Case Title: Lopez v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 259, 2008, 4, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ALEM LOPEZ,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  Nos. 259, 2008 and 
§               4, 2009  
§          CONSOLIDATED 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0404018958 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: April 13, 2009 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: May 13, 2009 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 13th day of May 2009, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Alem Lopez, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s December 19, 2008 order following remand, which denied 
his second motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61.1  We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we affirm.  
                                          
 
1 While the Superior Court originally considered, and denied, Lopez’ claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel on the merits, it summarily denied the remainder of his 
postconviction claims as time-barred under Rule 61(i) (1).  In its October 22, 2008 Order 
on appeal, this Court held that those claims were not time-barred and remanded the 
matter to the Superior Court for consideration of all of Lopez’ claims that were not 
previously addressed on the merits.   
 
2
 
(2) 
In November 2004, Lopez was charged with Murder in the First 
Degree, Attempted Murder in the First Degree, Possession of a Deadly 
Weapon by a Person Prohibited, and two counts of Possession of a Firearm 
During the Commission of a Felony.  He faced a sentence of life 
imprisonment.  In September 2006, Lopez pleaded guilty to a single count of 
Manslaughter and a single count of Possession of a Firearm During the 
Commission of a Felony.  On the manslaughter conviction, he was sentenced 
to twenty-five years of Level V incarceration, to be suspended after twenty-
three years for decreasing levels of supervision.  On the weapon conviction, 
he was sentenced to ten years of Level V incarceration.  Lopez did not file a 
direct appeal.   
 
(3) 
At his sentencing hearing, Lopez unsuccessfully moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  His subsequent motion for reargument also was 
unsuccessful.  Lopez did not file an appeal from the Superior Court’s denial 
of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.    
 
(4) 
In this appeal from the Superior Court’s December 19, 2008 
denial of his second postconviction motion, Lopez claims that a) his guilty 
plea was involuntary; b) the Superior Court should have held an evidentiary 
hearing regarding his appointed trial counsel’s conflict of interest; c) the 
Superior Court should have postponed his trial so he could retain private 
 
3
counsel; d) the Superior Court improperly questioned him during his plea 
hearing; and e) his counsel provided ineffective assistance. 
 
(5) 
In considering a motion for postconviction relief, the Superior 
Court first must ascertain if any of the procedural bars of Rule 61 applies.2  
If a procedural bar is found to exist, the Superior Court should refrain from 
considering the merits of any barred claims.3  The Superior Court also 
should refrain from addressing the merits of claims that are conclusory and 
unsubstantiated.4   
 
(6) 
In this case, Lopez’ first claim that his guilty plea was 
involuntary is procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated.5  Moreover, 
Lopez has failed to demonstrate that reconsideration of that claim is 
warranted in the interest of justice.6  We note that, while the transcript of 
Lopez’ guilty plea colloquy reflects that he initially was reluctant to accept 
the State’s plea bargain, the Superior Court judge afforded him extra time to 
consult with his counsel.  Ultimately, having consulted with his counsel, 
Lopez decided that it was in his best interest to accept the State’s plea 
                                          
 
2 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 555. 
5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (4).   
6 Id. 
 
4
bargain.  The transcript clearly reflects that his guilty plea was knowing and 
voluntary.  We, therefore, conclude that Lopez’ first claim is without merit.       
 
(7) 
Lopez’ next two claims are that the Superior Court should have 
held an evidentiary hearing regarding his counsel’s conflict of interest and 
should have postponed his trial so that he could retain private counsel.  
Under Delaware law, a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any 
alleged errors or defects occurring prior to the entry of the plea.7  Because 
Lopez’ guilty plea was voluntary, we conclude that those claims are waived 
and, therefore, must be denied. 
 
(8) 
Lopez’ next claim is that the Superior Court judge improperly 
questioned him at the plea hearing.  Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 11, 
a Superior Court judge is required to engage in a colloquy on the record with 
any defendant who enters a plea of guilty in order to insure that the 
defendant enters the plea fully aware of the nature of the charges against him 
and the consequences of entering the plea.8  The transcript of Lopez’ plea 
colloquy reveals no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior 
Court judge in this respect.  Therefore, we conclude that this claim also is 
without merit. 
                                          
 
7 Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 311-12 (Del. 1988). 
8 State v. Brown, 250 A.2d 503, 505 (Del. 1969). 
 
5
 
(9) 
Lopez’ fifth, and final, claim is that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance.  In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel within the context of a voluntary guilty plea, the defendant must 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on 
proceeding to trial.9  The transcript of Lopez’ plea colloquy reflects that he 
had thoroughly discussed his plea with his counsel and was satisfied with the 
advice he was given regarding the plea.  In the absence of clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary, Lopez is bound by those 
representations.10  Moreover, Lopez received a clear benefit by entering a 
guilty plea.  If he had proceeded to trial, he risked a sentence of life 
imprisonment.  As such, we conclude that this claim, too, is without merit.11      
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
 
  
                                          
 
9 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 60 (Del. 1988). 
10 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
11 To the extent that Lopez’ ineffectiveness claims involve conduct on the part of his 
counsel that preceded his voluntary guilty plea, those claims have been waived and, 
therefore, must be denied.  Downer v. State, 543 A.2d at 311-12.