Case Title: Commonwealth v. Weidman

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12612

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-09-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12612 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ROBERT WEIDMAN. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 6, 2020.  -  September 10, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Lowy, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Due Process of Law, Police custody.  Constitutional 
Law, Admissions and confessions, Waiver of constitutional 
rights, Voluntariness of statement.  Evidence, Admissions 
and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, Intoxication.  
Intoxication.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to suppress, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, 
Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 26, 2014. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Thomas 
P. Billings, J.; and the case was tried before Merita A. 
Hopkins, J. 
 
 
Theodore F. Riordan (Deborah Bates Riordan also present) 
for the defendant. 
Casey E. Silvia, Assistant District Attorney (Christopher 
M. Tarrant, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  The defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree, on theories of deliberate premeditation and 
2 
 
felony-murder, for the stabbing death of Hector Almedina.  On 
appeal, he argues that all the statements he made to 
investigators while being questioned at a police station should 
have been suppressed, and that the admission of those statements 
at trial resulted in prejudice requiring a new trial.  In the 
alternative, the defendant asks us to exercise our authority 
under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict or to order a 
new trial.  As we conclude that there was no error in the denial 
of the motion to suppress or the introduction of the defendant's 
statements at trial, and that no other relief is appropriate, we 
affirm the conviction. 
 
1.  Background.  We recite the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving certain details for later discussion. 
 
a.  The stabbing.  Two weeks before the July 10, 2014, 
stabbing of the victim, the defendant told his then girlfriend, 
Lynn,1 that he was considering robbing his drug dealer.  The 
defendant remarked that he also would have to kill the dealer, 
and that he was thinking of stabbing him.  He mentioned this 
plan to Lynn again two days before the stabbing and said that he 
intended to go through with it because he needed the money. 
 
On July 10, 2014, the defendant called his drug supplier, 
known as Javier.  He requested that Javier send a dealer with a 
                                                          
 
 
1 To protect their privacy, we refer to friends and 
associates of the victim and the defendant by their first names. 
3 
 
delivery of heroin to his apartment complex in Lowell between 
approximately 9:30 P.M. and 9:40 P.M. that evening.  Shortly 
before 9:30 P.M., the defendant left his apartment, walked to 
the adjacent parking lot, and waited in his vehicle for the 
dealer to arrive.  When the dealer, the victim, parked his 
vehicle in the lot, the defendant approached.  The defendant 
spoke with the victim through the driver's side window, before 
striking him multiple times with a knife. 
 
Mortally wounded, the victim drove to a gasoline station 
located around the corner from the defendant's residence.  He 
called his girlfriend, and she dialed 911.  Officers responded 
to the gasoline station, where they found Javier tending to the 
victim.2 
 
Paramedics transported the victim to a nearby community 
hospital.  By the time he arrived, he had lost an immense 
quantity of blood .  His condition rapidly deteriorated, and he 
succumbed to his wounds early in the morning of July 11, 2014. 
 
An autopsy revealed that the victim suffered three stab 
injuries to his chest and two to his right arm.  One of these 
stab wounds pierced a major artery as well as the victim's 
                                                          
 
 
2 Video footage from the gasoline station's surveillance 
cameras showed that Javier arrived there shortly after the 
victim. 
4 
 
heart; it resulted in significant internal bleeding and proved 
fatal. 
 
b.  The investigation.  The next day, Javier, accompanied 
by an attorney, met with officers of the Lowell police 
department.  He conceded that the victim had been working for 
him as a dealer selling drugs on his behalf.  Javier informed 
police that he had asked the victim to deliver drugs to a man 
named "Bob" and directed officers to the defendant's apartment 
complex. 
 
After going door to door, officers ultimately found the 
defendant with Lynn in their apartment.  He invited the officers 
into the apartment to speak.  Officers then asked him to come to 
the police station to talk about the stabbing.  The defendant 
agreed so long as he could drive himself and that Lynn could 
accompany him. 
 
