Case Title: ANNABELLE R HARVEY V STATE OF MICHIGAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 121672

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 16, 2003  
ANNABELLE R. HARVEY, beneficiary 
and successor of Paul Harvey, 
deceased, and MICHAEL F. MERRITT, 
Judge, retired, substituted for 
Bruce A. Fox, Judge, retired,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v 
No. 121672  
STATE OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUREAU OF 
RETIREMENT SERVICES, AND JUDGES 
RETIREMENT BOARD,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
KELLY, J.  
We took this case to consider the constitutionality of  
the district court judicial pension provisions of the Judges  
Retirement Act, MCL 38.2101 et seq., as amended in the court  
 
 
 
reorganization act of 1980, 1980 PA 438 through 443.1  The  
Court of Appeals reviewed plaintiffs' equal protection  
challenge 
and 
concluded 
that 
the 
statute 
was 
unconstitutional,  
utilizing the intermediate scrutiny test.  We hold that the  
statute is constitutional and the proper standard is the  
rational-basis test.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of  
the Court of Appeals and enter a judgment in favor of  
defendants.  
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
Plaintiffs are retired state district court judges who  
served throughout the state in districts other than the 36th  
Judicial District in Detroit.  They have asserted that the  
Judges Retirement Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of  
the Michigan Constitution2 by allowing the state to provide  
a greater retirement allowance to 36th District Court judges  
than to all others.  The act provides 36th District Court  
judges a pension based on their former total salary, whereas  
it provides the others a pension based on only a portion of  
their former total salary.  
Before 1980, in all Michigan's trial level judicial  
districts, judicial salaries were paid partly by the state and  
partly by a local funding unit, usually a city or county.  In  
1 Specifically, MCL 38.2104(1)(b) and (d), and MCL 
38.2108(3) and (8).  
2Const 1963, art 1, § 2.  
2  
 
accordance with this dual salary system, all state trial level  
judges belonged to two retirement systems: one maintained by  
the state and one by the local funding unit.  
In 1980, the Legislature created a new funding scheme for  
state judicial retirees as part of the court reorganization  
act, 1980 PA 438 through 1980 PA 443. Through this act, the  
Legislature sought to require the state to begin to fully  
assume the cost of state court operations, starting with the  
36th Judicial District.  Concomitant with this funding, the  
Legislature 
amended 
the Judges Retirement Act to establish the  
state as the provider of both the state and local components  
of 
36th 
Judicial 
District 
Court 
judges' 
salaries.  
Accordingly, the state pays both the state and local  
components of 36th Judicial District Court judges' retirement  
benefits.  
In succeeding years, the goal of full state funding of  
court operations was not fulfilled. Nevertheless, the state  
continues to fund one hundred percent of 36th Judicial  
District judges' pensions. 
The retirement systems and  
pensions 
of 
judges 
outside the 36th Judicial District continue  
to be funded by both state and local sources.  Depending on  
the funding and contribution levels in their local government  
retirement schemes, these judges may receive a greater or  
lesser retirement benefit than do the judges of the 36th  
Judicial District.  
3  
Plaintiffs commenced the present suit in 1994.  The  
circuit 
court 
granted 
defendants' 
motion 
for 
summary  
disposition, concluding that the Judges Retirement Act does  
not violate the Equal Protection Clause when subjected to  
review under the rational-basis test.  The Court of Appeals  
reversed the decision and remanded, holding that the court  
should 
have 
employed 
an intermediate scrutiny test in deciding  
this case.  Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 3,  
1997 (Docket No. 187112)(Harvey I).  
On remand, the circuit court again found for defendants,  
holding that the act satisfies intermediate scrutiny.  The  
Court of Appeals again reversed the lower court, applying the  
intermediate scrutiny test itself and holding the Act  
unconstitutional.
 It also remanded the case for further  
proceedings concerning the appropriate remedy. 251 Mich App  
323; 650 NW2d 392 (2002)(Harvey II).  
Upon 
defendants' 
application, 
this 
Court 
granted 
leave 
to  
appeal.
 In our grant order, we directed the parties to  
include among the issues to be briefed:  
(1) [T]he applicable level of scrutiny under 
Fourteenth Amendment analysis, (2) the current 
viability, if any, of Manistee Bank v McGowan, 394 
Mich 655 [232 NW2d 636] (1975), and (3) this 
Court's ability to order the relief requested, 
inter 
alia, 
fully 
state-funded 
pensions 
for  
outstate judges, prospectively and retroactively, 
in light of Const 1963, art 1, § 2; art 3, § 2; art 
4, § 1; Lewis v Mich, 464 Mich 781, 786-787 (2001); 
see also North Ottawa Hosp v Kieft, 457 Mich 394, 
408 n 141 (1998); 77th Dist Judge v Michigan, 175  
4  
 
