Case Title: Morris v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 109, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
THEODORE M. MORRIS, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 109, 2009 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0411013777 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: May 22, 2009 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
August 11, 2009  
 
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 11th day of August 2009, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the Superior Court 
record, it appear to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Theodore M. Morris, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s January 30, 2009 denial of his first motion for 
postconviction relief.  The appellee, State of Delaware, has filed a motion to 
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment below on the ground that it is manifest 
 
2
on the face of Morris’ opening brief that his appeal is without merit.1  We 
agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
By superseding indictment filed on March 28, 2005, Morris was 
charged with four counts of Rape in the First Degree and three counts of 
Sexual Exploitation of a Child, among other charges.  On June 20, 2005, 
Morris pled guilty to two counts of Rape in the First Degree and one count 
of Sexual Exploitation of a Child.2  After a presentence investigation, the 
Superior Court sentenced Morris, on August 12, 2005, to two life terms plus 
twenty-five years.  Morris did not file a direct appeal.  
 
 
(3) 
On June 17, 2008, Morris moved for postconviction relief 
pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”), on the ground that 
his guilty plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel.  At 
the Superior Court’s request, Morris’ counsel filed an affidavit in response 
to the allegations of ineffectiveness.3   
 
(4) 
By order dated January 30, 2009, the Superior Court denied 
relief after determining that Morris had not demonstrated there that his 
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or 
was prejudicial.  This appeal followed. 
                                          
 
1 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 The State entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining charges. 
3 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(g)(2).  Morris’ counsel disputed the allegations of 
ineffectiveness. 
 
3
 
(5) 
It is well-settled that when reviewing the Superior Court’s 
denial of a postconviction motion, this Court first must consider the 
procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive 
issues.4  Having applied the procedural imperatives of Rule 61, the Court has 
concluded that Morris’ postconviction motion, filed on June 17, 2008, is 
barred as untimely under Rule 61(i)(1) because it was not filed within one 
year after Morris’ conviction became final.5   
 
(6) 
Under Rule 61(i)(5), the time bar imposed by 61(i)(1) does not 
apply “to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim 
that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation 
that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of 
the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.”6  Here, however, 
Morris has not demonstrated, nor does the record reflect, that he is entitled to 
relief under Rule 61(i)(5).  There is no record evidence suggesting that 
Morris’ counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness or that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, Morris would 
not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.7  Also, the 
                                          
 
4 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
5 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).  Morris’ conviction became final on September 13, 
2005, upon the expiration of his appeal period thirty days after sentencing.  Del. Super. 
Ct. Crim. R. 61(m)(1).   
6 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). 
7 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58-61 (Del. 1988). 
 
4
record does not support Morris’ claim that his guilty plea was involuntary.  
Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Morris is bound by 
the answers on his guilty plea form and his sworn statements to the judge 
during the plea colloquy.8  
 
(7) 
  It is manifest on the face of Morris’ opening brief that the 
appeal is without merit.  The issues raised on appeal are clearly controlled 
by settled Delaware law.  To the extent the issues on appeal implicate the 
exercise of judicial discretion, there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Justice 
                                          
 
8 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).