Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Marshall

Citation: 2014-Ohio-4815

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Marshall, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4815.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-4815 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. MARSHALL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Marshall,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4815.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Conduct involving dishonesty or misrepresentation—
Conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law—Conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice—False statements concerning 
the integrity of a judge—Two-year suspension, partially stayed. 
(No. 2013-0924—Submitted October 22, 2013—Decided November 6, 2014.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2012-003. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Joy Lenore Marshall of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0073585, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2002.1   
                                                 
1 Marshall was admitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin in 2001.   
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{¶ 2} In January 2012, relator, disciplinary counsel, submitted a 
complaint charging Marshall with professional misconduct arising from her 
conduct during postjudgment proceedings initiated by a personal-injury client’s 
former counsel to establish and collect the value of their services pursuant to the 
doctrine of quantum meruit.  Relator alleged that Marshall engaged in dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and conduct that was both prejudicial to the 
administration of justice and adversely reflected on her fitness to practice law.  
Relator further alleged that Marshall charged a clearly illegal or excessive fee, 
failed to disclose potential conflicts of interest before accepting the client’s 
employment, and knowingly or recklessly made false statements concerning the 
integrity of the presiding judge. 
{¶ 3} A probable-cause panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline found that probable cause existed to file a formal 
complaint and certified relator’s complaint to the board. 
{¶ 4} After conducting a hearing on the matter, a separate panel issued a 
report finding that relator had proved by clear and convincing evidence that 
Marshall had committed most, but not all, of the violations and recommended that 
the allegations related to the amount of Marshall’s fee and the failure to disclose 
potential conflicts of interest be dismissed.  Based on the proven misconduct, the 
panel recommended that Marshall be suspended from the practice of law in Ohio 
for two years, with the second year stayed on the conditions that she engage in no 
further misconduct and pay her client’s former counsel an amount to be 
determined by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.  The board adopted 
the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction. 
{¶ 5} Marshall objects to the board’s findings of misconduct, arguing 
that she was honest and acted within the bounds of the law while zealously 
representing her client and defending her attorney fees.  She also argues that she 
had a reasonable basis for making allegations that the trial judge exhibited an 
January Term, 2014 
 
3
improper racial or gender bias against her.  She further contends that the board’s 
recommended sanction is too harsh. 
{¶ 6} For the reasons that follow, we overrule Marshall’s objections, 
adopt the board’s report, and suspend Marshall from the practice of law in Ohio 
for two years, with the second year stayed on conditions. 
The Board’s Findings of Fact and Misconduct 
Agreement to Represent Bessie Tyus and Settlement of Her Case 
{¶ 7} In late 2005 or early 2006, Kimberly Tyus contacted Marshall 
about a personal-injury complaint that attorney William P. Campbell had filed on 
behalf of her mother, Bessie Tyus, in August 2005.  The case was assigned to 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Nancy M. Russo.  Kimberly, 
who served as her mother’s attorney in fact, indicated that her family was not 
satisfied with the quality of Campbell’s representation in her mother’s legal 
matter.  Marshall initially advised Kimberly that she should remain with her 
existing counsel, whose fee contract entitled him to 40 percent of any recovery 
once a complaint had been filed.2  But a few days later, the Tyus family advised 
Marshall that they had decided to retain new counsel, and she agreed to take the 
case.  Kimberly sent Campbell a letter terminating his representation. 
{¶ 8} Marshall advised Kimberly that former counsel could claim 
payment for the reasonable value of the services he provided from November 
2004 to February 2006 pursuant to the doctrine of quantum meruit.  She instructed 
Kimberly to request a statement from Campbell setting forth his claim for the 
services rendered and costs advanced on Tyus’s behalf. 
{¶ 9} Kimberly received a settlement memorandum from Campbell’s 
office that detailed $2,943.70 in expenses advanced by his firm, but it made no 
                                                 
2 The contingent-fee contract was with Shiff & Dickson, L.L.C.  William P. Campbell was the 
attorney primarily responsible for the Tyus representation.  That firm later became Dickson & 
Campbell, L.L.C. 
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mention of any other amounts claimed to be due to the firm.  She faxed the 
document to Marshall and indicated that she did not believe that any additional 
fees were owed.  On February 18, 2006, Kimberly signed a contingent-fee 
contract providing that Marshall’s fee would be one-third of any recovery, plus 
costs. 
{¶ 10} In response to the Tyus’s decision to sever their attorney-client 
relationship, Campbell sent a February 20, 2006 letter to Kimberly, confirming 
the termination of his services.  He advised her that he intended to assert an 
attorney’s lien on any settlement based on his contingent-fee agreement, or 
alternatively on the basis of quantum meruit, though he did not state the value of 
his claim at that time.  The following day, he moved to withdraw as counsel, and 
advised the court that his firm was asserting an attorney’s lien for “fees and costs 
advanced.”  Once again, the only value stated was the $2,943.70 in costs 
advanced by his firm. 
{¶ 11} Campbell later sent a letter directly to Marshall stating that his firm 
was asserting a lien for $2,943.70 in costs and fees based on the doctrine of 
quantum meruit.  Marshall acknowledged receipt of that letter, but testified that 
she believed that she had no obligation to protect Campbell’s fee in negotiating 
the resolution of Tyus’s case.  Nor did she believe that she had any obligation to 
negotiate a split of her attorney fee with Campbell. 
{¶ 12} Marshall negotiated with the defendants’ counsel and, by March 
19, 2006—just one month after commencing her representation—settled Tyus’s 
claim for $150,000.  The court journalized an entry dismissing the case with 
prejudice, but expressly retained jurisdiction over all postjudgment motions. 
Former Counsel’s Charging Lien and Motion to Enforce It 
{¶ 13} Marshall did not call Campbell to discuss their fees as he had 
requested, nor did she advise her client to consult with independent counsel about 
her obligation to pay attorney fees to herself and Campbell.  On March 27, 2006, 
January Term, 2014 
 
