Case Title: In re Child of Nicholas M.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 30

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 30 
Docket: 
Pen-17-441 
Submitted 
On Briefs: February 26, 2018 
Decided: 
March 6, 2018 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF NICHOLAS M. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Nicholas M. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Newport, 
Budd, J.) terminating his parental rights to his child1 pursuant to 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i), (ii), (iv) (2017).  He argues that there 
is insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings of unfitness, that the 
court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to continue the hearing 
on the petition to terminate his parental rights, and that the court abused its 
discretion when it denied his attorney’s motion to withdraw.  We affirm the 
judgment.   
                                         
1  The mother consented to the termination of her parental rights, and she is not a party to this 
appeal.   
 
2 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The court made the following findings of fact, and even though they 
are expressed in terms of witness testimony, all are supported by competent 
evidence in the record:   
 
The final hearing in this matter occurred September 8, 2017 
and was relatively brief. . . .  
 
[The father] himself did not appear for the final hearing.  In 
spite of this, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
he was aware of the hearing . . . .  There was not so much as a phone 
call to the court on the day of the hearing. . . .  
 
 
[The permanency caseworker] testified that she has worked 
for two years in her current capacity, and has been involved with 
this case for most of its history.  She testified that [the father] 
maintained somewhat regular e-mail contact with the Department 
early in the case.  According to [her], among the notable 
expressions made by [the father] during this time was his 
acknowledgement in December 2016 that he believed he was [the 
child’s] father.  During this time, [the father] expressed interest in 
participating in the reunification and rehabilitative services the 
Department could offer.  However, beginning in May 2017, [the 
father] discontinued his communication with the Department.   
 
 
[The permanency caseworker] testified that, to the best of 
her knowledge, [the father] had contact on only one occasion with 
[the child].  That supervised visit took place on February 23, 2017, 
and was largely facilitated by the Department, which scheduled the 
visit, arranged the supervision and provided [the father] with bus 
transportation . . . .  [The permanency caseworker] testified further 
that [the father] made no further expression of interest in 
participating in the various rehabilitative or other reunification 
services the Department could provide him, other than to indicate 
 
3 
that his probation restrictions limited his ability to leave the state 
of Rhode Island with any regularity.   
 
 
[The permanency caseworker] confirmed that [the child] 
entered Department custody on September 12, 2016 . . . .  [The 
child] is doing well and has established a loving bond with his 
foster parents and foster siblings.   
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
[The guardian ad litem’s] final report . . . indicates that he had 
an opportunity to speak with [the father] the week prior to the final 
hearing.  The report states that [the father] last saw [the child] in 
February and [the father] is currently on probation for a domestic 
violence incident that occurred just after that visit.  [The guardian 
ad litem] reports that [the father] was also arrested in September 
2016 following his involvement in a domestic incident with his 
then-girlfriend.  [The guardian ad litem’s] report notes that [the 
father] was substantiated in 2010 by [the Department] in Maine for 
physical abuse towards [the child’s] older brother.    
 
(Footnotes omitted) (quotation marks omitted).  
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶3]  The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the 
father is unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy, and that this 
circumstance is unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably calculated 
to meet the child’s needs; (2) the father is unwilling or unable to take 
responsibility for the child within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet 
the child’s needs; and (3) the father has failed to make a good faith effort to 
rehabilitate and reunify with the child.  Contrary to the father’s contention, each 
 
4 
of the court’s unfitness findings is supported by competent evidence in the 
record.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i), (ii), (iv); see also In re River B., 
2017 ME 77, ¶ 6, 159 A.3d 1222.  
[¶4]  We are not persuaded by the father’s additional arguments that the 
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue and his attorney’s 
motion to withdraw.  On the record before us, neither the court’s denial of the 
motion to continue nor its denial of the motion to withdraw constitutes an 
abuse of discretion.  See In re Trever I., 2009 ME 59, ¶ 28, 973 A.2d 752; see also 
In re J.R., 2013 ME 58, ¶ 19, 69 A.3d 406.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Randy G. Day, Esq., Garland, for appellant father  
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Newport District Court docket number PC-2015-10 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY