Case Title: State v. LeBlanc

Citation: 171 Vt. 88, 759 A.2d 991

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. LeBlanc (99-182); 171 Vt. 88; 759 A.2d 991 

[Filed 14-Jul-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of  Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-182

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit

Andre A. LeBlanc	                         April Term, 2000

Howard E. Van Benthuysen, J.

Lauren Bowerman, Chittenden County State's Attorney, Robert Simpson, Chief 
  Deputy State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, 
  Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Paul D. Jarvis of Jarvis and Kaplan, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       SKOGLUND, J.  In this case, we address the issue we declined to reach
  in the recent  decision, State v. Carpenter, 11 Vt. L. W. 78, 79 (2000),
  namely, whether the savings clause that  accompanied the 1991 amendment to
  23 V.S.A. § 1210(d) is available to a defendant who had  already been
  convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) three times at the time of
  the  amendment.  This is an interlocutory appeal from a decision of the
  district court granting defendant  Andre LeBlanc's motion to dismiss the
  DUI, fifth offense charge against him, and amending the  charge to DUI,
  second offense.  We reverse and remand.

 

       On November 30, 1998, defendant was charged with DUI, fifth offense. 
  He had previously  been convicted of DUI on May 25, 1995, May 2, 1983,
  January 13, 1982, and October 17, 1981.  The  State sought a penalty of
  "[n]ot more than $2,500.00 or not more than 5 years imprisonment or both." 
  Thus, the State sought to punish defendant as a fifth offender, pursuant to
  23 V.S.A.  §  1210(d).  While under § 1210(b) & (c), first and second DUI
  offenses are treated as misdemeanors,  under § 1210(d), third and
  subsequent offenses are treated as felonies.

       Defendant moved to dismiss the allegation that he was a fifth
  offender, arguing that, if  convicted, he could be sentenced only as a
  second offender under the applicable statutes.  In support  of his motion,
  defendant first noted that the prior version of § 1210(d), applicable
  before July 1,  1991, provided that a person had to be convicted of DUI
  twice within fifteen years of his or her  current conviction in order for
  the enhanced penalties then in effect to apply.  Defendant then argued 
  that, when § 1210(d) was amended in 1991, the Legislature deleted the
  fifteen-year forgiveness  period, but added a savings clause that retained
  the forgiveness period in cases where the prior  convictions occurred
  before July 1, 1991.  Therefore, he argued, if convicted of the current
  offense,  he would not have been convicted twice within fifteen years, the
  1981, 1982 and 1983 convictions all  having occurred more than fifteen
  years prior to any conviction on the pending offense. (FN1)   Under
  defendant's analysis, he could only be convicted of DUI, second offense, a
  misdemeanor.

       The district court agreed, holding that, when sentencing a defendant
  for a third or subsequent  DUI offense, a court cannot consider any
  pre-July 1, 1991, DUI conviction that, at the time of 

 

  sentencing on the current DUI conviction, is more than fifteen years old. 
  Thus, because defendant's  1981, 1982 and 1983 convictions all predated
  July 1, 1991, and because, if defendant were to be  convicted on the
  current charge, more than fifteen years will have elapsed between his
  pre-1991  convictions and his current conviction, the court concluded that
  defendant's pre-1991 convictions  could not "be used either to enhance the
  present charge to a felony level or at sentencing."   Therefore, the court
  held that the charge had to be reduced from DUI, fifth to DUI, second.

       The State filed a motion for interlocutory appeal, which the court
  granted.  The court certified  the following questions for our review:

         What is the effect of the 7/1/91 amendment to 23 VSA section 
    1210(d) which eliminated the former 15 year forgiveness period for 
    the use and computation of prior DWI convictions for the purposes
    of  enhancing penalties on subsequent DWI convictions? 
          Does the legislative history contain a 'savings clause' which 
    requires that as to convictions accrued prior to 7/1/91 they may
    not be  considered for charging or sentencing in subsequent DWI's
    [sic] if  older than 15 years from the date of the new offense?
    
  Prior to July 1, 1991, 23 V.S.A. § 1210(d) provided:

    Third offense.  A person convicted of violating section 1201
    who has,  within the preceding 15 years, twice been convicted of
    violation of  that section, shall be sentenced as provided in
    subsection (c) of this  section, except that any fine shall not be
    less than $100.00 nor more  than $1,500.00.

  23 V.S.A. § 1210(d) (1987), amended by 1991, No. 55, § 9 (emphasis added). 
  As of July 1, 1991, §  1210(d) provides:

    Third or subsequent offense.  A person convicted of violating
    section  1201 of this title who has twice been convicted of
    violation of that  section shall be fined not more than $2,500.00
    or imprisoned not  more than five years, or both.

  23 V.S.A. § 1210(d) (emphasis added).

 

       In amending § 1210(d), the Legislature also provided, in pertinent
  part,

    that it is the intention of the general assembly that section 9 of
    this  act, which amended this section by eliminating the 5-year
    and 15-year  forgiveness periods, shall apply as follows: . . .
    (5) With respect to  section 1210 of Title 23, the 15-year
    forgiveness period used to  determine third convictions shall be
    considered a right [that] has  accrued to the operator if the
    prior convictions occurred at any time  prior to July 1, 1991.

  1991, No. 55, §§ 19(4), (5) (emphasis added).

       The State argues that the court erred in concluding that defendant's
  three pre-1991 DUI  convictions could not be used to enhance either the
  charge or the penalty.  According to the State,  defendant does not qualify
  for the fifteen-year forgiveness period because, prior to 1991, he had
  three  DUI convictions.  The State notes that the pre-1991 statute refers
  to third offenses, whereas the post-1991 statute refers to third or
  subsequent offenses, and the savings clause refers to third convictions. 
  The State argues that, if the Legislature intended for the savings clause
  to apply to third or  subsequent offenses or convictions, it would have
  specifically so stated.  Thus, according to the  State, under the plain
  language of the statute and the savings clause, the forgiveness period
  applies  only to defendants convicted of DUI, third, and does not apply to
  this defendant because the current  alleged offense is his fifth.  We
  agree.

       In construing a statute, "our principal goal is to effectuate the
  intent of the Legislature."   Tarrant v. Dep't of Taxes, 169 Vt. 189, 197,