Case Title: State v. Chambers

Citation: 502 P.2d 999, 84 N.M. 309

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1972-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
502 P.2d 999 (1972) 84 N.M. 309 STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Vestal CHAMBERS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 9435. Supreme Court of New Mexico. November 3, 1972. Dan B. Buzzard, David W. Bonem, Clovis, for appellant. David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., Prentis Reid Griffith, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, for appellee. COMPTON, Chief Justice. The defendant was charged with murdering his wife on December 1, 1970, in Curry County, to which he entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Upon the suggestion of insanity the defendant was committed to the New Mexico State Hospital for psychiatric evaluation. Later, he was convicted of first degree murder and appeals from the judgment imposing sentence therein. The appellant first contends that the court committed prejudicial error in giving the following instruction: The claimed vice in the instruction is the term "you must be satisfied." This instruction precisely tracks the language suggested by this court in the case of State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 330, 270 P.2d 727, and approved in State v. James, 83 N.M. 263, 490 P.2d 1236. It is our conclusion that the instruction is a correct statement of the law. Compare State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646. The appellant next contends that the trial court committed error in refusing his tendered instruction advising the jury that he would be given a sanity hearing and committed to the New Mexico State Hospital should he be found not guilty by reason of insanity. We see no error in the ruling of the court. The tendered instruction presented an irrelevant issue for consideration by the jury. This conclusion is in accord with those jurisdictions expressing a majority view on the issue. Appellant further contends that the court committed error in refusing a tendered instruction relating to his diminished responsibility resulting from mental disease or defect of the mind. The tendered instruction reads: The appellant relies on State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312. Noticeably, the instruction in Padilla concluded, "* * * you shall find the defendant not guilty of first degree murder and will pass on to the question of whether he is guilty of second degree murder." (Emphasis added). While Padilla stands for the proposition that a disease or defect of the mind may render an accused incapable of cool deliberation and premeditation and may be sufficient to reduce the charge against him from first to second degree murder, it does not hold that such mental condition may reduce the charge to voluntary manslaughter. We conclude that the court did not err in refusing the tendered instruction. The appellant further complains that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the testimony of a psychiatrist based on out-of-court statements of third persons regarding the previous conduct of the appellant. Dr. John F. Hughes, a psychiatrist, first testified that appellant was suffering from "a temporary psychosis or insanity." He stated that it was his opinion that because of this psychosis the appellant was incapable of preventing himself from firing a gun at his wife and that the appellant on December 1, 1970, was incapable of premeditation, deliberation, or malice. On cross examination Dr. Hughes was questioned *1001 with regard to certain reports obtained by Mrs. Edna Fitz, the Community Services Social Worker, relating to Chambers' past behavior and which were a part of the hospital records. He had not seen them at that time. Later, after he had reviewed and evaluated the reports, he was recalled. On the basis of these reports, he testified that in his opinion the appellant was suffering from an emotional state at the time of the homicide and was sane at the time of the alleged offense. It was his opinion that the killing was not an isolated incident, but was part of a "permanent personality pattern of violence and threats of violence when under emotion within his household." The New Mexico courts have not spoken directly on this point and cases from other jurisdictions offer divergent views. At 31 Am.Jur.2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence, § 86, the following is stated: However, we think the better reasoned authorities take a different view. In Brown v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 134, 375 F.2d 310 (1967), the Court said: Jenkins v. United States, 113 U.S.App. D.C. 300, 307 F.2d 637 (1962), citing McCormick, Ev. § 15 (1955), and 3 Wigmore, Ev. § 688 (3rd ed. 1940), is a case on all fours with the one before us. A psychiatrist as an expert witness changed his diagnosis upon discovery of new records not previously available to him. The Court there stated: Quoting Sundquist v. Madison Ry., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392 at 393, Jenkins said: Again, quoting Blunt v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 266 at 275, 244 F.2d 355 at 364, Jenkins said: In Kitchens v. United States, 272 F.2d 757 (10th Cir.1959), the trial court, in a like manner, admitted certain exhibits including a number of hospital records, findings of psychiatrists, and court records for the limited purpose of permitting experts to refer to them and be examined with regard to their contents. It is clear that Dr. Hughes based his opinion largely on New Mexico State Hospital records and that this is the type of clinical opinion he is accustomed to *1002 form and to rely upon in the practice of his profession. Appellant finally contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence certain statements made by the appellant to law enforcement officers prior to the time he had been advised of his constitutional rights in accord with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974. The record discloses that Chief of Police, Harry Kenneth Kingsbury, received a call that someone had been shot at a trailer park in Clovis. He went to the scene and observed a body lying in front of a trailer. A TV repairman was nearby and pointed toward the trailer. When the officer knocked on the door of the trailer a voice from within said, "In here." The officer entered, saw the appellant sitting at a table, and inquired, "What happened?" The appellant made the following response: "I shot her. She had it coming. The TV man saw everything." We conclude that the officer was in a fact-finding process when the question was asked and that the statements made by appellant were voluntary, and made before any type of custodial interrogation, within the meaning of Miranda, could be said to have begun. In State v. Lopez, 79 N.M. 282, 442 P.2d 594, this Court spoke on this point: The judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered. McMANUS and OMAN, JJ., concur.