Case Title: Southern v. State

Citation: 371 Md. 93

Docket Number: 109/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
George Wendell Southern v. State of Maryland
No. 109, September Term, 2001
Headnote:
The appropriate appellate response in a criminal case, where at a pretrial
suppression proceeding the defendant adequately challenged the
constitutionality of a warrantless stop and in response the State proffered no
evidence to sustain its burden of proving the constitutionality of the stop, is
not a limited remand for the taking of additional evidence in a reopened
suppression proceeding in the same case. This disposition would improperly
permit the State another opportunity to prevail on a suppression motion that
should have been granted in the first instance.  The appropriate appellate
response is a reversal with a new trial.
Circuit Court for Prince  George ’s County
Case # CT000482X
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 109
September Term, 2001
GEORGE WENDELL SOUTHERN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
     Raker  and Wilner, JJ.,  dissent
Filed:     September 17, 2002
1  The conviction for second-degree assault merged into petitioner’s conviction on
the first robbery count.
George Wendell Southern, petitioner, was indicted by a Grand Jury in Prince George’s
County on two counts of robbery and related offenses due to his alleged participation in the
robberies of two 7-Eleven stores on the morning of February 19, 2000.  On September 20,
2000, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County denied petitioner’s Motion to Suppress.
On September 22, 2000, after a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of two counts of robbery
and one count of second-degree assault.  On November 9, 2000, the Circuit Court imposed
a sentence of ten years incarceration without the possibility of parole for the first robbery
count1 and a consecutive ten-year sentence on the second robbery count.
On November 15, 2000, petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.
In that appeal, petitioner argued that at the hearing on his Motion to Suppress and after
petitioner challenged the constitutionality of his initial detention, the State failed to put on
any evidence to sustain its burden of proving the constitutionality of the stop and, thus,
petitioner’s motion should have been granted.  In a reported opinion, Southern v. State, 140
Md. App. 495, 780 A.2d 1228 (2001), the intermediate appellate court, after agreeing that
petitioner properly had raised the issue of the constitutionality of the initial stop, held that the
State had the burden of establishing the constitutionality of the stop, that the State had not
presented evidence sufficient to meet that burden, and that the Circuit Court had not ruled
on the issue.  Nevertheless,  the Court of Special Appeals did not reverse the convictions, but,
instead, ordered that petitioner’s convictions were to remain in effect pending further
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proceedings and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for the purpose of reopening the
suppression proceeding to give the State the opportunity to introduce evidence relating to the
constitutionality of the stop and for the Circuit Court to then rule on the constitutionality of
the stop. 
On December 13, 2001, we granted Southern’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari and
denied the State’s Conditional Cross-Petition.  Southern v. State, 367 Md. 88, 785 A.2d 1292
(2001).  Petitioner presents one question for our review:
“Where the defense challenged the legality of an initial stop at a
suppression hearing and the State failed to introduce any evidence on that
issue, was it proper for the Court of Special Appeals to order a limited remand
at which the State will have a second opportunity to introduce evidence
supporting the legality of the stop?” 
We answer no to petitioner’s question and reverse.  We hold that it was improper for the
Court of Special Appeals to remand and reopen the suppression proceeding in order to
provide the State with a second opportunity to present new evidence on the constitutionality
of the initial stop.  The Court of Special Appeals should have reversed the convictions and
remanded the case to the Circuit Court for a new trial. 
I. Procedural Facts
a.  Motion to Suppress
Petitioner filed two one-page omnibus motions, both stating inter alia that he “moves
to suppress any and all evidence obtained by the State in violation of the defendant’s rights
as guaranteed by the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United
2 “Omnibus motion” is the term given to a motion that encompasses the mandatory
motions that must be filed in the circuit court pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-252(a).  They
must be filed within a certain period of time and if not filed within that time period the right
to file the motions may be considered waived. 
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States, and the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” 2  
The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County held a hearing on petitioner’s motions
on September 20, 2000. The Circuit Court addressed the pre-trial motions and asked the
State, “[w]ell, which motions are we taking up first?”  The prosecutor responded, “I.D., and
then the statement.”  The State then proceeded to call various witnesses to testify about the
events on the day of the robberies.  The Circuit Court  heard evidence relating to the
circumstances of the post-apprehension show-up identification and denied petitioner’s
motion to suppress the identification. In respect to the issue of the validity of Petitioner’s
initial apprehension, the testimony was limited to the following:
“The first to testify was Officer Richard Pippin of the Prince George’s County
Police.  He testified that on February 19th, 2000, he responded to a call
regarding a robbery at a 7-11 on Old Branch Avenue.  When he arrived, he
spoke to a Carolyn Pryor, and approximately 15 minutes later drove her and
one other individual several blocks away to Wolverton Avenue.  He told her
that the police had apprehended a suspect fitting the description of the person
who had robbed the 7-11. . . . 
“The next witness called by the prosecutor was Corporal Charles
Burgess.  He stated that he had responded to the report of the robbery and had
been involved in the apprehension of a suspect, together with a K-9 officer. .
. . 
“Officer Monty Burkhalter . . . testified that Corporal Burgess had
handed over the Petitioner to him after he was apprehended . . . .  Burkhalter
stated that at the time the Petitioner was turned over to him, he had already
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been arrested and was in handcuffs.
“The State’s next witness on the identification was Carolyn Pryor. She
stated that she had been a customer in the 7-11 on the morning of the robbery,
and as she was approaching the cashier, a man came in the door with dark red
T-shirt or bandanna covering the lower part of his face.  He jumped over the
counter and began kicking the cash register, and while he was doing this the
bandanna or T-shirt kept falling down.  She described this person to the police
after the incident, and they took her to another location to see if she could
identify a person they had apprehended.  When she saw the suspect, she told
the police officer, ‘That’s him.’
“Gail Alexander was called as a defense witness on the motion.  She
stated that on the morning of the robbery she was getting some coffee at the
7-11 on Old Branch Avenue when she heard noises coming from the area of
the cash register.  When she looked up, she saw a white male attempting to
pull out the cash register drawer and saw that over his face he had a red shirt,
which kept falling down.  Later after the police were called, she and Ms. Pryor
accompanied Officer Pippin to an area where they were holding a suspect.  She
stated that when they arrived at their destination the suspect was removed from
the back seat of the police car and made to stand up and face them.  She
recalled that at that time ‘he was handcuffed with his hands behind him.’  Ms.
Alexander testified that although she heard Ms. Pryor identify the man as the
robber, she (Ms. Alexander) was unable to identify his face.  She also told the
officers that the man wasn’t wearing the same clothes that the robber had
worn.”
