Case Title: De Prins v. Michaeles

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12865

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12865 
 
HARRY DE PRINS  vs.  MICHAEL J. MICHAELES, personal 
representative,1 & others.2 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     March 5, 2020.  -  October 20, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.3 
 
 
Trust, Self-settled trust, Spendthrift provision.  Practice, 
Civil, Action to reach and apply.  Uniform Trust Code. 
 
 
 
 
Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit. 
 
 
 
Michael J. Rossi for the defendants. 
 
J. Mark Dickison (Ryan A. Ciporkin also present) for the 
plaintiff. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Of the estate of Donald Belanger. 
 
 
2 Michael J. Michaeles, trustee of the Donald Belanger 
Irrevocable Trust dated October 28, 2008; and the Donald 
Belanger Irrevocable Trust dated October 28, 2008. 
 
 
3 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit has certified a question to this court, pursuant 
to S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981).  We 
are asked whether, on the undisputed facts of this case, the 
assets of a self-settled discretionary spendthrift4 irrevocable 
trust governed by Massachusetts law are protected from a reach 
and apply action by the deceased settlor's creditors.  We answer 
the question "no," based on the circumstances presented here.  
Consistent with the well-established public policy of the 
Commonwealth, we conclude that where, as here, a settlor creates 
a self-settled spendthrift irrevocable trust and a judgment-
creditor's cause of action accrues prior to the settlor's death, 
a judgment-creditor of the settlor's estate may reach and apply 
the trust's assets after the settlor's death.  We do not address 
what the result might be in other circumstances. 
 
Background.  We recite the undisputed facts as established 
by the First Circuit in its opinion accompanying the certified 
question.  See De Prins v. Michaeles, 942 F.3d 521, 523-525 (1st 
Cir. 2019).  In 2000, Donald Belanger  and his wife moved from 
Massachusetts to Arizona.  In 2005, a dispute with their 
                     
4 A spendthrift trust is one "that prohibits the 
beneficiary's interest from being assigned and also prevents a 
creditor from attaching that interest; a trust by the terms of 
which a valid restraint is imposed on the voluntary or 
involuntary transfer of the beneficiary's interest."  Black's 
Law Dictionary 1824 (11th ed. 2019). 
3 
 
 
neighbors, Armand and Simonne De Prins (the De Prinses), over 
shared water rights gave rise to litigation.  In 2007, the De 
Prinses prevailed in their lawsuit against Belanger and his 
wife.  In 2008, Belanger and his wife moved to California, where 
the wife committed suicide on October 4, 2008.  Immediately 
thereafter, Belanger returned to Arizona with his daughter.  
That same month, Belanger created the Donald A. Belanger 
Irrevocable Trust Dated October 28, 2008 (trust), which included 
a spendthrift clause and provided that Belanger could not 
"alter, amend, revoke, or terminate" the trust.  Belanger named 
himself as the sole beneficiary during his lifetime and his 
attorney, Michael J. Michaeles (defendant), as the sole trustee.  
On Belanger's death, his daughter would become the sole 
beneficiary.  Immediately after signing the trust on November 3, 
2008, Belanger conveyed substantially all his assets to the 
defendant as trustee. 
 
Four months later, on March 2, 2009, Belanger shot and 
killed the De Prinses.  On March 3, 2009, Belanger shot and 
killed himself after being stopped by a police officer in New 
Mexico.  The defendant, as personal representative of Belanger's 
estate, probated the estate in Arizona. 
 
On June 10, 2010, the De Prinses' son, the plaintiff, Harry 
De Prins, brought a wrongful death action against the defendant 
as personal representative of Belanger's estate.  That action 
4 
 
 
was removed from Arizona State court to the United States 
District Court for the District of Arizona. 
 
In November 2014, after learning about the existence of the 
trust through the wrongful death action, the plaintiff brought a 
separate action in the United States District Court for the 
District of Arizona to reach and apply assets of the trust 
toward any judgment he may receive in the wrongful death action.  
In July 2015, the plaintiff settled the wrongful death action 
against Belanger's estate for $750,000.  In the action probating 
Belanger's estate, the plaintiff and the defendant stipulated 
that (1) the plaintiff's collection of the wrongful death 
judgment would be against the trust exclusively, through the 
pending reach and apply action, and (2) the reach and apply 
action would be transferred to the United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts. 
After the action was transferred pursuant to the 
stipulation, the plaintiff amended the complaint to state a 
single claim to reach and apply the trust's assets to satisfy 
the $750,000 wrongful death judgment against Belanger's estate.  
On cross motions for summary judgment, judgment entered for the 
plaintiff, with the judge concluding that the plaintiff 
satisfied the three elements required for a reach and apply 
5 
 
 
action under Massachusetts common law.5  The District Court judge 
further concluded that a settlor may not use a self-settled 
spendthrift trust to protect his assets from creditors.  The 
defendant appealed.  On appeal, the First Circuit held that (1) 
Massachusetts's statute of limitations for creditors' claims 
against a decedent's estate or trust did not apply to bar the 
plaintiff's claim against the trust;6 and (2) the defendant was 
not collaterally estopped from arguing that the plaintiff could 
not collect against the trust for the wrongful death judgment, 
despite the stipulation in the probate action that collection of 
the judgment could be enforced only against the trust's assets.  
The First Circuit certified to this court the following 
question: 
"On the undisputed facts of this record, does a self-
settled spendthrift irrevocable trust that is governed by 
Massachusetts law and allowed unlimited distributions to 
the settlor during his lifetime protect assets in the 
irrevocable trust from a reach and apply action by the 
settlor's creditors after the settlor's death?" 
 
                     
 
5 The three elements required for an action for reach and 
apply are (1) a creditor who has secured judgment (2) who has 
"unsuccessfully sought to execute on judgment," and (3) 
"property which could not be taken on execution at law."  Cavadi 
v. DeYeso, 458 Mass. 615, 631 (2011). 
 
 
6 General Laws c. 190B, § 3-803 (a), (b), provides that a 
creditor of a deceased person must bring an action against the 
decedent's estate or trust within one year after the date of 
death of the deceased. 
6 
 
 
The well-established legal maxim that one must be just 
before being generous compels us to conclude that it does not. 
See Foster v. Hurley, 444 Mass. 157, 172 (2005) (Greaney, J., 
dissenting in part); Hill v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 229 
Mass. 474, 477 (1918); Chase v. Redding, 13 Gray 418, 420 
(1859). 
 
Discussion.  The answer to the certified question depends, 
in part, on whether the common law or the Massachusetts Uniform 
Trust Code (MUTC), G. L. c. 203E, §§ 101 et seq., controls.  
When interpreting a statute, we are bound by the Legislature's 
intent.  Rotondi v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 463 
Mass. 644, 648 (2012).  Where a statute's plain meaning is 
unambiguous, the statutory text may be dispositive as to 
legislative intent.  Id.  Where the language of the statutory 
provision is ambiguous, however, we must look for legislative 
intent in the statute as a whole, and in "extrinsic sources, 
including the legislative history and other statutes" (citation 
omitted).  Ciani v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178 (2019).  See 
Rotondi, supra.  "[W]e do not construe a statute 'as effecting a 
material change in or a repeal of the common law unless the 
intent to do so is clearly expressed.'"  Suffolk Constr. Co. v. 
Division of Capital Asset Mgt., 449 Mass. 444, 454 (2007), 
quoting Riley v. Davison Constr. Co., 381 Mass. 432, 438 (1980). 
7 
 
