Case Title: Pedro Hernandez-Alberto v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC02-1617

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida 
____________ 
No. SC02-1617 
____________ 
PEDRO HERNANDEZ-ALBERTO, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[September 23, 2004] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
We have on appeal two judgments of conviction of first-degree murder and 
two sentences of death.  We have jurisdiction.  See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments and sentences of death. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Pedro Hernandez-Alberto and Maria Gonzalez were married in 1996 after a 
courtship of several years.  Maria had an adult son, Salvatore Gonzalez, an adult 
daughter, Isela Gonzalez, and a minor daughter, Donna Berezovsky.  Hernandez-
Alberto and Maria had one child together, Gabriella, who was an infant at the time 
of the homicides.  Prior to and during their marriage, Maria lived with her children 
 
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in her home in Apollo Beach, Florida, and she owned and operated a family 
business known as the Apollo Beach Family Restaurant. 
On the morning of January 3, 1999, Hernandez-Alberto and Maria continued 
an ongoing argument about ownership of the home and business.  Previously, 
Hernandez-Alberto insisted that Maria place his name on the title to the home and 
the business, which she had solely owned prior to their marriage.  After continuing 
to deny his demands, Maria left the home to go to work at the restaurant.  Upon her 
departure, Hernandez-Alberto put Gabriella in a back bedroom and then confronted 
his eleven-year-old stepdaughter, Donna, in the family room.  He told Donna to 
pick up a toy.  When she refused, he struck her on the head near the right ear, 
knocking her to the floor.  He then removed a gun from his fanny pack and shot 
her as she lay face down.  Donna died from the gunshot wound. 
The medical examiner’s testimony confirmed there was a contusion on 
Donna’s face consistent with being struck with a hand.  In addition, the autopsy 
indicated that the gunshot entered Donna’s back, traveled through her spinal cord, 
aorta, lung, chest, and arm.  The injuries were consistent with being shot while face 
down on the floor. 
After shooting Donna, Hernandez-Alberto drove to the Apollo Beach Family 
Restaurant where Maria and Isela were working.  Upon entering the back of the 
restaurant, Hernandez-Alberto went directly to the restroom where he remained for 
 
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approximately eight to ten minutes.  Upon exiting the restroom, he walked up 
behind Isela and shot her twice in the back.  After she fell to the floor, he then shot 
her once in the head. 
The medical testimony indicates that a gunshot to Isela’s lower back passed 
through her hip and intestines before exiting the front of her body.  A gunshot 
higher on her back penetrated her lung, diaphragm, spleen, pituitary gland, kidney, 
pancreas and stomach before exiting her body.  The third gunshot to her neck hit 
her spine, then went through her carotid artery and jugular vein. 
After the shooting, Hernandez-Alberto left the restaurant with a gun in his 
hand, got into his car, and fled toward Mexico.  He was arrested in Brookshire, 
Texas, a small town near Houston.  He was interviewed by the Brookshire police 
chief, Joe Garcia, and he confessed to shooting and killing both Donna and Isela.  
At the time of his arrest, Hernandez-Alberto had a gun, which was later determined 
to be the murder weapon, in his possession.  A fanny pack was also found in his 
possession. 
Throughout the trial, the defense contended that Hernandez-Alberto suffered 
from a mental illness and may have had brain damage, which he allegedly suffered 
as a result of an automobile accident with a Hillsborough County Sheriff’s vehicle 
several years prior to the homicides.  Throughout the trial, Hernandez-Alberto was 
uncooperative with his attorneys, the investigators assigned to aid in his defense, 
 
