Case Title: McLaughlin v. State

Citation: 161 Vt. 492, 642 A.2d 683

Docket Number: 93-093

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
MCLAUGHIN_V_STATE.93-093; 161 Vt. 492; 642 A.2d 683

[Filed 01-Apr-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 93-093


 Kevin McLaughlin, Sheriff of                 Supreme Court
 Chittenden County, and Chittenden
 County Sheriff's Department
                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Chittenden Superior Court

 State of Vermont and the Office              December Term, 1993
 of the Attorney General of the
 State of Vermont


 Alden T. Bryan, J.

 Norman R. Blais, Burlington, for plaintiffs-appellants

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Robert W. Gagnon, Senior
    Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for defendants-appellants


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      Dooley, J.  This appeal originates in a declaratory judgment action
 brought by plaintiffs Chittenden County Sheriff Kevin McLaughlin and the
 Chittenden County Sheriff's Department.  Plaintiffs sought an order
 requiring that defendants, the Attorney General and the State of Vermont,
 provide legal representation to plaintiffs in a pending workers'
 compensation action brought against plaintiffs by Alice Demag, and requiring
 that defendants assume any costs of award or settlement for which
 plaintiffs might become liable.  Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment
 below.  The court granted judgment in defendants' favor with respect to
 defendants' duty to provide representation to plaintiffs, but did order that

 

 defendants represent Sheriff McLaughlin's predecessor, Ronald Duell.
 Defendants now appeal the order to defend Duell.  Plaintiffs cross-appeal
 the grant of summary judgment in defendants' favor.  We affirm the entry of
 judgment against plaintiff McLaughlin.  We reverse the entry of judgment
 against the Chittenden County Sheriff's Department and remand that issue to
 the trial court.  Finally, we strike those parts of the trial court's order
 relating to Ronald Duell.
      Plaintiff Chittenden County Sheriff's Department is currently a party
 defendant in an action brought by Alice Demag as personal representative of
 the estate of her late husband Bernard Demag.  That action is now on appeal
 to the Chittenden Superior Court from a decision of the Commissioner of
 Labor and Industries.(FN1) Mrs. Demag sought recovery of workers' compensation
 death benefits after her husband suffered a fatal heart attack within two
 hours of his chase and apprehension of an escaped juvenile whom he had been
 transporting.  At the time of his death in January 1978, Mr. Demag was a
 special deputy sheriff for the Sheriff's Department.  He was transporting

 

 the juvenile pursuant to an agreement between the Sheriff's Department and
 the State.
      In 1992, after the Demag proceeding was appealed to superior court,
 plaintiffs in this matter brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to
 have defendants provide legal representation, as well as assume
 responsibility for paying any award or settlement amount for which the
 plaintiffs might become liable.  Plaintiffs subsequently moved for summary
 judgment, arguing that 3 V.S.A. { 1101 required defendants to defend and
 indemnify.  The motion was accompanied by an affidavit from plaintiff
 McLaughlin that essentially stated the allegations in the complaint.  In
 response, defendants argued that 21 V.S.A. { 601(12)(L), which excludes
 sheriff's deputies from state workers' compensation coverage, controlled,(FN2)
 and required that plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed.
      The superior court rejected defendants' argument, ruling that 21 V.S.A.
 { 601 is "relevant only to the question of whether Mr. Demag was engaged in
 public employment for the purposes of adjudicating his workers' compensation
 claim.  It is not relevant to the issue of the State's duty to defend civil
 actions against state employees, which is the subject of 3 V.S.A. { 1101."
 Despite this conclusion, the court granted summary judgment in defendants'
 favor, and denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, because Sheriff
 McLaughlin was not a party in the underlying workers' compensation appeal
 and the Chittenden County Sheriff's Department was not a state employee as
 required by 3 V.S.A. { 1101.  On the same day as it decided the summary
 judgment motion, it granted Mrs. Demag permission to add Ronald Duell,

 

 former sheriff, as a party in the workers' compensation appeal.  Because of
 that action, the court went on to state in this case that the State had an
 obligation to defend Ronald Duell.
      We can dispose easily of two of the issues raised by the parties: (1)
 whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against Sheriff
 McLaughlin; and (2) whether it erred in ruling that defendants had an
 obligation to defend former Sheriff Duell.  The court made the first ruling
 because Sheriff McLaughlin was not a party to the workers' compensation
 appeal.  The statute on which plaintiffs rely, 3 V.S.A. { 1101(a), is
 triggered when a civil action is brought against a state employee who in
 turn seeks representation at state expense.  Since Sheriff McLaughlin is not
 a party to the underlying action, the statute is inapplicable.
      Plaintiffs argue here that Sheriff McLaughlin had standing in this
 action, despite not being named in the workers' compensation appeal, because
 he is the successor in office to Ronald Duell, who is named.  Apparently,
 plaintiffs' theory is that Ronald Duell was named in his official capacity
 as former sheriff and any liability will inure to Sheriff McLaughlin as the
 current occupant of the office.  We understand plaintiffs' argument to be
 that McLaughlin had standing to bring the declaratory judgment action to
 assert the right of Duell and the Department to representation.  This
 argument was not raised below, and we will not consider it here.  See
 Northwest Vt. Solid Waste Management Dist. v. Central Vt. Solid Waste
 Management Dist., 159 Vt. 61, 65, 614 A.2d 816, 819 (1992) (Court will not
 considered claims first raised on appeal).  Indeed, as we discuss infra, the
 question of representation of Duell was never raised in the complaint nor in
 the motion for summary judgment.  Moreover, giving Sheriff McLaughlin

 

 standing is unnecessary unless he is named in the underlying suit or Duell
 fails to pursue his interests.  In either instance, Sheriff McLaughlin would
 be free to seek intervention anew upon asserting clearly the interest that
 gives him standing.
      On the second issue, defendants argue that the court erred in granting
 relief to Ronald Duell because he was not a party to the action and 3 V.S.A.
 { 1101(a) does not apply to him.  We agree that the trial court was at least
 premature in its action.  The lone matter before the court was a motion for
 summary judgment filed by plaintiffs.  In this context, the only questions
 for the court were whether a genuine issue of fact existed, Bennett Estate
 v. Travelers Ins. Co., 138 Vt. 189, 191,