Case Title: Cabral v. Caspar Bldg. Systems, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cabral v. Caspar Bldg. Systems, Inc.1996 WY 102920 P.2d 268Case Number: 95-301Decided: 07/19/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Ted CABRAL,

Appellant 
(Claimant/Petitioner),

v.

CASPAR BUILDING SYSTEMS, 
INC.,

 Appellee 
(Employer/Respondent).

Appeal from District 
Court, Natrona County, Harry E. Leimback, J.

Keith R. 
Nachbar, Casper, for Appellant.

Charles S. 
Chapin of Crowell & Chapin, P.C., Casper, for Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice effective 
July 1, 1996.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Ted 
Cabral (the claimant) petitioned the district court to review the hearing 
examiner's denial of his claim for worker's compensation benefits. The district 
court affirmed the hearing examiner's decision, and the claimant appealed to 
this Court.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUE

[¶3]      The claimant 
presents the following issue for our review:

Did the Hearing Examiner 
commit reversible error when he concluded that Claimant's bending down to pick 
up a pack of cigarettes was a normal activity of day-to-day living and excluded 
from the definition of a compensable injury under Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) (1994) and therefore denied benefits?

FACTS

[¶4]      The claimant 
applied for worker's compensation benefits, maintaining that he injured his back 
on October 4, 1994, while he was working as a laborer/iron worker for Appellee 
Caspar Building Systems, Inc. (the employer). The claimant asserted that his 
injury occurred when he bent over to retrieve a pack of cigarettes from his work 
pouch.

[¶5]      The employer 
objected to the claimant's request for benefits, and a contested case hearing 
was held before a hearing examiner.  
After the hearing concluded, the hearing examiner denied the claimant's 
request. The claimant filed a petition for judicial review in the district 
court. The district court found that substantial evidence supported the hearing 
examiner's decision. The claimant subsequently perfected his appeal to this 
Court.

DISCUSSION

[¶6]      When we are 
reviewing a decision in a worker's compensation case, we do not accord any 
deference to the district court's decision. Olheiser v. State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division, 886 P.2d 269, 271 (Wyo. 1994). Instead, we 
review the case as if it had come directly to this Court from the agency. Cronk 
v. City of Cody, 897 P.2d 476, 477 (Wyo. 1995). A worker's compensation claimant 
has the burden of proving every essential element of his claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Gilstrap v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 875 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Wyo. 1994). As a part of that 
burden, he must show that his injury arose out of and in the course of his 
employment. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) (Supp. 1995).

[¶7]      Whether an 
employee's injury occurred in the course of his employment is a question of 
fact. Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 881 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Wyo. 1994).

We review an 
administrative agency's findings of fact by applying the substantial evidence 
standard. Our task is to examine the entire record to determine whether 
substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner's findings. We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the hearing examiner when substantial 
evidence supports his decision. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which 
a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.

Latimer v. 
Rissler & McMurry Co., 902 P.2d 706, 708-09 (Wyo. 1995) (citations omitted). 
We do not, however, defer to an agency's conclusions of law. "Instead, if the 
`correct rule of law has not been invoked and correctly applied, . . . the 
agency's errors are to be corrected.'" Thunder Basin Coal Company v. Study, 866 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Devous v. Wyoming State Board of Medical 
Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 1993)).

[¶8]      The claimant 
asserts that the hearing examiner committed reversible error when he determined 
that the claimant's injury was not compensable on the basis that bending down to 
pick up a pack of cigarettes is a normal activity of day-to-day living and is 
excluded from the definition of a compensable injury under § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(G). That section states:

(a) As used in this 
act:

. . .

(xi) "Injury" means any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes damage 
to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out of and in the 
course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or 
controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the 
employer's business requires an employee's presence and which subjects the 
employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. "Injury" does not 
include:

. . .

(G) Any injury resulting 
primarily from the natural aging process or from the normal activities of 
day-to-day living, as established by medical evidence supported by objective 
findings[.]

Section 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(G). The plain language of this statute requires that medical 
evidence, which is supported by objective findings, be presented to establish 
that the claimant's injury resulted primarily from the normal activities of 
day-to-day living. The parties do not direct us to any such evidence in the 
record, and we have not found any specific medical evidence on this issue. The 
hearing examiner, therefore, erred when he concluded that the claimant's injury 
was not compensable under § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G).

[¶9]      It is, however, 
evident from the text of the hearing examiner's findings that he did not rely 
solely upon § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) in denying the claimant's request for 
benefits.

The hearing 
examiner's finding which is pertinent to this case stated:

15. The Claimant failed 
to prove a compensable injury in light of his testimony, which is found to have 
been not accurate at times, his previous back difficulties, which he apparently 
experienced for about 15 years, his unhappiness at being transferred to the job 
he was at when he was injured, and the relatively mundane activity he was 
engaged in at the time of the alleged injury. In addition, a normal activity of 
day-to-day living is specifically excluded from the definition of a compensable 
injury under W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G), effective July 1, 1994, which his 
reaching for cigarettes is found to be.

The hearing 
examiner concluded in this finding that the claimant's claim should be denied on 
two independent bases: (1) the claimant did not meet his burden of proving that 
he had suffered a compensable injury; and (2) his injury was the result of a 
normal activity of day-to-day living. If substantial evidence supported the 
hearing examiner's determination that the claimant did not meet his burden of 
proof, the hearing examiner was correct in denying the claimant's request even 
though the requirements of § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) were not satisfied.

[¶10]   In making his case that he was 
injured in the course of his employment, the claimant asserted that he suffered 
from a sore back for a few days prior to bending down to retrieve the 
cigarettes. He attributed that back pain to the heavy lifting and pulling which 
he did at his job. The doctor who treated the claimant's back condition 
testified by deposition at the hearing. He stated that the heavy lifting on the 
days preceding the alleged injury may have contributed to the injury and that 
the bending over to pick up the cigarettes may have been the "straw that broke 
the camel's back." The doctor stated, however, that he could not determine with 
a reasonable degree of medical certainty the cause of the claimant's back pain 
because the claimant had suffered two prior back injuries. He indicated that he 
did not know whether the claimant's previous back injuries could be separated 
from his current injury and characterized the claimant's condition as being a 
"continuum for this patient."

[¶11]   The hearing examiner found that the 
claimant was not entirely accurate in his statements. The claimant did not 
provide some of his treating physicians with a complete history of his prior 
back problems. His testimony about which days he worked prior to injuring his 
back and about the rate at which he was being paid was inconsistent with other 
evidence presented at the hearing. Additionally, the claimant was unhappy with 
his employer because his employer had transferred him from a higher-paying job 
to a lower-paying job shortly before he allegedly injured himself.

[¶12]   As we have stated many times, 
weighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of the witnesses are tasks 
which have been assigned to the hearing examiner, and we will not usurp the 
hearing examiner's position by second-guessing his determinations. See Latimer, 
902 P.2d  at 711. Faced with the inaccuracies in the claimant's statements and 
with the claimant's dissatisfaction in being transferred to a lower-paying job, 
the hearing examiner apparently found that the claimant was not a very 
trustworthy witness. The claimant's lack of veracity, coupled with the equivocal 
medical testimony, compels us to conclude that substantial evidence supported 
the hearing examiner's determination that the claimant did not meet his burden 
of proving that he was injured in the course of his employment when he bent down 
to pick up the cigarettes.

[¶13]   The claimant contends that, under 
Archuleta v. Carbon County School District No. 1, 787 P.2d 91, 93 (Wyo. 1990), 
he is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that his injury occurred in the 
course of his employment because it happened on the employer's premises. In 
Archuleta, the employee had finished his work shift when he died as a result of 
an injury he suffered after he had freed his vehicle from a snow drift on his 
employer's premises. 787 P.2d  at 91. In that case, no question existed as to the 
circumstances of the employee's death or as to whether the incident happened on 
the employer's premises. In the case at bar, by contrast, the claimant did not 
prove that his injury occurred at his job site on October 4, 1994, when he bent 
over to pick up his cigarettes. Therefore, Archuleta's "premises rule" does not 
have any application in this case. See Stuckey v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, 890 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶14]   The claimant also argues that his 
injury was compensable because he incurred it while he was at work, engaging in 
an act which was necessary to his life, comfort, or convenience. See Archuleta, 
787 P.2d  at 93. He apparently maintains that reaching down to pick up the 
cigarettes was an act which was necessary to his life, comfort, or convenience. 
The claimant's argument presupposes that his injury occurred when he reached 
down to get his cigarettes. As we have already stated, the claimant was not 
successful in proving that element of his claim at the hearing. We do not, 
therefore, need to consider the claimant's argument.

CONCLUSION

[¶15]   The hearing examiner erred in 
concluding that the claimant's injury was not compensable under § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(G); however, substantial evidence supported the hearing 
examiner's finding that the claimant did not meet his burden of proving that he 
suffered a compensable injury in the course of his employment.

[¶16]   Affirmed.