Case Title: Commonwealth v. Sosa

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2023-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12166 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  AMADI SOSA. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     May 5, 2023. - November 30, 2023. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Armed Assault with Intent to Rob.  Firearms.  Due 
Process of Law, Accomplice testimony.  Constitutional Law, 
Confrontation of witnesses.  Evidence, Videotape, Joint 
venturer, Intent.  Joint Enterprise.  Intent.  Practice, 
Criminal, Severance, Trial of defendants together, Cross-
examination by prosecutor, Confrontation of witnesses, 
Instructions to jury, Capital case, New trial, Assistance 
of counsel, Motion to suppress.  Search and Seizure, 
Expectation of privacy. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 11, 2014. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Daniel A. Ford, J.; a motion 
for a new trial, filed on August 23, 2019, was heard by Douglas 
H. Wilkins, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered 
by him. 
 
 
 
John M. Thompson (Linda J. Thompson also present) for the 
defendant. 
 
David L. Sheppard-Brick, Assistant District Attorney, for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
GEORGES, J.  This is a companion case to Commonwealth v. 
Leiva, 484 Mass. 766 (2020).  There, we affirmed the convictions 
of Julio Brian Leiva, who was tried together with the defendant 
for the shooting death of William Serrano during an attempted 
robbery.  Id. at 767, 769, 770 n.2.  A Hampden County jury 
convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on 
theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder, as well 
as armed assault with the intent to rob and unlawful possession 
of ammunition.  Before us are the defendant's consolidated 
appeals from his convictions and from the denial of his motion 
for a new trial. 
The defendant has asserted numerous errors.  He contends 
that the trial judge erred by (1) denying the defendant's motion 
for relief from prejudicial joinder, or otherwise failing to 
sever his trial from that of his codefendant, Leiva; (2) 
allowing the prosecutor to use an unauthenticated video 
recording during the course of trial; (3) denying the 
defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty on the 
charge of murder in the first degree; (4) failing to instruct 
the jury on an essential element of the charge of unlawful 
possession of ammunition; and (5) failing to instruct the jury 
on involuntary manslaughter.  The defendant further contends, 
with respect to his motion for a new trial, that the motion 
judge erred both in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing and 
3 
 
 
 
in denying the defendant's motion.  Finally, the defendant 
requests relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
We discern no reversible error with respect to the 
defendant's convictions of murder in the first degree and armed 
assault with the intent to rob.  Additionally, after a thorough 
review of the record, we decline to exercise our authority under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions of murder in the first degree and armed assault with 
the intent to rob.  We also affirm the denial of the defendant's 
motion for a new trial.  However, because of an error in the 
jury instructions, the defendant's conviction of unlawful 
possession of ammunition must be vacated. 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We summarize the facts the 
jury could have found, reserving further discussion of the facts 
for our analysis infra. 
On November 10, 2013, the day of the shooting, the victim 
joined his girlfriend for dinner at her sister's residence in 
Springfield.  About twenty minutes after the couple arrived, 
Leiva joined them, uninvited.  Leiva and the victim's girlfriend 
had previously dated, ending their relationship about six months 
prior to the shooting; they remained friendly after their 
relationship ended. 
Leiva stayed in the kitchen for about thirty minutes, 
eating and sending text messages on his cell phone before 
4 
 
 
 
abruptly leaving and returning about fifteen minutes later.  
After another ten to fifteen minutes had passed, Leiva departed 
again.  He left through the back door of the house onto a small 
porch where he passed by the victim, who was seated in a chair 
with the girlfriend on his lap.  Leiva, the victim, and the 
girlfriend were the only people on the porch. 
The girlfriend observed the defendant walk down the porch 
stairs, then around to the right, where he disappeared behind 
the porch.  A few minutes later, Leiva reemerged from behind the 
porch, followed closely by two men in dark sweatshirts with 
raised hoods.  The girlfriend recognized one of the men as the 
defendant, a friend of Leiva, whom she had known for over six 
months and with whom she frequently socialized.  As the three 
men approached the porch steps, the girlfriend could see that 
Leiva was carrying what appeared to be a shotgun or rifle with a 
sawed-off barrel.1  She had previously seen this same gun at the 
defendant's residence. 
Coming onto the porch, Leiva first pointed the barrel of 
the gun at the girlfriend, who was attempting to block the top 
of the stairway.  The three men pushed past her and surrounded 
the victim, with Leiva now aiming the gun at the victim's chest.  
Leiva then instructed the other two men to "run his pockets," at 
 
1 Police never recovered the gun used by Leiva. 
5 
 
 
 
which point the two men bent over to reach into the victim's 
pockets.  Although the girlfriend did not see what, if anything, 
they retrieved, the victim was in possession of two cell phones 
earlier that evening, and only one was discovered among the 
victim's belongings. 
When the victim, who was still seated in the chair, pleaded 
to be left alone, Leiva shot the victim seven times.  The 
defendant and the other man stood on either side of Leiva, 
looking on while facing the victim as the shots rang out.  
Hearing the gunshots, the girlfriend's sister called 911.  
Several minutes later, a responding officer entered the sister's 
living room and found the victim, who, while screaming and 
bleeding, had managed to crawl inside.  The victim was 
transported to the hospital, where he later died in surgery.  
After leaving the area, Leiva explained to a friend that he 
"went to go rob somebody" while he was with two associates but 
that things went wrong. 
b.  Procedural history.  In February 2014, a Hampden County 
grand jury indicted the defendant for murder in the first 
degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1; armed assault with intent to murder, 
G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); armed robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 17; armed 
assault with intent to rob, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); and unlawful 
possession of ammunition, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h). 
6 
 
