Case Title: People v. Haynes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85180, 85181

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 85180, 85181 cons.-Agenda 7-September 1999.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								JONATHAN HAYNES, Appellant.


Opinion filed July 6, 2000.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Jonathan Haynes, was charged with three counts
of murder and one count of burglary arising out of the August 6,
1993, shooting death of Dr. Martin Sullivan in Wilmette, Illinois.
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant was found guilty of all charges. Defendant waived his
right to a jury for the sentencing phase of the proceedings, and the
circuit court found defendant eligible for the death penalty on the
basis of two eligibility factors: (1) murder in the course of a felony
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1992)), and (2) murder committed
in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a
preconceived plan (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1992)). The
court then determined that no factors in mitigation were presented
to preclude imposition of the death penalty and sentenced
defendant to death. On direct appeal, this court affirmed
defendant's convictions for intentional murder and burglary, and
vacated defendant's convictions for knowing and felony murder.
This court also affirmed defendant's death sentence. People v.
Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204 (1996).
	During the pendency of defendant's direct appeal, defendant
filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)), alleging that his
constitutional rights had been violated during his fitness hearing,
trial and sentencing. After obtaining counsel for the post-conviction proceedings, defendant additionally filed a motion to
vacate his convictions and sentence pursuant to section 2-1401 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 1996)),
wherein defendant argued that new evidence, outside the record,
indicated that he was unfit to stand trial. After this court's
disposition of defendant's direct appeal, defendant, by counsel,
filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief with supporting
affidavits and exhibits. After hearing argument on the State's
motion to dismiss all claims, the trial court, without conducting an
evidentiary hearing, dismissed both defendant's post-conviction
petition and the section 2-1401 motion to vacate. Pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a)), defendant
appeals both dismissals, which were subsequently consolidated by
this court. For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
	This court previously detailed the evidence presented at
defendant's trial in our opinion on direct appeal. People v. Haynes,
174 Ill. 2d 204 (1996). Therefore, we reiterate only those facts
which are germane to the issues raised in this appeal. We set forth
in some detail the facts relating to defendant's fitness hearing and
the post-conviction proceedings.
	Defendant was charged with the murder of Dr. Martin
Sullivan, a plastic surgeon, on August 6, 1993. Defendant
confessed to the killing after his arrest, stating that he marked Dr.
Sullivan for death as part of an overall plan targeting people who
promoted "fake Aryan beauty" through plastic surgery, bleached-blonde hair, and blue-tinted contact lenses. Defendant also
confessed to the police that he had previously murdered Frank
Ringi, a San Francisco hair colorist, and had been stalking Lake
Forest executive Charles Stroupe, the president of the largest
manufacturer of blue-tinted contact lenses. In his statement to
police, defendant related that he targeted Dr. Sullivan based upon
the doctor's large advertisement in the Yellow Pages, and made an
appointment with him under an assumed name. Defendant shot the
doctor at close range in his office to ensure that he had killed the
right man.
	In March 1994, a hearing was held to determine defendant's
fitness to stand trial. Defendant, who was represented by counsel
during this hearing, waived his right to a jury, and the proceedings
were conducted before the trial judge. The parties did not dispute
that defendant understood the nature and purpose of the
proceedings against him. The parties disagreed, however, over
whether defendant had the capacity to assist in his defense. Expert
testimony was adduced by both the State and defendant, and, after
hearing the evidence, the trial court concluded that defendant was
fit to stand trial.
	The State's first witness during the fitness hearing was
Wilmette police officer Matthew McConnell, who testified that he
met with defendant on three occasions after defendant's arrest in
connection with retrieving blood, hair, fingerprint, palm print, and
handwriting samples from him. McConnell stated that during his
interactions with defendant, defendant established appropriate eye
contact, read the court orders requiring the taking of samples and
indicated that he understood the orders, had no difficulty in
following the officer's instructions, and cooperated fully with the
sampling. Officer McConnell testified that defendant did not appear
nervous, did not make unusual movements or twitches, did not
wring his hands, did not give irrational responses, and did not delay
in responding during conversations with the officers. McConnell
also stated that on one occasion he observed defendant confer with
his counsel.
	Dr. Mathew Markos, a licensed forensic psychiatrist and the
acting clinical director of the Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit
Court of Cook County, also testified on behalf of the prosecution.
Dr. Markos stated that he had previously performed thousands of
evaluations to determine a defendant's fitness for trial, and testified
that he had examined this defendant on four occasions, pursuant to
court orders, between August 1993 and February 1994. Dr.
Markos first examined defendant on August 27, 1993, and on that
occasion defendant was calm, cooperative, articulate, coherent, and
maintained good eye contact, especially when he was responding
to the doctor's questions. At no time during this four-hour
interview did defendant display any agitation, anxiety, depression,
mania or disturbed behavior. Further, Dr. Markos estimated that
defendant had high or superior intelligence.
 	Dr. Markos testified that during this examination, defendant
did not display any "looseness of association," which Markos
defined as a thought disorder in which the logical and sequential
links between two or more different thoughts become loose or
distorted, rendering speech difficult to understand or
incomprehensible. Further, Dr. Markos stated that he did not
observe any evidence that defendant suffered from perceptual
disturbances, such as hallucinations, and when he asked defendant
if he had ever previously experienced hallucinations, defendant
replied in the negative.
	Significantly, Dr. Markos testified that he was unable to detect
any evidence of a delusional thinking process in defendant during
any of the four examinations he conducted. Dr. Markos defined a
delusion as a false belief or conviction which is not amenable to
logic or reason, which is out of touch with reality, and which is not
in keeping with a person's educational and cultural background.
Dr. Markos related that he talked at length with defendant
regarding defendant's "philosophy" of Aryan supremacy, and the
doctor concluded that defendant's beliefs neither fit the definition
of a delusion nor fell within a delusional psychotic process. Rather,
Dr. Markos determined that defendant's philosophy was a "highly
personalized idiosyncratic belief."
	Using the criteria set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (Third Edition-Revised) (DSMIII-R)
at the conclusion of the first examination Dr. Markos diagnosed
defendant as having an Axis II personality disorder with schizoid,
narcissistic, and paranoid traits. Dr. Markos explained that in
psychiatric diagnosis, an Axis II diagnosis is reserved for
personality disorders, whereas an Axis I diagnosis is reserved for
mental illness. Dr. Markos testified that it was his opinion that
defendant was schizoid because he was a loner, aloof, and had very
limited social relationships; that defendant was narcissistic because
defendant believed that he had a special role to save the white race;
and that defendant was paranoid because he had a constant feeling
that the white race was threatened and that fake Aryan beauty
would bring about destruction of the race.
	Dr. Markos further testified that, under the DSMIII-R criteria,
defendant was not suffering from an Axis I schizophrenic disorder.
Although Dr. Markos had initially considered the possibility that
defendant could be afflicted with such a disorder, based upon
defendant's strong family history of mental illness which included
schizophrenia, the doctor explained that the DSMIII-R requires the
presence of at least two symptoms, one of which must be a
prominent delusion, for a diagnosis of schizophrenia. In Dr.
Markos' opinion, defendant exhibited no delusions or delusional
thinking, nor did he exhibit symptoms of delusional thinking, such
as hallucinations, catatonia or incoherence.
	Dr. Markos acknowledged that both Dr. Fauteck and Dr.
Rabin, also of the Psychiatric Institute, had diagnosed defendant as
schizophrenic, and Markos stated that he took these opinions into
account in reaching his own diagnosis. Dr. Markos also
acknowledged that other doctors at the Cook County jail had
diagnosed defendant as suffering from delusional disorders.
However, upon his review of defendant's medical records, it was
apparent to Dr. Markos that the "delusion" that had been identified
by the examiners was defendant's belief in white supremacy and his
opposition to fake Aryan beauty. In the opinion of Dr. Markos, the
symptoms described by the other examiners did not support a
diagnosis of delusional disorder under the criteria of the DSMIII-R.
	Dr. Markos testified that his diagnosis was further supported
by the fact that, while in custody, defendant was administered
various antipsychotic drugs, including Serentil, Mellaril, and
Haldol. There was, however, no change in defendant's beliefs as a
result of the medications, even when the dosages of the
medications were increased. Dr. Markos testified: "What was
significant from the clinical psychiatric standpoint was the fact that
[defendant] was thought to have either schizophrenia or a
delusional disorder, had received more than four months of
treatment with potent antipsychotic medications ***, and these
medications did little at all to change any of his beliefs and that was
significant to me because had it been a true delusional process, had
it been a true schizophrenic process, then from the clinical
standpoint I would have expected some degree of improvement,
*** I would have seen some remissions with respect to the
intensity of his belief or his belief would have disappeared because
a true delusion would be amenable to treatment." Dr. Markos on
cross-examination acknowledged, however, that drugs will not
always cure a delusional disorder.
