Case Title: Mansaray v. State

Citation: 2014-Ohio-750

Docket Number: 2012-1727

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Mansaray v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-750.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-750 
MANSARAY, APPELLEE, v. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Mansaray v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-750.] 
Action against state for wrongful imprisonment—R.C. 2743.48(A)(5)—Error in 
procedure resulting in release. 
(No. 2012-1727—Submitted October 8, 2013—Decided March 5, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 98171,  
2012-Ohio-3376. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When a defendant seeks a declaration that he is a wrongfully imprisoned 
individual and seeks to satisfy R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) by proving that an error 
in procedure resulted in his release, the error in procedure must have 
occurred subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to 
imprisonment. 
____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} Yanko Mansaray, appellee, asserts that he is a wrongfully 
imprisoned individual.  We conclude to the contrary because he has not satisfied 
R.C. 2743.48(A)(5), and we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 2} The circumstances surrounding Mansaray’s convictions underlying 
this civil case are described in the appellate court decision that reversed the 
convictions.  State v. Mansaray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93562, 2010-Ohio-5119.  
In 2010, United States marshals had a warrant to arrest Rodney Williams.  Acting 
on a reasonable belief that they would find him at appellee Yanko Mansaray’s 
house, the marshals entered and searched for Williams.  Instead of Williams, they 
found a large quantity of ecstasy pills.  Based on this evidence, which Mansaray 
moved to suppress at trial, Mansaray was convicted of a drug offense and a 
related offense and sentenced to 11 years in prison. 
{¶ 3} In late 2010, his convictions were reversed.  The court of appeals 
concluded that the ecstasy pills found in his house should have been suppressed at 
trial.  The court stated that the warrant issued for the arrest of Rodney Williams 
did not authorize the marshals to search Mansaray’s house.  According to his 
complaint, Mansaray was released on bond, and the charges against him were 
ultimately dismissed. 
{¶ 4} Mansaray subsequently filed the complaint in this case, asserting, 
pursuant to R.C. 2743.48, that he is a wrongfully imprisoned individual.  The trial 
court dismissed his complaint.  The court of appeals reversed, concluding that 
Mansaray satisfied all five requirements of R.C. 2743.48(A)(1) through (5).  The 
state of Ohio appealed, and we accepted jurisdiction. 
ANALYSIS 
{¶ 5} The issue in this case is whether Mansaray is a “wrongfully 
imprisoned individual” as defined in R.C. 2743.48(A).  In Doss v. State, 135 Ohio 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
St.3d 211, 2012-Ohio-5678, 985 N.E.2d 1229, paragraph one of the syllabus, we 
stated that “[o]ne who claims to be a ‘wrongfully imprisoned individual’ under 
R.C. 2743.48 must prove all of the factors in R.C. 2743.48(A) by a preponderance 
of the evidence before seeking compensation from the state for wrongful 
imprisonment.”  Because our conclusion with respect to R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) is 
dispositive, we will not address R.C. 2743.48(A)(1) through (4). 
R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) 
{¶ 6} When Mansaray was in prison and when he filed his complaint, 
R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) set forth the fifth element of the definition of “wrongfully 
imprisoned individual” as follows: 
 
Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to 
imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individual’s 
release, or it was determined by a court of common pleas that the 
offense of which the individual was found guilty, including all 
lesser-included offenses, either was not committed by the 
individual or was not committed by any person. 
 
2002 Sub.S.B. No 149, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3545, and 2010 Sub.H.B. No. 
338. 
{¶ 7} “The fifth factor of R.C. 2743.48(A) may be fulfilled in one of two 
ways:  (1) subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment ‘an 
error in procedure resulted in the individual’s release’ or (2) the charged offense 
(and any lesser included offense) was not committed by the individual or no crime 
was committed at all (actual innocence).”  Doss at ¶ 12.  In this case, Mansaray 
has not alleged a claim of actual innocence.  Accordingly, we will focus, as the 
court of appeals did, on the first method of satisfying R.C. 2743.48(A)(5). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
{¶ 8} The plain and ordinary meaning of the language in the statute—
“Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an error in 
procedure resulted in the individual’s release”—is clear and unambiguous.  See 
Coventry Towers, Inc. v. Strongsville, 18 Ohio St.3d 120, 122, 480 N.E.2d 412 
(1985).  Nevertheless, the parties proffer vastly different interpretations.  It is 
obvious that to satisfy the provision something must happen subsequent to 
sentencing and imprisonment.  The state’s version is that the subsequent event is 
an error in procedure that occurs after sentencing and during or after 
imprisonment.  Mansaray’s version is that the subsequent event is a judicial 
determination that an error occurred, even if that error occurred prior to 
sentencing and imprisonment. 
The state’s interpretation of R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) is correct 
{¶ 9} The state’s version is the meaning that is obvious and common in 
large part because in the state’s version, the introductory phrase modifies “error in 
procedure,” the noun phrase closest to it.  Youngstown Club v. Porterfield, 21 
Ohio St.2d 83, 86, 255 N.E.2d 262 (1970).  In Mansaray’s version, the 
introductory phrase modifies a noun phrase that doesn’t appear in the statute: “a 
judicial determination that an error in procedure occurred.”  It is axiomatic that 
we will not insert words into a statute unless it is absolutely necessary, which it is 
not in this case.  Bernardini v. Conneaut Area City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 58 
Ohio St.2d 1, 4, 387 N.E.2d 1222 (1979).  Nothing in the language of the statute 
suggests, even indirectly, that the subsequent event is a judicial determination 
than an error occurred. 
{¶ 10} Although Mansaray’s version may be consistent with a reasonable 
or, in any event, a possible legislative objective, it is not an objective that is 
apparent.  Nothing in the statute indicates that the General Assembly intended to 
open the state to liability for wrongful imprisonment when a conviction is 
reversed based on a procedural error that occurred prior to sentencing.  
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
Mansaray’s interpretation would greatly expand the ability of defendants to seek 
compensation for wrongful imprisonment.  If that is indeed what the General 
Assembly intended, it did a remarkable job of keeping it to itself—and it will be 
able to enact such legislation upon learning that we do not think that it has already 
done so. 
{¶ 11} Finally, one last flaw in Mansaray’s version of R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) 
is that this section of the statute will always be satisfied when a defendant satisfies 
R.C. 2743.48(A)(1) through (4).  When a defendant who satisfies R.C. 
2743.48(A)(1) through (4) is released based on a determination that there has 
been an error in procedure, the determination will necessarily have occurred 
subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment.  We consider 
that to be an absurd result, which is to be avoided.  Although satisfying R.C. 
2743.48(A)(5) would not mean that a defendant is necessarily a wrongfully 
imprisoned individual, because a defendant would still have to satisfy R.C. 
2743.48(A)(1) through (4), Mansaray’s version of R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) would 
swallow the actual-innocence part of the provision, rendering it superfluous.  
Nothing in the statute suggests that the General Assembly intended that result. 
{¶ 12} We conclude that when a defendant seeks a declaration that he is a 
wrongfully imprisoned individual and seeks to satisfy R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) by 
proving that an error in procedure resulted in his release, the error in procedure 
must have occurred subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to 
imprisonment. 
State’s propositions of law 
{¶ 13} The state’s first proposition of law states, “The Fourth 
Amendment’s exclusionary rule is inapplicable to a subsequent civil proceeding 
for wrongful imprisonment under R.C. 2743.48.”  Given our analysis above, it is 
unnecessary for us to reach a conclusion with respect to this proposition of law, 
and we decline to embrace its categorical conclusion. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 14} The state’s second proposition of law states, “R.C. 2743.48(A)(5) 
bars an action for wrongful imprisonment when the claimant’s alleged ‘error in 
procedure’ is a trial court’s denial of claimant’s motion to suppress evidence that 
is subsequently reversed and the State elects to not retry the Defendant/Claimant.”  
We also find it unnecessary to specifically address this proposition of law.  Our 
analysis indicates that this proposition of law is in effect adopted because we 
cannot conceive of a situation in which a denial of a motion to suppress evidence 
would occur subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment.  
Nevertheless, we are not inclined to endorse such a far-reaching proposition when 
it is not necessary to do so. 
{¶ 15} The state’s third proposition of law states, “Trial courts must not 
sua sponte take judicial notice of testimony or evidence in an underlying criminal 
proceeding when hearing a subsequent civil action for wrongful imprisonment 
under R.C. 2743.48.”  Again, given our analysis of R.C. 2743.48, it is not 
necessary to a resolution of this case for us to discuss this proposition of law. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 16} We conclude that the error in procedure, if that is what led to 
Mansaray’s release from prison, did not occur subsequent to sentencing and 
during or subsequent to imprisonment.  Accordingly, Mansaray has not satisfied 
R.C. 2743.48(A)(5), which means that on the facts of this case, he is not a 
wrongfully imprisoned individual.  We reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
Friedman & Gilbert and Terry H. Gilbert, for appellee. 
January Term, 2014 
7 
 
Timothy J. McGinty, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian 
R. Gutkoski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
________________________