Case Title: Rich v. Montpelier Supervisory District

Citation: 167 Vt. 415, 709 A.2d 501

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rich v. Montpelier Supervisory District  (97-010); 167 Vt. 415; 709 A.2d 501

[Filed 23-Jan-1998]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 97-010

William Rich and Montpelier                  Supreme Court
Education Association
                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       Washington Superior Court

Montpelier Supervisory District, et al.      September Term, 1997

John P. Meaker, J.

       Devin McLaughlin of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, and Donna
  Watts, Vermont-NEA, Montpelier, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

       Robert McKearin of Dinse, Erdmann, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Burlington,
  for Defendants-Appellees.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       JOHNSON, J.  William Rich appeals a summary judgment order by the
  Washington Superior Court (1) upholding the decision of the Montpelier
  School Board to nonrenew his contract as a probationary teacher and, (2)
  determining that the Superintendent of the Montpelier Supervisory District
  is entitled to qualified immunity from Rich's civil rights claims.  We
  affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

       Rich taught seventh-grade science and language arts as a probationary
  teacher at the Main Street Middle School in Montpelier for the 1992-93 and
  1993-94 school years.  Rich's employment contract was governed by a
  collective bargaining agreement (Agreement) between the Montpelier
  Education Association, the teachers' union, and the board.  In the event a
  teacher's contract was not to be renewed for the following year, the
  Agreement required that the teacher be given notice of the nonrenewal by
  March 15, and provided the teacher with the right to a hearing before the
  board.

       On March 15, 1994, Rich attended a meeting with the superintendent to
  discuss his

 

  contract and to address several issues that the superintendent believed
  warranted its nonrenewal. The meeting culminated in an agreement to extend
  the deadline for the renewal of Rich's contract by six weeks, to provide an
  opportunity for Rich to resolve the issues through negotiation with the
  school principal.  Later the same day, however, Rich informed the
  superintendent that he would not honor the agreement.  The superintendent
  then sent Rich a letter, dated March 15, informing him that his contract
  would not be renewed.  The March 15 letter also stated that Rich's contract
  was not renewed because of concerns about his judgment and self-control.

       Rich requested a hearing before the board on May 3.  The board denied
  the request as untimely, and Rich brought this suit seeking a determination
  that he is entitled to the renewal of his contract as well as damages for
  alleged violations of his civil rights.  The trial court granted summary
  judgment in favor of defendants, and this appeal followed.

       Rich claims that the trial court erred by 1) holding that his
  procedural claims are barred for failure to exhaust his administrative
  remedies under the Agreement, 2) granting summary judgment to defendants on
  his procedural due process claims, and 3) granting summary judgment to
  defendants on his civil-rights claims, based on its conclusion that the
  superintendent was immune from suit.

                                     I.

       We first address Rich's contractual claim.  Rich does not dispute that
  he requested a hearing before the board after the deadline provided for in
  the Agreement.  Rather, he argues that the March 15 letter was not notice
  of nonrenewal within the meaning of the Agreement because the board had not
  voted to nonrenew Rich before the letter was mailed.  Therefore, he argues
  that the March 15 letter could not have triggered an obligation on his part
  to request a hearing pursuant to the Agreement.  Because the Agreement
  provides for automatic renewal of a teacher's contract unless the teacher
  is given notice of nonrenewal, Rich concludes that he is entitled to a
  teaching contract.  We disagree.

 

       It is undisputed that the board did not officially act to nonrenew
  Rich before the superintendent sent the March 15 letter.(FN1)  This does not,
  however, excuse Rich from following the grievance procedure in the
  Agreement.  "[A]n employee subject to a collective bargaining agreement,
  who has a grievance within the scope of that agreement's grievance and
  arbitration procedure, must exhaust the remedies available under that
  agreement before he may maintain a suit against his employer."  Burkhart v.
  Mobil Oil Corp., 143 Vt. 123, 126,