Case Title: State v. Amaya

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49344

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  April 29, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
ROSITA AMAYA,
Petitioner on Review.
(D9707503M; CA A104692; SC S49344)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted November 4, 2003.
Peter Gartlan, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him
on the brief was David E. Groom, State Public Defender.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
*Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Timothy P. Alexander, Judge. 176 Or App 35, 29 P3d 1177 (2001).
**Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
BALMER, J.
In this criminal case, we consider the extent to which
a police officer who has made a valid traffic stop of a vehicle
may question a person in the vehicle about safety matters
unrelated to the purpose of the stop.  We hold, first, that ORS
810.410(3)(d), set out below, permitted the police officer's
inquiries of defendant, who was a passenger in the stopped
vehicle.  We further hold that, because the officer reasonably
was concerned for his safety, Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution permitted his inquiry.  Accordingly, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that the trial court did not err in refusing
to suppress either the statements that defendant made in response
to the officer's questions or the weapon that the officer seized
from defendant following her statements, although we do so on
somewhat different grounds.  
FACTS
We take the facts from the Court of Appeals opinion,
State v. Amaya, 176 Or App 35, 37-38, 29 P3d 1177 (2001), and
from the record.  On November 1, 1997, at 1:00 a.m., Officer
Reynolds observed a van with a burned-out license plate light
stopped in the middle of the road in an area of Beaverton known
for drug dealing.  The van pulled forward and made an unsignaled
left turn.  Reynolds stopped the van for the burned-out light and
the illegal turn.  The van was a full-sized cargo van without
windows along the side, and Reynolds was able to see inside the
van only when he was standing next to the driver's window or the
front passenger's window.  When Reynolds approached the van, he
noticed that both the driver and defendant, who was a passenger
in the van, were nervous.  The driver was sweating and shaking,
and the defendant was moving around and "tucking" something into
a large purse-like bag at her feet.  Reynolds immediately felt
concerned for his safety, although he did not see any weapons.
Reynolds checked the license of the driver of the van
and found that the driver's license was suspended.  Because
Reynolds did not want to leave the van on the side of the road
overnight, he asked defendant if she was a licensed driver.  When
she responded that she was, Reynolds took her license to check
its validity.  At the suppression hearing, neither Reynolds nor
defendant could recall specifically when Reynolds took
defendant's license, although it appears to have been after he
learned that the driver had a suspended license.  Nor could
Reynolds or defendant recall when Reynolds returned defendant's
license to her.  
During the stop, Reynolds asked the driver for consent
to search the van, which the driver gave.  Reynolds asked the
driver and defendant to step out of the vehicle while he awaited
a second officer.  Because of concern about what defendant might
have in her bag, Reynolds encouraged her to leave it in the van,
although he did not order her to do so.  Defendant took the bag
with her when she left the van and placed it on the ground
between her feet, where it was covered by her trench coat. 
Reynolds noticed that defendant had taken her bag out of the van
and apparently was trying to conceal it.  Again, he felt
concerned for his safety and believed that defendant might have a weapon or drugs in the bag.  
A second officer arrived at some point during the
encounter, although when he arrived in the sequence of events is
not entirely clear.  Reynolds asked defendant what she had in the
bag. (1)  Defendant said that she had a gun in the bag and that
she did not have a concealed weapon permit.  Based on that
admission, the officers searched defendant's bag and found a gun. 
The officers also searched defendant and the driver of the van by
patting them down or looking in their pockets with a flashlight,
although again the record is not clear as to whether that search
took place before or after Reynolds asked defendant about the
contents of her bag. 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Defendant moved to suppress both her admission and the
weapon.  She argued that the questions that Reynolds had asked
her exceeded the scope of the traffic stop.  The state resisted
the motion on two grounds:  that Reynolds had had a reasonable
suspicion that defendant had been engaged in some form of illegal
activity and, alternatively, that Reynolds had been justified in
seeking further information about the bag for safety reasons. 
