Case Title: Keahole Defense Coalition, Inc. v. Board of Land and Natural Resources, State of Hawaii. Concurring Opinion by Circuit Court Judge Del Rosario, with whom J. Acoba, joins [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Amendment, filed 05/25/2006 [pdf].

Citation: 110 Haw. 419

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘+**FOR PUBLICATION***

OO
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

000:

   

     

KEAHOLE DEFENSE COALITION, INC., a Hawa:
nonprofit corporation; PEGGY J. RATLIFF
MAHI COOPER, Appellants-Appellees

   
 

  

sa

B

BOARD OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES, STAT!
HAWAT'T; DEPARTMENT OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOUMCES,

STATE OF HAWAI'I; HAWAII ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC.,
‘@ Hawai'i corporation, DEPARTMENT OF HAWATIAN HOME:

LANDS, STATE OF HAWAI'I, Appellees-Appellees

   
 

 Ocvivneir
Gants

22:2 He 81 AVM 90

and

WAIMANA ENTERPRISES, INC., a Hawai't
corporation, Appellee-Appellant
(CIV. No, 02-1-0068K)

 

DEPARTNENT OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS, STATE
OF HANAT'T, Appellant-Appellee

DEPARTMENT OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE OF
HAWAI'I; BOARD OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE OF
HAWAI'I; HAWAII ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, INC., a Hawai'i

‘corporation, PEGGY J. RATLIFF, MAHI COOPER, KEAHOLE
DEFENSE COALITION, INC., a Hawai'i nonprofit corporation,

Appellees-Appellees

 

and

WAIMANA ENTERPRISES, INC., a Hawai'i
corporation, Appellee~Appellant
(CIV. No, 02-1-0079K)

a
‘***20R PUBLICATION*#*

 

Wo. 26308

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
(CIV. NOS. 02-1-68K 6 02-1-0079K)

MAY 18, 2006

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, ACOBA, JJ., CIRCUIT
JUDGE DEL ROSARIO FOR NAKAYAMA, J., RECUSED, AND
CIRCUIT JUDGE CHAN FOR DUFFY, J., RECUSED; WITH CIRCUIT
SUDGE DEL ROSARIO CONCURRING SEPARATELY
AND WITH WHOM ACOBA, J., JOINS

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

 

We hold that (1) Appellee-Appellant Waimana
Enterprises, Inc. (Waimana) lacked standing to challenge the
decision of Appellee-Appellee Board of Land and Natural Resources
(BLNR) regarding a time extension that it granted to Appellee-
Appellee Hawaii Electric Light Company, Inc. (HELCO) to complete
construction of HELCO’s Keahole power station inasmuch as Waimana
(2) was barred by collateral estoppel, and (b) does not have a
sufficient property interest to have suffered a due process
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United states
Constitution’ or article I, section $ of the Hawai'i
Constitutions? (2) notwithstanding the lack of a property

‘the Fourteenth Amendment te the United States Constitution states
in part that

No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abriage the privileges or inmunities of citizens
Of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, 1iberty, oF property, without due
Brocess of law’

 

2 article 1, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution, entitled “Due
Process and Equal Protection,” provides that

(comiaued.)
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SSS

interest, Waimana was given due process; (3) Waimana fails to

 

establish an equal protection violation; and (4) Waimana has
failed to establish a breach of the public trust, and, thus,
(5) the circuit court of the third circuit (the court),’ did not
abuse its discretion in vacating its November 7, 2002 final
judgment reversing the decision of the BLNR. For the foregoing
reasons, the court's November 28, 2003 first amended final
judgment, vacating the October 3, 2002 order reversing the
decision of the BLNR and Novenber 7, 2002 final judgment, is
affirmed.

I.

‘This appeal arises from a dispute, spanning more than @
decade, over plans by HELCO to expand the Keahole Generating
Station on the Island of Hawai'i.‘ See Hawaii Elec, Light Co.
pen't of Land § Natural Res., 102 Hawai'i 257, 75 P.3d 160 (2003)
(hereinafter, HELCO). On August 26, 1992, HELCO filed a
conservation district use application (CDUA) with BLNR. The CDUA
was designated as CDUA HA~487A. Following a hearing on COUA HA-

487A, Waimana, Appellee-Appellee Department of Land and Natural

 

*( continued)

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor be denied the
Sguel protection ef the laws, nor be denied the
Ghooyment of the person's civil rights or be
S12eFininated againat in the exercise thereof because
Of race, religion, sex or ancestry,

 

 

 

 

+ the Honorable Ronald Tearra presided.

+ the Keshole Generating Station has operated as 2 “pesking,”" or
e-time, generating station:

 
‘*++FOR PUBLICATION®#*

Resources (DLNR), and Appellants-Appeliees Mahi Cooper (Cooper)
and Peggy Ratliff (Ratliff) requested contested case hearings.
See id. at 262, 75 P.3d at 165. On May 13, 1994, while the
requests for contested case hearings were pending,” BLNR voted on
a DINR staff member's recommendation to deny COUA HA-487A without
prejudice. Id. BINR apparently took the vote without holding a
contested case hearing in order to meet the May 18, 1994 deadline
for acting upon the CDUA.* See id, The vote was two in favor of
denial, three against, and one recusal. Id, on the vote to
grant the application, no one voted in favor, two voted against,
with one recusal and three not voting. Id. On May 17, 1994,
eimana appealed to the court. This appeal was docketed as Civ.
No. $4-123K. On May 29, 1994, the court granted Maimana’s motion

for stay of agency action, staying any legal effect of the May

 

13, 1994 “non-action” of BLNR regarding approval/disapproval of
CDUA HA-487A, including any claim that the CDUA was automatically

granted.

 

° the hearing officer assigned to preside over the contested case
had fa2ien ili ang the chairperson of Appellee-Appellee Board of Land and
Returel Resources (BUNA) postponed the contested case indefinitely.

* pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes § 183-41 (1993), BLNR hag 160
days to rule on the conservation district use application (CDUA) or, bj
Sefault, Appelleerippellee Aawali Electric Light. Company, Inc. (MELO! could
pot the lend to the use requected, See intra note 8. See alge Hawsis

2 ioc Rawat 257, 262, 75
Pela 160, Te (2005) [hereinafter galec] (explaaning that “efforts to meet the
statutory deadline were frustrated By incidental problens”).

 

 

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a

on Novenber 9, 1994, the court issued an order
invalidating BLNR’s votes” and renanding CDUA HA-487A back to
BINA (the 1994 remand order). In the 1994 remand order, the
court concluded that “[i]n this instance, in the absence of
relevant statute or rule, the BLNR is ‘required by law’ to hold
contested case hearing upon these third party requests provided
chat Waimana, Cooper, and Ratliff have constitutionally protected
interests which entitle them to a contested case hearing by
constitutional due process{.J” The court then determined that
“(bly failing to provide Cooper and Ratliff with a contested case
hearing, the BNR denied these parties their constitutional right
to due process, and, consequently, they were prejudiced.” But as
to Waimana, the court rendered the following conclusions of law:

5) although Waimana argues it is 2 native Hawaiian
LLMMCG%neley whose economic interests, environmental
SEEESHS "stg interests in ceded lane are at stake and
TENET therefore, it has conseitationally protected property
Jeeerests or" the gourt concludes otherwise; 28 an entity
Aether phyaiceiiy loceted near the site of HELCO's proposed
Rkpansich sor whose purpose is to protect environmental oF
Hovelian ineerests, Haimaia's interest in contesting the
teen hee, ars te be cusely economia, an interest wnich the
SER SESSLSS in reconmanding Wainana’s intervention in
the COUR process

fMeisens) is an eneray company. Tt has conducted

itidier end obtained & lease for development of 3

 

 

  

 

As this court related in HELCO,

Iola Novenber 3, 1994, the court invalidated the votes of
tft'postd end held that! 1) because the Board failed to
Meinet our votes to either approve or to reject HELCO's
elation, the Beard tock ne “action” on the pplication
HE'a; ie would be a denial of procedural due process to
Stow sbLco te automatically expand the Kesnole generating
ation while there were requests for contested cases still
Sehding thet the Beara hag not acted upon. The court then
Peetndid the case and ordered the Eoard to hold a contested
Eerelearing within #9 days, of as extended by the Board.

