Case Title: Gregory Mills V. Michael W. Moore

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-338

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-338
____________
GREGORY MILLS,
Petitioner,
vs.
MICHAEL W. MOORE, etc.,
Respondent.
[April 12, 2001]
PER CURIAM.
Gregory Mills, a prisoner under sentence of death, petitions this Court for
writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const.  We
deny Mills’ petition for writ of habeas corpus for the reasons that follow.
Factual and Procedural History
In 1979, Petitioner was convicted of felony murder, aggravated battery, and
burglary.  The facts set forth by this Court in the opinion on direct appeal are as
follows:
-2-
The evidence at the trial showed that Gregory Mills and his
accomplice Vincent Ashley broke into the home of James and
Margaret Wright in Sanford between two and three o'clock in the
morning, intending to find something to steal. When James Wright
woke up and left his bedroom to investigate, Mills shot him with a
shotgun. Margaret Wright awakened in time to see one of the intruders
run across her front yard to a bicycle lying under a tree. Mr. Wright
died from loss of blood caused by multiple shotgun pellet wounds.
Ashley, seen riding his bicycle a few blocks from the Wright
home, was stopped and detained by an officer on his way to the crime
scene. Another officer saw a bicycle at the entrance to a nearby
hospital emergency room, found Mills inside, and arrested him. At
police headquarters officers questioned both men and conducted
gunshot residue tests on them. They were then released.
At trial Mills' roommate testified that he and his girlfriend hid
some shotgun shells that Mills had given them, that Mills had been
carrying a firearm when he left the house the night of the murder, and
that Mills had said he had shot someone. He also stated that Mills told
him that a city worker had found a shotgun later shown to have fired
an expended shell found near the victim's home.
After the murder, Ashley was arrested on some unrelated
charges. He then learned that Mills had told his roommate and his
girlfriend about the murder and that they in turn had told the police, so
he decided to tell the police about the incident. Ashley testified that
Mills entered the house (through a window) first, that he, Ashley, then
handed the shotgun in to him, and that he then entered the house
himself. Ashley saw that the man in the house had awakened and was
getting up, so he exited the house and ran to his bicycle. Then he
heard the shot and ran back to the house, where he saw Mills. They
both departed the scene on their bicycles, taking separate routes.
Ashley was granted immunity from prosecution for these crimes and
also for several unrelated charges pending against him at the time he
decided to confess and cooperate.
Mills testified in his defense. He said that he arrived home from
work on May 24 at about 9:30 p.m. Then he went out, first to one bar,
then another, playing pool and socializing. He went home afterwards
but could not sleep, he said, because of a toothache and a headache,
-3-
so he went to the hospital emergency room. There police officers took
him into custody.
Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d 172, 174-75 (Fla. 1985).  After finding Mills guilty of
first-degree murder, burglary, and aggravated battery, and with the knowledge that
the State granted immunity to Mills’ codefendant Ashley who testified against Mills,
the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment.  
Before sentencing Mills the trial court ordered and considered a presentence
investigation.  The trial court, the State, and Mills were provided copies of the
presentence investigation report in January, 1980.  In April, 1980, before
sentencing, the trial court heard further presentations from the parties regarding the
appropriate sentence.  
At trial, the jury heard evidence of four aggravators: (1) that the crime was
committed by a person under a sentence of imprisonment; (2) that Mills had a
previous conviction of a violent felony (aggravated assault); (3) that the murder was
committed in the course of a felony based on the contemporaneous conviction for
burglary and (4) that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC).  After the
presentence hearing, however, the trial judge found six aggravating factors,
including two that were not argued by the State to the jury:  (1) that the murder
involved great risk of death to many persons; and (2) that the murder was
-4-
committed for pecuniary gain.  
On direct appeal, we struck three of the aggravators:  great risk of death to
many persons (State conceded it was improper); pecuniary gain (because of
improper doubling based on the burglary conviction); and heinous, atrocious or
cruel (because we could not reconcile this aggravator with Teffeteller v. State, 439
So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1983), which was the same factual situation and in which HAC
was not found).  See Mills v. State, 476 So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1985).  However, we
affirmed the death sentence based upon the three remaining aggravators (all of
which the jury considered).  
We affirmed the trial court’s jury override and specifically found that the jury
override in this case met the requirements of Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla.
1975) (a jury’s recommendation of life should be given great weight and should be
followed unless the facts suggesting a sentence of death are so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ).  We said: 
We hold that the trial judge’s findings in support of the sentence
of death even without the finding of especially heinous, atrocious and
cruel, meet the Tedder standard.  We find that the facts suggesting a
sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no
reasonable person could differ.  There are three valid statutory
aggravating circumstances, and the trial judge has found there are no
valid mitigating circumstances.  The purported mitigating
circumstances claimed by Mills, but not found by the trial judge, are
not sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances nor do they
-5-
establish a reasonable basis for the jury’s recommendation.  We
conclude that the imposition of a sentence of death after a jury
recommendation of life was proper in this case.
