Case Title: Cochran v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 156, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DONALD R. COCHRAN, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 156, 2005 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Kent County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0102010757 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: October 7, 2005 
 
 
 
 
Decided: December 8, 2005 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 8th day of December 2005, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Donald R. Cochran, filed an appeal 
from the Superior Court’s April 4, 2005 order denying his second motion for 
sentence modification pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b).  We 
find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.   
 
(2) 
In February 2003, Cochran entered Robinson pleas1 to Burglary 
in the First Degree, Assault in the First Degree, and Possession of a Deadly 
Weapon During the Commission of a Felony.  On the burglary conviction, 
                                                 
1 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(b). 
 
2
he was sentenced to 20 years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after 
6 years for decreasing levels of probation.  He was sentenced to 10 years 
incarceration at Level V and 2 years incarceration at Level V on the assault 
and weapons convictions, respectively.  This Court dismissed Cochran’s 
direct appeal as untimely.2 
 
(3) 
In this appeal, Cochran claims that: a) the Superior Court judge 
who denied his motion should have disqualified himself; and b) the Superior 
Court judge should have excused the untimeliness of the motion on the 
ground of extraordinary circumstances due to Cochran’s “mental illness.” 
 
(4) 
A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which the 
judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”3  This rule includes 
instances where “[t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party . . . .”4     
 
(5) 
The Superior Court docket sheet in this case reflects that the 
Superior Court judge who denied Cochran’s second motion for sentence 
modification presided over Cochran’s initial case review.  Two other 
Superior Court judges presided over Cochran’s final case review and the 
entry of Cochran’s Robinson pleas, respectively.  The original judge then 
                                                 
2 Cochran v. State, Del. Supr., No. 356, 2003, Veasey, C.J. (Nov. 12, 2003). 
3 Del. Judges’ Code of Judic. Cond., Canon 3C (1); Stevenson v. State, 782 A.2d 249, 
255-58 (Del. 2001). 
4 Del. Judges’ Code of Judic. Cond., Canon 3C (1) (a). 
 
3
granted Cochran’s request for a continuance of the sentencing date.  After 
Cochran’s sentencing was continued for a second time, the docket sheet 
notes that the sentencing should not be handled by the original judge 
because of a “possible conflict.”  Cochran’s sentencing hearing was presided 
over by another Superior Court judge, who also denied Cochran’s first 
motion for sentence modification.  While Cochran contends that his counsel 
told him that the original judge had a personal relationship with the victim’s 
family, there is nothing in the record to support that contention.   
 
(6) 
We find Cochran’s first claim to be without merit.  Even 
assuming that the Superior Court judge should have disqualified himself 
from ruling on Cochran’s second motion for sentence modification,5 the 
outcome would have been the same if another Superior Court judge had 
decided it, since there is no question that Cochran’s motion was not only 
untimely, but repetitive.6    
 
(7) 
 Cochran’s second claim also is unavailing.  Even assuming that 
Cochran’s “mental illness” would have excused his untimely motion, the 
                                                 
5 We note that Cochran’s second motion for sentence modification was decided 
approximately two years after the judge’s last involvement with Cochran’s case.   
6 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b). 
 
4
Superior Court was, nevertheless, compelled to deny the motion as 
repetitive.7 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Id.