Case Title: Weimer v. Sauder Tank Co.

Citation: 184 Kan. 422, 337 P.2d 672

Docket Number: 41,116

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1959-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
184 Kan. 422 (1959)
337 P.2d 672
REIGN OGLE WEIMER, Appellee,
v.
SAUDER TANK COMPANY, INC., BITUMINOUS CASUALTY CORPORATION, Appellants.
No. 41,116

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 11, 1959.
Roscoe W. Graves, of Emporia, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellants.
Samuel Mellinger, of Emporia, argued the cause, and Roy W. Riegle, R. Wilford Riegle, Clarence V. Beck, and John G. Atherton, all of Emporia, were with him on the briefs for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is a workmen's compensation proceeding in which the commissioner allowed compensation. On appeal the district court adopted the independent findings of the commissioner, except as to the extent of disability attributable to the claimed occupational disease and rendered judgment accordingly. Thereupon the respondent and the insurance carrier perfected this appeal.
There is no controversy over the relationship of employer and employee and, from a careful examination of the record, it appears a formal factual statement can be dispensed with and essential facts related as we dispose of controverted issues. However, before consideration is given to grounds relied upon by appellants for reversal of the judgment, attention should be directed to our statute and findings made by both the commissioner and the district court.
The proceeding was instituted under the provisions of Chapter 246, Laws of 1953, now G.S. 1957 Supp., 44-5a01 to 44-5a22, incl., the provisions of which, so far as here pertinent, read:
It should be noted section 2 [44-5a02], above mentioned, of the act provides:
..............
"12. Silicosis, as hereinafter defined."
After reviewing the evidence, which we pause here to note is conceded to have established that appellee was employed by appellant, Sauder Tank Company, Inc., as a welder for approximately ten years prior to the filing of the involved compensation proceeding on May 15, 1956, the commissioner made findings. So far as here important they read:
Based on the foregoing findings the commissioner entered an award for not to exceed 415 weeks of temporary total disability at the rate of $32 per week, subject to review and modification as provided by law.
Following presentation of the case in district court that tribunal also made written findings, some of which serve the dual purpose of clarifying the factual picture as well as the reasons on which it proposed to base its subsequent judgment. The more important findings of that character read:
..............
Ultimately judgment was rendered in accord with the foregoing findings.
In approaching questions raised by appellants, all of which are based upon claims respecting the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment, it must be remembered that on appellate review of such questions in workmen's compensation proceedings (1) it is the function of the trial court not that of the appellate court to pass upon the facts (Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 139 P.2d 846, 148 A.L.R., Anno., 1131; McDonald v. Rader, 177 Kan. 249, 277 P.2d 652); (2) whether the judgment is supported by substantial competent evidence is a question of law as distinguished from a question of fact (Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., supra; Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., 180 Kan. 295, 299, 303 P.2d 197; Snedden v. Nichols, 181 Kan. 1052, 1055, 317 P.2d 448; McDonald v. Rader, supra, and cases there cited); (3) in reviewing a record to determine whether it contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding, this court is required to review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, and if substantial evidence appears therein, such finding is conclusive and will not be disturbed on review, even though the record discloses some evidence which might warrant the trial court making a finding to the contrary (Barr v. Builders, Inc., 179 Kan. 617, 296 P.2d 1106, and cases cited at page 619 of the opinion; Pinkston v. Rice Motor Co., p. 299, supra; Snedden v. Nichols, p. 1055, supra); (4) the term "substantial evidence," when applied by this court, means evidence possessing something of substance and relevant consequence and carrying with it fitness to induce conviction that the award is proper, or furnishes substantial basis of fact from which the issues tendered can be reasonably resolved. (Barr v. Builders, Inc., supra.)
*426 Appellants first contend there is no substantial competent evidence of record to sustain appellee's position he was poisoned by exposure to fumes from aluminum, cadmium, lead, silicon and sulphur as the term (poisoned) is used in the occupational disease statute from which we have heretofore quoted. We are not disposed to labor the evidence which clearly established that appellee, while in the employ of appellants, was exposed to such fumes. It suffices to say we are inclined to the view this contention lacks merit and cannot be upheld by reason of the testimony of appellee's witness Dr. Roland Brooks, whose qualifications as an expert are not disputed, and who, after stating that he had heard all testimony adduced in the case on behalf of appellee, testified as follows:
