Case Title: People v. Molano

Citation: 

Docket Number: S161399

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
CARL EDWARD MOLANO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S161399 
 
Alameda County Superior Court 
H38118 
 
 
June 27, 2019 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Groban concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
S161399 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
Carl Edward Molano was convicted by jury of first degree 
murder, with the special circumstance that the murder was 
committed during a rape.1  After he waived jury on prior 
conviction allegations for spousal abuse with great bodily injury 
and two rapes, the court found the allegations true.  After the 
jury returned a verdict of death, the court imposed that 
sentence.  This appeal is automatic.  We affirm the judgment in 
full. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase 
On June 16, 1995, friends of Suzanne McKenna had been 
unable to reach her by phone and went to her cottage in 
Hayward.  Judy Luque knocked on the front door but received 
no response.  Peering through the blinds, she saw a heavy-set 
man with brown hair standing in McKenna’s kitchen, wearing a 
blue Pendleton shirt.  She yelled to her husband, Jeff, as the 
man left through another door.  Jeff ran to the side of the cottage 
and saw a man walking quickly away, carrying something in his 
arms. 
                                        
1  
Penal Code, sections 187, subdivision (a), 189, 190.2, 
subdivision (a)(17)(C).  Further unspecified statutory references 
are to the Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
Jeff shouted at him and the man began to run.  Jeff gave 
chase but lost sight of him.  Meanwhile, Judy entered the 
cottage.  There was garbage all over the kitchen floor and a foul 
smell.  The living room appeared to have been ransacked.  Judy 
called for McKenna but heard nothing.  She left and a neighbor 
called 911.  Alameda County sheriff’s deputies responded, 
searched unsuccessfully for the fleeing suspect, then entered the 
cottage.  A trail of fecal matter led from the living room to the 
bathroom, where they found McKenna’s corpse.  There was a 
Reebok shoe print on the bathroom floor.   
McKenna’s face was purple.  A bra, panties, and a strip of 
leather were wrapped around her neck.  Rigor mortis had set in.  
There was no sign of forced entry.  Some fingerprints were 
recovered, but none were useful.  The deputies found a tin of 
condoms, as well as an empty condom wrapper on the couch.  
Two tubes of personal lubricant were found nearby.  Various 
items of McKenna’s property, along with a pair of Reebok shoes, 
were discovered in the surrounding neighborhood. 
The pathologist testified that it would have taken “a 
couple of minutes” for McKenna to lose consciousness when she 
was strangled, and another one or two minutes before she died.  
The greatest pressure had been applied to the front of her neck.  
One breast bore abrasions that could have come from a blow or 
a bite.  There were contusions on her face, which could have been 
inflicted by a fist or open hand.  Abrasions on her back and 
buttocks were consistent with having been dragged across the 
floor.  The vagina and anus showed no signs of trauma.2  Sperm 
was detected on a vaginal swab.  A toxicology screen showed a 
                                        
2  
An expert testified that around 40 percent of rape victims 
show no sign of genital trauma. 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
blood alcohol level of .15 percent, with 40 micrograms per liter 
of methamphetamine.  The latter level was considerable, and 
reflected illicit rather than prescribed usage. 
Biological samples were preserved.  Strands of hair were 
found wrapped around the strip of leather used as the ligature.  
In 1995, the crime lab was not able to do DNA testing.  When no 
leads developed, the investigation was put on hold. 
In May 2001, defendant’s wife Brenda brought their 13-
year-old son Robert to the sheriff’s station.3  Robert had recently 
told his mother about an encounter with defendant in 1995, 
when they lived near McKenna, and he wanted to tell the police 
about it.  While he and some friends were playing outside, he 
had seen defendant jogging from the area of the cottages behind 
their apartment complex.  He knew defendant socialized with 
residents at the cottages.  About 20 minutes later, Robert and 
his friends heard a commotion at the crime scene and decided to 
go see what was happening.  When he went to a storage unit to 
get his bicycle, he found defendant inside, sweating and holding 
a barbecue fork.  Defendant said he would kill Robert if he told 
anyone where he was.  Frightened, Robert returned to his 
friends. 
Brenda also gave a statement to the police.  At 7:00 a.m. 
on the day of the investigation, she had been getting ready for 
work.  Defendant came into the apartment, without his shoes 
and appearing nervous.  He said that he had been partying with 
a couple in one of the cottages, when the man got into an 
argument with the woman and choked her to death.  Brenda told 
defendant to go to the police, but he replied that the man had 
                                        
3  
Both Brenda and Robert testified at trial. 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
threatened to kill his family if he did so.  Defendant left the 
apartment, wearing a blue Pendleton shirt.  Brenda was upset 
and called in sick.  That afternoon, a sheriff’s deputy came to the 
door and told her a suspect had been seen in a neighboring 
apartment where someone was killed.  Defendant returned 
about three hours later, and said he had gone back to the cottage 
to wipe away his fingerprints.  The dead woman’s brother had 
come in and seen him.  He ran because he was anxious about 
being seen.  He changed his clothes, cut his hair, and shaved off 
his mustache.  He and Brenda drove to the San Leandro Marina, 
where defendant threw the Pendleton shirt in the water.  
Brenda did not then suspect he was the killer. 
The investigation was reopened after Brenda and Robert 
came forward.  Judy Luque identified defendant in a 
photographic lineup as the man she had seen.  One of the Reebok 
shoes found near the cottage tested positive for Brenda’s DNA.  
Defendant’s DNA was detected on the leather ligature.  The 
analyst was unable to recover a DNA profile from the sperm 
sample.   
Defendant gave a series of statements to investigating 
sheriff’s deputies and the district attorney, as set out more fully 
below.  He admitted having consensual sex with McKenna and 
claimed McKenna had asked him to choke her during the 
encounter.  He tied her panties and bra around her neck but did 
not intend to kill her.  Realizing she was dead, he panicked, 
dragged her body into the bathroom, and tried to clean up.  He 
returned to McKenna’s cottage the next day to make sure he 
hadn’t left anything inside.   
The prosecution introduced evidence of defendant’s 
violence against other women.  In 1982, he sexually and 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
physically assaulted 19-year-old Anne H.  Defendant visited 
Anne when her husband was out of town.  He was friendly at 
first, but when Anne resisted his sexual advances, he forced 
himself on her, choking and threatening to kill her.  He raped 
and sodomized her, then forced her to orally copulate him.  He 
threatened to kill her unless she agreed he could visit again.  
Anne reported the assault and defendant ultimately pleaded 
guilty to one count of rape.   
In 1987, defendant sexually assaulted 60-year-old Mabel 
L., whom he had known since his childhood.  Late one night he 
appeared at her door and asked to use the bathroom.  Inside, he 
knocked Mabel to the ground and raped her.  When he drew a 
knife, Mabel pleaded for her life and promised not to report the 
attack.  Defendant stabbed her in the back, knocked her down, 
and choked her.  Mabel was able to get free and defendant fled.  
Mabel reported the assault.  Defendant pleaded guilty to forcible 
rape and use of a knife. 
In 1996, defendant physically assaulted his wife, Brenda, 
choking her to unconsciousness.  She awoke to find her wrists 
and hands tied and a pillowcase shoved in her mouth.  
Defendant returned and again choked her.  When she awoke a 
second time she was no longer bound and defendant was gone.  
It took six months for her voice to return to normal.  Defendant 
subsequently pleaded guilty to corporal injury on a spouse, 
admitting to a probation officer:  “ I choked my wife.  I was under 
the influence of crack and I got paranoid.  I thought she was 
going to call the police.”   
Defendant presented no evidence in his defense at the 
guilt phase. 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
B.  Penalty Phase 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
McKenna’s brother, Ronald testified he and his children 
had been close to the victim.  Her death devastated the entire 
family.  McKenna had been very supportive of her sister, Patti 
Dutiot, who struggled with alcoholism and psychological 
problems.  Dutiot was a recluse and McKenna was her lifeline 
to the outside world.  Dutoit died in 1996.  Ronald commented 
that he “lost two sisters because of this clown,” referring to 
defendant.  McKenna was estranged from her sister Lori, but 
had a close relationship with her 10-year-old nephew, Michael.  
After McKenna’s death, Lori had a “breakdown” over the 
estrangement.  It was very painful for her to explain McKenna’s 
death to Michael.   
2. Defense Evidence 
Defendant’s single mother raised him and his siblings.  
His half-brother, Ernest Molano, testified that their mother 
spanked them with her hand, a belt, or anything else she could 
grab.  He felt that their mother loved them and only punished 
them when they deserved it.  They always had food, clothing, 
and a roof over their heads. 
Defendant’s former girlfriend, Bonnie Alexis, testified he 
was good with young children, including his own niece and 
Bonnie’s son.  Defendant supported Bonnie and helped her 
during difficult times.  Another friend, Evelyn Horne, said 
defendant was kind and had helped her leave an abusive 
relationship.  Other family members and friends likewise 
described defendant as a good person and role model who was 
close to his family and helpful to others.  
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
Several correctional officers testified about defendant’s 
behavior in prison.  They reported that defendant had a good 
attitude and work ethic and got along well with other inmates. 
Psychologist Rahn Minagawa compiled defendant’s social 
and family history.  Defendant’s mother had seven children by 
different men, and his father’s identity is unknown.  The mother 
was verbally and physically abusive.  She whipped him, said she 
hated him, and wanted to give him up for adoption.  He began 
drinking when he was 12 years old, and began using cocaine in 
high school. 
Neuropsychologist Myla Young assessed defendant’s IQ to 
be 85.  His previous test scores were 109 in 1982 and 94 in 1988.  
He has significantly impaired attention and mild impairment of 
verbal memory.  His cognitive flexibility and executive 
functioning 
are 
impaired, 
undermining 
his 
ability 
to 
conceptualize and plan.  Neuropsychological testing and brain 
tomography suggested damage to his hippocampus and frontal 
lobe.  Test results showed no evidence of malingering.  Young 
opined defendant would function well in a structured 
environment.   
Frank Agee, a chaplain at the Santa Rita Jail, met with 
defendant weekly for several months before his trial.  He 
described defendant as a born-again Christian who had 
experienced genuine spiritual growth.   
Retired correctional officer Daniel Vasquez testified that 
people sentenced to life without the possibility of parole do not 
receive conduct credits and are not allowed outside the prison 
walls.        
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Guilt Phase Issues 
1. Admissibility of Defendant’s Statements 
Defendant argued his statements to officers and the 
district attorney were taken in violation of his rights to remain 
silent and be assisted by counsel.  (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 
384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 
(Edwards).)  On appeal, he challenges the court’s denial of his 
suppression motion.  When reviewing a Miranda ruling, “we 
accept the trial court’s determination of disputed facts if 
supported by substantial evidence, but we independently decide 
whether the challenged statements were obtained in violation of 
Miranda.”  (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 586; see 
People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1311 (Bradford).) 
Defendant 
gave 
three 
taped 
statements 
to 
law 
enforcement officers.  The first was made at San Quentin State 
Prison.  The second occurred in a patrol car while defendant was 
driven from prison to the sheriff’s substation.  The third was 
made the same day at the station.  An audiotape of the prison 
interview and a videotape of the station interview were played 
for the jury.  The conversation in the patrol car was not offered 
in evidence.     
Defendant claims he was deceived into waiving his 
Miranda rights at the outset of the San Quentin interview.  He 
urges he did not reinitiate communication with the officers after 
invoking his Miranda rights, rendering subsequent statements 
inadmissible.  He argues he invoked his right to counsel a second 
time during the drive to the station.  He also contends his 
apparent waivers of Miranda rights at the station were 
involuntary because the officers disregarded his invocations and 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
attempted to soften him up during the transport.  We hold to the 
contrary.   
a. Background 
i. 
The San Quentin Interview 
On March 21, 2003, six years after the murder, Sergeant 
Scott Dudek and Detective Edward Chicoine went to San 
Quentin to interview defendant.  They knew he was scheduled 
to be released from prison in about two weeks.  His criminal 
record reflected two prior rape convictions as well as the spousal 
assault for which he was then incarcerated.  Chicoine testified 
that he and Dudek concocted a “ruse,” planning to present 
themselves as “290 investigators” looking into defendant’s past 
sexual offenses before he returned to the community.  (See § 290 
et seq. [Sex Offender Registration Act].)  Although Chicoine was 
in fact responsible for monitoring released sex offenders, he was 
also a homicide investigator and his true goal was to talk about 
the McKenna case.   
The interview was tape recorded, though there was some 
preliminary conversation before the recording began.  Chicoine 
and Dudek identified themselves as deputies with the Alameda 
County Sheriff’s Department.  At the beginning of the tape, 
Chicoine said:  “Ok.  Carl, like I’ve explained to you before we 
want to talk to you about some of your past crimes and some of 
the sex registration laws and things like that.  Before we do that, 
I had mentioned to you before that we’re going to read you your 
rights . . . .”  Chicoine then recited the Miranda rights.  
Defendant said he understood them, was willing to talk, and 
signed a written waiver.  As he was filling out the form, he asked 
if his parole would be affected “[i]f I don’t answer any of these 
questions.”  Chicoine replied, “No, absolutely not.” 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
When defendant asked if “[y]ou do that for everybody now?  
All the sex registrants?”  Dudek replied it was “our normal 
procedure.”  Chicoine explained:  “I list every single sex 
registrant that comes across my desk, I look at.”  “Every single 
one and I’m constantly on the phone and I have two files full.”  
Chicoine said, “And here’s, here’s one of the things that I do just 
so you know, is that, you know, especially when you’re out there 
your whole goal in life is you want to stay in my file.  I mean 
you’re going to be there for life anyhow.”  Defendant echoed that 
he would be “there for life anyway.”  Chicoine said, “Right.  But 
you want to stay [i]n the filing cabinet.”  Defendant said “Yeah.”  
Chicoine continued, “If you’re causing a problem or if I’m getting 
called or whatever else, then it gets put in a red file and it sits 
on my desk and I have about 4 or 5 of them on my desk at any 
time.  And those are the guys that I’m looking for.  Those are the 
guys I’m going after.  So, the goal . . . objective is to stay in the 
file and stay off my desk.  Correct?”4   Defendant’s response is 
not audible, but Chicoine followed up with “All right.” 
For about an hour, they discussed defendant’s job 
prospects, family background, substance abuse issues, and prior 
offenses.  After reviewing the assault on Brenda, Chicoine told 
defendant “we want to look at other things to see if, you know, 
maybe you have an involvement in, in other situations that were 
                                        