 
 
The defendant's joint trial with his codefendant, Leiva, 
commenced in January 2016.  Before trial, defendant's counsel 
filed a motion for relief from prejudicial joinder, seeking to 
sever the two cases on the grounds that the defenses would be 
antagonistic.  The trial judge denied this motion.  At the close 
of the Commonwealth's case, the trial judge allowed the 
defendant's motion for required findings of not guilty as to the 
charge of armed assault with intent to murder but otherwise 
denied the motion with respect to the remaining charges. 
The jury acquitted the defendant of armed robbery but found 
him guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of 
deliberate premeditation and felony-murder with attempted 
commission of armed robbery as the predicate felony, guilty of 
armed assault with the intent to rob, and guilty of unlawful 
possession of ammunition. 
The defendant timely appealed.  While his direct appeal was 
pending, the defendant filed a motion in this court for a new 
trial pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 
Mass. 1501 (2001).  We remanded the defendant's motion to the 
Superior Court.  After an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge, 
who was not the trial judge, denied the defendant's motion.  The 
defendant's motion to reconsider was likewise denied.  
Thereafter, the defendant appealed from the denial of his motion 
for a new trial, which we consolidated with his direct appeal. 
7 
 
 
 
c.  The trial.  At trial, the Commonwealth proceeded 
against the defendant as a joint venturer with Leiva in the 
armed robbery and murder of the victim.  In support of its 
theory, the Commonwealth primarily relied upon the girlfriend's 
testimony concerning the events that evening, including 
identifying the defendant as one of the other two men involved 
in the shooting.  See Leiva, 484 Mass. at 769-770.  The 
girlfriend's timeline of events was corroborated by surveillance 
footage that was recorded at an apartment building where Leiva 
would frequently stay while visiting Springfield, which depicted 
Leiva at various points on the evening of the shooting.2  Id. at 
768, 770. 
Additionally, the Commonwealth's ballistics expert opined 
that seven shell casings recovered from the crime scene had been 
fired from the same weapon, as were five bullets recovered from 
the scene of the shooting and the victim's body.  Id. at 770-
771.  The police seized from the defendant's residence live 
rounds of ammunition of the same caliber and bearing the same 
manufacturer's markings as the shells recovered from the crime 
scene.  Id. 
The defendant's primary defense was that he had been 
misidentified.  In support of this theory, counsel for the 
 
2 The apartment building was approximately a two-minute walk 
from the sister's residence. 
8 
 
 
 
defendant pointed to numerous factors in his closing, including 
the girlfriend's mistaken identification of the defendant due to 
her focus on the gun, the darkness of the setting, and the 
presence of hoods on Leiva's associates, as well as the 
girlfriend's mistaken identification of another of Leiva's 
associates. 
The defendant himself did not testify; Leiva, however, 
did -- in narrative form -- which the judge permitted him to do 
pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e), as appearing at 471 Mass. 
1416 (2015) (rule 3.3 [e]).  See Leiva, 484 Mass. at 771–773.  
The judge also prohibited counsel from referencing the 
invocation of rule 3.3 (e) and strongly cautioned them against 
examining Leiva on this topic.  Leiva testified that, while he 
had visited the sister's residence on the day of the shooting, 
he left to purchase some marijuana, did not see the defendant, 
and did not shoot the victim.  Id. at 771. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  "Where we 
consider, as we do here, a defendant's direct appeal from a 
conviction of murder in the first degree together with an appeal 
from the denial of a motion for a new trial, we review the whole 
case under G. L. c. 278, § 33E."  Commonwealth v. Goitia, 480 
Mass. 763, 768 (2018).  "Where the claims are preserved, we 
review for prejudicial error" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Gamboa, 490 Mass. 294, 299 n.8 (2022).  For 
9 
 
 
 
claims that are unpreserved, and for "other errors we discover 
after a comprehensive review of the entire record, [we review] 
for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  
Commonwealth v. Upton, 484 Mass. 155, 160 (2020). 
b.  Severance of the codefendants' trials.  The defendant 
first argues that severing his trial from the trial of his 
codefendant, Leiva, was constitutionally required to protect his 
due process rights and his right to confrontation,3 and that the 
trial judge's denial of his motion for relief from prejudicial 
joinder was otherwise an abuse of discretion.  These arguments 
center on Leiva's testimony pursuant to rule 3.3 (e). 
We have previously concluded that "[t]he procedures used to 
implement rule 3.3 (e) at the . . . trial were proper" and that 
the trial judge's "rulings relative to the form of [Leiva]'s 
testimony . . . did not constitute error."  Leiva, 484 Mass. at 
784–785.  Nonetheless, we reexamine the propriety of this 
procedure and testimony in the context of the nontestifying 
defendant's severance arguments.4 
 
3 Because, as we conclude infra, there was no error, we need 
not reach the defendant's argument that the alleged errors were 
structural.  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 470 Mass. 320, 337 n.15 
(2014). 
 
4 We decline to hold, as the defendant insists, that 
rule 3.3 (e) is "designed solely for use in single-defendant 
trials."  Because the defendant cites no legal authority in 
support of this proposition and presents it in cursory fashion, 
10 
 
 
 
i.  Due process.  The defendant asserts that severance was 
constitutionally required because the Commonwealth knowingly 
used Leiva's false testimony to secure the defendant's 
conviction, or allowed for Leiva's false testimony to go 
uncorrected, thereby violating the defendant's due process 
rights.  As the defendant did not raise this issue at trial,5 we 
review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See Commonwealth v. Ware, 482 Mass. 717, 721–722 (2019).  We 
conclude that there was no error. 
It is true that "[t]he Commonwealth may not present 
testimony at trial which [it] knows or should know is false" 
(quotation omitted).  Ware, 482 Mass. at 721, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 490 (2014).  "Nor may the 
Commonwealth, 'although not soliciting false evidence, allow[] 
it to go uncorrected when it appears.'"  Ware, supra, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Hurst, 364 Mass. 604, 608 (1974).  A conviction 
obtained in either scenario "must fall under the Fourteenth 
Amendment" to the United States Constitution.  Napue v. 
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).  Here, it is clear that the 
 
"we are not obligated to consider it here."  Halstrom v. Dube, 
481 Mass. 480, 483 n.8 (2019). 
 
5 Although the defendant's motion for relief from 
prejudicial joinder does not appear in the record, there is no 
indication that defense counsel ever argued, in writing or 
orally, that the motion should be granted because of Leiva's 
false testimony. 
11 
 
 
 
Commonwealth did not affirmatively present false testimony, 
given that Leiva was not the Commonwealth's witness, so the 
question is whether the Commonwealth allowed Leiva's testimony 
to go uncorrected when it knew or should have known that his 
testimony was false. 
In order to correct testimony that is known to be false, a 
prosecutor must "take such remedial measures before the jury 
retire[] as are necessary to ensure that [they are] not 
deceived."  Gomez v. Commissioner of Correction, 336 Conn. 168, 
189 (2020).  Although the precise remedial measures employed may 
vary depending on the circumstances of a case, one such means of 
correcting false testimony is, of course, cross-examination.  
See Leiva, 484 Mass. at 784 n.19 ("Our system[] . . . hedges 
against the risk that judgment will be rendered on false 
premises by providing for rigorous cross-examination . . .").  
See also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966) ("The 
established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave 
the veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and 
the credibility of his testimony to be determined by a properly 
instructed jury"). 
Here, the prosecutor challenged the veracity of much of 
Leiva's narrative testimony by conducting a vigorous and 
thorough cross-examination.  For example, the prosecutor showed 
surveillance footage, depicting an individual running shortly 
12 
 
 
 
after the murder.  Although Leiva disputed that he was this 
individual, he conceded -- in response to the prosecutor's 
questions -- that he is depicted in the footage at times before 
and after the running individual can be seen.  The implication 
was clear:  the prosecutor sought for the jury to infer, 
contrary to Leiva's testimony, that the running individual was 
in fact Leiva.  Indeed, the prosecutor explicitly stated during 
closing arguments that the jury "would have every right to draw 
the inference" that this individual was Leiva. 
With the prosecutor having rigorously cross-examined Leiva, 
it was for the jury to determine whether he was telling the 
truth.  See Forte, 469 Mass. at 490.  Indeed, there can be no 
doubt that the jury were not deceived by Leiva; in order to 
convict him, the jury needed to reject Leiva's version of 
events. 
Nonetheless, the defendant points out that the prosecutor 
asked Leiva on cross-examination whether he was trying "to help 
[his] friend Amadi out," and further asked Leiva why he decided 
to testify.  By doing so, the defendant argues, the prosecutor 
was insinuating that Leiva was "Sosa's witness."  As improper as 
these questions may have been, the defendant's theory has a 
fatal flaw:  Leiva never answered, as the trial judge sustained 
objections to these questions before Leiva could do so.  The 
jury had been previously instructed that, if an objection was 
13 
 
 
 
sustained, they were to disregard the question and not speculate 
as to what the answer might have been.  See Commonwealth v. 
Andrade, 488 Mass. 522, 535 (2021) ("Jurors are presumed to 
follow the instructions given").  Accordingly, because the 
prosecutor did not knowingly use, or knowingly fail to correct, 
false testimony from Leiva, the defendant's due process rights 
were not violated.6 
ii.  Right to confrontation.  The defendant next claims 
that severance was required because he was deprived of a 
constitutional right to cross-examine Leiva on a "critical issue 
of bias":  that Leiva was testifying falsely pursuant to rule 
3.3 (e).  We review for abuse of discretion and conclude that 
the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by restricting 
cross-examination of Leiva's invocation of rule 3.3 (e).  See 
Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass. 67, 71-72 (1995). 
"Both the Sixth Amendment [to the United States 
Constitution] and art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights] guarantee a criminal defendant's right to confront the 
 
6 We also reject the defendant's claim that the trial judge 
misled the jury by placing Leiva under oath, as if to suggest 
that Leiva's testimony was true.  Swearing or affirming one's 
duty to testify truthfully is a prerequisite to testifying.  See 
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 454 Mass. 527, 531 (2009).  If placing 
a witness under oath could somehow be construed as an 
endorsement of the veracity of his or her testimony, it would be 
impossible for the jury to ever engage in their role of 
determining witness credibility.  See Commonwealth v. Casey (No. 
1), 442 Mass. 1, 8 (2004). 
14 
 
 
 
witnesses against him through cross-examination."  Miles, 420 
Mass. at 71.  "In determining whether a defendant's 
constitutional right to cross-examine and thus to confront a 
witness against him has been denied because of an unreasonable 
limitation of cross-examination, we weigh the materiality of the 
witness's direct testimony and the degree of the restriction on 
cross-examination."  Id. at 72, citing Commonwealth v. Kirouac, 
405 Mass. 557, 561 (1989). 
While criminal defendants have a right to cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses concerning their bias, a judge may 
properly foreclose such examination where the theory of bias is 
"too tenuous" or "too speculative."  Commonwealth v. Bui, 419 
Mass. 392, 401-402, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 861 (1995).  Here, 
the connection between the invocation of rule 3.3 (e) and any 
conceivable bias on Leiva's part is simply too tenuous.  The 
defendant does not adequately explain how the invocation of rule 
3.3 (e) would motivate Leiva to testify falsely.  At best, he 
seems to vaguely suggest that preventing cross-examination on 
this topic would somehow incentivize Leiva to perjure himself 
because the falsity of his testimony would be shielded from 
disclosure.  But the judge did not prevent counsel from 
attacking the actual substance of Leiva's testimony; indeed, as 
we explained supra, the prosecutor did so to great effect. 
15 
 
