Case Title: Sanders v. State Farm Ins.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 509, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
DARRELL F. SANDERS,                       
           
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE FARM MUTUAL 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
     
 
 
     
Defendant Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 509, 2003 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   C.A. No. 02C-03-048  
                      
 
Submitted: October 18, 2004  
Decided:    December 16, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 16th day of December 2004, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The plaintiff-appellant, Darrell F. Sanders, filed an appeal from the 
Superior Court’s September 12, 2003 order granting the motion of defendant-appellee, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, for summary judgment.1  State 
Farm has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is 
                                                 
1 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56. 
 
 
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manifest on the face of Sanders’ opening brief that the appeal is without merit.2  We 
agree and AFFIRM.3 
 
(2) 
Sanders filed an action in the Superior Court for a declaratory judgment 
that he had comprehensive (including theft), collision and rental car coverage under 
his State Farm automobile policy for the theft of and resulting damage to his 
automobile in Detroit, Michigan.4  State Farm defended, in part, on the grounds that 
Sanders’ policy did not include the necessary types of coverage at the time of the loss 
and there was no prior written modification of the policy that included such coverage.  
Sanders subsequently took the position that, several months before the loss of his 
vehicle, State Farm, through its agent, issued him an oral binder of coverage.  
Although not pleaded in his complaint, Sanders also sought reformation of his policy 
to include the oral binder allegedly issued by the State Farm agent. 
 
(3) 
We have carefully reviewed the record in this case, including the 
transcript of the Superior Court’s June 30, 2003 hearing on State Farm’s motion for 
summary judgment.  The transcript reflects that, in support of its motion, State Farm 
submitted documents, including internal State Farm documents and a police report, 
                                                 
2 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
3 In the alternative, State Farm has moved to dismiss Sanders’ appeal on the ground that he did 
not comply with this Court’s September 27, 2004 Order requiring him to file his opening brief on 
or before October 5, 2004.  Supr. Ct. R. 29(b).  While it appears that Sanders did not comply 
strictly with this Court’s Order, we, nevertheless, hereby deny the motion to dismiss in the 
interest of justice. 
4 The record indicates that the Detroit police recovered Sanders’ stolen and wrecked vehicle on 
August 31, 2001. 
 
 
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showing that the Detroit police recovered Sanders’ wrecked vehicle at 3:00 a.m. on 
August 31, 2001, several hours before the State Farm agent placed additional 
coverage on Sanders’ policy at 12:41 p.m. on that date.   
 
(4) 
In response to the motion, Sanders submitted an affidavit in which he 
stated the following:  On or about July 7, 2000, Sanders requested collision and rental 
car coverage from State Farm for his automobile and, on that same date, a State Farm 
agent named Shirley Evans inspected the vehicle and documented the mileage.  A few 
months later, he went to a rental car company and was told that he did not have rental 
car coverage.  He called Shirley Evans and she represented that she must have made 
an error and would correct the problem.  In late August 2001, he again attempted to 
rent a car and, before doing so, checked with another agent at Shirley Evans’ office to 
make sure that he had collision and rental car coverage.  The agent he spoke to 
confirmed that his policy included this coverage.  
         (5) 
At the hearing on State Farm’s summary judgment motion, the Superior 
Court judge questioned Sanders and State Farm’s counsel concerning the state of the 
record at that point.5   Sanders conceded that State Farm had informed him that 
Shirley Evans was an independent agent and not a State Farm employee and that, 
therefore, State Farm could not compel her attendance at a deposition.  Sanders also 
conceded that he had no basis upon which to contest the veracity of the documents 
                                                 
5 At the time of the hearing, discovery in the case was closed and the pretrial conference was 
scheduled for October 9, 2003.  
 
 
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submitted by State Farm.  Sanders did not dispute that the policy language required 
any modification of the policy to be in writing.  The judge noted that the factual 
record was complete and that, on State Farm’s motion for summary judgment, he 
must view all the statements contained in Sanders’ affidavit as truthful.  The judge 
then instructed the parties to submit memoranda solely on the legal issue of whether 
an oral promise by an independent agent creates a binder of coverage.   
 
(6) 
Our review of a trial judge’s grant of summary judgment is de novo.6  
There must be no dispute of material fact and we view the record in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party.7  We also examine the trial judge’s legal rulings to 
determine whether there was error either in formulating or in applying the relevant 
legal precepts.8      
 
(7) 
Reviewing de novo the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of State Farm, we find no reversible error.  Even assuming the truthfulness of 
the facts recited in Sanders’ affidavit, State Farm clearly was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  As the Superior Court found, the policy provision that required any 
modification to the policy to be set forth in writing is clear and unambiguous.  In such 
circumstances, Delaware law does not permit a court to entertain extrinsic evidence of 
                                                 
6 Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 81 (Del. 1992). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
 
 
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a contrary agreement.9  In addition, the Superior Court correctly held that, on the basis 
of the record before it, Sanders was not entitled to reformation of the insurance 
contract as a matter of law.10     
 
(8) 
It is manifest on the face of Sanders’ opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled 
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, there was no 
abuse of discretion.11   
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
25(a), State Farm’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            Justice    
                                                 
9 ABB Flakt, Inc.v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 731 A.2d 811, 816 (Del. 
1999) (Delaware courts will not consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties 
where the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous). 
10 Cerberus Intern., Ltd. v. Apollo Mgt., L.P., 794 A.2d 1144, 1151-52 (Del. 2002) (in order to be 
entitled to reformation, the plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence that the parties 
came to a specific prior understanding that differed materially from the written agreement).  The 
Superior Court addressed this argument even though it was beyond the scope of its instructions 
for the parties’ supplemental memoranda.   
11 To the extent Sanders seeks to appeal any of the Superior Court’s rulings regarding discovery, 
we affirm any and all such rulings as a proper exercise of the Superior Court’s discretion.  In re 
Rinehardt, 575 A.2d 1079, 1082 (Del. 1990).  To the extent Sanders raises claims not presented 
to the Superior Court below, we decline to address those issues.  Supr. Ct. R. 8.