This, we may add is true, notwithstanding that on cross-examination this witness frankly admitted that his estimation of the portion of disability attributed to exposure to such fumes was purely a guess but nevertheless based on his best medical judgment; and thereafter stated on re-direct examination that his guess or estimate of the percentage of appellee's disability from being exposed to the fumes in question was based on the evidence he had heard in the case and the treatments and findings he had made from examination and observation of appellee as a patient.
Moreover, if there is any question regarding the sufficiency of the foregoing testimony there can be no doubt the evidence became sufficient when appellants' own witness, Dr. John K. Fulton, whose qualifications as an expert are also admitted, after being asked to state what percentage or proportion of appellee's disability was in his opinion the result of breathing the poisonous welding fumes, gave the following answer:
And on cross-examination testified:
"A. Yes, I think so."
Of a certainty, in the face of the foregoing testimony, it is asking too much of this court to hold there was no substantial evidence of record showing that appellee had been poisoned, by the welding fumes in question, during the course of his employment.
It is next urged and strenuously argued that there was no substantial competent evidence offered by appellee that poisoning by fumes is a peculiar hazard of the welding occupation. Here, as it appears they did in the district court (See quoted findings), appellants pose the question: Is poisoning by fumes a peculiar hazard of the welding occupation? They then answer this question in the negative and rely on the heretofore quoted proviso appearing in 44-5a01(a), as supporting their conclusion.
Stated in their own language appellants' position on the point now under consideration is that "the foregoing statute means that claimant had the burden of producing substantial evidence that poisoning from breathing fumes is a peculiar hazard to the occupation of welding, which hazard was greater than would be found in occupations in general." By this, as we understand their contentions, they mean that in order to receive compensation appellee was required to prove that poisoning from breathing fumes is a peculiar hazard to the general occupation of welding. In other words they contend that, as applied to the facts of this case, the word occupation, as used in the proviso, must be construed as meaning the broad general occupation of welding instead of the particular occupation of welding in which appellee was engaged at the time of his employment, i.e., the welding of new and used oil tanks. Mindful that it is a matter of common knowledge, of which we can take judicial notice, that there are many kinds of types of welders and that the occupation hazard involved in the various branches of welding may *428 vary from extreme hazard to a condition of no hazard at all, we refuse to place any such strained construction on legislative intent in enacting our occupational disease statute. Therefore we hold the proviso on which appellants rely is to be construed as contemplating that in a claim for compensation, such as is here involved, all that is required of the workman as a condition to his right to receive compensation is to show that his disability, if otherwise within the provisions of such statute, is due to the peculiar and unusual hazards of the particular occupation in which he was engaged at the time that disability occurred.
With the statute so construed we have no difficulty whatsoever in concluding that the answer to appellants' second contention must be that the record discloses ample substantial evidence to uphold the district court's findings to the effect that poisoning by the fumes in question was a peculiar hazard of the particular occupation in which the appellee was engaged; and that part of his disability resulted from the nature of his employment within the meaning of that term as used in the statute.
The third and final question raised by appellants is that there was no substantial competent evidence offered by appellee to establish that he was disabled by an occupational disease. We believe a negative answer to this question is required by what has been heretofore said and held. Even so, and at the risk of repetition, it should perhaps be noted the record in this case discloses a plethora of evidence to establish that appellee became disabled because of a condition of poisoning which, superimposed upon his pre-existing pulmonary emphysema, resulted in temporary total disability; and that our statute (G.S. 1957 Supp., 44-5a01 and 44-5a02) clearly provides that disablement, brought about by the combined effects of (1) a noncompensable condition, such as pulmonary emphysema, and (2) a compensable condition, such as poisoning by one or more of the therein enumerated poisons that aggravates, prolongs, accelerates or contributes to the noncompensable condition, is compensable.
We have been unable to find anything in the questions briefed and argued by appellants or the contentions advanced with respect thereto, which warrants or permits a conclusion the trial court erred in its judgment. Therefore such judgment must be and it is hereby affirmed.
It is so ordered.