Case Title: Burson v. Capps

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2/14

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2014-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
John S. Burson, et al., v. Jeffrey G. Capps, No. 2, September Term, 2014 
Federal Truth in Lending Act—Right of Rescission—Statutory Interpretation  
Under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), the right of rescission granted in 15 
U.S.C. § 1635 may not be invoked by borrowers before the loan transaction is 
consummated.  Before consummation, there is nothing for a borrower to rescind.  An 
attempt to do so is without effect.  Our holding is consistent with Regulation Z, TILA’s 
implementing regulation, which presupposes that, when the right to rescission is 
exercised, there is something to rescind.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Frederick County 
Case No. 10-C-09-003783 
 
Argued: September 9, 2014 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND 
 
No. 2 
 
September Term, 2014 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JOHN S. BURSON, ET AL. 
 
 
v. 
 
JEFFREY G. CAPPS 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Barbera, C.J., 
  
Harrell, 
Battaglia, 
  
Greene, 
  
Adkins, 
  
McDonald, 
  
Watts, 
 
  
 
JJ. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Harrell, J.  
Adkins and McDonald, JJ., concur in part 
and dissent in part. 
Watts, J., joins judgment only. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: October 23, 2014 
 
 
 
May one undo what one has not done yet?  Although the answer to this abstract 
question has been the premise for many a time travel “B” movie, it bodes even less well 
for a borrower or borrowers attempting to rescind loans that have not been consummated, 
within the meaning of the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et 
seq (2012).  Prior to closing on a home refinancing loan, Respondent, Jeffrey G. Capps, 
submitted a notice of rescission of the loan to the lender.  A day or two after submitting 
the notice, Capps signed a Note and Deed of Trust consistent with the negotiated terms of 
the ostensibly rescinded loan.  The loan proceeds were distributed as agreed to previously 
by the parties.  Capps made payments on the Note for approximately two years before 
defaulting on the loan.  After a foreclosure sale occurred, Capps filed exceptions, arguing 
that he had rescinded validly the loan pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635.  The Circuit Court 
for Frederick County overruled the exceptions and ratified the sale.  In an unreported 
opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court, holding that the 
rescission notice was timely.  Because there was no language in § 16351 or Regulation 
                                              
1 The relevant portion of the statute is as follows: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of 
any consumer credit transaction . . . in which a security 
interest . . . is or will be retained or acquired in any property 
which is used as the principal dwelling of the person to whom 
credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind 
the transaction until midnight of the third business day 
following the consummation of the transaction or the delivery 
of the information and rescission forms required under this 
section . . . , whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in 
accordance with regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to 
do so. . . .  The creditor shall also provide, in accordance with 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          (Continued…) 
2 
 
Z2—TILA’s implementing regulation—prohibiting a borrower from rescinding a loan 
prior to consummation of the transaction, the intermediate appellate court reasoned that 
such an initiative, when viewed in a light favoring borrowers, was supported by the 
statute.  We shall reverse, holding that, under TILA, the loan may not be rescinded before 
it came into being.   
JUST THE FACTS, IF YOU PLEASE 
In March of 2003, Respondent, Jeffrey G. Capps (hereinafter “Capps”), purchased 
a home located at 2909 Loch Haven Court, Ijamsville, Maryland.  Early in 2007, Capps 
decided to pursue refinancing his home loan.  He applied for refinancing through 
                                                                                                                                                  
(… Continued) 
regulations of the Bureau, appropriate forms for the obligor to 
exercise his right to rescind any transaction subject to this 
section. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 
2 The relevant portion of the regulation is as follows: 
 
(2) To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify 
the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram, or other 
means of written communication.  Notice is considered given 
when mailed, when filed for telegraphic transmission or, if 
sent by other means, when delivered to the creditor's 
designated place of business. 
 
(3) The consumer may exercise the right to rescind until 
midnight of the third business day following consummation, 
delivery of the notice required by paragraph (b) of this 
section, or delivery of all material disclosures, whichever 
occurs last. . . . 
 
12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a) (2013). 
3 
 
Endeavor Mortgage Group—a loan broker—to EquiFirst Corporation.  In February of 
2007, EquiFirst offered Capps terms of a refinancing, which offer he rejected.  In March 
of 2007, EquiFirst offered Capps a second proposal, which he rejected as well.  In April 
of 2007,3 EquiFirst offered Capps a third refinance package, which he accepted.     
The state of this record conjures illusions of multiple factual currents, pulling in 
seemingly different directions.  Although we find no material disputes of fact were 
generated properly with regard to the dispositive question before us,4 and accordingly no 
evidentiary hearing was sought or held, we shall call-out the confusion generated and 
burn away the obscuring fog at the same time.   
The Deed of Trust and Adjustable Rate Note implementing the third offer were 
signed by Capps on 17 April 2007.5  These documents secured a loan for $350,000.  The 
                                              
3 All further references in this opinion to “April” refer to dates in April of 2007, unless 
specifically noted otherwise. 
 
4 The essential material facts that tee-up the question before us are: (1) Capps transmitted 
what he purported to be a notice of rescission of the agreed upon third refinance loan 
proposal before April 17; (2) the note and deed of trust, which were consistent with the 
loan proposal bearing Capps’s signature, are dated April 17; (3) Capps accepted the 
benefits of the distribution of the loan proceeds; (4) Capps paid on the note, according to 
its terms, for approximately two years; (5) Capps lost his job and defaulted on the loan, 
which led to this foreclosure action; and, (6) for purposes of this litigation in the posture 
in which it reaches us, see infra note 18 and accompanying text, his defense was that he 
rescinded the loan properly under TILA. 
 
5 Although Capps’s signature on these documents is not dated separately, the typed date 
of each of these documents is April 17.  At different points in this litigation, Capps 
sought, as the spirit or occasion moved him, to argue inconsistent inferences as to when 
the loan documents were signed by him.  In a Declaration (attached as Exhibit 1 to his 
Motion to Stay and Dismiss Foreclosure Action in the trial court), dated 30 December 
2009, Capps seems unwilling to admit that the Deed of Trust and Note were signed on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          (Continued…) 
4 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
(… Continued) 
April 17, although he does not allege actually otherwise: “In April of 2007, EquiFirst 
offered a third mortgage to me.  I signed it, but, on April 16, 2007, I exercised the right to 
rescind the Note and sent the TILA rescission notice to EquiFirst by fax.”   
Capps urges an inference—but does not allege actually—that the loan documents 
were misdated.  Sometimes Capps implied before the Circuit Court that the loan 
documents were signed before April 17.  See Def.’s Mot. to Stay & Dismiss Foreclosure 
Action (“In this case, the lender EquiFirst provided defendant with the proper notice [of 
the right to rescission] and forms, and defendant completed the forms and exercised that 
right.  At that point, the Note was rescinded and had no legal effect.”); Def.’s Exceptions 
to Foreclosure Sale (arguing the same, but referring to the Note and Deed of Trust); see 
also Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet. for Cert. 4; Official Tr. of Proceedings (Exceptions Hr’g); Br. 
of Rsp’t 4–5.  Before us, Capps implies that the loan documents were signed after April 
17.  See Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet. for Cert. 3 (“It is obvious in this case that the lender 
violated [12 C.F.R. § 226.23(c), requiring the lender to disburse the funds at least three 
days after the loan documents were signed] and disbursed the funds before the three day 
waiting period had expired.”).  Elsewhere, Capps alleged, in the same pleading, that the 
loan documents were signed both before and after April 17.  Compare Resp’t’s Opp’n to 
Pet. for Cert. 3 with id. at 4; compare Br. of Resp’t 4 with id. at 4–5. 
The trial court seems to have gotten caught up in the confusion during its 
exceptions hearing.  The judge stated: 
 
 
Well, Counsel, as I said I did review the file, and I see, 
I notice a foreclosure was filed in July of 2009.  [T]hat was 
filed along with the deed of trust, which was dated 4/17/07 
and then the note and then the addendum to notes. . . .  
 
[I]n December I see that [Capps’s counsel] . . . filed a 
third party complaint . . . against EquiFirst Corporation, Wells 
Fargo, and . . . the allegations were that the, Mr. Capp [sic] 
had rescinded.  Apparently, there’s no dispute about that.  
[T]hat he signed the note, and then within the period of 
time—he was given the proper notice for a rescission, within 
the period of time . . . he did rescind. 
 
Capps came close to alleging explicitly that the loan documents were signed 
before April 17 in his brief to this Court.  Br. of the Resp’t 6 (“[I]n this case, Respondent 
signed the loan documents, and then he sent the notice of rescission in a timely manner.” 
(emphasis added)).  In his First Amended Third Party Complaint, which was dismissed 
ultimately, see infra note 13, Capps alleged that he told a Wells Fargo representative that 
“he had tried to rescind the loan immediately after he had signed the loan papers and that 
EquiFirst had improperly not allowed him to rescind.  He told the Wells Fargo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          (Continued…) 
5 
 
settlement date on the financing statement was April 24,6 and the loan proceeds (net of 
charges, costs, and fees) were disbursed on April 25, in satisfaction of the pre-existing 
mortgage ($292,061.86) and Capps’s credit card debts ($32,045), with an additional 
$5,878.31 to the borrower directly.   
On April 15 or 16,7 2007, Capps attempted to rescind a loan by faxing to EquiFirst 
a form titled “Notice of Right to Cancel”8 referring solely to a property address of 2909 
Loch Haven Court, Ijamsville, MD, 21754.9  In the subject line on the fax cover sheet of 
                                                                                                                                                  
(… Continued) 
representative that he wanted to rescind, and Wells Fargo refused to allow rescission.”  
This pleading was not made under oath or affirmation and was not supported by affidavit.  
He did not reiterate this allegation subsequently under oath or affidavit.  Paradoxically, 
Capps has never alleged that the loan documents were misdated. 
The confusion was perpetuated at oral argument before us.  The attorney for Capps 
suggested repeatedly that Capps signed the Deed of Trust and Note—and then was 
provided with the precompleted Notice of Right to Cancel forms—before he faxed the 
Notice, which would have been necessarily before April 17, the date on the documents.  
(Counsel responded to the question: “So, under your theory, after he—he signs this 
Notice of Rescission at closing?” with “No, he signed it afterwards.”)  When asked how 
counsel’s theory could be compatible with the April 17 date, counsel referred simply to 
an email chain between EquiFirst and Endeavor Mortgage employees.  See infra note 10.   
 
6 See supra note 5. 
 
7 Capps’s signature on the Notice of Right to Cancel was dated April 16.  The 
transmission verification report on the fax of the same to EquiFirst reflects that it was 
sent on April 15, at 9:19 pm.  Again, this could be explained as another example of time 
travel or an exercise in post-dating. 
 
8 Called the “Notice of Right to Cancel,” this form was designed by the lender to satisfy 
the requirements of 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b) (describing the required features of a notice of 
right to rescind).   
 
9 The typed date on the heading of the form is April 2.  The body of the document 
instructed Capps that he had a legal right to cancel the transaction within three business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          (Continued…) 
6 
 
this form, Capps stated “I wish to exercise this Right[.]  Please see attached form.”  This 
document was received by EquiFirst.10  Capps alleges that at some point after he sent the 
fax, someone from EquiFirst “told [him] that this rescission was not effective, that [he] 
could not rescind, and that the mortgage would remain in effect.”  Capps did not identify 
                                                                                                                                                  
(… Continued) 
days of the date of the transaction.  The date of the purported transaction, printed within 
the body of the document, was April 2.  This typed iteration of the transaction date was 
crossed out, with “11th” handwritten on the document in its place.  The notice goes on to 
instruct Capps that he must send the notice by mail or telegram no later than midnight on 
April 5, although this date was crossed out also, with “16th” handwritten in its place.  In a 
footnote in his brief to this Court, Capps suggests, for the first time, that the Notice of 
Right to Cancel should have reflected a third set of dates entirely, although he fails to say 
what they should have been.  (“In practice, a borrower does not receive the three day 
rescission forms until closing on a loan.  Therefore, Respondent could not have rescinded 
until after closing, and the notice was misdated.”).  His only support for this theory is that 
“[t]he lender admitted in an email to having timely received the notice.”  This reliance 
was misplaced.  See infra note 10.   
It was suggested by the Trustees in their brief to us that this Notice may have been 
left over from the first or second refinance offer and perhaps Capps submitted this Notice 
before going through with the third mortgage offered to him, in an attempt to ensure that 
he was working on a clean slate with the third offer.  This is supposition, as the record is 
silent as to the actual origin of this particular document.  The record also does not contain 
any information as to whether Capps was provided with a new Notice of Right to Cancel 
on April 17 or at any point thereafter.  Regardless, it is not material to the disposition of 
this case precisely when Capps received the form or who altered it.   
 