The balance of the evidence proffered at the suppression hearing (as well as most of that
discussed next above) was completely unrelated to the events surrounding the apprehension
of the petitioner. In its brief to this Court, the State conceded as much, saying: “None of the
witnesses called during the suppression hearing described the circumstances of the K-9
tracking or the initial detention of Southern.”    
    The following dialogue then transpired regarding the evidence as to other matters then
before the motions hearing judge:
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“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the State is saying they [have]
my client in custody, and there was a stop by a K-9, and obviously the seizure
of whatever they seized from him, and two statements, the statement to
Detective Cheeks and the statement to Detective Arscott.
“THE COURT: Okay.
(Pause in the Proceedings)
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we’re seeking to suppress the
stop and anything that flowed from that.  I believe evidence was seized from
him when he was stopped by Officer Peton, I can’t remember how they - Peton,
and his K-9, and Officer Burgess.  So anything that was seized from that stop.
“THE COURT: Okay.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The defendant’s statement to Officer Cheeks,
which was memorialized in writing allegedly by Mr. Southern and also as it
appears by Officer Cheeks.  There’s also an oral statement that was allegedly
given to Corporal Arscott at the hospital.  We’re moving to suppress that.  And
there was a search of the vehicle.  Officer - - responded to the car, and Officer
Stuehmeier seized it, and they are alleging my client had custody of that
vehicle.”   
    
The State then presented testimony regarding petitioner’s time in custody, petitioner’s
statements, and the seizure of a cash register drawer from the automobile petitioner allegedly
drove to the stores.  There was no evidence at the suppression hearing describing the initial
detention of petitioner or the reasons , i.e., probable cause supporting that apprehension. 
After the State concluded its presentation of testimony on the omnibus motion, the
following exchange between the court and counsel occurred: 
“THE COURT:  Any further evidence?
“[STATE’S ATTORNEY]:  No, Your Honor.
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“THE COURT: Okay.  Anything further?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I will not present any witnesses, Your
Honor.
“THE COURT: All right. Are you going to argue, or you want to
submit?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I would like to argue.
“THE COURT: Go ahead and argue.  First of all, what are you going
to argue about?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m going to re-argue with regard to the
search and seizure and the stop, when they stopped the defendant, about the
identification, and the statements of Detective Cheeks and - - 
“THE COURT: Then go ahead and start.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.  Your Honor, with regard to the stop,
the defendant should really be the starting point for everything.  We really
have no evidence.  What we have is Officer Burkhalter, who did not
participate in the stop of Mr. Southern, who indicated the description that was
given was a white male, and he really didn’t have anything further than that.
I believe it was five-eight to five-ten.
“Other than that, the next thing we know is we have Mr. Southern
stopped and witnesses driving by.   So I don’t think the State has established
probable cause - - I would therefore like you to suppress the identification
based on that.”
Petitioner’s counsel then argued about the statements and the search of the vehicle;
however, during petitioner’s argument that the identification should be suppressed because
the stop was unconstitutional the trial court interrupted the discussion.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  . . . With regard to the search of the
vehicle, I don’t believe the State satisfied under the rules who the owner is,
or who searched it, or where it came from.  And for that reason we would ask
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that - - but most importantly, we would ask that the I.D. be suppressed
because the stop was - -.
“THE COURT: The Court finds that the defendant was identified by
a witness as the person who perpetrated the robbery and was arrested as a
result of that.  He was taken into custody.  That a vehicle was recovered in
close proximity to the second location of the robbery.  That the vehicle
belonged to someone other than the defendant, and that someone gave
permission to the police to search it by written consent.
“That the defendant was not detained unduly.  That he was advised of
his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona.  That he waived his
constitutional rights pursuant to the same decision.  That he gave a statement.
That he answered questions and fully cooperated with the police, and this was
not after an undue delay.
.     .     .
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And Your Honor, with regard to the oral
statement and identification that flowed from the stop?
“THE COURT: You mean the oral statement when he said: It was my
girlfriend’s?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.
“THE COURT: The Court finds specifically that was not as the result
of any custodial interrogation, that he made that statement when two other
police officers were in fairly close proximity but not really in the same
location as he was.  And that does not run afoul of any 5th or 6th Amendment
right because it wasn’t a custodial interrogation.  It was a statement that was
made voluntarily by him, not in response to any question.
“So, quite frankly, I wasn’t aware that was your challenge on it.  I
didn’t know that was the subject of your challenge.  Because as I heard it, he
wasn’t answering any questions.  So I deny the motion to suppress.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Your Honor.”
The suppression proceeding ended and the trial commenced with opening statements.
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b.  The Court of Special Appeals’ Ruling
On appeal, petitioner presented several questions for review to the Court of Special
Appeals, only one of those questions is now involved in the case sub judice.  Petitioner
asked the intermediate appellate court, “[d]id the State fail to sustain its burden of proving
at the motion to suppress hearing that the appellant’s detention was constitutional?”
Southern v. State, 140 Md. App. 495, 499, 780 A.2d 1228, 1230 (2001). 
The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to rule on the
issue of the propriety of the initial stop of petitioner and remanded for the purposes of such
a ruling, noting that in its brief to that court the “State admit[ted] that ‘virtually no evidence
was presented at the suppression 
hearing regarding the circumstances of [petitioner’s] initial
stop.’” Id. at 504, 780 A.2d at 1234.  Then, the Court of Special Appeals stated in its
opinion the well settled rule that: 
“The State bears the ultimate burden of proving that evidence seized
without a warrant should not be suppressed.  Nevertheless, it is ‘always the
burden of the defense to raise the issue of unlawful search and seizure. . . .’
The failure to raise a suppression issue before the hearing court amounts to
a waiver to seek relief upon appellate review.  Moreover, the motion to
suppress must be presented with particularity in order to preserve an
objection.”  
Id. at 505, 780 A.2d at 1234 (citations omitted); see Carter v. State, 367 Md. 447, 788 A.2d
646 (2002).  
Before the Court of Special Appeals, the State contended that petitioner had failed
to properly challenge the propriety of the initial stop in his motion to suppress.  The Court
3  Hereafter, references to Rule 8-604 are to Maryland Rule 8-604. 
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of Special Appeals held that at the suppression hearing defense counsel’s comments were
sufficient to “articulate[] his challenge to the initial stop,” and because the suppression court
had not ruled on the propriety of the “initial stop” and instead focused on events surrounding
the show-up procedure, the Court of Special Appeals ordered a limited remand pursuant to
Maryland Rule 8-604(d)(1)3 “so that the court may rule on the propriety of the initial stop.”
