Case Title: Franklin Building Supply Co. v. Hymas

Citation: 

Docket Number: 41041

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2014-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 41041 
 
FRANKLIN BUILDING SUPPLY 
COMPANY, INC., 
 
    Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
AARON MICHAEL HYMAS, 
 
    Defendant-Appellant. 
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Burley, November 2014 Term 
 
2014 Opinion No. 123 
 
Filed: November 28, 2014 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk  
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Richard D. Greenwood, District Judge. 
 
The judgment is affirmed.  
 
Robinson & Tribe, Rupert, for appellant. Brent T. Robinson argued. 
 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chtd., Boise, for respondent. 
Samuel A. Diddle argued. 
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice 
Franklin Building Supply Co., Inc. (“FBS”) filed suit against Aaron Michael Hymas to 
recover money owed on an open account for construction supplies, equipment, and labor 
supplied to Crestwood Construction, Inc. FBS claims that Hymas guarantied any unpaid balance 
on Crestwood’s account. The district court granted FBS’s motion for summary judgment. Shortly 
thereafter, the district court permitted FBS to correct an error in an affidavit submitted in support 
of summary judgment regarding the amount of interest owed on the outstanding balance. Hymas 
twice moved the court to reconsider its order granting summary judgment and the district court 
denied both motions. He timely appealed.   
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In October of 2011, FBS filed a complaint against Hymas for breach of contract and 
moved for summary judgment just over a year later. It supported its motion with an affidavit 
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from Richard C. Pietrucci, FBS’s corporate credit manager. According to Pietrucci, Hymas 
applied for credit at FBS on behalf of Crestwood Construction, Inc., (“Crestwood”) in his 
capacity as an officer of Crestwood. Because FBS required a personal guaranty before it would 
extend credit to corporations, Hymas signed a continuing personal guaranty of Crestwood’s open 
account. FBS’s suit was an attempt to collect the balance of Crestwood’s open account—
including interest—from Hymas under the terms of the guaranty agreement.  
Pietrucci’s affidavit included three attachments. First, it attached the credit application 
dated June 22, 2004. The application, signed by Hymas and Justin Walker in their capacities as 
officers of Crestwood, provides in part that “the undersigned guarantors personally, jointly, 
severally and unconditionally guarantee payment to Franklin Building Supply for any and all 
indebtedness of purchaser now or hereafter owing, including all costs, fees and expenses of 
collection,” that “[p]ast due invoices accrue finance charges at the rate of 1.5% per month (18% 
per annum),” and that three individuals—Chris Georgeson, Crestwood’s lead superintendent, 
Justin Walker, and Hymas—are the only individuals empowered to authorize purchases on the 
account. The second attachment was a separate, continuing guaranty of Crestwood’s open 
account, signed by Hymas and Justin Walker on June 29, 2004. The third attachment was a 
customer transaction report for charges and credits to Crestwood’s account. The report shows a 
balance of $671,667.50 for charges almost entirely in the first half of 2007. The report attributes 
the invoices to Crestwood, but does not indicate who authorized or received the orders. 
Hymas made three arguments in opposition to summary judgment. First, he argued that 
because the invoices were dated from July 2007 or earlier, FBS was barred from suing to collect 
the debt by the four-year statute of limitations in Idaho Code section 5-217, governing actions on 
oral contracts. Second, he argued that Pietrucci’s affidavit and the attached customer transaction 
report do not show that the charges were authorized by one of the three individuals empowered 
to authorize charges on Crestwood’s account and, absent such a showing, summary judgment 
would be inappropriate. Third, Hymas requested that he be permitted to take the deposition of 
Pietrucci and complained that FBS had not responded to his discovery requests. In particular, 
Hymas complained that it would be impossible to determine whether the charges were properly 
authorized without the actual invoices associated with those charges, as opposed to the summary 
of invoices provided with the Pietrucci affidavit. Hymas did not oppose summary judgment with 
any admissible evidence.  
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The district court granted FBS’s motion for summary judgment. It held that any failures 
with respect to discovery prior to the summary judgment hearing should have been addressed via 
a motion under I.R.C.P. 56(f), properly supported by an affidavit, to continue the hearing 
pending further discovery. Hymas did not make such a motion. Second, the court held that the 
case was not barred by the four-year statute of limitations because the relevant contract is the 
written guaranty and the five-year statute of limitations in Idaho Code section 5-216 applies to 
written contracts. Finally, the court held that FBS provided evidence sufficient to support its 
claim for breach of contract, shifting the burden to Hymas to present admissible evidence 
establishing the existence of a material question of fact, and Hymas did not meet that burden.  
Roughly a week later, FBS filed a “Motion to Correct Calculation of Amount Claimed 
Owed Plaintiff.” Pietrucci’s affidavit in support of summary judgment stated that “[a]s of 
October 31, 2012, the reasonable value of the labor and materials supplied to Crestwood . . . is 
$671,667.05, inclusive of interest, plus attorneys’ fees and costs.” According to FBS, that 
sentence should have included the date “January 27, 2011,” rather than “October 31, 2012.” Or, 
alternatively, the sentence should have included the word “exclusive” rather than “inclusive.” 
The amount FBS claimed was actually owed as of January 17, 2013, with interest, was 
$934,332.44. The district court granted FBS’s motion to correct the amount owed, finding that 
the mistaken calculation was simply “a clerical error” and “should have been the higher 
number.” 
 Hymas responded with a motion asking the court to reconsider its ruling on summary 
judgment. He argued that, though FBS’s invoices include the name of at least one of the three 
individuals empowered to authorize purchases for Crestwood, those invoices are not signed. 
Because they are not signed, Hymas argued that there was insufficient evidence that the orders in 
question were properly authorized under the credit agreement or that the goods and services were 
in fact supplied to Crestwood. The motion states that Crestwood “had many issues with framers 
and other subcontractors calling plaintiff, Franklin Building Supply, and ordering products for 
Crestwood’s job sites.” Hymas also argued that “the only showing of an interest rate is in the 
credit application and it is so small that it cannot be read and it almost requires a magnifying 
glass to do so.” Presumably because of the size of the font in the credit agreement, Hymas 
claimed that the statutory interest rate of 12%—set out in Idaho Code section 28-22-104(1)(6), 
governing contracts that do not explicitly address interest—should apply to any balance owed by 
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Crestwood. The motion was supported by an affidavit from Hymas stating that Crestwood had 
issues with subcontractors making orders from FBS that had not been authorized by any of the 
three individuals empowered to do so.  
In his reply memorandum in support of reconsideration, Hymas asserted an additional 
argument for the first time. Hymas claimed that Crestwood Construction, Inc., was dissolved in 
2005 and, in the same year, Crestwood, Inc.—d/b/a Crestwood Construction, Inc.—was formed. 
According to Hymas, the entity that was ordering materials during 2007 was not the entity for 
which Hymas guarantied its open account with FBS. In support of this new argument, Hymas 
attached articles of dissolution and incorporation to his reply memorandum. He also attached 
several “sample” invoices from FBS to support his claim that the invoices were not signed.  
The district court refused to consider Hymas’ argument regarding the corporate status of 
Crestwood because that argument was raised for the first time in his reply memorandum and 
refused to consider the materials attached to Hymas’ reply memorandum because those materials 
were not attached to an affidavit and properly submitted under oath. It denied Hymas’ motion for 
reconsideration, holding again that FBS presented evidence sufficient to support its breach of 
contract claim and that Hymas failed to present evidence to establish the existence of a material 
dispute of fact. According to the court, Hymas’ affidavit in support of reconsideration asserted 
“the mere possibility” that some of the purchases for which FBS is attempting to collect were 
made by unauthorized purchasers. Because such claims are “conclusory and speculative,” the 
court held that they failed to satisfy Hymas’ burden. The court also rejected Hymas’ claim that 
the provision in the credit agreement governing interest was ineffective due to the small font 
size, noting that Hymas failed to support that claim with any argument or authority. The court 
entered judgment for FBS on April 8, 2013, in the amount of $961,162.07.  
Hymas subsequently filed an additional motion for reconsideration on April 19, 2013.1 
An affidavit from Hymas—including as attachments the articles of dissolution and incorporation 
and sample invoices from FBS that had been attached to Hymas’ reply memorandum in support 
of his first motion for reconsideration—was filed by Hymas and received by the court on April 
30, 2013.2 The motion asked the court to set aside the order granting summary judgment. The 
                                                 
