Case Title: Rodney A. Arneson v. Marcia Jezwinski

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
95-1592 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
Rodney A. Arneson,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Marcia Jezwinski, Personnel Coordinator, 
Administrative Data Processing, UW-Madison, 
Durwood Meyer, Assistant Director, 
Administrative Data Processing, UW-Madison and 
Dan Thoftne, Computer Operations Manager, 
Administrative Data Processing, UW-Madison,  
 
Defendants-Appellants.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  217 Wis. 2d 288, 577 N.W.2d 386 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Unpublished) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 5, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 6, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit  
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
Moria Krueger 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: Abrahamson, C.J., did not participate 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner there 
were briefs by Jacqueline Macaulay and Macaulay Law Office, 
Madison and oral argument by Jacquelien Macaulay. 
 
 
For the defendants-appellants the cause was 
argued by Richard Briles Moriarty, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
95-1592 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 95-1592 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Rodney A. Arneson,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Marcia Jezwinski, Personnel Coordinator,  
Administrative Data Processing,  
UW-Madison, Durwood Meyer, Assistant  
Director, Administrative Data Processing,  
UW-Madison and Dan Thoftne, Computer  
Operations Manager, Administrative Data  
Processing, UW-Madison,  
 
          Defendants-Appellants.  
FILED 
 
MAY 5, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
DONALD 
W. 
STEINMETZ, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Rodney 
Arneson, seeks review of a court of appeals' decision that 
reversed the circuit court's denial of the defendants' motion 
for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.  Arneson 
contends that the defendants are not entitled to qualified 
immunity from his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit because when they 
demoted him and suspended him without pay for 30 days following 
a sexual harassment complaint filed against him by a subordinate 
employee, they violated his clearly established constitutionally 
protected property interests in his wages and continuous 
employment.   
No. 
95-1592 
 
2 
¶2 
This court is presented with the following question: 
whether, in April 1990, when the defendants suspended the 
plaintiff without pay for 30 days and demoted him following a 
complaint of sexual harassment, they had reason to be aware that 
their actions 
would violate 
Arneson's 
clearly 
established 
constitutional rights.  This question demands that we resolve 
the following issues: did state law clearly establish in April 
1990 that Arneson had a property interest in his wages and in 
his continuous employment and, if so, did federal law clearly 
establish in April 1990 the amount of due process Arneson was 
entitled to receive prior to being deprived of his property 
interests.  If the answer to either question is "no", the 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.  As we answer 
"yes" to the first question and "no" to the second, we find that 
the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 
I 
¶3 
The parties agree that for purposes of the qualified 
immunity inquiry on summary judgment, as we are presented the 
case, the factual findings made by the Wisconsin Personnel 
Commission in Arneson's direct appeal of his discipline are 
undisputed.  The direct appeal, which will be detailed more 
fully below, has been fully resolved.1  In describing the 
background of this case, we draw where appropriate from the 
Commission's findings. 
                     
1 See Arneson v. University of Wisconsin, Wis. Pers. Comm. 
No. 90-0184-PC (May 14, 1992). 
No. 
95-1592 
 
3 
¶4 
Rodney Arneson was a University of Wisconsin employee 
when, in March 1990, a female employee whom he supervised filed 
a sexual harassment complaint against him.  When the complaint 
was 
filed, 
Arneson 
was 
employed 
by 
the 
University 
of 
WisconsinMadison, Administrative Data Processing (ADP) as a 
Management 
Information 
Specialist 
Supervisor 
4 
(MIS 
4 
supervisor).2  He had been promoted to the position of MIS 4 
supervisor in January 1990, and, at the time of the complaint, 
was within the statutorily defined probationary period that 
accompanies 
promotions 
within 
state 
public 
employment 
as 
provided by Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(a) and (am) (1989-90).3  Prior 
to the January 1990 promotion, Arneson had attained permanent 
status in class as an MIS 3 employee4 and had been working for 
the University for approximately nine years. 
                     
2 The ADP has since been renamed the Department of 
Information and Technology (DoIT).  
3 All references are to the 1989-90 version of the statutes 
unless otherwise noted.  
4 We note a discrepancy between the record and the parties' 
oral arguments with respect to the position from which Arneson 
was promoted in January 1990.  The record, as evidenced most 
clearly in the Personnel Commission’s Findings of Fact, provides 
that Arneson was promoted from an MIS 3 non-supervisory position 
to an MIS 4 supervisory position.  However, during their oral 
arguments, the parties appear to have agreed that Arneson was 
promoted from an MIS 4 non-supervisory position to an MIS 4 
supervisory position.  As will become clear, since part of the 
discipline which Arneson claims deprived him of a property 
interest included a demotion to a position below MIS 3, it 
matters little for our purposes here whether at the time of his 
promotion Arneson was employed within a classification of MIS 3 
or MIS 4 non-supervisory. 
No. 
95-1592 
 
4 
¶5 
Arneson was the immediate supervisor of the female 
complainant, a high school student who worked as a tape operator 
for the ADP.  On March 9, 1990, the female employee brought to 
work a bridal magazine, and while she was looking at it Arneson 
began talking and joking with her about the magazine and her 
wedding plans.  Later that evening, the female employee gave him 
the magazine.  When he returned it, Arneson told her that the 
most interesting thing in the magazine was a girl modeling a 
bra.  Arneson also told her that he owned a camera and enjoyed 
taking pictures of beautiful things and that he believed that 
the most beautiful thing was a woman in her bra. 
¶6 
The female employee volunteered to Arneson that she 
was not interested in modeling for him, but that her sister 
modeled and might be interested.  Arneson asked about the 
sister's looks and the female employee showed him her sister's 
picture.  Arneson also asked the female employee to call her 
sister, which she did.  Arneson then spoke with the sister and 
told her that he wanted to take pictures of her wearing a bra 
and slip, and that he would pay her $20 per hour to model for 
him. 
¶7 
Arneson further explained that he had taken similar 
pictures in the past, that he was married, that the photos were 
for his personal use, and that he could take the pictures at her 
house, his house, or on campus.  The three then made plans to 
speak about further arrangements on the following Monday. 
¶8 
On that following Monday, March 12, the female 
employee told Arneson that her sister was not interested in 
No. 
95-1592 
 
5 
modeling for him.  After a brief discussion, neither Arneson nor 
the employee again spoke about taking photos. 
¶9 
The female employee did not go to work on Tuesday, 
March 13, although she returned on March 14.  On March 15, the 
employee 
notified 
the 
defendant 
Durwood 
Meyer, 
Assistant 
Director of ADP, that Arneson had sexually harassed her.  Meyer 
contacted 
the 
defendant 
Marcia 
Jezwinksi, 
ADP 
Personnel 
Coordinator, later that same day.  On March 17, Jezwinski 
telephoned the female employee at her home and set up an 
appointment to speak with both her and her sister. 
¶10 On 
Monday, 
March 
19, 
Jezwinksi 
interviewed 
the 
employee and her sister.  Both filled out formal sexual 
harassment complaints against Arneson, and Jezwinski asked that 
neither discuss the lawsuit with anyone.  However, the next day, 
the female employee did discuss the sexual harassment with 
another employee at the ADP.  That employee later told yet 
another employee, who, in turn, told Arneson on March 22 that 
Arneson was the subject of a sexual harassment complaint. 
¶11 On 
March 
23, 
Arneson 
sought 
out 
Jezwinski 
who 
confirmed that the female employee had filed a sexual harassment 
complaint against him.  The two then scheduled a meeting between 
themselves 
and 
Arneson's 
immediate 
supervisor, 
the 
third 
defendant in this matter, Dan Thoftne, for later in the day. 
¶12 The Personnel Commission's Findings of Fact described 
this meeting between Arneson, Jezwinski, and Thoftne as follows: 
 
The meeting took place as scheduled.  At the meeting, 
Jezwinski 
asked 
Arneson 
questions 
about 
his 
No. 
95-1592 
 
6 
interaction with the employe and her sister regarding 
taking photos.  Jezwinski told Arneson very little 
about the employe's allegations, except to the extent 
they were corroborated by Arneson's statements.  At 
the close of the meeting, Arneson was directed to stay 
away from the employe and not talk to anyone about the 
matter.  The employe was reassigned to the print room. 
The commission further found that at this meeting, Arneson was 
given an opportunity to talk and before the meeting ended 
Jezwinski told Arneson that while she did not know what was 
going to happen, any level of discipline from reprimand through 
suspension or termination was possible. 
¶13 On April 2, Thoftne and Meyer told Arneson that he was 
suspended with pay pending investigation of the employee's 
complaint.  A letter of suspension was given Arneson by Thoftne 
and Meyer in Meyer's office. 
¶14 On April 19, Arneson was given a letter of discipline. 
 He was called into a meeting with both Thoftne and Meyer, who 
went through the details of the discipline which included a 30-
day suspension without pay and a demotion to a position to be 
later determined, which was accompanied by a reduction in pay 
from $15.51/hr. to $12.659/hr.  On May 3, 1990, Arneson was 
informed by letter that he was assigned to a Data Processing 
Operations Technicians 4 (DPOT4).  There is no dispute that this 
position was below the position which Arneson held prior to his 
promotion to MIS 4 supervisor. 
¶15 On May 15, 1990, Arneson filed an appeal of the 
disciplinary action with the Wisconsin Personnel Commission 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 230.44(1)(c).  The Commission Examiner 
heard testimony over a three-day period in the fall of 1990 and 
No. 
95-1592 
 
7 
concluded 
that 
Arneson 
did 
not 
receive 
his 
right 
to 
predisciplinary due process, and that, in any event, his 
behavior with the female employee did not warrant the severe 
discipline he received. 
¶16 Subsequently, on February 6, 1992, the full Personnel 
Commission issued an interim decision and order adopting the 
hearing examiner's proposed decision and order.  The proposed 
decision included the following conclusions of law: 
 
 
1. This matter is properly before the Commission 
pursuant to § 230.44(1)(c), Stats.   
 
2. Respondent [University of Wisconsin System 
(Madison)] has the burden of proof. 
 
3. Respondent was required to have provided 
appellant with a predisciplinary hearing sufficient 
under the standards set forth in Cleveland Bd. Of 
Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 [] (1985).   
 
4. Respondent failed to provide an adequate 
predisciplinary hearing. 
 
5. This disciplinary action is defective and must 
be rejected. 
¶17 Based on its conclusion that Arneson was entitled to a 
predisciplinary hearing and did not receive it, the Commission 
ordered the University of WisconsinMadison to take action 
consistent with its decision; i.e., to reverse Arneson's 
discipline and restore him to his promotional position. 
¶18 Despite its conclusion that Arneson was denied his due 
process rights, the Commission deemed appropriate a discussion 
of the merits of the disciplinary action.  It found that because 
Arneson's actions were not illegal, threatening or intimidating, 
and did not constitute a "solicitation" nor violate the 
University's sexual 
harassment policy, 
the 
discipline the 
No. 
95-1592 
 
8 
University had imposed was excessive.  However, the Commission 
also found that Arneson had violated other work rules which 
would have supported a suspension of no more than five days 
without pay.  Of course, this discipline could not be maintained 
as the University had violated Arneson's right to due process. 
¶19 Neither party appealed the Commission’s ruling and 
order, and subsequently Arneson and the University entered into 
a settlement through which Arneson received monetary and 
equitable relief, attorneys' fees and costs. 
¶20 Subsequently, Arneson filed the instant action in Dane 
County Circuit Court, the Honorable Moria G. Krueger, under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1983,5 1985(3), and 1988, seeking declaratory and 
monetary relief from the defendants Jezwinski, Meyer, and 
Thoftne, in their individual capacities, including punitive 
damages, based on allegations that they had violated his 
constitutional right to due process of law when they disciplined 
him.6  Specifically, the complained-of deprivation of rights, as 
                     
5 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part: 
Every 
person 
who, 
under 
color 
of 
any 
statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress.  
 
6  The named defendants were not named in Arneson's appeal 
of his discipline before the Personnel Commission. 
No. 
95-1592 
 
9 
described 
in 
Arneson's 
complaint, 
are 
the 
following: 
1) 
defendants' imposition of excessive discipline based on an 
improperly investigated and false charge of sexual harassment 
without pre-disciplinary due process, and 2) defendants' failure 
to provide make-whole relief to plaintiff when ordered to do so 
by the Wisconsin Personnel Commission.  Arneson has alleged that 
both actions were undertaken individually and in concert, were 
arbitrary and capricious, and infringed on his constitutionally 
protected property and liberty interests. 
¶21 Arneson's claim that the defendants failed to provide 
make-whole relief when ordered to do so apparently had its roots 
in the negotiations that Arneson engaged in with the University 
following the Commission's decision that he be reinstated.  The 
circuit court dismissed this claim on the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, finding that Arneson had failed to provide any 
facts demonstrating that the defendants were involved in these 
negotiations.  This issue is not before us on appeal. 
¶22 The defendants also filed a motion for summary 
judgment asserting that qualified immunity barred Arneson's 
remaining claim.  The circuit court denied the defendants' 
motion.  This is the issue with which we are now presented. 
¶23 In its decision, the circuit court identified the rule 
governing its qualified immunity inquiry: the defendants are 
entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff's rights 
were clearly established in the law, such that a reasonable 
person would be aware that he or she was violating plaintiff's 
rights.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).  In deciding 
No. 
95-1592 
 
10
that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, the 
circuit court looked to decisions of the Wisconsin Personnel 
Commission for the "clearly established" federal law governing 
the due process rights claimed by the plaintiff. 
¶24 At the April 21, 1995, hearing on defendants' motion, 
the circuit court stated:  
 
