Case Title: State v. Legassie

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 202

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-10-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 202 
Docket: 
Aro-16-188 
Argued: 
February 8, 2017 
 
Decided: 
October 5, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
ANDREW J. LEGASSIE 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  In this appeal, we address the intersection of the digital world of 
social media and our criminal statutes and rules of evidence. 
[¶2]  The victims of the charges at issue here are five teenage girls, 
designated in the trial court’s order as Victims A, B, C, D, and E.1  At the time of 
the alleged offenses, the victims ranged in age from fourteen to seventeen years 
old.  Each victim received from the defendant explicit digital images, which 
were admitted in evidence as State’s Exhibits 2, 5, 6, and 7, and digital messages.  
The trial court found that the defendant confessed to creating those digital 
images and sending them by social media to many young girls, including the 
                                         
1  The trial court order indicates that the defendant was originally charged with committing 
offenses against eight teenage girls.  The trial court entered convictions regarding only five victims, 
and those convictions are at issue in this appeal.   
 
2 
victims.  There is no evidence of any in-person contact that formed the basis of 
the alleged crimes.   
[¶3]  We must decide if the crime of indecent conduct (Class E), 
17-A M.R.S. § 854(1)(B) (2016), can be committed solely through the electronic 
transmission of images of one’s genitals.  We must also decide if M.R. Evid. 1002, 
requiring introduction of original writings, recordings or photographs, when 
available, requires the exclusion of the victims’ testimony about digital 
messages that they received from the defendant. 
[¶4]  Andrew J. Legassie appeals from a judgment of conviction of three 
counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 152(1)(C) (2016); 17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(A) (2014), one count of sexual 
exploitation of a minor (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(A),2 one count of 
attempted sexual abuse of a minor (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 152(1)(E) (2016); 
17-A M.R.S. § 254(1)(A) (2016), and five counts of indecent conduct (Class E), 
17-A M.R.S. § 854(1)(B), following a bench trial in the Superior Court 
                                         
2  Title 17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(A) (2014) has since been amended to, among other things, lower the 
age at which a target of the exploitation ceases to be a “minor” for purposes of the statute from 
eighteen, see 17-A M.R.S. § 281(2) (2016); 17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(A) (2014), to sixteen.  See P.L. 2015, 
ch. 394, § 1 (effective July 29, 2016) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(A) (2016)).  The criminal 
conduct occurred before the effective date of the amendment, and thus the prior version, 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 282(1)(A) (2014), which imported the definition of “minor” from 17-A M.R.S. § 281(2) as a person 
under eighteen, applied. 
 
3 
(Aroostook County, Hunter, J.).  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in 
part and vacate in part and remand for further proceedings. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶5]  In December 2013, Legassie added Victim A as a “friend” on the 
social media platform Facebook and began sending her messages through 
Facebook Messenger.3  At that time, Legassie was twenty-one years old and 
Victim A was fifteen.  Legassie purported to know her from working as a referee 
for her high school team’s basketball games.  In the beginning, the messages 
concerned basketball, but Legassie gradually steered the conversation toward 
sex.  He began by complimenting Victim A on her appearance, moved to asking 
whether she had ever had sex, and then progressed to implying and eventually 
stating explicitly that they should have sex.  He stated in several messages that 
they should meet.  Legassie asked Victim A for pictures of herself, asking her to 
put on a jersey “and have nothing else one [sic] and send me a pic” and “let me 
see them legss [sic] and behind.”  Legassie later sent Victim A a picture of 
himself in his bedroom exposing his genitals.  A computer printout of the 
                                         
3  Facebook Messenger is the messaging application associated with the Facebook social media 
platform.  The format of the messages is analogous to a text message. 
 
4 
Facebook messages exchanged between Legassie and Victim A was produced 
and admitted in evidence.4  
[¶6]  Legassie also added fifteen-year-old Victim B as a Facebook friend 
and sent her messages.  Legassie’s messages advanced to sexual topics; 
Legassie asked Victim B for “naked pictures” of herself and told her he wanted 
to have sex with her.  Legassie sent her the same picture of himself exposing his 
genitals.  After Victim B received the nude picture of Legassie, she removed him 
as a friend on Facebook and deleted the messages that they had exchanged.  
[¶7]  Legassie continued a similar pattern of behavior on Facebook with 
other teenage girls during the same period.  Legassie added seventeen-year-old 
Victim C as a friend on Facebook and sent her four nude photos of himself 
through Facebook Messenger.  He added fourteen-year-old Victim D as a friend, 
sent her messages asking for pictures and eventually for sex, and sent her the 
same nude photos.  Legassie also added Victim E as a friend, sent her messages, 
and asked her for nude photos, and she sent him two photos: one of her breasts 
and one of her genitals.  Victim E was sixteen at the time.  After Victim E sent 
photos of herself, Legassie sent her three of the nude photos of himself, 
including the photo of him exposing his genitals in his bedroom.   
                                         
4  Other victims testified about the messages from memory.  The State did not obtain originals or 
copies of the messages Legassie exchanged with the other victims. 
 
5 
[¶8]  On July 11, 2014, the State charged Legassie by indictment with 
seven counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor (Counts 1-7), one 
count of attempted sexual abuse of a minor (Count 8), twelve counts of indecent 
conduct (Counts 9-18, 26, 28), seven counts of violating a condition of release 
(Counts 19-25), and two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor (Counts 27 
and 29).  
[¶9]  The court held a bench trial on October 13, 2015.  During the trial, 
Legassie objected to testimony by each victim about the content of the 
Facebook messages on the basis that the evidence contravened M.R. Evid. 1002, 
the “Requirement of the Original” rule, also referred to as the “best evidence” 
rule.  In a memorandum submitted after trial, Legassie also argued that the 
evidence of photographs was insufficient to support his convictions for 
indecent conduct because the statute requires that the exposure of genitals 
occur in the physical presence of another.   
[¶10]  In a written decision dated February 25, 2016, the court 
determined that the best evidence rule did not apply because the specific 
content of the messages was not material to the charges; rather, the court found 
that the State’s proof relied on “the general import” of what Legassie wanted 
from the victims and what he sent to them.  The court further found that 
 
6 
Legassie exposed his genitals while in a private place, took a picture, and sent 
that picture to the victims with the intent that they see his genitals.  It concluded 
that he was therefore guilty of the indecent conduct charges.  The court noted 
that the indecent conduct statute’s plain language does not “restrict or limit the 
manner in which [indecent conduct] can be committed.”  The court thus found 
Legassie guilty of three counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, one 
count of sexual exploitation of a minor, one count of attempted sexual abuse of 
a minor, and five counts of indecent conduct.  The court found Legassie not 
guilty of the remaining counts charged in the indictment. 
[¶11]  On March 24, 2016, the court sentenced Legassie to the following:  
• four years, all but nine months and one day suspended with three 
years of probation, on Count 27;  
• thirty days on Count 26, ninety days on Count 6, and thirty days on 
Count 12, to be served concurrently with each other and 
consecutive to the other sentences;  
• sixty days on Count 1, thirty days on Count 8, and thirty days on 
Count 9, to be served concurrently with each other and 
consecutively to Counts 26, 6, and 12;  
• sixty days on Count 2 and thirty days on Count 10, concurrent with 
each other and consecutive to the other sentences; and  
• thirty days on Count 11, to be served consecutively with the other 
sentences.   
 
7 
Following the entry of the judgment, Legassie timely appealed.  See 15 M.R.S. 
§ 2115 (2016); M.R. App. P. 2. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Indecent Conduct 
[¶12]  Legassie argues that the court erred in interpreting the indecent 
conduct statute, 17-A M.R.S. § 854.  The statutory provision pursuant to which 
Legassie was convicted provides that “[a] person is guilty of indecent conduct 
if . . . [i]n a private place, the actor exposes the actor’s genitals with the intent 
that the actor be seen from a public place or from another private place.”  
17-A M.R.S. § 854(1)(B).   
[¶13]  The interpretation of 17-A M.R.S. § 854 is a question of law that we 
review de novo.  State v. Pinkham, 2016 ME 59, ¶ 14, 137 A.3d 203.  We first 
look to the statutory language to discern the Legislature’s intent.  Id.  “We look 
to legislative history and other extraneous aids in interpretation of a statute 
only when we have determined that the statute is ambiguous.”  Carrier v. Sec’y 
of State, 2012 ME 142, ¶ 12, 60 A.3d 1241 (quotation marks omitted).  “A statute 
is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.” Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  “[W]e must construe a statute to preserve its 
constitutionality, or to avoid an unconstitutional application of the statute, if at 
 
8 
all possible.”  Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 19, 41 A.3d 551.  In 
the context of criminal statutes, our interpretation is also “guided by two 
interrelated rules of statutory construction: the rule of lenity, and the rule of 
strict construction . . . .  Pursuant to each of these rules, any ambiguity left 
unresolved by a strict construction of the statute must be resolved in the 
defendant’s favor.”  State v. Lowden, 2014 ME 29, ¶ 15, 87 A.3d 694 (citations 
omitted) (quotation marks omitted).   
[¶14]  Title 17-A M.R.S. § 854 provides in relevant part: 
1.  A person is guilty of indecent conduct if:  
 
A. In a public place:  
 
(1) The actor engages in a sexual act, as defined in 
section 251. Violation of this subparagraph is a Class E 
crime;  
 
(2) The actor knowingly exposes the actor’s genitals 
under circumstances that in fact are likely to cause 
affront or alarm. Violation of this subparagraph is a 
Class E crime;  
 . . . . 
 
B. In a private place, the actor exposes the actor’s genitals 
with the intent that the actor be seen from a public place or 
from another private place. Violation of this paragraph is a 
Class E crime;  
 
C. In a private place, the actor exposes the actor’s genitals 
with the intent that the actor be seen by another person in 
that private place under circumstances that the actor knows 
 
9 
are likely to cause affront or alarm. Violation of this 
paragraph is a Class E crime . . . .  
 
