Case Title: Commonwealth v. Wright

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11950

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReportersjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11950 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSEPH WRIGHT. 
 
 
 
Essex.     November 10, 2017. - March 15, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement.  Evidence, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Expert opinion, 
Exculpatory, Intoxication.  Mental Impairment.  
Intoxication.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Admissions 
and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Discovery, 
Assistance of counsel, Preservation of evidence.  Witness, 
Expert. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on June 28, 2012. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Richard 
E. Welch, III, J., and the cases were tried before Howard J. 
Whitehead, J. 
 
 
 
David H. Mirsky (Joanne T. Petito also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
Marcia H. Slingerland, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The defendant, Joseph Wright, appeals from two 
convictions of murder in the first degree.  He urges the 
2 
 
 
reversal of his convictions on four grounds.  First, he contends 
that the pretrial motion judge erroneously denied his motion to 
suppress statements he made to Canadian law enforcement 
officers.  Second, he argues that the trial judge committed a 
reversible error in ordering the pretrial disclosure of the 
defendant's mental health expert's report regarding the 
defendant's mental condition at the time of the crimes, which 
the prosecution had in its possession during its subsequent 
cross-examination of the defendant.  Third, the defendant argues 
that the evidence at trial demonstrates his lack of criminal 
responsibility for the murders, and relatedly, that his trial 
counsel's failure to argue a lack of criminal responsibility 
defense before the jury constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Fourth, he argues that State police investigators 
failed to collect certain evidence relevant to his intoxication 
at the time of the crimes, thereby denying the defendant his 
right to a "complete defense."  Having considered the 
defendant's arguments, and, more broadly, "the whole case on the 
law and the facts" pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 278, § 
33E, Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 747 (2014), we 
affirm the convictions. 
 
Factual and procedural background.  We recite the facts the 
jury could have found in the light most favorable to the 
3 
 
 
Commonwealth, but we reserve certain details of the facts and 
proceedings for discussion of the individual issues. 
 
The defendant does not dispute that he killed his mother, 
Donna Breau, and his grandmother, Melba Trahant, at their 
residence in Lynn on April 30, 2012.  Following the killings, 
the defendant drove to the Canadian border at Belleville, New 
Brunswick, where he arrived at approximately 6 P.M. on May 1, 
2012.  After hesitating in responding to questions posed by a 
Canadian border services officer about his presence in Canada, 
the defendant fled across the border, and was quickly 
apprehended by a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted police.  
The defendant subsequently confessed to the murders of his 
mother and grandmother during an interview with two Canadian 
border officers.  The defendant told the officers that he had 
slit the victims' throats and left their bodies behind a local 
elementary school.1  (Unbeknownst to the Canadian officers, the 
victims' bodies had been found at 6:45 A.M. that day on the 
grounds of the elementary school; both women appeared to have 
suffered "pretty severe" neck wounds.) 
 
Custody of the defendant was transferred to United States 
authorities, and in June, 2012, a grand jury returned two 
                     
 
1 We save our discussion of the details of the defendant's 
arrest and interrogation by Canadian law enforcement officers, 
as well as the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress those 
statements, for our analysis of that issue. 
4 
 
 
indictments charging the defendant with murder in the first 
degree of his mother and grandmother.  Before trial the 
defendant moved to suppress his statements to the Canadian 
authorities on the grounds that they were involuntary and that 
he had not been given his Miranda warnings, but his motion was 
denied.  The defendant was then tried before a jury in the 
Superior Court between June 10 and 23, 2014.  The prosecution 
proceeded under the theories of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The defense's theory was that, 
although the defendant admitted to the killings, they did not 
constitute murder in the first degree because the defendant had 
a "diminished capacity" due to drugs and alcohol, and therefore 
he could not have deliberately premeditated or acted with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
The defendant took the stand as the sole defense witness.2  
Although the defense had, before trial, provided notice of the 
testimony of an expert psychologist who would testify as to the 
defendant's mental condition at the time of the killings, the 
defense ultimately chose not to call the expert, who had 
prepared a report, appeared on the witness list, and was 
available to testify. 
                     
 
2 Before testifying, the defendant affirmed in a colloquy 
with the judge that his decision to take the stand was his own 
and that he was not pressured into doing so. 
5 
 
 
 
From an early age the defendant heavily abused drugs and 
alcohol.  At ten years old he began smoking marijuana, and at 
thirteen he started drinking hard alcohol.  At fifteen, and for 
approximately the next two years, the defendant was in a 
residential program for marijuana and alcohol abuse.  His 
habitual drug abuse continued into adulthood, as the defendant 
ingested (in his words) "anything [he] was able to [stick] in 
[his] face," including mushrooms, "Ecstasy," cocaine, "crack" 
cocaine, and heroin.  He also abused a variety of over-the-
counter and prescription drugs. 
 
