Case Title: Manduley v. Super. Ct.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S095992

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 2/28/02
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
MORGAN VICTOR MANDULEY et al.,
)
)
Petitioners,
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S095992
v.
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)
Ct.App. 4/1
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
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D036356, D036456
   SAN DIEGO COUNTY
)
)
San Diego County
Respondent.
)
Super. Ct. No. CD154096
)
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Real Party in Interest.
)
__________________________________ )
)
MICHAEL ROSE et al.,
)
)
Petitioners,
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)
v.
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)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 
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   SAN DIEGO COUNTY
)
)
Respondent.
)
)
THE PEOPLE,
)
)
Real Party in Interest.
)
__________________________________ )
2
Proposition 21, titled the “Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention
Act of 1998” and approved by the voters at the March 7, 2000, Primary Election
(Proposition 21), made a number of changes to laws applicable to minors accused
of committing criminal offenses.  As relevant here, the initiative measure
broadened the circumstances in which prosecutors are authorized to file charges
against minors 14 years of age and older in the criminal division of the superior
court, rather than in the juvenile division of that court.  Welfare and Institutions
Code section 707, subdivision (d) (section 707(d)),1 confers upon prosecutors the
discretion to bring specified charges against certain minors directly in criminal
court, without a prior adjudication by the juvenile court that the minor is unfit for a
disposition under the juvenile court law.
Petitioners are eight minors accused of committing various felony
offenses.2  As authorized by section 707(d), the People filed charges against
petitioners directly in criminal court.  Petitioners demurred to the complaint,
contending that section 707(d) is unconstitutional on several grounds.  The
superior court overruled the demurrers, but the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its ruling
and to sustain the demurrers.  The Court of Appeal (by a two-to-one vote) held
that section 707(d) violates the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. III,
§ 3) by allowing the prosecutor to interfere with the court’s authority to choose a
juvenile court disposition for minors found to have committed criminal offenses.
                                                
1 
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2 
Petitioners are Morgan Victor Manduley, Michael Anthony Rose, Jason
Wayne Beever, Bradley Hunter Davidofsky, Steven James DeBoer, Nicholas Paul
Fileccia, Adam Mitchell Ketsdever, and Kevin Scott Williams.
3
In considering the validity of the Court of Appeal’s decision, we emphasize
that this court is not confronted with any question regarding the wisdom of
authorizing the prosecutor, rather than the court, to decide whether a minor
accused of committing a crime should be treated as an adult and subjected to the
criminal court system.  In the present case, rather, we must decide whether section
707(d) satisfies minimum constitutional requirements; we are not called upon to
resolve the competing public policies implicated by the measure, considered by
the electorate when it voted upon Proposition 21, and discussed at length by
numerous amici curiae who have filed briefs in support of petitioners or the
People.  As we shall explain, we conclude that a prosecutor’s decision to file
charges against a minor in criminal court pursuant to section 707(d) is well within
the established charging authority of the executive branch.  Our prior decisions
instruct that the prosecutor’s exercise of such charging discretion, before any
judicial proceeding is commenced, does not usurp an exclusively judicial power,
even though the prosecutor’s decision effectively can preclude the court from
selecting a particular sentencing alternative.  Accordingly, we disagree with the
Court of Appeal’s conclusion that section 707(d) is unconstitutional under the
separation of powers doctrine.
Because the Court of Appeal held that the statute violates the separation of
powers doctrine, the appellate court did not resolve the other constitutional
challenges to section 707(d) raised by petitioners in that court.  In order to prevent
continued uncertainty regarding the status of numerous proceedings involving
accusations of criminal conduct committed by minors, we shall resolve those
remaining issues in the present case.  As discussed below, we have reached the
following conclusions with regard to these questions:  (1) the absence of a
provision requiring that a judicial fitness hearing take place before a minor can be
charged in criminal court pursuant to section 707(d) does not deprive petitioners of
4
due process of law; (2) prosecutorial discretion to file charges against some minors
in criminal court does not violate the equal protection clause; and (3) Proposition
21 does not violate the single-subject rule, set forth in article II, section 8,
subdivision (d), of the California Constitution, applicable to initiative measures.
I
By a single felony complaint filed in the superior court, the People charged
petitioners with eight felonies:  four counts of assault with a deadly weapon by
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury against four victims (Pen.
Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), two counts of willful infliction of injury upon an elder
under circumstances likely to result in great bodily harm or death (id., § 368, subd.
(b)(1)), and two counts of robbery (id., § 211).  The complaint alleged that these
crimes were committed because of the victims’ race, color, religion, nationality,
country of origin, ancestry, gender, disability, or sexual orientation, and while
petitioners acted in concert (id., § 422.75, subd. (c)), and that some of the
petitioners personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victims (id., § 12022.7,
subd. (a)).  Finally, the complaint alleged that four petitioners were 16 years of age
or older at the time they committed the offenses, and that the remaining four
petitioners were 14 years of age or older at the time they committed the offenses.
Petitioners demurred to the complaint, contending that section 707(d) is
unconstitutional on a number of grounds.  First, petitioners claimed that section
707(d) violates the separation of powers doctrine by vesting in the district attorney
the discretion whether to file specified charges against minors 14 years of age and
older in either the juvenile division or the criminal division of the superior court.
Petitioners further contended that section 707(d) deprives them of due process of
law because the statute does not provide for any hearing to determine whether they
are fit for a disposition under the juvenile court law.  Petitioners also claimed that
section 707(d) violates their right to uniform operation of the laws (Cal. Const.,
5
art. IV, § 16, subd. (a)) and equal protection of the laws, because it permits two
classes of minors charged with the same crime to be treated differently at the
discretion of the prosecutor.  Furthermore, petitioners asserted that placing minors
in prison with adult offenders violates the constitutional prohibitions against cruel
and unusual punishment.  Finally, petitioners contended that Proposition 21
violates the single-subject rule (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (d)), because it
addresses at least three assertedly distinct, unrelated subjects:  (1) the juvenile
justice system, (2) criminal gang activity, and (3) sentencing provisions unrelated
to juveniles or gang activity.
The superior court overruled the demurrers.  The court concluded that
section 707(d) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, because the
decision whether to charge crimes lies within the traditional power and discretion
of the prosecutor.  The superior court also concluded that no due process right to a
hearing exists in these circumstances, that the statute does not create any classes in
which similarly situated individuals are treated disparately, that Proposition 21
does not violate the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, and that
the provisions of the initiative are reasonably related to, and germane to, the main
purpose of reducing violent crimes committed by juveniles and gangs.
Petitioners Manduley and Rose filed separate petitions for writ of mandate
and/or prohibition in the Court of Appeal.  They sought an order dismissing the
criminal complaint, directing the superior court to certify the matter to the juvenile
division of the superior court for the filing of a petition pursuant to section 602,
subdivision (a), and precluding their arraignment.  The Court of Appeal granted
the joint motions of all petitioners to join in both petitions, consolidated the
petitions, stayed the arraignments of petitioners, and issued an order to show cause
why the relief sought by petitioners should not be granted.  Petitioners raised in
the Court of Appeal all the issues raised in the superior court, except for the claim
6
based upon the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.  In a divided
decision, the Court of Appeal held that section 707(d) violates the separation of
powers doctrine by conferring upon the prosecutor the discretion to determine
which of two legislatively authorized sentencing schemes is available to the court.
The majority briefly discussed and expressed doubt regarding the merits of
petitioners’ claims based upon the due process and equal protection clauses, but
the Court of Appeal did not decide those issues.
The People sought review of the Court of Appeal’s resolution of the
separation of powers question.  We granted review and specified that the issues to
be briefed and argued in this court shall include all issues raised in the Court of
Appeal.
II
We begin our analysis of petitioners’ challenge to section 707(d) by
reviewing relevant provisions of the juvenile court law and then describing the
pertinent changes effected by Proposition 21.
The law apart from the provisions of Proposition 21 provides that except as
otherwise specified by statute, any individual less than 18 years of age who
violates the criminal law comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,3
                                                
3 
The juvenile court and the criminal court are divisions of the superior court,
which has subject matter jurisdiction over criminal matters and civil matters,
including juvenile proceedings.  (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10.)  When exercising
the jurisdiction conferred by the juvenile court law, the superior court is
designated as the juvenile court.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 245.)  Accordingly, when
we refer herein to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or the jurisdiction of the
criminal court, we do not refer to subject matter jurisdiction, but rather to the
statutory authority of the particular division of the superior court, in a given case,
to proceed under the juvenile court law or the law generally applicable in criminal
actions.  (See In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 837.)
7
which may adjudge such an individual a ward of the court.  (§ 602, subd. (a).)  A
minor accused of a crime is subject to the juvenile court system, rather than the
criminal court system, unless the minor is determined to be unfit for treatment
under the juvenile court law or is accused of certain serious crimes.  For example,
when a petition is filed alleging that a minor 16 years of age or older has violated
the criminal law and should be adjudged a ward of the juvenile court, the minor
generally is subject to the juvenile court law unless the court concludes, upon the
motion of the prosecutor and after an investigation and report by a probation
officer, that the minor would not be amenable to the care, treatment, and training
program available through the facilities of the juvenile court.  (§ 707, subd. (a)(1).)
In assessing the minor’s fitness for treatment under the juvenile court law, the
court considers the minor’s degree of criminal sophistication, whether the minor
can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the
minor’s previous delinquent history, the success of previous attempts by the
juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor, and the circumstances and gravity of the
alleged offense.  (Ibid.)
A minor 14 years of age or older who is alleged to have committed one of
the serious crimes specified in section 707, subdivision (b) — such as murder,
robbery, or assault with a firearm — is presumed not to be a fit and proper subject
for treatment under the juvenile court law.  (§ 707, subds. (b), (c).)  At the juvenile
court hearing to determine the question of fitness for treatment, a minor accused of
such a crime has the burden of rebutting this presumption of unfitness by a
preponderance of the evidence.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1483(a).)  If a minor is
declared not to be a fit and proper subject for treatment under the juvenile court
law in accordance with the foregoing statutes, the district attorney may file an
accusatory pleading against the minor in a court of criminal jurisdiction, and the
8
case then proceeds according to the laws applicable to a criminal proceeding.
(§ 707.1, subd. (a).)
Before the passage of Proposition 21, certain minors who were 16 years of
age or older at the time they committed specified crimes were required to be
prosecuted in a court of criminal jurisdiction — without any requirement of a
determination by the juvenile court that the minor was unfit for treatment under
the juvenile court law.  Section 602, former subdivision (b), provided that an
individual at least 16 years of age, who previously had been declared a ward of the
court for having committed a felony after the age of 14 years, “shall be prosecuted
in a court of criminal jurisdiction if he or she is alleged to have committed” any of
several enumerated serious offenses, such as first degree murder where the minor
personally killed the victim, certain violent sex offenses, and aggravated forms of
kidnapping.  (Stats. 1999, ch. 996, § 12.2.)  When such a prosecution lawfully was
initiated in a court of criminal jurisdiction, the individual would be subject to the
same sentence as an adult convicted of the identical offense, subject to specified
exceptions.  (Pen. Code, § 1170.17, subd. (a).)
Former section 1732.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provided that in
a criminal proceeding against a minor, the court retained discretion to sentence the
minor to the California Youth Authority (Youth Authority), unless the minor
(1) was convicted of a violent or serious felony, as defined by statute (Pen. Code,
§§ 667.5, subd. (c), 1192.7, subd. (c)), and (2) received a sentence of life
imprisonment, an indeterminate period up to life imprisonment, or a determinate
period of years such that the maximum number of years of potential confinement
could require incarceration of the minor beyond the age of 25 years.  (Stats. 1994,
1st Ex. Sess. 1993-1994, ch. 15, § 1, p. 8575.)  In addition, under no circumstances
could a minor less than 16 years of age be housed in any facility under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.  (Ibid.)
9
Proposition 21 revised the juvenile court law to broaden the circumstances
in which minors 14 years of age and older can be prosecuted in the criminal
division of the superior court, rather than in juvenile court.  Section 707(d), as
amended by the initiative, authorizes specified charges against certain minors to be
filed directly in a court of criminal jurisdiction, without a judicial determination of
unfitness under the juvenile court law.  The statute sets forth three situations in
which the prosecutor may choose to file an accusatory pleading against a minor in
either juvenile court or criminal court:  (1) a minor 16 years of age or older is
accused of committing one of the violent or serious offenses enumerated in section
707, subdivision (b) (§ 707(d)(1)); (2) a minor 14 years of age or older is accused
of committing certain serious offenses under specified circumstances
(§ 707(d)(2)); and (3) a minor 16 years of age or older is accused of committing
specified offenses, and the minor previously has been adjudged a ward of the court
because of the commission of any felony offense when he or she was 14 years of
age or older (§ 707(d)(3)).
Where the prosecutor files an accusatory pleading directly in a court of
criminal jurisdiction pursuant to section 707(d), at the preliminary hearing the
magistrate must determine whether “reasonable cause exists to believe that the
minor comes within the provisions of” the statute (§ 707(d)(4)) — e.g., reasonable
cause to believe that a minor at least 16 years of age has committed an offense
enumerated in section 707, subdivision (b), or that a minor at least 14 years of age
has committed such an offense under the circumstances set forth in section
707(d)(2)(C).  If such reasonable cause is not established, the case must be
transferred to the juvenile court.  (§ 707(d)(4).)
Section 602, subdivision (b), which specifies circumstances in which a
minor must be prosecuted in a court of criminal jurisdiction, also was amended by
Proposition 21.  The revised statute decreases the juvenile’s minimum age for such
10
mandatory criminal prosecutions from 16 years to 14 years and alters in some
respects the list of crimes for which a criminal prosecution is required.
In addition, Proposition 21 amended section 1732.6 to broaden the
circumstances in which a minor shall not be committed to the Youth Authority.
For example, a commitment to the Youth Authority is prohibited where a minor in
a criminal action is convicted of an offense described in section 707(d)(1), (2), or
(3) and the additional circumstances enumerated in those subdivisions are found
true by the trier of fact.  (§ 1732.6, subd. (b)(2).)  As was provided prior to the
passage of Proposition 21, however, minors less than 16 years of age shall not be
housed in any facility under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.
(§ 1732.6, subd. (c).)
Among the changes effected by Proposition 21, petitioners challenge only
the aspect of section 707(d) that confers upon the prosecutor the discretion to file
certain charges against specified minors directly in criminal court, without any
judicial determination that the minor is unfit for a juvenile court disposition.  We
proceed to consider petitioners’ various constitutional claims that section 707(d) is
invalid.
III
Petitioners first contend that section 707(d) violates the separation of
powers doctrine by vesting in the prosecutor the authority to make a decision —
whether to initiate a proceeding in criminal court or juvenile court — that
ultimately dictates whether minors charged with certain offenses, upon conviction,
shall be sentenced under the criminal law or receive a disposition under the
juvenile court law.  The exercise of such authority by the executive branch,
petitioners contend, invades the exclusive power of the judiciary to determine the
appropriate sentence for individuals who commit criminal offenses.  Petitioners’
contention is based upon article III, section 3, of the California Constitution,
11
which states:  “The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and
judicial.  Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either
of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.”
The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed with petitioners that section
707(d) violates the separation of powers doctrine.  The majority reasoned that
resolution of this question depends upon whether the district attorney’s choice
between filing a petition in juvenile court or an accusatory pleading in criminal
court is a charging decision properly allocated to the executive branch, or instead
is a sentencing decision properly allocated to the judicial branch.  According to the
majority, “the fundamental nature of the decision given to district attorneys under
section 707(d) is a decision that the adult sentencing scheme rather than the
juvenile court dispositional scheme must be imposed if the juvenile is found guilty
of the charged offenses.”  Section 707(d), the majority held, confers upon the
prosecutor “the power to preemptively veto a court’s sentencing discretion” and
therefore violates separation of powers principles.
The dissent in the Court of Appeal, on the other hand, stated that
prosecutors traditionally have possessed great discretion, largely unsupervised by
the judiciary, to determine what charges to file against an individual, or whether to
file charges at all.  The dissent observed that a prosecutor’s decision pursuant to
section 707(d) whether to file charges in juvenile or criminal court is made before
charges have been filed; therefore, the prosecutor exercises no veto over any
judicial decision made after the proceeding is commenced.  Because, in the
dissent’s view, the Legislature (or the voters through the initiative power) could
abolish the juvenile justice system completely, or deny access to that system to
juveniles of a certain age charged with certain crimes, the dissent concluded that
section 707(d) properly could “take a more moderate approach” and delegate to
the executive branch the discretion to determine where to file — in juvenile court
12
or criminal court — charges against juveniles of a certain age accused of particular
crimes.  In this court, the People adopt a position similar to that reflected in the
dissent in the Court of Appeal.
We believe that the majority of the Court of Appeal adopted an unduly
restrictive view of the scope of the executive power traditionally vested in
prosecutors to decide what charges shall be alleged, and against whom charges
shall be brought.  This broad power to charge crimes extends to selecting the
forum, among those designated by statute, in which charges shall be filed.
Contrary to the majority of the Court of Appeal, the circumstance that such a
charging decision may affect the sentencing alternatives available to the court does
not establish that the court’s power improperly has been usurped by the
prosecutor.
“ ‘[S]ubject to the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, the power to define crimes and fix penalties is vested exclusively in
the legislative branch.’  [Citations.]”  (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497, 516 (Romero).)  “[T]he power of the people through the statutory
initiative is coextensive with the power of the Legislature.”  (Legislature v.
Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658, 675.)  “[T]he prosecuting authorities,
exercising executive functions, ordinarily have the sole discretion to determine
whom to charge with public offenses and what charges to bring.  [Citations.]  This
prosecutorial discretion to choose, for each particular case, the actual charges from
among those potentially available arises from ‘ “the complex considerations
necessary for the effective and efficient administration of law enforcement.” ’
[Citations.]  The prosecution’s authority in this regard is founded, among other
things, on the principle of separation of powers, and generally is not subject to
supervision by the judicial branch.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Birks (1998) 19
Cal.4th 108, 134.)  “When the decision to prosecute has been made, the process
13
which leads to acquittal or to sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature.”
(People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 94.)  The judicial power to choose a
particular sentencing option, however, may be eliminated by the Legislature and
the electorate.  (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 516.)
Petitioners contend that the legislative branch unconstitutionally has
conferred upon the executive branch (that is, the prosecutor) an exclusively
judicial function of choosing the appropriate dispositions for certain minors
convicted of specified crimes.  Several decisions of this court have addressed
similar claims.  As we shall explain, these decisions establish that the separation of
powers doctrine prohibits the legislative branch from granting prosecutors the
authority, after charges have been filed, to control the legislatively specified
sentencing choices available to a court.  A statute conferring upon prosecutors the
discretion to make certain decisions before the filing of charges, on the other hand,
is not invalid simply because the prosecutor’s exercise of such charging discretion
necessarily affects the dispositional options available to the court.  Rather, such a
result generally is merely incidental to the exercise of the executive function —
the traditional power of the prosecutor to charge crimes.  Because section 707(d)
does not confer upon the prosecutor any authority to interfere with the court’s
choice of legislatively specified sentencing alternatives after an action has been
commenced pursuant to that statute, we conclude that section 707(d) does not
violate the separation of powers doctrine.
We reached a similar conclusion in Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46
Cal.3d 64 (Davis).  In that case, we considered a constitutional challenge to a local
diversion program that conferred upon the district attorney the authority to decide,
before charges were filed, whether a defendant would be eligible for pretrial
diversion.  Eligibility for the diversion program was limited to individuals charged
with a misdemeanor offense.  Thus, if an offense could be charged as either a
14
misdemeanor or a felony, the prosecutor’s decision to charge such a “wobbler” as
a felony precluded diversion, even if the court subsequently exercised its
discretion to reduce the felony charge to a misdemeanor.  The defendant in Davis
contended that conditioning eligibility for diversion upon the prosecutor’s decision
to charge a wobbler as a misdemeanor improperly infringed upon the judicial
power to make the ultimate determination whether a particular defendant should
be diverted.  We rejected the contention that this aspect of the diversion program
violated the separation of powers doctrine.
Our decision in Davis explained:  “It is true, of course, that a prosecutor’s
exercise of discretion to charge a defendant with a felony rather than a
misdemeanor when the facts of the case would support either charge will
frequently have a variety of effects on the ultimate judicial disposition of the
matter.  A prosecutor’s charging decision may, for example, determine whether a
defendant is convicted of an offense for which probation may not be granted, or
for which a specific punishment is mandated.  Those familiar consequences of the
charging decision have, however, never been viewed as converting a prosecutor’s
exercise of his traditional charging discretion into a violation of the separation-of-
powers doctrine.”  (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 82.)
In Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pages 81-86, we distinguished a line of
decisions that invalidated statutory provisions purporting to give a prosecutor the
right to veto decisions made by a court after criminal charges had been filed.
(E.g., People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 59 (On Tai Ho)
[district attorney could not disapprove trial court’s decision, following a hearing,
to grant diversion]; Esteybar v. Municipal Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 119 [district
attorney could not veto magistrate’s decision to reduce a wobbler to a
misdemeanor]; People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d 89 [district attorney could not
preclude trial court from exercising discretion to strike an allegation of a prior
15
conviction for the purpose of sentencing].)  Such decisions are based upon the
principle that once the decision to prosecute has been made, the disposition of the
matter is fundamentally judicial in nature.  A judge wishing to exercise judicial
power at the judicial stage of a proceeding never should be required to “ ‘bargain
with the prosecutor’ ” before doing so.  (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 83.)
Charging decisions made before the jurisdiction of a court is invoked and before a
judicial proceeding is initiated, on the other hand, involve purely prosecutorial
functions and do not limit judicial power.  (Id. at p. 86.)  This court recently
reiterated these principles when we construed a provision of the “Three Strikes”
law (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (f)) not to require the prosecutor’s consent before a
trial court could exercise its authority at sentencing to strike a prior-felony-
conviction allegation pursuant to Penal Code section 1385.  (Romero, supra, 13
Cal.4th at pp. 509-517.)
Like the decision whether to charge a wobbler as a misdemeanor,
considered in Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d 64, a prosecutor’s decision pursuant to
section 707(d) whether to file a wardship petition in juvenile court or an
accusatory pleading in criminal court is made before the jurisdiction of the court is
invoked.  Although a decision to file charges directly in criminal court might
preclude a juvenile court disposition, such a decision — like the prosecutor’s
decision in Davis — constitutes an aspect of traditional prosecutorial charging
discretion and does not intrude upon the judicial function.
Petitioners concede that the legislative branch possesses the power to
require that particular charges against certain minors always be initiated in
criminal court (§ 602, subd. (b)), and to preclude juvenile dispositions for certain
minors convicted of specified offenses (§ 1732.6).  (See In re Jose H. (2000) 77
Cal.App.4th 1090, 1099-1100.)  Petitioners assert, however, that where the
juvenile court law provides for the possibility of a juvenile court disposition for a
16
particular minor, the decision whether the minor ultimately receives such a
disposition is exclusively a judicial function and cannot be made by the
prosecutor.
A consideration of the statutory changes effected by Proposition 21,
however, establishes that the legislative branch has eliminated the judicial power
upon which petitioners base their claim.  It is true that, prior to the enactment of
section 707(d), section 707 provided that the juvenile court, after a hearing, made
the decision whether certain minors charged with particular offenses were fit for
treatment under the juvenile court law or instead could be charged and sentenced
in criminal court.  (See Edsel P. v. Superior Court (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 763,
786 [fitness determination constitutes a judicial function].)  Now, however, with
regard to minors within the scope of section 707(d), the statute confers upon the
prosecutor the discretion to determine whether accusations of criminal conduct
against the minor should be filed in the juvenile court or criminal court.  If the
prosecutor initiates a proceeding in criminal court, and the circumstances specified
in section 707(d) are found to be true, the court generally is precluded by statute
from ordering a juvenile disposition.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1732.6, subd. (b)(2);
see Pen. Code, §§ 1170.17, 1170.19.)
The prosecutor’s discretionary charging decision pursuant to section
707(d), which thus can limit the dispositional alternatives available to the court, is
no different from the numerous prefiling decisions made by prosecutors (e.g.,
whether to charge a wobbler as a felony, or whether to charge a particular
defendant with assault, assault with a deadly weapon, or another form of
aggravated assault, or whether to charge manslaughter or murder, or whether to
allege facts that would preclude probation eligibility (Pen. Code, § 1203.06 et
seq.)) that limit the dispositions available to the court after charges have been
filed.  Conferring such authority upon the prosecutor does not limit the judicial
17
power, after charges have been filed, to choose among the dispositional
alternatives specified by the legislative branch.  The voters, through the enactment
of Proposition 21, have determined that the judiciary shall not make the
determination regarding a minor’s fitness for a juvenile disposition where the
prosecutor initiates a criminal action pursuant to section 707(d).4
Contrary to the majority of the Court of Appeal, the circumstance that a
fitness determination for minors accused of crimes within the scope of section
707(d) formerly was made by the court after a judicial hearing does not establish
that granting the prosecutor discretion whether to file charges directly in criminal
court invades the judicial prerogative.  The Court of Appeal reasoned that, absent
section 707(d), the determination of whether the juvenile or criminal sentencing
scheme will apply “requires a particularized evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the
individual juvenile’s fitness or suitability for juvenile court treatment, and . . .
these adjudicatory functions are essentially judicial in nature.”  Therefore, the
court determined, the decision regarding which dispositional scheme applies “is
adjudicatory in nature, and . . . section 707(d) allocates a judicial power and
function to the district attorney in violation of separation of powers principles.”
The Court of Appeal majority’s analysis misapprehends the purpose and
scope of the separation of powers doctrine.  The charging authority implicated by
section 707(d) constitutes an exclusive executive function, generally reviewable
                                                
