Case Title: COLLICOTT v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
COLLICOTT v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2001 WY 3520 P.3d 1077Case Number: 00-171Decided: 04/04/2001
 

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2001

 
                                                                                                                   
April 4, 2001              

 

 

IN THE MATTER 
OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION CLAIM OF 
MYRON J.

COLLICOTT, AN EMPLOYEE 
OF

ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN FIBER:

MYRON J. 
COLLICOTT,

Appellant(Petitioner),

v.

STATE OF 
WYOMING ex rel.

WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY 
AND

COMPENSATION 
DIVISION,

Appellee(Respondent).

  

W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) 
Certification from the District Court of Laramie 
County

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 Representing 
Appellant:

            
Mark E. Macy of Macy Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming  

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay Woodhouse, Attorney 
General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald L. Laska, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, Assistant Attorney General 
 

 Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ.

            
KITE, Justice.

 [¶1]     Appellant Myron J. 
Collicott was denied worker's compensation benefits after the hearing examiner 
found he had filed an untimely report of injury.  Specifically, the hearing examiner 
determined Mr. Collicott failed to prove the statute of limitations for filing a 
claim for worker's compensation benefits pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-505 
(LEXIS 1999) should be tolled due to mental incompetence.  We hold the hearing examiner did not 
properly utilize the applicable law to determine mental incompetence.  We reverse the Order Denying Benefits 
and remand for reconsideration.  

ISSUE

[¶2]      Mr. Collicott 
presented the following issue for our review:

            
1.  Whether the decision of 
the Office of Administrative Hearings ruling that the Appellant was not mentally 
incompetent for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations as provided by 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §27-14-505 (1986) was unsupported by substantial evidence and 
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Appellee State 
of Wyoming ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (the 
Division) restated the issue as follows:

            
Did the Hearing Examiner correctly determine that Appellant failed to 
prove mental incompetence pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-505?

FACTS

[¶3]      On July 7, 1999, 
Mr. Collicott filed a report of injury with the Division reporting a 
work-related shoulder injury that occurred almost ten years earlier on October 
7, 1989.  The Division denied 
benefits on July 16, 1999, as untimely.  
On July 19, 1999, Mr. Collicott objected to the Division's determination 
and requested a hearing in writing.  
Thereafter, the case was referred to the Office of Administrative 
Hearings pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-601(k)(v) (LEXIS 1999).  Mr. Collicott stipulated that the report 
of injury was not timely filed but claimed the limitation period was tolled 
because he was mentally incompetent pursuant to § 27-14-505.  A hearing was held on January 13, 
2000.  The record firmly establishes 
that Mr. Collicott has long suffered from schizophrenia, initially diagnosed at 
age thirteen, and has been continually treated for the mental disorder since the 
initial diagnosis.  Mr. Collicott 
testified that he had received a psychological discharge from the army.  He has also been on social security 
disability since the early 1980s on the basis of his mental disorder.  The Social Security Administration 
considered Mr. Collicott disabled and therefore eligible for social security 
income after applying the applicable standard which was whether he had the 
ability to understand, carry out, and remember instructions and to respond 
appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and work pressures in a work 
setting.  However, Mr. Collicott 
testified he did not have a guardian or a conservator appointed for him and most 
of the time he was in control of his own finances.  The hearing examiner issued the Order 
Denying Benefits on February 10, 2000, and concluded Mr. Collicott had not met 
his burden of proving mental incompetence pursuant to § 27-14-505.  A petition for review was filed which 
the district court certified to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

            

[¶4]      An administrative 
agency's decision certified directly to this court is reviewed under the same 
appellate standards applicable to the reviewing court of the first 
instance.  Wesaw v. Quality 
Maintenance, 2001 WY 17, ¶8, 
2001 WL 167776, at ¶8 (Wyo. Feb. 20, 2001).  Our judicial review is limited to those 
considerations specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LEXIS 1999) which 
provides in pertinent part:

(c)  To the extent necessary to make a 
decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and 
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

                        
. . .

(ii) Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

                                    
. . .

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

The 
interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act are a question of law over which our review authority is 
plenary.  Wesaw, ¶8.  Conclusions of law made by an 
administrative agency are affirmed only if they are in accord with the law.  Corman v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996).  We do not afford any deference to the 
agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency in 
either interpreting or applying the law.  
DeLauter v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 
994 P.2d 934, 936 (Wyo. 
2000).

DISCUSSION

[¶5]      Section 27-14-505 
is silent as to what comprises mental incompetency sufficient to toll the timely 
filing requirements.  Section 
27-14-505 provides:

If an injured 
employee is mentally incompetent or a minor, or where death results from the 
injury and any of his dependents are mentally incompetent or minors, at the time 
when any right or privilege accrues under this act, no limitation of time 
provided for in this act shall run so long as the mentally incompetent or minor 
has no guardian.

The hearing 
examiner noted there was no definition of "mentally incompetent" in the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act nor were there any cases which interpreted this 
term.  Therefore, this case presents 
an issue of first impression.  As a 
result of the lack of statutory guidance, the hearing examiner applied the term 
of a "mentally incompetent person" as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
3-1-101(a)(xii) (LEXIS 1999) which is a statute that deals with guardianship and 
states in pertinent part:  
"Mentally incompetent person' means an individual who is unable 
unassisted to properly manage and take care of himself or his property as the 
result of mental illness, mental deficiency or mental retardation."  The hearing examiner stated that 
§ 3-1-101(a)(xii) "appears to be a reasonable example of what the 
legislature meant when mentally incompetent' was used in the worker's 
compensation statutes."  The hearing 
examiner determined Mr. Collicott failed to establish that he was a person who 
is "mentally incompetent" pursuant to the definition provided in the 
guardianship statute.  Specifically, 
the hearing examiner reasoned:

The evidence 
establishes that Collicott does suffer from schizophrenia, a mental illness 
which has been diagnosed by Dr. Merrell and other competent professionals.  He has been treated for this illness for 
a number of years and has periodically been hospitalized for the condition.  However, there have been extensive 
periods of time, after the alleged injury date, when Collicott was capable of 
properly managing and taking care of himself and his property without 
assistance.  Collicott has his own 
apartment, buys his own food, seeks medical treatment, timely prepared paperwork 
to retain his SSD benefits and sought various benefits through the VA.  Additionally, Collicott went to the 
workers' compensation office seeking benefits in 1997 and asked about filing a 
report, but did nothing further.  
Benefits are, therefore, denied.

[¶6]      Mr. Collicott 
claims the legislature did not intend the definition of "mentally incompetent" 
provided in the guardianship statute to apply in the context of a worker's 
compensation case or such definition would be explicitly set forth in the 
definitions in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102 (LEXIS 1999).  Rather, Mr. Collicott contends the 
definition of "mentally incompetent" was intended to be interpreted on a 
case-by-case basis.  He maintains 
the adoption of the definition from the guardianship statute in this case was 
improper and presumes that an incompetent person must be appointed a guardian to 
manage the person's daily living affairs and finances, unlike the standard used 
for determining a disability by the Social Security Administration.  Consequently, Mr. Collicott contends the 
hearing examiner's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not otherwise in accordance 
with the law.

[¶7]      The crux of the 
issue is whether an individual suffering from a diagnosed mental disorder, and 
assertedly incapable of following statutory procedures, may claim the statute of 
limitations is tolled based on his mental incompetence.  As a result of the statute's failure to 
provide a definition of what constitutes mental incompetence, we must discern in 
what circumstances the legislature intended the filing requirements to be 
tolled.  State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division v. Gerdes, 951 P.2d 1170, 1174 (Wyo. 
1997).  Our method of statutory 
construction has been fully explained:

We read the 
text of the statute and pay attention to its internal structure and the 
functional relation between the parts and the whole. . . . If an 
ambiguous statute has been construed by an agency charged with administering it, 
we will accord deference to, but are not bound by, that construction.  After all, the final construction of an 
ambiguous statute is a question for the court.

Parker Land 
and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1045 
(Wyo. 1993).

[¶8]      Following a 
similar analysis set forth in Gerdes, 951 P.2d  at 1174, we examine the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act as a whole, looking at its purposes as well as 
the underlying policy considerations.  
We conclude the definition provided in the guardianship statute which 
provides a person must be unable unassisted to properly manage and take care of 
himself or his property, while not conclusively incorrect, must be further 
refined to fit within the context of worker's compensation claims.  Some guidance can be gleaned from the 
general purposes behind the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, legislative 
intent, and the interpretation of similar statutes by other state courts. 

[¶9]      It is a basic 
rule of statutory construction that courts may try to determine legislative 
intent by considering the type of statute being interpreted and what the 
legislature intended by the language used, viewed in light of the objects and 
purposes to be accomplished.  
State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 546-47 (Wyo. 1982).  
Furthermore, when we are confronted with two possible but conflicting 
conclusions, we will choose the one most logically designed to cure the mischief 
or inequity that the legislature was attempting to accomplish.  648 P.2d  at 546.  When the Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Act is read as a whole, it clearly supports only one logical interpretation of 
the language used.  We hold the 
mental incompetence provision was intended to toll the statute of limitations 
for those individuals whose medically diagnosed mental condition is so severe as 
to render them unable to protect their legal right to compensation by following 
the statutory procedures provided in the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.  We believe our interpretation is 
consistent with both the legislature's intent and the plain meaning of "mental 
incompetence" within the context of worker's compensation.  The definition used by the Division and 
the Office of Administrative Hearings equates an individual's ability, in a 
routine manner, to properly manage and take care of himself or his property to 
an ability to comprehend the import and the requirements of worker's 
compensation statutory procedures.  
In applying our interpretation, we suggest these questions are posed: 
Does an individual with a medically diagnosed mental condition have the ability 
to comprehend that an injury is compensable?  Furthermore, can that individual 
comprehend that certain statutory guidelines must be complied with in order to 
receive benefits?  An individual's 
mere ignorance of the statutory procedures for filing a claim would not result 
in tolling the statute.

[¶10]   We turn for guidance to the 
interpretations by other states of their statutes which likewise lack 
definitions of key terms.  Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1061(A) (West 1995) is comparable to § 27-14-505 and 
states in pertinent part:

[N]either the 
commission nor any court shall have jurisdiction to consider a claim which is 
not timely filed under this subsection, except if the employee or other party 
entitled to file the claim has delayed in doing so because of justifiable 
reliance on a material representation by the commission, employer or insurance 
carrier or if the employee or other party entitled to file the claim is insane 
or legally incompetent or incapacitated at the time the injury occurs or the 
right to compensation accrues or during the one-year period thereafter.  

In 
Harrelson v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 697 P.2d 1119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984), the Court of Appeals of Arizona was faced with 
determining the meaning of "incapacitated" in the absence of a definition.  The claimant sought to have her untimely 
worker's compensation claim excused due to her depression.  697 P.2d  at 1125.  The court concluded the legislature 
envisioned a situation where an individual would have a diminished mental or 
physical capacity to the extent of being unable to file a claim.  697 P.2d  at 1124.  The court's interpretation was based on 
both the legislature's intent and the term's plain 
meaning.

[¶11]   Additionally, in Cerami v. City 
of Rochester School District, 624 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1993), the claimant filed 
an untimely worker's compensation claim for a mental breakdown allegedly 
precipitated by stressful working conditions.  The Court of Appeals of New York was 
required to construe the provision "any person who is mentally incompetent or a 
minor so long as he has no committee or guardian" to determine if the filing 
provision was tolled.  624 N.E.2d  at 
681.  The court applied the holding 
of the seminal case, McCarthy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 435 N.E.2d 1072 (N.Y. 1980), which had previously construed the meaning of insanity as it 
applied to a personal injury statute that provided a toll for insanity.  See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208 (McKinney 
1990).  McCarthy held, "the 
Legislature meant to extend the toll for insanity to only those individuals who 
are unable to protect their legal rights because of an over-all inability to 
function in society."  435 N.E.2d  
at 1075.

[¶12]   These courts provided definitions, 
in light of statutory silence, which comported with the legislative intent and 
statutory construction of the pertinent statutes at issue.  We have undertaken the same task to 
reach a definition which comports with the framework of the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act.

[¶13]   We must address the common law rule 
of "liberal construction" which both parties agreed applies in this case.  As we explained in Wright v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 952 P.2d 209, 212 n.1 (Wyo. 1998), 
in 1994 an amendment to the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act was adopted by the 
legislature with the apparent purpose of rejecting the rule of liberal 
construction.  The statute now 
provides in pertinent part:

(b) 
. . . It is the specific intent of the legislature that benefit claims 
cases be decided on their merits and that the common law rule of "liberal 
construction" based on the supposed "remedial" basis of workers' benefits 
legislation shall not apply in these cases.

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-101(b) (LEXIS 1999).  
However, that statutory provision is not applicable in this instance 
because a claim for benefits pursuant to the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act 
is controlled by the laws in effect at the time of the injury.  Wright, 952 P.2d  at 212 n.1.  Neither party disputes that the earlier 
rule of construction is applicable in this instance as Mr. Collicott's injury 
occurred in 1989 and the rule of "liberal construction" was not eliminated until 
1994.  As we explained in 
Wilkinson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Division, 991 P.2d 1228, 1242 (Wyo. 1999), the rule of liberal construction of a statute in favor of the 
claimant is applied when the statute at issue is silent as to the issue 
presented and precedes the legislature's 1994 amendment to the preamble of the 
worker's compensation statutes.  
Therefore, our statutory construction in this case "should be 
accomplished to afford coverage wherever that end may be achieved without 
unreasonably extending the clear language of the statute."  Wright, 952 P.2d  at 211.  Subsequent to the effective date of the 
current statute, worker's compensation statutes can no longer be interpreted in 
favor of coverage but will be interpreted in a way that gives effect to the 
legislative intent and preserves the historic compromise between workers and 
employers.  State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division v. Summers, 987 P.2d 153, 157 (Wyo. 1999).  Our conclusion in this case would be the 
same whether it is determined on the basis of liberal construction or to 
effectuate legislative intent.

[¶14]   Whether an individual's mental 
condition meets the definition of mental competence as set forth herein is a 
factual question.  We note that Mr. 
Collicott's doctor was asked in his deposition whether Mr. Collicott could 
follow through in a course of action under an obligation to report an injury to 
his employer and then file a report of injury.  He stated, "My best opinion on this 
would probably be the fact that Myron does have substantial difficulty with 
understanding the basic requirements of a job and being able to think through 
requirements of needing to report injuries at work."  This evidence was consistent with the 
findings of the Social Security Administration.  Because the evidence was presented and 
considered according to an incorrect standard, we remand for further hearing and 
factual findings under the proper standard.

[¶15]   Reversed and 
remanded.