Case Title: State v. Al-Muhhye Allah

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-75-00

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LaVecchia, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to raise a double jeopardy defense prior to trial after the attorney had objected to an earlier grant of a mistrial on the same charges. Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his co-defendant, Geraldo Garcia, when the vehicle was stopped by police. One of the officers noticed an open cardboard box containing envelopes of heroin on the floor of the passenger's side of the vehicle. Defendant ran from the vehicle, but was caught and arrested. Defendant and Garcia were indicted on four counts, including conspiracy, second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school. Prior to defendant's trial, Garcia entered into a plea agreement with the State and agreed to testify at defendant's trial. At the plea hearing, Garcia stated that he and defendant jointly purchased the heroin, which they intended to sell. At trial, defendant's counsel subpoenaed Garcia as a defense witness. Notwithstanding Garcia's plea agreement that required him to testify for the State, the State concluded its case without calling Garcia. Defense counsel then called Garcia to testify. Garcia's direct testimony suggested that defendant was innocent. While Garcia was on the stand, his attorney entered the courtroom on an unrelated matter. When the court declared a recess, Garcia's attorney informed the court that she was not aware her client was to testify that day. She requested an opportunity to speak with Garcia because, although Garcia had entered a guilty plea, he had not yet been convicted and sentenced, meaning his case remained open. Garcia's attorney argued that Garcia could assert his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refuse to testify. The trial court allowed the consultation. When trial reconvened, defense counsel announced he had no further questions for Garcia. In response to the State's first question on cross-examination, Garcia asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the State moved for a mistrial. Defense counsel immediately objected to the request, contending that the defense's actions did not cause the mistrial and that other options were available to the court, such as permitting the State to cross-examine Garcia or instructing the jury to disregard Garcia's direct testimony. A second trial was held before another judge. At no time prior to or during trial did defense counsel move for dismissal of the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Defendant was convicted of simple possession, third- degree. He was sentenced to a five-year term, two without parole. Defendant appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed. It agreed with defendant that there was no manifest necessity for the grant of the mistrial, since Garcia had waived his privilege against self-incrimination by testifying on direct examination and therefore could have been compelled to testify on cross-examination. Nonetheless, the Appellate Division held that defendant had waived his right to claim double jeopardy because he failed to file a Rule 3:10-2 motion before trial raising that defense. In addition, the Appellate Division found that the defense attorney's failure to file the motion did not violate defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certification. 1. The principle that no person is to be placed in jeopardy more than once for the same offense is found in both the United States Constitution and New Jersey Constitution. In addition, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-9 provides statutory protection against double jeopardy. In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches after the jury is impaneled and sworn. Only the improper termination of a trial, however, bars a retrial. Where the court finds a sufficient legal reason and manifest necessity to terminate a trial, the defendant's right to have his initial trial completed is subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials and reliable judgments. The Appellate Division determined that because Garcia was not entitled to rely on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during cross-examination, his invocation of the privilege did not create manifest necessity warranting a new trial. The State did not cross-petition for certification to challenge this determination. (Pp. 10-15) 2. The plain language of Rule 3:10-2(c) provides that the defense of double jeopardy must be raised by motion before trial and that failure to present the defense constitutes a waiver. It allows for relief from the waiver provision on a demonstration of good cause. Defendant claims that the failure of his lawyer to raise the double jeopardy issue before the retrial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and thus met the good cause standard. Courts apply a two-part test in evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). First, counsel's performance must be deficient, involving errors so serious that defendant was deprived of the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense, depriving defendant of a fair trial or a trial whose result is reliable. The Strickland Court further elaborated on the second, prejudice prong, noting that defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The Appellate Division took too narrow a view when it considered deficient performance to be prejudicial only if it rendered the actual trial unfair. Defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance because he had to submit to the second trial. (Pp. 15-28) 3. In view of the Court's disposition of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it need not resolve defendant's alternative arguments that he showed good cause for relief from the waiver provision of Rule 3:10-2(c), and that the double jeopardy claim should be reviewed as a matter of plain error. The question whether a plain error analysis must occur under these circumstances is far from clear. By its holding in this case, however, the Court does not intend to create a rule that requires review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims whenever a lawyer does not interpose a double jeopardy defense under Rule 3:10-2. The holding embraces only the facts of this case, in which defense counsel objected to the grant of a mistrial but did not explicitly assert the double jeopardy claim prior to retrial. In future cases involving a retrial following a mistrial, the Court suggests that the trial court make the waiver of any double jeopardy claim a matter of record to assist in appellate review. Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the indictment is dismissed with prejudice. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LaVECCHIA's opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. AL-MUHHYE ALLAH, a/k/a ANDREW SIMMONS, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________________ Argued October 9, 2001 -- Decided January 17, 2002 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 334 N.J. Super. 516 (2000). Mark H. Friedman, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Peter A. Garcia, Acting Public Defender, attorney). Maryann K. Lynch, Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent 2(Donald C. Campolo, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney). Steven G. Sanders argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Arseneault & Fassett and Edward L. Barocas, Legal Director, attorneys; Mr. Sanders, Mr. Barocas, Lenora M. Lapidus and J.C. Salyer, of counsel and on the briefs). Blair R. Zwillman argued the cause for amicus curiae The Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Zwillman & Zwillman, attorneys). Gerard C. Sims, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LaVECCHIA, J. In this appeal defendant claims he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to raise a double jeopardy defense prior to defendant's trial on various drug offenses after the attorney had objected to an earlier grant of a mistrial on the same charges. The Appellate Division determined that defendant waived his double-jeopardy claim by failing to file a Rule 3:10-2 motion raising the defense. The panel also found that the consequences of the attorney's decision were not sufficient to establish the showing of prejudice necessary to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), because defendant's complaint was that he was subjected to a second trial, not that the second trial was conducted unfairly. We hold that on the facts in this record defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel and is entitled, therefore, to reversal of his conviction. I get a subpoena . . . . Mr. Garcia is now called as a defense witness. . . . I asked him a couple of questions about his plea. I ask him one question, totally consistent with what he said in his plea hearing that the box was found underneath the driver's seat. That is exactly what he said. That's exactly what he said in his plea hearing. And I asked him how is the box bound. Now defense counsel is causing a mistrial in this trial, in this case[?] Really, [the prosecutor] could guarantee no mistrial in this case right now. Because I just said I'm not going to ask this gentleman another question on direct. [The prosecutor] can cross examine this man to his heart's content [.] . . . So I have a serious problem with a mistrial . . . d. The former prosecution was improperly terminated. Except as provided in this subsection, there is an improper termination of a prosecution if the termination is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and it takes place after the jury was impaneled and sworn . . . . Termination under any of the following circumstances is not improper: . . . (3) The trial court finds that the termination is required by a sufficient legal reason and a manifest or absolute or overriding necessity. The Strickland Court further elaborated on the prejudice prong, noting: [T]he appropriate test for prejudice finds its roots in the test for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution, . . . and in the test for materiality of testimony made unavailable to the defense by Government deportation of a witness[] . . . . The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [Id. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel under the New Jersey Constitution is the same as the guarantee under the federal constitution. State v. Fisher, 156 N.J. 494, 500 (1998) (citing State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 53-58 (1987)). Although Strickland instructs that satisfaction of the prejudice prong requires proof that counsel's deficient performance deprived the defendant of a fair trial, that is, a trial whose result is reliable, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, the opinion also states that prejudice may be shown when a defendant can point to the reality that but for counsel's deficiency, the outcome would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000), the Supreme Court reiterated that [t]o establish prejudice [the defendant] 'must show that there is reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.' Id. at 390-91, 120 S. Ct. at 1511-12, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 416 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698). This Court has viewed the prejudice prong in like manner, applying the Strickland test. Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698). See also Fisher, supra, 156 N.J. at 500 (applying Strickland). The question raised as a result of the Appellate Division decision is whether a showing of prejudice can be demonstrated only where the conviction is rendered unreliable by ineffective representation during the trial or by some deficient performance in trial counsel's pretrial work that led to the introduction of constitutionally tainted evidence. Allah, supra, 334 N.J. Super. at 529 (emphasis added). NO. A-75 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. A.L-MUHHYE ALLAH, a/k/a ANDREW SIMMONS, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED January 17, 2002 Chief Justice Poritz