Case Title: RS v. DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, SHERIDAN COUNTY, WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-03-12

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
RS v. DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES, SHERIDAN COUNTY, WYOMING2004 WY 8794 P.3d 1025Case Number: C-03-12Decided: 07/22/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL RIGHTS

TO 
KLS, Minor Child:

 

RS,

 

Appellant(Respondent),

 

v.

 

DEPARTMENT 
OF FAMILY SERVICES,

SHERIDAN 
COUNTY, WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Petitioner).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Robert W. Brown of Lonabaugh and Riggs, Sheridan, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Dan S. Wilde, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; and Sue 
Chatfield, Assistant Attorney General.

 

Guardian 
ad litem:

            
Jan K. Flaharty of Family Law Office, Sheridan, 
Wyoming.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

 

KITE, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      The Father of 
KLS, a minor child, appeals the district court's order terminating his parental 
rights claiming the Department of Family Services (DFS) failed to offer 
sufficient evidence of neglect at the time KLS was removed from his 
custody.  Upon review of the record, 
which contains clear and convincing evidence of abuse and neglect over the 
child's lifetime, including evidence the father caused her to witness repeated 
episodes of domestic violence, we affirm.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      The issues 
presented by Father are as follows:

 

            
A.        
Whether [Father] neglected his child as that term is defined [by] Wyoming 
Statute.

 

            
B.        
Whether the Court may consider evidence of a guilty plea by [Father] in a 
separate matter entered after the close of evidence in this 
case.

 

            
C.        
Whether the evidence presented by the State through its witnesses in 
support of termination is credible in light of the fact that the State's 
witness, Nelinda Dahmke, mislead and made false statements to the District 
Court.

 

[¶3]      DFS phrases the 
issue as follows:

 

Whether 
the district court's finding that [Father's] parental rights to KLS should be 
terminated was established by clear and convincing 
evidence?

 

 

FACTS

[¶4]      KLS was born 
October 28, 1999.  While Father and 
Mother were not married at the time of KLS' birth, they lived together 
periodically after KLS was born.  
Father and Mother married briefly, but eventually divorced.  Between October 1999 and January 2002, 
the couple moved in and out of at least twelve different residences in two 
states, which included houses, apartments, motels and homes of friends and 
family.  Father and Mother 
physically and verbally abused each other, often in the presence of KLS.  Mother filed for and received numerous 
family violence protection orders against Father over the course of their 
troubled relationship.   

 

[¶5]      On January 10, 
2002, Mother left KLS in Sheridan with a babysitter, Misty Humphries.  Four days later, on January 14, 2002, 
Ms. Humphries' sister Amanda contacted the DFS office in Sheridan to report that 
Mother had failed to pick up KLS as scheduled.  As a result of the allegation that 
Mother had abandoned KLS, and after failed attempts to contact Mother and 
Father, DFS took KLS into protective custody pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-405 (LexisNexis 2003).1     

 

[¶6]      The same day DFS 
took KLS into custody, it located Father and arranged for him to pick up 
KLS.  DFS placed KLS with Father on 
the condition that KLS not have un-supervised contact with Mother and that 
Father keep DFS informed of KLS' whereabouts.  On January 15, 2002, when DFS could not 
locate Father and KLS, it concluded Father had violated the conditions under 
which he was allowed custody.  Thus, 
DFS retrieved KLS from Father and placed KLS in foster 
care.

 

[¶7]      The district 
court entered an order for temporary protective custody on January 18, 2002, 
finding KLS' life or safety was in danger and continued placement in the family 
home would be contrary to KLS' wellbeing.  
KLS was to be placed in the protective legal and physical custody of DFS 
in accordance with the Child Protection Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-401, et. 
seq. (LexisNexis 2003).  Pursuant to 
the statute, a petition for neglect was filed in the district court sitting as 
the juvenile court.  After a hearing 
on May 3, 2002, the court entered an order finding Mother had neglected KLS.2  Consequently, the court ordered KLS to 
stay in the temporary custody of DFS until Father and Mother successfully 
completed the objectives identified in a case plan prepared by DFS. 

