Case Title: Medici v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 991389

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, and 
Kinser, JJ., and Stephenson, Senior Justice 
 
LAWRENCE P. MEDICI 
 
 
 
OPINION BY  
v.  Record No. 991389 
SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
 
 
 
June 9, 2000 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we determine whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in ruling that the trial court correctly (1) refused to 
strike for cause a prospective juror, (2) admitted into evidence 
the defendant's prior rape convictions in the guilt/innocence 
phase of his trial, and (3) refused to accept the defendant's 
stipulation that he had prior rape convictions. 
I 
 
A grand jury of the Circuit Court of Fairfax County 
indicted Lawrence P. Medici on four offenses.  Count I of the 
indictment charged that Medici "did rape [the victim], a second 
or subsequent offense."  Count II charged that Medici "did 
engage in cunninlingus with [the victim], against her will, by 
force, threat or intimidation, a second or subsequent offense."  
Count III charged that Medici "did engage in fellatio with [the 
victim], against her will, by force, threat or intimidation, a 
second or subsequent offense."  Count IV charged that Medici 
"did attempt to engage in anal sodomy with [the victim], against 
her will, by force, threat or intimidation." 
 
A jury found Medici guilty of each offense charged.  The 
jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment for each charge 
set forth in Counts I, II, and III of the indictment and 10 
years' imprisonment for the charge contained in Count IV of the 
indictment.  By order entered February 17, 1998, the trial court 
sentenced Medici in accordance with the jury's verdict. 
 
In an unpublished opinion dated May 25, 1999, the Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.  Lawrence P. Medici 
v. Commonwealth of Virginia, Record No. 0527-98-4.  We awarded 
Medici an appeal limited to the issues stated above.1
II 
 
A brief summary of the facts will suffice.  The eighteen-
year-old victim, a drug addict, was acquainted with Medici as 
her supplier of illicit drugs.  On May 21, 1997, Medici left a 
message on the victim's answering machine advising her that he 
had "an amazing amount of cocaine" and that she should come over 
to his house.  The victim went to Medici's house the following 
morning on her way to school.  Medici escorted the victim to the 
basement where she saw a mirror covered with white powder.  As 
the victim observed the powder, Medici ordered her to remove her 
                     
1 We also awarded an appeal on the issue whether the indictment 
is defective.  We will not consider Medici's contention that the 
indictment is defective, however, because the issue was not 
raised before the jury returned its verdict, as required by Rule 
3A:9.  Therefore, the issue was waived. 
 
 
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clothing.  The victim initially refused, but did remove her 
clothing when she noticed that Medici was armed with a knife.  
Thereafter, Medici forced the victim to engage in fellatio, 
cunninlingus, and sexual intercourse, and he attempted to engage 
the victim in anal sodomy.  The victim immediately reported the 
incident to her high school guidance counselor. 
III 
 
We first consider whether the trial court erred in refusing 
to strike for cause a potential juror.  During voir dire, Medici 
sought to have Inga Bennett stricken for cause because Bennett's 
husband had been murdered and the accused murderer was then 
represented by Medici's counsel's employer, the Office of the 
Public Defender.  When questioned by counsel and the trial 
court, Bennett unequivocally stated that those circumstances 
would not affect her ability to judge the evidence fairly and 
impartially.  The trial court refused to strike Bennett for 
cause, stating that "she was very adamant that she could be 
objective in this case." 
 
We considered a similar issue in Cantrell v. Crews, 259 Va. 
47, 523 S.E.2d 502 (2000), decided after the decisions of the 
trial court and the Court of Appeals in the present case.  In 
Cantrell, the issue was "whether the trial court erred in 
refusing to strike for cause a prospective juror who, at the 
time of trial, was a client of the law firm representing the 
 
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plaintiff."  Id. at 49, 523 S.E.2d at 503.  The prospective 
juror was, at the time, a plaintiff in a pending personal injury 
action.  In response to questioning, the prospective juror 
assured the trial court that she could "ignore" her 
representation by the plaintiff's law firm and "be totally fair 
to both sides."  Id. at 50, 523 S.E.2d at 503.  The trial court 
denied the defendants' motion to strike the prospective juror 
for cause, concluding that she could ignore her personal 
relationship and be fair.  Id. 
 
