Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallo

Citation: 2012-Ohio-758

Docket Number: 2011-0756

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallo, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-758.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-758 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. GALLO. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallo,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-758.] 
Attorney misconduct, including recklessly making false statements concerning the 
integrity of a judicial officer—Public reprimand. 
(No. 2011-0756—Submitted September 21, 2011—Decided February 29, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-087. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Nicholas Matthew Gallo of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0083226, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2008.  
On December 7, 2009, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Gallo with 
professional misconduct based on allegations he had made against a judge in an 
affidavit and in a motion to strike the judge’s motion to intervene in a domestic-
relations case.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline found 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
that Gallo had recklessly made false statements impugning the integrity of a judge 
and recommends that we publicly reprimand him for this misconduct. 
{¶ 2} Gallo objects to the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, arguing that due to his inexperience, he made an innocent mistake in 
identifying a man standing outside the judge’s judicial suite as the judge himself 
and that he had had a good-faith basis for the allegations he made against the 
judge.  Therefore, he urges the court to reject the board’s findings and dismiss the 
complaint against him. 
{¶ 3} The record clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Gallo failed 
to take reasonable steps to verify that the person who he thought was staring at his 
client was in fact the judge he accused.  Therefore, we adopt the board’s findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and publicly reprimand Gallo for his misconduct. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} In January 2009, Gallo was hired as an associate attorney at 
Stafford and Stafford Co., L.P.A., a small firm in Cleveland that handles mainly 
domestic-relations cases.  On June 3, 2009, he stepped in to handle a pretrial 
conference representing Jeffery Rymers, whom the firm represented in a divorce 
proceeding pending in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas.  At that time, 
Gallo had been practicing for only about six months, although he had been 
admitted to the bar for just over one year.  He had never met Mr. Rymers, Mrs. 
Rymers, or Mrs. Rymers’s attorney, and he had never been to the Lake County 
Courthouse.  He was, however, aware that Mrs. Rymers was in a relationship with 
Lake County Common Pleas Court Judge Eugene Lucci. 
{¶ 5} While Gallo waited in the hall outside the domestic-relations 
courtroom, which is just across the hall from Judge Lucci’s judicial suite, he saw 
a man repeatedly exit Judge Lucci’s judicial suite, look around the hall, and then 
re-enter the judicial suite.  When Mr. Rymers appeared, Gallo met him and 
walked down the hall with him to discuss the case.  As they were talking, Mrs. 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
Rymers’s counsel approached them and handed Gallo a copy of Judge Lucci’s 
motion to intervene in the Rymerses’ divorce proceeding.  Gallo quickly read 
through the document and phoned his boss, Joseph Stafford, to determine how he 
should proceed.  During that conversation, Gallo described the man he had seen in 
the hallway and Stafford told him that the description “sound[ed] like Judge 
Lucci.”  After ending the phone call, Gallo resumed talking to Mr. Rymers.  
Gallo’s back was to Judge Lucci’s judicial suite, and Mr. Rymer was facing him.  
At one point, Mr. Rymers told him that Judge Lucci was standing outside the 
judicial suite looking in their direction.  Gallo turned around and saw that the 
same man he had seen earlier was staring in their direction. 
{¶ 6} When Gallo returned to his office after the pretrial conference, he 
prepared a memorandum for his supervisors summarizing the events that occurred 
at the courthouse.  Two weeks later, Gallo filed a response to Lucci’s motion to 
intervene and argued that intervention was prohibited by Civ.R. 75(B).  He also 
argued that Lucci had violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.3 by “improperly using his position 
as presiding Judge to advance his own personal interests, by attempting to insert 
himself into an action in which he has no legitimate interest.”  He further asserted 
that Lucci had violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.3 by (1) failing to cite in his motion to 
intervene controlling law (Civ.R. 75(B)) that Lucci knew was directly adverse to 
his intervening in the divorce proceeding and (2) “engag[ing] in a pattern of 
harassing and threatening conduct toward the Defendant, Jeffery G. Rymers, and 
Joseph G. Stafford; and hav[ing] intimated on numerous occasions these threats, 
based upon [Lucci’s] position as a presiding Judge in the Lake County Court of 
Common Pleas.” 
