Case Title: State v. Roy

Citation: 169 Vt. 611, 738 A.2d 581

Docket Number: 98-162

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Roy (98-162); 169 Vt. 611; 738 A.2d 581

[Filed 13-Jul-1999]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                       SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 98-162

                             JANUARY TERM, 1999

State of Vermont	               }	APPEALED FROM:
	                               }
     v.	                               }	District Court of Vermont
	                               }	Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
Tyron Roy	                       }
	                               }	DOCKET NO. 3716-8-96 CnCr

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       Defendant Tyron Roy appeals from a sentence of fourteen to fifteen
  years imposed by the  Chittenden District Court on a conviction for
  voluntary manslaughter.  Defendant claims the  State's sentencing argument
  violated the plea agreement.  Defendant also appeals the court's 
  acceptance of contested facts in the presentence investigation report (PSI)
  and the court's findings  and conclusions about defendant's prior cutting
  of the victim.  We affirm.
	
       Defendant was initially charged with first degree murder under 13
  V.S.A.  2301.  By  agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to an amended
  charge of voluntary manslaughter under 13  V.S.A.  2304.  At the change of
  plea, defendant stipulated that the police affidavit on file  provided a
  factual basis for the plea.  The affidavit indicated that the victim,
  Bradley Morris, had  assaulted defendant but was passed out "in bed" when
  defendant crawled over the victim's  female companion and stabbed the
  victim.
	
       On appeal, defendant contends that the State violated the plea
  agreement by arguing at sentencing  that the victim was "defenseless and
  unsuspecting" in bed when defendant stabbed him.   Defendant argues that
  such a scenario is factually analogous to the charge of murder and 
  therefore inconsistent with the amended charge of manslaughter.  The State
  counters that it  reduced the charge from murder to voluntary manslaughter
  on the theory that defendant had not  "cooled off" after the victim had
  assaulted him.  Thus, the State maintains that, even though the  victim was
  defenseless and unsuspecting, defendant nonetheless stabbed him in the heat
  of  passion.

       Defendant argues that the State's implication that the victim was
  asleep when he was killed  suggests a substantial passage of time between
  the victim's assault on defendant and defendant's  stabbing of the victim. 
  Indeed, voluntary manslaughter is a time-sensitive doctrine that applies 
  only where an adequately provoked individual strikes before having an
  opportunity to cool off.   See State v. Turgeon, 165 Vt. 28, 33,