Case Title: Erb v. Erb

Citation: 2001-Ohio-104

Docket Number: 20001047

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Erb v. Erb, 91 Ohio St.3d 503, 2001-Ohio-104.] 
 
 
ERB, APPELLANT, v. ERB; OHIO POLICE & FIRE PENSION FUND, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Erb v. Erb (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 503.] 
Domestic relations — Divorce and alimony — Ohio Police and Fire Pension 
Fund ordered by court to pay directly to member’s former spouse that 
portion of member’s monthly benefit that represents former spouse’s 
property pursuant to division of marital assets — Order does not violate 
terms of the administration of the fund. 
(No. 00-1047 — Submitted February 7, 2001 — Decided May 30, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 75072. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
A domestic relations order requiring the Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund to pay 
directly to a member’s former spouse that portion of the member’s 
monthly benefit that represents the former spouse’s property pursuant to a 
division of marital assets does not violate the terms of the administration 
of the fund. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J.  In 1990, after approximately twenty years of marriage, John 
R. Erb and appellant, Donna V. Erb, were divorced.  The original divorce decree, 
issued by the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, awarded John his 
entire pension with appellee, the Police and Firemen’s Disability & Pension Fund 
of Ohio (“the fund,” now known as the Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund), the 
majority of which had been accrued during the marriage. 
 
Upon appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals remanded the matter to 
the trial court to take evidence as to the present value of John’s pension and to 
determine, in light of that value, whether the terms of the divorce decree were 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
equitable.  On remand, the trial court determined that the pension made up such a 
significant portion of the marital assets that awarding the entire pension to John 
resulted in Donna receiving less than twelve percent of the marital assets.  
Consequently, the trial court determined that the divorce decree was unfair and 
modified the decree to award Donna a separate ownership interest in 
approximately forty-two percent of the present value of the portion of John’s 
pension earned during the marriage. 
 
In addition, because John intended to delay his retirement for several years 
despite being fully vested in the fund, an action that would decrease Donna’s 
interest in the fund, the trial court ordered “an outright division” of John and 
Donna’s interests in the fund.  Accordingly, the court granted Donna a “separate 
and divisible ownership interest” in the fund, thereby giving Donna access to her 
portion of the fund immediately without having to wait for John to retire.  
Additionally, the trial court made the fund a party to the lawsuit so that its order 
could be enforced. 
 
John and the fund appealed the trial court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals 
for Cuyahoga County.  The court of appeals’ decision upholding the judgment of 
the trial court was subsequently appealed to this court.  In Erb v. Erb (1996), 75 
Ohio St.3d 18, 661 N.E.2d 175, we explicitly confirmed that Donna has a 
property interest in the fund but held that permitting Donna access to her interest 
prior to John’s retirement violated the terms of the fund as set forth in R.C. 
Chapter 742.  We, therefore, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, 
vacated the order of the trial court, and remanded the cause to the trial court to 
take measures to protect Donna’s interest in the fund.  Id. at 22-23, 661 N.E.2d at 
179. 
 
Upon remand, a subpoena of the fund’s records revealed that John had 
retired in January 1996, and that as of January 1, 1998, John had received a total 
of $61,969.49 in monthly benefits from the fund.  Despite having been awarded a 
January Term, 2001 
3 
property interest in the fund, Donna had apparently not received any portion of 
the pension benefits disbursed to John as of that date. 
 
Prior to trial on remand from this court, John and Donna reached a written 
agreement wherein Donna was entitled to receive $1,000 out of each of John’s 
future monthly payments from the fund.  The agreement further provided that 
Donna would receive her monthly $1,000 payment directly from the fund itself.  
The trial court incorporated the terms of John and Donna’s agreement into its 
entry and issued a domestic relations order to carry its judgment into effect. 
 
The fund appealed the trial court’s order to the extent that the order 
required the fund to pay a portion of John’s monthly benefits directly to Donna.  
The fund alleged that enforcement of such an order would result in a violation of 
R.C. 742.47, an antialienation provision of the fund.  The court of appeals agreed 
and reversed the judgment of the trial court, thereby vacating the corresponding 
domestic relations order. 
 
This matter is now before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary 
appeal. 
 
