Case Title: Hilton v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC11-898

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2013-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-898 
____________ 
 
GARY MICHAEL HILTON,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[March 21, 2013] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Cheryl Dunlap disappeared from the Leon Sinks Geological Area in Leon 
County, Florida, on December 1, 2007.  Her body was discovered in the 
Apalachicola National Forest on December 15, 2007.  Gary Hilton, who had been 
seen in the area during that time, and who was convicted in Georgia for a similar 
crime, was charged with her kidnapping and murder.  After trial, the jury convicted 
Hilton.  After hearing penalty phase evidence, the jury unanimously recommended 
the death penalty.  The court followed the jury’s recommendation and sentenced 
Hilton to death, finding six aggravating factors, one statutory mitigating factor, and 
eight nonstatutory mitigating factors.  This case is before the Court on appeal from 
 
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a judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and a sentence of death.  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  For the following reasons, we affirm 
Hilton’s convictions and sentence.  
FACTS 
 
On February 28, 2008, a Leon County grand jury indicted Gary Michael 
Hilton for the first-degree murder of Cheryl Dunlap between December 1 and 
December 15, 2007, kidnapping, grand theft of a motor vehicle, and grand theft of 
currency.  Hilton pleaded not guilty on March 14, 2008.  Hilton proceeded to a jury 
trial commencing on February 2, 2011. 
 
Cheryl Dunlap, 46, was last seen alive on December 1, 2007.  That morning, 
Dunlap called a friend, Kiona Hill, and made arrangements to have dinner with her 
that evening.  That afternoon, Dunlap went to Leon Sinks to read, where she was 
seen by Michael and Vikki Shirley at approximately 1:30 p.m.  The Shirleys 
described that Dunlap was wearing jeans and a sweater and carrying a hardback 
book.  Dunlap did not arrive for dinner that evening and was missed at church the 
following morning by Tanya Land.  Land went to Dunlap’s residence and found 
her dog, but noticed that her car was missing so she called the police.  Steven 
Ganey of the Wakulla County Sheriff’s Office took the missing person report on 
December 3, 2007. 
 
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Dunlap’s car, a white Toyota Camry, was found on December 3, 2007, on 
the side of Crawfordville Highway parked near the woods.  The car had deliberate 
tire punctures in the sidewall that was later identified as a bayonet piercing.  On 
December 1, the car had received a disabled vehicle ticket from Florida Highway 
Patrol Trooper Brian Speigner.  Ganey testified that it appeared that someone had 
driven into the woods with all four tires intact and punctured the tire after the car 
had been parked.  Dunlap’s purse was recovered in her car, but no money was 
found. 
 
Dunlap’s Ameris Bank account records revealed that Dunlap cashed a check 
with a drive-through teller at 11:17 a.m. on December 1.  The records further 
revealed that three cash withdrawals were made at the ATM at Hancock Bank on 
West Tennessee Street on December 2, 3, and 4, 2007, totaling $700.  In addition, 
two attempted withdrawals were declined because they exceeded the daily limit. 
The video from the security camera at the bank showed that the person making the 
transactions was wearing a blue and white patterned, long-sleeved shirt, glasses, a 
hat, and a make-shift mask made from tape. 
 
Dunlap’s body was discovered on December 15 by Ronnie Rentz while he 
was hunting in the Apalachicola National Forest.  Dunlap’s body was near a forest 
road and had been covered with some brush and limbs.  Additionally, her head and 
hands had been removed.  Dunlap’s body was identified using a sample of thigh 
 
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muscle.  Dr. Anthony Clarke, an associate medical examiner, performed the 
autopsy.  Dr. Clarke opined that Dunlap’s head and hands had been removed by an 
instrument with a sharp blade and that the dismemberment occurred postmortem.  
The cause of death was not able to be determined, but Dr. Clarke opined that it was 
likely to have been a violent homicide.  Additionally, Dr. Clarke noted that there 
was a significant pre-mortem bruise located on Dunlap’s middle to lower back and 
that the bruise was not consistent with a normal fall injury.  Dr. Clarke estimated 
that Dunlap’s body could have been in the woods for seven to fifteen days.  Dr. 
Clarke testified that his best estimate was that Dunlap died between December 5 
and December 8, 2007. 
 
On January 9, 2008, investigators found what they believed to be the 
remains of Dunlap’s head and hands in a fire pit at Joe Thomas campsite—
approximately seven miles from where her body had been found.  The bone 
fragments were charred.  Because of the burn damage, no DNA was recoverable 
from the fragments.  Dr. Anthony Falsetti, a forensic anthropologist, opined that 
there were two hands represented, that the bones were from an adult, and that the 
bones were from a person with small hands. 
 
Several witnesses testified that they saw or encountered Gary Michael 
Hilton during the time period surrounding Dunlap’s disappearance.  In late 
November 2007, George Ferguson encountered Hilton on LL Wallace Road.  
 
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Hilton asked Ferguson for a jump start because his van, a white Chevrolet Astro, 
would not crank.  Ferguson testified that it did not appear to him that Hilton 
actually needed the assistance.  Ethan Davis provided similar testimony, that 
sometime in late November 2007, Hilton stopped him and asked for help starting 
his vehicle.  Davis declined.  Shawn Matthews also encountered Hilton in late 
November near his LL Wallace Road camp.  Hilton appeared to be familiar with 
the area and told Matthews about a nearby sinkhole.  On December 1, 2007, 
Celeste Hutchins saw Hilton on Crawfordville Highway, not far from Leon Sinks.  
Hutchins testified that Hilton was rummaging through a white Camry on the side 
of the road.  On December 10, 2007, Loretta Mayfield spoke to Hilton at a 
convenience store on Crawfordville Highway.  Mayfield testified that Hilton was 
wearing a blue and white patterned shirt.  Hilton was also wearing something on 
his left side that looked like a large knife holder.  Mayfield testified that the shirt 
she saw Hilton wearing looked like the one in the ATM security video.  On 
December 11, 2007, Stephen Prosser saw Hilton in the Apalachicola National 
Forest.  On December 12, 2007, Michael Travis saw Hilton in the forest near the 
Bloxham cutoff and then saw him again on December 14.  On December 18, 2007, 
Teresa Johnson saw Hilton in Bristol, Florida, where Hilton told her that she 
looked like Dunlap and that it was “too bad” about that girl getting murdered. 
 
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Sometime between December 18, 2007, and January 1, 2008, Hilton made 
his way to Georgia where he kidnapped and murdered Meredith Emerson.  Hilton 
took Emerson from Blood Mountain and held her for four days before murdering 
her.  He cooperated with law enforcement in exchange for a life sentence.  Hilton 
was arrested in Georgia after Stephen Shaw saw Hilton walk to the back of a 
convenience store in the direction of the store’s dumpsters and called law 
enforcement.  Law enforcement officers recovered items Hilton was seen 
discarding in a dumpster at the convenience store.  From the dumpster, law 
enforcement recovered a U.S. Forestry citation for unauthorized camping, a knife 
and sheath, Hi-Tec boots, some chain, a padlock, gloves, a jacket, a folding police 
baton, and a blue backpack.  Hilton gave Georgia officials information on where to 
find his bayonet on a hiking trail on Blood Mountain in North Georgia.  Later, Jeff 
Foggy, an FDLE tool mark expert, matched the bayonet to the puncture marks in 
Dunlap’s tire.  Georgia law enforcement also gathered items from Hilton’s van.  
Items recovered from the van included clothing, jackets, gloves, camping 
equipment, duffel bags, two sleeping bags, Hi-Tec boots, a camera, tobacco rolling 
papers, Hilton’s Georgia driver’s license, tape, paper towels, maps, two BB pistols, 
a book purchased at a Tallahassee book store, and dog food. 
 
On February 12, 2008, Sergeant David Graham and Detective Dawn Dennis 
with the Leon County Sheriff’s Office executed a search warrant on Hilton while 
 
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he was in custody in Georgia.  Hilton’s DNA was collected and the entire 
execution of the warrant was recorded.  Portions of the recording were played for 
the jury.   
 
On June 6, 2008, Sergeant Graham and two other officers drove Hilton from 
Georgia to Florida.  Although Hilton was not questioned, he spoke for nearly the 
entire five-hour drive, which was recorded.  The State also played portions of this 
recording at trial.  Hilton stated: 
I’m not all bad.  I mean, you got to understand, I mean, I’m sure you 
can see.  I mean, I’m a [expletive] genius, man.  I’m not a—I’m not 
all bad.  I just, you know, lost my mind for a little bit.  Lost a grip on 
myself, man.  What can I tell you?  FBI and everybody else is trying 
to scratch their head, hey, guys don’t get started doing my shit at 61 
years old.  It just don’t happen, you know.  Like there’s a retired FBI 
(indecipherable) named Cliff Van, Clifford Van Zandt, that keeps 
getting himself in the news, talking about me.  And he said, this guy 
didn’t just fall off the turnip truck, he said.  You know, in other words, 
he’s been doing this.  But like I told you before, you know, when I 
saw you before, I said, remember, I said I’d give you one for free.  
Nothing before September, okay?  I mean, I’m not joking, okay?  I 
just, I got old and sick and couldn’t make a living and just lost, flat 
lost my [expletive] mind for a while, man.  I couldn’t get a grip on it. 
 
Additionally, Hilton made statements to a fellow inmate at the Leon County 
Jail that were overheard by Correctional Officer Caleb Wynn.  Specifically, Hilton 
told inmate Summers that he could answer all the State Attorney’s questions if he 
would give him a life sentence, that he would reveal where the head was located, 
that his bayonet was used on Dunlap’s tire, that he would explain how he “pulled it 
 
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off” on a busy highway, that he spent a few hours or a few days with Dunlap, and 
that he felt no regret other than getting caught. 
 
The penalty phase began on February 17, 2011, during which the state called 
Clay Bridges of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation.  Agent Bridges testified 
about Hilton’s prior felony conviction—the murder of Emerson in Georgia to 
which Hilton pleaded guilty.   The State played Hilton’s taped conversation with 
law enforcement where he described kidnapping Emerson, holding her captive, and 
stripping her body naked to remove DNA and fiber evidence.  He also stated that 
“you either kill them or you get caught.”   
 
Hilton presented four expert witnesses who testified regarding his 
psychological condition:  Dr. Joseph Wu, a psychiatrist and clinical director of the 
Brain Imaging Center at the University of California, Irvine; Dr. Charles Golden, a 
clinical neuropsychologist performing neuropsychological testing and 
examinations; Dr. Abbey Strauss, a psychiatrist with special expertise in 
psychopharmacology; and Dr. William Morton, a board certified psychiatric 
pharmacist and professor; and nine lay witnesses.  The State then called Dr. Greg 
Prichard in rebuttal.   
 
On February 21, 2011, the jury recommended unanimously that Gary Hilton 
be sentenced to death for the murder of Cheryl Dunlap.  
 
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The trial court held the Spencer1
 
The trial court found that the State had proven six aggravators beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Assigning weight to each aggravator, the trial court found: (1) 
the defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony (great weight); (2) the 
murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping (great weight); (3) the murder 
was committed to avoid arrest (moderate weight); (4) the murder was committed 
for pecuniary gain (some weight); (5) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious 
or cruel (HAC) (great weight); and (6) the murder was cold, calculated, and 
premeditated (CCP) (great weight).   
 hearing on April 7, 2011.   The State 
presented three victim impact witnesses: (1) Ms. Emma Blount, the victim’s aunt; 
(2) Laura Walker, the victim’s best friend; and (3) Gloria Tucker, the victim’s 
cousin.   Hilton presented no witnesses.   
 
The court also considered and weighed each mitigating circumstance 
proposed by Hilton and found one statutory mental mitigating factor—at the time 
of the murder Hilton was under extreme emotional distress (some weight).  Under 
the catch-all provision, the trial court considered ten mitigating factors, finding that 
Hilton established eight of them and rejecting two.  The court found: (1) Hilton 
grew up in an abusive household (some weight); (2) Hilton abused drugs, 
specifically Ritalin (some weight); (3) Hilton was deprived of a relationship with 
                                         
 
1.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
 
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his biological father (moderate weight); (4) Hilton is already serving a life sentence 
so society is protected (some weight); (5) Hilton served his country in the US 
military (very little weight); (6) Hilton suffered maternal deprivation and lack of 
bonding between mother and child (some weight); (7) Hilton was removed from 
his home and put into foster care when he was a child (some weight); (8) Hilton 
grew up in a financially poor family (not proven); (9) Hilton suffered a traumatic 
brain injury as a child (some weight); and (10) Hilton suffers from severe mental 
defects (not proven). 
 