I tend to agree with the defendants' reading of the 
federal cases; that there are some cases in which you 
might say that there are certainthat there are 
certain rights that should be given, but I think 
they're quite distinguishable, there are not bright 
lights out there in which I could say the defendants 
should have known this is really what they have done 
and we have the 7th Circuit cases I referenced earlier 
that suspension may well be a different animal than 
termination.  So I can't look at those federal cases 
and say, yup, these defendants were on notice that 
they really better do this a certain way as regards 
Mr. Arneson.  And on that basis . . . I can't look to 
the federal cases to make the decision. 
(emphasis supplied).   
¶25 The circuit court then requested that the defendants 
present the court with Wisconsin Personnel Commission cases 
preceding the April 1990 discipline that would support their 
motion.  The court also explained that "the issue I'm looking to 
is what should form the basis of determining what clearly 
established law the defendants should have looked to."  The two 
choices the circuit court then considered to be relevant to 
clearly established law were Wisconsin Personnel Commission 
cases or the Wisconsin Statutes, and it asked the parties to 
submit letter briefs in response. 
No. 
95-1592 
 
11
¶26 Before the circuit court, in support of a position 
that it has since apparently abandoned, the defendants argued 
that the clearly established law may be found in Personnel 
Commission decisions, and that those decisions predating 1990 
demonstrate that the law did not clearly establish a state 
employee's right to a presuspension hearing.  The circuit court 
disagreed with the defendants. 
¶27 In denying the defendants' motion, the circuit court 
noted that some federal law supported Arneson's position that a 
suspension 
be 
preceded 
with 
a 
due 
process 
hearing.  
Significantly, though, the circuit court relied most heavily 
upon a decision of the Wisconsin Personnel Commission, noting as 
it did so that a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
provided that in an extraordinary case, decisions of "other 
courts" could establish the law.  See Ohio Service Employees 
Assn. v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177-78 (6th Cir. 1988). 
¶28 Relying then upon Commission decisions prior to April 
1990, the circuit court found that Arneson's right to due 
process was clearly established at the time of his suspension, 
and, therefore, the defendants could not maintain a defense of 
qualified immunity. 
¶29 The defendants appealed the circuit court's nonfinal 
order.  The court of appeals declined leave to appeal, and then 
asked this court to determine under what circumstances denials 
of qualified immunity interlocutory appeals could be made.  This 
court granted the certification and held that interlocutory 
appeals from a denial of qualified immunity on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
No. 
95-1592 
 
12
claims should always be allowed where the denial turns on legal 
issues and the appealing party timely files a petition for leave 
to appeal.  Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 229, 556 
N.W.2d 721 (1996). 
¶30 On remand, the court of appeals, in an unpublished 
decision, found that both criteria for granting leave to appeal 
an interlocutory order were met in this case.  The court of 
appeals then reversed the circuit court and held that the 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 
¶31 The court of appeals framed the issue before it as 
whether "at the time of Arneson's disciplinary transfer, either 
Wisconsin law or federal law clearly granted him an established 
'property interest' either in the position he then occupied or 
in his former position, which would warrant the conclusion that 
the defendants did not enjoy qualified immunity from his 
lawsuit." The court concluded that neither Wisconsin nor federal 
law so provided.   
¶32 The court observed that Arneson's claim was somewhat 
ambiguous:  it could be read as a claim that he was deprived 
rights that accompanied his MIS 4 supervisor position, or in the 
alternative, a claim that he was deprived rights in his MIS 3 
position.  The court addressed both.  It first found that 
Arneson had no rights in the MIS 4 supervisor position that were 
constitutionally protected.  Turning to the second alternative, 
the court concluded that if Arneson was claiming rights to his 
original position, he had "essentially" been reinstated to that 
position following the Personnel Commission's finding that he 
No. 
95-1592 
 
13
had not been accorded due process.  The court of appeals 
believed that the post-disciplinary procedures by which Arneson 
was 
reinstated 
and 
provided 
back 
pay 
provided 
him 
with 
sufficient due process protection and that the defendants, 
therefore, were entitled to qualified immunity. 
¶33 Arneson appealed that decision and we now affirm the 
court of appeals' conclusion that the defendants are entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
II 
¶34 Whether the defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity 
is a question 
of 
law that 
this 
court decides 
independently of and without deference to the reasoning of the 
lower courts.  Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 
458, 468, 565 N.W.2d 521 (1997);  Barnhill v. Board of Regents, 
166 Wis. 2d 395, 406, 479 N.W.2d 917 (1992).  It is a question 
that is appropriately resolved at the summary judgment stage, 
Penterman, 211 Wis. 2d at 468-69, and is appropriate when there 
are no genuine issues as to any material facts and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Wis. Stat. § 
802.08(2) (1997-98).7 
                     
7 Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2) states in relevant part: 
The 
judgment 
sought 
shall 
be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law.  
No. 
95-1592 
 
14
 
¶35 Qualified 
immunity 
is 
a 
judicial 
doctrine 
that 
protects government officials performing discretionary functions 
from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate a 
person's clearly established statutory or constitutional right 
of which a reasonable person would have known.  Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818; Barnhill, 166 Wis. 2d at 406.  The 
qualified immunity inquiry "turns on the objective legal 
reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal 
rules that were clearly established at the time the action was 
taken."  Barnhill, 166 Wis. 2d at 407 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. 
at 818-19).  As we explained in Barnhill: 
 
If the law was not clearly established on the subject 
of the action when it occurred, then the public 
official cannot be held to know or anticipate that the 
conduct was unlawful.  On the other hand, if the law 
was clearly established, then the immunity defense 
should fail because a reasonably competent public 
official should have known that the conduct was or was 
not lawful. 
Id.; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-819.  Officials who violate the 
laws that are not clearly established at the time of their 
actions, regardless of later evolution in the law, are entitled 
to qualified immunity.  Lojuk v. Johnson, 770 F.2d 619, 628 (7th 
Cir. 1985).  To be clearly established, case law must clearly 
and consistently recognize the constitutional right claimed.  
Id. 
Source of Clearly Established Law 
¶36 The proceedings of this case in the courts below 
evince some confusion over the source of clearly established law 
No. 
95-1592 
 
15
that is to govern a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 Where a plaintiff alleges the violation of a constitutionally 
protected property interest in a job, two sources of law are 
considered, each which governs a separate part of the qualified 
immunity inquiry.  First, as a threshold issue, whether the 
plaintiff has a substantive property interest in his or her 
employment is determined exclusively by state law.  Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Flynn v. Kornwolf, 83 
F.3d 924, 926 (7th Cir. 1996); Vorvald v. School Dist. of River 
Falls, 167 Wis. 2d 549, 556, 482 N.W.2d 93 (1992).  Therefore, 
whether the plaintiff has a property interest in his wages and 
in his continuous employment is a question to be answered by 
looking to state law. 
¶37 However, 
"federal 
constitutional 
law 
determines 
whether that [substantive property] interest rises to the level 
of a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' protected by the Due 
Process Clause."  Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 
U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)).  Federal law governs the 
question of how much due process Arneson must be accorded before 
he is deprived of his property interests.  As have the parties, 
the courts below expressed some uncertainty as to where the 
source of clearly established federal law on this question may 
be found. 
¶38 The United States Supreme Court has not dispositively 
determined the question.  The most definitive word it has 
offered may be found in Harlow, where the Court avoided the 
No. 
95-1592 
 
16
question of what decisional law would establish the "state of 
the law," but implied that an evaluation of the federal law 
could only be made by reference to the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court, the federal courts of appeals, or the 
federal district courts.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.32. 
¶39 The Dane County Circuit Court, in deciding that 
Personnel Commission decisions could be the source of clearly 
established law, relied upon the following discussion from a 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision which stated that  
 
to find a clearly established constitutional right, a 
district court must find binding precedent by the 
Supreme Court, its court of appeals or itself.  In an 
extraordinary case, it may be possible for the 
decisions of other courts to clearly establish a 
principle of law.  For the decisions of other courts 
to provide such 'clearly established law,' these 
decisions 
must 
both 
point 
unmistakably 
to 
the 
unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and 
be so clearly foreshadowed by 
applicable 
direct 
authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a 
reasonable officer that his conduct, if challenged on 
constitutional grounds, would be found wanting. 
Seiter, 858 F.2d at 1177-78 (emphasis supplied, as it was in the 
circuit court decision).  The circuit court's reliance on this 
language is misplaced, for the Seiter court's reference to 
"other courts" may include the persuasive authority of other 
circuit courts of appeals, and perhaps other district courts, 
but could certainly not have referred to decisions of state 
administrative agencies.  See e.g., Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 
518, 525 (7th Cir. 1995)(the Seventh Circuit found unpersuasive 
the Sixth Circuit's "aside" that a district court could clearly 
establish the law). 
No. 
95-1592 
 
17
¶40 We have discovered no cases in which the source of 
clearly 
established 
federal 
law 
included 
decisions 
of 
administrative 
agencies 
such 
as 
the 
Wisconsin 
Personnel 
Commission.  And while Arneson relies in part on decisions of 
the Commission, he has provided us with no authority for his 
view that those decisions are authority on the question of 
federal law.  Decisions of state administrative bodies do not 
create federal law; nor do they provide the contours of clearly 
established federal law.  Hence, we do not consider these 
administrative decisions in determining whether the defendants 
knew what the clearly established federal law governing his due 
process rights was at the time they disciplined Arneson. 
¶41 While of greatest value, a Supreme Court decision on 
"all fours" is not necessary to overcome a qualified immunity 
defense.  In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Harlow 
which left unanswered the source of federal law, the Seventh 
Circuit has observed that "reliance on Supreme Court decisions 
alone might be inappropriate (unless they are the only cases 
ruling on the question), because they are infrequent in 
comparison to the decisions of the district and appellate 
courts, and this infrequency could have the practical effect of 
converting qualified immunity into absolute immunity."  Benson 
v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 275 (7th Cir. 1986).  Furthermore, the 
United States Supreme Court has acknowledged when it was itself 
determining the source of clearly established law, that "for 
purposes of determining whether a constitutional right was 
clearly established, the Court may look to the law of the 
No. 
95-1592 
 
18
relevant circuit at the time of the conduct in question."  
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 243 (1991)(citing Davis v. 
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1984)). 
¶42 At a minimum, defendants should be held aware of the 
controlling authority of this state, as well as the highly 
persuasive authority found within the Seventh Circuit.  However, 
the absence of controlling authority on point should not be 
dispositive that the law is not clearly established.  See 
Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 952 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(citing Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427, 431 (7th 
Cir. 1989)).  Instead, where there is no controlling authority 
on point, the parties must point to "such a clear trend in the 
caselaw that [they] can say with fair assurance that the 
recognition of the right by a controlling precedent was merely a 
question of time."  Id. (quoting Cleveland-Perdue, 881 F.2d at 
431).  To so show, "rulings in other circuits are instructive on 
what the law is as to constitutionally protected rights."  
Spreen v. Brey, 961 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir. 1992).  But see 
Kolman v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d 429, 434, (7th Cir. 1994)(the court 
intimated that if the Seventh Circuit did not have an analogous 
case, the defendant would be qualifiedly immune for his or her 
actions). 
¶43 In considering the weight to accord district court 
decisions, we recognize that by themselves, they cannot "clearly 
establish a constitutional right," Anderson, 72 F.3d at 525 
(emphasis in the original)(citing Jermosen v. Smith, 945 F.2d 
No. 
95-1592 
 
19
547, 551 (2nd Cir. 1991)), for they "have no weight as 
precedents, no authority."  Anderson, 72 F.3d at 525.  However,  
 
[t]hey are evidence of the state of the law.  Taken 
together with other evidence, they might show that the 
law had been clearly established.  But by themselves 
they cannot clearly establish the law because, while 
they bind the parties by virtue of the doctrine of res 
judicata, they are not authoritative as precedent and 
therefore do not establish the duties of nonparties. 
Anderson, 72 F.3d at 525. 
¶44 In summary, we believe that on the question governed 
by federal law, and with a view to the guidelines described 
above, this court should, as does the Seventh Circuit, "look to 
whatever decisional law is available to ascertain whether the 
law has been clearly established."  McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d 
567, 570 (7th Cir. 1995)(citing  Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 
1180, 1209 (7th Cir. 1988)(en banc)).  A "'sufficient consensus 
based on all relevant case law, indicating that the officials' 
conduct was unlawful' is required."  Id. (quoting Henderson v. 
DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1058-59 (7th Cir. 1991)(quoting 
Landstrom v. Illinois Dept. of Children & Family Serv., 892 F.2d 
670, 676 (7th Cir. 1990))). 
III 
¶45 Although qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, 
once raised, the plaintiff in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim bears the 
burden of demonstrating by closely analogous case law that the 
defendants have violated his clearly established constitutional 
right.  See Penterman, 211 Wis. 2d at 469 (citing Burkes v. 
Klauser, 185 Wis. 2d 308, 327, 517 N.W.2d 503 (1994)). 
No. 
95-1592 
 
20
¶46 As a first step, we look to see whether plaintiff's 
complaint, even when accepted as true, states a cognizable 
violation of constitutional rights.  If it does not, the 
plaintiff's claim fails.  Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel 
Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 1997)(citing Young v. 
Murphy, 90 F.3d 1225, 1234 (7th Cir. 1996)).  This is because 
"[a] necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the 
constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is 'clearly 
established' 
at 
the 
time 
the 
defendant 
acted 
is 
the 
determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation 
of a constitutional right at all."  Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232. 
¶47 In a section 1983 claim for a violation of procedural 
due process, a plaintiff must show a deprivation by state action 
of a constitutionally protected interest in "life, liberty, or 
property" without due process of law.  Penterman, 211 Wis. 2d at 
473 (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)).  This 
showing requires that there exists a liberty or property 
interest which has been interfered with by the State and that 
the 
procedures 
attendant 
upon 
that 
interference 
were 
constitutionally 
insufficient. 
 
Should 
Arneson 
make 
this 
showing, in order to overcome the qualified immunity defense, he 
must also demonstrate that both the interest and the procedures 
attendant upon the deprivation of his interest were clearly 
established in 1990, such that reasonable officials in the 
defendants' positions would have been aware their actions 
violated Arneson's rights. 
 
No. 
95-1592 
 
21
What property interests has Arneson alleged, and were those 
interests clearly established in 1990? 
¶48 We note that the parties, and the courts below, did 
not coherently identify the precise property interest Arneson 
claimed.  This interest must be clearly identified before we can 
engage in a consideration of the constitutional right Arneson 
claims has been violated. 
¶49 Despite the defendants' arguments in both their briefs 
and at oral argument, we do not understand Arneson to be 
claiming any protected interest in his position as an MIS 4 
supervisor.  Instead, we find that the property interest which 
Arneson claims is constitutionally protected is related to his 
employment in the MIS 3 non-supervisor position he held prior to 
his promotion in January 1990.  
¶50 At oral argument, Arneson admitted that he did not 
have a constitutionally protected property interest in his MIS 4 
supervisory position, which he conceded was a position in which 
he served as a probationary employee pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 230.28(1)(a) and (am), and, therefore, a position in which he 
had no protection.  We therefore direct our discussion to his 
argument that when he was promoted, he maintained his statutory 
rights to the position he held prior to the promotion, the non-
supervisor MIS 3 position. 
¶51 In Roth, 408 U.S. 564, the United States Supreme Court 
explained that property interests are not created by the 
Constitution, but rather, "are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
No. 
95-1592 
 
22
independent source such as state lawrules or understandings 
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of 
entitlement to those benefits." Id. at 577; see also, Vorvald, 
167 Wis. 2d at 556 (in determining whether one has a property 
interest in a job, this court examines state law). Thus, the 
property interest Arneson had in his pre-promotion position, if 
any, is to be determined from an examination of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, and in particular Wis. Stat. Chapter 230, which 
governs State Employment Relations, as well as our case law 
interpreting the statutes. 
¶52 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 230.34(1)(a), a person who 
has permanent status in class "may be removed, suspended without 
pay, discharged, reduced in base pay or demoted only for just 
cause."  Wis. Stat. § 230.34(1)(a).  An employee who may be 
dismissed only for "just cause" has a property interest in 
continued employment which is protected by the due process 
clause of the federal constitution.  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 
538-41; see also State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council, 72 Wis. 
2d 672, 678, 242 N.W.2d 689 (1976); Phares v. Gustafsson, 856 
F.2d 1003, 1010 (7th Cir. 1988).  The parties here do not 
dispute that as an MIS 3 employee just prior to his promotion, 
Arneson did have permanent status in class, and as such, a 
property interest in continued employment that was protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.   
¶53 The parties are also in agreement that the property 
interest an employee has in his or her supervisory position as a 
probationary promotion employee is governed by Wis. Stat. 
No. 
95-1592 
 
23
§ 230.28(1)(a) and (am) which together provide that an employee 
promoted to a supervisory position must serve a one-year 
probationary period, unless waived after six months, during 
which time, "dismissal may be made at any time" without cause.  
Wis. Stat. § 230.29 (1)(a) and (am).8 
¶54 The parties' point of dispute is the effect of the 
promotion, 
and 
the 
accompanying 
probationary 
period, 
on 
Arneson's property interests in his pre-promotion position, the 
only position for which Arneson is claiming constitutional 
protection.  The defendants argue that when Arneson was promoted 
from his MIS 3 position to the MIS 4 supervisor position, he 
forfeited his permanent status that he held as an MIS 3 
employee.  That is, they argue that Arneson lost the protection 
of his permanent status with his promotion when he fell subject 
to the probationary period all promoted employees to supervisory 
positions are subject to under Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(a) and 
                     
8 Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(a) provides in relevant part: 
 
 
All original and all promotional appointments to 
permanent, sessional and seasonal positions, with the 
exception of those positions designated as supervisor 
or management under s. 111.81, in the classified 
service shall be for a probationary period of 6 
months . . . .  Dismissal may be made at any time 
during such periods. 
 
Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(am) provides in relevant part that 
"[a]ll probationary periods for employes in supervisory or 
management positions are one year unless waived after 6 
months . . . ." 
No. 
95-1592 
 
24
(am).  In their view, any permanent employee could be terminated 
without cause upon that employee's acceptance of a promotion, 
regardless of that employee's length of service with the state. 
 
¶55 The defendants are in error, for they have not given 
appropriate weight to Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(d), which must be 
read in pari materia with § 230.28(1)(a) and (am).  We consider 
the subsection here in determining the extent of Arneson's 
property interests in his employment: 
 
A promotion or other change in job status within an 
agency shall not affect the permanent status in class 
and rights, previously acquired by an employe within 
such agency. 
Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(d).   
¶56 When Arneson was promoted within ADP, he had already 
acquired permanent status in class and rights as an MIS 3 
employee and therefore he retained his permanent status pursuant 
to the dictates of Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(d).  And as an 
employee with permanent status in class, the defendants were 
required to abide by Wis. Stat. § 230.34(1)(a) when they 
disciplined him, just as they would have been required to do 
when disciplining any other permanent status employee. 
¶57 Despite 
the 
statute's 
unambiguous 
and 
express 
language, the defendants maintain that our decision in DHSS v. 
State Personnel Bd., 84 Wis. 2d 675, 267 N.W.2d 644 (1978), 
requires a different outcome.  They argue that under DHSS, 
Arneson forfeited his property interest in permanent employment 
with the ADP when he was promoted because the case precludes any 
No. 
95-1592 
 
25
promoted state employee from carrying with him or her to his or 
her new position the previously acquired permanent status. 
¶58 The defendants misread our decision in DHSS, which, in 
fact, supports Arneson.  In DHSS, this court was presented with, 
among other issues, the question of whether the State Personnel 
Board had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's appeal alleging 
that 
his 
discharge 
from 
classified 
service 
within 
state 
employment was not for just cause.  As here, the plaintiff in 
DHSS had acquired permanent status in class prior to accepting a 
promotion.  While in the statutorily-defined probationary period 
governing the promoted position, the plaintiff was terminated.  
The plaintiff appealed the dismissal, requesting of the board 
consideration of whether his termination was with cause. 
¶59 This court held that the board only had jurisdiction 
to hear appeals from employees with permanent status in class, 
DHSS, 84 Wis. 2d at 680, and that the plaintiff, due to his 
promotion, did not have such permanent status due to his "inter-
departmental promotion."  Id. at 680-82. 
¶60 In determining that the plaintiff did not have any 
permanent status, this court first turned to the predecessor of 
the current Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(a), Wis. Stat. § 16.22(1)(a) 
(1975), which provided that "[a]ll original and all promotional 
appointments to permanent . . . positions in the classified 
service shall be for a probationary period of 6 months. . . .  
Dismissal may be made at any time during such periods."  We then 
recognized that an exception to § 16.22(1)(a) appeared in 
§ 16.22(1)(d)(1975), 
the 
equivalent 
of 
the 
current 
No. 
95-1592 
 
26
§ 230.28(1)(d), which provided that "[a] promotion or other 
change in job status within a department shall not affect the 
permanent status in class and rights, previously acquired by an 
employe 
within 
such 
department." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 16.22(1)(d)(1975).  In considering how the two provisions 
worked with one another, we stated that 
 
[s]ec. 16.22(1)(a) and (d), Stats., requires that 
promotional appointments in the classified service are 
subject to a six month probationary period, and 
possible discharge from the classified service.  If an 
employe is promoted within a department, he may be 
dismissed 
from 
the 
new 
position 
during 
the 
probationary period.  If dismissal from the new 
position occurs, the employe must be reinstated to his 
former position or a similar position within that 
department.  There is no effect on, '. . . permanent 
status in class and rights, previously acquired,' if 
the promotion is intra-departmental. 
DHSS, 84 Wis. 2d at 681 (emphasis supplied).  We then held that 
the plaintiff in DHSS did not have permanent status in class 
because the plaintiff in DHSS was promoted inter-departmentally 
and 
therefore 
forfeited 
his 
permanent 
status 
previously 
attained. 
¶61 Quite unlike the plaintiff in DHSS, Arneson was 
promoted within the same agency in which he first attained his 
rights in class.9  Under the express language of the statute, and 
                     
9 We 
note 
that 
one 
difference 
between 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 16.22(1)(d)(1975) and the current Wis. Stat. § 230.28(1)(d) is 
that in the earlier version of the statutes, an employee 
retained his or her permanent status when promoted within the 
same "department," whereas in the current version, an employee 
retains his or her permanent status when promoted within the 
same "agency."   
No. 
95-1592 
 
27
our interpretation of the statute in DHSS, it is clear that 
Arneson retained his permanent status in class and rights as an 
MIS 3 non-supervisor when he was promoted, within the same 
agency, from an MIS 3 non-supervisor position to an MIS 4 
supervisor position.  Because he retained this permanent status 
in class and rights, any discipline affecting his class and 
rights in his MIS 3 position could be maintained only for "just 
cause" in accord with Wis. Stat. § 230.34(1)(a).  Therefore, 
Arneson had a property interest in his MIS 3 position that was 
clearly established in April 1990. 
¶62 Our inquiry on qualified immunity must do more than 
reach this conclusion, however.  As Arneson was not terminated 
from his job, he cannot be claiming a property interest in his 
continued employment, the property interest that is affected 
when an employee is terminated.  Instead, we find the following: 
 First, his allegation that he was demoted without due process 
of law is a claim that he has a property interest in the amount 
of wages commensurate with the MIS 3 position.  Second, his 
allegation that he was suspended without pay without due process 
of law is a claim that he has a property interest in continuous 
employment.  In other words, this latter claim is that he had a 
significant private interest in the uninterrupted receipt of his 
paycheck.  See Ibarra v. Martin, 143 F.3d 286, 289 (7th Cir. 
1998); see also Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997). 
 
What procedural safeguards are attendant upon state 
interference with property interests in continuous 
employment and wages, and were those safeguards clearly 
established in 1990? 
No. 
95-1592 
 
28
¶63 The defendants argue that neither of these property 
interests are protected by the constitution, relying upon the 
recent United States Supreme Court decision in Gilbert in which 
the Court wrote that although it had "previously held that 
public employees who can be discharged only for cause have a 
constitutionally protected property interest in their tenure and 
cannot be fired without due process, [it has] not had occasion 
to decide whether the protections of the Due Process Clause 
extend to discipline of tenured employees short of termination." 
 Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 928-29 (internal citations omitted).  The 
defendants suggest that this statement by the Court in 1997 
dispositively demonstrates that the law in 1990 did not clearly 
establish a tenured employee's right to due process prior to 
discipline short of termination. 
¶64 We disagree. As early as 1972, federal law clearly 
established that a property interest arises for the purposes of 
the due process clause, that is, the property interest is 
constitutionally protected, "if there are such rules or mutually 
explicit understandings that support [a] claim of entitlement to 
the benefit . . . ."  Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 601 (emphasis 
supplied).  Wisconsin Stat. § 230.34(1)(a) provides these rules, 
and, accordingly, the due process clause protections must 
accompany demotions and suspensions with pay.  See Williams v. 
Com. of Ky., 24 F.3d 1526, 1538 (6th Cir. 1994)("Supreme Court 
cases decided before [May 1991] are clear that [statutes 
providing that classified employees can't be dismissed, demoted, 
suspended or otherwise penalized except for cause] create 
No. 
95-1592 
 
29
property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); see 
also Sower v. City of Fort Wayne, Indiana, 737 F.2d 622, 624 
(7th Cir. 1984) (firefighters who by statute and ordinance could 
not be demoted without just cause had a property interest which 
they could not be deprived of without due process of law). 
¶65 Therefore, since Arneson had a property interest in 
both the wages which are commensurate with his MIS 3 position 
and in continuous employment within the MIS 3 position, and 
these property interests were clearly established in 1990, they 
were protected by the Due Process Clause and the State could not 
interfere with them without according him the process he was 
due. 
¶66 "Once it is determined that the Due Process clause 
applies, 
'the 
question 
remains 
what 
process 
is 
due.'"  
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).  The amount of process due is a matter of 
federal constitutional law.  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541.   
¶67 So far, we have concluded that Arneson had property 
interests which were protected by the due process clause.  
However, this finding does not sufficiently identify the precise 
nature of the claimed constitutional violation.  To present a 
cognizable claim, Arneson must also show that the amount of due 
process that defendants were required to accord him was clearly 
established in 1990.   
¶68 It is not enough that Arneson allege a violation of a 
constitutional right in the abstract.  The constitutional right 
No. 
95-1592 
 
30
alleged to be violated must be specific.  As the Supreme Court 
has stressed,  
 
the right to due process of law is quite clearly 
established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there 
is a sense in which any action that violates that 
Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the 
particular action is a violation) violates a clearly 
established right.  Much the same could be said of any 
other constitutional or statutory violation.  But if 
the test of "clearly established law" were to be 
applied at this level of generality, it would bear no 
relationship to the "objective legal reasonableness" 
that is the touchstone of Harlow.  Plaintiffs would be 
able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that 
our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually 
unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of 
extremely abstract rights. 
 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 
¶69 "'In a procedural due process claim, it is not the 
deprivation of property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it 
is the deprivation of property or liberty without due process of 
lawwithout adequate procedures'" that is unconstitutional.  
D'Acquisto v. Washington, 640 F.Supp. 594, 606 (1986)(quoting 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 678-679 
(1986)(Stevens, J., concurring)(emphasis in the original)).  If 
the adequacy of procedures attendant upon a suspension and 
demotion were not clearly established in 1990, then the 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 
¶70 In 
order 
to 
show 
that 
the 
law 
was 
"clearly 
established" for qualified immunity purposes, "[t]he contours of 
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he [or she] is doing violates that 
No. 
95-1592 
 
31
right . . . [I]n light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must 
be apparent."  Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; see also McGrath, 44 
F.3d at 570.  "[T]he 'clearly established law' must be 
sufficiently analogous [to the plaintiff's current situation] to 
provide the public official with guidance as to the lawfulness 
of his or her conduct."  Barnhill, 166 Wis. 2d at 408.  The law 
must be clear in relation to the specific facts confronting an 
official at the time of the official's action.  Rakovich, 850 
F.2d at 1209 (citing Colaizzi v. Walker, 812 F.2d 304, 308 (7th 
Cir. 1987)). 
¶71 In this particular case, we must decide whether a 
reasonable official would have known that the holding of an 
informal meeting, before which Arneson knew that a particular 
female subordinate employee had made a complaint against him 
concerning sexual harassment, and during which Arneson was asked 
specific questions regarding his interest in taking photos of 
the employee and her sister and was told nothing about the 
employee's allegations except to the extent that they were 
corroborated by Arneson's statements, and Arneson was informed 
of a broad range of discipline that could result from the 
complaint near the end of the meeting, violated clearly 
established due process rights that were to be accorded an 
employee prior to suspension and demotion.  See Price v. 
Brittain, 874 F.2d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson, 
483 U.S. at 107). 
¶72 Arneson relies almost exclusively upon Loudermill as 
clearly established law that at a minimum, he was entitled to 
No. 
95-1592 
 
32
notice and an opportunity to respond to the charges prior to his 
discipline.  In Loudermill, the Court held that prior to 
termination, "[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral 
and written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of 
the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side 
of the story."  Id.  As the Court explained: 
 
An essential principle of due process is that a 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded 
by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to 
the nature of the case.'  Mullane v. Central Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).  We have 
described 'the root requirement' of the Due Process 
Clause as being 'that an individual be given an 
opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any 
significant 
property 
interest.' 
 
Boddie 
v. 
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)(emphasis in the 
original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 
(1971).  This principle requires 'some kind of 
hearing' prior to the discharge of an employee who has 
a constitutionally protected property interest in his 
employment. 
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542. 
¶73 The defendants disagree with Arneson that Loudermill 
is dispositive and argue that the facts of Loudermill are not 
sufficiently analogous to the circumstances then facing the 
defendants to make them aware that they would violate his 
constitutional rights by providing the process that they in fact 
gave him.   They argue that the minimum due process requirements 
as set forth in Loudermill are applicable only where a person is 
terminated from his or her tenured position.  Therefore,  
Loudermill is not clearly established law on the question before 
No. 
95-1592 
 
33
this 
court 
because 
Arneson 
was 
not 
terminated 
from 
his 
employment. 
¶74 We agree with the defendants that Loudermill does not 
involve property interests which are as significant as one's 
continued employment, and therefore Loudermill does not clearly 
establish the process due an employee disciplined short of 
termination.  The Court's discussion in Loudermill foreshadowed 
this conclusion when it stated that "'[t]he formality and 
procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon 
the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the 
subsequent proceedings'"  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545 (quoting 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)). 
¶75 We do recognize that a 30-day suspension without pay 
and a permanent reduction in pay of nearly $3 per hour is a 
significant 
property 
interest 
that 
must 
be 
safeguarded.  
However, it is not as significant as the severity of depriving 
someone of the means of livelihood, as is the result in a 
termination. 
¶76 The 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
has 
emphasized 
repeatedly that due process is a flexible concept in that its 
requirements vary depending on the circumstances of each case.  
Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 930 (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481).  
It "is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated 
to time, place and circumstances."  Id. (citing Cafeteria & 
Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).  
Indeed, the Court's decisions, including its decision in 
No. 
95-1592 
 
34
Loudermill, have recognized that the determination of what 
process is due includes the balancing of three distinct factors: 
 
'First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest.'  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 335 (1976). 
Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 931-32; see also Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 
542-543. 
¶77 Because balancing of competing interest is necessary, 
plaintiffs face a high hurdle in demonstrating that the law is 
clearly established in any given case.  The federal circuit 
courts 
of 
appeals 
have 
observed 
that 
"allegations 
of 
constitutional 
violations 
that 
require 
courts 
to 
balance 
competing interests may make it more difficult to find the law 
'clearly established.'"  Medina v. City and County of Denver, 
960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992)(citations omitted).  And as 
the Seventh Circuit has explained: 
 
it 
would 
appear 
that 
there 
is 
one 
type 
of 
constitutional 
rule, 
namely 
that 
involving 
the 
balancing 
of 
competing 
interests, 
for 
which the 
standard 
may 
be 
clearly 
established, 
but 
its 
application is so fact dependent that the "law" can 
rarely be 
considered 
"clearly established." 
 In 
determining due-process requirements for discharging a 
government employee, for example, the courts must 
carefully balance the competing interests of the 
employee and the employer in each case.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has consistently stated that one can 
only proceed on a case-by-case basis and that no all-
encompassing procedure may be set forth to cover all 
situations. 
 
It 
would 
appear 
that, 
whenever 
a 
balancing of interest is required, the facts of the 
No. 
95-1592 
 
35
existing 
caselaw must 
closely correspond 
to the 
contested action before the defendant official is 
subject to liability under the [sic] Harlow. . . .  
[Q]ualified immunity typically casts a wide net to 
protect government officials from damage liability 
whenever balancing is required. 
Benson, 786 F.2d at 276 (internal citations and footnotes 
omitted). 
¶78 Of course, that balancing is required is not to say 
that defendants will always be entitled to qualified immunity, 
for there are some circumstances in which the law is so clearly 
established as to leave no doubt in an official's mind that his 
or her action would violate a constitutional right.  For 
instance, given Loudermill, where the state has no arguably 
significant interest in quick discipline, a tenured employee's 
interest in continued employment is of such significance that he 
or she must receive the requirements of Loudermill.  But as we 
have already noted, the facts of the instant case are not 
sufficiently analogous to those in Loudermill for that case to 
present the defendants with clearly established law on the 
circumstances they then faced. 
¶79 Arneson 
argues 
that 
he 
has 
identified 
closely 
analogous law which established in April 1990 that property 
rights are implicated in suspensions and demotions.  To the 
extent that he argues that suspensions and demotions are 
property interests protected by the Due Process Clause, we 
agree.  However, the cases are not closely analogous law on the 
question of how much due process the defendants were required to 
give him.  Castelaz v. City of Milwaukee, 94 Wis. 2d 513, 520-
No. 
95-1592 
 
36
23, 289 N.W.2d 259 (1980), Hanson v. Madison Services Corp., 150 
Wis. 2d 828, 840-46, 443 N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1989), and McGraw 
v. City of Huntington Beach, 882 F.2d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 1989), 
each involve employees who were terminated, not disciplined 
short of termination, and discuss, as does Loudermill, pre-
termination 
due 
process 
requirements. 
 
They 
are, 
as 
is 
Loudermill, not clearly analogous on the question the defendants 
faced.  And while Narumanchi v. Bd. of Trustees of Connecticut 
State Univ., 850 F.2d 70 (2nd Cir. 1988), and Gillard v. Norris, 
857 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1988), both involve employees who were 
disciplined short 
of termination, 
neither 
establishes the 
minimum process due such an employeeat best they stand for the 
proposition that some due process must be provided an employee, 
and even then the court in Gillard held that a suspension 
without pay for three days was de minimus and entitled the 
employee to no procedural safeguards.  Id. at 1098.  
¶80 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in 
Williams v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 24 F.3d 1526 (1994), 
provides us with a helpful inquiry into a qualified immunity 
defense under circumstances similar to those here.  In Williams, 
the court was faced with the question of whether defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity when they did not give the 
process due under Loudermill prior to demoting an employee.  The 
court agreed with the defendants in the action that "[b]ecause 
the process due varies with the quality and extent of the 
deprivation of a property right . . . Loudermill did not clearly 
No. 
95-1592 
 
37
establish that [plaintiff] had a right to notice and hearing 
before her demotion."  Id. at 1539.  The court wrote: 
 
'Not every deprivation of liberty or property requires 
a predeprivation hearing or a federal remedy.'  Ramsey 
v. Board of Educ., 844 F.2d 1268, 1272 (6th Cir. 
1988).  In fact, the Loudermill Court noted that 
'[t]here are, of course, some situations in which a 
postdeprivation 
hearing 
will 
satisfy 
due 
process 
requirements.'  Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 n.7, [] 
(citing Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 
U.S. 594, [] (1950) and North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. 
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 [] (1908)).  Because determining 
what process is due in a given case involves the 
balancing of several interests, including the nature 
of the property interest involved, we cannot say that 
a reasonable public official should have known from 
the Loudermill case that its requirement of notice and 
hearing prior to termination of employment applied 
with equal force to a demotion. 
Id.  Since it did not believe that Loudermill was the closely 
analogous case required to clearly establish the law, the court 
then searched for opinions of its own circuit, and the opinions 
of other circuits, to find a case that did clearly establish 
that Loudermill predeprivation requirements apply to demotions. 
 
¶81 The court found unhelpful the two cases decided by its 
own circuit which "merely state the rule of Loudermill and 
determine that the rule was complied with in those cases."  Id. 
at 1540.  It also found that in two other circuits (First and 
Fifth), that through dicta they had indicated without discussion 
that they would apply Loudermill to demotions.  Id. at 1541.  
These cases were also considered not to have clearly established 
federal law on the question. 
No. 
95-1592 
 
38
¶82 The court did find two cases from outside the Sixth 
Circuit in which district courts, following a balancing of the 
competing interests, found that a tenured public employee is 
entitled to a Loudermill hearing before being demoted.  Id. 
(citing Williams v. City of Seattle, 607 F.Supp. 714, 720-21 
(W.D. Wash. 1985); DelSignore v. DiCenzo, 767 F.Supp. 423, 427-
28 (D.R.I. 1991)).  However, it found that these two decisions 
were "not 'so clearly foreshadowed by' Loudermill or opinions in 
[the Sixth Circuit] 'as to leave no doubt in the mind of a 
reasonable officer that' not giving a tenured employee notice 
and hearing before a demotion would violate the employee's due 
process rights."  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶83 We have found that Seventh Circuit cases, decided 
following Arneson's discipline, serve as evidence that the due 
process requirements attendant upon deprivations of property 
interests less significant than continued employment may be less 
than that required of Loudermill for terminated employees.  In 
Domiano v. Village of River Grove, 904 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 
1990), the Seventh Circuit considered whether providing a 
tenured employee the courtesy of a telephone call before 
termination was a violation of the employee's right to a 
pretermination hearing.  The court found that such a violation 
had occurred, but it also intimated that without running afoul 
of the due process clause,  the employer could have suspended 
the employee without a hearing until he had an opportunity to 
respond.  Id. at 1149.  And had the employer provided the 
employee with a post-termination hearing, the court stated that 
No. 
95-1592 
 
39
the necessary scope of its pretermination hearing would also 
have been narrower.  Id. 
¶84 In another case, 
the Seventh Circuit 
explicitly 
partook of the balancing of interests under the test in Mathews. 
 In 
Chaney 
v. 
Suburban 
Bus 
Division 
of 
the 
Regional 
Transportation Authority, 52 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995), the court 
reviewed the due process procedures required to support a 
suspension of a bus driver who was involved in an accident.  
Following the accident, and without a hearing, the bus driver 
was suspended immediately without pay pending the results of 
alcohol and drug tests.  Id. at 626.  Even after the results of 
the test proved that the driver had not been under the influence 
of either substance, his suspension and the investigation 
continued.  Id. 
¶85 After 
weighing 
the 
three 
Mathews' 
factors, 
and 
concluding that the state had a greater interest in the safety 
of the public than the driver in his continuous employment, the 
court held that the prior notification to the driver that he 
would remain suspended pending further investigation was deemed 
sufficient due process under the circumstances: 
 
[W]e have little trouble concluding that due process 
did not mandate giving [the driver] additional notice 
or a hearing before [the employer] suspended him.  The 
[driver's] 
interest in 
avoiding 
a 
suspension is 
significant.  Nonetheless, the [driver] was on notice 
as to why he was being suspended and [the employer's] 
interest in both managerial efficiency and in public 
safety clearly outweigh [the driver's] interest in a 
presuspension hearing.  The Constitution does not 
mandate additional protections at this stage. 
No. 
95-1592 
 
40
Id. at 628. 
¶86 While both of the Seventh Circuit cases, and Williams 
in the Sixth Circuit, were decided following the defendants' 
discipline of Arneson and cannot be used to show whether the law 
was clearly established in 1990, they do serve as evidence that 
in 1990 the breadth of Loudermill was unclear as to the question 
of the necessary process due an employee prior to discipline 
short of termination.  As the court in Williams stated: 
 
Although Loudermill's analysis should be applied 
to determine if [the plaintiff] was entitled to a 
predeprivation hearing, it is not yet clear how this 
analysis would come out in the demotion setting as 
opposed 
to 
the 
discharge 
setting. 
 
Loudermill 
recognized that there are some property interests for 
which a postdeprivation hearing will satisfy due 
process, but by balancing the competing interests the 
Court found that a predeprivation hearing must be 
provided 
before 
a 
tenured 
public 
employee 
is 
discharged.  In a demotion case the balancing of 
competing interests may or may not compel a different 
result. 
Williams, 24 F.3d at 1541. 
 
¶87 We cannot say that given the ambiguity of the case law 
governing 
suspensions 
and 
demotions 
in 
1990 
that 
the 
unlawfulness of not providing a predemotion or presuspension 
hearing would have been apparent to a reasonable official at the 
time Arneson was disciplined.  See Williams, 24 F.3d at 1541. 
¶88 Under the specific circumstances of this case, we find 
that in 1990, federal law did not clearly establish the amount 
of due process a tenured employee was entitled to receive prior 
to being suspended and demoted.  Therefore, the defendants are 
entitled to qualified immunity.  Although we agree with the 
No. 
95-1592 
 
41
result reached by the court of appeals, we do so on different 
grounds. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.  
 
¶89 CHIEF 
JUSTICE 
SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON 
did 
not 
participate.   
 
 
1