Case Title: Angel Enterprises Ltd. Partnership v. Talbot County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 45/20

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2021-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Angel Enterprises Limited Partnership, et al. v. Talbot County, Maryland, et al., No. 45, 
September Term, 2020, Opinion by J. Booth  
 
 
IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES – ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER 
ADJUDICATION 
OF PENALTIES 
IN THE 
MARYLAND COURTS 
– 
JURISDICTION OF BOARD OF APPEALS ESTABLISHED BY CHARTER 
COUNTY.  Talbot County had no authority to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon its 
Board of Appeals to consider an administrative appeal of civil penalties assessed by the 
Talbot County Chief Code Compliance Officer.  The Maryland General Assembly has not 
vested boards of appeal established by charter counties with authority to review or consider 
civil penalties assessed by a code enforcement officer for violations of a county code.  
Under the applicable Maryland laws, the authority to adjudicate civil penalties arising from 
violations of a local code enacted by a charter county is within the original jurisdiction of 
the courts.  Because this case originated in the Talbot County Board of Appeals, which did 
not have jurisdiction over the matter that was the subject of the administrative appeal, the 
Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Board of Appeals 
with instructions that its decision be vacated and that the assessments be dismissed.   
 
Circuit Court for Talbot County 
Case No.: C-20-CV-18-000011  
Argued: April 13, 2021  
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 45 
September Term, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANGEL ENTERPRISES LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP, et al. 
 
v. 
TALBOT COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
McDonald 
Watts 
Hotten 
Getty 
Booth 
Biran, 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Booth, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: July 9, 2021 
 
 
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2021-07-09 13:23-04:00
 
 
In this case, Petitioners, Angel Enterprises Limited Partnership (“Angel”) and 
Morton Bender (“Bender”) (sometimes referred to collectively as “Petitioners”) have posed 
several questions to this Court concerning Talbot County’s authority to impose civil 
penalties totaling $713,400 for Petitioners’ violations of the Talbot County Code 
(sometimes referred to as the “County Code,” “Code,” or “TCC”) arising from their 
unlawful actions associated with clearing trees and constructing a driveway on their 
property without a permit.  The penalties were imposed by six assessment notices issued 
after the Talbot County Chief Code Compliance Officer (“CCCO”) was advised of the 
violations and issued abatement orders that required the property owners to correct the 
violations and restore the property to its pre-construction condition.   
Under the applicable provisions of the Talbot County Code, the CCCO had the 
authority to issue “assessment notices” imposing civil fines that would accrue on a daily 
basis until the code violations were corrected.  Under the County Code, a property owner’s 
method for challenging the assessment of civil penalties was to file an administrative 
appeal to the Talbot County Board of Appeals (sometimes referred to as the “Board of 
Appeals” or “Board”).  Bender and Angel filed an administrative appeal of the assessments 
on December 29, 2009.  After the administrative appeal was stayed by agreement, in 2017, 
the Board of Appeals conducted an evidentiary hearing on the civil penalties that were 
assessed by the CCCO’s notices over the course of five evidentiary hearings, spanning a 
total of five months.  During the Board of Appeals hearing, Bender and Angel’s counsel 
made several legal arguments challenging Talbot County’s process for the imposition of 
civil penalties—a process that was added to the County Code in 2007.  At the conclusion 
2 
 
of the evidentiary hearing, the Board of Appeals determined that the CCCO had the 
authority to issue the civil assessments under the Code and Bender and Angel’s due process 
rights were not violated by the County’s procedure for the adjudication of civil fines.  
However, the Board determined that, under the applicable provisions of the Code, the daily 
accrual of fines was stayed by Bender and Angel’s administrative appeal filed on December 
29, 2009.   
After Talbot County filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision that 
the daily accrual of fines was stayed during the pendency of the administrative appeal, the 
circuit court reversed that portion of the Board’s determination and entered an order 
authorizing Talbot County to enforce the civil assessments “in the amount of $713,400 as 
originally assessed.”   
Bender and Angel filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  The intermediate 
appellate court agreed with the circuit court that, under the plain language of the Talbot 
County Code, the Board erred in concluding that the penalties were stayed upon the filing 
of the administrative appeal.  The Court of Special Appeals further determined that, 
because this case was an administrative appeal and the Board did not “mak[e] a factual 
finding that [Bender and Angel] owed $713,400[,]” the circuit court erred in making such 
a factual finding.  Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the portion of the 
judgment providing that Bender and Angel owed $713,400, concluding that the amount 
owed “is a determination to be made in a separate proceeding.”  The Court of Special 
Appeals also remanded the case to the Board of Appeals for the Board to consider 
3 
 
additional issues pertaining to the County’s authority to assess penalties for daily violations 
of the particular code in question.   
For the reasons set forth herein, we also vacate the judgment entered by the circuit 
court.  However, our basis for doing so differs from the reasons expressed by the Court of 
Special Appeals.  We conclude that the Talbot County Board of Appeals lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider or review the CCCO’s purported assessment of civil 
penalties.  As explained herein, the adjudication of civil penalties by a charter county in 
circumstances such as those presented here is within the original jurisdiction of the 
Maryland courts, and not within the jurisdiction of a local board of appeals established by 
a charter county under the authority granted by the Express Powers Act.  Accordingly, we 
vacate the judgment and remand this matter with instructions that the Board’s decision be 
vacated, and the assessments be dismissed.  
I. 
Background and Procedural History 
Angel1 purchased an unimproved lot in Talbot County on September 10, 2002.  The 
unimproved property contained a deed restriction denying the landowner direct access to 
Maryland Route 33 (“Route 33”) (also commonly referred to as “the St. Michaels Road”) 
unless approved by the Maryland State Highway Administration, the Talbot County 
Department of Planning and Zoning, and the Talbot County Public Works Department.  
Bender intended to construct a residence on the property and obtained a building permit 
 
1 Angel is the owner of the property.  Morton Bender is Angel’s general partner.   
4 
 
from Talbot County for the construction of the residence in 2003.  In connection with the 
construction of the residence, Bender tried, without success, to obtain approval from Talbot 
County to build a driveway on the property with direct access to Route 33.  Bender met 
with county representatives in February 2005 and was explicitly told that Angel could not 
have direct access from this property to Route 33 due to safety and environmental concerns.   
Despite the County’s lack of approval for the driveway, Bender hired a contractor 
to clear trees and build a driveway in early 2006.  The project was ongoing when the County 
was alerted to the violation by the Maryland Department of the Environment (“MDE”).  
Upon learning of the unlawful clearing and driveway construction activities, Talbot County 
issued administrative abatement orders for violations of the Talbot County Code, which 
kicked off twelve years of enforcement proceedings against Bender and Angel, including: 
civil and criminal enforcement actions by MDE, county administrative hearings related to 
the abatement orders, county attempts to assess daily accruing penalties associated with the 
initial clearing and construction activity, and Bender and Angel’s efforts to restore the 
property.  We recount the history as follows.  
A.  
Procedural History Related to County Abatement Orders  
1. 
Issuance of Abatement Orders  
After learning of the clearing activities and construction of the driveway from MDE, 
the Talbot County CCCO, Robert Graham, mailed Angel an administrative abatement 
order on January 23, 2009.  This order was followed by a supplemental abatement order, 
which was mailed to Angel and Bender on February 19, 2009 (the January and February 
2009 abatement orders will be collectively referred to as “the abatement orders”).  The 
5 
 
abatement orders alleged two types of violations: one for cutting trees outside the Critical 
Area, and the other for cutting trees in the Critical Area.  The abatement orders directed 
the Petitioners to remediate and restore the property.  The remediation and restoration 
requirements established in the abatement orders included, among other things, the removal 
of the driveway (which required the submission of associated plans for driveway removal), 
and the restoration of the property to its pre-existing natural habitat (which required a soil 
erosion and sediment control plan, a stormwater management plan, a non-tidal wetlands 
management plan, a habitat protection plan, and a forest replacement plan with a 3 to 1 
ratio for replanting of trees removed).   
The abatement orders stated that the Petitioners’ failure to comply with the terms of 
the orders would subject the property owners to “civil penalties under the Talbot County 
Code Section 58-5 of up to $1,000 per calendar day for each violation.”  The abatement 
orders stated that “civil penalties for continuing violations may be assessed separately for 
each violation for each day each violation continues.”  Additionally, according to the 
abatement orders, “[f]or continuing violations for which civil penalties have been assessed, 
the civil penalty continues to accrue until the County receives written notice the property 
has been brought into compliance and the County verifies compliance by inspection or 
otherwise.”  The abatement orders also stated that they were subject to appeal to the Board 
of Appeals.  
2. 
Administrative Appeal of Abatement Orders 
Petitioners appealed the abatement orders to the Board of Appeals on multiple 
grounds.  After a hearing, the Board issued a decision affirming the abatement orders on 
6 
 
November 4, 2009.  In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Talbot County 
Code and State law, Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review to the circuit court on 
December 2, 2009. 
Shortly after Angel and Bender filed the petition for judicial review of the Board of 
Appeals’ decision, on December 23, 2009, MDE filed a complaint for injunctive relief and 
civil penalties against Angel and Bender in the Circuit Court for Talbot County (“MDE 
civil enforcement action”).  The circuit court consolidated the administrative appeal and 
the MDE civil enforcement action.  On June 13, 2012, the circuit court issued a 
memorandum opinion and order in the administrative appeal denying Angel and Bender’s 
petition for judicial review.  Bender and Angel filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special 
Appeals.   
 
In April 2013, MDE, Angel, and Bender entered into a consent decree, which 
required Angel and Bender to remove the partially constructed driveway, restore the 
property to its pre-construction condition, and to pay civil fines totaling $40,000.2  
With the entry of the consent decree between MDE, Bender, and Angel in the 
separate, but consolidated case, the Court of Special Appeals dismissed Bender and 
Angel’s appeal of the administrative action as being moot.  Angel Enters. Ltd. P’ship v. 
Md. Dep’t of the Env’t, No. 1155, slip op. at 5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 8, 2013).  
 
2 In addition to the civil enforcement action, MDE also brought a criminal case 
against Bender and Angel, which was resolved by plea agreement.  Angel pleaded guilty 
to two counts of unlawfully conducting a regulated activity in a non-tidal wetland without 
first obtaining a permit.  The State entered a nolle prosequi on the criminal charges against 
Bender. 
7 
 
Specifically, the intermediate appellate court determined that because Bender and Angel 
had agreed to the “essential aspects” of the abatement order in the MDE consent decree—
namely, removing the driveway and restoring the property to its preconstruction 
condition—the administrative appeal was moot.  Id.  Bender and Angel argued that the 
appeal was not moot because the County had assessed its own civil penalties based upon 
the abatement orders.  Id. at 6.  The intermediate appellate court rejected this argument, 
noting that the “validity of the penalties . . . are not before this Court on this appeal[.]”  Id.  
Bender and Angel filed a petition for writ of certiorari to this Court, which was denied in 
January 2014, bringing the administrative appeal of the county abatement orders to its 
conclusion.   
B.  
County’s Assessment of Civil Penalties   
On December 2, 2009—the same day Petitioners filed the petition for judicial 
review of the Board’s decision upholding the abatement orders—the CCCO issued six 
notices to Bender and Angel titled “ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL PENALTY – NOTICE OF 
RIGHT OF REVIEW AND RIGHT TO APPEAL” (referred to collectively as 
“assessments”).  Each assessment contained an individual violation notice and advised 
Petitioners that “a civil penalty has been assessed against you for the following violation(s) 
of the Talbot County Code.”  Each assessment alleged a violation arising from the clearing 
and construction of the illegal driveway that occurred in 2006.  The illegal actions set forth 
in the assessments can be categorized as either arising from (1) the 2006 clearing and 
driveway construction activities that formed the basis of the abatement orders; or (2) the 
“ongoing failure to correct, discontinue, or abate ongoing . . . violation[s] as required by 
8 
 
[the] administrative abatement orders [that were upheld] by decision of [the] Talbot County 
Board of Appeals [in its decision] dated November 4, 2009.” 
The assessments advised that the daily fine would begin to accrue on December 8, 
2009 and would continue to accrue each day.  The collective daily fines for the continuing 
violations were $1,500 per day.  The assessments stated that the daily violations would 
continue to accrue until such time as the County received notice that the violations had 
been “brought into compliance” and the County verified compliance by an inspection.  The 
assessments also provided the following right to appeal to the Board of Appeals:  
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL TO BOARD OF APPEALS 
ANY PERSON AGGRIEVED BY THIS ASSESSMENT OF CIVIL 
PENALTY MAY FILE AN APPEAL TO THE TALBOT COUNTY 
BOARD OF APPEALS.  AN APPEAL IS TAKEN BY FILING WITH THE 
BOARD A WRITTEN NOTICE OF APPEAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
CHAPTER 20, TALBOT COUNTY CODE, AND IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE BOARD OF APPEALS RULES OF PROCEDURE, 
ACCOMPANIED BY THE APPROPRIATE FILING FEE.  AN APPEAL 
MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE DATE THE CIVIL 
PENALTY WAS IMPOSED.  
 
On December 9, 2009, Petitioners filed a request for administrative review of the 
six assessments with the CCCO.3  Thereafter, on December 29, 2009, Petitioners filed six 
separate administrative appeals to the Board, challenging the assessments.  On April 12, 
2010, the Board issued a consent scheduling order consolidating the six appeals and 
 
3 At the time that assessments were filed, the Talbot County Code provided for an 
initial right to a hearing before the CCCO.  Prior to issuing a decision on the request for 
administrative review, however, the Talbot County Code was amended, and the provisions 
of the Code providing for initial review before the CCCO were no longer applicable to 
Petitioners’ appeal.   
9 
 
deferring the hearing in the penalty appeal until after the completion of the administrative 
review by the CCCO, and until the circuit court ruled on a motion to stay that had been 
filed in the pending administrative appeal on the abatement orders.   
On May 27, 2010, the circuit court held a hearing on Bender and Angel’s motion to 
stay the administrative appeal of the abatement orders.  At that hearing, the County 
consented to a stay of the continued tolling of penalties while the administrative appeal of 
the abatement orders was pending in the circuit court.  The assessment “appeal” that 
Petitioners filed with the Talbot County Board of Appeals remained inactive over the 
ensuing years until August 2016.  We briefly pause our discussion of the assessments and 
turn to Angel and Bender’s remediation efforts and restoration of the property.   
C. 
Restoration of the Property 
As noted above, the circuit court denied the Petitioners’ petition for judicial review 
of the abatement orders on June 13, 2012.  While the appeal was pending before the Court 
of Special Appeals, and prior to the entry of the MDE consent order, the Petitioners 
apparently read the writing on the wall and began their efforts to comply with the abatement 
orders and remediate the property.  In September 2012, the Petitioners’ engineers, Lane 
Engineering, Inc., met with regulators on site to begin work on a restoration plan to bring 
the property into compliance with the abatement orders.  On January 3, 2013, Lane 
Engineering submitted a restoration plan to the County for its review.  Nine months later—
on October 10, 2013—the County approved the restoration plan.  Once the remediation 
plan was approved, Angel and Bender commenced remediation.  The County approved the 
restored site on August 31, 2015.   
10 
 
