Case Title: MERCY REGIONAL MEDICAL CTR. v. Doiron

Citation: 348 So. 2d 243

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1977-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
348 So. 2d 243 (1977) MERCY REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER v. Camille C. DOIRON. No. 49210. Supreme Court of Mississippi. July 6, 1977. Rehearing Denied August 3, 1977. Ramsey, Bodron, Thames & Robinson, Lee Davis Thames, Vicksburg, for appellant. Teller, Biedenharn & Rogers, Landman Teller, Jr., Vicksburg, for appellee. Before INZER, P.J., and SUGG and LEE, JJ. SUGG, Justice, for the Court. This is a negligence case from the Circuit Court of Warren County. Mrs. Camille C. Doiron was awarded $25,000 damages as a result of injuries sustained when she fell on a stairway situated on the property of defendant, Mercy Regional Medical Center. The question presented in this case is: Did the Hospital's failure to provide a handrail on steps to a parking lot constitute a breach of its duty to use ordinary care in keeping its premises in a reasonably safe condition? Plaintiff enrolled in the School of Nursing at Mercy Regional Medical Center in August, 1972. During orientation the hospital officials explained to the students that they would be required to park in the lower parking lot located across the street from the Hospital down a grassy hill. Concrete steps lead from the lower parking lot up the hill to the street adjacent to the Hospital. There are thirty steps, four feet wide, with gutters on both sides leading from the lower parking lot to the street. The steps were constructed of concrete with a five and one-half inch riser and a twelve inch tread. No complaint is made about the width of the tread, or the height of the riser, but the negligence charged is that the defendant failed to provide a handrail to be used by persons ascending and descending the steps. On the afternoon of December 13, 1972 plaintiff, accompanied by a fellow student, was descending the steps leading to the lower parking area. Approximately halfway down the steps plaintiff lost her balance for no apparent reason, unsuccessfully attempted to grab for something to enable her to regain her balance, and fell to the ground on the right side of the steps. There was no debris on the steps, the steps were not wet or slippery and the condition of the steps did not cause her to lose her balance. Her sole charge of negligence was the absence of a handrail on the steps. She *244 testified that had there been a handrail she would not have fallen. Defendant requested a peremptory instruction which was refused and, following the verdict of the jury, filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So. 2d 652 (Miss. 1975) we held that the evidence considered on a request for a judgment n.o.v. embraces the testimony on behalf of plaintiff as well as that of the defendant, there being no difference between that considered for a peremptory instruction and a judgment n.o.v. because the latter is entertained only to correct the court's error in refusing a requested peremptory instruction. We further stated in Paymaster that the jury resolves conflicts of fact while the court resolves issues of law arising from non-conflicting facts. There was no conflict in the evidence so the issue of negligence was for the court. City of Greenville v. Laury, 172 Miss. 118, 159 So. 121 (1935) was cited with approval in Supreme Instruments Corp. v. Lehr, 190 Miss. 600, 199 So. 294, Sugg. of Error Sustained, 1 So. 2d 242 (1941). In Laury, we held: In Supreme Instruments, supra, we held: In Supreme Instruments, the case was first affirmed by this Court which divided three three on the question of affirmance. On suggestion of error the case was reversed and judgment rendered for the appellant who was the defendant in the trial court. In a dissenting opinion when the case was originally before the court, Justice Griffith stated: When the Court reversed its original holding, the principle expressed by Judge Griffith in his dissent was adopted by the Court in different language. The duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff is well established in our jurisprudence. In Stanley v. Morgan & Lindsey, Inc., 203 So. 2d 473 (Miss. 1967) we stated: In this case the defendant owed the plaintiff the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition for the use of plaintiff who was an invitee. The question then may be simply put, did the defendant exercise reasonable care to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition? It is true that a handrail may have afforded the *246 plaintiff a means of regaining her equilibrium when she accidentally stumbled while descending the steps. It is also true that if a fellow employee had been stationed there to catch her the injury might have been avoided, but we are not dealing here with the question of making premises absolutely safe but with an alleged failure to exercise reasonable care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Most, if not all of us, use steps almost daily. Certainly any reasonable person recognizes the necessity of maintaining his balance when ascending or descending a stairway. Absent an unknown or concealed defect in a stairway, if it is otherwise reasonably safe, no negligence exists. In Supreme Instruments, we stated: In this case the steps were built on the ground which sloped gradually down from the street to the lower parking lot and did not constitute a hazard to one using due care when using them. This case does not fall within the rule that, where facts are undisputed, but reasonable minds may draw different inferences as to negligence therefrom, solution of the issue of negligence should be left to the jury. We are of the opinion that plaintiff's injury belongs to that class of ordinary accidents which are properly imputed to the carelessness or the misfortune of the one injured. The peremptory instruction requested by the defendant should have been given. REVERSED AND RENDERED. GILLESPIE, C.J., PATTERSON and INZER, P. JJ., and SMITH, ROBERTSON, WALKER, BROOM and LEE, JJ., concur.