Case Title: Dubray v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20140428

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 2015-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dubray v. State  Court Description: A district court order denying post-conviction relief is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2). IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA 2015 ND 244 Nathan G. Dubray, Petitioner and Appellant v. State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee No. 20140428 Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, the Honorable Debbie Gordon Kleven, Judge. AFFIRMED. Per Curiam. Charles J. Sheeley (argued), 3332 Fourth Ave. S., Ste. 2D1, Fargo, ND 58103, for petitioner and appellant. Mark J. McCarthy (argued) and Meredith H. Larson (on brief), Assistant State's Attorneys, P.O. Box 5607, Grand Forks, ND 58206-5607, for respondent and appellee. Dubray v. StateNo. 20140428 Per Curiam. [¶1] Nathan Dubray appeals from a district court order denying his application for post-conviction relief. In 2013, Dubray pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition, a class AA felony. Dubray applied for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied his application. Dubray appealed, arguing the district court committed reversible error in denying his application claiming his guilty pleas were not voluntary because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to (1) hire a private investigator; (2) depose witnesses; (3) move to exclude evidence; and (4) communicate all known facts to Dubray. Dubray also argues the district court applied the wrong standard to the second prong of its analysis. Courts need not address both prongs of the Strickland test if a court can resolve the case by addressing only one prong. Rencountre v. State, 2015 ND 62, ¶ 7, 860 N.W.2d 837. We conclude the district court's finding that Dubray's trial counsel's representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness is not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2). [¶2] Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J. Lisa Fair McEvers Daniel J. Crothers Dale V. Sandstrom Carol Ronning Kapsner