Case Title: Stowell v. Action Moving & Storage, Inc.

Citation: 2007 VT 46

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Stowell v. Action Moving & Storage, Inc. (2005-532)

2007 VT 46

[Filed 01-Jun-2007]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2007 VT 46

                                No. 2005-532


  Arthur Stowell                                 Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        Chittenden Superior Court


  Action Moving & Storage, Inc.                  January Term, 2007


  Richard W. Norton, J.

  Thomas C. Nuovo of Bauer, Gravel, Farnham, Nuovo, Parker & Lang,
    Burlington, for  Plantiff-Appellant.

  Gary W. Lange of Swanson & Lange, LLP, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and 
            Morse, J. (Ret.),  Specially Assigned


       ¶  1.  DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiff Arthur Stowell appeals the superior
  court's order denying penalties and attorney's fees under 21 V.S.A. § 347,
  claiming his employer, defendant Action Moving and Storage, Inc.,
  improperly withheld commission payments in violation of § 342.  We affirm
  the court's order to the extent it held that commission payments are wages
  within the meaning of Vermont's wages-and-medium-of-payment law.   We
  reverse the court's order, however, to the extent it held that defendant
  did not violate § 342 and plaintiff was not entitled to penalties under §
  347.  We hold that plaintiff is entitled to double damages under § 347 and
  remand for a determination of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to that
  statute. 
   
       ¶  2.  The facts are as follows.  Defendant employed plaintiff as a
  truck driver from January to November 2002.  Plaintiff initially performed
  local hauling jobs, for which he was paid an hourly wage.  In April 2002,
  plaintiff began performing long-haul trucking jobs, for which he was paid
  by commission, until he voluntarily resigned in November 2002. 

       ¶  3.  In 2002, defendant was an agent of Atlas Van Lines, Inc.
  ("Atlas").  Atlas divided moving jobs between defendant and other agents
  and distributed the revenue accordingly.  After each move, Atlas provided
  defendant a moving-distribution sheet showing the amount of money paid each
  agent for each aspect of the job.  Upon receiving the moving-distribution
  sheet, defendant would determine the commission payment due plaintiff after
  subtracting advances and other expenses.  Defendant completed a driver's
  commission sheet each week which provided plaintiff with a running total of
  commission payments, advances, and expenses.

       ¶  4.  Plaintiff received expense and commission advances of $900 per
  week (FN1) and received the balance of the commission for each move about
  six weeks after the move was completed.  Defendant occasionally paid for
  fuel expenses and Federal Express shipping charges which were deducted from
  plaintiff's commission payments.  Plaintiff was also responsible for
  damages to the goods he shipped, and defendant held $1,000 of plaintiff's
  commission aside as a reserve for potential claims.  Plaintiff was entitled
  to the balance of the reserve when the claims period expired.  The superior
  court found the claims period was "several months." (FN2)  
                                                           
       ¶  5.  Plaintiff resigned in November 2002, and on December 6, 2002,
  alleged he was owed additional commission payments.  Defendant made
  payments to plaintiff of $1,094.88 on December 13, 2002, and $800 on
  January 17, 2003.  Plaintiff subsequently claimed he was entitled to
  further commission payments.  After reconciling advances and other
  payments, defendant claimed it had actually overpaid plaintiff and refused
  further payments.  Plaintiff filed suit on January 23, 2003. 

       ¶  6.  After two days of trial, the superior court found that
  plaintiff was entitled to $280.24 on a common law breach-of-contract
  theory.  The court first found that defendant's "bookkeeping records . . .
  [were] wanting to say the least" and that for many of the commission
  calculations there were no explanations for the figures.  It went through
  an item-by-item analysis of each party's claims and found the net
  underpayment to be $280.24.  The court arrived at this figure by
  subtracting "pick and hold" charges ($1015.00), fuel charges ($1,197.25),
  Federal Express shipping charges ($118.12), and damage claims ($727.67)
  from the total of all commission payments due plaintiff over the period of
  his employment.  It subtracted from the net total the commission payments
  and advances actually paid to plaintiff to arrive at the final number.  The
  court concluded that plaintiff's commission payments were wages under 21
  V.S.A. § 342, but did not find a violation of that section and refused to
  assess penalties and attorney's fees for nonpayment as provided in 21 V.S.A
  § 347.  In response to plaintiff's post-trial motion, the court struck the
  original judgment of $280.24 and entered judgment for plaintiff in the
  amount of $2,740.72.  The new amount reflected the entire unpaid commission
  including a part that was to be paid to a third party at plaintiff's
  direction.  The superior court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff this
  amount, but denied plaintiff's renewed request for penalties and attorney's
  fees under § 347.  Plaintiff appealed.  


       ¶  7.  On appeal, plaintiff claims the court erred in denying
  penalties under § 347.  To resolve this question, we address four issues in
  turn: (1) whether plaintiff's commission payments were wages under § 342;
  (FN3)  (2) if so, whether defendant violated § 342 by withholding them; (3)
  whether plaintiff is entitled to penalties under § 347; and (4) the amount
  of penalties due.  

                                     I.

       ¶  8.  This case arises out of Vermont's wages-and-medium-of-payment
  statutes, see 21 V.S.A. §§ 341-347, the overriding intent of which is to
  ensure that workers are paid in a timely manner.  See State v. Carpenter,
  138 Vt. 140, 143,