Case Title: J. G. v. Deborah S. Wangard

Citation: 2008 WI 99

Docket Number: 2006AP000818

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2008 WI 99 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP818 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
J. G. and R. G., 
          Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants, 
     v. 
Deborah S. Wangard, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Great Northern Insurance Company and Pacific 
Indemnity Insurance Company, 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Steven C. Wangard, John Doe and XYZ Corporation, 
          Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 16, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 13, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert G. Mawdsley   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BUTLER, JR., J., join the 
dissent.   
 
BUTLER, JR., J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J. and BRADLEY, J., join the 
dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Francis H. LoCoco, Tamara Hayes O’Brien, and Whyte Hirschboeck 
Dudek S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Tamara Hayes 
O’Brien. 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief by James 
S. Smith, Wendy G. Gunderson, and Smith, Gunderson & Rowen, 
S.C., Brookfield, and oral argument by Wendy G. Gunderson. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 99
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP818  
(L.C. No. 
2005CV500) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
J. G. and R. G., 
 
          Plaintiffs-Co-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Deborah S. Wangard, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
Great Northern Insurance Company and Pacific 
Indemnity Insurance Company, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Steven C. Wangard, John Doe and XYZ 
Corporation, 
 
          Defendants. 
FILED 
 
JUL 16, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision and order of the court of appeals,1 that 
summarily affirmed a judgment of the Waukesha County Circuit 
Court, Robert G. Mawdsley, Judge. 
                                                 
1 J.G. v. Wangard, No. 2006AP818, unpublished order (Wis. 
Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2007). 
No. 2006AP818 
 
2 
 
¶2 
The case involves an insurance coverage dispute.  The 
question presented is whether homeowner's insurance policies 
issued by Great Northern Insurance Company (Great Northern) and 
Pacific Indemnity Insurance Company (Pacific) to Steven and 
Deborah Wangard2 provide coverage for the alleged negligence of 
Deborah in failing to prevent Steven's intentional sexual 
contact with J.G., a minor.  The policies in question cover 
liability for "damages a covered person is legally obligated to 
pay for personal injury or property damage," but they contain 
exclusions that bar coverage for damages arising out of the 
intentional act of "any covered person." 
¶3 
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
circuit court, which held that the homeowner's policies in 
question do not cover Deborah's alleged negligence.  The court 
of appeals determined that the instant case is controlled by its 
prior decisions in Jessica M.F. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance 
Co., 209 Wis. 2d 42, 561 N.W.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1997) and Taryn 
E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 178 Wis. 2d 719, 505 N.W.2d 418 (Ct. App. 
1993).  The court noted that the intentional acts exclusions in 
the Wangards' policies preclude coverage for the intentional 
acts of "any covered person," i.e., any insured.  Both Steven 
and Deborah are insureds under the policies.  Since it is 
undisputed 
that 
Steven's 
sexual 
contact 
with 
J.G. 
was 
                                                 
2 The Wangards were married during the events relevant to 
the plaintiffs' suit; they are now separated.  Deborah and 
Steven Wangard will be referred to individually by first name 
and collectively as "the Wangards." 
No. 2006AP818 
 
3 
 
intentional, and despite the existence of clauses in the 
policies that apply coverage to each insured separately, the 
court of appeals found that Deborah's alleged negligence is not 
covered.  We granted Deborah's petition for review. 
¶4 
We conclude that the result in this case is informed 
by the court of appeals' decisions in Jessica M.F. and Taryn 
E.F. 
 
The 
intentional 
acts 
exclusions 
in 
the 
Wangards' 
homeowner's 
policies 
bar 
coverage 
for 
Deborah's 
alleged 
negligence in failing to prevent Steven's intentional sexual 
contact with J.G. because the plaintiffs' damages——in the 
language of the Wangards' homeowner's policies——"[arose] out of 
an act intended by any covered person to cause personal injury."  
Furthermore, no insured would reasonably expect liability 
coverage for damages arising out of an act of sexual assault 
premised upon intentional sexual contact.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶5 
The relevant facts are not disputed.  On February 23, 
2005, plaintiffs J.G., a minor, and R.G., her mother, filed a 
civil complaint alleging that during a period from 2000 to 2003 
Steven Wangard had sexual contact with J.G. at two residences 
owned by him and his wife Deborah, namely 855 Circle Drive and 
14400 Juneau Boulevard, in Elm Grove, Wisconsin.  J.G. was 
between the age of five and eight years old at the time Steven 
had sexual contact with her.   
¶6 
On October 7, 2004, Steven pled guilty to second-
degree sexual assault of a child for having sexual contact with 
No. 2006AP818 
 
4 
 
J.G., a violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2).3  The plaintiffs' 
complaint alleges several claims for relief against Steven that 
are premised upon his intentional sexual assaults of J.G.4  We 
assume for purposes of this appeal that Steven's intentional 
wrongful conduct, which caused the plaintiffs' damages, has been 
established by his guilty plea as a matter of law.  
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(2) (2003-04) states: "Whoever has 
sexual contact . . . with a person who has not attained the age 
of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony." 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 948.01(5) 
(2003-04) 
defines 
"sexual 
contact":  
(5) "Sexual contact" means any of the following: 
(a) Intentional touching by the complainant or 
defendant, either directly or through clothing by the 
use of any body part or object, of the complainant's 
or defendant's intimate parts if that intentional 
touching is either for the purpose of sexually 
degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or 
sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant.  
(b) Intentional penile ejaculation of ejaculate 
or intentional emission of urine or feces by the 
defendant upon any part of the body clothed or 
unclothed of the complainant if that ejaculation or 
emission is either for the purpose of sexually 
degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or 
for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the 
defendant. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise noted. 
4 None of these claims is directly implicated in the instant 
appeal because no one has argued that Steven's intentional 
conduct is covered by the insurance policies in question.  
However, the allegations regarding Steven's intentional conduct 
are pertinent to our analysis of whether the intentional acts 
exclusion in the policies applies to Deborah. 
No. 2006AP818 
 
5 
 
¶7 
The plaintiffs' complaint also alleges that Deborah 
negligently failed to prevent her husband from sexually abusing 
J.G.  Specifically, the complaint's seventh claim for relief 
alleges that Deborah was negligent in the following ways:   
33. That prior to all or some of Steven C. 
Wangard's sexual contacts with J.G. . . . Deborah S. 
Wangard knew or should have known that Steven C. 
Wangard had intentional sexual contact and/or sexual 
intercourse with other minors; that she knew or should 
have known that Steven C. Wangard had a propensity to 
have 
intentional 
sexual 
contact 
and/or 
sexual 
intercourse with minors; that despite such knowledge, 
Deborah S. Wangard was negligent in that she, among 
other things, did not warn J.G. and/or R.G. of such 
knowledge prior to all or some of Steven C. Wangard's 
sexual contacts with J.G. as alleged hereinabove; that 
she did not take any action to prevent Steven C. 
Wangard from being alone with J.G. prior to all or 
some of Steven C. Wangard's sexual contacts with J.G. 
as alleged hereinabove; that at all times material 
hereto, she negligently supervised J.G. while J.G. was 
in her care; and was otherwise negligent. 
34. That the negligence of Deborah S. Wangard as 
alleged, was a direct and proximate cause of J.G.'s 
injuries 
and 
damages, as set forth hereinabove, 
subjecting 
Deborah 
S. 
Wangard 
to 
liability 
for 
compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be 
determined by the trier of fact. 
¶8 
The complaint alleges that the Wangards' acts and 
omissions 
harmed 
J.G. 
and 
R.G., 
namely, 
that 
Steven's 
intentional sexual assaults of J.G. and Deborah's negligence in 
failing to prevent the assaults allegedly caused J.G. "severe, 
extreme, disabling and permanent emotional distress, pain, 
suffering, 
embarrassment, 
loss 
of 
self 
esteem, 
disgrace, 
humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, psychological damages, 
injuries," and continuing expenses for medical and psychological 
No. 2006AP818 
 
6 
 
treatment.  The complaint also claims that Steven's intentional 
tortious conduct and Deborah's negligence have caused R.G. to 
suffer "the loss of J.G.'s society and companionship, past and 
future 
pecuniary 
losses, 
past 
and 
future 
medical 
and/or 
psychological expenses, severe emotional distress," and other 
injuries.  
¶9 
The residences where Steven sexually assaulted J.G. 
were insured by Great Northern and Pacific during the relevant 
time period.  Great Northern insured the 14400 Juneau Boulevard 
residence.  Pacific insured the 855 Circle Drive residence.  
After the plaintiffs filed suit, Great Northern and Pacific 
initially assumed the defense of Steven and Deborah pursuant to 
the policies' liability coverage under a reservation of rights.  
On May 26, 2005, Great Northern and Pacific filed a motion to 
bifurcate and stay the plaintiffs' case so that the court could 
determine whether the policies covered the Wangards' potential 
civil liability.   
¶10 The relevant language of the Great Northern and 
Pacific homeowner's policies is identical.  The coverage 
provisions of the policies state: "We cover damages a covered 
person is legally obligated to pay for personal injury or 
property damage which take place anytime during the policy 
period and are caused by an occurrence, unless stated otherwise 
or 
an exclusion applies."  The policies state that an 
"[o]ccurrence means a loss or accident to which this insurance 
applies occurring within the policy period."  Although the 
policies name Steven alone as the insured party in the "Coverage 
No. 2006AP818 
 
7 
 
Summary," a "covered person" includes "you or a family member."  
The 
policies 
also 
include 
language 
under 
the 
heading 
"Application 
of 
coverage" 
that 
reads: 
"Coverage 
applies 
separately to each covered person.  However, this provision does 
not increase the amount of coverage for any one occurrence."5   
¶11 The liability provisions of the Wangards' policies 
provide coverage for certain enumerated damages and injuries, 
while other harms caused by the insureds are excluded from 
coverage.  "Personal injury" is covered by the policies and 
includes "bodily injury . . . shock, mental anguish, or mental 
injury."  "Bodily injury" means "physical bodily harm, including 
sickness or disease that results from it, and required care, 
loss of services and resulting death."   
¶12 The policies exclude damages caused by the intentional 
acts of insureds.  The policies state:   
Intentional acts.  We do not cover any damages 
arising out of an act intended by any covered person 
to cause personal injury or property damage, even if 
the injury or damage is of a different degree or type 
than actually intended or expected.  An intentional 
act is one whose consequences could have been foreseen 
by a reasonable person.  But we do cover such damages 
if the act was intended to protect people or property 
unless another exclusion applies. 
¶13 On July 20, 2005, Great Northern and Pacific moved for 
a declaratory ruling and to dismiss the case against them on 
grounds that the Wangards' homeowner's policies did not cover 
                                                 
5 Throughout their briefs the parties have referred to this 
language as a "separation" or "severability" clause, and we will 
do so as well. 
No. 2006AP818 
 
8 
 
the losses alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint.  The circuit 
court heard argument on the motion on December 5, 2005, and 
issued a written decision in favor of Great Northern and Pacific 
on February 20, 2006.   
¶14 The circuit court held that the Wangards' homeowner's 
policies did not cover any of the claims alleged in the 
plaintiffs' complaint.  With regard to the alleged negligence of 
Deborah, the court concluded that the intentional acts exclusion 
in the two policies barred coverage.  The court found that "the 
language contained in the policy is not ambiguous nor is the 
policy as a whole contextually ambiguous."  The court also found 
that "the language contained in the exclusion bars coverage 
regardless of the existence of a separation clause."  The court 
cited Hagen v. Gulrud, 151 Wis. 2d 1, 6-7, 442 N.W.2d 570 (Ct. 
App. 1989), for two propositions: (1) one who purchases a 
homeowner's policy does not contemplate coverage for sexual 
misconduct of an insured; and (2) one would not anticipate 
sharing such a risk with other policyholders.  The court also 
relied upon Jessica M.F. to conclude that Deborah is not covered 
because she would not contemplate coverage for sexual assaults 
committed by Steven, despite the fact that she is arguably an 
"innocent spouse" and that the two policies include a provision 
that separates coverage as to each insured.   
¶15 On March 20, 2006, the circuit court issued an order 
and judgment dismissing all claims against Great Northern and 
Pacific because the insurers owed no duty to defend or indemnify 
No. 2006AP818 
 
9 
 
the 
Wangards 
under 
their 
homeowner's 
policies. 
 
Deborah 
appealed, and J.G. and R.G. cross-appealed. 
¶16 The court of appeals summarily affirmed on August 8, 
2007, holding that the Wangards' case is controlled by the court 
of appeals' prior decisions in Jessica M.F. and Taryn E.F.  The 
court of appeals held that there was "no meaningful way to 
distinguish" these cases and that the intentional acts exclusion 
in the Wangards' policies precludes coverage for the intentional 
acts of "any covered person," i.e., any insured.  Both Steven 
and Deborah are insureds under the two policies, and it is 
undisputed 
that 
Steven's 
sexual 
contact 
with 
J.G. 
was 
intentional.  Thus, the court of appeals found that, despite the 
existence of a "severability clause" in the policies, Deborah's 
alleged negligence is not covered. 
¶17 Deborah petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on November 5, 2007. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶18 In a declaratory judgment action, the granting or 
denying of relief is a matter within the discretion of the 
circuit court and is upheld absent an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  See Jones v. Secura Ins. Co., 2002 WI 11, ¶19, 249 
Wis. 2d 623, 638 N.W.2d 575 (citation omitted).  However, when 
the appropriateness of granting or denying declaratory relief 
depends on a question of law, our review is de novo.  Id.; 
Gulmire v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2004 WI App 18, ¶10, 
269 Wis. 2d 501, 674 N.W.2d 629 (citation omitted); Commercial 
No. 2006AP818 
 
10 
 
Union Midwest Ins. Co. v. Vorbeck, 2004 WI App 11, ¶7, 269 
Wis. 2d 204, 674 N.W.2d 665 (citation omitted).  
¶19 To resolve this case we must interpret the language of 
two insurance policies to determine whether they afford coverage 
for alleged negligence.  Whether an insurance policy affords 
coverage is a question of insurance contract interpretation, 
which we review de novo.  Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Girl, 
Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶23, 268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65 (citation 
omitted); Danbeck v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI 91, ¶10, 
245 Wis. 2d 186, 629 N.W.2d 150 (citation omitted).  
B. 
Discussion 
¶20 This case involves a question of insurance coverage; 
therefore, we begin with a recitation of general principles, the 
pertinent language of the policies in question, and the relevant 
allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint. 
¶21 "An insurance policy is a contract."  State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gillette, 2002 WI 31, ¶25, 251 Wis. 2d 561, 
641 N.W.2d 662.  The same rules of construction that govern 
other contracts are applied to the language of insurance 
policies.  Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶12, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 
665 N.W.2d 857 (citing Kremers-Urban Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. 
Co., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 735, 351 N.W.2d 156 (1984)).  We read 
insurance 
policies 
"to 
further 
the 
insured's 
reasonable 
expectations of coverage while meeting the intent of both 
parties to the contract."  Tara N. v. Economy Fire & Cas. Ins. 
Co., 197 Wis. 2d 77, 88, 540 N.W.2d 26 (Ct. App. 1995) (citation 
omitted).  A contract of insurance is not to be rewritten by the 
No. 2006AP818 
 
11 
 
court to bind an insurer to a risk that the insurer did not 
contemplate and for which it has not been paid.  Smith v. Katz, 
226 Wis. 2d 798, 807, 595 N.W.2d 345 (1999); Qualman v. 
Bruckmoser, 163 Wis. 2d 361, 365, 471 N.W.2d 282 (Ct. App. 
1991).   
¶22 Coverage provided in a liability insurance policy is 
typically stated in terms of the insurer's duty to defend and/or 
indemnify the insured for losses or injury caused by the 
insured.  See Gross v. Lloyds of London Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 
78, 84, 358 N.W.2d 266 (1984); Elliott v. Donahue, 169 Wis. 2d 
310, 320, 485 N.W.2d 403 (1992).  "[A]n insurer's duty to defend 
its insured is triggered by comparing the allegations of the 
complaint to the terms of the insurance policy."  Everson v. 
Lorenz, 2005 WI 51, ¶11, 280 Wis. 2d 1, 695 N.W.2d 298 (citation 
omitted).  When comparing the allegations in the complaint to 
the provisions in the insurance policy, "[t]he words of an 
insurance policy are given their common and ordinary meaning."  
Danbeck, 245 Wis. 2d 186, ¶10 (citing Henderson v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 59 Wis. 2d 451, 457-59, 208 N.W.2d 423 
(1973)).  When an insurance policy provides coverage for even 
one claim made in a lawsuit, the insurer is obligated to defend 
the entire suit.  Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Bradley 
Corp., 2003 WI 33, ¶21, 261 Wis. 2d 4, 660 N.W.2d 666; Doyle v. 
Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 285 n.4, 580 N.W.2d 245 (1998) 
(citations omitted).  "The duty to defend focuses on the nature 
of the claim and has nothing to do with the merits of the 
No. 2006AP818 
 