We held that the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing to strike the juror for cause and that the ruling 
constituted reversible error.  In so holding, we stated the 
following: 
Public confidence in the integrity of the process is 
at stake.  It cannot be promoted when a sitting juror 
is, at the time of trial, a client of the law firm 
representing one of the parties to the litigation as a 
result of a similar occurrence. 
 
This is true even though, as the record shows, 
the juror states that the circumstances of her 
representation would have no "bearing" on her judgment 
as a juror and that she could "be totally fair to both 
sides." 
Id. at 51, 523 S.E.2d at 504. 
 
It is true, as the Attorney General argues, that an 
appellate court must give deference to a trial court's ruling 
whether to exclude or retain a prospective juror and that the 
ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly 
 
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wrong and amounts to an abuse of discretion.  Vinson v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 467, 522 S.E.2d 170, 176 (1999).  We 
think, however, that the present case is controlled by our 
decision in Cantrell.  Here, the prospective juror's husband had 
been murdered, and the accused murderer was represented by a 
lawyer in the same Public Defender's Office that also served as 
counsel for Medici.  While we have no reason to question 
Bennett's honesty and sincerity, we think that permitting her to 
sit as a juror, in the circumstances of this case, would weaken 
public confidence in the integrity of criminal trials.  
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion 
in failing to strike Bennett as a juror and that the ruling 
constitutes reversible error. 
IV 
 
We next consider whether Medici's prior convictions of rape 
in California were improperly admitted into evidence during the 
Commonwealth's case-in-chief.  Medici makes three arguments in 
support of this contention.2
A 
 
First, Medici argues that the admission of the evidence in 
the guilt/innocence phase of his trial violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.  
                     
2 We will consider Medici's other assignments of error because 
the issues raised are likely to arise again upon retrial. 
 
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As previously noted, Medici was charged in three counts of the 
indictment with violating the rape and forcible sodomy statutes.  
He was also charged with the violation of Code § 18.2-67.5:3, 
which provides in subsection A as follows: 
Any person convicted of more than one offense 
specified in subsection B, when such offenses were not 
part of a common act, transaction or scheme, and who 
has been at liberty as defined in § 53.1-151 between 
each conviction shall, upon conviction of the second 
or subsequent such offense, be sentenced to life 
imprisonment and shall not have all or any portion of 
the sentence suspended, provided it is admitted, or 
found by the jury or judge before whom he is tried, 
that he has been previously convicted of at least one 
of the specified offenses. 
 
Medici asserts that, "because the Commonwealth currently 
has a bifurcated system in place[,] . . . the prior conviction 
should be introduced in the [penalty] phase of the trial."  
Medici further assets that, "[t]o do otherwise would be to 
violate a defendant's right to due process." 
 
In Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 567-69 (1967), the 
Supreme Court upheld a defendant's conviction despite the 
admission into evidence in the guilt/innocence phase of the 
trial of the defendant's prior conviction for the purposes of 
sentence enhancement.  More recently, in Marshall v. Lonberger, 
459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983), the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
Spencer and held that the accused's due process rights were not 
violated by the admission of his prior conviction into evidence 
in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.  Similarly, in Brown 
 
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v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 56, 59, 307 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1983), we 
ruled that "[d]ue process does not require that an accused be 
given a bifurcated trial when he is charged under a statute 
authorizing enhanced punishment for repeating offenders." 
 
The Supreme Court also has stated that "a state rule of law 
'does not run foul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another 
method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give 
a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at bar.'"  
Spencer, 385 U.S. at 564 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 
U.S. 97, 104 (1934)).  The Court has further noted that "[a] 
determination of the 'best' recidivist trial procedure 
necessarily involves a consideration of a wide variety of 
criteria . . . [and] is a far cry from a constitutional 
determination that this method of handling the problem is 
compelled by the Fourteenth Amendment."  Id. at 567-68. 
 
In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury 
that Medici's prior convictions "should be considered . . . only 
for proof . . . of a prior conviction, and not as proof that 
[Medici] committed the offenses to which he is charged."  We 
presume that jurors followed a court's instruction, unless the 
record plainly shows otherwise.  See Spencer v. Commonwealth, 
240 Va. 78, 95, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 
(1990).  Here, nothing in the record suggests that the jury did 
not follow the court's instruction. 
 