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and the doctors appointed to evaluate him.  He also made repeated outbursts in the 
courtroom whereby he shouted profanities directed at the court and ultimately had 
to be removed on several occasions.  At the beginning of the trial, he discharged 
his attorneys and invoked his constitutional right of self-representation.  The court 
made a specific observation that Hernandez-Alberto conducted himself 
appropriately throughout the trial while representing himself, that he asked relevant 
questions of the witnesses, and that he attempted to make valid points in the 
presence of the jury.  After both sides rested, Hernandez-Alberto made the decision 
to have his attorney make the closing argument for him. 
On August 24, 2001, Hernandez-Alberto was convicted by a jury of two 
counts of first-degree premeditated murder.  On November 29, 2001, the same jury 
recommended, by a vote of 10-2, that Hernandez-Alberto receive a sentence of 
death for each murder.  On April 30, 2002, the trial court held a Spencer1 hearing 
and allowed each side to present additional evidence and arguments.  On May 28, 
2002, the trial court agreed with the jury’s recommendation and sentenced 
Hernandez-Alberto to death for each of the murders.  The trial court found three 
aggravating circumstances for the murder of Donna Berezovsky, giving all three 
great weight: (1) the defendant had previously been convicted of another capital 
offense or of a felony involving the use of violence to some person; (2) the victim 
                                        
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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of the capital felony was a person less than twelve years of age; and (3) the victim 
of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to advanced age or disability 
or because the defendant stood in a position of familial or custodial authority over 
the victim.  The trial court found two aggravating circumstances for the murder of 
Isela Gonzalez, giving both great weight: (1) the defendant had been previously 
convicted of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use of violence to 
some person; and (2) the crime for which the defendant was to be sentenced was 
committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner and without any 
pretense of moral or legal justification. 
The trial court considered the following statutory mitigating circumstances: 
(1) the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity (some 
weight); (2) the crime for which the defendant was to be sentenced was committed 
while he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (no 
weight); (3) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially 
impaired (no weight); (4) the age of the defendant at the time of the crime (no 
weight); and (5) the existence of any other factors in the defendant’s background 
that would mitigate against imposition of the death penalty (some weight).  The 
trial court found the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) the 
defendant suffers from a brain injury (little weight); (2) the defendant lost his 
 
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mother at an early age (little weight); (3) the defendant suffered frequent beatings 
by his father when the father was drinking (some weight); (4) the defendant 
suffered beatings and mistreatment at the hands of the neighbor who took him in 
after the father abandoned the defendant (little weight); (5) the defendant trained 
and worked as an auxiliary police officer in Mexico City (little weight); (6) the 
defendant was capable when young of maintaining loving and respectful 
relationships (little weight); (7) the defendant lived in extreme poverty as a young 
child (no weight); (8) the defendant voluntarily provided a confession upon arrest 
(some weight); and (9) the defendant was of borderline intelligence (little weight). 
Hernandez-Alberto now appeals both judgments and sentences. 
DISCUSSION 
Issue 1: Competency 
Hernandez-Alberto asserts that he was incompetent to stand trial and that the 
trial court erred in this case by failing to hold competency hearings throughout the 
trial.  We have outlined a trial court’s role in the area of competency to stand trial 
as follows: 
In determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, the 
trial court must decide whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability 
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding 
- - and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.”  Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 404, 80 S. 
Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960); see also § 916.12(1), Fla. Stat. (1993); Fla. 
R. Crim. P. 3.211(a)(1).  In situations where there is conflicting expert 
testimony regarding the defendant’s competency, it is the trial court’s 
 
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responsibility to consider all the evidence relevant to competency and 
resolve the factual dispute.  Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 247 (Fla. 1995), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1128, 116 S. Ct. 946, 133 L. Ed. 2d 871 (1996); Watts 
v. State, 593 So. 2d 198, 202 (Fla. 1992).  The trial court’s competency 
decision will be upheld absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.  Hunter, 
660 So. 2d at 247; Watts, 593 So. 2d at 202. 
Hardy v. State, 716 So. 2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. 1998). 
On April 19, 1999, the trial court ordered a competency and sanity 
evaluation and psychiatric evaluation return to determine if Hernandez-Alberto 
was competent to stand trial.  Both Dr. Michael S. Maher and Dr. Alfonso H. Saa 
determined that Hernandez-Alberto was incompetent to stand trial.  On May 18, 
1999, the trial court adjudged Hernandez-Alberto incompetent to stand trial and 
committed him to the Florida Department of Children and Families.  While 
Hernandez-Alberto was committed to the South Florida Evaluation and Treatment 
Center in Miami, Dr. Fred J. Balzer, Dr. Andres L. Jimenez, Dr. Francisco A. 
Campos, and Hospital Administrator Cheryl Y. Brantley all determined that 
Hernandez-Alberto was malingering and competent to proceed.  On July 13, 1999, 
the trial court ordered a second competency and sanity evaluation and psychiatric 
evaluation return to determine if Hernandez-Alberto was competent to stand trial.  
Dr. Maher and Dr. Saa again evaluated Hernandez-Alberto.  On July 22, 1999, Dr. 
Saa concluded that Hernandez-Alberto was incompetent but stated, “However, I 
suspect that his clinical presentation, likely compatible with malingering, is 
coloring my conclusions.”  On August 6, 1999, Dr. Maher concluded that 
 