  
Mich App 681 (1989). [467 Mich 899 (2002).]  
II. PRINCIPLES OF REVIEW  
We 
review 
summary 
disposition 
judgments 
and  
constitutional 
issues de novo.  Taylor v Gate Pharmaceuticals,  
468 Mich 1, 5; 658 NW2d 127 (2003).  The Equal Protection  
Clause 
of 
the 
Michigan Constitution declares that "[n]o person  
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws . . . ."  
Const 1963, art 1, § 2.  We have interpreted this clause to be  
coextensive with its federal counterpart.3 
Crego v Coleman,  
463 Mich 248, 258; 615 NW2d 218 (2000); Vargo v Sauer, 457  
Mich 49, 60; 576 NW2d 656 (1998); Doe v Dep't of Social  
Services, 439 Mich 650, 662; 487 NW2d 166 (1992).  
III. ANALYSIS  
Not all legislative enactments that group people into  
classifications affront the Equal Protection Clause.  Indeed,  
many legitimately group people on the basis of such  
considerations as (1) their income for purposes of the tax  
laws, (2) their income for purposes of eligibility for social  
services, or (3) their conduct for purposes of imposing  
criminal sanctions.  A court evaluates equal protection  
3 By this, we do not mean that we are bound in our 
understanding of the Michigan Constitution by any particular 
interpretation of the United States Constitution.  We mean  
only that we have been persuaded in the past that  
interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause of the  
Fourteenth Amendment have accurately conveyed the meaning of 
Const 1963, art 1, § 2 as well.  
5  
 
 
 
challenges to the constitutional validity of a classification  
using one of three levels of scrutiny, depending on the nature  
of the classification.  Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 216-217; 102  
S Ct 2382; 72 L Ed 2d 786 (1982).  
In Crego, we articulated the three levels of scrutiny:  
The highest level of review, or "strict  
scrutiny," is invoked where the law results in 
classifications based on "suspect" factors such as 
race, national origin, or ethnicity, none of which 
are [sic] implicated in this case. Plyler v Doe, 
457 US 202, 216-217; 102 S Ct 2382; 72 L Ed 2d 786 
(1982). Absent the implication of these highly 
suspect categories, an equal protection challenge 
requires 
either 
rational-basis 
review 
or 
an  
intermediate, "heightened scrutiny" review.  
A. Where rational basis applies  
Under rational-basis review, courts will  
uphold legislation as long as that legislation is 
rationally related to a legitimate government  
purpose. Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 485; 90 
S Ct 1153; 25 L Ed 2d 491 (1970).  To prevail under 
this highly deferential standard of review, a 
challenger must show that the legislation is  
"arbitrary and wholly unrelated in a rational way 
to the objective of the statute." Smith v  
Employment Security Comm, 410 Mich 231, 271; 301  
NW2d 285 (1981).  A classification reviewed on this  
basis 
passes 
constitutional 
muster 
if 
the  
legislative judgment is supported by any set of 
facts, either known or which could reasonably be 
assumed, even if such facts may be debatable. 
Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 613-614; 
267 NW2d 72 (1978). Rational-basis review does not 
test the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the 
legislation, or whether the classification is made 
with "mathematical nicety," or even whether it 
results in some inequity when put into practice. 
O'Donnell v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 404 
Mich 524, 542; 273 NW2d 829 (1979).  Rather, the 
statute is presumed constitutional, and the party 
challenging it bears a heavy burden of rebutting 
that presumption. Shavers, supra.  
6  
 
 
B. Where heightened scrutiny applies  
The United States Supreme Court has recognized 
an intermediate level of review, between strict­
scrutiny and rational-basis review, under which a 
challenged statutory classification will be upheld 
only if it is "substantially related to an  
important governmental objective." Clark v Jeter, 
486 US 456, 461; 108 S Ct 1910; 100 L Ed 2d 465 
(1988). This "heightened scrutiny" standard has 
been 
applied 
to 
legislation 
creating 
classifications on such bases as illegitimacy and 
gender. The standard recognizes that, while there 
may be certain immutable distinctions, for example, 
between men and women or between legitimate and 
illegitimate children, that justify differing 
legislative treatments under some circumstances, 
the 
Legislature's 
authority 
to 
invoke 
those  
distinctions 
should 
not 
be 
viewed 
as 
an  
"impenetrable 
barrier 
that 
works 
to 
shield  
otherwise invidious discrimination." Gomez v Perez, 
409 US 535, 538; 93 S Ct 872; 35 L Ed 2d 56 (1973). 
See also, e.g., Clark, supra; Mills v Habluetzel, 
456 US 91; 102 S Ct 1549; 71 L Ed 2d 770 (1982); 
Mathews v Lucas, 427 US 495, 505-506; 96 S Ct 2755; 
49 L Ed 2d 651 (1976) (all applying heightened 
scrutiny to classifications based on illegitimacy). 
Thus, where an equal protection claim alleges 
unconstitutional 
treatment 
on 
the 
basis 
of  
illegitimacy, the Supreme Court has held that "a 
State may not invidiously discriminate against 
illegitimate children by denying them substantial 
benefits accorded children generally." Gomez, supra 
at 538. However, where a challenged statute is 
substantially 
related 
to 
an 
important 
state  
interest, the statute should be upheld. Mills,  
supra at 98-99. [Crego, supra at 259-261.]  
Here, as in Crego, plaintiffs' constitutional challenge does  
not implicate strict scrutiny review.  
IV. THE PROPER LEVEL OF SCRUTINY TO APPLY IN THIS CASE  
The key question in this appeal is which of two tests  
should be applied:  intermediate scrutiny or rational-basis  
scrutiny?  In Harvey I, the Court of Appeals held that the  
7  
 
 
 
appropriate test to apply to the Judges Retirement Act is the  
intermediate scrutiny test. The Court made this decision in  
reliance on Manistee Bank, supra.  
A. The Validity of Manistee Bank  
In Manistee Bank, this Court considered an equal  
protection challenge to the automobile guest statute,4 which  
prohibited 
suits 
against 
automobile 
drivers 
by 
their  
passengers. Before 1971, there existed two levels of review  
for equal protection challenges.  
The intermediate scrutiny standard emerged from the  
United States Supreme Court's decision in Reed v Reed, 404 US  
71; 92 S Ct 251; 30 L Ed 2d 225 (1971).  There, the Court  
evaluated a gender classification by considering whether it  
was "reasonable, not arbitrary, and [rested] upon some ground  
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the  
object of the legislation . . . ."  Id. at 76, quoting FS  
Royster Guano Co v Virginia, 253 US 412, 415; 40 S Ct 560; 64  
L Ed 989 (1920). The 1975 Manistee Bank Court, relying on a  
law review article,5 recognized the novelty of the Reed  
formulation, 
dubbing 
it 
the 
"fair-and-substantial-relation-to­
the-object-of-the-legislation test."  Manistee Bank, supra at  
4MCL 257.401.  
5Gunther, Foreward: In search of evolving doctrine on a  
changing court: A model for a newer equal protection, 86 Harv 
L R 1 (1972).  
8  
 
