Case Title: In re N.B.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 378A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-154 
No. 378A20 
Filed 17 December 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: N.B. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 5 May 
2020 by Judge Hal Harrison in District Court, Madison County. This matter was 
calendared in the Supreme Court on 12 November 2021 but determined on the record 
and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Law Offices of Jamie A. Stokes, PLLC, by Jamie A. Stokes, for petitioner-
appellee Madison County Department of Social Services. 
 
Sophie Goodman for appellee Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Peter Wood for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
EARLS, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent, the mother of the juvenile N.B. (Nancy),1 appeals from the trial 
court’s order terminating her parental rights. She argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion by concluding that termination was in Nancy’s best interests. In 
particular, respondent points to evidence in the record that she had a bond with her 
child and challenges the trial court’s findings to the contrary. However, the trial 
                                            
1 A pseudonym is used in this opinion to protect the juvenile’s identity and for ease of 
reading. 
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court’s findings were supported by the evidence. Further, in making its determination 
that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Nancy’s best interests, the 
trial court considered the applicable statutory criteria and made written findings 
concerning the relevant factors. The court’s ultimate decision is supported by reason 
and not an abuse of discretion. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s order.    
I. 
Background 
¶ 2 
 
On 17 June 2019, Madison County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed 
a petition alleging that Nancy, who was seven years old at the time, was a neglected 
juvenile. DSS alleged it had received four reports between February and June 2019, 
three of which followed Nancy’s disclosure to educators that she felt unsafe in her 
home due to abuse by respondent’s boyfriend and respondent’s substance abuse and 
self-harm. Nancy also disclosed that she had thought about suicide and had a plan 
for accomplishing it. DSS discovered that one of respondent’s boyfriends, Todd, had 
an extensive criminal history, and DSS established a safety plan with respondent to 
prevent Todd from having contact with Nancy. Respondent violated this safety plan 
numerous times and continued to have contact with Todd, even though he had stated 
he wanted to “kill children,” and respondent believed he was a danger to Nancy. 
Nancy further disclosed that respondent had instructed her to lie to DSS. DSS 
obtained nonsecure custody of Nancy the same day the petition was filed and placed 
her in foster care.  
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¶ 3 
 
On 1 July 2019, DSS filed an amended petition alleging that Nancy was a 
neglected and dependent juvenile. The amended petition detailed respondent’s 
extensive history with DSS, beginning when Nancy’s half-siblings were removed from 
respondent’s care in February 2009 due to domestic violence and substance abuse. 
DSS became involved with Nancy at her birth in April 2012 after she tested positive 
for marijuana and respondent tested positive for benzodiazepines. In addition, the 
petition alleged respondent had been arrested and charged with multiple drug 
offenses on 15 June 2019. She submitted to a drug screen, which was positive for 
oxycodone and opiates, and she admitted to methamphetamine use several days 
prior. DSS obtained a hair follicle test for Nancy, which revealed dangerously high 
levels of methamphetamine and amphetamines. The petition also alleged that 
Nancy’s father was deceased, that respondent lacked the ability to care for Nancy on 
her own, and that respondent had no appropriate alternative childcare arrangement.  
¶ 4 
 
Following a hearing on 1 July 2019, the trial court adjudicated Nancy to be a 
neglected and dependent juvenile. As an interim disposition, the court required 
respondent to produce two consecutive negative drug screens before exercising 
visitation with Nancy.  
¶ 5 
 
The trial court held a combined disposition and permanency-planning hearing 
on 12 August 2019. In its resulting order, the court found that seventeen reports were 
made to DSS since Nancy’s birth and that Nancy had “been surrounded by domestic 
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violence, drug use, and instability her whole life.” Respondent admitted to having 
methamphetamine in her possession when DSS took custody of Nancy, and Nancy’s 
hair follicle test was positive for methamphetamine in her system. Respondent 
acknowledged she had previously witnessed Nancy hallucinating. The court further 
found that respondent had started attending substance abuse classes, though the 
court also noted that this was the third time she had done so. Respondent had not 
visited with Nancy since the adjudication as she failed to produce two negative drug 
screens; she instead tested positive three times.  
¶ 6 
 