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Hernandez-Alberto was competent to stand trial.  On August 9, 2001, the trial 
court ordered a third competency and sanity evaluation and psychiatric evaluation 
return to determine if Hernandez-Alberto was competent to stand trial.  On August 
15, 2001, Dr. Maher again concluded that Hernandez-Alberto was competent to 
stand trial.  On August 16, 2001, Dr. Robert M. Berland concluded that he might 
have “a genuine psychotic disturbance.”  The trial court concluded that Hernandez-
Alberto was competent to stand trial at this time, and the trial commenced on 
August 20, 2001.  On August 24, 2001, the jury found Hernandez-Alberto guilty 
on both counts of first-degree murder. 
On November 16, 2001, defense counsel filed a motion for reconsideration 
of competency, alleging that Dr. Berland had done additional work on the issue 
and was prepared to state definitively that the defendant had a mental illness and 
was incompetent.  Prior to the penalty phase on November 19, 2001, the trial court 
revisited the issue of competency.  Dr. Berland was allowed to elaborate on his 
findings concerning Hernandez-Alberto’s competency.  The new information 
which formed the basis of Dr. Berland’s “definitive” opinion was a conversation 
with the defendant’s ex-wife.  At the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court 
stated: 
THE COURT:  Initially in this case, I found that he was incompetent to 
proceed and had him transferred to the state hospital.  While at the state 
hospital, they made extensive observations of Mr. Hernandez Alberto, and 
their final conclusion was that he was malingering.  He was sent back to 
 
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Hillsborough County, where he has just totally refused to cooperate with his 
attorneys, with all of the doctors that the Court has appointed, and to this day 
he continues to be uncooperative.  I have previously found that Mr. 
Hernandez Alberto was competent to proceed, and I believe that 
presumption remains with Mr. Hernandez Alberto today.  I’ll make a few 
other observations.  One was that Dr. Maher had the opportunity to make 
some observations of Mr. Hernandez Alberto, and, based upon his 
observations, felt that he was competent to proceed, that he had conducted 
himself appropriately in the courtroom.  Also when Mr. Hernandez Alberto 
represented himself throughout the trial, I made a particular note that he 
conducted himself appropriately in the courtroom and was able to ask what I 
felt were some competent questions in his defense.  Therefore, I’m going to 
find that Mr. Hernandez Alberto remains competent to proceed to the 
penalty phase of this proceeding. 
The penalty phase was conducted on November 28 and 29, 2001.  At the 
conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury recommended by a vote of 10-2 that 
Hernandez-Alberto receive the death penalty as to both counts of first-degree 
murder.  Prior to the Spencer hearing on April 30, 2002, the trial court granted 
Hernandez-Alberto’s motion for a PET scan.2  However, Hernandez-Alberto 
refused to cooperate and did not allow a PET scan to be performed on him. 
The record supports the trial court’s resolution of the factual disputes on the 
issue of competency.  Five medical experts, after having observed and examined 
Hernandez-Alberto, informed the trial court that he was malingering and 
competent to proceed.  Yet another expert opined that Hernandez-Alberto’s 
presentation was compatible with malingering.  Dr. Berland initially opined that 
                                        
2.  Positron emission tomography (or PET scan) is a medical test often used 
to detect tumors and monitor a patient’s brain function. 
 