 
 
Moreover, we do not accept the notion that Leiva would have 
been encouraged to perjure himself through the invocation of 
rule 3.3 (e), particularly where the record demonstrates that 
Leiva's attorney confirmed at sidebar that he had advised Leiva 
in accordance with the rule.  The advice required of counsel 
under rule 3.3 (e) is designed to dissuade false testimony, not 
encourage it.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.3 (e) ("In a criminal 
case, defense counsel . . . has a duty strongly to discourage 
the client from testifying falsely, advising that such a course 
is unlawful, will have substantial adverse consequences, and 
should not be followed").  Given the attenuation between rule 
3.3 (e) and Leiva's motive for testifying, the judge did not 
abuse his discretion. 
iii.  Prejudicial joinder.  The defendant's final argument 
concerning severance is that the judge abused his discretion in 
denying the defendant's motion for relief from prejudicial 
joinder.  "Absent a constitutional requirement for severance, 
joinder and severance are matters committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial judge."  Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 
Mass. 483, 485 (1999).  Accordingly, we review the judge's 
denial of the motion for relief from prejudicial joinder for 
abuse of discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Akara, 465 Mass. 245, 
256 (2013).  We conclude there was no error. 
16 
 
 
 
"A judge should sever trials if a defendant meets the 
burden of proving that (1) the defenses are 'antagonistic to the 
point of being mutually exclusive,' or (2) 'the prejudice 
resulting from a joint trial is so compelling that it prevents a 
defendant from obtaining a fair trial'" (citations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 542 (2011).  
Regarding the first basis, "defenses are mutually antagonistic 
and irreconcilable where the 'sole defense of each [is] the 
guilt of the other.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 450 
Mass. 25, 31 (2007).  It is not enough to require severance 
simply because the defendants "assert inconsistent trial 
strategies," Siny Van Tran, supra, or because "a defendant would 
stand a better chance of acquittal if tried alone."  
Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 629 (2017). 
Here, the defenses of Leiva and the defendant were not 
mutually antagonistic.  Indeed, we previously noted that the 
defendant and Leiva "advanced entirely consistent trial 
defenses."  Leiva, 484 Mass. at 793 n.35.  The defendant 
asserted he was misidentified as one of the participants, and 
Leiva similarly denied that he shot the victim.  Under the facts 
of this case, the jury were free to conclude both that the 
defendant was misidentified and that Leiva did not shoot the 
victim.  See Commonwealth v. Watson, 487 Mass. 156, 168–169 
(2021) (defenses not so mutually antagonistic requiring 
17 
 
 
 
severance where codefendants argued misidentification and lack 
of involvement).  Thus, "as the jury could have accepted either 
codefendant's argument while at the same time acquitting the 
other," the defenses presented were not mutually antagonistic.  
Commonwealth v. Fan, 490 Mass. 433, 440 (2022). 
Likewise, Leiva's testimony, which in no way implicated the 
defendant, did not prevent the defendant from receiving a fair 
trial.  Rather than pointing the finger at the defendant, Leiva 
testified that he had not seen the defendant on the day of the 
murder, and he denied having referred to the defendant in 
connection with the shooting.  Among his scant testimony that 
even related to the defendant, Leiva acknowledged that he had 
initially asked a friend to pick him up at the defendant's 
address on the night of the shooting, before changing his 
request to a different address.  But this same information had 
already been introduced in evidence independently through the 
friend's testimony, as well as through a printout of text 
messages exchanged between Leiva and the friend.  Thus, Leiva's 
testimony on this point "was at best cumulative" of other 
evidence in the record.  Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 462 Mass. 827, 
837 (2012).  Accordingly, the judge did not abuse his discretion 
in denying the defendant's motion. 
c.  Use of compilation video recording.  A Springfield 
police officer testified at trial that, shortly after the night 
18 
 
 
 
of the shooting, he extracted surveillance footage from a 
digital video recorder that was provided by the property 
management office at the apartment building where Leiva went on 
the night of the shooting.  The complete video footage contained 
several camera angles of the property, spanning multiple hours 
around the time of the shooting.  From this longer, multiple-
hour video footage, a condensed video recording (compilation 
video) was created, culled to what was relevant to the shooting.  
The defendant argues that the trial judge erred in allowing the 
prosecutor to use this compilation video because it was never 
authenticated, marked for identification, or admitted in 
evidence.7  In response, the Commonwealth emphasizes that the 
complete footage, from which the compilation was derived, was 
admitted in evidence. 
 
