Case Title: JACOB LOVATO V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0073

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
JACOB LOVATO V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 38228 P.3d 55Case Number: S-09-0073Decided: 03/26/2010Modified: 06/04/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
JACOB 
LOVATO,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County

The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Jacob 
Lovato entered a conditional guilty plea to two drug-related charges, reserving 
his right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion.  In this appeal, he challenges the 
district court's decision.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mr. Lovato 
presents this two-part issue:

 
 
The 
trial court erred in finding that (1) there was "probable cause" to conduct a 
traffic stop of Appellant's car; and (2) the scope of the traffic stop was 
not exceeded by the trooper's actions.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
This 
overview of the facts is based largely on the district court's decision letter, 
in which it explained why it was denying Mr. Lovato's suppression 
motion.  On the morning of March 19, 
2008, Trooper Jason Green of the Wyoming Highway Patrol was not on duty, but had 
stopped at his office to take care of some paperwork.  He was contacted by Special Agent Eric 
Ford of the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation, who had been tipped by a 
confidential informant that a man named Jacob Lovato was driving around town in 
a maroon-colored Buick sedan, and was in possession of a large amount of 
methamphetamine and cocaine.  
Trooper Green contacted Trooper Jacob Cheser, asked him to watch for the 
vehicle, and suggested making a traffic stop if Trooper Cheser could find a 
basis for it.  

 
 

[¶4]        
Trooper 
Cheser was in his patrol car when he saw a maroon Buick sedan coming toward him 
in the opposite lane of traffic.  As 
they passed, Trooper Cheser observed a crack in the windshield of the 
vehicle.  After passing, Trooper 
Cheser watched the vehicle in his rearview mirror, and noticed a tinted cover 
over the license plate.  He turned 
the patrol car around and followed the vehicle.  He was unable to read the license plate 
number until he was very close behind it.  
Trooper Cheser initiated a traffic stop based on the cracked windshield 
and the obscured license plate.  
After talking to Mr. Lovato, Trooper Cheser said he was going to 
issue him a warning ticket.

 
 

[¶5]        
While 
Trooper Cheser was in his patrol car filling out the warning ticket, Trooper 
Green arrived with his drug detection dog.  
Though he had not been on duty, he had received his supervisor's approval 
to have his dog sniff Mr. Lovato's vehicle.  According to Trooper Green, the dog 
alerted at the doors on both sides of the car.  Trooper Green informed Trooper Cheser, 
who asked Mr. Lovato and the passenger to get out of the car.  He patted them down for weapons, and 
found none.  He placed Mr. Lovato in 
Trooper Green's patrol car, and the passenger in his patrol car.  The Troopers then searched 
Mr. Lovato's car, and discovered a small digital scale with traces of white 
powder on it.  

 
 

[¶6]        
Suspecting 
that the white powder on the scale was an illegal drug, Trooper Green began 
questioning Mr. Lovato.  He 
conducted a more thorough pat-down search, but found nothing.  He told Mr. Lovato to return to his 
vehicle while Trooper Cheser finished writing the warning ticket.  As Mr. Lovato walked back to the car, 
Trooper Green observed that he walked stiff-legged with his hand holding his 
groin area.  Now suspicious that he 
had missed something during the pat-down search, Trooper Green asked Mr. Lovato 
to stop and place his hands on top of the patrol car.  Trooper Green shook Mr. Lovato's pants, 
and a pill bottle fell to the ground.  
Inside was a crystalline substance that turned out to be 
methamphetamine.

 
 

[¶7]        
Mr. 
Lovato was arrested.  Upon reaching 
the detention center, Trooper Green told Mr. Lovato that if he had any more 
illegal drugs with him, he could face additional charges if he took them into 
the detention center.  
Mr. Lovato indicated he had something in his right shoe.  Trooper Green removed the shoe, and 
inside it found a plastic bag containing 23 bindles of 
cocaine.

 
 

[¶8]        
At 
some time not specified in the record, Special Agent Bisceglia of the Wyoming 
Division of Criminal Investigation also arrived at the scene.  After Mr. Lovato's arrest, Agent 
Bisceglia drove Mr. Lovato's car to an impound area.  He testified that he also observed the 
crack in the windshield and the dark plastic cover over the rear license 
plate.

 
 

[¶9]        
Mr. 
Lovato was initially charged with two counts of felony possession of controlled 
substances, two counts of possession with intent to deliver, and four counts of 
conspiracy to deliver controlled substances.  Two of the conspiracy counts were soon 
dismissed by the prosecution.  Among 
other pre-trial pleadings, Mr. Lovato filed a motion to suppress, asserting that 
there was no probable cause for the traffic stop, so that his subsequent 
detention, the search of his car, and the search of his person were unreasonable 
in scope.  After a hearing was 
conducted, the district court denied the suppression motion.  Mr. Lovato pleaded guilty to one felony 
count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and one felony 
count of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, both in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007).  The prosecution dismissed the remaining 
counts.  Mr. Lovato was 
sentenced to two to eight years in prison.  
That sentence was suspended, and he was placed on three years of 
supervised probation.  

 
 

[¶10]     
Mr. Lovato 
entered the guilty pleas on the condition that he would be allowed to appeal the 
district court's denial of his suppression motion.  He has now brought his appeal before 
this Court.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶11]     
We 
apply this standard of review to resolve Mr. Lovato's 
issues:

 
 
When 
we review a district court's decision to deny motions to suppress, we defer to 
the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 8, 
146 P.3d 492, 495 (Wyo. 2006); O'Boyle v. 
State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2005).  "The evidence is viewed in a light 
favorable to the district court's determination, because that court had the 
opportunity to hear the evidence and assess the credibility of the 
witnesses."  Hicks v. State, 2008 WY 83, ¶ 13, 
187 P.3d 877, 880 (Wyo. 2008).  The 
issue of law  whether a search was unreasonable and in violation of 
constitutional rights  is reviewed de 
novo. Fertig, ¶ 8, 146 P.3d  
at 495; McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Wyo. 1999).

 
 

Yoeuth 
v. State, 
2009 WY 61, ¶ 16, 206 P.3d 1278, 1282 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶12]     
Mr. 
Lovato contends that the outcome of his case is the same under state or federal 
constitutional analysis.  In his 
brief he chose to "focus on federal constitutional principles, as adopted and 
recognized by this Court."  The 
principles applicable here have been stated as follows:  

 
 
The 
Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 A routine traffic stop constitutes 
a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "even though the purpose of 
the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief."  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 
64 P.3d 700, 704 (Wyo. 2003 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 
99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979)).  Because a traffic stop is more analogous 
to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest, the reasonableness of 
such stops [is] analyzed under the two-part test articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968):  
(1) whether the initial stop was justified; and (2) whether the officer's actions during the 
detention were "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified 
the interference in the first instance."  
Damato, ¶ 9, 
64 P.3d  at 705.

 
 

Garvin 
v. State, 
2007 WY 190, ¶ 13, 172 P.3d 725, 728-29 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
Was 
the initial stop justified?

 

[¶13]     
Mr. 
Lovato's initial contact with Trooper Cheser was an investigatory traffic stop, 
not an arrest.  The distinction is 
significant because it takes less to justify a traffic stop than an 
arrest.

 
 
For 
Fourth Amendment purposes, we recognize three tiers of interaction between 
police and citizens.  Custer [v. State, 2006 WY 72], ¶ 13, 135 
P.3d [620,] 624-25 [(Wyo. 2006)].  
See also, Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 691-92 
(Wyo. 1993). The least intrusive contact between a citizen and police is a 
consensual encounter. Custer, 
¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 624-25.  A 
consensual encounter is not a seizure and does not implicate Fourth Amendment 
protections. The second tier is the investigatory or Terry stop, named after the 
seminal case Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).  An investigatory detention is a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d  at 624-25. 
 However, because of its limited 
nature, a law enforcement officer is only required to show "the presence of 
specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime" 
in order to justify the detention.  Id., quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 (Wyo. 
1994).  The most intrusive encounter 
between police and a citizen is an arrest.  An arrest "requires justification by 
probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a 
crime.'"  Id. at 625, quoting Wilson, 874 P.2d at 
[220].

 
 

Flood 
v. State, 
2007 WY 167, ¶ 14, 169 P.3d 538, 543-44 (Wyo. 2007).  Thus, Trooper Cheser was justified in 
stopping Mr. Lovato if he had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Lovato had 
committed or may be committing a crime.

 
 

[¶14]     
Trooper 
Cheser readily admitted that this stop was prompted by the information provided 
by the confidential informant that Mr. Lovato was carrying illegal drugs.  Trooper Cheser believed that this 
information, by itself, was insufficient to justify a stop.  Accordingly, in his words, "I knew I 
would have to develop my own probable cause."1  However, as the district court 
accurately noted, an officer is permitted to make a traffic stop if he 
personally observes a traffic violation, without regard to his subjective 
intent.  Hernandez v. State, 2010 WY 33, 
¶ 8, 227 P.3d 315, 319 (Wyo. 2010), citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 
116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996), and Fertig, ¶ 28, 146 P.3d  at 
501.

 
 

[¶15]     
Trooper 
Cheser testified that he observed two traffic violations.  Almost as soon as he spotted Mr. 
Lovato's car, he "could see the sunlight glinting off of a crack on the 
windshield on the upper left side of the windshield."  This, Trooper Cheser testified, 
suggested a possible violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-955(a), which 
provides that "No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any . . . crack 
within the front windshield . . . which materially obstructs, obscures or  impairs the driver's clear view."  A short time later, Trooper Cheser 
observed that he was unable to read the car's rear license plate number because 
of "a dark-tinted license plate cover on the rear license plate."  This, Trooper Cheser testified, 
suggested a possible violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-205(a)(i), which 
requires license plates to be displayed and maintained so as to be "plainly 
visible." 

 
 

[¶16]     
Mr. 
Lovato points out in his appeal, as he did vigorously to the district court, 
that there were inconsistencies in the testimony about the crack in the 
windshield.  Trooper Cheser said it 
was "on the upper left side of the windshield," and estimated it was 
approximately three to four inches long.  Agent Bisceglia was uncertain about the 
location of the crack, but thought it was "going down the center and possibly 
across the top."  Mr. Lovato's wife 
testified that the crack was "on the lower driver's side of the windshield [by] 
the window wipers, by where the defrost would be."  She also testified that the crack was 
only about two inches long.  Mr. 
Lovato also testified that the crack was "on the lower windshield of the 
driver's side," and agreed that it was about two inches long.  Neither the prosecution nor the defense 
offered a photograph or other evidence to resolve these conflicts in the 
testimony.

 
 

[¶17]     
After 
hearing the evidence, the district court found that "Trooper Cheser observed a 
crack in the Buick sedan's windshield."  
The district court acknowledged the conflicting testimony about the size 
and location of the crack, but wrote that:

 
 
the 
exact position of the windshield crack is immaterial in determining whether 
Trooper Cheser possessed the necessary level of suspicion to stop [Mr.] 
Lovato.  The uncontroverted fact is 
that a windshield crack existed that was noticeable from both the interior and 
exterior of the vehicle.

 
 
We 
will defer to the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  "A finding is clearly 
erroneous when, even though substantial evidence supports it, the reviewing 
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was 
made."  Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 
2008 WY 2, ¶ 10, 181 P.3d 43, 49 (Wyo. 2008).  It is uncontroverted that the crack was 
there and visible.  Trooper Cheser 
testified that he saw it.  Given 
this evidence, we are not convinced that the district court made a mistake. 

