Case Title: Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.

Citation: 1995-Ohio-68

Docket Number: 19932385

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Thomas J. Moyer.                                                                 
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Hurst, Exr., Appellee, v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and                  
Correction, Appellant.                                                           
[Cite as Hurst v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1995),                           
Ohio St.3d    .]                                                                 
Torts -- Wrongful death, negligence and negligence per se --                     
     Parole violator participate in beating death of a person                    
     -- Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction not                     
     guilty of negligence per se, when -- Public duty rule                       
     applies to bar liability on part of Adult Parole                            
     Authority, when.                                                            
     (No. 93-2385 -- Submitted February 8, 1995 -- Decided                       
June 21, 1995.)                                                                  
     Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No.                   
93AP-672.                                                                        
     Gary E. Smith was paroled from the Lebanon Correctional                     
Institution on January 21, 1991.  He was ordered to reside in                    
the Toledo Volunteers of America ("VOA") halfway house and was                   
assigned to a parole officer.  On March 10, 1991, Smith failed                   
to return to the VOA and was declared absent without leave.                      
The following day, the parole officer filed an arrest report                     
with the Toledo Police Department.  The effect of this report                    
was to alert the local police of Smith's AWOL status and to                      
place on file an arrest order.  This information was not                         
disseminated beyond the Toledo Police Department.                                
     Pursuant to the policy of appellant, Ohio Department of                     
Rehabilitation and Correction, the parole officer waited thirty                  
days before drafting a parole violator at-large ("PVAL") report                  
on April 10, 1992.  Thereafter he discussed the situation with                   
his supervisor, who approved the PVAL report with minor                          
modifications.  There is some confusion as to what happened to                   
the PVAL report next.  The supervisor believes that two reports                  
were forwarded to Columbus, one on April 16 or 17 and a second                   
one on April 30.  However, elsewhere the record indicates that                   
the next step in the process did not occur until May 2, 1991,                    
when an Adult Parole Authority case analyst validated the                        
report for factual accuracy.                                                     
     After completing his duties, the case analyst passed the                    
PVAL report to a secretary, who prepared special minutes for                     
the signature of the Chief of the Adult Parole Authority.  On                    
May 8, 1991, the PVAL report was forwarded to another person to                  
be entered into two computer networks, the National Crime                        
Information Center and the Law Enforcement Automated Data                        
System.  However, the data was never entered, apparently                         
because Smith was arrested that same day for his participation                   
in the beating death of Della W. Hawkins.                                        
     In the interim, on April 14, as a result of the delay in                    
processing the PVAL report and the failure to enter Smith's                      
at-large status into the computer networks, the department had                   
missed an opportunity to hold him.  Smith was arrested in Allen                  
County on a charge of driving under the influence.  He was                       
sentenced on the charge and was incarcerated in Allen County                     
from April 14 to May 4.                                                          
     Appellee Minnie Ruth Hurst, executor of the estate of Ms.                   
Hawkins, filed suit in the Court of Claims against the Ohio                      
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.  The complaint                      
alleged wrongful death, negligence and negligence per se                         
against the department for its delay in processing the Smith                     
PVAL report.  The Court of Claims granted summary judgment for                   
the department.  The court of appeals reversed, holding that                     
the Court of Claims erred by applying the public duty doctrine                   
and not a rule of negligence per se to the conduct of the                        
representatives of the authority.                                                
     The matter is now before this court pursuant to the                         
allowance of a discretionary appeal.                                             
                                                                                 
     Gooding, Huffman, Kelley & Becker and Matthew C. Huffman,                   
for appellee.                                                                    
     Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Eric A. Walker,                  
Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.                                       
                                                                                 
     Moyer, C.J.     By its sole proposition of law, the                         
department argues that it is immune from liability by operation                  
of the public duty rule and that the court of appeals                            
incorrectly concluded that the department could be found to be                   
negligent per se.  For the reasons that follow, we reverse the                   
judgment of the court of appeals.                                                
     The public duty rule was adopted by this court in Sawicki                   
v. Ottawa Hills (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 525 N.E.2d 468.  In                   
paragraph two of the syllabus, we held, "[w]hen a duty which                     
the law imposes upon a public official is a duty to the public,                  
a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous                           
performance, it is generally a public and not an individual                      
injury."  Conversely, recovery for negligent conduct may be                      
awarded if the conduct of the public official falls within a                     
so-called special duty exception.  A special duty may be found                   
if there is "(1) an assumption by the [governmental entity],                     
through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on                    
behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part                   
of the [entity's] agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3)                   
some form of direct contact between the [entity's] agents and                    
the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on                  
the [entity's] affirmative undertaking."  Sawicki, paragraph                     
four of the syllabus.                                                            
     In reversing the Court of Claims' application of the                        
public duty doctrine, the court of appeals expressed                             
reservations concerning the continued vitality of the public                     
duty rule in light of our decisions in Reynolds v. State                         
(1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68, 14 ORB 506, 471 N.E.2d 776, and                        
Crawford v. Ohio Div. of Parole & Community Serv. (1991), 57                     
Ohio St.3d 184, 566 N.E.2d 1233.  However, Reynolds and                          
Crawford are clearly distinguishable from Sawicki and from this                  
case.                                                                            
     In both Reynolds and Crawford we held that the state was                    
negligent per se for failing to confine a furloughed prisoner                    
during nonworking hours.  We reasoned that the decision to                       
furlough a prisoner was an executive decision, but once the                      
decision was made, R.C. 2967.26(B) imposed a specific,                           
affirmative duty to confine the prisoner during nonworking                       
hours.  At the time pertinent to this case, R.C. 2967.26(B)                      
imposed a specific, affirmative duty to confine the prisoner                     
during nonworking hours.  At the time pertinent to this case,                    
R.C. 2967.26(B) provided that a prisoner "who is granted a                       
furlough pursuant to this section *** shall be confined during                   
any period of time that he is not actually working at this                       
approved employment *** or engaged in other activities approved                  
by the department."  142 Ohio Laws, Part 1, 287.                                 
 We have held that [w]here there exists a legislative enactment c                
ommanding or prohibiting for the safety of others the doing of                   
a specific act and there is a violation of such enactment                        
solely by one whose duty it is to obey it, such violation                        
constitutes negligence per se."  Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon (1954),                   
161 Ohio St. 367, 53 O.O. 274, 119 N.E.2d 440, paragraph three                   
of the syllabus.                                                                 
     However, where the duty is defined "only in abstract or                     
general terms, leaving to the jury the ascertainment and                         
determination of reasonableness and correctness of acts and                      
conduct under the proven conditions and circumstances, the                       
phrase negligence per se has no application."  Swoboda v. Brown                  
(1935), 129 Ohio St.512, 523, 2 O.O. 516, 521, 196 N.E. 274,                     
279.  In Eisenhuth we further explained that where the duty                      
prescribed by the enactment is so specific that the only                         
determination necessary by the jury is to find but a single                      
fact, a violation of the statute, then there is negligence per                   
se.  Conversely, if the jury must determine negligence from a                    
consideration of several facts and circumstances, then                           
negligence per se is inapplicable.  Id., 161 Ohio St. at                         
373-374, 53 O.O. at 277-278, 119 N.E.2d at 444.                                  
     Accordingly, in Reynolds and Crawford we held that the                      
statutory language "shall be confined" imposed a specific,                       
affirmative duty upon the state, the violation of which                          
constituted negligence per se.  The statutes pertaining to                       
paroled prisoners are not identical in nature or degree to                       
those relating to furloughed prisoners.                                          
     R.C. 5149.04(A) provides that "[p]ersons paroled *** shall                  
be under jurisdiction of the adult parole authority and shall                    
be supervised *** in such manner as to insure as nearly as                       
possible the parolee's rehabilitation which at the same time                     
providing maximum protection to the general public."                             
