Case Title: Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Barnstable County Sheriff's Office

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13116

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
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error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-13116 
 
COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC COUNSEL SERVICES & another1  vs.  BARNSTABLE 
COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     June 1, 2021. - September 28, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Sheriff.  County, Correctional facilities.  Committee for Public 
Counsel Services.  Imprisonment, Safe environment.  
Constitutional Law, Imprisonment, Cruel and unusual 
punishment, Assistance of counsel.  Due Process of Law, 
Pretrial detainees, Assistance of counsel.  Pretrial 
Detention.  Attorney at Law, Attorney-client relationship. 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on December 24, 2020. 
 
The case was reported by Cypher, J. 
 
 
 
 
1 Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
 
 
2 Berkshire County sheriff's office, Bristol County 
sheriff's office, Dukes County sheriff's office, Essex County 
sheriff's office, Franklin County sheriff's office, Hampden 
County sheriff's office, Hampshire County sheriff's office, 
Middlesex County sheriff's office, Norfolk County sheriff's 
office, Plymouth County sheriff's office, Suffolk County 
sheriff's office, and Worcester County sheriff's office. 
 
2 
Jessie J. Rossman (Matthew R. Segal & Laura K. McCready 
also present) for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers. 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services (Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, also present) for Committee for Public Counsel 
Services. 
Dan V. Bair, II, Special Assistant Attorney General, for 
the defendants. 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  Over one year ago, at the onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic, this court exercised its superintendence powers to put 
in place certain measures designed to mitigate the risks of 
COVID-19 disease in the Commonwealth's prisons and jails.  As 
part of that effort, we directed the Commonwealth's county 
sheriffs, among others, to report certain data to a special 
master in order to facilitate any further judicial response that 
might be necessary.  With that data and additional factual and 
expert evidence now before us, we are asked to evaluate three 
alleged failures by certain of the sheriffs in their responses 
to the COVID-19 pandemic -- namely, a failure to implement 
adequate COVID-19 testing strategies by all thirteen named 
defendants, a failure to exercise statutory authority to reduce 
population levels in the houses of correction by all thirteen 
named defendants, and a failure by two defendants to implement 
adequate avenues for remote attorney-client communication in 
their respective houses of correction -- to determine if these 
efforts run afoul of Federal and State constitutional 
 
3 
requirements.  For the reasons discussed infra, we conclude 
that, on this record, the responses of the named sheriff's 
offices and their respective houses of correction to the COVID-
19 pandemic do not violate Federal and State constitutional 
minimum requirements. 
Background.  1.  Prior proceedings.  In March 2020, at the 
beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in Massachusetts, the 
plaintiffs, the Committee for Public Counsel Services and the 
Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, filed an 
emergency petition in the county court against the Chief Justice 
of the Trial Court and others, asking this court to invoke its 
superintendence powers, among other things, to reduce the number 
of individuals housed in the Commonwealth's prisons and jails, 
as a means of mitigating the risk of COVID-19 within those 
institutions and in the community at large.  The defendants, 
thirteen county sheriffs' offices, were among the respondents 
added to that emergency petition. 
That case ultimately was reserved and reported to the full 
court, and on April 3, 2020, this court held that "[d]ue to the 
crisis engendered by the COVID-19 pandemic," certain pretrial 
detainees were entitled to a strong but rebuttable presumption 
of release.  Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice 
of the Trial Court (No. 1), 484 Mass. 431, 453 (2020) (CPCS I).  
Judicial officers conducting bail determinations for new 
 
4 
arrestees also were directed to consider the risks presented by 
COVID-19 as an "additional, temporary" bail consideration.  Id. 
at 449.  The court further concluded that its "broad power of 
superintendence over the courts [did] not grant [it] the 
authority to authorize courts to revise or revoke [criminal] 
defendants' custodial sentences, to stay the execution of 
sentence, or to order their temporary release" unless certain 
conditions were met, namely:  (1) the defendant had filed a 
timely motion to revise or revoke his or her sentence under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 29, as appearing in 474 Mass. 1503 (2016); (2) 
the defendant had a pending appeal from his or her conviction or 
sentence; or (3) the defendant had moved for a new trial under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  
CPCS I, supra at 450.  However, we noted that "mechanisms to 
allow various forms of relief for sentenced inmates exist within 
the executive branch."  Id. at 452. 
Finally, we required the Department of Correction and the 
county sheriffs to report certain data to a special master, and 
we directed the special master to report weekly to this court 
"in order to facilitate any further response necessary as a 
result of this rapidly-evolving situation."  Id. at 453, 456 
(Appendix B).  The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of 
certain aspects of that opinion, and we affirmed, with the 
exception of creating specific additional reporting 
 
5 
requirements, which we set forth in an amended Appendix B.  See 
Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial 
Court (No. 2), 484 Mass. 1029, 1030, 1034 (Appendix B [Amended]) 
(2020) (CPCS II). 
In CPCS I, the plaintiffs originally had argued that the 
failure to release incarcerated individuals violated due process 
and the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment contained in 
the Federal Constitution, as well as the prohibition on cruel or 
unusual punishment set forth in the State Constitution.  CPCS I, 
484 Mass. at 453.  However, in their reply brief and at oral 
argument in that case, the plaintiffs had represented that they 
were not pursuing their constitutional claims, and as a result, 
we did not address them.  Id. 
Following our opinions in CPCS I and CPCS II, a putative 
class of incarcerated inmates and individuals civilly committed 
under G. L. c. 123, § 35, filed a complaint against the 
Commissioner of Correction and others, alleging that their 
confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic exposed them to 
unreasonable risks in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. 26 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights and in violation of Federal and State due 
process provisions.  See Foster v. Commissioner of Correction 
(No. 1), 484 Mass. 698, 699-700 (2020).  We addressed those 
claims in the context of the Foster plaintiffs' request for a 
 
6 
preliminary injunction.  Id. at 700-701.  With respect to the 
inmates' Eighth Amendment claims, we applied a two-part, 
subjective and objective standard to determine whether the 
plaintiffs were likely to succeed in demonstrating that the 
defendants acted with (1) deliberate indifference (2) to a 
substantial risk of serious harm.  See id. at 717. 
With respect to the objective component of the Eighth 
Amendment test, we stated that "there [could] be no real dispute 
that the increased risk of contracting COVID-19 in prisons, 
where physical distancing may be infeasible to maintain, has 
been recognized by the [Centers for Disease Control (CDC)] and 
courts across the country," and we concluded that "the 
incarcerated plaintiffs almost certainly [would] succeed in 
establishing [that] component of their claims."  Id. at 718.  
However, after considering multiple factors, including the 
Department of Correction's compliance with interim guidance 
issued by the CDC and its "widespread testing program," we 
concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed in 
demonstrating deliberate indifference on the part of the 
Department of Correction.  Id. at 722-724. 
In December 2020, after working with the special master for 
a number of months, the plaintiffs in this case filed an amended 
petition in the full court matter that had resulted in the 
CPCS I and CPCS II decisions.  The petition was denied without 
 
7 
prejudice to refiling in the county court as a civil pleading, 
rather than as an appellate brief.  The plaintiffs subsequently 
filed the current complaint in the county court.  A single 
justice appointed a retired judge to act as a special master 
(second special master) to make any factual findings that he 
deemed necessary and relevant to the resolution of the legal 
issues raised in the complaint.  Upon receipt of the second 
special master's report, the single justice reserved and 
reported the matter to the full court. 
2.  Facts.  We draw our facts from the findings of fact 
submitted by the second special master, supplemented by other 
undisputed facts from the record, reserving some facts for our 
discussion of the issues. 
a.  COVID-19 symptoms and transmission in congregate 
settings.  All parties to this litigation agree, in the simplest 
terms, that COVID-19 is a "contagious, dangerous, and sometimes 
deadly disease."  Indeed, this court has recognized as much in 
its prior cases.  See, e.g., Foster, 484 Mass. at 702 ("For 
many, [COVID-19] causes only mild symptoms.  For others, 
particularly the elderly or those with preexisting conditions, 
the disease poses a substantial likelihood of serious illness or 
death"); CPCS I, 484 Mass. at 437 ("while many people who 
contract COVID-19 are able to recover without the need for 
hospitalization, those who become seriously ill from the virus 
 
8 
may require hospitalization, intensive treatment, and ventilator 
support"). 
The CDC has recognized three ways in which SARS-CoV-2, the 
virus that causes COVID-19, is spread:  (1) inhalation of 
respiratory droplets, (2) airborne transmission, and (3) 
touching of surfaces or objects.  Available data indicate that 
the first method is much more common than the latter two 
methods. 
Transmission through inhalation of respiratory droplets 
commonly occurs when someone physically is near (within six feet 
of) another person or comes into direct contact with that 
person.  In order to reduce the spread of COVID-19, the CDC 
recommends that individuals practice physical distancing, often 
called "social distancing," which is the practice of increasing 
the space between individuals, ideally to a minimum of six feet. 
The CDC has recognized, as has this court, that people in 
congregate living arrangements, such as correctional and 
detention facilities, where there are impediments to physical 
distancing, are at greater risk of contracting COVID-19.  See 
CPCS I, 484 Mass. at 436-437.  We also have recognized that 
"[t]hose in prisons and jails have an increased prevalence, 
relative to the general population, of underlying conditions 
that can make the virus more deadly."  Id. at 437. 
 
9 
b.  CDC guidelines applicable to managing spread of COVID-
19 in correctional and detention facilities.  The record in this 
case includes six documents issued by the CDC, which, as of the 
date this case was heard, the parties recognized as the most 
current CDC guidance applicable to managing the spread of COVID-
19 in correctional and detention facilities.3  In addition, the 
CDC further has updated its COVID-19 guidance regarding 
correctional and detention facilities since this case was heard.4 
 
 
3 The documents include (1) the August 21, 2020, Morbidity 
and Mortality Weekly Report, entitled, "Mass Testing for SARS-
CoV-2 in 16 Prisons and Jails -- Six Jurisdictions, United 
States, April-May 2020"; (2) Interim Guidance on Management of 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and 
Detention Facilities (updated Feb. 19, 2021); (3) Interim 
Guidance for SARS-CoV-2 Testing in Correctional and Detention 
Facilities (updated Mar. 17, 2021); (4) Overview of Testing for 
SARS-CoV-2 (updated Mar. 17, 2021); (5) COVID-19 Pandemic 
Planning Scenarios (updated Mar. 19, 2021); and (6) SARS-CoV-2 
Variant Classifications and Definitions (updated Apr. 30, 2021). 
 
 
4 See, e.g., Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus 
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities 
(updated June 9, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-
detention.html [https://perma.cc/9PMC-FNUR]; Interim Guidance 
for SARS-CoV02 Testing in Correctional and Detention Facilities 
(updated June 7, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/community/correction-detention/testing.html [https://perma 
.cc/47M5-PLWZ]. 
 
The defendants brought the June 7, 2021, updates to this 
court's attention in a letter pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 16 (l), 
as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).  See Foster v. 
Commissioner of Correction (No. 1), 484 Mass. 698, 719 (2020), 
quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994) (where 
prospective relief sought under Eighth Amendment, "prisoner may 
rely 'on developments that postdate the pleadings and pretrial 
 
10 
The CDC's Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus 
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities 
is "intended to provide guiding principles for healthcare and 
non-healthcare administrators of correctional and detention 
facilities . . . and their respective health departments, to 
assist in preparing for potential introduction, spread, and 
mitigation of SARS-CoV-2 (the virus that causes Coronavirus 
Disease 2019, or COVID-19) in their facilities."  Interim 
Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in 
Correctional and Detention Facilities (updated June 9, 2021).  
The CDC advises (in bold print toward the beginning of the 
guidelines) that "[t]he guidance may need to be adapted based on 
individual facilities' physical space, staffing, population, 
operations, and other resources and conditions."  Id.  The 
guidance covers a broad range of topics, including, but not 
limited to, operational and communications preparations, 
enhanced cleaning or disinfecting and hygiene practices, social 
distancing strategies, infection control (including recommended 
personal protective equipment [PPE]), verbal screening and 
temperature check protocols, testing considerations, and 
guidelines for medical isolation of infected individuals and 
quarantine for close contacts.  Id. 
 
motions, as [prison officials] may rely on such developments to 
show that the [prisoner] is not entitled to an injunction'"). 
 
11 
The CDC guidance regarding screening testing for COVID-19 
in correctional facilities is particularly relevant here.  The 
CDC defines "screening testing" as "[v]iral testing of persons 
without symptoms or known or suspected exposure to SARS-CoV-2."  
Interim Guidance for SARS-CoV-2 Testing in Correctional and 
Detention Facilities (updated June 7, 2021).  The guidelines 
discuss two types of screening testing:  movement-based and 
routine.  Id. 
"Movement-based screening" is "a selective screening 
approach which involves screening people at intake, before 
transfer to another facility, and before visits or release into 
the community."  Id.  According to the CDC, "[f]acilities should 
implement movement-based screening testing to prevent the 
introduction of the virus into the facility and to prevent 
transmission to another facility or into the community."  Id. 
With respect to intake, in particular, the CDC recommends 
that correctional facilities "[t]est incoming incarcerated [or] 
detained persons, including those returning after more than 
[twenty-four] hours away from the facility, and house them 
individually (when feasible) while waiting for test results."  
Id.  "For persons who are not fully vaccinated, testing can be 
combined with a [fourteen]-day observation period (sometimes 
referred to as 'routine intake quarantine') before persons are 
assigned housing with the rest of the facility's 
 
12 
population. . . .  If incoming incarcerated [or] detained 
persons undergo intake quarantine, consider re-testing every 
[three to seven] days."  Id. 
"Routine screening testing," sometimes also referred to as 
"serial screening testing," refers to regularly scheduled 
testing of persons without symptoms or known or suspected 
exposure to SARS-CoV-2.  According to the CDC, "[r]outine 
screening testing can increase the likelihood of early case 
identification to prevent widespread transmission."  Id.  In its 
most recent guidance, the CDC states:  "Facilities should 
consider implementing routine screening testing among all 
incarcerated [or] detained persons and staff who are not fully 
vaccinated or among a select group according to criteria it 
designates."  Id.  The CDC further instructs that "[d]ata on 
facility and community transmission level and testing capacity 
can guide decisions about routine screening testing strategies."  
Id.5  More specifically, the CDC now recommends that "[r]outine 
screening testing for staff and incarcerated [or] detained 
persons who are not fully vaccinated should be conducted at 
least weekly when community transmission is substantial or 
 
 
5 This language did not appear in the relevant guidelines 
regarding screening testing in correctional facilities prior to 
June 7, 2021. 
 
13 
high."  Id.6  In the event that "routine screening testing is 
conducted only among a subset of individuals or facilities 
within a correctional system," the guidelines set forth criteria 
to guide the selection of that subset.  Id. 
c.  COVID-19 responses at houses of correction.  The 
responses of the various houses of correction to the COVID-19 
pandemic have not been uniform; however, the responses generally 
have included some combination of the following:  testing of 
symptomatic individuals and those who have had close contact 
with infected individuals; testing, screening for symptoms, or 
quarantining of new inmates; testing or screening of staff for 
symptoms; isolating individuals who test or screen positive; 
enhanced hygiene practices (including deep cleaning of surfaces, 
increased access to soap and hand sanitizer, education on proper 
hand washing, and use of PPE); increased physical distancing, 
where feasible, including limitation of in-person contact among 
inmates, staff, and visitors; and a widely available vaccination 
program. 
 
 
6 The CDC displays the relevant indicators for each county 
on its COVID Data Tracker website, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-
data-tracker/#county-view [https://perma.cc/AMZ2-DW37].  As of 
the submission of the defendants' postargument letter, dated 
June 14, 2021, no Massachusetts county was listed as having an 
either "substantial" or "high" level of community transmission.  
However, in an indication of how quickly the situation can 
change, as of the writing of this opinion, every Massachusetts 
county was listed as having a "high" level of community 
transmission. 
 
14 
The houses of correction are offering the Moderna7 vaccine 
to all incarcerated people and staff.  The Moderna vaccine 
requires two doses administered twenty-eight days apart.  
According to the CDC, evidence from clinical trials demonstrated 
that the Moderna vaccine was 94.1 percent effective at 
preventing COVID-19 in adults who received two doses and had no 
evidence of being infected previously.8  As of the date this case 
was argued, the vaccination program offered by the houses of 
correction was voluntary; no inmate or staff member was required 
to participate. 
The houses of correction reported that, as of April 28, 
2021, a cumulative number of over 3,500 incarcerated people had 
received the first dose of the Moderna vaccine, and over 2,600 
incarcerated people had received the second dose.  As of that 
same date, a cumulative number of over 4,500 staff at the houses 
of correction had received the first dose of the Moderna 
vaccine, and over 4,000 staff had received the second dose. 
It is undisputed that "[f]rom the onset of the pandemic to 
the present, the [houses of correction] have not conducted 
 
 
7 "Moderna" refers to ModernaTX, Inc., the manufacturer of 
the vaccine. 
 
 
8 See CDC, Moderna COVID-19 Vaccine Overview and Safety 
(updated Aug. 19, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/vaccines/different-vaccines/Moderna.html [https://perma 
.cc/4PVT-ZWT6]. 
 
15 
serial screening testing of all or a [random sample] of non-
symptomatic incarcerated people and staff."  Only four of the 
thirteen houses of correction test nonsymptomatic incarcerated 
people at intake.  Eight of the houses of correction have not 
tested nonsymptomatic incarcerated people unless they have been 
in close contact with a COVID-infected individual.  Four of the 
houses of correction have tested certain groups of 
nonsymptomatic incarcerated people at particular points in time, 
in response to events such as an uptick in positive test results 
in particular housing units. 
d.  Department of Public Health involvement in COVID-19 
responses at houses of correction.  Each house of correction has 
been assigned an epidemiologist from the Department of Public 
Health (department) "who is available to provide information and 
recommendations regarding infectious disease prevention and 
control with respect to COVID-19."  Department epidemiologists 
use, and refer the houses of correction to, the publicly 
available CDC COVID-19 guidance regarding correctional settings.  
From the spring of 2020 through the present, the department has 
had ongoing discussions with Dr. Alysse G. Wurcel (the 
defendants' infectious disease expert) and representatives of 
the houses of correction regarding COVID-19 prevention and 
control.  During some of those calls, COVID-19 testing practices 
were discussed, and on a number of those occasions, Wurcel 
 
16 
recommended that a particular house of correction conduct broad, 
or even facility-wide, testing at a particular point in time in 
response to a rise in positive cases. 
The department has not recommended specifically that the 
houses of correction engage in routine, or serial, screening 
testing of inmates or staff, nor has the department recommended 
that the houses of correction decline to adopt such testing.  In 
her affidavit in this case, Wurcel avers that "[i]f at any time 
[the department] were to recommend serial screening testing 
(facility wide repetitive testing), [she] would assist the 
correctional facilities in recommending and implementing these 
new protocols."  For their part, the defendants represent that 
"if the [department] recommended the [houses of correction] 
begin serial testing of inmates and staff at their facilities, 
the [houses of correction] would immediately comply." 
e.  COVID-19 case rates, hospitalizations, and fatalities 
at houses of correction.9  During the week from April 22 to April 
28, 2021, around the time the second special master was 
compiling his findings of fact, the houses of correction 
reported nineteen confirmed new COVID-19 cases among a total 
 
 
9 This case was argued on June 1, 2021; however, this 
opinion takes into account data submitted by the special master 
up to and including the special master's report dated August 18, 
2021. 
 
17 
inmate population of 5,910 people.10  During the period from June 
10 to June 16, 2021, following oral argument in this case, the 
houses of correction reported zero new confirmed COVID-19 cases 
among a total inmate population of 6,015.11  As of the most 
recent report submitted by the special master, for the period 
from July 15 to August 16, 2021, the houses of correction 
reported twenty-three new confirmed COVID-19 cases among a total 
inmate population of 6,442.12 
By comparison, during the period from April 23 to April 29, 
2021, all but three Massachusetts counties reported at least one 
hundred to 199 new cases per 100,000 people among the general 
population.  For the period from June 25 to July 1, 2021, no 
Massachusetts county reported more than from five to nine new 
cases per 100,000 people among the general population.  And for 
the period from August 27 to September 2, 2021, all but one 
Massachusetts county reported at least one hundred new cases per 
100,000 people among the general population.  See COVID-19 State 
Profile Report 09.03.2021, Massachusetts State Synopsis, 
 
 
10 We acknowledge the risk of underreporting, where the 
houses of correction administered a total of 301 COVID-19 tests 
on inmates during that period. 
 
 
11 During that period, the houses of correction administered 
266 COVID-19 tests on inmates. 
 
 
12 During that period, the houses of correction administered 
2,437 COVID-19 tests on inmates. 
 
18 
https://healthdata.gov/Community/COVID-19-State-Profile-Report 
-Massachusetts/j75q-tgps [https://perma.cc/72SA-JDXM]. 
From April 4, 2020, to August 16, 2021, the houses of 
correction reported two COVID-19-related deaths.  There have 
been no reported COVID-19-related deaths of inmates at the 
houses of correction since June 2020.  From April 4, 2020, to 
April 15, 2021, the houses of correction reported thirteen 
overnight hospitalizations of inmates due to COVID-19-related 
issues.  From April 5, 2020, to August 16, 2021, the houses of 
correction reported no COVID-19-related deaths for correction 
officers or other staff. 
f.  Efforts by houses of correction to reduce their 
populations.  Pursuant to our opinions in CPCS I and CPCS II, 
the sheriffs have been making periodic reports to the special 
master and CPCS, among other designated entities, identifying 
certain data, including the over-all inmate population of the 
houses of correction and the number of inmates who have been 
released pursuant to the guidelines set forth in the CPCS I 
decision.  See CPCS II, 484 Mass. at 1034 (Appendix B 
[Amended]). 
As of April 12, 2020, the incarcerated population for all 
the houses of correction was 6,863.  As of April 28, 2021, the 
over-all population had been reduced to 5,910.  The data 
provided do not permit us to determine what percentage of these 
 
19 
releases has been the product of bail orders, stays of the 
execution of an inmate's sentence pending appeal, parole, or 
some other available mechanism.  However, certain data, 
discussed infra, suggest that the percentage attributable to 
independent actions by the sheriffs, as opposed to actions 
attributable to a judicial officer, district attorney, or other 
State actor, is relatively small. 
Sources of independent statutory authority for the sheriffs 
to reduce population levels in the houses of correction include 
authority to employ pretrial diversion programs, see G. L. 
c. 127, § 20B;13 authority to release certain qualified inmates 
to home confinement, see G. L. c. 127, § 49;14 and authority to 
 
 
13 General Laws c. 127, § 20B, provides in relevant part: 
 
"The sheriff of any county . . . , subject to rules and 
regulations established in accordance with this section, 
may permit a detainee who is committed to a jail awaiting 
disposition of any criminal matter, except those being held 
for offenses listed in this section, to be classified to a 
pretrial diversion program operated by the sheriff's office 
in the county where the court that committed the detainee 
is sitting." 
 
14 General Laws c. 127, § 49, provides in relevant part: 
 
"The . . . administrator of a county correctional facility, 
subject to rules and regulations established in accordance 
with the provisions of this section, may permit an inmate 
who has served such a portion of his sentence or sentences 
that he would be eligible for parole within eighteen months 
to participate in education, training, or employment 
programs established under [G. L. c. 127, § 48,] outside a 
correctional facility [subject to certain enumerated 
restrictions not relevant here]. . . .  A committed 
 
20 
house members of their population in alternative sites 
designated by an inspector, based on the inspector's opinion 
that a disease outbreak in a house of correction "may endanger 
the lives or health of the prisoners to such a degree as to 
render their removal necessary," see G. L. c. 126, § 26.15 
 
offender enrolled in any such program shall remain subject 
to the rules and regulations of the correctional facility 
and shall be under the direction, control and supervision 
of the officers thereof during the period of his 
participation in the program.  The commissioner or such 
administrator shall make and promulgate rules and 
regulations regarding programs established under [§ 48] 
outside correctional facilities." 
 
We observed previously that G. L. c. 127, § 49, in 
conjunction with neighboring provisions, §§ 48 and 49A, and this 
court's holding in Commonwealth v. Donohue, 452 Mass. 256, 265 
(2008), would permit the release of "certain individuals who 
currently are serving a sentence in a prison or house of 
correction to home confinement, under specified conditions, 
prior to the completion of their committed sentences, for 
certain educational, employment, and training programs."  
Foster, 484 Mass. at 733. 
 
15 General Laws c. 126, § 26, provides: 
 
"If disease breaks out in a jail or other county prison, 
which, in the opinion of the inspectors of the prison, may 
endanger the lives or health of the prisoners to such a 
degree as to render their removal necessary, the inspectors 
may designate in writing a suitable place within the same 
county, or any prison in a contiguous county, as a place of 
confinement for such prisoners.  Such designation, having 
been filed with the clerk of the superior court, shall be a 
sufficient authority for the sheriff, jailer, 
superintendent or keeper to remove all prisoners in his 
custody to the place designated, and there to confine them 
until they can safely be returned to the place whence they 
were removed.  Any place to which the prisoners are so 
removed shall during their imprisonment therein be deemed a 
prison of the county where they were originally confined, 
 
21 
It is undisputed that the houses of correction in 
Barnstable, Bristol, Hampden, Hampshire, Middlesex, Plymouth, 
and Worcester Counties do not have pretrial diversion programs 
pursuant to G. L. c. 127, § 20B, and that the houses of 
correction in Dukes, Norfolk, and Suffolk Counties have not 
released any person pursuant to § 20B since at least April 2020.  
It also is undisputed that the houses of correction in 
Barnstable, Bristol, Dukes, Plymouth, Suffolk, and Worcester 
Counties do not have any education, training, or employment 
programs for parole eligible inmates pursuant to G. L. c. 127, 
§ 49, and that the houses of correction in Berkshire and Norfolk 
Counties have suspended their programs under § 49.  As of 
February 21, 2021, no house of correction had availed itself of 
G. L. c. 126, § 26, to house members of its population at an 
alternative, designated site because of disease outbreak in the 
prison.  As of April 28, 2021, the populations of the houses of 
correction in ten counties (Barnstable, Berkshire, Bristol, 
Essex, Franklin, Hampden, Middlesex, Norfolk, Suffolk, and 
Worcester) were at eighty percent or more of the level first 
reported to the special master pursuant to our opinion in CPCS 
I. 
 
but they shall be under the care, government and direction 
of the officers of the county where they are confined." 
 
22 
g.  Options for attorney-client communication at Essex and 
Bristol County houses of correction.  During the pandemic, 
efforts to implement physical distancing in the houses of 
correction have been balanced, of necessity, with other 
important interests; among them, maintaining adequate avenues 
for confidential communication among attorneys, clients, and any 
third parties who may be necessary to that attorney-client 
communication, such as experts or interpreters.  Here, the 
communication options available at the Essex and Bristol County 
houses of correction are the subject of a constitutional 
challenge, so we detail them briefly. 
As of the date of oral argument in this case, methods 
available for attorney-client communication at the Essex County 
house of correction include the following:  in-person, contact 
and noncontact visits; telephone communication, including three-
way communications, either via a telephone located in a common 
area or via a computer tablet that may be used in a housing unit 
(often a cell with two bunk beds or a dormitory unit); video 
conferencing; an e-mail response system, which facilitates 
requests by attorneys for their clients to telephone them 
directly; and legal mail.  Of significance here, in-person 
contact visits are held in private rooms, whereas noncontact 
visits take place in the regular visiting area, where the 
attorney is separated from his or her client by plexiglass, 
 
23 
conversations occur over a telephone (often within hearing of 
other people), and documents must be passed via a correction 
officer.  The rooms used for contact visits are cleaned and 
disinfected after every attorney-inmate visit, and attorneys are 
provided with PPE before entering the facility. 
Video conferencing in the Essex County house of correction 
is limited to two video conferencing modules at the Middleton 
facility.  These modules only permit two-way communication, so 
any third parties must either be present at the attorney's end 
of the call or participate through a separate line of 
communication that can be placed on speaker at the attorney's 
location.  Video conferences are limited to thirty or sixty 
minutes, and the video conferencing modules do not have a screen 
sharing feature. 
As of the date of oral argument in this case, methods 
available for attorney-client communication at the Bristol 
County house of correction include in-person, contact and 
noncontact visits, telephone communication, and legal mail.  
With respect to telephone communication, the Bristol County 
house of correction has a protocol in place where attorneys may 
communicate via facsimile, e-mail, or telephone call with the 
superintendent's office to have a message delivered to a client 
to telephone the attorney at a set date and time.  Scheduled 
attorney-client calls are made from telephones in a common area 
 
24 
(as they were before the pandemic), often within hearing of 
other people.  Such calls are limited to thirty minutes. 
Video conferencing is not available for attorney-client 
communication at the Bristol County house of correction.  
According to the Bristol County sheriff, the house of correction 
does not have the necessary equipment or Internet bandwidth for 
video conferencing beyond that required for court video 
conferencing. 
In contrast, houses of correction in six counties 
(Berkshire, Franklin, Hampden, Hampshire, Middlesex, and 
Worcester) permit inmates to conduct video conferences with 
attorneys via Zoom.16  Also, as of the date of the second special 
master's report, two houses of correction (in Norfolk and 
Plymouth Counties) permitted inmates to conduct video 
conferences with attorneys via JurisLink,17 and the house of 
 
 
16 "Zoom" refers to the Internet-based video conferencing 
platform, Zoom Video Communications, Inc., as described in our 
recent opinion in Vazquez Diaz v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 336, 
336, 338-340 (2021).  Among other things, the Zoom platform 
permits screen sharing and the participation of third parties, 
such as interpreters or experts.  Id. at 339. 
 
 
17 "JurisLink" refers to an Internet-based conferencing 
platform, which allows attorneys to conduct video conferences 
with clients who are housed in a correctional facility equipped 
with a JurisLink kiosk.  Among other things, the JurisLink 
platform permits screen sharing and the participation of third 
parties, such as interpreters or experts. 
 
25 
correction in Barnstable County anticipated offering JurisLink 
in the near future. 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  Upon reservation and 
report of the case by a single justice of this court, we address 
the plaintiffs' claims in the first instance, based on the 
undisputed facts in the record and any facts found by the 
special master, according deference to any findings "drawn 
partly or wholly from testimonial evidence."  Commonwealth v. 
Welch, 487 Mass. 425, 429 (2021), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 655 (2018).  Here, the special master 
did not hear any live testimony.  We therefore conduct an 
independent review of the wholly documentary evidence in the 
case.  See Tremblay, supra at 646 (affirming "long-standing 
principle that an appellate court may independently review 
documentary evidence, but should accept subsidiary findings 
based partly or wholly on oral testimony, unless clearly 
erroneous"). 
2.  Claims under Eighth Amendment and art. 26 on behalf of 
sentenced inmates.  In Foster, we set forth the legal standard 
applicable to claims that the conditions of confinement of 
sentenced inmates violate the Eighth Amendment18 in the context 
of the risks presented by the COVID-19 pandemic: 
 
 
18 As noted in Foster, 484 Mass. at 716, "we have not held 
that art. 26 provides greater protections with respect to 
 
26 
"To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, an individual 
must establish that the punishment is inconsistent with 
'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society.'  See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
100-101 (1958).  Prison officials have a duty under the 
Eighth Amendment to protect inmates in their custody from 
the spread of serious, communicable diseases, including 
where the complaining inmate does not show symptoms of the 
disease, or where 'the possible infection might not affect 
all of those exposed.'  Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 
33 (1993) ('We have great difficulty agreeing that prison 
authorities may not be deliberately indifferent to an 
inmate's current health problems but may ignore a condition 
of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious 
illness and needless suffering the next week or month or 
year'). 
 
"Thus, . . . the incarcerated plaintiffs must show . . . 
that the defendants have been deliberately indifferent to a 
substantial risk of serious harm to their health or safety.  
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-104 (1976); Torres 
v. Commissioner of Correction, 427 Mass. 611, 613-614, 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 (1998)." 
Foster, 484 Mass. at 701.  The latter standard includes "both an 
objective element and a subjective element."  Id. at 717. 
As noted supra, with respect to the objective element of 
whether the COVID-19 pandemic poses a substantial risk of 
serious harm to inmates' health and safety, we previously have 
stated that "there can be no real dispute that the increased 
risk of contracting COVID-19 in [correctional institutions], 
where physical distancing may be infeasible to maintain, has 
been recognized by the CDC and by courts across the country."  
 
conditions of confinement than does the Eighth Amendment."  We 
therefore analyze the plaintiffs' art. 26 claims under the same 
standard as we do the Eighth Amendment claims. 
 
27 
Foster, 484 Mass. at 718 (gathering cases).  See CPCS II, 484 
Mass. at 1030, citing CPCS I, 484 Mass. at 445 ("the 
unprecedented and urgent conditions created by the global COVID-
19 pandemic necessitated judicial action to reduce the 
population of those held in custody"). 
Here, as mentioned supra, the parties do not dispute that 
COVID-19 is a "contagious, dangerous, and sometimes deadly 
disease" and that people in correctional facilities are at 
greater risk of contracting COVID-19 than the general 
population, due to the close living arrangements among inmates 
within those institutions.  Based on the record before us, we 
have no trouble concluding that the risks posed to inmates' 
health and safety by the COVID-19 pandemic constitute a 
substantial risk of serious harm for purposes of the Eighth 
Amendment.  See Foster, 484 Mass. at 717-718. 
We therefore turn to whether the plaintiffs have satisfied 
the subjective element of the Eighth Amendment analysis.  As 
discussed infra, we conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to 
establish deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants 
in the face of the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
"While Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106, establishes that 
deliberate indifference entails something more than mere 
negligence, the cases are also clear that it is satisfied by 
something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of 
 
28 
causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result."  Foster, 
484 Mass. at 718-719, quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
835 (1994).  We have described this element as "recklessly 
disregarding" a substantial risk of harm, which "requires the 
same showing of 'subjective recklessness' as would apply in the 
criminal context."  Foster, supra at 719, quoting Farmer, supra 
at 839-840. 
Before the full court, the plaintiffs narrowed their 
deliberate indifference claims to two discrete factual bases.  
First, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants' failure to 
conduct routine, or serial, screening testing of incarcerated 
people and staff constitutes deliberate indifference.  Second, 
the plaintiffs assert that the defendants' refusal to exercise 
their statutory authority under G. L. c. 126, § 26, and G. L. 
c. 127, §§ 20B and 49, to reduce the populations of their 
respective houses of correction constitutes deliberate 
indifference.  We address each of these arguments in turn; 
however, we emphasize that we do not consider these elements of 
the defendants' responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in isolation.  
Rather, we consider whether the plaintiffs have established the 
defendants' deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of 
serious harm posed by COVID-19 in light of the totality of the 
defendants' efforts to control and reduce the spread of the SARS 
CoV-2 virus in their facilities. 
 
29 
a.  Failure to implement routine screening testing.  The 
plaintiffs' argument with regard to screening testing boils down 
to four parts:  (1) the department recommends that the houses of 
correction follow CDC guidelines; (2) the CDC guidelines 
recommend that correctional facilities implement various forms 
of screening testing; (3) the plaintiffs' experts have opined 
that screening testing is a necessary part of any reasonable 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic; and therefore (4) the houses 
of correction exhibit deliberate indifference by failing to 
conduct the forms of screening testing recommended by the CDC.  
For the reasons discussed infra, we reject this argument. 
As all parties acknowledge, the CDC guidelines are mere 
recommendations, not mandates.  It is well established that 
while such professional guidelines "may be instructive in 
certain cases, they simply do not establish the constitutional 
minima."  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 543 n.27 (1979).  See 
Foster, 484 Mass. at 722 ("While compliance with professional 
guidance is not enough, on its own, to establish 
constitutionality [or a lack thereof], . . . such compliance 
does provide useful indications to be considered in conjunction 
with other factors . . ."). 
Here, the record reflects that the defendants consulted 
with the department's epidemiologists in an attempt to implement 
a testing strategy in conformity with CDC guidelines.  It is 
 
30 
undisputed that the strategy ultimately adopted did not include 
regular screening testing of asymptomatic individuals.  However, 
it also is undisputed that the department did not specifically 
recommend the adoption of such regular screening testing.  
Instead, after consultation with the department's 
epidemiologists, each of the defendants adopted some combination 
of symptom screening, testing, or quarantining at intake; 
testing of symptomatic individuals and close contacts; and 
isolation of infected individuals.  Certain houses of correction 
also conducted broader testing of asymptomatic individuals when 
advised to do so by department epidemiologists in response to an 
uptick in positive cases. 
In addition to implementing these strategies for screening, 
testing, isolation, and quarantine, the houses of correction 
adopted enhanced hygiene practices, implemented strategies to 
minimize in-person contact, and -- in perhaps the most 
significant development -- began offering a highly effective 
vaccine to all inmates and staff.19 
 
 
19 In some jurisdictions, inmates have found it necessary to 
resort to litigation to gain access to COVID-19 vaccines.  See, 
e.g., Maney v. Brown, 516 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1185 (D. Or. 2021) 
(granting motion for preliminary injunction requiring Oregon 
correctional facilities to offer COVID-19 vaccine to inmates); 
In re Holden vs. Zucker, N.Y. Sup. Ct., No. 801592/2021E (Bronx 
County Mar. 30, 2021) (mandating New York correction officials 
include incarcerated individuals in priority group authorized 
for vaccination). 
 
31 
Although one can dispute whether the defendants' testing 
strategies with regard to the COVID-19 pandemic are in full 
compliance with current CDC recommendations regarding screening 
testing, we conclude that it is beyond dispute on the record 
before us that the plaintiffs have failed to establish 
deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants with 
respect to their efforts to mitigate risks and control the 
spread of COVID-19 in the houses of correction.  Moreover, given 
the apparent success of the defendants' efforts -- with weekly 
new cases falling as of the time this case was argued and no 
deaths reported since June 2020  -- it was not unreasonable for 
the defendants to decline to accelerate their testing efforts to 
the highest levels recommended by the CDC.  See Valentine v. 
Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 283 (5th Cir. 2021) ("We conclude that it 
was not unreasonable for Defendants to rely on the healthcare 
experts who were legally delegated the responsibility of 
crafting a COVID-19 response policy, and, in any event, the 
policy was a reasonable response because it set forth safety 
measures in accordance with the CDC guidelines"); Wilson v. 
Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 841 (6th Cir. 2020) (prison officials 
not deliberately indifferent to risks of COVID-19 where their 
response included "screening for symptoms, educating staff and 
inmates about COVID-19, cancelling visitation, quarantining new 
inmates, implementing regular cleaning, providing disinfectant 
 
32 
supplies, and providing masks" and they were "on the cusp of 
expanding testing"); Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th 
Cir. 2020) (plaintiffs unlikely to succeed in establishing 
deliberate indifference where defendants adopted "extensive 
safety measures" in response to COVID-19 pandemic "such as 
increasing screening, providing protective equipment, adopting 
social distancing when possible, quarantining symptomatic 
inmates, and enhancing cleaning procedures").  Therefore, the 
plaintiffs have failed to establish an entitlement to relief 
under the Eighth Amendment or art. 26 with respect to the 
defendants' mitigation strategies with regard to the COVID-19 
pandemic, which include as one component their strategies for 
testing for COVID-19.20 
b.  Failure to exercise discretionary authority under G. L. 
c. 126, § 26, and G. L. c. 127, §§ 20B and 49.  Our conclusion, 
 
 
20 The cases cited by the plaintiffs for the proposition 
that the absence of regular testing of asymptomatic inmates and 
staff for COVID-19 constitutes deliberate indifference do not 
undermine our conclusion, as they do not address the widespread 
availability of a COVID-19 vaccine as part of that analysis.  
See, e.g., Zepeda Rivas v. Jennings, 504 F. Supp. 3d 1060 (N.D. 
Cal. 2020); Savino v. Souza, 459 F. Supp. 3d 317 (D. Mass. 
2020); Pimentel-Estrada v. Barr, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (W.D. 
Wash. 2020).  Similarly, the cases cited by the plaintiffs 
involving a failure to conduct adequate testing for tuberculosis 
did not involve a situation in which a highly effective vaccine 
had been made available to all inmates and staff.  See Hernandez 
v. County of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929 (N.D. Cal. 2015); 
Morales Feliciano v. Rosselló González, 13 F. Supp. 2d 151 
(D.P.R. 1998). 
 
33 
based upon the totality of the circumstances, that the 
plaintiffs have failed to show deliberate indifference with 
respect to the defendants' mitigation strategies with regard to 
the COVID-19 pandemic is also determinative of the plaintiffs' 
claims with respect to the defendants' failure to exercise their 
discretionary authority under G. L. c. 126, § 26, and G. L. 
c. 127, §§ 20B and 49. 
In our prior opinions, we have expressed in the strongest 
terms our view that "the unprecedented and urgent conditions 
created by the global COVID-19 pandemic necessitated judicial 
action to reduce the population of those held in custody."  CPCS 
II, 484 Mass. at 1030.  See Foster, 484 Mass. at 701, quoting 
CPCS I, 484 Mass. at 445 ("It is undisputed . . . that, due to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the situation inside the Commonwealth's 
jails and prisons 'is urgent and unprecedented, and that a 
reduction in the number of people who are held in custody is 
necessary'").  However, we have also made clear that, absent a 
constitutional violation, our intervention in discretionary 
executive decisions "would co-opt [those] executive functions in 
ways that are not permitted by art. 30 [of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights]."  CPCS II, supra at 1030-1031.  Thus, 
although we continue to encourage the defendants to employ every 
reasonably available mechanism to mitigate the risks posed by 
the COVID-19 pandemic, we conclude that we are without authority 
 
34 
to intervene in the defendants' discretionary exercise of 
authority under G. L. c. 126, § 26, and G. L. c. 127, §§ 20B and 
49, where the defendants' over-all efforts to combat the COVID-
19 pandemic in their houses of correction do not run afoul of 
Federal or State constitutional minimum requirements. 
3.  Due process claims on behalf of pretrial detainees.  
Our conclusion, supra, that the plaintiffs have not established 
deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants with 
respect to their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic does not put 
to rest entirely the plaintiffs' conditions-of-confinement 
claims.  In particular, the plaintiffs argue that even if this 
court were to conclude that sentenced inmates are not entitled 
to relief under the Eighth Amendment or art. 26, pretrial 
detainees nonetheless are entitled to relief on their analogous 
conditions-of-confinement claims under a purely objective due 
process standard, such as that applied to pretrial detainees' 
excessive force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 
U.S. 389, 397 (2015) ("the appropriate standard for a pretrial 
detainee's excessive force claim is solely an objective one"). 
Since Kingsley was decided, the Federal Courts of Appeals 
have split concerning whether a purely objective standard should 
also apply to pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment claims 
 
35 
regarding conditions of confinement or inadequate medical care.21  
Here, we need not weigh in on this split, because the 
plaintiffs' due process claims on behalf of pretrial detainees 
fail regardless of which standard is applied. 
For the same reasons discussed supra, with respect to the 
plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment and art. 26 claims, the defendants' 
multifaceted responses to the COVID-19 pandemic do not 
demonstrate deliberate indifference under the subjective 
component of the due process standard traditionally applied to 
pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment claims.  See Valentine, 
993 F.3d at 283; Wilson, 961 F.3d at 841; Swain, 958 F.3d at 
 
 
21 Compare Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352-353 
(7th Cir. 2018) (Kingsley's objective standard applies to 
pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding 
conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care), Darnell 
v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 33-36 (2d Cir. 2017) (same), and Castro 
v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 831 (2017) (same as to 
pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment claims of failure to 
protect), with Whitney v. St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 859 & 860 n.4 
(8th Cir. 2018) (Kingsley did not extend to claim for lack of 
adequate medical care), Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole County Fla., 
871 F.3d 1272, 1279 n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (same), and Alderson v. 
Concordia Parish Correctional Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 420, 424 
(5th Cir. 2017) (applying deliberate indifference standard, 
rather than Kingsley standard, to pretrial detainee's claim for 
inadequate medical care, over objection of concurring judge).  
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit has not spoken definitively on this issue, it has 
continued to apply a two-pronged objective and subjective test 
to pretrial detainees' claims under the Fourteenth Amendment for 
inadequate medical care post-Kingsley.  See Zingg v. Groblewski, 
907 F.3d 630, 635 (1st Cir. 2018); Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-
Dávila, 813 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 
36 
1090.  Nor would we conclude that these efforts are unreasonable 
under the purely objective standard for which the plaintiffs 
advocate.  See Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397, quoting Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (court cannot apply objective 
reasonableness standard "mechanically"; rather, "objective 
reasonableness turns on the 'facts and circumstances of each 
particular case'").  See also Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 819 
(7th Cir. 2020) (applying "objective reasonableness" inquiry to 
pretrial detainees' due process claims regarding conditions of 
confinement and concluding that Federal District Court erred in 
failing to consider "the totality of facts and circumstances, 
including all of the Sheriff's conduct in responding to and 
managing COVID-19"); Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 Fed. Appx. 978, 
985 (6th Cir. 2020) (pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment 
claims unlikely to succeed even if subjective component not 
required post-Kingsley where jail officials took "reasonable" 
steps to combat COVID-19 pandemic "similar to the steps taken by 
the officials in [Wilson, supra at 844]").  The defendants' 
efforts here are at least comparable to those deemed reasonable 
by a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in Cameron, supra, and arguably should be viewed even 
more favorably given the availability here of a highly effective 
vaccine to all inmates and staff.  Cf. Wyckoff vs. Warden, 
Belmont Correctional Inst., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 2:20-CV-5580 
 
37 
(S.D. Ohio June 25, 2021) ("The record indicates that prison 
officials have acted reasonably by offering the COVID-19 vaccine 
to more than [ninety-five percent] of Ohio's prison 
population"); Gladden vs. Doll, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:21-CV-
00802 (M.D. Pa. June 23, 2021) (no deliberate indifference 
where, among other efforts, correctional facility had begun to 
offer COVID-19 vaccine to detainees). 
In sum, even if we were to apply a purely objective 
standard to the plaintiffs' due process claims on behalf of 
pretrial detainees, we would conclude based upon the record 
before us that the risks faced by pretrial detainees in the 
houses of correction due to the COVID-19 pandemic objectively 
are not unreasonable in light of the totality of the defendants' 
efforts to mitigate those risks, including offering a highly 
effective vaccine to all inmates and staff. 
4.  Right to counsel.  Finally, we address the plaintiffs' 
claims that two houses of correction --  in Bristol and Essex 
Counties -- do not provide constitutionally adequate avenues for 
their inmates to communicate with counsel, in violation of the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and arts. 1, 10, and 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights. 
In Massachusetts, inmates in correctional institutions have 
a constitutional and statutory right "to meet in reasonable 
 
38 
circumstances with counsel and prospective counsel."  Hoffer v. 
Commissioner of Correction, 397 Mass. 152, 155–156 (1986), 
citing G. L. c. 127, § 36A.  See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 
396, 419 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Thornburgh v. 
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-414 (1989).  "In constitutional terms, 
the question can be whether the inmates are being denied their 
right of access to the courts."  Hoffer, supra, citing Souza v. 
Travisono, 498 F.2d 1120, 1123 n.6 (1st Cir. 1974).  See 
Procunier, supra ("The constitutional guarantee of due process 
of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be 
afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful 
convictions and to seek redress for violations of their 
constitutional rights.  This means that inmates must have a 
reasonable opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of 
attorneys"). 
"In addition to the right of access to the courts, inmates 
with pending criminal charges or pending appeals have a 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel," which 
requires that correctional facilities provide them with 
"sufficient access to attorneys."  Cacicio v. Secretary of Pub. 
Safety, 422 Mass. 764, 773 (1996).  See Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 
F.3d 175, 185 (2d Cir. 2001), quoting Sixth Amendment ("right of 
the accused '[i]n all criminal prosecutions . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence' is a direct right, 
 
39 
grounded squarely in the text of the Constitution").  
Accordingly, "[w]hile a prisoner complaining of poor law 
libraries does not have standing unless he can demonstrate that 
a direct right -- namely his right of access to the courts -- 
has been impaired, in the context of the right to counsel, 
unreasonable interference with the accused person's ability to 
consult counsel is itself an impairment of the right."  
Benjamin, supra. 
However, both the right of access to the courts and the 
right to counsel are subject to reasonable limitations.  See 
Jiles v. Department of Correction, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 658, 664 
(2002), citing, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scheffer, 43 Mass. App. 
Ct. 398, 400 (1997) ("Just as the lack of a perfect defense does 
not deprive a criminal defendant of his or her right to counsel, 
the lack of a perfect setting for attorney-inmate communication 
does not deny the inmate the right of access of pursuing legal 
challenges in the courts").  Correctional facilities may 
implement policies that impinge on an inmate's constitutional 
rights if the restriction is "reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests," Cacicio, 422 Mass. at 770, quoting 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), and courts accord 
special deference to correction officials "in the adoption and 
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are 
needed to preserve internal order and discipline," Wolfish, 441 
 
40 
U.S. 520, 547 (1979).  See Cacicio, supra at 769 (deference 
accorded to correction officials "particularly pronounced" in 
context of regulations that concern institutional security 
issues). 
Here, the houses of correction in Bristol and Essex 
Counties both offer what traditionally has been considered the 
apex of attorney access, namely, contact visits with counsel in 
a private room, unmonitored by correction officers.  Cf. Ching 
v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 609-610 (9th Cir. 1990), citing Dreher 
v. Sielaff, 636 F.2d 1141, 1143 (7th Cir. 1980) ("The 
opportunity to communicate privately with an attorney is an 
important part of . . . meaningful access [to attorneys]"; 
holding that "prisoner's right of access to the courts includes 
contact visitation with his counsel"). 
The plaintiffs argue that the availability of contact 
visitation, although constitutionally necessary, is not 
sufficient constitutionally in view of the risks posed by the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  However, the houses of correction in both 
Bristol and Essex Counties offer alternatives to contact 
visitation, including noncontact visitation, telephone 
communication, legal mail, and in the case of the house of 
correction in Essex County, video conferencing (albeit without 
three-way conferencing or screen-sharing capability).  As 
discussed supra, these alternative avenues need not be perfect 
 
41 
to pass constitutional muster.  Moreover, the risks of contact 
visitation have diminished considerably given the widespread 
availability of highly effective vaccines, not only to inmates 
and staff of the houses of correction, but to attorneys, 
experts, interpreters, and other individuals working in the 
Commonwealth.  See Commonwealth of Massachusetts, COVID-19 
vaccine information, https://www.mass.gov/covid-19-vaccine 
[https://perma.cc/X6Y5-YAMF] (COVID-19 vaccine available at no 
cost to people twelve years of age or older who live, work, or 
study in Massachusetts).  In the circumstances, we conclude that 
the avenues available for attorney-client communication at the 
Bristol and Essex County houses of correction do not violate 
Federal and State constitutional minimum requirements. 
Conclusion.  On the record before us, we conclude that the 
plaintiffs have failed to establish a Federal or State 
constitutional violation as a result of the defendants' failure 
to implement across-the-board, routine screening testing for 
COVID-19, or to exercise their discretionary statutory authority 
to reduce population levels in the houses of correction.  We 
also conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to establish a 
Federal or State constitutional violation as a result of the 
lack of availability in the Bristol and Essex County houses of 
correction of three-way video conferencing, with screen-sharing 
 
42 
capability, for the purpose of attorney-client communication.  
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' requests for relief are denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.