Case Title: Ryan v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-C-1544

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1985-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ryan v. State1999 WY 132988 P.2d 46Case Number: 98-279Decided: 10/08/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
ROY 
DALE RYAN, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Sweetwater County, Honorable Jere Ryckman, 
Judge.

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Assistant Public Defender; and 
Michael Dinnerstein, Assistant Public Defender. Argument by Mr. Dinnerstein, 
representing Appellant.

Gay Woodhouse, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Karen A. Byrne, Special Assistant 
Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Byrne, representing 
Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ.; and KALOKATHIS, 
DJ.

KALOKATHIS, District 
Judge.

[¶1]      Convicted of 
murdering his wife, Appellant alleges numerous errors deprived him of his right 
to a fair trial. While we find that Appellant was impermissibly profiled by 
expert testimony, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As none of 
Appellant's other contentions are meritorious, we affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant, Roy 
Dale Ryan (Ryan), presents eight issues for our review:

I. Did the trial 
court deprive Appellant of his constitutional right to a fair trial when it told 
the prospective jurors that appellant was there because he murdered his 
wife?

II. 
Did the trial court deprive Appellant of his constitutional right to a fair 
trial by refusing to grant a mistrial after a juror shared with her fellow 
jurors the fact that she had been threatened and her car damaged?

III. 
Did the trial court deprive Appellant of his constitutional right to a fair 
trial when it permitted a witness who was only five years old at the time of the 
incident to testify even though she did not have the mental capacity at the time 
of the occurrence to receive an accurate impression of it and did not have 
memory sufficient to retain independent recollection of the occurrence?

IV. 
Did the trial court deprive Appellant of his constitutional right to a fair 
trial when it refused to bar testimony suggesting that batterers have a 
propensity to kill those whom they have abused?

V. 
Did the trial court deprive Appellant of his due process right to a fair trial 
by refusing to bar evidence that the prosecution had obtained with a warrant 
from a court that did not have jurisdiction over Appellant's case and in a 
manner in which the defense had been denied the opportunity to be heard?

VI. 
Did the court deprive Appellant of his constitutional right to confront the 
witnesses against him by permitting a witness to testify remotely under 
circumstances in which the jury, the court, counsel, and appellant could not 
observe the witness' demeanor and the witness could not see the accused?

VII. 
Was Appellant deprived of his due process right to a fair trial when a security 
officer demanded to know whether the jury was close to a verdict?

VIII. Is the sentence that the court imposed upon Appellant 
for second degree murder illegal because it is definite rather than 
indeterminate?

[¶3]      Appellee, State of 
Wyoming (the State), more succinctly rephrases the issues as:

I. 
Did a single comment by the trial court create reversible error?

II. 
Was there jury tampering, and if so, did it constitute reversible error?

III. 
Was the child witness who was present at the scene of the murder competent to 
testify?

IV. 
Did the testimony of an expert witness create plain error?

V. 
Did the trial court properly admit evidence obtained from a legally sufficient 
search warrant?

VI. 
Was Appellant allowed to confront witnesses against him?

VII. 
Was Appellant deprived of a fair trial when a security officer made a casual 
comment to a juror during a smoke break? 

VIII. Was Appellant's life sentence illegal because it was 
a definite rather than indeterminate sentence?

II. 
FACTS

[¶4]      On December 11, 1996, 
the Green River Police Department received a call from a man asking for 
assistance and an ambulance. The caller stayed on the line only for a matter of 
seconds, but the dispatcher was able to trace the call to an address in the 
Shelter Valley Trailer Court. Green River Police Officers Cezanne Brennan and 
Stan Brannum were the first to arrive at the scene.

[¶5]      The officers 
approached the trailer and knocked on the outside of the residence. The front 
door was slightly ajar, and after the officers knocked, a small black dog pushed 
the door open far enough that the officers could see into the trailer. They saw 
a man, later identified as Ryan, laying in a pool of blood in the kitchen. They 
entered the residence, approached Ryan, and ascertained that he had been shot in 
the chest. Officer Brennan asked Ryan, "Who shot you?" and Ryan responded, "I 
did."

[¶6]      Officer Brannum then 
conducted a protective sweep of the trailer. He found a young boy and a 
five-year-old girl apparently asleep in one bedroom. Officer Brannum then 
proceeded into the back bedroom and found an infant in a crib and Keri Ryan 
(Keri), Ryan's wife, lying on the bed in a pool of blood with a .22 magnum 
two-shot Derringer under her hand. Brannum determined that Keri was dead. He 
returned to the kitchen and handcuffed Ryan.

[¶7]      Within seconds of the 
officers' arrival at the scene, EMT's arrived and began treating Ryan's wound. 
Ryan attempted to thwart their efforts and stated that he did not want to be 
treated. As he lost more blood, however, his efforts became less effective. Ryan 
was transported to the hospital, and Officer Brennan accompanied him to collect 
his clothing and other possible evidence.

[¶8]      As Ryan's treatment 
continued, he again became combative and asked not to be treated. In the 
emergency room an unidentified individual asked Ryan, "What happened?" and Ryan 
responded, "It was an accident." Officer Brennan then asked Ryan, "Who had the 
gun," and he responded, "We both did." Ryan was taken to LDS Hospital in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, where he subsequently fell into a coma for several weeks. When 
he awoke, he claimed to have no memory of the incident, although he did present 
a nurse with a note which read, "How did I miss," next to a picture of a 
heart.

[¶9]      Further investigation 
revealed that Keri had been shot once in the neck. The bullet lodged in her 
spinal cord, causing instantaneous paralysis and death. The blood patterns in 
the back bedroom led investigators to conclude that Keri's body had been moved 
after she had been shot, and the gun had been placed under her hand by someone 
else. Moreover, judging from the position of Keri's body at the time she was 
shot, it was likely that she was lying down or only partially sitting up on the 
bed at the time she was shot. The evidence indicated that Keri was not involved 
in a struggle prior to her death, and the location of the wound indicated that 
she had not committed suicide.

[¶10]   The Derringer found under Keri's hand 
contained two spent Federal brand cartridges. Ryan's mother admitted that the 
gun belonged to her and produced a partially empty box of Federal brand 
cartridges from her home. The gun was ordinarily kept in a gun cabinet, which 
was broken and did not lock, in Ryan's parents' home. Both Ryan and Keri had 
equal access to the gun, as both visited Ryan's parents' home frequently. 
Investigators found that Ryan and Keri each had gunshot residue on their hands 
on the night of the shootings.

[¶11]   Ryan and Keri had a turbulent marriage 
punctuated by Ryan's physical abuse of his wife, which he admitted at trial. An 
exhaustive list of friends, neighbors, and coworkers testified to Ryan's 
physical, mental, and emotional abuse of Keri throughout the course of their 
marriage. The State produced witnesses who testified to several incidents where 
Ryan punched and kicked Keri in fits of rage. Additionally, the State produced 
witnesses who stated that Ryan controlled and isolated Keri. Ryan would not 
allow Keri to go anywhere without his permission, and he demanded to know where 
she was and who she was with at all times. According to Keri's coworkers, Ryan 
called her at work ten times or more during her shifts to check up on her. There 
was testimony that Ryan had attempted to commit suicide in Keri's presence on 
one occasion. There was testimony that Ryan emotionally abused Keri through 
constant criticism. There was extensive testimony about Ryan's excessive 
jealousy. He often accused Keri of having extramarital affairs with the 
customers she spoke with at work, and on more than one occasion he assaulted men 
who spoke with Keri.

[¶12]   Keri left Ryan in early November of 
1996 and had a family violence protection order issued against Ryan on November 
5, 1996. That order was subsequently dismissed at Keri's request. During the 
separation period, Keri expressed her desire to return to school; she began 
dating another man and suggested that Ryan begin dating other women. For his 
part, Ryan did not handle the separation well. He became depressed and had 
noticeable weight loss.

[¶13]   Ryan was charged with first degree 
murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 (a).1 After lengthy 
deliberations, the jury convicted Ryan of the lesser included offense of murder 
in the second degree, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104.2 Ryan received a life sentence, and this timely 
appeal followed.

III. 
DISCUSSION

A. 
EVIDENTIARY CLAIMS OF ERROR

[¶14]   The decisions of the district court 
concerning the admission of witness testimony and the admission of evidence 
procured from a second search of the trailer are reviewed under the same 
standard of review. We recently summarized the considerations relevant to review 
of evidentiary rulings in Solis v. State, 981 P.2d 34 (Wyo. 1999):

[¶15]   Evidentiary rulings are within the 
sound discretion of the trial court and include determinations of the adequacy 
of foundation and relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of 
evidence. Punches v. State, 944 P.2d 1131, 1136-37 (Wyo. 1997). This court will 
generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of 
evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion. Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Wyo. 1997); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994). In 
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, the query is whether 
the court could reasonably conclude as it did, and whether its ruling was 
arbitrary or capricious. Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Wyo. 1998). The 
burden of establishing such abuse lies with the defendant. Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 527 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶16]   If the trial court erred by admitting 
evidence, we then must ascertain whether the error affects any substantial 
rights of the accused, providing grounds for reversal, or whether it is 
harmless. The harmless error standard is set out in W.R.A.P. 9.04:

Any 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded by the reviewing court.

See 
also W.R.Cr.P. 52. An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that 
the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had 
never occurred. Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1247 (Wyo. 1996); Kerns v. State, 
920 P.2d 632, 641 (Wyo. 1996). To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must 
show prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and 
injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play." Johnson v. 
State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 1990); see also Roderick v. State, 858 P.2d 538, 
550 (Wyo. 1993).

Id. 
at 36.

1. 
SEPARATION VIOLENCE - THE BRATTON TESTIMONY

[¶17]   Rosemary Bratton has extensive 
experience working with both battered and battering spouses and has previously 
testified as an expert on the subject of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS). BWS 
experts generally attempt to explain the irrational behavior of battered 
spouses, such as seeking withdrawal of a protective order or continually 
returning to an abusive spouse. Here, however, the State made known to defense 
counsel that Bratton would also testify about the characteristics of batterers 
and the kind of conduct they tend to exhibit. Ryan objected to that portion of 
the Bratton testimony pertaining to anything he might have done. While the trial 
judge admitted that he was having trouble determining the relevancy of Bratton's 
testimony concerning Ryan's actual or possible actions; ultimately, she was 
allowed to testify.

[¶18]   At trial, Bratton began by explaining 
the now familiar characteristics of BWS to the jury. She explained the cyclical 
pattern of violence often present in abusive relationships and then went on to 
describe a phenomena termed, "separation violence":

Q. 
Now, is there any particular phase of this cycle of violence which tends to be 
more dangerous than another?

A. 
Yes. And we actually term it now as separation violence. What I know from my 
experience and what we know from the literature and the research that has been 
done is that the time that the victim is planning to leave or has left this 
relationship is the time of the greatest danger. That's the time more homicides 
are committed, that's the time when there's greater physical injury, and it 
happens because perpetrators of domestic violence who need to maintain power and 
control over their partner become extremely upset, nervous, agitated when they 
feel that they are losing that control. When they feel that that person is 
actually going to leave them, then it becomes far more dangerous for the victim, 
because the violence will escalate to whatever it takes to prevent this person 
from actually leaving. They are losing control, they are losing access to this 
individual, and it's a very very dangerous time for victims.

Q. 
Now, this separation violence is what you've termed this; is that correct?

A. 
That's correct.

Q. 
And have there been any studies done here in Wyoming on that issue?

A. 
Yes, there have. There's a study that our coalition sponsored. We started this 
study in the early '90s, and we went back to 1985 and looked at those incidents 
of domestic homicides in our state, and one of the interesting facts that we 
learned was that of the - of the 38 individuals that - that are a part of our 
research, 16 of those had actually left the relationship.

[¶19]   Bratton added that the majority of the 
women involved in the study were killed with guns. She then described those 
characteristics exhibited by batterers. She testified that batterers tend to 
control and isolate their spouses by such means as constant calls to their place 
of employment, demanding to know where they are, who they are with, and when 
they will return. Bratton stated that batterers will often threaten to commit 
suicide in order to force their partner to remain in the relationship. She 
testified that batterers tend to abuse their spouses emotionally through 
constant criticism. She also testified that batterers tend to exhibit 
pathological jealousy often accusing their spouses of having adulterous affairs 
with random strangers.

[¶20]   The prosecutor argued, and the district 
court agreed, that separation violence is a logical extension of BWS. Ryan 
argued that under W.R.E. 404 (a), such an extension is not admissible. W.R.E. 
404 (a) prohibits use of evidence of a person's character if used to prove that 
he acted in conformity therewith. If offered pursuant to W.R.E. 404 (b),3 evidence which implies bad character is 
admissible for a limited purpose, but not to show conduct conforming to 
character. A large part of the testimony which portrayed Ryan as an angry and 
violent person who expressed that violence toward his wife was admitted for 
W.R.E. 404 (b) reasons. That testimony was not offered for the purpose of 
showing that he acted in conformity therewith, but rather to show motive, 
intent, or identity. The expert testimony on separation violence, however, was 
not offered under W.R.E. 404 (b), and, therefore, we must determine if it 
violates W.R.E. 404 (a).

[¶21]   W.R.E. 404(a), provides in pertinent 
part:

(a) 
Character evidence generally. - Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion[.]

[¶22]   Mueller and Kirkpatrick explain the 
rule's purpose this way:

FRE 
404(a) states the crucial principle that evidence of the character of a person 
is generally inadmissible to prove conduct on a particular occasion. There are 
important exceptions, but the principle applies broadly in both civil and 
criminal cases. The idea is that character should not be used, for the most 
part, as circumstantial evidence of behavior. The principle blocks resort to the 
"general propensity" argument - the argument that since a person is, for 
instance, by disposition violent, it follows that he likely committed the 
violent act giving rise to the present charges.

Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 1 Federal 
Evidence, § 100, at 539 (2d ed. 1994). Justice Jackson more forcefully explained 
in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S. Ct. 213, 93 L. Ed. 168 
(1948):

Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost 
unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any kind of 
evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish a probability of his 
guilt. Not that the law invests the defendant with a presumption of good 
character, . . . but it simply closes the whole matter of character, disposition 
and reputation on the prosecution's case-in-chief. The state may not show 
defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name 
among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that 
he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not 
rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh 
too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad 
general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular 
charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted 
probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to 
prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.

Id., 
335 U.S. at 475-76; 69 S. Ct.  at 218-19 (citation and footnotes omitted).

[¶23]   At the outset, we must determine 
whether separation violence evidence falls within the emerging field of "social 
framework and syndrome" evidence. In general, BWS and other syndrome evidence is 
considered a proper subject for expert testimony, and does not implicate the 
proscription against character evidence. See Mueller and Kirkpatrick, 3 Federal 
Evidence, § 351 (2d ed. 1994). According to Mueller and Kirkpatrick:

Usually framework and syndrome evidence is offered by 
prosecutors and relates to the victim, as in sexual assault and child abuse 
trials. But sometimes it is offered by the defense and relates to defendants, as 
in the setting of homicide trials of women charged with killing husbands or 
intimate companions. And typical patterns of usage do not always hold true, for 
defendants sometimes offer evidence that patterns of behavior or attitudes in 
the alleged victim did not fit the syndrome and prosecutors sometimes offer 
evidence of battered women syndrome in trials of men to explain the victim's 
behavior.

Id. 
at 633 (Emphasis added.) When such evidence is raised by the prosecution in its 
case-in-chief and relates to the defendant, however, the testimony "draws close 
to commenting directly on what likely happened" and "looks like character 
evidence after all." Id. at 637. In such situations, Mueller and Kirkpatrick 
recognize that:

The 
traditional sensitivity accorded to defense rights in criminal cases warrants 
special care when government experts are talking about the defendant, even if 
their testimony stops at one remove from direct comments on what the defendant 
likely did or thought.

Id. 
at 637. Expert testimony on BWS which relates to the victim is entirely proper. 
Evidence concerning the defendant's involvement, however, demands close scrutiny 
under the character evidence rules. This is so even if reference to the 
defendant may only be inferred from the testimony.

[¶24]   Bratton did not say that because Ryan 
was possessed of a violent character he acted in conformity therewith on the 
night of the murder. She was more subtle, but the effect was the same. After 
showing that the subjects of the study tended to commit homicide when faced with 
the prospect of separation, she impliedly invited the jury to group Ryan among 
those subjects and by this method determine conduct.

[¶25]   Finding guilt by reference to common 
characteristics of a class of individuals to which one belongs raises the 
specter of profile evidence. Profile or syndrome evidence is developed through 
expert testimony and tends to classify people by their shared physical, 
emotional, or mental characteristics. State v. Percy, 507 A.2d 955, 960 (Vt. 
1986) (citing 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 401[10], at 
88-91 (1985)). In the context of drug courier profiles, a profile has been 
characterized as,

an 
"informal compilation of characteristics often displayed by those trafficking in 
drugs," and as an "`abstract of characteristics found to be typical of persons 
transporting illegal drugs.'" Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist has described 
the profile as essentially an investigative tool involving characteristics 
recognizable to trained officers. "A `profile' is, in effect the collective or 
distilled experience of narcotics officers concerning characteristics repeatedly 
seen in drug smugglers."

United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019, 1021 (8th Cir. 
1989) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1091, 110 S. Ct. 1163, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1990). Translated into the battering spouse context, a profile is 
a compilation of characteristics repeatedly seen in those who batter their 
spouses.

[¶26]   While our research has not disclosed 
any case dealing specifically with battering spouses, other jurisdictions in 
different contexts have dealt with similar attempts to construct a criminal 
profile for the purpose of proving conduct in conformity therewith. Those 
jurisdictions that have considered profiles of battering parents, pedophiles, 
rapists, and drug couriers unanimously agree that the prosecution may not offer 
such evidence in its case-in-chief as substantive evidence of guilt. These cases 
generally articulate three evidentiary bases for excluding evidence tending to 
establish that the defendant fits a particular profile: 1) relevancy; 2) 
probative value substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect; and 3) 
impermissible character evidence.

[¶27]   Many courts find profile evidence 
irrelevant.4 Commonwealth v. Day, 569 N.E.2d 397 (Mass. 
1991) aptly articulated the reasoning for such a conclusion:

A 
criminal trial is by its very nature an individualized adjudication of a 
defendant's guilt or legal innocence. Testimony regarding a criminal profile is 
nothing more than an expert's opinion as to certain characteristics which are 
common to some or most of the individuals who commit particular crimes. Evidence 
of a "child battering profile" does not meet the relevancy test, because the 
mere fact that a defendant fits the profile does not tend to prove that a 
particular defendant physically abused the victim.

Id. 
at 399. See also, Percy, 507 A.2d  at 960 (Evidence that other rapists often 
excused or explained their conduct the way the defendant did was not relevant.); 
State v. Clements, 770 P.2d 447, 454 (Kan. 1989) (Evidence which only describes 
the characteristics of the typical offender has no relevance to whether the 
defendant committed the crime in question.); United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1990) (Proof that a person fits the drug courier profile, 
unsupported by evidence of drug trafficking, proves nothing.); State v. Maule, 
667 P.2d 96, 99 (Wash.App. 1983) (The relevance of testimony that the majority 
of child abuse cases involved a male parent figure is not readily discernable.); 
State v. Brown, 370 So. 2d 547, 552 (La. 1979) (Unable to see how evidence of 
drug courier profile is relevant to any issue of innocence or guilt at the trial 
on the merits.); Duley v. State, 467 A.2d 776, 780 (Md. App. 1983) (Evidence of 
child abuser profile is totally irrelevant because it does not tend to prove 
that the defendant committed the acts of abuse attributed to him.); United 
States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983), rehearing 
denied, 721 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1983) (Drug courier profile evidence is nothing 
more than the opinion of those officers conducting an investigation, and it 
cannot be used as substantive evidence of guilt.); State v. Hansen, 743 P.2d 157, 161 (Or. 1987) (That child abusers use certain techniques to get near their 
victims has no bearing on whether a person who does these things is a child 
abuser.); and People v. Bradley, 526 N.E.2d 916, 921 (Ill.App. 1988) (Evidence 
showing characteristics of child abuse perpetrators was in no way probative or 
relevant to the question of whether the defendant committed the crime.).

[¶28]   Even assuming that profile testimony is 
in some degree relevant to the issues at trial, the danger of unfair prejudice 
to the accused has generally been found to outweigh the probative value.5 See Percy, 507 A.2d at 960-61; Simpson, 910 F.2d  at 157; Maule, 667 P.2d  at 99; Duley, 467 A.2d  at 780; Brown, 370 So. 2d  at 
552; Day, 569 N.E.2d  at 399; United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 174, 177 (4th Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1052, 111 S. Ct. 766, 112 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1991); and 
Bradley, 526 N.E.2d  at 921.

[¶29]   Finally, profile evidence is often 
found to be an impermissible attack on the defendant's character.6 See State v. Hester, 760 P.2d 27, 33 (Id. 
1988); In the Interest of D.L., 401 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Iowa 1986); People v. 
Walkey, 177 Cal. App. 3d 268, 223 Cal. Rptr. 132, 138 (1986); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 62-64 (Minn. 1981); Sanders v. State, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 (Ga. 1983); 
Haakanson v. State, 760 P.2d 1030, 1035-36 (Alaska 1988); and Bradley, 526 N.E.2d  at 921.

[¶30]   We hold that the evidence pertaining to 
separation violence was inadmissable. Our ruling does not, however, proscribe 
BWS testimony in general, and we reaffirm our prior decisions which have allowed 
expert testimony to explain the behavior of a battered spouse. See Trujillo v. 
State, 953 P.2d 1182, 1183 (Wyo. 1998).

[¶31]   We must now determine whether the error 
was harmless.7 Generally, profile evidence consists of a 
compilation of otherwise innocent characteristics, coupled with an implicit 
invitation to infer criminal conduct from those characteristics. In the present 
case, however, the characteristics of the profile consist of prior bad acts, 
which have independent evidentiary significance. That is, they tend to prove 
motive, intent, and identity.

[¶32]   Aside from the formidable body of prior 
bad acts evidence, there was substantial physical evidence indicating Ryan's 
guilt. Keri was killed while lying prone on the bed. Her body was moved and the 
gun placed under her hand after she was shot. There was no evidence of struggle 
or suicide. After shooting Keri, Ryan admittedly shot himself and called 911, 
but it was his, rather than Keri's, impending demise that prompted the call.

[¶33]   The objectionable statements consist of 
two short answers made during more than a week of testimony, and the prosecutor 
only briefly discussed the testimony in closing argument. Where, as here, there 
is substantial evidence of guilt, and the State has not unduly emphasized the 
objectionable testimony, we cannot say that there is a reasonable probability 
that the result would have been more favorable to Ryan had the error never 
occurred. The error was harmless.

2. 
TESTIMONY OF STEPHANIE RYAN

[¶34]   Ryan also claimed in a pretrial motion 
that Stephanie Ryan (Stephanie), his five-year-old daughter, was incompetent to 
testify. Stephanie inaccurately stated during her deposition that she heard her 
mother say "Please don't kill me" when the police were in the trailer. As Keri 
was dead at the time the officers arrived, this statement was verifiably 
inaccurate. Additionally, Ryan claimed that Keri's parents, who took custody of 
the children after the shootings, bore undisputed malice toward Ryan and had 
influenced Stephanie's proposed testimony. The trial judge read Stephanie's 
deposition and found that while there were some inconsistencies in the child's 
testimony, she was competent to testify.

[¶35]   At trial, Stephanie demonstrated that 
she knew her birthday, her age, where she went to school, her address, her 
telephone number, and the names and ages of the people and animals with whom she 
lived. She remembered that she used to live in Green River in a trailer with her 
parents. She remembered her teacher and fellow students from her time in school 
in Green River. She stated that she knew the difference between the truth and a 
lie and gave examples of each. She also stated that she understood the oath to 
be a promise to God.

[¶36]   Stephanie then testified that on 
December 11, 1996, her parents had been fighting throughout the day. She 
remembered that her mother made her Spaghettios for dinner. She testified that 
Ryan telephoned his employer and stated that he could not come to work that 
evening. This testimony was corroborated by Ryan's employer. Stephanie then 
testified that she heard Ryan say, "We're going to work this out until we both 
die." At some point later in the evening, Stephanie also heard Keri say, "Please 
don't kill me." Consistent with her deposition testimony, Stephanie stated that 
officers were present when she heard her mother beg for her life. The State also 
presented testimony from Keri's parents and a counselor from Southwest 
Counseling Service who interviewed Stephanie in April of 1997, which showed that 
Stephanie's testimony had remained consistent throughout the period between the 
shootings and trial.

[¶37]   The competency of child witnesses is 
determined by the application of a five-part test. The child must 
demonstrate:

(1) 
an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) 
the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to 
testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to 
retain an independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to 
express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to 
understand simple questions about it. 

English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 145 (Wyo. 1999), (quoting 
Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1984)). Moreover, we have said that, 
"Intelligence, not age, is the guiding criteria in determining the competency of 
a witness." Id. (quoting Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 879 (Wyo. 1987)).

[¶38]   Stephanie demonstrated an understanding 
of the obligation to speak the truth by her statement that the oath was a 
promise to God. The accuracy with which she recalled the verifiable details 
about the night her mother was shot demonstrates that she had sufficient mental 
capacity to receive an accurate impression of the event. That Stephanie's memory 
proved fallible on one point does not demonstrate the absence of an independent 
recollection. Her memory of the event as a whole must be considered in 
ascertaining whether she actually had an independent recollection of the events. 
Clearly, she did. Her recitation of the events to which she was privy on that 
night has not changed since her initial interview, and much of her testimony has 
been corroborated without her knowledge. There is no question that Stephanie has 
been able to communicate what she recalled and to understand simple questions 
about the event.

[¶39]   Regarding Ryan's claims that Stephanie 
has been tainted by her grandparents, we find no evidence supporting such a 
claim. Recently, in English, supra, we stated that a party claiming that a 
child's testimony has been tainted by improper influences must show "some 
evidence" of improper influence before a competency hearing is necessary. 
English, 982 P.2d  at 146. Ryan has failed to present any evidence that 
Stephanie's maternal grandparents, the prosecution, or anyone else, influenced 
her testimony by either undue suggestiveness or outright coercion.

[¶40]   We find that the district court's 
determination that Stephanie was competent to testify was proper.

3. 
TESTIMONY OF JEANETTE HOPKINS

[¶41]   Jeanette Hopkins (Hopkins), who had 
been Keri's friend since high school, had witnessed Ryan abuse and control Keri 
several times. The State notified defense counsel in a pretrial motion of its 
intent to present testimony via video teleconference because Hopkins, a resident 
of Georgia, was in the midst of a high risk pregnancy and had been advised by 
her doctor not to travel. Before Hopkins testified, the trial judge advised 
defense counsel that there is usually a delay inherent in teleconferences and 
defense counsel should view the procedure himself prior to Hopkins' testimony. 
Counsel did not avail himself of this opportunity.

[¶42]   The Hopkins testimony was transmitted 
to Western Wyoming Community College, and the jury was seated before the 
receiving unit. Before testifying, Hopkins was sworn in Georgia. Hopkins 
testified about instances of abuse that she witnessed between Ryan and Keri, and 
only after the jury was removed from the teleconference facility did defense 
counsel move that all of Hopkins' testimony be stricken. Defense counsel 
asserted that he could not view her demeanor, and that she could not see Ryan, 
except for the moment when defense counsel stated that he had no questions. 
Defense counsel argued that the inability of the jury to assess Hopkins' 
credibility and her inability to see Ryan violated his right to confrontation. 
The trial judge stated:

I 
will agree with you, [defense counsel], that the three images that we saw, the 
images of the Green River audience and the attorneys speaking was of one 
quality. In between was the image from the - the [operator] in [Cheyenne].

. . 
. .

Okay. That was an in-between quality that did have a 
delayed image, but it was of a better quality picture, I felt, and then the 
third image, which was of a third quality was the image of the - the witness, 
Ms. Hopkins, who was testifying. I do not believe that this deprived the 
Defendant of his right of confrontation, and so I'm denying your motion.

[¶43]   The Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, § 10, of the Wyoming Constitution secure to 
all criminal defendants the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him." The right to confrontation: 

"(1) 
insures that the witness will give his statements under oath - thus impressing 
him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the 
possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to 
cross-examination, the `greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
truth'; [and] (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to 
observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the 
jury in assessing his credibility."

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970) (footnote omitted). Thus, the right to confrontation primarily 
secures the reliability of the evidence offered by the State. Maryland v. Craig, 
497 U.S. 836, 845, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).

[¶44]   While it has been broadly stated that 
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment "guarantees the defendant a 
face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact," Coy v. 
Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988), it is 
generally accepted that the confrontation clause actually "reflects a preference 
for face-to-face confrontation at trial." Craig, 497 U.S.  at 849 (quoting Ohio 
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980)) (emphasis in 
original). The preference "must occasionally give way to considerations of 
public policy and the necessities of the case." Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243, 39 L. Ed. 409, 15 S. Ct. 337 (1895). Where the reliability of the 
testimony is otherwise assured or an important public policy will be furthered, 
a criminal defendant may be denied the right to confrontation. Craig, 497 U.S. 
at 850.

[¶45]   In the present case, Ryan asserts that 
the State did not show that denial of a face-to-face confrontation furthered an 
important public policy, or that the reliability of the testimony was otherwise 
assured by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; therefore, he was 
entitled to a face-to-face confrontation. We agree. Ryan does not, however, 
assert that had the technology worked perfectly, he would have been denied the 
functional equivalent of a face-to-face confrontation. Therefore, the question 
presented is whether poor picture quality can eviscerate the face-to-face 
character of teleconference technology and, if so, whether such was the case 
here.

[¶46]   In Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366 (Mass. 1988), the court found that the quality of videotaped 
testimony was insufficient to allow the jury to properly fulfill its 
responsibilities. After reviewing the tapes, the court said,

Many 
of the technical aspects of these videotapes are troublesome. The color and 
sound were not true. . . . The court reporter, who watched the jury's monitor, 
at times had difficulty hearing the proceedings, as did we. At one point, the 
screen went blank. Sounds that ordinarily would be minor background noises - 
such as a truck passing outside, or one of the attorneys ripping a piece of 
paper from a pad - when carried over the audio portion of the transmission were 
highly magnified and distracting. Often the child [witness] would play with the 
microphone wire, creating very loud crackling noises that interfered with both 
sound and concentration. Due to the camera angle, throughout much of the first 
child's appearance her right hand fully or partially obscured her face; at 
times, when she leaned back in the chair, her face was nearly out of camera 
range. The electronic techniques that were used showed neither the face of the 
judge presiding nor the image of the attorneys. The disembodied voices of the 
participants in the interrogations were transmitted. Also, unidentified persons 
were seen on the screen without explanation.

Id. 
at 375. The court went on to conclude that the videotaped testimony was not 
equivalent to personal observation by the jury.

[¶47]   There is a point where insufficient 
technology can jeopardize substantive rights. That point, however, is not 
readily ascertainable from the cold record. Whether testimony taken by 
electronic means sufficiently allows the jury to measure the witness' demeanor 
and provides face-to-face confrontation between the accused and the accuser lies 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

[¶48]   The trial judge witnessed Hopkins' 
testimony, and determined that, while the picture was not perfect, it did not 
deprive Ryan of his right to confrontation. There was no objection to the 
quality of the sound, and no one complained that they could not hear the 
testimony. Moreover, Hopkins' testimony was merely cumulative of other prior bad 
acts evidence. The district court properly denied the motion to strike Hopkins' 
testimony.

4. 
SECOND SEARCH WARRANT

[¶49]   In a motion for discovery the State 
requested access to the trailer so that its out-of-state expert witness could 
examine it. In response, defense counsel stated, "Well, I think that that needs 
to be dealt with as a search warrant. I'm not consenting." The court and counsel 
then discussed whether the district court had authority to grant permission to 
the State to enter without a search warrant. Neither party produced any 
pertinent authority on the question, and the matter was left with the 
understanding that if "there's a legal basis for [the district court] to issue 
an order without a warrant or remove a warrant, [the State will] approach it 
that way, let [defense counsel] know it's coming, and if not, [the State will] 
do a search warrant." Ultimately, the State did seek and was issued a search 
warrant from the county court. Ryan moved to suppress any evidence obtained from 
the search, and that motion was denied.

[¶50]   Ryan contends that the county court was 
without jurisdiction to issue the search warrant, as the case had been 
transferred to the district court pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 5.18 Additionally, 
Ryan asserts that once a case has been transferred to the district court, that 
court has exclusive jurisdiction to manage discovery, pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 16. 
The State responds that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-7-101,9 which 
authorizes county court judges to issue warrants, is controlling.

[¶51]   The authority of the county court to 
issue a search warrant is statutory and cannot be abrogated or altered by court 
rule. Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-2-114 (LEXIS 1999):

The 
supreme court of Wyoming may from time to time adopt, modify and repeal general 
rules and forms governing pleading, practice and procedure, in all courts of 
this state, for the purpose of promoting the speedy and efficient determination 
of litigation upon its merits.

However,

(b) 
Such rules shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of 
any person nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts nor change the provisions 
of any statute of limitations.

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 5-2-115 (b) (LEXIS 1999). Therefore, county courts cannot be 
divested of their authority to issue a search warrant by W.R.Cr.P. 5.1.

[¶52]   Ryan correctly notes that the district 
court has exclusive jurisdiction to control discovery. Pursuant to that 
authority, the court "may at any time order that the discovery or inspection be 
denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate." 
W.R.Cr.P. 16 (d)(1). Therefore, while the district court has no power to prevent 
the issuance of a warrant from the county court, it does have the authority to 
prevent the litigants before it from seeking a search warrant, or, pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 16 (d)(2), from using evidence obtained thereby at trial. In the 
absence of such an order directing discovery, however, litigants are free to 
pursue any authorized avenue of discovery available to them.

[¶53]   There has been no contention that the 
warrant was not supported by probable cause, that Ryan's right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures has been violated, or that the district court 
abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. Therefore, we find that 
admission of the evidence obtained by the second search warrant was proper.

B. 
STATEMENTS TO THE JURY

1. 
TRIAL JUDGE'S STATEMENT

[¶54]   Defense counsel inquired extensively 
about spousal abuse during voir dire in an effort to ferret out jurors who could 
not judge the case on the evidence presented because Ryan had abused his wife. 
At one point, defense counsel attempted to challenge a potential juror for cause 
because she admitted that she had strong feelings about spousal abuse. In 
response to the challenge for cause, the trial judge stated:

Well, [defense counsel], what I've heard her say is that 
she is not for spousal or domestic abuse. That is a criminal act. I think if you 
ask all these people, "Do you have strong feelings about murder", they would 
probably say, "Yes". That does not disqualify them from serving on this jury. I 
think it's important they be able to separate, perhaps, the two, that Mr. Ryan 
is here not because he hit his wife, but because he murdered his wife, and 
whether or not they have strong feelings about domestic violence or hitting 
their wives, that isn't going to disqualify them from serving on this jury.

During the next in-chambers conference, defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial asserting that the statement tainted the entire jury panel. 
The motion was denied, and the trial judge gave the following curative 
instruction upon returning to the courtroom:

[¶55]   Ladies and gentlemen, the attorneys 
have pointed out to me that I said that "Mr. Ryan is here not because he hit his 
wife, but because he murdered his wife." I should have said, "He's not here 
because he's charged with hitting his wife, he's here because he is charged with 
having murdered her." I did not intend to imply that the Court has any opinion 
as to guilt or innocence of the defendant. In fact, the Defendant is presumed to 
be innocent, and the burden of proof is on the State to prove that he's guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and what the Court thinks about guilt or innocence, 
if anything, is irrelevant because that is the decision for the jury alone.

[¶56]   We have stated that:

[T]he trial judge must "`be careful and cautious and not 
comment on the evidence.'" Phillips v. State, 597 P.2d 456, 458 (Wyo. 1979) 
(quoting Peterson v. McMicken (Nelson's Estate), 72 Wyo. 444, 499, 266 P.2d 238, 
261 (1954)). In a trial before a jury, the trial judge must abstain from 
expressing or indicating, by word, deed, or otherwise, his personal feelings on 
the weight or quality of the evidence. Id. Comments or expressions of opinion on 
the evidence which have the tendency to indicate bias on the trial judge's part 
are regarded as being an infringement on the jury's duties and are prejudicial 
to the defendant. Id.

Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1118 (Wyo. 1997).

[¶57]   Ryan asserts that the trial judge's 
comment rises to the level of error per se. We disagree. More than a mere 
misstatement is necessary to show that the trial judge improperly expressed his 
opinion on the evidence. Moreover, the curative instruction alleviated any 
possible prejudice to Ryan.

2. 
STATEMENTS DIRECTED TO THE JURY OUTSIDE THE TRIAL

[¶58]   In the middle of the trial, while 
leaving the courthouse for the night, one of the jurors heard an unidentified 
male say, "We know who they are now, and they better find him innocent." The 
juror was certain that the statement was not made by Ryan, his father, or his 
brother. She told another juror about the incident immediately thereafter, and 
the next morning she told the other jurors in an effort to ascertain whether it 
was something that ought to be brought to the bailiff's attention.

[¶59]   Upon learning of the comment, the trial 
judge and counsel asked the juror whether she felt any animosity toward the 
defendant, whether she could continue to be fair, and whether she felt 
intimidated by the comment. She indicated that she did not blame Ryan for the 
comments of others, that the incident would not affect her ability to be fair, 
and that she did not feel intimidated. Defense counsel immediately moved for a 
mistrial. The trial judge instead brought each juror into chambers and asked 
them what they knew about the incident, whether it would affect their ability to 
be fair, and whether they felt intimidated. Each responded that they could 
continue to be fair and that they did not feel intimidated. Additionally, the 
judge made sure that each juror was aware that the statement was not made by 
Ryan, his father, or his brother. Given these assurances, the motion for 
mistrial was denied.

[¶60]   During deliberations, members of the 
jury who smoked were permitted to go to a common area outside of the courthouse. 
While one of the jurors was in this common area, in the company of a bailiff, a 
courthouse security guard approached the juror and asked, "[I]f they were even 
close, and he said no, and that was it." Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, 
asserting that, "[I]mplicit in that communication is, `Hey, you know, the guy's 
guilty as hell, and let's just get this over with so we can all go home.'" The 
district judge disagreed and denied the motion, finding that such an innocuous 
comment was not prejudicial.

[¶61]   As early as 1910 we made known that 
communications between jurors and third parties were improper. In Nicholson v. 
State, 18 Wyo. 298, 106 P. 929 (1910), we said,

that 
when a defendant in a capital case has shown a separation of the jury, or an 
opportunity for other parties, and especially witnesses, to communicate with 
them in violation of the statute, and it appears that defendant was prejudiced, 
or that it does not appear that he was not prejudiced thereby, a new trial 
should be granted.

Id. 
at 932. This rule has generally been viewed as establishing that improper 
communications are presumptively prejudicial to the defendant. Romo v. State, 
500 P.2d 678, 681-82 (Wyo. 1972). Of course, where the content of the improper 
communications can be proven, measurement of its prejudicial effect lies within 
the sound discretion of the district court. See State v. Goettina, 61 Wyo. 420, 
158 P.2d 865, 886 (1945) ("* * * The trial court had the right, we think, to 
conclude from the affidavits that Tom Lavery [the deputy sheriff] did not 
discuss with the jurors anything relating to the case, and, hence, we must 
conclude that no ground for a new trial has been shown.").

[¶62]   Here, the district court found that the 
first comment, although potentially troubling, was generally ignored by the 
jurors, and he was assured that it would not have any bearing on their verdict. 
The court found the second comment to be improper but harmless small talk. 
Without further evidence establishing actual prejudice, we cannot say that the 
district court improperly denied the motions for mistrial.

C. 
IMPOSITION OF LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT MINIMUM TERM

[¶63]   Ryan was sentenced to serve the 
remainder of his natural life in prison; a sentence authorized by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-2-104. No minimum term was established by the district court. Ryan 
contends that the court was prohibited from imposing a definite term, and that a 
minimum term must be established.

[¶64]   "An illegal sentence is one which 
exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for the same 
offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the law." Sanchez v. State, 982 P.2d 149, 150 (Wyo. 1999) (citing Duran v. State, 949 P.2d 885, 887 (Wyo. 
1997)). The determination of whether a sentence is illegal is made by reference 
to the authorizing statute or applicable constitutional provisions and is, 
therefore, a matter of statutory interpretation. Interpretation of statutes is a 
question of law, which we review de novo. French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1998); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. State, 918 P.2d 980, 983 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶65]   Statutory interpretation begins by 
looking at the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of the statute to 
determine whether it is ambiguous. Bolack v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 963 P.2d 237, 
240-41 (Wyo. 1998); Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish 
Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 1993).

A 
"statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able 
to agree as to its meaning with consistence and predictability." "[A] statute is 
ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations." "[W]hether an ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law 
to be determined by the court."

Bolack, 963 P.2d  at 241 (citations omitted), Parker Land 
and Cattle Company, 845 P.2d  at 1043 (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming 
State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219-20 (Wyo. 1991)). If a statute's 
meaning is plain, we apply it without further inquiry. Id. If we determine, 
however, that a statute is ambiguous, we will consider extrinsic evidence in our 
attempt to ascertain legislative intent. Parker Land and Cattle Company, 845 P.2d  at 1044.

[I]n 
ascertaining the legislative intent in enacting a statute * * * [we] * * * must 
look to the mischief the act was intended to cure, the historical setting 
surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state, the conditions of the 
law and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances that would 
enable the court intelligently to determine the intention of the lawmaking 
body.

Id. 
(quoting Carter v. Thompson Realty Company, 58 Wyo. 279, 291, 131 P.2d 297, 299 
(1942)).

[¶66]   Ryan contends that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-201 requires that the district court establish a maximum and minimum term 
in all felony cases where a life sentence is not mandatory. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-13-201 (LEXIS 1999) provides:

Except where a term of life is required by law, or as 
otherwise provided by W.S. § 7-13-101, when a person is sentenced for the 
commission of a felony, the court imposing the sentence shall not fix a definite 
term of imprisonment but shall establish a maximum and minimum term within the 
limits authorized for the statute violated. The maximum term shall not be 
greater than the maximum provided by law for the statute violated, and the 
minimum term shall not be less than the minimum provided by law for the statute 
violated, nor greater than ninety percent (90%) of the maximum term imposed.

[¶67]   The statute obviously breaks down 
where, as here, a life sentence is authorized by the statute, but not required. 
As it is not required, the district court appears to be compelled to establish a 
minimum term which is no more than 90% of the life sentence. We cannot envision 
the mathematics involved in such a calculation.

An 
early predecessor to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 provided:

When 
a convict is sentenced to the state penitentiary, otherwise than for life, for 
an offense or crime, the court imposing the sentence shall not fix a definite 
term of imprisonment, but shall establish a maximum or minimum term for which 
said convict shall be held in said prison. The maximum term shall not be longer 
than the longest term fixed by law for the punishment of the offense of which he 
was convicted, and the minimum term shall not be less than the shortest term 
fixed by law for the punishment of the offense of which he was convicted.

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-313 (Michie 1957). We held in Jaramillo v. State, 517 P.2d 490 
(Wyo. 1974), and Dolence v. State, 921 P.2d 1103 (Wyo. 1996), that the 
requirement for setting maximum and minimum terms did not apply to life 
sentences because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-313 applied to sentences "otherwise than 
for life." Jaramillo, 517 P.2d  at 492; Dolence, 921 P.2d  at 1104.

[¶68]   In 1986 we were called upon to decide 
whether a difference of a single day between the maximum and minimum terms was 
proper under the statute. We concluded that it was:

[T]here is nothing in the statute which requires any fixed 
period of time between the minimum and maximum, and this court would be 
interfering with an important legislative function if it undertook to establish 
such a period. We doubt that the legislature overlooked the obvious possibility 
that a judge might impose the sentences imposed here. Justice Brown, in a 
concurring opinion in Jahnke v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 991, 1010-1011 (1984), 
noted that such sentences would be possible under the statute. He stated that 
the judge in that case "could have sentenced Richard [Jahnke] to not less than 
nineteen years, eleven months and twenty-nine days." The legislature has not 
amended the statute in response to Justice Brown's observation.

Duffy v. State, 730 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶69]   The legislature took notice of Duffy 
and in the next legislative session changed Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 into its 
present form. From the timing of the amendment, we conclude that the legislature 
intended to address Justice Brown's concerns. The preamble to the applicable 
session law also reflects that the statute was being amended to provide "that in 
imposing an indeterminate sentence in a felony case the court shall set the 
minimum term at no more than 90% of the maximum term imposed." 1987 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws, Ch. 157.

[¶70]   As we find no indication that the 
legislature intended to abrogate the holdings in Jaramillo and Dolence, we 
interpret the statute to mean that the district court is not required to 
establish a minimum term where a life sentence is imposed but was not required 
by statute. We are mindful of the rule of statutory construction which provides 
that if the legislature deletes an express provision in a statute, it must have 
meant to change the law in some way. Nylen v. Dayton, 770 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Wyo. 
1989). An opposite interpretation of the statute, however, would not only fail 
to cure the ambiguity in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201, but would also effectively 
abrogate the permissive life sentence provision in the second degree murder 
statute. We must assume that the legislature did not intend for us to interpret 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 in a manner which produces that result. Ryan's 
sentence was not illegal.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶71]   Of Ryan's eight asserted errors, we 
find only one meritorious, and hold that the objectionable portions of Bratton's 
testimony dealing with separation violence were improperly admitted. We affirm 
only because the conviction is founded upon otherwise compelling evidence.

GOLDEN, 
Justice, specially concurring and dissenting, with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins.

[¶72]   Although I concur in the majority's 
affirmance of Ryan's conviction, I disagree with its treatment of the issue 
entitled "Separation Violence - The Bratton Testimony." The majority holds that 
two short objectionable answers in Bratton's testimony pertaining to separation 
violence were inadmissible and the trial court's ruling to the contrary was 
error, albeit harmless. The majority apparently finds that these two short 
answers in Bratton's "separation violence" testimony tended to establish that 
Ryan fit a particular profile, e.g., spouse batterer. And, apparently, the 
majority holds that such "profile evidence" violates W.R.E. 404(a) which 
proscribes admissibility of evidence of a person's character trait for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion.

[¶73]   In my judgment, on this record, the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied trial defense counsel's 
motion in limine and allowed Bratton's testimony. As I read the record, trial 
defense counsel was only concerned that Bratton's testimony would be in the form 
of opinions "concerning what the defendant might have done or might not have 
done. . . ." In particular, at the motion hearing on February 19, 1998, trial 
defense counsel objected to "opinions concerning how Roy Ryan would have acted 
under the circumstances that existed at the time of the shooting, . . . that 
[Bratton] may well say that because he was [an abuser] . . . and this was an 
abused spousal syndrome case, that he would become more frantic when his wife 
left, . . . that things got out of control would have propelled him towards 
violence, and in fact, that's exactly what happened. He shot his wife as a 
result of this whole spousal syndrome issue. . . ."

[¶74]   Responding to trial defense counsel's 
concern, the prosecutor assured him and the trial judge that Bratton would not 
express opinions that either Ryan or his wife would behave a certain way. 
Instead, the prosecutor stated that he was relying on that part of W.R.E. 702 
that permits an expert's testimony to "assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence." He explained that Bratton would testify in general terms about 
her area of expertise, including the actions of an abused spousal victim and the 
reactions of the abuser. He explained that Bratton's testimony providing general 
context or framework would assist the jury to understand the W.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence which the trial court had ruled admissible. In passing, it must be 
noted that Ryan has not raised any W.R.E. 404(b) issue on appeal. Referring to 
Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick's evidence treatise, Section 351, pages 
632-634, 637-639 (1994), which treats the admissibility of expert testimony 
describing social frameworks, the prosecutor made a strong case for the 
admissibility of Bratton's general context or framework testimony. According to 
Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick, expert testimony relating to social 
frameworks describes "patterns of human behavior and mental attitudes, typically 
in persons who have experienced various kinds of psychological stress arising 
out of particular experiences, usually relating to sexual or physical abuse. . . 
." 3 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, § 351, 
at 632 (2d ed. 1994). They explain that "[t]he term `framework' . . . relates to 
social or familial settings similar to those in which the events in suit 
occurred but rests largely on case studies unrelated to those events. In other 
criminal settings, something very like framework evidence has been admitted for 
years." Id. For example, experienced law enforcement agents often describe 
patterns of organizational behavior, bookkeeping, and jargon in trials for 
crimes such as drug trafficking, gambling, and interstate prostitution. Id. at 
632 n.2. Refuting the claim that framework evidence is inadmissible character 
evidence, they explain

Despite the obvious affinity with character evidence, the 
argument seems powerful that the very qualities that separate expert framework 
and syndrome testimony from conventional character evidence mean that such 
evidence, properly handled, need not be classified wholesale as proof of 
character. Instead it can be viewed as evidence of psychological condition or 
capacity and as a general account of human dynamics. After all, much of the 
explanatory force comes from models or studies of human behavior, rather than 
appraising personal qualities innate in the subject. The indicated conclusion is 
that such evidence, properly handled, is dissimilar enough from character 
evidence to remove it from control of FRE 404, FRE 405, and FRE 608.

Id. 
at 636.

[¶75]   The prosecutors here properly handled 
Bratton's framework testimony. They specifically avoided having Bratton testify 
whether Roy Ryan was a battering spouse and his wife a battered spouse; they 
specifically avoided having Bratton testify about what she thought happened, or 
that either Roy Ryan or his wife behaved a certain way. Bratton offered no such 
opinions or conclusions. In my judgment, the trial judge and the prosecutor 
handled the Bratton testimony correctly. There was no error.

THOMAS, 
Justice, specially concurring and dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.

[¶76]   I also agree that Ryan's conviction 
should be affirmed, and I join in the concurring and dissenting opinion of 
Justice Golden. In addition to the discerning analysis presented by Justice 
Golden, I believe that we have cases in Wyoming that justify the exercise of 
discretion by the trial court in admitting the Bratton testimony. The jury was 
confronted by events that seemed difficult to reconcile. In my judgment, the 
Bratton testimony was useful to the jury in its duty to determine the facts in 
this case.

[¶77]   I have analyzed the matter from a 
different perspective than Justice Golden. I agree that we should not treat 
Bratton's testimony as character evidence under W.R.E. 404. For me, the W.R.E. 
404 issue would relate only to the evidence of spousal abuse that was presented 
by other witnesses. Ryan did not contest the admissibility of that evidence. The 
admissibility of Bratton's testimony then should be evaluated under W.R.E. 702 
and W.R.E. 703.

[¶78]   These rules obviously raise far 
different questions than the question of character evidence. The primary concern 
in the exercise of the trial court's discretion is whether the expert will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue. This determination presupposes the determination of relevance under 
W.R.E. 401, and then invokes the weighing requirements of W.R.E. 403. In this 
case, the issue at the trial, as I understand the case, was who shot whom. This 
evidence was definitely useful to the jury in deciding whether Ryan had shot the 
victim and then shot himself, or, alternatively, whether the victim first 
wounded Ryan who then killed her in protecting himself.

[¶79]   While factually distinguishable, 
language that we invoked in Coleman v. State, 741 P.2d 99, 105 (Wyo. 1987), may 
well have been prophetic:

It 
was offered for a permissible purpose to show motive, the state of mind of 
Coleman, intent, purpose, and a continuing course of conduct. It was material 
because evidence of motive can lead to an inference of identity which is an 
element of this crime. That concept is appropriately stated in J. Weinstein and 
M. Berger, 2 Weinstein's Evidence, supra, § 404[14] at 404-108:

"Motive has been defined as `supply[ing] the reason that 
nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent.' Two 
evidentiary steps are involved. Evidence of other crimes is admitted to show 
that defendant has a reason for having the requisite state of mind to do the act 
charged, and from this mental state it is inferred that he did commit the act." 
(Footnotes omitted.)

In 
Marker v. State, 748 P.2d 295, 297 (Wyo. 1988), after quoting the above language 
from Coleman, we went on to adopt the following language:

Wright and Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence 
§ 5239, pp. 465-466 (1978) states:

"The 
exception [for proof of identity] is usually thought of as involving evidence of 
a method of committing crimes that is so distinctive as to constitute a 
`signature' of the culprit. But this is only one way in which evidence of other 
crimes may serve to identify the actor. Identity may also be shown when the 
other crime establishes that the defendant is one of a limited class of persons 
with the capacity to commit the crime * * * ."

(Emphasis added.) In Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1242 
(Wyo. 1996), we said:

The 
admissibility of such testimony is a function of helping the jury understand how 
particular conduct by the accused or an alleged victim can be viewed as part of 
a greater pattern of behavior, rather than as an isolated event.

[¶80]   I am convinced that is exactly why the 
trial court committed no error in admitting the Bratton testimony. Viewed as an 
isolated event, the circumstances could be perceived as nothing more than a 
tragic accident. When Ryan's conduct and that of the victim are viewed in the 
"greater pattern of behavior," however, it is much easier to understand what was 
going on that resulted in the death of the victim and the wounding of Ryan.

[¶81]   I would hold that there was no error, 
not that error occurred but was harmless. 

 Footnotes

1 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-101 (a) (LEXIS 1999) provides:

(a) Whoever purposely and 
with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, 
any sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting arrest, 
kidnapping or abuse of a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, kills any 
human being is guilty of murder in the first degree.

2 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-104 (LEXIS 1999) provides:

Whoever purposely and 
maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of 
murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any 
term not less than twenty (20) years, or during life.

3 W.R.E. 404 (b) 
provides:

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, 
or acts. - Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident.

  4 W.R.E. 401, provides:

"Relevant evidence" means 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence.

5 W.R.E. 403 provides:

Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.

6 We additionally note 
that there is a serious lack of evidence showing that the scientific basis of 
the expert testimony is in such a state of development so as to permit the 
expert to make a reasonable opinion about the conduct of batterers in any given 
situation. W.R.E. 702. Sorenson v. State, 895 P.2d 454, 457 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting 
Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 747 (Wyo. 1993)). See also Flanagan v. State, 
625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla.App. 1993) (sex offender profile does not meet test 
established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923)); and State v. 
Steward, 660 P.2d 278, 280 (Wash.App. 1983) (no scientific basis for testimony 
that live-in or babysitting boyfriends are likely to abuse children).

7 Several courts have 
found similar testimony to be improper, but harmless, where there was 
substantial evidence of guilt. In the Interest of D.L., 401 N.W.2d 201; Quigley, 
890 F.2d 1019; Walkey, 177 Cal. App. 3d 268, 223 Cal. Rptr. 132; Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58; Sanders, 303 S.E.2d 13 at 18.

8 W.R.Cr.P. 5.1 provides 
in pertinent part:

(a) Right. - . . . If the 
preliminary examination is waived, the case shall be transferred to district 
court for further proceedings.

(b) Probable cause 
finding. - If from the evidence it appears that there is probable cause to 
believe that the charged offense or lesser included offense has been committed 
and that the defendant committed it, the judicial officer shall enter an order 
so finding and the case shall be transferred to the district court for further 
proceedings.

9 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-7-101 (LEXIS 1999) provides in pertinent part:

(a) Any district judge, 
district court commissioner, county judge, county court commissioner, adjunct 
county court commissioner authorized pursuant to W.S. 5-5-167 (e)(iii) or any 
justice of the peace may issue a search warrant to search for and seize any 
property:

. . . .

(iv) When the property or 
things to be seized consist of any item, or constitute any evidence which tends 
to show a crime has been committed, or tends to show that a particular person 
has committed a crime.