 

[¶8]      The ultimate goal 
of the case plan was family reunification.  
The specific objectives with which Mother and Father were required to 
comply were: (1) substance abuse evaluation and treatment/counseling to address 
addiction and/or use of methamphetamine, marijuana and alcohol; (2) counseling 
to address issues such as, but not limited to, relationships, parenting, 
effective appropriate communication, anger and control issues; (3) parenting 
classes; (4) pay child support for KLS; (5) submit to random UAs and 
breathalyzer tests; (6) establish paternity; (7) maintain contact with KLS; (8) 
secure and maintain adequate, consistent, and safe housing for a minimum of six 
consecutive months; and (9) secure and maintain employment for a minimum of six 
consecutive months.  The case plan 
warned, "failure or refusal to successfully complete the case plan for family 
reunification shall result in alternative permanency planning for said minor 
child, i.e. termination of parental rights followed by adoption."  

 

[¶9]      On June 18, 2002, 
DFS filed a petition in juvenile court against Mother and Father alleging 
contempt for failure to follow the case plan.  At a hearing on the contempt petition, 
Mother admitted the allegations and Father failed to appear.  On July 10, 2002, the juvenile court 
issued a bench warrant for Father's arrest regarding his failure to appear.  On November 15, 2002, all juvenile 
proceedings were suspended when the juvenile court learned DFS had filed a 
petition for termination of parental rights in the district court. 

 

[¶10]   In the petition, DFS alleged Mother 
and Father failed to comply with rehabilitation services despite continued 
efforts by DFS, failed to comply with the case plan and, in turn, had neglected 
KLS.  After a two day hearing, the 
district court terminated Mother and Father's parental rights in an order dated 
May 13, 2003.  Father appeals that 
decision.

 

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶11]   Our standard of review for the 
granting of a petition to terminate parental rights is as follows:  

Due 
to the tension between the fundamental liberty of familial association and the 
compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of children, application of 
statutes for termination of parental rights is a matter for strict scrutiny. 
TR v. Washakie County Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs., 736 P.2d 712, 715 (Wyo. 1987). As part of this strict scrutiny standard, a case for 
termination of parental rights must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a) (Michie 1997); In Interest of JG, 
742 P.2d 770, 773 (Wyo. 1987); D.S. v. Dep't of Pub. Assistance & 
Soc. Servs., 607 P.2d 911, 919 (Wyo. 1980). Clear and convincing 
evidence is that kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact that the 
truth of the contention is highly probable. Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 
982 (Wyo. 1984). Rigorous though this standard may be, we apply our traditional 
principles of evidentiary review when a party challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting termination. Matter of SYM, 924 P.2d 985, 987 (Wyo. 
1996). Thus, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
prevailing below, assuming all favorable evidence to be true while discounting 
conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party. Id.; D.S. v. Dep't 
of Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs., 607 P.2d at 919-20; In Interest of 
JG, 742 P.2d  at 773. In Re ZKP, 979 P.2d 953, 956 (Wyo. 
1999); see also SD v. Carbon County Dept of Family Servs., 2002 WY 
168 ¶5, 57 P.3d 1235, (Wyo. 2002); Matter of TLC, 2002 WY 76, PP10-11, 46 P.3d 863, PP10-11 (Wyo. 2002); In Re IH, 2001 WY 100, P14, 33 P.3d 172, 
P14 (Wyo. 2001); Matter of TLC, 2002 WY 76, 46 P. 3 863 (Wyo. 
2002).

SD  v. Carbon County Dep't of Family Servs. 
(In re SED), 2002 WY 
168, ¶ 5, 57 P.3d 1235, ¶ 5 (Wyo. 2002).

 

DISCUSSION

[¶12]   Termination of parental 
rights 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii)  (LexisNexis 2003) requires the 
establishment of three elements: (1) abusive treatment or neglect by the parent; 
(2) unsuccessful efforts to rehabilitate the family; and (3) the child's health 
and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the 
parent.  Abuse and neglect are 
defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-202(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003): 

 (ii)  "Abuse" 
means inflicting or causing physical or mental injury, harm or imminent danger 
to the physical or mental health or welfare of a child other than by accidental 
means, including abandonment, unless the abandonment is a relinquishment 
substantially in accordance with W.S. 14-11-101 through 14-11-109, excessive or 
unreasonable corporal punishment, malnutrition or substantial risk thereof by 
reason of intentional or unintentional neglect, and the commission or allowing 
the commission of a sexual offense against a child as defined by 
law:

 

(A)  "Mental 
injury" means an injury to the psychological capacity or emotional stability of 
a child as evidenced by an observable or substantial impairment in his ability 
to function within a normal range of performance and behavior with due regard to 
his culture; 

 

(B)  "Physical 
injury" means any harm to a child including but not limited to disfigurement, 
impairment of any bodily organ, skin bruising if greater in magnitude than minor 
bruising associated with reasonable corporal punishment, bleeding, burns, 
fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma or substantial malnutrition; 

 

(C)  "Substantial 
risk" means a strong possibility as contrasted with a remote or insignificant 
possibility; 

 

(D)  "Imminent 
danger" includes threatened harm and means a statement, overt act, condition or 
status, which represents an immediate and substantial risk of sexual abuse or 
physical or mental injury. 

 

. . 
.

 

(vii) 
"Neglect" means a failure or refusal by those responsible for the child's 
welfare to provide adequate care, maintenance, supervision, education or 
medical, surgical or  ay other care 
necessary for the child's well being.

 

[¶13]   At the hearing on the petition to 
terminate parental rights, the State presented evidence through DFS employees 
and caseworkers, a counselor, and KLS' foster mother.  Both Mother and Father testified, as did 
family members.  Father denied he 
had neglected KLS.  Instead, he 
offered testimony that on the morning of January 15, 2002, when KLS was taken 
from him after one day in his custody, KLS was healthy, well-fed, well-dressed 
and clean.  The State produced 
evidence of Father's pattern of behavior throughout the child's short life, 
which included repeated incidences of domestic violence against Mother, often 
occurring in KLS' presence.

 

[¶14]   The district court found that 
although "Wyoming Courts recognize the parent child relationship is one of the 
most precious rights," KLS was neglected by both parents when they subjected her 
to domestic violence, failed to follow the case plan, failed to obtain 
consistent and adequate housing, and failed to visit KLS as often as 
allowed.  Further, the court found 
that because of the parents' lack of cooperation, reasonable efforts by DFS were 
unsuccessful in rehabilitating either parent in an effort to reunify the family. 

 

 

Abuse 
and Neglect

 

[¶15]   Because Father focuses on the 
sufficiency of the evidence of neglect, our discussion begins there.  This Court has previously observed that 
there is a thin line between abuse and neglect and often an act or an incident 
may be evidence of both neglect and abuse.  
MS v. Kuchera (In re MLM), 682 P.2d 982, 987 (Wyo. 1984).  Such was true in this case, and thus 
we view the evidence through the lenses of both, although only neglect was 
alleged by DFS. 

 

[¶16]   Father's argument relies on the one 
day he had full custody during which he claims he did not neglect KLS.  However, in the termination of parental 
rights, we must consider all of the factors, incidents and conditions that 
demonstrate neglect.  MLM, 
682 P.2d  at 988.  Rarely do we find 
a single condition or incident standing alone justifies termination.  Instead, neglect is usually 
manifested by numerous incidents and conditions extending over a considerable 
length of time.  Id. One day 
without neglect does not overcome a lifetime of abusive and neglectful 
behavior.

 

[¶17]   The record establishes clear and 
convincing evidence of a pattern of neglect by Father.  He failed to provide KLS with a stable 
home as demonstrated by the sheer number of living situations.  Of course, the lack of a stable home 
alone does not constitute abuse or neglect.  However, in the specific context of 
these facts, it is a factor.  In her 
short lifetime, Father shuffled KLS between twelve different residences in two 
different states.  The family lived 
in a hotel and two houses in Colorado.  
Mother testified to living in three different places in Gillette, which 
included two apartments and a friend's home.  Upon moving to Sheridan, Father moved 
KLS six times, mostly to different motels.  
As a result of the lack of a stable home, KLS was not given timely 
immunizations or follow-up medical care for illnesses. 

