Case Title: People v. Ballard

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88885

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88885-Agenda 32-May 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
MARK BALLARD, Appellant.
Opinion filed August 29, 2002.-Modified Upon Denial of
Rehearing  December 2, 2002.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a bench trial held in the circuit court of Du Page
County, the trial judge found defendant, Mark Ballard, guilty of
first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 1996)); robbery
(720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 1996)); concealment of a homicidal
death (720 ILCS 5/9-3.1(a) (West 1996)); unlawful possession of
a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1996)); and
armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 1996)). After finding
the defendant eligible for the death penalty and hearing
aggravation and mitigation testimony at the subsequent sentencing
hearing, the trial judge sentenced defendant to death for the first
degree murder conviction. In addition, the trial judge imposed a 5-year sentence for the concealment of a homicidal death, a 7-year
sentence for unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and a
60-year sentence for armed robbery; sentences to be served
concurrently. The death sentence has been stayed pending direct
appeal to this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs.
603, 609(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm both the
convictions and the sentences.
 
BACKGROUND 
	This case involves the murder of Patty Noland. The primary
evidence used by the State against defendant came from
defendant's own admissions to his family, friends and to police,
which can be summarized as follows. In October 1997, defendant
was living at a residence owned by John McGuire. Noland had
previously lived at this residence, but had recently moved out and
was living with her boyfriend. However, Noland had left some of
her clothes at McGuire's house and had yet to retrieve them.
While McGuire normally resided at his home, he was staying with
his girlfriend from approximately October 25, 1997, through the
beginning of November 1997, but left the care of his dog with
defendant.
	On October 29, 1997, around 8 p.m., defendant wanted a car
and money so that he could go to Elgin and buy drugs. Defendant
thought of Noland. Knowing that Noland would not lend
defendant her car and money, he thought of robbing her by first
luring her to McGuire's house under the pretense that she could
pick up her remaining clothes. Once there, defendant would knock
Noland out with chloroform and handcuff her down in the
basement. However, thinking that Noland could later identify him,
defendant's thoughts ultimately turned to murder. To that end,
defendant called Noland at the restaurant where she was a waitress
working the 5 p.m. to midnight shift. Defendant told her to come
over to McGuire's house to pick up her clothes after she was done
with work, but requested that she call him before coming so that
he would know when to expect her. Noland agreed.
	While defendant waited for Noland's call, he retrieved a bottle
of chloroform from McGuire's room and put it in a box next to the
front door so that Noland would not recognize it. Defendant then
wrapped a hammer in a bath towel and placed it in the
entranceway. Defendant also laid a blanket out on the floor in the
front living room so that he would have something to wrap the
body in. In addition, defendant retrieved a pair of handcuffs from
McGuire's room and put them in his back pocket.
	Noland called defendant around 10:30 p.m. to let him know
that she was on her way to pick up her clothes. Defendant asked
her to bring him a soda.
	After Noland's call, defendant soaked a rag with the
chloroform. When Noland arrived in the driveway, defendant
grabbed the rag and held it in his hand. Upon Noland's entrance
into McGuire's house, defendant asked her for his soda. Noland
responded that she had left the soda in her car and for defendant to
get it himself. As Noland proceeded to walk further into the house,
defendant grabbed her and put the chloroform-soaked rag over her
face. There was a struggle and both fell to the ground onto the
blanket that defendant had previously laid down. When defendant
realized that the chloroform was not having an effect on Noland,
he held her down while he grabbed the hammer and began to hit
her on the head. Defendant continued to keep the chloroform rag
over Noland's face as he hit her on the head with the hammer.
After hitting Noland approximately 30 times, defendant got up to
wash the blood off his hands. As he was washing his hands,
defendant heard Noland mumbling. Defendant then attempted to
stab Noland with a knife in order to "finish [her] off" and to
"prevent her from suffering any more," but the blade bent on
impact. Defendant then retrieved a three-foot long screwdriver or
pry bar and hit Noland in the side/rib area a couple of times.
Defendant next proceeded to take a number of McGuire's things,
such as a TV, two VCRs, and a stuffed owl. He put the items in
Noland's car. Defendant went back into the house and put
McGuire's dog in McGuire's room. Worried that Noland's
boyfriend might come looking for her, defendant wrapped Noland
up in another blanket and dragged her body in front of the couch
and out of view from the window. Noland was still mumbling so
defendant put the handcuffs on her, thinking she might get away.
Defendant then set white plastic bags filled with clothes next to
Noland and leaned two bikes against her to conceal her body.
Defendant took money from Noland's purse which she had left in
the car, and before leaving in Noland's vehicle, defendant turned
off the lights and locked up the house.
	McGuire testified that he received a telephone call on October
31, 1997, from defendant. McGuire asked defendant for a ride to
the store. Defendant drove McGuire to and from the store in
Noland's car. McGuire asked defendant how he had possession of
Noland's car and defendant responded that he had dropped Noland
off at work.
	On November 4, 1997, McGuire became concerned about his
dog because McGuire had been unable to contact defendant for a
few days. McGuire asked a friend to drive him to his house. When
he entered his house, he detected a foul odor. McGuire found his
dog in his room and noticed that his dog had lost a lot of weight.
McGuire had his friend drive him to the store to buy some dog
food. After returning to the house, McGuire looked around and
noticed some items missing from his home. McGuire also saw
blood under a rug that he normally kept by the front door and
proceeded to lift up a corner of the blanket covering Noland's
body and saw a large mass of blood. At this point, McGuire dialed
911.
	Sergeant Jeffrey A. Driskill of the Hanover Park police
department responded to the scene. When he arrived, he detected
an odor he recognized and associated with decaying human flesh.
Noland's body was discovered underneath the bikes, clothes, and
blankets; exactly how defendant had left her. Sergeant Driskill
carefully noted where each item was placed in and around Noland
while the items were being removed and inventoried. In fact,
Sergeant Driskill videotaped the scene of the crime before and
after the items were taken off the body.
	Detective John Dossey of the Hanover Park police department
was also at the crime scene and was the lead detective in the
investigation. On November 5, 1997, Detective Dossey observed
the autopsy of the body and received confirmation that the body
was that of Patty Noland. The autopsy revealed that Noland had
died from craniocerebral injuries due to multiple blunt-force
trauma with the chloroform exposure, and the handcuffed wrists
playing a part. Detective Dossey instructed officers to look for
defendant.
	On November 7, 1997, at approximately 8:15 p.m., officers
from the Broadview police department saw Noland's car in a
parking lot of a strip mall and detained defendant after a foot
pursuit. Defendant was arrested based on a warrant for unlawful
possession of a stolen motor vehicle and taken to the Broadview
police department, where he remained until Detective Dossey and
Detective Edward Piacenza, also from the Hanover Park police
department, arrived to escort defendant back to the Hanover Park
police station. Upon meeting defendant, Detective Dossey
introduced himself and Detective Piacenza as detectives with the
Hanover Park police department. Defendant immediately stated
that he was "glad it was over" and that he was "tired of running."
Detective Dossey told defendant that they would talk later at the
Hanover Park police station.
	By 9:45 p.m. Detectives Dossey and Piacenza had returned
with defendant to the Hanover Park police station. The detectives
placed him in a room to conduct an interview. At approximately
9:50 p.m., Detective Dossey gave defendant Miranda warnings,
reading verbatim from a preprinted Miranda warning and waiver
form. After defendant indicated that he understood his rights and
signed the form, he admitted to murdering Patty Noland as
detailed above. He also admitted to having committed a number
of burglaries.
	While Detectives Dossey and Piacenza were interviewing
defendant, Sergeant Driskill inventoried Noland's car, and upon
finding various items in the vehicle, including bloody clothing and
a pair of tennis shoes, coordinated his efforts with those of the
investigators who were interviewing defendant. Defendant
identified the clothing and shoes to be those he had worn while
murdering Noland.
	In the early morning hours of November 8, 1997, Assistant
State's Attorney Timothy Diamond met with defendant and
informed him that he was not his attorney, but was an attorney for
the State. Defendant responded that he understood the prosecutor's
role. Diamond reviewed defendant's signed Miranda form with
defendant, confirming defendant's understanding of his rights.
Defendant then relayed the facts of Noland's murder and the
burglaries to Diamond and signed a written confession.
	At defendant's trial, defendant's biological father, Charles
Stophlet, defendant's cousin, Walter Petersen, Jr., and McGuire's
girlfriend, Judy Mullins, each testified that prior to defendant's
arrest, he had contacted them and admitted to having killing
someone. Additionally, via stipulation, forensic examinations of
the physical evidence found at the crime scene and in Noland's car
revealed that the stains on the pants and shoes defendant admitted
to wearing during the murder were indeed human blood, and the
sample of liquid taken from the scene was chloroform. Detective
Dossey and Assistant State's Attorney Diamond both testified to
the circumstances and substance of defendant's confession.
	Defendant presented his case through one very short
stipulation concerning the testimony of Judy Mullins and Walter
Petersen, Jr. Namely, that if called to testify, Detective Edward
Piacenza would state that he interviewed Judy Mullins on
November 13, 1997, and that Mullins did not want McGuire to
find out that defendant had gone with her to her apartment on an
occasion prior to the murder of Noland. In addition, if called to
testify, Detective Dossy would testify that on November 7, 1997,
he and Assistant State's Attorney Diamond spoke with Walter
Petersen, Jr., and Petersen stated that on November 1, 1997,
defendant told him that he was feeling bad for what he had done.
Defendant waived closing argument. A theft charge against
defendant was nol-prossed. As mentioned at the outset of this
opinion, the trial judge entered judgment on his finding defendant
guilty of all remaining charges.
	After admonishments from the court, defendant waived a jury
for both the eligibility and penalty phases of the sentencing
hearing. All evidence presented at defendant's trial was readmitted
at the eligibility phase. Upon completion of the first stage of the
sentencing hearing, the trial judge found defendant eligible for the
death penalty (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6), (b)(11) (West 1996))
because defendant was 18 years of age, the murdered person was
killed in the course of another felony, the murdered person was
actually killed by defendant, and in performing the acts which
caused the death of the murdered person, the defendant acted with
the intention to kill the murdered person or with the knowledge
that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm, and that another felony or more was committed, and the
murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated
manner, pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme, or design to take
a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of defendant
created a reasonable expectation that a death of a human being
would result therefrom.
	At the second stage of the sentencing hearing, all of the
evidence presented at defendant's trial and eligibility phases was
readmitted at the penalty phase. After considering evidence in
aggravation and mitigation, evidence which we will later discuss
in more detail, the trial court found no mitigating factors sufficient
to preclude imposition of the death penalty and sentenced
defendant to death for the murder of Patty Noland. In addition, the
trial court imposed a 10-year sentence for concealment of a
homicidal death, a 14-year sentence for unlawful possession of a
stolen motor vehicle, and a 60-year sentence for armed robbery;
the sentences to be served concurrently.
	The trial court denied defendant's motion to reconsider
sentences pertaining to defendant's sentence of death and his
sentence of 60 years for armed robbery. However, pursuant to
defendant's motion and agreement by the State and the trial court,
the sentences imposed for concealment of a homicidal death and
unlawful possession of stolen motor vehicle were modified to five
and seven years respectively. Additionally, the trial court denied
defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a
motion for a new trial. Defendant appeals directly to this court
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603).
Additional pertinent facts will be discussed in the context of the
issues raised in this appeal.

