Case Title: State of Oregon v. Cory

Citation: 204 Or. 235, 282 P.2d 1054

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1955-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reversed April 20, 1955.
*236 Charles O. Porter, Eugene, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant.
Robert M. Stults, District Attorney, Roseburg, argued the cause. With him on the brief was Warren A. Woodruff, Deputy District Attorney, Roseburg.
REVERSED.
LATOURETTE, J.
William Frank Cory was indicted, tried and convicted for the violation of § 25-112, OCLA (ORS 166.210, 166.270), which, among other things, forbids convicts from possessing firearms. On December 18, 1953, he was sentenced to four years in the penitentiary. Thereupon the district attorney filed an information charging Cory with being an habitual criminal. After trial a conviction was had on said information. Thereafter the trial court set aside the four-year sentence and imposed a sentence of 15 years in the penitentiary. Defendant appeals.
1, 2. In the firearms case defendant's two assignments of error lack merit. It is first urged that the court erred in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The point raised is that the court improperly instructed the jury. Since no exception was taken at the trial to the instruction given the question is foreclosed. It is next argued that defendant was entitled to a new trial because the state had placed a microphone in defendant's cell for the purpose of eavesdropping on the conversation between defendant and his counsel. The occurrence complained of happened after the trial was concluded. The court's refusal to grant a new trial on this ground obviously constituted no error.
*237 Turning to the habitual criminal case, defendant moved in the trial court to quash and dismiss the information filed by the district attorney on the grounds that the Oregon Habitual Criminal Act is unconstitutional as applied to this case. This presents a grave constitutional question involving the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The information presented by the district attorney charged defendant with being an habitual criminal in that he had committed three previous felonies, to wit:
By ch 383, Oregon Laws 1951, the legislature amended § 4, ch 585, Oregon Laws 1947, now ORS 168.040, as follows:
Under the 1947 act it was the duty of the district attorney to file informations accusing persons of previous felony convictions in all cases, irrespective of the lack of personal violence. It will be seen that the 1951 amendment above quoted gives to the district attorney unbridled discretion to determine whether he will or will not proceed by information against a person who has theretofore been convicted of a felony not involving personal violence.
A scholarly analysis of the Equal Protection Clause of both state and federal constitutions is found in the opinion by Mr. Justice BRAND in the case of State v. Pirkey, 203 Or 697, 281 P2d 698, a portion of which reads as follows:
In the Pirkey case we struck down a statute as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause which gave the grand jury or magistrate the discretion to determine whether a person having drawn a check on a bank with insufficient funds should be prosecuted for a misdemeanor or a felony. In that case we said:
If the insufficient fund statute is unconstitutional because it grants to the grand jury or magistrate the power to choose whether or not proceedings shall be had as a misdemeanor or felony, a fortiori that portion of the habitual criminal act which gives the district attorney unlimited authority to proceed or not to proceed at all against a convicted felon in personal, nonviolent cases, should also be held unconstitutional.
3. In the portion of the statute being considered there is no yardstick or semblance of classification which would enable the district attorney to determine under what circumstances an information should be filed. The exercise of an absolute discretion is vested in the district attorney in such a circumstance. In other words, the fate of persons, even to the extent of life imprisonment, who have committed the same acts under the same circumstances and in like situations is determined by the whim and caprice of the district attorney. We hold the portion of ORS 168.040 reading "and in other cases, may" unconstitutional.
4. In considering the three charges of previous convictions set out in the information, it is obvious that none of them involves violence or threat of violence to person. This being so, the habitual criminal proceedings are void ab initio and the sentence based thereon is likewise invalid.
Judgment reversed with instructions to reinstate the original sentence of four years.