Case Title: Dumbarton Improvement Ass'n v. Druid Ridge Cemetery Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 128/10

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2013-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dumbarton Improvement Association, Inc., v. Druid Ridge Cemetery Company, Misc.
Docket No. 128, September Term, 2010.
COVENANTS: The language of a restrictive covenant contained in a deed is clear and
unambiguous when, viewing the deed as a whole, the language “the said property” refers
to a habendum clause that makes clear the scope of the intended burden.
COVENANTS: Radically changed circumstances do not render a restrictive covenant
unenforceable when there is no nexus between the demographic and economic changes
presented and the purpose of the covenant as revealed by its express language.  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 128
September Term, 2010
DUMBARTON IMPROVEMENT
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al.
v. 
DRUID RIDGE CEMETERY COMPANY, et
al.
         Barbera, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins 
               *Bell
         *Murphy
JJ.
Opinion by Bell, C. J.
Filed: August 22, 2013
*Bell, C.J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after being
recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV,
Section 3A, he also participated in the decision
and adoption of this opinion. 
*Murphy, J., now retired, participated in the
hearing and conference of this case while an
active member of this Court, but did not
participate in the decision or adoption of this
opinion.
I.
In August, 1999, Druid Ridge Cemetery Company, one of the respondents (“Druid
Ridge”), entered into a contract to sell 36.21 acres (the “Development Parcel”) of the
approximately 200 acres  that it owns and are a part of  its cemetery operation in Baltimore
1
County.  The purpose for which the intended purchaser, Druid Ridge, LLP, the other
respondent, entered into the contract was to construct fifty-six semi-detached residences on
portions of the land that are immediately adjacent to Park Heights Avenue.  The proposed
sale has been challenged by the petitioners, the Dumbarton Improvement and Long Meadow
Neighborhood Associations, which represent residents from the other side of Park Heights
Avenue, individual residents of these neighborhoods, and seven owners of burial lots in the
Druid Ridge Cemetery.  They brought an action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County
seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the residential development violated restrictive
covenants contained in the deed conveying the cemetery property to Druid Ridge.
The present challenge, initiated on November 1, 2006, is premised on the restrictive
covenant contained in the 1913 deed conveying the property to Druid Ridge.  Arguing that
The respondents characterize the property at issue as “approximately 209 acres of land in
1
the Pikesville area of Baltimore County, consisting of one parcel of approximately 173 acres
on which it operates a cemetery known as Druid Ridge Cemetery . . . and a second parcel of
approximately 36 undeveloped acres ( the “Development Parcel”) that is contiguous with but
separated from the larger parcel by the Western Run Stream and a forest buffer.”  The parties
do not dispute that this parcel of property, whether 200 acres or 209 acres, is the property
conveyed to the Cemetery in 1913 and was at issue in Gregory v. Chapman, 119 Md. 495,
87 A. 523 (1913).  In that case, the Court referred to the cemetery property as consisting of
200 acres.  Id. at 497, 87 A. 523.  As we will see, infra, the insolvency court, in its opinion,
also referred to the cemetery property as consisting of “200 acres, more or less.”
the covenant burdened the land then and still does, the petitioners maintain that the proposed
sale violates the covenant and should not be permitted to proceed.  On May 9, 2008, the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County determined that the language of the restrictive covenant
was ambiguous and that, even if the language were unambiguous, there were radically
changed circumstances in the area that rendered the restrictive covenant ineffective and
unenforceable.  On September 29, 2010, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed this judgment
by  the Circuit Court.  Dumbarton Improvement Ass'n, 195 Md. App. 53, 57, 5 A.3d 1133,
1135 (2010).  Because we conclude that the language of the restrictive covenant is
unambiguous, and, further, that the nexus between the changed circumstances and the
purpose of the covenant offered by the respondents is not sufficient to render the restrictive
covenant unenforceable, we shall reverse.
II.
 The Druid Ridge Cemetery of Baltimore County (the “Cemetery”) was incorporated
on January 14, 1896.  The Cemetery acquired, on the same day, 200 acres from Charles
Tyler, the corporation’s largest shareholder, see Gregory, 119 Md. at 497–98, 87 A. at 523,
to create a modern burial setting, unique for both its size and park-like appearance.   Because
2
Maryland law, at that time, prohibited cemeteries from holding more than 100 acres,
following the organization of the Cemetery, the Maryland General Assembly promulgated
Acts of 1900, Chapter 537, which authorized the corporation to “take, hold and use” 200
acres “for the purpose of burial.”  The Cemetery was also at the vanguard of a movement to
The 1897 Deed conveying the property to Druid Ridge Cemetery Company of Baltimore
2
County did not restrict  the use of the property. 
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make park-like cemeteries.  See For Burial Reform, New York Mail and Express, June 7,
1898.
 The Cemetery fell into insolvency in 1910, just twelve years after it commenced
operations in 1898, largely due to its unsustainable business model, and was placed into
receivership.  Gregory, 119 Md. at 499–500, 87 A. at 524.  As of 1911, approximately 134
of the Cemetery’s 200 acres were not being used for burial plots or cemetery lawns. 
Dumbarton Improvement Ass'n, 195 Md. App. at 59–60, 5 A.3d at 1137.   On May 1, 1911,
court-appointed receivers reported that the best way to protect the interest of creditors and
to provide for the perpetual care of lots already sold was to sell all the property of the
corporation, unencumbered by the accrued debt, to a purchaser willing to continue the
Cemetery as an ongoing concern.  Gregory, 119 Md. at 501, 87 A. at 525.  In response, some
creditors told the court that their interests would best be protected by permitting the property
to be used to meet varied interests.
On March 21, 1912, the insolvency court adopted the recommendation of the
receivers.  It found:
“... that the land of the corporations consisting of about 200 acres, more or
less, and all personal property should by the Receivers be sold as and for a
cemetery upon such terms as the Receivers in the[ir] discretion shall deem
most advantageous, discharged and free from the operation and effect of the
10,000 land shares mentioned in the said Agreement of January 14, 1896 or
any other lien or obligation of the said corporation, except that the purchaser
will be required to set apart and invest out of the purchase price the sum of
$40, 000 to provide for the perpetual care of the lots already sold and to
covenant to set apart a sufficient sum from lots by the purchaser thereafter sold
to invest for the permanent maintenance thereof.”
Dumbarton Improvement Ass'n, 195 Md. App. at 60, 5 A.3d at 1137 (emphasis included).
