Case Title: Troupis v. Summer Division of proceeds of sale of jointly owned real property

Citation: 

Docket Number: 35449

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2009-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 35449 
 
 
CHRIST T. TROUPIS and MAUREEN D. 
TROUPIS, husband and wife,                       
                                        
           Plaintiffs-Respondents,                                 
 v.                                     
                                        
D. SCOTT SUMMER and CHARLOTTE 
SUMMER, husband and wife, 
 
and 
 
WELLS FARGO BANK NORTHWEST, 
National Association, and DOES 1–10, 
inclusive, 
                                            
           Defendants-Appellants.          
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Boise, September 2009 Term 
 
2009 Opinion No. 122 
 
Filed:  October 9, 2009 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Ada 
County.  Hon. Patrick H. Owen, District Judge, Hon. Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge. 
 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
D. Scott Summer, appellant pro se. 
 
Gilbert L. Nelson, PLLC, Caldwell, for appellant Charlotte Summer. 
 
R. Brad Masingill, Weiser, for respondents. 
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice. 
 
D. Scott and Charlotte Summer appeal from the district court’s judgment dividing among 
the parties the proceeds of sale of jointly owned real property. We affirm.  
I. 
Factual and Procedural Summary 
Christ and Maureen Troupis were co-owners with D. Scott Summer and Charlotte 
Summer as tenants in common of real property located at 385 S. Locust Grove Road, Meridian, 
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Idaho. The Troupises alleged that from September 8, 2006, up to the filing of their lawsuit to 
partition and sell the real property, they incurred expenses for the common benefit of the co-
owners amounting to $40,560.54. The expenses included real estate taxes, principal and interest 
payments on the mortgage and line of credit secured by the real property, insurance, utilities, and 
weed removal. After the lawsuit was filed, the Troupises incurred further expenses to keep the 
property out of foreclosure, raising their claim to $52,453.65.   
 
On October 3, 2007, the Troupises filed a verified complaint for partition of the real 
property. The complaint requested the following relief: partition and sale of the real property, 
reimbursement of all sums incurred by the Troupises in maintaining the property for the common 
benefit of the parties, and division of the net proceeds of the sale between the parties.   
 
D. Scott Summer filed a verified answer pro se, asserting that the court lacked 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuit under Idaho Code sections 6-501 and 6-541. 
He also alleged as an affirmative defense that he was entitled to an equitable setoff for wage 
claims and ―wrongfully appropriated [p]artnership monies.‖ Charlotte Summer appeared through 
an attorney, and her answer similarly attacked the court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter.1 
Charlotte also asked the court to equitably set off amounts due to the Troupises for Scott’s wage 
claims and certain payments made by the Summers for utilities, mortgage indebtedness, and 
other expenses.   
 
While the lawsuit was pending, the parties found a buyer for the real property and the 
property was sold on March 20, 2008, pursuant to agreement of the parties. After all taxes and 
mortgage liens were satisfied, $114,202.92 of the proceeds remained payable to the Troupises 
and Summers. The Summers objected to any division of the sale proceeds that provided for 
repayment to the Troupises of the monies they advanced to preserve the property. After a 
disagreement regarding where to deposit the proceeds, the money simply remained in escrow 
until the court issued its ruling on the Troupises’ motion for summary judgment.   
 
The Troupises moved for summary judgment, asking the court to distribute the proceeds 
of the sale. Hearing was held on May 12, 2008. The Summers filed no affidavits to support their 
objections to the Troupises’ claims. Instead, the Summers called the court five minutes before 
the hearing to advise that they would not appear. After the hearing, the court issued its findings 
                                                 
1 D. Scott Summer initially attempted to appear pro se on behalf of his wife; however, the district court determined 
that Scott could not represent his wife’s interest pro se, and therefore she had to appear pro se herself or hire an 
attorney.   
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of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in which it found the Troupises to be the prevailing 
party and awarded them $52,453.65, representing the money they expended for the common 
benefit of the parties, plus accrued interest. The court also allowed the Summers $4,611.42 for 
expenditures they made for the common benefit of the parties, plus accrued interest. Finally, the 
court ordered that the remaining sale proceeds were to be divided equally between the parties.   
 
The district court awarded the Troupises $168.00 in costs and $13,920.00 in attorney fees 
for a total award of $14,088.00. The Summers appealed to this Court.  
II. 
Issues on Appeal 
 
The following issues are presented to this Court on appeal: (1) whether the district court 
had jurisdiction to divide the sale proceeds of the jointly-held property; and (2) whether the 
district court erred in awarding the Troupises attorney fees and costs.  
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
The issue of whether the district court had jurisdiction over this action is one of law, over 
which this Court exercises free review. Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 
1286 (2009). 
B. 
 
The Summers argue that Idaho Code section 6-501, under which this suit was brought, 
does not grant subject matter jurisdiction to the district court to distribute the proceeds of the sale 
of jointly-owned property when the sale was not judicially ordered. Under the Summers’ reading 
of section 6-501, the district court has the authority to order the sale, but lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to divide the resulting proceeds of sale. The Summers assert that section 6-501 
confers jurisdiction over real property only, and not the proceeds of a real property sale, which 
are personal property.  
 
The Troupises contend that the district court had equitable jurisdiction over the sale 
proceeds because both parties asserted equitable claims related to the proceeds of the sale of the 
tenancy-in-common real property in their pleadings. The Troupises point out that the Idaho 
Constitution and statutes grant the district court jurisdiction over cases like this one and allow the 
district court to make compensatory adjustments between parties when deciding the case.  
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Subject matter jurisdiction is a key requirement for the justiciability of a claim and cannot 
be waived by consent of the parties. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626, 586 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (1978). Because of the serious ramifications of a court acting without subject matter 
jurisdiction, namely that the judgments of that court are void, the concept must be clearly 
defined. Id. Subject matter jurisdiction was first defined in Richardson v. Ruddy, a case dealing 
with the predecessor to Idaho Code section 6-501, the statute in issue here:  
 
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the right of the court 
to exercise judicial power over that class of cases; not the 
particular case before it, but rather the abstract power to try a case 
of the kind or character of the one pending; and not whether the 
particular case is one that presents a cause of action, or under the 
particular facts is triable before the court in which it is pending, 
because of some of the inherent facts that exist and may be 
developed during trial.  
 
15 Idaho 488, 494-95, 98 P. 842, 844 (1908). This Court has adopted a presumption that courts 
of general jurisdiction have subject matter jurisdiction unless a party can show otherwise. Borah 
v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 78, 205 P.3d 1209, 1214 (2009).2  
The district court in this case had jurisdiction because it is a court of general jurisdiction 
and there has been no showing that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking. First, Idaho’s 
Constitution provides that ―[t]he district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at 
law and in equity.‖ Idaho Const. art. 5, § 20. Second, the relevant statutes—all part of Idaho 
Code, title 6, chapter 5, entitled ―Partition of Real Estate‖—provide for jurisdiction over both the 
class of cases presented and over the specific remedy sought. The lawsuit was filed pursuant to 
Idaho Code section 6-501, which reads: 
When partition may be had.  When several cotenants hold and 
are in possession of real property as parceners, joint tenants or 
tenants in common, in which one (1) or more of them have an 
                                                 
2 The Summers also argued in the court below, although they have failed to do so in their briefing to this Court, that 
the issue before the court is moot. Because this Court does not hear moot cases, the issue of mootness will be 
addressed. Comm. for Rational Predator Mgmt. v. Dept. of Agric., 129 Idaho 670, 672, 931 P.2d 1188, 1190 (1997). 
A case becomes moot when the issues addressed are ―no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest 
in the outcome.‖ Id. A case is also moot where ―a judicial determination will have no practical effect on the 
outcome.‖ Id. Here, the parties’ current status demonstrates that the case is not moot. The parties have a live 
controversy concerning the amount of reimbursement and/or setoff for funds they have expended for the benefit of 
their commonly held property. The proceeds of sale were under the jurisdiction of the district court and the district 
court’s decision in this case determined how they would be divided among the parties. Thus, the determination in 
this case had a practical effect on the parties’ recovery, rendering it a live controversy subject to appeal under 
Committee for Rational Predator Management. 
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estate of inheritance, or for life or lives, or for years, an action may 
be brought by one (1) or more of such persons for a partition 
thereof, according to the respective rights of the persons interested 
therein, and for a sale of such property, or a part thereof, if it 
appears that a partition cannot be made without great prejudice to 
the owners.   
 
I.C. § 6-501. The statutory and constitutional provisions, when taken together, demonstrate that 
the district court, as a court of general jurisdiction, had the authority to hear this matter when 
filed because it was in fact dealing with the partition of real property under the authority granted 
by Idaho Code section 6-501.  
To support their claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Summers rely on Platts 
v. Platts, which presents a situation entirely inapplicable to the question presented here. 37 Idaho 
149, 215 P. 464 (1923). Platts involved this Court’s examination of the validity of a judgment 
rendered by an Oregon Court. Id. at 151–52, 215 P. at 465. The Court determined that because 
the judgment did not demonstrate the Oregon court ever had personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant, the judgment was void. Id. (―If the authority to render the judgment is given by 
statute, and the proceedings are not according to the course of the common law, there is no 
presumption in favor of the judgment, and, if the record fails to show the existence of all the 
facts necessary to give the court authority to render it, the judgment is of no effect.‖). Platts is 
inapplicable to this case because it presents a question of personal jurisdiction rather than subject 
matter jurisdiction, and the facts that demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction in this case are 
clearly set forth in the record. 
Furthermore, the district court retained jurisdiction even after the property was sold, as 
indicated by the plain language of Idaho Code, title 6, chapter 5. There are several provisions of 
chapter 5 which show the Legislature intended for the district court to retain jurisdiction over a 
cause of action properly brought under that chapter, even after the subject property is sold. For 
example, Idaho Code section 6-508 provides that ―[t]he rights of the several parties, plaintiff as 
well as defendant, may be put in issue, tried and determined,‖ with no mention that those rights 
must be rights in real property. I.C. § 6-508. Additionally, Idaho Code section 6-522 provides for 
the distribution of sale proceeds as directed by the court. I.C. § 6-522. Finally, Idaho Code 
section 6-541 provides that ―in all cases the court has power to make compensatory adjustment 
between the respective parties according to the ordinary principles of equity.‖ I.C. § 6-541 
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(emphasis added). Accordingly, because the statutory language clearly vests the district court 
with equitable powers to apportion the proceeds of the sale of jointly held property after sale, the 
argument that the Court loses jurisdiction when the property is sold is without merit. 
This Court has long recognized ―that equity having obtained jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of a dispute, will retain it for the settlement of all controversies between the parties with 
respect thereto and will grant all proper relief whether prayed for or not.‖ Boesinger v. Freer, 85 
Idaho 551, 563, 381 P.2d 802, 809 (1963); see also Kessler v. Tortoise Dev., Inc., 134 Idaho 264, 
270, 1 P.3d 292, 298 (2000); Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 108 Idaho 602, 606, 701 P.2d 
222, 226 (1985). This principle allows the court flexibility in adjudicating cases, which is 
necessary because not all cases are presented in precisely the same fashion.  The district court 
acquired jurisdiction when the Troupises filed the lawsuit. The district court retained jurisdiction 
to conclude the action even after the parties agreed to sell the property—an agreement which 
may have been prompted by the filing of the lawsuit in the first place. Thus, the district court had 
jurisdiction over the case and properly granted summary judgment. 
C. 
The Summers argue that the award of attorney fees should be vacated because the district 
court had no jurisdiction to make its ruling, and therefore, no jurisdiction to award attorney fees. 
As discussed above, the court had jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the Summers’ 
arguments that the attorney fee award should be vacated is likewise without merit. The Troupises 
request attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code sections 12-120(3) and 12-121.  We award fees 
under section 12-120(3).  
Idaho Code section 12-120(3) compels an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party 
in an action to recover on a commercial transaction. I.C. § 12-120(3); BECO Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
J-U-B Eng’rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 844, 851 (2008). A court must award attorney 
fees to the prevailing party in an action to recover on a ―commercial transaction.‖ I.C. § 12-
120(3); BECO, 145 Idaho at 726, 184 P.3d at 851. A ―commercial transaction‖ is defined as ―all 
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.‖ I.C. § 12-120(3). The test 
to determine whether this section applies is whether the commercial transaction comprises the 
gravamen of the lawsuit; it must be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the 
party is attempting to recover. Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 432, 196 P.3d 341, 350 
(2008). The Summers and Troupises owned the real property in question to conduct their 
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business together. Therefore, the lawsuit was to recover on a commercial transaction and the 
Troupises are entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
III. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. The Troupises are awarded attorney fees 
and costs on appeal.  
 
 
Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices BURDICK and HORTON, and Pro Tem Justice 
KIDWELL CONCUR.