Case Title: Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting

Citation: 

Docket Number: S088829

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 6/13/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
DACUS WADE ALLEN,
)
)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
)
)
S088829
v.
)
)
Ct.App. 2/7 B127946
SULLY-MILLER CONTRACTING
)
COMPANY,
)
)
Los Angeles County
Defendant and Respondent.
)
Super. Ct. No. BC 166 964
__________________________________ )
Civil Code section 3333.4 (section 3333.4) was enacted through passage of
Proposition 213 in the November 5, 1996 General Election.  Known as “The
Personal Responsibility Act of 1996,” Proposition 213 sought to restrict the ability
of uninsured motorists, convicted drunk drivers, and convicted felons to recover
for losses suffered in accidents.
In this case, an uninsured motorcyclist was injured in a single-vehicle
accident while turning across an unmarked elevated “bus pad” on a public
roadway.  We shall address whether section 3333.4 bars the motorcyclist from
recovering noneconomic losses in his premises liability action against the private
construction company that maintained control over the roadway at the time of the
accident.  We conclude that it does.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The City of Los Angeles (the City) hired Sully-Miller Contracting
Company (Sully-Miller) as the prime contractor for certain road construction
2
work, including street widening and the installation of concrete bus pads on the
road at bus stop locations.  Sully-Miller, in turn, subcontracted with Daniel J.
Lopez Concrete Construction (Lopez Construction) to construct the bus pads.
Sully-Miller retained responsibility for providing traffic control at the construction
sites, which entailed the installation and maintenance of road barriers and
delineators to warn motorists and others of ditches and uneven road surfaces.
One of the bus pads constructed by Lopez Construction was not level with
the asphalt surface of the street; it rose three inches above the street surface in
some places.  On the night of August 13, 1996, there were no barricades or
delineators marking the differentiated height of the pad when Dacus Wade Allen
(Allen), who was driving his motorcycle, attempted to make a right-hand turn
across the pad.  Allen’s tire caught on the elevated lip of the pad and his
motorcycle fell, causing injuries to his knee.
Allen brought a negligence and premises liability action against the City,
Sully-Miller, and Lopez Construction.  On the day scheduled for trial, defendants
moved to preclude the introduction of evidence of Allen’s noneconomic damages
based on Allen’s admission that he did not have liability insurance for his
motorcycle at the time of the accident.  The trial court granted the motion, finding
the action subject to the restrictions of section 3333.4.
At the close of Allen’s case, the trial court granted a nonsuit in favor of
Lopez Construction.  Subsequently, the jury found, by special verdict, that the
public property in question was in a dangerous condition at the time of Allen’s
accident.  Although the jury found that the City was not liable because it had no
actual or constructive notice of the condition, it evidently accepted Allen’s theory
that Sully-Miller was negligent in failing to install barriers or delineators to warn
of the elevated nature of the bus pad.  Allen was not assessed with any
comparative negligence.  The jury awarded Allen $24,080 in economic damages
3
for his medical expenses and lost earnings.  The trial court entered judgment on
the jury verdict and denied Allen’s motion for a new trial.
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial.  Relying on
Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109 (Hodges), the appellate court
concluded that section 3333.4 does not apply in an action for premises liability
against a private entity.
We granted review and held the matter pending our decision in Day v. City
of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268 (Day), which involved the question whether
section 3333.4 applied in an action against two local public entities for nuisance
and dangerous condition of property.
After we decided Day, we ordered briefing limited to the issue whether
section 3333.4 bars recovery of noneconomic losses in this premises liability
action against a private construction company.
