Case Title: COE & PAYNE COMPANY v. Foster & Kleiser, Inc.

Citation: 258 Ga. 161, 366 S.E.2d 292

Docket Number: 

State: georgia

Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Date: 1988-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
258 Ga. 161 (1988) 366 S.E.2d 292 COE & PAYNE COMPANY v. FOSTER & KLEISER, INC. 45371. Supreme Court of Georgia. Decided April 7, 1988. Grizzard, Simons & Martin, Steven J. Martin, D. Michael Sweetnam, for appellant. Arrington & Horne, Stanley E. Foster, for appellee. WELTNER, Justice. Coe & Payne Company, a subcontractor, furnished labor and materials for improvements to real property owned by Foster & Kleiser, Inc. The general contractor subsequently was adjudicated a bankrupt. Within three months after completion of the work, Coe & Payne Company filed a lien against real property of Foster & Kleiser, Inc. Within twelve months after the debt became due, Coe & Payne filed an action to foreclose its lien. By error, the foreclosure action was filed against Foster & Kleiser, Corp., not Foster & Kleiser, Inc. Upon discovering its error, and after the twelve month's statutory period expired, Coe & Payne moved to amend its complaint under the provisions of OCGA § 9-11-15 by substituting as defendant Foster & Kleiser, Inc., for Foster & Kleiser, Corp. The trial court allowed the amendment. Foster & Kleiser, Inc., then moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that no action to foreclose the lien had been initiated against it (i.e., Foster & Kleiser, Inc.) within the twelve-month period provided by OCGA § 44-14-361.1. The motion was denied, an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, and that court reversed. Foster & Kleiser, Inc. v. Coe & Payne Co., 185 Ga. App. 284 (363 SE2d 818) (1987). We granted certiorari to consider whether OCGA § 9-11-15 (c), permitting amendments to "relate back" to the original filing, applies to actions to foreclose liens. 1. OCGA § 9-11-15 (c) provides in part: 2. It is plain that all the conditions of the code section were satisfied. *162 The lien was filed against the proper party, Foster & Kleiser, Inc.; the same attorney represented both corporations; both corporations were owned by the same parent company; both corporations were listed with the Secretary of State with the same home office address in New Jersey; both corporations had the same agent for service; the same person served as vice-president for both corporations; and both corporations occupy the same local address in Atlanta. 3. OCGA § 9-11-2 provides: "There shall be one form of action, to be known as `civil action.'" OCGA § 9-2-1 provides, in part, as follows: "As used in this title, the term: (1) `Action' means the judicial means of enforcing a right. (2) `Civil action' means an action founded on private rights, arising either from contract or tort."[1] An action to foreclose a lien clearly comes within this definition of "civil action," and is subject to amendment under the terms of OCGA § 9-11-15 (c). Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Marshall, C. J., and Clarke, P. J., who dissent. [1] The Court of Appeals has ruled that a party may be brought into a pending action by amendment, even though the statute of limitations has run as to that party. A subcontractor brought an action against a contractor for money due the subcontractor by reason of work performed under contract. The subcontractor was allowed to amend to bring in as an additional defendant (the surety on a labor and material payment bond), though the bond provided that no action could be commenced by any party after a period of one year from the date the principal ceased work on the contract, and the subcontractor's amendment was filed more than a year from the date on which the contractor ceased work. Sam Finley, Inc. v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 135 Ga. App. 14 (217 SE2d 358) (1975).