Case Title: Barner v. Chappell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 022710

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
WILLIAM M. BARNER, ET AL. 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 022710 
JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
September 12, 2003 
EDWARD A. CHAPPELL, ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG 
AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY 
Samuel T. Powell, III, Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the chancellor 
correctly determined that a restrictive covenant prohibiting the 
building of a house, garage, or other structure on a lot in a 
residential subdivision is enforceable by one or more 
neighboring landowners.  We further consider whether the 
chancellor correctly determined, in the alternative, that the 
restriction is enforceable by the neighboring landowners as an 
equitable servitude. 
BACKGROUND 
Beginning in 1922, John Garland Pollard, who would 
subsequently serve as the Mayor of the City of Williamsburg and 
Governor of Virginia, acquired property in the City of 
Williamsburg and James City County along what was then known as 
Texas Avenue.  Between 1924 and 1938, Governor Pollard 
subdivided and sold portions of that property for use in the 
construction of single-family homes.  A recorded plat of a 
portion of Governor Pollard’s property dated May 30, 1930 
reflects the subdivision of the property at that time.1  A short, 
dead-end road, subsequently designated “Ballard Lane,” extending 
from Texas Avenue allowed access to the parcels designated on 
the plat as Lots 7, 7A, B, E, and F.  A U-shaped road connecting 
to Texas Avenue at two points, subsequently referred to in some 
deeds as “Hairpin Road,” allowed access to the parcels 
designated on the plat as Lots A, B, C, D, 7, 8, and 9.2  In 
addition, another parcel, bounded by Texas Avenue and the 
interior curve of Hairpin Road, was designated as a “park.”  
Along the outer curve of Hairpin Road between Lot 9 and Texas 
Avenue there was a large undivided parcel that was not given a 
number or letter designation.  At the time the plat was 
prepared, Lots A, B, and 9 had already been conveyed.  Over the 
next two years, Governor Pollard conveyed the remaining 
designated parcels, with the exception of Lot 7 where he 
maintained his residence. 
The park, which remains undeveloped to this day, contains a 
natural, wooded ravine.  The deeds conveying the lots designated 
as A, B, C, D, E, F, and 9 from Governor Pollard to the original 
                     
1 See the attached copy of the 1930 plat. 
 
2 The U-shaped road was subsequently designated “Pollard 
Park,” which also became the common designation for the 
neighborhood.  For clarity, we will refer to the road as 
“Hairpin Road” and the neighborhood as “Pollard Park” in this 
opinion. 
 
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grantees contain provisions requiring that the park be 
maintained perpetually for the mutual benefit of the owners of 
lots in Pollard Park.  Additionally, provisions in these deeds 
limit development on the respective lots to single-family 
residences, and impose other construction restrictions such as 
twenty-foot setback lines and specified building sites.  The 
deeds expressly state that these restrictions shall run with the 
land. 
In 1932, Mary W. Craighill (Craighill) was the record owner 
of Lot A which is adjacent to Lot 8.  By a deed dated December 
3, 1932 and recorded on June 20, 1935, Governor Pollard conveyed 
Lot 8, a parcel containing less than one-tenth of an acre 
located at the midpoint of the outer curve of Hairpin Road, to 
Craighill (the Pollard/Craighill deed).  This deed provides that 
“[t]he property hereby conveyed is to be used in connection with 
[Lot A] and no house, garage or structure of any kind shall be 
erected thereon.”3  This deed further provides that the 
restriction shall run with the land “forever.”  The 
Pollard/Craighill deed is the only deed relating to the 
                     
3 On January 29, 1937, Craighill conveyed her interest in 
Lot A to a third party.  She again became the owner of Lot A by 
1951.  No evidence was produced that the severance of title of 
Lot A and Lot 8 constituted a breach of this provision of the 
deed, transforming the restriction into a personal covenant that 
expired upon the death of Governor Pollard. 
 