At age twenty-two the defendant became unemployed and moved 
in with his mother in her second-floor apartment in Lynn.  His 
grandmother, who was in her eighties and had a close 
relationship with the defendant, lived in the apartment on the 
first floor.  The defendant had only intermittent contact with 
his mother throughout his childhood because she was in Florida 
and in and out of jail with her own drug problems.  She 
eventually returned to Lynn when the defendant was sixteen or 
seventeen, but he avoided contact with her until he was eighteen 
or nineteen because "she wasn't there when [he] was a kid."  
Upon moving in with her, the defendant testified, "things just 
started getting out of hand" in terms of the pair's substance 
abuse, and it was "pretty much a big party."  The defendant's 
mother gave him her prescribed Klonopin, Ativan, and Wellbutrin 
6 
 
 
medications.  The defendant was also regularly smoking 
marijuana, snorting and injecting heroin, and smoking crack 
cocaine. 
 
The defendant testified to the details of the killings.  He 
had been abusing his mother's Klonopin virtually "nonstop" since 
his birthday on April 9.  Also, after having a cyst removed from 
his forehead four or five days before April 30, the defendant 
began hearing a voice inside his head.  On the evening of April 
30, the defendant recalled going to the liquor store and 
purchasing two forty-ounce containers of beer, which he brought 
home and drank with his mother at about 6 or 7 P.M.  Before 
leaving the apartment to purchase marijuana, the defendant 
ingested a "handful" of Klonopin.  He brought home the marijuana 
and smoked it with his mother.  His grandmother was downstairs 
in her apartment, and at some point his mother went to bed. 
 
While the defendant sat on a recliner in the living room of 
his mother's apartment, he heard a voice inside his head, and 
the thought of killing his mother entered his mind.  He began 
walking to the entranceway of his mother's bedroom, and the 
voice he heard was telling him to kill her.  He recalled being 
at the doorway, seeing his mother asleep on the bed, and walking 
away.  The defendant then obtained a knife from the kitchen, 
went into his mother's bedroom while she slept, and slashed her 
throat.  He did not remember if she asked for help, but did 
7 
 
 
recall she told him he was "fucked" and admitted to watching her 
"bleed[] out" on the bed. 
 
At some point during the night, the defendant took the same 
knife he used to kill his mother and went downstairs to his 
grandmother's apartment, where he found her in the living room.  
The defendant was not hearing any voice inside his head telling 
him to kill his grandmother, but he thought she saw blood on him 
and that she was going to call the police.  The defendant walked 
up to her from behind, put a pillow over her face, and slashed 
her throat.  She asked the defendant why he had done that, and 
died in front of him. 
 
The defendant awoke at some point in the early morning on 
May 1, 2012.  Not immediately recalling what had occurred, he 
was shocked to find blood on the kitchen floor; he walked into 
his mother's bedroom and found her dead with a "lot of blood," 
and went downstairs and found his grandmother "dead on her 
couch."  The defendant "freaked out" and took more drugs and 
alcohol.  He left the bodies at a nearby elementary school and 
fled to Canada.  Following deliberations, the jury found the 
defendant guilty of the murders of both victims on the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, and the defendant was sentenced to 
consecutive life terms.  Forgoing a motion for a new trial, the 
defendant filed a timely notice of appeal in June, 2014, and the 
case was entered in this court the following year. 
8 
 
 
 
Discussion.  1.  Defendant's statements to Canadian 
authorities.  The defendant first challenges his convictions on 
the ground that his statements to Canadian border officers were 
involuntary and therefore inadmissible.  The voluntariness of 
the defendant's statements was not a live issue at trial, so the 
issue was not submitted to the jury.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Sheriff, 425 Mass. 186, 193 (1997).3  Yet the defendant did move 
to suppress those statements before trial, and also objected to 
their introduction at trial through the testimony of certain 
Canadian law enforcement officers.  We therefore treat the 
defendant's argument as a claim of error in the denial of his 
pretrial motion to suppress. 
 
We briefly recount the relevant facts concerning the 
defendant's statements to the Canadian authorities, as found by 
the motion judge following an evidentiary hearing.4  At 
                     
 
3 The defendant testified on direct examination that the 
Canadian authorities allowed him to rest before the interview, 
and did not yell, threaten, or otherwise coerce him during the 
interview.  Following the close of evidence, defense counsel 
specifically asked "not to give the voluntariness" instruction 
(also known as a "humane practice" instruction), based on his 
concern that it might "water down" the requested DiGiambattista 
jury instruction, which applies where there is no recording of a 
defendant's interrogation, as here.  Commonwealth v. 
DiGiambattista, 442 Mass. 423 (2004).  The trial judge provided 
the jury with the DiGiambattista instruction. 
 
 
4 "In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept 
the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error but 
conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law" (citation and quotations omitted).  
9 
 
 
approximately 8 P.M. on May 1, 2012, the defendant was 
apprehended after illegally crossing the border into Canada -- 
specifically, the port of entry at Woodstock, New Brunswick, 
which borders Houlton, Maine.  He was arrested by a member of 
the Royal Canadian Mounted police (RCMP), who read the defendant 
a "caution" that stated:  "[Y]ou need not say anything, you have 
nothing to hope from any promise or favor and nothing to fear 
from any threat whether or not you say anything.  Anything you 
say may be given in evidence.  Do you understand?"  The 
defendant indicated he understood, and said he wished to speak 
to an attorney.  This information was relayed to Canadian border 
officers at the Woodstock crossing, where the RCMP officer 
brought the defendant.  Upon his arrival, the border officers 
asked the defendant, who was in custody, to disrobe, because 
there was blood on the defendant's clothing that the officers 
wished to preserve as potential evidence.  The defendant did not 
appear to be under the influence of any drugs or alcohol, but 
informed the officers that he had smoked "a little" marijuana 
that day. 
 
The defendant was then taken by two border officers to an 
interview room.  The defendant was not handcuffed and appeared 
"fully oriented."  One of the officers read the defendant a 
                                                                  
Commonwealth v. Weaver, 474 Mass. 787, 793 (2016), cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). 
10 
 
 
"secondary caution," similar to the one read to him by the RCMP 
officer, and informed him of his right under the Vienna 
Convention to speak with a member of the United States 
government.  The officer also informed the defendant of his 
right to speak with "duty counsel," an attorney paid for by 
Canada to represent someone who does not have his or her own 
attorney, and the defendant indicated he would like to speak 
with duty counsel.  The officer explained the charge the 
defendant was facing so that the defendant could inform duty 
counsel why he was being held (i.e., failing to stop and speak 
to immigration officers at the border). 
 
At that point the defendant began to laugh and said, 
"That's nothing, jail here or jail there, it doesn't make any 
difference."  He then asked the officers, "[D]o you want to know 
why I ran[?]"  One of the officers interrupted the defendant and 
advised him for a third time that he did not have to say 
anything and that anything he did say might be used in evidence.  
The officer then asked the defendant why he ran.  The defendant 
responded that he had killed his mother and grandmother by 
slitting their throats, and informed the officers what he had 
done with the murder weapon (the knife), where he had placed 
their bodies, and why he had committed the crimes.  After these 
responses, the defendant "slumped down in his chair, stopped 
speaking, and appeared relieved."  Throughout the confession the 
11 
 
 
defendant "was relaxed, calm, [and] never agitated," and 
understood what he was doing and what he was being asked.  The 
defendant's statements were not recorded. 
 
Before trial, the defendant argued that his statements 
should have been suppressed because they were not voluntary and 
the police did not give the defendant Miranda warnings before 
questioning him.  The motion judge held first that because the 
defendant's statements were given to foreign police officers, 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), did not apply.  The 
judge further concluded that "all the evidence points to the 
fact that [the defendant's] statements were made voluntarily and 
knowingly and [were] the product of his own rational intellect." 
 
We discern no error in these conclusions.  First, we have 
previously held that Miranda does not govern interrogations 
"carried out by foreign officials in a foreign country," and 
that statements made to foreign police are admissible if they 
were voluntary.  Commonwealth v. Wallace, 356 Mass. 92, 96-97 
(1969).5  We explained that "applying the Miranda rule to foreign 
police officers will not affect their conduct, and therefore we 
decline to so extend the scope of that decision."  Id.  Numerous 
courts that have more recently addressed this question have 
reached the same conclusion.  See, e.g., United States v. 
                     
 
5 Wallace, like this case, involved a defendant's statements 
made to Canadian law enforcement officers.  Commonwealth v. 
Wallace, 356 Mass. 92, 96-97 (1969). 
12 
 
 
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933 
(2003) ("the law is settled that statements taken by foreign 
police in the absence of Miranda warnings are admissible if 
voluntary"); Fisher v. United States, 779 A.2d 348, 353-354 
(D.C. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1095 (2002).  "[B]ecause the 
United States cannot dictate the protections provided to 
criminal suspects by foreign nations and one of the principal 
purposes of the exclusionary rule -- deterrence of unlawful 
police activity -- is absent when foreign [officers] direct an 
interrogation, a different rule applies to statements elicited 
by foreign officials."  United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 
227 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1170 (2009).  The 
defendant's statements to the Canadian authorities are 
admissible so long as they were voluntary.6 
 
