Case Title: Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re: Limiting Government Interference with Abortion

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC2023-1392

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2024-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC2023-1392 
____________ 
 
ADVISORY OPINION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RE: 
LIMITING GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE WITH ABORTION. 
 
April 1, 2024 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
The Attorney General of Florida has petitioned this Court for 
an advisory opinion concerning the validity of a proposed citizen 
initiative amendment to the Florida Constitution, circulated under 
article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, and titled 
“Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion.”  We 
have jurisdiction.  See art. IV, § 10; art. V, § 3(b)(10), Fla. Const.  
We approve the proposed amendment for placement on the ballot. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
On October 9, 2023, the Attorney General petitioned this 
Court for an opinion regarding the validity of this initiative petition 
sponsored by Floridians Protecting Freedom, Inc. (the Sponsor).  We 
invited interested parties to file briefs regarding the validity of the 
 
- 2 - 
initiative petition.  We received initial briefs from the Attorney 
General and four other opponents of the proposed amendment: 
Susan B. Anthony Pro Life America (“Susan B. Anthony”); the 
National Center for Life and Liberty (“Center for Life”); Florida 
Voters Against Extremism; and the Florida Conference of Catholic 
Bishops.  We received answer briefs arguing in favor of placing the 
proposed amendment on the ballot from the Sponsor and four other 
proponents: certain Former Florida Republican Elected Officials 
(“Former Republican Officials”); the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists; certain Florida Doctors; and 
certain Law Professors and Instructors.  Oral argument was heard 
on February 7, 2024.  
The full text of the proposed amendment, which would create 
a new section in the Declaration of Rights in article I of the Florida 
Constitution, states:  
SECTION __. Limiting government interference with 
abortion.—Except as provided in Article X, Section 22, 
no law shall prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion 
before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s 
health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare 
provider. 
 
- 3 - 
The ballot title for the proposed amendment is “Amendment to 
Limit Government Interference with Abortion,” and the ballot 
summary states: 
No law shall prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion 
before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s 
health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare 
provider.  This amendment does not change the 
Legislature’s constitutional authority to require 
notification to a parent or guardian before a minor has 
an abortion. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of Review 
In reviewing the validity of an initiative petition for placement 
on the ballot, “[t]his Court has traditionally applied a deferential 
standard of review.”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Use of Marijuana 
for Certain Med. Conditions (Medical Marijuana I), 132 So. 3d 786, 
794 (Fla. 2014).  Without regard to the merits or wisdom of the 
initiative, our review is limited to the following issues: (1) “the 
compliance of the text of the proposed amendment or revision with 
s. 3, Art. XI of the State Constitution”; (2) “the compliance of the 
proposed ballot title and substance with s. 101.161”; and (3) 
“whether the proposed amendment is facially invalid under the 
United States Constitution.”  § 16.061(1), Fla. Stat (2023).  This 
 
- 4 - 
Court will invalidate a proposed amendment “only if it is shown to 
be ‘clearly and conclusively defective.’ ”1  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. 
re Regulate Marijuana in a Manner Similar to Alcohol to Establish 
Age, Licensing, & Other Restrictions, 320 So. 3d 657, 667 (Fla. 2021) 
(quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Amend. to Bar Gov’t from 
Treating People Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ. (Treating 
People Differently), 778 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla. 2000)).  This Court’s 
review of a proposal’s compliance with article X, section 3 and 
section 101.161 is governed by the following principles:  
First, the Court will not address the merits or wisdom of 
the proposed amendment.  Second, “[t]he Court must act 
with extreme care, caution, and restraint before it 
removes a constitutional amendment from the vote of the 
people.”  Specifically, where citizen initiatives are 
concerned, “[the] Court has no authority to inject itself in 
 
 
1.  In her briefing, the Attorney General invites this Court to 
reconsider its long-held requirement that to invalidate a ballot 
initiative, this Court must conclude that the initiative is clearly and 
conclusively defective.  The Attorney General suggests that this 
Court need only consider whether the initiative violates the 
requirements of section 101.161(1), not whether it does so “clearly.”  
Essentially, the Attorney General seeks to reduce the opponents’ 
burden here, see Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let’s Help 
Florida, 363 So. 2d 337, 339 (Fla. 1978) (stating that the burden 
upon the opponent of an initiative proposal is to establish that the 
proposal is “clearly and conclusively defective” (quoting Weber v. 
Smathers, 338 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1976); Goldner v. Adams, 167 So. 2d 
575 (Fla. 1964))), which we decline to do. 
 
- 5 - 
the process, unless the laws governing the process have 
been ‘clearly and conclusively’ violated.” 
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re 1.35% Prop. Tax Cap, Unless Voter 
Approved, 2 So. 3d 968, 971 (Fla. 2009) (alterations in original) 
(citations omitted). 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the task at hand. 
B.  Single-subject Requirement 
Article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides in 
pertinent part: 
The power to propose the revision or amendment of 
any portion or portions of this constitution by initiative is 
reserved to the people, provided that, any such revision 
or amendment, except for those limiting the power of 
government to raise revenue, shall embrace but one 
subject and matter directly connected therewith. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  “[I]n determining whether a proposal addresses 
a single subject the test is whether it ‘may be logically viewed as 
having a natural relation and connection as component parts or 
aspects of a single dominant plan or scheme.’ ”  Fine v. Firestone, 
448 So. 2d 984, 990 (Fla. 1984) (quoting City of Coral Gables v. 
Gray, 19 So. 2d 318, 320 (Fla. 1944)).  In other words, a proposal 
must manifest “a logical and natural oneness of purpose” to 
 
- 6 - 
accomplish the purpose of article XI, section 3.2  Advisory Op. to 
Att’y Gen. re Fla. Marriage Prot. Amend. (Marriage Protection), 926 
So. 2d 1229, 1233 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Fine, 448 So. 2d at 990).  
The single-subject requirement is intended to “prevent[] a proposal 
‘from engaging in either of two practices: (a) logrolling; or (b) 
substantially altering or performing the functions of multiple 
branches of state   government.’ ”  Medical Marijuana I, 132 So. 3d 
at 795 (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Water & Land 
Conservation—Dedicates Funds to Acquire & Restore Fla. 
Conservation & Recreation Lands (Water & Land Conservation), 123 
 
 
2.  Opponent Susan B. Anthony urges this Court to reconsider 
the “oneness of purpose” standard, asserting that it is too subjective 
and that the plain text of article XI, section 3, requiring “one 
subject,” should instead be read more narrowly as requiring “one 
proposition.”  While Susan B. Anthony suggests that a narrower 
interpretation of the single-subject requirement would be more 
faithful to the supremacy-of-text principle, its interpretation bears 
little relationship to the actual constitutional text.  There is a 
difference between a proposal addressing a particular “subject,” and 
one that presents a single “proposition,” and the constitutional text 
plainly states that an initiative “embrace but one subject.”  Further, 
Susan B. Anthony ignores the text that immediately follows the 
word “subject” in article XI, section 3, which plainly permits a 
proposed amendment to address “matter directly connected” to the 
single subject.  Finally, our cases do not reflect a commitment to 
defining “subject” in such a narrow manner.  We thus decline 
Susan B. Anthony’s invitation to adopt a narrower interpretation of 
the single-subject requirement.  
 
- 7 - 
So. 3d 47, 50-51 (Fla. 2013)).  It “is a rule of restraint designed to 
insulate Florida’s organic law from precipitous and cataclysmic 
change.”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Save Our Everglades (Save Our 
Everglades), 636 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (Fla. 1994).  As explained 
below, the proposed amendment here does not violate the single-
subject requirement. 
This Court has defined logrolling as “a practice wherein several 
separate issues are rolled into a single initiative in order to 
aggregate votes or secure approval of an otherwise unpopular 
issue.”  Id. at 1339.  “The purpose of the single-subject requirement 
is to allow the citizens to vote on singular changes in our 
government that are identified in the proposal and to avoid voters 
having to accept part of a proposal which they oppose in order to 
obtain a change which they support.”  Fine, 448 So. 2d at 993.   
Susan B. Anthony and Florida Voters Against Extremism 
assert that the proposed amendment engages in logrolling by 
reaching two separate categories of abortion—abortion before 
viability of the fetus and abortion based on a healthcare provider’s 
authority—which present distinct moral and policy issues.  The 
“viability provision” would ban any law prohibiting, penalizing, 
 
- 8 - 
delaying, or restricting abortion before viability, regardless of the 
circumstances or the mother’s reasons for seeking an abortion.  
This, according to these opponents, would be, in effect, a 
constitutional guarantee of abortion at any time and for any 
purpose before the fetus is viable.  The “health provision” would bar 
any law that prohibits, penalizes, delays, or restricts abortion at 
any time—including after viability and until the moment of birth—
so long as a “healthcare provider” says it is necessary to “protect” 
the mother’s “health”—not “life.”  Opponents argue that these two 
provisions of the proposed amendment involve entirely different 
subjects.  Susan B. Anthony points out that many voters would 
simultaneously oppose an amendment that prohibits government 
interference with all previability abortions but support an 
amendment prohibiting government interference with abortions 
sought to protect the health of the mother.  Opponents argue that 
the proposed amendment forces those voters “to accept part of a 
proposal which they oppose,” id.—a ban on laws prohibiting 
abortion before viability—“in order to obtain a change which they 
support,” id.—a ban on laws prohibiting abortion when maternal 
health is in need of protection.  The Sponsor and other proponents 
 
- 9 - 
contend that the proposed amendment addresses a single subject, 
namely, “limiting government interference with abortion.” 
Under both Florida and federal law, the subject of abortion has 
historically involved two major interconnected matters: the viability 
of the fetus and the health of the mother.  See generally Dobbs v. 
Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 301 (2022); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973), overruled by Dobbs, 597 U.S. 
215, and holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 
1989), receded from by Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla. v. 
State, No. SC2022-1050 (Apr. 1, 2024) (slip op. at 2).  “Abortion”—
or, more specifically, “limits on government interference with 
abortion”—is the subject of the proposed amendment, and the 
viability of the fetus and the mother’s health are “matter[s] directly 
connected” thereto.  For this reason, the argument that the 
proposed amendment violates the single-subject requirement 
because voters may support some of the amendment’s applications 
but not others also fails.  Whether some voters may support only a 
portion of a proposed amendment and oppose another portion is 
not the inquiry that determines whether there is a violation of the 
 
- 10 - 
single-subject requirement.  Instead, the prohibition on “logrolling 
refers to a practice whereby an amendment is proposed which 
contains unrelated provisions, some of which electors might wish to 
support, in order to get an otherwise disfavored provision passed.”  
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Rts. of Elec. Consumers Regarding Solar 
Energy Choice (Solar Energy Choice), 188 So. 3d 822, 828-29 (Fla. 
2016) (emphasis added) (citing Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Protect 
People, Especially Youth, from Addiction, Disease, & Other Health 
Hazards of Using Tobacco, 926 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 2006)); see 
also Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Ltd. Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d 
997, 999 (Fla. 1993) (“The purpose of the single-subject restriction 
is to prevent the proposal of an amendment which contains two 
unrelated provisions, one which electors might wish to support and 
one which they might disfavor.” (emphasis added)).  Because 
viability and maternal health are interconnected matters related to 
the subject of abortion, the mere fact that electors might not agree 
with the entirety of the amendment does not render it violative of 
the single-subject requirement. 
The Former Republican Officials point out that this Court has 
repeatedly approved ballot measures that addressed multiple 
 
