Case Title: Church of God in N. Ohio, Inc. v. Levin

Citation: 2009-Ohio-5939

Docket Number: 20082462

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Church of God in N. Ohio, Inc. v. Levin, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5939.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5939 
CHURCH OF GOD IN NORTHERN OHIO, INC., APPELLANT, v. LEVIN,  
TAX COMMR., APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Church of God in N. Ohio, Inc. v. Levin,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5939.] 
Real property taxation — Exemptions — R.C. 5709.12 — Use of office building 
for administrative support of public worship not qualifying as charitable 
use. 
(No. 2008-2462 — Submitted August 25, 2009 — Decided November 18, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2007-N-102. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant, Church of God in Northern Ohio, Inc. (“COGNO”), 
appeals from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) that affirmed the 
Tax Commissioner’s denial of COGNO’s application to exempt from taxation a 
parcel of real property in Summit County.  The parcel is improved with an office 
building of between 11,000 and 12,000 square feet constructed in 2000-2001.  
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The Tax Commissioner denied the exemption on the principal ground that the 
“property is being used for purposes that are merely supportive of public 
worship.”  On appeal, the BTA affirmed the commissioner’s denial of the 
exemption. 
{¶ 2} Before this court, COGNO renews its argument that the “building 
is purely an administrative office building used by regional church officials to 
oversee and assist its member congregations,” and it characterizes the member 
congregations as carrying out “charitable purposes.” We disagree, and we 
therefore affirm the decision of the BTA. 
Facts 
{¶ 3} On November 14, 2003, COGNO filed an exemption application 
for its Summit County office building that sought exemption from real property 
taxation for tax year 2003 and remission of taxes for tax year 2002.  The 
application cited R.C. 5709.12 as the statutory basis for exemption and 
characterized the use of the property as “State Executive Offices and Ministry 
Training Center” and as “Office and support staff for Administrative Bishop, who 
oversees 121 congregations from I-70 north to Lake Erie.”  According to the 
application, the building contained “[c]onference rooms and classrooms used for 
church leadership meetings and ministerial teaching and training.”  Also in the 
building were offices for “Youth and Christian Education, Women’s Ministries,” 
and “Evangelism and Home Missions.”  The application summed up the use of 
the property as “[f]acilitating the proclamation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ and 
supporting public worship.” 
{¶ 4} By entry dated December 8, 2006, the Tax Commissioner denied 
the application.  Relying on Christian Church of Ohio v. Limbach (1990), 53 Ohio 
St.3d 270, 271, 560 N.E.2d 199, the commissioner found that the property was 
being used “for purposes that are merely supportive of public worship” and 
therefore did not qualify for exemption under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2).  Although 
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acknowledging that COGNO’s application invoked R.C. 5709.12 rather than 
5709.07, the commissioner ruled that under either statute, “property used as the 
administrative headquarters for a church or congregation is taxable.” 
{¶ 5} COGNO appealed to the BTA.  Its notice of appeal identifies as 
the sole issue “whether or not the property is being used exclusively for charitable 
purposes”; completely absent is any assertion that COGNO should enjoy 
exemption by virtue of qualifying itself as a “charitable institution” pursuant to 
R.C. 5709.121. 
{¶ 6} At the BTA hearing, COGNO presented the testimony of John D. 
Childers, who identified himself as an “ordained bishop” and the “administrative 
bishop” for COGNO.  In that capacity, Childers oversees the activities within the 
northern Ohio region, which had 126 churches with pastors and seven mission 
churches that were not yet fully operating.  Childers characterized himself as 
“responsible for the spiritual well being, the growth, the oversight of all the 
ministries in Northern Ohio.”  Childers supervises a staff of administrators:  a 
director of youth and Christian education, a coordinator for girls’ clubs, and an 
administrator for women’s ministries.  Also working on site are five support staff 
members:  two administrative assistants, a production coordinator, an office 
director, and a receptionist. 
{¶ 7} According to Childers, the regional office engages in the following 
activities: 
{¶ 8} ● Prepares materials regarding prayer that it sends out to the local 
churches, 
{¶ 9} ● Transmits information regarding worship from the international 
organization to the local churches, 
{¶ 10} ● Facilitates participation of local congregations in global 
outreach programs, 
{¶ 11} ● Helps start new churches within the region, 
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{¶ 12} ● Hosts pastoral covenant meetings as continuing education and 
development for local pastors, 
{¶ 13} ● Arranges donations and services among churches in the region. 
{¶ 14} COGNO funds its operations with a prescribed portion of the tithes 
collected by the local churches.  COGNO acquired the parcel at issue in 1997, 
demolished a previously existing house, and built the current office building, 
which opened for business in 2002. 
{¶ 15} The BTA analyzed the record and concluded that the primary use 
of the offices was administrative and corporate in nature, with church 
administration activities predominating such as “employee and church member 
training, board of director’s meetings, employee oversight, treasury duties, 
secretarial support, and training support.”  Church of God in N. Ohio, Inc. v. 
Wilkins (Nov. 25, 2008), BTA No. 2007-N-102, at 11.  The BTA affirmed the Tax 
Commissioner’s denial of the exemption, and we now affirm the decision of the 
BTA. 
Analysis 
{¶ 16} COGNO seeks a real property tax exemption for a building 
primarily used to provide administrative support to the local churches of its 
denomination.  Two tax exemptions are pertinent to the analysis of this appeal 
even though only one is claimed.  R.C. 5709.07(A)(2) exempts “[h]ouses used 
exclusively for public worship, the books and furniture in them, and the ground 
attached to them that is not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit and that 
is necessary for their proper occupancy.”  R.C. 5709.12(B) exempts “[r]eal and 
tangible personal property belonging to institutions that is used exclusively for 
charitable purposes.” 
{¶ 17} We have held that a religious denomination’s regional 
headquarters does not qualify for exemption under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2), because 
that exemption extends only to property that “facilitates the public worship 
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occurring on the premises.”  (Emphasis added.) Christian Church of Ohio v. 
Limbach (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 270, 271, 560 N.E.2d 199.  By contrast, where an 
institution that engages in charitable activity has sought to exempt its 
administrative offices, we have typically recognized a charitable exemption for 
those offices even if it appears that some portion of the institution’s charitable 
activity takes place off premises.  See Community Health Professionals, Inc. v. 
Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 432, 2007-Ohio-2336, 866 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 2–4, 23 
(charitable institution that provides home healthcare could exempt its 
administrative offices consistently with R.C. 5709.121); Girl Scouts–Great Trail 
Council v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 24, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493, ¶ 2 
(recognizing an exemption for a building containing regional administrative 
offices of the Girl Scouts); Herb Soc. of Am., Inc. v. Tracy (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 
374, 376, 643 N.E.2d 1132 (organizational headquarters of a society engaged in 
charitable diffusion of knowledge to the public constituted the exempt offices of a 
charitable institution). 
{¶ 18} In order to avoid the more limited scope of the public-worship 
exemption, COGNO seeks exemption solely under R.C. 5709.12(B).  The Tax 
Commissioner made a finding that COGNO’s use of the property at issue was 
“supportive of public worship,” a finding that COGNO did not contest and that 
the record supports.  In that context, the commissioner stated that “[w]hether the 
applicant seeks exemption pursuant to R.C. 5709.07 or R.C. 5709.12, property 
used as the administrative headquarters for a church or congregation is taxable.” 
{¶ 19} For its part, the BTA analyzed COGNO’s claim in terms of the 
“administrative and corporate function” exercised by COGNO on the property, as 
established by the evidence.  The BTA held that the predominance of that 
function in support of church-related activity defeated the claim of exclusive 
charitable use. 
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{¶ 20} As discussed, COGNO contests this determination by pointing to 
cases that appear to recognize a broader exemption for the administrative 
activities associated with charitable purposes.  Relying on those cases, COGNO 
argues that its “building is purely an administrative office building used by 
regional church officials to oversee and assist its member congregations in 
carrying out their charitable purposes.” 
{¶ 21} We agree with COGNO that its claim constitutes the type of claim 
that the court did not reach in Christian Church, 53 Ohio St.3d 270, 560 N.E.2d 
199.  In that case, we specifically noted that only the claim of exemption under 
R.C. 5709.07, not the claim under R.C. 5709.12, was before us.  Id. at 271, fn. 1.  
We also concur in the view that the predominance of administrative activity does 
not by itself defeat a claim of exemption under R.C. 5709.12(B), if the activity is 
ancillary to charitable endeavors. 
{¶ 22} Nonetheless, our review of the statutes and the pertinent case law 
persuades us that the commissioner and the BTA properly denied the exemption 
because, contrary to COGNO’s assertion, neither the activities conducted at the 
site nor the public worship conducted by the member congregations constitutes 
charitable activity. 
COGNO’s primary use of its property does not fall 
within the recognized categories of charitable use 
{¶ 23} In its second proposition of law, COGNO characterizes itself as an 
“institution using its real property exclusively for the lawful advancement of 
religion.”   As such, COGNO believes that its use of the property satisfies the two 
prerequisites for exemption under R.C. 5709.12(B). 1  Highland Park Owners, 
                                                 
1.  The BTA held that it had no jurisdiction to consider a claim of exemption under R.C. 5709.121 
because the notice of appeal COGNO filed at the BTA did not specify error in that regard.  Church 
of God in N, Ohio, Inc. v. Wilkins (Nov. 25, 2008), BTA No. 2007-N-102, at 6, fn. 1.  We agree 
with the BTA’s holding, and accordingly COGNO’s claim of any expanded exemption under the 
provisions of R.C. 5709.121 is jurisdictionally barred.  But the jurisdictional bar is immaterial to 
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Inc. v. Tracy (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 405, 406-407, 644 N.E.2d 284 (“to grant 
exemption under R.C. 5709.12, the arbiter must determine that (1) the property 
belongs to an institution, and (2) the property is being used exclusively for 
charitable purposes”).  No one disputes that COGNO can qualify as an institution 
that owns the property at issue.  As a result, we must determine whether COGNO 
can qualify its use of the property as charitable use. 
{¶ 24} Because the statutes do not define charity or charitable use, our 
case law has supplied the deficiency.  Charity, we have held, “is the attempt in 
good faith, spiritually, physically, intellectually, socially and economically to 
advance and benefit mankind in general, or those in need of advancement and 
benefit in particular, without regard to their ability to supply that need from other 
sources, and without hope or expectation, if not with positive abnegation, of gain 
or profit by the donor or by the instrumentality of the charity.”  Planned 
Parenthood Assn. v. Tax Commr. (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 117, 34 O.O.2d 251, 214 
N.E.2d 222, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 25} We have recognized specific activities as constituting charitable 
ones in the proper context.  Thus, the provision of medical or ancillary healthcare 
services qualifies as charitable if those services are provided on a nonprofit basis 
to those in need, without regard to race, creed, or ability to pay.  Vick v. Cleveland 
Memorial Med. Found. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 30, 31 O.O.2d 16, 206 N.E.2d 2, 
paragraph two of the syllabus; cf. White Cross Hosp. Assn. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals 
(1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 199, 201, 67 O.O.2d 224, 311 N.E.2d 862 (private medical 
offices adjoining hospital on hospital’s property did not share hospital’s tax 
exemption).  Also, the nonprofit provision of educational services constitutes 
                                                                                                                                     
the gravamen of COGNO’s appeal; indeed, COGNO cites cases that address R.C. 5709.121 
primarily to establish that its use of the property is charitable, not to establish that COGNO itself 
is a charitable institution.  See True Christianity Evangelism v. Tracy (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 48, 
51, 716 N.E.2d 1154 (if an institution is religious and not charitable, its claim of exemption must 
be considered under R.C. 5709.12(B) in terms of its use of the property). 
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charitable activity in a proper case.  See Gerke v. Purcell (1874), 25 Ohio St. 229, 
paragraph four of the syllabus (charity includes “endowments for the 
advancement of learning, or institutions for the encouragement of science and 
art”); Cleveland Bible College v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1949), 151 Ohio St. 258, 39 
O.O. 70, 85 N.E.2d 284; Cincinnati Community Kollel v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 
138, 2007-Ohio-1249, 863 N.E.2d 147, ¶ 15, 16 (institution that taught religious 
doctrine to students qualified as “educational institution” for purposes of  R.C. 
5709.121). 
{¶ 26} Similarly, disseminating useful information without expectation of 
profit may also qualify as charitable.  Herb Soc., 71 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 643 
N.E.2d 1132 (“The dissemination of useful information to benefit mankind is, 
traditionally, charity”); Battelle Mem. Inst. v. Dunn (1947), 148 Ohio St. 53, 60, 
35 O.O. 9, 73 N.E.2d 88.  The latter category encompasses the dissemination of 
distinctly religious messages to a general public, where the activity has been 
instigated for spiritual improvement and without expectation of profit.  True 
Christianity Evangelism v. Zaino (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 117, 119-120, 742 N.E.2d 
638. 
{¶ 27} COGNO argues generally that its activities fall within the 
definition of charity.  In making this contention, COGNO focuses on certain 
pastoral educational activities at the property and emphasizes the extent to which 
its religious activity involves the proclamation of the Gospel to the world.  
COGNO seeks support from the court’s pronouncement that “an institution used 
exclusively for the lawful advancement of education and of religion is an 
institution used exclusively for charitable purposes.”  Am. Commt. of Rabbinical 
College of Telshe, Inc. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1951), 156 Ohio St. 376, 46 O.O. 
217, 102 N.E.2d 589, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 28} But this argument fails because the character of the property’s use 
must be determined in light of its primary use, not secondary or ancillary 
January Term, 2009 
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activities.  True Christianity, 91 Ohio St.3d 117, 120-121, 742 N.E.2d 638.  In 
this case the record leaves no doubt about primary use.  COGNO itself stated in 
its exemption application that the property is used by “[o]ffice and support staff 
for Administrative Bishop, who oversees 121 congregations from I-70 north to 
Lake Erie, including 400 ordained ministers and 27,000+ parishioners,” a use 
properly characterized as “supporting public worship.”  Again, in its brief, 
COGNO states that the property consists of a building that is “purely an 
administrative office building used by regional church officials to oversee and 
assist its member congregations.”  These averments cannot be reconciled with a 
primary use that would bring the property at issue within the ambit of those cases 
in which a formal, degree-granting school was being operated on the property. 
{¶ 29} COGNO’s reliance on our holding in True Christianity Evangelism 
is also mistaken.  In that case, the BTA found that the primary use of a house was 
“an evangelistic one” involving the dissemination of literature and the posting of 
messages that urged readers to abide by spiritual and moral precepts.  True 
Christianity Evangelism v. Tracy (Sept. 25, 1998), BTA No. 96-K-904, 1998 WL 
683022, at 2; True Christianity Evangelism v. Tracy (Jan. 14, 2000), BTA No. 96-
K-904, 2000 WL 31781, at 3, 5.  Based upon this finding, we concluded that the 
property qualified for exemption inasmuch as the provision of spiritual 
enlightenment to the public without monetary charge fell within the Planned 
Parenthood definition of charity.  True Christianity, 91 Ohio St.3d at 120, 742 
N.E.2d 638.  Accord  Am. Humanist Assn., Inc. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1963), 174 
Ohio St. 545, 23 O.O.2d 210, 190 N.E.2d 685 (headquarters of organization 
devoted to publishing literature concerning human progress, values, and welfare 
held exempt). 
{¶ 30} COGNO attempts to equate its own situation with that involved in 
True Christianity Evangelism by characterizing its “charitable purpose” as “the 
spread of a religious message.”  But as discussed, the BTA correctly found that as 
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its primary use of the property, COGNO engaged in administrative and corporate 
activities in support of public worship.  Church of God in N. Ohio, BTA No. 
2007-N-102, at 11.  Quite simply, the use of the property at issue in True 
Christianity involved no direct connection with public worship.  The doctrine of 
True Christianity therefore does not apply to the present case. 
{¶ 31} Because COGNO’s primary use of the property involves activities 
that support worship at the local level, COGNO can prevail only by establishing a 
stronger form of its argument:  it must rely on the proposition that the public 
worship conducted at the local churches can itself be viewed as constituting 
charitable activity.  We now address that contention. 
Public worship does not per se constitute charitable activity 
{¶ 32} In spite of its apparent breadth, the definition of charity does not 
encompass public worship.  We have defined public worship as the “open and 
free celebration or observance of the rites and ordinances of a religious 
organization.”  Faith Fellowship Ministries, Inc. v. Limbach (1987), 32 Ohio 
St.3d 432, 513 N.E.2d 1340, paragraph one of the syllabus.  As discussed, charity 
involves the provision of goods or services or knowledge “to advance and benefit 
mankind in general, or those in need of advancement and benefit in particular”; in 
other words, charity looks outward toward a general and indefinite public that the 
institution will serve.  Planned Parenthood, 5 Ohio St.2d 117, 34 O.O.2d 251, 
214 N.E.2d 222, paragraph one of the syllabus.  Although a religious 
congregation may welcome all to join in the “celebration or observance” of its 
“rites and ordinances,”  and although that activity confers a spiritual benefit on its 
participants, the worship of any particular church, synagogue, mosque, or other 
temple will typically share a characteristic with fraternal associations:  it 
inevitably focuses on serving the spiritual needs of those participants who are 
already to a greater or lesser degree members of the congregation, or at least of 
the larger denomination.  See Olmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Tracy (1997), 77 Ohio 
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St.3d 393, 397, 674 N.E.2d 690 (organization’s activities that primarily benefit 
members rather than general public do not qualify as charitable).  And while 
worship often encourages its participants to engage in other distinctly charitable 
activities as part of the spiritual benefit that it confers, that does not establish that 
the worship service itself constitutes charitable activity. 
{¶ 33} Our determination that public worship does not fall within the 
definition of charity comports with the constitutional and statutory provisions that 
control property-tax exemption, as well as the case law that applies those 
provisions.  Both the Ohio Constitution and the exemption statutes have long 
distinguished between exempting public worship and exempting charitable use.  
The Constitution of 1851 instituted provisions for taxation at Article XII, and 
Section 2 of that article enumerated several appropriate subjects for exemption, 
listing as separate items “houses used exclusively for public worship” and 
“institutions of purely public charity.”  In its current form, Section 2 of Article 
XII lists “houses used exclusively for public worship” and “institutions used 
exclusively for charitable purposes.”  By adopting these provisions as part of their 
constitution, the people of Ohio have explicitly recognized two equally noble and 
socially important endeavors as the bases for separate exemptions from property 
taxation. 
{¶ 34} The statutes have mirrored the constitutional distinction, creating 
separate exemptions.  In their current form, the statutes on the one hand exempt 
“[h]ouses used exclusively for public worship, the books and furniture in them, 
and the ground attached to them that is not leased or otherwise used with a view 
to profit and that is necessary for their proper occupancy, use and enjoyment” at  
R.C. 5709.07(A)(2), while on the other hand exempting “[r]eal and tangible 
personal property belonging to institutions that is used exclusively for charitable 
purposes” at R.C. 5709.12(B). 
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{¶ 35} As already discussed, the proper analysis of the issue in this case 
requires us to recognize the scope and limitation of the public-worship exemption 
at R.C. 5709.07(A)(2).  Our cases have recognized and effectuated the limited 
character of that exemption, holding that to qualify under that provision property 
“must be used in a principal, primary, and essential way to facilitate the public 
worship” and that accordingly “uses which are merely supportive of public 
worship may not be exempted.”  Faith Fellowship Ministries, 32 Ohio St.3d 432, 
436, 436, 513 N.E.2d 1340, and paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 36} The constitutional and statutory provisions just cited refute 
COGNO’s contention that public worship may be equated with a charitable 
dissemination of religious information or viewed as equivalent to the charitable 
provision of spiritual edification to mankind in general.  First, if COGNO’s theory 
were correct, there would as a general matter be no need for a separate exemption 
for houses of public worship, because such buildings would already be exempt as 
“real property used exclusively for charitable purposes.”  The second point is a 
corollary to the first:  if public worship constituted a charitable use, then the 
limited scope the legislature prescribed for the exemption of houses of public 
worship could be avoided simply by claiming exemption under the charitable-use 
statute rather than the house-of-public-worship provision itself.  Taken together, 
these circumstances would amount to a violation of the precept that we should 
construe statutes to give effect to all the enacted language.  See R.C. 1.47(B); 
State ex rel. Bohan v. Indus. Comm. (1946), 147 Ohio St. 249, 251, 34 O.O. 151, 
70 N.E.2d 888 (recognizing the “duty of courts to accord meaning to each word of 
a leglislative [sic] enactment if it is reasonably possible so to do”).  Indeed, we 
have recognized a general principle that a property owner may not evade the 
limitations imposed with respect to a specific tax exemption by claiming 
exemption under a broad reading of other exemption statutes.  Rickenbacker Port 
Auth. v. Limbach (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 628, 631-632, 597 N.E.2d 494. 
January Term, 2009 
13 
 
{¶ 37} Also supportive of this conclusion is the reasoning in Watterson v. 
Halliday (1907), 77 Ohio St. 150, 82 N.E. 962.  That case addressed a claim of 
exemption for parish houses adjunct to their respective churches, in which the 
priests both resided and performed many church-related activities that included 
explicitly administrative functions.  Id. at 164-165, 171.  One theory advanced in 
support of exemption was that the religious denomination constituted an 
“institution[ ] of purely public charity” under the former statutory language.  91 
Ohio Laws 216.  The court rejected that claim in part because the denomination as 
an institution had as its “chief and primary object and purpose the teaching and 
extending of its recognized form of religious belief and worship into all parts of 
the world.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 179.  Because the chief and primary object of 
the religious denomination lay in promoting a particular “form of religious belief 
and worship,” it could not qualify as an institution of “purely” public charity, in 
spite of its many undoubtedly charitable endeavors. The necessary but unstated 
premise of that decision is that the activity of public worship by itself does not 
constitute a charitable activity, and that premise militates against COGNO’s 
argument in the present case.  Accord Hubbard Press v. Tracy (1993), 67 Ohio 
St.3d 564, 566, 621 N.E.2d 396 (nonprofit use of property exclusively to print 
items for use by local church congregations did not constitute charitable use of the 
property). 
{¶ 38} In this context, it is important to state the limits of our holding.  
Our disposition of this appeal in no way implies that an institution such as 
COGNO may not obtain an exemption for property when it proves that its use of 
the property actually constitutes charitable use.  If, for example, COGNO 
purchased a separate parcel on which it operated, as a primary use, a soup kitchen, 
or on which it distributed (again, as a primary use) clothing to the poor, COGNO 
would stand on equal footing with any other institution in applying to exempt the 
property devoted to those purposes.  See True Christianity Evangelism v. Tracy 
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(1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 48, 51, 716 N.E.2d 1154.  Our holding in this case is 
limited to property primarily used to support public worship that is conducted at 
other locations by local congregations:  we hold that such use does not by itself 
constitute a charitable use of real property. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 39} In light of the foregoing analysis, the Tax Commissioner correctly 
determined that whether an applicant “seeks exemption pursuant to R.C. 5709.07 
or R.C. 5709.12, property used as the administrative headquarters for a church or 
congregation is taxable.” It follows that the commissioner properly denied the 
exemption and that the BTA acted in accordance with the law when it affirmed 
that denial.  We therefore affirm the BTA’s decision. 
Decision affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 40} I believe that the Church of God in Northern Ohio (“COG”) uses 
its property exclusively for the charitable purposes of providing public worship 
and community programs and is therefore exempt from taxation under R.C. 
5709.12(B).  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 41} Under R.C. 5709.12, property is exempt from taxation if “(1) the 
property belongs to an institution, and (2) the property is being used exclusively 
for charitable purposes.”  Highland Park Owners, Inc. v. Tracy (1994), 71 Ohio 
St.3d 405, 406-407, 644 N.E.2d 284.  It is undisputed that COG is an institution.  
The question here is whether COG uses the property exclusively for charitable 
purposes. 
Property used for administrative support of off-premises 
charitable activities qualifies for a charitable tax exemption 
January Term, 2009 
15 
 
{¶ 42} In determining whether a property qualifies for a charitable-use tax 
exemption, the analysis usually involves examining the use of the property that 
the applicant seeks to exempt from taxation.  See Case W. Res. Univ. v. Wilkins, 
105 Ohio St.3d 276, 825 N.E.2d 146 (property leased by a college to a private 
sorority to house only sorority members was not exempt from taxation, because 
the use was not an educational use under R.C. 5709.121(A)(2)).  However, on 
several occasions this court has recognized that property used by an institution for 
administrative support of off-premises charitable activities qualifies for a 
charitable exemption.  Girl Scouts–Great Trail Council v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 
24, 2007-Ohio-972, 862 N.E.2d 493 (use of Girl Scouts’ administrative building 
to support scouting activities constituted charitable use); Community Health 
Professionals v. Levin, 113 Ohio St.3d 432, 2007-Ohio-2336, 866 N.E.2d 478 
(use of an administrative building by a nonprofit company to manage and support 
subsidized in-home care constituted chartable use); Herb Soc. of Am., Inc. v. 
Tracy (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 643 N.E.2d 1132 (the Herb Society 
sponsored numerous charitable activities that occurred off the premises, including 
organizing and conducting local symposiums and maintaining herb gardens 
throughout the United States). 
{¶ 43} In the instant case, the BTA determined that “[a]s appellant is a 
church, all of its support functions will necessarily be related to religion and the 
promotion of religion.”  Church of God in N. Ohio, Inc. v. Wilkins (Nov. 25, 
2008), BTA No. 2007-N-102, at 11.  Thus, the question becomes whether the 
activities performed in COG’s churches constitute charitable activities. 
Preparation and dissemination of a religious message is a 
charitable activity 
{¶ 44} We have held, “ ‘[C]harity,’ in the legal sense, is the attempt in 
good faith, spiritually, physically, intellectually, socially and economically to 
advance and benefit mankind in general, or those in need of advancement and 
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benefit in particular, without regard to their ability to supply that need from other 
sources, and without hope or expectation, if not with positive abnegation, of gain 
or profit by the donor or by the instrumentality of the charity.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
Planned Parenthood Assn. of Columbus, Inc. v. Tax Commr. (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 
117, 34 O.O.2d 251, 214 N.E.2d 222, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 45} In True Christianity Evangelism v. Zaino (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 
117, 742 N.E.2d 638, a religious organization sought a tax exemption under R.C. 
5709.12(B) for a house that it used to prepare and disseminate religious materials.  
Jeffery Botzko, the organization’s president, testified: 
{¶ 46} “ ‘My goal is to inspire, enthuse, or to badger people into actually 
reading the Bible and finding out what it says and living up to its standards.  Or 
even apart from that, just encourage them to seek the highest moral standards they 
can from whatever source they will accept. Like I tried to encourage people who 
believe in the Koran to find the best moral standards in it and see if there is higher 
things in the Bible that you can go above what the Koran says. 
{¶ 47} “ ‘I try to promote true Christianity, but if I can't do that, I still try 
to promote the best moral standards part.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 119. 
{¶ 48} The BTA in True Christianity Evangelism found that the primary 
use of the property was “(1) ‘an evangelistic one’ and (2) for ‘the preparation and 
dissemination of a religious message.’ ”  Id.  We held: “The information 
disseminated by appellant attempts to encourage people to read the Bible and to 
live up to its moral standards.  These efforts are a good-faith attempt to 
disseminate information to spiritually advance and benefit mankind in general.  
Under the definition of charity followed by this court, appellant’s activities 
constitute charitable purposes.”  Id. at 120.  Thus, we held that appellant’s 
property was exempt from taxation under R.C. 5709.12(B). 
{¶ 49} In the instant case, the COG uses its churches for worship and to 
promote certain outreach programs.  I believe that these activities and the 
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activities in True Christianity Evangelism are similar both in substance and in 
purpose.  In both, the applicant prepares and disseminates a religious message.  
And both do so for the purpose of spreading the gospel.  Moreover, in the instant 
case, the outreach programs, such as the backpack program, provide assistance to 
needy children by providing them with backpacks and school supplies, which is a 
charitable activity.  Thus, I would hold that the activities undertaken in COG’s 
churches constitute charitable activities akin to those in True Christianity 
Evangelism. 
{¶ 50} The majority reasons that public worship is not per se a charitable 
activity in large part because worship reaches primarily church members and not 
the general public.  In so holding, the majority relies on Olmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. 
v. Tracy (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 393, 397, 674 N.E.2d 690, for the proposition that 
an “organization’s activities that primarily benefit members rather than general 
public do not qualify as charitable.” 
{¶ 51} In Olmsted Falls, the Donauschwaben German American Cultural 
Center (“Donauschwaben”) owned 20 acres of land, which contained a small lake, 
soccer fields, tennis courts, a picnic area, a playground, and several buildings, 
including a cultural center.  Id. at 393.  The cultural center contained a bar and 
lounge, an outdoor beer garden, a dance floor, a bowling alley, meeting rooms, 
etc.  Id.  Donauschwaben organized many groups including a soccer club, tennis 
club, band, ski club, bowlers’ club, etc.  Membership was limited to one thousand 
members and members had to pay dues. Id. at 393-394. 
{¶ 52} Donauschwaben sought an exemption for the property under R.C. 
5709.12 and 5709.121. Id. at 395.  The court held that Donauschwaben did not 
use the property exclusively for charitable purposes primarily for two reasons: (1) 
participation in Donauschwaben’s activities was limited to dues-paying members 
and (2) social and fraternal events such as dinners and carnivals are not charitable 
activities.  Id. at 397. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 53} I believe that Olmstead Falls Bd. of Edn. is distinguishable from 
the instant case because COG’s churches are open to the public and no one 
attending church is required to pay any dues or fees.  Further, COG’s churches are 
not social clubs but are places of worship in which to spread the gospel and are 
also used to provide outreach programs that assist the needy.  Finally, COG seeks 
to spread the gospel beyond the doors of existing churches.  The bishop for COG 
testified that the church wants “to reach as many people as we can with the gospel 
and the message.”  He stated that “[t]he local churches have an outreach 
mentality.”  “[W]e encourage our local constituents to be part of the global aspect, 
even though they are from a local standpoint, but from a global standpoint, to 
become involved in the world of evangelism.  We do have a very strong emphasis 
on that.”  The bishop stated, “[w]e continually are preparing and projecting where 
we want to plant churches in communities that will make an impact and a 
difference.  So we have an ongoing program of resources that we develop for 
that.” 
{¶ 54} Moreover, in Herb Soc. of Am., Inc. v. Tracy, we held: “So long as 
an institution is operated without any view to profit and exclusively for a 
charitable purpose, it is a charitable institution.  It need not be open generally to 
the public if it promotes the lawful advancement of the charitable purpose.”  71 
Ohio St.3d at 376, 643 N.E.2d 1132, citing Am. Commt. of Rabbinical College of 
Telshe, Inc. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals (1951), 156 Ohio St. 376, 46 O.O. 217, 102 
N.E.2d 589, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.  Even though membership in 
the Herb Society was not generally open to the public, the court nevertheless held 
that it was engaged in a charitable activity by tending herb gardens, lecturing, and 
distributing literature, sponsoring symposiums, and endowing research grants, 
which resulted in the betterment of mankind.  Id.  Similarly, even though the 
churches have members, their services are open to the public and result in the 
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betterment of mankind by spreading the gospel to the public and by providing 
assistance to the needy. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 55} I would hold that COG’s property plays an integral role in 
supporting the charitable activities of public worship and providing outreach 
programs within the congregation’s churches.  Consequently, I would hold that 
COG’s property is used exclusively for a charitable purpose, and therefore is 
exempt from taxation under R.C. 5709.12(B).  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Kennedy & Associates Co., L.P.A., David R. Kennedy, and Alan B. 
Forrest, for appellant. 
 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Ryan P. O’Rourke, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee. 
______________________