4 
The present case does not raise any issue regarding the superior court’s
authority to dismiss, in furtherance of justice, an action commenced in criminal
court pursuant to section 707(d).  (See Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (a).)  Nor are we
confronted with any question regarding the scope or validity of Welfare and
Institutions Code section 1732.6, which precludes commitment to the Youth
Authority where a minor is convicted in a criminal action of specified offenses.
(See also Pen. Code, § 1170.17.)
18
by the judicial branch only for certain constitutionally impermissible factors, such
as discriminatory prosecution.  (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14
Cal.4th 968, 976.)  “ ‘The action of a district attorney in filing an information is
not in any way an exercise of a judicial power or function.’  [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)
The circumstance that a charging decision pursuant to section 707(d) can affect
judicial functions, after charges have been filed, does not result in a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine.
The majority of the Court of Appeal also erred in equating the prosecutor’s
decision pursuant to section 707(d) with the fitness determination made by the
juvenile court.  In circumstances in which 707(d) applies, the statute dispenses
with the requirement of “a particularized evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the
individual juvenile’s fitness or suitability for juvenile court treatment,” which the
Court of Appeal deemed to be an essential adjudicatory function that could not be
delegated to the prosecutor.  For example, where the prosecutor accuses a minor
16 years of age or older of committing an offense enumerated in section 707,
subdivision (b), the prosecutor possesses discretion to file an accusatory pleading
in criminal court.  (§ 707(d)(1).)  In making the decision whether to file a petition
in juvenile court or a pleading in criminal court, the district attorney might
consider circumstances ordinarily at issue in a fitness hearing (see § 707, subd.
(a)(1)), but section 707(d) does not require the prosecutor to do so.  In this
situation, nothing in the juvenile court law requires or authorizes an evidentiary
fitness hearing or any other judicial determination of fitness — other than a
finding at the preliminary hearing that reasonable cause exists to believe that the
minor has committed an offense described in section 707(d) under the
circumstances set forth therein.  Thus, section 707(d) grants the district attorney
authority to establish and apply the criteria that guide his or her decision whether
to file an accusatory pleading in criminal court.  Such power is well within the
19
district attorney’s traditional executive authority.  (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp.
77-78.)
Furthermore, the primary purpose of the separation of powers doctrine “is
to prevent the combination in the hands of a single person or group of the basic or
fundamental powers of government.”  (Parker v. Riley (1941) 18 Cal.2d 83, 89.)
“The doctrine has not been interpreted as requiring the rigid classification of all
the incidental activities of government, with the result that once a technique or
method of procedure is associated with a particular branch of the government, it
can never be used thereafter by another.”  (Ibid.)  The separation of powers
doctrine “recognizes that the three branches of government are interdependent,
and it permits actions of one branch that may ‘significantly affect those of another
branch.’  [Citation.]”  (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of California
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 298.)  The doctrine “ ‘is not intended to prohibit one
branch from taking action properly within its sphere that has the incidental effect
of duplicating a function or procedure delegated to another branch.’  [Citation.]”
(Ibid.)
The decision whether a minor is to be tried in the juvenile or the criminal
division of the superior court, even before the passage of Proposition 21, has not
been considered to constitute an exclusively judicial function.  For example, if a
prosecutor decides to charge a minor at least 14 years of age with certain serious
crimes, such as murder with special circumstances when the minor personally
killed the victim, the minor must be prosecuted in a court of criminal jurisdiction.
(§ 602, subd. (b).)  If, on the other hand, the prosecutor chooses to charge the same
minor with voluntary manslaughter, the juvenile court, upon the motion of the
prosecutor, must conduct a fitness hearing to determine whether the minor should
be the subject of a juvenile court proceeding or be tried in criminal court.  (§ 707,
subd. (c).)  In this situation, the Legislature’s specification of crimes in section
20
602, together with the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion whether to charge a
crime specified in that statute, dictates whether the juvenile court will be afforded
an opportunity to determine whether the minor is fit for a juvenile court
disposition.
Similarly, the prosecutor’s decision whether to file certain charges directly
in criminal court pursuant to section 707(d), when the circumstances enumerated
in that provision are present, might control whether a juvenile disposition will be
available to the court in such a proceeding.  The prosecutor does not usurp any
fundamental judicial power in exercising such discretion, even though the court in
other situations is authorized to decide whether a minor is fit for a disposition in
juvenile court.  The circumstance that a fitness determination is one that properly
could be made by the judicial branch, or that historically has been made by the
judicial branch, does not alone invalidate a statute granting the executive branch
the authority to make an analogous determination that has the same effect as a
decision regarding fitness.  (See Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State of
California, supra, 25 Cal.4th 287, 300-301 [separation of powers doctrine does
not preclude the Legislature from exercising authority over a matter that could
have been undertaken by the executive branch]; In re Attorney Discipline System
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 582, 596, 602 [separation of powers doctrine does not bar the
judicial branch from undertaking a function historically performed by the
Legislature].)
Petitioners acknowledge that determining an individual’s eligibility for a
particular sentencing alternative is not exclusively a judicial power, and that this
power properly may be exercised by the prosecutor or the Legislature.  They
contend, however, that a prosecutor’s decision whether a particular minor is to be
charged in criminal court instead determines suitability for a sentencing
alternative, and that such a determination is solely a judicial power.  Petitioners
21
rely upon On Tai Ho, supra, 11 Cal.3d 59, and People v. Sledge (1974) 11 Cal.3d
70 (Sledge), companion cases in which this court considered a pretrial diversion
program for defendants charged with certain narcotics offenses.  Under the
statutory scheme at issue in those cases, the prosecutor conducted a preliminary
screening to determine whether a defendant met certain minimum standards of
eligibility specified by statute.  If it appeared that the defendant was eligible for
diversion, the court conducted a hearing and decided whether to divert the
defendant into a rehabilitation program.  (On Tai Ho, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 62-
63.)
In On Tai Ho, supra, 11 Cal.3d 59, we held that a statutory provision
purporting to subject the court’s diversion decision to a prosecutorial veto violated
the separation of powers doctrine, because the decision whether to divert was an
exercise of judicial power.  Our opinion emphasized that this decision was made
after the jurisdiction of the court had been invoked, that the diversion hearing
mandated by statute was a judicial proceeding, and that the statute vested in the
court the power to weigh the evidence and make a determination as to the
appropriate disposition.
In Sledge, supra, 11 Cal.3d 70, we held that the district attorney’s
preliminary determination of eligibility for the program was not a judicial act and
therefore did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.  Our decision relied
upon the circumstances that the information required to determine eligibility was
in the possession of the district attorney rather than the court, that the statute
specified which facts were material and relevant to eligibility and did not confer
upon the prosecutor any power to weigh the effect of those facts, and that the
prosecutor’s determination that there was evidence rendering a defendant
ineligible for diversion could be reviewed on appeal from any conviction.
22
Petitioners contend that the district attorney’s decision pursuant to section
707(d) to prosecute a minor in criminal court is more akin to an unconstitutional
prosecutorial veto of a judicial sentencing decision, as in On Tai Ho, supra, 11
Cal.3d 59, than to the eligibility determination upheld in Sledge, supra, 11 Cal.3d
70.  They distinguish, on the following grounds, a decision made pursuant to
section 707(d) from the eligibility decision in Sledge:  (1) section 707(d) does not
specify any eligibility criteria; (2) information regarding amenability to a juvenile
court disposition is uniquely within the possession of the minor rather than the
prosecutor; (3) no judicial hearing is available to evaluate the minor’s suitability
for a juvenile court disposition; and (4) no record is created to protect the right to
judicial review.
Any distinctions between the prosecutor’s authority at issue in Sledge,
supra, 11 Cal.3d 70, and that in the present case, however, do not establish that the
prosecutor’s exercise of discretion pursuant to section 707(d) usurps an
exclusively judicial power.  First, as in Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pages 77-78, the
legislative branch properly has conferred upon the prosecutor the authority to
establish the criteria guiding his or her decision whether to file an action in
criminal court pursuant to section 707(d), rather than specifying such criteria by
statute as in Sledge.  Second, contrary to petitioners’ assertion, information
relevant to the prosecutor’s decision, such as the minor’s prior criminal history
and evidence of the minor’s current criminal conduct, is within the possession of
the prosecutor.  Third, no judicial hearing is available regarding amenability for a
particular disposition because, unlike the statute considered in Sledge, section
707(d) does not provide for such a hearing or a judicial determination of fitness.
Therefore, even if a prosecutor weighs the effect of relevant evidence in reaching a
decision, he or she does not interfere with the authority of the court.  Finally,
section 707(d) does provide for a judicial determination, after the charging
23
decision is made, to ensure that the minor meets the statutory criteria set forth in
section 707(d).  There is no judicial “review” of the prosecutor’s exercise of
discretion to file charges in criminal court against minors who come within the
scope of section 707(d), because just as with other instances of the traditional
charging power of the prosecutor, the statute vests in the prosecutor the power
both to establish and to apply the criteria guiding that decision.  For these reasons,
a prosecutor’s decision to file charges against a minor in criminal court pursuant to
section 707(d) is not analogous to a prosecutor’s veto of a court’s legislatively
authorized determination, after a judicial hearing, of a defendant’s suitability for a
particular disposition, and such a decision does not usurp a power possessed solely
by the judicial branch.
Petitioners further characterize the prosecutor’s decision pursuant to section
707(d) as the selection of the “jurisdiction with the most ‘appropriate’ sentencing
scheme” for a particular defendant, and they attempt to contrast such a decision
with a prosecutor’s well-established authority to select which crime to charge.  As
established above, however, the decision to charge a minor with a particular crime,
like a decision pursuant to section 707(d) to file charges in criminal court, also can
eliminate the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the matter and dictate the
sentencing scheme that will apply upon conviction, and petitioners admit that the
former decision properly can be exercised by the prosecutor.  Inasmuch as
petitioners concede that the Legislature possesses the authority to eliminate
entirely the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and preclude juvenile court
dispositions with regard to all minors who come within the scope of section
707(d), a statute conferring upon the prosecutor the discretion, before a judicial
proceeding has been commenced, to charge some of these minors in criminal court
does not usurp an exclusively judicial authority.
24
Moreover, the Legislature in other contexts has authorized the People to
pursue allegations of criminal conduct in alternative fora, sometimes with different
penalties.  For example, before unification of the California trial courts, the
prosecutor’s decision whether to charge an offense as a misdemeanor or a felony
could determine whether the matter would be tried in municipal court or superior
court.  (See Pen. Code, § 1462, subd. (a) [municipal court had jurisdiction in cases
involving misdemeanors].)  In addition, where criminal conduct constitutes a
violation of both federal law and state law, and federal and California courts have
concurrent jurisdiction, the district attorney possesses discretion to consent to
proceedings in federal court or to request that the federal authorities relinquish a
federal prisoner to the state for prosecution.  (4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal
Law (3d ed. 2000) Jurisdiction and Venue, § 5, p. 91.)  Furthermore, where the
Legislature has specified more than one location in which venue is proper,
prosecutors may choose the forum in which to file criminal charges.  (See Pen.
Code, §§ 778-795.)  Finally, the Legislature has conferred upon district attorneys
the discretion to seek either civil or criminal sanctions for certain illegal conduct.
For example, when confronted with gang-related crime, the prosecutor can decide
to charge individual gang members in criminal court for the offense of
participation in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22) or instead can file a
civil action in superior court to abate gang activity (id., § 186.22a).  (See also, e.g.,
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16754 [authorizing district attorney to initiate civil actions or
criminal proceedings for violations of the Cartwright Act]; Health & Saf. Code,
§§ 25189-25191 [authorizing both criminal and civil penalties for the illegal
disposal of hazardous waste].)  Therefore, the circumstance that a prosecutor’s
charging decision pursuant to section 707(d) determines the forum in which
charges of criminal conduct against minors are adjudicated, or limits the sanctions
25
available to the court, does not mean that the prosecutor exercises any judicial
power when making such a decision.
We also find no merit in petitioners’ contention that the absence of
statutory criteria guiding the prosecutor’s decision pursuant to section 707(d)
results in an unconstitutional delegation of the Legislature’s exclusive authority to
fix penalties for crimes.  As we have explained, most prosecutorial charging
decisions can circumscribe the sentencing options available to the court, and such
decisions never have been considered to be analogous to fixing penalties for
charged crimes or to require legislative guidelines governing the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.  The minimum standards governing the prosecutor’s
discretion whether to file charges against a minor in criminal court are those set
forth in section 707(d).  In these circumstances, a prosecutor’s charging decision
that results in a greater or lesser penalty does not constitute an impermissible
delegation of legislative authority.  (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 88-89.)
Similarly, we have rejected the claim that, in capital cases, the prosecutor is
required to abide by certain nonarbitrary standards in making the initial decision
whether to allege special circumstances and whether to seek the death penalty.
(People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 478.)  “When he [or she] acts under such
a law, and ‘[a]bsent a persuasive showing to the contrary, we must presume that
the district attorney’s decisions were legitimately founded on the complex
considerations necessary for the effective and efficient administration of law
enforcement.  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478,
506.)  These principles apply with equal force to a prosecutor’s decision whether
to file a criminal action pursuant to section 707(d).  The statute does not result in
an improper delegation of legislative power.
Courts in several other jurisdictions have rejected similar challenges, based
upon the separation of powers doctrine, to statutes conferring upon prosecutors the
26
authority to decide whether to file charges against minors in criminal court rather
than juvenile court.  (E.g., People v. Thorpe (Colo. 1982) 641 P.2d 935, 938-940;
State v. Cain (Fla. 1980) 381 So.2d 1361, 1367-1368; Bishop v. State (Ga. 1995)
462 S.E.2d 716, 717; People v. Conat (Mich.Ct.App. 1999) 605 N.W.2d 49, 56-
59; Jones v. State (Okla.Crim.App. 1982) 654 P.2d 1080, 1082-1083; Hansen v.
State (Wyo. 1995) 904 P.2d 811, 819-820.)  The Court of Appeal distinguished
some of these decisions on the ground that the statutory schemes there at issue
authorized the criminal court to remand the case to the juvenile system after the
action had been commenced, thus preserving the authority of the judiciary.  For
the most part, however, this circumstance was not important to the analysis of
these decisions, which in upholding the statutes relied primarily upon the scope of
the prosecutor’s discretionary charging power.  Furthermore, the statutory scheme
considered in People v. Conat, supra, 605 N.W.2d 49, did not include a provision
for the court to remand the proceeding to the juvenile court.  These decisions
provide additional support for our conclusion that the prosecutor’s exercise of
discretion pursuant to section 707(d) whether to file an accusatory pleading in
criminal court is within the scope of the executive power and does not violate the
separation of powers doctrine.
Having concluded that the Court of Appeal erred in holding section 707(d)
unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine, we shall resolve
petitioners’ remaining constitutional challenges to the statute.
IV
Petitioners further challenge section 707(d) on the ground that it deprives
them of due process of law as guaranteed by the federal and California
Constitutions.  (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd.
(a).)  According to petitioners, a minor accused of criminal conduct possesses a
statutory right to be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  Before a
27
prosecutor may deprive a minor of that right by filing an action in criminal court
pursuant to section 707(d), petitioners contend, the minor is entitled to a hearing to
determine, pursuant to established criteria, whether he or she is amenable for a
juvenile court disposition.  Because section 707(d) neither provides for such a
hearing nor sets forth criteria guiding the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion,
petitioners claim that the statute violates minimum constitutional standards of
procedural fairness.
The premise of petitioners’ claim is false, however, because minors who
commit crimes under the circumstances set forth in section 707(d) do not possess
any statutory right to be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  Although
the juvenile court has jurisdiction over minors accused of most crimes (§ 602),
under the statutory provisions adopted by the enactment of Proposition 21, the
criminal court also has jurisdiction over those minors who come within the scope
of section 707(d), when the prosecutor files charges in that court.  (§ 707(d)(4).)
In these circumstances, when governing statutes provide that the juvenile court
and the criminal court have concurrent jurisdiction, minors who come within the
scope of section 707(d) do not possess any right to be placed under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court before the prosecutor initiates a proceeding accusing them of
a crime.  Thus, the asserted interest that petitioners seek to protect through a
judicial hearing does not exist.
Statutory provisions that predate the adoption of Proposition 21 cannot
properly be interpreted to afford minors a statutory right that is inconsistent with
the language and purpose of this legislative measure.  Proposition 21 neglected to
amend explicitly the jurisdictional provisions of section 6035 to clarify that a
                                                