 
Although we determine that the common law applies to the 
present facts, an overview of the MUTC is warranted.  General 
Laws c. 203E, § 505, addresses when a creditor can reach a 
trust's assets to satisfy a claim against the trust's settlor 
and applies regardless of whether a trust contains a spendthrift 
provision.  Section 505 (a) (1) provides that a creditor can 
reach the assets of a revocable trust during the settlor's 
lifetime.  Section 505 (a) (3) provides that a creditor can 
reach the assets of a revocable trust after the settlor's death. 
Section 505 (a) (2) addresses a creditor's ability to reach 
the assets of an irrevocable trust.  It does not specify whether 
it applies only during a settlor's lifetime or whether it 
applies after a settlor's death.  G. L. c. 203E, § 505 (a) (2).  
It provides that, where a settlor has created an irrevocable 
trust, including one that contains a spendthrift provision, a 
creditor "may reach the maximum amount that can be distributed 
to or for the settlor's benefit."  Id.  Where a settlor may 
reach the assets of an irrevocable trust, the settlor's 
creditors may also reach those assets.  Therefore, as the 
defendants concede, if Belanger were still alive today, the 
plaintiff could reach the entirety of the trust's assets because 
the defendant trustee could, under the express terms of the 
trust, distribute all such assets to Belanger or for Belanger's 
benefit. 
8 
 
 
Because it is unclear from the statutory language whether 
§ 505 (a) (2) addresses a creditor's ability to reach the assets 
of an irrevocable trust after the settlor's death, we look to 
the other sections of the statute as well as the legislative 
history.  See Ciani, 481 Mass. at 178; Rotondi, 463 Mass. at 
648.  When Massachusetts was considering adopting the Uniform 
Trust Code, an ad hoc committee was created to review and revise 
it for adoption.  Report of the Ad Hoc Massachusetts Uniform 
Trust Code Committee 1-2 (rev. Jul. 18, 2012) (Report).  The 
committee's comment to G. L. c. 203E, § 505, however, does not 
shed any additional light as to whether § 505 (a) (2) was 
intended to allow a creditor to reach an irrevocable trust's 
assets after the settlor's death or only during the settlor's 
lifetime.7 
Looking to the other provisions in the statute, G. L. 
c. 203E, § 106, provides that the MUTC is to be supplemented by 
the "common law of trusts and principles of equity."  The 
committee's comment to this section further clarifies that "the 
[MUTC] is not intended to replace the common law of trusts in 
Massachusetts except where the [MUTC] modifies it."  Report, 
                     
 
7 The comment explains how this section was altered from the 
Uniform Trust Code to provide that property is not considered 
distributable solely because the trustee may reimburse the 
settlor for taxes paid related to income earned by the trust.  
Report of the Ad Hoc Massachusetts Uniform Trust Committee 27 
(rev. Jul. 18, 2012). 
9 
 
 
supra at 7.  It is clear, then, that the common law continues to 
apply where the MUTC does not address the situation at issue, 
and that the court may apply "principles of equity" to such 
cases.  See G. L. c. 203E, § 106.  In accordance with principles 
of equity, two sections of the MUTC specify that a trust may not 
be created that is contrary to public policy.  See G. L. 
c. 203E, §§ 105 (b) (3), 404.8 
The trust at issue here is an irrevocable, self-settled, 
spendthrift trust.  A trust is self-settled where "the settlor 
is also the person who is to receive the benefits from the 
trust."  Black's Law Dictionary 1824 (11th ed. 2019).  General 
Laws c. 203E, § 102, provides that the MUTC applies to express 
trusts "of a donative nature."  The committee's comment to this 
section explains that the MUTC "will not apply to business 
trusts or other non-donative trust arrangements."  Report, supra 
at 4.  "[D]onative" is defined as "[o]f, relating to, or 
characterized by a donation."  Black's Law Dictionary, supra at 
617.  "[D]onation" is defined as "[a] gift, [especially] to a 
charity; something, [especially] money, that someone gives to a 
                     
 
8 General Laws c. 203E, § 105 (b) (3), provides:  "The terms 
of a trust shall prevail over any provision of this chapter 
except:  . . . the requirement that a trust has a purpose that 
is lawful and not contrary to public policy." 
 
 
General Laws c. 203E, § 404, provides:  "A trust may be 
created only to the extent its purposes are lawful and not 
contrary to public policy." 
10 
 
 
person or an organization by way of help."  Id.  A "donative 
trust" is defined as one "that establishes a gift of a 
beneficial interest in property for a beneficiary."  Id. at 
1819.  See Matter of the MacMakin Nominee Realty Trust, 95 Mass. 
App. Ct. 144, 149-150 (2019), quoting 4 Restatement (Second) of 
Property:  Donative Transfers, Division III Introductory Note, 
at 3 (1992) ("The underlying requirement to effectuate a 
donative transfer is the intention on the part of the donor that 
some interest in property of the donor move from the donor to 
the intended donee, either during the donor's lifetime or on the 
donor's death"). 
Given the authorities discussed above, to the extent that a 
trust is self-settled such that the settlor retains the 
beneficial interest in the trust's assets and does not give such 
interest to another, it appears that the committee did not 
intend the MUTC to apply. 
In accordance with settled principles of statutory 
construction, and because the MUTC both (1) expressly provides 
that it does not replace the common law and (2) fails to address 
the situation here (i.e., the ability of a creditor to reach the 
assets of an irrevocable self-settled trust after the settlor's 
death), we conclude that the common law applies. 
In Massachusetts, there are both statutory and nonstatutory 
reach and apply actions.  See G. L. c. 214, § 3 (6); Cavadi v. 
11 
 
 
DeYeso, 458 Mass. 615, 624-625 (2011).  The statute provides 
this court and the Superior Court with equity jurisdiction to 
decide 
"[a]ctions by creditors to reach and apply, in payment of a 
debt, any property, right, title or interest, legal or 
equitable, of a debtor, within or without the commonwealth, 
which cannot be reached to be attached or taken on 
execution although the property sought to be reached and 
applied is in the possession or control of the debtor 
independently of any other person or cannot be reached and 
applied until a future time or is of uncertain value, if 
the value can be ascertained by sale, appraisal or by any 
means within the ordinary procedure of the court." 
 
G. L. c. 214, § 3 (6).9 
 
 
A nonstatutory reach and apply action is also considered an 
equitable action and "remains broader than the available 
statutes."  Cavadi, 458 Mass. at 626.  See Pacific Nat'l Bank v. 
Windram, 133 Mass. 175, 177 (1882); In re Rare Coin Galleries of 
Am., Inc., 862 F.2d 896, 903-904 (1st Cir. 1988).  As equitable 
actions that, when brought pursuant to statute, expressly invoke 
a court's equity jurisdiction, such actions are often determined 
by equitable, rather than legal, principles. 
                     
 
9 General Laws c. 214, § 3 (8), provides this court and the 
Superior Court with equity jurisdiction to decide "[a]ctions to 
reach and apply in payment of a debt any property, right, title 
or interest, real or personal, of a debtor, liable to be 
attached or taken on execution in a civil action against him and 
fraudulently conveyed by him with intent to defeat, delay or 
defraud his creditors, or purchased, or directly or indirectly 
paid for, by him, the record or other title to which is retained 
in the vendor or is conveyed to a third person with intent to 
defeat, delay or defraud the creditors of the debtor." 
12 
 
 
"The established policy of this Commonwealth long has been 
that a settlor cannot place property in trust for his own 
benefit and keep it beyond the reach of creditors."  Ware v. 
Gulda, 331 Mass. 68, 70 (1954), quoting Merchants Nat'l Bank of 
New Bedford v. Morrissey, 329 Mass. 601, 605 (1953).10  The 
Commonwealth has disfavored the self-settled trust as a tool to 
protect one's assets from creditors, as it is seen as an attempt 
by a settlor to "hav[e his] cake and eat[] it too."  Cohen v. 
Commissioner of the Div. of Med. Assistance, 423 Mass. 399, 414 
(1996), cert. denied sub nom. Kokoska v. Bullen, 519 U.S. 1057 
(1997); Nile v. Nile, 432 Mass. 390, 400 (2000) ("it would 
violate established authority and public policy for an 
individual to have an estate to live on, but not an estate from 
which his debts could be paid"). 
The prohibition against using a self-settled trust to 
protect one's assets against creditors applies both to current 
and future creditors.  Forbes v. Snow, 245 Mass. 85, 89 (1923).  
                     
 
10 This rule is derived from the Restatement of Trusts § 156 
(Restatement), which provides:  "Where a person creates for his 
own benefit a trust for support or a discretionary trust, his 
transferee or creditors can reach the maximum amount which the 
trustee under the terms of the trust could pay to him or apply 
for his benefit."  Ware v. Gulda, 331 Mass. 68, 70 (1954), 
quoting Restatement, supra at § 156(2).  This language from the 
Restatement was imported almost verbatim into the MUTC, G. L. 
c. 203E, § 505 (a) (2), further indicating that the Legislature 
merely intended to codify, rather than displace, the common law 
here. 
13 
 
 
It also applies where the settlor has included a spendthrift 
provision in the trust.11  See Taylor v. Buttrick, 165 Mass. 547, 
551 (1896); Jackson v. Von Zedlitz, 136 Mass. 342, 343 (1884); 
Pacific Nat'l Bank, 133 Mass. at 178-179; Tilcon Capaldi, Inc. 
v. Feldman, 249 F.3d 54, 60 (1st Cir. 2001). 
Here, the defendant trustee relies on State Street Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Reiser, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 638-639 (1979) 
(Reiser), for the proposition that a creditor may only reach and 
apply assets of a discretionary trust after the settlor's death 
where the settlor reserved the power to amend or revoke the 
trust and direct the disposition of the trust's assets (i.e., 
where the trust was revocable).  In Reiser, the plaintiff 
creditor sought to reach and apply trust assets of a revocable 
trust of a deceased settlor to satisfy a debt owed by the 
settlor's estate.  Id. at 633.  The settlor died before repaying 
the debt, and his estate had insufficient funds to pay it.  Id. 
at 634.  The Appeals Court held that the creditor could reach 
and apply the trust's assets to satisfy the debt.  Id. at 638-
639.  On the facts, the holding of the court in Reiser is merely 
illustrative of one instance in which a creditor was allowed to 
                     
 
11 This disregard for the spendthrift provision as a tool to 
protect one's trust assets from creditors also is found in the 
MUTC, G. L. c. 203E, § 505, which, as discussed above, addresses 
when a creditor can reach a trust's assets to satisfy a claim 
against the trust's settlor and applies regardless of whether a 
trust contains a spendthrift provision. 
14 
 
 
reach the assets of a trust of a deceased settlor.12  It does not 
define the limits of a creditor's ability to so reach.13 
In another Appeals Court case, a creditor was allowed to 
reach the assets of an irrevocable spendthrift trust to satisfy 
a judgment in a personal injury action against the deceased 
beneficiary's estate because the trust was held to be self-
settled.  Calhoun v. Rawlins, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 458, 459, 464-
465 (2018).  The beneficiary allegedly caused an automobile 
collision that seriously injured the plaintiffs and resulted in 
the beneficiary's death.  Id. at 461.  In that case, the court 
focused on the trustees' "complete discretion to distribute" 
trust assets to the beneficiary or for his benefit.  Id. at 460-
461.  Although the court did not address the effect of the 
beneficiary's death on the creditor's ability to reach the trust 
                     
 
12 The Appeals Court held that "where a person places 
property in trust and reserves the right to amend and revoke, or 
to direct disposition of principal and income, the settlor's 
creditors may, following the death of the settlor, reach in 
satisfaction of the settlor's debts to them, to the extent not 
satisfied by the settlor's estate, those assets owned by the 
trust over which the settlor had such control at the time of his 
death as would have enabled the settlor to use the trust assets 
for his own benefit."  State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Reiser, 
7 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 638 (1979) (Reiser).  This holding does 
not address whether the assets of an irrevocable trust are 
reachable after the settlor's death. 
 
 
13 It should be noted that, even if the court in Reiser 
purported to demarcate the bounds of a creditor's ability to 
reach the trust assets of a deceased settlor, we would not be 
bound by the decision. 
15 
 
 
property, it necessarily assumed that the creditor was not 
prohibited from such reach, as the cause of action giving rise 
to the personal injury action in which the plaintiffs received 
judgment accrued simultaneously to the beneficiary's death.  Id. 
at 461. 
The facts here lean even more compellingly in favor of the 
creditor.  Here, the cause of action giving rise to the judgment 
at issue accrued before Belanger's death.  The De Prinses' 
deaths also are the direct result of Belanger's intentional act 
of murder, not the result of a negligently or recklessly caused 
automobile accident as in Calhoun.  Further, as in Calhoun, this 
trust is self-settled.  As noted above, it is well established 
in this Commonwealth that a settlor may not use a self-settled 
trust to protect his assets from creditors. 
Although we have found no case law that directly discusses 
the distinction between the reachability of the assets of a 
self-settled trust during the settlor's lifetime versus after 
his death (if one exists), it would be incongruent for a self-
settled trust not to protect a settlor's assets from creditors 
while the settlor is alive but to have it protect the settlor's 
beneficiaries from the settlor's creditors after the settlor's 
death when, absent the self-settled trust, they would not be so 
16 
 
 
protected.14  We therefore hold that a self-settled trust does 
not become protected from creditors on the settlor's death. 
Although the plaintiff does not argue that the conveyance 
of Belanger's assets to the trust was fraudulent, the timing of 
the events could give rise to the inference that it was part of 
a single plan.  The De Prinses brought and prevailed in a 
lawsuit against Belanger in 2007.  Belanger's wife committed 
suicide on October 4, 2008.  Within six months of her suicide, 
Belanger created the trust, transferred substantially all of his 
assets to the trust, murdered the De Prinses, and then committed 
suicide. 
The defendant argues that Belanger did not have an estate 
to live on but not one from which to pay his debts, because the 
defendant did not distribute any trust assets to Belanger prior 
to his death.  According to the defendant's argument, now that 
Belanger is deceased, it would be impossible for the defendant 
to distribute any trust assets to Belanger or for Belanger's 
                     
 
14 Without the trust, the beneficiaries would not be 
protected, because the settlor's assets would simply be probated 
as part of the estate and subject to the creditor's claims prior 
to those of heirs or beneficiaries under a will.  See G. L. 
c. 190B, § 3-802.  See especially G. L. c. 109B, § 3-805 
(listing order in which estate's personal representative is to 
pay claims against estate in event that estate has insufficient 
assets to pay all claims in full). 
17 
 
 
benefit,15 so this is not a case where Belanger is able to "have 
his cake and eat it too."  As the First Circuit correctly 
observed, however, the important point is what is within the 
trustee's power to do, not what he actually does.  Tilcon 
Capaldi, Inc., supra at 60 ("Thus, even if the trustee chooses 
not to make any payments to the beneficiary, a creditor may 
still reach the maximum amount the trustee could pay").  In 
other words, although the defendant did not distribute any trust 
assets to Belanger during his lifetime, he could have under the 
express terms of the trust.  Therefore, under the First 
Circuit's reasoning, the plaintiff should be able to reach the 
maximum amount the defendant could have distributed during 
Belanger's lifetime -- all the assets of the trust.   See id. 
Further, often one of our greatest goals in life is to 
leave our children the benefit of our property.  To prevent the 
son of two murder victims from financially recovering for their 
wrongful deaths while protecting the murderer's assets for his 
beneficiary would contradict the well-established public policy 
of this Commonwealth and condone the actions of a settlor who, 
it can be inferred, thought he could use the protection of a 
trust to shield his assets from the consequences of his 
                     
 
15 As will be discussed below, allowing Belanger to gift his 
assets to his child could be considered a distribution for his 
benefit. 
18 
 
 
violence.  The equities here simply do not allow Belanger to 
murder the plaintiff's parents and then leave the plaintiff with 
no recovery in the subsequent wrongful death action, despite 
Belanger's possessing substantial assets during his lifetime. 
Conclusion.  We answer the certified question as follows:  
On the undisputed facts of this record, we hold that a self-
settled spendthrift irrevocable trust that is governed by 
Massachusetts law and that allowed unlimited distributions to 
the settlor during his lifetime does not protect assets in the 
irrevocable trust from a reach and apply action by the settlor's 
creditors after the settlor's death. 
The Reporter of Decisions is directed to furnish attested 
copies of this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in 
turn will transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the 
clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit, as the answer to the question certified, and also will 
transmit a copy to each party.