D. 
County’s Efforts to Collect Civil Fines 
By 2016, the Petitioners had completed construction of the residence.  Anticipating 
that the Petitioners would be seeking an occupancy permit from the County, the County 
filed a civil complaint in the Circuit Court for Talbot County titled “Complaint for 
Attachment Before Judgment, Interim and Permanent Charging Order, Preliminary and 
Permanent Injunctive Relief, and Entry of Money Judgment.”  The complaint recited the 
enforcement history related to the clearing and driveway construction activities, and 
asserted that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of their willful, knowing, and fraudulent 
activities, and their multiple violations of the County’s laws protecting [the] environment 
and natural resources and the resulting environmental destruction, Bender and [Angel] owe 
substantial civil penalties to the County.”  The complaint alleged that Bender’s 
administrative appeal of the abatement orders ended in February 2014 with the Court of 
Appeals’ denial of the petition for writ of certiorari, that Bender and Angel “elected . . . to 
procrastinate, delay and to refuse to remove the illegal driveway and correct the 
environmental destruction on the [p]roperty,” and that the abatement orders had not been 
satisfied until August 31, 2015, more than one and one-half years after the final judgment 
in the administrative appeal.   
The County attached to its complaint a chart titled “Outstanding and Unpaid Civil 
Penalties Assessed Against [Angel and Bender]” summarizing assessments that related 
back to the issuance of the initial assessments on December 8, 2009.  Although all of the 
assessments had a “start date” of December 8, 2009, three of the assessments had an end 
date of October 10, 2013 (totaling 170 days for which the applicable daily fine was 
11 
 
accruing), and three of the assessments had an end date of August 31, 2015 (totaling 743 
days for which the daily applicable fine was accruing).4  The chart reflected that the “total 
amount claimed by [the County]” in fines was $713,400.  The complaint requested, among 
other things, that the court: (1) issue an attachment before judgment on the property for the 
amount of the fines sought; (2) issue a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the 
Petitioners from selling the property, or encumbering the property “until all outstanding 
civil penalties owed to the County have been reduced to final judgment and fully paid;” 
and (3) enter a money judgment in favor of the County against Bender and Angel “for all 
civil penalties found to be due at the conclusion of the pending administrative proceedings 
when all judicial proceedings have been exhausted or otherwise terminated[.]” 
On October 18, 2016, the circuit court entered an order in response to the parties’ 
consent motion, in which the County agreed to issue the Petitioners’ certificate of 
occupancy for their residence in consideration of the Petitioners’ agreement to deposit the 
sum of $713,400 with the clerk of the circuit court “to be held as security to pay to Talbot 
County for civil penalties found to be due at the conclusion of the pending administrative 
proceedings, after all ensuing judicial reviews and appeals have been exhausted or 
otherwise terminated[.]”  The court further ordered the case “stayed until the conclusion of 
the pending administrative proceedings and all ensuing judicial review and appeals have 
been exhausted or otherwise terminated[.]” 
 
4 The end date for three of the assessments—October 10, 2013—coincides with the 
date that the County gave its final approval of the Petitioners’ restoration plan.  The end 
date for the other three assessments—August 31, 2015—coincides with the date that the 
County gave its final approval of the restoration of the property.   
12 
 
E. 
The Administrative Appeal of the Civil Penalties  
 
With their occupancy permit in hand, having deposited $713,400 in funds with the 
circuit court, in November 2016, Petitioners resubmitted the consolidated appeal of the 
assessments to the Board of Appeals.  On April 24, 2017, the Board held its first hearing 
on the civil penalties appeal.  It held five additional evidentiary hearings between May 
2017 and September 2017.  At the first hearing, Petitioners’ counsel asserted, by motion, 
several legal arguments in support of Petitioners’ position that the County could not collect 
the assessments in the manner proposed by the County.  Specifically, Petitioners’ counsel 
argued that under TCC §§ 58-12 A.(3) and 20-6 B.(3),5 the Petitioners’ filing of the petition 
 
5 Petitioners contend that the following provisions of the Talbot County Code 
operated to stay the accrual of daily fines during the pendency of its administrative appeal 
of the abatement orders.   
 
First, TCC § 1-14 supplies the following definition of enforcement action:  
 
ENFORCEMENT ACTION – Any suit, action, demand, monetary penalty, 
abatement order, or other administrative, civil, or criminal proceeding 
established by the Code and all decisions, judgements, degrees, convictions 
or penalties issued by any administrative agency or court to enforce the 
same.   
 
(Emphasis added).  With respect to proceedings pending before the Talbot County Board 
of Appeals, TCC § 20-6 B.(3) provides as follows:  
  
An application for administrative appeal shall automatically stay all further 
proceedings to enforce compliance with the order, requirement, decision, or 
determination, and shall automatically stay all further subdivision, site plan, 
and related development reviews.  There shall be no automatic stay when, in 
the judgment of the official having administrative authority to decide the 
question, a stay would cause immediate peril to life or property.   
 
(Emphasis added).  Finally, TCC § 58-12 A.(3) provides as follows:  
   
13 
 
for judicial review of the abatement orders operated as a stay of any enforcement action to 
enforce the abatement orders against the Petitioners.  Petitioners’ counsel asserted that the 
assessments were imposed to force Petitioners’ compliance with the abatement orders, 
which the Code did not permit so long as the abatement orders were being challenged on 
appeal.  Counsel also argued that Petitioners were entitled to a full evidentiary hearing prior 
to the imposition of the assessments.  Petitioners’ counsel suggested that the County had 
“split[] its cause of action” by separating the assessments or penalties arising from the 
abatement orders from the abatement orders themselves.   
 
The County Attorney argued that, once the Board of Appeals made its decision 
upholding the abatement orders on December 2, 2009, the County was free to issue 
penalties and “assessed them” on the same date.  He explained that the penalties began 
“accruing” on a daily basis as of December 8, 2009 in an attempt to encourage the 
Petitioners to begin restoration.  The County Attorney introduced into evidence a copy of 
the former county code and explained that the “Board no longer had the same powers.”  He 
explained that the procedure for administrative appeals had been changed, and that, as a 
result of these changes, the burden of proof shifted and “now require[s] that the [a]pplicant 
carries the burden of proof.”  In response to questioning from the Board concerning 
 
An appeal stays all actions by the Chief Code Compliance Officer seeking 
enforcement or compliance with the order or decision being appealed, unless 
the Chief Code Compliance Officer certifies to the Board of Appeals that 
(because of facts stated in the certificate), in his/her opinion, such stay will 
cause imminent peril to life or property.  In such a case, action by the Chief 
Code Compliance Officer shall not be stayed except by order of the Board of 
Appeals or a court upon application of the party seeking the stay.   
14 
 
whether the delay in assessing civil penalties “could amount to a denial of substantive due 
process – being arbitrary and capricious,” the County Attorney responded that “case law 
indicated the county had considerable discretion in determining whether to assess any 
penalty[]” and that he did not believe that the penalties assessed in this case were excessive.   
 
After hearing the initial legal arguments presented by the Petitioners’ counsel and 
the County Attorney, the Board members discussed whether the County had the authority 
to issue daily assessments during the pendency of the appeal.  Several Board members 
expressed doubt and concern over the County Attorney’s position.  The Board Chairman, 
Paul Shortall, questioned whether the Board had jurisdiction to consider the matters raised 
in the appeal.  Another member of the Board, Phillip Jones, commented that, although the 
monetary penalty was coercive and intended to induce compliance, “it is always a citizen’s 
right to take appeals[.]”  He expressed concern that a citizen’s right to appeal could be 
chilled if daily penalties continued to accrue during the pendency of the appeal.  He also 
added that the recent legislative changes to the Board’s rules of procedures and Code 
provisions “stack the deck” in favor of the County, adding that the County’s filing fees to 
file an administrative appeal to the Board of Appeals are burdensome for most citizens.6   
After obtaining legal advice in a closed session, the Board reconvened and 
proceeded to conduct the evidentiary hearing.  The Board deferred its ruling on whether 
 
6 The County’s filing fee for a Board of Appeals hearing is $750.  Initially, the 
County charged Petitioners a filing fee of $4,500, representing a separate filing fee for each 
of the six assessments.  The County ultimately agreed to consolidate the appeals and 
charged a single filing fee of $750.   
15 
 
the assessments were stayed during the pendency of the appeal of the abatement orders 
until after it received the evidence.   
 