5
Campbell and his co-counsel, M. David Smith, of Friedman, Domiano & Smith, 
L.P.A. (collectively, “former counsel”), filed a notice of charging lien with the 
court and moved to enforce it.  For the first time, former counsel alleged that they 
had performed 95 percent of the work on the Tyus matter and demanded a fee of 
$47,500 plus reimbursement of the costs advanced by their firm. 
{¶ 14} In light of the pending fee dispute, the defendants in the underlying 
personal-injury action gave a check for the settlement proceeds to the court.  The 
judge placed the check in a bowl on her desk and set a hearing date for former 
counsel’s motion.  Marshall sought a writ of prohibition in the Eighth District 
Court of Appeals to prohibit Judge Russo from ruling on former counsel’s 
motion, but her efforts were not successful.3  Tyus v. Grande Pointe Health 
Community, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88077, 2006-Ohio-2298. 
Hearing on Former Counsel’s Motion 
{¶ 15} Marshall was more than 30 minutes late for the April 28, 2006 
hearing on former counsel’s motion.  Judge Russo explained that she had not been 
properly served with Marshall’s petition for the writ and that she therefore 
retained jurisdiction to hear former counsel’s motion.  Attorney Campbell 
testified about the work his firm had performed on the Tyus case and advised the 
court that, in order to simplify the division of fees between the two attorneys, he 
would agree to calculate his fee based on a percentage of a one-third contingent 
fee, as specified in Marshall’s contract, rather than the 40 percent specified in his 
own.  He argued that his firm had completed 95 percent of the work leading to 
settlement of the Tyus matter, had advanced $2,943.70 in costs, and was therefore 
entitled to receive $50,443.70 of the settlement proceeds. 
{¶ 16} Before Edward Parks, an attorney assisting Marshall, finished 
cross-examining Campbell, and before Marshall had the opportunity to present 
                                                 
3 The court of appeals denied the applications for a writ of prohibition for failure to properly 
caption it, but also noted that they would fail on the merits.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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evidence of the work she had performed in the Tyus matter, Judge Russo advised 
the parties (off the record) that the hearing would be continued. 
Judge Russo Entrusts the Settlement Check to Marshall 
{¶ 17} At the conclusion of the April 28, hearing Judge Russo gave the 
$150,000 settlement check to Marshall.  Off the record, she ordered her not to 
disburse more than $85,000 of the proceeds to her client and to hold the 
remaining funds in trust, pending resolution of the attorney-fee dispute.  The 
judge gave Marshall a copy of the proposed judgment entry memorializing those 
instructions at the conclusion of the hearing, but the entry was not journalized 
until June 12, 2006.4   
{¶ 18} Marshall established a separate trust account for Tyus’s benefit and 
deposited the settlement funds on May 1, 2006.  Four days later, she wrote herself 
a check for $1,127.66 to reimburse her costs and distributed $63,352.34 to her 
client by wire, at a cost of $20.  On May 31, 2006, $241.15 in interest was 
transferred from the account, presumably to the state treasurer for the Legal Aid 
Fund, pursuant to R.C. 4705.09(B), leaving a balance of $85,500 in the trust 
account.  About that time, Kimberly sent Marshall a $25,000 cashier’s check from 
Tyus’s share of the settlement proceeds as a “gift.”  Although there was 
conflicting evidence regarding the disposition of those funds, the board found that 
Marshall accepted the money and applied it toward her fee. 
{¶ 19} In May 2006, Marshall engaged in a multipronged effort to avoid 
the enforcement of former counsel’s charging lien.  She moved to dismiss former 
counsel’s motion and sought writs of prohibition from the court of appeals (for a 
second time) and from this court, but her efforts were unsuccessful. 
                                                 
4 The entry provided:  “Pursuant to discussions with all counsel, the court has transmitted the 
check tendered to the court, as settlement in this matter, in the amount of $150,00[0], to current 
counsel for plaintiff, Ms. Joy Marshall.  The court orders that Ms. Marshall may distribute no 
more than $85,000 of the proceeds to the plaintiffs at this time.  The remaining funds must be 
maintained in the proper accounts pending the court’s ruling on the outstanding dispute regarding 
the lien on atty fees filed by plaintiff[’]s prior counsel.”   
January Term, 2014 
 
7
Marshall Distributes the Settlement Proceeds 
Before the Court Resolves the Fee Dispute and Seeks to Disqualify Judge Russo 
{¶ 20} On June 22, 2006, Judge Russo issued an entry stating that former 
counsel had withdrawn the pending motion to enforce their charging lien and 
advised the court that they intended to intervene in the proceeding to enforce their 
lien. 
{¶ 21} Marshall interpreted this entry as an opportunity to distribute the 
funds that she had previously been ordered to hold in trust pending the resolution 
of the attorney-fee dispute.  She distributed an additional $60,006.50 to Tyus and 
paid herself $25,493.50 (in addition to the $25,000 she had already received from 
the client) in attorney fees).  On June 26, 2006—the day that former counsel 
moved to intervene—the final interest credit of $167.48 was transferred, and 
Marshall closed the Tyus trust account. 
{¶ 22} The 
following 
month, 
Marshall 
filed 
an 
affidavit 
of 
disqualification in this court, alleging that Judge Russo had engaged in a pattern 
of biased conduct against her and should therefore be disqualified from presiding 
over the postjudgment motions in Tyus matter.  Finding no evidence of bias or 
prejudice at that time, Chief Justice Moyer denied the affidavit of disqualification 
and two motions for reconsideration. 
{¶ 23} Marshall continued her efforts to prevent a ruling on former 
counsel’s motion, filing a second complaint in prohibition followed by motions 
for injunctive relief and an emergency peremptory writ in this court; Judge Russo 
opposed them all.  When these actions proved unsuccessful, we granted Judge 
Russo’s motion for sanctions and awarded her $327.42 in expenses. 
{¶ 24} The board found that Marshall’s distribution of the settlement 
funds in contravention of the court’s orders violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law). 
Marshall Withdraws as Counsel and the 
Hearing on Former Counsel’s Motion Resumes in Her Absence 
{¶ 25} In anticipation of the hearing on former counsel’s motion 
resuming, attorney Cassandra Collier-Williams entered an appearance as counsel 
for Tyus.  On the morning of the hearing, Marshall filed a counterclaim on Tyus’s 
behalf and moved to withdraw as counsel.5  Following Marshall’s withdrawal as 
counsel, Judge Russo took the unusual step of ordering her to leave the 
courtroom, and Marshall complied. 
{¶ 26} Collier-Williams 
declined 
to 
resume 
Campbell’s 
cross-
examination and advised the judge that Tyus no longer intended to dispute former 
counsel’s fees.  She stated that Tyus wanted only to ensure that her attorney-fee 
obligation would not exceed the $65,000 that the court had ordered Marshall to 
hold in trust. 
{¶ 27} On the record, Judge Russo stated that Marshall was not defending 
her right to the fees and had withdrawn her opposition to former counsel’s 
motion.  She therefore declared the motion unopposed, granted former counsel a 
judgment of $50,443, ordered Marshall to retain $4,557 for her fees, and 
discussed the best method to distribute the settlement.  After reaching this 
decision, the judge sent Campbell out in the hallway to bring Marshall in, but he 
was unable to find her.  When Marshall returned to the courtroom on her own, the 
hearing had ended. 
                                                 
5Marshall’s motion to withdraw was formally granted on August 16, 2006, and the counterclaim 
was stricken on August 18, 2006, on the ground that Marshall had filed it without the consent of 
Tyus or her new counsel and because it was “an improper pleading in a post-dispositive 
enforcement of lien action.”   
January Term, 2014 
 
9
{¶ 28} Marshall received a copy of the court’s August 15, 2006 order 
directing her to retain $4,557 for her fees and transfer the remaining $60,443 that 
should have remained in her trust account to Collier-Williams, who was to 
distribute $50,443 to former counsel and the remaining $10,000 to the client.  The 
appellate court dismissed her appeal as untimely, and we declined to accept 
jurisdiction.6  Tyus v. Grand Pointe Health Community, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
88763; discretionary appeal not accepted, 115 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2007-Ohio-5056, 
874 N.E.2d 537. 
Former Counsel’s Separate Action to Enforce Judgment Against Marshall 
{¶ 29} On June 19, 2006, former counsel filed a civil action in the 
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in which they alleged that Marshall 
had engaged in fraud, conversion/theft, embezzlement, and tortious interference 
with a business relationship, and they sought both compensatory and punitive 
damages.  Dickson & Campbell, L.L.C. v. Marshall, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-07-
627533.  Marshall counterclaimed for fraud, interference with contractual 
relations, libel, abuse of process, and intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. 
{¶ 30} In December 2007, Judge Timothy McGinty granted summary 
judgment in former counsel’s favor and awarded them a judgment of $50,443—
the same amount Judge Russo had awarded them in the Tyus matter.  Marshall 
appealed, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order 
because her counterclaims and former counsel’s tortuous-interference claims 
remained pending.  Dickson & Campbell, L.L.C. v. Marshall, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 
No. 90963, 2010-Ohio-2878, ¶ 9-13.  The matter was remanded to the trial court 
                                                 
6 Even if Marshall had timely filed her notice of appeal of that judgment, however, it does not 
appear that she would had standing to pursue it because, although she was aggrieved by the 
judgment, she was not a party to the action and had not moved to intervene in the proceeding.  
Civ.R. 24.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Jones v. Wilson, 48 Ohio St.2d 349, 358 N.E.2d 605 (1976); 
Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. Jacobs, 10th Dist. Franklin No.  11AP-343, 2012-Ohio-64, ¶ 6. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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and remained pending when this disciplinary proceeding was orally argued to this 
court. 
Marshall’s Obligation to Former Counsel Declared 
Nondischargeable in Bankruptcy 
{¶ 31} In April 2008, Marshall petitioned for relief under Chapter 13 of 
the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio, though her filing was later converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding.  
At her disciplinary hearing, Marshall offered conflicting testimony regarding her 
reasons for seeking bankruptcy protection.  She testified that although she initially 
filed for a Chapter 13 reorganization, her goal was to discharge her debts, 
including the judgment that Judge McGinty awarded against her.  But she later 
denied that she had sought to discharge the judgment, implying that she had used 
the bankruptcy only as a means of staying execution of the judgment during her 
appeal, and emphasizing that she had initially intended to pay at least a portion of 
her debts through the reorganization. 
{¶ 32} Former counsel filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy 
court contesting the discharge of the judgment they received against Marshall in 
their separate civil action against Marshall.  The court found that Marshall had 
caused willful and malicious injury to former counsel by disbursing the escrowed 
settlement funds in contravention of the trial court’s order and rejected her theory 
that former counsel no longer had an interest in the settlement funds she held in 
trust once they withdrew their initial motion to enforce the charging lien.  Dickson 
& Campbell, L.L.C. v. Marshall (In re Marshall), No. 08-53659, Adv. Pro. No. 
08-02335 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio, Apr. 1, 2010).  Therefore, the court declared that 
former counsel’s judgment against Marshall was not dischargeable in bankruptcy.  
The United States District Court for the Southern Division of Ohio affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s holding.  Marshall v. Dickson & Campbell, L.L.C. (In re 
Marshall ), 2011 WL 249500 (S.D.Ohio). 
January Term, 2014 
 
11
Marshall Is Arrested for Tardiness at Her Contempt Hearing 
{¶ 33} On August 21, 2006, Judge Russo ordered Marshall to appear and 
show cause why she should not be held in contempt for her failure to comply with 
the August 15, 2006 order, and to produce copies of her trust-account records for 
the court’s inspection.  The entry set the contempt hearing for a date and time 
certain and clearly stated that if Marshall failed to appear, a bench warrant would 
be issued for her arrest.  Although Marshall received that notice, she arrived at 
least 70 minutes late for the hearing and was arrested, though she was released on 
a $5,000 bond later that day.  The only explanation that Marshall offered for her 
tardiness was that she had been unable to leave Columbus early enough to arrive 
on time. 
{¶ 34} The board found that Marshall’s tardiness at this hearing—not by a 
few minutes, but by well over an hour—without a reasonable excuse adversely 
reflected on her fitness to practice law and was prejudicial to the administration of 
justice in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6). 
Contempt for Disobedience, Misappropriation, and Failure to Disburse 
Settlement Proceeds in Accordance with Court’s Order 
{¶ 35} Judge Russo issued a second entry that ordered Marshall to appear 
and show cause why she should not be held in contempt for her failure to comply 
with the court’s prior orders, and to produce copies of her records of her client 
trust account pertaining to the Tyus matter for the court’s inspection.  At the 
September 21, 2006 hearing, attorney Edward Wade served as Marshall’s counsel 
and attempted to argue that Marshall had not been given an opportunity to defend 
her interest in the funds escrowed for Tyus’s attorney fees at the August 15, 2006 
hearing.  Judge Russo refused to hear that argument.  The judge characterized 
Marshall’s actions at the August 15 hearing as a voluntary withdrawal of counsel 
followed by a voluntary departure from the courtroom.  Having reviewed the 
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transcript of that hearing, the board correctly found that Marshall’s departure from 
the courtroom was anything but voluntary. 
{¶ 36} Although Wade attempted to elicit testimony from Marshall 
regarding her fees, Judge Russo cut him short and instructed counsel to focus his 
direct examination on the three issues raised in the contempt citation.  Judge 
Russo then proceeded to directly question Marshall about what happened to the 
money.  When Marshall would not answer the judge’s questions, the judge held 
her in contempt and ordered her jailed without bond based on her disobedience at 
the hearing and her failure to disburse the settlement proceeds in accordance with 
the court’s August 15 order.  The board found that Marshall’s incomplete and 
misleading answers to direct questions posed by Judge Russo at this hearing 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4). 
Appeal, Remand, and a Second Contempt Finding 
{¶ 37} Marshall appealed the court’s contempt finding to the Eighth 
District Court of Appeals, which granted her request for release from jail on bond 
pending appeal.  In December 2007, the court of appeals affirmed the finding of 
contempt but remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to 
resolve disputes regarding which parties were still owed money and whether 
Marshall retained any funds that did not belong to her.  In re Contempt of 
Marshall, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88780, 2007-Ohio-6639, ¶ 30-32. 
{¶ 38} On remand, Judge Russo set Marshall’s show-cause hearing to 
resume on January 9, 2008.  She also ordered Marshall to produce all relevant 
financial records and all records of her time, hours, and activity on the Tyus 
matter at that hearing.  At that hearing, Marshall informed the court that she had 
been unable to locate her trust-account records, but erroneously claimed that the 
content of those records had been read into the record at an earlier hearing.  Judge 
Russo gave Marshall another opportunity to explain what had happened to the 
money, but when she did not receive a straightforward answer, she found 
January Term, 2014 
 
13
Marshall in contempt for a second time and sentenced her to three days in the 
county jail. 
{¶ 39} Marshall filed a second affidavit with Chief Justice Moyer seeking 
to disqualify Judge Russo from the case.  The affidavit was dismissed as moot, 
however, because Judge Russo recused herself from the case. 
{¶ 40} The board found that Marshall’s failure to abide by the court’s 
order to produce her trust-account and financial records at the January 9, 2008 
hearing, in light of her testimony at the disciplinary hearing that she had done 
nothing to prepare for the hearing and was not even sure that she had previously 
produced the records, violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice) and 8.4(h) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the 
lawyer’s fitness to practice law). 
Appeal of Second Contempt: 
Allegations of Judicial Race and Gender Bias 
{¶ 41} In February 2008, Marshall timely appealed Judge Russo’s second 
finding of contempt.  In re Contempt of Marshall, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. CA-08-
091011.  In her brief, Marshall alleged that Judge Russo’s rulings against her had 
been influenced by improper racial and gender bias.  She admitted at her 
disciplinary hearing, however, that she had conducted no research to determine 
the racial makeup of Campbell’s law firm.  She could not cite any improper racial 
or gender-based remarks by Judge Russo and also admitted that the bases for her 
allegations were the judge’s ruling against her on the division of attorney fees and 
jailing her for contempt. 
{¶ 42} Although the board stated that it understood Marshall’s frustration 
with Judge Russo, it found that her allegations of racial and gender bias against 
the judge were unsubstantiated and unreasonable and therefore violated 
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Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly or recklessly making 
false statements concerning the integrity of a judicial officer), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). 
The Board Recommends that We Dismiss Two Alleged Violations 
{¶ 43} In addition to the violations found by the board, relator’s complaint 
charged Marshall with violations of DR 2-106(A) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
making an agreement for, charging, or collecting an illegal or clearly excessive 
fee) and 5-101(A)(1) (requiring a lawyer to disclose potential conflicts of interest 
before accepting employment that is likely to compromise the lawyer’s ability to 
exercise independent judgment on a client’s behalf), but the board recommends 
that we dismiss them. 
{¶ 44} The alleged violation of DR 2-106(A) relates to allegations that 
Marshall charged Tyus $790.87 in costs and expenses that were incurred after 
Tyus’s personal-injury matter was settled, in order to defend Marshall’s one-third 
contingent fee.  Noting that the plain language of the rule prohibits a lawyer from 
entering into an agreement for, charging, or collecting “an illegal or clearly 
excessive fee” (emphasis added), the board found that it does not apply to costs or 
expenses. 
{¶ 45} Relator also alleged that Marshall violated DR 5-101(A)(1) by 
failing to disclose a potential conflict of interest to Kimberly before having her 
execute a settlement agreement that set forth the distribution of the settlement 
proceeds and provided that Tyus would be responsible for all outstanding liens 
against the settlement proceeds, including any claims “found to be valid and 
owing any previous attorney.”  The agreement further provided, “As of the date of 
this signature there are no known valid and existing liens.”  The board found that 
this allegation was not proven by clear and convincing evidence, because the 
agreement conformed to Fox & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Purdon, 44 Ohio St.3d 69, 
72, 541 N.E.2d 448 (1989), in which we held that an attorney discharged by a 
January Term, 2014 
 
15
client is entitled to recover from the client the reasonable value of services 
rendered prior to the discharge on the basis of quantum meruit. 
{¶ 46} Therefore, the board recommends that we dismiss the alleged 
violations of DR 2-106(A) and 5-101(A)(1). 
Sanction Recommended by the Board 
{¶ 47} Based on findings that Marshall has engaged in conduct that 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(5), and 1-102(A)(6) and  Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a), 
8.4(d), and 8.4(h), the board recommends that we suspend Marshall for two years, 
with the second year stayed on the conditions that she engage in no further 
misconduct and make restitution to former counsel in an amount to be determined 
by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in the underlying personal-
injury action pursuant to the remand from the court of appeals in  In re Contempt 
of Marshall, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88780, 2007-Ohio-6639, ¶ 30. 
Marshall’s Objections to Findings of Fact and Misconduct 
{¶ 48} Marshall objects to the board’s findings that she violated DR 1-
102(A)(4), Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a), and DR 1-102(A)(5) and (A)(6). 
Marshall Engaged in Conduct Involving Dishonesty, 
Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation 
{¶ 49} We first address Marshall’s objection to the board’s finding that 
she engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
in violation of DR-102(A)(4).7  Marshall contends that she was at all times honest 
with the court as she attempted to protect her right to due process in the defense of 
her fees in the Tyus matter. 
{¶ 50} In a disciplinary proceeding, the relator bears the burden of 
proving an attorney’s misconduct “by clear and convincing evidence.”  Gov.Bar 
                                                 
7 Marshall’s objection mistakenly states that she did not violate DR 1-102(A)(2), which prohibits a 
lawyer from circumventing disciplinary rules through the acts of another, though her argument 
clearly addresses the board’s finding that she engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation, which is prohibited by DR 1-102(A)(4).  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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R. V(6)(J); Disciplinary Counsel v. Jackson, 81 Ohio St.3d 308, 310, 691 N.E.2d 
262.  “Clear and convincing evidence” has been defined as “that measure or 
degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but 
not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in 
criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm 
belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 
161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. 
{¶ 51} Here, the board found that Marshall violated DR 1-102(A)(4) in 
two ways.  First, she acted dishonestly and in perpetration of a fraud by 
distributing $65,000 of the Tyus settlement proceeds in violation of the court’s 
orders.  While the board recognized that Marshall believed that she was entitled to 
take her fee out of the Tyus settlement proceeds once former counsel dismissed 
their motion to enforce their charging lien, the board found that her interpretation 
of the court’s orders was unreasonable.  Instead, the board found that the court’s 
order for Marshall to hold $65,000 of the proceeds pending the resolution of 
former counsel’s claim for attorney fees was not supplanted by the court’s 
subsequent acknowledgment that former counsel had dismissed their motion to 
enforce their charging lien.  Not only did that order indicate that the fee dispute 
remained unresolved and that former counsel would move to intervene in the 
proceeding, but more importantly, it did not mention the funds Marshall held in 
trust, let alone authorize her to distribute them.  Marshall does not dispute these 
findings. 
{¶ 52} The board also determined that Marshall made incomplete and 
misleading statements to the court about her distribution of the settlement 
proceeds—including misrepresentations to the effect that she had not taken a fee 
in the Tyus matter when she knew that she had.  Marshall objects to this finding 
of misconduct, arguing that her claim that she did not “take” any fee is not false 
because the court’s phrasing implies some level of wrongdoing, and she maintains 
January Term, 2014 
 
17
that she rightfully “collected” her fee in accordance with her contingent-fee-
agreement.  She also argues that her statements in court could not have misled the 
judge because, in a separate prohibition proceeding in which the judge was a 
party, she stated that the funds had already been disbursed. 
{¶ 53} The transcript of the hearing shows that Judge Russo sought 
information regarding the whereabouts of the settlement proceeds that she had 
ordered Marshall to retain in trust pending resolution of the attorney-fee dispute.  
Marshall refused to answer her questions and argued that the court had no 
personal jurisdiction over her.  When the judge insisted that she reveal the 
whereabouts of the money, Marshall responded, “The client—no, the client has 
received the money. * * *  I’ve transmitted all the money to the client * * *.”  
And when asked, “How much did you take in fees Ms. Marshall?” she replied, “I 
didn’t take anything in fees.” 
{¶ 54} Marshall’s testimony at her disciplinary hearing clearly and 
convincingly demonstrates that these statements were false because Marshall 
admitted that she did not disburse the entire $150,000 to her client and that she 
received $50,000 in fees (a $25,000 check from the client and a $25,493.50 check 
issued to “Cash” from her trust account), plus $1,127.66 as reimbursement for her 
expenses.  Moreover, the panel heard and rejected Marshall’s testimony that she 
sought to distinguish between the judge’s inquiry as to whether she “took” a fee, 
which she believed implied a measure of wrongdoing, and her claim that she 
“collected” her in accordance with her contingent-fee agreement.  We defer to 
that credibility determination because the panel members saw and heard the 
witnesses firsthand.  See Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 164, 
2006-Ohio-550, 842 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 24.  And we now reject Marshall’s claims that 
her failure to answer and her incomplete answers to the judge’s questions were 
necessary to make a record for her defense or that they were somehow excusable 
because she had previously disclosed the whereabouts of the money to the judge 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
in a separate prohibition action.  The better practice would have been for Marshall 
to answer Judge Russo’s questions directly and then seek to explain her actions. 
{¶ 55} Because we find that clear and convincing evidence supports the 
board’s finding that Marshall violated DR 1-102(A)(4)—both by distributing the 
settlement proceeds in contravention of the court’s orders and by making false 
and misleading statements at her contempt hearing—we overrule Marshall’s 
objection and adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct. 
Marshall Knowingly or Recklessly Made False Statements 
Concerning the Integrity of a Judicial Officer 
{¶ 56} Marshall objects to the board’s finding that she knowingly or 
recklessly made false statements concerning the integrity of a judicial officer in 
violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a).  Marshall cites a number of instances in which 
she believes that the judge failed to comply with the law to the detriment of 
Marshall and her client.  She therefore contends that the allegations of bias that 
she raised against the judge were justified and necessary to protect her property 
interest in her attorney fees.  But even if there were some merit to those 
allegations, it would not excuse Marshall’s failure to abide by the rules governing 
our profession.  As it is often said, two wrongs do not make a right. 
{¶ 57} The board agreed with Marshall’s argument, in part, as it expressly 
found that Marshall was within her rights and ethical obligations to raise the issue 
of bias in her affidavits of disqualification.  Consequently, the board made no 
finding of misconduct with respect to those filings. 
{¶ 58} However, the board did not look as favorably upon Marshall’s 
allegations that Russo’s rulings against her were motivated by an improper racial 
and/or gender bias.  Marshall attempts to defend her allegations with an equal-
protection argument, asserting that she and former counsel were similarly situated 
but that she was in a superior position to collect her fee, given that she completely 
performed her contractual obligations, while former counsel had given only 
January Term, 2014 
 
19
partial performance.  The only other difference she perceived was that she was a 
black female, while former counsel were white males.  Therefore, Marshall claims 
that her race and/or gender are the only logical explanation for Judge Russo’s 
rulings against her.  And comparing the adverse rulings against her to an 
employment-discrimination claim, she contends that these facts are sufficient to 
constitute a prima facie case of illegal racial or gender-based discrimination. 
{¶ 59} In determining whether an attorney has knowingly or recklessly 
made false statements concerning the integrity of a judicial officer, we consider 
whether the attorney had a reasonable factual basis for making the statements.  
We apply an objective standard that looks to the nature of the statements and the 
context in which they were made and that considers what a reasonable attorney, in 
light of all his professional functions, would do in the same or similar 
circumstances.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 99 Ohio St.3d 416, 2003-Ohio-
4048, 793 N.E.2d 425, ¶ 26.  Applying this standard, we have held that “an 
attorney may be sanctioned for making accusations of judicial impropriety that a 
reasonable attorney would believe are false.”  Id. at ¶ 31.  We are also cognizant 
of Chief Justice Moyer’s explanation: 
 
Allegations of racial bias are among the most serious and 
damaging claims that can be directed at a judge, since such 
allegations, if true, would not only constitute a violation of the 
judge’s oath of office and the Code of Judicial Conduct, see R.C. 
3.23 [requiring judicial officers to swear “to administer justice 
without respect to persons, and faithfully and impartially to 
discharge and perform” all of the duties of their office] and Canon 
3(B)(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct [requiring a judge to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice],[8] but also would 
strike at the very heart of the integrity of the judiciary. 
 
In re Disqualification of Cunningham, 100 Ohio St.3d 1216, 2002-Ohio-7470, 
798 N.E.2d 4, ¶ 2. 
{¶ 60} Therefore, we find that a reasonable attorney would act with 
caution in deciding whether to raise issues of racial or gender bias against a 
judicial official and would proceed only if the attorney found clear evidence that 
such a bias existed. 
{¶ 61} The board found that Marshall could point to no specific actions or 
race- or gender-based remarks by the judge that would support her allegations of 
bias and that her allegation of gender bias was unreasonable given that both she 
and the judge were females.  Marshall also admitted that she conducted no 
research to determine the racial makeup of former counsel’s firms and that she 
was unaware of anyone else who had similar experiences with the judge.  
Therefore, the board determined that Marshall’s allegations of racial and gender 
bias lacked substantiation, were unreasonable, and violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a) as 
well as Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) and 8.4(h). 
{¶ 62} We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the board’s 
findings of fact and determination that no reasonable attorney would have made 
racial- or gender-bias allegations based on the limited information available to 
Marshall at the time she filed her appellate brief.  On the facts before us, it 
appears that any bias that Judge Russo’s may have exhibited against Marshall was 
likely to have been based not on her race or her gender but on her disobedience of 
                                                 
8 Canon 3(B)(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct has since been superseded by Jud.Cond.R. 2.2 
and 2.3(A) and (B), which maintain the requirement that  a judge perform the duties of judicial 
office fairly and impartially and without bias or prejudice).   
January Term, 2014 
 
21
the court’s prior orders, her extensive efforts disqualify the judge, and her 
concerted efforts to avoid a ruling on the merits of former counsel’s claim. 
{¶ 63} Accordingly, we find that Marshall had no reasonable factual basis 
for alleging that the rulings against her were the result of improper racial or 
gender discrimination.  We overrule this objection, adopt the board’s findings of 
fact, and find that Marshall’s allegations of racial and gender bias against Judge 
Russo violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). 
Marshall Engaged in Conduct that Was Prejudicial to the Administration of 
Justice and Adversely Reflected on Her Fitness to Practice Law 
{¶ 64} In her final challenge to the board’s findings of misconduct, 
Marshall contends that she did not engage in conduct that was prejudicial to the 
administration of justice or that adversely reflected on her fitness to practice law, 
in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) and (A)(6).  Instead, she argues that she acted 
within the bounds of the law to zealously represent her client.  She claims that she 
sought the administration of justice through the use of established precedent to the 
effect that the court’s orders were invalid, expired, or unenforceable and that the 
court had no jurisdiction over the postjudgment proceedings because there was no 
dispute pending before it once former counsel had withdrawn their motion.  But 
Marshall cites none of that precedent here. 
{¶ 65} Moreover, the court of appeals rejected her argument that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to address former counsel’s claim for fees, noting that 
the court had expressly retained jurisdiction over postjudgment motions in the 
case, that the court had jurisdiction over the entire amount of the settlement, and 
that the court had personal jurisdiction and contempt power over Marshall with 
regard to her practice in the court and her acceptance of the settlement proceeds 
pursuant to the court’s order.  In re Contempt of Marshall, 2007-Ohio-6639, ¶ 19-
21.  And this sentiment was echoed by the bankruptcy court and the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, in finding that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
Marshall had willfully and maliciously caused injury to former counsel.  Dickson 
& Campbell, L.L.C. v. Marshall (In re Marshall), No. 08-53659, Adv. Pro. No. 
08-02335 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio, Apr. 1, 2010); Marshall v. Dickson & Campbell, 
L.L.C. (In re Marshall), 2011 WL 249500 (S.D.Ohio). 
{¶ 66} Furthermore, the board’s findings that Marshall violated DR 1-
102(A)(5) and 1-102(A)(6) relate not only to her failure to abide by the court’s 
order to maintain the disputed portion of the settlement funds in a trust account 
but also to her failure to timely appear at her first contempt hearing with no 
excuse.  And in addition to these violations of DR 1-102(A)(5) and 1-102(A)(6), 
the board found, and we agree, that Marshall violated the corresponding 
provisions of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) and (h) by failing to submit trust-account 
records that Judge Russo had ordered her to produce and making unfounded 
allegations of racial and gender bias against the judge. 
{¶ 67} We find that relator has proven by clear and convincing evidence 
that Marshall has violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and 1-102(A)(6) and Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(d) and (h) as found by the board.  We therefore overrule Marshall’s third 
objection. 
We Adopt the Board’s Findings of Misconduct 
{¶ 68} Having overruled each of Marshall’s objections to the board’s 
findings of fact and misconduct, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and find 
that Marshall’s conduct as described above violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-
102(A)(5), and 1-102(A)(6) and Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h), as found 
by the board.  We also dismiss alleged violations of DR 2-106(A) and 5-
101(A)(1) as recommended by the board. 
Sanction 
{¶ 69} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
January Term, 2014 
 
23
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 70} As aggravating factors, the board found that Marshall acted with a 
dishonest or selfish motive when she distributed the settlement funds in violation 
of the trial court’s order and that she engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving 
multiple offenses—including the violation of multiple court orders and at least 
two findings of contempt.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), and (d).  The board 
also found that Marshall’s unsupported allegations of racial and gender bias 
caused harm to Judge Russo and the courts and that her plethora of filings aimed 
to prevent the judge from ruling on former counsel’s motion likewise harmed the 
judicial system.  However, the board declined to find that Marshall’s conduct 
caused any harm to her client. 
{¶ 71} The board further rejected relator’s contention that Marshall had 
refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct, stating that “[w]hile 
some of Respondent’s conduct was based on her interpretation of the law, some of 
her conduct was clearly wrong, and she acknowledged that it was wrong at the 
hearing in this matter.”  And, perhaps most importantly, the board refused to find 
that Marshall’s failure to make restitution was an aggravating factor.  Neither 
Judge Russo’s decision awarding former counsel attorney fees and costs of 
$50,443 nor the grant of summary judgment to former counsel in the separate 
enforcement proceeding is final. 
{¶ 72} With regard to mitigating factors that weigh in favor of a less 
severe sanction, the board found that Marshall has no prior disciplinary record, 
has made full and free disclosure to relator, possesses a good character and 
reputation aside from the charged misconduct, and has had other sanctions 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
imposed for her misconduct because she has served actual jail time for her 
contempt of court.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (d), (e), and (f). 
{¶ 73} In its prehearing brief, relator suggested that the appropriate 
sanction for Marshall’s misconduct falls somewhere between a two-year 
suspension and an indefinite suspension.  At the panel hearing, however, relator 
argued in favor of an indefinite suspension.  Marshall, in contrast, argued that the 
matter should be dismissed or that she should be publicly reprimanded for her 
conduct or receive an entirely stayed suspension. 
{¶ 74} After comparing Marshall’s conduct to that of three other attorneys 
who have engaged in similar types of offenses for whom we have imposed 
sanctions ranging from a 12-month suspension to an indefinite suspension, the 
board recommends that we suspend Marshall for two years, with the second year 
stayed on conditions. 
{¶ 75} Marshall objects to the board’s recommended sanction, arguing 
that it is too severe.  She contends that she did not willfully violate Judge Russo’s 
orders and that her violations do not demonstrate an unwillingness to properly 
discharge her duties to the court, her clients, or the public.  She once again asserts 
that she has not engaged in any deceptive practices and that neither her tardiness 
nor her failure to comply with Judge Russo’s order to produce copies of her trust-
account records should be considered a violations of the Disciplinary Rules.  But 
we have already rejected these arguments and found that she committed the 
charged violations. 
{¶ 76} Marshall also notes that this is the only complaint against her in 
her 12 years of practice, that she has submitted nine letters and the testimony of a 
subpoenaed common pleas court judge in support of her character and fitness to 
practice law, and that she has not caused harm to any client.  Therefore, she 
contends that her misconduct warrants no more than a public reprimand.  But she 
cites no precedent in support of her recommended sanction. 
January Term, 2014 
 
25
{¶ 77} We find that the cases cited by the board, Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Simon-Seymour, 131 Ohio St.3d 161, 2012-Ohio-114, 962 N.E.2d 309; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Stafford, 131 Ohio St.3d 385, 2012-Ohio-909, 965 
N.E.2d 971; and Disciplinary Counsel v. Frost, 122 Ohio St.3d 219, 2009-Ohio-
2870, 909 N.E.2d 1271, present a reasonable framework from which to determine 
the appropriate sanction for Marshall’s misconduct. 
{¶ 78} In Stafford, we found that by filing an ex parte motion to amend a 
complaint based on specific grounds and then surreptitiously adding a defense 
that might otherwise have been waived, Stafford intentionally misled a trial court 
and engaged in inappropriate ex parte communications.  He also made false 
allegations of judicial impropriety against a sitting judge in a court filing without 
taking any action to verify the truth of the statements and did not withdraw them 
after the falsity of the statements had been exposed.  Stafford at ¶ 18, 23-24, 42-
44, 56-57.  For these and other offenses, we imposed a 12-month actual 
suspension for Stafford’s misconduct. Id. at ¶ 58, 80. 
{¶ 79} Marshall’s conduct is more egregious than that of Stafford.  In 
addition to making false statements impugning the integrity of a judge in a court 
filing, appearing more than one hour late at her own contempt hearing, failing to 
produce trust-account records in violation of a court order, and giving incomplete 
and misleading answers to a judge’s questions while testifying as a witness, she 
also misappropriated substantial settlement proceeds by distributing them in 
violation of court orders. 
{¶ 80} At the opposite end of the spectrum, in Frost, we indefinitely 
suspended an attorney who (1) falsely accused several common pleas court judges 
and a county prosecutor of corruption and bias in the execution of their official 
duties, (2) repeatedly leveled unfounded accusations of racial bias and other 
impropriety against a federal district court judge who had granted summary 
judgment against her clients in a race-discrimination case, and (3) filed a baseless 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
defamation suit against two lawyers who had been her opposing counsel in a 
sexual-harassment action.  Marshall’s misconduct is not as widespread or 
egregious as that of Frost, however, because it relates to her conduct in several 
related cases arising from a single matter.  Frost, on the other hand, engaged in 
pattern of repeatedly raising unfounded corruption, discrimination, and other 
impropriety against multiple public officials in at least two separate matters, and 
filed a baseless defamation action against two lawyers who were her opposing 
counsel in a sexual-harassment action. 
{¶ 81} And in Simon-Seymour, we adopted a consent-to-discipline 
agreement in which the parties stipulated that a two-year suspension with the final 
six months stayed on conditions was the appropriate sanction for an attorney who 
neglected a decedent’s estate, collected a fee without obtaining the required 
approval from the probate court, misappropriated additional estate fees for her 
own purposes, and falsely represented to the probate court that she had satisfied 
certain estate obligations when she had not.  Simon-Seymour, 131 Ohio St.3d 161, 
2012-Ohio-114, 962 N.E.2d 971, at ¶ 3-4, 12.  Simon-Seymour had also failed to 
maintain client ledgers detailing the funds held in her client trust account and 
failed to perform a monthly reconciliation of that account for several years.  Id. at 
¶ 5. 
{¶ 82} Marshall’s misconduct, while perhaps more egregious than Simon-
Seymour’s, did not cause harm or threaten to cause harm to her clients.  And after 
reviewing the various motions and hearings that occurred in the underlying 
matters, the board expressed serious misgivings regarding the fact that Judge 
Russo denied Marshall the opportunity to have her counsel complete cross-
examination of attorney Campbell as well as the opportunity to present evidence 
detailing the services she provided to the Tyus family.  For that reason, the board 
declined relator’s request that Marshall be required to make restitution of $50,443 
to former counsel as a condition of a stayed suspension. 
January Term, 2014 
 
27
{¶ 83} Marshall argues, and the board and the court of appeals 
recognized, that Judge Russo’s judgment determining the value of services that 
Marshall and opposing counsel provided to Tyus is not final.  We share these 
concerns.  From the record before us, it appears that Judge Russo’s judgment 
allocating the attorney fees and ordering Marshall to remit the settlement proceeds 
to Collier-Williams, who was then ordered to pay $50,443 to former counsel, is 
not final and binding determination of Marshall’s fee because she was neither a 
party to the action nor in privity with a party once her interests conflicted with 
those of Tyus.  See, e.g., Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E.2d 67 
(1943), paragraph one of the syllabus (“A final judgment or decree rendered upon 
the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction is 
conclusive of rights, questions and facts in issue as to the parties and their privies, 
and is a complete bar to any subsequent action on the same claim or cause of 
action between the parties or those in privity with them”), overruled on other 
grounds, Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995), 
syllabus.  Moreover, she was expressly order to leave the courtroom once she 
withdrew as counsel for Tyus.  “The main legal thread which runs throughout the 
determination of the applicability of res judicata, inclusive of the adjunct 
principle of collateral estoppel, is the necessity of a fair opportunity to fully 
litigate and to be ‘heard’ in the due process sense.”  Goodson v. McDonough 
Power Equip., Inc., 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 200-201, 443 N.E.2d 978 (1983), 
superseded on other grounds by R.C. 2721.12. Thus, to the extent that Marshall 
was neither a party to the proceeding nor given the opportunity to be heard, it 
would appear that the doctrine of res judicata would not preclude her from 
litigating these issues in one of the proceedings that remains pending below, since 
she has never had the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate them. 
{¶ 84} Because the board accounted for this issue in recommending its 
sanction—which is not as severe as the sanction we imposed in Simon-Seymour—
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
28 
 
we find that a two-year suspension, with the second year stayed on the conditions 
that Marshall commit no further misconduct and make full restitution (or make 
installment-payment arrangements that are satisfactory to relator) to William P. 
Campbell and M. David Smith in an amount to be determined by the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas.  Therefore, we overrule Marshall’s final 
objection. 
{¶ 85} Accordingly, Joy Lenore Marshall is suspended from the practice 
of law in Ohio for two years, with the second year stayed on the conditions that 
she commit no further misconduct and make full restitution to William P. 
Campbell and M. David Smith in an amount to be determined by the Cuyahoga 
County Court of Common Pleas in Dickson & Campbell, L.L.C. v. Marshall, 
Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-07-627533.  If Marshall does not comply with the terms 
of the stay, the stay will be revoked, and she will serve the full two-year 
suspension.  Costs are taxed to Marshall. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
FRENCH and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent and would impose suspension of two 
years with eighteen months stayed. 
_________________________ 
Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Bruce Taylor Davis, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Joy Lenore Marshall, pro se. 
_________________________