Case Title: In re Moll

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5674

Docket Number: 2012-1186

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Moll, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5674.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5674 
IN RE JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN COMPLAINT AGAINST MOLL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Moll, Slip 
Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5674.] 
(No. 2012-1186—Submitted October 23, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Order of the Judicial Commission of the Supreme Court. 
_____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Jeanette M. Moll of Zanesville, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0066786, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1996.  
Moll was a candidate for Judge of the Fifth District Court of Appeals of Ohio for 
the six-year term beginning February 11, 2013.1  Moll appeals from a decision of 
a five-member judicial commission appointed by this court concluding that the 
record before a hearing panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline supported the panel’s finding that Moll violated several provisions of 
Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  Moll also contests the commission’s 
                                          
 
1. Moll won in the primary election, but lost in the general election.  
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imposition of a cease and desist order, a $1,000 fine, attorney fees of $2,500, and 
costs as sanctions premised upon her violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  
We agree with the commission that the finding of professional misconduct is 
supported by the record and affirm the sanctions imposed by the commission. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} The secretary of the board charged Moll in a three-count complaint 
with multiple violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  The panel of three 
board members held a hearing on the matter and made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.  The panel found that Moll had committed the violations of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct charged in the first count of the complaint, which 
related to her use of a campaign flyer, but dismissed the remaining charges in the 
second and third counts because of the lack of clear and convincing proof.  The 
panel recommended that the commission issue interim and permanent cease and 
desist orders that Moll immediately and permanently cease from using the 
campaign flyer specified in the first count.  The panel also recommended that 
Moll be assessed a fine of $1,000 and the costs of the proceeding, but that the fine 
be stayed on condition of no further violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
relating to judicial campaign conduct. 
{¶ 3} On July 31, 2012, the commission issued the recommended cease 
and desist order.  132 Ohio St.3d 1489, 2012-Ohio-3440, 971 N.E.2d 965.  Both 
Moll and complainant filed objections to the panel’s report.  On August 30, 2012, 
the commission affirmed the hearing panel’s finding that Moll committed 
multiple violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  132 Ohio St.3d 1505, 2012-
Ohio-3952, 973 N.E.2d 273.  The commission ordered Moll to pay a $1,000 fine 
and the costs of the proceeding and to pay the complainant $2,500 in attorney 
fees.  Id. 
{¶ 4} This cause is now before the court on Moll’s appeal of the 
commission’s order pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. II(5)(E). 
January Term, 2012 
 
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Analysis 
Scope of Appeal 
{¶ 5} In her appeal from the commission’s sanctions, Moll argues that 
the commission erred in determining that the record supports the hearing panel’s 
findings that she violated Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  The 
complainant contends that the court cannot address this argument because it is 
outside the scope of this appeal. 
{¶ 6} Under Gov.Jud.R. II(5)(E), a respondent charged with a grievance 
that alleges a violation by a judicial candidate of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct during the course of a campaign for judicial office, which results in a 
finding of misconduct by the board’s hearing panel that is upheld by the 
commission, “may appeal a sanction issued by the commission to the Supreme 
Court.” 
{¶ 7} Notwithstanding the complainant’s argument, our review under 
Gov.Jud.R. II(5)(E) permits a determination of the propriety of the commission’s 
holding that the record supports the hearing panel’s finding that Moll committed 
violations of Canon 4 and that no abuse of discretion occurred.  Because the 
commission’s issuance of sanctions is premised on the Moll’s violations of Canon 
4, a determination of the appropriateness of the sanctions necessarily includes a 
consideration of whether the violations are supported by the record.  If not, no 
sanctions would have been permissible. 
Finding of Misconduct—Campaign Materials including 
Photograph of Judicial Candidate in a Robe without Specification 
that Candidate is not Currently a Judge or Magistrate 
{¶ 8} The commission determined that the record supports the hearing 
panel’s finding that Moll violated Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which 
precludes a judge or judicial candidate from engaging in political or campaign 
activity that is inconsistent with the independence, integrity, or impartiality of the 
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judiciary.  This case involves Moll’s use of a campaign flyer that gave prospective 
voters the misleading impression that she is currently serving in an elected or 
appointed judicial office. 
{¶ 9} On the front page of the flyer, below the heading entitled, “Jeanette 
Moll for Judge,” Moll is depicted in a photograph wearing a judicial robe.  No 
text accompanies the photograph to indicate whether Moll is a current or former 
judge or magistrate.  The back of the flyer lists bullet points for Moll’s education 
and experience, including a notation of “Magistrate, Guernsey County,” without 
specifying whether she currently holds that position or the dates she served in that 
position.  Moll served as a magistrate for the Guernsey County Court of Common 
Pleas from 1997 to 2007, so she was not a magistrate at the time the flyer was 
distributed. 
{¶ 10} The commission agreed with the hearing panel that Moll’s 
campaign flyer contained information that was either knowingly false, or made 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or, if true, that would be deceiving 
or misleading to a reasonable person, in violation of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) 
(prohibiting a judicial candidate from circulating or distributing information 
concerning a judicial candidate, either knowing the information to be false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or, if true, that would be deceiving or 
misleading to a reasonable person), that the campaign flyer implies that Moll is 
currently in an office that she does not hold, in violation of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(C) 
(prohibiting a judicial candidate from knowingly or with reckless disregard using 
in campaign materials the title of an office not presently held by the judicial 
candidate in a manner that implies that the judicial candidate does currently hold 
that office), and that the campaign flyer misrepresents Moll’s current position as a 
private practitioner, in violation of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(F) (prohibiting a judicial 
candidate from knowingly or with reckless disregard using campaign materials 
that misrepresent the candidate’s present position). 
January Term, 2012 
 
