Case Title: Curo v. Becker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 962366

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
DAVID P. CURO, ADULT 
PROBATION OFFICER 
 
v. Record No. 962366 
OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
                                        October 3l, 1997 
HELIANTHE DENT CINDY BECKER 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 
 
Thomas D. Horne, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, the sole issue is whether the circuit 
court erred by awarding Helianthe Dent Cindy Becker a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus on the basis that Becker was denied effective 
assistance of counsel.  Because we conclude that the attorney's 
representation was not deficient, we will reverse the judgment 
of the circuit court. 
 
In March l993, a jury convicted Becker of arson, and on 
September 27, l993, the trial court sentenced her to two years 
of incarceration, suspended, and probation.  After exhausting 
the direct appeal process, Becker filed a Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and asserted ineffective assistance of counsel 
based on numerous alleged deficiencies.  The circuit court
1 
held a plenary hearing on August 2l, l996, and issued its 
decision in a letter memorandum dated September 3, l996.  The 
court concluded that Becker's trial counsel had failed to 
conduct both a meaningful review of the underlying data relied 
upon by the forensic expert and an effective cross-examination 
of the expert.  Because of these errors, the court found that 
                     
    
1 The same judge presided at Becker's original trial for 
arson and at the habeas hearing. 
 
 
 
 
2 
the attorney's representation of Becker fell below the standard 
for reasonably effective assistance of counsel, and that, but 
for the errors, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different.  Specifically, the court stated: 
 
In this circumstantial evidence case, in which the 
testimony of the expert was critical to the 
Commonwealth's proof, a failure to fully examine both 
the conclusions and the basis for the conclusions of 
such expert not only is unreasonable but likely to 
have affected the ultimate outcome of the case.  
 
In an order entered on September 23, l996, the court vacated 
Becker's arson conviction and awarded her a new trial.  In a 
separate order, it denied David P. Curo's
2 Motion for 
Reconsideration.
3
 
I. 
 
"One attacking a judgment of conviction in a habeas corpus 
proceeding has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
evidence the allegations contained in [the] petition."  Nolan 
v. Peyton, 208 Va. l09, ll2, 155 S.E.2d 318, 321 (1967).  
Because entitlement to habeas relief is a mixed question of law 
and fact, the circuit court's findings and conclusions are not 
binding upon this Court, but are subject to review to determine 
whether the circuit court correctly applied the law to the 
                     
    
2 Throughout this proceeding, appellant's name has been 
spelled "Curo" and "Curro."  We are using the spelling that 
appears in our order awarding the appeal. 
    3  The circuit court found no merit in Becker's other 
allegations in her Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.  Becker 
did not assign cross-error to that finding.  See Rule 5:9 and 
Rule 5:l7(c). 
 
 
 
 
3 
facts.  Williams v. Warden of Mecklenburg Correctional Ctr., 
254 Va. l6, 24, 487 S.E. 2d l94, l98 (1997).  We hold that it 
did not. 
 
II. 
 
To understand the significance of the evidence at the 
habeas corpus hearing, we must first review the evidence 
presented at Becker's trial.  Becker testified that on the 
morning of April 30, l992, she had planned to meet with her 
attorney to prevent an impending foreclosure on her farm.  She 
had called to prearrange a taxi the previous evening, but when 
the taxi arrived that morning at the appointed time, Becker was 
not ready to leave.  She asked the taxi driver to return a 
little later.  After the taxi left, Becker walked to the end of 
the driveway to close the gate and also to gather some bark to 
put on a fire in the fireplace in her den that she had ignited 
earlier with fire starter logs.  She then ate her breakfast and 
went to the barn, located behind her house, to get some tools 
she had promised to give to another individual.   
 