In its decree, the court ordered:
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“That all the unsold land of the corporation ... be sold [by the receivers] ... and
that the course and manner of their proceedings shall be as follows: ... They
shall then make said sale of said unsold lots and improvements in which the
use of lots for burial purposes has not been sold ....  Said receivers shall offer
all said unsold land described in the deed as a whole ....  Said property shall be
offered for sale by said receivers as a cemetery, to be maintained and operated 
as such, subject to the proviso that the purchaser or purchasers thereof shall
covenant and agree, in the deed to be executed to such purchaser or purchasers
of said property ... to hold and invest [$40,000] for the perpetual care thereof
and of said cemetery grounds , and shall also in said deed covenant and agree
to set apart , invest and hold, such portion of the proceeds of the sale of lots
hereafter to be sold in said Cemetery as may be necessary to provide for the
perpetual maintenance and care of said lots so hereafter to be sold.
“[T]he said Receivers shall, by a good and sufficient deed, ... so as to
contain[]the covenants aforesaid, convey [the Cemetery] to the purchaser or
purchasers subject also [to] the obligations of the purchaser or purchasers of
said property to provide for the perpetual care of lots and of said cemetery
grounds as hereinbefore ser forth.”
The receivers reported that the court’s condition requiring the land to be used as a cemetery
was not being favorably received by potential buyers.  Dumbarton Improvement Ass'n, 195
Md. App. at 60, 5 A.3d at 1137.  As a result, the insolvency court amended its order by
striking the condition that the property be operated as a cemetery, thus “reserving for [its]
future determination the question how much, if any, of said property shall be required to be
maintained as a cemetery.”  Id. at 61, 5 A.3d at 1137.
On August 8, 1912, the receivers accepted an offer to purchase the property of the
Cemetery for $205,000, subject to the exact conditions that had been set forth in the
insolvency court’s initial order and decree.  Gregory, 119 Md. at 502, 87 A. at 525.  On
March 17, 1913, a deed that transferred 200 acres from the receivers to the Druid Ridge
Cemetery Company was executed.  The deed provided, in relevant part:
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“[Sellers], do hereby grant and convey unto [buyers], its successors and
assigns, subject to the terms, conditions, and covenants hereinafter set out, all
that tract or parcel of land . . . described as follows:
“Beginning for the same at a stone heretofore planted at the end of a South 40
degrees west 48 1/8 perch line of the land conveyed by Samuel Owings and
Cornelius Howard to George Reinicker on August 11, 1813 . . . . 
“Being the same land which by Deed dated January 14, 1896 . . . was granted
and conveyed by Charles Tyler and wife to said Druid Ridge Cemetery of
Baltimore County.
. . .
“To have and to hold said tract or parcel of land and premises above described
and mentioned together with the rights, privileges, appurtenances and
advantages thereto belonging or appertaining . . . .
“Subject, however, to the following covenants and conditions which the said
Druid Ridge Cemetery Company for itself, its successors and assigns, does
hereby covenant and agree to perform: 
“1. That the said property be maintained and operated as a cemetery.
“2. That the said Druid Ridge Cemetery Company, its successors and assigns,
shall invest and hold subject to the orders of this Circuit Court, the sum of
$40,000 of the purchase money as a fund with the income of which to meet
and comply with any and all obligations heretofore assumed by said Druid
Ridge Cemetery or said receivers, with the purchasers of lots sold therein,
for the perpetual care thereof, and of said Cemetery grounds.
“3. That the said Druid Ridge Cemetery Company, its successors and assigns,
does hereby covenant and agree to invest and hold such portion of the
proceeds of lots hereafter sold in said Cemetery as may be necessary to
provide for like perpetual maintenance and care of lots in said Cemetery
hereafter to be sold." 
(emphasis added).
Since the execution of the 1913 Deed, the real property of the Druid Ridge Cemetery
has remained largely unchanged.  Between 1921 and 1989, six smaller-than-one-acre parcels
of the Cemetery were sold to nearby residents, businesses, and utility companies.  The
construction of Interstate 695 led to a shifting of property boundaries unrelated to the parcel
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under dispute in the present case.  In 1995, Druid Ridge Cemetery sought and received a
special exemption that would permit it to use the Development Parcel for burials.
The petitioners argue that the first restrictive covenant in the 1913 Deed is clear and
unambiguous because the language, “said property,” unequivocally refers to the property
being transferred by the deed.  They note that the Circuit Court decision did not identify or
describe any ambiguity in the language when it determined that the restrictive covenant was
ambiguous as to the extent of the covenant’s intended enforceability.  The petitioners also
highlight the language of the other restrictive covenants contained in the deed to argue that
the “said property,” burdened by the first restrictive covenant, encompasses more than the
respondents propose,  the area on which  burial lots had been sold and used and lawns
developed, in either 1913 or today.   The petitioners maintain that it would be nonsensical
to restrict the covenants in the 1913 Deed to the property that was improved with grave sites
(and lawns) in 1913 because that would imply a lack of intention to protect future grave-sites,
something that the deed’s reference to, and provision for, at the court’s insistence, the
perpetual care of present and future grave-sites belie.  The petitioners further contend that
the extrinsic evidence, were it appropriate, would support their reading of the covenant
because its 200-acre scope was constantly reaffirmed throughout the insolvency proceedings.
The petitioners contend that the conveyance of small tracts of land from the original
property after 1913, the potential negligible impact of residential development on areas
improved with burial plots, and the general availability of burial plots in other portions of the
Cemetery are all irrelevant to determining the intent of the restrictive covenant.  Likewise,
the petitioners argue, differences in the relative value of the property under different uses fail
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to illuminate the intent of the covenant.  Although there have been changes since 1913, the
petitioners argue that the changes are irrelevant because they were consistent with transitions
already underway when the property was conveyed by deed, and further, that there was no
sufficient  connection between the changes and the continued viability of the covenant.  The
petitioners further argue that  whether the Development Parcel will ever be used for grave-
sites is an inappropriate consideration, because such a consideration grants the covenantor
“the power to unilaterally defeat a covenant to which he or she has agreed to be bound.”  City
of Bowie v. MIE Properties, Inc., 398 Md. 657, 687, 922 A.2d 509, 527 (2007).
The respondents urge that the lack of reverter language and the mention of express
beneficiaries in the deed support their position that the use of the property is not  restricted. 
They argue that their absence suggests that the contested language in the deed functioned
more as an expression of confidence than as a restrictive covenant.  Even if it constituted a
restrictive covenant, the respondents argue that the intent of the parties was ambiguous
because a reasonable person could infer more than one possible understanding of the nature
and extent of the restriction from the express language of the covenant.  First, they concede
that the covenant’s language leaves little doubt that cemetery operations must occur on “said
property,” but, the respondents claim, it does not dictate how much of “said property” must
be reserved for cemetery purposes or for how long.  Then, the respondents contend that the
petitioners must insert the adjective, “entire,” to the reference to “said property” in the
covenant to render the covenant’s meaning unambiguous. 
The respondents assert that the use of 40 acres as farmland when the covenant was
included in the deed, subsequent sales of Cemetery property for non-cemetery use (including
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the sale, only eight years after the restrictive covenant was imposed, of 0.8 acres to a party
to the insolvency proceedings), and non-cemetery uses of the Development Parcel after the
1913 deed burdening the property with the covenant  demonstrate that there was no intent
3
to burden the entire property, only that then being used as a cemetery.  They submit that this
is borne out by the extrinsic evidence.  That evidence establishes, the respondents argue, that
the intention of the parties to the 1913 deed was to burden the deeded land only insofar as
was necessary to guarantee the Cemetery as an ongoing concern, provide for the perpetual
care of the graves and lawns, and resolve the insolvency proceedings in an orderly manner.4
The respondents argue, alternatively, that, even if the 1913 Deed contained an
unambiguous restrictive covenant, circumstances have radically changed since the  covenant
was imposed on the property and those changed circumstances have rendered the restrictive
covenant ineffective.  The respondents highlight the growing population of Pikesville and
of Baltimore County, the increasing commercial density, and rising land values for
residential use, as compared to cemetery use, in nearby Pikesville and throughout Baltimore
County.  The respondents also presented expert testimony that demonstrated how changes
in the death-care industry have increased the number of bodies able to be buried per acre and
decreased the demand for burial lots; they argue that these changes make it highly unlikely
Stressing that the Development Parcel has never been used for burials, the respondent details
3
the various uses to which it has been put: 1) a nursery; 2) a trash dump; 3) a bus turnaround;
and 4) a staging area for the Department of Public Works’ vehicles.
The respondents also argue that the petitioners waived the argument that the covenant was
4
unambiguous by failing to raise that point in their post-trial memorandum. We granted
certiorari to address, inter alia, infra note 5, the clarity of the covenant. The respondents did
not cross appeal. As such, it is our opinion that the respondents, rather, have not preserved
the issue of the petitioner’s waiver.
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that the Development Parcel will be needed for burials within the next century.  The
respondents finally note the significant changes in land-use regulation, especially wetland
regulation, that it maintains will make it far more difficult to use the Development Parcel as
a cemetery today than it would have been in 1913.
Following adverse decisions by the Circuit Court for Baltimore County and the Court
of Special Appeals, the petitioners filed in this Court a petition for issuance of the writ of
certiorari, presenting  six questions for review.   We granted the petition, Dumbarton
5
Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. Druid Ridge Cemetery Co., 417 Md. 500, 10 A.3d 1180  (2011),
but believe that the case can best be resolved by answering just two questions:
1.  Is the first restrictive covenant created by the 1913 Deed ambiguous?
The questions presented for review are, as follows:
5
“1. Is a restrictive covenant in a deed that requires, in plain and simple terms,
that the cemetery property be ‘maintained and operated as a cemetery’
unambiguous and enforceable as written?
“2. Did the Circuit Court err in its review of extrinsic evidence and finding
from that evidence that the restrictive covenant was only intended to apply to
the already developed portions of the cemetery and the then existing lot
owners?
“3. Did Appellees fail to meet their burden of demonstrating not only that a
radical or dramatic change in circumstances occurred since the restrictive
covenant was first imposed but also that the purpose of the covenant would no
longer be served by its enforcement?
“4. Did the Circuit Court err in finding a sufficient chance in circumstances
when the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that those changes were
already occurring, and anticipated to continue, at the time the covenant was
first imposed?
“5. Did the Circuit Court violate the standard set forth in City of Bowie v. MIE
Properties, Inc., 398 Md. 657 (2007) by considering the likelihood of the
proposed development parcel ever being used for gravesites?
“6. Are principles of macro-economics, and concern for achieving the most
productive and beneficial use of property, relevant considerations when
determining the enforceability of a restrictive covenant?”
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2. Have radically changed circumstances made enforcement of the first
restrictive covenant ineffective for achieving the purpose of said covenant?
III.
Our jurisprudence on contract interpretation is well settled and oft-stated.  As is the
case with statutory interpretation, “[t]he cardinal rule of contract interpretation is to give
effect to the parties’ intentions.”  Torman, Inc. v. Passano, 391 Md. 1, 14, 891 A.2d 336, 344
(2006) (citing Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook, 386 Md. 468, 497, 872 A.2d 969, 985 (2005)). 
Courts in Maryland apply the law of objective contract interpretation, which provides that
“[t]he written language embodying the terms of an agreement will govern the rights and
liabilities of the parties, irrespective of the intent of the parties at the time they entered into
the contract, unless the written language is not susceptible of a clear and definite
understanding.”  Slice v. Carozza Properties, Inc., 215 Md. 357, 368, 137 A.2d 687, 693
(1958).  See also Sy-Lene of Washington, Inc. v. Starwood Urban Retail II, LLC., 376 Md.
157, 166–67, 829 A.2d 540, 546 (2003); Long v. State, 371 Md. 72, 84, 807 A.2d 1, 8
(2002).  As such, “[a] contract’s unambiguous language will not give way to what the parties
thought the contract meant or intended it to mean at the time of execution.”  Sy-Lene of
Washington, 376 Md. at 167, 829 A.2d at 546.  Instead, “[i]f a written contract is susceptible
of a clear, unambiguous and definite understanding . . . its construction is for the court to
determine.”  Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 363 Md. 232, 251, 768 A.2d 620, 630
(2001) (quoting Rothman v. Silver, 245 Md. 292, 296, 226 A.2d 308, 310 (1967)).  Our task,
therefore, when interpreting a contract, is not to discern the actual mindset of the parties at
the time of the agreement, but rather, to “determine from the language of the agreement itself
what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was
-10-
effectuated.”  General Motors Acceptance v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261, 492 A.2d 1306,
1310 (1985).  Additionally, the principles of contract interpretation require that “in
ascertaining the true meaning of a contract . . . [,] the contract must be construed in its
entirety and, if reasonably possible, effect must be given to each clause so that a court will
not find an interpretation which casts out or disregards a meaningful part of the language of
the writing unless no other course can be sensibly and reasonably followed.”  Sagner v.
