Case Title: Alfonso v. Robinson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 981333

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
ANTHONY MANUEL ALFONSO, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 981333   OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
 
 
April 16, 1999 
DARLENE ROBINSON 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
LeRoy F. Millette, Jr., Judge 
 
 
 
In this appeal of a judgment in favor of a plaintiff in a 
negligence action, we consider whether the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury on the issue of willful and wanton 
negligence. 
On November 23, 1994, shortly before midnight, Anthony 
Manuel Alfonso was operating a tractor-trailer owned by 
Schneider Specialized Carriers, Inc.  He was proceeding in one 
of three northbound lanes on Interstate Route 95 in Prince 
William County on a "very dark" stretch of roadway.  The truck 
stalled and, although Alfonso could not restart the engine, he 
was able to steer the truck into the right-hand lane of the 
highway near a rest area. 
About the same time, Darlene Robinson was operating a 
passenger van at a speed of approximately 55-60 miles per hour 
in the right-hand lane of the highway.  Her van collided with 
the rear of Alfonso’s trailer, and Robinson was seriously 
injured in the accident. 
 
Robinson filed a motion for judgment against Alfonso and 
Schneider Specialized Carriers, Inc. (collectively, Schneider), 
seeking damages for her injuries.  In her amended motion for 
judgment, she alleged that Alfonso negligently failed to perform 
certain statutory duties placed on the driver of a disabled 
motor vehicle.  In Count I, Robinson alleged that Alfonso 
negligently failed to activate the truck's flashing hazard 
lights and to use warning flares or reflective triangles as 
required by state and federal regulations.  In Count II, 
Robinson alleged that Alfonso’s actions constituted willful and 
wanton negligence and exhibited a total disregard for the safety 
of the traveling public.  In its grounds of defense, Schneider 
alleged that Robinson was guilty of contributory negligence. 
 
Prior to a jury trial, Schneider admitted that Alfonso was 
guilty of simple negligence in failing to place reflective 
triangles behind the disabled truck.  At trial, Robinson and 
Michelle Annette Andrus, who was driving directly behind 
Robinson's van prior to the collision, testified that no flares 
or reflective triangles had been placed in the roadway behind 
the truck before the collision.  They each also stated that 
while Alfonso’s truck had the usual “running lights” on prior to 
the accident, the truck’s flashing hazard lights were not 
activated.  Trooper G.R. Austin of the Virginia State Police, 
who arrived at the accident scene about five minutes after the 
 
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collision, testified that the truck’s hazard lights had not been 
activated at the time he arrived. 
 
Both Robinson and Andrus stated that they had seen the 
truck from about a quarter-mile or a half-mile away, but that 
they thought the truck was moving.  Robinson testified that she 
did not realize the truck was stopped until she was “on top of 
it.”  She explained that she tried to avoid the collision by 
applying her brakes and swerving to the left, but that she was 
unable to get around the truck. 
 
Andrus testified that she did not realize the truck was 
stopped until the Robinson van collided with it.  After the 
accident, Andrus stopped to assist the occupants of Robinson’s 
van.  She observed Alfonso return from the rest area about 10 to 
15 minutes after the accident. 
 
Alfonso testified that when the disabled truck came to a 
stop, he unsuccessfully tried to send a message to his employer 
on the truck’s computer that the truck needed to be towed from 
the highway.  Alfonso then left the truck and ran about 100 
yards to the rest area to use a telephone to call for 
assistance.  Although he had reflective triangles in his cab, 
Alfonso did not place them behind the truck.  He testified that 
he thought he could run to the rest area, summon help, and 
return to the truck within ten minutes to set out the triangles. 
 
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Alfonso stated that he had activated the truck’s flashing 
hazard lights before the truck stalled, because traffic in the 
area had temporarily stopped due to road construction.  He 
testified that the truck’s “flashers” were still on when he left 
the truck to run to the rest area.  As he was returning from the 
rest area after placing the telephone call, Alfonso heard 
Robinson’s van collide with his truck.  Alfonso estimated that 
he had been away from the truck for three to five minutes. 
 
On cross-examination, Alfonso testified that he had 
attended eight weeks of training classes in 1990 in order to 
work as an interstate truck driver, and that he received further 
training from his employer later that year.  Alfonso stated that 
he learned from his training classes that the deployment of 
warning flares or reflective triangles was “the first thing you 
should do” after securing a truck that had become disabled.  He 
knew that the purpose of the safety triangles was “to warn 
people who are coming up from behind and let them know that 
you’re stopped.”  He also stated that he was aware that federal 
regulations governing interstate trucking require drivers to 
place flares or reflective triangles at specified distances 
behind a disabled truck “as soon as possible, but in any event 
within ten minutes.” 
 
Both at the end of the plaintiff’s case and at the 
conclusion of all the evidence, Schneider moved to strike 
 
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Robinson’s evidence on Count II, arguing that Alfonso’s conduct 
did not rise to the level of willful and wanton negligence.  The 
trial court denied both motions to strike the evidence and 
submitted the case to the jury on the issues of proximate 
causation, willful and wanton negligence, and contributory 
negligence. 
 
A special verdict form1 returned by the jury contained three    
findings: 1) that Alfonso’s negligence was a proximate cause of 
the accident; 2) that Alfonso’s negligence was willful and 
wanton; and 3) that Robinson was not guilty of contributory 
negligence.  The jury awarded damages in favor of Robinson in 
the amount of $550,000, plus interest from the date of the 
accident.  On the defendants’ motion, the court reduced the 
award of damages to $450,000, the amount requested in the 
amended motion for judgment.  The court denied Alfonso's motion 
to set aside the verdict and entered final judgment in favor of 
Robinson in that amount, plus interest.  This appeal followed. 
 
Schneider argues that the trial court erred in submitting 
the issue of willful and wanton negligence to the jury.  He 
contends that Alfonso’s violation of a ”motor vehicle safety 
statute” did not constitute willful and wanton negligence, and 
                     
 
1Although the use of a special verdict form is not at issue 
in this appeal, we note that this Court has not sanctioned the 
use of special verdicts in negligence actions. See Johnson v. 
Smith, 241 Va. 396, 401, 403 S.E.2d 685, 688 (1991). 
 
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that his conduct was not egregious and did not manifest a 
complete disregard for the safety of others.  Schneider asserts 
that Alfonso’s actions in trying to contact his employer by 
computer, and in running to the nearby rest area to obtain 
assistance by telephone, demonstrate that Alfonso attempted to 
remove the truck from the highway as soon as possible out of 
concern for the safety of others. 
 
In response, Robinson argues that the evidence concerning 
Alfonso’s conduct presented a factual question of willful and 
wanton negligence that was properly submitted to the jury.  
Robinson contends that the evidence supported a conclusion that 
Alfonso acted with conscious disregard for the rights of other 
drivers on the highway, or with reckless indifference to the 
knowledge that his conduct probably would cause injury to 
another driver.  We agree with Robinson's argument. 
 
Willful and wanton negligence is action taken in conscious 
disregard of another’s rights, or with reckless indifference to 
consequences that the defendant is aware, from his knowledge of 
existing circumstances and conditions, would probably result 
from his conduct and cause injury to another.  Harris v. Harman, 
253 Va. 336, 340-41, 486 S.E.2d 99, 101 (1997); Clohessy v. 
Weiler, 250 Va. 249, 252, 462 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1995); Griffin v. 
Shively, 227 Va. 317, 321-22, 315 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1984).  Each 
case raising an issue of willful and wanton negligence must be 
 
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evaluated on its own facts, and a defendant’s entire conduct 
must be considered in determining whether his actions or 
omissions present such a question for a jury’s determination.  
Clohessy, 250 Va. at 253, 462 S.E.2d at 97; Huffman v. Love, 245 
Va. 311, 315-16, 427 S.E.2d 357, 360-61 (1993). 
 
Willful and wanton negligence, unlike gross or ordinary 
negligence, requires an actual or constructive consciousness 
that injury will result from the act done or omitted.  Infant C. 
v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 239 Va. 572, 580-81, 391 S.E.2d 
322, 327 (1990); see Wolfe v. Baube, 241 Va. 462, 465, 403 
S.E.2d 338, 339-40 (1991); Boward v. Leftwich, 197 Va. 227, 231, 
89 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1955).  However, ill will is not a necessary 
element of willful and wanton negligence.  Infant C., 239 Va. at 
581, 391 S.E.2d at 327; Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 909, 114 
S.E.2d 617, 621 (1960). 
 
Schneider is correct in its contention that the intentional 
violation of a traffic law, without more, will not support a 
finding of willful and wanton negligence.  See Harris, 253 Va. 
at 341, 486 S.E.2d at 102; Baker, 201 Va. at 910, 114 S.E.2d at 
621-22.  We disagree, however, with Schneider’s further 
assertion that our prior decisions require a conclusion that 
Alfonso was not guilty of willful and wanton negligence as a 
matter of law. 
 
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Schneider's argument relies primarily on our holdings in 
Harris and Clohessy.2  In Harris and Clohessy, we concluded as a 
matter of law that the defendant’s conduct did not rise to the 
level of willful and wanton negligence.  In Harris, the evidence 
showed that the defendant “tailgated” the plaintiff’s vehicle 
while travelling at a speed between 10 and 30 miles per hour in 
excess of “the 30 m.p.h. speed which was safe for that stretch 
of road.”  253 Va. at 338, 486 S.E.2d at 100.  In Clohessy, the 
record demonstrated that the defendant’s vehicle hit a 
pedestrian walking in the street as the defendant was driving at 
night without headlights and with a fogged windshield while 
operating her vehicle about ten miles in excess of the speed 
limit.  250 Va. at 251, 462 S.E.2d at 96. 
 
The defendants’ conduct in Harris and Clohessy was not as 
egregious as Alfonso’s conduct.  A critical characteristic 
distinguishing the present case from those two cases is that 
Alfonso was a professional driver who had received specialized 
safety training warning against the very omissions he made prior 
                     
 
2Schneider also relies on our holding in Harris Motor Lines 
v. Green, 184 Va. 984, 37 S.E.2d 4 (1946).  This reliance is 
misplaced, however, because we did not decide an issue of 
willful and wanton negligence in Green.  There, the issue 
presented was whether the trial court erred in instructing the 
jury on the doctrine of last clear chance.  Id. at 989, 37 
S.E.2d at 5.  We concluded that both drivers “were guilty of 
such negligence as efficiently contributed to the accident and 
which continued down to the time of the accident” and, thus, 
 
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to the accident.  As stated above, Alfonso admitted at trial 
that he was instructed that the deployment of safety flares and 
reflective triangles was the first act that should be taken 
after securing a disabled truck.  He knew that the purpose of 
such safety devices was to warn motorists that they were 
approaching a stopped vehicle.  Despite this training and 
knowledge, Alfonso consciously elected to leave the disabled 
truck in a travel lane of an interstate highway without placing 
any warning devices behind it. 
 
Such evidence that a defendant had prior knowledge or 
notice that his actions or omissions would likely cause injury 
to others is a significant factor in considering issues of 
willful and wanton negligence.  See e.g., Huffman v. Love, 245 
Va. at 315, 427 S.E.2d at 360; Booth v. Robertson, 236 Va. 269, 
270, 272-73, 374 S.E.2d 1, 2-3 (1988).  In the present case, 
Alfonso’s prior knowledge was a conceded fact that related 
directly to the specific circumstances with which he was 
confronted on the night of the accident. 
 
Alfonso’s knowledge and omissions were factors to be 
considered in the context of the other evidence in the case.  
The evidence stated above showed that the disabled truck 
remained entirely on the traveled portion of the highway, and 
                                                                  
that the doctrine of last clear chance was inapplicable.   Id. 
at 990-91, 37 S.E.2d at 6. 
 
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that Alfonso left the truck unattended in nighttime traffic in a 
"very dark” area where there were no light fixtures and the 
speed limit was 55 miles per hour.  Also, viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Alfonso did not 
activate his hazard lights before leaving the vehicle 
unattended, and he did not return to the truck until 10 to 15 
minutes after leaving it on the highway. 
 
We conclude that the cumulative evidence of Alfonso’s 
knowledge and conduct raised a question of willful and wanton 
negligence for the jury’s determination.  Thus, the trial court 
did not err in instructing the jury on this issue. 
 
For these reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s 
judgment. 
Affirmed. 
 
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