Case Title: In re: R.W. v. T.J.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1101170

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:02/10/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012
____________________
1101170
____________________
Ex parte T.J.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: R.W. v. T.J. and C.W.
and
T.J. v. R.W. and C.W.)
(Montgomery Juvenile Court, JU-09-700.01 and JU-09-700.02;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2100277)
BOLIN, Justice.
T.J. seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the Montgomery
Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") to adjudicate T.J. the
1101170
2
presumed father of S.W. (hereinafter "the child") and to
vacate the juvenile court's order authorizing genetic testing
to establish the child's paternity. 
Facts and Procedural History
On September 3, 2009, the child's maternal grandmother,
R.W., filed a petition in the juvenile court against the
mother, C.W., and T.J., seeking custody of three of her
grandchildren, 
including 
the 
child. 
The 
maternal 
grandmother's
petition was not included in the materials attached to this
mandamus petition, but T.J. contends that the maternal
grandmother's petition named him as the father.  On October
30, 2009, T.J. filed a petition in the juvenile court seeking
custody of the child.  T.J.'s custody petition also is not
included in the materials submitted with this mandamus
petition.  T.J. contends that in his custody petition he
alleged that he was the biological father of the child and
that the child had lived with him since the child was born. 
On November 13, 2009, the mother filed a petition seeking
custody of the child.  According to the briefs filed in this
Court, the mother named J.H. as the father of the child.  On
January 22, 2010, the mother filed a motion requesting genetic
1101170
3
testing of T.J. and J.H. to establish paternity of the child.
T.J. objected. That same day, T.J. filed a motion to
reconsider and an affidavit of paternity with the juvenile
court.  None of those documents was attached to the materials
submitted to this Court.
On December 3, 2010, the juvenile court held a hearing on
the issue of the mother's request for genetic testing to
determine the paternity of the child.  On December 17, 2010,
the juvenile court entered an order granting the mother's
motion for genetic testing.  Specifically, the juvenile court
found that, because T.J. was incarcerated at the time the
child was conceived and the mother was five months' pregnant
when T.J. was released from prison, it was "unlikely" that
T.J. in good faith believed he was the biological father of
the child. Based on this finding, the juvenile court concluded
that T.J. could not be the child's presumed father under § 26-
17-204(a)(5), Ala. Code 1975, and authorized the genetic
testing.
On December 29, 2010, T.J. filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus with the Court of Civil Appeals, asking that court to
direct the juvenile court to recognize him as, and to
1101170
4
adjudicate him, the presumed father of the child and to vacate
the order authorizing genetic testing to determine the
paternity of the child.  The only material attached to the
mandamus petition before the Court of Civil Appeals was the
juvenile court's order.  The Court of Civil Appeals denied the
petition on the ground that, because there was no record of
the proceedings before the juvenile court, there was no way to
know whether T.J. had presented sufficient evidence from which
to determine that he had held the child out to the public as
his natural child as described in § 26-17-204(a)(5).  Ex parte
T.J., 74 So. 3d 447 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011).
On July 8, 2011, T.J. filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus with this Court, arguing that the juvenile court
erred in concluding that he must be the biological father of
the child in order to be a presumed father under § 26-17-
204(a)(5) and, therefore, that this Court should order the
juvenile court to recognize him as the presumed father and to
vacate its order requiring genetic testing.  
Discussion
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available
only when the petitioner demonstrates: "'(1) a clear legal
1101170
5
right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3)
the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.'"  Ex parte Nall, 879 So.
2d 541, 543 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823
So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)).  A petition for a writ of
mandamus is the proper vehicle for seeking review of an
interlocutory order.  Ex parte A.M.P., 997 So. 2d 1008, 1014
(Ala. 2008)(mandamus petition proper means of seeking review
of interlocutory order granting petition to adopt); Ex parte
D.J.B., 859 So. 2d 445 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)(mandamus review
of nonfinal order dismissing ex-husband's motion seeking a
paternity determination was proper). 