The trial court found that aggravated circumstances existed pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-901(c)(1)(b) and (e) (2019) and relieved DSS from making efforts 
toward reunification. The court determined a permanent plan of adoption with a 
concurrent plan of guardianship was in Nancy’s best interests. As a necessary 
precondition of visitation, respondent was required to produce negative drug screens 
for six consecutive weeks; if she complied with this precondition, respondent would 
be permitted visitation, provided visitation was also recommended by Nancy’s 
therapist. Respondent did not appeal the adjudication and disposition orders. 
¶ 7 
 
By the December 2019 permanency-planning hearing, respondent had made 
some progress on her case plan. She produced six negative drug screens. Based on 
this progress, she requested visitation with Nancy. However, Nancy’s therapist 
recommended against allowing visitation, and the trial court refused respondent’s 
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request. The trial court maintained Nancy’s permanent plan as “adoption concurrent 
with guardianship.”  
¶ 8 
 
On 2 December 2019, DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental 
rights on the grounds of abuse, neglect, and dependency. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(1)–(2) (2019). Following a hearing, the court entered an order on 5 May 2020 
that found the grounds as alleged in the petition and determined it to be in Nancy’s 
best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Respondent appeals.  
II. 
Best-interests determination 
¶ 9 
 
The termination of parental rights proceeds in two stages. First, the trial court 
adjudicates the existence of any alleged grounds for termination under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111 (2019). See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 (2019). The petitioner must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that one or more grounds for termination exist. In re A.U.D., 373 
N.C. 3, 5–6 (2019). If the trial court determines that at least one ground has been 
established, the case proceeds to the dispositional stage, where the court 
“determine[s] whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best 
interest.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019).  
¶ 10 
 
Here, the trial court adjudicated grounds to terminate respondent’s parental 
rights on the basis of abuse and neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and 
dependency under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). Respondent concedes that the trial court 
“properly found grounds to terminate [her] parental rights.” Accordingly, our review 
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of the termination order is limited to determining whether the trial court properly 
concluded that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Nancy’s best 
interests. 
¶ 11 
 
Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110, when the trial court determines whether 
termination of parental rights is in a juvenile’s best interests, the court  
shall consider the following criteria and make written 
findings regarding the following that are relevant: 
 
(1) The age of the juvenile. 
 
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile. 
 
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid 
in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 
juvenile. 
 
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent. 
 
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile 
and 
the 
proposed 
adoptive 
parent, 
guardian, 
custodian, or other permanent placement. 
 
(6) Any relevant consideration. 
 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). The court’s dispositional findings are binding on appeal 
if supported by the record evidence. In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 57 (2020). By statute, 
“[t]he court may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in 
[N.C.]G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary 
to determine the best interests of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). The trial 
court’s ultimate determination regarding the child’s best interests is reviewed for 
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abuse of discretion and will be reversed only if it is “manifestly unsupported by reason 
or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re 
T.L.H., 368 N.C. 101, 107 (2015). 
A. Challenges to the trial court’s findings of fact 
¶ 12 
 
Respondent first challenges dispositional findings of fact 44 and 45, which 
state: 
44. The minor child does not have a strong bond with the 
respondent mother. They have not visited since June of 
2019 due to prior orders requiring the respondent mother 
to 
provide 
clean 
drug 
screens 
and 
due 
to 
the 
recommendations of Dr. Huneycutt. At this time, future 
interaction between the juvenile and the respondent 
mother could trigger the juvenile, and the juvenile would 
require significant safety and stability measures before 
any such contact should occur. 
45. While the juvenile has asked when she will see the 
respondent mother, she has not requested to see the 
respondent mother and most of her inquiries regarding the 
respondent mother indicate that she has established a 
parentified role with the respondent mother. The minor 
child primarily inquires about her animals when asking 
about the respondent mother. 
The record contains ample evidence supporting both findings. Nancy began 
therapeutic services in August 2019, and her psychologist, Dr. Dominique Huneycutt, 
noted that she presented with a history of “significant emotional and behavioral 
difficulties,” including diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder, oppositional 
defiant disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Nancy had previously 
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engaged in self-harming behavior, exhibited physical and verbal aggression, and 
acknowledged prior suicidal ideation and planning.  
¶ 13 
 
