Case Title: Barclay v. State

Citation: 343 So. 2d 1266

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1977-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
343 So. 2d 1266 (1977)
Elwood Clark BARCLAY and Jacob John Dougan, Jr., Appellants,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 47260.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 17, 1977.
Rehearing Denied April 7, 1977.
*1267 Ernest D. Jackson, Sr., of Jackson & Micks, Jacksonville, for appellants.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review on direct appeal from the Circuit Court of Duval County, judgments of guilty of murder in the first degree and sentences of death. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.
Appellants were indicted for the first degree murder of Stephen Anthony Orlando, were found guilty by a jury who after advisory hearing recommended that the death sentence be imposed as to Dougan and that life imprisonment be imposed as to Barclay,[1] were convicted and sentenced to death.
As evidenced by the sentencing order of the trial judge and supported by the record, the facts surrounding the slaying which the judge characterized as a random, racial hate murder are as follows:
In detail, the Judge explained each of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances defined by statute and their application to the instant cause, and concluded that the death penalty was the appropriate punishment for appellants. As to the aggravating circumstance of heinousness or atrocity of the crime, the trial judge stated:
We have carefully considered each of the numerous points raised on appeal by appellants and find that none of them constitute reversible error.
Sections 782.04 and 921.141, Florida Statutes, are not unconstitutional nor were they unconstitutionally applied to appellants. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1975), and Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913, decided July 2, 1976.
Relative to appellants' argument that they were denied the right to be tried in the county where the crime occurred, we initially note the following excerpt from the record taken from the hearing on motion for new trial:
The indictment charged that appellants "in the County of Duval and the County of St. Johns, State of Florida, unlawfully and from a premeditated design ... did kill the said Stephen Anthony Orlando." The State cites the Court to Article I, Section 16, Florida Constitution, providing:
and Section 910.05, Florida Statutes, providing:
Appellants were properly tried in Duval County, for the reasons well expressed by *1270 Judge Smith with respect to one of Dougan's and Barclay's co-venturers. Crittendon v. State, 338 So. 2d 1088, opinion filed October 11, 1976 (Fla. 1st DCA).
Appellants contend that they were denied a fair and impartial trial because the prosecutor failed to reveal on direct examination complete details of a plea bargain agreement with a witness in exchange for his testimony. The State emphatically denies that the prosecution ever at any time deliberately and intentionally withheld any of witness Hearn's statement. No false testimony was given in this regard as is suggested by appellants. During the motion for new trial, appellants charged that the State willfully refused to disclose the full plea bargain agreement on direct examination. To this charge, State Attorney Austin expressly objected, as follows:
Although completely aware of the agreement, defense counsel never inquired of the subject State witness as to any bargain or deal or representations made to him by the State Attorney's office, nor did he on cross examination attempt to shake the credibility of this witness because of the plea bargain agreement mentioned on direct examination. Defense counsel, on cross examination, did not even mention the agreement that had been elicited on direct examination. As is clearly evidenced by the record, without question, defense was fully aware of the full plea bargain agreement. At the insistence of defense counsel, the deposition of Hearn was taken on January 31, 1975, at 10:20 a.m. in the Duval County Courthouse at which time Hearn testified fully to the details of the agreement thereby apprising the defense of the same.
Appellants raise several other points on appeal none of which we find to be meritorious so as to constitute reversible error.
We have listened carefully to oral argument, examined and considered the record in light of the assignments of error and briefs filed, and pursuant to Rule 6.16(b), Florida Appellate Rules, we have also reviewed the evidence to determine whether the interests of justice require a new trial, with the result that we find no reversible error is made to appear and that the evidence in the record before us does not reveal that the ends of justice require that a new trial be awarded.
Having determined that no reversible error has been made to appear which would require a new trial, we must proceed to examine whether the death sentences imposed by the trial judge were appropriate under the peculiar circumstances of this case.
The jury in these cases distinguished between the appellants in presenting their recommendations for sentence, suggesting life imprisonment for Barclay and a death penalty for Dougan. It is particularly important, therefore, that we explain our decision to uphold the recommendation of the trial judge that both be executed.
The judge before whom these cases were tried meticulously identified in writing each aggravating and mitigating circumstance listed in the death penalty statute, and he commented with specificity as to the relevance and weight to be accorded each. He noted as to Dougan that no mitigating circumstance pertained to his benefit, and that one of those factors actually suggested an aggravation rather than mitigation of sentence.[2] Dougan, who was age 27 at the time, had no significant history of prior criminal activity, was not (and did not claim to be) under a mental or emotional disturbance, was not (and did not claim to be) under duress or the dominance of another *1271 person and had (and did not deny having) full capacity both to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to law. The trial judge further found that Dougan's victim was not a participant in the episode and had not consented to the act, but that Dougan was an accomplice with four others in this crime and had a dominant, as opposed to minor role, in its accomplishment. It was Dougan who conceived and planned the events that occurred. Each of these findings is well documented in the record of Dougan's trial.
As to aggravating circumstances relative to Dougan, the trial judge recited that four factors essentially had no relevance here.[3] Four others were present to some degree, namely that Dougan's crime had created a great risk of death to many persons[4], had been committed while engaged in a kidnapping, had endeavored to disrupt governmental functions and law enforcement[5], and had been especially heinous, atrocious and cruel.[6] These findings are also well documented in the record before us. On balance, there is no doubt that the recommendation of the jury and the sentence of the trial judge are appropriate in his case.
As regards Barclay, who had received a life recommendation from the jury, virtually the same considerations apply with respect to consequences of the criminal episode. Different personal factors pertain, however. He was 23 rather than 27 years old, but had amassed a significant history of prior criminal activity. His participation, like Dougan's, was found by the trial judge not to be minor, as he was the first to assault the victim and then stab him repeatedly. The jury obviously weighed these differences somewhat differently than the trial judge.
When there is disagreement between the jury and judge after both have evaluated the same data, we have said that the jury's recommendation should generally prevail.[7] In this case, however, there is present one factor which persuades us that the judge's sentence should be upheld.[8] Two co-perpetrators who participated equally in the crime would have disparate sentences were the jury's recommendations accepted. The variation between defendants being so nominal (a minor age difference but no suggestion of different maturities), the facts here do not warrant the dispensation of unequal justice. See Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1976); Slater v. State, 316 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1975). "Equal Justice Under Law" is carved over the doorway to the United States Supreme Court building in Washington. It would have a hollow ring in the halls of that building if the sentences in these cases were not equalized. This is a case, then, where the jury did not act reasonably in the imposition of sentence, and the trial judge properly rejected one of their recommendations.
Accordingly, the judgments and sentences of the trial court are hereby affirmed.
It is so ordered.
*1272 OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, ENGLAND and ROBERTS (Retired), JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
HATCHETT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
BOYD, Justice, concurring specially.
The jury found both Appellants guilty of murder in the first degree, but recommended death by electrocution for Appellant Dougan and a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole during the first twenty-five years for Appellant Barclay.
A careful review of the entire record convinces me the jury was correct in recommending a higher degree of punishment for Appellant Dougan than for Appellant Barclay. Appellant Dougan was the architect of this atrocity, planned the crime and lead his karate students on the night of the murder, directed the course of the auto trip of the defendants and selected the victim to be killed. Appellant Barclay was a principal and is guilty of murder, but he was a follower who did exactly what he was told to do by Appellant Dougan and I feel that he should be granted a life sentence rather than death. Dougan fully deserves electrocution.
HATCHETT, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The murder in this case was heinous, atrocious, cruel, and indeed, senseless.
Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), "intended as it was to meet the constitutional infirmity of capital sentencing procedures explored in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), is designed to limit the unbridled exercise of judicial discretion in cases where the ultimate penalty is possible." Provence v. State, 337 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1976). In a capital case a judicial officer must evaluate the conduct of the defendant by weighing specifically enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances, taking into consideration prior judicial treatment of similar situations. The aggravating circumstances are limited to those listed in the statute.
The record in this case shows that the trial judge went beyond the statute and considered additional factors outside the record, including his own personal experiences, thus upsetting the balance mandated by the statute. We cannot properly perform our duty of review in capital cases and ensure uniform imposition of the death penalty if trial judges are allowed to supplement the list of factors found by the legislature to be determinative.
For this reason I would affirm the conviction and remand the case to the trial judge for the entry of sentences in accordance with Section 921.141, Florida Statutes, under the authority of Miller v. State, 332 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1976), and Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1976).
[1]  As to Barclay, the jury recommended life by a vote of seven to five.
[2]  See Section 921.141(6), Fla. Stat. (1975).
[3]  Dougan was not under sentence of imprisonment, was not attempting to avoid arrest or escape custody, had not been previously convicted of a major felony, and had not acted for pecuniary gain.
[4]  The trial judge noted five aborted attempts to select a victim from the streets of Jacksonville before Stephen Orlando was chosen, plus the taped threat made to white Jacksonville citizens that a race war had begun and none would be safe.
[5]  The basis for this finding was the judge's observation that the notion of a race war essentially threatened the foundations of American society.
[6]  Dougan's tapes explained how Stephen Orlando had begged for his life while being beaten and stabbed before Dougan "executed" him with two pistol shots in the head.
[7]  Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
[8]  The trial judge here painstakingly and with reasoned judgment detailed the factors which caused his departure from the jury's recommendation. His thorough analysis is precisely the type we would expect from mature, deliberative judges in this state. It suggests why the Legislature put the trial judges of Florida in the middle of the sentencing process for capital cases.