Case Title: John Doe 56 v. Mayo Clinic Health System - Eau Claire Clinic, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP001177

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 48 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP1177 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
John Doe 56, John Doe 57, a minor and Parents of 
John Does 56 and 57, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
Mayo Clinic Health System - Eau Claire Clinic, 
Inc., David A. Van de Loo, M.D., ProAssurance 
Casualty Co. and Injured Patients and Families 
Compensation Fund, 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 362 Wis. 2d 540, 885 N.W.2d 885) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 23, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 24, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael A. Schumacher 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, A. W., J. and ABRAHAMSON, J. dissent 
(Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs by Eric J. Magnuson and Robins Kaplan LLP, Minneapolis, 
and Russell D. Nicolet, Adam L. Nicolet, and Nicolet Law Office, 
S.C., Hudson. Oral argument by Eric J. Magnuson. 
 
For the defendants-respondents David A. Van de Loo and 
ProAssurance Casualty Company, there was a brief by Samuel J. 
Leib, Brent A. Simerson and Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & 
Dicker, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Samuel J. Leib. 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendant-respondent Injured Patients & Families 
Compensation Fund, there was a brief by Jeremy T. Gill and Nash, 
Spindler, Grimstad & McCracken, LLP, Manitowoc. 
 
For the defendants-respondents Mayo Clinic Health System-
Eau Claire Clinic, Inc. and ProAssurance Casualty Co., there was 
a brief by Guy DuBeau, Timothy M. Barber, and Axley Brynelson, 
LLP, Madison, and oral argument by Guy DuBeau. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 48
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP1177 
(L.C. No. 
13CV608 & 13CV13000) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John Doe 56, John Doe 57, a minor and Parents 
of John Does 56 and 57, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
Mayo Clinic Health System - Eau Claire Clinic, 
Inc., David A. Van de Loo, M.D., ProAssurance 
Casualty Co. and Injured Patients and Families 
Compensation Fund, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 23, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J.   Minors John Doe 56 and John 
Doe 57 appeal from the decision of the court of appeals,1 which 
affirmed the circuit court's2 dismissal of the Does' medical 
malpractice claims based on the statute of limitations.  The 
                                                 
1 John Doe 56 v. Mayo Clinic Health Sys.-Eau Claire Clinic, 
Inc., No. 2014AP1177, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 
1, 2015)(per curiam). 
2 The Honorable Michael A. Schumacher of Eau Claire County 
presided. 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
2 
 
issue is whether the statute of limitations for medical 
malpractice claims, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a) (2013-14),3 bars 
this 
action. 
 
More 
specifically, 
this 
case 
involves 
a 
disagreement as to when the Does' claims for medical malpractice 
accrued.  The circuit court and court of appeals determined that 
the Does' claims accrued on the last day Dr. David A. Van de Loo4 
performed the genital examinations during which the medical 
malpractice allegedly occurred.  The Does contend their claims 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55, in pertinent part provides: 
(1m) Except as provided by subs. (2) and (3), an 
action to recover damages for injury arising from any 
treatment or operation performed by, or from any 
omission by, a person who is a health care provider, 
regardless of the theory on which the action is based, 
shall be commenced within the later of: 
(a) 
Three years from the date of the injury, or 
 
(b) 
One year from the date the injury was discovered or, 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
been discovered, except that an action may not be 
commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from 
the date of the act or omission. 
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2013-14 
version unless otherwise indicated.  We cite to the most recent 
version of the statutes because no pertinent changes have been 
made. 
4 Dr. Van de Loo is no longer licensed to practice medicine 
in Wisconsin.  We refer to him with the title "Dr." throughout 
the opinion because he was licensed at the time he rendered 
treatment to the Does in this medical malpractice case, and 
because the absence of his Wisconsin license to practice 
medicine does not change the fact that he obtained a medical 
degree. 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
3 
 
for medical malpractice did not accrue until they learned in 
news reports that the State had charged Dr. Van de Loo with 
second-degree sexual assault of another boy for physically 
manipulating that boy's penis during a genital examination very 
similar to the Does' own examinations.  The Does contend that 
this knowledge caused them to suffer extreme emotional distress 
and other psychological injuries because the boys then believed 
that Dr. Van De Loo sexually assaulted them under the guise of a 
genital examination.  The Does are not arguing that the news 
reports caused them to discover that they had been injured 
during the genital examinations; rather, they are asserting that 
no injury had occurred, and therefore, their claims did not 
accrue, until they learned that Dr. Van de Loo's conduct during 
the genital examinations might have involved a criminal sexual 
assault. 
¶2 
At the outset, we address whether allegations of 
sexual assault during a medical examination may lawfully be 
pursued as a medical malpractice action.  We are not convinced 
that victims who are sexually assaulted by their physician 
during an appointment can state an actionable claim for medical 
malpractice.  See Deborah S.S. v. Yogesh N.G., 175 Wis. 2d 436, 
499 N.W.2d 272 (Ct. App. 1993)(improper sexual conduct by a 
physician against a patient during a physical examination 
constitutes 
intentional 
conduct, 
not 
medical 
malpractice).  
Sexual assault is an intentional act and therefore should be 
pursued as an intentional tort in the civil arena or as a 
criminal matter, not under a claim of medical negligence.  When 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
4 
 
there exists, however, a legitimate medical purpose for a 
genital 
examination, 
a 
claim 
can 
fall 
within 
medical 
malpractice.  See J.W. v. B.B., 2005 WI App 125, ¶10, 284 
Wis. 2d 493, 700 N.W.2d 277 (digital-rectal prostate exams done 
as part of a pre-employment physical properly fell within 
medical malpractice where physician had a legitimate medical 
purpose or reason for the allegedly inappropriate touching). 
¶3 
In Deborah S.S., the patient underwent a neurological 
examination during which the physician touched her vagina, 
buttocks, and breast, and she felt the physician's penis become 
erect against her body.  Id., 175 Wis. 2d at 439.  The parties 
agreed the sexual acts "did not serve any medical reason related 
to the examination" and were therefore "not part of the medical 
treatment accorded to the patient."  Id. at 443.  Based on this 
agreement, it was clear that Deborah S.S. did not have an 
actionable medical malpractice claim because the sexual touching 
was unrelated to the neurological treatment.  In J.W., like the 
instant case, this separation was not evident.  The medical 
malpractice alleged in J.W. consisted of an unnecessary digital-
rectal prostate examination as a part of a pre-employment 
physical.  Id., ¶¶2, 9-11.  The patients asserted these 
examinations were unnecessary and improper and may have been 
done for sexual rather than medical reasons.  Id., ¶¶10-12.  The 
J.W. court distinguished J.W. from Deborah S.S. because the J.W. 
plaintiffs did not "allege the physician touched them in places 
or in ways that served no medical purpose or reason, such that 
the prostate exams were not a part of the medical treatment the 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
5 
 
physician provided."  J.W., ¶10.  In other words, because there 
was a medical purpose for conducting digital-rectal prostate 
exams, the alleged conduct was part of the medical treatment and 
the only issue was whether "performing digital-rectal prostate 
exams 
on 
healthy, 
twenty-five-year-old 
males 
during 
pre-
employment physicals was 'unnecessary and improper treatment,' 
thus constituting medical malpractice."  Id. (citation omitted).  
The J.W. court held that under these circumstances, J.W.'s case 
properly fell within medical malpractice. 
¶4 
The Does' case is more akin to J.W. than Deborah S.S.  
The Does alleged that the touching occurred during their medical 
treatment——during their annual examinations.  The Does allege 
that Dr. Van de Loo asserts he had a legitimate medical purpose 
for 
manipulating 
the 
boys' 
penises 
during 
their 
genital 
examinations, and the Does claim that Dr. Van de Loo's  
"touching" during the medical examination was "unnecessary and 
improper treatment."  These allegations could constitute an 
actionable medical malpractice claim.  Northwest Gen. Hosp. v. 
Yee, 115 Wis. 2d 59, 61-62, 339 N.W.2d 583 (1983) (This court 
has 
held 
that 
"unnecessary 
and 
improper 
treatment 
[] 
constitute[s] malpractice."). 
¶5 
Further, this case comes to us following a motion to 
dismiss.  Our review on a motion to dismiss requires us to 
accept the facts alleged in the pleadings as true.  See Kaloti 
Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶11, 283 
Wis. 2d 555, 699 N.W.2d 205.  The Does' pleadings allege both 
unnecessary and improper treatment and that Dr. Van de Loo 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
6 
 
professes a medical reason for the manipulation of the Does' 
genitals.  Accordingly, we cannot hold as a matter of law that 
no claim exists under medical malpractice law.  We therefore 
analyze whether the circuit court properly dismissed the Does' 
medical malpractice claim based on the statute of limitations in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).  To decide whether the statute of 
limitations bars the Does' medical malpractice claims, we must 
determine whether their claims accrued on the date Dr. Van de 
Loo last physically touched the Does during their genital 
examinations or whether accrual occurred when the Does learned 
that Dr. Van de Loo's genital examination may, in actuality, 
have constituted a criminal act. 
¶6 
We hold that the Does' claims accrued on the date of 
the last physical touching by Dr. Van de Loo because that is the 
only moment at which a "physical injurious change" occurred.  
This is consistent with the "physical injurious change" test we 
use for determining accrual in medical malpractice cases.  See 
Estate of Genrich v. OHIC Ins. Co., 2009 WI 67, ¶17, 318 Wis. 2d 
553, 769 N.W.2d 481 ("[T]he determination of a 'physical 
injurious change' is the appropriate benchmark for establishing 
the date of 'injury' under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).").  The 
Does' last appointments with Dr. Van de Loo were December 31, 
2008 for Doe 56 and December 31, 2009 for Doe 57.  They did not 
file this medical malpractice action until October 2013, more 
than three years after each boy's last genital examination with 
Dr. Van de Loo.  Accordingly, the Does' claims for medical 
malpractice 
are 
time-barred 
by 
the 
three-year 
medical 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
7 
 
malpractice statute of limitations, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).5  
Therefore, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶7 
On October 9, 2013, John Doe 56, John Doe 57, and 
their parents filed suit against Dr. Van de Loo, Mayo Clinic 
Health System, ProAssurance Casualty Company and the Injured 
Patients and Families Compensation Fund alleging a variety of 
claims, including a claim for medical malpractice, which is the 
only claim involved in this appeal.6  The facts and any 
reasonable inferences derived therefrom are taken from the Does' 
complaint and are set forth below. 
¶8 
The complaint's first paragraph states that these boys 
"may have been the victim[s] of sex crimes."  From 2003 to 2008, 
Dr. Van de Loo served as Doe 56's primary care physician.  
During this timespan, while Doe 56 was 10 to 15 years old, he 
received medical treatment from Dr. Van de Loo that included Dr. 
Van de Loo touching Doe 56's genitals.  Doe 57 also received 
medical treatment from Dr. Van de Loo, including touching of Doe 
57's genitals between 2003 to 2009 when Doe 57 was 8 to 14 years 
                                                 
5 Although the Does argued the discovery rule in the circuit 
court, they abandoned this argument on appeal.  They do not 
argue that their claim was timely filed under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m)(b)'s one-year date-of-injury discovery rule, and 
therefore we analyze only when the Does' claim accrued under 
§ 893.55(1m)(a). 
6 The Does' attorney vociferously emphasized during oral 
argument that the only claim being argued here is the claim for 
medical malpractice. 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
8 
 
old.  During the respective time periods, Dr. Van de Loo 
"inflicted harmful bodily contact" on the Does "on multiple 
occasions."  As a result of this contact, the boys suffered 
"great pain of mind and body" and Dr. Van de Loo's actions 
"caused bodily harm."  The Does do not provide specific dates 
for their examinations, but instead give only a year range. 
¶9 
The Does' complaint further alleges:  Dr. Van de Loo 
"touched the genitals of additional minor male patients" and 
"did not wear gloves while he was performing examinations of 
minor male patients."  The examinations included physical 
manipulation of the penis.  Dr. Van de Loo asked parents to 
leave the room during the genital examination, leaving the 
doctor and the minor patient alone in the room. 
¶10 In August 2012, a minor male patient reported that Dr. 
Van de Loo had touched his genitals during a physical 
examination and this led to criminal charges being filed against 
Dr. Van de Loo in October 2012 for "second[-]degree sexual 
assault by an employee of an entity and one for exposing 
genitals or pubic area."  The State ultimately charged Dr. Van 
de Loo with 16 felony counts based on his conduct with male 
patients.7  The Does allege that Dr. Van de Loo claimed his 
                                                 
7 Dr. Van de Loo states in his brief that a jury acquitted 
him on 14 of the 16 criminal counts with which he was charged, 
and that the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the remaining two 
counts in exchange for Dr. Van de Loo's agreement to stop 
practicing medicine and surrender his medical license.  This 
information, however, is not contained in the record. 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
9 
 
genital examinations served a medical purpose in furtherance of 
professional medical services and denied that his conduct was 
criminal. 
¶11 The Does assert they did not discover any damages 
until the October 2012 news report on the criminal case against 
Dr. Van de Loo.  At that time, they discovered that Dr. Van de 
Loo's conduct caused them profound psychological damages.8  The 
boys "now realize" they have suffered "and will continue to 
suffer great pain of mind and body, including, but not limited 
to:  depression, anxiety, embarrassment, emotional distress, 
self-esteem issues, and loss of enjoyment of life." 
¶12 The medical malpractice cause of action alleged Dr. 
Van de Loo "failed to exercise reasonable care and medical skill 
in . . . which he diagnosed, cared, treated and rendered medical 
services to Doe 56, including, but not limited to providing 
unnecessary and improper treatment." 
¶13 The defendants filed motions to dismiss arguing the 
medical malpractice statute of limitations expired, barring the 
Does' claims based on medical malpractice.9  The circuit court 
                                                 
8 As noted, the Does are not arguing the discovery rule on 
appeal.  The Does use the term "discover" not in the sense that 
they discovered that Dr. Van de Loo had injured them when he 
touched their genitals, but to argue that the October 2012 news 
about Dr. Van de Loo caused the actual injury. 
9 The circuit court decided additional motions to dismiss 
not pertinent here as this appeal involves only the Does' 
dismissal of their medical malpractice claims.  The parties 
reported at oral argument that the Does' claim for sexual 
battery against Dr. Van de Loo survived all of the motions to 
dismiss and is still pending in the circuit court. 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
10 
 
granted the motions to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds 
and the court of appeals affirmed.  We granted the Does' 
petition for review. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶14 This case involves the review of a motion to dismiss, 
which presents a question of law we review independently.  
Alberte v. Anew Health Care Servs. Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶6, 232 
Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515.  A motion to dismiss tests the 
sufficiency of a complaint and will be upheld only when there 
are no conditions under which a plaintiff may recover.  Kaloti 
Enters., Inc., 283 Wis. 2d 555, ¶11.  Whether a plaintiff's 
complaint fails to state a claim is a question of law we review 
de novo.  Id., ¶10.  Moreover, in a review of a motion to 
dismiss, we construe the pleadings liberally and accept as true 
both the facts contained in the complaint and any reasonable 
inferences arising from those facts.  Id., ¶11.  The motion to 
dismiss here is based on whether the complaint was timely filed 
under 
the 
applicable 
statute 
of 
limitations, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m)(a). 
 
This 
involves 
the 
interpretation 
and 
application of a statute to an undisputed set of facts, which 
also presents a question of law we review de novo.  Genrich, 318 
Wis. 2d 553, ¶10.  If a complaint is not timely filed, the claim 
is time-barred and dismissal will be upheld.  See Pritzlaff v. 
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 312, 533 N.W.2d 780 
(1995). 
¶15 In this case, whether the Does' medical malpractice 
claims were timely filed is dependent upon when their claim 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
11 
 
accrued.  Accrual dates in medical malpractice claims are based 
on the date of injury or, if applying the discovery rule, the 
date the injury was or should have been discovered.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(1m). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a) provides: 
(1m) Except as provided by subs. (2) and (3), an 
action to recover damages for injury arising from any 
treatment or operation performed by, or from any 
omission by, a person who is a health care provider, 
regardless of the theory on which the action is based, 
shall be commenced within the later of: 
(a) 
Three years from the date of the injury[.] 
¶17 Courts are repeatedly asked to apply this statute to a 
particular 
set 
of 
facts 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
medical 
malpractice claim was timely filed.  Although every case is 
different, Wisconsin case law has over time developed a 
consistent test for determining the date of injury in medical 
malpractice claims under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a):  it is the 
date of the "physical injurious change."  Genrich, 318 Wis. 2d 
553, ¶17.  This test has worked in a variety of factual 
scenarios and withstood the test of time.  It was applied when 
the negligent conduct was a misdiagnosis, see Paul v. Skemp, 
2001 WI 42, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860 (physical injurious 
change was when blood vessel ruptured); when the negligent 
conduct was a failed tubal ligation, see Fojut v. Stafl, 212 
Wis. 2d 827, 569 N.W.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1997)(physical injurious 
change was the moment of conception), and when a foreign object 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
12 
 
was left in the patient during surgery, see Genrich, 318 Wis. 2d 
553 (physical injurious change was when a sponge was left inside 
a surgical patient). 
¶18 Thus, we must determine when the physical injurious 
change occurred here.  The Federal District Court for the 
Western District of Wisconsin recently decided this exact issue 
in Doe 52 v. Mayo Clinic Health System-Eau Claire Clinic, Inc., 
98 F. Supp. 3d 989, 994-95 (W.D. Wis. 2015).  Doe 52 involved 
similar allegations by another male, minor patient of Dr. Van de 
Loo.  Doe 52 alleged a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Van 
de Loo based on "'unnecessary and improper [medical] treatment' 
in the form of inappropriate touching."  Id. (citation omitted; 
brackets in original).  Doe 52 had undergone the same genital 
examinations as the Does while a patient of Dr. Van de Loo.  See 
id. at 990-91.  Doe 52 made the same argument to the federal 
district court that the Does make here: that no injury occurred 
(and therefore no claim accrued) until he learned that the State 
was charging Dr. Van de Loo criminally for the genital 
examinations.  Id. at 994.  The Doe 52 court rejected this 
argument and held that Doe 52's claims accrued at the time Dr. 
Van de Loo last inappropriately touched Doe 52. Id. at 995-96.  
The Doe 52 court reasoned that because the malpractice alleged 
was 
unnecessary 
and 
improper 
treatment, 
specifically 
inappropriate 
touching, 
"the 
'physical 
injurious 
change' 
plaintiff suffered was the touching, and any later emotional 
distress was an additional injury[.]"  Id. at 996 (emphasis 
added).  As a result, the Doe 52 court held that Doe 52's 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
13 
 
claims, which were filed more than three years from the last 
genital 
examination, 
were 
time-barred 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m)(a).  We agree with this analysis.10 
¶19 In a medical malpractice claim based on unnecessary 
and improper treatment of inappropriate touching, the physical 
injurious change occurs at the time of the touching.  These boys  
suffered an injury when Dr. Van de Loo physically touched their 
genitals in an allegedly inappropriate way.  To hold otherwise 
runs contrary to existing case law and would defeat the purpose 
behind the medical malpractice statute of limitations that 
"prompt litigation ensures fairness."  See Aicher ex rel. 
LaBarge v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶¶51-54, 
237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849. 
¶20 The Does contend that there was no physical injurious 
change at the time of the allegedly inappropriate touching 
because they did not know at that time that the touching was 
wrongful.  Therefore, the Does argue their cause of action could 
not have accrued at the time of the touching.  Although we are 
sympathetic to this argument, we are not persuaded by it.  
                                                 
10 The dissent criticizes our reliance on this federal case 
because a federal district court decision is not binding 
authority.  See dissent, ¶45.  Although it is true we are not 
bound by federal district court decisions, see State v. Mechtel, 
176 Wis. 2d 87, 94, 499 N.W.2d 662 (1993), the opinion on which 
we rely is highly persuasive.  It is a 2015 decision from the 
Western District of Wisconsin involving the same defendant as in 
this case——Dr. Van de Loo; it addresses the same unique 
circumstances presented here; and its analysis is reasonable, 
logical, and consistent with Wisconsin case law. 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
14 
 
Expiration of the medical malpractice statute of limitations 
before a patient knows about the injury is unfortunately a 
consequence of the legislature's policy reasons for enacting the 
medical malpractice statute of limitations.  See Aicher, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶¶2-6.  In Aicher, a 13-year-old claimed she became 
blind in one eye as a result of alleged medical malpractice 
committed during an examination of Aicher when she was a 
newborn.  Id., ¶2.  We held her claim was time-barred by Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55.  Id., ¶6.  We explained that the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations was enacted to promote prompt 
litigation of claims, to put the alleged wrongdoer on notice to 
defend a claim within a specified time period, and to avoid 
stale or fraudulent claims "brought after memories have faded or 
evidence 
has 
been 
lost." 
 
Id., 
¶27 
(citation 
omitted).  
Sometimes Wis. Stat. § 893.55 expires before a patient knows an 
injury occurred: 
We see no distinction between closing the doors to the 
courtroom for claimants when an injury has not been 
discovered within a fixed period of time after some 
act or omission and closing the doors to the courtroom 
for a person whose injury has not yet occurred within 
a fixed period of time after some act or omission.  
The effect of extinguishing a remedy in court is the 
same.  This court has concluded many times that the 
legislature may sever a person's claim by a statute of 
limitations or a statute of repose when the person has 
had no possibility of discovering the injury——when the 
person has been blameless in every respect.  These 
decisions represent judicial deference to the stated 
policy of the legislature. 
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶50.  The physical injurious change here 
occurred when Dr. Van de Loo allegedly inappropriately touched 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
15 
 
the Does' genitals.  The fact the Does may not have known at the 
time that the touching was allegedly inappropriate or that the 
manipulation 
of 
their 
genitals 
constituted 
the 
physical 
injurious change does not change this fact.  See Fojut, 212 
Wis. 2d at 831-32 (physical injurious change from negligent 
tubal ligation was moment of conception, a date the patient 
could not have known). 
¶21 We are further not persuaded by the Does' claim that 
no physical injurious change occurred at all because Dr. Van de 
Loo's physical manipulation of their penises with his bare hands 
did not leave bruises, scrapes, or other physical damage.  Lack 
of a physical mark does not mean that no physical injury 
occurred under the circumstances here.  As the Does allege in 
their complaint:  Dr. Van de Loo's alleged inappropriate 
touching "caused bodily harm" and was "harmful bodily contact."  
The physical injurious change here was the alleged improper 
sexual manipulation of the penis, a physical action.  The boys' 
genitals were physically touched in an allegedly inappropriate 
sexual way, which had not occurred prior to Dr. Van de Loo's 
allegedly negligent conduct.  To conclude otherwise would result 
in a holding that a patient who is wrongfully touched in a 
sexual manner by his or her physician does not have an 
actionable 
claim 
after 
the 
improper 
touching 
unless 
the 
physician does physical damage to their genitals. 
¶22 Further, accepting the Does' position that their claim 
did not accrue until they learned that Dr. Van de Loo was being 
charged criminally for similar genital examinations would result 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
16 
 
in a limitless extension of the medical malpractice statute of 
limitations and change the causation connection in medical 
malpractice cases from the negligent act to a fortuitous event——
here the media reporting about the criminal charges against Dr. 
Van de Loo. 
¶23 In essence, the Does are asking us to conclude that 
they had no injury until they learned about the criminal charges 
against Dr. Van de Loo.  Stated otherwise, learning about the 
criminal charges caused them to be injured for the first time.  
This would mean that if no patient had ever reported Dr. Van de 
Loo's genital examination as improper, or the State had declined 
to file criminal charges, or the media had not reported on the 
charges or the Does never saw the media reports, the Does would 
never have suffered an injury and their claim would never have 
accrued.  The Does' position is not reasonable.  The date of 
injury of a patient's medical malpractice claims cannot be 
tethered to whether or when the media reports on an allegedly 
criminal act, nor can it be dependent on whether another patient 
makes a report.  A physician's actions either fall below the 
standard of care and cause injury or they do not.  Knowledge 
that a physician is being charged criminally cannot be the 
causal factor in whether or not medical negligence results in 
injury. 
 
Moreover, 
adopting 
the 
Does' 
position 
could 
indefinitely 
extend 
the 
medical 
malpractice 
statute 
of 
limitations.  Here, the news report about Dr. Van de Loo came 
only a few years after the Does' last examination, but what if 
the news report came 10 or 20 or 30 years after the last contact 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
17 
 
with Dr. Van de Loo?  This would defeat the legislature's 
purpose for enacting Wis. Stat. § 893.55, see Aicher, 237 
Wis. 2d 
99, 
¶¶22-27, 
29-32, 
50-51, 
53-54, 
and 
would 
be 
unreasonable.  We will not interpret a statute in a way that 
renders it absurd or unreasonable.  See State v. Ziegler, 2012 
WI 73, ¶43, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238. 
¶24 Thus, we conclude that the Does' medical malpractice 
claims accrued on the date of the last genital examination.  It 
was on that date that each suffered the "physical injurious 
change" that triggered the start of the three-year statute of 
limitations. 
 
The 
psychological 
injuries, 
caused 
by 
the 
knowledge that Dr. Van de Loo had been criminally charged for 
similar touching of other boys, constituted a subsequent injury 
from the same tortious act (the inappropriate touching).  This 
emotional manifestation based upon the previously completed 
physical injury (the improper touching of the boys' genitals 
during the physical examination) does not restart the running of 
the statute of limitations.  See Genrich, 318 Wis. 2d 553, ¶21 
("later injury arising from the same tortious act does not 
restart the running of the statute of limitations")(citations 
and quotation marks omitted). 
¶25 The Does do not provide the specific date of the last 
genital examination in their complaint, but include only a year 
range.  The parties, however, agreed to use the last date of 
each calendar year from the last year in the range given.  For 
Doe 56, that date was December 31, 2008 and for Doe 57 that date 
was December 31, 2009.  Thus, the three-year statute of 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
18 
 
limitations for Doe 56 expired December 31, 2011, and the three-
year statute of limitations for Doe 57 expired December 31, 
2012.  Because the Does did not file their medical malpractice 
complaint until October 2013, their claims are time-barred by 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).  Accordingly, their complaints were 
properly dismissed and the decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.11 
B.  Reliance on John BBB Doe v. Archdiocese of 
Milwaukee12 in a medical malpractice case 
¶26 John BBB Doe involved seven cases alleging that 
priests in the Milwaukee Archdiocese sexually assaulted the 
minor victims.  Id., 212 Wis. 2d 312, 318, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997).  
The issue involved determining the date on which the victims 
discovered or should have in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence discovered that the sexual abuse caused injury.  Id. 
at 318-19.  We held that a victim of this clergy sexual abuse 
either discovered or should have discovered "that he or she was 
                                                 