Southern, 140 Md. App. at 505-07, 780 A.2d at 1234-35. 
The Court of Special Appeals also opined on whether the State was entitled to
introduce new evidence on remand and held that the trial court on remand could “hear
additional evidence concerning the propriety of the initial stop.”  Id. at 513, 780 A.2d at
1239.
The correctness of the Court of Special Appeals’s holding that would allow the State
to reopen the suppression proceeding and to present additional evidence on the initial stop,
is the issue presented for our resolution.
II. Discussion
a. The Right to Remand
The right of an appellate court to remand, in lieu of other methods of disposition, is
specifically recognized in Rule 8-604(d).  Davis Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Buckler, 231 Md.
370, 190 A.2d 531 (1963).  Section (d) of this Rule was designed to permit the appellate
court, in the interests of justice and judicial expediency, to remand a case for further
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proceedings instead of entering a final order affirming, reversing, or modifying the judgment
from which the appeal was taken.  Eastgate Associates v. Apper, 276 Md. 698, 350 A.2d
661 (1976).  
b. The Purposes for a (Limited) Remand
Rule 8-604, governing dispositions by Maryland’s appellate courts, reads:
“(a) Generally. As to each party to an appeal, the Court shall dispose
of an appeal in one of the following ways:
 (1) dismiss the appeal pursuant to Rule 8-602;
 (2) affirm the judgment;
 (3) vacate or reverse the judgment;
 (4) modify the judgment;
 (5) remand the action to a lower court in accordance with section (d)
of this Rule; or
 (6) an appropriate combination of the above.
.     .     . 
(d) Remand. (1) Generally.  If the Court concludes that the substantial
merits of a case will not be determined by affirming, reversing or modifying
the judgment, or that justice will be served by permitting further proceedings,
the Court may remand that case to a lower court.  In the order remanding a
case, the appellate court shall state the purpose for the remand.  The order of
remand and the opinion upon which the order is based are conclusive as to the
points decided.  Upon remand, the lower court shall conduct any further
proceedings necessary to determine the action in accordance with the opinion
and order of the appellate court.” 
There are certain times and types of cases where the limited remand is the proper
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disposition, but Rule 8-604(d) is neither an “antidote” for the errors of the State or of
counsel nor a method to correct errors committed during the trial itself.  See  Reid v. State,
305 Md. 9, 501 A.2d 436 (1985); Comptroller of Treasury v. Panitz, 267 Md. 296, 297 A.2d
289 (1972); Earl v. Anchor Pontiac Buick, Inc., 246 Md. 653, 229 A.2d 412 (1967).
The limited remand is proper in various circumstances, particularly when the
purposes of justice will be advanced by permitting further proceedings.  Butler v. State, 55
Md. App. 409, 462 A.2d 1230 (1983).  See McMillian v. State, 325 Md. 272, 600 A.2d 430
(1992) (remand was proper where a question was not previously addressed to the trial court
because of an error of law); Bailey v. State, 303 Md. 650, 496 A.2d 665 (1985) (a limited
remand was needed to determine whether a discovery violation prejudiced the defendant);
Warrick v. State, 302 Md. 162, 486 A.2d 189 (1985) (remand when necessary to answer
whether the State properly complied with disclosure provisions for discovery); Mahammitt
v. State, 299 Md. 82, 472 A.2d 477 (1984) (a remand to determine facts regarding a grant
of postponement relating to a statutory speedy trial claim served the interests of justice);
Wiener v. State, 290 Md. 425, 430 A.2d 588 (1981) (where the issue on restricted (limited)
remand is collateral to and not an integral part of a criminal trial and advances the purposes
of justice, remand is proper  – in reference to the right to counsel).  But see Lipinski v. State,
333 Md. 582, 636 A.2d 994 (1994) (the court may remand under 8-604(d) and while the rule
may be suitable to correct procedures subsidiary to the criminal trial, it can never be utilized
to rectify prejudicial errors committed during the trial itself, here a mistaken definition of
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the crime charged applied by the trial court at a bench trial); Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 289
A.2d 575 (1972) (there are times when remand is not to be used, and it is not to be used to
determine the issue of voluntariness of a confession which is ultimately a decision for the
jury).
Both the purpose and application of Rule 8-604(d) support a limited remand in
situations such as those discussed supra, but that line of case law is unlike the case sub
judice, where the State failed to meet its burden of proof on a motion to suppress.  This is
not a case where the State introduced sufficient evidence to meet its burden that the initial
stop was constitutional, but the trial court failed to rule on the issue.  In its present posture,
this is a case where the State failed to meet its burden, yet the trial court did not grant the
motion.  Rule 8-604 does not afford parties who fail to meet their burdens on issues raised
in a completed suppression hearing an opportunity to reopen the suppression proceeding for
the taking of additional evidence after the appellate court has held the party has failed to
meet its evidentiary burden.
The Court of Special Appeals recognized that it was the State’s responsibility to
introduce evidence regarding the constitutionality of the stop, not the responsibility of
petitioner.
“Defense counsel’s statement that she sought to ‘suppress the stop’ should
have put up a red flag for the State, and should have alerted the State that it
was necessary to provide evidence concerning the initial stop.  Appellant is
not required to present evidence concerning the propriety of the initial stop.
Once a defendant properly challenges the propriety of the stop, the burden is
on the State to present evidence justifying its actions. See, e.g., DiPasquale
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v. State, 43 Md. App. 574, 578, 406 A.2d 665 (1979) (‘Warrantless Fourth
Amendment intrusions are presumptively unreasonable . . . and the burden is
allocated to the State of showing adequate justification for the exceptional
departure from the Fourth Amendment norm’).  We hold that appellant did
not waive his Fourth Amendment challenge by failing to present evidence
concerning the initial stop.” 
Southern, 140 Md. App. at 506-07, 780 A.2d at 1235.
The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court had failed to rule on the
constitutionality of the initial stop, and granted a remand permitting the State to, in essence,
reopen the suppression proceeding in order to  introduce  new evidence regarding the initial
stop.  The purpose of the remand was not to correct a procedural error, but to afford the
State an additional opportunity to do that which it previously failed to do – present evidence
on the initial stop.  This is not a case where the motions hearing judge simply did not rule,
it is a case where the State, which had the burden of proof on the constitutionality of the
initial detention at the suppression hearing, admits that it did not present sufficient evidence
to support the constitutionality of the stop.  Without taking additional evidence at a renewed
hearing, the State obviously cannot meet its burden.  Accordingly, unless we were to permit
the introduction of additional evidence, a remand to the trial court would be merely pro
forma for the trial court to sign an order finding the initial detention unconstitutional and
suppressing the evidence emanating therefrom, because the Court of Special Appeals
correctly determined that the State failed to present such evidence at the original hearing.
If we were to affirm the mandate of the Court of Special Appeals, the State would have an
opportunity to reopen the evidentiary stage of the suppression proceeding and bolster its
4 The question necessarily arises, “What if the State fails to perceive and meet its
burden at the reopened suppression proceeding?”  Does it get another chance, and another
chance?
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case by presenting evidence that the State was required to  present in the first instance. 
c.  Remand with the Introduction of New Evidence
In the case at bar, the Court of Special Appeals improperly held that the State can
present new evidence on remand.  Rule 8-604(d) does not permit such a remand for the
purpose of introducing new evidence in cases where a party, like the State here, failed to
sustain its burden of proof on an issue both raised in a motion to suppress and argued at the
hearing on that motion.  Because the State did not sustain this burden, allowing the State to
introduce new evidence on remand, i.e. taking a second bite at the apple, is an improper
application of Rule 8-604(d) and undermines the State’s burden during the suppression
proceedings in this case.4
There is a line of cases permitting the introduction of new evidence on remand, but
the cases permitting new evidence on remand usually do so to correct some action taken by
the trial court in a proceeding collateral to the trial itself which results in unfairness to a
party.   See, e.g., Patrick v. State, 329 Md. 24, 617 A.2d 215 (1992) (holding that reports of
State experts who have conducted polygraph tests were discoverable and on remand
allocated the burden to the State to show that the defendant was not prejudiced by prior non-
disclosure); Warrick v. State, 326 Md. 696, 607 A.2d 24 (1992) (approving for the first time
the use of an in camera hearing to determine whether the defendant had been prejudiced by
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non-disclosure of the confidential informant and remanded so the trial court could conduct
such a hearing); Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267(1988) (remanding because the
trial court erroneously failed to find a prima facie case of discrimination in the State’s
exercise of its peremptory challenges and had deprived the State of an opportunity to explain
the reasons for its challenges); Reid, 305 Md. 9, 501 A.2d 436 (1985) (ordering a limited
remand for an evidentiary hearing because two favorable letters to the defendant had been
improperly excluded from the sentencing hearing and new evidence related to those letters’
authenticity was allowed); Bailey, 303 Md. 650, 496 A.2d 665 (1985) (remand allowing the
State to provide the defense with discovery materials which it had improperly withheld and
the defense could decide whether a motion to suppress should be filed on the basis of those
statements); Davis v. State, 100 Md. App. 369, 641 A.2d 941 (1994) (remanding for an
initial suppression hearing after the appellate court concluded that the trial court’s failure
to review the defendant’s right to court appointed counsel was good cause to waive the
thirty-day time limit for filing a motion to suppress).  We have not found a case that has
permitted the reopening of a suppression proceeding, after an appellate holding that the
State has failed to meet its burden on a constitutional challenge, for the presentation of
additional evidence where, on the facts and law, the motion to suppress should have been
granted.  
The facts and the procedural situation were different in Tu v. State, 336 Md. 406, 648
A.2d 993 (1994), relied upon by  the Court of Special Appeals.  Tu did not involve a remand
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for the reopening of a suppression proceeding for the presentation of additional evidence
where the suppression proceeding had been completed, but involved a reversal based upon
an improper denial of a motion to suppress, and a subsequent completely new trial.  In
respect to the items at issue, we noted:
“We have shown that Tu I held that the State had failed to prove at the
first suppression hearing that the plain view doctrine applied to items, beyond
the scope of the warrant, that the court understood were seized at the hotel. .
. .  Thus, the circuit court, at the second suppression hearing, did not directly
violate the precise holding of Tu I, at least as it applies to the custodial items.
“At the second suppression hearing the court accepted the State’s
testimony that the custodial items were not seized at the hotel. Tu does not
contend that the custodial items are subject to suppression if they may be
considered to have been acquired from the Nevada authorities as described in
the testimony at the second suppression hearing.”
Id. at 417, 648 A.2d at 998.
Tu had originally moved to suppress the evidence on the mistaken belief that it had
been improperly seized during the execution of a search warrant for a hotel room.  The State
originally defended on its also mistaken belief that the items were properly seized in the hotel
room, not under the warrant, but that the items were seized because they were in “plain view”
in the hotel room during the execution of the warrant.  The Court of Special Appeals reversed
on the failure by the State to present “plain view” facts at the first suppression hearing, and
remanded the case for a new trial.  In Tu I, there was no remand to the trial court for it to
reopen the initial suppression proceeding, requiring it to address an issue it had not
previously recognized, and further requiring the trial court to allow the State to present new
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evidence at a reopened suppression proceeding.  Tu I was completely reversed and remanded
for a new trial, not for a reopened suppression proceeding.  At the new trial, Tu II, Tu again
moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that the Court of Special Appeals had held that
there was insufficient evidence that the items had been in plain view during the search of the
hotel room, and, thus, the issue was controlled by the “law of the case.” 
During the suppression proceeding in the new trial, it was developed that the items
had not been seized during a search of the hotel room in the first instance, but had been
otherwise obtained. We held that the “law of the case” did not control because the actual
“place” of the search, and the actual manner of the obtaining of the evidence were different
than the manner of search and the place searched pursuant to the warrant at issue in the
suppression hearing at the original trial. Under those circumstances, we held that the State
was not foreclosed from establishing the admissibility of the evidence at the subsequent trial.
The Tu cases did not involve an appellate court’s direction to a trial court to, in essence,
reopen a suppression proceeding in the same case to permit the State another opportunity to
prevail on a suppression motion that should have been granted to a defendant.      
The intermediate appellate court in the case at bar noted the following language from
Tu:
“[R]eversal for the erroneous denial of a motion to suppress does not, in and
of itself, preclude any trial court reconsideration of the admissibility of the
State’s evidence that was the subject of the suppression motion, at least if the
reconsideration presents a legal theory that was not ruled upon on the prior
appeal.  Further, facts that are relevant to applying that previously
unadjudicated legal theory and that were not previously presented may be
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considered by the trial court, even if those facts were known to the State at the
time of the original trial court ruling.”
Southern, 140 Md. App. at 512-13, 780 A.2d at 1238 (quoting Tu, 336 Md. at 420, 648 A.2d
at 999-1000).
The Court of Special Appeals went astray when it attempted to afford the State the
opportunity to relitigate, in the same case, an issue it had failed to litigate and prove.  Tu
stands for the proposition that in a new trial after reversal, certain issues may be litigated,
unless prohibited by appropriate “law of the case” restrictions.
