Case Title: Poiroux v. Rich

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1120734

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 3/14/14
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2013-2014
____________________
1120734
____________________
Clement David Poiroux et al.
v.
Ashley Rich et al.
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-12-900854)
BRYAN, Justice.
Clement David Poiroux, Lamar Sanders Osborne, Travis Kyle
Blair, Christopher Raybon, Sara Hawkins, Brian Williams,
Levorish Hudson, Joseph Gardner Johnson, Jr., Nicholas Cain
McNeil, and Willie James Walker II (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "the criminal defendants"), and McNeil &
1120734
Stokley Enterprises, LLC, d/b/a Metro Bonding Co., Bay Area
Bail Bonds, LLC, A-Plus Bonding, Inc., Alternative Justice
Bail Bonding, Inc., A-Advantage Bonding, LLC, Affordable Bail
Bond, Inc., and Allstar Bail Bonds, Inc. (hereinafter
collectively 
referred 
to 
as 
"the 
bail-bond 
companies"), 
appeal
the dismissal of their claims against various district
attorneys,  circuit court clerks,  and other state officials
1
2
3
The district attorneys named in the action include:
1
Ashley Rich, district attorney for Mobile County; Ellen
Brooks, district attorney for Montgomery County; Douglas A.
Valeska, district attorney for Henry and Houston Counties;
Tommy Chapman, district attorney for Monroe and Conecuh
Counties; Hallie Dixon, district attorney for Baldwin County;
and Randall V. Houston, district attorney for Autauga,
Chilton, and Elmore Counties.  Steve Wadlington was
substituted for Chapman as a party to the action after he
replaced Chapman as district attorney for Monroe and Conecuh
Counties in October 2012.  See Rule 25(d), Ala. R. Civ. P.
The circuit court clerks named in the action include:
2
Jody Wise Campbell, circuit clerk of Baldwin County; Jojo
Schwarzauer, 
circuit 
clerk 
of 
Mobile 
County; 
Florence 
Cauthen,
circuit clerk of Montgomery County; Carla H. Woodall, circuit
clerk of Houston County; William R. McMillan, circuit clerk of
Monroe County; and Whit Moncrief, circuit clerk of Autauga
County.
The other state officials named in the action include:
3
Sam Cochran, sheriff of Mobile County; D.T. Marshall, sheriff
of Montgomery County; Andy Hughes, sheriff of Houston County;
Thomas Tate, sheriff of Monroe County; Huey "Hoss" Mack,
sheriff of Baldwin County; James "Herbie" Johnson, sheriff of
Autauga County; Marquita Davis, director of the Alabama
Department of Finance; Michael Sparks, director of 
the 
Alabama
Department of Forensic Sciences; and John Hixon, Jr.,
2
1120734
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "the defendants"). 
We affirm the judgment in part, reverse it in part, and remand
the cause for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
On July 6, 2012, several of the criminal defendants and
of 
the 
bail-bond 
companies  
sued 
the 
defendants 
and
4
fictitiously named parties in the Montgomery Circuit Court,
alleging claims related to Act No. 2012-535, Ala. Acts 2012,
codified as § 12-14-31 and § 12-19-311, Ala. Code 1975.   The
5
criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies argued, among
other things, that the fee assessed pursuant to § 12-19-
311(a)(1)a., Ala. Code 1975 ("the filing fee"), and the fee
assessed pursuant to § 12-19-311(a)(1)b., Ala. Code 1975 ("the
back-end fee"), are unconstitutional.  According to the
original and amended complaints, each of the criminal
defendants had been assessed either a filing fee or a back-end
executive director of the Alabama Peace Officers' Annuity
Benefit Fund.
Williams, Hudson, Johnson, McNeil, Walker, and Allstar
4
Bail Bonds, Inc., were actually added plaintiffs in the
amended complaint filed in November 2012.
Section 12-14-31 is not at issue in this appeal.
5
3
1120734
fee, and each of the bail-bond companies had paid filing fees
on behalf of various clients.
With the exception of minor traffic cases, the filing fee
and the back-end fee are "imposed on every bail bond in all
courts of [Alabama]."  § 12-19-311(a)(1).  The filing fee, if
collected by the official executing the bond, is collected "at
the execution of the bond or at the time of release," or, if
the circuit clerk collects the bond, the filing fee can also
be collected "within two business days of release."  § 12-19-
311(b).  The back-end fee is "assessed to the defendant and
... imposed by the court when the defendant appears in court
for adjudication or sentencing."  § 12-19-311(e)(1).
The filing fee is assessed "in the amount of thirty-five
dollars ($35) on each bond executed."  § 12-19-311(a)(1)a. 
The back-end fee is set forth in § 12-19-311(a)(1)b., which
provides, in pertinent part:
"For a misdemeanor offense, a bail bond fee in the
amount of 3.5 percent of the total face value of the
bail bond or one hundred dollars ($100), whichever
is greater, but not to exceed four hundred fifty
dollars ($450). For a felony offense, a bail bond
fee of 3.5 percent of the total face value of the
bail bond or one hundred fifty dollars ($150),
whichever is greater, but not to exceed seven
hundred fifty dollars ($750). ... For purposes of
this section, face value of bond shall mean the bond
4
1120734
amount set by court or other authority at release,
not the amount posted at release on bail."
Section 12-19-313, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"If the charge against a defendant in a case is
disposed of by a finding of not guilty, no bill,
dismissal or nolle prosequi without conditions, the
fees imposed in the case pursuant to [§ 12-19-
311(a)(1)b.] shall not be assessed.  In all other
cases wherein the charge against a defendant is
disposed of by conviction, a finding of guilty, or
dismissal or nolle prosequi upon conditions to pay
costs and fees, the fees pursuant to [§ 12-19-
311(a)(1)b.] shall be assessed.  If the defendant is
admitted to a pretrial diversion program or to a
specialty court program, the fee shall be assessed
as with other court costs and fees."
No such provision appears to apply to the filing fees.
The filing and back-end fees are distributed as follows:
"(f) The court clerks shall distribute on a
monthly basis as other fees are distributed, the
[filing] fees ... as follows:  Ten percent from each
fee shall be distributed either to the county
general fund to be earmarked and distributed to the
Sheriff's Fund, administered by the sheriff, in the
county where the bond was executed or, where the
bond is executed by the municipality, to the
municipality; 45 percent of the fee to the court
clerk's fund where the bond was executed or where
the bond is executed by the municipal court, to the
municipality; 45 percent of the fee to the
Solicitor's Fund in the county where the bond was
executed.  The bail bond fee records shall be
audited by the Department of Examiners of Public
Accounts.
"(g) The court clerks shall distribute on a
monthly basis as other fees are distributed, the
5
1120734
[back-end] fees ... as follows:  Twenty-one dollars
and fifty cents ($21.50) from each fee shall be
distributed to the county general fund which shall
be earmarked and distributed to the Sheriff's Fund,
administered by the sheriff, in the county where the
bond was executed or, where the bond was executed by
a municipality, to the municipality; 40 percent of
the remainder of the fee to the court clerk's fund
where the bond was executed or where the bond is
executed 
by 
the 
municipal 
court, 
to 
the
municipality; 45 percent of the remainder of the fee
to the Solicitor's Fund in the county where the bond
was executed; five percent to the State General Fund
and ten percent to the Alabama Forensic Services
Trust Fund. The bail bond fee records shall be
audited by the Department of Examiners of Public
Accounts."
§ 12-19-311.
The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies asked
the circuit court to certify a class under Rule 23, Ala. R.
Civ. P., and for a judgment declaring that the circuit court
had jurisdiction over the matter and that § 12-19-311 violated
the Alabama Constitution and the United States Constitution. 
They also asked for a declaration that the defendants' acts
and practices were "unlawful" and sought "injunctive and
equitable relief in accord with the declarations of this
Court."  The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies
asked the circuit court to "award [them] damages and the cost
of this matter" and "a reasonable attorney fee."
6
1120734
On July 26, 2012, the defendants, with the exception of
the sheriffs named in the action ("the defendant sheriffs"),
moved the circuit court to dismiss the criminal defendants and
bail-bond companies' claims against them or, in the
alternative, for a summary judgment or, in the alternative, to
deny the criminal defendants and bail-bond companies' request
for injunctive relief.  On August 7, 2012, Sheriff D.T.
Marshall moved the circuit court to dismiss the claims against
him, and, on August 10, 2012, Sheriff Thomas Tate and Sheriff
Huey "Hoss" Mack moved for dismissal of the claims against
them.  In a separate motion, Sheriff Sam Cochran also asked
the circuit court to dismiss the claims against him.  Each
sheriff's motion alleged that he was entitled to sovereign
immunity, pursuant to Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const. of 1901.
In August 2012, after a hearing, the circuit court denied
the criminal defendants and bail-bond companies' request for
a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. 
In October 2012, the circuit court stayed discovery pending a
ruling on the motions to dismiss.  In November 2012, the
criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies amended their
complaint, adding several plaintiffs and an additional claim
7
1120734
for relief under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.  The criminal defendants and the
bail-bond companies also filed objections to the circuit
court's order staying discovery and a response to the motions
to dismiss.  The defendants filed various motions to dismiss
the amended complaint, to which the criminal defendants and
the bail-bond companies responded.
On February 15, 2013, the circuit court dismissed the
criminal 
defendants and 
bail 
bond 
companies' claims,
determining that, pursuant to this Court's decision in
Citizenship Trust v. Keddie-Hill, 68 So. 3d 99 (Ala. 2011), it
did not have jurisdiction over the claims in this action and
that the criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies
lacked standing.  The criminal defendants and the bail-bond
companies appeal that judgment.
Standard of Review
"A ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed
without a presumption of correctness.  This Court
must accept the allegations of the complaint as
true.  Furthermore, in reviewing a ruling on a
motion to dismiss we will not consider whether the
pleader will ultimately prevail but whether the
pleader may possibly prevail."
8
1120734
Newman v. Savas, 878 So. 2d 1147, 1148-49 (Ala. 2003)
(citations omitted).  "Matters of subject-matter jurisdiction
are subject to de novo review."  DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d
814, 821 (Ala. 2011).  "'"When a party without standing
purports to commence an action, the trial court acquires no
subject-matter jurisdiction."'"  Blevins v. Hillwood Office
Ctr. Owners' Ass'n, 51 So. 3d 317, 321 (Ala. 2010) (quoting
Riley v. Pate, 3 So. 3d 835, 838 (Ala. 2008), quoting in turn
State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1028
(Ala. 1999)). 
Analysis
We turn first to the criminal defendants and bail-bond
companies' argument that the circuit court erred 
in 
concluding
that "[the circuit court] lack[ed] jurisdiction to consider
[their] claims pursuant to the authority of [Keddie-Hill]." 
In Keddie-Hill, this Court addressed claims by Mary Kathleen
Keddie-Hill, Cheryl Tillman, and Justin Hammond, alleging,
among other things, that the provision in Act No. 2009-768,
Ala. Acts 2009, allowing a portion of the DNA-database fee to
be distributed to the Citizenship Trust was unconstitutional. 
Keddie-Hill and Tillman had pleaded guilty to traffic
9
1120734
violations and paid the fines and court costs assessed against
them in their respective cases, including the DNA-database
fee.  However, they paid the DNA-database fee under protest,
arguing that the provision for distribution of the fee to the
Citizenship Trust was unconstitutional but that they could 
not
afford a lawyer to challenge the allegedly unconstitutional
portion of the fee.  Hammond had also received a traffic
citation, but, at the time he filed his claims in Keddie-Hill,
he had not yet pleaded guilty or been ordered to pay any fines
or court costs.  Instead, he argued that "'[s]hould I plea[d]
or be found guilty I anticipate being ordered to pay fines and
court costs assessed against me,'" including the allegedly
unconstitutional portion of the DNA-database fee.  Keddie-
Hill, 68 So. 3d at 103.
The Court first addressed Keddie-Hill's and Tillman's
claims, stating:
"Keddie-Hill and Tillman seek an order declaring
unconstitutional Act No. 2009-768, under which they
... were required to pay a $12 DNA database fee. 
