Case Title: Eastley v. Volkman

Citation: 2012-Ohio-2179

Docket Number: 2011-0606

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Eastley v. Volkman, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2179.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2179 
EASTLEY, ADMR., APPELLEE, v. VOLKMAN; HUFFMAN, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Eastley v. Volkman, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2179.] 
When the evidence to be considered is in the court’s record, a party need not have 
moved for directed verdict or filed a motion for a new trial or a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict to obtain appellate review of the 
weight of the evidence—In civil cases, as in criminal cases, the sufficiency 
of the evidence is quantitatively and qualitatively different from the weight 
of the evidence. 
(No. 2011-0606—Submitted December 7, 2011—Decided May 22, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Scioto County,  
Nos. 09CA3308 and 09CA3309, 2010-Ohio-4771. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  When the evidence to be considered is in the court’s record, a party need not 
have moved for directed verdict or filed a motion for a new trial or a 
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motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to obtain appellate 
review of the weight of the evidence. 
2.  In civil cases, as in criminal cases, the sufficiency of the evidence is 
quantitatively and qualitatively different from the weight of the evidence. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} Article IV, Section 3(B)(3) of the Ohio Constitution provides that 
“[n]o judgment resulting from a trial by jury shall be reversed on the weight of 
the evidence except by the concurrence of all three judges hearing the cause.”  In 
this case, two judges on the court of appeals panel voted to reverse the judgment 
on the weight of the evidence but one judge concluded that appellant had waived 
appellate review of the weight of the evidence by failing to renew her motion for 
directed verdict or to file a motion for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict.  Because we hold that appellant was not required to file those motions 
to obtain appellate review of the weight of the evidence, we reverse the judgment 
and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings. 
I. Background 
{¶ 2} Paula Eastley, appellee, filed a wrongful-death action as 
administrator of the estate of Steven Hieneman, her son, against Paul Volkman, 
M.D., and Tri-State Healthcare, L.L.C., a pain-management clinic in Portsmouth, 
Ohio, where Dr. Volkman practiced.  The complaint alleged that Volkman had 
committed medical malpractice and that Tri-State Healthcare was vicariously 
liable for the doctor’s conduct.  The complaint was amended later to add 
appellant, Denise Huffman, doing business as Tri-State Health Care, as a 
defendant.  The amended complaint asserted a claim of negligence against 
Huffman, as well as claims for vicarious liability and conspiracy. 
{¶ 3} A jury trial was conducted on February 4, 2008.  Eastley presented 
evidence that 33-year-old Hieneman received treatment at the clinic and died 
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April 20, 2005, due to the acute combined effects of oxycodone, Xanax 
(alprazolam), and Valium (diazepam) that Dr. Volkman had prescribed the 
previous day.  Eastley’s evidence against Huffman related to allegations of the 
negligent operation of the clinic in causing Hieneman’s death.  At the conclusion 
of Eastley’s evidence, Huffman moved for a directed verdict “on the grounds that 
there is no evidence in the record from which the jury could conclude that Denise 
Huffman was negligent.”  After the motion was denied, Huffman presented 
defense evidence but did not renew her directed verdict motion either after she 
rested or at the close of all evidence.  Because Eastley did not present evidence to 
support a theory of vicarious liability, the trial court instructed the jury on 
negligence rather than agency by estoppel with respect to Huffman. 
{¶ 4} The jury found that Volkman’s medical malpractice and 
Huffman’s negligence had proximately caused Hieneman’s death, and the trial 
court entered judgment in Eastley’s favor in the amount of $500,000 against 
Huffman and Volkman, jointly and severally.  Huffman appealed, arguing in part 
that because Volkman had admitted that he was an independent contractor, she 
could not be held vicariously liable.  Huffman also pointed out that Eastley’s 
counsel had repeatedly stated that Eastley was not pursuing a vicarious-liability 
claim.  Huffman further asserted that, once Volkman’s conduct is removed from 
the analysis, there was no basis to hold her liable because there was no evidence 
that she violated a duty of care owed to Hieneman. 
{¶ 5} The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict against 
Huffman.  Eastley v. Volkman, 4th Dist. No. 09CA3308 and 09CA3309, 2010-
Ohio-4771, 2010 WL 3835666.  Although two of the three judges on the court of 
appeals panel agreed with Huffman that based on an ordinary negligence theory, 
the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, one judge 
dissented in part and concluded that because Huffman had not renewed her 
motion for a directed verdict or filed a motion for new trial or for judgment 
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notwithstanding the verdict, she had forfeited all but plain error.  Thus, the 
dissenting judge1 prevented a reversal based on the weight of the evidence, 
because pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(3), a reversal 
on the manifest weight of the evidence requires concurrence of all three judges. 
{¶ 6} We accepted this discretionary appeal to clarify when and upon 
what standard a court of appeals must review the weight of the evidence in a case.  
We hold that when the evidence to be considered is in the court’s record, a party 
need not have moved for directed verdict or filed a motion for a new trial or a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict to obtain appellate review of the 
weight of the evidence.  We also hold that in civil cases, as in criminal cases, the 
sufficiency of the evidence is quantitatively and qualitatively different from the 
weight of the evidence. 
II. Legal Analysis 
A. Courts of Appeals May Review Cases on the Weight of the Evidence 
{¶ 7} At the outset, there should be no question that a court of appeals 
has the authority to reverse a judgment as being against the weight of the 
evidence.  Indeed, the Ohio Constitution sets forth certain restrictions on an 
appellate court that exercises this power.  “No judgment resulting from a trial by 
jury shall be reversed on the weight of the evidence except by the concurrence of 
all three judges hearing the cause.”  Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 
3(B)(3).  Or stated conversely, a court of appeals panel must act unanimously to 
reverse a jury verdict on the weight of the evidence.  This section of the 
constitution does not distinguish between criminal and civil jury trials and thus 
applies to both.  We have held that unanimous panels are needed to reverse 
judgments based on civil jury verdicts on grounds that they are against the 
manifest weight of the evidence.  Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 115 Ohio St.3d 
                                          
 
1. We refer to the “dissenting judge,” although the judge dissented only in part, and concurred in 
the judgment upholding the verdict.  
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5 
 
291, 2007-Ohio-4918, 874 N.E.2d 1198.  When a trial judge, rather than a jury, 
has acted as the factfinder in a civil case, however, App.R. 12(C) provides that 
two of the three appellate judges may reverse the judgment based on the manifest 
weight of the evidence, but that a judgment may be reversed only once for this 
reason.2   
B. Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence and Manifest Weight  
of the Evidence Are Distinct Concepts 
{¶ 8} The dissenting judge, based on the idea that manifest weight of the 
evidence and legal sufficiency “merge” in civil trials, determined that because 
Huffman failed to renew her Civ.R. 50(A) motion for directed verdict at the close 
of evidence or move for a new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A)(6) or move for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) pursuant to Civ.R. 50(B), she 
waived the issue of manifest weight of the evidence for purpose of appeal. 
{¶ 9} In civil cases, the concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and 
weight of the evidence continue to be sources of confusion, particularly as to what 
standard of review should apply when a verdict is challenged as being against the 
manifest weight of the evidence.  But there is no reason why the fundamental 
logical differences between evidential sufficiency and weight cease to exist in 
civil cases. 
                                          
 
2. App.R. 12(C) provides: 
 
In any civil action or proceeding which was tried to the trial court without 
the intervention of a jury, and when upon appeal a majority of the judges 
hearing the appeal find that the judgment or final order rendered by the trial 
court is against the manifest weight of the evidence and do not find any other 
prejudicial error of the trial court in any of the particulars assigned and argued in 
the appellant's brief, and do not find that the appellee is entitled to judgment or 
final order as a matter of law, the court of appeals shall reverse the judgment or 
final order of the trial court and either weigh the evidence in the record and 
render the judgment or final order that the trial court should have rendered on 
that evidence or remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings; 
provided further that a judgment shall be reversed only once on the manifest 
weight of the evidence. 
 
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{¶ 10} We have carefully distinguished the terms “sufficiency” and 
“weight” in criminal cases, declaring that “manifest weight” and “legal 
sufficiency” are “both quantitatively and qualitatively different.”  State v. 
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
1. Legal Sufficiency of Evidence 
{¶ 11} In Thompkins, we described “sufficiency” as 
 
“a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied to 
determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the 
evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter 
of law.”  * * *  In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy.  
Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a 
question of law. 
 
Id. at 386, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (6th Ed.1990). 
2. Manifest Weight of Evidence 
{¶ 12} Nevertheless, even if a trial court judgment is sustained by 
sufficient evidence, an appellate court may nevertheless conclude that the 
judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence: 
 
Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater 
amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side 
of the issue rather than the other.  It indicates clearly to the jury 
that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their 
verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find 
the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is 
January Term, 2012 
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to be established before them.  Weight is not a question of 
mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing belief.” 
 
(Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 387, quoting Black’s at 1594. 
{¶ 13} Thompkins, a criminal case, was the first case from this court that 
thoroughly considered the qualitative and quantitative distinctions between the 
legal sufficiency and the manifest weight of evidence.  We explained how the 
manifest-weight standard of review operated in a criminal case (i.e., the appellate 
court sitting as a “13th juror”) but we did not confine the analysis on the 
distinctions between the evidentiary standards to criminal cases alone. 
3. Misinterpretation of C.E. Morris 
{¶ 14} Although the holding in Thompkins was not limited to criminal 
cases, some appellate courts seemed hesitant to distinguish between sufficiency 
and manifest weight of the evidence in civil cases and instead began to blur those 
concepts.  See, e.g., Reed v. Key-Chrysler Plymouth, 125 Ohio App.3d 437, 440-
441, 708 N.E.2d 1021 (2d Dist.1998); Siegal v. Magic Carpet & Upholstery, 8th 
Dist. No. 74645, 1999 WL 608808, *4 (Aug. 12, 1999); Lakeshore Properties v. 
Sharonville, 1st Dist. No. C-000321, 2001 WL 127650, *4 (Feb. 16, 2001).  
These appellate courts relied on C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio 
St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978), a short opinion predating Thompkins that 
contained no analysis.  The C.E. Morris court stated, “Judgments supported by 
some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case 
will not be reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of 
the evidence.”  Id. at 280. But at least one court of appeals has questioned the use 
of separate standards for reviewing manifest weight of the evidence in civil and 
criminal cases.  See Gevedon v. Ivey, 172 Ohio App.3d 567, 2007-Ohio-2970, 876 
N.E.2d 604 (2d Dist.). 
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{¶ 15} Although we have repeated the C.E. Morris standard and applied it 
to the review of civil cases, we have not fully analyzed it in light of Thompkins.  
The phrase “some competent, credible evidence” in C.E. Morris presupposes 
evidentiary weighing by an appellate court to determine whether the evidence is 
competent and credible.  But unfortunately, in some cases after C.E. Morris, we 
used the term “merge” in relation to the concepts of manifest weight and 
sufficiency, which created some confusion in the courts of appeals.  One such 
case was State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264. 
{¶ 16} In Wilson, we were not concerned with the distinction between 
legal sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence but rather with the review 
of a trial court’s findings relating to sexual-offender classifications and whether 
the proceedings themselves were civil or criminal.3  When speaking in Wilson of a 
civil manifest-weight standard, we did not analyze the distinctions between 
sufficiency and weight of the evidence.  We merely noted that “the standard in 
C.E. Morris tends to merge the concepts of weight and sufficiency.”  Wilson at 
¶ 26.  We later made clear that “the merger [between sufficiency and weight of 
the evidence] is not complete because of the separate constitutional significance 
accorded ‘weight of the evidence’ by Section 3(B)(3), Article IV of the Ohio 
Constitution.”  Bryan-Wollman, 115 Ohio St.3d 291, 2007-Ohio-4918, 874 
N.E.2d 1198, ¶ 3. 
4. The Thompkins Standard of Review for Manifest Weight 
of the Evidence Applies in Civil Cases 
{¶ 17} There are several reasons why the standard set forth in Thompkins 
also applies in civil cases.  First, neither the constitution nor statutes nor rules of 
procedure treat civil cases differently from criminal cases with regard to appellate 
                                          
 
3. Our holding in Wilson does not apply to sexual offenders who commit offenses on or after 
January 1, 2008, the effective date of 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10, which made many changes to 
R.C. Chapter 2950.  See State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108 
(sexual-offender-registration statutes enacted in 2008 are punitive, rather than remedial in nature). 
January Term, 2012 
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review on the issues of sufficiency and manifest weight.  See Ohio Constitution, 
Article IV, Section 3(B)(3); App.R. 12(C); and R.C. 2321.01, 2321.18, and 
2945.831.  The concepts remain qualitatively and quantitatively different from 
each other no matter the type of case. 
{¶ 18} Second, if C.E. Morris required an appellate court to determine 
only whether there is sufficient evidence to support a civil jury verdict, then there 
would never be any review of manifest weight of the evidence in these cases.  
There is a distinction between review for weight of the evidence in the courts of 
appeals and review by the Supreme Court of matters of law.  R.C. 2503.43 states, 
“In a civil case or proceeding, except when its jurisdiction is original and except 
as provided by section 2309.59 of the Revised Code, the supreme court need not 
determine as to the weight of the evidence.”  But a court of appeals has the power 
to decide that a jury verdict is against the weight of the evidence, provided that it 
acts unanimously.  We will not review a determination by a court of appeals that a 
verdict or finding is against the weight of the evidence.  Bown & Sons v. 
Honabarger, 171 Ohio St. 247, 168 N.E.2d 880 (1960), paragraph three of the 
syllabus; State v. Robinson, 162 Ohio St. 486, 124 N.E.2d 148 (1955); see also 
R.C. 2953.02 (“The supreme court in criminal cases shall not be required to 
determine as to the weight of the evidence, except * * * in cases in which a 
sentence of death is imposed for an offense committed on or after January 1, 
1995, and in which the question of the weight of the evidence to support the 
judgment has been raised on appeal * * *”). 
{¶ 19} Third, because “manifest weight of the evidence” refers to a 
greater amount of credible evidence and relates to persuasion, it does not matter 
that the burden of proof differs in criminal and civil cases.  In a civil case, in 
which the burden of persuasion is only by a preponderance of the evidence, rather 
than beyond a reasonable doubt, evidence must still exist on each element 
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(sufficiency) and the evidence on each element must satisfy the burden of 
persuasion (weight). 
{¶ 20} Several courts of appeals do apply the Thompkins standard for 
manifest weight of the evidence in civil as well as criminal cases.  For example, 
the Ninth District stated how a review on manifest weight is to be conducted: 
 
“ ‘The [reviewing] court * * * weighs the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and 
determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the 
[finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 
miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a 
new trial ordered.’ ” 
 
(Alterations made in Tewarson.)  Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115, 
750 N.E.2d 176 (9th Dist.2001), quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 
N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 
(1st Dist.1983). 
{¶ 21} In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be 
mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact. 
 
“[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly 
against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment 
and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the 
judgment and the finding of facts. * * *  
“If the evidence is susceptible of more than one 
construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it that 
interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, 
most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.” 
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Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 
(1984), fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 
191-192 (1978). 
{¶ 22} When a court of appeals determines that a jury verdict is against 
the weight of the evidence, it should remand the case for a new trial.  See Hanna 
v. Wagner, 39 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 313 N.E.2d 842 (1974).  A court of appeals 
panel has the power to so act, provided it acts unanimously and reverses only 
once on manifest weight of the evidence.  These restrictions protect the jury 
verdict and safeguard against arbitrary remand. 
{¶ 23} We therefore make clear today that in civil cases, as in criminal 
cases, the sufficiency of the evidence is quantitatively and qualitatively different 
from the weight of the evidence. 
C. Motions Are Not Required to Challenge Manifest 
Weight of the Evidence on Appeal 
{¶ 24} The dissenting judge concluded that because Huffman had not 
moved for a directed verdict at the close of all evidence or filed motions for 
JNOV or a new trial after the jury’s verdict, she had waived her appeal on the 
manifest weight of the evidence.  These motions are governed by distinct 
standards. 
{¶ 25} Civ.R. 50(A) motions for directed verdict do not present factual 
issues but instead present questions of law.  Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, 769 N.E. 2d 835, 
¶ 4.  The same is true for a Civ.R. 50(B) JNOV motion.  Posin v. A.B.C. Motor 
Court Hotel, Inc., 45 Ohio St.2d 271, 275, 344 N.E.2d 334 (1976) (“The test to be 
applied by a trial court in ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict is the same test to be applied on a motion for a directed verdict”).  Faced 
with the question of sufficiency through a directed verdict motion, the court must 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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determine whether any evidence exists on every element of each claim or defense 
for which the party has the burden to go forward.  Even if it is necessary to review 
and consider the evidence, a reversal of a judgment from a jury trial on grounds 
that the trial court should have granted a directed verdict is not a reversal on 
manifest weight of the evidence.  Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 
66, 430 N.E.2d 935 (1982), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 26} A motion for new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A)(6), however, 
contends that “[t]he judgment is not sustained by the weight of the evidence.”  
The motion must be filed within 14 days of entry of judgment and the rule 
specifies that a trial judge may grant “only one new trial * * * on the weight of the 
evidence in the same case.”  Id.; see also R.C. 2321.18 (“The same trial court 
shall not grant more than one new trial on the weight of the evidence against the 
same party in the same case, nor shall the same court grant more than one 
judgment of reversal on the weight of the evidence against the same party in the 
same case”). 
{¶ 27} In explaining what a trial court considers when ruling on a motion 
for a directed verdict or motion for a new trial, we observed: 
 
There is a basic difference between the duty of a trial court 
to submit a case to the jury where “reasonable minds” could differ 
and the right of a trial court to grant a new trial on the basis of its 
conclusion that the verdict is not “sustained by sufficient 
evidence.”  The former does not involve any weighing of evidence 
by the court; nor is the court concerned therein with the question of 
credibility of witnesses.  However, in ruling on a motion for new 
trial upon the basis of a claim that the judgment “is not sustained 
by sufficient evidence,” the court must weigh the evidence and 
pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, not in the substantially 
January Term, 2012 
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unlimited sense that such weight and credibility are passed on 
originally by the jury but in the more restricted sense of whether it 
appears to the trial court that manifest injustice has been done and 
that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
 
Rohde v. Farmer, 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 262 N.E.2d 685 (1970), paragraph three of 
the syllabus. 
{¶ 28} Because motions for directed verdict and for JNOV present 
questions based on the sufficiency of the evidence, submitting one or both of 
these motions is clearly not a prerequisite for appellate review on the manifest 
weight of the evidence.  Nor is a motion for a new trial a prerequisite for appellate 
review of the weight of the evidence.  As R.C. 2321.014 explains, 
 
[a] motion for a new trial is not necessary as a prerequisite to 
obtain appellate review of the sufficiency or weight of the evidence 
submitted to the trial court where such evidence to be considered 
appears as a part of the record filed in the appellate court. 
 
{¶ 29} Nothing in the rules or statutes requires a party to have made a 
particular motion before seeking appellate review of a jury verdict on the weight 
of the evidence.  Nor do the cases cited in the dissenting appellate judge’s opinion 
support his assertion that Huffman waived appellate review of the weight of the 
evidence by failing to raise certain motions in the trial court.  See Eastley, 2010-
Ohio-4771, ¶ 60 (Kline, J., dissenting). 
                                          
 
4. A corresponding statute appears in the criminal code: “A motion for a new trial is not a 
necessary prerequisite to obtain appellate review of the sufficiency or weight of the evidence in 
the trial of a criminal case.”  R.C. 2945.831. 
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{¶ 30} We now hold that when the evidence to be considered is in the 
court’s record, a party need not have moved for directed verdict or filed a motion 
for a new trial or for JNOV to obtain appellate review of the weight of the 
evidence. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 31} Reversal on the manifest weight of the evidence and remand for a 
new trial are not to be taken lightly.  Nevertheless, we express no thought on 
whether the court of appeals should reverse the judgment and grant a new trial in 
this case.  It may be that the dissenting judge believes that the weight of the 
evidence supports the jury’s verdict, and in that event, the verdict will be affirmed 
again.  We simply remand for consideration of the issue based upon the 
appropriate standard. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would dismiss the appeal as having been 
improvidently accepted. 
__________________ 
 
Spetnagel & McMahon and Thomas M. Spetnagel; and Bender Law 
Offices and Stanley C. Bender, for appellee. 
 
Gallagher, Gams, Pryor, Tallan & Littrell, L.L.P., M. Jason Founds, and 
Mark H. Gams; and Mann & Preston, L.L.P., and James L. Mann, for appellant. 
 
Gallagher Sharp and Timothy J. Fitzgerald, urging reversal for amicus 
curiae, Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys. 
______________________