Case Title: Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli

Citation: 567 P.2d 182

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1977-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
567 P.2d 182 (1977) SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Teresa Jean RAMOSELLI, Defendant and Respondent. No. 14726. Supreme Court of Utah. July 22, 1977. *183 R. Paul Van Dam, Salt Lake County Atty., Quentin L.R. Alston, Deputy Salt Lake County Atty., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. Robert S. Campbell, Jr., of Watkiss & Campbell, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent. HALL, Justice: Plaintiff appeals from an adverse ruling of the district court as to its need for condemnation of some 11 acres of land to be used as a park and recreation area. The gravamen of the appeal is that the trial court exceeded its authority of judicial review despite the fact that at the time of trial it readily recognized the court's authority to determine the issue of necessity of the proposed acquisition. In fact, the parties stipulated and agreed at the time to bifurcate the trial, separating the issue of entitlement to condemn from that of just compensation for the taking and reserving the latter issue for a subsequent proceeding. The power of eminent domain is not to be exercised thoughtlessly or arbitrarily and the courts possess full authority to determine the proper limits of the power to prevent abuses in its exercise,[1] and litigants should, and do have great latitude in conferring dispositive functions upon the court as they clearly did in this instance. The question of necessity of the taking is the functional prerogative of the judicial system and that principle of law is stated in Nichols on Eminent Domain[2] as follows: The trial court clearly recognized its duty to determine the issue of necessity and proceeded *184 to take evidence on that sole issue pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.[3] Briefly stated, the evidence at trial was that no defined plans had been adopted or approved, that no time frame of use within the reasonably foreseeable future had been determined, despite the fact that a voluntary acquisition of nearby property for public use some six years prior had not as yet been placed to its intended purpose, and that no funds had been requested, budgeted, appropriated or were presently in existence to place the property in question to use. At the conclusion of the trial, the court made its findings, which, generally stated, were that any use of the premises was uncertain, indefinite, speculative, and not within the reasonably foreseeable future. Based thereon, it concluded that plaintiff had failed in its burden of proving need or public necessity and that the attempted condemnation was clear abuse of discretion. Plaintiff's challenge to the judgment fails since the parties sought and stipulated for the decision and there is an abundance of admissible, competent, substantial evidence to support the same. In accord with the numerous pronouncements of this court, no attempt should be made to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Affirmed. Costs to defendant. MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur. ELLETT, Chief Justice (dissenting): Salt Lake County, a body politic with power given by the legislature of this state to condemn land for public uses, brought this action to condemn 11.63 acres of land to be used as a park and recreation area. By agreement of the parties, the case was bifurcated and the only issue tried was the right of the county to condemn. The testimony presented by the county showed that the area wherein the subject property is located is being thickly populated and has no adequate recreational parks to serve the people. It further showed that as early as 1974 plans were made for a recreational area to be established in the vicinity of the Ramoselli property. The county has already acquired an adjoining tract of land containing an old pioneer house thereon, which land was a pioneer farm and which is to be maintained as an example of life on the farm one hundred years ago. The subject property also has a pioneer house in good condition which will be maintained and used as headquarters for an information center as to the farm, etc. The Ramoselli property is located at the corner of 6600 South and 900 East and affords access to the park and parking lot for those who visit the area. Other uses may be made of the area as the need arises. A master plan of development of the entire county has been prepared and adopted, and the area in question is set apart as a recreational park area therein. There is no question but that the county has decided to use the property as above stated. The trial court found that the county was "unentitled" to condemn the property and gave as his reasons: "... there did not and does not exist as of March, 1974, when the action was filed, a genuine need for the condemnation of the defendant (sic). Further the Court finds that a specific use of the property was not and still has not been defined by the governing board of Salt Lake County and that funds have not been budgeted for the construction of any public project on the condemned lands, and there is no showing what the county intends to use the property for in the foreseeable future." Now, the county would not be expected to provide funds for the erection of facilities on land which it did not own prior to the acquisition thereof. The evidence is clear and certain that the use of the land is for a park and recreation facility. Whether it be a baseball field, a tennis court, a horseshoe pitching area, or merely a grassy place for children to romp and play, is not *185 for the courts to decide. The general law is stated in 26 Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, Sec. 112 as follows: The next section reads: The prevailing opinion cites Section 78-34-4(2), U.C.A., 1953 as authorizing the trial court to decide the necessity of the taking. The statute reads: Clearly the courts will not allow the taking of property that cannot be used for the purpose for which it is allegedly taken. That is what the statute says, and that is what it means. The court would not permit the county to take 100 acres of land for a horseshoe court or to sell it to a manufacturing concern.[2] The Main opinion quotes from 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain to the effect that there is a judicial question as to whether the taking is of such a nature that it is or may be founded on public necessity. There can be no question that the taking of land for a public park is a taking for a public purpose. The prevailing opinion did not quote from Nichols (supra) the following pertinent sections: The County Commission, in the instant matter, is the legislative branch of government and it has the sole duty to determine the need for parks. Its ordinance providing for the need for, and creation of, a park cannot be reviewed by the court save to assure that the taking is necessary for the use to which it will be put. In this case there can be no question but that the land will be put to the use of a park. The Utah case of Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon S.L.R. Co., 23 Utah 474, 484, 485, 65 P. 735, 739 (1901) states the law of this state as follows: In the instant matter the trial court did not find that the taking was not necessary to the use as a park. He found simply that the taking was not necessary; and in doing so, he impinged upon the legislative functions of the County Commission. He attempted to substitute his judgment as to the necessity of the need for a recreational area for that of the appellant, and in doing so he erred. By stipulation of counsel the parties agreed that the case would be bifurcated and the only thing to be determined at this trial was the right of the county to condemn. By that stipulation, the county never intended to allow the judge to make a determination of legislative matters. In his fervor to usurp the legislative functions of the county, the trial court ruled that there was no need for an immediate occupancy when that matter was not even before it. The ruling of the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded with directions to proceed with the unresolved issues. No costs should be awarded. CROCKETT, J., concurs in the view expressed in the dissenting opinion of ELLETT, C.J. [1] 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 87. [2] 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec. 4.11(2) p. 4-157. [3] Sections 78-34-4 and 78-34-8, U.C.A., 1953, emphasize the judicial authority in this area. [1] 26 Am.Jur.2d., Eminent Domain, Sec. 113. [2] 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec. 4.11(2).