Case Title: State v. Porter

Citation: 158 S.E.2d 626, 272 N.C. 463

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1968-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
158 S.E.2d 626 (1968) 272 N.C. 463 STATE v. Roy E. PORTER. No. 825. Supreme Court of North Carolina. January 12, 1968. *627 Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton and Asst. Atty. Gen. George A. Goodwyn, for the State. John D. Xanthos, Burlington, for defendant appellant. PARKER, Chief Justice. Defendant contends that the warrant upon which he was tried was issued by a justice of the peace and was void, because the justice of the peace at the time of the issuance of the warrant had not given a bond as provided by G.S. § 7-114.1. Subsection (a) of that statute reads as follows: Subsection (b) of that statute reads as follows: The justice of the peace who issued the warrant in this case was Daniel S. Walker. The record shows that he was duly appointed to the office of justice of the peace for a term of one year beginning on the 1st day of April 1967 and ending on the 1st day of April 1968. The affidavit upon which the warrant was issued was sworn to and subscribed before Daniel S. Walker, justice of the peace, on 15 June 1967, and the warrant was issued by him on the same day. Walker filed his official bond as a justice of the peace on 19 June 1967 at 11:30 a. m., approximately four days after the issuance of the warrant. This being true, Daniel S. Walker was a de facto justice of the peace under the rule that a person is a de facto officer where the duties of the office were exercised "under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer failed to conform to some precedent requirement or condition, as to take an oath, give a bond, or the like." State v. Lewis, 107 N.C. 967, 12 S.E. 457, 13 S.E. 247, 11 L.R.A. 105; Hinson v. Britt, 232 N.C. 379, 61 S.E.2d 185. The words in quotation marks set forth in State v. Lewis, supra, are quoted from the scholarly and exhaustive opinion by Chief Justice Butler of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in the leading case of State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am.Rep. 409. A comprehensive definition of a de facto officer is found in Waite v. City of *628 Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302, 323, 22 S. Ct. 327, 334, 46 L. Ed. 552, 566, as follows: The same general idea has been expressed by this Court in State v. Lewis, supra. The acts of a de facto officer are valid in law in respect to the public whom he represents and to third persons with whom he deals officially. In re Wingler, 231 N.C. 560, 58 S.E.2d 372; Hinson v. Britt, supra. We held as far back as 1844 in an opinion bearing the illustrious name of Chief Justice Ruffin in the case of Gilliam v. Reddick, 26 N.C. 368, as correctly summarized in the headnote, as follows: In State of Delaware v. Pack (Superior Court of Delaware), 188 A.2d 524, the Court held, under a statute substantially similar to our G.S. § 7-114.1, as correctly summarized in the second headnote, as follows: In People v. Payment, 109 Mich. 553, 67 N.W. 689, the Court held, as correctly summarized in the first headnote in the North Western Reporter series: See to the same effect: Canty v. Bockenstedt, 170 Minn. 383, 212 N.W. 905; Cox v. State, 89 Okl.Cr. 256, 206 P.2d 1005. In In re Wingler, supra, the Court said: It cannot be gainsaid that Daniel S. Walker was at least a justice of the peace de facto when he issued the warrant in the instant case. The Court in In re Wingler, supra, further said: The issuance of the warrant in this case was effectual in law, for Daniel S. Walker was at least a justice of the peace de facto when he issued the warrant. His issuance of the warrant cannot be collaterally attacked, because the acts done by him as a justice of the peace de facto in issuing this warrant are as effectual so far as the rights of third persons or the public are concerned as if he were a justice of the peace de jure. The de facto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interests of the public and individuals, where those interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office, without being lawful officers. The public cannot reasonably be compelled to inquire into the title of an officer, nor be compelled to show a title, and these have become settled principles in the law. In 1461, on the accession of Edward IV, Parliament declared the previous Henrys of Lancaster usurpers, but to avoid great public mischief, also declared them Kings de facto, and persons were punished in that reign for treason to Henry VI, not in aid of the lawful claimant of the crown. 1 Blackstone's Commentaries (reprint of the first edition, London, 1966) 197. Defendant's contention that the warrant in this case was void because the justice of the peace at the time of the issuance of the warrant had not given a bond as provided by G.S. § 7-114.1 finds no support in our decisions, or in the law elsewhere, and is untenable. A study of the record shows that the State offered plenary evidence sufficient to carry the case to the jury. Defendant assigns as error that defendant's wife, Betty Porter, was called by the State as a witness and testified against him as follows: By the provisions of G.S. § 8-57 defendant's wife was not competent as a witness to testify against him in this trial except to prove the fact of marriage and in other respects not material here. State v. Cotton, 218 N.C. 577, 12 S.E.2d 246; State v. Dillahunt, 244 N.C. 524, 94 S.E.2d 479. The defendant was not represented by counsel in his trial in the Superior Court and did not except to his wife's testimony. In this Court he is represented by counsel and he excepts to this testimony and assigns it as error. Ordinarily, failure to object in apt time to incompetent testimony will be regarded as a waiver of objection, and its admission is not assignable as error, but this rule is subject to an exception where *630 the introduction or use of the evidence is forbidden by statute as here by the provisions of G.S. § 8-57. When the evidence rendered incompetent by statute was admitted, it became the duty of the trial judge to exclude the testimony, and his failure to do so must be held reversible error whether exception was noted or not. State v. Warren, 236 N.C. 358, 72 S.E.2d 763. While the testimony of defendant's wife does not contain a direct and positive statement of guilt on the part of her husband, the inference is unmistakably incriminating and harmful. For the admission in evidence of the testimony of defendant's wife, defendant is entitled to a New trial.