Case Title: State v. Carpenter

Citation: 170 Vt. 371, 749 A.2d 1137

Docket Number: 99-105

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Carpenter (99-105); 170 Vt. 371; 749 A.2d 1137

[Filed 10-Mar-2000]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 99-105

State of Vermont	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
     v.	                                         District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 3, Washington Circuit

Charles E. Carpenter	                         November Term, 1999

Alan W. Cheever, J.

Paul Finnerty, Washington County Deputy State's Attorney, Barre, for 
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate Attorney, 
  Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Defendant appeals his conviction by a Washington
  District Court jury  of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor
  (DUI), arguing that the court committed plain  error in charging a
  permissive inference of intoxication based on a blood-alcohol test taken
  more  than two hours after estimated operation and where the evidence
  showed that defendant consumed  alcohol after operation.  Defendant also
  argues that the court erred by permitting the jury to find  defendant
  guilty of a third or subsequent DUI offense on the basis of a conviction
  more than fifteen  years old.  We affirm.

                                  I.  Facts

       Evidence presented at trial established that at some unknown time on
  the evening of July 20,  1998, defendant Charles Carpenter drove his car
  into a ditch.  At 9:52 p.m., defendant arrived at the  home of Doreen
  Gilmore, about  1/4 mile down the road from the accident scene, seeking
  assistance  pulling his car out of the ditch.  Ms. Gilmore testified that
  defendant was drinking from a bottle of  beer and appeared intoxicated.  He
  told her that he had just driven off the road and that it took him 

 

  ten to fifteen minutes to walk to her house.  Ms. Gilmore declined his
  request for help and directed  him to her neighbors' home.  She then called
  the State Police to report the incident and her neighbor  Marion Hebert to
  warn her that defendant was on his way over.  After these calls, Ms.
  Gilmore  walked to where the car was stuck and noted that its engine was
  still running.  

       Defendant went next door to the Hebert home, still carrying a bottle
  of beer, and again  requested assistance.  He told Ms. Hebert that the
  accident had happened just a little while before,  and that he'd gone to
  her neighbor's house first.  Ms. Hebert testified that she could tell
  defendant  had been drinking, but that he was not staggering drunk.  Ms.
  Hebert's husband called defendant's  uncle, who had a chain, and evidently
  he and defendant returned to the car to pull it out of the ditch. 
 	
       State Police Trooper Robert Snetsinger arrived at the accident scene
  at approximately 10:12  p.m.  Trooper Snetsinger identified defendant as
  the owner and operator of the vehicle.  Defendant  told the trooper that he
  had consumed "a couple, three beers," that he was traveling from Cabot to 
  Barre, had pulled over to urinate, and gotten stuck when he attempted to
  return the car to the road.  Defendant told Trooper Snetsinger that his
  last drink was thirty minutes ago (approximately 9:45  p.m.), that the
  accident had occurred two-and-a-half hours ago (approximately 7:45 p.m.),
  and that  defendant had done all his drinking after the accident had
  occurred.  At another point in their  conversation, defendant stated that
  he had gone off the road at 8:30 p.m.  When the trooper asked  defendant
  where he had been drinking and with whom, defendant pointed in a southerly
  direction  and replied "over there," and that he had drank with a woman
  named Jenny Bressett and an Angie,  whose last name he did not know.	

       After failing a series of field dexterity tests, defendant was placed
  under arrest and taken to  the State Police Barracks.  There, at 12:19
  a.m., defendant consented to a breath test that indicated  a blood alcohol
  content (BAC) of .177%.    

       Defendant was charged with 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(1) ("A person shall not
  operate, attempt  to operate, or be in actual physical control of any
  vehicle on a highway . . . when the person's alcohol  concentration is 0.08
  or more) and § 1201(a)(2) ("A person shall not operate, attempt to operate,
  or

 

  be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway . . . when the
  person is under the influence  of intoxicating liquor.").  The State also
  charged defendant as a recidivist under 23 V.S.A. § 1210(d)  ("A person
  convicted of violating section 1201 of this title who has twice been
  convicted of violation  of that section shall be fined not more than
  $2,500.00 or imprisoned not more than five years, or  both.").

       At trial, defendant argued that he was not under the influence when he
  was operating his car,  emphasizing the undisputed evidence that defendant
  was drinking after operation and that the State  had no direct evidence of
  consumption before operation.  The State called Ms. Gilmore and Ms. 
  Hebert, each of whom essentially testified that defendant told them that he
  had run off the road just  before appearing at their respective homes. 
  Trooper Snetsinger also testified about his conversation  with defendant,
  highlighting defendant's conflicting statements as to the time of the
  accident and the  sobriety tests he performed upon defendant.  Finally, the
  State presented its chemist, whose  testimony supported the State's
  contention that defendant's BAC was over .08 at the time of  operation. 
  The chemist testified that a person of defendant's size would not be able
  to obtain a BAC  of .177% two and a half hours after his last drink by
  consuming three or four beers.  The chemist  testified that a person of
  defendant's size who started drinking at 8:30 p.m. and had his last drink
  at  9:45 p.m., would have had to consume seven-and-one-quarter standard
  drinks to produce a test result  similar to defendant's.  

       The court's jury charge included a permissive inference instruction,
  pursuant to 23 V.S.A.  § 1204(a)(3): "[I]f you find that at any time within
  two hours of the time Mr. Carpenter allegedly  operated a motor vehicle on
  a highway Mr. Carpenter's alcohol concentration was .10 or more, you  may
  infer that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of
  operation."  The jury  acquitted defendant of the § 1201(a)(1) (operation
  over .08 BAC) charge, but found him guilty of  the § 1201(a)(2) (operation
  under the influence of intoxicating liquor) charge.  In a bifurcated 
  enhancement hearing, the jury found defendant guilty of the recidivist
  charge under § 1210(d).  

 

       On appeal, defendant argues the court committed plain error in
  charging the two-hour  inference of the DUI law (a) in a case where the
  breath test was not taken within two hours of  operation, and (b) where the
  evidence showed that defendant consumed alcohol after operation.  
  Defendant also contends that the court erred at the recidivist stage of the
  trial by permitting the jury  to find defendant guilty of a third or
  subsequent DUI offense on the basis of a conviction that was  more than
  fifteen years old.

                               II. Discussion

                           A. Permissive Inference

       Defendant did not object to the court's permissive inference
  instruction at trial.  Thus, his  claims "were not properly preserved
  following the charge and are only reviewable under a plain error 
  standard."  State v. Brooks, 163 Vt. 245, 250,