Becker testified that, while in the barn, she heard a 
noise and smelled "something like lacquer."  Upon leaving the 
barn, Becker discovered that her house was on fire.  By this 
time, the taxi driver had returned, and the taxi was parked in 
Becker's driveway.  Both Becker and the taxi driver saw smoke 
coming out a door and some windows.  Becker testified that she 
went to the door and opened it, but she was not certain whether 
 
 
 
 
4 
                    
she actually went inside.  Since Becker did not have a 
telephone, the taxi driver took her to a neighbor's house to 
call for help.  When she returned to her home, flames were 
shooting out the windows.  Becker tried to enter the house, but 
people at the scene prevented her from going in.  Later, Becker 
went to a hospital by ambulance. 
 
Pat Brandenburg, a lieutenant with the Loudoun County Fire 
Marshall's Office, investigated the fire at Becker's home to 
determine the cause and the origin of the fire.  He concluded 
that there were multiple points of origin, that an incendiary 
means caused the fire, and that the fire was the result of 
arson.  During his investigation, he found boxes of Becker's 
personal items in the barn wrapped in newspaper bearing the 
same date as that of the fire.
4  Brandenburg also collected 
several items of evidence that he submitted to the Commonwealth 
of Virginia, Division of Forensic Science, for analysis.  The 
items included debris from the fire scene, a piece of "control 
wood" from the flooring material, liquid found in a gasoline 
can outside Becker's house, a tan skirt found inside the barn, 
a yellow shirt that Becker wore on the day of the fire, blue 
jeans, and a pair of shoes.
5  
 
    
4 Becker testified that she had been packing items the night 
before the fire.  The newspaper was available on the afternoon 
prior to its actual date.  
    
5 Brandenburg did not personally collect the tan skirt, 
yellow shirt, blue jeans, or shoes; he received them from 
Investigator Merchant of the Loudoun County Sheriff's Office.  
 
 
 
 
5 
                    
 
At trial, Eileen A. Davis, a forensic scientist with the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Division of Forensic Science, 
testified regarding the results of the analyses on these items. 
 Using a gas chromatograph, Davis concluded that the liquid 
found in the gasoline can was a mixture of petroleum 
distillates of the gasoline and fuel oil types.  Likewise, some 
of the debris samples from the scene and the yellow shirt 
contained the same mixture.
6  She found no difference in the 
nature of the petroleum mix on these items but acknowledged 
that she could neither identify the specific type of commercial 
gasoline nor state that the fuel oil on the yellow shirt was 
the same type as that found on the debris.  Finally, Davis 
acknowledged some starter logs contain fuel oil distillates.  
 
At the subsequent evidentiary hearing on her habeas 
petition, Becker's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
focused on the forensic evidence.  She offered evidence from an 
analytical chemist, Keith Flohr, regarding the chromatographic 
charts that Davis' testing produced.  Flohr concluded that the 
raw data on the charts were reliable and the results of 
appropriate testing.
7  He agreed with Davis' conclusion that 
 
    
6  Davis found no petroleum distillates on the blue jeans, 
tan skirt, or piece of control wood.  On the shoes, she found 
characteristics of a petroleum distillate of the gasoline type 
but could not make a more definitive determination.  
    
7 Flohr did not repeat any testing of the items but reached 
all his conclusions based upon the chromatographic charts 
prepared by the Division of Forensic Science. 
 
 
 
 
6 
                    
the blue jeans did not contain any appreciable amount of 
petroleum distillate.
8  Flohr's most critical conclusion, based 
on his interpretations of the tracings on the chromatographic 
charts, was that the petroleum distillate found on the yellow 
shirt came from exposure to smoke and not from exposure to 
gasoline or fuel vapor.   
 
Davis also testified at the evidentiary hearing on the 
habeas petition and did not agree with Flohr's analysis.  She 
stated that "you cannot tell whether it was a vapor, whether it 
was a liquid, whether it was splashed, whether it was pre-
existing, that there is no way to tell, looking at the 
chromatograms, to make that determin[ation]."  
 
