Case Title: Marcam Mortg. Corp. v. Black

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Marcam Mortg. Corp. v. Black1984 WY 73686 P.2d 575Case Number: 83-218Decided: 07/23/1984MARCAM MORTGAGE CORPORATION, A CANADIAN CORPORATION, AND WIND RIVER VILLAGE, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

THOMAS P. BLACK, JR., XRT PROPERTIES, LTD., A WYOMING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, CLARENCE G. OWENS, ROBERTA L. OWENS, AND TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY OF WYOMING, INC., APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARCAM MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION, A CANADIAN CORPORATION, AND WIND RIVER VILLAGE, INC., A WYOMING 
CORPORATION, APPELLANTS (PLAINTIFFS), 

v. 

THOMAS P. BLACK, JR., XRT 
PROPERTIES, LTD., A WYOMING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, CLARENCE G. OWENS, ROBERTA L. 
OWENS, AND TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY OF WYOMING, INC., APPELLEES 
(DEFENDANTS).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofFremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

 
 
Todd S. Welch of 
Loomis, Lazear, Wilson & Pickett, Cheyenne, for appellants.

Walter C. 
Urbigkit, Jr., and Edwin H. Whitehead of Urbigkit, Whitehead, Zunker & 
Davidson, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and 
THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellants-plaintiffs 
appeal from a summary judgment entered against them in an action for breach of 
contract. Appellants contend that the breach occurred when appellees refused to 
accept payment under an amendment to an installment land contract, which payment 
was tendered after the payment date contained in the amendment but within the 
grace period for payments contained in the original 
contract.

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     On August 4, 1980, 
appellant Wind River Village, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as WRV), as 
purchaser, entered into a contract with appellees, as sellers, for the purchase 
and sale of real property in FremontCounty. Appellant Marcam Mortgage 
Corporation is a majority shareholder in WRV. The contract consideration of 
$1,200,000.00 was to be paid as follows:

$225,000.00 paid upon 
execution of the contract.

$8,937.50 to be paid 
monthly for 23 months beginning August 20, 1980, representing interest only at 
11 percent, plus deposit sufficient to amortize the assessed tax and insurance 
payments.

$9,556.10 to be paid 
monthly for 25 months beginning August 20, 1982, representing payment of 
interest at 11 percent and payment on principal, based on 25-year amortization 
basis, plus payment on assessed tax and insurance.

Remaining principal and 
interest at 11 percent to be paid on September 20, 1984.

[¶4.]     WRV gave appellees a 
promissory note for $975,000.00, representing the balance due after the down 
payment.

[¶5.]     Following are pertinent 
provisions of the contract with reference to default:

"A. In the event of 
default by Purchaser of the terms of this Contract, Sellers shall given [sic] 
written notice of such default to Purchaser except for payments required on the 
promissory note, and if the default is not corrected within thirty (30) days 
of the notice, except for fifteen (15) 
days after the due date on payment requirements, the escrow agent shall 
redeliver the warranty deed to Sellers upon receipt of the affidavit from 
Sellers stating:

* * * * * 
*

"B. Upon receipt of such 
affidavit by the escrow agent, all interest of the Purchaser in and to the real 
property and improvements thereon, shall be forfeited, and the Sellers shall be 
entitled to all remedies available at law including suit for immediate 
possession and/or damages and/or Sellers 
may retain all monies paid by Purchaser as partial liquidated damages, and that 
actual damages may be difficult or impossible to ascertain and upon obtaining 
possession of the property, Sellers may return the promissory note described 
above marked cancelled and all further duties and obligations of each party to 
the other pursuant to the terms of this Contract shall cease, unless Sellers 
seek this remedy under specific performance.

"C. Events of default, 
the occurrence of any one or more of 
which shall provide the right of immediate possession of the premises, are as 
follows:

"(1) Default and failure of Purchaser to pay the 
promissory note in the amount of $975,000.00, or any installment payment 
thereof, at due date of said installment, within a fifteen (15) day grace period 
in making such installment, or at maturity of said note, whether on stated 
maturity or earlier on acceleration by the holder after default by maker in 
accordance with the tender and content of said note. * * *

* * * * * 
*

"(9) It shall be a default for Purchaser to fail 
to make the payments on the promissory note referred to herein, or to fail 
to perform any of the other obligations contained in this Installment Land 
Contract in a timely manner. It is 
expressly acknowledged that time is of the essence in the performance of the 
terms set forth herein." (Emphasis added.)

Other default 
provisions contained in Paragraph 11 C were such as failure by purchaser to pay 
taxes and assessments against the property, failure to obtain fire insurance on 
it, creation of liens or encumbrances on it, making major alterations or 
additions to it without prior permission of sellers, etc.

[¶6.]     The fact that WRV 
breached the contract by failing to make the required installment payments and 
the fact that appellees held the acceleration provisions of the contract in 
abeyance are not contested. In recognition thereof, the parties entered into an 
"amendment" to the contract on June 8, 1981. Following are pertinent provisions 
of such "amendment":

"WHEREAS, an initial 
Installment Land Contract (a copy of which is attached hereto and marked 
`Attachment A' and is hereby incorporated 
by this reference as if fully set forth herein) was entered into between the 
Sellers and Purchaser on the 4th day of August, 1980 * * 
*.

* * * * * 
*

"NOW, THEREFORE, for and 
in consideration of their mutual covenants and agreements herein contained the 
parties hereto agree to amend and add 
to the existing contract attached hereto as Attachment A, as 
follows:

"1. The Purchaser shall 
pay to the Sellers at such place as they direct the sum of One Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($100,000.00) on or before 
September 1, 1981.

"2. Such One Hundred Thousand Dollar 
($100,000.00) payment shall reduce and be applied against the outstanding 
principal owed by the Purchaser to the Sellers in the amount of One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), and shall be evidenced by a Promissory Note 
signed by the Purchaser.

"3. In consideration for 
and upon the payment of said One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) by the 
Purchaser, the Sellers agree to waive any and all rights or claims which they 
have previously exercised under the Contract (Attachment A) to accelerate the 
payments owed under said contract and the accompanying note. PROVIDED HOWEVER, 
that in the event said One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) is not paid on or before September 1, 1981, 
all documents held by the Escrow Agent shall be returned to the Seller's [sic] 
attorney, Walter Urbigkit.

* * * * * 
*

"8. It is agreed by the 
parties hereto that the One Hundred Thousand Dollar ($100,000.00) payment 
mentioned in paragraph 1 above, will reduce the principal amount owed by the 
Purchaser to the Sellers and therefore, said reduction in principal will reduce 
the amount of interest payable on a monthly basis by the Purchaser to the 
Seller[s].

"9. In lieu of and 
because of this reduction in the interest payable, it is agreed that the 
payments made by the Purchaser to the Sellers shall be recomputed to illustrate 
the reduction caused by said One Hundred Thousand Dollar ($100,000.00) payment 
and that an amortization schedule reflecting such re-computations shall be 
provided to Purchaser as soon as the same is available.

"10. The Purchaser further agrees to bring 
current the monthly payments due under the original Contract and Note 
(Attachments A and B) as well as an 
amount owed for back taxes. It is hereby agreed that this amount for the two 
(2) installment payments and back taxes is Twenty Four Thousand Three Hundred 
Sixty Two Dollars and Forty Five Cents ($24,362.45).

* * * * * 
*

"13. The acceleration of 
the amount due under the original contract (Attachment A) shall be held in 
abeyance for the 90 day period in which the Purchaser has to pay the Sellers the 
sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) as set forth in paragraphs 
[sic] 1 above." (Emphasis added.)

[¶7.]     The $100,000.00 payment 
was not made on September 1, 1981, as specified, but it was tendered on or about 
September 10, 1981. Appellees refused to accept it, declaring the contract to be 
in default and retaining all payments previously made as liquidated 
damages.

