Case Title: In re Disqualification of Burnside

Citation: 2006-Ohio-7223

Docket Number: 06AP015

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Burnside, 113 Ohio St.3d 1211, 2006-Ohio-7223.] 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF BURNSIDE. 
JONES v. BAKER & HOSTETLER, L.L.P., ET AL. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Burnside, 
 113 Ohio St.3d 1211, 2006-Ohio-7223.] 
Judges – Affidavit of disqualification – Disqualification denied. 
(No. 06-AP-015—Decided March 17, 2006.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Cuyahoga County  
Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-03-518194. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Plaintiff, Jeffrey F. Jones, his attorney Richard G. Johnson, and 
attorney Richard E. Flamm have filed affidavits with the clerk of this court under 
R.C. 2701.03, seeking the disqualification of Judge Janet R. Burnside from acting 
on any further proceedings in case No. CV-03-518194 in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Cuyahoga County. 
{¶ 2} Affiant Jones contends that Judge Burnside has received campaign 
contributions between 1992 and 2005 totaling “at least $8,300” from the law firm 
of Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., which was a defendant in the case until the plaintiff 
voluntarily dismissed his claims against that party in October 2005.  Attorney 
Flamm – the author of a treatise on judicial disqualification – offers the opinion 
that a reasonable and objective observer would question the ability of the judge to 
serve impartially in the case, given her acceptance of large campaign 
contributions from the Baker firm and her failure to disclose those contributions 
to the parties. 
{¶ 3} The affiants also describe some of the judge’s rulings in the case as 
arbitrary and capricious, and affiant Jones contends that 93 percent of her 
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substantive rulings in the case have favored the defendants.  This alleged 
favoritism in judicial rulings, coupled with the large campaign contributions to the 
judge from the defendants, calls the judge’s impartiality into doubt, according to 
the affiants.  They also fault her for failing to explain her refusal to step aside 
when they raised these concerns in a motion asking her to recuse. 
{¶ 4} Affiant Johnson also suggests that my own ability to rule on the 
affidavits of disqualification in this case is suspect because the Baker firm has 
contributed to my judicial campaigns as well. 
{¶ 5} Judge Burnside has responded to the affidavits in writing.  She 
denies holding any bias or prejudice for or against any of the parties or their 
attorneys.  She explains that she was unaware of the amount of Baker & 
Hostetler’s contributions to her judicial campaigns, and she contends that no law 
firm’s contributions stand out in her mind.  She makes decisions, the judge 
explains, based on her best judgment without regard to the amount or frequency 
of contributions from parties or lawyers.  The judge notes as well that she is 
unopposed for reelection this year, so her campaign committee will not be 
soliciting any additional campaign funds in 2006. 
{¶ 6} The judge also denies that she has treated this case differently from 
any others on her docket, and she denies tailoring her rulings to favor one side or 
the other.  “I ruled as I saw fit,” she explains, “without any bias against or 
favoritism for any party.”  She adds that she does not care whether or not the case 
stays on her docket. 
{¶ 7} I find no basis for ordering the disqualification of Judge Burnside. 
Her very thorough response addresses every allegation in the affidavits, and both 
the tone and the content of that response show quite clearly that the judge is 
neither biased nor prejudiced against the plaintiff.  Even though Judge Burnside 
has evidently received campaign contributions from the Baker & Hostetler firm in 
past judicial campaigns, I cannot conclude that a reasonable and objective 
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3 
observer – one familiar with both the allegations in the affidavits and the judge’s 
response to those allegations – would hold serious doubts about her ability to 
serve fairly and impartially in this case.  She has explained why she did not 
disclose those contributions – because she relied on professional campaign 
fundraisers and has not kept a mental log of campaign contributions or 
contributors while performing her judicial duties – and I see nothing in the record 
before me to call that explanation into doubt. 
{¶ 8} As attorney Flamm notes in his affidavit, elected judges are 
generally not required to recuse themselves from cases in which a party is 
represented by an attorney who has contributed to or has raised money for the 
judge’s election campaign.  See In re Disqualification of Jackson (1998), 84 Ohio 
St.3d 1232, 1233, 704 N.E.2d 1236 (“the mere fact that a party or lawyer in a 
pending case campaigned for or against a judge is not grounds for 
disqualification”); Nathanson v. Korvick (Fla.1991), 577 So.2d 943, 944 (“judges 
are not required to disqualify themselves based solely upon the allegation that an 
attorney or litigant has made a campaign contribution to the political campaign of 
the judge or the judge’s spouse”); Rocha v. Ahmad (Tex.App.1983), 662 S.W.2d 
77, 78 (“If a judge cannot sit on a case in which a contributing lawyer is involved 
as counsel, judges who have been elected would have to recuse themselves in 
perhaps a majority of the cases filed in their courts”). 
{¶ 9} That standard rule applies in this case.  The affiants correctly assert 
that they are entitled to a fair hearing and an impartial decision-maker, and they 
rightly suggest that a judge’s receipt of large campaign contributions might call 
into question the judge’s impartiality in a particular case.  In this case, however, 
Judge Burnside’s explanations of her fundraising activities and her decision-
making process do not convince me that the two are linked in the way that the 
affiants suggest.  She appears to have done her best to separate her judicial duties 
from her campaign activities, and in a state in which judges are elected, that is the 
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most we can ask of those who seek and secure judicial office.  Given Judge 
Burnside’s statement that she raised more than $1 million in a statewide campaign 
in 2002 alone, her alleged receipt of “at least $8,300” from the Baker firm does 
not call into serious doubt the judge’s ability to preside fairly and impartially in 
this case. 
{¶ 10} Judge Burnside’s assurances that she has made all decisions in the 
case using her best judgment without bias for or against any party, coupled with 
her statement that she does not care whether the case remains on her docket, 
prompt me as well to reject the affiants’ assertion that disqualification is 
warranted based on arbitrary and erroneous rulings by the judge.  It is not the role 
of the Chief Justice in cases such as this to question the correctness of a judge’s 
rulings, and nothing in the judge’s response suggests to me that she has 
approached her judicial duties in the case with anything other than the requisite 
open state of mind.  Though some decisions of a trial judge can be challenged on 
appeal, a party’s disagreement or dissatisfaction with a court’s rulings of law, 
without more, does not demonstrate bias or prejudice.  In re Disqualification of 
Murphy (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 605, 522 N.E.2d 459.  Even though the affiants 
contend that I ought to question the judge’s rulings because those rulings have 
allegedly favored a campaign contributor, I conclude that a reasonable and 
objective observer familiar with the judge’s response would not believe that her 
rulings were the result of any disqualifying bias or prejudice.  As I have said, “[a] 
judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the appearance of 
bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these presumptions.”  In re 
Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, 798 N.E.2d 
23, ¶ 5.  Those presumptions have not been overcome in this case. 
{¶ 11} For the reasons stated above, the affidavits of disqualification are 
denied.  The case may proceed before Judge Burnside. 
______________________