On April 21, 2011, the trial court followed the jury’s unanimous 
recommendation and sentenced Hilton to death.  The court found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators.   
Collateral Crime Evidence 
 
Hilton argues that his statements to law enforcement during his transport 
from Georgia to Florida should not have been introduced at trial because they 
constitute inadmissible Williams2
                                         
 
2.  Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). 
 rule evidence because the statements were only 
relevant to show his propensity to commit crime.  The State argues that the trial 
judge did not commit error in admitting the statements because Hilton did not state 
that he had committed other murders or crimes before he kidnapped Cheryl 
Dunlap.  The State argues further that even if the statements constitute collateral 
 
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crime evidence, they were still admissible to prove premeditation.  Because the 
statements did not constitute similar fact or collateral crime evidence and were 
otherwise relevant and admissible to establish premeditation, we find that the 
statements were properly admitted. 
 
Collateral crime evidence “is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant 
solely to prove bad character or propensity.”  § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008).  We 
explained in McGirth v. State, 48 So. 3d 777, 786-87 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 2100 (2011), that: 
[a]n appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s determination that 
evidence is relevant and admissible absent an abuse of discretion.  
Relevant evidence is generally admissible unless precluded by a 
specific rule of exclusion.  There are two categories under which 
evidence of uncharged crimes or bad acts will be admissible—similar 
fact evidence, otherwise known as Williams
Id.; see also McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 2011) (internal citations omitted) 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).     
 rule evidence, and 
dissimilar fact evidence.  The requirements and limitations of section 
90.404 govern similar fact evidence while the general rule of 
relevancy set forth in section 90.402 governs dissimilar fact evidence. 
 
During his transport from Georgia to Florida, Hilton talked practically 
nonstop for the entire nearly five-hour drive.  During this time, Hilton made 
several statements that were played in front of the jury.  At issue here, Hilton 
stated, “like I told you before, you know, when I saw you before, I said, remember, 
I said I’d give you one for free.  Nothing before September, okay?  I mean, I’m not 
 
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joking, okay?”   Hilton also stated repeatedly that he had “lost his mind” for a 
while.  Hilton claims that these statements were evidence of collateral crimes.  
Hilton’s argument is without merit.  The statements played for the jury did not 
implicate Hilton in a collateral crime, nor did they constitute similar fact evidence.  
Further, even if the statements constituted Williams rule evidence, they were 
admissible to demonstrate premeditation and were not introduced solely to 
demonstrate Hilton’s bad character or propensity.  Furthermore, Hilton’s statement 
to law enforcement was ambiguous and did not directly implicate him in a 
collateral crime.  Hilton’s statement that he began “hunting” in September did not 
correlate with any known crime at the time of his trial.  Nothing in Hilton’s 
statement implies that Dunlap was not his first victim or implicates Hilton in a 
collateral crime.  We do not find these statements constitute Williams rule 
evidence.  Because Hilton’s statement was relevant to prove premeditation, we find 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.  See 
§ 90.404(2), Fla. Stat. (2008); see, e.g., Durousseau v. State, 55 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 
2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 149 (2011).    
Dr. Prichard’s Testimony 
 
Hilton argues that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Gregory Prichard to 
testify about allegations of Hilton’s past criminal conduct during the penalty phase 
and that such testimony constituted improper nonstatutory aggravating 
 
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circumstances.  The State argues that Dr. Prichard was called as a proper rebuttal 
witness to dispute Hilton’s claim that he had done nothing wrong prior to this 
crime and that the change in his character was created by Ritalin.  Because Hilton’s 
expert testimony opened the door for Dr. Prichard’s testimony, we find that the 
trial court properly admitted the testimony. 
 
In considering the admission of evidence during the penalty phase of a trial, 
in Hildwin v. State, 531 So. 2d 124, 127 (Fla. 1988), we noted: 
it must be remembered that there is a different standard for judging 
the admissibility and relevance of evidence in the penalty phase of a 
capital case, where the focus is substantially directed toward the 
defendant’s character.  See § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (1987).  In Elledge 
v. State
 
Thus, “evidence that would not be admissible during the guilt 
phase could properly be considered in the penalty phase.” 
, 346 So. 2d 998, 1001 (Fla. 1977), we pointed out that “the 
purpose of considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances is to 
engage in a character analysis of the defendant to ascertain whether 
the ultimate penalty is called for in his or her particular case.” 
Perry v. State, 801 So. 2d 78, 89-90 (Fla. 2001). 
 
In Perry, we found that the State’s “anticipatory rebuttal” was improper and 
that nothing in the record supported the State’s assertion that the defendant 
“opened the door” to be questioned about specific acts of past violence.  Id. at 90 
(citing Hildwin, 531 So. 2d at 128).  Here, however, Hilton’s penalty phase 
defense relied heavily on the assertion that Hilton was a law-abiding citizen prior 
to his exposure to Ritalin.  Dr. Prichard’s testimony was provided in rebuttal to that 
assertion.  We therefore find that the testimony in this case when “[v]iewed in 
 
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context, . . . was offered in rebuttal to the defense, not as a nonstatutory 
aggravator.”  Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1208 (Fla. 2005).  Accordingly, we 
deny relief on this claim. 
Witness Sequestration 
 
Hilton argues that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. Prichard to stay in 
the courtroom, despite the sequestration rule.  Because we find that the trial court 
did not err in excluding Dr. Prichard from the sequestration rule, we deny relief on 
this claim. 
 
We have previously provided that reason for the rule of witness 
sequestration is to avoid coloring a witness’s testimony by that heard from other 
witnesses, but that the rule is not an absolute that must be invoked at the mere 
request of counsel.  See Randolph v. State, 463 So. 2d 186, 191 (Fla. 1984) (citing 
Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961)).  Section 90.616(2)(c), Florida 
Statutes (1997), allows an exception when a witness’s presence is shown by the 
party’s attorney to be essential to the presentation of the party’s cause, and the trial 
court has wide discretion in making that determination.  See Knight v. State, 746 
So. 2d 423, 430 (Fla. 1998).   
 
Here, Dr. Prichard was permitted to stay in the courtroom upon the State’s  
request.  Because the State was late filing its notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty, Dr. Prichard was prevented from examining Hilton.   The State requested 
 
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that he be excluded from the sequestration rule to give Dr. Prichard a chance to 
provide meaningful assistance to the State.  He testified in rebuttal to the defense 
expert witnesses and did not serve as a fact witness.  During cross-examination, 
Dr. Prichard stated that he “sat through the entire penalty phase . . . and handed 
notes to Mr. Meggs.”  Accordingly, we find that Dr. Prichard’s presence was 
essential to the presentation of the State’s cause and that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion permitting Dr. Prichard to remain in the courtroom. 
Aggravators 
 
Hilton argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the HAC and 
CCP aggravating circumstances and that the trial court erred in finding these 
circumstances applied in Hilton’s case.  The State argues that the trial court 
properly relied on the circumstances surrounding a collateral murder.  Because we 
find competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s 
findings, we find no error.   
 
“In reviewing an aggravating factor challenged on appeal, this Court’s task 
‘is to review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of 
law for each aggravating circumstance, and, if so, whether competent substantial 
evidence supports its finding.’ ”  Douglas v. State, 878 So. 2d 1246, 1260-61 (Fla. 
2004) (quoting Willacy v. State, 696 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1997)); see also Heyne 
v. State, 88 So. 3d 113, 122 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 574 (2012).  In deciding 
 
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whether a lower court erred in its finding of an aggravator, we do not reweigh the 
evidence to determine whether an aggravator was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt but instead “review the record to determine whether the trial court applied 
the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether 
competent substantial evidence supports its finding.”  Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 
79, 98 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Williacy, 696 So. 2d at 695).   
HAC 
 
This Court has explained the meaning of the HAC aggravator as follows: 
It is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or 
shockingly evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; 
and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with 
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.  
What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the 
actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such 
additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital 
felonies—the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily 
torturous to the victim. 
State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973); see also Guzman v. State, 721 So. 2d 
1155, 1159 (Fla. 1998) (“The HAC aggravator applies only in torturous murders—
those that evince extreme and outrageous depravity as exemplified either by the 
desire to inflict a high degree of pain or utter indifference to or enjoyment of the 
suffering of another.”).  This Court has also stated that “[u]nlike the cold, 
calculated and premeditated aggravator, which pertains specifically to the state of 
mind, intent and motivation of the defendant, the HAC aggravator focuses on the 
 
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means and manner in which death is inflicted and the immediate circumstances 
surrounding the death.”  Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998) (citing 
Stano v. State, 460 So. 2d 890, 893 (Fla. 1984)).  Furthermore, we have held that 
“[i]n determining whether the HAC factor was present, the focus should be upon 
the victim’s perceptions of the circumstances as opposed to those of the 
perpetrator.”  Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 369 (Fla. 2003); see also Heyne, 88 
So. 3d at 122; McGirth, 48 So. 3d at 794.  The victim’s mental state may be 
evaluated in accordance with common-sense inferences from the circumstances.  
Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988).  “[F]ear, emotional strain, and 
terror of the victim during the events leading up to the murder may make an 
otherwise quick death especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”  James v. State, 695 
So. 2d 1229, 1235 (Fla. 1997); see also Swafford, 533 So. 2d at 277; Hall, 87 So. 
3d 671-72.  Additionally, we have held that the actions of the defendant preceding 
the actual killing are also relevant.  Gore v. State, 706 So. 2d 1328, 1335 (Fla. 
1997).   
 
Here, the record demonstrates competent, substantial evidence that Dunlap 
was held anywhere from 2 days to a week prior to her murder, and that she was 
injured enough during that time to leave traces of her blood on several of Hilton’s 
items.  The trial court’s inferences that the victim was likely terrified, suffering 
from emotional strain, or suffering during the time leading up to her murder are 
 
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supported by our review of the record.  Accordingly, we find that there is 
competent, substantial evidence contained in the record to support the trial court’s 
finding of HAC.   
CCP 
 
As it relates to the finding of CCP, we have stated: 
To establish the CCP aggravator, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that (1) the killing was the product of cool and calm 
reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit 
of rage (cold); (2) the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged 
design to commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated); (3) the 
defendant exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated); and (4) 
the murder was committed with no pretext of legal or moral 
justification.   
McWatters, 36 So. 3d at 640-41.  “The CCP aggravator pertains specifically to the  
state of mind, intent, and motivation of the defendant.”  Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 
277, 298 (Fla. 2009) (citing Brown v. State, 721 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1998)).  The 
trial court’s determination of whether CCP is present in a case is based upon the 
totality of the circumstances.  Hudson v. State, 992 So. 2d 96, 115 (Fla. 2008).  
CCP can be proved by circumstantial evidence.  Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 561, 
576-77 (Fla. 2004).  CCP can be indicated by the circumstances showing such facts 
as advance procurement of a weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and the 
appearance of a killing carried out as a matter of course.  Swafford, 533 So. 2d at 
277.  It is the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder 
was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an act of emotional frenzy or 
 
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panic, or a fit of rage.  Walker v. State, 957 So. 2d 560, 581 (Fla. 2007).  “ ‘[T]he 
facts supporting CCP must focus on the manner in which the crime was executed, 
e.g., advance procurement of weapon, lack of provocation, killing carried out as a 
matter of course.’ ”  Id. (quoting Lynch, 841 So. 2d at 372).  “ ‘Competent 
substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence, and [this Court] 
assess[es] the record evidence for its sufficiency only, not its weight.’ ”  McCoy v. 
State, 853 So. 2d 396, 407 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Almeida v. State, 748 So. 2d 922, 
932 (Fla. 1999)). 
 
This Court has also found the heightened premeditation required to support 
CCP where a defendant has a lengthy period of reflection and the opportunity to 
abandon the plan but, instead, commits the murder.  Alston v. State, 723 So. 2d 
148, 162 (Fla. 1998).  We explained in Alston that where the defendant had ample 
opportunity to release the victim but instead, after substantial reflection, “acted out 
the plan [he] had conceived during the extended period in which [the] events 
occurred,” heightened premeditation was proven.  Id.  (quoting Jackson v. State, 
704 So. 2d 500, 505 (Fla. 1997)) (citation omitted); see also Looney v. State, 803 
So. 2d 656, 679 (Fla. 2001).   
 
The trial court’s finding of CCP in this case is supported by competent, 
substantial evidence.  Hilton’s statements to law enforcement demonstrate that he 
killed as a matter of course.  He describes his own actions as “hunting.”  Although 
 
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the manner of killing was not able to be established, the method of disposal of the 
victim’s body was calculated and carried out after a period of needed reflection.  
Hilton’s statements on the self-made video and to a fellow inmate describe being 
with the victim for a long enough time for careful reflection.  Accordingly, we find 
that the trial court did not err in finding this aggravating factor. 
Mitigation 
 
Hilton argues that that trial court improperly rejected the lack of capacity 
mitigating factor and failed to provide reasons why there is substantial, competent 
evidence in the record to support the rejection of the mitigating circumstance.  The 
State argues that the trial court properly weighed the experts’ testimonies and 
found the State’s expert’s opinion more credible.     
 
In rejecting this mitigating factor, the trial court stated, “[t]he Court finds 
that Dr. Prichard’s testimony was more credible and more consistent with the other 
evidence in the case as to this point.  The Court finds that this factor in mitigation 
was not proven.”  A trial court may reject a defendant’s claim that a mitigating 
circumstance has been proven as long as the record contains competent substantial 
evidence to support the trial court’s rejection of the mitigation.   See Spencer, 645 
So. 2d at 385.  Even expert testimony may be rejected if it cannot be reconciled 
with the other evidence in the case.  See Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1005 (Fla. 
2006). 
 
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Here, the testimony was not uncontroverted and, “[i]t is apparent from the . . . trial 
judge’s sentencing order that he considered the expert testimony presented in 
support of these factors but found this testimony unpersuasive.”  Roberts v. State, 
519 So. 2d 885, 894 (Fla. 1987).  Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim. 
Ring Claim 
 
Hilton argues that this Court should re-examine its holdings in Bottoson v. 
Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 662 (2002), and King v. 
Moore, 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 657 (2002).  Because Hilton 
was convicted of murder that occurred in connection with a kidnapping and 
because Hilton had previously been convicted of a prior violent felony, we find his 
request without merit.  We have repeatedly rejected this argument when either 
aggravating factor is present.  See McMillian v. State, 94 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 2012), 
cert. denied, 2013 U.S. Lexis 1305 (Feb. 19, 2013); Heyne v. State, 88 So. 3d 113, 
120 n.2 (Fla. 2012); Kopsho v. State, 84 So. 3d 204, 220 (Fla.), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 190 (2012); Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 540 (Fla. 2010), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 164 (2011).   
Sufficiency 
 
Hilton does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 
convictions.  However, this Court independently assesses the sufficiency of the 
evidence to determine whether it is legally sufficient.  See Crain v. State, 894 So. 
 
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2d 59, 72 (Fla. 2004) (“. . . in capital cases, this Court independently assesses the 
sufficiency of the evidence to determine if it is legally sufficient.”).  Based on our 
review of the record, we find that there is competent substantial evidence to sustain 
the convictions in this case.   
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there is 
competent, substantial evidence to support Hilton’s convictions.  See Bradley v. 
State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001) (“In determining the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  Specifically, the evidence 
presented at trial demonstrated that Cheryl Dunlap disappeared on December 1, 
2007, and that on December 15, her decomposing body was found beheaded and 
with her hands removed.  Dunlap had been last seen on December 1, 2007, at Leon 
Sinks National Park.  Her car was located abandoned on Crawfordville Highway 
on December 3 with a tire that had been punctured by an item later identified as 
Hilton’s bayonet.  On December 1, witnesses saw a man rummaging through 
Dunlap’s car and later identified that man as Gary Hilton.  Witnesses spoke with 
Hilton in surrounding areas during the time Dunlap was reported missing.  
Witnesses identified the clothing Hilton was wearing during that time period.  On 
December 2, 3, and 4, a man matching Hilton’s build and wearing clothing similar 
 
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to that described by witnesses used Dunlap’s ATM card and PIN at Hancock Bank 
on Tennessee Street to remove a total of $700 from her bank account.  In a self-
made video retrieved from a camera found in Hilton’s possession, Hilton is shown 
on December 3, 2007, talking to himself or his dog, describing hiding unknown 
items and killing “those b*tches.”  Charred human bones, including a skull and 
hand bones, were found in a fire pit near a campsite where Hilton was seen by 
Shawn Matthews.  In addition, this campsite also contained cigarette butts that 
contained Hilton’s DNA.  Dunlap’s DNA was found on articles recovered from 
Hilton’s van, including two sleeping bags, Hilton’s duffel bag, some pants and on 
the Hi-Tec boots Hilton was seen discarding.  Hilton was overheard by law 
enforcement telling a fellow inmate that he would tell them where the head was if 
they would give him a life sentence.  On the drive from Georgia to Florida, Hilton 
told law enforcement that he had lost his mind, but hadn’t done anything before 
September.   Based on this, we find the evidence sufficient to support the 
convictions in this case. 
Proportionality 
 
Although not raised by Hilton, we have an independent duty to review the 
proportionality of a death sentence.  See McMillian, 94 So. 3d at 581 (citing Bolin 
v. State, 869 So. 2d 1196, 1204 (Fla. 2004)); Hampton v. State, 103 So. 3d 98 (Fla. 
2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-8923 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2013).   A review of the 
 
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evidence demonstrates that the proportionality of Hilton’s sentence of death is 
proportionate.   
 
Here, the jury’s recommendation was unanimous.  The trial court weighed 
the six aggravators proven by the State against the mitigation proven by Hilton and 
concluded that “the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances in this case.”  The aggravating circumstances found are supported 
by competent, substantial evidence and the record “fails to reveal any indication 
that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning little weight to the mitigation 
that was established.”  Hampton, 103 So. 3d at 121.  We find that the imposition of 
the death sentence in this case is proportionate when compared to other death 
sentences that this Court has upheld.  See, e.g., Hildwin v. State, 727 So. 2d 193 
(Fla. 1998) (four aggravators: HAC, prior violent felony, pecuniary gain, and under 
sentence of imprisonment; two statutory mitigators; and five nonstatutory 
mitigators); Johnston v. State, 841 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2002) (prior violent felony, 
kidnapping, pecuniary gain, and HAC versus one statutory mitigator and twenty-
six nonstatutory mitigators); Suggs v. State, 923 So. 2d 419, 440 (Fla. 2005) 
(sentence to death proportionate when the trial court found seven aggravating 
factors and three mitigating factors, including one statutory mental mitigator and 
this Court noted that the murder “particularly heinous and premeditated”); Owen v. 
State, 862 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2003) (finding death sentence proportionate  for 23 year 
 
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old defendant, despite the presence of three statutory mitigators, including both 
mental mitigators and sixteen other mitigators where there was evidence of 
multiple stab wounds and the presence of multiple aggravators, including HAC, 
CCP, and a conviction for another murder); Rose v. State, 787 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 
2001) (finding death sentence proportionate despite the presence of eleven 
nonstatutory mitigators where trial judge found four aggravators—murder 
committed while on probation, prior violent felony, murder committed during a 
kidnapping, and HAC). 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hilton’s convictions and sentence of 
death.  It is so ordered. 
 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and 
PERRY, JJ., concur. 
LEWIS, J., concurs in result. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED.   
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Leon County,  
James C. Hankinson, Judge - Case No. 08-CF-697 
 
Nancy Ann Daniels, Public Defender and William Carl McLain, Assistant Public 
Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
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Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General and Meredith Charbula, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee