Case Title: Ex parte Kristopher Vanderwall.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1130036, 1130041

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 09/30/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2015
____________________
1130036
____________________
Ex parte Kristopher Vanderwall
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: M.C.
v.
Tallassee Rehabilitation, P.C., and Kristopher Vanderwall)
____________________
1130041
____________________
Kristopher Vanderwall
v.
M.C.
Proceedings from Elmore Circuit Court
(CV-10-900200)
MURDOCK, Justice.
Kristopher Vanderwall has filed both an appeal and a
petition for a writ of mandamus challenging orders of the
Elmore Circuit Court in an action filed against him by M.C. 
We dismiss the appeal, and we deny Vanderwall's petition.
I.  Facts
On November 12, 2009, M.C. had an appointment to receive
physical 
therapy 
at 
Tallassee 
Rehabilitation, 
P.C. 
("Tallassee
Rehab"), pursuant to a referral by her physician for treatment
of back pain.  M.C. arrived at Tallassee Rehab around 8:30 or
9:00 a.m. and was seen by Vanderwall, a physical therapist,
whom she had never met.  
According 
to 
M.C., 
the 
following 
then 
occurred. 
Vanderwall took her to a room, where he instructed her to put
on a gown.  Vanderwall left the room and closed the door. 
M.C. took off her jacket and shirt and put on a gown.  She did
not take off her bra or her pants.  Vanderwall returned to the
room, unhooked M.C.'s bra and told her to lie on the table in
the room; M.C. did as she was instructed, but, after she was
2
1130036 and 1130041
on the table, Vanderwall started to move his hands over her
body, removing her bra and the gown.  Vanderwall then began to
rub M.C.'s breasts, and he removed M.C.'s pants and panties
and placed his fingers into her buttocks and genitals.  In
deposition testimony, M.C. testified that she was shocked and
scared by Vanderwall's actions and that she did not know what
to do.
Vanderwall testified that "any and all transactions and
interactions" he had with M.C. on November 12, 2009, were "in
connection with the rendition of physical therapy services."
He stated that his actions were within the standard of care
for a physical therapist and that "[n]othing inappropriate
occurred during the delivery of physical therapy to [M.C.]." 
He also stated that the services he did in fact perform were
conducted pursuant to an order he received from M.C.'s
physician, Dr. Melvin Russell.  Vanderwall testified that
there was no therapy or medical reason for him to touch M.C.'s
breasts or her genitals and that he did not do so.  
M.C. alleges that Vanderwall has a pattern of this kind
of behavior and that he molested at least two other women in
2009 while administering physical therapy.  In 2010, those two
3
1130036 and 1130041
women filed an action in the Elmore Circuit Court against
Vanderwall and Tallassee Rehab alleging that Vanderwall had
molested them.1
M.C. filed a complaint against Vanderwall and Tallassee
Rehab in which she sought money damages based on a claim of
assault and battery against Vanderwall and a claim of
negligent or wanton hiring against Tallassee Rehab.  Both
defendants answered the complaint and denied the allegations. 
Along with the complaint, M.C. filed requests for discovery
from Vanderwall.  Included in the discovery requests were
interrogatories 9 and 10, which provided:
"9. Has anyone complained to you that they were
inappropriately touched by you while at Tallassee
Rehab?  If so, please identify every person.
"10. Has anyone complained to you or to any of your
employers that they were inappropriately touched by
you while at an employer's facility?  If so, please
identify said person."
On August 30, 2010, Vanderwall filed objections to M.C.'s
discovery requests.  One of Vanderwall's objections was that
interrogatories 
9 and 
10 
were 
inappropriate 
because,
M.C. complained to Tallassee Rehab about Vanderwall's
1
actions, and, as a result of the accusation, Tallassee Rehab
placed Vanderwall on indefinite suspension without pay.
Vanderwall 
left 
Tallassee 
Rehab's 
employment 
in 
December 
2009.
4
1130036 and 1130041
Vanderwall asserted,  the Alabama Medical Liability Act,
§ 6-5-480 et seq. and § 6-5-540 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the
AMLA"),  which he argued applies, and specifically § 6-5-551,
2
Ala. Code 1975, prohibits "conducting discovery with regard 
to
any other act or omission or from introducing at trial
evidence of any other act or omission."
On January 14, 2011, M.C. filed a motion to compel
discovery.  In the motion, M.C. contended that "[t]his case is
not a medical malpractice case, but an assault and battery
case alleging that [M.C.] was molested by Mr. Vanderwall." 
Accordingly, M.C. argued, Vanderwall could not use the AMLA as
a basis on which to refuse to answer M.C.'s interrogatories
concerning other acts.  Vanderwall responded with a motion for
a protective order in which he argued that the AMLA did apply
to M.C.'s action and that, therefore, under § 6-5-551, he
should not be obligated to respond to M.C.'s discovery
requests that sought information about other acts.
On March 8, 2011, the trial court held a hearing on
M.C.'s motion to compel discovery.  Following the hearing, the
See George H. Lanier Mem'l Hosp. v. Andrews, 901 So. 2d
2
714, 721 (Ala. 2004) (explaining the relationship between the
provisions of the AMLA set out in § 6-5-480 et seq. and those
set out in § 6-5-540 et seq.).
5
1130036 and 1130041
parties 
submitted 
additional 
materials 
and 
arguments
concerning the issue.
On January 6, 2012, Tallassee Rehab filed a "Petition and
Motion" seeking a ruling from the trial court that M.C.'s
action was governed by the AMLA.  On January 26, 2012,
Vanderwall filed a joinder in Tallassee Rehab's "Petition and
Motion."  On February 8, 2012, M.C. filed a response in
opposition to the motion.  On April 6, 2012, the trial court
held a hearing on the defendants' joint motion seeking a
ruling that the action was governed by the AMLA.  On April 7,
2012, the trial court entered an order allowing M.C. 14 days
to amend her complaint to add a count seeking a judgment
declaring that general tort-law principles pertaining to
assault and battery and negligent or wanton hiring governed
her claims for relief and that the AMLA was not the law that
applied to her claims for relief against the defendants.
On April 20, 2012, M.C. filed an amended complaint in
which she sought a judgment declaring "that the AMLA does not
apply" to the claims she asserted against Vanderwall and
Tallassee Rehab.  The defendants filed answers to the amended
complaint. 
6
1130036 and 1130041
On November 13, 2012, M.C. filed a motion to dismiss her
claim against Tallassee Rehab.  The trial court entered an
order on December 4, 2012, dismissing the claims against
Tallassee Rehab 
with prejudice, and the case 
proceeded against
only Vanderwall.  
On April 19, 2013, M.C. filed a motion for a partial
summary judgment as to her declaratory-judgment "claim" –-
i.e., a ruling that general tort-law principles governing
assault and battery claims, rather than the AMLA, applied to
her 
assault 
and 
battery 
claims 
against 
Vanderwall. 
Subsequently, on May 9, 2013, Vanderwall filed a motion for a
partial summary judgment in his favor as to the same "claim." 
That is, Vanderwall sought a decision by the trial court that
the AMLA did apply to M.C.'s assault and battery claims
against him.
