Case Title: State ex rel. Gary W. Engel v. Dave Dormire, Superintendent

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC90314

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
STATE ex rel. GARY W. ENGEL, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC90314 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
DAVE DORMIRE, SUPERINTENDENT, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
 
 
) 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN HABEAS CORPUS 
 
Opinion issued February 23, 2010 
 
At issue in this case is whether habeas petitioner Gary Engel's convictions should 
be vacated because they are undermined by newly discovered evidence.  This Court finds 
that material impeachment information was wrongly undisclosed to Engel during his trial, 
which violated his due process rights pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
Accordingly, Engel's convictions are vacated. 
I.  Procedural Background 
Engel was arrested in July 1990 on charges stemming from a 1984 armed 
kidnapping.  The State alleged that Engel, along with accomplices Steven Manning and 
 
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Thomas McKillip, was hired by drug-dealer Anthony Mammolito to kidnap and rob 
Charles Ford, a competing drug dealer.  The State alleged that the kidnappers, 
masquerading as drug enforcement agents, took Ford and his associate to a "safe house" 
and coerced payment of a ransom.   
The crime was not investigated actively until 1989, when authorities interviewed 
Mammolito while he was in a federal prison on an unrelated matter.  Based largely on 
Mammolito's testimony, Engel was convicted by a jury in June 1991 of two counts of 
kidnapping and two counts of armed criminal action.  Consecutive sentences were 
entered against him for each count, resulting in a total sentence of 90 years 
imprisonment.1  Engel's accomplice, Manning, also was convicted in the kidnapping and 
sentenced to two life sentences.   
Engel appealed and moved for post-conviction relief, but his efforts at relief were 
unsuccessful, and his convictions were affirmed in 1993.  State v. Engel, 859 S.W.2d 822 
(Mo. App. 1993).  Acting pro se in 2003, Engel unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus 
relief in Missouri's courts and was denied discretionary review of his case by this Court.  
He also unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal courts.   
Manning, however, did obtain federal habeas corpus relief from his kidnapping 
convictions after the federal court determined that his convictions were based on 
improper testimony from a jailhouse informant.  Manning v. Bowersox, 310 F.3d 571, 
                                             
 
1 He received a 30-year sentence for each kidnapping count and a 15-year sentence for each 
count of armed criminal action. 
 
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575-77 (8th Cir. 2002).  Manning was released from Missouri's custody in 2004 after the 
prosecutor declined to retry him following the reversal of his kidnapping convictions.   
Manning brought a federal civil suit against Chicago-based FBI Agent Robert 
Buchan and others whom Manning alleged had framed him in the kidnapping case and 
for an Illinois murder charge.  Manning v. Miller, 355 F.3d 1028, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 
2004).  He sought relief pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which authorizes suits for damages 
based on Fourth Amendment violations by federal officials.2  Manning asserted that 
Agent Buchan, the lead investigator in the 1984 kidnapping case, had manufactured false 
evidence, suborned the perjury of a witness, and secretly paid a witness to testify.   
Discovery in Manning's proceedings unearthed important evidence calling into 
question the testimony Mammolito provided at Engel's and Manning's kidnapping trials.  
Newly discovered letters from Mammolito to the prosecutor and investigators hinted that 
Mammolito believed there was an "agreement" for him to be paid.  Mammolito also 
wrote about investigators providing him reports before his trial testimony.  Mammolito 
sent a letter to one of the investigators, Sergeant Quid, to request that he send the 
"agreement" money to Mammolito's mother.  Another letter later was discovered from an 
investigator, Commander Del Re, to Mammolito's mother that indicated a check for $500 
                                             
 
2 Manning also brought a federal civil suit against the Village of Buffalo Grove, Illinois, and two 
of its former officers, Sergeant Robert Quid and Commander Gary Del Re, for their roles in 
falsely convicting him in the Missouri kidnapping case.  This suit was resolved in a confidential 
settlement. 
 
 
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was enclosed and recognized "the help [Mammolito] provided in this very important 
case."   
Other information revealed during the Manning proceedings evidenced the 
following:  Mammolito made contradictory statements to the prosecution about who was 
involved in the kidnapping; Sergeant Quid made an undocumented visit to Mammolito; 
and Mammolito arranged for investigators to assist him in securing release from federal 
prison. 
Following three weeks of testimony and a week of deliberations, the federal jury 
in Manning's civil trial issued a unanimous verdict in his favor and awarded him $6.5 
million in damages.  The jury found that Agent Buchan "knowingly induced or caused 
law enforcement officers to induce" Mammolito "to give false testimony and concealed 
information from prosecutors."3  It also found that Agent Buchan had promised to pay 
Mammolito for his testimony.   
In denying the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new 
trial, the district court found that Manning's evidence supported the jury's verdicts.  
Manning v. Miller, No. 02 C 372, 2005 WL 3078048, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2005).  
The court found "[t]he evidence amply supported Manning's contention that Agent 
Buchan worked in concert with Quid to put together a case to support a prosecution of 
                                             
 
3 The jury also found the agents had induced false testimony from witnesses Carolyn 
Heldenbrand and Sharon Dugan.  Heldenbrand provided identification testimony in Manning's 
trial.  She did not provide identification testimony against Engel, but he cites her discredited 
Manning testimony as representative of Agent Buchan's wrongful conduct.  Dugan was formerly 
married to Engel.  She testified at his trial about statements she said he had made about the 
kidnapping.  
 
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Manning for the Missouri kidnapping."  Id. at *7.  It noted that the investigators had a 
motive to succeed in prosecuting the kidnapping because they believed Manning was a 
dangerous criminal, but they lacked sufficient evidence to prosecute him for murders and 
other serious offenses.  Id.  The court also discussed that the jury reasonably determined 
that Agent Buchan's testimony was not credible.  It noted that "[his] demeanor on the 
witness stand was among the worst this Court has seen in over [24] years as a lawyer and 
a judge."  Id. at *8-9.  
Ultimately, however, the jury's verdict was set aside because the court determined 
that the jury's Bivens verdict violated the court's determinations under the FTCA.  
Manning v. U.S., 546 F.3d 430, 431, 438 (7th Cir. 2008); Manning v. U.S., No. 02 C 372, 
2006 WL 3240112, at *37 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2006).  But although the district court 
found against Manning under the FTCA, it also opined that "[t]here is no question that a 
deal was made at some point before Mammolito testified at Manning's [Missouri] trials to 
pay him some amount of money," and it found that "[t]he deal to pay Mammolito was not 
disclosed to Manning's attorney in the Missouri case."  Manning, 2006 WL 3240112, at 
*37.  Nothing in the court's decision to set aside the jury's verdict negated the jury's 
findings that investigators in the kidnapping case had perjured their testimony. 
Armed with the information from Manning's suits, Engel renewed his efforts to 
obtain habeas relief.  The motion court denied Engel's new habeas petition in July 2007, 
and the court of appeals also denied him relief.  Engel's plea for habeas relief is now 
before this Court, nearly 26 years after the alleged crimes for which he was convicted.   
 
 
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II.  Engel's Arguments for Habeas Relief 
Engel asserts he is entitled to habeas relief from his convictions because the 
prosecution violated his due process rights pursuant to Brady when it failed to disclose to 
him material exculpatory and impeachment evidence at trial.  He alleges the following 
information was developed during Manning's proceedings and supports his habeas 
claims: 
1.  Agent Buchan and Sergeant Quid conspired to frame Engel and Manning for 
the 1984 kidnapping. 
2.  Agent Buchan and Sergeant Quid failed to disclose the deal made with 
Mammolito in exchange for his testimony against Engel and Manning. 
3.  Agent Buchan and Sergeant Quid hid from the prosecutor that they had 
disseminated information to witnesses before their testimony to make them appear 
more credible. 
4.  Agent Buchan and Sergeant Quid produced false documentation of witness 
statements in an effort to persuade the prosecutor to pursue the 1984 kidnapping 
case. 
5.  New exculpatory and impeachment evidence was discovered during Manning's 
federal civil trial that was not disclosed to Manning or Engel during the defense of 
the kidnapping charges. 
 
In addition to his Brady claims, Engel also argues he is entitled to relief from his 
convictions because the prosecution used perjured testimony during his trial.  He further 
asserts that his armed criminal action convictions must be vacated because the armed 
criminal action charges were not filed timely.   
III.  Standards for Habeas Relief 
 
"Habeas corpus is the last judicial inquiry into the validity of a criminal conviction 
and serves as 'a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness.'"  State ex 
rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Mo. banc 2003) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 
U.S. 107, 126 (1982)).  "[A] writ of habeas corpus may be issued when a person is 
 
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restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or 
federal government."  Id.  Habeas proceedings, authorized under Rule 91, are limited to 
determining the facial validity of a petitioner's confinement.  State ex rel. Simmons v. 
White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Mo. banc 1993).  Engel, as the habeas corpus petitioner, has 
the burden of proof to show that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief.  State ex rel. Nixon 
v. Jaynes, 73 S.W.3d 623, 624 (Mo. banc 2002).   
Because Engel's arguments for habeas relief challenge the validity of his 
convictions and were cognizable in his direct appeal or post-conviction motion, he is 
afforded habeas review that is extremely limited in scope.  See Simmons, 866 S.W.2d at 
446 (explaining that prevention of "duplicative and unending challenges to the finality of 
a judgment" requires that habeas claims cognizable on direct appeal or in a post-
conviction motion be reviewed only if they present jurisdictional issues or "circumstances 
so rare and exceptional that a manifest injustice" will result if review is not taken).  The 
procedural bar to raising a habeas claim can be overcome by showings of manifest 
injustice, cause and prejudice, or a jurisdictional defect.  See Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 546.  
Engel seeks to overcome the procedural bar to his habeas claims by showing 
"cause and prejudice."  Cause is established where there is a factor at issue external to the 
defense or beyond its responsibilities.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.24 (1999) 
(noting that "cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner 
can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to 
comply with the State's procedural rule" (internal quotation omitted)).  This Court will 
not undertake habeas review of Engel's claims unless he can "establish that the grounds 
 
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relied on were not 'known to him'" during his direct appeal or post-conviction case.  
Simmons, 866 S.W.2d at 446.   
The State suggests that Engel's claims for habeas relief mirror the claims he raised 
in his prior pro se habeas petition, wherein he alleged that the prosecution had failed to 
disclose impeachment evidence related to Mammolito, including that Mammolito was 
paid for his testimony.  Engel's current claims for habeas relief, however, are distinct 
from his previous claims because they rest on a collection of new evidence developed in 
Manning's cases and unknown or unavailable when Engel previously sought relief.   
Justice requires that this Court consider all available evidence uncovered 
following Engel's trial that may impact his entitlement to habeas relief.  See Amrine, 102 
S.W.3d at 545 (noting that habeas review must assess the totality of all of the evidence 
uncovered over the years between various judicial reviews to determine if a habeas 
petitioner established a claim of innocence); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-
37 (1995) (discussing that courts must consider the cumulative effect of excluded 
evidence in determining if a Brady violation occurred).  Engel has established the cause 
needed to overcome the procedural bar to review of his habeas claims by showing that his 
arguments are based on evidence and information that was not revealed until Manning's 
federal lawsuits.   
Under the "cause and prejudice" standard, however, it is not enough that Engel's 
petition rests on newly discovered evidence.  He also must establish that he is entitled to 
habeas review because this Court's failure to review his claims would prejudice him.  In 
the context of whether Engel's Brady claims are barred procedurally from habeas review, 
 
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prejudice is identical to this Court's assessment of prejudice undertaken in assessing 
Engel's Brady claims.  Consequently, so long as Engel establishes the prejudice necessary 
to support his Brady claims, he will have shown the required prejudice to overcome the 
procedural bar for habeas relief. 
IV.  Brady Violations–Mammolito Evidence 
 
Engel's principal argument for habeas relief is that the prosecution wrongly failed 
to disclose to him material impeachment evidence related to Mammolito, which he 
argues violated his due process rights under Brady.  Brady holds that "'the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.'"  Merriweather v. State, 294 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Mo. 
banc 2009) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).   
To prevail in his Brady claims based on the Mammolito evidence, Engel must 
show each of the following:  (1) the evidence at issue is favorable to him, either because 
it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the 
State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) he was prejudiced.  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 
281-82; Merriweather, 294 S.W.3d at 54.   
A.  The Evidence At Issue Is Favorable To Engel 
To prevail in his Brady claim that evidence related to Mammolito was wrongly not 
disclosed to him, Engel first must establish that the Mammolito evidence at issue was 
favorable to him.  Id.  The evidence developed in Manning's case related to Mammolito 
supports Engel's allegations that Mammolito was paid for his testimony against Engel 
 
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and Manning.  New evidence includes a letter to Mammolito's mother that enclosed a 
$500 payment and mentioned "the help [Mammolito] provided in this very important 
case."  Other evidence supports Engel's allegations that investigators coached Mammolito 
to align his testimony with their testimony.  And Engel now has letters evidencing that 
investigators sought leniency for Mammolito based on his cooperation in the kidnapping 
case.  This Mammolito evidence is impeachment evidence favorable to Engel that proves 
the first prong of his Brady claim. 
B.  The Evidence At Issue Was Suppressed  
Engel next must prove his Brady claim as to the Mammolito evidence by showing 
that the State suppressed the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently.  Id.  There is no 
dispute that, during Engel's trial, he was not provided the Mammolito impeachment 
evidence that is the subject of his habeas claims.   
The State contends, however, that Engel cannot show that the Mammolito 
evidence was suppressed for Brady purposes because it did not exist at the time of trial.  
It argues that the prosecutor cannot be faulted for failing to provide not-yet-existent 
documents about the alleged "deal" made between Mammolito and investigators.  
Documents memorializing the "deal," however, need not have existed at the time of trial; 
it is enough that the evidence shows that the "deal" itself already existed, even if had not 
yet been documented.   
Under Brady, due process requires that the prosecution disclose to the defendant 
any evidence in its possession that is favorable to him and that is material to his guilt or 
punishment.  Id.  Brady provides that "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any 
 
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favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, 
including the police."  Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added).  It is irrelevant to Engel's 
Brady claim that the Mammolito evidence at issue in his habeas request involves non-
Missouri investigators.  These investigators were part of Missouri's prosecutorial team in 
the kidnapping cases against Engel and Manning, essentially acting as the prosecutor's 
agents during the investigation.   
Similarly, it is no hindrance to Engel's Brady claim that the prosecutor did not 
have the same knowledge about his case as the investigators.4  The prosecutor's lack of 
knowledge about information asserted in a Brady claim is not an impediment because the 
prosecutor is considered "'the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but 
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation 
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done.'"  Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281 (quoting Berger v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).   
Engel has satisfied the second prong for his Brady claim by showing that the 
Mammolito evidence that is the subject of his habeas petition was suppressed wrongly.   
C.  The Nondisclosure Of The Evidence Prejudiced Engel 
Having proved the first two prongs of his Brady claim, Engel also must show that 
he was prejudiced by the nondisclosure of the Mammolito evidence at issue.  See 
Merriweather, 294 S.W.3d at 54.  Before determining whether the evidence meets the 
                                             
 
4 Engel does not allege that the prosecutor knew at trial of the "deal" between Mammolito and 
investigators. 
 
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test for Brady prejudice, this Court must assess whether the evidence at issue is material 
to Engel's case.  See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282.  Evidence is material if there is a 
reasonable probability that its disclosure to the defense would have caused a different 
result in the proceeding.   Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280.  The materiality standard for Brady 
claims is established when "the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the 
whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict."  Kyles, 
514 U.S. at 435.  "The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not 
have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received 
a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence."  Id. at 434.    
The State suggests that the nondisclosure of the Mammolito impeachment 
evidence was not material or prejudicial to Engel because the defense offered other 
impeachment evidence related to Mammolito during the trial.  Efforts to discredit 
Mammolito during the trial included attacking his character by highlighting his criminal 
history and work as a drug dealer, highlighting that he had testified in exchange for not 
being charged in the kidnapping, and noting inconsistencies in his pre-trial and trial 
testimonies.  The State contends that any evidence that Mammolito had a "deal" with 
investigators "would have been overkill" and, therefore, was not material impeachment 
evidence. 
Contrary to the State's assertions, it makes no difference to Engel's Brady claim 
that other Mammolito impeachment evidence was unpersuasive to the jury during the 
trial.  See Taylor v. State, 262 S.W.3d 231, 244 (Mo. banc 2008) (noting "[t]he fact that a 
witness was impeached in other ways does not conclude the materiality inquiry required 
 
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under Brady" because the witness's credibility is not a collateral issue).  "In determining 
whether the suppressed impeachment evidence was material, the reviewing court must 
evaluate not only the ways that [the witness] was impeached, but also the ways that he 
was not impeached that would have been available had [the Brady claim] evidence been 
disclosed."  Id.   
If a witness is presenting false testimony, his testimony is not rendered truthful 
because he is cross-examined.  See Napue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 
269-70 (1959) (noting that "a lie is a lie" (internal quotation omitted)).  The unknown 
impeachment information, especially when coupled with the impeachment information 
presented at the time of trial, could have led the jury to a different assessment of 
Mammolito's credibility.  See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002).  
The defense's efforts to impeach Mammolito's credibility "were deprived of significant 
evidentiary force" by the prosecution's failure to disclose to Engel the evidence 
supporting his belief that investigators had encouraged Mammolito to testify falsely 
about Engel's role in the kidnapping.  Taylor, 262 S.W.3d at 245.   
The Brady materiality of the undisclosed Mammolito evidence is shown because 
(1) "knowledge of [the undisclosed] facts could have significantly undermined the 
legitimacy of [Mammolito's] testimony and involvement in the case in a way that no 
other impeachment presented was able to do" and (2) "[h]aving failed to disclose this 
impeachment evidence, the state was able to claim much greater credibility from 
[Mammolito's] testimony than the true facts would have warranted."  See id. 
 
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Having determined that the undisclosed Mammolito evidence was material for 
purposes of Brady, this Court also considers whether the nondisclosure of this material 
evidence prejudiced Engel so as to warrant habeas relief based on a Brady violation.  This 
assessment questions whether Engel's "trial result[ed] in a verdict worthy of confidence."  
See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.   
This Court finds that Engel has presented evidence showing that the verdict in his 
case is not "worthy of confidence."  Nondisclosure of impeachment evidence related to 
Mammolito, who was a chief prosecution witness, caused Engel to suffer Brady prejudice 
because his defense hinged on undermining Mammolito's credibility.  Cf. Merriweather, 
294 S.W.3d at 57 (noting prejudice where impeachment evidence was nondisclosed 
wrongly and the defendant's credibility was pitted against the witness's credibility).  The 
jury's verdict in Manning's federal civil case demonstrates that the nondisclosed 
Mammolito impeachment evidence would have aided Engel in discrediting Mammolito's 
testimony at trial.5 
 
                                             
 
5 The State argues that Mammolito's discredited testimony did not prejudice Engel because 
Sharon Dugan's testimony at trial provided sufficient evidence to convict him regardless of 
Mammolito's testimony.  Sufficiency of the evidence excluding the discredited testimony, 
however, is not the correct test for determining Brady prejudice.  See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-35 
("A defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the 
undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict.").  Regardless of the 
other evidence at trial, Engel successfully has demonstrated Brady prejudice by showing that 
undisclosed evidence puts his case in a "different light" and "undermine[s] confidence in the 
verdict."  See id. at 434.  While exploration of Engel's Brady claim as to Dugan is not necessary, 
it is worth noting that Engel also has shown new impeachment evidence not available to him at 
trial evidencing that Agent Buchan induced Dugan to provide false testimony and that Dugan 
was compensated directly by the FBI for her trial-related travel expenses. 
 
 
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V.  Engel Is Entitled To Habeas Relief 
Engel has shown that his due process rights were violated because the prosecutor's 
failure to disclose the Mammolito impeachment evidence resulted in a Brady violation.  
Because he has shown that the nondisclosure of the Mammolito impeachment evidence 
was prejudicial for Brady purposes, he also has established the "cause and prejudice" 
necessary to overcome the procedural bar to granting him habeas relief.  Accordingly, 
Engel's convictions are vacated. 
Because the evidence was sufficient at the first trial to convict, there is no double 
jeopardy bar to retrial if the State believes it can produce enough evidence to bring 
Engel's case to a jury.  See Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 549.  On retrial, however, Engel will 
have the opportunity to present the exculpatory and impeachment evidence discovered 
since his trial.  Given this new evidence and the long delay since the original trial, during 
which time Engel has been imprisoned on convictions this Court herein sets aside, an 
expeditious and final resolution of this case is imperative.  See Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 
549.  This Court, therefore, orders Engel discharged from the State's custody 60 days 
from the date the mandate issues in this case, unless within that time the State files in the 
circuit court an election to retry him.  If the State so elects, the new trial shall be held 
expeditiously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mary R. Russell, Judge 
 
All concur. 
 
 
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