Case Title: WILLIAM P. RICE V. COLLINS COMMUNICATION, INC., a Wyoming Corporation, COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Wyoming Corporation, CAMPBELL COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, CAMPBELL COUNTY SHERIFF, WILLIAM POWNALL, GILLETTE/WRIGHT/CAMPBELL COUNTY FIRE PROTECTION JOINT POWERS BOARD, and CAMPBELL COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COORDINATOR, DAVID KING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0007

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIAM P. RICE V. COLLINS COMMUNICATION, INC., a Wyoming Corporation, COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Wyoming Corporation, CAMPBELL COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, CAMPBELL COUNTY SHERIFF, WILLIAM POWNALL, GILLETTE/WRIGHT/CAMPBELL COUNTY FIRE PROTECTION JOINT POWERS BOARD, and CAMPBELL COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COORDINATOR, DAVID KING2010 WY 109Case Number: S-09-0007Decided: 08/04/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
WILLIAM 
P. RICE,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.COLLINS 
COMMUNICATION, INC., a Wyoming Corporation, COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a 
Wyoming Corporation, CAMPBELL COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, CAMPBELL 
COUNTY SHERIFF, WILLIAM POWNALL, GILLETTE/WRIGHT/CAMPBELL COUNTY FIRE PROTECTION 
JOINT POWERS BOARD, and CAMPBELL COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COORDINATOR, DAVID 
KING,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Jeffrey 
A. Tennyson of Jeffrey A. Tennyson, P.C.; and Heather Noble, Jackson, WY.  Argument by Mr. 
Tennyson.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Stuart 
R. Day and Ryan J. Schwartz of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., 
Casper, WY for Collins Communication, Inc.; Roger E. Shumate and James C. 
Worthen of Murane & Bostwick, LLC, Casper, WY for Communication 
Technologies, Inc.; Judith Studer of Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer, LLC, 
Casper, WY for Campbell County Board of County Commissioners, Campbell County 
Sheriff, and Campbell County Emergency Management Coordinator; and Tom C. Toner 
of Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, WY for Gillette Wright/Campbell County 
Fire Protection Joint Powers Board.  
Argument by Messrs. Schwartz, Shumate, Toner, and Ms. 
Studer.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      William P. Rice's 
commercial building caught fire in Campbell County, Wyoming.  Because of a failure in the 
communications/paging system used by the county, almost a half hour passed 
before there was any formal response to the fire.  Rice's building and its contents were 
almost totally destroyed.  Rice 
filed suit against several county entities as well as two communications 
companies alleging negligence, whereupon the district court dismissed his 
complaint in its entirety.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Rice states 
his issues as follows:

 
 

-          
Was 
it error for the district court to find as a matter of law that Defendants 
Collins and ComTech owed no duty of care to [Rice] in operating and maintaining 
an emergency communications system for Campbell County, when the failure of that 
system delayed the fire department's response to a fire, leading to the 
destruction of [Rice's] building and property?

-          
Was 
it error for the district court to grant summary judgment to the County 
Defendants on the basis of governmental immunity, despite W.S. § 1-39-108(a) 
which waives immunity for negligent operation of public utilities and 
services?

-          
Was 
it error for the district court to grant summary judgment to  Defendant Sheriff Pownall on the basis 
of governmental immunity, despite W.S. § 1 -39-112 which waives immunity [for] 
tortious conduct of peace officers while acting within the scope of their 
duties?

-          
Was 
it error for the district court to grant summary judgment to the County 
Defendants on the basis of governmental immunity despite W.S. § 1-39-106 which 
waives sovereign immunity for negligent operation or maintenance of any 
building?

-          
Did 
the district court err in finding that [Rice] could not establish that his 
damages were proximately caused by Defendant's negligence?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On April 8, 2006, 
a fire was reported at 402 East 2nd Street in 
Gillette, Wyoming. The county sheriff's office dispatch center received the call 
reporting the fire at 12:25 a.m.  
The first police officer responded to the scene at 12:28 a.m., and the 
ambulance arrived at 12:30 a.m.  
Fire engine 11 arrived at 12:52 a.m., twenty-seven minutes after the fire 
was first reported.