On July 2, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on the
motions for a partial summary judgment and on M.C.'s motion to
compel discovery.  On August 29, 2013, the trial court entered
an order granting M.C.'s motion for a partial summary
judgment, stating, in pertinent part:
"The Court finds that the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment filed on behalf of [M.C.] is due to
7
1130036 and 1130041
be granted and the Court finds that the Alabama
Medical Liability Act is not applicable to this
case.  It is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the
said Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on
behalf of the Plaintiff, [M.C.], is due to be and is
hereby GRANTED, related to Count III, Declaratory
Judgment Relief, only.  The Court holds that under
the facts of this case, none of the provisions of
the Alabama Medical Liability Act, including, but
not limited to § 6-5-551, are applicable to this
case.
"The Court further finds that this matter
involves a controlling question of law as to which
there are substantial grounds for a difference of
opinion, that an immediate appeal from the Order
would materially advance the ultimate termination of
litigation, and that the appeal would avoid
protracted and expensive litigation.[ ]  The Court
3
further makes a specific and express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and that said
judgment shall be entered as a final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure.  This Order does not apply to any other
Counts contained within the Plaintiff's Complaint."
On the same day, the trial court entered an order on
M.C.'s motion to compel discovery, and it provided, in
pertinent part:
This sentence appears to presage the certification of a
3
question of law for permissive appellate review under Rule 5,
Ala. R. App. P.  No such question is stated in the trial
court's order, however.  See generally Rule 5(a), Ala. R. App.
P. ("The trial judge must include in the certification a
statement of the controlling question of law.").  Moreover,
whether the AMLA is applicable to any given set of facts is
not a "question of law" within the meaning of Rule 5(a).
8
1130036 and 1130041
"This cause came before the Court for hearing on
the Motion to Compel filed by [M.C.].  Based upon
the Court's determination that the Alabama Medical
Liability Act is not applicable to this case, the
Court finds as follows:
"1. [Vanderwall] is hereby ordered to provide
responses to Interrogatories 9 and 10 propounded by
[M.C.], 
which 
seek 
complaints 
wherein 
other
individuals 
have 
asserted 
that 
they 
were
inappropriately touched by [Vanderwall], as well as
the complainant's identity."
Vanderwall appeals the partial summary judgment in favor
of M.C.  Vanderwall also petitions this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to vacate both the partial
summary judgment for M.C. and its order granting M.C.'s motion
to compel discovery of other acts.
II.  Analysis
A.  Vanderwall's Appeal (case no. 1130041)
It is incumbent upon us first to address the "vehicles"
by which Vanderwall seeks appellate review of the trial
court's orders. 
As noted, Vanderwall has filed an appeal
from the partial summary judgment in favor of M.C., an order
the trial court purportedly certified as a final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.   Even though neither
4
Rule 54(b) provides, in relevant part:
4
"When more than one claim for relief is presented in
9
1130036 and 1130041
party has raised the issue of the appropriateness of the trial
court's Rule 54(b) certification, the appropriateness of that
certification implicates the  fundamental issue of this
Court's jurisdiction to entertain the appeal; it is therefore
an issue we consider ex mero motu.  Summerlin v. Summerlin,
962 So. 2d 170, 172 (Ala. 2007) (determining ex mero motu that
a Rule 54(b) certification was not appropriate under the facts
of the case).  
It is well established that, "'for a Rule 54(b)
certification of finality to be effective, it must fully
adjudicate at least one claim or fully dispose of the claims
as they relate to at least one party.'"  Certain Underwriters
at Lloyd's, London v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 939 So. 2d 21,
28 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Haynes v. Alfa Fin. Corp., 730 So. 2d
178, 181 (Ala. 1999) (emphasis omitted)).  A trial court's
determination upon a request by an injured party for a
declaration as to what law or legal principles govern the
an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment."
10
1130036 and 1130041
injured party's claims against an alleged wrongdoer, even if
that request is framed as a separate "count" in a complaint,
is rarely, if ever, appropriate for certification as a final
judgment under Rule 54(b).  This is clearly so when there
remain pending in the wake of any such determination claims by
the plaintiff against the defendant for monetary, injunctive,
or other relief based upon that law and the set of facts to
which that law is claimed to be applicable.  In such a case,
the determination as to applicable law is but a subsidiary
step on the path to the full adjudication of the plaintiff's
cause of action against the alleged wrongdoer. 
To qualify as a judgment by a trial court that is
amenable to execution and appeal, a decision by a trial court
must be one that decides the substantive rights of the
parties.  This Court stated in McCulloch v. Roberts, 290 Ala.
303, 305, 276 So. 2d 425, 426 (1973) (quoting Carter v.
Mitchell, 225 Ala. 287, 293, 142 So. 514, 519 (1932)), that
"'[t]he test of the finality of a decree sufficient to support
an appeal is that it ascertains and declares the rights of the
parties ....'"  In Lunceford v. Monumental Life Insurance Co.,
641 So. 2d 244, 246 (Ala. 1994) (quoting Bean v. Craig, 557
11
1130036 and 1130041
So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Ala. 1990)), we observed that "[a] final
judgment is an order 'that conclusively determines the issues
before the court and ascertains and declares the rights of the
parties involved.'"  See also Jewell v. Jackson & Whitsitt
Cotton Co., 331 So. 2d 623, 625 (Ala. 1976) ("A final judgment
is a terminative decision by a court of competent jurisdiction
which demonstrates there has 
been complete adjudication of all
matters in controversy between the litigants within the
cognizance of that court. That is, it must be conclusive and
certain in itself."); State v. Brantley Land, L.L.C., 976 So.
2d 996, 999 (Ala. 2007) ("'"Only a fully adjudicated whole
claim against a party may be certified under Rule 54(b)."'"
(quoting James v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc., 713 So.
2d 
937, 
942 
(Ala. 
1997), 
quoting 
in 
turn 
Sidag
Aktiengesellschaft v. Smoked Foods Prods. Co., 813 F.2d 81, 84
(5th Cir. 1987) (emphasis omitted))).  
As this Court stated in Banyan Corp. v. Leithead, 41
So. 3d 51, 54 (Ala. 2009), a trial court errs in certifying an
order as a final, appealable judgment under Rule 54(b)  when
"the order ... did not completely dispose of any of the
12
1130036 and 1130041
substantive claims in th[e] case."  Professors Wright and
Miller put it this way:
"It would not be far amiss to think of Rule 54(b) as
involving matters separate from all that remains,
while [28 U.S.C.] § 1292(b) involves matters that
are central to all that remains. And so Rule 54(b)
cannot be used to enter judgment on deciding claims
closely related to claims that remain ...."
16 Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3929.1
(3d ed. 2012).
Echoing Professors Wright and Miller, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has explained that
"[a] declaration of rights is not an appealable order, in the
absence of a permissive interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), when claims to injunctive relief or damages
remain."  National Corn Growers Ass'n, Inc. v. Bergland, 611
F.2d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).  And the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
explained that a Rule 54(b) "cannot be invoked to certify a
partial summary judgment as final when a plaintiff seeks to
recover for the same loss on different theories and the
district court has resolved its claim on less than all the
theories advanced."  Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1368
(3d Cir. 1994).
