Case Title: Adams v. Underwood

Citation: 470 S.W.2d 180

Docket Number: 

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 1971-06-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
470 S.W.2d 180 (1971) Claire ADAMS, Executor of Estate of Jim Adams, and J.L. Adams, Appellant, v. Virginia Adams UNDERWOOD, Claimant-Appellee. Supreme Court of Tennessee. June 7, 1971. William D. Baird, R. David Allen, Lebanon, for appellant. MacFarland, Reed & Kinnard, Lebanon, for claimant-appellee. PER CURIAM. Heretofore, the Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals, Middle Division, affirming the judgment of the Wilson County Circuit Court, whereby Virginia Adams Underwood was awarded $5,600.00 for services rendered her father, Jim Adams, in the last sixty-three months of his life. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is as follows: "Claire Adams, Executor of the estate of Jim Adams, has appealed from a jury verdict and judgment sustaining the claim of Virginia Adams Underwood for services to the deceased, Jim Adams. "The claim filed by claimant reads as follows: "The jury returned a verdict in favor of claimant in the amount of $5,600.00, and judgment was entered thereon. "The first and third assignments of error assert that there was no evidence to support the verdict and that the trial court erred in overruling the motion of the executor for a directed verdict. "The executor insists that there is no evidence of (a) a contract between claimant and deceased, for payment for services, or (b) any intention of deceased that claimant be paid, or (c) any expectations by claimant of compensation. "The claimant presented witnesses who testified that, prior to 1963, she resided with her husband and two children on their 100 acre farm near Lebanon, that her husband had been employed for many years at Lebanon Woolen Mills; that she transported him several miles to and from work each day because he did not drive an automobile; that her mother and father lived in Lebanon near the woolen mills; that, following the death of her mother in 1963, at the request of her brother, J.L. Adams, she discussed and agreed with her father upon a plan whereby her entire family was moved to the home of her father so that she might care for her father; that the father insisted upon living in his own home, but was afraid to live alone; that claimant and her family lived with deceased from 1963 until his death in 1968; that she paid no rent, but their farm home remained vacant; that she drove to the farm every day to care for the livestock; that deceased gave her some money, but not enough to buy his groceries; that claimant cooked special food for deceased according to his prescribed diet; that she cooked special food for his dogs; that she cared for and nursed deceased; that she attended to the collection of rents and repair of the rental property of deceased; that he was physically and mentally incapable of caring for himself or property; and that the reasonable value of her services was $38.00 per week. "No evidence was offered by the executor. "Appellant correctly states that there is no evidence of an express contract whereby deceased agreed to pay claimant anything. Nor is there any evidence that deceased ever gave any indication that he intended for claimant to be paid. There is likewise no testimony by claimant that she expected payment. "The issue of law presented here is whether or not special circumstances may create a valid claim for services to deceased, even in the absence of contract, intention to pay or intention to be paid. "The special and persuasive circumstances of this case are as follows: "1. Deceased had three children. Only claimant would help him the others refused. *182 "2. Deceased was illiterate, senile, lonely, `just like a child,' physically and mentally unable to attend to his business, would hardly know what he was doing for three weeks at a time. "3. Claimant furnished deceased the care and nursing which no one else seemed willing to furnish. "The trial judge charged the jury in part as follows: "Under this charge, which was unexcepted to, the jury found for the claimant. Inherent in such a verdict is a finding that the circumstances were such as to imply an obligation to pay. "In Gorrell v. Tayior, 107 Tenn. 468 [568], 64 S.W. 888 (1901), the services were performed by a daughter and her husband who lived with deceased. The court disallowed the claim for services, but stated: "In the present case, the claimant was not living with her father until the urgency of his needs and demands required that she abandon her home in order to care for him. Services rendered to a fellow member of a household are in an entirely different category *183 from those which require the sacrifice of a separate abode in order to serve the deceased. The jury evidently found, with cause, that there were `such exceptional facts and circumstances as will establish an intention on the one part to charge and the other to pay * * *' "In Key v. Harris, 116 Tenn. 161, 92 S.W. 235 (1905) the services were rendered to a sister of weak mind, almost helpless, unable to move from her chair or bed without assistance, as helpless as a baby. It was further shown that, but for the services of the claimant, the deceased would have been a public charge. In said case, the Supreme Court allowed one half of the compensation fixed by the trial court on grounds of ordinary justice and necessities furnished to an incompetent. "In the present case, there is evidence to support the conclusion by the jury that deceased was physically and mentally unable to care for himself, that other children had refused to care for him, and that, but for the services of claimant, deceased would have been dependent upon the aid of outsiders, which certainly would not have been gratuitous. Thus the verdict of the jury is justifiable upon the theory of