- 11 - 
related facets of a subject.  For example, in Marriage Protection, the 
proposed amendment both defined “marriage” as “the legal union of 
only one man and one woman” and prohibited “the substantial 
equivalent thereof,” i.e., civil unions or domestic partnerships.  926 
So. 2d at 1232.  Although the opponents of the proposed 
amendment in that case contended that the definition of “marriage” 
and the prohibition on substantial equivalents were separate 
subjects, this Court concluded that they were both facets of “the 
singular subject of whether the concept of marriage and the rights 
and obligations traditionally embodied therein should be limited to 
the union of one man and one woman.”  Id. at 1234. 
Similarly, within the context of the proposed amendment here, 
abortion “before viability” and “when necessary to protect the 
patient’s health” are not separate subjects but facets of the singular 
subject of whether government “interference with abortion” should 
be “limit[ed]” when those circumstances are present.  We have 
explained that “a proposed amendment may ‘delineate a number of 
guidelines’ consistent with the single-subject requirement as long 
as these components possess ‘a natural relation and connection as 
component parts or aspects of a single dominant plan or scheme.’ ”  
 
- 12 - 
Medical Marijuana I, 132 So. 3d at 796 (quoting Advisory Op. to 
Att’y Gen. re Standards for Establishing Legis. Dist. Boundaries, 2 
So. 3d 175, 181-82 (Fla. 2009)).  Banning laws that restrict 
previability abortion and abortion performed to protect maternal 
health are aspects of a single scheme: limiting government 
interference with abortion. 
Susan B. Anthony’s reliance on In re Advisory Opinion to the 
Attorney General—Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination 
(Discrimination Laws), 632 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1994), in support of its 
position is misplaced.  The proposed amendment in that case 
stated, in pertinent part, 
The state, political subdivisions of the state, 
municipalities or any other governmental entity shall not 
enact or adopt any law regarding discrimination against 
persons which creates, establishes or recognizes any 
right, privilege or protection for any person based upon 
any characteristic, trait, status, or condition other than 
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, 
ethnic background, marital status, or familial status. 
Id. at 1020.  This Court concluded that the proposed initiative 
violated the single-subject rule because “it enumerate[d] ten 
classifications of people that would be entitled to protection from 
discrimination if the amendment were passed.”  Id. (“[A] voter may 
 
- 13 - 
want to support protection from discrimination for people based on 
race and religion, but oppose protection based on marital status 
and familial status.”).  Here, unlike what we characterized as the 
“expansive generality” and “disparate” classifications present in 
Discrimination Laws, the proposed amendment concerns only a 
single item—abortion.  
Susan B. Anthony also relies on Advisory Opinion to the 
Attorney General re Fairness Initiative Requiring Legislative 
Determination that Sales Tax Exemptions and Exclusions Serve a 
Public Purpose (Fairness Initiative), 880 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 2004).  In 
that case, we concluded that the proposed amendment  
contain[ed] three disparate subjects: (1) a scheme for the 
Legislature to review existing exemptions to the sales tax 
under chapter 212; (2) the creation of a sales tax on 
services that currently does not exist; and (3) limitations 
on the Legislature’s ability to create or continue 
exemptions and exclusions from the sales tax. 
Id. at 634.  This Court reasoned that 
[w]hile all of these three goals arguably relate to sales 
taxes, and any one of these three goals might be the 
permissible subject of a constitutional amendment under 
the initiative process, we conclude that together they 
constitute impermissible logrolling and violate the single-
subject requirement of article XI, section 3, of the Florida 
Constitution because of the substantial, yet disparate, 
impact they may have. 
 
- 14 - 
Id. at 635.  The elements of the proposed amendment in Fairness 
Initiative lacked the “natural relation and connection” present in the 
proposed amendment in this case.  The singular goal of the 
proposed amendment here is to limit government interference with 
the termination of pregnancy.  It involves one subject and addresses 
the related ability of State and local governments to “interfere[] 
with” that subject. 
The proposed amendment also will not substantially alter or 
perform the functions of multiple branches of government.  “This 
Court has held that while most amendments will ‘affect’ multiple 
branches of government this fact alone is insufficient to invalidate 
an amendment on single-subject grounds . . . .”  Advisory Op. to 
Att’y Gen. re Right to Treatment & Rehab., 818 So. 2d 491, 496 (Fla. 
2002).  Indeed “it [is] difficult to conceive of a constitutional 
amendment that would not affect other aspects of government to 
some extent.”  Solar Energy Choice, 188 So. 3d at 830 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Ltd. Casinos, 644 So. 
2d 71, 74 (Fla. 1994)).  But it is only “when a proposal substantially 
alters or performs the functions of multiple branches that it violates 
the single-subject test.’ ”  Medical Marijuana I, 132 So. 3d at 795 
 
- 15 - 
(emphasis added) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fish & 
Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 705 So. 2d 1351, 1353-54 (Fla. 
1998)); see also Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Prohibiting State 
Spending for Experimentation that Involves the Destruction of a Live 
Hum. Embryo (Prohibiting State Spending), 959 So. 2d 210, 213 (Fla. 
2007) (“While we recognize that the proposed amendment, if 
enacted, appears to limit the authority of the legislative and 
executive branches of state government, we conclude that this 
proposed amendment does not substantially alter or perform the 
functions of multiple branches of government.”). 
Here, the proposed amendment will affect the government 
“only in the general sense that any constitutional provision does” by 
requiring compliance with a new constitutional rule.  Solar Energy 
Choice, 188 So. 3d at 830.  It will not require any of the branches of 
government to perform any specific functions nor would it 
substantially alter their functions.  Instead, it primarily restricts the 
authority of the legislative branch to pass legislation that would 
“interfere” with abortion under certain circumstances.  This is not 
the type of “precipitous” or “cataclysmic” change to the government 
structure indicative of substantially altering or performing the 
 
- 16 - 
functions of multiple branches of government that the single-
subject rule is intended to prevent.  See, e.g., In re Advisory Op. to 
Att’y Gen. re Limits or Prevents Barriers to Local Solar Elec. Supply, 
177 So. 3d 235, 244-45 (Fla. 2015) (concluding that although the 
proposed amendment would limit the authority of the Legislature 
and other governmental entities to regulate in certain areas, it did 
“not substantially alter or perform the functions of multiple 
branches of government producing ‘precipitous’ or ‘cataclysmic’ 
changes”). 
We conclude that the proposed amendment before us 
embraces but one subject—limiting government interference with 
abortion—and matter directly connected therewith.  It does not 
violate the single-subject provision of article XI, section 3. 
C.  Ballot Title and Summary 
Section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2023), sets forth certain 
technical and clarity requirements for ballot titles and summaries.  
As to the technical requirements, the statute requires that the 
ballot title “consist of a caption, not exceeding 15 words in length, 
by which the measure is commonly referred to or spoken of” and 
that “[t]he ballot summary of the amendment or other public 
 
- 17 - 
measure shall be an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 words 
in length, of the chief purpose of the measure.”  § 101.161(1), Fla. 
Stat.  Here, the ballot title is composed of seven words and the 
ballot summary is composed of thirty-four words, clearly meeting 
the word count limitations provided in section 101.161(1). 
Section 101.161(1) also requires that a ballot summary “be 
printed in clear and unambiguous language.”  “This is to provide 
fair notice of the content of the proposed amendment so that the 
voter will not be misled as to its purpose, and can cast an 
intelligent and informed ballot.”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen.—Fee on 
Everglades Sugar Prod., 681 So. 2d 1124, 1127 (Fla. 1996).  
“Accordingly, in reviewing the ballot title and summary, this Court 
asks two questions: (1) whether the ballot title and summary fairly 
inform the voter of the chief purpose of the amendment; and (2) 
whether the language of the ballot title and summary misleads the 
public.”  Solar Energy Choice, 188 So. 3d at 831.  “[I]t is not 
necessary to explain every ramification of a proposed amendment, 
only the chief purpose.”  Water & Land Conservation, 123 So. 3d at 
50-51 (alteration in original) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re 
 
- 18 - 
Additional Homestead Tax Exemption (Homestead Tax Exemption), 
880 So. 2d 646, 651 (Fla. 2004)). 
Opponents contend that the ballot title and summary fail to 
fairly inform voters of the chief purpose of the amendment because, 
they argue, the chief purpose is not to limit government interference 
with abortion, as the title states, but to effectively provide for 
abortion on demand, up until the moment of birth, by requiring 
broad exceptions for maternal health.  The opponents find it all but 
impossible to imagine a circumstance in which a woman who wants 
a postviability (including late-term or partial-birth) abortion will not 
be able to find a “healthcare provider” willing to say that an 
abortion is somehow necessary to protect her health—physical, 
mental, or otherwise.  The opponents further argue that the ballot 
title and summary do not fully inform voters that the sweep of the 
proposed amendment is broad in its collateral effects on current 
Florida statutes regulating abortion; that the amendment may 
authorize late-term abortions for the sake of maternal health; or 
that “health” could encompass mental as well as physical health.    
While it may well be true that the proposed amendment would 
have broad effects flowing from its adoption that are not fully 
 
- 19 - 
explained in the ballot summary, to fairly inform voters of its chief 
purpose, a ballot summary—as we have already said—“need not 
explain every detail or ramification of the proposed amendment.”  
Treating People Differently, 778 So. 2d at 899 (quoting Advisory Op. 
to Att’y Gen. re Prohibiting Pub. Funding of Pol. Candidates, 693 So. 
2d 972, 975 (Fla. 1997)).  Nor must it provide “an exhaustive 
explanation of the interpretation and future possible effects of the 
amendment.”  Id.   
The ballot summary here tracks the language of the proposed 
amendment itself and provides that “no law shall prohibit, penalize, 
delay, or restrict abortion before viability or when necessary to 
protect the patient’s health, as determined by the patient’s 
healthcare provider.”  That the proposed amendment’s principal 
goal and chief purpose is to limit government interference with 
abortion is plainly stated in terms that clearly and unambiguously 
reflect the text of the proposed amendment.  And the broad sweep 
of this proposed amendment is obvious in the language of the 
summary.  Denying this requires a flight from reality.  We 
acknowledge that the text of the amendment—like any legal text—
presents interpretive questions, but we neither endorse nor reject 
 
- 20 - 
any litigant’s assertions about how the proposed amendment might 
be interpreted in the future and our decision today takes no 
position on the scope of legislative discretion that would remain if 
the proposed amendment were to become law. 
The second question we must consider in reviewing the ballot 
title and summary is whether the language of the ballot title and 
summary will be misleading to voters.  Medical Marijuana I, 132 So. 
3d at 797.  The ballot title—“Amendment to Limit Government 
Interference with Abortion”—clearly identifies the subject of the 
proposed amendment.  Nonetheless, some opponents still contend 
that the ballot title is misleading because, they suggest, the 
proposed amendment does more than “limit” government 
interference with abortion and the phrase “government interference 
with abortion” is improper inflammatory political rhetoric.  We 
disagree.  The word “limit” is not misleading in the title or 
summary.  The proposed amendment does not eliminate the 
government’s ability to “interfere” with abortion in all 
circumstances; by its plain language, it limits government 
interference before viability or when necessary to protect the 
mother’s health.  Its reference to article X, section 22 of the Florida 
 
- 21 - 
Constitution—which grants the Legislature authority to require 
notification to a parent or guardian of a minor before termination of 
the minor’s pregnancy—explicitly provides for an instance in which 
the legislative authority to “interfere[] with” abortion will be 
preserved in the event the proposed amendment is passed.  And the 
proposed amendment would not prohibit the Legislature from 
passing laws “interfering” with abortion after the point of viability 
and when the mother’s health is not in jeopardy.  The ballot title’s 
inclusion of the word “limit” is therefore not misleading but 
accurately explains that the Legislature will retain authority to 
“interfere[] with” abortions under certain circumstances. 
Nor does the ballot title contain inflammatory political 
rhetoric.  The “government interference” language in the ballot title 
is also found in both state and federal abortion precedent.  See, e.g., 
N. Fla. Women’s Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 
2d 612, 615 (Fla. 2003) (“Under our decision, parent and minor are 
free to do as they wish in this regard, without government 
interference.”), receded from by Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. 
Fla., No. SC2022-1050 (Apr. 1, 2024) (slip op. at 2-3, 50); Dobbs, 
597 U.S. at 273 (reasoning that Roe conflated “the right to shield 
 
