Case Title: Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 134, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KIMBERLY HECKSHER, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 134, 2014 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
§ 
Court Below — Superior Court   
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
FAIRWINDS BAPTIST CHURCH, §  
C.A. No. 09C-06-236 
INC., a Delaware corporation,  
§ 
FAIRWINDS CHRISTIAN 
 
§ 
  
SCHOOL, a Ministry of Fairwinds 
§ 
Baptist Church, Inc., 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
§ 
 
 
Appellees.  
 
§ 
 
Submitted: March 25, 2014 
Decided: 
April 30, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 30th day of April 2014, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) The plaintiff/appellant seeks to appeal the Superior Court’s 
February 28, 2013 order granting the defendants/appellees’ motion for 
summary judgment.1  The appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal on the 
basis that a motion for sanctions remains pending in the Superior Court.  The 
                                          
 
1 Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, 2013 WL 1561564 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 
2013). 
2 
 
Clerk issued a notice pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29(b) (“Rule 29(b)”) 
directing the appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be 
dismissed for failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 42 (“Rule 42”) 
when taking an appeal from an apparent interlocutory order. 
(2) In her response to the motion to dismiss and notice to show 
cause, the appellant agrees that a motion for sanctions is pending in the 
Superior Court.  Nonetheless, she opposes dismissal of the appeal, arguing 
that the Superior Court’s February 28, 2013 order is final because a decision 
on the pending motion for sanctions “will not alter, moot, or revise the 
summary judgment decision.” 
(3) Having carefully considered the parties’ positions, the Court 
concludes that the appeal must be dismissed as premature.  Absent 
compliance with Rule 42, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to the 
review of final judgments of trial courts.2  “The policy underlying the final 
judgment rule is one of efficient use of judicial resources through disposition 
of cases as a whole, rather than piecemeal.”3  The policy against piecemeal 
litigation applies to this ongoing litigation. 
                                          
 
2 Julian v. State ex rel. Sec’y of Dep’t of Transp., 440 A.2d 990, 991 (Del. 1982). 
3 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Aetos Corp. 809 A.2d 575, 580 (Del. 2002). 
3 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the appeal is 
DISMISSED pursuant to Rules 29(b) and 42.  The filing fee paid by the 
appellant shall be applied to any future appeal filed by her from the final 
order entered in the case.  
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Justice