Case Title: State ex rel. McNea v. Indus. Comm'n

Citation: 2012-Ohio-1296

Docket Number: 2010-1770

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. McNea v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1296.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-1296 
THE STATE EX REL. MCNEA, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION  
OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. McNea v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-1296.] 
Workers’ compensation—Meaning of “sustained remunerative employment”—
Illegal activity can be inconsistent with alleged disability—Judgment 
affirmed. 
(No. 2010-1770—Submitted February 7, 2012—Decided March 29, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 09AP-605,  
2010-Ohio-4186. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio terminated appellant 
Donald F. McNea Jr.’s permanent total disability (“PTD”) compensation after 
finding that he had engaged in sustained remunerative employment while 
receiving those benefits.  McNea does not contest the termination of 
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2 
 
compensation after September 5, 2007.  He does, however, object to the 
commission’s finding that he was performing, or capable of performing, sustained 
remunerative work from October 1, 2005, through September 5, 2007—a 
determination that generated a declaration of overpayment for compensation paid 
during that period. 
{¶ 2} McNea was a police officer for appellee city of Parma and was 
awarded PTD compensation in 2004 for injuries that he claimed to have sustained 
in that capacity.  When PTD was granted, however, none of the parties knew that 
McNea was being secretly investigated by his own department for the suspected 
illegal sale of Schedule II and III narcotics. 
{¶ 3} According to Parma police records, the department had received a 
tip in 2003 that McNea was selling prescription medications.  An investigation 
began, and over the next two years, numerous conversations occurred between 
McNea and confidential informants in which McNea indicated that he could 
obtain OxyContin or similar drugs for them.  Between October 1, 2005, and 
December 23, 2005, McNea made four recorded sales to informants, netting 
$6,200. 
{¶ 4} McNea was arrested on December 23, 2005, and was later indicted 
on 20 counts of criminal activity.  McNea pled guilty to four felony charges and 
on September 4, 2007, was sentenced to three years in prison. 
{¶ 5} On November 5, 2007, the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation 
moved the commission to both terminate further PTD compensation and to 
declare past PTD compensation overpaid as of August 25, 2004, when the 
payments began.  A commission staff hearing officer (“SHO”) terminated benefits 
pursuant to R.C. 4123.54(J) as of September 5, 2007, the date of McNea’s 
incarceration.  The SHO declined, however, to declare any earlier benefits to be 
overpaid because there was “no proof that the injured worker was involved in 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
sustained remunerative employment at the time of the permanent and total 
disability hearing.”  (Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 6} The bureau urged the commission to grant reconsideration, 
claiming that the SHO had made clear mistakes of law and fact in finding no 
evidence of sustained remunerative employment during the time McNea was 
receiving PTD compensation.  The bureau relied heavily on State ex rel. Lynch v. 
Indus. Comm., 116 Ohio St.3d 342, 2007-Ohio-6668, 879 N.E.2d 193, ¶ 8, which 
declared that the illicit sale of drugs could constitute sustained remunerative 
employment sufficient to terminate PTD. 
{¶ 7} The 
commission 
agreed 
with 
the 
bureau 
and 
granted 
reconsideration.  It ultimately declared that all compensation paid after McNea’s 
first confirmed drug sale on October 1, 2005, constituted an overpayment: 
 
[T]he Injured Worker’s activity of selling the prescription narcotic 
medication OxyContin over a period of months does constitute 
sustained remunerative employment, sufficient to require a 
termination of his permanent total disability benefits.  The 
Commission relies on the fact that the amount of money involved 
in the four sales to undercover agents over a two month period in 
late 2005 would equate to an annual figure of $24,000, which 
clearly would amount to sustained remunerative employment.  The 
Commission also agrees with the [bureau] Administrator that, had 
the Injured Worker not been arrested as of 12/23/2005, he most 
likely would have continued the activity for quite a while.  The 
Commission relies on the holding in Lynch, that such activity can 
amount to sustained remunerative employment, even though it is 
illegal.  The Commission further finds that the appropriate date of 
termination of the Injured Worker’s permanent total disability 
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4 
 
benefits is 10/01/05, as this was the first documented date of such 
activity to which the Injured Worker pled guilty. 
 
{¶ 8} McNea filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
Franklin County.  The court found that no abuse of discretion had occurred and 
denied the writ, prompting McNea’s appeal to this court as of right.  State ex rel. 
McNea v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-605, 2010-Ohio-4186. 
{¶ 9} R.C. 
4123.54(J) 
specifically 
prohibits 
the 
payment 
of 
compensation to an incarcerated claimant, so McNea does not contest the 
cessation of benefits during his period of confinement.  He does, however, object 
to the declaration of overpayment for compensation paid earlier, arguing that (1) 
the commission erred in reconsidering the SHO’s order, (2) there is no evidence 
that he engaged in sustained remunerative employment between October 5, 2005, 
and September 5, 2007, and (3) the commission violated his due process rights by 
terminating PTD while he was still in prison.  For the reasons to follow, none of 
these arguments have merit. 
{¶ 10} R.C. 4123.52 gives the commission continuing jurisdiction to 
reopen a matter previously decided.  This authority can be properly invoked when 
the order contains a clear mistake of law or fact for which reconsideration is being 
sought.  State ex rel. Gobich v. Indus. Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 585, 2004-Ohio-
5990, 817 N.E.2d 398, ¶ 14.  In the case at bar, the SHO based his decision on a 
lack of evidence that McNea was working at the time of the PTD hearing.  This 
reasoning is too narrow and constitutes a clear mistake of law.  The correct focus 
is not on whether McNea was performing sustained remunerative employment on 
the date of the PTD hearing.  The question is whether at any time during the 
receipt of PTD compensation, McNea was (1) doing sustained remunerative work, 
(2) medically capable of sustained remunerative employment, or (3) engaged in 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
activities medically inconsistent with the alleged disability. State ex rel. Lawson v. 
Mondie Forge, 104 Ohio St.3d 39, 2004-Ohio-6086, 817 N.E.2d 880, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 11} The commission, in granting reconsideration, relied on Lynch’s 
declaration that remunerative employment encompasses any remunerative 
activity, legal or otherwise.  Lynch, 116 Ohio St.3d 342, 2007-Ohio-6668, 879 
N.E.2d 193, ¶ 8. The commission thus found that the SHO had committed a clear 
mistake of law and fact in failing to take McNea’s illegal sales activity into 
account.  This finding is not an abuse of discretion and is accordingly upheld. 
{¶ 12} McNea next challenges the commission’s determination that he 
was performing, or capable of performing, sustained remunerative employment 
over the period in question.  A claimant who engages in, or is medically capable 
of, sustained remunerative employment cannot receive PTD. State ex rel. 
Stephenson v. Indus. Comm., 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 170, 509 N.E.2d 946 (1987).  
Sustained remunerative employment can encompass both legal and illegal 
activities. Lynch at ¶ 8.  McNea’s activities were clearly remunerative.  The 
question before us is whether the commission abused its discretion in 
characterizing McNea’s remunerative employment as sustained. 
{¶ 13} “Sustained” has not been defined for workers’ compensation 
purposes.  We have, however, stated that remunerative activity does not have to 
occur on a regular or daily basis to be considered sustained.  State ex rel. Kirby v. 
Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 427, 2002-Ohio-6668, 780 N.E.2d 275, ¶ 10.  Any 
“ongoing pattern” of activity can be categorized as sustained activity. State ex rel. 
Schultz v. Indus. Comm., 96 Ohio St.3d. 27, 2002-Ohio-3316, 770 N.E.2d 576, 
¶ 63. 
{¶ 14} In this case, the evidence established an ongoing pattern of phone 
calls and other sales-related activity that culminated in the four recorded sales that 
McNea made between October and December 2005.  The commission 
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characterized this sales activity as sustained remunerative employment, and we 
decline to disturb that finding. 
{¶ 15} The commission also extrapolated from its finding that McNea 
continued to possess the medical ability to engage in such activity even after his 
arrest. This conclusion is also sustained.  Lawson stated that nothing demonstrates 
a capacity for sustained remunerative work better than the actual performance of 
it. Id., 104 Ohio St.3d 39, 2004-Ohio-6086, 817 N.E.2d 880, at ¶ 17.  McNea was 
performing sustained remunerative work through late December 2005, and there 
is no evidence that his medical condition changed afterwards so as to preclude 
that endeavor.  The commission also found no evidence suggesting that McNea 
would have abandoned his long-running enterprise had he not been arrested.  
Given the commission’s “substantial leeway in both interpreting and drawing 
inferences from the evidence before it,” the commission did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that McNea remained medically capable of sustained 
remunerative work after his arrest and was not entitled to PTD compensation 
thereafter.  Id. at ¶ 34. 
{¶ 16} Finally, McNea had unsuccessfully petitioned the commission to 
postpone the PTD termination hearing until after his release from prison.  He now 
claims, in a perfunctory fashion, that this denial offended his due process rights 
because his presence at hearing was “of the utmost importance.”  We reject this 
argument. 
{¶ 17} McNea’s attendance at the hearing was not necessary to preserve 
his rights.  McNea was competently represented there by counsel, who could have 
presented by video or affidavit any statement McNea wished to make.  McNea 
never explains what allegedly indispensable evidence he would have offered had 
he been present, and he ignores that the focus of the hearing was not on factual 
issues but on legal ones: continuing jurisdiction and the characterization of his 
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7 
 
activities as sustained.  McNea’s absence did not compromise this discussion or 
his rights. 
{¶ 18} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, 
and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
Paul M. Friedman and Michael P. O’Malley, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Derrick L. Knapp, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Bashein & Bashein Co., L.P.A., and W. Craig Bashein; and Paul W. 
Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, for appellee city of Parma. 
______________________