Case Title: GARY KENT OPITZ V. SHELIE KAY OPITZ

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0015

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
GARY KENT OPITZ V. SHELIE KAY OPITZ2007 WY 207173 P.3d 405Case Number: S-07-0015Decided: 12/28/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
GARY KENT 
OPITZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
SHELIE KAY 
OPITZ,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Gibson Sean Benham, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Keith Robert Nachbar, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Gary Kent 
Opitz challenges the amount of child support ordered by the district court.   We affirm the district court's 
decision.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]           
Mr. Opitz 
presents these two issues for our review:

 
 
1.         
Whether the district court abused its discretion by imputing income to 
Mr. Opitz in determining his child support obligation.

 
 
2.         
Whether the district court violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007) by failing to set forth specific findings for deviating from 
Wyoming's 
presumptive child support guidelines.

 
 
Ms. Opitz presents an additional 
issue:

 
 
3.         
Whether Ms. Opitz should be awarded her attorney's fees for this 
appeal.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
Gary and 
Shelie Opitz married in 1986.  They 
had a son in 1988, and another in 1999.  
The parties separated in 2004, and Ms. Opitz filed for divorce near 
the end of that year.  Through 
mediation, the parties were largely successful in dividing property and debt, 
but ultimately could not agree on child custody, visitation, and support.  They took those issues to trial.  The district court entered a divorce 
decree on October 18, 2006, granting primary custody to Ms. Opitz and 
visitation to Mr. Opitz, and establishing Mr. Opitz's child support 
obligations.1

 
 

[¶4]           
In 
determining child support, the district court considered detailed evidence 
regarding Mr. Opitz's work history and income.  During much of the marriage, 
Mr. Opitz worked as an automobile technician in Casper, Wyoming, and eventually advanced to the job of 
automotive painter.  In 1996, he and 
Ms. Opitz started their own truck bed liner business.  They sold that business in 2004, shortly 
before the couple separated, but Mr. Opitz continued working for the 
company from time to time until 2005, with a salary of approximately $1,500 per 
month.  During a short period of 
unemployment in 2005, he took steps to begin a new career as an insurance agent, 
which would require him to pass a licensing examination offered in January 
2006.  In the interim, he returned 
to his previous job as an automobile painter, for which his gross salary 
exceeded $5,000 per month.  In 
January 2006, Mr. Opitz passed his insurance licensing examination and began 
working for an insurance company.  
His income was based on commission, but the company offered an initial 
"subsidy" of $1,500 per month to beginning agents, bringing his actual income to 
approximately $2,000 per month.

 
 

[¶5]           
The 
district court applied the presumptive child support guidelines from Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-304 to establish Mr. Opitz's past and future child support 
obligations.2  For the period from January 2005 until 
September 2005, the district court used Mr. Opitz's salary of approximately 
$1,500 per month from the truck bed liner company to calculate child support of 
$497.11 per month.  For the period 
from September 2005 through August 2006, the district court used his salary of 
more than $5,000 per month from the automobile painting job to calculate child 
support of $1,032.79.  For the 
period from August 2006 until February 2007, the district court used his salary 
of approximately $2,000 per month from the insurance company to calculate child 
support of $350 per month.  

 
 

[¶6]           
For the 
period beginning in February 2007, however, the district court ordered child 
support of $700 per month, based not on Mr. Opitz's actual income as an 
insurance agent, but rather, on the higher salary Mr. Opitz had received as 
an automobile painter.  The district 
court chose to impute the higher income to Mr. Opitz pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-307(b)(xi), based on the finding that Mr. Opitz was voluntarily 
underemployed.  This aspect of the 
district court's ruling is challenged by Mr. Opitz on 
appeal.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶7]           
The 
parties agree that we review the district court's decision on child support for 
abuse of discretion.

 

There 
are few rules more firmly established in our jurisprudence than the proposition 
that disposition of marital property, calculation of income for child support 
purposes, and the granting of alimony are committed to the sound discretion of 
the district court.  Johnson v. Johnson, 11 P.3d 948, 950 
(Wyo. 2000).  Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among 
which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound 
judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing 
so arbitrarily or capriciously.  
Id.; Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 
(Wyo. 
1998).  We must ask ourselves 
whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any 
facet of its ruling was arbitrary or capricious.  Johnson, 11 P.3d  at 950.  In accomplishing our review, we consider 
only the evidence in favor of the successful party, ignore the evidence of the 
unsuccessful party, and grant to the successful party every reasonable inference 
that can be drawn from the record.  
Id.

 
 

Belless 
v. Belless, 2001 
WY 41, ¶ 6, 21 P.3d 749, 750-51 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶8]           
While the 
district court exercises discretion in establishing child support, that 
discretion is guided by the applicable statutory provisions.  Rodenbough v. Miller, 2006 WY 19, 
¶ 9, 127 P.3d 800, 802 (Wyo. 2006).  
In Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304, the legislature established 
guidelines for calculating child support, based on factors including the 
parents' respective incomes, custody arrangements, and the number of 
children.  See Plymale v. Donnelly, 2007 WY 77, 
¶¶ 31-33, 157 P.3d 933, 940 (Wyo. 2007).  The child support calculated under these 
guidelines is "rebuttably presumed to be the correct amount of child support to 
be awarded in any proceeding to establish or modify temporary or permanent child 
support."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-307(a).  However, a 
court "may deviate from the presumptive child support . . . upon a specific 
finding that the application of the presumptive child support would be unjust or 
inappropriate in that particular case."  
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(b).  In 
considering whether to deviate from the presumptive child support, a court is 
required to consider a number of listed factors, 
including:

 
 
Whether either parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed.  In 
such case the child support shall be computed based upon the potential earning 
capacity (imputed income) of the unemployed or underemployed parent.  In making that determination the court 
shall consider:

 
 
(A)    Prior employment experience 
and history;

(B)    Educational level and whether 
additional education would make the parent more self-sufficient or significantly 
increase the parent's income;

(C)    The presence of children of 
the marriage in the parent's home and its impact on the earnings of that 
parent;

(D)    Availability of employment 
for which the parent is qualified;

(E)    Prevailing wage rates in the 
local area;

(F)    Special skills or training; 
and

(G)    Whether the parent is 
realistically able to earn imputed income.

 
 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-307(b)(xi).

 
 

[¶9]           
Mr. Opitz 
claims that the district court, in imputing to him the higher income from his 
previous position, ignored clear and undisputed evidence that his employment as 
an automobile painter was temporary, and that he "intended prior to, during, and 
after such employment to become an insurance salesman."  His only reasons for taking that 
temporary position, he explains, were "to find employment while studying for the 
exam and to afford Christmas."  He 
further asserts that there is an "utter lack of evidence that [he] had any ill 
intentions or was otherwise trying to avoid his child support obligations." 

 
 

[¶10]       
The 
decision to impute income does not, however, rest on Mr. Opitz's subjective 
intentions.  It rests instead on his 
"potential earning capacity."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(b)(xi).  
Evidence in this case showed that Mr. Opitz was well-qualified to be an 
automobile painter by his prior experience, job history, and training.  There was evidence that such positions 
were available in the area, and in particular, that Mr. Opitz could have 
continued working for his former employer.  
The prevailing wage was established by the salary Mr. Opitz actually 
earned in that position.  
Mr. Opitz did suggest that he quit because his "body couldn't  
couldn't do it," but he provided no medical evidence to support this suggestion, 
and he later testified that he had not missed any work because of health 
problems or physical restrictions.  
In light of the statutory factors the district court was required to 
consider, this evidence amply supported a finding that Mr. Opitz was 
realistically able to earn the higher income, and that he was voluntarily 
underemployed.  We find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's decision.

 
 

[¶11]       
In its 
oral ruling, the district 
court observed that Mr. Opitz "gave up a very good job for a job that is 
not nearly as good," and while there may have been good reasons to make the 
change, the child "should not suffer" as a result of Mr. Opitz's career 
decision.  The district court also 
closely tailored its child support decision to Mr. Opitz's particular 
circumstances.  It established child 
support based on Mr. Opitz's lower, actual income to begin with, giving him time 
"to figure out if he can make it, if he can be successful, or whether he's going 
to have to get another job that will allow him the salary that he basically had" 
as an automobile painter.  The 
record demonstrates that the district court drew rational conclusions from 
objective criteria, and exercised sound judgment under the circumstances.  We find no basis for reversing the 
district court's decision.  

[¶12]       
Mr. 
Opitz's situation is in marked contrast to that in Durham v. Durham, 2003 WY 95, 74 P.3d 1230 (Wyo. 2003), in which the district court imputed a higher income to Ms. 
Durham based on the salary she earned in financial services in Virginia prior to 
her marriage.  After the divorce, 
she and her children took up residence with her parents in Gillette, Wyoming, and she taught music lessons at a 
substantially lower salary than she received in her former position.  Id., ¶¶3-4, 74 P.3d  at 1232.  We reversed the 
district court's decision, not because it was improper to impute a higher income 
to Ms. Durham, but because the record did not "include any evidence regarding 
availability of employment and prevailing wage rates in the local area," and 
thus "nothing to support the proposition that mother is realistically able to 
earn, in the Gillette area, the income imputed to her."  Id., ¶ 12, 
74 P.3d  at 1234.  The record in Mr. 
Opitz's case does include evidence that automobile painting jobs were available 
in the area, and evidence of Mr. Opitz's actual salary in that very 
position.  Mr. Opitz's case is much 
closer to the situation in KC v. KJM, 
971 P.2d 603, 607 (Wyo. 1999), in which the mother "voluntarily left her 
four-year teaching job and was now a second-year law student with zero 
income."  We held that "the 
district court could reasonably find that Mother was voluntarily unemployed and, 
therefore, impute her income from prior years."

[¶13]       
Mr. Opitz 
further contends, however, that the district court failed to set forth specific 
findings justifying its deviation from the presumptive child support 
guidelines.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-307(b) provides that a district court may deviate from the 
presumptive child support amount "upon a specific finding that the application 
of the presumptive child support would be unjust or inappropriate in that 
particular case," and when the district court does deviate, "the reasons 
therefor shall be specifically set forth fully in the order or decree."  Mr. Opitz correctly points out that 
we have reversed a district court's decision when it "erred by not addressing 
child support obligations in the divorce decree and by not setting forth the 
specific reasons why it deviated, if it did, from the child support 
guidelines."  Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 334 
(Wyo. 
1998).

 
 

[¶14]       
In its 
Decree of Divorce in Mr. Opitz's case, the district court wrote as follows:  

 
 
This child support amount represents 
a deviation from the child support guidelines pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
§ 20-2-307 and is based upon actual income of [Mr. Opitz] at $1,906.67 per 
month, and imputed income for [Mr. Opitz] of $5,725.00 based on his earnings 
while employed [as an automobile painter].  
The Court finds that it is appropriate to deviate from the actual income 
of the parties pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-307 and to impute income to 
[Mr. Opitz] because he left his job [as an automobile painter] voluntarily and 
is now voluntarily underemployed.

 
 
It is true that the decree does not 
explicitly use the words "unjust or inappropriate" to justify the decision.  However, "[a]s long as it was clear from 
the findings that the district court determined that applying the presumptive 
child support would be unjust or inappropriate, those specific words are not 
necessary."  Wood v. Wood, 964 P.2d 1259, 1266 
(Wyo. 
1998).  The district court's 
decision makes sufficiently clear its determination that applying the 
presumptive child support guidelines to Mr. Opitz's situation would be unjust or 
inappropriate.  It adequately 
indicates that the reason for the decision was that Mr. Opitz was voluntarily 
underemployed, one of the reasons specifically listed in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 20-2-307(b)(xi) as justifying deviation from the child support 
guidelines.  The district court's 
decree is legally sufficient to comply with the statute.

 
 

[¶15]       
Finally, 
Ms. Opitz claims that she is entitled to recover her attorney's fees incurred in 
this appeal, citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-111.  That statute provides, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
In every 
action brought for divorce, the court may require either party to pay any sum 
necessary to enable the other to carry on or defend the action and for support 
and the support of the children of the parties during its pendency.  The court may decree costs against 
either party.

 
 
Mr. 
Opitz asserts that this statute applies only to attorney's fees incurred at the 
trial stage, not those incurred on appeal.  
His assertion is incorrect, as we have previously held:  

 
 
The 
defendant-appellee seeks attorney's fees for her representation in this appeal 
in a divorce matter. Such fees are properly allowable . . . pursuant to the 
court's authority to do so in divorce matters to assist the defendant in the 
continuing defense of the action, [Wyo. Stat. Ann §]  20-2-111, . . . and 
not as a penalty under Rule 72(k), W.R.C.P.

 
 

Hendrickson 
v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Wyo. 1978).  Indeed, this Court awarded attorney's 
fees in appeals in divorce proceedings nearly a century ago, long before the 
current statute acknowledged such authority:

 
 
On March 
21, 1908, in disposing of a motion for alimony pending the proceeding in error 
and a further allowance of suit money and counsel fees, an order was made and 
entered by this court allowing the said Anna Duxstad the sum of $175 as and for 
her expenses in conducting the proceeding in error, including counsel fees, and 
the sum of $30 per month for the support of herself and minor child during the 
pendency of said proceeding in error from the date of its commencement, and 
requiring the same to be paid by the said Louis Duxstad.

 
 

Snow v. 
Duxstad, 23 
Wyo. 82, 95, 147 P. 174, 176 (Wyo. 
1915).

[¶16]       
But 
while we have the authority to award attorney's fees to Ms. Opitz, we will 
not do so in this case.  As we have 
previously explained, "[t]he question of who pays the attorneys' fees in a 
divorce action is a part of the property division and thus is within the 
discretion of the trial court."  Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1162 
(Wyo. 1982), citing Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 713 
(Wyo. 
1980).  The district court ruled 
that each party to this divorce should pay his or her own attorney's fees.  This decision is not challenged on 
appeal, and we see no reason to deviate from the district court's 
formula.

[¶17]       
 The decision of the district court is 
affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1By this time, the older child had 
graduated from high school and reached the age of eighteen, so the district 
court's rulings on child custody, visitation, and future support applied only to 
the younger child.  

2These calculations were also 
influenced by factors that are not at issue in this appeal, such as abatements 
during summer visitations, adjustments for the older child after he reached the 
age of majority, and Ms. Opitz's income.