Case Title: McDougald v. Kuhn

Citation: 2020-Ohio-4924

Docket Number: 2020-0534

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
McDougald v. Kuhn, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4924.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-4924 
MCDOUGALD, APPELLANT, v. KUHN, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as McDougald v. Kuhn, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4924.] 
Procedendo—Appellant seeking order compelling judge to journalize final 
judgment of conviction failed to show clear legal right to relief in that 
judgment of conviction contained all elements required to be a final, 
appealable order—Court of appeals’ dismissal of complaint affirmed. 
(No. 2020-0534—Submitted August 18, 2020—Decided October 20, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Scioto County, No. 19CA3881. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jerone McDougald, appeals the Fourth District Court of 
Appeals’ judgment dismissing his complaint for a writ of procedendo against 
appellee, Judge Mark E. Kuhn of the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas.  
McDougald has also filed motions to amend his merit brief, for judgment on the 
pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C), and for default judgment under Civ.R. 55.  We grant 
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the motion to amend, deny the Civ.R. 12(C) and Civ.R. 55 motions, and affirm the 
Fourth District’s judgment. 
Background 
{¶ 2} McDougald is an inmate at the Toledo Correctional Institution.  On 
June 13, 2019, he filed a complaint for a writ of procedendo, seeking an order 
compelling Judge Kuhn to journalize a final judgment of conviction.  McDougald 
argued that “Crim.R. 32(C) requires that the verdict itself be recorded in the court’s 
journal” and that “without the journalization of this information, there is no 
judgment of conviction * * * and therefore, no final appealable order.” 
{¶ 3} Attached to McDougald’s complaint was a page that appears to have 
been printed from the Scioto County Clerk of Courts’ website.  The printout shows 
a docket entry dated April 30, 2007.  The docket entry states the prison terms 
imposed for four criminal counts (i.e., possession of drugs, trafficking in drugs, 
possessing criminal tools, and possessing a weapon while under a disability), which 
were to be served consecutively for a total of 20 years’ imprisonment. 
{¶ 4} Judge Kuhn moved to dismiss McDougald’s complaint.  He argued 
that McDougald was not entitled to a writ of procedendo because Judge Kuhn had 
recused himself and therefore “did not have a clear legal duty to proceed to 
judgment in this matter.”  Judge Kuhn also argued that McDougald is not entitled 
to a writ of procedendo because a motion to journalize the court’s decision, filed 
by McDougald on March 6, 2019, had already been denied by a substitute judge.  
See State ex rel. Daniels v. Russo, 156 Ohio St.3d 143, 2018-Ohio-5194, 123 
N.E.3d 1011, ¶ 9-12 (noting that an appeal lies from the denial of a motion for a 
judgment entry that complies with Crim.R. 32, precluding extraordinary relief in 
mandamus or procedendo). 
{¶ 5} The Fourth District sua sponte converted Judge Kuhn’s motion to 
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and permitted McDougald to file 
evidence in opposition.  McDougald did not submit evidence but filed a brief in 
January Term, 2020 
 
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opposition to summary judgment.  He argued that Judge Kuhn’s recusal did not 
preclude a writ of procedendo and that Judge Kuhn’s evidence showed that the 
motion denied by the substitute judge was not McDougald’s motion to journalize. 
{¶ 6} The Fourth District dismissed McDougald’s complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction.  The court examined the allegedly defective 2007 judgment entry1 and 
observed that it contained (1) a statement that a jury had found McDougald guilty 
of four felony counts, (2) the sentence imposed for each of the four counts, totaling 
20 years in prison, (3) the imposition of postrelease control, (4) the signature of 
Judge Kuhn’s predecessor, Judge William T. Marshall, and (5) a time stamp 
indicating the date of journalization.  The Fourth District therefore found that 
McDougald’s judgment of conviction contained all the elements required for a 
final, appealable order under Crim.R. 32(C) and State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 
303, 2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142.  Accordingly, the court concluded that it 
“lack[ed] jurisdiction” to grant McDougald’s requested relief in procedendo and 
dismissed his petition. 
{¶ 7} McDougald has appealed to this court as of right. 
McDougald’s Motions 
{¶ 8} McDougald has filed a motion to amend his merit brief, seeking to 
add an argument that Judge Kuhn’s recusal does not bar relief in procedendo.  He 
argues that Judge Kuhn recused himself after McDougald filed this action and “for 
the purpose of avoiding his duties to render a judgment.”  McDougald’s motion is 
unopposed. 
{¶ 9} We grant the motion to amend.  There is no prejudice to Judge Kuhn, 
because he had the opportunity to address McDougald’s amended argument in his 
merit brief.  Moreover, the additional argument does not add a new issue to this 
                                                 
1.  Neither party submitted the April 30, 2007 judgment entry as summary-judgment evidence.  The 
Fourth District considered it because McDougald alleged it to be defective in his procedendo 
complaint.  McDougald does not challenge the Fourth District’s consideration of the judgment entry. 
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appeal, because McDougald raised the issue of Judge Kuhn’s late recusal in his 
brief opposing summary judgment in the Fourth District. 
{¶ 10} McDougald has also filed a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on 
the pleadings and a Civ.R. 55 motion for default judgment in this appeal.  In both 
motions, McDougald contends that he is entitled to a judgment in his favor because 
Judge Kuhn has not filed a merit brief in this appeal.  We deny those motions 
because neither Civ.R. 12(C) nor Civ.R. 55 applies to proceedings on appeal.  See 
Civ.R. 1(C); see also S.Ct.Prac.R. 6.01 et seq. (rules of practice for appeals of right 
in this court).  In any event, McDougald is incorrect, because Judge Kuhn timely 
filed a merit brief in this case. 
Writ of Procedendo 
{¶ 11} A writ of procedendo is proper when a court has either refused to 
enter a judgment or unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment.  State ex rel. 
Culgan v. Collier, 135 Ohio St.3d 436, 2013-Ohio-1762, 988 N.E.2d 564, ¶ 7.  For 
a writ of procedendo to issue, McDougald must show a clear legal right to require 
Judge Kuhn to proceed, a clear legal duty on Judge Kuhn’s part to proceed, and the 
lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  Id. 
{¶ 12} The Fourth District dismissed McDougald’s petition based on its 
purported lack of jurisdiction over McDougald’s original action in procedendo.  
The Fourth District’s stated reason for the dismissal, however, conflates the merits 
of McDougald’s petition with the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.  A court of 
appeals has original jurisdiction in procedendo.  Article IV, Section 3(B)(1)(e), 
Ohio Constitution.  The Fourth District’s determination that McDougald’s April 
30, 2007 judgment of conviction was a final, appealable order did not divest the 
court of jurisdiction over McDougald’s complaint; rather, it was a merits 
determination that McDougald is not entitled to relief in procedendo. 
{¶ 13} This court will not, however, reverse a correct judgment simply 
because it is based on an erroneous rationale.  State ex rel. Miller v. Bower, 156 
January Term, 2020 
 
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Ohio St.3d 455, 2019-Ohio-1623, 129 N.E.3d 389, ¶ 14.  And in this case, the 
dismissal of McDougald’s petition was appropriate because he failed to show a 
clear legal right to relief in procedendo. 
{¶ 14} Judge Kuhn does not raise his recusal as a bar to McDougald’s action 
against him.  Rather, Judge Kuhn argues that his predecessor, Judge Marshall, 
entered a final, appealable order of conviction on April 30, 2007.  Citing the 
judgment entry of conviction, on which the Fourth District also relied, Judge Kuhn 
argues that all the elements required by Crim.R. 32(C) and Lester were present. 
{¶ 15} McDougald’s merit brief does not dispute the contents of the trial 
court’s judgment entry journalized on April 30, 2007.  Instead, he directs our 
attention to a page from the trial court’s docket in his criminal case.  The docket 
text for an entry dated April 30, 2007, recites the prison terms to which McDougald 
was sentenced for four criminal offenses.  Relying on this docket entry, McDougald 
contends that the trial court failed to journalize the jury verdict in his judgment of 
conviction, rendering the entry defective under Crim.R. 32(C) and not a final, 
appealable order. 
{¶ 16} McDougald is mistaken, however, because he has confused the trial 
court’s journalization of its judgment with its notation on the docket.  The trial 
court’s docket of journal entries, upon which McDougald relies, is not the 
equivalent of journalization.  State ex rel. Norris v. Wainwright, 158 Ohio St.3d 20, 
2019-Ohio-4138, 139 N.E.3d 867, ¶ 19.  Journalization is documented by the trial-
court judge’s signature and the stamp of the clerk of courts.  Id.  Thus, journal 
entries signed by the trial-court judge and stamped by the clerk of courts are what 
control, not the references to them contained on the court’s docket.  Id.; see also 
State ex rel. Hopson v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 135 Ohio St.3d 
456, 2013-Ohio-1911, 989 N.E.2d 49, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 17} The Fourth District determined that the judgment entry of conviction 
dated April 30, 2007, and signed by Judge Marshall contained all the elements 
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required by Crim.R. 32(C) and Lester to be a final, appealable order.  McDougald 
does not dispute the contents of the judgment entry and therefore has failed to show 
a clear legal right to relief in procedendo.  See State ex rel. Howard v. Doneghy, 
102 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-3207, 810 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 6 (writ of procedendo will 
not issue to compel performance of a duty the court has already performed).  The 
dismissal of McDougald’s complaint was therefore appropriate. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
 
Jerone McDougald, pro se. 
 
Shane A. Tieman, Scioto County Prosecuting Attorney, and Danielle M. 
Parker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
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