Case Title: Commonwealth v. St. Louis

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11862

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11862 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RICHARD J. ST. LOUIS. 
 
 
 
Berkshire.     September 8, 2015. - December 23, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Indecent Assault and Battery on a Person with an Intellectual 
Disability.  Indecent Assault and Battery on a Retarded 
Person.  Indecent Exposure.  Intellectually Disabled 
Person.  Mentally Retarded Person.  Constitutional Law, 
Vagueness of statute, Assistance of counsel, Ex post facto 
law.  Due Process of Law, Vagueness of statute.  Practice, 
Criminal, Instructions to jury, Required finding, New 
trial, Assistance of counsel.  Consent. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 24, 2011.  
 
 
The cases were tried before John A. Agostini, J., and a 
motion for a new trial was considered by him. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Michael J. Hickson for the defendant. 
 
John P. Bossé, Special Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In this case, we are asked to examine whether 
the term "intellectual disability" in G. L. c. 265, § 13F 
(indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual 
disability), renders the statute unconstitutionally vague.  On 
the effective date of November 2, 2010, the Legislature amended 
the statute substituting the term "mentally retarded person" 
with "person with an intellectual disability" as well as the 
words "be mentally retarded" with "have an intellectual 
disability."  St. 2010, c. 239, §§ 71-72.  These amendments were 
part of a broad legislative scheme that purged the term 
"mentally retarded" from the General Laws.  St. 2010, c. 239 
("An Act eliminating the word 'retardation' from the General 
Laws").  As a result, G. L. c. 265, § 13F, now states: "Whoever 
commits an indecent assault and battery on a person with an 
intellectual disability knowing such person to have an 
intellectual disability shall . . . be punished . . . ."  The 
term "intellectual disability" is not defined by the statute. 
 
The defendant was convicted on four indictments alleging 
indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual 
disability,1 one indictment alleging indecent exposure, and one 
                     
 
1 One indictment involved the touching of the defendant's 
penis by the victim.  A second involved the defendant touching 
the victim's vagina with his hands.  A third involved the 
defendant touching the victim's breast with his hands.  The 
fourth involved the defendant touching the victim's breast with 
3 
 
 
indictment alleging accosting or annoying a person of the 
opposite sex.  The crimes were alleged to have occurred between 
on or about January 1, 2008, which was before the effective date 
of the statutory amendments, and on or about September 16, 2011.   
 
At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, the defendant 
moved for required findings of not guilty on all charges.  A 
judge in the Superior Court entered a required finding of not 
guilty on an indictment alleging intimidation of a witness but 
denied the motion as to the remaining charges.   
 
At the close of all the evidence, the defendant renewed his 
motion for required findings of not guilty on the remaining 
charges, which was denied.  Appellate proceedings were stayed to 
allow the defendant to file postconviction motions.  The 
defendant filed postconviction motions for a new trial under 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001),2 
and for a required finding of not guilty under Mass. R. Crim. P. 
25 (b) (2), as amended, 420 Mass. 1502 (1995),3 both of which 
                                                                  
his mouth.  The jury found him not guilty on a fifth indictment 
involving evidence that he put his mouth on the victim's vagina. 
 
 
2 In his motion for a new trial, the defendant alleged that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss 
the indictments charging indecent assault on a person with an 
intellectual disability on grounds that the statute was 
unconstitutionally vague, and that he had been charged under an 
ex post facto law. 
 
 
3 In his postconviction motion for required findings of not 
guilty, the defendant alleged that the evidence was insufficient 
4 
 
 
were denied by the trial judge.  The defendant appealed from the 
denial of his postconviction motions.  The Appeals Court 
consolidated the two appeals.  We transferred the case to this 
court on our own motion.   
 
On appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the term 
"intellectual disability" renders G. L. c. 265, § 13F, 
unconstitutionally vague; (2) that he was convicted under an ex 
post facto law; (3) that the judge erred by denying certain of 
his motions for a required finding of not guilty; and (4) that 
the judge erred by denying his motion for a new trial.  For the 
following reasons, we conclude that G. L. c. 265, § 13F, is 
constitutional, and we affirm the judge's rulings.   
 
1.  Background.  The jury could have found the following 
facts.  In 2013, at the time of trial, Amy4 was a twenty-four 
year old woman.  At the time of the incidents, Amy lived in a 
farmhouse with a wraparound porch in Hancock with her mother and 
her maternal grandfather.  She was adopted at birth, and at the 
age of eight months she was diagnosed with "slow learning" and 
"special needs."  Amy reads at a third or fourth grade level and 
has a verbal intelligence quotient (IQ) of forty-seven.  In 
                                                                  
to warrant convictions on the indictments charging him with 
indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual 
disability, and that he had been charged under an ex post facto 
law. 
 
 
4 A pseudonym. 
5 
 
 
2008, after Amy reached age eighteen, her mother and grandfather 
were appointed legal guardians of her.  According to the 
permanent decree of guardianship admitted in evidence, a judge 
in the Probate and Family Court found that Amy is "mentally 
retarded" and that failure to appoint a guardian would create 
risk to her health and welfare.  The medical certificate 
supporting the permanent decree of guardianship details Amy's 
disability as being mental retardation and states that she lacks 
the ability to make decisions without adult supervision.5   
 
At the time of trial, the defendant was seventy-two years 
old.  He is a retired boat builder, which he had done for forty-
six years, but he continued to work part time doing fiberglass 
work.  His hobbies included hunting and fishing.  He and a 
friend used to hunt in western Massachusetts.  The friend 
introduced him to Amy's great grandmother.  In the early 1980s, 
he began to hunt on the property where Amy and her family live.  
The defendant and Amy's grandfather forged a friendship and grew 
close over the years.  The defendant would visit the family two 
to three times a year and hunt on the property.  He typically 
would stay for one or two weeks at a time in his camper, which 
                     
 
5 The medical certificate also reports that Amy's most 
recent evaluations at the time illustrated her problem-solving 
ability to be at a four year old level. 
 
6 
 
 
he parked behind the farmhouse.  The defendant came to know Amy, 
and he described her as behaving "like a child more or less."   
 
On September 11, 2011, Amy and the defendant were sitting 
side by side, alone on the porch.  The boy friend of Amy's 
mother was folding laundry in front of a window overlooking the 
porch.  While sitting next to the defendant, Amy dropped her 
hand to his leg and slowly moved her hand up toward the 
defendant's crotch area.  Amy began to "rub" and "pet" the 
defendant's penis over his pants.  Amy testified that the 
defendant did not ask her to do this but that it was "his idea."  
Amy's mother's boy friend watched this occur from the window, 
and after watching for a few moments, he went to the staircase 
and called up to Amy's mother to come downstairs.  She and her 
boy friend watched Amy and the defendant from the downstairs 
window.  Amy's mother saw Amy's hand on the defendant's leg, 
next to his penis.  Upon seeing this, Amy's mother frantically 
knocked on the window and told Amy to come inside.   
 
Amy went inside, and her mother took her upstairs to talk 
to her.  Once they were upstairs, Amy began to tell her mother 
about various incidents when the defendant touched her 
inappropriately.  Amy's mother made written notes of Amy's 
account of the incidents.6  These incidents occurred over a 
                     
 
6 Amy's mother testified as a first complaint witness. 
 
7 
 
 
period of three years, always outside the defendant's camper.7  
Amy would walk with the defendant back to his camper after 
dinner.  According to Amy's testimony, the defendant touched her 
breasts, her vagina, and kissed her multiple times on the mouth, 
breasts, and vagina.  Amy testified that these events made her 
feel uncomfortable.  She testified to one particular incident 
where the defendant put his hand on the back of her head and 
forced her head down toward his penis because he wanted her to 
perform oral sex.  She refused and told him she did not want to 
do that.  The defendant told her to keep it a secret because, if 
she did not, he could get in trouble.  Amy testified that the 
defendant's penis was exposed but that she could not see it 
because it was dark out and she could not describe it.   
 
After the September 11 incident, Amy was not allowed to go 
outside the house while the defendant was still on the property, 
and the defendant was not allowed in the home.  The defendant 
stayed for about another week on the property.  A few days after 
Amy made these disclosures, her mother reported the incidents to 
the police, who then began an investigation.   
 
2.  Indecent assault and battery on person with 
intellectual disability.  a.  Constitutionality of G. L. c. 265, 
                     
 
7 Although Amy testified that these various incidents of 
inappropriate touching occurred over three years, the record 
does not state specific dates.  Three years before the 
September 11, 2011, porch incident would be 2008, before the 
effective date of the statutory amendments. 
8 
 
 
§ 13F.  The defendant argues that the term "intellectual 
disability" renders § 13F unconstitutionally vague on its face 
under the State and Federal Constitutions because the term is a 
"neologism" that does not have a usual and accepted meaning.  We 
disagree.  The defendant did not raise the issue in a pretrial 
motion to dismiss, the required procedure for a facial challenge 
based on vagueness.8  See Commonwealth v. Moses, 436 Mass. 598, 
605 n.4 (2002); Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229, 237 (2001).  
We review under the standard of a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice.   
 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is well established in our 
jurisprudence.  "It is a basic principle of due process that an 
enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not 
clearly defined."  Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 
(1972).  A criminal statute must define the offense "in terms 
that are sufficiently clear to permit a person of average 
intelligence to comprehend what conduct is prohibited."  
Commonwealth v. Spano, 414 Mass. 178, 180 (1993).  See Kolender 
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Commonwealth v. Bohmer, 374 
                     
 
8 An as-applied challenge based on vagueness frequently 
depends on the evidence at trial, and may be raised in a motion 
for a required finding of not guilty.  See Commonwealth v. 
Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. 543, 545 (1994).  If a defendant fails to 
raise an as-applied challenge in a motion for a required finding 
of not guilty, the issue will be considered under the standard 
of a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229, 238 (2001). 
 
