Case Title: Commonwealth v. Castano

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12090

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-10-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12090 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  FRANKLIN CASTANO. 
 
 
 
Essex.     April 7, 2017. - October 6, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, 
Harmless error.  Error, Harmless.  Practice, Criminal, 
Capital case, Assistance of counsel, Harmless error, 
Hearsay, State of mind.  Evidence, Hearsay, State of mind, 
Motive, Expert opinion, Qualification of expert witness.  
Witness, Expert. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on March 24, 2014. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Timothy 
Q. Feeley, J., and the cases were tried before Mary K. Ames, J. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. 
 
Marcia H. Slingerland, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant 
of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation, G. L. c. 265, § 1, and of unlawful possession of 
2 
 
 
a firearm, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h).1  The defendant advances five 
arguments on appeal:  (1) his statements to police about the 
location of the gun involved in the case should have been 
suppressed; (2) the trial judge improperly admitted hearsay 
statements as motive evidence; (3) the Commonwealth's ballistics 
expert was not competent to testify about the trajectory of the 
shot that killed the victim; (4) the defendant was deprived of 
his right to counsel because his relationship with his attorney 
had deteriorated; and (5) the interests of justice require this 
court to exercise its power, under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
reduce the conviction to murder in the second degree.  For the 
reasons discussed below, we affirm the convictions and decline 
to exercise our authority under § 33E. 
 
Background.  On the morning of February 20, 2014, the 
defendant, accompanied by two friends, walked into the Lynn 
police station.  One of the friends, Alvaro Garcia, informed 
police that the defendant's girl friend was dead and that the 
defendant had killed her.  The defendant was placed under 
arrest, and police responded to the Peabody apartment that the 
defendant shared with his girl friend.  There, they found her 
                     
 
1 The judge sentenced the defendant to the mandatory term of 
imprisonment for life sentence without parole on the murder 
conviction, and to a sentence of two years in a house of 
correction on the firearm conviction to be served forthwith.  
The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
3 
 
 
dead with a gunshot wound to the head.  Two spent casings were 
found nearby, but no firearm was observed or recovered. 
 
The events immediately following the defendant's arrival at 
the police station were the subject of a motion to suppress, and 
we first summarize those facts as found by the motion judge.  We 
then summarize the evidence at trial, with additional facts 
reserved for later discussion. 
 
1.  The motion to suppress.  The motion judge found the 
following facts, which are not in dispute.  The defendant, who 
is not fluent in English, was booked at the Lynn police station 
with the assistance of Officer Francisco Gomez, who is 
bilingual.  Throughout the course of the day, Gomez administered 
Miranda rights to the defendant, in Spanish, at least four 
times, including at the Lynn police station and at the Peabody 
police station.  Soon after the first provision of Miranda 
rights, the defendant invoked his right to counsel. 
 
The questioning did not immediately cease.  The defendant 
was subjected to two sets of questions at the Peabody police 
station without ever having the opportunity to speak to a 
lawyer.  Both sets of postinvocation questions concerned the 
disposal of the firearm that police, at that time, believed the 
defendant had used to kill the victim. 
 
The first set of questions came from Peabody police Officer 
Mark Saia, who asked the defendant where "the gun" was.  The 
4 
 
 
defendant replied that he threw it out of his motor vehicle 
window near the apartment complex where the killing occurred.  
Saia told the defendant that it was important to locate the gun 
because of that area's proximity to places where children might 
be present.  The officer asked the defendant for more detail 
about where he had disposed of the gun.  The defendant said he 
had turned to the left out of the apartment complex and threw 
the weapon out the vehicle window near a dry cleaner.  Saia 
communicated that information to other officers at the scene.  
They did not find the gun. 
 
The second set of questions came from Peabody police 
Detective Stephanie Lane.  Lane had responded to the apartment 
complex on the morning of the events in question.  She was 
familiar with the area described by the defendant.  She was 
aware that both a church (with a school and day care facility) 
and a preschool were located nearby.  She also was aware that 
the apartment complex itself was home to a number of children.  
Lane further knew that police had not recovered the weapon from 
the apartment or from their subsequent search of its environs. 
 
When Lane returned to the station, she spoke to the 
defendant in the holding cell area and essentially repeated the 
questions asked by Saia.  The defendant provided the same 
information and described the firearm as silver in color.  Lane 
asked if the defendant would be willing to accompany her and 
5 
 
 
other officers to help find the firearm.  He agreed to 
cooperate.  Police placed the defendant in the back of a cruiser 
and drove to the area adjacent to the apartment complex.  The 
defendant pointed out the direction in which he had thrown the 
firearm.  Still, police never recovered the weapon. 
 
The motion judge ruled that the defendant's responses to 
these two sets of inquiries were admissible at trial under the 
public safety exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule, as 
first established in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-656 
(1984).  He concluded that (1) the Quarles exception extends to 
postinvocation questioning and (2) it applied here because 
officers had an objectively reasonable need to protect the 
public from danger when they asked the defendant about the 
location of the gun. 
 
2.  The evidence at trial.  We summarize the facts at trial 
as the jury could have found them. 
 
a.  Communication with Garcia.  Garcia, a friend of the 
defendant for several years, testified about communication he 
had had with the defendant on the night of the killing and the 
morning after.  Garcia also knew the victim, having nicknamed 
her "Explosive" because she was "the kind of person you [could] 
meet and connect [with] right away" and "[a]lways happy." 
 
On the night of February 19, 2014, Garcia was working at 
his job for a cleaning company.  Around 10:30 P.M., the 
6 
 
 
defendant began posting comments directed at Garcia on a social 
networking Web site, one of which struck Garcia as unusual.  As 
a result, Garcia telephoned the defendant, who said only that he 
would call Garcia later.  About an hour later, the defendant 
called Garcia and asked him to come by the defendant's apartment 
because the defendant needed to talk to him.  The defendant 
sounded "weird" and "nervous."  Garcia tentatively agreed to 
come by the apartment, or at least call the defendant, when his 
shift ended at 2 A.M. on February 20. 
 
The defendant subsequently sent Garcia another message, 
through the messaging application WhatsApp, asking if he had 
finished his shift yet.  Garcia asked why the defendant wanted 
him to come by the apartment.  The defendant replied that he had 
"problems" or "a thing on [his] hands."  The defendant also sent 
an emoji2 of a face with X's for eyes,3 and the word "Explosive."  
At that point, Garcia knew that "something was happening," and 
he told the defendant that he would call the defendant after 
work. 
                     
 
2 An emoji is "any of various small images, symbols, or 
icons used in text fields in electronic communication (as in 
text messages, [electronic ]mail, and social media) to express 
the emotional attitude of the writer, convey information 
succinctly, communicate a message playfully without using words, 
etc."  Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/emoji [https://perma.cc/QUC5-SA8E]. 
 
 
3 
  
7 
 
 
 
Garcia sent the defendant a text message when he was 
leaving work around 2 A.M., and again when he reached his home 
around 2:30 A.M., but the defendant did not respond to either.  
Garcia did not hear from the defendant again until around 7 
A.M., when the defendant called on the telephone while Garcia 
was working at his second job.  The defendant again told Garcia 
that he had "problems" -- "something serious" or "something big" 
-- and that he wanted Garcia to come by his apartment.  At this 
point, the defendant sounded "desperate." 
 
Garcia left work and went to the defendant's apartment in 
Peabody.  When he arrived, the defendant opened the door to let 
Garcia in, turned, and said, "I'm fucked."  Garcia asked what 
happened, and the defendant said, "Explosive is dead."  The 
defendant told Garcia that the victim was "in the other room," 
but he did not explain what happened before Garcia got scared 
and decided to leave. 
 
Garcia returned to his home in Lynn and spoke with his 
wife; they agreed to go to the Lynn police station.  At that 
point, the defendant telephoned Garcia and said that he was on 
his way to Garcia's house.  Garcia and his wife waited in the 
vehicle for the defendant to arrive, planning to accompany him 
to the police station. 
 
