Case Title: MORALES v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 105552

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
MORALES v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY  MORALES v. CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY 2010 OK 9 230 P.3d 869 Case Number: 105552 Decided: 02/09/2010 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA CRUZ MORALES, as Mother and Next Friend of Alma Morales, a Minor, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. THE CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Oklahoma, ex rel. THE OKLAHOMA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, a Department of the City of Oklahoma City, Defendant/Appellee ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT IN OKLAHOMA COUNTY ¶0 Plaintiff brought this action against the City of Oklahoma City to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained by her minor daughter during an arrest by an Oklahoma City police officer. The District Court in Oklahoma County, Patricia G. Parrish, trial judge, gave summary judgment to City based on the exemption from the general rule of legislatively mandated governmental tort accountability provided by §155(4) of the Governmental Tort Claims Act. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS REVERSED AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT. Travis W. Watkins, MULINIX OGDEN HALL ANDREWS & LUDLAM, PLLC, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant Kenneth Jordan, Municipal Counselor, Richard C. Smith, Litigation Division Head, and Paula A. Kelly, Assistant Municipal Counselor, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee OPALA, J. ¶1 The dispositive issue tendered on appeal is whether the trial court erred in giving summary judgment to City. We answer in the affirmative. I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 On 21 September 2005, Oklahoma City police officer Mitchell McCoy was on duty at Roosevelt Middle School when a fight broke out in the school's cafeteria between twelve-year-old Alma Morales ("Alma") and another female student. Officer McCoy stepped in to assist two teachers in breaking up the fight. After removing Alma from the proximity of the other student and restraining her, Officer McCoy placed her under arrest. At some point during the incident, Alma's left wrist was broken and her left elbow injured. ¶3 Plaintiff, Alma's mother, presented a written notice of claim for Alma's injuries to the City of Oklahoma City relying on the Governmental Tort Claims Act ("GTCA").3 Because the claim was not approved within ninety days after it was filed, it was deemed denied under the terms of §157(A) of the GTCA.4 Plaintiff then brought in the District Court in Oklahoma County a personal injury action against City on Alma's behalf. ¶4 In her initial petition plaintiff alleged that Officer McCoy, acting within the scope of his employment, used excessive force, acted negligently, intentionally, maliciously, and in reckless disregard of her daughter's safety. City responded with a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the allegations of intentional, malicious, and reckless conduct on their face took Officer McCoy's conduct outside the scope of his employment, thereby relieving City of any liability for his actions.5 Plaintiff then amended her petition, removing all descriptive allegations of Officer McCoy's conduct and replacing them with a non-specific allegation of tort-inflicted damage to Alma caused by Officer McCoy's actions taken within the scope of his employment. City admits that Officer McCoy was acting within the scope of his employment during the incident, but denies both that his conduct was tortious and that his actions caused Alma's injuries. ¶5 City moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) the undisputed material facts of record support no other conclusion than that Officer McCoy's use of force to restrain and arrest Alma was objectively reasonable and hence statutorily privileged; and (2) even if Officer McCoy's conduct caused Alma delictual harm, City is immune from liability for his conduct under three of the statutory exemptions from governmental tort accountability created by the GTCA.6 The trial court agreed that City was immune from liability under one of the three exemptions, 51 O.S. Supp. 2004 §155(4),7 and gave judgment to City. Plaintiff appealed. Upon City's motion, the appeal was retained by this court. We now reverse the judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings to be consistent with this opinion. II STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6 Summary process - a special pretrial procedural track pursued with the aid of acceptable probative substitutes8 - is a search for undisputed material facts which, without resort to forensic combat, may be utilized in the judicial decision-making process.9 The moving party stands entitled to judgment as a matter of law when neither genuine issues of material fact nor conflicting inferences that may be drawn from uncontested facts are in dispute and the law favors the moving party's claim or liability-defeating defense.10 Only those evidentiary materials which eliminate from trial some or all fact issues on the merits of the claim or of the defense afford legitimate support for a trial court's use of summary process for a claim's adjudication.11 ¶7 The purpose of summary process is not to deprive parties of their right to have the disputed facts of the case tried by a jury, but rather to decide the legal sufficiency of the evidentiary materials presented to determine whether a triable case is tendered. ¶8 Issues in summary process stand before us for de novo review. ¶9 Although the trial court gave City summary judgment solely because of the exemption from liability provided to governmental employers by the provisions of III SUMMARY RELIEF IS NOT CITY'S DUE BASED ON ITS STATUTORY EXEMPTION DEFENSES ¶10 Relying on three exemptions from the general rule of governmental tort accountability provided by the GTCA, City argues it cannot be held liable for Officer McCoy's actions even if they could be considered negligent. The trial court gave judgment to City on the basis of the exemption provided by §155(4) of the GTCA, the pertinent portion of which shields a municipality from liability if a loss or claim arises from the enforcement of a law.19 City urges this court to affirm the judgment on that basis or, alternatively, on the basis of either or both of the other two GTCA provisions City urged below but which were left unaddressed and uninvoked by the trial court's decision.20 We conclude in this case that none of the three provisions cited may shield City from liability. A. The Exemption from Liability Provided by GTCA §155(4). ¶11 The provisions of §155(4) of the GTCA state that a political subdivision shall not be liable for a loss or claim that results from: 4. Adoption or enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law, whether valid or invalid, including, but not limited to, any statute, charter provision, ordinance, resolution, rule, regulation or written policy; . . . City argues that even if Officer McCoy was negligent and injured Alma, it [City] cannot be held liable because the injuries occurred while Officer McCoy was enforcing a law. In essence, City poses for our adoption a construction of §155(4) that would provide a blanket immunity to a municipality for claims arising from law enforcement. We recently rejected just such an argument by City in Tuffy's Inc. v. City of Oklahoma City,21 in which we said, "To construe §155(4) as providing blanket immunity to political subdivisions for any claim arising from law enforcement would not conform to established precedent. We have consistently held that a municipality is liable for the tortious acts of police officers committed within the scope of employment as defined by the GTCA."22 ¶12 The purpose of §155(4) is to protect the discretionary acts of law enforcement officers in deciding whether a given situation calls for enforcing a law or not. That choice, whichever way it goes, may result in a detriment visited upon either the person with whom the officer is engaged or upon a third person. ¶13 Whether a governmental agency is ultimately liable depends, of course, on whether its police officer employee committed the tort of which he or she is accused. Unless the infliction of delictual harm is determinable as a matter of law, governmental liability or exoneration for loss caused by the manner of effecting arrest must await a jury's resolution. In short, we reject City's contention that in enacting §155(4) the Legislature intended to provide municipalities with a priori immunity where a plaintiff seeks recovery for allegedly tortious acts of law enforcement personnel in the use of force to effect an arrest. B. The Exemption from Liability Provided by GTCA §155(6) ¶14 The provisions of §155(6) of the GTCA state in pertinent part that a political subdivision shall not be liable for a loss or claim that results from "the method of providing, police, law enforcement or fire protection; . . ." In Salazar v. City of Oklahoma City, "The exemption in that subsection is invocable when the tort arises while a municipality is rendering services that fall into some category of police protection, law enforcement protection or fire protection. In short, a governmental subdivision is not liable for deficiency of protective services extended by its police, law enforcement or fire fighting components." City argues that Officer McCoy was providing protective services to Alma as well as engaging in a law enforcement activity when he subdued and arrested her. ¶15 To accept City's characterization of Officer McCoy's conduct would do away with the distinction between protective services by police and law enforcement activities. Officer McCoy testified in his deposition that the first thing he saw when he turned toward the fight was Alma hitting the other student in the back as that student was walking away. He said he grabbed Alma because she would not stop fighting. From Officer McCoy's viewpoint, it is clear that his role in breaking up the fight and arresting Alma was that of a law enforcer. Nothing in the record suggests that Alma was seeking protection from Officer McCoy. She did not summon him to protect her. The court in Salazar specifically characterized the act of making an arrest as a law enforcement function. C. The Exemption Provided by GTCA §155(16). ¶16 The provisions of §155(16) of the GTCA state that a political subdivision shall not be liable for a loss or claim that results from "any claim which is limited or barred by any other law; . . ." City argues that plaintiff's claim is limited or barred by the provisions of ¶17 The relevant provisions of §643 are: "To use or to attempt to offer to use force or violence upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases: 1. When necessarily committed by a public officer in the performance of any legal duty, or by any other person assisting such officer or acting by such officer's direction; 2. When necessarily committed by any person in arresting one who has committed any felony, and delivering such person to a public officer competent to receive such person in custody; * * * * * 4. When committed by a parent or the authorized agent of any parent, or by any guardian, master or teacher, in the exercise of a lawful authority to restrain or correct such person's child, ward, apprentice or scholar, provided restraint or correction has been rendered necessary by the misconduct of such child, ward, apprentice or scholar, or by the child's refusal to obey the lawful command of such parent or authorized agent or guardian, master or teacher, and the force or violence used is reasonable in manner and moderate in degree; . . ." City argues that all three of the above-quoted subdivisions of §643 apply to the incident at issue. Because these provisions would provide Officer McCoy with a defense to criminal liability for his conduct, City would have us hold that they also constitute a law that limits or bars a civil claim against Officer McCoy, thereby destroying the foundation of plaintiff's claim against City, which requires a claim against the governmental employee-actor that is neither barred nor limited by any other law. Plaintiff counters that the terms of §643 provide a defense to a criminal charge, not to a negligence claim, and hence do not affect City's liability for Officer McCoy's conduct in suit. ¶18 We reject City's argument that §643, in conjunction with §155(16), renders City immune from suit. To hold otherwise would mean the Legislature intended to immunize a governmental agency from suit ab initio simply because a law arguably creates an affirmative defense to liability invocable by the agency's employee. ¶19 Neither the provisions of §643 nor any other statute or common law norm (other than the GTCA itself) prevents plaintiff from bringing a negligence action against Officer McCoy. IV THE EXISTENCE OF TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDE THE USE OF SUMMARY PROCESS TO TERMINATE THIS LITIGATION ¶20 City also argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the evidentiary materials tendered below present no triable issues of fact. City contends the evidentiary materials support no other conclusion than that Officer McCoy's conduct conformed to the applicable standard of care. We disagree that the evidentiary materials are legally sufficient to warrant withholding this case from a jury's deliberations. ¶21 The threshold question in any negligence action is whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. ¶22 The standard of care prescribes how a person must act or not act in order to satisfy the duty of care. ¶23 We begin by noting the obvious: a police officer does not stand in the same shoes as an ordinary citizen when it comes to using force against another person which exposes that person to a risk of injury. This much stands clearly recognized in the state's criminal law. In making a lawful arrest, a police officer in Oklahoma is statutorily relieved of criminal liability for assault and battery as long as the act of force is "necessarily committed by the officer in the performance of a legal duty." ¶24 The legislature has directed the state's police departments to adopt policies and guidelines that outline the outer limit of permissible use of force. ¶25 The traditional centuries-old common-law rule recognized in Oklahoma holds that whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another, that, if he (she) did not use ordinary care and skill in his (her) own conduct, he (she) would cause danger of injury to the person or property of another, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger. ¶26 We therefore hold that a police officer has a special dispensation from the duty of ordinary care not to endanger others. A police officer's duty is very specific: it is to use only such force in making an arrest as a reasonably prudent police officer would use in light of the objective circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the arrest. In applying this standard, an officer's subjective mistake of fact or law is irrelevant, including whether he (she) is acting in good faith or bad. ¶27 Among the factors that may be considered in evaluating the objective reasonableness of an officer's use of force in making an arrest are: (1) the severity of the crime of which the arrestee is suspected; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest; (4) the known character of the arrestee; (5) the existence of alternative methods of accomplishing the arrest; (6) the physical size, strength and weaponry of the officers compared to those of the suspect; and (7) the exigency of the moment. ¶28 City argues that the objective reasonableness standard applicable to police use of force creates a fixed standard of care that may be applied by the court without a jury. ¶29 City next argues that summary judgment is its due as a matter of law because reasonable people could not draw different conclusions respecting the question of Officer McCoy's negligence. According to the applicable rule, where the evidence permits of no other conclusion than that a defendant has or has not met the standard of care imposed by law, the court may remove the issue from the jury and decide the question of negligence on its own. ¶30 It is undisputed that Officer McCoy removed Alma from a fight with another student. He accomplished this by grabbing Alma's neck with his right hand and, with his left hand holding her left hand, leading her about twelve feet to a wall. He then held her up against the wall with his body. Alma testified in her deposition that when Officer McCoy held her against the wall, he placed all of his force into her left side where her left hand got squished and was broken. Officer McCoy's deposition material tendered for the trial court's consideration does not include any estimation of the amount of force he used, but he repeatedly denied that the force he used would have caused Alma's broken wrist. Alma admits that she kept moving her left hand toward her neck, where Officer McCoy was holding her. Officer McCoy's deposition material contains a reading from his contemporaneous incident report, in which he stated that he perceived Alma's actions at the time as demonstrating her unwillingness to stop fighting. He testified that her actions were not sufficiently extreme to cause him to consider her to be resisting arrest, but she needed to be restrained. ¶31 Viewing the evidence as we must in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, V SUMMARY ¶32 Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for personal injury to her minor daughter by the alleged negligence of an Oklahoma City police officer in subduing and arresting the child. The existence of disputed material facts and/or inferences that call for resolution by a jury makes summary relief impermissible. It cannot be determined that as a matter of law Officer McCoy either was or was not negligent in the performance of his duty. In addition, the immunity defenses tendered by City are unavailable under the circumstances of this case and cannot legally support judgment in City's favor. Plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to her day in court before a panel of petit jurors sworn to try her case. ¶33 THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IS REVERSED AND THE CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT. ¶34 Edmondson, C.J., Hargrave, Opala, Kauger, Watt, and Colbert, JJ., CONCUR. ¶35 Taylor, V.C.J., Winchester and Reif, JJ., DISSENT. FOOT