DISCUSSION
Section 3333.4 provides in pertinent part:  “(a) . . . [I]n any action to
recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle, a person
shall not recover non-economic losses to compensate for pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary
damages if any of the following applies:  [¶] . . . [¶] (2) The injured person was the
owner of a vehicle involved in the accident and the vehicle was not insured as
required by the financial responsibility laws of this state.  [¶] (3) The injured
person was the operator of a vehicle involved in the accident and the operator can
not establish his or her financial responsibility as required by the financial
responsibility laws of this state.” 1
                                                
1 
Section 3333.4 additionally bars recovery of noneconomic losses if the
injured person was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of
(footnote continued on next page)
4
In this case, the question is whether an action to recover damages arising
out of a motor vehicle accident caused by a private construction company’s
negligent creation or maintenance of a dangerous road condition is an “action to
recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle” within the
meaning of section 3333.4, subdivision (a).
Where, as here, the issue presented is one of statutory construction, our
fundamental task is “to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the
purpose of the statute.”  (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272; see People v. Trevino
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 240.)  We begin by examining the statutory language
because it generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.  (People v.
Trevino, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 241.)  We give the language its usual and ordinary
meaning, and “[i]f there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant
what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.”  (Day, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 272.)  If, however, the statutory language is ambiguous, “we may
resort to extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the
legislative history.”  (Ibid.)  Ultimately we choose the construction that comports
most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting
rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute.  (Ibid.; Torres v.
Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003.)  Any interpretation that
would lead to absurd consequences is to be avoided.  (Ibid.)
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
the accident and was convicted of that offense.  (Id., subd. (a)(1).)  The statute
provides one exception to its bar on recovery of noneconomic losses whereby an
owner of an uninsured vehicle may recover such losses if he or she was injured by
a motorist who was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol and was
convicted of that offense.  (Id., subd. (c).)
5
Applying these rules of statutory construction, we conclude that Allen’s
action falls squarely within the terms of section 3333.4.  First, Allen did not have
liability insurance on his motorcycle at the time of the accident.  Second, his
action seeks to recover for damages that occurred when the tire of the uninsured
motorcycle he was operating caught on an uneven street surface, causing his
motorcycle to fall.  The factual circumstances here raise no ambiguity or
uncertainty as to the application of the statute, which precludes recovery of
noneconomic damages “[i]n any action to recover damages arising out of the
operation or use of a motor vehicle” (§ 3333.4, subd. (a)), if the injured person
was not insured as the owner or operator of the vehicle involved in the accident
(id., subd. (a)(2), (3)).  Accordingly, Allen “shall not recover non-economic losses
to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment,
disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary damages.”  (Id., subd. (a).)
We compare the instant action with the one at issue in Day, supra, 25
Cal.4th 268, which involved an uninsured motorcyclist who was struck by a car in
an intersection.  In that case, the jury determined that overgrown vegetation on
public property surrounding the intersection had obstructed the motorists’ views
and contributed to the accident.  Since such facts demonstrated “a necessary and
causal relationship between the plaintiff’s operation of his motorcycle and the
accident for which he claimed the public entities were responsible,” Day
concluded that the plaintiff’s action sought to recover damages arising out of the
operation or use of that motor vehicle within the contemplation of section 3333.4.
(Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 274.)
As in Day, the facts here establish “a necessary and causal relationship”
between Allen’s operation of his uninsured motorcycle and the accident for which
he claims Sully-Miller was responsible by virtue of its negligence in creating or
maintaining a dangerous road condition.  Just as in Day, then, Allen may recover
6
for his economic losses, but he is statutorily barred from seeking noneconomic
recovery.
Contrary to the assertions of Allen and the dissenting justices, neither
Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th 109, nor Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th
272, compels a different construction.  In both cases, we found the language of
section 3333.4, subdivision (a) ambiguous with respect to the particular factual
circumstances before us.  (Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 113; Horwich v.
Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 277.)  In Hodges, which involved an
uninsured plaintiff’s action against the manufacturer of a defective vehicle, there
was no necessary connection between the plaintiff’s “operation or use” of a
vehicle and the injuries he suffered.  In Horwich v. Superior Court, recovery of
noneconomic damages was sought by “a person” who was not the uninsured
owner or operator of the vehicle involved in the accident.  Since the facts in those
cases raised uncertainty as to the statute’s application, we consulted the ballot
materials accompanying Proposition 213 to determine whether section 3333.4 was
intended to restrict the subject actions.  (See Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 273.)