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{¶ 11} The commission did not err in determining that the record supports 
the hearing panel’s determination that Moll’s campaign flyer violated 
Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A), (C), and (F).  In this context, a judicial candidate acts 
“knowingly” if the result is probable, and the candidate acts “recklessly” if the 
result is possible and the candidate chooses to ignore the risk.  See In re Judicial 
Campaign Complaint Against Michael, 132 Ohio St.3d 1469, 2012-Ohio-3187, 
970 N.E.2d 970; In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Emrich, 75 Ohio 
St.3d 1517, 665 N.E.2d 1133 (1996).  Compare State ex rel. Oster v. Lorain Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 93 Ohio St.3d 480, 487, 756 N.E.2d 649 (2001) (defining the 
term “knowingly” for purposes of election statute according to its ordinary and 
common meaning that one is aware of existing facts). 
{¶ 12} Moll was aware that it was possible that her campaign flyer could 
mislead or deceive a reasonable person that she currently serves as a judge or 
magistrate.  Moll testified at the panel hearing that the campaign flyer was 
prepared with her personal knowledge and approval.  She attended a judicial 
candidates seminar in 2011, and upon completion, she certified her understanding 
of the requirements of the Code of Judicial Conduct.  The seminar materials 
included the full text of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3, a list of the board’s advisory ethics 
opinions, including Op. No. 03-08, with the caption that the opinion addresses the 
“[u]se of title and appearance in a robe by magistrate running for judicial office,” 
and case summaries and opinions, including In re Judicial Campaign Complaint 
Against Lilly, 117 Ohio St.3d 1467, 2008-Ohio-1846, 884 N.E.2d 1101. 
{¶ 13} In Lilly, the misconduct included a candidate’s appearance in a 
judicial robe although she was not an incumbent judge at the time.  Moll showed 
the capacity to use the same photograph in other campaign materials with 
accompanying language specifying the dates that she served as magistrate, but she 
did not use this limiting language in the pertinent campaign flyer.  And although 
she claims that a reasonable person would view her statement on the back of the 
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flyer that states “Magistrate, Guernsey County” to be a chronological, resume-
style listing that indicates that she is currently a private practitioner, her resume 
includes the dates she served in the positions she has held, including her tenure as 
magistrate.  Moll also admitted that the flyer did not differentiate between 
whether she could have held the positions of magistrate and private practitioner at 
the same time. 
{¶ 14} As the commission determined, the board’s conclusion that Moll 
violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 is consistent with precedent.  See In re Judicial 
Campaign Complaint Against Lilly, 131 Ohio St.3d 1515, 2012-Ohio-1720, 965 
N.E.2d 315 (judicial candidate violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 by, among other things, 
using campaign literature displaying photograph of candidate in judicial robe, 
without any qualification that the candidate is not currently a judge). 
{¶ 15} Moreover, Moll’s reliance on an appointed judicial commission’s 
7-6 decision in In re Judicial Campaign Grievance Against O’Neill, 132 Ohio 
St.3d 1472, 2012-Ohio-3223, 970 N.E.2d 973, to claim that Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 is 
unconstitutional is misplaced.  The decision in O’Neill is limited to Jud.Cond.R. 
4.3(C) and is further restricted to the rule’s application to the respondent therein 
under the facts of that case.  Id.  In addition, the disclaimer of “former judge” was 
prominent in the campaign advertisement at issue in O’Neill.  By contrast, this 
case involves Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) and (F) in addition to (C), and the campaign 
flyer contained no accompanying text specifying that Moll was a former 
magistrate. 
{¶ 16} Therefore, the commission correctly affirmed the hearing panel’s 
finding that Moll violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A), (C), and (F). 
Sanction 
{¶ 17} Moll next contends that the commission erred in imposing 
sanctions of a $1,000 fine, the costs of the proceeding, and $2,500 in attorney 
fees.  Pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. II(5)(D)(1), if the commission concludes that the 
January Term, 2012 
 
