Case Title: In re Isabelle W.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 81

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 81 
Docket: 
Sag-16-463 
Submitted 
On Briefs: April 27, 2017 
Decided: 
May 4, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE ISABELLE W. 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  The father of Isabelle W. appeals from a judgment of the District 
Court (West Bath, Dobson, J.) terminating his parental rights to the child 
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A), (B)(2) (2016).1  We affirm the judgment 
because the record contains sufficient evidence to support the court’s 
findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of at least one ground of parental 
unfitness and that termination is in the child’s best interest.2  See, e.g., 
In re M.S., 2014 ME 54, ¶¶ 14-15, 90 A.3d 443. 
 
[¶2]  The child was placed in the custody of the Department of Health 
and Human Services in June 2014, when she was ten days old, upon reports 
that the mother was abusing heroin and nonprescribed medication and had a 
                                         
1  The court also terminated the mother’s parental rights to the child.  The mother has not 
appealed from the judgment. 
2  In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment, the father 
argues that the Department’s actions exhibited gender bias.  The record contains no support for this 
accusation. 
 
 
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history of domestic violence toward the father, and that the father was unable 
or unwilling to protect himself or the child from the risk of harm posed by the 
mother.  The child has been in Department custody for her entire life since 
then, except for an unsuccessful trial placement with the mother in September 
and October 2015 that lasted seven weeks.   
 
[¶3]  In September 2014, the father agreed to the entry of a jeopardy 
order in which the court ordered him to participate in “services and treatment 
as recommended by the Department, including completing a substance abuse 
evaluation, parenting education, domestic violence treatment, and individual 
therapy.”  In March 2015, he signed a rehabilitation and reunification plan, 
see 22 M.R.S. § 4041(1-A)(A)(1) (2016), providing that for the child to be 
returned to his care, he would have to engage in mental health treatment and 
“[d]emonstrate an understanding of domestic violence” issues and their 
effects on children.   
 
[¶4]  The Department filed a petition seeking termination of the father’s 
parental rights on April 21, 2016, more than twenty-two months after the 
child entered Department custody.   
 
[¶5]  After a two-day hearing on the Department’s petition, the court 
found the following facts, which are supported by competent evidence in the 
 
 
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record.  See In re M.S., 2014 ME 54, ¶ 13, 90 A.3d 443.  The father has failed to 
participate consistently in mental health treatment and he has been minimally 
engaged with the other services outlined in the rehabilitation and 
reunification plan.  In May 2016, for example, the father had not 
communicated with the Department in months.  His visits with the child have 
been sporadic and inconsistent throughout the proceedings.  The court 
specifically found that the father—and not the foster parent, as the father 
suggested—was responsible for his missed visits.  The father has also failed to 
demonstrate that he recognizes the risk posed by the mother’s ongoing 
substance abuse problems.  At the time of the termination hearing, the mother 
was pregnant, and both the mother and the father acknowledged that the 
father might also be the father of this new child.   
 
[¶6]  Since entering Department custody, the child has resided with her 
maternal grandmother.  She is in a safe, nurturing home where her needs can 
be met, and she is happy and healthy.  The grandmother wishes to adopt the 
child. 
 
[¶7]  Based on these facts, the court found, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the father is unfit to parent the child on three grounds: (1) he is 
unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and these 
 
 
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circumstances are unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to 
meet the child’s needs, (2) he is unable or unwilling to take responsibility for 
the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, and 
(3) he has failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with 
the child.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv).  The court also found, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the father’s parental 
rights is in the child’s best interest.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a). 
 
[¶8]  Given the factual findings described above, the court’s unfitness 
and best interest determinations constitute neither clear error nor an abuse of 
discretion.  See In re R.M., 2015 ME 38, ¶ 7, 114 A.3d 212 (“We review the 
court’s factual findings for clear error and its ultimate conclusion regarding 
the best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and 
the weight to be given them, through the trial court’s lens.”); see also 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4050(3) (2016) (providing that one of the purposes of the statutes 
governing termination of parental rights is to “[p]romote the adoption of 
children into stable families rather than allowing children to remain in the 
impermanency of foster care”); In re B.P., 2015 ME 139, ¶ 19, 126 A.3d 713.3 
                                         
3  We are not persuaded by the father’s argument that the court committed clear error when it 
found that “the Department has made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate and reunify the family” in 
accordance with 22 M.R.S. § 4041 (2016).  First, the finding is well-supported by the record; and 
second, as we have explained, “[t]he Department’s compliance with its rehabilitation and 
 
 
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The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nathaniel Seth Levy, Esq., Brunswick, for appellant Father 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of 
Maine 
 
 
West Bath District Court docket number PC-2014-15 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                                                                                                                   
reunification duties as outlined in section 4041 does not constitute a discrete element requiring 
proof in termination proceedings, nor does the failure of the Department to comply with section 
4041 preclude findings of parental unfitness.”  In re Doris G., 2006 ME 142, ¶ 17, 912 A.2d 572.