Mills, 476 So. 2d at 179. 
The trial court summarily denied Mills’ first petition for postconviction relief,
and we reversed and remanded for evidentiary hearing.  Mills v. Dugger, 559 So. 2d
578 (Fla. 1990).  The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and again denied
postconviction relief, and Mills appealed.  Mills argued that trial counsel was
ineffective for failure to develop and present evidence regarding statutory and
nonstatutory mental health mitigators.  We agreed with the trial court that trial
counsel did not fall short of the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), for effectiveness of counsel and said:
“A defendant’s mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every
criminal proceeding.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82, 105 S.Ct.
1087, 1096, 84 L.Ed. 2d 53 (1985).  None of Mills’ original attorneys
had any idea that his mental health might be at issue.  Current
counsel’s getting those attorneys to admit that they would, today,
routinely pursue evidence for the mental health mitigators illustrates the
Supreme Court’s concern “that every effort be made to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.
Ct. at 2065.  “That current counsel, through hindsight, would now do
things differently than original counsel did is not the test for
ineffectiveness.”  Stano v. State, 520 So. 2d 278, 281 n. 5 (Fla. 1988). 
Mills v. State, 603 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 1992).  Mills then petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus, which was denied on procedural grounds.  Mills v. Singletary, 606
1  On appeal of the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition, Mills argued, as
he does in the second issue of this instant proceeding, that the trial court’s jury
override resulted in an arbitrary and discriminatory sentence and would not have been
sustained on direct appeal today.  The Eleventh Circuit disagreed and held that we
“complied with the mandate of Tedder” in the direct appeal, and that Mills’ claim was
a disguised request for another proportionality review.  Id. at 1283.
-6-
So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1992).  He then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals presented a detailed
procedural history of this case in Mills v. Singletary, 161 F.3d 1273, 1278-80 (11th
Cir. 1998).  In short, we affirmed Mills’ convictions and death sentence on direct
appeal, 476 So. 2d 172, denied his state habeas petition and reversal of denial of his
state petition for postconviction relief, 559 So. 2d 578, affirmed the second denial
of his state petition for postconviction relief, 603 So. 2d 482, and denied his state
petition for extraordinary relief and for writ of habeas corpus, 606 So. 2d 622. 
Thereafter, Mills sought federal habeas relief. The United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, No. 92-1184-Civ-ORL-19, Patricia C. Fawsett, J.,
denied the petition. Mills appealed. Mills v. Singletary, 161 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir.
1998).  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of federal habeas
relief.  Id.1  
On March 27, 2001, Mills filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
Mills makes two arguments:  (1) Florida’s death penalty override scheme, under
2  Apprendi involved a New Jersey statute that authorized an enhanced penalty
for a crime proven to be a “hate crime” if the judge found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the crime was motivated by a purpose to intimidate an individual or
group because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or
ethnicity.  The defendant in Apprendi was not charged with a “hate crime” in the
indictment.  He pled guilty on three counts, and the judge enhanced the penalty on one
of the counts beyond the statutory maximum, in accord with the “hate crime”
enhancement statute, after he held a hearing to determine the “purpose” of the crime.
-7-
which Mills was sentenced to death, violates the principle espoused in the recent
decision by the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.
Ct. 2348 (2000), and therefore violates the United States and Florida constitutions;
and (2) this Court’s recent decision in Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2000),
indicates Tedder was arbitrarily applied in this case.
The Apprendi Issue
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000),2 the Supreme Court
announced the general rule that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 2362-63.  The Court specifically stated in the
majority opinion that Apprendi does not apply to already challenged capital
sentencing schemes that have been deemed constitutional.  The Court stated:
Finally, this Court has previously considered and rejected the
argument that the principles guiding our decision today render invalid
state capital sentencing schemes requiring judges, after a jury verdict
3  Florida’s sentencing scheme was originally upheld in Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976), which observed that the jury’s recommendation is advisory only and
that the sentence is to be determined by the judge, and held that jury sentencing is not
constitutionally required.
-8-
holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific
aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death.  For reasons
we have explained, the capital cases are not controlling:
“Neither the cases cited, nor any other case, permits a
judge to determine the existence of a factor which makes
a crime a capital offense.  What the cited cases hold is
that, once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the
elements of an offense which carries as its maximum
penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge
to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a
lesser one, ought to be imposed . . . . The person who is
charged with actions that expose him or her to the death
penalty has an absolute entitlement to jury trial on all the
elements of the charge.”  
Id. at 2366 (citations omitted).  And one justice, in a separate concurring opinion, 
indicated that issue was left to be decided in the future.   Id. at 2380 (Thomas, J.
concurring).  
The Court was referring to its earlier decision in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639 (1990), wherein it addressed a capital sentencing scheme and held that the
presence of an aggravating circumstance in a capital case may constitutionally be
determined by a judge rather than a jury.  Id. at 647-48.3  Because Apprendi did not
overrule Walton, the basic scheme in Florida is not overruled either.
-9-
Mills argues that Apprendi overruled Walton and relies upon the five-to-four
split in the Court.  Four justices stated in dissent that Apprendi effectively overruled
Walton, and another justice in his concurring opinion stated that reconsideration of
Walton was left for another day.  With the majority of the justices refusing to
disturb the rule of law announced in Walton, it is still the law and it is not within this
Court’s authority to overrule Walton in anticipation of any future Supreme Court
action.  The Supreme Court has specifically directed lower courts to “leav[e] to
this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”  Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)). The majority opinion in Apprendi forecloses Mills’
claim because Apprendi preserves the constitutionality of capital sentencing
schemes like Florida’s.  Therefore, on its face, Apprendi is inapplicable to this
case.
No court has extended Apprendi to capital sentencing schemes, and the plain
language of Apprendi indicates that the case is not intended to apply to capital
schemes.  See State v. Hoskins, 14 P.3d 997, 1016 (Ariz. 2000) (noting Apprendi
did not apply to capital sentencing schemes and did not overrule Walton); Weeks
v. State, 761 A.2d 804, 806 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (“[W]e are not persuaded that
Apprendi’s reach extends to ‘state capital sentencing schemes’ in which judges are
-10-
required to find ‘specific aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death.’
”), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct 476 (2000); State v. Golphin, 533 S.E.2d 168, 193-94
(N.C. 2000) (“The United States Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Apprendi . . .
does not affect our prior holdings regarding the inclusion of aggravating
circumstances in an indictment. . . .  [A]n indictment need not contain the
aggravating circumstances the State will use to seek the death penalty . . . .), cert.
denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3618 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2001).  Importantly, in Weeks v. State, a
capital defendant brought his second habeas petition on October 27, 2000, alleging
an Apprendi violation and seeking a stay of his execution which was set for
November 17, 2000. The trial court ruled that Apprendi did not apply to Weeks'
case.  Weeks appealed and the trial court’s ruling was affirmed.  On November 16,
2000, just one day before the scheduled execution, the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.  Weeks v. Delaware, 121 S. Ct. 476. 
The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari indicates that the Court meant what it said
when it held that Apprendi was not intended to affect capital sentencing schemes.
Mills makes two additional arguments that are fact-specific to his case. First,
he argues that the statute in effect at the time of the initial trial made the maximum
penalty for his crime life imprisonment.  Only after the jury verdict and further
sentencing proceedings, Mills argues, could death be a possible sentence.  This
4  Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1979), provides:
-11-
particular scheme, Mills argues, puts the sentence of death outside of the maximum
penalty available and triggers Apprendi protection.  
With regard to the statute in effect at the time of trial, Mills cites section
775.082 (1), Florida Statutes (1979), which provided:
A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished
by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25
years before becoming eligible for parole unless the proceeding held to
determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141
results in finding by the court that such person shall be punished by
death, and in the latter event such person shall be punished by death.
§ 775.082 (1) Fla. Stat. (1979).  Mills argues that this statute makes life
imprisonment the maximum penalty available.  Mills argues that the statute allowing
the judge to override the jury’s recommendation makes it clear that the maximum
possible penalty is life imprisonment unless and until the judge holds a separate
hearing and finds that the defendant is death eligible.  
The plain language of section 775.082 (1) is clear that the maximum penalty
available for a person convicted of a capital felony is death.  When section 775.082
(1) is read in pari materia with section 921.141, Florida Statutes, there can be no
doubt that a person convicted of a capital felony faces a maximum possible penalty
of death.4  Both sections 775.082 and 921.141 clearly refer to a “capital felony.” 
Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital
felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life
imprisonment as authorized by s. 775.082.
. . . . 
(3) . . . Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the
court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,  shall
enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death . . . .  
-12-
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “capital” as “punishable by execution; involving the
death penalty.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 200 (7th ed. 1999).  Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary defines “capital” as “punishable by death . . . involving
execution.”  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 169 (10th ed. 1998). 
Therefore, a “capital felony” is by definition a felony that may be punishable by
death.  The maximum possible penalty described in the capital sentencing scheme
is clearly death. 
Mills is actually attacking the validity of the bifurcated guilt and sentencing
phases of a capital trial.  That issue was litigated and decided in  Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).  The Apprendi
majority clearly did not revisit these rulings.   
As for Mills’ second argument, Mills argues that the trial judge actually
considered additional aggravating factors not presented to the jury.  This
consideration, Mills argues, violates Apprendi’s requirement that the jury be the
5  The only additional evidence presented at the presentencing hearing was the
presentence investigation report and certified copies of various criminal convictions.
