Case Title: Liberty v. State Dept. of Transportation

Citation: 

Docket Number: S53232

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: November 24, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
JOHN P. LIBERTY,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
STATE OF OREGON,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Respondent on Review,
and
COUNTY OF TILLAMOOK,
Defendant.
NICKLAUS A. GRAHAM,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
STATE OF OREGON,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
and PARKS AND RECREATION DEPARTMENT,
Respondents on Review.
(CC 012082; CC 022066; CA A120225 (Control);
CA A120226; SC S53232)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 11, 2006.
Brian R. Whitehead, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
brief for petitioners on review.
Brendan C. Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondents on review.  With
him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General, Salem.
BALMER, J.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Balmer, and Kistler, Justices.**
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
*Appeal from Tillamook County Circuit Court, Rick W. Roll, Judge. 200 Or App 607, 116 P3d 902, aff'd on recons, 202 Or App
355, 122 P3d 95 (2005)
**Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case. 
Walters, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision
of this case.
BALMER, J.
This case requires us to determine the scope of the
immunity that ORS 105.682 confers on a land owner who "permits
any person to use the [owner's] land for recreational
purposes[.]"  The specific issue is whether ORS 105.682 grants
immunity to a land owner that permits persons to cross its land
to obtain access to other land where those persons will engage in
recreational activities.  Plaintiffs were injured on defendant's
land, which plaintiffs crossed to get to land where they swam and
picnicked.  Plaintiffs sought recovery for their injuries, and
defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of the immunity
statute.  The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant,
holding that ORS 105.682 provides immunity to owners of land who
permit their land to be used to obtain access to other land for
recreational purposes.  Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, in an en banc decision, holding that crossing
land to access other land on which to recreate amounted to the
use of land for a recreational purpose.  Liberty v. State Dept.
of Transportation, 200 Or App 607, 116 P3d 902 (2005).  We
allowed plaintiffs' petition for review and, for the reasons set
forth below, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and the
judgment of the trial court.
We take the facts from the Court of Appeals opinion and
the record.  Plaintiffs and their families drove on Highway 6 to
a paved turnout along the highway near the "Fisherman's Bridge"
area of the Wilson River.  Plaintiffs parked their cars in the
turnout area and walked along an asphalt path that is parallel to
the roadway and between the road's guardrail and a chain link
fence.  On the other side of the fence is a steep slope.  The
asphalt path and the underlying land is owned by defendant, the
State of Oregon Department of Transportation.  Plaintiffs and
their families used the path to gain access to a footbridge that
crosses the river to a riverside beach area owned by Willamette
Industries and Kenneth Fan Rad.  Willamette and Rad had opened
the beach area to the public for recreational purposes.  After
swimming and relaxing at the beach area, plaintiffs re-crossed
the footbridge and used the path owned by defendant to return to
their cars.  While walking on that path, the asphalt under
plaintiffs' feet crumbled and plaintiffs slid under the fence and
down the steep slope approximately 40 feet, sustaining injuries.
Plaintiffs filed separate actions against defendant to
recover damages for their injuries.  Defendant answered that ORS
105.682 granted it immunity, moved to consolidate the two
actions, and moved for summary judgment on the basis of ORS
105.682.  
ORS 105.682(1) provides:
"Except as provided by subsection (2) of this section,
and subject to the provisions of ORS 105.688, an owner
of land is not liable in contract or tort for any
personal injury, death or property damage that arises
out of the use of the land for recreational purposes,
woodcutting or the harvest of special forest products
when the owner of land either directly or indirectly
permits any person to use the land for recreational
purposes, woodcutting or the harvest of special forest
products.  The limitation on liability provided by this
section applies if the principal purpose for entry upon
the land is for recreational purposes, woodcutting or
the harvest of special forest products, and is not
affected if the injury, death or damage occurs while
the person entering land is engaging in activities
other than the use of the land for recreational
purposes, woodcutting or the harvest of special forest
products."
The trial court succinctly stated the legal question
presented by defendant's summary judgment motion as "whether the
legislature intended immunity to attach to contiguous land for
both the entry into and exit from recreational property."  The
trial court answered that question in the affirmative and granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
The court first determined that immunity under ORS 105.682 is
available only if (1) the land owner permits any person to use
the land for recreational purposes, without charge, and (2) the
injury has "arisen out of the use of that land for such
'recreational purposes.'"  Liberty at 614-15.  Next, the court
noted that the statute does not define "recreational purposes,"
but rather sets out, in ORS 105.672(5), a nonexclusive list of
activities that the term "includes" -- a list that does not
include the use of land to gain access to other land for
recreational purposes on the latter property.  Id. at 615.  The
court then examined the meaning of the words "recreational" and
"purpose" and found that "purpose," according to Webster's Third
New Int'l Dictionary, is "'an aim or end,'" or "'an object,
effect or result aimed at, intended or attained.'"  Id. at 616
(quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1847 (unabridged ed
(2002)).  "Recreational" means simply "'of or relating to
recreation,'" and "recreation" is defined as "'the act of
recreating or the state of being recreated.'"  Id. (quoting
Webster's at 1899).  From those definitions, the court concluded
that it "seems reasonably plausible that, when a person enters
land for the purpose of gaining access to another parcel for
recreational purposes, the access itself has a recreational
purpose in that the end, object, result, or goal of the entry is
recreation."  Id. at 616.
The Court of Appeals also examined the legislative
history of ORS 105.682 and determined that what limited evidence
existed supported its interpretation of the statute.  The
legislature enacted the predecessor to ORS 105.682 in 1963. 
During the hearings on the bill to enact that earlier statute, a
representative from the Oregon Farm Bureau testified that "his
organization supported the bill because, among other things, 'in
many cases an individual must cross private land in order to get
to public lands; and the potential suit is always there.  Such a
bill [creating immunity] would relieve the landowner's mind if he
allowed this.'" Liberty, 200 Or App at 617 (quoting Minutes,
House Committee on Fish and Game, HB 1696, Apr 10, 1963, 2)
(emphasis added by Court of Appeals).  The court noted that no
actual legislator had commented on that issue, but found that the
quote indicated that legislators were aware that at least one
member of the public viewed the act as providing immunity to
lands used to gain access to public recreational lands.  Id. at
617-18.  The court also observed that the immunity statute had
been amended on several occasions, but asserted that the
legislative history of those amendments did not suggest that the
legislature intended to alter the "basic thrust" of the statute. 
Id. at 618.  Accordingly, the court held that ORS 105.682
protected defendant from liability for plaintiffs' injuries.  Id.
at 619. (1)
In this court, not surprisingly, the parties reiterate
the arguments that they made below, with plaintiffs asserting
that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the
immunity statute and defendant arguing that the Court of Appeals
was correct.  Because the scope of the immunity that ORS 105.682
grants to landowners is a matter of statutory construction, we
begin with the text of the statute.  As noted, ORS 105.682
provides, in part, that "an owner of land is not liable in
contract or tort for any personal injury, death or property
damage that arises out of the use of the land for recreational
purposes * * * when the owner of land either directly or
indirectly permits any person to use the land for recreational
purposes[.]"  (Emphasis added.)  ORS 105.672(5) provides:
"'Recreational purposes' includes, but is not limited
to, outdoor activities such as hunting, fishing,
swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, nature
study, outdoor educational activities, waterskiing,
winter sports, viewing or enjoying historical,
archaeological, scenic or scientific sites or
volunteering for any public purpose project."
ORS 105.688 further defines the scope of the immunity granted to
landowners by ORS 105.682 by providing, in part:
"(1) * * * [T]he immunities provided by ORS
105.682 apply to: 
"(a) All public and private lands, including but
not limited to lands adjacent or contiguous to any
bodies of water, watercourses or the ocean shore as
defined by ORS 390.605[.]" 
Plaintiffs' argument is simply stated:  Nothing in ORS
105.682 or in the definition of "recreational purposes" in ORS
105.672(5) refers to land that persons cross to gain access to
other land for recreational purposes.  Although ORS 105.682
provides immunity to a landowner for injuries incurred in the
recreational use of its land, it does not expressly provide
immunity to owners of land that is used only to gain access to
other land in order to engage in recreational activities there. 
Plaintiffs contend that the Court of Appeals' conclusion -- that
crossing one person's property to obtain access to another
person's property for a recreational purpose is, in itself, a
recreational purpose -- will lead to anomalous and arbitrary
results, such as a providing immunity to a person whose
negligence injures a child on that person's sidewalk if the child
was on her way to a park for a picnic.
Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals correctly
concluded that ORS 105.682 grants immunity to owners of land who
open their land so that persons can gain access to another
owner's land for recreational purposes.  Defendant asserts that,
when a person crosses one parcel of land to reach or to return
from a second parcel of land where the person swims or engages in
other recreational activity, the person has entered and used the
first parcel of land "for recreational purposes."  Defendant
argues that its interpretation of the statute is supported by the
dictionary definitions of the statutory terms.  The definition of
"purpose" includes "an object to be attained" and a "result aimed
at."  Webster's at 1847 (unabridged ed 2002).  The definition of
"recreational" is something "relating to recreation."  Id. at
1899.  Therefore, according to defendant, "a person uses a parcel
of land for a purpose related to recreation when the person uses
that parcel of land with the end, aim, object or goal of reaching
an adjacent parcel of land where he plans to engage in
[recreation.]" 
In our view, the words that the legislature used in ORS
105.682 demonstrate its intent to grant immunity to only the
owner of the land that itself is "use[d] * * * for recreational
purposes," and that "recreational purposes" does not include
crossing one person's land to gain access to another person's
land to recreate there.  We reach that conclusion for two primary
reasons.  
First, ORS 105.682 grants immunity only when the injury
"arises out of the use of the land for recreational purposes." 
(Emphasis added.)  That statute, of course, does not expressly
grant immunity if the purpose of "the use of the land" is only to
cross the land to gain access to different land on which
recreation will occur, and we can reach the conclusion urged by
defendant only if we determine that that "use" of "the land"
constitutes a "recreational purpose."  In interpreting a statute,
we examine the text of the statute within its context.  Here, an
important part of the context of ORS 105.682 is another provision
in the immunity law, ORS 105.688(1)(a), which does grant immunity
if the injury occurs on land that is "adjacent or contiguous to
any bodies of water, watercourses or the ocean shore as defined
by ORS 390.605[.]"  In that related statute, the legislature
expressly extended the immunity conferred by ORS 105.682 to
adjacent or contiguous land that is used to gain access to waters
where the injured party intended to recreate.  The fact that the
legislature enacted ORS 105.688(1)(a) to provide immunity for
injuries on land that is adjacent or contiguous to water -- water
that persons travel to for recreational purposes -- strongly
suggests that the legislature believed that ORS 105.682(1)
otherwise did not extend to land that was "adjacent or
contiguous" to places where persons go for recreational purposes. 
If the legislature similarly had intended to extend immunity to
land -- often, adjacent or contiguous land -- that is used for
access to other land where the person intended to recreate, it
would have done so.  It did not do so, and we decline to insert
into the statute that which the legislature has omitted.  ORS
174.010.
Second, the definition of "recreational purposes" in
ORS 105.672(5) simply does not encompass a person's crossing of
one landowner's land to reach another landowner's land where the
person intends to recreate.  Defendant contends that, under the
dictionary definitions of "recreational" and "purpose," "a
person's act of entering one parcel of land so he can access or
leave a second parcel where he intends to swim is itself a 'use
of the land' or 'entry upon the land' that is 'for recreational
purposes.'"  
We disagree.  By providing in ORS 105.672(5) that the
term "'[r]ecreational purposes' includes, but is not limited to,
outdoor activities such as hunting, fishing [and other specified
activities]," the legislature made it clear that its list of
"outdoor activities" that could be "recreational purposes" was
not exhaustive.  When the legislature uses "nonspecific or
general phrases" as well as a list of items, this court, under
the principle of ejusdem generis, construes the statute "as
referring only to other items of the same kind."  Vannatta v.
Keisling, 324 Or 514, 533, 931 P2d 770 (1997) (stating and
applying principle).  See also Lewis v. CIGNA Ins. Co., 339 Or
342, 350-51, 121 P3d 1128 (2005) (under ejusdem generis rule,
court examines "basic characteristics" of enumerated items when
construing more general words).  With that principle in mind, we
consider whether there is a characteristic trait among the
"outdoor activities" listed in ORS 105.672(5) that also is shared
by the act of crossing land to get to other land.  
The first common trait of the enumerated items is
that identified by the legislature itself:  The activities all
can take place outdoors.  Traversing land parcel A to reach land
parcel B, as plaintiffs did, is, of course, also an activity done
outdoors, so it shares that trait with the listed items.  But
many other plainly nonrecreational activities, such as roofing a
house or paving a road, also take place outdoors, so that trait
does not provide any useful limiting characteristic or quality to
identify which "outdoor activities" other than those specifically
identified, are "recreational purposes" that come within the
statutory definition.  
Another common trait of the activities listed in ORS
105.672(5) is that the activities are recreational in and of
themselves.  With one possible exception, none of the specified
activities is solely a means to a different recreational
activity; each activity is an end in itself. (2)  In contrast
to each of the enumerated activities, the defining characteristic
of crossing one land parcel to gain access to another land parcel
is that the act of crossing is not an end or an activity unto
itself, but rather is a means to a different end.  For that
reason, applying the ejusdem generis rule, crossing land to
obtain access to other land is not an outdoor activity that comes
within the definition of "recreational purposes" in ORS
105.672(5). (3) 
We therefore disagree with defendant and the Court of
Appeals that "recreational purposes" includes crossing one land
parcel to gain access to another land parcel on which one will
engage in a recreational activity such as swimming.  The
definition in Webster's of "purpose" as an "object" or "aim" is
one common meaning of the word, but that meaning does not answer
the dispositive question in this case -- it simply removes it one
step.  Although it is apparent that plaintiffs' ultimate "aim" or
"object" in walking on the path was to swim -- a recreational
activity listed in ORS 105.672(5) -- that conclusion only leads
to a further question, "What was plaintiffs' purpose, aim, or
object in entering defendant's land, which was not where the
recreation was to take place?"  Based on our analysis of the
statute and the summary judgment record, we agree with plaintiffs
that the "purpose" of plaintiffs' crossing of defendant's land
was to travel to the land on which plaintiffs would engage in
recreation.  The activity of crossing a parcel of land, by
itself, is not a recreational purpose.  For that reason, we hold
that ORS 105.682 does not grant immunity to defendant. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
1. The Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs' argument that
application of the immunity statute would lead to the absurd
result that the state could not be liable for any accidents on a
public highway leading to a public recreation area.  The court
noted that other statutes impose obligations on the state
agencies responsible for maintaining highways.  Liberty, 200 Or
App at 619.  Plaintiffs petitioned for reconsideration, arguing
that the path on which they were walking at the time of the
accident was itself a "state highway."  The Court of Appeals
granted the petition, but adhered to its prior opinion because it
concluded that plaintiffs had offered no evidence, in responding
to defendant's summary judgment motion, that the path was part of
the state highway system.  Liberty v. State Dept. of
Transportation, 202 Or App 355, 122 P3d 95 (2005).  Because of
our disposition of the case, we do not address that issue.
2. The one possible exception -- an activity listed in ORS
105.672(5) that is both an end in itself as an outdoor activity
and can also be a means to engage in another outdoor activity --
is hiking.  One can hike as a recreational, outdoor activity --
an end in itself -- and as a means to another activity, such as
swimming in a mountain lake.  Defendant, however, does not claim
that plaintiffs had been "hiking" on its land, and the evidence
in the record indicates that plaintiffs' only purpose in walking
along the narrow strip of asphalt between the guardrail and the
fence was to gain access to the beach and river for purposes of
swimming and playing with their friends and relatives.
3. Defendant argues that the legislative history of the 1963
version of the immunity statute supports its position because one
witness testified that the statute would provide immunity from
liability for injuries that occur on land that a person crossed
to gain access to other land for recreational purposes.  See
Liberty, 200 Or App at 617-18 (describing that legislative
history).  We do not give substantial weight to that legislative
history, in light of our analysis of the text and context of ORS
105.682, set forth above.  Moreover, the immunity statutes were
substantially rewritten in 1971 and again in 1995, and provisions
that are central to our interpretation of the statute here --
including the definition of "recreational purposes" in ORS
105.672(5) and the provision extending immunity to land that is
adjacent or contiguous to bodies of water, ORS 105.688(1)(a) --
do not appear in the 1963 version of the statute.