Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V DALE ROY STAUFFER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 119127

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED MARCH 26, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellee,  
v  
No. 119127  
DALE ROY STAUFFER,  
Defendant-Appellant.  
MEMORANDUM OPINION  
The defendant pleaded guilty of criminal sexual conduct  
in the fourth degree.1
 After consulting the statutory  
sentencing guidelines,2 the circuit court sentenced him to a  
prison term of seventeen to twenty-four months.  
The defendant filed a motion for resentencing, which the  
circuit court granted.  At the resentencing, the court reduced  
1 MCL 750.520e(1)(b) (using “force or coercion”).  
2 MCL 777.1 et seq. 
The guidelines apply to offenses 
committed on or after January 1, 1999. MCL 769.34(2).  
 
the minimum sentence from seventeen months to sixteen months.3  
The court also elaborated on its decision to sentence the  
defendant to prison, providing substantial and compelling  
reasons for doing so.  
The defendant filed an application for leave to appeal,  
which the Court of Appeals denied.4  The defendant now has  
applied to this Court for leave to appeal.  
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we affirm the  
judgment of the circuit court.  We offer this memorandum  
opinion in order to highlight an aspect of the guidelines that  
was the subject of attention by the circuit court.  
As the guidelines were scored in this case, the high end  
of the range for the minimum sentence was seventeen months.5  
The circuit court duly imposed a minimum prison sentence of  
seventeen months (later reduced to sixteen months).  At first  
analysis, this sentence, which did not exceed the upper limit  
of the guidelines range, would appear not to be a departure  
and, thus, would appear not to require the articulation of a  
3 
 The seventeen-month minimum was reduced to sixteen  
months to comply with the rule of People v Tanner, 387 Mich 
683; 199 NW2d 202 (1972), which the Legislature has embraced 
in MCL 769.34(2)(b).  
4 Unpublished order, entered April 18, 2001 (Docket No. 
233082).  
5  Fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct is a "Class G" 
offense under MCL 777.16y, and the range for the minimum 
sentence is found in MCL 777.68.  
2  
 
 
substantial and compelling reason.6  
However, the statutory guidelines have a number of  
characteristics 
not 
present 
in 
the 
earlier 
judicial  
guidelines. One is the rule stated in MCL 769.34(4)(a):  
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum 
sentence range for a defendant determined under the 
sentencing guidelines set forth in [MCL 777.1 et  
seq.] is 18 months or less, the court shall impose 
an intermediate sanction unless the court states on  
the record a substantial and compelling reason to 
sentence the individual to the jurisdiction of the 
department 
of 
corrections. 
An 
intermediate  
sanction may include a jail term that does not 
exceed the upper limit of the recommended minimum 
sentence range or 12 months, whichever is less.  
An "intermediate sanction" can mean a number of things,  
but it does not include a prison sentence.7
 Thus MCL  
6 MCL 769.34(3) provides that “[a] court may depart from 
the 
appropriate 
sentence 
range 
established 
under 
the  
sentencing guidelines set forth in [MCL 777.1 et seq.] if the 
court has a substantial and compelling reason for that 
departure and states on the record the reasons for departure.”  
7 From MCL 777.1(d) and 769.31(c), one learns:  
"Intermediate sanction" means probation or any 
sanction, other than imprisonment in a state prison 
or state reformatory, that may lawfully be imposed. 
Intermediate sanction includes, but is not limited 
to, 1 or more of the following:  
(i) Inpatient or outpatient drug treatment.  
(ii) Probation with any probation conditions 
required or authorized by law.  
(iii) Residential probation.  
(iv) Probation with jail.  
(v)
 Probation with special alternative  
incarceration.  
3  
769.34(4)(a) required the circuit court here to set forth a  
substantial and compelling reason for imposing a prison  
sentence, 
even 
though its minimum length (sixteen or seventeen  
months) did not exceed the upper end of the range established  
by the guidelines.  Because in this case the circuit court did  
set forth substantial and compelling reasons for imposing a  
prison sentence, we affirm its decision.  
As indicated, we highlight this requirement of the  
guidelines, since it may be unfamiliar or confusing to some  
courts or practitioners.8  With that clarification, we affirm  
(vi) Mental health treatment.  
(vii)
 Mental health or substance abuse  
counseling.  
(viii) Jail.  
(ix) Jail with work or school release.  
(x)  Jail, with or without authorization for 
day parole under 1962 PA 60, MCL 801.251 to  
801.258.  
(xi)  Participation in a community corrections 
program.  
(xii) Community service.  
(xiii) Payment of a fine.  
(xiv) House arrest.  
(xv) Electronic monitoring.  
8 When this matter was addressed in circuit court, the 
phrase "straddle cell" was mentioned.  That term, common in 
discussion of the statutory guidelines, is not found in the 
statute.  The phrase refers to the situation arising under MCL 
769.34(4)(d):  
4  
 
 
 
 
 
the judgment of the circuit court.9  MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, 
KELLY, TAYLOR, 
YOUNG, 
and  
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.  
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum 
sentence exceeds 18 months and the lower limit of  
the recommended minimum sentence is 12 months or  
less, the court shall sentence the offender as 
follows absent a departure:  
(i) To imprisonment with a minimum term within 
that range.  
(ii) To an intermediate sanction that may 
include a term of imprisonment of not more than 12 
months.  
The phrase “straddle cell” would not properly describe the 
instant circumstance.  
9 Upon review, we are not persuaded that relief should be 
granted defendant on the issues raised on appeal.  
5