Case Title: Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc.

Citation: 195 So. 2d 216

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1967-02-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
195 So. 2d 216 (1967)
Freda P. BOSHNACK, Petitioner,
v.
WORLD WIDE RENT-A-CAR, INC., a New York Corporation, Olin's Rent-a-Car System, Inc., a Florida Corporation, and Charles O. Hatfield, Respondents.
No. 35432.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 8, 1967.
Rehearing Denied March 9, 1967.
*217 Orfinger & Tindell, Daytona Beach, for petitioner.
Cliff B. Gosney, Jr., Daytona Beach, and J. Lewis Hall, of Hall, Hartwell, Hall & Canada, Tallahassee, for respondents.
ERVIN, Justice.
We are petitioned for a certiorari review of the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc. et al. v. Boshnack, 184 So. 2d 467.
An automobile collision occurred between a car owned by World Wide Rent-A-Car but leased by it to Olin's Rent-A-Car System and driven by Olin's employee, Charles O. Hatfield, and a car in which Freda P. Boshnack was a passenger. The two car rental companies and Hatfield were sued by Freda P. Boshnack to recover damages for personal injuries she sustained in the collision. She recovered judgment in the Circuit Court, which the District Court of Appeal reversed in said reported opinion.
Petitioner, Mrs. Boshnack, contends that there is conflict between certain appellate decisions and the following language in the opinion of the District Court:
It is noted from the quotation Mrs. Boshnack, the Appellee, sought to get the District Court to recognize that defendant Hatfield's plea of guilty in a criminal prosecution constituted an admission against interest which was properly admissible in her civil suit since both cases involved the same circumstances. This the District Court refused to do. No doubt it was influenced to refuse because Appellee at the trial was not content to rest upon Hatfield's testimony that he had plead guilty in the criminal case but introduced in evidence with the trial court's permission a certified copy of the judgment of Hatfield's conviction which reflected his plea of guilty. The District *218 Court considered the decided cases made no distinction between judgments of conviction based upon jury verdicts and those resulting from pleas of guilty. It said: "It is immaterial whether such adjudication is made upon a plea of guilty by defendant or a verdict of guilty returned by a jury, for in either case the adjudication is termed a judgment of conviction."
A close analysis of our decisions denotes we have made such a distinction although primarily by reference to other legal authorities rather than by direct pronouncement in our decisions.
In State v. DuBose, 152 Fla. 304, 11 So. 2d 477, and in Stevens v. Duke (Fla.), 42 So. 2d 361, we noted the existence of the well-established rule that a judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution cannot be given in evidence in a civil action to establish the truth of the facts on which it is rendered, but simultaneously we also noted certain recognized exceptions to said rule, one of which is that a judgment entered in a criminal prosecution on a plea of guilty may be introduced in a civil action to establish an admission against interest. In the latter cited case, we referred to the following authorities which denote recognized exceptions to said rule:
The sections of American Jurisprudence cited in Stevens, supra, are now found in 30A Am.Jur., §§ 472-477. Section 477 points out one of the exceptions referred to by this Court in Stevens, viz.:
In the case of Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301, 31 A.L.R. 261, also cited in Stevens, supra, that court was confronted with a similar problem and said:
In the cited annotation to 31 A.L.R. 261, at page 278, the exception to the general rule is stated:
The annotations found in 80 A.L.R. 1145 and 130 A.L.R. 690 state the exception to the general rule in identical terms, while Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711, indicates the trend of authority to admit judgments of conviction in certain cases, even on a plea of "not guilty," as prima facie evidence of the facts in issue.
Even the quotation from Moseley v. Ewing (Fla. 1955), 79 So. 2d 776, in the opinion of the District Court upon which it strongly relies for its reversal on this point, makes reference to recognized exceptions to said rule and in particular to the annotation in 18 A.L.R.2d 1307. There it appears:
Compare, also, the decisions of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Parker v. Perfection Cooperative Dairies, 102 So. 2d 645, and Kuhn v. Telford, 115 So. 2d 36.
The case of Hendrick v. Strazzulla (Fla. 1961), 135 So. 2d 1, is relied upon by Respondents to negate the said exception to said rule recognized in State v. DuBose and Stevens v. Duke, supra. But it does not appear that Hendrick v. Strazzulla involved a situation where a judgment was entered in a criminal prosecution on a plea of guilty which was sought to be introduced in evidence in a civil case dealing with the same facts in order to demonstrate an admission against interest. It only appears therein that a defendant was convicted of an offense, presumably by a jury's verdict.
The foregoing considered, we quash so much of the judgment of the District Court of Appeal, First District, which fails to recognize the exception to the rule which permits the testimony of the defendant Hatfield that he pled guilty in the criminal case and the introduction of the certified copy of the judgment of conviction reflecting said plea as an admission against interest.
We find no conflict of decision or error as to the merits in the decision of the District Court concerning the inadmissibility of the testimony of a state trooper as to the speed limit applicable to the intersection where the accident occurred.
The petition is granted only to the extent indicated and the cause is remanded with direction that the new trial conform to our opinion and judgment herein.
It is so ordered.
THORNAL, C.J., and ROBERTS, DREW and O'CONNELL, JJ., concur.
THOMAS and CALDWELL, JJ., dissent.