Case Title: Chavez v. Valdez

Citation: 325 P.2d 919, 64 N.M. 143

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1958-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
325 P.2d 919 (1958) 64 N.M. 143 Jose Vicente CHAVEZ and Jesusita S. Chavez, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Fred J. VALDEZ and Lola G. Valdez, Defendants-Appellants. No. 6294. Supreme Court of New Mexico. March 17, 1958. Rehearing Denied June 12, 1958. Bertrand B. Prince, Charles B. Barker, Harold A. Roberts, Santa Fe, for appellants. David Chavez, Jr., George A. Graham, Santa Fe, for appellees. *920 McGHEE, Justice. The plaintiffs-appellees filed their complaint against the defendants-appellants alleging the sale of a farm for the sum of $10,000, of which they had received $5,000, leaving a balance unpaid of $5,000, payable in annual installments of $625 with interest, and that defendants had failed to make the first installment which was past due. They attached as an exhibit the following agreement: The English translation of which, omitting the acknowledgment, reads: The defendants answered stating the total consideration for the transaction between the parties was $5,000 as evidenced by the written contract set out above, and by way of counterclaim asked judgment for $1,200 on account of farm machinery which they stated was sold to them with the farm, and which the plaintiffs had wrongfully removed from the premises. A motion by the defendants for judgment on the pleadings was denied, and immediately prior to the opening statement of Judge Chavez for the plaintiff the trial court stated the contract was complete and unambiguous, and that oral testimony to vary its terms would not be permitted. The verdict was in favor of the plaintiffs. Notwithstanding such announcement such attorney stated, among other things, the following: The defendants thereupon moved for a directed verdict on the issue as to the sale of land based on the statement and the previous rulings of the court, which was denied. They then moved for a mistrial because of the above quoted part of the opening statement by plaintiff's attorney which was in violation of the court's announcement and in apparent defiance of the Judge. This motion was also denied, and then the following occurred: We think the statements of the trial court were entirely too mild to eradicate the objectionable opening statement made, which, as above indicated was in clear violation of and in defiance of the ruling of the court. Just why offending counsel was not at least reprimanded and a stern admonition given to the jurors to absolutely disregard such statements does not appear in the record or the briefs. Appellees in their answer brief contend they were privileged to make a statement of what they would prove if allowed to do so. Such would be the fact had it not been for the previous rulings. There can be no lawful justification for the part of the statement we have quoted. Only a scant amount of testimony was admitted in the trial. Plaintiffs attempted *922 to prove the matters about the consideration, etc., narrated in the opening statement but it was rejected on objection being made by the defendants that it would violate the parole evidence rule. Plaintiffs did not cross appeal so we may not review the action of the court in that regard. They then introduced testimony that the plaintiffs and the defendant Fred J. Valdez went to the office of the scrivener where the contract was prepared and signed, but that before they went into the office Valdez paid them $5,000 on the purchase price. The defendants corroborated the testimony that $5,000 was paid but they said the payment was made after they had left the office in order that they might save the interest that was called for in the contract. When the defendants started putting on their case they attempted to prove the farm was worth only $4,200, but such proof was objected to by the plaintiffs and was not admitted because it would tend to contradict and vary the terms of the written contract. The defendants made a proper tender of such proof which was likewise rejected. The defendants thereupon tried to introduce proof in support of their claim the farm machinery went with the farm, but such was rejected by the trial court on objection by the plaintiffs that such would vary the terms of the written instrument. The defendants did not make a tender of proof on that point, so we may not review their claim of error to the effect the sale of the machinery was an independent collateral agreement, and that the testimony was admissible under the doctrine of Locke v. Murdoch, 20 N.M. 522, 151 P. 298, L.R.A. 1917B, 267. We have held in many cases that the trial court had not, in our opinion, abused its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial because of claimed improper statements or arguments of counsel, but we did hoist a warning signal in Griego v. Conwell, 54 N.M. 287, 222 P.2d 606, about improper arguments and say we would not hesitate to reverse a judgment in a proper case, and we believe this is a proper case for such action. We do not believe there is a valid distinction to be drawn between an improper opening statement such as we have here and an improper argument to the jury. The case went to the jury with an instruction to which the defendants objected that if the $5,000 payment was made before the signing of the contract their verdict should be for the plaintiffs, but if made after the contract was signed then the verdict should be for the defendants. Neither the plaintiffs or defendants asked for reformation of the contract, although both claim it does not embody all of the terms of the purchase and sale, and it seems to us that when the trial court made the decisive question in the case one of when the payment was made there was in fact a reformation submitted to the jury, although without proper pleadings and on very meager evidence. We think this case calls for us to exercise our inherent powers in an attempt to see that full justice is done, and to that end we reverse the judgment and remand it to the District Court for a new trial where the parties may, if they desire, amend their pleadings and seek reformation according to their respective claims. Other points are raised but what we have said makes it unnecessary to decide them, but neither of the parties will be bound by rulings heretofore made below as the law of the case on a new trial. The defendants will recover the costs of this appeal. It is so ordered. LUJAN, C.J., and D.A. MacPHERSON, Jr., District Judge, concur. COMPTON and KIKER, JJ., specially concurring. COMPTON, Justice (specially concurring). I concur in the results only. I do not approve of the criticism of court and counsel. KIKER, J., concurs.