Case Title: Jones v. Brandt

Citation: 

Docket Number: 061086

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee, 
JJ., and Carrico and Russell, S.JJ. 
 
SHARON D. JONES, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 061086 
  JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 
 
 
 
            JUNE 8, 2007 
 
RENEE S. BRANDT, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE 
 OF WARREN DEAN DAVIS, SR., DECEASED 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
Frederick B. Lowe, Judge 
 
 
 
This is an interlocutory appeal, taken pursuant to Code 
§ 8.01-670(B)(2), from an order entered in a chancery case in 
which an executrix of a certain will sought the aid and 
direction of the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach 
regarding the distribution of an estate.  The sole issue is 
whether the circuit court erred in finding that an attorney-
in-fact had the authority, by the durable power of attorney 
under which he acted, to change the beneficiary of a 
particular certificate of deposit belonging to his principal. 
BACKGROUND 
 
The material facts are undisputed.  W. Leigh Ansell 
(Ansell), an attorney practicing in Virginia Beach, had 
represented Warren Dean Davis, Sr. (Davis) for many years.  At 
Davis’ request, Ansell prepared a durable power of attorney 
appointing Ansell attorney-in-fact to act for Davis.  Davis 
acknowledged the document on April 8, 2004.  The power of 
 
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attorney contains very broad powers, including the power to 
make gifts, but lacks a specific grant of power to make a 
change of beneficiaries of the principal’s certificates of 
deposit. 
 
Renee S. Brandt (Brandt), a widow, lived with Davis from 
2002 until his death on September 30, 2004.  Davis was in 
failing health during his last year.  In accordance with 
Davis’ directions, Ansell prepared a will that Davis executed 
within a few days of signing the power of attorney.  The will 
appointed Brandt trustee and executrix but gave her no 
interest in Davis’ estate except the right to occupy and use 
the home in which they had lived, along with all personal 
property therein, rent-free, “so long as she lives in the 
premises.”  The residual beneficiaries under the will, subject 
to the occupancy rights of several named tenants and a one-
dollar legacy to Davis’ son, were his two daughters, Sharon D. 
Jones and Jody Ann Davis.1  Davis, who personally handled his 
own estate planning, told Ansell that he intended to “take 
care of [Brandt] outside of this will.” 
 
On August 4, 2004, Davis orally directed Ansell to 
designate Brandt as the beneficiary “payable on death” (POD) 
of a certificate of deposit in the amount of $250,000, which 
                     
1 Jody Ann Davis appeared in this suit as Jody Davis 
Clark. 
 
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was in Davis’ name at the Pungo branch of Wachovia Bank.  
Ansell went to the bank the same day and executed such a POD 
designation, signing it “Warren Dean Davis, Sr. by:  W.L. 
Ansell, POA.”  The certificate of deposit previously had named 
no beneficiary other than Davis, its owner.  The next day, 
Ansell advised Davis by letter, which included a copy of the 
beneficiary designation, that he had complied with Davis’ 
direction. 
 
After Davis’ death, Brandt qualified as executrix under 
Davis’ will and brought this suit in chancery for aid and 
direction in the distribution of the estate, naming all 
parties in interest, including herself in her individual 
capacity, as defendants.  The circuit court heard evidence ore 
tenus and ruled that the designation of Brandt as the 
beneficiary POD was valid and that the proceeds of the 
certificate of deposit were payable to her individually.  We 
awarded this interlocutory appeal to Davis’ daughters, Sharon 
Jones and Jody Clark. 
DISCUSSION 
 
Because the sole issue on appeal is the legal effect of a 
written document, we review the issue de novo.  Perel v. 
Brannan, 267 Va. 691, 698, 594 S.E.2d 899, 903 (2004). 
 
Brandt concedes that the power of attorney did not 
expressly grant Ansell the authority to change the beneficiary 
 
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of Davis’ certificate of deposit at Wachovia Bank, but points 
to the following provisions of the power of attorney as 
granting such power by necessary implication: 
3.  To sign, endorse or assign any note, check or 
other instrument of any nature whatsoever, 
negotiable or non-negotiable, for deposit, discount, 
collection or otherwise; 
 
4.  To open accounts, make deposits, write checks 
upon or otherwise withdraw some or all funds or 
account balances now or hereafter outstanding to my 
credit or to the credit of my attorney, whether or 
not the check or other instrument is drawn to the 
order of my attorney; 
 
. . . . 
 
10. To instruct any entity or person having custody 
or control of any assets of mine, or any assets in 
which I may have an interest, in any agency, 
fiduciary or other capacity, and I authorize that 
person or entity to rely upon such instructions; 
 
. . . . 
 