The question before this court is whether the terms of the administration of 
the fund preclude it from complying with a domestic relations order requiring it to 
pay directly to a member’s former spouse that portion of the member’s monthly 
benefit that represents the former spouse’s property pursuant to an R.C. 3105.1711 
                                                          
 
1. 
R.C. 3105.171(A) provides: 
 
“(3)(a) ‘Marital property’ means * * * all of the following: 
 
“(i) All real and personal property that currently is owned by either or both of the 
spouses, including, but not limited to, the retirement benefits of the spouses, and that was acquired 
by either or both of the spouses during the marriage; 
 
“(ii) All interest that either or both of the spouses currently has in any real or personal 
property, including, but not limited to, the retirement benefits of the spouses, and that was 
acquired by either or both of the spouses during the marriage; 
 
“* * * 
 
“(B) In divorce proceedings, the court shall * * * determine what constitutes marital 
property and what constitutes separate property.  * * * [U]pon making such a determination, the 
court shall divide the marital and separate property equitably between the spouses, in accordance 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
division of marital assets.  We answer this question in the negative and, 
accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial 
court’s July 20, 1998 domestic relations order. 
 
There is no question that Donna has a property interest in the fund 
pursuant to a court-ordered division of marital property.  Erb, 75 Ohio St.3d at 22, 
661 N.E.2d at 179.  Although the court of appeals recognized that Donna has an 
interest in the fund, it held that the terms of the fund, as set forth in R.C. Chapter 
742, prohibit the fund from paying directly to Donna her share of John’s monthly 
benefit. 
R.C. 742.47 
 
The specific provision that the court of appeals found dispositive in this 
case is R.C. 742.47.  R.C. 742.47 is an antialienation provision and provides: 
 
“Except as provided in sections 742.461 [order to enforce restitution to 
employer for theft], 3111.23 [order for child support], and 3113.21 [orders for 
child and spousal support] of the Revised Code, sums of money due or to become 
due to any person from the Ohio police and fire pension fund are not liable to 
attachment, garnishment, levy, or seizure under any legal or equitable process, 
whether such sums remain with the treasurer of the fund or any officer or agent of 
the board of trustees of the fund, or is in the course of transmission to the person 
entitled thereto, but shall inure wholly to the benefit of such person.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
The court of appeals found that “the express language of R.C. 742.47 * * * 
clearly makes benefits under the pension fund available only to members of the 
[fund].”  Applying this interpretation, the court held that the trial court’s order 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
with this section.  For purposes of this section, the court has jurisdiction over all property in which 
one or both spouses have an interest.” 
January Term, 2001 
5 
violated R.C. 742.47, because it required the fund to make payments directly to 
Donna, who is not a “member of the fund” as defined in R.C. 742.01(E).2 
 
Donna contends that the court of appeals erred in construing the word 
“person” used in R.C. 742.47 to mean “member of the fund.”  We agree. 
 
Contrary to the court of appeals’ holding, the express language in R.C. 
742.47 does not make pension benefits available only to members of the fund.  In 
fact, R.C. 742.47 expressly authorizes the payment of “sums of money due or to 
become due to any person from the [fund],” where such payment is provided for 
in certain enumerated statutes.  (Emphasis added.)  In interpreting R.C. 742.47, 
the court of appeals, in effect, deleted the term “person” and inserted the phrase 
“member of the fund.”  Courts have a duty to give effect to the words used in a 
statute and not to delete words used or to insert words not used.  Cleveland Elec. 
Illum. Co. v. Cleveland (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 524 N.E.2d 441, paragraph 
three of the syllabus.  Thus, the court’s analysis of the statute violated the rules of 
statutory construction. 
 
Moreover, the court of appeals’ conclusion that R.C. 742.47 permits the 
fund to pay benefits only to members of the fund is untenable because it conflicts 
with other provisions of R.C. Chapter 742 that explicitly require the fund to pay 
benefits to persons who are not members.  For instance, R.C. 742.37(D), (E), and 
(F) require the fund to make payments directly to a member’s surviving spouse, 
children, or parents.  In fact, the fund acknowledges in its brief before this court 
that it is required to make payments directly to persons who are not members of 
the fund.  In this regard, the fund seems to concede that the court of appeals’ 
ruling resulted from the court’s misinterpretation of R.C. 742.47. 
                                                          
 
2. 
R.C. 742.01(E) provides: 
 
“ ‘Member of the fund’ means any person * * * who is contributing a percentage of the 
person’s annual salary to the [fund] or who is receiving a disability benefit or pension from the 
fund as a result of service in a police or fire department.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the fund adheres to its assertion that R.C. 
742.47 prohibits direct payments to Donna.  The fund contends that the General 
Assembly intended R.C. 742.47 to protect the fund from domestic relations orders 
that require direct payments to those in Donna’s situation, i.e., a member’s former 
spouse who has been awarded a property interest in the fund pursuant to a 
division of marital property.  We disagree. 
 
The purpose of R.C. 742.47 is to protect fund benefits from the creditors 
of persons to whom benefits are due.  However, a member’s former spouse who 
has been awarded a property interest in the member’s pension pursuant to an R.C. 
3105.171 division of marital property is not a creditor of the member with regard 
to the pension.  Rather, by virtue of the court order, the member’s former spouse 
has an outright property interest in the pension itself.  For the reasons set forth 
above, we hold that R.C. 742.47 does not prohibit the fund from paying benefits 
directly to Donna. 
 
We acknowledge that in addition to the Eighth Appellate District, several 
other courts of appeals have interpreted R.C. 742.47 as prohibiting the fund from 
honoring a domestic relations order requiring direct payments to a former spouse.  
See, e.g., Davis v. Davis (1998), 131 Ohio App.3d 686, 723 N.E.2d 599; Volz v. 
Volz (Aug. 20, 1999), Richland App. No. 98-CA-85, unreported, 1999 WL 
770728; Ciavarella v. Ciavarella (Oct. 20, 1999), Columbiana App. No. 98CO53, 
unreported, 1999 WL 979238; Ricketts v. Ricketts (1996), 109 Ohio App.3d 746, 
673 N.E.2d 156.  However, the rationales used to support those decisions are 
comparable to the arguments raised by the fund in this case and, therefore, we 
find those decisions not to be well reasoned. 
R.C. Chapter 742 
 
The fund argues that even if the terms of the fund, as set forth in R.C. 
Chapter 742, do not expressly prohibit direct payments to Donna, the relevant 
statutes do not authorize such payments and “[a]s a creature of statute, [the fund] 
January Term, 2001 
7 
has no authority beyond that which is expressly or impliedly conferred by 
statute.”  Dreger v. Pub. Emp. Retirement Sys. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 17, 20-21, 
516 N.E.2d 214, 217.  In essence, the fund suggests that unless Donna can point 
to a specific provision in R.C. Chapter 742 authorizing the fund to make 
payments directly to someone in her situation, it has no authority to do so.  We 
find this argument unpersuasive because it would render R.C. 742.47 
meaningless.  That is, if only those expressly listed in R.C. Chapter 742 could 
receive direct payments from the fund, then there would be no reason for the 
General Assembly to enact R.C. 742.47 to prevent creditors from receiving 
payments directly from the fund through attachment, garnishment, levy, or 
seizure. 
 
Furthermore, we find implied statutory authority for the fund to pay 
benefits directly to those in Donna’s situation.  Specifically, R.C. 3105.171 directs 
courts to divide marital property, including pension benefits, equitably between 
the spouses, and R.C. Chapter 742 does not prohibit direct payments to satisfy a 
former spouse’s property interest in the fund. 
Health Insurance Benefits 
 
The fund also claims that if it must comply with domestic relations orders 
to pay former spouses directly then it will be forced to treat those former spouses 
as “members of the fund.”  As members, the former spouses would be entitled to 
health insurance benefits, a costly requirement that the fund argues would be 
financially overwhelming.  We find this argument not well taken because it is 
based on the faulty premise that the fund will be required to treat former spouses 
as members of the fund simply because they are required to pay the former 
spouses directly.  As noted previously, the fund currently pays benefits to persons 
who are not members of the fund. 
Sub H.B. No. 535 (“H.B. 535”) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
Since this appeal was allowed, the 123rd General Assembly passed H.B. 
535.  H.B. 535 amends R.C. Chapters 742 and 3105 to specifically authorize 
payments to persons (such as Donna in this case) with a property interest in the 
fund pursuant to an R.C. 3105.171 division of marital assets.  H.B. 535 defines 
such persons as “alternate payees.”  R.C. 3105.80.  In addition, H.B. 535 amends 
R.C. 742.47 to include 3105.171 as an exception to the antialienation provision.  
The provisions of H.B. 535 expressly permitting the fund to make payments 
directly to alternate payees are not effective until January 1, 2002.  However, 
orders issued prior to that date may, after January 1, 2002, be modified to permit 
direct payments to alternate payees.  R.C. 3105.89(B). 
 
