Case Title: State v. Barnes

Citation: 

Docket Number: S44787

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  September 8, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v.

EDWARD FORREST BARNES,

	Respondent on Review.

(CC 95-1165; CA A91415; SC S44787)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted November 2, 1998.

	Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for petitioner on review.  With him on the
briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds,
Solicitor General, and David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney
General.

	Kenneth A. Morrow, of Morrow, Monks & Sharp, P.C., Eugene,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.**

	VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

	*Appeal from Lincoln County Circuit Court,
	 Robert L. Huckleberry, Judge.
	 150 Or App 128, 945 P2d 627 (1997).

	**Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration
or decision of this case.

		VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

		Defendant appeals his convictions of second-degree
assault, ORS 163.175(1)(a), and resisting arrest, ORS 162.315. 
He contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give his
proffered jury instruction and in failing to instruct the jury
correctly.  The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction of
resisting arrest and reversed his conviction of second-degree
assault.  State v. Barnes, 150 Or App 128, 945 P2d 627 (1996). 
The dispositive issue on review is whether the trial court erred
in instructing the jury with respect to the culpable mental state
of "knowingly" on the charge of second-degree assault.  We
conclude that the trial court did not err.  Accordingly, we
affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of
Appeals.(1)  

		We take the facts from the Court of Appeals' opinion:

		"The charges arose following an incident at the
Newport Seafood and Wine Festival in February 1994. 
Defendant and his wife Debra were at the marina
building with another couple, Dean and Dana Chase. 
Defendant had had four or five glasses of wine at the
festival when, around 6:00 p.m., the incident started. 
Newport Chief of Police Rivers testified that breaking
wine glasses had become 'kind of a tradition' and that
the crowd at the marina numbered about 3,500, the limit
the security personnel tried to maintain.  Rivers heard
glass being broken in the area where defendant, his
wife and the Chases were.  Rivers sent officers Miller
and Simpson to the area.  Simpson testified that he
asked Dana Chase to leave, and she refused.  Simpson
then physically removed her and outside, after she
tried to slap and kick him, Simpson told her that she
was under arrest.  She tried to run, and when he caught
her she continued to fight.  Debra Barnes then jumped
on his back, as did defendant.  Simpson said that
Miller took defendant off his back and, as Simpson
rolled over, he saw defendant throwing punches at
Miller.

		"Paul Rose was working as a security guard.  He
testified that he saw a police officer coming out with
a female who was yelling and screaming and that he saw
her try to slap and kick the officer and try to run. 
Rose testified that he saw Miller go down and that Rose
stepped forward with his hands out, intending to keep
the crowd back.  Defendant struck Rose in the right
eye.  Rose suffered a 'blow-out fracture' of the eye
socket--a fracture of a thin layer of bone at the floor
of the socket.  The injury resulted in double vision
and required surgery.  Rose still has some double
vision and a 'sunken' eye."

Id. at 130.

		Defendant was indicted for "unlawfully and knowingly
caus[ing] serious physical injury to Paul Rose."  ORS 163.175 
provides in part:

		"(1) A person commits the crime of assault in the
second degree if the person:

		"(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes serious
physical injury to another[.]"

ORS 161.085 provides in part:

		"As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, [the
1971 Oregon Criminal Code] and ORS 166.635, unless the
context requires otherwise:

		"* * * * *

		"(8) 'Knowingly' or 'with knowledge,' when used
with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described
by a statute defining an offense, means that a person
acts with an awareness that the conduct of the person
is of a nature so described or that a circumstance so
described exists."

		At trial, defendant requested that the jury be
instructed that

		"[t]o act knowingly in this case the defendant had
to have acted with an awareness that his conduct would
cause a serious physical injury.  A person achieves a
particular result knowingly when he is practically
certain that his conduct will cause that result.  A
person who is aware of and consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that a serious
physical injury will occur acts recklessly, but not
knowingly[.]" 

(Emphasis added.)  The trial court rejected defendant's proffered
instruction.(2)  Instead, the court relied on Uniform Criminal Jury
Instruction 1032 (describing "knowingly") and instructed the jury
that

	"a person acts 'knowingly' if that person acts with an
awareness that his or her conduct is of a particular
nature.

		"* * * * *

		"Oregon law provides that a person commits the
crime of Assault in the Second Degree if that person
knowingly -- I've defined the term 'knowingly' --
causes serious physical injury -- and I've defined
'serious physical injury' -- to another.