13
1130036 and 1130041
In this case, the ruling on the declaratory-judgment
count of M.C.'s complaint did not adjudicate a "claim" that
provided any substantive relief to any party; it simply
determined what law would apply to M.C.'s claims against
Vanderwall.  The trial court's declaration was substantively
no different than a determination by any trial court as to
what law governs a plaintiff's substantive claims.  Such a
determination does not constitute an adjudication of a claim
for relief.
In short, as this Court stated in Baker v. Bennett, 644
So. 2d 901, 903 (Ala. 1994):
"Rule 54(b) allows the court to direct the entry
of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer
than all, of the claims or parties upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of
judgment.  The ruling of the trial court involved in
[Vanderwall's] appeal granted no relief to anyone,
and it did not determine a separate claim.  The
facts here do not present the type of situation that
Rule 54(b) was intended to cover. Therefore, the
trial court's ruling was not a final judgment and
was not appealable."
"'When it is determined that an order appealed from is
not a final judgment, it is the duty of the Court to dismiss
the appeal ex mero motu.'"  State v. Lawhorn, 830 So. 2d 720,
725 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Powell v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins.
14
1130036 and 1130041
Co., 293 Ala. 101, 102, 300 So. 2d 359, 360 (1974)).  Thus,
Vanderwall's appeal of the trial court's August 29, 2013,
order entering a partial summary judgment for M.C. is due to
be dismissed.  
B.  Vanderwall's Petition for a Writ of Mandamus (case no.
1130036)
In his petition for writ of mandamus, Vanderwall seeks
relief in two respects.  First, he seeks to use a writ of
mandamus at this preliminary juncture to challenge the trial
court's 
interlocutory 
decision 
that 
general 
tort-law
principles, rather than the AMLA, will govern the litigation
of M.C.'s claims against him.  To the extent it is aimed at
preempting the entry of a final judgment against him based on
general tort-law principles, Vanderwall's petition to this
Court for a writ of mandamus is an inappropriate use of the
writ.  
"Mandamus is 
an 
extraordinary 
remedy 
and 
will 
be
granted only where there is '(1) a clear legal right
in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.'  Ex parte Alfab, Inc.,
586 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991).  This Court will
not issue the writ of mandamus where the petitioner
has '"full and adequate relief"' by appeal.  State
v. Cobb, 288 Ala. 675, 678, 264 So. 2d 523, 526
15
1130036 and 1130041
(1972) (quoting State v. Williams, 69 Ala. 311, 316
(1881))."
Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 810, 813 (Ala.
2003).  Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court
is in error in not applying the AMLA to M.C.'s claims against
Vanderwall and, further, that the trial court eventually
enters a final judgment against Vanderwall on that basis,
Vanderwall would at that time have an adequate remedy by way
of an appeal.  As in any appeal, he would be able to challenge
both the legal holdings of the trial court and its factual
findings.  Thus, to the extent it relates to the potentially
erroneous nature of some final judgment yet to be entered
against Vanderwall, Vanderwall's petition for a writ of
mandamus is due to be denied. 
That said, we also must address Vanderwall's request for
mandamus relief as it relates to the discovery issue. 
Specifically, Vanderwall contends that the trial court's
August 29, 2013, order granting M.C.'s motion to compel
discovery against Vanderwall violates the prohibition on
discovery of other acts and omissions stated in § 6-5-551 of
the AMLA.  
16
1130036 and 1130041
This Court has held that, generally, appellate review of
a discovery order may be afforded by the appeal of a final
judgment in the case but that, "[i]n certain exceptional
cases, ... review by appeal of a discovery order may be
inadequate...."  Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d at
813.  One of the "exceptional cases" the Ocwen Court noted is
"when a privilege is disregarded."  This Court has previously
determined that
"[t]he exemption from discovery offered by § 6-
5-551, Ala. Code 1975, which prohibits a party in a
medical-malpractice 
action 
'from 
conducting
discovery with regard to any other act or omission,'
i.e., any act or omission other than the one that
allegedly renders the health-care provider liable,
is 
treated 
as 
a 
privilege 
for 
purposes 
of
determining whether in issuing the discovery order
the trial court has disregarded a privilege, thus
warranting review of the discovery order by way of
a petition for a writ of mandamus."
Ex parte Gentiva Health Servs., Inc., 8 So. 3d 943, 946-47
(Ala. 2008).  Thus, the trial court's August 29, 2013,
discovery order is reviewable by a petition for a writ of
mandamus.  
Whether 
the 
information 
M.C. 
requested 
in 
interrogatories
9 and 10 pertaining to other acts allegedly committed by
Vanderwall is shielded from discovery under § 6-5-551
17
1130036 and 1130041
necessarily requires us to determine whether the AMLA governs
M.C.'s assault and battery claims against Vanderwall.  If the
AMLA applies, then the trial court erred in granting M.C.'s
motion to compel discovery and Vanderwall's petition for the
writ of mandamus is due to be granted.  If the AMLA does not
apply, then Vanderwall's mandamus petition is due to be
denied.
"The AMLA applies '[i]n any action for injury or damages
or wrongful death, whether in contract or in tort, against a
health care provider for breach of the standard of care.' 
§ 6-5-548(a), Ala. Code 1975."  Mock v. Allen, 783 So. 2d 828,
832 (Ala. 2000) (emphasis added).  Section 6-5-542, Ala. Code
1975 defines a "health care provider" as "[a] medical
practitioner, dental practitioner, medical institution,
physician, dentist, hospital, or other 
health care provider 
as
those terms are defined in Section 6-5-481."  Section 6-5-
481(8) in turn defines "other health care providers" as "[a]ny
professional 
corporation 
or 
any 
person 
employed 
by 
physicians,
dentists, or hospitals who are directly involved in the
delivery of health care services."  
This Court previously has stated that,
18
1130036 and 1130041
"although perhaps not perfectly consistent, our
caselaw considering § 6–5–481(8), and especially our
more recent decisions such as Cackowski [v. Wal–Mart
Stores, Inc., 767 So. 2d 319 (Ala. 2000)], and
Anderson [v. Alabama Reference Labs., 778 So. 2d 806
(Ala. 2000)], generally stand for the following
proposition:  a corporation or person seeking to be
considered an 'other health care provider' under the
AMLA 
need 
not 
prove 
an 
employer/employee
relationship or a contractual relationship with a
physician, dentist, or hospital to establish that it
or he is 'employed' by a physician, dentist, or
hospital, 
although 
such 
a 
relationship 
would
certainly fall within the statute; however, at a
minimum a physician, dentist, or hospital must have
made use of that corporation or person in the
physician's, dentist's, or hospital's delivery of
health-care services to the plaintiff-patient."
Ex parte Partners in Care, Inc., 986 So. 2d 1145, 1148 (Ala.
2007) (emphasis omitted).  
We are not asked in this case to revisit those cases in
which this Court has held that the requirement that a person
or corporation be "employed by" a physician, dentist, or
hospital does not require an employment or equivalent
contractual 
relationship, 
but 
requires 
only 
that 
the 
physician
(or dentist or hospital) "make use of" the person (or
corporation) in question.  See, e.g., Cackowski v. Wal–Mart
Stores, Inc., 767 So. 2d 319, 324–25 (Ala. 2000) (holding that
a pharmacist's filling of a doctor's prescription for a
patient is part of the physician's treatment of his or her
19
1130036 and 1130041
patient so that the pharmacist was included within the AMLA
definition of "other health care provider"); see also Ex parte
Partners in Care, Inc., 986 So. 2d at 1148 (describing
Anderson v. Alabama Reference Labs., 778 So. 2d 806, 810 (Ala.
2000), as a case in which this Court held "that a medical
laboratory was an 'other health care provider' because its
testing of a specimen was an integral part of the physician's
delivery of health-care services to the patient").5
Vanderwall 
argues 
that 
the 
complained-of 
conduct
allegedly occurred during the delivery of professional
services and that, therefore, "the AMLA and its discovery
provisions apply to the case regardless of the description of
the cause of action under which [M.C.] has filed."  M.C. 
M.C. does, however, argue that, for someone who does not
5
fall within any of the categories expressly named in § 6-5-542
to be considered a health-care provider for purposes of the
AMLA, that person must be "carrying out the physician's orders
and be inextricably linked to a physician's treatment of his
patients."  M.C.'s position in this regard focuses solely on
the fact that the particular manner in which Vanderwall
touched M.C. was not ordered by a physician; she does not
argue that, in general, the provision of physical-therapy
services upon the referral of a physician is not covered by
the AMLA.  The issue thus framed in this case cannot be
differentiated from the issue discussed below -- whether a
claim of sexual misconduct or assault by someone who would
otherwise be deemed to a be a health-care provider is governed
by the AMLA. 
20
1130036 and 1130041
responds, and the trial court concluded, that "[t]he AMLA
applies only to medical malpractice actions ..., which by
definition are actions for redress of a medical injury."  M.C.
states in her brief to this Court that "[her] position is that
the mere fact that she was present for physical therapy does
not place her claim under the A.M.L.A."  She argues that the
alleged sexual assault "bear[s] no relation to the medical
services provided," and that, therefore, those acts "cannot 
be
deemed 'professional services.'" 
Vanderwall cites Mock in support of his position that
this case is governed by the AMLA.  Like  M.C. in the present
case, the plaintiff in Mock argued that "that the AMLA does
not apply to his case because '[t]he acts of intentional
sexual assault of which [he] complains were for no medical
reason.'" 783 So. 2d at 832.  This Court, however, stated as
follows in Mock with respect to the applicability of the AMLA:
"[M]ost of the reported cases where appellate courts
have declined to hold that the physician's conduct
constituted 
professional 
malpractice 
involved 
either
an intimate sexual relationship or sexual misconduct
having 
no 
connection 
with 
the 
rendering 
of
professional services.  See St. Paul Ins. Co. of
Illinois v. Cromeans, 771 F. Supp. 349, 352-53 (N.D.
Ala. 1991) (physician's sexual conduct toward minor
patients -- masturbating in front of them, fondling
the patients, attempting to convince patients to
21
1130036 and 1130041
have sex with him -- did not constitute professional
services, and, thus, physician's conduct was not
covered by his malpractice insurance); McQuay v.
Guntharp, 336 Ark. 534, 540-41, 986 S.W.2d 850, 853
(1999) (physician's fondling of a patient's breasts
while using a stethoscope to listen to her heart and
lungs did not constitute malpractice); Atienza v.
Taub, 194 Cal. App.3d 388, 393, 239 Cal. Rptr. 454,
457 (1987) (sexual relationship between patient and
physician who was treating her for an industrial
injury did not constitute malpractice); Odegard v.
Finne, 500 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
(sexual relationship between patient and physician
who 
was 
treating 
her 
for 
colitis 
was 
not
malpractice); Mindt v. Winchester, 151 Or. App. 340,
345, 948 P.2d 334, 336 (1997) (sexual relationship
between patient's wife and the physician treating
the patient for infertility was not malpractice);
New Mexico Physicians Mut. Liability Co. v. LaMure,
116 N.M. 92, 95-96, 860 P.2d 734, 736-37 (1993)
(physician's sexual assault of patient he was
treating for an infected thumb was not malpractice
and thus was not covered under his malpractice
insurance); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Blakeslee, 54
Wash. App. 1, 9, 771 P.2d 1172, 1176 (1989) (sexual
assault 
of 
patient 
by 
her 
dentist 
was 
not
malpractice and thus was not covered by dentist's
malpractice insurance).
"By contrast, in cases where the alleged sexual
misconduct 
occurs 
as 
part 
of 
a 
physician's
examination and/or treatment of a patient, the
conduct is considered to have occurred during the
delivery of professional services, and is therefore
cognizable as a medical-malpractice claim.  See
Hagan v. Antonio, 240 Va. 347, 397 S.E.2d 810 (1990)
(physician's act of fondling patient's breasts and
making improper comments during what was supposed to
be a routine breast examination occurred during the
delivery of professional services).  Here, Mock went
to Dr. Allen complaining of pain to his neck, back,
left hip/groin area, and left leg.  It was incumbent
22
1130036 and 1130041
upon Dr. Allen to examine the painful areas
thoroughly in order to diagnose Mock's complaint.
Moreover, Dr. Allen testified that he wanted to rule
out radiculopathy, a nerve condition originating in
the spinal area and extending through the groin and
into the leg. Given these circumstances, Dr. Allen's
alleged sexual misconduct occurred while he was
providing professional services and/or treating
Mock's 
physical 
injuries. 
 
Accordingly, 
the
misconduct Mock accuses Dr. Allen of falls within
the ambit of the AMLA."
783 So. 2d at 832-33 (emphasis added).
Conversely, M.C. argues "sexual molestation could not be
part of [her] examination or treatment" and that,
"[e]ven if Mr. Vanderwall was deemed to be a
'healthcare provider' as defined by the A.M.L.A.,
his actions are outside the scope of the A.M.L.A.
The Alabama Supreme Court has specifically rejected
Mr. Vanderwall's argument that all claims against a
healthcare provider are covered by the A.M.L.A.,
stating specifically, 'We do not agree that the AMLA
applies to all claims against health-care providers
arising out of the relationship between the health-
care provider and the patient.'  The A.M.L.A.
applies only to medical malpractice actions in the
context of patient-doctor and patient-hospital
relationships, which by definition are actions for
redress of a medical injury.  Ex parte Addiction and
Mental Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Bradford Health
Services, 948 So. 2d 533, 53[5] (Ala. 2006)."
M.C.'s argument and Vanderwall's invocation of Mock for the
contrary 
position 
necessitate 
a 
reexamination 
of 
that 
decision
in the present case. 
23
1130036 and 1130041
This Court relied upon Mock in O'Rear v. B.H., 69 So. 3d
106 (Ala. 2011):
"Dr. O'Rear bases his argument on his contention
that all B.H.'s causes of action arose in connection
with Dr. O'Rear's providing B.H. with medical
services. In this context, he relies on Mock v.
Allen, 783 So. 2d 828 (Ala. 2000), in which the
Court held that the claims of the plaintiff, Mock,
against his doctor, Allen, for sexual assault were
governed by the Act. In Mock, Mock alleged that his
treating physician touched him improperly during his
treatment for various injuries to his head, spine,
and hip that resulted from an automobile accident.
In Mock, there was no instance of alleged improper
touching that did not occur outside the doctor's
office or hospital during a scheduled treatment.
Thus, Mock stands for the principle that a sexual
assault that occurs during the course of medical
treatment is subsumed under the proof requirements
of the Act.  Similarly, we note that this Court has
held that other actions that occur during the course
of medical treatment are subsumed under the Act.
See, e.g., Mobile Infirmary v. Delchamps, 642 So. 2d
954 (Ala. 1994) (negligence and breach-of-warranty
claims are governed by the Act); Benefield v. F.
Hood Craddock Clinic, 456 So. 2d 52 (Ala. 1984)
(fraud claims subsumed by the Act); and Sellers v.
Edwards, 289 Ala. 2, 265 So. 2d 438 (1972) (assault
and battery governed by the Act).  However, in each
of these cases, as in Mock, the cause of action
arose as a direct result of a particular medical
treatment by the defendant medical-service provider.
Thus, we agree with Dr. O'Rear that his acts of
prescribing medications in return for sexual conduct
that occurred while B.H. was being treated by Dr.
O'Rear are governed by the proof requirements of the
Act."
Id. at 114-15 (emphasis added).
24
1130036 and 1130041
Under Mock and O'Rear, the pertinent issues are simply
place and time.  Did the alleged sexual assault occur within
"the doctor's office or hospital" and did it occur "while [the
defendant] was providing professional services"?   There is no
dispute in this case that the place and time requirements
articulated in Mock and O'Rear are satisfied; the alleged
sexual misconduct occurred in the place and during the time
that Vanderwall otherwise was engaged in treating M.C. for her
back pain.  Thus, under the interpretation of the AMLA
enunciated in Mock and reiterated in O'Rear, 
M.C.'s 
allegation
of sexual misconduct would be governed by the proof
requirements of the AMLA.
We cannot in good conscience, however, continue to adhere
to the rule articulated in Mock and O'Rear.  We previously
have observed that stare decisis "'is a golden rule, not an
iron rule.'"  Goldome Credit Corp. v. Burke, 923 So. 2d 282,
292 (Ala. 2005) (quoting Ex parte Nice, 407 So. 2d 874, 883
(Ala. 1981) (Jones, J., dissenting)).  In those rare cases
where, in retrospect, a rule announced in a previous case is
not plausible, the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent
this Court's reexamination of it. 
25
1130036 and 1130041
"Although we have a healthy respect for the
principle of stare decisis, we should not blindly
continue to apply a rule of law that does not accord
with what is right and just.  In other words, while
we accord 'due regard to the principle of stare
decisis,' it is also this Court's duty 'to overrule
prior decisions when we are convinced beyond ...
doubt that such decisions were wrong when decided or
that time has [effected] such change as to require
a change in the law.'  Beasley v. Bozeman, 294 Ala.
288, 291, 315 So.2d 570, 572 (1975) (Jones, J.,
concurring specially)."
Ex parte State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 764 So. 2d 543, 545-46
(Ala. 2000) (footnote omitted).  "As strongly as we believe in
the stability of the law, we also recognize that there is
merit, if not honor, in admitting prior mistakes and
correcting them."  Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592,
598, 320 So. 2d 68, 73 (1975).6
In this instance, Vanderwall has asked us to apply an
interpretation of the AMLA from cases that exalt a broad
We also note that, apart from O'Rear, there are no
6
decisions employing the rationale of Mock and that Mock cannot
be said to have created some reliance interest on the part of
prospective tortfeasors.  See generally Ex parte Capstone
Bldg. Corp., 96 So. 3d 77, 89 n.8 (Ala. 2012) (noting that a
court may consider "'the plausibility of the existing
interpretation of a statute, the extent to which that
interpretation has been fixed in the fabric of the law, and
the strength of arguments for changing the interpretation'"
(quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 131 (2005))); see also 20 Am.
Jur. 2d Courts § 136 (2005) ("The application of stare decisis
is less compelling in tort cases than in property or contract
settings.").
26
1130036 and 1130041
reading of the statute over the plain text.  Mock and O'Rear
posit that the legislature intended the AMLA to apply to any
action in which the alleged injury was inflicted by a medical
provider at the same place and time as medical treatment,
rather than applying only to actions in which the alleged
injury occurred because of medical treatment.  
M.C. challenges
that interpretation.  She argues that the AMLA was intended to
address alleged violations of a "standard of care" applicable
to "medical treatment" and that "sexual molestation of a
female by a male physical therapist is not a matter of
'medical injury' subject to the AMLA when the physical
therapist admits that there is no medical reason to touch the
female's breasts or genitalia."  We agree with M.C.  We do not
believe the legislature intended for the protections afforded
under the AMLA to apply to health-care providers who are
alleged to have committed acts of sexual assault; such acts do
not, by any ordinary understanding, come within the ambit of
"medical treatment" or "providing professional services."  
The dissenting opinion in Mock written by Justice Lyons
(in which Justice Lyons quotes an earlier writing in the case
27
1130036 and 1130041
from Justice See) explains the correct interpretation of the
AMLA:
"'The Legislature declared that it
enacted the AMLA in response to increasing
health-care 
costs 
caused 
by 
"the 
increasing
threat of legal 
actions for alleged medical
injury."  Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-540.  The
AMLA 
applies 
to 
actions 
against 
a
health-care provider alleging a "breach of
the standard of care."  Ala. Code 1975,
§ 6-5-540 et seq.  A breach of the standard
of care is the "fail[ure] to exercise such
reasonable care, skill and diligence as
other 
similarly 
situated 
health 
care
providers in the same general line of
practice, ordinarily have and exercise in
a like case." § 6-5-548.  Thus, the AMLA
applies to conduct that is, or that is
reasonably related to, the provision of
health-care 
services 
allegedly 
resulting 
in
a medical injury.  Just as the Alabama
Legal Services Liability Act does not apply
to every action against a person who is a
lawyer, 
see 
Cunningham 
v. 
Langston, 
Frazer,
Sweet & Freese, P.A., 727 So. 2d 800 (Ala.
1999), the AMLA does not apply to every
action against a person who is a doctor,
see Thomasson v. Diethelm, 457 So. 2d 397
(Ala. 1984).  It does not, I believe, apply
to an action alleging sexual molestation,
where the health-care provider concedes
that the acts complained of were not
medically 
relevant. 
 
Although 
Mock's 
claims
arise out of conduct that took place at a
time when there was a doctor-patient
relationship 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
examination
and treatment, see Thomasson, that fact
alone cannot subject to the provisions of
the AMLA all conduct by the doctor, however
28
1130036 and 1130041
unrelated to the provision of medical
services.'"
Mock, 783 So. 2d at 836-37 (Lyons, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).  See also Ex parte Addiction & Mental Health Servs.,
Inc., 948 So. 2d 533, 535 (Ala. 2006) ("'By definition, a
"medical-malpractice action" is one for redress of a "medical
injury."  See § 6-5-540 (purpose of the [AMLA] is to regulate
actions 
for 
"alleged 
medical 
injury")....'" 
(quoting 
Taylor 
v.
Smith, 892 So. 2d 887, 893 (Ala. 2004))). 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the AMLA is not just
concerned with who committed the alleged wrongful conduct or
when and where that conduct occurred, but also with whether
the harm occurred because of the provision of medical
services.  Vanderwall testified that there was no therapeutic
or medical reason for him to touch M.C.'s breasts or her
genitals in the course of treating her for back pain. 
