Case Title: Hood v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 040774

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
STEPHEN JAMES HOOD 
 
v.  Record No. 040774     OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
 
 
 
March 3, 2005 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
Stephen James Hood was convicted of first-degree murder 
as a principal in the second degree.  Hood asks this Court to 
reverse his conviction, asserting that the trial court erred 
in allowing the Commonwealth to use statements Hood made in a 
proffer submitted to the government in the course of plea 
negotiations.  The proffer agreement provided that the 
proffered statements could be used against Hood if he offered 
testimony or presented evidence that was different from any 
statement or information provided in the proffer.  We conclude 
that because Hood's evidence at trial was inconsistent with 
his proffered statement, the trial court did not err in 
allowing the Commonwealth to use the proffered statement. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
The facts, as relevant to the issues in this appeal, are 
not in dispute.  Early in the morning of August 31, 1990, Eloise 
Cooper, an elderly African-American woman, was abducted from the 
apartment she shared with her husband.  That afternoon her body 
was found in the woods of a nearby park.  According to the 
medical examiner, Mrs. Cooper had suffered three stab wounds, 
two of which perforated vital organs and caused her to bleed to 
death. 
Although a third party was convicted of the murder in 
1991, the police reopened the case in 1999, at which time Hood 
and another individual, Billy Madison, were developed as 
suspects in Mrs. Cooper's murder.  Hood was indicted on May 
17, 2001 for first degree murder, in violation of Code § 18.2-
32, and abduction, in violation of Code § 18.2-47.  As part of 
plea negotiations, Hood and the government agreed that he 
would provide a "detailed oral proffer" and that none of the 
statements made in the proffer would be used against Hood in 
the Commonwealth's case-in-chief in a criminal prosecution of 
Hood.  The agreement further provided that if Hood "offers 
testimony or presents evidence different from any statement 
made or other information provided during the proffer," the 
Commonwealth could use his statements for impeachment, cross-
examination, and rebuttal. 
 
Hood's oral proffer was taken over the course of three 
days and was reduced to 17 typed pages.  In his proffer, Hood 
stated that he and Madison engaged in a number of drug 
transactions with Roberto Steadman in the summer of 1990.  
Shortly before the day of the murder, Madison had given 
Steadman money to purchase drugs, but Steadman failed to 
deliver the drugs to Madison or return Madison's money.  In 
 
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response, Madison took Steadman's bicycle and put it in Hood's 
apartment.  When Steadman recovered the bicycle from Hood's 
apartment, Madison was angry and said he was going to "get his 
drugs or get this thing straight." 
 
Madison went to Hood's apartment during the early morning 
hours the day of the murder.  Madison called Steadman from 
Hood's apartment and arranged to meet Steadman to get some 
drugs.  Suggesting that they should not go to the drug deal 
unarmed, Hood took three knives he obtained while working as a 
chef.  Hood did not want to take his truck because it was "so 
noisy."  Madison had access to a "quieter" car, and Hood drove 
that car to meet Steadman. 
The two men picked up Steadman and took him to his 
apartment.  Shortly after Steadman went into his apartment, 
Madison got out of the car and walked toward the apartment.  
According to Hood, when Madison returned to the car, he was 
"mad."  Madison took Hood's knives and again walked away from 
the car. 
Madison returned in a few moments with an elderly 
African-American woman in a nightgown.  Madison "threw" the 
woman into the back seat of the car and got in on top of her.  
The woman was screaming and crying.  Madison, pointing one of 
the knives at the woman and at Hood, told Hood to drive to a 
"dark place."  After driving around for a short while, Hood 
 
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stopped the car on a dark street.  Madison and the woman got 
out of the car and walked a short distance.  Hood stated that 
it looked like Madison was hitting the woman and that the 
woman's crying eventually stopped.  Madison returned to the 
car with Hood's knife still in his hand, and directed Hood to 
return to Madison's apartment.  Madison got out of the car, 
took Hood's knife, and returned to his apartment.  Hood took 
the rest of the knives and returned to his apartment. 
Sometime later, Hood refused to testify as a character 
witness for Madison.  Madison told Hood that if Hood did not 
testify he would kill Hood "just like" he killed the woman.  
Madison also threatened to harm Hood's daughter and the mother 
of his daughter. 
 
