Case Title: Allmaras v. Mudge

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-11-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Allmaras v. Mudge1991 WY 139820 P.2d 533Case Number: 90-275Decided: 11/08/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOSEPH 
ALLMARAS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN DAVID ALLMARAS, 
DECEASED,

APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

LISA 
FERN MUDGE; 71 CONSTRUCTION, A WYOMING CORPORATION; AND KLOEFKORN-BALLARD 
CONSTRUCTION/DEVELOPMENT, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION,

APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

 Joseph E. 
Darrah, Powell, for 
appellant.

Anthony 
A. Johnson of Retherford, Mullen, Rector&Johnson, 
Colorado Springs, Colo., for appellee 71 
Construction.

Ann M. 
Rochelle of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, Casper, for appellee Kloefkorn-Ballard 
Constr./Development, Inc.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
and GOLDEN, JJ., and BROWN, Ret. J.

 URBIGKIT, 
Chief 
Justice.

 [¶1.]     Appellant, Joseph 
Allmaras (Allmaras), father and personal representative of the estate of John 
David Allmaras, by suit for wrongful death, appeals from a summary judgment 
granted to Kloefkorn-Ballard Construction/Development, Inc. (Kloefkorn-Ballard) 
and 71 Construction. We affirm the judgment favoring 71 Construction and reverse 
as to Kloefkorn-Ballard.

I.

ISSUE

 [¶2.]     Allmaras raises one 
issue:

Did the 
trial court improperly exonerate the Appellee-contractors from their negligence; 
or at least concurrent negligence, in violating their duty to warn the traveling 
public of the construction hazards created by them which resulted in the death 
of Appellant's decedent under the circumstances?

II.

FACTS

 [¶3.]     For purposes of summary 
judgment, the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and exhibits established the 
following as generally undisputed facts.

 [¶4.]     On February 23, 1987, 
Paradise Valley Waste and Sewer District entered into an agreement with 
contractor Kloefkorn-Ballard to do utility system improvement construction. Work 
was to be done on three different areas, but Schedule C was the area in which 
the accident occurred at the intersection of Dahlia Street and Valley Drive. 
Kloefkorn-Ballard, as contractor, entered into an agreement with Jackman-Jackman 
as a general subcontractor. When Jackman-Jackman had finished its work, the 
back-filled road surface was passable through the area, although unfinished and 
subject to settlement before asphalt repaving. The street was then unbarricaded 
and opened to traffic usage.

 [¶5.]     On June 23, 1987, 
Boatright-Smith signed a subcontract agreement with Kloefkorn-Ballard to install 
the asphalt, which required Boatright-Smith to begin work after Jackman-Jackman 
had finished. Because Boatright-Smith had become preoccupied in moving their 
asphalt plant, 71 Construction was asked to do this work.

 [¶6.]     On August 18, 1987, 
John David Allmaras was killed while riding in a car driven by nineteen-year-old 
Lisa Fern Mudge (Mudge). Mudge lost control of the car as she approached the 
Dahlia 
Street and Valley Drive intersection. John David 
Allmaras was thrown from the car and the vehicle rolled over him. The Mudge 
vehicle was travelling south and the construction work had only occurred in the 
northbound lane.

 [¶7.]     On May 12, 1988, 
Allmaras filed suit against Mudge arguing that Mudge's negligence in driving at 
an excessive speed and while intoxicated was the direct and proximate cause of 
the death of his son. On January 9, 1989, Allmaras amended the complaint to 
include Kloefkorn-Ballard and 71 Construction. In that amended complaint, 
Allmaras claimed Kloefkorn-Ballard was the contractor and 71 Construction was a 
subcontractor at all relevant times for improvements to the Paradise Valley 
Water and Sewer District. The amended complaint claimed that both contractors 
had a duty, imposed both by contract and by law, to erect warning signs. In 
response, Kloefkorn-Ballard answered the amended complaint and brought 
Boatright-Smith and Jackman-Jackman into the litigation by cross-claim. During 
litigation, Allmaras settled with Mudge resulting in dismissal of the complaint 
against her.1

 [¶8.]     On September 28, 1990, 
the trial court, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact and that 
all defending parties were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, 
granted summary judgment to Kloefkorn-Ballard, 71 Construction, Boatright-Smith 
and Jackman-Jackman. The trial court found as a matter of law that none of those 
contractor parties had a duty to warn southbound traffic of construction located 
in the northbound lane.