They seek an injunction remedying the payment of the
allegedly unconstitutional fine by ordering the
defendants to refund the fees or, alternatively, an
order making distribution of those fees pursuant to
the cy pres doctrine.  Thus, the present proceeding
is a collateral proceeding to secure relief from
criminal sentences on constitutional grounds.  See
10
1120734
Rule 26.11(c) and (j), Ala. R. Crim. P. ('Docket
fees and other costs in criminal cases shall be
assessed upon conviction. ... Court costs shall be
deemed part of the penalty and the same procedures
provided herein for nonpayment of fines shall apply
for nonpayment of costs.')."
Keddie-Hill, 68 So. 3d at 104.  The Court went on to hold:
"[B]ecause this is a civil proceeding collaterally attacking
the judgments in criminal cases, it falls within the scope of
Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P." 68 So. 3d at 105 (citing, among
other things, Rule 32.4, Ala. R. Crim. P. ("A proceeding under
[Rule 32] displaces all post-trial remedies except post-trial
motions under Rule 24[, Ala. R. Crim. P.,] and appeal.  Any
other post-conviction petition 
seeking 
relief 
from 
a
conviction or sentence shall be treated as a proceeding under
this rule.")).  The Court went on to note that Rule 32
prohibited the circuit court from addressing petitions for
postconviction relief that involve more than one judgment
entered in more than one trial or guilty-plea proceeding.  See
Rule 32.1, Ala. R. Crim. P. ("A petition that challenges
multiple judgments entered in more than a single trial or
guilty-plea 
proceeding 
shall 
be 
dismissed 
without
prejudice.").  The Court then dismissed Keddie-Hill's and
Tillman's claims without prejudice.
11
1120734
Turning to Hammond's claims, the Court stated:
"[T]he issue before us is the propriety of a
preliminary injunction entered in aid of an action
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as to the
alleged 
unconstitutionality 
of 
a 
penalty 
in
Hammond's pending criminal proceeding.  The trial
court was without subject-matter jurisdiction,
however, to grant such preliminary relief or to
entertain the underlying action brought by Hammond. 
'The general rule is that a court may not interfere
with the enforcement of criminal laws through a
civil action. ...'  Tyson v. Macon County Greyhound
Park, Inc., 43 So. 3d 587, 589 (Ala. 2010) (holding
that, with exceptions not applicable here, courts
are 
without 
subject-matter 
jurisdiction 
to
adjudicate in civil proceedings matters that should
be decided in criminal proceedings or related
forfeiture actions for which the legislature has
provided).  See 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory
Judgments § 57 (2003) ('A declaratory judgment will
generally not be granted where its only effect would
be to decide matters which properly should be
decided in a criminal action.' (quoted with approval
in Tyson, 43 So. 3d at 589)).  Accordingly, the
trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction
over the action brought by Hammond.  The trial
court's order granting preliminary injunctive relief
and denying class certification is due to be
vacated; Hammond's action, as well as the present
appeal, are due to be dismissed without prejudice."
Keddie-Hill, 68 So. 3d at 106.
The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies
purport to seek relief from both the filing fee and the back-
end fee.  However, it is not until their reply brief that they
make any specific arguments regarding the back-end fee. 
12
1120734
"Arguments made for the first time in a reply brief are not
properly before this Court."  Baldwin Cnty. Elec. Membership
Corp. v. City of Fairhope, 999 So. 2d 448, 458 n.12 (Ala.
2008).  Moreover, only two of the criminal defendants, Walker
and Johnson, have alleged injuries from the imposition of the
back-end fee.  As the defendants note, Walker successfully
challenged on appeal the back-end fee assessed against him in
his criminal proceeding.  See Walker v. State, [Ms. CR-12-
0036, July 12, 2013] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2013)
(finding that Walker could not be charged the back-end fee
because he was not released on bail).  No specific argument is
made regarding alleged error in the circuit court's judgment
as it relates to the back-end fee assessed against Johnson. 
Thus, the criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies have
not demonstrated any error in the circuit court's judgment as
it applies to the claims regarding the back-end fee.
With regard to the filing fee, the criminal defendants
and the bail-bond companies argue that Keddie-Hill is
distinguishable and that it does not require dismissal of
their claims.  We agree.  None of the criminal defendants and
the bail-bond companies in this case is seeking "relief from
13
1120734
[a] criminal sentence[] on constitutional grounds," Keddie-
Hill, 68 So. 3d at 104, or "collaterally attacking the
judgments in criminal cases," 68 So. 3d at 105, related to the
filing fee.  Pursuant to § 12-19-311(a)(2), the filing fee is
assessed at "the issuance, reissuance, or reinstatement 
of 
the
bond," and not as part of a sentence or final judgment entered
against the criminal defendants or the bail-bond companies. 
Indeed, the bail-bond companies' obligations to pay 
the 
filing
fees do not arise in any such proceedings.  Thus, the criminal
defendants and bail-bond companies' claims related to the
filing fee are not precluded under this Court's first holding
in Keddie-Hill.
This Court's second holding in Keddie-Hill, which related
to Hammond's request for relief from a fine that had not yet
been assessed against him, likewise does not apply.  Hammond
had been cited for speeding in Jefferson County, but, at the
time the underlying action in Keddie-Hill was filed, criminal
proceedings were still pending against him, and no judgment
had been entered.  This Court held that, under "'[t]he general
rule ... that a court may not interfere with the enforcement
of criminal laws through a civil action,'" the trial court did
14
1120734
not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Hammond's claim. 
Keddie-Hill, 68 So. 3d at 106 (quoting Tyson v. Macon Cnty.
Greyhound Park, Inc., 43 So. 3d 587, 589 (Ala. 2010)).