The motion judge did not err in concluding that the 
defendant's statements were indeed voluntary.  "A voluntary 
statement is one that is the product of a rational intellect and 
                     
 
6 While "courts recognize two exceptions to the general rule 
regarding the application of Miranda . . . in a foreign 
jurisdiction" -- (1) "where the investigatory conduct is so 
inconsistent with our notions of due process that it 'shocks the 
conscience' of a [United States] court," and (2) "when a foreign 
officer acts as an agent of [United States] law enforcement" 
(citation omitted), Fisher v. United States, 779 A.2d 348, 354 
(D.C. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1095 (2002) -- neither 
exception applies here.  The first is plainly not at issue, and 
as for the second, the pretrial motion judge specifically found 
that the Canadian authorities were not acting as agents for 
United States law enforcement officers. 
13 
 
 
a free will, and not induced by physical or psychological 
coercion" (citation and quotations omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Monroe, 472 Mass. 461, 468 (2015).  As mentioned, the motion 
judge found that there were no signs the defendant was 
intoxicated or otherwise did not understand what he was doing or 
being asked; the judge also found no evidence of "trickery," 
"physical distress," or "that [the defendant] was made any 
promises or any threats."  The defendant does not dispute those 
factual findings (nor do we discern error in them), but he 
highlights the fact that the interrogation continued after he 
invoked his right to speak with duty counsel.  This argument is 
unavailing, as the requirement that police halt questioning 
after an individual states he or she wishes to speak with an 
attorney stems from Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, see Commonwealth 
v. Obershaw, 435 Mass. 794, 800 (2002), which does not apply 
here.7 
 
2.  Disclosure of expert report to the prosecution.  
Defense counsel clarified before trial that the defense theory 
would be based on the defendant's "diminished capacity" due to 
drug and alcohol abuse.  Six weeks before jury selection, the 
defense offered its notice of expert witness, stating that it 
                     
 
7 Hence, there was no error in the motion judge's conclusion 
that "the fact that [the defendant] had not yet talked to a 
lawyer does not in [any way] undermine [the] findings that . . . 
the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that he made these 
statements voluntarily." 
14 
 
 
would call a psychologist, Robert H. Joss, to testify about the 
defendant's mental condition at the time of the crimes.8  By this 
time Joss had already prepared a report on the defendant's 
behalf, which included descriptions of "statements made by the 
defendant relevant to the issue of [his] mental condition" at 
the time of the killings, along with Joss's "opinions as to the 
defendant's mental condition."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (B) 
(iii), as appearing in 463 Mass. 1501 (2012). 
 
The Commonwealth responded a week later by filing a motion 
for reciprocal discovery regarding the defense expert, seeking, 
in pertinent part, "[n]otice as to whether . . . Joss intends to 
rely upon any statements of the defendant as the basis of his 
opinion or testimony at trial," and stating that if so, "the 
Commonwealth is entitled to an independent examination of the 
defendant" pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (B).  The 
motion was "allowed as to whether . . . Joss intends to rely 
upon statements of the defendant"; the ruling further stated 
                     
8 The notice advised that the defendant would call Robert H. 
Joss to testify that "at the time of the offenses [the 
defendant] was undergoing an unusual pattern of indiscriminate 
substance abuse . . . and if not for this long history of drug 
abuse the killing of his mother and grandmother would not have 
happened."  Joss would further testify that "[the defendant] was 
experiencing the effects of a drug induced psychosis and 
dissociative experiences related to his mother[']s abandonment 
of him at the age of two at the time of the killings."  The 
notice did not clarify, as it was required to, whether Joss 
"intend[ed] to rely in whole or in part on statements of the 
defendant as to his . . . mental condition."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 
14 (b) (2) (A) (iii), as appearing in 463 Mass. 1501 (2012). 
15 
 
 
that "[i]f [the defendant] provides notice that he intends to 
offer expert testimony as to his mental state based in part on 
his statements[,] the Commonwealth may request a [rule] 14 (b) 
(2) (B) examination" of the defendant by a court-appointed 
examiner. 
 