10 Capps makes much of a subsequent email chain between EquiFirst and Endeavor 
Mortgage employees, suggesting that the email chain shows that the rescission notice was 
received timely.  On April 17 at 7:54 am, one email correspondent informed several 
others that “FYI, this file was cancelled due to the borrower signing the right to cancel.  It 
will now be forwarded to the Charlotte office.”  Another correspondent responded by 
noting that something, presumably their interactions with Capps, were “a waist of our 
time.. [sic]”  This email chain does not show, however, that the lender acknowledged the 
rescission as timely; rather, it acknowledges simply that a Notice of Right to Cancel had 
been signed and received by them.  The initial email was sent before normal business 
hours on April 17, leaving plenty of time for Capps to sign the loan documents later in 
the day. 
7 
 
which EquiFirst employee made such statements, nor did he substantiate from any other 
source that the conversation occurred.  He alleged further that he “believed what 
EquiFirst told [him]” and therefore began making payments on the loan.  In 2009, Capps 
lost his job and became unable to make his monthly mortgage payments.   
PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
On 30 September 2009, Petitioners (the Substitute Trustees,11 or “Trustees”) filed 
in the Circuit Court for Frederick County an Order to Docket Foreclosure, thereby 
commencing an action to foreclose under the deed of trust.  On 30 December 2009, 
Capps filed a Motion to Stay or Dismiss the foreclosure proceeding, in which he argued 
that he had rescinded the loan, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1635, by faxing a “Notice of Right 
to Cancel” to EquiFirst.12  Also on 30 December 2009, Capps filed in the foreclosure 
action a third-party complaint against EquiFirst and Wells Fargo, again arguing that he 
rescinded timely and validly the loan and also that EquiFirst violated TILA by refusing to 
recognize his rescission.  Wells Fargo filed a Motion to Dismiss the Third-Party 
Complaint, arguing that, whatever the merits, Capps’s claim fell beyond the applicable 
statute of limitations and further that he waived his claims by accepting the benefits of 
                                              
11 At some point, EquiFirst transferred the note to SABR Mortgage Loan 2008-1 REO 
Subsidiary-1, LLC (“SABR”).  The record does not suggest when this transfer occurred.  
SABR is a securitized trust administered by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”).  
On 1 September, 2009, SABR appointed John S. Burson, et al., as Substitute Trustees.  
 
12 This Motion was denied on 5 January 2010, without elaboration, by the trial court.   
8 
 
the transaction.  Wells Fargo’s motion was granted ultimately on 2 May 2011.13  On 7 
December 2011, the note holder purchased the home for $275,000 at a foreclosure public 
auction.  A Report of Sale was filed on 5 January 2012.   
Capps filed on 23 February 2012 Exceptions to the Foreclosure Sale, where he 
argued again that he had rescinded the loan.  The Substitute Trustees reiterated their 
position that Capps’s TILA claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, that 
they had standing to foreclose, and further that Capps did not raise any allegations which, 
if true, could result in the sale being rescinded.  The exceptions were overruled at a 
hearing on 3 April 2012,14 and the sale was ratified on 5 April 2012.  That same day, the 
                                              
13 Wells Fargo first filed a Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint on 15 November 
2010, which the Circuit Court granted on 10 March 2011with leave to amend.  Capps 
filed his First Amended Third-Party Complaint on 25 March 2011.  Wells Fargo 
responded with a Motion to Dismiss Amended Third-Party Complaint on 7 April 2011.  
This motion was granted on 2 May 2011.   
 
14 The trial court’s explanation for the denial was:  
 
I find this case presents some very interesting issues, 
and I can understand the Defendants raising them again.  
Although, I think they were properly raised prior to sale, and 
ruled upon.  So, . . . Defendant disagrees with the ruling, so I 
think from that he may have an appeal.   
As to the particular point where we are, really there is 
no allegations [sic] as to the validity or irregularity of the sale 
as it went forward specifically, . . . that would require the sale 
to be rescinded, . . . because all of the allegations that are 
made are really as to the validity of the note of first, no note, 
then the deed of trust gets cancelled, et cetera, et cetera, et 
cetera.  There’s nothing upon which to foreclose.   
And these arguments are not simple, but I do believe 
that they have been argued by both of you in your briefs prior 
to trial, and nothing really new has been raised.  So, at this 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          (Continued…) 
9 
 
court entered an Order of Ratification of Sale.  Capps appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals. 
In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the Circuit Court, 
addressing the question of whether the loan had been rescinded “lawfully.”15  The Court 
of Special Appeals reasoned that TILA’s overarching purpose was to “protect consumers 
in a rather difficult and complicated process.”  Because there was no language in § 1635 
or Regulation Z—TILA’s implementing regulation—prohibiting a borrower from 
rescinding a loan prior to the consummation of the transaction, the Court of Special 
Appeals reasoned that such an action, when viewed in a light favoring the interests of 
borrowers, was supported by the statute.16  Otherwise, reasoned the intermediate 
appellate court, the rights of borrowers to protect themselves would be restricted 
severely, contrary to Congress’ stated goals in TILA.  The three judge panel of our 
appellate colleagues explained that the three-day window for rescissions did not open at 
closing and then shut at midnight three business days later, but rather the window 
                                                                                                                                                  
(… Continued) 
point, . . . [Capps’s Counsel], I’m going to deny your motion 
to strike exceptions [sic]. 
 
15 In considering the question, the Court of Special Appeals addressed issues of 
timeliness and modality of the purported rescission.  Based on the manner in which this 
case was litigated and the questions presented to us on appeal, see infra, we decide here 
solely the issue of timeliness, which is dispositive of this case. 
 
16 The intermediate appellate court stated: “Based on our reading of 15 U.S.C. § 1601 and 
Regulation Z, as well as case law, we perceive no such prohibition [on exercising the 
right to rescind prior to a loan’s consummation].  In fact, there is nothing in either 
regulation specifically prohibiting such conduct.” 
10 
 
remained open throughout the negotiation process for a loan commitment leading up to 
closing and lapsed at the end of three days after closing.  The intermediate appellate court 
remanded the case to the Circuit Court to (1) determine whether it is possible for all 
parties to return to the status quo ante, (2) use its equitable powers to restore Capps’s 
credit rating should he be able to return the proceeds of the loan, and (3) determine 
whether EquiFirst violated TILA by ignoring intentionally Capps’s rescission notice.17    
We granted the Trustees’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari.  435 Md. 501, 79 A.3d 
947 (2013).  The Trustees posed the following three questions in their petition: 
1. Whether a TILA Notice of Rescission can be effective to 
cancel a loan transaction that has not yet taken place, and 
remain effective despite the issuing party’s subsequent 
acceptance of the benefits of the transaction? 
 
2. Whether a TILA action filed in December 2009 on the basis 
of a Notice of Rescission issued in April 2007 was untimely 
as beyond the one-year statute of limitation in 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1640(e)? 
 
3. Whether rescission is an available remedy when the trial court 
has no jurisdiction over either the original lender or its 
assignee because all claims against both have been dismissed, 
with no appeal taken from that dismissal? 
 
Because of our answer to the first question, we do not reach the others. 
Before us, the Trustees argue that Capps could not have rescinded the loan at a 
point in time when he had not yet signed the deed of trust, note, and other loan 
                                              
17 The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case to the Circuit Court to make a final 
determination as to whether the contract between Capps and EquiFirst was rescinded 
properly, but, based on its discussions of the issues presented to it, the intermediate 
appellate court seemed convinced that the loan was rescinded timely and through the 
proper channels. 
11 
 
documents.  He may have gone through the motion of submitting a Notice of Right to 
Cancel, but he did so prematurely—namely, before he consummated the transaction.  If 
he had wanted actually to avoid the obligations of the loan, the Trustees argue, he should 
not have signed the note and deed of trust, nor should he have accepted the net loan 
proceeds and authorized the lender to pay off the existing mortgage and his other 
creditors.  Capps, for his part, echoes the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals, and 
further argues that the Notice of Right to Cancel, regardless of when it was sent, operated 
to cancel the transaction, and that the funds never should have been disbursed.18     
                                              
18 In his brief to, and at oral argument before, this Court, Capps makes three additional 
arguments, none of which is properly before this Court.  First, he suggests that the lender 
violated 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(c) by disbursing funds before the three-day rescission 
waiting period expired.  Chronological inconsistencies aside, see supra note 5, Wells 
Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss Capps’s third party complaint alleging TILA violations was 
granted and no cross-appeal was taken.  Even had that judgment been appealed properly, 
the third party complaint did not allege a violation of 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(c)’s three-day 
funds-dispersal waiting period rule.   
 