	During his meetings with defendant, Dr. Markos found
defendant to have an "excellent comprehension of the nature of the
charges pending against him," that defendant was aware of the
consequences if he were to be found guilty of the charges,
including the possible imposition of the death penalty, and that
defendant had a good understanding of the court proceedings and
the functions of the court personnel. The doctor also related that
when he first examined defendant in August 1993, defendant made
it clear that he wished to represent himself during his trial. Based
upon this conversation, Dr. Markos concluded that defendant's
decision to represent himself was voluntary, that defendant had the
capacity to cooperate with counsel, and that defendant chose not
to cooperate. According to Dr. Markos, defendant consistently
adhered to the decision to represent himself, except on one
occasion when defendant told Markos that defendant had decided
to cooperate with the public defender as "a legal maneuver."
Defendant subsequently decided against this cooperation, however,
and returned to his decision to represent himself during the
proceedings.
	In conclusion, Dr. Markos testified that from the first time he
examined defendant, neither his diagnosis nor his opinion as to
defendant's fitness to stand trial had changed: defendant had the
capacity to cooperate with his attorney, if he chose to do so. In Dr.
Markos' opinion, defendant's decisions had always been volitional
and not related to any underlying mental disorder.
	Defendant presented six witnesses during the fitness
proceedings. The first witness to testify was Thomas Verdun, an
assistant public defender who was assigned to represent defendant
at his August 9, 1993, bond hearing. Verdun testified that prior to
the bond hearing, he spoke with defendant for 20 to 30 minutes in
an interview room located in the lockup area of the courthouse.
During that conversation, defendant did not look directly at
Verdun, and instead gave him "a side long glance." According to
Verdun, defendant interrupted the judge during the bond hearing
in order to make a statement condemning "fake Aryan beauty."
Defendant stated he was disgusted by the ugliness of people, and
that he was honored to give his life for his cause. Verdun testified
that defendant made it clear that he wanted to represent himself,
and the judge ordered defendant to undergo a behavioral clinical
examination at the Psychiatric Institute.
	The next witness to testify was Dr. Rafael Carreira, director
of the residential treatment unit of the Cook County jail. Dr.
Carreira testified that he examined defendant on September 2,
1993, and, after that 45-minute session, diagnosed defendant as
suffering from a delusional disorder. The doctor testified that, in
arriving at his diagnosis, he took into account the opinions of the
other examiners at the jail who had also diagnosed defendant with
a delusional disorder. He also stated that none of the professionals
at the jail had diagnosed defendant with schizophrenia, and that he
had personally not observed defendant exhibit any schizophrenic
symptoms. Dr. Carreira further testified that defendant had an
above-average insight into his condition as a psychiatric patient, his
legal situation, his surroundings, and the charges against him, and
although defendant's views were contradictory at times, they were
not always irrational. Dr. Carreira did not offer an opinion as to
whether defendant was fit to stand trial.
	The next witness to testify for defendant was Dr. Satinder
Brar, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Brar stated that, in her capacity as
the coordinator of the residential treatment unit of Cook County
jail, she was aware of defendant's mental health status through her
supervision of the mental health professional who was assigned to
defendant's dorm. Dr. Brar also had one conversation with
defendant regarding his Aryan views, during which defendant was
very protective of his ideology. Based upon this information, Dr.
Brar diagnosed defendant as suffering from the mental illness of
delusional disorder, grandiose type. Dr. Brar however, did not
diagnose defendant as being schizophrenic. In Dr. Brar's opinion,
defendant's delusional disorder rendered him unaware of the
consequences of his trial, and it caused him to illogically refuse
legal assistance in clarifying his position. Although Dr. Brar opined
that defendant was unwilling to cooperate with his defense counsel
as a means of protecting his ideological beliefs, Dr. Brar also
acknowledged that she had not discussed with defendant his
cooperation with his lawyers. Dr. Brar also testified that defendant
had no difficulty with day-to-day functioning, and stated that
although defendant was prescribed antipsychotic medication, the
medication had no impact on his firmly held beliefs.
	Dr. Usha Kartan next testified on defendant's behalf. Dr.
Kartan, a psychiatrist at the jail, examined defendant on September
4, 1993, and diagnosed him with a delusional disorder, but found
that defendant was not schizophrenic. Dr. Kartan also testified that
despite being prescribed various antipsychotic drugs, there was no
change in defendant's beliefs and thinking. Specifically, Dr. Kartan
stated that defendant received three months of therapy with Haldol,
a very potent antipsychotic medicine, and it had no effect on
defendant's philosophy. The doctor also noted, however, that
defendant often refused medications or requested changes in
medication. Dr. Kartan did not feel comfortable or qualified to
offer an opinion as to whether defendant was capable of
cooperating with defense counsel.
	Dr. Paul Fauteck, a forensic psychiatrist at the Psychiatric
Institute, also testified on defendant's behalf. Pursuant to court
order, Dr. Fauteck examined defendant on four occasions between
August 19, 1993, and February 15, 1994, and administered
psychological tests on two occasions. Dr. Fauteck's first
examination of defendant took approximately three hours, during
which time the doctor found defendant to be very intense,
maintaining unbroken eye contact. However, Dr. Fauteck also
found defendant, overall, to be appropriately behaved, and noted
no gross abnormalities of behavior at that time. The doctor and
defendant discussed defendant's philosophy, and defendant stated
that he was alarmed at the increasing ugliness of the American
population, and that he believed this was due to the availability of
false Aryan cosmetics, specifically referring to plastic surgery, hair
coloring, and tinted contact lenses. In addition, defendant conveyed
to the doctor his belief that defendant was being tracked by the
Anti-Defamation League (ADL), and that the ADL had labeled him
as a "very dangerous man." Based upon this initial examination,
Dr. Fauteck diagnosed defendant as suffering from the mental
illness of delusional disorder, persecutory type. Dr. Fauteck also
found defendant to have a mixed personality disorder, schizoid and
borderline with obsessive features. However, despite suffering
from these illnesses, Dr. Fauteck also determined that defendant
was fit to stand trial.
	During Dr. Fauteck's second examination of defendant,
Fauteck administered several psychological tests. After analyzing
the test results, Dr. Fauteck diagnosed defendant as suffering from
the mental illness of schizophrenia, paranoid type. Dr. Fauteck
explained that delusions are a prominent feature of paranoid
schizophrenia, and, therefore, the prior diagnosis of delusional
disorder was not inconsistent with his later diagnosis of
schizophrenia. In reaching this diagnosis, Dr. Fauteck testified that
he took into account defendant's statements and behavior,
defendant's medical records while incarcerated, and a written
social background prepared by defendant's parents which showed
a history of apparent schizophrenia in the family. Dr. Fauteck also
testified that defendant exhibited a marked looseness of
association, in that he did not have an internal consistency in his
delusions, and that defendant had reported experiencing auditory
hallucinations in 1983 while mildly intoxicated. Dr. Fauteck also
testified that it is not uncommon for a psychosis to be intractable
and nonresponsive to medications; therefore, the fact that
medication had no apparent effect upon defendant's beliefs did not
alter the doctor's opinion that defendant suffered from a mental
illness.
	Dr. Fauteck testified that, as a result of further examining
defendant, he arrived at the conclusion that defendant was now
unfit to stand trial. The doctor testified that defendant fully
understood the role of his defense attorney, was able to
communicate with his attorney, was able to discuss defense options
and strategic decisions, and was able to discuss the question of
self-representation. Dr. Fauteck also found defendant to be
exceptionally bright, and determined that defendant's mental illness
did not impair his ability to understand the charges against him.
However, Dr. Fauteck determined that defendant's mental illness
affected defendant's ability to assist counsel in his defense. Dr.
Fauteck concluded that defendant's decisionmaking was
constricted by his belief that civilization depended upon defendant
sacrificing his life to make a statement against fake Aryan beauty,
and, therefore, defendant could not view the trial process as it
would be viewed by a rational defendant. Defendant stated to Dr.
Fauteck that defendant did not wish to be represented by counsel
because no one could expound his philosophy as clearly and as well
as he could.