ANALYSIS
I. Suppression of Statements
	Prior to trial, defendant filed three motions to suppress his
incriminating statements, which the trial court denied. In these
motions, defendant claimed that the State: (A) denied his sixth
amendment right to counsel (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const.
1970, art. I, §8) and (B) his statutory right to be presented to a
judge "without unnecessary delay" (725 ILCS 5/109-1(a),
109-2(a) (West 1996)). Defendant assigns error to the trial court's
denial of his motions to suppress.
	We address at the outset defendant's argument that we should
review this contention de novo. At a hearing on a motion to
suppress, it is the function of the trial court to determine the
credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
People v. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d 153, 163 (1989). Accordingly, the
trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress generally will not be
overturned unless it is manifestly erroneous. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d  at
162; People v. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50, 78 (1988). "Manifestly
erroneous means arbitrary, unreasonable and not based on the
evidence." People v. Wells, 182 Ill. 2d 471, 481 (1998). However,
de novo review is appropriate when neither the facts nor the
credibility of witnesses is questioned. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 309 (1998).
	Defendant argues that we should review this contention de
novo because the facts are undisputed. We disagree. This
contention turns on the credibility of witnesses. Therefore, we
must review this contention based on the manifest error standard.
See Williams, 181 Ill. 2d  at 309.
	Evidence at the suppression hearing adduced the following
facts. On November 5, 1997, a Hanover Park police officer
charged defendant in a criminal complaint, which was reviewed by
a prosecutor, with possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Based on
this charge, a warrant was issued for defendant's arrest. It was
stipulated that at approximately 8:15 p.m. on Friday, November 7,
1997, Broadview police officers arrested defendant based upon the
warrant for unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle.
Defendant was taken to the Broadview police department. No
Broadview police officer questioned defendant on any matter.
	Detective Dossey testified as follows. He was the lead
detective in the investigation. He was assigned to the case on
November 4, 1997, the night that Noland's body was found. On
November 7, shortly after 8 p.m., Detective Dossey was at home
when he received a telephone call from Detective Piacenza
regarding defendant. Detective Dossey went to the police station,
where he met with Detective Piacenza, other investigators
assigned to the case, and Assistant State's Attorney Diamond.
Detective Dossey was informed that defendant was in custody in
Broadview. He and Detective Piacenza were instructed to go to the
Broadview police department and return with defendant.
	Detectives Dossey and Piacenza went to the Broadview police
department, arriving at approximately 9 p.m. They were taken to
defendant. Detective Dossey introduced himself and Detective
Piacenza as detectives with the Hanover Park police department.
According to Detective Dossey, defendant immediately stated that
he was "glad it was over" and that he was "tired of running."
Detective Dossey told defendant that they would talk later at the
Hanover Park police station.
	During the drive back to Hanover Park, the detectives did not
question defendant, and defendant did not indicate that he wanted
an attorney or wished to remain silent. Initially, there was no
conversation at all. Eventually, defendant again volunteered
comments such as he "was glad it was over," he "was tired of
running," and he "was tired of looking over his shoulder all the
time."
	By 9:45 p.m. Detectives Dossey and Piacenza had returned
with defendant to the Hanover Park police station. The detectives
placed him in a room to conduct an interview. At approximately
9:50 p.m., Detective Dossey gave defendant Miranda warnings,
reading verbatim from a preprinted Miranda warning and waiver
form. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights and signed
the form. Detective Dossey then asked defendant if he would be
willing to talk with him and Detective Piacenza. According to
Detective Dossey, defendant responded that "he would tell us
everything."
	Detective Dossey "then basically just asked [defendant] what
happened." Defendant then related the events of October 29, 1997.
The interview was essentially defendant's narrative, which the
detectives interrupted only to ask questions for clarification.
Defendant was calm and very cooperative. Defendant also told the
detectives that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
	At approximately 10:20 p.m., defendant requested and
received a cigarette, which he smoked during the interview. At
10:30 p.m., food arrived for defendant. They relocated to another
room. The three of them ate and engaged in "casual, small-talk"
having nothing to do with the case.
	After their meal, Detective Dossey asked defendant if he
would be willing to speak with Assistant State's Attorney
Diamond. Detective Dossey explained that Diamond was a
prosecutor and not a defense lawyer. Defendant responded that he
would talk with Diamond.
	The interview resumed. At approximately 12:15 a.m. on
November 8, Detective Dossey left the interview room to get
Diamond. At approximately 12:26 a.m. Detective Dossey returned
to the room. Diamond was already there with defendant and
Detective Piacenza. Diamond explained to defendant that he was
not his attorney. Defendant responded that he understood the
prosecutor's role. Diamond then reviewed with defendant the
signed Miranda form, confirming defendant's understanding of his
rights.
	Diamond proceeded to take an oral statement from defendant,
which concluded at approximately 1:30 a.m. During the oral
statement, defendant indicated that he knew what he had done was
wrong and that he should die for it. Diamond then asked defendant
if he would be willing to put his statement in writing; defendant
responded in the affirmative. Defendant dictated his statement to
Diamond, who transcribed defendant's words. During this time,
defendant was allowed to use the restroom. Defendant then
reviewed the written statement. Defendant indicated to Diamond
portions of the statement that were inaccurate and told Diamond
exactly what he wanted to say. Diamond then rewrote those
sections according to defendant's instructions. Defendant then
signed his written statement. The written statement concluded at
4:30 a.m.
	The detectives believed that they could go no further until
daylight, when they could search for physical evidence that
defendant threw away. Defendant was placed in a cell and allowed
to sleep. The detectives agreed to meet back at the station later
Saturday morning.
	At approximately 10:30 a.m., defendant was given breakfast.
Detectives Dossey and Piacenza read defendant his rights from a
preprinted Miranda warning and waiver form, which he signed. As
he ate breakfast, defendant stated that he remembered what he had
done with the hammer and some of the other items that the
investigators sought. Defendant volunteered to take the
investigators to where the items were located. Defendant was
allowed to take a shower.
	At approximately 1:10 p.m., defendant, Detectives Dossey
and Piacenza, and Assistant State's Attorney Diamond drove to
Broadview. Defendant led them to where he had dumped some of
the evidence. They stopped for lunch. They returned to the police
station at approximately 3 p.m. At his request, defendant was
allowed to use the restroom. Defendant then voluntarily assisted
the investigators in identifying items recovered from Noland's car.
	At approximately 4 p.m., Detective Dossey asked defendant
if he would be willing to make a videotaped statement at the crime
scene; defendant responded that he would. Defendant, the
detectives, and the assistant State's Attorney again left the station.
While en route to the crime scene, defendant offered to show them
some houses that he had burglarized. Defendant made a
videotaped statement at the crime scene. At the conclusion of the
video, Diamond again reviewed the Miranda warning with
defendant.
	They returned to the police station at approximately 4:43 p.m.
Waiting for them were law enforcement officers from two other
jurisdictions. They wanted to speak with defendant regarding some
burglaries that occurred in their communities. Detective Dossey
advised defendant that he did not have to talk with those officers.
However, defendant stated that he wanted to talk with them to
make sure that stolen property was returned to the proper people.
	Sometime after 4 p.m., a criminal complaint charging
defendant with first degree murder was prepared, and Detective
Dossey served defendant. At that point, the officers had completed
their investigation and no longer attempted to elicit any statements
from defendant. According to Detective Dossey, in the course of
defendant's interview, from approximately 9:50 p.m. on Friday,
November 7, 1997, through approximately 4 p.m. on Saturday,
November 8, defendant "continually divulged information
regarding the investigation." Detective Dossey did not know of
any press release from the Du Page County State's Attorney issued
earlier Saturday afternoon.
	Du Page County Assistant State's Attorney Diamond testified
as follows. On the night of November 4, 1997, Diamond and
several other assistant State's Attorneys were called to the crime
scene to offer legal assistance to the Hanover Park police
department. That night, Diamond first became aware that
defendant was being investigated for Noland's murder. From that
evening until the evening of November 8, he offered legal and
other assistance to the Hanover Park police department during the
course of its investigation.
	On the evening of Friday, November 7, Diamond was at the
Hanover Park police station. He and the police investigators
assigned to the case were informed that defendant was in custody
in Broadview. He accompanied the investigators to Broadview.
Detectives Dossey and Piacenza were in one car and Diamond and
another officer were in another. If defendant had remained with
the Broadview police department, Diamond likewise would have
remained there to assist those officers. He returned with the
Hanover Park investigators, with defendant riding with Detectives
Dossey and Piacenza.
	At the Hanover Park police station, Diamond waited to learn
what defendant had told the detectives. He did not speak to anyone
at the State's Attorney's office during this time. At approximately
12:26 a.m. he entered the room where defendant was being
interviewed and did not leave it until 4:30 a.m. He remained at the
police station for about an hour thereafter and then drove home.
	At 6 a.m., Diamond telephoned his supervisor, Michael
Wolfe. Diamond informed Wolfe that defendant gave a written
statement admitting his involvement in the murder, and Diamond
related the details of that statement to Wolfe. Diamond also told
Wolfe that investigators hoped to recover the murder weapon and
would attempt to corroborate the burglaries to which defendant
had confessed. Wolfe did not give Diamond any explicit
instructions regarding defendant's charge. Rather, the timing of the
charge was left up to Diamond when he thought the investigation
was complete. Wolfe took information from Diamond for the
purpose of preparing a press release, which the office does in all
murder cases. Diamond had nothing to do with preparing the
release.
	According to Diamond, when he, the detectives, and
defendant returned from videotaping defendant's statement at the
crime scene, "I had determined at that point that we had pretty
much dotted all of our I's and crossed all of our T's and the
investigation was as tight at that point as it needed to be."
Diamond then approved the murder charge against defendant.
	The testimony of Wolfe, Du Page County State's Attorney
Joseph Birkett, and First Assistant State's Attorney John Kinsella
was presented by stipulation. The parties stipulated that if Wolfe
were called to testify, he would testify as follows. He received a
telephone call from Diamond in the early morning of Saturday,
November 8, 1997. It was only during that telephone conversation
that Wolfe actually authorized Diamond to charge defendant. They
further discussed when charging would occur and whether
additional evidence, specifically the videotaped crime scene
statement, would be sought. Very soon after Wolfe's conversation
with Diamond, Wolfe telephoned State's Attorney Birkett and
informed him of the status of the case and related the conversation
with Diamond. Birkett agreed to charge defendant with murder
and to hold a press conference later that afternoon.
	According to the stipulation of State's Attorney Birkett, he
received a telephone call from Wolfe in the early morning on
Saturday, November 8, 1997. Wolfe informed Birkett of the status
of the investigation, and Birkett approved the decision to charge
defendant with first degree murder. They also discussed the
content and scheduling of a press conference later that afternoon.
Birkett then had a telephone conversation with his first assistant,
John Kinsella, in which they discussed the press conference.
	Laura Pollastrini, the public information manager at the
Du Page County State's Attorney's office, testified as follows. At
approximately 9:30 a.m. on Saturday, November 8, 1997,
Pollastrini received a telephone call from Kinsella informing her
that the office would conduct a press conference that day. She
received information from Wolfe and completed the press release
at approximately 1 p.m. She showed it to the State's Attorney,
who approved it. Sometime shortly after 1 p.m. the press release
issued to the media and was read at the press conference.
	The press release stated: "Joe Birkett, State's Attorney of
Du Page County *** announced today that First Degree Murder
charges have been filed this afternoon against Mark C. Ballard, 37,
of 5712 Bedford Court, Hanover Park. He is charged in connection
with the death of Patricia A. Noland, 43, of that same address."
(Emphasis added.) In his stipulation, Birkett conceded that the
press release erroneously stated that charges had been filed that
afternoon. In fact, charges had not yet been filed. According to
Birkett, the press release should have indicated that first degree
murder charges against defendant were expected to be filed that
afternoon.
	Defendant was presented to a Du Page County judge on
Sunday morning, November 9, 1997; a criminal complaint
charging defendant with first degree murder was filed.