9 
 
 
Mass. 368, 371-372 (1978).  "When a statute does not define its 
words we give them their usual and accepted meanings, as long as 
these meanings are consistent with the statutory purpose. . . . 
We derive the words' usual and accepted meanings from sources 
presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in 
other legal contexts and dictionary definitions" (citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Bell, 442 Mass. 118, 124 (2004).  A 
criminal statute must not be so vague that it opens itself up to 
arbitrary enforcement and prosecution.  See Grayned, supra at 
108-109; Commonwealth v. Freiberg, 405 Mass. 282, 289, cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 940 (1989).  "[A] vague statute offends by its 
lack of reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement and its 
consequent encouragement of arbitrary and erratic arrests and 
prosecutions."  Commonwealth v. Sefranka, 382 Mass. 108, 110 
(1980).   
 
However, "[i]t is not infrequent that prescribed conduct is 
incapable of precise legal definition."  Jaquith v. 
Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 439, 442 (1954).  "[L]egislative 
language need not be afforded 'mathematical precision' in order 
to pass constitutional muster."  Commonwealth v. Reyes, 464 
Mass. 245, 249 (2013), quoting Bohmer, 374 Mass. at 372.  A 
statute will be deemed constitutional if it "conveys [a] 
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when 
measured by common understanding and practices."  Commonwealth 
10 
 
 
v. Adams, 389 Mass. 265, 270 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Jarrett, 359 Mass. 491, 496-497 (1971).  See Reyes, supra.   
 
In this case, we conclude that the term "intellectual 
disability" is sufficiently clear and definite and is therefore 
not unconstitutionally vague.  The legislative history of § 13F, 
as amended through St. 2010, c. 239, §§ 71-72, makes it clear 
that the Legislature's intent was merely to change the 
nomenclature and not the substance of the statute.   
 
Section § 13F was amended in 2010 in conjunction with 
numerous other laws by an act entitled, "An Act eliminating the 
word 'retardation' from the General Laws."  St. 2010, c. 239.  
The only revision made to § 13F was a substitution of the term 
"person with an intellectual disability" for the term "mentally 
retarded person" and the words "have an intellectual disability" 
for "be mentally retarded."  No substantive changes to § 13F 
were made by these amendments.  This change in language was part 
of a larger legislative scheme to eradicate the pejorative term 
"mentally retarded" from the General Laws.9  St. 2010, c. 239.10  
                     
 
9 In addition to purging the General Laws of the term 
"mentally retarded," many other similar modifications took place 
in the quest for more respectful language.  Prior to 2009, the 
Department of Developmental Services, the agency charged with 
providing services to individuals with intellectual 
disabilities, was known as the Department of Mental Retardation.  
See G. L. c. 19B, § 1, as amended through St. 2008, c. 182, § 9.  
Correspondingly, the department amended its regulations by 
substituting "intellectual disability" for the term "mental 
retardation," but notably did not alter the substantive 
11 
 
 
Indeed, Massachusetts was part of a nationwide trend by which 
the United States Congress and many other State Legislatures 
enacted similar legislation in order to promote respect and 
dignity to those with intellectual disabilities.11  The 
                                                                  
definition.  Compare 115 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01 (2009) 
(defining "mental retardation" as "significantly sub-average 
intellectual functioning existing concurrently and related to 
significant limitations in adaptive functioning.  Mental 
retardation manifests before age [eighteen]"), with 115 Code 
Mass. Regs. § 2.01 (2012) (defining "intellectual disability" as 
"significantly sub-average intellectual functioning existing 
concurrently with and related to significant limitations in 
adaptive functioning.  Intellectual Disability originates before 
age [eighteen]"). 
 
 
Additionally, Governor Deval Patrick issued an executive 
order to rename the Governor's Commission on Mental Retardation 
as the Governor's Commission on Intellectual Disability.  
Executive Order No. 521 (Mar. 31, 2010).  In support of renaming 
the commission, the executive order referenced the widespread 
movement in using "intellectual disability," stating, 
"[Whereas], there is a strong trend, nationally and 
internationally, to use the term 'intellectual disability' 
rather than mental retardation . . . ."  Id. 
 
 
10 The Legislature did not succeed completely in eliminating 
the term "mentally retarded" from the General Laws.  The last 
sentence of the second paragraph of G. L. c. 265, § 13F, was not 
amended, and states:  "This section shall not apply to the 
commission of an assault and battery by a mentally retarded 
person upon another mentally retarded person."  We perceive this 
to be a mere oversight that does not affect our analysis.   
 