At a new trial, a defendant may always file a new motion to suppress, and if the State
opposes it, a defendant, in appropriate circumstances may avail himself of “law of the case”
principles.  Otherwise, it is a new motion, new hearing, new trial, and new decision.
The State, under the given facts of the present case, is attempting to get another
chance, a “second bite at the apple,” to present the evidence it should have presented at the
initial suppression proceeding.  If petitioner in this case, at the Motion to Suppress hearing,
had failed to present any evidence in response to some position the State had adequately
established, we normally would not allow petitioner a limited remand for the introduction of
new evidence to try and bolster his case.  What is required of the defendant in such
circumstances is no less required of the State.   
Furthermore, the Court of Special Appeals, by permitting the introduction of evidence
on remand, departed from the practice of appellate courts to reverse the judgment in a case
where the State has failed to sustain its burden of proof in a motion to suppress.  See Stokes
-19-
v. State, 362 Md. 407, 765 A.2d 612 (2001); Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 753 A.2d 519
(2000); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 735 A.2d 491 (1999); Turner v. State, 133 Md. App.
192, 754 A.2d 1074 (2000); Charity v. State, 132 Md. App. 598, 753 A.2d 556 (2000).
This notion of not allowing the presentation of new evidence on limited remand is
supported in Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
vol. 5, § 11.2(e), 82, fn. 238 (3d ed., West 1996), which states: 
“Such [a limited] remand is appropriate when the appellate court would
otherwise be unable to decide the case because of an absence of findings of
fact or conclusions of law.  State v. Wilson, 218 Mont. 359, 708 P.2d 270
(1985).  Upon remand, the responsibility of the lower court is to review the
evidence and make necessary findings and conclusions, rather than to receive
more evidence.  Ex parte Hergott, 588 So.2d 911 (Ala. 1991) (on remand
because of uncertainty as to what record indicated about whether barn was
within curtilage, it was error for trial court to receive new evidence by going
to view the premises; court holds “that Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the
Court of Criminal Appeals from sending the issue back to the trial court for a
second chance to supply on the record evidence sufficient to prove that the
warrantless search fell within the ‘open-field’ exception”).”
Cf. Hopkins v. State, 661 So.2d 774 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that although the record
before it left unanswered many questions, that court was not authorized to resolve those
questions by remanding for another hearing because the State when presented with an
opportunity to establish its case, failed to do so, and under the Double Jeopardy Clause it
does not get a second chance).
III.  Conclusion
The Court of Special Appeals sought to invoke Rule 8-604(d)(1) as authority to
remand petitioner’s case for the reopening of a suppression proceeding in order for new
-20-
evidence to be introduced by the State and then for a new ruling in that suppression
proceeding; however, the intent of this rule and Maryland case law reviewing this rule do not
provide a party with the opportunity to get a second “bite at the apple” in the same case, but
instead, the rule attempts to permit a court to cure some judicial error that resulted in
unfairness to a party. While remand is a right given to appellate courts under certain
circumstances, it is not an applicable remedy in this case.  During the suppression
proceeding, petitioner adequately challenged the “stop and anything that flowed from it,”
putting the State on notice of its challenge.  Nevertheless, the State  proceeded to proffer no
evidence as to the constitutionality of the initial detention.  Petitioner’s challenge to his initial
warrantless detention placed the burden of proof on the State to establish the constitutionality
of the detention.  The State failed to meet its burden.  The appropriate appellate response is
a reversal with a new trial, not a remand for the taking of additional evidence in a reopened
suppression proceeding in the same case. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO
THAT 
COURT 
WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY AND
TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT
COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL CONSISTENT WITH
THIS OPINION; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID
BY PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY.
-21-
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 109
September Term, 2001
GEORGE WENDELL SOUTHERN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by
 Raker and Wilner, JJ.
  
           Filed: September 17, 2002
Raker, J., and Wilner, J., dissenting: 
We respectfully dissent for two reasons.  First, we believe that the issue decided by
the Court — whether there was probable cause for the initial detention of petitioner — was
not properly raised in the Circuit Court and that, as a result, there is no basis for either a
reversal or a remand.  Second, we believe that, even if one could find that the issue was
raised, given the haphazard and thoroughly confusing manner in which it was raised, any
failure of the State to respond to it and any failure of the trial court to recognize that the issue
was raised was excusable, and a limited remand to allow a re-opening of the suppression
hearing is a proper and lawful remedy.
The history of the case is important.  On the morning of February 19, 2000, two
convenience stores in Prince George’s County — one on Auth Road and one on Old Branch
Avenue, near the intersection with Kirby Road — were robbed within an hour of each other.
Corporal Peton, a K-9 officer who responded to the Old Branch Avenue store, put his dog
in a “tracking mode” and went to the rear of the store.  The dog picked up a scent, led Peton
across Kirby Road to the rear of a house, and alerted under a tree.  Just before crossing the
street, Peton saw petitioner jump from a hiding place and run into a wooded area.  Petitioner
was found under the tree. Officer Pippin, informed of the apprehension, brought three
witnesses to the Old Branch Avenue robbery to observe petitioner.  One positively identified
him as the robber.
While this was occurring, Officer Greever observed an unoccupied Honda Accord
parked in what he regarded as an “odd location” near the intersection of Old Branch Avenue
1 We do not suggest that the apprehension and temporary detention, pending a show-
up which occurred very promptly, was in fact an arrest requiring probable cause.  We simply
note that, even if it was an arrest, there clearly was probable cause to support it.
Moreover, it is arguable that the record of the suppression hearing contains sufficient
evidence to support the stop and detention.  Although not argued or quoted by any party or
the Court of Special Appeals, the transcript from the suppression hearing does contain some
evidence supporting the stop.  Officer Richard Pippin was called by the State and testified
to the circumstances surrounding the identification show-up that occurred close to the place
(continued...)
-2-
and Kirby Road.  He looked inside, saw a cash register drawer, and reported that finding to
other officers.  The car was towed to a police lot.  The car was owned by one George
Howsore, who had lent it to petitioner’s girlfriend, Lisa Townsend.  Ms. Townson said that,
on the evening before the robberies, petitioner had taken the car without her permission.
After the show-up identification, petitioner was taken to the hospital for treatment of
dog bite wounds he suffered at the time of his apprehension.  While at the hospital, two of
the officers guarding him were discussing the car found near the scene of the Old Branch
Avenue robbery when petitioner, who was not part of the conversation, blurted out that the
car belonged to his girlfriend and that she had given him permission to use it.  Following his
treatment at the hospital, petitioner was taken to the police station where, after being given
his Miranda warnings, he gave a statement that implicated him in the two robberies.
