Case Title: State v. Kersh

Citation: 313 N.W.2d 566

Docket Number: 66180

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1981-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
313 N.W.2d 566 (1981) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James KERSH, Appellant. No. 66180. Supreme Court of Iowa. December 23, 1981. Francis C. Hoyt, Jr., State Appellate Defender, and Douglas F. Staskal, Asst. State Appellate Defender, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., John P. Messina, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Steven S. Hoth, Des Moines County Atty., for appellee. Considered by LeGRAND, P. J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, ALLBEE, and LARSON, JJ. UHLENHOPP, Justice. In this appeal we pass upon the validity of the seizure of a pistol from defendant James Kersh, in a prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon under section 724.4, The Code 1979. The principal witness for the State was Burlington Police Officer Ron Holtkamp. He testified at the suppression hearing not long after the seizure and again at defendant's trial about seven months later. At the trial he could not remember his suppression hearing testimony, which was more favorable to defendant's position than that given at trial. We believe the suppression testimony is more accurate and will base the decision on it. Holtkamp testified in material part at the suppression hearing: Prior to trial defendant moved to suppress evidence of the pistol on the ground of illegal search and seizure. After a hearing, the trial court overruled the motion. Defendant likewise objected at trial to evidence of the gun, and the court again overruled the objections. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to sixty days confinement, and appealed. On appeal defendant asserts that Holtkamp's search of defendant's person and consequent discovery of the pistol resulted from a prior seizure of his person or a prior search of his car or an arrest, all without probable cause. I. The search of defendant's person and seizure of the pistol was without a warrant and was therefore unconstitutional unless it fell within one of the carefully prescribed exceptions. State v. Schrier, 283 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 1979). The present facts bring the case within two exceptions. One has to do with the situation described thus in 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 7.4(f), at 587 (1978): Illustrations of that exception are United States v. Haley, 581 F.2d 723, 725-26 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1005, 99 S. Ct. 618, 58 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1978); Vauss v. United States, 370 F.2d 250, 252 (D.C.Cir.1966) (per curiam ); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004, 84 S. Ct. 1940, 12 L. Ed. 2d 1053 (1964); Anchorage v. Cook, 598 P.2d 939, 942 (Alaska 1979); Guardiola v. State, 268 Ind. 404, 413-14, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1110-11 (1978); Howell v. State, 300 So. 2d 774, 775 (Miss.1974). See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 300 (1978). Defendant did not respond to Holtkamp's knocks on the window. Suppose defendant had been the victim of a heart attack and Holtkamp had simply driven off. Under defendant's argument, Holtkamp would be placed in a "no-win" situation. Holtkamp justifiably opened the car door and checked defendant's condition. When he did so he discovered defendant was intoxicated. He could then legally arrest defendant for public intoxication and search him incident to the arrest. State v. Harty, 167 N.W.2d 665 (Iowa 1969). Intoxication in a public place constitutes a misdemeanor. § 123.46, The Code. A "public place" is "any place, building, or conveyance to which the public has or is permitted access." § 123.3(23). The evidence shows that defendant was sitting in his car in a place to which the public was permitted access. II. While the first exception is enough to uphold the trial court's ruling, we also think Holtkamp acted reasonably in checking defendant's state of sobriety in view of the report which came to the police *569 that a subject believed to be intoxicated had backed a car off the street and up into a lawn. This report would not be enough, standing alone, to justify a search. Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971). But the report does not stand alone. When Holtkamp arrived at the scene he found the car parked as it was, and inside it he saw defendant slumped in the seat. Defendant did not respond to knocks on the window. Was defendant asleep or intoxicated? These are the circumstances which distinguish the case from Whiteley. See 401 U.S. at 568, 91 S. Ct. at 1037, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 313 ("The arresting officer was not himself possessed of any factual data tending to corroborate the informer's tip that Daley and Whitely committed the crime."). See also State v. Richards, 110 Ariz. 290, 518 P.2d 113 (1974). Evidently, from the report, a member of the public had seen defendant drive. Apart from the report, Holtkamp did not have information about that fact. The other element of the crime of driving while intoxicated, which Holtkamp needed to consider, was the question of defendant's intoxication; a conviction of driving while intoxicated could not stand without that proof. With defendant slumped in the seat directly before him, we think Holtkamp is to be commended rather than criticized for checking on defendant's state of sobriety. When he did so, he discovered that defendant was intoxicated, and he so charged defendant. Whether defendant was also charged with driving while intoxicated and if not, why not, we do not know. In any event, the police should not be condemned because they investigate reports in a diligent and reasonable manner. We uphold the judgment and sentence. AFFIRMED.