Case Title: Applegate v. Riggall

Citation: 318 S.W.2d 596

Docket Number: 5-1717

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1958-12-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
318 S.W.2d 596 (1958) Stanley APPLEGATE, Appellant, v. Frank RIGGALL, Appellee. No. 5-1717. Supreme Court of Arkansas. December 15, 1958. *597 Shaw, Jones & Shaw, Ft. Smith, Crouch, Jones & Blair, Springdale, for appellant. James R. Hale, Pearson & Pearson, Fayetteville, for appellee. HARRIS, Chief Justice. On November 20, 1957, Pauline O. Holt instituted suit in the Washington Circuit Court against appellant, Dr. Stanley Applegate. The complaint alleged that about March 10, 1956, Mrs. Holt became ill and sought the advice and services of Dr. Applegate; that she was informed by appellant that it was necessary that she undergo immediate surgery for removal of a tumor from her left ovary; that without her consent, the doctor removed her uterus, and performed upon her a total hysterectomy; that Applegate negligently cut, or otherwise destroyed, the normal function of her left ureter, creating a condition that prevented urine from escaping from plaintiff's left kidney, but causing said urine to collect therein and causing the kidney to become enlarged and infected; that she underwent excruciating pain and suffering from March 20, 1956, until May 2, 1956, on which date it became necessary that the kidney be removed.[1] Further: The complaint prayed judgment against appellant in that amount. Applegate answered, with a pleading termed, "Answer and Third Party Complaint", denying the material allegations, and stating: *598 He then alleged that Dr. Frank Riggall, a physician and surgeon at Prairie Grove, Subsequently, Dr. Riggall demurred to the third party complaint, which demurrer was sustained by the court. From the action of the court in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the third party complaint, comes this appeal. Let it first be said that it is not necessary that the parties act in concert in order to be liable as joint tortfeasors, and appellee concedes this to be the general rule. See Giem v. Williams, 215 Ark. 705, 222 S.W.2d 800. The sole question to be determined is simply whether Dr. Riggall is a proper party defendant in this action. Appellee argues that the two doctors cannot be held to be joint tortfeasors, because any alleged injuries received from either by plaintiff were separate and distinct injuries; that under the law, tortfeasors, acting independently, are jointly liable to a plaintiff, and liable to each other in contribution, only when the independent acts of each, cause or contribute to the same injury obtained by a plaintiff. We consider the latter assertion to be a correct statement of the law, but even so, we do not agree that Applegate is precluded from filing his third party complaint. While it is true that a part of plaintiff's complaint deals with alleged injuries occurring before Dr. Riggall entered the picture, nonetheless, it is apparent from reading the portions of the complaint heretofore quoted, that a substantial part of the damage complained of was allegedly caused by the loss of the kidney. In other words, the suit is based upon all the injuries received by plaintiff, and suffering occasioned thereby. Dr. Applegate is being sued because of the removal of the kidney, and pain resulting, as well as for suffering occasioned by the earlier operation performed by him; and according to his third party complaint, the removal of the kidney was unnecessary. While Dr. Applegate denied any liability whatsoever, his alternative prayer was: Arkansas Statutes, Section 34-1007, provides: By Arkansas Statutes, Section 34-1001, the term joint tortfeasors is defined to mean, *599 "two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property." Therefore, it would appear that the pivotal phrase in Arkansas Statutes, Section 34-1007 (italicized above), means: "* * * who is or may be liable jointly or severally to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." Of course, if plaintiff has no cause of action against Riggall, the latter could not be liable as a joint tortfeasor, but clearly, if appellant's third party complaint be taken as true (as admitted by the demurrer[3]), it would appear that a cause of action was stated against Dr. Riggall as a third party defendant. The judgment of the court sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the third party complaint is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer and to reinstate the third party complaint. [1] This second operation was performed by Dr. Frank Riggall, appellee herein. [2] Emphasis supplied. [3] For the purpose only of determining the sufficiency of the pleadings.