Case Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Toohig

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5202

Docket Number: 2011-2037

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Toohig, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5202.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5202 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. TOOHIG. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Toohig,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5202.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
Failure, including charging excessive fees, dishonesty, and client-trust-
account improprieties and dishonesty—Felony conviction of income-tax 
evasion—Permanent disbarment. 
(No. 2011-2037—Submitted March 20, 2012—Decided November 15, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-072. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} On August 16, 2010, the relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar 
Association, filed a three-count complaint against Kevin Thomas Toohig, 
Attorney Registration No. 0067447, last known address in Chagrin Falls, Ohio, 
for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct.  On January 7, 2011, we issued 
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an order noting that a copy of a judgment entry of Toohig’s felony conviction had 
been certified to the court, and we ordered Toohig’s suspension for an interim 
period.  127 Ohio St.3d 1496, 2011-Ohio-18, 939 N.E.2d 865. 
{¶ 2} Relator amended the complaint twice.  The second amended 
complaint consisted of six counts charging Toohig with 22 violations of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct.  A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievance 
and Discipline found, and the board concurred in finding, 16 Rule violations, 
including four violations involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
and two involving an illegal act that reflects adversely on the attorney’s 
trustworthiness or honesty. 
{¶ 3} Those violations relate to Toohig’s (1) federal conviction for 
income tax evasion, (2) repeatedly misusing client funds held in a client trust 
account, including transferring funds to a corporate account he used for personal 
purposes to evade creditors, (3) transferring money by wire to his trust account 
and immediately withdrawing a fee during a criminal investigation of a person 
with whom he had no clear attorney-client relationship, and (4) failing to remit 
settlement money to his clients from the trust account.  After weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating factors, the panel recommended disbarment.  The 
board adopted that recommendation, and we concur.  We therefore order that 
Toohig be disbarred. 
Respondent’s objection to the second amended complaint is rejected 
{¶ 4} We first address Toohig’s objection to the board’s decision to use 
the second amended complaint as the basis for its proceedings.  Toohig lodged a 
twofold objection at the hearing:  he maintained that he had not received a 
certified-mail copy of the second amended complaint at a current address and 
additionally asserted that the consideration of the second amended complaint was 
improper because the panel and the board did not formally enter an order granting 
leave to file.  In the written objections to the board report, Toohig argues that 
January Term, 2012 
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standards under the Ohio Civil Rules, specifically Civ.R. 15(A), should apply in 
this proceeding.  Although Toohig admits that the panel chair informally agreed 
over the telephone to consider relator’s filing of a second amended complaint, he 
asserts that relator had permission only to file for leave to file an amended 
complaint and that relator filed a day late in any event.  Also, Toohig maintains 
that relator should have filed a motion for default when Toohig did not file an 
answer to the second amended complaint. 
{¶ 5} Pursuant to Gov.Bar R. V(11)(A)(1), the board “shall follow the 
Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and the Ohio Rules of Evidence wherever 
practicable unless a specific provision of this rule or Board hearing procedures 
and guidelines provides otherwise.”  Relator in this case did file a motion for 
leave to file the second amended complaint on March 28, 2011.  That motion 
states that Toohig “has no objection and consents to this motion,” and Toohig 
points to no evidence that that statement is inaccurate. 
{¶ 6} The motion for leave furnished information regarding the 
discovery of additional evidence of violations of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and indicated that the evidence was both newly discovered and could not 
reasonably have been discovered earlier.  Moreover, the second amended 
complaint was attached to the motion. 
{¶ 7} On March 31, 2011, the board entered an order permitting the 
filing of the second amended complaint on or before May 1, 2011, and 
rescheduled the hearing from April to August 2011.  The record does reflect the 
filing of the second amended complaint on May 2 rather than May 1, but it is 
significant that the document was already before the board—and had already been 
served on respondent—as an attachment to the motion for leave.  Next, on May 5, 
2011, a formal entry noted the filing of the second amended complaint and 
ordered that the filing be accepted and be served by certified mail on respondent. 