 
 

[¶18]     
There 
was also conflicting evidence about whether the cracked windshield was actually 
one of the reasons Trooper Cheser made the traffic stop.  The report prepared by the Trooper on 
the day Mr. Lovato was stopped made no mention of the crack in the 
windshield.  Trooper Cheser 
testified that he told Mr. Lovato he was being stopped "for an obscured 
license plate as well as a cracked windshield," but Mr. Lovato testified 
that Trooper Cheser mentioned only the license plate and "never said anything 
about the windshield."  In addition, 
Mr. Lovato's carbon copy of the warning ticket indicated that the warning 
was for a license plate violation, with the words "window violation" written in 
separately in ink.  Trooper Cheser 
admitted that he initially wrote the ticket only for the license plate 
violation, and that he added the words "window violation" later.  He did not specify how much later.  Mr. Lovato testified that he received his 
copy of the warning ticket while he was in jail the day after he was 
arrested.  

 
 

[¶19]     
After 
considering the conflicting evidence, the district court found that the cracked 
windshield was one of the reasons Trooper Cheser had stopped Mr. Lovato.  Again, we must defer to that finding 
unless it is clearly erroneous.  The 
finding is consistent with the Trooper's testimony.  Mr. Lovato's evidence to the 
contrary is sufficiently persuasive that the district court might reasonably 
have found in his favor.  It did 
not, and as the appellate court, we cannot say that the finding is clearly 
erroneous.

 
 

[¶20]     
Evidence 
about the license plate cover is also troublesome.  According to Trooper Cheser, he could 
not read the license plate on the back of Mr. Lovato's car, but could read 
the one on the front "just fine."  
According to both Mr. Lovato and his wife, there were identical 
license plate covers on the front and the back of the car.  In addition, Trooper Cheser described 
the license plate as "dark-tinted," and testified that the date sticker on the 
upper left corner of the license plate was "covered by the frame of the license 
plate protector."  The actual 
license plate cover was accepted into evidence during the suppression hearing, 
and it is contained in our record on review.  It is the same translucent plastic 
material throughout, with no frame that could have blocked Trooper Cheser's view 
of the date sticker.  While the 
plastic is not entirely transparent, it is a stretch to describe it as 
dark-tinted.

 
 

[¶21]     
The 
plastic is shiny, however, and it is conceivable that in some angles of 
sunlight, the combination of glare and tinting could make the license plate 
harder to read.  Trooper Cheser did 
not mention the angle of the sunlight or any other such details, but he did 
testify unequivocally that the license plate cover obscured his view of the 
license plate on the rear of Mr. Lovato's car.  We are not in a position to assess the 
credibility of this testimony, or to weigh it against the conflicting 
evidence.  The district court was in 
that position, and it found that:  

 
 
Trooper 
Cheser observed a crack in the Buick sedan's windshield.  After passing the vehicle, Trooper 
Cheser watched the vehicle in his rearview mirror and observed a tinted cover 
over the license plate, preventing him from reading the license plate number in 
his rearview mirror, at least from that distance.

 
 
We 
are not definitely and firmly convinced that these factual findings were 
mistaken.

 
 

[¶22]     
Based 
on these findings of fact, the district court concluded "that Trooper Cheser 
possessed more than the necessary reasonable suspicion to stop [Mr.] Lovato; 
Trooper Cheser possessed probable cause because he personally observed [Mr.] 
Lovato driving the Buick sedan in violation of two statutes."  Having deferred to the district court's 
findings of fact, we conclude that they were sufficient to provide Trooper 
Cheser with the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop Mr. Lovato.  The initial stop was 
justified.

 
 
Were 
the officer's actions during the detention reasonable in 
scope?

 
 

[¶23]     
Trooper 
Cheser's stated reasons for the traffic stop were the crack in the windshield 
and an obscured license plate.  Mr. 
Lovato contends that Trooper Cheser's questioning of him was wholly unrelated to 
either of these potential traffic offenses, and therefore unreasonable in 
scope.  He speculates that if 
Trooper Cheser had not extended the detention by his questions, it is plausible 
that Mr. Lovato would have been able to leave the scene before Trooper Green and 
the drug detection dog arrived.

 
 

[¶24]     
Mr. 
Lovato is correct that a traffic stop must be of reasonably short duration, and 
that there are limits to the questions that may be asked of the detained 
driver.

 
 
An 
investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer than necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the detention must be 
carefully tailored to its underlying justification.  During a routine traffic stop, a law 
enforcement officer may request the driver's proof of insurance, operating 
license, and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation or 
warning.  The officer may detain the 
driver and his vehicle only for the period of time reasonably necessary to 
complete these routine matters.  
Once the driver has produced a valid driver's license and proof that he 
is entitled to operate the vehicle, he must be allowed to proceed without 
further delay.  During the stop, an 
officer generally may not ask the detained motorist questions unrelated to the 
purpose of the stop, including questions about controlled substances, unless the 
officer has reasonable suspicion of other illegal 
activities.

 
 

Campbell 
v. State, 
2004 WY 106, ¶ 12, 97 P.3d 781, 784-85 (Wyo. 2004) (internal citations, 
punctuation, and footnote omitted).

 
 

[¶25]     
According 
to the dispatch records kept by the Wyoming Highway Patrol, Trooper Cheser 
initiated the traffic stop of Mr. Lovato at 11:01:23 a.m.  Trooper Green arrived at the scene at 
11:05:38, and reported by radio at 11:06:09 that his drug detection dog had 
alerted on Mr. Lovato's car.  
Mr. Lovato concedes that the drug detection dog's alert gave the 
Troopers probable cause to detain him further, search his car, and subsequently 
search his person.  Thus, the 
initial detention that Mr. Lovato challenges lasted only from the initiation of 
the traffic stop until the drug detection dog alerted, a total of four minutes 
and forty-six seconds.  We agree 
with the district court's conclusion that the "limited amount of time that 
Trooper Cheser was in verbal contact with [Mr.] Lovato" does not indicate that 
Mr. Lovato's initial detention was unreasonably prolonged.  Compare Kunselman v. State, 2008 WY 85, 
¶ 15, 188 P.3d 567, 570 (Wyo. 2008) ("initial traffic detention lasting 
about ten minutes" not unreasonable); Seymour v. State, 2008 WY 61, ¶ 20, 
185 P.3d 671, 677 (Wyo. 2008) (being "detained for less than 15 minutes" not 
unreasonable).  

 
 

[¶26]     
As 
to the subject matter of the questions, Trooper Cheser testified that he "asked 
the driver several questions regarding his trip, as far as his origin  his 
origin and destination."  After 
identifying the passenger, Trooper Cheser asked Mr. Lovato "to clarify the 
question as far as where he was coming from and where he was headed to."  Trooper Cheser then went back to his 
patrol car to write out the warning ticket.  Mr. Lovato's testimony confirmed 
that Trooper Cheser asked where he was coming from and where he was going.  

 
 

[¶27]     
We 
have previously recognized travel plans "as an acceptable area of inquiry during 
a traffic stop."  O'Boyle, ¶ 48, 117 P.3d  at 414.  However, extensive and prolonged inquiry 
into the details of a detained driver's travel plans may be unreasonable.  Id., ¶ 58, 117 P.3d  at 417.  There is no rule specifically 
prohibiting or allowing questions about travel plans.  The rule "is one of reasonableness under 
the totality of the circumstances."  
Id.

 
 

[¶28]     
There 
is no indication that Trooper Cheser used these questions to prolong 
Mr. Lovato's detention unreasonably.  
At least one federal court has written that "an 
officer may question a traffic-stop detainee on any topic without 
reasonable and articulable suspicion so long as the questioning does not prolong 
the stop."  United States v. 
Malouff, 114 Fed. Appx. 975, 979 (10th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added), quoted 
in O'Boyle, ¶ 51, 117 P.3d  at 
415.  Mr. Lovato's detention 
was prolonged, and his car was searched, not because of his questioning by 
Trooper Cheser, but because the drug detecting dog alerted on his car.  Having considered the totality of the 
circumstances, we cannot say that the district court erred in concluding that 
Trooper Cheser's questioning of Mr. Lovato was reasonable.  

 
 

[¶29]     
We 
affirm the district court's denial of Mr. Lovato's suppression 
motion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Because of Trooper Cheser's misstatement, we note again that he did not 
need probable cause to make a traffic stop.  He needed only reasonable 
suspicion.