13. To make, sign, acknowledge and deliver any 
contract, deed or other document relating to real 
estate or personal property or both and to perform 
any contract binding either me or my attorney; 
 
. . . . 
 
24. It is my intention that the grant herein of 
power to my attorney-in-fact be as broad as possible 
and the list above of specifically enumerated powers 
shall not be construed or interpreted to narrow the 
granted powers but rather they are meant to indicate 
my intention to grant as broad a grant of power as 
possible, and this Power of Attorney should be 
broadly construed to accomplish this intention. 
 
25. Without limiting the above powers, generally to 
perform any other acts of any nature whatsoever, 
that ought to be done or in the opinion of my 
 
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attorney ought to be done, in any circumstances as 
fully and effectively as I could do as part of my 
normal, everyday business affairs if acting 
personally. 
 
 
Initially, we note that this is not a case of an 
attorney-in-fact, under a durable power of attorney, engaging 
in self-dealing with regard to his principal’s personal 
property.  Indeed, there is no suggestion of fraudulent 
conduct by the principal’s agent.  Nor is this a case 
involving the authority of an attorney-in-fact, under a 
durable power of attorney, to make a gift of his principal’s 
personal property.  The beneficiary designation of the 
certificate of deposit in question did not become a final 
disposition of Davis’ certificate until his death on September 
30, 2004 and conveyed no present interest in the certificate, 
but only at best an expectancy.  Consequently, neither Estate 
of Casey v. Commissioner, 948 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1991), upon 
which the appellants principally rely, nor the provisions of 
Code § 11-9.5 resolve the issue presented in this case. 
 
There is no dispute that in directing Ansell’s actions to 
designate Brandt as the beneficiary POD on this certificate of 
deposit, Davis acted to accomplish, at least in part, his 
previously expressed intent to “take care of [Brandt] outside 
of [his] will.”  Undoubtedly, Davis and Ansell considered the 
provisions of the power of attorney sufficient to authorize 
 
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Ansell to act in accord with Davis’ direction to Ansell with 
regard to designating Brandt as the beneficiary of Davis’ 
certificate of deposit.  Nevertheless, the appellants assert 
that without express language in the power of attorney 
granting Ansell the authority “to change the beneficiary of 
the certificate of deposit,” Ansell’s act in doing so was a 
nullity.  We disagree. 
 
In Virginia, powers of attorney have been strictly 
construed for over a century.  The authority granted by such 
an instrument is never considered to be greater than that 
warranted by its language, or indispensable to the effective 
operation of the authority granted.  The authority given is 
not extended beyond the terms in which it is expressed.  
Hotchkiss v. Middlekauf, 96 Va. 649, 653, 32 S.E. 36, 37-38 
(1899). 
 
This general rule of construction essentially provides 
that expansive language, such as that contained in paragraphs 
24 and 25 of the power of attorney in this case, should be 
interpreted as intending only to confer those incidental 
powers necessary to accomplish objects as to which express 
authority has been given to the attorney-in-fact.  Id.  The 
policy that supports this rule of construction is that the 
power to dispose of the principal’s property is so susceptible 
of abuse that the power should not be implied.  That abuse of 
 
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the agent’s power is particularly dangerous in a case 
involving a durable power of attorney, which by its nature 
remains in effect after the principal has become incapable of 
monitoring the agent’s conduct.  We do not retreat from the 
rationale of these guidelines of construction. 
 
However, in this case we are not concerned with the power 
to make a gift or to transfer the principal’s property but, 
rather, the power to contract on behalf of the principal.  
Among the 35 numbered paragraphs included in Davis’ power of 
attorney, paragraph 3 authorized Ansell “[t]o sign, endorse or 
assign any note, check or other instrument of any nature 
whatsoever, negotiable or non-negotiable, for deposit, 
discount, collection or otherwise.”  A certificate of deposit 
is an instrument for deposit.  Additionally, paragraph 13 
authorized Ansell “[t]o make, sign, acknowledge and deliver 
any contract . . . or other document relating to . . . 
personal property.”  A certificate of deposit including the 
designation of the beneficiary POD thereon is a contract 
between the depositor and the bank relating to personal 
property. 
 
It is highly doubtful that every power of attorney, even 
as in this case one carefully drawn by a skilled draftsman, 
will always expressly confer the authority necessary to 
address every specific circumstance in which the principal 
 
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nevertheless intends to give authority to the attorney-in-
fact.  Undoubtedly, standard provisions granting broad general 
power to the agent are intended by the principal to become 
applicable so as to avoid any potential unintended limitation 
in the authority expressly granted.  Such is the case here as 
evidenced by the language in paragraph 25, stating that 
“[w]ithout limiting the above powers, generally to perform any 
other acts of any nature whatsoever, . . . in any 
circumstances as fully and effectively as I could do as part 
of my normal, everyday business affairs if acting personally.”  
Surely, the change of a beneficiary designation on a 
certificate of deposit is an act within “the normal, everyday 
business affairs” of the owner of a certificate of deposit at 
a bank. 
 