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{¶ 8} Under these circumstances, the case law indicates that the board 
acted properly by accepting the second amended complaint—indeed, failure to do 
so might even have constituted an abuse of discretion.  See Peterson v. Teodosio, 
34 Ohio St.2d 161, 297 N.E.2d 113 (1973), paragraph six of the syllabus (“It is an 
abuse of discretion for a court to deny a motion, timely filed, seeking leave to file 
an amended complaint, where it is possible that plaintiff may state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted and no reason otherwise justifying denial of the 
motion is disclosed”); Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 183-
184, 465 N.E.2d 1298 (1984).  Toohig additionally chides relator for not filing a 
motion for default, but that point is entirely moot because Toohig received the full 
benefit of an adversarial evidentiary hearing at which he had the opportunity to, 
and in fact did, cross-examine relator’s witnesses, present witnesses of his own, 
and offer exhibits. 
{¶ 9} With respect to the issue of service of the second amended 
complaint, the panel and the board made specific findings in support of using the 
second amended complaint.  First, the new complaint was mailed to the last 
known address—and any confusion about the proper address appears to result 
from Toohig’s failure to keep the board apprised of his current address, as he was 
required to do pursuant to the January 2011 order of this court.  Second, Toohig 
acknowledged at the hearing that he had received a copy of the second amended 
complaint. 
{¶ 10} We concur with the board that under the circumstances of this 
case, these findings justify proceeding on the second amended complaint. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 11} At the time of the hearing on August 8 and 9, 2011, Toohig was a 
42-year-old graduate of the University of Akron Law School who had been 
admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1996.  He was married, with three 
children under the age of five. 
January Term, 2012 
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1.  Count One:  Mishandling of Fees—The Rudolph Grievance 
{¶ 12} The first count charges Toohig with the improper retention and use 
of fee payments in a criminal case. 
{¶ 13} In 2007, Toohig met with Dan Rudolph, the brother-in-law of a 
man charged with sex offenses.  Toohig executed a fee agreement with Rudolph 
to provide legal services to the brother-in-law, and pursuant to that agreement, 
Toohig accepted from Rudolph an initial fee of $5,000, designated by the contract 
as a “nonrefundable” retainer.  In December 2007, Toohig decided that the case 
was beyond his expertise and that the services of a criminal-defense specialist 
were needed, so he referred the client to Ian Friedman, a Cleveland criminal-
defense lawyer. 
{¶ 14} At a meeting at which Rudolph, Friedman, and Toohig were 
present, it was agreed that Rudolph would advance $29,000 to Toohig which, 
together with the original $5,000, would be used to pay for services rendered by 
Toohig and Friedman, with Toohig holding the money and making payments to 
Friedman on Rudoph’s behalf as necessary.  Rudolph wrote the check to Toohig, 
who deposited it in his client trust account and shortly thereafter transmitted 
$20,000 of the money to Friedman.  The understanding was that further fees 
incurred by Friedman’s representation would be paid for out of the retainer money 
held by Toohig. 
{¶ 15} After sentencing in the criminal case, Rudolph received an invoice 
from Friedman dated August 6, 2008, billing $5,900.71 as the amount owed in 
relation to the representation.  Rudolph then requested that Toohig transmit the 
$5,900 to Friedman.  Of the $34,000 of retainer money Rudolph had tendered to 
Toohig, that would leave $8,099.29, which Rudolph authorized Toohig to keep as 
his own fee.  On September 7, 2008, Toohig communicated to Rudolph that the 
transfer of funds “was handled with Ian’s office.” 
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{¶ 16} Friedman’s office transmitted an overdue-balance invoice for the 
$5,900.71 on January 12, 2009, and Rudolph attempted to contact Toohig without 
success.  On February 12, 2009, Friedman wrote Rudolph indicating that the 
$5,900 had not been remitted by Toohig.  By the time Rudolph was demanding 
that Toohig pay Friedman, Toohig had taken the balance of the retainer money 
out of the client trust account. 
{¶ 17} Ultimately, Toohig did not remit the entirety of Friedman’s fee 
until October 21, 2009, almost 15 months after Friedman submitted the bill to 
Rudolph and Rudolph submitted the invoice to Toohig. 
{¶ 18} Toohig did prepare a statement of the time that Toohig himself had 
spent defending the criminal case.  The statement included five jail visits that 
were not reflected on visitation records of the jail.  The original fee agreement set 
forth an hourly rate for Toohig of $200, and the statement of hours enumerated 
38.75 hours spent by Toohig on the criminal case.  Once the five nonexistent jail-
visit hours are subtracted, Toohig spent 33.75 hours on the case, for which he 
received $8,099.29.  That indicates a rate of $240 per hour. 
{¶ 19} In connection with the Rudolph grievance, the second amended 
complaint charged that respondent improperly withdrew money from a trust 
account in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(c) (a lawyer shall deposit fees and 
expenses paid in advance into a trust account, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only 
as fees are earned or expenses incurred).  The complaint also charged a violation 
of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) (a lawyer shall not charge an illegal or clearly excessive 
fee), 1.5(d)(3) (a lawyer shall not enter into a fee agreement for a fee denominated 
“nonrefundable” without a written statement that the client may be entitled to a 
refund of all or part of the fee based on the value of the representation), and 8.4(c) 
(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation).  The panel and board found by clear and convincing evidence 
January Term, 2012 
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a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(c) and 1.5(d)(3), but found that violations of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) and 8.4(c) had not been proved.  We concur. 
2.  Count Two: The Randell Incident in Colorado 
{¶ 20} Toohig was charged with misconduct in connection with 
representing Hysear Randell, a Colorado promoter who was subsequently 
convicted of 52 counts in connection with the theft of almost $11 million from the 
Colorado Department of Revenue and was sentenced to 58 years in prison.  
Toohig met Randell in 2006 and maintained a social relationship during which he 
sought opportunities to represent Randell.  In late April 2007, Toohig received a 
call from Randell’s wife who stated that “a whole lot of people with a search 
warrant” were raiding her house in Colorado. 
{¶ 21} After receiving an additional call in which Randell’s wife indicated 
that Randell wanted to see Toohig, Toohig flew to Denver, where he met with 
Randell, who was being sought in connection with theft and was evading arrest.  
Randell wanted Toohig to find lawyers to represent him.  After two consultations, 
Toohig agreed to Randell’s suggestion that Toohig wire money from Randell’s 
account into Toohig’s trust account in Ohio.  On April 30, 2007, $710,098.39 was 
wired from a brokerage account in Randell’s name to Toohig’s client trust 
account.  By check of the same date, Toohig transferred $50,000, with the 
notation “partial Randell fees,” from the trust account to his law office account. 
{¶ 22} On May 1, Toohig was heading for the airport to fly back to Ohio 
when he received a phone call from law enforcement telling him to remain in 
Colorado.  Toohig communicated with Randell, and the two met.  Law 
enforcement then arrested Randell and Toohig.  Pursuant to actions of the 
Colorado prosecutor, the full $710,098.39 wired to Ohio was ultimately frozen 
and recovered in conjunction with the criminal investigation and prosecution of 
Randell and his accomplice. 
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{¶ 23} In connection with the Randell incident, the complaint charged 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a), 1.15(c), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) (a lawyer shall not 
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).  Although 
the second amended complaint alleged that Toohig had charged an excessive fee, 
no finding was made on that claim.  Other than the excessive-fee claim, the panel 
and board found violations with respect to all the charges, and we concur. 
3.  Count Three: Conviction for Tax Evasion 
{¶ 24} On May 21, 2010, a criminal complaint was filed in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, case No. 1:10-DR-0231, 
that alleged that Toohig had engaged in tax evasion with respect to $184,964 
owed for tax year 2000.  On June 22, 2010, Toohig entered into a plea agreement 
under which he agreed to enter a guilty plea to one charge of attempting to evade 
or defeat the payment of income tax in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7201. 