In Alabama, pursuant to the Alabama Uniform Parentage
Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 26-17-101 et seq. ("the AUPA"), a
presumption of paternity arises in favor of the mother's
husband when (1) a child is born during the marriage (§ 26-17-
204(a)(1)); (2) a child is conceived during the marriage (§
26-17-204(a)(2)); (3) a child is conceived or born during an
invalid marriage (§ 26-17-204(a)(3)); or (4) a child is born
before a valid or invalid marriage and the husband took some
1101170
6
voluntary 
step 
to 
establish 
his 
paternity, 
such 
as
acknowledging paternity, consenting to being named on the
child's birth certificate, or being obligated to pay child
support (§ 26-17-204(a)(4)).  A presumption of paternity
arises outside of marriage (1) when a man receives the child
into his home and openly holds the child out as his natural
child or otherwise openly holds the child out as his natural
child and establishes a significant parental relationship by
providing 
emotional 
and 
financial 
support 
(§ 
26-17-204(a)(5));
or (2) when a man legitimated the child pursuant to § 26-11-1
et seq., Ala. Code 1975 (§ 26-17-204(a)(6)).
Section 26-17-204(b) provides that a presumption of
paternity established under § 26-17-204 may be rebutted by an
adjudication of paternity under § 26-17-601 et seq., Ala. Code
1975.  Section 26-17-204(b) goes on to provide that, in the
event two or more presumptions arise, the presumption founded
on the weightier considerations of public policy and logic,
based on the facts, shall control.  Last, § 26-17-204(b)
provides that a court order establishing paternity of a child
by another man rebuts a presumption of paternity.        
1101170
T.J. persists in his contention that he is the biological
1
father of the child because he disputes the date of conception
and contends that the child was born prematurely.
We recognize that § 26-17-607(b) of the AUPA provides for
2
a weighing of competing presumptions in an action where a
presumed father seeks to disprove parentage. Section 26-17-
607(b) provides that a presumption of paternity may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence and that, in the
event two or more conflicting presumptions arise, then the one
7
In the present case, the controlling issue is whether the
juvenile court erred in concluding, based on evidence
indicating that T.J. was not the biological father of the
child, that § 26-17-204(a)(5) was not applicable to T.J.  We
conclude that it did err.  T.J. did not lose his ability to
present evidence that he was a presumed father under § 26-17-
204(a)(5) simply because he may not be the biological father.1
Section 26-17-204(b) provides that if two or more presumptions
arise, the presumption that on the facts is founded on the
weightier considerations of public policy and logic will
control.  If the legislature had intended that only a
biological father can be a presumed father under the
presumptions set out in § 26-17-204(a)(1) through (6), it
would not have provided for a weighing among two competing
presumptions under § 26-17-204(b), because there can be only
one biological father.   Moreover, the United States Supreme
2
1101170
founded on the weightier considerations of public policy and
logic will prevail.  Section 26-17-607(b) also provides that
a presumption of paternity is rebutted by a court judgment
establishing paternity of a child by another man.  Section 26-
17-607(b) is applicable when a man has been found to be a
presumed father and subsequently seeks 
to rebut that
presumption.  In the present case, T.J. has not yet been found
to be the presumed father.        
8
Court and this Court have held that biological ties are not as
important as parent-child relationships that give young
children emotional stability.  In Michael H. v.  Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110 (1989), a plurality of the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the presumed paternity of a nonbiological father
whose presumption as the parent of the child arose out of his
marriage to the mother at the time of the child's birth,
consequently 
denying 
the biological father's claim 
of
paternity.  Although blood-test results proved that the
presumed father was not the biological father, the Supreme
Court relied upon legal history and tradition to uphold the
validity of the marital presumption.  See also Caban v.
Mohammed, 
441 
U.S. 
380, 
397 
(1979)(Stewart, 
J.,
dissenting)("Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the
biological connections between parent and child.  They require
relationships more enduring.").
1101170
The former AUPA was repealed effective January 1, 2009,
3
and the current AUPA, § 26-17-101 et seq., became effective
that same day.  The presumptions of paternity listed in former
§ 26-17-5(a) are similar to the presumptions of paternity
listed in § 26-17-204(a). 
9
In Ex parte Presse, 554 So. 2d 406 (Ala. 1989), this
Court considered whether "a man claiming to be the father of
a child conceived and born during the marriage of its mother
to another man [has] standing under the [then existing AUPA]
to initiate an action to establish that he is the father of
the child, where the presumed father persists in the
presumption that he is the father."  554 So. 2d at 411.   The
3
court answered the question in the negative, determining that
the presumption of paternity accorded the man married to the
mother at the time of the child's conception and birth was, as
a matter of public policy and logic, weightier than any other
presumption provided for in the statute, thus foreclosing
another man from challenging the child's paternity. 554 So. 2d
at 412.   See also Ex parte C.A.P., 683 So. 2d 1010 (Ala.
