Case Title: State v. Jones

Citation: 2015-Ohio-483

Docket Number: 2013-2023

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-02-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-483.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-483 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. JONES, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-483.] 
Evidence—Motion to suppress—Search warrants—Probable cause—Sufficiency 
of supporting affidavit—Trash pulls—Totality of the circumstances—
Evidence seized from single trash pull that corroborates tips and 
background information involving drug activity is sufficient to establish 
probable cause. 
(No. 2013-2023—Submitted September 9, 2014—Decided February 12, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
No. 99538, 2013-Ohio-4915. 
_________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} “Totality of the circumstances” is the proper standard of review to 
determine whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant if the 
supporting affidavit relies in part on evidence seized from a “trash pull.”  Using 
the totality-of-the-circumstances test in this case, we hold that the evidence seized 
from a single trash pull that corroborates tips and background information 
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involving drug activity is sufficient to establish probable cause for a warrant.  
Accordingly, the evidence should not have been suppressed in this case, and we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the matter to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
I.  Case Background 
{¶ 2} A Cleveland narcotics detective sought a warrant to search a house 
located at 1116 Rowley Avenue based on the following facts within the 
supporting affidavit. 
{¶ 3} As part of an ongoing investigation in drug trafficking in 
Cleveland, police arrested James Taylor in October 2011 at 1116 Rowley Avenue 
for manufacturing methamphetamine.  On December 4, 2011, Cleveland police 
received a report from appellee, Lauren Jones, of a burglary at that same location 
and of a known male who she claimed was refusing to leave the premises.  
Officers responding to the scene arrested Ilya Shpilman, a person known to the 
police to be involved with the manufacture of methamphetamine. 
{¶ 4} While investigating drug activity as a member of Cleveland Police 
Department’s Narcotics Unit, the affiant learned from a confidential informant 
that an African-American female named Lauren, described as “overweight,” was 
engaged in the manufacture and sale of methamphetamine in the Cleveland area.  
Six other persons arrested for manufacturing meth had separately identified 
another woman, named Jennifer “Jen Jen” Chappell, as a known meth “cook.”  
Two of those arrested reported that Chappell had moved her methamphetamine-
manufacturing operation to Rowley Avenue. 
{¶ 5} While at the Cleveland Justice Center for an unrelated court 
appearance in March 2012, the affiant and another Cleveland detective saw 
Jennifer Chappell in the lobby.  Chappell was sitting next to an overweight 
African-American woman.  After observing a county prosecutor speaking with 
the woman, the detectives asked the prosecutor who she was.  They learned that 
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her name was Lauren B. Jones and that she was a resident of 1116 Rowley 
Avenue.  A computer check confirmed that information and revealed Jones’s 
December 2011 burglary report and the arrest of Shpilman at that address. 
{¶ 6} Within a few days after obtaining this information, the detectives 
went to 1116 Rowley Avenue, pulled the trash bin sitting at the curb, and brought 
it back to the Narcotics Unit for investigation.  In the garbage, the detectives 
found mail addressed to Jones at 1116 Rowley Avenue. They also discovered 
empty bottles of chemicals known to be used in the production of 
methamphetamine and materials for processing the chemicals.  The affiant 
observed what he believed to be methamphetamine residue on some plastic 
tubing.  Field tests revealed that the residue was in fact methamphetamine. 
{¶ 7} Based on these facts, the officers obtained a search warrant for the 
residence at 1116 Rowley Avenue within 24 hours after the trash pull.  Upon 
executing the warrant, they found evidence of an active methamphetamine lab, as 
well as evidence linking Jones to the production of the drug.  Jones was indicted 
on eight felony counts related to the manufacturing, possession, and trafficking of 
drugs. 
{¶ 8} Before trial, Jones moved to suppress the evidence discovered 
through execution of the search warrant, arguing that it was issued without 
probable cause.  The trial court granted the motion to suppress, reviewing the 
trash pull in isolation pursuant to State v. Weimer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92094, 
2009-Ohio-4983.  The court concluded that “one trash pull is not necessarily 
sufficient” to establish probable cause and that further investigation was needed to 
provide probable cause for the search warrant.  No evidence connected Chappell 
to 1116 Rowley, the court noted, and there had been no controlled drug buys, no 
sustained surveillance, and no unusual activity observed at that address.  Finally, 
there was no averment that Jones had ever been observed engaging in any 
criminal activity. 
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{¶ 9} On appeal, the Eighth District affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  
State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99538, 2013-Ohio-4915, ¶ 19.  Although 
stating that it relied on Weimer for the proposition that the trash-pull evidence 
must be viewed in isolation, the court of appeals then appeared to ignore that 
point by considering the informant’s report of a woman named Lauren “cooking 
meth on Rowley” and the physical description of the alleged offender.  Id. at ¶ 17.  
Even though the contraband found in the trash indicated recent criminal activity, 
the court of appeals was unwilling to state that the contraband rendered probable 
the continued presence of methamphetamine in the home. 
{¶ 10} The state appealed to this court, and we accepted its proposition of 
law:  “A single trash pull conducted just prior to the issuance of the warrant 
corroborating tips and background information involving drug activity will be 
sufficient to establish probable cause.”  138 Ohio St.3d 1448, 2014-Ohio-1182, 5 
N.E.3d 666. 
II.  Legal Analysis 
{¶ 11} The Fourth Amendment provides that search warrants may only be 
issued upon probable cause: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
 
{¶ 12} We have held that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution 
affords the same protection as the Fourth Amendment in felony cases.  State v. 
Smith, 124 Ohio St.3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949, ¶ 10, fn. 1. 
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{¶ 13} The Supreme Court of the United States has provided that in 
determining whether a search warrant was issued upon a proper showing of 
probable cause, reviewing courts must examine the totality of the circumstances.  
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).  
“[T]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 
‘substantial basis for * * * conclud[ing]’ that probable cause existed.”  Id. at 238-
239, quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 
697 (1960), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 
100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980).  The Gates court stated that the issuing 
magistrate’s duty is to determine whether “there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place * * *.”  Id. at 
238. 
{¶ 14} We have further stated:  
 
In conducting any after-the-fact scrutiny of an affidavit submitted 
in support of a search warrant, trial and appellate courts should 
accord great deference to the magistrate’s determination of 
probable cause, and doubtful or marginal cases in this area should 
be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant. 
 
State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 15} Both the trial court and the appellate court had a duty to examine 
the totality of the circumstances in determining whether probable cause existed 
for issuing the search warrant for 1116 Rowley Avenue.  Both the trial court and 
the Eighth District incorrectly asserted that the trash pull must be viewed in 
isolation, citing Weimer.  This characterization of Weimer, i.e., that it requires that 
the contents of a single trash pull must be viewed in isolation, is an undue 
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broadening of the actual holding in that case.  The trash seized in Weimer was 
viewed in isolation because the other evidence cited in the affidavit seeking a 
warrant was fatally flawed.  Weimer, 2009-Ohio-4983, ¶ 35 (“When the offending 
portions * * * of the affidavit are excised, * * * the remaining portions of the 
affidavit [describing the contents of the trash] do not provide the requisite 
probable cause * * *”).  If the Eighth District in this case was saying that contents 
of a trash pull must per se be viewed in isolation when determining probable 
cause, that is clearly mistaken.  Instead, the trash pull in this case should have 
been considered as a part of the totality of the circumstances, along with all of the 
other information presented in the affidavit accompanying the request for the 
search warrant. 
{¶ 16} Here, the affidavit demonstrated a “fair probability” that 
contraband or evidence of a crime would be found at 1116 Rowley Avenue.  The 
affidavit noted that Jones matched the description of a person named Lauren 
identified by a confidential informant as a producer and seller of 
methamphetamine in the Cleveland area.  The affidavit also associated Jones with 
Chappell, who herself was linked to the production of methamphetamine by six 
persons arrested for meth-related crimes, two of whom stated that Chappell’s 
operation was based on Rowley Avenue.  Jones lived at 1116 Rowley Avenue.  
Shpilman’s arrest at 1116 Rowley Avenue was cited in the affidavit, as well as the 
fact that he was a known buyer of pseudoephedrine, an ingredient of 
methamphetamine, and that items testing positive for methamphetamine were 
found on Shpilman’s person when he was arrested.  Finally, the affidavit set forth 
detailed information about the trash pull, which provided evidence of 
methamphetamine production, items containing residue of the drug, and mail 
addressed to Jones at 1116 Rowley Avenue. 
{¶ 17} Thus, while the Eighth District affirmed the trial court’s decision 
to grant the motion to suppress based upon its determination that the contraband 
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recovered from the trash did not necessarily render the continued existence of 
methamphetamine at 1116 Rowley Avenue probable, an examination of the 
totality of the circumstances indicates otherwise. 
{¶ 18} When the facts set forth in the affidavit are considered as a whole, 
there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of methamphetamine 
production would be found at 1116 Rowley Avenue.  Cleveland police received 
information linking the address to methamphetamine production and distribution 
from multiple sources, and that information was corroborated by the trash pull.  In 
light of George’s instructions that reviewing courts must accord great deference 
to a determination of probable cause and that doubtful or marginal cases should 
be resolved in favor of upholding that warrant, the search warrant was valid and 
Jones’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the search should have been 
denied. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 19} We accept the state’s proposition of law but we decline to adopt it 
as a bright-line rule.  We also decline to adopt a rule requiring that trash pulls 
must be viewed in isolation when determining whether probable cause has been 
established to issue a warrant.  In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress 
when deciding whether a corroborating trash pull is sufficient to establish 
probable cause, we apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test.  Based on the 
totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that the motion to suppress 
should have been denied, and we accordingly reverse the case and remand it to 
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 
T. Van, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Reuben J. Sheperd, for appellee. 
 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, 
Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Office of the 
Cuyahoga County Public Defender. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Eric E. Murphy, State Solicitor, and 
Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
Ohio Attorney General Michael DeWine. 
_________________