Case Title: Kimball v. Turner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kimball v. Turner1999 WY 171993 P.2d 303Case Number: 98-165Decided: 12/17/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
GEORGE C. KIMBALL and BEVERLY T. KIMBALL, Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

LOWELL H. TURNER and OPAL 
H. TURNER, Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Lincoln County, The Honorable John D. Troughton, 
Judge.

Joseph B. 
Bluemel, Kemmerer, WY., Representing Appellants.

Gerald L. 
Goulding, Afton, WY., Representing Appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      The descendants 
of Rawsel Turner (Rawsel) are quarreling over 7.3 acres of family ground. 
Although the 7.3 acre parcel was homesteaded by Rawsel's son, Deloss Turner, it 
is enclosed within a fence erected by Rawsel. Rawsel's successors in interest 
sought to quiet title in the property by adverse possession or, in the 
alternative, asserted that the property boundary had been altered by recognition 
and acquiescence. The district court rejected both theories, finding that the 
fence was not a boundary fence, but one of convenience. Because we conclude that 
the district court's finding is not clearly erroneous, we 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellants 
present four issues for our review:

1. Whether the 
Court committed error in granting the Plaintiffs only part of the disputed 
property.

2. Whether the 
Court committed error in finding that Plaintiffs did not meet the requirements 
to establish a boundary by implied acquiescence.

3. Whether the 
Court committed error in finding that the Plaintiffs did not fulfill the 
requirements for adverse possession.

4. Whether the 
Court committed error in finding that the fence in question was a fence of 
convenience.

[¶3]      Appellees accept 
the first three issues as stated by the appellants, but rephrase the fourth 
issue in this manner:

Whether the 
trial court committed error in finding "that the facts and circumstances of this 
case are not equivalent to an express agreement to make the fence the boundary 
line."

FACTS

[¶4]      In 1915, Rawsel 
Turner received a United States patent to 78 acres in Lincoln County near 
Bedford. Sometime between 1915 and 1920, Rawsel erected a fence in the vicinity 
of the southern boundary of his property. Actually, the fence was located beyond 
the southern boundary of Rawsel's land, and it enclosed approximately 7.3 acres 
of land which was then owned by the United States Forest Service. In 1929, 
Rawsel's son, Deloss Turner, received a patent to the Forest Service land 
immediately south of Rawsel's. Since this time, the fence has been maintained in 
the same location.

[¶5]      Over the years, 
the Rawsel and Deloss properties were passed down among the Turners. Rawsel's 
land was eventually conveyed to his son Clifford Turner. Clifford and his wife 
Ruth have, in turn, passed it on to their children. In 1983, Clifford and Ruth 
deeded an acre of land in the southwest corner of their property to their 
daughter Carol Lucy Downes. Believing the fence to constitute the southern 
boundary, Mrs. Downes and her husband placed their home on the now disputed 
property. The appellants in this case, Beverly Kimball (Clifford and Ruth 
Turner's oldest daughter) and her husband George are fee owners of a majority of 
the parcel homesteaded by Rawsel.

[¶6]      In the meantime, 
Deloss' land was also passed down through the generations. The appellees, Lowell 
Turner (Deloss' son) and his wife Opal currently own most of the land 
homesteaded by Deloss. When Lowell and Opal decided to convey parcels to their 
children for them to build on, a survey was required. At this time, around 1992, 
the surveyor noticed the fence was not located on the property boundary. Other 
surveys followed, and the parties eventually learned that the fence enclosed 
7.391 acres of largely undeveloped land located within Lowell and Opal Turner's 
property description. The property in question is partially forested and rises 
steeply to the east.

[¶7]      When Lowell and 
his son Kory Turner began erecting a fence on the true property line, the 
Kimballs and Carol Downes instituted this action. They first requested, and were 
granted, a restraining order. At the same time, the Kimballs and Downes sought 
to quiet title to the disputed 7.3 acres, claiming the property by adverse 
possession. In the alternative, they claimed that the fence had altered the 
boundary under the doctrine of recognition and acquiescence. After a bench 
trial, the district court rejected both theories as they relate to the Kimballs, 
finding that the fence constitutes a fence of convenience. However, the district 
court ruled in favor of Downes and quieted title to one acre of the disputed 
parcel in her. The remainder of the disputed property was quieted in Lowell and 
Opal Turner, the appellees. The Kimballs timely appeal.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶8]      Whether a fence 
is a boundary fence or merely one of convenience is a question of fact. Hillard 
v. Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Wyo. 1995). This court will not set aside a 
district court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous or 
contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Id.; Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d 295, 301 (Wyo. 1983); Stansbury v. Heiduck, 961 P.2d 977, 978 (Wyo. 1998). 
When reviewing the record, we keep in mind the following 
principles:

The judge who 
presided at the trial heard and saw the witnesses. He is in the best position to 
determine questions of credibility and weigh and judge the evidence, both expert 
and non-expert. Thus, on appeal, it is a firmly established and oft-stated rule 
that we must accept the evidence of the successful party as true, leave out of 
consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict 
therewith, and give to the evidence of the successful party every favorable 
inference that may fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.

Hillard v. 
Marshall, 888 P.2d  at 1260 (quoting Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d at 301). We 
review a district court's conclusions of law de novo. Stansbury v. Heiduck, 961 P.2d  at 978.

DISCUSSION

Adverse 
Possession

[¶9]      To establish 
adverse possession, the claiming party must show actual, open, notorious, 
exclusive and continuous possession of another's property which is hostile and 
under claim of right or color of title. Stansbury v. Heiduck, 961 P.2d  at 979; 
Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d  at 1258; Rutar Farms & Livestock, Inc. v. 
Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 1982). Possession must be for the statutory 
period, ten years. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-103 (Lexis 1999); Hillard v. Marshall, 
888 P.2d  at 1258; Connaghan v. Eighty-Eight Oil Co., 750 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Wyo. 
1988). Where there is no clear showing to the contrary, a person who has 
occupied the land for the statutory period, in a manner plainly indicating that 
he has acted as the owner thereof, is entitled to a presumption of adverse 
possession; and the burden shifts to the opposing party to explain such 
possession. Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d  at 1259; Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 
342 (Wyo. 1966); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 517, 273 P. 908, 
915-16 (1929). However, if a claimant's use of the property is shown to be 
permissive, he cannot acquire title by adverse possession. Hillard v. Marshall, 
888 P.2d  at 1259; Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d  at 344.

[¶10]   In some circumstances, enclosing 
land in a fence is sufficient to "raise the flag" of an adverse claimant. Meyer 
v. Ellis, 411 P.2d  at 343; Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 936 (Wyo. 1983); 
Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d  at 1259. However, a fence kept simply for 
convenience has no effect upon the true boundary between tracts of land. 
Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d  at 297; Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d  at 1260. 
This is so because a fence of convenience creates a permissive use, and a 
permissive user

cannot change his 
possession into adverse title no matter how long possession may be continued, in 
the absence of a clear, positive and continuous disclaimer and disavowal of the 
title of the true owner brought home to the latter's knowledge; there must be 
either actual notice of the hostile claim or acts or declarations of hostility 
so manifest and notorious that actual notice will be presumed in order to change 
a permissive or otherwise non-hostile possession into one that is 
hostile.

Hillard v. 
Marshall, 888 P.2d  at 1261 (quoting Stewart v. Childress, 111 So. 2d 8, 13 (Ala. 
1959)).

[¶11]   After a bench trial, the district 
court found that the fence erected by Rawsel was a fence of convenience and 
ruled that the Kimballs had not established their claim for adverse 
possession.1 In making its ruling, the district 
court could have followed either of two routes. Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d  at 
1260. First, it could have concluded that the Kimballs had not made a prima 
facie case of adverse possession because the convenience fence was an 
explanatory circumstance to the contrary; or, second, it could have found that 
the Kimballs had made out a prima facie case but concluded that the evidence 
that the fence was one of convenience rebutted the presumption of adverse 
possession. Although the record does not reveal which of these means the trial 
court employed to arrive at its decision, it does not matter. Under either 
scenario, the district court's decision would stand; if the evidence that the 
fence was one of convenience is sufficient to establish that fact in the first 
place, then it is sufficient to rebut the presumption. Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d  at 1260. Thus, the question for this court is whether the district court's 
finding of a convenience fence is clearly erroneous. We conclude it is 
not.

[¶12]   The district court summarized its 
findings in this fashion:

[T]he physical 
appearance of the fence . . . clearly demonstrates that it could not have been 
constructed as a boundary fence. To call the structure a fence is generous. It 
consists of 3 wires meandering between trees, bushes, and fence posts in an 
irregular fashion. It appears from the physical appearance that someone walked 
in the east-west direction stringing barbwire from tree to tree, placing fence 
posts when trees or bushes were not available. The irregular course of the fence 
clearly indicates that it was not constructed on a section line, a quarter 
section line, or any other line of a U.S. governmental subdivision parcel. Even 
to a casual observer, it is obvious that whoever built the fence never intended 
to strictly follow the straight line demarcation of a U.S. Government 
subdivision description. Clearly, the fence was constructed by Rawsel as a 
convenient way of separating his homestead from the public domain. The Court is 
not able to find and conclude that Rawsel constructed the fence as a 
boundary.

Besides these 
findings, which are supported by photographs and testimony, the district court's 
decision is buttressed by testimony from Lowell Turner. Lowell, who has been 
around the Turner land all his life, provided insight into how Rawsel and Deloss 
viewed the fence. Lowell testified that Rawsel and Deloss never treated the 
fence as a boundary fence. Instead, it was simply used to separate Rawsel's and 
Deloss' cattle. If cows escaped, the owner would simply retrieve 
them.

[¶13]   Even after Rawsel and Deloss had 
passed the property on, both the north and south Turners went back and forth 
freely on the now disputed property. None of the Turners asked permission to use 
the property because the land was seen as "family ground." Lowell also testified 
that his father, Deloss, had always said the fence was "off," meaning not on the 
property line. One of Lowell's sons, Kory Turner, testified that he had also 
been told all his life that the fence was off. Besides the manner in which the 
fence was constructed, the manner in which the Turners treated the fence and the 
now disputed property supports the district court's finding that the fence was 
not intended to serve as a boundary fence. See Pilgrim v. Kuipers, 679 P.2d 787, 
790 (Mont. 1984).

[¶14]   The Kimballs next contend that the 
district court's judgment is inconsistent because the district court quieted 
title in Downes, who had built a home on one acre of the disputed property, but 
not in the Kimballs. Relying on Kranenberg v. Meadowbrook Lodge, Inc., 623 P.2d 1196 (Wyo. 1981), the Kimballs argue that the facts that supported the finding 
of adverse possession for Downes mandate a finding of adverse possession for the 
entire disputed parcel. We disagree.

[¶15]   We have previously rejected the 
Kimballs' all-or-nothing view of adverse possession. A similar argument was 
before this court in Hillard v. Marshall. There we wrote:

Hillard argues 
that Kranenberg v. Meadowbrook Lodge, Inc., 623 P.2d 1196 (Wyo. 1981) 
establishes the rule that adverse possession is an all-or-nothing proposition. 
He asserts that since the possession of the nine-acre tract arose out of the 
same set of circumstances as the fourteen-acre tract, by adversely possessing 
one he necessarily had to have adversely possessed the 
other.

In Kranenberg, 
the adverse claimant had built a portion of his home on the defendant's land. A 
contiguous tract of that land was also used by the claimant as a yard, including 
the placement of a swing set, a sandbox, a barbecue and a root cellar. 
Kranenberg, 623 P.2d  at 1197-98. The district court found that the claimant had 
adversely possessed the portion around the house but not that portion which was 
utilized as a yard. Kranenberg, at 1196. We reversed, holding that the 
continuous possession of the entire portion of the property for the same 
purpose, residential use, was sufficient to show adverse possession. Since the 
defendant had failed to demonstrate a permissive use, we concluded that the 
claimant had adversely possessed the entire tract. Kranenberg, 623 P.2d  at 
1199-1200.

Kranenberg is 
distinguishable from this case. Here the land claimed is neither contiguous nor 
was used for the same purposes. Hillard used the fourteen-acre tract mainly for 
farming, while the nine-acre tract was exclusively used for grazing purposes. 
Further, the fact that the two parcels are physically separate could mean there 
are different reasons for them being fenced in, as the trial court found to be 
the case here. Although the tracts were created at the same time, their 
non-contiguous nature and the different uses on each requires the adverse 
claimant to prove his case for each tract individually. Hillard failed to do 
that. Kranenberg is not applicable.

Hillard v. 
Marshall, 888 P.2d  at 1261.

[¶16]   Here, as in Hillard v. Marshall, 
the two parcels have not been used for the same purposes. Since Downes moved her 
home onto the property in 1983, the acre quieted in her has been used for 
residential purposes. In fact, Downes' property is separated from the rest of 
the disputed parcel by a fence erected to prevent cattle from grazing on her 
land. The fencing and placement of structures upon land belonging to another can 
give rise to a claim for adverse possession. State v. Moore, 356 P.2d 141, 146 
(Wyo. 1960). Meanwhile, the balance of the disputed parcel has been used mainly 
for pasturage and recreational purposes, consistent with the historical, 
permissive use of the family ground.

[¶17]   In addition, by moving her home 
onto the property, Downes acted in a manner that changed the use of the property 
from permissive to hostile. Where, as in Downes' case, a parties' predecessor in 
interest held the disputed property by permission and not hostilely, a claim of 
adverse possession must fail. Miller v. Stovall, 717 P.2d 798, 805 (Wyo. 1986); 
Johnson v. Szumowicz, 63 Wyo. 211, 230, 179 P.2d 1012, 1018 (1947). However, a 
permissive user may change his possession into adverse title with a clear, 
positive, and continuous disclaimer and disavowal of the title of the true owner 
brought home to the latter's knowledge. Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d  at 1261; 
Miller v. Stovall, 717 P.2d  at 805. "[T]here must be either actual notice of the 
hostile claim or acts or declarations of hostility so manifest and notorious 
that actual notice will be presumed in order to change a permissive or otherwise 
non-hostile possession into one that is hostile." Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d  
at 1261. Here, although the southern Turners knew the fence was "off," they did 
not know how far off. Despite this, Downes' home was located close enough to the 
fence that the southern Turners were on actual notice that she was building on 
the now disputed property. Indeed, Lowell Turner admitted he was aware that 
Downes had moved her home on the land. By placing a home on the property, Downes 
had unfurled her flag in such a manner that the Turner appellees were on actual 
notice of her hostile possession. Thus, when she moved a home onto the property 
in 1983, Downes changed possession from permissive to 
hostile.

[¶18]   Finally, besides finding that 
Downes had adversely possessed the acre she claimed, the district court also 
relied on an estoppel theory. Because the Turner appellees stood by and did 
nothing while Downes built on the property, the district court ruled that they 
were estopped from asserting ownership to Downes' parcel. We conclude that the 
circumstances of Downes' claim for adverse possession are sufficiently different 
from those surrounding Kimball's claim that separate treatment is warranted. The 
district court did not err in ruling in favor of Downes but against the 
Kimballs.

Recognition and 
Acquiescence

[¶19]   The Kimballs also rely on the 
doctrine of recognition and acquiescence to argue that the fence has altered the 
boundary. This court, per Justice Blume, first described this doctrine in 
Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. 491, 500-502, 236 P. 517, 520-21 
(1925):

It is well 
settled that parties may make an express parol agreement as to a boundary line. 
But, to have a basis for consideration, it must be in dispute or uncertain and 
not readily ascertainable, and, to take it out of the statute of frauds, it must 
be followed up by occupancy by the parties in accordance with such agreement, up 
to the line agreed on. It would seem that the elements of mistake involved, both 
in estoppel as well as adverse possession, are eliminated in a case when parties 
deliberately enter into an agreement under such conditions, in the absence of 
special circumstances which would relieve a party from a mistake, because want 
of knowledge of the true boundary, and uncertainty thereof, is made the very 
basis of the agreement. The doctrine of recognition and acquiescence would seem 
to be based primarily, though not solely, upon the same principles as an express 
agreement. . . . However, . . . an agreement to fix an uncertain or disputed 
boundary need not be express, but may be implied, and may be shown by the 
conduct of the parties.

. . 
.

. . . [T]he 
existence of a division fence does not alone show the requisite facts. It may be 
kept up only for the convenience of the parties. But we think we may safely say 
that when there is recognition and acquiescence of the parties in a boundary 
line, uncertain or in dispute in the first instance, for a period equal at least 
to the prescriptive period, under facts and circumstances which should be 
considered equivalent to an express agreement, and the land on each side of the 
line is occupied by the respective parties as their land, no good reason exists 
why the parties should not be bound to the same extent as though such express 
agreement had been made and carried out, particularly when facts exist which 
would make any other holding inequitable.

(Citations 
omitted; emphasis supplied.)

[¶20]   The Kimballs complain that the 
district court improperly applied the doctrine of recognition and acquiescence 
by requiring the Kimballs to prove an express agreement that the fence would be 
considered the boundary. They correctly point out that such an agreement need 
not be express, but may be implied from the parties' conduct. Moreover, "[l]ong 
practical acquiescence is regarded as the equivalent of an agreement." 
Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. at 501, 236 P.  at 521.

[¶21]   We disagree with the Kimball's 
assertion that the district court denied this claim solely because there was no 
express agreement. While the district court recognized that no express agreement 
was reached, it also concluded that "the facts and circumstances of this case 
are not equivalent to an express agreement to make the fence the boundary line." 
For the following reasons, we interpret this language to be a finding that there 
was no implied agreement that the fence be a boundary. First, this finding by 
the district court was preceded by a paragraph in which the district court found 
no express agreement that the fence be a boundary. If the district court had, as 
the Kimballs claim, required them to prove an express agreement, nothing further 
need have been said. However, the court went on to make a finding that the facts 
and circumstances of the case were not the equivalent of an express agreement. 
In making this finding, the district court tracked language found in Carstensen 
v. Brown that discusses implied agreements. It is clear that the district court 
made a finding that no implied agreement existed; we, therefore, reject the 
Kimballs' claim that the district court required them to prove an express 
agreement.

[¶22]   In any event, the district court's 
decision is supported by more than one ground. In ruling on this issue, the 
district court also relied on its previous finding that the fence was not a 
boundary fence, but a fence of convenience. As Carstensen v. Brown teaches, "the 
existence of a division fence does not alone show the requisite facts. It may be 
kept up only for the convenience of the parties." 32 Wyo. at 501-502, 236 P.  at 
521; Johnson v. Szumowicz, 63 Wyo. 211, 229-30, 179 P.2d 1012, 1018 (1947). This 
was the case here, and the district court appropriately denied the Kimball's 
claim based on this ground. State v. Vanderkoppel, 45 Wyo. 432, 438-39, 19 P.2d 955, 957 (1933).

Finally, 
Carstensen v. Brown indicates that the equities of the case play a role in 
determining a claim of boundary by recognition and acquiescence. 32 Wyo. at 502, 
236 P.  at 521. On this issue, the district court wrote:

[T]here is 
nothing inequitable about ruling that [the Kimballs] are to retain the raw, 
unimproved, undeveloped property contained within their property description; 
and that [the appellees] are to retain the same kind of property contained 
within their description.

We cannot 
disagree. The decision of the district court on this issue is 
affirmed.

CONCLUSION

[¶23]   "There is a critical distinction 
between a fence which establishes a boundary line, and a fence that merely 
separates one side of the fence from the other. The former is a monument as well 
as a fence, while the latter is merely a fence." Pilgrim v. Kuipers, 679 P.2d 787, 790 (Mont. 1984). In this case, the district court's finding that the fence 
constitutes a fence of convenience is not clearly erroneous. This finding 
precludes both the adverse possession claim as well as the claim that the 
boundary had been altered by recognition and acquiescence. The decision of the 
district court is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Because 
adverse possession cannot be acquired against the government, we are only 
concerned with circumstances that followed Deloss Turner's acquisition of his 
property from the United States Forest Service. Porter v. Carstensen, 40 Wyo. 
156, 160, 274 P. 1072, 1073 (1929).