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record supports the hearing panel’s finding that a violation of Canon 4 has 
occurred and that the panel has not abused its discretion, it has the discretion to 
enter an order that includes one or more of the specified sanctions, including a 
disciplinary sanction, a fine imposed against respondent, an assessment against 
respondent of the costs of the proceeding, and an assessment against respondent 
of the reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred by the complainant in 
prosecuting the grievance.  See Miller v. Miller, 132 Ohio St.3d 424, 2012-Ohio-
2928, 973 N.E.2d 228, ¶ 28 (use of the word “may” denotes the granting of 
discretion).  Therefore, on appeal pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. II(5)(E) of the 
commission’s order of sanctions, our review is limited to whether the commission 
abused its discretion.  “A decision constitutes an abuse of discretion when it is 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.”  State ex rel. Ebbing v. Ricketts, __ 
Ohio St.3d __, 2012-Ohio-4699, __ N.E.2d __, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 18} The commission did not abuse its discretion in issuing the 
sanctions here.  Unlike the case relied on by Moll, In re Judicial Campaign 
Complaint Against Keys, 80 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 671 N.E.2d 1124 (1996), to support 
her claim that any violation was unintentional, there was no unintentional use by a 
third party of Moll’s name in the campaign flyer.  Instead, there is clear and 
convincing evidence that Moll made and approved the flyer and that her 
violations of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 in doing so were either knowingly or recklessly 
committed.  Given that the complainant submitted an affidavit of attorney 
expenses in the sum of $21,121.51 to the commission, we are not persuaded that 
the commission’s assessment of $2,500 in attorney fees as part of the sanction 
constitutes an abuse of its broad discretion in fashioning a remedy commensurate 
with the ethical misconduct committed by Moll in her judicial campaign. 
{¶ 19} Nor do the remaining sanctions establish that the commission acted 
in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner.  The primary purpose of 
these sanctions is to protect the public, and the imposition of fines, costs, and 
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attorney fees act as a deterrent against similar behavior by judicial candidates that 
may mislead or deceive prospective voters in the future.  See Disciplinary 
Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 53 
(“the primary purpose of disciplinary sanctions is not to punish the offender, but 
to protect the public”); In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Per Due, 98 
Ohio St.3d 1538, 2003-Ohio-2032, 787 N.E.2d 10 (“The purpose of sanctions is 
to inform other judicial candidates of the seriousness of such violations and to 
deter future similar misconduct. A sanction that may result in effective deterrence 
best serves the public interest and the profession”). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 20} Because the commission did not abuse its discretion is issuing 
sanctions against Moll for her violations of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3, we affirm the order 
of the commission. 
Order affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
CUPP, J., not participating. 
_____________________ 
 
Shumaker, Loop, & Kendrick, L.L.P., and David F. Axelrod; Sue Ann 
Reulbach, for complainant. 
 
Jeanette M. Moll, pro se. 
_____________________