 
 
670.  
After 
recognizing 
the 
new 
intermediate 
scrutiny 
test, 
the  
Court held that it applied to statutes like the automobile  
guest statute, which created "a discrete exception" to the  
common law that was "no longer experimental," Manistee Bank,  
supra at 671-672:  
In my judgment, at least where the challenged 
statute carves out a discrete exception to a 
general rule and the statutory exception is no 
longer experimental, the substantial-relation-to­
the-object test should be applied.  
Judicial deference to the Legislature is  
premised in part upon the perceived need for 
experimentation, especially in social and economic 
matters.  
"[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not  
require that a state must choose between attacking 
every aspect of a problem or not attacking the 
problem at all."47  
The guest passenger statutes have operated for  
45 
years 
to 
deny 
a 
discrete 
group-
-
-guest 
passengers-
-
-recovery for death, injury or loss 
caused by ordinary negligence.  They have been 
criticized, amended, repealed, whittled away and 
struck down.  
A court can no longer properly view the guest 
statutes as but the first experimental step in a 
legislative scheme designed eventually to require, 
for example, that gross negligence be shown before 
any person can recover for injuries suffered in an 
automobile accident.  
Where a classification scheme creates a  
discrete exception to a general rule and has been 
enforced for a sufficiently long period of time 
that all the rationales likely to be advanced in 
its support have been developed, a court should 
fully examine those rationales and determine  
whether they are sound.  
9  
__________________________________________________
___________________________________________________ 
 
  
47Dandridge v Williams, [397 US 471,] 486-487[n 
24; 25 L Ed 2d 491 (1970)].  
Thus, Manistee Bank stands for two propositions.  First,  
the intermediate scrutiny test should be applied to certain  
equal protection challenges.  Second, the test applies to  
"discrete exception" situations that occur when a statute  
creates an exception to a general rule and the exception is no  
longer considered experimental.  
We need not consider the wisdom of the Manistee Bank  
Court's recognition of the intermediate scrutiny test. Even  
had the Court not recognized its validity, the test has become  
established in federal equal protection jurisprudence,6 and  
our state Equal Protection Clause is coextensive with federal  
equal protection.7  Rather, we must determine whether the  
intermediate 
scrutiny 
test 
applies 
in 
the 
"discrete 
exception"  
situation identified in Manistee Bank.  
We conclude that it does not and that the second holding  
in Manistee Bank is flawed. First, the "discrete exception"  
justification for the application of intermediate scrutiny  
review has not found support in federal equal protection  
jurisprudence. The Manistee Bank Court decision determined  
that the age of certain legislative enactments permits the  
6E.g., Plyler, supra at 217.  
7Crego, supra.  
10  
 
 
 