The record does not reflect that the defense responded to 
the motion judge's order, however, and the prosecution did not 
ultimately seek an independent examination of the defendant.  
Before jury selection, on the first day of trial proceedings, 
the defense repeated to the trial judge its intention to call 
Joss as an expert witness.  The judge then asked the 
prosecution, "[A]re you going to have somebody?" -- presumably 
referring to an expert of its own -- to which the prosecution 
responded, "No."  Joss appeared on the witness list read to 
potential jurors.  Following jury empanelment and just before 
opening statements, the prosecution said that while it did not 
seek an independent examination of the defendant, it did seek 
access to Joss's report.  Over the defendant's objection, the 
judge "order[ed] that the report be turned over now, where there 
has been a commitment by the defense to the diminished capacity 
[of the defendant]." 
The defendant argues that this order violated Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 14 (b) (2), which governs discovery related to expert 
testimony on the issue of the defendant's "mental condition."  
16 
 
 
The prosecution should never have received Joss's report, the 
defendant contends, because it never sought an independent, 
court-ordered examination of the defendant under rule 
14 (b) (2) (B), which, he argues, is a prerequisite to the 
rule's requirement that a defendant provide his expert report to 
the prosecution.  The defendant concludes that the prosecution's 
later use of Joss's report during its cross-examination of him 
violated his State and Federal rights against self-
incrimination, and warrants reversal of his convictions.9 
 
"As our task is to interpret a rule of criminal procedure, 
we begin with the plain language of the rule."  Commonwealth v. 
Hanright, 465 Mass. 639, 641 (2013).  Rule 14 (b) (2) provides 
                     
9 As mentioned, the defendant took the stand in his own 
defense at trial.  On direct examination he did not recount the 
details of the killings themselves.  He testified that he did 
not immediately remember what happened between the time that he 
returned to his mother's apartment with marijuana, and when he 
woke up to find his mother and grandmother dead.  The defendant 
stated that "about a week later" he "started really thinking 
hard," and remembered that he had been awake for "two days 
straight without sleeping," and that he heard a voice in his 
head "telling [him] to just kill [his] mother."  He also 
recalled getting rid of the victims' bodies. 
 
Before cross-examining the defendant, the prosecution 
sought permission to impeach the defendant with statements he 
made to Joss, which were incorporated into Joss's report.  The 
judge ruled that while the prosecution could not introduce the 
statements themselves to impeach the defendant, it could use its 
knowledge of the content of those statements when formulating 
its cross-examination.  While it is not entirely clear to what 
extent the prosecutor's knowledge of the contents of Joss's 
report guided his cross-examination of the defendant, the 
defendant did more fully recount the details of the killings 
during cross-examination. 
17 
 
 
the "[s]pecial [p]rocedures" governing pretrial discovery 
regarding defenses based on a criminal defendant's "[m]ental 
[h]ealth [i]ssues."10  Subdivision (b) (2) (A) requires a 
defendant to notify the prosecution if he "intends at trial to 
raise as an issue his or her mental condition at the time of the 
alleged crime, or . . . intends to introduce expert testimony on 
[his or her] mental condition at any stage of the proceeding."  
The next subdivision, (b) (2) (B), states that where it appears 
(based on [1] the defendant's notice of expert testimony, [2] 
"subsequent inquiry by the judge," or [3] "developments in the 
case") that the defendant's expert will rely on "statements of 
the defendant as to his or her mental condition . . . , the 
court, on its own motion or on motion of the prosecutor, may 
order the defendant to submit to an examination" consistent with 
                     
 
10 As a preliminary matter, we are satisfied that the 
defendant's "diminished capacity" defense, which was to include 
expert testimony from a psychologist stating that the defendant 
was experiencing "a drug induced psychosis" at the time of the 
crime, implicates the defendant's "mental condition" such that 
it is subject to the "[s]pecial [pretrial discovery] 
[p]rocedures" of Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2), as appearing in 
463 Mass. 1501 (2012).  See Commonwealth v. Newton N., 478 Mass. 
747 (2018), citing Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (A) ("due to the 
complex nature of mental impairment, which is often presented at 
trial through expert testimony, we require defendants to provide 
the same notice regarding their intent to raise an issue of 
mental impairment at trial as we do their intent to raise a 
defense of criminal responsibility").  "[A]ll procedures and 
provisions applicable to such discovery are set out in rule 
14 (b) (2)," and are not subject to the "automatic and 
discretionary [discovery] provisions" of rule 14 (a).  
Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 319 (2010). 
18 
 
 
the detailed provisions of Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (B) and 
(C).11 
 
The same subdivision, (b) (2) (B) -- specifically, part 
(iii) -- also establishes a regime for the disclosure of mental 
health expert reports.  This disclosure occurs, in pertinent 
part, "after the defendant expresses the clear intent to raise 
as an issue his or her mental condition, [and] the judge is 
satisfied that (1) the defendant intends to testify, or (2) the 
defendant intends to offer expert testimony based in whole or in 
part on statements made by the defendant as to his or her mental 
condition at the relevant time."  Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) 
(B) (iii) (c).  While the paragraph in which this language 
appears refers to the disclosure of the court-appointed 
"examiner's report," the next paragraph clarifies that "[a]t the 
time [the examiner's report] is disclosed to the parties, the 
defendant shall provide the Commonwealth with a report of the 
defense psychiatric or psychological expert(s) as to the mental 
condition of the defendant at the relevant time."  Id.12 
                     
 
11 "As a practical matter, it is the prosecutor who 
recommends the expert psychiatrist for appointment as the 
examiner.  We have recognized the court-appointed examiner as an 
agent of the prosecution."  Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. at 318 
n.23. 
 
 
12 This provision ordering the disclosure of a defense 
expert's report was inserted as part of the 2012 amendments to 
the rule, following this court's opinion in Sliech-Brodeur, 457 
Mass. at 324-326.  Sliech-Brodeur involved a pretrial discovery 
19 
 
 
 
The defendant argues that because rule 14 (b) (2) (B) (iii) 
contemplates an exchange of reports from both sides' experts -- 
one by the defense ("a report of the defense psychiatric or 
psychological expert") and another by the court-ordered examiner 
("examiner's report") -- in a case where the prosecution has not 
sought a court-ordered examination, as here, a defendant has no 
independent duty to disclose his or her expert's report.  We 
disagree.  The fact that the rule discusses a defendant's 
disclosure obligation in tandem with that of the court-appointed 
examiner simply reflects the typical course in cases where a 
defendant pursues a mental health defense:  after the defendant 
expresses his or her intent to pursue that defense, the 
prosecution will seek an independent examination regarding the 
defendant's mental condition at the time of the crime.  Such was 
the sequence of events in Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. at 310, 
                                                                  
order requiring the defendant to furnish his mental health 
expert's notes and materials to the Commonwealth, who had 
secured an independent expert; the Commonwealth provided the 
defense materials to its expert, who relied on them when forming 
his own opinion about the defendant's criminal responsibility.  
Id. at 322.  The court deemed this reversible error on the 
grounds that "nothing in [rule 14 (b) (2)] obligates a 
defendant, before trial, to provide the Commonwealth's expert 
. . . with copies of her own expert witness's notes and other 
materials."  Id. at 321.  Responding to "'confusion' surrounding 
the sequence of production of mental health experts' materials," 
the court also provided for the amendment of rule 14 (b) (2) "to 
require the defendant's expert to produce to the prosecution a 
report that includes the defense expert's opinion [as to the 
defendant's mental condition] and the bases and reasons for this 
opinion."  Id. at 325-326. 
20 
 
 
which resulted in this provision.  While the rule affords the 
prosecution the opportunity to obtain an independent examiner, 
we do not interpret it to impose on the prosecutor an obligation 
to do so or otherwise be denied access to the defense expert's 
report.13 
 
Mental health defenses like the instant one represent 
"complex issues for which the prosecutor should have time to 
prepare."  Reporter's Notes (2012) to Rule 14 (b) (2), 
Massachusetts Rules of Court, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 
197 (Thomson Reuters 2016).  See Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. at 
325 (explaining "our view . . . that the Commonwealth should 
have advance notice of complex mental health issues that the 
defendant intends to raise as part of his or her defense").  An 
effective "[r]ebuttal of [such defenses] requires a degree of 
expertise on the part of a cross-examiner that can only be 
gained through pretrial research."  Reporter's Notes (Revised, 
2004) to Rule 14 (b) (2), supra at 195.  This includes access to 
the defense expert's report, without which the prosecution 
cannot effectively impeach the expert's or the defendant's own 
testimony during cross-examination, thereby undermining "rule 14 
                     
 
13 That the court-appointed examiner is an optional, not 
mandatory, component of a prosecutor's trial strategy is 
bolstered by the plain language of the rule, which states that 
the court "may order the defendant to submit to an examination," 
not that it "shall" always do so (emphasis added).  Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (B). 
21 
 
 
(b) (2) (B)'s truth-seeking function."  Hanright, 465 Mass. at 
644.  See Commonwealth v. Durham, 446 Mass. 212, 230, cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 855 (2006) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) 
(recognizing "the importance that cross-examination plays in the 
'fact finder's assessment of the truth'" [citation omitted]).  
Accordingly, consistent "with the trend of increased discovery 
in criminal cases," Sliech-Brodeur, supra at 325, we interpret 
rule 14 (b) (2) (B) (iii) to impose on a defendant an 
independent duty to disclose his or her expert's report to the 
prosecution "after the defendant expresses the clear intent to 
raise as an issue his or her mental condition," and where "the 
judge is satisfied that (1) the defendant intends to testify, or 
(2) the defendant intends to offer expert testimony based in 
whole or in part on statements made by the defendant as to his 
or her mental condition at the relevant time."  Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 14 (b) (2) (B) (iii).14 
                     
 
14 We disagree with the defendant that the required 
disclosure of his mental health expert's report to the 
prosecution implicates his right against self-incrimination.  As 
Chief Justice Gants (then Associate Justice) observed in his 
dissent in Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. at 340, that right "does 
not apply to a defendant's statements to the psychiatrist [or 
psychologist] retained by his attorney because these statements 
were not compelled by the Commonwealth or the court; the 
defendant voluntarily chose to speak to his defense expert."  
"Nevertheless," the dissent explained, "disclosure to the 
prosecution of the defense expert's reports and statements must 
still wait until the defendant decides whether the expert will 
testify at trial based in whole or in part on the defendant's 
statements to the expert, because, until that decision is made, 
22 
 
 
 
Here, the judge ordered the defendant to turn over his 
expert's report to the prosecution based on his conclusion that 
"there has been a commitment by the defense to the diminished 
capacity" of the defendant.  This was not in error.  By this 
stage of the proceedings the defendant had expressed the "clear 
intent to raise as an issue his . . . mental condition," Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (B) (iii), having explained before jury 
empanelment that he was "seeking a murder two conviction . . . 
based on diminished capacity," and that the defense would 
include "psychiatric testimony."  And as discussed, over a month 
before jury selection the defendant had filed his notice of 
expert witness, informing the prosecution (and the judge) that 
the defense would call Joss to testify "that at the time of the 
offenses [the defendant] was undergoing an unusual pattern of 
indiscriminate substance abuse" and "was experiencing the 
effects of a drug induced psychosis" that led to the killing of 
his mother and grandmother.  Joss then appeared on the list of 
potential witnesses in the case.  On these bases, the judge 
reasonably concluded that either (1) "the defendant intend[ed] 
to testify," or, more likely, (2) "the defendant intend[ed] to 
                                                                  
the defendant's statements to a defense expert retained by his 
attorney are protected by the attorney-client privilege.  
Reports and statements arising from such communications, while 
not within the compass of a defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination, are protected by the work product doctrine" 
(emphasis in original).  Id. at 341. 
23 
 
 
offer expert testimony based in whole or in part on statements 
made by the defendant as to his . . . mental condition at the 
relevant time."  Id.15 
 
3.  Lack of criminal responsibility and ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The defendant also seeks reversal of his 
convictions on the grounds that he lacked criminal 
responsibility for the murders; relatedly, he argues that trial 
counsel's failure to present this argument to the jury 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.  In support of 
these positions the defendant relies exclusively on Joss's 
report, which he contends "contains clear evidence that [the 
defendant] lacked criminal responsibility" for the murders. 
 
We reject both arguments for essentially the same reason:  
having reviewed Joss's report, which is impounded, we simply 
find no support for the defendant's position that he lacked 
criminal responsibility.  To the contrary, Joss concluded that 
                     
 
15 Rule 14 (b) (2) (B) (iii) vests a trial judge with 
discretion when making this determination, given that it 
conditions disclosure of the defense expert's report on the "the 
judge [being] satisfied" that the defense will include either 
the defendant's testimony or an expert's testimony based on the 
defendant's statements (emphasis added).  Such discretion is 
necessary in cases such as this, where despite being ordered to 
do so twice -- first, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) 
(A) (iii), in the defendant's notice of a mental health defense, 
and again by the court order granting the prosecution's motion 
for reciprocal discovery regarding the defense expert -- the 
defense apparently failed to clarify before trial whether Joss 
would be relying on the defendant's statements regarding his 
mental condition. 
24 
 
 
the defendant did not have a mental disease or defect –- an 
essential element of a defense based on lack of criminal 
responsibility.  See Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546-
547 (1967) ("A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if 
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or 
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality . . . of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of the law" [emphasis added]).  Rather, Joss 
concluded that the "source" of the defendant's impaired mental 
state at the time of the killings "was his ingestion of multiple 
drugs in an abusive way in the days and hours leading up to the 
[killings]."  This weighs strongly against the viability of a 
defense of lack of criminal responsibility, because the 
"[v]oluntary consumption of alcohol or drugs . . . do[es] not 
qualify as [a] 'mental disease[] or defect[]' in the McHoul 
formulation; as a result, a defendant whose lack of substantial 
capacity is due solely to one of these conditions, and not to 
any mental disease or defect, is criminally responsible" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. DiPadova, 460 Mass. 424, 
431 (2011).16  Contrast Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 
                     
16 In light of Joss's conclusion that the defendant's drug 
consumption was the source of his impairment, it is immaterial 
that Joss erroneously relied on the definition of "mental 
illness" under 104 Code Mass. Regs. § 27.05(1), which relates to 
involuntary commitment. 
 
25 
 
 
811-817 (1975) (reversing conviction of murder in first degree 
where defendant presented "very strong evidence of his lack of 
criminal responsibility" consisting of, among other things, 
testimony of two psychiatric experts who concluded defendant's 
schizophrenia prevented him from conforming his conduct to law, 
and where prosecution failed to present "any affirmative 
evidence of the defendant's sanity").17 
 
We similarly reject the defendant's contention that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to present a lack of 
criminal responsibility defense.  "The defendant did not file a 
motion for a new trial and therefore rests his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel solely on the trial record.  
Such ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 'the weakest 
form of such a challenge' because they lack 'any explanation by 
trial counsel for his actions.'"  Commonwealth v. Griffin, 475 
Mass. 848, 857-858 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Peloquin, 437 
                     
17 We also reject the defendant's suggestion that it was the 
prosecution's burden to demonstrate that the defendant was 
criminally responsible.  Only where a defendant "asserts a 
defense of lack of criminal responsibility and there is evidence 
at trial that . . . would permit a reasonable finder of fact to 
have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant was criminally 
responsible" does the prosecution "bear[] the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was criminally 
responsible."  Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 811 
(2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Keita, 429 Mass. 843, 849–850 
(1999).  As mentioned, the defense did not assert a lack of 
criminal responsibility defense here; to the contrary, just 
before opening statements, defense counsel reiterated that it 
was "not bringing forward a criminal responsibility defense" 
(emphasis added). 
26 
 
 
Mass. 204, 210 n.5 (2002).  "Examining this claim under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, 'we review the trial record alone to determine 
whether a defense counsel's strategic or tactical decision 
questioned on appeal was manifestly unreasonable when made and, 
if so, whether the unreasonable decision resulted in a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.'"  Griffin, 
supra at 858, quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 462 Mass. 620, 629 
(2012). 
 
There were clear reasons for not pursuing a lack of 
criminal responsibility defense at trial.  Compare Commonwealth 
v. LaCava, 438 Mass. 708, 714 (2003) (where counsel's expert 
opined defendant did not have mental disease or defect, not 
unreasonable for counsel to consider that opinion as "serious 
impediment" to insanity defense).  In addition to Joss's 
conclusions, defense counsel also clarified before jury 
selection -- "[j]ust so the record is clear" -- that he had 
"talked to [the defendant] about [the defense's trial strategy] 
at length" and that "diminished capacity by reason of alcohol 
and drugs" was the defense that the defendant had "agreed to."  
The strategic focus on the defendant's substance abuse at the 
time of the killings was therefore not unreasonable and presents 
no likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
4.  Alleged substandard evidence collection.  Last, the 
defendant contends that he was denied his constitutional right 
27 
 
 
to a "meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense," 
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984), based on 
State police investigators' failure to collect evidence that may 
have been tied to the defendant's drug use -- specifically, a 
number of prescription pill bottles in his grandmother's 
apartment, and certain small plastic bags in his mother's 
apartment that were consistent with drug packaging.  According 
to the defendant, this evidence "was potentially useful to 
support [his] defense that he possessed a diminished capacity to 
form the required intent for first degree murder due to his 
intoxication by drug use." 
 
We reject the defendant's argument, primarily because the 
potentially exculpatory value of this evidence was not apparent 
at the time of the State police investigation.  See Trombetta, 
467 U.S. at 488-489 ("Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on 
the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to 
evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in 
the suspect's defense.  To meet this standard of constitutional 
materiality, . . . evidence must . . . possess an exculpatory 
value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed 
[footnote omitted]").  The significance of the defendant's drug 
use did not come to light until nearly two years after the 
police's investigation in this case, when the defendant first 
raised his intoxication-based defense.  There is also no 
28 
 
 
indication that the police intended to conceal such evidence 
here, given that photographs from their investigation display 
the prescription pill bottles and plastic bags.  "While the 
prosecution remains obligated to disclose all exculpatory 
evidence in its possession, it is under no duty to gather 
evidence that may be potentially helpful to the defense."  
Commonwealth v. Lapage, 435 Mass. 480, 488 (2001). 
 
Moreover, the jury were not, as the defendant suggests, 
entirely precluded from considering this evidence, as those 
photographs were submitted to the jury as exhibits.  And as was 
the defendant's right under Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 
472, 485-486 (1980), the defendant raised the issue of the 
adequacy of the police's evidence collection at trial, and the 
judge did not preclude the jury from considering those points 
when deciding whether reasonable doubt existed as to the 
defendant's guilt.  See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 432 Mass. 578, 
590 (2000) ("Bowden simply holds that a judge may not remove the 
issue from the jury's consideration"). 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have carefully 
reviewed the entire record pursuant to our duty under G. L. c. 
278, § 33E, and we discern no reason to order a new trial or to 
reduce the convictions of murder in the first degree to a lesser 
degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.