Case Title: Bowslaugh v. Bowslaugh

Citation: 126 Ariz. 517, 617 P.2d 25

Docket Number: 14545-PR

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1979-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
126 Ariz. 517 (1979) 617 P.2d 25 Toni M. BOWSLAUGH, as surviving mother of Maureen and Karen Bowslaugh, deceased, for and on behalf of herself, Individually, and on behalf of Jeanne Bowslaugh and Laura Bowslaugh, surviving sisters of Maureen and Karen Bowslaugh, deceased, Appellants, v. Alan P. BOWSLAUGH, Appellee. No. 14545-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. November 19, 1979. *518 Treon, Warnicke, Dann & Roush, P.A. by B. Michael Dann and Michael J. Valder, Phoenix, for appellants. Shimmel, Hill, Bishop & Gruender, P.C. by Charles A. Finch and Susan R. Bolton, Phoenix, for appellee. HAYS, Justice. Appellee Alan P. Bowslaugh petitioned this court for review of the Court of Appeals decision in Bowslaugh v. Bowslaugh, 126 Ariz. 520, 617 P.2d 28 (App. 1979). We take jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-120.24 and Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, rule 23, and hereby vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Appellant Toni M. Bowslaugh sued her husband under A.R.S. § 12-612, alleging that negligence on his part resulted in a fire that took the lives of two of their four daughters. The trial court held that appellant could not sue her husband due to the doctrine of interspousal immunity. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968). Appellant then moved to amend the complaint to allow the personal representative of the decedents' estates to sue appellee on behalf of the estates. Strictly construing the list of beneficiaries in A.R.S. § 12-612(A), the trial court refused to allow the amendment. Since we agree that the wife is barred from recovery for the negligence of her husband due to the doctrine of interspousal immunity, we need decide a single question. When either or both parents survive but are ineligible beneficiaries, may the personal representative be allowed to sue in behalf of the decedents' estates? The statute in question, A.R.S. § 12-612(A), reads as follows: In Solomon v. Harman, 107 Ariz. 426, 430-31, 489 P.2d 236, 240-41 (1971), we had occasion to interpret this same subsection: When dealing with a legislative enactment clear on its face, we must construe the words according to their ordinary meaning unless it appears from context or otherwise that a different meaning should control. State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 579 P.2d 542 (1978); A.R.S. § 1-213. To adopt appellant's position would require that we change the statute by judicial fiat to read as follows: The addition of such a phrase, however benevolent the intent, would be an infringement upon the province of the legislature. In Padilla v. Industrial Commission, 113 Ariz. 104, 106, 546 P.2d 1135, 1137 (1976), we stated: The legislature has unequivocally declared that only "if none of these survive ..." may suit be brought on behalf of the estate. Here, the parents survive the decedents-regardless of their lack of legal capacity either to bring suit or to recover as beneficiaries. A cause of action for wrongful death is purely statutory in origin and we must adhere to the plain language of the statute, leaving any deficiencies or inequities to be corrected by the legislature. Lueck v. Superior Court, County of Cochise, 105 Ariz. 583, 469 P.2d 68 (1970). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. CAMERON, C.J., STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and HOLOHAN and GORDON, JJ., concur.