Case Title: McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S46683

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  May 10, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

LINDA McCATHERN,
	Respondent on Review,
	v.
TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION,
a foreign corporation,
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, INC.,
a foreign corporation,
and BROADWAY TOYOTA,
an Oregon corporation,
	Petitioners on Review,
	and
TAKATA CORPORATION,
a foreign corporation,
									Defendant.
(CC 9601-00689; CA A98578; SC S46683)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted May 10, 2000.
	Malcolm E. Wheeler, of Wheeler Trigg & Kennedy, P.C.,
Denver, Colorado, argued the cause for petitioners on review. 
With him on the briefs were Jonathan M. Hoffman and Julie K.
Bolt, of Martin, Bischoff, Templeton, Langslet & Hoffman, LLP,
Portland.
	Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, argued the cause for respondent
on review.  With her on the brief were Maureen Leonard, Jeffrey
P. Foote, and Jana Toran, Portland.
	Arthur C. Johnson, of Johnson, Clifton, Larson, & Corson,
P.C., Eugene, filed a brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial
Lawyers Association.
	Karen O'Kasey, of Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, Portland,
filed a brief for amicus curiae Oregon Association of Defense
Counsel.
	Christopher W. Angius, of Perkins Coie, Portland, and Victor
E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, and Leah Lorber, of Crowell &
Moring, LLP, Washington, D.C., filed a brief for amicus curiae
Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.  Also appearing on the
brief was Of Counsel Hugh F. Young, Jr., Product Liability
Advisory Council, Inc., Reston, Virginia.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham,
Kulongoski, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.**
	KULONGOSKI, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the
circuit court are affirmed.
* 	Appeal from Multnomah County Circuit Court, Jopseph F. Ceniceros, Judge. 160 Or App 201, 985 P2d 804 (1999).
** 	Van Hoomissen, J., retired December 31, 2000, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  De Muniz, J., did
not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
		KULONGOSKI, J.
		The primary issue on review in this product liability
civil action is whether plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence
to establish that the 1994 Toyota 4Runner was designed
defectively. (1)  Plaintiff was injured when the 1994 4Runner
vehicle in which she was riding as a passenger rolled over. 
Plaintiff sued defendants -- the manufacturer, distributor, and
seller of the 4Runner -- alleging that the 1994 4Runner was
dangerously defective and unreasonably dangerous because its
design rendered it unstable and prone to roll over.  A jury
returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and awarded noneconomic
damages totaling $2,250,000 and economic damages totaling
$5,400,000.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  McCathern v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 160 Or App 201, 985 P2d 804 (1999).  We now affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
		The following facts are taken from the record.  We view
the evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party in whose
favor the jury returned the verdict, i.e., plaintiff.  Parrott v.
Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 331 Or 537, 542, 17 P3d 473 (2001).
		The accident that caused plaintiff's injuries took
place one evening in May 1995, when plaintiff and her daughter,
together with plaintiff's cousin, Sanders, and her daughter, were
riding in Sanders's 1994 Toyota 4Runner.  Sanders was driving,
plaintiff was in the front passenger seat, and the children were
in the back seat.  Everyone was wearing a seatbelt. 
	While the group was traveling south on Highway 395 at a
speed of approximately 50 miles per hour, an oncoming vehicle
veered into Sanders's lane of travel. (2)  Sanders steered to the
right onto the paved shoulder to avoid a collision, then steered
to the left to stay on the highway, at which point the 4Runner
began to rock from side-to-side.  She then steered to the right
again to return to the south-bound lane, at which point the
4Runner rolled over and landed upright on its four wheels. 
During the rollover, the roof over the front passenger seat
collapsed and, as a result, plaintiff sustained serious and
permanent injuries.  The other passengers in the 4Runner
sustained only cuts and bruises.  The vehicle that had veered
into Sanders's lane did not stop, and no other vehicles were
involved in the accident.  
		In January 1996, plaintiff filed the present action
against defendants (collectively "Toyota"). (3)  Plaintiff's
complaint alleged that the 1994 4Runner "was dangerously
defective and unreasonably dangerous in that the vehicle, as
designed and sold, was unstable and prone to rollover." (4)   
		At trial, plaintiff presented expert testimony in
support of her theory that the 1994 4Runner was designed
defectively.  One of plaintiff's accident reconstruction experts,
Fries, opined that the accident was caused solely by the geometry
of the 1994 4Runner, as opposed to any other tripping mechanism,
such as braking, off-road travel, or a "rim trip." (5)  Robertson, a
statistician specializing in injury statistics, testified
regarding the correlation between the height of a vehicle's
center of gravity, its track width, (6) and its rollover resistence. 
Robertson stated that the 1994 4Runner was unreasonably dangerous
because widening the vehicle by only eight inches would have
increased its stability and decreased its propensity to roll
over.  Tamny, another engineer and accident reconstruction
expert, also opined that the 1994 4Runner was unreasonably
dangerous because the manufacturer could have designed it in such
a way that it would have skidded instead of rolling over when
making sharp turns on flat, dry pavement.
		Beginning with its opening statement and continuing
throughout the trial, Toyota conceded that it was aware that the
1994 4Runner rolls over on flat, dry pavement due to tire
friction forces alone.  According to Toyota, however, the 1994
4Runner's design was not defective because almost all sport
utility vehicles (SUVs) will roll over under conditions similar
to those present during plaintiff's accident. (7)  Toyota conceded
that the design modifications that plaintiff's experts had
suggested -- lowering the vehicle's center of gravity or widening
its track width to increase rollover resistance -- were feasible
at the time the 1994 model 4Runner was designed.  Toyota argued,
however, that those changes were not practicable because they
would have diminished the 4Runner's utility and inhibited its
performance in an off-road environment.
		Plaintiff also presented evidence that Toyota had
redesigned the 1994 model 4Runner in 1996 by lowering its center
of gravity and widening its track width.  Toyota's senior staff
engineer, Yonekawa, testified that the design modifications made
to the 1996 4Runner had improved the vehicle's handling and
rollover resistance.  In Toyota's testing, the 1994 model 4Runner
had overturned at speeds of less than 40 miles per hour with
steering input alone, i.e., without applying the brakes.  By
contrast, the 1996 4Runner did not roll over with steering input
alone.  According to plaintiff's expert, Tamny, "if you have to
hit the brakes to make the vehicle unstable, it has better
handling characteristics than if you can get it to lift off from
steering alone."  Tamny also characterized the 1996 4Runner as a
reasonably safe vehicle because, when a driver makes an "obstacle
avoidance maneuver" (8) on flat, dry pavement, the 1996 design
slides or skids to a stop, and does not roll over.  Finally,
Dobashi, Toyota's engineer who was responsible for testing and
evaluating the 1996 4Runner, also testified that the 1996 design
changes had improved the handling and stability of the 4Runner. 
When asked whether the 1996 4Runner was worse in any respect than
the 1994 model, i.e., whether the design modifications of the
1996 4Runner had affected its utility as an SUV, Dobashi
testified that, to his knowledge, "all performances are about the
same or better." 
		Finally, to counter the argument that no ordinary
consumer would expect a 4Runner to stay upright during evasive
turns, plaintiff presented evidence that Toyota had promoted the
1994 4Runner as a safe and dependable vehicle for both highway
and off-road purposes.  Toyota's national merchandising manager
for the United States, Cecconi, testified that Toyota had
marketed the 1994 4Runner to older, wealthier drivers who would
use the vehicle for commuting as well as for outdoor activities. 
According to Cecconi, Toyota was aware that many consumers
thought that the 4Runner's height was a safety feature because it
allowed better visibility.  He also admitted, however, that
Toyota's advertising did not attempt to communicate to consumers
the rollover risk attendant with the vehicle's height.  When
presented with an example of a television commercial depicting
the 4Runner performing evasive maneuvers similar to those that
occurred in plaintiff's accident, Cecconi admitted that, under
certain conditions, the maneuvers being depicted in the
commercial might cause the vehicle to roll over.  Cecconi also
was shown several Toyota advertising brochures and testified that
he was "not really sure" whether the 1994 4Runner safely could
perform the evasive maneuvers depicted in the brochures's
diagrams.
		At the close of plaintiff's evidence, Toyota moved for
a directed verdict on plaintiff's design-defect claim on two
grounds:  (1) that plaintiff had failed to prove that the 1994
4Runner was dangerously defective and unreasonably dangerous
because she had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of the
practicability of her proposed alternative design, viz., the 1996
4Runner; and (2) that plaintiff had failed as a matter of law to
prove that the design of the 1994 4Runner had caused her injuries
because she had failed to demonstrate that it was more probable
than not that the accident and injuries would not have occurred
had Toyota manufactured and sold the product with plaintiff's
proposed alternative design.  The court denied Toyota's motion on
both grounds.  Toyota renewed that motion on the same two grounds
at the close of the evidence, and the court again denied the
motion.
		As noted, the jury found for plaintiff, awarding her
economic and noneconomic damages.  Toyota timely filed a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the
alternative, a new trial, based on the same grounds as its
earlier motion for a directed verdict.  The trial court did not
rule on the motion, and it therefore was denied by operation of
law.  ORCP 63 D; ORCP 64 F.
		On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
trial court did not err in denying Toyota's motions for directed
verdict and JNOV because plaintiff had submitted evidence from
which a jury could have concluded that the 1994 4Runner had
failed to meet ordinary consumer expectations and, therefore, was
defective.  McCathern, 160 Or App at 204.  After reviewing the
history of "the controlling standard of strict products liability
under Oregon law:  the 'consumer expectation' test," id. at 207,
the Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff in Oregon could
establish defective design by proving ordinary consumer
expectations under either a "representational" theory, a
"consumer risk-utility" theory, or both.  Id. at 218.  The court
also concluded that plaintiff's proof legally was sufficient
under both theories.  Id. at 222, 228.  
		Toyota petitioned for review, renewing its contention
that plaintiff had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to
support her design-defect claim.  We allowed review to consider
that issue.  Before we reach that issue, however, we consider an
additional issue raised in Toyota's petition for review
concerning the trial court's admission of "other similar
incidents" evidence.
		At trial, plaintiff presented expert testimony by
Wallingford, a forensic engineer specializing in accident
reconstruction.  Plaintiff had retained Wallingford to review
approximately 35 rollover accidents involving pre-1996 Toyota
4Runners to determine whether those accidents were "substantially
similar" to plaintiff's accident.  The majority of Wallingford's
testimony was based on information that he had reviewed from
