Case Title: State ex rel. Standifer v. Cleveland

Citation: 2022-Ohio-3711

Docket Number: 2021-1280

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Standifer v. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3711.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3711 
THE STATE EX REL. STANDIFER ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE CITY OF 
CLEVELAND, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Standifer v. Cleveland, Slip Opinion No.  
2022-Ohio-3711.] 
Mandamus—Public Records Act—Confidential-law-enforcement-investigatory-
records (“CLEIR”) exception to disclosure requirement—City’s police use-
of-force (“UOF”) reports satisfy first requirement of CLEIR definition 
under R.C. 149.43(A)(2) because they pertain to law-enforcement matters 
and cannot be characterized as simply personnel documents—City’s UOF 
reports satisfy second requirement of CLEIR definition because city failed 
to prove that their release would create a high probability of disclosure of 
any of four types of information specified in R.C. 149.43(A)(2), including 
the “identity of a suspect who has not been charged with the offense to 
which the record pertains”—A UOF report could, in certain circumstances, 
identify an uncharged suspect, but there is no per se rule that UOF reports 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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always do so—Court of appeals’ denial of writ reversed and cause 
remanded. 
(No. 2021-1280—Submitted June 14, 2022—Decided October 20, 2022.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 110200, 
2021-Ohio-3100. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellants, Lauren “Cid” Standifer and Euclid Media Group, L.L.C., 
d.b.a. Cleveland Scene, sought a writ of mandamus to compel appellee, the city of 
Cleveland, to disclose use-of-force (“UOF”) reports, which are prepared whenever 
a Cleveland police officer uses force in the course of the officer’s duties.  The court 
of appeals denied the writ, agreeing with Cleveland that the UOF reports are exempt 
from disclosure under the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, as confidential law-
enforcement investigatory records (“CLEIR”).  We reverse the court of appeals’ 
judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Cleveland’s use of UOF reports 
{¶ 2} Cleveland’s General Police Order 2.01.05 defines three levels of use 
of force—“Level 1,” “Level 2,” and “Level 3”—and requires that a UOF report be 
prepared whenever a Cleveland police officer uses force rising to one of the three 
levels in the course of the officer’s duties.  UOF reports are distinct from police 
reports that detail a responding officer’s description of the circumstances of an 
incident.  They provide a “detailed account” of the use of force, including the reason 
for the initial police presence, a specific description of the acts that preceded the 
use of force, the level of resistance encountered, and a description of the force used.  
Officers who use Level 1 or Level 2 force must complete a UOF report “by the end 
of their tour of duty.”  When an officer has used Level 3 force, the officer in charge 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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of the police division’s designated “force investigation team” must complete the 
UOF report. 
{¶ 3} General Police Order 2.01.06 requires review of UOF reports through 
the chain of command to determine whether a use of force was proper.  The 
prescribed UOF procedures reflect not just city policy but also the content of a 
consent decree reached between the Cleveland police department and the United 
States Department of Justice. 
{¶ 4} UOF reports are entered into force-tracking software called 
IAPro/BlueTeam.  The software allows a user to save a report, export the report to 
an Excel spreadsheet, or download a PDF of the report. 
B.  The records requests at issue 
{¶ 5} Standifer is a journalist who publishes investigative news articles in 
Cleveland Scene, a local newspaper.  On September 9, 2020, Standifer emailed to 
Cleveland a public-records request for “all reports on use of force incidents between 
Jan. 1, 2019 and the date the record is generated.”  Cleveland responded by email 
on September 23, stating that it had located a responsive record that Standifer could 
access on the city’s public-records website.  The document was a one-page 
spreadsheet that indicated “use of force totals” for the years 2019 and 2020 (up to 
September 14). 
{¶ 6} Later that day, Standifer informed the city by email that the one-page 
spreadsheet was not responsive to her request.  Standifer stated that she was seeking 
“all individual reports for every instance of use of force from this time period.”  The 
city responded on October 13 that it was “not required to do a file-by-file review 
from 2019 to the present to produce what is a complete duplication of [its] use of 
force reports during the period requested.”  In that respect, the city told Standifer 
that her request was “both vague and overly broad.” 
{¶ 7} After additional communication with the city, Standifer submitted 
another records request on October 29, 2020, asking for “all reports on use of force 
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incidents that occurred on May 30 and June 1, 2020.”  The city denied this request 
on November 16, stating that “[t]he information requested is part of an open 
ongoing investigation and not releasable at this time based on the confidential law 
enforcement investigatory record exception in R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h), (A)(2).” 
{¶ 8} On November 18, 2020, Standifer emailed another request, this time 
seeking “all use of force reports filed in June 2019.”  The city produced some 
records in response to that request on December 3 and December 10, including a 
list of UOF-matter numbers. 
{¶ 9} Later on December 10, Standifer submitted a request for “the files 
identified by” the matter numbers on the list the city had provided.  On December 
16, the city sought clarification regarding the request, which Standifer provided.  
On December 26, the city responded that it regarded the request as closed and 
advised that Standifer could file a new request. 
C.  The mandamus action 
{¶ 10} On December 31, 2020, Standifer and Cleveland Scene brought a 
mandamus action against Cleveland in the Eighth District Court of Appeals.  
During mediation, the city disclosed some responsive documents but withheld 87 
otherwise responsive documents based on the CLEIR exception. 
{¶ 11} The court of appeals granted the city’s motion for summary 
judgment and denied the requested writ.  It held that the withheld UOF reports were 
exempt from disclosure as CLEIR because they relate to law-enforcement matters 
and because their disclosure “would create a high probability of” revealing the 
identities of uncharged suspects—i.e., the officers who used the force described in 
the reports.  2021-Ohio-3100, ¶ 16-17.  Standifer and Cleveland Scene appealed to 
this court as of right. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
{¶ 12} Appellants bear the burden of showing entitlement to the requested 
writ of mandamus by clear and convincing evidence.  State ex rel. McCaffrey v. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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Mahoning Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 133 Ohio St.3d 139, 2012-Ohio-4246, 976 
N.E.2d 877, ¶ 16.  On the other hand, “[e]xceptions to disclosure under the [Public 
Records Act] are strictly construed against the records custodian, who has the 
burden to establish the applicability of any claimed exception from disclosure.”  
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Cincinnati, 157 Ohio St.3d 290, 2019-Ohio-
3876, 135 N.E.3d 772, ¶ 6.  We review de novo a court of appeals’ grant of 
summary judgment in a mandamus action.  State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. 
of Commrs., 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 2021-Ohio-2374, 178 N.E.3d 492, ¶ 11. 
A.  The CLEIR exception does not apply categorically to the UOF reports 
{¶ 13} Appellants argue as their first proposition of law that they have a 
clear legal right to the undisclosed UOF reports because those reports “precede any 
investigation” and more closely resemble offense or incident reports, which initiate 
ordinary criminal investigations, than they do investigatory work product.  Thus, 
they contend that the CLEIR exception does not apply to these reports. 
{¶ 14} R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h) exempts CLEIR from disclosure as public 
records, and R.C. 149.43(A)(2) defines “CLEIR” as “any record that pertains to a 
law enforcement matter of a criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative 
nature, but only to the extent that the release of the record would create a high 
probability of disclosure of” one or more of the types of information listed in R.C. 
149.43(A)(2)(a) through (d).  Accordingly, “[t]he applicability of the [CLEIR 
exception] requires, first, that the records pertain to a law enforcement matter * * * 
and, second, that the release of the records would create a high probability of 
disclosure of any of the four types of information specified.”  State ex rel. Ohio 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Mentor, 89 Ohio St.3d 440, 444, 732 N.E.2d 969 
(2000). 
{¶ 15} Appellants argue that the UOF reports cannot fall under the CLEIR 
exception because they do not satisfy the first requirement of the CLEIR definition.  
They contend that UOF reports are routine reports, that their purpose is “to monitor 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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and discipline police officers,” and that they therefore do not pertain to a law-
enforcement matter.  They further contend that the reports do not initiate an 
investigation into a law-enforcement matter and that a UOF report leads to an 
investigation, if ever, only after an internal review of the report by the police 
department’s chain of command. 
{¶ 16} We have held that “records are not confidential law-enforcement 
records if they relate to employment or personnel matters rather than directly to the 
enforcement of law.”  State ex rel. Morgan v. New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 
2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 1208, ¶ 49; State ex rel. Mahajan v. State Med. Bd. 
of Ohio, 127 Ohio St.3d 497, 2010-Ohio-5995, 940 N.E.2d 1280, ¶ 30.  In support 
of their argument that UOF reports are not records “pertain[ing] to a law 
enforcement matter,” R.C. 149.43(A)(2), appellants rely heavily on State ex rel. 
Natl. Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 38 Ohio St.3d 79, 526 N.E.2d 786 (1988) 
(“NBC I”).  In NBC I, a broadcaster sought police records relating to incidents in 
which officers used deadly force, claiming that the records it sought were “routine 
reports.”  Id. at 79.  In opposition, the city asserted that the records constituted 
CLEIR—in particular, that the records constituted “specific investigatory work 
product” under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).  We reversed the court of appeals’ denial of 
the requested writ and remanded the case for in camera review of the documents.  
On “the limited record before this court,” we found that the records at issue were 
not investigatory records but, rather, “involve[d] the city’s monitoring and 
discipline of its police officers.”  NBC I at 83.  We also rejected the contention that 
the records were “trial preparation records” under R.C. 149.43(A)(4) because “part 
of th[e] records [were] gathered in order to satisfy the requirement of General Police 
Order No. 22-83.”  NBC I at 84. 
{¶ 17} Appellants’ reliance on NBC I, however, is undercut by Natl. 
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 57 Ohio St.3d 77, 566 N.E.2d 146 (1991) 
(“NBC II”).  On remand following NBC I, the court of appeals broadly ordered 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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disclosure of the records at issue.  The city appealed, and in NBC II, we revisited 
our earlier characterization of the records.  Whereas the limited evidence in NBC I 
led us to characterize the records at issue as “police personnel records,” the 
evidence before us in NBC II showed that they more closely resembled “records 
compiled pursuant to criminal investigations that police routinely perform when 
they investigate crimes.”  NBC II at 79.  And we observed that neither NBC I nor 
State ex rel. Beacon Journal Pub. Co. v. Univ. of Akron, 64 Ohio St.2d 392, 415 
N.E.2d 310 (1980) (also relied on by appellants here) “ever established an 
automatic, per se exclusion of all routine police criminal investigation from the first 
step of the definition of [CLEIR].”  (Emphasis sic.)  NBC II at 80.  Thus, the first 
requirement of the CLEIR definition was satisfied in NBC II.  We therefore 
reversed the court of appeals’ grant of the writ and remanded the case for a 
determination of whether any of the records satisfied the second requirement of the 
CLEIR definition. 
{¶ 18} Considering NBC II, appellants’ reliance on NBC I is unavailing.  
See also Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn., 89 Ohio St.3d at 445, 732 N.E.2d 969 
(routine police criminal investigations are not per se excluded from satisfying first 
requirement of CLEIR definition).  The records at issue here “pertain to a law 
enforcement matter,” R.C. 149.43(A)(2), as did the records at issue in NBC II.  UOF 
reports are records that are required to be created whenever an officer engages in a 
Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3 use of force as defined by the police department’s 
policy.  Under the policy, UOF reports are part of the investigation conducted into 
an officer’s use of force during the officer’s law-enforcement duties.  Thus, they 
pertain to a law-enforcement matter and cannot be characterized as simply a 
personnel document.  We therefore agree with Cleveland that the UOF reports 
satisfy the first requirement of the CLEIR definition.  Whether the court of appeals 
correctly denied the writ therefore depends on whether the UOF reports satisfy the 
second requirement of the CLEIR definition. 
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{¶ 19} R.C. 149.43(A)(2) identifies four categories of protected 
information that exempt law-enforcement records from disclosure as CLEIR.  See 
R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a) through (d).  In this case, the court of appeals relied on R.C. 
149.43(A)(2)(a), which exempts law-enforcement records the release of which has 
a high probability of disclosing “[t]he identity of a suspect who has not been 
charged with the offense to which the record pertains.”  The court of appeals held 
that releasing the UOF reports would create a high probability of disclosing the 
identity of the officer who used the force described in each report, whom the court 
viewed as an uncharged suspect in the review and possible investigation of a use of 
force.  2021-Ohio-3100 at ¶ 17.  The court additionally held that redactions of the 
reports were impracticable because the information in the reports was intertwined 
with the identity of the officers who used force.  Id., citing State ex rel. McGee v. 
Ohio State Bd. of Psychology, 49 Ohio St.3d 59, 550 N.E.2d 945 (1990). 
{¶ 20} We disagree with the court of appeals’ application of the uncharged-
suspect provision of R.C. 149.43(A)(2).  For one thing, the characterization of an 
officer who used force as a “suspect” is dubious, given that the UOF report is 
submitted prior to any determination that a use of force merits an administrative or 
criminal inquiry.  Indeed, the use of force by a police officer in the course of the 
officer’s duties may not be wrongful, and, in such a case, the UOF report may not 
necessarily lead to any further criminal investigation.  The court of appeals’ 
rationale, however, necessarily assumes that all officers who use force are per se 
criminal suspects.  Though we do not foreclose the possibility that a UOF report 
could, in certain circumstances, identify an uncharged suspect and thus be exempt 
from disclosure as CLEIR, we decline to recognize a per se rule that UOF reports 
always do so.  See Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. at 446 (finding that CLEIR 
exception did not apply, because criminal proceedings were not pending or highly 
probable; review of the records indicated that “crimes may not have occurred”). 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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{¶ 21} It is true that “the absence of pending or highly probable criminal 
charges is not fatal to the applicability of the uncharged-suspect exemption.”  Id., 
89 Ohio St.3d at 447, 732 N.E.2d 969.  So in some cases, a UOF report could be 
exempt from disclosure to protect the identity of an officer who used force as an 
uncharged suspect.  But it does not follow that UOF reports should be categorically 
treated as CLEIR.  We decline to adopt the court of appeals’ rationale that an officer 
who used force is an uncharged suspect in every case in which a UOF report 
describing that force is prepared. 
{¶ 22} In defending the court of appeals’ decision, Cleveland argues that 
other provisions of R.C. 149.43(A)(2) apply to UOF reports.  Specifically, 
Cleveland contends that disclosing the reports would reveal (1) the identity of 
witnesses who have been or might be promised confidentiality, (2) information that 
would compromise investigations, and (3) information that could endanger the 
physical safety of others.  See R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(b), (c), and (d).  In these 
arguments, Cleveland paints with broad strokes in its characterization of the 
information in UOF reports and does not point to specific information in them to 
which these provisions of R.C. 149.43(A)(2) apply.  While particular UOF reports 
might include one or more of these elements and therefore fall within the CLEIR 
exception, Cleveland has not demonstrated that all the requested UOF reports 
categorically qualify as one or more of the types of information listed in R.C. 
149.43(A)(2).  As the proponent of the CLEIR exception, Cleveland has the burden 
to prove that the exception applies to specific information contained in the reports.  
See State ex rel. Rocker v. Guernsey Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 126 Ohio St.3d 224, 
2010-Ohio-3288, 932 N.E.2d 327, ¶ 7.  It has not met that burden. 
B.  We need not reach appellants’ second proposition of law 
{¶ 23} As their second proposition of law, appellants argue that the court of 
appeals erroneously allowed Cleveland’s consent decree with the United States 
Department of Justice to override the disclosure requirement of the Public Records 
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Act.  Because we conclude that appellants prevail on their first proposition of law, 
we need not reach their second proposition of law. 
III.  MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
{¶ 24} Appellants have requested oral argument.  Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 
17.02(A), “[o]ral argument in a direct appeal is discretionary.”  State ex rel. Scott 
v. Streetsboro, 150 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-3308, 78 N.E.3d 809, ¶ 9.  The factors 
that inform this court’s exercise of our discretion in considering whether to grant 
oral argument are “whether the case involves a matter of great public importance, 
complex issues of law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among 
the courts of appeals.”  Id. 
{¶ 25} We deny oral argument.  The parties’ briefing provides an adequate 
basis for considering the legal issues related to the CLEIR exception.  And as for 
appellants’ argument that their counsel “is a pro bono law clinic within a law 
school” and that oral argument “would provide students with valuable opportunities 
in preparing for, observing, or participating in oral argument,” this rationale does 
not relate to any of our bases for granting oral argument. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and remand the case for further proceedings.  On remand, the court of 
appeals shall (1) direct Cleveland to review any responsive records that it has 
withheld in order to determine what portions should be redacted, (2) grant a writ of 
mandamus that requires Cleveland to disclose the responsive records, subject to 
appropriate redactions, either by giving Standifer access to the actual records as 
maintained by Cleveland or by making available accurate and usable copies of the 
records as they are maintained, and (3) decide whether appellants are entitled to 
statutory damages and, if so, determine the amount of such damages. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
January Term, 2022 
 
 
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
BRUNNER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and would have granted 
the request for oral argument so that the parties and the public would have had the 
opportunity to air and to hear the parties’ arguments concerning this case involving 
police use of force. 
_________________ 
First Amendment Clinic, Kramer Law Clinic Center, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law, Andrew Geronimo, and Sara Coulter, for appellants. 
Barbara Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, and William M. Menzalora 
and Timothy J. Puin, Assistant Directors of Law, for appellee. 
_________________