The Board considered the testimony of several witnesses at the evidentiary hearing.  
Robert Graham, the CCCO, testified that he had been the enforcement officer for 14 years.  
He testified that, upon receiving a complaint, his typical practice is to visit the site, assess 
the site for code violations, and write up abatement orders for any code violations.  Mr. 
Graham explained that, if the property owner does not correct the violations as required by 
the abatement orders, he has the authority to issue a monetary penalty to “incentivize the 
property owner to correct the violation.”   
Mr. Graham acknowledged that the assessments that he issued to the Petitioners 
arose from the tree cutting and driveway violations that were the subject of the abatement 
orders.  He admitted that his authority under the Code to issue assessments for civil fines 
is discretionary—that he typically gives the property owner 30 days to correct the violation 
identified in the abatement orders prior to issuing assessments, and that he has the 
discretion to make the abatement period longer.  He admitted that in this instance, it would 
have been impossible for the Petitioners to complete the work required under the abatement 
orders in 30 days.   
 
Sean Callahan, a principal with Lane Engineering, Inc., testified concerning the 
engineering firm’s efforts to resolve the violations on Bender and Angel’s behalf.  Lane 
Engineering prepared the restoration plans, which were admitted into evidence.  Mr. 
Callahan described the process for preparing the plans, the work involved, and the County’s 
timeline for approval of the plans, as well as the timeline for implementing the remediation 
16 
 
plan.  He testified that he met onsite with regulatory authorities in September 2012.  He 
explained that the preparation of the initial plan took about six weeks and included a forest 
conservation plan, critical area mitigation plan, soil erosion and sediment control plan, and 
stormwater management plan.  Field work was also involved, including surveying and 
wetlands delineation.   
Mr. Callahan described the County’s approval process, which involves initial 
submission of the plans, technical review by County staff, comments and requests for 
revisions, the engineering firm’s incorporation of comments and revisions to the plans, and 
resubmission.  He testified that the soil erosion and sediment control plan was submitted 
in October 2012, less than one month after the on-site meeting.  He testified that the 
County’s review process took eight months.  Mr. Lane also noted that the County selects 
the dates for replanting, which usually occur in the spring or fall.  He explained that when 
the initial plans were submitted, it would have been possible to complete the plantings in 
the spring and fall growing seasons for the next calendar year, but because the plans were 
not immediately approved by the County, the plantings were not able to be completed in 
those seasons.  The Board also heard testimony from Mr. Bridges, with Bridges Land 
Management, who performed some of the restoration work.  Mr. Bridges described the 
work that his company performed on-site as part of the restoration work.  Elisa DeFlaux, 
the Talbot County Environmental Planner, testified that, she was aware that under the 
language in the assessments, Petitioners were given six days to complete the restoration 
work before the fines commenced.  She agreed that it would have been impossible to obtain 
approval of the restoration plan and completion of the work within that time period.  She 
17 
 
also acknowledged that a ten-month process for county review and approval of plans of 
this nature was normal.  She agreed that the County establishes the planting completion 
dates, which in this case, would have involved the fall and spring growing seasons.  She 
explained that the restoration is not complete until the plantings are installed and approved.  
 
On December 15, 2017, the Board issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
The Board concluded that: (1) the County had the authority to issue the civil penalties under 
the TCC; (2) under applicable provisions of the State Forest Conservation Act, NR § 5-
1612(d)(1), the Legislature had delegated to the County the authority to charge a penalty 
in an amount not to exceed $1,000 per day, with each day constituting a separate violation; 
and (3) the CCCO did not err in assessing the monetary penalty.  However, the Board 
agreed with Angel and Bender that the civil penalties were stayed during the pendency of 
Bender and Angel’s administrative appeal.  The Board concluded that, under the plain 
language of TCC §§ 58-12 A.(3) and 20-6 B.(3), Petitioners’ administrative appeal of the 
civil penalties, which was filed on December 29, 2009, stayed the accrual of the daily 
penalties authorized by TCC §§ 58-3.  Accordingly, the Board determined that, although 
the assessments were “valid and enforceable and fell within the statutory limits and that 
Mr. Graham acted properly” in issuing them, the daily assessments were only permitted 
from December 8, 2009 (the date under which the penalties commenced under the 
assessment notices), until Angel’s administrative appeal of the assessments, which was 
filed on December 29, 2009.   
18 
 
 
F. 
Circuit Court Review of the Board’s Civil Penalties Decision 
 
Neither side was happy with the Board’s decision on the civil penalties.  On January 
16, 2018, the County filed a petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision.  It argued 
that the Board erred in finding that the daily penalties were stayed after the appeal was filed 
on December 29, 2009.  Angel and Bender filed a cross-petition, asserting that the Board 
erred in: (1) finding that the County had the authority to impose penalties for continuing 
violations; (2) upholding the penalties assessed; and (3) refusing to consider Angel’s due 
process claim.7   
 
After the submission of legal memoranda by the parties and a hearing, the circuit 
court issued a written decision.  It affirmed the Board’s decision in part and reversed it in 
part.  First, the court determined that the “Board did not err in denying [Angel’s] procedural 
due process challenge[,]” concluding that in a proceeding before a county board of zoning 
appeals, the applicant bears the burden of proof.  Second, the court ruled that the County 
had the legal authority to impose penalties for continuing violations under TCC § 58-5 D.  
Third, the court upheld the Board’s determination that the penalties assessed by the CCCO 
were not arbitrary or capricious.  Finally, the court determined that the Board erred in 
concluding that the accrual of the civil penalty assessments was stayed under the applicable 
provisions of the County Code.  The circuit court determined that Angel and Bender were 
“liable for the full amount of the civil penalties as assessed by Talbot County[,]” that they 
 
7 The Board declined to consider the due process argument, concluding that the 
argument was barred by collateral estoppel because Bender and Angel had previously 
raised a due process claim in a separate board proceeding.   
19 
 
owe, and the County “may seek to enforce [c]ivil [p]enalty [a]ssessments . . . in the amount 
of $713,400[.]”   
 
Angel and Bender filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  In an unreported 
opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court judgment in part, and 
reversed it in part, vacating the circuit court’s entry of judgment with respect to the civil 
penalties totaling $713,400, with instructions that the case be remanded to the Board of 
Appeals for further proceedings.  Angel Enters. Ltd. P’ship v. Talbot County, No. 2842, 
Sept. Term, 2018, 2020 WL 4882450 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 20, 2020).   
After undertaking a plain language analysis of the pertinent provisions of the Talbot 
County Code, the court agreed with the circuit court’s conclusion that the Board erred in 
determining that the daily assessment of penalties was stayed.  Id. at *9.  However, the 
Court of Special Appeals determined that the circuit court erred in imposing penalties in 
the amount of $713,400 because the Board “did not make a factual finding in this regard[.]” 
Id.  The intermediate appellate court stated that,  
although we affirm the circuit court ruling that the continued penalties were 
not stayed by the December 29, 2009 appeal, we vacate the portion of the 
judgment providing that [Angel and Bender] owe $713,400.  The number of 
days that the violations continued, and the total amount due, is a 
determination to be made in a separate proceeding. 
 
Id. 
The intermediate appellate court rejected Angel and Bender’s due process 
arguments, concluding that Bender and Angel had a “meaningful opportunity to be heard, 
where they presented their evidence and had the opportunity to rebut the County’s 
evidence.”  Id. at *10.  The Court of Special Appeals also rejected Bender and Angel’s 
20 
 
argument that the County lacked the authority to impose continuing violation penalties.  
Specifically, the court concluded that the County’s code provisions that permitted civil 
fines for continuing violations were consistent with the State law provisions authorizing 
local jurisdictions to establish civil fines for violations of a local forest conservation 
program and critical area program.  Id. at *13–14.   
 