We recite these facts, most of which came out at trial rather than at the suppression
hearing, only to make clear that, even if petitioner’s initial apprehension and detention were
to be regarded as an arrest rather than a Terry stop, there was, in fact, more than ample
probable cause to support it.  See Terrell v. State, 3 Md. App. 340, 239 A.2d 128 (1968).1
1(...continued)
of the robbery and within a few minutes of the crime.  The following testimony was
presented:
Q.  Did you explain to Miss Pryor the reason that you were taking her to
Wolverton Avenue?
A.  That’s correct. 
Q.  What did you tell her?
A.  We had apprehended a suspect fitting the description of the person that
robbed the 7-Eleven.
Ms. Pryor testified at the suppression hearing that she identified the man in police custody as
the robber.  The fact that the police apprehended a suspect in close proximity to the scene of
the crime and one fitting the description of the person they believed to be the robber
constitutes probable cause, or at the very least, reasonable suspicion to detain a person.
-3-
Had the issue of probable cause for the detention been clearly presented at the suppression
hearing, it is obvious from the record that the State could have produced more than enough
evidence to sustain its burden on the issue.
Petitioner was indicted on March 21, 2000.  On March 30, 2000, he filed a motion
captioned ENTRY OF APPEARANCE, ELECTION FOR JURY TRIAL, MANDATORY
MOTIONS, AND MOTION FOR DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION, in which he (1)
demanded a jury trial, (2) requested 20 peremptory challenges on voir dire, (3) moved to
dismiss the indictment, (4) requested a severance of his case from that of his co-defendant,
(5) demanded a speedy trial, and (6) moved to suppress evidence.  With respect to his request
to suppress evidence, the motion simply read:
“3.  Moves to suppress any and all evidence obtained by the
State in violation of the defendant’s rights as guaranteed by the
4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States and the Maryland Declaration of Rights.”
2 The motion to dismiss the indictment assigned no reasons at all.  Citing no facts or
legal principles, it simply said, “[m]oves to dismiss the indictment.”
-4-
The motion did not indicate what evidence the defendant wished to suppress or any factual
basis upon which he was entitled to have it suppressed.2
In apparent response to his discovery request, the State sent to petitioner copies of
documents and police investigative reports.  On August 1, 2000, petitioner filed the same
“omnibus” motion he filed in April, again without any specificity as to what he wished
suppressed or the factual or legal basis for suppression.
On September 20, 2000, after empaneling and swearing in a jury, the court held a
hearing on these motions, asking first “which motions are we taking up first?”  Without
objection or comment by defense counsel, the prosecutor responded “ID and then the
statement.”  At petitioner’s request, he was excluded from the courtroom, and the court then
heard evidence relating to circumstances of the post-apprehension show-up, and, finding that
the identifications were reliable, denied the motion to suppress the identification.  At that
point, defense counsel, noting that “the State is saying they had my client in custody and
there was a stop by a K-9, and obviously the seizure of whatever they seized from him, and
two statements, the statement to Detective Cheeks and the statement to Detective Arscott,”
announced that petitioner was seeking “to suppress the stop and anything that flowed from
that.”  She added, “I believe evidence was seized from him when he was stopped by Officer
Peton, I can’t remember how they — Peton, and his K-9, and Officer Burgess.  So anything
-5-
that was seized from that stop.”
That, of course, gave the court no clue whatever as to the evidence petitioner sought
to suppress, much less whether there was any basis for suppression.  Counsel added:
“The defendant’s statement to Officer Cheeks, which was
memorialized in writing allegedly by Mr. Southern and also as
it appears by Officer Cheeks.  There’s also an oral statement that
was allegedly given to Corporal Arscott at the hospital.  We’re
moving to suppress that.  And there was a search of the vehicle.
Officer — responded to the car, and Officer Stuehmeier seized
it, and they are alleging my client had custody of that vehicle.”
Upon that minor bit of clarification, petitioner returned to the courtroom and the State
presented evidence regarding petitioner’s time in custody, the statements he gave, and the
seizure of the cash register drawer from the car with which petitioner had associated himself.
At the conclusion of that evidence, both sides stated that they had no further evidence to
offer, and the court heard argument.  Defense counsel stated that she proposed “to re-argue
with regard to the search and seizure and the stop, when they stopped the defendant, about
the identification, and the statements of Detective Cheeks . . .”  The identification issue, as
noted, had already been resolved by the court, before petitioner returned to the courtroom.
At that point, of course, all of the evidence had been presented.  Completely switching
gears, defense counsel focused, for the first time, on the initial apprehension of petitioner.
She said that, “with regard to the stop, the defendant should really be the starting point for
everything.  We really have no evidence.  What we have is Officer Burkhalter, who did not
participate in the stop of Mr. Southern, who indicated the description that was given was a
-6-
white male, and he really didn’t have anything further than that.  I believe it was five-eight
to five-ten.”  Continuing, she argued, “Other than that, the next thing we know is we have
Mr. Southern stopped and witnesses driving by.  So I don’t think the State has established
probable cause — I would therefore like you to suppress the identification based on that.”
(Emphasis added).  Counsel then argued that petitioner’s statement regarding the car should
be suppressed because it was the product of what she regarded as a custodial interrogation,
and that the written statement given at the police station was involuntary.  She ended her
argument with the request “that the I.D. be suppressed because the stop was —.”
The court interrupted before she completed that sentence and repeated the finding it
had made earlier that the identification was proper, that the statements petitioner made were
voluntary, and that the police properly impounded the vehicle and saw the cash box in open
view.  On those bases, it denied the motion to suppress.  The final colloquy was as follows:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And Your Honor, with regard to the
oral statement and identification that flowed from the stop?
THE COURT: You mean the oral statement when he said:  It
was my girlfriend’s?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.  (Emphasis added).
THE COURT:  The Court finds specifically that was not as the
result of any custodial interrogation, that he made that statement
when the two other police officers were in fairly close proximity
but not really in the same location as he was.  And that does not
run afoul of any 5th or 6th Amendment right because it wasn’t a
custodial interrogation.  It was a statement that was made
voluntarily by him, not in response to any question.
-7-
So, quite frankly, I wasn’t aware that was your challenge on it.
I didn’t know that was the subject of your challenge.  Because
as I heard it, he wasn’t answering any questions.  So I deny the
motion to suppress.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you, Your Honor.”
On this record, petitioner complained in the Court of Special Appeals that the State
“failed to prove that his initial stop was constitutional” because “[n]o evidence was adduced
by the State . . . regarding the circumstances under which he originally came into police
custody . . . [and] there was no basis from which the court would have concluded that the
initial stop and subsequent arrest of the appellant was legal.”  Though acknowledging that
no such evidence was produced at the suppression hearing, the State argued that petitioner
had failed to challenge the propriety of the initial stop and that the issue was, therefore, not
properly presented.  The Court of Special Appeals concluded otherwise but, because the
matter was never ruled upon by the Circuit Court, it remanded the case “so that the court may
rule upon the propriety of the initial stop.”  
We granted certiorari to determine whether, assuming the facts as presented by
petitioner, that court erred in remanding in order to give the State “a second opportunity to
introduce evidence supporting the legality of the stop.”  The majority, erroneously in our
view, accepts that the issue was properly presented and concludes, as a result, that, as the
State failed in its burden to establish the legality of the initial stop, it was inappropriate to
afford the State a second opportunity to meet that burden.
It is clear to us that the question of whether the police had a lawful basis to detain
3It would be absurd to suggest that the State intentionally elected not to present
evidence to justify petitioner’s detention.  The record suggests that no one in the courtroom
believed that petitioner had any credible basis to contest the probable cause for the stop or
detention of petitioner.  Everyone proceeded upon that assumption and, therefore, the State
presented no evidence to establish the legality of the detention. 
-8-
petitioner was never properly presented to the trial court, and he, therefore, has waived any
right to complain about it on appeal.  See Maryland Rule 8-131(a) (stating that ordinarily, an
appellate court will not decide any issue, other than a jurisdictional one, “unless it plainly
appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court . . .”). 
The real problem here was created by petitioner and the manner in which he
proceeded in the Circuit Court.  The sole reason that the State did not address probable cause
for petitioner’s arrest is because the State and the trial court were not aware that the legality
of the stop was in issue at the suppression hearing.  Defense counsel never told anyone prior
to the conclusion of the hearing that the reason he was seeking “to suppress the stop and
anything that flowed from that” was because the stop lacked probable cause.  The pre-trial
motions filed by petitioner and the transcript make clear that the trial court and prosecutor
obviously were not aware that petitioner was contesting the legal basis to justify petitioner’s
detention.  Not until after all of the evidence was in did defense counsel make any allusion
to a problem with the initial detention, and even as to that, she limited her complaint to the
blurt-out about the automobile.  It is for that reason, and that reason only, that the State did
not present the evidence on this issue to the trial court.3 
Maryland Rule 4-252(a) lists certain issues that, if not raised in a pretrial motion
-9-
within the time specified in subsection (b) of the Rule, are waived — a defect in the
institution of the prosecution; a non-jurisdictional defect in the charging document; an
unlawful search, seizure, interception of wire or oral communication, or pretrial
identification; an unlawfully obtained admission, statement, or confession; and a request for
joinder or severance of defendants or charges.  It has become customary for defense counsel
to raise some or all of those issues in a single “omnibus” motion, as was done here, and we
have no problem with that practice.  The Rule does not require the issues to be raised by
separate, independent motions, and there is no reason to file separate motions when one will
do.
The problem is with the sloppiness that sometimes surrounds and permeates those
motions.  Not infrequently, as here, they make only the most general allegations — without
any specificity, and sometimes without any basis in fact — that the defendant’s arrest was
unlawful, that a confession was unlawfully obtained, that the defendant was subjected to an
unlawful identification procedure, that evidence was obtained unlawfully, that the defendant
was denied the assistance of counsel, and that the defendant was denied various other, often
unarticulated, Constitutional, statutory, or common law rights.  On those bald, and often
unsupported, allegations, the defendant seeks to dismiss the charging document, widespread
discovery, severance of one kind or another, and the suppression of every piece of evidence
that may be possessed by the State.
That kind of motion, whether it is in the form of an “omnibus” motion or one raising
4Maryland Rule 4-252(e) provides as follows:
“A motion filed pursuant to this Rule shall be in writing unless the court
otherwise directs, shall state the grounds upon which it is made, and shall set
forth the relief sought. A motion alleging an illegal source of information as
the basis for probable cause must be supported by precise and specific factual
averments. Every motion shall contain or be accompanied by a statement of
points and citation of authorities.”
5Some courts will not hold a suppression hearing unless the written motion alleges
facts sufficiently definite, specific, and detailed to enable the court to conclude that a claim
is presented.  See e.g., United States v. Ledesma, 499 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1974).
-10-
only one of the issues, is impermissible.  Rule 4-252(e) requires a motion filed in Circuit
Court to “state the grounds upon which it is made” and to be “accompanied by a statement
of points and citation of authorities.” 4  A similar requirement appears in the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 47, and probably in the criminal procedure rules
of most States, and it is there for a reason.  Whenever a court is asked to make a formal
ruling, especially one as important as the rulings sought under Rule 4-252, it must be given
the factual and legal basis upon which to make the ruling.  Some of that, of course, need not,
and should not, be stated in the motion itself, but may be supplied through evidence or
argument presented at a hearing or that accompanies the motion, but the motion itself must
fairly alert the court to the issue it needs to address.5
There is nothing strange or onerous about such a requirement.  The Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine observed in State v. Desjardins, 401 A.2d 165, 169 (Me. 1979) that “the
suppression movant must articulate in his motion with sufficient particularity the specific
reason on which he bases his claim . . . so that the court will recognize the issue to be
-11-
decided.”  The Supreme Court of California explained in People v. Williams:
“A motion is an application to the court for an order.  In general,
the moving party must carry the initial burden of informing its
opponent and the court of the specific basis for its motion.  If the
rule were otherwise, then the party opposing the motion would
have to try to guess, and then refute, every possible basis for the
motion, which would always be inefficient and would often
produce arbitrary results.  Similarly, when defendants move to
suppress evidence . . . they must inform the prosecution and the
court of the specific basis for their motion.”
973 P.2d 52, 59 (Cal. 1999) (citations omitted); see also O’Neal v. United States, 222 F.2d
411, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (stating that motion to suppress must identify the evidence that the
defendant seeks to suppress); Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 920, 923 (Colo. 1990) (holding
that motion to suppress should be adequately descriptive so the court and prosecution are on
notice as to what is to be decided); Best v. United States, 582 A.2d 966 (D.C. App. 1990);
State v. Johnson, 519 P.2d 1053 (Or. Ct. App. 1974) (requiring that defendant must give
State as much notice as possible of the contentions it must be prepared to meet at the
suppression hearing).  