Becker's trial attorney recognized that the prosecution's 
most compelling evidence directly linking Becker to the fire 
was the substance on the yellow shirt.  However, Becker's trial 
attorney was satisfied with Davis' admission that she could not 
determine if the distillate on the shirt was the same type as 
that on the debris.  Becker's trial attorney believed that 
Davis' admission coupled with the statement that some fire 
starter logs contain fuel oil distillates corroborated the 
defense theory that the distillate on the yellow shirt came 
 
    
8 According to Flohr, the absence of distillate on the blue 
jeans indicated that Becker did not pour the accelerant in the 
house.  First, he explained that gasoline has a low surface 
tension and thus splashes easily.  Second, when one comes in 
contact with the gasoline, most of it, but not all, will 
evaporate. 
 
 
 
 
7 
from the logs.  Because she believed this defense was viable, 
Becker's trial attorney did not employ an expert to check 
Davis' work, obtain the chromatographic charts, or ask Davis 
whether the distillate on the yellow shirt might have come from 
smoke. 
 
III. 
 
"The right to counsel which is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution and made applicable to 
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right 
to effective assistance of counsel."  Virginia Dep't. of 
Corrections v. Clark, 227 Va. 525, 533, 3l8 S.E.2d 399, 403 
(l984).  "The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined 
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the 
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (l984).  "In other 
words, the accused is entitled to counsel who is a reasonably 
competent attorney and to advice that is within the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."  Murray v. 
Griffith, 243 Va. 384, 388, 4l6 S.E.2d 219, 221 (l992) (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 
 
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court of the 
United States enunciated a two-part test for judging claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral attack on the 
conviction.  "First, the defendant must show . . . that counsel 
 
 
 
 
8 
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
`counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  The second element of the test 
requires the defendant to show "that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense."  Id.  Unless the defendant satisfies 
both elements, the claim of ineffective assistance will fail.  
Id.
 
In applying this two-part test, the Supreme Court 
cautioned against second-guessing counsel's representation 
through hindsight.  Instead, the Court stated that "a court 
deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the 
reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of 
the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's 
conduct."  Id. at 690.  Furthermore, the Court recognized that 
"[t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or 
substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or 
actions."  Id. at 691. 
 
This last admonition is determinative of the present case. 
 Becker's theory of ineffective assistance of counsel rests on 
the trial attorney's failure to develop the forensic evidence. 
 Becker claims that her attorney erred by not obtaining the 
chromatographic charts and procuring expert testimony such as 
that offered at the habeas hearing by Flohr to establish that 
the distillate on the yellow shirt might have come from smoke 
rather than from gasoline or fuel vapor.  Becker also contends 
 
 
 
 
9 
that her attorney's failure to understand the methodology and 
data led to an ineffective cross-examination of the expert.  
 
The above theory erroneously presupposes that Becker had 
not previously offered any explanation for the presence of the 
distillate on the yellow shirt.  However, Becker had told her 
attorney that she had used fire starter logs that morning, and 
she attributed the presence of distillate on her shirt to her 
handling of those logs.  Upon investigating this explanation, 
Becker's attorney learned three important things from Davis: 
(1) that some fire starter logs contain fuel oil distillates; 
(2) that Davis could not distinguish between specific types of 
fuel oil; and (3) that Davis would admit that she could not 
determine whether the petroleum distillate found on debris 
taken from the fire scene and that found on the yellow shirt 
were the same type. 
 
Despite this defense premised on information from Becker, 
the circuit court concluded that Becker's attorney erred in the 
manner in which she developed the forensic evidence and cross-
examined Davis.  That judgment, however, runs afoul of the 
instructions in Strickland.  "[W]hen the facts that support a 
certain potential line of defense are generally known to 
counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for 
further investigation may be considerably diminished or 
eliminated altogether."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 69l.  Because 
the attorney developed a defense based on Becker's version of 
 
 
 
 
10 
the events, we cannot now say that the representation "fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness" just because the 
attorney did not also investigate alternative defenses.  Id. at 
688. 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that Becker was not denied 
the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment.  Since Becker has not shown that her trial 
attorney's performance was deficient, we do not need to address 
the prejudice element of the Strickland test.  We hold, 
therefore, that the circuit court erred in granting the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus.  Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court 
will be reversed and vacated, and final judgment will be 
entered here dismissing Becker's Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. 
 
Reversed and final judgment.