{¶ 25} The elements to which Toohig pleaded guilty were (1) that he had 
substantial income tax due and owing for the year charged, (2) that he made an 
affirmative attempt to evade or defeat the payment of the tax due and owing, and 
(3) that he acted willfully, i.e. voluntarily, with the specific intent to violate a 
known legal duty to pay tax.  Toohig specifically stipulated that he “did willfully 
attempt to evade and defeat payment of his income tax due and owing for the 
calendar year 2000 in the approximate amount of $184,964.00,” and that he did so 
by “[c]oncealing the true profit of his law practice by paying substantial personal 
expenses through it and falsely claiming them as legitimate business expenses,” 
by “[s]tructuring deposits to and withdrawals from both business and personal 
bank accounts to avoid currency reporting requirements, by “[w]ithdrawing 
currency extensively from bank accounts to conceal large personal expenditures,” 
and by “[p]roviding false financial information to the Internal Revenue Service on 
or about October 13, 2004, in conjunction with [his] attempt to settle this debt.”  
The court convicted Toohig of the offense and sentenced him to four years’ 
January Term, 2012 
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probation that included provisions requiring Toohig to participate in an approved 
program for substance abuse. 
{¶ 26} With respect to the tax-evasion conviction, the complaint charged 
violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) (a lawyer shall not commit an illegal act that 
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty or trustworthiness), 8.4(c), and 8.4(h) 
(a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s 
fitness to practice law).  The panel and the board concluded that clear and 
convincing evidence proved that Toohig had violated all three provisions in 
conjunction with his conviction for federal tax evasion.  We concur in that 
conclusion. 
4.  Count Four:  Misconduct in the Settlement of the Kazen Case 
{¶ 27} On October 24, 2007, Shana Kazen engaged Toohig to represent 
her in connection with an automobile accident that had occurred in October 2006.  
She executed a limited power of attorney authorizing Toohig’s firm to “endorse 
on [her] behalf any document or any Settlement Draft or Release from any 
insurance company representing settlement of [her] personal injury claim.” 
{¶ 28} Toohig initiated a lawsuit on Kazen’s behalf that led to a 
settlement of $9,100.  Attorney Stephen Proe represented the defendant in that 
case, and on or about June 7, 2010, Proe mailed to Toohig a settlement draft 
payable to Kazen and Toohig’s firm in the amount of $9,100.  Transmitted to 
Toohig with the draft was a release and a cover letter that asked that Toohig have 
the release executed and returned to [Proe’s] office.  The letter further stated, “Of 
course, it is understood that the draft will not be negotiated until you are in a 
position to return the executed release to me.” 
{¶ 29} Toohig deposited the $9,100 in his trust account on June 9, 2010, 
and withdrew $3,200 that same day with a check payable to the law firm for 
“Shana Kazen Fees and Exp.”  On July 1, 2010, Proe sent a letter to Toohig by 
certified mail that recited the facts relating to the settlement and noted that Toohig 
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had negotiated the check but had not returned the signed release.  The letter 
further stated that Kazen had contacted Proe, stating that she had dismissed 
Toohig and had received no settlement funds. 
{¶ 30} During the hearing, Toohig gave differing reasons for why he did 
not remit the settlement money to Kazen.  One version was that Toohig could not 
locate Kazen.  Another reason was that he had an obligation to negotiate and pay 
doctor bills out of the recovery first (though Toohig offered no evidence that any 
such bills were in fact negotiated and paid). 
{¶ 31} In August 2010, Kazen came to Toohig’s office with a police 
officer to demand that she receive her settlement money.  She did not succeed in 
obtaining the money at that time.  Toohig offered additional reasons for why he 
had not tendered the settlement money owed to Kazen earlier.  At the hearing he 
testified that his attorney had told him not to give Kazen the money, but he agreed 
that at a deposition, he had testified that he tried to give her the money when she 
came to his office but “she wouldn’t take it.”  The record shows that there was in 
fact not enough money in respondent’s client trust account at the end of June 2010 
to pay Kazen the settlement amount. 
{¶ 32} Finally, in November 2010, Toohig remitted the sum of $9,100 to 
Kazen from the trust account.  But he did so only after relator had filed the initial 
complaint and he had been placed on probation in the federal tax case. 
{¶ 33} With respect to the Kazen matter, the second amended complaint 
charged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(d) (a lawyer “shall promptly deliver to 
the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person 
is entitled to receive”) and 8.4(c).  The panel and the board found that Toohig’s 
testimony as to why he did not timely remit the sum to the client was not credible, 
and concluded that clear and convincing evidence proved that Toohig had 
violated both rules.  We concur. 
