Case Title: Whitlock v. Dist. Court for Fayette Cty.

Citation: 497 N.W.2d 891

Docket Number: 92-878

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1993-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
497 N.W.2d 891 (1993) Eugene Harrison WHITLOCK, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR FAYETTE COUNTY, Defendant. No. 92-878. Supreme Court of Iowa. March 24, 1993. Rehearing Denied April 19, 1993. *892 John D. Standafer of the Donohue Law Office, West Union, for plaintiff. Dennis G. Larson and Chris A. Frana of the Larson Law Office, Decorah, for defendant. Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., John Parmeter, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Kay Delafield, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Stephen J. Belay, Asst. County Atty., for amicus curiae State of Iowa. Considered by LARSON, P.J., and SCHULTZ, LAVORATO, SNELL and ANDREASEN, JJ. SNELL, Justice. The issue presented by this case is whether plaintiff who is not the biological father of Michelle Whitlock is legally liable to pay temporary child support for her during the pendency of his dissolution of marriage proceeding. We determine he is liable for that support. Eugene and Georgia Whitlock were married on October 7, 1978. One child was born during the marriage, Michelle Whitlock. The parties agree and the trial court conclusively determined that Eugene is not the father of Michelle. This is because Eugene, who was in the United States Navy, left his wife for shipboard duty in San Diego at the end of June 1982. He did not see his wife again until after the baby was born on May 7, 1983. Georgia Whitlock told Eugene that he was not the biological father, and she has named the true biological father in these proceedings. The parties dispute whether Eugene consented to the placement of his name as the father of Michelle on her birth certificate. In any event, Eugene is named as her father on the birth certificate, and he proceeded to treat Michelle as his daughter for the next nine years. Eugene claimed Michelle as a dependent for military benefits while he was in the service and claimed her as a dependent on his income tax returns. Georgia says that the biological father was never asked to contribute support for Michelle because Eugene said that he wanted to be her father. Eugene acknowledged that when asked he would say that Michelle was his daughter. Eugene stated that he did not use the word stepdaughter in introductions. With family, however, he would state that the child was not his, that she was more like a stepdaughter. On November 20, 1991, Eugene filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Georgia answered and filed an affidavit of financial status. The affidavit contained a request for temporary child support for Michelle. Also during this time, the State of Iowa filed a notice of support debt which is also contested by Eugene. The State then filed a petition for judicial review in the district court. The district court consolidated the dissolution of marriage action and the State's action for support debt. At the hearing, Eugene stated that he supported Michelle as his daughter for nine years and acted as her father. Although Eugene voluntarily supported Michelle for nine years, he feels that because he is not her biological father, he is not obligated to support her and should not be forced to make payments of child support to her. He has not made any support payments for Michelle since the dissolution action was filed. Eugene challenges the legality of the temporary support order in his petition for writ of certiorari. We granted the writ to answer this question. The Iowa Attorney General submitted a brief as amicus curiae, having an interest in enforcing child support debts under Iowa Code chapter 252C (1991). The issue came before the court on a motion for partial summary judgment. The court specifically found that Eugene is not the biological father of Michelle. Nevertheless, the court held that Eugene was liable for temporary child support because this fact was not controlling. Temporary child support in the amount of $56.38 per week was set. Further order was made that the establishment of temporary child support would not be admissible with regard to whether Eugene would be liable for permanent child support. *893 Certiorari lies when the district court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has acted illegally. Iowa R.Civ.P. 306; State v. West, 320 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Iowa 1982); Hadjis v. Iowa Dist. Court, 275 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Iowa 1979). Illegality exists when the findings on which the court has based its conclusions of law do not have substantial evidentiary support or when the court has not applied the proper rule of law. Iowa Freedom of Info. Council v. Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920, 922 (Iowa 1983); Hightower v. Peterson, 235 N.W.2d 313, 316 (Iowa 1975). We proceed as directed by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 316: The sole issue presented at this juncture is the legality of the order for temporary child support. Authority for the court's order must come from Iowa Code chapter 598, Dissolution of Marriage, and chapter 252C, Child Support Debts. Respondent, Georgia Whitlock, relies on section 598.11, which states in part: Georgia points out that this statute refers to a "party" to the dissolution suit rather than to a "parent" of children affected by the action. She claims a broader group designation is intended. Eugene's argument that he should not be legally ordered to support a child not his is heavily based on several of our prior cases to which he analogizes. In In re Marriage of Carney, 206 N.W.2d 107, 112-13 (Iowa 1973), we said: "The term `in loco parentis' according to its generally accepted common law meaning, refers to a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relation without going *894 through the formalities necessary to legal adoption. It embodies the two ideas of assuming the parental status and discharging the parental duties." Even if it were to be determined that Dr. Carney stood in loco parentis to Darla during his marriage to respondent, the trial court was without authority upon dissolution of the marital relationship to make any provision for the continued support of Darla by petitioner. We followed Carney with language approving this holding in Mears v. Mears, 213 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Iowa 1973): Similarly, our court of appeals followed the same principle in In re Marriage of Holcomb, 471 N.W.2d 76 (Iowa App.1991). There, the court rejected claims by a mother for child support from her husband, who was not the father, based on equitable estoppel, implied contract, equitable adoption, virtual adoption, and adoption by contract. Citing a New Jersey case, the court said: Holcomb, 471 N.W.2d at 79. Georgia's position relies in large measure on equitable arguments and two Michigan cases that found a child support obligation arising out of equitable or promissory estoppel principles. See Nygard v. Nygard, 156 Mich.App. 94, 401 N.W.2d 323 (1986); Johnson v. Johnson, 93 Mich.App. 415, 286 N.W.2d 886 (1979). Support is also sought from Bergman v. Carson, 226 Iowa 449, 284 N.W. 442 (1939). In that case, a right of inheritance was successfully established on an adoption by estoppel theory by proof of an understanding and agreement between a father and mother that the father would adopt her son. Although the authorities cited by both parties are analogous, we again note the narrowness of the issue now before us. The trial court ruled only on the question of temporary child support, leaving to further development at trial the facts and legal issues attached to a permanent child support question. As such, we believe there is significance to be drawn from the *895 use of the word "party" in section 598.11. The purpose of that section is to authorize temporary orders of support during the pendency of the dissolution proceedings. Those orders of necessity are based on preliminary information that may or may not be substantiated on further hearing. Final dispositions and support orders are statutorily authorized by section 598.21. Section 598.21(4)(a) uses the word "parent" in referring to child support that would be permanent. It states: The preliminary nature of temporary child support is further indicated in Eastman v. Eastman, 159 Iowa 167, 140 N.W. 400 (1913). In that action for separate maintenance, the court authorized temporary alimony, observing it would not investigate the merits further than to examine the pleadings to see that a meritorious claim was alleged. It is apparent from the facts already established that there is a basis for ordering support for Michelle by Eugene at this juncture. We hold that the district court had jurisdiction and legal authority to order temporary child support pursuant to Iowa Code section 598.11. WRIT ANNULLED.