The trial court agreed and denied the motion to suppress.  
The trial court stated that Reynolds, once he had
noticed defendant's suspicious concern for the bag, "was entitled
to inquire further for his safety and that included asking what
was in the purse."  See ORS 810.410(3)(d) (police officer making
traffic stop may make any inquiries to ensure safety, including
inquiries regarding presence of weapons).  In addition to that
statutory authority, the trial court relied on State v. Bates,
304 Or 519, 747 P2d 991 (1987), and concluded that Reynolds had
had sufficient grounds to ask the questions that he did.  "[H]e's
entitled to take reasonable [minimally] intrusive steps to
determine whether or not there are weapons involved that might be
a danger to the officer, and there's enough articulable suspicion
here on the part of the officer * * * for him to be concerned
about his safety."  The trial court also found that defendant had
been free to leave the scene and that she had not been required
to answer Reynolds's questions.  As noted, the trial court denied
defendant's motion to suppress, and she subsequently was
convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon.
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
In the Court of Appeals, defendant made two arguments.  First,
she claimed that, when Reynolds had taken and retained her driver
license, he had "stopped" her separately and independently from
the valid traffic stop.  That stop had been unlawful, defendant
argued, because it had been made without reasonable suspicion
that she had been engaged in any criminal activity or had posed
an immediate threat of physical injury to Reynolds.  The Court of
Appeals refused to consider that argument, because defendant had
failed to raise it before the trial court.  176 Or App at 38.  
Defendant's second argument, which the Court of Appeals
did address, was that the evidence should have been suppressed
because Reynolds's questions to her about her bag constituted a
seizure without reasonable suspicion that she had been involved
in illegal activity or had posed a risk to Reynolds's safety. 
Defendant contended that, although ORS 810.410(3)(d) appears to
authorize inquiries related to officer safety during a valid
traffic stop without requiring reasonable suspicion, the court
nevertheless should construe that statute to prohibit those
inquiries in the absence of reasonable suspicion of an immediate
threat to officer safety.  Defendant argued that the state and
federal constitutions require a showing of reasonable suspicion
before an officer may make inquiries that go beyond the basis for
the traffic stop.  From that premise, she asserted that either
ORS 810.410(3)(d) was unconstitutional or that it must be
construed to include the reasonable suspicion requirement to
preserve its constitutionality.  According to defendant, because
Reynolds had not reasonably suspected that defendant had had a
weapon, his questioning had been unlawful and the evidence that
resulted from that questioning should have been suppressed.
The Court of Appeals concluded that ORS 810.410(3)(d)
does not require reasonable suspicion of a threat to officer
safety as a prerequisite for the questions that the officer asks. 
Amaya, 176 Or App at 39-40.  That court also rejected defendant's
argument that the state or federal constitution requires such
"reasonable suspicion" before an officer makes safety-related
inquiries.  It concluded that reasonable suspicion was not
required unless the questioning constituted a seizure of the
person being questioned.  Id. at 42-44.  In this instance, the
court concluded, no such seizure had occurred, because the
officer's questions had constituted "mere conversation" during
which defendant had been free to leave.  Id. at 44-47.
DEFENDANT'S STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
Defendant petitioned for review, arguing that the
police officer's questions to her and his seizure of a weapon
from her bag violated her right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.  We allowed review to examine defendant's statutory
and constitutional arguments.
We begin with ORS 810.410(3), the statute that
authorizes certain police conduct when a police officer makes a
valid traffic stop.  That statute provides, in part:
"(3) A police officer:
"* * * * *
"(b) May stop and detain a person for a traffic
violation for the purposes of investigation reasonably
related to the traffic violation, identification and
issuance of citation.
"(c) May make an inquiry into circumstances
arising during the course of a detention and
investigation under paragraph (b) of this subsection
that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.
"(d) May make an inquiry to ensure the safety of
the officer, the person stopped or other persons
present, including an inquiry regarding the presence of
weapons." 
Before 1997, ORS 810.410(3) included paragraph (b), but
not paragraphs (c) and (d).  The statute thus authorized a police
officer to stop and detain a person for a traffic violation for
the purposes of an investigation reasonably related to that
violation, but did not authorize an officer who was conducting a
valid traffic stop to make inquiries unrelated to the reason for
the stop.  This court interpreted the absence of any authority in
the pre-1997 version of ORS 810.410(3) to ask questions unrelated
to the basis for the stop to bar an officer from asking such
questions, unless the officer had a separate, valid basis for
those questions.  State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 531, 964 P2d 1007
(1998).  In Toevs, the officer made a valid traffic stop,
questioned the defendant about the infraction that was the basis
for the stop, and told the defendant that he was free to go. 
However, the officer then continued to question the defendant
about his possible possession of illegal drugs.  Because the
continued questioning by the officer in Toevs amounted to a
further detention that was not reasonably related to the traffic
infraction, and was not independently justified, this court
required suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of that
questioning.  See also State v. Porter, 312 Or 112, 817 P2d 1306
(1991) (same). (2)  By adding paragraphs (c) and (d) to ORS
810.410(3), the legislature expanded the authority of an officer
who has made a valid traffic stop to make inquiries that are
unrelated to the traffic infraction that was the basis for the
stop.  We now consider the text of ORS 810.410(3), following the
1997 amendments.  
At the outset, we note several significant distinctions
that the current statute draws regarding the kinds of inquiries
that a police officer is authorized to make as part of a valid
motor vehicle stop.  First, the statute authorizes a police
officer to "stop and detain a person for a traffic violation for
the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic
violation * * *."  ORS 810.410(3)(b).  That provision authorizes
only inquiries that are reasonably related to the traffic
violation.  See Toevs, 327 Or at 531; Bates, 304 Or at 522
(questions not reasonably related to infraction not permitted
under predecessor to ORS 810.410(3)(b)).
Second, under ORS 810.410(3)(c), if the officer, during
the stop, develops a "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,"
then the officer is authorized to inquire into the circumstances
that gave rise to that suspicion.  The text of subsection (c)
does not limit the persons to whom the officer may direct an
inquiry about criminal activity.
Third, the statute authorizes the officer to make an
inquiry "to ensure the safety of the officer" or others,
including an inquiry about weapons.  ORS 810.410(3)(d).  In
contrast to an inquiry concerning criminal activity, the text of
subsection (d) does not require "reasonable suspicion" of the
presence of a weapon or of a threat to safety as a predicate for
an officer's safety-related inquiries.  Like an inquiry
concerning criminal activity, however, subsection (d) does not
limit the category of persons to whom the officer may direct
safety-related inquiries.  
Before considering the application of ORS 810.410(3),
as summarized above, to this case, we note a shift in defendant's
position.  In the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that ORS
810.410(3)(d) should be interpreted to require that an officer
have reasonable suspicion of an immediate threat of serious
physical injury before the officer may ask safety-related
questions.  In other words, defendant argued that,
notwithstanding the legislature's use of the phrase "reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity" in ORS 810.410(3)(c), and its
omission of the words "reasonable suspicion" in ORS
810.410(3)(d), the court nevertheless should read those words
into subsection (d) to make that subsection consistent with the
requirements of Article I, section 9, as interpreted in Bates. 
The Court of Appeals rejected defendant's argument that the
statute should be so interpreted.  Amaya, 176 Or App at 39-40.  
On review, defendant expressly accepts the Court of
Appeals' determination that paragraph (d) of ORS 810.410(3) does
not require reasonable suspicion of an immediate threat to
officer safety, and we also agree with that interpretation. 
Instead, defendant first makes a statutory argument that
paragraph (d) does not apply to the questions asked here and then
asserts that the officer's questions violated her state and
federal constitutional rights.
