Case Title: Foster's Inc. v. City of Laramie

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-11

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
Foster's Inc. v. City of Laramie1986 WY 105718 P.2d 868Case Number: 85-11Decided: 04/29/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
FOSTER'S INC., d/b/a 
Foster's Country Corner, William Murphy and Maureen Murphy, d/b/a Travelodge 
Motel, D And R Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Camelot Motel, Ethyl Wadell, d/b/a 2 Bar 
S, Walker Enterprises, d/b/a Downtowner Motel and Gaslight Motel, Appellants 
(Petitioners),

v.

CITY OF LARAMIE and Wyoming Community Development Authority, 
Appellees (Respondents).

Appeal from District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

C.M. Aron 
(argued) of Aron and Hennig and Warren A. Lauer, Laramie, for appellants 
(petitioners).

Thomas S. Smith, 
City Atty. and Kathleen A. Hunt (argued), Asst. City Atty., Laramie, for 
appellee (respondent) City of Laramie.

David R. 
Nicholas (argued), and John M. Burman of Corthell and King, Laramie, and Alvin L. Wiederspahn of Oitzinger, Mullendore 
and Martin, Cheyenne, for appellee (respondent) Wyoming 
Community Development Authority.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE,[fn**] ROONEY,[fn***] BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

[fn**] Retired 
November 1, 1985.

[fn***] Retired 
November 30, 1985. 

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In this appeal we must 
decide whether the Wyoming Community Development Authority (WCDA) and Laramie 
City Council should have granted a full evidentiary hearing to motel owners who 
opposed the issuance of economic development project bonds. The WCDA and the 
City Council held only limited hearings before issuing the bonds to finance a 
new convention center at the Holiday Inn of Laramie. We will hold that the 
hearings were sufficient to satisfy both statutory and constitutional 
requirements.

BACKGROUND

[¶2.]     The legislature created 
the WCDA in 1975, defining it as "a body corporate operating as a state 
instrumentality operated solely for the public benefit." Section 9-7-104(a), 
W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985; §§ 9-7-101 through 9-7-124, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985 
(Wyoming 
Community Development Authority Act). The legislature amended the Act in 1984 to 
permit the WCDA to "[i]ssue bonds for purposes of financing any economic 
development projects." Section 9-7-122(a)(i), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985. Section 
9-7-103(a)(iv) defines "economic development project" to include a wide variety 
of undertakings.1

[¶3.]     The WCDA must comply 
with the procedural and substantive provisions of § 9-7-122, W.S. 1977, 
Cum.Supp. 1985, when it issues economic development project bonds (EDP bonds). 
The local governing body of the municipality or county in which the project is 
located must approve the project, and the governing body and the agency must 
hold a joint public hearing. Section 9-7-122(b) and (c), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1985. The bonds may issue only after the WCDA and the governing body determine 
that the project would:

"(i) Create new or 
additional employment opportunities;

"(ii) Expand the tax base 
and increases [increase] sales, property or other tax revenues to the 
municipality, county or state;

"(iii) Maintain and 
promote a stable, balanced and diversified economy among agriculture, natural 
resource development, business, commerce and trade;

"(iv) Promote or develop 
use of agricultural, manufactured, commercial or natural resource products 
within or outside the state; and 

"(v) Not result in an 
unfair competitive disadvantage for existing business in the municipality, 
county or state." Section 9-7-122(d), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1985.

FACTS

[¶4.]     In July 1984, Sagebrush 
Properties, Inc. petitioned the WCDA and the City of Laramie to issue an EDP 
bond in an amount not to exceed $5,500,000 to finance a new convention facility 
for the Holiday Inn of Laramie. The Laramie City Council and WCDA scheduled a 
joint public hearing to consider the proposal and published notices of the 
hearing in Laramie and Casper 
newspapers.