Respondent attended visitations with Nancy for a short period of time after 
Nancy was removed from respondent’s care in June 2019, but respondent was denied 
visitation following the initial adjudication hearing due to her inability to produce 
two consecutive negative drug screens. Nancy’s behavior worsened during the time 
respondent had visitations with her. Nancy was reportedly “on edge” on the days 
when she would visit with respondent, to the point that she pulled her hair out. She 
also exhibited behavioral problems in her foster home, including excessive cursing, 
hitting, screaming, biting, and defiance, for approximately two days following a visit. 
Nancy also assumed a parental role towards respondent, attempting to moderate her 
disclosures to DSS in order to protect respondent and requesting DSS to check on 
respondent because she “needed to make sure [respondent] was okay.” However, 
Nancy never indicated to her social worker a desire to see respondent. Dr. Huneycutt 
recommended visitation with respondent not resume until Nancy was able to safely 
process her trauma.  
¶ 14 
 
At the termination hearing, Dr. Huneycutt reiterated that Nancy was “a 
seriously, emotionally disturbed child, [with] severe behaviors and safety risks,” and 
“any additional environment[al] chaos or substance exposure and damage would 
further set her back and exacerbate conditions.” Dr. Huneycutt advised the court that 
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Nancy would need extensive support and stability, including intensive therapeutic 
supports; future evaluations; high levels of consistency, structure, safety, and 
responsiveness; 
intensive 
safety 
precautions; 
possible 
medical-neurological 
interventions; structured activities; peer skills; social interaction skills; safety skills; 
very high level of services with skilled professionals; and “a very stable environment 
for a very long time.” Dr. Huneycutt acknowledged Nancy did occasionally say she 
missed respondent and that she wanted to go back to her mother, but as she further 
explained: 
[m]ost commonly [Nancy’s] statements will—she asks 
about her animals, and she makes statements like, “I need 
to see my mother.” And when you explore it, she’s worried 
about her mother. She’s worried about whether she’s okay. 
. . . And she doesn’t bring her mother up a lot. She brings 
up her biological father. She brings up [respondent’s 
boyfriends]. She talks about her animals. But she’s, “I’m 
the warrior. I killed the bear. I need to be with my mother.” 
And she’s describing protective roles. Her play reflects 
protective roles. So she does—and yes, she talks about her 
mom.  
Thus, evidence in the record showed that Nancy had not had any contact with 
respondent since June 2019, that Nancy had not asked the social worker to see 
respondent, that Nancy would have to work through her past trauma before she could 
resume visits with respondent, and that Nancy discussed her feelings towards 
respondent during therapy in a protective or parental role and in the context of her 
animals. Based on this evidence, the trial court reasonably determined that Nancy 
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and respondent did not have a strong or healthy bond. See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 
843 (2016) (stating that it is the trial judge’s duty to consider all the evidence, pass 
upon the credibility of the witnesses, and determine the reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom). Findings of fact 44 and 45 are supported by relevant and reliable 
evidence. 
B. Challenges to the trial court’s best-interests determination 
¶ 15 
 
Respondent also challenges findings of fact 46 and 48, which state: 
46. Given the juvenile’s diagnoses and Dr. Huneycutt’s 
opinion that she is a seriously emotionally disturbed child, 
the juvenile is in high need of stability and permanence 
and it is not in the best interest of the juvenile to further 
postpone her permanence. 
 
. . . . 
 