As defendant's counsel objected to the use of the 
compilation video, "we review to determine whether the judge 
abused [his] discretion and, if so, whether the error resulted 
in prejudice to the defendant" (quotation and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 465 (2021), S.C., 491 
Mass. 1011 (2023).  "An error is not prejudicial if it did not 
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect" (quotation 
 
7 The prosecutor used the compilation video at several 
points during his cross-examination of Leiva.  The prosecutor 
also showed various clips from the compilation video to the jury 
during closing arguments. 
19 
 
 
 
and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 600, 
618, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 968 (2012).  We conclude that, 
assuming error, the defendant was not prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's use of the compilation video. 
The defendant does not argue that the complete footage 
itself was erroneously admitted, where testimony was offered to 
authenticate that footage.  In particular, an officer described 
at trial how the complete surveillance footage was transported 
and copied.  Additionally, an employee from the property 
management office testified as to how this footage was provided 
to the police, and offered various details concerning the 
cameras that recorded this footage. 
Further, it is undisputed that the compilation video was a 
subset of this longer surveillance footage that had already been 
admitted in evidence.  There is no indication that, for example, 
the visuals contained within the compilation video were somehow 
digitally altered to depict events  that were different from 
those depicted in the complete footage.  We have reviewed the 
compilation video and compared it to the corresponding times 
from the original surveillance footage.  Based upon our review, 
we conclude that the sequencing of certain events from the 
longer video footage into the compilation video "added little to 
the Commonwealth's case and detracted little from the 
20 
 
 
 
defendant's theory at trial."  Commonwealth v. Wood, 90 Mass. 
App. Ct. 271, 282 (2016). 
Therefore, under these circumstances, we are convinced that 
the defendant suffered no prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Kozubal, 488 Mass. 575, 588 (2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 
2723 (2022) (even if admission of isolated text messages between 
defendant and victim was error, defendant was not prejudiced, 
"given the cumulative nature of the evidence, including the 
admission of the many text messages between the defendant and 
the victim that the defendant does not contest"). 
Finally, we note that while the defendant suffered no 
prejudice here, the better practice is to authenticate excerpts 
that have been copied from an exhibit, even when the complete 
exhibit itself has already been authenticated and admitted in 
evidence, to ensure that those excerpts are accurate copies.  
See Commonwealth v. Leneski, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 294 (2006) 
("properly authenticated" copy of videotape is admissible if 
otherwise relevant).  Additionally, although the Commonwealth 
did not do so here, parties should explore the viability of 
admitting excerpts of voluminous video recordings pursuant to 
Mass. G. Evid. § 1006 (2023), particularly where a jury may find 
it "difficult to master the technology necessary to find and 
view the relevant parts of the [complete] videos in the jury 
room."  Commonwealth v. Suarez, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 562, 571-572 
21 
 
 
 
(2019) (no abuse of discretion in admitting compilation of 
surveillance videos pursuant to Mass. G. Evid. § 1006). 
d.  Deliberate premeditation.  The defendant also contends 
that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a required 
finding of not guilty on the charge of murder in the first 
degree based upon the theory of deliberate premeditation.  He 
claims the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that 
he intended to kill the victim, reasoning that because Leiva's 
intent to kill is not attributable to the defendant, the 
evidence at best supported an inference that the defendant 
intended to rob or intimidate the victim.  Additionally, the 
defendant maintains that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish deliberate premeditation, reasoning that, since "the 
abrupt shooting" was a "surprise" to him, the defendant's intent 
was not "the product of cool reflection."  See Commonwealth v. 
Colas, 486 Mass. 831, 836 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Tavares, 471 Mass. 430, 435 (2015).  Although we acknowledge 
that the issue is close, we conclude that the trial judge did 
not err. 
In reviewing the denial of such a motion, we ask whether 
"the Commonwealth's evidence, together with reasonable 
inferences therefrom, when viewed in its light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, is sufficient to persuade a rational jury of 
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" (quotation and 
22 
 
 
 
citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Gibson, 488 Mass. 854, 857 
(2022).  "The relevant question is whether the evidence would 
permit a jury to find guilt, not whether the evidence requires 
such a finding."  Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747 
(1988). 
For the defendant to be convicted on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation, the Commonwealth had to prove that he "had or 
shared an intent to kill or cause death" (quotation and citation 
omitted).  Tavares, 471 Mass. at 435.  Additionally, the 
Commonwealth had to prove that the decision to kill "was the 
product of cool reflection" (citation omitted).  Colas, 486 
Mass. at 836.  "Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient 
to prove deliberate premeditation."  Commonwealth v. Salazar, 
481 Mass. 105, 111 (2018).  "No particular period of reflection 
is required for deliberate premeditation to be found."  
Commonwealth v. Chipman, 418 Mass. 262, 269 (1994).  "Thus, if 
there was evidence presented from which the jury could infer 
that the defendant intended to kill [the victim], and the 
decision was the result of some period of reflection, however 
short, then the defendant's motion . . . was properly denied."  
Tavares, supra. 
Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury 
could infer that the defendant shared Leiva's intent to kill the 
23 
 
 
 
victim, and that this shared intent was the product of a period 
of reflection.   Although Leiva's intent is not imputed to the 
defendant, "[t]he jury may infer the requisite mental state [for 
a joint venturer] from [his] knowledge of the circumstances and 
subsequent participation in the offense" (citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 442 Mass. 779, 782–783 (2004), S.C., 
451 Mass. 1006 (2008).  Thus, the defendant's intent can be 
"inferred from evidence that [the] defendant (a) observed 
[Leiva] demonstrate or express lethal intent (e.g., by producing 
a gun) and (b) thereafter took some step to help carry out that 
intent."  Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 475 Mass. 396, 416–417 
(2016). 
As defense counsel conceded at oral argument before this 
court, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant knew 
that Leiva possessed a gun.  Indeed, the defendant had ample 
opportunity to observe the gun, given that the defendant was 
standing next to Leiva, the encounter took several minutes, and 
Leiva pointed the gun at the girlfriend before aiming it at the 
victim.  See Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 Mass. 131, 140 (2012).  
Although the Commonwealth was not obligated to prove that the 
defendant knew Leiva was armed, the defendant's knowledge is 
probative as to his intent.  See Commonwealth v. Rosa, 468 Mass. 
231, 245 (2014) (proof of defendant's knowledge that coventurer 
is armed is not required). 
24 
 
 
 
Additionally, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 
conclude that the defendant supplied both the gun and the 
ammunition, including (1) the girlfriend's testimony that she 
had previously seen the murder weapon at the defendant's 
residence and that the defendant was friends with Leiva; (2) the 
girlfriend's testimony that she witnessed Leiva disappear behind 
the porch and re-emerge with the defendant while holding a gun; 
and (3) expert testimony that the caliber and manufacturer 
markings of the ammunition found in the defendant's basement 
matched the caliber of the bullets recovered from the victim's 
body and the markings on the casings found at the crime scene.  
See Commonwealth v. Beliard, 443 Mass. 79, 81-82, 86 (2004).  
See also Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 416 ("knowledge and intent [may 
be] inferred . . . when a defendant brings a gun to the scene of 
the killing, but does not [himself] fire the fatal shot"). 
We also look to the defendant's conduct at the time of the 
shooting to infer intent.  See Freeman, 442 Mass. at 782–783.  
First, the defendant complied with Leiva's instruction to "run" 
the victim's pockets.8  Second, as Leiva shot the victim seven 
 
8 To be sure, an intent to rob cannot be conflated with an 
intent to kill.  See Commonwealth v. Mandile, 403 Mass. 93, 100 
n.11 (1988).  However, conduct that could support an inference 
that a defendant intended to rob a victim may, under the right 
circumstances, also support an inference that a defendant 
intended to kill a victim.  See, e.g., Freeman, 442 Mass. at 
783.  Here, even if this conduct is more probative as to the 
defendant's intent to rob the victim, it nonetheless has some 
25 
 
 
 
times, the defendant stood by Leiva's side facing the victim.  
While mere presence at a crime scene is not sufficient to 
establish intent, when viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury did not have to infer 
that the defendant's intent was merely to rob or intimidate the 
victim as he suggests.  See Gonzalez, 475 Mass. at 414.  To the 
contrary, the evidence at trial demonstrated that the three men 
were positioned in such a way as to effectively block the victim 
from the kitchen door and the porch stairs -- his only two means 
of escape.  In other words, the victim was "[t]rapped in his 
chair" on the small porch, while the three men stood over him.  
Leiva, 484 Mass. at 767.  Thus, the jury could have reasonably 
inferred that the defendant flanked Leiva, towering over the 
victim with the intent of making the crime succeed.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bonner, 489 Mass. 268, 279 (2022) (defendant 
standing next to shooter, who continued to aim gun at victim 
after shooting, was probative as to defendant's shared intent to 
kill victim); Watson, 487 Mass. at 163 (reasonable for jury to 
infer defendant's role was to block street so others could not 
interfere while coventurer shot victim).  That is, a rational 
jury could reasonably infer that the defendant helped block the 
 
weight as to the defendant's intent to kill the victim, 
particularly given that the defendant knew that Leiva was armed. 
26 
 
 
 
victim from escaping to ensure that Leiva could accomplish his 
goal:  shooting and killing the victim. 
While the inference that the defendant intended to block 
the victim from escaping is not itself inescapable, "reasonable 
inferences . . . need not be necessary or inescapable, only 
reasonable and possible" (quotations and citation omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Schoener, 491 Mass. 706, 714 (2023).  Moreover, 
"[t]he line that separates mere knowledge of unlawful conduct 
and participation in it, is 'often vague and uncertain.  It is 
within the province of the jury to determine from the evidence 
whether a particular defendant [has] crossed that line.'"  
Norris, 462 Mass. at 140, quoting Commonwealth v. Longo, 402 
Mass. 482, 487 (1988).  Therefore, there was sufficient evidence 
for a rational jury to conclude that the defendant intended to 
kill the victim. 
There was likewise sufficient evidence for a rational jury 
to conclude that the defendant's intent was a product of 
deliberate premeditation.  Given the abrupt comings and goings 
of Leiva over the course of the evening, and the defendant's 
sudden appearance from behind the porch alongside Leiva, who was 
at that point wielding a firearm, a jury could reasonably infer 
that the defendant was "lying in wait" with the murder weapon 
until the right time to provide the weapon to Leiva and join him 
in a confrontation with the victim.  Tavares, 471 Mass. at 435–
27 
 
 
 
436.  See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 482 Mass. 741, 746 (2019) 
("Deliberate premeditation can be inferred from the bringing of 
a firearm to the scene of the killing . . ."). 
Further, there is no evidence that the defendant was 
"surprise[d]," as he claims; rather, the evidence was that he 
freely stood by Leiva's side as the victim was shot seven times.  
Accordingly, "[t]his case . . . does not suggest plain 
spontaneity or tainted premeditation."  Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
482 Mass. 259, 272 (2019).  In short, while any one fact in this 
case would have been insufficient on its own, "the entirety of 
the facts presented 'form[ed] a fabric of proof that was 
sufficient to warrant the jury's finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant' was guilty of murder in the first 
degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation as a joint 
venturer."  Commonwealth v. Javier, 481 Mass. 268, 285 (2019), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Rojas, 388 Mass. 626, 630 (1983). 
e.  Felony-murder.  The defendant also argues that there 
was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of felony-
murder in the first degree with the attempted commission of 
armed robbery as the predicate felony.  Although not clearly 
articulated in the defendant's briefing, the defendant's 
argument appears to suggest that the trial judge was required to 
instruct the jury that they had to find, as an essential 
"factual" element of felony-murder, that the maximum sentence 
28 
 