court to inquire more deeply into the rationales behind them.  
However, the United States Supreme Court has applied the  
intermediate 
scrutiny 
test 
only 
to 
challenges 
involving 
quasi­
suspect classes, such as gender8 and illegitimacy.9
 The  
federal Equal Protection Clause has never been expanded to  
permit a close scrutiny of legislative wisdom beyond those  
cases involving suspect or quasi-suspect classes.  Certainly,  
the United States Supreme Court has not applied intermediate  
scrutiny review in any case involving a "discrete exception"  
to a general rule no longer considered experimental.  
Moreover, after Manistee Bank was decided, this Court  
adhered to the federal courts' limited view of when  
intermediate 
scrutiny review should apply.  In Frame v Nehls,10  
we stated that determining the appropriate test applicable to  
equal 
protection 
challenges is largely a choice between strict  
scrutiny and rational basis.11
 "Unless the discrimination  
impinges on the exercise of a fundamental right or involves a  
suspect class, the inquiry . . . is whether the classification  
8See Craig v Boren, 429 US 190; 97 S Ct 451; 50 L Ed 2d  
397 (1976).  
9See Clark v Jeter, supra.  
10452 Mich 171, 183; 550 NW2d 739 (1996).  
11The 
Frame 
Court 
implicitly 
acknowledged 
that  
intermediate scrutiny would apply if the classification in 
that case were based on illegitimacy. Frame, supra at 182 n  
11, 187 n 16.  
11  
is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose."  
Id. at 183.  
Similarly, in Yaldo v North Pointe Ins Co,12 we stated:  
"Defendant is not a member of a protected class, nor are  
fundamental rights involved.  Therefore, defendant's equal  
protection claim is reviewed using a rational basis test."  As  
a final example, in Vargo,13 we stated: "Because, there is no  
fundamental right or suspect classification involved, the  
rational-basis standard of review governs in the present  
case." These cases demonstrate our adherence to the federal  
trend that limits the application of intermediate scrutiny to  
cases involving suspect classifications that do not require  
strict scrutiny.  
Likewise, this Court recently failed to apply the  
Manistee Bank analysis to an equal protection challenge  
involving a discrete exception to a general rule. In Crego,  
we evaluated a repealed section of MCL 722.713.  It permitted  
the mother of an illegitimate child to enter into a  
nonmodifiable 
child 
support 
agreement 
with 
the 
putative 
father  
in lieu of the court determining paternity and setting a  
support amount. This statute represented a forty-year-old  
exception to the general rule allowing for the modification of  
12457 Mich 341, 349; 578 NW2d 274 (1998).  
13Vargo, supra at 60.  
12  
 
 
 
child support agreements.  
Although Crego involved a discrete exception no longer  
considered experimental, we held that intermediate scrutiny  
would apply only if the classification were considered to be  
based on illegitimacy.  Because the classification in the  
statute was based on the ascertainment of paternity, rational  
basis scrutiny was applied.  Significantly, the Court gave no  
consideration 
to 
the 
idea that, because the challenged statute  
excepts from a general rule, intermediate scrutiny should  
apply.  
Thus, the present state of both federal and Michigan  
equal 
protection 
jurisprudence 
fails 
to 
support 
application 
of  
the intermediate scrutiny test to statutes that create "a  
discrete exception to a general rule" where the exception "is  
no longer considered experimental."  Accordingly, we overrule  
the Manistee Bank holding to the extent that it created the  
“discrete exception to a general rule” basis for applying  
intermediate scrutiny.  We affirm its recognition of the  
existence of the intermediate scrutiny test.  
B. 
The Propriety of Rational Basis Review  
Given the state of the law and because this case does not  
involve 
a 
quasi-suspect classification, we hold that the Court  
of Appeals erred in ordering application of the intermediate  
13  
 
 
 
scrutiny test.14  The circuit court correctly held that  
plaintiffs' claim must be judged using the rational-basis  
test.  
In holding that rational-basis review applies, we find  
strong support in Hughes v Judges' Retirement Bd,15 decided  
just four years after Manistee Bank. 
There, the Court  
considered a similar equal protection claim concerning a  
statute that amended the Judges Retirement Act to increase the  
pension benefits to judges who retired after its effective  
date.
 The amendment caused the pensions of judges who  
remained in the system or were new to it to be greater than  
the pensions of those who had already retired.  
In assessing the equal protection challenge brought by  
the already-retired judges, the Court unanimously chose to  
consider the judges a classification that should be analyzed  
under the rational-basis test. It stated:  
“This 
Court 
has 
many 
times 
held 
that  
legislation is not unconstitutional because it is 
legislation of a particular kind or character, or 
because it benefits a particular class, so long as 
the law operates equally upon those within the 
particular class. In re Phillips, 305 Mich 636 [9 
NW2d 872 (1945)]; Lake Shore Coach Lines, Inc v  
Secretary of State, 327 Mich 146 [41 NW2d 503 
(1950)]; People's Appliance, Inc v City of Flint,  
14In Harvey II, the Court of Appeals compounded its error 
by adopting the dicta analysis of 77th Dist Judge v Michigan, 
175 Mich App 681; 438 NW2d 333 (1989), which opined that the 
Judges Retirement Act fails the intermediate scrutiny test.  
15407 Mich 75; 282 NW2d 160 (1979).  
14  
 