A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
	Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress alleging
that the State intentionally delayed bringing him before a judge to
prevent attachment of his right to counsel under the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amends. VI, XIV) and article I, section 8, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8). In his motion, defendant
claimed that his right to counsel attached when the State had
committed itself to prosecute him "at least as early as the issuance
of the press release, and perhaps earlier." Defendant sought
suppression of any statements that he made subsequent to the
attachment of his right to counsel. The trial court denied this
motion.
	Before this court, defendant focuses his claim. He relies solely
on the sixth amendment. He alleges specifically that the State's
"commitment to prosecute was made in the early morning hours
of Saturday, November 8, but the filing of charges was
intentionally delayed." Accordingly, defendant now claims that
only the videotaped statement that he gave on the afternoon of
November 8, 1997, should have been suppressed. Defendant seeks
a new trial.
	The controlling principles are established. The sixth
amendment, applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, guarantees in relevant part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const., amends. VI,
XIV. The purpose of the sixth amendment is to assure that, in any
criminal prosecution, the accused shall not be left to his or her
own devices in facing the prosecutorial forces of organized
society. "By its very terms, it becomes applicable only when the
government's role shifts from investigation to accusation. For it is
only then that the assistance of one versed in the 'intricacies ... of
law' [citation] is needed to assure that the prosecution's case
encounters 'the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.' "
[Citation.] Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410,
427, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1146 (1986).
	The sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at or after the
initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings-whether by way of a
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-88, 81 L. Ed. 2d 146, 153-54, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 2297 (1984), quoting
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 417, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1881-82 (1972) (plurality opinion). In Gouveia, the
Court explained:
			"Thus, given the plain language of the Amendment and
its purpose of protecting the unaided layman at critical
confrontations with his adversary, our conclusion that the
right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings 'is far from a mere
formalism.' [Citation.] It is only at that time 'that the
government has committed itself to prosecute, and only
then that the adverse positions of government and
defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds
himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized
society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and
procedural criminal law.' [Citation.]" Gouveia, 467 U.S. 
at 189, 81 L. Ed. 2d  at 155, 104 S. Ct.  at 2298.
As the plurality in Kirby concluded: "It is this point, therefore, that
marks the commencement of the 'criminal prosecutions' to which
alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are
applicable." Kirby, 406 U.S.  at 690, 32 L. Ed. 2d  at 418, 92 S. Ct. 
at 1882.
	In this case, when defendant gave his videotaped statement on
the afternoon of November 8, 1997, there had been no formal
charging proceeding, preliminary hearing, indictment, information,
or arraignment accusing defendant of murder. It has never been
held that an arrest, by itself, triggers the sixth amendment right to
counsel. Gouveia, 467 U.S.  at 190, 81 L. Ed. 2d  at 155, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2298, cited in People v. Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d 29, 50 (1987). Here,
the fact that an arrest warrant was obtained prior to defendant's
arrest was not sufficient to create trial-like confrontation
contemplated by the sixth amendment. See People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 126 (1990) ("Where the extent of the prosecutor's
involvement in the procurement of the warrant is no more than in
the assistance and preparation of the complaint *** the arrest must
be characterized as purely investigatory without any commitment
by the State at this point to pursue prosecution"), citing People v.
Boswell, 132 Ill. App. 3d 52, 59-60 (1985).
	Further, custodial interrogation, by itself, does not trigger the
sixth amendment right to counsel. Moran, 475 U.S.  at 431-32, 89 L. Ed. 2d  at 427-28, 106 S. Ct.  at 1146; People v. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50, 79 (1988). These sixth amendment principles apply even if
the investigation has focused on or targeted the defendant. United
States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 663, 674 (9th Cir. 2000); State v.
Register, 323 S.C. 471, 477, 476 S.E.2d 153, 157 (1996); State v.
McCormick, 778 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Tenn. 1989).
	However, this court has held that "the level of prosecutorial
involvement may be considered in determining whether a
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel has attached."
People v. Garrett, 179 Ill. 2d 239, 248 (1997) (collecting cases).
In this case, therefore, "defendant has a sixth amendment right to
counsel only if there has been significant prosecutorial
involvement at the time of the questioned action or if the
government has committed itself at that time to prosecute
defendant." Garrett, 179 Ill. 2d  at 250. Accordingly, our inquiry
is into the degree of prosecutorial involvement at the time of the
videotaped crime scene statement.
	In this case, prior to or at the time of defendant's videotaped
crime scene statement, there was not such a constitutionally
significant degree of prosecutorial involvement as to trigger
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. Diamond's initial
involvement in the case was solely to assist law enforcement
officers in their investigation. Diamond's role was one of
investigation and not accusation. Indeed, it was not until Diamond
spoke with Wolfe on the morning of November 8, 1997, that
Diamond actually received from Wolfe the authority to charge
defendant.
	Further, having the authority to charge defendant is not the
same as deciding to charge him. Diamond was authorized to
charge defendant when Diamond believed that the investigation
was complete. Wolfe never instructed Diamond to charge
defendant at a particular time.
	Defendant contends that "[t]he press release is one of the
totality of the circumstances that demonstrates that the charging
decision had been made in the early morning hours of November
8." According to defendant, the press release "is significant
evidence that the decision had been made and paperwork was
deliberately delayed while the police succeeded in getting a
videotaped statement at the scene of the crime, and a tour of
houses [defendant] had burglarized."
	We disagree. Although the press release supports defendant's
contention, it is only one of the many factors considered and is not
conclusive. The press release should have announced that charges
were expected to be filed against defendant. We agree with the
State that, in the course of a criminal investigation, there likely
exists an expectation that charges will be filed pending its
conclusion. However, this does not mean that whenever the police
or prosecutors investigate criminal activity and announce that
charges are expected to be filed "the government has committed
itself at that time to prosecute defendant." See Garrett, 179 Ill. 2d 
at 250.
	Defendant protests that "[t]here was no investigation that
needed to be done to get sufficient evidence to charge [him]," and
that "further investigation could yield little that would be relevant
to the charging decision." Describing this argument as "novel and
paradoxical," the United States Supreme Court rejected it as
follows:
		"There is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police
are not required to guess at their peril the precise moment
at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect,
risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act
too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they
wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no
constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation
the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish
probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far
short of the amount necessary to support a criminal
conviction." Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374, 386, 87 S. Ct. 408, 417 (1966).
In this case, the investigators did not violate defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel by failing to cease their ongoing
investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 475
(7th Cir. 1977).
	The trial court heard the testimony of Diamond, as well as that
of Detective Dossey and Pollastrini. The court observed their
demeanor and assessed their credibility. Based on their testimony
and the other evidence, the court found that prosecutors did not
intentionally and unreasonably delay charging defendant in order
to deny him his sixth amendment right to counsel. Rather, the
court found that police and prosecutors wanted to continue their
ongoing investigation. We cannot say that the trial court's finding
was manifestly erroneous.

B. Presentment
	Defendant filed two additional pretrial motions to suppress,
alleging violations of sections 109-1(a) and 109-2(a),
respectively, of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725
ILCS 5/109-1(a), 109-2(a) (West 1996)). Section 109-1(a)
requires in pertinent part that "[a] person arrested with or without
a warrant shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the
nearest and most accessible judge in that county ***." 725 ILCS
5/109-1(a) (West 1996). In his motion, defendant claimed that the
State violated section 109-1(a) by presenting him before a judge
approximately 36 hours subsequent to his arrest. Defendant sought
suppression of "[a]ll statements made by [him] after the time he
should have appeared before a judge."
	Section 109-2(a) requires in pertinent part:
			"Any person arrested in a county other than the one in
which a warrant for his arrest was issued shall be taken
without unnecessary delay before the nearest and most
accessible judge in the county where the arrest was made
or, if no additional delay is created, before the nearest and
most accessible judge in the county from which the
warrant was issued." 725 ILCS 5/109-2(a) (West 1996).
In his motion, defendant noted that he was arrested at
approximately 8:15 p.m. on Friday, November 7, 1997, in
Broadview, which is located in Cook County. Defendant also
submitted affidavit evidence that bond court in Cook County was
in session that night from 6:30 to 10:45 p.m. in Chicago and on the
following morning from approximately 9 to 10 a.m. in Maywood.
Defendant claimed that the State violated section 109-2(a) by not
presenting him to a Cook County judge, rather than to a judge in
Du Page County, where he was ultimately taken. Defendant sought
suppression of "[a]ll statements made by [him] after the time he
should have appeared" before a Cook County judge.
	The trial court denied these motions. Before this court,
defendant seeks a new trial.
	The committee comments to article 109 of the Code
succinctly identifies the practical concern:
			"The most tedious and perplexing problem in the area
is what happens between arrest and taking before a
[judge] for a judicial hearing on probable cause. In
practice, the time between arrest and hearing is that in
which police officers question the accused and obtain, if
possible, a confession. If the case is weak, there is a
tendency to delay. If a confession is obtained during such
delay, should it be admissible in evidence at the trial?
			Illinois continues to look at the confession cases solely
in the light of the voluntary-involuntary test." 725 ILCS
Ann., art. 109, Committee Comments-1963, at 3 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
Article 109 was drafted to assure an accused all necessary rights
inherent in a preliminary examination and, at the same time, to
continue Illinois statutory and case law pertaining to the time
within which the accused must be presented to a judge for such
hearing. 725 ILCS Ann., art. 109, Committee Comments-1963, at
3 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
	Although section 109-1(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/109-1(a)
(West 1996)) requires that an arrestee be presented to a judge
"without unnecessary delay," noncompliance therewith does not,
by itself, obviate a confession or render an otherwise voluntary
confession inadmissible at trial. Rather, such delay is merely a
factor to be considered on the question of voluntariness. People v.
House, 141 Ill. 2d 323, 380 (1990); People v. Brooks, 51 Ill. 2d 156, 164-65 (1972). This is also true for a violation of section
109-2(a). People v. Pittman, 55 Ill. 2d 39, 56-57 (1973).
	The test of voluntariness is whether the defendant made the
statement freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or
inducement, or whether the defendant's will was overcome at the
time he or she confessed. A determination of voluntariness
requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances of each
case. Factors to consider when determining voluntariness include:
the defendant's age, intelligence, background, experience, mental
capacity, education, and physical condition at the time of
questioning; the legality and duration of the detention; the duration
of the questioning; whether defendant was advised of his
constitutional rights; and whether defendant was subjected to any
physical or mental abuse. The question of the competency of a
confession is for the trial court alone to decide by a preponderance
of the evidence, and its determination will not be disturbed on
review unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500-01 (1996); House, 141 Ill. 2d  at 376.
	In the trial court, defendant expressly clarified that he was not
claiming any police coercion or duress that caused him to
involuntarily make the statements. Rather, defendant claimed
solely an "unnecessary delay" in violation of sections 109-1(a)
and 109-2(a). Accordingly, we turn to that factor of voluntariness.
	While statutes such as sections 109-1(a) and 109-2(a) require
presentment "without unnecessary delay," some latitude is
allowed. Presentment to a judge need be performed only with such
reasonable promptness as the circumstances permit. Whether there
was or was not unnecessary delay must be determined from all the
facts and circumstances of each case. People v. Jackson, 23 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (1961). Although "no arbitrary rule may be judicially
fixed" (Jackson, 23 Ill. 2d at 278), Illinois decisions suggest a
delay of 24 to 36 hours prior to presentment is usually not
considered to be unnecessary. People v. Shannon, 149 Ill. App. 3d
525, 530 (1986); People v. Martin, 121 Ill. App. 3d 196, 208
(1984) (collecting cases).
	Further, once a defendant in lawful custody has knowingly
waived his or her Miranda rights and indicated a willingness to
talk to police, section 109-1(a) does not obligate police to
interrupt their interrogation as long as its length is not
unreasonable and the defendant's statements continue to be
voluntary. The "delay" involved in taking a voluntary statement
from a defendant under these circumstances is "necessary" within
the meaning of section 109-1(a). See People v. Groves, 294 Ill.
App. 3d 570, 578 (1998); People v. Smith, 203 Ill. App. 3d 545,
563 (1990). The legislative directions that an accused be presented
to a judge " 'without unnecessary delay' " "cannot mean that
police officers must forsake all other duties to comply, and neither
can they mean that the police do not have reasonable latitude to
fully investigate a crime." Jackson, 23 Ill. 2d  at 280; accord
House, 141 Ill. 2d  at 380. These principles apply to section
109-2(a) as well. See Pittman, 55 Ill. 2d  at 56-57.
	In this case, the trial court expressly considered all of the
factors pertaining to the voluntariness of defendant's statements.
Regarding the factor of delay, the court found: defendant willingly
cooperated with police from the beginning of his interview;
defendant's cooperation extended throughout his prearraignment
detention; and the length of the interrogation was not
unreasonable. After considering the evidence, the trial court
concluded that defendant's statements were voluntary and denied
his motions to suppress based on sections 109-1(a) and 109-2(a)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court's determination
was not manifestly erroneous.

II. Sufficiency of Mitigation Evidence
	Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it found no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the
sentence of death. Defendant contends that he was suffering from
extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the crime; that he has
significant rehabilitative potential; and that he has taken full
responsibility for his actions. Defendant argues that one or all of
these factors is sufficient mitigation to preclude the imposition of
the death sentence. Defendant asks this court to vacate his death
sentence and remand for a sentence other than death.
	In determining whether a sentence of death is proper, we must
consider "the character and record of the individual offender and
the circumstances of the particular offense." People v.
Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d 353, 388 (1990), citing Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976). "[E]ach capital case is unique and must be
evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the circumstances
of the crime and the character of the defendant are such that the
deterrent and retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be
served by imposing the death penalty." People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 280 (1989). "A death sentence is appropriate if the
sentence is commensurate with the seriousness of the offenses and
gives adequate consideration to relevant mitigating
circumstances." Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d  at 388. After careful
consideration of the circumstances of the crime in this case and the
character of defendant, we agree with the trial court that there are
no sufficient mitigating factors to preclude the imposition of the
death penalty and find no error.
	The defendant presented the following evidence in mitigation.
Six family members, consisting of defendant's sister, step-sister,
aunt, cousin, great-aunt, and a cousin of defendant's biological
mother, related that defendant had been raised by his mother and
step-father. Defendant's step-father brought three of his own
children into the marriage and adopted defendant and defendant's
sister. Soon after their marriage, defendant's mother and step-father had two children. Furthermore, these witnesses stated that
incidents of physical abuse towards defendant and his siblings
while defendant lived with his mother and step-father were heard
of and/or witnessed. Defendant's step-sister testified that there was
a lot of rage, violence, and anger in the household and defendant's
cousin stated that it was "like hell" when he lived in the Ballard
home for a time. In addition, on a number of occasions not only
did defendant run away from home but five of his siblings ran
away, with three never to return. Furthermore, defendant's aunt,
cousin, and the cousin of defendant's biological mom stated that
defendant's step-father was very distrustful and a con artist. The
witnesses testified that defendant was always respectful, obedient,
and did anything asked of him.
	Defendant's ex-wife, Susan Ballard, testified that she was
married to defendant for 10 years and still maintains regular
contact with him while he is in jail. Throughout their marriage,
defendant would periodically discuss with Susan the physical
abuse he suffered as a child at the hands of his step-father. Susan
described defendant's mother and step-father as domineering and
controlling. In addition, Susan stated that she was aware of
defendant's drug and alcohol dependencies during their marriage
and that when defendant was on drugs and alcohol, he was violent,
argumentative, and not nice to be around. But when defendant was
clean and sober, he was very helpful, pleasant, and loving. Susan
also told of incidents where defendant had physically assaulted her
and stole from her. Furthermore, Susan testified that she met with
defendant a few days after he had murdered Noland and that
defendant was crying when he told her that he had killed someone.
	A minister who counseled defendant 10 or so times in the past
six to eight years prior to Noland's murder testified that he thought
defendant was unstable and needed help.
	Eight individuals, including a clinical social worker, minister,
and a jail chaplain, who volunteer their time supervising various
classes and helping inmates with their issues at the jail testified on
behalf of defendant. Defendant participated in the following
classes: Men's Issues Group; AA; Bible Study; Anger
Management, Relapse Management, and Addiction Education;
Healing Our Losses, Job Readiness, and Commitment to Change;
and Parenting. Those eight individuals collectively thought that
defendant was an active member in class and was well liked by
others. Defendant brought other inmates to the classes, and some
considered him their mentor. One inmate testified that he met
defendant in one of the classes above and felt that defendant
played an outstanding role in his recovery. In addition, the
volunteers who supervise these classes stated that defendant was
sincere, honest, and always searching for answers. Furthermore,
defendant admitted in class to killing Noland and discussed his
feelings of remorse and guilt. The minister specifically believed
that defendant has accepted reality and understands the choices he
has made.
	Dr. Albert Stipes, a forensic psychiatrist, testified as a
mitigation witness. Dr. Stipes evaluated defendant and based on
his review, found that defendant suffers from Bipolar II disorder.
Bipolar II is a disorder of the mood. There are many types of
bipolar disorders, but they are all characterized by extremes of
mood, i.e., elated moods, depressed moods, and sometimes
delusions and hallucinations accompany one of these.
Additionally, Dr. Stipes noted that defendant suffered from
alcohol and cocaine dependency and that, sometimes, people with
bipolar disorder use substances to control their own symptoms.
For example, people use cocaine when they are feeling depressed
and alcohol when feeling agitated. Furthermore, Dr. Stipes stated
that cocaine has a very short life and when put into someone with
Bipolar II disorder can promote rapid cycling-frequent changes
from depression to elation or agitation. Dr. Stipes concluded that
defendant was suffering from Bipolar II disorder when defendant,
as discussed later herein, assaulted fellow inmates and when he
killed Noland.
	Defendant testified on his own behalf as a mitigation witness.
Defendant related his past physical abuse at the hands of his step-father and the number of times he ran away. Defendant stated that
he started drinking alcohol when he was nine years old and started
using cocaine when he was 18. Defendant admitted to committing
over a hundred burglaries in order to fund his drug and alcohol
habits. Defendant testified that any time the police caught him, he
would readily confess. Being in and out of jail his whole life, there
were times when defendant tried to clean himself up, but would
ultimately revert back to drugs and alcohol.
	On the morning of Noland's murder, defendant was 37 years
old and was on one of his drug binges. That day, defendant
smoked cocaine from approximately 2 to 8 p.m. and wanted some
more, which is when Noland came to his mind. Initially, defendant
only intended to rob Noland, but thinking that she would later
identify him, his thoughts turned to murder. Defendant wrestled
with the idea of whether or not to kill Noland for over an hour and
decided that he was not going to kill her, but essentially snapped
when Noland left his soda in her car. Defendant stated that at one
point he had wanted to stop hitting Noland with the hammer, but
knew that if he had stopped, she would probably be a vegetable for
the rest of her life. Defendant believed that what he had done was
horrible and readily admitted that he deserved to die as a
consequence. Defendant further admitted that at the time of his
arrest, he felt relieved to be away from drugs and ashamed and
irritated at himself for what he had done and unmindful if he lived
or died. Defendant testified that he now cares and wishes to live.
	Furthermore, while in jail, defendant attended the classes
mentioned above, actively sought psychiatric help because he
though he had a chemical imbalance, and put God into his life.
Defendant began taking medication for his psychological problem
in December of 1997.
	In addition, defendant told the court that he physically
assaulted fellow inmates because (1) the first inmate slammed a
mentally ill person against the wall, (2) the second inmate was
homosexual and had made a pass at him, and (3) a third inmate
was calling him names.
	In contrast to this mitigating evidence, the State presented the
following evidence in aggravation. The State introduced all of the
evidence produced at trial regarding Noland's murder, including
a videotape of defendant walking through the murder scene and
defendant's oral and written confessions. In addition, evidence of
defendant's extensive criminal record was admitted, which
included convictions for: aggravated battery; battery; burglary;
residential burglary; attempted residential burglary; criminal
trespass; theft; assault; and violation of a court order. It appears
defendant has been in and out of jail since his early 20s.
	Further evidence of defendant's background was presented
through a number of witnesses, the majority of which are as
follows. The State presented defendant's step-father, step-brother,
half-sister, and a family friend; all of whom stated that there was
no abuse in the family while defendant was growing up and, in
particular, that defendant was not abused as a child by his step-father.
	Colonel Steve Connolly, from the United States Army
Reserve, testified that defendant joined the army in 1978 and
received a counseling statement within three weeks of his arrival.
In the army, a counseling statement is received for some type of
misconduct. Defendant's counseling statement stated that
defendant was "unmotivated, lacked self-discipline, won't
cooperate with his peers in doing his share of the work and will
not perform without direct supervision." In addition, defendant
received two "Field Grade Article 15s." An Article 15 gives a
commander an option to impose a sentence for a criminal violation
instead of sending a matter to court. A Field Grade Article 15 has
a more severe sentencing option than an Article 15 because it is
for a higher ranking officer who has greater authority to impose a
more significant sentence. Defendant's first Field Grade Article 15
pertained to an incident where defendant unlawfully hit another
soldier in the wrist and body with a broomstick. The second
pertained to defendant intimidating and threatening witnesses to
a third party's court martial. In the end, defendant received an
honorable discharge from the army after being reviewed and for
receiving the two Field Grade Article 15s.
	Six witnesses, including defendant's biological father and ex-brother-in-law, testified that their homes were burglarized by
defendant. In 1981, defendant's biological father came home from
vacation to find that his home had been burglarized. A year later,
defendant told his biological father that he committed the burglary
and that he sold the stolen items.
	In addition, 12 police officers testified in relation to the above
burglaries and other burglaries committed by defendant that they
were investigating. Officer Carlton Perry of the Bartlett police
department stated that he was investigating a burglary on
September 28, 1981, to a home belonging to defendant's
biological father. That on that same date, he interviewed defendant
and defendant admitted to burglarizing his biological father's
home.
	Also, Officers Mike Gartner and Robert Christ of the Elgin
police department testified that on August 8, 1981, they responded
to a break-in at a local bar. Officer Gartner found defendant in the
basement and defendant was subsequently charged with burglary.
	In December 1983, Kenneth Piletic testified that he was home
sleeping when he heard his doorbell ringing. Upon going
downstairs, Piletic saw a shadow of a figure go around his house
so he went to the back of his home to look through a window. By
the time Piletic reached his back door, the window in the door was
broken and someone was trying to get in. Piletic called the police,
who apprehended defendant in Piletic's neighbor's yard.
Defendant received a nine-year sentence for attempted residential
burglary of Piletic's home.
	Detective Norman Landwehr of the Elgin police department
testified that on January 18, 1984, defendant confessed to
committing 41 burglaries and was subsequently charged for a
number of them. Defendant also told Detective Landwehr that he
had a severe drug problem and that he committed the burglaries to
purchase drugs.
	Lieutenant Steve Schinkel of the Algonquin police department
testified that on January 21, 1984, defendant admitted to
committing well over a hundred burglaries within the last year,
some within Algonquin. After the interview, defendant was
charged with residential burglary. In addition, defendant told
Lieutenant Schinkel that he wanted to confess everything so that
he could start his life over when he got out of prison.
	Sergeant Randy Johnson of the North Aurora police
department testified that on January 26, 1984, defendant confessed
that on December 13, 1983, he had stolen a television and traded
it for cocaine in Elgin.
	In November 1997, Officer Shawn Talluto of the West
Frankfort police department responded to a call made by
defendant's grandmother on November 6, 1997. Defendant's
grandmother told Officer Talluto that defendant had been at her
home and had tried kicking in her door, demanding to be let in.
After refusing to let defendant in, she called the police. Scared for
her safety, she spent the night with a friend. The next day, Officer
William Troutt, also of the West Frankfort police department, met
defendant's grandmother and she asked Officer Troutt to search
her home before she went back in to make sure defendant was not
there. In addition, both officers responded to and investigated
burglaries in the area.
	Detective Sergeant Bruce McVety of the Bureau County
sheriff's department stated that he interviewed defendant on
November 8, 1997, with another officer at the Hanover Park police
station. Defendant confessed to committing four burglaries.
Detective McVety testified that defendant told him he committed
the burglaries to buy cocaine and that he felt bad about committing
the fourth burglary because the home belonged to his friends.
	Detective Dossey testified that after discussing Noland's
murder with defendant, he admitted to committing a number of
burglaries in South Elgin, Princeton, and West Frankfort between
the dates of November 4, 1997, and November 6, 1997.
Furthermore, Detective Dossey stated that defendant told him that
he had wished he had killed McGuire because McGuire was an
"asshole and had a drug problem and would blame other people
for things, and that he just didn't care for [McGuire]." Defendant
stated that he was going to "chop [McGuire's] head off with an
axe." At no time during Detective Dossey's interview did
defendant say he was sorry for murdering Noland.
	Detective Driskill testified that he searched Noland's car.
There, he found items defendant had stolen from the homes he
previously had burglarized.
	In addition, four witnesses gave testimony relating to
incidents where defendant physically assaulted them. The four
police officers who took the reports of the physical assault
incidents also testified and stated that all parties involved, with the
exception of one, named defendant as the wrongdoer. One of these
witnesses, Baldemar Santana, testified that on October 28, 1979,
he was walking through a packed bar in Elgin when he heard
someone yelling at him. Santana did not hear what was said. As he
started to walk back to his seat, he was hit over the head with a
beer bottle. Santana testified that he did not know the person who
hit him and had never seen him before. Later, witnesses at the bar
told him and police that defendant was the culprit. Another of
these witnesses, Brenda Kusch, defendant's half-sister, testified
that on July 24, 1991, defendant picked her up by the ears, threw
her to the ground, and hit her over the head with a beer bottle.
Kusch reported the incident to police and filed a complaint against
defendant for battery. Also, on August 23, 1991, defendant tried
to break into Kusch's home.
	Additionally, two inmates testified that defendant physically
assaulted them while defendant was in jail awaiting trial for the
murder of Noland. Eight officers and one registered nurse testified
to their involvement pertaining to the two incidences in jail with
one officer stating that he saw defendant fighting a third inmate on
another occasion.
	Dr. Jerry Wolfe, a psychologist, interviewed defendant after
defendant's second physical assault on an inmate. Dr. Wolfe
testified that defendant displayed no sense of remorse, regret, or
apology for the assaults. He further stated that defendant had been
on a number of different medications up to that point, which was
unusual.
	Lastly, the State presented victim impact testimony from five
of Noland's family members.
	Section 9-1(h) of the Illinois death penalty statute provides
that "once the State has proved the existence of any of the
aggravating factors [720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1996)], beyond a
reasonable doubt [720 ILCS 5/9-1(f) (West 1996)], a *** court
must weigh the mitigating factors against the aggravating factors
and must conclude that no mitigating factors sufficiently preclude
the imposition of the death sentence." People v. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d 508, 534 (1980); 720 ILCS 5/9-1(h) (West 1996). A balancing
process of the aggravation and mitigation evidence presented is
required of the sentencing authority. Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 534.
" 'While the various factors to be considered by the sentencing
authorities do not have numerical weights assigned to them, ***
the sentencing authority's discretion is guided and channeled by
requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or
against imposition of the death penalty, thus eliminating total
arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition.' " Brownell, 79 Ill. 2d  at 534, quoting Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913, 926, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2969 (1976).
	The trial court in this case considered the evidence that was
presented, the testimony of the witnesses, their credibility, their
believability on the stand, and the law that applies to cases
involving whether the death penalty should or should not be
imposed. In addition, the trial court considered the nature and
circumstances of the offense; the history, character and condition
of defendant; and whether or not defendant can be restored to
useful citizenship.
	As pertaining to defendant's mitigation evidence, the trial
court considered defendant's childhood and upbringing; whether
the murder was committed while defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although
not such as to constitute a defense to the prosecution; whether or
not defendant may be rehabilitated or restored to useful citizenship
at some future point; and if there were any other reasons supported
by the evidence in the record as to why defendant should not be
sentenced to death. The trial court ultimately found that none of
these matters were sufficient to preclude the imposition of the
death sentence.
	Defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding no
sufficient mitigation to preclude the imposition of death.
Specifically, defendant believes that he has significant
rehabilitative potential, which he demonstrated by actively
pursuing help in jail for his addictions, anger, and psychological
problems. However, good behavior in prison need not offset
otherwise substantial aggravating evidence against the defendant.
See People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 495 (2000); People v.
Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 162 (1997); People v. Turner, 156 Ill. 2d 354, 361 (1993) (" '[O]ne arrested for a capital crime, and
particularly a convicted defendant awaiting sentencing, has every
incentive to behave flawlessly in prison if good behavior might
cause the sentencing authority to spare his life. Good behavior in
those circumstances would rarely be predictive as to the conduct
of the prisoner after sentence has been imposed' (emphasis in
original)"), quoting Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 14-15,
90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 13, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 1676 (1986) (Powell, J.,
concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.) .
	Defendant also contends that his violent behavior in and out
of prison was directly attributable to his drug and alcohol
dependencies and bipolar disorder and that, because of these
dependencies and disorder, defendant was under an extreme
emotional disturbance at the time he murdered Noland and
physically assaulted his fellow inmates. However, this court has
recognized that "a history of substance abuse is a double-edged
sword at the aggravation/mitigation phase of the penalty hearing."
Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 138. " '[S]imply because the defendant views
his drug abuse history as mitigating does not require the sentencer
to do so.' " Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 138, quoting People v. Shatner,
174 Ill. 2d 133, 159 (1996). Accordingly, the sentencing judge was
free to conclude that defendant's dependencies and disorder were
aggravating and simply had no mitigating value. Furthermore, with
respect to the defendant's psychological disorder, this court has
repeatedly held that " 'information about a defendant's mental or
psychological impairments is not inherently mitigating.' " Madej,
177 Ill. 2d  at 139, quoting People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 382
(1997). This court explained in Tenner, "[a]t sentencing, a judge
or jury considering evidence of this nature might view the
information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of
course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that
it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future
dangerousness.' " Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d  at 382. "Even if we were to
consider defendant's alleged psychological and neurological
impairments as mitigating factors, '[m]itigation evidence of a
defendant's cognitive abilities and mental health does not preclude
imposition of a death sentence when that evidence is outweighed
by aggravating evidence.' " Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 139-40, quoting
People v. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d 261, 286 (1997).
	Similarly, the remainder of the evidence offered by defendant
carries little, if any, weight in terms of mitigation. As to
defendant's somewhat troubled childhood, the trial court in this
case was free to conclude " 'that it simply had no mitigating value
but may have been, in fact, actually aggravating.' " Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 140, quoting People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 337 (1992).
Moreover, " 'evidence that a defendant has been physically or
sexually abused *** does not invalidate a death sentence when
outweighed by aggravating evidence.' " Madej, 177 Ill. 2d  at 140,
quoting People v. Pulliam, 176 Ill. 2d 261, 286 (1997). Further, we
note that defendant never held a job for very long, often quitting
as a result of his drug and alcohol dependencies or because of
incarceration. It appears that for more than 20 years, defendant
was either in jail or committing burglaries to fund his drug and
alcohol habits. Finally, although defendant took full responsibility
for his crime and may have showed some sense of remorse by
saying "I deserve to die for what I did," which may be viewed as
mitigating, we do not consider that evidence sufficiently offsetting
in light of the aggravating circumstances in this case.
	In view of the foregoing, we hold that the trial court
considered and weighed all the evidence presented before it. In
addition, we find that the evidence presented in aggravation and
mitigation not to be closely balanced; therefore, we decline to
grant defendant a new sentencing hearing.

III. Other-Crimes Witnesses: Improper Testimony
	Defendant next argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing
hearing because the trial court erred in allowing the State to
present victim impact evidence from the victims of prior crimes.
Specifically, defendant raises issue with two of the State's
aggravation witnesses, Nicole Stieber and Lisa Trone. Trone's
home was burglarized by defendant. Trone merely described what
it was like entering her home on November 6, 1997, after it had
been burglarized. Trone found the front door jarred open and saw
large muddy footprints on her white carpet. Due to seeing exactly
where the burglar had traveled throughout her home, Trone
testified to having an eerie feeling.
	Since defendant failed to object to Trone's testimony in his
post-trial motion, as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-1 (West 1996)), the State argues that
defendant waived this issue as it pertains to Trone. We agree. This
court has stated the general rule that the failure to raise an issue in
a written motion for a new trial results in a waiver of that issue on
appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 185-86 (1988). To
preserve an issue on appeal, a defendant must object to the
purported error at trial and include it in his written post-trial
motion. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d  at 186. A defendant must follow this
same procedure if he wishes to raise errors which occurred at
sentencing or risk waiving them on appeal. People v. Mahaffey,
166 Ill. 2d 1, 27 (1995). In this case, defendant failed to raise
Trone's testimony in his post-sentencing motion; therefore,
defendant waived the issue. Defendant does not raise the issue of
plain error and, as noted above, the aggravation evidence was
overwhelming and not closely balanced. See People v. Simpson,
172 Ill. 2d 117, 147 (1996) (stating that the defendant did not raise
the issue of plain error and noticing that the evidence at trial was
overwhelming and not closely balanced).
	We now turn to defendant's properly raised contention
concerning Nicole Stieber's testimony. Stieber testified that she
dated defendant in 1992 and that he bragged about previous
burglaries he had committed. After four months of dating, Stieber
tried to break the relationship off with defendant. Even though
Stieber invoked restraining orders and orders of protection,
defendant would always come back and break into her home. On
August 26, 1992, defendant was drunk when he called Stieber at
her home, and later that evening, defendant went to Stieber's
house. Defendant yelled at Stieber and began hitting her with
anything he could put his hands on, including a ceramic cup.
During the assault, Stieber protected her face with her hands. Due
to this incident, Stieber's right hand was severely damaged and
remains crippled. Stieber further told the trial court that she
underwent seven surgeries on her hand, gave details of the
procedures performed, and stated how the injury has affected her
life. In addition, continuing therapy requires Stieber to wear a
brace for six hours every night on her hand to help with mobility.
	It is well established that "at the second stage of a capital
sentencing hearing, the standard for admissibility of evidence is
relevance and reliability, and that evaluation is left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge." People v. Hope, 184 Ill. 2d 39, 51
(1998). Defendant contends that Stieber's detailed testimony
concerning the after effects of defendant's offense was neither
reliable nor relevant and that it is victim impact testimony that is
barred by the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725
ILCS 120/1 (West 1996)). The State responds that Stieber's
testimony was relevant and reliable and that the trial court's
decision to admit the evidence was not an abuse of discretion. The
State contends that Steiber's detailed account regarding the extent
of her hand injury was relevant because it highlighted defendant's
taste for violence. We disagree.
	"While the details of prior crimes are considered relevant
aggravation because they illuminate the character and record of a
capital defendant [citation], the unforseen effects of those prior
crimes on their victims are of no such assistance." Hope, 184 Ill. 2d  at 52. In this case, Stieber testified to her encounters with
defendant, which included the assault upon her and the injury
resulting therefrom. However, upon further questioning by the
State, Steiber went into detail concerning the unforseen
consequences of the injury and its effect on her life. We find
Stieber's detailed account regarding defendant's offense to be
irrelevant victim impact testimony. However, we conclude the
State's introduction of this victim impact evidence not to be so
unduly prejudicial that it renders the capital sentencing hearing
fundamentally unfair. At the second stage of the sentencing
hearing, the State presented evidence in aggravation, through 47
witnesses, of, inter alia, defendant's criminal background, his
numerous burglaries and assaults, and his misconduct in prison.
Stieber's impact testimony covered approximately four pages in
the record. Considering the voluminous amount of aggravation
evidence presented, we conclude that the State's error was
harmless and not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair
sentencing hearing. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 19
(2000) (significant evidence in aggravation compelled finding that,
even if the brief answer given by the aggravation witness violated
Hope rule, supra, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt).

IV. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute
	Defendant lastly contends that the Illinois death penalty
statute (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1996)) is unconstitutional for
several reasons. Defendant asks us to vacate his death sentence
and remand the cause for imposition of a sentence other than
death.

A. Excessive Number of Eligibility Factors

	Defendant claims that the Illinois death penalty statute has a
constitutionally excessive number of statutory aggravating factors.
Defendant argues that the statute is "unconstitutional because it
fails to adequately limit the class of individuals eligible for the
death penalty."
	The constitutional principles are quite established. The eighth
amendment death penalty jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court addresses "two different aspects of the capital
decisionmaking process: the eligibility decision and the selection
decision." Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971, 129 L. Ed. 2d 750, 759, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2634 (1994). The eighth
amendment's concern that the death penalty be both appropriate
and not randomly imposed requires a state to perform two
somewhat contradictory tasks to impose the death penalty.
Romano v. Oklahoma,512 U.S. 1, 6, 129 L. Ed. 2d 1, 9, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2009 (1994).
	First, a capital sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the
class of individuals eligible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. A state's
sentencing procedure must suitably direct and limit the discretion
of the sentencing body so as to minimize the risk of completely
arbitrary and capricious action. Romano, 512 U.S.  at 7, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 9, 114 S. Ct.  at 2009, quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 248, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2741 (1983),
quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859,
883, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932 (1976).
	Accordingly, to render a defendant eligible for the death
penalty, the trier of fact must first convict the defendant of murder
and find one "aggravating circumstance" or its equivalent at either
the guilt or the penalty phase of the trial. The aggravating
circumstance may be contained in the definition of the crime, a
separate sentencing factor, or both. The aggravating circumstance
must meet two requirements. First, the circumstance must apply
only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder; it may not
apply to every defendant convicted of a murder. Second, the
aggravating circumstance may not be constitutionally vague.
Tuilaepa, 512 U.S.  at 971-72, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 759, 114 S. Ct.  at
2634-35 (and cases cited therein).
	Second, a state must ensure that a capital sentencing decision
rests on an individualized inquiry, under which the character and
record of the defendant and the circumstances of the particular
offense are considered. A state cannot limit the sentencing body's
consideration of any relevant circumstance that could cause it to
decline to impose the penalty. The state cannot channel the
discretion of the sentencing body, but must allow it to consider any
relevant information that the defendant offers. Romano, 512 U.S. 
at 7, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 10, 114 S. Ct.  at 2009, quoting McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 287, 107 S. Ct. 1756,
1774 (1987).
	Accordingly, this is a separate requirement for the selection
decision, where the sentencing body determines whether a
defendant who is eligible for the death penalty should receive that
sentence. The requirement of an individualized determination is
met when the sentencing body can consider all relevant mitigating
evidence of the character and record of the defendant and the
circumstances of the crime. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S.  at 972, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 759-60, 114 S. Ct.  at 2635.
	In sum: "The eligibility decision fits the crime within a
defined classification. *** The selection decision, on the other
hand, requires individualized sentencing and must be expansive
enough to accommodate relevant mitigating evidence so as to
assure an assessment of the defendant's culpability." Tuilaepa,
512 U.S.  at 973, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 760, 114 S. Ct.  at 2635.
	Procedure under the Illinois death penalty statute is familiar.
A death penalty hearing in Illinois consists of a two-stage process.
During the first phase, it is determined whether a defendant is
eligible for the death penalty. A defendant who has been found
guilty of murder is eligible if: (1) he or she has obtained the age of
18; and (2) the jury has found the existence of at least one listed
aggravating factor. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 2000). The first
phase is a nonweighing statutory scheme to determine death
eligibility. The statute does not place special emphasis on any
single aggravating factor and does not accord any added
significance to multiple aggravating factors. People v. Coleman,
129 Ill. 2d 321, 344-45 (1989); People v. Todd, 154 Ill. 2d 57, 75
(1992). "So long as the sentencing body has found at least one
valid aggravating factor, the fact that it also may have considered
an invalid aggravating factor does not infect the formal process of
deciding whether death is an appropriate penalty." Todd, 154 Ill. 2d  at 75. The aggravating factors distinguish and narrow the group
of persons who are death eligible. In the absence of one of these
limiting factors, the offense of murder qualifies the defendant for
a term of imprisonment. People v. Britz, 123 Ill. 2d 446, 484
(1988).
	If it is determined that the defendant is eligible for the death
penalty, then, during the second phase of the death penalty
hearing, the jury or court weighs any relevant aggravating and
mitigating factors and determines whether there are any mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty.
720 ILCS 5/9-1(c), (g), (h) (West 2000). Also, this court provides
meaningful appellate review of every death sentence. 720 ILCS
5/9-1(i) (West 2000); Coleman, 129 Ill. 2d  at 345; Britz, 123 Ill. 2d  at 484.
	Courts have consistently upheld the above-described
procedure under the Illinois death penalty statute as constitutional.
"It is this process, in conjunction with the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt of any aggravating factor, as well as
mandatory review [citation], which sufficiently circumscribes the
class or persons eligible for the death penalty." People v. Williams,
147 Ill. 2d 173, 267-68 (1991); accord People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 64-65 (1989); Britz, 123 Ill. 2d at 484-85; Williams v. Chrans,
742 F. Supp. 472, 501 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd, 945 F.2d 926 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("In sum, the Illinois death penalty statute properly and
clearly guides the sentencing jury to narrow the risk of
arbitrariness without preventing the jury from considering and
giving effect to any relevant mitigating circumstances")
	However, over the years, the legislature has added to the list
of aggravating factors in subsection (b) of the Illinois death
penalty statute (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 2000)). When originally
enacted in 1977, the statute listed seven aggravating factors. Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b). By 1981, the list had grown
to eight. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b). By 1989, the
listed aggravating factors totaled 10. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38,
par. 9-1(b). By 1991, the list contained 11 aggravating factors (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)), 12 aggravating factors by
1992 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1992)), 14 aggravating factors by
1994 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1994)), 15 aggravating factors by
1996 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1996)), 19 aggravating factors by
1998 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 1998)), and 20 aggravating factors
by 2000 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 2000)).
	Defendant contends that the death penalty statute is
unconstitutional because it contains too many aggravating factors.
Defendant argues:
		"The number and breadth of these factors do not
sufficiently narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty. Indeed, the high number of aggravating
factors so greatly expands the class of death eligible
defendants that it is difficult to imagine a first degree
murder defendant who does not qualify under at least one,
if not several factors."
According to defendant, this statutory sentencing scheme fails to
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty.
	We cannot accept defendant's contention for at least two
reasons. First, on a literal and practical level, defendant's
contention is incorrect. Looking at the entire universe of first
degree murders and murderers, the Illinois death penalty statute
genuinely narrows the class of individuals eligible for the death
penalty and reasonably justifies imposition of a more severe
sentence on those defendants compared to others found guilty of
first degree murder. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 249-50, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742 (1983).
	Initially, the statute limits its application to persons older than
18 years of age. Persons younger than 18 can commit first degree
murders yet will never be eligible for the death penalty.
	Further, there are innumerable examples of first degree
murders that do not fit within any of the statute's eligibility
factors. Each provision is narrowly tailored to fit a specific set of
facts and circumstances, e.g., murder of an emergency medical
technician or paramedic (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(12) (West 2000)),
murder of a disabled person (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(17) (West 2000)),
murder of a community policing volunteer (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(18)
(West 2000)), or murder of a person subject to an order of
protection (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(19) (West 2000)). Each provision
genuinely narrows the class of persons who can be eligible for the
death penalty. Further, the requirements of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of any aggravating factor and automatic appellate
review direct and limit the discretion of the sentencing body so as
to minimize the risk of completely arbitrary and capricious action.
See Romano, 512 U.S.  at 7, 129 L. Ed. 2d  at 9, 114 S. Ct.  at 2009,
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302-03, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 285,
107 S. Ct. 1756, 1772-73 (1987).
	A second reason for rejecting defendant's contention is more
conceptual. Even assuming that a death penalty statute could have
"too many" aggravating factors rendering a first degree murder
defendant eligible for the death penalty, how many aggravating
factors are "too many"? In a thorough decision, a trial court in
Delaware, a state whose death penalty statute has a number of
death-eligibility factors comparable to that of Illinois, thoughtfully
reasoned:
			"While the Court does not dispute that at first blush the
defendant's argument appears logical, it is disturbed by
the prospect of how one determines the point at which the
number of aggravating circumstances causes the death
penalty statute to be generally unconstitutional. Is the
Court to engage in some mathematical calculation as to
who might be covered by the statute and who is not; and
if so, what would be reasonable and logical factors to
include in the formula? Can the Court arbitrarily declare
that fifty aggravating circumstances is too many but forty-nine is permissible? Even assuming one could ever create
a tool that would measure the percentage of defendants
eligible for capital punishment, where is the dividing line
of constitutionality and who makes that decision?" State
v. Steckel, 708 A.2d 994, 1000 (Del. Super. 1996).
Affirming this reasoning, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded
that, absent factual substantiation, the remaining inquiry was
whether an individual aggravating factor could apply to any first
degree murder defendant, not whether all aggravating factors
combined apply to virtually all defendants convicted of first degree
murder. Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 12-13 & n.11 (Del. 1998)
(noting that although too many aggravating factors may violate
constitutional principles, the defendant had not shown that such a
limit had been reached in Delaware), citing Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474, 123 L. Ed. 2d 188, 200, 113 S. Ct. 1534, 1542
(1993).
	We lastly observe that " 'defendant has not demonstrated on
this record, or through sources of which we might take judicial
notice, that his claims are empirically accurate, or that, if they
were correct, this would require the invalidation of the death
penalty law.' " (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Crittenden, 9 Cal. 4th 83, 155, 885 P.2d 887, 930, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474, 517 (1994),
quoting People v. Wader, 5 Cal. 4th 610, 669, 854 P.2d 80, 114,
20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 788, 822 (1993). Defendant does not substantiate
this contention in any way. "As we are presently informed" (Pulley
v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29, 42, 104 S. Ct. 871,
881 (1984)), we cannot say that the Illinois death penalty statute
is unconstitutional in this regard.

B. Remaining Challenges
	Defendant makes several additional constitutional challenges
to the Illinois death penalty statute. However, this court has
previously rejected the argument that the Illinois death penalty
statute is unconstitutional because: (1) it does not require, at the
second phase of the death sentencing hearing, the State to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty (People v.
Davis, No. 89704, slip op. at 18-21 (February 22, 2002)); (2) it
places a burden of proof on a defendant that precludes meaningful
consideration of mitigation evidence (People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 376 (2000)); (3) it permits the sentencing body to weigh
the "vague" aggravating factor of "any other reason" a defendant
should be sentenced to death (People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502,
558-59 (2000)); (4) it fails to sufficiently minimize the risk of
arbitrarily imposed death sentences (Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 522-23); and (5) the death eligibility factor for murder committed in a
"cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a
preconceived plan, scheme or design" (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (11)
(West 1996)) is unconstitutionally vague (People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 358 (2000)). Defendant has not persuaded us to overturn
these decisions.

CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of
Du Page County is affirmed. We direct the clerk of this court to
enter an order setting Tuesday, January 14, 2003, as the date on
which the sentence of death, entered by the circuit court of
Du Page County, shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed
in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996).
The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate
in this case to the Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms
Correctional Center, and the warden of the institution where
defendant is confined.

Affirmed.
Supplemental Opinion Upon Denial of Rehearing

	In his petition for rehearing in this case, defendant raises but
a single issue. It concerns his argument that the Illinois death
penalty statute is unconstitutional because it does not require the
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no
mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death
penalty. He contends that a recent decision by the Supreme Court,
which we did not address in our original disposition of the case,
calls our resolution of this issue into question. See Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. __, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
We find the case distinguishable.
	In Ring the Court considered the constitutionality of Arizona's
death penalty scheme, and found it wanting. In doing so, the Court
reversed an earlier decision which upheld the constitutionality of
death penalty procedure in Arizona, and disavowed a related
portion of Apprendi. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 111 L. Ed. 2d 511, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990); Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 496-97,
147 L. Ed. 2d  at 459, 120 S. Ct.  at 2366, quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 257 n.2, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350,
377 n.2, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1237 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting,
joined by Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.).
	The constitutional infirmity the Court identified in Ring was
that the Arizona death penalty scheme removed from the jury the
determination of facts required to establish the defendant's
eligibility for a death sentence-specifically, the finding of
aggravating factors. "Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating
factors operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense,' Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 494, n.19, the Sixth
Amendment requires that they be found by a jury." Ring, 536 U.S.
at ___, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at 577, 122 S. Ct.  at 2443.
	Defendant contends that his sentence was unconstitutional
according to the reasoning of Ring. He argues that under the
Illinois first degree murder statute, lack of mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude death is a fact, which must be found
unanimously by a jury before a defendant can be sentenced to
death. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g), (h) (West 1996). Defendant
contends that it is inaccurate to conclude that the death penalty is
authorized by the facts found by the jury after the first stage of
death penalty proceedings, because this second finding must still
be made, unanimously, before that penalty can be imposed.
	This argument appears to find some support in Ring. There,
one of Arizona's arguments was that the defendant was "sentenced
within the range of punishment authorized by the jury verdict"
because he "was convicted of first-degree murder, for which
Arizona law specifies 'death or life imprisonment' as the only
sentencing options." Ring, 536 U.S. at __, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at 573,
122 S. Ct.  at 2440. The Court rejected this argument, stating that
the Arizona statutory scheme " 'authorizes a maximum penalty of
death only in a formal sense' " (Ring, 536 U.S. __, 153 L. Ed. 2d 
at 573-74, 122 S. Ct.  at 2440, quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 541,
147 L. Ed. 2d  at 486, 120 S. Ct.  at 2389 (O'Connor, J., dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy and Breyer, JJ.)) because a
finding of an aggravating circumstance was a necessary
prerequisite to any death sentence. "Because Arizona's
enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' Apprendi, 530 U.S.,
at 494, n.19, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by
a jury." Ring, 536 U.S. at __, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at 577, 122 S. Ct.  at
2443. The inquiry " 'is one not of form, but of effect.' [Apprendi,
530 U.S.] at 494. If a State makes an increase in a defendant's
authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that
fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt." Ring, 536 U.S. at __, 153 L. Ed. 2d 
at 572, 122 S. Ct.  at 2439.
	However, we do not find Ring dispositive. As a threshold
matter in terms of Apprendi analysis, it is not beyond question that
the finding at issue in the instant case-"that there are no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence"
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(g), (h) (West 1998))-is properly characterized as
"factual." The second stage of Illinois capital sentencing
proceedings clearly bears a marked resemblance to the balancing
of factors in which trial courts traditionally engage in determining
what sentence to impose within a statutory range, a practice of
which Apprendi explicitly approved. Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 481,
147 L. Ed. 2d  at 449-50, 120 S. Ct.  at 2358.
	Moreover, this case diverges from Ring because defendant's
complaint concerns mitigating, not aggravating, factors. See
Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490 n.16, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455 n.16, 120 S. Ct.  at 2363 n.16 (noting "the distinction the Court has often
recognized [citation] between facts in aggravation of punishment
and facts in mitigation"). We note that the statute at issue in Ring
provided that the court "shall impose a sentence of death if the
court finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in subsection G of this section and that there are no
mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency." (Emphasis added.) Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-703(F)
(West Supp. 2001). However, the Court only discussed the
extension of Apprendi to the finding of aggravating
circumstances. The Court specifically noted that the defendant
Ring was making no claim with respect to mitigating
circumstances, and noted that in Apprendi there had been a
distinction drawn between facts in aggravation and facts in
mitigation (Ring, 536 U.S. at __ n.4, 153 L. Ed. 2d  at 569 n.4, 122 S. Ct.  at 2437 n.4, quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S.  at 490 n.16, 147 L. Ed. 2d  at 455 n.16, 120 S. Ct.  at 2363 n.16), suggesting that a
different result might obtain if an Apprendi challenge were raised
in a mitigating factor context.
	Ring is distinguishable. Also, as we noted in our original
disposition of this case, this court has previously decided this
question. See People v. Davis, No. 89704, slip op. at 18-21
(February 22, 2002). As we have previously stated in the Apprendi
context,
			"We are bound to follow the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Constitution of the United
States. People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 398 (1990);
People v. Loftus, 400 Ill. 432, 436 (1948). See also Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 4 L. Ed. 97
(1816). But we are not bound to extend the decisions of
the Court to arenas which it did not purport to address,
which indeed it specifically disavowed addressing, in
order to find unconstitutional a law of this state. This is
especially true where, as here, to do so would require us
to overrule settled law in this state."  People v. Wagener,
196 Ill. 2d 269, 287 (2001).
The above remains an accurate expression of the philosophy of
this court.  The motion for rehearing is denied.
	I agree with the majority that defendant's convictions and
sentences should be affirmed. I write separately to comment on
defendant's argument that the Illinois death penalty statute is
unconstitutional because it fails to adequately narrow the class of
defendants eligible for the death penalty.
	In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held
unconstitutional the death penalty statutes of Georgia, Texas and
other states, which left the decision of whether to impose a
sentence of death for a capital offense to the unfettered discretion
of a judge or jury. Although there was no majority opinion in
Furman, each of the justices who made up the Furman majority
and, in particular, Justices Stewart, White and Douglas, voiced
concern about the infrequent(1) and arbitrary manner in which the
death penalty was then imposed under the existing discretionary
sentencing schemes. The relative infrequency with which the death
penalty was then being administered, and the lack of any limits on
the sentencer's discretion to impose the death penalty, led Justice
Stewart to conclude that the death penalty schemes at issue in
Furman allowed the death sentence to be "wantonly" and
"freakishly imposed." Furman, 408 U.S.  at 310, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at
390, 92 S. Ct.  at 2763 (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus, according
to Justice Stewart, the death sentences in Furman were
			"cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people
convicted of [capital offenses], many just as reprehensible
as [the offenses at issue], the petitioners are among a
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the
sentence of death has in fact been imposed." Furman, 408 U.S.  at 309-10, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 390, 92 S. Ct.  at 2762
(Stewart, J., concurring).
The views of Justice White were similar to those expressed by
Justice Stewart. In his concurrence, Justice White observed that,
under the death penalty statutes at issue in Furman, "the death
penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most
atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not." Furman, 408 U.S.  at 313, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at
392, 92 S. Ct.  at 2764 (White, J., concurring); see also Furman,
408 U.S.  at 253, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 357, 92 S. Ct.  at 2734 (Douglas,
J., concurring) ("Under theses laws no standards govern the
selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim
of one man or of 12").
	Four years after Furman, the Supreme Court again addressed
the constitutionality of Georgia's death penalty statute in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
The Georgia statute at issue in Gregg, which had been amended in
response to Furman, narrowed the range of offenses for which the
death penalty was available. Much like Illinois' current death
penalty statute, the amended Georgia statute provided that a
defendant would be eligible for the death penalty only if the
circumstances of the murder met one of several statutorily defined
aggravating or eligibility factors.
	The Supreme Court upheld the amended Georgia statute. As
in Furman, there was no majority opinion in Gregg. However, the
two concurring opinions of the Court, authored by Justice Stewart
and Justice White, understood the meaning of Furman in similar
terms:
			"Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination
of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to
minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action." Gregg, 428 U.S.  at 189, 49 L. Ed. 2d  at 883, 96 S. Ct.  at 2932 (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens,
JJ.).
		"In Furman, this Court held that as a result of giving the
sentencer unguided discretion to impose or not to impose
the death penalty for murder, the penalty was being
imposed discriminatorily, wantonly and freakishly, and so
infrequently that any given death sentence was cruel and
unusual"). Gregg, 428 U.S.  at 220-21, 49 L. Ed. 2d  at
901, 96 S. Ct.  at 2947 (White, J., concurring, joined by
Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.).
	With this understanding of Furman, the Court in Gregg
concluded that the amended Georgia statute eliminated the
constitutional problem of arbitrariness. Critical to this decision
was the fact that, under the new statute, the statutory aggravating
factors limited the number of capital offenses. By narrowing the
number of offenses for which the death penalty was available to a
select few, the amended statute necessarily reduced the risk of
arbitrary and capricious sentencing. Justice White explained:
		"As the types of murders for which the death penalty may
be imposed become more narrowly defined and are
limited to those which are particularly serious or for
which the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate *** it
becomes reasonable to expect that juries-even given
discretion not to impose the death penalty-will impose the
death penalty in a substantial portion of the cases so
defined. If they do, it can no longer be said that the
penalty is being imposed wantonly and freakishly or so
infrequently that it loses its usefulness as a sentencing
device." (Emphasis in original.) Gregg, 428 U.S.  at 222-23, 49 L. Ed. 2d  at 901-02, 96 S. Ct.  at 2947-48 (White,
J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.).
	This principle-that a narrowly drawn death penalty statute
reduces the risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing-was later
explained in these terms:
			"[T]he risk of arbitrariness condemned in Furman is a
function of the size of the class of convicted persons who
are eligible for the death penalty. When Furman was
decided, Georgia included virtually all defendants
convicted of forcible rape, armed robbery, kidnapping,
and first-degree murder in that class. As the opinions in
Furman observed, in that large class of cases race and
other irrelevant factors unquestionably played an
unacceptable role in determining which defendants would
die and which would live. However, the size of the class
may be narrowed to reduce sufficiently that risk of
arbitrariness, even if a jury is then given complete
discretion to show mercy when evaluating the individual
characteristics of the few individuals who have been
found death eligible." Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
715-16, 111 L. Ed. 2d 511, 568, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 3090
(1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
	In cases following Gregg, the United States Supreme Court
has continued to reaffirm the principle that death penalty statutes
must be narrowly circumscribed:
		"To avoid [the] constitutional flaw [of arbitrary and
capricious sentencing], an aggravating circumstance must
genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition
of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to
others found guilty of murder.
			***
			Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating
circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function
at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the
class of persons eligible for the death penalty." Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 249-50, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2742-43 (1983).
See also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29, 40,
104 S. Ct. 871, 879 (1984) (noting the "constitutionally necessary
narrowing function of statutory aggravating circumstances");
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 287 ,
107 S. Ct. 1756, 1774 (1987) (state may not impose death unless
it has "rational criteria that narrow the decisionmaker's
judgment"); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972, 129 L. Ed. 2d 750, 759, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2635 (1994) (narrowing
circumstances "must apply only to a subclass of defendants
convicted of murder").
	In the case at bar, defendant argues that the Illinois' death
penalty statute is unconstitutional because, when the statutory
aggravating factors are considered in the aggregate, the statute
fails to "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty." Zant, 462 U.S.  at 877, 77 L. Ed. 2d  at 249, 103 S. Ct.  at 2742. Defendant's argument is an attack on the death
penalty scheme as a whole and is essentially the same argument
addressed by the Supreme Court in Furman. Defendant argues that
all, or nearly all, of the first degree murders in Illinois are rendered
death eligible by the large number of aggravating factors contained
within our death penalty statute. Because each statutory
aggravating factor potentially subjects a defendant to the same
penalty, i.e., death, it follows that the circumstances of the murders
covered by the various aggravating factors must be considered
equally reprehensible. Yet, only a small percentage of first degree
murder defendants actually receive the death penalty. Thus, at
root, defendant's argument is that Illinois' current death penalty
scheme is no different from the schemes held unconstitutional in
Furman. In essence, defendant is contending that his death
sentence is "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual" (Furman, 408 U.S.  at 309, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 390 92 S. Ct. 2762 (Stewart, J., concurring)), for of all
the defendants eligible for the death penalty in Illinois, many
convicted of murders just as reprehensible as the murder at issue
in this case, defendant is "among a capriciously selected random
handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been
imposed" (Furman, 408 U.S.  at 309-10, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 390, 92 S. Ct. 2762 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
	The current Illinois death penalty statute contains 20
aggravating factors which render a first degree murder death
eligible. These factors are:
			(1) The murder victim was a police officer or firefighter
killed in the course of performing his official duties, to
prevent the performance of official duties, or in retaliation
for performing official duties.
			(2) The murder victim was an employee of an
institution or facility of the Department of Corrections or
any similar local correctional agency and was killed in the
course of performing official duties, to prevent the
performance of official duties, or in retaliation for
performing official duties. Or the victim was an inmate at
such an institution or facility.
			(3) The defendant has been convicted of the first degree
murder of two or more individuals, regardless of whether
the deaths were the result of the same or several acts.
			(4) The murder victim was killed as a result of the
hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other public
conveyance.
			(5) The defendant committed the murder pursuant to a
contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to
receive money or anything of value in return for
committing the murder, or the defendant procured another
to commit the murder for money or anything of value.
			(6) The defendant murdered the victim in the course of
one or more predicate felony offenses. The defendant
must have actually killed or injured the victim, and the
defendant must have acted with the intent to kill or with
the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or
another. The predicate felonies for this factor are: armed
robbery, armed violence, robbery, predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual
assault, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated vehicular
hijacking, forcible detention, arson, aggravated arson,
aggravated stalking, burglary, residential burglary, home
invasion, calculated criminal drug conspiracy, streetgang
criminal drug conspiracy, or the attempt to commit any of
the foregoing felonies.
			(7) The murder victim was under 12 years of age and
the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.
			(8) The defendant committed the murder to prevent the
victim from testifying in a criminal prosecution or giving
material assistance to the State. Or the defendant
committed the murder because the victim was a witness
in a prosecution or gave material assistance to the State.
			(9) The defendant, while committing one of several
drug offenses, or while engaged in a conspiracy or
solicitation to commit such an offense, murdered the
victim or commanded the murder.
			(10) The defendant, while incarcerated, and while
committing a felony offense or while engaged in a
conspiracy or solicitation to commit a felony offense,
murdered the victim or commanded the murder.
			(11) The murder was committed in a cold, calculated
and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan,
scheme or design.
			(12) The murder victim was an emergency medical
technician, paramedic, ambulance driver, or another
medical assistance official, employed by a municipality or
other governmental unit and was killed in the course of
performing official duties.
			(13) The defendant was the leader of a criminal drug
conspiracy and caused or commanded the victim's
murder.
			(14) The murder was intentional and involved the use
of torture.
			(15) The defendant shot the murder victim with a
firearm fired from a motor vehicle.
			(16) The murder victim was 60 years of age or older
and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.
			(17) The murder victim was a physically or mentally
disabled person and the defendant knew or should have
known that the victim was disabled.
			(18) The murder was committed by reason of any
person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to
prevent any person engaging in activity as a community
policing volunteer.
			(19) The murder victim had an order of protection
against the defendant.
			(20) The murder victim was known by the defendant to
be a teacher or other person employed in any school and
the victim was on or near school grounds.
See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(1) (West 2000).
	As the foregoing list shows, the Illinois death penalty statute
appears on its face to be quite extensive. Indeed, the current
number of aggravating factors is almost three times what it was
when the statute was first enacted and is one of the highest in the
country. See Fixing the Death Penalty, Chi. Trib., December 29,
2000, at 22 (noting that, in 2000, only the death penalty statutes in
Delaware and California, with 22 aggravating factors each, had
more aggravating factors than Illinois); see also A. Chambers,
Political Aggravation, Ill. Issues, October 2001, at 30, 32-33. Not
only is the total number of aggravating factors high but, in
addition, some of the aggravating factors are individually broad.
The felony-murder factor (720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 2000)), for
example, contains some 15 predicate felonies. Thus, while that
factor is narrowly drawn in the sense that it requires both actual
participation in the killing by the defendant and intent, the long list
of felonies makes a large number of first degree murders death
eligible. The "cold, calculated and premeditated" factor (720 ILCS
5/9-1(b)(11) (West 2000)) also has a broad reach. To establish
death eligibility under this factor, the State must prove that the
murder was "deliberated or reflected upon for an extended period
of time." People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 1, 37 (2000) (plurality
op.). This court has held that the period of deliberation may be as
little as three hours. See People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 166-67
(1996); Williams, 193 Ill. 2d  at 33 (plurality op.), citing Brown,
169 Ill. 2d  at 166-67. Thus, for a first degree murder not to be
death eligible in Illinois, the murder must be of a single individual,
the victim must not be one of those listed among the aggravating
factors (e.g., community policing volunteer, teacher), the murder
must be unaccompanied by any of the 15 felonies contained in the
felony-murder aggravating factor, and the murder must be
deliberated upon for less than three hours. Considering these facts,
one would be tempted to conclude that, in Illinois, "it is virtually
impossible to find a murder case that is not potentially death-eligible." T. Sullivan, Repair or Repeal-Report of the Governor's
Comm'n on Capital Punishment, 90 Ill. B.J. 304, 306 (2002).
	Furman and its progeny can be read as providing guidelines
for determining how narrowly a death penalty statute must be
drawn to satisfy constitutional concerns. See S. Shatz & N.
Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for
Furman?, 72 N.Y. L. Rev. 1283 (1997). Regardless of where the
line is ultimately drawn, however, the question of whether the
constitutional requirement of narrowing has occurred is a factual
one. 72 N.Y. L. Rev. at 1318. In other words, to determine
whether the Illinois death penalty statute is actually narrowing the
pool of death-eligible defendants, we must know what the scope
of the statute is with respect to actual cases. We must have some
idea, for example, what percentage of first degree murder
defendants are potentially death eligible and what percentage of
those defendants actually receive the death penalty. Defendant,
however, has not supplied us with this information. Although one
might suspect that relatively few first degree murders in Illinois
are not death eligible, suspicion is not a substitute for evidence.
We cannot answer defendant's argument without the pertinent
empirical data. Accordingly, defendant's contention that the death
penalty statute is unconstitutional fails in this case, not as a matter
of law, but rather, as the majority notes, because defendant has
failed to "substantiate [his] contention in any way." Slip op. at 40.
	The court's rejection of defendant's constitutional argument
in this case should not be viewed as diminishing the importance of
the general policy issue which he has raised. Among the numerous
organizations which have examined the scope of the Illinois death
penalty statute, there is unanimous agreement that, as a matter of
legislative policy, the Illinois death penalty statute is overbroad.
Foremost among these organizations is Governor Ryan's
Commission on Capital Punishment. This 14-member
commission,(2) created by Governor Ryan to study the capital
punishment system in Illinois, was charged with making
"recommendations to the governor 'designed to further ensure the
application and administration of the death penalty in Illinois is
just, fair and accurate.' " 90 Ill. B.J. at 304. The commission has
recently issued its report. One of the commission's principal, and
unanimous, recommendations is that the number of aggravating
factors in the Illinois death penalty statute should be reduced:
			"It appeared to the members of the Commission that to
the extent that the death penalty was to remain an
effective statute in terms of achieving its constitutional
objective of narrowing the class of cases to which the
penalty should be applied, the number of eligibility
factors should be reduced. *** The Commission members
unanimously expressed the view that the current
proliferation of eligibility factors, as found in the Illinois
death penalty statute, was unwise.
			***
			Reducing the number of eligibility factors should lead
to more uniformity in the way in which the death penalty
is applied in Illinois, and provide greater clarity in the
statute, while retaining capital punishment for the most
heinous of homicides. The scope of the statute should be
narrowed." Report of the Governor's Commission on
Capital Punishment, ch. 4, at 67 (April 2002).
The Illinois Attorneys General Association, in response to the
report of the Governor's commission, has expressed agreement
that our death penalty statute is overly broad and has
recommended that the number of aggravating factors be cut in
half. See J. Crimmins, Prosecutors Object to Quarter of Death
Penalty Reforms, Chi. Daily L. Bulletin, May 17, 2002, at 1, 24.
The assembly of the Illinois State Bar Association has also
recently voted in favor of reducing the number of aggravating
factors. See J. Brunts, ISBA Supports Execution Hold, Case
Review, Chi. Daily L. Bulletin, June 24, 2002, at 1. Even before
the commission's report, both opponents and advocates of the
death penalty in the academic community had recognized the need
to reconsider and reduce the scope of current death penalty
statutes. See, e.g., R. Blecker, Among Killers, Searching for the
Worst of the Worst, Wash. Post, December 3, 2000, at B1
("Execution is society's ultimate sanction, to be threatened rarely
and applied even more rarely. We must rethink the death penalty,
revise and refine our statutes. If we *** rethink it right, I am
convinced we will end up converting the sentences of thousands
of murderers presently on death row. The remaining few hundred
monsters we should execute"); D. McCord, An Open Letter to
Governor George Ryan Concerning How to Fix the Death Penalty
System, 32 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 451, 453 (2001) ("Aggravating
factors in every jurisdiction are over-inclusive. While they render
almost all the absolute worst murderers death-eligible, they also
render defendants whose crimes are not as egregious death-eligible").
	Each time an additional aggravating factor is added to our
death penalty statute, the risk of arbitrary and capricious
sentencing is increased. As Governor Ryan noted last year in
vetoing a twenty-first aggravating factor passed by the legislature,(3)
"as we continue to almost annually add eligibility factors to our
death penalty statute, we introduce more arbitrariness and
discretion and edge ever closer to our previous capital punishment
system that was effectively held unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court in 1972." Governor George Ryan's Veto
Message, August 17, 2001, at 3. The federal constitution mandates
that death penalty statutes be narrowly drawn. As the legislature
considers proposed reforms to the Illinois death penalty statute
(see A. Chambers, The Future of Illinois' Death Penalty System is
Now in Lawmakers' Hands, Ill. Issues, June 2002, at 6) reducing
the breadth of the statute is a matter that should be given serious
consideration.
	The proceedings which culminated in Ballard's convictions
and sentence of death were fatally flawed because they did not
comport with the new rules enacted by our court governing the
conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty.
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v.
Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 34-39 (September 27, 2001)
(Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures contained in those
rules are indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital cases now
coming before us. Because Ballard was tried, convicted and
sentenced without the benefit of the new rules, his convictions and
death sentence should be vacated, and the cause should be
remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
	Even if Ballard were not entitled to the benefit of the new
rules, his sentence of death could not stand. For the reasons set
forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v.
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void
and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Absent the new rules,
there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum,
Ballard's sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and he
should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j)
(West 1996).
	For the reasons set forth in my dissents in People v. Hickey,
No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J.,
dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084, slip op. at 35-38
(September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), defendant's
convictions and sentence should be set aside because the trial
proceedings were not conducted in accordance with the new
supreme court rules governing capital cases. The procedures in
capital cases prior to this court's adoption of the new rules were
unreliable and did not adequately protect a defendant's
constitutional rights. Consequently, since the new rules were
promulgated to address the deficiencies of constitutional
dimension that regularly occurred under the old system, the rules
must be applied retroactively to all capital cases currently pending
on direct appeal. See People v. Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d 117, 126
(2001), citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 661, 107 S. Ct. 708, 716 (1987). For those reasons, I
respectfully dissent.
	 
	 
	 
1.      1Studies cited in Furman estimated that, in the late 1960s and early
1970s, only 15 to 20% of death-eligible murderers were actually
sentenced to death. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S.  at 386 n.11, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 434 n.11, 92 S. Ct.  at 2802 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined
by Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.); 408 U.S.  at 309 n.10, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 390 n.10, 92 S. Ct.  at 2762 n.10 (Stewart, J., concurring).

2.      2The commission members included both former or current
prosecutors and members of the defense bar. For a list of the
commission members, see Report of the Governor's Commission on
Capital Punishment, Preamble, at v through vii (April 2002). See also
D. Vock, Deadly Equation, Ill. Issues, June 2002, at 17, 18.

3.      3The new aggravating factor would have made a defendant eligible
for the death penalty where the murder was committed in furtherance of
the activities of an organized gang. See 92d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill
1812, 2001 Sess.