Case Title: The People v. Joseph Goldstein

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
- 1 -
=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 67  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Joseph Goldstein, 
            Appellant.
Jacob Laufer, for appellant.
Karen Mannino, for respondent.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
Defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of
reckless endangerment in the first degree (Penal Law § 120.25),
one count of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle
- 2 -
No. 67
- 2 -
in the first degree (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511 [3]) and
numerous misdemeanors and violations.  According to the
indictment, defendant, while driving with a suspended license,
was pulled over by a police officer for failing to observe a stop
sign.  When asked by the officer to produce his license,
defendant sped away, committing numerous traffic offenses and, in
the course of being chased, drove his Ford Explorer at a high
speed through a one-lane construction zone into oncoming traffic,
causing flagmen at each end of the zone to jump out of the way of
his vehicle.  Defendant’s license had been suspended some 28
times and he had an extensive criminal record, including at least
two felonies.  He was on parole at the time of the events here at
issue.
At the plea proceedings, defendant was informed by the
court that, if he went to trial and was convicted, he faced
consecutive sentences.  Defendant indicated in substance that, in
accordance with the previously agreed upon plea bargain, he
wished to enter a plea of guilty to the indictment’s top three
counts in full satisfaction of the accusatory instrument and
understood that he would be sentenced to concurrent terms, the
longest of which would be 3½ to 7 years.  He acknowledged that,
at the time of the events in question, he had been driving in the
town of Liberty, New York without a valid license; that his
license had previously been suspended on 28 occasions; that he
drove a Ford Explorer through a construction zone “pretty fast”;
- 3 -
No. 67
- 3 -
and that he observed, but did not obey, flagmen directing traffic
into and out of the single lane passing through the work zone. 
During this allocution, the following exchange took place:
“THE COURT: And did you ignore the
traffic directions and cause one of
the construction workers to jump
out of the way to avoid being hit
by your car?
. . .
“THE DEFENDANT: I don't know if he
jumped out, your honor. I know I
went by.
“THE COURT: Very close. You could
have killed him if you hit him?
“THE DEFENDANT: I don't think so. I
don't know.
“THE COURT: You didn't kill him, of
course. But, you came so close that
you created a situation that was
very dangerous.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your honor, we
don't dispute the allegation. My
client has no recollection of
particular individuals. But, we
don't dispute the allegations and I
have had an opportunity to review
the allegations, as well as the
statement with my client, and we
don't dispute the voracity [sic] of
the situation.”
After accepting defendant’s plea, the court warned
defendant that his failure to appear for sentencing on the
appointed date would result in a sentence of 12 to 48 years.  It
is clear that a sentence of that length could not have been
imposed.
- 4 -
No. 67
- 4 -
Some 3½ months after entering his plea, defendant,
represented by new counsel, moved unsuccessfully before a
different judge to withdraw it. 
The essential issues raised on the motion, and upon
which the Appellate Division Justices differed in their
disposition of the ensuing appeal to that Court, are whether
defendant was misinformed as to what appears to have been the
only real benefit of his plea (i.e., concurrent as opposed to
consecutive sentences), and whether the allocution was fatally
defective with respect to the reckless endangerment counts. 
These issues, decided against defendant by the Appellate Division
majority, are now before us by leave of a Justice of that Court
(CPL 460.20).