III.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 [¶9.]     Summary judgment is 
proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the prevailing 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341 (Wyo. 1989); Farr v. 
Link, 746 P.2d 431 (Wyo. 1987). A material fact is one which would 
establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action or defense 
asserted by the parties. Albrecht v. 
Zwaanshoek Holding En Financiering, B.V., 762 P.2d 1174 (Wyo. 1988); Johnston v. Conoco, Inc., 758 P.2d 566 
(Wyo. 1988). 
We review a summary judgment in the same light as the trial court, using the 
same materials and following the same standards. Baros, 780 P.2d 341; Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1989). We examine the record from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the 
record. Baros, 780 P.2d 341; Doud v. First Interstate Bank of Gillette, 
769 P.2d 927 (Wyo. 1989). The character and classification 
of Wyoming summary judgment law is 
comprehensively analyzed in Cordova v. 
Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986). See Davenport 
v. Epperly, 744 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987). "Although summary judgments are 
not favored in negligence actions, where the record fails to establish an issue 
of material fact [and when the movant is entitled to the judgment as a matter of 
law], the entry of summary judgment is proper." MacKrell v. BellH[2]S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990). See also W.R.C.P. 56(c). Applying our 
standard of review, we examine the record to determine whether summary judgment 
in favor of 71 Construction and Kloefkorn-Ballard was appropriate. We must 
decide whether, as a matter of law, 71 Construction owed Allmaras a duty and 
whether a factual issue exists as to Kloefkorn-Ballard's liability. Cordova, 719 P.2d 625.

IV.

ISSUES 
OF LIABILITY - 71 CONSTRUCTION

 [¶10.]  Under Wyoming law, the tort of negligence must be 
based upon the breach of a duty where that breach proximately caused an injury 
to the plaintiff. Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726 (Wyo. 
1980). Whether a legal duty exists is a question of law. Thomas by Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and 
Sewer Dist., 702 P.2d 1303 (Wyo. 1985). Because we hold that 71 
Construction had no duty to Allmaras for signs and road conditions at the 
construction site, summary judgment in favor of 71 Construction is 
appropriate.

 [¶11.]  While the control over the construction 
site could be a material fact, there was nothing beyond the allegation by 
Allmaras that 71 Construction controlled the site. Its repaving function was 
performed on oral order from Boatright-Smith and the re-paver had not commenced 
work at the accident site before the accident happened, although it did start 
preparation for repaving early the next morning. In Thomas by Thomas, we upheld summary 
judgment in favor of the South Cheyenne Water and Sewer District because the 
district had no control over the accident's area and therefore owed no duty. We 
are faced with a similar situation here with respect to pre-accident 
participation at the accident scene by the repaving 
subcontractor.

 [¶12.]  The deposition testimony offered in 
support of its motion for summary judgment indicated 71 Construction had not 
exercised control of the area by the time of the accident. That evidence was not 
factually disputed by Allmaras. "`After the movant establishes a prima facie 
case the burden of proof shifts to the opposing party who must show a genuine 
issue of material fact * * * or come forward with competent evidence of specific 
facts countering the facts presented by the movant.'" Id. at 1304 
(quoting Roth v. First Sec. Bank of 
Rock Springs, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 95 (Wyo. 1984)). It is indisputable that 71 
Construction never exercised control over the site prior to the 
accident.

 [¶13.]  Although Allmaras claimed 71 Construction 
had contractual and legal duties, there was nothing beyond the allegation to 
support that claim. Nowhere within the oral work order is the source for the 
contractual duty pinpointed. Additionally, Allmaras presents no legal authority 
that would create such a duty under the circumstances of this case involving 
that oral order with respect to the paving to be done on a day work 
basis.

 [¶14.]  "Liability must be based upon duty." Thomas by Thomas, 702 P.2d  at 1307; 
accord Medlock v. Van Wagner, 625 P.2d 207 (Wyo. 
1981). "If duty has not been established, there is no actionable negligence." Thomas by Thomas, 702 P.2d  at 1307. 
Because it is unquestionable that 71 Construction exercised no control over the 
general job or this specific site prior to the time of the accident, no duty to 
Allmaras could have arisen. As a matter of law, summary judgment was appropriate 
in favor of 71 Construction because it had no duty to users of the street where 
it had not yet commenced its repaving work. Davenport, 744 P.2d 1110. We affirm summary 
judgment in favor of 17 Construction.

V.

ISSUES 
OF LIABILITY - KLOEFKORN-BALLARD

 [¶15.]  In considering the issue of liability of 
Kloefkorn-Ballard, we analyze the same negligence elements as stated in the 
previous section. In granting Kloefkorn-Ballard's motion for summary judgment, 
the trial court determined Kloefkorn-Ballard owed no duty to the decedent and, 
further, that the acts of Kloefkorn-Ballard were not the proximate cause of John 
David Allmaras' death. Summary judgment is inappropriate, however, if a duty 
exists and if there is a genuine issue whether that duty was breached or whether 
that breach caused the injury.

A. 
Duty.

 [¶16.]  Did a duty exist? The trial court found 
that there was no duty to warn because the car in which John David Allmaras rode 
was travelling southbound and the street had been dug up only in the northbound 
lane. The contract between Kloefkorn-Ballard and the Paradise Valley Water and 
Sewer District imposed the primary responsibility upon Kloefkorn-Ballard for 
"initiating, maintaining and supervising all safety precautions and programs in 
connection with the [w]ork."