The Court of Special Appeals observed, however, that there is a legal distinction 
between the County’s legal authority generally under State law to assess a daily civil 
penalty for a violation of a code provision, and the County’s authority in this instance to 
impose an ongoing daily penalty for the specific six code violations that were the subject 
of the assessments.  Concerning the latter question—whether the County had the authority 
to impose daily assessments for code violations here—the Court of Special Appeals 
determined that the answer depended upon the specific violation in question, and the 
language of the code that governed the particular violation.  Id. at *14–15.  The 
intermediate appellate court observed that neither the County nor the Board had undertaken 
this analysis, and that the Board simply “limited its assessment of the issue [to] whether 
the County had the legal authority to impose penalties for continuing violations” under the 
Express Powers Act, Local Government Article, Title 10.  Id. at *15 (emphasis added).  
Because the Board did not undertake that determination, the intermediate appellate court 
stated that it would “vacate the circuit court’s ruling in this regard and remand for further 
consideration of this issue.”  Id.  Finally, the Court of Special Appeals rejected Bender and 
Angel’s argument that the assessments were duplicative or arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at 
*16–17.  The mandate issued by the Court of Special Appeals remanded the case to the 
21 
 
circuit court “with instructions to remand the case to the Board for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.”  (Capitalization omitted).   
 
Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari to consider the following questions:   
1. Did the Board violate Petitioners’ due process rights by requiring 
Petitioners to bear the burden of proof (including the burdens of 
persuasion and going forward with the evidence) to explain the County’s 
basis for its actions and also to disprove the propriety and amount of the 
County’s civil penalties?  
 
2. Did the Board err in imposing penalties on a daily, continuing basis, 
including for days where no violative conduct occurred, and while 
Petitioners were exercising their right to challenge the County’s 
allegations and attempt to impose penalties? 
 
3. Did the Board err in finding that Talbot County has the legal authority to 
impose continuing violation penalties where the Express Powers Act 
limits the County’s ability to impose fines and does not authorize 
penalties for continuing violations?  
 
4. Did the Board err in determining that the civil penalties imposed by 
Talbot County were stayed upon the filing of Petitioners’ appeal pursuant 
to Code §§58-12A(3) and 20-6B(3)? 
 
5. Are the civil penalties sought by the County unconstitutionally excessive 
in violation of Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution?   
 
The Respondent filed a conditional cross-petition for writ of certiorari, requesting 
this Court answer the following additional questions: 
1. Whether the assessment of daily penalties for zoning violations 
continue[s] for each day between the violation date and date upon which 
such violation is abated? . . . or instead whether the penalties only accrue 
on the dates upon which the illegal actions occurred? 
 
2. Whether an appellate court should decide an issue of judicial estoppel that 
occurred during the judicial review period after an administrative 
decision (and not remand it to the administrative body for review)? 
 
22 
 
We granted certiorari on both the petition and the cross-petition. 
During this Court’s oral arguments, we asked counsel questions concerning whether 
the Talbot County Board of Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction under the Express 
Powers Act, Local Government Article, Title 10, Subtitle 2 to review the CCCO’s 
assessment of civil fines or penalties.  Following oral argument, we entered an order 
inviting the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the following question:  
Whether the Talbot County Board of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction 
under The Express Powers Act, Local Governmental Article, (“LG”) Title 
10-101, et seq., (and in particular, the jurisdictional parameters of charter 
county boards of appeal established by LG § 10-305(b)), to review or 
adjudicate assessments of civil penalties or fines by the county code 
compliance enforcement officer?   
 
 
In response to our invitation, Petitioners and Respondent each submitted 
supplemental briefing on this issue.  For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the 
Talbot County Board of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the CCCO’s 
assessments of civil penalties, and that the assessments are invalid and unenforceable.  
Because we determine that the Board of Appeals lacked authority to review the 
assessments, we do not reach the issues presented by the Petitioners and the Respondent in 
their petition and cross-petition.8  We shall vacate the judgment of the circuit court and 
issue a mandate with instructions that the Board of Appeals dismiss the assessments.   
 
8 Given that we have determined that the Board of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the assessments in the first instance, and our dismissal of the case, we do not reach 
the merits of the remaining issues upon which certiorari was granted.  Our opinion should 
not be considered as either agreeing or disagreeing with the legal determinations by the 
circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals in its unreported opinion on matters that we 
have not considered.  To the extent that our dismissal of this case leads to further 
23 
 
II.   
Discussion 
 
In their petition for writ of certiorari, Petitioners raise several issues related to 
Talbot County’s process for assessing and adjudicating civil fines or penalties for 
violations of the Talbot County Code, and the County’s legal authority to impose civil 
penalties in the manner outlined in the Code.  The Petitioners’ questions, and the questions 
posed by the Respondent in its cross-petition, all relate to the process for assessing civil 
penalties established by the Talbot County Code for code violations, which starts with an 
assessment notice issued by the CCCO, and provides an administrative right to appeal to 
the Talbot County Board of Appeals. 
The questions presented here involve questions of law, which we consider de novo. 
Talbot County v. Miles Point Prop., LLC, 415 Md. 372 (2010).  Although ordinarily we do 
not consider a matter that has not been raised in a petition for writ of certiorari, see 
Maryland Rule 8-131(b), that rule is not absolute.  The issue raised by this Court involves 
whether the Board of Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction to consider an appeal of civil 
fines imposed by assessment notices.  “Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised 
at any time, including initially on appeal.  Additionally, the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction need not be raised by a party, but may be raised by a court sua sponte.”  Cty. 
Council of Prince George’s Cty. v. Dutcher, 365 Md. 399, 405 n.4 (2001) (citations 
omitted); see also Duffy v. Conaway, 295 Md. 242, 254–55 n.8 (1983) (observing that 
 
proceedings between these parties, they will be free to argue their respective legal positions 
on the matters that were not considered herein.   
24 
 
subject matter “jurisdiction is a matter which, if noticed, will be addressed by a court even 
though it was not raised by any of the parties[]”) (citations omitted).   
For the reasons set forth herein, we hold that the Talbot County Board of Appeals 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider administrative appeals of civil fines.  The 
General Assembly has vested original jurisdiction in the Maryland courts for the 
adjudication of civil fines that are sought to be imposed by a charter county under the 
pertinent provisions of State law.  Consistent with the applicable provisions of State law 
that confer original jurisdiction in the Maryland courts to adjudicate civil penalties arising 
from code violations enacted by a charter county, the General Assembly has not granted 
jurisdiction to a board of appeals established by a charter county to conduct an 
administrative review of assessments of civil penalties.   
 
As we recently explained in K. Hovnanian Homes of Maryland, LLC v. Mayor of 
Havre de Grace, 472 Md. 267, 292 (2021), when a party is challenging the authority of a 
local government to take a particular action, it is important to strip away the labels and 
consider the particular governmental action that is sought to be undertaken.  First, we 
identify the precise nature of the governmental action in question.  Id.  Second, we 
determine whether the local government “has the legal authority to undertake the action, 
and if so, whether the contemplated action was correctly undertaken consistent with that 
grant of authority.”  Id. (emphasis in original).   
25 
 
A. 
Nature of the Governmental Action—Imposition and Adjudication of Civil 
Penalties  
 
 
In this case, the governmental action at the center of the controversy consists of the 
CCCO’s issuance of six assessment notices purporting to assess civil penalties arising 
from: (1) the Petitioners’ unlawful tree clearing and driveway construction activities in 
2006; and (2) the Petitioners’ “ongoing failure to correct, discontinue, or abate ongoing” 
violations as required by the two administrative abatement orders that were the subject of 
the initial administrative appeal.  On their face, the assessment notices are exactly what 
they are described to be—assessments of civil penalties or monetary fines.   
 
