Case Title: Flynn v. Kucharski

Citation: 319 N.E.2d 1, 59 Ill. 2d 61

Docket Number: 

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1974-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
59 Ill. 2d 61 (1974)
319 N.E.2d 1
THOMAS M. FLYNN et al.,
v.
EDMUND J. KUCHARSKI, County Treasurer, Appellant.  (William J. Harte et al., Appellees.)
No. 46513.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed September 27, 1974.
*62 Bernard Carey, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Sheldon Gardner, Deputy State's Attorney, and Henry A. Hauser, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for appellant.
James P. Chapman, of Chicago, for appellees.
Modified and affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE SCHAEFER delivered the opinion of the court:
The Appellate Court, First District, affirmed a judgment of the circuit court of Cook County which awarded William J. Harte and Kevin M. Forde, attorneys for the plaintiffs, $750,000 (Flynn v. Kucharski (1973), 16 Ill. App.3d 624), and we allowed the petition for leave to appeal filed by Bernard J. Korzen, Treasurer and ex-officio County Collector of Cook County.
The attorneys had represented the plaintiffs in a class action, brought on behalf of the taxpayers of the city of Chicago, challenging the constitutionality of the method of tax collection in effect in Cook County. The plaintiff taxpayers were required to pay their taxes to the county collector, whereas taxpayers living in that part of Cook County lying outside the city of Chicago had the option of paying their taxes to the county collector or to the township collector of the township in which their property was located. The basic dispute was thus described:
On December 15, 1969, the circuit court entered a decree declaring the method of tax collection unconstitutional insofar as it related to the commissions allowed to township collectors, and directing that until further order of the court all property taxes in Cook County be collected by the Cook County collector. On appeal that judgment was affirmed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Flynn v. Kucharski (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 211.
On remand the circuit court ordered that all funds which were in the possession or control of the townships or their officers on December 15, 1969, be disbursed to the trustee that had been appointed by the court, and directed that upon the approval of the trustee's report the court would entertain petitions for fees and costs and, after the deduction thereof, all funds in the possession or control of the trustee would then be disbursed to the Cook County collector and deposited in the corporate fund of Cook County. Upon appeal, this court affirmed this part of the judgment of the circuit court, but reversed another part of the judgment, which held that it was unnecessary to consider the reasonableness of the rate of commission charged by the Cook County collector, and remanded the cause to the circuit court. Flynn v. Kucharski (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 7.
Following this second remandment the township collectors filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, and an individual township collector filed a motion to dissolve the injunction which restrained the collectors from collecting taxes within their townships. The circuit court denied the motion, and dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. *64 This court affirmed. Flynn v. Kucharski (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 88.
On March 22, 1972, the plaintiffs filed a petition requesting the allowance of attorneys' fees, to which the Cook County treasurer objected. After a full evidentiary hearing, the circuit court allowed fees of $750,000 to the two attorneys for the plaintiffs. The appellate court affirmed that allowance, and, as has been stated, we granted leave to appeal.
The objector first contends that the trial court erred in allowing the payment of any attorneys' fees out of the funds held by the court-appointed trustee. To support this contention he relies heavily upon Hoffman v. Lehnhausen (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 323, and Rosemont Building Supply, Inc. v. Illinois Highway Trust Authority (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 126.
The Hoffman case involved two class actions challenging the validity of a provision of the Revenue Act which created a "homestead exemption" by way of a reduction in the assessed value of real property occupied as a residence by a person 65 years of age or older who was liable for the real esate taxes on the property. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. It also denied the motions of the plaintiffs' attorneys for an allowance of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. This court affirmed, saying:
The Rosemont case involved a class action seeking a declaratory judgment that the Illinois Highway Trust Authority Act was unconstitutional. The trial court sustained the Act, but on appeal it was held invalid. Thereafter the trial court awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $66,666.66 to the plaintiffs' attorneys, and ordered that the defendants, "in their respective capacities as elected officials of the State of Illinois jointly and severally," pay that sum to the plaintiffs' attorneys. We reversed that judgment, stating:
This case differs from Hoffman and Rosemont. Here the plaintiffs' basic attack was aimed at the asserted right of one group of taxpayers to divert a portion of the taxes levied by county-wide agencies to their own local governmental units, with the net result of reducing the taxes of that group of taxpayers. The taxes had been collected, and the dispute concerned the legality of the diversion. The attorneys for the plaintiffs established that the local *66 governmental units were not entitled to the disputed funds. We hold, therefore, that the attorneys are entitled to an allowance of fees.
In its memorandum opinion fixing the fee of the plaintiffs' attorneys at $750,000, the trial court said:
There is no doubt but that the issue involved in this litigation was novel and that the litigation was complex and difficult. The plaintiffs challenged a statute that had been in effect for more than 100 years. The case was vigorously, indeed bitterly, contested. The numerous efforts to defeat the objective of the litigation continued even after the basic issue was decided by this court in favor of the plaintiffs. The fee was entirely contingent. The trial court stated that as a result of the plaintiffs' action over $15 million has gone directly into the treasury of Cook County and that $5 million more is contained in a separate fund which, after the payment of fees, expenses and costs, will ultimately be deposited into the treasury of Cook County. About one half of the taxpayers in the county were represented by the plaintiffs' attorneys.
In a case of this kind the fee is not, as it is in the usual contingent-fee case, an amount that has been fixed by voluntary agreement between the client and his attorney. *67 Rather, it is an amount taken, by order of the court, from money that belongs to others. The rights of those others must be carefully considered as well as those of the attorneys. In our opinion the time expended in such a case is not to be relegated to a secondary or minor position; it is a highly significant factor in determining the fee. In this case the attorneys for the plaintiffs did not keep records of the amount of time they spent on this case. This failure to keep records greatly increases the difficulty in determining a proper fee. The fact that the attorneys, as they testified, prefer to work on a contingent basis rather than a per diem basis does not excuse their failure to keep adequate records.
The action was commenced in August of 1968 and the opinion of this court on the basic issue was filed on March 21, 1970. It was during that period that the work which was of primary benefit to the plaintiffs' class of taxpayers was performed. Subsequent efforts were largely devoted to ensuring the existence of a fund from which fees might be paid. The order awarding fees was entered on January 31, 1973. The testimony is that William J. Harte spent 3700 hours on this case during the entire 4 1/2-year period and Kevin M. Forde spent 3765 hours. From the testimony of the attorneys, as well as from the records of this and other courts, we know that this case was by no means the only matter that engaged the attention of these lawyers during the pendency of this case.
In our opinion the fee awarded in this case was unreasonably high and it should be substantially reduced. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court insofar as it awarded fees, but modify that judgment by reducing the amount of fees awarded to the sum of $560,000.
Judgment modified and affirmed.