Case Title: State v. Dennis R. Thiel

Citation: 2000 WI 67

Docket Number: 1999AP000316

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 67 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-0316 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
In re the Commitment of Dennis R. Thiel: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Dennis R. Thiel,  
 
Respondent-Appellant.  
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 23, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
May 31, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit Court 
 
COUNTY: 
Fond du Lac 
 
JUDGE: 
Peter L. Grimm 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating: PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs 
and oral argument by John D. Lubarsky, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was 
argued by Sally L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the brief was Diane M. Welsh, assistant attorney general, and 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
2000 WI 67 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 99-0316 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Dennis R. Thiel: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Dennis R. Thiel, 
 
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Fond du Lac 
County, Peter L. Grimm, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded to 
the court of appeals. 
 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. 
This case is before the court 
on certification from the court of appeals.1  The defendant, 
Dennis R. Thiel, challenges his commitment as a sexually violent 
person under Wis. Stat. § 980.06 (1997-98)2 and asserts that the 
                     
1 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1997-98), the 
court appeals certified an appeal of an order of the Circuit 
Court for Fond du Lac County, Peter L. Grimm, J., committing the 
defendant to the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family 
Services as a sexually violent person.     
2 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 
1997-98 volumes unless otherwise indicated. 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
2 
State of Wisconsin failed to satisfy its burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that its petition for commitment was 
filed within 90 days of Thiel’s release date.  We determine that 
in a commitment trial pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 980, the State 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the subject of the 
petition is within 90 days of release or discharge from a 
sentence imposed on the basis of a sexually violent offense.  
Because the evidence on the record does not provide proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the State filed its petition within 90 
days of Thiel's release, we reverse the circuit court and remand 
to the court of appeals to determine the appropriate remedy. 
¶2 
On June 23, 1997, the State filed a petition in 
circuit court seeking an order to detain Thiel as a "sexually 
violent person" under Wis. Stat. § 980.01(7).  In support of its 
petition, the State alleged that: 1) Thiel had been convicted of 
three sexually violent offenses; 2) he is scheduled to be 
released on June 24, 1997 from the sentence imposed for the 
convicted offenses; 3) Thiel suffers from two mental disorders, 
namely pedophilia and anti-social personality disorder; and 4) 
these disorders predispose him to engage in acts of sexual 
violence. 
¶3 
Additionally, the petition set forth numerous facts to 
establish probable cause to believe that Thiel is a sexually 
violent person, including statements and the diagnosis of a 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
3 
clinical psychologist who had evaluated him.  Upon reviewing the 
petition, the circuit court found cause to believe that Thiel 
meets the criteria of a sexually violent person and is eligible 
for commitment under Wis. Stat. § 980.05(5).  The court then 
ordered his detention and scheduled a hearing to determine 
whether there is probable cause to believe that Thiel is a 
sexually violent person.  Wis. Stat. § 980.04(2).        
¶4 
On the following day, June 24, 1997, the circuit court 
held a hearing and found probable cause to believe that Thiel is 
a sexually violent person within the meaning of Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.01(7).  The court ordered that he remain in custody during 
the pendency of the proceedings at any facility approved by the 
Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS) and further 
ordered that DHFS conduct an evaluation of Thiel. 
¶5 
A bench trial on the commitment petition was held on 
August 6, 1997, during which the circuit court accepted 
testimony from several psychologists on their assessments of 
Thiel's mental condition.  Thiel testified as to his efforts to 
seek treatment.  The State offered numerous exhibits in support 
of its petition, including various reports and risk assessments 
by those who had evaluated Thiel.  
¶6 
Although the State apparently did not attempt to prove 
that the commitment petition was filed within 90 days of Thiel's 
release, several of the documents received into evidence 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
4 
reference a mandatory release (MR) date.  A number of these 
exhibits note Thiel's MR date as June 1997.  One particular 
document specifies the release date as June 29, 1997.  However, 
other documents indicate the MR date as March 19, 1997.  Thiel 
did not challenge the admission of these exhibits into evidence. 
¶7 
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court 
rendered findings that the State had proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that: 1) Thiel had been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense; 2) he had a mental disorder, namely pedophilia; and 3) 
Thiel is dangerous to others because his mental disorder creates 
a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual 
violence.  However, the court failed to make an explicit finding 
that the State's petition was filed within 90 days of Thiel's 
release.   
¶8 
As a result of its findings, the circuit court 
adjudged Thiel a sexually violent person and ordered him 
committed to the custody of DHFS.  The court entered the final 
order of commitment on November 6, 1998.  
¶9 
Thiel appealed, asserting that the commitment order 
should be vacated because the State had failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that its commitment petition was filed within 
90 days of his release.  Subsequently, the court of appeals 
certified to this court the question of whether the State must 
No. 
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5 
affirmatively prove that the subject of a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
commitment petition is within 90 days of release or discharge. 
¶10 The certified question before this court requires us 
to examine Wis. Stat. ch. 980.  Statutory interpretation 
presents a question of law that we review independently of the 
legal conclusions of the circuit court or the court of appeals. 
 State v. Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316, 323, 595 N.W.2d 692 (1999). 
 The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and give 
effect to the legislative intent.  Id.  We examine first the 
statutory language to identify the intent of the legislature.  
State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389, 404, 597 N.W.2d 697 (1999).  
If the language of the statute clearly and unambiguously sets 
forth the legislative intent, we need not look beyond the 
language to determine the meaning of the statute.  Id.   
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.02(2) governs the contents of a 
petition seeking to commit a person as sexually violent.  The 
statute provides in relevant part: 
 
(2) A petition filed under this section shall 
allege that all of the following apply to the person 
alleged to be a sexually violent person: 
 
(a) The person satisfies any of the following 
criteria: 
 
1. 
The person has been convicted of a sexually 
violent offense.  
 
. . . 
 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
6 
(ag) The person is within 90 days of discharge or 
release, on parole, extended supervision or otherwise, 
from a sentence that was imposed for a conviction for 
a 
sexually 
violent 
offense, 
from 
a 
secured 
correctional facility, as defined in s. 938.02(15m) . 
. . . 
 
(b) The person has a mental disorder. 
 
(c) The person is dangerous to others because the 
person's 
mental 
disorder 
creates 
a 
substantial 
probability that he or she will engage in acts of 
sexual violence (emphasis added). 
 
In addition, Wis. Stat. § 980.05(3)(a) states that "[a]t a trial 
on a petition under [chapter 980], the petitioner has the burden 
of proving the allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 
 
¶12 Thiel 
contends 
that 
read 
together, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 980.02(2) and 980.05(3)(a) 
unambiguously 
set 
forth the 
State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
petition was filed within 90 days of his release.  The 90-day 
requirement represents an essential predicate to a finding that 
the subject of a commitment petition under ch. 980 is a sexually 
violent person.  Because the circuit court failed to render a 
finding that the State had met its burden of proof as to this 
essential allegation, Thiel asserts that the order of commitment 
should be vacated.    
¶13 Disputing Thiel's statutory interpretation, the State 
maintains that the language of Wis. Stat. §§ 980.02(2) and 
980.05(3)(a) creates an ambiguity that must be resolved by 
No. 
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7 
resort to the entire statutory scheme of ch. 980.  The State 
claims that Section 980.02(2) contains two types of allegations, 
those that are substantive in nature and the 90-day requirement, 
which is procedural in nature.   
¶14 Another statutory section upon which the State relies 
provides that a petition may include factual statements to 
establish probable cause to believe that the subject of the 
commitment petition is a sexually violent person.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02(3).3  Thus, the State asserts that a petition under 
Section 
980.02(2) 
essentially 
includes 
three 
types 
of 
allegations: substantive, procedural, and factual. 
¶15 Although 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 980.05(3)(a) 
requires 
a 
petitioner to prove the allegations in the commitment petition, 
the State argues that the statute is ambiguous because it leaves 
unanswered exactly which allegations the legislature intended to 
be proven.  This ambiguity may be resolved only by an 
                     
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.02(3) provides: 
(3) A petition filed under this section shall 
state with particularity essential facts to establish 
probable cause to believe the person is a sexually 
violent person.  If the petition alleges that a 
sexually violent offense or act that is a basis for 
the allegation under sub. (2)(a) was an act that was 
sexually motivated as provided under s. 980.01(6)(b), 
the petition shall state the grounds on which the 
offense or act is alleged to be sexually motivated. 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
8 
examination of the entire chapter and the purposes underlying 
the commitment of sexually violent persons. 
¶16 According to the State, the twin objectives underlying 
ch. 980 are the protection of the public and the treatment of 
high risk sex offenders to reduce the likelihood of future 
sexual misconduct.  State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252, 271, 
541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).  To further these objectives in detaining 
sexually violent persons, the State is required to prove only 
the substantive criteria defining one as sexually violent.  
These criteria include whether the person has been convicted of 
a sexually violent offense and whether the person suffers from a 
mental disorder that would render that person dangerous if 
released to the public.  Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(a), (b), and 
(c). 
¶17 In contrast, the State submits that the 90-day 
requirement 
under 
subsection 
(ag) 
represents 
a 
pleading 
requirement that does not promote the objectives of ch. 980 or 
help define a sexually violent person.  Rather, as a procedural 
allegation identifying the time when the commitment petition 
should be filed, it is deemed waived if the subject of the 
petition fails to object. 
¶18 In 
an 
attempt 
to 
resolve 
the 
conflicting 
interpretations and to discern the intent of the legislature, we 
begin our analysis with an examination of the language of Wis. 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
9 
Stat. §§ 980.02(2) and 980.05(3)(a).  A petition seeking to 
commit a person as sexually violent must contain four distinct 
allegations, including that the petition has been filed within 
90 days of the person's release from a sentence or confinement 
arising from a sexually violent offense.  Wis. Stat. § 
980.02(2); State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 297-98, 541 N.W.2d 
115 (1995).  At trial, the State "has the burden of proving the 
allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt."  Wis. 
Stat. § 980.05(3)(a). 
¶19 A reading of the statutory language leads us to the 
inescapable conclusion that the legislature intended the State 
to prove its fulfillment of the 90-day requirement beyond a 
reasonable doubt before a person may be adjudged sexually 
violent.  The words of the statutes clearly and unambiguously 
set 
forth 
the 
State's 
burden 
in 
proving 
this 
specific 
allegation. 
¶20 In light of the unambiguous words of the statutes, we 
are not persuaded by the State's argument that the legislature 
intended to create distinct categories of allegations, reserving 
one particular category for the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.02(2) specifies all of 
the allegations that must be contained in a petition.  Although 
Wis. Stat. § 980.02(3) allows the petitioner to supplement the 
petition with facts to support the specific allegations listed 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
10
under Section 980.02(2), these supplemental facts are not 
categorized as "allegations," as the State asserts. 
¶21 Rather, 
these 
particular 
facts 
serve 
merely 
to 
buttress the allegations that must be set forth under Section 
980.02(2) and to establish probable cause to believe that the 
person named in the petition is a sexually violent person.  
Thus, contrary to the State’s contention, Wis. Stat. §§ 
980.02(2) 
and 
980.05(3)(a) 
do 
not 
create 
any 
ambiguity.  
Instead, the statutes unambiguously require the State to prove 
that its commitment petition has been filed within 90 days of 
the subject’s release.   
¶22 Legislative history supports our interpretation.  An 
analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau confirms that 
"[t]he [S]tate must prove each of the 4 allegations in the 
petition beyond a reasonable doubt."  LRB Drafting File for 1993 
Wis. Act 479, Analysis of Assembly Bill 3, at 3.  See also 
Appleton Post-Crescent v. Janssen, 149 Wis. 2d 294, 301, 441 
N.W.2d 
255 
(Ct. 
App. 
1989) 
(LRB 
analysis 
indicative 
of 
legislative intent).   
¶23 Furthermore, this court has recently noted the State’s 
requirements of proof at a commitment trial.  See State v. 
Kienitz, 227 Wis. 2d 423, 429 n.6, 597 N.W.2d 712 (1999); 
Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 396 n.4.  In Kienitz, we observed that 
"[i]n a commitment trial, the State has the burden of proving 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
11
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person . . . (2) is within 90 
days of release from a sentence, commitment, or secured 
correctional facility arising from a sexually violent offense." 
 227 Wis. 2d at 429 n.6.   
¶24 We also observed in Curiel that "the State has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all of the 
allegations in the petition for commitment."  227 Wis. 2d at 396 
n.4.  This petition "must allege that the person . . . (2) is 
within 90 days of release from a sentence, commitment, or 
secured correctional facility arising from a sexually violent 
offense."  Id. (quoting Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 297-98). 
¶25 The State posits that the above-quoted footnotes 
contained in Kienitz and Curiel are merely dicta because they 
are not essential to the holdings in those cases.  We need not 
engage in an analysis of whether the footnotes constitute dicta 
because we determine that the observations in Kienitz and Curiel 
represent correct statements of law, accurately reflecting the 
legislative intent as established by the words of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 980.02(2) and 980.05(3)(a).4 
                     
4 The State offers the comments of the Jury Instructions 
Committee: 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
12
¶26 Having determined that at trial on a commitment 
petition, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it 
filed its petition within 90 days of the subject's release or 
discharge, we turn now to determine whether the State satisfied 
its burden in this case.  We will affirm the order of commitment 
if the trial record reflects that the petition was filed within 
90 days of Thiel's MR date, notwithstanding the circuit court's 
failure to make a specific finding to that effect. 
¶27 The State claims that the record contains sufficient 
proof of its compliance with the 90-day requirement.  Regardless 
of the proof, the State maintains that Thiel's failure to raise 
objections at trial constituted a waiver of the argument he now 
raises on appeal. 
¶28 We note at the outset that the subject of a commitment 
petition under ch. 980 is not required to voice an objection to 
the allegations contained in the petition.  A ch. 980 proceeding 
affords the subject of a commitment petition neither the 
                                                                  
Subsection (2)(ag) of § 980.02 requires that the 
petition further allege that the person is within 90 
days of discharge or release from a sentence imposed 
for the sexually violent offense.  The Committee 
concluded that this fact need not be submitted to the 
jury, though it certainly must be established before 
the trial can go forward.   
Wis JI-Criminal 2502 at 5 n.1.  The State interprets the 
comments to mean that the 90-day allegation serves only as a 
pleading requirement, not as a substantive allegation requiring 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
13
opportunity nor the obligation to file an answer or raise 
affirmative defenses to the allegations contained in the 
petition.  Thus, Thiel's failure to object to the admission of 
exhibits does not relieve the State of its statutorily defined 
burden to prove that its petition was filed within 90 days of 
his release. 
¶29 Our examination of the record at trial and the 
evidence relied upon by the State reveals inconsistencies in the 
MR dates set forth in several documents admitted as exhibits.  
An information and interview request form filed by Thiel 
provides an MR date that is handwritten as June 1997.  In 
another exhibit, a letter addressed to the Fond du Lac Probation 
and Parole office, Thiel opines: "I have only 8 months from 
October 96 until my MR."  Both the request form and the letter 
indicate a release date some time in June 1997 without referring 
to a particular date. 
¶30 Because these documents do not mention a specific date 
in June, it is plausible that Thiel's actual MR date may have 
been any date in June.  Thus, although they could establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a May 31, 1997 commitment 
petition complied with the 90-day requirement, these particular 
exhibits do not establish that the State's petition on June 23, 
1997 was properly filed.   
No. 
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14
¶31 Other evidence in the trial record likewise does not 
assist in proving that the State fulfilled the statutory 90-day 
requirement.  The examination report prepared by a clinical 
psychologist who had evaluated Thiel states that "[Thiel] 
reached his mandatory release date on that sentence in June 
1997, and at that time a petition was filed for commitment under 
Chapter 980."  The report subsequently notes that "[a]fter 
reaching his mandatory release date," Thiel was admitted to the 
Mendota Mental Health Institute "on June 26, 1997."  This report 
is not free of ambiguity because we are still left to wonder 
whether Thiel's MR date pre-dated the June 23, 1997 date of the 
commitment petition. 
¶32 A Sex Offender Report received into evidence and 
prepared by the Department of Corrections specifies Thiel's MR 
date as June 29, 1997.  This report, coupled with the references 
to June 1997 release dates, may have dispelled our doubts as to 
the timeliness of the State's commitment petition were it not 
for conflicting institutional documents implying a March 1997 
release date. 
¶33 The 
two 
problematic 
documents 
from 
the 
Dodge 
Correctional Institution specify Thiel's MR date as March 19, 
1997.  Attempting to dismiss the significance of these exhibits, 
the State contends that Thiel's own trial testimony clarifies 
the discrepancy in the dates: 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
15
Q: 
Was there a problem originally with credit and 
sentence credit or something like that? 
 
A: 
Yes.  There was a three month – or 180 day error, 
I believe. 
 
We are not convinced by the State's argument because Thiel's 
testimony fails to reconcile the discrepancy in favor of a June 
MR date.  Rather, the testimony creates further ambiguity by 
suggesting a potential September release date. 
¶34 Under the mistaken assumption that it need not prove 
that its commitment petition was filed within 90 days of Thiel's 
release, the State understandably offered no direct proof at 
trial on this particular allegation.  No testimony or evidence 
at trial established the date of the filing of the petition.  
Additionally, as we have noted, the exhibits admitted at trial 
create ambiguity as to Thiel's actual MR date.  Considering the 
absence of testimony on the filing date, as well as the presence 
of ambiguity relating to the MR date, we are unable to conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the State filed its commitment 
petition within 90 days of Thiel's release. 
¶35  Having determined that the trial record in this case 
does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the State 
filed its commitment petition within 90 days of Thiel's release, 
we are left now to consider the issue of an appropriate remedy. 
 In response to a question at oral argument regarding remedies, 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
16
the State referenced several remedy issues, none of which have 
been briefed or argued before this court.   
¶36 These issues include whether our decision should have 
retroactive or prospective application, and whether a decision 
affects only the "pipeline" cases on direct appeal or also 
reaches to cases on collateral review.  Another remedy concern 
referenced by the State is whether the court may remand the 
narrow issue involving proof of the 90-day requirement, as is 
done in other civil cases with respect to specific issues such 
as the appropriate measure of damages.  As the State notes, 
concerns of claim preclusion or double jeopardy may also arise. 
¶37 In light of the significant remedy issues, we hesitate 
to decide the question of appropriate remedy without affording 
the parties an opportunity to address adequately the above and 
other remedy issues.  Rather, we believe the more prudent course 
is to remand the cause to the court of appeals and direct the 
court to address the issue of the appropriate remedy. 
¶38 In sum, we determine that in a trial on a commitment 
petition filed under Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2), the State bears the 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petition was 
filed within 90 days of the subject’s release or discharge from 
a sentence based on a sexually violent offense.  We further 
determine that the trial record does not establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the State filed its commitment petition 
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
17
within 90 days of Thiel's release.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
circuit court and remand to the court of appeals to determine 
the appropriate remedy. 
By The Court.-The order of the circuit court is reversed 
and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals. 
¶39 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J., 
did 
not 
participate.
No. 
99-0316 
 
 
1