Case Title: Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Gregor

Citation: 777 So. 2d 79

Docket Number: 1980236

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
777 So. 2d 79 (2000)
SOUTHERN ENERGY HOMES, INC.
v.
Vicki Carol GREGOR and Herchel W. Baker.
1980236.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 30, 2000.
John Martin Galese and Jeffrey L. Ingram of John Martin Galese, P.A., Birmingham, for appellant.
Joseph C. McCorquodale III and Jacqualyn S. Bradley of McCorquodale & McCorquodale, Jasper, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Vicki Carol Gregor and Herchel W. Baker (hereinafter called "Gregor") purchased a mobile home manufactured by Southern Energy Homes, Inc. Gregor's agreements, disputes, and claims against the retailer who sold them the mobile home are not *80 material to the issues dispositive of this appeal.
Gregor sued both the retailer and Southern Energy. She alleged claims of intentional misrepresentation; fraud in the inducement; breach of warranty; negligent manufacture, design, or construction; negligent transportation; and negligent installation. Gregor also asked the trial court to declare void "any alleged agreement to arbitrate" between Gregor and Southern Energy.
Southern Energy answered and moved to stay the action and to compel arbitration of Gregor's claims. In support of its motion, it submitted a document entitled "SOUTHERN ENERGY WARRANTY LIMITED ONE-YEAR/FIVE-YEAR WARRANTY" containing the language of an arbitration agreement between the manufacturer and the purchaser. The warranty includes the following arbitration language:
Gregor did not object to the submission of this document. Thus, the record establishes Southern Energy's prima facie case for the existence of the agreement to arbitrate. TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 739 So. 2d 1110 (Ala.1999).
Southern Energy also submitted two affidavits by Don McNutt. Only one of these affidavits is material to the contested issues. It reads, in pertinent part:
Although Gregor submitted a brief in opposition to Southern Energy's motion to compel arbitration, she did not submit any evidentiary material in opposition to Southern Energy's motion.
Following argument of counsel, the trial court entered an order stating, in pertinent part, as follows:
Southern Energy appealed.
On appeal, Southern Energy contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to compel arbitration. Gregor argues that we should affirm the trial court *81 on two theories. The first is that Gregor never made any agreement to arbitrate. The second theory is that the Magnuson-Moss WarrantyFederal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Magnuson-Moss Act), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., invalidates the arbitration provisions in the Southern Energy warranty.
One of Gregor's arguments in support of her theory that she never made any agreement to arbitrate is that the affidavit of Don McNutt is "inadmissible hearsay" inasmuch as "no copies of any documents allegedly signed by Gregor were attached to this affidavit or submitted for the Court's consideration." Indeed, neither the warranty tickets nor the "books and records of Southern Energy Homes, Inc." to which Don McNutt's affidavit refers were submitted to the trial court for its consideration regarding Southern Energy's motion to compel arbitration. Southern Energy, however, argues that Gregor's failure to raise this hearsay challenge to the McNutt affidavit before the trial court forecloses consideration of this challenge by this Court.
On the one hand, this Court can affirm the ruling of a trial court for any valid reason, even one not presented to or considered by the trial court. Premiere Chevrolet, Inc. v. Headrick, 748 So. 2d 891 (Ala.1999); Southern United Fire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 736 So. 2d 582 (Ala.1999); Morrison v. Franklin, 655 So. 2d 964 (Ala. 1995); McKenzie Methane Corp. v. M-W Drilling, Inc., 653 So. 2d 982 (Ala.1995); Smith v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 537 So. 2d 463 (Ala.1988). On the other hand, the particular case now before us presents a compelling reason of fundamental fairness not to consider Gregor's belated challenge to the McNutt affidavit. Had Gregor challenged the affidavit before the trial court on the ground that the affidavit violated the hearsay rule or on the more apt ground that it violated the best evidence rule by presenting the substance of documents not in evidence without proving that those documents were lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable, Southern Energy likely could have remedied the defect simply by introducing its books and records as business records under Rule 803(6), Ala. R. Evid., and introducing the warranty tickets as Gregor's admissions under Rule 801(d)(2), Ala. R. Evid. Our considering Gregor's belated challenge to the affidavit would unfairly deprive Southern Energy of such an opportunity to remedy the defect.
Our recent case of Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131 (Ala.2000), addresses and defeats the remaining aspects of Gregor's two theories for affirming the denial of Southern Energy's motion to compel arbitration:
Therefore, on the authority of Ard, supra, we reverse the order denying Southern Energy's motion to compel arbitration and remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to vacate that order and to enter an order granting the motion, staying the court proceedings, and compelling arbitration.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, LYONS, and BROWN, JJ., concur.
SEE, J., concurs specially.
HOUSTON, COOK, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., dissent.
SEE, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur with the main opinion, but write specially to address the issue of the plaintiffs' challenge, raised for the first time on appeal, to the affidavit of Don McNutt. I agree that this Court should not consider the plaintiffs' belated challenge to the affidavit, and, in fact, I believe that this Court cannot consider the plaintiffs' belated challenge.
In the trial court, the plaintiffs did not object to the affidavit or move to strike it. Consequently, they waived any challenge to the admissibility of the affidavit, and, thus, failed to preserve that issue for this Court to review. See Carruth v. Pittway Corp., 643 So. 2d 1340, 1342 (Ala. 1994) ("[A] party challenging the admissibility of [an affidavit] must properly object to it; a failure to properly object in the trial court to the admissibility of such evidence results in a waiver of any objection to this Court's consideration of that evidence in reviewing a summary judgment."); McMillian v. Wallis, 567 So. 2d 1199, 1205 (Ala.1990) (holding that defendant-appellees waived any objection to this Court's consideration of evidence contained in an affidavit submitted by the *83 plaintiff-appellant in opposition to the defendant-appellees' motions for summary judgment because the defendant-appellees filed no motion to strike and entered no objections to that affidavit). Although this Court can affirm a trial court's judgment on any valid legal ground, even one raised for the first time on appeal, that ground must be supported by the record. As this Court stated in McMillan, Ltd. v. Warrior Drilling & Engineering Co., 512 So. 2d 14, 25 (Ala.1986): "[A]n appellee, though he files no cross-appeal or cross-petition, may offer in support of his judgment any argument that is supported by the record, whether it was ignored by the court below or flatly rejected." (Quotation marks omitted; citations omitted; emphasis added.) Therefore, this Court cannot consider the plaintiffs' challenge, unsupported by the record and raised for the first time on appeal, to the admissibility of the affidavit, even though that challenge is made in support of the trial court's judgment.
COOK, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent for the same reasons Justice Johnstone expressed in his dissenting opinion in Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131 (Ala.2000).
JOHNSTONE, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131 (Ala. 2000).
ENGLAND, J., concurs.