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We express no opinion whether the better policy would be to 
introduce a prior conviction into evidence only during the 
sentencing phase.  We also do not decide whether a prior 
conviction is an element of the offense charged.  Medici's 
assignment of error merely alleges that the admission into 
evidence of his prior convictions in the guilt/innocence phase 
of his trial violated his "right to due process."  We reject 
this contention and, for the reasons stated, hold that Medici's 
due process rights were not violated. 
B 
 
Medici next contends that the trial court erred in 
admitting into evidence his prior California rape convictions 
because the California statute "allows a conviction for rape for 
acts that do not constitute an offense under Code § 18.2-61," 
thereby rendering the Virginia and California statutes not 
"substantially similar."  We do not agree. 
 
"Prior convictions," within the meaning of Code § 18.2-
67.5:3(C), include "adult convictions for felonies under the 
laws of any state or the United States that are substantially 
similar to those listed in subsection B."  (Emphasis added.)  
Subsection B of Code § 18.2-67.5:3 includes the crime of rape. 
 
In 1985, Medici was convicted of rape in California, in 
violation of California Penal Code § 261(2), which, at the time 
 
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of the offense and his conviction, read, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with 
a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any 
of the following circumstances: 
 
. . . . 
(2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will 
by means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful 
bodily injury on the person or another. 
 
Code § 18.2-61(A)(i), under which Medici was charged in the 
present case, provides the following: 
If any person has sexual intercourse with a 
complaining witness who is not his or her spouse . . . 
against the complaining witness's will, by force, 
threat or intimidation of or against the complaining 
witness or another person, . . . he or she shall be 
guilty of rape. 
 
It is true that the California statute, when read in its 
entirety, permits a rape conviction for acts that would not 
necessarily constitute rape in Virginia.  In making a comparison 
regarding the similarity of the statutes, however, we need only 
compare the Virginia rape statute with the subsection of the 
California statute under which Medici was charged and convicted.  
See Honaker v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 682, 684, 454 S.E.2d 
29, 30 (1995). 
 
Clearly, the language in subsection 2 of California Penal 
Code § 261 is substantially similar to the language in Virginia 
Code § 18.2-61(A)(i).  Therefore, we hold that the trial court 
 
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did not err in admitting into evidence Medici's convictions 
under a substantially similar statute. 
C 
 
Medici also contends that the trial court erred in 
admitting the California convictions into evidence because, 
according to him, the conviction order was not properly 
certified.  The prior convictions order admitted in the present 
case was marked on the back with a stamp reading, "Allen Slater, 
Executive Officer and Clerk of the Superior Court of the State 
of California, in and for the County of Orange."  The order also 
contained the seal of the Orange County Superior Court and was 
signed by "Flor L. Perez," whose signature appears next to the 
word, "Deputy." 
 
Code § 8.01-389(A1) provides that "[t]he records of any 
judicial proceeding and any other official record of any court 
of another state or country, or of the United States, shall be 
received as prima facie evidence provided that such records are 
authenticated by the clerk of the court where preserved to be a 
true record."  We think the California order complies with the 
requirements of Code § 8.01-389(A1), and, therefore, the trial 
court properly admitted it into evidence. 
V 
 
Finally, we consider Medici's offer to stipulate.  Medici 
offered to stipulate his prior rape convictions in the 
 
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sentencing phase of his trial if he were convicted of the 
charged offenses.  He contends on appeal that the trial court 
erred in refusing to accept the stipulation.  We have held, 
however, that an accused "may not preclude the Commonwealth from 
introducing otherwise admissible evidence by offering to 
stipulate the facts which the evidence would show."  Spencer, 
240 Va. at 91, 393 S.E.2d at 617.  We conclude, therefore, that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
accept Medici's qualified stipulation offer. 
VI 
 
In sum, we hold that the trial court committed reversible 
error in refusing to strike for cause prospective juror Bennett, 
and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's 
ruling.  We further hold that the trial court did not err in 
admitting into evidence Medici's California rape convictions and 
in refusing to accept Medici's stipulation and that the Court of 
Appeals did not err in affirming these rulings of the trial 
court.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgments of the trial 
court and the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court 
of Appeals with direction that the case be remanded to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
Reversed and remanded. 
 
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