Case Title: ELI MAES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
ELI MAES V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 70114 P.3d 708Case Number: No. 04-112Decided: 06/28/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 

                                                                                                                        

 
 
ELI MAES,     

Appellant 
(Defendant),

 
 
v.

            

THE STATE OFWYOMING,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).   

 
 
 
 
Appeal from 
the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The Honorable E. 
James Burke, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

            
Tonya A. 
Morse, Cheyenne, Wyoming. 

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; 
Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and James Michael Causey, Assistant Attorney General.  

 
 
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, 
and VOIGT, JJ., and SANDERSON, DJ.

 
 
 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In a change of 
plea hearing arising out of three separate proceedings, Eli Maes pleaded guilty 
to:  1) one count of receiving 
stolen property; 2) two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter; and 3) one 
count of soliciting perjury.  After 
being sentenced to a term of years for each offense, Mr. Maes appealed, claiming 
his guilty pleas were not voluntary and the guilty plea for attempted 
manslaughter lacked a factual basis.  
We affirm.  

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Maes states 
the issues as follows: 

 
 
1.         
Whether the appellant's guilty pleas were 
voluntary?

 
 
2.         
Whether a factual basis existed for appellant's convictions for attempted 
manslaughter?

 
 
The State rephrases the issues 
as:

 
 
I.          
Were appellant's guilty pleas voluntarily entered?

 
 
II.          
Were there sufficient factual bases for appellant's guilty pleas to two 
counts of attempted manslaughter?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In January of 
2003, a concrete chop saw was stolen from a construction site in Laramie 
County, Wyoming.  
A few days later, Mr. Maes attempted to sell a concrete chop saw to A1 
Rental in Cheyenne.  
A1 Rental checked with law enforcement and was informed the saw was 
stolen.  When A1 Rental informed Mr. 
Maes the saw was stolen, he immediately left the store without the saw.  On March 21, 2003, Mr. Maes was arrested 
for receiving stolen property in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-403(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2003).  At his 
arraignment, Mr. Maes pleaded not guilty to the charge.

 
 
[¶4]      On July 14, 2003, 
while out on bond awaiting trial on the receiving stolen property charges, Mr. 
Maes was involved in an altercation outside a Laramie County bar, during which 
he pointed a gun first at his wife and then at a friend and threatened to kill 
them. Mr. Maes was arrested and charged with two counts of attempted 
second-degree murder in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301(a) and 6-2-104 
(LexisNexis 2003).  Mr. Maes pleaded 
not guilty to those charges. 

 
 
[¶5]      On December 31, 
2003, while Mr. Maes was in jail awaiting trial on the other charges, his wife 
visited him at the detention center and they talked by videophone.  During their conversation, Mr. Maes 
allegedly encouraged his wife to change her story about the July altercation to 
match his.  The conversation was 
recorded and Mr. Maes was charged with solicitation to commit perjury in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-302(a) and 6-5-301(a) (LexisNexis 
2003).  Like the other charges 
pending against him, Mr. Maes initially pleaded not guilty to this charge.  

 
 
[¶6]      Just before the 
State filed the solicitation to commit perjury charges, the parties reached a 
plea agreement.  Under the terms of 
the agreement, Mr. Maes agreed to plead guilty to all of the charges filed 
against him and the State agreed to reduce the attempted second-degree murder 
charges to attempted manslaughter, not to pursue conspiracy to commit perjury 
charges against Mr. Maes' wife and to obtain the U.S. Attorney's agreement not 
to file federal charges against him. 

 
 
[¶7]      On January 8, 
2004, in accordance with the plea agreement, Mr. Maes changed his plea to guilty 
on all of the charges.  At a 
sentencing hearing on April 5, 2004, the court sentenced Mr. Maes to concurrent 
terms of two to four years on the receiving stolen property and conspiring to 
commit perjury charges and four to seven years on each count of attempted 
manslaughter, to be served concurrent to each other and consecutive to the two 
to four year sentences. 

 
 
  

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      Our review of Mr. 
Maes' claim that his plea was not voluntary is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 11(d), 
which provides as follows:

 
 
  
(d) Insuring that plea is voluntary .  The court shall not accept 
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant 
personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the 
result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court 
shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or 
nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the attorney for the 
state and the defendant or the defendant's attorney.

 
 
Strict adherence to the rule is 
required and any deviation from the procedure set forth therein must be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt or a defendant must be allowed to enter a new 
plea.  Bird v. State, 939 P.2d 735, 737 (Wyo. 1997).

 
 
[¶9]      We review claims 
that a guilty plea was not voluntary de novo. Van Haele v. State, 
2004 WY 59, ¶12, 90 P.3d 708, ¶12 (Wyo. 2004).  Based upon the totality of the 
circumstances, we determine whether the district court sufficiently described 
the nature of the charges, including the possible penalties; informed the 
defendant of the right to representation; informed the defendant of the rights 
waived by a guilty plea; and obtained a factual basis for the plea.  Id., ¶13.  A guilty plea is valid where the 
totality of the circumstances demonstrates that a defendant made a voluntary and 
intelligent choice to plead guilty from alternative courses of action available 
to him and understood the consequences of his plea.  Herrera v. State, 2003 WY 25, 
¶17, 64 P.3d 724, ¶17 (Wyo. 2003); Major v. State, 2004 WY 4, ¶11, 83 P.3d 468, ¶11 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶10]   Our review of Mr. Maes' claim that 
there was not a sufficient factual basis for his guilty pleas to the attempted 
manslaughter charges is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 11(f), which provides as 
follows:

 
 
  
(f) Determining accuracy of plea.  Notwithstanding the acceptance 
of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea 
without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis 
for the plea.   

 
 
This provision does not require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant who pleads is actually guilty; the 
rule's standard is much lower.  Rule 
11(f) merely requires the court to satisfy itself that a factual basis exists 
for the guilty plea before accepting the plea. Van Haele, ¶27.      

            

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
 
 
1. Voluntariness of 
Pleas

 
 
[¶11]   The thrust of Mr. Maes' claim that 
his plea was not voluntary is that he entered the plea in order to protect his 
wife from prosecution.  He asserts 
he had no choice but to agree to the prosecutor's wishes in order to protect his 
family.  The State responds that the 
reference to Mr. Maes' wife was placed in the agreement at his request, Mr. Maes 
(and his wife) received the benefit of his agreement with the State, the 
district court strictly complied with W.R.Cr.P. 11, and the record clearly shows 
Mr. Maes' plea was voluntary.

 
 
[¶12]   Given the requirement of strict 
adherence to W.R.Cr.P. 11, we begin our review with consideration of what 
transpired at the change of plea hearing.  
The hearing transcript reflects that the district court addressed Mr. 
Maes personally in open court, advising him of his right to plead not guilty, 
including his right to proceed to trial represented by counsel, and the rights 
he would waive by pleading guilty.  
The court also advised him of the nature of the charges against him and 
the possible penalties.  Mr. Maes 
stated that he understood his rights, the charges against him and the possible 
penalties. 

 
 
[¶13]   The district court then inquired 
about the plea agreement.  Defense 
counsel stated Mr. Maes felt the plea was the best way to proceed given the 
prosecution's agreement not to file charges against his wife and to seek the 
U.S. Attorney's agreement not to pursue federal charges against him.  A few minutes later, defense counsel 
reiterated:  "The driving point of 
the plea for Mr. Maes is that the state has secured a promise from the U.S. 
Attorney's Office that they would not pursue the federal charges, that they 
would not charge his wife with conspiracy to commit perjury . . . ."  The district court expressed concern 
with a guilty plea entered by a defendant in order to protect a family member 
from criminal charges.  The State 
responded that the provision was put in the agreement to allay Mr. Maes' fears 
that he would plead guilty and the State would file charges against his wife 
anyway.  The State also asserted 
this type of provision had appeared in plea agreements a number of times before 
and as long as the plea is knowing and voluntary, it is an appropriate 
condition.  The court and Mr. Maes 
then had the following exchange:

 
 
THE COURT: . . . Mr. Maes, do you understand everything 
that is going on here today?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your Honor.

 
 
THE COURT:  The way this works is that once we've 
taken the plea, the Court ascertains that there's a factual basis, the Court 
would order a presentence investigation report. Once that has been completed, we 
would come back into court and the Court would make a decision as to an 
appropriate sentence. Do you understand that?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE COURT: With regards to Docket 
27-602 [the receiving stolen property charge]  I guess the other point is, 
regardless of the sentence that the court imposes, you would not be allowed to 
withdraw your plea. Do you understand that?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: 
Yes.

            

THE COURT: Are you still willing to go 
forward?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
 
 
The district court then read the 
charges filed against Mr. Maes in each of the three proceedings, asking him how 
he wished to plead after the reading of each charge was completed.  With respect to the receiving stolen 
property charge, Mr. Maes stated "guilty."  
When asked how he would plead to the solicitation of perjury charge, Mr. 
Maes initially responded, "I guess guilty, Your Honor."  Then, the following exchange 
occurred:

 
 
THE COURT: It's either 

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm guilty. I'm guilty. 
I ain't going to waste the Court's time, Your Honor, over this. I wasn't trying 
to coach nobody.

 
 
THE COURT: I understand, just hold on 
just a second.

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm 
guilty.

 
 
THE COURT: Your plea is 
guilty?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
When asked how he would plead to Count 
I of attempted voluntary manslaughter, Mr. Maes responded, "Alford plea."1 The transcript of the hearing then 
reads as follows:

 
 
THE COURT: Right. But as to Count I, do 
you plead guilty?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: An Alford plea, yeah, I 
guess. Yeah. What she says, Your Honor.

 
 
THE COURT: This is up to you. As to 
Count I, do you plead guilty or not guilty?

 
 
(Off-the-record 
discussion.)

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Alford 
plea.

 
 
(Off-the-record 
discussion.)

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I guess that means I'm 
guilty. I am guilty then.

 
 
THE COURT: As to Count II, how do you 
plead?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I am 
guilty.

 
 
THE COURT: Please raise your right 
hand.  (Whereupon, the defendant was 
administered the oath by the Court.)

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE COURT: How old are 
you?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: 23 years 
old.

 
 
THE COURT: Are you under the influence 
of any alcohol, medication, or drugs?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE COURT: Is there anything that 
prevents you from understanding what is going on here 
today?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE COURT: Were the pleas you just 
entered in all of these counts voluntary?

            

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah  
yes.

 
 
THE COURT: Were they the result of any 
force or threats or promises except for the plea 
agreement?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I'll accept the plea 
agreement to not touch my wife.

 
 
[¶14]   Based upon this record, there is no 
question the district court complied with the procedural requirements of 
W.R.Cr.P 11(d).  The only question 
is whether Mr. Maes' plea was voluntary given that it was motivated in part by 
his desire to obtain the State's agreement not to prosecute his wife.  Although this issue was presented to 
this Court once before, in Britain v. State, 497 P.2d 543 (Wyo. 1972), we did not 
address it.  

 
 
[¶15]   In Britain, 
the defendant claimed his guilty plea was not voluntary because he entered it to 
avoid the prosecution of his wife and son.  
We never reached the issue because we found the district court failed to 
comply with W.R.Cr.P. 15's (now W.R.Cr.P 11) requirements to address the 
defendant personally to determine that the plea was voluntary with an 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.  On that basis, this Court remanded the 
case with instructions to set aside the defendant's plea and permit him to enter 
a new plea. Of relevance to the issue currently before us, however, we 
said:  "The fact that the attorneys 
resolved matters as they did [i.e., with the prosecutor's promise not to 
prosecute other family members] in this case does not in and of itself prove 
that defendant's plea was involuntary."  
Britain, 497 P.2d  at 544.     

 
 
[¶16]   Since Britain, 
we have not had occasion to consider whether a guilty plea arising from an 
agreement not to prosecute a family member was voluntary.  We have considered, however, whether a 
plea was voluntary under other circumstances and have stated the test for 
determining whether a plea is voluntary as follows:

 
 
"[A] plea of guilty entered by one 
fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any 
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand 
unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), 
misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps 
by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship 
to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)."

 
 

Rodriguez v. State, 917 P.2d 172, 175 (Wyo. 1996) (citations 
omitted).  Where a defendant 
repeatedly affirms his intent to plead and states he understands the 
proceedings, we have said that he entered into the plea agreement on his own 
volition with full awareness of the consequences and it was, therefore, knowing 
and voluntary.  Major , 
¶23.

 
 
[¶17]   Courts in other jurisdictions have 
addressed squarely the issue of whether a plea entered to protect a family 
member was voluntary.  In Miles 
v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459 (10th Cir. 1995), the defendant claimed he was 
coerced into pleading by the government's threats to imprison his family unless 
he entered a plea.  He claimed he 
entered the plea involuntarily in order to protect his family.  The Tenth Circuit rejected his claim, 
stating:  

 
 
In the absence of facts demonstrating 
that the government prosecuted his family without probable cause in an attempt 
to gain leverage over Petitioner, the fact that he entered his plea out of a 
desire to protect his validly indicted family from further prosecution, does not 
render an otherwise voluntary plea involuntary. 

 
 

Id., at 1469.  Other courts that have addressed the 
issue have reached similar results. United States v. Bellazerius, 24 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1994) (guilty plea induced by promise of leniency toward 
defendant's wife was not involuntary); United States v. Bartoli, 572 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1978) (guilty plea was not 
coerced where entered by defendant pursuant to condition that indictment against 
defendant's father be dismissed); United States v. Vest, 125 F.3d 676 
(8th Cir. 1997) (nothing in the record suggested the government did not act in 
good faith in obtaining defendant's guilty pleas, and, in fact, it appears that 
he entered the guilty pleas not as an act of self-sacrifice for his brother, but 
rather as an attempt to avoid the harsher death sentence himself.); United 
States v. Armas, 11 Fed. Appx. 899 (9th Cir. 2001) (record was clear that 
defendant pled guilty of his own volition, although undoubtedly influenced by a 
desire to help his wife and family.)  

 

[¶18]   With these cases in mind and 
applying our own test for determining whether a guilty plea was voluntary, we 
hold Mr. Maes has failed to establish that his plea was involuntary.  The record suggests he was fully aware 
of the direct consequences of his plea, including the actual value of the 
commitments made to him by the State.  
He understood, for example, that in exchange for his guilty plea, the 
State would reduce the attempted second-degree murder charges to attempted 
manslaughter.  Additionally, he knew 
that in exchange for his plea the State would obtain the U.S. Attorney's 
agreement not to file federal charges against him.  And he knew that the State would not 
file conspiracy to commit perjury charges against his 
wife.

 
 
[¶19]   There is no indication from the 
record that Mr. Maes' plea was induced by threats, misrepresentation, or 
improper promises.  There likewise 
is no indication the State manufactured the potential charges against his wife 
in order to pressure Mr. Maes into pleading guilty.  The district court heard the recorded 
conversation between Mr. Maes and his wife and was persuaded a factual basis 
existed for Mr. Maes' plea to conspiracy to commit perjury.  If anything, the record suggests that 
Mr. Maes' plea was induced by an agreement under which he benefited 
significantly in ways unrelated to the potential charges against his wife.  By agreeing to plead, Mr. Maes avoided 
more serious state charges and potential federal charges.  The fact that his wife also benefited, 
and that his decision to plead may have been motivated in part by a desire to 
protect her, does not render his plea involuntary.   

 
 
 
 
2. Factual Basis for Plea to Attempted 
Manslaughter

 
 
[¶20]   Mr. Maes contends an adequate 
factual basis did not exist for his guilty plea to the attempted manslaughter 
charges because at the change of plea hearing he denied committing an essential 
element of the crime.  Specifically, 
he asserts that attempted manslaughter requires the intent to kill and 
commission of a substantial step toward that end. He argues there was not an 
adequate factual basis for his plea because he stated at the hearing that he 
never intended to kill anyone and did not pull the trigger.  The State asserts the district court had 
sufficient information to support acceptance of the plea.      

 
 
[¶21]   The intent of the procedural 
requirement of a factual basis is to prevent the individual charged with a crime 
from being misled into a waiver of substantial rights.  Sami v. State, 2004 WY 23, ¶9, 85 P.3d 1014, ¶9 (Wyo. 2004).  A 
sufficient inquiry to obtain a factual basis includes a determination that the 
defendant understood his conduct, in light of the law, to be criminal.  Id.  However, the factual basis for accepting 
a plea may be inferred from circumstances surrounding the crime and need not be 
established only from the defendant's statements.  Id.  W.R.Cr.P. 11 does not require proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant who pleads guilty is actually guilty 
nor does it require complete descriptions of the elements.  Id.  Acceptance of an Alford plea, however, 
does require strong evidence of actual guilt to negate the claim of innocence 
and provide a means by which the trial court can test whether the plea was 
intelligently entered. Johnston v. 
State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1181 (Wyo. 1992).

 
 
[¶22]   Applying these standards in Van 
Haele, we concluded an adequate factual basis was provided to support the 
plea to aggravated assault where: 

 
 
Van Haele clearly admitted that after 
he kicked in the doors of the victim's vehicle, a fracas ensued between himself 
and the victim.  Thereafter, Van 
Haele realized that a Leatherman tool was in his pocket so he unfolded it under 
his belly and stabbed the victim.  
Moreover, both the victim and Ms. Van Haele gave their eyewitness 
testimony substantiating these facts.  
Numerous other witnesses who later arrived at the scene testified they 
saw that the victim had been stabbed and Van Haele admitted to them that he had 
stabbed the victim.  The Leatherman 
tool was found at the scene and was identified as being in Van Haele's 
possession.  Additionally, Dr. 
Walter H. Gould testified that the stabbing wound resulted in the laceration of 
the victim's skin and lung causing bleeding into the chest cavity, which had to 
be drained.  The victim was required 
to stay in the hospital for four days as a result of the injury he sustained. 

 
 

Van Haele, ¶30. 

 
 
[¶23]   Similarly, in Sami, ¶12, we 
said: 

 
 
Sami contends that [the] factual basis 
does not establish that the restraint occurred under circumstances creating a 
risk of serious bodily injury, an element of the crime of felonious 
restraint.  Specifically, he 
contends that this record does not show that he caused any bodily injury to his 
victim.  However, the crux of the 
debate is whether Sami's behavior (angrily throwing the victim on a bed, laying 
on top of her and preventing her from getting up, touching her breast, and then 
performing nonconsensual sexual intercourse on the unlawfully restrained victim) 
knowingly exposed the victim to the risk of physical pain, illness or any 
impairment of physical condition which causes impairment of the function of any 
bodily member or organ.  We think 
that a district court in seeking a factual basis for a guilty plea to felonious 
restraint can, without more, infer that the victim of restrained, forcible 
nonconsensual sexual intercourse was subjected to such violence from that 
particular act that the court could reasonably conclude that she had been 
exposed to a risk of serious bodily injury. Additionally, the prosecutor also 
reasoned that the defendant's criminal conduct exposed the victim to risk of 
serious bodily injury, as statutorily defined, if she tried to resist that 
conduct and the defendant in his angry state retaliated against her.  The risks of serious bodily injury are 
established by both the defendant's words and the prosecutor's words.  We hold that the factual basis was 
sufficient to support the defendant's guilty plea.

 
 
[¶24]   The record in the present case 
reflects that the district court first asked the State for the factual basis for 
the attempted manslaughter charge.  
Relying on the affidavit of probable cause, the State responded that on 
July 14, 2003, law enforcement received a call concerning a disturbance at the 
Cowboy South Bar involving a man with a gun.  Witnesses at the scene identified Mr. 
Maes as the individual with the gun. They described what Mr. Maes was wearing 
and the gun he had in his possession and said he fled the bar on foot through an 
adjacent property after the altercation. 

 
 
[¶25]   The State informed the district 
court that witnesses stated the altercation occurred when Mr. Maes returned to 
the bar from taking his cousin and her boyfriend home and thought he saw his 
brother kissing his wife in the parking lot.  Mr. Maes confronted his brother and a 
struggle ensued.  Mr. Maes made 
statements to his wife to the effect that he was going to kill her and produced 
a gun.  In the process, he struck 
one of the witnesses in the face with the gun.  Another witness knocked the gun out of 
his hand, slammed him up against the pickup and began choking him, at which 
point Mr. Maes ' brother told the witness to let Mr. Maes go.  The witness complied and Mr. Maes 
retrieved the gun, pointed it at the man who choked him and threatened to kill 
him.  The witnesses saw Mr. Maes run 
from the bar across the adjacent field and, after his arrest, identified him as 
the man holding the gun and making the threats.  Thorns like those found in the field to 
which witnesses stated Mr. Maes ran were found in his clothes and in the chamber 
of the gun.  The gun was found later 
in Mr. Maes' garage in a stack of tires.

 
 
[¶26]   The district court asked whether 
there was evidence that Mr. Maes pointed the gun and attempted to shoot his wife 
and the other witness.  The State 
replied that witnesses saw him pulling the trigger and working the slide as he 
made the threats.  The district 
court then asked defense counsel whether she conceded that the State would 
present the evidence described and that it established an adequate factual basis 
for acceptance of the plea.  Defense 
counsel responded that she believed the evidence described was what the State 
would prove at trial. In addition, she stated:

 
 
. . . Of course, during the course of 
the trial we would be presenting maybe some different 
facts.

 
 
I don't know how salient they would be, 
but namely that Mr. Maes was not going to shoot anybody. He didn't intend to 
hurt anybody and that's where the Alford plea comes in. He admits that he had 
the gun and pointed it at the group there.

 
 
. . . I think Mr. Maes still would like 
to talk to the Court. I have advised him that most of what he is going to say is 
more appropriate for sentencing purposes, but he would tell the Court he didn't 
intend to hurt anyone or was going to kill anyone.

 
 
The following exchange then occurred 
between the court and Mr. Maes:

 
 
THE COURT:  Mr. Maes, do you agree with what 
[defense counsel] just said also?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT: To a point. I'd like to 
state my own opinion on it, you know.

 
 
THE COURT:  Hold on just one second. Were you 
present at the Cowboy Bar on July 14, 2003?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your Honor.

 
 
THE COURT:  And you had a weapon with 
you?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I did.

 
 
THE COURT:  That was the gun [the State] was 
referring to?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your Honor.

 
 
THE COURT:  You did point that 
gun?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, I did, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE COURT:  And your contention IS you didn't intend 
to kill anybody though?

 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  No, Your Honor, I did 
not.

 
 
The district court asked defense 
counsel whether she conceded there was a factual basis and she responded 
affirmatively.  The district court 
then found there was a factual basis for the attempted manslaughter 
charge.

 
 
[¶27]   Later in the proceedings, the 
district court allowed Mr. Maes to describe in his own words what happened in 
the bar parking lot.  He reiterated 
that he thought he saw his wife and brother kissing.  He was angry and confronted his 
brother.  He grabbed the gun with 
the intent of leaving when he saw someone coming at him out of the corner of his 
eye.  He swung around pointing the 
gun and accidentally struck his friend's wife.  His friend knocked the gun out of his 
hand and started choking him.  He 
broke free, grabbed the gun and pointed it at his friend because it looked like 
his friend was coming after him.  
Then he backed away, the bouncer grabbed him, and he broke free and took 
off through the adjacent lot.  Mr. 
Maes also stated that he never intended to hurt anybody but to keep his wife out 
of jail and his kids from being taken, he would take a plea bargain of anything. 

 
 
[¶28]   Despite Mr. Maes' assertion that he 
did not intend to hurt anyone, we conclude there was a sufficient factual basis 
for the district court to accept the plea.  
Mr. Maes conceded that he pulled a gun and pointed it at his friend.  The State was prepared to offer other 
testimony at trial showing that he also pointed the gun at his wife and that he 
made statements both to his wife and his friend to the effect that he was going 
to kill them.  From Mr. Maes' own 
statements and from inferences made from circumstances surrounding the crime, we 
hold the factual basis was sufficient to support acceptance of the 
plea.

 
 
[¶29]   Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1An 
Alford plea allows an individual accused of a crime to voluntarily, knowingly, 
and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is 
unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the 
crime. North Carolina v. Alford, 
400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 
(1970).