Case Title: Kovaleski v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-536 
____________ 
 
ANTHONY KOVALESKI,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[October 25, 2012] 
 
PERRY, J. 
 
Anthony Kovaleski seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District Court 
of Appeal in Kovaleski v. State, 1 So. 3d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), on the ground 
that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of the Third District Court of 
Appeal, Alonso v. State, 821 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).1  We have 
                                         
 
1.  Kovaleski also sought this Court’s review based on express and direct 
conflict with a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, Jaggers v. State, 
536 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).  As conceded by Kovaleski, this Court’s 
decision in Pantoja v. State, 59 So. 3d 1092 (Fla.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 496 
(2011), which held that a victim may not be cross-examined about an alleged prior 
false accusation that did not result in a criminal conviction, resolves the conflict 
between Kovaleski and Jaggers.  Accordingly, we decline to grant jurisdiction on 
this ground and decline to address Kovaleski’s claim that the Fourth District erred 
in finding that such elicited testimony was not preserved for review. 
 
 
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jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we 
approve the decision of the Fourth District in Kovaleski, but upon different 
reasoning.  We disapprove the decision of the Third District in Alonso to any 
extent it could be read as inconsistent with this opinion. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Anthony Kovaleski was convicted by a jury of two counts of lewd and 
lascivious acts on a minor.  At Kovaleski’s first trial in 1998, the trial court 
partially closed the courtroom during the testimony of the victim, J.L., pursuant to 
section 918.16, Florida Statutes (1997), which allowed for partial closure of the 
courtroom during the testimony of a victim who was under the age of sixteen 
concerning a sex offense.  On appeal, the Fourth District held that the trial court 
erred in closing the courtroom after it became clear that J.L. was not under the age 
of sixteen and in failing to make findings in support of closing the trial as required 
by Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984).  See Kovaleski v. State, 854 So. 2d 
282, 284 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).  Thus, the Fourth District reversed and remanded 
for a new trial.  Id. at 284. 
At Kovaleski’s second trial in 2006, the trial court partially closed the 
courtroom during the testimony of the victim pursuant to section 918.16(2), Florida 
Statutes (2001), which provided for partial closure of the courtroom during the 
testimony of a victim of a sex offense upon the victim’s request regardless of the 
 
 
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victim’s age.  Kovaleski was again convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious 
acts on a minor.  On appeal, the Fourth District addressed whether: (1) J.L. could 
be cross-examined about a prior false accusation of sexual misconduct against 
another person; (2) the trial court erred in ordering partial closure of the courtroom 
when the victim testified; and (3) Kovaleski was subjected to vindictive sentencing 
when, after retrial, he was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of fifteen years 
each.  Kovaleski, 1 So. 3d at 256-58.  The Fourth District concluded that Waller 
was inapplicable to partial closures, the trial court erred in not giving Kovaleski 
credit for time served on each of his consecutive sentences after retrial, and the 
additional claims raised by Kovaleski were without merit.  Id. at 257-58.  Thus, the 
Fourth District affirmed Kovaleski’s convictions, and remanded the cause for 
resentencing.  Id.   
On review here, Kovaleski claims that the Fourth District erred in finding 
that the trial court did not err in partially closing the courtroom during the victim’s 
testimony.   
ANALYSIS 
 
Kovaleski contends that the trial court’s closure during J.L.’s testimony 
pursuant to section 918.16(2) violated his right to a public trial under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the 
Florida Constitution.  Specifically, Kovaleski asserts that a partial closure pursuant 
 
 
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to section 918.16(2) runs afoul of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Waller, which sets out requirements that must be satisfied before the presumption 
of openness may be overcome: (1) the party seeking to close the hearing must 
advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; (2) the closure must 
be no broader than necessary to protect that interest; (3) the trial court must 
consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceedings; and (4) the court must 
make findings adequate to support the closure.  467 U.S. at 48. 
Section 918.16(2) provides for partial closure of a trial during the testimony 
of victims at a sex offense trial:  
(2)  When the victim of a sex offense is testifying concerning that 
offense in any civil or criminal trial, the court shall clear the 
courtroom of all persons upon the request of the victim, regardless of 
the victim’s age or mental capacity, except that parties to the cause 
and their immediate families or guardians, attorneys and their 
secretaries, officers of the court, jurors, newspaper reporters or 
broadcasters, court reporters, and, at the request of the victim, victim 
or witness advocates designated by the state attorney may remain in 
the courtroom.  
§ 918.16(2), Fla. Stat. (2001).2   
We find that section 918.16(2) acceptably embraces the requirements set 
forth in Waller.3  Pursuant to the statute, the courtroom is partially closed not 
                                         
 
2.  Section 918.16(2) has remained the same since 2001. 
 
3.  See Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, CS for SB 198 (1999) Staff Analysis 2 
(Jan. 20, 1999) (on file with comm.) (contemplating the requirements of Waller in 
 
 
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automatically but only upon the request of the victim.  C.f. Globe Newspaper Co. 
v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 607-09 (1982) (automatic 
mandatory exclusion of the press and public from the courtroom with no 
particularized finding is constitutionally infirm as not narrowly tailored to the 
State’s compelling interest of protecting the testifying victim).  Because the partial 
closure pursuant to section 918.16(2) occurs only at the request of the testifying 
victim, protecting the victim upon his or her request is a compelling interest of the 
State, satisfying the first prong of Waller.   
As to the second prong of Waller, because of the number of people including 
members of the press who are explicitly allowed to remain in the courtroom, and 
because the partial closure is only during the victim’s testimony, the partial closure 
is narrowly tailored to the interest of protecting the victim.  Regarding the third 
prong of Waller, we find that allowing the parties enumerated in section 918.16(2) 
to remain in the courtroom during the victim’s testimony and only providing the 
partial closure during the victim’s testimony provides for the most reasonable 
alternative to closing the courtroom during a trial.  Finally, as to the fourth prong 
of Waller, we caution trial courts to ensure that the statute is in fact applicable to 
                                                                                                                                   
analyzing the bill which amended section 918.16(2), Fla. Stat. (1997), as set forth 
above). 
 
 
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the case before them and is properly applied.  Reflecting such determinations in the 
record will allow for proper appellate review.   
For the reasons expressed above, we find that Kovaleski was not denied his 
right to a public trial.  We therefore approve the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Kovaleski, but upon different reasoning, and disapprove the 
decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Alonso, to any extent it could be 
read as inconsistent with our decision. 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.  
POLSTON, C.J. and CANADY, J., concur in result.  
PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.  
 
PARIENTE, J., concurring in result only. 
 
While I agree with approving the result reached by the Fourth District that 
Kovaleski is not entitled to relief, I also agree with the Third District in Alonso that 
under the facts and circumstances of that case, the automatic application of the 
statute resulted in a constitutional violation of the defendant’s right to a public 
trial.  As explained by the United States Supreme Court, “it is clear that the 
circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the interest.”  
 
 
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Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 608 
(1982). 
In this case, the defendant said only that he was objecting for the record, 
without further explanation.  The defendant did not at that time or during appellate 
proceedings in the Fourth District or this Court point to any individuals who were 
improperly excluded.  Therefore, in my view, the application of section 918.16, 
Florida Statutes (2001), did not result in any demonstrated constitutional violation 
in this case.  
 
The facts of Alonso demonstrate why the one-size-fits-all approach adopted 
by the majority, in which the statute negates any need for an individualized 
inquiry, may create constitutional problems and why the Third District’s decision 
in Alonso v. State, 821 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), is clearly distinguishable 
from this case.  First, the defendant in Alonso made a specific objection to the 
courtroom closure on constitutional grounds, id. at 425, whereas the defendant here 
made no such specific objection.  Second, the defendant in Alonso objected to the 
exclusion of certain individuals, including his cousin.  Id.  The defendant’s 
“immediate family” allowed under the statute would have included his wife, from 
whom he was separated, and his parents, who could not attend the trial, but not his 
cousin, the individual he considered to be a father figure.  Id.  Third, the witnesses 
 
 
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testifying in Alonso while the courtroom was closed were not victims, id., unlike in 
the instant case.   
The Third District in Alonso correctly reasoned on the record before it that 
“[t]he trial court itself expressed doubts about whether the courtroom should be 
closed under the circumstances of [that] case.  In the absence of the necessary 
findings justifying the closure, we must order a new trial.”  Id. at 426 (emphasis 
added).  Further illustrating the necessity of a case-by-case evaluation and findings 
by the trial court as to whether the courtroom should be closed, the Third District 
also observed that “[o]n the facts of [that] case, we see no viable argument for 
closing the courtroom during the testimony of the teenaged witnesses, who were 
fourteen and twelve at the time of trial.  They were not victims.  They simply 
recounted what happened when the victim came to their apartment, including what 
the victim told them.”  Id. at 427 (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the Third 
District concluded: “We see no overriding interest served by closing the hearing 
during their testimony.”  Id. 
 
The majority opinion broadly pronounces that the statute will always satisfy 
Waller.  In my view, however, section 918.16 cannot obviate the need for an 
individualized inquiry before a partial courtroom closure where, like in Alonso, the 
defendant objects and points to specific individuals who were excluded from the 
 
 
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courtroom that interfere with his right to a public trial.  In Waller, the United States 
Supreme Court set forth the requirements that must be met:  
[1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding 
interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no 
broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must 
consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it 
must make findings adequate to support the closure. 
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984) (emphasis added).  While the statute 
may generally satisfy the first two requirements of Waller, it cannot satisfy the 
third and fourth requirements.  Simply put, the statute cannot satisfy the 
requirements for the trial court to consider reasonable alternatives and make 
specific findings in each case. 
 
It should be noted that some courts have applied a less stringent standard to 
partial closures than the standard in Waller, requiring a “substantial reason” rather 
than an “overriding interest.”  See, e.g., Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d 
Cir. 1992).  The United States Supreme Court has never explicitly decided whether 
Waller is the standard to use when there is a partial closure, and the case law is far 
from uniform.4  In my view, even under the lesser standard, there must be an 
                                         
 
4.  Compare United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(applying “substantial reason” test to partial closures); United States v. Osborne, 
68 F.3d 94, 99 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Farmer, 32 F.3d 369, 371 
(8th Cir. 1994) (same); Woods, 977 F.2d at 76 (same); United States v. Sherlock, 
962 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753 
(10th Cir. 1989) (same); Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 533 (11th Cir. 
1984) (same); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 921 N.E.2d 906, 921-22 (Mass. 2010) 
 
 
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individualized determination.  See United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542, 546 
(10th Cir. 1991) (“recogniz[ing] that a different standard applies where the 
courtroom is only partially closed” but holding that “[n]evertheless, the trial court 
must make sufficient findings to allow the reviewing court to determine whether 
the partial closure was proper”); Cohen, 921 N.E.2d at 922-23 (“[E]ven in a partial 
closure context, the remaining Waller factors must be satisfied. . . .  Closure by 
policy runs counter to the requirement that a court make a case-specific 
determination before a closure of any part of a criminal proceeding constitutionally 
may occur.”); People v. Kline, 494 N.W.2d 756, 760 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) 
(applying “substantial reason” test but stating that “the court failed to make 
findings on the record in support of its order as required by the United States 
Supreme Court”). 
In conclusion, the application of section 918.16 without conducting a Waller 
inquiry and making individualized findings can result in the unjustified exclusion 
of individuals or an overly broad closure of the courtroom.  This was illustrated in 
Alonso, where there was no logical or justified reason for excluding the 
                                                                                                                                   
(same); State v. Drummond, 854 N.E.2d 1038, 1054 (Ohio 2006); People v. Kline, 
494 N.W.2d 756, 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); with English v. Artuz, 164 F.3d 105, 
108-09 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying Waller’s “overriding interest” test to partial 
closures); People v. Jones, 750 N.E.2d 524, 529 (N.Y. 2001) (same); State v. 
Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn. 2007) (same); State v. Ortiz, 981 P.2d 
1127, 1137 (Haw. 1999) (same); People v. Taylor, 612 N.E.2d 543, 548-49 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1993) (same). 
 
 
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defendant’s cousin other than because the statute required it.  I would therefore 
approve the Third District’s decision in Alonso, which held that “[i]n order to 
implement the statute in a constitutional way, it is necessary to apply [the] four-
part [Waller] constitutional test when closure of the courtroom is requested.”  
Alonso, 821 So. 2d at 426.  In this case, however, because the defendant never 
made a specific objection or even indicated who was excluded that interfered with 
his right to a public trial, I agree with approving the result reached by the Fourth 
District to affirm the conviction.  
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Indian River County, 
Dan Lewis Vaughn, Judge - Case No. 4D06-1168 
 
Carol Stafford Haughwout, Public Defender and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant Public 
Defenders, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,  
 
for Petitioner  
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Katherine Yzquierdo 
McIntire and Consiglia Terenzio, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, 
Florida,  
 
for Respondent