As noted, however, the filing fee, unlike the DNA-
database fee, which was assessed upon conviction or entry of
a guilty plea, is, in most cases, "assessed at the issuance,
reissuance, or reinstatement of the bond,"  § 12-19-311(a)(2),
6
and is not dependent on any judgment or sentence meted out by
the trial court or by any determination of guilt.  Thus, the
criminal defendants and bail-bond companies' claims regarding
the filing fee do not ask the circuit court to "adjudicate in
[a] civil proceeding[] [a] matter[] that should [or would] be
decided in [a] criminal proceeding[]," Keddie-Hill, 68 So. 3d
at 106 (citing Tyson, 43 So. 3d at 589), or to enter a
Section 12-19-311(b), Ala. Code 1975, provides that,
6
"[i]f a person is released on own recognizance, judicial
public bail, or non-custodial offense pursuant to Rule 20[,
Ala. R. Jud. Admin.], the [filing] fee shall be assessed at
the time of adjudication or at the time that any other fees
and costs are assessed."  Rule 26.11(c), Ala. R. Crim. P.,
provides that "[d]ocket fees and other costs in criminal cases
shall be assessed upon conviction."  Under 
such circumstances,
the filing fee could be considered part of a criminal
defendant's sentence or judgment.  However, none of the
parties argues that this provision applies to any of the
filing fees paid by the criminal defendants or the bail-bond
companies here.
15
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declaratory judgment "'where its only effect would be to
decide matters which properly should be decided in a criminal
action.'"  Id. (quoting 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory Judgments
§ 57 (2003)).  Thus, this Court's second holding in Keddie-
Hill is also distinguishable, and the circuit court erred in
determining that the claims related to the filing fee were due
to be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
pursuant to that case.
The defendants argue, however, that, even assuming the
inapplicability of Keddie-Hill, the criminal defendants and
bail-bond companies' claims for monetary relief were due to be
dismissed because such claims are barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.  Article I, § 14, Ala. Const. of 1901,
provides "[t]hat the State of Alabama shall never be made a
defendant in any court of law or equity."  This Court has
stated:
"'To determine whether an action against a
State officer is, in fact, one against the
State, this Court considers 
"'"whether 'a result favorable to
the 
plaintiff 
would 
directly
affect a contract or property
right of the State,' Mitchell [v.
Davis, 598 So. 2d 801, 806 (Ala.
1992)], whether the defendant is
16
1120734
simply a 'conduit' through which
the plaintiff seeks recovery of
damages from the State, Barnes v.
Dale, 530 So. 2d 770, 784 (Ala.
1988), and whether 'a judgment
against 
the 
officer 
would
directly affect the financial
status of the State treasury,'
Lyons [v. River Road Constr.,
Inc.], 858 So. 2d [257] at 261
[(Ala. 2003)]."
"'Haley [v. Barbour County], 885 So. 2d
[783] at 788 [(Ala. 2004)].  Additionally,
"[i]n 
determining 
whether 
an 
action 
against
a state officer is barred by § 14, the
Court considers the nature of the suit or
the relief demanded, not the character of
the office of the person against whom the
suit is brought."  Ex parte Carter, 395 So.
2d 65, 67–68 (Ala. 1980). [Alabama Dep't of
Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990 So. 2d
831, 839-40 (Ala. 2008).]'
"....
"'... [C]ertain causes of
action are not barred by § 14:
"'"'There are four general
categories of actions which in
Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226,
250 So. 2d 677 (1971), we stated
do 
not 
come 
within 
the
prohibition of § 14: (1) actions
brought to compel State officials
to perform their legal duties;
(2) actions brought to enjoin
State officials from enforcing an
unconstitutional law; (3) actions
to compel State officials to
perform ministerial acts; and (4)
17
1120734
actions 
brought 
under 
the
Declaratory Judgments Act ...
seeking construction of a statute
and its application in a given
situation.  287 Ala. at 229–230,
250 So. 2d 677.  Other actions
which are not prohibited by § 14
are: 
(5) 
valid 
inverse
condemnation 
actions 
brought
against State officials in their
representative capacity; and (6)
actions for injunction or damages
brought against State officials
in their representative capacity
and individually where it was
alleged 
that they 
had 
acted
fraudulently, 
in 
bad 
faith,
beyond their authority or in a
mistaken 
interpretation 
of
law.[ ]  Wallace v. Board of
7
Education of Montgomery County,
280 Ala. [635] at 639, 197 So. 2d
428 [(1967)]; Unzicker v. State,
Later in Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119 (Ala. 2013),
7
this Court restated the sixth "exception" to the sovereign-
immunity bar under § 14 as follows: 
"(6)(a) actions for injunction brought against State
officials in their representative capacity where it
is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad
faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken
interpretation of law, and (b) actions for damages
brought against State officials in their individual
capacity where it is alleged that they had acted
fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority,
or in a mistaken interpretation of law, subject to
the limitation that the action not be, in effect,
one against the State."
116 So. 3d at 1141 (citations omitted).
18
1120734
346 So. 2d 931, 933 (Ala. 1977);
Engelhardt v. Jenkins, 273 Ala.
352, 141 So. 2d 193 (1962).'"
"'Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't 
of Transp.,
937 So. 2d 56, 58 (Ala. 2006) (quoting [Ex
parte] Carter, 395 So. 2d [65,] 68 [(Ala.
1980)]) (emphasis omitted).  These actions
are sometimes referred to as "exceptions"
to § 14; however, in actuality these
actions are simply not considered to be
actions "'against the State' for § 14
purposes."  Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835
So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002).  This Court
has qualified those "exceptions," noting
that "'[a]n action is one against the
[S]tate when a favorable result for the
plaintiff would directly affect a contract
or property right of the State, or would
result in the plaintiff's recovery of money
from the [S]tate.'"  Alabama Agric. & Mech.
Univ. v. Jones, 895 So. 2d 867, 873 (Ala.
2004) (quoting Shoals Cmty. Coll. v.
Colagross, 674 So. 2d 1311, 1314 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1995)) (emphasis added in Jones).'"
Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1130-32 (Ala. 2013)
(quoting Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990
So. 2d 831, 840 (Ala. 2008)).
In Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d 137 (Ala.
2002), this Court addressed whether a party that had
successfully challenged the constitutionality of corporate
franchise taxes collected pursuant to § 40-14-40, Ala. Code
1975, before that Code section was repealed, could get a
19
1120734
refund of taxes paid under that statute.  The Court
determined:
"A direct action for a refund of taxes paid to
the State is essentially 'a common law action of
indebitatus assumpsit against the State.'  J.R.
Raible Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 239 Ala. 41, 44, 194
So. 560, 561 (1939).  Clearly, a judgment in favor
of the class, which seeks tax refunds totaling
approximately 
$1 
billion, 
would 
'affect 
the
financial status of the state treasury.'"
Patterson, 835 So. 2d at 143 (quoting State Docks Comm'n v.
Barnes, 225 Ala. 403, 405, 143 So. 581, 582 (1932)).  This
Court then went on to note that several statutory remedies had
been set forth to allow a refund of improperly paid taxes but
ultimately found that the appellants in that case had not
pursued those remedies.  Therefore, the Court concluded:
"[T]he Taxpayers' class action seeking a refund of
franchise taxes paid pursuant to Alabama's invalid
statutory scheme is an action against the State as
that concept is expressed in § 14. ... Because the
circuit court was without jurisdiction to entertain
this action, we vacate the trial court's class-
certification order and dismiss the action."
Patterson, 835 So. 2d at 154.
The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies in
this case, like the taxpayers in Patterson, request a refund
of fees paid under allegedly unconstitutional provisions of §
12-19-311.  They have also requested the payment of costs and
20
1120734
attorney fees.  Recovery on those claims, like the taxpayers'
claims in Patterson, would "affect the financial status of the
state treasury," Patterson, 835 So. 2d at 143, and would
"'result in the ... recovery of money from the [S]tate.'" 
Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ. v. Jones, 895 So. 2d 867, 873
(Ala. 2004) ("However, '[a]n action is one against the [S]tate
when a favorable result for the plaintiff would directly
affect a contract or property right of the State, or would
result in the plaintiff's recovery of money from the
[S]tate.'" (quoting Shoals Cmty. Coll. v. Colagross, 674 So.
2d 1311, 1314 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995)) (emphasis omitted)). 
Such claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
See Patterson, supra; see also Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro,
950 So. 2d 1203, 1211-12 (Ala. 2006) (holding that "an award
of interim attorney fees and expenses impacts the State
treasury and divests it of funds in the very way forbidden by
§ 14").   Therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed the
8
The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies cite
8
Ex parte McCurley, 412 So. 2d 1236, 1238 (Ala. 1982), for the
proposition that "'[t]o petition for the return of a fine and
of costs imposed on the basis of unlawful authority is no more
a suit against the state barred by sovereign immunity than to
petition or file for the return of money paid to the
government as income tax in excess of the amount due.  To make
more of the action than that offends common sense and severely
21
1120734
criminal 
defendants 
and 
bail-bond 
companies' 
claims 
insofar 
as
they sought monetary relief.9
The defendant sheriffs argue that all the criminal
defendants and bail-bond companies' claims against them are
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  
"'A sheriff is entitled to State immunity because of
his status as a constitutional officer as detailed
in Art. V, § 112, Ala. Const. 1901.  Suits against
such officers for actions taken in the line and
scope of their employment inherently constitute
actions against the State, and such actions are
prohibited by § 14.'"
Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So. 3d 895, 898 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Ex
parte Shelley, 53 So. 3d 887, 895 (Ala. 2009)).  
"Exceptions to State immunity for sheriffs (and
their deputies) that have been recognized ...
include actions brought 
distorts the image of justice as fairness.'" (Quoting State v.
Piekkola, 90 S.D. 335, ___, 241 N.W.2d 563, 565 (1976)). 
However, Ex parte McCurley is inapposite here, because it was
in the nature of a criminal action –- specifically, a petition
for the writ of habeas corpus –- asking the trial court to
vacate an improper conviction and sentence, which included
fines and court costs, whereas the criminal defendants and the
bail-bond companies have sought by civil action to recover
allegedly improper fees collected by the State.
Our decision in this regard renders unnecessary any
9
consideration of the criminal defendants and bail-bond
companies' request for an accounting or to hold the funds in
escrow.
22
1120734
"'"(1) to compel him to perform his duties,
(2) to compel him to perform ministerial
acts, (3) to enjoin him from enforcing
unconstitutional laws, (4) to enjoin him
from acting in bad faith, fraudulently,
beyond his authority, or under mistaken
interpretation of the law, or (5) to seek
construction of a statute under the
Declaratory Judgment Act if he is a
necessary party for the construction of the
statute."'"
Ex parte Donaldson, 80 So. 3d at 898 n.1 (quoting Alexander v.
Hatfield, 652 So. 2d 1142, 1143 (Ala. 1994), quoting in turn
Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442, 443 (Ala. 1987)). 
The defendant sheriffs argue that none of the five
exceptions to immunity applies here because "sheriffs do not
collect, administrate, or enforce any of the bail bond fees." 
Brief of Sheriffs Hughes, Tate, and Mack, at 13.  We agree. 
Nothing in § 12-19-311 indicates that sheriffs 
are 
responsible
for assessing, enforcing, or collecting the filing fee or that
the sheriff is a necessary party for the construction of the
statute.  The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies
make no argument to the contrary; instead, they insist that
because "the Circuit Court did not issue a ruling on whether
or not the [defendant s]heriffs should be afforded immunity
and dismissed from the case, the issue is not properly before
23
1120734
this Honorable Court for a decision."  The criminal defendants
and bail-bond companies' reply brief, at 17.  However, "[t]he
assertion of State immunity [under § 14] challenges the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the court; therefore, it 
may 
be
raised at any time by the parties or by a court ex mero motu." 
Atkinson v. State, 986 So. 2d 408, 411 (Ala. 2007).  Thus,
this Court may address the defendant sheriffs' argument,
regardless of whether that issue was addressed by the circuit
court.
Because the criminal defendants and bail-bond companies'
claims against the defendant sheriffs do not fall within any
of the recognized exceptions to the sovereign immunity
accorded sheriffs, see Ex parte Donaldson, supra, the circuit
court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over those
claims, and its judgment is due to be affirmed as it applies
to the claims against the defendant sheriffs.
We turn now to the criminal defendants and bail-bond
companies' argument that the circuit court erred 
in 
concluding
that they did not have standing to bring their claims against
the defendants.  This Court has recently noted:  "[T]he
concept [of standing] appears to have no necessary role to
24
1120734
play in respect to private-law actions, which, unlike public
cases ..., come with established elements that define an
adversarial relationship and 'controversy' sufficient to
justify judicial intervention."  Ex parte BAC Home Loans
Servicing, LP, [Ms. 1110370, September 13, 2013] ___ So. 3d
___, 
___ 
(Ala. 
2013). 
 
Public-law 
actions 
involve
"constitutional or other challenges to the actions of
officials or administrative agencies."  BAC Home Loans, ___
So. 3d at ___; see also Black's Law Dictionary 1350-51 (9th
ed. 2009) (defining "public law" as "[t]he body of law dealing
with the relations between private individuals and the
government, and with the structure and operation of the
government itself; constitutional law, criminal law, and
administrative law taken together").
The underlying action is brought by private individuals
and companies against various state officials, and the claims
relate to the constitutionality of the fees imposed pursuant
to § 12-19-311, Ala. Code 1975.  Thus, this action falls
within the definition of a public-law case, and the concept of
standing applies.
25
1120734
In Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens Caring for Children,
904 So. 2d 1253, 1256-57 (Ala. 2004), this Court stated:
"In Jones v. Black, 48 Ala. 540 (1872), this
Court first articulated a test for determining
whether a party has the necessary standing to
challenge the constitutionality of an act of the
Legislature.  We stated then:
"'A party who seeks to have an act of
the legislature declared unconstitutional,
must not only show that he is, or will be
injured by it, but he must also show how
and in what respect he is or will be
injured and prejudiced by it. Injury will
not be presumed; it must be shown.'
"48 Ala. at 543.  In Alabama Alcoholic Beverage
Control Board v. Henri–Duval Winery, LLC, 890 So. 2d
70, 74 (Ala. 2003), a party challenged the
constitutionality of Alabama's Native Farm Winery
Act, § 28–6–1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975.  In that
case, this Court effectively restated the standard
articulated in Jones, using language adopted from
the Supreme Court of the United States:
"'A party establishes standing to
bring 
a 
challenge 
[on 
constitutional
grounds] 
when 
it 
demonstrates 
the 
existence
of 
(1) 
an 
actual, 
concrete 
and
particularized "injury in fact" –- "an
invasion of a legally protected interest";
(2) a "causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of"; and (3) a
likelihood 
that 
the 
injury 
will 
be
"redressed by a favorable decision."'"
(Quoting Henri–Duval Winery, 890 So. 2d at 74, quoting in turn
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).)
26
1120734
As noted previously, "[a] ruling on a motion to dismiss
is reviewed without a presumption of correctness.  This Court
must accept the allegations of the complaint as true. 
Furthermore, in reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss we
will not consider whether the pleader will ultimately prevail
but whether the pleader may possibly prevail."  Newman, 878
So. 2d at 1148-49 (citations omitted).  The criminal
defendants and the bail-bond companies alleged in the
complaint and amended complaint that they were required to pay
the allegedly unconstitutional filing fee and that many of the
criminal defendants were held in custody until the filing fee
was paid.  Accepting those allegations as true, the criminal
defendants and the bail-bond companies have alleged "an
actual, concrete and particularized 'injury in fact'" arising
from or related to the allegedly unconstitutional filing fee. 
Town of Cedar Bluff, supra.  The criminal defendants and the
bail-bond companies have requested relief in the form of a
judgment declaring, among other things, that § 12-19-311 is
unconstitutional; "permanent injunctive and equitable relief"
related to the requested declaratory relief; and damages,
costs, and reasonable attorney fees.  The criminal defendants
27
1120734
and the bail-bond companies specify that the damages would
include a refund of the filing fees paid under the allegedly
unconstitutional statute.
We have determined that the criminal defendants and bail-
bond companies' claims for monetary relief are barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Therefore, those 
funds 
cannot
act as redress for the alleged injuries.  The defendants argue
that "[t]o the extent a [criminal defendant] has paid the
[filing] fee in the past, he has no standing to seek
prospective injunctive relief.  The existence of a filing fee
does not impose any real or immediate threat of future injury
to any of them, making their claims for future relief
speculative."  Defendants' brief, at 25.   The defendants cite
10
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1988), and O'Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), in support of these
arguments.  In Lyons, the United States Supreme Court stated:
The defendants do not appear to make this argument with
10
regard to the bail-bond companies' claims for injunctive
relief; indeed, they cannot.  Section 12-19-311(a) provides
that the filing fee will be "imposed on every bail bond in all
courts of this state."  Thus, the bail-bond companies are
likely to suffer the injury alleged in the complaint and
amended complaint, i.e., the payment of the allegedly
unconstitutional filing fee, for each future client for whom
they agree to pay the bond.  Thus, their claims for injunctive
relief are not based solely on past wrongs.
28
1120734
"In [O'Shea], we dealt with a case brought by a
class of plaintiffs claiming that they had been
subjected to discriminatory enforcement of the
criminal law.  Among other things, a county
magistrate and judge were accused of discriminatory
conduct in various respects, such as sentencing
members of plaintiff's class more harshly than other
defendants.  The Court of Appeals reversed the
dismissal of the suit by the District Court, ruling
that if the allegations were proved, an appropriate
injunction could be entered.
"We reversed for failure of the complaint to
allege a case or controversy.  414 U.S., at 493.
Although it was claimed in that case that particular
members of the plaintiff class had actually suffered
from the alleged unconstitutional practices, we
observed that '[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct
does not in itself show a present case or
controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse
effects.'  Id., at 495–496.  Past wrongs were
evidence bearing on 'whether there is a real and
immediate threat of repeated injury.'  Id., at 496. 
But the prospect of future injury rested 'on the
likelihood that [plaintiffs] will again be arrested
for and charged with violations of the criminal law
and will again be subjected to bond proceedings,
trial, or sentencing before petitioners.'  Ibid. 
The most that could be said for plaintiffs' standing
was 'that if [plaintiffs] proceed to violate an
unchallenged law and if they are charged, held to
answer, and tried in any proceedings before
petitioners, 
they 
will 
be 
subjected 
to 
the
discriminatory 
practices 
that 
petitioners 
are
alleged to have followed.'  Id., at 497.  We could
not 
find 
a 
case 
or 
controversy 
in 
those
circumstances: the threat to the plaintiffs was not
'sufficiently real and immediate to show an existing
controversy simply because they anticipate violating
lawful criminal statutes and being tried for their
offenses....' Id., at 496.  It was to be assumed
29
1120734
'that [plaintiffs] will conduct their activities
within the law and so avoid prosecution and
conviction as well as exposure to the challenged
course 
of 
conduct 
said 
to 
be 
followed 
by
petitioners.' Id., at 497."
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102-03 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court went on to apply the rationale in
O'Shea to Lyons's request for "a preliminary and permanent
injunction against the City [of Los Angeles ('the City')]
barring the use of control holds," including chokeholds, by
the City's police officers.  461 U.S. at 98.  Lyons alleged
that he had been injured when police officers from the City
applied a chokehold to him during a traffic stop, even though,
Lyons argued, "[he] offered no resistance or threat
whatsoever" to the officers.  461 U.S. at 97.  The Supreme
Court determined: 
"Lyons' standing to seek the injunction requested
depended on whether he was likely to suffer future
injury from the use of the chokeholds by police
officers.  Count V of the complaint alleged the
traffic stop and choking incident five months
before.  That Lyons may have been illegally choked
by the police on October 6, 1976, while presumably
affording Lyons standing to claim damages against
the individual officers and perhaps against the
City, does nothing to establish a real and immediate
threat that he would again be stopped for a traffic
violation, or for any other offense, by an officer
or officers who would illegally choke him into
unconsciousness 
without 
any 
provocation 
or
30
1120734
resistance on his part.  The additional allegation
in the complaint that the police in Los Angeles
routinely apply chokeholds in situations where they
are not threatened by the use of deadly force falls
far short of the allegations that would be necessary
to establish a case or controversy between these
parties.
"In order to establish an actual controversy in
this case, Lyons would have had not only to allege
that he would have another encounter with the police
but also to make the incredible assertion either,
(1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always
choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an
encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest,
issuing a citation or for questioning or, (2) that
the City ordered or authorized police officers to
act in such manner.  Although Count V alleged that
the City authorized the use of the control holds in
situations where deadly force was not threatened, it
did not indicate why Lyons might be realistically
threatened by police officers who acted within the
strictures of the City's policy.  If, for example,
chokeholds were authorized to be used only to
counter resistance to an arrest by a suspect, or to
thwart an effort to escape, any future threat to
Lyons from the City's policy or from the conduct of
police officers would be no more real than the
possibility that he would again have an encounter
with the police and that either he would illegally
resist arrest or detention or the officers would
disobey their instructions and again render him
unconscious without any provocation."
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-06 (some emphasis added).  The Supreme
Court determined that, pursuant to O'Shea, this possibility
was not sufficient to give Lyons standing to bring his claims
for injunctive relief.  See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 110 ("Our
31
1120734
conclusion is that the [United States] Court of Appeals [for
the Ninth Circuit] failed to heed O'Shea ... and other
relevant authority, and that the District Court was quite
right 
in 
dismissing 
[Lyons's 
claims 
for 
injunctive 
relief].").
As the criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies
note, this case, unlike Lyons, involves an "official policy"
of the State.  Section 12-19-311(a) provides that the filing
fee will be "imposed on every bail bond in all courts of this
state," and the criminal defendants or their sureties –- the
bail-bond companies –- can be held in contempt for failing to
pay those fees.  See § 12-19-311(c), Ala. Code 1975.  Also,
unlike the plaintiff in Lyons, the criminal defendants and the
bail-bond 
companies 
have 
sought 
to 
be 
certified 
as
representatives of a class of plaintiffs who have allegedly
suffered the same injuries.
However, O'Shea also involved a class of plaintiffs and,
like the plaintiffs in that case, future harm to the criminal
defendants here "rests on the likelihood that [the criminal
defendants] will again be arrested for and charged with
violations of the criminal law and will again be subjected to
bond proceedings."  O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496; see also Lyons,
32
1120734
461 U.S. at 105 ("That Lyons may have been illegally choked by
the police on October 6, 1976, while presumably affording
Lyons standing to claim damages against the individual
officers and perhaps against the City, does nothing to
establish a real and immediate threat that he would again be
stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other offense, by
an officer or officers who would illegally choke him into
unconsciousness without any provocation or resistance on his
part.").  This is true even under the official policy in this
case.  The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies
have not meaningfully distinguished Lyons or O'Shea in this
regard.
The criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies also
argue that, "[u]nlike the O'Shea plaintiffs, [the criminal
defendants and the bail-bond companies] do not have to violate
the law to be again subject to the unconstitutional [filing]
fee.  Instead, they only need to be arrested and be released
on bail, which is not always equivalent to breaking the law." 
Criminal defendants and bail-bond companies' brief, at 57. 
However, the United States Supreme Court in O'Shea did not
state that the plaintiffs' alleged future injury 
depended 
upon
33
1120734
actual violations of the law but upon being arrested and
charged with violations of the law.  Instead, the Supreme
Court stated: "[H]ere the prospect of future injury rests on
the likelihood that respondents will again be arrested for and
charged with violations of the criminal law and will again be
subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing before
petitioners."  O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496.  As noted previously,
the prospect of future harm to the criminal defendants here
rests on the same assumption –- that the criminal defendants
will be arrested and subjected to bond proceedings.11
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in O'Shea, the
criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies have not
demonstrated that the circuit court erred in determining that
the criminal defendants lacked standing to bring their claims
The 
criminal defendants 
and 
the 
bail-bond companies also
11
argue that O'Shea is distinguishable because, they argue,
"unlike the plaintiffs in O'Shea, the [criminal defendants
here] do allege a specific injury from the challenged actions:
specifically, the payment of the [filing] fee."  Criminal
defendants and bail-bond companies' brief, at 57.  However,
the Supreme Court in O'Shea noted that, "[a]t oral argument,
respondents' counsel stated 
that some of the named plaintiffs-
respondents, who could be identified by name if necessary, had
actually 
been 
defendants 
in 
proceedings 
before 
petitioners 
and
had suffered from the alleged unconstitutional practices." 
O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 495.  Thus, the criminal defendants and
the bail-bond companies have failed to demonstrate a
meaningful distinction in this regard as well.
34
1120734
for injunctive relief.  Similarly, the criminal defendants'
claims for declaratory relief would not redress their alleged
injuries where, as here, the likelihood of future harm is
speculative.  Thus, the circuit court correctly dismissed
those claims for lack of standing, see Town of Cedar Bluff,
supra, and the circuit court's judgment is due to be affirmed
with regard to the criminal defendants' claims for both
declaratory and injunctive relief.
The defendants do not argue that the bail-bond companies
lack standing pursuant to O'Shea and Lyons.  Instead, they
argue that the bail-bond companies lack standing because,
"while the statute does not require the [bail-]bond
companies to pass the [filing] fee on to their
customers, they apparently do so: All the [criminal
defendants and the bail-bond companies] argue with
fervor that the [filing] fee 'comes out of the
criminal 
defendants' 
pockets.' 
 
([Criminal
defendants and bail-bond companies' brief,] at 47.) 
Taking them at their word, the [bail-]bond companies
have no injury from the [filing] fee."
Defendants' brief, at 31.  However, the statement from the
criminal defendants and the bail-bond companies' brief was
made in the context of their argument that the criminal
defendants had suffered a monetary injury, even where a bail-
bond company or other individual had paid the filing fee on
35
1120734
their behalf.  The criminal defendants and the bail-bond
companies do not argue that the bail-bond companies have
recouped the filing fees paid on behalf of their clients or
that they will be able to recoup those fees from future
clients.
As noted previously, pursuant to the provision in § 12-
19-311(a) that the filing fee be "imposed on every bail bond
in all courts of this state," the bail-bond companies are
likely to suffer the injury alleged in the complaint and
amended 
complaint 
–- 
the 
payment 
of 
the 
allegedly
unconstitutional filing fee -– for bonds paid on behalf of
future clients.  Thus, the bail-bond companies have alleged an
injury caused by the allegedly unconstitutional statute that
would be redressed by the requested declaratory 
and 
injunctive
relief.  Therefore, the circuit court erred in dismissing
those claims based on an alleged lack of standing.  See Town
of Cedar Bluff, 904 So. 2d at 1256-57.
Moreover, as noted previously, our decision in Keddie-
Hill does not apply to the bail-bond companies, which do not
pay the filing fee as part of a criminal proceeding, and the
doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar "actions brought
36
1120734
to enjoin State officials from enforcing an unconstitutional
law" or "actions brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act
... seeking construction of a statute and its application in
a given situation."   See Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d at
12
1131.  Thus, the circuit court's judgment is due to be
reversed insofar as it dismissed the bail-bond companies'
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, except those
claims asserted against the sheriff defendants.
The defendants also argue that, "[e]ven if the circuit
court had jurisdiction [over the criminal defendants 
and 
bail-
bond companies' claims], the judgment should be affirmed
because [the] defendants are due to prevail on the merits." 
In Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1211
12
n.5 (Ala. 2006), this Court noted that a declaratory-judgment
action is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
"'when an officer of the State is confronted with an
uncertain problem of what the law means which
requires certain acts on his part, or whether the
law is valid, and he proposes to pursue a certain
course of conduct in that connection, which would
injuriously affect the interests of others who
contend that he has no legal right thus to act
....'"
(Quoting State v. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co., 243 Ala. 629,
633, 11 So. 2d 342, 345 (1943), superseded, in part, on other
grounds, Ala. Code 1940, tit. 7, § 167 (now Ala. Code 1975, §
6–6–221) (emphasis added).) 
37
1120734
Defendants' brief, at 32.  However, as noted previously, "in
reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss we will not consider
whether the pleader will ultimately prevail but whether the
pleader may possibly prevail."  Newman, 878 So. 2d at 1149
(emphasis added).  Thus, we will not address the merits of the
bail-bond companies' surviving claims at this time. 
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's
dismissal of all claims regarding the back-end fees, all
claims seeking monetary relief, and all claims against the
defendant sheriffs.  We also affirm the dismissal of the
criminal defendants' claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief.  We reverse the circuit court's judgment insofar as it
dismissed the bail-bond companies' claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief against the defendants other than the
defendant sheriffs.  The cause is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
Moore, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Main, and Wise,
JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.
38
1120734
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion.  I write separately to
offer two comments. 
First, in reference to footnote 12 of the main opinion,
___ So. 3d at ___, I would simply note that the case cited,
Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203 (Ala. 2006), was
not a case in which the plaintiff's claim for a declaratory
judgment implicated the State's treasury.  Insofar as we
reinstate the bail-bond companies' claim for a declaratory
judgment in the present case, the same is true.  Compare
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978 So. 2d 17, 25 (Ala.
2007) (holding that a claim seeking a declaratory judgment
should have been dismissed on sovereign-immunity grounds
because, among other things, a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would "directly affect a contract right of [the
State] and would 'necessarily open the doors of the State
treasury to legal attack'" (quoting Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d at
1211)). 
Second, in the final paragraph of its "Analysis," the
main opinion considers the defendants' argument that "'[e]ven
if the circuit court had jurisdiction ..., the judgment should
39
1120734
be affirmed because [the] defendants are due to prevail on the
merits.'"  ___ So. 3d at ___.  I do not foreclose the
possibility that some of the alternative grounds offered by
the defendants in support of the circuit court's judgment are
valid, alternative legal grounds -- grounds allegedly
entitling the defendants to a judgment as a matter of law
based 
on 
facts 
that 
are 
not 
genuinely 
disputed. 
Notwithstanding that possibility, I have no objection to
returning this case to the circuit court for it to consider
those grounds in the first instance.
40