Review of such materials led us to conclude the statute was inapplicable on the
facts presented.
As explained in Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th 268, actions seeking damages for
vehicular accidents caused by dangerous road conditions are an entirely different
matter.  In such actions, a necessary and causal relationship generally exists
between the uninsured motorist’s use or operation of a vehicle and the accident
that occurs.  (See Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 274.)  Not only do actions of this
sort fall squarely within a fair and objective reading of section 3333.4’s terms, but
allowing such actions advances, rather than defeats, the legislation’s declared
purpose to “ ‘change the system that rewards individuals who fail to take essential
7
personal responsibility’ and to ‘restore balance to our justice system.’ ”  (Day,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 276.)
And as Day emphasized, nothing in Hodges implied the contrary.  (Day,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 279-282.)  Thus, while Hodges observed that a primary
aim of Proposition 213 was to limit automobile insurance claims by uninsured
motorists against insured motorists, that decision did not suggest it was the
initiative’s exclusive aim.  (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 280.)
Allen points out that in Day, we observed in a footnote that some of the
plaintiff’s arguments in the case had assumed that section 3333.4 did not apply to
premises liability actions against owners of private property.  (Day, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 282, fn. 8.)  But because Day did not involve the liability of a private
property owner, we declined to address “such arguments or the possibility that
other concerns may justify a different result” in the case of private owners.  (Ibid.)
Seizing on that footnote, Allen contends there are several distinctions
between his property-related action against Sully-Miller and the property-related
action in Day.  First, he argues, the fact that Sully-Miller’s negligence in
maintaining the construction site was the sole legal cause of his accident
distinguishes his action from the one in Day, wherein liability for the plaintiff’s
damages was apportioned between a second motorist (52 percent) and the two
public entities responsible for the nuisance and dangerous condition (48 percent,
cumulatively).  (See Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272.)  Second, the legislative
history of section 3333.4, he claims, offers no basis for concluding that the statute
8
encompasses actions involving injury caused by the ownership, occupation, or
maintenance of private, as opposed to public, property.2
Upon careful review of Day and the statutory language and history, we
perceive no legitimate basis for distinguishing Allen’s action from the action in
Day in assessing section 3333.4’s application.  Day’s holding did not turn upon
the factual circumstance that a second motorist was partly at fault.  Rather, its
analysis focused on the particular action against the public entity defendants and
determined that the action, which sought recovery under the theories of nuisance
and dangerous condition of public property, was reasonably viewed as having
arisen out of the plaintiff’s operation or use of his uninsured motorcycle.  (Day,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 273-274, 280.)
More importantly, we find no evidence of legislative intent supporting
Allen’s proposal to carve out a private entity or private property exception to
section 3333.4’s application.  The statutory language makes no distinction
between public entity and private entity defendants in precluding recovery for
noneconomic losses.  To the contrary, section 3333.4 explicitly bars recovery of
such losses “[i]n any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use
of a motor vehicle” (id., subd. (a), italics added), where the injured person was the
owner of an uninsured vehicle involved in the accident or was the vehicle operator
and cannot properly establish his or her financial responsibility (id., subd. (a)(2),
(3)).
Likewise, nothing in the legislative history of the provision, as reflected in
the ballot materials accompanying Proposition 213, suggests an intent to
                                                
2 
Strictly speaking, the action here does not involve private property.  Rather,
it involves a private party that occupied public property while making
improvements to the property.