 
11 In 2010, President Barack Obama signed legislation 
entitled "Rosa's Law" that amended various Federal education, 
labor, and health laws by removing the words "mental 
retardation" and replacing them with the words "intellectual 
disabilities."  Pub. L. 111-256, 111th Cong., 124 Stat. 2643 
(2010).  In 2012, California enacted a law that eliminated the 
words "mentally retarded" in State laws, regulations, and 
publications and replaced them with the words "intellectual 
disability."  2012 Cal. St. c. 457.  In 2013, the Social 
12 
 
 
Legislature did not intend to change the substance of the 
statute with the substitution of the words "intellectual 
disability" but only intended the statute to contain more 
respectful and acceptable terms.   
 
The term "intellectual disability" is not defined by § 13F.  
In such cases we apply the familiar rule of statutory 
construction that guides us to give the words "their usual and 
accepted meanings, as long as these meanings are consistent with 
the statutory purpose."  Bell, 442 Mass. at 124, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Zone Book, Inc., 372 Mass. 366, 369 (1977).  As 
has been discussed, "intellectual disability" has become the 
accepted term for someone who would have been described as 
mentally retarded prior to the various statutory and regulatory 
amendments.  The definition of "mentally retarded" in 115 Code 
                                                                  
Security Administration promulgated a final rule that eliminated 
the term "mental retardation" and replaced it with "intellectual 
disability."  78 Fed. Reg. 46,499 (2013).  The agency explained, 
"This change reflects the widespread adoption of the term 
'intellectual disability' by Congress, government agencies, and 
various public and private organizations."  Id.  The United 
States Supreme Court has discontinued use of the term "mental 
retardation" and now uses the term "intellectual disability."  
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).  Justice Kennedy, 
in an opinion analyzing a Florida statute regarding the death 
penalty and intellectually disabled defendants, stated by way of 
introduction:  "Previous opinions of this Court have employed 
the term 'mental retardation.'  This opinion uses the term 
'intellectual disability' to describe the identical phenomenon."  
Id.  He went on to explain that the term "intellectual 
disability" is also used in the latest edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.  Id. 
 
13 
 
 
Mass. Regs. § 2.01 prior to the 2010 statutory amendments was 
identical to the definition given to the term "intellectual 
disability" in the regulations after the statutory amendments.  
See note 9, supra.   
 
Prior to the 2010 amendments, Massachusetts courts had 
referenced the definition of "mental retardation" found in the 
regulations of the Department of Developmental Services 
(department) to define "mental retardation" under § 13F and 
other statutes.  See e.g., Commowealth v. Fuller, 66 Mass. App. 
Ct. 84, 96 (2006); Commonwealth v. Aitahmedlamara, 63 Mass. App. 
Ct. 76, 76-77 (2005) (discussing "usual and accepted meaning" of 
"mental retardation" under § 13F).  "Administrative regulations 
have been frequently used as guides to determine the meaning of 
statutory provisions."  1A N.J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 31.6, at 696 (7th ed. 
2009).  In Fuller, supra, the Appeals Court held that an 
instruction given to a jury regarding the definition of "mental 
retardation" "was consistent with the usual and accepted 
understanding of the meaning of the words 'mentally retarded' as 
well as the definition promulgated by the [Department of Mental 
Retardation] at 115 Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01 (1994)."12  Fuller, 
                     
 
12 In Executive Order No. 521, changing the name of the 
Governor's Commission on Mental Retardation, Governor Deval 
Patrick stated, "[Whereas], the Department of Developmental 
Services changed its regulations to make the term 'intellectual 
14 
 
 
supra.  The trial judge in Fuller had instructed the jury that 
"[a] mentally retarded person is a person who, as a result of 
inadequately developed or impaired intelligence, is 
substantially limited in his or her ability to learn or to adapt 
to the means necessary to function effectively in the 
community."  Id. at 94.  As noted above in note 9, the 
regulations since have been amended and now include the more 
accepted term "intellectual disability."  Those regulations 
define "intellectual disability" in identical terms as the term  
"mental retardation" previously had been defined.  Where "mental 
retardation"13 is itself a commonly understood term, see id. at 
96, and where it is synonymous with "intellectual disability," 
the latter also is a commonly understood term.   
 
In addition to the regulatory definition, the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines "intellectual 
disability" as "a disorder with onset during the developmental 
period that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning 
                                                                  
disability' synonymous  with mental retardation . . . ."  
Executive Order No. 521 (Mar. 31, 2010). 
 
 
13 The 2012 regulations also noted that the substituted 
definition is consistent with the standard used in the eleventh 
edition of American Association of Intellectual Disabilities:  
Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports (2010).  115 
Code Mass. Regs. § 2.01 (2012). 
 
