Case Title: Metropolitan Associates v. City of Milwaukee

Citation: 2011 WI 20

Docket Number: 2009AP000524

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 WI 20 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP524 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Metropolitan Associates , a Wisconsin Limited 
Partnership, On behalf of itself and all other 
persons and entities who filed an objection to 
the 2008 assessment of any parcel of real or 
personal property in the City of Milwaukee, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
City of Milwaukee , a Wisconsin Municipal 
Corporation, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 321 Wis. 2d 632, 774 N.W.2d 821 
(Ct. App. 2009 – Published)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 25, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 7, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jean W. DiMotto 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY and CROOKS, JJ. 
dissent (Opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there were briefs 
by Alan Marcuvitz, Robert L. Gordon, Andrea H. Roschke and 
Michael Best & Friedrich, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
Robert L. Gordon. 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Grant F. 
Langley, city attorney and Vincent D. Moschella, deputy city 
attorney, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Vincent D. Moschella. 
There was an amicus brief by Maureen A. McGinnity, Foley & 
Lardner LLP, Milwaukee, John T. Barry, Quarles & Brady LLP, 
 
 
2 
Milwaukee and Douglas A. Pessefall, Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek, 
S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of State Bar of Wisconsin Taxation 
Section Board of Directors. 
 
 
 
2011 WI 20
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2009AP524 
(L.C. No. 
2008CV9866) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Metropolitan Associates, a Wisconsin Limited 
Partnership, on behalf of itself and all other 
persons and entities who filed an objection to 
the 2008 assessment of any parcel of real or 
personal property in the City of Milwaukee, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Milwaukee, a Wisconsin Municipal 
Corporation, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 25, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.  This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit 
court 
order 
granting 
summary 
judgment 
to 
Metropolitan 
Associates.1  Metropolitan Associates challenges the procedure 
taxpayers must follow in order to dispute municipal property tax 
                                                 
1 Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 157, 321 
Wis. 2d 632, 774 N.W.2d 821. 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
2 
 
assessments.  After a taxpayer receives his or her annual 
property tax assessment, the taxpayer may challenge that 
assessment before the Board of Review for the municipality where 
the taxed property is located.2  If the taxpayer remains 
unsatisfied after the Board of Review makes its determination, 
the taxpayer may seek review of that decision in the circuit 
court.3 
¶2 
Prior to 2008, a taxpayer could choose between two 
types of review in the circuit court: common law certiorari 
review or statutory de novo review pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37.  Common law certiorari review is a limited review of 
the record made before the Board of Review, while de novo review 
is an entirely independent circuit court action in which the 
circuit court creates its own record and gives no deference to 
the Board of Review's determination. 
¶3 
In 2008, the legislature passed 2007 Wis. Act 86 ("Act 
86") which allows municipalities to pass an ordinance opting out 
of de novo review.  Taxpayers in these "opt out" municipalities 
are restricted to a new form of circuit court review referred to 
as "enhanced certiorari review."4  This enhanced certiorari 
review is broader in scope than traditional certiorari review 
                                                 
2 See 
Wis. Stat. § 70.47 (2007-08).  All subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version 
unless otherwise indicated. 
3 See Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47(13), 74.37. 
4 Act of Mar. 13, 2008, 2007 Wis. Act § 86 (relating to 
objecting to property tax assessments).   
No. 
2009AP524   
 
3 
 
but narrower in scope than de novo review.  Act 86 also requires 
opt out municipalities to grant their taxpayers additional 
rights during their initial Board of Review hearing. 
¶4 
In 2009, the circuit court for Milwaukee County, the 
Honorable 
Jean 
DiMotto 
presiding, 
found 
that 
Act 
86 
unconstitutionally 
denied 
taxpayers 
residing 
in 
opt 
out 
municipalities equal protection of the laws by depriving those 
taxpayers of access to de novo review without a rational basis 
for doing so.  The court of appeals reversed.  It held that the 
treatment taxpayers received in opt out municipalities under Act 
86 was not significantly different than the treatment taxpayers 
received in all other municipalities. 
¶5 
We conclude that the treatment taxpayers in opt out 
municipalities receive under Act 86 is significantly different 
than the treatment all other taxpayers receive, and we conclude 
that this difference in treatment lacks a rational basis.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and hold that all 
of Act 86’s modifications to Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47, 73.03, and 
74.37 are unconstitutional. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶6 
Property in Wisconsin is taxed by a method of 
assessment set forth in Wis. Stat. ch. 70.  Assessors, who are 
either elected or appointed, must value all taxable real and 
personal property within their taxation district on an annual 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
4 
 
basis.5  Wis. Stat. §§ 70.05, 70.10, 70.29, 70.32(1)-(2).  
Property owners who disagree with an assessment may file an 
objection before the local Board of Review.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 70.07, 70.075, 70.47. 
¶7 
A Board of Review is a quasi-judicial body that hears 
evidence to adduce whether an assessor’s valuation is correct.  
Nankin v. Vill. Of Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, ¶18, 245 Wis. 2d 86, 
630 N.W.2d 141.  Its membership typically consists of lay 
citizens without legal or technical backgrounds.  Wis. Stat. 
§§ 70.46(1), 70.99(10)(a); Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶31; Rite-
Hite Corp. v. Bd. of Review of Vill. of Brown Deer, 216 
Wis. 2d 189, 575 N.W.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1997).  After conducting a 
hearing, the Board of Review may adjust an assessment if it 
determines that the assessment is too high or too low.  
§ 70.47(6), (9)(a).   
¶8 
We begin with an overview of the two traditional 
methods of obtaining judicial review of a Board of Review’s 
decision available prior to the enactment of Act 86: certiorari 
review and de novo review.  We then discuss how Wisconsin’s 
process 
for 
challenging 
assessment 
decisions 
changed 
significantly in both 2001 and 2008——in 2001 it changed because 
of our Nankin decision, and in 2008 it changed because of Act 
86.   
A. Certiorari Review and De Novo Review  
                                                 
5 "Taxation district" is defined as "a town, village or city 
in which general property taxes are levied and collected."  Wis. 
Stat. § 70.045. 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
5 
 
¶9 
Certiorari review existed prior to the enactment of 
Act 866 as a limited review in which the circuit court examined 
only the record made before the Board of Review.  Nankin, 245 
Wis. 2d 86, ¶20.  In certiorari review, a circuit court may not 
take its own evidence nor conduct its own factual inquiry.  Id.  
The circuit court applying certiorari review must uphold the 
Board of Review's decision unless: (1) the Board acted outside 
its jurisdiction, (2) the Board acted in violation of the law, 
(3) 
the 
Board's 
action 
was 
arbitrary, 
oppressive 
or 
unreasonable, representing its will rather than its judgment, or 
(4) the evidence was such that the Board could not reasonably 
make the determination in question.  Id.  If the circuit court 
determines that the Board of Review's assessment is so deficient 
that it meets one of these four tests, the court must remand the 
matter to the Board of Review for a reassessment.  Id.  The 
taxpayer 
seeking 
certiorari 
review 
receives 
scheduling 
preference in the circuit court and does not have to pay the tax 
before filing.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13). 
¶10 De novo review, as it existed prior to the enactment 
of Act 86,7 is a more substantial form of review than certiorari 
review.  The circuit court applying de novo review may receive 
evidence regardless of the record made before the Board of 
Review.  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶25.  While the circuit court 
conducting a de novo review gives no deference to the Board of 
                                                 
6 Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) (1999-2000). 
7 Wis. Stat. § 74.37 (1999-2000). 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
6 
 
Review's decision, the underlying assessment still carries a 
presumption of correctness.  Id.; Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2).  If a 
circuit court conducting de novo review determines that the 
Board of Review's assessment is incorrect, the circuit court may 
calculate the proper assessment without remanding it to the 
Board of Review for that purpose.  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶25.  
In contrast to certiorari review, the de novo action is not 
given scheduling preference in the circuit court and the 
taxpayer must pay the tax before filing.  Wis. Stat. § 74.37(2). 
B. 2001: Nankin Invalidates Population-Based Thresholds on De 
Novo Actions 
¶11 Prior to 2001, most property owners could obtain 
judicial review of a Board of Review's decision by filing an 
action in the circuit court seeking either certiorari review 
under Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) or de novo review under Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37.8  Prior to 2001, however, property owners in counties 
with populations of 500,000 or more could file for only 
                                                 
8 A third option, not relevant to the present case, is 
available for obtaining judicial review of a Board of Review’s 
decision.  An objecting taxpayer may file a written complaint 
with the Wisconsin Department of Revenue pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.85. 
 
