Case Title: Ex parte Nancy Worley, individually, and Beth Chapman, individually and in her official capacity as Secetary of State. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Anita Tatum v. Nancy Worley, in her individual capacity and Beth Chapman, in her official capacity as Alabama Secretary of State and in her individual capacity)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1070543

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2009-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel. 12/30/2009
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2009-2010
____________________
1070543
____________________
Ex parte Nancy Worley, individually, and Beth Chapman,
individually and in her official capacity as Secretary of
State
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Anita Tatum
v.
Nancy Worley, in her individual capacity, and Beth Chapman,
in her official capacity as Secretary of State and in her
individual capacity)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-07-879)
PARKER, Justice.
1070543
2
Nancy Worley, Alabama's former secretary of state, and
her successor, Beth Chapman, the current secretary of state,
petition this Court seeking  a writ of mandamus directing the
Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its  order of December 13,
2007, denying their motion for a judgment on the pleadings
seeking the dismissal of the claims of Worley's former
subordinate, Anita Tatum, based on lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. For the reasons presented below, we issue the
writ.
Background and Procedural Posture
On October 19, 2004, Tatum resigned her position in the
Office of the Secretary of State as supervisor of voter
registration. On October 29, 2004, she filed a notice of
appeal to the State Personnel Board, alleging that her
resignation was coerced and that it was, in actuality, not a
resignation but an involuntary "constructive" termination.
According to the complaint Tatum filed in the Montgomery
Circuit Court, Worley called Tatum to Worley's office at about
3:30 p.m. on October 19, 2004, and demanded an explanation for
a discrepancy between the number of registered voters on the
Secretary of State’s Web site and the number of registered
1070543
3
voters on the Alabama Voter Information Network ("ALVIN"), the
statewide voter-registration system. Worley directed Tatum to
provide an explanation for the discrepancy by 5:00 p.m. that
day.  
Tatum alleged that because of her lack of technical
expertise with ALVIN, completing the task would require the
assistance of an experienced technician. According to Tatum,
Worley denied her request for the assistance of the computer
technician responsible for maintaining ALVIN. Tatum further
alleges that Worley did not provide her with information
identifying the specific counties in which the discrepancies
existed. 
When she was unsuccessful in identifying the reason for
the discrepancies within the required time, Tatum  drafted and
presented a memorandum to Worley stating that she needed more
time to complete the task. Tatum contends that Worley
responded in a "hostile and demeaning tone," stating that a
reporter was asking questions about the discrepancies and that
Tatum could either resign or be fired. Tatum alleged that
later that day Worley delivered to her a prepared letter of
resignation and demanded that Tatum make an immediate decision
1070543
4
regarding her alternatives. Tatum requested time to consider
her options and to consult with legal counsel, but Worley
denied the request. Instead, Tatum alleges, Worley summoned
the personnel director for the Secretary of State's Office,
who gave Tatum what she describes as "tentative, incomplete,
and inaccurate advice concerning her two options." Allegedly
fearing that termination would cause a forfeiture of the
retirement benefits she had accrued during 21 years of state
employment, Tatum signed the letter of resignation. 
Worley's and Chapman's version of these facts, as
presented in their joint brief to this Court, is slightly
different, although the differences are not substantial.
Their brief states that Worley gave Tatum the choice either of
resigning or of being suspended pending an investigation.
Also, according to the version of the facts in their brief,
the tone of the exchanges between Worley and Tatum was matter-
of-fact, rather than hostile.  
After consulting with legal counsel, Tatum decided to
appeal her resignation, which she considered to be a
"constructive termination," and 10 days later, on October 29,
2004, Tatum filed a notice of appeal with the State Personnel
1070543
5
Board. The content of the notice of appeal is unavailable to
us, but in a letter dated November 5, 2004, to Tatum's legal
counsel, the Personnel Board advised Tatum as follows:
"Our records ... indicate that [Tatum] resigned her
position .... Our rules do not allow an appeal of a
resignation, 
nor 
do 
we 
have 
jurisdiction 
to
determine whether a constructive discharge occurred
under our termination appeal statute.
