Case Title: STEVEN M. KRENNING and JOYCE C. KRENNING, husband and wife v. HEART MOUNTAIN IRRIGATION DISTRICT and JAMES FLOWERS and THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0271

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
STEVEN M. KRENNING and JOYCE C. KRENNING, husband and wife v. HEART MOUNTAIN IRRIGATION DISTRICT and JAMES FLOWERS and THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 11200 P.3d 774Case Number: No. S-07-0271Decided: 01/29/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
STEVEN 
M. KRENNING and JOYCE C. KRENNING, husband and wife,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
HEART 
MOUNTAIN IRRIGATION DISTRICT and JAMES FLOWERS,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants),

 
 
and

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Intervenor).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Larry 
B. Jones and William L. Simpson, Burg, Simpson, Eldredge, Hersh & Jardine, 
PC, Cody, Wyoming; Michael S. Messenger, Messenger & Jurovich, PC, 
Thermopolis, Wyoming; Thomas W. Redmon, Redmon Law Offices, Casper, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Jones.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee, Heart Mountain Irrigation District:

Jay 
A. Gilbertz, Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.  

 
 
Representing 
Appellee, James Flowers:

Jason 
A. Neville and Lori L. Gorseth, Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, PC, Casper, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Neville.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee, State of Wyoming:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Elizabeth C. Gagen, Chief Deputy Attorney 
General; Martin L. Hardsocg, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Bridget L. Hill, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Gagen.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]        
Steven 
and Joyce Krenning brought suit against the Heart Mountain Irrigation District 
and its employee, James Flowers, seeking recovery for personal injuries 
Mr. Krenning suffered in an altercation with Mr. Flowers.  The district court ruled that the 
Irrigation District and Mr. Flowers were immune from liability pursuant to the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), and granted summary judgment in their 
favor.  Mr. and 
Mrs. Krenning challenge that decision in this appeal.  We will affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
The 
Krennings state the following issues, although we put them in a different order 
to facilitate discussion:

 
 

1.            
Appellee 
Heart Mountain Irrigation District is not a governmental entity under the 
provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, W.S. § 1-39-101, et seq., (LexisNexis 2007), and thus 
neither the Irrigation District, nor its employees, are within the scope of 
governmental immunity granted by the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act.

 
 

2.            
If 
Appellee Heart Mountain Irrigation District is a governmental entity for 
purposes of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), it is also a "public 
utility" for which immunity has been waived under the provisions of W.S. 
§ 1-39-108, and thus both the Irrigation District and its employees may be 
liable for their negligence.

 

3.            
Under 
the alternative allegations of Appellants' Complaint, Appellee James Flowers was 
asserted to be acting both within and without the scope of his employment.  Questions of fact remain as to whether 
he was acting outside the scope of his employment so as to not be protected by 
any immunity that allegedly exists for the Irrigation 
District.

 
 

4.            
Granting 
Sovereign Immunity to an Irrigation District and its employees, such as 
Appellees, is contrary to and violative of the Wyoming Constitutional guarantees 
of Equal Protection under Article 1, §§ 2, 3, 6, 8, 34 and Article 3, 
§ 27.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Heart 
Mountain Irrigation District is an irrigation district organized pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-7-201 (LexisNexis 2007).  Through a series of canals, ditches, 
dams, and other works, the Irrigation District delivers irrigation water to 
landowners with water rights within the district.  Mr. Flowers was an employee of the 
Irrigation District.  Mr. Krenning 
owns and leases lands within the Irrigation District, and receives irrigation 
water from the Irrigation District.

 
 

[¶4]        
On 
October 4, 2004, Mr. Flowers and Mr. Krenning had a chance meeting on the road 
paralleling one of the Irrigation District's canals.  They began arguing, and a physical 
confrontation followed.  There is 
considerable dispute about the details, but the district court's decision letter 
provided this useful summary:

 
 
[The 
Krennings] allege that Flowers had a volatile temper which had been reported to 
the District on numerous occasions.  
[The Irrigation District and Mr. Flowers] allege that [Mr. Krenning] 
had a history of behavior that "terrorized" neighbors and family members.  