[¶15]  Legassie argues that to prove that his conduct met the statutory 
definition of indecent conduct, the State must prove that he exposed himself in 
the physical presence of the victim.  Legassie therefore contends that proof that 
he merely transmitted a digital photograph of himself to the victims in a 
Facebook message is legally insufficient to support the convictions. 
[¶16]  Although “expose[]” and “see[]” could, construed very broadly, 
apply to Legassie’s conduct, a narrower construction of those same terms could 
be interpreted to fall outside the scope of the statute.  The terms are undefined.  
The Legislature neither expressly extended the statute to cover an exposure 
depicted in a photograph and later seen by the victim, nor specifically restricted 
its scope to an in-person exposure.  Because different reasonable 
interpretations of the statute both do and do not cover Legassie’s conduct, we 
conclude that the statute is ambiguous and thus look to legislative history and 
other extraneous aids to discern the Legislature’s intent.  See Carrier, 2012 ME 
142, ¶ 12, 60 A.3d 1241.  Because we must construe section 854(1)(B) in the 
context of the entire statutory scheme, see Carr v. Bd. of Trs., 643 A.2d 372, 375 
(Me. 1994), and legislative intent relevant to the meaning of “expose[]” and 
“see[]” may be revealed by reference to the amendments to other subsections 
 
10 
that contain the same terms, we consider the legislative history of section 854 
as a whole. 
[¶17]  Indecency statutes can be traced to the common law criminal 
offense of “public indecency.”  See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568 
(1991) (“Public indecency statutes such as the one before us reflect moral 
disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public 
places.”).  “Indecent exposure” has been defined specifically by reference to the 
public nature of the act.  See Indecent Exposure, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014) (“An offensive display of one’s body in public, esp. of the genitals; specif., 
the crime of deliberately showing one’s sex organs in a place where this action 
is likely to offend people.”).  Consistent with the foregoing, Maine’s indecent 
conduct statute has historically been employed to prosecute in-person public 
exposures.  See State v. Robbins, 666 A.2d 85, 86 (Me. 1995); State v. Long, 
577 A.2d 765, 765 (Me. 1990); State v. Works, 537 A.2d 221, 221-22 (Me. 1988); 
State v. Smith, 437 A.2d 639, 640-41 (Me. 1981).   
[¶18]  In 1995, the Legislature changed the title of the offense from 
“public indecency” to “indecent conduct” and added subsection (C).  See P.L. 
1995, ch. 72, § 2 (effective Sept. 29, 1995).  Section 854(1)(C) provides, in 
relevant part, that a person commits indecent conduct if “[i]n a private place, 
 
11 
the actor exposes the actor’s genitals with the intent that the actor be seen by 
another person in that private place under circumstances that the actor knows 
are likely to cause affront or alarm.”  17-A M.R.S. § 854(1)(C).  The Legislature 
thereby extended the reach of the statute from exposures by an actor visible to 
the outside domain—from a public place or another private place—to 
exposures in the private domain where the actor and the victim were in the 
same private place.  Legislative testimony by the representative who proposed 
the 1995 amendment suggests that the Legislature intended to criminalize an 
in-person exposure that would otherwise escape prosecution because the actor 
and the victim were in the same private place.  See An Act to Prohibit Private 
Indecency: Hearing on L.D. 179 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Criminal Justice, 
117th Legis. (1995) (testimony of Rep. William F. Reed).  The legislative record 
further indicates that the “affront or alarm” requirement was included to avoid 
criminalizing consensual private exposures.  See id. (testimony of Marty 
McIntyre, Maine Coalition Against Sexual Assault).   
[¶19]  Except for minor revisions not relevant here, section 854(1)(B) 
has remained unchanged since its initial enactment.  Compare P.L. 1975, 
ch. 499, § 1 (effective Mar. 1, 1976), with 17-A M.R.S. § 854(1)(B).  The 
legislative history contains no affirmative indication that the Legislature 
 
12 
contemplated or intended that the indecent conduct statute could be used to 
prosecute an individual for distributing a nude photograph.   
[¶20]  The Legislature has, however, specifically criminalized the 
dissemination of obscene photographs to minors—a Class C offense that 
appears more directly applicable to Legassie’s conduct and weighs against the 
State’s proposed interpretation.  See 17 M.R.S. § 2911(1)(C), (D) (2016); see also 
State v. Ray, 1999 ME 167, ¶ 7, 741 A.2d 455 (stating that undefined statutory 
terms must be construed “consistent with the overall statutory context” 
(quotation marks omitted)).  
[¶21]  We also note that the State’s interpretation of section 854(1)(B), 
which could subject to criminal liability any individual seen exposing his or her 
genitals by another in person or in a photograph, would present serious 
constitutional problems because section 854(1)(B) contains no “affront or 
alarm” requirement.5  The State’s construction of section 854(1)(B) could 
therefore not only criminalize private behavior between consenting adults, but 
also subject to prosecution individuals who appear in photographs, which 
                                         
5  Although indecency statutes have generally withstood constitutional challenges, those statutes 
include elements that consider state of mind or consent—generally that the defendant’s exposure 
cause offense, annoyance, or alarm.  See State v. Whitaker, 793 P.2d 116, 118 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); 
People v. Randall, 711 P.2d 689, 691-93 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); State v. Bauer, 337 N.W.2d 209, 210 
(Iowa 1983); State v. Bergen, 677 A.2d 145, 146 (N.H. 1996); Commonwealth v. Allsup, 392 A.2d 1309, 
1312 (Pa. 1978); State v. Knight, 285 S.E.2d 401, 404 (W. Va. 1981).  Such provisions have been held 
to remedy constitutional infirmities.  See, e.g., Whitaker, 793 P.2d at 120. 
 
13 
could burden well-established free speech and due process rights.  See 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (recognizing two consenting adults’ 
due process right to engage in homosexual acts in their private lives and 
striking down a criminal sodomy statute); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 
(1997) (“In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it 
perfectly clear that [s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is 
protected by the First Amendment.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(quotation marks omitted)); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 n.8 (1973) 
(“[T]he States have greater power to regulate nonverbal, physical conduct than 
to suppress depictions or descriptions of the same behavior.”). 
[¶22]  Ultimately, because we conclude that the statute does not apply to 
Legassie’s conduct, it is unnecessary to speculate about the various ways in 
which an individual could commit the crime of indecent conduct.  We simply 
conclude, considering the ambiguous legislative history, the rules of lenity and 
strict construction applicable to criminal statutes, and our obligation to avoid, 
if possible, an unconstitutional interpretation of a statute, that as reprehensible 
as Legassie’s behavior was, section 854(1)(B) cannot be stretched to meet the 
facts of this case.6  We hold that a digital photograph transmitted over the 
                                         
6  Whether Legassie could have legitimately been charged with disorderly conduct, 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 501-A (2016), or disseminating obscene materials to a minor, 17 M.R.S. § 2911 (2016), is not before 
 
14 
internet is legally insufficient to constitute an “exposure” pursuant to section 
854(1)(B) and accordingly vacate the convictions for Counts 9, 10, 11, 12, and 
26.  We remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal as to those counts.  
B. 
Best Evidence Rule 
[¶23]  Legassie also argues that the court erred in allowing the victims to 
testify from memory about the digital messages he sent them over Facebook 
Messenger.7  He argues that the State should have introduced the messages in 
evidence if available, and the failure to do so contravened the best evidence 
rule, rendering the victims’ testimony inadmissible. 
  
[¶24]  The trial court concluded that the best evidence rule did not apply 
to the messages because the State was not required to prove the specific words 
or content of the messages, but rather the “tone,” “type,” and “general import” 
of Legassie’s communications with the victims.  We disagree and begin with an 
analysis of the best evidence rule, and then we consider the implications for 
each of the remaining convictions at issue. 
 
                                         
us.  The State represented at oral argument that Legassie was not charged with visual sexual 
aggression against a minor because the victims were fourteen years of age or older.  See 17-A M.R.S. 
§ 256 (2016).  
 
7  In light of our conclusion vacating the indecent conduct convictions, our analysis here is limited 
to the remaining convictions for attempted sexual exploitation of a minor (Counts 1, 2, and 6), 
attempted sexual abuse of a minor (Count 8), and sexual exploitation of a minor (Count 27) involving 
Victim A, Victim B, Victim D, and Victim E. 
 
15 
  
[¶25]  “An original writing . . . is required in order to prove its content 
unless these rules or a statute provides otherwise.”  M.R. Evid. 1002. 
An “original” of a writing or recording means the writing or 
recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect 
by the person who executed or issued it.  For electronically stored 
information, “original” means any printout—or other output 
readable by sight—if it accurately reflects the information.  
 
M.R. Evid. 1001(d). 
[¶26]  There are thus two requirements for the rule to apply: first, that 
the evidence sought to be proved is a “writing” and, second, that the contents 
of that writing are at issue.  See M.R. Evid. 1002, 1004(d) (stating that the rule 
does not apply where the writing “is not closely related to a controlling issue”).  
The content is at issue if “the party seeking to prove a fact is trying to prove 
what a particular writing, recording or photograph says or shows.”  3 Francis 
Wharton, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 15:4 (Barbara E. Bergman et al. eds., 
15th ed. 2016).  “Whether the content is at issue is determined on a 
case-by-case basis.”  Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 578 (D. Md. 
2007) (interpreting the similarly-worded best evidence rule of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, Fed. R. Evid. 1002).   
[¶27]  The justification for the best evidence rule is that it “lessens the 
probability of inaccuracy through human or mechanical error and that it 
 
16 
promotes prevention of fraud.”  Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 1002.1 at 562 
(6th ed. 2007); see also Dalton v. Commonwealth, 769 S.E.2d 698, 703 (Va. Ct. 
App. 2015) (“As a legal term of art, the best evidence rule requires that where 
the contents of a writing are desired to be proved, the writing itself must be 
produced or its absence sufficiently accounted for before other evidence of its 
contents can be admitted.” (quotation marks omitted)).  
[¶28]  The best evidence rule applies not only to documents that are 
required to be in writing, such as a will, but also applies to acts with 
independent significance voluntarily performed in a writing—for example, 
when the claim or matter sought to be proved occurred solely in writing.  
See M.R. Evid. 1002 advisers’ note to 1976 amend. (“Many situations arise 
where the parties choose to perform the event in writing although the law does 
not require it.  For example, a contract may be made or a notice given in writing.  
Here also the original must be produced or accounted for.”). 
[¶29]  The rule has exceptions that relieve a party of the obligation to 
produce the original writing to prove its content.  See M.R. Evid. 1004.  “[T]he 
original is not required if it: (1) was lost or destroyed, absent bad faith; (2) is 
unobtainable; (3) is in the control of the party against whom the document is 
offered; or (4) relates to a collateral matter.”  LDC Gen. Contr. v. LeBlanc, 
 
17 
2006 ME 106, ¶ 7, 907 A.2d 802.  We review the court’s application of the best 
evidence rule for an abuse of discretion.  See id. ¶ 8.  We conclude that the 
Facebook messages were “writings,” that the State sought to prove the content 
of those messages, and that the messages received by the Victims constituted 
“originals.” 
1. 
The Messages Are “Writings” 
[¶30]  The messages clearly fit within the broad definition of a “writing.”8  
See M.R. Evid. 1001(a) (“A ‘writing’ consists of letters, words, numbers, or their 
equivalent set down in any form.”); M.R. Evid. 1001 advisers’ note to 1976 
amend. (“[T]he rule includes sophisticated methods of data compilation, 
storage, and retrieval.”); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 233 & n.9 (7th ed. 2016) 
                                         
8  A majority of state and federal courts, applying similarly-worded versions of the rule, have 
concluded that electronically-transmitted communications such as emails or text messages 
constitute writings and that when a party seeks to prove at trial what the communication said, the 
original or a copy must be produced or accounted for before secondary evidence may be admitted.  
See United States v. Harry, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1194-99, 1227 (D.N.M. 2013) (holding that the best 
evidence rule applied to text messages sent by the defendant to a witness containing admissions that 
he committed an assault the previous night), modified on other grounds by No. CR 10-1915 JB, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74272 (D.N.M. May 13, 2013); Rodriguez v. State, 449 S.W.3d 306, 311-13 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2014) (concluding that a picture of a text message, where there was evidence from the victim 
that the message had been deleted and testimony from a cellular representative that the original 
message contents were not stored by the company, complied with the rule); State v. Espiritu, 176 P.3d 
885, 892-93 (Haw. 2008) (holding that threatening text messages sent by the defendant to the victim 
were a writing, but allowing testimony as to their content because evidence supported the conclusion 
that the messages were unavailable); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding that the best evidence rule applied to messages sent in an internet chat room supporting a 
charge for attempted child solicitation), abrogated on other grounds by Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 
1201, 1206 n.9 (Ind. 2007) (superseded by statute, Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5 (2007)); Dalton v. 
Commonwealth, 769 S.E.2d 698, 703-04 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that the best evidence rule 
applied to a text message arranging a drug transaction). 
 
18 
(stating that “writing” is broadly defined to include digital evidence such as text 
messages).  
2. 
The Content of the Messages 
[¶31]  In this case, the nature of Legassie’s conduct and the evidence 
adduced at trial lead us to the inescapable conclusion that the State sought to 
prove the content of the messages.  Legassie is alleged to have committed the 
crimes with which he was charged entirely through the words communicated 
in the messages; it was therefore only by proving the content of the messages 
that the State could prove that Legassie “[k]nowing or intending that the 
conduct will be photographed . . . intentionally or knowingly employ[ed], 
solicit[ed], entice[d], persuade[d], use[d] or compel[led] another person, not 
that person’s spouse, who is in fact a minor, to engage in sexually explicit 
conduct.”  17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(A); cf. Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1159 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the best evidence rule applied to messages 
sent in an internet chat room supporting a charge for attempted child 
solicitation).9 
[¶32]  At trial, although the State did not have to prove that Legassie 
employed any particular legally operative words to prove each element of the 
                                         
9  Laughner was abrogated on other grounds by Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 n.9 
(Ind. 2007).  Fajardo was itself later superseded by statute, Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5. 
 
19 
offenses, the evidence supporting the convictions—the victims’ testimony—
derived entirely from the victims’ knowledge and recollection of the content of 
the messages.  Cf. 3 Francis Wharton, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 15:4 
(illustrating that the best evidence rule does not bar testimony by a witness 
about facts set forth in a writing if the witness has independent personal 
knowledge of those facts that is not derived from a review of the writing).  In 
other words, without describing the very content of the messages Legassie sent, 
the victims would not have been able to testify about what he communicated to 
them in the messages. 
3. 
The Messages are “Originals” 
[¶33]  Each of the messages that the victims received is an “original” as 
set forth in M.R. Evid. 1001(d) in two respects.  First, each message was a 
“counterpart intended to have the same effect by” the author, Legassie.  M.R. 
Evid. 1001(d).  Second, because each message constituted “electronically stored 
information,” the rule treats “any printout” of such data as an “original,” so long 
as the content of the printout “accurately reflects the information.”  Id. 
(emphasis added); see also Bank of Am. v. Barr, 2010 ME 124, ¶ 21 & n.4, 9 A.3d 
816 (concluding that electronically-stored records created by a bank and 
 
20 
printed out by a third-party contractor met the definition of an “original” 
pursuant to Rule 1001).10 
[¶34]  Depending on the content sought to be proved and the nature of 
the writing, multiple “originals” can be at issue in a single case.  See LeBlanc, 
2006 ME 106, ¶ 9, 907 A.2d 802 (concluding that both an “original” credit card 
bill and annotated copies of the bill constituted an “original” because both were 
sought to be proved).  The fact that Legassie created the messages does not 
mean that the messages created and perhaps stored in Legassie’s Facebook 
account are the only “originals.”  As stated in Maine’s leading treatise on 
evidence, “[t]he nature of an original in the sense used in the best evidence rule 
may be very different from the ordinary lay usage.  The layperson calls the 
paper first produced in chronological succession the original and later 
reproductions of the paper copies or duplicates.  Under the rule, the chronology 
is not decisive.  An original is the document the contents of which are to be 
proved.”  Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 1001.1 at 559 (emphasis added).   
[¶35]  The focus of the State’s proof, as elicited from the victims’ 
testimony, was what Legassie communicated through written text in the 
                                         
10  Accordingly, because Legassie does not dispute the accuracy of the printout of messages that 
Victim A received from Legassie that were admitted as Exhibit 1, the printout was an “original” for 
the purposes of the rule. 
 
21 
messages that the victims received through Facebook.  Although it is accurate 
to state that the messages originated from Legassie’s Facebook account, once 
the messages were sent, two “originals” were generated simultaneously—one 
retrievable from the sender’s Facebook account and one retrievable from the 
recipient’s account.11  At the time that the messages were sent and received, 
they would have been electronically stored and accessible on any device with 
an internet connection with access to either Legassie’s or the victims’ Facebook 
accounts.   
  
[¶36]  An “original writing” is simply a shorthand term for the best 
evidence to prove the contents of a writing, when, as here, the contents are 
being challenged or questioned.  At trial, the State offered the testimony of the 
victims’ recollection of the content of the messages that the victims received to 
establish that Legassie “intentionally or knowingly employ[ed], solicit[ed], 
entice[d], persuade[d], use[d] or compel[led]” them “to engage in sexually 
explicit conduct.”  17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(A).  The victims’ testimony, recounted 
                                         
11  A number of courts have concluded that an electronic communication received from an 
opposing party is not merely a copy or duplicate, but rather constitutes an “original” unto itself.  See 
Greco v. Velvet Cactus, LLC, No. 13-3514, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87778, at *8 (E.D. La. June 27, 2014) 
(treating email printouts that reproduced text messages exchanged between the parties as an 
“original” for purposes of the rule); Espiritu, 176 P.3d at  892 (holding that text messages received by 
a victim that were sent by the defendant constituted an “original”); Laughner, 769 N.E.2d at 1159 
(concluding that internet chat room messages received by an undercover police officer posing as a 
child, which were copied into a word processing document and printed, constituted “original” 
writings). 
 
22 
in their recollections nearly two years after Legassie sent and the victims 
received and read the messages, was clearly not the best evidence to prove their 
content.   
  
[¶37]  Because Legassie’s messages constituted writings and the State 
sought to prove their content, the State was required to introduce the original 
messages if available, or, in the alternative, make a showing that the messages 
could not be obtained before offering secondary evidence in the form of witness 
testimony.  See M.R. Evid. 1004. 
  
4. 
Exception to the Rule: M.R. Evid. 1004(c) 
[¶38]  An original writing is not required to prove its content where 
“[t]he party against whom the original would be offered had control of the 
original; was at that time put on notice, by pleadings or otherwise, that the 
original would be a subject of proof at the trial or hearing; and fails to produce 
it at the trial or hearing.”  M.R. Evid. 1004(c).  We have applied M.R. Evid. 
1004(c) where the “original” writing is in the physical control of the party that 
lodges an objection based on the best evidence rule to secondary evidence 
regarding the writing’s content.  See Graybar Elec. Co. v. Sawyer, 485 A.2d 1384, 
1387 (Me. 1985).  In Sawyer, the defendant objected to the admission of a 
carbon copy of a letter that the plaintiff had purportedly sent to the defendant.  
 
23 
See id.  We concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting a carbon copy of the letter because the “original” letter was sent to 
the defendant, and assuming that he received it, the defendant had control of 
the only original, warranting application of the Rule 1004(c) exception, which 
allowed the content of the letter to be proved by the carbon copy.  Id. at 
1387-88.  
[¶39]  “All preliminary matters which must be established to make 
secondary evidence admissible [pursuant to Rule 1004] are questions of fact 
for the [trial] court . . . .”  State v. Lewis, 373 A.2d 603, 611 (Me. 1977).  The 
burden of proof to establish that a Rule 1004 exception applies is on the party 
seeking to prove the content of the original, here, the State.  See Barrows v. IRS, 
231 B.R. 446, 450 (D.N.H. 1998).  The State thus had the burden to establish 
that (1) Legassie had “control of the original,” and that (2) he was placed on 
notice “by pleadings or otherwise” that the State would seek to prove the 
content of the original at trial.  See M.R. Evid. 1004(c). 
[¶40]  Rule 1004(c) does not apply in this case as a matter of fact and law, 
for several reasons.  First, the trial court did not make the necessary findings 
for that exception to apply, and even if those findings were made, they would 
lack record support.  Additionally, unlike in Sawyer, Legassie was not in control 
 
24 
of the only “original.”  See Sawyer, 485 A.2d at 1387.  The State sought to prove 
the content of the messages that the victims received from Legassie, and those 
messages also meet the definition of an “original.”  See M.R. Evid. 1001(d).  
Consistent with the plain language of the Maine Rules of Evidence, the State was 
required to produce the original messages or demonstrate an exception to the 
best evidence rule to be able to try to prove the content of the messages through 
the victims’ testimony.  Finally, given the burden of proof and discovery in 
criminal cases, and the constitutional protections against self-incrimination, 
Legassie was not obligated to produce his messages before asserting an 
objection based on the best evidence rule. 
[¶41]  In sum, the State sought to prove the content of the messages that 
the victims received. Those messages constituted “originals,” see M.R. 
Evid. 1001(d), that were not in Legassie’s “control.”   
5. 
Application to Victim A, Victim B, Victim D, and Victim E12 
[¶42]  The best evidence rule applies to the Facebook messages, but the 
consequences with respect to each conviction vary.  The State introduced, and 
the court admitted, a printout from Victim A’s computer of the messages that 
                                         
12  We do not analyze the trial court’s application of the best evidence rule as to Victim C because 
the only conviction involving messages Legassie sent to her was for indecent conduct (Count 11).  See 
supra n.7. 
 
25 
Victim A exchanged with Legassie.  At trial, Legassie used the messages to 
cross-examine and impeach Victim A’s testimony.  Legassie argues that the 
State was required to produce the “original” messages from his device or 
Facebook account, and that Victim A should not have been permitted to testify 
about the content of the messages.  As we have already discussed, the message 
on Victim A’s device is an “original” of the content of the message that she 
received.  To the extent that Legassie argues that the printout is not an 
“original” and the trial court should not have admitted it, there was no error 
because Legassie does not dispute the accuracy of the content of the printout of 
the messages.  See State v. Degen, 552 A.2d 2, 4 (Me. 1988) (holding that the 
admission of testimony that violated the best evidence rule was harmless error 
because the defendant did not allege that the photocopied notes summarizing 
test results were inaccurate).  In contrast, with respect to the other victims, the 
messages were not produced and admitted in evidence, and Legassie disputes 
their contents.  
[¶43]  As to Victim B, although the court ultimately concluded that the 
rule did not apply, the court also found that the messages were no longer in 
existence or available and stated that Victim B’s testimony was admissible 
 
26 
pursuant to M.R. Evid. 1004.13  Because there was competent record evidence 
to support the conclusion that the messages met the exception for writings that 
are “lost or destroyed,” see M.R. Evid. 1004(a), the court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting Victim B to testify about the content of the messages.  
See State v. Robinson, 2015 ME 77, ¶ 23, 118 A.3d 242 (“Once the requirements 
of M.R. Evid. 1004 [are] met, any type of secondary evidence, not otherwise 
inadmissible, becomes admissible.” (alteration in original) (quotation marks 
omitted)); State v. Young, 560 A.2d 1095, 1096-97 (Me. 1989) (affirming a trial 
court’s admission of testimony about the contents of love letters sent by 
defendant to victim because the evidence met the M.R. Evid. 1004(a) 
exception). 
[¶44]  The court’s admission of Victim A’s messages and Victim B’s 
testimony complied with M.R. Evid. 1002 and 1004.  There was therefore 
sufficient competent evidence for the court to find Legassie guilty of Counts 1, 
2, and 8.  
[¶45]  We reach a different conclusion as to Victims D and E.  Each 
testified from memory about the content of the messages that she received 
                                         
13  The court stated “[i]n the event one might conclude that the ‘best evidence rule’ was implicated, 
the court is satisfied that the ‘second best evidence’ of content that [Victim B] provided would be 
admissible pursuant to M.R. Evid. 1004.”  
 
27 
from Legassie.  Legassie made a timely objection under the best evidence rule 
in each instance, and the trial court overruled the objections.  Unlike with 
Victim A, printouts of Legassie’s messages received by Victims D and E were not 
produced or admitted in evidence, and unlike with Victim B, the court did not 
expressly find that those messages were “lost or destroyed.”  See M.R. 
Evid. 1004(a).  The trial court instead concluded that the rule did not apply at 
all, and made no preliminary factual findings that would excuse the State’s 
failure to introduce the messages and permit the use of secondary evidence.  
See M.R. Evid. 1004(a); Lewis, 373 A.2d at 611 (“All preliminary matters which 
must be established to make secondary evidence admissible [pursuant to Rule 
1004] are questions of fact for the [trial] court . . . .”).  
[¶46]  As a general rule, where, as here, neither party requested further 
findings of fact, we will assume that the trial court made any findings necessary 
to support the judgment, provided that the findings are supported by 
competent record evidence.  See M.R.U. Crim. P. 23(c); State v. Brown, 2017 ME 
59 ¶ 17, 158 A.3d 501.  The circumstances of this case, however, prevent us 
from assuming that such findings were made as to the availability of the 
messages received by Victims D and E.  Because the court expressly concluded 
that the best evidence rule did not apply, which would necessarily include any 
 
28 
exception under M.R. Evid. 1004, we can only assume that the court chose not 
to consider, and thus would not have made, any findings that the messages sent 
by Legassie to Victims D and E were lost, destroyed or otherwise unavailable.  
See M.R. Evid. 1004(a); cf Spangler v. Memel, 498 P.2d 1055, 1063 n.10 (Cal. 
1972) (“Since we have concluded that section 580b [of the California Code of 
Civil Procedure] does not apply, we need not consider possible exceptions to its 
applicability.”); Pa. Mfrs. Indem. Co. v. Air Power, Inc., No. 1:13CV217, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 52343, at *25 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 16, 2014) (“Because the . . . rule does 
not apply in this case, the Court need not consider whether the . . . exception to 
the . . . rule applies.”).  
[¶47]  Even if the application of Rule 23(c) is appropriate here because a 
request for further findings was not made, a close review of the record reveals 
that there is insufficient evidence to support an express or implied finding, 
pursuant to M.R. Evid. 1004(a), that the messages Victim D allegedly received 
from Legassie were lost or destroyed.  Because the testimony of Victim D was 
the only direct evidence that Legassie committed the offenses of sexual 
exploitation of a minor and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, and 
because that testimony was admitted in contravention of the best evidence 
rule, the State failed in its proof.  We accordingly vacate the remaining 
 
29 
conviction involving Victim D, attempted sexual exploitation of a minor 
(Count 6) and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal as to that conviction.  
See State v. Sudsbury, 2016 ME 25, ¶ 5, 132 A.3d 863; State v. Howes, 432 A.2d 
419, 425-26 (Me. 1981). 
[¶48]  In contrast, there is some evidence in the record that may bear 
upon the availability of the messages sent to Victim E.14  However, because the 
court affirmatively determined that the best evidence rule did not apply, we 
cannot speculate whether, had it applied the Rule, the court would have 
permitted the use of secondary evidence or whether it would have reached a 
different decision as to the charge of sexual exploitation of a minor (Count 27).  
Accordingly, we vacate the remaining conviction on that charge involving 
Victim E and remand to the trial court to review the record in this case to 
determine whether, applying the best evidence rule, M.R. Evid. 1001, 1002, 
1004, the State met its burden to prove that Legassie committed that offense.   
C. 
Sentencing 
[¶49]  Because we vacate the convictions on Counts 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 
26 and remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal on those counts, and also 
                                         
14  That evidence included testimony that Victim E, assisted by a law enforcement officer, had 
attempted and failed to recover her messages with Legassie from her cell phone, and that Victim E 
discovered that Legassie had blocked her access to his messages. 
 
30 
vacate the conviction on Count 27 and remand for the court to review the 
record and determine whether the State met its burden as to the charge in 
Count 27, we also remand this case with instructions for the trial court to 
determine whether those convictions may have influenced the court’s 
sentencing as to Counts 1, 2, and 8.  If so, we further direct the court to 
resentence Legassie “after a new sentencing proceeding at which both 
[Legassie] and the State may be heard.”  State v. Lacourse, 2017 ME 75, ¶ 17, 
159 A.3d 847 (quotation marks omitted).   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed as to Counts 3, 4, 5, 7, 13, 14, 
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, and 
29.  Judgment vacated as to Counts 6, 9, 10, 11, 
12, 26 and 27.  The matter is remanded with 
instructions to (i) enter a judgment of acquittal 
as to Counts 6, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 26; (ii) enter a 
judgment as to Count 27 after reviewing the trial 
record applying the best evidence rule to 
determine whether the State met its burden of 
proof as to the offense charged in Count 27; and 
(iii) reconsider the sentence and, if warranted, 
resentence defendant on Counts 1, 2, and 8 
consistently with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
Alan F. Harding, Esq. (orally), Hardings Law Office, Presque Isle, for appellant 
Andrew J. Legassie 
 
James Mitchell, Assistant District Attorney (orally), Prosecutorial District 8, 
Caribou, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
Aroostook County Superior Court docket number CR-2014-190 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY