Case Title: Ex Parte Daniels

Citation: 534 So. 2d 656

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1986-09-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
534 So. 2d 656 (1986)
Ex parte John Ronald DANIELS.
Re: John Ronald Daniels
v.
State.
No. 85-442.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 5, 1986.
John Bertolotti, Jr., Mobile, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Helen P. Nelson and Ed Carnes, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.
PER CURIAM:
John Ronald Daniels, the defendant herein, was indicted and convicted under Alabama's 1975 capital punishment statute, §§ 13-11-1 through 13-11-9, Code 1975 (repealed 1981).[1] For the murders of Cheryl Moore and Richard Brune he received the death penalty pursuant to § 13-11-2(a)(10), which proscribes that penalty upon a conviction of first degree murder wherein two or more people are intentionally killed by one or a series of acts. In an excellent opinion, authored by Judge Patterson, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction, but found error in the trial court's sentencing order and remanded for resentencing. See Daniels v. State, 534 So. 2d 628 (Ala.Cr.App.1985). The defendant filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted pursuant to Rule 39(c), Ala.R.App.P.
Having carefully read and considered the record, together with the briefs and arguments of counsel, we conclude that the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
SHORES, BEATTY, ADAMS, HOUSTON[2] and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.
TORBERT, C.J., and JONES and ALMON, JJ., dissent.
MADDOX, J., not sitting.
*657 TORRBERT, Chief Justice (dissenting).
The defendant contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in its determination that he was not prejudiced, and thus was not entitled to a new trial, because of the application of the "preclusion clause" in § 13-11-2(a), Code 1975, which precluded any instructions to the jury concerning lesser included offenses. I agree that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred; therefore, I dissent.
Applying the test which this Court set out in Cook v. State, 431 So. 2d 1322 (Ala. 1983), to determine the effect of the preclusion clause on a trial held prior to Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645 (Ala.1980), the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that there was no evidence presented at trial upon which a conviction of a lesser included offense could have been based. The court correctly acknowledged that the defendant's assertion of an alibi defense did not foreclose his right to jury instructions on any lesser included offenses. See Ex parte Pruitt, 457 So. 2d 456 (Ala.1984); Ex parte Stork, 475 So. 2d 623 (Ala. 1985). A defendant has a right to have the jury instructed on lesser included offenses if there is a reasonable theory from the evidence supporting his or her position, regardless of whether the State or the defendant offers the evidence. Ex parte Pruitt, supra.
In Chavers v. State, 361 So. 2d 1106 (Ala. 1978), the Court stated:
The defendant argues that the jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence presented at trial that he was guilty of the noncapital offense of first degree murder. Defendant argues in his brief:
The thrust of the defendant's argument is that the jury could have reasonably inferred that, although he traveled to Alabama for the purpose of assisting Phillip Tomlin in the killing of Ricky Brune, he was not actually present at the time the murders took place and, thus, that he lacked the "particularized intent" to kill Cheryl Moore. See Ex parte Raines, 429 So. 2d 1111 (Ala.1982) (requiring proof of a "particularized intent to kill" by a non-triggerman accomplice).
Having carefully read and considered the record, I think it does appear that the credibility of Melvin Turberville was subject to serious question by the jury. His testimony was the only evidence directly placing the defendant at the scene of the murders. There was also evidence that Tomlin and Charles Shanks were seen getting out of a car at the Shanks residence a short distance from the murder scene and within minutes of the time of the murders. One of them was carrying a shotgun.
In light of the above, it is certainly within reason to suppose that the jury, after considering the evidence as a whole, could have found the defendant guilty of first degree murder had they been afforded the opportunity.
I would hold that the defendant was prejudiced by the application of the preclusion clause. Therefore, I dissent.
JONES and ALMON, JJ., concur.
[1]  The 1975 capital punishment statute, as contained in §§ 13-11-1 through 13-11-9, was carried over intact to the new criminal code as §§ 13A-5-30 through 13A-5-38. These sections of the new criminal code were repealed, effective July 1, 1981, by the 1981 capital offense statute, but only as to conduct occurring on or after July 1, 1981. Therefore, conduct occurring before July 1, 1981, as in the present case, is governed by the preexisting law, i.e., §§13-11-1 through 13-11-9. See Spears v. State, 428 So. 2d 174 (Ala.Cr.App.1982).
[2]  Although Justice Houston did not sit at oral arguments, he has listened to the tapes of the arguments.