Case Title: Britt v. N.C. Sheriffs' Educ. and Training Standards Comm'n #+##+#

Citation: 348 N.C. 573

Docket Number: 600PA97

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 600PA97
FILED: 9 JULY 1998
MARILYN JEAN BRITT,
Petitioner
v.
N.C. SHERIFFS’ EDUCATION AND TRAINING STANDARDS COMMISSION,
Respondent
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 128 N.C. App. 81,
493 S.E.2d 86 (1997), affirming an order entered by Cobb, J., on
26 September 1996 in Superior Court, Onslow County, that reversed
the final agency decision of the North Carolina Sheriffs'
Education and Training Standards Commission revoking plaintiff's
deputy sheriff’s certification.  Heard in the Supreme Court
27 May 1998.
Charles K. Medlin, Jr., for petitioner-appellee.
Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John J.
Aldridge, III, Assistant Attorney General, for
respondent-appellant.
WHICHARD, Justice.
The North Carolina Sheriffs' Education and Training
Standards Commission (Commission) appeals from a decision of the
Court of Appeals reviewing the Commission's interpretation and
application of the North Carolina Administrative Code provisions
governing the certification of justice officers in this state.
The facts giving rise to this appeal are not in
dispute.  In February 1990 Marilyn Jean Britt, petitioner, was
indicted for felonious perjury based on her false testimony under
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oath in a divorce proceeding.  On 10 April 1992, as part of a
plea arrangement under which the State agreed to dismiss the
felonious perjury charge, petitioner pled no contest to the
misdemeanor offense of obstruction of justice.  Petitioner
understood that she could receive a maximum sentence of two
years’ imprisonment for this offense.  After accepting
petitioner's plea of no contest, however, the superior court
entered a prayer for judgment continued upon payment of the
costs.
On 5 September 1994 petitioner was appointed to be a
deputy with the Onslow County Sheriff's Department.  Petitioner
applied for and received certification as a Deputy Sheriff
effective 14 September 1994.  A subsequent background check by
the Commission revealed petitioner's no-contest plea.
On 8 December 1994 the Commission notified petitioner
that probable cause existed to revoke her certification as a
justice officer based upon her conviction of the class B
misdemeanor offense of obstruction of justice.  Petitioner
requested an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 150B of
the North Carolina General Statutes.  The Commission held a
hearing and in its final agency decision ordered that
petitioner's sheriff's certification be revoked pursuant to
12 NCAC 10B .0204(d)(2), the regulation authorizing revocation of
a previously issued sheriff's certification.  Petitioner appealed
to the trial court pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 150B-43.  The trial
court reversed the Commission, concluding that petitioner had not
been "convicted" of a class B misdemeanor within the meaning of
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that term as used in 12 NCAC 10B .0204(d)(2).  On the
Commission’s appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
a plea of no contest, followed by a prayer for judgment
continued, was not a "conviction" under the North Carolina
Administrative Code, and that the Commission improperly revoked
petitioner's certification.  Britt v. N.C. Sheriffs' Educ. &
Training Standards Comm'n, 128 N.C. App. 81, 83-84, 493 S.E.2d
86, 87 (1997).
The Commission contends that petitioner's plea of no
contest was a "conviction" for purposes of petitioner's deputy
sheriff’s certification despite the trial court's entry of a
prayer for judgment continued.  We agree.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs this
appeal and defines the scope of our review of the Commission's
final agency decision.  N.C.G.S. § 150B-51 provides that a court
reviewing a final agency decision may
reverse or modify the agency's decision if
the substantial rights of the petitioners may
have been prejudiced because the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional
provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory
authority or jurisdiction of the
agency;
(3)
Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4)
Affected by other error of law;
(5)
Unsupported by substantial evidence
admissible under G.S. 150B-29(a),
150B-30, or 150B-31 in view of the
entire record as submitted; or
(6)
Arbitrary or capricious.
N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b) (1995).  This appeal presents an issue
under N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b)(4):  Was the Commission's
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interpretation of "conviction," as used in 12 NCAC 10B
.0204(d)(2) (quoted in pertinent part below), affected by an
error of law?
When the issue on appeal is whether a state agency
erred in interpreting a regulatory term, an appellate court may
freely substitute its judgment for that of the agency and employ
de novo review.  See Brooks v. McWhirter Grading Co., 303 N.C.
573, 580-81, 281 S.E.2d 24, 29 (1981).  However, the
interpretation of a regulation by an agency created to administer
that regulation is traditionally accorded some deference by
appellate courts.  See id. at 581, 281 S.E.2d at 29.
The Commission administers the North Carolina
Administrative Code regulations at issue here.  N.C.G.S. § 17E-4
(1997).  These regulations provide that "[t]he Commission may
revoke, suspend or deny the certification of a justice officer
when the Commission finds that . . . the certified officer has
committed or been convicted of:  . . . a crime or unlawful act
defined in 12 NCAC 10B .0103(10)(b) as a Class B misdemeanor
within the five-year period prior to the date of appointment." 
12 NCAC 10B .0204(d)(2) (Nov. 1995) (emphasis added).  They also
explain that " <Convicted' or <Conviction' means and includes, for
purposes of this Chapter, the entry of:  . . . a plea of no
contest."  12 NCAC 10B .0103(2)(c) (Nov. 1995).
These regulations are unambiguous.  When the language
of regulations is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for
judicial construction, and courts must give the regulations their
plain meaning.  See Correll v. Division of Social Serv., 332 N.C.
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141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992).  Applying the clear meaning
of these regulations to the facts here, petitioner's plea of no
contest to the class B misdemeanor offense of obstruction of
justice was a "conviction" under 12 NCAC 10B .0103(2)(c), and the
Commission, pursuant to 12 NCAC 10B .0204(d)(2), could revoke
petitioner's certification as a justice officer based upon that
conviction.
The fact that the trial court issued a prayer for
judgment continued does not alter the plain language of these
regulations.  Nothing in the regulations suggests that
"conviction" means and includes a plea of no contest only in
those instances in which the trial court does not enter a prayer
for judgment continued.  Further, this Court and the General
Assembly have recognized that a plea may amount to a "conviction"
despite the issuance of a prayer for judgment continued.  See
State v. Sidberry, 337 N.C. 779, 781-82, 448 S.E.2d 798, 800-01
(1994) (holding that a guilty plea amounted to a "conviction"
despite the fact that it was followed by the entry of a prayer
for judgment continued); N.C.G.S. § 15A-1331(b) (1997)
(recognizing that "a person has been convicted when he . . . has
entered a plea of guilty or no contest," regardless of the
judgment imposed).
We thus conclude that, in the context presented, the
Commission properly interpreted "conviction" to include a plea of
no contest followed by a prayer for judgment continued.  We also
conclude that the Commission properly revoked petitioner's deputy
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sheriff’s certification under 12 NCAC 10B .0204(d)(2) based upon
such a conviction.
Alternatively, 12 NCAC 10B .0204(d)(2) permits the
Commission to revoke, suspend, or deny the certification of a
certified officer if that officer has committed a class B
misdemeanor.  Petitioner does not contest that she in fact
committed a class B misdemeanor.  Thus, the Commission could have
revoked petitioner's certification under 12 NCAC 10B .0204(d)(2)
without relying upon petitioner's conviction.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for
further remand to the Commission for reinstatement of the
Commission's final agency decision.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.