Case Title: Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth.

Citation: 2008-Ohio-3320

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 119 Ohio St.3d 77, 2008-Ohio-
3320.] 
 
 
OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION ET AL., APPELLEES, v. AKRON METROPOLITAN 
HOUSING AUTHORITY ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth.,  
119 Ohio St.3d 77, 2008-Ohio-3320.] 
Housing discrimination — R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) — Claim of hostile housing 
environment — Landlord not liable for failure to prevent racial 
harassment of one tenant by another. 
(No. 2007-0254 – Submitted February 26, 2008 – Decided July 8, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County,  
Nos. 23056 and 23060, 170 Ohio App.3d 283, 2006-Ohio-6967. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A landlord may not be held liable under R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) for failing to take 
corrective action against a tenant whose racial harassment of another tenant 
created a hostile housing environment. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} This case raises a question of first impression in this court:  May a 
landlord be held liable under R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) for failing to take corrective action 
against a tenant whose racial harassment of another tenant created a hostile housing 
environment?  We hold that a landlord may not be held liable under R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) 
for failing to take corrective action against a tenant whose racial harassment of another 
tenant created a hostile housing environment.  The decision of the court of appeals is 
therefore reversed. 
I 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 2} Appellee Fontella Harper and nonparty Beverly Kaisk lived in 
neighboring apartments at Van Buren Homes, a public housing development managed 
by appellant June Davidson and owned and operated by appellant Akron Metropolitan 
Housing Authority (“AMHA”).  After a series of confrontations between Harper’s 
family and Kaisk’s family, appellee the Ohio Civil Rights Commission filed a 
complaint against AMHA and Davidson, alleging unlawful discrimination based on 
race in violation of R.C. 4112.02(H)(4).  In particular, the complaint alleged that 
members of Kaisk’s family had harassed members of Harper’s family, that the 
harassment was racial in nature, and that AMHA and Davidson had failed to take 
corrective action against Harper and her family, despite having notice of the nature of 
the harassment.  Harper and appellee Fair Housing Advocates Association (“FHAA”) 
later intervened as plaintiffs. 
{¶ 3} In its complaint and subsequent motion for summary judgment, the 
commission alleged the following facts.  Over the course of approximately a year, 
Harper’s family and Kaisk’s family had several heated confrontations in the vicinity of 
their apartments.  On one occasion, Kaisk’s daughter referred to members of Harper’s 
family as “niggers” and “Black bitches,” and the girl’s father threatened Harper and her 
cousin with serious physical harm.  On other occasions, members of Kaisk’s family 
called Harper and her children “niggers, nigger lovers, Black bitch, * * * [and] Black 
fuckers.”  Before Kaisk and her family moved out of Van Buren Homes, Kaisk spoke 
with Harper and said, “[Y]ou Black bitch, I’m moving and you can’t do anything about 
it.” 
{¶ 4} Harper spoke with a member of the building management about the first 
incident with Kaisk’s daughter and the girl’s father, describing the racially derogatory 
comments made by Kaisk’s daughter.  Harper also submitted written reports to 
Davidson about subsequent racial harassment.1  Although a member of AMHA’s 
                                                 
