Case Title: Swetich v. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1990-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Swetich v. Smith1990 WY 140802 P.2d 869Case Number: 90-64Decided: 12/11/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
Daniel William SWETICH, 

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Carolyn SMITH, f/k/a 
Carolyn Swetich, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Campbell County, Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

Peggy Taylor 
Pfau of Daly, Anderson and Taylor, P.C., Gillette, for 
appellant.

Robert W. 
Connor, Jr., Sheridan, for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      Daniel Swetich 
signed a separation agreement in which he agreed to pay his wife Carolyn Smith, 
f/k/a Carolyn Swetich, alimony of $600 per month for ten years, with a six 
percent annual increase escalation factor. This negotiated separation agreement 
was incorporated into their divorce decree. Carolyn remarried and Daniel 
promptly stopped making his alimony payments. Daniel now appeals the district 
court decision which indicated his agreement to pay alimony did not 
automatically terminate upon Carolyn's remarriage.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Daniel, as 
appellant, raises two issues:

1. The district court 
erred in its construction of the decree in not finding that as a matter of 
public policy and as a matter of law, that alimony must terminate automatically 
upon the remarriage of a party.

2. The district court 
erred as a matter of law by awarding arrearages in alimony after the wife 
remarried.

FACTS

[¶4]      In March 1982, 
Carolyn filed for divorce. Carolyn and Daniel signed a Stipulation and Agreement 
in which Daniel agreed inter alia to pay Carolyn $600 per month.1 Their agreement made no provision 
for the termination of the alimony payments upon the remarriage of Carolyn or 
the death of either. Carolyn remarried in 1987 and Daniel quit making payments 
to her at that time. The district court decided that the alimony did not 
terminate automatically but may be terminated by the district court upon motion 
and after a hearing. The district court awarded $21,710.00 for alimony accruing 
for the period of January 1987 through October 27, 1988.2 Daniel appeals.

DISCUSSION

Issue 
I

[¶5]      Daniel asks that 
we construe the agreement to provide for automatic termination of alimony upon 
remarriage in the absence of any agreed termination provision in the agreement. 
His basic argument is that, traditionally, alimony ends upon remarriage as a 
matter of law. Daniel cites several cases which tend to support that 
proposition. Only recently, we indicated "[a]limony payments terminate on the 
death of either party or on the remarriage of the payee." Sellers v. Sellers, 
775 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Wyo. 1989) (accord Warren v. Warren, 361 P.2d 525 (Wyo. 
1961)). There was also language in Neagle v. Neagle, 481 P.2d 661, 663 (Wyo. 
1971) (Neagle I), which indicates "alimony payments * * * cease upon the 
remarriage or death of [the payee]."

[¶6]      While Daniel 
argues with some force for that proposition, another factor must be considered 
that the argument advanced and the cases cited by Daniel do not accommodate. 
Daniel's argument does not weigh the continuing jurisdiction of the district 
court to modify decrees, Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029, and the cited cases do not 
involve decree incorporated term payment separation agreements and do not 
provide any express termination on remarriage proviso.

[¶7]      In Hendrickson v. 
Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Wyo. 1978), we said "an award always remains 
open; and upon application, where conditions and circumstances have changed, the 
trial court can provide relief and modify the allowance." Necessarily, 
modification of the award for the payment of alimony is to be made by the 
district judge, not by a unilateral decision by the payor.

[¶8]      This approach is 
similar to that used in other jurisdictions. In Marquardt v. Marquardt by 
Rempfer, 396 N.W.2d 753 (S.D. 1986), a separation agreement incorporated by 
reference into the divorce decree provided for alimony payments but did not 
provide for the termination of alimony upon remarriage of the payee. The 
ex-husband moved to have alimony support terminated after his ex-wife remarried. 
In that case, the court held that remarriage is prima facie evidence that 
alimony should be terminated and shifts to the payee the burden of showing 
extraordinary circumstances which might require continued payments of alimony. 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota relied upon In re Marriage of Shima, 360 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1985) for its rationale.

[¶9]      In In re Marriage 
of Shima, the Iowa Supreme Court indicated that while alimony did not terminate 
automatically upon remarriage, the burden was upon the payee to demonstrate 
extraordinary circumstances which could justify continued alimony payments. The 
Supreme Court of Iowa had relied upon Wolter v. Wolter, 183 Neb. 160, 158 N.W.2d 616, 619 (1968) for its rationale. In Wolter, the Nebraska Supreme Court held 
that remarriage does not automatically terminate a right to alimony but makes a 
prima face case which can only be overcome by a showing by the payee of 
extraordinary circumstances justifying a continuation of alimony.

[¶10]   There is also a substantial body of 
cases and accommodating statutes determining that termination of alimony is 
automatic upon remarriage. See Voyles v. Voyles, 644 P.2d 847 (Alaska 1982); 
Myers v. Myers, 62 Utah 90, 218 P. 123 (1923); Ala. Code § 30-2-55 (1989); 
Cal.Civ. Code § 4801(b) (West 1983 & Cum.Supp. 1990); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 
14-10-122(2) (1987 & Cum.Supp. 1990); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1519(b) 
(1981); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 125.150.5 (Cum.Supp. 1989); and N.Y.Dom.Rel.Law § 248 
(McKinney 1986). See also Kuhns' Estate v. Kuhns, 550 P.2d 816 (Alaska 1976) 
(death case) and Cecil v. Cecil, 11 Utah 2d 155, 356 P.2d 279 (1960). See the 
conflict within reported cases detailed in Annotation, Alimony as Affected by 
Wife's Remarriage, In Absence of Controlling Specific Statute, 48 A.L.R.2d 270 
(1956) and later case service.

[¶11]   Resolution of this case will be 
confined to its factual content. It presents an agreement for periodic alimony 
payments with a stated term and no remarriage termination condition.3 We need not write an all inclusive 
rule for nonagreement cases to decide this case where the agreement of the 
parties initially created the obligation. Dorr v. Newman, 785 P.2d 1172 (Wyo. 
1990). Since the agreement and the decree into which it was incorporated made no 
provision for automatic termination where each document contained a term period 
for alimony payment, the remedy available to the alimony obligor is reserved to 
a petition to modify the decree. Sellers, 775 P.2d 1029; Buchler v. Buchler, 65 
Wyo. 452, 202 P.2d 670 (1949). Remarriage could be a change of circumstance, but 
it does not automatically cancel the obligation provided in the decree without 
amendatory court action.4 Beck v. Beck, 208 Kan. 148, 490 P.2d 628 (1971).

[¶12]   Daniel argues expressively that a 
different result is required because of an income tax provision which was 
included in the original decree:

"Defendant shall be 
entitled to deduct the alimony portion of his payments as stated in this 
paragraph from his taxes, likewise, plaintiff shall include same as income, 
pursuant to Internal Revenue Service regulations."

The argument 
presented is to recognize that under IRS regulations, the payment might not be 
properly deductible as alimony unless the contingencies of death or remarriage 
existed concurrently with the decree-established payment obligation. This court 
will not determine tax deductibility in order to imply into an agreement a 
termination provision that had not been written by the parties. Dorr, 785 P.2d 1172.

[¶13]   We are satisfied that in this case 
the argument by Daniel has no merit. In his brief, Daniel quotes from the Code 
of Federal Regulations the following:

Where payments under a 
decree, instrument, or agreement are to be paid over a period ending 10 years or 
less from the date of such decree, instrument, or agreement, such payments are 
not installment payments * * * (and are considered periodic payments for the 
purposes of section 71(a)) only if such payments meet the following two 
conditions:

     (a) Such payments are 
subject to any one or more of the contingencies of death of either spouse, 
remarriage of the wife, or change in the economic status of either spouse, 
and

     (b) Such payments are 
in the nature of alimony or an allowance for support.

IRC and 
Treas.Regs. § 1.71-1(d)(3)(i) (Matthew Bender 1990). Daniel goes on to state in 
his brief that "[t]he parties had already modified it once based on economic 
changes of Mr. Swetich when he lost his job."

[¶14]   Daniel's expressed concern is that 
because the payments to Carolyn were not automatically stopped by her remarriage 
then they could not be deducted by him in computing his federal income tax 
liability. The requirements of subparagraph (a) of the foregoing regulation 
clearly are expressed in the alternative, and it seems to be the law of this 
case that a "change in the economic status of either spouse" has been recognized 
as a contingency to which the required payments are subject. Consequently, the 
judgment of the district court should not in any way inhibit the income tax 
deductibility of these alimony payments.

[¶15]   We hold that modification of the 
alimony decree in this case was not automatically accomplished without district 
court petition upon remarriage of the spouse.

Issue 
II

[¶16]   Daniel's second issue begins with 
the assumption that he prevailed on the first issue.5 Because Daniel did not prevail on 
the first issue, the argument behind the second issue is without 
force.

CONCLUSION

[¶17]   For the reasons advanced, the 
district court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The provision 
provided:

Commencing April 15, 
1982, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff in the form of alimony the sum of 
Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per month, which sum shall continue for a period 
of ten (10) years (One Hundred Twenty-Four (124) payments) from the above date, 
inclusive. On April 15, 1983, the above sum shall be increased by six percent 
(6%), and an additional six percent (6%) increase shall be paid on each May 15 
thereafter for the entire term of ten (10) years. All increases shall be based 
upon the prior years' figure. Defendant shall be entitled to deduct the alimony 
portion of his payments as stated in this paragraph from his taxes, likewise, 
plaintiff shall include same as income, pursuant to Internal Revenue Service 
regulations.

2 A petition to modify 
remained pending before a different judge at the time of initiation of this 
appeal. Its status or disposition is not shown in this record.

3 In addition to the 
non-inclusion of a remarriage provision, the agreement lacked any death clause, 
e.g., to early terminate upon remarriage or the death of either party. Also 
absent was any non-modification provision. See In re Marriage of Sherman, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 208 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1984) and Driscoll v. O'Reilly, 486 So. 2d 693 (Fla.App. 1986).

4 We specifically do not 
determine whether automatic termination occurs where there is a defining 
provision in an agreement between the divorcing parties or if there was no 
agreement and no provision stated in the initial decree. See, for example, 
Daniel v. Baker, 794 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1990).

5 "Since the alimony 
terminated automatically upon remarriage of Appellee, there can be no Judgment 
entered for amounts past due."