Case Title: Matter of Benge

Citation: 

Docket Number: 76, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER
§
OF THE BAR OF THE SUPREME
§
No. 76, 2001
COURT OF DELAWARE:
§
Board Case Nos. 28,
§
46 and 47, 1999
JOHN H. BENGE, JR.
§
Submitted: August 21, 2001
Decided: October 9, 2001
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
Disciplinary Proceeding Upon Report of the Board on Professional Responsibility
of the Supreme Court.  Respondent Disbarred.
John H. Benge, Jr.,  Esquire, Centerville, Delaware.
Andrea Rocanelli, Esquire, Mary M. Johnston, Esquire, Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, Wilmington, Delaware.
Per curiam:
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This is the decision in a disciplinary proceeding involving charges of
professional misconduct by respondent, John H. Benge, Jr.  The Board on
Professional Responsibility (“Board”) has filed a Report and Recommendation
Regarding Sanctions.  Neither the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) nor
Respondent filed any objections to the Report or Recommendation. The Court adopts
the Board’s findings and concludes that Respondent must be disbarred.
Disciplinary Proceedings and Board Decision
In May 2000, ODC filed a seventeen count petition to discipline Respondent
for alleged violations of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct
(“Rules”).  Respondent filed an answer denying any violations, and the Board
conducted a two day hearing in September 2000.  The Board then set a schedule for
the submission of post-hearing memoranda. ODC submitted its Opening
Memorandum in accordance with the Board’s revised schedule, but Respondent did
not. In February 2001, the Board filed its Report, which found that Respondent
violated numerous Rules, and in June 2001,  the Board filed its Recommendation
Regarding Sanctions, which concluded that Respondent should be disbarred and
ordered to pay costs and restitution.  
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In June 2001, the Court notified the parties of the date on which objections,
if any, were due.  ODC advised the Court that it would not be filing objections.
Respondent requested an extension, which was granted, but he never filed
objections.  
The Board made the following findings:
Board Case No. 28, 1999 - Josephine Smith Estate
Josephine Smith died on December 29, 1995 and was survived
by her husband, Charles W. Smith.  Respondent drafted the Will for
Mrs. Smith and was also named as Executor of the Estate.  On
March 15, 1996, the Last Will and Testament of Mrs. Smith was filed
with the Register of Wills and the Register of Wills office issued Letters
Testamentary to Respondent.  The Smith Estate inventory was to be
filed with the Register of Wills on June 15, 1996 and the final
accounting was to be filed on March 15, 1997.  Neither document was
filed by Respondent.
Frances Schanne, Esq. ...[was] contacted by Mr. Charles Smith.
At the time [Schanne] was retained, the inventory was approximately
two years overdue and the accounting was approximately nine months
overdue.... Mr. Schanne testified that Respondent did not respond
initially to the efforts by [Schanne’s law firm] to contact him. [When he
did respond], Respondent then stated that he would be able to “wrap
things up in about a month or 30 days.”  Nothing happened within the
next 30 days and Mr. Schanne finally ...[filed] a petition to have
Respondent removed as the Executor....On March 17, 1999, Vice-
Chancellor Jacobs granted the motion for default judgment and removed
Respondent as Executor of the Smith Estate.  On March 25, 1999,  the
Register of Wills ... wrote to Respondent ordering him to turn over to
Charles Smith, the new Executor, any and all unadministered assets of
the Estate and to turn over all documents and information regarding the
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Estate that were in Respondent’s possession.  Pursuant to [the
Register’s] order, delivery of these documents was to be made within
ten days.  Respondent did not comply with the delivery order and as a
result, a Motion for Rule to Show Cause was filed by Mr. Schanne.  By
order dated July 20, 1999, Vice-Chancellor Strine held Respondent in
contempt of the judicial and administrative processes of the Court.
Respondent turned over the Estate records the night before the
scheduled Court of Chancery hearing....
Respondent testified that he had difficulty gathering all of the
information to prepare the filings.  He also testified that the relocation
of his office entered into the delay.  He did acknowledge ... that he was
not as timely ... as he should have been....
The Panel finds ... that Respondent has violated Rule 3.4(c)
which states: “A lawyer shall not knowingly disobey an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an
assertion that valid obligation exists.”  Respondent maintains that the
Register of Wills’ order ... is not a court order.  Nevertheless, he was
held in contempt ... by Vice-Chancellor Strine and no challenge was
taken to that order.
The Panel further finds that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d)
which states that: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
Respondent acknowledged that he did not perform his obligations in a
timely manner.  However, the record demonstrates that there was more
than just an occasional excused delay.  In fact, once [Mr. Schanne’s
firm] was in possession of all of the documents, they administered the
Estate within a four to five month period.
