Case Title: State ex rel. Corn v. Russo

Citation: 2001-Ohio-15

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 2001-Ohio-15.] 
THE STATE EX REL. CORN ET AL., APPELLEES, v. RUSSO, JUDGE, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Corn v. Russo (2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 551.] 
Courts — Jurisdiction — Contempt — Dismissal of an underlying civil action 
does not divest a court of common pleas of jurisdiction to conduct 
criminal contempt proceedings. 
(No. 00-23 — Submitted September 12, 2000 — Decided January 17, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 76730. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The dismissal of an underlying civil action does not divest a court of common 
pleas of jurisdiction to conduct criminal contempt proceedings. 
__________________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, Sr., J.  This matter comes before this court upon 
the granting of a writ of prohibition that prohibits respondent from conducting 
further contempt proceedings in the underlying personal injury lawsuit entitled 
Crow v. Dotson, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV345899.  Since we find that respondent 
had jurisdiction to conduct criminal contempt proceedings, we reverse the court of 
appeals and deny the writ of prohibition. 
 
This action arises from a subpoena issued to relators, Robert C. Corn, 
M.D., and Highland Musculo-Skeletal Associates, Inc., requesting financial 
information and related reports concerning Corn’s medical/legal consultations. 
 
Relator Corn, an orthopedic surgeon, was hired by defense counsel in the 
Crow litigation to perform an independent medical examination (“IME”) of the 
plaintiff and to be a medical expert witness.  Believing that Corn was biased, in 
that he earned a substantial amount of income by performing examinations for the 
defense in personal-injury cases and acting as a defense expert witness, plaintiff’s 
counsel filed a request for production of documents.  Plaintiffs asked that Corn 
produce all I.R.S. 1099 tax forms received from insurance companies and 
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attorneys for the years 1991-1997, as well as office records, including 
appointment books, computerized records and billing statements, and IME 
reports, relating to any IMEs he conducted during those years. 
 
When those records were not produced, plaintiff’s counsel, on July 27, 
1998, issued a subpoena, pursuant to Civ.R. 45, to Corn and his professional 
organization and employees, requiring them to produce the documents.  Corn 
filed a motion to quash the subpoena.  Respondent, Judge Nancy Russo, denied 
the motion to quash on September 4, 1998.  In this order, respondent stated that 
the failure to comply by September 14, 1998, would be deemed contempt of 
court. 
 
On September 14, 1998, Corn, through his attorney, responded to the 
subpoena by letter.  Although Corn was able to produce a 1997 calendar 
containing the names of his patients and approximately one hundred three IME 
reports from 1996 and 1997, he did not produce the remainder of the requested 
reports or the 1099 tax forms. 
 
On September 22, 1998, respondent ordered Corn to appear in court to 
show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failure to abide by the 
court’s orders regarding production of documents ordered by subpoena. 
 
A show-cause hearing took place on September 28, 1998.  At the hearing, 
Corn testified that, with the exception of the one calendar produced, he could not 
produce any other appointment books or calendars prior to 1998.  He explained 
that appointment books are destroyed at the end of the calendar year or every 
three months, once the file is inactive.  With respect to the IME reports sought, 
Corn also testified that the majority of these reports had been destroyed.  Upon 
cross-examination, he conceded that one of the reasons he destroys these records 
is to prevent plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys from establishing his financial 
interest and defense bias in personal injury litigation.  Corn also said that he could 
not produce any 1099 tax forms because he did not have any. 
January Term, 2001 
3 
 
Attorney Robert Housel was also called as a witness at the show-cause 
hearing.  In a separate tort action entitled Hegedus v. Johnson, Cuyahoga C.P. No. 
290943, an issue similar to Corn’s alleged defense bias had been raised.  In 
Hegedus, Judge Daniel Gaul had appointed Housel as a special master to 
investigate Corn’s income and financial records pertaining to defense medical 
examinations.  (The Eighth District Court of Appeals later granted a writ of 
prohibition in that case, finding that Judge Gaul lacked the authority to appoint a 
special master.  State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gaul [1999], 131 Ohio App.3d 
419, 722 N.E.2d 616.)  In his testimony, Housel revealed information he had 
obtained during his investigation of Corn in the Hegedus case.  Following 
Housel’s testimony, Judge Russo continued the hearing to October 13, 1998. 
 
On October 8, 1998, relators filed a petition for a writ of prohibition and a 
writ of mandamus to prevent respondent from going forward with the contempt 
hearing in the Crow case.  The court of appeals granted an alternative writ of 
prohibition.  During the pendency of that litigation in the court of appeals (“Corn 
I”), on April 2, 1999, the parties in the Crow litigation entered into a settlement 
agreement and agreed to voluntarily dismiss the case with prejudice. 
 
On June 4, 1999, the court of appeals issued its final decision in “Corn I.”  
The court found that respondent Russo had jurisdiction to proceed with the 
contempt hearing against Corn but did not have jurisdiction to compel testimony 
or seek evidence from attorney Housel.  Therefore, the court of appeals granted a 
permanent writ of prohibition in that regard and ordered the testimony of attorney 
Housel to be sealed.  State ex rel. Corn v. Russo  (1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 57, 
726 N.E.2d 1052. 
 
On June 11, 1999, respondent Russo returned Crow to her active docket 
and continued the show-cause hearing.  To prohibit respondent from proceeding 
with the contempt hearing, relators commenced this action on July 23, 1999, by 
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filing a verified complaint, again seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus 
against respondent, Judge Russo. 
 
The court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus but granted the writ of 
prohibition.1  The court found, inter alia, that once the parties dismissed the 
underlying case, respondent lacked jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings.  
The court further found that because the contempt proceedings were civil in 
nature, respondent did not have the authority to continue the contempt hearing. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
The primary issue in this case is whether the court of appeals erred in 
finding that respondent lacked jurisdiction to hear the contempt proceedings.  For 
the reasons that follow, we find that respondent did have jurisdiction over the 
contempt proceedings.  Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals’ decision and 
deny relators’ writ of prohibition. 
 
A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that is granted in limited 
circumstances with great caution and restraint.  State ex rel. Henry v. Britt (1981), 
67 Ohio St.2d 71, 73, 21 O.O.3d 45, 47, 424 N.E.2d 297, 298-299.  Proceedings 
on a petition for a writ of prohibition test the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
lower court.  Thus, a writ of prohibition prevents an inferior court from exceeding 
its jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Barton v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Elections (1988), 39 
Ohio St.3d 291, 530 N.E.2d 871. 
 
For a writ of prohibition to be granted, the relator must prove that (1) the 
lower court is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of power is 
unauthorized by law, and (3) the relator possesses no other adequate remedy of 
law.  State ex rel. Tollis v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Appeals (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 
                                          
 
1.  In claiming that they were entitled to a writ of mandamus, relators alleged that respondent 
failed to comply with Corn I by not turning over documents the court ordered to be returned.  
Finding that relators had an adequate remedy at law, in that they could file a show-cause motion, 
the court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus.  That issue is not before this court. 
 
January Term, 2001 
5 
145, 147, 532 N.E.2d 727, 729.  However, even where an appeal may be 
available, “[w]hen a court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to 
consider a matter, a writ of prohibition will issue to prevent assumption of 
jurisdiction regardless of whether the lower court has ruled on the question of its 
jurisdiction.”  Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv., Office of Collective Bargaining v. State 
Emp. Relations Bd. (1990), 54 Ohio St.3d 48, 562 N.E.2d 125, syllabus; State ex 
rel. Sanquily v. Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 79, 80, 
573 N.E.2d 606, 608.  In such a case, “ ‘the availability or adequacy of a remedy 
of appeal * * * is immaterial.’ ”  Id. at 79, 573 N.E.2d at 607, quoting State ex rel. 
Adams v. Gusweiler (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 326, 329, 59 O.O.2d 387, 388, 285 
N.E.2d 22, 24. 
 
The court of appeals found that when the parties dismissed their case 
pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A)(1), respondent patently and unambiguously lacked 
jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings in Crow and did not have the 
jurisdiction to proceed with the contempt proceedings against relators, as they 
were civil in nature. 
 
Thus, in deciding whether respondent patently and unambiguously lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction in this matter, our first inquiry is whether the contempt 
proceedings were civil or criminal in nature. 
 
Contempt is defined in general terms as disobedience of a court order.  “ 
‘It is conduct which brings the administration of justice into disrespect, or which 
tends to embarrass, impede or obstruct a court in the performance of its 
functions.’ ”  Denovchek v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 
14, 15, 520 N.E.2d 1362, 1363-1364, quoting Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk 
(1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 55, 56 O.O.2d 31, 271 N.E.2d 815, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  Contempt proceedings are often classified as sui generis, neither civil 
nor criminal.  Id.  However, most courts distinguish between civil and criminal 
contempt proceedings.  The distinction is usually based on the purpose to be 
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served by the sanction.  Dan D. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey (1971), 56 
Cornell L.Rev. 183, 235.  Thus, in determining whether a contempt is civil or 
criminal, the pertinent test is “what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by 
imposing sentence?”  Shillitani v. United States (1966), 384 U.S. 364, 370, 86 
S.Ct. 1531, 1535, 16 L.Ed.2d 622, 627. 
 
Civil contempt sanctions are designed for remedial or coercive purposes 
and are often employed to compel obedience to a court order.  Id.  Criminal 
contempt sanctions, however, are punitive in nature and are designed to vindicate 
the authority of the court.  Denovchek v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 36 Ohio 
St.3d at 15, 520 N.E.2d at 1363.  Thus, civil contempts are characterized as 
violations against the party for whose benefit the order was made, whereas 
criminal contempts are most often described as offenses against the dignity or 
process of the court.  State v. Kilbane (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 204-205, 15 
O.O.3d 221, 223, 400 N.E.2d 386, 390. 
 
Relators contend that respondent was conducting a civil contempt 
proceeding, since respondent was attempting to compel relators to comply with a 
court order to produce documents for the benefit of the plaintiffs.  Thus, relators 
maintain that when the underlying lawsuit was dismissed under Civ.R. 41(A)(1), 
respondent no longer had jurisdiction to proceed with the contempt proceedings. 
 
It is well established that where the parties settle the underlying case that 
gave rise to the civil contempt sanction, the contempt proceeding is moot, since 
the case has come to an end.  Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co. (1911), 221 
U.S. 418, 451-452, 31 S.Ct. 492, 502, 55 L.Ed. 797, 810.  Respondent 
understands this principle and concedes that she has no jurisdiction over any civil 
contempt arising from the underlying case.  However, respondent argues that 
what began as a civil contempt shifted to a criminal contempt when it was learned 
that relators had purposefully conducted their business in such a fashion as to 
circumvent civil discovery rules and orders of the court attempting to enforce 
January Term, 2001 
7 
them.  Thus, respondent characterizes the contempt proceedings as being of a dual 
nature, both civil and criminal.  What initially started as a civil contempt to 
determine whether relators violated the September 4, 1998 order became a 
criminal contempt matter to investigate an intentional practice of destroying 
records, which was admittedly done in part to prevent their use by future litigants.  
Thus, respondent contends that the dismissal of the underlying civil action in 
Crow did not divest her from jurisdiction to hold a criminal contempt hearing. 
 
We agree with respondent’s characterization of the contempt proceedings.  
The proceedings were initiated by respondent to determine why relators did not 
comply with a subpoena and a subsequent court order to provide documents to the 
plaintiffs.  At this point, the purpose of the proceedings was to compel 
compliance with the court’s order; hence, it was civil in nature.  However, when 
respondent learned that it was relators’ practice to intentionally and systemically 
destroy records to prevent opposing counsel and the court from inquiring into his 
practices, the purpose of the contempt sanction was no longer restricted to 
coercing relators into complying with the court’s orders.  Instead, its purpose was 
to vindicate the authority of the judge and to punish relators if she found that their 
practices impeded the judicial process and frustrated the civil discovery rules.  
Thus, what began as a civil matter became criminal in nature. 
 
We must next decide whether respondent can go forward with the criminal 
contempt proceedings even though the underlying lawsuit has been dismissed. 
 
In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. (1990), 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 
110 L.Ed.2d 359, the United States Supreme Court decided a similar issue in the 
context of whether it could impose under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 sanctions on a law firm 
after the firm had dismissed the complaint in an antitrust action.  The law firm had 
argued, like the relators argue in this appeal, that the court had no jurisdiction to 
impose sanctions, since the lawsuit had been dismissed.  The United States 
Supreme Court disagreed.  The court ruled: 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“Like the imposition of costs, attorney’s fees, and contempt sanctions, the 
imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits of an action.  
Rather, it requires the determination of a collateral issue:  whether the attorney 
has abused the judicial process, and, if so, what sanction would be appropriate.  
Such a determination may be made after the principal suit has been terminated.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 396, 110 S.Ct. at 2456, 110 L.Ed.2d at 376. 
 
The court cited with approval those federal  decisions where the courts have 
held that collateral issues (such as criminal contempt) survive the dismissal of a 
case: 
 
“It is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after 
an action is no longer pending.  * * *  A criminal contempt charge is likewise ‘a 
separate and independent proceeding at law’ that is not part of the original action. 
* * *  A court may make an adjudication of contempt and impose a contempt 
sanction even after the action in which the contempt arose has been terminated.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 395-396, 110 S.Ct. at 2455-2456, 110 L.Ed.2d at 375. 
 
We agree with these federal authorities and find that a court may consider the 
collateral issue of criminal contempt even after the underlying action is no longer 
pending.  Id.  Consequently, we hold that the dismissal of an underlying civil 
action does not divest a court of common pleas of jurisdiction to conduct criminal 
contempt proceedings.  Therefore, even though the parties dismissed the 
underlying personal injury lawsuit in this case, we find that respondent has 
jurisdiction to continue the criminal contempt proceedings against relators. 
 
Relators also question whether respondent has jurisdiction to investigate 
whether Dr. Corn’s record-keeping practices violate State Medical Board 
requirements.  At the September 28, 1998 contempt hearing, respondent raised 
this issue after questioning relator Corn about his failure to keep patient records.  
Respondent then ordered the parties to brief the issue of whether the failure to 
January Term, 2001 
9 
keep patient records constitutes a violation of R.C. 4731.22(B)(6) or Ohio 
Adm.Code 4731-11-02 (grounds for discipline of licensed physicians).2 
 
Relators contend that respondent patently and unambiguously lacks  
jurisdiction over the issue of whether there is a violation under R.C. Chapter 4731 
and has, in fact, improperly inserted herself into the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
State Medical Board.  However, respondent maintains that she was not attempting 
to conduct an investigation into whether relator Corn violated any provision under 
R.C. Chapter 4731.  Instead, she states that she was asserting her jurisdiction to 
punish contempts. 
 
R.C. Chapter 4731 provides for the establishment of the State Medical Board 
and contains provisions concerning the licensing and disciplining of physicians.  
Of particular relevance in this case is R.C. 4731.22(F)(1), formerly (C)(1).  This 
section provides, “Any person may report to the board in a signed writing any 
information that the person may have that appears to show a violation of any 
provision of this chapter or any rule adopted under it.”  (Emphasis added.)  By its 
express language, this section affords any person, including respondent, the right 
to report any potential violation to the State Medical Board.  Although respondent 
does not have the jurisdiction to actually decide whether relator Corn has, in fact, 
violated any provision of R.C. Chapter 4731, she does have the right to further 
investigate whether she believes that there has been a violation and to report any 
alleged violation to the State Medical Board.  Accordingly, in connection with the 
contempt proceedings, respondent did not patently and unambiguously lack the 
jurisdiction to inquire into whether the practices of relator Corn’s practices violate 
R.C. Chapter 4731. 
                                          
 
2.  The court also ordered the parties to brief the issues of what privilege, if any, attaches to 
appointments maintained in a physician’s appointment book and whether destruction of records 
relating to the examination of individuals in connection with pending litigation and/or anticipated 
litigation constitutes contempt. 
 
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Since we find that respondent has jurisdiction over the criminal contempt 
proceedings and has not usurped the State Medical Board’s jurisdiction, we deny 
relators’ request for a writ of prohibition.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment 
of the court of appeals and deny the writ of prohibition, thereby allowing further 
proceedings on the criminal contempt charge.  Before continuing the contempt 
hearing, respondent shall afford relators with all procedural due process 
safeguards outlined in R.C. 2705.03.3 
Judgment reversed 
and writ denied. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  Because I agree with the court of appeals’ 
unanimous conclusion that the contempt proceedings against Dr. Corn were, and 
remained, civil in nature, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Respondent initiated contempt proceedings against Dr. Corn when he did 
not produce documents sought by the plaintiffs.  The purpose of the proceedings 
was to coerce Dr. Corn to comply with the court’s order to produce the documents 
for the benefit of the plaintiffs.  “If sanctions are primarily designed to benefit the 
complainant through remedial or coercive means, then the contempt proceeding is 
civil.”  Denovchek v. Trumbull Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 16, 
520 N.E.2d 1362, 1364, citing Brown v. Executive 200, Inc. (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 
250, 253, 18 O.O.3d 446, 448, 416 N.E.2d 610, 613.  As the appellate panel 
concluded, “[n]ow that the Crow litigation has been settled and dismissed, the 
civil contempt hearing for the benefit of the plaintiffs must also end.  The pursuit 
                                          
 
3.  R.C. 2705.03 sets forth procedures and constitutional guarantees that must be afforded 
individuals charged with criminal contempt. 
 
January Term, 2001 
11 
of documents from Dr. Corn * * * is over.”  State ex rel. Corn v. Russo (Nov. 24, 
1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 76730, unreported, 1999 WL 1085519, at *7. 
 
The majority concedes that the contempt proceedings against Dr. Corn 
were, at their inception, in the nature of civil contempt.  But the majority 
concludes that the contempt proceedings “became” criminal in nature at some 
point after the proceedings had begun.  The majority’s approach is based not on 
the underlying purpose of the contempt proceedings against Dr. Corn, which is 
the appropriate inquiry in these cases,4 but rather on the post hoc characterization 
of those proceedings suggested by respondent after Dr. Corn sought a writ of 
prohibition questioning her jurisdiction to proceed. 
 
The majority’s approach conflicts with this court’s prior recognition of the 
fact that even though contempt proceedings are sui generis, and thus neither 
wholly civil nor wholly criminal, “for certain purposes we have found it necessary 
to classify contempt proceedings as either ‘civil’ or ‘criminal.’ ”  (Emphasis 
added.) Denovchek, 36 Ohio St.3d at 16, 520 N.E.2d at 1364. 
 
One of the reasons that courts categorize contempt proceedings as either 
civil or criminal (and not as a continuum consisting of both) is so that courts may 
determine, with some degree of consistency, whether contempt proceedings 
initiated for a particular purpose may continue after dismissal of the underlying 
action.  See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. (1990), 496 U.S. 384, 395-
396, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2455-2456, 110 L.Ed.2d 359, 375.  Another reason that 
courts assign contempt proceedings into one of these two categories is that 
“notwithstanding the many elements of similarity in procedure and in punishment, 
                                          
 
4.  “ ‘It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to 
distinguish’ civil from criminal contempt.”  Shillitani v. United States (1966), 384 U.S. 364, 369, 
86 S.Ct. 1531, 1535, 16 L.Ed.2d 622, 627, quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. (1911), 
221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498, 55 L.Ed. 797, 806.  See, also, State v. Kilbane (1980), 61 
Ohio St.2d 201, 206, 15 O.O.3d 221, 224, 400 N.E.2d 386, 390 (“The inquiry to be made under 
this test is ‘what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing sentence?’ ” quoting 
Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 370, 86 S.Ct. at 1535, 16 L.Ed.2d at 627). 
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there are some differences between the two classes of proceedings which involve 
substantial rights and constitutional privileges. * * * [I]t is certain that in 
proceedings for criminal contempt the defendant is presumed to be innocent, he 
must be proved to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and cannot be compelled 
to testify against himself.”  Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. (1911), 221 
U.S. 418, 444, 31 S.Ct. 492, 499, 55 L.Ed. 797, 807, citing Boyd v. United States 
(1886), 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746.  Today’s decision blurs the 
distinction that courts have developed for these purposes. 
 
The majority cites no legal authority for its conclusion that civil contempt 
proceedings can, in midstream, transform into criminal contempt proceedings that 
will survive dismissal of the underlying action.  Though the majority eventually 
quotes from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cooter & Gell, supra, 
that case begs the question presented here, for it simply stands for the generally 
accepted proposition that “[a] criminal contempt charge is * * * not part of the 
original action,” and that imposition of criminal contempt sanctions may occur 
after termination of the underlying action.  (Emphasis added.)  Cooter & Gell, 496 
U.S. at 396, 110 S.Ct. at 2456, 110 L.Ed.2d at 375.  Though Cooter holds that 
criminal contempt proceedings survive dismissal of the underlying action, the 
issue here is whether civil contempt proceedings may be characterized in 
retrospect as having become criminal contempt proceedings in order to apply that 
rule. 
 
In her briefs, respondent relies on our Kilbane case as an example of this 
court’s refusal to “pigeonhole” contempt sanctions as being solely civil or 
criminal.  See State v. Kilbane (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 15 O.O.3d 221, 400 
N.E.2d 386.  Respondent correctly notes that in Kilbane, this court rejected the 
contention that every conditional contempt is civil contempt.  Id. at 206, 15 
O.O.3d at 224, 400 N.E.2d at 390.  But Kilbane, like Cooter, stopped well short 
of holding that what begins as one category of contempt proceedings may become 
January Term, 2001 
13 
another type.  In fact, in Kilbane this court decided that the addition of conditions 
to a criminal contempt sanction did not transform criminal contempt into civil 
contempt because the addition of these conditions did not alter the “overriding 
punitive purpose” of the proceedings.  Id. at 206, 15 O.O.3d at 224, 400 N.E.2d at 
391. 
 
My position in this case should not be construed as disapproving of a trial 
court’s inherent power to impose criminal contempt sanctions.  Before an 
underlying case is dismissed, trial courts may impose sanctions to punish offenses 
against the dignity or process of the court, or to coerce compliance with orders 
that were for the benefit of a party.  But I agree with the court of appeals that once 
an underlying case is dismissed, trial courts lack jurisdiction to pursue contempt 
sanctions for violations of orders intended to benefit a party to the underlying 
case. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the court of appeals’ decision 
granting the writ. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
McLaughlin & McCaffrey, L.L.P., Patrick M. McLaughlin, W. Joseph 
Melnik and Colin R. Jennings, for appellees. 
 
Zukerman, Daiker & Lear Co., L.P.A., Larry W. Zukerman and S. Michael 
Lear, for appellant. 
__________________