lawsuits or investigation reports involving those incidents,
including police reports, police photographs, and witness
depositions.  In some of the cases, Wallingford actually had
visited the accident scene or had examined the vehicle involved
in the accident.  After analysis, Wallingford concluded that
approximately 20 of the 35 rollover accidents reviewed were
"substantially similar" to plaintiff's accident. (9)
		In response to Toyota's objection that the "other
similar incidents" evidence was cumulative, and in the interest
of time, the court restricted Wallingford's testimony to 15
incidents.  Toyota also objected that the factual information
underlying Wallingford's opinions was inadmissible hearsay.  The
court overruled that objection and permitted Wallingford to give
a brief summary of each accident for the jury and then to offer
his opinion whether each accident was "substantially similar" to
plaintiff's accident based on the criteria that he had
identified. 
		On cross-examination, Toyota sought to impeach
Wallingford's opinion testimony by referring to information
contained in several police reports that were part of the factual
information on which Wallingford had based his opinions. 
According to Toyota, those reports had included accident
descriptions that directly contradicted Wallingford's conclusions
about the substantial similarity of the other accidents to
plaintiff's accident.  When Toyota offered those police reports
into evidence, plaintiff's counsel objected to their admission on
the basis that the reports contained inadmissible hearsay. 
Defense counsel responded: 
	"It's true that the offering attorney may be
prevented from putting things into evidence on the
grounds that what the expert relied on is hearsay, but
that is not true on cross.  [O]n cross, the opposite
rule applies:  If the witness has relied on the
information, it is admissible for impeachment purposes,
and it's admissible in the record for that purpose."
		The trial court initially sustained plaintiff's
objection.  Thereafter, the trial court changed its mind about
the hearsay nature of the reports and admitted them into evidence
for impeachment purposes.  Plaintiff again objected and argued
that their admission was prejudicial to her because other
information in Wallingford's file that the court had not
admitted, such as deposition testimony, supported Wallingford's
conclusions.  In response to that objection, Toyota offered and
stipulated to the admission of Wallingford's entire file, which
included the reports, depositions, and photographs from the 15
accidents.  Accordingly, the trial court admitted Wallingford's
entire file into evidence.
		On appeal, Toyota argued that the trial court erred
when it overruled its hearsay objections and allowed
Wallingford's testimony about the factual information contained
in his file on which he based his opinions.  The Court of Appeals
refused to consider the merits of that argument, because it
concluded that Toyota had waived any error on that issue when it
subsequently offered and stipulated to the admission of
Wallingford's file.  McCathern, 160 Or App at 235-36.
		On review, Toyota asserts that the Court of Appeals'
refusal to consider that argument was incorrect because it
conflicts with this court's holding in Wallace v. American Life
Ins. Co., 111 Or 510, 533-37, 225 P 192, on reh'g 227 P 465
(1924).  Toyota argues that the evidence was inadmissible:  (1)
because it was hearsay; and (2) because it was unfairly
prejudicial.  For the reasons set out below, we agree that Toyota
did not waive its objection by stipulating to the admission of
Wallingford's file. (10)  Nonetheless, we do not agree that the
testimony was hearsay or that it was unfairly prejudicial.
		We first consider plaintiff's argument that Toyota
waived its hearsay objections to Wallingford's testimony by
stipulating to the admission of his file.  Toyota is correct
that, under Wallace, plaintiff's waiver argument fails.  The
plaintiff in Wallace argued that the defendant had waived its
objections to the plaintiff's expert's opinion evidence for two
reasons:  first, because the defendant had "met [the] plaintiff's
expert witnesses with expert witnesses and offered 'opinion
evidence' against 'opinion evidence,'" 111 Or at 533; and,
second, because the defendant had cross-examined the plaintiff's
expert about the same evidence that, during the direct
examination of that expert, the court had admitted and the
plaintiff had used over the defendant's objections, id. at 537. 
The court in Wallace disagreed with the plaintiff's waiver
arguments, explaining: 
	"The defendant did not waive his objection and
exception by attempting to disprove the matters
testified to, or to prove facts inconsistent with them. 
A party excepting to the admission of testimony is not
bound to concede its truth, or to refrain from
combating it, in order to retain his exception." 
Id. at 536 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
		The rationale articulated in Wallace is consistent with
the general understanding that, when a party's objection is made
and overruled, that party
	"is entitled to treat [that] ruling as the 'law of the
trial' and to explain or rebut, if he can, the evidence
admitted over his protest.  Consequently, there is no
waiver if he cross-examines the adversary's witness
about the matter, even though the cross-examination
entails a repetition of the fact, or if he meets the
testimony with other evidence which, under the theory
of his objection, would be inadmissible."
McCormick, Evidence, § 55, 246-47 (5th ed 1999) (footnotes
omitted).  That rationale applies equally to this proceeding.  A
party has the right to meet its opponent's evidence admitted
under the trial court's rulings.  After making the proper
objections, a party may counter its opponent's evidence, whether
correctly admitted or not, without waiving its evidentiary
objection on appeal.  Accordingly, Toyota did not waive its
hearsay objection by stipulating to the admission of
Wallingford's file.  Because no waiver occurred, we turn to
Toyota's argument that the admission of Wallingford's testimony
about the information underlying his opinion was reversible
error.  
		OEC 703 specifies some types of information on which an