Defendant's statutory argument is that ORS
810.410(3)(d) does not apply to the officer's questions here
because "the officer never asked defendant about the presence of
weapons."  We disagree, because the statute does not limit
permissible questions to those specifically asking about weapons
but, instead, authorizes "an inquiry to ensure the safety of the
officer, the person stopped or other persons present."  Here,
Reynolds testified that his questions to defendant about the
contents of defendant's bag were based on safety concerns, and
the trial court made findings to that effect.  We agree with the
trial court that Reynolds's questions were of the kind that he
had the authority to ask under ORS 810.410(3)(d) because they
were asked "to ensure the safety of the officer."
We now turn to defendant's argument that, even if ORS
810.410(3)(d) authorized Reynolds's questions to defendant, the
questioning violated defendant's rights under Article I, section
9.  As explained above, before the 1997 amendments, ORS
810.410(3) barred officer questions about weapons unless the
officer had a separate, valid basis for asking the questions. 
Toevs, 327 Or at 531.  Under the current version of the statute,
an officer conducting a valid traffic stop may make an inquiry to
ensure his or her safety or the safety of others, including an
inquiry about the presence of weapons, even if the officer does
not reasonably suspect criminal activity or the threat of
immediate harm.  However, an officer's actions, even if
authorized by ORS 810.410(3)(d), nevertheless must comply with
Article I, section 9, which provides, in part, "[n]o law shall
violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or
seizure[.]"
Defendant's initial argument -- which she also made in
the trial court and the Court of Appeals -- is that Article I,
section 9, requires "reasonable suspicion" before a police
officer may question a person during a traffic stop about matters
beyond the scope of the traffic infraction that was the basis for
the stop.  Specifically, defendant argues that this court held in
Bates that a police officer conducting a valid traffic stop may
take reasonable steps to protect himself, including searching or
seizing the person who is stopped, only if the officer has a
reasonable suspicion that the person poses an immediate threat to
the officer.  As applied here, defendant argues that (1)
Reynolds's questions to her about the bag at least temporarily
restrained her liberty and therefore constituted a "seizure" for
purposes of Article I, section 9; and (2) because Reynolds did
not have a reasonable suspicion that defendant posed a threat to
his safety, the seizure violated Article I, section 9.  
Defendant also argues that, even if Reynolds's
questions about the bag did not constitute an unlawful seizure,
he had seized her unlawfully before he questioned her about the
bag's contents, and the evidence obtained as a result of that
questioning therefore was inadmissible.  Defendant now states
that her "primary" argument in that regard is that she was seized
unlawfully when Reynolds searched the pockets of her coat, but
she also argues that other circumstances before Reynolds
questioned her about the bag constituted an unlawful seizure,
including Reynolds's request that she exit the van and stand
where Reynolds could see her.
The state responds that the Court of Appeals correctly
held that Reynolds's questions to defendant had not amounted to a
seizure because they had constituted "mere conversation" between
defendant and Reynolds.  Amaya, 176 Or App at 43-44.  The state
argues that defendant was free to leave the scene and that she
was not required to respond to Reynolds's questions.  In those
circumstances, the state asserts, Reynolds's questions did not
constitute a "seizure," thereby triggering the reasonable
suspicion requirement of Article I, section 9.  As to defendant's
contention that she was seized unlawfully by Reynolds's conduct
before he asked about weapons, the state responds that defendant
failed to preserve that argument and, on the merits, that she
always had been free to leave and therefore never had been
seized.
ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, we think it is useful to
clarify the issue before us.  To the extent that defendant argues
that every question by an officer that is unrelated to the reason
for a valid traffic stop violates Article I, section 9, unless
the question is based on reasonable suspicion, we reject
defendant's argument.  That argument is tantamount to asserting
that ORS 810.410(3)(d) is unconstitutional on its face because it
allows safety-related questions without requiring reasonable
suspicion that there is an immediate threat to the officer's
safety.  On the contrary, this court's cases demonstrate that
some encounters between a police officer and a citizen are "mere
conversation," involving no restraint on the citizen's liberty. 
Such a noncoercive encounter is not a "seizure" under Article I,
section 9, and therefore does not require justification.  State
v. Holmes, 311 Or 400, 407, 813 P2d 28 (1991).  Whether a
particular encounter is free of coercion or interference with a
citizen's liberty or, instead, is a "seizure" and therefore must
be justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or
immediate threat to the officer depends on the totality of the
circumstances of the encounter.  Id. at 408.  We now turn to that
issue.
We begin with defendant's argument that she was seized
unlawfully before Reynolds asked her what was in the bag because,
if Reynolds had seized defendant in violation of her Article I,
section 9, rights before he questioned her about the bag, then
his questions about the bag also were unlawful, and the evidence
that the state obtained as a result of those questions must be
suppressed.  Bates, 304 Or at 527 (court must suppress evidence
obtained following search in violation of defendant's Article I,
section 9, rights). 
Defendant asserts that the critical events happened in
the following sequence: (3)  (1) Reynolds asked for and
retained defendant's driver license; (2) the driver consented to
a search of the van, and Reynolds asked defendant and the driver
to exit the van so that he could conduct the search; (3) Reynolds
encouraged defendant to leave her bag in the van; (4) Reynolds
directed defendant and the driver to stand in front of the van,
so that he could watch them while he searched; (5) Reynolds
searched both the driver and defendant by looking in their coat
pockets with a flashlight; (4) (6) Reynolds asked defendant for
consent to search her bag, which she refused; (7) Reynolds asked
defendant what was in the bag and whether there was anything in
the bag that defendant did not want Reynolds to find, which led
to defendant's response that she had a gun.  Defendant also notes
that the events took place at 1:00 a.m. and argues that she did
not feel free to leave.  Defendant claims that an impermissible
"seizure" occurred no later than at point (5) in the sequence
described above.
Defendant's position is problematic from the outset,
because the sequence of events on which her argument rests is
based only on her testimony and ignores both Reynolds's testimony
and the trial court's findings, which, in some respects, are
inconsistent with defendant's testimony.  We base our review on
the findings of the trial court, which we summarized above, and,
to the extent that it depends on facts that go beyond the trial
court's specific findings, we assume facts that are consistent
with the trial court's ultimate conclusion that defendant had not
been seizedunlawfully.  Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443
P2d 621 (1968).  As we discuss below, defendant's arguments that
she was seized without justification before Reynolds asked her
about the contents of her bag fail, because they were not
preserved or because they are based on factual claims that the
trial court rejected.  
First, defendant identifies the fact that Reynolds took
her driver license as a critical factor that supports her
assertion that he seized her unlawfully.  As noted earlier, and
contrary to the sequence of events outlined by defendant, the
record does not establish when Reynolds took defendant's license
or when he returned it.  In any event, defendant failed to make
any argument to the trial court that Reynolds stopped or seized
her when he took her license.  The Court of Appeals rejected her
claim on that basis, Amaya, 176 Or App at 38, and we conclude
that that reasoning applies to defendant's present argument as
well.
Second, defendant argues that she was seized without
reasonable suspicion when Reynolds conducted the pat-down search
of her coat.  However, defendant made that argument for the first
time in her petition for review.  Defendant never argued to the
trial court or to the Court of Appeals that she had been searched
or seized unlawfully when Reynolds searched her pockets. 
Although she filed a generic motion to suppress, asserting that
her statements and her weapon were obtained in violation of
applicable statutes and constitutional provisions, the memorandum
in support of her motion does not mention the pat-down search. 
Similarly, in her oral argument in support of the motion,
defendant's counsel never referred to the pat-down search.  The
memorandum and oral argument focused solely on whether Reynolds
had been authorized to ask questions that went beyond the scope
of the traffic stop.  Before the Court of Appeals, defendant
again phrased the legal issue as whether Reynolds's questioning
about the contents of her bag had been unconstitutional because
it had been unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop.  
Although we reject the two arguments just discussed on
preservation grounds, we recognize the problems that may arise if 
the preservation onion is sliced too thinly.  Defendant notes
that whether a person is "seized" for purposes of Article I,
section 9, requires a "fact-specific inquiry into the totality of
the circumstances of the particular case."  Holmes, 311 Or at
408.  We agree with defendant that the preservation requirement
does not require a party to identify and assert a separate legal
theory as to why each element in the "totality of circumstances"
or each successive event in a sequence of events amounts to a
"seizure."  The purpose of the preservation rule is the practical
one of requiring a defendant to provide an explanation of his or
her position "specific enough to ensure that the [trial] court
can identify its alleged error with enough clarity to permit it
to consider and correct the error immediately, if correction is
warranted."  State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343, 15 P3d 22 (2000). 
Defendant's arguments that we have rejected on preservation
grounds, however, are discrete legal theories as to specific
actions of the officers, each of which allegedly constituted a
seizure.  They could, and should, have been raised below.
Finally, defendant suggests that Reynolds unlawfully
seized her when, after the driver consented to a search of the
van, Reynolds asked her and the driver to exit the van and stand
nearby.  Defendant testified that Reynolds had asked them to get
out of the van and that, after Reynolds had searched the van, he
had questioned her about the contents of her bag.  Thus,
according to defendant, when Reynolds asked what was in her bag,
she already had been detained unlawfully.  The trial court's
findings, however, do not support defendant's version of the
facts.  The trial court apparently accepted Reynolds's testimony
that he had questioned defendant about her bag shortly after she
had left the van and before he had searched the van, rather than
defendant's testimony that the questioning had occurred after the
search of the van.  The trial court's recitation of the facts
indicates that it concluded that, by the time that defendant had
left the van -- taking her bag with her, placing it between her
legs, and hiding it with her coat -- Reynolds reasonably
suspected that defendant posed a threat to his safety. 
Accordingly, defendant's argument that she was seized at an
identifiable point in time before Reynolds's questions about the
bag -- when she had been asked to exit the van and stand nearby
-- is properly viewed as one aspect of her claim that she was
seized unlawfully by Reynolds's questioning.  We consider that
argument below.
As the foregoing summary demonstrates, defendant's
arguments that she had been seized unlawfully before Reynolds had
asked about her bag either are not preserved or must be
considered as part of her argument about the questioning
concerning her bag.  We therefore turn to the issue that
defendant argued in the trial court and the Court of Appeals: 
whether Reynolds's questioning of defendant about the contents of
her bag constituted an unlawful seizure.
As we noted earlier, the Court of Appeals held that the
questions did not amount to a seizure because the trial court had
found that defendant had been free to leave and that the officers
had imposed no restraint on her liberty.  Amaya, 176 Or App at
44.  Defendant argues that, under the standard articulated in
Holmes, 311 Or at 409-10, she was seized for purposes of Article
I, section 9, because she believed that the officers
significantly had restricted her liberty and "such belief [was]
objectively reasonable in the circumstances."
It is a truism that all passengers in a validly stopped
car have been "stopped," at least physically.  However, such a
stop is not a "seizure" of those passengers for constitutional
purposes.  See Holmes, 311 Or at 410-12 (discussing circumstances
in which police-citizen encounters are not "seizures").  It also
is true that an officer may take reasonable steps respecting the
passengers, including, for example, asking the passengers to exit
the vehicle so the officer may search the vehicle, assuming that
the driver has consented to the search or that it otherwise is
justified.  However, an officer's further exercise of coercive
authority over the passengers after they are out of the vehicle
may, in certain circumstances, constitute a seizure.  Here,
defendant argues that Reynolds's questions to her after she
exited the van about the contents of her bag constituted such a
seizure.
We conclude, however, that it is unnecessary in this
case to decide if defendant was "seized" by Reynolds's
questioning.  Even assuming that Reynolds's questions to
defendant temporarily restrained her liberty and thus constituted
a "seizure" of defendant, those questions were permissible under
Article I, section 9, because they were based on Reynolds's
reasonable suspicion that defendant posed an immediate threat of
serious injury to him.  Our conclusion in that regard is based on
this court's prior decisions in Bates and State v. Ehly, 317 Or
66, 854 P2d 421 (1993).  
As discussed above, Bates, like this case, involved a
traffic stop.  In the course of the stop, the officer observed
one end of a bag on the floor of the car between the defendant's
feet.  The officer instructed the defendant to "cautiously pull
that item from between his feet, so [the officer] could see what
it was."  304 Or at 521.  Eventually, the officer seized and
searched the bag and found that it contained ammunition, drugs,
and drug paraphernalia.  Recognizing that police officers engaged
in a lawful traffic stop are entitled to take steps reasonably
necessary to ensure their safety, id. at 523, this court stated
that Article I, section 9, required that those steps be supported
by "a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable
facts, that the citizen might pose an immediate threat of serious
physical injury to the officer or to others then present."  Id.
at 524.  This court further noted that, in reviewing an officer's
conduct during a lawful traffic stop, the court's inquiry was
"limited to whether the precautions taken were reasonable under
the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time that
the decision was made."  Id. at 524-25. 
Applying that constitutional test to the facts, this
court in Bates concluded that the vehicle's out-of-state plates,
the "high crime" area in which the stop occurred, and the
presence of a VCR and a television in the car did not support the
state's assertion that the officer reasonably suspected that the
defendant "was armed and dangerous."  Neither did the defendant's
appearance -- a self-described "Indian" with long hair and a
beard -- support a reasonable belief that the defendant was
dangerous, nor did the defendant's behavior during the stop
suggest that he was dangerous.  Moreover, there had been no sign
of a weapon in the car; the officer simply had seen what had
appeared to be a bag on the floor.  On those facts, this court
held that the officer had not had a reasonable suspicion based on
specific facts that the defendant had posed an immediate threat
to him.  Accordingly, the officer's questions and orders to the
defendant regarding the bag, and the subsequent search and
seizure of the bag, had violated the defendant's right under
Article I, section 9, to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. (5)
In contrast, in State v. Ehly, this court upheld a
safety-related search, because the police officers reasonably had
suspected that the person whom they were investigating had posed
a serious threat of harm to them.  The officers had been called
to a motel room to confront the defendant, whom they knew to be a
methamphetamine user and who appeared to be under the influence
of methamphetamines.  317 Or at 69.  The officers had just seen a
man leaving the motel parking lot whom they knew to be a friend
of the defendant and whom they thought possessed a handgun.  Id. 
While the officers talked to the defendant, he began rummaging
through a gym bag, with both hands concealed.  Id. at 70-71.  On
those facts, this court held that the officers' decision to grab
the gym bag and dump out its contents had been based on their
reasonable suspicion that the defendant had been looking for a
gun.  Id. at 83.
Applying the standards articulated in Bates and Ehly to
this case, we conclude that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, Reynolds reasonably suspected that defendant posed
an immediate threat to his safety.  Reynolds testified that, when
he first approached the stopped vehicle, he had noticed that
defendant appeared nervous and was moving something around and
putting something into a large purse-like bag at her feet.  When
defendant and the driver exited the van, Reynolds, concerned that
defendant might have a weapon in the bag, encouraged her to leave
the bag in the vehicle.  Defendant, however, took the bag with
her when she left the vehicle, placing the bag on the ground
between her feet and attempting to conceal it with her coat. 
Reynolds thought that defendant was trying to hide the bag. 
Moreover, by keeping the bag close to her, defendant would have
had easy access to any weapon in the bag, a fact that made
Reynolds's stated concern for his safety more reasonable. 
Reynolds also testified that the stop had occurred at 1:00 a.m.
in an area known for drug dealing and that he had been the only
officer present at the time that he asked defendant what was in
her bag.  Reynolds testified that those facts had made him
concerned for his safety and that he had suspected that defendant
had a weapon or drugs in her bag.
Reynolds testified that he had based his suspicion that
defendant had posed an immediate threat to his safety on the
circumstances of the encounter and on specific and articulable
facts regarding defendant's behavior.  As noted previously, the
trial court found that there had been "enough articulable
suspicion here on the part of the officer * * * for him to be
concerned about his safety," and the record supports the trial
court's finding.  
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Reynolds's
questions about the bag's contents were based on a reasonable
suspicion that defendant posed an immediate threat of serious
injury to him and therefore did not violate defendant's rights
under Article I, section 9.  Further, after defendant responded
that she had a weapon in her bag and that she did not have a
concealed weapon permit, the officers' subsequent search of the
bag and seizure of the weapon were supported by probable cause to
believe that defendant had committed a crime. (6)
The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.
1. 
In its factual summary, the Court of Appeals stated that Reynolds first asked defendant if
he could search her bag.  176 Or App at 37.  Defendant so testified.  However, Reynolds testified
that he first asked defendant what was in the bag and that it was only after she said she had a gun
that he asked to search the bag.  The trial court did not make a specific finding regarding which
question came first, although the court's findings suggest that it believed Reynolds's testimony
that he asked defendant what was in the bag before asking to search it.  The trial court stated that
Reynolds "ultimately asked the passenger what was in the purse and, after some conversation
about the purse, she eventually told him that she had a handgun and had it for protection, that she
did not have a concealed weapons permit."  
2. 
The holding in Toevs was based on this court's interpretation of ORS 810.410(3), rather
than on state or federal constitutional grounds.  However, Toevs was consistent with Bates,
discussed in detail below, in which this court held that Article I, section 9, prohibits an officer
conducting a traffic stop from questioning a driver about weapons unless the officer has a
reasonable suspicion that the driver poses an immediate threat of serious injury to the officer. 
3. 
Defendant does not argue that the initial stop of the van was unlawful. 
4. 
Defendant refers to that search variously as a "frisk," a "pat-down," or simply a "search,"
and we refer to it as a "pat-down search" to distinguish it from the search of the van and the later
search of defendant's bag.  At the suppression hearing, defendant testified that she didn't
remember whether she was "pat searched," but did remember Reynolds shining a flashlight in her
trench coat pockets.  No party argues that Reynolds's action in checking defendant's pockets was
not a "search."
5. 
See also State v. Hoskinson, 320 Or 83, 879 P2d 180 (1994) (search of wallet incident to
lawful arrest for driving while suspended not justified, because officer had no reasonable
suspicion that arrestee posed threat of harm to officer);  State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 561 P2d
1006 (1977) (individual's "sharp" appearance and fact that individual was placing paper bag in
car trunk in high crime area at 5:00 p.m. did not constitute reasonable suspicion that individual
had committed crime).
6. 
Defendant also argues that Reynolds's conduct violated her Fourth Amendment rights. 
The Court of Appeals rejected defendant's argument.  176 Or App at 44-48.  We, however,
decline to address defendant's federal constitutional claim.  Although defendant cited both the
state and federal constitutions in her motion to suppress, her memorandum cited only state case
law and never developed any separate federal constitutional analysis.  Similarly, her brief in the
Court of Appeals mentions the Fourth Amendment in passing, but relies solely on state cases and
fails to develop any separate federal law argument.  Defendant cited a single federal decision in a
memorandum of additional authorities filed in the Court of Appeals.  In those circumstances, we
decline to consider defendant's Fourth Amendment argument.  See State v. McNeely, 330 Or 457,
468, 8 P3d 212, cert den, 531 US 1055 (2000) (declining to consider claim supported by mere
summary references to federal constitutional provisions).