Second, Capps argues in his brief to this Court that EquiFirst committed 
fraudulent conduct when it told him that his rescission was not effective and that he was 
still bound by the Note and its terms.  Accordingly, the Note and Deed of Trust are not 
enforceable.  Third, at oral argument, Capps’s attorney suggested that the Trustees 
violated the Maryland Rules by not serving him with a Report of Sale, instead sending 
the document only to Capps.  Neither of these two questions were preserved properly for 
appeal.   
The concurring and dissenting opinion implies that Capps’s allegation of 
fraudulent conduct might still be a live question.  See Concurring and Dissenting slip op. 
at pp. 3–4, 5–6.  Capps did not file, however, a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari as to 
that question.  See Maryland Rules 8-131(b).  Even if that issue were properly before this 
Court, Capps failed to argue the question with particularity in that he failed to cite even a 
single case or authority relevant to the question in his brief either to us or the intermediate 
appellate court.  “[A]rguments not presented in a brief or not presented with particularity 
will not be considered on appeal.”  Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 552, 735 A.2d 
1061, 1074 (1999) (refusing to consider an argument when one statement to that effect 
was “lumped in” with another argument); Mathis v. Hargrove, 166 Md. App. 286, 318, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          (Continued…) 
12 
 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
 
Before a foreclosure sale takes place, “the defaulting borrower may file a motion 
to ‘stay the sale of the property and dismiss the foreclosure action.’”  Bates v. Cohn, 417 
Md. 309, 319, 9 A.3d 846, 852 (2010) (quoting Md. Rule 14-211(a)(1)).  In other words, 
the borrower may “petition the court for injunctive relief, challenging ‘the validity of the 
lien or . . . the right of the [lender] to foreclose in the pending action.’”  Bates, 417 Md. at 
319–20, 9 A.3d at 852 (quoting Md. Rule 14-211(a)(3)(B)).  In Svrcek v. Rosenberg, the 
Court of Special Appeals explained the appropriate standard of review on appeal from a 
denial of a Motion to Dismiss or Stay sought pursuant to Maryland Rule 14-211: “‘The 
grant or denial of injunctive relief in a property foreclosure action lies generally within 
the sound discretion of the trial court.’  Accordingly, we review the circuit court’s denial 
of a foreclosure injunction for an abuse of discretion.  We review the trial court’s legal 
conclusions de novo.”  203 Md. App. 705, 720, 40 A.3d 494, 503 (2012) (quoting 
                                                                                                                                                  
(… Continued) 
888 A.2d 377, 396 (2005) (refusing to review one argument on appeal because no 
authority for the position was cited); Pool v. State, 207 Md. App. 614, 633, 53 A.3d 479, 
491 (2012) (refusing to consider an argument when it was made in one sentence, in a 
footnote, with no supporting argument).  The full extent of his argument to this Court on 
the question of fraudulent conduct attributable to the Substitute Trustees is as follows: 
“[I]nstead of honoring Respondent’s request, the lender told him that his request was 
legally not effective and that he was bound by the Note and its terms.  This was both a 
violation of TILA and fraudulent conduct, and, as a result, the Note and Deed of Trust are 
not enforceable.”  The point was argued similarly in his brief to the Court of Special 
Appeals as well.  This is plainly insufficient under our appellate Rules and case law.  
Further, certiorari was not granted as to either question.  We decline to consider them.  
See 8504(a)(3), (5); Comptroller of Treas. v. Aerial Prods., Inc., 210 Md. 627, 644, 124 
A.2d 805, 814 (1956). 
13 
 
Anderson v. Burson, 424 Md. 232, 243, 35 A.3d 452, 459 (2011) and citing Wincopia 
Farm, LP v. Goozman, 188 Md. App. 519, 528, 982 A.2d 868, 873 (2009)).   
When ruling on exceptions to a foreclosure sale: 
[T]rial courts may consider both questions of fact and law.  In 
reviewing a trial court's finding of fact, we do “not substitute 
our judgment for that of the lower court unless it was clearly 
erroneous” and give due consideration to the trial court’s 
“opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, to 
judge their credibility and to pass upon the weight to be given 
their testimony.”  Young v. Young, 37 Md. App. 211, 220, 376 
A.2d 1151, 1157 (1977).  Questions of law decided by the 
trial court are subject to a de novo standard of review. 
 
Jones v. Rosenberg, 178 Md. App. 54, 68, 940 A.2d 1109, 1117 (2008) (citations 
omitted).  Once a foreclosure sale has been ratified:  
The ratification of a foreclosure sale is, however, presumed to 
be valid.  Webster v. Archer, 176 Md. 245, 253, 4 A.2d 434, 
437–38 (1939).  It is settled law that, “there is a presumption 
that the sale was fairly made, and that the antecedent 
proceedings, if regular on the face of the record, were 
adequate and proper, and the burden is upon one attacking the 
sale to prove the contrary.”  Id.  The party excepting to the 
sale bears the burden of showing that the sale was invalid, 
and must show that any claimed errors caused prejudice.  Ten 
Hills Co. v. Ten Hills Corp., 176 Md. 444, 449, 5 A.2d 830, 
832 (1939).  Additionally, “[i]n reviewing a court’s 
ratification of a foreclosure sale, we will disturb the circuit 
court’s findings of fact only when they are clearly erroneous.”  
Fagnani, 190 Md. App. at 470, 988 A.2d at 1138 (relying on 
Jones v. Rosenberg, 178 Md. App. 54, 68–69, 940 A.2d 1109 
(2008)). 
 
Fagnani v. Fisher, 418 Md. 371, 384, 15 A.3d 282, 290 (2011). 
 