5 
Section 603 provides in full:  “(a) No court shall have jurisdiction to
conduct a preliminary examination or to try the case of any person upon an
(footnote continued on next page)
28
criminal charge against a minor may be filed directly in a court of criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to either the preexisting provisions of section 707.01 (as
already provided in section 603, subdivision (b)) or the newly adopted provisions
of section 707(d).  In light of established principles of statutory construction,
however, it is clear that because the provisions of section 707(d) are more recently
enacted and more specific than the provisions of section 603, it is appropriate to
harmonize the two statutes to effectuate the purpose of this aspect of Proposition
21.  (See Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 464; DeVita v. County of Napa
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 778; Kaiser v. Hopkins (1936) 6 Cal.2d 537, 538.)
Accordingly, section 707(d) properly must be interpreted as creating an additional
statutory exception to the general rule, reflected in section 603, subdivision (a),
that criminal charges against minors ordinarily must be filed initially in juvenile
court.
For similar reasons, an isolated phrase contained in section 707(d)(6)
cannot be interpreted reasonably to create a right or expectation that a minor may
be tried in criminal court only after a determination of unfitness equivalent to that
made by the juvenile court pursuant to other subdivisions of section 707.  Section
707(d)(6) states:  “If, pursuant to this subdivision, the minor is found to be not a fit
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
accusatory pleading charging that person with the commission of a public offense
or crime when the person was under the age of 18 years at the time of the alleged
commission thereof unless the matter has first been submitted to the juvenile court
by petition as provided in Article 7 (commencing with Section 650), and the
juvenile court has made an order directing that the person be prosecuted under the
general law.
“(b)  This section shall not apply in any case involving a minor against
whom a complaint may be filed directly in a court of criminal jurisdiction pursuant
to Section 707.01.”
29
and proper subject for juvenile court treatment and is tried in a court of criminal
jurisdiction and found guilty by the trier of fact, the judge may commit the minor
to the Youth Authority in lieu of sentencing the minor to the state prison,” except
as otherwise provided by statute.  Language identical to that in section 707(d)(6)
also was added by Proposition 21 to section 707, subdivisions (a) and (c), which
require the juvenile court to make a fitness determination based upon an
evaluation of specified criteria concerning the minor.  Read in context, the obvious
purpose of this language is to make clear that minors whose cases are tried in
criminal court under any provision of section 707, including section 707(d), may
be committed to the Youth Authority instead of state prison (subject to the
exceptions specified in section 1732.6).  In view of the explicit language of
subdivision (d)(1), (2), and (3) of section 707, which authorize prosecutors to file
actions in criminal court without any reference to a fitness determination, and the
purpose of these provisions as reflected in the ballot materials,6 section 707(d) as a
whole cannot be construed reasonably as placing a substantive “unfitness”
limitation upon the prosecutor’s discretion and thereby creating a liberty interest in
a minor not to be charged in criminal court without such a finding.
                                                
6 
The analysis of the initiative by the Legislative Analyst states that
“prosecutors would be allowed to directly file charges against juvenile offenders
in adult court under a variety of circumstances without first obtaining permission
of the juvenile court.”  (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) analysis of
Prop. 21 by Legis. Analyst, p. 45.)  The Rebuttal to the Argument in Favor of
Proposition 21 quotes the following statement of a judge of the juvenile court:
“Proposition 21 would let prosecutors move kids like mentally impaired children
to adult court where they don’t belong, without judicial review.  These important
decisions must be reviewed by an impartial judge.”  (Id., Rebuttal to Argument in
Favor of Prop. 21, p. 48.)
30
Several amici curiae supporting petitioners7 contend that juvenile offenders
possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in remaining in the juvenile
court system, and that this interest precludes the prosecutor from filing charges
against minors in criminal court without first providing notice and a hearing.  The
authority upon which amici curiae rely, however, found liberty interests arising
from statutes that created an expectation that adverse action by the state would
occur only upon the occurrence of certain conditions.  (E.g., Vitek v. Jones (1980)
445 U.S. 480, 488-491 [transfer of prisoner to mental hospital permitted only after
a finding of mental illness].)  Section 707(d), in contrast, eliminates any
expectation that a minor who commits an offense under the circumstances
specified therein will be transferred to criminal court only upon an adverse fitness
determination by the court.  The predicate for filing charges in criminal court
pursuant to section 707(d) is a determination by the prosecutor that the
circumstances set forth in that statute are present.  To the extent this provision
creates a protected liberty interest that minors will be subject to the jurisdiction of
the criminal court only upon the occurrence of the conditions set forth therein, the
statute does require a judicial determination, at the preliminary hearing, “that
reasonable cause exists to believe that the minor comes within the provisions” of
the statute.  (§ 707(d)(4).)  Contrary to the contention of amici curiae, such a
minor possesses no other protected interest in remaining in the juvenile court
system.  (Hicks v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1649, 1658 [minors
possess no constitutional or fundamental right to trial in juvenile court]; accord,
                                                
7 
Public Counsel; Bar Associations of Los Angeles County, Beverly Hills,
Culver Marina, and San Francisco; Women Lawyers Association of Los Angeles;
Criminal Courts Bar Association; Mexican American Bar Association; and Los
Angeles Chapter of the National Association of Counsel for Children.
31
State v. Angel C. (Conn. 1998) 715 A.2d 652, 659-665 [minors possess no liberty
interest in juvenile status where applicable statutes authorize prosecutor to file
charges directly in criminal court or to seek a transfer to juvenile court].)
Because petitioners do not possess a protected interest in being subject to
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the authority upon which they rely in support
of their claim is distinguishable.  In Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541
(Kent), the high court considered a statutory scheme conferring upon the juvenile
court “original and exclusive” jurisdiction over a minor accused of committing
various crimes.  (Id. at p. 556.)  The law authorized the juvenile court to waive its
jurisdiction and transfer the matter to criminal court after a “full investigation,”
but no statutory criteria or procedures governed the juvenile court’s determination
to waive jurisdiction.  (Id. at p. 548.)  The decision in Kent held that the juvenile
court violated the minor’s right to due process of law when it transferred the
matter to criminal court without conducting a hearing or providing a statement of
reasons.  The United States Supreme Court explained that the waiver of
jurisdiction in this context was a critically important action that determined vitally
important statutory rights of the minor, including whether he was entitled to the
special rights and immunities ordinarily conferred upon minors under the juvenile
court law.  Under these circumstances, the high court held, the minor was entitled
to a judicial hearing affording “the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”
(Id. at p. 562.)  In connection with such a hearing, the minor possessed the right to
the effective assistance of counsel, access to the records considered by the juvenile
court, and a statement of reasons for the juvenile court’s decision.  (Id. at pp. 553-
563; see also In re Winnetka V. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 587, 593-595 [requiring
procedural protections in connection with juvenile fitness determinations and
dispositional orders made by the court].)
32
Unlike the statute considered in Kent, supra, 383 U.S. 541, California’s
juvenile court law does not confer upon the juvenile court original and exclusive
jurisdiction over minors accused of crimes under the circumstances set forth in
section 707(d).  Furthermore, pursuant to section 707(d), neither the juvenile court
nor the criminal court renders a decision whether the minor is fit for a juvenile
court disposition.  Rather, as we have explained, the prosecutor’s charging
decision determines which court shall hear the matter.  Petitioners nevertheless
contend that the procedural protections ordinarily applicable in judicial fitness
hearings, and mandated for such hearings by Kent, also must apply to the
prosecutor’s exercise of discretion whether to file charges in juvenile court or
criminal court.  Otherwise, they maintain, decisions determining whether minors
are amenable to juvenile court treatment will be arbitrary and subject to the whim
of individual prosecutors.
As the Court of Appeal in the present case recognized, however, Kent,
supra, 383 U.S. 541, held only that where a statute confers a right to a judicial
determination of fitness for a juvenile court disposition, the due process clause
requires that the determination be made in compliance with the basic procedural
protections afforded to similar judicial determinations.  A statute that authorizes
discretionary direct filing in criminal court by the prosecutor, on the other hand,
does not require similar procedural protections, because it does not involve a
judicial determination but rather constitutes an executive charging function, which
does not implicate the right to procedural due process and a hearing.
Numerous decisions from other jurisdictions support the conclusion that a
prosecutor’s discretionary decision to file charges against a minor in criminal
court does not give rise to procedural protections ordinarily afforded in connection
with a judicial decision.  For example, in Woodard v. Wainwright (5th Cir. 1977)
556 F.2d 781, 784-787, the federal court of appeals considered a statute that
33
precluded juvenile court jurisdiction over certain minors indicted for serious
crimes.  Noting the long tradition of prosecutorial discretion in charging crimes,
the court held that the prosecutor’s discretionary decision whether to present the
case against the minor to a grand jury, and thus divest the juvenile court of
jurisdiction upon indictment, did not trigger any due process right to a hearing.
The decision in Woodard agreed with the statement in Russell v. Parratt (8th Cir.
1976) 543 F.2d 1214, 1216, that prosecutorial decisions whether to charge minors
as adults or juveniles fall within “ ‘the long and widely accepted concept of
prosecutorial discretion, which derives from the constitutional principle of
separation of powers.’ ”  The court of appeals also relied upon Cox v. United
States (4th Cir. 1973) 473 F.2d 334, 335, which determined that the decision by a
United States attorney to charge a juvenile as an adult was “a prosecutorial
decision beyond the reach of the due process rights of counsel and a hearing,” and
upon United States v. Bland (D.C. Cir. 1972) 472 F.2d 1329, 1337, in which the
court stated:  “We cannot accept the hitherto unaccepted argument that due
process requires an adversary hearing before the prosecutor can exercise his age-
old function of deciding what charge to bring against whom.  Grave consequences
have always flowed from this, but never has a hearing been required.”
Relying in part upon the foregoing decisions, the Connecticut Supreme
Court recently reached the same conclusion in upholding a statute requiring that
minors at least 14 years of age charged with certain crimes be tried in criminal
court, unless the prosecutor exercised discretion to recommend that the court
transfer the case to the juvenile docket.  In State v. Angel C., supra, 715 A.2d at
page 666, the court explained:  “There is a vast difference between the exercise of
judicial discretion without a hearing and the exercise of executive, i.e.,
prosecutorial, discretion without a hearing.  The former has been held to violate
due process, while the latter has not.  ‘Judicial proceedings must be clothed in the
34
raiment of due process, while the processes of prosecutorial decision-making wear
very different garb.  It is one thing to hold, as we have, that when a state makes
waiver of a juvenile court’s jurisdiction a judicial function, the judge must cast
about the defendant all of the trappings of due process, but it does not necessarily
follow that a state or the United States may not constitutionally treat the basic
question as a prosecutorial function . . . .  [T]he character of the proceeding, rather
than its consequences to the accused, are largely determinative of his rights. . . .
[T]he guaranty of a hearing found in the due process clause of the Fifth [and
Fourteenth] Amendment[s] has traditionally been limited to judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings.  It has never been held applicable to the processes of
prosecutorial decision-making.’  [Citation.]  Consequently, the prosecutor’s right
to exercise discretion in determining whether to recommend transfer to the
juvenile docket does not violate the defendants’ due process rights.”
In sum, under the circumstances of the present case, petitioners do not
possess any right to be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.  As we have
concluded, the legislative branch properly can delegate to the prosecutor — who
traditionally has been entrusted with the charging decision — discretion whether
to file charges against a minor directly in criminal court, and the Legislature also
can eliminate a minor’s statutory right to a judicial fitness hearing.  Therefore, a
prosecutor’s decision pursuant to section 707(d) to file charges in criminal court
does not implicate any protected interest of petitioners that gives rise to the
requirements of procedural due process.
V
Petitioners next challenge section 707(d) on the ground that it violates their
right to the equal protection of the laws (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 7; id., art. IV, § 16, subd. (a)), because the statute permits identically
situated minors to be subject to different laws and disparate treatment at the
35
discretion of the prosecutor.  Petitioners assert that minors of the same age and
charged with the same crime under the circumstances enumerated in section
707(d) are subject either to the juvenile court law or to the criminal justice system,
based solely upon a prosecutorial decision that is unguided by any statutory
standards.  According to petitioners, the creation of two classes of minors pursuant
to section 707(d) implicates fundamental liberty interests, and the disparity in
treatment of minors falling within the scope of the statute is neither justified by a
compelling state interest nor rationally related to a legitimate interest.  Therefore,
they contend, section 707(d) is unconstitutional on its face.  We conclude that
petitioners’ equal protection claim lacks merit.
To succeed on their claim under the equal protection clause, petitioners first
must show that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more
similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.  (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d
522, 530.)  Petitioners do not challenge the classification expressly set forth in
section 707(d) — that is, they do not contend that the disparate treatment of
minors who meet the criteria set forth in section 707(d), and of minors who do not
meet such criteria, is impermissible.  (See Hicks v. Superior Court, supra, 36
Cal.App.4th 1649 [statutory presumption of unfitness applicable only to limited
class of minors does not violate the equal protection clause].)  Instead they assert
that section 707(d) authorizes prosecutors to create two classes of minors, both of
which satisfy the criteria set forth in the statute.  One class consists of those
minors against whom prosecutors choose to file criminal charges in criminal court;
the other consists of minors accused of having committed the same offenses, but
against whom prosecutors choose to file wardship petitions in juvenile court.
These two classes of minors are affected in an unequal manner, petitioners
observe, because application of the juvenile court law or the criminal law can give
rise to significantly different rights and penalties for similarly situated minors.
36
As petitioners implicitly concede, all minors who meet the criteria
enumerated in section 707(d) equally are subject to the prosecutor’s discretion
whether to file charges in criminal court.  Any unequal treatment of such minors
who commit the same crime under similar circumstances results solely from the
decisions of individual prosecutors whether to file against particular minors a
petition in juvenile court or instead an accusatory pleading in criminal court.
Although, as petitioners assert, a prosecutor’s decision in this regard can result in
important consequences to the accused minor, so does a decision by a prosecutor
to initiate criminal charges against any individual, including an adult.  Claims of
unequal treatment by prosecutors in selecting particular classes of individuals for
prosecution are evaluated according to ordinary equal protection standards.
(Baluyut v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 826, 836.)  These standards require
the defendant to show that he or she has been singled out deliberately for
prosecution on the basis of some invidious criterion, and that the prosecution
would not have been pursued except for the discriminatory purpose of the
prosecuting authorities.  (Id. at p. 832.)  “[A]n invidious purpose for prosecution is
one that is arbitrary and thus unjustified because it bears no rational relationship to
legitimate law enforcement interests . . . .”  (Id. at p. 833.)
Section 707(d) contains no overtly discriminatory classification.  In their
challenge to section 707(d), petitioners do not contend that the district attorney
filed charges against them in criminal court on the basis of some invidious
criterion or for a discriminatory purpose, or that section 707(d) has had any
discriminatory effect.  Petitioners instead contend that section 707(d) might result
in invidious discrimination because it contains no standards guiding the
prosecutor’s discretion whether to file charges in criminal court.  Similarly,
37
several amici curiae 8 assert that historical data regarding racial disparities in the
juvenile justice system suggest that section 707(d) likely will exacerbate such
inequities.  Such speculation is insufficient to establish a violation of the equal
protection clause.
Moreover, numerous decisions have upheld statutes conferring upon
prosecutors the authority to make analogous decisions.  For example, in Davis,
supra, 46 Cal.3d 64, we determined that a provision limiting a defendant’s
eligibility for diversion to cases in which the prosecutor charged a wobbler as a
misdemeanor did not violate equal protection principles.  Our opinion explained
that the eligibility rule was “no different than any other legislative rule which
accords differential treatment to an individual depending on whether a prosecutor
believes a greater or lesser charge is appropriate.”  (Id. at p. 87.)  We relied upon
United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442 U.S. 114 (Batchelder), which upheld a
prosecutor’s discretion to charge the defendant pursuant to a statute imposing a
penalty that was harsher than that imposed by another statute proscribing precisely
the same conduct.  The high court held that in the absence of any showing that the
prosecutor’s exercise of discretion had been based upon an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, the existence of such
prosecutorial discretion did not violate equal protection principles.  The high
court’s decision in Batchelder stated:  “[T]here is no appreciable difference
between the discretion a prosecutor exercises when deciding whether to charge
under one of two statutes with different elements and the discretion he exercises
when choosing one of two statutes with identical elements.  In the former
                                                
8 
The Youth Law Center, Juvenile Law Center, Child Welfare League of
America, National Council of La Raza, National Mental Health Association,
National Urban League, and Sentencing Project.
38
situation, once he determines that the proof will support conviction under either
statute, his decision is indistinguishable from the one he faces in the latter context.
The prosecutor may be influenced by the penalties available upon conviction, but
this fact, standing alone, does not give rise to a violation of the Equal Protection or
Due Process Clause.  [Citations.]  Just as a defendant has no constitutional right to
elect which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the basis of his indictment
and prosecution neither is he entitled to choose the penalty scheme under which he
will be sentenced.  [Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 125.)
A prosecutor’s discretionary decision pursuant to section 707(d) is similar
to the prosecutor’s decision considered in Batchelder.  Depending upon the
prosecutor’s exercise of his or her traditional charging discretion, similarly
situated minors who have engaged in the same criminal conduct may be
prosecuted under distinct statutory schemes, one of which can give rise to harsher
penalties upon conviction.  As is apparent from the preceding part of this opinion,
petitioners possess no right to be subject to the juvenile court law.  Therefore, like
the defendant in Batchelder, petitioners are not entitled to elect which of two
applicable statutes shall be the basis of the adjudication of the charges against
them, or to choose the statutory scheme under which they will be sentenced upon
conviction.
The decision to file charges in criminal court pursuant to section 707(d)
also is analogous to a prosecutor’s decision to pursue capital charges against a
defendant.  It long has been held that “prosecutorial discretion to select those
eligible cases in which the death penalty will actually be sought does not in and of
itself . . . offend principles of equal protection . . . .  [Citations.]”  (People v.
Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 505.)  “Many circumstances may affect the
litigation of a case chargeable under the death penalty law.  These include factual
nuances, strength of evidence, and, in particular, the broad discretion to show
39
leniency.  Hence, one sentenced to death under a properly channeled death penalty
scheme cannot prove a constitutional violation by showing that other persons
whose crimes were superficially similar did not receive the death penalty.
[Citations.]  The same reasoning applies to the prosecutor’s decisions to pursue or
withhold capital charges at the outset.”  (Id. at p. 506; see also People v. Andrews
(1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1098 [differing prosecutorial charging policies with regard
to the Three Strikes law do not violate the equal protection clause].)
Thus, petitioners cannot establish a violation of their right to the equal
protection of the laws by showing that other minors in circumstances similar to
those of petitioners can be prosecuted under the juvenile court law.  Section 707(d)
limits the prosecutor’s discretion to file charges in criminal court to minors of a
specified age who commit enumerated crimes under certain circumstances, and at
the preliminary hearing the magistrate must find reasonable cause to believe that
the minor has committed such a crime under those circumstances.  In addition, the
prosecutor’s decision is subject to constitutional constraints against invidious
discrimination (Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 293-301) and
against vindictive or retaliatory prosecution (In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865,
873-874).  Therefore, contrary to petitioners’ contention, the prosecutor’s decision
is not unfettered or entirely without standards.  The prosecutor’s discretion to
select those statutorily eligible cases in which to seek a criminal disposition
against a minor — based upon permissible factors such as the circumstances of the
crime, the background of the minor, or a desire to show leniency, for example —
does not violate the equal protection clause.
Several decisions from other jurisdictions are consistent with our
conclusion that section 707(d) does not deprive petitioners of the equal protection
of the laws.  For example, in State v. Angel C., supra, 715 A.2d at page 671, the
Connecticut Supreme Court stated, with regard to a statute authorizing the
40
prosecutor to file charges against minors in criminal court, that “the mere fact that
a statute permits the prosecutor to treat one individual charged with a specific
crime differently from another individual charged with the same crime or a crime
of similar magnitude does not render the statute discriminatory on its face.”
Similarly, the court in People v. Thorpe, supra, 641 P.2d at page 940, “reject[ed]
the defendant’s argument that he was denied equal protection of the law because
the district attorney chose to file a criminal action against him whereas another in
his same circumstance could be treated as a juvenile and charged with
delinquency.”  (Accord, People v. Hughes (Colo.Ct.App. 1997) 946 P.2d 509,
515-516, overruled on another point in Valdez v. People (Colo. 1998) 966 P.2d
587, 591; Hansen v. State, supra, 904 P.2d at pp. 818-819.)
In connection with their equal protection claim, petitioners independently
rely upon article IV, section 16, subdivision (a), of the California Constitution
(hereafter article IV, section 16(a)), which states:  “All laws of a general nature
have uniform operation.”  Petitioners contend that Welfare and Institutions Code
section 707(d) denies them the right to the uniform operation of the laws, because
different prosecutors throughout the state are authorized to charge identically
situated minors in either juvenile court or criminal court.  Therefore, petitioners
continue, section 707(d) does not “have uniform operation” as required by article
IV, section 16(a).
This court has stated that article IV, section 16(a), and other equal
protection provisions in the California Constitution9 “have been generally thought
                                                
9 
“A person may not be . . . denied equal protection of the laws . . . .”  (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)
“A citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities
not granted on the same terms to all citizens. . . .”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd.
(b).)
41
in California to be substantially the equivalent of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”  (Department of
Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1965) 62 Cal.2d 586, 588; see also Niedle v.
W.C.A.B. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 283, 288.)  Although we recognize our authority
to construe the state Constitution independently (Hubbart v. Superior Court
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1152, fn. 19), this court has not done so when considering
analogous claims of arbitrary prosecution.  Consequently, we deem our analysis of
petitioners’ equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution also applicable to their equal protection claim made pursuant
to provisions in the California Constitution, including article IV, section 16(a).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we reject petitioners’ contention that
Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d) violates article IV, section 16(a).
In support of their claim based upon article IV, section 16(a), petitioners
rely upon a divided decision of the Utah Supreme Court — State v. Mohi (Utah
1995) 901 P.2d 991 (Mohi) — which invalidated a statute conferring upon
prosecutors the discretion to file charges against minors directly in criminal court.
The holding in Mohi was based exclusively upon a provision in the Utah
Constitution identical to article IV, section 16(a).  As the plurality opinion in Mohi
emphasized, however, Utah’s constitutional provision concerning uniform
operation of the laws established requirements different from those of the federal
equal protection clause.  (901 P.2d at p. 997.)  Indeed, a plurality of that state court
previously had held that a prior version of the “direct-filing statute” invalidated in
Mohi did not violate the federal equal protection clause.  (State v. Bell (Utah 1989)
785 P.2d 390, 395-405.)
42
In any event, we are not persuaded by the reasoning of the plurality opinion
in Mohi.10  The opinion contrasted a prosecutor’s traditional charging discretion
with the prosecutor’s assertedly arbitrary discretion to file charges against a minor
directly in criminal court.  According to the plurality opinion, traditional charging
discretion concerned which law to apply to a single offender, whereas direct-filing
discretion involved how to apply the same law to different offenders.  (Mohi,
supra, 901 P.2d at pp. 1003-1004.)  Because the challenged statute permitted
prosecutors to treat different offenders accused of the same criminal offense
differently, without any statutory criteria to guide the prosecutors’ decisions, the
plurality opinion held that the law operated “nonuniformly on similarly situated
juveniles” and thus violated the state constitutional requirement of uniform
operation of the laws.  (Id. at p. 1004.)
Contrary to the reasoning of the plurality opinion in Mohi, however,
traditional prosecutorial charging discretion, which includes the discretion not to
bring any charges against a particular offender, encompasses decisions how to
apply the same law to different offenders, often without any express statutory
criteria guiding such decisions.  Thus, prosecutors properly may decide that some
individuals who have engaged in criminal conduct proscribed by a particular penal
statute should not be prosecuted at all.  Prosecutors may charge some defendants
with a misdemeanor violation of the statute, and others with a felony violation.
                                                
10 
Two justices of the Utah Supreme Court signed the plurality opinion.
Stating that it was “a close case,” the Chief Justice authored a separate concurring
opinion joining the plurality and adhering to the reasoning of the concurring and
dissenting opinion in State v. Bell, supra, 785 P.2d 390, 407.  (Mohi, supra, 901
P.2d at p. 1007.)  Two justices signed a concurring and dissenting opinion
disagreeing with the court’s holding that the direct-filing provision violated the
state constitutional requirement concerning uniform operation of the laws.  (Ibid.)
43
With regard to some offenders, prosecutors may seek the maximum penalty
authorized by the statute, while offering to recommend probation or diversion for
other offenders.  None of these prosecutorial decisions, unless based upon
invidious discrimination or retaliatory motive, ever has been considered to be
unconstitutionally arbitrary.  Therefore, prosecutorial discretion resulting in the
different application of the same law to different offenders does not necessarily
violate the requirement of uniform operation of the laws.
In light of prior case authority considering prosecutorial charging
discretion, discussed above, we conclude that section 707(d) does not deprive
petitioners of the equal protection (or the uniform operation) of the laws.
VI
Finally, petitioners contend that Proposition 21 is invalid in its entirety
because it violates the single-subject rule set forth in article II, section 8,
subdivision (d), of the California Constitution (hereafter article II, section 8(d)),
which provides that “[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one subject may
not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.”  Petitioners assert that
Proposition 21 addresses three subjects:  (1) gang-related crime, (2) the sentencing
of repeat offenders, and (3) the juvenile justice system.  According to petitioners,
these subjects do not relate to a sufficiently defined common theme or purpose to
satisfy the requirements of article II, section 8(d).  In addition, petitioners contend
that Proposition 21 violates the single-subject rule because voters were not
adequately informed of the provisions regarding repeat offenders, and because the
proposal to authorize prosecutors to file charges against minors directly in
criminal court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707(d)) should have been submitted as a
separate initiative.
We begin our analysis of petitioners’ claim by summarizing the provisions
of Proposition 21.  Section 1 sets forth the short title of the measure — the Gang
44
Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998.  (Ballot Pamp., Primary
Elec. (Mar. 7. 2000) text of Prop. 21, § 1, p. 119 (Ballot Pamphlet).)
Section 2 contains findings and declarations, which refer to the growing
problem of juvenile and gang-related violent crime, the inability of the juvenile
justice system to protect the public adequately from violent juvenile offenders, the
goal of devoting fewer resources of the juvenile court to violent offenders and
more to those offenders who can be rehabilitated, the desirability of eliminating
confidentiality in some juvenile proceedings in order to hold juvenile offenders
more accountable for their actions, and the need to increase penalties for gang-
related felonies.  (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 21, p. 119.)
Sections 3 through 13 of the initiative are related to criminal gang activity.
(Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 21, pp. 119-123.)  Sections 3 through 10 amend
the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act (Pen. Code,
§ 186.20 et seq.), which addresses the problem of violent street gangs.  Section 11
amends Penal Code section 190.2 to add gang-related murder as a special
circumstance permitting the imposition of the death penalty or a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole.  Section 12 addresses the crime of vandalism of
property, including graffiti.  Section 13 amends Penal Code section 629.52 to
authorize wiretaps in cases arising under the STEP Act and in cases involving
possession of moneys involved in the unlawful sale of controlled substances.
Sections 14 through 17 of Proposition 21 amend portions of the Three
Strikes law.  (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 21, pp. 123-125.)  Section 15
alters the list of “violent felonies” (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)), and section 17
modifies the list of “serious felonies” (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)), for which
enhanced sentences are required.  (See Pen. Code, § 667.)  Sections 14 and 16
change the “lock-in” date for determining the existence of qualifying offenses
(such as violent or serious felonies) under the Three Strikes law.  Thus, before the
45
passage of Proposition 21, references to existing statutes, such as the law defining
violent felonies, in Penal Code section 667 were “to statutes as they existed on
June 30, 1993.”  (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (h).)  Section 14 of Proposition 21
provides that references to existing statutes in Penal Code section 667, for all
offenses committed on or after the effective date of the initiative, are to those
statutes as they existed on the effective date of Proposition 21 (March 8, 2000),
including, but not limited to, amendments made to those statutes by this initiative.
(Pen. Code, § 667.1.)  Section 16 of the initiative makes a corresponding change to
the lock-in date for statutes referenced in Penal Code section 1170.12.  (Pen.
Code, § 1170.125.)
Sections 18 through 34 of Proposition 21 amend provisions of the Welfare
and Institutions Code concerning the juvenile justice system.  (Ballot Pamp.,
supra, text of Prop. 21, pp. 125-131.)  In addition to the revisions related to
charging minors in criminal court and restricting juvenile court dispositions for
certain minors, changes made by these sections include limitations on the
confidentiality of juvenile criminal records, restrictions on the pre-hearing release
of minors accused of specified offenses, and revisions to various procedures and
evidentiary rules in juvenile wardship proceedings.
Petitioners contend that each of the foregoing subjects addressed by
Proposition 21 — gang violence, the sentencing of repeat offenders, and juvenile
crime — are distinct and unrelated to one another.  The unifying theme and
purpose of the initiative, according to petitioners, is to create a “safer California.”
(Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 21, § 2, subd. (k), p. 119 [“This act addresses
each of these issues with the goal of creating a safer California”].)  Petitioners
assert that, although the subjects addressed by Proposition 21 might be related to
the general goal of reducing crime, such a goal is too broad to satisfy the
requirements of the single-subject rule.
46
“In articulating the proper standard to guide analysis in this context, the
governing decisions establish that ‘ “ ‘[a]n initiative measure does not violate the
single-subject requirement if, despite its varied collateral effects, all of its parts
are “reasonably germane” to each other,’ and to the general purpose or object of
the initiative.” ’  [Citation.]  As we recently have explained, ‘the single-subject
provision does not require that each of the provisions of a measure effectively
interlock in a functional relationship.  [Citation.]  It is enough that the various
provisions are reasonably related to a common theme or purpose.’  [Citation.]
Accordingly, we have upheld initiative measures ‘ “which fairly disclose a
reasonable and common sense relationship among their various components in
furtherance of a common purpose.”  [Citation.]’  [Citation.]”  (Senate of the State
of Cal. v. Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1142, 1157.)  The common purpose to which
the initiative’s various provisions relate, however, cannot be “ ‘so broad that a
virtually unlimited array of provisions could be considered germane thereto and
joined in this proposition, essentially obliterating the constitutional requirement.’
[Citation.]”  (Id. at p. 1162.)
As Proposition 21 itself reveals, the purpose of the measure is narrower
than that identified by petitioners.  The general object of the initiative is to address
the problem of violent crime committed by juveniles and gangs — not simply to
reduce crime generally.  This narrower purpose is reflected in the title of the
initiative — the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998 — as
well as in the findings and declarations set forth in the initiative.  Section 2 of
Proposition 21 recites statistics indicating that serious and violent juvenile crime
has increased significantly, and that the problem of youth and gang violence is
projected to grow substantially over the next decade.  This section further states
that criminal street gangs and gang-related violence pose a significant threat to
public safety, and asserts that gang-related felonies warrant severe penalties.
47
Among other declarations in section 2 is the assertion that “[t]he juvenile justice
system is not well-equipped to adequately protect the public from violent and
repeat serious juvenile offenders.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 21, § 2,
subd. (i), p. 119.)
Addressing the problem of juvenile crime and gang-related crime properly
can be considered the common purpose of Proposition 21.  Although, as
petitioners assert, juvenile crime is not coterminous with violent gang crime, a
significant portion of criminal gang activity is undertaken by juveniles.  A recent
report issued by the United States Department of Justice indicates that in 1998,
approximately 40 percent of all gang members were under the age of 18 years.
(Off. of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1998 Nat. Youth Gang
Survey (Nov. 2000) pp. 14-15  [as of
Feb. 28, 2002].)  Thus, it would be difficult to attempt to combat the problem of
juvenile crime without also considering gang-related crime; conversely, measures
to address gang-related crime without dealing with juveniles involved in criminal
activity could prove inadequate.  Accordingly, Proposition 21 contains provisions
that impose harsher penalties both for gang-related crimes and for serious crimes
committed by juveniles.  In addition, the initiative alters aspects of the juvenile
justice system in order to render certain minors more accountable for serious
crimes (including gang-related crimes), for example by authorizing prosecution of
these minors in criminal court.  Thus, the provisions of Proposition 21 that change
laws regarding gang-related crime and the juvenile justice system are reasonably
germane to each other and to the initiative’s common purpose of addressing
violent crime committed by juveniles and gangs.  This subject or goal clearly is
not so broad that an unlimited array of provisions could be considered relevant
thereto.  Indeed, as the People emphasized at oral argument, in previous decisions
we have upheld initiatives containing various provisions related to even broader
48
goals in the criminal justice system.  (E.g., Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d
336, 347 [promoting the rights of actual and potential crime victims]; Brosnahan
v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 247 [strengthening procedural and substantive
safeguards for victims in the criminal justice system].)
Petitioners contend that even if addressing juvenile and gang-related crime
constitutes a proper common goal for purposes of the single-subject rule, the
provisions of Proposition 21 that amend the Three Strikes law are unrelated to that
goal and constitute a distinct subject that should have been submitted to the
electorate as a separate measure.  We disagree.  These revisions bear a reasonable
and commonsense relationship to the initiative’s provisions regarding juvenile and
gang-related crime.
As described above, Proposition 21 added a number of crimes to the list of
violent and serious felonies that qualify as strikes under the Three Strikes law.11
The violent felonies now qualifying as strikes under the measure include robbery;
kidnapping; assault with intent to commit mayhem, rape, sodomy, or oral
copulation; carjacking; extortion or threats to victims or witnesses in connection
with gang activity; first degree burglary; and the use of a firearm in connection
with the commission of specified felonies.  (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c), as
amended by Prop. 21, § 15.)  The serious felonies qualifying as strikes under the
initiative include exploding a destructive device causing bodily injury; certain
felonies committed in connection with a street gang in violation of Penal Code
section 186.22; throwing acid or a flammable substance; assault with a deadly
                                                
11 
The Legislature added some of these crimes to the list of violent and
serious felonies before the passage of Proposition 21, but those crimes did not
qualify as strikes until Proposition 21 amended the statutory lock-in date for
determining qualifying offenses under the Three Strikes law.  (See Pen. Code,
§§ 667.1, 1170.125.)
49
weapon; assault on a peace officer or firefighter; assault with a deadly weapon
against a public transit employee, custodial officer, or school employee; discharge
of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling, vehicle, or aircraft; rape in concert;
continuous sexual abuse of a child; shooting from a vehicle; intimidation of
victims or witnesses; and terrorist threats.  (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c), as
amended by Prop. 21, § 17.)
Although some of these crimes, at first blush, might not bear an obvious
relationship to juvenile or gang offenders, upon closer scrutiny we cannot properly
conclude that they are not reasonably related to the goal of the initiative.  For
example, assault with a deadly weapon and burglary constitute crimes that
commonly are committed by street gangs.  In 1998, 53 percent of local
jurisdictions nationwide reported that youth gang members often or sometimes
used firearms in assault crimes.  (Off. of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, 1998 Nat. Youth Gang Survey, supra, at p. 32.)  In the western region
of the nation (including California), 27 percent of jurisdictions reported that youth
gang members often used firearms in assault crimes; 35 percent reported that such
persons sometimes used firearms in assault crimes.  (Ibid.)  Similarly, 58 percent
of jurisdictions reported that “most/all” or “some” youth gang members in their
region committed burglaries.  (Id. at p. 31.)
Furthermore, although the continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age
of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288.5) ordinarily might not be considered a crime
associated with juvenile or gang offenders, another recent United States
Department of Justice report suggests otherwise.  According to this report, sexual
abuse by juveniles is a serious problem that is underreported, and such abuse
involves a wide range of sexual misconduct.  (Off. of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, Juveniles Who Have Sexually Offended (Mar. 2001) p. 1
 [as of Feb. 28, 2002].)  Victims of
50
such abuse typically are relatives or acquaintances of the juvenile offender and are
substantially younger than the perpetrator.  (Id. at p. 4.)  Among the types of abuse
considered in this report is abuse against siblings (including stepsiblings and
adoptive siblings).  As compared with juveniles who abused individuals other than
siblings, juveniles who sexually offended against siblings perpetrate a greater
number of abusive acts over a longer period of time, and these acts are more likely
to involve substantial sexual conduct.  Sibling offenders also are more likely to
abuse multiple victims.  (Id. at p. 15.)  Penal Code section 288.5 provides that any
person who resides in the same home with a minor and engages in three or more
acts of substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age of 14 years, over a
period of time not less than three months in duration, is guilty of the offense of
continuous sexual abuse of a child.  In light of the data reported by the Department
of Justice, we cannot conclude that this crime bears no reasonable relationship to
juvenile offenders.
Even if some of the crimes added to the list of violent and serious felonies
are more likely to be committed by an adult who is not a gang member, the
offenses nonetheless constitute crimes that commonly are committed by members
of street gangs and/or juvenile offenders and thus bear a reasonable and
commonsense relationship to the purpose of the initiative.  We are not confronted
with an initiative that purports to address juvenile and gang-related crime, but that
also contains a few provisions that relate solely to adults who are not members of
gangs, such as an amendment to the Three Strikes law that would affect only a
defendant who, as an adult, previously had been convicted of a strike unrelated to
gang activity.  The circumstance that the Three Strikes provisions affect adults in
addition to juveniles and gang members does not mean that these provisions are
not reasonably germane to the purpose of the initiative.
51
Furthermore, certain juveniles in wardship proceedings who are found to
have committed violent or serious felonies within the meaning of the Three Strikes
law can accumulate strike priors that result in enhanced sentences in future
criminal prosecutions.  (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (d)(3).)  In addition, adult gang
members, as well as juveniles prosecuted in criminal court, who commit such
crimes are subject to the increased penalties and other restrictions imposed by the
Three Strikes law, such as limitations upon plea negotiation and upon conduct
credits.  (Pen. Code, §§ 1192.7, subd. (a), 2933.1.)  These provisions further the
initiative’s goal of preserving juvenile court resources for less violent offenders
who are more likely to benefit from rehabilitation.  Furthermore, no minor shall be
committed to the Youth Authority when he or she is convicted in a criminal action
of a violent or serious felony as set forth in Penal Code sections 667.5 and 1192.7
and receives a sentence of a specified length.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1732.6, subd.
(a).)
Thus, the list of violent and serious felonies contained in the Three Strikes
law bears both a topical and a functional relationship to provisions regarding
juvenile crime.  Revising the list of violent and serious felonies to add crimes for
which juveniles and gang members can receive increased penalties is reasonably
germane to the initiative’s general purpose of addressing juvenile and gang-related
crime.  In addition, changing the lock-in date (that is, the effective date of relevant
statutes) for determining the existence of strikes is necessary to give effect to this
list of violent and serious felonies as revised by Proposition 21.  “[I]t is well
established that an initiative may have ‘collateral effects’ without violating the
single-subject rule.  [Citations.]”  (Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 254-255.)  Thus, despite the collateral effects
of these provisions upon adults who are not gang members, and despite the
circumstance that the new lock-in date has the incidental effect of adding strikes
52
that the Legislature previously had included in the list of violent and serious
felonies, the provisions remain relevant to the common purpose of Proposition
21.12
Petitioners further contend that Proposition 21 violates the single-subject
rule because voters were not adequately informed of the changes to the Three
Strikes law effected by Proposition 21, or of the circumstance that these changes
concerned laws enacted through prior initiative measures.  According to
petitioners, nothing in the title, findings, declarations, or ballot pamphlet
arguments mention this “major revision” to the Three Strikes law.  Petitioners
contend that this revision includes provisions that relate solely to adult offenders
who are not members of gangs, that the revision therefore is unrelated to the
purpose of Proposition 21, and that voters thus were likely to be confused
regarding the effect of the initiative.
Petitioners’ claim of voter confusion is refuted by the materials in the ballot
pamphlet presented to the voters.  The official summary of Proposition 21
prepared by the Attorney General, as well as the analysis of the measure by the
Legislative Analyst, clearly and prominently refer to the proposed changes to the
Three Strikes law.  Thus, the Attorney General’s summary states that Proposition
21 “[d]esignates additional crimes as violent and serious felonies, thereby making
offenders subject to longer sentences.”  (Ballot Pamp., supra, official title and
                                                
12 
In light of our conclusion that the provisions of Proposition 21 fairly
disclose a reasonable and commonsense relationship among their various
components in furtherance of a common purpose, we also reject petitioners’
contention that the initiative constituted an instance of “logrolling,” or combining
in a single measure several unrelated provisions that might not have commanded
majority support if considered separately.  (See Senate of the State of Cal. v.
Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1142, 1151 & fn. 5; Amador Valley Joint Union High
Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 231-232.)
53
summary of Prop. 21, p. 44.)  The Legislative Analyst’s summary states in part:
“This measure makes various changes to laws specifically related to the treatment
of juvenile offenders.  In addition, it changes laws for juveniles and adults who are
gang-related offenders, and those who commit violent and serious crimes.
Specifically, it:  [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Increases criminal penalties for certain serious and
violent offenses.”  (Id., analysis of Prop. 21 by Legis. Analyst, p. 45, italics
added.)  The Legislative Analyst then describes in greater detail each of the
changes proposed by Proposition 21.  In a separate section titled “Serious and
Violent Felony Offenses,” the Legislative Analyst describes the general effect of
the Three Strikes law, as well as the proposed revisions that would be made by the
initiative:  “This measure revises the lists of specific crimes defined as serious or
violent offenses, thus making most of them subject to the longer sentence
provisions of existing law related to serious and violent offenses.  In addition,
these crimes would count as ‘strikes’ under the Three Strikes law.”  (Id. at pp. 46-
47, italics added.)
“We must assume the voters duly considered and comprehended these
materials.  [Citations.]”  (Raven v. Deukmejian, supra, 52 Cal.3d 336, 349.)
Accordingly, we find no indication that the voters were unaware that Proposition
21 amended the list of serious and violent felonies for which longer sentences may
be imposed.
In a related argument, several amici curiae 13 contend that Proposition 21
violates the single-subject rule because voters were not informed that the
                                                
13 
American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, American Civil
Liberties Union of Southern California, American Civil Liberties Union of San
Diego and Imperial Counties, League of Women Voters of California, California
Teachers Association, Children’s Advocacy Institute, Coleman Advocates for
Children and Youth, and Pacific Juvenile Defender Center.
54
foregoing revisions to the Three Strikes law amended statutes adopted through
prior initiative measures.  Amici curiae contend that, because these statutes can be
amended only by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature or by another initiative
measure (see Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (c)), the proponents of Proposition 21
were required to alert voters that the measure would amend prior laws enacted
through the initiative process.  This contention is unsupported by any legal
authority, however.  As established above, the electorate properly was informed of
the revisions to the Three Strikes law effected by Proposition 21.  Voters need not
have known that the Three Strikes law was enacted by initiative in order to
comprehend the changes to that law made by Proposition 21.
Lastly, petitioners contend that Proposition 21 violates the single-subject
rule because section 707(d), as amended by the initiative, effected a reallocation of
judicial power to the executive branch.  Such a transfer of power constitutes a
single subject within the meaning of article II, section 8(d), petitioners contend,
and therefore should have been submitted to the voters in a single initiative.
Petitioners rely upon Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1142,
in which we held that an initiative violated the single-subject rule where it would
have (1) changed laws regarding the compensation of state officers and
(2) transferred the power of reapportionment from the Legislature to this court.
Our decision reasoned that the proposal to transfer the power of reapportionment
from the Legislature, where it traditionally had resided, to the Supreme Court,
involved “a most fundamental and far-reaching change in the law” that “clearly
represent[ed] a separate ‘subject’ within the meaning of the single-subject rule
upon which a clear expression of the voters’ intent is essential.”  (Id. at pp. 1167-
1168.)  We concluded that authorizing the combination of such a provision with
unrelated provisions concerning the pay of state officers “would inevitably create
voter confusion and obscure the electorate’s intent with regard to each of the
55
separate subjects included within the initiative, undermining the basic objectives
sought to be achieved by the single-subject rule.”  (Id. at p. 1168.)
As we have explained, however, the various provisions of Proposition 21,
including the provision authorizing prosecutors to file charges against certain
minors directly in criminal court, are reasonably germane to the common purpose
of reducing gang-related and juvenile crime.  Including such a relevant provision
in an initiative addressing this single subject is not likely to confuse the voters or
obscure the electorate’s intent.  Moreover, conferring upon the prosecutor the
discretion to pursue charges against a minor in criminal court does not comprise “a
most fundamental and far-reaching change in the law” that clearly represents a
single subject upon which a clear expression of the voters’ intent is essential.
(Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones, supra, 21 Cal. 4th at pp. 1167-1168.)  As
established above, prosecutors traditionally have exercised charging discretion
with regard to minors accused of criminal conduct, and such prosecutorial
decisions often have determined whether the accusations were adjudicated in
juvenile court or criminal court.  Incrementally expanding such discretion to
include the authority to file charges in criminal court under the circumstances set
forth in section 707(d) does not reallocate the judicial power, nor does it
accomplish such a fundamental change in the law that this provision must be
considered a single subject that can be submitted to the electorate only as an
individual measure, without the other related provisions of Proposition 21.14  All
                                                
14 
Similarly, contrary to the assertion of amici curiae law professors and
juvenile justice specialists (Franklin E. Zimring, Elizabeth Cauffman, Laurence
Steinberg, Dean Hill Rivkin, Jeffrey Fagan, Darrell F. Hawkins, Peter Edelman,
Jan C. Costello, Mercer Sullivan, Elizabeth Scott, and William Patton), other
revisions accomplished by Proposition 21 do not constitute “a wholesale invasion
of judicial branch authority and function,” but rather represent modest,
incremental changes to the existing statutory scheme.  Indeed, most of the
(footnote continued on next page)
56
these provisions are germane to the initiative’s common purpose of addressing
gang-related and juvenile crime, and satisfy the requirements of the single-subject
rule set forth in article II, section 8(d).
VII
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.
GEORGE, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
                                                                                                                                                
(footnote continued from previous page)
revisions upon which amici curiae rely retain significant judicial authority and
discretion in the process.  (E.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 707, subd. (c) [extending a
presumption against fitness to minors who are 14 and 15 years of age and accused
of certain offenses], 625.3 [prohibiting the prehearing release of minors at least 14
years of age taken into custody for certain offenses], 654.3, subd. (h) [designating
program of probation for certain minors charged with felony offenses “[e]xcept in
unusual cases where the court determines the interest of justice would best be
served by” another program], 707(d)(5) [requiring the juvenile court to choose
among particular dispositions for minors who are found to have committed certain
offenses]; see also Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (a) [court may dismiss action in
furtherance of justice].)
1
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.
I concur in the judgment and, in all but one respect, in the majority
opinion’s reasoning.  I write separately to explain my reasons for agreeing that
Proposition 21 does not violate the single-subject limitation imposed on initiative
measures by article II, section 8(d) of the California Constitution.
As the majority explains (maj. opn., ante, at p. 47), the problems of violent
gang crime and juvenile crime are so closely interrelated that they can reasonably
be considered the common subject Proposition 21 seeks to address.  The difficulty,
in terms of the single-subject rule, comes with those provisions changing the
“Three Strikes” law’s “lock-in” date (Pen. Code, §§ 667.1, 1170.125)1 and
amending the statutory lists of serious (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)) and violent (§ 667.5,
subd. (c)) felonies that, among their other roles in sentencing, define the prior
convictions that qualify recidivists for sentencing under the Three Strikes law.  I
would analyze this aspect of the issue somewhat differently than the majority.
By Proposition 21, the voters added to the lists in sections 1192.7 and 667.5
certain offenses clearly related to gangs and/or juvenile crime.  Newly designated
as serious felonies under section 1192.7 were, for example, felonies committed in
promotion of a pattern of criminal gang activity (id., subd. (c)(28)), shooting from
a vehicle or at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle (id., subd. (c)(33), (36)),
                                                
1 
All further statutory references are to this code.
2
intimidation of witnesses (id., subd. (c)(37)), and making criminal threats (id.,
subd. (c)(38)).  Newly designated as violent felonies under section 667.5 were, for
example, extortion in promotion of criminal gang activity (id., subd. (c)(19)) and
threatening victims or witnesses in promotion of criminal gang activity (id., subd.
(c)(20)).
Qualifying these felonies as “strikes,” so as to impose greater punishment
on those who repeatedly committed such offenses, was a measure reasonably
germane to Proposition 21’s purpose of deterring gang and juvenile violence.
Adding to the lists in sections 667.5 and 1192.7 would not, by itself, accomplish
that task, because the cross-references in the Three Strikes law were statutorily
frozen as of June 30, 1993.  (See § 667, subd. (h); Stats. 1994, p. A-316, § 2.)
Changing the lock-in date was therefore necessary, though it had the collateral
effect of qualifying as strikes all offenses added to sections 1192.7 and 667.5
between the initial 1993 date and the passage of Proposition 21, not just those
added by the initiative.
As the majority recognizes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 51), that an initiative
measure has collateral effects outside its subject area does not put the measure in
violation of the single-subject rule.  (Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of
Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 254-255; Amador Valley Joint Union High
Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 230.)  That some
offenses not particularly related to juvenile and gang violence became strikes by
virtue of Proposition 21’s change in the lock-in date, therefore, would not
invalidate the measure under the single-subject rule.  For this reason, we need not
struggle to demonstrate that continuous sexual abuse of a child (§ 288.5; see
§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(35)) is germane to Proposition 21’s subject area, as the
majority does.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 49-50.)  Violation of section 288.5 was
added to the serious felony list in section 1192.7 by legislative amendment in 1998
3
(Stats. 1998, ch. 936, § 13.5), not by Proposition 21, though its qualification as a
strike is a collateral effect of Proposition 21’s change in the Three Strikes law’s
lock-in date.  The same is true of assault with intent to commit rape, mayhem,
sodomy, or oral copulation (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(29)), a set of crimes already listed
in section 1192.7 by virtue of the 1998 amendments (Stats. 1998, ch. 936, § 13.5),
though qualified as a strike only by virtue of Proposition 21’s change in the lock-
in date.
Of the offenses that were added to sections 1192.7 or 667.5 by Proposition
21, a few are of doubtful germaneness to the initiative’s gang and juvenile
violence subject matter.  In particular, assault with a deadly weapon (§ 1192.7,
subd. (c)(31)) and burglary of a residence when a resident is present (§ 667.5,
subd. (c)(21)) are crimes commonly committed by many types of offenders,
juvenile and adult, gang members or not.  I disagree with the majority that, simply
because juveniles and gang members sometimes or often commit these offenses,
their addition to the serious and violent felony lists was germane to Proposition
21’s subject.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 49.)  Such a broad view of the initiative’s
subject would render virtually any criminal law provision germane.
On the other hand, I do not believe that the inclusion of these very few
doubtfully germane provisions in a broad and complex measure addressing
juvenile and gang violence should be deemed a separate “subject” for purposes of
article II, section 8(d) of the California Constitution.  The single-subject rule
“should not be interpreted in an unduly narrow or restrictive fashion that would
preclude the use of the initiative process to accomplish comprehensive,
broad-based reform in a particular area of public concern.”  (Senate of the State of
Cal. v. Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1142, 1157.)  As shown above, the vast majority
of offenses qualifying as strikes because of Proposition 21 either were closely
related to the measure’s gang and juvenile violence subject or qualify as strikes
4
only as a collateral consequence of the initiative’s change in the Three Strikes
law’s lock-in date.  The addition of burglary with a resident present and assault
with a deadly weapon was, moreover, not completely unrelated to Proposition 21’s
subject, since these offenses, even if equally or more likely to be committed by an
adult who is not a gang member, are also commonly committed by juveniles and
gang members.  Requiring, in addition, that each and every provision of an
initiative be clearly and particularly related to the initiative’s purposes would
demand of initiative proposers a degree of precision unrealistic in the drafting of
measures effectively reforming California’s complicated body of statutory law.
(Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 254.)
For this reason, I agree with the majority that Proposition 21 does not
violate our Constitution’s single-subject limitation on initiative measures.
WERDEGAR, J.
1
CONCURRING OPINION BY MORENO, J.
I concur in parts I through V of the majority opinion and concur in the
result.  But as explained below, I take issue with much of the majority’s analysis
of the single-subject rule and with the way this court has defined the single-subject
rule in prior case law.
I.
On the March 7, 2000 ballot on which Proposition 21 appeared, there were
17 initiatives and one referendum, including complex and important matters
involving election reform, limits on same-sex marriages, voting requirements for
school bonds, and approval of Indian gaming compacts.  The texts of the proposed
laws took 56 double-columned pages of small (9 point) type.  The ballot
summaries and arguments were 78 pages long.  It is doubtful that the average
judge or lawyer, let alone the average layperson, comprehended all the material
within these pages.
Although many of the reforms suggested to reduce the volume and complexity
of the legislative choices faced by voters are beyond the scope of this court’s power to
implement, there is one measure already available to us: the rigorous enforcement of
the single-subject rule.  It is unlikely that the drafters of the rule in 1948, when there
were only eight propositions on the ballot, could have envisioned the initiative
explosion that was to occur 40 and 50 years later.  But their purpose was clearly to
create a more manageable initiative process suitable for the average voter with limited
2
time and resources.  The ballot argument in favor of the single-subject rule stated that
one of the principal reasons for the single-subject rule is to achieve “simplification
and clarification of issues presented to the voters.”  (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2,
1948) p. 8.)  Elaborating on this purpose, the ballot argument stated: “Today, any
proposition may be submitted to the voters by initiative and it may contain any
number of subjects. . . .  The busy voter does not have the time to devote to the study
of long, wordy, propositions and must rely upon such sketchy information as may be
received through the press, radio or picked up in general conversation.  If improper
emphasis is placed upon one feature and the remaining features ignored, or if there is
a failure to study the entire proposed amendment, the voter may be misled as to the
over-all effect of the proposed amendment. [¶] [The single-subject rule] entirely
eliminates the possibility of such confusion inasmuch as it will limit each proposed
amendment to one subject and one subject only.”  (Ibid.)
Moreover, as we recognized in Senate of the State of Cal. v. Jones (1999) 21
Cal.4th 1142, 1160, the single-subject rule was also designed to prevent “ ‘ “an
unnatural combination of provisions . . . dealing with more than one subject” ’
[citations] that have been joined together simply for improper tactical purposes.”  In
other words, the single-subject rule was intended to discourage what has been called
“logrolling.”  (See Minger, Putting the “Single” Back in the Single-Subject Rule: A
Proposal for Initiative Reform in California (1991) 24 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 879.)  Jones
itself illustrates this type of mischief: a presumably popular measure, reduction of
legislative salaries, was conjoined with a less popular measure, shifting
reapportionment from the Legislature to this court.  The single-subject rule was
designed in part to ensure that each legislative measure succeeds or fails on its own
merits.
Unfortunately, this court has generally not interpreted the single-subject
requirement to accomplish these basic purposes.  In our first case to consider the
3
single-subject rule, Perry v. Jordan (1949) 34 Cal.2d 87, this court ignored the
language of the ballot argument quoted above.  Instead it assumed, without
explanation, that the single-subject rule for initiatives should be defined in the same
manner as the single-subject requirement imposed on legislation passed by the
Legislature, found at the time in article IV, section 24 of the California Constitution.
Following case law interpreting this latter section, we concluded that the requirement
should “ ‘be construed liberally to uphold proper legislation, all parts of which are
reasonably germane.’ ”  (Perry v. Jordan, supra, 34 Cal.2d at p. 92, italics added.)
The Perry court thus disregarded the ballot argument’s specific concern with
avoiding information overload and voter confusion, and instead grafted the single-
subject rule for the Legislature onto the single-subject requirement for initiatives.  But
the differences between the initiative and legislative process are substantial:  in the
latter case, a proposed bill is scrutinized by legislators and their staffs, is assigned to
legislative committees for hearings, is often amended during this process, and is
finally reviewed by the Governor.  Initiatives do not receive comparable scrutiny, and
the voters are unable to amend them.  “The result of this inflexibility is that more
often than not a proposed initiative represents the most extreme form of law which is
considered politically expedient. . . .  [¶]  It is because of the voters’ lesser ability to
scrutinize a proposal and their total inability to propose modifications, that the
multisubject initiative presents greater dangers than a similar multisubject legislative
bill.”  (Schmitz v. Younger (1978) 21 Cal.3d 90, 99-100 (dis. opn. of Manuel, J.).)
Unfortunately, our subsequent cases have uncritically followed Perry v.
Jordan, employing a liberally interpreted “reasonably germane” test rather than a test
designed, as the ballot argument to the single-subject rule states, to “eliminate[ ] the
possibility” of voter confusion caused when “improper emphasis is placed upon one
feature and the remaining features [are] ignored.”  (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends
to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 1948) p. 8; see, e.g.,
4
Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336 [varied package of criminal justice
reforms held not to violate the single-subject rule]; Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32
Cal.3d 236 [same].)  In so doing, this court has come close to rendering the single
subject rule meaningless.
In contrast, the Florida Supreme Court, for example, has been rigorous in its
enforcement of the single-subject requirement as it pertains to voter initiatives that
amend the Florida Constitution.  (See Fla. Const., art. XI, §  3 [any constitutional
revision or amendment by the electorate “shall embrace but one subject and matter
directly connected therewith”].)  In the seminal case of Fine v. Firestone (Fla. 1984)
448 So.2d 984, the court determined that the single-subject rule for constitutional
initiatives should be interpreted more strictly than a comparable single-subject
requirement imposed on the Legislature, for reasons similar to those discussed above .
The court stated the focus of its inquiry as one of determining whether a proposed
amendment “has a logical and natural oneness of purpose,” considering “whether the
proposal affects [separate] function[s] of government” and how “the proposal affects
a section of the constitution.”  (Id. at p. 990.)  Moreover, the court has also rigorously
enforced Florida Statutes Annotated section 101.161, which requires the chief purpose
of any constitutional amendment submitted to the voters to be clearly contained in an
explanatory statement “not exceeding 75 words in length.”  (See Advisory Opn. to
Atty. Gen. re Pub. Educ. (Fla. 2000) 778 So.2d 888, 892.)  The Florida Supreme
Court has accordingly invalidated a number of initiatives over the last 15 years.  (See,
e.g., Advisory Opn. to Atty. Gen. re Pub. Educ., supra, 778 So.2d at p. 893 [anti-
affirmative-action initiative concerned with three distinct subjects  public
education, public employment, and public contracting  violates single-subject rule];
Advisory Opinion to Atty. Gen. (Fla. 1997) 699 So.2d 1304 [same for initiative that
would create exception to single-subject rule for property rights and tax reform
measures ]; Advisory Opinion to Atty. Gen. re Tax (Fla. 1994) 644 So.2d 486 [same
5
for initiative reforming both taxes and user fees]; Evans v. Firestone (Fla. 1984) 457
So.2d 1351 [same for initiative that would cap tort damages and reform summary
judgment proceedings ]; Fine, supra, 448 So.2d 984 [same for initiative that reforms
taxation, user fees, and use of revenue bonds for capital improvement].)
While the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of its own single-subject rule
may be somewhat overly stringent for California, some kind of reasonable middle
ground between that court’s rigor and this court’s laxity seems in order.  To be sure,
there are inherent conceptual difficulties in formulating the proper constitutional
standard for enforcing the single-subject requirement.  As commentators have pointed
out, the term “subject” is problematic to define with any precision because almost any
two legislative measures may be considered part of the same subject if that subject is
defined with sufficient abstraction.  (See Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the
Single Subject Rule (1983) 30 UCLA L.Rev. 936,  938-942 (Lowenstein).)  But our
task is made simpler if the rule’s purpose of avoiding voter confusion and logrolling is
kept in mind.  Some have suggested that a provision is reasonably germane to the
main subject of the initiative if it can be surmised that the public would consider it to
be.  (Uelman, Handling Hot Potatoes: Judicial Review of California Initiatives after
Senate v. Jones (2001) 41 Santa Clara L.Rev. 999; 1009-1010; Lowenstein, supra, 30
UCLA L.Rev. at p. 973.)  A variation on this formulation proposed by the California
Commission on Campaign Financing is whether a “reasonable voter” would be
“surprised” to learn that a specific provision being challenged was included in the
initiative under question.  (Cal. Com. on Campaign Financing Democracy by
Initiative: Shaping California’s Fourth Branch of Government (1992) 330, fn. 97.)
Moreover, as has been recognized, the single subject of the initiative must be
expressed in the initiative’s title.  (See Perry v. Jordan, supra, 34 Cal.2d at p. 93; see
also California Trial Lawyers Assn. v. Eu (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 351, 358.)  Thus, at
the very least, an initiative should not pass muster under the single-subject rule unless
6
its provisions are reasonably encompassed within the title and summary of the
initiative.  The inquiry is roughly analogous to a court’s inquiry into whether a party
was unfairly surprised by a provision in a contract of adhesion, rendering that
provision unconscionable.  (See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp. (1982) 135
Cal.App.3d 473, 490-491.)  Moreover, the subject encompassed by the title and
summary should be reasonably specific, not a broad, generic subject as crime or
public disclosure.  (See Chemical Specialties Manufactures Assn., Inc. v. Deukmejian
(1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 663, 670-671.)
California Trial Lawyers Assn. v. Eu, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 351,
illustrates the application of this test.  There, an initiative that sought to establish a
system of no-fault insurance with the purpose of lowering insurance rates also had
a provision, section 8, guaranteeing to insurers and various other groups the same
right to make campaign contributions as is given generally and provided that state
officials receiving such contributions would not be disqualified from
“ ‘participating in any decision affecting the interest of the donor.’ ”  (Id. at
p. 356.)  As the court stated: “In our view, section 8 of the initiative is a paradigm
of the potentially deceptive combinations of unrelated provisions at which the
constitutional limitation on the scope of initiatives is aimed.  It is located . . . near
the middle of a 120 page document, and consists of two brief paragraphs which
bear no connection to what precedes or follows. . . .  [¶]  The significant threat that
voters will be misled as to the breadth of the initiative is heightened by the
absence of any reference to section 8 in the Attorney General’s title and summary,
or in the introductory statement of findings and purpose in the initiative itself . . . .
[N]ot only is there a lack of any reasonably discernible nexus between the stated
object of the initiative and the campaign spending and conflict of interest
provisions of section 8, but the title and various descriptions of the initiative’s
7
contents give no clue that any such provisions are buried within.  These flaws are
fatal.”  (Id. at pp. 360-361.)
Finally, in addition to the test discussed above, an initiative would pass
muster under the single-subject rule if it were “functionally related in furtherance
of a common underlying purpose.”  (Schmitz v. Younger, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p.
100 (dis. opn. of Manuel, J.).)  In Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v.
State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.2d 208, 230-231, in which Proposition 13
was upheld as constitutional, this test was employed along with the reasonably
germane test.  (See also Brosnahan v. Eu (1982) 31 Cal.3d 1, 9 (dis. opn. of Mosk
J.) [advocating adoption of the functionally related test].)  The functionally related
test would require that an initiative’s various measures are “reasonably interrelated
and interdependent, forming an interlocking ‘package’ ” designed to accomplish
the initiative’s purpose.  (Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 231.)
II.
With these principles in mind, I turn to Proposition 21.  I agree that the
juvenile justice and gang-related provisions are reasonably germane to the single
subject of preventing juvenile crime.  The gang-related provisions would be popularly
understood to be germane to the subject of juvenile crime since gang-related crime is
often juvenile crime.  This single subject is appropriately expressed in the title given
by the Attorney General  Juvenile Crime.  Initiative Statute.  (Ballot Pamp.,
Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) p. 44.)  It is also expressed in the title given by the
drafters of the initiative, the “Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of
1998.”  (Id. at p. 119.)  Moreover, these interrelated subjects are reasonably specific.
The third part of Proposition 21, concerning the amendment of the “Three
Strikes” law by adding to the list of serious and violent felonies found in Penal Code
sections 667.5 and 1192.7, presents a much closer question.  As the majority correctly
state: “The general object of the initiative is to address the problem of violent crime
8
committed by juveniles and gangs — not simply to reduce crime generally.”  (Maj.
opn., ante, at p. 46.)  Although some of the crimes added to the Three Strikes law are
clearly gang related  such as extortion or threats in connection with gang activity
and intimidation of victims or witnesses  some have no apparent relationship with
either juvenile or gang-related crime.  I disagree with the majority’s argument that
crimes such as first degree burglary, use of a firearm in connection with a felony, or
continuous sexual abuse of a child, are sufficiently related to the subject of juvenile
and gang-related crime merely because some juveniles or gang members commit such
crimes, even though the large majority of those committing these crimes are adults
who are not members of gangs.  Employing the popular understanding test discussed
above, it is highly doubtful that, for example, the general public would particularly
associate continuous sexual abuse of a child with juveniles or gangs.
Moreover, the “significant threat that voters [were] misled as to the breadth of
the initiative [was] heightened by the absence of any reference to [the provision] in
the Attorney General’s title and summary, or in the introductory statement of findings
and purpose in the initiative itself.”   (California Trial Lawyers Assn. v. Eu, supra,
200 Cal.App.3d at p. 361.)  Nothing in the title of Proposition 21 would have placed
voters on notice that it would be amending the Three Strikes law, nor that some of the
amendments would have only an incidental connection with juvenile or gang-related
crime.  Nor do the arguments for and against Proposition 21 contain any mention of
these provisions.  (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) pp. 48-49.)  Likewise,
the findings and declarations contained in section 2, subdivision (d) of the law make
no mention of these amendments, instead focusing on the increasing “problem of
youth and gang violence.”  (Id. at p. 119.)  The Attorney General’s summary does
mention that the initiative “[d]esignates additional crimes as violent and serious
felonies, thereby making offenders subject to longer sentences.”  (Id. at p. 44.)  But
because that mention comes after the title and after the portions of the summary
9
specifically related to juvenile and gang-related crime, it is doubtful that this reference
would have placed the average voter on notice that the “offenders” in question are not
necessarily, and in some cases are not usually, juveniles or gang members.
To counter these arguments, the majority point to the more extensive
description of the initiative in the Legislative Analyst’s summary and state, “ ‘We
must assume the voters duly considered and comprehended these materials.’ ”
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 53.)  But while it is to be hoped that voters carefully study
their ballot guides, the realistic premise behind the single-subject rule is that many
voters do not, and the ballot measures should be simple enough to be fairly well
described in the title and summary.  The less rigorously we enforce the single-
subject rule, the more we are compelled to rely on implausible assumptions about
voters’ understanding of a ballot measure’s intricacies.
This lack of notice to voters is especially troublesome because the Three
Strikes law is itself a substantial and controversial piece of legislation, the
amendment of which merits the careful attention of the voters.  I note that there is
currently circulating an initiative to amend the Three Strikes law so as to narrow
the list of violent and serious felonies that will count as strikes.  (See text of
proposed initiative for Gen. Elec. Nov. 5, 2002, entitled “Three Strikes” Law.
Limitation to Violent and Serious Felonies. Initiative Statute (Cal. Sec. of State,
2002 Initiative Update [as of  Feb.
28, 2002].)  There is therefore cause for concern that the amendments to the
controversial Three Strikes law were tacked on to a popular anti-juvenile-crime
initiative as a form of improper logrolling  a practice the single-subject rule was
designed to prevent.
Nonetheless, I concur in result because I agree that there is a functional
relationship between the juvenile justice provisions and the amendment of Penal
Code sections 667.5 and 1192.7.  Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6,
10
subdivision (a) provides that “[n]o minor shall be committed to the Youth
Authority when he or she is convicted in a criminal action” of any of the violent or
serious felonies set forth in the above two Penal Code sections.  As the majority
explains, Proposition 21 amends Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6 to
add additional offenses, enumerated in Welfare and Institutions Code sections 602
and 707, under which a minor would be precluded from being committed to the
Youth Authority.  But these amendments did not alter the role that Penal Code
sections 667.5 and 1192.7 offenses have in determining which minors would not
be committed to the Youth Authority.
In other words, a critical determination in the juvenile justice system 
whether or not a minor will be committed to the Youth Authority or to prison 
depends in part on the nature of the crimes defined by Penal Code sections 667.5
and 1192.7.  In this sense, the amendment of these two statutes is also an
amendment of Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6 and is therefore
functionally related to the goal of the initiative  the reform of the juvenile justice
system to impose greater punishment on some juveniles who have committed
crimes.  This interlocking, functional relationship between Welfare and
Institutions Code section 1732.6 and Penal Code sections 667.5 and 1192.7, more
than any tenuous topical connection, persuades me that the amendment of these
latter two sections is fairly included in the subject of juvenile justice reform.  For
that reason, I conclude Proposition 21 does not violate the single-subject rule.
MORENO, J.
1
DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J.
Historically, in California the decision whether to grant a district attorney’s
request that a minor be prosecuted in adult court instead of juvenile court has been
a function of the judiciary, a neutral body.  In 2000, however, the voters of this
state enacted Proposition 21, an initiative measure that among other matters grants
a prosecutor arbitrary and virtually unlimited discretion to decide whether a minor
should be tried in juvenile or adult court.  There is no hearing, and no right to
counsel.  No standards guide the exercise of discretion.  There is no judicial
review.  This last omission is fatal, for by depriving the judiciary of any role in
making or reviewing the decision, this portion of Proposition 21 eliminates an
essential check to arbitrary executive power, and thus offends the principle of
separation of powers embodied in the California Constitution.
I
The California Constitution expressly provides for the separation of
governmental powers among the three branches of state government.  (Cal. Const.,
art III, § 3.)  “Although this particular provision dates only from 1972, our state
Constitution ‘[f]rom its inception . . . has contained an explicit provision
embodying the separation of powers doctrine.’ ”  (Obrien v. Jones (2000) 23
2
Cal.4th 40, 65 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.), quoting Superior Court v. County of
Mendocino (1996) 13 Cal.4th 45, 52.)
“ ‘ “[T]he separation of powers principle does not command ‘a hermetic
sealing off of the three branches of Government from one another.’ ” ’ ”  (Obrien
v. Jones, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 48, quoting In re Attorney Discipline System
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 582, 602.)  It is expressed, instead, in a system of checks and
balances intended to prevent any branch from attaining arbitrary or inordinate
power.  This court in Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th at
pages 52-53 stated:  “Although the language of California Constitution article III,
section 3, may suggest a sharp demarcation between the operations of the three
branches of government, California decisions long have recognized that, in reality,
the separation of powers doctrine ‘ “does not mean that the three departments of
our government are not in many respects mutually dependent” ’ [citation] . . . .
Indeed, upon brief reflection, the substantial interrelatedness of the three branches’
actions is apparent and commonplace . . . .  Such interrelationship, of course, lies
at the heart of the constitutional theory of ‘checks and balances’ that the separation
of powers doctrine is intended to serve.”
The charging power of the district attorney, which the majority cites as an
exclusive executive power, illustrates the point.  The legislative branch defines
those crimes that can be charged, the executive branch decides what crimes to
charge, and the judicial branch decides whether to sustain those charges.  Before
the electorate enacted Proposition 21, a similar system of checks and balances
protected the decision whether a minor should be prosecuted as a juvenile or as an
adult.  Most actions against juveniles had to begin in the juvenile court.  (See
Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 602, as amended by Stats. 1976, ch. 1071, § 12,
3
p. 4819.)1  The prosecution, in its discretion, could seek to have the proceeding
transferred to adult court.  (§ 707, subd. (a.).)  The juvenile court would hold a
hearing and, applying standards established by the Legislature, rule on the
prosecutor’s request.  (§ 707.)
Proposition 21 seeks to eliminate the required checks and balances.  It
amended section 602, subdivision (b), declaring some minors statutorily ineligible
for juvenile court proceedings.  That provision raises no separation of powers
issues.  But as to those minors who could be prosecuted in either adult court or
juvenile court, it allows the prosecutor to make that decision unrestrained by any
legislatively prescribed standards and without judicial review.  If the decision is to
prosecute in adult court, and it later appears that the juvenile court would have
been more appropriate, the minor has no remedy because the judicial branch is
excluded from the determination.  This portion of Proposition 21, in my view,
conflicts with the constitutional mandate.
The juvenile court system and the adult criminal courts serve fundamentally
different goals.  The punishment for serious crimes tried in the criminal courts is
imprisonment, and “the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.”  (Pen.
Code, § 1170, subd. (a)(1).)  California Rules of Court, rule 4.410 identifies seven
objectives in sentencing a criminal defendant.  They include punishment,
deterrence, isolation, restitution, and uniformity in sentencing, but they do not
include goals important in the treatment of juvenile offenders such as maturation,
rehabilitation, or preservation of the family.
                                                
1 
Unless otherwise designated, all statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
4
In contrast, the juvenile court system seeks not only to protect the public
safety, but also the youthful offender.  Section 202, subdivision (a), states that the
purpose of the juvenile court system is “to provide for the protection and safety of
the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to
preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible . . . .”  The
statute further provides that “[w]hen the minor is removed from his or her own
family, it is the purpose of this chapter to secure for the minor custody, care, and
discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by
his or her parents.”  (Ibid.)  Indeed even for the most serious offenders – those
who will be committed to the California Youth Authority – “community
restoration, victim restoration, and offender training and treatment shall be
substituted for retributive punishment and shall be directed toward the correction
and rehabilitation of young persons who have committed public offenses.”
(§ 1700.)
The practical consequences are immense.  An adult court may sentence a
defendant to life imprisonment; a juvenile court cannot impose confinement
beyond the age of 25.  (§§ 607, subd. (b), 1769.)  Adult convictions are public but
juvenile commitments are sealed (T.N.G. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 767,
778; Cal. Juvenile Court Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1981) § 13-7, pp. 371-383), a
difference that affects future employability and many other matters.  Adult
convictions are criminal in character, and may deprive the person convicted of the
right to vote (Cal. Const., art. II, § 4), to serve on a jury (Code Civ. Proc., § 203),
to carry firearms (Pen. Code, § 12021) and to enter certain professions (e.g., Gov.
Code, § 1029 [peace officers]); juvenile convictions carry no such collateral
consequences.  Finally, by filing in adult court the prosecutor deprives the juvenile
of the varied rehabilitative programs available in juvenile court.
5
II
Concern with the danger in granting arbitrary power to a person who acts as
an advocate, not as an impartial adjudicator, was the underpinning of this court’s
decision in the leading case on separation of powers, People v. Tenorio (1970) 3
Cal.3d 89.  There, this court overruled People v. Sidener (1962) 58 Cal.2d 645,
which had upheld Health and Safety Code section 11718’s provision prohibiting a
court from dismissing the allegation of a prior conviction without the prior
approval of the prosecution.  Tenorio relied heavily on the dissenting opinions in
Sidener in concluding Health and Safety Code section 11718 violated the
separation of powers doctrine.  It quoted Justice B. Rey Schauer’s dissent,
observing that he viewed Sidener as “ ‘a step toward totalitarian concentration of
power in the executive; a power to be exercised without any legislative standard
and without possibility of judicial review.’ ”  (People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d
at p. 93, quoting People v. Sidener, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 673 (dis. opn. of
Schauer, J.).)  Tenorio also cited Justice Thomas White’s dissent, which stressed
the district attorney’s status as an advocate, and argued that vesting such an
advocate with unreviewable power to preclude an order striking priors, “ ‘without
any impartial tribunal to review his decision . . . seems . . . to do violence to our
concept of constitutional government, and offends our oft repeated and proud
boast that we are a government of laws and not of men.’ ”  (People v. Tenorio,
supra, at p. 94, quoting People v. Sidener, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 675 (dis. opn. of
White, J.).)  Distinguishing valid statutes conferring discretion on the Adult
Authority (the predecessor of the Department of Corrections), Tenorio noted that
in contrast to those statutes, “the discretion section 11718 purports to vest in
prosecutors is unreviewable, and may therefore be exercised in a totally arbitrary
fashion both in individual cases and by the adoption of county-wide policies
6
precluding dismissal of priors regardless of the circumstances of individual cases.”
(Tenorio, at p. 95, italics added.)
We expressed the same concerns in Esteybar v. Municipal Court (1971) 5
Cal.3d 119, which held unconstitutional a statute (Pen. Code, § 17, former subd.
(b)(5)) that required prosecutorial consent before a magistrate could determine that
an offense was a misdemeanor.  Esteybar said:  “[S]ection 17, subdivision (b)(5),
purports to vest in the prosecutor, admittedly an advocate, a power which may be
exercised in a totally arbitrary fashion without regard to the circumstances of
individual cases.  Indeed, the prosecutor in the instant case admitted that it was a
county-wide policy of the district attorney’s office to refuse to consent to the
prosecution of such offenses as misdemeanors unless the defendant first agreed to
plead guilty.  Under our system of separation of powers, we cannot tolerate
permitting such an advocate to possess the power to prevent the exercise of
judicial discretion . . . .”  (Esteybar, supra, at pp. 125-126, fn. omitted.)
This court relied on Tenorio and Esteybar in deciding the companion cases
of People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 59 (On Tai Ho) and
Sledge v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 70 (Sledge).  On Tai Ho invalidated
Penal Code section 1000.2, which required the prosecutor to consent to the
diversion of a first time drug offender into a rehabilitation program.  Rejecting the
contention that the consent requirement did not invade the judicial sentencing
power because diversion occurred before sentencing, we said:  “Our decision in
Esteybar teaches that the issue whether a power is judicial in nature depends not
on the procedural posture of the case but on the substance of the power and the
effect of its exercise. . . .  At whatever stage such [prosecutorial] intervention
occurs . . . it is an integral step in the process leading to the disposition of the case
before the court, and therefore constitutes an exercise of judicial authority within
7
the meaning of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.”  (On Tai Ho,
supra, at p. 68.)
Sledge involved a different section of the same drug diversion law.  Penal
Code section 1000, subdivision (a)(3), authorized the district attorney to make the
initial determination whether a defendant was eligible for diversion.  We
distinguished On Tai Ho and upheld the statute, because it provided for judicial
review of a decision by the district attorney that a defendant was ineligible for
diversion.  (Sledge, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 75-76.)
The majority here, however, relies on Davis v. Municipal Court (1988) 46
Cal.3d 64 (hereafter Davis), which, like On Tai Ho and Sledge, involved a
diversion statute.  San Francisco had established a diversion program, but it
provided that diversion was possible only for persons charged with misdemeanors.
This provision had the effect of giving the district attorney unreviewable
discretion, whenever a defendant was charged with a “wobbler” (a crime that can
be either a felony or a misdemeanor), to exclude that defendant from diversion by
the device of filing the charge as a felony.  The Davis majority upheld this
practice, distinguishing this court’s earlier decisions in People v. Tenorio, supra, 3
Cal.3d 93 and later cases on the ground that all of the prior cases concerned
prosecutorial action after charges had been filed.  (Davis, at p. 82.)  The separation
of powers doctrine, Davis said, limits only prosecutorial action during the
“ ‘judicial phase’ ” of a criminal proceeding.  (Id. at p. 85.)  The majority here
adopts that reasoning, holding that decisions occurring before the filing of charges
fall under the prosecutor’s traditional charging discretion, regardless of their effect
on later judicial proceedings.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)
Davis is factually distinguishable from this case.  In People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, this court noted that Davis involved
diversion, and “[t]he design of diversion programs is not historically, or
8
necessarily, a judicial function.”  (Id. at p. 517.)  Thus we concluded that Davis
was not relevant to the trial court’s power to strike a prior conviction, a power that
has historically been exercised by the judiciary.  The same distinction could apply
here, for unlike the design of diversion programs, but akin to the power to strike a
prior conviction, the decision whether to prosecute a minor in adult or juvenile
court has been historically a judicial function.  That power has rested exclusively
in the hands of the juvenile court from 1915 (see Stats. 1915, ch. 631, § 2,
p. 1225), shortly after the Legislature established the juvenile court system in 1909
(see People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248, 277; Juvenile Court Act, Stats. 1909,
ch. 133, p. 213), until the voters enacted Proposition 21 in 2000.
Although the result in Davis might be defended on the ground that the
prosecutorial action involved did not invade a historically judicial function, its
analysis is unsound.  Davis reasoned that because a court acquires jurisdiction
with the filing of charges, nothing that happens before the filing of charges could
constitute an invasion of the judicial powers.  Three justices dissented in Davis; in
my view, they have the better of the argument.  Justice Stanley Mosk disagreed
that the separation of powers issue depended on the timing of the prosecutor’s
action.  As the author of On Tai Ho, supra, 11 Cal.3d 59 and Sledge, supra, 11
Cal.3d 70, he explained that “those cases turn not on a simple chronological
distinction between the ‘charging stage’ of a case and the point at which the case
is ‘before the court,’ but rather on the character and consequence of the decision
placed in the hands of the district attorney.”  (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 90 (dis.
opn. of Mosk, J.).)  Justice Marcus Kaufman, joined by Justice Edward Panelli,
focused on the arbitrary and unreviewable discretion given the district attorney:
“[T]he diversion program effectively grants the district attorney unbridled
discretion to determine who among those committing wobblers shall be
conditionally eligible for diversion and who shall be absolutely ineligible. . . .  [¶]
9
. . . [W]hen the executive’s exercise of the charging function also constitutes the
exercise of delegated legislative power, as it does in this case, that power must be
circumscribed by ‘suitable safeguards . . . to guide the power’s use and to protect
against misuse’ [citation], or it cannot be upheld.”  (Id. at p. 95 (dis. opn. of
Kaufman, J.).)
Under the reasoning of Davis, 46 Cal.3d 64 and the majority opinion here,
the Legislature (or the electorate by initiative) can effectively abrogate all of our
previous decisions on separation of powers.  For example, People v. Tenorio,
supra, 3 Cal.3d 89, invalidated a law that permitted the prosecutor to veto a court
order dismissing a prior conviction, but under the majority’s reasoning the
Legislature could nullify Tenorio by allowing the prosecutor to specify in the
charging papers that certain prior conviction allegations will not be subject to
dismissal, and by making that decision binding on the court.  Another separation
of powers decision, Esteybar v. Municipal Court, supra, 5 Cal. 3d 119, said that
principle was violated by a law requiring prosecutorial consent before a magistrate
could order that a crime be prosecuted as a misdemeanor; under the majority’s
holding, the Legislature could simply authorize the prosecutor, in the charging
papers, to specify whether the magistrate could treat the offense as a misdemeanor.
A third decision, On Tai Ho, supra, 11 Cal.3d 59, held invalid a statute requiring
prosecutorial consent to diversion; under the majority’s holding the Legislature
could simply prohibit diversion unless the prosecutor, in the charging papers, has
consented.  Indeed, the rationale of Davis and the majority here would permit the
enactment of a statute that authorized the prosecutor to make binding and
unreviewable determinations, before or at the time of filing charges, as to what
judge will hear the case, what evidence will be admitted, and what sentence
imposed if the defendant is convicted, thus effectively abrogating the function of
the separation of powers doctrine.
10
III
The majority asserts that because the Legislature has the power to eliminate
entirely the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, a statute that confers authority on the
prosecutor to bypass that jurisdiction does not usurp an exclusive judicial
authority.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  This is a familiar argument, because it has
been repeatedly raised and rejected in separation of powers cases.  In Esteybar v.
Municipal Court, supra, 5 Cal.3d 119, the People argued that because the
Legislature was not required to give magistrates the power to determine that a
charge should be prosecuted as a misdemeanor, the Legislature could condition
this power on the consent of the prosecutor.  We responded:  “[This] argument[]
. . . [is] not persuasive. . . .  [T]he fact that a particular power has been conferred
on a magistrate by statute does not prevent the exercise of that power from being a
judicial act for purposes of the doctrine of separation of powers.”  (Id. at pp. 126-
127; see People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 94.)  And in People v. Superior
Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at page 516, we observed that even though the
Legislature had the power to abolish judicial discretion to strike a prior conviction
allegation, that did not give it the authority to condition that power on the consent
of the district attorney.
IV
In my view, Proposition 21 unconstitutionally invaded a judicial function,
for the following reasons:
First, almost from the inception of the juvenile court system in California,
the decision whether a minor is unfit for juvenile court proceedings has been a
judicial function.  History alone may not be conclusive (see maj. opn., ante, at
p. 20), but it is important, for the division of authority among the three co-equal
branches of government is largely a product of history.
11
Second, the decision whether to prosecute in juvenile or adult court is
critical, and thus deserving of the due process protections of a judicial proceeding.
In Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, the United States Supreme Court
reviewed an arbitrary ruling of the District of Columbia juvenile court to waive
jurisdiction and permit trial in adult court.  Overturning that ruling, the high court
repeatedly described the decision whether a minor should be tried as a juvenile or
an adult as “critically important” (id. at pp. 553, 556, 558, 560, 561), one of
“tremendous consequence” (id. at p. 554), and thus deserving and requiring the
protection of due process.  (Id. at p. 554.)  In re Harris (1967) 67 Cal.2d 876, 878,
noted:  “In Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 553, the Supreme Court
held that a juvenile court’s direction that a minor be held for trial as an adult must
be based on a hearing that conforms to ‘the basic requirements of due process and
fairness, . . .’ ”  People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 718, said:  “It
cannot be denied that the process of certifying a juvenile for criminal proceedings
is a critically important action affecting vitally important rights of the juvenile. . . .
The certification process must . . . be attended by minimum requirements of due
process and fair treatment as dictated by the Fourteenth Amendment.”  (See Edsel
P. v. Superior Court (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 763, 775.)
These cases do not suggest that the critically important decision whether to
try the minor in adult or juvenile court should receive due process protections only
if it is made after charges have been filed.  Yet if the same decision, equally
important and consequential, is made before charges are filed, then, according to
the majority, the prosecutor has unreviewable discretion, subject only to the most
minimal of constitutional constraints prohibiting invidious discrimination or
vindictive or retaliatory prosecution.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 39.)  There is no
judicial review to correct erroneous decisions, inconsistent decisions, or decisions
12
that certain classes of minors, or all minors, will always be prosecuted in adult
court.
Third, at the time of filing charges, the district attorney’s office has limited
information – the details of the particular crime, and the minor’s prior criminal
history, if any.  It may not know the minor’s family, school, or community history,
all matters that are important in deciding whether the minor is suitable for juvenile
court treatment.  It may not know the minor’s view of the matter, and probably has
not heard from the minor’s counsel, who has yet to be appointed.  There has been
no hearing, no testimony, and no receipt of evidence.  As a result, the prosecutor,
acting with limited information, may err in the decision, and although an error in
submitting the minor to juvenile court jurisdiction is correctable, one in assigning
the minor to adult court is not.
V
The separation of powers doctrine does not require that the prosecutor take
no part in the decision whether a minor should be tried in adult or juvenile court.
Because that doctrine envisions that each branch of government acts as a check
upon the power of the other branches, the doctrine of separation of powers would
be satisfied if the prosecutor’s initial decision were subject to judicial review.
Tenorio, in striking down a statute requiring approval of the prosecutor to
dismissal of a prior conviction allegation, repeatedly emphasized the absence of
judicial review, suggesting that judicial review would have saved the statute.  (See
People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d 89, 93-95.)  This was confirmed in On Tai Ho,
supra, 11 Cal.3d 59 and Sledge, supra, 11 Cal.3d 70, which concerned parallel
provisions giving prosecutors power to disapprove drug diversion -- On Tai Ho
held invalid a provision that did not provide for judicial review, Sledge upheld a
similar provision because it provided for judicial review.  As the majority
13
acknowledges, court decisions in other states upholding laws similar to section
707, subdivision (d) in all but one instance involved laws permitting judicial
review.  (See cases cited in maj. opn., ante, at p. 26.)
VI
In conclusion, the validity of Proposition 21’s provision giving the
prosecutor power to decide whether to prosecute a minor in adult court or juvenile
court turns not on the timing of the prosecutor’s decision, but “the substance of the
power and the effect of its exercise.”  (On Tai Ho, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 68.)  The
power, as I have explained, is unrestrained by legislative standards and susceptible
to arbitrary exercise; the effect is profound, determining whether the minor will be
prosecuted in a system that stresses punishment or one that stresses rehabilitation.
In this setting, the absence of judicial review brings that portion of Proposition 21
into conflict with article III, section 3 of the California Constitution.
KENNARD, J.
1
See last page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion Manduley v. Superior Court
__________________________________________________________________________________
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 86 Cal.App.4th 1198
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S095992
Date Filed: February 28, 2002
__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: Superior
County: San Diego
Judge: Geary Dennis Cortes
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for Appellant:
William J. LaFond; Kerry L. Steigerwalt; and Charles M. Sevilla for Petitioner Morgan Victor Manduley.
Haus & Damiani and Lisa J. Damiani for Petitioner Steven James DeBoer.
Patrick Q. Hall for Petitioner Kevin Scott Williams.
Timothy A. Chandler, Alternate Public Defender, Mary Ellen Attridge and Jose H. Varela, Deputy
Alternate Public Defenders, for Petitioner Adam Mitchell Ketsdever.
Michael D. McGlinn for Petitioner Jason Wayne Beever.
Steven J. Carroll, Public Defender, Gary R. Nichols, Stewart Dadmun and Jo Pastore, Deputy Public
Defenders, for Petitioner Michael Anthony Rose.
Marc B. Geller for Petitioner Nicholas Paul Fileccia.
Bardsley & Carlos, Francis J. Bardsley and Judith A. Litzenberger for Petitioner Bradley Hunter
Davidofsky.
Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabin, Steven L. Mayer, Kimberly A. Proctor, Erick M.
Silber; Robert Kim, Margaret C. Crosby; Mark D. Rosenbaum; Jordan C. Budd for American Civil
Liberties Union of Northern California, America Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, American
Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties, League of Women Voters of California,
California Teachers Association, Children’s Advocacy Institute, Coleman Advocates for Children and
Youth and Pacific Juvenile Defender Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
John T. Philipsborn for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
James F. Sweeney for California Catholic Conference as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
2
Page 2 – counsel continued – S095992
Attorneys for Appellant:
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Jeffrey L. Bleich, Deborah N. Pearlstein; Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights of
the San Francisco Bay Area, Robert Rubin and Rebekah B. Evenson for The Center on Juvenile and
Criminal Justice, The National Center for Youth Law, Legal Services for Children, The National
Association of Counsel for Children, The American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, The American
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, The Center for Young Women’s Development, The Trauma
Foundation, The Asian Law Caucus, The Ella Baker Center for Human Rights and Children Now as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Elissa Barrett; Rohde & Victoroff and Stephen F. Rohde for Progressive Jewish Alliance as Amicus Curiae
on behalf of Petitioners.
Earl Warren Legal Institute and Franklin E. Zimring for Law Professors and Juvenile Justice Specialists
Elizabeth Cauffman, Laurence Steinberg, Dean Hill Rivkin, Jeffrey Fagan, Darrell F. Hawkins, Peter
Edelman, Jan C. Costello, Mercer Sullivan, Elizabeth Scott and William Patton as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Petitioners.
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, William A. Norris, Edward P. Lazarus and Jonathan Gottlieb for Los
Angeles County Bar Association, Beverly Hills Bar Association, Culver Marina Bar Association, Bar
Association of San Francisco, Women Lawyers Association of Los Angeles, Criminal Courts Bar
Association , Mexican American Bar Association and Los Angeles Chapter of the National Association of
Counsel for Children as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Carla J. Johnson; Daniel M. McGuire and Debra A. Gutierrez-McGuire for Criminal Defense Attorneys of
Michigan as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Mark I. Soler, Michael Finley; Laval Miller-Wilson and Marsha Levick for Youth Law Center, Juvenile
Law Center, Children’s Defense Fund, Child Welfare League of America, National Council of La Raza,
National Mental Health Association, National Urban League and The Sentencing Project as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Petitioners.
Ron Boyer, Deputy Public Defender (Contra Costa) for California Public Defenders Association as Amicus
Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
__________________________________________________________________________________
Attorneys for  Respondent:
No appearance for Respondent.
Paul J. Pfingst, District Attorney, Thomas F. McArdle, Hector M. Jiminez and Anthony Lovett, Deputy
District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.
Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on
behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Gary T. Yancey, District Attorney (Contra Costa) and L. Douglas Pipes, Deputy District Attorney, for
California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
3
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Laura Whitcomb Halgren, Raquel M. Gonzalez and
Patti W. Ranger, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amici Curiae.
4
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
William J. LaFond
550 West C Street, Suite 1790
San Diego, CA  92101
(619) 234-2000
Jo Pastore
Deputy Public Defender
8525 Gibbs Drive, Suite 105
San Diego, CA  92123
(858) 974-5799
Thomas F. McArdle
Deputy District Attorney
330 West Broadway, Suite 920
San Diego, CA  92101
(619) 531-3579