Glenangus Farms, Inc., 234 Md. 156, 167, 198 A.2d 277, 283 (1964).  See also Torman, Inc.,
391 Md. at 13–14, 891 A.2d at 344; Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Md.
758, 782, 625 A.2d 1021, 1033 (1993).
Likewise, covenants, a species of contracts, are to be enforced according to the
objective intent of the original parties.  See Live Stock Co. v. Rendering Co., 179 Md. 117,
122, 17 A.2d 130, 133 (1941) ("It is a cardinal principle . . . that the court should be governed
by the intention of the parties as it appears or is implied from the instrument itself.");  MIE
Properties, Inc., 398 Md. at 682 n.13, 922 A.2d at 524 n.13 (“Restrictive covenants . . . are
a species of contract.  Thus, they are interpreted in a like manner as other types of
contracts.”); see also Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Crofton Corp., 286 Md. 666, 673, 410 A.2d 228,
232 (1980) (“[A] court, in construing agreement, must first determine from the language of
the agreement itself, what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant
at the time the agreement was effectuated.”). 
The language of the restrictive covenant is the first source to which we must look in
an effort to uncover the intent of the covenanting parties; if the language of the covenant is
unambiguous, it is the only source to which we look, except to confirm the plain meaning of
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the covenant.  Shillman v. Hobstetter, 249 Md. 678, 688, 241 A.2d 570, 576 (1968) (“In
determining the intention of the parties, the language of the instrument is the primary source
for that determination.”); see also Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 205
Md. App. 636, 654, 46 A.3d 473, 484 (2012) (quoting Voljack v. Washington County Hosp.
Ass’n, 124 Md. App. 481, 509, 723 A.2d 463, 477 (1999)) (“The primary source for
determining whether the parties intended a third party to have standing to enforce the
contractual provisions is the language of the contract itself.”).  Indeed, we have stated that
“[w]here the language of the instrument containing a restrictive covenant is unambiguous,
a court should simply give effect to that language ‘unless prevented from doing so by public
policy or some established principle of law.’”  SDC 214, LLC., v. London Towne Prop.
Owners Ass’n, 395 Md. 424, 434, 910 A.2d 1064, 1069 (2006) (quoting Miller v. Bay City
Prop. Owners Ass'n, 393 Md. 620, 636, 903 A.2d 938, 948 (2006)); accord Belleview Constr.
Co. v. Rugby Hall Cmty. Ass’n, 321 Md. 152, 158, 582 A.2d 493, 496 (1990).
As with contracts generally, a covenant is ambiguous if its language is susceptible to
multiple interpretations by a reasonable person.  See Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425,
435–36, 727 A.2d 358, 363 (1999) (citing Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc.,
320 Md. 584, 596, 578 A.2d 1202, 1208 (1990); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Marks Rentals, 288 Md.
428, 433, 418 A.2d 1187, 1190 (1980)).  “An ambiguity does not exist simply because a
strained or conjectural construction can be given to a word.”  Belleview, 321 Md. at 159, 582
A.2d at 496.  The first step is to "[d]etermine from the language of the agreement itself what
a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have meant at the time it was
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effectuated,” and if “the language of the contract is plain and unambiguous there is no room
for construction”  Calomiris, 353 Md. at 436, 727 A.2d at 363. 
“Extrinsic evidence is only utilized when the intent of the parties and the purpose of
a restrictive covenant cannot be divined from the actual language of the covenant in question,
necessitating a reasonable interpretation of the language in light of the circumstances
surrounding its adoption.”  MIE, 398 Md. at 681, 922 A.2d at 523–24 (citing SDC 214,
LLC., 395 Md. at 434–36, 910 A.2d at 1070–71 (refusing to employ the rule of reasonable
construction  when the restrictive covenant was clear and unambiguous and applying the
6
plain language of the covenant); Miller, 393 Md. at 634–35, 637, 903 A.2d at 946–48
(outlining the evolution of the reasonable construction rule and foregoing its application in
construing a covenant because the "words used [were] clear and unambiguous")). 
The respondents primarily rely upon the Circuit Court’s decision, affirmed by the
Court of Special Appeals, to argue “[t]hat the said property be maintained and operated as
The rule of reasonable construction, or the “reasonably strict construction” rule, County
6
Commissioners v. St. Charles, 366 Md. 426, 447, 784 A.2d 545, 557 (2001), provides that
“[i]f the meaning of [an] instrument is not clear from its terms, the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument should be
considered in arriving at the intention of the parties, and the apparent meaning
and object of their stipulations should be gathered from all possible sources.”
SDC 214, LLC., 395 Md. at 434, 910 A.2d at 1070 (quoting Belleview, 321 Md. at 157–58,
582 at 493, 495).  Conversely,
“‘[i]f an ambiguity is present, and if that ambiguity is not clearly resolved by
resort to extrinsic evidence, the general rule in favor of the unrestricted use of
property will prevail and the ambiguity in a restriction will be resolved against
the party seeking its enforcement.”
SDC 214, LLC., 395 Md. at 434, 910 A.2d at 1070 (quoting Belleview, 321 Md. at 158, 582
A.2d at 495).  See also MIE, 398 Md. At 681, 922 A.2d at 523; Miller, 393 Md. at 634–35,
903 at 938, 946–7.
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a cemetery” is ambiguous.  After determining that language in the 1913 Deed constituted a
restrictive covenant, the Circuit Court addressed the question of ambiguity, stating:
“The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the covenant is
unambiguous.  If it is, it must be enforced in accordance with its terms, thereby
restricting the use of the Development Parcel for any purpose other than a
cemetery.  If it is ambiguous, then the intent of the parties must be determined.
“Having reviewed the language in the 1913 Deed, I find it to be ambiguous. 
It is unclear the extent to which the ‘said property’ is to be maintained and
operated as a cemetery. Clearly at the time it was sold, large portions of the
nearly 200 acre parcel were not used as a cemetery, and nearly 100 years later,
that remains true.  While it is clear that use of at least some portion as a
cemetery was contemplated, the extent and nature of that use, as required by
the Deed, is ambiguous.”
The interpretation of a covenant involves both the discovery of facts and the
application of legal rules.  Although this Court will only overturn a trial court’s findings of
fact when the findings are clearly erroneous, Maryland Rule 8-131 (c),  whether a covenant’s
7
language is ambiguous is an issue of law, which this Court reviews de novo.  See United
Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Riley, 393 Md. 55, 79, 899 A.2d 819, 833 (2006); MIE, 398 Md. at
682, 922 A.2d at 524; Sy-Lene of Washington, 376 Md. at 163, 829 A.2d at 544; see also
Huber, 148 Md. App. 190, 201, 811 A.2d 389, 396 (2002).  Additionally, this Court recently
noted in MIE, “the interpretation of a restrictive covenant, including a determination of its
continuing vitality, is subject to de novo review as a legal question.”  398 Md. at 677, 922
A.2d at 521 (citing Huber, 148 Md. App. at 201, 811 A.2d at 395–96 (2002)).
Maryland Rule 8-131 (c) provides:
7
“When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review
the case on both the law and the evidence.  It will not set aside the judgment
of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due
regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.”
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The Circuit Court wrote that enforcing the restrictive covenant in the 1913 Deed “in
accordance with its terms” required “restricting the use of the Development Parcel for any
purpose other than a cemetery”; as a matter of law, its analysis of the covenant’s ambiguity
should have ended there.  If the terms of a covenant require a particular outcome, then it is
impossible to meet the legal threshold for ambiguity, which requires that the language of a
covenant be susceptible to multiple interpretations by a reasonable person.  See Calomiris,
353 Md. at 435–36, 727 A.2d at 363.
The Circuit Court did not stop there, however.  Instead, it proceeded  to conclude that
the covenant in the 1913 Deed was ambiguous, but without highlighting a particular word
or any of its language that could be construed differently by a reasonable person.  In fact, the
Circuit Court, having opined that the extent of the restriction was unclear,  relied on extrinsic
evidence to infer the subjective intent of the parties, wholly independent of the language. 
This analysis is fundamentally flawed for two reasons.  First, as we made clear in MIE, an
ambiguity in the actual language used by the parties should be identified before consulting
and introducing extrinsic evidence.  See 398 Md. at 681, 922 A.2d at 523–24.  Second, once
an ambiguity in the language has been identified, extrinsic evidence should be used only to
resolve that ambiguity.  See Calomiris, 353 Md. at 447, 727 A.2d at 369 (“even if the
language were ambiguous, parol evidence would be admissible only to resolve the
ambiguities and not to contradict unambiguous terms”); see also Belleview, 321 Md. at 158,
582 A.2d at 495 (using extrinsic evidence to clarify the meaning of the word “lots” as found
in the covenant).
-15-
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision because a
“reasonable reading of the covenant would have been that the requirement to use the property
to maintain and operate a cemetery did not extend to every square foot of the nearly 200
acres.”  Dumbarton Improvement Ass'n, 195 Md. App. at 70–71, 5 A.3d at 1143 (2010).  The
intermediate appellate court noted that the covenant did not expressly require that all of the
property be “solely or exclusively” used for a cemetery and that there was no time limit on
the covenant.  Id.  The Court of Special Appeals also, as we have noted, emphasized the lack
of reverter language in the covenant, the covenant’s lack of clarity as to duration, and the
failure of the covenant to address who may enforce the covenant in the event of violations
of the covenants.  Id.  Like the Circuit Court, the Court of Special Appeals failed to identify
any ambiguous language, in particular, in the covenant as written. 
As a preliminary matter, a covenant need not address every conceivable issue or
potential outcome to avoid being ambiguous; it need only provide a clear answer for the
matter in dispute.  The question before us does not concern the consequences of violating the
covenant, so the potential ambiguity of the covenant due to a lack of reverter language is of
no consequence.  See, e.g., Calomiris, 353 Md. at 441, 727 A.2d at 365–66 (holding that
there must be a nexus between “the alleged ambiguities” and “the contract language
necessary to resolve [the] dispute”).  Nor does the lack of a specific time frame render the
language of a covenant ambiguous.  Although the ongoing validity of the covenant, nearly
a century following its creation, is an issue in this case, this Court has previously held that
“where the duration of a restrictive covenant has not been expressly limited, it will be
implied that some reasonable limitation adapted to the nature of the case was intended.” 
-16-
Norris v. Williams, 189 Md. 73, 77, 54 A.2d 331, 333 (1947) (citing Whitmarsh v.
Richmond, 179 Md. 523, 529, 20 A.2d 161, 164 (1941); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Levy, 181 Md.
488, 494, 30 A.2d 740, 743 (1943)).  Determining the reasonable time limit is very similar
to the analysis of changed circumstances, see, e.g., Norris, 189 Md. at 77, 54 A.2d at 333,
which we shall take up below. It is clear, however, that the lack of an express time frame
does not make a covenant, as a whole, ambiguous. 
The Court of Special Appeals correctly cited  SDC 214, LLC. for the proposition  that
it would be improper to insert “solely or exclusively” (or, we add, “partially”) to the
covenant to avoid an ambiguity as “‘it is not the province of this Court to supply a missing’
word or phrase in a restrictive covenant.” 395 Md. at 437, 910 A.2d at 1071 (quoting Sowers
v. Holy Nativity Church, 149 Md. 434, 442, 131 A. 785, 788 (1926)).  Nevertheless, the
intermediate appellate court’s analysis of the covenant’s ambiguity is flawed.
The language of the restrictive covenant contained in the 1913 Deed is clear and
unambiguous.  After describing all 200 acres, both in its precisely surveyed relationship to
the neighboring property and its full publicly recorded history, as a distinct parcel of land,
the deed makes the conveyance of this property to the Druid Ridge Cemetery Company
subject to the conditions “[t]hat the said property be maintained and operated as a cemetery”
and that steps be taken to insure that exiting grave-sites and future ones, lots to be sold in the
future for burial, be perpetually maintained.  What is encompassed in “the said property” is
only ambiguous if the language in the habendum clause of the 1913 Deed, which precisely
sets forth the extent of the property burdened, is ignored.  And, of course, consistent with the
rules of contract construction, the meaning of that phrase must be determined from the deed
-17-
as a whole, not by viewing the covenant in isolation. Md. Agric. Land Pres. Found. v.