 

 

102 Wawas't at 263, 75 P.3d at 166.
‘+**E0R PUBLICATION***

generator station at an alternative site, Kawaihae,
fhat nay be superior to the Keahole site. Expansion
Of the Keahole generating station may suppress
evelopment of [Waimana’s) project.

 

 

6
sais hearing Dectuse its econopie interest cous aot

{i Therefore, tne Zact that the BLWR eamitted Wainana as a
party to the case and granted 1¢ 9 contested case hearing
‘Gia not constitute 2 determination that (Waimana) hada
Property interest protectable under the Fourteenth

fnendinent|
)
Teor By Heiman ta
a seals Revises
‘ipa ection Sasieial i.

(Emphases added.) The court further concluded that

[a)itnough Cooper and RatLi£t are designated as Appellees in
this Appeal, their interests are aligned with Appellant
fisimana in contesting the agency's actions... {andy thus,
UJe order to avoid disnisesl of Cooper’ s and ahi’ s
{nterests due to [laimana’s) dismissal from this action, the
Court confers standing on Cooper ana Ratliff as “de
Appellants,” consicering that they are pro se parties ano
that there would appeer to be little or no prejudice to the
other parties by granting then such status]

 

 

Waimana did not appeal the 1994 remand order; it did
not challenge the court’s determination that it lacked standing.
On remand to BLNR, however, Waimana was made a party to the
contested case by stipulation among all of the parties. HELCO,
102 Hawai'i at 262, 75 P.3d at 165. The 1994 remand order was
incorporated in a December 5, 1997 final judgment, which stated

as follows:

Dadgnent is entered in favor of Appellant Waimans
Enterprises, inc. and Appelives Peggy Ratliff and Mani
Cooper and against Appellees Departrent of Land and Natural
Resources, Soard of Land and Natural Resources and Hawaii
Electric Company, Ine., renanding the Conservation District
Use Application HR-#87A to the Board of Lang and Neural
Resources for further hearing consistent with the [c]oure’ s
November 9, 1984 Orger.

‘Sudghent is entered nunc pro tunc to Novenber 9, 1994
and is limited to tne disposition of issues before the
Telourt a8 of Novenber 9, 1994

 

 

 

 
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a

Following the contested case hearing that was held over
a five-day period in November 1995, the hearing officer
reconmended that the CDUA be denied. Id, BLNR denied CDUA HA-
487A based on a three-to-two vote. Id. at 264, 75 P.3d at 167.
on May 17, 1996, HELCO appealed to the court. Id. On May 22,
1996, Cooper, Ratliff, and Waimana filed separate notices of
appeal. Id. “On January 2, 1997, the court ruled that the
failure to deny the application by four votes constituted non-
action on the part of the Board and, by operation of HRS § 183-
41, HELCO could put the Keahole conservation land to use as
requested in the application[.1"" Id.
In

In tandem with litigation over what then became CDUP
(conservation district use permit) HA-487A, Appellant-Appellee
Keahole Defense Coalition (KDC) maintained a separate action,
filed in the court on February 5, 1997, against the Department of
Health (DOH), BLNR, and HELCO. This action, docketed as Civ. No.
97-00017K, sought to compel enforcement of various environmental

regulations on HELCO’s expansion project.

  

+ on guy 8, 2003, thie court affirmed the court's determination
that HELCO could put the land to the Use requested in the CDUA because BLNR

lea to take “action” within the statuter:ly required time period. HELCO,
102 Hawal's at 261, 78 P.3d at 164, This court held that “i]nsofar as a
hejority of the Board cid not aftimatively approve or disapprove of HELCO’s
application within the time established, . the Board failed to render a
SGecision’ 20 a2 to avoid the 1s0-day default mechanism of HRS $ 163-41" which
“oliows the applicant to inplesent the use requested in the application if the
Gepartnent’ “feria to give notice, hold a hearing, and render a decision.” Jd.
Sizes, 95 P.3a at 172 (brackets eng emphasis omitted)

    

 

 

 
‘+*+FOR PUBLICATION*#*

qn.
HELCO’s construction deadline under CDUP HA~487A
expired on April 26, 1999. On March 25, 2002, following an
evidentiary hearing in which HELCO, Appellee-Appellee Department
of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL), Cooper, Ratliff, KDC, and Waimans
participated,’ BLNR granted HELCO a time extension to complete
construction of improvements at the Keahole power station. The
new deadline under the CDUP was December 31, 2003. On April 6,
2002, KDC, Cooper, and Ratliff filed a notice of appeal to the
court, challenging BLNR’s grant of this time extension. This
appeal was docketed as Civ. No. 02-1-0068K. Waimana did not
appeal BLNR’s decision. Waimana was named as an appellee,
apparently because it participated in the hearing before BLNR.
on October 3, 2002, the court reversed SLNR’s decision,
finding that BLNR exceeded its statutory authority in granting
the extension. On November 1, 2002, HELCO filed its notice of

apps

 

1 to this court, challenging the court’s October 3, 2002

order, This secondary appeal was docketed as S.Ct. No, 25446.

 

Final Judgment by the court relating to the October 3, 2002 order
was entezed on Novenber 7, 2002.

While HELCO’s appeal in S.Ct. No. 25446 concerning the
time extension was pending before this court, the court granted

HELCO’s motion to compel alternative dispute resolution in Civ.

 

+ According to HELCO, the contested case hearing for the extension

request was docketed a2 "DLNR Contested Case Hearing No. O1-O3-HA,""

 
**#POR PUBLICATION*#*
eee
No. 97-00017K. On May 15, 2003, the court ordered KDC, HELCO,

DOH, BLNR, and DLNR “to mediate the legal disputes involving the
expansion of the Keahole power plant.” Although Waimane was
not @ party to Civ. No. 97-00017K, counsel for HELCO contacted
counsel for Waimana by letter dated April 26, 2003, to determine
ieimana’s position in light of the order to mediate. On

April 28, 2003, counsel for HELCO also wrote to Albert S.N. Hee
(Hee), President of Waimana, to docunent the particulars of
conversation. That letter stated that Hee “expressed great doubt
that HELCO would be successful in negotiations with DHHL as long

as HELCO’s objective remained to finish construction at Keahole”

 

and that “Hee indicated [he] view[ed] these settlement efforts as
a waste of time.” Counsel for HELCO informed Waimana by letter
that HELCO would continue negotiating with the other parties and

 

® — Befor to the order compelling mediation, the Center for
Alternative Dispute Resolution contacted Appel iee-Appellant Wainana
Enterprises, Inc. (Wainana) to facilitate mediation regerding the HELCO
Speci, Sc. No, 21369, (consolidating 8.Ce. Nos, 21263 and 21422 under $.ct
Ner'2i566).. By letter dated February 28, 2003, Albert S.N. Hee, President of
Wainana, inforsed the Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution as follow

 

 

 

Waimans welcomes and is willing to participate in any and
ail efforts to resclve the disputes now before the Suprene
Court provided any effort has s reasonable chance to

ab mit seed due

waeel 2 Tt eh seal
Siprene Court tod

Wainana continues to be willing to participate provided we
Gre convinced that it ie not ¢ further waste of our
Fesources,, Noimana firmly believes there is a solution
Evailoble outside of the judicial systen. However, Waimana
Goes not believe st is possible to find that solution if one
Of the parties drives the proce:

 

 

  

(Baphasis added. 1
‘+##FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

would keep Waimana’s “perspective in mind." Waimana did not
respond.