11 This does not leave the Does without a remedy.  Pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 893.587, the Does have claims for sexual assault 
that are not barred until they are 35 years old.  See id. 
("Sexual assault of a child; limitation.  An action to recover 
damages for injury caused by an act that would constitute a 
violation of s. 948.02, 948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or 948.095 or 
would create a cause of action under s. 895.442 shall be 
commenced before the injured party reaches the age of 35 years 
or be barred.")  As explained in footnote 9, the Does' sexual 
battery claim is still pending. 
12 See John BBB Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 Wis. 2d 
312, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997).  
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
19 
 
injured at the time of the alleged sexual assaults or by the 
last date of the alleged multiple assaults."  Id. 
¶27 The circuit court in this case applied John BBB Doe to 
Does 56 and 57's claims to conclude that both boys either 
discovered or should have discovered that they were injured on 
the date of the last inappropriate genital exam.  The court of 
appeals in this case also applied John BBB Doe to conclude that 
the Does' negligence claims against Mayo Clinic accrued at the 
time of the touching.  See John Doe 56 v. Mayo Clinic Health 
Sys.-Eau Claire Clinic, Inc., No. 2014AP1177, unpublished slip 
op., ¶22 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2015)(per curiam).  In this 
court, however, the Does are not making a discovery-rule 
argument.  Thus, the John BBB Doe discovery-rule holding is not 
pertinent to our analysis.  See id., 211 Wis. 2d at 318-19.13 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶28 We hold that the Does' claims accrued on the date of 
the last physical touching by Dr. Van de Loo because that is the 
moment at which the "physical injurious change" occurred in this 
medical malpractice case.  See Genrich, 318 Wis. 2d 553, ¶17.  
                                                 
13 We are not convinced that John BBB Doe should apply to a 
medical malpractice case.  There are significant differences 
between clergy-abuse cases and alleged sexual abuse in a medical 
malpractice case.  Namely, there are medical reasons for a 
physician to touch a patient's genitals in the course of a 
legitimate physical examination.  Although the line between an 
inappropriate sexual touching and a medically necessary touching 
of the body may not always be clear, a physician nevertheless is 
in a very different position than a priest or clergy-person.  A 
priest or clergy-person has no legitimate reason to touch 
another person's genitals. 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
20 
 
Dr. Van de Loo's last physical contact with the Does' genitals 
occurred when he manipulated each boys' penis in an allegedly 
inappropriate and unnecessary manner.  The dates of the last 
genital examinations were December 31, 2008 for Doe 56 and 
December 31, 2009 for Doe 57.  The Does did not file these 
medical malpractice claims until October 2013, more than three 
years 
after 
each 
Doe 
had 
his 
last 
genital 
examination.  
Accordingly, their medical malpractice claims are time-barred by 
the medical malpractice statute of limitations, Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m)(a).  Further, we see no reason to extend John BBB 
Doe to this medical malpractice case where the discovery rule is 
not an issue.14  
                                                 
14 The dissent's analysis in support of its conclusion that 
the Does' case is most like Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, ¶20, 242 
Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860, is illogical. 
Paul was a misdiagnosis case, where the negligence was an 
omission leading to an injury that occurred two months after 
Paul was last seen.  See Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶2, ¶¶4-5.  The 
physical injurious change did not occur at the same time as the 
negligent act, but the Pauls' lawsuit was filed within the five-
year statute of repose.  Id., ¶¶6, 12.  The Does' case is not a 
misdiagnosis case, Dr. Van de Loo's alleged negligent act was 
the affirmative act of touching the boys' genitals (allegedly 
unnecessary and improper treatment) rather than an omission, and 
the Does' physical injurious change occurred at the time of the 
touching.  Attempting to analogize the Does' case to a 
misdiagnosis case is simply wrong. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
21 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The dissent's second point suggesting that this opinion 
creates a statute of repose not found in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m) 
is also unfounded.  The statute of repose issue raised by the 
dissent——and notably not by the parties——is unnecessary to 
resolve the case presented to us; therefore we do not address 
it.  The dissent's statements misconstrue an issue not before 
this court and warrant clarification.  In dicta, Paul raised the 
possibility that the date of injury under § 893.55(1m)(a) could 
potentially 
exceed 
the 
five-year 
statute 
of 
repose 
in 
§ 893.55(1m)(b) and urged the legislature to resolve the 
potential conflict.  Paul, 242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶¶48-49.  The 
legislature has not taken up that request.  Isolated cases, 
relying on Paul's dicta, have held that the five-year statute of 
repose in § 893.55(1m) only applies to the discovery rule 
paragraph (b) and is inapplicable to paragraph (a).  See, e.g., 
Storm v. Legion Ins. Co., 2003 WI 120, ¶¶9-10, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 
665 
N.W.2d 
353 
(alleging 
medical 
malpractice 
against 
psychologists where hypnosis was used to recover memories of 
childhood sexual abuse that were later found to be untrue and 
allegedly 
led 
to 
patient 
developing 
multiple 
personality 
disorder; also involving tolling for mental illness);  Forbes v. 
Stoeckl, 2007 WI App 151, ¶1, 303 Wis. 2d 425, 735 N.W.2d 536 
(doctrine of continuous treatment in dental malpractice case 
applies, 
allowing 
claim 
timely 
made 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(a) to include negligence that pre-dates the five-
year repose limitation under (1)(b)). 
Before Wis. Stat. § 893.55 was enacted, there was no 
discovery rule applicable to medical malpractice actions, see  
Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis. 2d 284, 292-94, 562 N.W.2d 584 
(1997), and medical malpractice claimants had to file suit 
within three years of their injury.  See Aicher ex rel. LaBarge 
v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶24, 237 Wis. 2d 
99, 613 N.W.2d 849.  As cases arose where claimants did not 
discover their injuries until after three years had already 
passed, we urged the legislature to amend the statute of 
limitations because three years from the time of injury was "too 
short."  Id. (citations omitted).  The legislature later enacted 
the current statute of limitations: 
(1m) Except as provided by subs. (2) and (3), an 
action to recover damages for injury arising from any 
treatment or operation performed by, or from any 
omission by, a person who is a health care provider, 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP1177 
 
22 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
regardless of the theory on which the action is based, 
shall be commenced within the later of: 
(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or  
(b) One year from the date the injury was discovered 
or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have been discovered, except that an action may not be 
commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from 
the date of the act or omission. 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55. 
Finally, we note the reasons the legislature enacted this 
statute of limitations (as well as the statute of repose):  to 
promote fair and prompt litigation, protect defendants from 
stale or fraudulent claims, and ensure claims are litigated 
before the truth is "obfuscated by death or disappearance of key 
witnesses, loss of evidence, and faded memories."  Aicher, 237 
Wis. 2d 99, ¶27.  Adopting the Does' argument in this case would 
eviscerate the three-year statute of limitations and flout the 
legislative policy choices on which it is based by effectively 
allowing a plaintiff to bring a medical malpractice claim 
whenever he chooses simply by alleging his emotional distress 
began even decades after the allegedly unnecessary and improper  
treatment occurred.   
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
1 
 
 
¶29 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority that in this case "we cannot hold as a matter of 
law that no claim exists under medical malpractice law."  
Majority op., ¶5.  The majority is correct that the Does' 
allegations against Dr. Van de Loo constitute actionable medical 
malpractice claims because the alleged conduct was part of the 
Does' medical treatment during their annual examinations.  
Majority op., ¶4. 
¶30 Additionally, 
I 
agree 
that 
"the 
John 
BBB 
Doe 
discovery-rule holding is not pertinent to our analysis" because 
the Does are not making a discovery-rule argument.  Majority 
op., ¶26 (citing John BBB Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 211 
Wis. 2d 312, 565 N.W.2d 94 (1997).  Like the majority, I also am 
"not convinced that John BBB Doe should apply to a medical 
malpractice case."  Majority op. n.12.      
¶31 I write separately, however, because I disagree with 
the conclusion that the Does' claims for medical malpractice are 
time-barred by the three-year medical malpractice statute of 
limitations.  Majority op., ¶6.  The majority opinion suffers 
from two analytical missteps: 
(1) 
It 
muddles 
Wisconsin's 
medical 
malpractice 
jurisprudence by failing to distinguish between cases 
in which injury and negligence occurred simultaneously 
and those in which the injury occurred after the 
negligence.  As a result it erroneously concludes that 
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
2 
 
the Does' injuries occurred at the same time as the 
allegedly negligent medical examinations; and    
(2) 
It conflates the statute of repose under Wis. Stat. § 
893.55(1m)(b) with the statute of limitations for the 
Does’ claims pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a), 
thereby judicially creating a statute of repose that 
contravenes the plain language of the statute and our 
case law. 
¶32 Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the Does' 
injuries 
did 
not 
occur 
simultaneously 
with 
the 
alleged 
negligence.  Their claims accrued when they suffered severe 
emotional distress upon learning that they were the victims of 
child sexual assaults perpetrated by Dr. Van de Loo during their 
physical examinations.  Thus, the Does' claims are not time-
barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations because 
the Does filed their claims within three years of the date they 
accrued.   Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.    
I 
¶33 At issue in this case is whether the Does' claims 
accrued at the time of Dr. Van de Loo's allegedly negligent 
genital examinations or whether they accrued when the Does 
suffered severe emotional distress upon learning that they were 
the victims of child sexual assault.   
¶34 The Does allege that Dr. Van de Loo committed medical 
malpractice when he sexually assaulted them under the guise of a 
genital examination.  They were children at the time, as young 
as eight and ten years old, when Dr. Van de Loo performed some 
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
3 
 
of the examinations.  Accordingly, they  assert that they did 
not immediately understand that Dr. Van de Loo's conduct 
constituted sexual assault. 
¶35 Rather, the Does contend that they realized Dr. Van de 
Loo's examinations were improper years later after learning that 
he 
had 
been 
criminally 
charged 
with 
sexual 
assault 
for 
conducting a sexually gratifying  genital examination on another 
minor patient.  The complaint against Dr. Van De Loo alleges 
they suffered physical injury in the form of severe emotional 
distress, 
including 
depression, 
anxiety, 
embarrassment, 
emotional distress, self-esteem issues, and loss of enjoyment of 
life, upon learning that they had been sexually assaulted by 
their trusted physician.1 
¶36 The Does bring their 
medical malpractice claims 
against Dr. Van de Loo pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a), 
which provides for a three-year statute of limitations from the 
date of the injury.  Although the Does filed medical malpractice 
                                                 
1 The 
majority 
acknowledges 
that 
the 
Does' 
suffered 
"psychological 
injuries," 
but 
asserts 
that 
their 
severe 
emotional distress constituted a subsequent injury to the 
"inappropriate touching."  Majority op., ¶24; see also Bowen v. 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 632, 517 N.W.2d 432 
(1994) ("[I]n a cause of action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress the injury a plaintiff must prove is severe 
emotional distress; but the plaintiff need not prove physical 
manifestation of that distress."); see also Camp ex rel. 
Peterson v. Anderson, 2006 WI App 170, ¶21, 295 Wis. 2d 714, 721 
N.W.2d 146 (Bowen recognizes direct claims for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, as long as a plaintiff's claim 
satisfies the elements of negligent conduct, causation and 
injury (severe emotional distress) and is not otherwise barred 
by public policy."). 
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
4 
 
claims against Dr. Van de Loo more than three years after the 
date of their last examinations, they allege that their claims 
were filed within three years of the date they suffered alleged 
physical injury in the form of severe emotional distress.   
¶37 Wisconsin's medical malpractice law provides for two 
alternative statutes of limitations depending on whether the 
plaintiff brings a claim under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a) or 
(b).  The former provides a three-year statute of limitations 
with no statute of repose and the latter sets forth Wisconsin's 
discovery of injury rule with a five-year statute of repose: 
[A]n action to recover damages for injury arising from 
any treatment or operation performed by, or from any 
omission by, a person who is a health care provider, 
regardless of the theory on which the action is based, 
shall be commenced within the later of:  
 
(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or 
 
(b) One year from the date the injury was 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have been discovered, except 
that an action may not be commenced under this 
paragraph more than 5 years from the date of the 
act or omission.  
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55 (1m). 
 
¶38 In this case, the Does do not allege that they 
discovered 
an 
existing 
injury 
years 
after 
it 
occurred.  
Consequently, they do not pursue a "discovery" claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(1m)(b).  Rather, the Does assert that they did 
not suffer physical injury until they experienced severe 
emotional distress upon learning that they were victims of child 
sexual assault perpetrated by Dr. Van de Loo during their  
genital examinations.  
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
5 
 
II 
¶39 The majority muddles Wisconsin's medical malpractice 
jurisprudence by failing to distinguish between cases in which 
injury and negligence occur simultaneously and those in which 
injury occurs after the negligent act, enabling it to assert 
that the Does' injuries occurred at the same time as the 
allegedly negligent medical examinations.   
¶40 According to the majority, "Wisconsin case law has 
over time developed a consistent test for determining the date 
of injury in medical malpractice claims under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m)(a):  it is the date of the 'physical injurious 
change.'"  Majority op., ¶17 (quoting Estate of Genrich v. OHIC 
Ins. Co., 2009 WI 67, ¶17, 318 Wis. 2d 553, 769 N.W.2d 481). The 
majority concludes that "the Does' claims accrued on the date of 
the last physical touching by Dr. Van de Loo because that is the 
only moment at which a 'physically injurious' change occurred."  
Majority op., ¶6.   
¶41 Given the nature of the Does' claims, the application 
of the Genrich test appears to be an odd fit here.  Even 
assuming 
that 
Genrich's 
physically 
injurious 
change 
test 
properly fits, its application merely begs the question:  when 
did the Does' suffer a physical injurious change? 
¶42 The 
majority 
conclusively 
states 
that 
touching 
constitutes a physically injurious change.  Majority op., ¶19.  
But what’s the change?  The majority doesn’t tell us.   
¶43 Describing a touching as constituting a physical 
injurious change seems at odds also with common parlance.  Does 
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
6 
 
it make sense to state as a matter of law that when there is a 
touching a physical injurious change occurs?  I don’t think so.  
¶44 It also does not make sense as a matter of good 
policy.  Will future cases deem a claim to be sufficiently 
stated if together with a negligent act all that need be alleged 
is that one was touched on the arm or the leg or some part of 
the torso?  Where is the stopping point? 
¶45 Without giving the reader a clue about what changed or 
how it changed, the majority relies solely on a federal district 
court decision for its conclusion that the physically injurious 
change the plaintiff suffered occurred simultaneously to the 
allegedly negligent examination.  Majority op., ¶18 (citing Doe 
52 v. Mayo Clinic Health System-Eau Claire Clinic, Inc., 98 F. 
Supp. 3d 989, 996 (W.D. Wis. 2015).  Although this court 
benefits from the analysis of a federal district court's 
interpretation of State law, it is not binding authority.  The 
majority’s reliance on a sole federal district court decision is 
not an adequate substitute for its failure to apply the facts of 
this case to established Wisconsin precedent.   
¶46 Because the majority completely fails to do so, I will 
first set forth the case law relevant to the Does' claims.  
Under Wisconsin law, "[a] tort claim is not capable of 
enforcement until both a negligent act and an accompanying 
injury have occurred."  Paul v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, ¶20, 242 Wis. 
2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860 (quoting Hansen v. A.H. Robins Inc., 113 
Wis. 2d 550, 554, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983).  Thus, it is not the 
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
7 
 
negligence, but the injury resulting from the negligent act that 
begins the three-year statute of limitations period.  Id.       
¶47 In Fojut v. Stafl, 212 Wis. 2d 827, 829, 569 N.W.2d 
737 (Ct. App. 1997), the plaintiff underwent elective tubal 
litigation surgery in order to prevent pregnancy, but then 
became pregnant a few months later.  At issue was whether Fojut 
suffered physical injury on the date of the surgery, which the 
parties agreed was the date of the alleged negligent act, or the 
later date of conception.  Id. at 829-30.     
¶48 Fojut concluded that the date of the injury triggering 
the three-year medical malpractice statute of limitations was 
the date of conception, rather than the date of the surgery.  
Id. at 830-31.  The Fojut court explained that there was no 
evidence that the plaintiff suffered physical injury on the date 
the surgery was performed.  Id. at 831.  Instead, it determined 
that Fojut suffered physical injury on the date she became 
pregnant.  Id.  Thus, the three-year medical malpractice statute 
of limitations began to run from the later date of conception, 
rather than the date of the alleged negligent act.  Id. 
¶49 Similarly, in Paul, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
misdiagnosis 
of 
the 
cause 
of 
their 
daughter's 
recurring 
headaches resulted in a ruptured blood vessel in her brain, 
which caused her death.  242 Wis. 2d 507, ¶1.  This court 
concluded that "[t]he Pauls' claim for medical malpractice did 
not, and could not, accrue until [their daughter] suffered an 
injury."  Id., ¶2.  The Paul court explained that "[a] 
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
8 
 
misdiagnosis may be a negligent omission, but it is not, in and 
of itself, an injury."  Id.   
¶50 Based on the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1), 
Paul concluded that the legislature did not intend that 
"omission" and "injury" should be conflated.  Id., ¶20.  
According to the Paul court, "[t]he plain language of Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(a) indicates that it is not the negligence, but the 
injury resulting from the negligent act or omission which 
initiates the limitations period."2  Id.  Paul explained that 
"[a]s our long-time precedent has established, the negligence 
and its result——and injury——should be considered separately.  
The negligence must cause an injury before there is an accrual 
of a claim."  Id., ¶34 (citing Meracle v. Children's Serv. 
Soc'y, 149 Wis. 2d 19, 26, 437 N.W.2d 532 (1989)). 
¶51 In contrast, in 
Genrich, the alleged negligence 
occurred when doctors left a sponge in Genrich's abdominal 
cavity after performing surgery.  318 Wis. 2d 553, ¶3.  However, 
the surgical sponge in Genrich's abdomen was not discovered 
until approximately two weeks after the surgery when he 
developed a fatal infection.  Id.  This court concluded that 
Genrich 
experienced 
an 
injury 
triggering 
the 
statute 
of 
limitations when the doctors left the sponge in his abdomen on 
                                                 
2 The majority attempts to explain away the import of Paul 
v. Skemp, 2001 WI 42, ¶20, 242 Wis. 2d 507, 625 N.W.2d 860.  
Majority op., ¶28 n.14.  Yet, there is no explaining away Paul's 
clear conclusion cited above, which explicitly applies to both 
"negligent acts or omissions."  Thus, the majority's attempt to 
distinguish Paul as a case addressing only an "omission" is a 
non-starter.    
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
9 
 
the date of the surgery.  Id., ¶18.  Thus, in Genrich, the 
negligence and the injury occurred simultaneously. 
¶52 The Does' claims are more analogous to Fojut and Paul, 
than to Genrich.  They do not allege that they were physically 
injured at the time of the examination.  Instead, the Does argue 
that they were physically injured when they suffered severe 
emotional distress upon learning that they had been sexually 
assaulted by Dr. Van de Loo.  As the Does' counsel explained at 
oral argument, there are no allegations in the complaint that 
the Does were physically different after Dr. Van de Loo's 
examination.   
¶53 Despite the fact that the majority fails to apply the 
facts of this case to the law set forth in Wisconsin precedent, 
the majority summarily asserts that "[t]o hold otherwise runs 
contrary to existing case law. . . ."  Majority op., ¶19.  After 
applying the facts of this case to Wisconsin's well-established 
case law, I reach the opposite conclusion of the majority and 
determine that the Does' claims did not accrue until they 
suffered severe emotional distress upon learning that they were 
victims of child sexual assault perpetrated by Dr. Van de Loo 
during their physical examinations.  
III 
¶54 Not only does the majority muddle Wisconsin case law, 
its analysis of the statute of limitations conflates the statute 
of repose under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(b) with the statute of 
limitations for the Does’ claims pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 
893.55(1m)(a), thereby judicially creating a statute of repose 
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
10 
 
that contravenes the plain language of the statute and our case 
law.   
¶55 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(b) sets 
forth the one-year discovery statute of limitations together 
with a five-year statute of repose for plaintiffs who allege 
that they did not discover their injury at the time the 
negligence occurred:  
One year from the date the injury was discovered or, 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
been discovered, except that an action may not be 
commenced under this paragraph more than 5 years from 
the date of the act or omission.   
¶56 In contrast, under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a), there 
plainly is a three-year statute of limitations but no statute of 
repose.  Storm v. Legion Ins. Co., 2003 WI 120, ¶19, 265 Wis. 2d 
169, 665 N.W.2d 353 ("We conclude under a plain reading of 
§ 893.55(1)(b) that the five-year repose period applies only to 
actions brought pursuant to the discovery rule in paragraph 
(b)); Forbes v. Stoeckl, 2007 WI App 151, ¶1, 303 Wis. 2d 425, 
735 N.W.2d 536 (five-year statute of repose under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1m)(b) does not apply to accrual claims brought under 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a)).3   
                                                 
