Case Title: Baird v. Owczarek, M.D., et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 504, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-05-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
THOMAS BAIRD, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 504, 2013 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Case No. N11C-09-241 
FRANK R. OWCZAREK, M.D., 
§ 
EYE CARE OF DELAWARE LLC, § 
and CATARACT AND LASER 
§ 
CENTER, LLC, 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellees.  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  May 14, 2014 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  May 28, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED and 
REMANDED.   
 
Bruce L. Hudson, Esquire, Hudson & Castle Law, Wilmington, 
Delaware, and Todd J. Krouner, Esquire (argued), Chappaqua, New York, 
for appellant. 
 
Gregory S. McKee, Esquire (argued), Joshua H. Meyeroff, Esquire, 
Wharton Levin Ehrmantraut & Klein, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, for 
appellees.   
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
2 
 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Superior Court that was 
entered after a jury verdict in favor of defendants-appellees, Frank R. 
Owczarek, M.D. (“Dr. Owczarek”), Eye Care of Delaware, LLC, and 
Cataract and Laser Center, LLC (collectively, the “Appellees”).  The 
plaintiff-appellant, Thomas Baird (“Baird”), appeals on a number of 
grounds.  We have concluded that the Superior Court’s failure to conduct 
any investigation into alleged egregious juror misconduct (internet research), 
which violated the Superior Court’s direct instruction to refrain from 
consulting outside sources of information, constituted reversible error.  In 
addition, the Superior Court’s failure to exclude evidence of informed 
consent in this medical negligence action also constituted reversible error.  
Accordingly, the judgments of the Superior Court are reversed and this 
matter is remanded for a new trial.1 
Facts 
 
On January 27, 2004, Baird underwent a LASIK2 procedure on both 
eyes performed by Dr. Owczarek.  On October 14, 2009, Baird underwent a 
second LASIK surgery on his left eye—a LASIK “enhancement.”  Baird 
                                          
 
1 We do not address the other evidentiary issues raised by Baird in this appeal but instead 
hold that those evidentiary rulings shall not constitute the law of the case at a new trial. 
2 Laser-Assisted In Situ Keratomileusis. 
3 
 
alleged that as a result of the surgeries, he developed post-LASIK ectasia, a 
vision-threatening corneal disease that required a DALK3 procedure. 
On September 30, 2011, Baird filed a medical negligence action, 
alleging that the Dr. Owczarek was negligent, not during his performance of 
the surgeries themselves, but in his decision to perform the surgeries in the 
first place.  Baird also brought a claim based on a lack of informed consent, 
which he later withdrew. 
 
Having withdrawn his informed consent claim, Baird moved to 
exclude the defense of assumption of risk and evidence of informed consent.  
In the same motion, Baird requested that the trial judge exclude the expert 
testimony of Dr. Steven Siepser, the defendant’s standard of care expert.  
The trial judge denied the motions, but agreed to give a limiting instruction 
on the issue of informed consent. 
 
An eight-day trial began on April 1, 2013.  The jury returned a verdict 
in favor of the defendants.  Over a two-week period following the trial, Juror 
No. 6 left a telephone message with Baird’s counsel and repeatedly 
attempted to contact the trial judge to inform him of juror misconduct.  
Eventually, Juror No. 6 wrote a letter to the trial judge alleging that Juror 
No. 9 had done internet research during the jury’s deliberations.  Baird 
                                          
 
3 Deep Anterior Lamellar Keratoplasty.   
4 
 
moved for a new trial based upon the allegations of misconduct by Juror No. 
6.  After hearing oral argument, the trial judge summarily denied the motion 
for a new trial without conducting any investigation. 
Delaware Constitution 
The historical origins of the right to trial by jury which is provided for 
in the Delaware Constitution was reviewed by this Court in Claudio v. 
State.4  When the Delaware Constitution of 1792 was adopted, the right to 
trial by jury set forth in the federal Bill of Rights as the Sixth5 and Seventh6 
Amendments to the United States Constitution was only a protection against 
action by the federal government.7  In Claudio, this Court noted that when 
Delaware adopted its Constitution in 1792, notwithstanding the ratification 
of the first ten amendments or federal Bill of Rights in 1791, it did not create 
“a mirror image of the United States Constitution” with regard to trial by 
jury.8 
                                          
 
4 Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278 (Del. 1991). 
5 The Sixth Amendment pertains to criminal trials.  For a discussion of the history of trial 
by jury in criminal proceedings in Delaware see Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278 (Del. 
1991).   
6 The Seventh Amendment pertains to civil trials and provides that “[i]n Suits at common 
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court 
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”  U.S. Const. amend. 
VII (emphasis added).  For a discussion of the history of trial by jury in civil proceedings 
in Delaware see McCool v. Gehret, 657 A.2d 269 (Del. 1995). 
7 Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
8 Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d at 1289. 
5 
 
 
Following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury in criminal 
proceedings has been deemed to have been incorporated by the Due Process 
clause and now also provides protection against state action.9  Nevertheless, 
the United States Supreme Court has not held that the Seventh Amendment’s 
guarantee of jury trials in civil proceedings was made applicable to the states 
by the incorporation doctrine10 with the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.11   Accordingly, the right to 
a jury trial in civil proceedings has always been and remains exclusively 
protected by provisions in the Delaware Constitution.12 
Jury Determines Facts 
 
When the Delaware Constitution was rewritten in 1897, the General 
Assembly included several significant provisions regarding the right to trial 
by jury.  Article I of the 1897 Delaware Constitution was denominated for 
the first time as the “Bill of Rights.”  Section 4 of that article provided for 
the right to trial by jury as “heretofore.”  Article IV, Section 19 was a new 
addition in the 1897 Constitution and provided:  “Judges shall not charge 
                                          
 
9 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
10 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3034 n.12 (collecting 
cases where federal Bill of Rights have been incorporated) & n.13 (collecting cases 
where federal Bill of Rights have not been incorporated) (2010).   
11 Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 
U.S. 90 (1876).   
12 McCool v. Gehret, 657 A.2d 269 (Del. 1995). 
6 
 
juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the questions of fact in 
issue and declare the law.”13  The reason given during the Constitutional 
Debates for the adoption of Section 19 was to ensure “that Judges shall 
confine themselves to their business, which is to adjudge the law and leave 
juries to determine the facts.”14   
 
In Storey, this Court characterized Section 19 as perpetuating 
Delaware’s commitment to trial by jury in civil actions at law with regard to 
issues of fact.15  In examining when a trial judge may set aside a jury verdict, 
this Court described Delaware’s long history of commitment to trial by 
jury.16  We explained that Section 19 reaffirmed Delaware’s commitment to 
the common law principles regarding trial by jury: 
In the policy of the law of this state, declared by the courts in 
numberless decisions, the jury is the sole judge of the facts of a 
case, and so jealous is the law of this policy that by express 
provision of the Constitution the court is forbidden to touch 
upon the facts of the case in its charge to the jury.17 
 
 
Accordingly, under the Delaware Constitution, an essential element of 
the right to trial by jury is for verdicts to be based solely on factual 
                                          
 
13 Del. Const. art. IV, § 19 (emphasis added). 
14 3 Constitutional Debates at 1730 (emphasis added).  See Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 
458, 463 n.4 (Del. 1979).   
15 Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d at 462-65. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 462 (quoting Philadelphia, B. & W.R. Co. v. Gatta, 85 A. 721, 729 (Del. 1913)) 
(emphasis added). 
7 
 
determinations that are made from the evidence presented at trial.18  The 
accused’s rights to confrontation, cross-examination and the assistance of 
counsel19 assure the accuracy of the testimony which the jurors hear and 
safeguard the proper admission of other evidence.20  Those rights can be 
exercised effectively only if evidence is presented to the jury in the 
courtroom,21 where that evidence can be subjected to the adversarial process 
under the authoritative guidance of a trial judge.  These principles are 
equally applicable to the parties’ rights in a Delaware civil jury trial.  In 
addition, the Delaware Constitution provides that, in a civil proceeding that 
is appealed to this Court, “from a verdict of a jury, the findings of the jury, if 
supported by the evidence, shall be conclusive.”22 
Ascertaining Juror Misconduct 
 
The right to an impartial jury is compromised if even one juror is 
improperly influenced.23  This Court has recognized the difficulty which a 
party has in proving actual prejudice within a jury panel.24  That difficulty is 
attributable to the sanctity of the jury’s deliberations and the common law 
prohibition against jurors impeaching their own verdict.  Accordingly, this 
                                          
 
18 Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d 1034, 1040 (Del. 1985). 
19 Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965). 
20 Smith v. State, 317 A.2d 20, 23 (Del. 1974).  
21 Id.   
22 Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
23 Styler v. State, 417 A.2d 948, 951-52 (Del. 1980). 
24 Massey v. State, 541 A.2d 1254, 1257-58 (Del. 1988). 
8 
 
Court has held “that a flat prohibition against receiving post-verdict 
testimony from jurors would contravene another important public policy:  
that of ‘redressing the injury of the private litigant where a verdict was 
reached by a jury that was not impartial.’”25   
 
The need to accommodate the conflicting policies of preserving the 
sanctity of a jury’s deliberations and the parties’ right to an impartial jury, 
has resulted in the recognition of a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic 
influences upon a jury’s verdict.26  D.R.E. 606(b) codifies the common law 
prohibition against inquiry into the jurors’ mental processes,27 but also 
provides an exception: 
[A] juror may testify on the question whether extraneous 
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s 
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror.28 
                                          
 
25 Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886, 895 (Del. 1987) (citing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 
U.S. 454, 462 (1907)). 
26 Id.   
27 It has been codified in Delaware Rule of Evidence 606(b): 
COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS.  Inquiry into Validity of 
Verdict or Indictment.  Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or 
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring 
during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything 
upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to 
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his 
mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify 
on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence 
was improperly brought to bear upon ay juror.  Nor may his affidavit or 
evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he 
would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. 
28 Id. (emphasis added). 
9 
 
 
Egregious Circumstance Test 
In an effort to address the evidentiary limitations caused by precluding 
any inquiry into a juror’s mental processes, this Court has adopted an 
inherently prejudicial egregious circumstance test.29  To succeed on a claim 
of improper jury influence, a party must either prove that he or she was 
“identifiably prejudiced” by the juror misconduct or prove the existence of 
“‘egregious circumstances,’—i.e., circumstances that, if true, would be 
deemed inherently prejudicial so as to raise a presumption of prejudice.”30  
The presumption of prejudice can be rebutted, however, by a post-trial 
investigation conducted by the trial judge.31   
Juror Internet Research Improper 
In this case, the Superior Court clearly and appropriately instructed 
the jury that they were not to “. . .use any electronic device or media, such as 
a telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry, computer; the 
Internet, any Internet service, or any text or instant messaging service; or 
Internet chat room, blog, or website such as Facebook, My Space, LinkedIN 
                                          
 
29 Massey v. State, 541 A.2d at 1258-59. 
30 Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261 (Del. 2008). 
31 Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954). 
10 
 
[sic], YouTube or Twitter to communicate to anyone any information in this 
case or conduct any research about this case until I accept your verdict.”32   
Baird argues that Juror No. 9’s internet research was an improper 
extraneous influence and was an “egregious circumstance” that raised a 
presumption of prejudice.  We agree.  Internet research provides a juror with 
access to information that was not admitted into evidence and consists of 
written “text” that is inadmissible into evidence under any circumstance. 
 
This Court has held that “charts” admitted into evidence, which 
included explanatory “text” cannot be distinguished in a principled way 
from a “text from learned treatises” which the policy underlying D.R.E. 
803(18) prohibits from going into the jury room during deliberations.33  
Delaware Rule of Evidence 803(18) states: 
[t]o the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon 
cross-examination, or relied upon by him in direct examination, 
statements contained in published treatises, periodicals or 
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine or other science or 
art, established as reliable authority by the testimony or 
admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by 
judicial notice.  If admitted, the statements may be read into 
evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
 
 
According to Weinstein and Berger, the purpose of Rule 803(18) is to 
help “ensure that the jurors will not be unduly impressed by the treatise, and 
                                          
 
32 See Appellant’s Op. Br. App. at A-1211. 
33 Berry v. Cardiology Consultants, P.A., 935 A.2d 255 (Del. 2007). 
11 
 
that they will not use the text as a starting point for conclusions untested by 
expert testimony . . . .”34  The Handbook of Federal Evidence notes that the 
“provision attempts to prevent jurors from overvaluing the written word        
. . . .”35  Jones on Evidence Civil and Criminal states: 
The last sentence of the rule permits the attorney to read 
relevant passages from the treatise into evidence to bolster, or 
as the basis of questions to challenge the witness, but neither 
the treatise itself, or the relevant passages, may be received as 
exhibits.  This restriction is intended to prevent jurors from 
attempting to interpret or apply the treatise on their own 
independent of the testimony of the expert witness(es) who 
are questioned about it.36 
 