 [¶17.]  In addition to the contractually imposed 
duty, the duty to place appropriate warning signs was also imposed by law 
through city ordinance. The City of Casper has a "Manual of Specifications & 
Procedures for the Use of Traffic Control Devices in Construction & 
Maintenance Areas." That manual says that "[i]t is essential that signs be 
positioned in such a manner that the public has sufficient time to react to the 
changes in traffic patterns or other requirements of the work area." No legal 
questions exist regarding the duty to provide signs; the factual issue is where. 
We hold that a jury could properly find within the evidence provided at the 
summary judgment stage that the duty to provide warning signs at this particular 
construction zone existed for traffic moving in both directions. Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 
(Wyo. 1981); Culver v. Sekulich, 80 Wyo. 437, 344 P.2d 146 
(1959); Ruhs v. Pacific Power & 
Light, 671 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1982). Cf. Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, Inc., 
731 P.2d 1195 (Wyo. 1987).2

 B. 
Proximate Cause and Associated Issues of Appeal.

 [¶18.]  Kloefkorn-Ballard asserts three 
contentions to provide an escape from liability, even though complete traffic 
warning signs were not provided at the accident site in compliance with either 
city ordinance or construction contract. Although this is essentially a 
proximate cause-summary judgment issue, each of those contentions will be 
examined in conjunction with the proximate cause review.

(1) Protective Delegation to Independent 
Contractor Providing Immunity From Liability.

 [¶19.]  Kloefkorn-Ballard argues, although 
without persuasive conviction, that it was not liable for any failure of its 
subcontractors to provide proper warning signs. The cited authorities are not 
persuasive to justify a decision as a matter of law that a general contractor 
like Kloefkorn-Ballard could delegate both ordinance and contractual duty, Ely v. Kirk, 707 P.2d 706 (Wyo. 1985); 
Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge Intern. Order 
of Odd Fellows, 526 P.2d 52 (Wyo. 1974), for street repair signs to its 
subcontractors and consequently absolve itself from negligently caused injury to 
street users at its construction site within city streets. Evans v. Elliott, 220 N.C. 253, 17 S.E.2d 125 (1941). Following the general law, we hold that the general 
contractor had a non-delegable duty under the facts here presented involving a 
constructionally created hazardous condition, Thomas v. Harrington, 72 N.H. 45, 54 A. 285 (1902), to assure safety to the driving public during street repair by 
providing proper warning signs. Jones v. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo. 1986); Casper Nat. Bank v. Jones, 79 
Wyo. 38, 329 P.2d 1077 (1958); Stockgrowers' Bank of Wheatland v. Gray, 
24 Wyo. 
18, 154 P. 593 (1916); Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 71 (5th ed. 1984); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965). See also Lindler v. District of Columbia, 
502 F.2d 495 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Either site condition which forecloses release by 
delegation to an independent contractor (1) inherently dangerous activity or (2) 
activity necessitating special precautions can be applied here, which creates a 
non-delegable duty. Lindler, 502 F.2d 495; Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. 
L'Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc., 448 A.2d 864 (D.C.App. 
1982).

(2) Adequacy of Signs as a Matter of 
Law.

 [¶20.]  The second argument is that signs were in 
place for travel on the opposite lane - northbound - and consequently were not 
needed for warning to decedent's host driver where the southbound lane had not 
been disturbed in construction. Within the context of this case and in the face 
of the expert witness whose affidavit was provided by Allmaras, this examination 
clearly reaches an issue of fact status. Gilpatrick Const. Co. v. Wind River 
Ready-Mix Concrete Co., 473 P.2d 586 (Wyo. 1970). The jury, not the trial court, 
should decide whether any signs provided were "adequate" and consequently not 
negligent in what was or was not done. That argument leaves a factual decision 
which is inappropriate for summary judgment disposition. Cohen v. Sahuaro Petroleum & Asphalt 
Co., 17 Ariz. App. 215, 496 P.2d 641 
(1972); Transcon Lines Corp. v. Cornell 
Const. Co., Inc., 539 P.2d 1372 (Okla. 1975). There were no street construction 
signs for drivers in the southbound lane which was the direction occupied by 
decedent's host driver. Smith v. 
Lafortune, 288 Minn. 135, 179 N.W.2d 136 (1970). Considering 
the relevant circumstances - the construction contract, city ordinance 
requirements, traffic patterns, neighborhood usage, and nonlinear configuration 
of the street - there was an appropriate jury issue of negligence from neglect 
to provide the warning signs for that street at that repair construction site, 
which were called for by both city ordinance and contract. Gilpatrick Const. Co., 473 P.2d 586; 
Jackson v. W.A. Norris, Inc., 54 Wyo. 403, 93 P.2d 498 (1939); Ferguson v. Ben M. Hogan Co., 307 F. Supp. 658 
(W.D.Ark. 1969); Moore v. Geiger, 6 Ohio App.2d 14, 215 N.E.2d 607 (1966).

(3) Controlling Issue - Existence of Proximate 
Cause.

 [¶21.]  Finally, Kloefkorn-Ballard attempts to 
avoid liability in this instance by arguing that its failure to provide traffic 
warning signs was not the proximate cause of John David Allmaras' death. The 
third and compelling issue of this case is proximate cause. Recognizing at least 
a jury decision requirement to determine the obligation to provide warning signs 
at the construction site and the factual issue of the adequacy of warning signs 
utilized, we are left with the decision of whether failure to provide signs 
constituted a proximate cause of this fatal accident.

 [¶22.]  In fairness to the litigants and to the 
trial court, a more detailed recitation of the facts is required. Mudge had 
borrowed a car early in the evening and spent the next hours driving, visiting 
and drinking alcoholic beverages. During the course of the evening, Mudge and 
her female friend became acquainted with the decedent and another young man. 
After each of these young people had consumed three to four beers, the time came 
when Mudge drove them toward the Dahlia Street and Valley Drive 
intersection where the construction work was located.

 [¶23.]  It is established that the posted speed 
limit at the accident site was thirty miles per hour and Mudge, immediately 
before the accident, had been accelerating. She was traveling at least 
sixty-five miles per hour before she lost control while approaching the area 
where a trench had been dug to mid-street for a sewer manhole installation. The 
trial court found, and Kloefkorn-Ballard now argues, that the proximate cause of 
the accident was the vehicle speed, alcoholic condition of Mudge, and subsequent 
loss of control. Mudge, as a result of the occurrence, made a guilty plea to 
vehicular homicide. It is contended that warning signs in the southbound lane of 
travel would not have deterred driving speed or changed the loss-of-control 
result.

 [¶24.]  The investigative police officer 
testified by deposition that the sole cause of the accident was the character of 
driving by Mudge. Conversely, Allmaras provided an expert witness who stated in 
affidavit that adequate warning signs would have allowed the driver of the 
vehicle to slow down and consequently pass the construction site without 
danger:

6. That 
I am further of the opinion, based upon reasonable professional certainty, under 
all of the circumstances here present, that had the construction signage been 
installed in compliance with the aforesaid Casper Manual and Uniform Manual at 
the time of the accident to advise both north bound and south bound traffic of 
the construction activity at the intersection of Valley Drive and Dahlia Street, 
such signage would have allowed, even given the excessive speed of upwards of 65 
MPH or more of the Mudge vehicle, additional reaction time to the driver of the 
Chevrolet Camaro, Lisa Mudge. The fact that Miss Mudge could and would 
reasonably be expected to react to the imminent presence of this signage is 
shown by the physical facts at the scene in that Mudge did in fact react to the 
presence of the construction site once the area came within her view or the view 
of her passengers. At that time, her reaction took the form of a swerving motion 
to avoid the perceived dug-out area of the construction site within Valley Drive. 
Additional signage would have given Miss Mudge advance notice of the presence of 
construction activity, and would have timely reminded her of the abnormal and 
hazardous nature of the road surface in that intersection 
area.

7. That 
I am further of the opinion based upon reasonable professional certainty, under 
all of the circumstances aforesaid, that proper construction signage placed at 
recommended distances prior to the construction activity would have allowed the 
Chevrolet Camaro, even with the reported location and excessive speed of Mudge 
to slow to a safe passing speed, or even to slow to a stop if necessary, prior 
to traversing the area of the intersection of Valley Drive and Dahlia where the 
construction activity was taking place. With the evidence aforesaid that Mudge 
had a predisposition to react to a known danger, the increased reaction time 
created by the proper placement of construction sign, and warning devices alerts 
a driver to unusual road surface conditions, unusual activities in, and adjacent 
to the road, and to be cautious of roadway conditions [due to] the construction 
activity. This, in turn, given the circumstances and speed of the Mudge vehicle, 
would allow ample time, and therefore ample distance for Miss Mudge to have 
adjusted her driving to a reasonable manner for activities and traffic 
conditions that could be expected in a highway construction zone to avoid the 
collision.

 [¶25.]  Complex and conflicting arguments are 
made whether warning signs for this lane of travel, where none had been 
provided, would have prevented the accident. Since we deal with what Mudge would 
have done if signs had been in place, no result assessment with reasoned 
certainty can be made. It seems relatively determined from all witnesses that a 
safe passage could easily have been negotiated within her proper lane and, 
perhaps, even her attained speed if Mudge had slowed down prior to reaching the 
area where the street had been dug up in the opposite lane, and had she not 
suddenly jerked the wheel to move further to the outside edge of the roadway. 
Her fault in negligent driving is not an issue.

 [¶26.]  For summary judgment consideration in 
accepting that adequate warning signs had not been provided, we analyze whether 
proximate cause is determinable as a matter of law for this other participant as 
announced by the trial court and contended by appellees or remains as a factual 
issue for jury decision as Allmaras' argument. Exhaustive evaluation and review 
of proximate cause can be found in the literature of the law, which is a subject 
considered to be one of the most troubling areas of decision within basic tort 
law.

The 
most important and challenging questions in tort law for this case involve 
issues of proximate cause, such as whether it is proper for jury decision to 
submit the question of England's recovery from Simmons for causing the head-on 
collision with Barnes. Vandall, Judge 
Posner's Negligence-Efficiency Theory: A Critique, 35 Emory L.J. 383, 404 
(1986). * * * It seems clearly established by the Restatement of Law and general 
case law that foreseeability is not a factor of proximate cause but instead an 
element of causal negligence.

"The 
term `proximate cause' is applied by the courts to those more or less undefined 
considerations which limit liability even where the fact of causation is clearly 
established. * * * [`Proximate'] is an unfortunate word, which places an 
entirely wrong emphasis upon the factor of physical or mechanical closeness. For 
this reason `legal cause' or perhaps even `responsible cause' would be a more 
appropriate term. * * *

* * * * 
* *

"* * * 
[T]wo contrasting theories of legal cause recur throughout the cases and account 
for most of the conflict with respect to the choice of a basic theory. One of 
these theories is that the scope of liability should ordinarily extend to but 
not beyond the scope of the `foreseeable risks' - that is, the risks by reason 
of which the actor's conduct is held to be negligent. The second, contrasting, 
theory is that the scope of liability should ordinarily extend to but not beyond 
all `direct' (or `directly traceable') consequences and those indirect 
consequences that are foreseeable.

"* * * 
Another choice of theory concerns the question whether all limitations on the 
scope of liability of a negligent defendant - apart from defenses and, in some 
instances, requirements regarding the nature of the harm - will be dealt with 
under the rubric of `legal cause' (or `proximate cause') or instead some will be 
dealt with as issues of `duty.'" Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, 
Ch. 7, § 42 at 
273-74.

"* * * 
It is simpler, and no doubt more accurate, to state the problem in terms of 
legal responsibility: is the defendant legally responsible to protect the 
plaintiff against such unforeseeable consequences of the defendant's own 
negligent acts? * * * As to this problem, there are two basic, fundamental, 
opposing and irreconcilable views, which have been in conflict for more than a 
century; and each has developed complications of its own. * * 
*

[* * 
*]

"The 
first of these positions * * * [is] that the same criterion of foreseeability 
and risk of harm which determined whether the defendant was negligent in the 
first instance should determine the extent of the liability for that negligence; 
and that no defendant should ever be held liable for consequences which no 
reasonable person would expect to follow from the conduct. * * *" Prosser and 
Keeton on The Law of Torts, supra, § 43 at 281. "There remains the opposing 
view, which has been urged from time to time by a good many writers, that a 
defendant who is negligent must take existing circumstances as they are, and may 
be liable for consequence brought about by the defendant's acts, even though 
they were not reasonably to be anticipated. * * *" Id. at 
290.

England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137, 
1150-51 (Wyo. 
1986), Urbigkit, J., dissenting.

 [¶27.]  Prosser and Keeton on Torts, supra, § 45 at 321 (footnotes omitted) 
states:

Thus, 
in any case where there might be reasonable difference of opinion as to the 
foreseeability of a particular risk, the reasonableness of the defendant's 
conduct with respect to it, or the normal character of an intervening cause, the 
question is for the jury, subject of course to suitable instructions from the 
court as to the legal conclusion to be drawn as the issue is determined either 
way. By far the greater number of the cases which have arisen have been of this 
description; and to this extent it may properly be said that "proximate cause is 
ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, to be solved by the exercise of good 
common sense in the consideration of the evidence of each particular 
case."

 [¶28.]  Restatement (Second) Torts, supra, §§ 430, 431, and 435 
state:

§ 430. 
Necessity of Adequate Causal Relation

In 
order that a negligent actor shall be liable for another's harm, it is necessary 
not only that the actor's conduct be negligent toward the other, but also that 
the negligence of the actor be a legal cause of the other's 
harm.

§ 431. 
What Constitutes Legal Cause

The 
actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another 
if

(a) his 
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, 
and

(b) 
there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner 
in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.

§ 435. 
Foreseeability of Harm or Manner of Its Occurrence

(1) If 
the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, 
the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of 
the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being 
liable.

(2) The 
actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where 
after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, 
it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about 
the harm.[3]

 [¶29.]  An illuminating discussion of causation 
is also found in Keeton, Causation, 
28 S.Tex. L.Rev. 231, 231-32 (1986) (emphasis in original and footnotes 
omitted):

There 
are four elements in a claimant's prima facie case of negligence. These 
generally recognized elements are: (1) a duty of reasonable care, (2) a breach 
of that duty, (3) proximate causation, and (4) damages. An explanation of the 
terms duty and breach of duty is necessary to identify the issues underlying 
each of the elements and the problems arising in connection with proximate 
cause.

* * * * 
* *

Generally, 
two elements are required to establish that the negligence of a defendant is the 
proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury: factual causation and legal causation. 
Factual causation refers to the requirement that the act and the injury be 
related. Legal causation refers to the requirement that the act and the injury 
be reasonably related.

 [¶30.]  This appeal presents double concepts 
frequently presented in proximate cause examinations. First, foreseeability and 
its relationship to legal responsibility, and second, jury participation in 
resolution of proximate cause as a factual decision. Justice Blume of this court 
provided a basic and well reasoned analysis on the subject in one of his last 
opinions which included a quotation from W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of 
Torts, at 324 (1st ed. 1941):

"If the 
defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's loss, it 
follows that he will not be absolved from responsibility merely because other 
causes, such as the negligence of other persons, have contributed to the 
result."

If the 
original wrongdoer "could have anticipated that the intervening act of 
negligence might, in a natural and ordinary sequence, follow the original act of 
negligence, the person first in fault is not released from liability by reason 
of the intervening negligence of another." Shearman & Redfield on 
Negligence, Rev.Ed., Section 38.

Phelps v. Woodward Const. Co., 66 
Wyo. 33, 204 P.2d 179, 187 (1949). In Phelps, 
Justice Blume considered similar facts involving the liability of a utility 
for a shallow gas line which was hit by a negligent grading contractor. 
Proximate cause was justifiably determined by the jury as a factual issue and 
the resulting plaintiff's verdict was affirmed on appeal.

 [¶31.]  In considering the voluminous yet 
conflicting evidence about the nature of travel on Valley Drive and the 
problem created by the insufficient warnings to alert drivers to the danger 
created by the manhole installation, proximate cause becomes an issue of fact to 
be resolved by a jury. Bettencourt v. 
Pride Well Service, Inc., 735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987). See also Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089 (Wyo. 1985); McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 
(Wyo. 1983); and O'Mally v. Eagan, 43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d 1063, reh'g denied 43 Wyo. 350, 5 P.2d 276 
(1931).

 [¶32.]  In the carefully considered case of Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light 
Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Wyo. 1989), this court 
recognized:

Proximate 
cause is normally a question of fact unless the evidence is such that reasonable 
minds could not disagree. * * * [T]he ultimate test of proximate cause is the 
foreseeability of injury, and we noted that it is not necessary that the 
specific injury be foreseen - it is sufficient if a reasonably prudent person 
would foresee that the same general type of injury would be likely in the 
absence of adequate safeguards.

 [¶33.]  In Bettencourt, 735 P.2d  at 726, a case 
considering proximate cause with similar issues and structured nature for 
appeal, this court said:

The 
concept of proximate cause and how it is to be established in a judicial forum 
is the crux of this case. In McClellan v. 
Tottenhoff, Wyo., 666 P.2d 408, 414 (1983), we said, "[p]roximate 
cause means that the accident or injury must be the natural and probable 
consequence of the act of negligence." That case involved the sale of 
intoxicating liquor to a minor, and we went on to hold that whether the vendor 
could foresee an injury to a third person would be the ultimate test. More 
recently, in Buckley v. Bell, Wyo., 703 P.2d 1089, 1091-1092 (1985), the following 
definition of proximate or legal causation was 
espoused:

"* * * 
[T]hat conduct which is a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries 
identified in the complaint. * * * [I]f the conduct is `that cause which in 
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by a sufficient intervening cause 
produces the injury, without which the result would not have occurred,' it must 
be identified as a substantial factor in bringing about the harm." (Citations 
omitted.)

Our 
usual disposition is to treat proximate causation as a question of fact to be 
resolved by the trier of fact unless, on the evidence demonstrated in the file 
reasonable persons could not disagree.

VI.

CONCLUSION

 [¶34.]  We conclude that this case presents 
proximate cause as a factual resolution for jury disposition since reasonable 
minds could disagree whether the absence of warning signs was the proximate 
cause of the passenger's death in the vehicular accident. Summary judgment is 
inappropriate.

 [¶35.]  Judgment in favor of 71 Construction is 
affirmed. Judgment in favor of Kloefkorn-Ballard Construction/Development, Inc. 
is reversed and remanded.

 [¶36.]  GOLDEN, Justice, concurring in part; 
dissenting in part.

 [¶37.]  I concur in this court's affirmance of 
the summary judgment in favor of 71 Construction; however, I respectfully 
dissent from this court's reversal of the summary judgment in favor of 
Kloefkorn-Ballard. I would hold as a matter of law that Kloefkorn-Ballard's 
failure to sign the construction area was not the proximate cause of this tragic 
accident and John Allmaras' senseless death.

 [¶38.]  I agree with the majority that 
Kloefkorn-Ballard, as the road contractor, owed a duty to the motoring public to 
take due precautions for the safety of motorists. Gilpatrick Construction v. Wind River 
Ready-Mix Concrete Company, 473 P.2d 586 (Wyo. 1970); Phelan v. Read Construction Company, 379 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1963); Brasel & Sims 
Construction Co. v. Neuman Transit Co. Inc., 378 P.2d 501 (Wyo. 1963); and 
Jackson v. W.A. Norris, Inc., 54 Wyo. 
403, 93 P.2d 498 (1939); and see 4 
Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice § 164.11, p. 428 (3d ed. 
1965).

 [¶39.]  Before proceeding, I reiterate this 
court's definition of proximate cause, that it "means the accident * * * must be 
the natural and probable cause of the act of negligence" and "is normally a 
question of fact unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not 
disagree." Century Ready-Mix Company, et 
al. v. CampbellCountySchool 
District, et al., 816 P.2d 795, 805-06 (Wyo. 1991); Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light 
Company, 779 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Wyo. 1989). After carefully reading the 
materials submitted by the parties for and against summary judgment, I conclude 
that the evidence presented is such that reasonable minds could not disagree. 
Therefore, Kloefkorn-Ballard's failure to sign the construction area was not the 
proximate cause of this tragedy.

 [¶40.]  The most pertinent materials submitted by 
the parties and on which they relied for purposes of the summary judgment motion 
included the depositions of the three surviving occupants of the car, driver 
Lisa Mudge and two passengers Jackie Kinder and Troy Nash; the deposition of 
Officer Branson, investigating for the city police department; the deposition of 
Sgt. Martin, investigating on behalf of the Wyoming Highway Patrol; and the 
affidavit and deposition of Arnold G. Wheat, accident reconstructionist hired by 
plaintiff Joseph Allmaras.

 [¶41.]  From the depositions of driver Lisa Mudge 
and passenger Jackie Kinder, we learn that they were familiar with the 
construction area, having driven through it twice before the accident happened. 
They had driven in the northbound lane through the area around 3:00 or 4:00 p.m. 
Later that same day, around 9:30 or 10:00 p.m., they traveled through the 
construction area again. Kinder reminded Mudge of the area's existence before 
she got to it, and Mudge successfully passed around the area at a rate of speed 
of 30-35 m.p.h. Referring to the construction area as a "dip" in the road, Mudge 
testified she was concerned with the dip at this time because she did not "want 
to hit it." On this occasion the deceased and Troy Nash, both of whom two hours 
later would be unfortunate passengers in the car driven by Mudge when it 
crashed, were following Mudge in the deceased's car and also traveled through 
the area. About this, Nash testified he saw Mudge brake briefly at the 
construction area but go around it at a "pretty fast speed," a lot faster than 
the deceased did. He believed she was over the speed limit when she briefly 
applied her brakes.

 [¶42.]  The accident occurred approximately two 
hours after Mudge and Kinder had traveled through the area on their way to 
Mudge's house for a party. According to the investigating law enforcement 
personnel, at the time of the accident Mudge was operating the high performance 
Camaro at a rate of speed from 60-70 m.p.h. when these youths approached the 
construction area. Mr. Wheat also estimated Mudge's rate of speed at 
approximately 60 m.p.h. About this fateful approach to the construction area, 
Kinder testified that she told Mudge she was driving too fast, and Mudge 
testified that as she traveled southbound on Valley Drive, "It was in my head, I 
believe" that the construction area was there. At a distance of about 300 feet 
north of the construction area (the length of a football field), in order to be 
heard over the blaring car stereo speaker playing the pop hit La Bamba, Kinder 
screamed that Mudge should not forget that the construction area was ahead. At 
the time of this warning, the Mudge-driven Camaro was about a half block north 
of the intersection of Valley Drive and Marigold (Marigold joins Valley Drive 
from the east and is not a through street, i.e., it ends at Valley Drive). Mudge 
testified she does not recall becoming concerned about the construction area. 
Neither Mudge nor Kinder remember what happened from this point on as the 
accident unfolded.

 [¶43.]  Troy Nash remembered the events preceding 
the accident. As Mudge turned onto Valley Drive and headed south in the 
southbound lane, she "started getting some pretty high speed going." So to Nash, 
Mudge seemed to continue picking up speed before the accident. He testified that 
where Valley 
Drive curves, Mudge was going fast enough that when 
they came to the curve Mudge switched from the southbound lane to the oncoming 
northbound lane so she would not roll the car. Nash said, "She was going too 
fast to stay in the right lane. And it's like a race car driver, where you go 
around the corner, you bank high. Well, that's what she was doing." Nash further 
testified there was no traffic on Valley Drive as they traveled 
southbound.

 [¶44.]  According to Nash, both he and the 
deceased simultaneously told Mudge to slow down. They told her this a couple of 
seconds before Kinder told Mudge to "watch out for the hole [construction 
area]." Nash testified the car was in the northbound lane on Valley drive for a 
few seconds and then moved over into the southbound lane. The car then hit the 
west curb on Valley 
Drive. When the car hit the curb, the car careened to 
the left, sliding toward the construction area.

 [¶45.]  Officer Branson testified that the 
Mudge-driven Camaro struck the west curb of Valley Drive about 190 feet north of the 
south curb of Dahlia 
Street which intersects Valley Drive south 
of Marigold's intersection with Valley Drive. Branson estimated Mudge's 
rate of speed at about 60 m.p.h. when she struck the curb. Further, Mudge's 
blood alcohol was .14; the level at which a person is considered intoxicated in 
Wyoming is .10 
or more. W.S. 31-5-233(b)(iii) (Nov. 1984 Repl.)

 [¶46.]  Sgt. Martin investigated Valley Drive north 
of the west curb area. He then called in Lt. Arnold from the highway patrol and 
together they investigated Valley 
Drive north from the intersection of Marigold and 
Valley 
Drive. They found tire marks attributed to the 
Mudge-driven Camaro which crossed from the southbound lane of Valley Drive into 
the northbound lane and onto the east sidewalk approximately 200 feet north of 
Marigold. Martin, Arnold and Officer Dye, also of the highway patrol, calculated 
Mudge's rate of speed to be approximately 70 m.p.h. at a point about 300 feet 
north of the construction area. According to Martin's calculations, the 
Mudge-driven Camaro traveled on the sidewalk for about 200 feet before it left 
the sidewalk at Marigold and Valley 
Drive. Thus, when Mudge was nearly 430 feet north of 
the construction area, she had switched from the southbound to the northbound 
lane and gone onto the east sidewalk, all the while traveling at a high rate of 
speed.

 [¶47.]  In summary, we have a driver who was 
under the influence of alcohol, driving a high performance vehicle at a rate of 
speed estimated between 60-70 m.p.h., and traveling on a familiar curving 
roadway toward a known construction area.

 [¶48.]  Against this factual setting, appellant 
relies on the deposition and subsequent affidavit of an accident 
reconstructionist to create an issue of fact about whether Kloefkorn-Ballard's 
failure to sign the construction area was a proximate cause of the accident. 
This witness stated that the purpose of signs is to warn motorists of the 
presence of the construction site so they may adjust their driving to safely 
traverse the area. In Lopez v. American 
National Bank of Cheyenne, 389 P.2d 21, 22 (Wyo. 1964), in which this court 
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant bank and against the bank's 
customer who was injured when he walked into and shattered the glass panel next 
to a glass double-door entrance to the bank, this court 
said:

Even 
had there been a duty on the part of the bank to give some type of special 
warning to its business invitees that the two, plainly indicated, glass entrance 
doors had glass panels on either side of them, plaintiff said he knew the panel 
was there. This knowledge on plaintiff's part obviated the need for any warning 
being given so far as [plaintiff] was concerned.

 [¶49.]  Relying on Lopez, this court affirmed a 
summary judgment against a lodge patron who had slipped and fallen on a path, 
saying

[k]nowledge 
of danger on the part of plaintiff obviated any need for warning signs. [citing 
Lopez] It would be absurd to put up a 
sign saying, "Slippery, Walk Carefully" or "Danger - Ice," when it tells the 
plaintiff something he is bound to know because of its presence which he can see 
and realize just as well through his own active senses, without prompting. There 
was no hidden danger but only a well-known prevailing 
condition.

Bluejacket v. Carney, 550 P.2d 494, 498 
(Wyo. 
1976).

 [¶50.]  Appellant's accident reconstruction 
witness, both in deposition and in affidavit, speculates that Mudge would have 
reacted sooner and adjusted her rate of speed and driving behavior to safely 
traverse the construction area with which she was familiar had signs been 
properly placed. That opinion and other similar opinions that adorn this 
witness's conclusory testimony are rank conjecture, are inadmissible evidence 
under W.R.E. 702 and 704, and fail to create a genuine issue of material fact. Brebaugh v. Hales, 788 P.2d 1128, 1140 
(Wyo. 1990); Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 345 
(Wyo. 1989); and see Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 
66-67 (Wyo. 
1989). As this court strongly reminded litigants in Bluejacket:

 Mere 
conjecture is never sufficient to establish liability: if the walks had been 
shoveled, sanded or salted or there had been a warning sign, and the light was 
on, the plaintiff might not have been injured. That is not enough. Causal 
connection has not been established. There is no liability for injuries from 
dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as well known to the person 
injured as they are to the owner of the facilities in 
question.

Bluejacket, 550 P.2d  at 
497.

 [¶51.]  I would affirm the summary judgment for 
Kloefkorn-Ballard.

1 During appeal, Boatright-Smith 
settled out and Jackman-Jackman was dismissed by this court since its status as 
a third-party defendant raised no appellate issue. This left only 
Kloefkorn-Ballard and 71 Construction as appellees.

2 The trenching at the point of the 
accident extended from the east edge of the north lane of Valley Drive to the 
middle of the street where a sewer manhole had been installed. Consequently, no 
direct interference by paving tear up had been created for the travel lane used 
by the southbound vehicle in which John David Allmaras was riding. The opened-up 
pavement to the center of the street for northbound vehicles provided a 
back-filled dip since final repair had not been completed. It is a general 
argument of Allmaras that a zone of danger was created for the southbound traffic since northbound drivers crossed over into the 
opposite lane in order to avoid the dip. Mudge, as the driver, had previously 
passed this location and immediately before losing control of the vehicle, was 
emphatically warned by another passenger "to watch out for [the] dip." In 
reaction to the warning, Mudge swerved to the right from the center of the 
street where the vehicle was then traveling, lost control of the vehicle, hit a 
curb, skidded and rolled.

Whether 
Allmaras' stated concept can ever be sold to a jury may be problematical, but 
one explanation for the sudden shock, loss of control and rollover might be 
Mudge's suddenly realized nighttime fear in approaching the area that an 
oncoming car could be in the wrong lane to avoid the dip and consequently cause 
a head-on collision. Within the summary judgment evidentiary status of this 
appeal, an oncoming vehicle was never shown to have 
existed.

3 A representative listing of 
Wyoming cases, inclusive through 1985, can be 
found in England, 728 P.2d  at 1152 n. 2. A primary case 
of more recent date is Stephenson v. 
Pacific Power & Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169 (Wyo. 1989). See also Petersen v. CampbellCounty Memorial Hosp. Dist., 760 P.2d 992 
(Wyo. 1988); Bettencourt v. Pride Well Service, Inc., 
735 P.2d 722 (Wyo. 1987); and DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 
(Wyo. 
1986).