Case Title: Doubek v. Kaul

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP000704

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2022-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
2022 WI 31 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP704 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Daniel Doubek, 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
     v. 
Joshua Kaul, 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 20, 2022   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 9, 2021   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
Kendall M. Kelley   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
court. KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring opinion.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the Petitioner-Appellant there were briefs filed by 
John R. Monroe and John Monroe Law, P.C. There was an oral 
argument by John R. Monroe.  
 
For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Brian P. Keenan, assistant attorney general; with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Brian P. Keenan. 
 
 
 
 
 
2022 WI 31 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP704 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV1350) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Daniel Doubek, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Joshua Kaul, 
 
          Respondent-Respondent. 
FILED 
 
MAY 20, 2022 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous 
Court.  KAROFSKY, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court 
for Brown County, Kendall M. Kelley, Judge.  Reversed and cause 
remanded. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.    Wisconsin law provides that an 
individual who is prohibited from possessing a firearm under 
federal law may not hold a license to carry a concealed weapon 
(CCW license).  Federal law, in turn, prohibits firearm 
possession for anyone who has been convicted of a "misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence" under state or federal law.  In this 
case, we address whether a conviction for disorderly conduct 
No. 
2020AP704 
 
2 
 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 947.01(1) 
(2019-20)1 
qualifies 
as 
a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.  We hold that disorderly 
conduct is not a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 
federal law, and therefore does not disqualify a person from 
holding a CCW license. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
In 1993, Daniel Doubek broke into his estranged wife's 
trailer waving a 2x4 and shouting threats.  He was convicted of 
disorderly conduct in violation of Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1)——a 
misdemeanor offense.2  More than two decades later, in 2016, 
Doubek applied for and received a CCW license from the 
Department of Justice (DOJ).  In 2019, DOJ conducted an audit 
and determined that Doubek was prohibited from possessing a CCW 
license based on his 1993 misdemeanor conviction.  According to 
DOJ, 
Doubek's 
conviction 
constituted 
a 
disqualifying 
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" under federal law.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).  DOJ revoked Doubek's CCW license and 
sent a letter notifying him of its decision.  Doubek petitioned 
for judicial review pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 175.60(14m).  The 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2019-20 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 When Doubek was convicted, disorderly conduct was defined 
at Wis. Stat. § 947.01 (1991-92).  The crime has since been 
renumbered to Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1) but remains otherwise 
identical to the prior version.  See 2011 Wis. Act 35, § 85.  We 
therefore cite to the 2019-20 version of the statute throughout 
this opinion. 
No. 
2020AP704 
 
3 
 
circuit court upheld DOJ's revocation of Doubek's CCW license.3  
The court of appeals certified the case to us, and we accepted 
the certification.4 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
¶3 
When DOJ revokes a CCW license, a reviewing court 
"shall reverse" if, among other reasons, DOJ "erroneously 
interpreted a provision of law and a correct interpretation 
compels a different action."  Wis. Stat. § 175.60(14m)(f).  We 
consider 
whether 
Doubek's 
revocation 
was 
consistent 
with 
§ 175.60, the statute governing CCW licensing.  That statute 
incorporates a federal firearms prohibition, which in turn 
relies on state penal law.  Our interpretation of these statutes 
presents a question of law we review independently.  Serv. Emps. 
Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶28, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 
N.W.2d 35.  In interpreting federal statutes, we are bound by 
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation.  James v. City 
of Boise, 577 U.S. 306, 307 (2016) (per curiam). 
                                                 
3 The Honorable Kendall M. Kelley of the Brown County 
Circuit Court presided. 
4 The court of appeals certified the following question: 
Are Evans v. DOJ, 2014 WI App 31, 353 Wis. 2d 289, 844 
N.W.2d 403, and Leonard v. State, 2015 WI App 57, 364 
Wis. 2d 491, 868 N.W.2d 186, "good law" in light of 
the United States Supreme Court's decision in United 
States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014)? 
As explained below, we overrule Evans.  We decline to address 
Leonard, however, because it is unnecessary to resolve Doubek's 
petition. 
No. 
2020AP704 
 
4 
 
 
A.  CCW Licensing 
¶4 
CCW licensing in Wisconsin is regulated in large part 
though Wis. Stat. § 175.60.  Among other things, this section 
governs when a CCW license shall or shall not issue, what an 
applicant must do to qualify for a license, when a licensee is 
authorized to carry a concealed weapon, and the processes DOJ 
must follow in administering the CCW program.  Relevant here, 
§ 175.60(3)(b) provides that DOJ may not issue a license to an 
individual that "is prohibited under federal law from possessing 
a firearm that has been transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce."  And, if a prohibited individual holds a license 
despite that prohibition, § 175.60(14)(a) directs that DOJ 
"shall revoke a license issued under this section if the 
department determines that sub. (3)(b) . . . applies to the 
licensee."  Taken together, these provisions direct DOJ to deny 
or revoke a CCW license anytime federal law bars the would-be 
licensee from possessing a firearm. 
 
B.  Federal Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence Prohibition 
¶5 
In 
this 
case, 
that 
federal 
law 
is 
18 
U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(9), which prohibits anyone convicted of a "misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence" from possessing a firearm.5  A 
                                                 
5 In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . .  
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or 
No. 
2020AP704 
 
5 
 
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" is not itself a 
standalone crime.  Rather it refers to a class of crimes as 
defined one section earlier: 
[T]he term "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" 
means an offense that—— 
(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal 
law; and 
(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of 
physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly 
weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, 
parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with 
whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person 
who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the 
victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a 
person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or 
guardian of the victim. 
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). 
¶6 
Doubek's crime was a misdemeanor under Wisconsin law, 
satisfying clause (i) of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).  Clause (ii) 
includes two criteria.  United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 
421 (2009).  First, the misdemeanor must "in fact" have been 
committed by someone who had a specified, domestic relationship 
with the victim.  Id.  This criterion depends on the facts 
underlying the conviction, not the elements of the charged 
misdemeanor.  Id. at 426.  The victim of Doubek's crime was his 
wife, and thus, the first criterion is undisputed.  Our focus is 
therefore on the second criterion of clause (ii). 
                                                                                                                                                             
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or 
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition 
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or 
foreign commerce. 
No. 
2020AP704 
 
6 
 
¶7 
The second criterion requires that the misdemeanor 
have "as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, 
or the threatened use of a deadly weapon."  18 U.S.C. 
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).  The key here is that the misdemeanor must 
have either the force component or the deadly weapon component 
as an essential element of the crime; this does not depend on 
the facts underlying any specific conviction.  Hayes, 555 
U.S. at 421.  Under this "categorical approach"——as the Court 
has termed it——the focus is "solely on whether the elements of 
the crime of conviction sufficiently match the elements" of the 
relevant federal statute, "while ignoring the particular facts 
of the case."  Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 504 
(2016).  The question is thus whether the elements of the 
statutorily defined misdemeanor itself, apart from the facts 
giving rise to it, include the use of physical force, the 
attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a 
deadly weapon. 
¶8 
Sometimes 
the 
task 
of 
comparing 
elements 
is 
complicated by the use of a list in the statute defining the 
relevant misdemeanor.  When that happens, the United States 
Supreme Court instructs us to determine whether the statute is 
indivisible or divisible, and then analyze whether the relevant 
elements match the applicable federal law.  Id. at 504-06. 
¶9 
An 
indivisible 
statute 
"sets 
out 
a 
single 
(or 
'indivisible') set of elements to define a single crime."  
Id. at 504-05.  When an indivisible statute contains a list of 
alternatives, it "enumerates various factual means of committing 
No. 
2020AP704 
 
7 
 
a single element."  Id. at 506.  Thus, a "jury could convict 
even if some jurors" thought the conduct satisfied one of the 
listed factual means while others concluded it satisfied 
another, "so long as all agreed" the conduct met one or more of 
the enumerated factual means.  Id.  Because an indivisible 
statute defines only one crime, no recourse to case records is 
needed to determine what type of conduct gave rise to the 
conviction.  A court simply "lines up that crime's elements 
alongside those of the [federal law] and sees if they match."  
Id. at 505.  This is the standard application of the categorical 
approach.  Id. at 504-05. 
¶10 Divisible statutes, on the other hand, "list elements 
in the alternative, and thereby define multiple crimes."  Id. at 
505.  When faced with a divisible statute, courts use a 
"modified categorical approach" and look "to a limited class of 
documents (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or 
plea agreement and colloquy) to determine what crime, with what 
elements, a defendant was convicted of."  Id. at 505-06.  The 
court then compares that specific crime to the relevant federal 
statute to see if they match.  Id. at 506. 
¶11 In this case, to determine whether Doubek's prior 
conviction constituted a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, 
we must analyze whether the statute he was convicted under is 
indivisible or divisible. 
 
No. 
2020AP704 
 
8 
 
C.  Wisconsin's Disorderly Conduct Statute 
¶12 Doubek's prior conviction was for disorderly conduct 
under Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1).  Doubek argues disorderly conduct 
does not have as a necessary element of the crime the actual or 
attempted use of physical force or the threatened use of a 
deadly weapon.  He is correct. 
¶13 Wisconsin's disorderly conduct statute provides: 
Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in 
violent, 
abusive, 
indecent, 
profane, 
boisterous, 
unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct 
under circumstances in which the conduct tends to 
cause or provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B 
misdemeanor. 
Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1).  Under this language, a person is guilty 
of this misdemeanor if:  (1) the defendant engaged "in violent, 
abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or 
otherwise disorderly conduct," (2) under circumstances that tend 
"to cause or provoke a disturbance."  Id.; see also State v. 
Breitzman, 2017 WI 100, ¶57, 378 Wis. 2d 431, 904 N.W.2d 93. 
¶14 The key interpretive question is whether "violent" and 
"boisterous" conduct, for example, are simply alternative 
factual circumstances that satisfy one of the two elements of 
disorderly conduct, or whether violent disorderly conduct is a 
different crime than boisterous disorderly conduct.  Resting on 
a plain reading of the statute, we conclude Wisconsin's 
disorderly conduct statute is indivisible, and enumerates 
different means of committing the same crime.  The language of 
Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1) is most naturally read as creating a 
single crime of disorderly conduct, while listing alternative 
No. 
2020AP704 
 
9 
 
means to satisfy its first element.  The focus of the list is 
any type of conduct that is disorderly.  This is particularly 
seen by the inclusion of a general catchall term at the end:  
"violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably 
loud or otherwise disorderly conduct."  § 947.01(1) (emphasis 
added).  This phrasing suggests the first six types of conduct 
listed are examples of conduct that qualify as disorderly, not 
alternative elements establishing distinct crimes.  Were it 
otherwise, the statute would create a crime of "otherwise 
disorderly conduct"——a crime that would not make much sense 
since it would necessarily include the six types of conduct that 
come before.  Nothing in the grammar or structure of the list 
separates the listed behaviors in a way that would suggest it 
codifies seven different crimes.  The most straightforward 
understanding of § 947.01(1)'s text is that it provides a non-
exhaustive list of means by which the single crime of disorderly 
conduct may be committed. 
¶15 This understanding of the statute is in harmony with 
how it has long been interpreted.  Our cases have consistently 
described disorderly conduct as having "two elements"——the 
"first element being that the defendants engaged in disorderly 
conduct, and the second element being that such conduct tended 
to cause or provoke a disturbance."  State v. Zwicker, 41 
Wis. 2d 497, 514, 164 N.W.2d 512 (1969); see also Breitzman, 378 
Wis. 2d 431, ¶57.  It would be a marked departure to read 
§ 947.01(1) as creating seven different crimes. 
No. 
2020AP704 
 
10 
 
¶16 The jury instructions are in accord.  They describe 
disorderly conduct as a single "offense" with "two elements."  
Wis. JI——Criminal 1900, at 1 (2018).  An included note likewise 
describes the various types of conduct as means to prove a 
single offense:  "The Committee recommends selecting one of the 
terms [from the list] where possible, but believes it is proper 
to instruct on all alternatives that are supported by the 
evidence."  Id. at 4.  Nowhere do the jury instructions suggest 
there are seven separate disorderly conduct crimes, or that each 
version may be charged separately. 
¶17 Finally, this appears to be how the statute has been 
applied in day-to-day practice as well.  In this case, for 
example, Doubek's 1993 conviction was for "violent, abusive and 
otherwise disorderly conduct."  Yet, Doubek was charged and 
convicted of only one count of disorderly conduct, not three.  
Other cases reveal the same pattern.  See, e.g., Leonard v. 
State, 2015 WI App 57, ¶22, 364 Wis. 2d 491, 868 N.W.2d 186 
(same); Evans v. Wis. Dept. of Just., 2014 WI App 31, ¶12 n.3, 
353 Wis. 2d 289, 844 N.W.2d 403 (same). 
¶18 In Evans, however, the court of appeals addressed the 
divisibility of the disorderly conduct statute in the same 
context and reached a different conclusion.  It held that the 
violent conduct component of a disorderly conduct conviction 
under Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1) could constitute a separate element 
of the crime, depending on how it was charged.  353 Wis. 2d 289, 
¶¶8-20.  Evans is not consistent with the analytical framework 
clarified in recent United States Supreme Court cases and 
No. 
2020AP704 
 
11 
 
described 
above. 
 
We 
conclude 
Evans 
must 
be 
overruled; 
§ 947.01(1) is an indivisible statute subject to the standard 
categorical approach.  See State v. Yakich, 2022 WI 8, ¶31, 400 
Wis. 2d 549, 970 N.W.2d 12 ("[W]e are not bound by court of 
appeals decisions.  As the state's highest court, we interpret 
legal questions independently."). 
 
D.  Application 
¶19 Turning to Doubek's petition, we start from our 
conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1) is indivisible, defining 
only one crime.  Therefore, by way of reminder, we look to the 
two elements of § 947.01(1)——and not to the facts of Doubek's 
particular conviction——to determine if it is a "misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A).  
Recall that a crime qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence only if it "has, as an element, the use or attempted 
use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly 
weapon."  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).  And under § 947.01(1), 
a person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:  (1) the defendant 
engaged "in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, 
unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct," (2) under 
circumstances that tend "to cause or provoke a disturbance." 
¶20 While one could be convicted of disorderly conduct for 
conduct involving the use or attempted use of physical force or 
the threatened use of a deadly weapon, the statute does not make 
such conduct an element of the crime that must always be proven.  
A person may be convicted of disorderly conduct for all kinds of 
No. 
2020AP704 
 
12 
 
conduct that does not involve the use or attempted physical 
force or threatened use of a deadly weapon——for example, profane 
or unreasonably loud behavior.  Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1); see also 
State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, ¶3, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 
N.W.2d 725 (holding that written speech can satisfy the elements 
of disorderly conduct).  In short, the crime of disorderly 
conduct defined in § 947.01(1) is a single indivisible crime 
that does not require the use or attempted use of physical force 
or the threatened use of a deadly weapon as an element, even if 
that conduct could serve as the basis for a disorderly conduct 
conviction.  It is therefore not a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence under federal law. 
¶21 Accordingly, DOJ revoked Doubek's CCW license on the 
basis of an erroneous interpretation of law.  We therefore 
reverse the circuit court's decision affirming DOJ's action.  
See Wis. Stat. § 175.60(14m)(f)2. (directing that a court "shall 
reverse" if DOJ "erroneously interpreted a provision of law and 
a correct interpretation compels a different action").6 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶22 DOJ improperly revoked Doubek's CCW license based on 
its incorrect view that Doubek was prohibited from possessing 
                                                 
6 Doubek makes two additional arguments.  First, he 
maintains that "violent" disorderly conduct does not necessarily 
involve physical force against a person.  Second, he argues for 
reversal based on his claim that DOJ failed to file a timely 
answer pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 175.60(14m)(d).  Because we 
reverse on other grounds, we do not reach these issues. 
No. 
2020AP704 
 
13 
 
firearms under federal law.  We reverse the circuit court's 
decision affirming the revocation and remand to the circuit 
court to provide Doubek the appropriate relief.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 175.60(14m)(g). 
By the Court.——The judgment and order of the circuit court 
is reversed and the cause remanded. 
No.  2020AP704.jjk 
 
1 
 
¶23 JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   (concurring).  Late in the 
evening on August 21, 1993, Doubek's estranged wife was in her 
home alone with their four-year-old daughter.  While talking 
with her sister on the phone, the line suddenly went dead.  
Minutes later, Doubek broke through the front door, punching a 
hole in the glass so he could unlock it from the inside.  
Without his wife's permission, Doubek entered her home armed 
with a 2x4 slab of lumber.  Raising the 2x4 above his head, he 
told his wife she "was dead."  She asked her husband to leave 
and then went to the door, yelling out to her neighbors for 
help.  Doubek threatened that if she did not move away from the 
door, he would "let her have it."  The two eventually went 
outside to avoid waking their young daughter.  Once outside, 
Doubek told his wife he did not care what would happen to him if 
he killed her, even if it meant he lost custody of their 
daughter.  About 30 minutes later, Doubek left. 
¶24 Based on these facts, Doubek was found guilty of 
disorderly conduct, a criminal misdemeanor.1  And here, that 
misdemeanor qualifies as an act of domestic abuse under 
Wisconsin law because it involved: (1) a physical act——Doubek 
raising a 2x4 above his head while telling his wife she "was 
dead" and that he'd "let her have it"; (2) against his wife; and 
(3) that may have caused her to reasonably fear imminent 
                                                 
1 Wis. Stat. § 947.01(1) ("Whoever, in a public or private 
place, 
engages 
in 
violent, 
abusive, 
indecent, 
profane, 
boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly conduct 
under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or 
provoke a disturbance is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor."). 
No.  2020AP704.jjk 
 
2 
 
intentional infliction of physical pain or injury.2  Yet, despite 
Doubek's conviction for a misdemeanor crime that constituted 
domestic violence, the majority opinion is correct:  under 
federal law, his conviction is not a "misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence."  See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33).  Consequently, 
Doubek may continue to possess and conceal a firearm on his 
person. 
¶25 Though legally correct, this result is as nonsensical 
as it is dangerous.  In the realm of domestic violence, threats 
to kill, like the one Doubek made to his wife, more than double 
the risk of femicide.3  So while threats may not constitute 
"violence" in the generic sense, 
an act of this nature is easy to describe as "domestic 
violence," when the accumulation of such acts over 
time can subject one intimate partner to the other's 
control.  If a seemingly minor act like this draws the 
attention of authorities and leads to a successful 
prosecution for a misdemeanor offense, it does not 
offend common sense or the English language to 
characterize 
the 
resulting 
conviction 
as 
a 
"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." 
United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 166 (2014). 
                                                 
2 "Domestic abuse" is defined, in part, as a "physical act" 
"engaged in by an adult person against his . . . spouse" that 
"may cause the other person reasonably to fear imminent 
engagement in," among other things, the "[i]nentional infliction 
of 
physical 
pain 
[or] 
physical 
injury." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 968.075(1)(a).  This opinion uses "domestic abuse" and 
"domestic violence" interchangeably. 
3 Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in 
Abusive Relationships, 93 Am. J. of Pub. Health 1089 (2003).  
This opinion refers to the victim as female and the perpetrator 
as male at times because those are the facts of this case and, 
at other times, because that is consistent with the research 
being cited.  I recognize, of course, that those gender 
assignments do not account for all acts of domestic abuse. 
No.  2020AP704.jjk 
 
3 
 
¶26 And when a domestic abuse perpetrator, who has engaged 
in threats to kill or any other type of domestic violence, has 
access to a gun, the lethality risk for his victim increases 
significantly.  The numbers are staggering.  A domestic abuse 
victim is five times more likely to be killed by her abuser when 
the abuser has access to a gun.4  Every month in this country an 
average of 70 women lose their lives to a domestic abuse 
perpetrator using a gun.5  Over half of all male-perpetrated 
femicides related to domestic abuse are the result of a firearm.6  
What's more, an abuser's access to a gun increases the risk that 
a domestic homicide will claim the lives of multiple victims.7  
And even where no homicide occurs, a gun provides an abuser 
additional means to coerce, threaten, or terrorize a domestic 
abuse victim.8  As the United States Supreme Court aptly 
summarized, "[f]irearms and domestic strife are a potentially 
                                                 
4 Campbell, supra note 3. 
5 https://everytownresearch.org/report/guns-and-violence-
against-women-americas-uniquely-lethal-intimate-partner-violence
-problem/ (analyzing annual data collected by the Centers for 
Disease 
Control 
and 
Prevention's 
National 
Violent 
Death 
Reporting System through 2019). 
6 Emiko Petrosky et al., Ctrs. Disease Control & Prevention, 
Differences in Homicides of Adult Women and the Role of Intimate 
Partner Violence——United States, 2003–2014, 66 Morbidity & 
Mortality Wkly. Rep. 741 (2017). 
7 Aaron J. Kivisto & Megan Porter, Firearm Use Increases 
Risk of Multiple Victims in Domestic Homicides, 48 J. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry & L. 26 (2020). 
8 Susan B. Sorenson & Rebecca A. Schut, Non-Fatal Gun Use in 
Intimate 
Partner 
Violence:  A 
Systematic 
Review 
of 
the 
Literature, 19 Trauma Violence Abuse 431 (2018). 
No.  2020AP704.jjk 
 
4 
 
deadly combination."  United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 427 
(2009). 
¶27 Recognizing this deadly combination, Congress enacted 
a firearm ban on domestic violence misdemeanants to address a 
"dangerous loophole" in which domestic abusers avoided losing 
their access to guns because often prosecutors did not charge, 
much less convict, such abusers as felons——a status that 
generally would dispossess them.  See id. at 426-427 (citing 142 
Cong. Rec. 22985–86 (1996)); see also, e.g., Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.29(1m) (criminalizing firearm possession by one "convicted 
of a felony," but not for one convicted of a misdemeanor). 
¶28 Cases like this show the loophole is still open and 
dangerously so.9  Closing it, though, requires legislative——
rather than judicial——action.  Legislative action that would 
address conduct like Doubek's could take several forms; I 
outline three examples here.  First, the Wisconsin legislature 
could enact a threatened-battery criminal statute that included 
                                                 
9 While Wisconsin and federal law both ban gun possession by 
persons 
subject 
to 
domestic 
abuse 
restraining 
orders 
or 
injunctions, there are at least two reasons to believe such 
orders alone are insufficient to close the loophole.  First, 
these orders are time limited.  See Wis. Stat. § 813.12(3)(c) & 
(4)(c)-(d).  Second, the percentage of abuse victims who obtain 
protective orders is startlingly low.  See Patricia Tjaden & 
Nancy Thoennes, U.S. Dep't of Just., Extent, Nature, and 
Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence 52 (2000); Ctrs. For 
Disease Control & Prevention, Use of Medical Care, Police 
Assistance, and Restraining Orders by Women Reporting Intimate 
Partner 
Violence——Massachusetts, 
1996-1997, 
49 
Morbidity 
& 
Mortality Wkly. Rep. 485 (2000). 
No.  2020AP704.jjk 
 
5 
 
an element of "threatened use of a deadly weapon."10  This would 
be consistent with the "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" 
definition in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33).  Second, the legislature 
could avoid that federal definition altogether by criminalizing 
"domestic abuse,"11 making it a stand-alone crime as many states 
have done.12  The legislature could then add misdemeanants 
convicted under the new domestic abuse criminal statute to Wis. 
Stat. § 941.29(1m)'s list of persons barred from possessing a 
gun.  Third, the legislature could pass a statute authorizing a 
court to make a civil determination as to whether the facts 
underlying a conviction constitute an act of domestic violence.  
If a court determined those facts did constitute an act of 
domestic violence, then the court could disqualify an abuser 
from possessing a gun under a new § 941.29(1m) category.  Cf. 
                                                 
10 Generally speaking, a threatened-battery assault statute 
makes unlawful any threating conduct that causes the victim to 
fear imminent bodily harm.  See, e.g., Model Penal Code 
§ 211.1(1)(c) (Am. L. Inst. 2021) (making it a misdemeanor to 
"attempt[] by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent 
serious bodily injury"); N.J. Rev. Stat § 2c:12-1a.(3) (2021).  
But to trigger 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33), such a statute must 
include an explicit, divisible crime for "the threatened use of 
a 
deadly 
weapon." 
 
See 
United 
States 
v. 
Daniels, 
316 
F. Supp. 3d 949 (N.D. Tex. 2018); Frazier v. N. State Prison, 
Dept. of Corr., 921 A.2d 479 (N.J. App. Div. 2007). 
11 See Wis. Stat. §§ 813.12(1)(am) & 968.075(1)(a). 
12 See 
Thompson 
Reuters, 
Domestic 
Violence, 
50 
State 
Surveys: Criminal Law: Crimes (Oct. 2021) (noting that about 
half of the U.S. jurisdictions contain criminal statutes 
specifically outlawing the act of domestic violence); see also 
Nat'l Conf. of State Legislatures, Domestic Violence/Domestic 
Abuse 
Definitions 
and 
Relationships 
(Jun. 
13, 
2019) 
("Approximately 38 states place domestic violence definitions 
and penalties within the criminal code . . . ."). 
No.  2020AP704.jjk 
 
6 
 
Wis. Stat. §§ 941.29(1m)(e) & 51.20(13)(cv) (barring a person 
determined in a civil proceeding to be mentally ill and 
dangerous from possessing a firearm).13 
¶29 The bottom line is that while the majority opinion 
correctly applies current federal law and reaches the conclusion 
it dictates, as nonsensical and dangerous as it is, the 
judiciary must follow that law; only the legislature may close 
this dangerous loophole.  For these reasons, I respectfully 
concur. 
 
                                                 
13 I raise these purely as illustrations and without any 
guarantees of or passing judgment on the constitutionality of 
any such laws.  See generally State v. Roundtree, 2021 WI 1, 395 
Wis. 2d 94, 952 N.W.2d 765.