		"In this case to establish Assault in the Second
Degree, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the following three elements:

		"* * * * *

		"Number three, that [defendant] knowingly caused
serious physical injury to Paul Rose."

		On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred
in refusing to give his proffered jury instruction and in failing
to instruct the jury correctly.  The Court of Appeals agreed and
reversed, explaining:

		"The drafters of the Oregon Criminal Code sought
to restrict the concept of 'knowingly' to awareness of
the nature of one's conduct or to the existence of
specified circumstances. * * * Thus, ORS 161.085(8)
specifically provides that the definition of
'knowledge' applies 'when [knowingly] is used with
respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a
statute defining an offense[.]'  However, despite that
general definition, 'knowingly' in ORS 163.175(1)(a) is
not used with respect to conduct or a circumstance.  It
is used instead, as defendant contends, with a result.

		"* * * * *

	"[A]ssault in the second degree under ORS 163.175(1)(a)
proscribes a result -- causing serious physical injury. 
Here, the trial court instructed the jury according to
the statutory definition of 'knowingly' and
incorporated that definition in its instructions on the
elements of assault in the second degree.  However, the
statutory definition of 'knowingly' is restricted to
awareness of conduct; it does not define awareness as
to result.  It is the result that must be proved for
the offense of assault in the second degree, and an
instruction using only the statutory definition of
'knowingly' does not sufficiently inform the jury of
the nexus between conduct and knowledge of the result
of the conduct to satisfy the elements of ORS
163.175(1)(a)."

Barnes, 150 Or App at 133-34 (emphasis in original; footnote
omitted).  The court then held:

	"Because the instruction that was given could have
allowed the jury to find defendant guilty without
finding that defendant knew his act would likely cause
the prohibited result, the error was not harmless."

Id. at 134-35.(3)  We granted the state's petition for review on
this issue of first impression. 

		On review, the state contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the trial court's instructions were
insufficient.  The state argues that the instructions given,
which quoted verbatim both the statutory elements of second-degree assault and the statutory definition of "knowingly," were
a correct statement of the law that sufficiently apprised the
jury of the factual issues that it had to address to find
defendant guilty.  The state further argues that it was required
to prove only that defendant acted with an awareness of the
nature of his conduct, i.e., that his conduct was assaultive and
likely to cause physical injury, and that his conduct, in fact,
caused the victim serious physical injury. 

		Defendant responds that the definition of "knowingly"
in ORS 161.085(8) has no application to ORS 163.175(1)(a) because
the statutory definitions of "intentionally," "recklessly," and
"criminal negligence," ORS 161.085(7), ORS 161.085(9), and ORS
161.085(10),(4) refer to a "result * * * described by a statute
defining an offense," but that a "result" is absent from the
definition of "knowingly" set out in ORS 161.085(8).  Defendant
posits that second-degree assault is a "result" crime that
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with an
awareness that his conduct would cause a serious physical injury
or that it was practically certain that his conduct would cause
that result.  Defendant argues that, because the trial court's
instructions did not distinguish between "conduct" and "result,"
the instructions permitted the jury to find defendant guilty of
second-degree assault if it found only that he knowingly had
assaulted Rose and, in fact, Rose had been seriously injured. 
Thus, the sole issue presented on review is the sufficiency of
the instructions given, not the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the conviction of second-degree assault.  We review for
error as a matter of law.  State v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 427, 927
P2d 1073 (1996).

		Generally, parties are entitled to have a proffered
instruction given based on their theory of the case if the
instruction correctly states the law.  State v. McBride, 287 Or
315, 319, 599 P2d 449 (1979).  If a proffered instruction is
refused, however, there is no error if the instruction is not a
correct statement of the law.  Hernandez v. Barbo Machinery Co.,
327 Or 99, 106, 957 P2d 147 (1998); see also State v. Nefstad,
309 Or 523, 542, 789 P2d 1326 (1990) (trial court properly
refused proffered instruction because it was "not correct"). 
There also is no error if the substance of the proffered
instruction, even if correct, was covered fully by the trial
court's other instructions.  Hernandez, 327 Or at 106.  An error
in refusing to give a proffered instruction requires reversal
only if the instructions that were given cause prejudice by
substantially affecting the rights of the party requesting the
refused instruction.  State v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 38, 828 P2d
1006 (1992).  In determining whether a trial court's instructions
accurately state the law, the instructions are read as a whole.  
State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 266, 971 P2d 879 (1999); State v.
Rogers, 313 Or 356, 383, 836 P2d 1308 (1992).  Defendant is not
entitled to reversal merely because he believes that his
proffered instruction stated the law more clearly than did the
trial court's instructions, if the instructions given correctly
and completely addressed the issues.  See State v. Montez, 324 Or
343, 362, 927 P2d 64 (1996) (no error in refusing to give 
requested instruction if the instruction given adequately
addresses the subject of the requested instruction).  We first
consider whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury,
because, if it did, the court did not err in refusing to give
defendant's proffered instruction.  See Rogers, 313 Or at 383
(court not required to give instruction in the particular form
requested by defendant when the instruction given accurately
stated the law).

		In the construction of a statute, this court seeks to
determine the intention of the legislature.  ORS 174.020.  In
doing so, we use the methodology set out in PGE v. Bureau of
Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993),
which directs us first to look to the text of the statute.  Id.
at 610-11.  Although the text of a statutory provision is the
best evidence of legislative intent, at the first level of
analysis we also consider the context of the statutory provision,
which includes other provisions of the same statute and other
related statutes, as well as the preexisting decisional law and
the statutory framework within which the law was enacted. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406,
416-17, 908 P2d 300 (1995), modified on recons 325 Or 46, 932 P2d
1141 (1997).  If the legislative intent is clear after that
analysis, further inquiry is unnecessary.  PGE, 317 Or at 611. 
If the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and
context inquiry, then the court will move to the second level of
analysis, which is to consider legislative history to inform the
court's inquiry into legislative intent.  Id. at 611-12.

		Generally, Oregon's assault statutes, ORS 163.160 et
seq., classify assaults according to:  (1) the defendant's state
of mind (intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally
negligent); (2) the effect of the assault on the victim (physical
injury or serious physical injury); and (3) whether the defendant
used a deadly or dangerous weapon.  That statutory scheme creates
a hierarchy of crimes based on those factors and assigns a
sanction to each crime reflecting the legislature's view of the
gravity of each combination of circumstances.  We turn to the
text and context of ORS 163.175(1)(a).  

		As noted, that statute provides that a person commits
the crime of second-degree assault if the person "knowingly
causes serious physical injury to another."  ORS 163.175(1)(a)
does not require expressly that the state prove that a defendant
acted with an awareness that his conduct would cause a serious
physical injury to another or that he was practically certain
that his conduct would cause that result.  As used in this
context, "knowingly" could mean that a defendant acted with an
awareness of the result that would follow from his conduct. 
However, "knowingly" also could mean that a defendant acted with
an awareness that his conduct was assaultive.  Moreover, nothing
in ORS 163.175(1)(a) or in the other assault statutes indicates
that, as used in this context, the word "knowingly" is to be
given a meaning different from the meaning of "knowingly" set out
in ORS 161.085(8), which, by its terms, expressly applies to ORS
163.175(1)(a) "unless the context requires otherwise."  Other
than ORS 161.085(8), no statute defines the term "knowingly" for
purposes of ORS 163.175(1)(a).

		The Court of Appeals concluded that the "knowingly
causes" wording in ORS 163.175(1)(a) must be construed only as
result-oriented and, because the "knowingly" definition in ORS
161.085(8) addresses only conduct and circumstances, it is not a
sufficient definition.  Barnes, 150 Or App at 134.  The court
concluded that the definition of "knowingly" in ORS 161.085(8)
must not be used because the context requires otherwise.  We
disagree.  Although, as used in ORS 163.175(1)(a), "knowingly"
could refer to knowledge of the result that followed from
defendant's conduct, nothing requires that nonstatutory
interpretation of "knowingly," because the other plausible
interpretation of the wording "knowingly causes" noted above is
available. 

		Some ambiguity is created because ORS 163.175(1)(a)
defines second-degree assault in terms of "knowingly causes,"
i.e., in wording that appears to be result-oriented, while ORS
161.085(8) provides a definition of "knowingly" that addresses
only conduct or circumstances.  Because we conclude that the
intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and context
inquiry, we move to the second level of analysis, which is to
consider legislative history to inform our inquiry into
legislative intent.  PGE, 317 Or at 611-12.  When the court
reaches legislative history, it considers it along with text and
context to determine whether all of those together make
legislative intent clear.  Id.

		The statutory provisions at issue here were enacted as
part of the 1971 Criminal Code revision and have remained
essentially unchanged since that time.  The Commentary to the
Proposed Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report -- 1970, Criminal
Law Revision Commission (Commentary) discloses that the statutes
defining the various culpable mental states were based on
comparable provisions of New York statutes.(5)  Although those
statutes generally follow section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code,
an important exception is the definition of "knowingly." 
Commentary at 10.  The Commentary notes that the definition of
the term "knowingly"

	"was changed by the New York reporters to eliminate any
reference to the result of the conduct and to restrict
the term to awareness of the nature of one's conduct or
of the existence of specified circumstances (e.g., the
property is stolen, that one has no right to enter a
building, etc.)."

(Emphasis added.)  In sum, the drafters of the New York statutes
rejected the Model Penal Code's two-pronged definition of
"knowingly" that applied that term both to an awareness of
conduct or circumstances, and to an awareness of a potential
result.  The drafters of the 1971 Criminal Code followed New York
and eliminated the result of the conduct alternative from the
definition of "knowingly."

		Thus, unlike the definitions for "intentionally,"
"recklessly," and "criminally negligent," the definition of
"knowingly" addresses only "conduct" and "circumstances" and does
not also include a reference to "result."  Even though the
drafters of the 1971 Criminal Code enacted several "knowingly
cause" assault provisions, they specifically omitted from the
definition of "knowingly" the wording that would have prescribed
a knowledge requirement for the result element of those offenses. 

		The Court of Appeals concluded that the ORS 161.085(8)
"knowingly" definition cannot be applied to the "knowingly
causes" element of ORS 163.175(1)(a).  Barnes, 150 Or App at 134. 
The fundamental problem with that approach is that no statute
provides an alternative definition of "knowingly," and it is
clear that the legislature considered and specifically rejected
the Model Penal Code definition on which defendant relies. 
Moreover, to adopt defendant's proffered instruction would be to
insert into ORS 161.085(8) by way of judicial construction the
very definition that the legislature specifically rejected.  That
cannot be done.  See ORS 174.010 ("In the construction of a
statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and
declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not
to insert what has been omitted * * *."). 

		Construing ORS 163.175(1)(a) and ORS 161.085(8)
together according to their express terms and in context with the
related assault statutes, in a prosecution for assault in the
second degree, the state needs to prove only that defendant was
aware of the assaultive nature of his conduct and that his
conduct in fact caused the victim serious physical injury.  In
this case, the trial court instructed the jury using the wording
of ORS 163.175(1)(a) and ORS 161.085(8).  Because that
instruction adequately conveyed to the jury the legal standards
to be applied, the trial court was not required to provide any
further instruction, and the court properly refused to give
defendant's proffered instruction. 

		We hold that the trial court's instructions were
correct.  Therefore, the trial court did not err either in
instructing the jury or in refusing to give defendant's requested
instruction.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in
part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed.

1. 	Defendant did not petition for review of the Court of
Appeals' decision affirming his conviction of resisting arrest.

2. 	In rejecting defendant's proffered instruction, the
trial court concluded that one who "knowingly" assaults another
must live with the consequences, i.e., that "you take the
victim[s] as you find them."

3. 	The Court of Appeals opined in dictum that defendant's
proffered instruction "more accurately stated the requirement of
* * * causing the prohibited result."  Barnes, 150 Or App at 134. 
The court ultimately held that the trial court's error was not
harmless, because the jury could have found defendant guilty
without finding that he knew his act "would likely cause" the
prohibited result.  Id. at 135.  Although it applied only a
"would likely cause" standard, the court did not explain why the
trial court committed reversible error in refusing defendant's
proffered instruction that set out a "practically certain that
his conduct will cause" standard.

4. 	ORS 161.085 provides in part:

		"As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, and ORS
166.635, unless the context requires otherwise:

		"* * * * *

		"(7) 'Intentionally' or 'with intent,' when used
with respect to a result or to conduct described by a
statute defining an offense, means that a person acts
with a conscious objective to cause the result or to
engage in the conduct so described.

		"* * * * * 

		"(9) 'Recklessly,' when used with respect to a
result or to a circumstance described by a statute
defining an offense, means that a person is aware of
and consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that
the circumstance exists.  The risk must be of such
nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation.

		"(10) 'Criminal negligence' or 'criminally
negligent,' when used with respect to a result or to a
circumstance described by a statute defining an
offense, means that a person fails to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will
occur or that the circumstance exists.  The risk must
be of such nature and degree that the failure to be
aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe
in the situation."

5. 	See State v. Chakerian, 325 Or 370, 376-78, 938 P2d 756
(1997) (noting that the Commentary is part of the legislative
history of the revised criminal code and not part of the context
for purposes of PGE analysis).