Case Title: Minn. Dept. of Hwys. v. MINN. DEPT. OF HR

Citation: 241 N.W.2d 310

Docket Number: 45624, 45631

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1976-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
241 N.W.2d 310 (1976) MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS and Ray Lappegaard, Commissioner, et al., Respondents. v. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Appellant-Respondent. and Garry DeYOUNG, Respondent-Appellant, v. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, and Samuel L. Richardson, Commissioner of Human Rights, Appellants-Respondents. Nos. 45624, 45631. Supreme Court of Minnesota. April 9, 1976. *311 Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Richard L. Varco, Jr., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for appellant, Minn. Dept. of Human Rts. Ramier, Soules & Hynes and Rodney M. Hynes, Minneapolis, for Minn. Dept. of Highways and others, respondents. Gary DeYoung, pro se. Heard before OTIS, PETERSON and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc. PER CURIAM. These are consolidated appeals by Garry DeYoung and the Minnesota Department of Human Rights. The Department of Human Rights filed a complaint against the Minnesota Department of Highways on behalf of DeYoung alleging that DeYoung's employment with the Department of Highways had been suspended and terminated because of religious discrimination. The hearing examiner appointed by the commissioner of human rights found that the Highway Department had violated Minn.St. c. 363 and ordered DeYoung reinstated with damages. The examiner found, however, that DeYoung did not mitigate damages by seeking alternative employment; consequently, the examiner reduced the amount of damages by $2,500 on the condition that the department reemploy DeYoung before February 1, 1974. Both the Highway Department and DeYoung petitioned for review of the examiner's decision, and the Department of Human Rights filed a cross-petition. The petitions were consolidated for hearing before the Ramsey County District Court. Following that hearing, the court ordered the hearing examiner's findings and order reversed, resulting in these consolidated appeals. DeYoung began working for the Department of Highways as an information writer *312 in May 1969 and remained in that job, except for a suspension in December 1971, until his dismissal effective March 3, 1972. At the time of his hiring, DeYoung's atheistic beliefs were known to his superiors in the department. DeYoung's job involved the writing of articles and the distribution of information on the department. The material he prepared was released to the public in a weekly departmental publication entitled Minnesota Highway News. According to the testimony of his superiors, DeYoung's behavior changed beginning in the spring of 1971. Complaints were recorded regarding his writing and demeanor. Some of DeYoung's articles were rejected as inappropriate or unsatisfactory. In the fall of 1971 the project director of the Minnesota Valley Restoration project accused DeYoung of proselytizing during a field trip to research an article on the project. On December 22, 1971, the public information office held a Christmas party in the office. Protesting the playing of religious music at the party, DeYoung switched off the religious music and switched on his own recorder with secular music. An argument developed between DeYoung and his superior, Dwight Bonin, when Bonin told DeYoung to switch off his music. Bonin then suspended DeYoung from December 22, 1971, until January 3, 1972. Following DeYoung's return to work in January, the relationship between DeYoung and all his supervisors deteriorated further. DeYoung's job performance was unproductive. Articles which DeYoung submitted were not returned to him. Bonin was unable to communicate with DeYoung. On February 18, 1972, Assistant Highway Commissioner Francis Marshall, Bonin, and DeYoung had a meeting to discuss DeYoung's job performance. During that week, Commissioner Ray Lappegaard, Marshall, and Bonin reviewed DeYoung's activities. Commissioner Lappegaard decided to terminate DeYoung because his job performance was unsatisfactory. DeYoung received a written notice of termination sent to him on February 25, 1972. DeYoung filed a charge of religious discrimination against the department on February 29, 1972. 1. The first issue presented is whether or not the district court acted properly in reversing the hearing examiner's order. The scope of judicial review for an administrative agency decision is set forth in Minn.St. 15.0425: Cases interpreting the above statute have established that a court may reverse an agency's findings when they are not supported by the evidence. State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Service Bd., 226 Minn. 240, 32 N.W.2d 574 (1948). In a memorandum, the trial court explained the reasons for its order reversing the hearing examiner's determination: The trial court in effect found that DeYoung was not fired because of any animosity to his atheistic views but because of his unsatisfactory job performance. The testimony of DeYoung's superiors, DeYoung's offensive conduct in the office and in the field, his expressed attitude toward other workers, and his unproductive job performance for several weeks prior to his termination adequately support the trial court's determination. 2. A peripheral issue is whether the Department of Human Rights has standing to seek judicial review of the decision of its own hearing examiner. The agency proceeding involved here was initiated by DeYoung's charge filed pursuant to Minn.St. 363.06, subd. 1. The hearing on the charge was conducted pursuant to Minn.St. 363.071, subd. 1, which provides: The activities of the examiner of the Department of Human Rights in this case are similar to those of the administrative board in In re Getsug, 290 Minn. 110, 186 N.W.2d 686 (1971). In Getsug, the State Board of Registration for Architects, Engineers, and Land Surveyors found an engineer guilty of the unauthorized practice of architecture and revoked his certificate of registration *314 as an engineer in proceedings initiated by the St. Paul Chapter of the American Institute of Architects. This court said: This court further noted: In the present case the examiner heard testimony, made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issued an order requiring reinstatement and an award of damages to DeYoung. Such proceedings are essentially judicial; therefore, according to the rule in Getsug, the Department of Human Rights lacks standing to appeal the decision of its own hearing examiner to the district court. The Department of Human Rights notes that Minn.St. 15.0424, subd. 2(c), requires that every person served with a petition for judicial review of an agency decision who desires to participate in the review proceedings is required to serve upon the petitioner "a notice of appearance stating his position with reference to the affirmance, vacation, reversal or modification of the order or decision under review." The department further notes that Minn.St. 15.0424, subd. 2(b), provides that "the agency * * * shall have the right to participate in the proceedings for review." The department argues that its activity at the trial court level was only a response to the petition of the Department of Highways. This argument is inconsistent with the nature of the allegations made by the Department of Human Rights in its cross-petition in which it alleged errors of law in the order of its own hearing examiner and requested a modification of that order in its prayer for relief. In Minnesota Water Resources Bd. v. County of Traverse, 287 Minn. 130, 177 N.W.2d 44 (1970), this court refused to broadly interpret Minn.St. 15.0424, subd. 2(b), and specifically interpreted our Administrative Procedure Act to exclude any authority for a participating agency to seek a judicial review of its own decision. The court held: The Department of Human Rights further argues that its commissioner should be considered an entity separate from the acts of the hearing examiner. Minn.St. 363.071, subd. 2, makes this position untenable in that the statute defines the order of the hearing examiner as "a final decision of the department." 3. The third issue presented is whether the department has standing to appeal the district court's reversal of its hearing examiner's order. The original decision by the hearing examiner was judicial and not administrative in nature. However, Minn.St. 363.10 provides for appeal to this court as follows: Minn.St.1971, § 605.09, repealed by L.1974, c. 394, § 11, had been superseded by *315 Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, Rule 103.03, which provides in relevant part: Normally, an agency which performs in a quasi-judicial capacity cannot claim that a trial court's reversal of the agency's decision affects a "substantial right." In this case, however, Minn.St. 363.10 specifically gives the commissioner of human rights the right to appeal a district court decision reviewing a "final decision of the department reached after a hearing" (Minn.St. 363.072, subd. 1), where a substantial right of the commissioner is involved. When a trial court reverses the decision of a hearing examiner which favored the Department of Human Rights as a party, we hold that a "substantial right" of the department is affected and the department may appeal to this court. Normally an agency has no right to appeal its own judicial decision to either lower or appellate courts. To so hold in this case, however, would make a nullity of Minn.St. 363.10,[1] which specifically gives the commissioner the right to appeal a district court judgment involving a decision made by the department in a hearing conducted under Minn.St. 363.071. Respondents' argument that the repeal of Minn.St. 605.09 in 1974 was intended to repeal Minn.St. 363.10 is not persuasive. The title of L.1974, c. 394, which repealed § 605.09, states in part that it is and act "eliminating certain statutory provisions which conflict with the rules of civil appellate procedure." There is no provision in c. 394 which repeals Minn.St. 363.10. Affirmed. MARSDEN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [1] This statutory authority distinguishes this case from Minnesota Bd. of Health v. Governor's Certificate of Need App. Bd., Minn., 230 N.W.2d 176 (1975).