 
 
[¶4]      The fire consumed 
much of the commercial building, out of which Rice ran several businesses.1  Rice also leased business space to 
several other tenants.  
Unfortunately for all of the businesses and owners, the fire resulted in 
a total loss of the building.2

 
 
[¶5]      The night of the 
fire, a malfunction occurred in the emergency paging system used by the 
county.  The system works as 
follows:  When a page is initiated 
by the sheriff's department, it originates in the dispatch center and travels by 
wire to a microwave transceiver.  
The transceiver then transmits the page to an antenna located in the back 
of the sheriff's office.  The 
antenna then sends a signal, via microwaves, to one of four remote towers  the 
Hitt tower, the North tower, the South tower and the Wright tower.  Those towers then re-transmit the signal 
to portable radios carried by volunteer firefighters.  Although the fire department is staffed 
by full-time career firefighters from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., volunteer firefighters 
are "on call" from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m.  
Those volunteer firefighters are "paged" to notify them of a fire.  Normally, they contact dispatch when 
they are en route to the fire station.  
However, the night of the fire in this case, the dispatcher did not hear 
any responses, and so she sent the page again.  Once more, she heard no responses, and 
then activated the City Watch AVS 100 Phone Notification System, which called 
the firefighters by telephone to notify them of the fire.

 
 
[¶6]      Because of the 
delay in response, Rice filed suit, alleging negligence against several 
defendants.  First, he named the 
Campbell County Board of County Commissioners, Campbell County Sheriff William 
Pownall, and Campbell County Emergency Management Coordinator David King (the 
"County Defendants"), alleging that they were negligent based upon the decisions 
they made related to the emergency communication system in place at the time of 
the fire.  Rice also named Collins 
Communication, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation that sells electronic and 
communications products and provides service for those products.  Collins installed a Motorola Quanter 
repeater system and related components at the Hitt Hill site on February 22, 
2006, and Rice alleged that they were negligent based upon the work they 
performed at the Hitt Hill site.  
Finally, Rice named Communication Technologies, Inc. ("ComTech"), which 
has a contract for maintenance and service of specific communication equipment 
which is part of the Campbell County emergency communication system  Rice 
alleged that they were negligent based on that contract.3

 
 
[¶7]      All named 
defendants filed motions for summary judgment in response to Rice's amended 
complaint.  In its decision letter, 
the district court divided the motions into "two broad categories."  The first issue presented by Collins and 
ComTech involved whether a duty to Rice existed.  The second issue presented by the County 
Defendants and the Defendant Fire Board involved the question of immunity from 
liability under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-101, et. seq. (LexisNexis 2009).  
The court concluded that no duty existed on behalf of Collins or ComTech, 
and because the County Defendants and the Fire Board did not meet any of the 
exceptions to the WGCA, their governmental immunity was not waived.  Thus, all motions for summary judgment 
were granted, and this appeal followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      Our oft repeated 
standard of review for summary judgment motions is as 
follows:

 
 
We 
evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same 
standards and using the same materials as the district court. Cook v. 
Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo. 2006). 
Thus, our review is plenary. Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2003 
WY 102, ¶ 7, 75 P.3d 640, 647 (Wyo. 2003). 

 
 

Wyo. 
R. Civ. P. 56 governs summary judgments. A summary judgment is appropriate when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c).  When reviewing a summary judgment, we 
consider the record in the perspective most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be 
fairly drawn from the record. We review questions of law de novo without 
giving any deference to the district court's 
determinations.

 
 

Cathcart 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
2005 WY 154, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 579, 586 (Wyo. 2005), quoting Baker v. Ayres 
& Baker Pole & Post, Inc., 2005 WY 97, ¶ 14, 117 P.3d 1234, 
1239 (Wyo. 2005).

 

 
"A 
genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, 
would establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a defense 
that the parties have asserted." Christensen v. Carbon County, 2004 WY 
135, ¶ 8, 100 P.3d 411, 413 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Metz Beverage Co. v. 
Wyoming Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 
2002)). The party requesting a summary judgment bears the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment. If he carries his burden, 
"the party who is opposing the motion for summary judgment must present specific 
facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists." Id. 
We have explained the duties of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment 
as follows: 

 
 
"After 
a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing 
party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing 
there are genuine issues of material fact. The opposing party must affirmatively 
set forth material, specific facts in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment, and cannot rely only upon allegations and pleadings , and conclusory 
statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's 
burden."

 
 
The 
evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment "must be 
competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely 
eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or 
wishful speculation." Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, 
guesses, or even probability, are insufficient to establish an issue of material 
fact.  Cook, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d  at 890, quoting Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶¶ 9-11, 113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo. 2005).  Hatton 
v. Energy Elec. Co., 2006 WY 151, ¶¶ 8-9, 148 P.3d 8, 12 13 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 

Loredo 
v. Solvay Am., Inc., 
2009 WY 93, ¶ 10, 212 P.3d 614, 618-619 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Collins/ComTech 
Duty of Care

 
 
[¶9]      Rice first argues 
that it was error for the district court to find as a matter of law that 
Appellees Collins and ComTech owed no duty of care to Rice in operating and 
maintaining an emergency communications system for Campbell County, when the 
failure of that system delayed the fire department's response to the fire that 
led to the destruction of Rice's building and property.

 
 
[¶10]   In order to maintain a claim of 
negligence, 
a plaintiff must prove: 1) The defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of 
reasonable care; 2) the defendant breached the duty; 
and 3) the defendant's breach was the proximate cause of injury or loss to the 
plaintiff.  Andersen v. Two Dot 
Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶ 11, 49 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 2002). The 
existence and scope of a duty are 
questions of law for the court.  
Absent a duty, 
there is no actionable claim of negligence.  Additionally, absent evidence that the 
defendant breached the duty by 
failing to exercise reasonable care, a claim of negligence 
is not sustainable. Id.  A duty of care "may arise by 
contract, statute, common law, or when the relationship of the parties is such 
that the law imposes an obligation on the defendant to act reasonably for the 
protection of the plaintiff."  Hamilton v. Natrona County Educ. Ass'n, 
901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 
[¶11]   We begin with Rice's claim that 
Collins and ComTech owed him a duty of care based on the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.  The Restatement contains the 
following provision:

 
 
One 
who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another 
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or 
his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his 
undertaking, if

(a)  his 
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or 

(b)  he 
has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, 
or

(c)  the 
harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the 
undertaking. 

 
 
Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 324(A) (1965).  
We have adopted this Restatement view of voluntary undertakings in the 
"Good Samaritan" context.  See Berry v. Tessman, 2007 WY 175, 
¶ 13, 170 P.3d 1243, 1246 (Wyo. 2007) (visitor Tessman tripped and fell into 
a naturally occurring marmot hole at a campground; because campground owner 
Berry had not undertaken to fix or free the area of marmot holes, there was no 
duty); Andersen, ¶ 11, 49 P.3d 1011 at 1014.

 
 
[¶12]   Although this Court has adopted the 
Restatement as it applies to Good Samaritans, to do so in this case would be 
wholly outside of that context.  
Here, under Rice's argument, a private corporation doing business with a 
government entity would owe a duty to a private citizen.  The Restatement does not contemplate 
that sort of expansion.

 
 
[F]or 
purposes of liability under . . . [section] 324A, it must be demonstrated that 
the services rendered either increased the risk of harm to the third party or 
consisted of the performance of a duty owed by the other party to the involved 
third party, or that the harm resulted from the third party's reliance upon the 
service renderer's performance.

 
 

May 
Dep't Stores Co. v. University Hills, Inc., 
789 P.2d 434, 441 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).  
"The Restatement of Torts 
(Second) 324(a) 
only refers to a duty to avoid physical harm to a third person or his 
things; it does not include language expanding the duty to infliction of 
intangible harm to property rights."   Braick 
v. Faxton-St. Luke's Healthcare, 
2004 NY Slip Op 51595U, 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (emphasis 
added).

