Case Title: State ex rel Metropolitan Public Defender v. Courtney

Citation: 

Docket Number: S50164

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: March 6, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE EX REL METROPOLITAN
PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES, INC.,
an Oregon corporation,
	Plaintiff-Relator,
	v.
HONORABLE PETER COURTNEY,
President of the Oregon Senate,
and HONORABLE KAREN MINNIS,
Speaker of the Oregon House of Representatives,
for themselves 
and on behalf of all other members
of the Oregon Legislative Assembly,
	Defendants.
(SC S50164)

	On petition for alternative writ of mandamus filed February
10, 2003.
	Don H. Marmaduke and Elden M. Rosenthal, Portland, filed the
petition for plaintiff-relator.
	Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed
the memorandum in opposition for defendants.  With her on the
memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
	William B. Crow and Christina Thacker, of Miller Nash LLP,
Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Fellows
of the American College of Trial Lawyers.
	Before Gillette, Presiding Justice, and Durham, Riggs, De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	Petition for alternative writ of mandamus denied.
	*Carson, Chief Justice, did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.
		DE MUNIZ, J.
		This is an original mandamus proceeding brought in this
court under ORS 34.120(2) and Article VII (Amended), section 2,
of the Oregon Constitution.  Relator is the principal provider of
legal defense services to indigent persons accused of crimes
committed in Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas counties. 
Defendants are the presiding officers of the two houses of the
Legislative Assembly and their legislative colleagues.  Relator
seeks an alternative writ of mandamus directing defendants to
provide what relator characterizes as "adequate" levels of
funding for relator and, as is more pertinent to this case, for
the judicial branch.  Relator alleges that the legislative branch
presently has failed to provide such levels of funding and that,
as a result, the judicial branch is being prevented from
performing its core functions (including trying criminal cases
involving indigent accused defendants).
		There is no question that this court has the inherent
power under the Oregon Constitution to ensure that the judicial
branch operates as an independent branch of government, free from
undue interference by the other branches.  See Rooney v.
Kulongoski, 322 Or 15, 28, 902 P2d 1143 (1995) (separation of
powers seeks to avoid potential for coercive influence between
governmental departments).  This court has not, however,
previously determined whether that inherent power extends so far
as to permit this court to order the legislative branch to
appropriate an amount of money deemed by this court to be
minimally necessary to support this court's core functions. (1) 
Neither side of the present controversy, however, appears to
question that this court's inherent power extends to that
exigency.  Therefore, for purposes of this opinion, we assume
that this court's power includes the authority to order the
legislature to provide certain minimum levels of funding to
sustain the core functions of the judicial branch.  Nevertheless,
we acknowledge that this court should exercise that power
sparingly, such as in circumstances in which it appears that the
ability of the judicial branch to perform its core functions is
at stake.  For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the
showing that relator makes regarding the problems presently
confronting the judiciary (and, indeed, state government as a
whole) falls short of demonstrating that this is a case in which
this court should exercise that inherent power.
		Relator alleges that, as a result of defendants' budget
actions, the Judicial Department has announced that, effective
March 1, 2003, counsel will not be available for appointment to
the following trial-level case types:
		 All nonperson misdemeanors (adult and juvenile);
		 All nonperson misdemeanor probation violations
(adult and juvenile);
		 All post-conviction relief cases;
		 All adult nonperson felony probation violations;
		 All adult contempts, except Family Abuse and
Prevention Act (violation of a restraining order) and
child support contempts;
		 All adult nonperson class C felonies (generally,
property and drug crimes);
		 All adult possession of controlled substance
felonies (including drug courts);
		 All adult class A and B property felonies;
		 80 percent of all adult person misdemeanor
probation violations (reserving 20 percent for courts
to be able to appoint counsel for the most egregious,
high-risk cases);
		 80 percent of all juvenile person misdemeanor
probation violations (reserving 20 percent, as above);
		 80 percent of all juvenile felony probation
violations (assumes 20 percent are person felony
probation violations); and 
		 All juvenile nonperson felonies.
		According to relator, the Legislative Assembly has cut
the Judicial Department's Indigent Defense Account budget so
deeply that, after March 1, 2003, the Judicial Department will be
unable to compensate indigent defense counsel in the kinds of
cases set out above, thereby rendering the judicial branch
incapable of performing its constitutionally mandated function of
adjudicating whole categories of criminal cases.  Relator
contends that the failure to adjudicate those cases violates the
Oregon Constitution's requirement that there be a separation of
powers exercised by the legislative and judicial branches of
state government.
		Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution
provides: 
		"The powers of the Government shall be divided
into three seperate (sic) departments, the Legislative,
the Executive, including the administrative, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with official duties
under one of these departments, shall exercise any of
the functions of another, except as in this
Constitution expressly provided." 
This court previously has not confronted a separation-of-powers
claim based on an assertion that the legislature has not
adequately funded the judicial branch.  However, in a related
context, this court has observed that
		"[t]he power reserved to the judiciary by Art III,
s 1, is neither absolute nor exclusive.  As we said in
a recent decision:
			"'The separation of powers principle
cannot in practice work absolutely; there is
a necessary overlap between the governmental
functions.  The rule has evolved that
legislation can affect the practice of law so
long as it does not unduly burden or
substantially interfere with the judiciary.'
Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 275 Or 279, 285,
550 P2d 1218 (1976)."
State ex rel Acocella v. Allen, 288 Or 175, 180-81, 604 P2d 391
(1979); see also State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or 597,
617, 932 P2d 1145 (1997), quoting State ex rel Frohnmayer v.
Oregon State Bar, 307 Or 304, 310, 767 P2d 893 (1989) (exercise
of power constitutionally assigned to one branch of government
often will have direct impact on another branch, and determining
such an impact does not, itself, violate the constitution).
		In Circuit Court v. AFSCME, 295 Or 542, 669 P2d 314
(1983), this court commented that, in evaluating a challenge
under Article III, section 1, the appropriate inquiry is whether
the action of another branch of government has interfered with
the judiciary in a manner that prevents or obstructs the
performance of the judicial branch's irreducible constitutional
task.  Id. at 550.  See also DeMendoza v. Huffman, 334 Or 425,
454, 51 P3d 1232 (2002) quoting AFSCME, 295 Or at 551 ("'[o]nly
an outright hindrance of a court's ability to adjudicate a case *
* * or the substantial destruction of the exercise of a power
essential to the adjudicatory function' will render legislation
constitutionally defective under Article VII (Amended), section
1") (ellipses in DeMendoza). (2)


		Those holdings, although arising in different contexts,
establish that, with respect to the judiciary, the separation of
powers principle is not offended by choices that the other
branches make, unless those choices unduly burden the capacity of
the judiciary to perform its core function.  
		The Oregon Constitution assigns the responsibility for
making fiscal appropriations and approving budgets to the
legislative and executive branches.  The legislature must weigh
the competing fiscal demands of each branch of government, and
the allocation of limited resources requires difficult choices. 
No court should consider challenging those choices on separation
of powers and inherent powers grounds, except under the
circumstances already described.
		We agree that the budgetary crisis currently faced by
state government and, in particular, the judicial branch, is
severe and that the consequences to the judiciary are
unprecedented and regrettable.  However, the budgetary reductions
forced on the judicial branch, as alleged in relator's petition,
have not and will not prevent the judicial branch from carrying
out its core functions until the end of the biennium.  That being
so, the exercise, through mandamus, of the judiciary's inherent
power (which, as noted, we assume to exist for the purpose of
this opinion) is not yet warranted.  We therefore deny the
petition for an alternative writ of mandamus.
		Petition for alternative writ of mandamus denied.


1. 	Other courts have held that the power of the judicial
branch does indeed extend that far.  See, e.g., Folsom v. Wynn,
631 So 2d 890, 898-99 (Ala 1993) (inherent power of judiciary to
assure adequate funding for itself stems from (1) its position as
separate and coequal branch of government; and (2) fact that
essential services are constitutionally required of judiciary on
behalf of every person in each jurisdiction); Judges For the
Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 386 Mich 1, 14, 190 NW
2d 228, 231 (Mich 1971) (constitutional court possesses inherent
power to sustain its existence); State ex rel Durkin v. City
Council of Youngstown, 9 Ohio St 3d 132, 134-35, 459 NE 2d 213,
216 (Ohio 1984) (principle well established that administration
of justice by judiciary cannot be impeded by other branches of
government; courts' authority to effectuate orderly and efficient
administration of justice without monetary limitations by
legislature is within inherent powers of courts); Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania ex rel Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa 45, 57, 274 A2d 193,
199 (Pa 1971) (if legislature could not be compelled by courts to
provide necessary funding for judiciary, then "judicial system
could be extirpated" by legislature); In the Matter of the Salary
of the Juvenile Director, 87 Wash 2d 232, 245, 552 P2d 163, 170-71 (Wash 1976) (separation of powers doctrine dictates that court
possesses inherent power to protect itself in performance of its
constitutional duties; it is not logical to conclude that
constitution denies judges authority to determine basic needs of
their courts). 	

2. 	Article VII (Amended), section 1, provides, in part:
		"The judicial power of the state shall be vested
in one supreme court and in such other courts as may
from time to time be created by law."