Case Title: Lynch v Lynch

Citation: 342 Md. 509

Docket Number: 55/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBERT D. LYNCH v. SUSAN M. LYNCH
NO. 55, SEPTEMBER TERM, 1995
HEADNOTE: 
CIVIL CONTEMPT -- CHILD SUPPORT -- ALTHOUGH SUBJECT TO BEING HELD
IN CRIMINAL CONTEMPT, A DEFENDANT WHO LACKS THE PRESENT FINANCIAL
ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH A CHILD SUPPORT ORDER, WHETHER OR NOT THAT
INABILITY IS PURPOSEFUL, MAY NEITHER BE HELD IN CIVIL CONTEMPT NOR
IMPRISONED. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
NO. 55
SEPTEMBER TERM, 1995
___________________________________
ROBERT D. LYNCH
V.
SUSAN M. LYNCH 
___________________________________
Murphy, C. J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
     
    
JJ.
___________________________________
OPINION BY BELL, J.
___________________________________
     FILED:  June 10, 1996
     The petitioner's certiorari petition asked the court to
1
decide "whether an alleged contemnor has the burden of proving
his or her inability to comply with the purge provision in order
to avoid imprisonment."  That issue no longer needs to be decided
since, at oral argument, the respondent wisely conceded that the
burden is on the contemnor.  That fact is well established by
Maryland law, see, e.g., Soldano v. Soldano, 258 Md. 145, 146,
265 A.2d 263, 264 (1970) ("imprisonment may be voided by showing
that one has neither the money nor the ability to pay"); McDaniel
v. McDaniel, 256 Md. 684, 692-93, 262 A.2d 52, 57 (1970) ("the
alleged contemnor '...has the burden of showing his inability to
comply and that his situation is in good faith and not due to
calculated and deliberate choice.'") (quoting 2 W. Nelson,
Divorce and Annulment § 16.25 at 440 (2nd ed. 1961)); Speckler v.
Speckler, 256 Md. 635, 636, 261 A.2d 466 (1970); Johnson v.
Johnson, 241 Md. 416, 420, 216 A.2d 914, 917 (1966) ("Until [the
contemnor] was given an opportunity to show that he had neither
the estate nor the ability to pay his obligation and failed to
make such a showing, he should have not been incarcerated.  The
purpose of imprisonment for contempt is to compel compliance with
a court order but where the person alleged to be in contempt can
establish a valid defense, such as the unintentional ability to
obey the order, imprisonment is not proper."); Oles Envelope
Corp. v. Oles, 193 Md. 79, 92, 65 A.2d 899, 905 (1947).   See
also Kerr v. Kerr, 287 Md. 363, 370, 412 A.2d 1001, 1005 (1980)
(burden of proof on contemnor to prove inability to comply with
previous order); Schwartzman v. Schwartzman, 204 Md. 125, 135,
102 A.2d 810, 815 (1954).   Turner v. State, 307 Md. 618, 624-31,
516 A.2d 579, 582-86 (1986) is consistent in that the burden is
placed on the probationer to prove an inability to comply with
condition of probation.  This is also the law in our sister
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Ex Parte Capps, 396 So.2d 70, 71 (Ala.
1981) ("proving inability is a defensive matter, the burden of
which rests on the contemnor."); Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d 212,
217 (Minn. 1968) (same); Houtchens v. District Court, 199 P.2d
272, 274 (Mont. 1948) ("lack of ability to perform is a defense
to be advanced and to be proved by the accused ...."); Katz v.
Katz, 166 A. 176 (N.J. App. 1933) ("To succeed in this defense
[that his failure to obey was due to his inability to obey] he
must prove - the burden is his - that his inability  was
real...."); Ex Parte Chennault, 776 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Ct. App.
1979); King v. Dept. of Social and Health Services, 756 P.2d
This case presents for our resolution the issue of the
sufficiency of the evidence that Susan M. Lynch, the respondent,
was unable  to pay the court-ordered child support to comply with
the purge provision set by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County1
2
1303, 1310 (Wash. 1988).  See also Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56,
75-76, 68 S.Ct. 401, 411, 92 L.Ed. 476, 490-91 (1948); Cutting v.
Van Fleet, 252 F.100, 102 (9th Cir. 1918) ("It is true that, in
cases of civil contempt for failure to comply with an order to
pay money, the defendant may show in defense that he is
financially unable to comply.").
     In the respondent's brief, her income is reported to have
2
been $460 per month.  This is an obvious miscalculation.  The
respondent testified that she was paid $11.49 an hour.  For a 40-
and the propriety of the trial court holding the respondent in
contempt of court.  The Court of Special Appeals held, as to the
former, that the evidence was insufficient to prove the
respondent's ability to comply, but as to the latter, that the
court did not abuse its discretion.  Lynch v. Lynch, 103 Md. App.
71, 80-82, 652 A.2d 1132, 1136-38 (1995).  Accordingly, it affirmed
the contempt finding, and reversed the sanction imposed, i.e., the
incarceration of the respondent until she complied with the purge
provision the court had set.   We granted cross-petitions for
certiorari.  We shall affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
The respondent and Robert D. Lynch, the petitioner, divorced
in 1987.  At that time, the respondent was awarded custody of the
parties' two minor children.  Subsequently, however, the circuit
court modified the decree, terminating the respondent's custody of
the children and transferring it to the petitioner.  The court also
ordered the respondent, who was then working as a receptionist for
the United States Government, National Institutes of Health (NIH),
earning $460 per week,  to pay $150 per month child support,
2
3
hour work week that would amount to $460 per week.
     No payments were made pursuant to the order because,
3
according to the respondent, of a miscommunication between the
court and her employer.
initially through an earnings withholding order, payable through
the court's Child Support Enforcement Division.   The respondent
3
immediately fell behind in the support payments.  As a result, the
support enforcement division initiated contempt proceedings,
pursuant to which the court issued an order requiring the
respondent to show cause why she should not be held in contempt.
Over the course of the next two and one-half years, the show cause
hearing was continued eight times, at the respondent's request, and
on one occasion, she failed to appear.  When a hearing finally was
held the respondent had made only one support payment and was,
therefore, $5,680 in arrears.  
The only testimony presented at the hearing was by the
respondent.  She admitted that she was working when she was ordered
to make child support payments and that she continued in that
employment for almost a year thereafter.  She quit her job, she
explained, to care for her mother, who "got very sick and because
of personal problems at home, etc."  She continued to care for her
mother until she died.  Although testifying to having pursued some
job opportunities, the respondent acknowledged that she had
remained largely unemployed since August of 1991.  She noted that
she had a few miscellaneous jobs like yard work or flower delivery.
4
The only applications for jobs to which she testified were to
discount retail stores.  The respondent maintained that she had no
assets, and that she did not receive public assistance, social
security, workers' compensation, or any other such benefits.
Moreover, she testified that she did not own a car, had no bank
accounts or valuables of any kind and, except for the $20 that she
had in her possession, she had no money.  With respect to her
living arrangements, the respondent advised the court that she
lived rent free in the home of her deceased mother and received
free food from a charitable organization called Mana.  She also
testified that she did not have title to her mother's home, rather,
it had been bequeathed to her children and "the parental guardian,"
i.e., the petitioner.  Although she said she intended to contest
the will, she recognized that, unless she was successful, she would
not have title to the house.
The petitioner did not cross-examine the respondent, nor did
he offer evidence in contradiction of the respondent's testimony.
Instead, he argued that the respondent presented a "classic
involuntary impoverishment case," observing:
She doesn't work, she obviously doesn't have
to work.  She can meet her needs by some other
way.  I can't get to any of her assets because
she doesn't legally own anything.  In terms of
this piece of property, it would be nice if we
had a judgment, we could go after the
property, but she doesn't own the property and
she won't do anything to get the estate moving
along.  
The trial court held the respondent in contempt and entered a
5
     Neither party to this lawsuit has challenged the money
4
judgment.  We note that the court has the authority to impose a
judgment pursuant to Rule 2-648, which states, in pertinent part,
"[w]hen a person fails to comply with a judgment mandating the
payment of money, the court may enters a money judgment to the
extent of any amount due."
judgment against her for $5,680.   It sentenced her to 20 days in
4
the detention center, but ordered that she could purge herself of
the contempt by paying $500.  While recognizing that the respondent
did not have $500 in cash or assets from which that amount could be
acquired, the court nevertheless determined that she had the
ability to purge herself of the contempt.  The basis of that
determination was its finding that she led a "discretionary
lifestyle ... and in the process of it you don't pay support that
you have the ability to pay."  The court admonished the respondent
about the importance of her obligation to make "support payments"
and that she must "face" and "deal with" the fact that she has to
"go out and make some money" to care for her children.  The court
also commented that the respondent at one time held "a job paying
you $24,000 a year, that was a darn good job and you just left it."
The respondent moved for reconsideration.  At that time, the
trial court explained what it had meant by "discretionary
lifestyle":
many defendants in criminal cases are indigent
and qualified for and are in fact represented
by the Public Defender's Office, but those are
- not all, but many of them are people who
live in a place or a home where somebody else
pays their bills, and they actually physically
show up in court - they either take a bus or
6
     The actual amount the respondent was paid was, as the court
5
said at the contempt hearing, $24,000.
they might borrow somebody's car, some of them
smoke, they can get cigarettes, they don't
live a luxurious lifestyle, but they are able
to live, they stay alive, they have some
discretion, they have - nobody else has any
obligation to support them, but other people
do.  So, it allows people, some people, an
option in their lives that other people don't
have, and they put this term "Discretionary
lifestyle" on it.  So that is where I got it
from.  It is not something that I thought up.
I apply it to many people come in as URESA
cases.
This is a woman who, as I remember, at
one time [was paid] 30 or $40 thousand
dollars,
 working for the United States
[5]
government, and for one reason or another she
decided it wasn't good - I think maybe she
wanted to stop the job to come home and take
care of her mother, when her mother was sick,
and she did, and she lives in her mother's
home, who is now deceased, apparently there
are some other matters going on.  She lives
rent-free.  Regardless of whether she is going
to have ownership in this property, she lives
rent-free.  She gave me a couple of letters
from a couple of places that have supplied her
food.  I am not sure if one was a church, but
those, as I recall, and I could be wrong,
because I don't have them here, but they were
1991 and 1992; not recent.  I think she told
me - you said you made the tape - maybe other
people help her and allow her to eat and
provide food for her so she can stay alive,
and I applied that principle.  It is a
discretionary lifestyle.  It is a lifestyle
that she has that isn't luxurious, she is not
living the life of Riley, but she is alive,
she makes no money.  If she lived in a place
where she had no friends, she had no family,
she had no support, she would either have to
go to work and make money to live or she would
die, and that is what I imposed on her and
that is why I said that I found as a fact that
7
she had the present ability to purge herself.
Not because she had $500 in her pocket.
These other people who help her have no
obligation to pay her child support; nobody
else does except her, but because of this,
quote "Discretionary lifestyle," she had the
present ability to get the money to pay it.
That is what I found as a matter of fact and I
am going to stick to it.  Until somebody says
that discretionary lifestyle that we have
talked about doesn't apply to this situation,
I am going to stick to it.
The court was emphatic that it had not found that the respondent
had voluntarily impoverished herself.  It also made clear what it
meant when it indicated that she had the ability to purge herself
of the contempt:
... I don't think she did have $500 in her
pocket, I don't think she did, but I think
because of the lifestyle that she leads, has
it available to her to purge herself.  I found
that as a fact. 
II.
In this State, the basic criteria applicable to civil contempt
proceedings, as well as the purpose of such proceedings, are well
settled.  As to the former, where "(1) the complainant is ... a
private person as opposed to the State; (2) the contempt proceeding
is entitled in the original action and filed as a continuation
thereof as opposed to a separate and independent action; (3)
holding the defendant in contempt affords release to a private
party (4) the relief requested is primarily for the benefit of the
complainant; [and] (5) the acts complained of do not of themselves
constitute crimes or conduct by the defendants so wilful or
8
contumelious that the court is impelled to act on its own motion,"
the proceeding ordinarily is one for civil contempt.  Winter v.
Crowley, 245 Md. 313, 317, 226 A.2d 304, 307 (1967), citing Knaus
v. Knaus, 127 A.2d 669, 673 (Pa. 1956).  See also State v. Roll &
Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 729-30, 298 A.2d 867, 877 (1973).  With
respect to its purpose, we have made clear that "[a] civil contempt
proceeding is intended to preserve and enforce the rights of
private parties to a suit and to compel obedience to orders and
decrees primarily made to benefit such parties.  These proceedings
are generally remedial in nature and are intended to coerce future
compliance."  Id. at 728, 298 A.2d at 876.  
The conduct which precipitates the initiation of contempt
proceedings is the alleged failure, in contravention of a court
order, to do that which has been ordered done or the doing of that
which is prohibited.  When that conduct has been proven, the
defendant may be held in contempt. But, because the intended
purpose of the proceedings is remedial - intended to benefit the
other party to the action by compelling the defendant to obey the
court order - finding the defendant in contempt may not suffice.
If the proceedings are to have the desired effect, there must be a
means of forcing the defendant to conform his or her conduct to
what the court order requires, to force the defendant to obey the
court order.  Such a means is available when, in addition to
entering a contempt finding, the court is able to impose penalties
designed to achieve that effect and which, in fact, make the
9
achievement more likely.  Imprisonment is such a penalty.  Thus,
notwithstanding that the proceedings are civil in nature, a
defendant may be imprisoned for civil contempt.  Id. at 729, 298
A.2d at 876.
In the case of civil contempt, the purpose of imprisoning the
contemnor is remedial.  Therefore, because the purpose of the
proceedings defines and limits the penalties that may be imposed,
before the contemnor may be imprisoned, he or she must have an
opportunity to purge the contempt, that is to say, he or she must
have the keys to the prison in his or her pocket.   In Re Nevitt,
117 F.448, 459 (8th Cir. 1902).  Thus, any sentence of imprisonment
entered following a finding of civil contempt must provide for
purging.  Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347, 355, 464 A.2d 228,
232-33 (1983); Roll & Scholl, 267 Md. at 728, 298 A.2d at 876;
Elzey v. Elzey, 291 Md. 369, 374-75, 435 A.2d 445, 447 (1981).  
A "provision for purging" or the "opportunity for purging"
relates to affording the defendant "the chance to rid him or
herself of guilt and thus clear himself of the charge."  Herd v.
State, 37 Md. App. 362, 365, 377 A.2d 574, 576 (1977).  According
to Black's Law Dictionary 1236 (6th Ed. 1990), to "purge" is "[t]o
cleanse; to clear.  To clear or exonerate from some charge or
imputation of guilt, or from a contempt."   Criminal contempt
proceedings offer a decided contrast.  The object of those
proceedings is to punish the contemnor for past misconduct which,
unlike in the case of civil contempt, may not necessarily be
10
capable of remedying.   The penalty imposed in such cases need not
provide a purging provision; it may be purely punitive.  Roll &
Scholl, 267 Md. at 728, 298 A.2d at 876.  
Before the defendant may be imprisoned, of course, the
defendant must have been held in contempt, as indicated.  That
requires proof, by the petitioner, that the defendant acted in
contradiction of the applicable court order.  In the case of a
court order prescribing, or prohibiting, a specified course of
conduct, the petitioner must establish that the defendant did or
failed to do what was required.  Where the order requires the
payment of money, he or she has to prove that it was not paid.
Moreover, because the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is to
coerce future compliance, id., the defendant must have been fully
capable of having complied; in addition, the ability to perform the
act required by the court order must have been within the power of
the defendant.  Elzey, 291 Md. at 374, 435 A.2d at 447 (quoting
Williams & Fullwood v. Director, 276 Md. 272, 313, 347 A.2d 179,
201 (1975)), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 2178, 48 L.Ed.2d
801 (1976).   See People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970, 974 (Colo.
1985). "The 'choice' must be the defendant's "as to whether [he
can] comply."  Elzey, 291 Md. at 374, 435 A.2d at 447.
The latter requirement, whether or not the defendant is able
to comply with the court order is, however, a matter of defense.
Johnson v. Johnson,  241 Md. 416, 420, 216 A.2d 914, 917 (1966).
In "The Indigent Defendant's Right To Court-Appointed Counsel In
11
Civil Contempt Proceedings For Non Payment Of Child Support
Payments," 50 U. Chi.L.Rev., 326, 338 (1983), the point was made:
Inability to comply is a complete defense.
Proof of ability to comply requires a showing
that the defendant had a resource to meet the
court-ordered payments, allowing a reasonable
amount for his own subsistence.  If he has the
means to comply, the court is justified in
reordering his priorities by applying coercive
measures.  The court exceeds its powers,
however, if it confines a man on the ground
either that he is healthy and able to work or
that he could prevail upon relatives to pay
the sums required for his release.  
We made a similar point in Johnson, 241 Md. at 420, 216 A.2d at
917:
"The purpose of imprisonment for contempt is
to compel compliance with a court order but
where the person alleged to be in contempt can
establish a valid defense, such as the
unintentional inability to obey the order,
imprisonment is not proper.  
Where the order is one prescribing  or prohibiting a specified
cause of conduct, the required defense showing is that the
defendant is unable to conform his or her conduct in compliance
with the court order.  Where the order calls for the payment of
money, the defendant is entitled to the "opportunity to show that
he [or she] had neither the estate nor the ability to pay his or
[her] obligation."  Id.  In that situation, "[m]oreover, the issue
is not the ability to pay at the time the payments were originally
ordered; instead, the issue is his present ability to pay."  Elzey,
291 Md. at 374, 435 A.2d at 448.  Only if he or she fails to show
such inability is a finding of contempt and subsequent imprisonment
12
permitted.  Id.   See McDaniel v. McDaniel, 256 Md. 684, 692-93,
262 A.2d 52, 57 (1970); Speckler v. Speckler, 256 Md. 635, 637, 261
A.2d 466, 467 (1970); Schwartzman v. Schwartzman, 204 Md. 125, 135,
102 A.2d 810, 815 (1954); Oles Envelope Corp. v. Oles, 193 Md. 79,
92, 65 A.2d 899, 905 (1949); Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 681,
141 A. 387, 390 (1928).     
Proof of inability to comply, however, does not guarantee
immunity from imprisonment.  In Roll & Scholl, the Court explained:
Situations may arise where at a hearing held
pursuant to an order to show cause in what
properly began as a civil contempt, facts are
presented which indicate that the alleged
contemnor cannot comply with the order of the
court that directed him to perform an act for
the benefit and advantage of another party to
the suit.  If this inability to comply was
caused by a deliberate effort or a wilful act
of commission or omission by the alleged
contemnor committed with the knowledge that it
would frustrate the order of the court, the
civil contempt proceeding should be terminated
and new proceedings may be instituted which
can result in a finding of criminal contempt.
267 Md. at 730, 298 A.2d at 877.
Although this Court recognized in Johnson, a civil contempt
case, that there are valid defenses to a charge of contempt - we
pointedly did not specify civil contempt, 241 Md. at 420, 216 A.2d
at 917 - the example we gave was the "unintentional inability to
obey the order."  Nothing in that case suggests that the Court
intended to limit the defenses that would be valid in contempt
proceedings.  Subsequent cases belie such an intention.  In Elzey,
also a civil contempt case, we considered another example of a
13
valid defense to a contempt proceeding - intentional inability to
obey the order.  See 291 Md. at 375-76, 435 A.2d at 448 (quoting
Roll & Scholl, 267 Md. at 730, 298 A.2d at 877).   The context of
that case made clear that such intentional inability is a defense
limited to civil contempt proceedings.   Id.  Read together with
Elzey, therefore, it would appear that Johnson's reference to
"unintentional inability to obey" was no more than it purported to
be, an example of a valid defense.   As the respondent correctly
argues, "the statement in Johnson can be read to mean that
inability to pay precludes imprisonment for civil contempt and an
unintentional inability to pay precludes imprisonment for either
civil or criminal contempt."  The Respondent's Brief at 13.  
Furthermore, the goal of civil contempt proceedings, to coerce
compliance with a court order entered primarily for the benefit of
private parties to a suit, cannot be accomplished when the
responsible party is unable, for whatever reason, to comply.  The
same is true in the case of court-ordered child support payments.
If the responsible party does not have the money, or any means of
obtaining it, payment cannot be coerced.  Indeed, this is true
whether the responsible party chose intentionally to frustrate the
court order, as, for example, acting in bad faith, to impoverish
him or herself, or whether his or her inability is unintentional.
Although primarily focused on the imprisonment aspect of the
analysis, rather than the proof of contempt, both Johnson and Elzey
are instructive.  In Elzey, the petitioner, a plumber, was required
14
by a divorce decree, incorporating a settlement agreement, to pay
his former wife weekly support.  A little more than a year after
the decree was entered, he informed his former wife that he was
retiring and therefore would be financially unable to continue the
payments.  She initiated civil contempt proceedings.  The
petitioner produced evidence in support of his financial inability
to meet his support obligation.  His testimony explained why he
retired, he "wasn't able to get out and do the work that [he] had
done years before," he could not make enough money to pay his
overhead, he was "going behind every month, and ... he 'could not
see any other way out.'"  291 Md. at 372, 435 A.2d at 446-47.
Although noting that the petitioner had been able to pay his former
wife the support payments required when the agreement was
originally made, but that "the circumstances changed," so that,
since his retirement, the petitioner became financially unable to
pay, the trial court found the petitioner in contempt and expressed
the view that "I have to send you to jail."  Id.  at 373, 435 A.2d
at 447.  While it made no finding that the petitioner retired in
order to escape his court ordered obligation to his former wife -
it found, to the contrary, that he retired because he had reached
the age at which most people retire - the trial court opined,
"because the petitioner's financial inability resulted from his own
decision to retire, this case fell outside of the principle that
one may not be imprisoned in a civil contempt case for failing to
make support payments if one has neither the assets nor the ability
15
to pay."  Id.
Agreeing with the trial court that the petitioner had become
unable to pay the arrearages as well as the continuing weekly
support payments, this Court held that the "petitioner should not
have been sentenced to jail."  Id. at 375, 435 A.2d at 448.
Moreover, we rejected the trial court's belief that a jail sentence
was required because the petitioner voluntarily retired, thus
placing himself in a position of financial inability.  Relying on
Roll & Scholl, 267 Md. at 730, 298 A.2d at 877, we also pointed out
that, had the trial court found that the petitioner retired in bad
faith or to defraud his former wife or to deprive her of her
support, that finding would not have justified a civil contempt
jail sentence, although one for criminal contempt may have been in
order.  The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the
judgment of the Circuit Court for Dorchester County was reversed.
Elzey, 291 Md. at 376, 435 A.2d at 449. 
In Johnson, the issue was again whether the petitioner should
have been incarcerated for contempt.  We noted that "[w]hether or
not the father was subject to incarceration depends on whether he
was able to meet the obligation imposed on him by the support
order."  241 Md. at 419, 216 A.2d at 916 (emphasis added).  Having
concluded that the record seemed to indicate that the petitioner
was unable to meet his obligations because he had neither
sufficient estate nor an ability to pay, we remanded the case for
a hearing on the petitioner's petition to reduce the support
16
payments and for the "introduction of evidence as to his present
ability to meet his obligations."  Id. at 420, 216 A.2d at 917.
III.
A.
The petitioner argues that the respondent failed to meet her
burden of proving her inability to comply with the court-ordered
support order.  It thus urges affirmance of the contempt finding.
Although he does not specifically cite Johnson, 241 Md. at 420, 216
A.2d at 917, for the proposition, he, like the Court of Special
Appeals, see 103 Md. App. at 80, 652 A.2d at 1136, believes that
the only available defense, hence the showing the respondent had to
make, was her "unintentional inability to pay the court ordered
support."  So it is that the petitioner contends that the inability
proven must be "in good faith and not due to calculated and
deliberate choice."  McDaniel, 256 Md. at 692, 262 A.2d at 57.
Accordingly, the party alleged to be in contempt, the petitioner
submits, 
cannot be compelled to work and earn the
wherewithal to meet the court's mandate if he
is physically or for other good reason unable
to do so.  On the other hand, he will not be
permitted to succeed on a defense of inability
to comply where he has chosen his own
situation and declines to make any reasonable
effort to employ his earning capacity in other
directions.  Nor can he arbitrarily sit back
and refuse to work when he has the capacity
for gainful employment.  
Id. at 693-94, 262 A.2d at 57-58 (quoting Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d
212, 218 (Minn. 1968)).  Indeed, whether non payment is in good
17
faith and not with deliberate disregard of the support order
requires consideration of the defendant's "ability to perform
labor; his opportunity to find gainful employment; his disposition
and will to earn money and contribute a reasonable amount to his
family's support, and his diligence in seeking employment...."  Id.
at 693, 262 A.2d at 57 (quoting Hopp, 156 N.W.2d at 217-18).
Focusing, as did the Court of Special Appeals on the entirety
of the period between the passage of the support order and the
contempt hearing, see Lynch, 103 Md. App. at 79, 652 A.2d at 1136,
the petitioner believes that there is ample evidence in the record
to sustain the circuit court's contempt finding.  He agrees with
that court that, given her discretionary lifestyle, the respondent
did not meet her burden to prove herself incapable of complying
with the support order.  The petitioner explains:
Clearly the trial judge considered Ms. Lynch's
testimony and concluded that she had chosen a
discretionary lifestyle that did not require
her 
to 
obtain 
employment. 
 
Ms. 
Lynch
voluntarily left her job, was able to have
housing and food provided at no cost, had made
no effort at settling her mother's estate, and
had 
only 
recently 
started 
a 
less 
than
comprehensive effort at seeking employment.
Based on this uncontroverted evidence, the
trial court did not find Ms. Lynch's failure
to 
comply 
with 
the 
support 
order 
an
unintentional or unavoidable act; rather, he
found that she chose a lifestyle in which she
was cared for by others and was not required
to earn any money for herself or her children.
That deliberate choice resulted in Ms. Lynch's
alleged inability to comply with the support
order.  The trial court certainly acted within
its discretion in concluding that Ms. Lynch's
lifestyle choice did not excuse compliance
18
     The Court of Special Appeals reached its conclusion using a
6
different analysis.  The intermediate appellate court believed
with the support order.
The Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4-5.  The petitioner submits that
there is a fundamental difference between inability to pay a purge
amount and inability to comply with a support order.  A finding
with regard to the former does not necessitate, in his view, a
consistent finding with respect to the latter.
B.  
Next, the petitioner argues that assessed in light of the fact
that it is the respondent's burden to establish inability to pay
the purge amount, the evidence of inability to comply was
insufficient and, thus, the Court of Special Appeals must be
reversed.  In the petitioner's view, the respondent has left
unexplained a number of circumstances, including her ability to pay
for public transportation, her ability to pay the taxes on her
mother's house, and the source of the $20 she brought with her to
court, which raised serious doubts about her alleged inability to
pay the $500 purge amount.  That being the case, he submits that
the trial court's discretionary finding that the respondent did not
meet her burden in that regard is fully supported by the record.
IV.
A. 
Addressing the latter argument first, we believe that the
Court of Special Appeals correctly reversed the purging provision.6
19
that the proper focus was on the proof of the respondent's
financial ability to comply, rather than her financial inability
to comply.  In its view, the burden was on the petitioner to
prove the former, rather than on the respondent to prove the
latter.  Lynch v. Lynch, 103 Md. 71, 82, 652 A.2d 1132, 1137-38
(1995)  Having thus allocated the burden, the Court of Special
Appeals concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove the
respondent's present ability to comply with the purge provision. 
It reasoned that proof of present ability to comply cannot be
"based exclusively on the disbelief of [the respondent's]
testimony that she was not able to pay any more than the twenty
dollars ($20) she brought to court with her."  Id. at 83, 652
A.2d at 1138.
There is absolutely no evidence in this case on the basis of which
it could be concluded that the respondent had a present ability to
pay the purge amount.  The respondent testified, without
contradiction and without cross-examination, that aside from $20,
she had no income, or assets, and no way of raising the purge
amount.  Moreover, the trial court found that she did not have the
present financial ability to comply with the purge provision.  It
made clear, at the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, that
the basis for its finding was "not because she had $500.00 in her
pocket," or that she could raise it from assets or property she
possessed, but because of the respondent's discretionary lifestyle.
It was on that basis that the court inferred that the respondent
would be able to acquire the monies with which to purge her
contempt.  Significantly, the court believed that she would get the
money from persons who had no legal obligation to support her or
her children.  Indeed, by resting its fact finding on the
discretionary lifestyle rationale, the court necessarily found that
20
the respondent had no present financial ability to comply; rather,
she was dependent upon the largess and good wishes of those persons
who made her discretionary lifestyle possible, the very antithesis
of present financial ability. See Russell v. Russell, 559 So.2d
675, 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
B.
Neither is the petitioner correct with regard to the contempt
finding. 
The respondent's testimony was the only evidence bearing on
her inability to comply with the court order.   That testimony
applied equally to the monthly payments, the full amount due under
the order, and the purge amount.  The trial court found, correctly,
we concluded, that that evidence did not establish that the
respondent had a present financial ability to comply with the purge
provision.  We do not believe that the same testimony nevertheless
could be sufficient to establish the respondent's ability to comply
with the court order.
The Court of Special Appeals and, as we have seen, the
petitioner, believe that the present financial inability to comply
applies only to the sanction, i.e., the purge provision and not the
finding of contempt.  In their view, it is enough if the evidence
reveals that the defendant could have complied with the order at
some time during its life and/or that the defendant's present
financial inability to comply is caused by the defendant's bad
faith decision and intentional act, orchestrated to frustrate or
21
avoid compliance with the court order.  This analysis disregards
the important distinction between civil contempt and criminal
contempt 
and, 
in 
fact, 
contributes 
to 
the 
haziness 
and
indistinctiveness, see Roll & Scholl, 267 Md. at 728, 298 A.2d at
876, of the line between them.
Moreover, it is at odds with the
analysis employed in Roll & Scholl. 
Whether a defendant has failed to pay court ordered support
when he or she had the ability to do so and whether that defendant
has, in bad faith, caused his or her own present inability to
comply, with the intent of frustrating the court order, are
material, and, indeed, necessary, considerations bearing on whether
a defendant should be punished.  Those considerations do not
address whether the defendant is in civil contempt, the object of
which is remedial - to force compliance.  Even if the present
inability to comply is the product of the defendant's bad faith,
compliance still cannot be coerced by civil contempt.  Thus, to the
extent that this record reflects that the respondent failed to pay
the court-ordered support when able and quit her job in bad faith,
for the purpose of avoiding the responsibility and, in the process
frustrated the court order, the petitioner could have, and should
have, initiated criminal contempt proceedings, for the purpose of
punishing the respondent for those acts.  That would, of course,
have required the termination of the civil contempt proceedings.
See Elzey, 291 Md. at 375, 435 A.2d at 448; Roll & Scholl, 267 Md.
at 730, 298 A.2d at 877.
22
Furthermore, merely finding a defendant in contempt of court
does not ordinarily further the purpose of coercing future
compliance with the court order.  Indeed, a finding of contempt,
where there is no possibility of enforcing compliance with the
court order to which it relates, simply labels the defendant a
contemnor and imputes guilt to him or her.  That is a form of
punishment.  See Herd, 37 Md. at 364-65, 377 A.2d at 576 ("the
contemner [sic] must be afforded the chance to rid himself of guilt
and thus clear himself of the charge.  To suspend the sentence and
allow the conviction to stand falls well short of the mark.").  As
our cases recognize, civil contempt requires a purge provision with
which the defendant is able to comply in order to purge, i.e.,
clear or exonerate, him or herself of the contempt.  Where, based
on past acts and/or the defendant's lack of good faith compliance
with the court order, a finding of contempt is permitted to stand,
the defendant is denied any opportunity to purge the contempt.   
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED AS TO THE PURGING
PROVISION AND REVERSED AS TO THE
FINDING OF CONTEMPT.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
THE
PETITIONER.            
  
23