Case Title: Roca v. E.I. DuPont De Numours and Co. et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 640, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
CARL ROCA, 
 
 
 
§   No. 640, 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§   Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§   in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§   C.A. No. 01C-10-063 
E.I. DU PONT De NEMOURS  
 
§  
AND COMPANY; GENERAL  
§  
MOTORS CORPORATION;  
§  
DAIMLERCHRYSLER   
 
§  
CORPORATION; RHONE- 
 
§  
POULENC, INC., as Successor- 
§  
In-Interest to Stauffer Chemical  
§  
Company,  
 
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
§  
 
Appellees.  
 
 
§  
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  November 4, 2003 
 
 
 
 
     Decided:  January 30, 2004 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, STEELE and 
JACOBS, Justices (constituting the Court en Banc). 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Kathleen D. Hadley, Esquire and Barbara J. Gadbois, Esquire, Law 
offices of Peter G. Angelos, P.C., Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant, Carl 
Roca. 
 
 
John C. Phillips, Jr., Esquire and James P. Hall, Esquire, Phillips, 
Goldman & Spence, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee, E.I. duPont 
de Nemours and Company. 
 
Somers S. Price, Jr., Esquire, Daniel F. Wolcott, Jr., Esquire, and 
James M. Kron, Esquire, Potter, Anderson & Corroon, Wilmington, 
 
2 
Delaware, for appellees, General Motors Corporation and DaimlerChrysler 
Corporation. 
 
Mark L. Reardon, Esquire and Joseph F. Gula, III, Esquire, Elzufon, 
Austin, Reardon, Tarlov & Mondell, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee, 
Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. as Successor-in-Interest to Stauffer Chemical 
Company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
3 
 
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the Superior Court.  
In October 2001, the plaintiff-appellant, Carl Roca, filed a complaint in the 
Superior Court.  The defendant-appellees are E. I. du Pont de Nemours and 
Company, General Motors Corporation, DaimlerChrysler Corporation and 
Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., as successor-in-interest to Stauffer Chemical 
Company.  Roca alleged inter alia that he contracted mesothelioma, a deadly 
lung cancer, as a result of exposure to asbestos dust and fibers while 
working for independent contractors on the premises of the defendants-
appellees.  
 
The defendants filed motions for summary judgment on a number of 
issues.  Following briefing and oral argument, the Superior Court granted the 
defendants’ motions in a bench ruling on July 1, 2002 and in a memorandum 
opinion dated September 3, 2002.1  These rulings were entered by the 
Superior Court on November 7, 2002, as a stipulated final judgment in favor 
of all defendant-appellees. 
 
In this appeal, Roca’s opening brief raised only two issues as the basis 
for his challenge to the Superior Court’s complete dismissal of his 
complaint:  first, “The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion and Erred As A 
Matter Of Law In Determining That Plaintiff Was Not An ‘Other’ Pursuant 
                                        
1 In re Asbestos Litigation (Roca), 2002 WL 31007993, at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 3, 2002).  
 
4 
To Chapter 15 Of The Restatement Of Torts (2nd)”; and second, “The Trial 
Court Abused Its Discretion And Erred As A Matter Of Law In Finding That 
Defendants Did Not Retain Control Of Their Premises And Did Not Assume 
[The Duty Of] Job Site Safety.” 
We have concluded that neither of the two claims expressly raised by 
Roca in his opening brief are meritorious.  We have also determined that the 
final judgments entered by the Superior Court should be affirmed on the 
basis of and for the reasons stated by the Superior Court in it memorandum 
Opinion dated September 3, 2003.2  Roca, however, asserts that there is a 
third issue before this Court that must be decided. 
Section 343 and Oral Argument 
 
During the oral arguments before this Court, Roca contended that the 
Superior Court erred by denying his claim that was made pursuant to Section 
343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Section 343”).  Following oral 
arguments, this Court directed Roca to file an opening memorandum that: 
1. 
Clearly identifies that portion of the Superior Court’s 
ruling which explicitly or implicitly rejected appellant’s 
Section 343 argument; and 
 