Board Case No. 28, 1999 - Books and Records Violations
Mr. Martin Zukoff, CPA testified at the Panel hearing.
Delaware lawyers are required to provide a certificate pursuant to Rule
1.15 of the [Rules].  All lawyers are required to certify whether ... they
are in compliance with Rule 1.15 on an annual basis.  Zukoff
performed an audit of Respondent’s books and records in May of 1999.
Zukoff could not complete the audit because some of the Respondent’s
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records were unavailable. Specifically, with regard to the Estate of
Josephine Smith, Zukoff found that no records were maintained of the
transactions of the Estate.  Respondent ... indicated that he was the
executor of the Estate and not the attorney and therefore is not subject
to Rule 1.15(d).  Zukoff also found that Respondent answered “yes” to
a number of items on his 1999 Certificate of Compliance when he
should have answered “no.” Specifically, questions 5, 6(b), 6(d), and
6(e) were answered affirmatively by Respondent as if he were in
compliance when, in fact, he was not.
A further investigatory audit was conducted by Zukoff and he
issued a report dated September 27, 1999.  In Zukoff’s [report], he
stated that Respondent was able to locate statements in order for Zukoff
to complete his review of the deposits, cancelled checks, etc.  In the
May 26th visit to the ODC by Zukoff, Respondent represented that he
had filed an inventory and Delaware inheritance tax return with the
Register of Wills but later concluded when the Register of Wills did not
have copies of the documents on record, that he had not, in fact, filed
them.  Zukoff’s letter of September 27, 1999 concludes that Respondent
appears to have been in compliance through June, 1999.
On January 27, 2000, Zukoff entered a further report stating that
Respondent was now in compliance with Rule 1.15.
Respondent argues that Rule 1.15 does not apply to Estate
accounts.  However, Zukoff testified that even if we assume that that
is correct, he was not in compliance with Rule 1.5 as to his general
escrow account. Zukoff testified that Respondent was not maintaining
his monthly client balances or reconciliations.
Based upon the testimony and the exhibits presented, the Panel
concludes that Respondent violated Rule 1.15(d) by failing to properly
maintain the financial records of his law office.  With respect to
Respondent’s argument that pursuant to Rule 1.5 that he was not
engaged in an attorney/client relationship and therefore not subject to
Rule 1.15, the Panel finds this argument to be disingenuous.  Rule 1.15
states that a lawyer: “Shall hold property of clients or third persons that
is in the lawyer’s possession in connection with the representation
separate from the lawyer’s own property.”  The Panel had some
concern as to whether, in fact, such a distinction should be made, but
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the Rules do not create such a distinction.  In fact, Zukoff testified that
estate escrow accounts are fiduciary accounts and the record keeping
requirements of Rule 1.15 apply.  Since Respondent’s Certificate of
Compliance was not accurate and contained false statements, the Panel
concludes that Respondent has violated the [Rules] 8.4(c) and 8.4(d).
The ODC also alleges that Respondent violated Rule 1.5(a) in
that Respondent charged an unreasonable fee.  Respondent charged
$41,000 for his work on the Smith Estate.  Based upon the testimony
of Francis Schanne who indicated that they had performed the actual
work necessary to probate the Estate and charged $20,000, the Panel
finds that an Executive Commissioner’s fee of $41,000 is unreasonable
and in fact, in violation of Rule 1.5(a).
Board Case No. 28, 1999 - Charles William Smith Trust
Respondent was retained by Charles Smith...and drafted a Trust
document.  The Trust named Mr. Smith as both Trustor and Trustee
and included a provision that required Respondent’s written consent to
any amendments to the Trust, including Respondent’s own removal as
successor trustee.  Again, in 1998, Charles Smith retained the law
office of Morris, James, Hitchens and Williams to seek...removal of
Respondent as successor trustee.  Smith and Morris, James attempted
to contact Respondent by telephone and by written correspondence.
As a result of those attempts, two meetings were conducted in
June of 1998.  At the first meeting, Respondent expressed his concern
about Smith’s request for his removal as successor Trustee.  Another
meeting was scheduled and Respondent’s consent was again sought for
his removal as successor trustee.  According to Francis Schanne, Esq.,
Morris James repeatedly attempted to obtain Respondent’s written
consent by sending him letters.  Mr. Schanne testified that Respondent
never responded to telephone calls nor did he consent to the Trust
amendment.  Again, Morris James was forced to file a petition with the
Chancery Court.  On February 23, 1999, in excess of one year after
Smith first made the request, Respondent consented to the Trust
amendment in the Chancery Court’s waiting room.  As a result, Smith
made an application for an award of attorney’s fees and costs.  
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*     *     *
On July 26, 1999, Vice-Chancellor Jacobs ordered Respondent
to pay Smith’s attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $4,119.30.
On November 5, 1999, Vice-Chancellor Jacobs issued an order and rule
to show cause as to why Respondent should not be held in contempt of
Court for his failure to pay the attorney’s fees and costs....
Pursuant to a prior disciplinary order (In re the Matter of Benge,
Del. Supr. No. 362, 1996 (September 18, 1996)(ORDER)), the
Delaware Supreme Court approved the report of the Board of
Professional Responsibility which required, inter alia: “That
Respondent shall communicate with each client in writing regarding
their pending matters not less frequently than once very three months,
and shall respond promptly to reasonable requests for information.”  By
failing to respond to reasonable requests for information by Smith or his
attorneys, Respondent violated Rule 7 in that he violated the terms of
a prior disciplinary order.
Based upon the evidence presented, the Panel finds that
Respondent violated Rule 1.1 ... requiring a lawyer to provide
“competent representation to a client.  Competent representation
requires legal knowledge, skill, and thoroughness in preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.”  The Panel finds that
Respondent violated Rule 1.2(a) in that Respondent failed to cooperate
and abide by Smith’s decisions concerning the objectives of the
representation.  Smith requested through his new counsel that
Respondent consent to the replacement of him as successor trustee and
only did so after twelve months and on the eve of the Chancery Court
proceeding for a scheduling conference.  Respondent also violated Rule
1.13 in that he did not act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
his representation of Smith.  As stated before, it took Respondent over
one year before he ultimately consented to his replacement as successor
trustee.  Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a) in that he failed to promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information.  Finally, Respondent
also violated Rule 8.4(d) in that he engaged in conduct that was
prejudicial to the administration of justice.  Respondent’s actions
resulted in a petition in the Chancery Court to order his removal.
Respondent should have consented after the initial request was made.
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Board Case No. 46, 1999 - Missimer Estate
Walter C. Missimer died May 15, 1995 and Respondent was
named as the Executor of the Estate in the Will that was drafted for
Missimer by Respondent.  Respondent was appointed Executor on May
31, 1995.  The beneficiaries of the Missimer Estate were represented
by Thomas J. Eastburn.  The inventory and first and final accounting
were originally filed by Respondent on June 11, 1998.  After a Rule to
Show Cause hearing, the beneficiaries in the Missimer Will took
exception to the inventory and accounting on September 8, 1998.  The
beneficiaries complained that the inventory and accounting were
incomplete and incorrect.  Among the exceptions taken by the
beneficiaries were the fact that the inventory and accounting failed to
report certain assets, income and expenses of the Estate.  On July 20,
1999, Master Glasscock issued a Master’s Report after a hearing on a
Rule to Show Cause.  Respondent did not contest the allegations made
by the beneficiaries and in accordance with Master Glasscock “in a
candid manner” admitted that an amended inventory and accounting
needed to be filed.  Respondent asked that he be allowed 30 days to
amend the inventory and accounting “upon pain of be removed as
Executor”.  The attorney for the beneficiaries opposed the entry of such
an order and asked that the Executor be removed immediately.
Notwithstanding this request, Master Glasscock entered an order
granting Respondent’s request.  However, as a result of the
beneficiaries having to take this action, the Master recommended that
the attorney for the beneficiaries be permitted to submit to the Court
and Executor the reasonable costs of presenting the exceptions and that
this amount be deducted from Executor’s commission.
Mr. Eastburn testified at the hearing that even though the Master
gave Respondent 30 days to close the Estate, Respondent took no
actions to do so.  In fact, there were difficulties over the following year
in that he had problems in getting Respondent to cooperate and respond
to him.  Mr. Eastburn did testify that the administration of this Estate
had certain difficulties.  The beneficiaries lived in Virginia and there
were problems in tracking down insurance policies.
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The Panel concludes that with respect to the Missimer Estate,
Respondent violated Rule 3.4(c) in that he knowingly disobeyed an
obligation pursuant to the Rule of a Tribunal by failing to probate the
Missimer Estate in a timely manner and by failing to cooperate or
comply with the Missimer report to file an amended inventory and
accounting within 30 days.  In conjunction with this, Respondent also
violated 8.4(d) in that he engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
Board Case No. 27, 1999 - Jones Estate
Respondent was named as Executor of the Jones Estate in a Will
that he had drafted for Russell E. Jones who died on December 30,
1996.  Myron Jones was the sole beneficiary.  Respondent was
appointed as Executor on January 7, 1997.  In May, 1998, Myron Jones
retained the law firm of Gordon, Fournaris & Mammarella, P.A. as
counsel in connection with his beneficiary interest in the Estate.  In
May, 1998, Russell Jones’ residence was sold.  Jane Monahan, Esq.,
a lawyer with Gordon, Fournaris & Mammarella, P.A., testified that
Myron Jones was dissatisfied with Respondent’s handling of the Estate.
According to Monahan, Respondent was uncooperative in efforts to
make documents available.  There was also a significant tax lien which
was a liability of the Jones Estate.  Monahan testified that beginning  in
May, 1999, information was requested from Respondent that might help
substantiate a request to compromise the tax lien.  Monahan personally
took over the file in October, 1998, and began communicating with
Respondent in order to get information that they could use to
substantiate the compromise of the tax lien.  Monahan wrote to
Respondent in October, 1998 and followed-up with letters and
telephone calls.  She did not receive any response until February 15,
1999.  At that time, Respondent consented to the release of a personal
injury file in which there was some evidence that there had been an
equal ownership of the Jones house, thereby lowering the tax liability.
It took from October, 1998 to February of 1999 before Respondent
gave his consent to release the file.  After the release of the file,
Monahan wrote to the Division of Revenue and on April 26, 1999, the
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Division of Revenue advised Monahan that the tax had been
compromised.  Monahan wrote to Respondent on May 24, 1999
inquiring as to whether the inheritance tax lien had been paid.  The lien
was ultimately paid in July, 1999 after Monahan “wrote or called him
about six times”. 
When the house was sold, Respondent paid himself a fee of
$15,000 as an Executor’s commission.  Monahan testified that a
reasonable Executor’s fee would have been approximately $7,200.00
to $7,400.00.  As of October 22, 1999, the Estate had been open for
approximately three years and although there had been a draft of an
inventory, it is not clear as to whether one was filed.  No accounting
had been filed.  On November 15, 1999, Vice-Chancellor Jacobs
ordered Respondent to be discharged from all duties and powers as
Executor of the Estate of Jones.  Vice-Chancellor Jacobs also ordered
Respondent to deliver all unadministered effects, books, papers,
proceeds from the sale of Estate assets, to counsel for Petitioner.
Respondent never filed an answer to the petition to have him removed
as Executor nor did he appear at the hearing.  On March 15, 2000,
Vice-Chancellor Jacobs entered an order scheduling a hearing on the
issue of the Executor’s commission being charged by Respondent and
the improper payment of any sums by Respondent from the Estate.  The
Chancery Court also entered judgment against Respondent in favor of
Myron Jones in the amount of $2,300 for Petitioner’s attorney’s fees
and costs in connection with two petitions filed earlier.  On March 28,
2000, the Chancery Court entered a default judgment against
Respondent and ordered Respondent to reimburse the Estate in the
amount of $15,500.00.  A further hearing was scheduled on May 4,
2000 for Petitioner to be able to present evidence to seek recovery
against Respondent for additional sums improperly paid.  Finally, on
May 4, 2000, judgment was entered against Respondent in connection
with the petition for disallowance of the Executor’s commission.  An
additional $497 plus costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $22,625
were assessed against Respondent.
According to Monahan, Respondent did not comply with the
court order to deliver all of the books and records of the Estate.  A
hearing was scheduled on a rule to show cause petition on
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December 17, 1999 and in the afternoon before the hearing on
December 16th between 4:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m., Respondent delivered
what appeared to be the complete file to Monahan.
Once again, the Panel finds that Respondent violated Rule 3.4(c)
in that he knowingly disobeyed the Jones removal and delivery order,
the Jones attorney’s fees order and the Jones reimbursement order.  In
conjunction, Respondent also violated Rule 8.4(d) in that he engaged
in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Additional Violations
As stated earlier in this report, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
moved to amend the Petition for Discipline to include allegations of
violations of Rules 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d) as well as Rules 1.7(b) and
1.9(a).
During the course of Respondent’s testimony, Respondent
acknowledged that he had prepared the Will for Josephine Smith.  After
her death, Respondent testified that he advised Charles Smith as
beneficiary of potential possible legal challenges to the Will.
Respondent acknowledged that he knew that there was a conflict in this
regard.  Because of the additional evidence and testimony elicited at the
hearing, the Panel concludes that Respondent violated Rule 1.7(b) and
Rule 1.9(a).  Respondent’s advice to Charles Smith as to potential legal
challenges violated his duties under Rule 1.7(b) since he had prepared
the Will of Josephine Smith and was now advising Charles Smith of
possible actions to upset the intent of that instrument.  Respondent
violated Rule 1.9(a) in that he was involved in representation of the
same or substantially related matter in which Mr. Smith’s interests were
materially adverse to the interest of Respondent’s former client.
Conclusion
For the reasons hereinbefore stated, the Panel finds that the ODC
has established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent has
violated the following Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional
Conduct: Rule 3.4(c), Rule 8.4(d), Rule 1.5(a), Rule 1.15(d), Rule
1In re Higgins, Del. Supr., 582 A.2d 929, 932 (1990).
2In re Benge, Del. Supr., 754 A.2d 871, 878-79 (2000).
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8.4(c), Rule 1.1, Rule 1.2(a), Rule 1.3, Rule 1.4(a), Rule 7.4, Rule
1.7(b), Rule 1.9(a).
Violations Affirmed
We review the Board’s factual findings to determine whether they are
supported by substantial evidence; we review its legal conclusions de novo.1  After
careful consideration, we conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the Board’s findings of fact and that the Board correctly determined, based
on those facts, that Respondent violated the specified Rules. 
Sanctions
Respondent was admitted to the Bar in 1976 and was not involved in any
disciplinary proceedings until 1994.  Since that time, however, he has been
sanctioned repeatedly for professional misconduct.  In 1995, Respondent was given
a private admonition and was placed on two years probation for his failure to protect
the interests of an elderly client with a personal injury claim.  In that matter,
Respondent “admitted to violations of Rules 1.1 (lack of competence), 1.3 (lack of
diligence), 3.2 (failure to expedite litigation) and 8.1(b) (failure to cooperate... with
the disciplinary investigation).”2  While Respondent was on private probation, his
3In re Benge, 754 A.2d at 880 (2000).
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conduct precipitated four additional disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in a
public reprimand and two years of public probation.  Finally, in July 2000,
Respondent was suspended for one year for numerous violations relating to his
representation of a creditor in a bankruptcy matter.  This Court concluded that
suspension was warranted because:
The most recent ethical violations found by the Board, to which
[Respondent] has filed no objections, occurred at a time when
[Respondent] was already serving a period of public probation for prior
violations of the [Rules]. [Respondent’s] record reflects a persistent
pattern of client neglect that has continued unabated despite the
imposition of a private admonition with a private probation and the
subsequent imposition of a public reprimand with a public probation.
[Respondent’s] disciplinary history demonstrates an inexcusable
disregard for his responsibilities to his clients as an officer of this
Court.3
Respondent’s most recent violations continue the same pattern of neglect.  He
has caused injury to his clients and failed to adhere to previous disciplinary orders.
During his suspension, Respondent was ordered to make monthly payments to the
Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection, but he failed to do so.  Moreover, Respondent
has not acknowledged his misconduct, expressed remorse, or offered any mitigating
factors for the Court to consider.   
4In re Benge, 754 A.2d at 879 (Quotations and citations omitted.)
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As this Court has noted repeatedly, “[t]he primary purpose of disciplinary
proceedings is to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to
preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar
misconduct. The lawyer discipline system was not designed to be either punitive or
penal in nature.”4  The American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) most relevant in this case are:
8.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: (a)
intentionally or  knowingly violates the terms of a prior disciplinary
order and such violation causes injury or potential injury to a client, the
public, the legal system or the profession; or (b) has been suspended for
the same or similar misconduct, and intentionally or knowingly engages
in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a
client, the public, the legal system or the profession.
4.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly
converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
4.31 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, without the
informed consent of client(s): ... (c) represents a client in a matter
substantially related to a matter in which the interests of a present or
former client are materially adverse, and knowingly uses information
relating to the representation of a client with the intent to benefit the
lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a
client.
4.41 Disbarment is generally appropriate when: ... (c) a lawyer engages
in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious
or potentially serious injury to a client.
5In re McCoy, Del. Supr., 767 A.2d 191 (2001); In re Rich, Del. Supr., 559 A.2d 1251
(1989).
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Respondent’s misconduct falls in all of these categories, and, consistent with other
disciplinary proceedings5, we conclude that he must be disbarred.  This Court Orders
that:
1) Respondent be, and hereby is, disbarred.  His name shall be
immediately stricken from the Roll of Attorneys entitled to practice before the courts
of this State;
2) Respondent is required to pay all costs of this disciplinary proceeding
upon receipt of ODC’s statement of costs;
3) Respondent is required to make restitution to Myron Jones and the
Smith Estates in an amount determined by ODC and approved by this Court. 
This Opinion shall be disseminated by ODC in accordance with Rule 23 and
Rule 14 of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. 
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