4  
We have independently reviewed the recorded interviews.  
(People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 238.)  Quotations are from 
the prosecutor’s transcripts provided to the trial court.  We have 
not corrected minor typographical and grammatical errors in 
the original quoted material.  Bracketed words and phrases 
reflect statements that were deemed unintelligible in the 
transcripts, but that we have been able to discern from our 
independent review of the recordings. 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
out in that area.”  He asked if defendant remembered “an 
incident where there was a girl that died?”  Defendant said, “My 
neighbor next door.”  He did not remember her name, but said 
he had “a drink at the manager’s house with her and we got high 
at the manager’s house together.”  Dudek showed defendant a 
picture of McKenna, and defendant recognized her as “my 
neighbor.”  Chicoine gave her name “Susan McKenna,” and 
defendant acknowledged “we called her Sue.”  He said at the 
time of the murder his parole officer had asked him if he knew 
anything, and he told her “no.” 
They talked about defendant’s use of drugs with McKenna 
and asked if he had a sexual relationship with her.  Defendant 
admitted that he did, saying it was a “hit and run,” a single 
occasion a day or two before her death.  He was surprised no one 
had come to see him after she died, “because I know what my 
record looks like.”  He said they had had “[r]egular missionary 
style sex,” and answered “No” when asked if it was “rough sex.”  
He said “it was just spontaneous sex.”  He denied biting her. 
Chicoine asked if anyone had suspected him of the 
murder.  Defendant said, “Yes,” even his wife “thought so.”  
When Dudek inquired what he had told his wife, defendant 
became reticent, and said he needed to go to the bathroom.  He 
admitted, “I told Brenda I know what happened,” then again 
asked to use the restroom.  Pressed by Chicoine for “the gist of 
what you told Brenda,” defendant said “It was so long ago, I 
cannot remember.  I’m not going to bullshit you.”  The tape 
recorder was turned off and defendant went to the restroom.  
When he returned, he invoked his Miranda rights.  The officers 
turned the recorder back on, and said defendant wanted “to tell 
us something specifically.”  Defendant said, “No disrespect to 
both of you gentlemen.  I understand where this is leading to, 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
this conversation and I would rather not say anything else until 
I have a public defender of mine.” 
The officers stopped the interrogation and said they had a 
search warrant for blood and buccal swabs, dental casts, and his 
shoes.  They said if he wanted to talk to them again, “You have 
to initiate the contact.”  Defendant said he understood and asked 
if they had a card.  They each gave him one, and repeated that 
he needed to initiate contact, telling him to “get ahold of the 
guards here” and say “I want to talk.”  Defendant responded, 
“[or] my counselor [or my captain or something].”  The tape 
recording ended.  Chicoine testified that defendant said he 
wanted to tell them what happened, but would like to talk to a 
counselor first, which Chicoine understood to mean a religious 
counselor.  Defendant said he would call them after he had that 
opportunity. 
Chicoine conceded that defendant’s final statements about 
wanting to talk after consulting a counselor were not on the 
tape, or in his police report, written five days later.  A 
supplemental report from April 3, however, includes the 
following summary:  “Molano had previously invoked his right 
to an attorney during an interview . . . on 3/21/03.  At that time, 
Molano told us that he intended to call us and tell us everything 
about his involvement with Suzanne McKenna’s murder, but 
said he wanted to have a counseling session with his 
psychologist first.  Dudek explained to Molano that we would 
not be able to contact him, and that if he wanted to tell us 
anything regarding the crime, he would have to contact us.” 
The officers finished collecting samples from defendant, 
and informed prison staff of his status as a suspect.  Chicoine 
said it was understood that he would be placed in a “more secure 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
situation, because of the possibility of [a] criminal complaint 
coming down in the future.” 
ii. 
The Conversation in the Car 
A complaint was filed on March 27, 2003, charging 
defendant with murder.  An arrest warrant issued, and on 
March 31, Dudek and Chicoine drove to San Quentin to take 
defendant into custody.  They told him he was under arrest for 
the murder.  Chicoine testified that when the officers first 
encountered defendant in a receiving area at the prison, he told 
them “that he had been meaning to call us, that he had already 
talked to a counselor and that he intended to call us.”  There had 
been no contact with defendant since the last interview, but he 
said “[h]e knew we’d be coming back.”  Chicoine understood 
defendant’s statements as a reinitiation of the discussion at the 
end of the March 21 interview, when he had said “he did want 
to talk to us, he wanted to explain what was going on.”  
The court asked if that was only what Chicoine thought 
defendant meant, or if defendant expressly said he wanted to 
talk to them.  Chicoine answered, “It sounded to me that that’s 
exactly what he meant.”  The court commented, “But he didn’t 
overtly say ‘I want to talk to you now.’ ”  Chicoine said, “Yes, he 
did.  He said he wanted to talk to us.  He had already talk[ed] to 
his counselor and that he meant to call us.”  Chicoine told 
defendant “to wait” and that “we would get an opportunity to 
talk to him later.”  On cross-examination, Chicoine said he could 
not remember defendant’s exact words, “but I know that it was 
very close to — he said that he wanted to — that he meant or 
intended to call us, and that he had just wanted to get this over 
with.”  The court asked whether defendant made this statement 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
before or after being told he was under arrest.  Chicoine could 
not remember the sequence of the exchange.5   
Dudek drove from San Quentin to the station.  Chicoine 
sat behind him and defendant was in the right rear seat.  When 
they got into the car, Dudek turned on a tape recorder placed on 
the front passenger seat.  At the outset of the ensuing 
conversation, Dudek asked defendant if he had “any questions 
or anything.”  Defendant said he was “in limbo.”  Dudek replied, 
“You’re in limbo?”  “Is that, is that a good thing or a bad thing 
being in limbo?”  Defendant said he didn’t know.  Dudek asked 
him, “Know what’s going on or no?”  Defendant replied, “[No,] 
run it down.”  Chicoine told defendant he would be arraigned, 
“hopefully on Wednesday.”  After a pause, defendant asked, 
“What’s it look like I’m facing?”  Dudek said “obviously we can’t 
tell one way or the other, but, I don’t know.  You understand the 
charge, right?”  Defendant gave an affirmative response, and 
silence ensued. 
Dudek resumed the conversation, saying “I’ve seen better, 
I’ve seen worse.  That’s a pretty chicken shit answer but . . . .”  
“And obviously we’d like to have an explanation, but we’re not 
in that position because of what you said the other day, but if 
you’d like to give an explanation then we’re gonna give you 
another opportunity once we get to our station.  That’s kind of 
where we’re at right now.  And obviously, you know, we’re a little 
bit more at liberty to tell you some things that we didn’t tell you 
the other day that we can tell you now.  That’ll come out if you 
want it to, but [you kind of hold the,] you’re kind of in control 
                                        
5 
No mention of the conversation in the receiving area was 
included in Chicoine’s April 3 supplemental police report. 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
here right now to say yeah, go ahead and tell me or I don’t give 
a shit, I’ll find out sooner or later, so . . . .” 
Defendant said, “Tell me.”  Dudek replied, “Alright.  Does 
that mean you want to talk to us again or does that mean you 
just wanna, let me explain what’s gonna go on now and then 
maybe [you’ll answer] our questions.  You’re gonna go back, 
we’re gonna put you in an interview room, we’re gonna read you 
your rights again, we’re gonna go over the fact that we were out 
to talk to you a week ago, ten days ago actually it is now, and at 
that point you talked to us a little bit and you said hey, at this 
point here you want to talk to your counselor, you wanted to talk 
to whoever, and, and, we’ll go over that again . . . if at that point 
you say I wanna know a little bit more, I wanna talk to you about 
it a little bit more then we’ll go from there, and that’s where 
we’re at, OK?”  Defendant said, “[All right].” 
Dudek continued, “So, even if it’s one sided and you say 
hey, I want to talk to you and you don’t say nothing, you gotta 
tell us I want to have the conversation be more of a two-sided 
conversation.  Cause I think that’s only fair to us and you’ve 
been in the system, you know what I mean?  I’m not here to 
clown you, like I told you the other day, you know.  And it’s only 
right that you say yeah, let’s go ahead and I want to hear what’s 
up, and then once you give us that, and if you decide at one point 
again, you know what, I’m hurting enough, and, and then we 
stop again, so.  I think truthfully, and you know this too, and 
you even said it, that, you know, you, I think you did want to go 
on with a little bit more, and I think there’s probably stuff that 
you do want to share with us that we may not know about, but 
. . . [¶] . . . Now ultimately . . . [¶] . . . You know, and the bottom 
line is too, is, is, is ultimately there’s always a story behind 
everything, and unfortunately when it comes down to the 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
charging part of it, we’re, we’re, this is kind of a one shot deal 
here.  You get your [opportunity to] say this is where we’re at, 
or let’s see how it shakes out, and then that’s [a decision you,] 
Carl Molano the, the, the, the 46, 47 year old [dude’s gotta 
make].  I, I can’t, Scott or Ed can’t do that for you.  You have to 
do it on your own, you know what I mean?” 
At this point Chicoine interjected, “Right now, there’s a 
story [that’s being told, but it doesn’t have your side].”  Dudek 
resumed, “I’ll be more than happy, and so would Ed, we’d [be] 
more than happy to share exactly, you know, how the story even 
started.  Why are we at this point after so many years, and, and, 
and, you know, a lot of that has to do with, with your family and, 
and, and, and it’s only fair that you know that cause you are 
gonna know and my credibility and Ed’s credibility with you is 
gonna mean everything as far as this goes.  If you think I’m a 
big bullshitter, horse’s ass, and you think he is, there’s no sense 
of us even going any further, you know what I mean?  And you’re 
gonna find that what we tell you is ultimately, you know, we’re 
not bullshitting you, so.” 
Defendant said, “No, you guys been straight up.”  Dudek 
replied, “I mean we’re, we’re trying to be that way cause this is 
what we do.  You, you got to do what you got to do, we got to do 
want we got to do, you know what I mean, and, and I was up 
front with you when I said the other day, I said I, I mean, I know 
Suzy’s not an angel, or wasn’t an angel, you know what I mean, 
and, and there could be some other factors, but that, that’s . . . .”  
At this point Dudek evidently took a wrong turn, which 
interrupted the conversation briefly.  He resumed with, “like Ed 
said, there’s two sides to every story, you know what I mean?  I 
mean, you can tell by where we were going that we obviously 
talked to a bunch of people and somebody, you know, and, and, 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
quite frankly, you know, we talked to your ex old lady who told 
us some stuff and we talked to some other people, so that’s kind 
of, that’s kind of where we’re at.” 
Defendant said, “I ought to be arraigned Wednesday [and 
assigned a] (unintelligible).”  Dudek told him, “[Nuh.]  You’ll 
probably just be arraigned, they’ll ask you your financial status, 
more than likely you’ll be assigned a PD your next court 
appearance, but you could get one right off the get go on 
something like this, I’m, I’m, probably you will actually.”  
Defendant said, “Can I ask you a question?”  Dudek answered, 
“Sure.”  Defendant said, “They assign me a PD, right?”  Dudek 
said, “Right.”  Defendant said, “I can sit down and talk to my PD 
first, then talk with you all?”  Dudek replied, “Yeah.”  Defendant 
said, “Can I do that?”  Dudek told him, “Yeah.  I mean, that’s 
one of your options and that’s why we’re here, you know.”  
Defendant said, “That’s, I would, I would (unintelligible).” 
Dudek responded, “Ok.  If you’re [gonna go through] that 
formally when we get to the tape, we’re gonna say Carl Molano, 
you understand you’re being charged with this, and then, . . . 
and then we’re gonna go through the rights thing again.  It’s at 
that time, you know, you can say hey, let me talk to my PD and 
I’ll talk to you again, but, you know, that’s entirely up to you.  
We’re here only to do shit on the up-and-up.  If we don’t do it on 
the up-and-up then we might as well just throw it away right 
now, you know what I mean?” 
After a pause, Dudek said, “I know I read some of your 
letters and I know you know I read them, when you were, you 
were out there the other day with your other daughter, your 
daughter there, the 4.0 whiz kid there, you know.  I, I can’t think 
of, Regina, is that her name?”  Defendant said, “Jasmine.” 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
Dudek said, “It sounds like you’re starting to, you know, at least 
head in the right direction there with a relationship with her.  
Irregardless whether you talk to us or not, when we get to our 
station I think it’s only fair that you know that, is it Robert?  
Robert’s your 17 year old son?  Robert played a fairly key role in 
this as far as where we’re at right now, and I just don’t want it 
to be a, a, a mind blower from you when it comes out, ok?  So, 
that’s kind of, you know, you’ve got one relationship by your own 
admittance you’re trying to get back together when you were 
talking to us the other day, and, and really said you hadn’t 
talked to Robert or your other, was it son, from, from your that 
wife?”  Defendant said, “Yeah.”  Dudek continued, “But I think 
what I’m asking you probably, from my standpoint [as a dad and 
stuff,] that you’ve got to rebuild and don’t take it out on your 
kids.  They, they had to do what they had to do, so, you know 
what I mean?” 
Dudek continued, “Ok.  So, unfortunately, Robert’s had a 
lot of problems over the years because of, you know, the stuff 
and, and Robert felt he had to do what he had to do, and you’ll 
probably never have a relationship with Robert, but in the 
scheme of things hopefully you’ll, you’ll view it as Robert’s 
becoming a man, that type of thing, you know what I mean?  And 
I think the reason I’m telling you this is because when I first 
talked to your ex-wife, the first thing was well, of course she’s 
coming forward because she can’t stand your guts because, you 
know what I mean?”  Defendant said, “Yeah I know.”  Dudek 
said, “So that’s something that, that the whole thing weighed 
on, so.” 
After an extended pause, Dudek asked about the 
temperature in the back seat, then opened a new topic:  “Other 
thing too is, and then this is just kind of [weird], obviously this, 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
this murder occurred in 1995.  It’s gonna be fairly a, a big deal 
in the newspapers and probably even the media and stuff 
because it’s, you know, it’s an eight year old homicide, so I’m just 
kind of preparing you for that.  I don’t know, I mean I know your 
mom’s not around anymore, but if you think there’s somebody 
you may want to prepare for it, you may want to let us know 
that so we can tell them before they hear it on the 7 o’clock news 
[tonight], i.e. your, your daughter, or whoever else, know what I 
mean?” 
After a long pause, there was some talk about the art work 
defendant had done, and his life in prison.  After another 
extended pause, Dudek asked if defendant had told anyone 
about their previous visit.  Defendant said inmates had seen 
them, but Dudek said, “I meant family or something, not 
inmates.”   Defendant asked, “I can give you two numbers to 
call?”  Dudek said, “I can let you call two numbers, how’s that?  
I don’t really like to tell people what’s up.  I’d rather have them 
hear it from you, or, you know, I mean if you don’t want to do 
that I understand, but it’s up to you.  That’s a decision you can 
make from now until the 150th exit, right?”  This was a 
reference to the freeway exit for the station.  Defendant said, 
“Yeah.”  After some further conversation about defendant’s 
other son who was serving a prison term in New York, there was 
a long pause broken by defendant saying, “Hey.”  Dudek replied 
“[Heyo],” and defendant said, “[I have a question,] if I want to 
get this over with as soon as possible, right?”  Dudek said, “Uh-
huh.”  Defendant asked, “Who [do I talk] to?  [PD?  DA?]” 
Dudek said, “Yeah, you mean you just wanna plead and 
get, get on with your time?”  Defendant said, “Yeah.”  He wanted 
to be “sentenced, you know, or whatever.”  Dudek said, “We can, 
we can let the DA know that that’s your, your wish[es] . . . I 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
mean, they’re, they’re gonna go on the guidance of your PD 
anyway . . . .”  Defendant said, “Yeah,” and commented, “PD 
doesn’t (unintelligible).”  After some discussion about waiving 
time, Dudek told defendant, “It’s going to be up to you.”  He 
explained, a defense attorney would be “[t]here to advise you, 
but you, you’re still in the driver’s seat, you know, it’s your 
defense.  I mean, he’s there to advise you, but if you say hey, you 
know, you’re still a young guy, let’s just get on with this so I can 
. . .”  Defendant said, “I’m the only one that [holds it].  I actually, 
you know, it’s like [at the house?  I have the keys to all the 
doors].”  Dudek said, “Exactly.” 
After a pause Dudek said, “When we get here it’s a lot 
easier, let, let us do what we gotta do and then we can talk to 
you and you can talk to us [and].  I mean, I understand what you 
said before, but let’s just, just get in here and do what we gotta 
do.”  After another pause he asked defendant, “You consider 
yourself institutionalized?  By that (unintelligible) talk to a 
whole bunch of people and some dudes are just kind of reserved 
to the fact that that’s the way it’s always gonna be, and 
sometimes . . .”  “It’s easier and just do time, or do you consider 
yourself, I want to get over with this so I can try to make at least, 
have ten good years or whatever.”  Defendant’s response is 
unintelligible.  Dudek concluded the conversation with an 
exhortation: 
“It’s kind of unfortunate for you because . . . it seems like 
you were at least heading in the right direction as far as with 
the religion, and the making amends with your kids, and stuff 
like that.  What you can’t do Carl though, is, is, is, it’s, it’s your 
heart and it’s your soul, don’t, don’t give up on yourself, alright?  
It’s, you know, believe it or not your, your, your daughter 
obviously is pissed off at you for not having a relationship [but 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
at least] she’s kind of proud of herself [and] proud of [making 
amends], [and] you can still do some good, you know what I’m 
saying, and, and you, you can’t give up on yourself.  Once you 
give up on yourself then, you know, the healing process has to 
start with you first, you know.”  Defendant said, “Yeah.”   
Dudek continued:  “It does, so I’m not gonna jump into this 
Bible thumping thing or anything like that, but I’m just telling 
you don’t give up on yourself, alright?  Cause then you don’t do 
anybody any good.  Believe it or not, what families want more 
is, like Ed said, they want to know the why and they want to 
hear something from your mouth and people, even people that 
are victims of something terrible, they get over it too, you know 
what I mean?  So, they mainly look at you and, you know that 
from your previous crimes too though, you know.  Just like that 
lady that you see walking around.[6]  You know, that was one of 
your more powerful moments, was meeting up with her on the 
streets.  [So, people] get over it.  People realize that, you know.  
I told you before that before I did this I was in, you know, I, I did 
dope, I was a dope sergeant, you know what I mean, and believe 
me I know when, when crack cocaine and, and crank, and 
everything else does to people.  People, it’s the wors[t] thing that 
they ever had because you take people that have been clean and 
you could sit there and you could, and trust them and, and you’d, 
you’d want to have them come around and, and then I see these 
[fuckin’], more so the girls (unintelligible) and stuff spun out on 
the [crank] and shit.  It’s like damn, it’s like how can anybody 
                                        
6  
During the San Quentin interview, defendant had 
described an encounter on a street corner with one of his prior 
rape victims, a family friend. He had written her to apologize, 
and she told him she forgave him. 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
get to that point, but you understand [how they can, ‘cause,] 
especially with the crack man, it’s just so powerful and stuff you 
know.  I mean, you gotta realize people are going to do you in 
one fashion, but only you know what, what Carl’s all about 
inside, inside your heart.  That pretty much ends my sermon 
here so that’s where I’m coming from.” 
There was a considerable period without conversation 
before they arrived at the station. 
iii. 
The Statements at the Station 
Chicoine testified that at the station, defendant stopped 
by the rear of the car and said, “ ‘I have a question.’ ”  Chicoine 
said, “ ‘What?’ ” and defendant told him that he “wanted to get 
this over with . . . that he had been speaking with inmates in the 
prison and they told him not to talk to the police.  He said he 
knows that the public defender would tell him not to talk to the 
police, but he told me that he had to walk in his shoes, that they 
don’t have to walk in his shoes.  He just wants to get closure 
from this, and he just wants to tell the story, and get it over 
with.”  Chicoine told him to wait until they got into the building, 
where they would give him another opportunity after reading 
him his rights.  Chicoine understood defendant to be saying that 
he wanted to discuss the McKenna murder.7 
                                        
7  
Chicoine’s supplemental report of April 3 provided a 
similar account.  It stated that after the recorder was turned off 
and defendant got out of the car, “he told Dudek and I that he 
wanted to tell us everything.  He explained that he did not want 
the court procedure to be a long drawn out ordeal.  Dudek 
reiterated that he should wait until we got into the station 
where we would read him his rights again.” 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
Defendant was taken to an interview room, where the 
conversation was video and audiotaped.  Dudek began by 
reciting that 10 days earlier, he and Chicoine had gone to San 
Quentin and spoken with defendant.  He said, “You were 
advised of your Miranda rights prior to the interview and at 
some point in the interview you told us that you wanted to 
invoke your Miranda rights, and you wanted to consult with an 
attorney before you talked to us, is that correct?”  Defendant 
said, “Correct.”  Dudek then said, “at some point” during the 
“transportation from San Quentin,” “you then told us you 
wanted to talk to us, and, and hear what we had to say, and, and 
didn’t 
want your attorney 
present 
anymore, 
correct?’’  
Defendant paused and replied, “I didn’t have an attorney 
present.” 
Dudek said, “That’s what I mean though, you, you said you 
wanted to talk to us and you understood you were now waiving 
your rights to have an attorney present, is what I meant to say, 
if I didn’t make that clear.  And, and that’s kinda where we’re at 
right now, if that’s correct, then I want to go ahead and re-read 
you your rights so you understand them again, so at any point 
you can go ahead and invoke your rights again.  You follow me?”  
Defendant answered, “Oh, ok, so I do want to talk to an 
attorney?”  Dudek repeated that defendant was read his rights 
on the 21st, and had said he wanted to talk to an attorney.  
Defendant said, “Right.”  Dudek said, “On the trip over here, you 
said now I want to talk to you for a little while, I want to make 
sure that’s clear, and then I’m gonna read your rights again, so 
you know we can talk, because you approached us, to talk to us 
but then at a point, you can always re . . . ,  you’re not giving up 
your rights, I’m just gonna re-advise you that at, at this 
interview point you can again say no, stop.”  Defendant said, 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
“[Stop] if I wanted to.”  Dudek asked if what he had said was 
accurate, and defendant agreed it was.  Dudek said, “So you’re 
freely giving up your rights at this point here, and then I’m 
gonna advise him.  You approached us, is the only thing I’m 
getting to, is that correct?”  Defendant said, “Uh-huh.”  Dudek 
said, “Without any promises from us or anything, correct?”  
Defendant said, “Correct.” 
Dudek then told defendant “at this point I’m gonna re-
advise you of your rights, and then we can start talking again, 
okay?” 
 
He 
repeated 
the 
Miranda 
rights; 
defendant 
acknowledged he understood each one.  The officers began the 
interrogation by telling him they had spoken with his wife.  
Defendant said he knew what she had told them.  They then 
discussed his son Robert, and the psychological issues he had 
been dealing with as a result of his interaction with defendant 
on the day of the murder.  They talked about defendant’s drug 
habit at the time.  Defendant said it had been “out of control.” 
Dudek brought up the importance of closure, for defendant 
and for “Susie’s family.”  Defendant agreed this was important.  
Chicoine asked, “Carl did things just get out of hand?”  
Defendant said, “[Neh,] yeah.”  Dudek said, “It’s gonna be 
painful that it got out of hand, to the point where she died, 
correct?  And you understand that, right?”  Defendant replied, 
“I understand.  Can I ask you a question?”  Dudek said “Sure.”  
Defendant said, “I don’t actually want to relive this.”  He 
affirmed Dudek’s comments that “[y]ou know where we’re 
heading” and “we want to go over every fine detail.”  Defendant 
then interjected, “my thing is, is this.”  In a series of statements 
interspersed with brief acknowledgments from the officers, he 
told them, “if I choose to say what happened, all the way down 
the whole 411, whatever, right?  I just . . . .”  “I don’t have to live 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
it again after this.”  “If I give this testimony now, I say whatever 
I have to say now, I don’t want to live it again.” 
Dudek told defendant that his having admitted to things 
getting out of hand was “a step in the right direction.  You have 
to take it to at least to the part, where you have to give us some 
of the details.  Whether it’s painful or not, we don’t have to sit 
here and harp on ya, and say, how come this and how come that?  
Go through it.  Once you get it off your chest Carl, it, it’s not 
gonna be as difficult as you think, and if it does get difficult, 
we’re not gonna sit here and, and badger you.”  Defendant asked 
if what he said would be in the newspaper.  He continued, 
“Whatever I say I, you know it’s, it’s bad enough that you know 
like, you know I’ve already fucked up, and I you know, I wanna 
just, I don’t want it to be in the paper and have my kids hurt 
anymore than they already are.”  Dudek said the way the 
information would become public was if there were a trial, and 
“there’s certain ways that you can get closure where it may not 
even go into trial, and that’s a decision that you’re gonna have 
to make.”  Defendant said “I just want to, I want to get it over.”  
He said, “If I can ask you this question,” and “this is the question 
that concerns me, all right?” 
In another series of statements interspersed with 
acknowledgments from Dudek, defendant said, “What I would 
like, you know I can talk to you guys.  I can even talk to the DA.”  
“You know, with my Public Defender there or whatever right, 
and after I say what I have to say, just ask to be sentenced, if I 
can be sentenced.”  “You know I’m not asking for a jury trial 
’cause I don’t want a jury trial.”  “I just want you know, if I can, 
if what I’m saying, if I can have that, right, I can get this all over 
with.”  “. . . I understand you thought you guys say you can’t 
promise me that.”  Dudek told defendant he would “be absolutely 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
lying to you if I told you that, ’cause that’s just not the way the 
system works, okay?  But can we let ’em, can we let ’em know 
that that’s your request?  We can let them know verbally and 
they’re gonna watch this, too.”  Defendant asked if he could “sit 
down wit’ you two and the DA, right?”  “Can I sit down with the 
DA?” 
Chicoine told him, “Carl after this it’s all over.”  Defendant 
said, “It’s all in their hands?”  Chicoine said, “It’s all over there.  
Right now this is, I’m, I’m the one that has to talk to the family, 
man.  That’s, that’s my concern, man.  My concern is just making 
sure everything now is at peace.  Obviously it’s not like peace 
with you.”  Dudek said, “Carl you’ve already started in the right 
direction here too, you’ve already said I killed Susan, or Susie.”  
Defendant said, “Yeah.”  Dudek said, “Ok so no matter what you 
say at this point here is only gonna benefit Carl, because Carl’s 
gonna be able to tell his side of the story.” 
Chicoine suggested that defendant’s drug habit may have 
been “the reason,” but that “we need to kinda hear that from you 
though.”  Dudek said, “You got to tell us what you’re gonna tell 
us.  There’s a way actually and they have a DA that’s on stand 
by for murders, and when murder defendants, which you are, 
okay, start to talk, like you’re starting to talk to us okay, they’ll 
get a DA up here today, okay?  To, to come back and they’ll come 
in and they’ll ask you questions too, from the DA, not from the 
cops’ standpoint.  But we got to know what you’re gonna tell the 
DA, and that can happen today, okay?  So I, within probably an 
hour, forty five minutes we can have a DA up here to say, ‘hey 
the cops already told ya, what I did yeah, this is what I want,’ 
okay?  And that can, that can happen today okay?  But you know 
the hardest part is, is you’ve already done it and you know what 
that is.”  Defendant said, “Ok.”  After obtaining assurances that 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
a district attorney would be on the way if they called for one, he 
said, “You call them now,” and, “Come back and we’ll continue.” 
While Dudek was out calling the district attorney, 
Chicoine asked defendant whether he “want[ed] to have 
everybody here all at once?”  Defendant said he didn’t “wanna 
live this whole story over,” that “it eats me up more and more 
and more and more,” that he was “tired of it,” that he was at 
peace with God but had to “live with the consequences of what 
I’ve done,” and “this conversation I only want to say it one time.  
The DA comes in, he looks [and] he listens to it, you know, I want 
to get over with it.”  He added, “I’ve made peace with me, but I 
it has to come out.”  Dudek returned and said it would take the 
DA thirty to forty minutes to get there.  He told defendant, 
“You’re not gonna leave here until you talk to him.”  Defendant 
indicated that he understood, and Dudek proceeded to question 
him. 
Defendant described a consensual sexual encounter when 
he and McKenna were both “loaded.”  They drank.  He used 
crack cocaine; she methamphetamine.  It became “rough sex” 
when, during intercourse, “she starts to like hitting me, slapping 
me.”  Their prior sexual encounter had been different.  He said 
it was “possible” that he bit her, and answered “Yeah” when 
Dudek asked whether she asked him to choke her.  He had used 
her panties or bra, but she said it wasn’t tight enough.  He could 
not remember what he used to exert more pressure.  The officers 
told him she was found with a shoelace around her neck.  
Defendant said, “I learned so much here.”  Asked “Probably from 
what?” he said, “My own shoes.”  He had panicked when he 
realized she was dead, and dragged her into the bathroom to try 
to “clean up.”  
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
The next day he went back to make sure he hadn’t left 
anything in McKenna’s cottage.  Someone knocked on the door 
and saw him inside, so he ran.  The only thing defendant could 
remember saying when Robert found him in the storage unit 
was not to tell anyone he was there.  Dudek returned to the 
circumstances of the killing, asking if McKenna had asked 
defendant to stop.  He said no, and told Dudek, “I didn’t rape 
her.”  But he conceded she “may have” asked him to stop 
choking, he simply didn’t know. 
When Deputy District Attorney Andy Sweet arrived, he 
turned first to the circumstances of his statements that day.  
Defendant acknowledged that he had previously invoked his 
Miranda rights, but then wanted to talk.  When asked, “What 
changed from before to now?” defendant said, “I just . . .  I’m . . .  
I’m tired.”  Sweet said, “It was your decision to start talking.”  
Defendant agreed, saying, “It was my decision.  I’m tired now.”  
“In my mind, they didn’t press the issue, understand me?”  
Sweet turned on a tape recorder, though the conversation was 
already being recorded, and again advised defendant of his 
Miranda rights, obtaining an express waiver.  He returned to 
defendant’s decision to talk, saying, “When they came to pick 
you up today, some place between San Quentin and here, the 
Sheriff’s Department in Alameda County, you started talking to 
the officers about your case and about what was going on.  Isn’t 
that true?”  Defendant said, “That’s correct.”  He reaffirmed that 
he changed his mind because he was “tired and I just want 
closure,” and that it was “[m]y decision.”  He said the officers 
had not said or done anything that made him think he had to 
talk to them, adding, “I asked them on the way here if I would 
be able to talk to a DA.” 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
Sweet asked, “Would it be a fair statement to say that you 
reinitiated kind of the discussion about the case?”  Defendant 
answered, “Ok.  I, it, that would be fair because I asked like if I 
will be straight up with you both like I was with them, right.  I 
understand ok, I don’t have the money for a public defender, 
blah blah blah.  Right.  But I understand my public defender 
said well, look you shouldn’t do this you shouldn’t do that 
because they’re not here.  Ok.  I know what I did.  All right.  And 
I just want to get it over with.”  He agreed with Sweet’s 
statement that “They didn’t ask you any questions, you were the 
one asking them questions to start the conversation going again.  
Correct?”  He said, “They made me no promises or anything.  My 
only, my main concern was that you were to come down here.” 
Defendant gave Sweet essentially the same version of the 
crime he had just given the officers.  Under the influence of 
drugs, he and McKenna had engaged in rough sex, and she 
asked him to choke her.  He didn’t intend that she die.  He said 
McKenna “was the aggressor that night,” taking off his clothes.  
He twice emphasized that he did not rape her.  After the 
intercourse ended, he noticed she wasn’t breathing.  He 
panicked and tried to clean up.  The next day he returned to 
clean up more, and fled when seen.  The only thing he 
remembered telling his son was not to tell anyone where he was. 
iv. 
The Suppression Hearing 
Defendant moved to suppress his statements.  The 
prosecutor said he was not going to offer the conversation in the 
car.  Chicoine testified at length about the circumstances of the 
statements and the trial court listened to the conversation in the 
car.  On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Chicoine 
about his April 3 supplemental police report, which did not 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
mention defendant’s statements in the San Quentin receiving 
area about a willingness to talk.  Chicoine acknowledged that he 
had not reported the conversation, saying, “I inadvertently left 
that out.  At the time, I didn’t realize that that was an important 
issue.”  He also conceded that when the taped interview began 
in the station, the officers did not ask defendant about any 
statements he made after getting out of the car.  He denied that 
the reason defendant was brought to the station was to take a 
statement from him.  He said a variety of procedures had to take 
place before defendant was taken to jail. 
Chicoine agreed that Dudek began the station interview 
by summarizing the events of the day without mentioning any 
statements by defendant at San Quentin about wanting to talk 
to the officers.  He further agreed that Sweet, the district 
attorney, made no such mention in his initial summary.  Nor did 
Sweet mention any statements by defendant after leaving the 
car at the station.  On redirect, the prosecutor showed that 
Chicoine had memorialized the unrecorded statement by the car 
in his supplemental police report.  He also established that 
Chicoine’s preliminary examination testimony included both 
that statement and defendant’s earlier statements in the San 
Quentin receiving area.  Defendant did not testify at the 
hearing.  No direct evidence contradicted Chicoine’s testimony 
about defendant’s unrecorded statements.   
The court denied the motion to suppress the statements.  
As to the March 21 statement, it ruled that the “ruse” employed 
by the officers did not invalidate defendant’s Miranda waiver.  
The court noted that, in addition to mentioning the sex offender 
registration process, Chicoine had told defendant that “they 
wanted to talk about some of your past crimes which could well 
have alerted the defendant that this event was fair game.”  The 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
court found defendant had voluntarily reinitiated contact with 
the officers on March 31.  It relied on “numerous indications in 
subsequent statements of the defendant and the various 
interrogations to substantially corroborate the statement under 
oath of [Chicoine] of the statement that was not recorded at San 
Quentin, that the defendant basically communicated that he 
knew that they would be coming back and he meant to call them 
and that he wanted to talk to them and that he wanted to get 
the whole thing over with.  And I find that most particularly in 
the statements . . . to Andy Sweet.” 
The court further found that “any conduct of Sergeant 
Dudek in his statements in the trip down from San Quentin to 
[the station] were not so psychologically compelling that they 
would have overborne Mr. Molano’s free will.  And [that] in fact 
is belied by the sheriff’s officers preventing Mr. Molano from 
making his statement until after he had been given his Miranda 
rights, and he was perfectly free once given those Miranda 
rights to reaffirm that he wanted an attorney or that he wanted 
to remain silent.  So under either analysis, under voluntary 
reinitiation or under [a] voluntariness analysis, I believe that 
Mr. Molano was given his Miranda rights at [the station] and 
that by continuing talking . . . he impliedly waived those rights,” 
making his subsequent statements to the officers and to Sweet 
“legal and voluntary.” 
b. Validity of Miranda Waiver on March 21st 
Defendant claims his initial Miranda waiver was 
constitutionally invalid because he was deceived into waiving 
his rights at the outset of the San Quentin interview.  
Specifically, he agreed to speak to Chicoine because Chicoine 
said he was a sex crime investigator conducting a routine pre-
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
release interview of defendant, who would have to register as a 
sex offender under section 290.  According to defendant, because 
of Chicoine’s deliberate falsehood the waiver was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  The claim fails.   
The governing principles are well established.  Before 
subjecting suspects to custodial interrogation,8 the police must 
inform them of their Miranda rights and obtain a waiver that is 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.  (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 
at pp. 444, 478–479.)  The test for validity is as follows.  “First, 
the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the 
sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice 
rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.  Second, the 
waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the 
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the 
decision to abandon it.  Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice 
and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly 
conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.”  (Moran v. 
Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 (Moran).)  The prosecution 
must demonstrate the validity of a suspect’s waiver by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  (Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 
U.S. 157, 168–169 (Connelly).)  
There is no factual dispute as to the circumstances of 
defendant’s initial waiver at San Quentin.  Chicoine testified 
that he and Dudek came up with a “ruse” to make defendant 
                                        
8  
We recognize that defendant’s incarceration for an 
unrelated offense does not necessarily constitute custody for 
Miranda purposes.  (See Howes v. Fields (2012) 565 U.S. 499, 
508–516; Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98, 112–114 
(Shatzer).)  However, the People have not contested the point, so 
we need not further consider it. 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
think they had come to talk to him about sex offender 
registration matters.  Chicoine told defendant that he had “files 
full” of sex registrants, and that “the objective” was for 
defendant to stay out of the “red file” on his desk of “the guys 
I’m going after.”  Chicoine did not reveal that he was 
investigating McKenna’s death.  Nonetheless, he did say that he 
wanted to talk to defendant “about some of your past crimes and 
some of the sex registration laws and things like that.”  (Italics 
added.)  Whether Chicoine’s statements about the purpose of the 
interrogation invalidated defendant’s Miranda waiver is a legal 
question subject to our independent review. 
The high court has made it clear that merely withholding 
certain information from a defendant does not invalidate a 
Miranda waiver.  In Moran, supra, 475 U.S. 412, a public 
defender called the police station where the defendant was in 
custody on a burglary arrest.  She said she would act as his 
counsel if he were to be interrogated and was told he would not 
be.  However, the defendant’s cohorts in the burglary had 
implicated him in a murder, and police from a different 
jurisdiction soon began questioning him about that crime.  The 
defendant waived his Miranda rights and gave a statement.  
(Moran, at p. 417.)  The court affirmed the denial of a 
suppression motion, holding there was no need for the police to 
inform the defendant that his attorney was trying to reach him. 
Noting there was no question the waiver was voluntary, 
and that the defendant understood his rights, the Moran court 
said “[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect 
and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the 
capacity 
to 
comprehend 
and 
knowingly 
relinquish 
a 
constitutional right.”  (Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 422.)   The 
court reasoned that “we have never read the Constitution to 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of 
information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding 
whether to speak or stand by his rights.  [Citations.]  Once it is 
determined that a suspect’s decision not to rely on his rights was 
uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and 
request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State’s intention 
to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is 
complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law.”  (Id. at pp. 
422–423; see People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1070 [valid 
waiver does not require that a defendant be told of the evidence 
against him, the severity of his predicament, or the chances he 
will be charged]; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 411 
[valid waiver does not require that a defendant be informed of 
an arrest warrant].) 
The court returned to the subject of withholding 
information in Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564 (Spring).  
There, an informant told agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) that Spring was selling stolen 
firearms, and had spoken of his role in a Colorado killing.  
Agents arrested him when Spring tried to sell them guns during 
an undercover operation in Kansas City.  (Id. at p. 566.)  He was 
given his Miranda rights and signed a waiver form.  After 
questioning about the transactions for which he was arrested, 
the agents asked if he had a criminal record.  He admitted to a 
juvenile record for shooting his aunt.  Asked if he had ever shot 
anyone else, he mumbled, “ ‘I shot another guy once.’ ”  He went 
on to deny he had ever been to Colorado and denied shooting a 
man there.  (Id. at p. 567.) 
Some two months later, Colorado officers interviewed 
Spring in a Kansas City jail.  Given the Miranda warnings, he 
again signed a waiver.  When they brought up the Colorado 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
homicide, Spring indicated he was ready to talk, and confessed.  
(Spring, supra, 479 U.S. at pp. 567–568.)  The trial court denied 
a suppression motion, but the Colorado Court of Appeals and 
Supreme Court held the waiver invalid because the ATF agents 
had not told Spring he would be questioned about the Colorado 
homicide during his interview.  (Id. at pp. 568–570.)  The high 
court reversed, finding the waiver voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent.  (Id. at pp. 573–577.) 
It was undisputed that “ ‘the agents did not tell [the 
defendant] that they were going to ask him questions about the 
killing of Walker before [the defendant] made his original 
decision to waive his Miranda rights.’ ”  (Spring, supra, 479 U.S. 
at p. 575, fn. 7.)  Nonetheless, the court observed that, under 
Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at page 422, “a valid waiver does not 
require that an individual be informed of all information ‘useful’ 
in making his decision or all information that ‘might . . . [affect] 
his decision to confess.’ ”  (Spring, at p. 576.)  Instead, the 
essential requirement of Miranda is that a suspect understand 
“the nature of his constitutional right—‘his right to refuse to 
answer any question which might incriminate him.’ ”  (Ibid.)  
The court explained:  “This Court’s holding in Miranda 
specifically required that the police inform a criminal suspect 
that he has the right to remain silent and that anything he says 
may be used against him.  There is no qualification of this broad 
and explicit warning.  The warning, as formulated in Miranda, 
conveys to a suspect the nature of his constitutional privilege 
and the consequences of abandoning it.  Accordingly, we hold 
that a suspect’s awareness of all the possible subjects of 
questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to 
determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege.”  (Ibid.) 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
36 
In People v. Tate (2010) 49 Cal.4th 635 (Tate), we applied 
Spring’s ruling.  Tate was arrested while driving a murder 
victim’s car on the day of the murder.  (Id. at pp. 641–642.)  
Brought to the police department’s homicide division, officers 
told him they were investigating the car because it was stolen 
and “a lady had been ‘hurt.’ ”  (Id. at p. 681.)  They gave the 
Miranda admonitions and Tate agreed to talk.  At the beginning 
of a recorded interview, he asked if he was in the homicide 
division.  Told that he was, the defendant noted “ ‘ So I’m here 
for a car that was stolen.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The interviewing officer said 
again that “he was investigating an incident in which a car was 
stolen and a lady was ‘hurt’; and . . . stated that ‘I’m not here to 
trick you into anything.’  Defendant said, ‘I know you ain’t, just 
tell me, you just said a car was stolen.’  [The officer] repeated 
that he was investigating ‘the incident [in] which the car was 
taken.’  Defendant responded, ‘Whatever you said, okay.’  [The 
officer] asked if everything was now clear in defendant’s head, 
and defendant answered, ‘Yeah.’ ”  (Ibid.) 
After another Miranda advisement, Tate denied any 
knowledge of the incident, and lied about how he obtained the 
car.  The officers eventually told him the victim was dead.  They 
confronted him with the implausibility of his story and the facts 
that he had just been arrested wearing bloodstained clothing 
and in possession of the victim’s car and other property.  Urged 
to tell the truth, the defendant responded, “ ‘Why should I tell 
the truth?  Well, what’s in it for me?  I’m going to jail anyway.’ ”  
(Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 681.)  The trial court rejected his 
claim that he had been tricked into waiving his Miranda rights 
when the officers did not tell him he was suspected of a 
homicide, saying instead they were investigating a car theft in 
which a lady got hurt.  The court noted that the defendant knew 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
37 
he was being questioned in the homicide division and must have 
inferred a killing was involved.  (Id. at p. 682.) 
We upheld the ruling.  Summarizing the holding in 
Spring, we observed:  “The warnings required by Miranda, 
supra, 384 U.S. 436 for a suspect in custody—i.e., that the 
suspect has the right to refuse to talk, to talk only with counsel 
present, and to stop talking at any time, and that criminal 
prosecutorial use will be made of any statements the suspect 
does utter—are designed fully to protect the knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent exercise of the constitutional right 
against compelled self-incrimination in that custodial context.  
[Citation.]  Thus, in general, a suspect in custody who, having 
heard and understood a full explanation of these rights, then 
makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to talk, has 
thereby knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived them.”  
(Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 683.)  The facts in Tate supported 
a conclusion that defendant understood the serious nature of the 
investigation.  He did not appear to have been “misled by any 
ambiguity in the officers’ use of the word ‘hurt’ rather than 
‘killed.’ ”  (Id. at p. 682.)  He had ascertained that he was in the 
homicide division, and “must certainly have understood that the 
injury at issue was fatal.”  (Id. at p. 683.)  We further observed 
that “[e]ven if this evidence were not present . . . we would not 
accept defendant’s contention.  We conclude the officers did 
nothing to invalidate defendant’s two separate waivers of his 
Miranda rights.”  (Ibid.)  This is because “mere failure by law 
enforcement officers to advise a custodial suspect of all possible 
topics of interrogation is not trickery sufficient to vitiate the 
uncoerced waiver of one who heard and understood the 
warnings required by Miranda.”  (Ibid., citing Spring, supra, 
479 U.S. at pp. 564, 576.) 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
38 
Consistent with these authorities, the court properly 
concluded 
defendant’s 
Miranda 
waiver 
was 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary.  Notwithstanding Chicoine’s failure 
to disclose that he was investigating McKenna’s death, 
defendant was aware that he was speaking with law 
enforcement officers and that the scope of the interview would 
include his “past crimes.”  Having received full and complete 
Miranda warnings, defendant was also aware that anything he 
said during the interview could be used against him.  This 
“broad and explicit warning” conveyed to defendant “the nature 
of his constitutional privilege and the consequences of 
abandoning it.”  (Spring, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 577.)  “Thus, in 
general, a suspect in custody who, having heard and understood 
a full explanation of these rights, then makes an uncompelled 
and uncoerced decision to talk, has thereby knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waived them.”  (Tate, supra, 49 
Cal.4th at p. 683.)  As in Spring, the fact that the officers did not 
tell defendant they were going to ask him about McKenna’s 
killing does not invalidate the waiver.  Defendant’s lack of 
“awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance 
of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether [he] 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth 
Amendment privilege.”  (Spring, at p. 577.)  The officers were 
not constitutionally required to “supply [defendant] with a flow 
of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding 
whether to speak or stand by his rights.”  (Moran, supra, 475 
U.S. at p. 422.)    
Defendant attempts to distinguish Moran, Spring, and 
Tate because none of those cases involved affirmative deception.  
(See Spring, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 576 & fn. 8; Moran, supra, 475 
U.S. at p. 423; Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 682–683.)  Here, by 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
39 
contrast, defendant argues that misleading him about the 
purpose of the interview “constitute[s] a form of misconduct by 
officers that society seeks to discourage,” is “likely to overbear 
the will of suspects and therefore produce involuntary 
confessions,” and constitutes “a kind of unfairness that shocks 
the conscience and brings law enforcement and the justice 
system into disrepute . . . .” 
Defendant’s arguments are unpersuasive.  The high court 
has intimated that some circumstances may invalidate a waiver.  
The Miranda court declared:  “[A]ny evidence that the accused 
was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, 
show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.  
The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a 
fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and 
not simply a preliminary ritual . . . .”  (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 
at p. 476, italics added.)  In Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 
420, the court said, “The purposes of the safeguards prescribed 
by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick 
captive suspects into confessing . . . .”  (Id. at p. 433, italics 
added and deleted.)  Similarly, in Moran, supra, 475 U.S. 412, 
the court stated that “the relinquishment of the right must have 
been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and 
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or 
deception.”  (Id. at p. 421, italics added; see Berghuis v. 
Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370, 382–383.)   
The Supreme Court has nonetheless clarified that the 
Constitution does not punish lack of candor for its own sake.  
The Moran court explained:  “Granting that the ‘deliberate or 
reckless’ withholding of information is objectionable as a matter 
of ethics, such conduct is only relevant to the constitutional 
validity of a waiver if it deprives a defendant of knowledge 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
40 
essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and 
the consequences of abandoning them.”  (Moran, supra, 475 U.S. 
at pp. 423–424.)  Moran expressly dismissed the idea that the 
intent of the police to deceive might make a difference.  (Ibid.)  
And in Spring, the court cited examples of “certain 
circumstances” under which the court had previously 
invalidated Fifth Amendment waivers; those examples all 
involved misrepresentations that were coercive in nature.  
(Spring, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 576, fn. 8, citing Lynumn v. Illinois 
(1963) 372 U.S. 528, 534–535 [misrepresentation by police 
officers that suspect would be deprived of state financial aid for 
her dependent child unless she cooperated]; Spano v. New York 
(1959) 360 U.S. 315, 319, 322–324 [misrepresentation by 
suspect’s friend that friend would lose his job if suspect failed to 
cooperate].)   
The officers’ ruse, that their purpose was to interview 
defendant regarding his sex offender registration status, was 
not coercive.  Defendant argues that Chicoine’s reference to a 
“red file” of problem offenders that sits on his desk “plainly 
implied that there might be consequence for failing to 
cooperate.”  The record belies this assertion.  The comment 
suggested only that defendant should stay out of trouble 
following his release from prison.  Moreover, as he was filling 
out the waiver form, defendant asked if his parole would be 
affected “[i]f I don’t answer any of these questions.”  Chicoine 
replied, “No, absolutely not.”   
Defendant further maintains “it is clear from the record 
that [he] would not have waived his Miranda rights if he had 
actually been told who the officers were and what they were 
investigating.”  Defendant reasons that he promptly invoked his 
right to an attorney when the officers actually broached the 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
41 
subject of McKenna’s death.  But the fact that he did so only 
reinforces the conclusion that he understood his options and his 
will was not overborne.  (See People v. Williams (2010) 49 
Cal.4th 405, 442, 444.)   
For these reasons, defendant’s initial Miranda waiver was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.9 
c. The Reinitiation of Questioning 
As noted, defendant asserted his right to counsel at the 
end of the San Quentin interview and the officers promptly 
stopped their questioning.  Defendant contends the officers 
violated his rights under Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. 477, when, 
10 days later, they resumed questioning on the car trip to the 
station despite his earlier invocation of Miranda rights.  We 
reject his claim.  Defendant reinitiated further communications 
with the officers when they arrived at San Quentin to take 
                                        
9  
Defendant urges us to overrule Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th 
635, to the extent it can be understood to hold that only 
deception “ ‘ “ ‘ “of a type reasonably likely to procure an untrue 
statement” ’ ” ’ ” will be said to invalidate a Miranda waiver.  
(Tate, at p. 684.)   
Tate’s discussion on that point was in response to the 
defendant’s argument that “by deceptively minimizing the 
seriousness of the investigation, the officers induced false 
statements that were later used against him.”  (Tate, supra, 49 
Cal.4th at p. 684, italics added.)  According to defendant, it is 
unclear whether the holding in Tate addressed only deception 
during the interrogation, or also applied to deception used to 
obtain a waiver of Miranda rights.  Given our conclusion that 
defendant’s Miranda waiver was valid without resort to the 
deception standard articulated in Tate, we need not address the 
scope of that holding. 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
42 
custody of him, thus allowing for further questioning under 
Edwards.  (Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485.)   
“[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel 
present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that 
right cannot be established by showing only that he responded 
to further police-initiated custodial interrogation . . . .  [There is 
to be no] further interrogation by the authorities until counsel 
has been made available to him, unless the accused himself 
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations 
with the police.”  (Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484–485; 
accord, People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 384.)  
“Edwards set forth a ‘bright-line rule’ that all questioning must 
cease after an accused requests counsel.  [Citation.]  In the 
absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities 
through ‘[badgering]’ or ‘overreaching’ —  explicit or subtle, 
deliberate or unintentional — might otherwise wear down the 
accused 
and 
persuade 
him 
to 
incriminate 
himself 
notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel’s assistance.”  
(Smith v. Illinois (1984) 469 U.S. 91, 98.)  “[I]t is presumed that 
any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, 
and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of 
. . . ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and not the purely 
voluntary choice of the suspect.”  (Arizona v. Roberson (1988) 
486 U.S. 675, 681; Gamache, at p. 385.)  “Thus, the People must 
show both that the defendant reinitiated discussions and that 
he knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had 
invoked.”  (Gamache, at p. 385.)   
“The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures 
that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive 
pressures of ‘prolonged police custody,’ [citation] by repeatedly 
attempting to question a suspect who previously requested 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
43 
counsel 
until 
the 
suspect 
is 
‘badgered 
into 
submission.’  [citation.]”  (Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 105.)  In 
Shatzer, the high court considered the temporal reach of the 
Edwards presumption, noting that without a time limit, “every 
Edwards prohibition of custodial interrogation of a particular 
suspect would be eternal.  The prohibition applies, of course, 
when the subsequent interrogation pertains to a different crime, 
[citation], when it is conducted by a different law enforcement 
authority, [citation], and even when the suspect has met with 
an attorney after the first interrogation.”  (Id. at pp. 108-09.)10  
In the course of its discussion, the Shatzer court examined the 
underpinnings of the Edwards rule. 
The court identified the benefits of the rule:  “Edwards’ 
presumption of involuntariness has the incidental effect of 
‘conserv[ing] judicial resources which would otherwise be 
expended in making difficult determinations of voluntariness.’  
[Citation.]  Its fundamental purpose, however, is to ‘[p]reserv[e] 
the integrity of an accused’s choice to communicate with police 
only through counsel,’ [citation], by ‘prevent[ing] police from 
badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted 
Miranda rights,’ [citation].”  (Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 106.)  
These benefits are typically realized in “the paradigm Edwards 
case.  That is a case in which the suspect has been arrested for 
a particular crime and is held in uninterrupted pretrial custody 
while that crime is being actively investigated.  After the initial 
interrogation, and up to and including the second one, he 
                                        
10  
The significant exception to the bar against resumed 
interrogation is the one stated Edwards:  questioning is 
permitted when “the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”  
(Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 485.) 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
44 
remains cut off from his normal life and companions, ‘thrust 
into’ and isolated in an ‘unfamiliar,’ ‘police-dominated 
atmosphere,’ [citation], where his captors ‘appear to control [his] 
fate.’ [citation]”  (Ibid.) 
When, however, “a suspect has been released from his 
pretrial custody and has returned to his normal life for some 
time before the later attempted interrogation, there is little 
reason to think that his change of heart regarding interrogation 
without counsel has been coerced.  He has no longer been 
isolated.  He has likely been able to seek advice from an 
attorney, family members, and friends.  And he knows from his 
earlier experience that he need only demand counsel to bring 
the interrogation to a halt; and that investigative custody does 
not last indefinitely.  In these circumstances, it is farfetched to 
think that a police officer’s asking the suspect whether he would 
like to waive his Miranda rights will any more ‘wear down the 
accused,’ [citation] than did the first such request at the original 
attempted interrogation — which is of course not deemed 
coercive. . . .  Uncritical extension of Edwards to this situation 
would not significantly increase the number of genuinely 
coerced confessions excluded.”  (Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at pp. 
107–108, fn. omitted.)  The court considered how long of “a break 
in custody” would be sufficient “to dissipate its coercive effects.”  
(Id. at p. 109.)  It determined that 14 days was the appropriate 
period.  “That provides plenty of time for the suspect to get 
reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and 
counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior 
custody.”  (Id. at p. 110.) 
Here, defendant was questioned again 10 days after his 
initial interview, within the Shatzer window period.  During the 
intervening 10 days, defendant did not entirely “return[] to his 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
45 
normal life” while in prison.  (Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. 107.)  
When the interview ended, the officers took blood and buccal 
swab samples, dental casts, and defendant’s shoes.  They told 
prison staff that defendant was a suspect, and he was subject to 
an enhanced level of prison security as a result.  When 
defendant next saw the officers, they arrested him.  Instead of 
anticipating a release from custody, as he had been at the time 
of the first interview, he faced a new prosecution on a very 
serious charge.  Thus, he was under the “mounting coercive 
pressures of ‘prolonged police custody,’ ” identified by the 
Shatzer court as the rationale for the Edwards presumption of 
involuntariness.  (Shatzer, at p. 105.)  “If further conversations 
[were] initiated by the police . . . defendant’s statements are 
presumed involuntary and inadmissible as substantive evidence 
at trial.  This [would be] true even [if] defendant again waive[d] 
his Miranda rights and his statements [were] voluntary under 
traditional standards.”  (People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 
926.) 
“An accused ‘initiates’ ” further communication, when his 
words or conduct “can be ‘fairly said to represent a desire’ on his 
part ‘to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly 
or indirectly to the investigation.’ ”  (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 
Cal.3d 612, 648, quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 
1039, 1045 (Bradshaw) (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); see People 
v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 641–642.)  The trial court 
found that defendant initiated conversation with the officers in 
unrecorded statements he made before the car trip began.  
Chicoine testified that they had contacted prison staff to 
coordinate defendant’s transfer to Alameda County custody.  
Defendant was in a receiving area when they arrived.  Without 
prompting, he told them “he had been meaning to call us, that 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
46 
he had already talked to a counselor.”  He said “[h]e knew we’d 
be coming back” and “he wanted to talk to us.”  Chicoine 
understood these remarks as “a continuation” of what defendant 
had said at the end of his first interview, which was that he 
wanted to talk to them after he had a chance to talk to a 
counselor.11  Chicoine told defendant to wait, and “we would get 
an opportunity to talk to him later.”  Chicoine also testified that 
while in the receiving area they told defendant he was under 
arrest for McKenna’s murder.  He could not remember whether 
this advisement came before or after defendant said he wanted 
to talk.   
On appeal, defendant challenges Chicoine’s veracity.  He 
points out that the initiation of contact in the receiving area was 
not noted in Chicoine’s police reports.  He argues that the tape 
of the conversation in the car reflects no readiness to talk on 
defendant’s part, and no understanding on the officers’ part that 
he had reinitiated the conversation.  
“When the facts are disputed, we must accept the trial 
court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its 
evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported.”  
(Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1311.)  A trial court’s 
credibility finding will be sustained so long as the account is 
plausible.  (Ibid.; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 731–
732; cf. People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 384.)   
Chicoine’s version of events is both plausible and 
corroborated by defendant’s own later recorded statements.  
                                        
11  
The tape of the first interview included a reference by 
defendant to his counselor.  When the officers advised him to let 
a guard know if he decided to talk, defendant responded “[or] my 
counselor [or my captain or something].” 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
47 
When defendant first invoked his right to counsel during the 
March 21 interview, the officers honored that request, stopped 
the interview, and told defendant that if he wanted to talk to 
them again, “You have to initiate the contact.”  When the officers 
returned to San Quentin on March 27, they did so to execute the 
arrest warrant.  According to Chicoine, defendant volunteered 
that he had spoken to his counselor and was ready to talk.  The 
10-day break between the first interview and the officers’ return 
on March 31 would have given defendant ample time to seek 
advice.  Indeed, he does not dispute that he did so. 
Despite defendant’s repeated statements about his 
willingness to talk, the officers did not interview him 
immediately.  Instead, they repeatedly told him to wait until he 
was re–Mirandized at the station.  They explained that at the 
station they would take him to an interview room and read him 
his rights again.  They explicitly told him:  “[A]t that time, you 
know, you can say hey, let me talk to my PD and I’ll talk to you 
again, but, you know, that’s entirely up to you.” 
Back on tape at the station, Dudek clarified, “You 
approached us, is the only thing I’m getting to, is that correct?”  
Defendant replied, “Uh-huh.”  In a subsequent interview, 
Deputy District Attorney Andy Sweet also explored defendant’s 
reinitiation of contact in detail.  Defendant acknowledged that 
he had previously invoked his Miranda rights.  When asked, 
“What changed from before to now?” defendant said, “I just . . . 
I’m . . . I’m tired.”  Sweet said, “It was your decision to start 
talking.”  Defendant agreed, saying, “It was my decision.  I’m 
tired now,” and, “In my mind, they didn’t press the issue, 
understand me?”  Sweet sought further clarification, asking, 
“When they came to pick you up today, some place between San 
Quentin and here, the Sheriff’s Department in Alameda County, 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
48 
you started talking to the officers about your case and about 
what was going on.  Isn’t that true?”  Defendant said, “That’s 
correct.”  He reaffirmed that he changed his mind because he 
was “tired and I just want closure,” and that it was “[m]y 
decision.”  He said the officers had not said or done anything 
that made him think he had to talk to them, adding, “I asked 
them on the way here if I would be able to talk to a DA.”  Sweet 
then asked, “Would it be a fair statement to say that you 
reinitiated kind of the discussion about the case?”  Defendant 
answered, “Ok.  I, it, that would be fair because I asked like if I 
will be straight up with you both like I was with them, right.  I 
understand ok, I don’t have the money for a public defender, 
blah blah blah.  Right.  But I understand my public defender 
said well, look you shouldn’t do this you shouldn’t do that 
because they’re not here.  Ok.  I know what I did.  All right.  And 
I just want to get it over with.”  He agreed with Sweet’s 
statement that “[t]hey didn’t ask you any questions, you were 
the one asking them questions to start the conversation going 
again.  Correct?”  He volunteered, “They made me no promises 
or anything.  My only, my main concern was that you [the DA] 
were to come down here.” 
This record amply supports the trial court’s factual finding 
that defendant reinitiated conversation with the officers at San 
Quentin before the car trip began.  Accordingly, under Edwards, 
the officers were permitted to resume their questioning of 
defendant about the McKenna homicide.  (Edwards, supra, 451 
U.S. 477 at pp. 484-85.)     
d. Alleged Invocation in the Car 
Defendant argues that even if he reinitiated conversations 
with the officers at San Quentin, he once again invoked his right 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
49 
to counsel during the drive, making any subsequent waiver at 
the station involuntary under Edwards.  He cites the following 
exchange:   
Defendant:  “Can I ask you a question?”   
Dudek:  “Sure.”   
Defendant:  “They’ll assign me a PD, right?”   
Dudek:  “Right.”   
Defendant:  “I can sit down and talk to my PD first, then 
talk with you all?”   
Dudek:  “Yeah.”   
Defendant:  “Can I do that?”   
Dudek:  “Yeah.  I mean, that’s one of your options and 
that’s why we’re here, you know.”   
Defendant:  “That’s, I would, I would (unintelligible).”   
Although the transcript prepared for the suppression 
hearing identifies the relevant portion of the tape as 
unintelligible, defendant now argues on appeal that he actually 
said, I would “feel more comfortable.”   
The claim was forfeited.  Defense counsel did not advance 
this interpretation of the tape during the suppression hearing 
or ask Chicoine about it.  Nor did she secure a finding of fact 
from the trial court regarding this portion of the tape, or argue 
that it amounted to a second invocation of counsel.  For his part, 
the Attorney General states that, because of the poor quality of 
the tape recording, he cannot determine whether defendant 
actually said he would “feel more comfortable.”  We have 
independently reviewed the tape recording and did not make out 
the words “feel more comfortable.”  Because the theory was 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
50 
never litigated and the relevant facts are subject to dispute, it is 
not properly raised for the first time on appeal.  (People v. Gurule 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 602.) 
Even overlooking forfeiture and assuming, as defendant 
asserts, that he said he would “feel more comfortable” if he spoke 
to a public defender first, the comment did not amount to a 
“clear assertion” of the right to counsel under our high court’s 
precedent.  (Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 460 
(Davis).)  “The applicability of the ‘ “rigid” prophylactic rule’ of 
Edwards requires courts to ‘determine whether the accused 
actually invoked his right to counsel.’ ”  (Id. at p. 458.)  
Ambiguous or equivocal references to an attorney do not require 
cessation of questioning.  (Id. at pp. 458–459, 462.)  As the high 
court has emphasized, “we are unwilling to create a third layer 
of prophylaxis [beyond the holdings in Miranda and Edwards] 
to prevent police questioning when the suspect might want a 
lawyer.  Unless the suspect actually requests an attorney, 
questioning may continue.”  (Id. at p. 462.)   
Defendant’s first reference to an attorney was phrased in 
equivocal language.  He asked Dudek, “I can sit down and talk 
to my PD first, then talk with you all?” and, “Can I do that?”  
Similar statements have been found not to be a clear request for 
counsel’s assistance.  (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 455, 462 
[“ ‘Maybe I should talk to a lawyer’ ”]; People v. Bacon (2010) 50 
Cal.4th 1082, 1105 [“ ‘I think it’d probably be a good idea for me 
to get an attorney’ ”]; People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 535 
[“ ‘I think it’s about time for me to stop talking’ ”].)   
When Dudek affirmed that was one of defendant’s options, 
defendant then allegedly said, “That’s, I would, I would [feel 
more comfortable].”  Although this statement was not framed in 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
51 
the form of a question, it was also not a clear invocation of the 
right to an attorney.  Most people would feel more comfortable 
with a lawyer present during interrogation.  But that reality 
does not establish the converse:  that defendant was unwilling 
to speak without counsel’s assistance.   
In some respects, this statement is similar to that 
statement in People v. Sauceda-Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203.  
There, defendant was given his Miranda rights and asked if he 
would like to speak with the detective.  Defendant said:  “ ‘If you 
can bring me a lawyer, that way I[,] I with who . . . that way I 
can tell you everything that I know and everything that I need 
to tell you and someone to represent me.’ ”  (Id. at p. 216.)  We 
held that because defendant’s reference to an attorney was 
“conditional, ambiguous, and equivocal,” a cessation of 
questioning was not required.  (Id. at p. 219; see also Delashmit 
v. State (Miss. 2008) 991 So.2d 1215, 1219, 1221 [defendant’s 
statement, “ ‘I prefer a lawyer’ ” was ambiguous].)  A similar 
conclusion follows here, though in Sauceda-Contreras and 
Delashmit the officers asked follow-up questions.  (Sauceda-
Contreras, at pp. 216, 219–220; Delashmit, at pp. 1219–1221.)  
That did not happen here, at least in the car.  But clarification, 
while advisable, is not required.  (Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 
461–462.)  “[W]e decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask 
clarifying questions.  If the suspect’s statement is not an 
unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers 
have no obligation to stop questioning him.”  (Id. at p. 461.)  
Further clarification was ultimately sought by both the officers 
and the district attorney once defendant arrived at the police 
station and was formally Mirandized.  
Because defendant reinitiated conversation with the 
officers at San Quentin, and did not clearly invoke his right to 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
52 
counsel en route to the station, the officers were permitted to 
resume their questioning of defendant about the McKenna 
homicide.  (Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485.)   
e. Voluntariness of Miranda Waiver on March 
31st 
Even when a suspect initiates further discussions, the 
burden remains on the prosecution to show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the suspect knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived the rights he had previously invoked.  
(Connecticut v. Barrett (1987) 479 U.S. 523, 527; Connelly, 
supra, 479 U.S. at p. 168; Bradshaw, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 1044, 
plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.; People v. Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at 
p. 596.)  We independently review the validity of the waiver “ ‘in 
light of the record in its entirety, including “all the surrounding 
circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the 
details of the [encounter]” . . . .’ ”  (People v. Neal (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 63, 80.)  
At the station, Dudek again read the Miranda rights, and 
defendant acknowledged that he understood them.  He concedes 
that his willingness to talk after affirming that he understood 
his rights is sufficient to establish an implied waiver.  (See 
Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 383–385; North 
Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369, 373.)  He argues, 
however, that his waiver was not voluntary because the officers 
lied to obtain the initial waiver, disregarded his invocations of 
the right to counsel, and engaged in impermissible softening-up 
tactics.  His arguments are unpersuasive. 
As explained, the officers’ “ruse” did not invalidate 
defendant’s initial waiver.  Moreover, by the time defendant was 
re–Mirandized on March 31, he knew that he had been arrested 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
53 
for McKenna’s homicide.  There is no colorable claim of police 
deception as to defendant’s second waiver.   
Nor did the officers disregard defendant’s invocation of the 
right to counsel.  When defendant asked for counsel during the 
San Quentin questioning, the officers immediately ended the 
interview.  In the car ride to the station, defendant asked 
whether he would be assigned a public defender and be allowed 
to talk to that counsel before questioning.  In response, Sergeant 
Dudek directly affirmed defendant’s right to the assistance of 
counsel, explained just how to make such a request, and 
affirmed:  “[T]hat’s entirely up to you.”  Defendant did not make 
an unequivocal request for counsel at that time.    
Defendant argues that the officers coerced him into 
waiving his Miranda rights at the station by engaging in 
improper softening-up techniques.  Specifically, he claims the 
officers disparaged the victim and appealed to defendant’s 
desire to mend his relationship with his children.  He relies 
primarily on People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150 
(Honeycutt).  There the defendant was initially hostile to one of 
the interrogating officers.  Without administering Miranda 
warnings, a different officer who had known him for about 10 
years had a 30-minute unrecorded discussion with him.  (Id. at 
p. 158.)  They discussed past events and former acquaintances, 
and the officer made disparaging comments about the victim.  
(Ibid.)  The defendant “ ‘soften[ed] up’ ” and agreed to talk about 
the underlying offense, after which he was advised of and 
waived his Miranda rights and confessed to murdering the 
victim.  (Id. at p. 158.) 
Honeycutt 
held 
the 
defendant’s 
Miranda 
waiver 
involuntary.  (Honeycutt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 161.)  It framed 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
54 
the issue as follows:  “Detective Williams had, prior to 
explaining the Miranda rights, already succeeded in persuading 
defendant to waive such rights.  Thus the critical question is 
what effect failure to give a timely Miranda warning has on the 
voluntariness of a decision to waive which is induced prior to the 
Miranda admonitions.”  (Id. at p. 159.)  Honeycutt concluded 
that, “When the waiver results from a clever softening-up of a 
defendant through disparagement of the victim and ingratiating 
conversation, the subsequent decision to waive without a 
Miranda warning must be deemed to be involuntary for the 
same reason that an incriminating statement made under police 
interrogation without a Miranda warning is deemed to be 
involuntary.”  (Id. at pp. 160–161.) 
Defendant’s reliance on Honeycutt is misplaced.  First, 
unlike that case, defendant here was well aware of his Miranda 
rights, having previously and successfully invoked them.  Dudek 
affirmed defendant’s right to counsel during the very discussion 
defendant claims was intended to soften him up.  A key 
predicate to the Honeycutt holding, the absence of Miranda 
warnings, does not exist here.  Second, defendant was not hostile 
to the officers, and Dudek did not exploit a personal relationship 
to encourage his waiver of rights.  Third, in his interview with 
Deputy District Attorney Sweet, defendant confirmed that he 
waived his rights voluntarily, stating that it was his decision to 
talk and that “[i]n my mind, [the officers] didn’t press the issue, 
understand me?”  He affirmed that the officers said or did 
nothing that made him think he had to speak with them.  All of 
these factors weigh heavily against defendant’s argument that 
his decision to waive his right to counsel and speak with the 
officers was not voluntary. 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
55 
Defendant argues that, as in Honeycutt, the officers here 
disparaged the victim in an attempt to minimize the crime and 
ingratiate themselves.  He observes that the officers questioned 
him about McKenna’s drug use and whether she favored multi-
party sex.  Dudek commented that he knew McKenna was not 
an angel.  Honeycutt did cite the officer’s disparaging comments 
about the victim before any Miranda admonition as one of 
several factors that combined to render the defendant’s waiver 
involuntary.  (Honeycutt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 158, 160.)  But 
here, as noted, the other factors were absent:  defendant was not 
hostile or reluctant to speak; the officers did not exploit a long-
standing relationship; and he was forewarned of his Miranda 
rights.  The officers’ brief comments about the victim, standing 
alone, did not render defendant’s waiver involuntary.  
The same is true of Dudek’s comments to defendant about 
mending his relationship with his children.  Dudek did not 
threaten defendant’s children with prosecution or other harm if 
he failed to confess.  (See Lynumn v. Illinois, supra, 372 U.S. at 
pp. 531–532; People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 550; In re 
Shawn D. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 200, 212.)  As defendant’s own 
statements indicate, he was motivated to confess because he was 
tired of living with the guilt of killing McKenna.  He believed 
that officers would be coming for him, and emphasized that “if 
you didn’t come, I would have came to you.”  He acknowledged 
that his public defender would tell him not to cooperate, but 
commented that “he doesn’t have to wear my shoes.”  Defendant 
wanted an expedited resolution, perhaps to spare himself and 
his family the stress of a trial.  He commented, “I know what I 
did.  All right.  And I just want to get it over with.”  The Fifth 
Amendment is not “concerned with moral and psychological 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
56 
pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official 
coercion.”  (Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 304–305.) 
In sum, the conversation during the car ride did not 
improperly “soften-up” defendant or render his waivers 
involuntary.  His statement at the police station was properly 
admitted.   
2. Other Crimes Evidence 
As noted, the prosecutor introduced evidence of three 
other crimes:  two rapes and the physical abuse of his wife.  
Defendant challenged the admissibility of this evidence below, 
and renews his arguments on appeal.  All three incidents were 
properly admitted. 
a. Crimes Against Anne H. and Mabel L. 
(Evid. Code, § 1108) 
Under Evidence Code section 1108, the trial court 
admitted evidence that defendant raped Anne H. and Mabel L.  
That section carves out an exception to Evidence Code section 
1101, subdivision (a)’s ban on character evidence offered to 
prove a person’s conduct on a particular occasion.  Specifically, 
subdivision (a) of Evidence Code section 1108 provides:  “In a 
criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual 
offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another 
sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 
1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 
352.”  Evidence Code section 352, in turn, provides that “[t]he 
court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
or of misleading the jury.”  In short, if evidence satisfies section 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
57 
1108, and is not excluded under section 352, admission of that 
evidence to prove propensity is permitted.  (People v. Daveggio 
and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 823.)   
Defendant’s earlier rape offenses fall under the rule of 
Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a).  (See id., subd. 
(d)(1)(A).)  Nevertheless, defendant maintains their admission 
violated due process under the federal Constitution.  He 
concedes that we rejected this argument nearly two decades ago 
in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 907, but urges us to 
reconsider that holding.  We have repeatedly declined to do so.  
(See People v. Daveggio and Michaud, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 827; 
People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 60–61; People v. Lewis (2009) 
46 Cal.4th 1255, 1288–1289.)  He offers no persuasive reason for 
reconsideration of this established precedent.  Specifically, his 
argument that Evidence Code section 352 does not provide the 
“ ‘safeguard’ ” anticipated in Falsetta is unpersuasive.  To the 
contrary, the record here demonstrates the trial court’s careful 
attention to Evidence Code section 352 factors. 
b. Crimes Against Defendant’s Wife, Brenda 
(Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)) 
Defendant challenges the admission of evidence that he 
strangled his wife, Brenda, to unconsciousness.  Evidence Code 
section 1101, subdivision (b) allows the admission of other crime 
evidence relevant to prove a fact at issue, such as intent, 
common plan, identity, lack of mistake, or accident.  There was 
no abuse of discretion here.  (See People v. Jones (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 899, 930.)  Defendant’s assault on Brenda was relevant 
to prove that he intentionally used deadly force on McKenna and 
to defeat his claim that her death was accidental.  The jury was 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
58 
properly instructed on the limitations on how the evidence could 
be used.12 
In order to be relevant, the “least degree of similarity 
(between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required 
in order to prove intent.  [Citation.]  ‘[T]he recurrence of a 
similar result . . . tends (increasingly with each instance) to 
[negate] accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or 
other 
innocent 
mental 
state, 
and 
tends 
to 
establish 
(provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the 
normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act . . . .’ 
[Citation.]  In order to be admissible to prove intent, the 
uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support 
the inference that the defendant ‘ “probably harbor[ed] the same 
intent in each instance.” ’ ”  (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
380, 402 (Ewoldt).) 
                                        
12  
Specifically, the jury was told that if it found the 
uncharged offense to be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence, “you may, but are not required to, consider the 
evidence for the limited purpose of deciding in the charged 
offense whether or not:  The defendant intended to kill; or the 
defendant acted with the knowledge that his acts were reckless 
and that they created a high risk of death or great bodily injury; 
or, the defendant’s alleged actions were the result of mistake or 
accident; or, the defendant reasonably and in good faith believed 
that Suzanne McKenna consented.  Do not consider this 
evidence for any other purpose except for the limited purpose[s] 
identified above.  If you conclude that the defendant committed 
the uncharged offense, that conclusion is only one factor to 
consider along with all the other evidence.  It is not sufficient by 
itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of the charged offense 
and special circumstance allegation.  The People must still prove 
each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”    
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
59 
Defendant argues that his spousal abuse was so dissimilar 
from the McKenna strangulation that it was irrelevant to prove 
intent or demonstrate lack of accident.  He observes that 
corporal injury on a spouse is a general intent crime, while the 
current crime was murder.  He argues that the assault on 
McKenna occurred during a sexual encounter, while the assault 
on Brenda was prompted by an argument over his drug use and 
his fear that she would report him to his parole officer.  He 
further contends that there could be no inference of lack of 
accident from “ ‘the recurrence of a similar result’ ” (Ewoldt, 
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402), because here there was no similar 
result.  McKenna died and Brenda did not.   
His arguments miss the mark.  Defendant’s statements to 
police placed his intent at issue.  He claimed that he and 
McKenna engaged in consensual sex, during which she asked 
him to strangle her.  He insisted that she wanted to be strangled 
and her death was accidental.  McKenna’s death prevented her 
from telling her side of the story.  However, the assaults on 
Brenda and McKenna were sufficiently similar to support 
several inferences related to defendant’s own intent and motive.  
In both cases defendant strangled women with whom he was 
intimate.  Brenda was rendered unconscious twice.  The effect 
on McKenna was lethal.  Defendant’s conduct with Brenda could 
support an inference that he acted with conscious disregard for 
the danger to the lives of both women, and that he intended to 
dominate his intimate partners in that manner.  The fortuity 
that Brenda survived the strangulation does not diminish the 
legitimate inference that defendant harbored a similar intent 
when he strangled McKenna, and that her death was not 
accidental.    
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
60 
Defendant further argues that the trial court erroneously 
admitted the evidence under a theory of common design or plan.  
(See Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 393.)  But the jury was 
instructed it could consider the assault on Brenda only on the 
issues of intent, mistake or accident, and whether the defendant 
reasonably and in good faith believed that McKenna consented.  
The jury was expressly told:  “Do not consider this evidence for 
any other purpose except for the limited purposes identified 
above.”  Defendant cites nothing in the record to suggest that 
the jury was confused about the meaning of this limiting 
instruction.  We therefore need not decide whether the evidence 
was also admissible to show a common design or plan. 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to exclude evidence of the assault against 
Brenda under Evidence Code section 352.  Not so.  Defendant’s 
denial of criminal intent and his claim of accident made his prior 
assaultive conduct particularly probative.  The spousal assault, 
while certainly blameworthy, was not unduly inflammatory 
compared to the gruesome murder of McKenna.  Moreover, the 
jury knew defendant had already served a prison sentence for 
his attack on Brenda.  (See People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
414, 427.)  No abuse of discretion appears.   
3. Unreasonable Belief that the Victim Consented to 
Intercourse 
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 
1000 defining rape.  The instruction, as given, stated in relevant 
part:  “The defendant is not guilty of rape if he actually and 
reasonably believed that the woman consented to the 
intercourse.  The People have the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually and 
reasonably believe that the woman consented.  If the People 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
61 
have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not 
guilty.”  Two other instructions also referred to a reasonable and 
good faith belief that the victim consented to intercourse.13   
Defendant requested the relevant language of CALCRIM 
Nos. 1000 and 1194, and did not object to the language of 
CALCRIM No. 375, requested by the prosecutor.  On appeal, he 
argues that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to modify the 
instructions to allow the jury to consider whether he harbored a 
good faith but unreasonable belief that the victim consented to 
intercourse.  Defendant maintains that rape felony murder and 
the rape-murder special circumstance require specific intent, as 
opposed to the general intent required for rape.  He reasons that 
the element of specific intent may be negated by an 
unreasonable mistake of fact, and he was entitled to an 
instruction that if he had a bona fide but unreasonable belief 
that McKenna consented, he lacked the requisite intent.  
                                        
13  
CALCRIM No. 1194, as given, stated:  “You have heard 
evidence that Suzanne McKenna had consensual sexual 
intercourse with the defendant before the act that is charged in 
this case.  You may consider this evidence only to help you decide 
whether the alleged victim consented to the charged act and 
whether the defendant reasonably and in good faith believed 
that Suzanne McKenna consented to the charged act.  Do not 
consider this evidence for any other purpose.”  Section 1127d, 
subdivision (a) mandates that this instruction be given when 
evidence is admitted that the victim consented to sexual 
intercourse with the defendant before the occurrence of the 
charged crime. 
 