 
 
  
358 Mich 34 [99 NW2d 522 (1959)]. . . . This Court 
cannot and will not question [the Legislature's] 
reasons unless they appear to be palpably arbitrary 
or unreasonable.  Ver Hoven Woodward Chevrolet, Inc  
v Dunkirk, 351 Mich 190 [88 NW2d 408 (1958)]; 
Metropolitan Funeral System Ass'n v Commissioner of  
Insurance, 331 Mich 185 [49 NW2d 131 (1951)].”  
[Hughes, supra at 93, quoting Burgess v Detroit, 
359 Mich 269; 280; 120 NW2d 483 (1960).]  
The Court then described why the Legislature’s actions  
were rational, saying that it was sufficient to meet this test  
that the Legislature was inducing "competent and qualified  
attorneys to become judges, or to remain judges if already in  
office." Hughes, supra at 94. Thus, the rational-basis test  
had been satisfied and the statute was constitutional.  
In our case, a similar analysis is appropriate.  The  
state, by assuming the entire funding of the pensions of 36th  
District 
judges 
in 
the financially distressed city of Detroit,  
made those pensions more secure.  Certainly the Legislature  
would or could understand that this would induce competent and  
qualified attorneys to become judges or to remain judges, just  
as the legislation did in Hughes.16  Accordingly, we agree with  
the trial court's holding  that plaintiffs have not satisfied  
their burden to show that there was no rational basis for this  
legislation.
 Thus, the statute withstands constitutional  
scrutiny.  
16 We note that it is likely that the Legislature was 
motivated by other rational grounds as well.  However, we need 
not consider these as the case can be resolved, as was Hughes, 
on this ground alone.  
15  
 
V. CONCLUSION  
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we hold that  
the Judges Retirement Act is constitutional.  The Court of  
Appeals erred in evaluating plaintiffs' equal protection  
challenge using the intermediate scrutiny test and in holding  
the act unconstitutional.  When the correct test, rational­
basis scrutiny, is applied, plaintiffs are unable to show that  
no rational basis exists for the act's disparate treatment of  
36th Judicial District judges.  Moreover, we find that a  
rational basis did exist. Accordingly, because the contested  
portions of the Judges Retirement Act survive rational-basis  
scrutiny, 
we 
hold 
them constitutional and reverse the decision  
of the Court of Appeals.  The original judgment of the Ingham  
Circuit Court is reinstated.  
Marilyn Kelly 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
16  
___________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
ANNABELLE R. HARVEY, beneficiary 
and successor of Paul Harvey, 
deceased, and MICHAEL F. MERRITT, 
Judge, retired, substituted for 
Bruce A. Fox, Judge, retired,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
No. 121672  
STATE OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUREAU OF 
RETIREMENT SERVICES, AND JUDGES 
RETIREMENT BOARD,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
WEAVER, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent.  Applying the analysis of  
Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655; 232 NW2d 636  
(1975), which the majority overrules, I would affirm the Court  
of Appeals decision that the statutory scheme concerning  
pension benefits of the judges of the 36th Judicial District  
is unconstitutional because it violates equal protection.  
Moreover, 
even 
under 
the rational-basis test, I would conclude  
that the funding scheme is unconstitutional.  
Because the statute at issue in Manistee Bank involved a  
discrete exception to the general rule and the statutory  
 
 
exception was no longer experimental, the Court employed a  
“fair-and-substantial-relation-to-the-object-of-the­
legislation” test. 
Id. at 670-671. 
The Court further  
explained:  
Where a classification scheme creates a  
discrete exception to a general rule and has been 
enforced for a sufficiently long period of time 
that all the rationales likely to be advanced in 
its support have been developed, a court should 
fully examine those rationales and determine  
whether they are sound. [Id. at 672.]  
Likewise, the statutory scheme at issue in the present  
case involves a discrete exception to the general rule:  
pension benefits for 36th District judges are funded  
differently than the pension benefits for the rest of the  
district judges in the state.  Applying the test articulated  
in Manistee Bank to a similar, older version of the current  
statutory scheme, a Court of Appeals panel in a previous case  
struck down the scheme, explaining:  
We hold that the statutory disparity in  
treatment as to the compensation, retirement  
funding 
obligations, 
and 
retirement 
benefits  
violates equal protection. 
We are unable to  
discern any constitutionally appropriate basis for 
the disparities that would permit us to find a 
reasonable relationship to the object of the  
legislation or that would avoid the conclusion that 
the 36th District judges’ preferred compensation  
treatment is arbitrary and unreasonable. 
Even  
though 36th District judges do serve in the most 
populous area of this state, defendant has not 
shown that the judges’ duties are thereby expanded; 
statistical data submitted in this case suggests 
that their individual case load is less than  
plaintiff’s own case load.  Although defendant  
2  
suggests that the particular compensation package 
afforded 36th District judges is attributable to the  
transitions 
from 
those 
judicial 
positions 
superseded by the creation of the 36th District  
Court, it remains to be explained the significance 
these historical facts have at this present time or 
why 
they 
serve 
to 
justify 
more 
favorable  
compensation and benefits.  In short, no reason has  
been 
put 
forth 
explaining 
why 
the 
duties, 
responsibilities, and circumstances of service  
obtaining in the 36th District Court provide the 
basis for any reasonable justification of more 
favorable treatment than their counterparts in the 
other 
judicial 
districts 
of 
this 
state.  
Accordingly, we find ourselves in agreement with 
the ruling of the Court of Claims that the  
statutory disparities are unconstitutional. [77th  
Dist Judge v Michigan, 175 Mich App 681, 691-692; 
438 NW2d 333 (1989).]  
This analysis is equally applicable to the present case.  
The statutory scheme guarantees 36th District judge retirees  
a level of retirement benefits that is not guaranteed to other  
district judges. Therefore, applying Manistee Bank, I would  
conclude 
that 
the 
statutory 
scheme 
at 
issue 
is  
unconstitutional because it violates equal protection.  
Moreover, even if this case were analyzed under the  
rational-basis 
test, I would still conclude that the statutory  
scheme at issue is unconstitutional. 
As we explained in  
Reich v State Hwy Dep’t, 386 Mich 617, 623; 194 NW2d 700  
(1972), when considering an equal-protection challenge to a  
statute, the classification at issue must bear a reasonable  
relationship to the recognized purpose of the act.  It may not  
be arbitrary or unreasonable.  Id. (emphasis added). While  
3  
 
deferential, the rational-basis test should not be applied so  
deferentially as to lack any substance.  This Court is not  
simply a rubber stamp for anything the Legislature enacts.  
The original goal of the funding scheme was to require  
the state to begin to fully assume the cost of state-court  
operations.  However, since the Legislature created the  
funding scheme in 1980, it has taken no further steps to fully  
fund pension benefits for any other district courts.  Thus, if  
there was a rational basis when the statutory scheme was  
enacted, it does not continue now, twenty-three years later,  
when the Legislature has taken no further steps toward its  
goal to fully assume the cost of state-court operations.1  
Therefore, even under the rational-basis test, the Court  
should conclude that the statutory scheme is unconstitutional  
because it violates equal protection.  
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
1 The majority’s argument that the rational-basis test is 
satisfied because the funding scheme would attract competent 
and qualified attorneys to become judges is not persuasive. 
First, as noted, the goal of the legislation was to require 
the state to begin fully funding state-court operations. 
Second, there is no lack of candidates for judicial office in 
districts where pension benefits are not fully funded. Thus, 
inducing competent and qualified attorneys to become judges 
should not be considered a rational basis for the statutory 
scheme.  
4