[¶8.]     Appellants contend that 
WRV had not breached the contract inasmuch as the $100,000.00 payment was 
tendered within the 15-day grace period provided in the original contract for 
installment payments, and that, thus, appellees' refusal to accept that tendered 
amounted to a breach on their part. Further, they contend that, in any event, 
the retention by appellees of payments already made amounted to a penalty and 
was in excess of any damage suffered by appellees.

BREACH

[¶9.]     The trial court 
properly found a failure on the part of WRV to make timely payments as required 
by the contract and the "amended" contract.1 In Amoco Production Company v. Stauffer 
Chemical Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463, 465 (1980), we 
said:

"Our basic purpose in 
construing or interpreting a contract is to determine the intention and 
understanding of the parties. Fuchs v. 
Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 163 P.2d 783 (1945); Shellhart v. Axford, Wyo., 485 P.2d 1031 (1971); Oregon Short Line Railroad Company v. Idaho 
Stockyards Company, 12 Utah 2d 205, 364 P.2d 826 (1961). If the 
contract is in writing and the language is clear and unambiguous, the intention 
is to be secured from the words of the contract. Pilcher v. Hamm, Wyo., 351 P.2d 1041 (1960); Fuchs v. Goe, supra; Hollabaugh v. Kolbet, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1359 (1980); Wyoming Bank and Trust 
Company v. Waugh, Wyo., 606 P.2d 725 (1980). And the contract as 
a whole should be considered, with each part being read in light of all other 
parts. Shepard v. Top Hat Land & 
Cattle Co., Wyo., 560 P.2d 730 (1977); Rossi v. Percifield, Wyo., 527 P.2d 819 
(1974); Shellhart v. Axford, supra; 
Quin Blair Enterprises, Inc. v. Julien 
Construction Company, Wyo., 597 P.2d 945 (1979). The interpretation and 
construction is done by the court as a matter of law. Hollabaugh v. Kolbet, supra; Bulis v. Wells, Wyo., 565 P.2d 487 
(1977); Shepard v. Top Hat Land & 
Cattle Co., supra.

"If the contract is 
ambiguous, resort may be had to extrinsic evidence. J.W. Denio Milling Co. v. Malin, 25 
Wyo. 143, 165 P. 1113 (1917); Kilbourne-Park Corporation v. Buckingham, Wyo., 404 P.2d 244 (1965). An ambiguous contract `is an 
agreement which is obscure in its meaning, because of indefiniteness of 
expression, or because a double meaning is present.' Bulis v. Wells, 
supra, 565 P.2d  at 490. Ambiguity justifying extraneous evidence is not 
generated by the subsequent disagreement of the parties concerning its meaning. 
Homestake-Sapin Partners v. 
United 
States, 10th Cir. 1967, 375 F.2d 507.

"Appellee contends this 
contract to be clear and unambiguous. The trial court so found, and appellant 
does not contend otherwise. Whether ambiguity exists is a question of law. Redding Foods, Inc. v. Berry, Tex.Civ.App., 361 S.W.2d 467 (1962); Bosler v. Coble, 14 Wyo. 423, 84 P. 895 
(1906). We are, therefore, at liberty to make a determination as to the 
existence of ambiguity whether or not the parties here agree thereto one way or 
the other, and whether or not the trial court has reached a conclusion thereon 
one way or the other."

[¶10.]  Since the "whereas clause" of the 
"amended" contract, supra, incorporates the original contract by reference, the 
two contracts must be construed as one agreement, Busch Development, Inc. v. City of Cheyenne, 
Wyo., 645 P.2d 65, 70 (1982), and the agreement must be construed as a 
whole, Shepard v. Top Hat Land & 
Cattle Co., Wyo., 560 P.2d 730, 732 (1977).

[¶11.]  Without consideration of the $100,000.00 
payment required by the "amended" contract, the plain and unambiguous language 
of the "amended" contract required WRV to "bring current the monthly payments 
due under the original Contract and Note * * * as well as an amount owed for 
back taxes" (see Paragraph 10 of "amended" contract, supra). There is nothing in 
the record2 to reflect that such was done 
before September 1, 1981, or within 15 days thereafter or at any 
time.

[¶12.]  With reference to the application of the 
15-day grace period to the $100,000.00 payment required by the "amended" 
contract, the plain and unambiguous language of the original contract limited 
such grace period to the "installment" payments. The $100,000.00 payment is a 
lump sum payment on the principal and is not an installment payment on the note. 
Paragraph A of the original contract excepts from the notice requirement 
defaults in payments "on the promissory note" (see supra). The provision thereof 
relied upon by appellants (Paragraph C(1), supra) refers to the installment 
payments on the note and defines a default as failure to pay any installment "at 
due date of said installment, within a fifteen (15) day grace period in making 
such installment." The 15-day grace period was not made applicable to the 
initial $225,000.00 as payment, or to the balloon payment due on September 20, 
1984. The $100,000.00 payment specified in the "amended" contract was to be paid 
on or before September 1, 1981 (see Paragraph 1, supra), with the direction that 
if not so paid, the escrow documents "shall be returned" (emphasis added) to 
appellees' attorney (see Paragraph 3, supra).

[¶13.]  The foregoing would be determinative as 
to the intent of the parties should it be necessary to ascertain such intent 
because of ambiguity. In their reply brief, appellants acknowledge that "the 
parties intended to allow every provision of the original contract not specifically changed by the amended 
contract to control." (Emphasis added.) One of the specific changes was a 
requirement of payment of $100,000.00 by September 1, 
1981.

[¶14.]  In their brief appellants acknowledge the 
usual purpose of a grace period. They say:

"There was a very 
definite purpose for putting in the fifteen (15) day grace period because of 
problems existing with payments being received even though payments have been 
properly made."

But there is no 
contention that the tender of the $100,000.00 payment was made before September 
1, 1981, with the receipt being delayed because of mail problems or for similar 
reasons. The payment was simply not made at the time intended by the parties, 
which time was expressed in plain and unambiguous language in the "amended" 
contract. Any grace period set forth in the original contract which was 
applicable to the "amended" contract by virtue of the "incorporation by 
reference" language pertained to installment payments. The $100,000.00 was not 
an installment payment. In any event, the delinquent monthly payments and 
assessment owed for back taxes were not "made current" as required by the 
"amended" contract.

[¶15.]  WRV had breached the agreement, and 
appellees were entitled to receive the escrow documents pursuant to Paragraphs A 
and B of the original contract and Paragraph 3 of the "amended" contract. This 
being so, appellants' action for breach of the contract by appellees must 
fail.

DAMAGES

[¶16.]  Appellants contend that the retention by 
appellees of the $225,000.00 down payment amounts to a penalty and bears no 
reasonable relationship to the amount of actual damages. Thus, they argue, an 
issue of material fact existed as to the amount of actual damages suffered by 
appellees, and the summary judgment was improper.

[¶17.]  We do not favor forfeitures. We said in 
Ray v. Electrical Products 
Consolidated, Wyo., 390 P.2d 607, 609 
(1964):

"We think there can be no 
quarrel with the rule that a provision in a contract will be construed as a 
penalty or forfeiture and hence unenforceable if it bears no reasonable 
relationship to the amount of actual damages. * * *"

But we have also 
said:

"The disposition of this 
case is controlled by Younglove v. 
Graham&Hill, Wyo., 
526 P.2d 689 (1974), upon which Barker Brothers Company relies. In that opinion 
this court recognized the general proposition that forfeitures are not favored, 
as suggested by the Johnsons. The court concluded, however, that the general 
concept with respect to abhorrence of forfeitures does not justify a court of 
equity in disregarding and setting aside a valid contractual obligation of the 
parties in the absence of some particular equitable reason. * * *" Barker 
v. Johnson, Wyo., 
591 P.2d 886, 889 (1979).

And:

"If there is an express 
contract in connection with the damages, that contract, of course, must govern. 
* * *" Studer v. Rasmussen, 80 
Wyo. 465, 344 P.2d 990, 998 (1959).

[¶18.]  Whether or not a provision for liquidated 
damages amounts to a penalty depends upon the circumstances of each individual 
case, and the question is resolved as a matter of law.

"* * * It is virtually 
the unanimous rule of all jurisdictions that whether a stipulation is for 
liquidated damages or a penalty is a question of law for the court. * * *" Ruckelshaus v. BrowardCountySchool Board, 494 F.2d 1164, 1165 (5th 
Cir. 1974).

See Babler Bros., Inc. v. Hebener, 267 Or. 
414, 517 P.2d 653 (1973); Abel 
Construction Company v. School District 
of Seward, 188 Neb. 205, 195 N.W.2d 744 
(1972); and Dave Gustafson & Co. v. 
State, 83 S.D. 160, 156 N.W.2d 185 (1968).

"It is frequently stated 
that whether a provision is for liquidated damages or a penalty is to be 
determined by a construction of the contract. The question is to be decided upon 
the terms and inherent circumstances of each particular contract, judged of as 
at the time it was made, and not at the time of the breach, except when the 
court compares the reasonableness of the stipulated sum with actual damages. It 
will be considered in connection with the nature and subject matter of the 
contract, the condition of the contracting parties, and the surrounding 
circumstances, and the court will also consider that the parties, being informed 
as to the facts and circumstances, are better able than anyone else to determine 
what would be a fair and reasonable compensation for a breach." 22 Am.Jur.2d 
Damages § 223, p. 310 (1965). "As distinguished from liquidated damages, a 
`penalty,' in the sense in which that term is used in this article, is a sum 
inserted in a contract, not as the measure of compensation for its breach, but 
rather as a punishment for default, or by way of security for actual damages 
which may be sustained by reason of nonperformance, and it involves the idea of 
punishment. A penalty is an agreement to pay a stipulated sum on breach of 
contract, irrespective of the damage sustained. Its essence is a payment of 
money stipulated as in terrorem of the offending party, while the essence of 
liquidated damages is a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of damages. The parties 
are bound by a stipulation for liquidated damages. The amount is fixed and is 
not subject to change; however, if the stipulated sum is deemed to be a penalty, 
it is not enforceable and the nondefaulting party is left to the recovery of 
such actual damages as he can prove." 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 213, pp. 298-299 
(1965).

[¶19.]  Two factors are listed in § 356, 
Restatement of Contracts 2d, p. 157 (1981) for determination of whether the 
amount fixed for damages in the contract is proper liquidated damages or whether 
it is a penalty:

"(1) Damages for breach 
by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount that is 
reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach 
and the difficulties of proof of loss. * * *"3

The Comment 
thereto recites in part as follows:

"* * * The first factor 
is the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach. The amount fixed is 
reasonable to the extent that it approximates the actual loss that has resulted 
from the particular breach, even though it may not approximate the loss that 
might have been anticipated under other possible breaches. * * * Furthermore, 
the amount fixed is reasonable to the extent that it approximates the loss 
anticipated at the time of the making of the contract, even though it may not 
approximate the actual loss. * * * The second factor is the difficulty of proof 
of loss. The greater the difficulty either of proving that loss has occurred or 
of establishing its amount with the requisite certainty * * *, the easier it is 
to show that the amount fixed is reasonable. To the extent that there is 
uncertainty as to the harm, the estimate of the court or jury may not accord 
with the principle of compensation any more than does the advance estimate of 
the parties. A determination whether the amount fixed is a penalty turns on a 
combination of these two factors. If the difficulty of proof of loss is great, 
considerable latitude is allowed in the approximation of anticipated or actual 
harm. If, on the other hand, the difficulty of proof of loss is slight, less 
latitude is allowed in that approximation. If, to take an extreme case, it is 
clear that no loss at all has occurred, a provision fixing a substantial sum as 
damages is unenforceable. * * *"

[¶20.]  Turning, then, to the provision for 
liquidated damages in the contract before us, the parties recognized that 
"actual damages may be difficult or impossible to ascertain." (See Paragraph B, 
supra.) It may have been possible to ascertain the loss of rents during the time 
appellants were in possession, but it would have been difficult at that time to 
ascertain the condition in which the property was maintained. Indeed, the 
language of the "amended" contract indicates some problem in this respect. 
Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 read:

"5. The Purchaser agrees 
to take whatever action is necessary to place the property described above in 
the same condition or as similar thereto as possible, as soon as is reasonably 
possible, as said property was in when it was purchased originally by the 
Purchaser on or about the 4th day of August, 1980.

"6. The Purchaser agrees 
to obtain from any person or entity to whom the Purchaser sells said property an 
agreement to maintain said property in the same condition it was in when it was 
purchased by Wind River Village, Inc., normal wear and tear 
excepted.

"7. Purchaser agrees to 
obtain and keep a competent resident property manager on the premises to care 
for and keep up the premises as well as collect rents. Sellers shall approve of 
such manager, PROVIDED HOWERVER [sic], that such approval shall not be 
unreasonably withheld."

The contract 
reflects the existence of obligations which were secured by the property. The 
result of WRV's failure to perform under such obligations as a result of default 
would be difficult to determine at the time of the 
contract.

[¶21.]  The parties obviously recognized these 
and other undetermined factors when they expressed their intention in the 
agreement that liquidated damages would result from a 
breach.

"* * * However, as a 
general rule, where the question is whether a contract provides for liquidated 
damages or for a penalty, the burden of establishing facts showing that the 
intention of the parties was other than appears from the face of the contract is 
on the party claiming such facts." 25A C.J.S. Damages § 144, p. 24 
(1966).

[¶22.]  Appellants did not suggest, by affidavit 
or otherwise, that the liquidated damage amount was unreasonable in light of the 
anticipated loss or that actual damages were subject to proof without 
difficulty.

[¶23.]  In this instance, the fixing of 
liquidated damages at the amount already paid on the contract is a reasonable 
method of anticipating the actual loss to be covered by a default on the part of 
WRV inasmuch as the payments to be made were only sufficient to cover the 
interest on the mortgage loans. Loss of rentals to handle payments on the 
principal and to return a profit increased each month, making it necessary to 
provide for liquidated damages on default to increase with each payment. Of 
course, if the agreement required the consideration to be paid in monthly 
payments which were to continue until full payment was accomplished and a 
default occurred in the last few months, the retention of all payments made and 
a return of escrow documents would be a forfeiture not allowed by us. In this 
instance, however, the real consideration for the transaction was to be in the 
final balloon payment. Intermediate payments were only to pay interest on 
mortgage debts. The $225,000.00 down payment could well not be enough to 
compensate for the potential property damage, or for the loss of a sale to a 
responsible buyer during the period appellants had the property, i.e., it is 
similar to an option payment to tie up the property until the transaction was 
completed with the balloon payment.

[¶24.]  It is to be noted that the liquidated 
damages in this case are 18.75 percent of the purchase price, whereas they were 
29 percent thereof in Younglove v. Graham 
& Hill, supra, wherein we held the retention not to be a 
penalty.

[¶25.]  Appellants did not indicate to the trial 
court the potential of any evidence to reflect that the agreement for liquidated 
damages was unreasonable in the light of anticipated or actual loss covered by 
the breach and that the proof of actual losses would not be difficult. The 
summary judgment was proper.

[¶26.]  Affirmed.

1 The trial court 
converted appellees' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) to a Rule 56 motion for 
summary judgment, noting that documents relative to the transaction were filed 
by all parties with their respective briefs and that no issue was raised 
relative to the validity of the documents. All parties were given reasonable 
opportunity to present additional material pertinent to consideration of a Rule 
56 motion, and an opportunity was afforded for additional argument. The court 
found that there was no genuine issue of a material fact and rendered a summary 
judgment as a matter of law upon interpretation of the original contract and of 
the "amended" contract, both of which were included among the documents 
presented outside of the pleadings.

2 Appellants' memorandum 
in opposition to the motion to dismiss refers to the tendered payment to have 
been only of the $100,000.00.

3 Wyoming public policy in 
this respect is evidenced by § 34-21-297(a), W.S. 1977 (Uniform Commercial 
Code):

"(a) Damages for breach 
by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which 
is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the 
breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or 
nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing 
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a 
penalty."