expert witness may rely for his or her opinion testimony. (11)  One
source of information provided by OEC 703 is facts or data that
are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject."  Although the rule specifically provides that such
evidence "need not be admissible," OEC 703 does not render
otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible merely because it was
the basis for the expert's opinion.
		Nevertheless, we hold that the trial court did not err
when it overruled Toyota's hearsay objections, because plaintiff
offered the evidence of the details surrounding the 15 other
rollover accidents only to provide the foundation necessary to
explain Wallingford's opinions, not for its truth.  The trial
court admitted the evidence solely for that purpose. 
Consequently, by definition, that information was not "hearsay." 
See OEC 801(3) ("hearsay" is out-of-court statement offered to
prove truth of matter asserted); see also Oberg v. Honda Motor
Co., 316 Or 263, 269-70, 851 P2d 1084 (1993) (excerpts of
documents read to jury admitted for limited purpose that
defendants had notice of defective design and not for truth were
not hearsay), rev'd on other grounds sub nom Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg, 512 US 415, 114 S Ct 2331, 129 L Ed 2d 336 (1994). 
		Toyota also contends that evidence of other similar
incidents, including Wallingford's testimony, (12) even if otherwise
admissible, was unfairly prejudicial under OEC 403 (13) and,
therefore, should not have been admitted.  In support, Toyota
argues that the evidence was prejudicial because it "powerfully
suggested to the jury that it was the vehicle -- not the driver,
not the road, not the sudden, hard steering, not the speed, and
not the other circumstances -- that caused the rollover in this
case."  In addition, Toyota argues that the evidence was unfairly
prejudicial because some of that testimony included information
about injuries or deaths that resulted from those accidents.  
		We review a trial court's ruling whether to exclude
relevant evidence under OEC 403 for abuse of discretion.  State
v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 243, 986 P2d 5 (1999), cert den 528 US
1086 (2000).  "To be excluded under OEC 403, testimony must be
not only prejudicial, but unfairly so."  Id. at 235.  Toyota's
assertion that the evidence powerfully suggested that the design
of the 1994 4Runner caused the rollover in this case is no more
than an assertion that plaintiff's evidence supported her theory
of the case.  As this court has recognized, relevant evidence
often has the effect of proving one party's position while
harming the other's.  See Macy v. Blatchford, 330 Or 444, 455, 8
P3d 204 (2000) (so stating).  
		The record in this case demonstrates that the trial
court complied with OEC 403 by balancing the cost in terms of
prejudice of the evidence against its benefits.  Oberg, 316 Or at
270-71.  The court limited both the number of incidents that
Wallingford could discuss and the number of videotaped
depositions that plaintiff could present.  Additionally, the
court did not permit plaintiff to submit detailed evidence of the
injuries other people had suffered in other rollover accidents. 
We conclude that the trial court permissibly could have
determined that the probative value of the "other similar
incidents" evidence was not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.  Accordingly, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting that testimony.
		We turn to the primary issue on review, viz., whether
plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence to establish that
Toyota's 1994 4Runner was designed defectively.  At the outset,
we must determine the controlling standard for design defect
liability in Oregon and the proof necessary to satisfy that
standard. 
		Before 1979, product liability claims in Oregon were
common-law claims.  See Wights v. Staff Jennings, 241 Or 301, 405
P2d 624 (1965) (recognizing common-law action for personal
injuries resulting from defective product).  In 1967, this court
expressly adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts (1965) (Restatement (Second)) and its consumer expectations
test as the standard for liability in design defect cases.  See
Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or 467, 470, 435 P2d 806 (1967)
(adopting Section 402A).  Heaton explained that, under Section
402A, a product "is dangerously defective when it is in a
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user" and that
"unreasonable" in that context means "dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer."  Id. at 471.  
		Subsequently, in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269
Or 485, 525 P2d 1033 (1974), the court deviated from Heaton's
"pure" Section 402A approach and announced what became known as
the reasonable manufacturer test.  Unlike the consumer
expectations test, which asks juries to focus on the expectations
of the ordinary consumer about product safety, the reasonable
manufacturer test instructs juries to focus on the manufacturer's
motives for placing the product on the market and on the
reasonableness, or lack thereof, of that conduct.  Phillips
opined:
"A dangerously defective article would be one which a
reasonable person would not put into the stream of
commerce if he had knowledge of its harmful character. 
The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be
negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk
involved."
269 Or at 492 (emphasis in original).  The court in Phillips
acknowledged that Comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second), previously endorsed by the court in Heaton, examines
unreasonable dangerousness from a consumer-oriented, as opposed
to a seller-oriented, perspective. (14)  Id. at 492-93.  According
to Phillips, however, the two standards -- consumer expectations
and reasonable manufacturer -- substantively were
indistinguishable, because an ordinary consumer expects what a
reasonable manufacturer would market.  Id. at 493.  As the court
later explained in Ewen v. McLean Trucking Co., 300 Or 24, 706
P2d 929 (1985): 
	"Clearly the court [in Phillips] regarded a focus
on the 'reasonableness' of marketing the product,
