Case Title: Rodney C. White v. Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-396

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION PER CURIAM MARCH 14, 2002 RODNEY C. WHITE Appellant v. LARRY NORRIS, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction Appellee 01-396 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY, LCIV-2000-89-3, HONORABLE FRED D. DAVIS III, JUDGE AFFIRMED Appellant, an inmate in the Arkansas Department of Correction, brings this appeal from the Lincoln County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus. He contended in the petition that his parole eligibility date had been miscalculated by the Department. The circuit court dismissed the petition pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state grounds upon which the relief requested could be granted. We affirm. Facts In November of 1996, appellant pled guilty to three counts of second-degree forgery and three counts of attempted delivery of a controlled substance. Judgment was filed on January 23, 1997, reflecting that appellant's sentences totaled fifteen years' imprisonment. Upon imprisonment, appellant's parole eligibility date for transfer to the Department of Community Correction (formerly the Department of Community Punishment) was calculated to be February 24, 1999. It is not clear from the record whether appellant was paroled on February 24, 1999, or on adate subsequent as he claims. It is apparent, however, that appellant was paroled on or after February 24, 1999, and that a parole violation report was filed on April 9, 2000. Appellant subsequently pled guilty on May 19, 2000, to aggravated assault and fleeing, and had three suspended sentences revoked. Judgment was filed on June 19, 2000, reflecting appellant's new sentences, including an additional twenty years' imprisonment to be served consecutive to the previously imposed fifteen year sentence. Appellant's new parole eligibility date was calculated to be June 8, 2003. Standard of Review In reviewing a decision on a motion to dismiss under Ark.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the party who filed the complaint. Martin v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 344 Ark. 177, 180, 40 S.W.3d 733, 735-36 (2001). In testing the sufficiency of the complaint on a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the complaint, and the pleadings are to be liberally construed. Id. Our rules require fact pleading, and a complaint must state facts, not mere conclusions, in order to entitle the pleader to relief. Id. This court looks to the underlying facts supporting an alleged cause of action to determine whether the matter has been sufficiently pled. Country Corner Food & Drug, Inc. v. First State Bank, 332 Ark. 645, 652, 966 S.W.2d 894, 897 (1998). Declaratory Judgment and Mandamus A petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus is civil in nature. Wiggins v. State, 299 Ark. 180, 181, 771 S.W.2d 759, 760 (1989). Such a petition seeking recalculation of a parole eligibility date is properly filed in the county in which the defendant, i.e. the Director or keeper of the records of the Arkansas Department of Correction, is located. Id. We have held that there are four requisite conditions before declaratory relief may be granted: (1) there must exist a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved in the controversy must be ripe for judicial determination. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ross-Lawhon, 290 Ark. 578, 579, 721 S.W.2d 658, 658 (1986). Our declaratory judgment act was not intended to allow any question to be presented by any person; the matters must first be justiciable. Andres v. First Ark. Development Finance Corp., 230 Ark. 594, 606, 324 S.W.2d 97, 104 (1959). The declared legislative purpose is "to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-102(a) (1987). The purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right or to enforce the performance of a duty. Arkansas-Democrat Gazette v. Zimmerman, 341 Ark. 771, 777, 20 S.W.3d 301, 304 (2000). A writ of mandamus is issued by this court only to compel an official or judge to take some action, and when requesting the writ, a petitioner must show a clear and certain right to the relief sought and the absence of any other remedy. Id. But a writ of mandamus will not lie to control or review matters of discretion. Id. Motion to Dismiss The circuit court granted appellee's motion to dismiss under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding that appellant's petition failed to state grounds upon which relief can be granted. Appellant's claimed in his petition that his earlier parole eligibility date of February 24, 1999, should have been retained, notwithstanding the sentences imposed on May 19, 2000. He further contended that the 450 days that elapsed between February 24, 1999, and May 19, 2000, referred to as "dead time" by the Department, should be included in the parole eligibility equation. Appellantcited Bosnick v. Lockhart, 283 Ark. 206, 672 S.W.2d 52 (1984), in support of his claims. On appeal, appellant raises similar and additional claims. He now argues that the proper calculation of his parole eligibility date is September 27, 2002, that the Varner Unit Records Division lacked authority to make the "dead time" declaration, and that he is entitled to 375 days jail credit awarded him on May 19, 2000, at his revocation hearing. It is well settled, however, that parties may not change their argument on appeal and are limited to the scope and nature of their arguments made below. Hunter v. State, 330 Ark. 198, 203, 952 S.W.2d 145, 148 (1997). As such, we will not consider appellant's arguments that go beyond the scope and nature of the arguments raised in his petition. Additionally, we note that despite appellant's failure to present a record that clearly shows the date of his parole, we will consider his appeal because the exact date of parole is not essential for the resolution of his claims. The determination of parole eligibility is the province of the Department of Correction. Morris v. State, 333 Ark. 466, 468, 970 S.W.2d 210, 211 91998). Parole eligibility is determined by the law in effect at the time the crime is committed. Boles v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 410, 412, 12 S.W.3d 201, 202 (2000); Woods v. Lockhart, 292 Ark. 37, 39-40, 727 S.W.2d 849, 850-51 (1987). Therefore, appellant's parole eligibility for both his 1996 and 2000 crimes is determined by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-1301, which states, in part: (c) Persons who commit felonies on or after January 1, 1994, and who shall be convicted and incarcerated for those felonies, shall be eligible for transfer to community punishment as follows: * * * (3)(A) All other classified or unclassified felons who are incarcerated therefor shall be eligible for transfer to community punishment after having served one-third (1/3) or one-half (1/2), with credit for meritorious good time, of their sentences depending on the seriousness determination made by the Arkansas Sentencing Commission, or one-half (1/2), with credit for meritorious good time, of the time to which their sentences are commuted by executive clemency. Appellant failed to show in his petition and has failed to show on appeal that the Department is miscalculating his parole eligibility date in a manner inconsistent with the law in effect at the times he committed his crimes. Clearly, appellant's earlier transfer eligibility date of February 24, 1999, should not be retained in light of the fact that appellant was paroled on or after that date, and while on parole, committed further crimes leading to additional convictions and sentences that increased his total term of imprisonment. Appellant's reliance on Bosnick, supra, does not help his case. As in Woods, supra, the situation here differs from the one in Bosnick because appellant has not shown that the Department is attempting to apply a new or different law to lengthen his parole eligibility under his earlier convictions instead of applying the law in effect at the times he committed his crimes. Furthermore, the entire 450 days that elapsed between appellant's earlier parole eligibility date of February 24, 1999, and the date new sentences were imposed, May 19, 2000, which has been characterized as "dead time" by the Department, cannot apply to the setting of appellant's new parole eligibility date. "Time served shall continue only during the time in which an individual is actually confined in a county jail or other local place of lawful confinement or while under the custody and supervision of the Department of Correction." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-1303(a)(2). The Department's release date calculation appearing in the record shows that appellant received an additional 217 days jail time credit during the "dead time." Because appellant has not shown that the Department excluded the additional 217 days jail time credit in determining his new parole eligibility date, his attacks upon the characterized "dead time" are without merit. We additionally note that the Department's release date calculation reflects that appellant's total jail time credit is 375 days. Thus, his argument that he is being deprived 375 days jail credit awarded him at his revocation hearing, despite his failure to preserve this argument below, is moot. From our review of the record presented by appellant, treating the facts alleged in the petition as true and viewing them in a light most favorable to appellant, we cannot say that the circuit court erred in dismissing his petition. We also note that the circuit court dismissed this case without reference to whether it was with or without prejudice. We have held that ordinarily such dismissals are without prejudice. Cotten v. Fooks, 346 Ark. 130, 135, 55 S.W.3d 290, 293 (2001). However, should a plaintiff elect to appeal rather than plead further, then the option to plead further is waived in the event of affirmance by the appellate court. Id. Accordingly, because we affirm, the dismissal is with prejudice. See id. Affirmed.