Having identified the nature of the governmental action—we consider whether the 
County’s assessment of civil penalties comports with the authority granted to the County 
by the Maryland Constitution, State law, and, finally, local laws.  Although the code 
enforcement officer has the authority to seek the imposition of civil penalties for code 
violations, we determine that the local county administrative procedure for the assessment 
of civil penalties is inconsistent with the applicable provisions of State law that confer 
original jurisdiction over the adjudication of civil fines of this nature in the Maryland 
courts.  Moreover, we determine that the County’s code provisions that purport to expand 
the Board of Appeals’ jurisdiction to encompass administrative appeals of civil fines are 
inconsistent with State law.   
26 
 
B. 
Statutory Authority for the Imposition of Civil Penalties by a Charter 
County for County Code Violation 
 
We start our analysis with Article XI-A of the Constitution of Maryland (“the Home 
Rule Amendment”),9 and the Express Powers Act of the Maryland Code, Local 
Government Article § 10-101, et seq.  Talbot County has elected a charter form of local 
government, deriving its constitutional source of authority from Article XI-A, Section 2 of 
the Maryland Constitution, which provides that “[t]he General Assembly shall by public 
general law provide a grant of express powers for such County or Counties as may 
thereafter form a charter under the provisions of this Article.”  Md. Const. art. XI-A, § 2.   
The Home Rule Amendment mandated that the General Assembly enumerate and 
delegate certain powers, which may be exercised by counties electing a charter form of 
government.  Ritchmount P’ship v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections for Anne Arundel Cty., 
283 Md. 48, 57 (1978).  In compliance with its constitutional mandate, the Legislature 
enacted the Express Powers Act, “which . . . endows charter counties with a wide array of 
legislative and administrative powers[.]”  Id.; see also Miles Point Prop., LLC, 415 Md. at 
384 (explaining that “[t]he Express Powers Act is the General Assembly’s fulfillment of 
this constitutional command[]”); Anne Arundel County v. Bowen, 258 Md. 713, 715 (1970) 
(observing that the Express Powers Act was enacted “[i]n obedience to [Article XI-A’s] 
mandate”); Cty. Council for Montgomery Cty. v. Inv’rs Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 418 
 
9 For a history of the Home Rule Amendment, Article XI-A of the Maryland 
Constitution, see Ritchmount Partnership v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for Anne 
Arundel County, 283 Md. 48 (1978).   
27 
 
(1973) (stating that the purpose of the Act “is to share with the counties, within well 
delineated limits the legislative powers formerly reserved to the General Assembly[]”).  
Prior to October 1, 2013, enumerated express powers that were granted to and conferred 
upon charter counties were codified in Maryland Code, Article 25 A, § 5 (1957, 2011 Repl. 
Vol).  Former Article 25A, § 5 was re-codified without substantive change as part of the 
code revision and creation of the Local Government Article (“LG”) by ch. 119 of 2013 
Laws of Maryland.  
Under the Express Powers Act, charter counties have the authority to exercise their 
express powers by legislative enactment.  See LG § 10-102(a).  In addition to the laundry-
list of enumerated express powers identified in the Express Powers Act (see LG § 10-301, 
et seq.),10 the Express Powers Act grants a charter county council additional legislative 
powers to pass ordinances or resolutions that “may aid in maintaining the peace, good 
government, health, and welfare of the county[,]” but only to the extent that the exercise of 
such powers is not “inconsistent with State law[.]”  LG § 10-206(a); see also LG § 10-
206(b) (“A county may exercise the powers provided under this title only to the extent that 
the powers are not preempted by or in conflict with public general law.”).    
 
10 The specific enumerated powers set forth in the Express Powers Act, LG § 10-
102, et seq. grant charter counties the authority to adopt local laws on a broad range of 
topics including: the establishment of a county board of appeals (LG § 10-305); the 
establishment of election districts and precincts (LG § 10-306); the establishment of a 
competitive bidding process (LG § 10-310); acquisition of property (LG § 10-312); 
imposition of taxes (LG § 10-313); waste disposal, soil erosion, and building construction 
standards (LG § 10-317); fences (LG § 10-318); public parks (LG § 10-323); planning and 
zoning (LG § 10-324); historic preservation (LG § 10-325);  public health nuisances (LG 
§ 10-328); and animals (LG § 10-329).  
28 
 
 
Where a charter county enacts local laws on any matter authorized by the Express 
Powers Act, the Act also grants the county the authority to enforce its laws by civil and 
criminal fines.  Specifically, LG § 10-202(b) provides that: “[a] county may provide for 
the enforcement of an ordinance, a resolution, a bylaw, or a regulation adopted under this 
title: (1) by civil fines not exceeding $1,000; or (2) by criminal fines and penalties not 
exceeding $1,000 and imprisonment not exceeding 6 months.”  (Emphasis added).   
 
Where a charter county adopts civil fines or penalties for violations of its ordinances 
that are adopted pursuant to the Express Powers Act, the Legislature has conferred 
exclusive, original jurisdiction over the adjudication of such matters in the courts.  
Specifically, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”) § 4-401 confers upon the 
Maryland District Court, “exclusive original civil jurisdiction in: . . . [a] proceeding for 
adjudication of: . . . [a] violation of an ordinance enacted: . . . [b]y a charter county for 
which a civil penalty is provided under § 10-202 of the Local Government Article[.]” 
(Emphasis added).  The District Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction over the 
adjudication of civil penalties is subject to the provisions of CJ § 4-402(d), which grants 
concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit court, if the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000, 
exclusive of prejudgment interest or attorney’s fees, if allowable.   
 
In addition to the express powers enumerated under the Express Powers Act, 
elsewhere under State law, the Legislature has granted local governments additional 
powers.  For example, and as particularly pertinent here, the Legislature requires that a 
local government with planning and zoning authority adopt a forest conservation program, 
consistent with standards established by State law, which must be approved by the 
29 
 
Department of Natural Resources (“Department”) (“the Forest Conservation Act”).  See 
Maryland Code, Natural Resources Article (“NR”) § 5-1603.  The enforcement provisions 
of the Forest Conservation Act, NR § 5-1612, grant enforcement authority to the 
Department, as well as any local authority that has adopted a forest conservation program.  
The penalty provisions for violations of the Forest Conservation Act are similar in nature 
to the civil penalties authorized by the General Assembly under the Express Powers Act 
for violations of ordinances enacted by charter counties:  
(1) A person who violates any provision of this subtitle [Forest Conservation 
Act] or any regulation, order, plan, or management agreement under this 
subtitle is liable for a penalty not exceeding $1,000 which may be recovered 
in a civil action brought by the Department or a local authority.  Each day a 
violation continues is a separate violation under this subtitle. 
 
(2) The court may issue an injunction requiring the person to cease the 
violation and take corrective action to restore or reforest an area.  
 
NR § 5-1612(d) (emphasis added).11  
 
In addition to adopting a local forest conservation program, the Legislature also 
requires that local governments with planning and zoning powers over any property which 
is located within the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area adopt a critical area protection program 
approved by the Critical Area Commission for the Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays 
 
11 To assist local governments with the development of a local forest conservation 
program, the Department of Natural Resources has promulgated, by regulation, a Model 
Forest Conservation Ordinance.  See Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”) 
08.19.03.01.  The enforcement provisions in the Model Ordinance, which provide for the 
establishment “of a penalty not to exceed $1,000, which may be recovered in a civil action 
brought by the Department[,]” are identical to the enforcement provisions for a violation 
set forth in NR § 5-1612.   
30 
 
(“Critical Area Commission”).  See NR § 8-1801, et seq. (“Critical Area Laws”).  The 
Critical Area Law, NR § 8-1815(a), establishes the following enforcement provisions:  
(2)(i) A person who violates a provision of an order, permit, plan, local 
program, this subtitle, or regulations adopted, approved, or issued under the 
authority of this subtitle shall be:  
 
1. Subject to prosecution or suit in circuit court or District Court by 
the chairman or local authorities, who may invoke the sanctions 
and remedies afforded by State or local law;  
2. Guilty of a misdemeanor; and  
 
3. On conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, subject to a fine 
not exceeding $10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or 
both, with costs imposed in the discretion of the court.   
 
(ii) A criminal prosecution or a suit for a civil penalty for violation of a 
provision of an order, permit, plan, local program, this subtitle, or 
regulations adopted, approved, or issued under the authority of this subtitle 
shall be instituted within 3 years after the Commission or the local authorities 
in fact knew or reasonably should have known of the violation.   
 
(Emphasis added).  In addition to the general enforcement provisions set forth above, the 
Critical Area Law also establishes additional, supplemental penalties and remedies for 
damages occasioned by tree cutting or clearing activities in the critical area in violation of 
an approved local program.  See NR § 8-1815.1.  These laws permit a local jurisdiction, 
the Critical Area Commission, or the Office of the Attorney General to bring an action in 
the circuit court to require, among other things, that the violator replant trees or for damages 
“[t]o be assessed by a circuit court in an amount equal to the estimated cost of replanting 
trees.”  NR § 8-1815.1(b).   
 
In summary, the Express Powers Act, LG § 10-202, grants charter counties the 
authority to impose civil fines for violations of its ordinances enacted pursuant to the 
31 
 
exercise of its express powers.  The Legislature has conferred original jurisdiction for the 
adjudication of such penalties and fines in the District Court, see CJ § 4-401(10)(vi)(1), 
with concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit courts where the amount exceeds $5,000, see CJ 
§ 4-402(d).  In addition to powers granted under the Express Powers Act, and as pertinent 
here, where the Legislature has required the adoption of a local conservation program and 
a critical area program, the Legislature has created similar enforcement provisions, 
authorizing the assessment of civil penalties which are brought “as a civil action”  (in the 
case of a forest conservation violation) or as “suit in circuit court or District Court” (in the 
case of a critical area violation, in addition to potential criminal prosecution).  Under the 
applicable provisions of State law that authorize a charter county to impose civil fines for 
violations of its ordinances and local laws, including laws related to violations of a local 
forest conservation program and critical area program, such laws provide for the 
adjudication of civil fines and penalties within the original jurisdiction of the Maryland 
courts.   
C. 
Enforcement Provisions for Violations of Talbot County Code—Talbot 
County’s Establishment of an Administrative Process for the Imposition 
and Adjudication of Civil Penalties  
 
 
In accordance with the authority granted under the Home Rule Amendment, the 
Express Powers Act, and other provisions of State law which grant the authority to enact 
local laws, Talbot County has adopted a Charter and a County Code.  The Talbot County 
Code represents a compilation of its ordinances and public local laws, consisting of 
Chapters 1 through 190.  TCC § 1-1.  In 2007, the Talbot County Council enacted Bill No. 
1108, which adopted a new Chapter 58 to the Talbot County Code, which purported to 
32 
 
create unified code enforcement procedures applicable to the Talbot County Code, 
including provisions for the accrual of daily civil penalties for continuing code violations, 
and a county administrative process for the imposition of civil fines and penalties by the 
code compliance officer, with the right to appeal to the Talbot County Board of Appeals.12   
Chapter 58, titled “Enforcement of Code,” establishes the enforcement provisions 
available to the County, as well as the penalties for violations of the County Code.13  TCC 
§ 58-3 provides that each violation of the Code that occurs and “each calendar day that a 
violation continues shall be a separate offense.  Any person who violates any provision of 
 
12 The full title of Bill No. 1108 from the 2007 Legislative Session of the Talbot 
County Council is:  
 
A BILL TO CREATE UNIFIED CODE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES 
APPLICABLE TO THE TALBOT COUNTY CODE, WITH CERTAIN 
CHAPTERS EXCEPTED, INCLUDING PENALTIES FOR DAILY AND 
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS, TO DESCRIBE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR VIOLATIONS, TO PROVIDE FOR CIVIL PENALTIES, CIVIL 
INFRACTIONS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
ABATEMENT 
ORDERS, 
INJUNCTIVE 
RELIEF, 
AND 
NON-ISSUANCE, 
NON-RENEWAL, 
SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF PERMITS, TO MAKE ALL 
REMEDIES CUMULATIVE, TO PROVIDE FOR RECOUPMENT OF 
ENFORCEMENT COSTS, TO PROVIDE FOR APPEALS TO THE 
TALBOT COUNTY BOARD OF APPEALS, AND TO AMEND CHAPTER 
10, 
ENTITLED 
“ALARMS” 
§ 
10-6 
“INSPECTIONS 
AND 
ENFORCEMENT, VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES” OF THE TALBOT 
COUNTY CODE, TO GRANT THE CHIEF CODE COMPLIANCE 
OFFICER AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE SAID CHAPTER, AND 
GENERALLY RELATING TO ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES UNDER 
THE TALBOT COUNTY CODE 
 
13 The enforcement provisions set forth in Chapter 58 “apply to every chapter, 
article, and section of [the] Code except Chapter 8 (Airport); Chapter 11 (Alcoholic 
Beverages); Chapter 15 (Animals); Chapter 102 (Parks and Recreation); Chapter 121 
(Public Landings); and Chapter 159 (Smoking and Tobacco Products).”  TCC § 58-1. 
33 
 
this Code shall be subject to separate fines, orders, sanctions, and civil penalties for each 
offense.”  The Code provides that “each offense shall be punishable by a civil penalty of 
up to $1,000 per calendar day[]” unless a different amount is established under the Code.  
TCC § 58-5 A, C.  As the title of the original 2007 bill reflects, instead of providing for the 
adjudication of civil penalties for code violations by the courts, Chapter 58 establishes an 
administrative process for the imposition of civil penalties.  As set forth below, the 
County’s administrative process for the imposition of civil penalties is extensive and 
provides only limited review by the circuit court in the form of a petition for judicial 
review.   
The Code designates a CCCO to enforce the provisions of the Code.  TCC § 58-2.  
The Code states that “[t]he amount of a civil penalty shall be administratively imposed by 
the [CCCO] by written notice.”  TCC § 58-5 A.  (Emphasis added).  The CCCO is vested 
with the authority to determine the amount of the civil penalty, which “shall be determined 
per calendar day[,]” after considering the following factors: “(1) [t]he severity of the 
violation  for which the penalty is to be assessed; (2) [t]he presence or absence of good 
faith of the violator; (3) [a]ny history of prior violations.”  Id.   
The Code requires that the CCCO send a written “notice of violation and assessment 
of a civil penalty[,]” which shall include:  
(1)  
Each alleged violation, including a citation to the section of the Talbot  
County Code allegedly violated; 
 
(2) 
Classification of each alleged violation as a continuing or 
noncontinuing violation;  
 
34 
 
(3) 
Separate assessment of a civil penalty for each violation, and a 
separate daily assessment for each continuing violation;  
 
(4)  
Notice of the right to request administrative review before the Hearing 
Officer to evaluate the amount(s) of civil penalties; and  
 
(5) 
Notice of the right to file an appeal with the Board of Appeals.   
 
TCC § 58-5 B.  The Code provides for the imposition of civil penalties for each calendar 
day that a violation continues, with no requirement that the County provide additional 
“assessments, notice, or hearings.”  TCC § 58-5 D.  Additionally, through the use of the 
word “shall,” the TCC seems to require the imposition of a daily fine by rote computation:  
“The total amount payable for continuing violations shall be the amount assessed per 
calendar day for each violation multiplied by the number of calendar days that each 
violation has continued.”  Id. (Emphasis added).14   
 
If the amount of the civil penalties claimed by the County does not exceed $5,000, 
the alleged violator has the right to a hearing before a hearing officer appointed by the 
county manager (and subject to the approval of the County Council), who may “decrease, 
increase, or confirm the amount of the civil penalty.”  TCC § 58-2 B.  TCC § 58-2 C 
provides that the Talbot County “Board of Appeals shall have exclusive jurisdiction to 
 
14 The County Attorney confirmed this interpretation by advising the Board that 
under the TCC, the “civil penalty continues to operate with no further enforcement action 
required.  There’s no further action required by the county, by the County code officer.  It 
continues to accrue by operation of law.”  
 