12 
 
claim."  Smith, 226 Wis. 2d at 806 (citing Grieb v. Citizens 
Cas. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 552, 557-58, 148 N.W.2d 103 (1967)).   
¶23 "The duty to defend is necessarily broader than the 
duty to indemnify because the duty to defend is triggered by 
arguable, as opposed to actual, coverage."  Fireman's Fund, 261 
Wis. 2d 4, ¶20.  Once the court resolves the question of 
indemnity in the insurer's favor, however, coverage is no longer 
open to debate.  "An insurer need not defend a suit in which it 
has no economic interest."  Baumann v. Elliott, 2005 WI App 186, 
¶10, 286 Wis. 2d 667, 704 N.W.2d 361 (citing Sch. Dist. of 
Shorewood v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 170 Wis. 2d 347, 364, 488 N.W.2d 
82 (1992)). 
¶24 The coverage issue in this case turns on a dispute 
over the applicability of an intentional acts exclusion in each 
policy, and, ultimately, its interaction with a severability 
clause.  "Exclusions are narrowly or strictly construed against 
the insurer if their effect is uncertain."  Am. Girl, 268 Wis. 
2d 16, ¶24 (citing Cardinal v. Leader Nat'l Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 
2d 375, 382, 480 N.W.2d 1 (1992)).  "However, an insurance 
contract must also be interpreted to mean what a reasonable 
person in the position of the insured would have understood the 
words of the contract to mean."  Tara N., 197 Wis. 2d at 90-91 
(citing Sch. Dist. of Shorewood, 170 Wis. 2d at 367). 
¶25 We turn to the pertinent language of the Wangards' 
homeowner's policies.  First, the policies provide coverage for 
certain enumerated harms caused by an insured, namely, "damages 
a covered person is legally obligated to pay for personal injury 
No. 2006AP818 
 
13 
 
or property damage which take place anytime during the policy 
period and are caused by an occurrence, unless stated otherwise 
or an exclusion applies."  "Personal injury" is covered by the 
policies 
and 
includes 
"bodily 
injury . . . shock, 
mental 
anguish, or mental injury."  "Bodily injury" means "physical 
bodily harm, including sickness or disease that results from it, 
and required care, loss of services and resulting death." 
¶26 Presumably, the injuries covered by the policies would 
encompass the injuries alleged in the complaint.  This point is 
not disputed; therefore, we will assume there would be initial 
coverage for at least some of the damages alleged. 
¶27 Second, the policies name Steven Wangard as the 
insured party, but the policies define a "covered person" to 
include "you or a family member"; thus, Deborah, Steven's wife 
during the two policy periods, was also a covered insured.6  The 
policies also include language under the heading "Application of 
coverage" that reads: "Coverage applies separately to each 
covered person." 
¶28 Finally, the policies exclude damages arising out of 
the intentional acts of any insured person from coverage.  
Specifically, the policies state:   
                                                 
6 "You" is also a defined term in the policies.  It means 
"the person named in the Coverage Summary, and a spouse who 
lives with that person."  Steven is the "You" referred to in the 
Coverage Summary under the heading "Name and address of 
Insured," and Deborah lived with him and was his spouse during 
the relevant time period.  Deborah would therefore be covered 
under the policies as an insured by the word "You."   
No. 2006AP818 
 
14 
 
Intentional acts.  We do not cover any damages 
arising out of an act intended by any covered person 
to cause personal injury or property damage, even if 
the injury or damage is of a different degree or type 
than actually intended or expected.  An intentional 
act is one whose consequences could have been foreseen 
by a reasonable person.  But we do cover such damages 
if the act was intended to protect people or property 
unless another exclusion applies.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶29 Having examined the policies, we turn to the relevant 
allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint.  The allegations in 
the 
complaint 
stem 
from 
the 
intentional 
sexual 
assaults 
committed by Steven Wangard.  The complaint alleges that between 
2000 and 2003 Steven had sexual contact with J.G. at two 
residences owned by the Wangards that were insured by Great 
Northern and Pacific homeowner's policies.  On October 7, 2004, 
Steven pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault of a child 
for having sexual contact with J.G.  There is no dispute that 
Steven's wrongful conduct was intentional, that the consequences 
of his actions were foreseeable (at least to him), and that 
Steven's sexual contact with J.G. has been established as a 
matter of law by Steven's guilty plea.7  Furthermore, there is no 
dispute that Steven's intentional acts, which allegedly caused 
harm to J.G. and R.G., are excluded from coverage under the 
policies by the intentional acts exclusion. 
                                                 
7 See N.N. v. Moraine Mut. Ins. Co., 153 Wis. 2d 84, 91-93, 
450 N.W.2d 445 (1990) (holding that an appellate court may, but 
is not required to, conclude as a matter of law that intent for 
purposes of civil liability is satisfied by a guilty plea to a 
crime involving an element of intentional conduct).  
No. 2006AP818 
 
15 
 
¶30 Moving to Deborah, the complaint alleges that Deborah 
was negligent in failing to prevent Steven's intentional sexual 
contact with J.G.  Specifically, the complaint alleges that 
Deborah was negligent because she knew or should have known 
that: (1) Steven had intentional sexual contact and/or sexual 
intercourse with other minors; and (2) Steven had a propensity 
to have intentional sexual contact and/or sexual intercourse 
with minors.  Deborah's alleged negligent acts and omissions are 
that she: (1) did not warn J.G. and/or R.G. of her knowledge of 
Steven's past sexual contacts with minors prior to Steven's 
sexual contacts with J.G.; (2) did not take any action to 
prevent Steven from being alone with J.G. prior to his sexual 
contacts with J.G.; and (3) negligently supervised J.G. while 
J.G. was in her care. 
¶31 Keeping the policy language and allegations in the 
complaint in mind, we examine the disputed issue of coverage for 
Deborah's alleged negligence.   
¶32 The circuit court and the court of appeals held that 
the intentional acts exclusion in the Wangards' policies 
controls and excludes Deborah from coverage because J.G. and 
R.G.'s damages arose out of the intentional acts of "any covered 
person," namely Steven.  The court of appeals relied primarily 
on the express language of the policies and its prior decisions 
in Jessica M.F. and Taryn E.F.  There is no dispute that if the 
express language of the intentional acts exclusion applies to 
Deborah, either directly because of her own negligence or 
No. 2006AP818 
 
16 
 
indirectly because of Steven's intentional conduct, Deborah's 
negligence is not covered. 
¶33 Deborah makes several arguments that the intentional 
acts exclusion is inapplicable to her.  Deborah asserts that 
applying the intentional acts exclusion to bar coverage for her 
alleged negligence violates her reasonable expectations of 
coverage.  She contends that the severability clause in each 
policy cannot be reconciled with the intentional acts exclusion 
and that this inconsistency must be resolved in favor of 
coverage.  She also argues that Jessica M.F. and Taryn E.F. 
improperly construed or disregarded the severability clauses at 
issue in those cases and are inconsistent with Doyle v. Engelke, 
Gulmire v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 2004 WI App 18, 
269 Wis. 2d 501, 674 N.W.2d 629, and Northwestern National 
Insurance Co. v. Nemetz, 135 Wis. 2d 245, 400 N.W.2d 33 (Ct. 
App. 1986).  Relying on Folkman v. Quamme,8 Deborah asserts that 
                                                 
8 In Folkman v. Quamme, this court reviewed a case involving 
the alleged ambiguity of a "split liability limits" endorsement 
to an automobile insurance policy.  Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 
116, ¶1, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857.  We concluded that the 
policy in question, read as a whole, did not present contextual 
ambiguity with regard to liability limits.  Id., ¶58.  
The Folkman court set forth general principles to evaluate 
whether a clause in an insurance contract is contextually 
ambiguous when construed in relation to other parts of the 
contract.  This court noted that "[i]nsurance policy language is 
ambiguous 'if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation.'"  Id., ¶13 (quoting Danbeck v. Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 2001 WI 91, ¶10, 245 Wis. 2d 186, 629 N.W.2d 150).  
"If there is an ambiguous clause in an insurance policy, we will 
construe that clause in favor of the insured."  Id. (citation 
omitted).   
No. 2006AP818 
 
17 
 
the 
interaction 
of 
the 
intentional 
acts 
exclusion 
and 
severability clause creates contextual ambiguity that must be 
resolved in favor of coverage.  Finally, Deborah takes the 
position that Jessica M.F. was wrongly decided and that intent 
to injure cannot be inferred as a matter of law from allegations 
that an insured "should have known" of a spouse's abusive 
propensities. 
¶34 To address these arguments, we begin with the two 
decisions relied upon by the court of appeals, Jessica M.F. and 
Taryn E.F. 
¶35 In Jessica M.F. four grandchildren and their parents 
sought a declaration of coverage under their grandparents' 
homeowner's policies for their grandfather's alleged sexual 
assaults of the grandchildren.  Jessica M.F., 209 Wis. 2d at 44-
45.  The question of coverage turned on whether the intentional 
                                                                                                                                                             
A clear and unambiguous provision may be found ambiguous in 
the context of the entire policy.  Id., ¶19 (citations omitted).  
Courts are not required to mechanically apply a clear provision 
regardless of "the ambiguity created by the organization, 
labeling, explanation, inconsistency, omission, and text of the 
other provisions in the policy."  Id.  "Courts will interpret 
the words of an insurance contract against the insured when the 
interpretation conforms to what a reasonable person in the 
position of the insured would have understood the words to 
mean."  Id., ¶20 (citation omitted).  However, "courts will not 
surrender the authority to construe insurance contracts in favor 
of the insured when a policy is so 'ambiguous or obscure,' or 
deceptive that it befuddles the understanding and expectations 
of 
a 
reasonable 
insured." 
 
Id. 
(citation 
omitted).  
"[C]ontextual ambiguity in an insurance policy must be genuine 
and apparent on the face of the policy, if it is to upset the 
intentions of an insurer embodied in otherwise clear language."  
Id., ¶29. 
No. 2006AP818 
 
18 
 
acts exclusion in the policies applied to preclude coverage for 
the alleged negligence of the grandmother when she failed to 
protect her grandchildren from the assaults.  Id. at 45.  The 
complaint alleged that the grandmother "knew or, in the exercise 
of reasonable care, should have known that [the grandfather] was 
engaging in sexual contact and engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct with [the grandchildren]."  Id. at 46.  Each of the 
policies in question included an intentional acts exclusion and 
also specified that coverage "applies separately to each 
insured."  Id. at 47 n.7. 
¶36 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's 
holding that the grandmother's negligence was excluded from 
coverage under the policies.  Id. at 45, 60.  First, the court 
of appeals traced a line of cases regarding homeowner's 
insurance coverage for sexual abuse.  Id. at 50-53.   
¶37 The court of appeals reviewed its decision in K.A.G. 
v. Stanford, 148 Wis. 2d 158, 434 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1988), 
which established that acts of sexual molestation against a 
minor are so certain to result in injury that intent to injure 
can 
be inferred for purposes of the application of an 
intentional acts exclusion.  Id. at 165.  The K.A.G. court 
observed that "no reasonable person would expect a homeowner's 
insurance policy to provide coverage for damages resulting from 
his sexual misconduct, especially when the language in the 
intentional act exclusion would alert a reasonable person that 
injury inflicted intentionally is not subject to coverage."  Id. 
at 165-66.  
No. 2006AP818 
 
19 
 
¶38 Building on K.A.G., the Jessica M.F. court noted that 
the court of appeals decision in Hagen, a case involving the 
question whether a homeowner's insurance policy provided coverage 
for sexual assault committed by the homeowner's son, indicated 
"that a person purchasing homeowner's insurance would not expect 
that he or she was insuring his or her children against 
liability for their sexual assaults."  Jessica M.F., 209 
Wis. 2d at 51 (quoting Hagen, 151 Wis. 2d at 7).  The Hagen 
court observed that the reasonable expectations of both insurer 
and insured indicated that both "would cringe at the very 
suggestion that they were buying and selling sexual assault 
insurance."  Hagen, 151 Wis. 2d at 6-7 (citation omitted).  
Furthermore, one who purchases homeowner's insurance would not 
want to share that type of risk with other homeowner's 
policyholders.  Id. (citations omitted). 
¶39 The 
Jessica 
M.F. 
court 
concluded 
that 
these 
considerations apply with "at least equal force to a policy-
holder's expectations with respect to sexual assaults committed 
by his or her spouse."  Jessica M.F., 209 Wis. 2d at 57.   
¶40 The 
Jessica 
M.F. 
court 
then 
addressed 
the 
"severability 
of 
interest" 
clause 
in 
the 
policies 
and 
distinguished its earlier Nemetz decision, which held that, 
despite an intentional acts exclusion, a severability clause in 
a homeowner's liability policy preserved coverage for a wife 
when her husband committed arson of their tavern and a 
neighbor's adjoining property.  Id. at 58 (discussing Nemetz).  
The court noted that "Nemetz considered whether an apparently 
No. 2006AP818 
 
20 
 
innocent spouse retains separate coverage," and concluded that 
the grandmother in Jessica M.F. was not "innocent" because, 
based on the allegations in the complaint, she "knew or should 
have known of her husband's sexual abuse of their four 
grandchildren 'for several years.'"  Id. at 58-59.  Summarizing 
its holding, the Jessica M.F. court stated: "[W]e conclude that 
despite severability clauses and regardless of sexual misconduct 
exclusions, the intentional-acts exclusions precluded homeowner 
insurance coverage for the grandmother who allegedly knew or 
should have known of her husband's alleged sexual abuse of their 
grandchildren."  Id. at 60.9 
¶41 In Taryn E.F., parents of a child that had been 
sexually molested by her 12-year-old babysitter sought a 
declaration that her babysitter's parents were covered by their 
homeowner's policy for potential liability stemming from the 
molestation. 
 
Taryn 
E.F., 
178 
Wis. 2d at 
721-22. 
 
The 
unambiguous language of the policy provided liability coverage 
for the young babysitter and both of his parents.  Id. at 723.  
However, the policy excluded coverage for "any outrageous 
                                                 
9 We offer no analysis regarding the validity of the court 
of appeals' holding that the intentional acts exclusion in 
Jessica M.F. applied when the grandmother in that case "knew or 
should have known of her husband's alleged sexual abuse of their 
grandchildren."  Jessica M.F. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance 
Co., 209 Wis. 2d 42, 60, 561 N.W.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1997).   
As noted below, we do not rely on this specific holding to 
resolve the case at hand.  Nor do we offer any comment on 
whether we believe Deborah Wangard was an "innocent" spouse, in 
the words of the Jessica M.F. court.  See id. at 58-59.  These 
issues are not relevant to our determination today. 
No. 2006AP818 
 
21 
 
conduct on the part of any 'insured' consisting of any 
intentional, wanton, malicious acts."  Id.  The policy also 
excluded coverage for "sexual molestation," and contained a 
severability clause that stated: "Each person listed above is a 
separate insured under this policy, but this does not increase 
our limit of liability under this policy."  Id. at 723-24.  
There was no question that the policy excluded coverage for the 
young babysitter.  Id. at 723.  Taryn E.F. therefore turned upon 
the applicability of the severability clause.  Id. at 724-25.   
¶42 Like the Jessica M.F. court, the Taryn E.F. court 
addressed the severability clause in light of its earlier Nemetz 
decision, and it distinguished Nemetz.  Id. at 724-26.  First, 
the Taryn E.F. court noted that the intentional acts exclusion 
"unambiguously denies coverage for all liability incurred by 
each and any insured as a result of certain conduct by any of 
the persons insured by the policy."  Id. at 724.  This is so 
because of the policy's use of the word "any," as opposed to 
"an" or "the," before the word "insured."  Id. at 724-25.  In 
Nemetz, the intentional acts exclusion used the phrases "an 
insured" and "the insured" to denote the parties excluded; 
therefore, "the insurers [in Nemetz] failed to adequately draft 
the policy to exclude coverage for both insureds based on the 
excludable acts of one insured."  Id. at 724 (citing Nemetz, 135 
Wis. 2d at 253-54 n.2, 256).  The court held that the "any" 
language in Taryn E.F. was unambiguous, even when read in 
No. 2006AP818 
 