Police officers later searched the defendant's apartment 
with his consent.  Based on information provided by the 
defendant, a forensic scientist found a folding knife in a walk-
in closet.  The blade of this knife measured three and one-
quarter inches long and three quarters of an inch wide.3  The 
forensic scientist observed red brown stains on the knife, as 
                                                          
 
3 The stab wounds to the chest were approximately three 
quarters of an inch in length and up to four inches in depth.  
An instrument shorter than four inches in length could have 
caused these injuries. 
5 
 
well as yellow skin-like debris; testing confirmed that human 
blood was present on the knife.  The forensic scientist also 
tested a T-shirt found in a laundry basket; it too tested 
positive for human blood.  A chemist later compared samples from 
the knife handle, the knife blade, and the exterior and interior 
of the T-shirt to known standards from the defendant and the 
victim.  The blade of the knife and bloodstains on the T-shirt 
matched the victim's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). 
 
c.  The interrogation.  When the defendant and Lynn went to 
the police station for questioning, they were brought into 
separate interview rooms.  The two officers interviewing the 
defendant began by advising him of his Miranda rights4 by reading 
aloud a police department-issued form explaining these rights.  
After listening to this explanation, the defendant signed and 
dated the form, indicating that he understood his Miranda rights 
and wished to speak with the officers.5  The officers then began 
interrogating the defendant. 
 
Initially, the defendant denied that he had been involved 
in the victim's death.  He agreed that he had met with the 
victim outside his apartment to purchase drugs from the victim, 
                                                          
 
 
4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
 
5 One of the interviewing officers also signed and dated the 
form.  By signing another part of the form, the defendant 
consented to the interview being recorded. 
6 
 
but said that that was the extent of his interaction with the 
victim on the evening of the stabbing.  Later, however, police 
revealed to the defendant that Lynn had made statements to them 
implicating the defendant.  Specifically, she told police that 
the defendant said that he intended to rob the victim.  The 
officers then brought Lynn into the defendant's interrogation 
room.  The defendant became irate, urging Lynn not to cooperate 
with the police.  She responded, "I already told them."  After 
she left, the defendant claimed that he did not remember making 
such a comment and that, even if he had, it must have been a 
joke.6  The investigators did not believe the defendant and 
pressed him to admit that he had planned to rob the victim. 
 
Eventually, the defendant changed his story; he admitted 
that he had stabbed the victim, but claimed that it had been in 
self-defense.  Following the defendant's repeated denials that 
he had intended to rob or kill the victim that evening, the 
investigators revealed that Lynn had said not only that the 
defendant had intended to rob the victim, but also that the 
defendant had intended to kill him.  The defendant continued to 
deny that he had had any such plan and to claim that he had 
acted in self-defense. 
                                                          
 
 
6 The defendant conceded that he had intended to "short 
change" the victim when making the drug purchase. 
7 
 
 
At the conclusion of the interrogation, the interviewing 
officers briefly stepped out of the room.  When they returned, 
they found that the defendant had attempted suicide by slitting 
his neck with a piece of metal.  He told the officers, "I'm not 
going back to fucking jail."  After being transported to a local 
hospital for treatment, he was assessed by a forensic 
psychologist.  Based on that assessment, the defendant was 
transferred to Bridgewater State Hospital for observation. 
 
d.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted on 
charges of murder, G. L. c. 265, § 1; armed assault with intent 
to rob, G. L. c. 265, § 18 (b); and assault and battery by means 
of a dangerous weapon, causing serious bodily injury, G. L. 
c. 265, § 15A (c) (i).  In December of 2015, the defendant moved 
to suppress statements he made at the Lowell police station 
prior to his arrest.  A Superior Court judge denied that motion 
following an evidentiary hearing.  In December of 2017, the 
defendant was tried on all charges before a jury and a different 
judge.  Prior to submitting the case to the jury, the 
Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi on all but the murder 
indictment.  After deliberating over two days, the jury 
convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree on 
theories of deliberate premeditation and felony-murder.7 
                                                          
 
 