35 
 
review civil penalties claimed by the County in excess of $5,000 cumulatively.”  (Emphasis 
added).15   
D. 
Talbot County’s Code Provisions—That Purport to Establish an 
Administrative Process for the Imposition of Civil Penalties with a Right to 
an Administrative Appeal to the Board of Appeals—are Ultra Vires and 
Inconsistent with State Law 
 
 
The Talbot County Code provisions that establish a procedure for the administrative 
imposition and adjudication of civil fines by assessment notices issued by a CCCO, with a 
right to an administrative appeal to the Talbot County Board of Appeals, are inconsistent 
with the applicable provisions of State law, which vest original jurisdiction in the courts 
for the adjudication of civil penalties established by a charter county in the exercise of its 
express powers, as well as in the exercise of additional powers authorized by the Forest 
Conservation Act and the Critical Area Law.  See, e.g., CJ §§ 4-401(10)(vi)(1), 4-402(d) 
(establishing exclusive original jurisdiction for the adjudication of penalties for violations 
arising under a charter county’s exercise of express powers in the District Court unless the 
amount in controversy exceeds $5,000, in which case the trial courts of general jurisdiction 
 
15 We observe that, in addition to the administrative process for the assessment of 
civil penalties, the County Code also provides for the enforcement for the provisions of its 
code by municipal infraction.  See TCC § 58-6 (“In addition to other remedies, violations 
of this Code may be prosecuted as municipal infractions.”).  The County Code specifically 
incorporates the provisions of Local Government Article (“LG”) § 6-102, which govern 
the process for municipal infractions.  Unlike the administrative process that the County 
has established for assessments of civil penalties (with limited judicial review after an 
administrative appeal), the municipal infraction process is undertaken pursuant to the 
original jurisdiction of the District Court.  LG § 6-101, et seq.  The State Laws governing 
municipal infractions set forth a comprehensive process for the imposition of civil fines 
not exceeding $1,000, including the issuance of a citation with a summons, an election to 
stand trial, and the process and proceeding for adjudication by the court.  Id.  
36 
 
have concurrent jurisdiction); see also NR § 5-1612 (authorizing recovery of civil fines for 
violations of a local forestation program in a civil action brought by a local authority) 
(emphasis added); NR § 8-1815(a) (authorizing “prosecution or suit in circuit court or 
District Court” for fines and penalties related to violations of a local critical area program) 
(emphasis added).  
The provisions of the Talbot County Code that purport to establish a right to 
administrative appeal of a civil assessment in the Talbot County Board of Appeals are also 
inconsistent with the jurisdictional limitations of a charter county board of appeals under 
the Express Powers Act set forth in LG § 10-305(a)(1).  Under the Express Powers Act, a 
charter county may enact local laws to provide for the establishment of a county board of 
appeals, whose members shall be appointed by the local legislative body.  LG § 10-
305(a)(1).  Where a charter county elects to establish a board of appeals, the Express 
Powers Act, LG § 10-305(b), also sets the jurisdictional parameters of the board as follows:  
The county board of appeals may have original jurisdiction or jurisdiction 
to review the action of an administrative officer or unit of county government 
over matters arising under any law, ordinance, or regulation of the county 
council that concerns: 
 
(1) an application for a zoning variation or exception or amendment of a 
zoning map;  
 
(2) the issuance, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, or 
modification of any license, permit, approval, exemption, waiver, 
certificate, registration, or other form of permission or of any adjudicatory 
order; or  
 
(3) the assessment of any special benefit tax.   
 
37 
 
(Emphasis added).  After considering a matter within its jurisdiction, the county board of 
appeals is required to file an opinion “that shall include a statement of facts found and the 
grounds for the decision.”  LG § 10-305(c).  Any person aggrieved by a decision and a 
party to the proceeding before the county board of appeals may seek judicial review by the 
circuit court.  LG § 10-305(d).  Any party to the circuit court proceeding who is aggrieved 
by the decision in the circuit court may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in the same 
manner provided for in civil cases.16  Id.   
Under the  plain language of LG § 10-305(b), the jurisdiction conferred upon a local 
board of appeals by the Legislature does not include original jurisdiction or administrative 
adjudicatory review of civil fines or penalties or other civil assessments.  The County 
argues that it has the authority under the Express Powers Act to confer jurisdiction upon 
its Board of Appeals to consider civil assessments because the assessments issued by the 
CCCO constitute “adjudicatory orders.”  We disagree.   
When statutory terms are not defined in a statute, “we may consult a dictionary and 
give words their ordinary meaning.”  Balt. City Det. Ctr. v. Foy, 461 Md. 627, 645 (2018). 
“Adjudicate” is defined as “to deem or pronounce to be[.]”  Adjudicate, Garner’s 
Dictionary of Legal Usage (3d ed. 2011).  “Order” is defined as “a command or 
 
16 Of course, one of the fundamental tenets of administrative law is that judicial 
review of a matter arising under the jurisdiction of an administrative agency is different 
from a matter arising under the original jurisdiction of the courts.  “Judicial review of 
administrative agency action is narrow.”  United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. People’s Counsel for 
Balt. Cty., 336 Md. 569, 576 (1994).  “A court’s role is limited to determining if there is 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and 
conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous 
conclusion of law.”  Id. at 577 (citations omitted).   
38 
 
direction[.]”  Order, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage (3d ed. 2011).  The assessments 
are not adjudicatory orders—they are not pronouncements by the CCCO that command or 
direct the Petitioners to take a specific action.  Rather, the assessments issued to the 
Petitioners purported to enforce the abatement orders by imposing a daily civil penalty 
until such time as the Petitioners complied with the separately issued orders.17  To 
understand the difference between adjudicatory orders and civil assessments, one need look 
no further than the face of the abatement orders that were issued by the CCCO, which were 
“adjudicatory orders”18—they directed the Petitioners to take remedial action to correct the 
violations, specifying the precise manner for the correction of the violations. 
Moreover, if we were to accept the County’s argument that the assessments 
constituted “adjudicatory orders” within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Board of 
Appeals, such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the other statutory provisions, 
described supra, which confer original jurisdiction over the adjudication of civil penalties 
and fines in the Maryland courts.  We will not adopt an interpretation that is flatly 
inconsistent with other statutory provisions that explicitly address this subject matter.  See, 
e.g., Immanuel v. Comptroller of Maryland, 449 Md. 76, 87 (2016) (“[I]f two acts can 
reasonably be construed together, so as to give effect to both, such a construction is 
 
17 At the Board of Appeals hearing, the County Attorney made this very point by 
noting that “the civil penalties that were issued in this case were intended to enforce the 
obligations in the abatement order[s].”  (Emphasis added).  
 
18 In contrast to the assessments, the abatement orders constituted adjudicatory 
orders that were subject to administrative review by the Board of Appeals.   
39 
 
preferred, and the two should be construed together to be interpreted consistently with their 
general objectives and scope.”). 
III. 
Conclusion 
Talbot County does not have the authority to expand the jurisdiction of its Board of 
Appeals beyond the jurisdictional limits established by the General Assembly.  
Accordingly, it lacks the authority to vest its Board of Appeals with administrative review 
of civil penalties.  Because this matter originated in the Board of Appeals, we shall vacate 
the judgment and direct that the case be dismissed.  Additionally, we hold that the 
assessment notices issued by the CCCO that purported to assess civil penalties subject only 
to administrative review by the Board of Appeals are facially invalid and unenforceable.   
We further hold that, to the extent that Chapter 58 of the Talbot County Code 
establishes a process for the administrative assessment of civil penalties that is inconsistent 
with the applicable provisions of State law that confer original jurisdiction in the courts for 
the adjudication of civil fines and penalties, such provisions of the Talbot County Code are 
ultra vires and void.   
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED; CASE 
REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS 
TO 
VACATE 
THE 
CIRCUIT COURT’S JUDGMENT AND TO 
REMAND TO THE CIRCUIT COURT;  
WITH FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS TO 
THE CIRCUIT COURT TO REMAND TO 
THE 
BOARD 
OF 
APPEALS; 
WITH 
FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE 
BOARD VACATE ITS DECISION, AND 
40 
 
DISMISS THE ASSESSMENTS.  COSTS IN 
THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE DIVIDED 
EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES.