Case Title: The Florida Bar Re: Michael Howard Wolf

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC08-250

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC08-250 
____________ 
 
 
 
 
THE FLORIDA BAR RE: 
MICHAEL HOWARD WOLF.  
 
[July 9, 2009] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
We have for review a referee’s report recommending that Michael Howard 
Wolf be reinstated to the practice of law in Florida.  We have jurisdiction.  See 
art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated below, we reject the referee’s 
recommendation that Wolf be reinstated.  Wolf failed to prove rehabilitation by 
failing to strictly comply with this Court’s suspension order, in that he engaged in 
the practice of law while under suspension.  He has also failed to prove 
rehabilitation by continuing to demonstrate financial irresponsibility, the character 
flaw that caused or greatly contributed to the conduct that led to his suspension. 
 
In 2006, Wolf was suspended for two years for negligently misappropriating 
client funds.  See Fla. Bar v. Wolf, 930 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2006).  Prior to his 
 
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suspension, Wolf practiced primarily in the area of gaming law.  After being 
suspended, Wolf worked as a paralegal with two separate attorneys, both of whom 
had contacted the Bar seeking advice about the scope of the work that Wolf was 
allowed to undertake.  Although Bar grievances were filed against Wolf with 
respect to his paralegal work, the Bar dismissed the complaints due to insufficient 
evidence. 
 
In addition to his paralegal work, Wolf earned regular and, at times, 
substantial sums as a private consultant with a consulting business he created to 
advise arcades.  Wolf advised his consulting clients on opening arcades, reported 
on law changes in this area, reviewed leases, and researched ordinances that would 
apply to new arcade sites.  At one point, Wolf consulted with a representative of a 
state attorney’s office on the “proper interpretation” of gaming law for an 
attorney’s criminal client.   
At the reinstatement hearing before the referee, Wolf called several 
witnesses, including the attorneys for whom he worked as a paralegal, a judge, 
friends, family, and clients, to testify as to his good reputation, remorse, and 
community service.  The referee found that Wolf spent ten to fifteen hours a week 
coaching and assisting in the management of a disadvantaged children’s seasonal 
basketball league.  Wolf also passed the ethics portion of the Bar exam and paid 
 
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the Bar’s costs.  The referee found that Wolf is well-liked, respected, 
knowledgeable, and remorseful.   
However, although the referee found that Wolf learned some financial 
management skills while working as a paralegal, she also found that Wolf’s 
financial situation is unstable and that he owes substantial money to the Internal 
Revenue Service.  In fact, the referee specifically found that Wolf was “horrible at 
financial management” and that he failed to take a Law Office Management 
Assistance Service (LOMAS) course for which he enrolled.  Further, Wolf allowed 
a check written as a direct retainer for an attorney to be written to him.  He cashed 
checks that were made out to him but were to be used to pay for the legal services 
of an attorney.  One check clearly noted “for legal services” on it.  Another noted 
“legal consult” and was made out to him.  He also failed to keep adequate financial 
records for his gaming consultation business.  The referee recommends that Wolf 
be reinstated to the practice of law, with conditions, because he is knowledgeable, 
well-liked, and remorseful. 
 
The Bar petitions for review, opposing Wolf’s reinstatement.  The Bar 
primarily argues that Wolf practiced law and handled trust funds during his 
suspension.1   
                                          
 
 
1.  The Bar also argues that Wolf failed to fully disclose his occupations in 
his petition for reinstatement and that his failure to notify two clients and a judge 
of his suspension constitutes disqualifying conduct to reinstatement.  Because our 
 
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A petitioner seeking reinstatement to The Florida Bar must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that he has met the criteria set forth in Rule Regulating 
the Florida Bar 3-7.10, “Reinstatement and Readmission Procedures,” and the 
decisions of this Court.  See Fla. Bar re McGraw, 903 So. 2d 905, 909 (Fla. 2005).  
This Court has a wide scope of review with regard to the referee’s legal 
conclusions because we have the ultimate responsibility to enter the appropriate 
judgment.  Id. 
We agree with the Bar that Wolf should not be reinstated because he 
practiced law while under suspension and, therefore, was not in strict compliance 
with this Court’s suspension order.  Clearly, by operation of our opinion 
suspending Wolf, he may not practice law until he is reinstated.  See R. Regulating 
Fla. Bar 3-7.10(f)(3)(A) (an element of rehabilitation is “strict compliance with the 
specific conditions of any disciplinary, judicial, administrative, or other order”); 
10-2.1(c) (“A suspended lawyer, while a member of The Florida Bar during the 
period of suspension as provided elsewhere in these rules, does not have the 
privilege of practicing law in Florida during the period of suspension.”).   
The referee found that the conduct Wolf engaged in while suspended did not 
amount to the practice of law.  We cannot agree.  While the referee’s factual 
                                                                                                                                        
decisions with regard to the other issues raised by the Bar preclude Wolf’s 
reinstatement, we need not and do not address these issues. 
 
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findings are supported, her conclusion that Wolf’s actions did not constitute the 
practice of law is erroneous. 
 In State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962), 
vacated on other grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), we defined the practice of law as 
follows: 
 
We think that in determining whether the giving of advice and 
counsel and the performance of services in legal matters for 
compensation constitute the practice of law it is safe to follow the rule 
that if the giving of such advice and performance of such services 
affect important rights of a person under the law, and if the reasonable 
protection of the rights and property of those advised and served 
requires that the persons giving such advice possess legal skill and a 
knowledge of the law greater than that possessed by the average 
citizen, then the giving of such advice and the performance of such 
services by one for another as a course of conduct constitute the 
practice of law. 
(Emphasis added.)   
 
The referee found that “defining advice as legal or business is difficult.”  
However, although Wolf informed his clients that he could not dispense legal 
advice, he was not simply identifying applicable statutes and ordinances with 
regard to opening arcades.  In fact, Wolf testified that he would find the ordinances 
applicable to the jurisdiction in which an arcade was located and admittedly 
provided this advice based on his legal skill, which is greater than that possessed 
by the average citizen.  Further, as stated above, Wolf gave advice on opening 
arcades, reported on changes in the law applicable to this area, reviewed leases, 
 
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researched ordinances applicable to new arcade sites, and consulted with a 
representative of a state attorney’s office on the proper interpretation of gaming 
law for an attorney’s criminal client.  Based on the definition in Sperry, trading on 
one’s enhanced legal skill and knowledge to advise clients on how to legally 
proceed with a business transaction and on changes in the law based on statutory 
research and legal interpretation is the province of licensed attorneys.  
Accordingly, the referee’s conclusion that Wolf’s actions did not constitute the 
practice of law is erroneous and is disapproved. 
 
The Bar also argues that Wolf should not be reinstated because he handled 
trust funds while under suspension.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-6.1(d)(2) 
(prohibiting suspended attorneys from receiving, disbursing, or otherwise handling 
trust funds or property).  The referee did not squarely find that Wolf handled trust 
funds.  In one instance, the first attorney for whom Wolf worked as a paralegal 
directed two clients to pay to Wolf fees the attorney had earned because he owed 
Wolf back pay.  Wolf accepted the clients’ checks.  As the attorney had already 
earned the fees, we cannot conclude that they constituted trust funds.  See R. 
Regulating Fla. Bar 5-1.1(a); Fla. Bar v. Riggs, 944 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 2006) 
(approving referee’s conclusion that “[d]epositing earned fees into a trust account 
is a violation of the Rules Regulating Trust Accounts”).   In another instance, one 
of Wolf’s consulting clients gave Wolf checks, made payable to Wolf, so that Wolf 
 
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could use the money to retain a lawyer in good standing to represent the consulting 
client.  Wolf deposited the checks into his business account on which a lien was 
later placed.  These funds were certainly in the nature of trust funds because they 
did not belong to Wolf.  Wolf’s poor judgment in accepting, managing, and 
depositing these checks, along with the fact that his financial management skills 
are “horrible,” demonstrates his financial irresponsibility, a disqualifying factor in 
reinstatement proceedings.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.10(f)(1)(G).  This 
factor weighs especially heavy here because this same weakness caused or 
contributed to the conduct that led to Wolf’s suspension in the first place. 
 
In evaluating a referee’s recommendation as to reinstatement, we will 
generally not second-guess the referee where the recommendation has a basis in 
existing case law.  See Fla. Bar re Hochman, 944 So. 2d 198, 200-01 (Fla. 2006).  
However, it is ultimately the Court’s responsibility to enter an appropriate 
judgment as to reinstatement.  See id.  Because Wolf, in fact, engaged in conduct 
that constituted the practice of law during his suspension and he continues to be 
financially irresponsible, the recommendation as to reinstatement lacks a basis in 
existing case law and must be disapproved.  See Fla. Bar re Shores, 587 So. 2d 
1313 (Fla. 1991) (denying reinstatement of a lawyer who practiced law while 
under suspension and was financially irresponsible).  Therefore, despite the 
evidence presented vouching for Wolf’s character and reputation, we reject the 
 
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referee’s recommendation that Wolf be reinstated.  Wolf may not reapply for 
reinstatement until at least one year after the date of this opinion.  See R. 
Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.10(k).2 
 
Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson Street, 
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from Michael Howard Wolf 
in the amount of $3,508.14, for which sum let execution issue. 
 
It is so ordered. 
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar 
 
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, Kenneth Lawrence Marvin, Director of 
Lawyer Regulation, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Michael David 
Soifer, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Complainant 
 
Michael David Gelety, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent 
 
                                          
 
 
2.  We have not been presented with the question and do not address whether 
respondent’s practice of law while suspended constitutes a violation of rules that 
may subject him to additional sanctions.