7 The defendant's trial took place shortly after the 
issuance of our decision in Commonwealth v. Brown, 477 Mass. 
8 
 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant's main argument on appeal is 
that the statements he made to police officers shortly after the 
stabbing should have been suppressed under the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, and that admitting them at 
his trial resulted in two reversible errors.  First, he claims 
that, at two different times during his interrogation, the 
officers continued to question him after he had invoked his 
right to remain silent pursuant to the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and 
that the subsequent statements should not have been admitted.  
Second, he contends that because he was under the influence of 
narcotics or suffering from withdrawal at the outset of the 
interrogation, his initial waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights 
was involuntary, and all of the statements that he made during 
the custodial interrogation should have been held to be 
inadmissible. 
a.  Standard of review.  "In reviewing the denial of a 
motion to suppress, we defer to the motion judge as to the 
weight and credibility of the evidence.  We accept the motion 
                                                          
 
805, 807-808 (2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018), 
narrowing the scope of felony-murder in cases decided after that 
date.  Under that more narrow scope, the evidence before the 
jury of the defendant's conduct at the scene of the intended 
robbery clearly evinced the necessary malice. 
9 
 
judge's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and 
assess the correctness of the judge's legal conclusions de novo" 
(citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Bell, 473 Mass. 131, 138 
(2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2467 (2016).  To the extent 
that the motion judge's findings are based entirely on 
documentary evidence, including video recordings, that are 
equally available to a reviewing court, no deference is owed 
because the reviewing court is "in the same position as the 
[motion] judge."  Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 266 
(2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Prater, 420 Mass. 569, 578 n.7 
(1995). 
 
b.  Whether the defendant was in custody.  As a preliminary 
matter, the parties dispute if and when during his interrogation 
the defendant was actually "in custody."8  "Miranda warnings are 
required only when a suspect is subject to custodial 
interrogation."  Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 287, 
cert. denied, 562 U.S. 874 (2010).  As a result, if, as the 
Commonwealth contends, the defendant was not in custody when he 
made the two statements at issue, then he had no right to remain 
silent to invoke; in other words, the police had no obligation 
to cease asking him questions.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 
Molina, 467 Mass. 65, 75 (2014). 
                                                          
 
8 The Commonwealth does not contest that the police 
questioning at the station was an interrogation. 
10 
 
 
"[W]hether there is a 'custodial interrogation'" depends on 
"whether the defendant has been 'deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way.'"  Commonwealth v. Accaputo, 380 
Mass. 435, 452 (1980), quoting Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 
545, 551 (1977), S.C., 398 Mass. 806 (1986).  "The critical 
question in determining whether an individual is in custody is 
whether a reasonable person in the individual's position would 
feel free to leave."  Simon, 456 Mass. at 287, citing 
Commonwealth v. Damiano, 422 Mass. 10, 13 (1996), "When 
considering 'how a suspect would have gaug[ed] his freedom of 
movement, courts must examine all of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation'" (quotations omitted).  
Commonwealth v. Medina, 485 Mass. 296, 300 (2020), quoting Howes 
v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012).  Based on all these 
circumstances, we must determine "whether the defendant was 
subjected to 'a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of 
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'"  
Medina, supra at 301, quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 
112 (1995). 
 
It suffices for our analysis that, based on all the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation, the defendant was 
in custody by the time he first purportedly invoked his right to 
remain silent.  The ongoing interrogation took place within the 
police station, an inherently coercive environment in which the 
11 
 
police investigators "possess[] all the advantages."  Haas, 373 
Mass. at 553, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450.  It was also 
clear to the defendant that he was suspected of having committed 
a serious crime.  Moreover, the nature of the interrogation had 
become hostile; the officers had accused the defendant of lying 
to them.  By that point, a reasonable person in the defendant's 
position would not have felt free to cut off questioning and 
leave. 
 
c.  Whether the defendant clearly and unambiguously invoked 
his right to remain silent.  Because the defendant was in 
custody when, he claims, he invoked his right to remain silent, 
we must consider whether the police violated that right.  A 
defendant in custody may "voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently" waive his or her Miranda rights and consent to 
being interrogated.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  Even after such 
a waiver, as here, however, a defendant may reassert his or her 
right to remain silent.  See Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 
244, 265 (1982).  The defendant bears the burden to establish, 
based on a totality of the circumstances, that his or her 
statements purportedly reasserting that right were "clear and 
unambiguous[], such that a reasonable police officer in the 
circumstances would understand the statement to be an invocation 
of the Miranda right" (quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
12 
 
Smith, 473 Mass. 798, 808 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 731 (2014), S.C., 479 Mass. 52 (2018). 
 
The defendant first points to his statement that, "No, it 
was nobody with me except [my girlfriend], and I'm not going to 
keep answering the same questions," as indicating that he wanted 
to terminate the interview.  He made this statement about two 
hours into the interrogation.  By then, the officers had asked 
him several similar questions, and had twice previously asked 
the defendant if someone who was with him might have been 
involved in the stabbing.  It is clear that the defendant was in 
an agitated state at that time, as indicated by the next 
exchange between the officers and him: 
 
Q.:  "Why are you getting angry?" 
 
A.:  "Because you're accusing me and I didn't do anything." 
 
Considering the context surrounding this first statement, 
it falls well short of an unequivocal invocation of the 
defendant's Miranda rights.  It appears far more likely that the 
defendant was expressing frustration with the repetitious nature 
of the officers' questioning rather than that he intended to 
assert his constitutional right to remain silent.  A reasonable 
officer would not have understood the statement about not 
answering "the same questions" as an expressed refusal to answer 
any further questions.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 
Mass. 273, 285 (2012) ("a suspect's unwillingness to answer 
13 
 
questions on a particular topic does not unambiguously indicate 
that the suspect is unwilling to continue speaking with police 
or obligate them to inquire whether the suspect would "like to 
reassert his right to silence" [citation omitted]). 
 
The cases cited by the defendant to show that his statement 
was a clear and unambiguous reassertion of his Miranda rights 
actually contrast markedly with the facts here.  In all of those 
cases, the defendants "manifest[ed] an expressed unwillingness 
to continue with the interview" as a whole; unlike the defendant 
here, he did not merely "refus[e] to answer certain questions."  
Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144, 161 & n.7 (2007).  
Also, by contrast to the circumstances in Commonwealth v. Neves, 
474 Mass. 355, 364-365 (2016), the defendant here points to no 
previous statements by him that, in context, would have 
clarified that his first statement was an invocation of his 
right to remain silent, nor does the transcript indicate that he 
sought to explain his statement as an invocation of his rights 
immediately after he made it. 
 
For similar reasons, the second statement the defendant 
relies upon, "then [I] guess we should stop this conversation," 
also was not a clear expression of an unwillingness to continue 
answering questions.  By the time the defendant made this second 
statement, he knew that he was a suspect in the stabbing.  He 
then began trying to persuade the officers that he must have 
14 
 
been "joking around" with his girlfriend when he said that he 
had intended to rob the victim, and that he would never do such 
a thing, but the officers did not seem to believe him.  When the 
defendant said again that he did not even remember making such a 
statement, they responded by calling him a liar three times in a 
row.  After the third time, the defendant answered with this 
exasperated, sarcastic remark, "Oh, okay, then [I] guess we 
should stop this conversation because apparently I'm not going 
to give you the truth." 
 
The defendant places almost talismanic weight on his use of 
the word "stop" in that sentence.  To be sure, this court has 
described a "defendant's use of the word 'stop,' or the phrase, 
'I would like to stop at that point,'" as a "red flag for an 
interrogating police officer" indicating that a defendant may be 
attempting to invoke his or her right to remain silent.  See 
Howard, 469 Mass. at 733 n.13.  Again, however, our fact-
specific inquiry requires us to consider the totality of the 
circumstances; to determine whether a reasonable officer would 
have understood the defendant to be invoking his Miranda rights, 
we cannot isolate the defendant's choice of words from tone or 
context. 
 
In Commonwealth v. Pennellatore, 392 Mass. 382, 386–388 
(1984), for example, this court held that a defendant's 
statement, "Can we stop please?" did not manifest an 
15 
 
unwillingness to continue answering police officers' questions, 
because it was clear from the context that the defendant merely 
was requesting a break.  In particular, the court held that the 
defendant's request for the interview to "stop" had to be viewed 
in light of the defendant's "willingness to talk both 
immediately prior to and subsequent to the break."  Id. at 387.  
The court pointed to the fact that the defendant made this 
request at "one particularly emotional point during the 
questioning," and that he willingly continued to answer 
questions after a short break.  Id. at 385–386. 
 
Similarly here, a reasonable police officer would likely 
interpret the defendant's statement as an expression of 
frustration with the officers' questions and their unwillingness 
to believe the defendant's story.  And as with a defendant who 
is willing to continue answering questions after a break, it 
also is telling that the defendant continued to answer the 
officers' questions, without any apparent hesitation, after 
making this statement.  The next words he spoke were not along 
the lines of, "I'm done talking," but, rather, "I'm telling the 
truth[,] I didn't hurt anybody, I wouldn't hurt anybody, no 
way."  This later statement evinces that the defendant had not 
been trying to terminate the interrogation; he became distressed 
that the officers did not seem to believe him, and after 
16 
 
expressing this frustration, he persisted in his efforts to 
persuade the officers. 
 
Because neither of the defendant's statements was a clear 
and unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent, the 
defendant has failed to meet his burden. 
 
d.  Whether the waiver was knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent.  In the alternative, the defendant challenges 
whether his initial waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent, and whether his subsequent 
statements were voluntary.  Specifically, he asserts that his 
drug use left him without the requisite capacity to make such a 
waiver knowingly and intelligently, and that his subsequent 
statements were involuntary as a matter of law. 
 
"Although the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver and the 
voluntariness of a particular statement made during custodial 
interrogation 'are separate and distinct issues,' the 'test' for 
both is 'essentially the same.'"  Commonwealth v. Newson, 471 
Mass. 222, 229 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 
Mass. 666, 670 (1995).  A waiver of Miranda rights is valid only 
if made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."  Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 444.  "The initial burden is on the defendant to 
produce evidence tending to show that his statement was 
involuntary; if he satisfies this burden, the Commonwealth is 
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement 
17 
 
was voluntarily made."  Commonwealth v. Montoya, 464 Mass. 566, 
577 (2013).  See Edwards, supra at 669 (applying same standard 
to voluntariness of Miranda waiver). 
 
Of relevance here, "statements that are attributable in 
large measure to a defendant's debilitated condition, such as 
drug abuse or withdrawal symptoms, [or] intoxication . . . are 
not the product of a rational intellect or free will and are 
involuntary."  Bell, 473 Mass. at 141, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Allen, 395 Mass. 448, 455 (1985).  Nonetheless, an "otherwise 
voluntary act is not necessarily rendered involuntary simply 
because an individual has been drinking or using drugs."  
Commonwealth v. Silanskas, 433 Mass. 678, 685 (2001), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Shipps, 399 Mass. 820, 826 (1987).  Accord 
Newson, 471 Mass. at 231.  If a defendant is able to give 
coherent answers during an interrogation and the defendant's 
responses "evince a concerted effort to rebut any involvement" 
in the crime of which the defendant is suspected, the fact that 
a defendant consumed drugs or alcohol shortly before the 
interview does not necessarily render the subsequent conduct 
involuntary.  See id. at 231–232. 
 
Here, the defendant contends that he was under the 
influence of drugs when he signed the form waiving his Miranda 
rights and during his subsequent interrogation.  In support of 
this argument, he relies primarily on statements he made during 
18 
 
the interrogation, observations by a police psychologist with 
whom he spoke the day after the interrogation, as well as a 
number of statements that he made to his own expert 
psychologist.9  According to the police psychologist, during his 
evaluation, the defendant seemed depressed and was exhibiting 
physical symptoms that could be consistent with drug withdrawal, 
such as yawning and fidgeting.10  He claimed to have used two 
bags of heroin per day for several years, and also claimed to 
have used heroin on the day of the interrogation.  The police 
psychologist noted also, however, that the defendant was alert, 
cooperative, and polite during his evaluation, and he did not 
display other withdrawal symptoms such as nausea or nodding off. 
 
The defense psychologist testified that, in his opinion, 
the defendant was going through drug withdrawal when he was 
interrogated.  According to the defense psychologist, the 
defendant used heroin daily,11 and had consumed cocaine on the 
day of the interrogation; that evening, he also consumed heroin 
in order to mitigate stimulation from the cocaine.  In addition 
                                                          
 
 
9 Both psychologists testified at the hearing on the motion 
to suppress and prepared reports that were admitted in evidence. 
 
 
10 On cross-examination, the police psychologist conceded 
that the defendant had been in the hospital overnight and likely 
had not slept well before his interview. 
 
 
11 The defendant apparently developed a dependency on 
opiates after he was prescribed Percocet and oxycodone to cope 
with a serious work-related injury. 
19 
 
to the defendant's statements to him and other sources,12 in 
forming his opinion, the defense psychologist also reviewed the 
recording of the defendant's interrogation.  He characterized 
the defendant as agitated, restless, and irritated during the 
interrogation, which would be consistent with heroin withdrawal. 
 
The motion judge did not share the defense psychologist's 
opinion, and pointedly criticized the defense psychologist's 
"uncritical acceptance" of the defendant's statements.  Contrary 
to the psychologist's view, the motion judge found that the 
defendant's "actions, words and demeanor" indicated "a lengthy, 
calculated and voluntary effort to persuade the police that he 
should not face charges, especially of murder."  "The defendant 
showed himself, in the recorded statement, to be well aware of 
his jeopardy, ready to lie when and as long as it might benefit 
him, and surprisingly energetic given the length of the 
interview and the late hour."  In sum, the motion judge found 
that the defendant's heroin use "did not materially affect his 
ability to make informed, rational, and voluntary decisions 
concerning whether to waive his Fifth Amendment rights and what 
to tell the police to further his own interests." 
                                                          
 
 
12 These included hospital records, the police 
psychologist's evaluation, and an interview that the defense 
psychologist conducted with the defendant's girlfriend. 
20 
 
 
Based on our review of both the transcript and the 
recording of the defendant's interview, we agree that the 
Commonwealth has met its burden to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant had the capacity knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently to waive his Miranda rights, and 
voluntarily to respond to police questioning.  The defendant's 
answers to questions do not appear to have derived in large part 
from his use of heroin or cocaine.  Even granting that the 
defendant may have been influenced by withdrawal from drugs when 
the interrogation took place, he was able to give clear answers 
to the officers' questions from their introductory questions 
about his background and continuing throughout the interview. 
 
Further, the defendant's answers indicate that he was aware 
enough to formulate a plan to persuade the officers that he had 
not been involved in the victim's death.  He initially explained 
to the officers that he simply had purchased drugs from the 
victim, and repeatedly denied involvement in the stabbing.  
After being confronted with his girlfriend's statements, 
however, the defendant changed tactics.  He then admitted that 
he had stabbed the victim, but claimed that he had done so in 
self-defense.  This change in his story evinces that the 
defendant was cognizant of what was going on around him; he was 
able to understand that his previous efforts to rebut any 
involvement in the crime were contradicted by other evidence in 
21 
 
police possession, so he adapted accordingly.  The defendant's 
self-destructive actions at the end of his interrogation were 
consistent with his growing fear that he likely would face 
imprisonment for murder,13 and not evidence that his state of 
mind was so altered by drugs as to make his statements and 
waiver involuntary. 
 
In sum, the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda 
rights, voluntarily made statements to the police, and did not 
thereafter unambiguously reassert his right to remain silent.  
Thus, the motion judge did not err in denying the defendant's 
motion to suppress, and the admission of those statements at the 
defendant's trial was not error, reversible or otherwise. 
 
e.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant urges 
us to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt 
pursuant to our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Having 
carefully reviewed the entire case pursuant to our statutory 
obligation, we conclude that there is no basis to reduce the 
verdict or to order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
                                                          
 
13 Although not revealed at trial, the defendant told the 
interrogating officers that he previously had served a two-year 
term of incarceration for an unrelated offense.