{¶ 7} Gallo supported these allegations with affidavits from himself and 
Mr. Rymers attesting that on the day of the pretrial hearing, they had seen Judge 
Lucci standing in the hallway outside his judicial suite, staring at Mr. Rymers.  
Mr. Rymers further attested that he had felt intimidated and threatened by this 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
conduct.  Gallo also submitted an affidavit from Stafford addressing Judge 
Lucci’s allegation that Stafford’s representing Mr. Rymers was a conflict of 
interest because Lucci had consulted Stafford regarding his divorce.  Gallo signed 
and filed the opposition brief on June 17, 2009.  He resigned his position at 
Stafford’s firm approximately one week later for reasons unrelated to the Rymers 
case. 
{¶ 8} Judge Lucci filed a grievance with relator stating that he had been 
falsely accused of abusing his office and that he had not been in the hallway while 
Gallo and Mr. Rymers were at the courthouse.  He alleged that he had “witnesses 
and irrefutable, conclusive evidentiary proof” that the allegations in Gallo’s and 
Mr. Rymers’s affidavits were not true.  Gallo stood by his allegations until relator 
filed a formal complaint and assistant disciplinary counsel advised him that she 
had obtained video recordings of the activity in the Lake County Courthouse from 
June 3, 2009.  After reviewing the video recordings, Gallo moved to withdraw his 
affidavit, stating that the video revealed that the person he had believed to be 
Judge Lucci was not, in fact, the judge, but rather the judge’s bailiff. 
{¶ 9} At the disciplinary hearing, the panel heard testimony from Mr. 
and Mrs. Rymers, Judge Lucci and his bailiff, Stafford, Gallo, and others.  The 
panel also viewed portions of the video recordings from all four cameras that 
record activity in the pertinent hallway of the Lake County Courthouse.  The 
evidence revealed that Judge Lucci had not been in the hallway during the time in 
question and that the man whom Gallo and Rymers had seen in the hallway was 
the judge’s bailiff. 
{¶ 10} Gallo testified that while he was standing approximately 70 feet 
away from the door to Judge Lucci’s judicial suite talking to Mr. Rymers, he saw 
the man whom he then believed to be Lucci standing outside the judicial suite 
staring at him and Mr. Rymers.  He stated that Rymers appeared very 
uncomfortable—his face turned bright red and he started shuffling his feet.  Gallo 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
admitted that he had never asked Mr. Rymers whether he had met Judge Lucci 
and that other than the information he had obtained from Rymers and Stafford, the 
only effort he had made to determine the identity of the man he had observed in 
the hall was to view Judge Lucci’s picture on the Internet.  He stated that he 
believed the picture to be consistent with the man he had observed in the 
courthouse that morning. 
{¶ 11} The board found that Gallo had not knowingly made false 
statements and that he had been under considerable pressure from his employer 
when he filed the documents containing the accusations.  However, it concluded 
that his conduct was not blameless.  Rather, the board found that Gallo had acted 
recklessly by failing to independently verify the identity of the man he had 
observed in the hallway before raising such serious allegations against Judge 
Lucci.  Based upon these findings, the board concluded that Gallo had violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly or recklessly making 
false statements concerning the integrity of a judicial officer) and 8.4(d) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).  Citing insufficient evidence, the board recommends 
that we dismiss alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from 
engaging 
in 
conduct 
involving 
dishonesty, 
fraud, 
deceit, 
or 
misrepresentation) and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). 
Recommended Sanction 
{¶ 12} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.   
{¶ 13} The parties did not stipulate to any aggravating or mitigating 
factors in this case, and the board found that no aggravating factors are present.  
Mitigating factors found by the board include the absence of a prior disciplinary 
record, the absence of a selfish or dishonest motive, Gallo’s timely withdrawal of 
his affidavit after viewing the videotapes and discovering his mistake, and his 
cooperative attitude throughout the disciplinary proceeding.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10 
(B)(2)(a), (b), (c), and (d).  While Gallo did not submit any evidence of his 
character or reputation, the board observed that Stafford and another associate 
from his firm spoke positively of Gallo throughout the hearing.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e). 
{¶ 14} The board also considered the fact that Gallo had voluntarily 
stopped practicing law as a mitigating factor, even though his departure from the 
practice was largely due to his inability to find work in the legal field.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(f).  Moreover, the board concluded that Gallo’s 
inexperience—he had been a member of the bar for only a brief period prior to his 
misconduct—was also a mitigating factor.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  See also 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Mullaney, 119 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008-Ohio-4541, 894 
N.E.2d 1210, ¶ 40-42 (considering an attorney’s recent admission to the practice 
of law to be a mitigating factor when a more experienced attorney at his firm had 
established the practices that contributed to his misconduct). 
{¶ 15} At the hearing, Gallo urged the panel to either dismiss the 
complaint against him or recommend a public reprimand for his conduct.  Citing 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 
N.E.2d 425, relator sought a six-month suspension from the practice of law. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
{¶ 16} The board observed that in Gardner, we imposed a six-month 
suspension from the practice of law on an attorney who, in a motion for 
reconsideration, had waged a vitriolic attack against the appellate court that had 
affirmed his client’s criminal conviction, making unfounded accusations that the 
court was biased and corrupt.  Id. at ¶ 2-9, 33-34.  But the board found that 
Gallo’s conduct was less egregious than Gardner’s because Gallo did not impugn 
the integrity of the judicial process or attack the impartiality of a judge presiding 
over a case in which he served as counsel.  Finding no evidence that Gallo is 
either unfit to practice law or that he is unworthy of the trust and confidence 
essential to an attorney-client relationship, and finding that he has accepted full 
responsibility for his conduct, the board concluded that he should not be 
suspended from the practice of law, but should be publicly reprimanded for his 
misconduct. 
Gallo’s Objections 
{¶ 17} Gallo objects to the board’s findings of misconduct, arguing that 
neither his mistaken identification of the bailiff as Judge Lucci nor his allegation 
that Judge Lucci had engaged in a pattern of harassing and threatening conduct 
was reckless.  With regard to his mistaken identification, he asserts that he had no 
reason to believe that Mr. Rymers had not previously met Judge Lucci or to 
question Stafford’s statement over the phone that the man Gallo described in the 
hallway at the courthouse was Judge Lucci. 
{¶ 18} Gallo had not been involved in the Rymerses’ divorce prior to his 
attendance at the June 3, 2009 pretrial hearing, and he met Mr. Rymers for the 
first time that morning.  And yet he accepted Mr. Rymers’s identification of the 
man in the hallway without any further inquiry.  He relied upon Mr. Rymers’s 
identification, Stafford’s telephonic identification, and his own determination that 
the man he had seen in the courthouse matched an online photograph of Lucci as 
conclusive proof that the man in the hallway was Lucci. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
{¶ 19} In Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, 
¶ 26, we adopted an objective standard to determine whether an attorney has made 
a statement about a judicial officer with knowledge or reckless disregard of its 
falsity.  Under that standard, we consider the nature of the statements and the 
context in which they were made and determine whether the attorney had a 
reasonable factual basis for making them.  Id. 
{¶ 20} Gallo made no effort to confirm the man’s identity with anyone 
working at the courthouse.  Nor did he ask Mr. Rymers, whom he had just met, 
about his familiarity with Judge Lucci.  Instead, he relied upon the identification 
by a client he barely knew, a telephonic identification by his employer, and his 
own determination that the man he had seen in the courthouse matched an online 
photograph of Lucci to levy serious charges of professional misconduct against a 
sitting judge.  Furthermore, he made those allegations in a public filing in a 
domestic-relations court instead of in a confidential grievance submitted to 
disciplinary counsel or a certified grievance committee in accordance with 
Gov.Bar R. IV(2) (requiring a lawyer to maintain a respectful attitude toward the 
courts and to submit any serious complaints against judicial officers to the proper 
authorities) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.3(b) (requiring a lawyer who possesses 
unprivileged knowledge that a judge has violated the rules of professional or 
judicial conduct to inform the appropriate authority).  Given the evidence that 
Gallo relied on and the minimal effort that he undertook to confirm the identity of 
the man in the hallway before making serious allegations against Judge Lucci, we 
do not find that he had a reasonable factual basis for his statements.  We therefore 
find by clear and convincing evidence that Gallo engaged in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice by recklessly making false statements 
impugning the integrity of Judge Lucci in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a) and 
8.4(d). 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
{¶ 21} Accordingly, we overrule Gallo’s objections, adopt the board’s 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in their entirety, and hereby dismiss the 
alleged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) and 8.4(h) as being unsupported by the 
evidence.  For the reasons set forth in the board’s report, we agree that the proper 
sanction for Gallo’s misconduct is a public reprimand. 
{¶ 22} Accordingly, Nicholas Matthew Gallo is hereby publicly 
reprimanded.  Costs are taxed to Gallo. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, 
JJ., concur. 
LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 23} The majority concludes that Gallo failed to take reasonable steps to 
verify that the person who he thought was staring at his client was in fact the 
judge he accused.  I disagree.  For the reasons that follow, I dissent from the 
majority’s decision to publicly reprimand Gallo for his conduct. 
{¶ 24} Gallo had been practicing law for less than a year before he was 
called in to handle the pretrial conference representing Jeffery Rymers.  Gallo had 
never seen or talked to Judge Lucci or his bailiff, had never been in Judge Lucci’s 
courtroom or chambers, and had never even met the Stafford firm’s own client, 
Mr. Rymers, until the day in question. 
{¶ 25} The man who was mistaken for Judge Lucci had gone into and out 
of Judge Lucci’s chambers multiple times that morning and had been seen staring 
in the direction of Gallo and his client, and Mr. Rymers mistakenly confirmed that 
the man was Judge Lucci.  Gallo was aware that Judge Lucci was involved in a 
relationship with Mr. Rymers’s wife and that she and the Rymerses’ children 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
were living in the judge’s home.  It was reasonable for Gallo to believe that his 
client would recognize Judge Lucci. 
{¶ 26} But Gallo did not rely solely on the identification by his client 
when he prepared his affidavit accusing the judge.  He also relied on the 
identification made by one of the partners in the Stafford firm, who confirmed 
that the man described by Gallo was Judge Lucci.  In addition, Gallo compared 
the judge’s official photograph on the Lake County Common Pleas Court website 
to his memory of the man he had seen in the hallway.  In my view, Gallo took 
reasonable steps to verify the identity of the person in question. 
{¶ 27} Further, I would argue that the circumstances in this case are 
unusual.  The more typical situation in these types of cases is that an attorney 
attacks the integrity of a judge presiding over a case in which the attorney is 
involved.  In this case, this judge was personally involved in the divorce case that 
Gallo was handling, even to the point of filing a motion to intervene in the 
proceeding.  Thus, it was reasonable for Gallo to make the assumption that his 
client could identify the man in the hallway.  And because the case does involve 
such unusual facts, it is not a situation that is likely to occur again in the future. 
{¶ 28} In my view, Gallo made a simple, good-faith mistake—a mistake 
that was reasonable, not reckless.  Moreover, Gallo immediately moved to 
withdraw his affidavit when he discovered his mistake, and he left his position 
with the firm shortly thereafter.  I dissent from the majority’s decision to publicly 
reprimand him.  I would dismiss. 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, Lori J. Brown, Chief 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, for relator. 
Law Offices of Brent L. English and Brent L. English, for respondent. 
______________________