The fund urges this court to hold that the passage of H.B. 535 renders this 
case moot or, in the alternative, to find that by altering the statutory scheme to 
explicitly authorize the fund to pay benefits directly to those in Donna’s situation 
starting in 2002, H.B. 535 supports the fund’s position that the current scheme 
forbids such payments.  We will address the fund’s assertions separately. 
 
The specific question before us is whether, pursuant to the law as it exists 
today, the fund must comply with the trial court’s July 20, 1998 domestic 
relations order.  The fact that a new law will provide relief for Donna in the future 
does not answer the question whether Donna is now entitled to payments directly 
from the fund pursuant to the July 20, 1998 domestic relations order issued by the 
trial court. 
 
In addition, H.B. 535 provides that an alternate payee’s share of monthly 
benefits will be subordinate to deductions made for child support and/or spousal 
support obligations of the member.  R.C. 742.462(F) and (G).  Donna argues, and 
we agree, that because these provisions were not anticipated when the trial court 
issued its order, they could result in a reduction of Donna’s property interest in 
the fund.  Accordingly, for these reasons we do not agree that H.B. 535 renders 
this case moot. 
January Term, 2001 
9 
 
The fund’s second argument related to H.B. 535 is that by enacting new 
provisions that will explicitly provide the fund with the authority to make the type 
of payments sought by Donna in this case, the General Assembly acknowledged 
that the fund is not now authorized to make such payments.  However, we believe 
that the more reasoned conclusion is that when it enacted H.B. 535, the General 
Assembly was aware that numerous courts of appeals had interpreted R.C. 
Chapter 742 as prohibiting the fund from making payments directly to a former 
spouse with a property interest in the fund.  Thus, H.B. 535 reflects the General 
Assembly’s dissatisfaction with the courts’ incorrect interpretation of R.C. 
Chapter 742 and is simply a clarification of the law as it exists today. 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”) 
 
The trial court’s July 20, 1998 entry included the following language: 
 
“The [domestic relations order] attached to this judgment entry is, and 
shall be treated by the parties as, a ‘qualified’ domestic relations order for 
purposes of Section 414(p) of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby causing 
[Donna] to be considered the recipient and distributee of any payments she 
receives directly [from] the Fund.” 
 
The fund contends that the qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) 
Donna seeks to have enforced against the fund is based on a mechanism created 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Section 
1001 et seq., Title 29, U.S.Code.  Because an ERISA QDRO may be used only in 
relation to private pensions, the fund argues that the QDRO may not be enforced 
against the fund, a government pension.  See Sections 1003(b)(1) and 1002(32), 
Title 29, U.S.Code. 
 
There is no support for the fund’s contention that the QDRO at issue is an 
ERISA QDRO.  The trial court’s order clearly provides that it is to be treated as a 
QDRO for purposes of Section 414(p) of the Internal Revenue Code, i.e., Title 26, 
U.S.Code.  In tailoring its order as a QDRO, the trial court’s goal was to satisfy 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
federal income tax requirements to protect John from incurring the tax burden for 
that portion of the fund that is actually being paid to Donna.  See Section 
402(e)(1)(A), Title 26, U.S.Code.  Thus, we find no merit to the fund’s assertion 
that the trial court’s order was an ERISA QDRO. 
Actuarial Soundness of July 20, 1998 Domestic Relations Order 
 
The fund’s arguments addressed above relate to the fund’s contention that 
it is prohibited from complying with domestic relations orders in general.  In 
addition to these arguments, the fund challenges the validity of the specific 
domestic relations order issued in this case on the grounds that it is actuarially 
unsound.  In this regard, the fund argues that it made certain actuarial assumptions 
in determining John’s monthly benefit and that the order issued by the trial court 
could result in the fund being required to pay out more than could have been 
anticipated.  We find this argument to be without merit because it is based on the 
fund’s flawed interpretation of the trial court’s order. 
 
The fund calculated John’s monthly benefit based on his election to 
receive a single life annuity.  Pursuant to such an election, the monthly benefit 
payments are to cease upon John’s death.  The fund interprets the trial court’s 
order as requiring it to pay Donna $1,000 for the remainder of her life regardless 
of whether John predeceases her.  We agree that if the trial court’s order required 
the fund to continue paying a portion of the monthly payments to Donna even 
after John’s death, then the order could result in the fund paying out more than 
was actuarially anticipated.  A careful reading of the trial court’s July 20, 1998 
entry and domestic relations order, however, reveals that the domestic relations 
order does not require that the fund continue paying Donna after John’s death. 
 