knowing of its dangers, not as a departure from the
Restatement's Comment i but as another way to explain
it.  In the court's view, it might be an advantage to
bring the definition of a dangerously defective product
back into the 'familiar terms and thought processes'
associated with common law negligence, as indeed this
alternative phrasing did[.]"
300 Or at 30-31 (footnote omitted).  
		The departure in Phillips from the consumer
expectations test subsequently was challenged in Allen v. The
Heil Company, 285 Or 109, 589 P2d 1120 (1979).  The plaintiff in
Allen contended that analysis of a design-defect claim
necessarily begins with the consumer expectations test of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) and disputed this court's
departure from that approach.  Id. at 118-20.  In response, this
court opined that, because no statute codified Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second), the consumer expectations test was binding "only so long and in such particulars" as the court found
appropriate.  Id. at 119 n 5.
		Motivated, at least in part, by this court's indication
in Allen that the court believed that it could exercise
considerable discretion in applying Section 402A, the 1979
Legislature codified the law of strict product liability by
enacting ORS 30.920.  See Ewen, 300 Or at 28 (enactment of ORS
30.920 motivated by desire to "stabilize the rules of [product]
liability"); Or Laws 1979, ch 866, § 2.  ORS 30.920 provides:
	"(1) One who sells or leases any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to the property of the user or consumer
is subject to liability for physical harm or damage to
property caused by that condition, if:
	"(a) The seller or lessor is engaged in the
business of selling or leasing such a product; and
	"(b) The product is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold or leased.
	"(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) of this
section shall apply, even though:
	"(a) The seller or lessor has exercised all
possible care in the preparation and sale or lease of
the product; and
	"(b) The user, consumer or injured party has not
purchased or leased the product from or entered into
any contractual relations with the seller or lessor.
	"(3) It is the intent of the Legislative Assembly
that the rule stated in subsections (1) and (2) of this
section shall be construed in accordance with the
Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 402A, Comments a to
m (1965).  All references in these comments to sale, sell, selling or seller shall be construed to include
lease, leases, leasing and lessor.
	"(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit the rights and liabilities of sellers and lessors
under principles of common law negligence or under ORS
72.1010 to 72.7250."
		In Ewen, this court interpreted the legislative mandate
in ORS 30.920(3) to construe the substantive formulas codified in
subsections (1) and (2) "in accordance with the Restatement
(Second) of Torts sec. 402A, Comments a to m (1965)" as an
enactment of the consumer expectations test.  300 Or at 27, 31-32.  Therefore, the court held that, under ORS 30.920, a jury in
a design-defect case "should receive some instruction phrased so
as to focus on what extent of risk an ordinary consumer would
contemplate when purchasing a product with the knowledge of its
characteristics common to the relevant community."  Id. at 32.  
		Plaintiff contends that, when the legislature adopted
the consumer expectations test in ORS 30.920, it did so to the
exclusion of the reasonable manufacturer test.  For the reasons
set out below, we agree.
		It is true that, in dictum, this court in Ewen stated
expressly that it was not resolving the issue whether the
reasonable manufacturer test had any continuing relevance in
design defect litigation under ORS 30.920.  See Ewen, 300 Or at
32 (leaving unanswered whether "any role remains for the
[reasonable manufacturer] instruction approved in Phillips"). 
However, it is clear from the text of ORS 30.920 that the
legislature intended to adopt the consumer expectations test. 
ORS 30.920(3); Ewen, 300 Or at 31-32; see also PGE v. Bureau of
Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (text
of statutory provision is starting point for interpretation and
best evidence of legislature's intent).  As the court in Phillips
acknowledged, the reasonable manufacturer and the consumer
expectations tests take different perspectives.  Whether we agree
with the court's conclusion in Phillips -- that the two tests
substantively are equivalent -- is of no moment.  When it enacted
ORS 30.920, thereby codifying the consumer expectations test, the
legislature endorsed only one perspective -- that of the
consumer.  We infer from that choice that the legislature did so
to the exclusion of the different perspective of the
manufacturer.  In light of the clear choice embodied in the
wording of ORS 30.920, there is no room to argue that the
reasonable manufacturer test remains viable.  Accordingly, we
conclude that the legislature has abrogated the reasonable
manufacturer test.  Oregon trial courts no longer may instruct
juries according to the reasonable manufacturer test instruction
approved in Phillips, 269 Or at 501 n 16.   
		Having concluded that, under ORS 30.920, the consumer
expectations test governs design defect cases in Oregon, we now consider the proof necessary to establish that a product fails to
meet ordinary consumer expectations as to safety. 
		The Court of Appeals held that there are "two distinct
answers" to the question of how a plaintiff proves ordinary
consumer expectations in Oregon:
"[A] plaintiff in a defective design case can, with
sufficient proof, proceed under either a
'representational' theory, a 'consumer risk-utility'
theory, or both."
McCathern, 160 Or App at 218.  According to that court, a
plaintiff may establish consumer expectations under the
"representational" theory
"by proving that the manufacturer specifically
represented to the consuming public that the product
would be able to perform certain functions, when, in
fact, it could not, resulting in the plaintiff's
injury."
Id. at 209.  By contrast, the court stated that a plaintiff may
establish consumer expectations under the "consumer risk-utility"
theory by proving "that a product could have feasibly and
practicably been designed more safely."  Id. at 210.  
		On review, Toyota's first complaint is that the Court
of Appeals' decision created, by way of its "representational"
theory, a "new theory of product liability" that conflicts with
the controlling statute, ORS 30.920, and with this court's case
law.  Similarly, plaintiff complains that the Court of Appeals'
decision erroneously converted categories of evidence that are
relevant to consumer expectations into separate theories of
liability.  We agree with plaintiff's characterization of the
error and, for the reasons that follow, we reject the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that a product design defect may be proved
under two separate and distinct "theories" of liability.
		As noted above, the consumer expectations test is the
only theory of liability that ORS 30.920 expressly mandates. 
Under ORS 30.920(1), that test requires a plaintiff to prove that
the product at issue is both defective and unreasonably
dangerous. (15)  See also Restatement (Second), § 402A, Comment i
(liability under 402A attaches only when defective condition of
product makes it unreasonably dangerous to user or consumer). 
The comments to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) define
the terms "defective" and "unreasonably dangerous."  See ORS
30.920(3) (ORS 30.920(1) and (2) "shall be construed in
accordance with" Restatement (Second) Section 402A, Comments a to
m).  Both definitions refer to the consumer expectations test as the standard for determining whether a product is defective and
unreasonably dangerous. 
		Accordingly, to prove that a product was in a
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer," ORS 30.920(1), the plaintiff must prove that:  (1) "at
the time it leaves the seller's hands, [the product is] in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will
be unreasonably dangerous to him," see Restatement (Second), §
402A, Comment g (so defining "defective"); and (2) "[the product
is] dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics," see Restatement (Second), § 402A, Comment i (so
defining "unreasonably dangerous").  Whether a product is
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer is a factual question to be determined by
the jury.  Heaton, 248 Or at 472-73.  It is the trial court's
role, however, to ensure that the evidence is sufficient for the
jury to make an informed decision about what ordinary consumers
expect.  Id.  
		As noted in Heaton, in some cases, consumer
expectations about how a product should perform under specific
conditions will be within the realm of jurors' common experience. 
Id. at 472.  However, some design-defect cases involve products
or circumstances that are "not so common * * * that the average
person would know from personal experience what to expect."  Id.
at 473.  When a jury is "unequipped, either by general background
or by facts supplied in the record, to decide whether [a product]
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would have
expected," this court has recognized that additional evidence
about the ordinary consumer's expectations is necessary.  Id. at
473-74.  That additional evidence may consist of evidence that
the magnitude of the product's risk outweighs its utility, which
often is demonstrated by proving that a safer design alternative
was both practicable and feasible.  See id. at 471 (user has
right to expect reasonably safe design).  
		Plaintiff acknowledges that evidence related to risk-utility balancing of that kind may be necessary to show that a
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would
have expected.  However, plaintiff disputes the Court of Appeals'
holding that, under the consumer expectations test, a plaintiff
must introduce such evidence.  See McCathern, 160 Or App at 211
(proof of safer practicable alternative design essential to
consumer risk-utility theory).  According to plaintiff, evidence
related to risk-utility balancing, as described above, is
required only under the now-defunct reasonable manufacturer test. 
See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 282 Or 61, 67-69, 577
P2d 1322 (1978) (relying on Phillips's reasonable manufacturer
test; requiring that, when risk-utility balancing and proof of
design alternative are necessary, proof must include evidence
that alternative design was practicable).  
		We agree that evidence related to risk-utility
balancing, which may include proof that a practicable and
feasible design alternative was available, will not always be
necessary to prove that a product's design is defective and
unreasonably dangerous, i.e., that the product failed to meet
ordinary consumer expectations.  However, because the parties did
not dispute that evidence related to risk-utility balancing was
necessary in this case, we leave for another day the question
under what circumstances ORS 30.920 requires a plaintiff to
support a product liability design-defect claim with evidence
related to risk-utility balancing of the kind discussed above.
		We emphasize that, whether or not evidence related to
risk-utility balancing is necessary to satisfy a plaintiff's
burden of proof, a plaintiff's theory of liability under ORS
30.920 remains the same:  That the product was dangerously
defective and unreasonably dangerous because it failed to perform
as the ordinary consumer expects.  In other words, contrary to
the Court of Appeals' opinion, "consumer risk-utility" is not a
separate "theory of liability" under the statutorily mandated
consumer expectations test.  
		The Court of Appeals' "representational" approach also
is not a separate "theory of liability" under the consumer
expectations test.  Although advertising and promotional
materials may be sufficient to demonstrate what the ordinary
consumer expects from a product in some cases, such evidence by
itself rarely will demonstrate that a product is defective. 
		In sum, we conclude that the controlling test for
design defect in Oregon is the consumer expectations test.  ORS
30.920.  When a plaintiff alleges that a product is "in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer," ORS 30.920(1), the plaintiff must prove that, when the
product left the defendant's hands, the product was defective and
dangerous to an extent beyond that which the ordinary consumer
would have expected.
		We turn, then, to plaintiff's evidence and whether that
evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict in her favor
in this case.  This court may set aside plaintiff's verdict only
if the court affirmatively can say that there was no evidence
from which the jury could have found the facts necessary to
establish an element of plaintiff's claim.  Brown v. J.C. Penney
Co., 297 Or 695, 705, 688 P2d 811 (1984).  
		Toyota contends that there was no evidence that
ordinary consumers expected the 1994 4Runner to make the
"obstacle avoidance maneuvers" that Sanders made in this case
without rolling over.  Specifically, Toyota argues that plaintiff
failed to produce sufficient evidence that her proposed design
alternative, the 1996 4Runner, was practicable, and that her
evidence of causation was insufficient.  We disagree with both
contentions.
		As noted, Toyota argued at trial that evidence related
to risk-utility balancing was necessary, and plaintiff did not
dispute that contention.  Accordingly, plaintiff submitted
evidence that the magnitude of the 1994 4Runner's risk outweighed
its utility and that a safer alternative design was feasible and
practicable.  Plaintiff's evidence included testimony that the
1994 4Runner had a high risk of rolling over and that the 1996
4Runner was safer and as practicable as the 1994 model without
any detriment to other safety or utility features.  Plaintiff's
accident reconstruction expert, Tamny, testified that it was
possible to build a vehicle that would not roll over due to tire
friction forces alone, but would skid to a stop instead.  Tamny
demonstrated that a vehicle's dynamic stability -- how much side
force the vehicle can withstand in relation to its weight,
without rolling -- affects its propensity to roll over. 
According to Tamny, a vehicle with a .90 dynamic stability is
reasonably safe.  Tamny testified that the 1996 4Runner had a
dynamic stability of .94, as compared to the 1994 4Runner, which
had a dynamic stability of .80.  Toyota achieved that difference
by lowering the floor and widening the track width of the 1996
model.  
		Toyota conceded that what actually was done in 1996 was
feasible in 1994.  The jury also could have inferred that the
1996 design modifications also were practicable in 1994. 
Toyota's engineer, Dobashi, testified that the 1996 model design
modifications did not interfere with the vehicle's sport utility
functions and that they actually improved the handling and
stability of the vehicle as compared to the 1994 model.  In
addition, one witness testified that the design changes actually
would have reduced the cost and would not have made the vehicle
more dangerous in other respects.  It follows from the foregoing
that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence from which a jury
could have found that the 1996 4Runner design was a safer design
that was feasible and practicable when Toyota manufactured the
1994 4Runner.
		Next, Toyota argues that plaintiff failed to prove that
the design of the 1994 4Runner caused her injuries. 
Specifically, Toyota asserts that plaintiff's proof was
insufficient because there was no direct evidence that the 1996
4Runner would not have rolled over under similar circumstances.
		Contrary to defendant's assertions, there was
sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that, had
plaintiff been riding in a 1996 4Runner on the night of the
accident, the 1996 4Runner would not have rolled over.  Before
trial, Toyota conceded that plaintiff's injuries occurred because
the 1994 4Runner in which she was a passenger rolled over.  There
was evidence from which the jury could have found that the 1996
4Runner, instead of rolling over, would have skidded to a stop. 
The evidence showed that plaintiff's accident was the result of
tire friction forces alone.  According to the evidence, Sanders
did not apply the brakes before the vehicle rolled, and no other
tripping mechanism caused the accident.  Toyota's own testing for
rollover resistance, in which test drivers made sharp turns on
dry, flat, smooth pavement, demonstrated that the 1994 4Runner
overturned at 32 miles per hour -- approximately 20 miles per
hour slower than the speed at which plaintiff's accident
occurred.  When Toyota tested the 1996 4Runner, using a more
extreme test that involved more severe steering maneuvers than
those used to test the 1994 model, Toyota was unable to overturn
the 1996 model with steering input alone.  To make the 1996
4Runner overturn, Toyota's test drivers had to apply the brakes,
and the antilock braking system had to be disconnected.  In
addition, Tamny testified that the difference between the 1994
4Runner and the 1996 model was "clearly significant" because the
pre-1996 4Runner will roll on a flat road surface and the 1996
4Runner will not.  Tamny testified that the lower center of
gravity and wider wheel track of the 1996 4Runner made it "very
unlikely" that a 1996 4Runner would have rolled over in the
circumstances in which plaintiff was injured. 
		Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence from which the jury could have inferred that
the 1996 4Runner would not have rolled over under the conditions
of plaintiff's accident.  Therefore, contrary to Toyota's
assertions, plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to prove that the
design of the 1994 4Runner caused her injuries.  Cf. Baccelleri
v. Hyster Co., 287 Or 3, 7, 597 P2d 351 (1979) (although no
direct testimony that accident would not have happened if
forklift had had a backup alarm, evidence from which jury could
infer that alarm warning generally was effective in preventing
such accidents is sufficient to prove that absence of alarm
caused the plaintiff's injuries).
		We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
Toyota's motions for directed verdict and JNOV, because plaintiff
submitted evidence from which the jury could have concluded that
the 1994 4Runner failed to meet ordinary consumer expectations
and was, therefore, "in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer."
		The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment
of the circuit court are affirmed.



1. 	ORS 30.900 defines a "product liability civil action"
as a 
"civil action brought against a manufacturer,
distributor, seller or lessor of a product for damages
for personal injury, death or property damage arising
out of:
	"(1) Any design, inspection, testing,
manufacturing or other defect in a product;
	"(2) Any failure to warn regarding a product; or
	"(3) Any failure to properly instruct in the use
of a product."
Of the three types of product liability civil actions that ORS
30.900 describes -- manufacturing defects, design defects, and
warning or instruction deficiencies -- we are concerned in this
proceeding only with design defect.

2. 	Highway 395 is a two-lane paved highway with wide,
paved shoulders.  At the location of the accident, the highway
was flat, smooth, and, on the night of plaintiff's accident, dry. 

3. 	The trial court dismissed Takata Corporation from the
case, and it is not a party on review. 

4. 	Plaintiff also alleged that Toyota was negligent in
failing to design and sell a vehicle that provided adequate
resistance to rollover.  On Toyota's motion for a directed
verdict at the close of plaintiff's evidence, ORCP 60, the trial
court dismissed plaintiff's negligence claim.  That ruling is not
at issue on review.

5. 	A "rim trip" occurs when a tire debeads, or breaks
down, and the wheel rim gouges into the pavement, creating a
sideways force that can cause the vehicle to roll over.

6. 	"Track width" is the distance between the center of
each front tire.

7. 	A multipurpose vehicle, like the Toyota 4Runner, is
classified by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
as a "sport utility vehicle," based on specific design
characteristics, such as high ground clearance, that enable the
vehicle to perform in a variety of off-road applications.

8. 	"Obstacle avoidance maneuver" was the phrase that Tamny
used to describe the series of turns that Sanders had made on the
night of the accident.

9. 	Wallingford based that conclusion on the following
criteria:  (1) the accidents had occurred on a flat, hard, dry
surface; (2) the accidents were the result of tire friction
forces alone, i.e., there was no other tripping mechanism or
impact before rollover; (3) there was no evidence of driver
impairment; and (4) the 4Runner models compared (that is, models
from the mid-1980s through 1994) all had substantially the same
capabilities as the 1994 model that Sanders had been driving. 

10. 	In reaching its decision on that issue, the Court of
Appeals relied on two criminal cases, State ex rel Juv. Dept. v.
Cook, 325 Or 1, 932 P2d 547 (1997), and State v. Lopez, 147 Or
App 314, 936 P2d 386 (1997).  Those cases do not involve the
admission of hearsay under OEC 703 and, therefore, are inapposite
to our analysis in this case. 

11. 	OEC 703 provides:
	"The facts or data in the particular case upon
which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be
those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing.  If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence."

12. 	Plaintiff presented two kinds of "other similar
incidents" evidence:  (1) Wallingford's opinion testimony
regarding the substantial similarity of 15 other rollover
accidents involving pre-1996 model 4Runners; and (2) videotaped
testimony of four witnesses who were involved in four of the 15
accidents and videotaped testimony of one police officer who had
investigated one of the 15 accidents. 
		Toyota has not assigned error to any specific ruling
regarding the videotaped testimony.  However, Toyota's objection
under OEC 403 to the prejudicial nature of "other similar
incidents" evidence necessarily includes that testimony. 

13. 	OEC 403 provides:
	"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

14. 	Comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
provides, in part:
	"The rule stated in this Section [402A] applies
only where the defective condition of the product makes
it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.* * * The article sold must be dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics.  * * *"
(Emphasis added.)

15. 	As formulated in ORS 30.920, the necessary elements of
a design defect case are:  (1) the sale or leasing of a product
by one engaged in the business of selling or leasing such
products; (2) a product that was expected to, and did, reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in condition; (3) a
product that, when sold, was in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; (4) injury to the
user or consumer, or damage to his or her property; (5) that was
caused by the product's defective condition.  In this proceeding,
we are concerned only with the sufficiency of plaintiff's proof
under the third and fifth elements listed above -- the product's
defective condition and causation.