Case Title: Brunner v. Brown

Citation: 480 N.W.2d 33

Docket Number: 91-15

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1992-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
480 N.W.2d 33 (1992) Elsie BRUNNER, Paul Warnke, Lucille Warnke, Arthur Eugene Warnke and Ellen L. Kirkestue, Appellants, v. James BROWN and Orville Kapka, Appellees. No. 91-15. Supreme Court of Iowa. January 22, 1992. James F. Smith of Noah & Smith, Charles City, and C.J. Anderson of Anderson, Story & Schoeberl, Cresco, for appellants. Richard D. Stochl and Christopher F. O'Donohoe of O'Donohoe, O'Connor, O'Donohoe *34 & Stochl, New Hampton, for appellees. Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, SCHULTZ, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ. LARSON, Justice. John Wermuth's will was challenged by family members on the ground that Wermuth lacked sufficient testamentary capacity. The trial court rejected these arguments, and the contestants appealed. Their sole complaint on appeal is that the court erred in refusing to allow their expert witness, during direct examination, to relate hearsay evidence that he had considered in forming his opinion on the decedent's mental state. We conclude that, while such evidence is admissible under Iowa Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting it under the facts of this case. The contestants' psychiatrist, Dr. Vernon P. Varner, was retained to investigate Wermuth's testamentary capacity. Because Wermuth was deceased, it was necessary for Dr. Varner to base his opinion on interviews he had with Wermuth's social acquaintances and his treating doctor. Dr. Varner testified that this evidence was the kind that psychiatrists regularly rely on in reaching their conclusions. Dr. Varner was allowed to state his opinions, which were based on these interviews, but he was not permitted to relate the statements themselves or to state the contents of the medical report prepared by Wermuth's treating doctor. The court ruled that they were inadmissible hearsay. The initial issue is whether an expert witness may relate, in his direct testimony, hearsay evidence on which his opinion is based. The Iowa rule is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 703, as to which the advisory committee's note states: Fed.R.Evid. 703 advisory committee's note, citing Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 Vand.L.Rev. 473, 531 (1962). An expert may testify from three possible sources: (1) the firsthand observation by the witness; (2) from information obtained at trial through hypothetical questions or the testimony of other witnesses; and (3) the presentation of data to the expert outside of court and other than by his own perception. Id. The third source, outside presentation of data to the expert, supplements the traditional sources of information and recognizes the practicalities involved. Experts who make their living from examining various authenticating sources, and on which they often make life-and-death decisions, may be reasonably relied on for judicial purposes. Id. Iowa rule 703 must be applied in tandem with Iowa Rule of Evidence 705, which provides: Rule 705 eliminates the requirement of preliminary disclosures at the trial through other witnesses or by the use of hypothetical questions. The hypothetical question is complex and time-consuming, and it affords an opportunity to argue a case in the middle of the evidence. See Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 414, 426-27 (1952); Fed.R.Evid. 705 advisory committee's note. Under rules 703 and 705, two safeguards in the use of inadmissible evidence in conjunction with an expert's testimony are provided: (1) the information relied on must be of a type reasonably relied on by other experts in the field, and (2) the expert's reliance may be amply tested on cross-examination. United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451, 1457 (10th Cir.1985). Whether the underlying evidence is reasonably relied on for purposes of rule 703 is an issue for the trial judge. The expert's own testimony regarding reasonable reliance is not conclusive, being only one factor in the consideration. D. Binder, Hearsay Handbook § 103, at 457 (1983); Supp. at 267. If the underlying evidence is furnished by a biased witness, it probably will be excluded. See, e.g., Faries v. Atlas Truck Body Mfg. Co., 797 F.2d 619, 622-24 (8th Cir.1986) (reversible error to admit investigating police officer's opinion based on interview with driver of one of the vehicles involved). While rules 703 and 705 provide a broadened factual basis for expert testimony, they are silent on the question of whether the underlying hearsay evidence itself is admissible. The proponents of the will in this case concede that rules 703 and 705 permit the opinion based on hearsay, but they argue that the details of the underlying information may not be related by the expert on direct examination. Our rules of evidence are patterned after the federal rules, and we give considerable weight to their rationale and the cases interpreting them. According to the federal advisory committee, it was the intent of federal rule 705 to permit the introduction of "underlying facts or data" necessary to the expert's opinion: Fed.R.Evid. 705 advisory committee's note. One authority characterizes the use of this underlying evidence as falling under an "indirect exception" to the hearsay rule. Binder, Hearsay Handbook § 1.02, at 452. This authority states that Id. § 1.01, at 451. Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 694 F.2d 1349, 1356 (5th Cir.1983). Accord People v. Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d 1, 10-13, 99 Ill.Dec. 104, 108-09, 495 N.E.2d 485, 489-90 (1986). 2 Jones on Evidence § 14:21, at 642 (1972). The rationale for this rule is that Id. § 14:21, at 643-44. In Anderson, 113 Ill. 2d at 8-9, 99 Ill.Dec. at 107, 495 N.E.2d at 488, the Supreme Court of Illinois held it was error to deny the introduction of underlying hearsay evidence as a part of the expert's testimony. First, the court noted that neither federal rule 703 nor 705 answers the question of whether eliciting specific facts upon which the expert opinion is based is a matter of right. It noted, however, that Id. at 9, 99 Ill.Dec. at 107, 495 N.E.2d at 488. The court noted that rule 703 "expands the range of information available, at least indirectly, to the trier of fact." And, "[i]nasmuch as the opinion based on these materialswhich are deemed trustworthy by the professionis allowed, it would be both illogical and anomalous to deprive the jury of the reasons supporting that opinion." Id. at 10, 99 Ill.Dec. at 107-08, 495 N.E.2d at 488-89. The court in Anderson stated that this conclusion "accords with the overwhelming weight of authority from other jurisdictions as well as a great deal of persuasive scholarly commentary" and sets forth a list of other jurisdictions, and commentators, which concur with that view. Id. The court continued: Id. at 10-11, 99 Ill.Dec. at 108, 495 N.E.2d at 489 (citations omitted). We agree with this observation. In Affleck, an income tax prosecution, the court allowed introduction of statements by the defendant's employees that had been reasonably relied upon by the government's expert. The court noted that such hearsay information must be used only as a basis for the expert's opinion and not for the truth of the matter asserted. 776 F.2d at 1458. In Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66 (3d Cir.1985), an expert metallurgist relied on another expert's opinion in his direct testimony. The court stated that Id. at 74 (citation omitted). In Brown v. United States, 375 F.2d 310 (D.C.Cir.1966), an expert testified regarding *37 the defendant's sanity and relied in part on statements made to him by nursing assistants. The court stated: Id. at 318 (emphasis added). In United States v. McCollum, 732 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir.1984), an expert for the defendant stated that he relied on hearsay evidence in forming his opinion. The court stated that Id. at 1422-23 (citations omitted). If the hearsay related by the expert is not limited in its scope, through a limiting instruction to the jury, the jury may consider the underlying evidence as substantive evidence. Fox, 694 F.2d at 1356; Binder, § 1.01, at 451. A limiting instruction, of course, should be requested. For the form of such an instruction, see Affleck, 776 F.2d at 1458. In the present case, the trial court noted the broad reach of federal rules 703 and 705, but it expressed the view that Iowa cases have been more restrictive, citing State v. Barrett, 445 N.W.2d 749 (Iowa 1989). In Barrett, however, we did not restrict the scope of rules 703 or 705. We simply held that an expert witness's bare statement that other experts agreed with him did not establish that such opinions were reasonably relied on by experts in that field. They were therefore inadmissible as lacking in foundation. Id. at 751. There is nothing in Barrett that is inconsistent with our present view of rules 703 and 705 as expressed in this opinion. The trial court has considerable discretion in the admission of expert testimony. Sallis v. Lamansky, 420 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Iowa 1988); State v. Chancy, 391 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Iowa 1986). To establish an abuse of that discretion, it must be shown that it was exercised on untenable grounds or was clearly erroneous. Chancy, 391 N.W.2d at 233. While the underlying hearsay evidence was admissible under rules 703 and 705, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit it. As the court noted, the doctor, whose hearsay report was attempted to be used by Dr. Varner, as well as the lay witness interviewed by Dr. Varner, were to be witnesses at the trial. These will contestants have not shown that they were unable to obtain the evidence in question from examination of these witnesses, just as well as through the testimony of Dr. Varner. Moreover, having been denied the opportunity to introduce the hearsay evidence in Dr. Varner's direct testimony, the contestants could have recalled Dr. Varner after the lay witnesses and Wermuth's treating doctor had testified. He could then be asked to express his opinion based upon the testimony of those witnesses, or Dr. Varner could have been asked hypothetical questions using the facts to which those witnesses would testify. We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings, and we therefore affirm. AFFIRMED.