At trial, the Commonwealth agreed that, under the terms 
of the proffer agreement, it could not use Hood's proffered 
statements unless Hood presented evidence inconsistent with 
those statements.  During the course of the Commonwealth's 
case, the state medical examiner was asked to describe the 
condition of the victim at the crime scene.  The medical 
examiner answered that the victim's pajama bottoms were off, 
her pajama top was open and pulled up, and her legs were 
"spread eagle."  Under these circumstances, the medical 
examiner explained that the crime would be treated as a "sex 
crime;" however, the laboratory tests "were negative for 
 
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sperm."  On cross-examination, Hood's counsel asked the 
medical examiner if she recalled whether during the same time 
period "there were several other elderly African-American 
women who were found stabbed to death."  The Commonwealth 
objected to this question as beyond the scope of its direct 
examination.  Hood's counsel suggested that the Commonwealth 
could cross-examine the witness and was permitted to elicit 
testimony from the medical examiner about other murders of 
elderly women who had been beaten and sexually assaulted 
around the same time as the instant crime. 
Before resting its case, the Commonwealth sought to 
introduce Hood's proffered statements through the 
investigating officer, arguing that the testimony from the 
medical examiner presented by Hood regarding the similarity of 
murders of other elderly women to the murder in this case was 
contrary to the statements in the proffer and, therefore, the 
Commonwealth was entitled to use the proffered statement 
against Hood.  Hood argued that the medical examiner's 
testimony was not contrary to Hood's proffer.  The court 
concluded that the testimony of the medical examiner presented 
by Hood indicating that the murder of Mrs. Cooper "could have 
been related to the Golden Years Murders" was different from 
Hood's proffered statements and, therefore, the Commonwealth 
was entitled to introduce those statements. 
 
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The trial court found Hood guilty of murder and abduction 
as a principal in the second degree.  The trial court, after 
further briefing and argument of counsel, denied Hood's motion 
to reconsider the admission of his proffered statement, 
finding that Hood had presented "circumstantial evidence which 
was different from" the proffered statements.  The trial court 
also rejected Hood's arguments that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction.  In an unpublished 
memorandum opinion, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Hood of 
the murder as a principal in the second degree.1  Hood v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 2469-02-2 (February 17, 2004). 
Discussion 
 
 
We have not previously considered the type of agreement, 
described as an "immunity/cooperation" agreement, at issue 
here.  Neither party questions the legality or enforceability 
of the proffer agreement and the agreement is not inconsistent 
with the provisions of Rule 3A:8.2  We first note that these 
"cooperation/immunity" agreements, are markedly different from 
                     
1 Hood's abduction conviction was not before the Court of 
Appeals and is not before this Court. 
2 The proffer agreement is consistent with the provisions 
of Rule 3A:8(c)(5) that prohibit such statements from being 
admitted in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief because it 
contained such a prohibition and allowed the statements to be 
admitted only for cross-examination, rebuttal or impeachment.  
 
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plea agreements.  These agreements, unlike plea agreements, 
involve only the contracting parties and are not subject to 
the filing and acceptance procedures applicable to plea 
agreements.  See Rule 3A:8.  Compare Commonwealth v. Sandy, 
257 Va. 87, 509 S.E.2d 492 (1999).  Nevertheless, there are 
similarities between plea agreements and the agreement at 
issue in this case.  The Court of Appeals and other courts 
that have considered such agreements have uniformly held that 
these cooperation/immunity agreements, like a plea agreement, 
implicate a defendant's due process rights and are generally 
governed by the law of contracts.  Lampkins v. Commonwealth, 
___ Va. App. ___, ___, 607 S.E.2d 722, ___ (2005); 
Commonwealth v. Sluss, 14 Va. App. 601, 604, 419 S.E.2d 263, 
265 (1992); Plaster v. United States, 789 F.2d 289, 293 (4th 
Cir. 1986).  On appellate review, the trial court's 
interpretation of the agreement is a matter of law subject to 
de novo review, while a clearly erroneous standard of review 
is applied to the trial court's factual findings.  Sluss, 14 
Va. App. at 606-07, 419 S.E.2d at 266-67; United States v. 
Smith, 976 F.2d 861, 863 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1076 (4th Cir. 1991).  We will apply 
these standards of review in this case. 
                                                                
Hood raised no objection to the manner in which the evidence 
at issue was used by the Commonwealth. 
 