"Based on your letter, however, it appears that
you are alleging that retaliation or discrimination
by 
the 
appointing 
authority 
prompted 
the
resignation. ... If this is the basis of your
complaint, an appeal right exists pursuant to Rule
670-X-4-.03 of the Rules of the State personnel
Board which states in part:
"'Any applicant or employee who has reason
to believe that he has been discriminated
against because or religious or political
opinions or affiliations or race, sex,
national origin, age or handicap in any
personnel action may appeal to the State
Personnel Board.'
"Should the Board determine that discrimination
has occurred, it has the authority to reinstate
[Tatum] or take other appropriate corrective action.
Please advise how you wish to proceed."
Tatum's brief, Exh. H. 
Tatum apparently indicated to the Personnel Board  that
her appeal included a claim under Rule 670-X-4-.03, Ala.
Admin. Code (Alabama State Personnel Board), because, after a
three-day hearing on November 14-16, 2005, the administrative
1070543
The parties do not explain the significance of the phrase
1
"facts which prove to be false or inaccurate," nor do they
provide the Court a copy of the administrative ruling, which
Worley and Chapman refer to as a 56-page opinion.
6
law judge hearing the appeal concluded both that Tatum had
resigned her position, obviating the Board's jurisdiction over
the appeal, and that Worley’s actions did not constitute an
unlawful form of nonmerit-factor discrimination sufficient to
trigger 
jurisdiction 
under 
Rule 
670-X-4-.03. 
The
administrative law judge therefore determined that the State
Personnel Board did not have jurisdiction over the appeal, but
she recommended to the Board that the nonmerit factors  under
which the Board may exercise jurisdiction be extended to
include actions based upon "facts which prove to be false or
inaccurate."  Tatum then appealed the decision of the
1
administrative law judge to the full State Personnel Board.
On April 18, 2007, that Board issued the following decision:
"This matter came before the Board upon the
authority of Ala. Admin. Code § 670-X-4-.03. [Tatum]
resigned her position with the Secretary of State's
Office and thereafter filed this appeal. This matter
was assigned to Julia J. Weller as Administrative
Law 
Judge 
who 
recommended 
the 
extension 
of
jurisdiction of a non-merit factor to include
actions based upon 'facts which prove to be false or
inaccurate.'
"The Board finds that there was a resignation
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7
and the Board declines to extend jurisdiction under
Ala. Admin. Code  § 670-X-4-.03 to include as a non-
merit factor 'facts which prove to be false or
inaccurate.'
"....
"It is therefore the Order of this Board that
this APPEAL is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE."
Petition, Exh. F (capitalization in original).
On May 18, 2007, Tatum filed a notice of appeal to the
Montgomery Circuit Court, as required by § 41-22-20, Ala. Code
1975, a part of the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act, §
41-22-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the AAPA"). Section 41-22-20
provides the procedure for soliciting judicial review of final
decisions of administrative agencies within the State. The
section provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) 
A 
person 
who 
has 
exhausted 
all
administrative remedies available within the agency,
other than rehearing, and who is aggrieved by a
final decision in a contested case is entitled to
judicial review under this chapter. ...
"(b) 
All 
proceedings 
for 
review 
may 
be
instituted by filing of notice of appeal or review
and a cost bond with the agency to cover the
reasonable costs of preparing the transcript of the
proceeding under review, unless waived by the agency
or the court on a showing of substantial hardship.
A petition shall be filed either in the Circuit
Court of Montgomery County or in the circuit court
of the county in which the agency maintains its
headquarters, 
or 
unless 
otherwise 
specifically
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8
provided by statute, in the circuit court of the
county where a party other than an intervenor,
resides or if a party, other than an intervenor, is
a corporation, domestic or foreign, having a
registered office or business office in this state,
then in the county of the registered office or
principal place of business within this state.
"....
"(d) The notice of appeal or review shall be
filed within 30 days after the receipt of the notice
of or other service of the final decision of the
agency upon the petitioner .... The petition for
judicial review in the circuit court shall be filed
within 30 days after the filing of the notice of
appeal or review. ... Failure to file such petition
within the time stated shall operate as a waiver of
the right of such person to review under this
chapter .... This section shall apply to judicial
review from the final order or action of all
agencies ....
"....
