Case Title: In re S.D.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 150A19

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
No. 150A19 
Filed 3 April 2020 
IN THE MATTER OF: S.D. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 2 
January 2019 by Judge Louis A. Trosch in District Court, Mecklenburg County.  This 
matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 25 March 2020 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Gretchen L. Caldwell, Associate County Attorney, for petitioner-appellee 
Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth & Family Services 
Division. 
 
K&L Gates, LLP, by Sophie Goodman, for Guardian ad Litem. 
 
Mercedes O. Chut for respondent-appellant father. 
 
 
ERVIN, Justice. 
 
 
Respondent-father Jonathan K. appeals from an order entered by the trial 
court terminating his parental rights in his minor child, S.D.1  After careful 
consideration of respondent-father’s challenges to the trial court’s termination order 
                                            
1 S.D. will be referred to throughout the remainder of this opinion as “Sarah,” which 
is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading. 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s 
termination order should be affirmed. 
In September 2016, the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, 
Youth and Family Services Division assumed responsibility for addressing concerns 
that Sarah might be a neglected juvenile from the Gaston County Department of 
Social Services.  At that time, Sarah was in a kinship placement with a maternal 
great-aunt as the result of substance abuse and mental health problems involving 
her mother and her mother’s boyfriend.  After Sarah’s mother tested positive for 
methamphetamines at the time that she gave birth to Sarah’s half sibling on 30 
November 2016, YFS filed a juvenile petition alleging that Sarah was a neglected and 
dependent juvenile and obtained nonsecure custody of her on 2 December 2016.2  
Sarah’s placement with her great-aunt continued after she was taken into YFS 
custody. 
At the time that YFS filed the juvenile petition and obtained nonsecure custody 
of Sarah, respondent-father was incarcerated in the custody of the Division of Adult 
Correction based upon convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon and felony 
drug-related offenses.  Although YFS noted that respondent-father was Sarah’s 
father in the juvenile petition, it also alleged that “[p]aternity ha[d] not been 
established” and that “[respondent-father] ha[d] never seen [Sarah] nor ha[d] he 
                                            
2 The juvenile petition also addressed the status of Sarah’s newborn half sibling, who 
is not respondent-father’s child. 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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provided any financial or emotional support to her.”  When a YFS social worker 
visited respondent-father in prison on 31 January 2017, respondent-father 
acknowledged that he had a history of substance abuse, requested paternity testing, 
and expressed a willingness to enter into a case plan and participate in remedial 
services in the event that he was determined to be Sarah’s biological father.  In the 
aftermath of this meeting, YFS proposed an initial Out-of-Home Family Services 
Agreement, pursuant to which respondent-father would be required, among other 
things, to complete an assessment through the Families in Recovery Stay Together 
program, maintain sobriety, follow any recommendations resulting from the FIRST 
assessment, maintain consistent contact with YFS and Sarah’s guardian ad litem, 
complete parenting education, and demonstrate the skills that he had learned during 
parenting education in the course of his interactions with Sarah. 
The juvenile petition came on for hearing before Judge David H. Strickland on 
15 February 2017.  Paternity of Sarah had not been established by the time of the 
hearing.  In light of an agreement between the parties, which included stipulations 
to the existence of certain facts and indicated that “[respondent-father] ha[d] never 
seen [Sarah] nor ha[d] he provided any financial or emotional support to her[,]” Judge 
Strickland entered an order on 27 February 2017 in which he adjudicated Sarah to 
be a neglected and dependent juvenile, ordered that Sarah remain in YFS custody, 
and established reunification as the primary permanent plan, with adoption and 
guardianship being the concurrent secondary plan. 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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On 28 February 2017, respondent-father submitted to DNA testing.  In 
addition, respondent-father was present for the first permanency planning review 
hearing on 11 May 2017 despite his continued incarceration.  In the review hearing 
order that resulted from the 11 May 2017 hearing, Judge Strickland determined that 
respondent-father was Sarah’s biological father based upon the results of the DNA 
test; ordered that respondent-father contact YFS immediately after his release in 
September 2017 so that he could begin working on his case plan; authorized 
respondent-father to send mail or gifts to Sarah through YFS, and noted that Sarah’s 
great-aunt had authorized respondent-father to call her for the purpose of inquiring 
about Sarah’s well-being. 
Respondent-father sent a birthday card to Sarah prior to the next review 
hearing, which was held on 25 August 2017.  In a review order entered on 18 
September 2017, Judge Strickland established a plan under which respondent-father 
was allowed to visit with Sarah for two hours each week following his release from 
his incarceration in the event that he had demonstrated his ability to maintain 
sobriety by providing a clean drug screen to YFS.  In addition, Judge Strickland 
changed Sarah’s permanent plan to a primary plan of adoption and a concurrent 
secondary plan of legal guardianship and reunification on the grounds, among others, 
that respondent-mother had failed to make progress in satisfying the requirements 
of  her case plan and the fact that respondent-father had remained incarcerated since 
the filing of the  juvenile petition. 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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Respondent-father was released from prison on 21 September 2017.  Between 
the date of his release and the next review hearing on 20 December 2017, respondent-
father contacted YFS for the purpose of setting up a meeting to develop his case plan 
and to initiate a visitation program.  However, respondent-father failed to appear on 
four scheduled meeting dates in October before finally meeting with a YFS 
representative on 21 November 2017.  Although respondent-father expressed 
hesitation about participating in the case plan process, he agreed to complete a FIRST 
assessment.  In spite of this agreement, respondent-father failed to complete the 
required FIRST assessment prior to the 20 December 2017 review hearing and had 
no further contact with YFS in advance of that hearing aside from a text message 
that he transmitted to a social worker on the date of the hearing indicating that he 
would be unable to attend.  Similarly, even though respondent-father had contacted 
the maternal great-aunt on three separate occasions to set up a visit with Sarah, he 
never actually visited with his daughter. 
In the order entered following the 20 December 2017 review hearing on 26 
January 2018, the trial court ordered respondent-father to comply with the case plan 
that had been proposed by YFS, to obtain stable housing and employment, and to 
consistently visit with Sarah.  In spite of the fact that it determined that respondent-
father had failed to make significant progress toward complying with the provisions 
of his case plan, the trial court concluded that the initiation of a termination of 
parental rights proceeding at that time would not be in Sarah’s best interests and 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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determined that respondent-father should be afforded “one more short review period 
to demonstrate significant progress . . . towards reunification.”  As a result, the trial 
court ordered respondent-father to “immediately demonstrate his commitment to 
reunifying with [Sarah] by taking affirmative action to comply with his case plan.” 
Although respondent-father visited with Sarah shortly after the 20 December 
2017 review hearing, he otherwise failed to make significant progress toward 
satisfying the requirements of his case plan prior to the next review hearing, which 
was set for 20 February 2018.  On the contrary, respondent-father was arrested for 
an alleged parole violation on 7 February 2018 and remained in custody until 12 
February 2018.  In view of the fact that respondent-father had failed to make 
significant progress in satisfying the provisions of his case plan by the time of the 20 
February 2018 review hearing, the trial court concluded in the resulting order that 
termination of respondent-father’s parental rights would be in Sarah’s best interests 
and ordered YFS to make a filing seeking the termination of his parental rights in 
Sarah within the next sixty days.  On the other hand, the trial court did not suspend 
efforts to reunify Sarah with respondent-father and allowed respondent-father to 
continue to visit with Sarah on the condition that, prior to his next visit, he provide 
a clean drug screen and meet with YFS for the purpose of discussing the provisions 
of his case plan.  On 30 April 2018, YFS filed a motion seeking to have respondent-
father’s parental rights in Sarah terminated on the grounds of neglect and willfully 
leaving her in foster care or a placement outside the home for more than twelve 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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months without making reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that 
had led to her removal from the home.  N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2) (2019).3 
On 14 May 2018, respondent-father was arrested for possession of heroin, 
possession of methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  In addition, 
respondent-father was charged with violating the terms and conditions of his parole 
on 15 May 2018 as a result of the fact that these new criminal charges had been 
lodged against him.  Respondent-father remained incarcerated in connection with 
these new charges until he entered a plea of guilty to them on 5 September 2018, 
received a suspended sentence, and was released on probation. 
After a continuance from a 25 July 2018 hearing date resulting from 
respondent-father’s incarceration, another review hearing was held on 12 September 
2018.  On 21 November 2018, the trial court entered a review order finding that 
respondent-father had failed to make sustained efforts to comply with the provisions 
of his case plan or to make significant progress toward reunification with Sarah.  In 
view of his failure to satisfy the requirements that had been established as a 
prerequisite for the reinstatement of visitation, respondent-father had not had any 
additional visits with Sarah as of that date. 
                                            
3 The YFS filing also sought to terminate the mother’s parental rights in Sarah and 
the parental rights of the mother and the mother’s boyfriend in Sarah’s half sibling. 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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The motion to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights came on for 
hearing before the trial court on 12 December 2018.4  On 2 January 2019, the trial 
court entered an order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights in Sarah on 
both of the grounds alleged in the termination motion.  The trial court further 
concluded that the termination of respondent-father’s parental rights in Sarah would 
be in the child’s best interests.  Respondent-father noted an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from the trial court’s order.5 
In seeking relief from the trial court’s termination order before this Court, 
respondent-father argues that the trial court erred by determining that his parental 
rights in Sarah were subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and 
(2).  According to well-established North Carolina law, termination of parental rights 
proceedings are conducted utilizing a two-stage process.  N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109, -1110 
                                            
4 Although the motion that YFS had filed sought to terminate the rights of the parents 
in both Sarah and her half sibling, the 12 December 2018 hearing was limited to a 
consideration of the issue of whether respondent-father’s parental rights in Sarah should be 
terminated.  The hearing concerning the termination of the mother’s rights in Sarah was 
continued after the mother executed a relinquishment of her parental rights in Sarah on 7 
December 2018, see N.C.G.S. §§ 48-3-701, 48-3-706 (2017), with this aspect of the termination 
proceeding being subsequently dismissed after the time within which the mother was entitled 
to revoke the relinquishment of her parental rights in Sarah had expired.  The termination 
proceeding regarding Sarah’s half sibling was dismissed by YFS after a guardian had been 
appointed for Sarah’s half sibling. 
 
5 Although respondent-father’s notice of appeal specifies that his appeal had been 
noted to the Court of Appeals, rather than to this Court, we elect, in the exercise of our 
discretion, to issue a writ of certiorari authorizing review of respondent-father’s challenges 
to the trial court’s termination order on the merits in the exercise of our discretion given the 
seriousness of the issues that are implicated by the trial court’s termination order.  In re 
N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 73–74, 833 S.E.2d 768, 771 (2019). 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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(2019).  “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by 
‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence of one or more grounds for 
termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes.”  In re A.U.D., 373 
N.C. 3, 5–6, 832 S.E.2d 698, 700 (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2017)).  “If 
[the trial court] determines that one or more grounds listed in section 7B-1111 are 
present, the court proceeds to the dispositional stage, at which the court must 
consider whether it is in the best interests of the juvenile to terminate parental 
rights.”  In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 835, 842, 788 S.E.2d 162, 167 (2016) (citing In re 
Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614–15 (1997); N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110).  “This 
Court reviews a trial court’s adjudication decision pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 ‘in 
order to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and 
convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law,’ with the trial 
court’s conclusions of law being subject to de novo review on appeal.”  In re N.D.A., 
373 N.C. 71, 73, 833 S.E.2d 768, 771 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 
111, 316 S.E.2d 246, 253 (1984) (citation omitted)).  Findings of fact that are not 
challenged on appeal on the grounds that they lack sufficient evidentiary support are 
binding for purposes of appellate review.  Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 
S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). 
In his initial challenge to the trial court’s termination order, respondent-father 
argues that the trial court erred by concluding that his parental rights in Sarah were 
subject to termination on the grounds of neglect. 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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According to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), a trial court has the 
authority to terminate a parent’s parental rights in a child 
in the event that the parent has neglected the child as that 
term is defined in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101, which provides that 
a neglected juvenile is, among other things, a juvenile who 
“does not [receive] proper care, supervision, or discipline 
from the juvenile’s parent, guardian, custodian, or 
caretaker; or who has been abandoned.” 
 
In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 79–80, 833 S.E.2d at 774–75 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-
101(15)).  As the Court of Appeals has recognized, “[n]eglect is more than a parent’s 
failure to provide physical necessities and can include the total failure to provide love, 
support, affection, and personal contact.”  In re C.L.S., 245 N.C. App. 75, 78, 781 
S.E.2d 680, 682 (citation omitted), aff’d per curiam, 369 N.C. 58, 791 S.E.2d 457 
(2016). 
“[I]n deciding whether a child is neglected for purposes of 
terminating parental rights, the dispositive question is the 
fitness of the parent to care for the child ‘at the time of the 
termination proceeding.’ ”  In the event that “a child has 
not been in the custody of the parent for a significant period 
of time prior to the termination hearing, ‘requiring the 
petitioner in such circumstances to show that the child is 
currently neglected by the parent would make termination 
of parental rights impossible.’ ”  In such circumstances, the 
trial court may find that a parent’s parental rights in a 
child are subject to termination on the grounds of neglect 
in the event that the petitioner makes “a showing of past 
neglect and a likelihood of future neglect by the parent.” 
 
In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 80, 833 S.E.2d at 775 (citations omitted).  “If past neglect is 
shown, the trial court also must then consider evidence of changed circumstances.”  
In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. 149, 152, 804 S.E.2d 513, 516 (2017) (citing In re Ballard, 311 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984)).  “The determinative factors must be the 
best interests of the child and the fitness of the parent to care for the child at the time 
of the termination proceeding.”  In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at 232. 
After noting that it had received its orders in the underlying neglect and 
dependency case into evidence without objection, the trial court made detailed 
findings of fact based upon those orders and the testimony that had been received at 
the termination hearing.  Among other things, the trial court found in Finding of Fact 
No. 15 that Sarah had been adjudicated to be a neglected and dependent juvenile on 
15 February 2017 and determined in Finding of Fact No. 16 that YFS had proposed 
an initial case plan for the purpose of addressing the barriers to reunification between 
respondent-father and Sarah which, in the trial court’s opinion, consisted of 
substance abuse, mental health, and respondent-father’s lack of stable housing and 
employment.  In Finding of Fact Nos. 17 through 56, the trial court delineated 
respondent-father’s progress, or lack thereof, in addressing those barriers to 
reunification between the date upon which Sarah had been adjudicated to be a 
neglected and dependent juvenile and the date of the final review hearing, which had 
been held on 12 September 2018.  In Finding of Fact Nos. 57 through 73, the trial 
court addressed the extent to which respondent-father had addressed the barriers to 
reunification between the date of the 12 September 2018 review hearing and the date 
of the 12 December 2018 termination hearing.  According to the trial court’s findings 
of fact, respondent-father (1) never made significant, sustained progress toward 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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addressing the barriers to his reunification with Sarah; (2) had not established a 
relationship with Sarah; and (3) only desired to have contact and visit with Sarah 
instead of obtaining custody of her. 
Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that respondent-
father’s parental rights in Sarah were subject to termination for neglect.  See N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(1).  More specifically, the trial court determined in Conclusion of Law 
No. 8 that, “[p]ursuant to N.C.G.S. §[ ]7B-1111(a)(1), [respondent-father] has 
neglected the juvenile as that term is defined in N.C.G.S. §[ ]7B-101(15) in that he 
has failed to provide proper care, supervision or discipline for the juvenile” and 
further determined in Conclusion of Law No. 9 “that the likelihood of ongoing or 
continued neglect in the future is significantly high if the juvenile is returned to 
[respondent-father’s] care.”  The trial court explained the rationale underlying the 
second of these two determinations in Conclusion of Law No. 9, stating that: 
[Respondent-father] has made almost no effort to establish 
a relationship with [Sarah], even in the 14 months since he 
was released from prison.  He has continued to engage in 
criminal activity since his release from prison, resulting in 
incarceration and unavailability to [Sarah].  Additionally, 
even when not incarcerated, [respondent-father] hasn’t 
complied with his case plan services specifically identified 
to address the barriers to reunification . . . . 
 
In challenging the trial court’s determination that his parental rights in Sarah 
were subject to termination on the grounds of neglect, respondent-father begins by 
asserting that many of the trial court’s findings of fact lacked sufficient evidentiary 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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support or were otherwise erroneous.  More specifically, respondent-father contends 
that a number of the trial court’s findings were inaccurate and misleading given that 
he was not responsible for the conditions that led to Sarah’s placement in YFS 
custody; that he lacked sufficient time to make adequate progress in complying with 
his case plan given that he had been incarcerated for fourteen months of the two-year 
interval between the date upon which Sarah was taken into YFS custody and the date 
of the termination hearing; and that YFS had failed to make adequate efforts to assist 
him in addressing the problems that he faced during the relevant time period.  In 
addition, respondent-father has identified various findings of fact that he claims to 
be erroneous on the grounds that they fail to account for the progress that he had 
made in addressing the obstacles to his reunification with Sarah prior to the date of 
the termination hearing.  We are not persuaded by any of respondent-father’s 
challenges to the trial court’s findings of fact. 
As an initial matter, we note that respondent-father’s contention that the trial 
court erred by finding that his parental rights were subject to termination on the 
grounds of neglect because he was not responsible for the conditions that resulted in 
Sarah’s placement in YFS custody is devoid of merit.  Simply put, there is no 
requirement that the parent whose rights are subject to termination on the grounds 
of neglect be responsible for the prior adjudication of neglect.  As we have previously 
explained, “[i]n determining whether a child is neglected, the determinative factors 
are the circumstances and conditions surrounding the child, not the fault or 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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culpability of the parent.”  In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. at 154, 804 S.E.2d at 517 (quoting 
In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 109, 316 S.E.2d at 252).  In light of that fact, we held 
in In re M.A.W. that a prior adjudication of neglect based upon a mother’s substance 
abuse and mental health problems was “appropriately considered” by the trial court 
as “relevant evidence” in determining whether the parental rights of a father who 
had been incarcerated at the time of the initial adjudication should be terminated.  
Id. at 150–54, 804 S.E.2d at 515–17; see also In re C.L.S., 245 N.C. App. at 78–79, 
781 S.E.2d at 682–83 (affirming the termination of a father’s parental rights on the 
grounds of neglect even though the father had been incarcerated and paternity had 
not been established at the time that the juvenile was adjudicated to be neglected 
based, in part, upon the mother’s substance abuse problems).  Moreover, we note that 
the determination that Sarah was a neglected and dependent juvenile rested, in part, 
upon findings that respondent-father’s “[p]aternity ha[d] not been established” and 
that “[respondent-father] ha[d] never seen [Sarah] nor ha[d] he provided any 
financial or emotional support to her.” 
Respondent-father’s contention that he had not been given an adequate 
opportunity to satisfy the requirements of his case plan prior to the termination of 
his parental rights in Sarah because he had been in prison for approximately fourteen 
months of the two-year period during which Sarah had been in YFS custody is equally 
unpersuasive.  This Court and the Court of Appeals have both emphasized that 
“[i]ncarceration, standing alone, is neither a sword nor a shield in a termination of 
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parental rights decision[,]” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 412, 831 S.E.2d 54, 62 (2019) 
(quoting In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. at 153, 804 S.E.2d at 517), and that incarceration 
“does not negate a father’s neglect of his child” because 
“[t]he sacrifices which parenthood often requires are not 
forfeited when the parent is in custody.”  Thus, while 
incarceration may limit a parent’s ability “to show 
affection, it is not an excuse for [a parent’s] failure to show 
interest in [a child’s] welfare by whatever means available 
. . . .” 
 
In re C.L.S., 245 N.C. App. at 78, 781 S.E.2d at 682 (quoting Whittington v. Hendren, 
156 N.C. App. 364, 368, 576 S.E.2d 372, 376 (2003)).  As the record reflects, 
respondent-father had been incarcerated for approximately ten months between the 
time that YFS obtained nonsecure custody of Sarah on 2 December 2016 and the date 
of his release on 21 September 2017, which, in turn, occurred approximately fourteen 
months prior to the date of the 12 December 2018 termination hearing.  In addition, 
respondent-father had been incarcerated for a brief period of time in February 2018 
based upon an alleged parole violation and for the period between 14 May 2018 and 
6 September 2018 as the result of the fact that he had been charged with committing 
new drug-related offenses.  The evidentiary record developed in this case shows that 
respondent-father made minimal efforts to show interest in Sarah while incarcerated, 
sending just a single birthday card to her after the trial court advised him that “he 
may send any mail or gifts to [Sarah] through the social worker” and after YFS 
encouraged him to do so.  Moreover, even though respondent-father had been unable 
to engage in the full range of remedial services required by his case plan during the 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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first of these multiple periods of incarceration,6 his own conduct led to this aspect of 
his inability to attempt to satisfy the requirements of his case plan in 2018.  As the 
trial court recognized in Conclusion of Law No. 9, respondent-father’s continued 
criminal activity and the resulting separation from Sarah justifies, rather than 
undercuts, the trial court’s determination that there was a significant likelihood that 
Sarah would be neglected in the event that she was returned to respondent-father’s 
care.  As a result, the trial court did not err in the manner in which it addressed 
respondent-father’s incarceration and the extent of his ability to satisfy the 
requirements of his case plan in the process of finding that his parental rights in 
Sarah were subject to termination on the basis of neglect. 
Finally, respondent-father faults YFS for not doing enough to assist him in 
satisfying the requirements of his case plan.  More specifically, respondent-father 
argues that YFS did not maintain contact with him, failed to recommend specific 
services that would be of assistance to him in addressing the problems that prevented 
his reunification with Sarah, and made minimal attempts to assess his progress in 
satisfying the requirements of his case plan after his release from incarceration on 6 
                                            
6 Although respondent-father asserts that he made progress toward satisfying the 
requirements of his case plan while incarcerated because, “during his first incarceration, [he] 
earned his high school equivalency diploma and completed a college course in computer 
technology[, which] furthered his case plan goal of obtaining gainful employment after 
incarceration,” the trial court specifically found that “[those] courses were completed prior to 
[Sarah] entering YFS custody[ ] and were not related to his case plan objectives.”  In view of 
the fact that respondent-father has not challenged this finding of fact as lacking sufficient 
evidentiary support, it is binding upon this Court for purposes of appellate review.  See 
Koufman, 330 N.C. at 97, 408 S.E.2d at 731. 
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Opinion of the Court 
 
 
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September 2018.  The evidentiary record developed in this case undercuts the validity 
of this aspect of respondent-father’s argument. 
In each of the review orders entered while Sarah was in YFS custody, the trial 
court found, as required by N.C.G.S. § 7B-906.2(c), that YFS had made reasonable 
efforts to eliminate the conditions that had led to Sarah’s removal from the family 
home.  In addition, the record, as reflected in the trial court’s findings of fact, 
establishes that respondent-father, rather than YFS, was responsible for his failure 
to satisfy the requirements of his case plan.  According to the record evidence, a 
representative of YFS met with respondent-father for the purpose of discussing his 
case plan on at least four separate occasions while he was in prison and met with him 
on one other occasion following his release from incarceration in September 2017.  
During those meetings, the YFS representative emphasized the importance of 
respondent-father’s case plan and the need for respondent-father to complete a FIRST 
assessment in order to ensure the development of an appropriate case plan.  In spite 
of these admonitions, respondent-father never obtained the required FIRST 
assessment. 
In addition, respondent-father failed to immediately contact YFS upon his 
release from incarceration in September 2018, despite having been instructed to do 
so and his commitment to YFS representatives that he would comply with this 
instruction.  Respondent-father missed or canceled numerous meetings with YFS 
representatives throughout the time that Sarah was in YFS custody and  provided 
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minimal verification of the claim that he made at the termination hearing to have 
been making progress toward complying with the requirements of his case plan.  
Although respondent-father argues that the trial court placed an undue emphasis 
upon the importance of the requirement that he complete a FIRST assessment,7 the 
evidentiary record and the trial court’s findings establish that the FIRST assessment 
was an integral component of respondent-father’s case plan that was intended to 
identify the barriers to his reunification with Sarah, including his difficulties with 
substance abuse, mental health, physical health, and parenting skills, and to allow 
YFS to recommend suitable services to assist respondent-father in addressing those 
barriers to reunification with Sarah.  As a result, the trial court’s determination in 
Finding of Fact No. 65 that respondent-father’s “failure to consistently respond to, or 
engage with, [YFS] and recommended services limited [YFS’s] ability to assist him” 
is supported by ample record evidence and precludes acceptance of respondent-
father’s argument that YFS failed to make reasonable efforts to assist him in 
overcoming the barriers to reunification that he needed to address. 
Aside from these more generalized complaints, respondent-father asserts that 
Finding of Fact Nos. 33–35, 37, 41–44, 46, 48, 53–55, and 58–73 are erroneous or 
                                            
7 The arguments made by respondent-father with respect to the FIRST assessment 
strike us as being inconsistent.  At various points, respondent-father claimed that he did not 
need to  complete the FIRST assessment because he did not have a substance abuse problem, 
that the FIRST assessment was unnecessary because he had enrolled in substance abuse 
treatment, and that the FIRST assessment was part of the parenting education component 
of his case plan. 
IN RE S.D. 
 
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misleading.  As a general proposition, respondent-father refrains from asserting that 
these findings of fact lack sufficient evidentiary support, an argument that would be 
unavailing given that they are clearly based upon these review orders and the 
evidentiary record developed at the termination hearing.  Instead, respondent-father 
advances challenges to these findings on a collective rather than an individual basis,8 
arguing, primarily, that the findings fail to account for the progress that he had made 
in completing the requirements of his case plan during the period immediately 
preceding the 12 December 2018 termination hearing.  In reviewing respondent-
father’s challenges to the trial court’s findings of fact, we will focus upon those 
findings that are necessary to support the trial court’s determination that 
respondent-father’s parental rights in Sarah are subject to termination on the 
grounds of neglect, see In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407, 831 S.E.2d at 58–59, while 
remaining mindful that this Court’s role is to determine whether the trial court’s 
findings are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, see In re N.D.A., 373 
N.C. at 74, 833 S.E.2d at 771, and that we should avoid any sort of appellate 
reweighing of the evidence. 
                                            
8 For example, respondent-father asserts that “nearly all” of Finding of Fact Nos. 58–
73 are erroneous because they “recite the same themes:  [respondent-father] made no 
progress on his case plan; he failed to engage in his case plan and work with YFS or the 
[guardian ad litem]; he failed to communicate with YFS and the [guardian ad litem] for long 
periods; he never demonstrated any commitment to Sarah or any genuine interest in 
reuniting with her; he only attended Cornerstone [Treatment Program] because he was court-
ordered and never successfully completed it; he refused substance abuse treatment because 
he never obtained a FIRST assessment.” 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-20- 
According to the trial court, it was likely that Sarah would be neglected if she 
was returned to respondent-father’s care because respondent-father had “made 
almost no effort to establish a relationship with [Sarah], even in the 14 months since 
he was released from prison.”  In support of this determination, the trial court found 
as a fact that: 
70. 
Since [Sarah] entered YFS custody, [respondent-
father] has not made himself available to the child to 
provide the care, personal contact, love, and affection that 
inheres in the parental relationship. 
 
71. 
[Respondent-father] has only attended two visits 
with [Sarah] over the life of this case, despite visitation 
arrangements being in place and the father being 
encouraged to set them up with [the maternal great-aunt].  
Prior to [Sarah] entering custody, [respondent-father] had 
not had any contact with [Sarah]. 
 
72. 
[Respondent-father] has not provided any gifts to 
[Sarah] over the life of this case.  He sent one birthday card 
to [Sarah] through [YFS] in 2017. 
 
73. 
The first step for any parent towards reunification 
with their child is to acknowledge that they are ready and 
willing to reunify with the juvenile.  Over the life of this 
case, 
[respondent-father] 
has 
never 
indicated 
his 
willingness, ability, and intention to reunify with [Sarah].  
He has clearly and consistently stated that he does not 
want full custody of [Sarah]. . . .  [Respondent-father] has 
stated that he would like the maternal great[-]aunt to be 
granted guardianship of [Sarah].  [Respondent-father] has 
never identified any alternative placement options for 
[Sarah]. 
 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-21- 
Respondent-father’s contentions to the contrary notwithstanding, each of these 
findings has ample evidentiary support and accurately depicts the relevant record 
evidence. 
As far as Finding of Fact No. 71, which addresses the issue of visitation, is 
concerned, the record evidence shows that, prior to his initial release from 
incarceration, respondent-father was authorized to visit with Sarah on the condition 
that he provide a clean drug screen.  According to the order entered following the 20 
December 2017 review hearing and the testimony elicited at the termination hearing, 
respondent-father did not visit with Sarah until shortly after the 20 December 2017 
review hearing, even though such visits had been authorized on 21 November 2017 
after he provided two negative drug screens.  In spite of respondent-father’s 
suggestion that YFS had failed for over a month after his visits with Sarah had been 
approved to arrange for his first visit with Sarah, the record evidence shows that 
respondent-father had been advised to contact the maternal great-aunt directly in 
order to schedule visits and that respondent-father had failed to follow up with the 
great-aunt for the purpose of making the necessary arrangements after an initial 
exchange of text messages.  In addition, the record contains evidence tending to show 
that, even though respondent-father’s visitation plan was still in place at the time of 
the 20 February 2018 review hearing, which was held after respondent-father had 
been arrested for violating the terms and conditions of his parole, his visitation with 
Sarah had been suspended until respondent-father provided a negative drug screen 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-22- 
and met with representatives of YFS.  Moreover, the record reflects that respondent-
father’s visits with Sarah were not reinstated until his case plan was updated on 29 
November 2018.  Respondent-father had a second visit with Sarah on 1 December 
2018.  In confirmation of this evidence, respondent-father testified at the termination 
hearing that he had had two visits with Sarah since his release from incarceration in 
September 2017.  As a result, we have no difficulty in holding that Finding of Fact 
No. 71 has ample record support. 
The record also provides adequate support for Finding of Fact No. 72.  Finding 
of Fact No. 72 is supported by unchallenged Finding of Fact Nos. 20 and 22, which 
provide that “[t]he [c]ourt advised [respondent-father at the 11 May 2017 review 
hearing] that he may send any mail or gifts to [Sarah] through the social worker,” 
that “[his social worker] encouraged [him] to do so[,]” and that respondent-father had 
“sent [Sarah] a birthday card [prior to the 25 August 2017 review hearing].”  In spite 
of the fact that respondent-father claimed to have sent a money order to the maternal 
great-aunt in November 2018 and that he was planning to send another money order 
to the great-aunt and Christmas gifts to Sarah in December 2018, there is no evidence 
in the record confirming that respondent-father sent the initial money order nor any 
indication that respondent-father had sent the other money order and gifts prior to 
the termination hearing.  As a result, we are unable to accept respondent-father’s 
challenge to the sufficiency of the record support for Finding of Fact No. 72. 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-23- 
Finding of Fact No. 73 has ample evidentiary support, as well.  In spite of 
respondent-father’s expressed desire to have contact with, and visit with Sarah, the 
findings of fact contained in the review orders and the testimony delivered by the 
social workers at the termination hearing demonstrate that respondent-father 
initially expressed uncertainty concerning the extent to which he wished to attempt 
to comply with a case plan, that he was worried about being accused of misconduct in 
the event that he cared for Sarah by himself, and that he was uncertain about his 
ability to care for Sarah without “an old lady” to help.  Subsequently, respondent-
father stated that he wanted the maternal great-aunt to have legal guardianship of 
Sarah.  Finally, the social worker with responsibility for this matter at the time of 
the termination hearing testified that, since she had been assigned to work with 
Sarah on 24 September 2018, respondent-father had never asked that Sarah be 
placed in his care and had, instead, indicated that “he does not want custody of 
[Sarah]” and “just wants to remain in her life and have visits with her.”  As a result, 
for all of these reasons, we hold that Finding of Fact Nos. 71 through 73 are supported 
by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and buttress the trial court’s ultimate 
finding that respondent-father “ha[d] not made himself available to the child to 
provide the care, personal contact, love, and affection that inheres in the parental 
relationship.” 
In addition, the trial court determined that there was a likelihood of future 
neglect in the event that Sarah was returned to respondent-father’s care because 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-24- 
respondent-father “ha[d] continued to engage in criminal activity since his release 
from prison, resulting in incarceration and unavailability to [Sarah].”  The trial court 
found in Finding of Fact No. 43 that respondent-father had been incarcerated from 7 
February 2018 to 12 February 2018 for a parole violation and found in Finding of 
Fact Nos. 50, 53, and 54 that respondent-father had been arrested and held in pretrial 
detention based upon new drug-related charges, for which he was ultimately 
convicted, from 14 May 2018 to 6 September 2018.  Although respondent-father 
challenged the validity of these findings of fact, the only argument that he has 
advanced in support of this contention rests upon the assertion that the trial court 
had erroneously described the sentence that had been imposed upon him in 
connection with these convictions for the three new drug-related charges. 
According to Finding of Fact Nos. 53 and 54, respondent-father entered pleas 
of guilty to and was convicted of possession of heroin, possession of 
methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia on 5 September 2018; was 
sentenced to a suspended term of six to seventeen months imprisonment and placed 
on supervised probation for a period of thirty months on the condition that he 
complete the Cornerstone Treatment Program; was released from jail on 6 September 
2018 into the custody of the Cornerstone Treatment Program in accordance with the 
terms and conditions of his probation; and failed to contact YFS prior to the 12 
September 2018 review hearing.  Although the judgment that was entered based 
upon respondent-father’s drug-related convictions was not admitted into evidence, 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-25- 
respondent-father testified that he had pleaded guilty to the drug-related charges 
identified in Finding of Fact No. 53 on 5 September 2018 and had received a six to 
seventeen month suspended sentence.  In spite of the fact that respondent-father 
claimed that he had “chose[n] to go” to the Cornerstone Treatment Program and 
expressed uncertainty about whether he had been ordered to enroll in and complete 
that program, he also testified that he “was court-ordered to stay [at the Cornerstone 
Treatment Program]”  and had been “ordered only to be released to the Cornerstone 
Treatment Program.”  Thus, we hold that the record contains sufficient evidence to 
support the trial court’s essential findings concerning the nature of defendant’s drug-
related convictions and the sentence that was imposed upon him in light of those 
convictions. 
Finally, the trial court determined that there was a likelihood of future neglect 
in the event that Sarah was returned to respondent-father’s care on the grounds that, 
“even when not incarcerated, [respondent-father] hasn’t complied with his case plan 
services specifically identified to address the barriers to reunification.”  The trial 
court’s conclusion to this effect is supported by Finding of Fact Nos. 66 and 69, which 
state that, “[a]t the time of the [termination h]earing, [Sarah] ha[d] remained in YFS 
custody for a period of two years”; that respondent-father “ha[d] not made significant 
progress on any portion of his case plan”; and that respondent-father “ha[d] not 
demonstrated that he ha[d] the ability or willingness to establish a safe home for 
[Sarah].” 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-26- 
As further support for the determinations contained in Finding of Fact Nos. 66 
and 69, the trial court found as a fact that: 
63. 
There is no evidence before the [c]ourt that 
[respondent-father] has maintained long-term sobriety. 
 
. . . . 
 
67. 
[Respondent-father] has not maintained stable 
housing or employment.  Since his discharge from the 
Cornerstone [Treatment Program] halfway house, it is 
unknown where he is currently residing.  He has never 
provided verification of employment or income over the life 
of the case.  He has not completed a parenting education 
program.  He has not maintained consistent contact with 
[Sarah] through visits.  He has significant medical and 
mental health issues but did not cooperate with YFS and 
the FIRST Program to assess and treat those conditions, 
and he has not provided any evidence to the [c]ourt of how 
he is appropriately managing those conditions. 
 
68. 
The only case plan progress [that respondent-father] 
has made has occurred within the past 30–60 days, and 
occurred pursuant to his recent court-ordered supervised 
probation.  Until entering the Cornerstone [Treatment 
P]rogram 
in 
September 
2018, 
[respondent-father] 
remained adamant that he did not need or intend to engage 
with the FIRST Program which would have assessed his 
need for substance abuse treatment services, along with 
mental health and parenting education services. 
 
In response, respondent-father asserts that these findings are in error to the extent 
that they indicate he had made no progress toward satisfying the requirements of his 
case plan and fail to account for the record evidence tending to show that he had 
recently made progress toward satisfying the requirements of his case plan in 
advance of the termination hearing. 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-27- 
Admittedly, the trial court did state in Finding of Fact No. 44 that, as of the 20 
February 2018 review hearing, respondent-father “had made no progress towards 
reunification.”  To the extent that Finding of Fact No. 44 fails to reflect the 
undisputed evidence concerning respondent-father’s visit with Sarah shortly after the 
20 December 2017 review hearing or the irregular contact that respondent-father had 
with YFS representatives following his release from prison, it does overstate the 
degree of respondent-father’s noncompliance with the provisions of his case plan.  For 
that reason, we will refrain from taking that portion of the trial court’s termination 
order into consideration in determining whether it should be affirmed or reversed on 
appeal.  See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 411, 831 S.E.2d at 61 (noting that, even if a 
finding lacks sufficient evidentiary support, the remaining findings more than 
sufficed to support the challenged termination order). 
A careful review of the remaining findings reveals that they either detail 
respondent-father’s progress in addressing specific components of his case plan 
during the relevant review periods or indicate that respondent-father had not made 
“adequate progress” toward completing the requirements of his case plan or 
“significant progress” toward reunification.  The review orders entered throughout 
the pendency of the underlying neglect and dependency proceeding and the social 
workers’ testimony concerning respondent-father’s actions during the relevant review 
periods amply support the trial court’s determination that respondent-father had not 
made adequate progress toward satisfying the requirements of his case plan or 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-28- 
significant progress toward reunification prior to the 12 September 2018 review 
hearing. 
In addition, the trial court made Finding of Fact Nos. 58 through 62 for the 
purpose of addressing the extent to which respondent-father had made progress 
toward satisfying the requirements of his case plan after the 12 September 2018 
review hearing.  In Finding of Fact Nos. 58 through 61, the trial court found that 
respondent-father’s case plan had been updated over the telephone on 29 November 
2018 after the cancellation of a scheduled 8 November 2018 meeting between YFS 
representatives and respondent-father; respondent-father’s visitation with Sarah 
had been reinstated after respondent-father provided proof of negative drug screens 
from September and October 2018 to YFS; respondent-father had visited with Sarah 
on 1 December 2018; and respondent-father had completed a thirty-hour substance 
abuse program through the Restorative Justice Center in October 2018.  In Finding 
of Fact Nos. 61 and 62, the trial court found that, while respondent-father had 
participated in the Cornerstone Treatment Program, he had failed to present 
evidence concerning the extent of his treatment needs, the nature of his treatment 
goals, and the content of the services that Cornerstone had recommended for him.  In 
addition, the trial court found that respondent-father had not been engaged in any 
substance abuse treatment following his discharge from the Cornerstone Treatment 
Program on 9 December 2018 after he failed to return to the facility by the designated 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-29- 
time.  A careful examination of the record reveals that each of these findings are 
supported by the social worker’s testimony during the termination hearing. 
Respondent-father’s challenge to the adequacy of the trial court’s findings 
concerning his progress between the 12 September 2018 review hearing and the 12 
December 2018 termination hearing rests primarily upon respondent-father’s 
contentions concerning findings that the trial court did not make.  According to 
respondent-father, the trial court’s findings fail to take into account his testimony 
about his recent employment, his treatment for medical problems, his completion of 
the Cornerstone Treatment Program, the extent of his substance abuse treatment, 
his negative drug screens in November and December 2018, the money order that he 
had sent to the maternal great-aunt, the money order that he planned to send to the 
great-aunt and the gifts that he planned to send to Sarah in December 2018, and his 
application for housing at Oxford House.  The record clearly reflects, however, that 
the trial court adequately considered respondent-father’s testimony.  In fact, during 
the termination hearing, the trial court requested that respondent-father’s trial 
counsel refrain from asking repetitive questions on the grounds that they had been 
“asked and answered” and that it had heard respondent-father’s earlier testimony.  
In addition, the record clearly reflects that the trial court simply failed to credit the 
portions of respondent-father’s testimony upon which this argument relies, given the 
absence of any verification for respondent-father’s assertions.  Aside from the fact 
that the social workers who testified at the termination hearing repeatedly stated 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-30- 
that respondent-father had not provided proof in support of his claims to have 
recently made progress toward eliminating the barriers to his reunification with 
Sarah, respondent-father acknowledged that he had failed to provide supporting 
documentation for these claims and defended his failure to provide such 
documentation on the grounds that he did not know that he needed to provide such 
evidence and was not “about to provide something that [he] wasn’t asked for.”  As 
further evidence of the trial court’s unwillingness to find respondent-father’s 
unsupported testimony credible in the absence of supporting documentation, Finding 
of Fact No. 62 states that, despite his testimony that he had tested negative for the 
presence of drugs in November and December 2018, respondent-father had “failed to 
provide any evidence of [the] negative drug screens.”9  Similarly, in Finding of Fact 
No. 67, the trial court noted that “[respondent-father had] never provided verification 
of employment or income over the life of the case.”  Thus, the record clearly 
establishes that the trial court simply did not find respondent-father’s testimony 
concerning his recent efforts to comply with the requirements of his case plan to be 
credible, which is a determination that it is entitled to make without fear of appellate 
reversal in light of the applicable standard of review.  See In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 
                                            
9 Although defendant claims to have attempted to introduce evidence concerning the 
allegedly negative November and December drug screens and asserts that his efforts to do so 
were unsuccessful because the trial court sustained an objection to the admission of the 
evidence in question, the portion of the transcript to which respondent-father directs our 
attention in support of this contention shows, instead, that the trial court sustained a YFS 
objection to the admission of evidence concerning the drug screens for September and October 
2018, which the trial court found to have been negative in Finding of Fact No. 58. 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-31- 
411, 831 S.E.2d at 61; see also In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 844, 788 S.E.2d at 168.  As a 
result, we conclude that there is ample evidentiary support for the trial court’s 
findings that respondent-father had failed to make adequate progress toward 
achieving long-term sobriety, stable housing, and employment; had not maintained 
consistent contact with Sarah; had not completed a FIRST assessment or a parenting 
education program; and had only made progress toward satisfying some of the 
requirements of his case plan in order to avoid violating the terms and conditions of 
his probation and that the trial court did not err by stating in Finding of Fact Nos. 66 
and 69 that respondent-father “ha[d] not made significant progress on any portion of 
his case plan” and “ha[d] not demonstrated that he ha[d] the ability or willingness to 
establish a safe home for [Sarah].” 
Having determined that the trial court’s findings of fact have adequate 
evidentiary support, we next consider whether the trial court’s findings support its 
determination that respondent-father’s parental rights in Sarah were subject to 
termination on the grounds of neglect.  See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1); see also In re 
N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 79–80, 833 S.E.2d at 775.  We addressed a similar set of 
circumstances in In re M.A.W., in which a child had been adjudicated to be a neglected 
juvenile based upon the mother’s substance abuse and mental health problems while 
the father was incarcerated and in which “the trial court made an independent 
determination that neglect sufficient to justify termination of [the father’s] parental 
rights existed at the time of the termination hearing and that a likelihood of 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-32- 
repetition of neglect also existed.”  370 N.C. at 153–54, 804 S.E.2d at 517 (citation 
omitted).  In reversing a decision of the Court of Appeals overturning the trial court’s 
termination order, see In re M.A.W., 248 N.C. App. 52, 787 S.E.2d 461 (2016), rev’d, 
370 N.C. 149, 804 S.E.2d 513 (2017), this Court held that the “trial court . . . 
appropriately considered the prior adjudication of neglect as relevant evidence during 
the termination hearing” and that the trial court’s findings supported its 
determination that there was a likelihood that the neglect to which the juvenile had 
been subjected would be repeated if the child was to be placed in his care, given that 
the father “had a long history of criminal activity and substance abuse” and that, 
even though the father had “initially indicated his desire to be involved in [the 
juvenile’s] life,” he had, “after his release, failed to follow through consistently with 
the court’s directives and recommendations.”  In re M.A.W., 370 N.C. at 153, 154, 804 
S.E.2d at 517.  We reached this result on the grounds that, “[a]lthough [the father] 
completed a parenting course, attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and 
completed his General Educational Development (GED) program while incarcerated, 
the trial court made numerous relevant findings of fact supporting termination that 
illuminated respondent’s behavior following his release and which established a 
likelihood of repetition of neglect,” id. at 154, 804 S.E.2d at 517, including findings 
that the father had not complied with the recommendations made during his 
substance abuse assessment; that the regularity of the father’s visits with the 
juvenile had diminished over time; that the father had not provided proof that he had 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-33- 
completed the parenting course that he had taken while incarcerated; that the father 
denied social workers access to the residence of his mother, in which he allegedly 
lived; that the father’s testimony that he was self-employed lacked credibility; that 
the father did not comply with clinical assessments; and that the father had not 
provided any care, discipline, or supervision to the juvenile since his release from 
incarceration approximately nine months earlier.  Id. at 155, 804 S.E.2d at 518. 
The trial court’s findings of fact in this case are similar to those deemed 
sufficient to support the trial court’s termination decision in In re M.A.W.  In addition 
to finding that Sarah had been adjudicated to be a neglected and dependent juvenile 
on 15 February 2017, the trial court found that respondent-father had a history of 
criminal activity and substance abuse; that respondent-father had continued to 
engage in criminal activity during the pendency of the underlying neglect and 
dependency proceeding that resulted in his reincarceration and created additional 
limitations upon his ability to be available to Sarah; that respondent-father had not 
established a relationship with Sarah prior to the time that she was removed from 
the mother’s care and had only visited with Sarah twice following his initial release 
from incarceration; that respondent-father had not developed a relationship with or 
demonstrated the ability to care for Sarah since his release from incarceration; and 
that respondent-father had not made significant progress toward correcting the 
barriers to reunification that were identified by the trial court, including addressing 
issues relating to employment, housing, substance abuse, mental health, and 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-34- 
parenting skills.  Thus, as was the case in In re M.A.W., we hold that “[t]he trial court 
properly found that past neglect was established by [YFS] and that there was a 
likelihood of repetition of neglect[,]” 370 N.C. at 156, 804 S.E.2d at 518, given that 
the trial court’s findings provide ample justification for its conclusion that 
respondent-father was unable to properly care for Sarah at the time of the 
termination hearing, see In re Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at 232 (explaining 
that the trial court must consider evidence of changed circumstances in addition to 
evidence of the prior adjudication of neglect, with the determinative factors being the 
best interests of the child and the parent’s fitness to care for the child at the time of 
the termination hearing). 
In light of this determination, we hold that the trial court did not err by 
concluding that respondent-father’s parental rights in Sarah were subject to 
termination on the grounds of neglect pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1).  
Moreover, given that “a finding by the trial court that any one of the grounds for 
termination enumerated in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) exists is sufficient to support a 
termination order[,]” In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 380, 831 S.E.2d 305, 311 (2019) 
(citations omitted), we need not address respondent-father’s challenge to the trial 
court’s determination that his parental rights in Sarah were subject to termination 
based upon his willful failure to make reasonable progress toward correcting the 
conditions that led to Sarah’s removal from the family home pursuant to N.C.G.S. 
§ 7B-1111(a)(2).  As a result, in light of the fact that respondent-father has not 
IN RE S.D. 
 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
-35- 
advanced any challenge to the trial court’s dispositional decision in his brief before 
this Court, the trial court’s termination order is affirmed. 
AFFIRMED.