 Additionally, former R.C. 2967.15 stated that "a prisoner who ha                
s been paroled, who in the judgment of the adult parole                          
authority, has violated the conditions of his *** parole shall                   
be declared a violator.                                                          
     "Whenever any parole officer has reasonable cause to                        
believe that any parolee under the supervision of the authority                  
has violated the terms or conditions of his *** parole, such                     
parole officer may arrest such parolee ***.                                      
                              "***                                               
     "In the event such parolee is declared to be a parole                       
violator the superintendent shall within a reasonable time,                      
order his return to the institution from which he was paroled.                   
                              "***                                               
     "In the event a parolee absconds from supervision such                      
fact shall be reported by the superintendent to the authority,                   
in writing, and the authority shall enter an order upon its                      
official minutes declaring such parolee to be a parole violator                  
at large.  ***"  130 Ohio Laws, Part II, 154-155.                                
     Finally, Ohio Adm. Code 5120:1-1-16 provides:                               
     "(A) Whenever a releasee absconds from supervision, such                    
fact shall be reported at the earliest practicable time by the                   
Unit Supervisor, or other supervisor of the releasee, to the                     
Chief of the Adult Parole Authority, or his designee, in                         
writing.                                                                         
     "(B) Upon receipt of such report by the Adult Parole                        
Authority, the releasee may be declared a violator-at-large and                  
such declaration entered into its official minutes or such                       
decision may be delayed pending further investigation."                          
     The duties imposed upon the department regarding parolees                   
are significantly different from those involving furloughed                      
prisoners.  A furloughed prisoner remains incarcerated, whereas                  
a paroled prisoner has been given a conditional release from                     
prison.  The only affirmative duty imposed is to report the                      
status of a parole violator as at-large and to enter this fact                   
into the official minutes of the Adult Parole Authority.  The                    
parties agree this was done.  The dispute centers on whether                     
the act was performed timely.  However, the duty to advise the                   
authority is described in terms of reasonableness.                               
Furthermore, the parties have failed to bring to our attention,                  
nor has our research discovered, a statute or rule that imposes                  
a specific, affirmative duty of the authority to enter the                       
violator's name on any computer network.                                         
     It is the failure to respond in a timely fashion or to                      
enter the violator's name into a computer network that is                        
alleged to be negligence; however, both require a determination                  
of reasonableness and discretion.  Since the finder of fact                      
must determine the issue of liability by deciding more than                      
whether a specific safety statute was violated, negligence per                   
se is inapplicable.  It follows that ordinary principles of                      
negligence, including the public duty rule, apply to the                         
conduct of the Adult Parole Authority.                                           
     The public duty rule comprises a defense independent of                     
sovereign immunity.  Sawicki, supra, 37 Ohio St.3d 222, 525                      
N.E.2d 468, paragraph three of the syllabus.  The rule                           
originated in English common law and survived the abrogation of                  
sovereign immunity.  Id. at 229-230, 525 N.E.2d at 476-477.  It                  
is used to determine the first element of negligence, the                        
existence of a duty on the part of the state.  If the duty owed                  
is general in nature, the wrong created by its breach is to the                  
public in general and, therefore, not individually actionable.                   
Id. at 230, 525 N.E.2d at 477, citing 2 Cooley, Law of Torts (4                  
Ed. 1932) 385-386, Section 300.                                                  
     As the statutes relating to each indicate, parole and                       
furlough are very different in their purpose.  So, too, are                      
Reynolds and Crawford distinguishable precedent.  The statutes                   
at issue herein do not establish specific affirmative duties to                  
any person.  Rather, they prescribed a general procedure for                     
granting parole from prison and reporting violators of parole.                   
Because appellee has failed to establish the existence of a                      
special duty owed the decedent by the state, the public duty                     
rule applies to bar liability on the part of the Adult Parole                    
Authority.                                                                       
     The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed.                           
                                     Judgment reversed.                          
     Wright, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and Cook, JJ., concur.                        
     Douglas, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the                  
court of appeals in all respects.                                                
     Pfeifer, J., dissents.                                                      
     Pfeifer, J., dissenting.  Della Hawkins is dead.  Gary                      
Smith was a parole violator at large ("PVAL") for over seven                     
weeks when he killed Della.  Just four days before Della's                       
murder, Smith finished a three-week stint in the Allen County                    
Correctional Facility for driving under the influence.  Lacking                  
the appropriate information on the prisoner,. Allen County                       
officials released him, since they had no idea they were                         
holding a PVAL.                                                                  
     In the days when a federal marshal rode over his territory                  
on horseback and handed out wanted posters, a lack of                            
communication between jurisdictions was expected.  It was                        
understandable that outlaws would easily evade detection when                    
only trains connected most towns and electricity was still a                     
fascination.  Incomplete information was even common when                        
telephones had dials and documents actually traveled by mail.                    
This, however, is the age of computers, fax machines, and                        
mobile phones -- instantaneous communications -- the                             
information age.  Today we expect more, and the state has                        
promised us more.                                                                
     The majority contends that the Department of                                
Rehabilitation and Correction cannot be negligent for losing                     
Gary Smith, nor for allowing his parole violation to go                          
unreported.  The majority states that "the duties imposed upon                   
the [Department of Rehabilitation and Correction] regarding                      
parolees are significantly different from those involving                        
furloughed prisoners," and that, therefore, Della's estate                       
cannot pursue its claim as the plaintiffs had in Reynolds and                    
Crawford.                                                                        
     While the duties involved may differ, the key fact remains                  
that the state does have certain statutorily defined duties                      
regarding paroled prisoners.  It is that existence of a                          
statutory duty that took Crawford, and which should take this                    
case, out of the realm of Sawicki.                                               
     Every negligence case has four factors: duty, a breach of                   
that duty, damage, and causation.  Sawicki stands for the                        
notion that the state owes the public no general, actionable                     
duty to exercise ordinary care.  In Crawford, however, this                      
court held that the state does create an actionable duty to the                  
public when it sets certain specific statutory standards for                     
itself.  The plaintiff in Reynolds went on to prove the breach                   
of that duty and linked that breach to the injuries suffered.                    
     In this case, we are still at the first step, duty.  The                    
fact that the duty the state statutorily defines for itself in                   
this case is, in the majority's words, "described in terms of                    
reasonableness," is relevant to whether the duty was breached,                   
not to whether the duty exists.  In Crawford, the question of                    
breach answered itself, since the statute required furloughees                   
to be confined, and the assailant in that case obviously was                     
not.  The plaintiffs in this case will have a tougher row to                     
hoe because of some leeway the state has created for itself --                   
the statutory and Administrative Code sections require a PVAL's                  
supervisor to report that status to the Chief of the Adult                       
Parole Authority "at the earliest practicable time" (Ohio Adm.                   
Code 5120:1-1-16[A]) and the superintendent of parole                            
supervision to order a PVAL returned to confinement "within a                    
reasonable time" (former R.C. 2967.15).  However, the fact that                  
it will be harder to prove a breach of a duty does not mean                      
that the duty does not exist.  Therefore, the trial court                        
wrongly granted the state summary judgment.                                      
     The state's duties regarding furloughed prisoners and                       
paroled prisoners are different.  While the differences are                      
legitimate, to hold that an injured person may recover for the                   
state's breach of duty regarding a furloughee but not for its                    
breach of duty regarding a parolee defies both logic and                         
fairness.  To summarily excuse the state from liability in the                   
death of Della Hawkins clings to the antiquated and incorrect                    
British notion that "the King can do no wrong."                                  
     The trial court should allow a determination by the trier                   
of fact on the question of the state's breach of duty.  If the                   
delays in this case were not reasonable in light of manpower                     
demands, technology, and other factors, then the state breached                  
its duty.  Whether that breach proximately caused Della's death                  
is another factual question.                                                     
         Della Hawkins will have no other days on earth, but                     
her heirs should have their day in court.