Case Title: Kittery Point Partners, LLC v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 35

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 35 
Docket: 
Yor-16-558 
Argued:  
February 14, 2018 
Decided: 
March 15, 2018 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
KITTERY POINT PARTNERS, LLC 
 
 v.  
 
BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, et al. 
 
 
GORMAN, J. 
 
[¶1]  Kittery Point Partners, LLC (KPP) appeals from a partial summary 
judgment entered by the Superior Court (York County, Douglas, J.) in favor of 
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC and M&T Mortgage Corporation.  KPP challenges 
the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Bayview and M&T and 
alleges that disputed issues of material fact remain.  Because we conclude that 
the judgment that KPP appeals from is not a final judgment, we dismiss the 
appeal as interlocutory and do not reach the merits.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  This case concerns a property located in Kittery Point within the 
Town of Kittery.  The individuals who previously owned the property (the 
 
2 
family) deeded title to it to KPP in 2005.  KPP executed a promissory note and 
mortgage for the property, and those were assigned to Bayview in June of 2005.   
[¶3]  In 2008, KPP stopped making loan payments and Bayview instituted 
a foreclosure action in the Superior Court (York County).  In February of 2009, 
one of the family members, acting on behalf of KPP, signed a delinquency 
repayment agreement with Bayview.  In the delinquency repayment 
agreement, KPP released Bayview from “any and all claims” associated with the 
note and mortgage.  Bayview voluntarily dismissed the foreclosure action 
pursuant to the delinquency repayment agreement in April of 2010.  M.R. Civ. P. 
41(a).   
[¶4]  In August of 2011, KPP filed a complaint against Bayview, M&T,1 and 
a third defendant—a former member of KPP—in the Superior Court (York 
County).  The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the promissory 
note and the mortgage securing it are invalid and also sought the recovery of 
sums paid on the note.  Although the third defendant initially responded to the 
complaint, he has otherwise been nonresponsive to the lawsuit.   
[¶5]  An extremely lengthy discovery process ensued.  In February of 
2016, Bayview and M&T filed a motion for summary judgment, which KPP 
                                         
1  At some point, M&T Mortgage Corporation allegedly serviced KPP’s loan. 
 
3 
opposed.  After a hearing, the court ordered entry of a partial summary 
judgment in favor of Bayview and M&T on November 30, 2016.  In its order the 
court stated:  
This judgment is final as to claims between plaintiff KPP and 
defendants/counterclaimants Bayview Loan Servicing and M&T 
Mortgage Corporation.  There is no just reason for delay in entering 
final judgment as to those parties.  To the extent that any claims 
against [the third defendant] remain unresolved, the adjudication 
of those issues are not necessary to the resolution of claims 
between KPP and Bayview and M&T and do not prevent the entry 
of final judgment.   
 
KPP timely appeals.2  14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2017); M.R. App. 2(b)(3) (Tower 
2016).3 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶6]  Absent an exception to the final judgment rule, a trial court’s 
decision is not appealable unless it resolves all claims against all parties.  See 
Safety Ins. Grp. v. Dawson, 2015 ME 64, ¶ 6, 116 A.3d 948; Marquis v. Town of 
Kennebunk, 2011 ME 128, ¶ 12, 36 A.3d 861.  A trial court can, however, certify 
                                         
2  This appeal was initially set for argument in July of 2017.  We stayed the appeal by order dated 
June 30, 2017, because KPP had filed for bankruptcy protection.  After an order from the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maine, In re Kittery Point Partners, LLC, Case No. 17-20316 
(Bankr. D. Me. Nov. 7, 2017), we lifted the stay, permitting this appeal to move forward.   
3  The Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure were restyled and are effective for appeals commenced 
on or after September 1, 2017.  See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled Rules).  Because KPP filed this appeal 
before September 1, 2017, the restyled Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply.   
 
4 
an order pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)(1) to permit the 
appeal of partial final judgments, and “[w]e review partial final judgment 
certifications from the trial court for an abuse of discretion.” Guidi v. Town of 
Turner, 2004 ME 42, ¶¶ 8, 10, 845 A.2d 1189.  
[¶7]  The court’s November 30, 2016, order appears to be a certification 
of a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)(1) because it purports to be 
final as to the claims against Bayview and M&T, despite the outstanding claims 
against the third defendant.  M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1).  Rule 54(b)(1) states, in 
pertinent part: 
[W]hen multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the 
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 
claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is 
no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry 
of judgment.  In the absence of such determination and direction, 
any order or other form of decision, however designated, . . . which 
adjudicates less than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
less than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of 
the claims or parties . . . .  
 
Because of the “strong policy against piecemeal review of litigation,” Fleet Nat’l 
Bank v. Gardiner Hillside Estates, Inc., 2002 ME 120, ¶ 10, 802 A.2d 408, “a Rule 
54(b)(1) partial final judgment order should be entered only in limited and 
special circumstances,” Guidi, 2004 ME 42, ¶ 9, 845 A.2d 1189.  To properly 
certify a partial final judgment, “the trial court must make specific findings and 
 
5 
a reasoned statement explaining the basis for its certification.”  Id.  “[T]here 
must be a good reason for immediate certification, and the court must explain 
with particularity why it finds that no just reason for delay exists.”  Marquis, 
2011 ME 128, ¶ 12, 36 A.3d 861 (quotation marks omitted).  The court’s 
findings and explanation “must be more than a summary recitation of the 
provisions of M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1).”  Guidi, 2004 ME 42, ¶ 9, 845 A.2d 1189.   
[¶8]  Here, the court’s order contains no specific findings about and does 
not adequately explain the basis for its certification, and its “statement amounts 
to a summary recitation of the provisions of Rule 54(b)(1).”  Id. ¶ 10.  Neither 
party requested that the court provide a more robust explanation of its order, 
and in the absence of specific findings or an adequate explanation for its 
reasoning, “we are unable to determine whether the facts of this case constitute 
such an unusual circumstance that the merits of an interlocutory appeal should 
be considered before all pending claims are resolved.”4  Id.  We, therefore, must 
dismiss the appeal.  
                                         
4  We note that “even an order with proper findings, supporting a certification of partial final 
judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1), will not assure that we will reach the merits of an appeal.”  
Guidi v. Town of Turner, 2004 ME 42, ¶ 12, 845 A.2d 1189.  “When deciding whether the trial court 
correctly certified a partial final judgment, we consider the following factors: 
• 
The relationship of the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; 
• 
The possibility that the need for review may be mooted by future developments in the trial 
court;  
 
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The entry is: 
 
 
Appeal dismissed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clifford H. Ruprecht, Esq. (orally), Roach, Hewitt, Ruprecht, Sanchez & Bischoff, 
P.C., Portland, for appellant Kittery Point Partners, LLC 
 
Andrew W. Sparks, Esq. (orally), and Misha C. Pride, Esq., Drummond & 
Drummond, LLP, Portland, for appellee Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC 
 
  
York County Superior Court docket number CV-2011-177 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
• 
The chance that the same issues will be presented to us more than once; 
• 
The extent to which an immediate appeal might expedite or delay the trial court’s work;  
• 
The nature of the legal questions presented as close or clear; 
• 
The economic effects of both the appeal and any delays on all of the parties, including the 
parties to the appeal and other parties awaiting adjudication of unresolved claims; and  
• 
Miscellaneous factors such as solvency considerations, the res judicata or collateral estoppel 
effect of a final judgment and the like.” 
McClare v. Rocha, 2014 ME 4, ¶ 8 n.1, 86 A.3d 22.