Case Title: State ex rel. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation v. O'Donnell

Citation: 2023-Ohio-428

Docket Number: 2022-0108

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2023-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. O’Donnell, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-428.] 
 
                                                                
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-428 
THE STATE EX REL. OHIO BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION v. 
O’DONNELL, JUDGE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. O’Donnell, Slip 
Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-428.] 
Mandamus—Prohibition—R.C. 2743.03(A)—Court of Claims Act—Claim for 
declaratory and injunctive relief filed by public employer against Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation is a legal claim over which common-pleas-court 
judge lacks subject-matter jurisdiction—Writs of mandamus and 
prohibition granted against common-pleas-court judge. 
(No. 2022-0108—Submitted January 10, 2023—Decided February 16, 2023.) 
IN MANDAMUS and PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In this original action, relator, Ohio Bureau of Workers’ 
Compensation, requests (1) a writ of prohibition ordering respondent, Judge John 
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P. O’Donnell of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, to stop exercising 
jurisdiction over Parma v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-
21-943131 (“the underlying case”), and (2) a writ of mandamus ordering Judge 
O’Donnell to dismiss the underlying case.  We grant both of the requested writs. 
I. BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} In 2013, the city of Cleveland and intervening respondent, the city of 
Parma, sued the bureau in separate actions in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas 
Court, alleging that the bureau’s former premium-calculation method had resulted 
in excessive premium charges for non-group-rated employers.  Cleveland brought 
its action individually; however, Parma filed a class action.  In February 2020, this 
court held that the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over Cleveland’s 
action because Cleveland’s claim for relief—reimbursement of excessive 
premiums by way of restitution—sounded in law, not equity.  Cleveland v. Ohio 
Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 159 Ohio St.3d 459, 2020-Ohio-337, 152 N.E.3d 172,  
¶ 1, 7-8, 11.  In March 2020, Judge O’Donnell dismissed Parma’s action without 
prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing this court’s decision in 
Cleveland. 
{¶ 3} In January 2021, Parma filed the underlying case in the common pleas 
court, which Parma characterized as a “refiling” of its 2013 case against the bureau.  
Parma sought a declaratory judgment determining the amount of the refund that it 
claimed it was owed by the bureau and an injunction prohibiting the bureau from 
refusing to pay the refund.  Judge O’Donnell denied the bureau’s motion to dismiss 
Parma’s complaint, reasoning that this court’s decision in Cleveland did not control. 
{¶ 4} On the same day Parma filed the underlying case, it also filed an 
action against the bureau in the Court of Claims.  See Parma v. Ohio Bur. of 
Workers’ Comp., Ct. of Cl. No. 2021-00024JD (July 12, 2021).  In the Court of 
Claims, Parma asked for an award of damages as compensation for the alleged 
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overcharged premiums.  The Court of Claims dismissed Parma’s complaint, in part 
because the statute of limitations had passed. 
{¶ 5} In January 2022, the bureau brought this action against Judge 
O’Donnell, asserting that in the wake of this court’s decision in Cleveland, 159 
Ohio St.3d 459, 2020-Ohio-337, 152 N.E.3d 172, the common pleas court patently 
and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the underlying case.  We denied Judge 
O’Donnell’s motion to dismiss, denied Parma’s first motion to intervene, and 
granted an alternative writ.  166 Ohio St.3d 1528, 2022-Ohio-1837, 188 N.E.3d 
197.  We later granted Parma’s second motion to intervene.  167 Ohio St.3d 1456, 
2022-Ohio-2429, 190 N.E.3d 632. 
II. ANALYSIS 
{¶ 6} The central question here is whether the Court of Claims Act, R.C. 
2743.01 et seq., patently and unambiguously divests the common pleas court of 
jurisdiction in the underlying case.  To answer that question, we must determine 
whether Parma brought a legal or equitable claim in the underlying case.  The 
bureau argues that Parma brought a legal claim that belongs in the Court of Claims 
and that Parma has employed artful labels to disguise its claim as equitable.  Judge 
O’Donnell and Parma disagree, stressing that the complaint in the underlying case 
advances a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.  The absence of a legal claim 
requesting damages, they contend, means that Judge O’Donnell has jurisdiction 
over the underlying case.  We agree with the bureau. 
A. Prohibition 
{¶ 7} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, the bureau must establish that 
(1) Judge O’Donnell has exercised judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is 
unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no 
other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Elder v. 
Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13.  If the 
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common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, then the bureau 
need not establish the lack of an adequate legal remedy.  Id. 
{¶ 8} This court will typically “deny relief in prohibition when a respondent 
judge has general subject-matter jurisdiction and will deem any error by the judge 
to be an error in the exercise of that jurisdiction.”  State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein, 
153 Ohio St.3d 560, 2018-Ohio-3155, 108 N.E.3d 1089, ¶ 24.  Thus, “[i]n the 
absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general 
subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party 
contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.”  State ex rel. Plant 
v. Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 5.  When 
this court has determined that a “court of common pleas patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, it is almost always because a statute explicitly 
removed that jurisdiction.”  Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 157 Ohio 
St.3d 296, 2019-Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 9} Here, we must determine whether the Court of Claims’ “exclusive, 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of 
immunity contained in section 2743.02 of the Revised Code,” R.C. 2743.03(A)(1), 
patently and unambiguously divests the common pleas court of jurisdiction in the 
underlying case.  To do so, we must decide whether Parma’s claim seeks legal or 
equitable relief.  Cleveland, 159 Ohio St.3d 459, 2020-Ohio-337, 152 N.E.3d 172, 
at ¶ 10.  “Money damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 124 
