Case Title: Atrium Unit Owners Assoc. v. King

Citation: 

Docket Number: 022417

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-09-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
THE ATRIUM UNIT OWNERS ASSOCIATION 
 
v.  Record No. 022417  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   September 12, 2003 
SHARON KING 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
Joanne F. Alper, Judge 
 
 
In this negligence case, the dispositive issue is 
whether the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence from 
which a jury reasonably could infer a causal connection 
between a condominium unit owners association’s alleged 
negligence regarding a convenience key and the damages 
sustained by the plaintiff in a burglary of her 
condominium.  We conclude that the plaintiff failed to 
establish proximate causation and will, therefore, reverse 
the judgment of the circuit court sustaining a jury verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff. 
MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
Sharon King owned a condominium unit on the sixth 
floor of The Atrium, a high-rise condominium complex 
located in Arlington County.  As required by The Atrium 
Unit Owners Association Rules and Regulations, King 
provided the general manager a key to her unit for use in 
an emergency.  The Rules also permitted residents to 
deposit an additional key called a “convenience key” with 
the general manager.  The convenience key would be given to 
those persons specifically authorized by the resident on an 
“admittance envelope.”  King chose to take advantage of 
this service. 
 
On November 12, 1997, King left for a trip to 
California.  On November 16, 1997, King received a voice 
mail message from Thomas K. Meyer, the real estate agent 
with whom King had listed her condominium for sale.  Meyer 
informed King that he was unable to show her condominium to 
some potential buyers because the convenience key was 
missing.  King then called her daughter, Lenette Lepore, 
and asked her to leave a key for Meyer at The Atrium’s 
“front desk.”  When Lepore went to her mother’s condominium 
the next day, she discovered that the door was unlocked and 
the condominium was not in the condition in which her 
mother typically “left her house.”  Clothes were lying on 
the floor and several drawers and cabinet doors were open.  
Lepore called her mother and the police to report a 
possible burglary.  When King returned home the next week, 
she found that numerous items, including clothing, jewelry, 
coats, and electronic equipment, were missing from the 
condominium. 
 
King subsequently filed a motion for judgment in the 
circuit court against The Atrium Unit Owners Association 
 
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(Atrium), Polinger Company, Polinger, Shannon & Luchs, and 
Brooks Business Transfer, Inc.1  Regarding Atrium, King 
alleged, as pertinent to the issues on appeal, that Atrium 
was negligent by failing “to train employees in security, 
. . . to store securely spare keys, to keep inventories of 
spare keys, to document adequately the distribution and 
return of spare keys, to follow established procedures 
regarding keys and control of the Atrium property, and to 
use due care under the circumstances.”  King further 
alleged that Atrium’s negligence “was the sole, direct and 
proximate cause of [her] incurring a significant monetary 
loss of property, as well as considerable mental distress.” 
 
At trial, Corporal Robert Rutledge, the Arlington 
County police officer who responded to Lepore’s call about 
the burglary, testified that he saw no signs of “forced 
entry” into King’s condominium.  He stated that, in most 
burglaries where access is gained other than by forced 
entry, the burglar has either been allowed in by someone, 
used a key, or entered through an unsecured door or window.  
Corporal Rutledge testified that he found the sliding glass 
                     
1 Polinger Company and Polinger, Shannon & Luchs were 
allegedly retained by Atrium to manage the condominium 
building.  Brooks Business Transfer, Inc. was a commercial 
moving company whose employees were allegedly in the 
condominium complex around the time of the burglary of 
 
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door to the condominium’s balcony unlocked and that it is 
not “unheard of” for burglars to gain access to high-rise 
apartments by means of a balcony.  However, Corporal 
Rutledge conceded that the location of King’s condominium 
in the building and the distance between balconies would 
make access “from balcony to balcony” difficult. 
 
King’s real estate agent, Meyer, testified that he was 
familiar with Atrium’s procedure for obtaining a 
convenience key from the front desk.  Once the personnel at 
the front desk determined that there was a permission slip 
for a particular person, they checked the key out to that 
individual.  Meyer stated that, although the procedure for 
returning a key required the person to “sign the key back 
in” by initialing the key log, occasionally he would simply 
“hand it to [a person at the desk]” or “set it on the 
counter top.” 
 
Continuing, Meyer stated that he had “a standing 
permission slip” from King allowing him to check out King’s 
convenience key for the purpose of showing her condominium 
to potential buyers.  Meyer testified that when he asked 
for King’s convenience key on November 16, 1997, he was 
told that “they didn’t have a key for it.”  Meyer had used 
________________________ 
King’s unit.  All these defendants were dismissed with 
prejudice from the action. 
 
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the key on November 2, 1997, but insisted that he had 
returned it to the front desk after he had shown King’s 
condominium to a perspective buyer.  He admitted, however, 
that he did not sign the key back in on November 2 by 
initialing the key log.  Meyer was the last person to sign 
out the convenience key for King’s condominium before the 
burglary. 
 
Shalu Wohldegioris, the front desk supervisor both 
before and after the burglary of King’s condominium, 
explained that the convenience keys were physically kept in 
a “box mounted on the counter in the inner side of the 
front desk.”  The emergency keys, however, were stored “in 
a locked box on a wall in the general manager’s office.”  
According to Wohldegioris, all the front desk staff had 
access to the box containing the convenience keys.2  He also 
admitted that, in November 1997, Atrium did not have any 
procedure in effect for determining the whereabouts of a 
convenience key that was not returned to the front desk. 
 
At the conclusion of King’s case-in-chief, Atrium 
moved to strike her evidence.  The court took the motion to 
                     
2 According to a private investigator hired to 
investigate the burglary at King’s condominium, Atrium’s 
general manager admitted that both employees and non-
employees had access to the box where the convenience keys 
were stored and that “there was lots of activity around the 
box.” 
 
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strike under advisement with regard to the negligence claim 
against Atrium and allowed that claim to proceed to the 
jury.3  The jury returned a verdict in favor of King. 
 
Atrium filed a post-trial motion to set aside the 
verdict and to enter judgment for it as a matter of law.  
Atrium asserted that the court should have granted its 
earlier motion to strike because King “failed to establish 
a duty, failed to establish a breach of any duty, failed to 
establish notice, and failed to establish a causal 
relationship between the duty/breach and damages.”  Atrium 
argued that each of these failures was fatal to King’s 
negligence claim.  At the conclusion of a hearing on the 
motion, the circuit court denied Atrium’s motion.  The 
court stated that “there was sufficient evidence to send 
the case to the jury” and that “[t]he jury’s verdict is not 
plainly wrong.”  The court subsequently entered an order 
denying Atrium’s motion and granting judgment to King on 
the jury’s verdict.  Atrium appeals from that judgment. 
ANALYSIS 
 
“[A] party who comes before us with a jury verdict 
approved by the trial court ‘occupies the most favored 
position known to the law.’ ”  Ravenwood Towers, Inc. v. 
                     
3 The court granted the motion to strike with regard to 
a breach of contract claim that King had alleged against 
 
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Woodyard, 244 Va. 51, 57, 419 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1992) 
(quoting Pugsley v. Privette, 220 Va. 892, 901, 263 S.E.2d 
69, 76 (1980)); accord Sugarland Run Homeowners Ass’n v. 
Halfmann, 260 Va. 366, 371, 535 S.E.2d 469, 472 (2000).  On 
appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at 
trial.  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. St. John, 259 Va. 71, 
76, 524 S.E.2d 649, 651 (2000); Ravenwood, 244 Va. at 57, 
519 S.E.2d at 630.  A trial court’s judgment will not be 
set aside “unless it appears from the evidence that such 
judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support 
it.”  Code § 8.01-680; accord Ravenwood, 244 Va. at 57, 
519S.E.2d at 630.  However, upon applying these principles, 
if it appears that a judgment is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it, we must set it aside.  Sugarland 
Run Homeowners Ass’n, 260 Va. at 371, 535 S.E.2d at 472. 
 
To establish actionable negligence, King had the 
burden to show the existence of a legal duty, a breach of 
the duty, and proximate causation resulting in damage.  Fox 
v. Custis, 236 Va. 69, 73, 372 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1988); 
Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co., Inc., 192 Va. 776, 780, 66 
S.E.2d 441, 443 (1951); see Delk v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Corp., 259 Va. 125, 132, 523 S.E.2d 826, 830 (2000).  The 
________________________ 
Atrium. 
 
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dispositive question in this appeal is whether King 
established a causal connection between Atrium’s alleged 
negligent handling of her convenience key and the damages 
she suffered as a result of the burglary. 
 
Atrium argues that King did not present any evidence 
proving “how, or by whom, or even whether . . . the 
convenience key was used in the burglary.”  Atrium asserts 
that this failure was fatal to King’s case and, that by 
submitting the case to the jury, “the trial court 
erroneously invited the jury to speculate.”  On this issue, 
King contends that there was credible circumstantial 
evidence supporting the jury’s determination as to 
proximate causation.  King points to the evidence that she 
could account for all the keys to her condominium except 
for the missing convenience key, that there were no signs 
of forced entry into her condominium, and that any other 
reasonable method of “unforced entry” was excluded.  We 
agree with Atrium. 
 
“The proximate cause of an event is that act or 
omission which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the 
event, and without which that event would not have 
occurred.”  Beale v. Jones, 210 Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 
851, 853 (1970).  Proximate cause is generally a question 
 
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of fact to be resolved by a jury.  Jenkins v. Payne, 251 
Va. 122, 128, 465 S.E.2d 795, 799 (1996).  Although facts 
may be established by circumstantial evidence, Fobbs v. 
Webb Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 232 Va. 227, 230, 349 S.E.2d 355, 
357 (1986), such evidence “must be sufficient to establish 
that the result alleged is a probability rather than a mere 
possibility.”  Southern States Coop., Inc. v. Doggett, 223 
Va. 650, 657, 292 S.E.2d 331, 335 (1982).  Before a 
question of fact with regard to proximate cause may be 
submitted to a jury, the evidence proving the causal 
connection must be “sufficient to take the question out of 
the realm of mere conjecture, or speculation, and into the 
realm of legitimate inference.”  Beale, 210 Va. at 522, 171 
S.E.2d at 853 (quoting Hawkins v. Beecham, 168 Va. 553, 
561, 191 S.E. 640, 643 (1937)). 
 
In Wooldridge v. Echelon Service Co., 243 Va. 458, 
459, 416 S.E.2d 441, 442 (1992), we considered whether a 
plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to establish 
proximate cause.  There, a woman was fatally attacked in a 
building for which Echelon provided security services.  Id. 
at 460, 416 S.E.2d at 442.  At trial, one of the security 
guards on duty at the time of the attack testified that he 
saw a “ ‘flash in the elevator corridor . . . [l]ike 
someone had ran . . . from the down elevator to the up 
 
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elevator.’ ”  Id. at 459-60, 416 S.E.2d at 442.  The 
security guard stated that he called out to the individual 
but that the individual did not respond.  The security 
guard did not pursue the individual.  Id. at 460, 416 
S.E.2d at 442.  Shortly thereafter, the security guards 
received a telephone call reporting that a woman was 
screaming on the 11th floor of the building.  Id.  The 
security guard testified that, when he went to the 11th 
floor to investigate, he was confronted by a man holding a 
pair of long scissors in his hand.  Id.  The security guard 
also found the victim “wearing a bloody shirt and 
wheezing.”  Id.  Although the man initially fled, he was 
later apprehended in the lobby of the building.  Id.
 
A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 
but the trial court set aside the jury verdict and entered 
judgment for the defendant.  Id. at 460-61, 416 S.E.2d at 
442-43.  The trial court concluded that the jury’s finding 
of “‘a nexus between the entry of the ‘flash’ into the 
building, the failure to pursue the ‘flash’ to the exact 
site of [the] crime, . . . and the ultimate damage done 
could only have been based upon surmise, conjecture, and 
speculation by the jury.’”  Id. at 461, 416 S.E.2d at 443. 
 
We reversed, stating that the plaintiff “needed only 
to produce sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude 
 
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that [the man apprehended] was the ‘flash’ seen and called 
to by [the security guard], and that he gained access to 
the upper floors of the building at that point.”  Id. at 
461, 416 S.E.2d at 443.  We noted that the security guard 
testified that the “flash” was a person and that, after 
calling out to the individual, he did not pursue the man 
further or attempt to require him to follow the procedures 
for admission to the building.  Id. at 461-62, 416 S.E.2d 
at 443.  The evidence also showed that the call reporting 
an attack on the 11th floor was received a short time later 
and that the man apprehended was the sole unauthorized 
person found in the building at the time of the attack.  
Id.  We concluded that, “[b]ased upon this circumstantial 
evidence, . . . the jury reasonably could [have] infer[red] 
that [the assailant] was the person [the security guard] 
saw running from the ‘down elevators’ into the ‘up 
elevators’ ” and that the security guard’s “inaction” was a 
proximate cause of the victim’s death.  Id.
 
A plaintiff has the burden “to establish a causal 
connection between the defendant’s alleged negligence and 
the injury of which the plaintiff complains.”  Commercial 
Distributors, Inc. v. Blankenship, 240 Va. 382, 395, 397 
S.E.2d 840, 847 (1990).  Thus, in this case, King had the 
burden to produce evidence from which the jury reasonably 
 
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could infer that, as a result of Atrium’s alleged 
negligence, the convenience key was used to access her 
condominium for the purpose of committing a burglary.  We 
conclude that King failed to carry this burden. 
 
The evidence presented at trial established that the 
convenience key could not be found at the front desk when 
Meyer asked for it on November 16 and that there were no 
signs of forced entry into King’s condominium.  But, 
Corporal Rutledge testified that the use of a key was only 
one of several ways in which a burglar could have gained 
access to the condominium without using force.  Although 
the location of King’s balcony would have made access by 
way of the balcony difficult, it is, nevertheless, notable 
that Corporal Rutledge found the sliding glass door to the 
balcony unlocked.  Moreover, Atrium’s employees had access 
to the convenience keys, but King presented no evidence to 
show what happened to her convenience key after Meyer 
returned it to the front desk on November 2, whether any of 
Atrium’s employees saw her key after that date, or whether 
the convenience key, as opposed to another key, was even 
used in the burglary.  “Proof of ‘possibility’ of causal 
connection is not sufficient.”  Wilkins v. Sibley, 205 Va. 
171, 175, 135 S.E.2d 765, 767 (1964).  The evidence in this 
case did not establish that Atrium’s alleged negligent 
 
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handling of the convenience key was an “act or omission 
which, in natural and continuous sequence, . . . produc[ed] 
the [burglary], and without which [the burglary] would not 
have occurred.”  Beale, 210 Va. at 522, 171 S.E.2d at 853. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Here, unlike Wooldridge, there was nothing in the 
record from which the jury could reasonably infer a causal 
connection between Atrium’s alleged negligence and the 
damages King sustained as a result of the burglary.  
Therefore, the circuit court erred by submitting the case 
to the jury and by affirming a jury verdict that could only 
have been “the product of mere conjecture, surmise, or 
speculation.”  Wooldridge, 243 Va. at 462, 416 S.E.2d at 
443. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court and enter final judgment here in favor of 
Atrium. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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