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5.  Counts 5 and 6:  Multiple Client-Trust-Account Improprieties 
and the Rolic Matter 
{¶ 34} The complaint alleges several improprieties in the maintenance of 
Toohig’s client trust accounts.  The panel and the board found:  (1) two instances 
of overdrawn trust accounts, (2) four instances between December 2009 and 
March 2010 of payments totaling $16,400 out of a client trust account to 
Equitable Property, Ltd., a corporation wholly owned by Toohig, who admitted 
the money was for his personal use and that he put it in a corporate account to 
avoid “sweeps” by his creditors, (3) checks written from the client trust account to 
Toohig’s assistant, Kacie Butcher, for which Toohig offered no satisfactory 
explanation, (4) one instance in December 2010 in which Toohig paid for a 
continuing-legal-education course out of the client trust account, (5) one instance 
in which Toohig wrote a check from his client trust account for attorney fees to 
obtain legal counsel for the disciplinary proceedings, (6) several instances in 
which checks were written from the client trust account to DiCillos, a tavern, in 
amounts totaling $1,100.  In two instances, Toohig engaged in the practice of law 
after the Januuary 7, 2011 order of the court suspending his license on account of 
his federal-tax-evasion conviction:  first, Toohig filed a  complaint on behalf of a 
client and advanced a filing fee of $435 out of his trust account, after which the 
check was dishonored on account of insufficient funds, and second, Toohig issued 
a check from his law-firm account to a court clerk in the amount of $220 with a 
memo line noting “J. Jackson Complaint,” which was then dishonored for lack of 
funds.  In conjunction with the last two items, Toohig was listed as counsel of 
record after the effective date of his interim suspension. 
{¶ 35} The panel and the board additionally found, based on the 
documents and testimony, that “[d]uring all times relevant to this matter, [Toohig] 
did not maintain records for funds received, disbursements made, or return 
monthly reconiciliation of his Liberty and PNC IOLTA accounts.” 
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{¶ 36} With respect to the Rolic matter, Toohig represented Rolic in 
connection with a mediation concerning distribution of the proceeds of a 
wrongful-death judgment (Toohig had no involvement in the underlying 
litigation).  As a result of the mediation, Rolic was to receive $275,790.  At 
Rolic’s request, Toohig held the proceeds in his client trust account so that Rolic 
would not spend the money foolishly.  From March 10, 2010, through December 
9, 2010, Rolic received 18 checks from the trust account, totaling $222,400.  
There were no further payments.  If Toohig’s 10 percent fee is presumed valid, 
Toohig owed Rolic $25,811.  Bank records show that the balance in the trust 
account was insufficient to pay Rolic what he was owed.  Among other things, the 
failure to repay Rolic violated the court’s order suspending Toohig’s law license; 
the order specifically required Toohig to “account for any trust money or property 
in Respondent’s possession or control.” 
{¶ 37} The panel and the board concluded, on the basis of the foregoing 
findings, that Toohig had violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a)(2) (a lawyer shall 
maintain a record for each client on whose behalf funds are held), 1.15(a)(5) (a 
lawyer shall perform and retain a monthly reconciliation of the records of client 
funds), 1.15(d) (a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third persons upon 
receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest), 
8.4(b), and 8.4(c).  We concur. 
Aggravation and mitigation 
1.  Aggravating Factors 
{¶ 38} The present case is replete with aggravating factors pursuant to 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1). 
{¶ 39} First, numerous violations found by the panel and the board 
involve a dishonest or selfish motive.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b).  
Specifically, the federal-tax-evasion plea and conviction involves Toohig’s 
admitting the willful submission of false information in order to enjoy the 
January Term, 2012 
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personal benefit of paying lower taxes.  Additionally, the Randell incident in 
Colorado involved conspiring with a fugitive to wire a substantial sum into 
Toohig’s client trust account, after which Toohig immediately paid himself 
$50,000 in violation of the requirement that fees be withdrawn only as earned. 
{¶ 40} In the Kazen matter, Toohig likewise served his own financial 
interest by depositing the draft and withdrawing his fee even though he failed to 
obtain execution of the release and failed to remit settlement money to the client.  
Only after many months, with a grievance pending and a visit by the client with 
police, did Toohig pay the client what was owed. 
{¶ 41} Second, the violations demonstrate a clear pattern of misconduct.  
See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c).  In particular, the payment of client-trust-
account funds to himself and nonclients, the account overdrafts, and the failure to 
maintain required records of funds received and disbursements made are evidence 
of a systematic failure by Toohig to comply with basic ethical obligations. 
{¶ 42} Third, the foregoing discussion of the misconduct plainly 
establishes multiple offenses over many years.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d). 
{¶ 43} Fourth, the record demonstrates Toohig’s failure to cooperate in 
the disciplinary process.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(e).  In part because 
Toohig failed to comply with the January 7, 2011 order that he provide notice of 
any change of address, service of documents on Toohig failed several times.  
Relator requested production of documents but no documents were ever produced 
despite orders compelling production and imposing sanctions.  Moreover, Toohig 
filed at least two complaints in court after he had been suspended from the 
practice of law, and he failed to make refunds of unearned fees or expenses and 
failed to account for trust money in his control in violation of the January 7, 2011 
order. 
{¶ 44} Fifth, harm did result to Toohig’s clients, and full restitution was 
not made.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(h) and (i).  Specifically, Kazen suffered 
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a substantial delay in obtaining settlement money owed to her.  Rolic, after 
entrusting the proceeds of a wrongful-death judgment to Toohig, obtained some 
but not all of the money from Toohig.  As of the time of the hearing, Toohig had 
still not paid at least $25,811 owed to Rolic. 
2.  Mitigating Factors 
{¶ 45} In mitigation is the absence of a prior disciplinary record and 
testimony regarding Toohig’s alcoholism.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and 
(g). 
{¶ 46} We confront a substantial dispute concerning the proper 
consideration of Toohig’s alcohol abuse.  The panel and the board found that the 
testimony of the witness from the Ohio Lawyers’ Assistance Program (“OLAP”) 
satisfied, at least superficially, the requirements necessary to consider alcoholism 
as a mitigating factor.  But the panel and the board concluded that the opinions 
expressed were derived more from Toohig’s narrative than the witness’s 
awareness of all the specifics of the misconduct. 
{¶ 47} The witness from OLAP made the blanket assertion that Toohig’s 
misconduct could be attributed to alcoholism despite the witness’s lack of 
knowledge of the specifics and the timing of Toohig’s misconduct.  The panel and 
the board found it significant that the tax evasion occurred almost nine years 
before the witness met Toohig and that the witness had no direct source of 
information regarding the connection between alcoholism and the tax evasion 
apart from Toohig’s own narrative.  Under these circumstances, the panel and the 
board accorded little weight to alcoholism as a mitigating factor. 
{¶ 48} Toohig also presented a written report from Lee J. Horowitz, 
Ph.D., that was addressed to the panel and that purported to make a psychological 
diagnosis of Toohig.  Because relator had no prior knowledge of the report, and 
because Dr. Horowitz did not appear as a witness and could not be cross-
examined, the panel and the board declined to consider his report. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 49} Toohig objects to the lack of credence accorded to the testimony of 
the witness, and he asserts that the psychologist’s report ought to have been 
considered.  Our review of the record leads us to reject Toohig’s objections and to 
uphold the report of the board. 
{¶ 50} At the outset, we note that in order to constitute a mitigating factor, 
a chemical dependency must meet four criteria, including diagnosis and a 
determination that the dependency “contributed to cause the misconduct.”  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(i) and (ii).  Toohig attempted to establish this through a 
combination of the testimony of the witness from OLAP, who is a licensed 
chemical-dependency counselor, and a written report of a psychologist who did 
not testify.  Under these circumstances, the board was justified in viewing the 
“contributing cause” element as not being sufficiently established by the record.  
That is so for three reasons. 
{¶ 51} First and foremost, the board was fully justified in declining to 
consider a psychological report when the author did not testify.  Basic evidentiary 
principles call for the author’s testimony to avoid authenticity and hearsay 
problems generally and to accord relator the opportunity to cross-examine and 
thereby call the professional pronouncements into question. 
{¶ 52} Second, the board’s comments concerning the testimony of the 
witness are not without merit.  The witness, who first became acquainted with 
Toohig in October or November 2009, based his testimony on (1) Dr. Horowitz’s 
report, which was properly not considered by the board, (2) the witness’s 
interviews with Toohig, (3) the witness’s observing Toohig’s progress and 
change.  The witness stated that other than Dr. Horowitz’s report, he had not 
consulted collateral sources, but he pointed out that it is the practice to do so only 
when chemical dependency is being denied, not when it is being admitted.  And 
the witness did not know the specifics surrounding the tax evasion that had 
occurred several years previously. 
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{¶ 53} Third, relator correctly points out that much of the charged 
misconduct occurred after Toohig’s period of sobriety commenced in November 
2009.  Specifically, the failure to remit settlement money to his client Kazen 
occurred in the summer and fall of 2010, and the numerous client-trust-account 
violations in counts five and six of the complaint occurred in late 2009 and into 
2010. 
{¶ 54} Under all these circumstances, the board was justified in not 
regarding Toohig’s alcoholism as a significant mitigating factor, and we concur in 
that conclusion. 
Disposition 
{¶ 55} Broadly speaking, this case presents two strands of misconduct:  a 
guilty plea and conviction of federal-income-tax evasion, and a pattern of abusing 
the client trust account for personal purposes accompanied by a callous failure to 
account for those funds overall. 
{¶ 56} The presumptive sanction for misappropriation of client funds is 
disbarment.  Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-2490, 
769 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 15.  Although the presence of sufficient mitigating factors 
justifies consideration of a lesser sanction, we do not confront such circumstances 
in this case.  We have concluded that the attempt to attribute Toohig’s actions to 
alcoholism is not credible on this record, and that is particularly true of many of 
the trust-account violations, which occurred after the alleged date of sobriety. 
{¶ 57} In the context of a conviction for federal tax evasion, we have 
sometimes imposed a sanction less than disbarment.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Smith, 128 Ohio St.3d 390, 2011-Ohio-957, 944 N.E.2d 1166 (indefinite 
suspension for tax evasion); Disciplinary Counsel v. Petroff, 85 Ohio St.3d 396, 
709 N.E.2d 111 (1999) (one-year suspension with credit for time served).  
However, the Smith case involved “full and free disclosure to Disciplinary 
Counsel and cooperative attitude toward these proceedings,” mitigating factors 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
that are not present in this case.  Nor did Smith involve the numerous trust-
account violations presented here.  In Petroff, the respondent “cooperated fully 
with relator’s investigation” and “none of his conduct had any impact on his 
clients and did not arise from the representation of his clients.”  The same cannot 
be said for the trust-account violations in the present case. 
{¶ 58} Ultimately, the disposition of this case should be commensurate 
with the multiple instances of dishonesty and misappropriation that we confront.  
Analogous cases are Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Weaver, 102 Ohio St.3d 264, 2004-
Ohio-2683, 809 N.E.2d 1113; Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dadisman, 109 Ohio St.3d 
82, 2006-Ohio-1929, 846 N.E.2d 26; and Toledo Bar Assn. v. Mason, 118 Ohio 
St.3d 412, 2008-Ohio-2704, 889 N.E.2d 539.  These cases involve acceptance and 
retention of client fees and settlement funds, accompanied by neglect of client 
matters or failure to remit monies properly.  There, as here, the violations involve 
client harm and willful disregard of legitimate client interests.  Also pertinent is 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Farrell, 129 Ohio St.3d 223, 2011-Ohio-2879, 951 
N.E.2d 390, which involved an egregious instance of fraud on a court coupled 
with failure to file returns and pay taxes.  All these cases resulted in disbarment, 
and the same result is warranted here. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 59} For all the foregoing reasons, we adopt the findings and 
conclusions of the board, and we concur in the recommended sanction of 
disbarment.  Respondent is therefore permanently disbarred from the practice of 
law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
 
McDonald Hopkins, L.L.C., R. Jeffrey Pollock, and Erin K. Walsh, for 
relator. 
 
Kevin T. Toohig, pro se. 
______________________