 
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Hernandez-Alberto might have a genuine psychosis.  After talking with 
Hernandez-Alberto’s ex-wife, Dr. Berland stated the defendant was not competent. 
Even though there is conflicting evidence on the issue, the trial court’s 
determination is supported by competent, substantial evidence and will not be 
disturbed on this appeal.  See Evans v. State, 800 So. 2d 182, 188 (Fla. 2001) 
(“Even when the experts’ reports conflict, it is the function of the trial court to 
resolve such factual disputes, and the trial court’s determination should be upheld 
absent an abuse of discretion.”).  As there was evidentiary support in the record for 
the trial court’s decision, we will not disturb the trial court’s competency 
determination.  See Mora v. State, 814 So. 2d 322, 327 (Fla.) (“In situations where 
there is conflicting expert testimony regarding the defendant’s competency, it is 
the trial court’s responsibility to consider all the evidence relevant to competency 
and resolve the factual dispute.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1050 (2002). 
The trial judge held hearings on Hernandez-Alberto’s competency at various 
stages of the trial proceedings and did not err in finding him competent to stand 
trial. 
Issue 2: Pro Se Representation 
Hernandez-Alberto next asserts that the trial court erred in allowing him to 
proceed pro se at trial.  From the time of his arrest until the third day of his trial, 
Hernandez-Alberto had been represented at different times by two sets of 
 
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attorneys. At some point he requested that both sets be discharged.  Prior to 
discharging each set of attorneys, the trial court conducted a Nelson hearing.  Such 
a hearing is required: 
[W]here a defendant, before the commencement of trial, makes it appear to 
the trial judge that he desires to discharge his court appointed counsel, the 
trial judge, in order to protect the indigent’s right to effective counsel, 
should make an inquiry of the defendant as to the reason for the request to 
discharge.  If incompetency of counsel is assigned by the defendant as the 
reason, or a reason, the trial judge should make a sufficient inquiry of the 
defendant and his appointed counsel to determine whether or not there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the court appointed counsel is not rendering 
effective assistance to the defendant.  If reasonable cause for such belief 
appears, the court should make a finding to that effect on the record and 
appoint a substitute attorney who should be allowed adequate time to 
prepare the defense.  If no reasonable basis appears for a finding of 
ineffective representation, the trial court should so state on the record and 
advise the defendant that if he discharges his original counsel the State may 
not thereafter be required to appoint a substitute.  See Wilder v. State, Fla. 
App. 1963, 156 So. 2d 395, 397.  If the defendant continues to demand a 
dismissal of his court appointed counsel, the trial judge may in his discretion 
discharge counsel and require the defendant to proceed to trial without 
representation by court appointed counsel. 
Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256, 258-59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). 
After both Nelson hearings, the trial court concluded that Hernandez-Alberto 
had been zealously represented.  However, at the conclusion of the first Nelson 
hearing, the trial court nonetheless discharged counsel and appointed substitute 
counsel.  Prior to discharging the second set of attorneys and prior to opening 
statements, the trial court warned Hernandez-Alberto that substitute counsel would 
not be appointed and asked Hernandez-Alberto if he still wished to discharge his 
 
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counsel and represent himself.  When Hernandez-Alberto indicated that he wished 
to discharge his counsel, the trial court conducted a Faretta inquiry. 
When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a 
purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the 
right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused 
must “knowingly and intelligently” forgo those relinquished benefits.  
Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a 
lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, 
he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, so that the record will establish that “he knows what he is 
doing and that his choice is made with his eyes open.” 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (citations omitted).  During the 
Faretta inquiry, Hernandez-Alberto indicated that he understood the charges 
against him, that he wished to represent himself, and that he understood the 
consequences of representing himself.  Hernandez-Alberto then represented 
himself for two days while his second set of counsel remained, as required by the 
trial court’s order, as standby counsel.3  During those two days, the trial court 
asked Hernandez-Alberto numerous times if he wished to have his counsel 
reappointed, and Hernandez-Alberto declined these invitations.  On the morning of 
the final day of the guilt phase, Hernandez-Alberto moved for standby counsel to 
be reappointed prior to closing arguments, and the trial court granted his request. 
                                        
3.  The “State may—even over objection by the accused—appoint a 
‘standby counsel’ to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to 
be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the 
defendant’s self-representation is necessary.”  Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 n.46. 
 
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Based upon the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err in allowing 
Hernandez-Alberto to proceed pro se.  As we stated in Bowen: 
[O]nce a court determines that a competent defendant of his or her own free 
will has “knowingly and intelligently” waived the right to counsel, the 
dictates of Faretta are satisfied, the inquiry is over, and the defendant may 
proceed unrepresented.  See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111.  The court may not 
inquire further into whether the defendant “could provide himself with a 
substantively qualitative defense,” Bowen, 677 So. 2d at 864, for it is within 
the defendant’s rights, if he or she so chooses, to sit mute and mount no 
defense at all. 
State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248, 251 (Fla. 1997).  Although Hernandez-Alberto’s 
self-representation did not result in a favorable outcome, the trial court committed 
no error in allowing Hernandez-Alberto to represent himself, because the record 
demonstrates that the trial court properly conducted a Faretta hearing.  As 
explained by the United States Supreme Court in Faretta: 
It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could 
better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts.  
But where the defendant will not voluntarily accept representation by 
counsel, the potential advantage of a lawyer’s training and experience can be 
realized, if at all, only imperfectly.  To force a lawyer on a defendant can 
only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him.  Moreover, it is 
not inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defendant might in fact 
present his case more effectively by conducting his own defense.  Personal 
liberties are not rooted in the law of averages.  The right to defend is 
personal.  The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the 
personal consequences of a conviction.  It is the defendant, therefore, who 
must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to 
his advantage.  And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to 
his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of “that respect for the 
individual which is the lifeblood of the law.” 
 
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Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.4  The trial court did not err in allowing the defendant to 
exercise his right to represent himself in this case. 
Issue 3: Motion for Continuance 
Hernandez-Alberto further claims the trial court erred in denying his motion 
for a continuance after the trial court permitted him to proceed pro se.  We have 
repeatedly held that “[t]he denial of a motion for continuance is committed to the 
sound discretion of the trial judge.”  Lebron v. State, 799 So. 2d 997, 1018 (Fla. 
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1036 (2002).  A “court’s ruling on a motion for 
continuance will only be reversed when an abuse of discretion is shown.  An abuse 
of discretion is generally not found unless the court’s ruling on the continuance 
results in undue prejudice to [the] defendant.  This general rule is true even in 
death penalty cases.”  Israel v. State, 837 So. 2d 381, 388 (Fla. 2002) (quoting 
Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1127 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 931 
(2003)).  “While death penalty cases command our closest scrutiny, it is still the 
obligation of an appellate court to review with caution the exercise of experienced 
discretion by a trial judge in matters such as a motion for a continuance.”  Cooper 
v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133, 1138 (Fla. 1976). 
                                        
4.  Accord Bowen, 698 So. 2d at 250 (“The federal Court in Faretta made no 
provision for an additional layer of protection requiring courts to ascertain whether 
the defendant is intellectually capable of conducting an effective defense.  Such a 
requirement would be difficult to apply and would constitute a substantial intrusion 
on the right of self-representation.”). 
 
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Hernandez-Alberto offered three reasons for his request for a continuance: 
(1) so that he could go to the library and familiarize himself with the law because 
he knew “almost nothing”; (2) so that he could obtain a copy of the indictment and 
read it over; and (3) so that he could have someone go to the library with him and 
translate from English to Spanish all of the related discovery documents in the case 
for him so that he could understand the State’s case.  The trial court addressed all 
three of Hernandez-Alberto’s concerns, so a continuance was unnecessary.  The 
trial court repeatedly warned Hernandez-Alberto that his unfamiliarity with the law 
was the main reason why it would be advantageous to remain represented by his 
counsel.  Furthermore, the trial court appointed standby counsel to assist 
Hernandez-Alberto with the legal aspects of his case.  The trial court recessed the 
guilt phase proceedings, gave Hernandez-Alberto a copy of the indictment, and 
allowed him to read the indictment in his cell.  Leann Goudie, one of the attorneys 
initially assigned to represent Hernandez-Alberto, testified that she had traveled to 
the jail on two occasions to visit Hernandez-Alberto and translated the discovery 
documents into Spanish so that he could understand the charges and evidence 
against him.  Furthermore, Caroline Fulgueira, a mitigation specialist hired by the 
Office of the Public Defender, testified that she played to Hernandez-Alberto the 
taped confession he made to the Brookshire police chief.  This tape was a major 
piece of evidence against him in the State’s case.  Hernandez-Alberto even 
 
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admitted that Fulgueira had in fact played the tape for him.  The trial court 
thoroughly considered and addressed the reasons proffered for a continuance.  
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hernandez-
Alberto’s pro se motion for a continuance. 
Issue 4: PET Scan 
Hernandez-Alberto also asserts the trial court erred in initially denying his 
motion for a PET scan.  Because he was given an opportunity to have a PET scan 
but refused to cooperate, we deny relief on this issue.  In Rogers v. State, 783 So. 
2d 980 (Fla. 2001), we stated the criteria to be applied by trial courts in making a 
determination regarding the necessity for a PET scan.  We said: 
A trial court’s decision to deny a defendant’s motion for a PET-Scan 
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.  In evaluating whether 
the trial court abused its discretion, this Court generally looks at two factors.  
First, before the trial court will provide a defendant with the necessary funds 
for a PET-Scan, the defendant must establish a particularized need for the 
test, that is, that the test is necessary for experts to make a more definitive 
determination as to whether the defendant’s brain is functioning properly 
and to provide their opinions about the extent of the defendant’s brain 
damage.  Second, this Court must consider whether the defendant was 
prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of the motion requesting a PET-Scan. 
 Id. at 998-99 (citations omitted). 
On March 21, 2001, Hernandez-Alberto filed a motion for a PET scan to 
help in preparation for the sentencing phase.  In the motion Hernandez-Alberto 
pointed to Dr. Berland’s March 8, 2001, affidavit which recommended that the 
defendant receive a PET scan in order to “contribute critical and otherwise 
 
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unavailable information about the presence of injured brain tissue which which 
[sic] may have been caused by the auto accident described above [Hernandez-
Alberto’s accident with a Hillsborough County sheriff], or in other, unknown 
incidents in the defendant’s history.”  Although the trial court initially denied the 
motion for a PET scan on January 7, 2002, the trial court reversed itself and 
ordered that $2500 be allotted for a PET scan.  This order was entered three 
months prior to the April 30 Spencer hearing.  Had the test been done, the results 
of the PET scan would have been available for argument as mitigation at the 
Spencer hearing.  However, Hernandez-Alberto refused to allow a PET scan to be 
performed on him.  He now claims that, although he refused to cooperate with a 
PET scan prior to the Spencer hearing, he might have cooperated with a PET scan 
prior to the guilt and penalty phase hearings, and he may cooperate with PET scan 
testing on remand.  He concedes that when given the opportunity he did not allow 
the PET scan. 
It is clear that the trial court afforded Hernandez-Alberto the opportunity for 
a PET scan, and he refused to take advantage of it.  As a result, he has failed to 
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s initial decision to deny the 
PET scan.  Therefore, error has not been demonstrated. 
Issue 5: Premeditation 
 
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Hernandez-Alberto next asserts that there was insufficient evidence of 
premeditation as to count one, the murder of Donna Berezovsky.  In Johnston v. 
State, 863 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1676 (2004), we 
reiterated our definition of premeditation, and said: 
Premeditation is defined as “a fully-formed conscious purpose to kill, 
which exists in the mind of the perpetrator for a sufficient length of time to 
permit of reflection, and in pursuance of which an act of killing ensues.”  
Blackwood v. State, 777 So. 2d 399, 406 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Sireci v. State, 
399 So. 2d 964, 967 (Fla. 1981)).  Premeditation may be “formed in a 
moment and need only exist ‘for such time as will allow the accused to be 
conscious of the nature of the act he is about to commit and the probable 
result of that act.’”  Blackwood, 777 So. 2d at 406 (quoting DeAngelo v. 
State, 616 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 1993)). 
Id. at 285.  The facts and circumstances of Donna Berezovsky’s death indicate that 
the defendant had sufficient time to form the state of mind necessary for 
premeditated murder. 
During direct examination, the former chief of police for Brookshire, Texas, 
Joe Garcia, recounted Hernandez-Alberto’s taped confession, in which Hernandez-
Alberto admitted that he took his own daughter, Gabriella, and placed her in a 
bedroom before he confronted Donna in the family room.  He asked Donna to pick 
up a toy, and when she refused, he hit her in the head.  Donna fell on the 
floor.  Hernandez-Alberto then removed a gun from his fanny pack and fired a shot 
into her back as she lay face down.  These actions demonstrate there was sufficient 
 
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time for Hernandez-Alberto to be conscious of and reflect on his 
actions.  Therefore, this issue is without merit. 
Issue 6: Proportionality 
On the issue of sentencing, Hernandez-Alberto argues that the death penalty 
is not appropriate because it is not proportional and is premised on inapplicable 
aggravating factors and the improper disregard of critical mitigating factors.  ”In 
deciding whether death is a proportionate penalty, we must consider the totality of 
the circumstances of the case and compare the case with other capital cases.  We 
also must remain mindful that the death penalty is reserved for the most aggravated 
and least mitigated of first-degree murders.”  Johnson v. State, 720 So. 2d 232, 238 
(Fla. 1998) (citations omitted). 
The trial court found three aggravating circumstances applicable to the 
murder of Donna Berezovsky: (1) previous violent felony conviction; (2) victim 
less than twelve years old; and (3) vulnerable victim.  The trial court found two 
aggravating circumstances applicable to the murder of Isela Gonzalez:  (1) 
previous violent felony conviction and (2) CCP.5  All of the aggravating factors 
were given great weight.  
                                        
5.  As we stated in Larkins v. State, 739 So. 2d 90, 95 (Fla. 1999), the CCP 
aggravator is one of the “most serious aggravators set out in the statutory 
sentencing scheme.”  
 
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The trial court considered and analyzed the following mitigating 
circumstances: (1) no significant criminal history (some weight); (2) extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance (no weight); (3) substantial impairment (no 
weight); (4) age of the defendant (no weight); and (5) the defendant’s background 
(some weight) and a number of nonstatutory circumstances.   
A comparison of this case to other capital cases with similar aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances demonstrates that Hernandez-Alberto’s sentence of death 
is proportional.  See Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2003) (finding death 
sentence proportional in case where defendant murdered his wife and two young 
children with three aggravating circumstances of previous conviction of another 
capital offense, HAC, and CCP; statutory mitigating circumstances of no 
significant prior criminal history and that the murders were committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 
and a number of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances); Lynch v. State, 841 So. 
2d 362 (Fla.) (finding death sentence proportional in case where defendant 
murdered his mistress and her thirteen-year-old daughter with three aggravating 
circumstances as to the murder of the mistress: CCP, prior violent felony 
conviction, and the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in one or 
more other felonies; three aggravating circumstances as to the murder of the 
daughter: HAC, prior violent felony conviction, and the murder was committed 
 
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while defendant was engaged in one or more other felonies; statutory mitigating 
circumstance of no significant history of prior criminal activity; and a number of 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, including mental or emotional disturbance 
and substantial impairment), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 189 (2003); Rimmer v. State, 
825 So. 2d 304 (Fla.) (finding death sentence proportional in case where defendant 
murdered two people during a robbery with aggravating circumstances that the 
murders were committed by a person convicted of a felony and under a sentence of 
imprisonment, the defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony 
and a felony involving use or threat of violence to the person, the murders were 
committed while the defendant was engaged in a robbery and kidnapping, the 
murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest, 
HAC, and CCP; no statutory mitigating circumstances; and a number of 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, including a troubled family background and 
diagnosis of a schizoaffective disorder), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1034 
(2002).  Therefore, we conclude that death is a proportionate penalty in this case. 
Issue 7: Ring6 Claim 
Lastly, Hernandez-Alberto asserts that Florida’s capital sentencing statute is 
unconstitutional.  We have repeatedly rejected such challenges.  See, e.g., Bottoson 
v. Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002).  Hernandez-
                                        
