Case Title: TINA BECKER, Individually, and in her capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Zachary Tyler Becker, Deceased V. DON MASON; and BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF SWEETWATER, a governmental entity

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
TINA BECKER, Individually, and in her capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Zachary Tyler Becker, Deceased V. DON MASON; and BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF SWEETWATER, a governmental entity2006 WY 143145 P.3d 1268Case Number: 05-219Decided: 11/09/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
TINA 
BECKER, Individually, and in her capacity as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Zachary Tyler Becker, Deceased,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
DON 
MASON; and BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF SWEETWATER, a 
governmental entity,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Timothy 
W. Miller of Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; and John 
D. Rossetti, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee Don Mason, and 
Richard Rideout of Law Offices of Richard Rideout, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, for 
Appellee Board of County Commissioners.  
Argument by Messrs. Rossetti and Rideout.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL*, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
C.J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; HILL, 
J., files a dissenting opinion, in which GOLDEN, J., 
joins.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      This is an appeal 
from a district court's dismissal of a wrongful death action on the ground that 
the appellee deputy sheriff did not owe the appellant's decedent a duty of care 
under the circumstances of this case.  
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent 
herewith.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Whether, under 
the circumstances of this case, the appellee deputy sheriff had a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to protect the appellant's 
decedent.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      During the 
evening of October 24, 2003, Glenn Towner and Mary Brandes were at horse corrals 
north of Rock Springs, 
Wyoming.  Towner was extremely intoxicated, having 
consumed nearly a case of beer throughout the day.  At around 8:00 p.m., a horse knocked 
Brandes to the ground, causing her to hit her head and lose consciousness.  An ambulance was called to the scene, 
and Sweetwater County Deputy Sheriff Don Mason also 
responded.

 
 
[¶4]      Towner told Mason 
that he had been drinking, but that he wanted to go to the hospital to be with 
Brandes.  Mason noted that Towner 
appeared to be intoxicated, but did not arrest him or make any effort to prevent 
him from driving.  Towner got into a 
vehicle and drove toward the hospital.  
About two miles down the road, his vehicle veered off the right side of 
the road, he overcorrected to the left, crossed the centerline, and collided 
with a vehicle in which fourteen-year-old Zachary Tyler Becker was a 
passenger.  Becker was 
killed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      Both appellees 
filed motions to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) alleging failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.  Our standard for review of such a 
dismissal is well known:  (1) we 
accept the facts stated in the complaint as true and view them in the light most 
favorable to the appellant; (2) we sustain the dismissal only if it is certain 
from the face of the complaint that the appellant cannot assert any facts that 
would entitle him to relief; (3) we employ the same standards and examine the 
same materials as did the district court; and (4) such review is de novo.  See Askvig v. Wells Fargo Bank Wyo., 
N.A., 2005 WY 138, ¶ 10, 121 P.3d 783, 787 (Wyo. 2005); Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, ¶ 9, 
118 P.3d 429, 433 (Wyo. 2005); and Bonnie 
M. Quinn Revocable Trust v. SRW, Inc., 2004 WY 65, ¶ 8, 91 P.3d 146, 148 
(Wyo. 2004).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶6]      Our focus will be 
upon the specific rationale the district court followed in dismissing the 
amended complaint.  First, the court 
identified Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-112 (LexisNexis 2005) as the source of the 
appellees' liability, if any:  "A 
governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of 
peace officers while acting within the scope of their duties."  Second, the district court noted that 
the evaluation of a peace officer's conduct under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-112 
requires application of general tort law principles.  See Keehn v. Town of Torrington , 834 P.2d 112, 114 (Wyo. 1992).  Next, the court pointed out that the 
complaint alleged the tort of negligence, the elements of which cause of action 
are:  "(1) a duty, (2) a violation 
of that duty, (3) which is the proximate cause of, (4) injury to the 
plaintiff."  MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 
(Wyo. 
1990).  And finally, the court 
stated the well-known principles that the question of whether or not a duty 
exists is a question of law for the court, and duty may arise via contract, 
statute, or the common law.  See Downtown Auto Parts, Inc. v. Toner, 
2004 WY 67, ¶ 8, 91 P.3d 917, 919 (Wyo. 2004); and Natrona County v. Blake, 2003 WY 170, ¶ 6, 81 P.3d 948, 951 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶7]      The district 
court resolved this case in favor of the appellees by declaring that the deputy 
sheriff had no legally enforceable duty or obligation to detain or arrest 
Towner.  In reaching that 
conclusion, the court relied upon McCoy 
v. Crook County Sheriff's Dep't, 987 P.2d 674, 677 (Wyo. 1999).  Because McCoy was central to the district 
court's reasoning, we will review it in detail.

 
 
[¶8]      At about 9:30 
p.m. on June 16, 1994, the Crook County Sheriff's Office received a telephonic 
complaint that someone was "hot-rodding" a motorbike around the town of 
Hulett.  A deputy sheriff responded and observed 
Joe Arlint on a motorbike, speeding 44 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. zone.  The deputy stopped Arlint, who was loud, 
uncooperative, and verbally abusive.  
Hulett's chief-of-police then arrived as backup.  Despite subsequent medical evidence and 
other testimony indicating Arlint was drunk, neither officer observed behavior 
that indicated such to them.  
Id. at 675-76.  Arlint was issued four traffic 
ticketsspeeding, no driver's license in possession, no registration, and no 
insurancebut he was not arrested, the officers did not impound the motorbike, 
and they did not take the keys.  
Instead, they told Arlint to park the motorbike and walk home.  Id. 
at 676.  The officers then 
left.  Some time later that night, 
Arlint was seriously injured in an accident on the motorbike.  He died four months later from those 
injuries.  Id.

 
 
[¶9]      Arlint's mother 
brought a wrongful death action against the officers, alleging that they had a 
duty to arrest Arlint for driving while under the influence.  The district court granted summary 
judgment to the officers on three grounds:  
(1) the officers owed no duty to Arlint; (2) the doctrine of qualified 
immunity applied to protect the officers; and (3) the officers' negligence, if 
any, was not the proximate cause of Arlint's death.  Id. 
at 676.  On appeal to this Court, we 
found the first issue to be determinative under the following 
analysis:

 
 
            
We first consider whether the officers in question had a legally 
enforceable duty or obligation to arrest Mr. Arlint.  It is well settled that in order to 
establish a cause of action in tort there must first be a "duty, or obligation, 
recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of 
conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks."  Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 341 
(Wyo. 1979); 
Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, 
§ 30, p. 164 (5th ed. 1984).  A 
recent law review article presents a cogent analysis concerning the difference 
between a peace officer's general authority and legal duties which give rise to 
tort liability.

 
 
            
A tort is a breach of a duty imposed by law.  The general duties of a law enforcement 
officer are provided by statute and obligate the officer to maintain public 
order and to make arrests for violation of the laws of the state or the 
ordinances of any municipality.  The 
statutes provide the boundaries of the police function 
but do not explain where tort liability may arise.

 
 
Stephen 
R. McAllister & Peyton H. Robinson, The Potential Civil Liability of Law 
Enforcement Officers and Agencies, 67-Sep. J. Kan. B.A. 14, 16-17 
(1998) (emphasis added).  We have 
not considered this question in the past, and in so doing we now look first to 
Wyoming's 
statutory scheme.

 
 
            
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-102 (Lexis 1999), relating to arrests, 
provides:

 
 
(b) A 
peace officer may arrest a person without a 
warrant when:

 
 
(1)  Any criminal offense is being committed 
in the officer's presence by the person to be arrested;

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
(iii)  The officer has probable cause to 
believe that a misdemeanor has been committed, that the person to be arrested 
has committed it and that the person, unless immediately 
arrested:

 
 
(A)   Will not be 
apprehended;

 
 
(B)   May cause injury to himself or 
others or damage to property; or

 
 
(C)   May destroy or conceal evidence of 
the commission of the misdemeanor.

 
 
 
 
(Emphasis 
added).  According to this statute, 
arrest is discretionary even when the officer has probable cause and the person 
to be arrested "[m]ay cause injury to himself or others."

 
 
            
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-103 (Lexis 1999) goes on to 
state:

 
 
(b)  A person may be released if, after 
investigation, it appears that the person:

 
 
(i)  Does not present a danger to himself or 
others[.]

 
 
One 
might reasonably argue that a person who is drunk and in possession of a motor 
vehicle automatically presents a danger to himself or others.  Apparently, however, the legislature 
believes otherwise or it would have made arrest mandatory under such 
circumstances in § 7-2-102.  It did 
not do so.

 
 
            
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1204(d) (Lexis 1999) 
provides:

 
 
Whenever 
any person is halted by a police officer for any violation of this act . . . the 
person shall, in the discretion of the officer, 
either be given a traffic citation or be taken without unnecessary delay 
before the proper judge. . . .

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The term "this act" refers 
to §§ 31-5-101 through 31-5-1214, which includes Wyoming's drunk driving statute, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 31-5-233.  Finally, Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 31-5-1205(k) (Michie 1997) specifically allows the officer 
discretion to arrest, cite or issue a summons for violation of § 
31-5-233.

 
 
            
Obviously, the statutes authorize officers to arrest and detain drunk 
drivers.  However, none of the 
statutes mandate the arrest of such persons.  To the contrary, the statutes emphasize 
officer discretion in determining the appropriate action to take with drunk 
drivers.

 
 

Id. 
at 
677-78.

 
 
[¶10]   In reaching our conclusion in McCoy, we discussed the related concept 
of an officer's duty to investigate potential DWUI 
offenses:

 
 
In Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112, 115-16 (Wyo. 1992), we stated:

 
 
Subsumed 
within the general duty to apprehend, arrest, and remove drunk drivers from 
Wyoming's 
roadways is the duty to investigate potential DWUI violations.  This brings us to the precise duty issue 
raised by this appeal:  What is the 
nature and extent of a peace officer's duty to investigate a potential DWUI 
violation when, during an unrelated traffic stop, it is reasonably suspected 
that the driver has been drinking alcoholic beverages.  While this case presents the opportunity 
to define specifically a peace officer's duty in this respect, we decline to do 
so both on the ground that it is beyond our arena of expertise and on the ground 
that rigid rules are not consistent with the realities of law enforcement.  Consequently, we resort to traditional 
tort principles and hold that a peace officer's duty to investigate a potential 
DWUI violation during an unrelated traffic stop is dictated by what a reasonable 
peace officer of ordinary prudence would do under the 
circumstances.

 
 

Keehn 
bypassed 
the precise issue of whether there is a legally enforceable duty to arrest and 
stated simply that officers had a duty to investigate potential DUI 
violations.  Keehn further recognized the fact that 
rigid rules are simply not compatible with the realities of law enforcement in 
today's society.  Wyoming statutes 
recognize that fact as well by granting to peace officers the discretion to 
arrest or issue a traffic ticket as the situation, in the officer's judgment, 
dictates.  Indeed, to impose upon 
peace officers the duty to arrest and detain all potential DUI violators would 
force police to choose between potential liability on the one hand for false 
arrest and on the other hand for failure to make an arrest.  Such a choice would effectively paralyze 
the government's right to carry out its essential functions free of the threat 
of undue litigation.  See Shore  v. Town of Stonington , 187 Conn. 
147, 444 A.2d 1379, 1384 (Conn. 1982).

 
 

Id. at 
678.

 
 
[¶11]   The appellant contends that the 
district court's reliance upon McCoy 
was misplaced because McCoy only 
answered the question of whether the statutory authority to arrest a person for 
DWUI also created a statutory duty to arrest that person.  Instead, the appellant reasons that the 
officer's duty in the instant case arose out of his obligation under the common 
law to do what a reasonable peace officer would have done under the 
circumstances.  First, the appellant 
cites the above-quoted language from Keehn, in particular this Court's 
statement that "a peace officer's duty to investigate a potential DWUI violation 
during an unrelated traffic stop is dictated by what a reasonable peace officer 
of ordinary prudence would do under like circumstances."  Keehn, 834 P.2d  at 116.  Next, the appellant cites Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 615 
(Wyo. 1993), 
where we said:

 
 
In its 
facts, as disclosed by the record, this case resembles Keehn.  In Keehn, we analyzed the conduct of the 
police officers under traditional negligence principles, and we held a police 
officer's duty in assessing a person's fitness to drive a vehicle is to act as a 
reasonable police officer under the existing 
circumstances.

 
 
We 
resolved Brown, as had the district 
court, not by finding no duty on the part of the officer, but by finding that, 
even if we assumed the officer was negligent, the record was insufficient to 
justify a finding that the officer's conduct was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries.1

 
 
[¶12]   Finally, the appellant points out 
several other cases in which this Court measured police officers' conduct under 
the common law's reasonable person standard:  Blake, 2003 WY 170, ¶¶ 19-24, 81 P.3d  at 
957-58 (duty found in alleged negligent supervision of prisoner who committed 
murder two days after escaping from county jail); Bd. of County Comm'rs ex rel. Teton County 
Sheriff's Dept. v. Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 1082-85 (Wyo. 2000) (officers' 
alleged negligence in setting up roadblock to stop fleeing suspect measured by 
common law tort standard of Keehn); Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 552 (Wyo. 1995) (peace officers responding to report of accident, if acting 
within the scope of their duties, "have a common law duty to act as reasonable 
peace officers of ordinary prudence under like circumstances"); and DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 649-50 
(Wyo. 1986) (so long as officer does not violate duty of due care in operating 
his own vehicle in a high-speed chase, his conduct is not the proximate cause of 
harm that occurs to a third person involved in a collision with the fleeing 
suspect).

 
 
[¶13]   Neither appellee suggests that, in 
the instant case, Mason's duty, if any, to protect the deceased from Towner 
should not be measured under common law tort principles.  In fact, they both concede that, in the 
law enforcement context, negligence is the failure to act as a reasonable peace 
officer of ordinary prudence would act under like circumstances.  However, in stating the issue, both 
appellees limit that issue to the question of whether or not Mason had a duty to 
arrest Towner.  They then find McCoy to be dispositive of that issue, 
with the answer being in the negative.  
The appellees' reasoning is that, if an officer's decision whether or not 
to arrest in a DWUI situation, even where probable cause to arrest exists, is 
discretionary and cannot form the basis for a tort duty, then surely the same is 
true in the present circumstances, where a traffic stop had not even 
occurred.  Generally, they contend 
that, in the DWUI context, McCoy has 
claimed the field.

 
 
[¶14]   We are inclined to believe that Keehn, rather than McCoy, dictates the result in this 
case.  Or perhaps more accurately 
stated, while McCoy held that, in the 
DWUI situation, the statutory authority to arrest did not create a statutory 
duty to arrest, it did not reverse Keehn's holding that "a peace officer's 
duty to investigate a potential DWUI violation during an unrelated traffic stop 
is dictated by what a reasonable peace officer of ordinary prudence would do 
under the circumstances."  Keehn, 834 P.3d  at 116.  The law in Wyoming is that existing 
circumstances may create a duty on the part of the officer to investigate a 
potential DWUI.  This case should 
not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.  It is not clear from the 
pleadings that the appellant will be unable to state any facts to support a 
negligent investigation allegation.  
The complaint did not just allege failure to arrest; rather, it alleged 
numerous failures, such as the failure to determine how Towner intended to 
travel to the hospital, the failure to determine whether Towner was fit to 
drive, the failure to provide or obtain transportation for Towner, the failure 
to otherwise restrain Towner, the failure to prevent Towner from driving, and 
the failure to monitor Towner's whereabouts.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   Upon arriving at the horse corrals 
and determining that the intoxicated Towner intended to travel to the hospital 
to be with Brandes, Mason had a duty to do what an ordinarily prudent law 
enforcement officer would have done under like circumstances.  Saying that the decision of whether or 
not to exercise one's statutory authority by arresting a drunk driver is 
discretionary, and therefore cannot form the basis for a tort claim based on 
negligent failure to arrest, does not answer all the questions in this case, 
particularly by dismissal based upon failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted.

 
 
[¶16]   Reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Brown was 
injured in a car accident that occurred about an hour after the driver of the 
vehicle in which she was a passenger was stopped by police, but the driver was 
not given field sobriety tests or arrested despite the fact that the officer 
could smell the odor of alcohol coming from him during the traffic 
stop.

  

            
HILL, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.

 
 
[¶17]   
I concur with the majority's interpretation of our prior decisions in 
McCoy v. Crook County Sheriff's 
Department, 987 P.2d 674 (Wyo. 1999), and 
Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112 (Wyo. 
1992).  I cannot agree, however, 
that the duty identified in Keehn may 
be imposed under the facts alleged in the Complaint.

 
 
[¶18]   As the majority notes, Keehn held that "a peace officer's duty 
to investigate a potential DWUI violation during an unrelated traffic stop is 
dictated by what a reasonable peace officer of ordinary prudence would do under 
like circumstances."  834 P.2d  at 
115-16.  Constitutionally, a "peace 
officer may temporarily detain an individual for the purpose of investigation 
only when he has a reasonable suspicion, based on all the circumstances, that 
criminal activity may be afoot.'"  
834 P.2d  at 116 (citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968)).  Clearly, 
a reasonable peace officer of ordinary prudence would not detain an individual 
in circumstances inconsistent with constitutional dictates.  Accordingly, whether a duty to 
investigate a potential DWUI violation has arisen is dependent upon the 
existence of a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was being 
committed.

 
 
[¶19]   The existence of a reasonable 
suspicion is the critical difference between Keehn and this case.  In Keehn, the duty arose out of a 
police-citizen contact during a traffic stop. In the course of the stop certain 
facts were observed that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the citizen 
was operating a motor vehicle while driving under the influence in violation of 
Wyoming 
statute.  As alleged in this case, 
Towner was not operating a motor vehicle during the contact with Officer 
Mason.  The Complaint contains no 
allegation that Towner informed Officer Mason that he had been driving that day 
or that he would be driving to the hospital.  The Complaint does not allege that 
Officer Mason observed Towner approach, enter, or drive away in a motor 
vehicle.  In short, there are no 
facts alleged that would have supported a reasonable suspicion that a DWUI had 
been or was going to be committed, which would have justified an investigatory 
detention of Towner. 

 
 
[¶20]   I believe that application of the 
duty to investigate a DWUI under the facts alleged in this case would greatly 
expand the scope of the duty identified in Keehn.  The death of Zachary Becker is 
unquestionably tragic.  However, as 
we said in Keehn:

 
 
As to 
the factual realities, governments simply do not have the resources to protect 
all citizens at all times from the consequences of all illegal or tortious 
activity.  Consequently, law 
enforcement agencies and personnel must be afforded some discretion as to how to 
marshall [sic] 
their time, talents, and assets to achieve the greatest overall good.  That an intoxicated driver or other law 
violator causes injury to another does not, without more, necessarily mean that 
a governmental entity or public employee was negligent.  See Wyo. Stat. § 1-39-102(b) (June 1988) 
(governmental entities or public employees are not subject to strict 
liability).  Rather, the facts of 
each case must be independently examined. 

 
 
834 P.2d  
at 116-17.  The facts, as alleged 
here, do not give rise to a legally enforceable duty.  I would affirm the district court's 
dismissal.