Case Title: Sarkco, Inc. v. Edwards

Citation: 482 S.W.2d 623

Docket Number: 5-6001

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1972-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
482 S.W.2d 623 (1972) SARKCO, INC., Appellant, v. C. Ray EDWARDS, d/b/a Edwards Plan Service, Appellee. No. 5-6001. Supreme Court of Arkansas. July 17, 1972. Tackett, Moore, Dowd & Harrelson, Texarkana, for appellant. Young & Patton, Texarkana, for appellee. HARRIS, Chief Justice. C. Ray Edwards operates Edwards Plan Service in Texarkana, Texas which, inter alia engages in planning residential apartments, preparing plans, specifications, and supervision. Edwards instituted suit in the Miller County Circuit Court in July, 1970, alleging that he had entered into a contract with Sarkco, Inc., in July of 1968 to furnish services in connection with the plans, specifications, and supervision, and engineering of the Orleans apartments in Texarkana, Arkansas; that after crediting Sarkco with amounts paid, he was still due the sum of $14,500, and judgment was sought in that amount. Sarkco, Inc., appellant herein, filed a general denial and further pleaded the statute of frauds, asserting that the alleged contract was not in writing and that the services sued for could not have been completed within a year. It was further alleged that Edwards had been paid for all services which had been rendered. Subsequently, Sarkco amended its answer and, in addition to the defenses already pleaded, further alleged that the actions alleged by Edwards were contrary to Ark.Stat.Ann. §§ 71-301 through 71-308, in that said statutes prohibited the activities for which Edwards was suing unless Edwards was a registered architect or engineer; that appellee was not a registered *624 architect or engineer, and his cause of action was thus void.[1] Motions for directed verdict at the conclusion of appellee's testimony and at the conclusion of all the testimony were made by appellant but such motions were denied and the jury returned a verdict for Edwards in the amount of $11,667. A motion for judgment non obstante veredicto and a motion for a new trial were both denied by the court. From the judgment entered in accordance with the jury verdict, appellant brings this appeal. The contention that the contract was unenforceable because of the statute of frauds is not argued by appellant, and that point accordingly is waived and goes out of the case. Gordon et al. v. Street Improvement District No. 1 of Gillett et al, 242 Ark. 599, 414 S.W.2d 628. We agree however with appellant that this case must be reversed. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 71-308 (Repl.1957) provides as follows: In Arkansas State Board of Architects v. Bank Building & Equipment Corp. of America, 225 Ark. 889, 286 S.W.2d 323, this court, in defining an architect, stated: There is no dispute but that Edwards was rendering architectural services. From the record during cross-examination of Edwards: As long ago as 1878, this court, in the case of Lindsey v. Rottaken, 32 Ark. 619, in an opinion by Chief Justice English, held: In Compagionette v. McArmick, 91 Ark. 69, 120 S.W. 400, this holding was reiterater, the court stating: These holdings among several other cases, were reiterated in Eager v. Jonesboro, Lake City & Eastern Express Company, 103 Ark. 288, 147 S.W. 60; Florence Cotton Oil Co. v. Anglin, 105 Ark. 672, 152 S.W. 295. It is apparent, that under the cases cited, the contract entered into between Edwards and Sarkco was void, and recovery cannot be had. It is argued that it is "unjust and inequitable to allow a fully knowledgeable party to a contract to accept the services of the other party and to allow the other party to expend substantial sums of money in the performance of the contract and then to turn and contend that the contract is unenforceable because the contract was illegal". We certainly can appreciate this viewpoint but that does not change the law. In addition, Edwards can hardly be classed as "innocent", since he admitted that he was familiar with the Arkansas statute. The only case cited by appellee is American Accident and Life Ins. Co. et al. v. *626 American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. et al., 247 Ark. 355, 445 S.W.2d 896, but, without looking further, one pertinent fact quickly marks that case as distinguishable from the case at hand. In American Accident, supra, one prayer of the complaint sought relief on a quantum meruit basis, and the opinion points out that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the amount allowed was due upon a quantum meruit basis. Here, no relief on that basis was sought, nor any instruction given the jury on that theory. Rather, the jury verdict could only have been based on the provisions of the contract, a contract which appellee was prohibited from entering into by statute. Reversed and dismissed. [1] No argument is presented relative to the place of the contract, or whether Texas or Arkansas law applies. It is interesting to note that Texas has a statute substantially similar to the Arkansas statute; Vernon's Texas Civ.Stat.Ann. Art. 249a § 10(a) 6. [2] Appellee does not come within the exemptions.