Case Title: Billiot v. State

Citation: 515 So. 2d 1234

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1987-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
515 So. 2d 1234 (1987) James E. BILLIOT v. STATE of Mississippi. No. DP-38. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 25, 1987. *1235 John C. Henegan, Butler, Snow, O'Mara, Stevens & Cannada, Thomas C. Lowe, Jr., Jackson, Bruce H. Hanley, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant. Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Marvin L. White, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Donald G. Barlow, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. SULLIVAN, Justice, for the Court: Petitioner James E. Billiot through counsel and pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated, § 99-19-57(2)(a) (Supp. 1986), and the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, Mississippi Code Annotated, § 99-39-1, et seq. (Supp. 1986), applies for an order granting him leave to file a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County, Mississippi. Because we find Billiot's pleading to suggest with statutory and factual particularity that he may be legally insane and thus protected from execution, we remand this case to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County for a hearing on the limited issue of Billiot's present sanity. Billiot was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death pursuant to a jury verdict in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County, the Honorable J. Ruble Griffin, then Circuit Judge, presiding, following a change of venue from the Circuit Court of Hancock County. Both conviction and sentence, entered on December 2, 1982, were unsuccessfully appealed to this Court and the United States Supreme Court. Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445 (Miss. 1984); cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 105 S. Ct. 1232, 84 L. Ed. 2d 369; rehearing denied, 470 U.S. 1089, 105 S. Ct. 1858, 85 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1985). Billiot's first application for leave to file motion to vacate or set aside judgment and conviction was filed on June 17, 1985, with this Court. That motion and petition for rehearing were denied. Billiot v. State, 478 So. 2d 1043 (Miss. 1985). The United States Supreme Court denied Billiot's petition for certiorari on March 31, 1986. Billiot v. Mississippi, 475 U.S. 1098, 106 S. Ct. 1501, 89 L. Ed. 2d 901 (1985). Thereafter, Billiot filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Billiot v. Thigpen, et al, No. S86-0549(L) (S.D.Miss.). By order dated September 8, 1986, the Honorable Tom Lee, United States District Judge, ruled that the petition for writ of habeas corpus would be held in abeyance until the petitioner had exhausted his state remedy on the issue of his alleged present insanity and had presented the instant claim to this Court for consideration in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 91 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1986). In sum, the petition today was precipitated by the District Court's order and asserts that Billiot is presently insane and thus protected from execution by state and federal law. Mississippi Code Annotated, § 99-19-57(2)(a)(b), (Supp. 1986), provides that: Ford v. Wainwright, supra, recognizes the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against the execution of one who is presently insane. 477 U.S. at ___, 106 S. Ct. at 2602, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 346. Notably, the statute and federal case law differ primarily in the former's apparent requirement that the insanity be of a supervening quality, i.e., that the insanity have arisen after conviction. Admittedly, Ford expressly preserves the state's right to require "some high threshold showing on behalf of the prisoner ... to control the number of non-meritorious or repetitive claims of insanity." 477 U.S. at ___, 106 S. Ct. at 2606, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 351. In our own state, we have required a petitioner in the posture of Billiot to show "to a reasonable probability" that he is insane, a condition which has arisen since conviction. Billiot v. State, 478 So. 2d at 1045 (Miss. 1985). Clearly however, where the federal constitution guarantees a broader right than does a state statute, the statute must yield, casting great doubt on the continued viability of our rule requiring a showing that the insane condition is of a supervening quality. The potential conflict between the statute and federal case law is not our focus for purposes of the issue we now face for we today encounter the sole question of whether Billiot, within the pleading confines of the Uniform Post-Conviction Relief Act, has sufficiently posed allegations which, if proven, would entitle him to relief. In other words, has he alleged facts which require further inquiry in the expanded setting of an evidentiary hearing? As we have recently noted in another capital case, review of claims brought via formal post-conviction petition proceeds in a structural order whereby "[o]ur procedural posture is analogous to that when a defendant in a civil action moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Rule 12(b)(6), Miss.R.Civ.P.; Stanton & Associates, Inc. v. Bryant Construction Company, Inc., 464 So. 2d 499, 504-06 (Miss. 1985). Functionally, Section 99-39-9 is substituted for the pleadings requirements of Rule 8(a) and (e), Miss.R.Civ.P." Neal v. State (No. DP-36, decided September 23, 1987, not yet reported) (Slip op. at 2). Neal further instructs that we examine such petitions for the following essential pleading components: Neal, (No. DP-36, Slip op. at 2-3), quoting Section 99-39-9, Mississippi Code Annotated (Supp. 1987). The court's authority in the face of a petition such as that presented by Billiot is fixed: Neal, (DP-36, Slip op. at 3.) Within the foregoing parameters, we address petitioner's claims. Billiot presents the court with an application backed by the affidavits of three mental health professionals, selected portions of which are excerpted below: Undoubtedly, Billiot has presented allegations under oath which, if true, bring into serious question the legality of execution under both state and federal law. In the face of this fact-backed pleading, we acknowledge Billiot's "claim procedurally alive `substantially showing denial of a state or federal right'," and conclude that he "is entitled to an in-court opportunity to prove his claims." Neal, (DP-36, Slip op. at 3.) It bears note that the only relief to which Billiot is presently entitled is an evidentiary hearing. Our function is not to resolve issues of contested fact by a process of trial by affidavit. *1238 We grant the application of James Billiot for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of his allegation of present insanity. This matter is remanded to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County for the purpose of conducting such a hearing. Mississippi Code Annotated, §§ 99-39-23, 99-39-27 (Supp. 1986); Neal, supra; Tokman v. State, 482 So. 2d 241 (Miss. 1986); Leatherwood v. State, 473 So. 2d 964 (Miss. 1985). THE APPLICATION OF JAMES E. BILLIOT FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF HIS ALLEGATION OF PRESENT INSANITY IS HEREBY GRANTED, AND THIS CAUSE IS REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, FOR SUCH HEARING. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, ANDERSON and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur. HAWKINS, P.J., and GRIFFIN, J., not participating.