 
Internet research by a juror is an improper extrinsic influence that is 
an egregious circumstance because it has the prospect of being so inherently 
prejudicial that it raises a presumption of prejudice.  Several decades ago, 
this Court held “fairness and, indeed, the integrity of the judicial process, 
make it imperative that jurors receive information about the case only as a 
corporate body in the courtroom.”37  “Nothing is more repugnant to our 
traditions of justice than to be at the mercy of witnesses [or written text] one 
cannot see or challenge, or to have one’s rights stand or fall on the basis of 
                                          
 
34 4 Weinstein and Berger, United States Rules, ¶ 803(18)[02], at 803-375 (1995). 
35 Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 803:18, at 415 (6th ed. 2006). 
36 5 Jones on Evidence Civil and Criminal, § 35:28, at 317 (7th ed. 2003) (emphasis 
added).   
37 Smith v. State, 317 A.2d at 23. 
12 
 
unrevealed facts that perhaps could be explained or refuted.”38  The 
following rationale is applicable to internet research by a juror:   
Had evidence of such matters been offered and admitted over 
his objections, it would have been reversible error.  If the 
admission of such evidence in the trial, where he at least might 
have had opportunity to meet and perchance explain the 
damaging facts, would be prejudicial, it cannot be less so when 
the facts are brought to the attention of the jurors in the jury 
room by one of their fellows whose word, of course, the others 
have no reason to doubt and without the knowledge or consent 
of defendant nor with any opportunity for him to explain the 
facts or rebut the unfavorable inferences.39 
 
Jurors cannot render a fair verdict when facts to support the basis for that 
verdict do not appear in the record evidence that was presented to them in 
the courtroom.  Similarly, a judge may not investigate issues of fact on the 
internet, when a judge sits as the fact finder without a jury.40 
Further Investigation Mandatory 
 
Under D.R.E. 606(b), “a juror may testify on the question whether 
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s 
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear 
on any juror.”41  Thus, testimony about “extrinsic” influences is permissible 
under the rule.  The trial judge acknowledged that under the rules of 
                                          
 
38 Torres v. Allen Family Foods, 672 A.2d 26, 31 (Del. 1995).  
39 Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d at 1045 n.13. 
40 Tribbitt v. Tribbitt, 963 A.2d 1128 (Del. 2008).   
41 D.R.E. 606(b). 
 
13 
 
evidence, Juror No. 6 would be permitted to testify about the “something” 
that was researched by Juror No. 9.   
 
Nevertheless, the trial judge did not call Juror No. 6 to testify.  The 
trial judge explained why he concluded that the circumstances alleged in the 
letter from Juror No. 6 did warrant further investigation: 
The circumstances do not come close to warranting a new trial 
or further investigation here because Juror No. 6 has not stated 
with any detail what Juror No. 9 researched online.  Juror No. 6 
has not explained (if she even knows) what Juror No. 9 “looked 
up” on the internet.  Any prejudice is thus completely 
speculative.  In other words, Plaintiff has not shown that here is 
a “reasonable probability” that what Juror No. 9 researched 
online affected the verdict. 
 
 
Baird argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion in finding 
that Juror No. 6 could, pursuant to D.R.E. 606 (b), testify that Juror No. 9 
did internet research, but in failing to call her to testify or conduct any 
further investigation to determine the content of the outside research.  We 
agree.  Generally, “[t]he trial court has discretion to decide that allegations 
of juror misconduct are not sufficiently credible or specific to warrant 
investigation.”42  However, once the trial court has been presented with 
evidence of internet research by a juror it is incumbent on the trial judge to 
conduct an investigation.   
                                          
 
42 Black v. State, 3 A.3d 218, 221 (Del. 2010). 
14 
 
 
Internet research by a juror is intolerable misconduct because it is an 
extrinsic influence that has the potential to prejudicially compromise the 
jury’s function under the Delaware Constitution to determine facts 
exclusively based upon evidence that is presented in the courtroom.  
Accordingly, we hold that where, as here, a juror makes allegations that one 
or more jurors violated a direct instruction of the trial judge to refrain from 
conducting internet research, such allegations represent an egregious 
circumstance giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice from 
exposure to an improper extrinsic influence.  The presumption of prejudice 
can be rebutted by an investigation.43 
 
An investigation is mandatory when there is an allegation of internet 
research by a juror.  The trial judge must determine whether the alleged 
internet research actually occurred; if it occurred, the content of the outside 
research; whether the content of the internet research prejudiced the errant 
juror; and whether the results of the internet research were communicated to 
other jurors.  If after the trial judge’s investigation there is sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption of prejudice, the trial judge may deny a 
motion for a new trial.  If, however, the opposing party fails to rebut the 
presumption of prejudice arising from a showing of an egregious 
                                          
 
43 Black v. State, 3 A.3d 218, 220 (Del. 2010). 
15 
 
circumstance (internet research), the trial judge must grant a motion for a 
new trial.   
In this case, the allegation of internet research by a juror presented an 
egregious circumstance.  It raised a rebuttable presumption of prejudice by 
an extrinsic influence that may have been rebutted by a post-trial 
investigation.  The trial judge’s failure to conduct any investigation was an 
abuse of discretion and reversible error.44  Since the presumption of 
prejudice was not rebutted, the unexpanded, uncontradicted record reflects 
that parties’ rights under the Delaware Constitution, to have the case 
exclusively decided by evidence that was presented to the jury in the 
courtroom, were violated.     
Informed Consent Forms Improperly Admitted 
 
 
After Baird withdrew his claim for lack of informed consent, his 
counsel filed a motion in limine which sought to preclude the presentation of 
several pieces of evidence.  Among the evidence objected to was the various 
informed consent forms signed by Baird prior to his surgeries.  In the 
                                          
 
44 Black v. State, 3 A.3d 218, 221 (Del. 2010).  Accord Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. 
Weatherwax, 20 F.3d 572, 578 (3d Cir. 1994) (“We have emphasized the importance of 
questioning jurors whenever the integrity of their deliberations is jeopardized . . . . failure 
to evaluate the nature of the jury misconduct or the existence of prejudice require[s] a 
new trial.”).  See also United States v. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 1993) (failure to adequately investigate the 
prejudicial effect of jury misconduct on the jury’s deliberations).  See also George L. 
Blum, Annotation, Prejudicial Effect of Juror Misconduct Arising from Internet Usage, 
48 A.L.R. 6th 135 (2009).   
16 
 
motion, Baird’s counsel argued that the informed consent evidence “bears 
only upon issues relating to Plaintiff’s withdrawn informed consent claim.”  
“Therefore, they now have no probative value to any issues remaining in this 
action.  Moreover, the consent forms would prejudice, confuse and mislead 
the jury.” 
 
In a pretrial conference, the trial judge addressed the various parts of 
Baird’s motion in limine, including the informed consent evidence.  The trial 
judge denied Baird’s motion after finding that the informed consent forms 
were relevant as part of “the work-up done by the defendant” in the context 
of an elective procedure.  The trial judge then requested that Baird’s counsel 
“take the lead” in drafting a jury instruction that would inform the jury about 
the proper use of the evidence.  The jury instructions ultimately contained 
the following language: 
Informed consent is not a valid defense to a medical negligence 
action.  Plaintiff-patient cannot consent to the negligence of a 
defendant-doctor.  The fact that the defendant-doctor may have 
informed the plaintiff of certain known and accepted risks, does 
not excuse him of liability for any negligence. 
 
When determining whether or not Dr. Owczarek committed 
medical negligence, you may not, and should not, consider any 
evidence of Mr. Baird’s consent or any warnings given by Dr. 
Owczarek, as evidence that Mr. Baird consented to Dr. 
Owczarek’s negligence, if any.   
 
17 
 
 
In Delaware, assumption of risk is not a valid defense to a medical 
negligence action as a matter of public policy.45  This Court has never 
addressed the question of whether evidence of informed consent may be 
entered into evidence in a medical negligence case where the plaintiff makes 
no claim for lack of informed consent.  That question has been addressed, 
however, by courts in a number of other jurisdictions.  Those cases 
“uniformly have concluded that evidence of informed consent, such as 
consent forms, is both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial in medical 
malpractice cases without claims of lack of informed consent.”46  We agree. 
                                          
 
45 See Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 885 (Del. Super. 2005). 
46 Hayes v. Camel, 927 A.2d 880, 889 (Conn. 2007) (finding that trial court abused its 
discretion by allowing into evidence informed consent forms in a claim for negligence, 
but finding error harmless). See also Waller v. Aggarwal, 688 N.E.2d 274, 275-76 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1996) (finding that the issue of informed consent, and therefore evidence 
thereof, was irrelevant to plaintiff’s claim of negligence and carried great potential for 
jury confusion); Liscio v. Pinson, 83 P.3d 1149, 1156 (Colo. App. 2003) (finding that 
evidence pertaining to a patient’s informed consent may be unfairly prejudicial and 
irrelevant to a negligence claim, but finding no reversible error because plaintiff “opened 
the door”);  Wright v. Kaye, 589 S.E.2d 307, 317 (Va. 2004) (finding reversible error 
where trial court failed to grant plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of 
informed consent where no claim for lack of informed consent); Warren v. Imperia, 287 
P.3d 1128 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 
evidence of informed consent in a medical malpractice case where no “lack of informed 
consent” claim was brought because the evidence was irrelevant and, to the extent 
relevant, unfairly prejudicial and confusing to the jury); Schwartz v. Johnson, 49 A.3d 
359, 371-75 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding evidence of informed consent because irrelevant to claim for medical 
malpractice without a “lack of informed consent” claim and overly prejudicial or 
confusing to jury even if relevant).     
18 
 
In order to be admissible at trial, evidence must be relevant.47 
Relevant evidence, as defined by Delaware Rule of Evidence 401, is 
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence.”48  D.R.E. 401’s definition 
of relevance contains aspects of materiality and probative value.49  This 
Court has said that “evidence is material if it is offered to prove a fact that is 
of consequence to the action[, and it] has probative value if it affects the 
probability that the fact is as the party offering the evidence asserts it to 
be.”50 
Dr. Owczarek argues that the evidence of informed consent, 
especially the consent forms Baird signed, was relevant to the work-up done 
prior to the surgery, which Dr. Owczarek contends was put at issue during 
trial.  In addition, Dr. Owczarek submits that the consent forms were 
relevant to the historical context of Baird’s treatment and the fact that the 
surgery was elective.  We conclude that Dr. Owczarek’s arguments are 
without merit.      
                                          
 
47 Stickel v. State, 975 A.2d 780, 782 (Del. 2009). 
48 D.R.E. 401. 
49 Stickel v. State, 975 A.2d at 783 (citing Lily v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1060 (Del. 1994)).  
50 Id. 
19 
 
 
In this case, Baird originally brought claims for lack of informed 
consent and for medical malpractice.  Significantly, however, Baird 
dismissed his claim for lack of informed consent prior to trial.  Once Baird’s 
claim for lack of informed consent was removed from the suit, the consent 
forms Baird signed pre-surgery became irrelevant, because assumption of 
the risk is not a valid defense to a claim of medical negligence,51 and 
because evidence of informed consent is neither material or probative of 
whether Dr. Owczarek met the standard care in concluding that Baird was an 
eligible candidate for the surgery.52  Therefore, the evidence should have 
been excluded pursuant to D.R.E. 401. 
 
Even if relevant, “evidence may be excluded where its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues or misleading the jury. . . .”53  Informing the jury of a plaintiff’s 
consent does not help a defendant show that he was not negligent.  Evidence 
of informed consent in a medical malpractice action could confuse the jury 
by creating the impression that consent to the surgery was consent to the 
injury.54  Therefore, because evidence of informed consent in this case 
                                          
 
51 Storm v. NSL Rockland Place, LLC, 898 A.2d 874, 885 (Del. Super. 2005). 
52 Schwartz v. Johnson, 49 A.3d 359, 374-75 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012). 
53 D.R.E. 403. 
54 Schwartz v. Johnson, 49 A.3d 359, 374 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (citing Hayes v. 
Camel, 927 A.2d 880, 888-89 (Conn. 2007)). 
20 
 
carried a clear danger of confusing the jury, even if the evidence would have 
been otherwise relevant, it should have been excluded pursuant to D.R.E. 
403.  The trial judge’s failure to do so was an abuse of its discretion.     
Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded for a new trial.