48. In light of the findings above, it is in the best interest 
of the juvenile [Nancy] that the [c]ourt terminate the 
parental rights of the respondent mother . . . to said 
juvenile.  
These findings are not factual in nature but instead address the ultimate question of 
Nancy’s best interests. We thus consider respondent’s challenges to them as such. See 
In re A.S.T., 375 N.C. 547, 555 (2020) (“Although the trial court labeled these 
conclusions of law as findings of fact, findings of fact which are essentially conclusions 
of law will be treated as such on appeal.” (cleaned up)). Respondent relatedly 
challenges the trial court’s conclusion of law 7, which also reflects its ultimate 
determination that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in Nancy’s best 
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interests.  
1. The trial court’s consideration of respondent’s bond with Nancy 
¶ 16 
 
Respondent first argues that the trial court abused its discretion because the 
court failed to consider her tenuous bond with Nancy in the proper context. She 
argues that her lack of opportunity to visit with Nancy, which she attributes to the 
trial court having “fast tracked the case, moving full speed ahead from the initial 
underlying petition to termination in eight months,” prevented  the court from having 
the time needed to adequately assess their relationship. Respondent asserts that 
“[n]ot enough time had passed to evaluate whether the trial court should have 
terminated parental rights,” and that with additional time she would have been able 
to meet the necessary criteria to resume her visits with Nancy and strengthen the 
bond between them.  
¶ 17 
 
Initially, we note that the trial court acted in accordance with the Juvenile 
Code throughout this case. The “fast track[ing]” that respondent refers to occurred 
because the trial court determined in its initial disposition and permanency-planning 
order that the case fit within the aggravated circumstances of N.C.G.S. § 7B-
901(c)(1)(b) and (c)(1)(e). Based on this determination, the court relieved DSS from 
making any further efforts toward reunification, as permitted by that statute. The 
order specifically found that respondent “has committed, encouraged, and allowed the 
continuation of chronic physical or emotional abuse of the juvenile, and chronic and 
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toxic exposure to controlled substances that causes the impairment of the juvenile.” 
Respondent did not appeal the trial court’s order, and she is therefore bound by its 
findings and conclusions. See In re A.S.M.R., 375 N.C. 539, 544 (2020). 
¶ 18 
 
Respondent argues that this case is analogous to various other termination 
cases, all of which addressed whether there were grounds for termination in the first 
place and not whether termination was in the child’s best interest.  She relies on In re 
Young, 346 N.C. 244, 252 (1997), in which this Court held that there was insufficient 
evidence that the parent willfully abandoned her child when she was prevented from 
seeing the child; In re Shermer, 156 N.C. App. 281, 288 (2003), in which the Court of 
Appeals held that the parent was not given adequate time to make progress on the 
conditions which led to his child’s removal after the parent was released from prison; 
In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 78–79 (2019), in which this Court vacated and remanded a 
termination order in part because the trial court’s findings failed to resolve whether 
the parent’s actions and omissions which constituted abandonment of his child were 
willful; and In re I.R.L., 263 N.C. App. 481, 483 (2019), in which the Court of Appeals 
vacated and remanded a termination order with insufficient findings regarding 
willfulness when the parent was subject to a domestic violence protective order that 
forbid contact with the child’s mother. 
¶ 19 
 
These cases turned on the question of whether there were sufficient evidence 
and findings of fact with respect to parental fault to justify the trial court’s conclusion 
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that grounds existed to terminate a parent’s parental rights. Here, respondent does 
not dispute that the trial court properly adjudicated multiple grounds for 
termination. None of the precedents respondent invokes stand for the proposition 
that, having concluded that grounds exist which permit termination of parental 
rights, the trial court must nevertheless delay its best-interests determination. 
¶ 20 
 
The focus at the dispositional stage of a termination hearing is whether 
termination is in the best interests of the child. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).  
[A]lthough parents have a constitutionally protected 
interest in the care and custody of their children and 
should not be unnecessarily or inappropriately separated 
from their children, “the best interests of the juvenile are 
of paramount consideration by the court and . . . when it is 
not in the juvenile’s best interest to be returned home, the 
juvenile will be placed in a safe, permanent home within a 
reasonable amount of time.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-100(5).  
In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 11–12 (2019). 
¶ 21 
 
Respondent does not cite any evidence in the record suggesting Nancy’s best 
interests would have been served by delaying the termination hearing. Dr. 
Hunneycutt testified that, at the time the termination hearing occurred, any 
interaction with respondent “could be triggering for [Nancy],” and that before 
respondent’s visitation with Nancy could resume “a lot of things . . . would have to 
happen.” Among the many things that “would have to happen,” Nancy “would need 
to be in a stable placement, need to be stable at school, and we would at least need to 
have fairly good safety for her in order to not overwhelm her.” There was no evidence 
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presented by respondent or by any other party regarding how long it might take 
before respondent and Nancy made sufficient progress such that visitation could 
resume or regarding how long it might further take to allow respondent sufficient 
visitation to improve her bond with Nancy.  
¶ 22 
 
We also note that respondent’s proposed delay relates to only one of the best 
interests factors: the parent-child bond. Even if respondent’s bond with Nancy was 
strong and positive, “the bond between parent and child is just one of the factors to 
be considered under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and the trial court is permitted to give 
greater weight to other factors.” In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437 (2019). 
¶ 23 
 
Ultimately, the trial court was presented with relevant and reliable evidence 
regarding the bond between respondent and Nancy as it existed at the time of the 
termination hearing, and it properly made findings based on that evidence. Of course, 
the trial court possessed the discretion to conclude, based upon its assessment of the 
relevant dispositional factors, that it was in Nancy’s best interests not to terminate 
respondent’s parental rights even after concluding that multiple grounds for 
termination existed. But respondent’s argument that as a matter of law she was 
entitled to a delay in order to potentially improve her bond with Nancy is not 
supported by case law, by the evidence presented at the termination hearing, or by 
the Juvenile Code. The trial court did not err by moving forward with its best-
interests determination after it concluded that grounds existed to terminate 
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respondent’s rights. 
2. The trial court’s weighing of the dispositional factors 
¶ 24 
 
The trial court’s order reflects that it considered all the required statutory 
criteria when it decided that termination of respondent’s parental rights would be in 
Nancy’s best interests. In addition to the findings already discussed, the court made 
uncontested findings that termination of respondent’s parental rights would assist 
“in achieving permanency for [Nancy] and would eliminate [the] barrier to 
implementing” the permanent plan of adoption, which also supports the finding that 
Nancy was “in high need of stability and permanence.” The court also found that 
Nancy was in a pre-adoptive placement and had a good relationship with her foster 
family. As in similar cases upheld by this Court, “the trial court’s findings in this case 
show that it considered the dispositional factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and 
performed a reasoned analysis weighing those factors.” In re Z.A.M., 374 N.C. 88, 101 
(2020). We thus have no basis to reweigh these factors. See In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. at 
12 (“[T]his Court lacks the authority to reweigh the evidence that was before the trial 
court.”). 
3. The trial court’s failure to consider other dispositional alternatives 
¶ 25 
 
Lastly, respondent argues that “the trial court abused [its] discretion by not 
recognizing that continued visitation was still in the best interests of Nancy.” 
Respondent contends the court should have considered other dispositional 
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alternatives instead of termination to provide an avenue by which Nancy could 
maintain a relationship with her mother.  
¶ 26 
 
We have previously observed that  
this Court has rejected arguments that the trial court 
commits error at the dispositional stage of a termination of 
parental rights proceeding by failing to explicitly consider 
non-termination-related dispositional alternatives, such as 
awarding custody of or guardianship over the child to the 
foster family, by reiterating that “the paramount 
consideration must always be the best interests of the 
child.” 
 
In re N.K., 375 N.C. 805, 820 (2020) (quoting In re J.J.B., 374 N.C. 787, 795 (2020)). 
Here, there was no evidence presented at the dispositional hearing that an 
alternative disposition was available or preferrable to the termination of respondent’s 
parental rights, and the evidence that was presented did not establish that Nancy’s 
best interests would be served by maintaining a relationship with respondent. 
Instead, as stated above, the evidence indicated that contact with respondent 
impeded Nancy’s progress and resulted in increased negative behaviors. The trial 
court found that Nancy will require “intense intervention,” including “high levels of 
consistency; structure and safety; . . . a stable environment; and a high level of care 
for a very long time,” which was best accommodated through the termination of 
respondent’s parental rights. 
This determination was neither manifestly 
unsupported by reason nor so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a 
reasoned decision.  
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III. 
Conclusion 
¶ 27 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of 
respondent’s parental rights was in Nancy’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the 
trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights. 
AFFIRMED.