 
 
Regardless, 
on October 4, 2004, Flowers was working for the District and talking with a 
ditch rider, Mr. House, when Steve Krenning approached him to discuss ditch 
seepage.  Flowers was sitting in his 
truck at the time.  There had been 
previous accusations from Flowers that Krenning was improperly using irrigation 
water.  A confrontation between 
Flowers and Krenning ensued and it is undisputed that Flowers struck Krenning 
with a shovel at least twice.  As a 
result, Krenning's arm was broken and he received head injuries.  

 
 

[¶5]        
Mr. 
Flowers was arrested and charged with assault with a deadly weapon.  At trial, he did not deny hitting Mr. 
Krenning with the shovel.  However, 
he claimed that he had acted in self-defense, and that Mr. Krenning had 
been the aggressor.  The jury agreed 
that Mr. Flowers had acted in self-defense,1 and he was acquitted. 

 
 

[¶6]        
On 
July 14, 2005, the Krennings presented the Irrigation District with a Verified 
Notice of Claim pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113, which requires such 
notice before an action may be brought against a governmental entity.  The Irrigation District did not respond 
to the notice, and on August 10, 2005, the Krennings filed a complaint in the 
district court against the Irrigation District and Mr. Flowers.  On June 15, 2007, the Irrigation 
District moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity from suit pursuant to 
the WGCA.  Mr. Flowers joined that 
motion, claiming that he was also subject to governmental immunity as an 
employee of the Irrigation District.  
The district court ruled in favor of the Irrigation District and 
Mr. Flowers, and the Krennings appeal that decision.  

 
 

[¶7]        
One 
of the issues raised in this appeal is the constitutionality of the WGCA.  Accordingly, notice was served on the 
Attorney General as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-113 and W.R.C.P. 
24(d).  The State of Wyoming 
intervened in order to address the constitutional challenge.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶8]                        
            
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c); Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002).  "A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an essential 
element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have asserted." Id. Because summary judgment involves a 
purely legal determination, we undertake de novo review of a trial court's 
summary judgment decision.  Glenn v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 WY 
16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 

Jacobs 
Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 
2008 WY 101, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 125, 128-29 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Is the Irrigation District subject to governmental 
immunity?

 
 

[¶9]        
This 
is the first time we have been squarely presented with the question of whether 
the WGCA provides governmental immunity to an irrigation district.  To answer the question, we must 
interpret the statutory language of the WGCA.  "Statutory interpretation is a question 
of law, so our review is de novo." 
 Qwest 
Corp. v. Public Svc. Comm'n of Wyo., 
2007 WY 97, ¶ 3, 161 P.3d 495, 497 (Wyo. 2007).  We 
attempt to determine 
the legislature's intent based primarily on the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the words used in the statute.

 
 
The 
paramount consideration is to determine the legislature's intent, which must be 
ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute.  We look first to the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the words to determine if the statute is ambiguous.  A statute is clear and unambiguous if 
its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning 
with consistency and predictability.  Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it 
is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.  If we determine that a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the 
statute.

 
 

RK 
v. State ex rel. Natrona County Child Support Enforcement Dep't, 
2008 WY 1, ¶ 10, 174 P.3d 166, 169 (Wyo. 2008) (internal citations 
omitted).

 
 

[¶10]     
The 
WGCA begins by granting governmental entities broad immunity from tort 
liability:

 
 
A 
governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of 
duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by 
W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 and limited by W.S. 1-39-121. 

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a).  The first question to be resolved is 
whether the Irrigation District is a governmental entity to which immunity is 
granted.

 
 

[¶11]     
The 
term "governmental entity" is defined to include "the state, University of 
Wyoming or any local government."  
Wyo. Stat Ann. § 1-39-103(a)(i).  In turn, the term "local government" is 
defined to include "cities and towns, counties, school districts, joint powers 
boards, airport boards, public corporations, community 
college districts, special districts and their governing bodies, all political 
subdivisions of the state, and their agencies, instrumentalities and 
institutions."  Wyo. Stat Ann. 
§ 1-39-103(a)(ii) (emphasis added).  
The Irrigation District asserts that it is a "public corporation," and so 
a governmental entity subject to immunity.2

 
 

[¶12]     
The 
WGCA does not define the term public corporation.  However, in 1979 when the WGCA was 
enacted, a familiar source listed this definition:

 
 
An 
artificial person . . . created for the administration of public affairs. . . 
.  A public corporation is an 
instrumentality of the state, founded and owned in the public interest, 
supported by public funds and governed by those deriving their authority from 
the state.

 
 

Black's 
Law Dictionary 
1105-06 (5th ed. 1979).  The Irrigation District is plainly an 
artificial person, being a corporate body duly organized pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 41-7-201.  It is founded 
and owned in the public interest, as indicated by the legislature's direction 
that the statutes concerning irrigation districts "shall be liberally construed 
to promote the public welfare by 
reclaiming and irrigating lands."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-7-102 (emphasis 
added).  To the extent that 
irrigation districts "promote the public welfare," they are created for the 
administration of public affairs.  
Irrigation districts derive their authority from the state, as 
demonstrated by the fact that they must be created by an order of the state 
district court.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 41-7-210.  Thus 
far, the Irrigation District fits comfortably within the definition of a public 
corporation.  

 
 

[¶13]     
The 
question of whether the Irrigation District is supported by public funds is not 
so easily answered.  Irrigation 
districts are not funded by taxes paid by the public at large, but rather, by 
assessments against district members.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-7-401 through -415.  However, the public nature of these 
assessments is established by other statutory provisions.  An irrigation district's annual budget 
must be approved by the district court.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-7-402.  
The assessments are approved, levied, and assessed by county 
commissioners.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 41-7-403.  The county 
assessor must then "extend upon the tax roll of such county the respective 
amounts levied and assessed against each lot, tract and easement of land, and 
against each corporation as shown by said assessment roll of said 
districts."  Id.  The assessments are "collected by the 
same officer and in the same manner and at the 
same time as state and county taxes are collected."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-7-404(a).  Read together, these statutory 
provisions give the Irrigation District's assessments the character of public 
funds.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that the Irrigation District satisfies all of the requirements of Black's definition of a public 
corporation.

 
 

[¶14]     
Further, 
while the legislature did not define the term "public corporation" in the WGCA, 
it did provide a definition in 
the statutes concerning water conservancy districts.  There, a public corporation is defined 
to include:

 
 
counties, 
city and counties, towns, cities, school districts, irrigation districts, water 
districts, part districts, subdistricts, and all governmental agencies, clothed 
with the power of levying or providing for the levy of general or special taxes 
or special assessments.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 41-3-702(b) (emphasis added).  While this definition may not apply 
directly under the WGCA, it does establish that the legislature considers 
irrigation districts to be public corporations for some purposes.  

 
 

[¶15]     
Our 
conclusion that an irrigation district is a public corporation can be tested 
against other statutory provisions as well.  "[I]n ascertaining the meaning of a 
given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general 
purpose must be considered and construed in harmony."  Plymale v. Donnelly, 2007 WY 77, 
¶ 30, 157 P.3d 933, 940 (Wyo. 2007), citing McClean v. State, 2003 WY 17, ¶ 6, 
62 P.3d 595, 597 (Wyo. 2003).  The 
statutes dealing with irrigation districts expressly provide that the 
commissioners 
of an irrigation district are "declared to be public officers."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-7-301.  Irrigation district commissioners must 
take "an oath to support the constitution of the United States and the 
constitution of the state of Wyoming."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-7-302.  
Irrigation districts have the power to exercise eminent domain.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 41-7-210(a)(iv)(E).  They 
have the authority to issue bonds to secure indebtedness.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-7-408.  They must advertise for bids, and accept 
the lowest bid, for any work estimated to cost more than $7,500.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-7-412.  All of these statutory provisions tend 
to confirm our conclusion that irrigation districts are of such a public nature 
that they must be considered public corporations, and that the legislature 
intended to include irrigation districts among the governmental entities 
subject to immunity under the WGCA.

 
 

[¶16]     
Finally, 
we can test this conclusion against prior decisions of this Court.  Significantly, we have expressly 
declared that irrigation districts are public 
corporations:

 
 
An 
irrigation district, reclaiming, as it does, desert lands in the state, and 
accordingly conferring a benefit not alone upon the private individuals within 
the district, but also upon the people of the state as a whole, is a public, 
rather than a private corporation. Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, (2nd 
ed.) sec. 1404; 40 Cyc. 817. . . .  
They are . . . special state organizations for state purposes with 
limited powers, created to perform certain work which the policy of the state 
requires or permits to be done and to which the state has given a certain degree 
of discretion in reclaiming desert lands.

 Sullivan 
v. Blakesley, 
35 Wyo. 73, 83-84, 246 P. 918, 921-22 (1926).  In addition, in Biddick v. Laramie Valley Municipal 
Irrigation Dist., 76 Wyo. 67, 72, 299 P.2d 1059, 1060 (1956), we affirmed a 
district court's finding that the "Laramie Valley Municipal Irrigation District 
is a public corporation."  We find 
no Wyoming cases holding to the contrary.

 
 

[¶17]     
In 
their arguments against governmental immunity for irrigation districts, the 
Krennings point to a long line of Wyoming cases in which irrigation districts 
have been defendants.  These cases 
range in age from Big Goose and Beaver 
Ditch Co. v. Morrow, 8 Wyo. 537, 59 P. 159 (1899), to Reed v. Cloninger, 2006 WY 37, 131 P.3d 359 (Wyo. 2006).  They include 
Wheatland 
Irrigation Dist. v. McGuire, 
537 P.2d 1128, 1140 (Wyo. 1975), in which we expressly recognized that owners of 
irrigation ditches and reservoirs are "charged with a duty of reasonable care in 
constructing, maintaining and operating [their] irrigation works and 
facilities."  The Krennings contend 
that holding irrigation districts subject to governmental immunity ignores or 
overrules these prior decisions.

 
 

[¶18]     
Careful 
review of the cases cited reveals that all are distinguishable from the present 
case.  Some of these cases involved 
private irrigation districts or canal companies, which were plainly not subject 
to governmental immunity.  See, e.g., Tillery v. West Side Canal, Inc., 719 P.2d 1384 (Wyo. 1986); Pine Creek Canal 
No. 1 v. Stadler, 685 P.2d 13 (Wyo. 1984).  Nearly all of the cases, including Wheatland Irrigation Dist., 537 P.2d 1128, were decided prior to the enactment of the WGCA.  We are not ignoring or overruling these 
cases, only interpreting the legislature's intent as expressed in the WGCA.  Finally, in Reed, 131 P.3d 359, the Shoshone 
Irrigation District was a defendant, and the case was decided after the passage 
of the WGCA.  However, the issue of 
governmental immunity was not raised by the parties or considered by the 
Court.  That may be because, 
although the suit initially sought damages from the irrigation district, 
"[e]ventually, the Reeds withdrew their claim for damages vis- -vis the 
District, and asked only that irrigation in that area be enjoined."  Id., ¶ 7, 131 P.3d  at 363.  The WGCA grants "immunity from liability 
for any tort," Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a), but it does not preclude a 
claim for injunctive relief against an irrigation 
district.

 
 

[¶19]     
Another 
argument raised by the Krennings is more troubling.  They point out that the WGCA was enacted 
generally to limit the scope of governmental immunity, not to expand it.  As we have previously observed, "in 
adopting the Governmental Claims Act, the legislature recognized and embraced 
the curtailment of 
governmental immunity initiated by the judiciary."  Hamlin v. Transcon Lines, 701 P.2d 1139, 
1144 (Wyo. 1985) (emphasis added).  The Krennings assert that because 
irrigation districts did not enjoy governmental immunity prior to the enactment 
of the WGCA, extending governmental immunity to irrigation districts after the 
enactment of the WGCA is contrary to the general purpose of that 
act.

 
 

[¶20]     
While 
this argument has merit, we are compelled to reject it.  As stated above, under our rules of 
statutory construction, we must interpret a statute based on the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.  The WGCA expressly grants governmental 
immunity to public corporations.  
Irrigation districts are public corporations, as shown by the ordinary 
definition of a public corporation, other legislative provisions, and previous 
holdings by this Court.  Thus, the 
WGCA unambiguously grants governmental immunity to irrigation 
districts.

 
 

When 
the words used are clear and unambiguous, a court risks an impermissible 
substitution of its own views, or those of others, for the intent of the 
legislature if any effort is made to interpret or construe statutes on any basis 
other than the language invoked by the legislature. . . .  If the language selected by the 
legislature is sufficiently definitive, that language establishes the rule of 
law. . . .  This 
inhibition upon statutory construction offers assurance that the legislative 
efforts and determinations of elected representatives will be made effective 
without judicial adjustment or gloss.

State, 
ex rel., Dept. of Revenue v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 
2001 WY 27, ¶ 16, 18 P.3d 1182, 1187 (Wyo. 2001), quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board 
of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991).  In light of our recognition that the 
language selected by the legislature is clear and unambiguous, we must conclude 
that the WGCA provides governmental immunity to irrigation districts. 

 
 
2.         
Is the Irrigation District a "public utility" for which governmental 
immunity has been waived?

 
 

[¶21]     
As 
noted above, the WGCA provides broad governmental immunity from tort 
liability.  However, it also 
establishes a number of specified exceptions.  The Krennings seek to apply this 
exception to the Irrigation District:

 
 
A 
governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful 
death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while 
acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of public utilities and 
services including gas, electricity, water, solid or liquid waste collection or 
disposal, heating and ground transportation.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-108(a).  The 
Krennings say that the Irrigation District supplies water as a public utility, 
and so governmental immunity has been waived for their negligence claims against 
the Irrigation District.  We note 
that the question of whether an irrigation district is a public utility is also 
one of first impression for this Court.  

 
 

[¶22]     
The 
WGCA does not define the term public utility, but the Krennings point to this 
definition from the statutes governing public utilities:

 
 
(vi)  "Public utility" means and includes 
every person that owns, operates, leases, controls or has power to operate, 
lease or control: . . .

 
 
            
(E)  Any plant, property or 
facility for the supply, storage, distribution or furnishing to or for the 
public of water for manufacturing, municipal, agriculture or domestic uses, 
except and excluding any such plant, property or facility owned by a 
municipality;

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 37-1-101(a).  We 
agree that this definition provides a useful indication of what the legislature 
meant by the term public utility as used in the WGCA.  

 
 

[¶23]     
The 
Krennings rely on the fact that the Irrigation District supplies, distributes, 
or furnishes water for agricultural uses, which they say brings the Irrigation 
District within the statutory definition of a public utility.  In contrast, the Irrigation District 
asserts that it does not supply water "to or for the public," but only to its 
members.  Accordingly, the 
Irrigation District says that it does not fit the definition of a public 
utility.

 
 

[¶24]     
We 
have previously explained that the statutory phrase "to or for the public" 
refers to "sales 
to sufficient of the public to clothe the operation with a public 
interest."  Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of Wyoming, 
545 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Wyo. 1976), citing Iowa State Commerce Comm'n v. Northern 
Natural Gas Co., 161 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Iowa 1968), and Griffith v. New Mexico Public Service 
Comm'n, 86 N.M. 113, 116, 520 P.2d 269, 272 (1974).  Applying that definition, we determined 
that a company supplying natural gas to a single purchaser did not supply gas 
"to or for the public," and was not a public utility.  Phillips Petroleum, 545 P.2d  at 
1172.  Similarly, in Bridle Bit Ranch Co. v. Basin Elec. Power 
Coop., 2005 WY 108, ¶ 31, 118 P.3d 996, 1011 (Wyo. 2005), we considered 
the status of an electric company supplying wholesale electricity only to 
distribution cooperatives that, in turn, distributed the electricity in the 
retail market.  We concluded that 
supplying electricity to a limited number of distribution cooperatives was not 
supplying it "to or for the public," and that the electric company was not a 
public utility.  

 
 

[¶25]     
We 
have also explained that the test for a public utility is not the absolute 
number of persons it serves, but whether it is devoted to public use.  Rural 
Elec. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
57 Wyo. 451, 471-72, 120 P.2d 741, 747 (1942).  In that case, we held that a rural 
electric company was a public utility, despite the fact that it provided 
electricity only to its members.  
Indications that it was devoted to public use included the facts that it 
had "solicited practically everyone in that territory" to become members, and it 
"accepted substantially all requests for service of its commodity."  Id. at 482, 120 P.2d  at 751.  This ruling supports the concept that a 
public utility is "open 
to the use and service of all members of the public who may require it."  73B C.J.S. Public Utilities § 2 (2008).    

 
 

[¶26]     
By 
Wyoming statute, an irrigation district may include only those lands that 
benefit from the irrigation works.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-7-203.  
It makes assessments only against the owners of those lands.  See Gies v. Boehm, 78 Wyo. 449, 463-64, 329 P.2d 807, 813 (1958); Biddick, 299 P.2d  at 1064-65.  In this case, the 
Krennings do not dispute the Irrigation District's position that "it serves only 
a limited class of individuals, those who are actually members [of] the 
irrigation district."  While there 
may be a substantial number of members,3 still membership in the Irrigation 
District is a small subset of the public at large.  As the district court stated in its 
decision letter, there is "no reason to believe that any type of products or 
services are being sold by the District to the general public."  These facts support the conclusion that 
the Irrigation District is not a public utility, just as an electric company 
supplying electricity to a limited number of distributors was not a public 
utility.  See Bridle Bit, ¶ 31, 118 P.3d  at 1011. 

 
 

[¶27]     
The 
Krennings do not contend that the Irrigation District solicits practically 
everyone to become members, or that it accepts substantially all requests for 
its commodity.  This is in direct 
contrast with Rural 
Elec. Co., 
120 P.2d  at 751, where such facts indicated that the electric cooperative was a 
public utility.  The Krennings do 
not contend that this 
Irrigation District, or any other in the state, has ever been regulated as a 
public utility by the Wyoming Public Service Commission.  Based on these facts, we must agree with 
the district court's conclusion that the Irrigation District does not supply 
water "to or for the public," and affirm its ruling that the Irrigation District 
is not a public utility.

 
 

3.         
Did 
the district court properly grant summary judgment to Mr. Flowers as 
an employee of the Irrigation District?

 
 

[¶28]     
The 
WGCA extends governmental immunity to the "governmental entity and its public 
employees while acting within the scope of duties."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a).  On that basis, the 
district court granted summary judgment to Mr. Flowers, ruling that he, as an 
employee of the Irrigation District, was also subject to governmental 
immunity.  However, the 
Krennings point out that their complaint alleged Mr. Flowers committed an 
intentional assault and battery against Mr. Krenning.  On appeal, they maintain that the 
actions of Mr. Flowers were outside the scope of his duties as an employee of 
the Irrigation District and that Mr. Flowers is not entitled to 
governmental immunity as an employee of the Irrigation District.

 
 

[¶29]     
The 
Krennings correctly contend that Mr. Flowers is not entitled to 
governmental immunity for actions outside the scope of his employment with the 
Irrigation District.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-108(a) grants immunity only for "public 
employees while acting within the scope of their duties."  The 
problem for the Krennings, however, is that none of their pleadings ever alleged 
that Mr. Flowers had acted outside the scope of his employment.  To the contrary, the complaint filed by 
the Krennings, under the heading "Facts Common to All Counts," included these 
allegations:

 
 
7.         
On October 4, 2004, Defendant James Flowers, (hereinafter FLOWERS), was 
employed by Defendant HEART MOUNTAIN and acting within the scope of his employment 
for Defendant HEART MOUNTAIN.  
Defendant FLOWERS was driving a vehicle provided to him by Defendant 
HEART MOUNTAIN and was accompanied by another employee of Defendant HEART 
MOUNTAIN, Glen House, a ditch rider.

 
 
8.         
On October 4, 2004, Defendant FLOWERS, while acting within the scope of his 
employment, met with Plaintiff STEVEN M. KRENNING along a [sic] 
irrigation ditch road owned or maintained by Defendant HEART 
MOUNTAIN.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  These express allegations 
that Mr. Flowers was "acting within the scope of his employment" were 
incorporated, by reference, into each and every one of the Krennings' causes of 
action.  Of particular note, their 
third cause of action, alleging the intentional tort of assault and battery, 
explicitly incorporated the allegations that Mr. Flowers was acting within 
the scope of his employment:

 
 

20.         
Plaintiffs 
adopt and incorporate by reference all allegations contained in paragraphs 1 
through 19, previously recited, the same as if they were set forth herein in 
their entirety.

 
 

21.         
While 
present on the irrigation ditch right-of-way, a place where Plaintiff STEVEN M. 
KRENNING has a legal right to be, Defendant FLOWERS assaulted, battered and 
inflicted injury upon Plaintiff STEVEN M. KRENNING.

 
 
We 
have reviewed the district court pleadings carefully, and did not find any 
allegation that Mr. Flowers had acted outside the scope of his 
employment.  

 
 

[¶30]     
"We 
have previously determined that notice pleading is recognized by our rules of 
civil procedure."  BB v. RSR, 
2007 WY 4, ¶ 12, 
149 P.3d 727, 732 (Wyo. 2007).  
Litigants need not present their claims in any technical language or 
form, and pleadings must be liberally construed to ensure substantial 
justice.  Harris v. Grizzle, 
599 P.2d 580, 583 (Wyo. 1979); see also W.R.C.P. 8(e)(1), 8(f).  However, notice pleading imposes the 
"fundamental . . . obligation of every pleader to apprise his adversary of the 
nature of the claim against him."  
Glover v. Giraldo, 824 P.2d 552, 556 (Wyo. 1992).  A complaint is sufficient if it provides 
the opposing party fair notice of the claims against him.  Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126, 1134 (Wyo. 1985).  See also 
Jackson State Bank v. Homar, 837 P.2d 1081, 1085-86 (Wyo. 1992).

 
 

[¶31]     
We 
have applied this standard to the Krennings' pleadings in this case.  It may be, as the Krennings assert, that 
assault and battery seem unlikely to 
fall within the scope of Mr. Flowers' duties as an employee of the 
Irrigation District.  On that basis, 
the Krennings claim that their cause of action for assault and battery 
necessarily implied the allegation that Mr. Flowers had acted beyond the 
scope of his employment.  However, 
such an implication cannot overcome the Krennings' express allegations that he 
was acting within the scope of his employment.  In the face of those express 
allegations, a mere implication could not fairly apprise 
Mr. Flowers that claims were being brought against him for actions outside 
the scope of his employment.

 
 

[¶32]     
Accordingly, 
while the Krennings could have brought claims against Mr. Flowers alleging he 
had acted outside the scope of his employment, we agree with the district court 
that they did not.  All of the 
allegations in the complaint were expressly made against Mr. Flowers as an 
employee of the Irrigation District.  
In that capacity, he is subject to governmental immunity, and summary 
judgment was properly granted in his favor.

 
 
4.         
Does governmental immunity violate the equal protection guarantees of the 
Wyoming Constitution?

 
 

[¶33]     
Finally, 
the Krennings assert that granting governmental immunity to an irrigation 
district and its employees is contrary to Wyoming's constitutional guarantees of 
equal protection under the law.4  The party challenging the 
constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving the statute is 
unconstitutional.  Pfeil v. Amax Coal West, Inc., 908 P.2d 956, 961 (Wyo. 1995).  That burden 
is a heavy one "in that the appellant must clearly and exactly show the 
unconstitutionality beyond any reasonable doubt.'"  Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 7, 
88 P.3d 1050, 1056 (Wyo. 2004), quoting Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, ¶ 7, 
36 P.3d 586, 589 (Wyo. 2001).  In 
our analysis, we presume "the statute to be constitutional. . . . Any doubt in 
the matter must be resolved in favor of the statute's constitutionality."  Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow 
Committee, 651 P.2d 778, 789-90 (Wyo. 1982) (internal citations 
omitted).  We apply a three-element 
test requiring:  (1) identification 
of the legislative classification at issue; (2) identification of the 
legislative objectives; and (3) determination of whether the legislative 
classification is rationally related to the achievement of an appropriate 
legislative purpose.  Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp., 2003 WY 
77, ¶ 40, 71 P.3d 717, 732 (Wyo. 2003). 

 
 

[¶34]     
The 
Krennings have failed to carry this heavy burden.  Their identification of the legislative 
classification is less than lucid.  
They state only that the "legislative 
classification which is at issue in this case is immunity granted to 
non-taxpayer special districts' or public corporations.'"  This establishes only one group, with no 
indication of what the opposing classification might be, or of how the two 
groups are subject to different treatment or unequal protection.  

 
 

[¶35]     
The 
Krennings 
have also failed to show that granting governmental immunity to the Irrigation 
District is not rationally related to an appropriate legislative purpose.  They assert that 
the legislative purpose of governmental immunity is to protect taxpayers, and 
because the Irrigation District is not supported by taxes, there is no rational 
legislative purpose served by granting the Irrigation District governmental 
immunity.  The Krennings have read 
the legislative purpose too narrowly.

 
 

[¶36]     
The 
legislative objective in enacting this statute was expressly set forth by the 
legislature as follows:

 
 
The 
Wyoming legislature recognizes the inherently unfair and inequitable results 
which occur in the strict application of the doctrine of governmental immunity 
and is cognizant of the Wyoming Supreme Court decision of Oroz v. Board of County Commissioners, 
575 P.2d 1155 (1978).  It is further 
recognized that the state and its political subdivisions as trustees of public 
revenues are constituted to serve the inhabitants of the state of Wyoming and 
furnish certain services not available through private parties and, in the case 
of the state, state revenues may only be expended upon legislative 
appropriation.  This act is adopted 
by the legislature to balance the respective equities between persons injured by 
governmental actions and the taxpayers of the state of Wyoming whose revenues 
are utilized by governmental entities on behalf of those 
taxpayers.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-102(a).  
While this statement of legislative purpose does speak about protecting 
taxpayers, as we concluded above, the assessments by irrigation districts are 
funds of a public nature and those paying such assessments are similar to 
taxpayers.  The statute also 
recognizes that some services are available only through the public sector, and 
indicates that the provision of such services should be fostered.  Moreover, in determining legislative 
purpose, we "may properly consider not only the language of the statute but also 
general public knowledge about . . . prior law."  Greenwalt, ¶ 39, 71 P.3d  at 
730-31.  As an expression of that 
prior law, we turn again to this statement made many years 
ago:

 
 
An 
irrigation district, reclaiming, as it does, desert lands in the state, and 
accordingly conferring a benefit not alone upon the private individuals within 
the district, but also upon the people of the state as a whole, is a public, 
rather than a private corporation.

 
 

Sullivan, 
246 P.  at 921.  In light of the 
public benefits conferred by irrigation districts, it is apparent that there is 
a rational relationship to an appropriate legislative purpose served by 
extending governmental immunity to irrigation districts.  The Krennings have not carried their 
burden of demonstrating that the WGCA's grant of immunity to irrigation 
districts is unconstitutional "clearly and exactly" or "beyond any reasonable 
doubt." Cathcart, ¶ 7, 88 P.3d  
at 1056.  We affirm 
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Heart Mountain 
Irrigation District and Mr. Flowers.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In 
criminal cases, it is often difficult or impossible to ascertain the basis on 
which the jury reached a decision.  
In Mr. Flowers' case, however, the verdict form asked the jury to check 
one of two choices:  "Guilty (no 
self-defense)" or "Not Guilty (self-defense)."  The jury checked the 
latter.

2The 
Irrigation District also took the position that it is a special district.  The district court agreed.  Given our conclusion that the Irrigation 
District is a public corporation, we need not decide whether it also fits the 
definition of a special district.

3The 
Irrigation District did not cite current figures, but by way of illustration, 
when it was organized in 1953 it had approximately 225 members.  

4As 
a preliminary matter, we note that the Wyoming Constitution contains no single 
equal protection clause, but rather, a cluster of clauses (art. 1, §§ 2, 3, 
and 34, and art. 3, § 27) that, together, create the state's functional 
equivalent of the federal equal protection clause, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 
1.  See Greenwalt v. Ram Rest. Corp., 2003 WY 
77, ¶ 39, 71 P.3d 717, 730 (Wyo. 2003).  In the statement of issues in their 
brief, the Krennings also list the due process provision of the Wyoming 
Constitution, art. 1, § 6, and the open courts provision of 
art. 1, § 8.  However, 
their brief contains no argument or discussion of these latter provisions, so we 
deem those arguments waived, and confine our discussion to an equal protection 
analysis.  See Ultra Res., Inc. v. McMurry Energy Co., 
2004 WY 121, ¶¶ 7-8, 99 P.3d 959, 962 (Wyo. 2004).