 
 
for the predicate felony -- armed robbery -- is "punishable by a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment."  Because the jury were 
not so instructed and no "evidence" of this "fact" was 
presented, the defendant contends, his conviction of felony-
murder "is invalid." 
We disagree.  The penalty for armed robbery, as with other 
criminal offenses, is set by statute; thus, the maximum sentence 
allowable for armed robbery is a matter of statutory 
interpretation -- "a pure question of law."  Commonwealth v. 
Cintolo, 415 Mass. 358, 359 (1993).  Accordingly, this question 
is "for the judge, not the jury."  Commonwealth v. Trotto, 487 
Mass. 708, 735 (2021).  Here, as the defendant concedes, the 
trial judge correctly instructed the jury that armed robbery is, 
as a matter of law, a felony with a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment.  See G. L. c. 265, § 17.  Accordingly, the 
defendant's argument fails. 
f.  Unlawful possession of ammunition.  In his brief, the 
defendant argues, with respect to his conviction of unlawful 
possession of ammunition under G.  L. c. 269, § 10 (h), that 
there was insufficient evidence that he knew that Leiva's 
firearm was loaded.9  Subsequently, in light of the United States 
 
9 The Commonwealth proceeded on a theory that the defendant 
constructively possessed the ammunition found at the crime 
scene; he was not charged in connection with the ammunition 
seized from his residence. 
29 
 
 
 
Supreme Court's holding in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n 
v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2122 (2022), that the Second 
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an 
individual's right to carry a firearm outside the home, this 
court concluded that "licensure is . . . an essential element of 
the crime of unlawful possession of ammunition under G. L. 
c. 269, § 10 (h)."  Commonwealth v. Guardado, 491 Mass. 666, 692 
(2023) (Guardado I), vacated in part, 493 Mass. 1, 12 (2023) 
(Guardado II).  The defendant thereafter filed a supplemental 
brief in which he argues that our holding in Guardado I 
necessitates that his unlawful possession conviction be vacated 
and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal. 
We agree that the defendant's conviction must be vacated.  
It is a violation of a defendant's Second Amendment and due 
process rights "when he [i]s convicted of unlawfully possessing 
ammunition although the jury were not instructed that licensure 
is an essential element of the crime."  Guardado I, 491 Mass. at 
693.  "[T]he Commonwealth carries the burden of proving each 
element of a charged crime."  Id. at 682.  Here, the jury were 
not instructed that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving 
the defendant's lack of licensure as an element of the crime.  
Thus, the defendant's unlawful possession conviction must be 
vacated. 
30 
 
 
 
However, we disagree with the defendant's proposal to 
remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal.  The proper remedy 
under these circumstances is to remand for a new trial.  See 
Guardado II, 493 Mass. at 6-7, 12.  Accordingly, the 
Commonwealth shall have an opportunity to prove that the 
defendant unlawfully possessed ammunition.  Id. at 2-3, 12. 
 
g.  Manslaughter instruction.  The defendant next argues 
that the judge erred in denying his request for an involuntary 
manslaughter instruction.  The defendant reasons that the jury 
could have found that the defendant acted "wanton[ly]" or 
"reckless[ly]" in accompanying Leiva to merely frighten or 
intimidate the victim, rather than to kill or rob him.  As the 
defendant requested an involuntary manslaughter instruction at 
trial, we review for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. 
Pina, 481 Mass. 413, 422 (2019).  We conclude that, even 
assuming that the judge erred, there was no prejudice. 
Ordinarily, in the case of felony-murder, "the defendant is 
not entitled to an instruction on manslaughter" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 Mass. 512, 523 (2016).  
Nonetheless, "[a]n instruction on involuntary manslaughter is 
appropriate in a felony-murder case . . . if there is evidence 
that the defendant was merely engaged in wanton [or] reckless 
conduct . . . ."  Commonwealth v. Donovan, 422 Mass. 349, 353 
(1996).  Here, while the jury were not instructed on involuntary 
31 
 
 
 
manslaughter, the trial judge did instruct the jury on murder in 
the second degree, based on theories of both malice and felony-
murder.  Because the jury found the defendant guilty of murder 
in the first degree based on both theories, the judge's 
instruction on murder in the second degree precludes any 
conclusion of prejudice.  See Commonwealth v. Chase, 433 Mass. 
293, 300 (2001) ("This is not a case where the failure to 
instruct on a lesser included offense left the jury with no 
alternative between a murder conviction and an acquittal").  See 
also Donovan, supra at 354 ("If the jury believed that the 
defendant shared some lesser intent than that required for [the 
underlying felony for felony-murder in the first degree], they 
had the option of returning a verdict of murder in the second 
degree.  They did not"). 
h.  Motion for a new trial.  i.  Ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  In his motion for a new trial, the defendant asserted 
that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
timely file a motion to suppress the ballistics evidence seized 
from the basement of the apartment building where the defendant 
resided.  The defendant maintained that the search warrant 
affidavit of Springfield police Detective Timothy Kenney failed 
to establish probable cause to search the basement for firearms, 
ammunition, and related evidence.  In denying the defendant's 
32 
 
 
 
motion for a new trial, the motion judge concluded that there 
was probable cause to search the basement common area. 
On appeal, the defendant reiterates his argument that there 
was no probable cause to search the basement for ammunition or 
firearms, and therefore, the motion judge erred in concluding 
otherwise.  The Commonwealth counters that the defendant lacked 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement, and 
therefore no search occurred in the constitutional sense.  The 
defendant asserts that the Commonwealth's argument must be 
disregarded because the record is incomplete as to whether the 
basement is a common area.  The defendant's argument misses the 
mark. 
Where, as here, a defendant's motion for a new trial based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel has been denied and we are 
reviewing it alongside his direct appeal pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, our task is to determine whether counsel erred 
and, if he did, whether that error "was likely to have 
influenced the jury's conclusion" (citation omitted). 
Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 754 (2008).  More 
specifically, "the defendant must show that the motion to 
suppress would have been successful, and that failing to bring 
such a motion . . . created a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. Banville, 457 Mass. 
530, 534 (2010). 
33 
 
 
 
Here, the evidence presented in connection with the 
defendant's motion for a new trial implicates, at minimum, a 
likelihood that the basement is a common area.10  The basement 
was part of a three-family residence.  In general, occupants of 
a multiunit residence lack a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in its common areas.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 
Mass. 290, 302 (1991).  That said, the question whether such an 
occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a 
purportedly common area "cannot be answered categorically."  
Commonwealth v. Dora, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 141, 144–145 (2003).  If 
that question were to be answered in the negative, then "the 
police [were] free to search [the basement] without a warrant 
and without probable cause."  Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 
Mass. 254, 259 (2010). 
However, we need not answer that question.  It is true that 
some details regarding the basement are unclear.11  But this is 
 
10 For example, at an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's 
motion for a new trial, Detective Kenney testified that the 
basement could be accessed through a staircase that connects to 
each apartment.  Additionally, there were no clearly marked 
areas in the basement that could be used to attribute ownership 
to particular individuals.  However, Detective Kenney could not 
recall whether the basement had a door or whether he forced 
entry to gain access to the basement. 
 
11 For example, it is unclear whether, assuming that the 
basement had a door, it was locked at the time of the search.  
It is likewise unclear who actually used the basement and 
whether any residents were excluded from using the basement.  We 
express no opinion as to the precise facts that would have been 
34 
 
 
 
precisely why a motion to suppress would have failed -- because 
it is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that he had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement and its 
contents at the time of the search, rather than the 
Commonwealth's burden to show that he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  See Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 
686, 697 (2003).  Therefore, "if the record is unclear," the 
defendant has failed to meet his burden.  Id.  In this context, 
the defendant's burden on his motion for a new trial is the same 
as the burden he would have had if his trial counsel had filed a 
motion to suppress; that is, in order to meet his burden of 
demonstrating that a motion to suppress would have been 
successful for purposes of his motion for a new trial, the 
defendant was obligated to present sufficient evidence that 
demonstrated he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
basement.  See Commonwealth v. Druce, 453 Mass. 686, 703 (2009) 
("A defendant who seeks a new trial based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel bears the burden of proving the 
ineffectiveness"). 
Here, nothing that the defendant submitted in support of 
his motion for a new trial resolves whether he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the basement.  Without even, for 
 
required for the defendant to demonstrate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in this case. 
35 
 
 
 
example, a signed affidavit from the defendant providing 
additional details concerning the basement, the defendant did 
not satisfy his threshold burden of demonstrating that a search 
in the constitutional sense had occurred at all.  See 
Commonwealth v. D'Onofrio, 396 Mass. 711, 714 (1986). 
While the motion judge did not address whether the 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, "[a]n 
appellate court is free to affirm a ruling on grounds different 
from those relied on by the motion judge if the correct or 
preferred basis for affirmance is supported by the record and 
the findings."  Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 
(1997).  The record clearly supports the conclusion that the 
defendant did not meet his threshold burden of demonstrating 
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement.  
Accordingly, the motion judge did not err in denying the 
defendant's motion for a new trial. 
ii.  Evidentiary hearing.  The defendant also argues, with 
respect to his motion for a new trial, that the motion judge 
erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing.  However, the 
motion judge did hold an evidentiary hearing.  After this 
evidentiary hearing, the defendant did not request another 
hearing in his motion for reconsideration.  Thus, the motion 
judge concluded that another hearing was unnecessary and adopted 
the defendant's version of the facts. 
36 
 
 
 
Where the trial court had already conducted an evidentiary 
hearing, and where the defendant made no request for another, it 
would have been "fair to conclude that the defendant was 
proceeding on the facts from the existing . . . record."  
Commonwealth v. Pimental, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 325, 333 (2002).  In 
any event, the motion judge properly exercised his discretion in 
determining that another hearing was unwarranted, as he could 
have reasonably concluded that the briefing and documents before 
him "were sufficient to allow him to reach an informed 
decision."  Commonwealth v. Barry, 481 Mass. 388, 401 (2019). 
i.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, we have 
reviewed the entire record and discern no basis upon which to 
exercise our extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.12 
3.  Conclusion.  For the reasons stated, the defendant's 
convictions of murder in the first degree and armed assault with 
intent to rob are affirmed.  The trial court's orders denying 
the defendant's motion for a new trial and the defendant's 
motion for reconsideration of the same are likewise affirmed.  
 
12 To the extent we do not discuss other arguments made by 
the defendant (including arguments on duplicative convictions, 
an alleged error in the jury instruction on felony-murder in the 
second degree, alleged ambiguities between the attempted 
commission of armed robbery and the commission of armed assault 
with intent to rob, the alleged irrelevance of certain 
photographic evidence, and omissions from Detective Kenney's 
search warrant affidavit), they "have not been overlooked.  We 
find nothing in them that requires discussion."  See 
Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954). 
37 
 
 
 
We vacate and set aside the conviction of unlawful possession of 
ammunition and remand to the Superior Court for a new trial on 
the unlawful possession indictment. 
 
So ordered.