 
14 
 
DISCUSSION 
The right of rescission dispute joined in this case derives from that right as granted 
in the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”).  TILA was designed to “assure a 
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more 
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of 
credit . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2012).  TILA requires creditors “to provide borrowers 
with clear and accurate disclosures of terms dealing with things like finance charges, 
annual percentage rates of interest, and the borrower’s rights.”  Beach v. Ocwen Fed. 
Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998); see McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 
F.3d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 2012) (“TILA protects consumers from fraud, deception, and 
abuse within the residential secured lending marketplace by mandating that lenders 
disclose certain information to borrowers.”).   
When interpreting TILA and its implementing regulations, federal and Maryland 
principles of statutory construction agree that we begin with its text.  “‘The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the plain meaning rule, stating that if 
the language of a statute or regulation has a plain and ordinary meaning, courts need look 
no further and should apply the regulation as it is written.’”  Gilbert v. Residential 
Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Textron, Inc. v. Comm’r, 336 
F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2003).  By the same token, “‘absent some obvious repugnance to the 
statute, the . . . regulation implementing [TILA] should be accepted by the courts.”  
Textron, Inc., 336 F.3d at 277 (quoting Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 
219 (1981)).  Our goal in interpreting TILA, as with any legislation, is “to ascertain and 
15 
 
implement the legislative intent, which is to be derived, if possible, from the language of 
the statute (or Rule) itself.  If the language is clear and unambiguous, our search for 
legislative intent ends and we apply the language as written in a commonsense manner.”  
Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 571, 880 A.2d 343, 349 (2005).  We “presume that [a] 
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”  
Turner v. Knight, 406 Md. 167, 175, 957 A.2d 984, 988 (2008) (internal quotations 
omitted).  The interpretation of a word or phrase “depends upon reading the whole 
statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any 
precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.”  Turner, 406 Md. at 175, 957 A.2d at 
989 (internal quotations omitted).   
TILA grants homeowners a right to rescission in certain circumstances: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, in the case of 
any consumer credit transaction (including opening or 
increasing the credit limit for an open end credit plan) in 
which a security interest, including any such interest arising 
by operation of law, is or will be retained or acquired in any 
property which is used as the principal dwelling of the person 
to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to 
rescind the transaction until midnight of the third business 
day following the consummation of the transaction or the 
delivery of the information and rescission forms required 
under this section together with a statement containing the 
material 
disclosures 
required 
under 
this 
subchapter, 
whichever is later, by notifying the creditor, in accordance 
with regulations of the Bureau [of Consumer Financial 
Protection], of his intention to do so.  The creditor shall 
clearly and conspicuously disclose, in accordance with 
regulations of the Bureau, to any obligor in a transaction 
subject to this section the rights of the obligor under this 
section.  The creditor shall also provide, in accordance with 
regulations of the Bureau, appropriate forms for the obligor to 
16 
 
exercise his right to rescind any transaction subject to this 
section. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (emphasis added).  See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2013) (“The 
consumer may exercise the right to rescind until midnight of the third business day 
following consummation, delivery of the notice required by paragraph (b) of this section, 
or delivery of all material disclosures, whichever occurs last.” (emphasis added)).  This 
three-day rescission window is a cooling-off period within which the borrower may 
rescind with no questions asked.  The lender may not disburse the funds until those three 
days have passed (unless the borrower waives the right to rescind).  12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.23(c).  In the event that the lender fails to comply with the statutory disclosures, the 
right to rescind is extended to three years after closing.  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.23(a)(3).   
 
Regulation Z, TILA’s implementing regulation, describes how the right to rescind 
is to be exercised:  
To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the 
creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram, or other means of 
written communication.  Notice is considered given when 
mailed, when filed for telegraphic transmission or, if sent by 
other means, when delivered to the creditor’s designated 
place of business. 
 
12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(2).   
Once the right to rescission has been exercised timely and properly, the borrower 
is “not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the 
obligor, including any such interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such 
a rescission.”  15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); see 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(1) (“When a consumer 
17 
 
rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of rescission becomes 
void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including any finance 
charge.”).  Upon receipt of a notice of rescission, “the creditor shall return to the obligor 
any money or property given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall 
take any action necessary or appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest 
created under the transaction.”  15 U.S.C. § 1635(b).   
Capps bows, as he must, to what the statute provides as to when the three-day 
window for rescission shuts—at midnight three business days after closing, or, if the 
notice was delivered after closing, three days after that later date.  We must decide here 
when that window sash is flung open.   
TILA does not define the term “rescission.”  Regulation Z provides that, when a 
term is not defined, “the words used have the meanings given to them by state law or 
contract.”  12 C.F.R. § 226.2(b)(3).  The Court of Special Appeals had occasion to 
consider the definition of “rescission” in Maslow v. Vanguri, where the intermediate 
appellate court sought to determine the point at which a breach of contract became 
material enough to warrant rescission under Maryland common law.  168 Md. App. 298, 
323–24, 896 A.2d 408, 423 (2006).  The court adopted the definition of rescission in an 
earlier iteration of Black’s Law Dictionary:  
Rescission of Contract.  To avoid, or cancel a contract; 
particularly, nullifying a contract by the act of a party . . . . To 
declare a contract void in its inception and to put an end to it 
as if it never were . . . . A ‘rescission’ amounts to the 
unmaking of a contract, or an undoing of it from the 
beginning . . . . It necessarily involves a repudiation of the 
18 
 
contract and a refusal of the moving party to be further bound 
by it.   
 
168 Md. App. at 323, 896 A.2d at 423 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1306–07 (6th ed. 
1990)).19  Other courts have looked to Black’s Law Dictionary, as well as Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary, for definitions of the term: 
While neither the Act nor the implementing regulations 
define the term, common definitions of “rescission” indicate 
that it covers more than simply removing a security interest 
created through a loan.  According to [Black’s Law 
Dictionary], the term means “[a] party’s unilateral unmaking 
of a contract,” which “restores the parties to their 
precontractual positions.”  According to [Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary], the term means “an act of 
cutting off” or “an act of rescinding, annulling, or vacating or 
of cancelling or abrogating (as by restoring to another party to 
a contract or transaction what one has received from him).”  
 
See Barrett v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 445 F.3d 874, 879 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations 
omitted).  For present purposes, we understand the term “rescission” in TILA to mean “to 
cancel” or “to undo.”  
The right of rescission belongs to borrowers only “in the case of any consumer 
credit transaction.”  15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).  In those cases, the borrower may rescind until 
midnight of the third business day “following the consummation of the transaction.”  Id. 
§ 1635(a).  Regulation Z defines “consummation” as “the time that a consumer becomes 
                                              
19 The current iteration of Black’s Law Dictionary defines rescission as follows: “1. A 
party’s unilateral unmaking of a contract for a legally sufficient reason . . . .”  Rescission, 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1420–21 (9th ed. 2009).   
19 
 
contractually obligated on a credit transaction.”20  12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(13).  TILA does 
not define the phrase “consumer credit transaction,” nor the term “transaction.”  The 
word “transaction,” however, is included as part of two other defined terms, each of 
which presupposes that the “transaction” must be consummated.  See Weintraub v. 
Quicken Loans, Inc., 594 F.3d 270, 273 (4th Cir. 2010).  TILA’s definitional section 
defines “residential mortgage transaction” as “a transaction in which a mortgage, deed of 
trust, purchase money security interest arising under an installment sales contract, or 
equivalent consensual security interest is created or retained against the consumer’s 
dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial construction of such dwelling.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1602(x) (emphasis added).  Similarly, a “reverse mortgage transaction,” also defined in 
§ 1602, is “a nonrecourse transaction in which a mortgage, deed of trust, or equivalent 
consensual security interest is created against the consumer’s principal dwelling . . . .”  
Id. § 1602(cc) (emphasis added).  Both definitions treat the word “transaction” as a 
consummated event, “indicating that any credit transaction under § 1635(a) must be 
consummated for the right to rescind to attach.”  Weintraub, 594 F.3d at 275. 
                                              
20 When a consumer “becomes contractually obligated on a credit transaction” is, in turn, 
determined by looking to state law: “State law governs.  When a contractual obligation 
on the consumer’s part is created is a matter to be determined under applicable law; 
Regulation Z does not make this determination.”  12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, p. 612 
(Official Staff Commentary).  As the case was presented here, neither party alleged that 
the consummation date was some date in the negotiation process other than the date that 
the Adjustable Rate Note and Deed of Trust were signed and dated.  Accordingly, for 
present purposes, the consummation date in this case was April 17.  We decline to opine 
on the definition of the word “consummation” and whether other events might qualify as 
“becom[ing] contractually obligated.”   
20 
 
Regulation Z presumes that, at the time a borrower wishes to exercise his or her 
rescission right, there is something to rescind.  It notes that the effect of rescission is to 
render void “the security interest giving rise to the right of rescission.”  12 C.F.R. 
§ 226.23(d)(1).  There must be a security interest in being to rescind in order for it to be 
rendered void.  See 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, pp. 709–10 (Official Staff Commentary) 
(“In order for the right of rescission to apply, the security interest must be retained as part 
of the credit transaction.”); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 226, Supp. I, p. 712 (Official Staff 
Commentary) (“Any security interest giving rise to the right of rescission becomes void 
when the consumer exercises the right of rescission.  The security interest is 
automatically negated, regardless of its status and whether or not it was recorded or 
perfected.”).  In our view, “consummation of the transaction” refers to closing, or, the 
moment when the note and deed of trust or mortgage are signed.  Until a loan is 
consummated, there is no consumer credit transaction, and the consumer has no 
obligations from which he or she would need a right of rescission.  If the loan was not 
consummated yet, the borrower could decline simply to sign the loan documents and 
avoid liability.  Under TILA, a borrower cannot rescind that which has not occurred yet.21   
                                              
21 We need not grapple with, in the abstract, whether TILA’s right of rescission mirrors, 
enlarges, or diminishes existing Maryland common law on rescission because the 
outcome is the same under either.  Under Maryland common law, “if a party who knows 
the facts would justify rescission, does any act which recognizes the continued validity of 
the contract or indicates that he still feels bound under it, he will be held to have waived 
his right to rescind.”  Lazorcak v. Feuerstein, 273 Md. 69, 76, 327 A.2d 477, 481 (1974).  
It is undisputed that, approximately a week and a half after submitting a Notice of Right 
to Cancel, Capps accepted not only sufficient funds to pay off his prior mortgage (almost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          (Continued…) 
21 
 
In the case at bar, Capps could not have rescinded what he had not yet created.  On 
the 15th of April, when he faxed a Notice of Right to Cancel, the arguably rescindable 
transaction had not come into being yet, and therefore could not be cancelled then.  
Capps consummated the transaction on Tuesday, April 17, when he signed the loan 
documents.  April 17, then, is the earliest that the three-day window could have opened.22  
If Capps wanted to avoid the loan, he should not have signed the loan documents, or he 
should have caused the proceeds to be returned promptly. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit shares our view of 
§ 1635.  In Weintraub v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 594 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2010), the Fourth 
Circuit considered whether the TILA right to rescind applies in cases where the 
transaction had not closed yet.  The borrowers in that case argued, like Capps, that the 
text of § 1635(a) does not require that a loan be consummated before the right to rescind 
may arise, but rather that rescission is possible any time after the parties begin 
negotiations for a potential extension of credit.  Weintraub, 594 F.3d at 273–74.  The 
Fourth Circuit held that “no ‘consumer credit transaction’ exists for which the right to 
rescind can be exercised until that transaction has been consummated, or put another 
way, until credit is in fact extended.”  Weintraub, 594 F.3d at 275 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
                                                                                                                                                  
(… Continued) 
$300,000), but also more than $32,000 to pay off credit card debts and $5,878.31 in his 
pocket.  In addition, he made monthly payments on the loan until 2009.   
 
22 In the event that Capps was provided with a Notice of Right to Cancel after April 17, 
the three-day window would have opened at that time.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a).   
22 
 
In support of its decision, the Fourth Circuit looked to TILA disclosure cases in 
the context of automobile loans for the proposition that TILA liability under the 
analogous § 1638 does not attach until after the consummation of a consumer credit 
transaction.  Weintraub, 594 F.3d at 274–75 (examining Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac 
GMC, Inc., 319 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 543 U.S. 50 (2004), 
and Baxter v. Sparks Oldsmobile, Inc., 579 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1978)).  In Baxter, the 
Fourth Circuit held that there was no consumer credit transaction to which TILA would 
apply when the consumer cancelled the transaction before it was consummated.  Baxter, 
579 F.2d at 864.  In Nigh, although the transaction had not been consummated formally 
(i.e., the credit had not yet been extended), the Fourth Circuit held that Baxter was 
satisfied once the consumer became obligated contractually on the credit transaction.  
Nigh, 319 F.3d at 123–24.   
The Fourth Circuit relied also on “a commonsense reading of the text of 
§ 1635(a)” in holding that the term transaction “refers to a consummated, binding 
agreement, rather than to the whole course of the parties’ interactions.  The right to 
rescind a transaction defined as the whole course of interactions between the parties 
would essentially be meaningless—there would often be nothing to rescind.”  Weintraub, 
594 F.3d at 276. 
23 
 
We could find little else on point across the country.  In an unreported opinion23 
from 2002, a federal district court in Illinois held similarly that the TILA remedy of 
rescission was not available to homeowners before closing.  In Sampanetti v. E*Trade 
Mortgage Corp., No. 02-C-3513, 2002 WL 31478269 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2002), the 
homeowners signed a “Lock-In Agreement” which provided that their $400 interest-rate 
lock-in fee was only refundable in the event that E*Trade did not approve the loan for 
closing.  Sampanetti, 2002 WL 31478269 at *1.  The homeowners alleged that this was in 
violation of their statutory right to rescind under TILA.  E*Trade argued that that right 
was not available yet as the parties had not closed.  Sampanetti, 2002 WL 31478269 at 
*1–*2.  Because TILA and Regulation Z “do not clearly indicate that the concept of 
rescission, or the language requiring a refund upon rescission, applies to a situation where 
a loan has not yet closed,” the court concluded that “holding that the rescission and 
refund provisions apply to such a situation would constitute an impermissible expansion 
of the statute and the regulations.”  Sampanetti, 2002 WL 31478269 at *2.   
 
We are aware of only one additional opinion that speaks to the question of 
whether, under TILA, a loan may be rescinded before it is consummated.  In 1997, a City 
Court for Mt. Vernon, New York (a trial court-equivalent), held in Community Mutual 
Savings Bank v. Gillen, 655 N.Y.S.2d 271 (N.Y. City Ct. 1997), that consumers have a 
right to rescind even when they do not close on the loan.  Cmty Mut. Sav. Bank, 655 
                                              
23 We do not include this case for any precedential or persuasive value here.  The Fourth 
Circuit’s opinion in Weintraub serves as persuasion enough.  Sampanetti is recounted 
merely to illustrate the paucity of opinions nationally—especially from high courts—as 
to the question before us. 
24 
 
N.Y.S.2d at 273.  In that case, the borrowers applied for a loan and received a firm 
commitment letter, which scheduled closing for 12 July 1996.  Cmty Mut. Sav. Bank, 655 
N.Y.S.2d at 272.  Due to a dispute over real property taxes, the borrowers did not sign the 
loan documents at the closing table.  Id.  Nonetheless, the representatives of the lender 
gave the rescission notice to the borrowers and asked that they sign it immediately, which 
they did.  Cmty Mut. Sav. Bank, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 274.  The City Court reasoned that, 
because the notice of rescission itself did not say that the loan needed to be consummated 
before it could be used, and because the lender gave the notice to the borrowers and 
instructed them to sign it, the lender “must be bound by its own notice of rescission.”  Id.  
From the court’s perspective, “the consummation merely provides a frame of reference 
from which the time for rescission may be calculated.”  Cmty Mut. Sav. Bank, 655 
N.Y.S.2d at 273.  Further, the City Court reasoned that, as rescission is an equitable 
doctrine, “[n]othing in TILA or Regulation Z limits a Court of Equity from preventing an 
inequitable or improper result from the exercise of the statutory rescission.”  Cmty Mut. 
Sav. Bank, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 274.  To the extent that the City Court reasoned that, under 
TILA, a contract need not be formed before it may be rescinded, we are unpersuaded and 
disagree accordingly.  See Cmty Mut. Sav. Bank, 655 N.Y.S.2d at 273 (indicating, in 
dicta, that “[a]ccording to the plain language of the statute and regulation, there is no 
requirement that the transaction be consummated”).  
In the present case, the Court of Special Appeals relied on another Fourth Circuit 
case, Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012), in holding that 
Capps did what a borrower is supposed to do to rescind a loan.  In Gilbert, the Fourth 
25 
 
Circuit considered what actions by borrowers were sufficient to exercise the right of 
rescission.  There, the borrowers notified the lender by letter, within three years of the 
execution of the note, that they were rescinding their mortgage transaction.  Gilbert, 678 
F.3d at 274–75.  The Fourth Circuit considered whether a borrower must file a lawsuit 
within three years after the consummation of a loan transaction, or whether he or she may 
assert the right simply through a written notice.  Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 276.  Based on the 
plain meaning of the statute, the court concluded that 15 U.S.C. § 1635 “does not require 
borrowers to file a claim for the invocation of that right.”  Gilbert, 678 F.3d at 278.  
Although Gilbert is instructive as to the appropriate demonstrative methodologies by 
which a borrower may rescind a loan, it has little to contribute on the subject of when a 
borrower may rescind under TILA.  At most, Gilbert suggests that Capps may have 
chosen a proper method when he employed a form Notice of Right to Cancel; however, 
he deployed it prematurely.   
 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE 
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH 
DIRECTIONS 
TO 
AFFIRM 
THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
FOR FREDERICK COUNTY; COSTS IN 
THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY 
RESPONDENT CAPPS. 
 
Judge Watts joins the judgment only. 
Circuit Court for Frederick County
Case No. 10-C-09-003783
Argued:  September 9, 2014
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 2
September Term 2014
JOHN S. BURSON, ET AL.
v.
JEFFREY G. CAPPS
Barbera, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
McDonald
Watts
JJ.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
McDonald, J., which Adkins, J., joins
Filed: October 23, 2014
The Majority opinion holds that a borrower’s right to rescind a loan transaction under
the federal Truth in Lending Act does not extend to a transaction that has yet to occur.  I have
no quarrel with that legal proposition, but it is not at all clear that it applies to this case.  The
Majority opinion essentially engages in its own fact-finding in an effort to apply that holding
and to resolve this case.  But that is not our role.  I would remand this matter to the Circuit
Court for further factual development in the appropriate forum. 
The Majority opinion makes heroic efforts, largely in footnotes,  to construct a factual
1
basis for its decision.  But, as the Majority opinion recognizes, the current record of this case
is quite murky with respect to the sequence of events involving Mr. Capps, the mortgage
broker, and the lender.  The Majority opinion attributes this state of the record solely to Mr.
Capps.  Majority slip op. at pp. 3-5 & n.5.  However, while Mr. Capps provided a sworn
affidavit and e-mails between the loan broker and lender  on the question of rescission in the
2
Circuit Court, the substitute trustees never disputed the timeliness of the rescission notice in
the Circuit Court and, perhaps for that reason, did nothing themselves to clarify the record
Majority slip op. at pp. 3-5 n.5, pp. 5-6 nn.9-10. 
1
Those e-mails documented that the loan broker and lender received the rescission
2
notice.  While the representative of the loan broker expressed disappointment that the
transaction had fallen through (“what a waist” [sic]), none of the parties in the e-mail string
suggests that the rescission was premature.  The Majority opinion puts its own gloss on these
e-mails, asserting that because some of the e-mails are dated on the morning of April 17,
there was “plenty of time for Capps to sign the loan documents later in the day.”  Majority
slip op. at p. 6 n.10.  Whether some unknown event occurred on April 17 that resulted in a
transaction taking place subsequent to the e-mails – contrary to Mr. Capps’ assertion – is pure
speculation by the Majority opinion.  The substitute trustees offered no evidence in the
Circuit Court on that point.
on the relevant time line.   Nonetheless, the Majority opinion faults Mr. Capps alone for
3
failing to clarify the time line of the loan transaction and rescission. 
In the Circuit Court, the substitute trustees relied on a host of other legal arguments,
but not the one on which the Majority opinion decides this case.  Indeed, the substitute
trustees did not suggest that Mr. Capps’ rescission of the transaction was premature until this
case reached the Court of Special Appeals.  In its unreported opinion, the intermediate
appellate court held that a rescission notice is effective under the Truth in Lending Act, even
if it is sent before the consummation of a transaction.  Thus, resolution of the time line in Mr.
Capps’ case was not essential to that court’s decision.  That court apparently accepted the
substitute trustees’ belated assertion that the rescission notice pre-dated the transaction and
held that, under its view of the rescission right, that timing did not matter.
In this Court, the substitute trustees challenge the timeliness of the rescission notice
based on typewritten and handwritten dates that appear on various documents, although they
offered no evidence in the Circuit Court as to the accuracy of any particular date.  The
Majority appears to accept the idea that the typewritten and handwritten dates on various
documents may not be the dates on which the particular documents were actually executed. 
Majority slip op. at pp. 5-6  nn.7, 9.  Nevertheless, it generally draws inferences in favor of
the substitute trustees and against Mr. Capps as to the accuracy of particular dates. 
In opposing Mr. Capps’ exceptions to the foreclosure sale in the Circuit Court, the
3
substitute trustees themselves did not argue that the rescission notice was premature.  Record
Excerpts at 82-91.  
2
In the oral argument before us, the substitute trustees conceded that a borrower
receives the form to rescind a loan only at the closing – a fact that suggests that the borrower
(Mr. Capps) could only have submitted the rescission form – however the documents may
have been dated or mis-dated – after the closing.  The Majority opinion dismisses this
information as to when a borrower receives a rescission form in relation to a closing as “not
material” to the question of when this borrower would have been able to submit the
rescission form related to the loan transaction in this case.  Majority slip op. at pp. 5-6 n.9. 
But the Majority opinion can only speculate as to how Mr. Capps would have come into
possession of the rescission form prior to the closing.
Mr. Capps asserted in the Circuit Court that he had rescinded the transaction in a
timely manner, but that the lender had told him – incorrectly – that the rescission was
ineffective, that he was bound by the promissory note he had signed, and that he was
obligated to accept the funds and make payments.  It is not inconceivable that a mortgage
broker or a lender, who stands to lose a substantial fee if a transaction does not go forward,
would discourage a borrower from rescinding a transaction.   The Majority opinion discounts
4
Mr. Capps’ affidavit, although it is unrebutted in this record, and faults Mr. Capps for not
elaborating on the circumstances of the rescission by filing an additional affidavit.  Majority
The record discloses that, in Mr. Capps’ transaction, the loan broker and lender
4
received fees totaling more than $13,000 upon closing of the transaction.  Record Excerpts
at 41.
3
slip op. at pp. 3-5 n.5.  The substitute trustees introduced no evidence – in the form of sworn
affidavits or otherwise – on this issue in the Circuit Court.
As the Majority opinion notes, at the hearing on exceptions in the Circuit Court, the
judge summarized the history of the case as to the rescission issue – without any
contradiction or objection by counsel for the substitute trustees – as follows:
... the allegations [in a third party complaint against the lender]
were that Mr. Capps had rescinded.  Apparently, there’s no
dispute about that. [T]hat he signed the note, and then rescinded
within the period of time – he was given proper notice for a
rescission, within the period of time, ... he did rescind.
[A]pparently there’s little dispute about the fact that, ...
when he spoke to the lender he was told he couldn’t ... rescind
and he then began making payments on the loan, which
apparently he made until he lost his job.
Record Excerpts at 109-10.  The Majority opinion dismisses the trial judge’s statement as the
result of “confusion.”  Majority slip op. at p. 4 n.5.
At times, it appears that it is the Majority opinion that is confused or that simply
disregards parts of the record.  For example, the Majority opinion relies heavily on the
undisputed facts that Mr. Capps accepted the proceeds of the loan and made payments on it
until he lost his job.  Majority slip op. at p. 3 n.4, 11, 20-21 n.21.   While it notes that Mr.
5
Capps recounted in his affidavit that he did so because the lender had told him that his
rescission was ineffective and that the mortgage would remain in effect, it gives no weight
These are two of the six facts it deems material to the disposition of this case. 
5
Majority slip op. at p. 3 n.4.  
4
to that undisputed fact,  stating that “Capps did not identify which Equifirst employee made
6
such statements, nor did he substantiate from any other source that the conversation
occurred.” Majority slip op. at pp. 6-7 (emphasis added).  Apparently, the Majority opinion
would prefer to have more evidence on the circumstances of this conversation, as might a
fact-finder at trial.  But the substitute trustees never challenged Mr. Capps’ statement that this
conversation occurred.    
The Majority opinion disregards Mr. Capps’ factual allegations by noting that the
order granting a writ of certiorari did not address fraud.  This is not surprising, as the Court
of Special Appeals did not rely on the allegedly fraudulent statements by the lender in issuing
its decision and remanding the case to the Circuit Court.   The Majority opinion does not
7
Indeed, in arguing that Mr. Capps waived his right of rescission, Majority slip op. at
6
pp. 20-21 n.21, the Majority either ignores these facts or is very forgiving as to the lender’s
alleged misconduct, which would constitute a violation of the Truth in Lending Act.
The record before us reveals that Mr. Capps has consistently asserted that he went
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through with the loan and made payments because he was told by the lender that he could not
rescind the loan.  This allegation of fraud on the part of the lender, supported by a sworn
affidavit and never rebutted by the substitute trustees, was part of his initial motion to stay
and dismiss the foreclosure action and was reiterated in the post-sale exceptions and
considered by the Circuit Court.  Although that court alluded to the possibility of a fraud
exception to the limitations of Rule 14-305, see Bates v. Cohn, 417 Md. 309, 324 n.10, 9
A.3d 846 (2010), it ultimately did not address the effect of the rescission or the lender’s
alleged statement, as the court held that the issue did not concern “the validity or irregularity
of the [foreclosure] sale.”  See Record Excerpts at 43, 78, 111-12.  Thus, the Circuit Court
did not make any fact findings as to whether the alleged statements were made or whether
Mr. Capps accepted the loan and made payments in reliance on those statements.  In ruling
in Mr. Capps’ favor, the Court of Special Appeals did not address the fraud question and
remanded the case for a determination whether Mr. Capps had in fact rescinded the
transaction. 
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explain why Mr. Capps should have filed a conditional petition for certiorari on an issue that
was not decided against him in the intermediate appellate court and that would remain part
of the case on remand to the Circuit Court.  In any event, we should not disregard sworn
factual information in the record simply to make the remaining facts fit our disposition of the
case.
In sum, in concluding that Mr. Capps’ rescission was premature, the Majority is
making a decision that is premature.  Now that the question of the timing of the rescission
has been raised, further proceedings in the Circuit Court would clarify what documents were
post-dated or pre-dated, whether Mr. Capps was purposely vague or the substitute trustees
were purposely silent, and whether there is other evidence of when the closing took place in
relation to the rescission notice.  It may be that the Majority’s speculation as to the facts of
this case would ultimately prove accurate and that Mr. Capps’ rescission notice would be
held ineffective or that the lender had not misled him and he had waived the rescission.  But
the trial court is the appropriate forum for determining the dispositive facts.  Pursuant to
Maryland Rule 8-604(d),  I would remand without affirming or reversing for further factual
8
development. 
Judge Adkins has advised that she joins this opinion.
That rule provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]f the Court concludes that the substantial
8
merits of a case will not be determined by affirming, reversing or modifying the judgment,
or that justice will be served by permitting further proceedings, the Court may remand the
case to a lower court....”
6