Mills argued that he had no significant criminal history in support of mitigation. The
trial judge specifically indicated that the evidence of criminal convictions and the
information contained in the presentence investigation report was only considered for
purposes of mitigation (i.e. to rebut Mills’ claim of no significant criminal history) and
not as an aggravating factor.  Indeed, the two additional aggravating factors the trial
court found were unrelated to the evidence received at the presentencing hearing. 
-13-
trier of fact for all elements of the crime charged.
First, any error that might have occurred when the trial judge considered
evidence that the jury did not hear would be harmless in this case because the
additional aggravators that the trial judge found were struck by this Court on direct
appeal and not considered in any way when we affirmed the death sentence on
direct appeal.  Furthermore, the evidence supporting the pecuniary gain aggravating
factor was in fact heard by the jury because it was based on Mills’
contemporaneous burglary conviction.
The essence of this argument was raised and decided on direct appeal.  Mills
argued on direct appeal that the State’s presentation of evidence on two additional
aggravators invalidated the judge’s override.5  On direct appeal as to the penalty
phase, Mills challenged the constitutionality of Florida’s capital felony sentencing
law, argued that the court found improper aggravating circumstances, argued that
the trial court failed to consider certain mitigating evidence, and argued that the trial
-14-
court failed to give appropriate consideration to the jury’s recommendation of life
imprisonment.  Mills, 476 So. 2d at 177-79.  In his brief on direct appeal, Mills
argued that the State may not  reserve additional evidence for the judge’s
consideration alone after the jury’s recommendation.  Relying on Presnell v.
Georgia, 439 U.S. 14 (1978), Mills argued that as a matter of due process, he was
entitled to have the existence and validity of aggravating circumstances determined
as they were placed before the jury.  To allow a “post-jury” determination of
aggravating circumstances would deprive him the right of due process and deny
him his right to trial by jury.  Mills also argued that post-jury determinations of
aggravating circumstances would destroy the trifurcated sentencing procedures
then in place.  
Although we did not address this argument with specificity in Mills’ direct
appeal, we did address Mills’ broader claim that the trial court failed to give
appropriate consideration to the jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment.  On
this claim we stated the issue was properly evaluated under Tedder.  See Mills, 476
So. 2d at 179.  Mills’ second Apprendi claim, although framed a different way, 
was raised and decided on direct appeal.  It is therefore procedurally barred. 
See Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1995);  Rivera v. Dugger, 629 So. 2d
105 (Fla. 1993);  Mendyk v. State, 592 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 1992).  
-15-
The Tedder/Keen Issue
Mills’ second argument is that Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975),
which allows the trial judge to override a jury recommendation in capital cases, was
arbitrarily applied in this case based on the language used in Keen v. State, 775 So.
2d 263 (Fla. 2000).  In Tedder we said, “In order to sustain a sentence of death
following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death
should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.” 
Id. at 910.  In Keen, on the defendant’s direct appeal following his third trial, we
applied the Tedder analysis.  In applying Tedder we emphasized the fact that a trial
court’s analysis in an override situation should focus on the record evidence
supporting the jury’s recommendation and should not be the same weighing
process that is used when the jury recommends death.  
While conceding that Keen is not new law, Mills nonetheless argues that
Keen’s application of Tedder constitutes a new standard by which jury override
cases are reviewed.  Keen is not a major constitutional change or jurisprudential
upheaval of the law as it was espoused in Tedder.  Keen offers no new or different
standard for considering jury overrides on appeal.  Thus, we disagree with Mills’
contention that Keen offers a new standard of law and we reject the contention that
Keen was anything more than an application of our long-standing Tedder analysis. 
-16-
Tedder is the seminal case in Florida on jury overrides and remains so after
Keen.  Tedder was applied to this case.  Keen provides no basis for our
reconsideration of this issue.  For these reasons, we deny Mills’ petition for writ of
habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and HARDING, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
HARDING, J., concurs with an opinion, in which WELLS, C.J., and LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW and PARIENTE, JJ.,
concur.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ.,
concur.
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.
HARDING, J., concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion.  As pointed out in that opinion, Mills’
sentence has been reviewed and affirmed on several different occasions by several
different courts.  Yet, in an attempt to bolster their argument, the dissenting justices
on the present panel rely on views expressed by dissenting justices from previous
panels that considered this case.  While I respect the opinions of those justices,
their dissenting opinions are just that--dissenting opinions; the positions expressed
in those opinions did not carry the day.  Hence, such opinions have no precedential
value.  But according to dissenters on the present panel, this Court should
-17-
completely disregard all previous precedent in this case and instead adopt the views
of past dissenters.  They rely on the familiar idiom that “death is different” in order
to justify abandoning the fundamental judicial principle of stare decisis.
Pursuant to the authority granted under the Florida Constitution, this Court is
often called upon to interpret the law.  However, it is not the function of this Court
to make new law on a case-by-case basis in order to reach a desired result.  Once
the law has been established by this Court, it is our responsibility to apply that law
uniformly in all cases, regardless of the status of the players or the stakes of the
game.  This adherence to the rule of law allows the judiciary to fulfill its obligation
of providing stability and certainty for the citizens of this state.  Only in rare
circumstances should precedent be overturned or subsequent changes be applied
retroactively.  This is not such a case.  The facts of this case clearly support the
conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death.  No manifest injustice will
result from the denial of Mills’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
WELLS, C.J., and LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., dissenting.
A life hangs in the balance while this Court considers whether it should
6In Proffitt, the defendant, while burglarizing a home, stabbed and killed the
victim as he lay sleeping in bed.  He was subsequently convicted and sentenced to
death in 1974.  Proffitt’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on
direct appeal.  See Proffitt v. State, 315 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1975).  The United States
Supreme Court granted review but upheld Florida’s death penalty statute against an
Eighth Amendment challenge.  See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).  However,
some thirteen years later we set aside Proffitt’s death sentence because our own
-18-
openly acknowledge its past mistake.  In my view the choice is obvious while we
still have time.  A jury has lawfully determined that Mr. Mills’ life should be spared. 
We are now called upon to recognize that a trial court wrongfully ignored the jury’s
decision and this Court erroneously approved of that action.  No one disputes that
a mistake was made.  Under our holding in Keen v. State, 775 So. 2d 263 (Fla.
2000), and countless other decisions properly applying the Tedder rule, it is
apparent that there was a reasonable basis for the jury’s decision to spare Mills’ life
and we should not hesitate to say so now.  For example, in both Keen and Mills,
the jury was entitled to rely on the more lenient treatment of a codefendant as a
valid reason to recommend life.  However, under our ruling today, Mills will die
while Keen will live.  
In the past this Court has been quick to accept responsibility for its mistakes,
especially if blind adherence to a flawed decision will result in a manifest injustice
and the taking of a human life.  See, e.g., Proffitt v. State, 510 So. 2d 896 (Fla.
1987).6  After all, we have consistently said that death is different.  Today I fear the
proportionality standards had changed, and declared:
We recognize that Proffitt is a case of considerable notoriety
because it resulted in the United Supreme Court’s upholding the facial
validity of Florida’s death penalty statute.  The death sentence law as it
now exists, however, controls our review of this resentencing.  There
have been multiple restrictions and refinements in the death sentencing
process, by both the United States Supreme Court and this Court, since
this matter was first tried in 1974 and affirmed in 1975, and we are bound
to fairly apply those decisions.
Proffitt, 510 So. 2d at 897.  Ironically, Mills was convicted of felony murder also
based upon the commission of a burglary, and arguably under less egregious
circumstances than those involved in Proffitt.  
7In Keen v. State, we declared:
As we unambiguously stated several years ago: 
Under Florida law, the role of the jury is one of great
importance, and this is no less true in the penalty phase of
a capital trial.  Tedder.  Juries are at the very core of our
Anglo-American system of justice, which brings the citizens
themselves into the decision-making process.  We choose
juries to serve as democratic representatives of the
community, expressing the community’s will regarding the
penalty to be imposed.
-19-
Court has deviated from that course in rejecting a plea for mercy based upon this
Court’s mistake in Mills’ case in not properly applying the rule of law set out in
Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975), which first announced that a jury’s
recommendation of life must be honored when there is any reasonable basis for the
jury’s action.7  
775 So. 2d at 285 n.21 (quoting Stevens v. State, 613 So. 2d 402, 403 (Fla. 1992)).
-20-
At the time of Mills’ direct appeal, the law pertaining to a trial court’s
authority to void a jury decision for life was unclear and conflicting, often leading to
patently inconsistent outcomes in this Court.  However, in 1989 this Court openly
conceded its prior erroneous and inconsistent application of Tedder:
Finally, we agree with the dissent that "legal precedent consists
more in what courts do than in what they say."  However, in
expounding upon this point to prove that Tedder has not been applied
with the force suggested by its language, the dissent draws entirely
from cases occurring in 1984 or earlier.  This is not indicative of what
the present court does, as Justice Shaw noted in his special
concurrence to Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833, 851 (Fla. 1988)
(Shaw, J., specially concurring): 
During 1984-85, we affirmed on direct appeal trial judge
overrides in eleven of fifteen cases, seventy-three percent. 
By contrast, during 1986 and 1987, we have affirmed
overrides in only two of eleven cases, less than twenty
percent.  This current reversal rate of over eighty percent
is a strong indicator to judges that they should place less
reliance on their independent weighing of aggravation and
mitigation.
Clearly, since 1985 the Court has determined that Tedder means
precisely what it says, that the judge must concur with the jury's life
recommendation unless "the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are]
so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
differ."  Tedder, 322 So. 2d at 910.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of guilt, but vacate the
sentence of death with directions that appellant be sentenced to life
imprisonment.
-21-
Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d 928, 933 (Fla. 1989).  Of course, Mills’ case was
“among those cases occurring in 1984 or earlier” in which this Court had not
applied Tedder with “the force suggested by its language.”  
Under the rule announced in Cochran and as definitively explained in Keen,
this Court dramatically shifted its focus and has subsequently rigidly applied the
Tedder rule and set aside numerous jury overrides.  The rule is now clear that under
Tedder, a jury recommendation of life imprisonment must be upheld if any
reasonable basis can be identified to support the jury’s recommendation of life. 
See Keen, 775 So. 2d at 283.  No one disputes that a reasonable basis exists for the
jury’s recommendation of life for Mills.
An examination of Keen vividly illustrates our mistake in failing to enforce the
Tedder rule in Mills.  Keen actually involved circumstances much more egregious
than those involved herein, since Keen involved a killing planned by the defendant
well in advance of its execution.  However, the jury recommended life for Keen,
and this Court reversed a judge’s override sentencing Keen to death, declaring that
the more lenient sentence imposed on an accomplice, in and of itself, provided a
reasonable basis for the jury’s action.  As explained in Keen, the process of
weighing aggravating and mitigating factors as was erroneously done in Mills’ case,
and by the trial judge in Keen, simply does not apply in cases where the jury
-22-
recommends life.  See id.  We further explained:
Moreover, so there is no doubt as to the proper focus of a life
recommendation analysis, reversal under Tedder is in no way
prevented even assuming the presence of several valid aggravators. 
Indeed, that has been the rule rather than the exception.  See Johnson
v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 440, 474 n. 78 (11th Cir. 1990) (listing 47 cases
reversed by this Court under Tedder between 1975 and 1989 where
between one to five valid aggravating factors existed or were assumed
to exist), vacated on other grounds, 920 F.2d 721 (11th Cir. 1990);
Fuente, 549 So. 2d at 658-59 (recognizing propriety of jury override
reversal in Brookings despite presence of four “valid” aggravators).
Keen, 775 So. 2d at 287 n.24.  Clearly, the disparate treatment of a codefendant,
whether alone or in combination with other mitigation, constitutes a reasonable
basis to support a jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment.  See id. at 284
n.19.  Indeed, this Court itself has relied upon the disparate treatment of a
codefendant as a critical factor in its proportionality review of dozens of death
sentences.  See, e.g., Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992); Slater v. State,
316 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1975).
It is also important to note that the injustice of the treatment of Mills has not
gone unnoticed by members of this Court.  Indeed, numerous justices have called
to the Court’s attention that the disparate treatment of Mills’ codefendant, by itself
and in conjunction with other mitigation, clearly constituted a reasonable basis for
the jury’s recommendation of life for Mills under Tedder, as applied in Cochran
-23-
and subsequent cases.  For example, Justice McDonald in Mills’ direct appeal,
joined by Justice Overton, strongly dissented from the majority’s decision to affirm
the trial court’s override in an opinion that mirrors our later opinion in Keen:
I dissent only from the affirmance of the death sentence.  Were
it not for the jury's recommendation, I would have little difficulty in
upholding the death sentence.  Valid aggravating circumstances
existed, and the defense established the existence of no statutory
mitigating circumstances.
The jury, however, recommended life imprisonment.  In such
instances we have stated that "the facts suggesting a sentence of death
should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person
could differ."  Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).  We
should, therefore, review Mills' sentence in light of Tedder.
The jury's recommendation must have been predicated on the
circumstances of this homicide and on nonstatutory mitigating
evidence.  The chief testimony against Mills came from Ashley [the
codefendant].  As previously indicated, Ashley received immunity
from prosecution for this crime and other crimes in exchange for his
testimony.  Ashley said that Mills did the killing, but Mills has always
denied this.  The jury could have found the evidence sufficient to
convict but still have had doubts about whether Mills intended to kill
the victim.  It could also have concluded that Mills and Ashley were
being treated so disparately when their involvement was substantially
the same that any such doubt should be weighed in Mills' favor.  Mills
was employed at the time of the crime and his employer thought well
of him.  Mills had a harsh and deprived youth, but his grandmother
and sister were supportive of him.  During prior incarceration he
completed studies to the extent that he passed his G.E.D. tests.
Are these circumstances, considered collectively, adequate to
find that reasonable persons could recommend life imprisonment?   I
think so.  As previously indicated, adequate and reasonable grounds
existed for the trial judge to impose death.  For the death penalty to
prevail when there is a jury recommendation of life, however, more
than a disagreement with a jury's recommendation must be shown. 
-24-
"[T]he facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and
convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ."  Id.  This
is a difficult test, and it has not been met in this case.
Mills, 476 So. 2d at 180 (McDonald, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part).  Of
course, this is precisely how this Court explained the rule of Tedder in Cochran
and Keen.  
Later, in Mills’ appeal from the denial of his motion for postconviction relief,
three members of this Court again expressed concern with the jury override issue. 
In a dissenting opinion in which Justices Shaw and Kogan concurred, Justice
Barkett pointed out that Mills was entitled to the imposition of a life sentence
because he had demonstrated an additional basis for a jury’s recommendation of
mercy, even beyond the disparate treatment of the codefendant and the
nonstatutory mitigation previously presented:
At the evidentiary hearing below, the two mental health experts
who examined Mills prior to the hearing testified extensively about
Mills's mental impairments.  They concluded that Mills suffered from a
substantially impaired capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law and from an extreme mental or emotional
disturbance at the time of the offense.  They also explained that Mills's
level of functioning was below that of his chronological age and that
Mills's brain damage, low intelligence, psychological deficiencies, and
history of traumatic abuse and deprivation had further diminished his
ability to function throughout his life, as well as at the time of the
offense.  I cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that this Court
would not have reversed the jury override under Tedder v. State, 322
So.2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), had such mental mitigating evidence been
-25-
presented during the penalty phase hearing.
Mills, 603 So. 2d at 486-87 (Barkett, J., dissenting).  Hence, no less than five
justices of this Court have called attention to the injustice of the override of the
jury’s finding for life in Mills’ case.
When a life is at stake this Court should not hesitate to admit its past
mistakes.  We did so in Cochran on this precise issue.  We should do so here.  In
the words of Justice Kogan: 
To fail in this regard would render our capital punishment system
utterly arbitrary.  The majority relies on the formalities of procedure to
justify the imposition of the death penalty in this case, despite the
inappropriateness of such imposition.
Since the time Spaziano was sentenced to death, and this Court
affirmed that sentence, our cases have more fully refined the standards
under which the death penalty may be imposed over a
recommendation of life.  These cases clearly enunciate that in the
presence of any reasonable basis for such a recommendation, that
recommendation must be upheld.  While aggravation and mitigation
are not irrelevant, there is no weighing process involved here.  Even
when the judge determines that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances, we are obligated to view a jury
recommendation of life with the highest regard.  Under our present
law, a life recommendation can only be overridden in cases where
there is absolutely no basis for the recommendation, when the
recommendation appears based on emotion, caprice, or some other
irrelevant factor.  Otherwise, the life recommendation must be upheld.
If we are to administer a death penalty that is not arbitrary, then
we must do so in a consistent fashion.  The standards by which the
majority justified the jury override are no longer acceptable.  We are
empowered to correct a sentence according to our evolving standards,
as we did in Proffitt v. State, 510 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1987).
-26-
Spaziano v. State, 545 So. 2d 843, 846 (Fla. 1989) (Kogan, J., dissenting). 
Because the standard this Court previously applied in permitting the judge’s
override of the jury’s decision was admittedly erroneous, as we acknowledged in
Cochran, we must correct Mills’ sentence so as to avoid the unjust and arbitrary
taking of a life here.  
Over the years, the major concern expressed by courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, as to the constitutionality of the application of the death
penalty, has been the fear that the penalty may be applied arbitrarily.  The arbitrary
execution of Mills, whose case cannot be distinguished in any meaningful way from
that of Cochran, Keen and countless other cases where we have mandated
adherence to Tedder, is that fear come true.
We have recognized, time and time again, that the other branches of
government, and especially the executive branch which has the responsibility to
carry out the death penalty, relies on the judicial branch, and especially this Court,
to get it right before a life is taken.  We did not get it right here, and we should not
hesitate to say so before Mills is put to death because of our mistake.  Otherwise
our message is clear: death is not so different after all.
SHAW and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
8  I agree with the majority, however, that the United States Supreme Court
majority opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2366 (2000), by its
express terms did not apply to capital sentencing and thus does not provide a basis
for granting Mills relief.  Nonetheless, I point out that a jury recommendation of life
might, under a logical extension of the reasoning in Apprendi, preclude a trial court
from overriding a jury's life recommendation.
-27-
PARIENTE, J., dissenting.
I join in Justice Anstead's dissent.8  The undeniable fact is that a proper and
consistent application of Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975), would result
in this Court honoring the jury's recommendation of life and therefore requires that
we revisit our prior ruling in this case.  The issue in this case is whether the doctrine
of the law of the case precludes our revisiting the jury override issue.  I conclude
that it does not because it would be a manifest injustice for Mills to be executed
when, under identical circumstances, he would not be executed if this Court had
reviewed his sentence at any time after 1985.  Contrary to Justice Harding's
assertion in his concurrence, a proper and consistent application of Tedder does
not result in our making "new law on a case-by-case basis in order to reach a
desired result."  Concurring op. at 17.  Rather, a proper and consistent application
of our long-standing Tedder analysis mandates that we reduce Mills' sentence to life
in order to fulfill "our responsibility to apply the law uniformly in all cases,
regardless of the status of the players or the stakes of the game."  Id.  It is precisely
-28-
because this Court has openly acknowledged in Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d 928,
933 (Fla. 1989), that it did not properly and "uniformly" apply Tedder to Mills and
other defendants, that we are urged to correct our mistake now before a life is taken
based on that mistake.    