The very nature of the task of interpreting language in a 
document is a fact specific one.  Here, we are called upon to 
determine the intent of the principal with regard to the 
beneficiary designation of the principal’s certificate of 
deposit.  We are of opinion that Davis, the principal, 
sufficiently expressed the intent to authorize Ansell, the 
attorney-in-fact, to make a change in the beneficiary 
designation under the provisions of paragraphs 3, 13, and 25 
of the power of attorney when those provisions are considered 
in concert. 
 
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The appellants place considerable weight on the fact that 
paragraph 21 of the power of attorney expressly grants the 
attorney-in-fact the power to change the beneficiary on an IRA 
or employee benefit plan and the fact that paragraph 22 
expressly grants the attorney-in-fact the power to select the 
beneficiaries of any insurance policies and any pension, 
profit sharing, stock ownership, or other retirement plans to 
conclude that no power to change the beneficiary of a 
certificate of deposit was intended by Davis.  Of course, all 
of these enumerated financial instruments or arrangements are 
entirely distinct financial matters from a certificate of 
deposit.  Thus, it is a reasonable assumption that Davis felt 
it necessary to expressly address his intent with regard to 
them, while operating under the equally reasonable assumption 
that his intentions were adequately addressed in other 
paragraphs with regard to any other instrument of any nature 
“for deposit” and any “contract” for personal property. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not 
err in finding that Ansell was authorized to designate Brandt 
as the beneficiary POD of Davis’ certificate of deposit at 
 
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Wachovia Bank.  Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court 
will be affirmed.2 
Affirmed. 
SENIOR JUSTICE RUSSELL, with whom CHIEF JUSTICE HASSELL and 
JUSTICE AGEE join, dissenting. 
 
The majority opinion correctly notes that powers of 
attorney are strictly construed in Virginia, citing Hotchkiss 
v. Middlekauf, 96 Va. 649, 32 S.E. 36 (1899).  That case stood 
for the proposition that the authority given is not extended 
beyond the terms in which it is expressed, and that broad, 
sweeping language in such an instrument will be interpreted as 
intending to confer only those incidental powers necessary to 
accomplish objects as to which express authority has been 
given to the attorney-in-fact.  Id. at 653, 32 S.E. at 37-38.  
The majority opinion goes on to express, correctly, the policy 
reason underlying that rule of strict construction: "the power 
to dispose of the principal’s property is so susceptible of 
abuse that it should never be implied." 
                     
2 Although not addressed by the circuit court or raised by 
the parties in this appeal, we note that the doctrine of 
ratification would apply on the facts of this case even if the 
language of the power of attorney was not sufficiently 
specific to have permitted Ansell to make the change in 
beneficiary on the certificate.  The record plainly shows that 
Davis orally directed Ansell to act as his agent in the 
matter, and that Davis, when advised by Ansell that he had 
carried out that direction, accepted the fact of performance 
without objection.  See, e.g., Higginbotham v. May, 90 Va. 
233, 238-39, 17 S.E. 941, 943 (1893). 
 
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Indeed, such a power is particularly dangerous in a case 
such as this, where a durable power of attorney was given by a 
person in declining health, where the power remained in effect 
after the principal had become incapable of monitoring the 
agent’s conduct, where the agent employed the power to dispose 
of the principal’s property at a time when the principal, a 
month before his death, was gravely ill, and where the court, 
later weighing the agent’s conduct, could rely only upon the 
agent’s uncorroborated, self-serving testimony because the 
principal was by then deceased. 
Here, Ansell’s testimony is the only source in the record 
for a finding that Davis expressed an intention to “take care 
of [Renee Brandt] outside of [his] will.”  Ansell is the only 
source for a finding that Davis ever asked him to make her the 
beneficiary “P.O.D.” of the certificate of deposit.  Ansell is 
the only source for a finding that he had written a letter to 
Davis the day after making the change of beneficiary, to which 
Davis had not replied.  Ansell testified that he was alone 
with Davis when Davis orally expressed his intention to take 
care of Renee Brandt outside his will.  He testified that when 
Davis orally asked him to change the beneficiary, he had met 
Davis at “Doctor Berger’s office” and that Davis was “very ill 
at that time.  Mr. Lawless and a friend of his had to help him 
get into a wheelchair and get into the doctor’s office.”  
 
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Although these potential witnesses might have corroborated 
Ansell’s account of this oral exchange, neither was called to 
testify.  Similarly, Ansell’s testimony that he had promptly 
confirmed his action by a letter to Davis, is entirely 
uncorroborated.  Neither the original letter nor Ansell’s file 
copy was ever offered in evidence.   
Ansell may very well have been a truthful witness, acting 
in faithful obedience to his principal’s instructions.  He may 
well have had no connection with Renee Brandt, nor any desire 
to confer a benefit upon her.  He may well have had no 
intention to obtain an indirect benefit for himself.  
Nevertheless, if the state of the law is such that an agent of 
a very different kind may give his principal’s property to a 
person selected by the agent, exceeding his explicit written 
authority, and thereafter justify his act by his own self-
serving and uncorroborated testimony, the danger is too 
obvious to require discussion. 
In Estate of Casey v. Commissioner, 948 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 
1991), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit considered a case in which an attorney-in-fact made 
gifts under broad general powers contained in a power of 
attorney that lacked an express grant of the power to make 
gifts.  Applying Virginia law, that Court observed:  “[T]here 
is a wise general rule of construction that we are satisfied 
 
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the Virginia Court would follow.  It is, in effect, that such 
expansive language should be interpreted as intending only to 
confer those incidental, interstitial powers necessary to 
accomplish objects as to which authority has been expressly 
conferred.”  Id. at 901 (citing Hotchkiss). 
 
In the present case, as there was in Casey, there is an 
additional factor leading to the conclusion that the principal 
did not intend to confer the power exercised by the attorney-
in-fact.  Paragraph 21 of Davis’s power of attorney provides 
that Ansell is authorized: 
To create and contribute to an IRA or employee 
benefit plan (including a plan for a self-employed 
individual) for my benefit; to select any payment 
option under any IRA or employee benefit plan in 
which I am a participant, (including plans for self-
employed individuals) or to change options I have 
selected; to make and change beneficiary 
designations; to make voluntary contributions to 
such plans; to make "roll-overs" of plan benefits 
into other retirement plans; 
 
The following paragraph explicitly grants the attorney-in-fact 
the power "To select . . . the beneficiaries of any insurance 
policies and any pension, profit sharing, stock ownership, or 
other retirement plans." 
 
Having explicitly included the power to change or select 
beneficiaries on the assets specifically named above, the 
absence of a power to change beneficiaries as to other assets 
was a glaring omission on the principal’s part.  He knew how 
 
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to confer such an express power, but declined to extend it to 
certificates of deposit.  Applying the rule that the 
instrument is assumed to represent the entire understanding of 
the parties, I conclude that no power to change the 
beneficiary of a certificate of deposit was intended by Davis. 
 
In 1992, in the wake of the Casey decision, the General 
Assembly enacted Code § 11-9.5, relating to gifts under powers 
of attorney.  Subsection A of the statute expressly authorizes 
an attorney-in-fact to make gifts of the principal’s property 
under general powers, but only to individuals or charitable 
organizations qualified under the Internal Revenue Code, and 
only “in accordance with the principal’s personal history of 
making or joining in the making of lifetime gifts.”  
Subsection B provides that Subsection A shall not affect a 
power to make gifts that the principal has, in the power of 
attorney, set forth by “express words.”  Subsection C provides 
a procedure under which an attorney-in-fact under a durable 
power of attorney may petition the circuit court for authority 
to make gifts of the principal’s property “to the extent not 
inconsistent with the express terms of the power of attorney.”  
 
Code § 11-9.5 is not applicable to the present case 
because Renee Brandt is not a charity, there is no record or 
claim of a personal history of lifetime gifts from Davis to 
her, and the power of attorney contains no express words 
 
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authorizing the attorney-in-fact to designate her as 
beneficiary of the certificate of deposit.  Nevertheless, the 
statute is a clear demonstration of legislative approval of 
the “wise general rule” articulated in Casey, subject only to 
the narrowly defined exceptions set forth in subsection A, 
relating to charities. 
The majority opinion appears to distinguish this case 
from Casey on the theory that here the agent’s P.O.D. 
disposition of the principal’s property transferred “only at 
best an expectancy,” while in Casey the agent made gifts inter 
vivos.  That theory assumes that Davis was aware of Ansell’s 
act and was capable of undoing it during his remaining 
lifetime.  In view of Davis’ physical condition and impending 
death at the time Ansell acted, I consider that theory to be a 
distinction without a difference. 
I think it unfortunate that the majority has failed to 
adopt the “wise general rule” expressed in Casey and has, by 
reading into a power of attorney authority greater than that 
explicitly expressed, departed from a century of precedent.  
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.