15 
 
 
deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains."14  
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders 33 (5th ed. 2013).  These definitions 
maintain the core concept that an intellectual disability 
consists of intellectual limitations and affects adaptive 
behaviors.  In this case, no one questioned whether Amy in fact 
had an intellectual disability.  The defendant himself 
acknowledged on direct examination that he knew Amy had 
"intellectual disabilities" and the record demonstrates that it 
was generally understood that Amy had an intellectual 
disability.  We conclude that the term "intellectual disability" 
has an accepted and well understood meaning, and applying that 
meaning to the defendant does not render the statute 
unconstitutionally vague. 
 
The defendant also argues the judge's instructions defined 
the term "intellectual disability" in a manner that was 
erroneous.15  The judge's instruction incorporated the definition 
                     
 
14 The American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities defines "intellectual disability" as 
"a disability characterized by significant limitations both in 
intellectual functioning . . . and in adaptive behavior."  See 
American Association on Intellectual and Development 
Disabilities, Frequently Asked Questions on Intellectual 
Disability, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition/ 
faqs-on-intellectual-disability#.VfxrPVKFNaR [http://perma.cc/ 
G6CS-5V5G]. 
 
 
15 The defendant does not allege error for the remaining 
portions of the jury instructions.  The trial judge instructed 
16 
 
 
of "person with disability" from G. L. c. 265, § 13K, which 
proscribes assault and battery on an elderly or disabled person.  
The defendant contends that this definition did not cure the 
problem of vagueness in § 13F, and it permitted the jury to 
convict him under § 13K.  The defendant did not object to the 
trial judge's instructions.  We review the instruction under the 
standard of a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Ford, 424 Mass. 709, 712 (1997); Commonwealth v. 
Mitchell, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 556, 565 (2006).  We look to the 
jury instructions as a whole in order to determine if there was 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Shea, 467 Mass. 788, 796 (2014); Commonwealth v. 
Whitman, 430 Mass. 746, 755 (2000).  We agree that the trial 
judge's jury instructions regarding the definition of 
"intellectual disability" were erroneous.  However, the error 
did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.   
 
General Laws c. 265, § 13K, defines "person with 
disability" as "a person with a permanent or long-term physical 
or mental impairment that prevents or restricts the individual's 
ability to provide for his or her own care or protection."  The 
definition of "person with disability" in § 13K encompasses a 
                                                                  
the jury that "intellectual disability is a permanent or long-
term mental impairment that prevents or restricts the 
individual's ability to provide for her own care or protection." 
 
17 
 
 
greater variety of disabilities than does § 13F, including 
Alzheimer's disease and a number of other disabilities.  
However, it also includes "intellectual disability" under § 13F.   
 
The erroneous jury instruction did not create a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice because the disability that was 
the focus of the evidence at trial was an intellectual 
disability.  Amy's condition met the definition from § 13K that 
the judge used to instruct the jury, and it is highly unlikely 
that the jury would have based its verdict on any other 
disability, such as Alzheimer's disease.  We conclude that the 
defendant has failed to show the existence of a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice.  In future trials under § 13F, it 
would be appropriate to instruct a jury with the definition of 
"intellectual disability" as used in the regulations of the 
department.  That definition is consistent with other 
organizations' definition of "intellectual disability" and is 
well understood.   
 
b.  Motion for required findings of not guilty.  i.  
Consent.  The defendant argues that his trial and posttrial 
motions for required findings of not guilty should have been 
granted as to the indictment under G. L. c. 265, § 13F, 
concerning the incident on September 11, 2011, because the 
Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence of lack of consent.  
The Commonwealth argues that the judge correctly denied the 
18 
 
 
defendant's motions because there was sufficient evidence that 
the defendant intended for Amy to touch his penis and that the 
combination of her intellectual disability and the significant 
age difference between them is sufficient to prove Amy did not 
consent to the touching on that date.  When deciding a motion 
for a required finding of not guilty, we view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. 
Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979).  We must determine 
whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 120 (2010), quoting 
Latimore, supra at 677.   
 
The elements of an indecent assault and battery on a person 
with an intellectual disability include lack of consent, and the 
Commonwealth bears the burden of production and persuasion on 
the issue.  See Commonwealth v. Portonova, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 
905, 906 (2007).  The element of lack of consent in a 
prosecution for indecent assault and battery is the same as in a 
prosecution for rape.16  See Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 456 Mass. 
                     
16 Capacity to consent may be an issue in such cases.  "In 
order to give consent a person must . . . have the capacity to 
do so."  Commonwealth v. Burke, 390 Mass. 480, 484 (1983).  
Capacity to consent can be affected by a number of different 
factors, including intoxication, consumption of drugs, sleep, 
unconsciousness, head injury, and intellectual disability.  See 
Commonwealth v. Blache, 450 Mass. 583, 590 n.10 (2008).  The 
judge did not instruct the jury on lack of capacity to consent, 
19 
 
 
135, 138 (2010); Commonwealth v. Simcock, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 
188 (1991).  In this case, the Commonwealth presented sufficient 
evidence from which the jury could find that, in the totality of 
the circumstances, including Amy's intellectual disability, Amy 
did not consent.   
 
The evidence of Amy's intellectual disability was 
prevalent.  Amy's mother testified that she was diagnosed with 
"slow learning, special needs" when she was eight months old.  
She also revealed that Amy was missing the left half of her 
cerebellum.  Amy read at a third or fourth grade level and her 
mother described her age range relative to over-all mental 
capacity as spanning from that of a young age to that of a 
teenager in regards to her moods.  State police Trooper Dale 
Gero, the officer who investigated the incidents, testified that 
Amy appeared to act like a five to seven year old child.17  The 
mother's boy friend described Amy as "basically" a child and as 
"a woman with a child's mind."  Amy had an IQ of forty-seven and 
lacked the mental capabilities to complete a high school 
                                                                  
thereby effectively removing the possibility of a verdict on 
that evidence alone.  He only instructed on lack of consent, but 
told the jury that they could consider Amy's state of mind on 
this element of the Commonwealth's proof. 
 
 
17 State police Trooper Dale Gero based his opinion on his 
observation of Amy and his experience of having a five year old 
daughter of his own. 
 
20 
 
 
program.18  Her mother testified that Amy's mental disability is 
classified as mental retardation.  Amy was not allowed to go 
shopping by herself.  Additionally, the jury were able to 
observe Amy testify and assess the scope of her intellectual 
disability.  See Fuller, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 90; 
Aitahmedlamara, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 77-78 ("the victim 
testified extensively at trial, and the jury were able from 
their observations of her to assess both the question of her 
mental retardation and the likelihood that the defendant was 
aware of it").  While testifying, Amy required a number of 
breaks.   
There was evidence from which the jury could have found 
that Amy perceived that the defendant had authority over her 
because of his friendship with her family, "the considerable age 
disparity between [them,] . . . and an obvious disparity in 
experience and sophistication."  Commonwealth v. Shore, 65 Mass. 
App. Ct. 430, 432 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Castillo, 55 
Mass. App. Ct. 563, 567 (2002).  There was evidence of prior 
unwanted sexual touching.  With respect to the incidents before 
September 11, 2011, Amy testified that she felt uncomfortable, 
and that the defendant told her to keep these incidents secret 
because he could get in trouble.  The jury reasonably could have 
                     
 
18 Amy obtained a certificate of attendance in 2010 when she 
was twenty-two years old. 
 
21 
 
 
found that, in the totality of the circumstances, including 
Amy's intellectual disability, she did not consent to the sexual 
touching.   
 
The fact that the defendant did not do the touching on this 
occasion did not preclude the jury from convicting him of 
indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual 
disability.  See Portonova, 69 Mass. App. Ct. at 905-906 
(reiterating our case law does not require defendant to do 
touching); Commonwealth v. Davidson, 68 Mass. App. Ct. 72, 73, 
75-76 (2007) (defendant convicted of indecent assault and 
battery on child under age of fourteen, G. L. c. 265, § 13B, 
when victim touched his penis and rubbed his "private" with her 
nose).  "The gravity of the conduct rises to the level which 
the[] statute[] [was] designed to prohibit."  Davidson, supra at 
75-76, quoting Commonwealth v. Nuby, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 362 
(1992).   
 
ii.  Ex post facto law.  The defendant further argues that 
his motions for required findings of not guilty as to the four 
remaining indictments charging him with violations of § 13F 
should have been allowed because the Commonwealth presented 
insufficient evidence that these acts occurred after the 2010 
amendments to § 13F.  He further contends that as a result, his 
convictions violate the prohibitions against ex post facto laws 
under art. I, § 10, of the United States Constitution and art. 
22 
 
 
24 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  Specifically, he 
asserts that as a matter of law he could not have been convicted 
under § 13F, based on conduct that occurred prior to November 2, 
2010, when the statutory amendments took effect.  As discussed 
above, the substitution of the term "intellectual disability" 
for "mental retardation" did not change the substance of the 
statute.  The two terms are synonymous.  Therefore, the 
defendant's conduct was illegal prior to the 2010 amendments as 
well as after.  The statutory amendments had no retrospective 
effect that operated to the detriment of the defendant.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fuller, 421 Mass. 400, 408 (1995).  The evidence 
was sufficient, and the convictions do not violate the ex post 
facto prohibitions of the Federal or Massachusetts 
Constitutions.   
 
c.  Ineffective assistance of counsel.  The defendant 
argues that the judge erred in the denial of his motion for a 
new trial, which claimed that the defendant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Specifically, the defendant asserts that 
counsel failed to move to dismiss the complaint on the grounds 
that G. L. c. 265, § 13F, was void for vagueness, failed to 
argue effectively that the Commonwealth's evidence was 
insufficient, and failed to request jury instructions that the 
defendant could not be convicted based on acts occurring prior 
to November 2, 2010, the effective date of the statutory 
23 
 
 
amendments.  We conclude that the defendant's counsel was not 
ineffective because such motions and arguments would not have 
succeeded.   
 
When analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
a defendant must first show that "there has been serious 
incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel" and 
behavior that falls "measurably below that which might be 
expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer."  Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).  If the first prong is 
satisfied, then a defendant must show "whether it has likely 
deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial 
ground of defence."  Id.   
 
For the reasons stated above, the defendant's trial counsel 
would not have been successful on a motion to dismiss on the 
ground that G. L. c. 265, § 13F, is void for vagueness.  
Commonwealth v. Conceicao, 388 Mass. 255, 264 (1983) ("It is not 
ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel declines to 
file a motion with a minimal chance of success").  For the 
reasons stated above, the defendant's other arguments also would 
not have been successful.   
 
3.  Motion for required finding of not guilty -- indecent 
exposure.  The defendant asserts error in the denial of his 
motion for a required finding on not guilty as to the indictment 
alleging indecent exposure.  Specifically, he argues that the 
24 
 
 
Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence that he 
intentionally exposed his genitals to Amy and that Amy was 
offended by the exposure.19  The Commonwealth argues that it 
presented sufficient evidence on the charge of indecent exposure 
because a reasonable person in Amy's position would have been 
offended by the defendant's act of forcing Amy's head down 
toward his penis for the purpose of placing her mouth on his 
penis.  We agree with the Commonwealth.   
 
Indecent exposure requires proof of an "intentional act of 
lewd exposure, offensive to one or more persons."  Commonwealth 
v. Swan, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 261 (2008), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Broadland, 315 Mass. 20, 21-22 (1943).  The exposure of one's 
genitalia is a necessary element to indecent exposure.  
Commonwealth v. Arthur, 420 Mass. 535, 540-541 (1995).  
Offensive behavior are acts "that cause 'displeasure, anger or 
resentment'" and are "repugnant to the prevailing sense of what 
is decent or moral."  Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 621, 
625 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Cahill, 446 Mass. 778, 781 
(2006).   
                     
 
19 The defendant argues that the Commonwealth presented two 
independent factual bases for indecent exposure.  However, this 
is unclear because the Commonwealth only discusses the incident 
where the defendant forced Amy's head down to his penis.  The 
Commonwealth's argument that sufficient evidence was presented 
to convict on the charge of indecent exposure discussed only 
that one incident. 
 
25 
 
 
 
Amy testified that one night near the defendant's camper, 
the defendant put his hand behind her head and forced it down 
toward his "private part."  When asked whether "boys pee from 
their private part," Amy answered, "Yes."  Amy first testified 
that it was so dark out that she could not even see his "private 
part."  However, when asked whether his "private part" was 
inside or outside of his pants, she responded that it was 
outside of his pants.  She could not remember what his "private 
part" looked like.  Amy testified that the defendant wanted her 
to put her mouth on his "private part" but she told him no and 
that she wanted to go inside.   
 
The defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence 
that he intentionally exposed his genitals to Amy.  He argues 
that Amy unambiguously testified that it was too dark out to see 
the defendant's penis.  Although Amy did testify that it was so 
dark out that she could not even see his "private parts," she 
also testified that his "private part" was outside of his pants.  
Conflicting inferences that can be drawn from the evidence are 
for the jury to resolve.  Commonwealth v. Miranda, 458 Mass. 
100, 113 (2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).  "When 
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we resolve issues of 
credibility in favor of the Commonwealth . . . ."  Commonwealth 
v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 785 (1997).  The jury reasonably could 
infer (as did Amy when she testified that the defendant wanted 
26 
 
 
her to effect oral sex on him) that the defendant exposed his 
penis and pushed her head down toward his penis because it was 
his intention that Amy effect fellatio.  We conclude that the 
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable 
trier of fact to find that the defendant exposed his penis to 
Amy.   
 
The defendant further argues that Amy never testified that 
she was offended any of the times that she saw the defendant's 
penis.20  Although Amy never specifically testified that she was 
offended by the defendant's actions, she did describe the 
defendant's act of grabbing the back of her head and forcing her 
head down toward his penis.  She testified that she told him 
that she did not want to do that and that she wanted to go 
inside.  A jury rationally could infer that by saying no and by 
expressing her desire to detach herself from the situation, she 
felt "displeasure" toward defendant's conduct.  See Sullivan, 
469 Mass. at 625, quoting Cahill, 446 Mass. at 781.  We are 
satisfied that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence 
from which a reasonable trier of fact could determine that Amy 
was offended by the defendant's conduct.   
                     
 
20 The defendant is unclear in his brief as to what 
incidents he is referring; however, he argues that the 
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant exposed his genitals and on the same occasion offended 
the victim.  We will limit our discussion to whether Amy was 
offended during the incident where the defendant forced her head 
down. 
27 
 
 
 
4.  Motion for required finding of not guilty -- accosting 
or annoying a person of the opposite sex.  The defendant 
contends that the judge erred by not granting his motion for a 
required finding as to the indictment alleging accosting or 
annoying a person of the opposite sex.  Specifically, he argues 
that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to 
establish that the defendant's conduct was disorderly.  The 
Commonwealth responds that the defendant's act of forcing Amy's 
head toward his penis for the purpose of oral sex was offensive 
and disorderly conduct.   
 
General Laws c. 272, § 53, states that "persons who with 
offensive and disorderly acts or language accost or annoy 
another person . . . shall be punished."  The statute requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was both offensive 
and disorderly.  Commonwealth v. Lombard, 321 Mass. 294, 296 
(1947).  The requirements of being offensive and being 
disorderly are distinct from one another.  Id.  The Commonwealth 
also must prove that the acts were offensive and disorderly to a 
reasonable person, applying an objective standard.  Sullivan, 
469 Mass. at 625; Cahill, 446 Mass. at 781, citing Chou, 433 
Mass. at 235.   
 
Offensive acts, as discussed above "cause a complainant to 
feel displeasure, anger, resentment, or the like, and such acts 
or language would be considered indecent or immoral by a 
28 
 
 
reasonable person."  Sullivan, 469 Mass. at 625.  Offensive acts 
also require "proof of sexual conduct or language, either 
explicit or implicit."  Id. at 626.  We have determined that 
explicit sexual conduct is self-explanatory and implicit sexual 
conduct or language means conduct or language, "which a 
reasonable person would construe as having sexual connotations."  
Id.   
 
Disorderly conduct is distinct from offensive conduct. 
Lombard, 321 Mass. at 296.  Disorderly acts "are those that 
involve fighting or threatening, violent or tumultuous behavior, 
or that create a hazardous or physically offensive condition for 
no legitimate purpose of the actor, whether the resulting harm 
is suffered in public by the public or in private by an 
individual."  Chou, 433 Mass. at 233.  To be physically 
offensive, a defendant must act in such a way that a reasonable 
person would fear "imminent physical harm."  Sullivan, 469 Mass. 
at 627.  Context is taken into account when analyzing whether 
acts are physically offensive or threatening.  Id. at 628, 
quoting Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 9, 16 (2007) 
("context is critical").  The jury could have found that the 
defendant's act of forcing Amy's head down toward his penis 
caused her to fear imminent physical harm.   
 
The incident in question here is, again, the defendant's 
act of forcing Amy's head down toward his penis.  The defendant 
29 
 
 
argues that the evidence the Commonwealth presented demonstrates 
that the defendant's actions were brief and minimal and fall 
outside the spectrum of that which is offensive.  We disagree.  
As discussed above, the defendant's act of forcing Amy's head 
down for the purpose of engaging in oral sex was offensive.  As 
the defendant was forcing her head down, Amy told him no and 
that she wanted to go back inside.  A reasonable person would 
infer from Amy's inclination to go back inside that at the very 
least she felt "displeasure," and in fact was offended by the 
conduct.  Sullivan, 469 Mass. at 625.  The act of forcing Amy's 
head down toward his penis also can be construed as a physically 
offensive condition.  Viewing the events in context, Amy 
reasonably could have feared imminent physical harm.  The 
incident occurred outside, and at night, near the defendant's 
camper.  Amy is intellectually disabled and significantly 
younger than the defendant.  This was not just one isolated 
incident of the defendant making sexual advances toward Amy.  
Amy testified to various times where he touched her breasts and 
her vagina.  Viewing the defendant's actions within this context 
could place a reasonable person in fear of imminent physical 
harm.  Additionally, forcing a person's head down toward one's 
penis to engage in sexual conduct could place a reasonable 
person in fear of imminent physical harm.  We conclude that the 
Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence that the defendant's 
30 
 
 
behavior was disorderly, and that the motion for a required 
finding of not guilty properly was denied.   
5.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we determine 
G. L. c. 265, § 13F, as amended through St. 2010, c. 239, §§ 71-
72, to be constitutional, and we affirm the defendant's 
convictions of indecent assault and battery on a person with an 
intellectual disability, indecent exposure, and accosting or 
annoying a person of the opposite sex.  We also affirm the 
orders denying the defendant's motions for a new trial and for 
required findings of not guilty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.