Case Title: State v. Kornell

Citation: 169 Vt. 637, 741 A.2d 290

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-08-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Kornell (98-226); 169 Vt. 637; 741 A.2d 290

[Filed 24-Aug-1999]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-226

                               JUNE TERM, 1999

State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
	                               }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont
	                               }	Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit
Diane Jesse Lynn Kornell	       }
a/k/a Diane Gentlewolf,	               }	DOCKET NO. 984-8-93Wmcr
Diane Viemeist	                       }	

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant appeals the district court's order dismissing for lack of
  jurisdiction her motion to compel  return of property.  We reverse and
  remand the matter for further proceedings.

       In July 1993, pursuant to a search warrant, a humane officer
  accompanied by several police officers,  seized eighteen dogs, twelve
  rabbits, and four sheep from defendant's home pursuant to 13 V.S.A. §
  354(b)(2)  (humane officer having probable cause to believe that animal is
  being subjected to cruel treatment may apply for  search warrant to
  authorize officer to seize animal).  Shortly thereafter, defendant was
  arraigned on three counts of  cruelty to animals, simple assault on a
  police officer, and impeding a police officer.  The State arranged for the 
  Windham County Humane Society to care for the animals.  See id. § 354(c)
  ("A humane officer shall provide  suitable care at a reasonable cost for an
  animal seized under this section, and have a lien on the animal for all 
  expenses incurred.").  In March 1994, in response to defendant's motion for
  return of property, the district court  terminated the State's right to
  retain possession of the animals, but acknowledged that it was not
  adjudicating any  rights of possession that might exist by virtue of the
  lien created under § 354.  In November 1994, after noting  that the State
  sought no further jurisdiction over the animals, the district court
  directed the State to return them "to  restore the animals to their proper
  owners or keepers according to law."  In March 1995, in response to the 
  humane society's motion for disposition of the animals, the district court
  ruled that it was not the proper forum to  resolve the parties' rights to
  the animals under § 354.  In February 1996, the district court granted
  defendant's  motion to suppress, ruling that the search warrant had been
  unlawfully based on the humane officer's misleading  description of the
  circumstances concerning defendant's care of the animals.  The State then
  agreed to the  dismissal of all charges.

       Following dismissal of the charges, defendant and the humane society
  pursued in superior court the  question of whether defendant would have to
  pay for the society's care of the animals over the previous three  years. 
  In July 1996, the superior court ruled that because the State did not
  lawfully seize the animals under § 354,  and because the humane society's
  claim to a lien under § 354 derived from the State's unlawful seizure,
  defendant  was entitled to return of her animals notwithstanding the humane
  society's claimed lien.  Still, the animals were  not returned.  In
  November 1997, defendant wrote the State asking for return of the animals,
  and the state's  attorney responded by explaining that the humane society
  had been advised that the animals could be released.  In  February 1998,
  defendant filed a motion in district court to compel return of the
  property.  The court denied the  motion for lack of jurisdiction.  This
  appeal followed.

       A person may move the district court under V.R.Cr.P. 41(e) for return
  of unlawfully 

 

  seized property.  When criminal proceedings against the moving party are
  not yet pending or have transpired, the  motion is treated as a civil
  equitable proceeding.  See United States v. Solis, 108 F.3d 722, 723 (7th
  Cir. 1997);  Mora v. United States, 955 F.2d 156, 158 (2d Cir. 1992);
  United States v. Colon,