Claggett, 412 Md. 45, 63, 985 A.2d 565, 576 (2009); St. Charles Assocs., 366 Md. at 463,
784 A.2d at 566–67 (noting that rules of construction require that a court consider the deed
in question as a whole); Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110, 123, 733 A.2d
1055, 1062 (1999) (concluding that a reviewing court “must consider the deed as a whole,
viewing its language in light of the facts and circumstances of the transaction at issue as well
as the governing law at the time of conveyance”). 
Furthermore, no evidence has been proffered to explain why the language,
“maintained and operated as a cemetery,” is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation.  Even when the use of extrinsic evidence is appropriate, it should first be
directed at resolving the ambiguity in the language, MIE, 398 Md. at 681, 922 A. 2d at 523,
and the clarified language should, in turn, be used to ascertain intent.  In the present case, if
the phrase, “the said property,” is ambiguous for not being precise as to the scope of the
burden it imposed on the cemetery property, reference to another part of the deed, the
habendum clause, resolves the ambiguity and the deed, considered as a whole, makes clear
that the intent of the restrictive covenant was to burden the entire property, all 200 acres, with
the restrictive covenant.
Uncovering the intent of an ambiguous covenant involves findings of facts, to be sure.
 MIE, 398 Md. at 683 n.16, 922 A.2d at 525 n.16 (citing McLean, Koehler, Sparks &
Hammond v. Schnepfe, 309 Md. 399, 410, 524 A.2d 86, 91 (1987); Shapiro v. Massengill,
105 Md. App. 743, 754–55, 661 A.2d 202, 208 (1995)).  We will not overturn a trial court’s
factual determinations unless there is clear error. See Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 460, 682
-18-
A.2d 248, 254 (1996) (“[A]bsent clear error in its fact-finding, an appellate court is required,
in deference to the trial court, to accept those findings of fact.).  Such an error is present here. 
Although there was no clear error in the Circuit Court’s fact-finding methodology, that
methodology was directed at answering the wrong question.  In the case of covenant
interpretation, like that of other contracts, extrinsic evidence should answer the question: how
would a reasonable person have understood the covenant  language at the time it was made? 
See Calomiris, 353 Md. at 441, 727 A.2d at 366 (noting that “extrinsic evidence admitted
must help interpret the ambiguous language and not be used to contradict other, unambiguous
language”).
The argument made by the respondents and adopted by the Circuit Court to explain
the intent of the parties to the 1913 Deed focuses upon the use of portions of the land for
activities other than maintaining and operating a cemetery at the time the deed was conveyed
and afterwards.  The respondents, in that regard, point to the facts that, beginning 8 years
after the 1913 deed, in 1921, and continuing until as late as 1989, the Cemetery has conveyed
parcels of the Cemetery property to other parties for non-cemetery uses and those parties
have so used the property conveyed.   This evidence does little to resolve the case sub judice.
8
 It simply may demonstrate that the covenant has been violated on several occasions.   At
9
The transactions include the conveyance of: .8 acres for a single family dwelling; a 185 foot
8
strip for “a siding for the purposes of the standing of trolley cars”; .6 acres for an office
building and an additional .843 acre ground rent lease for parking associated with the
building; .4 acres for a bank branch office; and a 4200 square foot perpetual drainage and
utility easement.   The conveyance for the dwelling house was signed by two signatories of
the 1913 deed, which, to the respondents, is clear evidence that the restrictive covenant was
never intended to be applicable to 100% of the property.
We note that a burdened party cannot waive an obligation through noncompliance, MIE, 398
9
Md. At 697–98, 922 A.2d at 533–34, and there is no evidence that the petitioners waived the
-19-
best, it illuminates the subjective aspirations of one of the parties to the deed.  As we noted
earlier, however, this Court employs an objective standard for interpreting covenants, and
this evidence does little to explain how a reasonable person would have understood the
covenant’s language at the time it was written.
There is evidence that directly addresses how the language of the restrictive covenant
would have been understood by a reasonable person when it was created.  As noted above,
the 1913 Deed was drafted to comply with an insolvency court order.  Although the final
version of the court’s order did not require that the property be maintained and operated as
a cemetery, the initial version did.  It mandated that: “[s]aid property shall be offered . . . as
a cemetery, to be maintained and operated as such.”  In suggesting the removal of this
requirement from the earlier version of the order, the receivers, in relevant part, informed the
court: 
“Your Receivers have since had numerous inquiries from prospective
purchasers, and they find that much objection has been made to those features
of the decree which requires that the purchaser shall covenant to use the
property as a Cemetery . . . . Criticism has been made that it will not be
necessary or desirable to use the whole 189
 acres as a cemetery, but that a
[10]
considerable part of it can be much better used for other purposes, without
injury to the Cemetery property.”
In response to the receiver’s report, the insolvency court altered its earlier order:
“[B]y striking out . . . the requirement that said property shall be offered . . . as
a Cemetery, to be maintained and operated as such . . . the Court reserving for
future determination the question how much, if any, of said property shall be
required to be maintained as a cemetery.”
enforcement of the covenant or are in privity with any party that may have done so.
According to a newspaper advertisement for the sale of the cemetery property, announcing
10
the public auction to be held on May 15, 1912, 111/4 acres of the 200 acres had been sold
as burial sites.
-20-
(Order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County in the matter of Baker v. Druid Ridge
Cemetery, 4/19/1912 E.1694–95).  In order to preserve the question of how much of the land
would be maintained and operated as a cemetery, the judge was compelled to remove
language that is nearly identical to that found in the 1913 Deed.   The evidence suggests
11
that, in addition to the court, both the receivers and the potential purchasers in 1912
understood the removed language to prevent non-cemetery use of the entire property.
The only obvious dispute regarding the language of the covenant in the 1913 Deed in
the 1912 proceedings concerned whether placing this restriction on the land was a sensible
business decision.  As we noted in MIE, however, this Court will “not invalidate a plainly
written covenant to save a party from what may prove to be a poor business decision.” 398
Md. at 683, 922 A.2d at 525 (citing Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 540, 530 A.2d 724, 728
(1987)); see also Miller, 393 Md. at 638, 903 A.2d at 948.
The question of how the language would have been understood at the moment that an
ambiguous covenant was made ordinarily is best addressed by the trial court.  It is
unnecessary to undertake  that analysis in the present case, however.  We determine, as a
matter of law, that the covenant, as written, clearly and unambiguously “restrict[s] the use
of the Development Parcel for any purpose other than a cemetery.”
IV.
The respondents, as indicated, alternatively argue that even if the restrictive covenant
is unambiguous, and was meant to preclude the use of any portion of the original 200 acres
Compare “[s]aid property shall be offered . . . as a cemetery, to be maintained and operated
11
as such” from the initial order in 1912 with “the said property be maintained and operated
as a cemetery.”
-21-
for any activity other than maintaining and operating a cemetery, it should, nonetheless, no
longer be enforced.  As we discussed in MIE, “[t]he proper legal standard for this inquiry is
to examine whether, after the passage of a reasonable period of time, the continuing validity
of the covenant cannot further the purpose for which it was formed in light of changed
relevant circumstances.”  398 Md. at 685, 922 A.2d at 526; see also Texas Co. v. Harker, 212
Md. 188, 198, 129 A. 2d 384, 390 (1957) ("Most jurisdictions now recognize a change in the
character of a neighborhood as a ground for affirmative relief against restrictive covenants
. . . where the change has been so radical as . . . to defeat the object or purpose of the
restriction.”).  “The inquiry, therefore, is whether there has been a complete or radical change
in the neighborhood causing the restrictions to outlive their usefulness.”  Chevy Chase
Village v. Jaggers, 261 Md. 309, 316, 275 A.2d 167, 171 (1971).
As we stated in MIE, “we begin our analysis of whether the Covenants in this case
remain valid and enforceable with an examination of the Covenants’ purpose as indicated by
their actual language.”  398 Md. at 681–2, 922 A.2d at 524 (citing SDC 214, LLC., 395 Md.
at 433, 910 A.2d at 1069; Miller, 393 Md. at 637, 903 A.2d at 948; Belleview, 321 Md. at
157, 582 A.2d at 495).  The respondents contend that the sole purpose of the covenant was
to allow “time for the Cemetery Company to become a continuous and successful cemetery
operation able to provide for the ‘maintenance and care of the graves and attendant
structures.’” The petitioners, on the other hand, argue that the purpose of the covenant was
to prevent non-cemetery uses of the Cemetery and thus insulate the entire 200 acres from
outside influences.  The Circuit Court, agreeing with the respondents, found that the purpose
of the covenant was “to require continued operation of the existing cemetery, and to provide
-22-
for perpetual care of the grounds and grave.”  The Court of Special Appeals affirmed this
finding after determining that it was not clearly erroneous.  Dumbarton Improvement Ass'n,
195 Md. App. at 71, 5 A.3d at 1144.
A circuit court’s finding of purpose is generally not disturbed in the absence of clear
error.  MIE, 398 Md. at 684, 922 A.2d at 525 (“We do not second-guess the Circuit Court's
evaluation of the Covenants' purpose given the trial court's unique position to weigh the
credibility of the evidence and testimony adduced at trial”).  We find clear error here because
the Circuit Court’s determination of intent proceeds directly from its incorrect determination
that the covenant was ambiguous.  It was this erroneous determination that prompted the
inappropriate use of extrinsic evidence by the Circuit Court to assess the intent of the parties. 
As we noted above, the language of the covenant is clear and unambiguous. Where this is the
case, it is in the plain language of the covenant that the parties’ intentions are found. 
Accordingly, we agree with the petitioners, that the purpose of the covenant was to ensure
that the full 200 acres be reserved for cemetery uses. 
The next step in the analysis is to determine if there have been relevant radical
changes such that the covenant cannot achieve the purpose for which it was created.  In that
regard, the respondents contend that there have been numerous radical changes in the
neighborhood that prevent the covenant from furthering the purpose for which it was formed. 
The changes to the area identified by the respondents can be grouped into three kinds or sets:
(1) the change from agrarian and rural to residential, suburban, and commercial in the
Cemetery’s immediate vicinity between 1913 and today; (2) the development of superior,
alternate means of fulfilling the Cemetery’s fiduciary duties; and (3) increased regulation of
-23-
land-use.
Both the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals relied upon these changes to
find that the covenants, even if they initially prevented the sale of the Development Parcel,
were no longer enforceable.  The petitioners do not deny that much has changed in the
vicinity of the Cemetery.  They argue, however,  that some changes were anticipated in 1913,
and that none of the changes frustrates the purpose of the covenant.  We address each set of
changes in turn.
There is no nexus between the demographic and economic changes presented by the
respondents and the purpose of the covenant as revealed by its express language.  The
respondents presented evidence that tended to show a dramatic increase in the population of
Pikesville in particular and Baltimore County in general.  They also used aerial photographs
to show that what was once a largely agrarian and sparsely populated area is now a densely
populated commercial hub.  The respondents also noted the current use of the Cemetery as
a shortcut between area arterial roads.  The petitioners counter these assertions with evidence
that many of the changes described by the respondents were already underway in 1913.
This Court previously has determined that otherwise valid residential-use restrictions
are no longer enforceable because of the changing character of the neighborhood.  See, e.g.,
Whitmarsh, 179 Md. at 529, 20 A.2d at 164 (holding a restriction to only use property for
residential purposes unenforceable because the surrounding neighborhood had transformed
into a commercial district); Talles v. Rifman, 189 Md. 10, 17, 53 A.2d 396, 398–99 (1947)
(holding that a restriction, which required detached housing on a block, was unenforceable
because each of the surrounding blocks were composed of row houses).  The primary
-24-
difficulty with applying the holdings from these cases to the present issue is that the changed
circumstances noted by the respondents are targeted at a misreading of the covenant’s
purpose.
The respondents’ evidence was introduced to counter the petitioner’s argument that
the purpose of the covenant was to create a tranquil preserve.
  That, however was not the
 12
purpose of the covenant.  We have already determined that the purpose of the covenant,
reflected in and by its plain language, is to preserve 200 acres for the maintenance and
operation of a cemetery.  A perpetual preserve of repose and tranquility is, or may be, an
ancillary effect of this purpose, but it is not the proper metric for determining the ongoing
viability of the covenant.  The respondents failed to explain how the changing character of
the neighborhood frustrated the potential use of the entire 200 acres as a cemetery in any
way, and there is no obvious reason why these changes would do so.
Furthermore, even if the purpose of the covenant was to preserve a space of
tranquility, the present case, involving a 200-acre property, is distinguishable from the cases
where we held that a change in neighborhood conditions rendered a covenant unenforceable. 
In those cases we were confronted with a requirement that only a single house be placed on
a lot in a neighborhood where all the other lots had multiple dwellings, see Whitmarsh, 179
Md. at 524–26, 20 A.2d at 162, or a restriction against the construction of a row house on a
block surrounded by row houses.  See Talles, 189 Md. at 12–14, 53 A.2d at 396.  The
The respondents also presented evidence to suggest that tranquil space would not have been
12
a major concern for the parties to the 1913 Deed as the Cemetery was located in a sparsely
populated area.  The petitioners argued that the covenant could be seen as a bulwark against
the changes that could have been reasonably anticipated in 1913.  We do not resolve this
factual question here as we have already held that the covenant is clear and unambiguous. 
-25-
purpose of these covenants was to preserve a particular type of neighborhood,  a purpose that
simply could not be achieved by restricting a single lot or block in the midst of other lots or
blocks not similarly restricted.  The present case is  not at all analogous;  the preservation of
a 200-acre cemetery does not require that the surrounding area also be similarly restricted. 
The respondents also contend that changes in the death-care industry, land value, and
the Cemetery’s financial status mean that continued enforcement of the covenant no longer
serves any purpose.  To that end, the respondents presented evidence that there has been an
increase in the number of burials permitted per acre and a decrease in the proportion of
people selecting burials, as compared to cremations, since the restriction was placed in  the
1913 Deed.  The respondents claim that, as a result of these changes,  there is at least a
century’s worth of space for burial plots in the portion of the Cemetery that does not include
the contested Development Parcel.  The respondents also presented evidence that the demand
for residential land had increased dramatically, and, as a result, retaining the land for
cemetery use in the distant future was no longer a socially efficient or desirable outcome. 
Additionally, the respondents note that the Cemetery is no longer in danger of insolvency,
explaining, further, that the sale of the Development Parcel will be a financial benefit to the
Cemetery Company, rather than the financial detriment that could potentially arise from the
cost of property taxes for, and maintenance of, the Development Parcel.
These changes were presented as evidence that the restriction on the property now
frustrated the covenant’s purpose of ensuring that the Cemetery remain an ongoing,
financially stable operation that could provide for the perpetual care of graves and grounds
already purchased.  We note again, this is not the purpose of the covenant as expressed in the
-26-
plain and unambiguous  language of the covenant, and there is no direct connection between
the changes presented here and the ability to maintain and operate a cemetery on the 200
acres transferred in the 1913 Deed.  Accepting, arguendo, the respondents’ characterization
of the covenant’s purpose, their changed circumstance argument, which was accepted by the
Circuit Court, and affirmed by the intermediate appellate court, is, nonetheless, legally
flawed.  
In MIE, where we stated that: “The proper legal standard for this inquiry is to examine
whether, after the passage of a reasonable period of time, the continuing validity of the
covenant cannot further the purpose for which it was formed in light of changed relevant
circumstances,” 398 Md. at 685, 922 A.2d at 526, we explicitly rejected the standard that
assessed the effects of changes by “determin[ing] whether there is a reasonable probability
that the parties will be able to achieve the goals of the Covenants within a reasonable period
of time.” Id. 
The respondents do not contend that the Cemetery is presently or will eminently be
unable to provide for the perpetual care of grounds and graves currently in existence unless
they are permitted to sell Cemetery grounds, as were the facts in Columbia Bldg. Co. v.
Cemetery of the Holy Cross. 155 Md. 221, 225, 41 A. 525, 526 (1928) (“plaintiff has been
and is in need of money for cleaning up the cemetery ground . . . the sale of said land will
provide the funds necessary”).  The respondents in this case simply contend that they would
be in a better position to care for graves and grounds if they were allowed to sell the
Development Parcel.  Ensuring the best fiscal outcome is not the test for the ongoing validity
of a covenant.  See Harker, 212 Md. at 200–01, 129 A.2d at 391 (finding economic benefits
-27-
insufficient to invalidate restrictions on a particular lot).  Moreover, considering the ongoing
financial stability of the Druid Ridge Cemetery Company, there has been no showing that
the Cemetery cannot continue at its current size.
The sale of the Development Parcel may make better business sense for the
respondents, but, as we noted in the discussion of ambiguity, this Court will “not invalidate
a plainly written covenant to save a party from what may prove to be a poor business
decision.”  MIE, 398 Md. at 683, 922 A.2d at 525 (citing Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532,
540, 530 A.2d 724, 728 (1957)).  Furthermore, we note that the decision to defer the use of
the 36.21 acres constituting the Development Parcel until after all of the other Cemetery
grounds have been used is a business decision.  Although it may be a very sensible one,
Druid Ridge Cemetery Company’s decision not to use the land for burials in the foreseeable
future does not bear upon the question of whether the Development Parcel can be used as a
cemetery within a reasonable period.
The most persuasive of the respondents’ arguments, given the purpose of the covenant
as identified in the language, is that increased regulation of land use, especially of wetlands,
has made it impractical to use the Development Parcel as a cemetery.  In support of this
argument, the respondents presented evidence that it would cost approximately one million
dollars, following an extended permitting process, to access the Development Parcel for the
purposes of burial. The Circuit Court determined that petitioners unsuccessfully contested
the foundation for the respondents’ claims, and we find no clear error in the Circuit Court’s
finding of fact in that regard.   Nevertheless, these facts do not reach the standard set forth
-28-
in MIE.  See 398 Md. at 685, 922 A.2d at 526.  Although the high costs and difficult
permitting process may lead the Cemetery company to want to develop the Cemetery
property in other ways and for different purposes, the respondents need to demonstrate that
they cannot procure a permit or that they cannot recuperate the costs of bridging the wetlands
while fulfilling obligations that arise from the restrictive covenants burdening the property.
We hold that the first restrictive covenant in the 1913 Deed, clearly and
unambiguously, requires that all 200 acres sold to the Druid Ridge Cemetery Company be
maintained and operated as a cemetery.  Although we agree that there have been significant
changes in the vicinity of the Cemetery, we also hold that none of these changes frustrate the
covenant’s ability to achieve the purpose expressed in its language or affect its ongoing
validity.  For these reasons we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO 
REMAND THIS CASE TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY FOR
ENTRY OF  JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
THE PETITIONERS. COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
THE
RESPONDENTS.
-29-