 
 
[¶13]   In this case, both Collins and 
ComTech were merely supplying services at the request of the county.  Thus, the Restatement does not impose 
liability.  However, that conclusion 
does not end our inquiry as to the question of duty.  Rice also contends that the 
"eight-factor" test, when applied, determines that a duty existed.  The eight factors utilized to determine 
the existence of a duty are:

 
 
(1)  The 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2)  the closeness of the 
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, 
(3)  the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, 
(4)  the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, 
(5)  the policy of preventing future harm, (6)  the extent 
of the burden upon the defendant, (7)  the consequence to the 
community and the court system, and (8)  the availability, cost and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.

 
 

Berry, 
¶ 8, 170 P.3d  at 1245 (citing Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 1987)).  The court may also consider the 
"magnitude of the risk involved in defendant's conduct, the burden of requiring 
defendant to guard against that risk and the consequences of placing that burden 
upon the defendant."  Sponsel v. Park County, 2006 WY 6, ¶ 18, 126 P.3d 105, 110 
(Wyo. 2006).

 
 
[¶14]   In its decision letter, the 
district court outlined the eight factors and concluded as follows in relation 
to them:

 
 

1.    
While 
the failure of such communication equipment causing a delay in the response of 
emergency services could have been foreseeable, it cannot be established that 
the delay contributed to [Rice's] harm.

2.    
The 
degree of closeness between the conduct of Defendants Collins and ComTech and 
the injury suffered is small.  Three 
of the four repeaters in the County emergency communications systems were fully 
functional, and it cannot be conclusively established that the delay in response 
time contributed to [Rice's] harm.

3.    
While 
it is clear [Rice] suffered harm, it cannot be established that the Defendants' 
actions caused that harm.

4.    
Moral 
blame cannot be attached to the Defendants for failure in equipment used in the 
normal course of business and properly maintained.

5.    
While 
preventing future harm is always a concern for the court, imposing a duty of 
this magnitude upon those who provide service and equipment to emergency 
communication systems would ultimately hinder the ability of county governments 
to acquire such services.

6.    
Holding 
the Defendants responsible for the failure of communication equipment in this 
case would impose an unreasonably heavy burden on the 
Defendant.

7.    
The 
consequences to the community and court would be high as costs for the 
maintenance of emergency communication systems would increase and the likelihood 
of lawsuits would also increase.

8.    
Fire 
insurance is easily acquired and relatively inexpensive compared to the 
benefit.  [Rice] could have been 
compensated for his damages through those means.

 
 
We 
are in agreement with the district court. While we do not see a need to expound 
on the district court's sound reasoning as to every factor, we would like to 
address factors one and two in greater detail.  We believe factors one and two, the 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff and the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, are the "crux" of the 
issue in front of us.  Our caselaw 
is instructive on these two factors.  
We have stated that summary judgment is proper when "the causal 
connection between defendant's acts and plaintiff's damage is almost entirely 
subject to conjecture and speculation."  
De Wald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 651 (Wyo. 1986).4  With respect to Collins' and ComTech's 
conduct in the instant case, it cannot be stated that the fire on Rice's 
property, and the resulting damage, was either's fault.  After reviewing the record on appeal, we 
conclude that neither Collins nor ComTech owed Rice a duty of care.  

 
 
Governmental 
ImmunityScope of Duties

 
 
[¶15]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a) 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides: 

 
 
A 
governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of 
duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by 
W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112, and limited by W.S. 
1-39-121.

 
 
The 
WGCA is a "closed end tort claims act" such that any claim is barred unless it 
falls within a statutory exception.  
Sponsel, 126 P.3d  at 
105.

 
 
[¶16]   Rice contends that "several 
provisions" of the WGCA apply and effectively strip the County Defendants of 
their governmental immunity, and that the district court was in error when it 
granted summary judgment to the County Defendants, finding that immunity had not 
been waived.

 
 
[¶17]   First, Rice points to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-108(a) (LexisNexis 2009), which provides that a governmental 
entity is liable for damages caused 
by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their 
duties "in the operation of public utilities and services including gas, 
electricity, water, solid or liquid waste collection or disposal, heating, and 
ground transportation."  Rice argues 
that the emergency communication system at issue in this case qualifies as a 
public utility and service within the scope of this statute, and thus, the 
County Defendants are liable.  The 
County Defendants argue that a fire page is not the operation of a public 
utility for purposes of the waiver of immunity under § 
1-39-108(a).

 
 
[¶18]   Both parties rely upon City of Cheyenne v. Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102 
(Wyo. 1993), to support their arguments.  
In that case, this Court held that firefighting is not a public utility 
or service for purposes of § 1-39-108(a).  
We stated in Huitt:

 
 

            
If 
we would accept respondent's contention that firefighting is included among the 
governmental operations for which immunity is waived by Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-108, 
although not so specified therin, the same could also be true for all other 
governmental operations.  The 
legislature, then, would have done a useless thing in specifying certain 
operations in the statute for which 
immunity is waived.  Further, should 
we accept such contention, the legislature would also have done a useless thing 
in providing exceptions to immunity in 
other statutes contained in the Act, e.g., uses of motor vehicles, aircraft, 
and watercraft in Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-105 (1988); for operation of a building, 
recreational area or public park in Wyo. Stat. §1-39-106; or for peace officers 
in Wyo. Stat. §1-39-112 (1988).

 
 

Huitt, 
844 P.2d  at 1104-1105.  Citing Huitt, the district court reached a 
similar conclusion by employing the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius 
and held that because the statute enumerated certain activities to be 
included, it should be construed as excluding all things not expressly 
mentioned.  The County Defendants 
echo the district court and also contend that if firefighting is not covered, 
then certainly a page by a county dispatcher to volunteer firefighters should 
also not be included as part of the operation of a public utility.  However, Rice argues that Huitt should not be read this way, in 
light of the language of the statute and this Court's subsequent decision in Sponsel.

 
 
[¶19]   
In Sponsel, this Court 
considered whether erecting and maintaining highway signage qualified as a 
"public utility or service" under § 1-39-108.  There, this Court noted the statute 
provides for liability for "operation of public utilities and services including 
gas, electricity, water," etc.  Sponsel, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d  at 
109.  Because of the word 
"including" that preceded the list of public utilities, Sponsel recognized the enumerated 
utilities could not be interpreted as an exclusive list:

 
 
[T]he 
use of the word includes' is significant because includes' generally signifies 
an intent to enlarge a statute's application, rather than limit it, and it 
implies the conclusion that there are other items includable, though not 
specifically enumerated.  That 
general rule certainly has vitality, but it cannot so broaden the statute at 
issue here, so as to make a public service' of all things that are a public 
responsibility,' without regard as to whether or not they are somehow related to 
the more limited concept of public utilities and 
services.'

 
 

Sponsel, 
¶ 12, 126 P.3d  at 109.  
Ultimately, in Sponsel the 
decision was that a failure to communicate a dangerous condition by use of a 
road sign did not fall within the public utility exception to liability even 
though the county undertook the responsibility to provide proper road signage. 
 We reasoned that "[t]he statutory 
construction rule of ejusdem generis instructs us that the legislature 
must have intended a catch-all phrase to include things similar to those 
specifically listed." Sponsel, 
¶ 16, 126 P.3d  at 109 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶20]   As in Sponsel, we apply the same statutory 
construction rule here.  Although Sponsel recognized that the enumerated 
utilities in the statute is not an "exclusive" list, we cannot extend that list 
to the fire page system at issue in this case, in part because of our holding in 
Huitt, which says that firefighting 
is not similar to or of the same genre as "gas, electricity, water, solid or 
liquid waste collection or disposal, heating and ground transportation."  Huitt, 844 P.2d  at 1105.  
Although the fire page system is not firefighting, we nevertheless reject 
Mr. Rice's argument that it qualifies as a public utility.  Section 1-39-108 cannot be construed to 
make a public service of all things that are a "public responsibility."5

 
 
Governmental 
Immunity, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-112 (Tortious Conduct of Peace 
Officers)

 
 
[¶21]   Next, Mr. Rice also claims that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment to the County Defendants 
(specifically, Sheriff Pownall) on his claim that governmental immunity should 
be waived under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-112 (LexisNexis 2009), which states, 
"[a] governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct 
of peace officers while acting within the scope of their 
duties."

 
 
[¶22]   Rice claims on appeal that Sheriff 
Pownall assumed a duty to provide and maintain the communication system, to 
alert law enforcement and firefighters in the event of an emergency, and to 
provide a reliable and dependable means for his agency and many other agencies 
within Campbell County to have interoperable communications in times of 
emergency.  According to Rice, when 
the Sheriff failed to heed the advice and warnings of private companies that 
maintained and upgraded the system, and when he failed to take precautions to 
avoid delay if the system failed, he was negligent.

 
 
[¶23]   Although the legislature waived 
sovereign immunity for the tortious conduct of peace officers, we have 
recognized for some time that the waiver is limited by the common law concept of 
qualified immunity.  See DeWald, supra; Kimbley v. City of Green River, 
663 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 1983).  We 
explained the basis for qualified immunity in Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096. 1109 (Wyo. 
1982):

 
 
[A] 
qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of 
government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and 
responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably 
appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be used.  It is the existence of reasonable 
grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, 
coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of 
executive officers for acts performed in the course of official 
conduct.

 
 
The 
determination of a peace officer's entitlement to qualified immunity under state 
law is governed by the consideration of four factors: (1) The officer was acting 
within the scope of his duties; (2) the officer was acting in good faith; (3) 
the officer's acts were reasonable under the circumstances; and (4) the 
officer's acts were discretionary duties and not merely  operational or ministerial duties.  Board of County Comm'rs v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 1087 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶24]   In the context of qualified 
immunity, the term "discretionary" is understood to be limited to "executive 
policy functions."  Bassett, 8 P.3d  at 1087.  
Conversely, the term "ministerial" refers to 
when

 
 
it 
is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set 
task, and when the law which imposes it prescribes and defines the time, mode, 
and occasion of its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for 
judgment or discretion.

 
 

Oyler 
v. State, 618 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Wyo. 1980).  
Decisions by an elected official regarding expenditures on equipment, the 
type of equipment, and replacement parts are within the purview of an elected 
official's discretion; the decisions by Sheriff Pownall as to when to replace 
the fire page equipment is certainly within his discretion.  He testified to that at length in his 
deposition.  While we will refrain 
from repeating his testimony verbatim, after reviewing the record, we are 
assured from that testimony that the Sheriff knew that the system was out of 
date, and that he was taking steps, in good faith, to replace 
it.

 
 
Q:  In 
your initial term and in this term, what kind of a priority have you put on the 
communication systems in general in trying to bring them all the things you've 
been telling us about?

A:  It's 
been a top priority since I took office, since I learned, basically, that the 
system was old.  And I knew 
that.  I mean, I knew it was 
old.  And I knew - -with technology 
today, I mean, it seems to change on a daily basis, almost.  But we were 
trying[.]

 
 
[¶25]   The Sheriff was acting within the 
scope of his duties, in good faith, in determining when to replace the equipment 
at issue.  We fail to see any 
tortious conduct while doing so.

 
 
Governmental 
Immunity, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-106 (Negligent Operation of 
Building)

 
 
[¶26]   Rice also claims that the County 
Defendants are not entitled to immunity from liability under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-39-106 (LexisNexis 2009), which provides as 
follows:

 
 
            
A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, 
wrongful death, or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees 
while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of 
any building[.]

 
 
The 
district court found this section inapplicable, stating "the facts do not 
indicate a building was involved in this instance," and that "the failure of a 
repeater does not implicate negligence in the operation of a building in which 
it is housed."  In State Dept. of Corrections v. Watts, 
2008 WY 19, 177 P.3d 793 (Wyo. 2008), this Court decided 
that:

 
 
[T]he 
legislature intended to limit the waiver of [governmental] immunity to 
negligence associated with the function of the building structure and did not 
intend to extend the waiver to negligence associated with operation of the penal 
institution within the building.

 
 

Watts, 
¶ 38, 
177 P.3d  at 802.

 
 
[¶27]   Rice argues that the "buildings" at 
issue in this case are the various "tower sites" around Campbell County that 
house the actual repeaters, transmitters, and other communication 
equipment.  According to Rice, those 
buildings were prone to extreme temperature variations, contributing to poor 
functionality of the equipment.  
Rice argues that the failure to follow guidelines with regard to moisture 
and temperature control is thought to be one possible cause for the failures in 
the system components, which culminated in the negligence by the County 
Defendants.

 

[¶28]   Our discussion in Watts is instructive as to Rice's 
argument.  We stated:

 
 
We 
are not, however, inclined to agree that any "unsafe condition," beyond those 
involving the building 
itself, should come within the statute, especially when interpreted as broadly 
as the New Mexico Supreme Court did in Upton. Instead, we believe the 
waiver of immunity in Wyoming was intended to apply only if the unsafe condition 
is due to a physical defect in the building. 
The concept of physical defect would include any safety features mandated by 
applicable law, as recognized by the New Mexico court of appeals in 
Williams.

            
. . . .

            
We, therefore, conclude the clear and unambiguous 
language of § 1-39-106, within the context of the rest of the 
WGCA, indicates that the legislature intended to limit the waiver of 
immunity to negligence associated with the function of the building 
structure and did not intend to extend the waiver to negligence associated with 
operation of the penal institution within the building. 
The operation and maintenance responsibility includes fixtures attached to the 
building. 
Moreover, like the New Mexico court of appeals recognized in Williams, if 
applicable building 
codes, statutes or ordinances mandate that certain safety features be installed 
or in use in the building, 
then liability would extend to injuries arising from the failure of the 
governmental entity to install or maintain those devices. We have no difficulty 
stating that such matters fall within the definition of operation of public 
buildings 
because they are necessary to make the building 
legally functional. We do, as always, take this opportunity to invite the 
legislature to revise the statute if we have not interpreted it in accordance 
with its intent.

 
 

Watts, 
¶¶ 36, 
38, 177 P.3d  at 802.

 
 
[¶29]   Turning to the facts once again, we 
conclude that the district court ruled correctly when it granted summary 
judgment to the County Defendants, affirming their governmental immunity under § 
1-39-106.  Assuming a problem 
occurred with communication equipment, that equipment does not qualify as a 
"building" as contemplated by the statute.  
Rather, that communication equipment does not operate as part of the 
building structure and, accordingly, its failure does not extend the waiver to 
any negligence associated with the operation of that communication equipment 
within the building.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶30]   The district court is affirmed on 
all issues.  First, Collins and ComTech owed no duty of care to 
Rice in operating and maintaining an emergency communications system for 
Campbell County, when the failure of that system delayed the fire department's 
response to the fire that led to the destruction of Rice's building and 
property.  As to the three 
governmental immunity claims Rice brings on appeal, there is no waiver of 
governmental immunity in any of those claims.  For purposes of this appeal, the fire 
page system cannot be considered a public utility under the statute; Sheriff 
Pownall acted in good faith and within the scope of his duties, and did not 
exhibit tortious conduct, and the communication equipment at issue cannot be 
classified as a "building" for purposes of the statute.  Finding no duty, Rice's fifth and final 
argument regarding proximate cause was not addressed.  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The property consisted of a large "L-shaped" metal and stucco 
structure.  One section housed a 
laundromat called "The Little Washboy Laundromat."

 
 

2The fire investigator concluded that the fire started in one of the 
clothes dryers in the laundromat.

 
 

3Although Rice named multiple defendants, no determination as to the cause 
of the page failure has been made.

 
 

4In De Wald, this Court 
cited to Hoyle v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 474 F. Supp. 1350 
(W.D.N.C. 1979).  In Hoyle 
the plaintiff claimed that the defendant negligently failed to repair a 
customer's telephone and, as a result, the customer was delayed in getting to 
the hospital and died. The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment 
finding that the case hinged on many facts which could never be determined. 
 The court based its judgment 
primarily upon the fact that it was impossible to show that, absent the delay, 
the deceased would have lived.

 
 

5Note the Wyoming State Legislature extended immunity to those providing 
"911" services.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-9-108 (LexisNexis 2009) states:

 
 
A governmental entity, public safety agency, local exchange access 
company, telephone exchange access company or wireless carrier that provides 
access to an emergency system or any officers, agents, or employees thereof is 
not liable as a result of any act or omission except willful and wanton 
misconduct or gross negligence in connection with developing, adopting, 
operating or implementing emergency telephone service, enhanced wireless 911 
service or any 911 system.