1 As a result of a filing error on the part of the district court, the motion was not properly entered into the record until 
May 17, 2013.  
2 Hymas filed an affidavit earlier, on April 26th, but failed to attach the articles of dissolution and incorporation.  
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sole argument offered in support of the motion was that Crestwood Construction, Inc., was 
dissolved in 2005. Because he guarantied payment of an open account in the name of Crestwood 
Construction, Inc., and that entity dissolved prior to the purchases at issue in this action, Hymas 
argued that there is a material question of fact regarding his obligation under the guaranty 
agreement.  
The district court denied Hymas’ second motion to reconsider on the ground that the 
motion, as a “motion to reconsider a motion to reconsider,” was procedurally improper. In 
addition, the court emphasized that Hymas had multiple opportunities to present his argument 
regarding the dissolution of Crestwood Construction, Inc., but failed to take advantage of those 
opportunities.  
Hymas timely appealed, challenging the summary judgment order in favor of FBS, the 
court’s decision to permit FBS to correct its error regarding the amount of interest owed, and the 
denial of his motions for reconsideration.  
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred when it granted Franklin Building Supply’s 
motion for summary judgment. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it permitted Franklin Building Supply to 
correct its calculation of the interest owed by Hymas. 
3. Whether the district court erred when it denied Hymas’ first motion for 
reconsideration. 
4. Whether the district court erred when it denied Hymas’ second motion for 
reconsideration. 
5. Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.  
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court reviews an order granting summary judgment under the same standard 
employed by the district court. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 271, 281 P.3d 103, 108 
(2012). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c). “Once the 
moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the 
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nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Chandler v. Hayden, 
147 Idaho 765, 769, 215 P.3d 485, 489 (2009). The nonmoving party must meet this burden by 
coming “forward with evidence by way of affidavit or otherwise that contradicts the evidence 
submitted by the moving party, and that establishes the existence of a material issue of disputed 
fact.” Id. “[A] mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to 
withstand summary judgment.” Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 
1007 (1986). The district court evaluates a motion to reconsider an order granting summary 
judgment by employing the summary judgment standard, and this Court uses that same standard 
to review the district court’s order with respect to such a motion. Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 276, 
281 P.3d at 113.  
B. The district court did not err when it granted FBS’s motion for summary 
judgment. 
“The elements for a claim for breach of contract are: (a) the existence of the contract, (b) 
the breach of the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the amount of those damages.” 
Mosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269, 278, 297 P.3d 232, 241 (2013). The 
district court held that FBS provided evidence sufficient to establish each of these elements. 
Having established a prima facie breach of contract claim, the burden shifted to Hymas to 
present admissible evidence demonstrating the existence of a material question of fact and 
Hymas failed to meet that burden when he failed to present any admissible evidence on summary 
judgment.  
On appeal, Hymas makes two arguments for the claim that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment.3 First, Hymas argues that FBS failed to make a prima facie case 
because its evidence submitted in support of summary judgment is consistent with the possibility 
that unauthorized purchases were made on Crestwood’s account or that products and services 
billed on the account were not supplied to Crestwood. Hymas notes that the credit application 
signed by Hymas provides that only three individuals were empowered to authorize purchases on 
Crestwood’s account. Because the customer transaction report submitted in support of summary 
judgment attributes all of the orders to Crestwood Construction—without detailing who, in 
particular, made the orders—Hymas claims that Pietrucci’s affidavit does not establish the 
                                                 
