the testimony and is able to observe matters not usually reflected in
a cold record, such as the demeanor and credibility of witnesses.  “That is to say, the judge
has his finger on the pulse of the trial.”  State v. Hawkins, 326 Md. 270, 278, 604 A.2d 489,
493 (1992).  In $3,417.46 U.S. Money v. Kinnamon, 326 Md. 141, 149, 604 A.2d 64, 67-68
(1992) we further elaborated: 
[In a bench trial], the trial court is not only the judge of a witness’s
credibility, but is also the judge of the weight to be attached to the
evidence. It is thus plain that the appellate court should not substitute its
18Md. Code (2002), § 6-402 (a) of the Crim. Law Article provides, in relevant part: “A person
may not enter or trespass on the property that is posted conspicuously against trespass by:
(1) signs placed where they reasonably may be seen . . . . ”
-29-
judgment for that of the trial court on its findings of fact but will only
determine whether those findings  are clearly erroneous in light of the
total evidence.
$3,417.46 U.S. Money, 326 Md. at 149, 604 A.2d 67 (citing Housing Opportunities
Comm’n v. Lacey, 322 Md. 56, 59-60, 585 A.2d 219, 221 (1991), and Kowell Ford,
Inc. v. Doolan, 283 Md. 579, 581, 391 A.2d 840, 841 (1978)).
Despite the Court of Specials Appeals’s finding that Anthony W.’s window
breaking was “an acceleration of the illegal activity in which all three engaged,” we
held in Coleman that, “the term ‘accomplice’ does not include a person who has
guilty knowledge, or is morally delinquent, or who was even an admitted participant
in a related but distinct offense.”  Coleman, 209 Md. at 385, 121 A.2d at 257 (quoting
2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, 229, Sec. 448 et seq. (12th Ed.)).  In the present case,
Steers and Gonzales admittedly participated in the taking of a box of flares from the
bus. This act, however, is a separate and distinct offense from the malicious
destruction of property.  Likewise, assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
property was posted against trespassers,18 all parties here participated in that crime by
entering the property and boarding the bus.  Trespass, however, like the crime of theft
is a separate and distinct offense.  In addition, there is no evidence in the record that
the alleged accomplices knew that the respondent intended to break the door of the
bus and damage the interior of the bus.  The court was not required to conclude from
-30-
the evidence of their presence at the scene of the crime or their participation in
distinct crimes that the alleged accomplices aided or encouraged the damage to the
bus.  As the juvenile court judge found, “the fact that Gonzales and Steers at some
point in this continuum may have committed independent crimes . . . does not make
them accomplices to [the malicious destruction of property] in the sense of the word
for purposes of the evidentiary rule.”
Analyzing the evidence and testimony in the record, a rational trier of fact
could have found that Steers and Gonzales were not accomplices.  In the absence of a
statement relating to why the judgment of the juvenile court was clearly erroneous,
the Court of Special Appeals erred by not deferring to the juvenile court judge’s
factual findings.  Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Special Appeals and hold that
the Circuit Court, sitting as a juvenile court, was not clearly erroneous in finding that
Steers and Gonzales were not accomplices and in relying on their uncorroborated
testimony to determine Anthony W.’s involvement.  
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED
AND CASE REMANDED TO THE
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
C O U R T  F O R  F R E D E R I CK
COUNTY; COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS TO BE PAID BY
FREDERICK COUNTY.