KOC, Cooper, Ratliff, HELCO, DOH, BLNR, DINK, and
DAHL" began several months of settlement discussions with the
assistance of a court appointed mediator. They eventually
reached 2 “settlement in principle” in Civil No. 97-00017K.
Waimana did not participate in the settlement negotiations. As
part of the settlement, the parties agreed to 2 vacatur of the
court’s Novenber 7, 2002 final judgnent reversing BLNA’s decision
to extend the construction deadline to Decenber 31, 2003 in Civil
No. 02-1-0068K, which was on appeal as S. Ct. No. 25446. On
Septenber 17, 2003, the mediator notified Waimana of an upcoming
status conference in Civil No. 02-1-0068K. On September 19,
2003, the court held a status conference with all parties,
including Waimana, and on September 29, 2003, the court expressed
its “inclination” to vacate the Novenber 7, 2002 judgment
reversing BLUR’s decision to grant the time extension under CDUP
HA-487A in Civil No, 02-1-0068K, which was on appeal as S.Ct. No.
25446. In light of the court’s “inclination,” on October 14,
2003, this court remanded the appeal in S.Ct. No, 25446 to allow

the court to consider the motion to vacate its November 7, 2002

%—ppperiee-Appeliee Department of Hawaiian Hone Lands (DHKL)
participated in the mediation although it was not & party to Civ. No. 97=
booix

10
‘s+#FOR PUBLICATION**++
——_—
judgment.”

upon remand, on October 17, 2003, KDC, Ratliff, Cooper,
‘and DHHL moved to vacate the October 3, 2002 order and November
7, 2002 judgment pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure
(uRcr) Rule 60(b). HELCO, BLNR, and DINR filed joinders to this
motion. Waimana filed a memorandum in opposition. On Novenber
12, 2003, the court vacated its October 3, 2002 order and
Novenber 7, 2002 final judgment (2003 vacatur order). In the
2003 vacatur order, the court rendered the following relevant

findings of fact (findings) and conclusions of law (conclusions):

 

this court's October 14, 2003 order recognized thet
42) during the pendency of this apoeal S.Ct. No, 2540611.
ie eens relat tered the
batt in ce
FZ eties he 2 tel ot of
a ee ard nen at

fuoaaiy and (6) the circuit court indicated ite Inclination
sree a [ewal't Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP)] Rule
60(B) motion if this court renands the matter to the circuit
If IS’ HERESY ORDERED that

2, Pursuant to Life of the Land vy Acivaahi, 57 Haw.
243, 553 pida det (1976), the Botion for Fenand and stay of
briefing is granted...

2 ie este ot
cixcuit court shalt enter ite order on the HACE Alle e0(b
Botion To vacate the order and iudanent at iasve ip Chis
sibel

4.” Indesteer, Appellant [iHEUCO1) shall take the
nscomaiy steps to dismiss this amseal. TF the circoit
BESEEabes not enter the erder graneing the HACE Rule 60(b)
Rotion within the time provides, [#ELCO) shall file its
reply brief on January 9, 2006

 

added.)

 

n
‘+**F0R PUBLICATION***

 

PINOINGS OF FACT

bioceedina are substantially the samt as the oarties
[ntrelsted proceedings involving the Reahole expeneicn
brotest.

finite th
Concerns with r

settlement will resolve KDC and DHL’ ©
pect to the Keahole expansion

 

 

project, of grester sionificance is the fact that the

tect

Scrus in the public intersat asa shales “The
Of the settienent is to secure, By sgreement, oF
protections for the public interest than could be
Expected to be inposed solely by the Land Use
Commission through ite consideration of a petition to
Spezone” the Land at issve from Conservation to Urban.
The additional significant protections provided by the
Settlement will mitigate against the impact of the
project in terme of sir and noise polluvion, potable
Mater, and aesthetic concerns, in addition, HELCO has
fqreed to provide Dill with fresh water, and to assist
Di ine Solar water-heating progren for its housing
project in the eres. HELCO nes further agreed to
Support KDc's request to participate in the Public
Gebiities commission rate base docket.” All of these
he-eubiic
Pursuant to the settlenent, HELCO hes agreed to
petition the Land Use Comission, State of Hawaii, to
Ghend the existing and use district boundary for’ the
Jan on which the Keahole project sits from the
Conservation District te the Crban district. In
addition, #ELC0 ha agreed to petition the County of
Hawail eo change the General Plan designation and
County soning distract from ite current designation
and district to a designation and district appropriate
for industrial activity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

all interested parties additional omortunicies t2
Srovide inpot on the Keshole expansion protest
he parties have also sarees

Sounty laws and requlations:
fainans ie a Hawai “Corporation whose primary
Eurpose tu to endeae in the aenevstion of electricity,

 

Iainana’s] interest in the Keahole expanaion is
gurely sconsnie, ss ir ae conducted studies and

‘sbtained a lease for develomment of a cenerator
Station st an aitersative cite, Tanaihae. that may be

‘uberior to the Keahcle site. Expansion of che
Keanole dite nay sumerece devaleneent of” Wpinane’
aise
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

‘CONCLUSIONS OF LAM
This (clourt concluded that {Waimana) lacks standing
in ite Geder Sensnding HeLeO's COUR back to (BLNE

Siz No, s4-059k. nie (olosrt held that iainanat
‘Geeinet have a due process right tos contested case:
Deatine because its econonic interests do not,

he holding stiiT

 

this creceeding.—“t ‘unt cons ludes
Even sssaning atauenao, that (Wainana] has standing,
St’has not suffered any constitutional prejudice, 3
its due process rights have not been denied,

issmane! hada ful and fair opgortunity £0
participate inthe sadiation with all of che parsies,
Et repestediy ceclined: the settlement agreement is,
pot biding on (Waieanal and (Waimanal has every

Sbecetusity to pursue lets] remedies, 4?-anv. in the

‘spurts.
REE Rie 60(b) provides that
‘On motion and upen such terms as are just, the

 

 

court may relieve a party... « from a final
Sudgnent, order, or proceeding for the following
Feasons se Tess no Longer

equitable that the judgnent should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason
Justifying relief trom the operation of
judgment
This {oloust does not vacate ite Orders Lightly. A
aupioptiate 20 accomplish iuatice.”
Goer haw App. él, G42 P2096. (1982)-
Rule 60(b) “nay be utilized to seek the vacation of a
Sudgnent on the ground that the case has been settled
0 that it would not be equitable to have i
effect. so
This [elourt finds that the parties to this agency
appeal, pursuant to this [eleurt’s order compelling
Redistion in the main enforcenent action, Civ. No. 97-
O1K, have worked diligently to resolve thelr
Gifterences regarding the Keahole expansion project,
and the agency appelsants have rescinded their
Sbjections to the completion of the project. AS such,
there is no present case of controversy, the issues in
this agency sppesl are now moot, and itis no longer’

Hive prospective application.
 sdsition, the [elosrt finde that vacating the

 

 

‘remain sn)

 

 
4++FOR PUBLICATION*+*

 

protection reduced noise mitication("1 and reduced
igual impact, aa well as water and solar enezay

achieved:
(Emphases added.) On November 28, 2003, the court entered its

first amended final judgment in favor of HELCO, BLNR, DINE, KDC,
Ratliff, Cooper, and DHHL, and against Waimana. Waimana filed
its notice of appeal fron the first amended final judgment on
December 26, 2003. On January 13, 2004, this court granted
HELCO's motion to dismiss its appeal in $.Ct. No. 25446.

Ww.

In this appeal, S.Ct. No. 26305, Waimana challenges the
court's November 12, 2003 vacatur of the Novenber 7, 2002 final
Judgment as well as what it refers to as the court's “sua sponte”
determination that Waimana “lacked standing to oppose the basis
for the vacatur.” Waimana argues that (1) yacatur of the
underlying decision violated its due process and equal protection

rights, (2) yacatur of the underlying decision was not in the

 

public interest, (3) State appellees breached the public trust,

(4) the court lacked authority to determine Waimana’s standing,
and (5) the court erred in holding that Waimana lacked standing
in Civ. No. 02-1-0068K (KDC, Cooper, and Ratliff’s appeal to the

court concerning the extension of time).

%_Atthough the court stated the settlenent will result in “reduced
noise mitigation,” finding of fact [finding] § states in relevant part that
S[e}he aaditional significant protections provides by the settienent will
mitigate against the impact of the project in terms of air and noise
Pollution.” This finding makes clear that the settlement will reduce noise
Pollution, not reduce efforts to mitigate nolse pollution

 

“4
***FOR PUBLICATION®**
a
Four answering briefs have been filed -- one by KDC,

Ratliff, and Cooper," and the remaining three by HELCO," BLNR,’*
‘and DHL.” Essentially, the appellees maintain that (1) Waimana
lacked standing to oppose the motion to vacate, (2) Waimana was
precluded from relitigating the issue of standing to appeal
pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel,
(3) Waimena waived its standing argument by not appealing the
1994 remand order which determined Waimana lacked standing to
challenge COUR HA-487A, (4) Waimana does not have a legitimate

due process interest and, in any event, it received substantial

“specifically, HOC, RAtLLEL, and Cooper assert that (1) “the

[court} did noe deny ainana dve process," (2) “the [court] did not deny,
ASGEED SoG. Geotedetens” (3) "Weimane lacked standing,” (4) “the (court) had
TRaGtnority fovdetermine Weimana’s standing below,” (5) “vacatur 3s in the
ree teenererdats* 16) sehe vacetur and settlement agreement Ls the coly
PebLiie Dy unich the public's interest could be and can be vindicated, ”
ii Seecatur doug not jeopardize any judicial interest for the finality of
JLgmeness:(g)"ehe state agencies nove not breached their trust or other
TESRUESEy Seligations, ang. {9). "(Hawai Administrative Rules (HAR) Title
IN Ghepter § and Chapter 343, HRS do not apply.”

 

 

 

 

% tn particular, HELCO argues that (2) "[Maimana] lacks standing to
bring this appesl, and it must be dismissed for lack of appellate
pritdaietion © (2) “although [Melnana) has no legitinate due process interest
ELM prsceealng, it received substantial due process before the (court) in
Enneceion with the motion to vacate,” (3) “the [court's] finding that, the
ESECIESERe Sas vacstur was in the public interest was amply supported by the
feuSruse not “clearly erroneous’ and must be affirmed,” and (4) “the
iSjeate appelices acted properly and responsibly with respect to the
Settlesent, ang dia net “breach the public trust.’*

 

 

 

 

 

“specifically, BNR argues that (1) “(Waimana] lacks standing to
ing this appeal,” (2) tthe vacatur of the order reversing (BLiR’s) decision
i dot e vioistion of (Waimane’s] sue process or equal protection rights,”
TEE TS) Sune isteace eppetices did not breach their public trust duties by
porticipating ia the settlement agreement.

 

 

 

tn des answering brief, DHKL maintains that (1) "{[Waimana” lacks
standing to appeal the [court's] first amended final judgment," (2) “the
court] correctly found no due process violation," and (3) "vague and
Ucoubbarees references to the public trust doctrine do not provide a besis to
over turn ehe (court's) decisien.”

1s
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*
due process before the court on the motion to vacate, (5) the

court's finding that the settlenent and vacatur was in the public
interest was amply supported by the record, and (6) State
appellees did not breach the public trust.

In reply, Waimana maintains that (1) “[Waimana’s]
standing is not determined by the {court’s] nunc pro tune ruling

in an unrelated civil action,” (2) “the standing issue was not

timely raised below,” (3) “[Waimana] was an aggrieved party,”
(4) “[Waimana] did not receive due process in Civil No. 02-1-
068K,” (5) there is a “need for precedence” to assist future

litigants, and (g) “the public interest is not best served where
a lower court approves a settlement implicating state and federal
rights without first consulting the Keahole community as a
whole.” Waimana requests that this court reverse the yacatur and
reinstate the proceedings in S.Ct. No. 25446 (which arose from
Civ. No. 02-1-0068K) for final adjudication.

v.

The issue of standing implicates this court’s
jurisdiction, and, therefore, must be addressed first. Because
standing is a jurisdictional issue that may be addressed at any
stage of a case, an appellate court has jurisdiction to resolve
questions regarding standing, even if that determination

ultimately precludes jurisdiction over the merits." United Pub,

“tn Ste reply brief Wainana argues that its standing in civil No.
02-1-0068K and S.Ct. Ro, 25446 was not challenged by the parties or the court
Weimena appears to argue thet the appellees are estopped “from now teking ©

(cotinved.)

16
‘+##FOR PUBLICATION***
oe

Workers, Local 646 v. Broun, 80 Hawai'i 376, 379, 910 P.2d 147,
150 (App. 1996) ("[BJecause standing is a jurisdictional issue

that needs to be addressed at any stage of the case, . . . ve
have jurisdiction here on appeal, not of the merits, but for the
purpose of correcting an error in jurisdiction.” (Internal
quotation marks and citations omitted.)).

“Generally, the requirements of standing to appeal are:

(1) the person must first have been a party to the action;

(2) the person seekina modification of the order or iudament must
have had standing to oppose it in the trial courts and (3) such

 

person must be. . . ‘one who is affected or prejudiced by the
appealable order.'” Kapc'o v. Watson, @7 Hawai'i 91, 95, 952 P.2d
379, 383 (1998) (quoting Waikiki Malia Hotel, Inc. v. Kinkai
Prope, Ltd. P’ahip, 75 Haw. 370, 393, 862 P.2d 1048, 1061 (1993)
(emphasis added), In its 2003 vacatur order, the court ruled
that Waimana did not have standing to oppose the motion to vacate
inasmuch as the court Kad previously ruled in the 1994 remand

order that (1) Waimana did not have a due process right entitling

 

contin)
position ries Ps inconsistent with the one they have token from the filing of
EVI No. 0291-0066" and vp to and including October 2003." However, es
Gadlceted above, tne question of standing implicates jurisdiction which may be
SGireased by a court at any tine, regerdiess of any position teken By any
party. sscount bazaat 18 Hae
Bop. é3s, 640, Toe F.22 1515, 1519 (1885) (stating thet “[t}he question of
Uhetner {a plaineifi nas standing to bring the action or to appeal ite
SiiniSsal may be raises sus sponte by the court having jurisdiction over the
Sate" and noting nat "(tie Judiciary’s ability to control its caseloed by
EoGuising plaingiees and appellants to have standing does not depend on the
SSfLiy del desire of defendante and appellees to notice and reise the
SELLE" hecstainaly, Maimana’a judicial estoppel argument is not persuasive.

 

 

 

7
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION*#*

it to a contested case hearing on CDUA HA~487A and (2) Waimana
never appealed that holding. ‘These determinations negate the
second prong of the Kepo's test for standing to appeal. Thus, if
we agree with the court that Waimana lacked standing to challenge
the motion to vacate, Waimana would also lack standing to appeal
here, thereby divesting this court of jurisdiction to entertain
Waimana’s remaining arguments.

By way of review, the 1994 remand order resolved
Waimana’s appeal concerning BLNR’s failure to hold a contested
case hearing before ruling upon CDUA HA-487A. The court remanded
the CDUA for BLNR to hold a contested case hearing as requested
by Ratliff and Cooper, but not as requested by Waimana. As
mentioned before, with respect to Waimana, the court ruled, in
conclusion no. 4, that “Waimana [did] not have a due process
right to a contested case hearing because its economic interest
[dig] not constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of the due
process clauses of the federal and state constitutions.” In
conclusion no. 8, the court determined that by “[nJot having a
right to a contested case hearing by statute, rule or by the

constitution, Waimana lack(ed) standing to file [the appeal]

 

pursuant to HRS Section 91-14(a)[.

% es § s1-24(a)_ (1983) provides, in relevant part, that “(any
person aggrieved by a final decision and ofder in s contested case or by 2
Brelininary roling of the nature that deferral of review pending entry of
EGbsequent final decision would deprive appellant of adequate relie! is
entitied to judicial review therest under this chapteri.]"

 

18
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

‘As the court noted in the 2003 vacatur order, Waimana
never challenged conclusion nos. 4 and 8. Hence, Waimana’s
failure to appeal the 1994 remand order's issue of standing
raises doubt as to its ability to contest the court’s conclusions
here.

vr.

‘An apparent waiver of the standing argument
notwithstanding, Waimana was precluded from opposing the motion
to vacate inasmuch as it was collaterally estopped from
relitigating the issue of its standing to challenge decisions
regarding CDUA HA~487A. This court has recognized that
collateral estoppel is “an aspect of res judicata.” Dorrance v.
Les, 90 Hawai'i 143, 148, 976 P.2d 904, 909 (1999) (quoting
Eovtik v. Chandler, 88 Hawai'i 307, 314-15, 966 P.2d 619, 626-27
(1998). “(Bes judicata and collateral estoppel . . . share the
common goals of preventing inconsistent results, preventing a
multiplicity of suits, and promoting finality and judicial
economy.” Id, at 148-49, 976 P.2d at 909-10. Collateral
estoppel, or issue preclusion, “applies to a subsequent suit
between the parties or their privies on a different cause of
action and prevents the parties or their privies from

relitigating any issue that was actually litigated and finally

* __ueLco and OHHL argue that Waimana’s failure to appeal the 199¢
remand order constituted 4 waiver of the right fo challenge the court’
Cenelusion that Waimans lacked standing

9
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

decided in the earlier action.” Id. at 148, 976 8.20 at 909
(emphases in original).

[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel bars
relstagation of an istue where: (1) the issue decided in
the pricr adjudication is identical to the one presented in
the section in questions (2) there es final judgment on the
merits; (3) the Lesue decided in the prior adjudication was
essential and (4) the party against
‘om col La sted was a party or in
privity with 2 party to the prior adjudication.

Id, at 149, 976 P.2d at 910; Citizens for the Prot, of the W.

Kohala Coastline v. County of Hawai'i, 91 Hawai'i 94, 102, 979
P.2d 1120, 1128 (1999) [hereinafter, Citizens}. The fourth prong

 

 

 

of the collateral estoppel test is easily met here, Waimana, the
party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted, was 2
party, indeed the appellant, to the prior adjudication that
resulted in the 1994 remand order. The remaining three prongs
require greater analysis.

The first prong of the collateral estoppel test
necessitates @ comparison of the issue decided in the prior
adjudication with the issue presented in the action in question.
‘This prong is satisfied only where both issues are “identical.”
The standing issue resolved in the 1994 renand order was whether
Waimana had standing to challenge BLNR’s vote on COUA HA-487A
absent a contested case hearing. The standing issue presented
here is whether Waimana had standing to challenge the motion to
vacate the order reversing BLNR’s decision to grant HELCO an
extension of time under COUP HA-4B7A. Although the first appeal

addressed whether the CDUA could be approved at all and the

20
‘*#*POR PUBLICATION***
ee

second addressed one of the conditions of the CDUA, the standing
issues pose the same question -- whether Weimana has stending to
challenge CDUA HA-487R. Additionally, the standing issues were
raised in HRS § 91-14 agency appeals, which further supports 2
finding of identicalness. Gf, Citizens, 91 Hawai'i at 102, 979
P.2d at 1128 (holding that “the issue of standing to appeal an
agency decision under HRS § 91-14, decided in [a] prior agency
appeal, is not ‘identical’ to. . . [the issue of . . . standing
to pursue an action for declaratory relief under HRS § 632-1").
Hence, the question of standing resolved in the 1994 remand order
land the question of standing presented by the 2003 motion to
vacate were “identical,” satisfying the first prong of the
collateral estoppel test.

As to the second prong, if the party against whom
collateral estoppel is being asserted was given “the opportunity
to fully” litigate the issue, “the final judgment from that
proceeding [1s deemed to have been] ‘on the merits./” Dorrance,
00 Hawai'i at 150, 976 P.2d at 911 ("Where a party, . . . had the
opportunity to fully defend herself against claims of negligent
driving -- the same issue here -- the final judgment from that
proceeding was ‘on the merits.'"). As previously mentioned,
Wainana appealed to the court in Civ. No, 94-123K, challenging
BLNR's decision to hold a vote on CDUA HA~487A before completing

a contested case hearing.

2
‘s**FOR PUBLICATION*+*

sss
As the appellant before the court, Waimana filed briefs

 

and participated in the October 31, 1994 oral argument on the
matter, Finding no. 20 of the 1994 remand order, which describes
Waimana, references Waimana’s opening brief and an affidavit by
its counsel. Conclusion no. $ of the 1994 remand order also
cites to Waimana’s reply brief. These references to Waimana’s
briefs indicate that the court considered Waimana’s arguments to
render its 1994 decision on standing. Thus, not only did Waimana
have ample opportunity to assert its bases for standing, but the
court “heard” its arguments. Accordingly, the December 5, 1997
final Judgment flowing from the 1994 remand order denying
standing was “on the merits.”

Finally, the third prong of the collateral estoppel
test inquires as to whether the issue decided in the prior
adjudication was “essential” to the final judgment. In Dorgance,
this court held that the issue of negligence was “essential to
the earlier judgment |] inasmuch as it established liability for
[the plaintiff's] injuries.” 90 Hawai" at 150, 976 P.2d at 911
(emphasis added). Likewise here, the issue of Waimana’s standing
to contest CDUA HA-487 was “essential” to the Decenber 5, 1997
final judgment of remand. By determining Waimana did not have
standing in the 1994 remand order, the court, in order to avoid
dismissal of Cooper's and Ratliff’s interests “due to [Waimana’s]
dismissal from [the] action, . . . confer[red] standing on Cooper

and Ratliff as ‘de facto Appellants{.]'" This designation, in

2
‘++#POR PUBLICATION*#*
ee
turn, allowed the court to remand CDUA HA-487A for a contested

case hearing to correct BLNR's denial of Cooper's and Ratliff’s

constitutional due process rights. Hence, the underlying

 

determination that Waimana lacked standing was “essential!
inasmuch as it ultimately led to the determination that Cooper
and Ratliff were entitled to 2 contested case hearing.

Therefore, all four prongs of the Dorrance test being satisfied,
iaimana was collaterally estopped from relitigating the standing
issue.

BLNR observes that if Waimana “does not have standing
to contest HELCO’s underlying CDUA, it does not have standing to
appeal a decision of the Board relating to one of the conditions
of the same COUR.” We believe BINR’s contention is correct. See
Kepo's, 87 Hawai'i at 95, 952 P.2d at 383 (holding that in order
to have standing to appeal, “the person seeking modification of
the order or judgment must have had standing to oppose it in the
trial court"), Because Waimana does not satisfy the second
requirement of Kepo'o, it lacks standing to appeal. Accordingly,
the court was correct to conclude that Wainana did not have
standing to challenge the 2003 motion to vacate “asa matter of
Law." (Emphases added.)

vir.

‘Turning to Waimana’s specific arguments with regard to

standing, Waimana relies on the language of the Decenber 5, 1997

judgment which states, “Judgment is entered nunc pro tune to

2
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION*#*

November 9, 1994 and is limited to the disposition of issues
before the [cJourt as of November 9, 1994.” Waimana argues that
“the 1994 (rJemand (ojrder, even if correct, was limited ‘to the
disposition of issues before the (clourt as of Novenber 9,
1994[.1]" Tt reasons that

[t]he cases have consistently emphasized that the poner of

courts to enter judgments qune oxo tune is limited to giving

ite judgnents proper getreactive effect.» , 1 it 4s clear

that reliance bpon the 1994 [zlenand order in'thie matter

was elininated by the Decenber [5], 1997 Judgnene in Civil

io. $4-125K. These ie absolutely ho aushority supeorting

Seger in Civil non goet = 00eee
(Citations omitted.) (Some emphases in original and some added.)

A “nunc pro tune order relates back to the original

date of the matter it affects.” Poe v. Hawai'i Labor Relations
98 Hawai'i 416, 423, 49 P.34 382, 389 (2002) (Acoba, J.,

 

dissenting).

 

The term pune pro tune signifies or means “now for then” or
that a thing is done now that shall have the same legal
force and effect as if done st the tine it ought te heve
been done.” The doctrine seems to apply to delays of the
court and not to premature actions of the partiva. Where
through no fault Gf the complaining party some ace which the
court must perform is not done at the tine it ought to be
Gone, the court, in the interest of justice, may and should
presently do or perform that act ss Of the date it should
Rave been done

 

 

 

Makainai v. Lalakea, 24 Haw. $18, $22 (1918) (citation omitted).
Hence, the court's judgment * tune” indicates that the

three-year lapse between the 1994 remand order and the December
5, 1997 judgment was not due to fault of the parties. The
inclusion of the “pune pro tunc” language had the effect of

making the judgment relate back to November 9, 1994, as if the
‘++*FOR PUBLICATION***
a
judgment had been rendered on that date. The nunc pro tune

judgment did not, as Waimana contends, eliminate future reliance
on the 1994 remand order. Indeed, none of the cases cited by
iaimana support its position that judgments nunc pro tune have
only “retroactive effect." As HELCO observes, adopting
Weimana’'s position “would result in the anomalous situation of
having a court conform a judgnent or order to ‘speak the truth’
yet being unable to prospectively enforce that very same order or
judgment."
Additionally, the language in the judgment “Limit [ing]

|. the disposition of issues before the [c]ourt as of
jlovenber 9, 1994” was apparently included to specify that
Judgnent was final as to the issues resolved in the 1994 remand
order only, given the existence of subsequent issues to be
determined on remand, Inasmuch as Waimana’s standing was one of
the issues so resolved in the 1994 remand order, that issue was
subject to the December 5, 1997 final judgment and, as discussed

supra, could not be relitigated.

 

oinen:
City ¢ county of ensiuly vy Castans, 20 flaw, 1 (1927), ‘and Makainad, supra.
SEGRE Sha Ghetanc aia not sddress judgnents or’ orders uns

AO*ite Getane chat’ Gagtana’s discussion on amenanents of judgment “for the
Barpose of making the Fecerd speak the truth” is analogous, that opinion did
PeePese prospective applicetion of such amendments. 30 Haw. at 6. Finsily,
Bebgits’saseesses the standard for entering orders pune Bro tunc, sae 24 Naw,
Makplnet Mining thee {blefore one hae the right to invoke the exercise of
Zhs power it should be made to appear affirmatively that the delay was
Setastoned either by the court or the opposite party and not by the
SeaTEhine pareyti"), but it cid not cireunscribe prospective application of
Sete Sider’ Macduzalhgly, these ceses do not support Meimana’ s contention
that, judgrents and orders gnc pro tune are linited to retroactive
application.

cites to Hong v. Wong, 79 Hawai'i 26, 897 P.2d 953 (1995),

 

2s
‘+**FOR PUBLICATION***
Waimana also contends that the court lacked authority

to determine the issue of its standing, arguing that “[i]t is
plain on its face that [this court's October 14, 2003] order of
remand [in $.Ct. No. 25446] was limited in scope and that the
trial court exceeded its authority by addressing the nevly-raised
stending issue” in its 2003 yacatur order. To reiterate, this
court’s October 14, 2003 order of remand stated, in pertinent
part, that “[w)ithin sixty days from the date of this order, the
circuit court shall enter its order on the HRCP Rule 60(b) motion
to vacate the [October 3, 2002) order and [Novenber 7, 2002]
judgment at issue in this appeal.” Upon remand, KOC, Retliff,
Cooper, and DHKL filed a motion to vacate the October 3, 2002
order reversing BLNR’s March 25, 2002 decision and the Novenber

2002 final judgment on appeal. HELCO, BLNR, and DLNR filed

 

Joinders to the motion. Waimana then filed a memorandum in
opposition to the motion to vacate and joinder. Waimana also
participated in the November 10, 2003 oral argument on the

motion.

 

Given that Waimana was contesting the motion to vacat

the court was compelled to address Waimana’s position in order to

 

comply with this court's October 14, 2003 order of remand for the
court to consider vacatur under HRCP Rule 60(b). Inasmuch as a
court may assess standing, a jurisdictional question, at any

stage of a case, see Gustetter v, City & County of Honolulu, 44

Haw. 484, 490, 354 P.2d 956, 959 (1960) (stating that “(t]he

6
+*4FOR PUBLICATION*#*
a

question of jurisdiction 1s always open and can be raised at any
tine” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), the court
had the prerogative to address that issue in order to reach its
determination on the motion to vacate. Contrary to Waimana’s
assertion, the court, then, did not “exceed[] its authority” in
addressing Waimana’s standing.

Waimana’s final argument with regard to the standing
Assue is that this court “must look to [Waimana’s] standing as it
existed at the time of the vacatur, and during the tine in which
[Waimana] was a named party to both Civil No. 02-1-0068K and
S.Ct. No. 25446.” (Emphasis in original.) Waimana contends that
s{p]etween 1994 and 1995, [it] negotiated an agreement with DHHL
to provide telecommunication services to ail DHL properties
throughout the State," including a 153-acre parcel adjacent to
the Keahole power plant site. As such, argues Waimana,

(elhe 1994 [rJenand (olrder was filed before [Waimana) was
Granted the exclusive License. Therefore, in Civil No. 02-
$iSgeex, which was filed spproximately seven (7) yeors after
Twolmens) was granted the License, the trial court was faced
iuthvestirely different circumstances, both factually end
Teganly.

 

According to Waimana, “[t]he court, by relying on the 1994
[rlenand [olrder, failed to address the standing issue on the
appropriate merits.

Ae previously mentioned, in conclusion no. 2 of the
Novenber 12, 2003 vacatur order, the court resolved that its
earlier determination in the 1994 remand order was dispositive of

the standing issue. Consistent with the first prong of the

2”
‘+##F0R PUBLICATION***

standing test in Access ine y,
Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425, 431, 903 P.2d 1246, 1252 (1995)

[nereinafter, BASH),“* conclusion no. 2 stated:

is does not nave 2 us siant es

 

‘Slausss of the federal and state constitutions. (Wsinens)
RaMSier appeated thet holdings therefore the holding sti11
lange on the isave of whether [aimana] has standing to
participate in this proceeding. This. (cJourt concludes,

ERSt, ass matter of law, it does not.

 

(Emphasis added.)
Regarding the showing a party must make to assert a due
process right, it is well-settled that

[tine claim to a due process right to 2 hearing requires
that the particular anterest which the clainant seeks to

protect be property” within the meaning of the doe process
Eftuses of the Feaefal and stete constitutions. A “property

 

 

Gneerest®. ig not limited to "the traditional ‘right~
privilege’ distinction, . . . put also includes 2 benefit
rene peat fie arr me
ece-ihal_af abstract aeed or desize ior it, ie must have
pore tan ao eet emeectarionor ie femust, inereas

hve Home: Yn, 76 Hawai'i 128, 136, 870 P.2d

1272, 1280 (1994) (brackets and citations omitted) (emphasis

 

= Ip order to invoke the court's appellate jurisdiction under HRS $

oi-14, s would-be appellant must meet four requirenents:

[ELixat, the proceeding that regulted in the unfavorable
Agency action must nave been 2 "contested cage” hearing -~
ee a hearing that was 1) “required by lex” and 2)
Sctttalned the mrighes, duties, and privileges of specific

cties"; aecsad, the agency's actich mast represent 3
Efinal decision and order," or "a preliminary ruling” such
that deferral of review would deprive the claimant of
Ruequote relief; Ehisd, the claimant must have followed the
Spplicable agency rules ans, therefore, have been involved
Sib the contested casey and finally, the claimant's legal
interests must have been injured =~ iug,, the claimant aust
have stancing te appest

   

  

 

wb. Access Shoreline Hauesi v. neue ss Sn, 79 Hawai'i 425,
Gaty-G0s Peza i2te, 1752 (2995) (extation omitted) (emphases added) .

8
+**F0R PUBLICATION*#*
SSS

added). Waimana apparently maintains that the 1995 exclusive
telecommunications services license, executed after the 1994
remand order, constituted “property” which entitled Waimana to a
hearing, thereby giving rise to 2 basis for standing to contest
the motion to vacate.”

First, the exclusive license, though executed after the
199¢ remand order, is nonetheless the type of “economic” interest
rejected by the court as being insufficient for standing
purposes. To reiterate, in conclusion no. 5 of the 1994 remand
order, the court stated that “as an entity neither physically
located near the site of HELCO’s proposed expansion nor whose
purpose is to protect environmental or Hawaiian interests,
Wiaimana’s interest in contesting the CDUA appears to be purely
econonic|.)" In conclusion no. 6, the court determined that
vWaimana does not have a due process right to a contested case
hearing because its economic interest does not constitute
‘property’ within the meaning of the due process clauses of the
federal and state constitutions{.]”

These conclusions were based on the court's finding no.

20 that “Waimana ie a native Hawaiian entity, an economic

 

 Wesmana arguably waived the argument that it had a
ioe property interest in the exclusive license. The

Grclusive license wae execoted on May 9, 1995. The 199¢ remand order was not
SeGuced te finel Judgment until December 5, 1997. Hence, Wainana had two
Jears to raise ite doe process argument before the court entered judgment
Kjsin, Wainane never sppesied the court's conclusion in the 1994 remand order
That it lacked standing to appeal SLNR’s decision end, therefore, that order
remains final

  

 

 

»
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION®**
ee

conpetitor of HELCO, an independent power producer organized
under the laws of the State of Hawaii that is seeking @ purchase
power agreenent . . . and is a lessee of property owned by (DHEL]
in Kawaihae, S. Kohala, where it plans to develop a generator
station.” Waimana does not explain how its current exclusive

license is different from the economic interests delineated in

finding no. 20. Waimana concedes that it must demonstrate “a

legitimate claim of entitlement” to the license to have a
property interest in it requiring due process. However, the
entirety of Waimana’s argument to establish that entitlement is

as follows:

tn. 1994, Dik acquired @ 153-acre parcel adjoining
netcots Keahole site, ROR2758." (Waimaha] is a native
Hawaiian corporation, recognized by DHKL, whose business
Sedeavors inberentiy concern the welfare and betterment of
fotive Howeisans. Setwees 1994 and 1995,  (Raimana)
fegotiated an agreement with DHKL to provide
Eelecommonseation services to all DNML properties throughout
the State of Hawaii, ROA:29¢9-2957. Apperies DIL issued
the license pursuant to Section 207(c) (1) (A) [") of the
Rewaiion Homelands Commission Act and [Hawai’s
Raministrative Rules (WAR)] $10-4-21,(*] ROA:29¢9. In the

 

 

 

   
    

 

Section 207(c) (1)(A} of the Hawaiian Homelands Commission Act,
ld “Leases to Hawaiians, Licenses,” provides:

 

(c)(1) The departnent 1s authorized to grant Lice
a2 easements for reilroads, telephone lines,
Slectric power and Light Iines, gas mains, and
the like.” The depertnent ic aiso authorized to
Grant Licenses for lots within a district in
GEich lands are leased under the provisions of
this section, for:
(al “Churenes, hospitals, public schools, post
Gifices, and ether inprovenens for’ public
porposes,

 

 

 

 

 

° BAR § 10-6021

 

fee in relevant part:

(a) Applications for Licenses shall be made in writing

and shall state the applicant's status, type and location of

the land desired, proposed use of the lang, the services oF
(continued)

30
+#*POR PUBLICATION*#*

lease, DilHL ("Leasor”) stated that the Leasor “believes and
intends that the issuance of this Exclusive Benefit LICENSE
Mill algo fulfill the purpose of advancing the
Tehabiiitation ang the welfare of native Hawaiian
fen: 2950. This exclusive statutory license extends to the
Dai. 1e3-acre parcel which abuts the northeastern corner of
HELCO's present Keahole power plant site, Id, The adjacent
DHKL partel will be made availeble to (Wainana) to provide
teleconmunication services under Its lease. ROA: 2909.
[Waimana] has both a statutory entielesent and obligation to
Brovide these services to sll DML land, including Dilli-hele
St Keahol

 

 

 

 

  

Waimana’s argument consists largely of facts and fails to show

Further, Waimana’s conclusory

 

why it Se entitled to the licen:
statement that it has a “statutory entitlement” to the license is
both unsupported and incorrect. The plain language of the
provisions Waimana relies on in Section 207(c) (1) (A) of the
Hawaiian Homelands Commission Act and HAR § 10-4-21 does not
provide a “statutory entitlement” to any entity which may be
granted a license pursuant to them. In fact, these provisions
reveal that DHHL in actuality has discretion to grant such
Licenses as well as discretion to determine the terms and
conditions of any lease granted." It is well settled that when

2 governmental agency has discretion in granting @ license,

 

% continued)
Facilities to be provided and the term of the License,

(b} The department may negotiate the issuance
License. The department shall determine guch terms and
conditions of license 2s it deans prodent, reasonable, and
proper and in accordance with this chapter and subject to
he commission's approval”

  

 

 

* ie algo note that in its answering brief, DAHL argues that Maimana
Sis no different than any of the other vendors that DHL contracts with to
provide services to DHEL developments," This statenent, which Naimane does
fot dispute in ite reply brief, supports our conclusion that DHEL had
Sutherity and discretion to contract with Waimana

3
‘**#FOR PUBLICATION*#*

parties such as Waimana do not have a legitimate claim of
entitlement. ‘Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164
(9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “a statute that grants the
reviewing [governmental] body unfettered discretion to approve. or
deny [a state operating license] application does not create a
property right”); Alloceo Recycling, Ltd. v. Doherty, 378 F.
Supp. 24 348, 366 (8.D.N.¥. 2005) (concluding that “when an
agency has substantial discretion under state or local law to
grant or deny a license or permit, the plaintiff has no
Legitimate claim of entitlement”); Gabris v. New York City Taxi &
Limousine Comm'n, 2005 wi 2560384 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that
“ [defendant] is vested with broad discretion to grant or deny a
license application, which forecloses plaintiff{] from showing an
entitlenent to one”). Cf, Bd, of Recents of State colleces vw.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, $78 (1972) (opining that a non-tenured
teacher did not have a property interest or entitlement to re~
employment, and therefore could be terminated without due
process).

Waimana maintains that “as a native Hawaiian
corporation{, it] is given, by law, preferential treatment for
the use of Hawaiian home lands, over non-Hawaiian entities.” In

support of its assertion, Waimana relies on article XII, section

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4 and article XVI, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution, The

plain language of these constitutional provisions does not
directly support Waimana’s contention that it is deprived of 2
property right and Waimane has not directed this court to any
case law or statutory authority to support its interpretation of
these provisions. Second, Waimana’s articles of incorporation
state that the company’s primary purposes are to produce energy
land conduct financial transactions in furtherance of that
purpose, The articles do not mention any purpose to benefit
native Hawaiians. ‘Therefore, Waimana fails to establish that the
exclusive license constitutes “property” which would entitle it

to due process protection.

Article HIT, section 4 of the Hawai'i Constitution, entitled
public Trust,” provides that.

 

‘The lands granted to the State of Hawai by Section
bib) of the Admission Act and pursuant to Article XVI,
Section 1, of the State Constitution, excluding therefron
[Snds defined as “evailable ends” by Section 203 of the
Hawaisen Homes Comission Act, 1920, as amended, shall be
held by the State os a public trust for qative dawaitans ang
‘the general public.

(emphasis added.)

   

 

* article XVI, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution, entitled
“compliance with Trust,” provides that:

doy trust provisions which the Congress shail impose,
upon the’ adslssibn of this state, in respect of the Lands

potanted to the state by the Unived States or the proceeds
Ene Income therefron, shall be compiled with by appropriate
Segisietien. Such legislation shell noc diminish er Liait
the benefits of native dawaiiang under Section 4 of Article
Be

 

(emphasis saded.)
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Second, assuming the exclusive license constituted

“property” for due process purposes, Waimana does not establish
how its license would be affected by the Keshole expansion
project. In other words, Wainana does not establish sufficient
injury, the fourth element of the BASH test. Pursuant to BASH,
Waimana must “demonstrate that its . . . interests were injured.
79 Hawai's at 1255, 903 P.2d at 434 (quoting Bele Def, Fund vy

Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 69, 881 P.2d 1210, 1215
(1994)) (brackets omitted). Generally, whether a party has

 

standing is determined by the three part “injury in fact” test:
(2) he or she has suffered an actual or threatened injury as
result of the defendant's wrongful conduct, (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions, and (3) a favorable
decision would likely provide relief for a plaintiff's injury.”
Bush v. Watson, @1 Hawai'i 474, 479, 918 P.2d 1130, 1235 (1996)
(citation omitted); see also United Pub. Workers, 80 Hawai'i at
380 n.3, 910 P.2d at 151 0.3 (1isting the elements of the “injury
in fact” test as “1) an actual or threatened injury, which 2) is
traceable to the challenged action, and 3) is likely to be
remedied by favorable judicial action"). The fact that Waimana
now has an exclusive license to provide teleconmunications
services to land adjacent to the Keahole expansion project site
does not “demonstrate” injury. As BLNR observes, Waimana “has
not alleged that its license agreement with DHKL has been

breached or that it has been deprived of any property. There is

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no indication that the generator expansion project will affect
DHHL' s plans to develop its neighboring property.” Morever,
while OHHL may have a constitutionally protected right in the
Is3-acre tract adjacent to the Keahole power plant,
“constitutional rights may not be vicariously asserted.” Kaneohe

2s, v. Hirata, 75 Haw. 250, 265, 861 P.2d 1, 9
(1993) (citation omitted) .

Based on the foregoing, the court was correct in
determining that Waimana lacked standing to challenge the motion
to vacate.

vant.

For the reasons stated herein, the court’s November 28,

2003 first amended final judgment, vacating the October 3, 2002

order and November 7, 2002 final judgment, is affirmed.

on the briefs:

Michele-Lynn E. Luke and

Deborah 5. Jackson

(Richards 6 Luke), for .
Appellee-Appellant Waimana Btncephlicrnsen
Enterprises, Inc.

Michael J. Matsukawa Ae.
Abie tim

for Appeliants~Appellees
Keahole Defense Coalition,
Inc., Peggy J. Ratliff, and

Mahi’ Cooper. Onli.

A, Sonia Faust and
Linda L.W. Chow, Deputy
Attorneys General, for
Appellees-Appellees

Department of Land and Natural
Resources, State of Hawai'i, and
Board of Land and Natural

 

35
 

‘***FOR PUBLICATION:

Resources, State of Hawai'i.

Warren Price III and Robert A.
Marks (Price Okamoto Himeno &
Lum) and John T. Komeiji and
Brian A. Kang (Watanabe Ing
Kawashima & Komeiji), for
Rppellee-Appellee Hawaii
Electric Light Company, Inc.

Wiayne Nasser, Kevin W.
Herring and Mi Yung C. Park
(Ashford & Wriston) for
Appellant-Appellee Department
cf Hawaiian Home lands, State of
Hawai'i.

 

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