[¶5.]     Various Laramie motel owners or 
their representatives appeared at the joint hearing on August 9, 1984, and 
objected to the proposed bond issue on the ground that it would put their 
businesses at an unfair competitive disadvantage. Proponents of the project 
spoke of the advantages the facility would bring to the community including 
increased employment and tax revenues. They argued that the convention center 
would enhance, rather than impair, the business of existing motels. The 
proponents based many of their comments on a market study prepared for Sagebrush 
Properties by an accounting firm. The study was not submitted to the city 
council at the hearing nor made available to the opponents of the project. 
However, a written summary of the study was provided to the council after the 
hearing. The motel owners objected to these informal procedures as a denial of 
their rights to confront the proponents' evidence.

[¶6.]     On August 21, 1984, the 
city council adopted a resolution approving the convention center as an economic 
development project qualified for financing by the WCDA. On the question of 
unfair competitive disadvantage, the city council specifically 
found

"that after the proposed 
Project is in full operation, the Project should:

* * * * * 
*

"(f) not result in unfair 
competitive disadvantage for any existing business in the City since, among 
other things, there are no other large commercial convention centers or 
Holidome-type facilities in Laramie. The presently existing 100 guest 
rooms, and the 59 new guest rooms are in the intermediate price range, which is 
a price range above other hotels and motels located in Laramie. Of the 59 new 
guest rooms, 13 will be two-room suites. Presently, no other motel or hotel in 
Laramie offers 
such two-room suites. Although equivalent facilities exist in Casper, Cheyenne, and 
Sheridan, this 
Project will not compete unfairly with any existing business in those cities or 
elsewhere in the State."

On October 5, 
1984, based on the record of the joint public hearing and the resolution adopted 
by the city council, the WCDA authorized the issuance of the EDP 
bonds.

[¶7.]     Invoking the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, §§ 16-3-101 through 16-3-115, W.S. 1977, the motel 
owners petitioned the district court for review of the actions taken by the city 
council and the WCDA in authorizing the bond issue. The court dismissed the 
petition against the City of Laramie on the ground that the city's governing 
body is not an agency subject to the review provisions of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act but certified the action against the WCDA directly 
to this court pursuant to Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P. We must decide whether the city 
was properly dismissed and whether the WCDA properly issued the 
bonds.

ISSUES

[¶8.]     The motel owners raise 
the following issues for review:

"A. Does § 9-7-122, 
Wyoming Statutes (1977) impose on the administrative agency and the governing 
body the requirement to provide notice and a hearing to affected 
parties?

"B. Is a constitutionally 
protected property interest created, with the resulting right to a full due 
process hearing, by a statute which grants to an existing business the right to 
be free from unfair competitive disadvantage?"

The proponents 
raise additional questions concerning the jurisdiction of this court to consider 
the petitions for review and the standing of the motel owners to complain about 
the bond authorization.

JURISDICTION OVER THE 
CITY COUNCIL

[¶9.]     The project proponents 
contend that neither the Laramie City Council nor the WCDA is an agency governed 
by the review provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, supra, 
and, therefore, the motel owners' petitions for review must be dismissed. The 
Administrative Procedure Act provides only for judicial review of action or 
inaction taken by an agency. Section 16-3-114(a), W.S. 1977. An agency 
is

"any authority, bureau, 
board, commission, department, division, officer or employee of the state, a 
county, city or town or other political subdivision of the state, except the 
governing body of a city or town, the state legislature and the judiciary." 
Section 16-3-101(b)(i), W.S. 1977.

Administrative 
decisions by a city council are not reviewable pursuant to the procedures of the 
Administrative Procedure Act because a city council is not an agency. City of 
Evanston v. Whirl Inn, Inc., Wyo., 647 P.2d 1378 
(1982). The district court properly dismissed the petition for 
review.

[¶10.]  The WCDA, unlike the city council, is an 
agency or instrumentality of the state and falls within the purview of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, Wyo., 575 P.2d 1100, 1131 
(1978); § 16-3-101(b)(i), W.S. 1977. The district court, therefore, had 
jurisdiction to review the action taken by the WCDA as a result of the timely 
petition to that court. This court obtained jurisdiction over the matter upon 
certification by the district court.

STANDING

[¶11.]  Section 16-3-114(a) authorizes judicial 
review of an agency action only for those persons "aggrieved or adversely 
affected in fact" by the challenged action. The WCDA contends that the motel 
owners have not demonstrated a direct injury from the bond's approval and, 
therefore, have no standing to challenge the agency's decision in 
court.