	On cross-examination, Dr. Fauteck acknowledged that the
criteria found in the DSMIII-R for diagnosing schizophrenia are
used almost universally in his profession, and that, under the
DSMIII-R, more than just a delusion is necessary for a diagnosis
of schizophrenia. However, when asked if hallucinations were
necessary to make this diagnosis, Dr. Fauteck replied in the
negative, and stated that schizophrenia can correctly be diagnosed
without a finding of hallucinations. Defendant had no present
hallucinations, although Dr. Fauteck believed that there was a
report that defendant did suffer from hallucinations in the past.
Although Dr. Fauteck had testified that defendant suffered from
looseness of association, Dr. Fauteck acknowledged that defendant
was not incoherent or cataonic, nor did he have "bizarre" delusions
as characterized by the DSMIII-R. Dr. Fauteck testified that
schizophrenia is a long-term disabling illness, characterized by a
disturbance in normal daily functioning. Dr. Fauteck stated that he
believed that defendant exhibited early signs of this illness from
about 1978, and that there were periods in defendant's past when
defendant's functioning became substantially diminished. However,
Dr. Fauteck acknowledged that, as of 1993, defendant worked in
a laboratory, that subsequently defendant had been employed by
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and that there was
no evidence that defendant's functioning in a work setting had
diminished.
	Dr. Fauteck further testified on cross-examination that he
holds the belief that schizophrenia is 100% genetic. He
acknowledged, however, that this is "definitely not" the belief of
everyone who studies schizophrenia. Dr. Fauteck also stated that
his opinion on defendant's fitness was predicated on defendant's
failure to cooperate with counsel. Dr. Fauteck testified that
defendant told him that defendant did not relish the idea of
spending the rest of his life in prison and, although defendant did
not want the death penalty, if it enabled him to make a statement
to the world, he would sacrifice his life for what he believed to be
an important cause. Dr. Fauteck admitted that there was nothing
irrational about these statements. Dr. Fauteck also testified that
defendant did not tell him that defendant was willing to go along
with the advice of his counsel as part of "a legal maneuver." Dr.
Fauteck admitted that if defendant held that position for any length
of time, Fauteck would have to reevaluate his opinion as to
defendant's ability to cooperate with defense counsel.
	The final witness to testify for defendant was Dr. Michael
Gray Rabin, a psychologist at the Psychiatric Institute. Dr. Rabin
stated that Dr. Fauteck had requested that he analyze the results of
defendant's Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI),
one of the tests Dr. Fauteck administered to defendant in August,
1993. Based upon Dr. Rabin's interpretation of the test results, the
doctor diagnosed defendant as being paranoid schizophrenic. Dr.
Rabin also sat in on an examination conducted of defendant by Dr.
Fauteck in February 1994, wherein defendant stated that he wanted
to use his trial as a forum to present a warning to the American
population and to convey the danger to the Aryan race because of
fake Aryan beauty. Dr. Rabin testified that defendant further stated
that he did not want to be represented by counsel because his ideas
were unique to himself, that only he could understand and fully
expound upon these ideas, and that no one else could adequately
explain defendant's philosophy to the court.
	Based upon his interpretation of the MMPI test, his interview
with defendant, a review of the material in defendant's charts
including Dr. Fauteck's and Dr. Markos' examinations, police
reports, and defendant's social history, Dr. Rabin concluded that
defendant's delusional beliefs rendered him unable to cooperate
with counsel to a reasonable degree, and therefore defendant was
unfit for trial. Dr. Rabin acknowledged, however, that defendant
has above-average intelligence, did not have difficulty
understanding questions, and was responsive to Dr. Rabin's
inquiries. Although Dr. Rabin considered defendant's responses to
be illogical at times, Dr. Rabin did not have difficulty
understanding them.
	Dr. Rabin also acknowledged that, although defendant had
been prescribed various potent antipsychotic drugs, defendant's
thinking and beliefs were not changed in any way. Dr. Rabin
additionally acknowledged that just because a person is diagnosed
as schizophrenic does not necessarily mean that he is unfit for trial,
and just because a person has a delusion does not necessarily
prevent him from cooperating with defense counsel if he chooses
to do so.
	In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Markos, who testified that
defendant deviated from his desire to represent himself only as part
of what defendant termed a "legal maneuver," which defendant
believed would speed up the court proceedings. However,
defendant decided against cooperating with counsel after his case
had been delayed on several occasions. Dr. Markos concluded that
defendant's temporary change in his desire to represent himself was
a purely voluntary decision, and was not related to any underlying
mental disorder.
	At the conclusion of the fitness hearing, the circuit court noted
that the sole issue was whether defendant was capable of
cooperating with counsel in his own defense. In holding that
defendant was fit to stand trial, the trial court judge found that
"[t]he law does not proscribe a trial where although suffering from
a mental disease an individual will not, and I underscore that, assist
in his defense," and that the fact that an individual has deep-seated
beliefs does not render that person "unable" to assist counsel who
may not hold or agree with those beliefs. Therefore, the trial court
judge determined that defendant was fit to stand trial. This court
affirmed that finding on direct appeal. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204 (1996).
	Defendant waived counsel for trial and sentencing, although
the trial court appointed the public defender as standby counsel
during the proceedings. As part of the State's case in chief,
defendant's handwritten diary was read into the record. The diary
contained details of defendant's murder of Dr. Sullivan and his
stalking of Charles Stroupe. The State also played a cassette tape
marked "taped confession" which the police found upon searching
defendant's apartment. In this tape defendant described his murders
and his motivation for those crimes. Defendant had intended to
send the tape to cosmetic industry executives to warn them against
producing "fake Aryan cosmetics." The State also presented
defendant's oral and written confession to the police. Defendant,
acting as his own counsel, posed no questions to the State's
witnesses, and his defense consisted essentially of making
statements of his "Aryan beauty" philosophy. After being sworn as
a witness, defendant testified as follows: "I have never denied that
I shot Dr. Martin Sullivan. I confess that I did that. I wanted to
make a statement. I condemn the fake Aryan cosmetics, bleached
blond hair, blue tinted contact lenses, and plastic surgery."
	The circuit court found defendant guilty of all charges.
Subsequently, the court found defendant eligible for the death
penalty on the grounds that defendant intentionally killed Dr.
Sullivan during the course of a burglary (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6)
(West 1992)) and that defendant killed Dr. Sullivan in a cold,
calculated and premeditated manner (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11)
(West 1992)).
	At the aggravation-mitigation stage of the sentencing
proceedings, the State again called Dr. Markos, who opined that
defendant was not under the influence of an extreme mental or
emotional disturbance at the time of the crime. Dr. Markos also
testified that defendant lacked regret or remorse, gave very
coherent and detailed accounts of the offense, and was of above-average intelligence. The State also introduced evidence of
defendant's confession to his prior murder of hair colorist Frank
Ringi, given to San Francisco police detectives on August 12,
1993, after defendant's murder of Dr. Sullivan. Defendant
presented no evidence in mitigation and gave only a brief statement
reiterating his philosophy condemning fake Aryan beauty. The trial
court found no mitigating factors to preclude the imposition of the
death penalty, and sentenced defendant to death.
	During the pendency of the direct appeal of defendant's
conviction and sentence to this court, defendant, on December 21,
1995, filed a pro se petition for post conviction relief, wherein he
alleged that his constitutional rights were violated during the fitness
hearing, trial, and sentencing. Among other allegations, defendant
stated that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the
fitness hearing, and that the State violated due process and
defendant's right to a fair trial by not disclosing certain information
during that hearing.
	In April 1996, defense counsel was appointed for the post-conviction proceedings. On May 6, 1996, counsel filed a petition
to vacate defendant's convictions and death sentence pursuant to
section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS
5/2-1401 (West 1996)) based upon newly discovered information
outside of the record. Counsel attached affidavits and other
documents of later-discovered evidence which, it was argued,
would probably have changed the result of the fitness hearing.
These documents indicated that, two days after defendant was
sentenced to death, defendant was examined at Pontiac
Correctional Center and diagnosed as suffering from an Axis I
psychotic disorder. One of the documents submitted in support of
this petition was the affidavit of Dr. Kwan-Bon Jin, who
subsequently diagnosed defendant as suffering from an Axis I
psychosis of either delusional disorder or schizophrenia. The
documents also indicate that when Dr. Jin increased defendant's
dosage of Haldol, defendant showed significant improvement until
November 19, 1994, when Dr. Jin observed defendant to be free
from delusional behavior.
	On February 28, 1997, post-conviction counsel filed an
amended post-conviction petition. Among other claims, the
petition alleged that defendant's trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to present certain evidence at the fitness hearing. Defendant
attached various documents indicating that he was diagnosed and
treated for schizophrenia at the San Mateo County Mental Health
Services in California during 1982 and 1983. The admitting
documents show that defendant at the time stated that he had
previously had symptoms of hearing voices. The evidence also
included a document prepared by defendant's parents, showing a
family history of mental illness which included schizophrenia, and
affidavits of relatives, friends, and acquaintances relating their
observations concerning defendant's past behavior.
	The amended post-conviction petition also alleged that the
State improperly withheld certain evidence until after the fitness
hearing, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). The allegedly withheld evidence
consisted of defendant's handwritten diary and the audio tape
marked "taped confession" used at trial, the confession made by
defendant to detectives from the San Francisco police department
used at sentencing, and the medical records of defendant's
diagnosis and treatment after trial at Pontiac Correctional Center
by Dr. Jin and others.
	On February 11, 1998, after argument of counsel, the trial
court granted the State's motion to dismiss the post-conviction
petition without an evidentiary hearing. The post-conviction judge
noted that Dr. Markos, a well-respected psychiatrist, testified at
length during the fitness proceedings with regard to his knowledge
of defendant's psychiatric history, defendant's family's psychiatric
history, and the reports of the other professionals who had
examined defendant. Based upon this information, the court noted,
Dr. Markos concluded that defendant was aware of the charges
against him as well as the possible consequences of those charges,
and that although defendant was able to cooperate with counsel,
defendant made a voluntary choice not to cooperate.
	The post-conviction judge found that Dr. Markos' opinion
was "bolstered by what occurred subsequent to the fitness hearing
when the defendant chose to represent himself based on the
articulated reason that only he was aware of the political
philosophy that he was trying to get out to the public, and that no
one was in a better position than he to insure that that occurred."
The post-conviction judge further found that Dr. Markos' opinion
that defendant was able to cooperate with counsel, and thus was fit
to stand trial, was substantiated and corroborated by the fact that
despite being administered psychotropic medication, that
medication had absolutely no effect on defendant's desire to
continue to preach about his political philosophy.
	In regard to the alleged Brady violations, the post-conviction
judge held that an affidavit filed by the assistant State's Attorney
who prosecuted this case, Bruce Paynter, indicated that all
discovery was tendered to the defense. Further, attached to
Paynter's affidavit was a memo written by Assistant Public
Defenders Bernard Sarley and Crystal Marchiagianni to the
Psychiatric Institute that they had "all kinds" of discovery at their
disposal should the Institute wish to view it for purposes of
rendering an opinion. Further, the post-conviction judge noted that
the fitness hearing was completed on March 4, 1994, and within six
weeks the trial began. At the trial, the State introduced the very
evidence that defendant claims the defense never had, and the
judge observed that there is no evidence in the record that there
was an objection or a claim of a Brady violation.
	The post-conviction judge then heard brief argument of
counsel on the section 2-1401 petition and dismissed that petition
as well. Defendant filed notices of appeal from both denial orders.
These appeals have been consolidated.
ANALYSIS
Section 2-1401 Petition
	 Defendant first contends that the post-conviction judge erred
in denying his section 2-1401 petition to vacate his convictions and
death sentence based on newly discovered evidence, without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing. Section 2-1401 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 1996)) provides a
comprehensive statutory procedure by which final orders,
judgments, and decrees may be vacated after 30 days from their
entry. Although a section 2-1401 petition is usually characterized
as a civil remedy, its remedial powers extend to criminal cases.
People v. Sanchez, 131 Ill. 2d 417, 420 (1989). A section 2-1401
petition for relief from a final judgment is the forum in a criminal
case in which to correct all errors of fact occurring in the
prosecution of a cause, unknown to the petitioner and court at the
time judgment was entered, which, if then known, would have
prevented its rendition. People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d 286, 313-14
(1978); People v. Hinton, 52 Ill. 2d 239, 243 (1972). A section
2-1401 petition, however, is "not designed to provide a general
review of all trial errors nor to substitute for direct appeal."
Berland, 74 Ill. 2d  at 314. Points previously raised at trial and
other collateral proceedings cannot form the basis of a section
2-1401 petition for relief. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d  at 314-15. When
examining a trial court's ruling on a section 2-1401 petition, the
appropriate standard of review is whether the trial court abused its
discretion. Sanchez, 131 Ill. 2d  at 420. Absent an abuse of
discretion, the trial court's determination will not be disturbed.
Sanchez, 131 Ill. 2d  at 420.
	The gist of defendant's section 2-1401 petition is that, had the
trial court known of the evidence newly discovered by defendant,
this evidence would have precluded the court from ruling that
defendant was fit to stand trial and, in turn, would have prevented
defendant from being convicted and sentenced to death. Defendant
contends that this new evidence undermines Dr. Markos' opinion
that defendant was fit, to the extent that immediately following his
convictions and sentencing, defendant was diagnosed as suffering
from an Axis I psychotic disorder, and that defendant's delusions
responded to medication administered at an appropriately higher
level. We reject defendant's arguments.
	The evidence presented by defendant in support of his section
2-1401 petition consists of events occurring subsequent to
defendant's conviction and the imposition of his death sentence on
May 4, 1994. Defendant was thereafter transferred to Pontiac
Correctional Center and, on May 6, 1994, was given a preliminary
mental health evaluation wherein he was diagnosed as suffering
from an Axis I psychotic disorder. Dr. Kwan-Bon Jin, a psychiatrist
employed at Pontiac, submitted an affidavit in support of
defendant's 2-1401 petition stating that he began treating
defendant in June 1994, and subsequently diagnosed defendant as
suffering from an Axis I disorder, either delusional disorder or
schizophrenia. In his affidavit, Dr. Jin stated that during his
interactions with defendant, he observed strong delusional content
in defendant's thinking, as well as looseness of association of
defendant's thoughts.
	In addition, defendant relies upon Dr. Jin's affidavit, as well as
an affidavit submitted by Dr. Jonathan Lipman, a
neuropharmacologist specializing in the effect of drugs on the
brain, to show that defendant's delusions responded to medication
when the medication was increased to a higher dosage than
defendant had been administered at the time of his fitness hearing.
	Specifically, in accordance with his diagnosis of an Axis I
mental illness, Dr. Jin increased defendant's daily intake of Haldol
to 10 mg. At this increased level of medication, Dr. Jin observed
significant improvement to defendant's condition and, by
November, 1994, Dr. Jin found defendant to be free of delusional
behavior. In his affidavit, Dr. Jin stated that, based upon his
observations, "it appears that [defendant's] delusional and
psychotic symptomology was brought under control as a result of
increasing and maintaining his dosage of Haldol at 10 milligrams."
Similarly, Dr. Lipman concluded, based upon his review of
defendant's medical records and treatment records, that "given the
documented response [defendant] later demonstrated" to an
increased daily dosage of Haldol, defendant's previous Haldol
dosage "in retrospect *** was subeffective for treatment of his
delusional and psychotic state at the time of his legal proceedings."
	As stated, the purpose of a section 2-1401 petition is to bring
facts to the attention of the circuit court which, if known at the
time of judgment, would have precluded its entry. See Smith v.
Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 220-21 (1986); Berland, 74 Ill. 2d
at 313-14; Hinton, 52 Ill. 2d  at 243. Therefore, a general rule has
developed that section 2-1401 is available "for relief based on
matters which antedate the rendition of the judgment and not those
which arise subsequent to its rendition." Russell v. Klein, 58 Ill. 2d 220, 225 (1974). The new evidence proffered by defendant in
support of his section 2-1401 petition consists of events occurring
subsequent to defendant's conviction and death sentence.
Specifically, Dr. Jin's opinion that defendant suffers from an Axis
I mental illness, and his statement that defendant responded to
increased dosages of medication is based upon the doctor's
observations concerning defendant's mental state during the period
after the trial court's judgment. Significantly, Dr. Jin's affidavit
gives no opinion as to defendant's fitness for trial in March 1994.
Similarly, the conclusions stated by Dr. Lipman in his affidavit are
based upon factors occurring subsequent to defendant's conviction
and sentencing. Because this evidence did not exist at the time of
defendant's fitness hearing in March 1994, and therefore could not
have been presented to the trial court for its consideration during
those proceedings, it does not provide a proper basis for relief
pursuant to a section 2-1401 petition. See Russell, 58 Ill. 2d  at
225.
	In addition, even if defendant's proffered evidence was a
proper basis for a section 2-1401 petition, defendant has failed to
establish that this evidence would have changed the outcome of the
fitness hearing. Five experts testified during the fitness proceedings
that defendant suffered from either a delusional disorder and/or
schizophrenia. Therefore, we cannot discern how Dr. Jin's similar
findings would have altered the outcome of the proceedings. See
Berland, 74 Ill. 2d  at 316; People v. Gandy, 227 Ill. App. 3d 112,
139-41 (1992); People v. Lambert, 23 Ill. App. 3d 615, 619-20
(1974). Accordingly, we find that the circuit court properly
dismissed defendant's section 2-1401 petition without an
evidentiary hearing.
Post-Conviction Petition
	Defendant next argues that the circuit court erred in
dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, the claims in his post
conviction petition that the State failed to disclose certain evidence
to the defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), and that defendant was
denied effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.
	The Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a
mechanism by which criminal defendants can assert that their
convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights
under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or
both. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994). An action for post-conviction relief is a collateral proceeding, not an appeal from the
underlying conviction and sentence. People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55, 62 (1999); People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 242 (1995). In
order to be entitled to post-conviction relief, a defendant must
establish a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional
rights in the proceedings that produced the judgment being
challenged. People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997).
	The purpose of a post-conviction proceeding is to permit
inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction
and sentence that have not been, and could not have been,
adjudicated previously upon direct appeal. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998); People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 72-73
(1997). The doctrine of res judicata bars consideration of issues
that were raised and decided on direct appeal. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 
at 502; Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 73. Further, issues that could have
been presented on direct appeal, but were not, are deemed waived
for purposes of post-conviction review. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503;
Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 73. These rules are relaxed, however, where
the facts relating to the post-conviction claim do not appear on the
face of the original record. See People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 372 (1996); People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 528 (1991);
People v. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303, 308 (1989).
	An evidentiary hearing on post-conviction claims is warranted
only where the allegations of the post-conviction petition,
supported where appropriate by the trial record or accompanying
affidavits, make a substantial showing that a defendant's
constitutional rights have been violated. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999); Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503. In determining
whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in
the petition and in any accompanying affidavits are taken as true.
Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528; Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503. A trial
court's determination regarding the sufficiency of the allegations
contained in a post-conviction petition are reviewed de novo.
Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528; People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366,
389 (1998).
Brady Claim
	Defendant contends that his constitutional right to due process
of law was violated because the State failed to disclose to the
defense certain exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).
Defendant argues that the State violated the Brady rule when it
failed to disclose four items of evidence prior to the fitness hearing:
defendant's handwritten diary; the audio cassette marked "taped
confession" found by police in defendant's apartment wherein
defendant described his murders and his motivation for them; the
transcript of his audio taped interview by San Francisco police on
August 12, 1993, wherein defendant recounted his murder of Frank
Ringi and stated that he believed he was under surveillance by the
ADL; and the medical records from Pontiac Correctional Center
indicating that on May 6, 1994, defendant was diagnosed with a
psychotic disorder, and on June 1, 1994, defendant was diagnosed
with an Axis I mental illness.
	In Brady, the United States Supreme Court required that the
prosecution disclose evidence that is both favorable to the accused
and "material either to guilt or to punishment." Brady, 373 U.S.  at
87, 10 L. Ed. 2d  at 218, 83 S. Ct.  at 1196; People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 485-86 (1996). Evidence is material "if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985); Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d  at
486.
	Defendant contends that the post-conviction judge erred in
denying an evidentiary hearing on his Brady claim. For the purpose
of determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the post conviction petition and any accompanying
affidavits are taken as true. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 381; People v.
Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 428 (1998). According to defendant, the
above-described evidence allegedly withheld by the State prior to
the fitness hearing was material to the proceedings "because [it]
contain[ed] examples of conduct Dr. Markos testified he had not
observed in the petitioner during their sessions," and "[a]t the very
least, this was relevant information for the cross-examination of
Dr. Markos; it should arguably also have had an impact on his
fitness determination in that this evidence should have caused him
to rethink his diagnosis." Defendant also asserts that his
handwritten diary and his statements are material because they
present defendant's "view of the world and his way of thinking
through his own words."
	In support of his Brady claim, defendant relies upon an
affidavit filed by Bernard Sarley, defendant's counsel during the
fitness proceedings, in which counsel states that the diary and
defendant's statements were not tendered by the State prior to the
fitness hearing, that counsel "never saw" these items from the time
of his appointment "through my representation of Mr. Haynes,"
and that counsel would have used this evidence to support the
contention that defendant was unfit to stand trial. We find that the
affidavit filed by defense counsel constitutes new information
which was not in the original trial record, and, therefore could not
have been addressed by a reviewing court on direct appeal.
Because the rules of procedural default are relaxed where the facts
relating to a defendant's claim do not appear on the face of the
original record (see Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d  at 372; Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d  at 528; Owens, 129 Ill. 2d at 308), we address the merits of
this post conviction claim.
	Taking, as we must, defendant's allegations of fact to be true,
we hold that the circuit court properly dismissed defendant's Brady
claims without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant has failed to
make a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability
that the diary, the "taped confession," and the statements made by
defendant to the San Francisco police would have altered the
outcome of the fitness hearing. Although defendant maintains that
these three items of evidence establish that he was "delusional" at
the time of Dr. Sullivan's murder, we disagree. A review of this
evidence indicates that defendant was fully aware of his actions, as
well as of the consequences of these actions.
	Defendant's handwritten diary provides a day-by-day account
of his activities shortly before and after the Sullivan murder. In
many of the entries defendant recounts his methodical stalking of
Charles Stroupe, revealing that defendant kept Stroupe's house
under surveillance in order to ascertain the best opportunity to kill
Stroupe, that, using assumed identities, defendant repeatedly
telephoned the Stroupe household to determine Stroupe's
whereabouts, and that defendant concocted various cover stories
in the event he was stopped by the police. At one point, defendant
wrote that he believed that he had "scared off" Stroupe, and that
"I'm starting to wish that I'd just walked up and rung the doorbell.
Let him have a few slugs right in the belly. Too late now.
(Would've saved a lot of time and money)." On August 7, 1993,
the day after defendant killed Dr. Sullivan, defendant wrote that
"[y]esterday I did the deed, and I feel that the stain of cowardice
has washed off my shirt." Defendant related that his murder of Dr.
Sullivan was "somewhat messy" and that he "[h]ad a clear shot at
his head and missed. Used up all 6 bullets." Reflecting on the
consequences of his actions, defendant wrote that his "decision to
face the possibility of prison rape takes courage," but that he had
committed himself "too deeply to back out now." Remarks similar
to those found in defendant's diary are contained in the audio
cassette recording labeled "taped confession," and in the transcript
of the taped statement defendant made to the San Francisco police.
	We conclude that, far from supporting defendant's contention
that, as required under Brady, these items of evidence were both
favorable to defendant and material to the proceedings because
they contained evidence of "delusional" thinking, a review of these
three items leads to the conclusion that defendant is a methodical
stalker and a calculating and ruthless killer. On this record,
defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that there is a
reasonable probability that the above-described evidence would
have affected the outcome of the fitness hearing. Accordingly, we
reject defendant's Brady claim as to these evidentiary items.
	We likewise reject defendant's contention that the State
violated the Brady rule when the State failed to disclose medical
records from Pontiac Correctional Center indicating that, after
defendant was convicted and sentenced to death, he was diagnosed
as suffering from an Axis I mental illness. This argument is
unavailing because in the previous argument defendant claims that
such information constituted "new evidence" and was not available
until after defendant's trial. If the information was unavailable for
the proceedings, it cannot be said that the State failed to disclose
the information in violation of Brady. See People v. Hinton, 302
Ill. App. 3d 614, 623 (1998). We find that the circuit court
properly dismissed this claim.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
	Defendant next argues that the circuit court erred in
dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, defendant's claim that
he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the fitness hearing.
Defendant contends that counsel was ineffective during the fitness
proceedings in failing to present specific evidence, which,
according to defendant, establishes that he was unfit to stand trial.
First, defendant claims that his attorney failed to introduce
defendant's handwritten diary during the fitness proceedings.
Second, defendant maintains that defense counsel failed to present
documentary evidence of the history of mental illness in
defendant's family. Third, defendant asserts that his attorney failed
to present testimony from defendant's family, friends, and
acquaintances regarding defendant's past impairment in the areas
of self-care, work functioning, family functioning and social life.
Finally, defendant contends that counsel failed to introduce
defendant's mental health records from the early 1980s.
	We first address defendant's claim that counsel was ineffective
for failing to introduce defendant's diary during the fitness
proceedings. In the prior argument, defendant alleged that the
State violated the Brady rule by failing to tender this diary to
defense counsel prior to the fitness hearing. In support of that
claim, defendant filed the affidavit of his trial attorney, who averred
that he did not have defendant's diary in his possession at the time
of the fitness proceedings. Accepting, as we must, the veracity of
defense counsel's statement (see Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 381;
Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 428), we hold that defendant has not
presented a cognizable post-conviction claim with respect to his
diary. Defendant cannot claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to present evidence that was not tendered to him. Therefore,
the circuit court properly dismissed this claim.
	We also find that defendant has failed to present a cognizable
post-conviction claim with respect to counsel's alleged failure to
present evidence of the history of mental illness in defendant's
family. Our review of the record reveals that both Dr. Markos and
Dr. Fauteck testified at length during the fitness proceedings
regarding the incidence of mental illness in defendant's family and
the impact of this family background upon defendant's mental
health. Dr. Markos testified that defendant's parents had supplied
written information detailing a history of mental illness in
defendant's family, including incidences of schizophrenia, and that
Markos had taken this family history into account in forming his
opinion as to defendant's fitness. Similarly, Dr. Fauteck also
testified that he reviewed the written social history supplied by
defendant's parents detailing incidences of mental illness in
defendant's family. Dr. Fauteck stated that, in his view,
schizophrenia is 100% genetic, and that he used this background
information in arriving at his conclusion that defendant suffered
from schizophrenia and was unfit for trial. In addition, the
information supplied by defendant's parents concerning a history
of mental illness in defendant's family was specifically considered
in this court's opinion on defendant's direct appeal. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d  at 229.
	Defendant similarly complains that, during the fitness hearing,
his trial counsel failed to introduce evidence concerning
defendant's past impairment in the areas of self-care, work
functioning, family functioning and social life. However, our
review of the record discloses that during the fitness proceedings,
defendant's expert, Dr. Fauteck, testified that there were periods
in the past when defendant's functioning became substantially
diminished. Dr. Fauteck surmised that these periods coincided with
the active phases of defendant's mental illness. Accordingly, we
hold that this claim is not a cognizable post-conviction claim.
	In sum, the record reveals that the evidence cited by defendant
in the two above-detailed claims was before the court during the
fitness proceedings. Defendant cannot now claim that counsel was
ineffective for failing to present evidence which was already part of
the record. Therefore these two claims were properly dismissed by
the circuit court.
	Defendant also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective
during the fitness proceedings for failing to produce defendant's
prior mental health records. Defendant contends that these records,
which date from the early 1980s in California, not only show that
he had previously been treated for psychotic symptoms, including
auditory hallucinations and delusions, but also reveal that, in 1984,
defendant had been diagnosed as suffering from chronic
schizophrenia. We find that defendant's prior mental health records
constitute new information which was not contained within the
original trial court record and, therefore, could not have been
considered by a reviewing court on direct appeal. We accordingly
address the merits of this specific post-conviction claim. See
People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d 239, 250-51 (1997); People v. Britz,
174 Ill. 2d 163, 177 (1996).
	As stated, a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on his post-conviction petition as a matter of right. An evidentiary
hearing is warranted only where the allegations of the post-conviction petition, supported where appropriate by the trial record
or accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing that a
defendant's constitutional rights have been violated. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528; Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503; Owens, 129 Ill. 2d  at 308.
In determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and in any accompanying affidavits are
taken as true. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528; Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at
503. We review a trial court's determination regarding the
sufficiency of the allegations contained in a post-conviction petition
de novo. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528; Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388-89.
	The constitutional guarantee of the assistance of counsel (U.S.
Const., amends. VI, XIV) includes the right to effective assistance
of counsel (Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 343-44, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1716 (1980)), both at trial and on
a defendant's first appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,
396-97, 83 L. Ed. 2d 821, 830-31, 105 S. Ct. 830, 836-37 (1985).
Claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel are judged under
the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 397. To prevail on a
claim asserting that counsel was not effective, a defendant must
first establish that his defense counsel's performance was deficient
in that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693,
104 S. Ct.  at 2064. A defendant must establish that "counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at
2064. Because judicial scrutiny of a defense counsel's performance
is highly deferential, "a defendant must overcome the strong
presumption that the challenged action or inaction of counsel was
the product of sound trial strategy and not of incompetence."
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 397.
	If a defendant establishes that defense counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, then a
defendant must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at
2068.
	A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test
before he or she can prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. However, if the ineffective assistance claim can be
disposed of on the ground that the defendant did not suffer
prejudice, a court need not determine whether counsel's
performance was constitutionally deficient. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at
74.
	Attached to defendant's post-conviction petition are copies of
records prepared by the San Mateo Mental Health Services, dated
September 1982 to May 1984. The documents, entitled "adult
admission summary," "patient activity record and progress notes,"
and "record of drug treatment," indicate that defendant was
referred for mental health services by the probation department as
part of his sentence for a conviction of misdemeanor malicious
mischief, and reveal that defendant reported hearing voices in his
past, that defendant was diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia
by Kaiser Medical Center, and that defendant was treated with
various psychotropic drugs. Also attached to the post-conviction
petition is a patient progress note from Kaiser Medical Center,
dated December 12, 1982, which contained the diagnosis that
defendant suffered from "schizophrenia chronic."
	According to defendant, this newly discovered evidence
"contradicts and undermines" Dr. Markos' testimony and
conclusion that defendant was fit to stand trial. Specifically,
defendant contends that this evidence could have verified that
defendant had a long history of mental illness, including
schizophrenia, and that defendant suffered from auditory
hallucinations. Defendant argues that "had Dr. Markos been
confronted with this evidence during his testimony, it is possible
that he would have agreed that [defendant] did suffer from a
psychotic illness, and found him unfit for trial." Therefore,
defendant concludes, the circuit court erred in dismissing this claim
without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
	We disagree.	Based upon the record in this matter, we
conclude that defendant has failed to make a substantial showing
that, had counsel introduced defendant's prior mental health
records, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
fitness proceedings would have been different. During the fitness
hearing, Dr. Markos testified in detail concerning his personal
examinations of defendant. Markos stated that he examined
defendant on four occasions, with their first session occurring on
August 27, 1993, shortly after defendant killed Dr. Sullivan, and
their last session occurring in February 1994, shortly before the
fitness hearing. Based upon his personal observations of defendant
during this period, Dr. Markos found that defendant was capable
of cooperating with defense counsel and that defendant had made
a voluntary choice not to cooperate with his attorney. Dr. Markos'
opinion that defendant was fit for trial was largely premised upon
the facts that, between August 1993 and February 1994, defendant
was not suffering from delusions and that his beliefs did not change
in response to medication. Therefore, evidence that defendant was
diagnosed with schizophrenia in 1982 was not particularly relevant
to the question of defendant's mental state in 1994, when he was
tried. See Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d  at 522. In addition, Dr. Markos
testified that, in arriving at his opinion, he took into consideration
the contrary opinions of his colleagues, including Dr. Fauteck,
who, during the fitness proceedings, referenced information similar
to that contained in defendant's prior mental health records. During
the hearing, Dr. Fauteck testified that there "were reports" that
defendant had suffered from auditory hallucinations in 1983, and
that defendant showed signs of schizophrenia starting as early as
1978. Nevertheless, Dr. Markos concluded that, based upon the
criteria found in the DSMIII-R, defendant was not suffering from
a mental illness and was fit for trial. We hold that the circuit court
properly dismissed this claim.
	As his final contention, defendant maintains that the circuit
court erred in dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, his
allegation that he was denied effective assistance of appellate
counsel. Relying upon the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981), defendant claims that his rights under the fifth and
sixth amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as
under article I, sections 2 and 8, of the Illinois Constitution, were
violated when, prior to the examinations conducted by Dr. Markos,
neither the trial court nor defense counsel advised defendant that
he had the right to remain silent and that statements made by him
in the course of the examination could later be used against him
during the sentencing proceedings.
	Subsequently, Dr. Markos, based upon information gathered
during his evaluations of defendant, testified for the State in
aggravation at sentencing.
	Defendant contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise this claim on direct appeal. Although this issue
could have been raised on direct appeal, the waiver doctrine is
inapplicable where, as here, a defendant asserts that the alleged
waiver stems from ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 346 (1992); People v. Flores,
153 Ill. 2d 264, 282 (1992). Like claims alleging deprivation of
effective assistance of trial counsel, claims of ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel are also evaluated under the two-prong
standard set forth in Strickland. People v. Ward, 187 Ill. 2d 249,
258 (1999); People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 333 (1997). "A
defendant who contends that appellate counsel rendered ineffective
assistance, e.g., by failing to argue an issue, must show that the
failure to raise that issue was objectively unreasonable and that the
decision prejudiced the defendant. Appellate counsel is not
obligated to brief every conceivable issue on appeal, and it is not
incompetence of counsel to refrain from raising issues which, in his
or her judgment, are without merit, unless counsel's appraisal of
the merits is patently wrong. Accordingly, unless the underlying
issues are meritorious, defendant has suffered no prejudice from
counsel's failure to raise them on appeal. People v. Childress, No.
84566, slip op. at 4 (April 20, 2000); People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 435 (1999) (and cases cited therein)." People v. Easley, No.
84418, slip op. at 13 (May 25, 2000). We now turn to the merits
of defendant's argument.
	In Estelle, the defendant, awaiting trial for murder, was
ordered by the trial court to submit to a pretrial examination by a
psychiatrist for the purpose of determining his competency to stand
trial. The defendant was interviewed by the psychiatrist and, in a
letter to the trial court, the psychiatrist found that the defendant
was competent to stand trial. The trial commenced and the
defendant was convicted of murder. Thereafter, at the sentencing
phase of the defendant's death penalty hearing, the State called as
its sole witness the psychiatrist who had previously examined the
defendant at the court's request. The psychiatrist described
defendant's severe sociopathic condition, expressed the opinion
that the defendant could not be remedied by treatment, and
concluded that the defendant would continue to be dangerous in
the future. The psychiatrist's opinion concerning the dangerousness
of the defendant was not based merely upon his observations of
defendant, but upon detailed descriptions of defendant's statements
about the underlying crime. Under the then-existing Texas capital
sentencing procedure, the question of a defendant's "future
dangerousness" was one of three requisite questions which, if
answered in the affirmative by the sentencing body, resulted in the
mandatory imposition of the death penalty. Given these facts, the
Court held that "[a] criminal defendant, who neither initiates a
psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric
evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his
statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing
proceeding." Estelle, 451 U.S.  at 468, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 372, 101 S. Ct.  at 1876.
	We find that the distinct circumstances present in Estelle
render that decision distinguishable from the matter at bar for
several reasons. The Court's decision in Estelle was animated by
the concern that the psychiatrist was acting as an agent of the
State, eliciting incriminating statements from a defendant in a post-arrest custodial setting without providing Miranda warnings, and
then using those incriminating statements in support of sentencing
the defendant to death. Estelle, 451 U.S.  at 469, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at
373, 101 S. Ct.  at 1876. Those same concerns are not present in
the instant matter. The record reveals that, at sentencing, Dr.
Markos testified that defendant suffered from a personality
disorder and not from a mental illness, that during his examinations
defendant was articulate and intelligent, that defendant's highly
personal and idiosyncratic beliefs are related to his personality, and
that these beliefs are not affected by medication. Dr. Markos also
testified that the statements made by defendant to the police
immediately following his arrest for the Sullivan murder supported
his diagnosis because defendant's lack of remorse concerning his
crimes is symptomatic of a personality disorder rather than a
mental illness. In conclusion, Dr. Markos testified that, at the time
of the offense, defendant did not suffer from any extreme mental or
emotional disturbance which would have substantially impaired his
ability to appreciate the criminality of his actions. Not only had the
content of Dr. Markos' testimony already been introduced before
the trial court judge during the fitness proceedings, but throughout
the trial defendant himself repeatedly reminded the judge of the
nature and motivation of his crimes, freely admitted that he had
committed the crimes, and showed no remorse for his conduct.
Therefore, we cannot discern how defendant's right against self-incrimination was violated by Dr. Markos' testimony when
defendant, of his own volition, had already placed this information
into the record himself.
	Estelle is additionally distinguishable on the basis that the
psychiatric testimony in that case was initially introduced by the
State at the sentencing hearing to carry its burden of proof of
showing that the defendant would be dangerous in the future, a
proposition that was required to be established under the death
penalty law of Texas at that time. In the present case, in contrast,
Dr. Markos merely testified that defendant was fit and that he was
not suffering from a mental disease. Thus, unlike in Estelle, the
prosecution in the matter at bar was not using evidence obtained
in the challenged interviews to fulfill a burden of proof or
persuasion under the death penalty statute. See People v.
Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d 1, 28 (1995).
	Furthermore, the result in Estelle was premised on the fact
that, in that case, defense counsel had not been previously notified
about the scope of the psychiatric examination, or even of its
existence, thereby depriving the defendant of the opportunity to
discuss the examination with counsel. Estelle, 451 U.S.  at 469, 68 L. Ed. 2d  at 373, 101 S. Ct.  at 1876. The facts of the present case
are distinct from those in Estelle. Here, on October 8, 1993,
defendant's trial counsel filed a motion for fitness examination,
requesting that the trial court "order the Psychiatric Institute of
Cook County to conduct an examination of Mr. Haynes and render
an opinion on the issue of his fitness for trial." In granting the
request of defense counsel, the court ordered the Psychiatric
Institute to examine defendant on the issue of his fitness to stand
trial and make a report to the court on or before October 29, 1993.
The record reveals that a continuance of this due date was granted,
and that Dr. Markos reexamined defendant on October 25, 1993,
and November 16, 1993. The record also discloses that, upon the
request of defense counsel, another order for fitness examination
was entered by the court on February 15, 1994, ordering Dr.
Markos and Dr. Fauteck to examine defendant for fitness to stand
trial and to make a report to the court on or before February 16,
1994. We have previously held that Estelle "seemingly excepts
defense-initiated examinations from the scope of its rule."
Mahaffey, 166 Ill. 2d  at 28. Because it appears that three of the
four examinations of defendant conducted by Dr. Markos were
prompted by defense counsel's request for consideration of
defendant's fitness, we find Estelle inapposite.
	Unless the underlying issues are meritorious, a defendant
suffers no prejudice due to appellate counsel's failure to raise those
issues on direct appeal. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 523
(1995). As stated, Estelle does not apply to the facts as presented.
Therefore, the circuit court appropriately dismissed this claim.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County dismissing defendant's section 2-1401 petition and
defendant's amended post-conviction petition is affirmed. The
clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting Wednesday,
November 22, 2000, as the date on which the sentence of death
entered in the circuit court of Cook County is to be carried out.
Defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law. 725
ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The clerk of this court shall send a
certified copy of the mandate to the Director of Corrections, to the
warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of the
institution where defendant is now confined.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring:
	I agree with the majority that we should affirm the dismissal
of defendant's post-conviction petition. Nevertheless, one problem
in the majority's analysis prevents me from joining its opinion. 
	The majority improperly addresses the merits of defendant's
Brady claim. This issue is waived because it could have been raised
on direct appeal. The majority correctly acknowledges that issues
that could have been presented on direct appeal, but were not, are
deemed waived for purposes of post-conviction review. See
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503. That rule is clearly applicable here. The
evidence that defendant claims the State should have turned over
prior to his fitness hearing was later introduced by the State at trial.
At that point, defendant knew of the evidence, and it was a matter
of record. Accordingly, there is no reason that defendant could not
have presented this argument on direct appeal.
	The majority's reason for relaxing the waiver rule is that
defendant attached to the post-conviction petition an affidavit from
his attorney stating that the attorney did not have the evidence
prior to the fitness hearing. According to the majority, this affidavit
"constitutes new information which was not in the original trial
record, and, therefore could not have been addressed by a
reviewing court on direct appeal." Slip op. at 21. The majority's
rationale is incorrect.
	The proper inquiry is not whether a particular piece of
evidence could have been considered on direct appeal, but whether
the claim could have been considered on direct appeal. In People
v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 372 (1996), this court explained this
exception to the waiver rule as follows:
			"[I]t is not so much that such a claim 'could not have
been presented' or 'raised' by a party on direct appeal, but
rather that such a claim could not have been considered by
the reviewing court because the claim's evidentiary basis
was de hors the record." (Emphasis in original.)
Here, the claim of a Brady violation is not outside the record. The
evidentiary basis for this claim is the evidence that defendant claims
was not turned over prior to the fitness hearing. This evidence was
introduced at trial and is part of the original trial record.
Accordingly, defendant could have made this argument both at trial
and on direct appeal.(1)
	The defense attorney's affidavit adds nothing to the Brady
claim. The affidavit merely states that the defense did not have this
information prior to the fitness hearing. In other words, the
affidavit is itself the argument that defendant should have made
both at trial and on direct appeal. When the State introduced the
evidence at trial, defendant should have raised the Brady claim.
Had that argument proved unsuccessful at trial, defendant should
have raised it as an issue on direct appeal. 
	If the majority is correct that the type of redundant affidavit
filed by the defense in this case is sufficient to renew a waived
claim, then we have effectively removed any distinction between
direct and post-conviction appeals. A post-conviction appeal now
is apparently nothing more than a second direct appeal in which
defendants can raise all of the arguments that they should have
raised, but did not raise, in the first appeal. Even if the claim's
evidentiary basis has a clear foundation in the original record, this
court will consider the claim if defendant's attorney files an
affidavit that does nothing more than state the very argument
defendant wishes this court to address. I am not prepared to make
such a mockery out of the post-conviction appellate process.
	I agree with the majority that defendant is not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his claim of a Brady violation. However,
rather than addressing the merits of this argument, I would hold
that defendant waived the claim by failing to raise it on direct
appeal.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
	Six mental health professionals testified at Haynes' fitness
hearing. Psychiatrists Drs. Rafael Carreira and Usha Kartan both
diagnosed Haynes with a delusional disorder. Dr. Satinder Brar, a
clinical psychologist and coordinator of the residential treatment
unit of Cook County jail likewise testified that Haynes suffered
from a delusional disorder. Although Dr. Kartan felt unqualified to
offer an opinion as to Haynes' ability to cooperate with defense
counsel, Dr. Brar testified that Haynes' condition prevented him
from cooperating in his defense. Dr. Paul Fauteck, a forensic
psychologist at the Psychiatric Institute, examined Haynes four
times during a six-month period. He opined that Haynes was
schizophrenic, paranoid type. Dr. Fauteck agreed that Haynes'
mental illness rendered him incapable of assisting in his defense and
stated that Haynes was not fit to stand trial. Dr. Michael Rabin,
another forensic psychologist at the Psychiatric Institute, shared
Dr. Fauteck's assessment. He stated that Haynes was paranoid
schizophrenic, that he was unable to cooperate with counsel due to
his delusional beliefs and that he was unfit for trial. People v.
Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 228-31 (1996).
	Of all the mental health professionals who testified at trial, the
only one to take a contrary view was the State's expert, Dr.
Markos. Dr. Markos dismissed Haynes' ideas about "fake Aryan
beauty" as being nothing more that "a highly personalized
idiosyncratic belief." In Markos' view, Haynes was not
schizophrenic and did not suffer from a true psychiatric delusion.
The basis for Markos' conclusion was that Haynes' beliefs did not
change even after he had been given various antipsychotic drugs.
According to Markos,
		"these medications did little at all to change any of his
beliefs and that was significant to me because had it been
a true delusional process, had it been a true schizophrenic
process, then from the clinical standpoint I would have
expected *** or seen some remissions with respect to the
intensity of his belief or his belief would have disappeared
because a true delusion would be amenable to treatment
***."
	In declaring Haynes to be fit to stand trial, the circuit court
accepted Markos' assessment and rejected that of all of the other
experts whose testimony it considered. We deferred to the circuit
court's judgment when the matter was presented to us on direct
review. What we did not know then, what the trial court did not
know when it accepted Markos' opinion, and what Markos himself
did not realize when he testified at the fitness hearing is that the
basis for his opinion was incorrect. Haynes' condition was, in fact,
highly amenable to treatment through medication. The problem
was simply that the jailhouse doctors had not given him the proper
medication in the proper dosage. After Haynes was sentenced to
death and remanded to the custody of the Department of
Corrections, a staff doctor there altered his medication with
dramatic results. The doctor changed Haynes' medication on
September 24, 1994, and by November 19, 1994, Haynes' was
observed to be "free of delusional behavior." The notions of Aryan
supremacy that had led him to kill and then to forgo legal
representation at trial had vanished.
	Had Markos realized that Haynes would respond so
remarkably to a change in medication, his assessment of Haynes
condition would unquestionably have been different. Faced with
the results obtained by the Department of Corrections medical
staff, Markos could not have denied what was so obvious to
everyone else. Haynes was not just "idiosyncratic." He was
mentally ill.
	No claim can be made that Haynes' schizophrenia was
somehow fabricated for purposes of his criminal defense.
Documentary evidence submitted in support of Haynes' pleadings
in this case show that his family has a history of mental illness
spanning generations. His great-great grandmother was
involuntarily committed in 1894 suffering from "confused" and
"irrational" ideas and "delusions of persecution." His great aunt
was diagnosed with "dementia praecox, paranoid" in 1939 after she
murdered her two young daughters. In 1991, his first cousin, Stacia
Bulgar, was diagnosed as "probably paranoid schizophrenic."
	Haynes, himself, exhibited pronounced aberrant behavior long
before he started killing people in his bizarre effort to eradicate the
nation's supposed non-Aryan ugliness. That behavior was noted by
family members, associates, employers and even his one-time
landlord, who was a psychiatrist associated with the military.
Unknown to Dr. Markos at the time of trial, Haynes was actually
diagnosed as schizophrenic for the first time in the early 1980s
after engaging in aberrant behavior that led to his arrest by
authorities in California.
	Mental health professionals who have had the benefit of
reviewing Haynes' complete history, including his early medical
records and his treatment following his conviction, have confirmed
what the doctors knew in 1980: Haynes is a paranoid
schizophrenic. Moreover, according to George Woods, M.D., a
board-certified psychiatrist whose affidavit was submitted in
support of Haynes' petition in the circuit court, Haynes'
		"severe psychotic disorder rendered him paranoid,
cognitively unable to prioritize, sequence appropriately,
and rationally assist his attorneys in the preparation of his
own defense, thereby making him, in my opinion, unfit to
stand trial."
	Although Haynes' amenability to treatment and the
corresponding confirmation of his true condition were not
discovered until after trial, those matters bore directly on his status
at the time he was tried, convicted and sentenced. They showed
that the circuit court's fitness determination was based on a
medical error. As noted earlier, there is no question that this error,
if discovered earlier, would have altered the outcome of the fitness
hearing. Had Markos known of Haynes' complete history and seen
the effects that proper medication could have when properly
administered, the basis for the doctor's opinion would have been
eliminated. He would have had no possible grounds for
contradicting all of the other expert testimony and medical
evidence, and the circuit court would have had no basis for
declaring Haynes fit.	
	The purpose of a petition under section 2-1401 is to bring
before the court matters of fact which were unknown at the time
the judgment was entered, and if known, would have affected or
altered the judgment that was entered. See In re Marriage of
Hoppe, 220 Ill. App. 3d 271, 282 (1991). In my view, this case
presents precisely the sort of situation section 2-1401 was intended
to address. Haynes' petition has provided the court with an
opportunity to correct an obvious and fundamental error. We
should welcome that opportunity. At a time when the fairness and
reliability of our death penalty law has come under intense scrutiny,
this court should redouble its efforts to ensure that capital
proceedings are as error free as possible. Regardless of whether
one shares my view that the present death penalty law is
unconstitutional in all its applications (People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 225 (1998) (Harrison, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)), allowing a death sentence to stand based on a mistake of the
magnitude present in this case is intolerable. If my colleagues are
serious about rehabilitating the system, this is where they should
begin.
	Now is not the time for a limited construction of the law.
Technical objections have no place. A section 2-1401 petition
invokes the equitable powers of the court as justice and fairness
require and should be considered in light of equitable principles.
Whether a section 2-1401 petition should be granted depends upon
the facts and equities presented. Relief is granted under this statute
in order to achieve justice, and a liberal construction is used to
achieve that end. See In re Marriage of Hoppe, 220 Ill. App. 3d at
282-83.
	In considering a section 2-1401 petition, the court accepts as
true all uncontradicted facts in the petition and supporting
affidavits. See O'Malley v. Powell, 202 Ill. App. 3d 529, 533
(1990). Where the facts are challenged by the opposing party, a full
and fair evidentiary hearing must be held. See In re Marriage of
Breyley, 247 Ill. App. 3d 486, 492 (1993). Under these standards,
the circuit court should not have dismissed Haynes' section 2-1401
petition on the pleadings. The circuit court's judgment should
therefore be reversed, and the cause should be remanded for
further proceedings.
1.      1Notably, defendant does not raise this issue as an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.