"h) The petition for review shall name the
agency as respondent and shall contain a concise
statement of:
"(1) The nature of the agency action
which is the subject of the petition;
"(2) The particular agency action
appealed from;
"(3) The facts and law on which
jurisdiction and venue are based;
"(4) The grounds on which relief is
sought; and
"(5) The relief sought."
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(Emphasis added.)
On May 30, 2007, Tatum, departing from the procedures
outlined in the AAPA, filed a complaint in the Montgomery
Circuit Court, naming former Secretary of State Worley in her
individual capacity and Secretary of State Chapman in her
official capacity and in her individual capacity. She invoked
the jurisdiction of the trial court, relying on Fields v.
State, 534 So. 2d 615  (Ala. Civ. App. 1993), and arguing that
when a statute provides no right of appeal or statutory
certiorari review, the common-law writ of certiorari is the
only available means of review and original jurisdiction is
proper in the circuit court. In her complaint, Tatum sought a
common-law writ of certiorari to review her allegedly unlawful
dismissal, reinstatement to her position, damages for the
deprivation of her property interest in continued employment,
compensatory and punitive damages for Worley's alleged
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and attorney
fees. In addition, Tatum requested a judgment declaring that
her resignation was involuntary, that Worley had violated her
constitutional 
rights 
without 
due 
process, 
that 
her
resignation was actually a constructive termination, that
1070543
10
Worley 
arbitrarily 
dismissed 
Tatum, 
and 
that 
Tatum's
resignation 
was 
obtained 
by 
coercion, 
duress, 
and
misrepresentation.
 
In the petition for a writ of mandamus, Chapman claims
that Tatum's claims against her for money damages and attorney
fees are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Tatum
responds by citing Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 83
(1989), for the premise that a "state employee is not
protected by § 14[, Ala. Const. 1901,] when [the employee]
acts 'wilfully, maliciously, illegally, fraudulently, in bad
faith, 
beyond 
his 
authority, 
or 
under 
a 
mistaken
interpretation of the law.'" Tatum's brief, at 52.   
In response to Tatum's complaint, Worley and Chapman
moved the trial court for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing 1) that Tatum may not
maintain an independent action after availing herself of the
appellate process of the State Personnel Board; 2) that any
claim against Chapman in her official capacity is barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity; 3) that the claims against
Worley and Chapman in their individual capacities are barred
by the doctrine of State-agent immunity; 4) that the claims
1070543
11
are barred by the statute of limitations; and 5) that Tatum's
claim asserting intentional infliction of emotional distress
fails as a matter of law. The trial court issued an order
denying their motion, and Worley and Chapman seek a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to vacate that order and to
enter a judgment on the pleadings.
Standard of Review 
"[M]andamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ to
be issued only where there is (1) a clear legal
right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court."
  
Ex parte Alfab, Inc., 586 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991).
Mandamus is a proper remedy for a trial court’s refusal
to dismiss a case for failure to comply with the necessary
procedures for appeal set out in the AAPA. See, e.g., Ex parte
Crestwood Hosp. & Nursing Home, Inc., 670 So. 2d 45 (Ala.
1995). Further, "[a] petition for a writ of mandamus 'is an
appropriate means for seeking review of an order denying a
claim of immunity.' Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 176 (Ala.
2000)." Ex parte Haralson,  853 So. 2d 928, 931 (Ala. 2003).
"In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss
by means of a mandamus petition, we do not change
1070543
12
our standard of review. ... Under Rule 12(b)(6),
Ala. R. Civ. P., a motion to dismiss is proper when
it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set
of circumstances upon which relief can be granted.
Cook v. Lloyd Noland Found., Inc., 825 So. 2d 83, 89
(Ala. 2001). '"In making this determination, this
Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail, but only whether [she] may
possibly prevail."' Id. (quoting Nance v. Matthews,
622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993)). We construe all
doubts regarding the sufficiency of the complaint in
favor of the plaintiff. [Ex parte] Butts, 775 So. 2d
[173] at 177 [(Ala. 2000)]."
Analysis
Alabama provides statutory procedures in the AAPA for
reviewing the actions of administrative agencies. It is a
mainstay of administrative procedure that a party must exhaust
all applicable administrative remedies before seeking relief
in the courts. § 41-22-20(a), Ala. Code 1975. The purpose of
these administrative procedures is "[t]o simplify the process
of judicial review of agency action as well as increase its
ease and availability. In accomplishing its objectives, the
intention of this chapter is to strike a fair balance between
these purposes and the need for efficient, economical and
effective government administration." § 41-22-2(b)(7), Ala.