necessities furnished. Coincidentally, in the present case, the jury allowed approximately one-half of the amount claimed. "In Cotton v. Roberts Estate, 47 Tenn. App. 277, 337 S.W.2d 776 (1960), the court denied the claim of a nephew who occupied a house on the farm of deceased and tilled her farm on a crop-sharing basis. Deceased was active, healthy, intelligent and business-like. "In the present case, there was evidence to show, and the jury evidently found, that the deceased was not as competent and able to care for his affairs as was Mrs. Roberts, supra. "Appellant urges that claimant herein occupied the home of deceased for five years rent-free; however, during the same period, claimant's own home stood vacant and untended; and claimant thus received no benefit from the use of the home of deceased. She was present there, not to save rent, but to satisfy and serve her father. "Appellant urges that deceased was reasonably active and managed his own affairs. There is evidence to this effect, but there is also evidence otherwise which the jury evidently believed and followed in its verdict. "Appellant relies upon a statement from Key v. Harris, supra, as follows: "The exclusion of the commercial consideration from cases such as this would enable children who are unmoved by the needs of a parent to shirk all responsibility therefor and place the entire burden upon the only child who will care for the parent and then to demand that estate of the parent be divided equally among the children. This would discourage services to parents by any child unless firm contractual relations were established, and this would, indeed, mar the family relationship. "The reason of the law is, indeed, the soul of the law, and should not fail. In the present case reason and justice require that there be some difference between the inheritance of the attentive daughter and that of the inattentive sons. The jury has determined from competent evidence that unusual circumstances exist which justify an inference of contract, or a quasi contract *184 for necessaries. Being supported by material and substantial evidence, the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed. Kroger Co. v. Giem, 215 Tenn. 459, 387 S.W.2d 620 (1964); Clark v. Allison, [58] Tenn. App. [355], 430 S.W.2d 784 (1967) and many other authorities cited in Tenn. Digest, Vol. 2, Appeal and Error, § 930(1). "The second assignment of error that: is not proper for consideration in this Court and is respectfully overruled. Ewing v. Birthright, Tenn. App., 448 S.W.2d 71 (1969); Cherry v. Floyd, Tenn. App., 448 S.W.2d 444 (1969); Leach v. Leach, 52 Tenn. App. 606, 376 S.W.2d 739 (1964). "The fourth assignment is that the verdict of the jury is excessive. "Appellant urges that the rental value of claimant's occupancy of the home of deceased should reduce if not eradicate the claim. This insistence has been dealt with heretofore. "Appellant urges that the convenience of the home of the deceased to the work of claimant's husband should mitigate the claim. There is evidence that daily trips to the farm were made to attend the livestock which would largely balance the nearness to employment, and the general verdict of the jury for approximately one-half of the claim includes consideration of this factor. Appellant insists, correctly, that claimant has not shown the precise amount she spent for the benefit of deceased or the precise number of hours or minutes she spent in his service, and that the verdict is therefore based upon speculation. "The amount of recovery allowed may not be based upon speculation, but it may be, and usually is, based upon estimation. "In 25A, C.J.S., Damages, § 162(2), pp. 80, 81 is found the following: "No authority has been cited, and none has been found, which denies to the jury the prerogative of exercising its common sense and common experience in estimating the value of goods and services, especially where the claimant has placed a given value thereon and the jury sees fit to place a lesser value thereon without other testimony. There are areas in which jurors are entitled to call upon their own knowledge and experience which is shared by all reasonably well informed and experienced persons. "The claim was for $10,374.00 for about five years work at $38.00 per week. Whether the jury found for a lesser period, or for a lesser charge per week, the verdict was for about one half the amount claimed. There is evidence to support the finding of the jury as to the fair amount due, and, upon appeal, the amount of the verdict could hardly be revised without re-weighing the controverted evidence, which action is not within the province of this Court. "The fourth assignment of error is respectfully overruled. "Each assignment of error has been overruled for the reasons given. The verdict of the trial jury and judgment thereon is affirmed. The cause is remanded for further appropriate proceedings. All costs of the cause, including costs of this appeal, are taxed against the appellant-executor. "Affirmed and Remanded." While this Court is not in disagreement, in general, with this opinion, certiorari was *185 granted because the judgment of the trial court was affirmed in spite of a finding by the Court of Appeals that there was no evidence of contract, whatsoever. If in fact there is no evidence whatsoever of contractual intent, the special circumstances relied on by the Court as justifying the award, being of the same general character as those held to be inadequate for this purpose in Gorrell v. Taylor, 107 Tenn. 568, 64 S.W. 888, could not amount to such exceptional facts and circumstances as are contemplated in that case. It is important to note that the "exceptional facts and circumstances" contemplated by Gorrell v. Taylor, supra, as adequate to sustain a recovery are not facts which prove the rendition of arduous, valuable services, but facts which will, as the opinion in Gorrell states it, "establish an intention on the one part to charge and on the other to pay." p. 570, 64 S.W. p. 888. So, being concerned that the Court of Appeals opinion would leave the inference that Gorrell v. Taylor could be satisfied by the volume of personal services rendered, we granted certiorari: not for the purpose of reversing, but for the purpose of pointing out that the record does contain evidence which tends to show that the arrangement under which Mrs. Underwood rendered services to her father, Jim Adams, was consensual in nature, in that there was a specific request for these services on the one hand and the furnishing thereof on the other, and that this calls into operation a rule which sustains the recovery. We quote from the transcript: This testimony together with other testimony in the case shows that Mrs. Underwood left her own home and entered the home of her father, not to reestablish a family relationship, but to render services according to a pre-arrangement. Under such circumstances, a number of respectable courts hold that the presumption of gratuity is either done away with, or loses its full force and effect. In Mathias v. Tingey, 39 Utah 561, 118 P. 781, 38 L.R.A.,N.S., 749, it was held that an adult child who was no longer a member of the parent's family but was supporting himself through his own efforts, who returned to his parent's home at the parent's request to perform certain services for the parent would not be prevented from recovering by the gratuity presumption, which would lose its full force and effect in such a case. In Cramer v. Clark, 121 Wash. 507, 209 P. 688, 24 A.L.R. 970, it is said: This same proposition is exemplified by the holdings in Marietta v. Marietta, 90 Iowa 201, 57 N.W. 708; Markey v. Brewster, 10 Hun 16, affirmed 70 N.Y. 607; Freeman v. Freeman, 65 Ill. 106; Patterson v. Rehfuss, 250 Ala. 508, 35 So. 2d 330. Cases related in effect to this proposition which it may be of benefit to read are Estate of Grossman, 250 Wis. 457, 27 N.W.2d 365, and Wilsey v. Franklin, 57 Hun 382, 10 N.Y.S. 833, and Ronsiek v. Boverschmidts Admr., 63 Mo. App. 421. Also, Macomber v. King, 288 Mass. 381, 192 N.E. 926. In sum, where, as in this case, an adult or emancipated child, by pre-arrangement with a parent, gives up an established home and moves into the home of the parent, not for the purposes of reestablishing a family relationship, but for the purpose of rendering services of an extraordinarily burdensome nature, over a long period of time, the presumption of gratuity need not apply. These facts may constitute "such exceptional facts and circumstances as will establish an intention on the one part to charge and on the other to pay, notwithstanding the relation of kinship." (quoted from Gorrell). The Court of Appeals envisioned this to be the rule, but it did not specify the facts and circumstances giving rise to the application of this rule in its particularization of "exceptional" circumstances, nor was authority cited. In conclusion let us point out that we are in no way departing from the general rule that services rendered to a parent by a child are presumed to be gratuitous, we are simply holding that facts and circumstances *187 such as are present in this case tend to show the services were rendered as the result of an agreement, not family relationship, from which it could reasonably and lawfully follow that consideration is involved. The other assignments are the same as those dealt with by the Court of Appeals, with whose action thereon we concur. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court of Wilson County, is affirmed. A petition to rehear has been filed based on the contention that neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court considered and ruled on the Executor's third assignment of error. The Executor is mistaken in this contention. The third assignment of error makes the point that the trial judge erred in refusing to direct a verdict on motion of the Executor, which motion was in this language: "If Your Honor please, at this time the defendants to this lawsuit, that is Executor of this estate, moves the court to return a verdict of not guilty." This motion raised the question whether there was any material evidence on which a jury verdict could be predicated. Both the Court of Appeals and this Court responded to this question. The Court of Appeals in its opinion considered, together, the first and third assignments of error, and expressed the opinion that the two assignments made the single question whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict against a motion for a directed verdict. In the course of considering that question the Court of Appeals thoroughly and extensively reviewed the pertinent facts, and overruled the assignment of error. This Court, being satisfied that the Court of Appeals had ruled correctly, concurred in the Court of Appeals action. Neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court responded to the argument that the trial judge's action in overruling the motion for a new trial was reversible error because the trial judge stated that his reason for so doing was that the case was being tried by a jury and that if he were trying the case as a non-jury case he would sustain the motion for a directed verdict. This argument, was not considered because it did not merit attention. However, since this proposition is again insisted upon by the petition to rehear, we respond by pointing out to the Executor that it is a fundamental rule of law that an appellate court will not reverse a correct judgment of a trial court which is based upon an insufficient or wrong reason therefor. Some twenty-five or more cases wherein this rule has been applied are collected in 2 Tennessee Digest, Appeal & Error. It follows that the petition to rehear should be, and hereby is, denied.