Case Title: Reposa v. Buhler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Reposa v. Buhler1989 WY 66770 P.2d 235Case Number: 88-300Decided: 03/10/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
DUANE 
REPOSA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AGENT OF TRANSIT HOMES OF AMERICA, AND TRANSIT HOMES 
OF AMERICA, AN IDAHO CORPORATION, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

 
 
v.

 
 
CHARLES 
BUHLER AND CAROL BUHLER, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLEES 
(PLAINTIFFS).

 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

 
 
John A. 
Thomas of Phillips, Lancaster & Thomas, P.C., Evanston, for appellants.

 
 
Roger Cowan 
of Harris and Morton, P.C., Evanston, for appellees.

 
 
Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
ROONEY, Retired J.

 
 

ROONEY, Retired 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant Transit Homes 
of America is in the business of 
transporting mobile homes in interstate commerce. Appellant Reposa is an 
owner-operator of a truck-tractor. He contracts with appellant Transit Homes of 
America to lease his 
truck-tractor to appellant Transit Homes of America and to operate it in transporting mobile 
homes as designated by appellant Transit Homes of America.

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellees engaged 
appellant Transit Homes of America to transport their double-wide mobile 
home from Evanston, Wyoming to St. 
George, Utah. Appellant 
Reposa was designated by Transit Homes of America to do 
so. The mobile home was to be transported in two sections. Appellant Reposa 
completed the transportation of one section on February 12 and 13, 1988. On 
February 15, 1988, while transporting the second section, a heavy wind blew it 
over near Bluffdale, 
Utah. The "blow over" and 
subsequent efforts to clear the road completely destroyed the second section of 
the mobile home.

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellees filed this 
action to recover damages resulting from the "blow over." The complaint 
contained two claims for relief: one premised on negligence, and one premised on 
breach of contract. Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to the existence of 
liability on both claims, and the trial was held only on the issue of the amount 
of damages. The trial court entered judgment in the amount of $31,368 with costs 
of $102.20 and with post-judgment interest.

 
 

[¶4.]     Appellants word the 
issues on appeal:

 
 
"I. WHETHER 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT AWARDING DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFFS IN THE AMOUNT 
OF $31,368.00 IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND IS UNWARRANTED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE 
OF THE USE OF AN IMPROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES."

 
 

[¶5.]     Appellees word 
them:

 
 
"I. WHETHER 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE COURT COULD DETERMINE FAIR MARKET 
VALUE OF THE MOBILE HOME.

 
 
"II. 
WHETHER PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER SPECIAL DAMAGES IN ADDITION TO THE 
VALUE OF THE MOBILE HOME."

 
 

[¶6.]     We reverse and 
remand.

 
 

[¶7.]     The uncontradicted 
evidence was that the destroyed section of the mobile home could not be 
replaced, and that the remaining section had no value as a mobile home. Appellant Transit 
Homes of America presented testimony that the 
remaining section had the potential to be converted into that useful for an 
office or something similar. The judgment awarded possession and ownership of 
the remaining section to appellants. The monetary damage award was therefore 
based upon a total destruction of the mobile home as such.

 
 

[¶8.]     The trial court did not 
set forth the particulars by which it arrived at the damage figure of $31,368. 
However, the court commented at trial that his notes reflected telephone charges 
to have been $168 "roughly,"1 travel expenses to have been $144 
"roughly,"2 and lost wages to have been $108 
for each ($216 for both).3 He further commented at that time 
that $690 per month was a reasonable amount for alternate housing,4 and he referred to the mobile home 
set-up charges as being $3,700. Subtracting these figures from the award of 
$31,368 leaves $23,000 as the amount allocated to the loss of the mobile home. 
Thus, the damage award consisted of the following:

 
 


$23,000

Loss 
      of mobile home 

3,700

Set 
      up charges 

4,140

Alternate 
      housing 

144

Travel 
      expenses 

216

Lost 
      wages 

168

Telephone 
      charges

$31,368

 
 
 
 

[¶9.]     The parties failed to 
supply the trial court with any proper evidence from which it could determine 
the market value of the mobile home at 
the time and place of destruction. Thus, the $23,000 allowed for such 
destruction cannot stand.

 
 

[¶10.]  The measure of damages for tortious 
conversion or destruction of a chattel as set forth in Restatement, Second, 
Torts § 927 at 534 (1979) is:

 
 
"(1) When 
one is entitled to a judgment for the conversion of a chattel or the destruction 
or impairment of any legally protected interest in land or other thing, he may 
recover either

 
 
     "(a) the value of the 
subject matter or of his interest in it at the time and place of the conversion, 
destruction or impairment; or

 
 
     "(b) in the case of 
commodities of fluctuating value customarily traded on an exchange to which 
traders customarily resort, the highest replacement value of the commodity 
within a reasonable period during which he might have replaced 
it.

 
 
"(2) His 
damages also include:

 
 
     "(a) the additional 
value of a chattel due to additions or improvements made by a converter not in 
good faith;

 
 
     "(b) the amount of any 
further pecuniary loss of which the deprivation has been a legal 
cause;

 
 
     "(c) interest from the 
time at which the value is fixed; and

 
 
     "(d) compensation for 
the loss of use not otherwise compensated."

 
 
The measure 
of damages for breach of contract as set forth in Restatement, Second, Contracts 
§ 347 at 112 (1981) is:

 
 
"Subject to 
the limitations stated in §§ 350-53, the injured party has a right to damages 
based on his expectation interest as measured by

 
 
     "(a) the loss in the 
value to him of the other party's performance caused by its failure or 
deficiency, plus 

 
 
     "(b) any other loss, 
including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, 
less

 
 
     "(c) any cost or other 
loss that he has avoided by not having to perform."

 
 
The 
limitations stated in referenced §§ 350-53 are those relative to avoidance of 
loss by the injured party, unforeseeability of damages resulting from the 
breach, damages not established with reasonable certainty, and loss due to most 
types of emotional disturbances.

 
 

[¶11.]  The general rule, in pertinent part, is 
stated in 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages §§ 427, 429 and 430 at 512-14 (1988) (footnotes 
omitted):

 
 
     "As a general rule, 
damages for taking, damaging, or destruction of personal property are measured 
by the difference in the property's market value immediately before and after 
the injury. If the item was wrongfully taken or totally destroyed, this 
`decrease' in market value is, of course, the market value of the item at the 
time of the taking or destruction.

 
 
* * * * * 
*

 
 
     "The ordinary and 
basic measure of damages * * * to personal property is * * *, in case of its 
destruction, its market value at the time of the loss. But since the market 
value test is, at best, a means of determining the loss suffered, it may be 
discarded if a more accurate test is applicable.

 
 
     "* * * Market value 
means, generally, the price for which an article is bought and sold, and is 
ordinarily best established by sales in the ordinary course of business. It is 
the price a willing seller would accept from a willing buyer. There must be a 
demand for the item in order for it to be said to have a market value; 
therefore, if there is no demand for a thing and no ability to sell it, then it 
cannot be said to have a market value. Retail market value is used if it is 
assumed that the plaintiff would replace the property.

 
 
 * * * * * *

 
 
     "Generally the value 
of personal property taken or destroyed is to be determined as of the time and 
place of its taking or destruction."

 
 

[¶12.]  We have recognized market value as the 
ordinary measure of damages for loss of destruction of personal property. 
Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119 (Wyo. 1985); 
D'Arge v. Davis, 710 P.2d 830 (Wyo. 1985); Redwine v. Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407, 329 P.2d 257, 
reh. denied, 78 Wyo. 407, 330 P.2d 112 
(1958).

 
 

[¶13.]  Damages must be proven with a reasonable 
degree of certainty so that the fact finder, in turn, can determine the amount 
with a measurable degree of certainty. Exact certainty of the amount of damages 
need not be proven, but remote, conjectural or speculative damages are not 
allowed. Reiman Const. Co. v. Jerry Hiller Co., 709 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1985); Krist 
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 667 P.2d 665 (Wyo. 1983); Cates v. Barb, 650 P.2d 1159 (Wyo. 1982); Chrysler Corp. v. Todorovich, 580 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1978); 
Opheim v. United Mobile Homes, Inc., 511 P.2d 1289 (Wyo. 1973); Reeder Flying 
Service v. Crompton, 470 P.2d 281 (Wyo. 1970).

 
 

[¶14.]  The evidence in this case attempted to 
establish the fair market value of the mobile home through comparable sales - a 
standard and usual method of doing so since it is in compliance with the 
definition of reasonable or fair market value, i.e., the price which the 
property will bring when offered for sale by an owner who is willing but under 
no obligation to sell to a buyer who is willing or desires to buy but is not 
compelled to do so. See Wheatland Irrigation District v. McGuire, 562 P.2d 287 
(Wyo. 
1977).

 
 

[¶15.]  However, there was no evidence of a comparable sale. There was no evidence 
as to value of the mobile home at the 
time and place of its destruction, and damages were not proved with a reasonable degree of 
certainty.

 
 

[¶16.]  Appellees resided in St. George, Utah, where they owned a home subject to a 
mortgage. They proposed to purchase a mobile home and live in it on some nearby 
rural acreage. They purchased the mobile home through Dennis Buhler, a cousin of 
appellee Charles Buhler, who was employed by Hoback Realty as a sales associate 
in Evanston, Wyoming. The purchase was made in Evanston, Wyoming on February 3, 1988 for $15,000. The 
seller was Green Tree Acceptance Corporation. It had repossessed the mobile home 
about two weeks before the sale.