Code 1975. To allow a plaintiff to raise issues in court that
have been addressed by an administrative agency, without
1070543
13
having exhausted that administrative process, would frustrate
the orderly administration of justice. See Ex parte Gadsden
Country Club, 14 So. 3d 830, 832 (Ala. 2009).
Although a party seeking review of a ruling by an
administrative agency may petition the court for a common-law
writ of certiorari, this means of review is allowable only
when no statutory right of appeal or statutory certiorari
review is available.  Collins v. Alabama Dep't of Corr., 982
So. 2d 1078, 1080 (Ala. 2007). Section 41-22-20, Ala. Code
1975, however, explicitly provides both a statutory vehicle
for obtaining judicial review and a definition of the required
process. This statutory process, by its existence, forecloses
review by way of a petition for a common-law writ of
certiorari.
Tatum contends that her claims were not constrained by
the AAPA because, she says,  her appeal to the Personnel Board
was not a "contested case" within the meaning of § 41-22-20,
Ala. Code 1975, which states in subsection (a) that "[a]
person ... who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested
case is entitled to judicial review ...." A "contested case"
is defined in § 41-22-3(3), Ala. Code 1975, as "[a] proceeding
1070543
14
... in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party
are required by law to be determined by an agency after an
opportunity for hearing."  Tatum argues that, because the
Personnel Board declined jurisdiction and did not adjudicate
her appeal "on the merits," she is not aggrieved by a final
decision in a contested case and, thus, that the AAPA does not
govern her claim.
Tatum 
also cites in support of this
contention Rule 41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which states that an
involuntary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an
adjudication on the merits. However, Rule 81(b),  Ala. R. Civ.
P., states that "[t]hese rules are not applicable to any
proceeding in which the adjudication of the controversy is by
... an administrative agency or official body of any kind,
other than the courts enumerated in Rule 1."  Therefore, Rule
41(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., does not apply to the decisions of an
administrative agency, and it does not provide support for
Tatum's position. 
As support for her claim that the AAPA applies only to
adjudications on the merits, Tatum cites Jones v. Alabama
State Board of Pharmacy, 624 So. 2d 613, 614 (Ala. Civ. App.
1993). The portion of Jones Tatum cites states: 
1070543
15
"Appellate review of administrative actions is
limited to a determination of 'whether the agency
acted within its powers conferred upon it by law and
the constitution, whether its decision is supported
by substantial evidence, and whether the agency’s
decision is reasonable and not arbitrary.'"
It is unclear why Tatum offered this case as support; it
concerns how a court will review an agency decision, not
whether judicial review of an agency decision is available or
required.
Despite Tatum’s contention, the AAPA does not use the
phrase "on the merits."  Rather, it states that a party
aggrieved by a "final decision" is entitled to judicial
review.  A "final decision" is one that garners the support of
"a majority of the officials who are to render the final
order." § 41-22-15, Ala. Code 1975. The Personnel Board
determined as a matter of fact that Tatum had resigned, and
because Tatum's resignation was not the result of nonmerit
discrimination, as defined by Rule 670-X-4-.03, Ala. Admin.
Code (Alabama State Personnel Board), the Board declined to
follow the administrative law judge's recommendation and
extend its jurisdiction under Rule 670-X-4-.03 in order to
reach Tatum's claims. Because Tatum had resigned, leaving
nothing to adjudicate, the Personnel Board dismissed her
1070543
16
appeal with prejudice. The  order was signed by a majority of
the officials empowered to render the order and was,
therefore, a final decision.
Tatum also curiously alleges that "the question whether
Tatum resigned was never at issue before the Personnel Board.
Instead, the gravamen of Tatum’s claim to the Personnel Board
was that her resignation was involuntary."  Tatum's brief, at
39.  Only by a twist of logic could one assert that the State
Personnel Board never considered whether Tatum resigned, when,
in fact, the Personnel Board determined that it lacked
jurisdiction over Tatum's appeal only after it found that
Tatum had resigned.  
This conclusion was reached after a hearing held before
an administrative law judge over the course of three days and
a subsequent hearing before the Board. Despite Tatum’s
assertion that the Board never adjudicated the claim on the
merits, the Board had to consider Tatum’s claim to determine
whether it would extend jurisdiction to reach the claim.  The
nature of Tatum’s separation from her employment in the
Secretary of State's Office was a threshold factual question
the Board had to determine.
1070543
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The AAPA requires that one unhappy with the agency's
determination petition the circuit court for review. The
petition for review in the circuit court must "name the agency
as respondent and shall contain a concise statement of: (1)
The nature of the agency action which is the subject of the
petition; (2) The particular agency action appealed from; (3)
The facts and law on which jurisdiction and venue are based;
(4) The grounds on which relief is sought; and (5) The relief
sought."  § 41-22-20(h), Ala. Code 1975. Instead of a petition
naming the State Personnel Board as respondent as required
under (1) above, Tatum filed in the circuit court a complaint
naming Worley and Chapman, individually and in her capacity as
secretary of state, as defendants. Tatum's complaint did not
state that in filing the complaint she was appealing a
decision by the Personnel Board as required by § 41-22-
20(h)(2) above. The relief sought in the circuit court was 12
actions and declarations that began with a prayer for "[a]
Common Law Writ of Certiorari to review Defendants' unlawful
removal of Plaintiff from her position as Supervisor of Voter
Registration." (Emphasis in original.) The complaint did not
mention or invoke the right to judicial review under the AAPA.
1070543
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Instead, Tatum disregarded the requirements of the AAPA and
proceeded as if there were no statute that provided for
judicial review. Her complaint was not a petition for review
of an agency action; it was, in fact, a new civil action
against Worley and Chapman. 
Ex parte Smith, 683 So. 2d 431 (Ala. 1996), cited by
Worley and Chapman, is factually similar to the present case.
In Smith, a professor at a state college appealed his
termination to the administrative-review panel. The panel
found that Smith had been terminated for good cause, and the
panel affirmed Smith's termination. Smith did not appeal the
panel’s decision; instead, he filed an original civil action
against the college, which resulted in a summary judgment in
favor of the college.  This Court affirmed the summary
judgment, noting that the decision of the review panel, as
determined by statute, was "final and binding."  
"[B]ecause the decision of the review panel is
considered final and binding, the only remedy
available to Smith was to appeal the panel's
decision to the appropriate circuit court. A
reviewing court 'may reverse or modify the decision
[of an administrative review panel] or grant other
appropriate relief' if it finds that 'substantial
rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced
because the agency action is ... [i]n violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions.'  § 41-22-
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20(k), Ala. Code 1975.  Smith did not appeal the
decision of the review panel to the circuit court;
rather, he brought this action in order to recover
damages for wrongful termination.  Therefore, he
waived his right to appeal the decision of the
review panel."
683 So. 2d at 435. See also Island Bay Utils. v. Alabama Dep’t
of Envtl. Mgmt., 587 So. 2d 1210 (Ala. 1991)(holding that
plaintiff’s failure to follow the procedure necessary to
institute an appeal from a decision by the Alabama Department
of Environmental Management was fatal to claim); Smith v.
Civil Serv. Bd. of Florence, 52 Ala. App. 44, 289 So. 2d 614
(Civ. App. 1974) (stating that when a special statutory
procedure has been provided as an exclusive method of review
for a particular type of case, no other statutory review is
available); and Hallman v. City of Northport, 386 So. 2d 756
(Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (ruling that when the right to appeal is
purely statutory, an appeal taken without statutory authority
must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction).
Under this authority, Tatum’s failure to follow the
statutory process for taking an appeal acts as a waiver of her
right to a review of the decision of the State Personnel
Board.  The process for appealing a termination is defined by
statute, as described supra. That process states that
1070543
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decisions of the State Personnel Board are final and binding.
Rule 670-X-4-.03, on which Tatum relies, states: "If the Board
finds after hearing that there was discrimination on any of
the above nonmerit factors, it shall order appropriate
corrective action and its decision shall be final."  Also,
Rule 
670-X-18-.02, 
entitled 
"Dismissals," 
states 
in 
subsection
(3): "The decision of the Board based upon its records and the
testimony shall be final." The statutory process directs
parties who are aggrieved by a final decision to appeal that
decision to the circuit court. Failure to follow this
procedure acts as a waiver of the right to appeal the
decision. Although Tatum conveyed jurisdiction to the trial
court by filing her notice of appeal, she waived her right to
review when she  subsequently failed to file the required
petition and instead filed a new civil action naming Worley
and Chapman as defendants.
Tatum 
clearly 
did 
not 
comply 
with 
the 
statutory
requirements for filing an appeal of the Personnel Board’s
decision.  Although Tatum substantially complied with the
requirements of § 41-22-20 by exhausting her administrative
remedies within the agency and by filing a notice of appeal,
she failed to file a petition in the circuit court as required
1070543
21
by § 41-22-20(d), and she failed to strictly comply with the
requirements of § 41-22-20(h), Ala. Code 1975. In Ex parte
Carlisle, 894 So. 2d 721, 728-29 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004), the
Court of Civil Appeals held that strict compliance with
statutory procedure was necessary for a party to obtain review
by the circuit court of the action of the State Department of
Revenue. Here, Tatum failed to follow the statutorily defined
procedure for appealing final decisions of the State Personnel
Board, and in doing so she waived her right to judicial
review. Because we are issuing the writ based on Tatum's
waiver of her right to judicial review, we pretermit
discussion of the other issues raised by the parties.
Tatum's complaint, however, asserted new claims for
damages that were not raised before the Personnel Board.
Worley and Chapman correctly argue that the claims against
them are barred by the doctrine of State immunity.
Section 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, which states
that "[t]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant
in any court of law or equity," bars actions against the State
and, more particularly, bars actions against constitutional
officers, when the claims arise from the performance of the
constitutional officer's duties. Boschell v. Walker County
1070543
22
Sheriff, 598 So. 2d 843, 844 (Ala. 2002). Article V, § 112,
Alabama Constitution of 1901, defines the executive department
as consisting of a "governor, lieutenant governor, attorney-
general, state auditor, secretary of state, state treasurer,
superintendent of education, commissioner of agriculture and
industries, and a sheriff for each county." The persons
occupying the named offices are constitutional officers, and
"this Court has consistently held that a claim for monetary
damages made against a constitutional officer in the officer's
individual capacity is barred by State immunity whenever the
acts that are the basis of the alleged liability were
performed within the course and scope of the officer's
employment." Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 500-01 (Ala.
2005). Chapman was sued in her official capacity as secretary
of state, and Worley was acting in her official capacity as
secretary of state when the incident that forms the basis for
these claims occurred. Ex parte Shelley, [Ms. 1080588,
September 18, 2009] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2009) ("Suits
against [constitutional] officers for actions taken in the
line and scope of their employment inherently constitute
actions against the State, and such actions are prohibited by
§ 14. See [Ex parte] Haralson, 853 So. 2d [928,] 932 [(Ala.
1070543
23
2003)]."). Thus, Tatum's claims against both Worley and
Chapman in the Montgomery Circuit Court that were not asserted
in Tatum's appeal to the State Personnel Board are barred by
the doctrine of State immunity.
Conclusion
Tatum waived her right to judicial review of the decision
of the Personnel Board because she failed to follow the
statutory procedure for obtaining that judicial review. A
common-law writ of certiorari was unavailable to her because
statutory procedures for such an appeal existed. Further,
Tatum's claims against Worley and Chapman asserted for the
first time in the action in the Montgomery Circuit Court are
barred by the doctrine of State immunity under § 14, Ala.
Const. 1901. Accordingly, the writ of mandamus will issue and
the trial court is directed to vacate its order denying Worley
and Chapman's motion and to enter a judgment on the pleadings
in Worley's and Chapman's favor.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Lyons, Stuart, and Smith, JJ., concur.
Cobb, C.J., and Woodall and Shaw, JJ., concur in the
result.
1070543
24
WOODALL, Justice (concurring in the result).
I concur in the result.  All of Tatum's claims are
clearly barred by the immunity afforded Worley and Chapman by
§ 14, Ala. Const. 1901.
Cobb, C.J., concurs.