L.Ed.2d 161 (1993).  But this court’s decision in Cleveland illustrates that a claim 
may sound in law even when the plaintiff does not seek money damages. 
{¶ 10} In Cleveland, the city sued the bureau in common pleas court on a 
claim of unjust enrichment, arguing that the discounts the bureau had provided to 
group-rated employers resulted in excessive premiums for non-group-rated 
employers like itself.  Id. at ¶ 7.  The court of appeals affirmed the common pleas 
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court’s order directing the bureau to pay restitution to Cleveland, id. at ¶ 8, but this 
court reversed on the ground that the trial court had usurped the Court of Claims’ 
jurisdiction, id. at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 11} In determining whether Cleveland had brought a claim for legal or 
equitable relief, this court observed that a claim sounds in law if it “s[eeks] to 
recover from a defendant’s general assets rather than ‘specifically identified funds 
that remain in the defendant’s possession.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Montanile v. Natl. 
Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan Bd. of Trustees, 577 U.S. 136, 144-145, 136 
S.Ct. 651, 193 L.Ed.2d 556 (2016).  Equitable remedies, on the other hand, “ ‘ “are, 
as a general rule, directed against some specific thing; they give or enforce a right 
to or over some particular thing * * * rather than a right to recover a sum of money 
generally out of the defendant’s assets.” ’ ”  (Ellipsis added in Montanile.)  Id., 
quoting Montanile at 145, quoting 4 S. Symons, Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 
Section 1234, 694 (5th Ed.1941).  Thus, when a plaintiff cannot point to a 
“specifically identifiable fund * * * to seize” or to “traceable items on which the 
money from the fund was spent,” the claim sounds in law.  Id.  Applying these 
principles, we concluded that Cleveland had brought a legal claim that belonged in 
the Court of Claims because Cleveland’s premiums went into the state’s general 
insurance fund and became commingled with the premiums of other employers.  
And even assuming that the state’s general insurance fund could have been 
construed as a specific fund, the money in that fund had been paid out long ago, 
meaning that it could no longer be traced. 
{¶ 12} Parma and Judge O’Donnell argue that Cleveland, 159 Ohio St.3d 
459, 2020-Ohio-337, 152 N.E.3d 172, does not control here, because it did not 
involve, as this case does, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.  This 
argument points to the Court of Claims Act’s preservation of “the original 
jurisdiction of another court of this state to hear and determine a civil action in 
which the sole relief that the claimant seeks against the state is a declaratory 
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judgment, injunctive relief, or other equitable relief.”  R.C. 2743.03(A)(2); see also 
Ohio Hosp. Assn. v. Ohio Dept. of Human Servs., 62 Ohio St.3d 97, 103, 579 
N.E.2d 695 (1991) (“a suit that seeks only injunctive or declaratory relief may be 
brought against the state in the court of common pleas”). 
{¶ 13} Although Parma claims that it is seeking only a declaratory judgment 
and injunctive relief, we are not bound by Parma’s labels.  “Regardless of how an 
action is labeled, the substance of the party’s arguments and the type of relief 
requested determine the nature of the action.”  Lingo v. State, 138 Ohio St.3d 427, 
2014-Ohio-1052, 7 N.E.3d 1188, ¶ 38; see also State ex rel. Zupancic v. Limbach, 
58 Ohio St.3d 130, 132, 568 N.E.2d 1206 (1991) (this court will look beyond the 
pleadings to ensure that a mandamus complaint is not a disguised request for a 
prohibitory injunction); Ruehmer v. Queen City Lodge, 2021-Ohio-2904, 176 
N.E.3d 350, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.) (“Artful pleading does not alter the essence of the claim 
* * *”).  We accordingly look beyond Parma’s labels and independently analyze 
the nature of the claims asserted. 
{¶ 14} We start by analyzing Parma’s claim for injunctive relief.  At first 
blush, it may seem that Parma seeks a prohibitory injunction because it seeks an 
order that “forbids or restrains an act.”  See Black’s Law Dictionary 905 (10th 
Ed.2014) (defining “prohibitory injunction”).  But although Parma seeks to 
“enjoin[] the Bureau * * * from continuing to refuse to furnish the refunds” that 
Parma claims it is due, this is just an artful way of saying that it wants a refund. 
{¶ 15} On this point, the bureau repeatedly points to the opinion concurring 
in judgment only in Cirino v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., which observed: “ ‘It 
does not take much lawyerly inventiveness to convert a claim for payment of a past 
due sum (damages) into a prayer for an injunction against refusing to pay the sum, 
or for a declaration that the sum must be paid, or for an order reversing the agency’s 
decision not to pay.’ ”  153 Ohio St.3d 333, 2018-Ohio-2665, 106 N.E.3d 41, ¶ 36 
(DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only), quoting Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 
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U.S. 879, 915-916, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
Parma concedes as much, saying that “the objective of [its] request for declaratory 
and injunctive relief is to require [the bureau] to issue refunds.” 
{¶ 16} As this court relayed in Cleveland, “ ‘ “[a]lmost invariably * * * suits 
seeking * * * to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are 
suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has traditionally been applied, since they 
seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant’s breach of 
legal duty.” ’ ”  (First ellipsis added in Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co.; second 
ellipsis added in Cleveland.)  159 Ohio St.3d 459, 2020-Ohio-337, 152 N.E.3d 172, 
at ¶ 12, quoting Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210, 
122 S.Ct. 708, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002), quoting Bowen, 487 U.S. at 918-919 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 17} Here, Parma’s premiums went into a general fund and became 
commingled with premiums paid by other public employers.  See Cleveland at  
¶ 17, citing R.C. 4123.30.  Moreover, even if Parma’s premiums had been deposited 
into a specific fund, Parma seeks refunds for premiums it paid from 2001 to 2011.1  
As in Cleveland, in which the last funds Cleveland paid were in 2009, it is 
inconceivable in this case how money belonging to Parma “could ‘clearly be traced 
to particular funds or property’ in the [bureau’s] possession,” id., quoting Great-
West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. at 213.  It follows here, as it did in Cleveland, that 
Parma’s claim for relief “sounds in law and must proceed through the Court of 
Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction over legal claims against the [bureau],” id. 
{¶ 18} This conclusion holds true notwithstanding Parma’s additional claim 
for declaratory relief, which is a claim that is “sui generis in the sense that it is 
 
1. Parma’s complaint in the underlying case alleges that the overcharges began in “approximately 
2001 and continued past 2010 * * * through 2011 and potentially beyond.”  Without objection from 
Parma, the bureau and Judge O’Donnell have described Parma as challenging the period from 2001 
to 2011. 
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neither one strictly in equity nor one strictly at law; it may possess attributes of 
both.”  Sessions v. Skelton, 163 Ohio St. 409, 415, 127 N.E.2d 378 (1955).  Under 
Ohio law, when a plaintiff brings a claim permitted by R.C. 2743.02’s waiver of 
immunity that is joined with a claim for declaratory judgment “that arises out of the 
same circumstances,” the Court of Claims has “exclusive, original jurisdiction to 
determine” both claims.  R.C. 2743.03(A)(2); see also Ohio Hosp. Assn., 62 Ohio 
St.3d 97 at 103, 579 N.E.2d 695 (Court of Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction over legal 
claims is not defeated by the presence of a claim for ancillary relief such as a 
declaratory judgment that arises from the same circumstances). 
{¶ 19} Judge O’Donnell rejoins that prohibition cannot lie, because the 
bureau has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of appeal from 
the trial court’s disposition of the underlying case.  He further emphasizes that the 
common pleas court has the power to determine its own jurisdiction.  But these 
arguments lose their force when, as here, a court patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction.  See Cosgrove, 119 Ohio St.3d 264, 2008-Ohio-3838, 893 N.E.2d 485, 
at ¶ 5. 
{¶ 20} For its part, Parma points to instances in which courts have 
determined that claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were properly brought 
against the state in common pleas court rather than in the Court of Claims, see, e.g., 
Bee v. Univ. of Akron, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21081, 2002-Ohio-5776, or, 
conversely, that claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were improperly 
brought against the state in the Court of Claims, see, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Ohio Dept. 
of Human Servs., 77 Ohio App.3d 827, 603 N.E.2d 1089 (1991).2  But it is 
 
2. Parma also cites Racing Guild of Ohio, Local 304, Serv. Emps. Internatl. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC 
v. Ohio State Racing Comm., 28 Ohio St.3d 317, 503 N.E.2d 1025 (1986), in which this court held 
that the common pleas court, rather than the Court of Claims, had jurisdiction over an action for 
injunctive relief brought against the state racing commission, including a claim for relief demanding 
that a third party be ordered to refund tax abatements.  This court in Racing Guild reached that 
conclusion without analyzing whether the character of the refund would have sounded in law or 
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unnecessary for this court to scrutinize those cases to decide this one because “[t]he 
law of precedent teaches that like cases should generally be treated alike.”  Epic 
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, __ U.S. __, __, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1623, 200 L.Ed.2d 889 (2018).  
Aside from the words used to describe the relief sought, Cleveland, 159 Ohio St.3d 
459, 2020-Ohio-337, 152 N.E.3d 172, and this case are substantively alike, 
meaning that Cleveland supplies the rule of decision here.3 
{¶ 21} Parma next argues that it should be permitted to seek declaratory 
relief against the bureau because questions concerning the bureau’s statutory 
authority are bound to arise and declaratory judgments are well-suited to resolve 
these questions.  But, as explained above, Parma’s complaint contains more than a 
claim for declaratory relief; it contains a disguised legal claim cast as a request for 
injunctive relief.  When a plaintiff brings a suit against the state that combines a 
claim for declaratory relief with a claim sounding in law, as Parma’s complaint 
does, both claims must be brought in the Court of Claims.  R.C. 2743.03(A)(2); see 
also Ohio Hosp. Assn., 62 Ohio St.3d at 103, 579 N.E.2d 695. 
{¶ 22} Lastly, Parma highlights the fact that it instituted the underlying case 
as a class action.  Parma argues that because a party in a class action may assert 
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, the underlying case should be permitted 
to proceed before Judge O’Donnell in common pleas court.  But we have no license 
to ignore the terms of the Court of Claims Act based on class-action considerations.  
See Ohio Neighborhood Fin., Inc. v. Scott, 139 Ohio St.3d 536, 2014-Ohio-2440, 
13 N.E.3d 1115, ¶ 20 (“we must apply statutory language as enacted by the General 
Assembly and * * * we are prohibited from acting in a legislative capacity”). 
 
equity.  Moreover, unlike in the underlying case here, the refund at issue in Racing Guild would 
have required a third party to return money to the state. 
 
3. We note that the result in Cleveland would have been the same even if Cleveland had, as Parma 
has done here, joined its legal claim with a claim for a declaratory judgment.  R.C. 2743.03(A)(2); 
see also Ohio Hosp. Assn., 62 Ohio St.3d at 103, 579 N.E.2d 695. 
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{¶ 23} In summary, the bureau is entitled to a writ of prohibition because 
Judge O’Donnell patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the 
underlying case. 
B. Mandamus 
{¶ 24} We next turn to the bureau’s mandamus claim.  To be entitled to a 
writ of mandamus, the bureau must show (1) a clear legal right to the requested 
relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of Judge O’Donnell to provide it, and (3) 
the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  See State ex rel. 
Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6.  When 
“ ‘a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a 
cause, prohibition and mandamus will issue to prevent any future unauthorized 
exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally 
unauthorized actions.’ ”  State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 
Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15, quoting State ex rel. Mayer 
v. Henson, 97 Ohio St.3d 276, 2002-Ohio-6323, 779 N.E.2d 223, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 25} In Sapp, we concluded that because the court of appeals patently and 
unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over an appeal, the relator was entitled to both 
a peremptory writ of prohibition preventing the court from proceeding over the 
appeal and a peremptory writ of mandamus compelling the court to dismiss the 
appeal.  Id. at ¶ 32.  Applying that logic here, we grant a writ of mandamus ordering 
Judge O’Donnell to dismiss the underlying case.  Judge O’Donnell’s contrary 
argument, that mandamus cannot lie because the bureau has an adequate remedy 
by way of appeal, is foreclosed by Sapp. 
III. CONCLUSION 
{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, we grant a writ of prohibition ordering 
Judge O’Donnell to stop exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case, and we 
grant a writ of mandamus ordering Judge O’Donnell to dismiss the underlying case 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
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Writs granted. 
KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, 
and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Sandra Nimrick, Assistant Attorney 
General; and Taft Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., James D. Abrams, David J. Butler, 
David C. Roper, and Michael J. Zbiegien Jr., for relator. 
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jake A. 
Elliott and Matthew T. Fitzsimmons IV, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
respondent. 
Flowers & Grube, Paul W. Flowers, Louis E. Grube, and Melissa A. Ghrist; 
Bashein & Bashein Co., L.P.A., W. Craig Bashein, and John P. Hurst; Plevin & 
Gallucci and Frank Gallucci; and Weisman, Kennedy & Berris Co., L.P.A., and 
Daniel P. Goetz, for intervening respondent. 
_________________