 

[¶18]   Father repeatedly subjected KLS to 
witnessing domestic violence between him and Mother.  The statutory definition of neglect 
includes failure to provide adequate care and supervision and abuse is defined 
to include inflicting mental injury.  
Causing a child to witness violence and abuse of others is an appropriate 
consideration in determining whether a parent is guilty of neglect by failing to 
properly care for and supervise that child and of abuse by subjecting the child 
to mental and emotional injury.  
Father first struck Mother three days into their relationship.  Father often pushed and hit Mother, as 
well as destroyed her property.  
Because of the frequency of reported incidents of domestic violence 
between the two parents, we can infer that it often occurred in KLS' 
presence.  In addition, the record 
contains direct evidence of that fact on numerous occasions.  In October 2000, law enforcement 
officers responded to a domestic dispute between Father and Mother, which 
occurred while KLS was present in her crib.  On December 13, 2000, Mother filed a 
petition for a family violence protection order in Sheridan County Circuit 
Court.  In her affidavit, she 
claimed Father pulled her out of bed by her hair, broke the bed, bathroom doors 
and mirror, and punched and kicked her.  
In March 2001, Mother filed another petition for a family violence 
protection order in Campbell County claiming Father pushed her down and tore the 
phone out of the wall.  A few days 
later, while KLS was in the vehicle with him, Father tried to run Mother's 
vehicle off the road while yelling, "I'll kill you, you fucking bitch."  In July 2001, law enforcement was called 
to a residence where Mother and Father were engaged in a domestic dispute while 
KLS was inside the house.  Police 
were called again in October 2001 after Father and Mother (and Father's mother) 
got into an argument.   

 

[¶19]   Mother filed for and obtained yet 
another family violence protection order on November 13, 2001, stemming from an 
argument outside of the motel room where they were staying while KLS remained 
inside the room.  Mother claimed 
Father grabbed her by the neck, shook and choked her, then threatened he would 
kill her if she left.  He then threw 
a bottle of alcohol at Mother's car as she left, breaking the window.  Mother also indicated in her affidavit 
that the day before this incident, Father charged and choked her while she was 
holding KLS and said he would cut her head off and could not wait until she was 
dead.  Mother testified that during 
the rest of the day two-year-old KLS repeated, "cut off Mommy's head", until 
Father apologized, at which time KLS started repeating "so fucking sorry."  After the hearing on the last protection 
order, Father yelled, "You fucking bitch" to Mother as she was leaving the 
courtroom with KLS in her arms.  

 

[¶20]   Evidence of the effect on KLS of 
witnessing the violence between her parents came through the testimony of Sharyn 
Siler, a licensed clinical social worker.  
In October 2002, DFS retained Ms. Siler to examine and treat KLS.  After approximately thirty-four sessions 
with KLS involving play, art therapy and discussions with Mother and KLS' foster 
mother, Ms. Siler diagnosed KLS with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  Ms. Siler testified as 
follows:

 

[KLS] 
displays feelings of anxiety, fears. [KLS] worries about the safety of others. 
[KLS] can be very clingy to her caregiver. At other times she's more  -- as she gets used to the surroundings, 
she is more free and apart from. But she can be very clingy. She worries about 
recurrence of violence. This is not something that she has verbally said. I want 
to make that specific. This is what has come out through play therapy about how 
she displays  KLS is right now three years old, so much of her life has been 
preverbal stages; and she doesn't still right now have a lot of verbal skills to 
be able to explain things. So, this is through interpretation of play 
therapy.  

 

There 
ha[ve] been changes in behavior throughout the time that she's been in foster 
care of withdrawal and then  first, she'll withdraw; and then she will become 
closer in the clinging part. She'll have outbursts of anger without any knowing, 
precipitating event that happened before.  
She has in play therapy recreated events that display violence or anger 
between the toys that she's playing with, the toys that she's 
selected.

 

She 
has  she's hyper-vigilant, increased sensitivity to sound.  If there's any noises in my office that 
she can't readily identify, if there's pipes or something going on, she will 
immediately stop what she's doing and ask what that is.  At first she was fearful of that and 
after the explanations and she's getting used to it, but she still is very aware 
of any noises in the office.

 

Changes 
in sleep pattern, as explained --- or as told to me by the foster mother, she 
has a difficult time falling asleep.  
She has a difficult time staying asleep once asleep.  She prefers, well, white noises  the 
sound of the TV or someone else in the room, some sort of other stimulation 
during sleep.

 

She's 
had an increase in negative behaviors, as shown at the daycare, as well as at 
the foster home.  There has been 
some regression in behaviors.  Most 
recently she was in respite care for a week.  I saw her during that week.  She regressed during that time.  When I saw her during the session, she 
started baby talking, displaying symptoms that I hadn't seen in KLS before.  And this is while the foster mother 
wasn't there. 

 

Ms. 
Siler ended her testimony by explaining that the PTSD could be caused by a 
number of factors, including witnessing domestic violence between parents and 
unstable living conditions.  She 
testified that children who may not have been abused directly, but who  witnessed abuse of others, will 
oftentimes display symptoms of PTSD.

 

[¶21]   Other jurisdictions have recognized 
that subjecting a child to witnessing domestic violence between parents 
constitutes neglect and abuse of the child.  Children who witness acts of violence 
between their parents may be in imminent danger of becoming impaired, if they 
have not already suffered actual emotional harm.  In re Athena M., 678 N.Y.S.2d 11 
(A.D. 1 Dept. 1998).  Children are 
victimized by a climate of violence existing between their 
parents, even if they are not direct targets of 
the abuse.  Heck v. 
Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155, 163 (N.D.1995).  
A 
New York court of appeals upheld a finding of neglect based on abuse between 
parents, stating:

 

While 
violence between parents adversely affects all 
children, younger children in particular are most likely to suffer from 
psychosomatic illnesses and arrested development (Lynn R. Kurtz, Note, 
Protecting New York's Children: An Argument for the Creation of a 
Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child, 60 Albany 
L.Rev. 1345, 1351, n 45 (1997)). 

 

In 
re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1998).  
The law review article cited by the New York court describes scientific 
support for the proposition that witnessing abuse between parents has a profound 
negative impact on children:

 

Studies 
have shown that children who witness domestic violence suffer many harmful 
psychological and emotional effects. Areas in which such problems exist include 
"health[,] socioemotional development[,] and behavior" relating to others. A 
more recent study, which compared children with no history of domestic violence 
to children with violent family backgrounds, found that the latter group had 
borderline to severe behavioral problems, below average adaptive behavior 
skills, lower reading levels, a significant difference in their social 
competence and more aggressive responses.

 

Comment, 
Protecting New York's Children: An Argument for the Creation of a 
Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a 
Child, 60 Albany 
L.Rev. 1345, 1351, n 45 (1997) (footnotes omitted).  

 

[¶22]   Many, if not most, jurisdictions 
have echoed the conclusion that subjecting children to domestic violence 
justifies termination of parental rights.  
4 Child Custody and Visitation, Law and Practice § 28.02[1][c] 
(Matthew Bender, Lexis 2004).  In 
In re Stephen Tyler R., 584 S.E.2d 581 (W.Va. 2003), the facts resemble 
those we are faced with in this case, and the court affirmed a termination of 
parental rights.  In that case, the 
father struck the child's mother while she was holding the child in her arms, 
and repeatedly refused to cooperate in a family case plan or undergo therapy for 
anger management.   In In 
re: J.R., 991 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999), a Texas court terminated 
mother's parental rights finding that she knowingly placed or allowed the 
children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their emotional 
or physical well-being.

 

[¶23]   A young child is not a mere 
bystander to domestic violence.  The 
consequences of subjecting KLS to such dysfunctional behavior are manifested in 
her documented psychological problems.3  Additional evidence existed of Father's 
failure to provide proper care and supervision of KLS and his propensity to 
compromise her safety including the incident in which Father attempted to run 
Mother off the road while KLS was in the car with him. 

 

[¶24]   Further evidence of neglect was 
Father's failure to comply with the case plan, which is discussed in detail 
below.  Father argues that his 
noncompliance with the case plan is immaterial because he claims he did not 
neglect KLS in the first place and, therefore, DFS could not force him to comply 
with the case plan.  However, the 
district court sitting as the juvenile court always has jurisdiction over 
both parents under Wyo. Stat. § 14-3-402(a)(xiv).  That statute defines "parties" to a 
neglect proceeding as including "the child, his parents, guardian or custodian, 
the state of Wyoming, and any other person."  Furthermore, Father signed the case 
plan.  Therefore, the court had 
jurisdiction over Father and his failure to comply with the case plan led to his 
neglect.  See  EBH v. 
Hot Springs Dep't of Family Servs. (In re IH), 
2001 
WY 100, 33 P.3d 172 (Wyo. 2001) (Father failed to adhere to the case plan, which in part led to 
termination of his parental rights); WR v. Natrona County Dep't of Family 
Servs. (In the Interest of DG), 916 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1996) (Mother 
signed 
and agreed to case plan, but did not complete programs suggested in case plan, 
leading to termination of parental rights).

 

[¶25]   All of this evidence, when 
considered together, provides clear and convincing proof sufficient to support 
the district court's findings of neglect.  
In re SED v. Carbon County Dep't of Family Services, 2002 WY 168, 
¶ 15, 57 P.2d 1235, ¶ 15 (Wyo. 2002). 

 

Attempts 
to Rehabilitate the Family

 

[¶26]   We now turn our focus to the second 
element of § 14-2-309(a)(iii), unsuccessful attempts to rehabilitate the 
family.  As we have discussed above, 
DFS presented sufficient evidence of neglect to warrant placement of KLS in its 
custody and imposition of the requirements of the case plan as condition 
precedent to reunification of the family.  
When family reunification is the goal of the case plan, the statute 
imposes on DFS the responsibility to provide reasonable services necessary to 
accomplish that goal and sets out the steps the parents must take before 
reunification can occur.  SED, 
¶ 16.  The record is replete 
with instances of DFS' fulfillment of its responsibilities and Father's failure 
to fulfill his.

 

[¶27]   After failing to appear for the May 
9, 2002, meeting to develop the case plan, Mother and Father appeared at a 
second meeting and stipulated to the plan prepared by DFS.  The plan contained nine objectives and 
clearly warned that failure or refusal to successfully complete the case plan 
for family reunification would result in alternative permanency planning for 
said minor child, i.e. termination of parental rights, followed by 
adoption.  The district court made 
the following findings regarding Father's failure to follow the case 
plan:

 

Objective 
1: 
Substance abuse evaluation and treatment/counseling to address [addiction] 
and/or use of methamphetamine, marijuana and alcohol.  [Father did not complete].  

. 
. .

 

Father 
failed to attend a substance abuse evaluation at Piedmont.  He [did] participate in a substance 
abuse evaluation at Big Horn Counseling in Basin, Wyoming.  The results of that evaluation are 
questionable because Father falsely reported no history of abusive use of 
alcohol or drugs, and that he had lost his temper only once in the last three 
years.

 

Objective 
2:  Counseling to address issues such as but 
not limited to relationships, parenting, effective appropriate communication, 
anger and control issues.  [Father 
did not complete]. 

 

Father 
failed to attend anger management counseling as recommended by Big Horn 
Counseling.

 

. 
. .

 

Objective 
3: 
Parenting Classes.  [Father did not 
attend] classes offered by DFS.

 

Objective 
4: 
Child Support.  Neither parent has 
paid support during the pendency of [these] proceedings.  

 

Father 
did not provide proof of employment. . . .

 

Objective 
5: 
Random UAs and breathalizer. 

 

. 
. .   

 

Father 
complied with 7 of a possible 46 UAs.  
[One] of 7 was positive for methamphetamine.

 

Objective 
6:  Establishing paternity was 
accomplished.

 

Objective 
7: 
Contact with [KLS].  Failure to 
visit and provide nurturing for a child is neglect.  [Father did not visit] KLS regularly 
despite the fact that many different visitation plans were developed by DFS, 
with input from parents, to accommodate their schedules. 

 

Father 
attended less than half of scheduled visits. . . .

 

. 
. . 

 

Objective 
8:  Father and Mother will secure and 
maintain adequate, consistent, and safe housing for a minimum of six consecutive 
months.  [Father did not 
complete.]  

 

After 
February 2002, when the Case Plan went into effect, Father provided DFS with 
many different addresses and telephone numbers. . . .

 

Telephone 
numbers that were provided by [Father] were not always accurate and DFS was not 
always able to contact [Father]. 

 

[¶28]   Father does not dispute the factual 
findings of the district court regarding his failures to meet the requirements 
of the case plan.  Of the nine 
requisites in the case plan, the evidence demonstrated Father fully complied 
with only one  determining his paternity.  
Accordingly, the district court's finding regarding this element is fully 
supported by the evidence.  

 

 

Health 
and Safety of Child

 

[¶29]   The third element of § 
14-2-309(a)(iii) requires DFS to prove that returning KLS to Father's custody 
would seriously jeopardize her health and safety.  Pam Emerson, director of Sheridan County 
Court-Appointed Special Advocates, testified that every time KLS was exposed to 
domestic violence, her safety was compromised.  She testified:

 

Q:  In what way was her safety compromised, 
then, by the alleged exposure to domestic violence?

 

A:  In domestic violence situations, 
children's safety is compromised by parents that are out of control, by parents 
who are exhibiting anger physically.  
KLS' physical safety could be compromised by that.  Certainly her emotional safety is 
compromised.

 

                        
. . .

 

Q: 
When you say her physical safety could be compromised, what do you mean? The 
possibility exists that a shoe might come flying out of the 
melee?

 

A:  Absolutely.  That's not uncommon.  We have  I read an affidavit for the 
Family Violence Protection Order that we supervised visitation on where [Mother] 
indicated that she was sitting in a chair while [Father] was choking her and KLS 
was sitting on her lap.  And those 
are the kinds of situations where a child's physical safety can be 
compromised.

 

[¶30]   Testimony from Nelinda Dahmke, the 
DFS caseworker in charge of KLS' case, demonstrated that KLS would not be safe 
if returned to Father.  She 
stated:

 

The 
risk of abuse or neglect, future harm to the child have not been reduced; and 
the position the department took was it was not safe for the child's return to 
these caretakers. 

 

That 
decision was made in consultation with, again, my supervisor, CASA advocate, and 
then subsequent meetings, including contact with Mr. Tate, you, and Mr. 
Flaharty.  

 

[¶31]   Father's lifestyle continued to be 
unstable despite DFS' efforts to assist him in developing the skills necessary 
to be an adequate parent.  As 
evidenced by testimony iterated above, clear and convincing evidence existed 
that KLS's health and safety would be in jeopardy if KLS were returned to 
Father's custody.  

 

 

Credibility 
of Witness

 

[¶32]   Father challenges the testimony of 
the State's principal witness, Ms. Dahmke, as not credible and claims the court 
should not have relied upon it to support the termination of his parental 
rights.  

 

[¶33]   As we stated in Keever v. 
Payless Auto Sales, 
Inc., 2003 WY 147, 
¶ 7, 79 P.3d 496, ¶ 7 (Wyo. 2003)(citations omitted): 

 

We 
do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, 
we defer to those findings unless they are unsupported by the record or 
erroneous as a matter of law. We affirm the trial court's findings if there is 
any evidence to support them.  We 
accept the evidence of the prevailing party as true and give that party the 
benefit of all favorable inferences that can fairly be drawn from the 
evidence, while disregarding conflicting evidence. 

 

[¶34]   We have held that "the trial judge 
is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh 
their testimony, and, thus, this Court accords considerable deference to the 
trial judge's findings."  
CAA v. 
ZWA (In the Interest of KRA), 2004 WY 
18, ¶ 16, 85 P.3d 432, ¶ 16 (Wyo. 2004) (citation omitted).

 

[¶35]   Father points to three instances in 
which he claims Ms. Dahmke mislead the district court.  Ms. Dahmke's lengthy testimony consisted 
of almost 200 pages in which she fully explained each of the alleged misleading 
statements to the satisfaction of the district court.  We find the minor inconsistencies in her 
testimony afford no basis for reversal of the district court's termination of 
Father's parental rights.

 

 

District 
Court's Reliance on Father's Drug Conviction After 
Hearing

 

[¶36]   Father maintains the district court 
committed reversible error because it relied on evidence concerning Father's 
guilty plea to a felony drug charge that was entered after the termination 
hearing.  The State did not address 
this argument.  Although Father 
provides no support for his contentions on this issue, we will briefly address 
his concerns.  

 

[¶37]   The district court's findings 
stated "Father is currently released on bond, pending sentencing after an April 
28, 2003[,] plea of guilty to a felony charge of delivery of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) within this district."  Although the guilty plea took place 
after the termination of parental rights hearing, Father failed to 
explain how the district court's judicial notice of Father's criminal file was 
improper.  This Court has held that 
a court may take judicial notice of its own records in cases closely related to 
the one before it.  State in 
Interest of C v. Platte County Department of Public Assistance and Social 
Services, 638 P.2d 165, 172 n.10 (Wyo. 1981).  See also State ex rel. Romsa v. 
Grace, 5 P.2d 301 (Wyo. 1931); Ellis v. Cauhaupe, 260 P.2d 309 (Wyo. 
1953); Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 540 P.2d 535 (Wyo. 1975) (we 
do not deem it improper to take notice of the judgment, temporary restraining 
order, and opinion in the earlier case because of the identity of the parties 
and the interrelationship of these actions).  While the guilty plea in this case was 
entered after the termination hearing, the district court was well aware of the 
pending charges at the time of the hearing and of Father's repeated failure of 
the drug tests required by the case plan. 

 

[¶38]   Whether or not Father pled guilty 
to a drug-related charge was of minor importance in the face of the overwhelming 
evidence of abuse and neglect.  The 
court made multiple and detailed findings of fact which demonstrated 
neglect.  We fail to see how the 
reference to the guilty plea that occurred after the hearing prejudiced 
Father.  See In the 
Matter of A.C.B., 598 N.E.2d 570, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (where Father alleged the district court 
improperly took judicial notice of a paternity test in its findings of fact, the 
appellate court failed to see the prejudice that 
resulted).  

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶39]   The district court fully considered 
all of the evidence and provided detailed and thorough findings on each of the 
elements required by the statute for termination of Father's parental rights. 
Clear and convincing evidence proved Father subjected KLS to continuing abuse 
and neglect, and her safety and well-being requires that she not be returned to 
his custody.  We affirm the district 
court's findings and order terminating Father's parental 
rights.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-3-405 
(LexisNexis 2003).  "Taking 
of child into custody; when permitted. 
(a)  A 
child may be taken into custody by a law enforcement officer without a warrant 
or court order when: (i)  There 
are reasonable grounds to believe a child is abandoned, lost, suffering from 
illness or injury or seriously endangered by his surroundings and immediate 
custody appears to be necessary for his protection; or (ii)  The 
child's conduct or behavior seriously endangers himself and immediate custody 
appears necessary."

 

2The 
record does not contain transcripts of the neglect hearing, nor does it contain 
the original petition for neglect.

 

3The 
Wyoming Legislature recognized domestic violence must be considered contrary to 
the best interest of children in the context of custody issues.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(c) 
(LexisNexis 2003); see Cobb v. Cobb, 2 P.3d 578, 580 (Wyo. 2000) 
where abuse, harassment, and stalking by mother's boyfriend occurred, we agreed 
that although the boyfriend had not directly harmed the children, the district 
court properly reasoned it was not required to "sit idly by until some form of 
physical or emotional harm is done to [the children]."  Id.