 
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conveyance of lots in Pollard Park that restricts all 
construction. 
At the time of the conveyance of Lot 8 to Craighill, 
Governor Pollard had previously conveyed all the other lots 
designated on the 1930 plat by either numbers or letters with 
the exception of Lot 7, where he continued to reside.  Governor 
Pollard, however, retained ownership of the undivided parcel 
located on Hairpin Road between Lot 9 and Texas Avenue.  On 
January 16, 1937, Governor Pollard conveyed a portion of this 
parcel to Marion P. Morecock.  The deed conveying this property 
contained the same restrictions concerning use of the property 
for residential purposes and preservation of the park as the 
deeds conveying the other Pollard Park lots prior to the 
conveyance of Lot 8.  Through a series of subsequent 
conveyances, Eugene R. and Maureen B. Tracy (the Tracys) 
acquired this property on July 1, 1985. 
Following Governor Pollard’s death in 1937, the remainder 
of the previously undivided parcel was subdivided into two lots 
which were conveyed in 1938 by the executors of Governor 
Pollard’s estate to the predecessors-in-title respectively of 
Lloyd A. Julien, Jr. and Sarah B. Julien (the Juliens) and Pat 
C. Fulmer and Robert M. Fulmer (the Fulmers).  The original deed 
in the Juliens’ chain of title contained restrictions similar to 
those in the deeds conveying lots in Pollard Park prior to 
 
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Governor Pollard’s death; the original deed in the Fulmers’ 
chain of title did not contain these restrictions, although it 
did reference the 1930 plat.  On August 5, 1941, the executors 
conveyed Lot 7 to the predecessor-in-title of Genevieve T. 
Barrett and Jack C. Barrett (the Barretts).  The original deed 
in the Barretts’ chain of title contained restrictions similar 
to those in the deeds conveying other lots in Pollard Park prior 
to Governor Pollard’s death. 
By recorded deed dated August 5, 1998, William Maxwell 
Barner, III and Sandra E. Barner (the Barners) became the owners 
of Lot 8.4  Because they failed to conduct a title examination, 
the Barners did not have actual notice of the Lot 8 building 
restriction originating from the Pollard/Craighill deed.  
However, the Barners do not dispute that the restriction was 
discoverable within their chain of title and, thus, that they 
had record notice of this restriction.  Soon after acquiring Lot 
8, the Barners made preparations to construct a single-family 
residence upon this lot.5
                     
4 The Barners are also the record owners of Lot A where they 
currently reside. 
 
5 To build this home, the Barners needed a variance because 
of certain setback requirements in the Williamsburg Zoning 
Ordinance.  On November 3, 1998, the Board of Zoning Appeals for 
the City of Williamsburg granted the requested variance for Lot 
8.  An appeal of that decision is pending in the trial court 
until the resolution of this appeal. 
 
5
On August 26, 1999, the Tracys, the Juliens, the Fulmers, 
Edward A. Chappell, Susan S. Geary, William T. Geary, Elizabeth 
A. Rutgers, Marcia T. Smith, Victor H. Smith, and Joseph S. 
Wheeler (collectively, the neighboring landowners), who were at 
that time residents and record owners of lots in Pollard Park, 
filed a bill of complaint seeking to enforce the restriction in 
the Pollard/Craighill deed.6  The bill of complaint alleged that 
the construction of a residence on Lot 8 would violate this 
covenant and, therefore, requested that the Barners be 
permanently enjoined from building a residence thereon.  
Although the bill of complaint did not state the precise theory 
under which all the neighboring landowners asserted that they 
were entitled to enforce the covenant, it subsequently developed 
that the majority of these parties, who trace their ownership of 
lots in Pollard Park to deeds that predated the 
Pollard/Craighill deed, were relying upon the theory that the 
restrictive covenant represented an equitable servitude intended 
to benefit all the lots in Pollard Park. 
                     
6 The current record owner of Lot 7, Genevieve Barrett, also 
joined in the bill of complaint, but was granted a nonsuit early 
in the proceedings below.  Two other lot owners who initially 
joined in the suit have subsequently sold their respective 
properties, although they have not formally withdrawn from the 
suit.  However, the parties remaining in the suit with a current 
interest in the litigation are sufficient to allow us to 
consider all the issues raised in this appeal. 
 
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During an ore tenus hearing held September 27, 2001, the 
parties presented conflicting evidence on the purpose of the 
covenant.  The Barners’ expert witness testified that, in 1932, 
the City of Williamsburg had a sewage disposal problem and that 
Governor Pollard supported a drainage plan which would run a new 
sewer line through Lot 8.  The Barners contended that the 
building restriction on Lot 8 was intended solely to prevent any 
structures from obstructing the proposed sewer line.  Because 
the Barners were willing to reroute the existing sewer line 
around the footprint of their proposed residence, they asserted 
that the covenant was no longer needed for its intended purpose 
and, thus, had lapsed. 
On cross-examination, the Barners’ expert testified that 
Lot 8 was naturally a part of the ravine in the center of 
Pollard Park prior to the construction of Hairpin Road.  
Additionally, he testified that Governor Pollard could have 
chosen to place the sewer line along the edge of Lot 8 instead 
of permitting the sewer line to bisect this lot so that no 
dwelling could be built on it.  The neighboring landowners 
contended that this indicates that facilitation of the proposed 
sewer plan was not Governor Pollard’s primary purpose in 
creating the building restriction on Lot 8.  Rather, they 
contended that Governor Pollard’s intention, as demonstrated by 
the building restrictions in all the deeds conveying lots in 
 
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Pollard Park, was to preserve the natural, green character of 
the subdivision. 
In a final decree dated August 21, 2002, the chancellor, 
based on the evidence and a view of Pollard Park, found that 
Governor Pollard intended to preserve Lot 8 as an open, green 
space and that the purpose of the covenant, therefore, had not 
lapsed.  The chancellor further found that there was sufficient 
vertical privity between at least one of the neighboring 
landowners and Governor Pollard and that the restrictive 
covenant in the Pollard/Craighill deed met all other 
requirements for a covenant running with the land.  Thus, the 
chancellor determined that this covenant could be enforced 
against the Barners.  The chancellor also expressly found, in 
the alternative, that the restriction was enforceable by all the 
neighboring landowners as an equitable servitude.  Based upon 
these findings, the chancellor permanently enjoined the Barners 
and their successors from building a house, garage, or structure 
of any kind on Lot 8.  We awarded the Barners this appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
Under well established principles of appellate review, we 
will affirm the chancellor’s judgment unless it is plainly wrong 
or without evidence to support it.  Code § 8.01-680.  Moreover, 
we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
parties who prevailed in the proceedings before the chancellor.  
 
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Willard v. Moneta Building Supply, Inc., 258 Va. 140, 149, 515 
S.E.2d 277, 283 (1999). 
We first consider whether the chancellor correctly 
determined that the restrictive covenant in the 
Pollard/Craighill deed originally conveying Lot 8 in Pollard 
Park is enforceable by at least one of the neighboring 
landowners.  A restrictive covenant is enforceable if a 
landowner establishes:  (1) horizontal privity; (2) vertical 
privity; (3) intent for the restriction to run with the land; 
(4) that the restriction touches and concerns the land; and (5) 
that the covenant is in writing.  Waynesboro Village, L.L.C. v. 
BMC Properties, 255 Va. 75, 81, 496 S.E.2d 64, 68 (1998); Sloan 
v. Johnson, 254 Va. 271, 276, 491 S.E.2d 725, 728 (1997).  The 
parties agree that the only requirement at issue in this appeal 
is whether any of the neighboring landowners can establish 
vertical privity to enforce the restrictive covenant.  In 
addition, the Barners contend that the chancellor erred in 
failing to find that the purpose of the restrictive covenant has 
lapsed. 
Vertical privity exists when there is privity between the 
original parties and their successors-in-interest.  Id.  More 
precisely, vertical privity requires that the benefit of a 
restrictive covenant extend only to “one who succeeds to some 
interest of the beneficiary in the land respecting the use of 
 
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which the promise was made.”  Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp. v. 
Virginia Electric & Power Co., 215 Va. 658, 663, 212 S.E.2d 715, 
719-20 (1975) (citing Restatement of Property § 547 (1944)).  In 
the present case, the neighboring landowners who trace their 
ownership of property in Pollard Park through chains of title to 
conveyances from Governor Pollard that pre-date the 
Pollard/Craighill deed have not established the necessary 
vertical privity.  This is so because the interests of their 
predecessors pre-date the creation of the covenant in the 
Pollard/Craighill deed and, thus, they did not succeed “to some 
interest of the beneficiary” of the covenant.7  These landowners 
are Edward A. Chappell, Susan S. Geary, William T. Geary, 
Elizabeth A. Rutgers, Marcia T. Smith, Victor H. Smith, and 
Joseph S. Wheeler. 
By contrast, the Tracys, the Juliens, and the Fulmers trace 
their ownership of property in Pollard Park to original grantees 
in deeds executed after the execution of the Pollard/Craighill 
deed and, thus, meet the requirements for vertical privity 
                     
7 We recognize that the beneficiary of an express covenant 
in a deed may not always be limited to the grantor.  Here, 
however, there was no express intention to extend the benefit of 
the covenant directly to third parties.  The absence of such an 
express extension of the benefit of the covenant does not, 
however, preclude the possibility that third parties may claim 
the benefit as an equitable servitude, as will be discussed 
infra. 
 
 
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because they can trace their interests directly to Governor 
Pollard, the beneficiary of the restrictive covenant contained 
in that deed. 
There is no merit to the Barners’ contention that the 
Tracys, the Juliens, and the Fulmers do not have the necessary 
vertical privity because their lots were originally a part of 
the previously undivided parcel between Lot 9 and Texas Avenue 
as shown on the 1930 plat.  The mere fact that this parcel was 
not given a specific number or letter designation on this plat 
is of no significance and does not preclude the conclusion that 
Governor Pollard intended for this parcel also to benefit from 
the restriction imposed upon Lot 8.  No evidence in the record 
suggests that Governor Pollard intended only Lot 7, upon which 
he maintained his residence, to benefit from the restriction he 
placed upon Lot 8. 
Once a restrictive covenant has been established, the party 
asserting that the restriction is unenforceable because changed 
conditions have defeated the purpose of the restriction has the 
burden of proving that the purpose of the restriction no longer 
exists.  Conditions must have changed so substantially that the 
essential purpose of the covenant is defeated.  Smith v. 
Chesterfield Meadows Shopping Center Associates, L.P., 259 Va. 
82, 84, 523 S.E.2d 834, 835 (2000); Booker v. Old Dominion Land 
Co., 188 Va. 143, 148, 49 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1948).  The only 
 
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evidence presented by the Barners regarding this issue was that 
Governor Pollard supported a plan to run a sewer line through 
Lot 8, the plan would not have worked without the sewer line in 
that approximate location, and currently the sewer line can be 
relocated on Lot 8 so as not to prevent the construction of a 
single-family home upon the lot. 
The neighboring landowners, however, presented sufficient 
evidence to support the chancellor’s determination that the 
purpose of the restrictive covenant was to maintain Lot 8 as an 
open, green area in Pollard Park.  This purpose is consistent 
with the setback requirements and building restrictions in the 
various deeds and the provisions that the ravine area be 
maintained as a park.  The evidence that Lot 8 was a natural 
extension of the ravine prior to the construction of Hairpin 
Road is also consistent with the determination that the 
grantor’s intent was to maintain Lot 8 as an open, green area.  
Finally, the chancellor’s view of Pollard Park clearly 
established that the conditions in the neighborhood have not 
changed so substantially that the purpose of the restrictive 
covenant has been defeated.  Indeed, the evidence shows that 
Pollard Park remains substantially unchanged.  Accordingly, we 
hold that the chancellor’s determination that the restrictive 
covenant on Lot 8 is enforceable by at least one of the 
 
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neighboring landowners is supported by the evidence and not 
plainly wrong. 
Finally, we now address the question whether those 
landowners who acquired their interests in lots in Pollard Park 
through chains of title to conveyances from Governor Pollard 
that pre-date the Pollard/Craighill deed may enforce the 
restriction contained in that deed as an equitable servitude 
benefiting their properties. 
By definition, an equitable servitude can only arise when a 
common grantor imposes a common restriction upon land developed 
for sale in lots.  Forster v. Hall, 265 Va. 293, 300, 576 S.E.2d 
746, 749-50 (2003) (citing Duvall v. Ford Leasing Development 
Corp., 220 Va. 36, 41, 255 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1979)).  The burden 
is on the party claiming the benefit of the equitable servitude 
to show that a common restriction was intended.  Minner v. City 
of Lynchburg, 204 Va. 180, 188, 129 S.E.2d 673, 678 (1963). 
The prohibition against erecting a “house, garage or 
structure of any kind” is not a common restriction on the lots 
in Pollard Park because only Lot 8 is restricted in that way.  
Accordingly, we hold that the chancellor erred in determining 
that this restriction contained in the Pollard/Craighill deed is 
enforceable as an equitable servitude. 
 
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the chancellor’s judgment 
that Lot 8 is burdened by a restrictive covenant that is 
enforceable by those neighboring landowners who acquired their 
interests through original grantees in deeds executed after the 
execution of the Pollard/Craighead deed.  In this case, those 
neighboring landowners are the Tracys, Juliens, and Fulmers.  We 
will reverse the chancellor’s judgment that the restrictive 
covenant is enforceable by the other neighboring landowners as 
an equitable servitude, and enter final judgment upholding the 
permanent injunction issued against the Barners. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and final judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
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