 
 

[¶17.]  In their testimony, neither appellee 
presented any evidence of the value of the mobile home - other than to recite 
the purchase price.

 
 

[¶18.]  Dennis Buhler was the only witness to 
testify to such value. He gave an opinion that the fair market value of it was 
"20 to $25,000." Later, he testified on direct 
examination:

 
 
     "Q. Okay. The fair 
market value that you just gave us, 22 to 25,000?

 
 
     "A. Right. 22 - I 
don't remember the exact - 22 to 25, basically."

 
 

[¶19.]  He testified that he fixed the value of 
the mobile home as in Evanston. There was testimony that the market 
value of mobile homes in Evanston was quite different from that in St. 
George and elsewhere.

 
 

[¶20.]  In any event, an opinion as to the value 
of $20,000 to $25,000 is worthless as evidence of actual value. Such a large 
value span invites speculation. The opinion does not have a reasonable degree of 
certainty. Damages must be "proved with a reasonable degree of certainty."5

 
 

[¶21.]  Added to the uncertain and speculative 
nature of Dennis Buhler's testimony, he did not make reference to the use of a 
single comparable sale. He made 
reference to having talked to some others about sales, and he introduced two 
exhibits, one containing a list of twenty-five mobile homes for sale by Green 
Tree Acceptance Corporation. The prices at which they were listed ranged from 
$7,400 to $28,900, and the other contained a list of twenty-seven mobile homes 
for sale with prices listed from $8,000 to $47,000. List prices (offers) are not 
sales.

 
 
     "As a general rule, 
evidence of mere offers to buy or sell personal property is not competent to 
show the value of such property. Although market value may be determined by 
actual sales, it may not ordinarily be determined by asking prices. However, in 
a market regularly attended by buyers and sellers, an offer to buy or sell an 
article of recognized uniform character, constantly bought and sold in that 
market so as to have a place upon the daily price current lists, may serve to 
show the market value of that article."

 
 
29 
Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 389 at 441 (1967) (footnotes omitted).6

 
 

[¶22.]  The fact that the destroyed mobile home, 
as testified by Dennis Buhler, was listed by Green Tree Acceptance Corporation 
at $24,000 or $25,000, but was reduced in price during negotiations with Dennis 
Buhler to "around" $20,000, and then finally an offer for $15,000 was accepted, 
indicates the fallacy of considering list prices instead of sales as evidence of 
fair market value.

 
 

[¶23.]  Dennis Buhler characterized the $15,000 
sale of the destroyed mobile home as a "distress" sale because it had been 
repossessed by Green Tree Acceptance Corporation. If it had been sold at a 
foreclosure sale wherein the sales price would effect a deficiency judgment, it 
could be classified as a distress sale. In this instance, there was no evidence 
that Green Tree Acceptance Corporation was "under an obligation" to sell. It is 
obvious that Green Tree Acceptance Corporation is in the business of financing 
mobile homes and regularly sells repossessed ones in its normal course of 
business. 

 
 

[¶24.]  The purchase price paid by appellees for 
the destroyed mobile home was at a time near enough to its destruction to have 
been evidence of its value at that time. However, there was no evidence relative 
to the purchase price to make possible its use for a nonspeculative 
determination of the value of the mobile home at the place of its destruction. Without 
such evidence, the sale was insufficient to be considered in fixing 
value.

 
 

[¶25.]  Evidence of value was not otherwise 
presented at trial. In the usual case, testimony is given by an expert witness 
as to his opinion of the fair market value of the property - giving a figure 
that is sufficiently exact and certain to obviate speculation or conjecture in 
applying the figure to the value of the property. He then supports his opinion 
by reference to sales. Since it is 
rare that there are sales of identical properties under identical conditions, 
the witness' expertise comes into play.7 He uses it in making adjustments to 
the individual sales to make them comparable to the value of the property in 
question. The adjustments are with reference to the elements necessary to make 
the status of such sale comparable to that of the subject property, e.g., time 
of sale, place of sale, differences in the properties (age, condition, 
composition, wear and tear, etc.). None of this supporting testimony exists in 
this instance.

 
 

[¶26.]  Of particular importance is the failure 
to have evidence of value at the place of destruction - Bluffdale, Utah, a place 
between Salt Lake City, Utah and Provo, Utah. 
There was no evidence of comparable sales in that area, or of adjustments to 
sales in other areas to make them comparable to value in that area. There was no 
basis on which damages could be properly computed.8 The question is not one of 
sufficiency of the evidence but is if there was any evidence at 
all.

 
 

[¶27.]  Accordingly, we must reverse the holding 
of the trial court. Normally, the reversal would leave appellees without further 
redress. Ordinarily, the burden is upon one seeking more than nominal damages to 
prove his damages as part of his claim during trial. State ex rel. Scholl v. 
Anselmi, 640 P.2d 746 (Wyo. 1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 805, 103 S. Ct. 28, 74 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1982); Downing v. Stiles, 635 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1981); Western National Bank of 
Lovell v. Moncur, 624 P.2d 765 (Wyo. 1981).

 
 

[¶28.]  In this case, there has been not only a 
stipulation acknowledging liability, but there was testimony that appellant 
Transit Homes of America recognized the responsibility to respond with payment 
of damages on the claim for such - the argument being with regard to the amount 
of damages. Under these circumstances, it is proper to remand the case for a new 
trial on the issue of damages, in which trial the parties can assist the trial 
court by submitting proper evidence from which the amount of damages can be 
ascertained.

 
 

[¶29.]  For this purpose and as assistance to the 
trial court, we note the following with reference to the issues presented to us 
in connection with the damage award for other than the loss of the mobile home. 
The set-up charge of $3,700 is the amount appellees were to pay to appellants 
for transportation of the mobile home and setting it up "ready to move in." It 
has not been paid. Since the service was not performed by appellants, payment is 
unnecessary. In any event, it would be useless to have appellees pay the $3,700 
and then include the requirement for appellants to pay it back. It is improper 
to require appellants to reimburse appellees for a consideration which appellees 
never paid and appellants never received. The $3,700 should not have been 
included in the judgment award. 

 
 

[¶30.]  The $4,140 alternate housing award 
represents the amount appellees were obligated to pay on the loan secured by the 
house in which they were living for six months after they could have been living 
in the mobile home. Appellees testified that they owned a house in St. George, 
Utah which had been mortgaged under a Veteran's Administration guaranty; that 
the last payment was made in December 1987; that the balance of the mortgage 
debt at that time was $57,817.80; that they did not know if there was a 
provision for deficiency judgment in the mortgage or trust deed; and that they 
intended to sell the house when they moved into the mobile home. There was no 
evidence that a sale was attempted or possible. Since there was no evidence that 
appellees would have been relieved of the obligation to pay the $690 each month 
on the mortgage debt after moving to the mobile home, it cannot be determined 
that inability to move to the mobile home caused their obligation to continue 
the payments on the mortgage debt - especially when the payments were delinquent 
and there was no evidence that they would be liable for a deficiency judgment 
upon foreclosure. The $4,140 should not have been included in the judgment 
award.

 
 

[¶31.]  The $144 travel expenses and the $168 in 
lost wages were testified to have occurred on a trip to Richfield, Utah and 
Rock Springs, Wyoming to look at one mobile home in Richfield and two mobile homes in Rock Springs from which a 
replacement for the one destroyed might be chosen. The trip was made on 
"instructions from somebody in Transit Homes to go look for a replacement." 
Under such conditions, the expenses for the trip were properly allowed as 
damages.

 
 

[¶32.]  The $168 telephone charges were testified 
to as "relative to locating an alternate mobile home." They were properly 
allowed as a reasonable effort to mitigate damages. However, $18.99 of these 
charges were before the "blow over" and could not be for the purpose of 
"locating an alternate mobile home." Charges in the amount of $42.12 were 
incurred after the complaint was filed and, thus, after the effort to locate an 
alternate mobile home was abandoned. The allowable telephone charges should be 
$168.35 less $61.11, or $107.24.

 
 

[¶33.]  REVERSED AND 
REMANDED.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The 
telephone charges were testified to be $168.35.

 
 

2 Exhibit 5 
reflected $138.86 to have been the travel expenses.

 
 

3 Appellee 
Charles Buhler testified his lost wages to have been $108 (16 hours at $6.75 per 
hour). Appellee Carol Buhler testified her lost wages to have been $111.24 (18 
hours at $6.18 per hour). The lost wages for both appellees were 
$219.24.

 
 

4 Six months 
of $690 per month results in $4,140 as an amount for alternate housing. Exhibit 
9 reflects the monthly payment to be $627.57. Appellee Carol Buhler testified 
that insurance and costs increased the amount to $690.

 
 

5 This 
situation is distinguished from the situation in which evidence is received from 
two or more sources of different value. The fact finder can then fix the award 
within the parameters of that evidence. If there is to be speculation, it must 
be by the fact finder within such parameters and not by a single witness setting 
such parameters.

 
 

6 That said 
hereafter is with reference to the particular facts of this case, to which the 
first two sentences of the quotation apply. It is not with reference to 
circumstances such as referred to in the last sentence of the 
quotation.

 
 

7 If the 
evidence were to be limited to sales lists, classified advertisements, N.A.D.A. 
guides or other forms of offers, any lay person could introduce them into 
evidence and expert testimony would be unnecessary.

 
 

8 There are 
other methods by which fair market value can be established, but the comparable 
sales method presented through an expert witness was the method undertaken in 
this case.