6.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 
- 22 - 
Alberto specifically argues that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional because (1) the State is not required to provide notice of the 
aggravating circumstances it intends to establish at the penalty phase; (2) the jury 
is not required to make any specific findings regarding the existence of aggravating 
circumstances, or even of a defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty; (3) there is 
no requirement of jury unanimity for finding individual aggravating circumstances 
or for making a recommendation of death; and (4) the State is not required to prove 
the appropriateness of the death penalty.  We have rejected each of these 
assertions.  See, e.g.,  Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981, 986 (Fla. 2003) (rejecting 
argument that aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the indictment, 
submitted to the jury, and individually found by a unanimous jury verdict); 
Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41, 54 (Fla.) (“While Ring makes Apprendi7 
applicable to death penalty cases, Ring does not require either notice of the 
aggravating factors that the State will present at sentencing or a special verdict 
form indicating the aggravating factors found by the jury.”), cert. denied, 124 S. 
Ct. 392 (2003).  Additionally, the assertion that the State does not have to prove 
the appropriateness of the death penalty is simply without merit.  In a criminal 
prosecution the State always has the burden of proof, and in the sentencing context 
the State bears that burden by proving the existence of each aggravating 
                                        
7.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 
- 23 - 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Clark v. State, 443 So. 2d 973, 976 
(Fla. 1983) (“The burden is upon the state in the sentencing portion of a capital 
felony trial to prove every aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”).  Therefore, this claim is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Hernandez-Alberto’s conviction for two 
counts of first-degree murder and the two sentences of death. 
It is so ordered. 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion. 
BELL, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., concurs. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs as to the conviction and concurs in result only as to the 
sentence. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., specially concurring. 
I concur in the affirmance of the convictions and sentences in this case, but 
write separately to address the majority's discussion on the constitutionality of the 
death sentences under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  I cannot agree with 
the majority's conclusion that there is no constitutional requirement of a unanimous 
 
- 24 - 
finding of a death-qualifying aggravating circumstance.  As I have previously 
stated, I believe that the Sixth Amendment dictates of Ring and the right to trial by 
jury in article I, section 22 of the Florida Constitution combine to require that the 
jury unanimously find an aggravating factor that makes the defendant eligible for 
the death penalty.  See Butler v. State, 842 So. 2d 817, 836 (Fla. 2003) (Pariente, 
J., dissenting).   
Although the jury vote recommending death in this case was not unanimous, 
the aggravator of previous conviction of a violent felony removes the death 
sentence from the requirements of Ring and article I, section 22.  See Doorbal v. 
State, 837 So. 2d 940, 964 (Fla.) (Pariente, J., concurring as to the conviction and 
concurring in result only as to the sentence) (stating that the prior violent felony 
aggravator makes it unnecessary to determine whether the nonunanimous 
recommendation renders the death sentence unconstitutional), cert. denied, 123 S. 
Ct. 2647 (2003).  Accordingly, Hernandez-Alberto's death sentence does not 
violate his federal or state constitutional guarantees to a jury trial. 
 
BELL, J., specially concurring. 
I fully concur with the majority opinion.  I write separately simply to 
commend the trial judge for his unfaltering patience and painstaking attention to 
 
- 25 - 
the numerous procedural and substantive issues that arose in this difficult case.  
His professionalism throughout these proceedings was exemplary. 
WELLS, J., concurs. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,  
Daniel Perry, Judge - Case No. 99-117 CFAWS 
 
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public 
Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Katherine V. Blanco, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General and Kimberly Nolen Hopkins, Assistant Attorney General, 
Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee