Case Title: State v. Bishop

Citation: 223 Kan. 539, 574 P.2d 1386

Docket Number: 48,897

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1978-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
223 Kan. 539 (1978)
574 P.2d 1386
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
LARRY KEITH BISHOP, Appellant.
No. 48,897

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed February 25, 1978.
Walter F. Stueckemann, of Jetmore, and David L. Patton, of Smith & Patton, of Dodge City, argued the cause and were on the brief for the appellant.
John E. Fierro, special prosecutor, of Dodge City, argued the cause; and Curt T. Schneider, attorney general, and B.A. Lightfoot, county attorney, were with him on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
McFARLAND, J.:
This is a direct appeal in a criminal action in which defendant-appellant was convicted after a trial by jury of first degree murder (K.S.A. 21-3401) and aggravated burglary (K.S.A. 21-3716).
The defendant and his wife, Joy, resided in Jetmore, Kansas, in a house owned by Joy's mother. Five children lived in the home, only one of whom was a child of the marriage. Three of the children were defendant's from a prior marriage. The fifth was Joy's three-year-old child, David. Marital problems arose and the defendant moved out of the home. A married couple moved in with Joy and the children. Joy filed for divorce and a restraining order was issued barring defendant from the premises. The defendant moved into New Chance, Inc., a halfway house in Dodge City, Kansas, for assistance with his drinking problems.
On the evening of July 24, 1976, Joy and the children visited the defendant at the halfway house. An argument erupted and the visitors left. Later on in the evening the defendant called Joy in Jetmore and a heated argument occurred. Still later the same evening another call was placed by defendant to Joy but she was not at home. The defendant suspected Joy of engaging in infidelities *540 and had made several threatening remarks about her to individuals at the halfway house. The Bishop marriage had been stormy for many months with the law officers being called in at various times to investigate family disturbances. At about 1:30 A.M. on July 25, 1976, the defendant's vehicle was seen a short distance from Joy's home. Witnesses saw the defendant's vehicle on the highway headed from Jetmore to Dodge City between 2:30 and 3:00 A.M. At 3:45 A.M. on the same morning Joy was found dead in her bed. Her son David was in the bed with two cuts on his leg. Joy had fifteen separate stab wounds. The time of death was fixed at approximately 2:00 A.M.
At 6:15 A.M. the defendant was taken into custody in Dodge City. The defendant was given the Miranda warning and questioned by officers. Initially the defendant denied being in Jetmore that night. The following day defendant then gave a statement admitting he had been at Joy's house, that he "must have stabbed her" and detailing his activities including how he returned the butcher knife to its customary place at the halfway house upon his return. The defendant was then transported to Jetmore and an attorney was appointed to represent him.
The defendant's first claim of error is the admission of testimony regarding his initial willingness to take a polygraph test and then his unwillingness to do so. The complained of testimony came from K.B.I. agent Lanny Grosland and is as follows:
A. "Yes, it was."
...............
A. "Yes, sir.
Q. "And was that the reason Tom Lyons was there?
Q. "All right, he was preparing it and you left?
A. "Yes.
Q. "What did he tell you?
A. "No, sir."
Immediately thereafter the defendant made his damaging statements to the officer. It should be born in mind that the defendant had consistently denied involvement with the crime and then he agreed to take a polygraph test. The above quoted conversations took place. Thereafter, the defendant "confessed." To put it another way the defendant was denying the crimes and agreeing to take a lie detector test. Then he said that the test would not be necessary as he would like to talk about it. This is followed by the confession.
The defendant contends that this is evidence of unwillingness to take a polygraph contrary to our holding in State v. Stafford, 213 Kan. 152, 515 P.2d 769. We do not agree. The defendant did not refuse to take the test, he only said it was not necessary as he wanted to talk. The implication is that the test was not necessary as the defendant would tell the truth in what he intended to say. The prohibition against evidence of a defendant's unwillingness to take a polygraph test is that it implies the defendant was lying and that he refused for fear of failing the test. The objected to testimony states the conversation occurred immediately preceding the defendant's damaging statements. The jury had the duty to weigh the evidence and that included the confession of the defendant. The circumstances leading up to the confession were relevant and material. There was no error in the admission of testimony relative to the proposed polygraph test in this particular case.
The defendant's second claim of error is the admission of opinion evidence as to the guilt of the defendant. K.B.I. agent Grosland testified he had interviewed thirty-two persons in the course of his investigation of this case. Among these persons was defendant's eleven-year-old daughter Kimberly who said she had seen another person in the house. The objected to testimony is as follows:
A. "No, sir."
*542 The court sustained an objection to the question as going to the ultimate conclusion. The state then rephrased the question to agent Grosland.
THE COURT: "Not in the way it's phrased, overruled.
BY MR. FIERRO: (Continuing)
Q. "You may answer.
A. "No."
Under all the circumstances shown in the record, we conclude that this line of questioning, although improper as it went to the ultimate question, constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant's third claim of error is the admission into evidence of his extrajudicial statements. The court held an extensive Jackson v. Denno hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court concluded:
When a trial court conducts a full pretrial hearing on the admissibility of an extrajudicial statement by an accused, determines the statement was freely, voluntarily and intelligently given and admits the statement into evidence at the trial, this court on appeal should accept that determination if it is supported by *543 substantial competent evidence. (State v. Jones, 222 Kan. 56, Syl. 6, 563 P.2d 1021.) The trial court's decision is supported by substantial competent evidence and will not be disturbed on appeal.
The defendant's fourth claim of error relates to the refusal of the trial court to grant his motion for a new trial which was based on newly discovered evidence.
In State v. Johnson, 222 Kan. 465, 565 P.2d 993, we set forth the rules applicable to such motions as follows:
The deceased had been with a number of people shortly before she died. Conflicting times of events were stated. This was also true of witnesses testifying to defendant's activities during the night in question. During the trial, the defense tried to establish that a Rodney Gibbs committed the crime. At the hearing on the motion for a new trial a number of the trial witnesses were called and some changed their testimony as to times and other matters. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made the following determination:
After a careful review of the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.
The defendant's fifth and final claim of error is the failure of the trial court to direct a verdict of not guilty on the aggravated burglary charge. The defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary of the home he had resided in prior to the time he moved out because of marital strife. His wife, the deceased, had subsequently filed for a divorce and had obtained a restraining order against the defendant barring him from the premises. The outside doors were locked and the people in the house were asleep. The defendant gained entry by cutting a screen door.
K.S.A. 21-3716 provides:
The defendant argues this was his home and a person cannot be convicted of burglarizing his own home. He admits knowledge of the restraining order but evidence was introduced that he had, on occasion, been to the home while the restraining order was in effect. There was no evidence of any consent to enter the home at the time in question. Under the circumstances shown in this case the trial court did not err in failing to direct a verdict of not guilty of aggravated burglary.
We have examined all points raised and the judgment is affirmed.