Case Title: State v Johnny Ulrigg

Citation: 2007 MT 239N

Docket Number: 72f98c56-dd59-4126-9846-93d19c12ad7b

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED
September 18 2007

 

 

Davsans
IN THESUPREME COURT oF THESTATEOF MONTANA
orn 39
STATEOF MONTANA,
<yro
Pia Reqd, FILED
. vos 267
roma vito, .
14
Defendant and Appellant. PLEPK OFT a

 

 

APPEAL FROM: District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District,
Inand For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC-04-366
Honorable Douglas G. Harkin, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant

Martin W. Judnich, Law Office of Martin W, Judnich, P.C.,
Missoula, Montana

For Respondent:

Honorable Mike McGrath, Attomey General; Carol E, Schmidt,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Fred Van Valkenburg, County Attomey; Karen Townsend, Deputy
County Attomey, Missoula, Montana

 

Submitted on Briefs: February 28, 2007
Decided: September 18, 2007

Filed:

Terk
sentenced Ulrigg to a short prison sentence, mostly suspended. ‘The court also imposed
{terms and conditions on Ulrigg’s sentence, Ulrigg takes issue with the District Court's
order that he pay $50 for the “cost of prosecution,” and its order that he pay $95 in
restitution for two police uniforms he damaged and medical treatment of the officers he
injured.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
{7 We review a criminal sentence for legality only. ‘Thus, our review is confined to
‘whether the sentence is within the parameters provided by statute. State v. Heath, 2004
MT 58, § 8, 320 Mont. 211, 48, 89 P.3d 947, §8.

DISCUSSION

{8 Did the District Court err by imposing a $50 “cost of prosecution” fee as a
condition of Ulrigg's sentence?
$9 On appeal, Ulrigg argues the District Court improperly required him to pay the
cost of his own prosecution despite the absence of any statutory authority for doing so.
While Ulrigg presents compelling authority in support of his argument that such a fee—
without a statute specifying the purpose and basis for calculating the fee—is
‘unconstitutional, we agree with the State that the $50 fee was actually imposed to pay the
cost of Ulrigg’s court-appointed defense counsel and thus was not improper.
{10 A district court may require a convicted defendant to pay the costs of court-
appointed counsel as a condition of sentence. Section 46-8-113(1), MCA. Such costs
‘must be limited and reasonable and may not be imposed unless the district court finds
that the defendant is or will be able to pay them, Section 46-8-113(2) and (3), MCA. We

3
recently upheld the constitutionality of § 46-8-113, MCA, in State v. Ellis, 2007 MT 210,
Mont. __,__P.3d

{11 Although the District Coun’s

 

n judgment specifically refers to the fee
imposed as a “cost of prosecution,” the record reveals that this term does not accurately
‘identify the purpose for which the fee was actually imposed. The following exchange
‘occurred between the District Court and counsel for the State at sentencing:

THE COURT: You're asking for cost of prosecution, fifty dollars,
reimbursement for public defender?

MS. TOWNSEND: Right.
‘THE COURT: Why times two?

MS. TOWNSEND: Because he's had two different public defenders. Mr.
Henry represented him for about ~ up until ~I guess, September or October

and so I think that Mr, Henry's costs as well as Mr. Judnich’s costs ought
to be [] reimbursed.

 

Defense counsel objected to the “prosecution fee,” as well as to repayment of public
defender fees.

{12 The colloquy between the District Court and prosecutor clearly shows that the fee
‘was for the purpose of reimbursing the cost of Ulrigg’s two public defenders. However,

the fee was incorrectly termed a “cost of prosecution” in the written judgment, and

 

neither party moved to amend the judgment, ‘Therefore, we remand for entry of an
amended judgment assessing, as intended, a cost for Ulrigg’s court-appointed defense
‘counsel in accordance with § 46-8-113, MCA

{13 Is § 45-6-101(2), MCA, unconstitutional under the United States Supreme

  

Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)?

4
14 Ulrigg argues it is unconstitutional for the criminal mischief statute to require

 

iposition of restitution in an amount determined by the court. According to Ulrigg, this
violates Apprendi because it authorizes the judge, not the jury, to determine the amount
of restitution following a tral

{15 Apprendi stated the following rule: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, $30 U.S. at
490, 120 S. Ct, at 2362-63. However, we held in State v. Field, 2005 MT 181, 4 29, 328
Mont. 26, § 29, 116 P.3d 813, 4 29, that the rule of Apprendi does not apply to the

imposition of restitution. There, we agreed with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

 

that restitution is not a criminal punishment but instead is a civil remedy administered

for convenience by courts that have entered criminal convictions, so the Sixth

 

Amendment does not apply.” Field, $ 29 (quoting United States v. George, 403 F.3d
470, 473 (7th Cir, 2005), Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err in
ordering Ulrigg to pay $95 in restitution.

CONCLUSION
{16 We affirm the judgment of the District Court but remand for entry of an amended
judgment assessing costs for court-appointed defense counsel instead of the “cost of

prosecution.”