 
In most instances, this requirement of stating the “grounds upon which [the motion]
is made” and points and authorities that specify the legal basis for the motion means more
than simply alleging a violation of broad Constitutional provisions.  See People v. Mendoza,
624 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (N.Y. 1993).  It means articulating a factual and legal basis for the
relief requested.  The motions filed in this case did not even come close to doing so.  They
did not state the grounds on which they were made and did not contain anything even
-12-
resembling points and authorities.  A motion to suppress “any and all evidence obtained by
the State in violation of the defendant’s rights as guaranteed by the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and the Maryland Declaration of
Rights” tells the court nothing about what evidence petitioner wished to suppress or the basis
for any suppression.  Faced with such a motion, the court could quite properly have denied
it on that ground alone.
We are told, in defense, that the practice has developed, at least in some areas of the
State, for the court and the State to accept such a hollow motion, filed solely to comply with
the time deadlines of Rule 4-252, and to allow defense counsel, at or shortly before a hearing
on the motion, to inform the prosecutor and the court more particularly what issues the
defendant really is raising and what relief is sought.  That practice is not in conformance with
the “precise” rubric embodied in Rule 4-252(e) and is not to be condoned, but if the court
chooses to excuse the procedural lapse and entertain the motion, it certainly becomes
incumbent upon counsel, at that point, to make clear what the defendant is complaining about
and what relief is being sought.  In our view, that was not done, even at the hearing.
We have quoted much of the argument presented at the suppression hearing, for it
demonstrates far better than any characterization of the proceedings how hidden was any
complaint about a lack of probable cause to detain petitioner and how thoroughly confusing,
and to a large extent misleading, was the articulation of the relief sought.  Without objection
by defense counsel, the issue was initially presented as one of the post-arrest identification
-13-
show-up.  At the request of defense counsel, petitioner was taken out of the courtroom, and
substantial evidence was taken on the issue.  The court then ruled that the identification was
permissible, and everyone assumed that that issue had thus been resolved.  Petitioner was
brought back into the courtroom and the discussion turned to other issues — the various
statements made by petitioner at the hospital regarding the automobile and later at the police
station.  Although at one point counsel announced that she was seeking “to suppress the stop
and anything that flowed from that,” when pressed later about what she wanted suppressed
because of the “stop,” she made clear that it was limited to his statement at the hospital
regarding the automobile.  We have quoted that colloquy: 
THE COURT: You mean the oral statement when he said: It
was my girlfriend’s?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.
The court then ruled on that complaint, holding that the statement was essentially a
“blurt” and was “not as the result of any custodial interrogation.”  As noted, the court
expressed understandable surprise — “I wasn’t aware that was your challenge on it” — but
it addressed the complaint and rejected it.  Counsel understood that a ruling had been made.
She never indicated to the court that it misunderstood the nature of petitioner’s complaint,
but immediately responded, “Thank you, Your Honor.”  
That ruling was absolutely correct.  On the evidence presented, petitioner’s statement
regarding the automobile was not the product of any kind of custodial interrogation, and there
was utterly no basis for suppressing it.  It is only with appellate afterthought that petitioner
-14-
now seeks to expand his attack to include a complaint that the police had no probable cause
to detain him and a demand that, by reason of that lack of probable cause, all evidence
obtained as a result of that detention be suppressed.  That broad attack, however, was never
presented to the trial court — neither in the motion nor in argument on it.
Assuming that the suppression issue was raised properly, a limited remand to allow
a reopening of the suppression hearing is a proper and lawful remedy.  Rule 8-604(d) permits
a limited remand and provides as follows:
“If the Court concludes that the substantial merits of a case will
not be determined by affirming, reversing or modifying the
judgment, or that justice will be served by permitting further
proceedings, the Court may remand the case to a lower court.
In the order remanding a case, the appellate court shall state the
purpose for the remand.  The order of remand and the opinion
upon which the order is based are conclusive as to the points
decided.  Upon remand, the lower court shall conduct any
further proceedings necessary to determine the action in
accordance with the opinion and order of the appellate court.”
This is an ideal case for a limited remand pursuant to Rule 8-604(d).  See Atkins v. State, 331
S.E.2d 597, 599 (Ga. 1985) (holding that although all crucial elements of test of valid
consent were not established, reversal was not required; case remanded to trial court for new
suppression hearing) (citing Carpenter v. State, 310 S.E.2d 912) (Ga. 1984) (remanding case
for in camera inspection of documents); Pittman v. State, 265 S.E.2d 592 (Ga. 1980)
(remanding case for Jackson-Denno hearing)). 
The majority holds that a limited remand is inappropriate because the State failed to
6The majority ill-advisedly tosses in references to Double Jeopardy as a basis for
rejecting limited remand.  See maj. op. at 19.  The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United
States Constitution has nothing to do with this case.
7Although reference to the “one bite at the apple” principle is absent from our cases,
many other states discuss the notion.  See e.g., Boughton v. McAllister, 576 N.W.2d 94, 96
(Iowa 1998); Aice v. State, 409 S.E.2d 392, 395 (S.C. 1991); Horne v. State, 607 S.W.2d 556,
563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (Roberts, J., concurring).
-15-
meet its burden and is not entitled to a second bite at the apple.  See maj. op. at 12-14.6  The
majority recognizes that cases permitting the introduction of new evidence on remand are
permitted to correct some action taken by the trial court in a proceeding that is collateral to
the trial itself and results in unfairness to a party.  See maj. op. at 15.  In the instant case, the
issue on remand is collateral to and not an integral part of the criminal trial and the purposes
of justice will be advanced by permitting further proceedings.  
There are several sound reasons underlying the “one bite at the apple” rule.7  The
philosophy underlying this rule includes the interest of finality and appreciation that
repetitive motions waste scarce judicial resources and increase the costs of the judicial
system.  Moreover, by requiring the parties to present all the arguments on an issue at the
same time, the court may comprehensively analyze the issue presented rather than doing so
in a piecemeal fashion.  The “one bite” rule means that a party is entitled to but one bite at
the apple — but it presupposes that the party knows which apple to bite.  See Thomas v.
State, 517 So. 2d 1285 (Miss. 1987).  
This is not a case of giving the State more than “one bite at the apple.”  This is a case
in which the State should be given at least a bite at the apple.  In this case, there is a strong
-16-
competing interest between petitioner’s right to have all the State’s evidence presented at the
initial suppression hearing and society’s right to have guilty defendants convicted.  For that
reason, the “one bite at the apple” rule is not applicable and the State should not be barred
from having one full bite at the apple.