CALCRIM No. 375, as given, told the jury that it could 
consider evidence of defendant’s assault on Brenda Molano in 
deciding, among other things, whether or not defendant 
“reasonably and in good faith believed that Suzanne McKenna 
consented.”   
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
62 
Defendant is correct that rape is a general intent crime 
(People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 685), while we have 
said that rape felony murder requires a specific intent to commit 
rape.  (People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 314; People v. Jones 
(2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1256-1257; People v. Hernandez (1988) 
47 Cal.3d 315, 346.)  Contrary to defendant’s argument, we have 
also said that a felony-murder special circumstance does not 
require a finding of specific intent when the underlying crime is 
one of general intent.  (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 
518-519; but see People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 342-
343; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1021.) 
People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143 (Mayberry) held 
that a defendant’s reasonable and good faith mistake of fact that 
the victim consented to sexual intercourse is a defense to rape.  
(Id. at p. 155.)  We have not considered whether the 
reasonableness component of the Mayberry defense applies in a 
case involving rape felony murder or the rape-murder special 
circumstance.  We need not answer that question here.  
Defendant has forfeited his claim of instructional error, and the 
alleged error was harmless in any event.  
a.  Forfeiture  
“ ‘ “It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence 
of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of 
law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence” ’ and 
‘ “necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” ’ ”  (People 
v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 73.)  The court has a sua sponte 
duty to give a Mayberry instruction about good faith and 
reasonable belief in the victim’s consent “ ‘if it appears . . . the 
defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial 
evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
63 
inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.’ ”  (Ibid.; 
accord, People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 423–425; People 
v. Lujano (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 187, 194; People v. Burnham 
(1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1134, 1141–1142.)  Section 1127d, 
subdivision (a) requires that the trial court instruct on the 
permissible use of evidence that the victim consented to sex with 
the defendant on other occasions, and that such evidence is 
relevant to “whether the defendant had a good faith reasonable 
belief that the victim consented to the [charged] act of sexual 
intercourse.”  The trial court instructed the jury according to 
these general principles. 
By contrast, at the time of defendant’s trial in July 2007, 
no California case had held that a good faith but unreasonable 
belief in consent would negate a specific intent to commit rape.  
Our closest authority at that time was People v. Stitely, supra, 
35 Cal.4th 514.  There the defendant challenged the trial court’s 
failure to instruct on a Mayberry defense in the context of rape 
felony murder.  (Id. at pp. 552–554.)  We recited the requirement 
that the defendant’s subjective belief in the victim’s consent be 
“ ‘reasonable under the circumstances.’ ”  (Id. at p. 554.)  We 
went on to note that the failure to instruct, if error, was 
harmless.  (Ibid.)  We did not consider the precise claim 
defendant raises here.  And at the time of defendant’s trial at 
least one appellate court had assumed that the Mayberry 
reasonableness standard applies when the charged sexual 
offense requires specific intent, such as assault with intent to 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
64 
commit rape.  (People v. Rivera (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 736, 738, 
741–742.)14 
“[A] legal concept that has been referred to only 
infrequently, and then with ‘inadequate elucidation,’ cannot be 
considered a general principle of law such that a trial court must 
include it within jury instructions in the absence of a request.”  
(People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 126 (Bacigalupo), 
judg. vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. 
Bacigalupo v. California (1992) 506 U.S. 802, quoting People v. 
Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 681 (Flannel), superseded on 
other grounds as stated in In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
768, 777 (Christian S.).)  In Flannel, we held for the first time 
that “a genuine but unreasonably held belief [in the need for 
self-defense] negates the mental state of malice aforethought 
that is necessary for a murder conviction.”  (Flannel, at p. 682.)  
We also clarified that, going forward, trial courts would have a 
sua sponte duty to instruct on unreasonable self-defense, when 
warranted by the evidence.  (Id. at pp. 682–683)  But we held 
that the trial court’s failure to instruct on that theory did not 
require reversal because the theory of unreasonable self-defense 
was not so well-established that the trial court could be faulted 
for failing to instruct sua sponte.  (Id. at pp. 675, 681–683.)  This 
was true even though several decisions from the Courts of 
Appeal had already recognized unreasonable self-defense — and 
even though we had previously “affirmed [its] existence” in 
dicta.  (Id. at p. 676; see also id. at pp. 675–676, citing People v. 
                                        
14  
That assumption persists.  (See, e.g., People v. Andrews 
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 590, 602–603; People v. Sojka (2011) 196 
Cal.App.4th 733, 736–739; People v. Dillon (2009) 174 
Cal.App.4th 1367, 1383–1384; but see People v. Braslaw (2015) 
233 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1249–1250.) 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
65 
Lewis (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 585, People v. Best (1936) 13 
Cal.App.2d 606, and People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703.  As 
we explained in Bacigalupo, “Flannel does not suggest that . . . 
acceptance of a legal rule in one intermediate appellate decision” 
imposes a sua sponte duty to instruct on that rule.”  (1 Cal.4th 
at pp. 126–127, fn. 4.) 
Defendant argues it is well established that a defendant 
who genuinely makes an unreasonable mistake of fact as to 
consent necessarily lacks the specific intent to rape.  He relies 
by analogy on cases holding that a bona fide belief in a claim of 
right to property or that the property was abandoned disproves 
the specific intent requirement for certain theft offenses, even if 
that belief is unreasonable.  (See, e.g., People v. Russell (2006) 
144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1425–1426; People v. Navarro (1979) 99 
Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 5–6, 10–11; see generally People v. Tufunga 
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 938.)  He also relies on our recognition of 
a defense to malice-murder based on an actual but unreasonable 
belief in the need for self-defense.  (See Christian S., supra, 7 
Cal.4th at pp. 778, 783.)  But extension of this principle to sex 
crimes requiring specific intent is not a foregone conclusion.  The 
issue has not arisen frequently, and at the time of defendant’s 
trial no Court of Appeal had squarely addressed the viability of 
an unreasonable mistake of fact defense in this context.  One 
court has since issued a decision offering some support for 
defendant’s position, but that decision was rendered several 
years after defendant’s trial.  (See People v. Braslaw, supra, 233 
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1247-1249.)  In any event, one appellate 
decision in support of a legal rule does not “transform[] it into a 
general principle of law” (Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th at 
pp. 126-127, fn. 4).  We have never considered, let alone decided, 
the issue.   Under the governing authority of Flannel and 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
66 
Baciagalupo, defendant’s unreasonable mistake theory falls far 
short of a well-established rule that would have required a sua 
sponte instruction.   Because defendant never requested such an 
instruction, he has forfeited the issue. 
b. Harmless Error  
Notwithstanding forfeiture, and even assuming the 
validity of defendant’s unreasonable-belief-in-consent theory, 
the alleged error in failing to instruct on that defense was 
harmless.  “Error in failing to instruct on the mistake-of-fact 
defense is subject to the harmless error test set forth in People 
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.”  (People v. Russell, supra, 
144 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431; accord, People v. Watt (2014) 229 
Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219–1220, and cases cited; People v. Givan 
(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 349; People v. Hanna (2013) 218 
Cal.App.4th 455, 462–463; People v. Soika, supra, 196 
Cal.App.4th at p. 738.)  Under this standard, a conviction “may 
be reversed in consequence of this form of error only if, ‘after an 
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence’ (Cal. 
Const., art. VI, § 13), it appears ‘reasonably probable’ the 
defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had 
the error not occurred [citation].”  (People v. Breverman (1998) 
19 Cal.4th 142, 178, fn. omitted (Breverman).)15   
There was compelling evidence that defendant strangled 
McKenna to death during an act of rape.  McKenna had 
contusions and abrasions on her upper torso, mouth, and nose 
consistent with the use of force.  The pathologist testified that 
                                        
15  
Mayberry, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pages 157‒158, applied the 
harmless error standard articulated in People v. Modesto (1963) 
59 Cal.2d 722, 730.  That standard, however, has long since been 
repudiated.  (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 175–176.)   
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
67 
defendant would have had to apply pressure to McKenna’s neck 
for “a couple of minutes” before she lost consciousness, and then 
for one or two more minutes to stop her heart.  This evidence 
strongly supported an inference of premeditated and deliberate 
intent to kill, and undermined any suggestion that defendant 
believed in good faith the victim had consented.  Defendant’s two 
attempts to clean up the crime scene and his flight from the 
apartment the next day also cast into doubt his description of  a 
consensual 
encounter 
and 
accidental 
death. 
 
Finally, 
defendant’s forcible rape and strangulation of Anne H. and 
Mabel L. were strong evidence that he assaulted McKenna in a 
similar fashion and with similar intent.      
The evidence presented at trial and the defense theory of 
the case provided very little support for a claim that defendant 
mistakenly harbored a good faith but unreasonable belief in 
McKenna’s consent.  The defense argued actual consent:  
defendant and McKenna engaged in foreplay, she removed his 
clothes, and she willingly engaged in intercourse.  Although 
there were elements of force involved, defendant made clear that 
McKenna instigated the “rough sex,” enjoyed it, and encouraged 
him to choke her. 
According to defendant, this was not their first sexual 
encounter.  He claimed that two days before her death, he and 
McKenna “got high together, we talked, we fooled around, what 
people call petting, and one thing led to another, we had sex 
. . . .”  He claimed it was “[r]egular missionary style sex,” and 
was not violent.  “[W]e both wanted sex and we had sex.”   
Defendant said that, on the day of McKenna’s death, she 
invited defendant to her apartment.  The two of them used drugs 
and drank together.  They were “fooling around,” she removed 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
68 
his clothing, and “she was the aggressor that night.” During 
intercourse, McKenna set the tone by hitting, slapping, and 
biting him.  Then she asked him to choke her.  He used her 
panties or bra to choke her, but she said it was not sufficient.  
According to defendant, she seemed to enjoy it.  He choked her 
to unconsciousness, and at some point he realized she was dead.  
He did not intend to kill her. 
When asked if McKenna slapped defendant during sex to 
fight him off, he responded, “She had no reason to fight me off.”  
Asked if McKenna had told defendant to stop choking her at 
some point, defendant responded, “she may have,” and, “I don’t 
know.”  But defendant also repeatedly insisted that he did not 
rape McKenna.  He did not contend that McKenna revoked an 
initial grant of consent or that he failed to appreciate that fact.  
Moreover, such a theory would have been substantially 
undermined by the length of time it would have taken to fatally 
strangle McKenna, and by defendant’s subsequent conduct on 
two successive days.   
Consistent with defendant’s description of events, defense 
counsel argued in closing that the critical issue before the jury 
was actual consent.  She argued that defendant’s claim of a 
sexual relationship with McKenna was corroborated by the 
testimony of Brenda and Robert Molano that they frequently 
saw defendant at McKenna’s residence.  Counsel noted several 
circumstances consistent with consensual intercourse.  There 
were no signs of forced entry into McKenna’s apartment.  A 
container of condoms, an empty condom wrapper, personal 
lubricant, and empty wine and beer bottles were found inside 
the cottage.  The autopsy revealed no injuries to McKenna’s 
genitalia.  Defense counsel argued that this circumstantial 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
69 
evidence, as well as defendant’s own account, all pointed to 
consensual sex.   
But the jury evidently rejected all of this, and instead 
believed the People’s theory of the case:  that defendant entered 
McKenna’s home and forcibly raped her from the start of the 
encounter.  Even if defendant had received an instruction 
permitting him to argue that he genuinely but unreasonably 
believed McKenna consented, it is not reasonably probable that 
such an instruction would have made a difference on this record. 
On appeal, defendant argues that he “has a history of 
unreasonably believing that women with whom he has had sex 
have consented to do so when in fact they have not done so, 
particularly when [he] is under the influence of drugs and 
alcohol or other altered psychological states.”  But nothing about 
the circumstances as defendant recounted them suggested that 
he actually misperceived the situation or could not form the 
specific intent to commit rape due to his intoxication.  On the 
contrary, defendant recalled several details about the 
encounter, suggesting that his intoxication did not in fact 
interfere to a significant degree with his perception.  Moreover, 
the jury was instructed that it could consider defendant’s 
intoxication in deciding whether he intended to kill, acted with 
deliberation and premeditation, or intended to commit rape.  
Because the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, 
it was unlikely to accept a theory of intoxication that would have 
supported defendant’s argument of a 
good faith 
but 
unreasonable belief in consent.   
Considering the strength of the prosecution’s case and the 
lack of evidence or argument supporting defendant’s belatedly 
advanced theory of mistake of fact, there is no reasonable 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
70 
likelihood that the jury would have reached a different result 
had it been instructed in the manner defendant now suggests. 
For much the same reasons, we reject defendant’s claim 
that the absence of an instruction undermined his right to 
present a complete defense implicating due process and the 
prejudice standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 
386 U.S. 18, 24.  As we explained in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 826:  “Defendant relies on cases in which federal courts 
have held that a trial court’s failure to give a requested 
instruction (whether on a lesser included offense, or on some 
other subject) embodying the defense theory of the case and 
around which the defendant had built his or her defense, 
violated the defendant’s due process right to present a complete 
defense.  [Citations.]  [¶]  In these cases, unlike the present one, 
the instruction at issue was requested by the defense.  The cases 
do not support the proposition that a trial court’s failure to 
instruct on a lesser included offense sua sponte denies due 
process.  Further, nothing in the record suggests the trial court 
would not have given the express malice second degree murder 
instruction had the defense asked for it.  Nor can it be said that 
the omitted instruction ‘embodied the defense theory of the 
case.’  Rather, in closing argument the only lesser-included-
offense verdict that defense counsel asked the jury to return was 
manslaughter. Although the defense presented evidence of lack 
of premeditation and deliberation and argued the prosecution’s 
evidence did not support a finding of premeditation, defense 
counsel did not ask the jury to return a verdict of second degree 
murder.  Because defendant was allowed to present the defense 
he chose, followed by jury instructions he agreed to, he was not 
denied due process by being deprived of the opportunity to 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
71 
present a complete defense.”  (Id. at p. 872, fn. omitted; accord 
People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1089.)   
Here, too, defendant did not request an instruction on 
unreasonable but good faith belief in consent.  That theory 
played no role in the defense he chose.  No due process violation 
appears.    
B. Penalty Phase Issues 
1. Victim Impact Testimony 
At the penalty phase, McKenna’s brother Ronald testified 
that his sister Patti Dutoit committed suicide after the murder, 
adding, “I lost two sisters because of this clown.”  The court had 
earlier ruled that the cause of Dutoit’s death was not to be 
mentioned before the jury.  Consistent with this ruling, it twice 
admonished the jury to disregard Ronald’s statement.  
Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly elicited 
evidence in violation of the court’s order and that the court 
abused its discretion in denying his motions for a mistrial.  He 
argues that admission of Ronald’s testimony was “incurable 
error” that violated the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments and deprived him of a fair trial and due process, 
notwithstanding the court’s corrective actions.  We reject these 
claims. 
“To constitute a violation under the federal Constitution, 
prosecutorial misconduct must ‘so infect[ ] the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process.’  [Citations.]  ‘But conduct by a prosecutor that does not 
render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial 
misconduct under state law only if it involves the use of 
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade 
either the court or the jury.’  [Citation.]  To be cognizable on 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
72 
appeal, a defendant ‘ “must make a timely objection at trial and 
request an admonition; otherwise, the [claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct] is reviewable only if an admonition would not have 
cured the harm caused by the misconduct.” ’ ”  (People v. Valdez 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 122 (Valdez).) 
Seven months after McKenna’s death, her sister, Dutoit, 
died as a result of respiratory failure following a drug overdose.  
Dutoit’s family members believed her death was a suicide 
committed in response to McKenna’s murder.  The defense 
moved to exclude any such testimony at the penalty phase.  The 
court ruled that family members could testify about Dutoit’s 
death, but not that the cause of the death was suicide.  The court 
authorized the prosecutor to “ask surviving family members 
how Patt[i] reacted to Sue’s murder,” but cautioned the 
prosecutor to admonish the witnesses not to state that her 
reaction was to commit suicide.   
During the testimony of McKenna’s brother, Ronald, the 
prosecutor asked if there was a special bond between Dutoit and 
McKenna.  He replied, “Yes.  They hung out together a lot.  They 
were probably closest.”  When the prosecutor asked, “How did 
Patti take the news of Sue’s death?” Ron replied, “Very bad.  She 
committed suicide.  So I lost two sisters because of this clown.”  
Defense counsel objected to the answer and asked that it be 
stricken.  In response, the court admonished the jury that “you 
are not to consider the suicide mentioned as in any way relating 
to the defendant Molano.”  In a discussion outside of the jury’s 
presence, the prosecutor stated for the record that “I did this 
morning in no uncertain terms make it very clear to both Yvonne 
Searle and Ron McKenna that there would be no mention of 
Patti committing suicide.  I even explained the basis of the 
ruling and discussed the parameters of what could be shared in 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
73 
court, and frankly Mr. McKenna wasn’t listening very closely 
because we were all here when he did make the statement.”   
Defendant twice moved for a mistrial on the ground that 
Ronald’s reference to Dutoit’s suicide had resulted in incurable 
prejudice.  The court denied the motions.  At the close of the 
penalty phase, the court again instructed the jury to disregard 
Ronald’s testimony:  “If I ordered testimony stricken from the 
record, you must disregard it and must not consider that 
testimony for any purpose.  In this regard, the opinion testimony 
of the witness Ron McKenna that his sister Patricia Dutoit had 
committed suicide in reaction to Sue McKenna’s death and that 
Carl Molano was responsible for Patricia Dutoit’s death has no 
basis in fact, and that testimony was ordered stricken from the 
record.  You must not consider it for any purpose.”  (Italics 
added.) 
Defendant 
claims 
that 
the 
prosecutor 
committed 
misconduct by eliciting the testimony about suicide.  Not so.  A 
prosecutor commits misconduct by “ ‘ “ ‘intentionally elicit[ing] 
inadmissible testimony.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. 
Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1035 (Tully).)  “However, a 
prosecutor cannot be faulted for a witness’s nonresponsive 
answer that the prosecutor neither solicited nor could have 
anticipated.”  (Ibid.)  Here, the prosecutor directly admonished 
Ronald not to mention that Dutoit had committed suicide, and 
further “explained the basis of the ruling and discussed the 
parameters of what could be shared in court.”  The prosecutor’s 
representation was unchallenged by defense counsel and 
accepted by the court.  Defendant now asserts that the 
prosecutor’s question was in fact “designed” to elicit 
inadmissible testimony, and that the prosecutor either “failed to 
admonish [Ronald] at all, or failed to admonish [him] in a 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
74 
manner sufficient to achieve the goal.”  His argument “is mere 
conjecture unsupported by the record.”  (Tully, at p. 1041, fn. 
32.)   
Citing People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, defendant 
further counters that “no showing of intentionality or bad faith 
is required” to establish that a prosecutor committed 
misconduct by eliciting inadmissible evidence in violation of a 
court order.  Hill reaffirmed that the prosecutor need not act in 
bad faith or with intentionality in order to commit misconduct 
of the type involved there.  (Id. at pp. 822–823.)  Hill involved 
allegations that the prosecutor had misstated the evidence and 
the law, referred to facts not in evidence, made derisive 
comments about defense counsel, intimidated witnesses, and 
made improper references to the Bible.  (Id. at pp. 823, 827, 829, 
832, 836–838.)  Such behavior may be misconduct even if 
inadvertent.  Nonetheless, after Hill, we have repeatedly 
reaffirmed that a claim of misconduct based on allegations that 
the prosecutor elicited evidence in violation of a court order 
requires proof that the prosecutor acted deliberately or 
intentionally.  (Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1035; People v. 
Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 679; People v. Chatman (2006) 38 
Cal.4th 344, 379–380; Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 125; People 
v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960.)  Indeed, Smithey noted 
that the lead case for that proposition, People v. Bonin (1988) 46 
Cal.3d 659, 689, had been overruled by Hill on another point.  
(Smithey, at p. 960, citing Hill, at p. 800, 823, fn. 1 [overruling 
the discussion in Bonin, 46 Cal.3d at p. 702 of bad faith 
regarding the prosecutor’s argument to the jury].)  As noted, the 
prosecutor asked a question consistent with the court’s 
direction.  He also expressly admonished Ronald not to mention 
Dutoit’s suicide.  The witness’s apparent willful refusal to abide 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
75 
by this admonishment does not establish misconduct by the 
prosecutor.  (Valdez, at p. 125 [no misconduct where “the 
prosecutor did not intentionally solicit, and could not have 
anticipated,” the witness’s testimony].)    
Defendant argues another of the prosecutor’s questions 
contravened the court’s ruling.  Specifically, the prosecutor 
asked Ronald and Yvonne Searle (McKenna’s mother), whether 
McKenna was a “lifeline” for Dutoit.  There was no objection to 
this questioning, rendering any claim of misconduct forfeited.  
(People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841.)  Further, the 
question was not improper.  The trial court ruled that the 
prosecutor could ask McKenna’s family members about how 
Dutoit reacted to McKenna’s murder so long as he admonished 
them not to say that her reaction was to commit suicide.  Before 
questioning the two witnesses, the prosecutor so admonished 
them.  In response to the prosecutor’s question about McKenna 
being a “lifeline” for Dutoit, Ronald simply answered, “Yes.”  He 
had previously explained that McKenna and Dutoit “hung out 
together a lot.  They were probably closest.”  In response to the 
same question, Searle testified that Dutoit was an alcoholic and 
a recluse, and that McKenna provided her with alcohol.  The 
prosecutor’s question was not designed to elicit, nor did it 
actually elicit, inadmissible testimony in violation of the court’s 
order.  
We also reject defendant’s claim that the court erred in not 
granting a mistrial based on Ronald’s testimony.  When a 
witness’s volunteered statement is not attributable to either 
party, a mistrial is called for only if the misconduct is so 
inherently prejudicial as to threaten defendant’s right to a fair 
trial despite admonitions from the court.  (People v. Dement 
(2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 39–40 (Dement).)  “ ‘ “Whether a particular 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
76 
incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative 
matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion 
in ruling on mistrial motions. . . .”  [Citation.]  A motion for a 
mistrial should be granted when “ ‘ “a [defendant’s] chances of 
receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged.” ’ ” ’ ”  
(Ibid.) 
Ronald’s comment was not “ ‘so incurably prejudicial that 
a new trial was required.’ ”  (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 40.)  
The trial court took corrective action by admonishing the jury 
immediately, and again at the end of the penalty phase.  The 
court’s admonition was decisive and clear.  It told the jury that 
the comment “has no basis in fact, and that testimony was 
ordered stricken from the record.  You must not consider it for 
any purpose.”  (Italics added.)  The jurors are presumed to have 
followed the court’s admonishment.  (People v. Montes (2014) 58 
Cal.4th 809, 888.)   
Defendant counters that Ronald’s comment was so 
inflammatory that no admonishment could undo the damage.  
He is incorrect.  Although defendant describes the testimony as 
“factually baseless, highly improper, and grossly inflammatory,” 
we have in fact held that a family member’s attempted suicide 
as a result of the victim’s death can be proper victim impact 
evidence.  (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 154, 193; 
People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 356–357.)  Acting within 
the scope of its discretion, the court here ruled the evidence 
inadmissible.  But the fact that our decisions support a broader 
view of admissibility “must certainly factor into any prejudice 
analysis.”  (Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1035, fn. 30.)  On that 
score, defendant is incorrect to suggest that there was no 
concrete evidence that Dutoit actually committed suicide 
because the death certificate did not explicitly indicate that 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
77 
cause of death.  There was evidence before the court that the 
cause of death was a drug overdose, and that Dutoit had 
expressed a desire to take her own life after McKenna was 
murdered.  This evidence could certainly support an inference of 
suicide.    
The jury was likely to see Ronald’s statement for what it 
was:  an opinion by a brother grief stricken over the loss of two 
sisters.  It is qualitatively different from the cases defendant 
cites, where the prosecutor improperly suggested that the 
defendant had been involved in drug sales or that there was a 
specific description of the assailant that matched the 
defendant’s appearance.  (See, e.g., People v. Wagner (1975) 13 
Cal.3d 612, 619–621; People v. Evans (1952) 39 Cal.2d 242, 248–
252.)  Moreover, both parties elicited evidence that Dutoit was a 
reclusive alcoholic and suffered from significant psychological 
problems predating McKenna’s death.  Dutoit lived with her 
mother, Yvonne Searle.  Searle described Dutoit as a “chronic 
alcoholic” who could not leave the house and relied on McKenna 
to bring her alcohol.  Both the prosecution and the defense 
questioned Ronald on these topics, and he admitted as much 
before the jury.  Specifically, the prosecutor asked Ronald, “In 
fairness, it’s true, is it not, that Patti had significant 
psychological problems before Sue was murdered, is that 
correct?”  Ronald agreed.  This evidence countered any 
suggestion by Ronald that defendant’s acts were the sole or even 
primary reason Dutoit took her own life.  
Given the manner in which the evidence was presented, 
and the trial court’s express admonitions to the jury, Ronald’s 
assertion that defendant was responsible for Dutoit’s suicide 
was not incurably prejudicial.  The trial court did not abuse its 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
78 
discretion in denying the motion for mistrial, nor was defendant 
deprived of a fundamentally fair trial or due process.  
2. Cumulative Error 
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the 
asserted guilt and penalty phase errors was prejudicial.  We 
concluded Ronald testified at the penalty phase in contravention 
of a court order, but that any prejudice was cured by the trial 
court’s admonition and by other evidence tending to undermine 
the significance of his assertions.  We have also held that any 
assumed error in failing to instruct at the guilt phase on a good 
faith but unreasonable belief in consent to intercourse was not 
prejudicial.  No different conclusion results from considering 
these two circumstances cumulatively. 
3. Challenges to the Death Penalty Statute 
Defendant raises a series of constitutional challenges to 
California’s death penalty scheme, all of which we have 
considered and rejected before.  Because he offers no compelling 
reasons to reconsider our precedent, we decline his invitation to 
do so.   
“Section 190.2 adequately narrows the class of murderers 
subject to the death penalty.”  (People v. Delgado (2017) 2 
Cal.5th 544, 591 (Delgado); accord People v. Brooks, supra, 3 
Cal.5th at pp. 114–115.)    
Section 190.3, factor (a) properly permits the jury to 
consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding the 
appropriate punishment.  (Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 
U.S. 967, 975–976.)  It does not allow arbitrary and capricious 
imposition of the death penalty as applied.  (People v. Henriquez 
(2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 45 (Henriquez); People v. Winbush (2017) 2 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
79 
Cal.5th 402, 489 (Winbush); People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 
149 (Simon).)   
The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional because 
it “does not require either unanimity as to the truth of 
aggravating circumstances or findings beyond a reasonable 
doubt that an aggravating circumstance (other than Pen. Code, 
§ 190.3, factor (b) or factor (c) evidence) has been proved, that 
the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or 
that death is the appropriate sentence.”  (People v. Rangel (2016) 
62 Cal.4th 1192, 1235; accord, Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 
p. 45; Delgado, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 591; Winbush, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at p. 489.)  Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 
270, Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, Apprendi v. 
New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 
U.S. 584, do not compel a different conclusion.  (Henriquez, at p. 
45; Delgado, at p. 591; Winbush, at p. 489.)   
“The death penalty law is not unconstitutional for failing 
to require that the jury base any death sentence on written 
findings.”  (People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 488; accord, 
Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 46; Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th 
at p. 490.)  Nor does the federal Constitution require intercase 
proportionality review.  (Henriquez, at p. 46; Winbush, at p. 490; 
Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 149.) 
“Use in the sentencing factors of such adjectives as 
‘extreme’ (§ 190.3, factors (d), (g)) and ‘substantial’ (id., factor 
(g)) does not act as a barrier to the consideration of mitigating 
evidence in violation of the federal Constitution.” (People v. 
Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 614–615; accord, Delgado, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at pp. 591–592; Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 150.) 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
80 
The court was not required to instruct the jury that section 
190.3, factors (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (j) are only relevant as 
factors in mitigation.  (Delgado, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 592; 
Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 490; Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 
p. 150.) 
The equal protection clause does not require California to 
include in its capital sentencing scheme the same procedural 
safeguards provided noncapital defendants.  The two groups are 
not similarly situated.  (Henriquez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 45; 
People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 199 (Sivongxxay).) 
California’s use of the death penalty, as actually 
implemented in this state, does not violate international law 
and the Eighth Amendment.  (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 
199; People v. Trinh (2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 255.) 
Finally, we reject defendant’s claim that “the cumulative 
impact of the alleged deficiencies in California’s capital 
sentencing scheme render California’s death penalty law 
constitutionally infirm.  We have individually rejected each of 
defendant’s challenges to California’s death penalty law, and 
‘[s]uch claims are no more compelling . . . when considered 
together . . . .’ [Citation.]”  (People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 
197, 296.) 
 
 
PEOPLE v. MOLANO 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
81 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
We affirm the judgment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.   
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Molano 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S161399 
Date Filed: June 27, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: Allan D. Hymer 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Wesley A. Van Winkle, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Alice B. Lustre and Juliet B. Haley, Deputy 
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Wesley A. Van Winkle 
Law Offices of Wesley A. Van Winkle 
P.O. Box 5216 
Berkeley, CA  94705-0216 
(541) 735-3170 
 
Juliet B. Haley 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 510-3797