Case Title: Herrington v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 150085

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2016-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Mims, McClanahan, Powell, and Roush, JJ., and Russell, 
S.J. 
 
DONALD ARTHUR HERRINGTON 
 
 
 
 
  OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 150085 
JUSTICE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 
 
 
 
     
  February 12, 2016 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 Donald Arthur Herrington appeals his conviction of possession with intent to sell or 
distribute a Schedule I or II controlled substance.  He contends that the indictment was improper, 
and that his right to a speedy trial was violated.  He also contends that the circuit court denied 
him the right to represent himself and that it erred in granting a continuance to the 
Commonwealth.  We will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding his conviction. 
I. 
 
A jury convicted Herrington of possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance with 
the intent to sell or distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248.  Herrington appealed his 
conviction to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion.  
Herrington v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1083-13-4, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 371 (Nov. 12, 
2014).  Herrington filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which was denied.  Herrington v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 1083-13-4 (Dec. 16, 2014). 
A. 
Herrington’s Motion to Quash the Indictment 
 
Herrington was charged by warrant of arrest with possession of a Schedule I or II 
controlled substance with the intent to sell or distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248.  On 
August 28, 2012, the district court held a preliminary hearing in which it found no probable 
cause to support the element of intent to sell or distribute.  The district court reduced the charge 
 
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to possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance in violation of Code § 18.2-250 and 
certified that charge to the grand jury.  On October 1, 2012, the grand jury indicted Herrington 
on the charge of possession with intent to sell or distribute a controlled substance under Code § 
18.2-248. 
 
Prior to Herrington’s arraignment, he moved the circuit court to quash the indictment or 
amend it to reflect a charge of simple possession in violation of Code § 18.2-250.  Herrington 
argued that in “disregarding the General District Court’s order, and instead of seeking a direct 
indictment as authorized by the Code of Virginia and applicable legal precedent, the 
Commonwealth chose to lay before the grand jury an indictment that had not been certified.”  
Herrington asserted the indictment was “improper” because it “was the product of a certified 
preliminary hearing, and as such [the] indictment is not the charge as certified and not a direct 
indictment.”  Ruling that the Commonwealth “was within its rights” to offer the indictment, the 
circuit court denied Herrington’s motion.1  The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s 
decision. 
 
On appeal to this Court, Herrington contends the circuit court erred in denying his 
“motion to quash the amended indictment which had been certified by the General District Court 
as a different offense.”  Herrington further contends the Court of Appeals erred “by determining 
that the act of amending an indictment by the Commonwealth was the same as presenting a 
second distinct indictment.” 
 
At the outset, we note that Herrington’s contentions are based on a flawed premise – that 
the indictment was amended by the Commonwealth.  The Commonwealth obtained one 
                                                 
 
1 The circuit court reasoned that, absent the district court’s entry of a final judgment on a 
lesser-included offense, “the Commonwealth is entitled to offer an indictment to the grand jury 
based on what it thinks its case is, regardless of the proceedings below.” 
 
3 
indictment against Herrington on October 1, 2012.  The Commonwealth did not thereafter amend 
the indictment or seek from the circuit court any amendment to the indictment.2 
 
We reject Herrington’s argument that the indictment was improper or that the 
Commonwealth engaged in action that was “not lawful.”  The indictment satisfied the 
requirements of Code §§ 19.2-220 and -221,3 and Herrington does not contend otherwise.  The 
indictment was “returned ‘a true bill’ upon the oath or affirmation” of the grand jury.  Code § 
19.2-216.  Although Herrington contends that the Commonwealth “did not engage in the 
approved procedure of seeking both an indictment for the certified charge and a direct indictment 
for its desired offense of possession with intention to distribute,” the Commonwealth was not 
required to obtain an indictment on the certified charge of simple possession.4  Furthermore, it is 
well-established that the Commonwealth may obtain an indictment from the grand jury charging 
an offense for which the district court has previously found no probable cause.  Moore v. 
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 388, 394, 237 S.E.2d 187, 192 (1977) (had the General Assembly 
                                                 
 
2 A circuit court may permit amendment of a defective indictment pursuant to Code § 
19.2-231.  No such amendment was sought in this case and Herrington does not argue that the 
circuit court permitted any such amendment. 
   
 
3 Code § 19.2-220 provides that the indictment “shall be a plain, concise and definite 
written statement, (1) naming the accused, (2) describing the offense charged, (3) identifying the 
county, city or town in which the accused committed the offense, and (4) reciting that the 
accused committed the offense on or about a certain date.”  Code § 19.2-221 provides that “any 
form of . . . indictment . . . which informs the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him shall be good.” 
 
 
4 Herrington cites no statute or other legal authority to support his contention that the 
indictment was improper.  The only statute cited by Herrington, Code § 19.2-186, governs 
preliminary hearings.  Pursuant to this statute, the district court, finding “sufficient cause to 
charge” Herrington with a violation of Code § 18.2-250, certified the case to the circuit court.  
Code § 19.2-186.  Nothing in this statute, however, obligated the Commonwealth to seek an 
indictment on the charge certified by the district court.  While Herrington complains that the 
“paperwork” sent to the grand jury included the warrant of arrest, the indictment functioned 
independently of the warrant. 
 
 
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intended to bar the bringing of an indictment after a finding of no probable cause by a district 
court, it could have easily so provided).5 
 
In sum, we conclude the circuit court did not err in denying Herrington’s motion to quash 
the indictment.  After the district court certified the reduced charge of simple possession of a 
controlled substance at the preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth was not required to obtain 
an indictment from the grand jury on that charge.  Furthermore, neither the district court’s 
finding of probable cause for the charge of simple possession nor its finding of no probable cause 
for the charge of possession with intent to sell or distribute precluded the Commonwealth from 
obtaining an indictment on a charge of possession with intent to sell or distribute. 
B. 
Herrington’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment under Speedy Trial Statute 
 
On the date of trial, March 11, 2013, Herrington moved to dismiss the indictment 
pursuant to the speedy trial statute.  Herrington argued that a 16-day delay in the proceedings 
should not have been attributed to him by the circuit court such that a total of 155 days not 
attributable to him had run since the date of the preliminary hearing on August 28, 2012.6  The 
circuit court refused to reverse the prior finding attributing the delay to Herrington and denied 
the motion to dismiss.  The Court of Appeals held that because the speedy trial time period began 
                                                 
 
5 Herrington readily acknowledges that the Commonwealth may indict an accused 
directly, instead of proceeding first with an arrest followed by preliminary hearing.  See, e.g., 
Waye v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 683, 689, 251 S.E.2d 202, 206 (1979); Webb v. 
Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 30-31, 129 S.E.2d 22, 27-28 (1963). 
 
 
6 Herrington’s argument was based on a calculation of the five month requirement of 
Code § 19.2-243 translating to “152 and a fraction days.”  Ballance v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. 
App. 1, 6, 461 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1995). 
 
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to run from the date of Herrington’s indictment, October 1, 2012, rather than the date of his 
preliminary hearing, his trial occurred within the time required by Code § 19.2-243.7 
 
In this Court, Herrington contends that the circuit court erred by not granting his motion 
to dismiss the indictment under the speedy trial statute, Code § 19.2-243, and that the Court of 
Appeals erred in holding that “an amended indictment” reset the speedy trial clock.  Herrington 
argues that “[a]t the time of his arraignment [he] was incarcerated continuously and so his trial 
date had to be set within five months, or 153 days, of his preliminary hearing.” 
 
The premise of Herrington’s argument is both factually and legally incorrect.  First, as 
noted previously, the Commonwealth did not obtain an “amended” indictment against 
Herrington.  The Commonwealth obtained one indictment against him on October 1, 2012.  
Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals ruled, the speedy trial time period began to run on the date 
of Herrington’s indictment on October 1, 2012, not on the date of the preliminary hearing, 
August 28, 2012. 
 
The indictment by the grand jury on the charge of possession with intent to sell or 
distribute supplanted the district court’s finding of probable cause on the charge of simple 
possession at the preliminary hearing.  See Ashby v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 545-46, 
535 S.E.2d 182, 185 (2000) (indictments charging different offense than charges certified by 
district court supplanted finding of probable cause by district court and speedy trial clock began 
to run anew from date of indictments); see also Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318, 322, 171 S.E.2d 
243, 246 (1969) (“When an original indictment is supplanted by a second indictment, the terms 
contemplated by [the speedy trial statute] are to be counted from the time of the second 
                                                 
 
7 The Court of Appeals found that “only 117 days which were not attributable to 
[Herrington] elapsed between October 1, 2012 and [his] trial on March 11, 2013.” 
 
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indictment.”); Harris v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 576, 585, 520 S.E.2d 825, 830 (1999) (same); 
Miller v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 929, 934, 234 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1977) (same). 
 
Herrington’s continued incarceration, therefore, was based on the indictment for 
possession with intent to sell or distribute, rather than the charge of simple possession certified 
by the district court.  Pursuant to Code § 19.2-243, the Commonwealth was required to 
commence the trial within five months from the date he was indicted.8  Because Herrington’s 
trial on March 11, 2013 occurred within this time period, the circuit court did not err in denying 
his motion to dismiss the indictment.9 
C. 
Herrington’s Request for Self-Representation 
 
On the date that was originally set for trial, January 8, 2013, Herrington’s court-appointed 
counsel moved to withdraw because of a conflict of interest.10  Herrington told the circuit court 
that he would like to represent himself.  The circuit court responded: “Well, I don’t mind you 
doing that, but I don’t think I’m going to leave it at that at this point.  I’m going to go ahead and 
appoint a counsel for you.”  The circuit court advised Herrington to “discuss with your newly 
appointed counsel the pros and cons of that” after which Herrington would “have an opportunity 
to . . . request to represent yourself.”  The circuit court acknowledged:  “You, obviously, have an 
                                                 
 
8 Code § 19.2-243 provides: 
 
If there was no preliminary hearing in the district court, or if such preliminary 
hearing was waived by the accused, the commencement of the running of the 
five . . . month[] period[] . . . set forth in this section, shall be from the date 
an indictment . . . is found against the accused. 
 
 
9 Herrington does not contest the calculation by the Court of Appeals of the time not 
attributable to him that elapsed between the date of the indictment and his trial. 
 
 
10 This was Herrington’s second court-appointed counsel.  His first court-appointed 
counsel had previously withdrawn due to a conflict of interest. 
 
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absolute constitutional right to [represent yourself]” if the court finds “you understand what you 
are doing.”  The circuit court stated: 
[F]or right now I’m going to go ahead and appoint counsel to 
represent you.  You can discuss with him your case, him or her 
your case, and then if you still desire to represent yourself then 
have the counsel schedule a date on which the Court can hold a 
hearing to determine your capability to represent yourself. 
 
Although Herrington stated he was prepared to go forward with trial and the Commonwealth 
informed the circuit court that Herrington had previously represented himself on an unrelated 
felony offense, the circuit court continued the trial, proceeded with appointment of new counsel, 
and scheduled a date for hearing to “resolve this issue of whether [Herrington] gets to represent 
himself or not.”11 
 
When Herrington subsequently appeared in circuit court with new counsel at the next 
scheduled hearing date and at subsequent proceedings, he did not request to represent himself.  
Before the trial commenced on March 11, the circuit court specifically asked if Herrington 
wished to represent himself.  Herrington’s counsel informed the circuit court that Herrington did 
not wish to represent himself and had made the request on January 8 only “so he could be tried 
that day.” 
 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Herrington argued the circuit court erred in denying 
his motion to represent himself at trial.  The Court of Appeals found that the circuit court “did 
not foreclose [Herrington] from exercising his right to represent himself at trial,” and therefore, 
did not “refuse[] to permit [Herrington] to represent himself at trial.” 
                                                 
 
11 Before concluding the proceedings, the circuit court informed Herrington the court 
would notify new counsel of his appointment and again advised Herrington “to get in touch with 
[new counsel] to express to him your desire to represent yourself, discuss the case with him, get 
his advice, and then you choose.” 
 
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Herrington also contends in this Court that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to 
waive counsel and to represent himself at trial.  Because the Sixth Amendment guarantee to the 
assistance of counsel “implies a right of self-representation,” a defendant may waive his right to 
counsel and proceed pro se at trial.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).  The 
defendant relinquishes many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel when 
he represents himself, and therefore, must knowingly and intelligently forego those benefits.  Id. 
at 835.  “The purpose of the ‘knowing and voluntary’ inquiry . . . is to determine whether the 
defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision 
and whether the decision is uncoerced.”  Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n.12 (1993).  To 
that end, “he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so 
that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes 
open.”  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.  When the defendant elects to waive counsel and proceed pro se 
at trial, his request “must be timely, clear, and unequivocal.”  Thomas v. Commonwealth, 260 
Va. 553, 558, 539 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2000). 
 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that there is no factual support for Herrington’s 
contention that he was denied his right to represent himself at trial.  When the circuit court 
granted leave to court-appointed counsel to withdraw and Herrington told the circuit court that he 
would like to represent himself, the circuit court advised Herrington to discuss with newly 
appointed counsel “the pros and cons of that.”  The circuit court informed Herrington that if he 
still desired to represent himself after speaking with counsel, Herrington would have an 
opportunity to make his request at which time the court would determine whether Herrington 
understood what he was doing.  Despite having multiple opportunities at subsequent proceedings 
to raise his right to self-representation, Herrington declined to do so.  To the contrary, when the 
 
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case came on for trial on March 11 and Herrington was asked directly by the circuit court 
whether he wished to represent himself at trial, he informed the circuit court that he did not.  
Accordingly, the record does not support Herrington’s assertion that the circuit court denied him 
the right to represent himself at the trial. 
 
D. 
Commonwealth’s Motion for Continuance 
 
After Herrington was appointed new counsel, the trial was scheduled for February 20, 
2013.  When the case came on for trial on that date, the Commonwealth moved for a two-week 
continuance to enable an analyst from the FBI to recover communications from Herrington’s 
cellular phone relating to the drug transaction at issue in the case.  The Commonwealth explained 
that a search warrant previously had been issued for Herrington’s cellular phone but because the 
sheriff’s office believed the case would be resolved on a plea, it had not been immediately 
executed.  Once the sheriff’s office proceeded with executing the search warrant, it was unable to 
defeat the password.  According to the Commonwealth, the FBI analyst could retrieve the 
communications in approximately five business days. 
 
Herrington objected and argued that the Commonwealth did not have good cause for a 
continuance because it had known about the phone for at least five months and delayed 
execution of the search warrant.  Herrington further asserted that when the phone was taken prior 
to the preliminary hearing, he provided the password, and pictures were taken of the text 
messages and entered into evidence at the preliminary hearing. 
 
The circuit court granted the continuance and scheduled the trial for March 11, 2013.  
The court explained that the evidence was “material” and “acquirable within a certain time 
period.”  On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals refused to overturn the circuit 
 
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court’s ruling, concluding that there was “no basis to conclude that [Herrington] suffered 
prejudice as a result of the brief continuance requested by the Commonwealth.” 
 
Herrington asserts that the circuit court erred by granting the Commonwealth’s motion 
for a continuance because “the Commonwealth did not show good cause.”  “The decision to 
grant a motion for a continuance is within the sound discretion of the circuit court” and will be 
reversed “only upon a showing of abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice to the [party who 
claims an abuse of discretion].”  Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 705, 722-23, 677 S.E.2d 751, 
762 (2008) (quoting Haugen v. Shenandoah Valley Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34, 645 
S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007)).  Thus, a showing of both abuse of discretion and prejudice “are 
essential to reversal.”  Butler v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 614, 621, 570 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2002) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Although Herrington argues the Commonwealth 
did not establish “due diligence” in obtaining its evidence for trial, he fails to allege any harm to 
him resulting from the two-week continuance and the record discloses no such prejudice.  
Because Herrington “has shown no prejudice resulting from what he claims was an abuse of 
discretion,” we will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling.  Quintana v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 
127, 135, 295 S.E.2d 643, 646 (1982). 
II. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.