Case Title: Hart v. Idaho Tax Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: 38756

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (civil)

Date: 2012-04-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
Docket No. 38756 
 
PHILIP L. HART, 
 
       Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
IDAHO STATE TAX COMMISSION and 
IDAHO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS, 
 
       Respondents. 
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Boise, April 2012 Term 
 
2012 Opinion No. 70 
 
Filed:  April 26, 2012 
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Kootenai County.  Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. 
 
The decision of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Starr Kelso, Coeur d’Alene, argued for appellant. 
 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondents.  William 
A. Von Tagen argued. 
_____________________ 
 
J. JONES, Justice. 
This case involves Philip L. Hart’s appeal of an Idaho Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) 
decision.  Hart appealed two State Tax Commission Notice of Deficiency determinations to the 
BTA.  The BTA found Hart’s appeal untimely and therefore dismissed it.  Hart appealed to the 
district court, which likewise found his BTA appeal untimely and dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.  We affirm the district court. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
 
 The State Tax Commission (Commission) issued Hart two Notice of Deficiency (NOD) 
determinations on September 4, 2008.  One NOD covered tax years 1996 through 1998 and the 
other was for 1999 through 2004.  The Commission issued separate NODs because Hart paid no 
income taxes for the years 1996 through 1998. He apparently paid some taxes, but less than he 
 
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owed, for 1999 through 2004.  Hart protested the NODs and requested that the Commission make 
a redetermination, contending he had no outstanding tax liability.  Hart also requested an informal 
hearing before the Commission, which he delayed until July 2009.  After the hearing, and after 
Hart’s further delay and failure to provide additional relevant information in support of his protest, 
the Commission issued a decision on September 30, 2009, affirming and finalizing the NODs.  
Hart acknowledged receiving the Commission’s final decision on October 2, 2009.  The 
Commission’s final decision indicated that Hart owed $53,523 for unpaid taxes, penalties, and 
interest for tax years 1996 through 2004.  On December 31, 2009, Hart wrote the Commission, 
stating that he intended to appeal the NODs after the Idaho Legislature’s 2010 session.  Hart is a 
member of the Idaho State Legislature and he asserted that he therefore had a right to defer his 
appeal.   
On March 30, 2010, Hart sent a letter to the BTA entitled “Notice of Appeal to the Board 
of Tax Appeals.” Included with that letter were two checks, totaling $9,462.04, which Hart 
tendered as a portion of the cash bond necessary for his BTA appeal.  Hart recognized, however, 
that his outstanding tax liability, as specified in the NODs, required a bond greater than he 
submitted.  Hart thus asked the BTA to “consider [his] letter [a] promise to pay the remaining 
[amount].”  Hart’s March 30 letter did not include any specific objections to the Commission’s 
findings, but it did state that he would submit arguments in a subsequent filing.  On March 31, 
2010, Hart sent another letter to the BTA entitled “Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Board of Tax 
Appeals.”  That letter included Hart’s objections to the NODs.  The BTA, upon motion from the 
Commission, determined it lacked jurisdiction because it found Hart’s appeal untimely.  The BTA 
denied Hart’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal on September 24, 2010.   
 
On October 22, 2010, Hart filed an appeal of the BTA decision.  The district court, upon 
motion by the Commission, likewise determined it lacked jurisdiction, finding Hart’s BTA appeal 
untimely.  Hart filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied.  Hart then filed this 
appeal and asks this Court to determine whether the district court erred in dismissing his petition 
for lack of jurisdiction.  He also contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to 
reschedule a hearing on his motion to reconsider. 
 
 
 
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II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. 
The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Hart’s petition. 
 
On appeal, Hart contends that the district court employed an improper analysis to 
determine it lacked jurisdiction. The Commission and BTA respond that, regardless of how the 
court articulated the standard it used, the court had broad authority to determine whether it had 
jurisdiction.  
In every appeal, this Court must satisfy itself that the district court had jurisdiction.  See 
State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 47, 266 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2011). The Court is free to consider the 
question of subject matter jurisdiction even if the district court employed an improper analysis, 
or no analysis, on the issue.  See id.  Before a district court may exercise judicial review of an 
agency decision, there must be a statute granting a right of review.  See In re City of Shelley, 151 
Idaho 289, 292, 255 P.3d 1175, 1178 (2011).  Idaho Code § 63-3812(a) provides taxpayers 
aggrieved by a BTA decision the right to petition the district court for review, in accordance with 
I.R.C.P. 84.  However, “[p]ursuit of statutory administrative remedies is a condition precedent to 
judicial review.”  Park v. Banbury, 143 Idaho 576, 578, 149 P.3d 851, 853 (2006).  A party 
seeking judicial review must “run the full gamut of administrative proceedings before an 
application for judicial relief may be considered.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  To 
fully avail oneself of administrative proceedings, one must necessarily timely file and perfect his 
or her appeal.  A taxpayer may appeal decisions of the Commission by filing an appeal from an 
NOD with the BTA within ninety-one days after receiving the NOD.1  I.C. § 63-3049(a).  If the 
BTA had no opportunity to review the taxpayer’s appeal, there is no administrative decision for 
the district court to review and that court lacks jurisdiction.   
Here, Hart acknowledged receipt of the Commission’s decision affirming and finalizing 
the NODs on October 2, 2009.  Hart had until January 1, 2010—ninety-one days after receiving 
the Commission’s final decision—to file his appeal with the BTA.  Because January 1 was a 
holiday, and the next two days were weekend days, the BTA determined the appeal deadline to 
be Monday, January 4, 2010. It is undisputed that Hart sent his first “Notice of Appeal to the 
                                                 
