Case Title: CARMEN T. ARAGON V. MICHAEL JAMES ARAGON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-40

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
CARMEN T. ARAGON V. MICHAEL JAMES ARAGON2005 WY 5104 P.3d 756Case Number: 04-40Decided: 01/19/2005

October 
Term, A.D. 2004
 
 
CARMEN 
T. ARAGON,
 
Appellant
(Plaintiff),
 
v.
 
MICHAEL 
JAMES ARAGON,
 
Appellee
(Defendant).
 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty
The 
Honorable E. James Burke, 
Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Ronald 
G. Pretty, Cheyenne, 
WY.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Tracy 
L. Zubrod of Zubrod Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, WY.
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, 
and VOIGT, JJ., and YOUNG, 
D.J.
 
 
YOUNG, 
District Judge.
 
[¶1]      This appeal is 
from an order modifying the custody portion of a decree of divorce involving 
appellant 
Carmen T. Aragon (Mother) 
and appellee Michael James Aragon (Father).  The order granted Father custody of the 
couple's four children, separating the children from their half siblings and 
stepsibling who remain in the custody of Mother and her new husband.  We 
affirm.  
 
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Mother presents 
these issues for our review:
 
1.  Do 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar a claim that 
could have been brought in previous proceedings when issues concerning those 
claims existed at the time previous claims were brought[?]
 
2.  Was 
awarding the [Father] custody of the children in the best interest of the 
children[?]
 
3.  Did 
the court err by splitting the children[?]
 
Father 
phrases the issues:
 
1.  Did 
the district court apply the proper standard when determining to modify 
custody?
 
2.  Was 
there sufficient evidence to support the order granting Father's petition for 
modification?
 
3.  Was 
the district court required to consider Pace [v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, 22 P.3d 861 (Wyo. 
2001),] when modifying custody of the parties' four 
children?
 
4.  Is 
[Father] entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal?
 
 
 
 
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      On April 29, 
1987, Mother and Father were married.  
The marriage produced four children.1  Ultimately, Mother and Father were 
divorced on January 10, 2000, and Mother was awarded primary custody of the 
children.  Father was granted 
visitation and ordered to pay child support. 
 
[¶4]      Both Father and 
Mother remarried.  Mother and her 
new husband had two daughters together.2  Mother's new husband has four children 
from a previous relationship, one of whom, a deaf son age sixteen at the time of 
hearing, resides with Mother and her new husband.  Mother's father also resides with Mother 
and her new husband.  Father and his 
new wife have no other children. 
 
[¶5]      In June of 2000, 
Mother petitioned the district court to modify Father's child support, modify 
Father's visitation with the children, allow Mother to claim the children as 
dependents for income tax purposes, and find Father in contempt.  Father filed his own motions seeking to 
have Mother found in contempt for 1) improperly claiming the children for 
tax purposes, 2) not removing her name from certain motor vehicle titles, 
3) denying Father visitation with the children, and 4) making 
derogatory statements about Father to the children.  Discovery ensued.  Each of these motions was eventually 
resolved through settlement entered between the parties in February of 
2001.  Pursuant to the settlement, 
on March 5, 2001, the district court entered an order modifying the decree of 
divorce, raising the child support to be paid by Father and altering Father's 
visitation with the children. 
 
[¶6]      In September of 
2001, Father filed a motion seeking a correction in the computation of his child 
support obligation and asking that he be given credit for any overpayment in 
child support.  Mother replied to 
this motion with a request that Father again be held in contempt for not 
properly meeting his child support responsibilities.  Upon hearing, the district court granted 
Father's motion and entered its order on April 4, 2002.  Thereafter, in May of 2002, Father filed 
a petition to change custody and support.  
After a day and a half hearing, the district court entered its order 
awarding Father custody of the children, finding that Father had shown a 
material and substantial change of circumstances warranting a change in custody 
and that such change of custody was in the best interests of the children.  This appeal followed. 

 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶7]                              
We have previously reiterated the well recognized standard of review for 
custody determinations:
 
            
"Custody, visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the 
sound discretion of the district court.  
It has been our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare 
and needs of the children are to be given paramount consideration.  The determination of the best interests 
of the child is a question for the trier of fact.  We do not overturn the decision of the 
trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of 
a violation of some legal principle.'  
Fink [v. Fink], 685 P.2d [34,] 36 [(Wyo. 
1984)]."
 
Reavis 
v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998). . . . Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶9, 22 P.3d 861, ¶9 (2001); Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).
 
            
"Our review entails evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the trial court's decision, and we afford to the prevailing party every 
favorable inference while omitting any consideration of evidence presented by 
the unsuccessful party.  We cannot 
sustain findings of fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the 
evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence.  Similarly, an abuse of discretion is 
present when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.  RDS v. GEMN, 9 P.3d 984, 986 
(Wyo. 2000)."
 
In re 
KRA, 2004 
WY 18, ¶7, 85 P.3d 432, ¶7 (Wyo. 2004) (some citations 
omitted).
 
 
 
DISCUSSION
 
Res 
Judicata/Collateral Estoppel
 
[¶8]      
Mother argues that both the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel apply in this case.  
According to Mother, the district court's orders of March 2001 and April 
2002 must be considered final orders on the merits, which preclude Father from 
again litigating the issue of custody of the children.  Specifically, Mother asserts that in 
each of the previous proceedings Father raised the issue of custody, or at least 
had an opportunity to raise the issue of custody.  Thus, Mother contends that in the 
interests of finality and judicial economy, Father was prohibited from raising 
the issue of custody in May of 2002.  

 
[¶9]      This court has 
previously addressed the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as 
these doctrines relate to modification of custody.  This court's established policy 
manifests a balance between the doctrine of finality of judgments and judicial 
economy supported by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, on 
the one hand, and the applicable statutes providing for modification of the 
provisions of a divorce decree concerning child custody, child support, 
visitation, and alimony, on the other hand.3  A court is charged with resolving that 
tension by determining if there has been a material change in circumstances 
warranting modification and that modification would be in the best interests of 
the children.  Rogers v. Rogers, 973 P.2d 1118, 1122-23 (Wyo. 1999); Ayling v. Ayling, 661 P.2d 1054, 
1055-56 (Wyo. 
1983).  See also generally, Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121, ¶11, 76 P.3d 836, ¶11 (Wyo. 2003); Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 41 (Wyo. 
1995).  
 
[¶10]   While the doctrines of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel can bar reopening a divorce decree, a district court 
does retain jurisdiction to modify a decree of divorce under certain 
circumstances.  Harshfield v. 
Harshfield, 842 P.2d 535, 537-38 (Wyo. 1992). One such circumstance is where the 
party is able to show a material change in circumstances surrounding the care, 
custody, and visitation of a child.   
Indeed, as we recently expressed in Geerts v. Jacobsen, 2004 WY 
148, ¶17, 100 P.3d 1265, ¶17 (Wyo. 2004), Wyoming statutory law expressly 
provides courts with subject matter jurisdiction to enforce or modify a final 
decree of divorce concerning the care, custody, and visitation of a child as the 
circumstances of the parents and needs of the children require on either a 
temporary or permanent basis.   
Our examination and evaluation of the record in the instant case leads us 
to the conclusion that there was ample evidence presented to the district court 
to demonstrate that a material and substantial change of circumstances had 
occurred.
 
[¶11]   Further, even upon application of 
the traditional standards of review applicable to the doctrines of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel, we hold that such doctrines do not apply given the 
circumstances established in this case.  

 
            
In Amoco Prod. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 154, ¶12, 
55 P.3d 1246, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 
2001 WY 55, ¶¶15-20, 25 P.3d 511, ¶¶15-20 (Wyo. 2001)), we recognized that res 
judicata and collateral estoppel are related but distinct concepts.  We noted that res judicata bars the 
relitigation of previously litigated claims or causes of action and that four 
factors are examined to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata 
applies:  (1) identity in 
parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same 
and relate to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are 
identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them. 
Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of previously litigated issues and 
involves an analysis of four similar factors:  (1) whether the issue decided in 
the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the present 
action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the 
merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted 
was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and 
(4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. 

 
Markstein 
v. Countryside I, L.L.C., 2003 
WY 122, ¶15, 77 P.3d 389, ¶15 (Wyo. 2003).
 
[¶12]   Application of each of the four 
factors regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel, respectively, 
demonstrate that the previous proceedings in this case did not limit Father's 
ability to request a custody modification in May of 2002.  The identity of the parties, the 
identity of the subject matter, and the capacities of the parties remained 
identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them 
throughout this action.  However, 
the matters decided in the prior adjudications did not expressly address custody 
of the children as presented by Father in the last proceeding.  Therefore, it was impossible for the 
prior adjudications to have resulted in orders on the merits regarding custody 
of the children.
 
[¶13]   Initially, the parties appeared 
before the district court resulting in the March 5, 2001 order addressing the 
issues of 1) child support, 2) medical expenses, and 3) additional weekend 
visitations between Father and the children.  This order was entered by the district 
court upon the parties reaching full settlement of these issues.  The issues resolved upon settlement were 
limited only to these issues and did not include custody of the children. 

 
[¶14]   Additionally, the district court 
explicitly recognized in its March 5, 2001 order, as specifically agreed upon by 
the parties in settlement, that the willful violation of any of the terms 
stipulated to by the parties and set forth in the order or any other court order 
could be punishable as contempt of court and could constitute a change of 
circumstances warranting a change in custody.  Hence, neither Father nor Mother 
intended to be foreclosed from contesting custody in any subsequent 
proceedings.  To the contrary, the 
parties absolutely contemplated and specified that such a possibility 
existed.  Thus, we conclude that the 
district court was correct in not applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
in this instance.
 
[¶15]   The second time the parties 
appeared before the district court, the district court entered an order granting 
the parties' requested relief.  This 
order only addressed the district court's miscalculation of child support and 
Father's child support arrearage.  
Custody of the children, or modification thereof, was not addressed.  Consequently, the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel cannot be applied because the district court did not then make a 
specific determination on the merits concerning custody of the 
children.
 
[¶16]   We also do not agree with Mother's 
argument that because custody is interwoven with a determination of child 
support, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable in this case.  If custody is modified, then child 
support can be addressed, but nothing in law requires such action.  Similarly, the modification of child 
support does not necessarily mandate that a modification of custody be 
considered.  
 
[¶17]   Mother further implies, through 
bald assertion unsupported by reference to the record, that because Father 
propounded discovery that might have some bearing on the modification of custody 
of the children during the initial proceeding, he was required to address the 
custody modification at that time.4  First, it must again be recognized that 
each of the issues involving the initial proceedings in this action was fully 
settled voluntarily by the parties.  
In addition, W.R.C.P. 26(b)(1)(A) makes it clear that discovery may be 
undertaken in any area, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action or any area that is reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence.  
Thus, Father had an expected right to delve into those issues as they 
related to the issues then formally raised before the district court.  Obviously, if Mother believed that the 
discovery requested by Father was inappropriate, she could have addressed such 
contention formally with the district court through a motion for protective 
order pursuant to W.R.C.P. 26(c).  
Critically, the issue of custody modification was not formally raised for 
the district court's consideration from the time of entry of the initial decree 
of divorce until Father filed his May 2002 motion.  We do not find it unreasonable for 
Father to have waited until such time to do so.     
 
[¶18]   
Mother additionally asserts that allowing Father to bring his May 2002 
motion under the circumstances allows him to 1) manipulate the judicial system 
in a quest to re-litigate an issue until a desired answer is achieved, 2) 
continue to control Mother, and 3) undermine desired stability in the 
children's lives.  She further 
contends that such a result cuts against the doctrine of finality and judicial 
economy.  However, the fact still 
remains that until Father brought his May 2002 motion, he had not previously 
been given a formal full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of 
modification of custody before the district court since entry of the original 
divorce decree on January 10, 2000.  
Therefore, we find Mother's complaints 
unpersuasive.
 
Abuse 
of Discretion
 
[¶19]   Mother claims that the district 
court abused its discretion when it awarded Father custody of the children.   Specifically, Mother asserts that 
the district court erred when it failed to give weight to certain evidence at 
trial.  That evidence included the 
oldest son's testimony during trial that he had been held by the arm and throat 
and thrown on a bed by Father when Father was angry.  In addition, Mother complains that the 
district court 1) improperly disallowed evidence of Father's unwillingness 
to foster a relationship with Mother, as allegedly shown through a letter sent 
from Father's counsel to Mother's counsel and 2) inappropriately refused to take 
judicial notice of an earlier order that did not provide for an additional seven 
weekends of visitation between Father and the children as was provided in the 
divorce decree.
 
[¶20]   In making her argument, Mother 
asserts that such evidence was significant and the district court failed to 
properly weigh this evidence in making its determination.  Mother fails to otherwise substantiate 
her argument or cite applicable authority supporting this position.  In addition, as to the two latter 
identified documents, the appellate record is devoid of any request for the 
district court to admit the subject letter as evidence or take judicial notice 
of the earlier order.  The record on 
appeal similarly does not include the referenced letter or order.  An appellant bears the burden of 
bringing to the reviewing court a sufficient record on which to base a 
decision.  Erhart v. Evans, 
2001 WY 79, ¶18, 30 P.3d 542, ¶18 (Wyo. 2001).  Thus, we will not further consider these 
matters.
 
[¶21]   As to the weight accorded the other 
evidence, we have long recognized that evidentiary rulings are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and include the adequacy of foundation, 
competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This court, therefore, will accede to 
the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless the 
court clearly abused its discretion.  
The burden is on the party asserting an abuse of discretion to establish 
such an abuse.  Person v. 
State, 2004 WY 149, ¶11, 100 P.3d 1270, ¶11 (Wyo. 2004).  In this instance Mother failed to meet 
the applicable burden. 
 
[¶22]   While the oldest son did testify 
during trial that he had been held by the arm and throat and thrown onto a bed 
by Father, testimony was also elicited from the oldest son that this event was 
singular in nature and took place when Father was trying to break up a physical 
encounter that had developed between the oldest son and his younger 
brother.  Additional testimony 
showed that the stepfather of the children and Mother engaged in a heated 
argument in front of the children while stepfather was intoxicated.  During the course of the argument, 
stepfather struck Mother.  This 
event resulted in one of the children calling the police for assistance and 
greatly upsetting the children.  In 
Produit v. Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶22, 35 P.3d 1240, ¶22 (Wyo. 2001), we 
recognized:
 
            
The trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses and weigh their testimony.  
Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 332 (Wyo. 1998);  
Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Wyo. 1993).  This entire case revolved around the 
assessment of credibility and the proper weight of testimony.  The evidence was relatively evenly 
distributed.  However, it is 
conceivable that the district court weighed the evidence that the mother 
essentially abandoned the family and had a recent history of personal and 
employment instability against her former role as primary care giver.  It could have also weighed the evidence 
with regard to the father's parenting skills, employment stability, and conduct 
during the period of temporary custody to determine he was the more fit and 
stable parent.  Such an evaluation 
would require the assessment of the witnesses' credibility and the weighing of 
conflicting testimony.  A process of 
this kind could readily swing the balance toward one party despite there being a 
material factor in favor of the other party.  Therefore, we cannot conclude the 
mother's former role as primary care giver, or any other material factor, was 
ignored.  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 
431; Triggs v. Triggs, 920 P.2d 653, 657 (Wyo. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by 
Vaughn, 962 P.2d  at 151.   
Due to the nature of the evidence this case presents, we must rely on the 
fact finder's determinations and accord them considerable deference.  Raymond, 956 P.2d at 332;  Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 
1170 (Wyo. 
1997).  We hold the custody award to 
the father is not against the great weight of the evidence and does not 
constitute an abuse of discretion.
 
The same 
reasoning applies in this case.  
While there were factors weighing in Mother's favor, there were similar 
factors weighing in Father's favor.  
It is the district court's duty to weigh the evidence in making custody 
determinations.  Here, it appears 
from the record that the district court considered all the evidence in making 
its ultimate decision.  It must 
further be acknowledged that under the applicable standard of review, this court 
has an obligation to afford Father, as the prevailing party, every favorable 
inference while omitting any consideration of evidence presented by Mother, the 
unsuccessful party.  In re 
KRA, at ¶7.
 
[¶23]   Finally, Mother argues that the 
district court erred by awarding Father custody of the children, thereby 
splitting the children from their half siblings and stepsibling.  According to Mother, the case of Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo. 1993), stands for 
the proposition that separating siblings through custody awards to different 
parents is not preferred.  Mother 
contends that this rule of law should apply to half siblings and 
stepsiblings, as 
well as full siblings.  Mother also 
asserts that the district court failed to adequately state the factors upon 
which it relied and the evidence that supported its decision as required by our 
decision in Pace, which provides at 
¶17 (footnote omitted):
 
            
As future guidance to the trial courts, we hold that, when the exercise 
of its discretion in custody matters involves splitting custody of children 
between parents or other unconventional custody approaches, the trial court must 
provide an explanation of its reasoning and place its findings on the 
record.  A reasoned explanation and 
an expression of findings of a trial court's conclusion will assure this court 
that a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors occurred prior to the 
award of custody.
 
Thus, Mother asserts that, at a 
minimum, this matter must be remanded to the district court for an elaboration 
of such factors.
 
[¶24]   
A reading of our opinion in Dowdy does indicate that generally 
speaking the separating of siblings through custody awards to different parents 
is not preferred.  Keeping siblings 
together in the same household is considered the better practice.  However, this court clarified that the 
effect of separating siblings from each other is just 
one of several factors courts consider in determining 
the primary issuethe best interests of the children.  Dowdy, at 440 (citing Jay M. Zitter, 
Annotation, Child Custody:  
Separating Children by Custody Awards to Different ParentsPost-1975 
Cases, 67 A.L.R. 4th 354, § 2[a] (1989) and In re Marriage of 
Barnthouse, 765 P.2d 610 (Colo.App. 1988)).  In other cases we have consistently 
taken this position.  See 
Reavis, at 431, Rogers v. Rogers, 973 P.2d 1118, 1121 (Wyo. 1999), and 
Pace, at ¶11.  We have 
instructed trial courts to be explicit in placing on the record the reasons 
supporting its determination to separate siblings so as to assure that a 
comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors occurred prior to the award of 
custody.  We have additionally 
admonished trial counsel that they cannot remain passive and must assist the 
trial judge in articulating on the record the relevant factors and their 
relative weight which, in the lawyer's professional judgment, should act as a 
foundation for the trial court's exercise of judicial discretion.  Pace, at ¶18.  The standards as enunciated within both 
Dowdy and Pace remain valid and applicable, but we emphasize that 
these standards must be applied within their full 
context as specifically identified.
 
[¶25]   
Further while we do not expressly adopt such holdings, we find upon our 
review of established foreign case authority that other jurisdictions are 
essentially in accord with the standards established in Dowdy and 
Pace.  Although we 
acknowledge that there is somewhat of a split of authority in the weight to be 
given to sibling relationships in custody determinations, all jurisdictions we 
reviewed agree that the paramount focus in determining who should be given 
custody of a child is what outcome would optimally serve the best interest of 
each child.  That said, some 
jurisdictions recognize that sufficient circumstances, looking at the totality 
of the situation with the best interest of the child being the paramount 
concern, must exist before siblings are separated.  See Miers v. Miers, 53 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Mo.App. 2001); Viamonte v. Viamonte, 748 A.2d 493, 496-99 
(Md.App. 2000); Mayer v. Mayer, 397 N.W.2d 638, 644-45 (S.D. 1986).  Other jurisdictions reserve a higher 
"exceptional circumstances" standard only if the contemplated separation 
involves full siblings.  See 
Eaton v. Dixon, 9 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Ark.App. 
2000).  
 
[¶26]   
Moreover, we find the strong public policy toward preservation of sibling 
relationships to be equally applicable whether the children are full sibling, 
half sibling, or stepsiblings.  As 
recognized in Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice, §4-17 (2d ed. 
2004), a recurrent theme in custody cases is the importance of keeping siblings 
together because close familial relationships are much to be encouraged, 
brothers and sisters need each other's strengths and association in those 
everyday and often common experiences; separating them unnecessarily is likely 
to be traumatic and harmful.  In 
addition, brothers and sisters may particularly need each other's support to 
cope with the strain of their parents' divorce.  This same treatise further notes that 
the presumption of keeping children together has been applied by many courts in 
cases where children have only one parent in common, i.e., brothers and sisters 
who were born of a parent's prior or subsequent marriage.  Id.  Thus, we hold that our established 
standards enunciated in Dowdy and Pace are applicable for all 
siblings regardless of their nature.
 
[¶27]   Having established the proper 
criteria to be used when considering the potential splitting of children from 
their siblings, of whatever status, we now must review the facts as they exist 
in this case.  The evidence 
convinces us that the decision of the district court to award Father custody of 
the children and thereby separate them from their half siblings and stepsibling 
is supported by substantial evidence.  

 
[¶28]   In its order, the district court 
found that, while both parents were fit and proper to have custody of the 
children and it was obvious that both parents cared deeply for the children, the 
history of the parties in the matters of visitation had been nothing but 
detrimental.  To such end, the 
district court noted that although Father was to receive liberal visitation of 
the children, that had not occurred because of Mother's obstructions.  The district court further found that 
Mother had exhibited an inability to interact and communicate with Father.  Specifically, the district court noted 
that there was no excuse for Mother removing Father from the school contact 
forms and for failing to accept certified letters from Father regarding his 
visitation requests.  The district 
court identified that Mother had failed to respect Father's rights and 
responsibilities. 
 
[¶29]   Additionally, the district court 
found that Mother's testimony concerning anticipated future living conditions 
for the children was not credible, particularly recognizing that since the 
divorce the children had lived with Mother in several different locations 
causing the children to attend several different schools.  The district court further stated that 
the financial situation of Mother's new husband had changed and that the 
supervision and current living conditions at Mother's home and the plans to 
change those conditions lent even more instability to the children's lives.  The court also concluded that Father 
could provide a more stable environment for the children.  While Father may be working out of town, 
Father's current wife was good with the children and had the ability to support 
and care for the children.  The 
court further noted that Father had demonstrated a willingness to create and 
foster a relationship between the children and Mother and that credible evidence 
existed that domestic violence had occurred in Mother's home. 

 
[¶30]   Thus, the district court concluded 
that it was in the children's overall best interest that Father be awarded 
custody.  In addition, we further 
find that the district court's order was sufficiently detailed so as to provide 
an adequate basis for the district court's ultimate determination awarding 
Father custody of the children.5  Accordingly, we hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it entered its order granting Father 
custody of the children.  Again, we 
emphasize:
 
            
"The law affords wide discretion to the district court when fashioning 
custody and visitation provisions for the best interests of the children." 
Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 431.   
We recognize such discretion encompasses one of the most difficult and 
demanding tasks assigned to a trial judge. Id. Ultimately, the "goal to be 
achieved is a reasonable balance of the rights and affections of each of the 
parents, with paramount consideration being given to the welfare and needs of 
the children." Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 720 (Wyo. 1965); see also Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 
440 (Wyo. 
1993).
 
Pace, at 
¶11.
 
Sanctions 
on Appeal
 
[¶31]   Father asks that we impose 
sanctions against Mother pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05.  Although we affirm the actions of the 
district court, we decline to impose sanctions.  Mother's brief was not so lacking in 
cogent argument or pertinent authority that it constituted that rare 
circumstance where sanctions are appropriate.  See Maher v. Maher, 2004 WY 62, 
¶18, 90 P.3d 739, ¶18 (Wyo. 2004).    
 
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶32]   We affirm the 
district court's determination to award Father custody of the children.   We deny Father's request that we 
levy sanctions against Mother on appeal.
 
FOOTNOTES
 1At the time of hearing, these 
children were ages sixteen, thirteen, eleven, and ten.  The oldest three children are boys, 
while the youngest child is a girl. 
 
 2These children were approximately 
three years and six months of age at the time of hearing.
3Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-2-116, 
20-2-203 and 20-2-204 (LexisNexis 2001) specifically allow the areas of alimony, 
custody, support, and visitation addressed within a decree of divorce to be 
modified under certain circumstances. 
  4Mother alleges that this discovery 
raised issues concerning care of the children, the size of the home in which the 
children resided, and their struggles in school.  In addition, Mother contends that Father 
listed witnesses and proposed exhibits concerning these areas in his pretrial 
disclosure pleading. 
  5However, we again emphasize that 
trial courts should provide the most comprehensive, detailed, and well-reasoned 
explanation and expression of findings of fact possible to support its 
conclusions so as to assure this court on appeal that a comprehensive evaluation 
of all relevant factors occurred prior to the award of 
custody.
 
 
 

October 
Term, A.D. 2004

 
 
 
 
CARMEN 
T. ARAGON,

 
 
Appellant

(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
MICHAEL 
JAMES ARAGON,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable E. James Burke, 
Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ronald 
G. Pretty, Cheyenne, 
WY.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Tracy 
L. Zubrod of Zubrod Law Office, P.C., Cheyenne, WY.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, 
and VOIGT, JJ., and YOUNG, 
D.J.

 
 
 
 
YOUNG, 
District Judge.

 
 

[¶1]      This appeal is 
from an order modifying the custody portion of a decree of divorce involving 
appellant 
Carmen T. Aragon (Mother) 
and appellee Michael James Aragon (Father).  The order granted Father custody of the 
couple's four children, separating the children from their half siblings and 
stepsibling who remain in the custody of Mother and her new husband.  We 
affirm.  

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Mother presents 
these issues for our review:

 
 
1.  Do 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar a claim that 
could have been brought in previous proceedings when issues concerning those 
claims existed at the time previous claims were brought[?]

 
 
2.  Was 
awarding the [Father] custody of the children in the best interest of the 
children[?]

 
 
3.  Did 
the court err by splitting the children[?]

 
 
Father 
phrases the issues:

 
 
1.  Did 
the district court apply the proper standard when determining to modify 
custody?

 
 
2.  Was 
there sufficient evidence to support the order granting Father's petition for 
modification?

 
 
3.  Was 
the district court required to consider Pace [v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, 22 P.3d 861 (Wyo. 
2001),] when modifying custody of the parties' four 
children?

 
 
4.  Is 
[Father] entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal?

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶3]      On April 29, 
1987, Mother and Father were married.  
The marriage produced four children.1  Ultimately, Mother and Father were 
divorced on January 10, 2000, and Mother was awarded primary custody of the 
children.  Father was granted 
visitation and ordered to pay child support. 

 
 
[¶4]      Both Father and 
Mother remarried.  Mother and her 
new husband had two daughters together.2  Mother's new husband has four children 
from a previous relationship, one of whom, a deaf son age sixteen at the time of 
hearing, resides with Mother and her new husband.  Mother's father also resides with Mother 
and her new husband.  Father and his 
new wife have no other children. 

 
 
[¶5]      In June of 2000, 
Mother petitioned the district court to modify Father's child support, modify 
Father's visitation with the children, allow Mother to claim the children as 
dependents for income tax purposes, and find Father in contempt.  Father filed his own motions seeking to 
have Mother found in contempt for 1) improperly claiming the children for 
tax purposes, 2) not removing her name from certain motor vehicle titles, 
3) denying Father visitation with the children, and 4) making 
derogatory statements about Father to the children.  Discovery ensued.  Each of these motions was eventually 
resolved through settlement entered between the parties in February of 
2001.  Pursuant to the settlement, 
on March 5, 2001, the district court entered an order modifying the decree of 
divorce, raising the child support to be paid by Father and altering Father's 
visitation with the children. 

 
 
[¶6]      In September of 
2001, Father filed a motion seeking a correction in the computation of his child 
support obligation and asking that he be given credit for any overpayment in 
child support.  Mother replied to 
this motion with a request that Father again be held in contempt for not 
properly meeting his child support responsibilities.  Upon hearing, the district court granted 
Father's motion and entered its order on April 4, 2002.  Thereafter, in May of 2002, Father filed 
a petition to change custody and support.  
After a day and a half hearing, the district court entered its order 
awarding Father custody of the children, finding that Father had shown a 
material and substantial change of circumstances warranting a change in custody 
and that such change of custody was in the best interests of the children.  This appeal followed. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]                              
We have previously reiterated the well recognized standard of review for 
custody determinations:

 
 
            
"Custody, visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the 
sound discretion of the district court.  
It has been our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare 
and needs of the children are to be given paramount consideration.  The determination of the best interests 
of the child is a question for the trier of fact.  We do not overturn the decision of the 
trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of 
a violation of some legal principle.'  
Fink [v. Fink], 685 P.2d [34,] 36 [(Wyo. 
1984)]."

 
 

Reavis 
v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 (Wyo. 1998). . . . Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶9, 22 P.3d 861, ¶9 (2001); Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 
1998).

 
 
            
"Our review entails evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the trial court's decision, and we afford to the prevailing party every 
favorable inference while omitting any consideration of evidence presented by 
the unsuccessful party.  We cannot 
sustain findings of fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the 
evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence.  Similarly, an abuse of discretion is 
present when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.  RDS v. GEMN, 9 P.3d 984, 986 
(Wyo. 2000)."

 
 

In re 
KRA, 2004 
WY 18, ¶7, 85 P.3d 432, ¶7 (Wyo. 2004) (some citations 
omitted).

 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
Res 
Judicata/Collateral Estoppel

 
 
[¶8]      
Mother argues that both the doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel apply in this case.  
According to Mother, the district court's orders of March 2001 and April 
2002 must be considered final orders on the merits, which preclude Father from 
again litigating the issue of custody of the children.  Specifically, Mother asserts that in 
each of the previous proceedings Father raised the issue of custody, or at least 
had an opportunity to raise the issue of custody.  Thus, Mother contends that in the 
interests of finality and judicial economy, Father was prohibited from raising 
the issue of custody in May of 2002.  

 
 
[¶9]      This court has 
previously addressed the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as 
these doctrines relate to modification of custody.  This court's established policy 
manifests a balance between the doctrine of finality of judgments and judicial 
economy supported by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, on 
the one hand, and the applicable statutes providing for modification of the 
provisions of a divorce decree concerning child custody, child support, 
visitation, and alimony, on the other hand.3  A court is charged with resolving that 
tension by determining if there has been a material change in circumstances 
warranting modification and that modification would be in the best interests of 
the children.  Rogers v. Rogers, 973 P.2d 1118, 1122-23 (Wyo. 1999); Ayling v. Ayling, 661 P.2d 1054, 
1055-56 (Wyo. 
1983).  See also generally, Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121, ¶11, 76 P.3d 836, ¶11 (Wyo. 2003); Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 41 (Wyo. 
1995).  

 
 
[¶10]   While the doctrines of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel can bar reopening a divorce decree, a district court 
does retain jurisdiction to modify a decree of divorce under certain 
circumstances.  Harshfield v. 
Harshfield, 842 P.2d 535, 537-38 (Wyo. 1992). One such circumstance is where the 
party is able to show a material change in circumstances surrounding the care, 
custody, and visitation of a child.   
Indeed, as we recently expressed in Geerts v. Jacobsen, 2004 WY 
148, ¶17, 100 P.3d 1265, ¶17 (Wyo. 2004), Wyoming statutory law expressly 
provides courts with subject matter jurisdiction to enforce or modify a final 
decree of divorce concerning the care, custody, and visitation of a child as the 
circumstances of the parents and needs of the children require on either a 
temporary or permanent basis.   
Our examination and evaluation of the record in the instant case leads us 
to the conclusion that there was ample evidence presented to the district court 
to demonstrate that a material and substantial change of circumstances had 
occurred.

 
 
[¶11]   Further, even upon application of 
the traditional standards of review applicable to the doctrines of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel, we hold that such doctrines do not apply given the 
circumstances established in this case.  

 
 
            
In Amoco Prod. Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2002 WY 154, ¶12, 
55 P.3d 1246, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Eklund v. PRI Environmental, Inc., 
2001 WY 55, ¶¶15-20, 25 P.3d 511, ¶¶15-20 (Wyo. 2001)), we recognized that res 
judicata and collateral estoppel are related but distinct concepts.  We noted that res judicata bars the 
relitigation of previously litigated claims or causes of action and that four 
factors are examined to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata 
applies:  (1) identity in 
parties; (2) identity in subject matter; (3) the issues are the same 
and relate to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons are 
identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them. 
Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of previously litigated issues and 
involves an analysis of four similar factors:  (1) whether the issue decided in 
the prior adjudication was identical with the issue presented in the present 
action; (2) whether the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the 
merits; (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted 
was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and 
(4) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. 

 
 

Markstein 
v. Countryside I, L.L.C., 2003 
WY 122, ¶15, 77 P.3d 389, ¶15 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶12]   Application of each of the four 
factors regarding res judicata and collateral estoppel, respectively, 
demonstrate that the previous proceedings in this case did not limit Father's 
ability to request a custody modification in May of 2002.  The identity of the parties, the 
identity of the subject matter, and the capacities of the parties remained 
identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between them 
throughout this action.  However, 
the matters decided in the prior adjudications did not expressly address custody 
of the children as presented by Father in the last proceeding.  Therefore, it was impossible for the 
prior adjudications to have resulted in orders on the merits regarding custody 
of the children.

 
 
[¶13]   Initially, the parties appeared 
before the district court resulting in the March 5, 2001 order addressing the 
issues of 1) child support, 2) medical expenses, and 3) additional weekend 
visitations between Father and the children.  This order was entered by the district 
court upon the parties reaching full settlement of these issues.  The issues resolved upon settlement were 
limited only to these issues and did not include custody of the children. 

 
 
[¶14]   Additionally, the district court 
explicitly recognized in its March 5, 2001 order, as specifically agreed upon by 
the parties in settlement, that the willful violation of any of the terms 
stipulated to by the parties and set forth in the order or any other court order 
could be punishable as contempt of court and could constitute a change of 
circumstances warranting a change in custody.  Hence, neither Father nor Mother 
intended to be foreclosed from contesting custody in any subsequent 
proceedings.  To the contrary, the 
parties absolutely contemplated and specified that such a possibility 
existed.  Thus, we conclude that the 
district court was correct in not applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
in this instance.

 
 
[¶15]   The second time the parties 
appeared before the district court, the district court entered an order granting 
the parties' requested relief.  This 
order only addressed the district court's miscalculation of child support and 
Father's child support arrearage.  
Custody of the children, or modification thereof, was not addressed.  Consequently, the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel cannot be applied because the district court did not then make a 
specific determination on the merits concerning custody of the 
children.

 
 
[¶16]   We also do not agree with Mother's 
argument that because custody is interwoven with a determination of child 
support, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable in this case.  If custody is modified, then child 
support can be addressed, but nothing in law requires such action.  Similarly, the modification of child 
support does not necessarily mandate that a modification of custody be 
considered.  

 
 
[¶17]   Mother further implies, through 
bald assertion unsupported by reference to the record, that because Father 
propounded discovery that might have some bearing on the modification of custody 
of the children during the initial proceeding, he was required to address the 
custody modification at that time.4  First, it must again be recognized that 
each of the issues involving the initial proceedings in this action was fully 
settled voluntarily by the parties.  
In addition, W.R.C.P. 26(b)(1)(A) makes it clear that discovery may be 
undertaken in any area, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action or any area that is reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence.  
Thus, Father had an expected right to delve into those issues as they 
related to the issues then formally raised before the district court.  Obviously, if Mother believed that the 
discovery requested by Father was inappropriate, she could have addressed such 
contention formally with the district court through a motion for protective 
order pursuant to W.R.C.P. 26(c).  
Critically, the issue of custody modification was not formally raised for 
the district court's consideration from the time of entry of the initial decree 
of divorce until Father filed his May 2002 motion.  We do not find it unreasonable for 
Father to have waited until such time to do so.     

 
 
[¶18]   
Mother additionally asserts that allowing Father to bring his May 2002 
motion under the circumstances allows him to 1) manipulate the judicial system 
in a quest to re-litigate an issue until a desired answer is achieved, 2) 
continue to control Mother, and 3) undermine desired stability in the 
children's lives.  She further 
contends that such a result cuts against the doctrine of finality and judicial 
economy.  However, the fact still 
remains that until Father brought his May 2002 motion, he had not previously 
been given a formal full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of 
modification of custody before the district court since entry of the original 
divorce decree on January 10, 2000.  
Therefore, we find Mother's complaints 
unpersuasive.

 
 
Abuse 
of Discretion

 
 
[¶19]   Mother claims that the district 
court abused its discretion when it awarded Father custody of the children.   Specifically, Mother asserts that 
the district court erred when it failed to give weight to certain evidence at 
trial.  That evidence included the 
oldest son's testimony during trial that he had been held by the arm and throat 
and thrown on a bed by Father when Father was angry.  In addition, Mother complains that the 
district court 1) improperly disallowed evidence of Father's unwillingness 
to foster a relationship with Mother, as allegedly shown through a letter sent 
from Father's counsel to Mother's counsel and 2) inappropriately refused to take 
judicial notice of an earlier order that did not provide for an additional seven 
weekends of visitation between Father and the children as was provided in the 
divorce decree.

 
 
[¶20]   In making her argument, Mother 
asserts that such evidence was significant and the district court failed to 
properly weigh this evidence in making its determination.  Mother fails to otherwise substantiate 
her argument or cite applicable authority supporting this position.  In addition, as to the two latter 
identified documents, the appellate record is devoid of any request for the 
district court to admit the subject letter as evidence or take judicial notice 
of the earlier order.  The record on 
appeal similarly does not include the referenced letter or order.  An appellant bears the burden of 
bringing to the reviewing court a sufficient record on which to base a 
decision.  Erhart v. Evans, 
2001 WY 79, ¶18, 30 P.3d 542, ¶18 (Wyo. 2001).  Thus, we will not further consider these 
matters.

 
 
[¶21]   As to the weight accorded the other 
evidence, we have long recognized that evidentiary rulings are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and include the adequacy of foundation, 
competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence.  This court, therefore, will accede to 
the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless the 
court clearly abused its discretion.  
The burden is on the party asserting an abuse of discretion to establish 
such an abuse.  Person v. 
State, 2004 WY 149, ¶11, 100 P.3d 1270, ¶11 (Wyo. 2004).  In this instance Mother failed to meet 
the applicable burden. 

 
 
[¶22]   While the oldest son did testify 
during trial that he had been held by the arm and throat and thrown onto a bed 
by Father, testimony was also elicited from the oldest son that this event was 
singular in nature and took place when Father was trying to break up a physical 
encounter that had developed between the oldest son and his younger 
brother.  Additional testimony 
showed that the stepfather of the children and Mother engaged in a heated 
argument in front of the children while stepfather was intoxicated.  During the course of the argument, 
stepfather struck Mother.  This 
event resulted in one of the children calling the police for assistance and 
greatly upsetting the children.  In 
Produit v. Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶22, 35 P.3d 1240, ¶22 (Wyo. 2001), we 
recognized:

 
 
            
The trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses and weigh their testimony.  
Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 332 (Wyo. 1998);  
Goff v. Goff, 844 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Wyo. 1993).  This entire case revolved around the 
assessment of credibility and the proper weight of testimony.  The evidence was relatively evenly 
distributed.  However, it is 
conceivable that the district court weighed the evidence that the mother 
essentially abandoned the family and had a recent history of personal and 
employment instability against her former role as primary care giver.  It could have also weighed the evidence 
with regard to the father's parenting skills, employment stability, and conduct 
during the period of temporary custody to determine he was the more fit and 
stable parent.  Such an evaluation 
would require the assessment of the witnesses' credibility and the weighing of 
conflicting testimony.  A process of 
this kind could readily swing the balance toward one party despite there being a 
material factor in favor of the other party.  Therefore, we cannot conclude the 
mother's former role as primary care giver, or any other material factor, was 
ignored.  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 
431; Triggs v. Triggs, 920 P.2d 653, 657 (Wyo. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by 
Vaughn, 962 P.2d  at 151.   
Due to the nature of the evidence this case presents, we must rely on the 
fact finder's determinations and accord them considerable deference.  Raymond, 956 P.2d at 332;  Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 
1170 (Wyo. 
1997).  We hold the custody award to 
the father is not against the great weight of the evidence and does not 
constitute an abuse of discretion.

 
 
The same 
reasoning applies in this case.  
While there were factors weighing in Mother's favor, there were similar 
factors weighing in Father's favor.  
It is the district court's duty to weigh the evidence in making custody 
determinations.  Here, it appears 
from the record that the district court considered all the evidence in making 
its ultimate decision.  It must 
further be acknowledged that under the applicable standard of review, this court 
has an obligation to afford Father, as the prevailing party, every favorable 
inference while omitting any consideration of evidence presented by Mother, the 
unsuccessful party.  In re 
KRA, at ¶7.

 
 

[¶23]   Finally, Mother argues that the 
district court erred by awarding Father custody of the children, thereby 
splitting the children from their half siblings and stepsibling.  According to Mother, the case of Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo. 1993), stands for 
the proposition that separating siblings through custody awards to different 
parents is not preferred.  Mother 
contends that this rule of law should apply to half siblings and 
stepsiblings, as 
well as full siblings.  Mother also 
asserts that the district court failed to adequately state the factors upon 
which it relied and the evidence that supported its decision as required by our 
decision in Pace, which provides at 
¶17 (footnote omitted):

 
 
            
As future guidance to the trial courts, we hold that, when the exercise 
of its discretion in custody matters involves splitting custody of children 
between parents or other unconventional custody approaches, the trial court must 
provide an explanation of its reasoning and place its findings on the 
record.  A reasoned explanation and 
an expression of findings of a trial court's conclusion will assure this court 
that a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors occurred prior to the 
award of custody.

 
 
Thus, Mother asserts that, at a 
minimum, this matter must be remanded to the district court for an elaboration 
of such factors.

 
 
[¶24]   
A reading of our opinion in Dowdy does indicate that generally 
speaking the separating of siblings through custody awards to different parents 
is not preferred.  Keeping siblings 
together in the same household is considered the better practice.  However, this court clarified that the 
effect of separating siblings from each other is just 
one of several factors courts consider in determining 
the primary issuethe best interests of the children.  Dowdy, at 440 (citing Jay M. Zitter, 
Annotation, Child Custody:  
Separating Children by Custody Awards to Different ParentsPost-1975 
Cases, 67 A.L.R. 4th 354, § 2[a] (1989) and In re Marriage of 
Barnthouse, 765 P.2d 610 (Colo.App. 1988)).  In other cases we have consistently 
taken this position.  See 
Reavis, at 431, Rogers v. Rogers, 973 P.2d 1118, 1121 (Wyo. 1999), and 
Pace, at ¶11.  We have 
instructed trial courts to be explicit in placing on the record the reasons 
supporting its determination to separate siblings so as to assure that a 
comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors occurred prior to the award of 
custody.  We have additionally 
admonished trial counsel that they cannot remain passive and must assist the 
trial judge in articulating on the record the relevant factors and their 
relative weight which, in the lawyer's professional judgment, should act as a 
foundation for the trial court's exercise of judicial discretion.  Pace, at ¶18.  The standards as enunciated within both 
Dowdy and Pace remain valid and applicable, but we emphasize that 
these standards must be applied within their full 
context as specifically identified.

 
 
[¶25]   
Further while we do not expressly adopt such holdings, we find upon our 
review of established foreign case authority that other jurisdictions are 
essentially in accord with the standards established in Dowdy and 
Pace.  Although we 
acknowledge that there is somewhat of a split of authority in the weight to be 
given to sibling relationships in custody determinations, all jurisdictions we 
reviewed agree that the paramount focus in determining who should be given 
custody of a child is what outcome would optimally serve the best interest of 
each child.  That said, some 
jurisdictions recognize that sufficient circumstances, looking at the totality 
of the situation with the best interest of the child being the paramount 
concern, must exist before siblings are separated.  See Miers v. Miers, 53 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Mo.App. 2001); Viamonte v. Viamonte, 748 A.2d 493, 496-99 
(Md.App. 2000); Mayer v. Mayer, 397 N.W.2d 638, 644-45 (S.D. 1986).  Other jurisdictions reserve a higher 
"exceptional circumstances" standard only if the contemplated separation 
involves full siblings.  See 
Eaton v. Dixon, 9 S.W.3d 535, 537 (Ark.App. 
2000).  

 
 
[¶26]   
Moreover, we find the strong public policy toward preservation of sibling 
relationships to be equally applicable whether the children are full sibling, 
half sibling, or stepsiblings.  As 
recognized in Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice, §4-17 (2d ed. 
2004), a recurrent theme in custody cases is the importance of keeping siblings 
together because close familial relationships are much to be encouraged, 
brothers and sisters need each other's strengths and association in those 
everyday and often common experiences; separating them unnecessarily is likely 
to be traumatic and harmful.  In 
addition, brothers and sisters may particularly need each other's support to 
cope with the strain of their parents' divorce.  This same treatise further notes that 
the presumption of keeping children together has been applied by many courts in 
cases where children have only one parent in common, i.e., brothers and sisters 
who were born of a parent's prior or subsequent marriage.  Id.  Thus, we hold that our established 
standards enunciated in Dowdy and Pace are applicable for all 
siblings regardless of their nature.

 
 
[¶27]   Having established the proper 
criteria to be used when considering the potential splitting of children from 
their siblings, of whatever status, we now must review the facts as they exist 
in this case.  The evidence 
convinces us that the decision of the district court to award Father custody of 
the children and thereby separate them from their half siblings and stepsibling 
is supported by substantial evidence.  

 
 
[¶28]   In its order, the district court 
found that, while both parents were fit and proper to have custody of the 
children and it was obvious that both parents cared deeply for the children, the 
history of the parties in the matters of visitation had been nothing but 
detrimental.  To such end, the 
district court noted that although Father was to receive liberal visitation of 
the children, that had not occurred because of Mother's obstructions.  The district court further found that 
Mother had exhibited an inability to interact and communicate with Father.  Specifically, the district court noted 
that there was no excuse for Mother removing Father from the school contact 
forms and for failing to accept certified letters from Father regarding his 
visitation requests.  The district 
court identified that Mother had failed to respect Father's rights and 
responsibilities. 

 
 
[¶29]   Additionally, the district court 
found that Mother's testimony concerning anticipated future living conditions 
for the children was not credible, particularly recognizing that since the 
divorce the children had lived with Mother in several different locations 
causing the children to attend several different schools.  The district court further stated that 
the financial situation of Mother's new husband had changed and that the 
supervision and current living conditions at Mother's home and the plans to 
change those conditions lent even more instability to the children's lives.  The court also concluded that Father 
could provide a more stable environment for the children.  While Father may be working out of town, 
Father's current wife was good with the children and had the ability to support 
and care for the children.  The 
court further noted that Father had demonstrated a willingness to create and 
foster a relationship between the children and Mother and that credible evidence 
existed that domestic violence had occurred in Mother's home. 

 
 
[¶30]   Thus, the district court concluded 
that it was in the children's overall best interest that Father be awarded 
custody.  In addition, we further 
find that the district court's order was sufficiently detailed so as to provide 
an adequate basis for the district court's ultimate determination awarding 
Father custody of the children.5  Accordingly, we hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion when it entered its order granting Father 
custody of the children.  Again, we 
emphasize:

 
 
            
"The law affords wide discretion to the district court when fashioning 
custody and visitation provisions for the best interests of the children." 
Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 431.   
We recognize such discretion encompasses one of the most difficult and 
demanding tasks assigned to a trial judge. Id. Ultimately, the "goal to be 
achieved is a reasonable balance of the rights and affections of each of the 
parents, with paramount consideration being given to the welfare and needs of 
the children." Leitner v. Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 720 (Wyo. 1965); see also Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 
440 (Wyo. 
1993).

 
 

Pace, at 
¶11.

 
 
Sanctions 
on Appeal

 
 
[¶31]   Father asks that we impose 
sanctions against Mother pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05.  Although we affirm the actions of the 
district court, we decline to impose sanctions.  Mother's brief was not so lacking in 
cogent argument or pertinent authority that it constituted that rare 
circumstance where sanctions are appropriate.  See Maher v. Maher, 2004 WY 62, 
¶18, 90 P.3d 739, ¶18 (Wyo. 2004).    

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶32]   We affirm the 
district court's determination to award Father custody of the children.   We deny Father's request that we 
levy sanctions against Mother on appeal.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 1At the time of hearing, these 
children were ages sixteen, thirteen, eleven, and ten.  The oldest three children are boys, 
while the youngest child is a girl. 

 
 
 2These children were approximately 
three years and six months of age at the time of hearing.

3Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-2-116, 
20-2-203 and 20-2-204 (LexisNexis 2001) specifically allow the areas of alimony, 
custody, support, and visitation addressed within a decree of divorce to be 
modified under certain circumstances. 

  4Mother alleges that this discovery 
raised issues concerning care of the children, the size of the home in which the 
children resided, and their struggles in school.  In addition, Mother contends that Father 
listed witnesses and proposed exhibits concerning these areas in his pretrial 
disclosure pleading. 

  5However, we again emphasize that 
trial courts should provide the most comprehensive, detailed, and well-reasoned 
explanation and expression of findings of fact possible to support its 
conclusions so as to assure this court on appeal that a comprehensive evaluation 
of all relevant factors occurred prior to the award of 
custody.