1996)(holding that a man cannot challenge the paternity of a
child born during the marriage of the mother to another man
regardless of whether the child was conceived during the
1101170
10
marriage so long as the husband persists in the marital
presumption of paternity).
The presumed father's presumption of paternity in Ex
parte Presse arose from the marital presumption that a child
born during a marriage or within 300 days after the
termination of a marriage is the child of the husband. In Ex
parte Presse we held that the provision of the AUPA that
created a presumption of paternity if the man received a child
into his home and openly held out the child as his natural
child did not allow that man to assert paternity to the
exclusion of the man who was married to the child's mother
when the child was conceived and born, simply because the man
had since married the mother, who was now divorced.  Ex parte
Presse was based specifically upon the application of the
marital presumption.  However, in Ex parte Presse, we
recognized that the AUPA "espouses principles that seek to
protect the sanctity of family relationships," 554 So. 2d at
412, and we now apply those principles where the marital
presumption is not applicable and the only issue is whether
the man claiming to be the presumed father,  "while the child
is under the age of majority, ... receive[d] the child into
1101170
11
his home and openly [held] out the child as his natural child
or otherwise openly [held] out the child as his natural child
and establishe[d] a significant parental relationship with the
child by providing emotional and financial support for the
child" under § 26-17-204(a)(5).
 
We also find support for our conclusion that the
legislature did not intend for biology to prevent a
presumption of paternity under § 26-17-204(a)(5) in Judge
Thomas's dissent in Ex parte T.J., in which she discusses the
phrase "openly holds out the child as his natural child":
"I understand that the use of the word 'as' in
the phrase 'openly holds out the child as his
natural child' is perhaps not entirely clear in
meaning.  However, I read 'as' in this context as
meaning 'in the way or manner that,' 'in accordance
with what or the way in which,' or 'in the capacity,
character, condition, or role of.' Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary 71 (11th ed. 2003).  Likewise,
to 'hold out' is defined as 'to represent to be,'
id. at 592, while 'represent' is defined as 'to
describe 
as 
having 
a 
specified 
character 
or
quality.'  Id. at 1057.  Thus, subsection (a)(5)
establishes a presumption of paternity in a man who
openly treats a child in the same manner he would
treat his biological child, who openly treats a
child in accordance with the way that a father would
treat his biological child, or who openly treats the
child as if the child had assumed the role of his
biological child 'and establishes a significant
parental relationship with the child by providing
emotional and financial support for the child.'  §
26–17–204(a)(5). Read in this way, § 26–17–204(a)(5)
1101170
12
serves 
to 
promote 
a 
significant 
parental
relationship over a mere biological connection. Such
a reading finds generous support in comments to the
[AUPA]."
74 So. 3d at 454 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
The fact that T.J. may not be the child's biological
father does not negate his ability to present evidence that he
is the presumed father of the child under § 26-17-204(a)(5) by
virtue of his relationship with the child, because the
presumption established by § 26-17-204(a)(5) is based on the
man's relationship with the child, not on a biological
connection. 
 
Accordingly, 
the 
juvenile 
court's 
legal
conclusion that § 26-17-204(a)(5) does not apply to T.J.,
because, according to the court's reasoning, he could not be
the child's biological father, was in error.  Because T.J. has
demonstrated a clear legal right to proceed under § 26-17-
204(a)(5), he is entitled to relief from that erroneous
conclusion of law.  However, we cannot grant T.J.'s request to
order the juvenile court to adjudicate him the presumed father
of the child and to vacate the juvenile court's order
authorizing genetic testing to determine the paternity of the
child.  Based on the briefs submitted to this Court, the
evidence in that regard appears to be disputed, and T.J. did
1101170
13
not provide this Court with a transcript of the hearing in the
juvenile court.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that there was
sufficient evidence to hold that T.J. is the presumed father
of the child under § 26-17-204(a)(5).  Accordingly, the
juvenile court must determine, based on the testimony
submitted at the hearing, whether T.J. presented sufficient
evidence indicating that he received the child into his home
and openly held out the child as his natural child or that he
otherwise openly held out the child as his natural child and
established a significant parental relationship with the child
by providing emotional and financial support for the child. If
the juvenile court finds that the evidence that T.J. did so is
sufficient and that, therefore, T.J. is the presumed father of
the child under § 26-17-204(a)(5), then the order requiring
genetic testing must be vacated.  However, if the juvenile
court finds that T.J. did not present sufficient evidence for
such a finding under § 26-17-204(a)(5), then the order
requiring genetic testing may stand.   