1 Alternatively, a taxpayer may seek judicial review of the Commission’s redetermination decisions directly and thus 
bypass the BTA entirely.  I.C. § 63-3049(a).  But the same ninety-one day time limitation applies to petitions for 
review in district court as for appeals to the BTA.  I.C. § 63-3049(a).  
 
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Board of Tax Appeals” on March 30, 2010, nearly three months late.  In the BTA, Hart asserted 
that his untimely filing was excused because Article III, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution tolled the 
statutory ninety-one day time limit as to him.  According to Hart, legislative immunity saved him 
from having to file an appeal during the legislative session and the ten days just before the 
session.  The 2010 Session began on January 11.  So, Hart argued that January 4—the apparent 
deadline for his appeal—fell within the timeframe contemplated by Article III, § 7. 
As the district court recognized, the BTA accepted Hart’s argument arguendo but 
nonetheless found his filing untimely because his March 2010 “Notices of Appeal” failed to 
comply with the BTA’s rules for appeals.  The district court likewise assumed that, even if Hart’s 
time for filing was tolled during the legislative session, he still filed his “Notices of Appeal” late.  
That approach is understandable, since this Court has yet to address the merits of a legislative 
immunity argument like Hart’s.  But administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction, 
which depends entirely upon compliance with their statutory grant of power.  Washington Water 
Power Co. v. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, 99 Idaho 875, 879, 591 P.2d 122, 126 (1979).  The BTA 
was not authorized to assume jurisdiction if not statutorily provided for.  In other words, if Hart’s 
appeal should have been filed on January 4, 2010, the BTA was without jurisdiction to consider 
any of Hart’s filings after that.  It is therefore necessary to determine whether Hart’s legislative 
immunity argument has merit. 
 
Article III, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution privileges Idaho’s legislators from arrest and 
from liability to civil process during the legislative session.  Specifically, Section 7 provides: 
Senators and representatives in all cases, except for treason, felony, or breach of 
the peace, shall be privileged from arrest during the session of the legislature, and 
in going to and returning from the same, and shall not be liable to any civil 
process during the session of the legislature, nor during the ten days next before 
the commencement thereof . . . . 
 
Idaho Const. art. III, § 7.   
Hart contends, the word “process,” as used in Section 7, means “proceeding.”  At oral 
argument, Hart’s counsel characterized appeals from adverse rulings as legal proceedings subject 
to Section 7’s privilege.  According to Hart, a legislator is privileged from conforming to the 
typical time limits for appeals while the Legislature is in session, and the ten days before the 
legislative session.  Hart conceded that Section 7 cannot toll statutes of limitation for a legislator 
to file a new lawsuit, which he characterized as affirmative legal proceedings.  He was, however, 
 
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unable to articulate a meaningful distinction between affirmative legal proceedings, like a new 
law suit, and permissive appeals, like this case involves.   
 
Hart’s untenable argument flows from his misunderstanding of the word “process.”  In 
the legal context, “process” does not mean “proceeding.”  “Strictly speaking, [‘]process,’ as its 
etymology shows, is something issuing out of, or from a court or judge . . . .”  People v. Nash, 1 
Idaho 206, 210, 1868 WL 1944 (Idaho Terr. 1868).  See also Black’s Law Dictionary 1325 (9th 
ed. 2009) (defining “process” as “[a] summons or writ, esp. to appear or respond in court”); 
Webster’s II New College Dictionary 881–82 (1999) (defining “process,” when used in the legal 
context, as “[a] summons or writ ordering a defendant to appear in court”).  Idaho courts have 
broad authority to compel appearance before them, and to compel obedience to their orders and 
“process.”  See I.C. § 1-1603 (articulating the powers of every court in the state to enforce their 
authority); Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560, 566, 671 P.2d 473, 479 (1983) (discussing the 
authority of courts to compel compliance with their orders); Camp v. E. Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 
137 Idaho 850, 865, 55 P.3d 304, 319 (2002) (same).  See also I.C. § 8-201 et seq. (describing 
procedures for “Discharge of Persons Imprisoned on Civil Process” (emphasis added)). Court 
powers include, for example, the authority to jail people for “civil contempt.”  I.C. § 7-611; 
Camp, 137 Idaho at 865, 55 P.3d at 319.  “Process” also connotes the State’s authority to compel 
compliance with the law.  In Nash, the Territorial Supreme Court explained that “process,” as 
used in a criminal statute at issue there, referred to the sheriff’s official authority to carry out the 
law.  1 Idaho at 209, 1868 WL 1944.   
 
At the time Article III, § 7 was being considered and adopted at the constitutional 
convention, there were  a number of territorial statutes providing for arrest in civil actions, as 
well as the discharge of those arrestees from jail. CCP 1881, §§ 270−296, 783−794. Those 
provisions are currently codified in Chapters 1 and 2, Title 8, Idaho Code. While the Court 
certainly does not vouch for the continuing viability of any of the statutes, they are instructive as 
to the meaning of “civil process” at the time of the constitutional convention. Idaho Code § 8-
102 provides for the arrest of defendants in specified civil action settings. Chapter 2 is entitled 
“Discharge of Persons Imprisoned on Civil Process.” The code sections in Chapter 2 specify how 
a “person confined in jail on an execution issued on a judgment rendered in a civil action” may 
be discharged. I.C. § 8-201. Thus, it is clear that “civil process,” as used in Section 7, involves an 
element of compulsion, similar to arrest in a criminal proceeding. There is no indication 
 
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whatsoever that civil process contemplates a person taking an action to avail himself of benefits 
available through the judicial process, such as filing a lawsuit, filing an appeal of an adverse 
decision, and the like.   
 
Section 7 speaks of privilege from liability to civil process, not privilege from 
conformance with the rules governing permissive actions.  Idaho Const. art. III, § 7 (“Senators 
and representatives . . . shall not be liable to any civil process.” (emphasis added)).  “Liable” 
means being responsible or answerable in law; legally obligated.  Black’s Law Dictionary 998 
(9th ed. 2009); Webster’s II New College Dictionary 631 (1999).  Thus, Section 7 only 
privileges legislators from the legal obligation to answer to the government’s broad authority to 
compel compliance with its civil laws.  This interpretation makes sense because Section 7 also 
speaks of privilege from arrest for all but egregious criminal offenses—treason, felony, and 
breach of peace.  In sum, Article III, § 7 privileges legislators from unnecessary compulsion by 
the other branches of government, which may interfere with official legislative duties.   
 
In this case, Hart was not obligated to do anything but pay his taxes.  Neither the BTA, 
nor any other government official, tried to compel Hart’s appearance before a tribunal.  No court 
sought to hold Hart responsible for a new legal obligation.  No sheriff or other agent of the State 
sought to arrest Hart or compel him to appear anywhere or take any other action.  In other words, 
no one tried to hold Hart liable to civil process.  Rather, Hart sought to avail himself of BTA 
appeals procedures, which he had until January 4, 2010 to do.  He missed that deadline by almost 
three months.  In this instance, Hart is just a taxpayer, with no greater privilege than his 
constituents.  Because Hart failed to timely file his BTA appeal, he failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies.  Consequently, neither the BTA nor the district court had jurisdiction to 
consider any of his arguments about the legality or appropriateness of Idaho’s tax system. The 
district court assumed away a necessary threshold issue, but that court reached the right result.  
We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Hart’s petition for want of jurisdiction. 
B. 
The district court did not err by denying Hart’s motion to reschedule 
an oral argument. 
Hart argues that the district court erred by failing to reschedule an oral argument on a 
motion to reconsider.  Hart contends that due process somehow entitles him to be physically 
present at any hearing and to assist his lawyer give oral argument; and he asserts a right to 
unilaterally reschedule hearings to accommodate his calendar.  Because the district court lacked 
 
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jurisdiction to consider Hart’s petition, we need not reach this issue.  Furthermore, we will not 
entertain an issue that is “not supported by any cogent argument or authority.”  Bach v. Bagley, 
148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010).  Hart’s argument on this issue is devoid of 
reasoned analysis or relevant authority.   
C. 
The Commission and the BTA are entitled to fees on appeal. 
All parties request fees on appeal.  Hart, as the losing party, is not entitled to fees.  The 
Commission and the BTA seek fees under I.C. § 63-3049(d).  Section 63-3049(d) provides:  
Whenever it appears to the court that . . . [a] party’s position in [a] proceeding [for 
judicial review of the Commission] is frivolous or groundless[,] the court, in its 
discretion, may require the party which did not prevail to pay the prevailing party 
costs, expenses and attorney’s fees. 
 
I.C. § 63-3049(d).  See also Parker v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 148 Idaho 842, 850, 230 P.3d 
734, 742 (2010) (awarding attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 63-3049(d)).  Hart’s position 
here is groundless.  Hart’s theory of legislative immunity was based on an untenable reading of 
Article III, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution.  None of this Court’s decisions support his assertion 
that he had more than ninety-one days to file a BTA appeal, nor did Hart offer any reasoned 
basis for us to blaze a new trail in the law.  Accordingly, we award costs and fees to the 
Commission and the BTA. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The decision of the district court dismissing Hart’s petition is affirmed.  We award costs 
and fees on appeal to the respondents. 
 
 
Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices EISMANN, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.