When the defendant arrived, he leaned in the driver's side 
window of Garcia's vehicle.  Garcia's wife asked the defendant 
8 
 
 
what had happened.  The defendant explained that he was counting 
money at a table, upon which there was a gun.  According to the 
defendant, the victim grabbed the gun and said, "I don't know 
why you have this in here."  The victim then "dropped" the gun 
back onto the table.  It fell off of the table, and the 
defendant "grabbed" it.  After grabbing the gun, the defendant 
said something along the lines of "leave me alone, asshole" and 
swung his arm backward.  The defendant said the motion caused 
him to shoot the victim, and then he got scared and a second 
shot fired into the wall.  The defendant told Garcia it was an 
accident and he wanted to "do the right thing" and surrender 
himself to police. 
 
b.  Defendant's statements to police.  The testimony at 
trial regarding the defendant's statements to police was 
essentially consistent with the testimony at the suppression 
hearing, discussed above.  Officer Gomez and Detective Lane 
testified that the defendant told them that he "threw [the gun] 
out of the car" at some point after the incident.  Both Officer 
Saia and Detective Lane described police efforts to locate the 
gun based on information given to them by the defendant. 
 
c.  Physical evidence.  Although police never recovered the 
weapon, the Commonwealth presented other pieces of physical 
evidence linking the defendant to the crime.  When police 
entered the apartment, it appeared relatively clean and 
9 
 
 
undisturbed, other than a small lamp near the victim's feet that 
had been knocked over and a suitcase on the floor of the room 
where the victim was found. 
 
Photographs of the inside of the apartment showed that 
police discovered the victim lying face-down on a small couch, 
with a sweatshirt covering her head.  Blood had pooled in the 
corner of the couch next to the victim's head and on the floor 
nearby.  Police found one earring in a crevice of the couch; the 
other remained in the victim's left ear. 
 
Police also located two spent shell casings inside the 
apartment -- one on the floor near the couch and one on a 
windowsill in the corner of the same room.  They recovered two 
spent projectiles -- one from inside the arm of the couch, and 
one from inside the wall above the victim's feet. 
 
The exhibits also included two pairs of examination gloves 
and one pair of winter gloves that police found sitting out on a 
coffee table and a bureau inside the apartment.  The outside of 
one pair of examination gloves tested positive for gunshot 
residue. 
 
d.  Motive evidence.  The Commonwealth's theory of motive 
was based largely on the testimony of two acquaintances of the 
victim -- a cousin and a friend.  The cousin testified that she 
saw the victim on February 13 and 14, 2014.  She testified that 
on February 13, the victim told her that, the night before, she 
10 
 
 
and the defendant had gotten into an argument over the way the 
defendant opened a bag of cotton balls.  The argument progressed 
to the point where the victim told the defendant she wanted to 
end their relationship.  According to the cousin, the victim 
also had received gifts from the defendant for their 
anniversary, on February 13, but had told the defendant that she 
did not want them. 
 
The friend testified that, on the Monday before she was 
killed, the victim had told the friend that she was planning to 
end her relationship with the defendant and that his belongings 
were already packed.  The victim said that "[s]he wanted him out 
of the apartment so she could continue her life without him." 
 
There also was testimony from the leasing agent for the 
apartment complex where the defendant and the victim lived.  The 
leasing agent testified that on the afternoon of February 19, 
2014, the victim came into her office to obtain a roommate 
release form.  The leasing agent provided the victim with the 
form, along with instructions for completing it. 
 
e.  Medical evidence.  The medical examiner testified to 
her autopsy findings underlying her opinion that the victim died 
from a gunshot wound to the head.  She described the entrance 
wound above the victim's right temple and the exit wound in the 
lower, left part of her skull.  She also opined that the 
11 
 
 
entrance wound was a "contact wound," meaning the gun was fired 
while in contact with the victim's head. 
 
The autopsy revealed other injuries.  The victim had 
abrasions around her neck, roughly matching the pattern of a 
necklace she was wearing.  The abrasions, along with petechial 
hemorrhages in the victim's eye and face, indicated possible 
ligature strangulation.  The medical examiner also observed 
bruising and abrasions on the victim's right cheek, as well as a 
bruise on the back of her left hand. 
 
f.  The defense.  The theory of the defense was that the 
victim's death was accidental.  The defendant did not put on his 
own case.  However, in addition to the evidence already 
discussed, the defendant, without objection, elicited testimony 
from Garcia and Garcia's wife about how the defendant had told 
them, before they all went to the police station, that the 
shooting was an accident.  He argued in closing that the 
shooting was accidental and there was reasonable doubt about his 
alleged motive. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Defendant's statements to police.  There 
is no dispute that the defendant invoked his right to counsel 
shortly after appearing at the Lynn police station on the 
morning of February 20, 2014, and well before officers asked him 
about the location of the gun.  The Commonwealth conceded at the 
suppression stage that because police continued to question the 
12 
 
 
defendant after he had invoked his right to counsel, his 
statements in response to those questions were not admissible 
under the general parameters of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477, 484-485 (1981). 
 
However, the Commonwealth urges this court to adopt the 
reasoning of the motion judge -- in particular, that the public 
safety exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule, announced by 
the United States Supreme Court in Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-656, 
authorizes the admission of the defendant's postinvocation 
statements to police regarding the whereabouts of the gun.  The 
defendant argues that this court has never, and should not now, 
apply Quarles to post-Miranda, postinvocation questioning.  He 
further argues that even if Quarles applied in such a scenario, 
it should not apply here because there was no objectively 
reasonable concern that police or the public faced any immediate 
danger from the gun that the defendant discarded. 
 
Although ably argued by both sides, we need not decide 
whether Quarles might apply in a postinvocation setting such as 
this one, or, if so, whether the circumstances here would meet 
the requirements of the public safety exception.  Even if we 
assume, without deciding, that it was constitutional error to 
admit the defendant's postinvocation statements and the evidence 
about the ensuing, but fruitless, police search for the gun, any 
such error would not require reversal in this case. 
13 
 
 
 
Where the Commonwealth introduces evidence in violation of 
a defendant's constitutional rights, "we examine the case to 
determine whether the erroneous admission was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447 Mass. 546, 552 
(2006).  In order to answer that question, we look to several 
factors, including, as relevant here, the importance of the 
evidence in the prosecution's case, the relationship between the 
evidence and the premise of the defense, and the weight or 
quantum of evidence of guilt.  Id. at 552–553 (listing factors).  
"An assertion that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt is most particularly vulnerable where the over-all 
strength of the Commonwealth's case radiates from a core of 
tainted evidence."  Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 701-
702 (2010).  On the other hand, an error may be harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt where the Commonwealth's evidence is so 
"overwhelming" that it "nullif[ies] any effect the erroneously 
admitted [evidence] might have had on the jury or the verdict."  
Dagraca, supra at 555. 
 
The defendant argues that the prejudice calculus tips in 
his favor because the Commonwealth presented testimony from 
several police officers not only regarding the defendant's 
statements to them about throwing away the gun, but also -- and 
perhaps more harmfully -- about their extensive, yet 
unsuccessful, search effort that resulted from those statements.  
14 
 
 
Indeed, the Commonwealth's case included testimony that the 
search involved personnel from the State police and at least 
four municipal police departments, a canine unit, and a front-
end loader digging through the snow over the course of about 
four hours, all in a fruitless search for the gun.  All of this 
provided a foundation for the prosecutor to argue, in closing, 
that the defendant "manipulated the police" into "a wild goose 
chase looking for a gun." 
 
Nevertheless, we are satisfied that the evidence of 
premeditation was so "overwhelming" as to "nullify any effect" 
that this evidence might have had on the jury or the verdicts.  
Dagraca, 447 Mass. at 555.  See id. at 556-557 (collecting 
cases).  The gun itself was not an important piece of evidence 
in the case, given that it was never recovered and that the 
victim's cause of death -- a gunshot wound to the head -- was 
never in dispute.  Rather, it is clear to us that, as laid out 
below, the physical evidence, the motive evidence, and the 
evidence of the defendant's communications with Garcia formed 
the center of gravity of the Commonwealth's case.  The 
defendant's statements to police and the ensuing search for the 
gun were peripheral to it, and not a "core of tainted evidence," 
Tyree, 455 Mass. at 702, from which the verdicts flowed.4 
                     
 
4 Although our determination is far from mathematical, a 
survey of the prosecutor's closing argument illustrates this 
15 
 
 
 
Moreover, the challenged evidence was not totally inimical 
to the defendant's own theory of the case.  Indeed, defense 
counsel, in closing, directed the jury's attention to the fact 
that the defendant had surrendered himself to police and later 
helped them search for the gun.  The implication of this 
argument was that a person who was guilty of premeditated murder 
would not do these things, but one who had committed an 
accidental killing would. 
 
That articulation of the issue points to the crux of the 
defendant's argument on prejudice:  that the jury could have 
used the "wild goose chase" evidence as a reason to disbelieve 
his version of events (the shooting was accidental) and instead 
believe the Commonwealth's version (the shooting was 
premeditated).  However, the evidence supporting deliberate 
premeditation was plentiful and potent, and each piece provided 
the jury with a reason to reject the defendant's theory of 
accident that was wholly independent of the "wild goose chase" 
evidence. 
 
As already discussed, the victim died of a contact gunshot 
wound to the head.  And, as discussed in more detail below, the 
evidence showed that this gunshot was likely fired in a 
"downward trajectory" through the victim's head and into the arm 
                                                                  
point.  Her closing argument spanned 268 lines of transcript; 
the "wild goose chase" evidence took up about ten lines, or 
about four per cent, of the argument. 
16 
 
 
of the couch.  The victim was found lying face-down, with her 
head pressed into the corner of the couch and her feet in the 
air.  All of this suggests that the shooter had leverage over 
the victim, forced her head against the armrest of the couch, 
and held the gun against her temple before firing.  That version 
of events, as corroborated by the physical evidence, flatly 
contradicts the story that the defendant told Garcia -- that he 
accidentally fired the gun when he swung his arm backward while 
seated at a table. 
 
Similarly, the medical examiner's extensive testimony about 
the abrasions on the victim's neck, the petechial hemorrhages in 
her face, and the bruising to her head and hand refutes the 
defendant's accident theory.  These injuries, along with the 
fact that one of the victim's earrings was found in the seam of 
the couch while the other remained in her ear, indicate that 
some sort of struggle, and possibly strangulation, took place on 
the couch before the shooting.  Again, this evidence cannot be 
squared with the story that the defendant told Garcia. 
 
The Commonwealth's case also included substantial evidence 
of motive.  As discussed in more detail below, the jury 
reasonably could have inferred that the defendant was aware that 
the victim wanted to end their relationship and kick him out of 
the apartment they shared, and that this motivated the killing.  
17 
 
 
This evidence, if believed, would give the jury yet another 
reason to reject the defendant's theory of accident. 
 
The defendant's communication with Garcia also was 
irreconcilable with an accidental shooting.  Between 10:30 P.M. 
on February 19 and 2 A.M. on February 20, the defendant 
initiated numerous communications with Garcia -- including 
sending an emoji face with X's for eyes alongside the victim's 
nickname "Explosive" -- that suggested the shooting had already 
occurred.  Yet, there was no evidence that the defendant ever 
called 911 or otherwise sought to aid the victim.  Instead, when 
Garcia finally visited the apartment after 7 A.M., the defendant 
opened the door and said, simply, "I'm fucked."  Shortly after, 
when Garcia told the defendant of his intention to call the 
police, the defendant immediately asked him not to, pleading, 
"[D]o not do that to me." 
 
Finally, there was some evidence that the defendant may 
have manipulated the crime scene.  In particular, when police 
searched the apartment, they observed three pairs of gloves and 
a spray bottle of cleaner sitting out in the open, along with 
numerous aromatic candles burning. 
 
The totality of the evidence so overwhelmingly refutes the 
defendant's accident defense that we are convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that no reasonable jury would have been 
affected in their deliberations by the evidence the admission of 
18 
 
 
which is alleged to be constitutional error.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the Commonwealth's properly admitted evidence was 
"so powerful as to neutralize," Dagraca, 447 Mass. at 555, any 
prejudice that may have arisen from the admission of the 
defendant's statements about the location of the gun and the 
resulting search. 
 
2.  Hearsay statements.  The defendant next argues that the 
trial judge abused her discretion in admitting statements of the 
victim, to her cousin and her friend, that she was planning to 
end her relationship with the defendant because there was no 
evidence that the defendant was aware of this plan.  We discern 
no error. 
 
There is no dispute that the victim's statements to her 
cousin and her friend ordinarily would constitute hearsay.  See 
generally Mass. G. Evid. §§ 801(c), 802 (2017).  However, in 
certain circumstances, an exception to the hearsay rule permits 
the admission of evidence of a murder victim's state of mind as 
proof of the defendant's motive to kill the victim.  See 
Commonwealth v. Qualls, 425 Mass. 163, 167 (1997), S.C., 440 
Mass. 576 (2003).  Such evidence is admissible "when and only 
when there also is evidence that the defendant was aware of that 
state of mind at the time of the crime and would be likely to 
respond to it."  Id.  There need not be direct evidence that the 
defendant learned of the victim's state of mind, so long as the 
19 
 
 
jury reasonably could have inferred that he or she did learn of 
it.  Commonwealth v. Franklin, 465 Mass. 895, 907 (2013). 
 
Here, there was adequate evidence for the jury to infer 
that the defendant was aware of the victim's plan to end their 
relationship.  In particular, the evidence showed that a 
suitcase lay in the middle of the floor of the room where the 
victim's body was found.  The evidence also showed that, the 
afternoon before the killing, the victim obtained a roommate 
release form from the apartment leasing agent, and received 
specific instructions on how to fill it out in order to remove 
the defendant from the lease.  Police later recovered the form 
from the victim's automobile, although there was no evidence 
that the defendant actually saw it.  Further, even in the 
defendant's own description of the purportedly accidental 
shooting, he and the victim were arguing in the moments leading 
up to it. 
 
These pieces of evidence, considered together and in the 
context of the location and manner of the victim's death, 
provided the jury with a sufficient foundation to reasonably 
infer that the victim made the defendant aware of her desire to 
end their relationship and for the defendant to move out of the 
apartment not long before the killing occurred.5  Compare 
                     
 
5 The Commonwealth asserts that additional hearsay 
statements -- testimony to the effect that the victim told her 
20 
 
 
Franklin, 465 Mass. at 907-908 (defendant's statements permitted 
inference that he learned of victim's threat and that it was 
motive in killing); Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 454 Mass. 135, 142 
(2009) (defendant's request to friend for help getting new 
apartment reasonably implied he was aware of victim's plan to 
move without him to new apartment); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 424 
Mass. 207, 212 (1997) (proper evidence of "threats" and 
"discord" in relationship demonstrated respective states of mind 
of victim and defendant); Commonwealth v. Weichell, 390 Mass. 
62, 74 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984) (defendant's 
statements and actions, including heated argument with victim in 
week before murder, permitted inference that defendant and 
victim had communicated hostile intentions toward each other); 
Commonwealth v. Borodine, 371 Mass. 1, 8 (1976), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 1049 (1977) (defendant's statements to others 
concerning argument with victim over their relationship, coupled 
with victim's willingness to tell third parties that her 
                                                                  
cousin and her friend that she had told the defendant of her 
desire to end her relationship with him -- lent further support 
to the inference that the defendant was made aware of the 
victim's state of mind.  Compare Commonwealth v. Borodine, 371 
Mass. 1, 8 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1049 (1977) ("If the 
victim was willing to tell third persons that her relationship 
with the defendant had deteriorated and that she had told or 
would tell the defendant that their relationship would end, it 
is inferable that by word or action, or both, she communicated 
her feelings to the defendant").  Given the nonhearsay basis for 
the inference of the defendant's awareness discussed in the 
text, we need not reach this question. 
21 
 
 
relationship with defendant had deteriorated, permitted 
inference that defendant was made aware of victim's state of 
mind). 
 
Of course, the jury were not required to make this 
inference.  But the fact that they permissibly could have means 
that "[i]t was within the judge's discretion," Commonwealth v. 
Bins, 465 Mass. 348, 366 (2013), to admit the victim's 
statements under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay 
rule.  See Franklin, 465 Mass. at 908.  Moreover, the judge 
issued timely and forceful instructions to the jury regarding 
the limited purpose of this evidence.  See Bins, supra.  There 
was no error. 
 
3.  Shot trajectory.  The defendant also argues that the 
Commonwealth's ballistics expert was not qualified to offer an 
expert opinion on the trajectory of the shot that killed the 
victim.  In particular, he takes issue with the fact that a 
member of the firearms identification section of the State 
police was permitted to testify that, in his opinion, the shot 
that killed the victim traveled in a "downward trajectory."  
There was no objection to that testimony at trial, nor is there 
any indication that defense counsel sought a Daubert-Lanigan 
hearing to investigate the trooper's qualifications to offer 
this opinion.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993); Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 (1994). 
22 
 
 
 
Typically, a trial judge has wide discretion in qualifying 
a witness to offer an expert opinion and that determination will 
not be upset on appeal if any reasonable basis appears for it.  
Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 764 (2009), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Rice, 441 Mass. 291, 298 (2004).  Here, the 
record demonstrates that the judge was well within her 
discretion in admitting the opinion of the Commonwealth's 
ballistics expert because that opinion did not require 
qualifications beyond those the witness possessed.  The evidence 
showed that the victim was found lying on her stomach with the 
left side of her face pressed into the corner of a small couch.  
The medical examiner testified that the fatal shot entered the 
victim's skull near the right temple and exited through the back 
left side of the skull.  There was a bullet hole, with hairs 
around it, in the armrest nearest the victim's head.  
Investigators retrieved a bullet buried inside the armrest of 
the couch. 
 
Considering these pieces of evidence together, mere common 
sense permits the inference that the bullet traveled in a 
downward trajectory.  That is, it does not take an expert to 
draw a straight line between three points -- from the entrance 
wound on the victim's right temple, through the exit wound on 
the left side of her skull, to the bullet's final resting place 
inside the armrest of the couch.  Compare Commonwealth v. 
23 
 
 
Pasteur, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 826–827 (2006) (discussing 
expert testimony of State police firearms examiner on ricochet 
trajectory of bullet).  At most, drawing such a conclusion might 
require basic familiarity with the operation of firearms.  
Compare Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431 Mass. 461, 469 (2000), citing 
Cammon v. State, 269 Ga. 470, 471–474 (1998) (testimony about 
direction in which blood typically falls "may well be within the 
general knowledge" of experienced police homicide investigator, 
provided appropriate foundation questions are asked regarding 
investigator's experience).  Assuming such familiarity was 
required, this witness clearly possessed it, having test-fired 
over 1,000 weapons and having worked as a State police 
ballistician for over eight years.  See Commonwealth v. Fritz, 
472 Mass. 341, 349 (2015) (officer's experience in firearms 
identification supported judge's determination that officer 
satisfied foundational requirements to qualify as expert).  
There was no error. 
 
4.  Right to counsel.  The defendant further argues that 
the trial judge abused her discretion by denying his request for 
new counsel after jury selection, but before trial began.  The 
request was premised on the defendant's assertion that his 
attorney was acting ineffectively and that communication between 
the two had broken down beyond repair.  On appeal, the defendant 
24 
 
 
mainly takes issue with the judge's suggestion that his last-
minute request for a new lawyer was a delay tactic. 
 
The defendant states the correct standard of review:  a 
defendant's motion to discharge counsel, when made on the eve of 
trial, is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial 
judge.  Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 804 (1985).  
However, his argument misconstrues what happened below.  In 
fact, the trial judge stated -- on the record and in 
considerable detail -- that she had been closely observing the 
interactions between the defendant and his attorney, and that 
she saw "nothing to indicate . . . that any relationship ha[d] 
broken down."  To the contrary, she determined that the 
defendant's attorney had acted with "the highest degree of 
professionalism," went "beyond the call of duty," and 
"communicat[ed] quite effectively" with his client.  Given these 
findings, the judge's decision to deny the defendant's request 
for new counsel fell squarely within "the range of reasonable 
alternatives," L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 
(2014), available to her. 
 
5.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant contends that a conviction of murder in the second 
degree would be more consonant with justice.  As already 
discussed, ample evidence supported the jury's finding of 
deliberate premeditation.  After a thorough review of the 
25 
 
 
record, we see no reason to exercise our power under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.