Case Title: State v. Peeler

Citation: 2003-Ohio-2903

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Peeler, 99 Ohio St.3d 151, 2003-Ohio-2903.] 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PEELER, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State v. Peeler, 99 Ohio St.3d 151, 2003-Ohio-2903.] 
Criminal law — Health — Records of controlled substances — If proof-of-use 
sheets and medication-administration reports contain information 
required by R.C. 3719.07(C)(3)(b), then falsification of such records 
would 
constitute 
a 
violation 
of 
R.C. 
2925.23(A) 
— 
R.C. 
3719.07(C)(3)(b), construed and applied. 
(No. 2002-0230 — Submitted February 26, 2003 — Decided June 18, 2003.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 18831, 2002-
Ohio-109. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶1} 
On June 29, 2000, defendant-appellant, Dawn Peeler, a nurse, was 
charged with five counts of illegal processing of drug documents in violation of 
R.C. 2925.23(A).  She was also charged with one count of theft of drugs in 
violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(2), but that charge is not at issue in this appeal.  The 
document charges arose from Peeler’s alleged falsification of proof-of-use sheets 
and medication administration reports (“MARs”) used by her employer, 
Washington Manor Nursing Home, to track the drugs it dispensed to its residents. 
{¶2} 
Prior to trial, Peeler filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent the 
state from presenting at trial the proof-of-use sheets and MARs at issue.  The trial 
court granted that motion.  The court acknowledged that R.C. 2925.23(A) 
prohibits anyone from “knowingly mak[ing] a false statement in any prescription, 
order, report or record required by Chapter 3719,” but held that the records at 
issue were not required by R.C. Chapter 3719 and that they therefore could not be 
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2 
used to establish a violation of R.C. 2925.23(A).  After the court granted the 
motion in limine the prosecuting attorney stated that without that evidence the 
state would not be able to prove the charges.  The trial court then dismissed the 
document falsification charges against Peeler. 
{¶3} 
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  The 
cause is before this court upon the allowance of a discretionary appeal. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶4} 
R.C. 2925.23(A) provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly make 
a false statement in any prescription, order, report, or record required by Chapter 
3719. * * * of the Revised Code.”  The outcome of this case hinges on whether 
the documents allegedly falsified by Peeler were records required by R.C. Chapter 
3719. 
{¶5} 
The General Assembly enacted R.C. Chapter 3719, Ohio’s 
Controlled Substances Act, in an attempt to regulate controlled substances in the 
state.  One goal of the Act is to control the abuse of prescription drugs.  To help 
achieve that goal, R.C. 3719.07 requires certain recordkeeping of those who 
prescribe, manufacture, and distribute controlled substances.  At issue in this case 
is R.C. 3719.07(B)(3), which provides: 
{¶6} 
“Every category III terminal distributor of dangerous drugs shall 
keep records of all controlled substances received or sold.  The records shall be 
kept in accordance with division (C)(3) of this section.” 
{¶7} 
There is no dispute that Washington Manor is a category III 
terminal distributor of dangerous drugs.  “Category III” refers to a specific 
category of drugs.  See R.C. 3719.01(FF), 4729.54(A)(3), 4729.54(A)(6), and 
3719.41.  And R.C. 4729.01(Q) defines “[t]erminal distributor of dangerous 
drugs” to mean “any person * * * who has possession, custody, or control of 
dangerous drugs for any purpose other than for that person’s own use and 
consumption, and includes * * * nursing homes * * * and all other persons who 
January Term, 2003 
3 
procure dangerous drugs for sale or other distribution by or under the supervision 
of a pharmacist or licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs.” 
{¶8} 
As a terminal distributor of dangerous drugs, Washington Manor 
was required by R.C. 3719.07(C)(3) to keep records that contained the following: 
{¶9} 
“(a) The description of controlled substances received, the name 
and address of the person from whom the controlled substances are received, and 
the date of receipt; 
{¶10} “(b) The name and place of residence of each person to whom 
controlled substances * * * are sold, the description of the controlled substances 
sold to each person, and the date the controlled substances are sold to each 
person.” 
{¶11} The issue herein is whether Washington Manor sold controlled 
substances to its residents, thereby triggering the R.C. 3719.07(C)(3)(b) 
requirement of proof-of-use sheets and MRAs.  Although the proof-of-use sheets 
and MRAs are not included in the record, we assume that since the dispute herein 
focuses on R.C. 3719.07(C)(3)(b), those documents contain the information 
required by that subsection. 
{¶12} Testimony at the hearing established that Washington Manor did 
not sell—as the term is commonly used—drugs to its residents.  Washington 
Manor residents got their medications by first having their doctors write 
prescriptions.  The prescriptions were then sent to a pharmacy, which filled the 
prescription and sent the drugs to Washington Manor.  The pharmacy then billed 
either the resident or the resident’s insurance company.  When Washington Manor 
received the drugs, the nurses placed them in a medication cart and took them to 
the appropriate residents. 
{¶13} Thus, Washington Manor simply acted as a conduit from the 
pharmacy to the resident.  However, in the context of R.C. Chapter 3917, this 
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action fits within the definition of “sale.”  R.C. 3719.01(AA) defines “sale” as 
follows: 
{¶14} “ ‘Sale’ includes delivery, barter, exchange, transfer, or gift, or 
offer thereof, and each transaction of those natures made by any person, whether 
as principal, proprietor, agent, servant, or employee.” 
{¶15} Since delivery is included within the meaning of the term “sale,” 
the delivery of drugs by nurses to residents constitutes a sale under the statute.  
Thus, the name of each person to whom controlled substances are delivered, the 
description of the controlled substances delivered, and the date the controlled 
substances are delivered must be recorded by Washington Manor. R.C. 
3719.07(C)(3)(b). 
{¶16} However, the court of appeals held that Washington Manor nurses 
did not deliver the drugs.  The appellate court opinion states that Washington 
Manor’s “sole function is to receive the delivery from the pharmacy and to 
administer the drugs to the patient.”  In analyzing the statute, the court of appeals 
was persuaded by the presence of a separate statutory definition for the term 
“administer,” which it saw as the nurses’ true function at Washington Manor.  
The court reasoned that if the General Assembly had intended to require R.C. 
3719.07(C)(3)(b) information for the function performed by the nurses it would 
have required that such records be kept for the administering of controlled 
substances, rather than for their sale. 
{¶17} “Administer” is defined at R.C. 3719.01(A) as follows: 
{¶18} “ ‘Administer’ means the direct application of a drug, whether by 
injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means to a person or an animal.” 
{¶19} Our interpretation of the definition of “administer” yields a 
different conclusion from that of the appellate court.  The statutory definition of 
“administer” includes only the direct application of a drug.  A nurse’s bringing 
pills to a nursing home resident for that resident to take himself is not the direct 
January Term, 2003 
5 
application of a drug.  The direct application of the drug in that instance is left to 
the resident.  The appellate court’s interpretation implies that “administer” is an 
administrative or clerical pursuit, including bringing the drug to the resident.  In 
fact, the statutory definition addresses only the medical process of the direct, 
physical application of the drug. 
{¶20} While Washington Manor nurses do not directly apply drugs to 
every resident that has been prescribed them, they do in fact deliver the drugs to 
the residents in every case.  If the General Assembly had made nursing homes 
responsible for keeping records of only the drugs that their staffs administer, 
rather than deliver, it would have left a gap in the recordkeeping for those drugs 
not directly applied by the staff. 
{¶21} Our interpretation of R.C. 3719.07 is consistent with the legislative 
intent behind R.C. Chapter 3719.  Only through our interpretation does the statute 
provide a record of the drugs from the time they are prescribed to the time they 
reach the patient.  Without a requirement of recordkeeping for the delivery of 
controlled substances, the record would stop before the drugs reached the patient 
if the patient lived in a nursing home.  We believe that the General Assembly 
specifically included nursing homes within the ambit of R.C. 3719.07 to make 
them responsible for keeping records of the drugs they handle.  The high quantity 
of drugs present in a nursing home, the often reduced awareness of the residents 
for whom they are prescribed, and the ease with which prescription pills could 
otherwise be pilfered are factors necessitating the keeping of records of drugs 
delivered within nursing homes. 
{¶22} Therefore, we find that if the records at issue in this case, i.e., the 
proof-of-use sheets and MARs, contained the information required by R.C. 
3719.07(C)(3)(b), then falsification of such records would constitute a violation of 
R.C. 2925.23(A).  Accordingly, these documents are relevant in prosecuting an 
alleged violation of R.C. 2925.23(A).  Consequently, we reverse the judgment of 
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the court of appeals and remand this cause to the trial court for further 
proceedings. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, CORRIGAN, LUNDBERG STRATTON 
and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
 
MICHAEL J. CORRIGAN, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for 
Cook, J. 
__________________ 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Johnna M. Shia, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
Joyce A. Rollert and Michael L. Monta, for appellee. 
__________________