Specifically, paragraph 3 of the July 20, 1998 entry provides Donna with 
the right to purchase insurance on John’s life “intended to pay to [Donna] a 
benefit sufficient to offset her loss of her monthly payments for her life in the 
event [John] predeceases [her].”  This provision clearly contemplates that Donna 
January Term, 2001 
11 
will not continue to receive $1,000 per month from the fund if John predeceases 
her. 
 
In addition, Section 7 of the domestic relations order provides: “The 
Firemen’s Pension Fund will pay directly to [Donna] * * * her ownership interest 
in the Firemen’s Pension Fund, as recognized and ordered hereby.  [Donna] shall 
receive $1,000.00 per month for the balance of her life from [John’s] gross 
monthly benefit.  [John] shall receive the balance of his gross monthly benefit.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Bearing in mind that John will not receive a monthly benefit 
after his death, this provision can only be interpreted to mean that the payments to 
Donna will cease upon John’s death. 
 
Although some would argue that the language used in the order could have 
been clearer, when read in conjunction with the entry, there can be no question 
that the order does not require the fund to continue paying Donna after John’s 
death.  Consequently, there is no set of circumstances under which the trial 
court’s order will require the fund to pay greater benefits than it otherwise would.  
In practical terms, the domestic relations order merely requires the fund to issue 
two checks each month instead of one, one to Donna for $1,000 and one to John 
for the remainder of his monthly benefit, until either John or Donna dies.  For the 
above reasons, the fund’s argument that the trial court’s order is actuarially 
unsound is not well taken. 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a domestic relations order 
requiring the fund to pay directly to a member’s former spouse that portion of the 
member’s monthly benefit that represents the former spouse’s property pursuant 
to a division of marital assets does not violate the terms of the administration of 
the fund.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and 
reinstate the July 20, 1998 order of the trial court. 
Judgment reversed. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY and COOK, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent because the judgment of the 
majority requiring payment from the Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund 
(“OPFPF”) to a fund member’s ex-spouse contravenes R.C. 742.47. 
 
Pension benefits accumulated during marriage are marital assets subject to 
division in a divorce proceeding.  Holcomb v. Holcomb (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 
128, 132, 541 N.E.2d 597, 600.  Five years ago, we expressly recognized that Ms. 
Erb retained a marital property interest in the pension benefits accumulated by 
Mr. Erb during the parties’ marriage. Erb v. Erb (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 18, 22, 661 
N.E.2d 175, 179.  But while pension benefits are subject to division upon divorce, 
the trial court’s method of division is less certain.  While the trial court must make 
an equitable division of all marital property, it may not divide a pension in a 
manner that violates the terms of the pension plan.  Id. at 20, 661 N.E.2d at 178.  
Indeed, in Erb, we vacated a trial court’s order providing for outright distribution 
of pension funds to Ms. Erb prior to Mr. Erb’s retirement because such payment 
was not authorized under the terms of the OPFPF.  Id. at 21-22, 661 N.E.2d at 
178-179. 
 
Following our reversal and remand in Erb, the trial court tried another 
method of equitably dividing Mr. Erb’s pension.  In accordance with the parties’ 
agreement, the court entered an order designed to operate in the same manner as a 
qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”), which is commonly used in 
dividing benefits from private pensions.  Just as it would in a QDRO, the trial 
court designated Ms. Erb as an alternate payee entitled to receive part of Mr. 
Erb’s pension benefits directly from the OPFPF.  See Hoyt v. Hoyt (1990), 53 
Ohio St.3d 177, 179-180, 559 N.E.2d 1292, 1295. The order appears to have been 
designed to accomplish two objectives: (1) allow Ms. Erb to receive $1,000 per 
January Term, 2001 
13 
month directly from the OPFPF, and (2) designate Ms. Erb as the distributee of 
the fund payments for tax purposes.  See Sections 402(e)(1)(A) and 414(p), Title 
26, U.S.Code.  In essence, the trial court’s order obligates OPFPF to pay directly 
to Ms. Erb a portion of the funds that it would have otherwise paid to Mr. Erb 
under the terms of his pension. 
 
The majority concludes that the trial court’s method of dividing marital-
property OPFPF benefits was valid.  Yet the order actually violates R.C. 742.47, 
which provides: 
 
“Except as provided in sections 742.461, 3111.23, and 3113.21 of the 
Revised Code, sums of money due or to become due to any person from the Ohio 
police and fire pension fund are not liable to attachment, garnishment, levy, or 
seizure under any legal or equitable process, whether such sums remain with the 
treasurer of the fund or any officer or agent of the board of trustees of the fund, or 
is in the course of transmission to the person entitled thereto, but shall inure 
wholly to the benefit of such person.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
R.C. 742.47 forecloses the trial court from transferring OPFPF benefits 
directly to Ms. Erb before Mr. Erb ever receives them.  The trial court’s order, 
however, does just that.  It effectively operates as an attachment or seizure of 
money due Mr. Erb, precluding funds from inuring wholly to his benefit.  The 
court’s method of dividing Mr. Erb’s pension directly conflicts with R.C. 742.47 
and is therefore invalid.  See Davis v. Davis (1998), 131 Ohio App.3d 686, 693, 
723 N.E.2d 599, 604-605. 
 
The majority upholds the trial court’s order, however, with a dubious 
reading of R.C. 742.47.  Emphasizing the statute’s use of the phrase “any person,” 
the majority concludes that R.C. 742.47 “expressly authorizes” payment from the 
OPFPF to any person and not simply OPFPF members.  But R.C. 742.47 does not 
authorize payment to anyone.  The statute is merely an antialienation provision 
that prevents seizure by legal or equitable process of funds that a person is due to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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receive under the terms of the OPFPF.  Money due from the fund is exempted 
from attachment, garnishment, or seizure under any legal process except orders 
under R.C. 742.461 (restitution for theft offense), 3111.23 (child support 
withholding), or 3113.21 (spousal support withholding).  Significantly, however, 
the statute contains no such exemption for orders relating to a property division in 
a divorce action. 
 
The majority bolsters its faulty reading of R.C. 742.47 by noting that the 
statute’s purpose “is to protect fund benefits from the creditors of persons to 
whom benefits are due.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Because Ms. Erb is not a “creditor” of a 
fund member but, rather, someone with “an outright property interest in the 
pension itself,” the majority reasons that R.C. 742.47 does not prohibit the OPFPF 
from paying Ms. Erb directly.  But Ms. Erb’s status as an owner of a marital 
property interest in pension funds, as opposed to being a creditor of a fund 
member, does not render R.C. 742.47 inapplicable.  The statute’s language is not 
limited to attachments or garnishments arising from a creditor/debtor relationship.  
Ciavarella v. Ciavarella (Oct. 20, 1999), Columbiana App. No. 98CO53, 
unreported, 1999 WL 979238.  To the contrary, the statute applies to “attachment, 
garnishment, levy, or seizure under any legal or equitable process.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  This broad language includes domestic relations orders issued under R.C. 
3105.171 that purport to operate as QDROs.  See Ricketts v. Ricketts (1996), 109 
Ohio App.3d 746, 752, 673 N.E.2d 156, 160.  The trial court in this case attached 
pension funds that OPFPF was obliged to pay to Mr. Erb under R.C. 742.37(C), 
thereby ordering a transfer of benefits that R.C. 742.47 directly forbids.  See 
Davis, 131 Ohio App.3d at 693, 723 N.E.2d at 604. 
 
The majority exacerbates the misreading of R.C. 742.47 by reaching its 
ultimate conclusion that Ms. Erb is entitled to direct payment from the OPFPF 
under the statutory scheme.  “As a creature of statute, the [OPFPF] has no 
authority beyond that which is expressly or impliedly conferred by statute.”  
January Term, 2001 
15 
Dreger v. Pub. Emp. Retirement Sys. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 17, 20-21, 516 N.E.2d 
214, 217.  The majority finds “implied statutory authority” because “R.C. 
3105.171 directs courts to divide marital property, including pension benefits, 
equitably between the spouses, and R.C. Chapter 742 does not prohibit direct 
payments to satisfy a former spouse’s property interest in the fund.”  But the 
majority’s finding of “implied statutory authority” contradicts our admonition that 
the trial court cannot violate terms of the pension plan when dividing a pension.  
Erb, 75 Ohio St.3d at 20, 661 N.E.2d at 178; Hoyt, 53 Ohio St.3d at 181, 559 
N.E.2d at 1297.  Thus, the trial court’s authority to equitably divide OPFPF 
benefits in a divorce is necessarily limited by R.C. 742.47, the antialienation 
provision of the pension plan.  That statute, by its very terms, prohibits the direct 
payment Ms. Erb seeks from the fund. 
 
The majority’s interpretation of R.C. Chapter 742, and R.C. 742.47 in 
particular, is further undermined by the General Assembly’s apparent recognition 
of the difficulty trial courts faced when dividing OPFPF pension funds in a 
divorce.  To help alleviate the problem, the General Assembly enacted Sub.H.B. 
No. 535, which was signed by the Governor on December 14, 2000.  Effective 
January 1, 2002, H.B. 535 amends R.C. 742.47 to exempt orders issued under 
R.C. 3105.171 from the antialienation provision.  Because of this amendment to 
R.C. 742.47, an order seeking to accomplish what the trial court sought to do in 
this case will likely be valid after H.B. 535’s effective date (so long as the order 
meets other statutory requirements).  Thus, the General Assembly appears to have 
intended H.B. 535 to enact a substantive change to the OPFPF and afford persons 
in Ms. Erb’s position the opportunity to receive payment from the fund under a 
court-ordered division of marital property. 
 
The majority discounts the significance of H.B. 535 by concluding that the 
General Assembly’s effort “is simply a clarification of the law as it exists today.”  
Because numerous courts of appeals had interpreted R.C. 742.47 to prohibit direct 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
payment by the OPFPF to satisfy an ex-spouse’s interest in a member’s pension, 
the majority reasons that H.B. 535 “reflects the General Assembly’s 
dissatisfaction with the courts’ incorrect interpretation.”  The majority therefore 
believes that H.B. 535 enacted no substantive change to R.C. Chapter 742.  But 
the majority’s explanation is unavailing.  “It is a well-settled canon of 
interpretation of an amendment to a statute that the Legislature will be deemed to 
have intended some practical change to existing legislation.”  Union Trust Co. v. 
Hawkins (1929), 121 Ohio St. 159, 180, 167 N.E. 389, 395; see, also, Lynch v. 
Gallia Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 251, 254, 680 N.E.2d 1222, 
1224.  In some instances, a change might indeed be nothing more than a 
rewording of the statute to clarify a previously intended meaning.  See Bartlett v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 50, 54, 62 O.O.2d 406, 409, 294 
N.E.2d 665, 668.  But the changes enacted by H.B. 535 suggest more than a 
clarification of existing law. 
 
If the changes to R.C. 742.47 were merely meant as a clarification of 
existing law, there would be no reason for the General Assembly to set a future 
effective date of January 1, 2002 for the amendment.  It would be curious for the 
legislature to delay the effective date of a statutory amendment that was meant 
merely to clarify what the statute already meant.  The intent to change existing 
law is further reflected in the preamble to H.B. 535 expressing the General 
Assembly’s desire “to permit a public retirement program, pursuant to a court 
order, to make payments to a participant’s former spouse for the purpose of 
dividing marital property.”  The bill’s text therefore suggests that the legislature 
sought to permit something that was not permitted under the current version of the 
OPFPF.  Finally, the enacted amendment to R.C. 742.47 adds to the statutory text 
an entirely new category of court orders (i.e., orders issued under R.C. 3105.171) 
that may validly attach, seize, garnish, or levy OPFPF funds notwithstanding the 
antialienation provision.  Had the General Assembly intended the current version 
January Term, 2001 
17 
of R.C. 742.47 to exempt orders under R.C. 3105.171, it could have easily done 
so.  Instead, the current version of the statute applies the exemption only to orders 
issued under R.C. 742.461, 3111.23, and 3113.21, leaving R.C. 3105.171 
conspicuously absent. 
 
As the law currently stands, R.C. 742.47 forbids the method of dividing 
OPFPF benefits that the trial court ordered in this case.  The court of appeals was 
therefore correct to vacate the trial court’s order.  The majority’s decision to the 
contrary is incorrect.  I therefore dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and F.E. SWEENEY, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., John J. McGowan, Jr. and James A. Loeb, for 
appellant. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General; Chester, Willcox & Saxbe, 
L.L.P., Eugene B. Lewis and Sarah Daggett Morrison, for appellee. 
__________________