[¶12.]  We thoroughly analyzed the requirements 
for standing to seek judicial review of an administrative decision in Matter of 
Various Water Rights in Lake DeSmet Reservoir, Wyo., 623 P.2d 764 (1981). We 
said that a potential litigant must show injury or potential 
injury:

"`Standing to sue' is a 
right to relief and goes to the existence of a personal claim for relief. It 
includes a legal disability, such as insanity or infancy, but it is more. It 
involves a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain 
judicial resolution of that controversy. It is closely related to the doctrine 
of mootness. It requires sufficient personal interest in the outcome of 
litigation by way of injury or potential injury to warrant consideration by the 
court." 623 P.2d  at 767.

To establish the 
requisite injury, a petitioner must allege a perceptible, rather than a 
speculative, harm resulting from the agency action:

"[A] party is not 
considered `aggrieved' when there is only a remote possibility of 
injury.

* * * * * 
*

"`[P]leadings must be 
something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable. A 
plaintiff must allege that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly harmed by 
the challenged agency action, not that he can imagine circumstances in which he 
could be affected by the agency's action. * * *' United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 2416, 37 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1973)." (Citation omitted.) 623 P.2d  at 769.

[¶13.]  The motel owners complain that they were 
injured by the informal, nonadversarial proceedings which led to the WCDA's 
approval of the convention center's financing. They allege 
that:

"The Proponent's business 
endeavor and the use of the proposed financing is for its motel business 
including a restaurant, liquor lounge, and potential gasoline filling station, 
of which the motel business center is in direct competition with all of the 
Petitioners' businesses."

Since the motel 
owners allege a perceptible harm caused by the challenged agency action, they 
are entitled to judicial review of the issue they have 
raised.

RIGHT TO CONTESTED CASE 
PROCEDURES

[¶14.]  Under the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act, all parties in a contested case must be afforded an opportunity 
for a trial-type hearing. Section 16-3-107(a), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985; 
Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, 
Teton County, Wyo., 463 P.2d 26 (1969). A contested case is 
a proceeding

"in which legal rights, 
duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an 
agency after an opportunity for hearing." Section 16-3-101, W.S. 
1977.

We have 
interpreted the final phrase - opportunity for hearing - to mean opportunity for 
a trial-type hearing. Lund v. Schrader, Wyo., 492 P.2d 202, 209 (1971); Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, TetonCounty, supra, 463 P.2d  at 29. This 
interpretation makes our analysis essentially circular. If the applicable law, 
usually a statute, requires a hearing and not a trial-type hearing, then that 
hearing is not defined as a contested case. If, on the other hand, that 
applicable law requires a trial-type hearing, then that case fits the definition 
of a contested case. A contested case mandates a trial-type hearing, completing 
the circle.

[¶15.]  There is a well-established exception to 
the rule that a contested case leads to a trial-type hearing. A trial-type 
hearing is not necessary when the only facts to be found are legislative facts, 
or when the only action the agency undertakes is legislative action. Scarlett v. 
Town Council, Town of Jackson, Teton County, supra, 463 P.2d  at 29; Holding's 
Little America v. Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County, Wyo., 670 P.2d 699, 702 (1983).

"`Legislative facts are 
the facts which help the tribunal determine the content of law and of policy and 
help the tribunal to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what 
course of action to take.'" Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, Teton 
County, supra, 463 P.2d  at 29 n. 5, quoting 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 
§ 15.03 at 353 (1958).

Legislative 
action "produces a general rule or policy which applies to a general class of 
individuals, interests, or situations" and must be distinguished from 
adjudicatory functions which apply "to identifiable persons and specific 
situations." Holding's Little America v. Board of County Commissioners of 
LaramieCounty, supra, at 
702.

[¶16.]  In many cases, this court has quite 
properly focused on the legislative-adjudicative distinction. E.G., Lund v. Schrader, supra, 
492 P.2d  at 209. It is an economical way to handle cases when the agency's 
function, or the facts involved, are clearly legislative because, once we make 
that finding, we do not have to decide whether the parties have a statutory or 
constitutional right to a trial-type hearing. A party has no right to a 
trial-type hearing on legislative facts.

[¶17.]  In cases where the 
adjudicative-legislative distinction is unclear, it is better to begin the 
analysis by determining whether there is statutory or constitutional law which 
demands a trial-type hearing. If such a hearing is not required by law, then it 
may be unnecessary for us to make the adjudicative-legislative determination. 
This is just such a case. There is a difficult issue of whether the facts before 
the agency were adjudicative or legislative. Therefore, we will start our 
analysis by deciding whether some law requires a trial-type 
hearing.

STATUTE

[¶18.]  The motel owners argue that the bonding 
statute creates a right to a trial-type hearing because it forces the WCDA to 
hold a "joint public hearing" at which the agency must explore the unfair 
impacts the bond authorization might have on competitors. See § 9-7-122(c), 
(d)(v), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985. The owners contend also that the agency would 
not have promulgated a rule requiring advance public notice of the joint public 
hearing unless the legislature intended a trial-type 
hearing.

[¶19.]  The statute is not as clear as the motel 
owners suggest. Neither the purpose of the hearing nor the notice requirement 
conclusively identifies the type of hearing which the legislature intended. We 
must explore the legislative history to discover the legislature's intent. See 
In re Certificate of Need by HCA Health Services of Wyoming, Inc., Wyo., 689 P.2d 108 
(1984).

[¶20.]  The legislature first passed the Wyoming 
Community Development Authority Act in 1975. 1975 Wyoming Session Laws, ch. 
188. The authority was empowered to issue bonds without any public hearing, and, 
under § 103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, the interest earned by the 
purchasers of those bonds was exempt from federal taxation. 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) 
(1954) (as amended).

[¶21.]  In 1982, the United States Congress 
passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act which contained several 
provisions relating to industrial development bonds. Pub.L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 
324. Those provisions were intended

"to help eliminate 
inappropriate uses [of industrial development bonds] and to help restore the 
benefit of tax-exempt financing for traditional governmental purposes." S.Rep. 
No. 494, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 168, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & 
Ad.News 781, 930.

One way to 
eliminate inappropriate private uses was to require that open public hearings be 
held at which competitors might object. Therefore, Congress passed § 215 of the 
Act (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 103(k) (1982)), which permitted industrial 
development bonds to achieve tax-exempt status only if issued after a voter 
referendum or "a public hearing following reasonable public notice * * *." 26 
U.S.C. § 103(k)(2)(B)(i) (1982).

[¶22.]  The statute did not specify what kind of 
public hearings were required, but the Treasury Department has issued 
regulations explaining the public hearing provision. Those regulations are 
consistent with the legislative history. See S.Rep. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. 170-171, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 781, 932-933. 
Treasury Regulation § 5f.103-2(g)(2) (1983), 2 Fed.Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 945F at 
14,141, states:

"Public hearing. Public 
hearing means a forum providing a reasonable opportunity for interested 
individuals to express their views, both orally and in writing, on the proposed 
issue of bonds and the location and nature of a proposed facility to be 
financed. In general, a governmental unit 
may select its own procedure for the hearing, provided that interested 
individuals have a reasonable opportunity to express their views. Thus, it 
may impose reasonable requirements on persons who wish to participate in the 
hearing, such as a requirement that persons desiring to speak at the hearing so 
request in writing at least 24 hours before the hearing or that they limit their 
oral remarks to 10 minutes. For purposes 
of this public hearing requirement, it is not necessary, for example, that the 
applicable elected representative who will approve the bonds be present at the 
hearing, that a report on the hearing be submitted to that official, or that 
State administrative procedural requirements for public hearings in general be 
observed. However, compliance with such State procedural requirements 
(except those at variance with a specific requirement set forth in this section) 
will generally assure that the hearing satisfies the requirements of this 
section." (Emphasis added.)

[¶23.]  A treasury regulation also fleshed out 
the public notice requirement.