1.  AMHA and Davidson challenge Harper’s claim that the building management was aware of the racial 
nature of the harassment.  AMHA and Davidson also challenge Harper’s claim that she submitted written 
January Term, 2008 
3 
security department may have investigated one complaint, neither Davidson nor the 
AMHA took any corrective action regarding the harassment.  Under the lease signed by 
Kaisk, AHMA could terminate the lease “for serious or repeated violations of material 
terms of the lease.”  The lease included a provision requiring tenants to conduct 
themselves in a manner that “will not disturb the neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of their 
accommodations.” 
{¶ 5} The Court of Common Pleas for Summit County granted summary 
judgment in favor of the appellants.  The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that the trial court erred in not recognizing a cause of action for hostile housing 
environment.  The Ninth District further held that the following elements are necessary 
to establish a prima facie case of hostile living environment:  “(1) plaintiffs are 
members of a protected class, (2) the harassment was unwelcome, (3) the harassment 
was based on the plaintiffs’ race, (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive 
to alter the plaintiffs’ living conditions and create an abusive environment, and (5) 
either (a) the harassment was committed by a landlord or (b) the landlord, through its 
agents or supervisory personnel, knew or should have known about the harassment and 
failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.”  (Emphasis added.)  170 
Ohio App.3d 283, 2006-Ohio-6967, 866 N.E.2d 1127, ¶ 19. 
{¶ 6} We accepted jurisdiction on the discretionary appeal. 
II 
{¶ 7} This case raises the following question:  May a landlord be held liable 
under R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) for failing to take corrective action against a tenant whose 
racial harassment of another tenant created a hostile housing environment? 
{¶ 8} At the outset, it is important to distinguish this case from a claim of 
hostile housing environment in which a tenant alleges that the landlord or building 
                                                                                                                                     
reports about subsequent racial harassment.  None of the written reports that were allegedly filed appear 
in the record. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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supervisor created a hostile housing environment through his own harassment of the 
tenant.  See, for example, DiCenso v. Cisneros (C.A.7, 1996), 96 F.3d 1004.  We have 
not yet addressed whether such a cause of action exists under R.C. 4112.02(H)(4), and 
those facts are not before us.  Rather, we consider whether a cause of action exists 
against a landlord who failed to take corrective action against a tenant whose racial 
harassment of another tenant created a hostile housing environment. 
{¶ 9} R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) does not expressly recognize a cause of action 
against a landlord who fails to take corrective action in response to the creation of a 
hostile housing environment by one of his tenants.  R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) provides only 
that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to “[d]iscriminate against 
any person in the terms or conditions of selling, transferring, assigning, renting, leasing, 
or subleasing any housing accommodations or in furnishing facilities, services, or 
privileges in connection with the ownership, occupancy, or use of any housing 
accommodations * * * because of race.” 
{¶ 10} In the absence of an express statutory command, the court of appeals 
found support for the cause of action at issue here in two types of cases:  federal 
housing-discrimination cases and Ohio workplace-harassment cases.  For the reasons 
described below, neither provides a compelling argument in favor of recognizing a 
cause of action against a landlord who failed to take corrective action in response to a 
hostile housing environment created by one of his tenants. 
{¶ 11} We do not agree with the court of appeals’ characterization of its holding 
as consistent with federal rulings on claims of hostile housing environment.  Three of 
the six cases cited by the court of appeals involved claims of direct landlord harassment 
of tenants.  See DiCenso, 96 F.3d 1004; Honce v. Vigil (C.A.10, 1993), 1 F.3d 1085, 
1088; and Smith v. Mission Assoc. Ltd. Partnership (D.Kan. 2002), 225 F.Supp.2d 
1293.  Another case involved claims of direct harassment by a homeowners’ 
association, members of the homeowners’ association who were the plaintiff’s 
neighbors, and a corporation that acted in cooperation with the homeowners’ 
January Term, 2008 
5 
association.  Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Assn. (C.A.7, 
2004), 388 F.3d 327, 330.  Four of the six cases cited by the court of appeals thus arise 
from facts that are clearly distinguishable from the facts in this case. 
{¶ 12} The remaining two federal cases cited by the court of appeals rely on 
authorities that are unconvincing.  The first, Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp. (C.A.8, 
2003), 351 F.3d 361, relies primarily on the authority of federal cases involving claims 
for hostile work environment to hold that a supervisor may be liable for one tenant’s 
harassment of another tenant.  As described below, we reject the argument that the 
principles of employer liability in hostile-work-environment claims should be used as 
models for landlord liability for the acts of tenants.  Furthermore, the facts of Neudecker 
can be distinguished from the facts in the present case:  in Neudecker, the parties 
accused of harassing the plaintiff on account of his disability were the children of 
building managers, and building managers had also committed overt acts of harassment 
against the plaintiff, including a threat of eviction in response to his harassment 
complaints. 
{¶ 13} In the second remaining case cited by the court of appeals, Bradley v. 
Carydale Ents. (E.D.Va.1989), 707 F.Supp. 217, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia held that the toleration by the building owner, manager, and 
employees of harassment of tenants by other tenants was actionable under the Virginia 
Fair Housing Law pursuant to the court’s broad reading of the statutory language.  We 
do not find that court’s broad application of the Virginia statute to be persuasive. 
{¶ 14} The court of appeals’ reliance on the cause of action for hostile work 
environment is also misplaced.  The court of appeals implied, and the appellees argue, 
that we should recognize the present cause of action because we recognize a similar 
cause of action in the employment context:  An employer may be held liable for a 
nonsupervisory employee’s sexual harassment of his co-worker if the employer, 
through its agents or supervisory personnel, knew or should have known of the 
harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.  Hampel v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Food Ingredients Specialties, Inc. (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 169, 729 N.E.2d 726.  We 
reject the argument that our precedent in the employment context requires us to 
recognize the cause of action in the landlord-tenant circumstances of this case. 
{¶ 15} This court first recognized that an employer may be held liable for 
failing to take corrective action in response to co-worker sexual harassment in Hampel.  
The court in Hampel established the following elements for a hostile-environment 
sexual-harassment claim:  “(1) that the harassment was unwelcome, (2) that the 
harassment was based on sex, (3) that the harassing conduct was sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to affect the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter 
directly or indirectly related to employment,’ and (4) that either (a) the harassment was 
committed by a supervisor, or (b) the employer through its agents or supervisory 
personnel, knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate 
and appropriate corrective action.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 16} The statutory language at issue in Hampel did not explicitly recognize a 
cause of action against an employer for failing to take corrective action in response to 
co-worker sexual harassment.  R.C. 4112.02(A) provides only that it is an unlawful 
discriminatory practice “[f]or any employer, because of the * * * sex * * * of any 
person, * * * to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to 
employment.” 
{¶ 17} The court in Hampel extended liability to employers who “knew or 
should have known” of the harassment on the authority of applicable federal case law:  
“[T]he federal courts uniformly apply a ‘known or should have known’ test in 
determining an employer’s liability for harassment by nonsupervisory coworkers or 
nonemployees.”  Id., 89 Ohio St.3d at 177, 729 N.E.2d 726, fn. 2, citing Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth (1998), 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633; and 
Faragher v. Boca Raton (1998), 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662. 
January Term, 2008 
7 
{¶ 18} In Burlington Industries and Faragher, the United States Supreme Court 
noted that imposing liability on an employer who knew or should have known about co-
worker harassment was an application of negligence liability.  In Faragher, the 
Supreme Court noted in dicta that “combined knowledge and inaction may be seen as 
demonstrable negligence.”  Id. at 789, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662.  In Burlington 
Industries, 524 U.S. at 759, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633, the Supreme Court noted, 
also in dicta, that “[a]n employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it 
knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it.” 
{¶ 19} This liability of an employer for an employee’s negligence derives from 
the established principles of agency law.  In Burlington, the Supreme Court discussed 
employer liability for the tortious actions of an employee in the context of master-
servant liability, noting that a master is not liable for the torts of a servant acting outside 
the scope of employment unless one of four factors exists. Id. at 758, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 
141 L.Ed.2d 633, citing 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Agency (1958), Section 219(2).  
None of those factors apply to the liability of a landlord for the actions of a tenant. 
{¶ 20} The agency principles that govern employer-employee liability have no 
parallel in the context of landlord-tenant disputes:  “The relation of landlord and tenant 
in itself involves no idea of representation or of agency. It is a relation existing between 
two independent contracting parties. The landlord is not responsible to third persons for 
the torts of his tenant.”  Midland Oil Co. v. Thigpen (C.A.8, 1925), 4 F.2d 85, 91.  See 
also Darnell v. Columbus Show-Case Co. (1907), 129 Ga. 62, 65, 58 S.E. 631 (“a 
tortious act done by one tenant to another tenant of a common landlord, without the 
authority, consent, or connivance of the landlord, is not the latter's tort, but the tort of 
him who does the act”). 
{¶ 21} The amount of control that a landlord exercises over his tenant is not 
comparable to that which an employer exercises over his employee.  As the appellants 
observe, a landlord does enjoy a measure of control through his ability to evict tenants.  
In the present case, the lease signed by Kaisk gives the AMHA authority to evict a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
tenant who disturbs other tenants’ “peaceful enjoyment of their accommodations.”  The 
power of eviction alone, however, is insufficient to hold a landlord liable for his 
tenant’s tortious actions against another tenant.  See Siino v. Reices (1995), 216 A.D.2d 
552, 553, 628 N.Y.S.2d 757 (“Absent authority to control the conduct of a third person, 
a landowner does not have a duty to protect a tenant from the conduct of another tenant.  
A reasonable opportunity or effective means to control a third person does not arise 
from the mere power to evict.”  [Citations omitted]).  We therefore reject the argument 
that our precedent in the employment context applies to the cause of action at issue 
here. 
{¶ 22} Finally, we decline the request by appellees Harper and FHAA to 
recognize this action under the statutory command that R.C. Chapter 4112 “shall be 
construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes.”  R.C. 4112.08.  Although 
the conduct alleged by the appellees is reprehensible, we decline to extend liability to 
behavior so far beyond the reach of the statutory language, especially in light of the 
absence of an agency relationship between a landlord and his tenants and the landlord’s 
comparative lack of control over his tenants. 
III 
{¶ 23} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a tenant may not bring a claim 
against his landlord under R.C. 4112.02(H)(4) when racial harassment by another tenant 
creates a hostile housing environment. 
{¶ 24} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed. 
Judgment reversed. 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, 
JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Nancy Hardin Rogers, Attorney General, William P. Marshall, Solicitor 
General, Elise W. Porter and Robert J. Krummen, Deputy Solicitors, and David A. 
January Term, 2008 
9 
Oppenheimer and Sharon D. Tassie, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee Ohio 
Civil Rights Commission. 
 
Margolius, Margolius & Associates, Andrew L. Margolius, and Emily E. 
Warren, for appellees Fontella Harper and Fair Housing Advocates Association. 
 
Michele Morris, Richard A. Green, and James D. Casey, for appellants. 
 
Fair Housing Law Clinic, Edward G. Kramer, and Kenneth J. Kowalski, urging 
affirmance for amicus curiae the Housing Advocates, Inc.. 
 
Relman & Dane, P.L.L.C., and Stephen M. Dane, urging affirmance for amici 
curiae National Fair Housing Alliance, Inc., Miami Valley Fair Housing Center, Inc., 
Housing Research & Advocacy Center, Heights Community Congress, Fair Housing 
Contact Service, Housing Opportunities Made Equal of Greater Cincinnati, Toledo Fair 
Housing Center, the John Marshall Law School Fair Housing Legal Support Center, 
Akron Branch NAACP, Urban League of Greater Cincinnati, Lorain County Urban 
League, Coalition on Homelessness and Housing in Ohio, St. Bernard Catholic Church, 
Equal Justice Foundation, and City of Barberton Law Department. 
 
Lisa L. Walker, urging reversal for amicus curiae Housing and Development 
Law Institute. 
 
Reno & Cavanaugh, P.L.L.S., Stephen I. Holmquist, Jaime Lee, Sarah Molseed, 
and Casius Pealer, urging reversal for amici curiae Council of Large Public Housing 
Authorities, National Apartment Association, National Association of Housing and 
Redevelopment Officials, National Leased Housing Association, National Multi 
Housing Council, and Public Housing Authorities Directors Association. 
______________________