Case Title: State v. Malshuk

Citation: 177 Vt. 475, 2004 VT 54, 857 A.2d 282

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Malshuk  (2003-243); 177 Vt. 475; 857 A.2d 282

2004 VT 54

[Filed 09-Jun-2004]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                 2004 VT 54

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2003-243

                             JANUARY TERM, 2004

  State of Vermont                   }     APPEALED FROM:
                                     }
                                     }
       v.                            }     District Court of Vermont,
                                     }     Unit No. 3, Orleans Circuit     
                                     }     
  Dennis Malshuk, II                 }
                                     }     DOCKET NO. 452-7-02Oscr

                                           Trial Judge: Walter M. Morris

            In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶ 1     Defendant appeals from his conviction for violating an abuse
  prevention order by following his ex-girlfriend.  Defendant asserts that
  the Orleans District Court erred by (1) violating "the law of the case" by
  changing its definition of "following" from the first trial which resulted
  in a hung jury, (2) instructing the jury that "following" included
  consciously placing oneself in physical proximity of another, (3) denying a
  motion of acquittal because of insufficient evidence to support the
  verdict, and (4) excluding evidence of victim's angry outburst at the
  defendant.  We affirm. 

       ¶ 2     The issues presented in this appeal arose from an encounter in
  Newport between defendant and his ex-girlfriend, Lori Libbey, who had
  previously obtained an abuse prevention order against defendant,
  prohibiting him from stalking, following, or coming within 100 feet of her. 
  On the early evening of May 14, 2002, Libbey was picking up her children
  from day care, when defendant's current girlfriend, Donna Grondin, drove by
  in defendant's truck.  Defendant was a passenger in the vehicle.  After
  taking several minutes to get the children settled in her vehicle, Libbey
  drove to the Main Street intersection and found that defendant's truck was
  there.  As Libbey pulled up behind the truck, the truck drove off, with
  defendant staring out the back window at Libbey. 
   
       ¶ 3     Libbey stopped at her brother's Newport residence to seek his
  advice.  While she was speaking with her brother outside of his house,
  defendant and Donna Grondin drove by several times. Libbey's brother
  advised her to drive home and to call the police if necessary.  As she
  drove home, Libbey saw defendant's truck drive up behind her.  She turned
  onto Route 5, and then pulled off at a rest area to let defendant pass. 
  After waiting for a minute or two, Libbey pulled on to the highway and
  drove slowly to avoid catching defendant.  Nevertheless, she soon came up
  behind defendant's vehicle, and while following behind him, defendant threw
  a beer bottle out of the window.

       ¶ 4     Libbey was stopped by a police officer after Grondin called to
  report that Libbey was driving with a suspended license.  The police
  officer who responded to the call found Libbey upset and crying.  He
  verified that her license was valid and went on to question defendant, whom
  he found buying beer at a local store.

       ¶ 5     Donna Grondin testified that she and defendant were running
  errands while these events were transpiring, including looking for
  defendant's grandmother around Newport, buying meat scraps for their dogs,
  and stopping at a store to make a payment on defendant's account.  Grondin
  also testified that defendant threw the beer bottle out of the window
  because they often throw bottles to a man who collects them from the side
  of the road.  Grondin further explained that defendant and Libbey were
  engaged in a custody battle over their child, and that the guardian ad
  litem had instructed them to call the authorities if they saw Libbey
  operating without a license.  Grondin testified that she had telephoned the
  authorities from a cell phone to report Libbey because she and defendant
  believed that Libbey did not have a valid driver's license.  Grondin made
  two or three calls, reporting Libbey's current location at each respective
  time.  

       ¶ 6     Defendant was charged with violation of an abuse prevention
  order, second offense. 13 V.S.A. § 1030(b).  In the first trial, the jury
  was instructed that "following" meant "to go after, to proceed after or to
  come after, to pursue in an effort to overtake."  The trial resulted in a
  hung jury.  At the second trial, upon the State's request, the judge
  altered the instruction to add that following could also mean, in addition
  to the previous definition, "consciously maintain physical proximity
  nearness with another person over a period of time or distance . . . ." 
  The jury found defendant guilty.  Defendant moved for acquittal alleging
  first, that the trial court erred in its definition of "following," and
  second, that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence.  The
  trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. 

       ¶ 7     Defendant first claims that the trial court erred in changing
  the definition of "follow" from the first trial to the second, and in
  denying the motion for acquittal to correct that error.  Defendant argues
  that this change violated the "law of the case."  Because defendant failed
  to object to the jury instruction, this issue has not been preserved for
  appeal.  See State v. Dunbar, 172 Vt. 557, 559,