Case Title: Miller and Smith v. Casey PMN

Citation: 412 Md. 230

Docket Number: 29/09

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Miller and Smith at Quercus, LLC, et al. v. Casey PMN, LLC, No. 29, September Term
2009.
JURISDICTION – FINAL JUDGMENT – VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
Casey PMN, LLC, filed a four count complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County
against Miller and Smith and Miller and Smith Holding, Inc., alleging that Miller and Smith,
after selling property secured by a Note and Deed of Trust held by Casey, had “not properly
calculated and paid Additional Contingent Interest to Casey based on the fair market value
of the Property, as contemplated by the Note and Deed of Trust . . . .”  Miller and Smith filed
a Motion to Dismiss Count II, and Answer to the remaining three counts, and a
Counterclaim.  The Circuit Court granted Miller and Smith’s Motion to Dismiss Count II of
the Complaint.  The parties then filed a joint “Stipulation of Dismissal” pursuant to Rule 2-
506, dismissing “with prejudice” Counts I and III of the Complaint and also purportedly
dismissing Count IV and the Counterclaim “with prejudice,” but with an important caveat
that the dismissal of Count IV and the Counterclaim would be “without prejudice to the
extent that the Court’s earlier interlocutory Opinion and Order dismissing Count II, is vacated
or reversed on appeal and remanded to this Court.”  On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals
reached the merits of the case after stating that it did “not perceive the parties’ Stipulation
of Dismissal to flout the final judgment rule, despite its caveat,” thereby indicating that the
admonition against circumventing the final judgment rule should require an intent analysis,
relying on Collins v. Li, 158 Md. App. 252, 273-74, 857 A.2d 135, 148 (2004).
The Court of Appeals vacated the Court of Special Appeals’ decision and held that the
parties could not agree to confer appellate jurisdiction after the dismissal of Count II of the
complaint when they created a dismissal without prejudice of Count IV and the
Counterclaim, and when both were inexorably intertwined with Count II.  The Court stated
that the “without prejudice” exception of the Stipulation, no matter how narrow, still created
an exception that attempted to confer appellate jurisdiction.  The Court noted that the Court
of Special Appeals, by engaging in an intent analysis, attempted to give more power to the
parties to determine finality.  The Court stated that the intermediate appellate court
misconstrued the use of the word “circumvent” in Collins to permit a without prejudice
stipulation to constitute a final judgment because the parties did not intend to flout the final
judgment rule, thereby inferring that the word circumvent requires bad intent.  Because
neither the Circuit Court judge’s dismissal of Count II, nor the parties’ Stipulation of
Dismissal of Count IV and the Counterclaim without prejudice, created a final, appealable
judgment, the appeal was vacated and remanded to the Court of Special Appeals with
instructions to dismiss.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 29
September Term, 2009
MILLER AND SMITH AT QUERCUS,
LLC, ET AL.
v.
CASEY PMN, LLC
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Adkins
Barbera,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed: January 11, 2010
1
This promissory note was the second of two promissory notes executed in
connection with the purchase.  The first promissory note was paid in full and is not at issue
in this case.
2
The record does not include information explaining the relationship between
Miller and Smith at Quercus, LLC and Miller and Smith Holding, Inc.
In 1998, M iller and Smith, a Maryland limited liability company, executed a
promissory note titled “Deferred Purchase Money Promissory Note II”1 in which it promised
to pay $3,296,000, with interest, to Potomac Capital Investment Corporation, an affiliate of
Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO), in order to purchase approximately 258 acres
of land in Montgomery County.  In addition to the repayment of principal and its attendant
interest upon maturity or sale of all or any portion of the property, the promise to pay also
included a provision for payment of “Additional Contingent Interest,” “[i]n order to
compensate the Holder for accepting an interest rate equal to the Libor Rate, and further to
compensate the Holder for granting the Borrower the exculpation from liability provided in
[the Note].”  Additional Contingent Interest was defined as “35% of the difference between
Gross Revenue and Approved Costs, calculated at a time or times specified in this Note,”
while Gross Revenue was defined as “the greater of the sales price or gross sales proceeds
payable in connection with the sale of all or any portion of the Property securing this Note.”
A Deed of Trust and Security Agreement also were executed on the same day, as well as a
Guaranty Agreement executed by Miller and Smith Holding, Inc., a Virginia corporation.2
In 2001, Potomac transferred its rights under the Note and the Guaranty to Casey PMN, LLC
which then became the Holder under the Note and the Guaranty and the Beneficiary under
2
the Deed of Trust.
In 2002, under threat of imminent condemnation of the property, Miller and Smith
entered into an Agreement with Montgomery County for the sale of the property, for the
purpose of open space conservation.  Under the Agreement, the property was divided into
six parcels, and the County was to make five cash payments between November 2002 and
July 2006 totaling $9,025,500 to Miller and Smith upon the conveyance of the six separate
parcels of land, as follows: Parcel 1 (85.79 acres) for $3,000,000 on November 15, 2002;
Parcel 2 (63.52 acres) for $2,221,500 on July 1, 2003; Parcel 3 (50.16 acres) for $1,754,000
on July 1, 2004; Parcels 4A and 4B (27.91 and 16.41 acres, respectively) for $1,550,000 on
July 1, 2005; and Parcel 5 (14.3 acres) for $500,000 on July 1, 2006.  Montgomery County
also agreed to provide a letter to the Internal Revenue Service “acknowledging that [Miller
and Smith] was paid the above amounts for the Property and acknowledging that [Miller and
Smith] claims that the fair market value of the Property is not less than $17,100,000.”  The
County took no position on the actual fair market value of the property, but included
$17,100,000 in the Agreement to enable Miller and Smith to attempt to take advantage of any
possible tax benefits.  According to the parties, the entire $9,025,500 has been paid to Miller
and Smith and, in turn, Miller and Smith has transferred all parcels of the property to the
County.
Miller and Smith paid Casey Additional Contingent Interest under the promissory
note, based on the $9,025,500 paid by Montgomery County, but Casey did not agree with the
3
computation and claimed that the calculation should have included not only the $9 million,
but additional tax benefits.  
Casey, thereafter, filed a four count complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County against Miller and Smith and Miller and Smith Holding, Inc., alleging that Miller and
Smith had “not properly calculated and paid Additional Contingent Interest to Casey based
on the fair market value of the Property, as contemplated by the Note and Deed of Trust . .
. . ,” prefacing the following four Counts with the factual recitations noted above:
COUNT I
(BREACH OF NOTE AND DEED OF TRUST – DAMAGES)
18. Casey incorporates the preceding paragraphs of its
Complaint by reference as if set forth herein.
19.  Miller and Smith’s failure to pay Casey the full amount of
Additional Contingent Interest due under the Note, calculated as
35% of the fair market value of the Property, as contemplated by
the terms of the Note, constitutes a breach of the Note and the
Deed of Trust.
20.  As a result of Miller and Smith’s breach of the Note and the
Deed of Trust, Casey has suffered substantial financial harm.
21. Under the terms of the Note, in addition to the Additional
Contingent Interest due but unpaid, Miller and Smith is liable to
Casey for all reasonable costs of collection of amounts due
under the Note, including reasonable attorneys’ fees.
COUNT II
(ALTERNATIVE: BREACH OF NOTE AND DEED OF TRUST – DAMAGES)
22. Casey incorporates the preceding paragraphs of its
Complaint by reference as if set forth herein.
23. Miller and Smith’s failure to pay Casey the full amount of
Additional Contingent Interest due under the Note, calculated as
35% of all compensation received by its members, including by
their use of the charitable deductions derived from the sale of
4
the Property to the County at below fair market value,
constitutes a breach of the Note and the Deed of Trust.
COUNT III
(BREACH OF THE NOTE AND DEED OF TRUST
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE – INJUNCTIVE RELIEF)
24. Casey incorporates the preceding paragraphs of its
Complaint by reference as if set forth herein.
25. Miller and Smith’s refusal to permit Casey to inspect its
books and records for the purpose of, inter alia, assessing
whether Miller and Smith has accurately calculated the
Approved Costs that it is permitted to deduct from “Gross
Revenue” in determining the amount of Additional Contingent
Interest due under the Note constitutes a breach of the terms of
the Note and the Deed of Trust.
26. Without inspecting and examining the books and records
maintained by Miller & Smith, Casey has not been able to
determine whether Miller and Smith has deducted more as
“Approved Costs” from “Gross Revenue” in making payments
of Additional Contingent Interest to Casey under the Note than
is proper.
COUNT IV
(BREACH OF THE GUARANTY)
27. Casey incorporates the preceding paragraphs of its
Complaint by reference as if set forth herein.
28. Under the Guaranty, M & S Holding is jointly and severally
liable with Miller & Smith to Casey for injury it suffers as a
result of Miller and Smith’s failure to make proper payment of
Additional Contingent Interest and Miller and Smith’s failure to
meet other obligations under the terms of the Note and the Deed
of Trust.
29. As a result of Miller and Smith’s breach of the Note and the
Deed of Trust, Casey has suffered substantial injury for which
M&S is liable to Casey.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Casey PMN, LLC, respectfully
demands that the Court enter judgment in its favor against
Defendants Miller and Smith at Quercus, LLC and M&S
3
Rule 2-323(d) provides:
(d) General denials in specified causes. When the action in any
count is for breach of contract, debt, or tort and the claim for
relief is for money only, a party may answer that count by a
general denial of liability.
5
Holding, Inc., jointly and severally, (a) awarding Casey PMN,
LLC, compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial
for unpaid Additional Contingent Interest, together with court
costs and pre- and post-judgment interest, and costs of
collection, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and
expenses; (b) ordering Defendant Miller and Smith at Quercus
to permit Casey PMN, LLC to inspect, examine and copy its
books and records; and (c) granting such other and further relief
as the Court deems just and proper.
Miller and Smith filed a Motion to Dismiss Count II, as well as an Answer to the
remaining three counts of the Complaint, generally denying liability pursuant to Rule 2-
323(d),3 after which Casey filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.  Miller and Smith
filed a Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment alleging entitlement to damages based on
Casey’s wrongful claim that Miller and Smith and its holding company were obligated to pay
Additional Contingent Interest based on $17,100,000 rather than the purchase price of
$9,025,500; Casey filed an Answer to the Counterclaim generally denying liability.  
The Circuit Court thereupon held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and in a written
“Opinion and Order,” found that the terms of the contract were “clear and unambiguous,”
and charitable tax deductions from the sale of land did not constitute “Additional Contingent
Interest,” thereby granting   Miller and Smith’s Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Complaint,
4
The docket entry regarding the grant of the Motion to Dismiss Count II states:
ORDER, DISMISS (PARTIAL – CASE NOT CLOSE[D]) . . .
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT . . . THAT
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT II . . .
SHALL BE, AND HEREBY IS GRANTED, ENTERED.
5
Rule 2-506 regarding voluntary dismissals provides:
(a) By notice of dismissal or stipulation. Except as otherwise
provided in these rules or by statute, a party who has filed a
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim may
dismiss all or part of the claim without leave of court by filing
(1) a notice of dismissal at any time before the adverse party
files an answer or (2) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed
by all parties to the claim being dismissed.
(b) By order of court. Except as provided in section (a) of this
Rule, a party who has filed a complaint, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim may dismiss the claim only by
order of court and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper. If a counterclaim has been filed before the filing
of a plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal, the action shall
not be dismissed over the objection of the party who filed the
counterclaim unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court.  
(c) Effect. Unless otherwise specified in the notice of dismissal,
stipulation, or order of court, a dismissal is without prejudice,
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a party who has previously
dismissed in any court of any state or in any court of the United
States an action based on or including the same claim.  
(d) Costs. Unless otherwise provided by stipulation or order of
court, the dismissing party is responsible for all costs of the
(continued...)
6
and the docket entry reflected the fact that the case was not closed based on the partial
judgment.4  The parties, on August 22, 2007, then filed a joint “Stipulation of Dismissal”
pursuant to Rule 2-506,5 dismissing “with prejudice” Counts I and III of the Complaint and
5(...continued)
action or the part dismissed.
7
also purportedly dismissing Count IV and the Counterclaim “with prejudice,” but with an
important caveat:
(a) Plaintiff is hereby dismissing Counts I and III of its
Complaint with prejudice (Count II having previously been
dismissed by interlocutory Opinion and Order granting
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count II);
(b) Plaintiff is hereby dismissing Count IV of its Complaint,
with prejudice, except that, since Count IV includes a claim that
Defendant Miller & Smith Holding, Inc., is a guarantor with
respect to the liability of Defendant Miller & Smith at Quercus,
LLC, as alleged in Count II, such dismissal shall be without
prejudice to the extent that the Court’s earlier interlocutory
Opinion and Order dismissing Count II, is vacated or reversed
on appeal and remanded to this Court; and
(c) Defendant is hereby dismissing its Counterclaim with
prejudice, except that such dismissal shall be without prejudice
to the extent that the Court’s earlier, interlocutory Opinion and
Order dismissing Count II, is vacated or reversed on appeal and
remanded to this Court.
Casey subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal stating that it “notices its appeal of the Court’s
Opinion and Order dismissing Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint in the above-captioned
action, which Order became a final judgment upon the filing of a Stipulation of Dismissal,
dismissing all then-pending claims and counterclaims in this matter on August 22, 2007.” 
The Court of Special Appeals reached the merits of the controversy and reversed the
Circuit Court, but, in a footnote, recognized the problem with the conditional language of the
dismissal of Count IV and the Counterclaim:
8
The Stipulation was subject to the exception that the
dismissal of the counterclaim and appellant’s fourth count
(against Miller & Smith Holding as guarantor of the Note)
would be without prejudice if the Opinion and Order dismissing
Count II were vacated or reversed on appeal and remanded.
Ordinarily, “[t]here can be no final judgment until every
claim is resolved, [but] dismissal is one of the means by which
claims may be resolved for the purposes of the pending
litigation.”  Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williams, 381 Md. 378,
393 (2004).  Maryland Rule 2-506(a)(2) provides that parties
may “dismiss all or part of [a] claim without leave of court . . .
by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties to the
claim being dismissed.”  In this case, although the circuit court’s
grant of appellee’s Motion to Dismiss Count II was not a final
judgment, the parties’ voluntary dismissal of the remaining
claims, with prejudice, imparted finality to the court’s Opinion
and Order.  We elaborate.
In Collins v. Li, 158 Md. App. 252 (2004), we determined
that Maryland adheres to the majority rule “‘that a plaintiff
cannot appeal from the dismissal of some claims when the
balance of his or her claims have been voluntarily dismissed
without prejudice.’”  Id. at 267 (quoting and adopting Smith v.
Lincoln Meadows Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 678 N.W.2d 726,
731 (Neb. 2004)) (emphasis added.)  See also Cheng v. Comm’r
of IRS, 878 F.2d 306, 308-11 (9th Cir. 1989) (also followed in
Collins).
We do not perceive the parties’ Stipulation of Dismissal
to flout the final judgment rule, despite its caveat that appellee’s
counterclaim and “Count IV” of appellant’s complaint were
dismissed without prejudice to the extent that we vacate or
reverse.  On review of the record, appellee’s counterclaim for
declaratory judgment is limited to the same question presented
by appellant’s Count II, which was the subject of the circuit
court’s Opinion and Order: whether the term “gross sales
proceeds payable” in the Note encompasses the financial gain
realized from the charitable tax deductions at issue.  Moreover,
“Count IV” does not allege a separate substantive cause of
action; it merely provides the basis for the joint and several
liability of both appellees.  The remaining substantive counts of
appellant’s complaint, Counts I and III, were dismissed “with
6
We will not address questions II and III, thereby declining to address whether
the Court of Special Appeals’ reversal of the grant of the Motion to Dismiss should be
reversed, because of our disposition of the first question.
9
prejudice.”  Thus, the parties have effectively reserved only the
right to continue to litigate on the substantive grounds
encompassed by Count II of appellant’s complaint.  The parties’
stipulation, which has enabled this appeal to proceed, means that
they may no longer litigate any other issues implicated by
appellant’s complaint.
Miller and Smith petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted, 408
Md. 148, 968 A.2d 1064 (2009), to address the following questions, which we have
reordered:
I. May a party, through a voluntary dismissal without prejudice,
cause a non-final judgment to become final?
II. Does the term “sales proceeds payable” as used in a private
contract incorporating Md. Code. Ann., Comm. Law, § 9-
102(A)(65) include tax deductions for which the seller might be
eligible?
III. May an appellate court construe an ambiguous contract as a
matter of law without giving the parties an opportunity to
present extrinsic evidence?[6]
(Italics in original). 
Discussion
Our jurisprudence is replete with references to the fact that parties cannot agree to the
exercise of our appellate jurisdiction, even when the Court of Special Appeals has exercised
its review, because our jurisdiction is governed only by the Constitution, statutes, and the
10
Rules.  See East v. Gilchrist, 293 Md. 453, 458, 445 A.2d 343, 345 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis,
290 Md. 175, 179, 428 A.2d 454, 456 (1981); Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 211-12, 406 A.2d
922, 924 (1979), quoting Biro v. Schombert, 285 Md. 290, 293, 402 A.2d 71, 73 (1979).
Judge John C. Eldridge, writing for the Court in Biro, observed that parties cannot confer
jurisdiction on our Court, and we must dismiss a case sua sponte on a finding that we do not
have jurisdiction:
The apparent acquiescence of the parties to the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction by the Court of Special Appeals does not
enable us to overlook the matter.  As we stated in Eastgate
Associates v. Apper, 276 Md. 698, 700-701, 350 A. 2d 661
(1976): “The jurisdiction of this Court, and the Court of Special
Appeals, is determined by constitutional provisions, statutory
provisions and rules; jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent
of the parties.”  Consequently, “this Court will dismiss an appeal
sua sponte when it notices that appellate jurisdiction is lacking.”
Smith v. Taylor, 285 Md. 143, 400 A. 2d 1130 (1979).  See Rule
835 a 1.  Similarly, where the Court of Special Appeals has
entertained an appeal without having jurisdiction to do so, and
the case is timely brought to our attention (such as by a petition
for a writ of certiorari dealing with the merits of the appeal), we
will issue a writ of certiorari and sua sponte consider the
jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court. Eastgate
Associates v. Apper, supra. See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740, 96 S. Ct. 1202, 1204, 47 L.Ed.2d 435
(1976) (“Though neither party has questioned the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals to entertain the appeal, we are obligated to
do so on our own motion if a question thereto exists.”).
Id. at 293, 402 A.2d at 73.  In this regard, we may generally exercise jurisdiction over a case
on appeal if there exists a final judgment, which disposes of all claims against all parties and
concludes the case.  See Nnoli v. Nnoli, 389 Md. 315, 323, 884 A.2d 1215, 1219 (2005)
7
The exceptions to the final judgment rule, not relevant here, and more fully
discussed in Addison v. Lochearn, 411 Md. 251, 273-74, 983 A.2d 138, 151-52 (2009),
include appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute, immediate appeals
permitted under Rule 2-602, and appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the
common law collateral order doctrine.
8
Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides in
pertinent part:
Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may
appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case
by a circuit court.
All statutory references are to the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code
(1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), unless otherwise stated.
11
(“The general rule as to appeals is that, subject to a few, limited exceptions, a party may
appeal only from a final judgment.”).7  We have often stated that appeals may be taken to the
Court of Special Appeals under Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.),8 with exceptions not relevant here, only from a final
judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.  See Addison v. Lochearn, 411
Md. 251, 261, 983 A.2d 138, 144 (2009); Gruber v. Gruber, 369 Md. 540, 546, 801 A.2d
1013, 1016 (2002).
A “final judgment” is defined in Section 12-101(f) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article as “a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other
action by a court . . . from which an appeal . . . may be taken.”  See Anthony v. Clark, 335
Md. 579, 587, 644 A.2d 1070, 1074 (1994).  “The final judgment rule derives originally from
the English common law principle that a writ of error ordinarily would not lie until there had
9
Rule 2-602(a) entitled “Judgments not disposing of entire action” provides:
(a) Generally. Except as provided in section (b) of this Rule, an
order or other form of decision, however designated, that
adjudicates fewer than all of  the claims in an action (whether
raised by original claim, counterclaim,  cross-claim, or
third-party claim), or that adjudicates less than an entire claim,
or that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties to the action:  
(1) is not a final judgment;  
(2) does not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or any of the parties; and  
(3) is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of a judgment that adjudicates all of the
claims by and against all of the parties.
12
been a final disposition of an entire controversy.”  Brewster v. Woodhaven Bldg. & Dev., 360
Md. 602, 609-10, 759 A.2d 738, 742 (2000) (citations and footnote omitted) (“The core of
the final judgment rule is thus that a trial court’s decision disposing of the merits of the
parties’ claims may be appealed.”).
Our “bedrock” principles of jurisdiction indicate that, ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction
is dependent upon “the entry of a final judgment, disposing of all claims against all parties,”
with limited exceptions.  See Kennedy v. Lasting Paints, Inc., 404 Md. 427, 449, 947 A.2d
503, 516 (2008), citing Smith v. Lead Indus. Assoc., Inc., 386 Md. 12, 21, 871 A.2d 545, 550
(2005), quoting Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 165, 725 A.2d 549, 560 (1999); see also
Silbersack v. ACandS, Inc., 402 Md. 673, 678, 938 A.2d 855, 857-58 (2008); Rule 2-602(a).9
In Silbersack, we discussed our “bedrock” principles of appellate jurisdiction:
To set the context, there is a long-standing bedrock rule of
13
appellate jurisdiction, practice, and procedure that, unless
otherwise provided by law, the right to seek appellate review in
this Court or the Court of Special Appeals ordinarily must await
the entry of a final judgment that disposes of all claims against
all parties.
Id. at 678, 938 A.2d at 858 (citations omitted).  To qualify as a final judgment, an order
“must either decide and conclude the rights of the parties involved or deny a party the means
to prosecute or defend rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding,”  Nnoli,
389 Md. at 324, 884 A.2d at 1219-20, and must, ordinarily, satisfy three criteria:
(1) [I]t must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final
disposition of the matter in controversy, (2) unless the court
properly acts pursuant to Md. Rule 2-602(b), it must adjudicate
or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties, and
(3) the clerk must make a proper record of it in accordance with
Md. Rule 2-601.
Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989).  In considering whether
a particular court order or ruling constitutes a final, appealable judgment, we have looked to
whether the order was “unqualified,” and whether there was “any contemplation that a
further order [was to] be issued or that anything more [was to] be done.”  Rohrbeck, 318 Md.
at 41-42, 566 A.2d at 774 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).  
It is clear that when there is a disposition of all claims against all parties, there is a
final judgment.  We have held that an unqualified order granting a motion to dismiss or to
strike a plaintiff’s entire initial pleading, without granting leave to amend, absent
counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims, puts the plaintiffs out of court, and
terminates the particular action in the trial court, is final and appealable.  See Houghton v.
10
The Circuit Court’s order stated that “the Motion to Dismiss Counts I and III
of the Complaint as Amended is GRANTED this 21st day of January, 1985.  The Motion is
Denied as to Count II.”  Houghton v. County Comm’rs of Kent County, 305 Md. 407, 410,
504 A.2d 1145, 1147 (1986).
14
County Comm’rs of Kent County, 305 Md. 407, 412, 504 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1986), aff’d upon
reconsideration, 307 Md. 216, 221, 513 A.2d 291, 293-94 (1986) (citations omitted).  See
also Moore v. Pomory, 329 Md. 428, 432, 620 A.2d 323, 325 (1993) (holding that a court’s
dismissal of a plaintiff’s entire complaint without prejudice was a final and appealable
judgment).  In Houghton, Edward and Elizabeth Houghton filed a three count complaint in
the Circuit Court for Kent County against the County Commissioners, alleging questionable
conduct regarding voting in connection with a particular public project.  The Commissioners
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint, which the Circuit Court granted with regard to
Counts I and III for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, but denied
Count II.10  Two days later, the plaintiffs filed a notice voluntarily dismissing Count II of
their complaint with prejudice, which was entered on the docket the same day; we held that
as of the day Count II was dismissed with prejudice, there was a final disposition.
The rub comes, however, because of the complexity of our modern practice of
pleading.  We already have noted that our long held belief that a judgment which “decides
or settles the ‘very matter in controversy between the parties’ and determines ‘the question
of right in issue in the cause’” is a final judgment, and “works well enough in a simple
lawsuit in which a single plaintiff sues a single defendant on a single claim,” does not
11
Rule 2-602(b) provides:
(b) When allowed. If the court expressly determines in a written
order that there is no just reason for delay, it may direct in the
order the entry of a final judgment:  
(1) as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties; or  
(2) pursuant to Rule 2-501(f)(3), for some but less
than all of the amount requested in a claim
seeking money relief only.
15
function easily in our modern system of pleading, in which liberal joinder of parties, cross-
claims, and counterclaims may be disposed of at various stages of litigation.  Planning Bd.
of Howard County v. Mortimer, 310 Md. 639, 644-45, 530 A.2d 1237, 1240 (1987), quoting
Nally v. Long, 56 Md. 567, 571 (1881).
Although we have held that an order or other form of decision that adjudicates less
than the entire claim, or adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all parties to the
action, is not a final judgment, utilization of Rule 2-602(b),11 regarding certification by a trial
court of a final judgment, has occupied much of our efforts in recent years.  The Rule allows
a party to appeal from a judgment not disposing of an entire action, and one that is not
otherwise a final judgment, if a court expressly determines in a written order that there is no
just reason for delay and directs the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer
than all of the claims or parties.  We have noted, however, that while Rule 2-602(b) affords
a judge limited discretion to enter final judgment when fewer than all parties or claims have
been adjudicated, it does not create some kind of “mystic ‘never-never land’” where a
16
defendant can be both in and not in a case. Silbersack, 402 Md. at 687, 938 A.2d at 863.
In Smith, 386 Md. at 12, 871 A.2d at 545, we emphasized that Rule 2-602(b) is
reserved for the “infrequent harsh case,” and we will not hesitate to countermand the entry
of judgment under the Rule and dismiss an appeal upon a finding that the trial court did not
articulate a sufficient reason why there was no just reason for delay of an appeal.  Id. at 24-
25, 871 A.2d at 552, quoting Diener Enters. v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 555-56, 295 A.2d 470,
473 (1972).  Smith was a complex case involving seven minor plaintiffs from four families
(the Smiths, the Brantleys, the Hamiltons, and the Shorters) who jointly filed a fifteen-count
complaint against twenty-one defendant companies for various products liability-related
claims in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  Early in the Circuit Court proceedings, the
judge denied the plaintiff families’ motion to sever the action into four separate cases, one
for each family, which would have allowed them to dismiss the action without prejudice and
bring separate actions.  Instead, the Circuit Court set four separate trial dates, but maintained
the action as one unit.  A “blizzard” of motions to dismiss and for summary judgment
followed, which were granted, in whole or in part, as to various counts and defendants.  On
appeal, the Court of Special Appeals recognized there was no final judgment in the case
because many of the counts against many of the defendants were still unresolved, but that all
claims against all defendants had been finally resolved with respect to the Smith family, and
concluded, as a result, that “to condition the Smith appeal upon the entry of final judgment
in the claims brought by the other plaintiffs would be inefficient, at best, and possibly
12
Rule 8-602(e)(1)(C) provides in pertinent part:
If the appellate court determines that the order from which the
appeal is taken was not a final judgment when the notice of
appeal was filed but that the lower court had discretion to direct
the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 2-602 (b), the
appellate court may, as it finds appropriate, . . . enter a final
judgment on its own initiative . . . .
17
foolish,”  Smith, 386 Md. at 20, 871 A.2d at 549, and purported to enter final judgment on
the Smith claims.
We granted certiorari, but ultimately dismissed the appeal because there was no final,
appealable judgment.  We held that no final judgment could be certified, because all claims
by the Smith family against all of the defendants had not been resolved.  There had been an
automatic stay that accompanied the filing for bankruptcy protection by Lead Industries
Association, Inc., a trade organization defendant; without severing LIA as a defendant, the
Circuit Court could not have entered a final judgment under Rule 2-602(b), because “that
would have amounted to splitting a single claim, which is not allowed.”  Id. at 23, 871 A.2d
at 551.  We held, as a result, that the Court of Special Appeals abused its discretion by
entering final judgment under Rule 8-602(e)12 and that discretion to allow an appeal by
entering a final judgment as to less than all of the claims or parties “was to be reserved for
the ‘very infrequent case.’” Id. at 24, 871 A.2d at 552, quoting Diener, 266 Md. at 555-56,
295 A.2d at 473.
In Mortimer, 310 Md. at 639, 530 A.2d at 1237, we dismissed two consolidated
18
appeals for lack of jurisdiction, because the trial court, in one appeal, had failed to certify an
order under Rule 2-602, and in the other appeal, certified a non-certifiable order.  In the first
appeal, the dismissal of a defendant was arguably final in the traditional sense because it was
an unqualified order granting a motion to dismiss, which put the parties out of court and dealt
with a single claim, but was not, in fact, final because there were multiple parties involved
and a second defendant remained.  We held that absent certification pursuant to Rule 2-
602(b), there was no final judgment because the order adjudicated the rights and liabilities
of fewer than all the parties to the action.  Id. at 651-53, 530 A.2d at 1243-44.  In the second
appeal, we addressed the denial of a motion to dismiss a party and held that it was not a final
judgment because it was not an order that settled the matter in controversy or completely
adjudicated the rights and liabilities of the parties.  Because it maintained the status quo and
did not display the characteristics of finality, it was not certifiable under Rule 2-602(b).  Id.
at 653-55, 530 A.2d at 1244-45.
Recently, in Addison v. Lochearn, 411 Md. 251, 983 A.2d 138 (2009), we had
occasion to discuss the limited application of Rule 2-602(b) and discussed the limited ability
of a court to certify a final judgment when claims are related and only one claim had been
dismissed:
In fact, in the present case, the trial judge may not have been
able to certify the denial of the motion to compel arbitration as
a final judgment, because the counterclaim involved the same
set of facts as the complaint and thereby constituted a single
claim within the meaning of Rule 2-602(a) (previously Rule
605).  See County Comm’rs for St. Mary’s County v. Lacer, 393
13
Rule 2-506 provides in pertinent part:
(continued...)
19
Md. 415, 426, 903 A.2d 378, 384 (2006) (“[T]he trial court
would not be authorized to finalize an order unless, by its nature,
that order was final as to a single claim or party.”), quoting
Medical Mutual v. Evander, 331 Md. 301, 308-09, 628 A.2d
170, 173-74 (1993) (“This Court has repeatedly held that an
order which disposes of only a part of a single claim cannot be
made final under Rule 2-602 or its predecessor rule”) (internal
citations and quotations omitted); see also East v. Gilchrist, 293
Md. 453, 459-60, 445 A.2d 343, 346 (1982) (holding that only
a single claim for relief was presented when the counterclaim
involved the same facts as the plaintiff’s claim, because
“[d]ifferent legal theories for the same recovery, based on the
same facts or transaction, do not create separate ‘claims’ for
purposes of [Rule 605]”); Biro v. Schombert, 285 Md. 290, 295,
402 A.2d 71, 74 (1979) (alternate legal theories “based upon one
matter or transaction” do not give rise to separate claims);
Diener Enterprises, Inc. v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 556, 295 A.2d
470, 473 (1972) (“[T]he ‘claims’ stated by using two counts is
actually but one claim that was framed in two ways so as to
present either one of two legal theories for one recovery.”).
Id. at 273 n.14, 983 A.2d at 151 n.14.  In the case sub judice, the Circuit Court’s dismissal
of Count II of the Complaint did not constitute a final, appealable judgment, because Counts
I, III, and IV of the Complaint, and the Counterclaim remained.  We  know from Smith and
Addison, supra, that the trial court could not have certified its partial dismissal as a final
judgment, because the remaining counts and the counterclaim involved the same set of facts,
within the meaning of Rule 2-602(a).
The parties, nevertheless, then attempted to circumvent the final judgment rule and
attempted to utilize Rules 2-50613 and 2-60114 to file a Stipulation of Dismissal, which
13(...continued)
(a) By notice of dismissal or stipulation. Except as otherwise
provided in these rules or by statute, a party who has filed a
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim may
dismiss all or part of the claim without leave of court by filing
(1) a notice of dismissal at any time before the adverse party
files an answer or (2) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed
by all parties to the claim being dismissed.
(b) By order of court.  Except as provided in section (a) of this
Rule, a party who has filed a complaint, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim may dismiss the claim only by
order of court and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper. If a counterclaim has been filed before the filing
of a plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal, the action shall
not be dismissed over the objection of the party who filed the
counterclaim unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court.  
(c) Effect. Unless otherwise specified in the notice of dismissal,
stipulation, or order of court, a dismissal is without prejudice,
except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a party who has previously
dismissed in any court of any state or in any court of the United
States an action based on or including the same claim.  
The practice and procedure with respect to voluntary dismissal in equity as it existed
prior to the adoption of Rule 2-506, was expressed in Camden Sewer Co. v. Mayor and
Council of Salisbury, 157 Md. 175, 184, 145 A. 497, 500 (1929):
It appears, therefore, to be well settled that when equity
proceedings have progressed to such a point as to entitle the
defendant to affirmative relief, or where, as stated by Chancellor
Bland, [Hall v. McPherson], he becomes virtually clothed with
the rights of an actor, the right of the complainant to dismiss as
a matter of course ceases.  We are of the opinion that ordinarily
and as a general rule the complainant is master of his own
litigation and has the right to dismiss his proceedings at any time
up to a final determination of the case, by following the
(continued...)
20
13(...continued)
approved practice of making application to the court for leave
so to do; but that when at any point of the proceedings the
defendants become entitled to affirmative relief which it is
proper for them to enforce in the proceedings then pending, the
complainant no longer, as of course, has the right to dismiss . .
. .”
Rule 2-506 is a codification of this long standing practice.  See Byron Lasky & Assoc. v.
Cameron-Brown, 33 Md. App. 231, 235, 364 A.2d 109, 112 (1976) (interpreting former Rule
582, which was incorporated into Rule 2-506).
14
Rule 2-601 requires a judgment to be memorialized in writing, but neither the
word “judgment” nor the judge’s signature are required for relief.  Tierco Maryland, Inc. v.
Williams, 381 Md. 378, 393-94, 849 A.2d 504, 513-14 (2004).
Rule 2-601 regarding entry of judgment provides:
(a) Prompt entry – Separate document. Each judgment shall
be set forth on a separate document. Upon a verdict of a jury or
a decision by the court allowing recovery only of costs or a
specified amount of money or denying all relief, the clerk shall
forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment, unless the court
orders otherwise. Upon a verdict of a jury or a decision by the
court granting other relief, the court shall promptly review the
form of the judgment presented and, if approved, sign it, and the
clerk shall forthwith enter the judgment as approved and signed.
A judgment is effective only when so set forth and when entered
as provided in section (b) of this Rule. Unless the court orders
otherwise, entry of the judgment shall not be delayed pending
determination of the amount of costs.
(b) Method of entry – Date of judgment. The clerk shall enter
a judgment by making a record of it in writing on the file jacket,
or on a docket within the file, or in a docket book, according to
the practice of each court, and shall record the actual date of the
entry. That date shall be the date of the judgment.
(c) Recording and indexing. Promptly after entry, the clerk
shall (1) record and index the judgment, except a judgment
(continued...)
21
14(...continued)
denying all relief without costs, in the judgment records of the
court and (2) note on the docket the date the clerk sent copies of
the judgment in accordance with Rule 1-324.
22
dismissed Counts I and III of the Complaint “with prejudice,” and attempted to also dismiss
Count IV and the Counterclaim “with prejudice,” with the caveat that the dismissal of these
claims were “without prejudice to the extent that the Court’s earlier interlocutory Opinion
and Order dismissing Count II, is vacated or reversed on appeal and remanded to this Court.”
Casey argues before us that the stipulated dismissal of Count IV and the Counterclaim
following the Circuit Court’s dismissal of Count II, really constitutes a dismissal with
prejudice of all claims and constitutes a final judgment.  Casey contends “there can be no
concern whatsoever about piecemeal litigation, inconsistent rulings, advisory opinions or
judicial economy,” because, Casey argues, Count IV cannot be revived unless the dismissal
of Count II is vacated and the case remanded to the Circuit Court.  Rather than circumventing
or flouting the final judgment rule, Casey contends the stipulation avoided the “wasteful
process” of proceeding to discovery and trial on Counts I and III solely to “preserve its claim
against the guarantor” in Count IV.  Conversely, Miller and Smith before us argues there was
no final judgment in the Circuit Court because the stipulation of dismissal was “without
prejudice,” as to Count IV and the Counterclaim, even though it contends we should reach
the merits of this case.
To paraphrase writer Gertrude Stein, “without prejudice is without prejudice is
15
See Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 515, 629 A.2d 70, 80 (1993), quoting
Gertrude Stein, Sacred Emily (1913) (A “[r]ose is a rose is a rose is a rose”).
23
without prejudice.”15  Despite Casey’s vehemence that the parties’ Stipulation of Dismissal
was “with prejudice” and created a final judgment, we disagree.  The “without prejudice”
exception of the Stipulation, no matter how narrow, still created an exception that attempted
to confer appellate jurisdiction—an action that could not have been the subject of a
certification order.  The parties could not agree to confer appellate jurisdiction after the
dismissal of Count II of the complaint when they created a dismissal without prejudice of
Count IV and the Counterclaim, and when both were inexorably intertwined with Count II.
In so holding, our disagreement is with the Court of Special Appeals and with its
emphasis on the parties’ intent to determine whether a final judgment existed.  In reaching
the merits, the Court of Special Appeals stated that it did “not perceive the parties’
Stipulation of Dismissal to flout the final judgment rule, despite its caveat that appellee’s
counterclaim and ‘Count IV’ of appellant’s complaint were dismissed without prejudice to
the extent that we vacate or reverse,” claiming that the admonition against circumventing the
final judgment rule would require an intent analysis, relying on Collins v. Li, 158 Md. App.
252, 273-74, 857 A.2d 135, 148 (2004).
In Collins, 158 Md. App. at 252, 857 A.2d at 135, the case arose out of several claims
and counterclaims between three plaintiffs and twelve defendants.  The original plaintiffs
included two sets of parents, individually and as Personal Representatives, to their respective
24
two children who died in a residential fire at a home rented by Michael Chapman and
Carolyn Hill (“the Chapman-Hills”).  There were ten defendants in the original complaint,
one of which included Dr. Gui-Fu Li and Chung Ling Li (“the Lis”), as owners of the home.
A later complaint was filed by the Chapman-Hills, individually and as Legal Guardians of
their three children, one of whom was severely injured in the fire, against the original
defendants and two others.  Amidst a flurry of motions and counterclaims, the court
consented to the dismissal, without prejudice, of all claims between the Chapman-Hills and
Lis, and also granted several motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment,
in favor of two defendants, The Ryland Group, Inc., and Summit Electric Company.  The
court, thereafter, denied the Chapman-Hill’s motion to certify the orders of dismissal as a
final judgment under Rule 2-602(b)(1), and the Chapman-Hill’s appealed.  Ryland cross-
appealed raising the question of whether the Circuit Court erred in consenting to the
dismissal without prejudice in order to obtain a final judgment.
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals noted the plaintiffs’ clear intent to revive
their previously dismissed claims against the voluntarily dismissed defendants after the ruling
on appeal, and stated that “[t]he final judgment rule cannot be circumvented by voluntary
dismissal pursuant to Rule 2-506.”    Collins, 158 Md. App. at 273-74, 857 A.2d at 148.  The
Court reasoned that the “voluntary dismissal exception” would quickly subsume the rule, if
it were to provide a mechanism for securing appellate review of any trial court order, and the
appellate courts “would be left without any meaningful way to regulate interlocutory
16
Casey cites to Crowder v. Master Financial, Inc., 176 Md. App. 631, 933 A.2d
905 (2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 409 Md. 51, 972 A.2d 864 (2009),
in which the Court of Special Appeals distinguished Collins, and held that when the parties
used voluntary dismissal without prejudice, but made clear at oral argument they had no
intention of refiling claims, it became clear that the voluntary dismissal was not illusory or
used as a vehicle to obtain an advisory opinion, and was a final, appealable judgment.  Id. at
(continued...)
25
appeals.”  Id. at 273, 857 A.2d at 147 (citations and quotations omitted).  The Court
concluded that the plaintiffs’ actions in dismissing the remaining defendants without
prejudice gave them the option to resurrect their dismissed claims and was held to be an
impermissible attempt to circumvent the final judgment rule.
Circumvent has several definitions including, “to go around: make a full circuit
around or bypass without going through” and “to overcome or avoid the intent, effect, or
force of: anticipate and escape, check, or defeat by ingenuity or stratagem.”  Webster’s Third
Int’l Dictionary Unabridged 410 (2002).  The Court of Special Appeals in the present case
misconstrued the use of the word “circumvent” in Collins to permit a without prejudice
stipulation to constitute a final judgment because the parties did not intend to flout the final
judgment rule, thereby inferring that the word circumvent requires bad intent.
A party or a court cannot intentionally or unintentionally determine that a conditional
stipulation or order, respectively, is a final judgment for purposes of conferring appellate
jurisdiction.  By engaging in an intent analysis, the Court of Special Appeals attempted to
give more power to the parties to determine finality than we have given to the judiciary, a
result which would be anomalous. 16  As Judge Irma S. Raker stated in Brewster, 360 Md. at
16(...continued)
644-45, 933 A.2d at 913.  Crowder does not support an intent analysis, however, because the
plaintiff-appellants’ voluntary dismissal “without prejudice,” was in reality, “with prejudice,”
for there was no condition upon which the plaintiff-appellants could refile the same claims
against the voluntarily dismissed defendants.
26
623, 759 A.2d at 749, “[T]here exists one principle of appealability to which this Court has
continuously adhered, one that is simple and understandable.  An order which terminates the
proceeding in a particular court is final and appealable.”  Here, neither the Circuit Court
judge’s dismissal of Count II, nor the parties’ Stipulation of Dismissal of Count IV and the
Counterclaim without prejudice, created a final, appealable judgment.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED, AND
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
DISMISS THE APPEAL.  COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID
BY PETITIONER.