3 Though Hymas asserted a statute of limitations defense at the summary judgment stage, he has abandoned that 
argument on appeal. In his opening brief, Hymas concedes that “the transaction in question was, in fact, not barred 
by the Statute of Limitations.” 
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amount owed under the guaranty contract for purposes of summary judgment.4  Without signed 
invoices as evidence that the purchases were properly authorized and delivered, Hymas claims 
that there was insufficient evidence to support summary judgment.  
Hymas is mistaken. The district court properly held that while an invoice by invoice 
investigation of the charges to Crestwood’s account “would be one way of proving the debt, . . . 
it’s not the only way.” The summary judgment record consisted entirely of Pietrucci’s affidavit, 
its attachments, and the pleadings. Because only authorized parties were empowered to charge 
on the account, the existence of the charges on the account summary is evidence that the charges 
were properly authorized. That evidence is unquestionably defeasible. Hymas could have—but 
did not—present evidence that the account summary was inaccurate or that it included 
unauthorized charges. Instead, as the district court noted, he merely “complain[ed] that . . . [the 
account statement was] [un]reliable,” but did not “show why.” The summary judgment record 
supports the district court’s conclusion that the amount reflected in the account summary is the 
amount Hymas owed under the terms of the guaranty agreement. With no evidence in the record 
to create a material question of fact regarding the amount owed under the guaranty contract, the 
district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of FBS.  
Next, Hymas argues that the district court should have permitted him an opportunity to 
depose Pietrucci prior to granting FBS’s motion for summary judgment. Hymas requested an 
opportunity to depose Pietrucci in his opposition to FBS’s motion. I.R.C.P. 56(f) permits a party 
to move for a continuance to secure affidavits, take depositions, or conduct additional discovery 
“[s]hould it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition . . . .” The rule 
clearly contemplates that such a motion must be supported with an affidavit stating the reasons 
why the continuance is necessary. See Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 391, 797 P.2d 95, 99 
(1990) (holding that a district court did not err when it failed to grant a continuance to a party 
who presented “neither a motion for a continuance nor an affidavit necessary to support such a 
motion”). Though Hymas cited Rule 56(f) in his opposition to summary judgment, he did not file 
                                                 