22 
 
context with the severability clause in the policy.  Id. at 
725.10 
¶43 Second, the Taryn E.F. court rejected the argument 
that there is no logical or grammatical difference between "an" 
and "any."  Id.  The court noted that dictionary definitions of 
                                                 
10 One insurance treatise cites Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 
178 Wis. 2d 719, 505 N.W.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1993), with approval 
and notes the important distinction between "the insured" and 
"any insured."  The treatise states:   
Finally, it has been held that an "any insured" 
exclusion will be treated like a "the insured" 
exclusion 
if 
the policy contains a severability 
clause; 
that 
is, 
a 
provision 
stating 
that 
the 
"insurance applies separately to each insured."  Such 
a holding is not justifiable.  A severability clause 
provides 
that 
each 
insured 
will 
be 
treated 
independently under the policy.  The fact remains, 
however, that as applied even independently to each 
insured, an "any insured" exclusion unambiguously 
eliminates coverage for each and every insured. 
2 Allan D. Windt, Insurance Claims and Disputes § 11.8, at 11-
160——11-163 (5th ed. 2007) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).  
See also BP America, Inc. v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
148 P.3d 832, 840-41 (Okla. 2005) as corrected on denial of 
rehearing Oct. 30, 2006 (concluding that to hold that a 
severability clause affords coverage in contravention of an "any 
insured" exclusion "ignores the purpose of the severability 
clause——to afford each insured a full measure of coverage up to 
the policy limits, rather than to negate bargained-for and 
plainly-worded 
exclusions" 
and 
that 
"[t]he 
separation 
of 
insureds clause has no effect on the clear language of the 
exclusionary clause.  Simply, a claim made against any insured 
is excluded.  The purpose of severability is not to negate 
plainly worded exclusions."); Nw. G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard, 
518 N.W.2d 179, 183 (N.D. 1994) ("[t]he purpose of severability 
clauses is to spread protection, to the limits of coverage, 
among all of the . . . insureds.  The purpose is not to negate 
bargained-for exclusions which are plainly worded.") (quoting 
Nat'l Ins. Underwriters v. Lexington Flying Club, Inc., 603 
S.W.2d 490, 492 (Ky. App. 1980)).   
No. 2006AP818 
 
23 
 
these words distinguish them based on the fact that "an" refers 
to one object and "any" refers to one or more objects of a 
certain type.  Id. at 725-26 (citing Webster's Third New Int'l 
Dictionary 1, 75, 97 (1976)).  The court also cited persuasive 
case law from Colorado for the proposition that use of the word 
"any," as opposed to "an," in an exclusion "unambiguously 
expresses a contractual intent to create joint obligations and 
to prohibit recovery by an innocent co-insured."  Id. at 726 
(quoting Chacon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d 748, 751 
(Colo. 1990)).11 
                                                 
11 In Chacon, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the 
phrase "any insured" in an intentional acts exclusion "clearly 
and unambiguously expresses an intention to deny coverage to all 
insureds when damage is intended or expected as a result of the 
actions of any insured."  Chacon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
788 P.2d 748, 752 (Colo. 1990).   
Chacon involved a question of coverage for the parents of a 
10-year-old boy who vandalized a school.  Id. at 749.  The court 
construed the parents' homeowner's policy, which contained an 
intentional acts exclusion barring coverage for property damage 
caused by 
the intentional acts of "any insured" and a 
severability clause that provided that "this insurance applies 
separately to each insured."  Id. at 750.  The Colorado court 
noted that the majority of courts that have considered the issue 
of coverage in similar policies have held that "unlike the 
phrase 'the insured,' the phrase 'any insured' unambiguously 
expresses a contractual intent to create joint obligations and 
to prohibit recovery by an innocent co-insured."  Id. at 751 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  In concluding 
that there was no coverage, the Colorado Supreme Court noted 
that "[t]he inclusion of a severability clause within the 
contract is not inconsistent with the creation of a blanket 
exclusion for intentional acts.  Instead, the inquiry is whether 
the contract indicates that the parties intended such a result."  
Id. at 752 n.6. 
No. 2006AP818 
 
24 
 
¶44 The Taryn E.F. court concluded that "the term 'any 
insured' unambiguously precludes coverage to all persons covered 
by the policy if any one of them engages in excludable conduct."  
Id. at 727.   
¶45 The logic of the lower courts' application of Jessica 
M.F. and Taryn E.F. to Deborah's case is evident.  We agree with 
the analysis in Taryn E.F. and conclude that Great Northern and 
Pacific's use of the phrase "any covered person" in the 
policies' intentional acts exclusions, like the phrase "any 
insured" in the Taryn E.F. policy, unambiguously precludes 
coverage for all insureds.  Taryn E.F., 178 Wis. 2d at 727.   
¶46 The express language of the two homeowner's policies 
in question broadly excludes from coverage "any damages arising 
out of an act intended by any covered person to cause personal 
injury or property damage."  (Emphasis added.)  Without 
considering whether Deborah's negligent conduct was itself 
"intentional," as Jessica M.F. might imply, it is clear that 
J.G.'s and R.G.'s alleged damages arose out of Steven's 
intentional wrongful conduct.  For this reason, the exclusion 
plainly bars coverage as to Steven and to Deborah if, as is 
undisputed, J.G. and R.G.'s personal injury damages arose out of 
Steven's intentional sexual contact with J.G. 
¶47 We also agree with the reasoning of the Taryn E.F. 
court that the existence of a severability clause does not 
change this analysis.  Id. at 725.  "[O]ur objective is to 
further the insured's reasonable expectations of coverage while 
meeting the intent of both parties to the contract."  Everson, 
No. 2006AP818 
 
25 
 
280 Wis. 2d 1, ¶14 (quoting Benjamin v. Dohm, 189 Wis. 2d 352, 
359, 525 N.W.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1994)).  It is inescapable that 
the policies, even when applied separately to Steven and Deborah 
as if they were distinct contracts, would include Steven 
Wangard, either explicitly by name or implicitly by status in 
their Coverage Summary.  Steven would continue to fall under 
"any insured" for purposes of the intentional acts exclusion in 
Deborah's "separate" policies.  It is not reasonable to suggest 
that "separate" policies owned by Deborah that explicitly name 
Steven as an insured in their Coverage Summary under the heading 
"Name and address of Insured," would not regard Steven as an 
insured subject to the intentional acts exclusion.  (Emphasis 
added.)  Furthermore, the policies state that the "You" that 
constitutes a "covered person" under the policies "means the 
person named in the Coverage Summary."  The severability clause 
cannot reasonably be interpreted to eliminate express language 
in the policies referencing Steven by name in the Coverage 
Summary.12   
                                                 
12 We 
need 
not 
speculate 
about 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
severability clause in these policies.  However, Great Northern 
and Pacific's brief indicates that there are several exclusions 
in the policies where "a covered person," as opposed to "any 
covered person," is the language used.  Arguably, "a covered 
person" might apply differently in some contexts than "any 
covered person."   
No. 2006AP818 
 
26 
 
¶48 Under this construction we therefore reject Deborah's 
contention that the policies are contextually ambiguous under 
the standards set forth in Folkman v. Quamme, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 
¶¶16-35.  Use of "any covered person" in the exclusion, coupled 
with the fact that Steven is a named insured even if coverage is 
applied separately to Deborah, leads us to conclude that a 
reasonable interpretation of the Wangards' policies excludes 
coverage for both Steven and Deborah on these facts. 
¶49 Because of the unambiguous language in the policies, 
we also reject Deborah's arguments that the court of appeals' 
decision in this case is inconsistent with the construction of 
the policies in Nemetz, Doyle, and Gulmire.   
¶50 As indicated by the Taryn E.F. court, Nemetz is 
distinguishable from cases like the instant case because the 
exclusion in Nemetz referred to "an insured" and "the insured" 
in the intentional acts exclusion instead of "any" insured or 
covered person.  Taryn E.F., 178 Wis. 2d at 724; see Nemetz, 135 
Wis. 2d at 254.  Here, the intent to exclude damages arising 
from the intentional acts of "any covered person" from coverage 
is unambiguous.  Furthermore, the policies here were phrased in 
                                                                                                                                                             
In any event, use of "any insured" in the policies does not 
strip the severability clause of all meaning.  See 2 Allan D. 
Windt, Insurance Claims and Disputes § 11.8, at 11-164 (5th ed. 
2007) 
(rejecting 
the 
position 
of 
courts 
that 
have 
"held . . . that a severability clause renders an 'any insured' 
exclusion meaningless . . . on the basis that, otherwise, the 
severability clause would itself be meaningless" and noting that 
"[a] severability clause would still have meaning in a variety 
of contexts.") (footnote omitted). 
No. 2006AP818 
 
27 
 
a way that Steven remained a named insured regardless of whether 
the policies were treated as applying separately to Deborah. 
¶51 Doyle is also inapposite.  In Doyle, this court 
reviewed a duty to defend case involving a claim of negligent 
supervision against an employer.  Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at 281.  
The employer's insurer, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company 
(St. Paul), sought a declaration that the comprehensive general 
liability policy it issued to the employer did not cover the 
employer's 
negligent 
supervision 
of 
its 
employees, 
which 
allegedly resulted in harm to the plaintiff.  Id. at 286.  In 
construing an intentional acts exclusion that indicated that St. 
Paul would not "cover bodily injury . . . that's . . . intended 
by the protected person," this court held the exclusion 
inapplicable because the negligent supervision claim alleged no 
acts by the employer intended to cause bodily harm.  Id. at 291.  
The court noted that its interpretation was strengthened by the 
severability clause in the policy, which read: "Separation of 
protected persons.  We'll apply this agreement: to each 
protected person named . . . as if that protected person was the 
only one named there; and separately to each other protected 
person."  Id. at 291 n.7.   
¶52 In the Wangards' case, the severability clause reads: 
"Coverage applies separately to each covered person."  Unlike 
Doyle, there is no express or implied intent in the language of 
the Wangards' policies that the contracts apply to Deborah and 
Steven individually "as if [he or she] was the only one named."  
Id. (emphasis added).  Such a construction would be unreasonable 
No. 2006AP818 
 
28 
 
on the instant facts because: (1) the express language of the 
intentional acts exclusion here refers to "any covered person," 
(emphasis added); and (2) the Coverage Summary names Steven as a 
covered insured, regardless of the fact that coverage applies 
separately to Deborah.   
¶53 Gulmire 
is 
similarly 
distinguishable 
from 
the 
Wangards' case.  In Gulmire, plaintiff Mary Gulmire (Gulmire) 
was injured when a co-worker, Floyd Klister (Klister), struck 
her with a vehicle while both were acting in the course of their 
employment for Fox Valley Auto Auction (Fox Valley).  Gulmire, 
269 Wis. 2d 501, ¶3.  Gulmire sued Klister, Klister's insurer, 
and Fox Valley's insurer, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Company (St. Paul).  Id.  The commercial automobile liability 
policy issued by St. Paul contained a fellow employee exclusion 
that stated that St. Paul would not "cover bodily injury to a 
fellow employee of any protected person arising out of and in 
the course of the fellow employee's employment by you."  Id., 
¶29 (emphasis added).  "You" referred to three named insureds, 
Fox Valley, Fox Valley Wholesale Company, and Gerald Sheriff, 
owner of the businesses, and "any permitted user," which 
included Klister.  Id., ¶22.  The policy also included 
severability clause provisions similar to those in Doyle, which 
is not surprising as St. Paul issued the policies in both cases.  
Id., ¶24; Doyle, 219 Wis. 2d at 291 n.7.  However, unlike Doyle, 
the severability clause provisions in Gulmire indicated that the 
policy applied to named insureds as if they were the "only one 
No. 2006AP818 
 
29 
 
named," 
and 
to 
"other 
protected 
person[s]" 
"separately."  
Gulmire, 269 Wis. 2d 501, ¶24.  
¶54 Gulmire successfully argued that the fellow employee 
exclusion was inapplicable because the severability clause 
created separate policies as to each insured, thereby removing 
Klister from the "by you" in the exclusion.  Id., ¶29.  If the 
"by you" were eliminated, the court of appeals stated, the 
exclusion would have applied because Gulmire, as a "fellow 
employee" of Klister, a "protected person," was injured by 
Klister in the course of Klister's employment.  Id., ¶29 n.8.  
The court indicated that under such circumstances the exclusion 
would have applied "regardless of the separation clause."  Id. 
¶55 The Gulmire court focused its decision on the fact 
that the words "by you" in the fellow employee exclusion made 
the exclusion inapplicable to Klister.  Id., ¶29.  In the 
Wangards' policies, there is no similar qualifying language that 
limits the intentional acts exclusions' applicability.  Thus, 
the Wangards' case is similar to the circumstance indicated by 
the Gulmire footnote, and coverage is barred "regardless of the 
separation clause."  Id., ¶29 n.8.   
¶56 Deborah also asserts that the court of appeals' 
interpretation 
of 
the 
intentional 
acts 
exclusion 
in 
the 
Wangards' policies violates her reasonable expectations of 
coverage for her negligence in failing to prevent Steven from 
having sexual contact with J.G.  We disagree for two reasons.  
As noted above, the policies in question unambiguously state 
that personal injury damages "arising out of" the intentional 
No. 2006AP818 
 
30 
 
acts of "any covered person" are excluded from coverage.  
Deborah cannot reasonably argue that this policy language should 
be construed to cover the damages arising out of the intentional 
sexual contact with J.G. by her husband Steven, a covered 
person. 
¶57 In addition, as the court of appeals recognized in 
Jessica M.F., an insured cannot reasonably expect coverage for 
harms resulting from sexual assaults committed by one's spouse.  
Jessica M.F., 209 Wis. 2d at 57; see also K.A.G., 148 Wis. 2d at 
165-66; Hagen, 151 Wis. 2d at 6-7.  As the court of appeals 
noted in Hagen, "[t]he average person purchasing homeowner's 
insurance would cringe at the very suggestion that [the person] 
was paying for such coverage.  And certainly [the person] would 
not want to share that type of risk with other homeowner's 
policyholders."  Id. at 6-7 (quoting Rodriguez v. Williams, 713 
P.2d 135, 137-38 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Altena v. United Fire & 
Cas. Co., 422 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Iowa 1988) (quoting Rodriquez)).   
¶58 We need not reach Deborah's argument that Jessica M.F. 
was wrongly decided.  Deborah argues that because the Jessica 
M.F. court conflated the alleged negligence of an "innocent" 
insured with intentional conduct, the court wrongly applied the 
intentional acts exclusion in question.  See Jessica M.F., 209 
Wis. 2d at 54 (indicating that the grandmother in that case 
allegedly 
"knew" 
of 
her 
husband's 
sexual 
abuse 
of 
the 
grandchildren; 
therefore, 
she 
"expected 
or 
intended" 
the 
resultant harm).  Although the decision in Jessica M.F. is 
arguably specific to a sexual assault fact situation, we do not 
No. 2006AP818 
 
31 
 
rely upon Jessica M.F. for a proposition that Deborah's 
allegedly negligent conduct amounted to intentional conduct, 
directly implicating the application of the intentional acts 
exclusion in the policies to Deborah.  We simply do not reach 
Deborah's alternative argument regarding Jessica M.F. 
¶59 In sum, Jessica M.F. and Taryn E.F. inform the outcome 
in this case.  The intentional acts exclusion in the Wangards' 
homeowner's policies excludes coverage for damages "arising out 
of an act intended by any covered person to cause personal 
injury."  Steven is a "covered person" under the Wangards' 
policies, and J.G.'s and R.G.'s injuries allegedly arose out of 
his intentional acts.  Deborah has no reasonable expectation of 
coverage for damages arising out of Steven's intentional sexual 
contact with J.G.; therefore, the intentional acts exclusion in 
the Wangards' homeowner's policies applies and excludes coverage 
for the alleged negligence of Deborah.   
III. CONCLUSION 
¶60 We conclude that the result in this case is informed 
by the court of appeals' decisions in Jessica M.F. and Taryn 
E.F. 
 
The 
intentional 
acts 
exclusions 
in 
the 
Wangards' 
homeowner's 
policies 
bar 
coverage 
for 
Deborah's 
alleged 
negligence in failing to prevent Steven's intentional sexual 
contact with J.G. because the plaintiffs' damages——in the 
language of the Wangards' homeowner's policies——"[arose] out of 
an act intended by any covered person to cause personal injury."  
Furthermore, no insured would reasonably expect liability 
coverage for damages arising out of an act of sexual assault 
No. 2006AP818 
 
32 
 
premised upon intentional sexual contact.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2006AP818.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶61 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The majority 
holds here that "no insured would reasonably expect liability 
coverage for damages arising out of an act of sexual assault 
premised upon intentional sexual contact." Majority op., ¶4. The 
cases that the majority cites as informing this holding are also 
cases involving intentional acts of sexual assault. Id.; see 
Jessica M.F. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 2d 42, 561 
N.W.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1997); Taryn E.F. v. Joshua M.C., 178 
Wis. 2d 719, 505 N.W.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1993).  
¶62 I write separately to emphasize that the majority 
holding today is limited to cases involving the intentional act 
of sexual assault. As the court of appeals in Jessica M.F. 
explained, cases involving sexual assault differ from cases 
involving harms from other sorts of intentional acts. 209 
Wis. 2d at 58.1 The majority follows Jessica M.F. in precluding 
separate coverage only in cases involving intentional sexual 
assault.   
¶63 I also write separately because of a problem in the 
majority's interpretation of the severability clause and the 
                                                 
1 The court of appeals distinguished Jessica M.F. from an 
earlier 
decision 
involving 
arson, 
Northwestern 
National 
Insurance Co. v. Nemetz, 135 Wis. 2d 245, 400 N.W.2d 33 (Ct. 
App. 1986). The court stated that because Nemetz dealt with 
arson it "did not encounter the special considerations that 
arise in the context of child sexual abuse, particularly within 
a family." Jessica M.F. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 209 
Wis. 2d 42, 58, 561 N.W.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1997). 
No.  2006AP818.awb 
 
2 
 
relation of that clause to the intentional acts exclusion.2 The 
majority's interpretation of the severability clause contradicts 
its express language and our precedent, which require that 
coverage apply "separately to each insured." (Emphasis added.) 
As a result of its erroneous interpretation, the majority 
concludes that the intentional acts exclusion trumps the 
severability clause.  
¶64 I conclude instead that the express language of the 
severability clause applying the policies separately to each 
insured directly contradicts the intentional acts exclusion. 
This contradiction renders the Wangards' policy contextually 
ambiguous. Because we construe ambiguous insurance contracts in 
favor 
of 
the 
insured, 
Deborah 
is 
entitled 
to 
coverage.  
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.  
¶65 This case centers on two provisions in the Wangards' 
insurance policies. One is the intentional acts exclusion: 
We do not cover any damages arising out of an act 
intended by any covered person to cause personal 
injury . . . even if the injury or damages is of a 
different degree or type than actually intended or 
expected. An intentional act is one whose consequences 
could 
have 
been 
foreseen 
by 
a 
reasonable 
person . . . . 
¶66 The majority's analysis focuses on the phrase "any 
covered person." Because Steven Wangard is a covered person, the 
intentional acts exclusion applies to his intentional acts. 
                                                 
2 As the majority notes, there are two different insurance 
policies involved. The language of the relevant portions of the 
policies is identical. In order to simplify, I refer to the  
severability clauses and the intentional acts exclusions in the 
singular. 
No.  2006AP818.awb 
 
3 
 
Majority op., ¶32. Looking at the language of the exclusion in 
isolation, coverage would not extend to damages arising out of 
Steven's actions here.  
¶67 The other provision at issue is the severability 
clause. It requires that coverage be applied "separately" to 
each insured: 
Coverage applies separately to each covered person. 
However this provision does not increase the amount of 
coverage for any one occurrence. 
¶68 The majority determines that because Steven Wangard is 
a named insured on each of the Wangards' policies Deborah cannot 
receive coverage, despite the promise of the severability clause 
that "[c]overage applies separately to each covered person." 
Majority 
op., 
¶52. 
It 
maintains 
that 
this 
case 
is 
distinguishable from a more recent decision, Gulmire,3 where the 
court of appeals determined that a severability clause required 
coverage despite the presence of an exclusion in the policy. 
Majority op., ¶¶53-54.  
I 
¶69 The majority misinterprets the severability clause. To 
begin, the language of the severability clause is clear on its 
face: "Coverage applies separately to each covered person." 
Deborah is a covered person, and coverage must apply to her 
separately from each other covered person, including Steven. 
Applying coverage to Deborah separately from Steven would 
                                                 
3 Gulmire v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2004 WI App 
18, 269 Wis. 2d 501, 674 N.W.2d 629. 
No.  2006AP818.awb 
 
4 
 
require that Steven's actions not bear upon Deborah's coverage. 
Otherwise, coverage is linked, not separate. 
¶70 The majority seeks to circumvent the express language 
of the severability clause by arguing that even if the Wangards' 
policies were applied separately, "as if they were distinct 
contracts, 
[they] 
would 
include 
Steven 
Wangard, 
either 
explicitly by name or implicitly by status in their Coverage 
Summary." Majority op., ¶47. The argument appears to confuse the 
notion of separate coverage with the existence of separate 
contracts. Whether there are separate contracts, each with 
Steven Wangard as a named insured, tells us nothing about what 
it means for coverage to be separate. Having a "coverage" 
summary that includes Steven conflicts with the claim that 
Deborah's coverage is applied separately from Steven. 
¶71 More importantly, the majority's argument contradicts 
the language of the severability clause. How can coverage apply 
"separately to each insured" when Deborah's coverage is, as the 
majority requires, inextricably connected to Steven Wangard's 
coverage?  
¶72 The majority's interpretation of the severability 
clause also conflicts with our precedent. In Gulmire v. St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Insurance Co., the court of appeals examined the 
relationship between a severability clause and a fellow employee 
exclusion. 2004 WI App 18, 269 Wis. 2d 501, 674 N.W.2d 629. The 
severability clause at issue had two parts. The first part 
stated that coverage applied "to each protected person named in 
the Introduction as if that protected person was the only one 
No.  2006AP818.awb 
 
5 
 
named there..." Id., ¶24. The second part of the clause had 
almost identical language to the clause at issue here, stating 
that coverage was to apply "separately to each other protected 
person." Id. 
¶73 The court of appeals focused on the second part of the 
clause. 
It 
determined 
that 
"separately" 
means 
applying 
"independently" or "individually." Id., ¶28. Accordingly, the 
court concluded that the party causing injury must be "treated 
in an independent manner such that he is detached from all other 
protected persons." Id.  
¶74 The majority seeks to distinguish Gulmire from the 
present case by focusing on the court of appeals' discussion of 
the fellow employee exclusion. Majority op., ¶55.  The problem 
with the majority's argument is that the court of appeals' 
discussion of the fellow employee exclusion is independent of 
its interpretation of the severability clause, and it is the 
interpretation of the severability clause that is relevant to 
the present case.  
¶75 In other words, in Gulmire the court of appeals 
interpreted language almost identical to the language in the 
severability clause here to mean that each covered person must 
be treated independently, "such that [the insured] is detached 
from all other protected persons." Gulmire, ¶28. Treating 
Deborah 
as 
detached 
from 
Steven 
would 
require 
providing 
coverage, regardless of Steven's intentional actions. Basing a 
coverage 
decision 
for 
Deborah 
on 
Steven's 
actions 
is 
No.  2006AP818.awb 
 
6 
 
incompatible with treating Deborah independently and detached 
from all other protected persons.  
II 
¶76 The insurance policies in this case have one provision 
that excludes coverage for Deborah for damages arising out of 
Steven's intentional acts. The policies also have a different 
provision requiring that Deborah's coverage must be provided 
without 
consideration 
of 
Steven. 
The 
provisions 
directly 
contradict each other.  
¶77 Insurance provisions cannot be read in isolation. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 2007 WI 90, ¶31, 302 
Wis. 2d 409, 734 N.W.2d 386. Rather, the intentional acts 
exclusion must be read in conjunction with the severability 
clause.  
¶78 Reading the two provisions here in conjunction, the 
Wangards' policies are susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation. An ordinary insured could reasonably interpret 
the policies here such that (1) the intentional acts exclusion 
trumps the express language of the severability clause or (2) 
the severability clause trumps the express language of the 
intentional acts exclusion. Where provisions in an insurance 
policy 
are 
reasonably 
susceptible 
to 
more 
than 
one 
interpretation, they are contextually ambiguous. Folkman v. 
Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶29, 264 Wis. 2d 617, 665 N.W.2d 857.  
¶79 In Folkman, this court determined that in order to 
avoid contextual ambiguity, policies "should avoid inconsistent 
provisions, provisions that build up false expectations, and 
No.  2006AP818.awb 
 
7 
 
provisions that produce reasonable alternative meanings." Id., 
¶31. The policies here failed to follow our admonition.  
¶80 By misinterpreting the severability clause and failing 
to apply coverage separately, the majority concludes that the 
intentional acts exclusion trumps the severability clause. 
However, when the severability clause is interpreted according 
to 
its 
express 
language 
and 
our 
precedent, 
a 
different 
conclusion is required.  
¶81 It is a longstanding principle that courts will 
interpret policies in favor of the insured (that is, in favor of 
coverage) where the policy is contextually ambiguous. Id., ¶13. 
Because the policy provisions here are contextually ambiguous, 
we must construe them in favor of coverage. That is, we must 
apply the severability clause as worded: coverage applies to 
Deborah separately from Steven.4 
¶82 In sum, the express language of the severability 
clause and Wisconsin precedent require that coverage be applied 
to Deborah independently from Steven, regardless of Steven's 
intentional acts. The severability clause directly contradicts 
the 
intentional 
acts 
exclusion, 
rendering 
the 
policies 
contextually 
ambiguous. 
Because 
we 
construe 
contextually 
ambiguous insurance policies in favor of coverage, Deborah 
should receive 
coverage here. Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
                                                 
4 This is the approach taken in a number of jurisdictions. 
See Premier Ins. Co. v. Adams, 632 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. App. 1994); 
West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Salemi, 158 N.E.2d 785 (Ill. App. 
1987); Brumley v. Lee, 963 P.2d 1224 (Kansas 1998).  
No.  2006AP818.awb 
 
8 
 
¶83 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2006AP818.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶84 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (dissenting).  I join 
Justice Bradley's dissent.  I agree with Justice Bradley's 
dissent that the intentional acts exclusion and the severability 
clauses 
of 
the 
Wangards' 
insurance 
policies, 
read 
in 
conjunction, at best create ambiguity as to the issue of whether 
Deborah Wangard's negligent acts may be considered separately 
from her husband's intentional acts for purposes of insurance 
coverage.  I disagree with the majority that the intentional 
acts exclusion clauses in the policies bar coverage for 
"Deborah's alleged negligence in failing to prevent Steven's 
intentional sexual contact with J.G. because the plaintiffs' 
damages . . . '[arose] out of an act intended by any covered 
person to cause personal injury.'"  Majority op., ¶4.  
¶85 The language of the intentional act exclusion clauses 
contained in the insurance policies precludes coverage for 
damages arising out of intentional acts.  See majority op., ¶12 
("We do not cover any damages arising out of an act intended by 
any covered person to cause personal injury or property damage 
. . . .").  Although it is clear that coverage for damages 
attributable to Steven's intentional acts is precluded by the 
intentional acts exclusion clauses, it is not clear that damages 
attributable to Deborah's negligent acts are also excluded.  
¶86 There is nothing in the intentional acts exclusion 
clauses indicating that negligent acts are excluded from 
coverage, or that Deborah's alleged negligence should be 
conflated with her husband's alleged intentional acts.  Although 
No.  2006AP818.lbb 
 
2 
 
the intentional acts exclusion clauses exclude from coverage 
"any damages arising out of an act intended by any covered 
person to cause personal injury or property damage," that 
language does not indicate that any damages arising out of a 
different person's negligent acts are similarly excluded.    
¶87 The complaint against Steven and Deborah Wangard does 
not allege that all of the damages arose out of Steven's 
intentional acts.  Rather, the complaint alleges that damages 
also arose out of Deborah's negligence, stating at paragraph 15 
of the complaint that "as a result of Steven C. Wangard's 
intentional tortuous conduct, as herein alleged, and Deborah S. 
Wangard's causal negligence as herein alleged, J.G. has suffered 
and continues to suffer" a number of injuries, expenses and 
other damages.  The complaint's seventh claim for relief alleges 
that Deborah was negligent in that she did not warn J.G. of her 
actual or constructive knowledge of Steven's propensities, that 
she did not take any action to prevent him from being alone with 
J.G., that she negligently supervised J.G. while J.G. was in her 
care, and was otherwise negligent.  The complaint further 
alleges that Deborah's negligence was a direct and proximate 
cause of J.G.'s injuries.  
¶88 If the majority means to equate Steven's intentional 
acts with Deborah's negligent acts, such conflation of claims is 
not in accord with the manner in which different claims are 
treated by Wisconsin courts in insurance coverage cases.  This 
is the case for two primary reasons. 
No.  2006AP818.lbb 
 
3 
 
¶89 First, Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 580 N.W.2d 
245 (1998),1 clearly establishes that if any alleged claim could 
be covered by a policy, coverage must be provided even if the 
complaint also alleges claims that are excluded.  Thus, even 
without consideration of the severability clause in this case, 
we must determine whether there is coverage for the negligence 
claims against Deborah independently from our examination of 
whether there is coverage for Steven's intentional conduct.     
¶90 Second, to the extent that the majority appears to 
view the intentional acts exclusion clause as unambiguously 
imputing Steven's intentional acts to his wife's negligent acts, 
such an imposition of vicarious liability violates the rule of 
law we have generally established against imputing one spouse's 
conduct to another in an insurance coverage contract: 
This court rejects the invitation to invent a 
doctrine that a spouse should be denied recovery on an 
insurance contract because of action of the other 
spouse when those actions cannot be imputed to the 
insured spouse.  The marriage relationship should not 
be used as a basis for such a law.  Married people are 
still individuals and responsible for their own acts.  
Vicarious liability is not an attribute of marriage. 
Shearer v. Dunn County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 39 Wis. 2d 240, 
249, 159 N.W.2d 89 (1968). 
¶91 Consequently, 
I 
believe 
the 
only 
reasonable 
interpretation of the intentional acts exclusion clause is that 
                                                 
1 Notably, Doyle v. Engelke, 219 Wis. 2d 277, 580 N.W.2d 245 
(1998), is a supreme court decision decided after the court of 
appeals decisions upon which the majority primarily relies, 
Jessica M.F. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 209 Wis. 2d 
42, 561 N.W.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1997), and Taryn E.F. v. Joshua 
M.C., 178 Wis. 2d 719, 505 N.W.2d 418 (Ct. App. 1993). 
No.  2006AP818.lbb 
 
4 
 
it bars coverage for damages arising out of Steven's intentional 
acts, but does not bar coverage for the damages arising out of 
Deborah's negligent acts which were alleged as a separate claim 
in the complaint in this case.  Her conduct is at issue, and is 
alleged to have caused damages with respect to the seventh claim 
for relief.  Those damages are alleged to have arisen out of her 
conduct, and not out of Steven's intentional acts.   
¶92 To the extent there is any ambiguity about the meaning 
of the intentional acts clause as applied to coverage for 
Deborah's negligence, such ambiguity must be construed in favor 
of coverage.  Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶20, 264 Wis. 2d 
617, 665 N.W.2d 857. 
¶93 For all the above reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶94 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissenting 
opinion. 
 
No.  2006AP818.lbb 
 
 
 
1