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At trial neither party suggested that the proffer 
agreement was ambiguous, and the trial court was not called 
upon to interpret the agreement.  In his brief to this Court, 
Hood asserts that the "terms and conditions of the proffer 
agreement are not contested."  Although the record does not 
reflect any dispute over the meaning of terms in the proffer 
agreement, the record does show that neither the parties nor 
the trial court considered or asserted that the phrase 
"different from" meant simply "in addition to."  Rather both 
parties suggested that evidence contrary to, or inconsistent 
with, the proffered statement would violate the terms of the 
proffer.  Thus, in this case we consider the phrase "different 
from" in the same manner. 
The trial court concluded that the testimony of the 
medical examiner presented by Hood was circumstantial evidence 
regarding the commission of the murder and was different from 
that contained in the proffered statement.  Whether Hood 
breached the agreement is a question of fact which we review 
under a clearly erroneous standard. 
 
Hood argues that the evidence elicited from the medical 
examiner regarding the stabbing murders of other elderly women 
was not different from his proffered statement.  At trial Hood 
asserted that the "crux of [his] statement is this, that he 
was present and that he knew who did it."  On brief in this 
 
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Court, Hood agrees that evidence showing that someone other 
than Madison committed the crime would "have constituted 
presenting evidence different from his statement." 
The Commonwealth argues that the testimony elicited by 
Hood from the medical examiner created an inference that a 
person other than Madison murdered Mrs. Cooper.  This 
inference arises from the testimony regarding the stabbing 
murders of a number of elderly women during the same time 
period.  The trial court agreed, stating that this evidence 
implied that the murder of Mrs. Cooper was related to the 
"Golden Years" cases, a name given the murders of the other 
elderly women.  The trial court concluded that this 
circumstantial evidence created an inference that someone 
other than Madison murdered Mrs. Cooper and that this 
inference was inconsistent with Hood's proffer that Madison 
killed Mrs. Cooper.3
Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial court 
clearly erred in concluding that the evidence presented by 
Hood created an inference that Mrs. Cooper's murderer was 
someone other than Madison and that the introduction of such 
evidence was different from the proffer statement that 
                     
3 As noted by the dissenting judge in the Court of 
Appeals, the trial court's initial statement that the evidence 
was inconsistent with Hood's statement that he committed the 
 
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attributed the murder to Madison.  Accordingly, for the 
reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals holding that the trial court's admission of Hood's 
proffered statement was not error. 
We also will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
that the evidence supported Hood's conviction for first degree 
murder as a principal in the second degree.  A murder 
committed in the course of an abduction is first degree 
murder.  Code § 18.2-32.  A person is guilty as a principal in 
the second degree if he is present and assists the perpetrator 
of the crime or shared the perpetrator's intent to commit the 
crime.  Jones v. Commonwealth,  208 Va. 370, 372-73, 157 
S.E.2d 907, 909 (1967); Snyder v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 
1015, 121 S.E.2d 452, 457 (1961).  Hood argues that there is 
no evidence that he engaged in any overt act to further the 
murder.  However, the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Commonwealth, Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 
459, 461, 536 S.E.2d 437, 438 (2000), proved that when Hood 
left his apartment with Madison he knew that something "was 
going to happen when they met with Steadman that night."  The 
evidence further showed that Hood provided the knives, and 
that he, at Madison's direction, drove Madison and Mrs. Cooper 
                                                                
crime was erroneous.  This error, however, does not affect our 
analysis. 
 
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to a secluded area where they would not be detected and then 
drove Madison away from the crime scene.  This evidence is 
sufficient to sustain a finding that Hood was present and 
assisted Madison in the murder of Mrs. Cooper. 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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