9
differentiate between public defendants and private defendants, or between
dangerous conditions on public property and private property.  Although Allen
correctly notes that the ballot materials contained a specific reference to the
initiative’s impact upon public entities (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996)
Legis. Analyst’s analysis of Prop. 213, p. 49), the broad statutory language (“[i]n
any action”) leaves no doubt that section 3333.4 applies in all actions where the
statutory prerequisites are met, including those actions brought against private
persons and entities.  (§ 3333.4, subd. (a).)  Conversely, the implication of Allen’s
alternative construction is that the phrase “[i]n any action to recover damages
arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle” (ibid.) would have one
meaning for the public entity that owned the uneven roadway and a different
meaning for the private contractor that exercised control over it.  Such an illogical
and inconsistent reading of the statute cannot be what the voters intended.
In the final analysis, Allen stands in the same position as the plaintiff in
Day.  He drove his motorcycle in violation of the state financial responsibility law
and got into an accident because of a roadway condition.  He seeks to hold another
financially responsible for his economic and noneconomic damages, even though
he himself, as an uninsured motorist, could have avoided financial responsibility
for any damages had he caused an accident while on the road.  Even if Sully-
Miller did not own the property where the elevated bus pad was situated, but
merely occupied it, construing section 3333.4 to apply in circumstances such as
these substantially advances, rather than defeats, the statute’s general purpose to
restore balance to the justice system with respect to violators of the financial
responsibility law.  (See Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 276.)
DISPOSITION
We conclude that section 3333.4 bars Allen from recovering noneconomic
damages in his action against Sully-Miller.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal
10
is reversed and the matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings
consistent with the views expressed herein.
BAXTER, J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C.J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
1
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.
Civil Code section 3333.4, an initiative measure that the voters passed in
1996, precludes uninsured motorists who are injured in accidents from recovering
noneconomic damages for their pain and suffering.1  In Day v. City of Fontana
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 268 (Day), a majority of this court applied that provision against
two public entities that failed to correct or warn of a dangerous condition on public
land.  I disagreed and joined Justice Stanley Mosk’s dissent.  Today, relying on
Day, the majority applies section 3333.4 in an action against private contractors
responsible for a dangerous property condition.  Again, I dissent.
The front tire of plaintiff’s motorcycle caught on a three-inch high elevated
lip of a bus pad defendants built on Bundy Drive at Santa Monica Boulevard for
the City of Los Angeles.  The motorcycle slipped and plaintiff fell on his kneecap.
The majority bars recovery for the pain and suffering plaintiff experienced from
the injury.  But as Justice Mosk pointed out in Day, the voters who enacted section
3333.4 “did not intend to limit damages for injuries to motorists based on a
dangerous condition of property . . . .”  (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 283 (dis. opn.
of Mosk, J.).)
                                                
1  
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
2
Drawing on this court’s earlier decision in Hodges v. Superior Court (1999)
21 Cal.4th 109 (Hodges), Justice Mosk explained in Day that the voters’ intent in
enacting section 3333.4 was “to resolve inequities involving the allocation of costs
between motorists who carry automobile liability insurance and motorists who do
not.”  (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 285 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  “The former —
scofflaw uninsured motorists — are held accountable as both a punishment and
incentive” by the limitation on damages; “the latter — motorists who obey the
financial responsibility laws — are the beneficiaries” because they are relieved of
paying noneconomic damages for injuries to uninsured motorists.  (Ibid.)  Justice
Mosk also noted that in Hodges this court “found nothing in [section 3333.4’s]
ballot materials suggesting ‘that such punishment or incentive was also intended
— or should be permitted — to benefit’ other defendants ‘not reasonably included
among “those who play by the rules” ’ or ‘take personal responsibility’ or ‘pick up
the tab’ for the ‘skyrocket[ing]’ costs of automobile insurance.”  (Day, supra, at
p. 285 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
I agreed with Justice Mosk’s dissent in Day that it “follow[ed] ineluctably
from our analysis in Hodges” that liability for a dangerous condition on public
property did not come “within the purview of Civil Code section 3333.4.”  (Day,
supra, at p. 285 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  Public entities that fail to maintain a safe
roadway and do not “contribute to the relevant insurance pool” are not “among
those who ‘play by the rules’ or ‘take personal responsibility’ or ‘pick up the tab’
for skyrocketing automobile insurance costs.”  (Ibid.)  Justice Mosk also stressed
that public policy was better served by fully “[c]ompensating the victims of
injuries caused by unsafe design or maintenance of public streets” because doing
so would “operate[] as a strong incentive for cities and counties to prevent or abate
dangerous conditions, thus minimizing risks to the public.”  (Day, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 285.)
3
So too in this case in which the duty to prevent or abate a dangerous
condition on property fell to private contractors rather than public entities.  The
majority’s holding here weakens the incentive for such contractors to protect the
motoring public from dangerous roadway conditions that the contractors
themselves have created.  Furthermore, the majority’s holding is contrary to the
voters’ intent in enacting section 3333.4’s limitation on damages.  Accordingly, I
dissent.
KENNARD, J.
1
DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J.
The majority’s expansive interpretation of Proposition 213, enacted as Civil
Code section 3333.4 (section 3333.4), produces a result that surely was not
contemplated by the voters who passed this initiative.  According to the majority,
a private contractor that maintains a dangerous condition on property is excused
from bearing the cost of injuries caused by its negligent behavior when the injured
party happens to be an uninsured motorist.  Because there is no suggestion in
either the language or the legislative history of section 3333.4 that it was intended
to apply in the case of a negligent private contractor, I respectfully dissent.
The majority reaches its conclusion by relying on our decision in Day v.
Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268 (Day), where we held that under section 3333.4, an
uninsured motorist is precluded from recovering noneconomic damages in an
action against a public entity.  I disagree for three reasons.  First, I question the
Day majority’s broad reading of Proposition 213, given our previous discussion of
this initiative in Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109 (Hodges) and
Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272 (Horwich).  Instead, I agree with
the dissent in Day that the intent of the voters in passing Proposition 213 was to
benefit motorists who obey the financial responsibility laws and not to insulate
negligent public entities from liability.  (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 285-286
(dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  Second, I believe that Day is distinguishable from the
present case.  The position of the negligent private contractor in this case is more
2
similar to that of an automobile manufacturer, which in Hodges we found was not
protected by section 3333.4, than to a public entity, which in Day we determined
was protected by the provisions of section 3333.4.  Third, I find that the majority’s
decision implicates serious public policy concerns that should preclude the
extension of our holding in Day to insulate a private contractor from liability for
noneconomic damages.  For these reasons, I conclude that section 3333.4 does not
prevent an uninsured motorist from recovering noneconomic damages from a
negligent private contractor.
I.
On August 13, 1996, Dacus Wade Allen was injured in a single vehicle
accident as he attempted to make a right turn across an elevated concrete bus pad,
which was under construction.  The front tire of his motorcycle caught on a three-
inch raised lip of the concrete pad.  Allen’s motorcycle slipped from under him
and fell onto his knee, injuring him.
The City of Los Angeles had awarded Sully-Miller Contracting Company
(Sully-Miller) a contract to perform certain road construction work at the site of
Allen’s accident.  Sully-Miller had entered into a subcontract with Daniel Lopez
Concrete Construction (Lopez Construction) to provide concrete work, including
the construction of bus pads.  Sully-Miller, as the prime contractor, was
responsible for traffic control, including the installation and maintenance of road
barriers to mark uneven road surfaces to protect both motorists and pedestrians
from injury.  Prior to the accident in this case, the City of Los Angeles’s project
inspector had issued three written warnings to Sully-Miller regarding deficiencies
in its traffic control plan, including the lack of barriers necessary to protect
vehicular and pedestrian traffic.  On August 13, 1996, the date of the accident in
this case, the disparity in height between the road surface and the bus pad had
existed for at least 11 days.
3
Allen brought a personal injury and premises liability action against Sully-
Miller, Lopez Construction, and the City of Los Angeles.  On the day of trial,
defendants sought an order barring Allen from presenting evidence of general
damages based on his admission that he did not have automobile liability
insurance at the time of the accident.  The trial court granted defendants’ motion
and, at the close of Allen’s evidence, granted a nonsuit in favor of Lopez
Construction.  The jury returned a defense verdict in favor of the City of Los
Angeles, but it found Sully-Miller liable, and awarded Allen $20,480 in medical
expenses and $3,600 in lost earnings.  The jury found that Allen was not
comparatively negligent.  The trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict.
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, to permit Allen
to present evidence of his noneconomic damages.  In a decision filed before we
issued our opinion in Day, the Court of Appeal applied our analysis of section
3333.4 in Hodges.  The Court of Appeal determined:  “There is no indication
either the electorate or the sponsors of Proposition 213 intended to protect from
premises liability claims road construction companies who do not contribute to the
automobile insurance pool and whose other insurance rates are not affected by the
existence of uninsured motorists.”  Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded that
section 3333.4 did not preclude Allen from recovering noneconomic damages
from a private contractor.
II.
I disagree with the majority’s determination that the present action falls
squarely within the language of section 3333.4.  Instead, as we have previously
concluded in both Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th 109, and Horwich, supra, 21 Cal.4th
272, the statutory language is ambiguous; therefore, we must look to the
legislative history to determine whether Proposition 213 was intended to apply to a
premises liability action against a private contractor.
4
In Hodges, the first case in which we interpreted section 3333.4, we found
that the language of section 3333.4, specifically the phrase “any action to recover
damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle,” was “not
pellucid.”  (Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 113.)  The majority in the present case
contends that in Hodges we found the statutory language of section 3333.4,
subdivision (a) ambiguous only with respect to a products liability action against
an automobile manufacturer.  I disagree.  While in Hodges the statutory ambiguity
revealed itself in the context of a products liability action against a manufacturer,
it was the language itself, specifically the phrases “arising out of” and “operation
or use,” that we found to be unclear.  (Hodges, at p. 113.  [“Nor, as we have
previously observed, is the sense of the phrase ‘arising out of’ transparent.”].)
Given this ambiguity, we looked to the legislative history to discern whether the
voters intended Proposition 213 to apply in the case of an action against an
automobile manufacturer.  (Hodges, at p. 114.)
In Horwich, we again determined that the language in section 3333.4 was
“‘not pellucid,’” this time with respect to the words “person” and “injured person.”
(Horwich, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 277.)  We further stated that “‘“[i]t is a settled
principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a
literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the
Legislature did not intend.”  [Citations.]’”  (Id. at p. 276.)  As in Hodges, it was
the vagueness of the language itself, rather than the facts of the case, that made us
look beyond the words of the provision to the legislative history in order to
determine its intended scope.  (Horwich, at p. 277.)
In Day, a majority of this court found that the action in that case, in which
an uninsured motorist sought to recover noneconomic damages from a public
entity for nuisance and dangerous condition of property, fell within the terms of
section 3333.4.  (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 273.)  The Day court stated that
5
since there was a “necessary and causal relationship” (id. at p. 274) between the
operation of the vehicle by an uninsured motorist and the accident for which the
motorist sought damages, section 3333.4 barred recovery of noneconomic
damages.  The majority in the present case applies the same analysis, determining
that the action brought by Allen falls within the statutory language because of the
“necessary and causal relationship” between his operation of the motorcycle and
the accident for which he seeks damages.  (§ 3333.4.)
I find that the “necessary and causal relationship” test developed by the
court in Day and applied in this case broadens the reach of the statute beyond what
is supported by either its language or its legislative history.  The majority seeks to
replace the ambiguous statutory language, “arising out of the operation or use of a
motor vehicle,” by reading a “necessary and causal relationship” test into the
statute.  (§ 3333.4, subd. (a).)  However, the majority provides no support, other
than our statement in Day, to show why we should read such an expansive test into
the statutory language.  Moreover, the majority’s “necessary and causal
relationship” test is just as indeterminate as the ambiguous statutory language it
seeks to replace.
Rather than reading additional language into the statute, we should look to
the legislative history of Proposition 213 to determine the intent of the voters.  As
we said in Hodges:  “We do not interpret the meaning or intended application of a
legislative enactment in a vacuum.  In the case of a voters’ initiative statute, too,
we may not properly interpret the measure in a way that the electorate did not
contemplate:  the voters should get what they enacted, not more and not less.”
(Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 114.)
Our opinions in Hodges, Horwich, and Day all cite extensively from
Proposition 213’s statement of legislative purpose, as well as the ballot arguments
for and against the initiative.  It is clear from these statements that the principal
6
intended beneficiaries of Proposition 213 were Californians who obey the
financial responsibility laws.  (Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 115.)  The initiative
was fueled by a “principle of fairness.”  (Ibid.)  In passing Proposition 213, “[t]he
electorate wanted to ensure that uninsured motorists, who contribute nothing to the
insurance pool, would be restricted in what they receive from it.”  (Hodges, at p.
115.)  The initiative would protect insured motorists, who would not be forced to
pay higher premiums in order to compensate uninsured motorists.
Proposition 213, then, was meant to “restore balance to our justice system”
by remedying the unfairness that occurs between insured and uninsured motorists.
(Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), text of Prop. 213, § 2, p. 102.)  There is
simply no suggestion in the legislative history that Proposition 213 was intended
to bar an uninsured motorist from recovering damages from a negligent private
entity.  (See Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 116 [“no suggestion that [Proposition
213] was intended to apply in the case of a vehicle design defect”]; Horwich,
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 280 [“no mention” in the legislative history that the heirs of
an uninsured motorist would be barred from recovering noneconomic damages].)
Therefore, I conclude that section 3333.4 does not bar such a recovery.
III.
Even if this court in Day were correct in deciding that an uninsured
motorist cannot recover noneconomic damages from a public entity, it does not
follow that section 3333.4 should also apply to suits against a negligent private
contractor.  Instead, the present suit is similar to a suit against an automobile
manufacturer, which in Hodges we determined fell outside the scope of section
3333.4.  In Day, we found it significant that the negligent defendant was a public
entity.  We noted that “[p]ublic entities, many of which provide the transportation
infrastructure for the motoring public, are among those directly affected by
motorists who violate the financial responsibility law.”  (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
7
p. 275.)  We further observed that “[m]otorists who drive in violation of [the
financial responsibility] law and negligently cause damage to roadways and other
public property, however, typically fail to compensate for the damage; in such
circumstances, public entities wind up paying for repairs to their property while
the uninsured tortfeasors escape responsibility for their actions.”  (Id. at pp. 280-
281.)
The negligent private contractor here is not directly affected by motorists
who violate the financial responsibility law.  Unlike public entities, private
contractors have no obligation to maintain the state’s roadways.  Additionally,
unlike in Day, the private contractor in this case was the sole negligent party; the
injured motorist was found not to be negligent and he did not damage any property
in sustaining his injuries.
Further, while the legislative history of Proposition 213 does mention its
potential effect on public entities, there is no discussion of the initiative’s effect on
a private entity, such as a private contractor.  The ballot materials indicate that
voter approval of Proposition 213 would “result in fewer lawsuits filed against
state and local governments”; the materials also refer to “unknown savings to state
and local governments as a result of avoiding these lawsuits.”  (Ballot Pamp., Gen.
Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), analysis of Prop. 213, p. 49.)  These same ballot materials
make no mention whatsoever of private entities, indicating that this initiative was
not intended to affect the liability of private entities.
In fact, the position of the private contractor in this case is quite similar to
that of the automobile manufacturer in Hodges.  In Day, we distinguished Hodges:
“While Hodges placed emphasis on the absence of any effect on the particular
defendant’s insurance costs, it must be remembered that the defendant there, in its
capacity as a car manufacturer, faced no potential of direct harm to itself or its
property from uninsured drivers who failed to comply with the state financial
8
responsibility law.  In that case, the consideration that car manufacturers also had
no insurance rates affected by the existence of uninsured motorists was significant
to our conclusion that manufacturers of defective cars were not among those
whom the initiative was intended to protect.”  (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 281,
fn. omitted.)
Similar distinguishing facts are present here.  The private contractor in this
case, having negligently failed to erect safety barriers, was not harmed by the
actions of the uninsured motorist.  Additionally, requiring a private entity such as
Sully-Miller to pay noneconomic damages when it is negligent will not impact
either the public fisc or the insurance pool.  For these reasons, even if public
entities are protected under section 3333.4, damage suits against private
contractors fall outside the purview of the statute.
IV.
There is no dispute in this case that Sully-Miller was negligent in failing to
install and maintain safety barriers.  Further, there is no disagreement that Allen’s
accident, and his related injuries, were caused by Sully-Miller’s negligence.
Under traditional tort principles, if Allen had been injured as an insured motorist,
or as a passenger in a vehicle, or as a pedestrian, or as anyone else, Sully-Miller
would certainly be required to fully compensate him.  Yet the majority holds that
Allen cannot recover noneconomic damages from this accident solely because he
was an uninsured motorist.  I find this holding to be in conflict with the long-
standing public policy goal of requiring private parties who maintain dangerous
conditions on property to bear the costs of injuries from their negligent behavior.
(See Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 118 [declining to read § 3333.4 to protect
manufacturers of defective cars, to further the public policy goal of requiring
manufacturers to bear the costs of injuries from their defective products].)
9
As we articulated in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108,
“[a]lthough it is true that some exceptions have been made to the general principle
that a person is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care
in the circumstances, it is clear that in the absence of statutory provision declaring
an exception to the fundamental principle enunciated by section 1714 of the Civil
Code, no exception should be made unless clearly supported by public policy.”
(Id. at p. 112.)  Here, there is no indication in either the statutory language or the
legislative history that Proposition 213 was intended to alter the general principles
of tort liability.  (See Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 115 [“It is not clear that
anyone — either the sponsors of the measure or the voters — intended to protect
from products liability claims manufacturers who do not contribute to that pool
and whose other insurance rates are not affected by the existence of uninsured
motorists.”].)
Further, the result in this case does not further the “principle of fairness”
that “fueled the initiative.”  (Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 115.)  In fact, the
majority’s holding produces the opposite result, providing a windfall to a negligent
private contractor at the expense of an innocent motorist.  Instead, holding private
contractors liable for injuries caused to all motorists would benefit insured
motorists, since it would provide additional incentives for these entities to provide
adequate safety precautions.
In Hodges, we found that “the express goal of the initiative statute was
restoring balance to the system, not simple retribution.”  (Hodges, supra, 21
Cal.4th at p. 117.)  Preventing uninsured motorists from recovering damages at the
expense of insured motorists restores such a balance to the system.  Insulating
private entities that maintain dangerous conditions on property from paying
damages simply because the injured party happens to be an uninsured motorist
does not restore balance to the system.  Instead, by shielding the negligent private
10
contractor from responsibility, the majority’s holding unbalances the system and
serves no purpose other than simple retribution.
MORENO, J.
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Company
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 80 Cal.App.4th 245
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S088829
Date Filed: June 13, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Reginald A. Dunn
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
Law Offices of Greg W. Garrotto and Greg W. Garrotto for Plaintiff and Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
Kirtland & Packard and Robert A. Muhlbach for Defendant and Respondent.
2
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Greg W. Garrotto
Law Offices of Greg W. Garrotto
1925 Century Park East, Suite 2000
Los Angeles, CA  90067
(310) 229-9200
Robert A. Muhlbach
Kirtland & Packard
1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 2600
Los Angeles, CA  90067
(310) 552-9700