Case Title: Burks v. Baumgartner

Citation: 381 P.2d 57, 72 N.M. 123

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1963-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
381 P.2d 57 (1963) 72 N.M. 123 Joy Jean BURKS and Seldon E. Burks, her husband, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. M. R. BAUMGARTNER, Defendant-Appellee. No. 7175. Supreme Court of New Mexico. March 28, 1963. Rehearing Denied May 14, 1963. Albert J. Rivera, Alamogordo, Smith, Kiker & Kitts, Albuquerque, for appellants. Shipley, Seller & Whorton, Alamogordo, for appellee. CHAVEZ, Justice. This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court dismissing appellants' second cause of action, upon motion of appellee made after both parties had concluded their evidence and rested. Appellants sought recovery for medical malpractice in that appellee performed a hysterectomy upon appellant, Joy Jean Burks, hereinafter referred to as "appellant," while appellant, without her knowledge, was pregnant; that appellee failed to diagnose such pregnancy prior to his performance of such surgery; and that the surgery caused appellant to suffer an abortion. The damages alleged in *58 the second cause of action are for mental anguish, distress and anxiety. Appellants rely solely upon two points for a reversal: Thus, the questions before us are whether appellants adduced substantial evidence to show that appellant was pregnant at the time of the surgery performed upon her by appellee; and, that if appellant was pregnant, appellee was negligent in failing to diagnose such pregnancy prior to such surgery. The record of the evidence submitted in this case is voluminous; however, a fair summary of said evidence follows. Dr. M.S. Hart, a specialist in pathology from El Paso, Texas, and a member of the American, Texas and El Paso County Medical Associations, the American Society of Clinical Pathologists, the College of American Pathologists, the International Academy of Pathology and a Diplomate of the American Board of Pathology, testified that on April 29, 1960, he made a pathological examination of the tissue consisting of the uterus, right tube, ovaries and appendix taken from appellant; that the tissue was submitted from Champion Memorial Hospital, Alamogordo, New Mexico, under the name of Dr. M.R. Baumgartner; that the examination of the tissue was made first from a gross examination, that is, a general description of the tissue submitted, and then the various areas were removed or sectioned and processed, stained and examined under the microscope; that the gross examination showed a uterus, fallopian tube, ovary and an appendix; that the uterus was found to be enlarged and measured 120 by 85 millimeters (approximately 6" by 4 1/2"); that the average size of a uterus of an adult female who is not pregnant would be approximately 4" by 2 1/2"; that the uterus was intact and it was not cut open; that the other gross finding was a cyst in the ovary that was designated as a gluteal cyst, called a corpus luteum, which is normally present at each month in the female, but associated with pregnancy becomes larger than under normal circumstances; that the microscopic study of the uterus revealed an adenomyosis, which means a diseased uterus, in that there are islands or areas of the lining of the uterus that are embedded or present within the muscle of the uterus; that there was an inflammation of the cervix, which is the mouth of the womb, and there was present microscopic evidence of a reaction of pregnancy; that microscopic evidence reveals certain changes in the lining of the uterus in the event of pregnancy and are manifested by a swelling of the cells, a change in the glandular pattern and the presence of placental tissue. Dr. Hart testified: Based upon his gross and microscopic study, after examining the tissue on April *59 29, 1960, Dr. Hart testified that his diagnosis was: On cross-examination, Dr. Hart testified that the enlargement of the uterus was caused by two factors, a diseased uterus and a reaction of pregnancy; that the uterus was approximately two times average size and was symmetrical. Dr. Hart defined the word "fetus" as the product of conception that results in a human life being implanted in the lining of the womb, the child in the formative stages. He further testified that the term "reaction of pregnancy" is the qualified term apart from the normal term "pregnancy," implying a fetus in a uterus. Dr. Hart was asked to explain the term "corpus luteum of pregnancy" and answered: In direct conflict with the testimony of Dr. Hart, that the uterus was intact, is the testimony of appellee and a nurse, Ruby Mirabal, who testified that appellee opened *60 the uterus following the surgery and that it contained no fetus. Another nurse, Mrs. John Lenzo, testified as to appellee's usual procedure in surgery cases, including the removal of any organ from the body, but could not remember this particular case because "it was so common." Dr. Gerald H. Jordan, a general surgeon and gynecologist, testified that appellant came to him on February 19, 1960, complaining of periodic cramping a week before her period with clots and a bright red discharge, low back ache, occasionally had dyspareunia and had severe pain with her last period in the right lower quadrant. Dr. Jordan did a "suction-curettage" in which the cervix is very slightly dilated and a small instrument is inserted, removing tissue primarily for study. Such tissue was submitted to Hart, Boverie, Green, Black, Clayton and White Laboratory for analysis. He recommended the removal of the uterus, i.e., that appellant have a hysterectomy. Asked if he would say that the finding made by the pathologist, Dr. Hart, would indicate that appellant was pregnant at the time of surgery, he answered: There is also evidence in the record pertaining to the time of termination of appellant's pregnancy. Dr. Hart testified that, in his opinion, the fetus could have been expelled not longer than six to eight or nine days prior to the surgery. There is also evidence in the record that there was no fetus or indication thereof present at the time the pathological work was performed. Dr. Hart also testified that there was evidence of placental tissue, which indicates that there was initiated the products of conception that resulted in the formation of placenta in the uterus cavity. There is evidence of the hypothesis that the fetus had died, which was negatived by the absence of necrotic tissue which would have formed not less than twenty-four hours, nor more than six or seven days after its death. There is also evidence that appellant did not want any more children and had been practicing contraception. Appellant was asked if, at the time she was examined by appellee on April 19, 1960, anything was said about whether she was pregnant or might be pregnant, or whether she thought she was pregnant, and replied: Appellant was then asked if she had informed Dr. Jordan, on February 19, 1960, after learning of her condition, whether she planned to have more children and she replied: *61 Appellant contends that there is sufficient evidence to support her contentions that appellee was negligent in not causing a laboratory frog test to be performed; that assuming that a frog test was performed, appellee was nevertheless negligent in relying upon a purported negative frog test reported less than twenty-four hours after injection of the frog; and assuming that a proper frog test was performed, still the jury would have been warranted in finding appellee negligent in failing to diagnose appellant's pregnancy, in view of the clinical symptoms thereof that were present. Appellee says the contention, that no frog test was performed, is untrue. Appellants' Ex. 1, p. 7, asserts: "Remarks: Frog test Negative." Appellant testified that she was given a slip of paper to take to the laboratory and that nothing was said on said slip about a frog test. Appellee testified that he had given appellant a slip ordering a frog test. Lu Ainsworth, a laboratory technician, testified with reference to the laboratory report, appellants' Ex. 1, p. 7, as follows: On recross examination, Mrs. Ainsworth testified: There is also testimony that the laboratory log book (appellants' Ex. 2) showed that no frog test had been performed on appellant and that she was not charged for any frog test. This exhibit also shows that the only laboratory test done on appellant, on the day in question, was routine work required on all presurgical patients. This line of testimony bears upon the question of whether or not sufficient evidence was presented on behalf of appellants that the purported frog test result, as set out in the hospital record, was fabricated. Appellants argue that if the purported negative frog test report slip, purportedly signed by "Lu," was genuine and was in the hospital chart (appellants' Ex. 1, p. 7), why did Dr. Hosford write a report of consultation, undated and without examining appellant, which report became page 8 of said exhibit, and stated in part: Appellants contend that the purported frog test was not genuine, as it lacked any data or details of any type concerning such test. Dr. Hart testified that a frog test report coming from his laboratory would contain considerably more information than appears on the report slip in question. Appellants further contend that, even assuming that a frog test was performed, the evidence establishes that appellee was negligent in relying upon a frog test result reported less than twenty-four hours after the injection of the frog. Appellee testified that he knew on the same day the frog test was purportedly performed that it was negative, and that he relied upon the negative result reported that same day. Whereas, Dr. Hart *62 testified that it would be necessary, before reaching a determination that the reaction of the frog is negative, to wait for a period of twenty-four hours after the cerium or urine is injected into the frog, and that this would be the standard period required. There is evidence in appellants' Ex. 1, p, 1, a notation on the hospital chart, examined, approved and evidently signed by appellee, as follows: "abortion incomplete," which term appellee explained to be an "interruption of pregnancy." In a jury case such as this, where a motion to dismiss is made by the defendant at the conclusion of the case and after both sides have presented their evidence and rested, or on a motion to direct a verdict on an issue in the case, the rule is well established that we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, indulging in his favor every reasonable inference that may be drawn therefrom. If reasonable minds may differ, it is a proper question to be submitted to the jury; otherwise, it should be withdrawn. Stranczek v. Burch, 67 N.M. 237, 354 P.2d 531; Bryan v. Phillips, 70 N.M. 1, 369 P.2d 37. Thus, under the evidence in this case, the minds of reasonable men may differ, and hence we hold that there is sufficient evidence from which the jury might find that appellant was pregnant at the time that the operation was performed, and that the learned trial court committed error in dismissing appellants' second cause of action. Since this case requires a retrial, it becomes necessary to comment on the trial court's ruling excluding portions of the testimony, by deposition, of Admiral Joseph William Kimbrough, a medical doctor. The trial court sustained appellee's objections to the questions and answers marked and appearing in the transcript, pages 378-379, also questions and answers appearing on pages 366-367, and the answer made by this witness appearing on page 422. The above testimony is pertinent because the trial court, in the judgment, held that "there is no just reason for delay in entering a final judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' second cause of action * * *." It may be that the questions appearing in the transcript, pages 378-379, failed to include material facts necessary for the expert witness to form an opinion, and that the trial court's ruling was correct. The trial court may have been correct in striking the other portions of Kimbrough's testimony, but this we need not decide because, upon retrial, according to appellants' statements, they will submit other evidence in support of their second cause of action. Thus, at the retrial of this case, when evidence is offered tending to establish appellants' second cause of action, the trial court will rule upon its admissibility. The cause is reversed and remanded to the district court with direction to vacate the judgment dismissing appellants' second cause of action, to reinstate said cause on the trial docket, and proceed in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. COMPTON, C.J., and CARMODY, J., concur.