3 The majority embraces a two-pronged approach in an attempt 
to rebut the assertion that it is judicially creating a statute 
of repose that contravenes case law.  Both prongs fail. 
(continued) 
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
11 
 
¶57 The majority's discussion conflates the three-year 
statute of limitations applicable to the Does' claims with the 
five-year statute of repose applicable to discovery rule claims. 
It contends that "[s]ometimes Wis. Stat. § 893.55 expires before 
a patient knows an injury occurred . . ."  Majority op., ¶20.  
According 
to 
the 
majority, 
"[e]xpiration 
of 
the 
medical 
malpractice statute of limitations before a patient knows about 
the injury is unfortunately a consequence of the legislature's 
policy reasons for enacting the medical malpractice statue of 
limitations."  Majority op., ¶20.  However, the issue in this 
case is not whether the Does knew about their injuries, but when 
they were injured.   
¶58 As set forth above, the Does argue that they were not 
injured and that therefore their claims did not accrue until 
they suffered severe emotional distress upon learning that they 
                                                                                                                                                             
First, the majority attempts to discredit clear Wisconsin 
Supreme Court precedent by labeling its conclusion as "dicta."  
Majority op., ¶28 n.14.  As the court of last resort in this 
state, our conclusions cannot be dicta.  State v. Picotte, 2003 
WI 42, ¶61, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381; State v. Kruse, 101 
Wis. 2d 387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981); Chase v. American 
Cartage Co., 176 Wis. 235, 238, 186 N.W. 598 (1922) ("[W]hen a 
court of last resort intentionally takes up, discusses, and 
decides a question germane to, though not necessarily decisive 
of, the controversy, such decision is not a dictum, but is a 
judicial act of the court which it will thereafter recognize as 
a binding decision."). 
Second, noting that the parties did not raise a statute of 
repose issue, the majority takes the dissent to task for 
discussing it.  Admittedly, the parties did not raise a statute 
of repose issue——but the discussion and analysis of the majority 
opinion most certainly did.  See, e.g., majority op., ¶20.  
Accordingly, I respond to that discussion and analysis.  
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
12 
 
had 
been 
victimized 
as 
children 
by 
the 
sexual 
assaults 
perpetrated by Dr. Loo.  This is distinguishable from a claim 
brought under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(b), in which a plaintiff 
may bring a claim if an injury is not discovered at the time it 
occurs.   
¶59 The majority acknowledges that "[t]he Does are not 
arguing that the news reports caused them to discover that they 
had been injured during the genital examinations; rather, they 
are asserting that no injury had occurred, and therefore, their 
claims did not accrue, until they learned that Dr. Van de Loo’s 
conduct during the genital examinations might have involved a 
criminal sexual assault."  Majority op., ¶1 (emphasis in 
original); see also Majority op., ¶11 n.8 ("The Does use the 
term 'discover' not in the sense that they discovered that Dr. 
Van de Loo had injured them when he touched their genitals, but 
to argue that the October 2012 news about Dr. Van de Loo caused 
the actual injury.") (emphasis in original).  
¶60 Not only does the majority's analysis contravene the 
plain language of Wis. Stat. § 893.55, it also contravenes 
Wisconsin case law by failing to distinguish between cases 
addressing the discovery rule's statute of repose and cases 
addressing accrual claims such as the Does.  Relying on Aicher 
ex rel. LaBarge v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 
237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849, the majority asserts that "the 
legislature may sever a person's claim by a statute of 
limitations or a statute of repose when the person has had no 
possibility of discovering the injury . . ."  Majority op., ¶20 
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
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(citing Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶50).  Remarkably, the majority 
fails to acknowledge that Aicher addressed a discovery claim 
brought under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(b), not an accrual claim 
like the Does' claims brought under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).   
¶61 In contrast to the Does’ case, the plaintiff in Aicher 
alleged that she became blind in her right eye as a result of 
medical negligence that occurred during her newborn examination, 
but that she did not discover the condition until a decade 
later.  237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶2.  Aicher is also distinguishable from 
this case because the parties did not dispute that the condition 
resulted in an injury during the first six months of Aicher's 
life.  Id.     
¶62 The majority further asserts that "[t]he fact the Does 
may not have known at the time that the touching was allegedly 
inappropriate or that the manipulation of their genitals 
constituted the physical injurious change does not change this 
fact."  Majority op., ¶20 (citing Fojut, 212 Wis. 2d at 831-32 
for the proposition that "physical injurious change from 
negligent tubal ligation was moment of conception, a date the 
patient could not have known.").  Again, the majority conflates 
the accrual rule set forth in Fojut, with the discovery rule set 
forth under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a).  
¶63 Neither Fojut nor Paul limit the time period within 
which a medical malpractice claim might accrue, yet the majority 
contends the opposite, thereby judicially creating a statute of 
repose for accrual claims.  Although the plaintiff in Fojut 
became pregnant a few months after her surgery, it is just as 
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
14 
 
possible that she could have become pregnant years later.  
Likewise, in Paul, the failure to diagnose the patient's 
condition began nearly a decade before she passed away.  242 
Wis. 2d 507, ¶3-4.  This was a much longer period of time than 
the few years at issue in this case, yet the Paul court found 
that the plaintiff's claim did not accrue until she suffered 
actual physical injury.  Id., ¶2. 
¶64 As the Does' counsel aptly stated at oral argument, 
the legislature could have chosen to enact a statute of repose 
that applied to Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1m)(a), but it chose not to  
do so.  Unlike the majority, I refuse to endorse a judicially 
created statute of repose that contravenes the plain language of 
the statute and well-established Wisconsin case law.   
¶65 In sum, I conclude that the Does' injuries did not 
occur simultaneously with the alleged negligence.  Their claims 
accrued when they suffered severe emotional distress upon 
learning that they were the victims of child sexual assaults 
perpetrated 
by 
Dr. 
Van 
de 
Loo 
during 
their 
physical 
examinations.  Thus, the Does' claims are not time-barred by the 
medical malpractice statute of limitations because the Does' 
filed their claims within three years of the date they accrued.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
¶66 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
No. 2014AP1177.awb   
 
 
 
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