This 
method 
is 
only 
available 
in 
limited 
circumstances.  § 70.85(1).  Review of the Department of 
Revenue's 
decision 
may 
only 
proceed 
through 
common 
law 
certiorari.  § 70.85(4)(c); See Hanlon v. Town of Milton, 2000 
WI 61, ¶23, 235 Wis. 2d 597, 612 N.W.2d 44.  In Nankin we held 
that "[o]ur discussion of certiorari review of the board of 
review's decision applies equally for certiorari review of the 
Department of Revenue's decision."  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶20 
n.8. 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
7 
 
certiorari review and did not have access to de novo review.9  
Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6).   
¶12 In 2001, we considered in Nankin v. Village of 
Shorewood whether preventing taxpayers' access to de novo review 
solely based on the population of the county in which the 
property was located unconstitutionally denied those taxpayers 
equal protection of the laws.10  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶11.  We 
applied a three-step analysis to guide our holding.  First, we 
determined 
that 
the 
population-based 
threshold 
created 
a 
"distinct classification of citizens"——those owning property in 
Milwaukee County.  Id., ¶13.  Second, we determined that this 
population-based threshold caused taxpayers in Milwaukee County 
to be treated in a "significantly different" manner from all 
other taxpayers because the de novo review available in all 
other counties provided greater protections than the certiorari 
review available in Milwaukee County.  Id., ¶14.  Third, we 
determined that no rational basis existed for limiting access to 
de novo review solely because of the population of the county 
where the taxed property was located.  Id., ¶15.  As a result, 
we held that the population-based threshold violated the rights 
provided to taxpayers under the equal protection clause.  Id., 
¶46.  The immediate effect of this holding was that both de novo 
                                                 
9 Only Milwaukee County exceeded a population of 500,000 at 
that time. 
 
10 Because we interpret the United States Constitution's 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the Wisconsin 
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause in the same manner, we 
decided Nankin under both.  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶11 n.5. 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
8 
 
and certiorari review became available to all property owners in 
Wisconsin regardless of the population of the county in which 
their property was located. 
C. 2008 to Present: Legislature Allows Municipalities to Opt Out 
of De Novo Review  
¶13 On March 13, 2008, seven years after our holding in 
Nankin, the Wisconsin Legislature passed Act 86.  2007 Wis. Act. 
86.  Act 86 allows municipalities to adopt an ordinance opting 
out of § 74.37 de novo review of Board of Review assessment 
decisions.   
¶14 A municipality that passes an ordinance pursuant to 
Act 86 “opting out” of de novo review must give their taxpayers 
greater rights in their Board of Review proceedings than those 
taxpayers 
would 
receive 
if 
they 
lived 
in 
all 
other 
municipalities.  2007 Wis. Act. 86 §§ 1-3, 6-7.  Further, 
taxpayers in the opt out municipality lose access to de novo 
review and must instead follow § 70.47(13) which provides for a 
new process we will refer to as "enhanced certiorari review." 
¶15 These differences are further described in Part III of 
this opinion. 
D.  Metropolitan Associates Challenges Act 86's De Novo Review 
Limits 
¶16 The City of Milwaukee opted out of de novo review when 
its Common Council unanimously adopted an ordinance conforming 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
9 
 
with § 70.47(16)(c)11, which became law on April 30, 2008.  On 
July 15, 2008, Metropolitan Associates filed a class action 
lawsuit against Milwaukee seeking declaratory relief and a 
ruling that Act 86's opt out provision violated the equal 
protection provisions of the Wisconsin and the United States 
Constitutions.  Wis. Const. art. I, § 1; U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
¶17 The circuit court orally granted summary judgment to 
Metropolitan Associates on January 20, 2009, memorialized in its 
written order dated February 9, 2009.  It followed the same 
three-step analysis of Metropolitan Associates' equal protection 
claim as we did in Nankin.  First, the circuit court found that 
Act 86 created a distinct classification of citizens——taxpayers 
residing in opt out municipalities.  Second, it found that Act 
86 treated this class significantly different than taxpayers in 
all other municipalities.  Third, the circuit court found that 
no rational basis existed for the different treatment of 
taxpayers who own property in opt out municipalities.  It 
concluded that Wis. Stat. § 74.37(4)(c) as amended by Act 86 and 
                                                 
11 Wis. Stat. § 70.47(16)(c) details the enhanced Board of 
Review procedure for first class cities that adopt ordinances 
for assessment review under Act 86.  To be classified a first 
class city, a city must have a population of at least 150,000.  
Wis. Stat. § 62.05(1)(a).  The City of Milwaukee, by adopting an 
ordinance in 2008 conforming with § 70.47(16)(c), limited the 
assessment review available to its taxpayers to enhanced Board 
of Review and enhanced certiorari procedures under Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(13). 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
10 
 
§ 74.37(4)(d) as created by Act 8612 violated equal protection, 
and enjoined their enforcement. 
¶18 The court of appeals, also following the Nankin three-
step analysis, reversed the circuit court.  The court of appeals 
agreed with the circuit court that taxpayers in opt out 
municipalities 
constituted 
a 
distinct 
classification 
of 
citizens.  However, in contrast to the circuit court, the court 
of appeals determined that Act 86's enhanced certiorari review 
supplied 
taxpayers 
in 
opt 
out 
municipalities 
with 
"the 
functional equivalent of a court trial."  Metro. Assocs. v. 
Milwaukee, 
2009 
WI 
App 
157, 
¶11, 
321 
Wis. 2d 632, 
774 
N.W.2d 821.  The court of appeals therefore held that there was 
no significantly different treatment of taxpayers between de 
novo review and enhanced certiorari review.  Id., ¶9.  Because 
of this holding, the court of appeals did not need to reach the 
third step of the analysis and, therefore, did not consider 
whether the legislature had a rational basis for distinguishing 
between taxpayers in opt out municipalities and taxpayers in all 
other municipalities.  Id., ¶10. 
¶19 Metropolitan Associates then petitioned this court for 
review, which we granted.  We heard oral arguments in this case 
on April 12, 2010.  The oral argument concerned Metropolitan 
Associates' equal protection challenge under our three-step 
                                                 
12 Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37(4)(c) and § 74.37(4)(d) prohibit 
taxpayers 
in 
municipalities 
that 
have 
enacted 
ordinances 
adopting enhanced Board of Review and enhanced certiorari 
procedures from challenging their assessments under de novo 
review.   
No. 
2009AP524   
 
11 
 
analysis.  Following this oral argument, we ordered the parties 
to file supplemental briefs on four distinct issues: 
1. Does either of the two procedures——de novo actions under 
Wis. Stat. § 74.37 and enhanced certiorari actions under Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(13)——carry with it a right to a jury trial under 
Article I, Section V of the Wisconsin Constitution and Village 
Food & Liquor Mart v. H & S Petroleum, Inc., 2002 WI 92, 254 
Wis. 2d 478, 647 N.W.2d 177? 
2. If the right to a jury trial exists under one set of 
procedures but not the other set of procedures, how does this 
affect the question of whether the procedures are significantly 
different? 
3. What is the level of scrutiny applied to determine the 
constitutionality of the statute if there is a constitutional 
right to a jury trial? 
4. Do the challenged portions of Act 86 survive that level 
of scrutiny? 
¶20 The parties presented oral argument in regard to these 
four issues on October 7, 2010. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶21 A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute 
presents a question of law that we review de novo.  Nankin, 245 
Wis. 2d 86, ¶10.   A statute is presumed constitutional and this 
court must indulge in every presumption to sustain the law if at 
all possible.  Id.  The party challenging the statute must prove 
that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
12 
 
and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the statute's 
constitutionality.  Id.   
III. DISCUSSION 
¶22 The 
equal 
protection 
clause 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution provides that "[a]ll people are born equally free 
and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these 
are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness . . . ."  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 1.  We apply the same interpretation to the 
equal protection provisions of the Wisconsin and the United 
States Constitutions.  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶11; Tomczak v. 
Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 261, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998). 
¶23 Nankin sets forth the three-step analysis we apply in 
determining whether Act 86 violates the equal protection 
provisions of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.  
Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶11-15.  First, we must determine 
whether the legislature created a distinct classification of 
citizens when it passed Act 86.  Id., ¶13.  Second, if it did, 
we must determine whether Act 86 treats this class significantly 
different from all others similarly situated.  Id., ¶14.  If 
this question is also answered in the affirmative, we must reach 
the third determination: whether a rational basis exists for the 
significantly different treatment.  Id., ¶15. 
A.  Act 86 Creates a Distinct Class of Citizens 
¶24 The parties agree that Act 86 created a distinct class 
of citizens.  We are not bound by this agreement.  However, we 
have conducted our own review, and after doing so, hold that Act 
86 did create a distinct class of citizens: taxpayers living in 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
13 
 
opt out municipalities.  Therefore, we turn our attention next 
to the second step in the Nankin analysis——whether Act 86 treats 
taxpayers in opt out municipalities significantly different than 
all other taxpayers. 
B. Act 86 Treats Taxpayers Living in Opt Out Municipalities 
Significantly Different Than All Other Taxpayers 
¶25 Act 86 requires taxpayers in opt out municipalities to 
follow a different procedure in order to challenge their 
property tax assessments than the procedure taxpayers in all 
other municipalities must follow.  In this section, we first 
discuss Act 86's different treatment at the Board of Review 
stage.  Second, we discuss Act 86's different treatment at the 
circuit court review stage.  Third, we explain why these 
differences cause taxpayers in opt out municipalities to follow 
a significantly different process to challenge their assessments 
than taxpayers in all other municipalities.  Fourth, we discuss 
whether a jury trial right exists in de novo review actions. 
1. Assessment Challenges at the Board of Review Stage 
¶26 Act 
86 
grants 
taxpayers 
living 
in 
opt 
out 
municipalities three rights at the Board of Review stage that 
taxpayers in all other municipalities do not have: a more 
detailed notice of a changed assessment, the right to additional 
time to prepare for their Board of Review hearing date, and 
comparatively 
broader 
discovery 
rights. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(c), (8)(d), (8)(j). 
¶27 The first of these rights relates to the notice of a 
changed assessment that must be sent to an affected taxpayer.  
No. 
2009AP524   
 
14 
 
Assessors in all municipalities must send notices of changed 
assessments to each taxpayer at least fifteen days before the 
Board of Review's annual meeting.13  Wis. Stat. § 70.365.  In opt 
out municipalities, this notice must inform the taxpayer of the 
last day on which he or she may file an objection.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(c), (16)(c).  Opt out municipalities must also post 
on their websites the last day objections to assessments may be 
made.  Id. 
¶28 The second of these rights is the right of taxpayers 
in opt out municipalities to a sixty-day extension of their 
Board of Review hearing date.  If a taxpayer in any municipality 
objects to their assessment, the taxpayer must give written or 
oral notice of an intent to file an objection to the board's 
clerk at least forty-eight hours before the board's first 
scheduled meeting of the year.14  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(a).  The 
taxpayer must then file a written objection within the first two 
hours of the Board of Review's first scheduled meeting of the 
year, unless extraordinary circumstances are shown.  Id.  During 
its first meeting, the Board of Review schedules hearings for 
                                                 
13 Boards of review must meet annually during the thirty-day 
period beginning on the second Monday in May.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(1).   
14 Unless good cause or extraordinary circumstances are 
shown.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(a).  In first class cities, the 
notice of an intent to object must be written and must be filed 
by the third Monday in May.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(16)(a). 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
15 
 
each 
written 
objection 
it 
has 
received.15 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(3)(a).  The Board of Review must then notify each 
objecting taxpayer of the time of their hearing at least forty-
eight hours in advance of that meeting.  § 70.47(3)(ah).  In 
contrast, in opt out municipalities, the Board of Review must 
grant a sixty-day extension of the hearing date once a taxpayer 
requests the extension and pays a $100 fee.  § 70.47(7)(c).  
This 
extension, 
available 
to 
only 
taxpayers 
in 
opt 
out 
municipalities, may be lengthened by the Board of Review if the 
taxpayer shows good cause.  Id. 
¶29 The third of these rights relates to broader discovery 
rights available to taxpayers in opt out municipalities during 
Board of Review proceedings.  If the objecting taxpayer in an 
opt out municipality receives a sixty-day extension, the 
assessor and the taxpayer must exchange all reports, documents, 
and exhibits they will present at the Board of Review hearing no 
less 
than 
ten 
days 
before 
the 
hearing. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(c), 16(c).  Both the assessor and the objecting 
taxpayer in an opt out municipality can compel the attendance of 
witnesses at the Board of Review hearing.  § 70.47(8)(d).  In 
addition, taxpayers in opt out municipalities may compel the 
                                                 
15 The Board of Review may hear written objections at its 
first meeting if the board gave notice of the hearing to the 
property owner and the assessor at least forty-eight hours prior 
to the beginning of the scheduled meeting or if both the 
property owner and the assessor waive the forty-eight hour 
notice requirement.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(3)(a). 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
16 
 
attendance of witnesses for depositions after showing good cause 
to the Board of Review.  Id.   
2. Assessment Challenges at the Circuit Court Stage 
¶30 While Act 86 requires opt out municipalities to grant 
their taxpayers additional rights during Board of Review 
proceedings, Act 86 limits both the type and scope of circuit 
court review these taxpayers may seek.  Act 86 limits taxpayers 
in opt out municipalities to circuit court review through the 
“enhanced 
certiorari 
procedure” 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 70.47(13).  In contrast, taxpayers in all other municipalities 
have a right to select from either traditional certiorari review 
or de novo review.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47(13), 74.37. 
 
¶31 The enhanced certiorari review available to taxpayers 
in opt out municipalities is narrower in scope than the de novo 
review available to all other taxpayers.  Under enhanced 
certiorari review, the circuit court must presume that the Board 
of Review's assessment is correct absent a "sufficient showing" 
that the assessment is incorrect.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13).  In 
opt out municipalities, it is the taxpayer's burden to rebut 
this presumption.  If, in the course of an enhanced certiorari 
hearing, the taxpayer in an opt out municipality successfully 
rebuts the presumption that the Board of Review’s assessment is 
correct, the court may consider (1) evidence that was not 
available at the time of the hearing before the Board, (2) 
evidence that the Board refused to consider, and (3) evidence 
that the court otherwise determines should be considered in 
order to correctly assess the property.  Id.  A taxpayer in an 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
17 
 
opt out municipality who seeks enhanced certiorari review is not 
required to pay the challenged tax prior to seeking such review, 
and the enhanced certiorari proceeding is given scheduling 
preference in the circuit court over other proceedings.  Id.  In 
addition, both Metropolitan Associates and Milwaukee agree that 
enhanced certiorari review does not carry with it a right to a 
jury trial.16 
 
¶32 In contrast, the de novo review available in all other 
municipalities 
requires 
that 
a 
circuit 
court 
make 
its 
determination without regard to the Board of Review's record or 
decision.  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶25.  In de novo review, the 
circuit court must hear new evidence and, while the court must 
presume that the assessor's valuation is correct, the court does 
not presume that the decision of the Board of Review is correct.  
Id.  Taxpayers who request de novo review have access to 
traditional civil discovery tools, but they must pay the 
challenged tax prior to filing their action.  Further, in 
contrast to enhanced certiorari proceedings, their action is not 
given 
scheduling 
preference 
over 
other 
circuit 
court 
proceedings.  Id., ¶29; Wis. Stat. §§ 74.37(4)(b), 70.47(13).  
In addition, the parties dispute whether de novo review includes 
a right to a jury trial. 
3. Enhanced Certiorari and Enhanced Board of Review Procedures 
Available in Opt Out Municipalities Are Significantly Different 
From the De Novo Procedure Available in All Other Municipalities 
                                                 
16 See Part III.B.4. 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
18 
 
¶33 Having surveyed the differences between the assessment 
challenge 
procedure 
available 
to 
taxpayers 
in 
opt 
out 
municipalities and the assessment challenge procedure available 
to taxpayers in all other municipalities, we next consider 
whether these differences are significant in light of this 
court’s decision in Nankin.  The court of appeals held that Act 
86 successfully addressed Nankin's equal protection concerns 
and, therefore, no significantly different treatment existed 
between taxpayers in opt out municipalities and taxpayers in all 
other municipalities.  We disagree.  
¶34 We first discuss the reasoning that led the Nankin 
court to hold that Milwaukee taxpayers experienced significantly 
different treatment.  We then apply the reasoning from Nankin to 
the facts of the present case. 
a.  Nankin Concludes that Significantly Different Treatment 
Exists When Some Citizens May "Fully Contest Their Case in a 
Court Trial" and Others May Not 
 
¶35 In 2001, all taxpayers could first seek review of an 
assessment at their local Board of Review.  In 2001, however, 
Milwaukee taxpayers could only challenge the Board of Review's 
decision through traditional certiorari review.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(13) (2000-01).  In contrast, all other Wisconsin 
taxpayers could challenge a Board of Review's decision through 
either traditional certiorari review or § 74.37 de novo review.  
See Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶6.  We held in Nankin that all 
taxpayers outside of Milwaukee could "fully contest their case 
in a court trial" through the de novo review process.  Id., ¶24.  
No. 
2009AP524   
 
19 
 
We then compared the assessment review procedure available to 
Milwaukee taxpayers with de novo review available to all other 
taxpayers to determine whether Milwaukee taxpayers had access to 
a process which allowed them to "fully contest their case in a 
court trial." 
¶36 The Nankin court pointed to four differences between 
de novo review and the Board of Review procedures provided to 
Milwaukee taxpayers to conclude that the two procedures were 
significantly different.  First, de novo review allows taxpayers 
to present their case in a forum that is conducted according to 
the rules of evidence and discovery.  Id., ¶29.  Board of Review 
hearings, by contrast, follow more informal rules that "may lead 
to an incomplete or inadequate record."  Id.  Second, de novo 
review permits property owners to subpoena witnesses to testify 
at trial, while the Board of Review procedures in place prior to 
2001 did not.  Third, de novo review is conducted by a judge, 
while Board of Review proceedings are conducted by citizens who 
may not be "versed in the rules of evidence."  Id., ¶31.  
Fourth, de novo review "typically afforded a greater amount of 
time to prepare [a] case at the circuit court level," while 
Board of Review hearings afford less time to prepare a case.  
Id., ¶32. 
¶37 Next, Nankin focused on three differences between de 
novo review and traditional certiorari review when it held that 
the traditional certiorari process was significantly different 
than a de novo procedure which allowed taxpayers to  "fully 
contest their case in a court trial." First, de novo review 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
20 
 
requires 
the 
circuit 
court 
to 
make 
its 
own 
independent 
determinations, while traditional certiorari review is limited 
to a review of the record as it was compiled at the Board of 
Review stage. Second, de novo review requires giving presumptive 
weight only to the assessor's determination, while traditional 
certiorari review requires circuit court deference to the Board 
of Review's decision. And third, de novo review requires the 
circuit court to make its own assessment determination, while 
traditional certiorari review generally requires the circuit 
court to remand to the board if a reassessment is necessary.  
Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶25. 
¶38 Since Milwaukee taxpayers could not "fully contest 
their case in a court trial" while all other taxpayers could do 
so through the de novo procedure, we held that the classes 
received 
significantly 
different 
treatment. 
 
Nankin, 
245 
Wis. 2d 86, ¶¶24, 27. 
b.  Taxpayers in Opt Out Municipalities May Not “Fully Contest 
Their Case in a Court Trial” While All Other Taxpayers May Do So 
¶39 Applying this court’s reasoning in Nankin to the 
present case, we must examine the differences between Act 86's 
enhanced certiorari and Board of Review procedures, and contrast 
them with the de novo procedure available to all other 
taxpayers——a process which allows taxpayers to "fully contest 
their case in a court trial."  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶24.  
First, we review the enhanced Board of Review rights provided to 
taxpayers under Act 86, and conclude they do not provide 
taxpayers with the protections of a court trial.  Second, we 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
21 
 
review the enhanced certiorari procedure under Act 86, and again 
conclude they fail to provide taxpayers with the protections of 
a court trial. 
i. Enhanced Board of Review Rights 
¶40 The enhanced Board of Review hearing rights available 
under Act 86 to taxpayers in opt out municipalities do not allow 
taxpayers in Board of Review proceedings to "fully contest their 
case in a court trial."  Id.  Even with the additional rights 
granted under Act 86, the Board of Review proceedings continue 
to favor municipalities over taxpayers, just as they did in 
Nankin.   
¶41 For one, the sixty-day hearing date extension under 
Act 86 runs the risk of forcing complex property disputes into 
being heard much more quickly than such disputes would typically 
be heard in a de novo action.  Further, additional extensions 
following the initial sixty-day extension would require a 
finding of "good cause" by a Board of Review composed not of 
legal experts, but instead composed of lay citizens.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(7)(c), 
(16)(c). 
 
This 
truncated 
discovery 
period 
heightens the risk we feared in Nankin of an "incomplete or 
inadequate record."  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶29.   
¶42 Even setting aside these defects, the Board of Review 
process suffers other shortcomings when compared to a de novo 
action.  For one, the Board of Review procedure under Act 86 
allows the taxpayer access to the assessor's trial exhibits a 
mere ten days prior to their hearing.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13).  
The appropriate time for the taxpayer to depose the assessor 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
22 
 
would be in this ten-day period after the taxpayer has received 
the assessor's report that will be introduced during the Board 
of Review hearing.  Additionally, Act 86 requires that taxpayers 
in opt out municipalities show “good cause” in order to depose 
the assessor.  § 70.47(8)(d).  Therefore, in this ten-day pre-
hearing period, the taxpayer would need to obtain a finding of 
"good cause" from a Board of Review composed of individuals 
untrained in the law, depose the assessor, review and analyze 
all of the assessor's trial exhibits, and prepare to argue their 
case.  Further, during this ten-day pre-hearing period, the 
taxpayer would be attempting to discover other evidence that may 
refute the assessor’s valuation.  De novo trials, on the other 
hand, do not operate under such restrictive timelines and the 
discovery process is governed by a judge, not a lay citizen.  
Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶31.  Nankin's concern that the Board of 
Review would develop an "incomplete or inadequate record" 
remains unanswered.  Id., ¶29. 
¶43 The enhanced Board of Review rights created by Act 86 
fail to provide taxpayers the ability to "fully contest their 
case in a court trial." Accordingly, we hold that the enhanced 
Board of Review rights cause taxpayers in opt out municipalities 
to be treated significantly different than all other taxpayers. 
ii. Enhanced Certiorari Procedure  
¶44 The enhanced certiorari procedure created by Act 86 
also 
fails to offer the protections of a court trial.  
Specifically, the enhanced certiorari procedure significantly 
restricts the taxpayer's ability to bring additional evidence 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
23 
 
before the circuit court when compared to de novo review.  In de 
novo review, the challenging taxpayer can seek the introduction 
of any admissible evidence in the circuit court.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.02.  Under the enhanced certiorari procedure created by 
Act 86, however, the circuit court may allow the taxpayer to 
introduce additional evidence only if the taxpayer first rebuts 
the presumption that the board's valuation is correct.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(7)(c), (16)(a).  If the taxpayer successfully 
rebuts the presumption that the Board's valuation is correct, 
then, and only then, may the circuit court consider (1) evidence 
that was not available at the time of the Board of Review 
hearing, (2) evidence that the Board of Review refused to 
consider, or (3) evidence that the court otherwise determines 
should 
be 
considered 
in 
order 
to 
determine 
the 
correct 
assessment.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13). 
¶45 This court observed in Nankin that the de novo action 
“is not simply another means of judicial review."  Nankin, 245 
Wis. 2d 86, ¶24.  Instead, the de novo action is a completely 
independent cause of action in which the Board of Review's 
factual and legal determinations may be entirely disregarded by 
the circuit court.  Id., ¶¶24-25.   
¶46 Unlike de novo actions, the circuit court on enhanced 
certiorari review must first review the Board of Review's 
factual and legal findings.  Only then does it decide whether 
the 
decision's 
presumption 
of 
correctness 
is 
rebutted——a 
prerequisite 
to 
the 
taxpayer 
introducing 
any 
independent 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
24 
 
evidence.17  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13).  This enhanced certiorari 
procedure merely entails a “court’s review of a lower court’s or 
an administrative body’s factual or legal findings.” Nankin, 245 
Wis. 2d 86, ¶24.  This is not comparable to a de novo action 
where taxpayers have access to a new "action according to state 
civil practice and procedure, including the right to a trial."  
Id.  The taxpayer on de novo review need not first overcome any 
presumptions to introduce evidence.  Rather, "[a]ll relevant 
evidence is admissible" in de novo actions.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 904.02.   
¶47 The enhanced certiorari procedure created by Act 86 
fails to provide taxpayers the ability to "fully contest their 
case in a court trial." Accordingly, we hold that the enhanced 
certiorari procedure created by Act 86 causes taxpayers in opt 
out municipalities to be treated significantly different than 
all other taxpayers. 
4. Section 74.37 De Novo Review Does Not Contain a Jury Trial 
Right 
¶48 Both parties concede that if a § 74.37 de novo action 
contains 
a 
jury 
trial 
right 
and 
a 
§ 70.47(13) 
enhanced 
                                                 
17 Under Act 86, the circuit court may consider “evidence that the 
court . . . determines should be considered in order to 
determine the correct assessment.”  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13).  It 
is true that this "catch-all" option provides an opportunity for 
the taxpayer to seek the introduction of new evidence.  However, 
the plain language of the statute allows for such an opportunity 
only after the taxpayer overcomes the substantial burden of 
demonstrating the incorrectness of the Board of Review's 
decision and, even then, does so only at the discretion of the 
circuit court which "may" consider the new evidence. 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
25 
 
certiorari proceeding does not contain such a right, this would 
per se qualify as significantly different treatment.18  We agree 
that such a distinction between the assessment review processes 
would qualify as a significant difference.  Therefore, whether 
the § 74.37 de novo action contains a jury trial right is 
relevant in determining whether the de novo action and enhanced 
certiorari proceeding are significantly different. 
¶49 The parties disagree as to whether de novo actions 
brought pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 74.37 contain a jury trial 
right.  We hold they do not.  In Village Food & Liquor Mart, 216 
Wis. 2d 189, ¶11, we held that: 
[A] party has a constitutional right to have a 
statutory claim tried to a jury when: (1) the cause of 
action created by the statute existed, was known, or 
was recognized at common law at the time of the 
adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution in 1848 and (2) 
the action was regarded at law in 1848. 
Id.  Metropolitan Associates argues that the modern § 74.37 de 
novo excessive assessment claim is a counterpart to the common 
law claim for "money had and received" which existed in 1848.  
Milwaukee argues that the claim for money had and received 
included only illegal assessment claims and not excessive 
assessment claims. 
¶50 We conclude that an action for money had and received 
in an excessive valuation case was not recognized at common law 
                                                 
18 The parties agree that enhanced certiorari proceedings do not 
contain a jury trial right.  We also agree.  These proceedings 
are directly correlated to the common law writ of certiorari 
which was not an action for which a jury would have been 
available at common law.  See Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Schubel, 29 
Wis. 2d 444, 450-52 (1872). 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
26 
 
in 1848 and therefore only reach the first step in the Village 
Food analysis.  In applying the first step of the Village Food 
test, we look to whether a § 74.37 de novo action "is 
essentially the counterpart of a cause of action existing in 
1848 [and whether] the two causes of action . . . share a 
similar purpose."  Harvot v. Solo Cup Co., 2009 WI 85, ¶72, 320 
Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 176. 
¶51 First, 
we 
discuss 
whether 
Matheson 
v. 
Town 
of 
Mazomanie, 20 Wis. 201 (*191)(1865), or A.H. Strange Co. v. City 
of Merrill, 134 Wis. 514, 115 N.W.2d 115 (1908), points to a 
common law counterpart to the § 74.37 de novo excessive 
assessment action.  Second, we discuss whether the assessment 
challenge process which existed in pre-statehood Wisconsin 
contained a jury trial right.  Third, we discuss whether the 
assessment challenge process which existed immediately after 
statehood contained a jury trial right. 
a.  No Common Law Action Existed in 1848 for Excessive 
Assessment Claims   
¶52 Metropolitan Associates cites no case showing that 
actions for an excessive assessment existed in our pre-1848 
common law.  Metropolitan Associates erroneously relies on 
Matheson v. Town of Mazomanie, 20 Wis. 201 (*191)(1865) to 
support its argument that the common law action for money had 
and received included excessive assessment claims.  In that 
case, the taxpayer (“Matheson”) self-reported and verified by 
oath the value of his personal property to be $1,000.  Id. at 
201 (*191).  The assessor then added $5,000 to the value of 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
27 
 
Matheson's nonenumerated articles of personal property, for a 
total assessed value of $6,000.  Id.  We held that after 
Matheson had verified the value of his nonenumerated property by 
oath, neither the assessor, town clerk, or board of supervisors 
had the statutory power to increase the valuation.  Accordingly, 
we concluded that the $5,000 addition was "unlawful and void" 
against Matheson.  Id. at 204 (*194). 
¶53 Matheson is not an excessive assessment case.  The 
"unlawful and void" language from Matheson shows that the 
assessor did not merely overvalue property which the assessor 
had the lawful power to tax.  This "unlawful and void" language 
instead reveals that the assessor did not have the power to 
assess the nonenumerated articles against Matheson.  A clear 
counterpart to the common law Matheson claim would be a modern 
Wis. Stat. § 74.35 action to recover an "unlawful tax" and not a 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 74.37 
excessive 
assessment 
action. 
 
Modern 
excessive assessment cases under § 74.37 do not concern the 
power of the assessor to assess a certain property (i.e. the 
"lawfulness" of the tax).  Rather, modern excessive assessment 
cases concern the proper application of assessment principles to 
property which can lawfully be subject to tax. 
¶54 Metropolitan Associates further relies on our holding 
in A.H. Strange Co. v. City of Merrill, 134 Wis. 514, 518, 115 
N.W. 115 (1908), that: 
Independently of the statute, if one pays a tax 
involuntarily, . . . he may sue to recover back the 
tax.  It will be observed that an action based on 
involuntary payment of an illegal tax was held to be 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
28 
 
maintainable in this state before the passage of the 
law of 1870 . . . . 
Metropolitan Associates argues that since property taxes are 
involuntarily paid, they fall under the common law action 
described in A.H. Strange.  Metropolitan Associates, however, 
ignores the language in A.H. Strange which expressly limits the 
common law action described therein to one involving an "illegal 
tax."  Id.  Again, this implicates a § 74.35 unlawful tax claim 
and not the § 74.37 excessive assessment claim.  Accordingly, 
case law evidences no common law action existing in 1848 for an 
excessive assessment claim. 
b.  The Procedure for Challenging Assessments Which Existed in 
Wisconsin Before 1848 Did Not Contain a Jury Trial Right 
¶55 The statutory processes for assessment challenges 
which existed in the decade prior to statehood show that in this 
period, excessive assessment cases were not tried to juries.19  
The 1839 Statutes of the Territory of Wisconsin required that:  
[S]hould any person feel aggrieved by the value which 
may be affixed upon his land by the assessor, or by 
the value at which the appraisers estimated his town 
lot, he may produce evidence before the board of 
commissioners, and if they think the value too high or 
too low, they shall order the clerk to alter it 
accordingly. 
                                                 
19 This 1838-48 period is critical to our analysis because 
the Village Food test requires that we examine whether the cause 
of action created by Wis. Stat. § 74.37 "was known, or was 
recognized at common law at the time of the adoption of the 
Wisconsin Constitution in 1848."  Village Food, 216 Wis. 2d 189, 
¶11. 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
29 
 
Wis. Terr. Stat. p. 45 § 5 (1839).  As this statute illustrates, 
prior to statehood, county commissioners served as the precursor 
to the modern Board of Review.  This review conducted by county 
commissioners was not a jury trial but rather is more comparable 
to an administrative hearing before a public agency. 
¶56 The 1839 statutes also provided a mechanism for review 
of the county board of commissioners' decision in the district 
court: 
From all the decisions of the several boards of 
commissioner[s] there shall be allowed an appeal to 
the 
district 
court, 
by 
any 
person 
or 
persons 
aggrieved, and the person or persons appealing shall 
take the same within thirty days after such decision, 
by giving bond with security, to the acceptance of the 
clerk of said board, conditioned for the faithful 
prosecution of such appeal, and the payment of costs, 
if the same shall be adjudged by the said court to be 
paid by such appellant; and the clerk shall record 
such appeal, with the cases pending in the district 
court, within twenty days after the taking of such 
appeal. 
Wis. Terr. Stat. p. 106 § 18 (1839).  The fact that such an 
appeal would be heard by a judge and not a jury provides support 
for our conclusion that the procedure for prosecuting an 
excessive assessment has never included the right to a jury 
trial.  Wis. Terr. Stat. p. 196 § 6 (1839). 
c.  The Procedure for Challenging Assessments Which Existed 
Immediately After Statehood Did Not Contain a Jury Trial Right 
¶57 During the decade after statehood, from 1848 until 
1858, Wisconsin allowed property owners to make an affidavit as 
to the value of their property.  Wis. Stat. tit. 5, ch. 15, § 26 
(1849).  The assessor was required to accept the value 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
30 
 
determined by the taxpayer's affidavit.  Id.  Because of this 
affidavit 
process, 
taxpayers 
had 
no 
reason 
to 
challenge 
assessments——the 
taxpayers 
themselves 
valued 
the 
property.  
Simply put, there was no need for juries in such matters, which 
is likely why none were provided for by statute.  
¶58 Because taxpayers had no right to try excessive 
assessment claims to juries either immediately before or after 
statehood, it would be incompatible with both Wisconsin's 
history and the Village Food test to hold that the modern 
§ 74.37 de novo excessive assessment claim contained a jury 
trial right. 
 
¶59 Although we find that neither an enhanced certiorari 
proceeding nor a de novo action contains a jury trial right, we 
nonetheless hold that Act 86 treats taxpayers in opt out 
municipalities significantly different from all other taxpayers.  
We must therefore, unlike the court of appeals, reach the third 
step of Metropolitan Associates' equal protection challenge——
whether there is a rational basis for this significantly 
different treatment.  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶15. 
C.  No Rational Basis Exists for the Significantly Different 
Treatment of Taxpayers in Opt Out Municipalities 
¶60 Having concluded that Act 86 treats taxpayers in opt 
out 
municipalities 
significantly different from all other 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
31 
 
taxpayers, we next consider whether this significantly different 
treatment has a rational basis.20 
¶61 A statute violates equal protection only when "the 
legislature has made an irrational or arbitrary classification, 
one that has no reasonable purpose or relationship to the facts 
or a proper state policy."  Milwaukee Brewers v. Wisconsin Dep't 
of Health & Soc. Servs., 130 Wis. 2d 79, 99, 387 N.W.2d 254 
(1986).  Any doubts must be resolved in favor of the 
reasonableness of the classification.  State v. Hezzie R., 219 
Wis. 2d 848, 894, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1990). 
¶62 "'The fact [that] a statutory classification results 
in some inequity . . . does not provide sufficient grounds for 
invalidating a legislative enactment.'"  Id. at 893-94. (quoting 
State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989)).  
Indeed, "'[e]qual protection does not deny a state the power to 
treat persons within its jurisdiction differently . . . .'"  Id. 
at 893.  However, "[t]he basic test is not whether some 
inequality results from the classification but whether there 
                                                 
20 Usually, this court will uphold a statute under equal 
protection principles if we find that a rational basis supports 
the legislative classification.  Aischer ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. 
Patients Compensation Fund, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 127, 613 N.W.2d 849 
(2000).  We engage in strict scrutiny analysis only when a 
statute 
impinges 
on 
a 
"fundamental 
right" 
or 
creates 
a 
classification that "operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a 
suspect class."  Castellani v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 261, 261-62, 
578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).  In the present case, because no suspect 
class or fundamental interest is involved, we will sustain the 
classification if any rational basis exists to support it.  
Milwaukee Brewers v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 
130 Wis. 2d 79, 98, 387 N.W.2d 254 (1986). 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
32 
 
exists a rational basis to justify the inequality of the 
classification."  Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 99.  In 
determining whether a rational basis exists, we look first to 
determine whether the legislature articulated a rationale for 
its determination.  Id. at 99-101.  If we cannot identify any 
such articulated rationale, it is the court’s obligation to 
construct one.  Id. at 101. 
¶63 The classification created by Act 86 is based on 
whether or not a municipality has enacted an ordinance opting 
out of de novo review.  After reviewing Act 86's legislative 
history, we note that the legislature did not articulate any 
rationale for creating this distinct class of opt out taxpayers.  
Therefore, we are obligated to construct a rationale if at all 
possible.  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶37. 
¶64 Under our case law, a statute must meet five criteria 
in order to have a rational basis: 
(1) All 
classification[s] 
must 
be 
based 
upon 
substantial distinctions which make one class really 
different from another;  
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the 
purpose of the law;  
(3) The 
classification 
must 
not 
be 
based 
upon 
existing circumstances only.  [It must not be so 
constituted as to preclude addition to the numbers 
included within the class];  
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply 
equally to each member thereof;  
(5) The characteristics of each class should be so 
far different from those of other classes as to 
reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
33 
 
regard to the public good, of substantially different 
legislation. 
Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶39 (citing Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶ 
58, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849)(alterations in original).  
Under this test, Act 86 fails to satisfy the first, second, and 
fifth criteria. 
¶65 To overcome the first prong of the rational basis 
test, Milwaukee must show that "substantial distinctions" exist 
between taxpayers living in opt out municipalities and taxpayers 
living in all other municipalities. 
¶66 Milwaukee argues that the enhanced Board of Review 
rights and enhanced certiorari procedure given to taxpayers in 
opt out municipalities create substantial distinctions between 
the 
classes 
sufficient 
to 
make 
taxpayers 
in 
opt 
out 
municipalities "really different" from taxpayers in all other 
municipalities.  Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶39.  Metropolitan 
Associates argues that Milwaukee only cites distinctions in the 
treatment of the taxpayers and does not cite to any distinctions 
between the characteristics of the taxpayers in the two classes. 
¶67 In Nankin we held that "[t]here is nothing inherent 
about populous counties to justify the classification in the 
statute that restricts the manner in which owners of property 
located in such counties may challenge their assessments."  
Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶41.  We also held that: 
There is no reason why an owner of property located in 
the Village of Shorewood in Milwaukee County should be 
treated differently than an owner of property in the 
Village of Amherst in Portage County with respect to 
challenging their property assessments. 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
34 
 
Id. 
¶68 In this case——to echo Nankin's holding——we see nothing 
inherently different about taxpayers in opt out municipalities 
that would justify restricting the manner in which taxpayers 
located in those municipalities may challenge their assessments.  
See Id., ¶41.  Taxpayers in opt out municipalities are no 
different from taxpayers in all other municipalities, except for 
the 
different 
rights 
available 
to 
taxpayers 
in 
opt 
out 
municipalities at the Board of Review and circuit court review 
stages.  We see no reason why Act 86 allows opt out 
municipalities to deny their taxpayers the ability to "fully 
contest their case in a court trial," while taxpayers in all 
other municipalities may still fully contest their case in a de 
novo proceeding.21  Id., ¶24. 
¶69 Milwaukee advances no characteristic of taxpayers in 
opt out counties that makes such taxpayers really different from 
all other taxpayers.  Thus, it fails to establish the first 
prong of the rational basis test. 
¶70 Under the second prong of the rational basis test, we 
examine whether the classification adopted is germane to the 
                                                 
21 Milwaukee advances two arguments in the present case that 
are necessarily inconsistent with each other.  On the one hand, 
Milwaukee denies that Act 86 treats taxpayers in opt out 
municipalities significantly different than taxpayers in all 
other municipalities.  On the other hand——for the purposes of 
its 
rational 
basis 
argument——Milwaukee 
argues 
that 
the 
differences 
in 
the 
treatment 
between 
these 
two 
classes 
constitute 
"substantial 
distinctions" 
which 
make 
opt 
out 
taxpayers "really different" from all other taxpayers.  The 
illogic of this position is self-evident. 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
35 
 
purpose of the law.  Milwaukee argues——similarly to the 
arguments we found unpersuasive in Nankin——that the purpose of 
Act 86’s opt out review is to promote early settlement, provide 
taxpayers access to a faster review, and provide taxpayers a 
cheaper review.  See Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶37.  Milwaukee 
argues that creating the class of opt out taxpayers is germane 
to these purposes.  We are not persuaded. 
¶71 Judicial efficiency is a concern that all courts 
share, irrespective of municipal location.  See id., ¶¶38, 43-
44.  It is irrational for the legislature to allow opt out 
municipalities to arbitrarily deprive their citizens of de novo 
review based on whatever criteria the municipality chooses to 
consider.  Act 86 does not bind a municipality to first consider 
whether opting out of de novo review would be a more efficient 
process for that municipality and its taxpayers.  A municipality 
following Act 86 may, for whatever reason it chooses——whether 
aligned with the legislature’s stated objectives or not——opt out 
of de novo review. 
¶72 Milwaukee argues that the assessment review under Act 
86 is a "faster, more efficient, more cost-effective" procedure 
than the traditional Board of Review and circuit court review 
procedure.  If this is true, there appears to be no reason why 
the legislature would not simply repeal the § 74.37 de novo 
review statute and instead require the Act 86 review procedure 
be followed in all municipalities.  However, the legislature did 
not do this.  Instead, the classification created by the 
legislature under Act 86 delegates the decision of whether to 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
36 
 
pass an ordinance adopting the assessment review procedure under 
Act 86 to each individual municipality in Wisconsin.  The 
objectives of Act 86 argued by Milwaukee in the present case, 
which are essentially to create a more efficient assessment 
review procedure for municipalities, have no relation to the 
classification created by Act 86, which simply delegates the 
choice of whether to implement Act 86’s streamlined assessment 
review procedure to each individual municipality.  To be germane 
to the purposes of Act 86, the classification created by Act 86 
would need to, in some way, align to the legislature’s 
objectives in enacting Act 86.    Milwaukee fails to explain, 
and we are unable to discern, how the classification of opt out 
taxpayers is germane to the purposes of Act 86.  Therefore, we 
conclude that Milwaukee fails to satisfy the second prong of the 
rational basis test. 
¶73 Finally, under the fifth prong of the rational basis 
test, we "examine whether the characteristics of each class are 
so far different as to reasonably suggest the propriety, as to 
the 
public good, 
of substantially different legislation."  
Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶43.  Here, as noted above, Milwaukee 
presents no characteristic of taxpayers residing in opt out 
municipalities——and we are unable to discern one——that is 
different than the characteristics of all other taxpayers.  
Since the characteristics of these taxpayers are identical, they 
cannot "reasonably suggest the propriety  . . . of substantially 
different legislation."  Thus, Milwaukee also fails to satisfy 
the fifth criteria of the rational basis test. 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
37 
 
¶74 In sum, Act 86 fails to satisfy the first, second, and 
fifth criteria of the rational basis test.  We therefore hold 
that Act 86's irrational denial of de novo review to a distinct 
class of citizens violates the equal protection provisions of 
the Wisconsin and the United States Constitutions. 
D. Act 86's Severability 
¶75 Because we have concluded that the provisions of Act 
86 which allow municipalities to deny their citizens access to 
§ 74.37 de novo review violate equal protection, we must now 
determine whether the unconstitutional provisions may be severed 
from Act 86's remaining provisions. 
¶76 Wisconsin Stat. § 990.001(11) provides that "[i]f any 
provision 
of 
the 
statutes 
or 
of 
a 
session 
law 
is 
invalid . . . such invalidity shall not affect other provisions 
or applications which can be given effect without the invalid 
provision or application."  We have long held that "the 
presumption is in favor of severability."  Nankin, ¶49 (quoting 
State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, ¶37, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998)).   
"Unless it is evident that the legislature would not have 
enacted 
those 
provisions 
which 
are 
within 
its 
power, 
independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be 
dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law."  Id. 
¶77 The legislature has expressed no intent in Act 86 that 
is 
contrary 
to 
the 
general 
presumption 
of 
severability.  
Further, the remaining sections of Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47, 73.03, 
and 74.37 remain fully operative as a law when the modifications 
from Act 86 which create the enhanced Board of Review procedure 
No. 
2009AP524   
 
38 
 
and the enhanced certiorari procedure are severed.  As a result, 
we hold that the provisions of Act 86 which create the enhanced 
Board of Review procedure and the enhanced certiorari procedure 
are severable. 
¶78 The 
circuit 
court 
severed 
only 
the 
specific 
subsections of § 74.37 that restrict taxpayers in opt out 
municipalities from seeking de novo review.22  The statutes 
creating the enhanced Board of Review and enhanced certiorari 
procedures were not affected by the circuit court order. 
¶79 As 
a 
result, 
under 
the 
circuit 
court's 
order, 
taxpayers in opt out municipalities would have access to three 
separate assessment review procedures: the enhanced Board of 
Review procedure, enhanced certiorari procedure, and de novo 
review.  By contrast, under the circuit court's order, taxpayers 
in all other municipalities would have access to traditional 
certiorari review and de novo review.  In enacting Act 86, the 
legislature clearly did not intend to create a situation where 
enhanced board of review and enhanced certiorari procedures 
would be available in a municipality where de novo review was 
also available.  Therefore, we conclude that all of Act 86’s 
                                                 
22 The specific subsections of § 74.37 that were severed by 
the circuit court were § 74.37(4)(c) as amended by Act 86 and § 
74.37(4)(d) as created by Act 86.   
No. 
2009AP524   
 
39 
 
modifications to Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47, 73.03, and 74.37 are 
unconstitutional.23 
¶80 It is important to note that our holding today simply 
returns the Board of Review procedures in all counties to the 
procedures which existed before Act 86 was approved.  It also 
returns the procedure for challenging Board of Review assessment 
determinations to the procedure which existed before Act 86 was 
approved——allowing all taxpayers the choice between traditional 
certiorari review and de novo review. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶81 We conclude that the treatment taxpayers in opt out 
municipalities receive under Act 86 it significantly different 
than the treatment all other taxpayers receive, and we conclude 
that this difference in treatment lacks a rational basis.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and hold that all 
of Act 86’s modifications to Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47, 73.03, and 
74.37 are unconstitutional. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
                                                 
23 One exception exists.  Section 10 of Act 86 modifies the 
manner in which interest is calculated under § 74.37.  This 
section applies to all taxpayers seeking de novo review and 
therefore is not implicated by our equal protection analysis.  
Further, it is evident the legislature would have enacted this 
interest rate provision independently of the provisions we are 
invalidating today.  Therefore, we do not sever § 74.37(5) as 
modified by Section 10 of Act 86. 
No.  2009AP524.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶82 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  I agree 
with the unanimous decision of the court of appeals reversing 
the order of the circuit court and holding that 2007 Wis. Act 86 
is constitutional.  I agree with the court of appeals that in 
enacting 2007 Wis. Act 86 the legislature sought to, and 
effectively did, address the equal protection deficiencies 
identified in Nankin v. Village of Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, 245 
Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141. 
¶83 As a result of 2007 Wis. Act 86, a taxation district 
may determine the procedure a taxpayer may use to challenge an 
assessment.  The taxation district may adhere to Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37(3)(d), allowing a taxpayer to pay the assessment and 
commence an action in circuit court to recover the amount of a 
claim not allowed.  Or a taxation district may "opt in" to Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 74.37(4)(c), 
(4)(d), 
allowing 
a 
taxpayer 
to 
get 
additional rights before the Board of Review and a broad right 
to be heard in court following an adverse decision by a Board of 
Review.        
¶84 First, like the court of appeals, I conclude that the  
treatment of taxpayers in "opt-in" taxation districts under 2007 
Wis. Act 86 is not significantly different from the treatment of 
taxpayers in taxation districts operating under Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37(3)(d).  Second, I conclude that even if the treatment of 
taxpayers in the two different classes of municipalities is 
significantly different, a rational basis exists for enabling 
taxing districts to determine whether to enact an ordinance to 
"opt in" under 2007 Wis. Act 86.  Third, I conclude that the 
No.  2009AP524.ssa 
 
2 
 
majority errs in its severability analysis.  If sections 8 and 9 
of 2007 Wis. Act 86 are unconstitutional, they may be severed 
from the remainder of 2007 Wis. Act 86.  
I 
¶85 Like the court of appeals, I conclude that the 
treatment of taxpayers in opt-in taxation districts under 2007 
Wis. Act 86 is not significantly different from the treatment of 
taxpayers in taxation districts operating under Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37(3)(d).1 
 
Accordingly, 
2007 
Wis. 
Act 
86 
is 
not 
unconstitutional. 
¶86 2007 Wis. Act 86 addressed the concerns this court 
elucidated in Nankin. 
¶87 2007 Wis. Act 86 gives increased rights to the 
taxpayer before the Board of Review: 
 
• Property owners can request a 60-day period to prepare 
for a hearing before the Board and may request additional 
extensions for good cause. 
 
• The parties are required to simultaneously exchange all 
reports, documents, and exhibits that will be presented 
at the hearing at least 10 days prior to the Board 
hearing. 
 
• The Board may, and upon request of the assessor or the 
taxpayer shall, compel the attendance of witnesses for 
the hearing.  Further, the Board upon good cause may 
compel the attendance of witnesses for depositions. 
¶88 Moreover, 2007 Wis. Act 86 gives increased rights to 
the taxpayer in judicial review of the Board of Review's 
assessment.  The decision of the Board of Review is granted a 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2009AP524.ssa 
 
3 
 
presumption of correctness, but "that presumption goes away if 
'rebutted by a sufficient showing by the [taxpayer] that the 
valuation is incorrect.  If the presumption is rebutted, the 
court shall determine the assessment without deference to the 
board of review and based on the record before the board of 
review, except that the court may consider evidence that was not 
available at the time of the hearing before the board[,] [or] 
that the board refused to consider, or that the court otherwise 
determines should be considered in order to determine the 
correct assessment.'"2  
¶89 As the court of appeals explains, the circuit court is 
given extensive leeway in judicial review under 2007 Wis. Act 
86, consistent with a circuit court's powers to conduct trials.3   
¶90 A presumption plays a role in judicial review under 
2007 Wis. Act 86 and also plays a role in judicial review under 
Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d).  The circuit court in a § 74.37(3)(d) 
action gives presumptive weight to the assessor's assessment.  
Therefore, under 2007 Wis. Act 86 or under § 74.37(3)(d), a 
taxpayer before the circuit court must overcome a presumption, 
either that the board's decision is presumptively correct, or 
that the assessor's assessment is presumptively correct.  In 
situations when the board accepts the assessor's assessment as 
                                                 
2 Metro. Assocs. v. City of Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 157, ¶9, 
321 Wis. 2d 632, 774 N.W.2d 821 (the court of appeals explains 
that this analysis comes directly from the statutes but that 
"[t]he bracketed comma does not appear in the amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(16)(a); 
the 
bracketed 
"or" 
is 
in 
the 
amended 
§ 70.47(16)(a) but is not in the amended § 70.47(13)"). 
3 Id., ¶9. 
No.  2009AP524.ssa 
 
4 
 
its determination of the assessment value, the two presumptions 
are indistinguishable. 
¶91 Even if the difference in the operation of these two 
presumptions under the two systems amounts to "some inequity," 
which I do not think it does, a "statutory classification [that] 
results in some inequity . . . does not provide sufficient 
grounds for invalidating a legislative enactment."4 
¶92 I conclude that a taxpayer in an "opt in" taxation 
district is not treated significantly differently from a 
taxpayer who pays the tax and seeks relief from an excessive 
assessment under Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d).  Accordingly, I 
conclude there is no equal protection violation.    
II 
¶93 In Nankin, this court was faced with a classification 
based on county population.  In the instant case, we are faced 
with a classification based on an option given to taxation 
districts. 
¶94 The challenged legislation in the present case, unlike 
the statute the court declared unconstitutional in Nankin, is 
uniformly 
applicable 
to 
all 
taxation 
districts. 
 
The 
classifications developed in the present statutory system are 
based on an option granted to all taxation districts to 
determine 
a comprehensive tax assessment challenge system 
applicable to the taxpayers in that district.  
                                                 
4 State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 
(1989). 
No.  2009AP524.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶95 This distinction leads me to the conclusion that even 
if I were to agree with the majority that taxpayers are treated 
substantially differently, the legislation granting a taxation 
district the option to establish this alternative procedure for 
tax assessment challenges is constitutional.   
¶96 A statute is presumed constitutional.5  In the present 
case it is undisputed that rational basis is the appropriate 
level of scrutiny for the equal protection challenge.6  The 
challenger 
has 
the 
burden 
of 
demonstrating 
that 
the 
classification is arbitrary and irrational beyond a reasonable 
doubt.7    
¶97 The statute challenged in the instant case will be 
upheld against an equal protection challenge if a plausible 
policy 
reason 
exists 
for 
the 
classification 
and 
the 
                                                 
5 Nankin v. Village of Shorewood, 2001 WI 92, ¶10, 245 
Wis. 2d 86, 630 N.W.2d 141. 
6 For a discussion of the strict and intermediate levels of 
scrutiny when a statute is challenged on equal protection 
grounds, see Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients 
Compensation Fund, 2005 WI 125, ¶¶59-63, 284 Wis. 2d 573, 701 
N.W.2d 440. 
7 Ferdon, 284 Wis. 2d 573, ¶73. 
This oft-used language of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" 
is more pertinent to an evidentiary burden of proof than to a 
burden imposed on a party on constitutionality, a question of 
law.  The burden of proof language recognizes the deference due 
to the legislature.  State v. Jadowski, 2004 WI 68, ¶10 n.7, 272 
Wis. 2d 418, 680 N.W.2d 810; Davis v. Grover, 166 Wis. 2d 501, 
564 n.13, 480 N.W.2d 460 (1992) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); 
Guzman v. St. Francis Hosp., 2001 WI App 21, ¶4 n.3, 240 
Wis. 2d 559, 623 N.W.2d 776. 
No.  2009AP524.ssa 
 
6 
 
classification is not arbitrary in relation to that reason.8  It 
will be held unconstitutional if it is shown to be "patently 
arbitrary" with "no rational relationship to a legitimate 
government interest."9 
                                                 
8 Ferdon, 284 Wis. 2d 573, ¶73; Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, 
¶106, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 N.W.2d 866; Doering v. WEA Ins. Group, 
193 Wis. 2d 118, 131, 532 N.W.2d 432 (1995) (citing Szarzynski 
v. YMCA, Camp Minikani, 184 Wis. 2d 875, 886, 517 N.W.2d 135 
(1994)); see also Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 
370-72, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980). 
9 Maurin, 274 Wis. 2d 28, ¶106 (citations omitted).   
The court sometimes uses a five-part test in analyzing 
equal protection challenges.  The five-part test is derived from 
cases involving a challenge to a law on the grounds that it is a 
special law.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, 60 
N.W. 270 (1894) (setting forth the first four factors in the 
five-part test in determining constitutionality based on the 
challenge that a law was a special law); Boyd v. City of 
Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 456, 66 N.W. 603 (1896) (challenge under 
constitutional prohibition of special laws); Risch v. Board of 
Trustees of Policeman's Pension Fund, 121 Wis. 44, 98 N.W. 954 
(1904) (establishing the fifth criterion in deciding whether the 
challenged law was a general or special law); Brown v. Haney, 
190 Wis. 285, 209 N.W. 591 (1926) (uniformity challenge based on 
classifications of school districts). 
In Ford Hopkins Co. v. Mayor & Common Council of City of 
Watertown, 226 Wis. 215, 276 N.W. 311 (1937), the court first 
applied the five-part test rooted in Johnson v. City of 
Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, to an equal protection challenge. 
No.  2009AP524.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶98 The legislature did not explicitly set out its purpose 
in enacting 2007 Wis. Act 86.  I will therefore search for a 
purpose that will uphold the statute's constitutionality. 
¶99 A legitimate purpose of this law is to increase the 
efficiency of the tax assessment challenge process for taxpayers 
and taxation districts.  An additional purpose, as indicated by 
the legislative history, is to provide a system that will reduce 
the number of actions brought under § 74.37.10   
¶100 In Nankin, we determined that a classification based 
strictly on county population was not germane to the purpose of 
judicial efficiency, or faster and cheaper resolution of 
assessment challenges for taxpayers (and taxation districts).  
                                                                                                                                                             
For early cases using the rational basis approach in equal 
protection challenges, see State v. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 118, 
99 N.W. 468 (1904) (equal protection "permits separation of 
[property or persons] into classes of property or persons 
similarly 
conditioned 
or 
situated, 
having 
characteristics 
legitimately distinguishing the members of one class from those 
of another in respects germane to some general and public 
purpose and object of the particular legislations."); Milwaukee 
Sales & Investment Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Wis., 174 Wis. 458, 
465, 183 N.W. 687 (1921) (equal protection action holding that 
"[t]he classification made by the act fails, in that it is not 
based on characteristics legitimately distinguishing the members 
of one class from those of the others in respects germane to the 
public purpose or object of this legislation . . . ."); In re 
Christoph, 205 Wis. 418, 421, 237 N.W. 134 (1931) ("[The] 
equality rule of the Constitution permits separation into 
classes if they have characteristics legitimately distinguishing 
the members of one class from another in respects germane to 
some public purpose."). 
10 "We're trying to reduce the number of assessment appeals 
that go to Circuit Court by creating an optional Board of Review 
process that municipalities could choose to adopt."  E-mail from 
Denise Solie of Rep. Mark Gottlieb's office to Joseph Kreye re: 
Drafting Request - Board of Review, drafting file for 2007 Wis. 
Act 68, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wis. 
No.  2009AP524.ssa 
 
8 
 
In large part this conclusion was based on the fact that those 
same 
purposes 
are 
similarly 
applicable 
to 
all 
taxpayers 
regardless of the population of the county in which the property 
is located.   
¶101 Here, the analysis is necessarily different.  The 
classification is not based strictly on a county population 
number.  Rather, the classification is based on the choice of a 
taxation district. 
¶102 Put simply, there is a legitimate government interest 
in efficiently handling tax assessment challenges.  Giving 
municipalities a choice between two comprehensive procedures 
advances this purpose, because it allows each taxation district 
to determine which procedure is more efficient under its unique 
circumstances.  As pointed out by the circuit court, one unique 
factor 
is 
the 
number 
and 
percentage 
of 
commercial 
and 
residential 
properties 
located 
in 
the 
taxation 
district.  
Apparently, more challenges can be expected regarding commercial 
properties. 
¶103 While the purpose of 2007 Wis. Act 86 is not expressly 
stated, efficiency in resolving tax assessment challenges is 
seemingly the driving force (both for the taxation district and 
the taxpayer) in creating this new optional system.  Providing 
municipalities with the option to determine which of two 
procedures 
will 
most 
efficiently 
resolve 
tax 
assessment 
challenges based on various local factors (like the number of 
residential 
and 
commercial 
properties) 
bears 
a 
rational 
relationship to the government interest in creating an efficient 
No.  2009AP524.ssa 
 
9 
 
system before the Board of Review and the courts for tax 
assessment challenges. 
¶104 The majority opinion rebukes Milwaukee's argument that 
the procedures under 2007 Wis. Act 86 are "faster, more 
efficient, [and] more cost-effective" by suggesting that if that 
were the case the legislature could simply repeal § 74.37(3) and 
universally apply the procedure created by 2007 Wis. Act 86. 
Majority op., ¶72.    
¶105 The legislature most certainly has the power to do so.  
However, although the procedure created in 2007 Wis. Act 86 may 
be 
faster, 
more 
efficient, 
and 
more 
cost-effective 
for 
Milwaukee, other taxation districts such as Green Bay, Richland 
Center, or the Village of Shorewood may come to a different 
conclusion based on the nature of the property and tax 
assessment challenges.  Therefore, the legislature made a policy 
choice to provide taxation districts with an option of two 
alternative procedures as opposed to mandating one or the other 
procedure for all taxation districts.        
¶106 Contrary to the majority's conclusions, I cannot 
conclude that the legislation is "arbitrary," because it leaves 
for the taxation district the choice of how a taxpayer should 
proceed to challenge an assessment.11  The state legislature 
                                                 
11 Majority op., ¶¶71-72.   
No.  2009AP524.ssa 
 
10 
 
provides options to local government in a number of areas.12  And 
as with all policy decisions vested in the representative 
branches of government, the recourse for taxpayers unhappy with 
the policy decisions of their representatives rests in the 
ballot box.  
¶107 I conclude that the legislature could rationally 
conclude that the uniqueness and variety of the taxation 
districts 
in 
Wisconsin 
provide 
ample 
distinguishing 
characteristics that support providing this option to advance 
the purpose of establishing a more efficient system for tax 
assessment challenges. 
III 
¶108 The circuit court declared unconstitutional only Wis. 
Stat. § 74.37(4)(c) and (4)(d) as amended and created by 2007 
Wis. Act §§ 8 and 9.  In contrast, the majority opinion 
invalidates the entire 2007 Wis. Act 86 by stating: "[T]he 
legislature clearly did not intend to create a situation where 
enhanced board of review and enhanced certiorari procedures 
would be available in a municipality where de novo review was 
also available."  Majority op., ¶79.  I disagree with the 
majority opinion. 
                                                 
12 These options run the gamut of issues that effect local 
governance, from the most fundamental, the organizational 
structure of local government, Wis. Stat. §§ 64.01 & 64.25, or 
the number of alders, Wis. Stat. § 64.39, to more specific 
issues 
that 
affect 
residents 
and 
businesses 
within 
a 
municipality.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 66.0615 (establishment of 
room tax); Wis. Stat. § 66.0405 (system for removal of rubbish). 
No.  2009AP524.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶109 Severability is favored.  Wis. Stat. § 990.001(11).  
The presumption is in favor of severability.13 
¶110 There seems to be no dispute in the present case that 
if the invalid part of 2007 Wis. Act 86 falls away, the 
remainder can be fully operative. 
¶111 The question then becomes whether it is "evident that 
the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which 
are 
within 
its 
power, 
independently 
of 
that 
which 
is 
not . . . ."14 
¶112 Nothing in the text of 2007 Wis. Act 86 or the 
legislative history of the Act makes it "evident" that the 
legislature intended that the Act not be severable. 
¶113 For 
the 
reasons 
set 
forth, 
I 
cannot 
join 
the 
majority's declaration that 2007 Wis. Act 86 violates the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  Further, I disagree with the majority's 
declaration that the provisions of 2007 Wis. Act 86 are not 
severable.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶114 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS join this dissent. 
 
                                                 
13 State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 379, 580 N.W.2d 260 
(1998). 
14 Nankin, 245 Wis. 2d 86, ¶49 (quoted source omitted). 
No.  2009AP524.ssa 
 
1