"Reasonable public 
notice. Reasonable public notice means published notice which is reasonably 
designed to inform residents of the affected governmental units, including 
residents of the issuing unit and the governmental unit where a facility is to 
be located, of the proposed issue." Treas.Reg. § 5f.103-2(g)(3) (1983), 2 Fed. 
Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 945F at 14,141.

[¶24.]  In 1984, the Wyoming Legislature enacted 
the "joint public hearing" requirement which we must interpret in this case. 
1984 Wyoming Session Laws, ch. 43 § 1 (codified at § 9-7-122(c), W.S. 1977, 
Cum.Supp. 1985). The legislature undoubtedly passed this requirement in order to 
preserve the tax-exempt status of the WCDA's economic development bonds. There 
is nothing in § 9-7-122(c) which indicates that the legislature intended the 
hearings to be more extensive than necessary to satisfy the federal directives. 
Therefore, we can look to the federal law for the proper interpretation of the 
hearing requirement. See In re Certificate of Need by HCA Health Services of 
Wyoming, Inc., supra, 689 P.2d  at 113. Since the federal statute and treasury 
regulations do not require trial-type hearings, we hold that the legislature did 
not intend that § 9-7-122(c) require trial-type hearings. The motel owners 
cannot rely on the applicable statute, § 9-7-122(c), to trigger the 
Administrative Procedure Act's contested-case procedures.

DUE 
PROCESS

[¶25.]  Due process requires a trial-type hearing 
when a party has a property or liberty interest that is deemed protectable. 
Board of County Commissioners of Teton County v. Teton County Youth Services, 
Inc., Wyo., 652 P.2d 400, 412-413 (1982); 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 12:5 
at 420-421 (2nd ed. 1979). The motel owners contend that § 9-7-122(d)(v) gives 
them a property interest in freedom from competitive disadvantage because it 
permits the WCDA to issue the bonds only if it finds that the project would: 
"Not result in an unfair competitive disadvantage for existing business in the 
municipality, county or state." The owners argue that the agency can only ferret 
out unfair competitive disadvantages by giving specific businesses the full 
panoply of procedural rights.

[¶26.]  We disagree with this interpretation of § 
9-7-122(d)(v). The statute mentions unfair competitive disadvantage to existing 
"business," not "businesses." The reference is to business generally as opposed 
to each specific business. An open public hearing, without cross-examination, 
discovery and other time-consuming trial procedures, might be a perfectly 
logical way for the agency to determine whether existing business would suffer unfairly from the 
issuance of an economic development bond.

[¶27.]  Our decision in Holding's Little America 
v. Board of County Commissioners of LaramieCounty, supra, 670 P.2d  at 703, indicates 
that the bond statutes do not create a property interest in competitors. In that 
case we held that "[p]roceedings under the Wyoming Industrial Development 
Projects Act do not require a trial-type hearing as may be involved in a 
`contested case * * *.'" Although we did not explicitly mention due process in 
the Holding's case, we could not have ignored the requirement for a trial-type 
hearing if due process demanded one.2 The supremacy clauses of the 
Wyoming and 
federal constitutions require our adherence to the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.3

[¶28.]  The EDP bonds involved in this case are 
very similar to the industrial development bonds disputed in Holding's Little 
America v. Board of County Commissioners of LaramieCounty, supra. Before either type of bond 
can be issued, the county commissioners must find that issuance would create new 
or additional employment opportunities, expand the tax base, maintain and 
promote a stable, balanced and diversified economy and promote or develop use of 
various products within or outside the state. See §§ 9-7-122(d) and 
15-1-705(a)(i), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, for the specific texts of these 
statutes. The only additional criteria for issuance of the EDP bonds is that 
they must "[n]ot result in an unfair competitive disadvantage for existing 
business in the municipality, county or state." Section 9-7-122(d)(v), W.S. 
1977, Cum.Supp. 1985.

[¶29.]  This final statutory criteria does not 
give competing businessmen any more of a protected property interest in their 
competitive positions than they had under the industrial development bond 
statute.

"To have a property 
interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or 
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, 
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. * * 
*

"Property interests, of 
course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their 
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law - rules or understandings that secure 
certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." 
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972).

[¶30.]  The mere fact that the WCDA must avoid 
unfair competitive results when it issues EDP bonds does not create an 
entitlement to be free of such results. "[F]reedom from economic competition is 
`an interest not rising to the dignity of a right.'" Smith & Smith, Inc. v. 
South Carolina Public Service Commission, 271 S.C. 405, 247 S.E.2d 677, 679 
(1978) (Littlejohn, J., dissenting), quoting 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 8.11 (1958). The 
statute is a general directive to the bonding authority to avoid unfair 
competition. It does not entitle each existing business to a protected property 
right.

[¶31.]  In the bonding context, the Sixth Circuit 
recently held that a bond applicant, K-Mart, had no protectable property 
interest in industrial revenue bonds for which it applied. Riverview 
Investments, Inc. v. Ottawa Community Improvement Corporation, 769 F.2d 324, 327 
(6th Cir. 1985). Likewise, a bond applicant's competitors should have no 
property interest that would trigger a trial-type hearing under due process 
unless the bonding statute clearly creates such an interest. The statute in this 
case creates no property interest in either the entity applying for the bond or 
its competitors. Due process was not implicated, and there was no "law" creating 
an opportunity for a trial-type hearing. The contested case procedures were not 
triggered.

[¶32.]  The decision of the WCDA and Laramie City 
Council to issue EDP bonds for the Holiday Inn convention facility is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 9-7-103(a)(iv), 
W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, provides:

"(a) As used in this 
act:

* * * * * 
*

"(iv) `Economic 
development project' means any land, building or other improvement and all real 
and personal property including machinery and equipment suitable 
for:

"(A) Manufacturing, 
processing or assembling agricultural or manufactured 
products;

"(B) Storing, 
warehousing, distributing or selling agricultural, mining or industrial products 
or any related processes including research and 
development;

"(C) Health care 
including any facility used or occupied by any person for providing services in 
any home for the elderly, any nursing home, rest home or facility providing 
living space for the developmentally disabled or [for] any person sixty (60) 
years of age or older,

"(D) Airports, parking 
facilities or storage or training facilities directly related to any other 
facility specified under this paragraph;

"(E) Industrial park 
facilities;

"(F) Sewage or solid 
waste disposal facilities;

"(G) Facilities 
furnishing electric energy, gas or water;

"(H) Any other project 
which can be financed by a municipality or county pursuant to the definition of 
project under W.S. 15-1-701(a)(ii);

"(J) Secondary, tertiary 
and enhanced mineral recovery projects."

Section 
15-1-701(a)(ii), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, provides:

"(a) As used in this 
article:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) `Project' 
means any land, building, pollution control facility or other improvement and 
all necessary and appurtenant real and personal properties, whether or not in 
existence, suitable for manufacturing, industrial, commercial or business 
enterprises or for health care facilities having received an approved state 
certificate of need for said project in accordance with W.S. 35-2-201 through 
35-2-214. Project may also mean an undivided interest as a tenant in common in 
an electrical generating facility or in pollution control facilities in 
connection therewith."

2 In Holding's we could 
not avoid the due process clause by applying the legislative-function exception. 
We held explicitly that the bond issue was an adjudicatory function of the 
agency involved.

3 Article VI of the United 
States Constitution states: "This Constitution * * * shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land * * *." Article 1, § 37 of the Wyoming Constitution states: "The State 
of Wyoming is an inseparable part of the 
federal union, and the constitution of the United States is 
the supreme law of the land."

ROONEY, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶33.]  I concur in the majority opinion and only 
add that the criterion for the issuance of the bonds, i.e. that they "[n]ot 
result in an unfair competitive disadvantage for existing business," does not 
require the result to not be a "competitive disadvantage" for existing business. 
The requirement is an "unfair 
competitive disadvantage." (Emphasis added.) The word "unfair" must be 
considered as other than a useless thing. 

[¶34.]  There is no indication here that existing 
business could not have the same access to funding through economic development 
project bonds. Business people are always striving to obtain a competitive 
advantage over other people. Such should be legally restrained only if it is 
done unfairly. The record does not 
reflect unfairness in this instance.

ROSE, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶35.]  While I agree that the decision to issue 
economic development project bonds for the proposed convention center should be 
affirmed, I cannot join the majority's analysis in arriving at that conclusion. 
In my opinion, the information-gathering hearing conducted by the Wyoming 
Community Development Authority (WCDA) and the city council, prior to approval 
of the bonds, satisfied statutory and constitutional procedural requirements 
solely because the decision-making process involved legislative rather than 
adjudicatory facts.

STATUTE

[¶36.]  Section 9-7-122(c), W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 
1985, directs the WCDA and the governing body to conduct a joint public hearing 
prior to the issuance of economic development project 
bonds:

"The authority shall not 
finance any economic development project unless the governing body of the 
municipality or county in which the economic development is located and the 
authority conducts [conduct] a joint public hearing."

This statutory 
requirement for a hearing entitles the parties to a contested-case or trial-type 
hearing under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act,1 if adjudicative facts are at issue. 
Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, 
Teton County, Wyo., 463 P.2d 26 (1969). Notwithstanding this 
well-established rule of law, the majority hold that the WCDA and city council 
need not determine adjudicative facts in a trial-type proceeding because federal 
statutes and treasury regulations do not require trial-type proceedings. These 
federal enactments, however, do not establish the type of hearing required under 
Wyoming 
law.

[¶37.]  The majority's reliance on In re 
Application for Certificate of Need by HCA Health Services of Wyoming, Inc., 
Wyo., 689 P.2d 108 (1984), is misplaced. In that case, specific federal statutes 
and regulations required states to conduct full evidentiary hearings prior to 
issuing certificates of need for proposed health care facilities. We recognized 
that the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the United States Constitution prevented 
Wyoming from 
authorizing less procedural protection, and interpreted our statutes 
accordingly.

[¶38.]  The federal tax laws and regulations, 
cited as controlling by the majority, 718 P.2d  at 874-875 allow local 
governmental units flexibility in setting a form of hearing that is appropriate 
for the particular tax-exempt bonds and that satisfies local concerns. Nothing 
prevents states from requiring formal, trial-type procedures, and, indeed, 
Treasury Regulation 5f.103-2(g)(2) (1983), 718 P.2d  at 874-875, commends the use 
of state administrative hearing rules as a means of assuring compliance with 
federal requirements.

[¶39.]  The Wyoming Community Development Authority Act, 
§§ 9-7-101 through 9-7-121, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1985, at issue in the present 
case, directs the WCDA and the governing body to conduct a public hearing and to 
make five specific factual findings prior to the issuance of bonds. If, as the 
majority suggest, these required factual findings involve adjudicative facts, 
then the act contemplates their determination in an adjudicative or trial-type 
hearing. Since legislative rather than adjudicative facts determine the 
propriety of an economic development bond issue, however, no trial-type hearing 
is required. Lund v. Schrader, Wyo., 492 P.2d 202 (1971); Scarlett v. Town 
Council, supra.

[¶40.]  Legislative facts generally relate to 
policy-making by a tribunal, whereas adjudicative facts typically concern the 
specific actions and intent of the parties:

"Adjudicative facts 
usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what 
motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go to a 
jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate 
parties but are the general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of 
law and policy and discretion." 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 2d § 12:3, 
p. 413 (1978).

We have relied 
on this distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts to determine 
administrative procedural requirements in the past. Holdings' Little America v. 
Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County, 
Wyo., 670 P.2d 699 (1983); Lund v. Schrader, supra; 
Scarlett v. Town Council, supra.

[¶41.]  In the case at bar, the principal issue 
before the WCDA and the city council was whether the proposed economic 
development project would "result in an unfair competitive disadvantage for 
existing business in the municipality, county or state." Section 9-7-122(d)(v). 
Resolution of this question requires a determination of the general business 
climate in the community, including such factors as the services currently 
provided, the extent to which existing facilities are used, the anticipated 
demand for the proposed facilities, the degree of duplication of services, and 
the clientele served by the proposed and existing facilities. General 
information of this sort is often available from state and local chambers of 
commerce. Certainly it can be obtained in open public meetings where opponents 
and proponents of the proposal describe their respective situations and submit 
pertinent data. Cross-examination challenging the details of opposing positions 
would be of minimal value in illuminating the overall business picture. I would 
hold, therefore, that § 9-7-122 contemplates an information-gathering hearing 
rather than a trial-type hearing to determine whether a proposal qualifies for 
economic development project financing.

DUE 
PROCESS

[¶42.]  Petitioners contend that § 
9-7-122(d)(v)2 creates a property right in 
existing businesses in that portion of the market which is secure from loss due 
to the unfair competitive disadvantage caused by an economic development 
project. Therefore, petitioners urge, they are entitled to individualized, 
adversarial hearings to protect against a wrongful deprivation of this property 
interest.

[¶43.]  I am not prepared to join the majority in 
holding that individuals have no protected property interest in the continuation 
of their business positions, free from government-created, unfair competitive 
disadvantages. I note in this regard the well-established principle that the 
state cannot exclude a person from his chosen occupation in a manner that 
contravenes due-process requirements. Willner v. Committee on Character and 
Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83 S. Ct. 1175, 10 L. Ed. 2d 224, 2 A.L.R.3d 1254, (1963); 
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of the State of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S. Ct. 752, 1 L. Ed. 2d 796, 64 A.L.R.2d 288 (1957).

[¶44.]  At any rate, this court need not 
determine whether § 9-7-122(d)(v) creates a constitutionally protected property 
interest in petitioners, because the due process clause, like the statutory 
requirement for a hearing, does not mandate a trial-type hearing for the 
resolution of legislative facts. The United States Supreme Court laid the 
foundations for this rule in two well-known decisions involving tax assessment, 
Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 28 S. Ct. 708, 52 L. Ed. 1103 
(1908); and Bi-Metallic Investment Company v. State Board of Equalization of 
Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 36 S. Ct. 141, 60 L. Ed. 372 (1915). See Davis, supra, § 12:2, pp. 
409-412.

[¶45.]  In Londoner v. City and County of Denver, supra, landowners with no 
opportunity for a hearing were taxed for the cost of paving a street abutting 
their property. The Supreme Court held that due process of law required that the 
affected taxpayers have an opportunity to be heard:

"* * * Many requirements 
essential in strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with in proceedings 
of this nature. But even here a hearing in its very essence demands that he who 
is entitled to it shall have the right to support his allegations by argument 
however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however informal." 210 U.S.  at 386, 28 S. Ct.  at 
714.

[¶46.]  In Bi-Metallic Investment Company v. 
State Board of Equalization of Colorado, supra, a property owner sought to 
enjoin state officials from increasing the taxable valuation of all property in 
Denver by 40 
percent. The taxpayer argued that it had been given no opportunity for a hearing 
and, therefore, had been deprived of its property without due process of law. 
The Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion by Justice Holmes refused to require a 
hearing to decide the general factual questions involved:

"* * * General statutes 
within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of 
individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be 
heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex 
society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule." 239 U.S.  at 445, 36 S. Ct.  at 
142.

[¶47.]  The dispute in the case at bar asks 
general factual questions concerning the competitive impact of the proposed 
project on the existing business community. The information-gathering hearing 
afforded to all interested persons by the city council and WCDA was an 
appropriate forum for resolving these questions and satisfied due-process 
requirements.

[¶48.]  I would have affirmed the issuance of the 
economic development project bonds in this case on the foregoing 
grounds.

FOOTNOTES

1 A contested case is a 
proceeding

"* * * in which legal 
rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by 
an agency after an opportunity for hearing." Section 16-3-101(b)(ii), W.S. 
1977.

2 Section 9-7-122(d)(v), 
Cum.Supp. 1985, provides:

"The authority shall not 
finance any economic development project unless the governing body and the 
authority determine that the economic development project 
would:

* * * * * 
*

"(v) Not result in an 
unfair competitive disadvantage for existing business in the municipality, 
county or state."