- 22 - 
information from disclosure and the right to make and implement 
important personal decisions without governmental interference”).  
The “government interference” terminology is a fair description of 
the proposal.  Thus, we cannot say that the phrase “government 
interference” is inflammatory political rhetoric. 
The opponents contend that the ballot summary is misleading 
because it fails to define “viability,” “health,” or “healthcare 
provider”; does not disclose that it might be left to a “healthcare 
provider” to determine when a fetus is viable; and does not disclose 
that despite its proclamation that no law will prohibit previability 
abortion, previability partial-birth abortions will remain prohibited 
under the federal partial-birth abortion ban, see 18 U.S.C. § 1531.  
But none of these things render the summary misleading or 
inadequate in any way. 
This Court has held that it will not strike a proposal from the 
ballot based upon an argument concerning “the ambiguous legal 
effect of the amendment’s text rather than the clarity of the ballot 
title and summary.”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Voter Control of 
Gambling (Voter Control of Gambling), 215 So. 3d 1209, 1216 (Fla. 
2017).  The question for our consideration here is not whether the 
 
- 23 - 
proposed constitutional language itself is free of any ambiguity or 
whether there are uncertainties regarding the potential legal effect if 
the proposed amendment were to pass but whether the ballot 
summary misleads voters as to the new constitutional language 
voters are asked to adopt in the proposed amendment itself.  In 
other words, it asks whether the ballot summary will give voters a 
false impression about what is contained in the actual text of the 
proposed amendment. 
The ballot summary essentially follows the language of the 
proposed amendment.  It says nothing more and nothing less than 
what the operative language of the proposed amendment itself says.  
In light of this almost verbatim recitation of the text of the proposed 
amendment, it cannot be said that the ballot summary will mislead 
voters regarding the actual text of the proposed amendment.  See 
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Voting Restoration Amend., 215 So. 3d 
1202, 1208 (Fla. 2017) (“[T]he ballot title and summary also do not 
mislead voters with regard to the actual content of the proposed 
amendment.  Rather, together they recite the language of the 
amendment almost in full.”); Prohibiting State Spending, 959 So. 2d 
at 214 (upholding a summary that contained language identical to 
 
- 24 - 
that in the proposed amendment); Marriage Protection, 926 So. 2d 
1229 (upholding a summary that reiterated almost all of the 
language contained in the amendment); Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. 
re Med. Liab. Claimant’s Comp. Amend., 880 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2004) 
(same). 
The fundamental problem with the main clarity arguments 
advanced by the opponents is that they effectively would impose 
requirements on the substance of a proposed amendment rather 
than require accuracy in the ballot summary.  But an alleged 
ambiguity of a proposed amendment itself does not render a ballot 
summary misleading.  And this Court “does not have the authority 
or responsibility to rule on the merits or the wisdom of these 
proposed initiative amendments.”  Treating People Differently, 778 
So. 2d at 891 (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Tax Limitation, 
644 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. 1994)).  There is simply no basis in the 
constitution for imposing a requirement for clarity on the substance 
of a proposed amendment.  And section 101.161(1)’s requirement 
for a ballot summary to be in “clear and unambiguous language” 
cannot be reasonably understood as imposing an extra-
constitutional requirement concerning the substance of proposed 
 
- 25 - 
amendments.  Nor should a summary be expected to resolve every 
interpretive question presented by a proposed amendment.  Any 
summary that attempts to do so will no doubt be challenged for 
making the wrong interpretive choices.  Indeed, the sponsor of an 
initiative does not have the authority—under the guise of 
clarification—to use the ballot summary to narrow or broaden the 
meaning of the words used in the amendment text itself.  In our 
legal system, the meaning of terms placed in the constitution is 
determined by the application of established interpretive 
conventions and separation of powers principles; legal meaning is 
not dictated by an amendment’s sponsor. 
The opponents argue that the proposed amendment is 
misleading for failing to mention that it would not affect the federal 
ban on partial-birth abortion.  “This Court has . . . never required 
that a ballot summary inform voters as to the current state of 
federal law and the impact of a proposed state constitutional 
amendment on federal statutory law as it exists at this moment in 
time.”  Medical Marijuana I, 132 So. 3d at 808.  This case is thus 
distinguishable from Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re 
Adult Use of Marijuana, 315 So. 3d 1176 (Fla. 2021), in which this 
 
- 26 - 
Court concluded that a ballot summary was affirmatively 
misleading “regarding the interplay between the proposed 
amendment and federal law.”  Id. at 1180 (quoting Medical 
Marijuana I, 132 So. 3d at 808).  There, we expressly rejected the 
idea that the ballot summary was defective for failing to “include 
language that [wa]s not in the proposed amendment itself,” and 
instead concluded that the ballot summary was defective for its 
omission of “important language that [wa]s found ‘in the proposed 
amendment itself.’ ”  Id. at 1183 (quoting Medical Marijuana I, 132 
So. 3d at 808). 
In the end, the ballot title and summary fairly inform voters, in 
clear and unambiguous language, of the chief purpose of the 
amendment and they are not misleading.  The ballot summary’s 
nearly verbatim recitation of the proposed amendment language is 
an “accurate, objective, and neutral summary of the proposed 
amendment.”  See Homestead Tax Exemption, 880 So. 2d at 653-54 
(“[A]n accurate, objective, and neutral summary of the proposed 
amendment is the sine qua non of the citizen-driven process of 
amending our constitution.”).  Accordingly, there is no basis to 
 
- 27 - 
reject the proposed summary and ballot title under section 
101.161, Florida Statutes. 
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that “the polestar of 
our analysis is the candor and accuracy with which the ballot 
language informs the voters of a proposed amendment’s effects.”  
Dep’t of State v. Fla. Greyhound Ass’n, Inc., 253 So. 3d 513, 520 
(Fla. 2018).  Here, there is no lack of candor or accuracy: the ballot 
language plainly informs voters that the material legal effects of the 
proposed amendment will be that the government will be unable to 
enact laws that “prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict” previability 
abortions or abortions necessary to protect the mother’s health.  It 
is undeniable that those are the main and material legal effects of 
the proposed amendment.   
“[W]e have also recognized ‘that voters may be presumed to 
have the ability to reason and draw logical conclusions’ from the 
information they are given.”  Id. at 520 (quoting Smith v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 606 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla. 1992)).  Because of this, 
ballot language—as we have previously mentioned—“is not required 
to explain every detail or ramification of the proposed amendment.”  
Id. (quoting Smith, 606 So. 2d at 620).  We thus presume that 
 
- 28 - 
voters will have an understanding of the obviously broad sweep of 
this proposed amendment despite the fact that the ballot summary 
does not and cannot reveal its every possible ramification or 
collateral effect.  Cf. Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Ltd. Casinos, 644 
So. 2d at 75 (noting that “[t]he seventy-five word limit placed on the 
ballot summary as required by statute does not lend itself to an 
explanation of all of a proposed amendment’s details”). 
Even if elements of ambiguity in the text of a proposed 
amendment could result in the invalidity of a proposal—a 
proposition we reject—no such ambiguity has been shown here.  
Rather, the challenged concepts have been at the forefront of the 
abortion debate in this country for more than fifty years—a debate 
that may be at its height today in the wake of Dobbs.  And while 
some indeterminacy remains regarding these concepts, it is difficult 
to imagine a Florida voter in 2024 who would be befuddled in any 
material way by the ballot summary or proposed amendment due to 
the use of the terms “viability,” “health,” and “healthcare provider.” 
Regarding whether ambiguity in the text of a proposed 
amendment can be the basis for a finding that the proposal is 
invalid, we acknowledge tension in our case law.  But we have never 
 
- 29 - 
given a reasoned explanation of any basis for applying the 
requirements designed to prevent misleading ballot summaries as a 
substantive limitation on the content of a proposed amendment.  
And our most recent pronouncement on the subject is in 
Department of State v. Hollander, 256 So. 3d 1300, 1311 (Fla. 
2018), in which we unequivocally stated: “[T]his Court has held that 
it will not strike a proposal from the ballot based upon an argument 
concerning ‘the ambiguous legal effect of the amendment’s text 
rather than the clarity of the ballot title and summary.’ ” (quoting 
Voter Control of Gambling, 215 So. 3d at 1216).  We see no reason to 
depart from our most recent ruling on this question. 
The opponents emphasize our decision in Askew v. Firestone, 
421 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1982).  But Askew is entirely inapposite.  In 
Askew, we determined that the chief purpose of the proposed 
amendment was “to remove the two-year ban on lobbying by former 
legislators and elected officers.”  Id. at 156.  We found the ballot 
summary to be fatally defective because although it “indicate[d] that 
the amendment [wa]s a restriction on one’s lobbying activities, the 
amendment actually g[ave] incumbent office holders, upon filing a 
financial disclosure statement, a right to immediately commence 
 
- 30 - 
lobbying before their former agencies which [wa]s . . . precluded.”  
Id. at 155-56.  In other words, the ballot summary was fatally 
misleading because it operated to permit something when it said 
that it was “[p]rohibit[ing]” something.  Id. at 153.  No similar 
infirmity exists in this case.  As previously stated, “[t]hat the 
proposed amendment’s principal goal and chief purpose is to limit 
government interference with abortion is plainly stated in terms 
that clearly and unambiguously reflect the text of the proposed 
amendment.”  Supra at 19.   
The decision in Wadhams v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Sarasota County, 567 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1990), is likewise 
distinguishable from the circumstances here.  In Wadhams, the full 
text of a charter provision—with amendments engrossed—was 
placed on the ballot so that the voters were not informed of what 
was being changed in the text of the charter.  Id. at 415.  We held 
“that the chief purpose of the amendment was to curtail the Charter 
Review Board’s right to meet,” but nothing on the ballot gave the 
voter information necessary to understand that fact.  Id. at 416.  
Nothing like that is occurring in this case. 
 
- 31 - 
We are told by dissenting colleagues that “the vagueness of the 
proposed amendment itself leaves many key issues undetermined.”  
Dissenting op. at 46 (Grosshans, J.).  Indeed, we are advised that 
the “language and structure” of the proposed amendment are 
“overwhelmingly vague and ambiguous” and that the proposal in 
fact has “no readily discernible meaning.”  Dissenting op. at 66 
(Sasso, J.).  We are further instructed that the summary—in 
tracking the text of the proposed amendment—“does not attempt to 
explain that the amendment itself is similarly vague and 
ambiguous.”  Id. at 76.  Furthermore, the supposed ambiguity is 
not “self-evident from the vague and ambiguous nature of the 
summary.”  Id.  We are also told that the language of the summary 
and proposed amendment “hides the ball” and “explains nothing” 
but then are instructed on a series of far-reaching “effects” gleaned 
from that very language.  Dissenting op. at 53 (Francis, J.).  Again, 
as we have explained, the suggestion that an amendment sponsor 
must use a ballot summary to “clarify” the text of an assertedly 
vague proposal ignores limits on the sponsor’s own authority.  And 
we see no basis in law or common sense to require a ballot 
summary to announce, as if in a warning label, “caution: this 
 
- 32 - 
amendment contains terms with contestable meanings or 
applications.”  Voters can see and decide for themselves how the 
specificity of the proposal’s terms relates to the proposal’s merits.  
For reasons that are evident from what we have already said, none 
of this is convincing.3 
Lawyers are adept at finding ambiguity.  Show me the text and 
I’ll show you the ambiguity.  The predominant reasoning in the 
dissents would set this Court up as the master of the constitution 
with unfettered discretion to find a proposed amendment 
ambiguous and then to deprive the people of the right to be the 
judges of the merits of the proposal.  It would open up a playground 
for motivated reasoning and judicial willfulness.  This Court has an 
 
 
3.  It is also suggested that the voters should be informed that 
the proposed amendment “could, and likely would, impact how 
personhood is defined for purposes of article I, section 2 of our 
constitution.”  Dissenting op. at 49 (Grosshans, J.).  The 
constitutional status of a preborn child under existing article I, 
section 2 presents complex and unsettled questions.  Until our 
decision today to recede from T.W., this Court’s jurisprudence for 
the past thirty-odd years had assumed that preborn human beings 
are not constitutional persons.  See T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193-94 
(treating the fetus as only “potential life”), receded from on other 
grounds by Planned Parenthood of Sw. & Cent. Fla., No. SC2022-
1050 (Apr. 1, 2024).  Given the unsettled nature of this issue, any 
“disclosure” would be speculative and therefore unwarranted. 
 
- 33 - 
important role in determining the validity of proposed amendments 
and ensuring that ballot summaries do not mislead the voters.  But 
nothing in the law of this state gives the Court a stranglehold on the 
amendment process.  We decline to adopt a standard that would 
effectively vest us with the power to bar an amendment from the 
ballot because of a supposed ambiguity in the text of the 
amendment.  We decline to encroach on the prerogative to amend 
their constitution that the people have reserved to themselves. 
D.  Facial Invalidity 
In 2020, section 16.061(1), Florida Statutes, was amended to 
direct the Attorney General that in addition to requesting an 
advisory opinion regarding the compliance of a proposed 
amendment and ballot language with article XI, section 3 and 
section 101.161, she also requests an opinion as to “whether the 
proposed amendment is facially invalid under the United States 
Constitution.”  See ch. 2020-15, § 2, Laws of Fla.  Despite this 
directive, the Attorney General failed to request that we issue an 
opinion concerning the facial invalidity of the proposed amendment 
in this proceeding, and only one opponent contends that the 
proposed amendment is facially invalid.  Opponent Center for Life 
 
- 34 - 
argues that the proposed amendment is facially invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,4 because it is 
preempted by federal law, namely 18 U.S.C. § 1531, which prohibits 
partial-birth abortion.5  Specifically, the Center for Life argues that 
the “viability provision” of the proposed amendment—which 
purportedly would ban any law that “prohibit[s], penalize[s], 
delay[s], or restrict[s] abortion before viability”—sets up an 
inherent, irreconcilable conflict with federal law because the 
proposed amendment’s efforts to prohibit any restriction on 
 
 
4.  See art. VI, cl. 2, U.S. Const. (“This Constitution, and the 
Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
 
 
5.  Under federal law, partial-birth abortion is defined as  
 
deliberately and intentionally vaginally deliver[ing] a 
living fetus until, in the case of a head-first presentation, 
the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, 
in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal 
trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother, 
for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person 
knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus[,] 
18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A), and is prohibited unless “necessary to 
save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical 
disorder, physical illness, or physical injury,” 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a).   
 
- 35 - 
previability abortion cannot coexist with the federal ban on partial-
birth abortion.  Neither the Sponsor nor any of the proponents 
addressed the Center for Life’s argument.   
Assuming congressional preemption is even an appropriate 
consideration for this Court in assessing facial validity,6 there is no 
basis for accepting the Center for Life’s argument here.  For a 
provision of state law, including a state constitutional amendment, 
“to be held facially unconstitutional, the challenger must 
demonstrate that no set of circumstances exists in which the 
[provision] can be constitutionally applied.”  Abdool v. Bondi, 141 
So. 3d 529, 538 (Fla. 2014).  The federal prohibition on partial-birth 
abortion would by no means invalidate the proposed amendment in 
all its applications.  
 
6.  As a threshold issue, no one has briefed whether section 
16.061 uses the phrase “invalid under the United States 
Constitution” to include any proposed amendment that would be 
preempted by an act of Congress or if that phrase should instead be 
interpreted to apply only if a proposed amendment is in conflict 
with a substantive provision of the United States Constitution.  See 
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re: Adult Personal Use of Marijuana, 
SC2023-0682, at 16 note 7 (Apr. 1, 2024). 
 
- 36 - 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the proposed amendment complies with the 
single-subject requirement of article XI, section 3 of the Florida 
Constitution, and that the ballot title and summary comply with 
section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes.  And there is no basis for 
concluding that the proposed amendment is facially invalid under 
the United States Constitution.  Accordingly, we approve the 
proposed amendment for placement on the ballot. 
No rehearing will be permitted. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, LABARGA, and COURIEL, JJ., concur. 
MUÑIZ, C.J., concurs with an opinion, in which CANADY and 
COURIEL, JJ., concur. 
GROSSHANS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SASSO, J., 
concurs. 
FRANCIS, J., dissents with an opinion. 
SASSO, J., dissents with an opinion, in which GROSSHANS and 
FRANCIS, JJ., concur. 
 
MUÑIZ, C.J., concurring. 
 
 
Animating the majority’s decision today is the constitutional 
principle that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people.”  Art. I, 
§ 1, Fla. Const.  A judge’s obedience to that principle does not 
signal personal indifference to the objective justice of a proposed 
 
- 37 - 
constitutional amendment.  It also does not imply that our legal 
tradition views considerations of justice as irrelevant to legal 
interpretation.  See, e.g., Bancroft Inv. Corp. v. City of Jacksonville, 
27 So. 2d 162, 171 (Fla. 1946) (“If the positive law (constitution or 
statute) does not give a direct answer to the question, the court is at 
liberty on the factual basis to indulge the rule of reason to reach a 
result consonant with law and justice.”).  Instead, our Court’s 
constrained role in the amendment process is dictated by the 
limited authority and task the people have assigned us. 
 
By contrast, questions of justice are appropriately at the heart 
of the voters’ assessment of a proposed amendment like the one 
under review.  With its reference to the existence of “inalienable 
rights” in all persons, our constitution’s Declaration of Rights 
assumes a pre-constitutional, objective moral reality that demands 
our respect—indeed, a moral order that government exists to 
protect.  The proposed amendment would constitutionalize 
restrictions on the people’s authority to use law to protect an entire 
class of human beings from private harm.  It would cast into doubt 
the people’s authority even to enact protections that are prudent, 
compassionate, and mindful of the complexities involved.  Under 
 
- 38 - 
our system of government, it is up to the voters—not this Court—to 
decide whether such a rule is consistent with the deepest 
commitments of our political community. 
 
With these considerations in mind, we fully concur in the 
Court’s opinion. 
CANADY and COURIEL, JJ., concur. 
 
GROSSHANS, J., dissenting. 
In the decades after Roe v. Wade was decided, abortion was 
rarely an issue on which the public made decisions—either directly 
or through their elected representatives.  See Roe, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973).  Instead, the courts acted as policymakers, and judges 
determined the boundaries and scope of abortion regulations.  
However, courts were unable to settle the complicated issues 
surrounding abortion, and even the U.S. Supreme Court struggled 
to justify the constitutional basis for such a right.  See id. at 153 
(holding that abortion is a constitutional right as part of the “right 
of privacy”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
846 (1992) (joint opinion) (“Constitutional protection of the woman’s 
decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (emphasis added)); cf. Dobbs 
 
- 39 - 
v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 279 (2022) (“The 
Court [in Casey] abandoned any reliance on a privacy right and 
instead grounded the abortion right entirely on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”). 
Stressing these points and others, the Supreme Court 
relinquished the power that Roe claimed—returning the issue of 
abortion “to the people and their elected representatives.”  
See Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 259.  Now, in the post-Dobbs era, citizens 
must wrestle with how to balance the compelling interests of bodily 
autonomy and unborn life, while considering scientific advances, 
policy choices, and serious ethical implications.  Cf. Casey, 505 
U.S. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The permissibility of abortion, and the 
limitations upon it, are to be resolved like most important questions 
in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and 
then voting.”).  These are difficult issues, and both sides of the 
debate have acted, at times rashly, in an attempt to resolve an issue 
on which there is little consensus.  And we are reminded, yet again, 
what has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court many times—
 
- 40 - 
abortion is fundamentally different.  See Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 257; 
Roe, 410 U.S. at 159; Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (joint opinion). 
Today, we consider an initiative that proposes to amend our 
constitution by providing express protection for abortion 
procedures.  The proposed amendment, with one exception, broadly 
forbids any “law” “prohibit[ing], penaliz[ing], delay[ing], or 
restrict[ing] abortion before viability or when necessary to protect 
the patient’s health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare 
provider.” 
We have described our role in these advisory opinions as 
narrow.  We determine if the proposed amendment meets our 
constitution’s single-subject requirement and assess whether the 
ballot summary offers an explanatory statement of the amendment’s 
chief purpose.  See In re Advisory Op. to Att’y. Gen. re Use of 
Marijuana for Debilitating Med. Conditions, 181 So. 3d 471, 478 (Fla. 
2015); cf. art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const. (single-subject rule); § 101.161, 
Fla. Stat. (2023) (requiring summary to set forth “explanatory 
statement . . . of the chief purpose of the measure”). 
Nevertheless, as revealed by our precedent, the precise scope 
of our review in this advisory role is subject to debate.  The majority 
 
- 41 - 
implies that we check to see if the summary and title track the 
amendment’s text.  See majority op. at 23-24 (collecting cases 
which involved summaries that tracked the proposed amendments).  
However, in a long line of decisions, we have consistently 
interpreted our role to be more comprehensive and have examined 
the material legal effects of the amendment—thereby ensuring that 
the voters are not misled and have fair notice of the decision before 
them on the ballot.  See, e.g., Wadhams v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of 
Sarasota Cnty., 567 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. 1990); Dep’t of State v. 
Fla. Greyhound Ass’n, Inc., 253 So. 3d 513, 520 (Fla. 2018) (“Ballot 
language may be clearly and conclusively defective either in an 
affirmative sense, because it misleads the voters as to the material 
effects of the amendment, or in a negative sense by failing to inform 
the voters of those material effects.” (emphasis added)); Advisory Op. 
to Att’y Gen. re Prohibits Possession of Defined Assault Weapons 
(Assault Weapons), 296 So. 3d 376, 381 (Fla. 2020) (same).  As 
Justice Sasso notes in her dissent, no party in this case has argued 
that our precedent applying this approach in ballot-summary 
review is erroneous.  And under this approach, we have found both 
citizens’ initiative proposals and legislatively proposed ballot 
 
- 42 - 
initiatives to be defective.  Yet, to my knowledge, the Legislature has 
not acted to restrict or narrow this Court’s role in reviewing a ballot 
summary, nor has it attempted to clarify that our interpretation is 
improper. 
Accordingly, our precedent supports the conclusion that our 
statutory duty requires more than simply inspecting the summary 
for technical compliance.  Instead, we determine if the summary 
clearly explains the chief purpose of the amendment.  This will, at 
times, require the summary do more than simply echo the 
amendment’s text.  
We have stated many times that the summary and title must 
be accurate and informative so that the “electorate is advised of the 
true meaning, and ramifications, of an amendment.”  See, e.g., 
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Tax Limitation, 644 So. 2d 486, 490 
(Fla. 1994) (emphasis added); Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Med. 
Liab. Claimant’s Comp. Amend., 880 So. 2d 675, 679 (Fla. 2004) 
(“These requirements make certain that the ‘electorate is advised of 
the true meaning, and ramifications, of an amendment.’ ” (quoting 
Tax Limitation, 644 So. 2d at 490)); Detzner v. League of Women 
Voters of Fla., 256 So. 3d 803, 807 (Fla. 2018) (same).  And I 
 
- 43 - 
acknowledge that the summary “need not explain every detail or 
ramification of the proposed amendment” so long as they “give the 
voter fair notice of the decision he or she must make.”  Detzner, 256 
So. 3d at 807 (citations omitted). 
However, I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that if the 
summary is an “almost verbatim recitation of the text of the 
proposed amendment” it cannot be misleading.  Majority op. at 23.  
The majority finds that a parroting summary cannot be affirmatively 
“mislead[ing] . . . regarding the actual text of the proposed 
amendment.”  Id.  That, however, fails to address if the summary is 
negatively misleading for omitting material legal effects.  And in 
declining to consider this point, the majority distinguishes our 
opinion in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Adult Use of 
Marijuana, 315 So. 3d 1176 (Fla. 2021) (rejecting a summary for 
omitting material language found in the amendment), seemingly 
characterizing that case as the axiomatic example of misleading by 
omission.   
The majority also does not account for the numerous other 
cases that have rejected summaries for misleading by omission, and 
others that have approved summaries while reaffirming that 
 
- 44 - 
doctrine.  We have repeatedly reaffirmed the broader holding that 
summaries must tell voters the amendment’s legal effects.  See, e.g., 
Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1355 (Fla. 1984) (the summary 
“should tell the voter the legal effect of the amendment, and no 
more”); Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Fla. Marriage Prot. Amend., 926 
So. 2d 1229, 1238 (Fla. 2006) (same); Assault Weapons, 296 So. 3d 
at 381 (ballot can be clearly and conclusively defective “in a 
negative sense by failing to inform the voters [of] material effects of 
the amendment” (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right to 
Competitive Energy Mkt. for Customers of Inv’r-Owned Utils., 287 So. 
3d 1256, 1260 (Fla. 2020)); Greyhound, 253 So. 3d at 520 (same). 
Although we have indicated that parroting the language of an 
amendment in the summary may easily satisfy the misleading 
prong,7 we have never claimed that doing so would always be 
 
7.  See Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Voting Restoration Amend., 
215 So. 3d 1202, 1208 (Fla. 2017) (“[T]he ballot title and summary 
also do not mislead voters with regard to the actual content of the 
proposed amendment.  Rather, together they recite the language of 
the amendment almost in full.”); Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re 
Prohibiting State Spending for Experimentation that Involves the 
Destruction of a Live Hum. Embryo, 959 So. 2d 210, 214 (Fla. 2007) 
(upholding a summary that contained language identical to that in 
the proposed amendment); Fla. Marriage Prot. Amend., 926 So. 2d 
at 1236-40 (upholding a summary that reiterated almost all of the 
 
- 45 - 
sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements.  For example, in 
Wadhams, we found that even though a ballot contained “the entire 
section as it would actually appear subsequent to amendment,” it 
still “fail[ed] to contain an explanatory statement of the amendment” 
and thus was “deceptive, because although it contains an 
absolutely true statement, it omits to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statement made not misleading.”  567 So. 2d 
at 416; see also Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7, 15-16, 18 (Fla. 
2000).8  Nor have we receded from our cases requiring the summary 
to inform the voter as to material legal effects.  See Live Human 
Embryo, 959 So. 2d at 215.  Sometimes a verbatim summary will 
capture the material legal effects contained in the amendment.  But 
sometimes it will not.  See, e.g., Wadhams, 567 So. 2d at 416. 
 
language contained in the amendment); Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. 
re Med. Liab. Claimant’s Comp. Amend., 880 So. 2d at 679 (same).  
  
8.  Even where we have upheld a ballot summary, we have still 
reaffirmed Wadhams and its logic, reiterating our precedents 
against parroting while approving a summary because it “is an 
accurate description of what the proposed amendment will do, 
consistent with the requirement that ballot language accurately 
represent the main legal effect and ramifications of a proposed 
amendment.”  Detzner v. Anstead, 256 So. 3d 820, 824 (Fla. 2018) 
(emphases added) (first citing Armstrong, 773 So. 2d at 12; and 
then citing Wadhams, 567 So. 2d at 417-18). 
 
- 46 - 
Turning to this ballot summary, the vagueness of the proposed 
amendment itself leaves many key issues undetermined.  Thus, as 
Justice Sasso notes, we ask: “[I]s the Sponsor relieved of its 
obligation to explain the legal effect of the proposed amendment 
just because the amendment has no readily discernable meaning?” 
Dissenting op. at 75-76 (Sasso, J.)  Like Justice Sasso, I conclude 
the answer is no and agree with her detailed analysis that the 
summary’s language fails to convey the amendment’s ramifications 
to the voter.  
The majority implies that I am concerned only with “ambiguity 
in the text of the amendment” itself.  Majority op. at 33.  That is not 
so.  On the contrary, it is the summary that has failed to adequately 
explain the amendment.  In my view, the summary does not give 
the voter any clarity on the decision they must actually make or 
reveal the amendment’s chief purpose.  Instead, it misleads by 
omission and fails to convey the breadth of what the amendment 
actually accomplishes—to enshrine broad, undefined terms in our 
constitution that will lead to decades of litigation.  
A voter may think this amendment simply returns Florida to a 
pre-Dobbs status quo.  It does not.  A voter may think that a 
 
- 47 - 
healthcare provider would be clearly defined as a licensed physician 
specializing in women’s health.  It is not.  A voter may think that 
viability falls within a readily apparent time frame.  It does not.  A 
voter may think that the comma is an insignificant grammatical tool 
that would have very little interpretive purpose.  It will not.  And, 
critically, the voter may think this amendment results in settling 
this issue once and for all.  It does not.  Instead, this amendment 
returns abortion issues back to the courts to interpret scope, 
boundary, definitions, and policy, effectively removing it from the 
people and their elected representatives.  Perhaps this is a choice 
that Floridians wish to make, but it should be done with clarity as 
to their vote’s ramifications and not based on a misleading ballot 
summary. 
To be clear, I do not criticize the content of the proposed 
amendment itself.  The amendment’s sponsors may draft an 
amendment as they see fit.  But, contrary to the majority’s 
assessment, it would seem “common sense” that the language a 
sponsor chooses clearly affects what must be included in the 
summary to meet the statutory requirements.  The sponsor’s 
burden to properly summarize the material legal effects of a 
 
- 48 - 
proposed amendment is not lessened by its decision to include 
undefined terms or broad, abstract language.  
Moreover, the breadth of this amendment would likely impact 
existing constitutional provisions.  Article I, section 2, a provision of 
our constitution’s Declaration of Rights, states that “[a]ll natural 
persons . . . are equal before the law and have inalienable rights,” 
including “the right to enjoy and defend life.”  Art. I, § 2, Fla. Const.  
We have held time and again that a summary must “identify 
the provisions of the constitution substantially affected by the 
proposed amendment.”  Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care 
Providers, 705 So. 2d at 566 (citing Tax Limitation, 644 So. 2d at 
490).  This is required “in order for the public to fully comprehend 
the contemplated changes.”  Id.9   
 
9.  The requirement that a summary list substantially affected 
provisions is so embedded in our jurisprudence that some older 
cases have described it as being rooted in our constitution.  See 
Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 989-90 (Fla. 1984); Tax 
Limitation, 644 So. 2d at 490; Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Right of 
Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 So. 2d 563, 565-66 
(Fla. 1998) (reiterating that “it is imperative that an initiative 
identify the provisions of the constitution substantially affected by 
the proposed amendment”); Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Amend. to 
Bar Gov’t from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Pub. 
Educ., 778 So. 2d 888, 892 (Fla. 2000) (same).  More recently, we 
have found that the modern clarity statute requires the same rule.  
 
- 49 - 
The amendment’s potential effects on article I, section 2 have 
present significance, even though we don’t have the benefit of a 
robust body of case law on the topic.  That is, the public should be 
made aware that the scope of the amendment could, and likely 
would, impact how personhood is defined for purposes of article I, 
section 2 of our constitution.  The voters are owed that “candor and 
accuracy.”  See majority op. at 27 (quoting Greyhound, 253 So. 3d 
at 520).  
I do not deny that the return of abortion policy to the states in 
the wake of Dobbs has resulted in a minefield of potential issues, 
many of which are “unsettled.”  Majority op. at 32 n.3.  As I 
previously discussed, citizens have not been asked to contend with 
these questions in decades.  In similar fashion, this Court has failed 
to address whether the rights guaranteed in article I, section 2 
apply to the unborn and, if so, what the scope of those rights could 
 
See Treating People Differently Based on Race, 778 So. 2d at 898 
(rejecting a ballot summary as misleading under section 101.161 
because it failed to mention its effect on article I, section 2’s 
nondiscrimination provision; concluding that “the ballot titles are 
defective because of the misleading negative implication that no 
such constitutional provision addressing differential treatment 
currently exists”). 
 
 
- 50 - 
be.  However, our failure to decide on this issue does not render the 
provision void.  Nor does it alleviate a sponsor’s duty to advise the 
voter of impact.  Nowhere has this requirement to inform been 
arbitrarily limited to substantial effects on issues that this Court 
has already weighed in on.  Cf. Greyhound, 253 So. 3d at 523 
(evaluating substantial effect on then-recently added article X, 
section 23, and citing no cases for its interpretation).  While a 
substantial effect would be even more obvious if we had previously 
addressed this issue, our silence should not eliminate a citizen’s 
right to be informed.  If advised of the conflict, the voter could 
recognize for themselves that, at some level, an amendment 
providing broad protection for abortion would bear upon 
constitutional personhood rights as applied to the unborn child.  
Thus, the voter would be able to consider the choice before them 
and the decision they must make.  See Fine, 448 So. 2d at 989.  
Accordingly, I cannot say that failing to inform voters as to the 
proposed amendment’s impact on article I, section 2 is acceptable.   
In summary, Floridians have the right to amend their 
constitution through the initiative process, and it is an integral part 
of our state’s commitment to responsible citizenship.  However, 
 
- 51 - 
there are constitutional and statutory requirements that must be 
satisfied in order for an amendment to reach the ballot.  Holding a 
sponsor to those requirements is far from what the majority 
characterizes as a “stranglehold on the amendment process.”  See 
majority op. at 33.  Consequently, I find the ballot summary 
conclusively defective for failing to inform the voter of the material 
legal effects of the amendment, including the substantial effect this 
amendment could have on article I, section 2 of our constitution.  
This conclusion requires me to respectfully dissent from the 
majority’s opinion.  
SASSO, J., concurs. 
 
FRANCIS, J., dissenting. 
The issue of abortion is incredibly divisive.  See Dobbs v. 
Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 292 (2022) (“Roe [v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)] ‘inflamed’ a national issue that has 
remained bitterly divisive for the past half century.  And for the past 
30 years, [Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.] Casey [505 U.S. 883 
(1992)] has done the same.” (citations omitted)).  
When Dobbs found there was no federal constitutional right to 
it, the Court “return[ed] the issue of abortion to the people’s elected 
 
- 52 - 
representatives.”  Id. at 232.  Our elected representatives here in 
Florida did address the issue of abortion legislatively.  See §§ 
390.011-.0111, .0112, Fla. Stat. (2023).  But those laws have faced 
legal challenges.  
Simultaneously, groups have undertaken the use of the 
initiative process, see art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const., to enshrine abortion 
in our state constitution.   
Today, we are asked to opine on one such effort—an 
Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion.10  
As written, the title and the ballot summary (which parrots the 
amendment) fail to give the voters what they need to make an 
 
 
10.  Specifically, we must determine whether the language of 
this proposed amendment embraces but one subject, see art. XI, § 
3, Fla. Const., and whether the ballot summary explains the “chief 
purpose” of the proposed amendment in clear, unambiguous, non-
misleading terms, § 101.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2023).  The short ballot 
title must also be clear, unambiguous, and non-misleading.  
Together, the ballot summary and title must “ ‘provide fair notice of 
the content of the proposed amendment’ to voters so that they ‘will 
not be misled as to [the proposed amendment’s] purpose, and can 
cast an intelligent and informed ballot.’ ”  Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. 
re Voter Control of Gambling, 215 So. 3d 1209, 1215 (Fla. 2017) 
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Advisory Op. to 
Att’y Gen. re Right of Citizens to Choose Health Care Providers, 705 
So. 2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1998)).   
 
- 53 - 
informed decision; thus, both violate the truth-in-packaging law.  § 
101.161(1), Fla. Stat. 
The title fails to communicate to the voters that the purpose of 
the proposed amendment is ending (as opposed to “limiting”) 
legislative and executive action on abortion, while inviting limitless 
and protracted litigation in the courts because of its use of vague 
and undefined terms.  Just as it played out on the federal stage for 
over 50 years, the issue of abortion—far from the people settling the 
matter—will continue to be decided by each iteration of this Court. 
And the summary hides the ball as to the chief purpose of the 
proposed amendment: which, ultimately, is to—for the first time in 
Florida history—grant an almost unrestricted right to abortion.11    
Because the summary only parrots the language of the 
proposed amendment, it explains nothing, and does not disclose its 
chief purpose.  See § 101.161(1), Fla. Stat.  The fact that the 
 
 
11.  I disagree with the majority’s conclusions that “the broad 
sweep of this proposed amendment is obvious in the language of 
the summary,” majority op. at 19, and that “[t]he ballot title’s 
inclusion of the word ‘limit’ is . . . not misleading but accurately 
explains that the Legislature will retain authority to ‘interfere[] with’ 
abortions under certain circumstances.”  Majority op. at 21 (second 
alteration in original). 
 
- 54 - 
language has a “broad sweep,” see majority op. at 19, as to its “no 
law” restriction, to me, doesn’t end the inquiry.  Rather, the sponsor 
is statutorily and constitutionally required to provide the voter an 
explanation of the summary’s vague language (e.g., as to what 
constitutes “health” or who may qualify as a “healthcare provider”), 
as well as tell the voter of the amendment’s chief effects.  This is not 
some run-of-the-mill restoration of Roe—it goes far beyond that into 
uncharted territory in this State.    
As to the majority’s statement that the Court cannot place a 
“stranglehold” on the initiative process, majority op. at 33, I could 
not agree more!  But this is not that.  It is my view that while the 
constitution enshrines the reserved right of the people to amend 
their constitution, this Court also has a role in ensuring the people 
can exercise that right free of anything that would mislead them or 
present them with ambiguity.  See art. V, § 3(b)(10), art. IV, § 10, 
art. XI, § 3, Fla. Const.; § 101.161, Fla. Stat.12  And quite simply, 
 
 
12.  See supra note 10. 
 
- 55 - 
for the reasons expressed in greater detail here and elsewhere, the 
summary and title, I submit, don’t pass muster.13 
The effects I discern from the parroted-proposed-amendment 
summary here—which effects are the best evidence of its chief 
purpose—are fourfold:  
(1) to immediately abrogate meaningful abortion laws and 
restrictions;  
(2) to eliminate any meaningful, future participation by the 
Legislature by prohibiting any laws on previability abortions and 
subjecting any laws regulating postviability abortions to a 
“healthcare provider’s” veto;  
(3) to—by eliminating the Legislature’s interference—vastly 
expand the right to abortion at any time during pregnancy as a 
“health” issue for the mother; and  
 
 
13.  I also remain convinced that our precedent has read the 
single-subject requirement far too broadly.  However, as I tackle 
that topic in my dissent in Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General 
re Adult Personal Use of Marijuana, SC2023-0682 (Apr. 1, 2024) 
(Francis, J., dissenting), I limit my dissent here to the proposal’s 
violation of the truth-in-packaging provisions. 
 
- 56 - 
(4) troublingly, to—by ignoring the State’s legitimate interests 
in protecting life—completely redefine abortion as a health issue in 
Florida without saying so.  
I address these four effects—that are left unexplained by the 
summary—in part I, below.  And in part II, I further address why 
the title will mislead voters.   
I. Ballot Summary 
(1) 
First, the ballot summary doesn’t explain that the scope and 
immediate impact of the “no law” language is to abrogate Florida’s 
current prohibitions, restrictions, and regulations on both pre and 
postviability abortions.  This includes current laws defining viability 
and drawing the line at a certain number of weeks, §§ 390.011(15), 
.0111(1), Fla. Stat. (2023); those requiring a sonogram and 
informed consent, § 390.0111(3), Fla. Stat. (2023); and those 
prohibiting abortions postviability with limited exceptions.  §§ 
390.0111(1)(a)-(c), .0112, Fla. Stat. (2023). 
The summary also provides that the Legislature can’t make 
laws interfering with a “healthcare provider’s” determination that a 
 
- 57 - 
late term abortion is medically necessary for the sake of the 
patient’s “health.”   
“Health” is undefined and, thus, not limited to just life-
threatening physical conditions.  Rather, “health” could mean 
anything, really.  And “health” seems to include nebulous 
conditions that could be used to justify a late term abortion.  The 
ballot summary does not explain this. 
(2) 
Second, the ballot summary doesn’t explain that the proposed 
amendment effectively eliminates the Legislature’s ability to pass 
laws in the future regulating abortion in any meaningful, 
substantive way.  This prohibition applies to previability 
pregnancies.  But it applies to postviability pregnancies, too, 
because the undefined “healthcare provider” gets a veto over any 
laws the Legislature might be able to pass to protect the unborn as 
long as said “healthcare provider” decides a “health” issue exists 
necessitating an abortion.14  The ballot summary does not explain 
this.   
 
 
14.  I completely agree with Justice Sasso’s excellent dissent 
concerning the vagueness of the language used by the sponsor, 
 
- 58 - 
(3) 
Third, the ballot summary doesn’t explain that by eliminating 
the Legislature’s ability to meaningfully pass laws regulating 
abortion either pre or postviability, and housing the proposed 
amendment under Article I’s “Declaration of Rights” in the Florida 
Constitution, the amendment vastly expands the right to abortion 
beyond anything Florida has ever done in the history of the State.     
Whatever limits on the “right” to abortion remain are placed 
squarely in the “healthcare provider’s” hands as ultimate 
decisionmaker.  The ballot summary neither explains nor discloses 
this.  
(4) 
Fourth, the summary doesn’t explain that the proposed 
amendment implicitly and completely redefines the abortion issue 
as a “patient’s health” issue without acknowledging what even Roe 
and Casey acknowledged: the State’s compelling interest in 
 
though, arguendo, for purposes of my dissent, I assume that the 
placement of the comma means the worst-case scenario: the 
“healthcare provider” also determines viability.  See dissenting op. 
at 74-75 (Sasso, J.). 
 
- 59 - 
protecting “the potentiality of human life,” particularly viable 
pregnancies.  See Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 228, 271 (defining “viability” 
as the ability to survive outside the womb).15  
While I recognize that our review in ballot initiative cases is 
narrow, this case is different because abortion is different.  Dobbs, 
597 U.S. at 218 (Syllabus) (“Abortion is different because it destroys 
what Roe termed ‘potential life’ . . . .  None of the other decisions 
cited by Roe and Casey involved the critical moral question posed 
by abortion.”).  The exercise of a “right” to an abortion literally 
results in a devastating infringement on the right of another person: 
the right to live.  And our Florida Constitution recognizes that “life” 
is a “basic right” for “[a]ll natural persons.”  Art. I, § 2, Fla. Const.  
One must recognize the unborn’s competing right to life and the 
State’s moral duty to protect that life. 
 
 
15.  Roe found that “in ‘the stage subsequent to viability,’ 
which in 1973 roughly coincided with the beginning of the third 
trimester, the State’s interest in the ‘potentiality of human life’ 
became compelling, and therefore a State could ‘regulate, and even 
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.’ ”  Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 271 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65). 
 
- 60 - 
Contrary to what the summary—which parrots the proposed 
amendment—suggests, abortion is not just about a medical 
procedure, and it is not just about the rights of women to bodily 
integrity.  “Abortion presents a profound moral issue on which 
Americans hold sharply conflicting views.”  Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 
223.16  The summary does not address this.  Instead, it is a Trojan 
horse for the elimination of any recognition of the State’s interest in 
protecting what Roe termed “potential life.” 
II. Title 
Based on the four points above, it is clear that the title is also 
misleading in its use of the term “limit government interference.”  A 
more truthful title may be “eliminating the Legislature’s ability to 
regulate abortion in any meaningful way.” 
 
 
16.  “Some believe fervently that a human person comes into 
being at conception and that abortion ends an innocent life.”  Id. at 
223-24.  “Others feel just as strongly that any regulation of abortion 
invades a woman’s right to control her own body and prevents 
women from achieving full equality.”  Id. at 224.  “Still others in a 
third group think that abortion should be allowed under some but 
not all circumstances, and those within this group hold a variety of 
views about the particular restrictions that should be imposed.”  Id. 
at 223-25.   
 
- 61 - 
Beyond this, the current title isn’t even accurate because it 
does not limit government interference: it actively encourages it.  
This is so because the prohibition on the law- and rule-making 
authority of the legislative and executive branches does not extend 
to the judicial branch.  In fact, quite the opposite: the summary—
which parrots the amendment—reflects multiple undefined terms 
that invite protracted litigation and, thus, limitless interference by 
the judicial branch of government.   
This is exactly what happened after Roe, when abortion was 
recognized as a fundamental right under the United States 
Constitution.  It led to 50 years of protracted litigation and to the 
courts continually policing state provisions seeking to protect the 
lives of both the unborn and their mothers.17 
 
 
17.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52 (1976) (blocking Missouri law requiring spousal consent for 
abortion); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (reversing decision 
striking a Connecticut law that excluded abortion services from 
Medicaid coverage); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) 
(striking Pennsylvania law requiring physicians to save the life of a 
potentially viable fetus as unconstitutionally vague); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding federal law proscribing 
federal funding for abortions except for abortions necessary to 
either preserve the mother’s life or terminate pregnancies resulting 
from rape or incest); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) 
(upholding Utah law requiring parental notification when the 
 
- 62 - 
After Dobbs returned the abortion issue to the states, both 
abortion proponents and opponents identified the states as the new 
abortion battleground and started filing lawsuits in the courts.18  
 
patient is a minor living with parents); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (striking portions of Ohio 
law imposing limitations, such as a waiting period, parental consent 
without judicial bypass, and a ban on abortions outside of hospitals 
after the first trimester); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking Pennsylvania law 
requiring informed consent to include information about fetal 
development and alternatives to abortion); Webster v. Reprod. 
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding Missouri law that 
required physician viability testing and blocked state funding and 
state facility participation in abortion services); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(announcing “undue burden” test in landmark case striking 
portions of Pennsylvania abortion law); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703 (2000) (upholding Colorado law limiting protest and leafletting 
close to an abortion clinic); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) 
(striking Nebraska law banning partial birth abortion); Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding 2003 federal law banning 
partial birth abortion). 
 
18.  See Center for Reproductive Rights, New Digital Tool 
Provides State-by-State Analysis of High Court Rulings on Abortion, 
https://reproductiverights.org/state-constitutions-abortion-rights-
digital-tool (last visited Mar. 14, 2024) (“Since the U.S. Supreme 
Court eliminated the federal constitutional right to abortion in its 
2022 ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 
states have become the battlegrounds for abortion rights.”); Alliance 
Defending Freedom, “What You May Not Know: How ADF Helped 
Overturn Roe v. Wade,” https://adflegal.org/article/what-you-may-
not-know-how-adf-helped-overturn-roe-v-wade (last visited Mar. 27, 
2024) (“Roe v. Wade has finally been overturned.  But this does not 
mean the work of the pro-life movement is over—far from it  . . . .”; 
playing video of ADF CEO, President, and General Counsel Kristen 
 
- 63 - 
Those state lawsuits began immediately.19  According to the 
Brennan Center for Justice’s “State Court Abortion Litigation 
 
Waggoner explaining that there are now generally four areas of 
abortion laws that will be litigated post-Dobbs: (1) trigger laws (state 
laws with provisions restricting or prohibition abortion to some 
degree upon Roe being overturned); (2) pre-Roe laws limiting 
abortion; (3) post-Roe/pre-Dobbs laws stricken under Roe; and (4) 
post-Dobbs (new) laws restricting and regulating abortions); Becky 
Sullivan, “With Roe Overturned, State Constitutions Are Now at the 
Center of the Abortion Fight,” 
https://www.npr.org/2022/06/29/1108251712/roe-v-wade-
abortion-ruling-state-constitutions (last visited Mar. 14, 2024) 
(“Now, with Roe v. Wade overturned, the legal spotlight has shifted 
to the states, where abortion supporters and opponents must 
contend with 50 different constitutions that, in many places, 
guarantee rights more broadly than their federal counterpart.”); see 
also David S. Cohen et. al., The New Abortion Battleground, 123 
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (2023) (predicting that “interjurisdictional 
abortion wars are coming” now that there is no longer a national, 
uniform abortion right, which will involve intervention by the federal 
government). 
 
19.  See American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), “Reproductive 
Rights Organizations Go to Court in 11 States to Protect Abortion 
Access in Aftermath of Roe v. Wade Falling,” 
https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/reproductive-rights-
organizations-go-court-11-states-protect-abortion-access (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2024) (“This week, following the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade and eliminate the federal 
constitutional right to abortion, Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America (PPFA), the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Center 
for Reproductive Rights (CRR) took legal action to block abortion 
bans in 11 states: Arizona, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Florida, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia.  So far, 
these efforts have successfully blocked abortion bans in five 
states—Utah, Kentucky, Louisiana, Florida, and Texas—through 
 
- 64 - 
Tracker,” “[a]s of January 11, 2024, a total of 40 cases have been 
filed challenging abortion bans in 23 states, of which 22 remain 
pending at either the trial or appellate levels.”20  In fact, Planned 
Parenthood of Southwest Florida v. State of Florida, No. 2022-CA-
000912 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct.),21 is one of the cases filed immediately 
after Dobbs in which abortion proponents succeeded in obtaining a 
temporary restraining order from a Florida trial court to keep a 
fifteen-week abortion ban from going into effect.  
All of this illustrates that the proposed amendment will not do 
what the Sponsor and the title say it will do.  Instead of limiting 
government interference, it will ultimately encourage a great deal of 
interference by the judicial branch.  So, I must conclude the title is 
misleading.   
 
temporary restraining orders, allowing some providers there to 
resume abortion care for now.”); Becky Sullivan, supra note 18 
(“The legal chaos has already begun.  In a half-dozen states and 
counting, lawsuits argue that new restrictive abortion laws are in 
violation of state constitutions.”). 
 
20.  https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/state-court-abortion-litigation-tracker (last visited Mar. 14, 
2024); see also supra note 19.  
 
21.  Review was granted by this Court in SC2022-1050. 
 
- 65 - 
III. Conclusion 
In sum, the Sponsor is required to tell the truth about the 
purpose and scope of the proposed amendment and not mislead 
voters; it has done neither.   
For these reasons, I dissent.   
SASSO, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
SASSO, J., dissenting. 
 
After a sincere assessment of this case, I conclude that the 
Sponsor’s cut-and-paste approach to preparing the ballot summary 
fails to satisfy its legal obligation to provide an explanatory 
statement of the proposal’s chief purpose.  For that reason, and 
with the utmost respect for the majority’s decision to the contrary, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I. 
 
This case is somewhat unprecedented.  Since this Court first 
stepped into its role reviewing ballot summaries in the citizen 
initiative context, we have not been presented with an amendment 
quite like this.  What makes the amendment unique is not its 
controversial subject matter; this Court has considered 
controversial amendments before.  Instead, it is unique because of 
 
- 66 - 
the proposed amendment’s overwhelmingly vague and ambiguous 
language and structure. 
In essence, the Sponsor has submitted a proposal with no 
readily discernable meaning, leaving it up to courts to determine 
even its most essential legal effects over time.  The challenge, then, 
is to evaluate whether the summary meets the requirements of 
section 101.161, Florida Statutes (2023), when we have said that in 
doing so we evaluate “objective criteria inherent in the amendment 
itself,” Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Citizenship Requirement to Vote 
in Fla. Elections, 288 So. 3d 524, 529 (2020) (quoting Fla. Dep’t of 
State v. Fla. State Conf. of NAACP Branches, 43 So. 3d 662, 667 
(Fla. 2010)), to determine whether or not the ballot title and 
summary fairly inform the voter of the “true meaning, and 
ramifications, of an amendment,” Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 
151, 156 (Fla. 1982).  To answer this question, I will explain what 
our precedent requires,22 how that applies here, and why my 
decision is consistent with our role. 
 
22.  Critical to my determination in this case—no one has 
argued that our precedent is wrong.  No one questions the 
constitutionality of section 101.161, no one argues that the 
requirements this Court has applied to ballot summaries do not 
 
- 67 - 
II. 
A. 
When a sponsor submits a constitutional amendment to the 
voters, section 101.161 imposes on the sponsor the obligation to 
prepare a ballot summary of the proposed amendment.  
§ 101.161(2), Fla. Stat.  The requirements the sponsor must meet in 
preparing the summary are delineated in section 101.161(1), which 
provides: 
Whenever a constitutional amendment or other public 
measure is submitted to the vote of the people, a ballot 
summary of such amendment or other public measure 
shall be printed in clear and unambiguous language on 
the ballot after the list of candidates . . . .  The ballot 
summary of the amendment or other public measure 
shall be an explanatory statement, not exceeding 75 
words in length, of the chief purpose of the measure. 
 
Id. (emphases added). 
 
From this text, our Court has derived a few requirements.  
First, the statute requires an “explanatory statement” of the 
 
flow from the statutory text, and no one argues that this Court 
lacks the authority to prevent ballot summaries that fail to meet 
those requirements from being submitted to the voters.  And while 
this Court’s precedent related to citizen initiatives has been 
disjointed at best, because no one has argued that even one of this 
Court’s decisions is clearly erroneous, I will do my best in this case 
to follow the common thread those cases provide. 
 
- 68 - 
amendment’s chief purpose.  That is something distinct from an 
accurate replication of the proposed amendment.  See, e.g., 
Wadhams v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Sarasota Cnty., 567 So. 2d 
414, 416 (Fla. 1990). 
Second, the ballot summary’s explanatory statement must be 
clear and unambiguous.  This means 1) the summary must not 
mislead the public, and 2) the ballot summary must fairly inform 
the voter of the chief purpose of the amendment.  See Fla. Dep’t of 
State v. Slough, 992 So. 2d 142, 147 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Advisory 
Op. to Att’y Gen. re Prohibiting State Spending for Experimentation 
that Involves the Destruction of a Live Hum. Embryo, 959 So. 2d 210, 
213-14 (Fla. 2007)). 
And although the term “chief purpose” is undefined in the 
statute, this Court has filled in the gaps.  For decades, this Court 
has described “chief purpose” to mean “the amendment’s chief 
effect,” Askew, 421 So. 2d at 155, and even more specifically to 
mean the “legal effect of the amendment,” Evans v. Firestone, 457 
So. 2d 1351, 1355 (Fla. 1984); see also Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re 
All Voters Vote in Primary Elections for State Legislature, Governor, & 
Cabinet, 291 So. 3d 901, 913 (Fla. 2020) (Muñiz, J., dissenting) 
 
- 69 - 
(“[T]he ‘chief purpose’ of the amendment can be understood in 
terms of the subset of those legal effects that would be material to a 
reasonable voter.”). 
In doing so, we have clarified that a sponsor “need not explain 
every detail or ramification of the proposed amendment.”  Advisory 
Op. to Att’y Gen. re Amend. to Bar Gov’t from Treating People 
Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d 888, 899 (Fla. 
2000) (quoting Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Prohibiting Pub. Funding 
of Pol. Candidates’ Campaigns, 693 So. 2d 972, 975 (Fla. 1997)).  
Even so, “drafters of proposed amendments cannot circumvent the 
requirements of section 101.161, Florida Statutes, by cursorily 
contending that the summary need not be exhaustive.”  Id.; see also 
Dep’t of State v. Fla. Greyhound Ass’n, 253 So. 3d 513, 520 (Fla. 
2018) (a ballot summary that fails to inform the voter of an 
amendment’s “material effects” is defective). 
Together, these requirements serve a greater purpose than 
guaranteeing the sponsor fulfills technical rules.  Section 101.161 
ensures that “[t]he voter should not be misled and . . . [will] have an 
opportunity to know and be on notice as to the proposition on 
which he is to cast his vote.”  Wadhams, 567 So. 2d at 417 
 
- 70 - 
(omission in original) (quoting Hill v. Milander, 72 So. 2d 796, 798 
(Fla. 1954)).  In other words, to make an informed decision, the 
voter must know the “true meaning, and ramifications, of an 
amendment.”  Askew, 421 So. 2d at 156. 
B. 
 
Giving effect to these requirements, this Court has never 
hesitated to hold a sponsor to its statutory obligations.  And this 
has been true particularly when presented with ballot summaries 
that contain vague and ambiguous language, even when that 
language closely mirrors the underlying proposal. 
For example, in Askew, a ballot summary closely followed the 
text of a proposed amendment that would prohibit former state 
officers from lobbying without disclosing financial interests.  421 
So. 2d at 153.  This Court still found the summary misleading 
because it neglected to advise the public of an existing two-year 
lobbying ban that did not require financial disclosures.  Id. at 155.  
We concluded that “[t]he problem, therefore, lies not with what the 
summary says, but, rather, with what it does not say.”  Id. at 156.  
“[S]uch a change must stand on its own merits and not be 
disguised as something else.”  Id. 
 
- 71 - 
And in Wadhams, similar to the Sponsor here, the 
amendment’s proponents simply provided the text of the 
amendment without a summary.  567 So. 2d at 415.  The Court 
held that a summary explaining the effects of the amendment was 
necessary, concluding: 
The problem with the ballot in the present case is 
much the same as the problem with the ballot in Askew.  
By containing the entire section as it would actually 
appear subsequent to amendment, rather than a 
summary of the amendment to the section, the ballot 
arguably informed the voters that the Charter Review 
Board would only be permitted to meet once every four 
years.  By failing to contain an explanatory statement of 
the amendment, however, the ballot failed to inform the 
public that there was presently no restriction on 
meetings and that the chief purpose of the amendment 
was to curtail the Charter Review Board’s right to meet.  
Similar to the ballot summary at issue in Askew, the 
present ballot “is deceptive, because although it contains 
an absolutely true statement, it omits to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statement made not 
misleading.” 
 
Id. at 416 (quoting Askew, 421 So. 2d at 158 (Ehrlich, J., 
concurring)). 
In similar fashion, in 2018 a majority of this Court concluded 
that “it is not sufficient for a ballot summary to faithfully track the 
text of a proposed amendment.”  Detzner v. League of Women Voters 
of Fla., 256 So. 3d 803, 811 (Fla. 2018).  With that rule guiding its 
 
- 72 - 
analysis, this Court held that a ballot summary was defective for 
failing to explain the phrase “established by” because that phrase 
“is neither commonly nor consistently used” and therefore “cannot 
be commonly understood by voters.”  Id. at 809-10.  Likewise, we 
determined the ballot summary failed to explain the categories of 
schools that would be affected by the proposal and therefore “voters 
will simply not be able to understand the true meaning and 
ramifications of the revision,” so “the ballot language [was] clearly 
and conclusively defective.”  Id. at 810. 
This Court has also, at times, determined that ballot 
summaries fail when specific terms are left undefined.  See, e.g., 
Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re People’s Prop. Rts. Amends. Providing 
Comp. for Restricting Real Prop. Use May Cover Multiple Subjects, 
699 So. 2d 1304, 1308-09 (Fla. 1997) (failure to define “owner,” 
“common law nuisance,” and “in fairness” in the summary, even 
though those terms were properly replicated from and also 
undefined in the text of the proposed amendment, caused the 
amendment to be stricken from ballot); Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 
2d at 899-900 (“[T]his Court has repeatedly held that ballot 
summaries which do not adequately define terms, use inconsistent 
 
- 73 - 
terminology, fail to mention constitutional provisions that are 
affected, and do not adequately describe the general operation of 
the proposed amendment must be invalidated.”); Smith v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 606 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla. 1992) (observing the 
statutory word limit “does not give drafters of proposed 
amendments leave to ignore the importance of the ballot summary 
and to provide an abbreviated, ambiguous statement in the hope 
that this Court’s reluctance to remove issues from the ballot will 
prevent us from insisting on clarity and meaningful information”). 
Of course, I recognize this Court did not deem any of those 
ballot summaries defective because they parroted language.  
Instead, the best I can do to synthesize our cases is to conclude 
that this Court has considered ballot summaries defective where, 
despite parroting, the summary either misled by omission, failed to 
explain the material ramifications of the amendment, or resulted in 
a disconnect between the operative meaning of a term and a voter’s 
understanding of it. 
 
- 74 - 
III. 
 
So, how do these principles apply here? 
A. 
The Sponsor argues that this Court’s cases referenced in 
section II(B) are inapplicable because there is no ambiguity in the 
amendment.  It argues that the terms “viability,” “healthcare 
provider,” and “patient’s health” all have clear meanings that are 
obvious to voters.  Similarly, the Sponsor argues that the comma 
placed between “patient’s health” and “as determined by the 
patient’s healthcare provider” means that the term “viability” used 
earlier in the amendment is also modified by the phrase “as 
determined by the patient’s healthcare provider.”  This too, says the 
Sponsor, is clear and obvious to the voter because of common rules 
of grammar. 
 
The Sponsor is just plain wrong.  None of those terms have 
any sort of widely shared meaning,23 nor do I think the comma 
 
23.  “Health” and “healthcare provider” have obviously broad 
and undefined boundaries which are seemingly unlimited without 
the benefit of a technical, legal analysis.  As for “viability,” “[t]his 
arbitrary line has not found much support among philosophers and 
ethicists . . . .  The most obvious problem with [relying on or 
attempting to define viability] is that viability is heavily dependent 
 
- 75 - 
accomplishes what the Sponsor says it does.24  So if the ballot 
summary is sufficient in this case, it is not for the reasons the 
Sponsor has presented to this Court. 
B. 
 
The more difficult question is whether the ballot summary is 
sufficient because it parrots the proposed amendment, which itself 
is vague and ambiguous.  In other words, is the Sponsor relieved of 
its obligation to explain the legal effect of the proposed amendment 
just because the amendment has no readily discernable meaning?
 
In my view, the answer is no.  I agree with the majority that, at 
 
on factors that have nothing to do with the characteristics of a 
fetus.”  Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 275-
76 (2022). 
 
24.  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012), a treatise devoted to the 
interpretation of legal text, identifies the application of the series 
qualifier canon as “highly sensitive to context.”  Id. at 150.  This 
sensitivity to context is exemplified in Justice Alito’s concurrence in 
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid, 592 U.S. 395 (2021), where he lays out 
several examples of sentences that go against the canon.  And so, 
application of the series qualifier canon is not so straightforward 
that all reasonable Florida voters will mechanistically apply this 
arcane rule and discover that, “indeed, ‘as determined by the 
patient’s healthcare provider’ also modifies ‘viability.’ ”  See id. at 
413 (Alito, J., concurring) (“No reasonable reader interprets texts 
that way.”). 
 
- 76 - 
a very high level, the voters will understand that this amendment 
creates a broad right to abortion in Florida.  However, our precedent 
has consistently required that the summary explain more than the 
amendment’s general aim.  Indeed, we have said that ballot 
summaries must explain the “material legal effect,” so that the 
electorate is advised of the “true meaning, and ramifications, of an 
amendment” and is thereby “adequately informed.” 
The summary here does none of this.  Instead, it leaves the 
legally operative terms that define the amendment’s scope 
(“viability,” “health,” and “healthcare provider”) up in the air.  
Likewise, the summary does not attempt to explain that the 
amendment itself is similarly vague and ambiguous, nor do I believe 
that this fact is self-evident from the vague and ambiguous nature 
of the summary. 
 
What we are left with, then, is a summary that does not 
attempt to explain the amendment’s material legal effects and 
employs terms that are neither consistently nor commonly 
understood.  As a result, I find it much more likely that this 
summary will mislead voters into committing the same error the 
Sponsor did in its briefing to this Court: they will carry their 
 
- 77 - 
personal conception of the amendment’s meaning into the voting 
booth, operating under the assumption that their particular 
interpretation is widely understood.  Similarly, I find it highly 
unlikely that voters will understand the true ramifications of this 
amendment—that they will read the ballot summary and vote based 
on an informed understanding and acceptance of the uncertainties 
posed by its vague and ambiguous language. 
For that reason, I believe this case better fits with those 
decisions in which we concluded that ballot summaries were 
defective, rather than those relied upon by the majority.  See, e.g., 
Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So. 2d at 899 (concluding an undefined 
term left “voters to guess at its meaning. . . .  [V]oters would 
undoubtedly rely on their own conceptions of what constitutes a 
bona fide qualification,” and that the summary violated section 
101.161); League of Women Voters, 256 So. 3d at 811; People’s 
Prop. Rts. Amends., 699 So. 2d 1304; Askew, 421 So. 2d 151.25  
 
25.  The closest cases cited by the majority to this one are 
Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Medical Liability 
Claimant’s Compensation Amendment, 880 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 2004), 
and Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Florida Marriage 
Protection Amendment, 926 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 2006).  I find Medical 
Liability distinguishable because the chief purpose of the 
 
- 78 - 
And so, I conclude the Sponsor has failed to prepare a ballot 
summary that meets the requirements of section 101.161 as 
previously interpreted by this Court. 
IV. 
I will end by briefly touching upon one point in the majority 
opinion.  The majority argues that if we conclude the summary is 
defective due to its vague and ambiguous nature, we may be 
inadvertently imposing a substantive limitation on what types of 
amendments can be proposed via the citizen initiative process.  
While I do not think this concern is totally unfounded, I also think 
the concern is more for the legislature than the judiciary. 
Again, no one challenges the constitutionality of section 
101.161, and no one challenges this Court’s precedent interpreting 
it.  If a sponsor cannot fulfill its statutory obligation because its 
 
amendment was still communicated to the voter despite the 
undefined term.  I find Marriage Protection Amendment 
distinguishable because the meaning of the undefined terms was 
clear to the ordinary voter.  Likewise, I do not think Advisory 
Opinion to the Attorney General re Voter Control of Gambling, 215 So. 
3d 1209 (Fla. 2017), provides helpful guidance because the 
undisclosed ambiguous legal effect in that case was retroactivity—
not a legal effect that constituted a pillar of the amendment’s scope, 
like viability, health, and healthcare provider here. 
 
- 79 - 
proposed amendment is too vague and ambiguous to explain, I 
believe the statute places the burden of that bargain with the 
sponsor—not the voters.  See Smith, 606 So. 2d at 621 (“[T]he 
burden of informing the public should not fall only on the press and 
opponents of the measure—the ballot title and summary must do 
this.” (quoting Askew, 421 So. 2d at 156)). 
And that is what happened here.  The Sponsor has made no 
attempt to “explain” the material legal effects of the proposed ballot 
amendment as required by section 101.161.  Instead, the Sponsor 
has punted, leaving the legal effect to be revealed by the eye of the 
beholder.  The Sponsor’s statutory obligation, as explained by this 
Court’s precedent, demands more.  As a result, I respectfully 
dissent. 
GROSSHANS and FRANCIS, JJ., concur. 
 
Original Proceeding – Advisory Opinion – Attorney General 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor 
General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, 
Daniel W. Bell, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Nathan A. Forrester, 
Senior Deputy Solicitor General, John M. Guard, Chief Deputy 
Attorney General, and James H. Percival, Chief of Staff, Office of the 
Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Petitioner 
 
- 80 - 
Mathew D. Staver, Anita L. Staver, Horatio G. Mihet, and Hugh C. 
Phillips of Liberty Counsel, Orlando, Florida, 
 
for Interested Party, Florida Voters Against Extremism, PC 
 
Stephen C. Emmanuel of Ausley McMullen, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Interested Party, Florida Conference of Catholic Bishops, 
Inc. 
 
Alan Lawson, Samuel J. Salario, Jr., Jason Gonzalez, and Caroline 
May Poor of Lawson Huck Gonzalez, PLLC, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Interested Party, Susan B. Anthony Pro-Life America 
 
Jeremy D. Bailie and R. Quincy Bird of Weber, Crabb & Wein, P.A., 
St. Petersburg, Florida, 
 
for Interested Party, National Center for Life and Liberty 
 
Quinn Yeargain of Widener University Commonwealth Law School, 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and Mark Dorosin of Florida A&M 
University College of Law, Orlando, Florida, 
 
for Interested Parties, Law Professors & Instructors 
 
Joshua A. Rosenthal and Aadika Singh of Public Rights Project, 
Oakland, California; and Matthew A. Goldberger of Matthew A. 
Goldberger, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
for Interested Parties, Current and Former Florida Republican 
Elected Officials 
 
Kelly O’Keefe and Hannah Murphy of Stearns Weaver Miller 
Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, and Abby 
G. Corbett and Jenea E. Reed of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler 
Alhadeff & Sitterson, P.A., Miami, Florida; Stephen Petkis, Judy 
Baho, Kendall J. Christie, and Aubrey Stoddard of Covington & 
Burling LLP, Washington, District of Columbia; Isaac D. Chaput of 
 
- 81 - 
Covington & Burling LLP, San Francisco, California; and Vanessa J. 
Lauber of Covington & Burling LLP, New York, New York, 
 
for Interested Parties, Florida Doctors 
 
Michelle Morton, Daniel B. Tilley, and Nicholas Warren of American 
Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Miami, Florida; and 
Courtney Brewer, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
for Interested Party, Floridians Protecting Freedom 
 
Carrie Flaxman and Skye Perryman of Democracy Forward 
Foundation, Washington, District of Columbia; and Sean Shaw of 
Swope, Rodante P.A., Tampa, Florida, 
 
for Interested Party, American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists