Case Title: DAVID ROY CONINE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0202

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
DAVID ROY CONINE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 146197 P.3d 156Case Number: S-07-0202Decided: 12/12/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
DAVID 
ROY CONINE,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Tina 
N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender's Office; Diane E. 
Courselle, Faculty Director, and Jonah Buckley and Robert Pascoe, Student 
Interns, of the Defender Aid Program.  
Argument by Mr. Pascoe.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Brandi L. 
Monger, Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Monger.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

 
 
[¶1]      A jury convicted 
Appellant David Roy Conine of aggravated assault and battery.  On appeal, Conine challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction and asserts reversible 
error based on alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire 
and opening statement.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Conine presents 
the following issues:

 
 
I.          
Was the evidence legally insufficient to support a conviction for 
aggravated assault when, in the manner used, the allegedly deadly weapon  a 
frying pan  caused only minor injuries?

 
 
II.         
Did the prosecutor during voir dire improperly precondition the jury to 
conclude that the frying pan was a deadly weapon?

 
 
III.        Did 
the prosecutor improperly vouch for the credibility of the alleged victim when 
he told the jury that Jerry Cox seems to be "a pretty honest 
man"?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In October 2006, 
Conine and the victim, Jerry Cox, resided at the Lazy U Bunkhouse, a boarding 
house with individual bedrooms and shared common areas for cooking and 
socializing.  On the evening of 
October 10, Cox was in the kitchen area preparing his dinner when Conine 
approached him and started a verbal altercation regarding an incident that had 
occurred several days earlier.  Cox 
tried to ignore Conine, but Conine continued to become more aggressive.  Cox eventually turned away from Conine 
in an attempt to halt the exchange.  
When he turned back around, Conine punched him several times about the 
head and face and then hit him with an aluminum frying pan on the left side of 
his face, his right jaw, and the top of his head.  As a result of Conine's actions, Cox 
lost a tooth and suffered significant pain, bruising and swelling to his face 
and head.  

 
 
[¶4]      The State charged 
Conine with aggravated assault and battery, alleging that Conine knowingly 
caused bodily injury to Cox with a deadly weapon; to wit, the frying pan.  Following a one-day trial, during which 
both Conine and Cox testified and provided differing accounts of the events 
surrounding the altercation and Cox's resulting injuries, the jury found Conine 
guilty on the charged offense.1 The district court subsequently 
sentenced Conine to a term of imprisonment of three to eight years. This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

A.        
Sufficiency of the Evidence

 
 
[¶5]      Conine questions 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction.  When reviewing a sufficiency of the 
evidence claim, we analyze the evidence, and any applicable inferences that may 
be reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the State.  Dettloff v. State, 2007 WY 29, ¶ 22, 152 P.3d 376, 383 (Wyo. 2007); Grissom v. 
State, 2005 WY 132, ¶ 24, 121 P.3d 127, 136 (Wyo. 2005).  We have consistently held that it is the 
jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, 
and draw reasonable inferences from the facts.  Sotolongo-Garcia v. State, 2002 WY 185, 
¶ 11, 60 P.3d 687, 689 (Wyo. 2002).  
We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury but will only 
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Grissom, ¶ 24, 121 P.3d  at 136; Pacheco v. State, 2004 WY 160, ¶ 6, 102 P.3d 887, 889 (Wyo. 2004); Sotolongo-Garcia, ¶ 11, 60 P.3d  at 689; 
Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1063 
(Wyo. 2000).

 
 
[¶6]      Conine was 
convicted of aggravated assault and battery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007), which states in pertinent part: "A person is 
guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he . . . knowingly causes bodily 
injury to another with a deadly weapon."  
At trial, and in accordance with the statute, the district court 
instructed the jury that it should not convict Conine unless it found, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that he caused bodily injury to Cox with a deadly 
weapon:

 
 
The 
necessary elements of the crime of Aggravated Assault and Battery, as charged in the Information, 
are:

 
 
1.         
On or about the 10th day of October, 
2006;

 
 

2.                  
In 
Campbell County, Wyoming;

 
 

3.                  
The 
Defendant, David Roy Conine;

 
 

4.                  
Knowingly 
caused;

 
 

5.                  
Bodily 
injury to another person, Jerry Cox;

 
 

6.                  
With 
a deadly weapon.

 
 
If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty.

 
 
If, 
on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any 
of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should 
find the defendant not guilty.  

 
 
The 
district court instructed the jury on these statutory definitions of the 
elements of the offense:2

 
 
"Bodily 
injury" means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical 
condition.  

 
 
"Deadly 
weapon" means but is not limited to a firearm, explosive or incendiary material, 
motorized vehicle, an animal or other device, instrument, material or substance 
which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is reasonably capable 
of producing death or serious bodily injury.  

 
 
"Serious 
bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or 
which causes miscarriage, severe disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment 
of the function of any bodily member or organ.  

 
 
[¶7]      In attacking the 
sufficiency of the evidence, Conine first argues the evidence failed to support 
the jury's finding that the frying pan used to assault Cox constituted a deadly 
weapon.  Conine asserts that the 
jury could not properly have viewed the frying pan as a deadly weapon because 
Cox suffered only minor injuries.  
According to Conine, the frying pan could only have been deemed a deadly 
weapon if, in the manner it was used, it actually caused serious bodily injury 
to Cox.

 
 
[¶8]      The problem with 
Conine's argument is that the statutes governing his conviction do not require 
that the weapon used on Cox in fact cause serious bodily injury; they only 
require that Cox incurred bodily injury caused by Conine's use of an object 
which, in the manner it was used, was reasonably capable of producing death 
or serious bodily injury.  The State 
was not required to prove, nor was the jury required to find, that Cox suffered 
serious bodily injury when Conine hit him with the frying pan.  To convict Conine, the jury only needed 
to find from the State's evidence that Conine caused bodily injury to Cox by 
attacking him with an object that might reasonably cause serious bodily injury 
or death.

 
 
[¶9]      Conine also 
argues that, even if deemed a deadly weapon, there was no evidence from which 
the jury could rationally conclude that the frying pan, rather than his fists, 
caused Cox's bodily injuries.  
Conine's argument simply ignores the testimony and evidence presented at 
trial.  Cox specifically remembered 
receiving three distinct blows from the frying pan: the first to the left side 
of his face with what felt like the bottom of the pan; the second to the top of 
his head with the inside of the pan; and the third to his right jaw with what 
felt like the edge of the pan.  
According to Cox, the blow to his jaw was in the area just below where he 
lost the tooth.  Cox also testified 
that he felt pain in his face and head, particularly the jaw and scalp areas 
from those blows, and continued to have pain for approximately two weeks, along 
with difficulty chewing.  In 
addition, a police officer and paramedic responding to the Bunkhouse testified, 
without objection, that Cox reported being struck multiple times in the face 
with the frying pan.  They testified 
Cox had quite a bit of facial swelling and redness to the sclera of his eye, 
which was consistent with the reported blows received from the frying pan.  The frying pan, which was admitted at 
trial, showed extensive damage  it was extremely bent and deformed.  Finally, Conine admitted striking Cox 
once with the frying pan on the head.  

 
 
[¶10]   Viewing the evidence as a whole, 
and affording the State every favorable inference which may be fairly and 
reasonably drawn from it, we have no trouble concluding the evidence was 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the frying 
pan caused Cox bodily injury.  We 
likewise have no trouble concluding the evidence was sufficient to permit a 
rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt the frying pan was a deadly 
weapon.  Applying common sense and 
experience, the jury could have rationally determined the frying pan, when used 
as Conine did to beat Cox about the head and face, was reasonably capable of 
causing serious bodily injury or death.  
In sum, we find ample evidence to support Conine's conviction for 
aggravated assault and battery.

 
 

B.        
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
 
[¶11]   Conine alleges instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire and opening statement, which he claims 
warrant reversal of his conviction.  
Conine did not object at the trial to the alleged instances of misconduct 
and, therefore, our review is limited to the plain error doctrine, which 
requires: (1) the record clearly reflect the incident alleged as error; (2) 
Conine demonstrate the error transgressed an unequivocal rule of law in a clear 
and obvious, not merely arguable, way; and (3) Conine demonstrate the error 
adversely affected a substantial right resulting in material prejudice to 
him.  Callen v. State, 2008 WY 107, ¶ 20, 192 P.3d 137, 145 (Wyo. 2008); Talley v. 
State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007).  Before we hold that an error mandates 
reversal of a conviction, we must conclude, based on the entire record, that a 
reasonable possibility exists that the outcome of Conine's trial might have been 
more favorable to him absent the error.  
Id.; Williams v. State, 2002 WY 136, ¶ 21, 54 P.3d 248, 254 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
Voir 
dire

 
 
[¶12]   Conine's first complaint of 
misconduct is directed at the following questions posed by the prosecutor during 
voir dire:

 
 
Now, 
folks, the charge in this case is aggravated assault and battery with the use of 
a deadly weapon.  I think we can all 
agree that things such as firearms, a knife, a baseball bat, brass knuckles, 
could generally be considered to be a deadly weapon?  Are you all in agreement with 
that?