4 Notably, Hymas did not move to exclude Pietrucci’s affidavit for lack of foundation under I.R.C.P. 56(e). Though 
Hymas mentioned Rule 56(e), his only objection to the affidavit was to its sufficiency as evidence regarding the 
amount owed on Crestwood’s open account. Hymas conceded at oral argument before this Court that he did not 
object to the foundation of the affidavit. Thus, the question of whether FBS laid a proper foundation for admission 
of the affidavit and its attachments is not before the Court.  
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a motion under Rule 56(f) and did not support such a motion with an affidavit. Because Hymas 
“did not ask the district court for a continuance under Rule 56(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, . . . it is therefore too late to assert that he needed more time to respond to the 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment.” Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & Pump Co. 
Inc., 153 Idaho 735, 742, 291 P.3d 418, 425 (2012).  
C. The district court did not err when it granted FBS’s motion to correct its claim 
regarding the interest owed under the guaranty agreement.  
Pietrucci’s affidavit stated that as of October 1, 2012, the amount owed on Crestwood’s 
open account was “$671,667.05, inclusive of interest, plus attorneys’ fees and costs.” Roughly a 
week after the district court granted summary judgment in its favor, FBS moved the court to 
correct the calculation of the amount owed under the guaranty agreement because the affidavit 
contained a clerical error and should have included the date “January 27, 2011,” rather than 
“October 1, 2012.” Alternatively, FBS claims that the affidavit should have included the word 
“exclusive” rather than “inclusive.” In either event, the effect of the change is to award FBS 
interest that accrued after the complaint was filed, interest to which FBS claims it is entitled 
under the terms of the credit agreement and that it requested in its complaint. FBS supported its 
motion with another affidavit calculating the additional interest and stating that the amount owed 
as of January 17, 2013, inclusive of interest, was $934,332.44. After hearing arguments 
concerning the motion, the district court permitted FBS to correct the affidavit because the 
amount claimed in the initial affidavit represented “a clerical oversight.”  
Though Hymas claims that the district court’s decision was in error, he does not say 
where the error lies. Hymas simply claims that “it was improper” for the court to permit FBS to 
correct the amount it claimed after granting summary judgment based on Pietrucci’s affidavit, 
but does not expand on his view that the court acted improperly. “This court will not consider 
assignments of error if the party fails to include either argument or citation of authority in the 
brief.” Schofield v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hosp., 90 Idaho 186, 192, 409 P.2d 107, 108 
(1965).  
D. The district court did not err in denying Hymas’ first motion for 
reconsideration. 
Hymas’ first motion for reconsideration involved several arguments, supported by an 
affidavit from Hymas. His principal argument repeats the claim made in opposition to summary 
judgment that, because FBS could not show that charges to Crestwood’s open account were 
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properly authorized or that products and services were supplied to Crestwood, FBS did not 
establish the amount owed under the terms of the guaranty agreement for purposes of summary 
judgment. This time, Hymas referenced FBS’s invoices, claiming that it is impossible to 
determine whether the purchases were properly authorized on Crestwood’s account or delivered 
to Crestwood construction projects because the invoices were not signed. In addition, Hymas 
attempted to establish the existence of a material question of fact regarding the amount Hymas 
might owe under the guaranty agreement by claiming, for the first time, that Crestwood had 
difficulties with unauthorized purchases on its open account. Hymas included an affidavit in 
which he claimed that “Crestwood Construction, Inc., . . . had many issues with framers and 
other subcontractors calling . . . [FBS] and ordering products for Crestwood’s job sites,” though 
they were not authorized to do so. Next, Hymas argued that the contractual provision governing 
interest on past due amounts was written in font that was too small and the provision was 
therefore ineffective. Finally, in his reply memorandum in support of his motion, Hymas argued 
for the first time that Crestwood Construction, Inc., dissolved prior to the purchases at issue in 
this case. 
The district court properly rejected each of these arguments. In granting summary 
judgment for FBS, the court held that FBS provided evidence sufficient for summary judgment 
with respect to the amount owed under the guaranty agreement. FBS did so, according to the 
court, by virtue of Pietrucci’s testimony and the attached customer transaction report. The fact 
that the invoices are not signed does not provide evidence that the account summary is 
inaccurate, that any purchases were unauthorized, or that products and services were not supplied 
to Crestwood. Because the district court properly determined that FBS made an adequate 
showing at the summary judgment stage without introducing the invoices into the record, that 
same record, now including the unsigned invoices, also supports the district court’s conclusion 
that the charges were properly authorized and the products and services were delivered to 
Crestwood. Whether the invoices were signed or unsigned, the district court properly concluded 
based upon the account summary, coupled with the fact that only certain parties were authorized 
to make purchases on the account, that the purchases were authorized and the products and 
services were delivered to Crestwood. 
The district court likewise properly rejected Hymas’ attempt to establish the existence of 
a material question of fact regarding the amount he might owe under the guaranty agreement by 
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claiming that Crestwood previously had difficulties with unauthorized purchases. Hymas’ bare 
assertion that unauthorized purchases were previously made on Crestwood’s account is not 
sufficient to establish the existence of a material question of fact. The district court found that 
Hymas’ affidavit was conclusory and speculative, and relied on the mere possibility that 
Crestwood’s balance included unauthorized purchases. Though in possession of FBS’s invoices 
and customer transaction report, Hymas did not point to any particular invoice as reflecting an 
unauthorized purchase, provide evidence that anyone at Crestwood ever complained to FBS of 
unauthorized purchases, provide evidence that anyone at Crestwood ever returned supplies 
purchased from FBS because a purchase was not properly authorized, or provide evidence that 
anyone at Crestwood ever complained to FBS that products and services had not been properly 
delivered to Crestwood. “A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 
133, 191 P.3d 205, 211 (2008). 
With respect to the interest allegedly owed under the credit agreement, Hymas argued 
that “the only showing of an interest rate is in the credit application and it is so small that it 
cannot be read and it almost requires a magnifying glass to do so.” Because of the small font 
size, claims Hymas, if FBS is entitled to recover some principal amount, it is entitled to recover 
interest only at the 12% per annum rate provided by Idaho Code section 28-22-104(1)(6), 
governing contracts that do not expressly address interest. In rejecting this argument, the district 
court noted that, regardless of the font size, Hymas does not claim in his affidavit that he was 
unaware of the language governing interest at the time he signed the credit agreement. Hymas 
also cited no authority for the proposition that the font size would render the provision governing 
interest ineffective. On appeal, Hymas appears to have abandoned this argument. Though he 
claims that interest should be added to any principal amount he owes “only at the contract rate of 
12% and not 18%,” his briefing to this Court does not discuss the size of the font in the credit 
agreement or the manner in which the font size might affect the enforceability of the provision. 
Where an issue “is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or 
authority, it cannot be considered by this Court.” Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 
1146, 1152 (2010). 
Finally, in his reply memorandum in support of his motion for reconsideration, Hymas 
argued for the first time that Crestwood Construction, Inc., dissolved in February of 2005, 
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roughly eight months after the credit agreement was signed. About the same time, Crestwood, 
Inc.—d/b/a Crestwood Construction, Inc.—was formed.5 So, Hymas argued, FBS is attempting 
to recoup payment for supplies and services provided in 2007 to Crestwood, Inc., and not to 
Crestwood Construction, Inc., the entity whose open account Hymas guarantied. Hymas 
supported this argument with articles of dissolution and incorporation attached to his reply 
memorandum. The district court properly rejected this argument for two reasons. First, Hymas 
raised the argument for the first time in his reply memorandum in support of his motion for 
reconsideration. Second, the documents were not properly part of the evidentiary record on 
summary judgment because they were attached to the reply memorandum, not submitted with 
Hymas’ motion and attached to a sworn affidavit.  
This Court will not consider arguments that were raised for the first time in an appellant’s 
reply brief. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). That rule is justified, in 
part, by a concern that the respondent should have an opportunity in briefing to address 
arguments raised by the appellant. Id. Similar concerns suggest that a district court has the 
discretion to disregard arguments raised for the first time in a reply memorandum. Where a 
movant raises an argument for the first time in a reply memorandum, the party opposing the 
motion has no opportunity to address the argument in writing. In addition, I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1) 
requires that a motion should “state with particularity the grounds” on which the court should 
grant the motion. Where wholly new arguments in support of a motion are offered in a reply 
memorandum, the motion itself does not state with particularity the grounds for granting the 
motion. In such a case, the district court may exercise its discretion to disregard the arguments.6  
                                                 
5 Documents attached to the reply memorandum indicate that articles for dissolution for Crestwood Construction, 
Inc., were filed with the Secretary of State on February 11, 2005. The document indicates the dissolution was 
effective on 12-31-04.  Also on February 11, articles of incorporation for Crestwood, Inc., were filed with the 
Secretary of State. On April 6, 2005, a certificate of assumed business name was filed with the Secretary of State for 
Crestwood, Inc., indicating the company was using the assumed business name of Crestwood Construction, Inc. 
There is no explanation in the record as to what brought about these changes. To dissolve a corporation and to then  
have a successor corporation assume the dissolved corporation’s name as an assumed business name presents 
somewhat troublesome implications, such as that the moves were accomplished to affect the validity of personal 
guaranties of the dissolved corporation’s obligations. Whatever the motivation may have been, it is of no import to 
the outcome of this appeal.  
6  It would be hard to fault the district court for exercising its discretion to decline to consider an argument first 
raised in the reply brief in support of a motion for reconsideration. Even in such a situation, however, the affected 
party still has the ability to file an additional timely motion for reconsideration under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) in order to 
bring to the court’s attention new evidence, arguments and authorities.  
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In addition, the argument is unsupported by any evidence in the summary judgment 
record. Because Hymas moved the district court to reconsider its order granting summary 
judgment in favor of FBS, the summary judgment standard applied to the district court’s 
evaluation of that motion. Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 276, 281 P.3d at 113. That standard requires 
the trial court to look to the summary judgment record—“the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any”—to determine whether there is a genuine 
issue as to any material fact. I.R.C.P. 56(c). “[I]tems offered in support of or opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment must be attached to the party’s affidavit verifying the items’ 
authenticity.” Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 820, 979 P.2d 1174, 1178 (1999). 
Because Hymas did not attach the articles of dissolution and incorporation to a sworn affidavit, 
they were not part of the summary judgment record and the district court properly rejected an 
argument unsupported by evidence in the record. 
E. The district court did not err when it denied Hymas’ second motion for 
reconsideration.  
The district court entered judgment against Hymas on April 8, 2013. Hymas filed a 
second motion for reconsideration under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) on April 19. The motion focuses 
exclusively on Hymas’ argument regarding the distinction between Crestwood Construction, 
Inc., and Crestwood, Inc. On April 30, Hymas filed an affidavit in support of his motion that 
included as attachments the articles of dissolution and incorporation. 
The district court denied Hymas’ motion as procedurally improper. I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) 
permits a party to move the court to reconsider an interlocutory order—no matter when the 
interlocutory order was issued—up to fourteen days after the entry of final judgment.  The Rule 
also permits a party to move the court to reconsider an order made after the entry of final 
judgment, but only if the motion is made within fourteen days from the time the order was 
issued. In holding that Hymas’ motion was procedurally improper, the district court was 
apparently concerned that if a party could make a motion for reconsideration of the denial of a 
motion for reconsideration, a party could move the court to reconsider an order denying a motion 
to reconsider, where the latter motion was made after the entry of final judgment, so long as the 
party did so within fourteen days of the order. In that event, a party could keep a case perpetually 
alive in the district court by filing an endless series of motions to reconsider orders denying 
motions to reconsider.   
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The district court’s reasoning was in error. There is nothing procedurally improper with a 
motion for reconsideration of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. A motion for 
reconsideration of “any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the 
entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of final judgment” 
and “[a] motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial court made after entry of final 
judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order . . . .”  I.R.C.P. 
11(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). The clear language of the rule permits a party to make a motion 
for reconsideration of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. See Agrisource, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 912, 332 P.3d 815, 824 (2014) (noting that the district court’s order 
denying a motion for reconsideration was an interlocutory order that a party could move the 
court to reconsider). In Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, an opinion issued after the district court’s 
decision, this Court squarely addressed the district court’s concern that a party in Hymas’ 
position could use the rule to file an endless series of motions for reconsideration. Because “a 
motion to reconsider the denial of a motion to reconsider is still asking the court to reconsider the 
underlying interlocutory order,” a motion to reconsider an order denying a motion to reconsider 
an order granting summary judgment is a motion for reconsideration of the order granting 
summary judgment. Id. at 824–25. The district court’s order granting summary judgment was an 
interlocutory order. So, where the underlying order is a summary judgment order, I.R.C.P. 
11(a)(2)(B) requires that any motion asking the court to reconsider an order denying a motion for 
reconsideration—no matter how many motions for reconsideration preceded it—must be made 
within fourteen days of the entry of final judgment. Hymas filed his motion within fourteen days 
of the entry of final judgment.  
Though the district court erred in denying Hymas’ motion for the reason that it did, it 
nevertheless properly denied the motion. “[I]t is well established that this Court will use the 
correct legal theory to affirm the correct decision of a district court even when it is based on an 
erroneous legal theory.” J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 120 Idaho 849, 853, 820 
P.2d 1206, 1210 (1991). 
While Hymas timely filed his motion for reconsideration, he did not timely file his 
affidavit in support of that motion. Hymas filed his motion on April 19.  He filed an affidavit 
with evidence in support of his motion on April 30, twenty-two days after the entry of final 
14 
 
judgment.7 I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(B) requires that “[w]hen a motion is supported by affidavit(s), the 
affidavit(s) shall be served with the motion . . . .” Hymas failed to do so and the district court 
could properly have refused to consider the affidavit for that reason. See Jensen v. State, 139 
Idaho 57, 64, 72 P.3d 897, 904 (2003) (holding that a district court properly refused to consider 
affidavits submitted in support of, but not with, a motion for reconsideration). In addition, the 
affidavits were not submitted in the time for filing of the motion. Hymas had fourteen days to file 
his motion. Though he filed his motion within fourteen days of the entry of final judgment, he 
did not support his motion within that period. A party cannot sidestep the requirement to file a 
motion within a certain period by filing an unsupported motion and promising support down the 
road. See Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 248, 245 P.3d 992, 1000 
(2010) (holding that motions for a new trial were untimely where the movant filed the motions 
within the fourteen-day period dictated by the rule, but did not provide factual support for the 
motions until after the period expired, “[b]ecause there was no factual support filed in support of 
these motions within the fourteen-day period prescribed by the rule”). Rule 11(a)(2)(B) does not 
require that a movant support a motion for reconsideration with an affidavit. A movant who does 
so, however, must serve the affidavit with the motion and within the period of time for filing of 
the motion.  
The district court might, in its discretion, have permitted Hymas to file an untimely 
affidavit had he requested leave to do so. See Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc. v. Massey, 155 Idaho 942, 
946, 318 P.3d 932, 936 (2014) (noting that a district court’s decision to accept an untimely 
affidavit is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). Hymas did not request leave to do so. Further, 
the district court clearly indicated that it would not have exercised such discretion had Hymas 
requested leave. The court repeatedly noted that Hymas had multiple opportunities to present his 
evidence regarding the dissolution of Crestwood Construction, Inc., and that nothing prevented 
him from doing so, yet he failed to take advantage of those opportunities.  
Because Hymas failed to serve his affidavit with his motion and within the time required 
by Rule 11(a)(2)(B), the motion was without any factual support in the record. The district court 
properly denied the motion, though for the wrong reason.  
F. FBS is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
                                                 
7 Even the initial affidavit filed by Hymas, which did not include the articles of incorporation and dissolution as 
attachments, was filed eighteen days after the entry of final judgment on April 26.  
15 
 
FBS claims to be entitled to attorney fees on appeal based upon the terms of the guaranty 
contract and Idaho Code sections 12-120(3) and 12-121. Hymas also requests fees on appeal. 
Because Hymas is not the prevailing party, he is not entitled to fees on appeal.  
The clear terms of the guaranty agreement provide that Hymas will “pay . . . any and all 
collection fees and attorney fees we [FBS] incur in collecting past due sums . . . .” Contractual 
terms providing for recovery of attorney fees “are generally honored in Idaho.” Zenner v. 
Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 452, 210 P.3d 552, 560 (2009) (awarding attorneys’ fees and costs on 
appeal under the terms of a contract providing that litigation fees involved in the enforcement of 
the contract will be paid by the prevailing party). FBS is entitled to fees and we award them 
under the guaranty agreement. As a result, we need not consider application of the cited statutes.  
IV. 
         CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. FBS is awarded its costs and fees on 
appeal.  
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN, HORTON and Justice Pro Tem 
WALTERS CONCUR.