As this Court has explained the doctrine of the law of the case:
Generally, under the doctrine of law of the case, "all questions of law
which have been decided by the highest appellate court become the
law of the case which must be followed in subsequent proceedings,
both in the lower and appellate courts."  However, the doctrine is not
an absolute mandate, but rather a self-imposed restraint that courts
abide by to promote finality and efficiency in the judicial process and
prevent relitigation of the same issue in a case.  This Court has the
power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings in exceptional
circumstances and where reliance on the previous decision would
result in manifest injustice, notwithstanding that such rulings have
become law of the case.
 State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 720 (Fla. 1997) (emphasis added).   
In Porter v. State, 723 So. 2d 191, 197-98 (Fla. 1998), this Court
reconsidered a trial court's override of a jury's recommendation of a life sentence in
a death case where the issue before the Court was whether the trial court was
impartial.  The Court explained that the constitutional infirmity concerning due
process based upon the trial court's lack of impartiality overcame the procedural
bar of the law of the case.  See id. at 198.
Moreover, in Owen, we rejected the invocation of the law of the case
-29-
doctrine by the defendant and we invoked a change in the law in favor of the State. 
696 So. 2d at 720.  In Owen, this Court initially reversed a defendant's first-degree
murder conviction because we concluded that the defendant had given an equivocal
invocation of the right to terminate questioning, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Owen, 696 So. 2d at 717.  After this decision, but before the
defendant's retrial, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), in which it held that neither Miranda nor its
progeny required police officers to stop questioning when the defendant makes an
equivocal or ambiguous request for counsel.  See Owen, 696 So. 2d at 717.  Prior
to retrial, the State moved the trial court to reconsider the admissibility of the
defendant's confession in light of Davis, but the trial court held the confession
inadmissible.  See id.  The district court affirmed, holding that the suppression
constituted the law of the case, but certified the issue to this Court.  See id.  This
Court rejected the application of law of the case under these circumstances, holding
that 
the Supreme Court's decision in Davis qualifies as an exceptional
situation . . . [and] we find that reliance upon our prior decision in
Owen's direct appeal would result in manifest injustice to the people of
this state because it would perpetuate a rule which we have now
determined to be an undue restriction of legitimate law enforcement
activity. 
-30-
Id. at 720.
The exception to law of the case applies equally to intervening legislative
actions.  For example, in Trotter v. State, 690 So. 2d 1234, 1237 (Fla. 1996), this
Court held that "[a]n intervening act of the legislature refining a portion of Florida's
death penalty statute may be sufficiently exceptional to warrant modification of the
law of the case."  In Trotter, this Court initially reversed the trial court's finding as
an aggravating factor the fact that the defendant was on community control at the
time he committed the murder.  Id. at 1236.  At resentencing, the trial court again
found that community control constituted an aggravating circumstance.  See id. 
This Court rejected the defendant's argument that the application of community
control as an aggravating factor violated the doctrine of law of the case, explaining:
In light of the specificity and promptness of the 1991
amendment to section 921.141(5)(a), and in view of our prior caselaw
giving retroactive application to other aggravating circumstances
effecting a refinement in the law, reliance on Trotter would result in
manifest injustice to the people of Florida by perpetuating an
anomalous and incorrect application of the capital sentencing statute.
Id. at 1237 (emphasis supplied).  
Given this Court's prior application of the exception to the law of the case
doctrine, I would conclude that the failure to reconsider the jury override issue in
this case constitutes a manifest injustice.  As Justice Anstead correctly notes in his
9  I therefore would recede from this Court's contrary holdings in Porter v.
Dugger, 559 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 1990), and Johnson v. Dugger, 523 So. 2d 161, 162
(Fla. 1988).  
-31-
dissenting opinion, even though a faithful application of Tedder clearly required that
Mills' sentence be reduced to life at the time of the direct appeal, until 1985 this
Court's application of Tedder often led to patently inconsistent outcomes.  See
dissenting op. at 19-20.  In Cochran, 547 So. 2d at 933, this Court candidly
acknowledged its prior inconsistent application of Tedder. Therefore, to apply the
doctrine of law of the case to preclude consideration of this inconsistent
application of Tedder rises to the level of manifest injustice, justifying a
reconsideration of the jury override issue.9  To fail to do so would result in an
"anomalous and incorrect application of the capital sentencing statute."  Trotter,
690 So. 2d at 1237.  
Moreover, application of this exception to the law of the case doctrine is
consistent with our responsibility to ensure that sentences of death are not
arbitrarily and inconsistently imposed.  Whether Mills will live or die depends on
this Court's willingness to acknowledge that a proper and uniform application of
our case law requires that this defendant's sentence of death be reduced to life in
accordance with his jury's recommendation. 
-32-
SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
Original Proceeding - Habeas Corpus
Todd G. Scher, Litigation Director, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Respondent