 
 
(Panel 
indicating yes.)

 
 
Would 
you also agree that the manner in which the object is used that makes it 
deadly?

 
 
(Panel 
indicating in the affirmative.)

 
 
What 
else is there that could possibly be deadly?  Well, could this be deadly?  I am holding a pen.  Can you conceive of a way in which this 
could be used that would [be] deadly?  
How about in the eye, up the nose, in the ear, possibly in the 
throat?

 
 
How 
about, say, a belt buckle, that somebody in a rodeo is wearing?  Could that be used as [a] deadly 
weapon?

 
 
(No 
response.)

 
 
How 
about shoes?  Is that possible to 
kick or hit with?

 
 
(No 
response.)

 
 
How 
about a frying pan?  Can you agree 
with the thought that possibly a frying pan could be considered a deadly 
weapon?

 
 
(No 
response.)

 
 
For 
those of you who sit on this jury, I believe that you will hear this 
definition:  Under Wyoming law, a 
deadly weapon means, but is not limited to a firearm, explosive, or incendiary 
material, something that burns, a motorized vehicle, an animal, or other device, 
instrument, material, or substance which in the manner it is used or is intended 
to be used is reasonably capable of producing deadly or serious bodily 
injury.

 
 
Is 
there anyone here who does not understand that definition?

 
 
(No 
response.)  

 
 
[¶13]   Conine contends the prosecutor 
impermissibly questioned the jury regarding the law, as well as the meaning of 
words within the context of the law, so as to precondition the jurors to find 
that the frying pan was a deadly weapon.  
He asserts the prosecutor's questioning violated several restrictions of 
W.R.Cr.P. 24(c).  Conine further 
claims he was materially prejudiced thereby because the manner in which the pan 
was used, as well as the bodily injury caused by its use, was hotly contested at 
trial.

 
 
[¶14]   W.R.Cr.P. 24(c) governs voir dire 
and states in pertinent part:

 
 
(1)       The only 
purpose of the examination is to select a panel of jurors who will fairly and 
impartially hear the evidence and render a just verdict.

(2)       The court 
shall not permit counsel . . . to attempt to precondition prospective jurors to 
a particular result, comment on the personal lives and families of the parties 
or their attorneys, nor question jurors concerning the pleadings, the law, the 
meaning of words, or the comfort of jurors.

(3)               
In 
voir dire examination counsel . . . shall not:

(A)              
Ask 
questions of an individual juror that can be asked of the panel or a group of 
jurors collectively;

(B)       Ask 
questions answered in a juror questionnaire except to explain an 
answer;

(C)       Repeat a 
question asked and answered;

(D)       Instruct 
the jury on the law or argue the case; or

(E)       Ask a juror 
what the juror's verdict might be under any hypothetical 
circumstance.

 
 
Notwithstanding 
the restrictions set forth in subsections 24(c)(3)(A)-(E), counsel . . . shall 
be permitted during voir dire examination to preview portions of the evidence 
from the case in a non-argumentative manner when a preview of the evidence would 
help prospective jurors better understand the context and reasons for certain 
lines of voir dire questioning.

 
 
[¶15]   We agree with Conine that the 
prosecutor's questions violated Rule 24(c).  The essential function of voir dire is 
to allow for the impaneling of a fair and impartial jury.  Properly conducted voir dire examination 
aspires to identify bias and prejudice, not implant it.  Law v. State, 2004 WY 111, ¶ 32, 98 P.3d 181, 192 (Wyo. 2004).  In this case, 
the entire line of highlighted questioning by the prosecutor served only to 
instruct the prospective jurors on the law and place the suggestion in their 
minds that an object such as a frying pan could be a deadly weapon.  In effect, the prosecutor was using voir 
dire to argue an important aspect of the State's case.

 
 
[¶16]   Although improper, we must still 
determine whether the challenged questions caused material prejudice to 
Conine.  We must answer that 
question in the negative.  The 
prosecutor's questions were not so suggestive as to commit any member of the 
jury panel to find a frying pan was a deadly weapon.  The jury was repeatedly advised that 
findings of facts were exclusively within their realm.  As we have already discussed, there was 
more than sufficient evidence to support a finding that the frying pan was used 
as a deadly weapon.  In light of the 
entire record, we do not find a reasonable possibility exists that the outcome 
of the trial would have been more favorable absent the prosecutor's indiscretion 
during voir dire.

 
 
Opening 
statement

 
 
[¶17]   Conine contends the prosecutor 
engaged in misconduct when he uttered the following highlighted statement during 
his opening statement:

 
 
Mr. 
Cox will tell you that during the early evening hours of October 10, 2006, he 
was in the common area, trying to cook some food after having worked for a long 
day.  He is a pretty honest man seems to 
be.  He will also tell you he 
had been drinking.  His drink of 
choice is something called a 40, which is a large beer, 40 ounces.  I think he will tell you he had two of 
them that evening.  

 
 
Conine 
contends the prosecutor's statement amounted to improper vouching of the 
credibility of Cox.  Conine is 
correct that it is improper for a prosecutor to personally vouch for the 
credibility of a witness.  Lane, 12 P.3d  at 1065.  In this regard, we have 
said:

 
 
When 
the prosecutor asserts his credibility or personal belief, an additional factor 
is injected into the case.  This 
additional factor is that counsel may be perceived by the jury as an authority 
whose opinion carries greater weight than their own opinion:  that members of the jury might be 
persuaded not by the evidence, but rather by a perception that counsel's 
opinions are correct because of his position as prosecutor, an important state 
official entrusted with enforcing the criminal laws of a sovereign state.  While the prosecutor is expected to be 
an advocate, he may not exploit his position to induce a jury to disregard the 
evidence or misapply the law.

 
 

Id. 
(quoting Barela v. State, 787 P.2d 82, 83-84 (Wyo. 1990)).  However, even though we find that the 
prosecutor's "honest man" remark transgressed this clear rule of law, we are 
unable to conclude, based on our review of the entire record, that it prejudiced 
Conine to a degree that requires reversal of his 
conviction.

 
 
[¶18]   The prosecutor's statement was 
isolated, and the district court twice instructed the jury concerning its 
responsibilities to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, as well as weigh 
the evidence and resolve factual issues, in determining Conine's guilt or 
innocence on the charged crime.  
Immediately prior to the prosecutor's opening statement, the district 
court instructed the jury:

 
 
On 
the other hand, it is the exclusive province of the jury to weigh and consider 
all evidence which is presented to you; to determine the credibility of all 
witnesses who testify before you, and from such evidence and testimony, to 
determine the issues of fact in this case.

 
 
            
This duty you shall perform with sincere judgment and sound discretion, 
uninfluenced by sentiment, conjecture, or by passion or prejudice against any of 
the litigants in this case, or by public opinion or public feeling.  The litigants have the right to demand 
and expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh 
the evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just 
verdict, regardless of the consequences.  
That verdict must express the individual opinion of each juror. . . 
.

 
 
You 
are the exclusive judges of the facts and of the effect and value of the 
evidence, but you must determine the facts from the evidence produced here in 
court.  If any evidence is admitted 
and afterwards is ordered by me to be stricken out, you must disregard entirely 
the matter thus stricken, and if any counsel intimates by any of his questions 
that certain hinted facts are, or are not true, you must disregard any such 
intimation and must not draw any inference from it.  As to any statement made by counsel in 
your presence concerning the facts of the case, you must not regard such a 
statement as evidence[.] . . . 

 
 
*  *  
* *

 
 
The 
jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and of the weight to 
be given their testimony.  You 
should take into consideration their demeanor upon the witness stand, their 
apparent intelligence, their means of knowledge of the facts testified to, the 
interest, if any, which any witness may have in the outcome of this trial, the 
prejudice or motives, or feelings of revenge, if any, which have been shown by 
the evidence.  In doing so, you may 
take into consideration all of the facts and circumstances in the case and give 
such weight as you think the same are entitled to, in the light of your 
experience and knowledge of human affairs.  

 
 
[¶19]   The district court also gave the 
jury a virtually identical instruction before the commencement of 
deliberations.  We presume the jury 
followed the district court's instructions.  Haynes v. State, 2008 WY 75, ¶ 22, 186 P.3d 1204, 1209 (Wyo. 2008); Guy v. 
State, 2008 WY 56, ¶ 19, 184 P.3d 687, 694 (Wyo. 2008).  Additionally, the prosecutor reiterated, 
during his principal and rebuttal closing arguments, that it was the jury's 
exclusive role to determine issues of credibility.  Finally, as previously noted, the 
evidence of Conine's guilt was strong.  
Weighing these factors, we do not believe, in the absence of the 
challenged comment, the verdict might have been more favorable to 
Conine.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶20]   The record contains sufficient 
evidence to support Conine's conviction for aggravated assault and battery.  The prosecutor's conduct during voir 
dire and opening statement did not constitute plain error, warranting reversal 
of Conine's conviction.  
Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The district 
court's "Judgment Upon Jury Verdict" and "Sentence" incorrectly identifies the 
criminal offense as "Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon."  

 
 

2These 
definitions are taken verbatim from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a) (LexisNexis 
2007).