Defendant’s contention that he was misinformed as to
the possibility of receiving consecutive sentences if he went to
trial, is without merit.  While it is arguable that the
allegations of the indictment and facts adduced at the allocution
did not sufficiently demonstrate that the two reckless
endangerment counts were based on distinct acts for which
consecutive sentences could be imposed -- since neither the
indictment nor the allocution indicated the length of the
construction zone or the interval between the defendant's alleged
near misses of the construction zone flagmen (see generally
People v Laureano, 87 NY2d 640, 644 [1996]) -- it is clear, and,
indeed, on this point the Appellate Division Justices agreed,
- 5 -
No. 67
- 5 -
that the conduct underlying the count alleging aggravated
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle was distinct from that
involved in the ensuing reckless endangerment offenses and thus
permitted a consecutive sentence.  Defendant’s plea, then, would
have afforded him the considerable benefit of avoiding exposure
to consecutive sentences had he appeared for sentencing as
directed.  This being the case, defendant’s contentions that he
was misled into a worthless plea bargain and that he was denied
effective representation in connection with the plea bargain,
would appear untenable.  While it is true that the plea court
grossly misrepresented defendant’s exposure to consecutive
sentencing in the course of administering Parker warnings (see
People v Parker, 57 NY2d 136 [1982]), this occurred after the
plea had been entered.  There is no indication that the
misinformation figured in defendant’s decision to plead as he
did.  The only representation of record made to the defendant by
the court prior to the entry of his plea was, simply, that a
consecutive sentence was possible, but that under the plea
bargain the sentence would be concurrent.  This was accurate.
The argument as to the adequacy of the allocution is
based on defendant’s claimed inability, when asked, to state
whether he had passed perilously close to the construction zone
flagmen.  Defendant’s asserted ignorance on this point is said to
negate the mental state of depraved indifference, which is
elemental to first degree reckless endangerment (see People v
- 6 -
No. 67
- 6 -
Feingold, 7 NY3d 288 [2006]).  But defendant’s professed
inability at the time of the plea to remember whether he nearly
hit the flagmen does not “negate”  the accusation that he acted
with depraved indifference at the time of the incident. 
Defendant’s counsel explained that although defendant did not
remember “the particular individuals,”  he and his client had
reviewed the allegations and did not dispute them.  Certainly,
the court was not presented with a protestation of innocence.  
If the issue were whether the facts specifically
admitted by defendant during the allocution would, if proved,
suffice to support a conviction, the question would be close;
defendant ably argues that what was made out in the allocution
itself amounted to no more than second degree reckless
endangerment (Penal Law § 120.20), a non-depraved indifference
offense.  But an allocution based on a negotiated plea need not
elicit from a defendant specific admissions as to each element of
the charged crime.  Nor is "[t]he court's duty to inquire further
. . .  triggered merely by the failure of a pleading defendant,
whether or not represented by counsel, to recite every element of
the crime pleaded to" (see People v Lopez (71 NY2d 662, 666 n 2
[1988]).  Indeed, no catechism is required in connection with the
acceptance of a plea (see People v Nixon, 21 NY2d 338, 350
[1967]) and we have refused to disturb pleas by canny defendants
even when there has been absolutely no elicitation of the
underlying facts of the crime (see People v Fooks, 21 NY2d 338,
- 7 -
No. 67
- 7 -
350 [1967] [decided with People v Nixon]).  It is enough that the
allocution shows that the defendant understood the charges and
made an intelligent decision to enter a plea (id.).  Here, the
allocution was adequate to meet these purposes.  The defendant,
represented by counsel and no novice to the criminal justice
system, clearly understood the nature of the charges to which he
was pleading and willingly entered his plea to obtain the benefit
of the bargain he had struck.
Defendant's remaining argument is that the court abused
its discretion when it enhanced his sentence by reason of his
failure to appear for sentencing on the appointed date, without
affording him an opportunity to substantiate his proffered
psychiatric excuse for his absence.  However, had there been any
plausible psychiatric reason for defendant’s failure to appear on
the two prior scheduled sentencing dates, it is to be expected
that defendant would have been prepared at sentencing with some
supporting documentation, particularly after a warrant had been
issued to secure his appearance.  Under the circumstances,
including, notably, defendant’s extensive history of
nonappearances -- many of his license suspensions having resulted
from failing to appear -- the court’s decision to proceed with
sentencing, and to enhance the sentence by reason of defendant’s
failure to heed the Parker warnings he had been given, did not
rise to the level of an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
- 8 -
No. 67
- 8 -
be affirmed.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   * 
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman.  Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided April 30, 2009