PETITION DENIED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Malone, C.J., and Woodall, Stuart, Parker, Shaw, Main,
and Wise, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., dissents.
1101170
14
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
My understanding of the reasoning employed by the trial
court is different than the understanding contemplated by the
analysis in the main opinion.  Specifically, the analysis
offered in the main opinion appears to contemplate that the
trial judge entertained evidence of who the biological father
might be because she thought it necessary for a man to be a
biological father in order to maintain his position as a
"presumed father" under § 26-17-204, Ala. Code 1975.  I do not
read her order in this manner.  Instead, I read her order --
and her explanatory brief to this Court -- to indicate that
she was operating under the incorrect impression that she was
dealing with a true evidentiary presumption as to who the
biological father might be and that evidence of another man
being the biological father therefore could and did rebut this
presumption.  I write in Part B below, to explain the trial
court's reasoning, as I understand it, and in turn why I think
that reasoning was wrong.  
At the end of Part B, I also note my disagreement with
the characterization in the main opinion of the holding of
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).  
1101170
15
I begin this writing in Part A with the discussion of the
procedural issue, which was the focus of the majority opinion
of the Court of Civil Appeals.  Ex parte T.J., 74 So. 3d 447
(Ala. Civ. App. 2011).
Finally, I believe that the order of the trial court
ordering genetic testing is due to be formally vacated at this
juncture.  As explained in Part C below, because the main
opinion does not order the vacatur of that order, my vote, as
reflected above, is registered as a "dissent."  
A.  The Procedural Issue
A majority of the Court of Civil Appeals in this case
used as a reason for denying T.J.'s requested relief a concern
about a factual issue not addressed by the trial court:
whether T.J. held himself out as the "natural" father of the
child.  Because of its focus upon this factual issue, that
majority in turn considered itself unable to provide relief to
T.J. without the benefit of a transcript of the evidentiary
hearing held by the trial court:
"In this case, because we do not have a record
of the proceedings before the juvenile court, we
simply do not have before us the means to know
whether T.J. presented sufficient evidence from
which to determine that he held the child out to the
public as his natural child as described in §
1101170
16
26-17-204(a)(5); we also do not know to what extent
such evidence was disputed."
Ex parte T.J., 74 So. 3d at 451 (emphasis added).
If the trial court had expressly made a factual finding
that T.J. had not held himself out as the "natural" father of
the child, or if we could impute this finding to the trial
court, the Court of Civil Appeals' concern with the lack of a
transcript would be appropriate.  The trial court, however,
did not expressly decide this factual issue or even address it
in its order.  For the reason explained below, neither can we
(or the Court of Civil Appeals) impute to the trial court any
finding as to this issue. 
The one portion of the "record" the petitioner has
provided us in this mandamus proceeding is the trial court's
order itself.  Based on this order, we know exactly on what
ground the trial court entered its order -- and it was not on
the ground discussed by the majority of the Court of Civil
Appeals.  Instead, the trial court simply found that the
"presumption" that T.J. was the father of the child had been
"rebutted" by evidence that he was not the genetic/biological
father of the child.  Specifically, the trial court expressly
found and reasoned as follows:
1101170
17
"Undisputed testimony revealed that [T.J.] had been
incarcerated during the period of July through
November in 2004.  Both the mother and [someone
else's] testimony indicated that the parties were
not cohabiting and did not engage in sexual
intercourse at the probable time of conception. 
"It is clear from the testimony of the witnesses
and the admissions by the mother that [T.J.] has
been in a generous and loving role towards the minor
child, and that he has provided for her emotionally
and financially since her birth.  Furthermore, it is
clear from the testimony that the mother has allowed
the relationship to grow and that the child calls
[T.J.] 'daddy.'  The evidence clearly shows that
[T.J.], despite knowing that the child is not or may
not be his genetic child, affirmatively accepted a
caregiver role as the child's father and that the
child, the mother, and the maternal grandmother have
relied on that acceptance.
"....
"It is undisputed that [T.J.] has established a
parent-child 
relationship 
with 
[the 
child].
Notwithstanding the same, it is unlikely that he
believed this child to be his 'natural' child when
he 
was 
incarcerated 
at 
the 
likely 
time 
of
conception.  [T.J.] does not dispute that he was
incarcerated from July through November in 2004 and
further that he did not have a physical relationship
with the mother at the likely time of conception.
This court can not ignore this fact.  Further, the
mother testified that she was already 5 months'
pregnant when [T.J.] was released from incarceration
in November 2004.  This court also considered the
Headstart 
application, 
which 
pre-dates 
this
proceeding, wherein the mother identified another
man as the father of [the child] and identified
[T.J.] as the Godfather.
"Based on the foregoing, this court is unable to
find that [T.J.] is the presumed father."
1101170
18
(Emphasis added.)
In addition to the trial court's order itself, we have
the trial judge's letter brief to this Court, which further
confirms 
that 
the 
basis 
for 
her 
holding 
was 
her
misunderstanding that she was obligated to consider evidence
that might tend to show that T.J. was not the biological
father of the child.  In her letter brief to this Court, the
judge explains her own order, providing only the following
basis for it:
"The undersigned acknowledges the [T.J.'s] love
and affection for the minor child at issue in this
matter and his financial and emotional support of
the child.  The undersigned recognizes that [T.J.'s]
actions could give rise to a presumption of
paternity of the child.  However, in making the
determination whether to adjudicate [T.J.] as the
presumed father of the child, the undersigned also
weighed evidence which showed that [T.J.] was
incarcerated at the likely time of conception and
the testimony of the Mother that another man is the
biological father of the child.
"The undersigned determined that clear and
convincing evidence was presented which rebutted any
presumption of paternity on the part of [T.J.]."
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the trial court's finding was based upon a supposed
"rebuttal" of a "presumption" of fatherhood, a rebuttal based
on evidence regarding who the biological father might be.  The
1101170
19
Court of Civil Appeals' "affirmance" of that order, however,
revolved around a different concern, namely whether the
evidence did or did not establish that T.J. had held himself
as the "natural" father of the child.  If this were a case in
which the trial court's order had failed to state any basis
for its decision and the materials before us did not otherwise
reveal the basis for the trial court's decision, we and the
Court of Civil Appeals could impute to the trial court a
ground not actually expressed by it, provided that there was
substantial evidence to support any factual findings that
would be necessary to such a ground.  This would be true
because of the principle that, in the absence of a contrary
indication in the trial court's order or otherwise in the
record, we will presume that the trial court knows the law and
that the trial court has made those factual findings necessary
to support its judgment under the applicable law.  See, e.g.,
Lemoine Co. of Alabama, L.L.C. v. HLH Constructors, Inc., 62
So. 3d 1020, 1024 (Ala. 2010) ("'When evidence is taken ore
tenus and the trial judge makes no express findings of fact,
this Court will assume that the trial judge made those
findings necessary to support the judgment.'" (quoting
1101170
20
Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 608
So. 2d 375, 378 (Ala. 1992)(emphasis added))).
Here, however, the trial court's order, as well as the
trial judge's brief to this Court, does reveal the  basis for
that court's decision.  We therefore are not at liberty to
impute some different ground to the trial court as the basis
for its decision.  Concomitantly, we cannot be concerned that
we are without a transcript by which to evaluate the extent of
evidentiary support for any such different ground.  
It is true that (subject to due-process limitations),
even when the trial court's order or other aspects of the
record do indicate the specific ground for the trial court's
decision, an appellate court can uphold a trial court's
judgment on an alternative valid legal ground.  In that
circumstance, however, the alternative ground must be a
"legal" ground.  That is, the appellate court must be able to
seize upon this alternative ground as a matter of law based on
the record or the materials before it, because it does not
otherwise have at its disposal necessary factual findings,
either actual or imputable, to use in support of the
alternative ground.  For example, as the Court of Civil
1101170
21
Appeals put it in Gartman v. Hill, 874 So. 2d 555, 559 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2003):
"While it is true that this Court will affirm the
judgment appealed from if supported on any valid
legal ground, the evidence in this case falls well
short of what would be required for this Court to
hold, as a matter of law, that [the plaintiff] is
entitled [to prevail on a factual theory as to which
the trial court made no finding]." 
(Final emphasis added.) 
The Court of Civil Appeals' concern about the absence of
a transcript relates to a factual theory as to which, as in
Gartman, "the trial court made no factual finding."  878 So.
2d at 559.  See Pavilion Dev., L.L.C. v. JBJ P'ship, 979 So.
2d 24, 36 (Ala. 2007) ("Although we have stated that an
appellate court may affirm a judgment of a trial court for any
valid reason, we do not consider [the appellee's] arguments
about the statutory requirements because the record here
indicates that the trial court did not make any findings
concerning, nor did it intend to base its judgment on, those
alternative grounds."); Ex parte Philon, 10 So. 3d 1022, 1026
(Ala. 2008) (Murdock, J., concurring specially) ("[T]he trial
court made no factual finding as to whether Philon's back
injury was caused over time by changes to his gait resulting
from his leg injury.  Therefore, the only basis upon which the
1101170
In addition, of course, the majority of the Court of
4
Civil Appeals would have to be correct in their strict
understanding of what it means for a man to hold a child out
"as" his natural child.  In her dissent, Judge Thomas explains
why she believes the majority's understanding of this term is
incorrect, 74 So. 3d at 454, and I am inclined to agree with
her.
22
Court of Civil Appeals could have affirmed the order of the
trial court on this alternative factual theory is if the Court
of Civil Appeals could have determined, as a matter of law,
that the record before it could not reasonably support any
conclusion other than that Philon's back injury occurred in
the stated manner.").  Moreover, the materials before us are
not merely silent as to the ground for the trial court's
decision; the trial court's order and the trial judge's brief
to this Court in this case expressly state the specific basis
for that court's decision.  Therefore, the only basis upon
which the Court of Civil Appeals could have upheld the trial
court's order on the alternative factual theory at issue is if
the Court of Civil Appeals could have determined, as a matter
of law from the materials that were before it, that T.J.,
though he held the child out as his own, did not hold the
child out as his "natural" child.  Obviously, it could not do
so.4
1101170
23
We have here a case in which the trial judge has
expressly provided us in her order and in her letter brief to
this Court the specific ground for her ruling.  That ground is
that there was evidence that she believed "rebutted" the
presumption that T.J. was the genetic father of the child. The
trial court's reliance upon this ground to order genetic
testing was a legal error as to which the absence of an
evidentiary transcript is irrelevant.
B. Merits
The long-standing recognition of "presumed fathers" in
our law finds its origins in time-honored, common-law
principles 
reflecting 
traditional 
values 
and 
concerns 
relating
to adultery, the integrity of the family, and protection for
both the father and the child in established father-child
relationships.  Accordingly, our law not only adheres to the
general rule that a child with a "presumed father" may not be
declared illegitimate by our courts, it protects both children
and de facto fathers in preserving established parent-child
relationships.
Section 26-17-204, Ala. Code 1975, states:
"(a) A man is presumed to be the father of a
child if:
1101170
24
"(1) he and the mother of the child
are married to each other and the child is
born during the marriage;
"(2) he and the mother of the child
were married to each other and the child is
born within 300 days after the marriage is
terminated 
by 
death, 
annulment, 
declaration
of invalidity, or divorce;
"(3) before the birth of the child, he
and the mother of the child married each
other in apparent compliance with law, even
if the attempted marriage is or could be
declared invalid, and the child is born
during the invalid marriage or within 300
days after its termination by death,
annulment, declaration of invalidity, or
divorce;
"(4) after the child's birth, he and
the 
child's 
mother 
have 
married, 
or
attempted to marry, each other by a
marriage solemnized in apparent compliance
with 
the 
law 
although 
the 
attempted
marriage is or could be declared invalid,
and:
"(A) he has acknowledged his
paternity 
of 
the 
child 
in
writing, such writing being filed
with the appropriate court or the
Alabama 
Office 
of 
Vital
Statistics; or
"(B) with his consent, he is
named as the child's father on
the child's birth certificate; or
"(C) 
he 
is 
otherwise
obligated to support the child
either under a written voluntary
promise or by court order;
1101170
25
"(5) while the child is under the age
of majority, he receives the child into his
home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child or otherwise openly holds out
the 
child 
as 
his 
natural 
child 
and
establishes 
a 
significant 
parental
relationship with the child by providing
emotional and financial support for the
child; or
"(6) he legitimated the child in
accordance with Chapter 11 of Title 26."
(Emphasis added.)
Section 26-17-204 continues:
"(b)  A presumption of paternity established
under this section may be rebutted only by an
adjudication under Article 6 [§ 26-17-601 through §
26-17-638]."
(Emphasis added.)  Section 26-17-607(a), Ala. Code 1975,
limits "adjudication[s] under Article 6":
"Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a
presumed father may bring an action to disprove
paternity at any time.  If the presumed father
persists in his status as the legal father of a
child, neither the mother nor any other individual
may maintain an action to disprove paternity."    
(Emphasis added.)  The presumed father in this case does
indeed "persist[] in his status."
As a result, we have in this case a trial court order
that is expressly based on an error of law.  The trial court
clearly based its order on a factual finding that there was
1101170
26
sufficient evidence to "rebut" the presumed-father status of
T.J.  In so doing, the trial court treated the presumed-father
status established in Ala. Code 1975, § 26-17-204(a)(5), as no
more than an evidentiary presumption to be rebutted by
whatever evidence the trial court might assign sufficient
credibility and weight.  That is not the nature of the
"presumption" with which we are dealing.  
First, we are not dealing here with a "presumed" status
as to the genetic or biological father of a child, but as to
the legal father.  The question is who, in the contemplation
of the law, will be treated as the father.  The trial court's
order and letter brief clearly reveal that the judge thinks
her task is to determine who is the genetic father. 
Second, the "presumed father" status is the result of a
substantive rule of law, not an evidentiary presumption. Thus,
it was that in P.G. v. G.H., 857 So. 2d 823, 828 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2002), the court noted the distinction between the
evidentiary standard for rebutting a traditional presumption
of paternity under then § 26-17-5(b), Ala. Code 1975 (the
predecessor statute to § 26-17-204(b)), and the substantive
rule that actually prevents another party from challenging the
presumed-father status of a man who persists in that
1101170
27
presumption.  As this Court stated in Ex parte Presse, 554 So.
2d 406, 418 (Ala. 1989):
"[T]he legal question is whether a man has standing
to bring an action seeking to declare a child
illegitimate and to have himself declared the father
of that child.  This is not permitted under the
[Alabama Uniform Parentage Act], as long as there is
a presumed father, pursuant to § 26-17-5(a)(1), who
has not disclaimed his status as the child's father
...."
(Emphasis added.)  See also Ex parte C.A.P., 683 So. 2d 1010,
1012 (Ala. 1996) ("A man not presumed to be the father, but
alleging himself to be the father, may institute an action to
have himself declared the father only when the child has no
presumed father." (emphasis added)); Hooten v. Hooten, 754 So.
2d 634, 635 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) ("Our supreme court has held
that no one ... has standing to challenge a presumed father's
paternity as long as the presumed father persists in claiming
paternity of the child.").
Despite the foregoing, the trial court treats the
presumed-father status of T.J. under § 26-17-204(a)(5) as
merely a rebuttable evidentiary presumption.  She concluded
that because the mother or grandmother put on evidence
indicating that T.J. was in jail at the time of conception,
the presumption created by § 26-17-204(a)(5) had been
1101170
28
"rebutted."  The trial court even goes so far as to comment on
T.J.'s subjective thoughts regarding the matter, stating that
"it is unlikely that [T.J.] believed this child to be his
'natural' child when he was incarcerated at the likely time of
conception," a factor clearly not specified as a criterion
under the statute. 
Again, the question is not whether the child is in fact
the genetic or biological child of a presumed father.  The
rule embodied in § 26-17-204 and § 26-17-607(a) is a
substantive rule of law as to who is to be deemed the legal
father.  It is a rule based on two time-honored ideas in our
law: a child with a "presumed father" should not easily be
declared illegitimate by our courts, and children with long-
standing relationships with de facto parents should not be
deprived of those relationships based merely on the fact that
a trial court might believe testimony by the mother, for
example, as to who she thinks the natural father might be.
Likewise, as T.J. puts it:
"[T]o allow inquiry through genetic testing into the
child's biological paternity when the Father has not
waived his presumption of paternity would be against
the Code of Alabama and destructive of family
integrity, relationships and privacy and against the
public interest and law of Alabama. 
1101170
As the main opinion notes, in order to vacate the
5
particular order entered by the trial court, we do not have to
go so far as to declare T.J. to be the legal or even the
"presumed" father of the child, as the majority of the Court
of Civil Appeals suggests in its opinion.  We merely have to
vacate the trial court's order requiring genetic testing
because it was based on a legal error and then remand the case
for further consideration consistent with correct legal
principles. 
29
"Based on § 26-17-204(a)(5), if T.J. meets the
requirement set out by the AUPA he is the presumed
father and no person may challenge his status. The
Circuit Court has no discretion to rule against the
law as set out by the AUPA. The public policy behind
the AUPA is one of long history and importance with
regard to the welfare, permanency and best interest
of children."
T.J.'s petition, at 17-18.
The trial court clearly erred by not recognizing these
principles and, instead, entering an order for genetic testing
that is at odds with them.  It is this pure legal error in the
trial court's approach to this case that makes the particular
order it entered one that we are now obligated to vacate.  
5
Before turning to a brief discussion of the judgment line
in the main opinion, I pause to comment on two other aspects
of the analysis offered by the main opinion.  First, the main
opinion makes reference to what it calls "the marital
presumption" in the course of explaining that "we now apply
[Presse's] principles where the marital presumption is not
1101170
30
applicable" and presumed fatherhood exists "under § 26-17-
204(a)(5)."  ___ So. 3d at ___.   I offer two observations in
regard to this reference.
First, the objective of the statute insofar as is germane
to a decision in the present case is to provide a rule of
decision as between all presumed fathers, on the one hand, and
all other persons, on the other hand.  In this context, the
statute gives priority over all other persons to one who falls
within any of the six categories of presumed fathers outlined
in § 26-17-204(a)(1) through (6). As noted, § 26-17-204(b)
states simply that "[a] presumption of paternity established
under this section may be rebutted only by an adjudication
under Article 6 [§ 26-17-601 through § 26-17-638]."  Insofar
as contests between presumed fathers and persons who are not
presumed fathers, the language of the statute has never
suggested any basis for some different level of protection of
a presumed father whose status relates to one of the four
categories that involves a marriage (or an attempted
marriage). 
Second, this lack of differentiation between categories
of presumed fathers (or, for that matter, between the
positions of those who might attempt to challenge a presumed
1101170
31
father's status), is now corroborated by the 2008 amendment to
the AUPA.  This amendment actually broadened the statutory
language that was in place when Presse, C.A.P., and other
cases cited above were decided.  As a result of that
amendment, § 26-17-607(a) now expressly provides, without any
differentiation between those categories of presumed fathers
described in § 26-17-204(a): "If the presumed father persists
in his status as the legal father of a child, neither the
mother nor any other individual may maintain an action to
disprove paternity."  (Emphasis added.) 
Finally, I am concerned as to the manner in which the
main opinion discusses the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).  I
am 
particularly 
concerned 
about 
the 
following 
characterization
of  Michael H. and other cases: "[T]he United States Supreme
Court and this Court have held that biological ties are not as
important as parent-child relationships ...."   ___ So. 3d at
___.  I believe the import of Michael H. and our cases is
merely that protection of biological parents' rights in the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not
prevent a state from subordinating those rights to a de facto
parent-child relationship in an appropriate case.  I believe
1101170
32
it is incorrect to state that there is some general rule that
has been adopted by both the United States Supreme Court and
this Court to the effect that biological ties simply are "not
as important" as de facto parent-child relationships.
C.  Vacatur of the Trial Court's Order
The main opinion concludes that the trial court erred by
the manner in which it reached the conclusion that § 26-17-
204(a)(5) does not apply to T.J.  I certainly agree with this
conclusion, albeit for the reasons stated above, rather than
the exact analysis offered by the main opinion.  I would add,
however, that given the nature of the legal error upon which
the trial court's order for genetic testing was based, I
believe the appropriate relief at this juncture is the vacatur
of that order.  I respectfully dissent from the judgment
offered by the main opinion to the extent that it does not
order such a vacatur.  After conducting further proceedings in
accordance with this Court's opinion, if the trial court
determined that T.J. does not hold presumed-father status, it
could at that juncture issue such new order as it deemed
appropriate.