Case Title: LINDA HENDRICKS, Individually and As Personal Representative for Ryan Hendricks, a Minor and as Best Friend for Her Children v. JOHN HURLEY and MAUREEN HURLEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0178

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
LINDA HENDRICKS, Individually and As Personal Representative for Ryan Hendricks, a Minor and as Best Friend for Her Children v. JOHN HURLEY and MAUREEN HURLEY2008 WY 57184 P.3d 680Case Number: S-07-0178Decided: 05/22/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
LINDA 
HENDRICKS, Individually and As Personal Representative for Ryan Hendricks, a 
Minor and as Best Friend For Her 
Children,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.JOHN HURLEY AND 
MAUREEN HURLEY,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Bruce S. 
Asay of Associated Legal Group, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.  

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

Raymond 
W. Martin of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.     

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Eight-year-old Ryan Hendricks (Ryan) was 
electrocuted after touching an ungrounded well head at his grandparents' 
home.  Linda Hendricks, Ryan's 
mother, filed a claim against the grandparents, John and Maureen Hurley (the 
Hurleys), alleging that they failed to use reasonable care in inspecting the 
well and supervising Ryan.  The 
Hurleys filed a summary judgment motion, which the district court granted.  Mrs. Hendricks appeals, claiming the 
district court erred in granting the motion.  We affirm. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  1.  
Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on Mrs. 
Hendricks' claim of negligent inspection.

 
 
2.         
Whether summary judgment was appropriate on Mrs. Hendricks' claims of 
negligent supervision, negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of 
consortium. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On July 31, 2004, Ryan, the 
eight-year-old son of Shawn and Linda Hendricks (the Hendricks), was playing in 
the Hurleys' yard just north of Cheyenne in 
Laramie County, Wyoming.  
He stopped to get a drink of water from an outdoor hydrant in the 
yard.  As he touched the hydrant 
with one hand, he also touched the wellhead located next to the hydrant.  He screamed and fell to the ground where 
he lay unconscious.  The other 
children with whom he had been playing thought he was joking and did not realize 
immediately that he was injured.  
When he did not respond to efforts to arouse him, one of the children 
summoned the Hurleys.  Mr. Hurley 
carried Ryan to the house where he performed CPR while Mrs. Hurley called for 
emergency assistance.  

 
 
[¶4]  Laramie County Sheriff Deputy Burch was 
one of the people who arrived at the Hurleys' home in response to the call.  He spoke with one of the other children 
who showed him what had happened.  
As the child touched the hydrant and then the well cap, he screamed and 
said it felt like something bit him.  
Someone called Excel Energy and a repairman came to inspect the 
well.  He determined there was a 
short at the well cap from the pump.  
He indicated that if Ryan had been touching the hydrant and then touched 
the metal well cap he would have been grounded between the two as approximately 
242 volts of electricity passed through him.           

 
 
[¶5]  Emergency medical personnel were unable 
to revive Ryan at the Hurleys' home, and they transported him to the 
hospital.  Further efforts to revive 
him there were also unsuccessful.  
Mrs. Hendricks, individually, as Ryan's personal representative and as 
best friend of Ryan's siblings, filed a complaint against the Hurleys, claiming 
that their negligent failure to inspect the well and supervise Ryan caused his 
death.1  She claimed damages on her own behalf 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress and on behalf of Ryan's siblings 
for loss of consortium.  The Hurleys 
filed an answer generally denying Mrs. Hendricks' claims and a third party claim 
against Stewart Drilling Company (Stewart Drilling), which had installed the 
pump.2

 
 
[¶6]  The Hurleys also filed the summary 
judgment motion that is the subject of this appeal.  In their brief in support of the motion, 
the Hurleys claimed they had no duty to inspect the well and, even assuming a 
duty, there was no evidence that they breached it; Wyoming has not recognized 
the tort of negligent supervision and, in any event, lack of supervision was not 
the proximate cause of Ryan's death; Mrs. Hendricks' claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress was without merit because the undisputed 
evidence showed that she did not observe Ryan's injury or death or its aftermath 
without material change in his condition or location; and, there was no basis in 
Wyoming law or the evidence for the loss of consortium claim.  The district court granted the motion, 
concluding the Hurleys did not know of, and with the exercise of reasonable care 
would not have discovered, the unsafe condition created by the defective 
wiring.  The court did not 
specifically rule on the negligent supervision, negligent infliction of 
emotional distress or loss of consortium claims.  Its order, however, dismissed the entire 
complaint with prejudice. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]  When reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment, we consider the record de 
novo.  Pittard v. Great 
Lakes Aviation, 2007 WY 64, ¶ 14, 156 P.3d 964, 969 (Wyo. 
2007).  Our review is governed by 
W.R.C.P. 56(c), which provides in pertinent part:

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  

 
 
[¶8]  In determining whether an issue of 
material fact exists, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record.  Id., ¶ 14, 156 P.3d  at 969.  A genuine issue of 
material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or 
defense.  Id.   

 
 
[¶9]  Summary judgment is not favored in 
negligence actions and is, therefore, subject to more exacting scrutiny.  Jacobson v. Cobbs, 2007 WY 99, ¶ 7, 160 P.3d 654, 656-57 (Wyo. 2007).  
However, where the record fails to establish the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact, we will affirm summary judgment even in negligence 
cases.  Id.     

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.                  
Summary 
Judgment on the Duty to Inspect

 
 
[¶10]  Mrs. Hendricks' first claim against the Hurleys 
rested in part on an alleged duty to inspect their property for dangerous 
conditions.  In Landsiedel v. Buffalo Properties, LLC, 2005 WY 61, ¶ 9, 
112 P.3d 610, 613 (Wyo. 2005), the district court refused to give the following 
jury instruction:

 
 
The 
owner of a business has a duty to visitors to use reasonable care to prevent or 
correct dangerous conditions on the premises.  This duty includes the duty to inspect 
the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions, of which the owner does 
not know, and to take reasonable precautions to protect users of the premises 
from dangers which are foreseeable from the condition or use of the 
property.  

 
 
On 
appeal, this Court upheld the district court's ruling because the instruction 
imposed on premises owners a duty to inspect  a duty that has never been 
recognized in Wyoming.  Id., ¶ 20, 112 P.3d  at 615.  To the extent that Mrs. Hendricks' claim 
against the Hurleys rested on a duty to inspect, no such duty exists in 
Wyoming and 
the Hurleys were entitled to summary judgment.

 
 
[¶11]  It is clear from the record, however, 
that Mrs. Hendricks' claim involved more than a duty to inspect.  In her complaint and throughout the 
proceedings, she has alleged that the Hurleys owed a duty of reasonable care to 
those invited onto their property and that they breached this duty by allowing a 
dangerous condition to exist.  She 
asserts that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Hurleys 
exercised reasonable care to discover the dangerous condition.    

 
 
[¶12]  Our cases clearly establish that in 
Wyoming a 
premises owner must use ordinary care to keep the premises in a safe condition 
and is charged with an affirmative duty to protect visitors against dangers 
known to him and dangers discoverable with the exercise of reasonable care.  Rhoades v. K-Mart Corp., 863 P.2d 626, 
(Wyo. 
1993).  Under this standard, Mrs. 
Hendricks was required to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact showing either that the Hurleys had actual notice of the danger 
created by the improper wiring or that with the exercise of reasonable care they 
would have discovered the danger.  

 
 
[¶13]  The evidence presented, viewed in the 
light most favorable to Mrs. Hendricks, showed that the Hurleys purchased the 
property in 2003, just over a year before the incident giving rise to Ryan's 
death.  At the time they purchased 
the home, the Hurleys were living in California.  Mrs. Hurley had seen the house once but 
neither she nor Mr. Hurley had the opportunity to look it over thoroughly before 
they purchased it.  For that reason, 
and because they had spent most of their lives in California and were not familiar with the issues facing 
Wyoming 
homeowners, the Hurleys wanted someone local to perform a complete inspection of 
the home.  Neither of them had ever 
lived in a home with a well prior to moving to Wyoming. 

 
 
[¶14]  Because the Hurleys were in California and the Hendricks lived in Cheyenne, the Hendricks 
assisted the Hurleys with the purchase of the home.  Mr. Hendricks had the power of attorney 
to act for his mother and step-father with respect to the purchase and appeared 
at the closing on their behalf.  
Mrs. Hendricks worked in the mortgage department of a federal credit 
union and was experienced with the sale and purchase of homes and conventional 
loans.  She helped the Hurleys with 
various aspects of the purchase, including, at Mrs. Hurley's request, finding 
someone to perform a full inspection of the home.  Mrs. Hendricks testified that full home 
inspections were not required in Wyoming and were not normally part of the 
process of purchasing a new home. However, because Mrs. Hurley wanted a full 
inspection performed, Mrs. Hendricks asked her assistant to obtain the names of 
home inspectors who might be available to conduct the inspection.  Her assistant obtained some names and, 
after speaking with Mrs. Hendricks, contacted an inspector who performed a 
complete inspection of the home.  

 
 
[¶15]  The Hurleys believed the full inspection 
included an inspection of the well.  
Although the cover page of the completed inspection form stated that the 
well was not part of the inspection, the Hurleys testified they were not aware 
until after Ryan's death that the well was not inspected before they purchased 
the home.  The Hurleys had no work 
done on the well before Ryan's death.  
Mr. Hurley testified that the prior owners had not mentioned having the 
well serviced at any time.  There 
simply is no evidence that the Hurleys knew or should have known of any problems 
with the well wiring before Ryan was injured.  

 
 
[¶16]  Mrs. Hendricks asserts in her brief that 
there was evidence from which the Hurleys should have discovered the unsafe 
condition.  She claims "the 
proximity of the hydrant to the [well casing] pedestal, the polarity of the 
electrical system, [and] the visible electrical connections all indicated that 
there was an issue involving the safety of the premises."  She also claims that the Hurleys would 
have known the home inspection did not include the well if they had read the 
inspection report and this fact creates a jury question as to whether they 
exercised reasonable care.    

 
 
[¶17]  In Goodrich v. Seamands, 870 P.2d 1061 
(Wyo. 1994), a 
woman was struck by a falling ceiling tile and fan as she entered the restroom 
in a building leased to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW).  She claimed the building owners had 
reason to know of defects that caused the tile and fan to come loose because 
there was evidence that ceiling tiles in other areas of the building 
occasionally came loose when doors were shut; the owners hired the person who 
installed the tiles and were charged with the same knowledge he had of the 
defects; and the owners were required to maintain the common areas of the leased 
building and had owned the building for twelve years.  We said:  

 
 
            
Essential to any negligence cause of action is proof of facts which 
impose a duty upon defendant.  The 
question of the existence of a duty is a matter of law for the court to 
decide.  A duty exists where, "upon 
the facts in evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that the 
community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the 
other--or, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered 
invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant."   

 
 

Id. at 
1064.

 
 
[¶18]  Applying these principles, we concluded 
that evidence showing the owner knew ceiling tiles in rooms other than the 
women's restroom occasionally moved was not sufficient to show that a reasonable 
person should have known that the ceiling tile and fan in the women's bathroom 
were improperly installed.  We also 
concluded that the installer's possible knowledge of defects did not demonstrate 
that a reasonable person in the owners' position should have known of the 
defects.  In light of the evidence 
that there were no problems with the restroom tile or fan during the twelve 
years the owners owned the building, we further concluded that the period of 
ownership and the fact that the lease required the owners to maintain common 
areas did not establish that they should have known of the defects.  We said:      

 
 
Necessary 
to every negligence action is proof that the defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty.  In this case the Seamandses 
had a duty to disclose only if they knew or had reason to know of the 
defects.  Goodrich failed, however, 
to establish that the Seamandses had either actual or constructive knowledge of 
the defects and, therefore, failed to establish a duty to disclose the defective 
ceiling, fan and ducting.  The 
failure to prove duty, which is a question of law, makes summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants, the Seamandses, proper.

 
 

Id. at 
1065.

 
 
[¶19]  By the same token, the Hurleys had a 
duty to disclose only if they knew or had reason to know of the defects.  Other than her own assertions, Mrs. 
Hendricks presented no admissible evidence that the hydrant's proximity to the 
well, the polarity of the electrical system or the visible electrical 
connections would have put a reasonable person on notice that the wiring 
underneath the well cap was faulty.  
The electrician who inspected the well after Ryan's death discovered the 
problem when he removed the well cap and inspected the wiring inside.  Absent evidence that the Hurleys knew or 
had reason to know of the danger created by the well wiring, Mrs. Hendricks 
cannot establish that they owed a duty giving rise to a negligence claim.  In light of the failure to prove a duty, 
the district court properly granted summary judgment for the Hurleys on Mrs. 
Hendricks' first negligence claim.

 
 
2.         
Summary Judgment on the Other Claims

 
 
[¶20]  The district court's order addressed 
only Mrs. Hendricks' claim for negligent inspection.  Without addressing her claims for 
negligent supervision, negligent infliction of emotional distress or loss of 
consortium, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  We must determine whether the record 
supports summary judgment as to the claims the district court did not 
specifically address.

      

a.                  
Negligent 
Supervision

 
 
[¶21]   Mrs. Hendricks claimed the Hurleys 
had a duty to use reasonable care in supervising Ryan, they breached the duty 
and the breach caused Ryan's death.  
She cites Daniels v. 
Carpenter, 2003 WY 11, 62 P.3d 555 (Wyo. 2003) as support for the 
proposition that Wyoming recognizes a duty to supervise.  Specifically she cites language in Daniels, ¶ 21, 62 P.3d  at 563, 
indicating that "duty exists where society says it ought to exist."  She also cites Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 
1160 (Wyo. 
1992) in which this Court held that parents have "a duty to buckle the seat 
belts of their minor passengers who are dependent on adult care and supervision 
for their well being and safety."  
Neither Daniels nor Dellapenta supports Mrs. Hendricks' 
assertion that a general common law duty to supervise is recognized in 
Wyoming.

 
 
[¶22]  In Daniels, this Court upheld the dismissal 
of a claim for negligent supervision brought against the owners of property 
where three teenagers were spending the night when one of them became 
intoxicated, left the property with the other two, borrowed a car, and was 
involved in an accident in which the other two teenagers were killed.  In affirming the dismissal, we applied 
the usual test for imposition of a duty under common law negligence, i.e., a 
duty of reasonable care exists to avoid injury to another person where it could 
be reasonably foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such 
injury.  Daniels, ¶ 21, 62 P.3d  at 563.  We said the property owners were not 
liable unless they knew or had reason to know the teenager had access to 
alcohol, had become intoxicated and would drive a car.  We said, "An allegation of failure to 
supervise minors, without more, is not sufficient."  Id., ¶ 29, 62 P.3d  at 564.

 
 
[¶23]  In Dellapenta, we held that parents have a 
common law duty to buckle the seatbelts of their minor children.  We recognized this duty in large part 
because of national and state statistics showing that serious injury or death is 
a foreseeable result of not wearing seat belts.  Dellapenta, 838 P.2d  at 1159.  Our holding in Dellapenta was limited to its facts and 
cannot be construed as recognizing a general common law duty to supervise.  

 
 
[¶24]  In both Daniels and Dellapenta, the determining factor was 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, with the Court concluding in Daniels that there were no facts alleged 
from which it could be concluded the owners knew or had reason to know about the 
circumstances leading to the accident, and in Dellapenta that there were facts 
supporting the conclusion that the parent knew or had reason to know about the 
dangers associated with not wearing seat belts.  In this case, we have already concluded 
there is no evidence showing the Hurleys knew or had reason to know about the 
dangerous condition of the well.  
Mrs. Hendricks has not met her burden of presenting evidence that the 
harm to Ryan was foreseeable.

 
 
[¶25]  As part of her claim for negligent 
supervision, Mrs. Hendricks asserted that if the Hurleys had been out in the 
yard when Ryan collapsed, he would have received medical assistance sooner and 
perhaps would have survived.  Mrs. 
Hendricks offers no medical evidence to support this assertion.  Absent evidence establishing a genuine 
issue of material fact on the question of whether immediate emergency assistance 
would have saved Ryan, summary judgment was appropriate.            

            
    

b.         
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 

 
 
[¶26]  Mrs. Hendricks also alleged that she 
suffered severe emotional distress as a result of witnessing her son's serious 
bodily injury and death.  She claims 
that she became a witness to her son's injuries even though she was not 
physically present because her husband called her from the scene and described 
what was happening as emergency personnel tried to save him.  She also claims she was a witness to the 
serious bodily harm inflicted upon her son and his death when she arrived at the 
hospital and observed emergency room personnel trying to save him and then 
ceasing those efforts.  

 
 
[¶27]  The Hurleys claim Mrs. Hendricks cannot 
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress because she did not 
observe her son immediately after he was injured but saw him for the first time 
after he had been taken to the emergency room.  Citing Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 
1986), and subsequent Wyoming cases, the Hurleys contend Mrs. Hendricks can only 
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress if she was present and 
observed her son's injuries, or arrived shortly after and observed his injuries 
without material change in his condition or location.  

 
 
[¶28]  In Gates, 719 P.2d  at 199, we recognized a 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by parents, spouses, 
children and siblings who observe the infliction of serious bodily harm or 
death, or its immediate aftermath without material change in the condition and 
location of the victim.  It is 
undisputed that Mrs. Hendricks did not observe the infliction of Ryan's injuries 
or the immediate aftermath without material change in his condition and 
location.  She first saw him at the 
hospital some time after he sustained the injuries.  

 
 
[¶29]  Additionally, in Gates we said:

 
 
Once 
these conditions are satisfied, the case can go forward under normal negligence 
principles.  The defendant must have been negligent and 
his negligence must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's mental 
injuries.

 
 

Id. 
at 201 
(emphasis added).  Subsequently, in 
Sims v. General Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357, 366 (Wyo. 1988), we reiterated that, 

 
 
in order 
for a plaintiff to recover on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, that plaintiff must show that the emotional distress resulted from 
death or serious physical injury to persons within a specified group as a result of the defendant's 
negligence.        

 

We held 
in Sims that the plaintiff failed to 
meet her burden of showing that her emotional injuries were caused by the 
defendant's negligence and, on that basis, we affirmed the directed verdict the 
district court granted for the defendant.  
We have concluded that Mrs. Hendricks did not meet her burden of proving 
the Hurleys knew or had reason to know of the dangers that existed because of 
the faulty wiring.  Absent such 
proof, she has failed to establish the existence of a duty and her negligence 
claim fails.  Without proof of 
negligence, she cannot recover for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress.  Id. at 366; Gates, 719 P.2d  at 200-01.  

 
 
[¶30]  Despite the limitations imposed in Gates, Mrs. Hendricks claims that this 
Court has expanded the circumstances under which emotional damages can be 
recovered.  She cites Larsen v. Banner Health System, 2003 WY 
167, 81 P.3d 196 (Wyo. 2003) and Lawrence 
v. Grinde, 534 N.W.2d 414, 421 (Iowa 1995), a case cited in Larsen, to support her assertion.  In Larsen, a hospital switched two babies 
at birth.  When one of the mothers 
and her daughter discovered the switch 43 years later, they brought a negligence 
claim against the hospital, alleging purely emotional damages.  This Court discussed at some length the 
rule in Wyoming that recovery for emotional damages is 
allowed only when they are accompanied by physical injury, exposure to physical 
harm or willful, wanton or malicious conduct.  Then, in what we characterized as an 
"extremely limited" exception to the rule, we held that "in the limited 
circumstances where a contractual relationship exists for services that carry 
with them deeply emotional responses in the event of breach, there arises a duty 
to exercise ordinary care to avoid causing emotional harm."  Larsen, ¶ 39, 81 P.3d  at 206. 

 
 
[¶31]  The limited exception recognized in Larsen is not applicable here.  There is no allegation or evidence of a 
contractual relationship for services between Mrs. Hendricks and the Hurleys. 
Mrs. Hendricks seems to be asking this Court to go beyond the exception 
recognized in Larsen and adopt 
another exception based solely on the relationship between the parties.  It is in this context that she points to 
Lawrence where the court discussed 
the general rule in Iowa that in negligence cases emotional distress damages are 
not recoverable unless accompanied by physical injury, but also acknowledged an 
exception "where the nature of the relationship between the parties is such that 
there arises a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid causing emotional harm." 
Mrs. Hendricks seems to be asking this Court to recognize a duty on the part of 
the Hurleys based solely upon the facts that they were Ryan's grandparents and 
he was playing at their home when he was hurt.  We are not persuaded to go beyond the 
limited exception recognized in Larsen.  Mrs. Hendricks has not presented evidence 
showing that she is entitled to emotional damages under any of the exceptions 
allowing recovery for such damages in Wyoming.  
Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate on her claim for emotional 
distress.        
  

 
 

 
 
[¶32]  Ms. Hendricks' final claim was for loss 
of consortium on behalf of Ryan's brothers.  In Wyoming, a claim for loss of consortium is 
derivative of the injured party's claim.  
Worman v. Carver, 2002 WY 59, 
¶ 31, 44 P.3d 82, 89 (Wyo. 2002).  
 Therefore, if the injured 
party's claim fails, the loss of consortium claim must also fail.  Id.  Because summary judgment was appropriate 
on Ms. Hendricks' negligence claim, the loss of consortium claim was properly 
dismissed. 

 
 
[¶33] 
Affirmed.  

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. Hendricks was not a party to the 
action his wife filed against his mother and 
stepfather.

 
 

2In the meantime, the Hendricks filed 
a separate action against Stewart Drilling, claiming that it negligently 
installed the pump and failed to warn the Hurleys of the danger, and Campbell 
Manufacturing, Inc., (Campbell Manufacturing), the well cap manufacturer, for 
strict liability in tort and negligence.  
The district court dismissed Campbell Manufacturing pursuant to the 
parties' joint stipulation.  The 
Hendricks then amended the complaint against Stewart Drilling to add claims 
against the City of Cheyenne for failure to warn.  The district court also dismissed those 
claims.  With only the claims 
against Stewart Drilling and themselves remaining, the Hurleys filed a motion to 
consolidate the two cases, which motion the district court granted.  Stewart Drilling subsequently moved for 
summary judgment and the district court granted the motion.  The Hendricks appealed that order as 
well as the order granting summary judgment for the Hurleys.  After the appeal was filed, this Court 
granted a stipulated motion to dismiss the appeal with prejudice as to Stewart 
Drilling.  Thus, the only issues 
remaining for determination are those relating to Mrs. Hendrick's claims against 
the Hurleys.