Consequently, it is undisputed that M.C.'s allegation of
injury does not stem from the provision of medical services. 
Therefore,
"[a]lthough [Vanderwall's] acts might have occurred
during the same time frame within which he was
providing some medical care to [M.C.], and although
[Vanderwall's] acts may have occurred in the same
location where [Vanderwall] provide[d] medical care
29
1130036 and 1130041
to patients, [Vanderwall's] acts in [allegedly
sexually assaulting M.C. instead of administering
care for her back pain] were not part of providing
medical care to [M.C.] so as to be governed by the
AMLA."
O'Rear, 69 So. 3d at 122 (Murdock, J., concurring in the
result). 
Our conclusion today is buttressed by numerous cases from
other 
jurisdictions 
that 
have 
concluded 
that 
sexual
molestation is not included within any ordinary understanding
of the provision of medical services.  In Kaufmann v.
Schroeder, 241 Ill. 2d 194, 349 Ill. Dec. 151, 946 N.E.2d 345
(2011), for example, the Illinois Supreme Court had to
determine whether a plaintiff's action alleging that a doctor
sexually assaulted her while she was under sedation was time-
barred based on the application of the Illinois Tort Immunity
Act.  As the court explained:  "The ultimate issue before this
court ... is whether the injuries for which Kaufmann seeks
recovery in her claims against [the hospital] are injuries
'arising out of patient care' within the meaning of section
8-101(b) of the Act."  241 Ill. 2d at 199, 349 Ill. Dec. at
154, 946 N.E.2d at 348.  The court concluded that Kaufmann's
action fell outside this provision, reasoning:
30
1130036 and 1130041
"[I]n Orlak [v. Loyola University Health System, 228
Ill. 2d 1, 319 Ill. Dec. 319, 885 N.E.2d 999
(2007)], this court reiterated that 'arising out of
patient care' did not encompass 'but for' causation.
Rather, it meant that the injury had '"[t]o
originate; to stem (from)," or "to result (from)"'
the patient's medical care or treatment.  See Orlak,
228 Ill. 2d at 14-15, 319 Ill. Dec. 319, 885 N.E.2d
999 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 115 (8th ed.
2004)).
"In the case before this court, Kaufmann did not
allege that she was injured because of the medical
treatment she received.  In other words, she did not
claim that the 'unnecessary' exam and sedation she
received during her hospitalization harmed her in
any way.  Rather, the harm resulted from the sexual
assault.  The sedation that was given and the
'unnecessary' exam (if one was, in fact, performed)
were not part of Kaufmann's medical treatment, but
simply a means by which Schroeder was able to
accomplish his sexual assault on Kaufmann.
"In sum, we find that Kaufmann's injury arose
out of Dr. Schroeder's sexual assault and not any
medical care she received from him. The sexual
assault, itself, was not medical care, nor was there
even any pretense that Dr. Schroeder's sexual acts
were necessitated by, or in any way related to, the
medical care he was providing to Kaufmann. There was
no suggestion by Schroeder that there existed a
medical reason for his actions."
241 Ill. 2d at 200-01, 349 Ill. Dec. at 155, 946 N.E.2d at
349.
In Burke v. Snyder, 899 So. 2d 336, 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005), a Florida district court held that "a claim of
sexual misconduct by a doctor during a medical examination or
31
1130036 and 1130041
procedure is not a claim 'arising out of the rendering of ...
medical care or services'" so as to fall within Florida's
medical-malpractice statute.  The court reasoned:
"In this case, ... the complaint makes no
mention of any pretense of medical care by the
doctor 
or 
any 
psychological 
manipulation 
or
seduction of the plaintiff.  The plaintiff does not
allege that Dr. Snyder engaged in sexual conduct
under the guise of medical diagnosis, treatment or
care.  She does not allege that she was induced to
have sexual relations with Dr. Snyder in furtherance
of medical diagnosis, treatment, or care.  On the
contrary, she alleges that the sexual assault
occurred 'suddenly and unexpectedly' within minutes
after the start of her first office visit with
Dr. Snyder."
899 So. 2d at 340.  
In Doe v. Cherwitz, 894 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Iowa 1995),
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa concluded that a plaintiff's allegation of sexual
misconduct against a doctor did not fall within the coverage
of Iowa's medical-malpractice statute, reasoning:
"The injuries alleged in the instant case, according
to plaintiff's allegations and evidence presented in
connection with the previous motions for summary
judgment, arose out of forcible sexual intercourse
perpetrated by defendant Cherwitz against the will
of the plaintiff when she was undergoing a medical
examination by Cherwitz.
"Section 614.1(9) is, by its terms, limited to
claims 'arising out of patient care.'  Defendants
32
1130036 and 1130041
rely on one sentence in Langner[ v. Simpson, 533
N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1995)]:  'All of the claims in the
Langners' petition arose out of injuries allegedly
suffered while Kathy was under the care of Simpson
and the hospital.'  Langner, 533 N.W.2d at 516.
Defendants read the phrase 'while Kathy was under
the care of Simpson and the hospital' too broadly.
That language must be read in the context of the
facts of the Langner case.  I do not believe the
Iowa Supreme Court meant to hold, or would hold if
this case were presented to it, that section
614.1(9) applies to willful non-treatment tortious
activity by the physician, simply because it
occurred when the patient was seeing the physician
for medical reasons.  Obviously, that is not what
the legislature intended in enacting the statute,
and its careful choice of language -- arising from
patient care -- clearly limits the protection of the
statute to claims resulting from patient care
activity.  Rape is not patient care activity. I
believe the Iowa Supreme Court would hold that
willful tortious activity outside the realm of
patient care, such as that alleged in this case, is
not governed by the statute."
894 F. Supp. at 345-46.  
In Descant v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund,
639 So. 2d 246, 250 (La. 1994), the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that the state's medical-malpractice act 
"does not protect the provider from all acts of
misconduct between the provider and his patients. It
is only triggered by the negligent care and
treatment of the patient.  Were the provider to
commit an intentional tort against his patient or
negligently injure his patient in a manner unrelated
33
1130036 and 1130041
to medical treatment, the limitation of liability
would not be available."7
In short, the simple fact is that sexual misconduct by a
health-care provider toward a patient is not medical
treatment, and it does not result in a "medical injury" as
such an injury as is understood under the AMLA.  The AMLA
addresses the provision of medical services to patients and
failures to meet the applicable standard of care in providing
those services.  M.C.'s action against Vanderwall is not
concerned with such matters.  Accordingly, the trial court did
not err in granting M.C.'s motion to compel discovery on the
ground that the AMLA does not govern M.C.'s claims against
Vanderwall.
III.  Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we dismiss Vanderwall's appeal of
the partial summary judgment as being from a nonfinal
judgment.  We deny Vanderwall's petition for a writ of
mandamus both insofar as it challenges the partial summary
In addition to cases directly addressing a state's
7
medical-liability act, "the majority of jurisdictions have
concluded that professional liability policies do not provide
coverage for health care practitioners who sexually assault
their patients" because such acts do not constitute the
provision of "professional services."  Physicians Ins. Co. v.
Pistone, 555 Pa. 616, 621, 726 A.2d 339, 342 (1999).
34
1130036 and 1130041
judgment in favor of M.C. and insofar as it challenges the
order granting M.C.'s motion to compel discovery.  
1130036 –- PETITION DENIED.
Moore, C.J., and Bolin, Parker, Main, Wise, and Bryan,
JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
Stuart, J., concurs in the result.
Shaw, J., dissents.
1130041 –- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Moore, C.J., and Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, Wise, and
Bryan, JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs specially.
Stuart, J., concurs in the result.
35
1130036 and 1130041
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
The dissent charges that, in overruling Mock v. Allen,
783 So. 2d 828 (Ala. 2000), the main opinion "changes the law"
and "abandons precedent."  ___ So. 3d at ___ (Shaw, J.,
concurring in case no 1130041 and dissenting in case no.
1130036).  To begin, under the declarative theory of law, the
main opinion does not "change the law."  ___ So. 3d at ___. 
No opinion of this Court ever does that.  We simply recognize,
as this Court has done countless times throughout it history,
that one or more prior opinions of this Court incorrectly
stated the law and that we are correcting that error.  As is
customary when this or any appellate court realizes the error
of some prior decision, we "overrule" prior precedent.
Citing Moore v. Prudential Residential Services Ltd.
Partnership, 849 So. 2d 914, 926 (Ala. 2002), and Ex parte
McKinney, 87 So. 3d 502, 509 n.7 (Ala. 2011), the dissent 
suggests that this Court has an ironclad rule that, unless a
party explicitly requests that we overrule a case, we will not
do so.  The dissent even chooses to use the terms "loosey-
goosey" and acting "on a whim" to describe what it perceives
to be this Court's variance from the rule expressed in Moore
36
1130036 and 1130041
and McKinney.  Even if the dissent's ironclad approach to
overruling precedent was the law, I see no warrant for the
dissent to invoke the quoted verbiage in an effort to make its
point.  In point of fact, however, our precedents -- as they
relate to overruling precedents -- do not reflect a rule quite
so "ironclad" as the dissent suggests. 
To begin, it is worth noting that there is no such rule
expressed in the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure.  And in
fact, this Court recently overruled a case even while
specifically noting that it had not been asked to do so.  See
Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Miller, 86 So. 3d 338,
347 (Ala. 2011). 
The authorities the dissent cites for its "rule" are not
as black and white as the dissent claims.  In Moore, the Court
stated:  "Stare decisis commands, at a minimum, a degree of
respect from this Court that makes it disinclined to overrule
controlling precedent when it is not invited to do so."  849
So. 2d at 926 (emphasis added).  Moore simply made the point
that we do not as a regular practice overrule cases when not
invited to do so, but it did not say that we never do so. 
37
1130036 and 1130041
Furthermore, it does not explain what being "invited to do so"
actually entails.  
Ex parte McKinney expresses the same idea, but is even
less definitive as to what an invitation entails.  The Court
in McKinney noted that there exists "a disinclination to
overrule existing caselaw in the absence of either a specific
request to do so or an adequate argument asking that we do
so."  87 So. 3d at 509 n.7 (emphasis added).  We have
expressed the idea similarly before.  See Ex parte Carlisle,
26 So. 3d 1202, 1207 (Ala. 2009) (commenting on "[t]he
principle of stare decisis and this Court's reluctance to
consider abandoning precedent in the absence of an adequate
argument to us that we should do so" (emphasis added)).  Thus,
under McKinney, overcoming our "disinclination" is not solely
dependent upon a "specific request" for overruling precedent,
but also includes evaluating whether the party made an
"adequate argument" that "invites" us to overrule the
precedent at issue.  In fact, in nearly every case in which
this Court has expressed its preference for not overruling
precedent when it has not been specifically asked to do so,
the Court has noted that the party that the overruling would
38
1130036 and 1130041
have favored made no argument at all in contradiction of the
precedent at issue.  See, e.g., American Bankers Ins. Co. of
Florida v. Tellis, [Ms. 1131244, June 26, 2015] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ n.3 (Ala. 2015); Fort Morgan Civic Ass'n, Inc. v.
City of Gulf Shores, 100 So. 3d 1042, 1047 n.7 (Ala. 2012);
Clay Kilgore Constr. Co. v. Buchalter/Grant, L.L.C., 949
So. 2d 893, 898 (Ala. 2006) (also cited in the dissent);
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Human Res., 999 So. 2d 891, 896
(Ala. 2008); and Moore, 849 So. 2d at 925-26.
Such clearly is not the case here.  M.C. argues that the
Alabama Medical Liability Act, § 6-5-480 et seq. and § 6-5-540
et seq., Ala. Code 1975 ("the AMLA"), applies only to actions
that involve medical malpractice, or "medical injury," and
that sexual assault "bears no relation to medical services."
Her argument directly contradicts the holding in Mock, and the
parties to this case expressly argue over the applicability of
the AMLA to this case.  Yet, according to the dissent, this
Court is forbidden from examining the correctness of the rule
enunciated in Mock solely because M.C. did not specifically
state that Mock should be overruled.  The cases cited above
illustrate that we are under no such prohibition.  In fact, 
39
1130036 and 1130041
"while we accord 'due regard to the principle of
stare decisis,' it is also this Court's duty 'to
overrule prior decisions when we are convinced
beyond ... doubt that such decisions were wrong when
decided or that time has [effected] such change as
to require a change in the law.' Beasley v. Bozeman,
294 Ala. 288, 291, 315 So. 2d 570, 572 (1975)
(Jones, J., concurring specially)."
Ex parte State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 764 So. 2d 543, 545-46
(Ala. 2000).  In other words, our duty, first and foremost, is
to the correctness of law.  That is not something the parties
ultimately dictate to us.  
"'"Appellate review does not consist of supine
submission to erroneous legal concepts.... Our duty
is to enunciate the law on the record facts. Neither
the parties nor the trial judge, by agreement or by
passivity, can force us to abdicate our appellate
responsibility."'"
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So. 2d
949, 960 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d
1335, 1357 n. 20 (Fed. Cir. 2002), quoting in turn Empire Life
Ins. Co. of America v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330, 334 (5th
Cir. 1972)). 
The dissent pejoratively describes the change in the law
we make today as "a more comfortable result" for us.  It is
indeed "more comfortable."  And it is more comfortable for
good reason.  Any just law is designed to produce fair and
40
1130036 and 1130041
just results.  When the law is followed, therefore, it should
not be surprising that a "comfortable result" is achieved.  
And here the result achieved is in fact one dictated by
the law in question (the AMLA), which is what we are sworn to
uphold.  As this Court has observed:
"'The doctrine of stare decisis tends to
produce certainty in our law, but it is
important to realize that certainty per se
is but a means to an end, and not an end in
itself.  ...  When it appears that the evil
resulting from a continuation of the
accepted rule must be productive 
of greater
mischief to the community than can possibly
ensue 
from 
disregarding 
the 
previous
adjudications on the subject, courts have
frequently 
and 
wisely 
departed 
from
precedent, 14 Am.Jur., Courts, § 126.'"
Ex parte State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 764 So. 2d at 545 n.3
(quoting Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 25, 76 A.2d 877, 883-84
(1950) (Vanderbilt, C.J., dissenting)).
41
1130036 and 1130041
SHAW, Justice (concurring in case no. 1130041 and dissenting
in case no. 1130036).  
I concur to dismiss the appeal in case no. 1130041; I
respectfully dissent from denying the petition for a writ of
mandamus in case no. 1130036.
In Mock v. Allen, 783 So. 2d 828 (Ala. 2000), this Court
rejected the argument that the Alabama Medical Liability Act,
§ 6-5-480 et seq. and § 6-5-540 et seq., Ala. Code 1975  ("the
AMLA"), "[did] not apply ... because '[t]he acts of
intentional sexual assault of which [the patient] complains
were for no medical reason'" and were "outside the scope of
the physician's professional services and did not constitute
professional malpractice."  Instead, the rule has been as
follows:
"[M]ost of the reported cases where appellate courts
have declined to hold that the physician's conduct
constituted 
professional 
malpractice 
involved 
either
an intimate sexual relationship or sexual misconduct
having 
no 
connection 
with 
the 
rendering 
of
professional services. ...
"By contrast, in cases where the alleged sexual
misconduct 
occurs 
as 
part 
of 
a 
physician's
examination and/or treatment of a patient, the
conduct is considered to have occurred during the
delivery of professional services, and is therefore
cognizable as a medical-malpractice claim. ..."
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1130036 and 1130041
783 So. 2d at 832-33 (emphasis added). 
Under the precedent established by Mock, the AMLA is
applicable in this case.  To be clear, the application of Mock
and the AMLA in no way denies the plaintiff a cause of action
or the ability to seek damages for any alleged misconduct by
the defendant.  Instead, under Mock, the plaintiff's claim is
litigated 
pursuant 
to 
certain 
statutorily 
prescribed
substantive and procedural requirements.  The main opinion in
this case instead changes the law and abandons precedent.  
We have described our adherence to precedent under the
doctrine of stare decisis as follows:
"As Justice Somerville observed in his dissent in
Bolden v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 215 Ala.
334, 340, 110 So. 574, 580 (1925), 'The doctrine of
stare decisis, though not without its limitations,
is the only thing that gives form, and consistency,
and stability to the body of the law. Its structural
foundations, at least, ought not to be changed
except for the weightiest reasons.'• In Lindsay v.
United States Savings & Loan Ass'n, 120 Ala. 156,
167, 24 So. 171, 174 (1898), this Court commented: 
"'The observations of Chancellor Kent are
instructive, and have been often quoted by
courts and text writers: "If a decision has
been 
made 
upon 
solemn 
and 
mature
consideration, the presumption is in favor
of its correctness, and the community have
a right to regard it as a just declaration
or exposition of the law, and to regulate
their actions by it."'•
43
1130036 and 1130041
"... Recently we stated, 'Judges adhering to the
rule of stare decisis defer to prior precedent to
obtain the beneficial effect of predictability in
the law even when enticed to embrace what appears to
be a more logically sound rule.'• Keck v. Dryvit
Sys., Inc., 830 So. 2d 1, 7-8 (Ala. 2002)."
Exxon Corp. v. Department of Conservation & Natural Res., 859
So. 2d 1096, 1102 (Ala. 2002) (emphasis omitted).
The plaintiff does not ask this Court to overrule Mock;
instead, the majority elects to do so on its own initiative. 
"However, this Court has long recognized a disinclination to
overrule existing caselaw in the absence of either a specific
request to do so or an adequate argument asking that we do
so."  Ex parte McKinney, 87 So. 3d 502, 509 n.7 (Ala. 2011). 
This is because "[s]tare decisis commands, at a minimum, a
degree of respect from this Court that makes it disinclined to
overrule controlling precedent when it is not invited to do
so."  Moore v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 849
So. 2d 914, 926 (Ala. 2002).  See also Clay Kilgore Constr.,
Inc. v. Buchalter/Grant, L.L.C., 949 So. 2d 893, 898 (Ala.
2006) (noting the absence of a specific request by the
appellant to overrule existing authority and stating that,
"[e]ven if we would be amenable to such a request, we are not
44
1130036 and 1130041
inclined 
to 
abandon precedent without a specific invitation to
do so").  Because the plaintiff attempts to distinguish Mock
but does not ask us to overrule it, I would follow the
doctrine of stare decisis and apply that precedent.  I express
no opinion as to whether Mock correctly interpreted or applied
the AMLA, because I do not believe that the issue is before
us.     
Despite no "specific request" to overrule Mock, the
majority navigates around this requirement by noting that
"[the plaintiff's] argument and [the defendant's] invocation
of Mock for the contrary position necessitate a reexamination
of that decision in the present case."  ___ So. 3d at ___.  I
must respectfully submit that a party presenting an argument
contrary to precedent and the opposing party pointing this out 
does not constitute a "specific request" or an "adequate
argument asking" this Court to overrule that controlling
precedent.  Ex parte McKinney, supra.  Indeed, virtually any
argument citing a case can now be deemed a request to overrule
a decision.  This new rule effectively negates the idea that
one must present a "specific request" to overrule a prior
decision and replaces it with a loosey-goosey test that allows
45
1130036 and 1130041
this Court to overrule a prior decision on a whim.  Thus, yet
another exception to our general requirements regarding the
proper 
presentation of arguments for appellate review has 
been
created.  See Ex parte Pollard, 160 So. 3d 835, 837 (Ala.
2014) (Shaw, J., dissenting) (noting the unclear standard of
preserving issues for review found in Ex parte Jenkins, 26 So.
3d 464 (Ala. 2009), and its potential for abuse).
Mock provided a clear distinction between sexual
misconduct that occurred with no connection to treatment,
which, Mock held, falls outside the AMLA, and sexual 
misconduct that occurs during treatment, which, Mock held,
falls within the AMLA. The main opinion erases this
distinction. Appropriate medical care or treatment might, in
certain cases where such care or treatment occurs as part of
a physician's examination and/or treatment of a patient,
require touching that, in another context, would constitute
sexual assault.  The AMLA would require a plaintiff alleging
assault under this scenario to provide certain expert
testimony to show that the touching was outside the standard
of care--i.e., that the touching was medically improper or not
necessary--and restrict some of the evidence that might
46
1130036 and 1130041
otherwise be discoverable and admissible at trial.  The
application 
of 
this 
statutory 
procedure 
might 
seem
uncomfortable in a sensitive case like one alleging a sexual
assault because it seemingly provides some measure of
protection to the defendant physician.  Now, under the rule
embraced in the main opinion, when there is an allegation of
sexual assault, the plaintiff will have to show only the
elements of that tort outside of any strictures imposed by the
AMLA.  This is a more comfortable result than the application
of the previous rule.  However, a future case could involve a
physician who was clearly permitted by the applicable 
standard
of care to touch a patient, but who is nonetheless sued
alleging assault and is deprived of the substantive and
procedural rules of the AMLA when those rules may be clearly
needed.  Once again, in light of this uncomfortable result and
without  the restraint of stare decisis, the Court may
vacillate back to a Mock-type analysis.  This potential for
uncertainty and instability in the law, fickle as it is, is
exactly what stare decisis is intended to prevent.  I thus
respectfully dissent.  
47