Case Title: State v. McCoy

Citation: 425 P.2d 874, 70 Wash. 2d 964

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1967-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
70 Wn.2d 964 (1967) 425 P.2d 874 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. SYLVESTER E. McCOY, Appellant.[*] No. 38851. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. March 31, 1967. *965 McGavick, Betzendorfer, Hemmen & Bottiger, by M.H. Hemmen (Appointed counsel for appeal.), for appellant. John G. McCutcheon and Gary Cronk, for respondent. OTT, J. October 2, 1965, Sylvester E. McCoy was injured in an automobile accident. He was taken in an unconscious condition to the Lakewood General Hospital by ambulance. At the hospital, while still in a state of unconsciousness, he was undressed by two nurses preparatory to his being examined. When one of his socks was removed, a package, which was later found to contain marajuana, fell to the floor. At the time of this incident, no physician or surgeon was present. The package was given to a state trooper who was investigating the accident. The prosecuting attorney for Pierce County charged Sylvester E. McCoy with the crime of unlawful possession of narcotics. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. From the judgment and sentence entered upon the jury's verdict, the defendant has appealed. Appellant's first assignment of error is that the court erred in permitting the nurses to testify relative to marijuana, contending that testimony of nurses, as well as physicians and surgeons, comes within the ban of the statute. RCW 5.60.060 provides in part: [1] RCW 10.58.010 provides: "The rules of evidence in civil actions, so far as practicable shall be applied to criminal prosecutions." In State v. Miller, 105 Wash. 475, 178 Pac. 459 (1919), this court held that the privilege can be invoked in criminal cases. [2] In State v. Fackrell, 44 Wn.2d 874, 877, 271 P.2d 679 (1954), we said: "The privilege is for the benefit of the *966 patient to the end that he will be encouraged to disclose his ailments to a physician so that they may be properly treated." [3] The nurses were not acting under the direction of any physician or surgeon. The patient had been brought by ambulance to the hospital emergency room. The nurses in the emergency room performed those services which were necessary to be performed on behalf of a person admitted through the emergency room of the hospital. In this regard, the nurse in charge testified that she checked Mr. McCoy's blood pressure, pulse and respiration and that she removed his clothes in order that the physician could examine him. As of the moment when the package was discovered, no physician or surgeon had yet been in attendance or had seen the patient. Therefore, the relationship of physician-patient had not yet been effected. Since the physician-patient relationship had not been accomplished, the ban of the statute does not here apply. Appellant's final assignment of error is, "the court erred in allowing admission of appellant's confession or admission by reason of its having been gained in violation of his constitutional rights under the state and federal constitutions." Pursuant to Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 101.20W, RCW vol. 0, the trial court conducted a hearing in the absence of the jury to determine the voluntariness of the appellant's alleged confession. Officer Ward Archer testified on behalf of the state at this hearing as follows: Appellant did not testify or offer any other evidence at this hearing. The court held that the confession was voluntarily given and admitted it in evidence. The signed confession stated, inter alia, that: *968 We conclude that the confession was voluntarily given. The appellant was fully advised of his constitutional rights including his right to remain silent at all times. The appellant relies upon Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966), contending that he was not advised of his right to have counsel present at the time he signed the confession. The undisputed testimony of Officer Archer and the signed admission set out in the italicized statement above conclusively establish appellant was fully advised of his constitutional rights. However, assuming arguendo the advice was inadequate, the rule of Miranda does not here apply. Subsequent to the announcement of the Miranda rule, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, 86 Sup. Ct. 1772 (1966), announced that the Miranda rule would apply prospectively as to trials commenced after June 13, 1966. The instant case was tried February 28, 1966, some 3 1/2 months before the rule in the Miranda case became prospectively effective. We conclude, therefore, that the rule in the Miranda case is not here apropos. Judgment is affirmed. FINLEY, C.J., HUNTER and HAMILTON, JJ., and BARNETT, J. Pro Tem., concur. [*] Reported in 425 P.2d 874.