2. 
Explains why the Superior Court’s decision on that issue 
constituted reversible error. 
 
                                        
2 Id.  
 
5 
 
Roca’s response to this Court’s request did not identify the portion of 
the Superior Court’s opinion that explicitly or implicitly rejects his 
purported claim under Section 343 of the Restatement.  The defendants’ 
response to this Court asserts that Roca’s “Opening Memorandum does not 
do so for the simple reason that no such portion exists.  That is, the 
[Superior] Court did not reject a § 343 claim because [Roca] never made 
such a claim.” 
Section 343 and Superior Court 
 
Roca contends that, as a result of his factual allegations about the 
defendants’ knowledge of asbestos hazards in paragraphs 17 and 18 of his 
complaint, the Superior Court should have recognized that he was asserting 
a legal claim under Section 343 of the Restatement.  Roca also contends that 
he presented “lengthy arguments” below on a premises owner’s duty to warn 
invitees, and that this put the Superior Court on notice of a Section 343 
claim.   
The record reflects, however, that when the Superior Court asked 
Roca to identify the legal theories under which he intended to proceed Roca 
expressly identified Sections 413, 416, 422 and 427 of the Restatement, but 
not Section 343.  The defendants’ submit that:  “in over 332 pages of 
briefing to the [Superior] Court, not once did Plaintiff mention § 343.  
 
6 
Roca’s original four answering briefs in opposition to defendants’ respective 
summary judgment motions contained:  77 pages for General Motors; 75 
pages for Chrysler; 106 pages for du Pont; and 74 pages for Rhone-
Poulenc.”  According to the defendants, “Roca also made no reference 
whatsoever to invitees or Section 343 at oral argument before the Superior 
Court on either June 20, 2002 or July 1, 2002.”   
 
The Superior Court’s memorandum opinion indicates that it did not 
believe there was a Section 343 claim before it.  Citing the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Monk v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority,3 the Superior 
Court stated:  “employers need not be held liable under the peculiar risk 
provisions of Chapter 15 because other remedies exist under the 
Restatement, such as the right of the contractor’s employees, like other 
invitees, to sue for certain defects on the land under Restatement §  343.”4  
Roca did not file a motion for reargument, pursuant to Superior Court Rule 
59(e).   
The defendants submit that the first time Roca specifically raised 
Section 343 as a theory of recovery was in a letter to the Superior Court 
dated September 17, 2002. 
                                        
3 Monk v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority, 53 F.3d 1381 (3d Cir. 1995). 
4 In re Asbestos Litigation (Roca), 2002 WL 31007993, at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 3, 2002).  
 
7 
In light of Your Honor’s reference to § 343, is the written 
opinion of September 3, 2002 combined with Your Honor’s 
oral ruling at the close of argument on the Defendants’ Motions 
meant to be a compelte dismissal as to all of Plaintiff’s claims 
against Defendants DuPont, GM, Chrysler, and Rhone-
Poulenc?  If that is the case, Plaintiff respectfully requests that 
Your Honor sign the attached Order of Judgment evidencing 
the fact that the Court has entered a final judgment so that 
Plaintiff may move forward with his appeal. 
 
That letter was written after Roca had received the Superior Court’s 
September 3, 2002 memorandum opinion and after the period for 
reargument had expired.  Thereafter, Roca stipulated to the entry of a final 
judgment. 
Section 343 and this Appeal 
 
Assuming arguendo that Roca did assert a Section 343 claim before 
the Superior Court and further assuming arguendo that the Superior Court 
rejected that claim, this Court determined that a question remained about 
whether Roca waived the Section 343 issue in his present appeal.  This 
Court asked the parties to address the following question:  “Did Carl Roca 
waive his purported claim under Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 343 
by not citing that section as a basis for relief in his opening brief on appeal 
to this Court?” 
 
8 
In Murphy v. State,5 this Court noted that an appellant is entitled to 
frame the issues on appeal.  We also stated that “[t]he failure to raise a l
egal 
issue in the text of the opening brief generally constitutes a waiver of that 
claim on appeal.”6  The defendants argue that because Roca “omitted from 
his opening brief any challenge to the Superior Court’s finding or failure to 
decide a claim under section 343, that issue has been waived.”7 
 
Roca argues that he raised Section 343 as an issue for review, and 
claims that he “specifically cited Section 343 on page 37 of his opening 
brief.”  An examination of that page, however, reflects that Roca did not cite 
to Section 343, but rather cited Niblett v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,8 in which 
the Superior Court cited Section 343 among a number of other authorities.  
The fact that Roca did not cite to Section 343 in his opening brief is 
emphasized by the fact that, although Roca’s Table of Citations references 
Restatement Sections 411, 413, 416 and 527, it includes no reference to 
Section 343.   
 
Roca also asserts that he raised Section 343 on pages thirty-six 
through forty of his opening brief.  The defendants acknowledge that 
selected sentences of the text on these pages refer to the duty of premises 
                                        
5 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150 (Del. 1993). 
6 Id. at 1152. 
7 Id. 
8 Niblett v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 158 A.2d 580 (Del. Super. 1960). 
 
9 
owners to invitees.  The defendants assert, however, that those references to 
duty don’t mention Section 343 but are interspersed among general 
discussions on the other expressly identified sections of the Restatement 
with regard to the issue of control of contractors and assumption of a duty 
for safety by an owner.   
Section 343 Waived On Appeal 
 
It is well established that “to assure consideration of an issue by the 
court, the appellant must both raise it in [the Summary of the Argument] and 
pursue it in the Argument portion of the brief.”9  The rules of this Court 
specifically require an appellant to set forth the issues raised on appeal and 
to present an argument in support of those issues in their opening brief. 10  If 
an appellant fails to comply with these requirements on a particular issue, 
the appellant has abandoned that issue on appeal irrespective of how well the 
issue was preserved at trial. 11 
 
We have concluded that Roca failed to comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 14(b)(iv) when he omitted any reference to Section 343 in the summary 
of argument section of his opening brief.  Rule 14(b)(iv) expressly requires 
                                        
9 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3974.1, at 504-08 (1999 
and Supp. 2003).  
10 See Supr. Ct. R. 14. 
11 Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993) and Turnbull v. Fink, 644 A.2d 
1322, 1324 (Del. 1994). 
 
10
that an appellant’s opening brief contain a summary of a
rgument section 
“stating in separate numbered paragraphs the legal propositions upon which 
each side relies.”  We have also concluded that Roca failed to raise Section 
343 as a basis for relief in the argument section of his opening brief.  
Supreme Court Rule 14(b)(vi) requires that “[t]he argument . . . be divided 
under appropriate headings distinctly setting forth the separate issues 
presented for review . . . .”   
Most importantly, however, Rule 14(b)(vi)(2) provides that “[t]he 
merits of any argument that is not raised in the body of the opening brief [is] 
deemed waived and will not be considered by the Court on appeal.”  Roca 
presented only two arguments in his opening brief, neither of which refers to 
Section 343 either in the headings or in the body of those arguments on the 
merits.  Thus, n
owhere in his opening brief does Roca either identify or 
present an argument on the issue of Section 343 in the manner that is 
required by the Rules of this Court. 
This Court has held that the appealing party’s opening brief must fully 
state the grounds for appeal, as well as the arguments and supporting 
 
11
authorities on each issue or claim of reversible error.12  “[C]asual mention of 
an issue in a brief is cursory treatment insufficient to preserve the issue for 
appeal”13 and a fortiori no specific mention of a legal issue is insufficient.  
The “failure of a party appellant to present and argue a legal issue in the text 
of an opening brief constitutes a waiver of that claim on appeal.”14  
Accordingly, we hold that, assuming arguendo that Roca preserved the 
Section 343 issue in the Superior Court, Roca abandoned and waived that 
issue in his appeal to this Court by raising it for the first time at oral 
argument.15 
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior court are affirmed. 
                                        
12 Turnbull v. Fink, 644 A.2d 1322, 1324 (Del. 1994).  See also Willhauck v. Halpin, 953 
F.2d 689, 700 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 
1990)).  (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at 
developed argumentation, are deemed waived . . . .  It is not enough merely to mention a 
possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work . . . .   
Judges are not expected to be mindreaders.  Consequently, a litigant has an obligation to 
spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly, or else forever hold its peace.”).   
13 Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).  
14 Id.; see also Central States, Southweast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Midwest 
Motor Exp., Inc., 181 F.3d 799, 808 (7th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 
1052 (9th Cir. 1999); King v. Town of Hanover, 116 F.3d 965, 970 (1st 1997); Matter of 
Texas Mortg. Servs. Corp., 761 F.2d 1068, 1073-74 (5th Cir. 1985). 
15 Cannon v. Teamsters and Chauffers Union, 657 F.2d 173, 177-78 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(issue raised by appellant at oral argument had been waived because appellant failed to 
argue the issue in its brief). 
 
12
Those paragraphs provide: 
 
17. 
Before and during the times when Plaintiff Carl 
Roca was injuriously exposed to asbestos while upon the 
property of the Premises Liability Defendants as invitee, said 
defendants knew or should have known that: 
 
 
a. 
Large quantities of asbestos-containing products 
were present on their premises; 
 
 
b. 
The asbestos-containing products on their premises 
released dangerous levels of airborne asbestos fibers during 
application, deterioration and removal; 
 
 
c. 
Persons such as Plaintiff Carl Roca would work 
with, around, or in close proximity to those working with the 
asbestos-containing products on their premises and would thus 
inhale large quantities of asbestos fibers; 
 
 
d. 
The inhalation of asbestos fibers could cause 
pleural disease, asbestosis, carcinoma, and other asbestos-
related diseases. 
 
 
e. 
Plaintiff Carl Roca was unaware of the dangers of 
asbestos exposure, or the full magnitude of that danger, and, 
thus, would not take adequate measures to protect himself. 
 
 
18. 
Nonetheless, the Premises Liability Defendants, 
negligently failed, inter alia: 
 
 
a. 
To warn plaintiff Carl Roca and other similarly 
situated of the dangerous and defective condition of the 
premises; 
 
 
b. 
To remove or contain the asbestos materials so as 
to render the premises safe; 
 
 
c. 
To cease and discontinue further use of asbestos-
containing products on their premises; 
 
 
13
 
d. 
To require that safe work practices be used on their 
premises; 
 
 
e. 
To otherwise exercise their control as owners of 
their property in a manner to maintain their premises free of this 
unnecessarily dangerous and defective condition. 
 
14
 
No. 640, 2002 
 
Kathleen D. Hadley, Esquire 
Barbara J. Gadbois, Esquire 
1300 N. Market Street, Suite 212 
Wilmington, DE  19801 
 
John C. Phillips, Jr., Esquire 
James P. Hall, Esquire 
Phillips, Goldman & Spence, P.A. 
1200 North Broom Street 
Wilmington, DE   19806 
 
Somers S. Price, Jr., Esquire 
Daniel F. Wolcott, Jr., Esquire 
James M. Kron, Esquire 
Potter, Anderson & Corroon 
P.O. Box 951 
Wilmington, DE   19899 
 
Mark Reardon, Esquire 
Joseph F. Gula, III, Esquire 
Elzufon, Austin, Reardon, Tarlov & Mondell 
P.O. Box 1630 
Wilmington, DE   19899 
 
Honorable John E. Barbiarz, Jr. 
Superior Court of Delaware 
500 N. King Street, Suite 10400 
Wilmington, DE   19801