Case Title: Adkins v. Lawson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Adkins v. Lawson1995 WY 41892 P.2d 128Case Number: 94-176Decided: 03/17/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Eleanor ADKINS, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Gayle Marie LAWSON, Executrix of the Estate of Walter 
William Washut, Appellee (Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Sheridan County, John C. Brackley, 
J.

Hardy H. Tate, Sheridan, for appellant.

Anthony T. Wendtland of 
Davis and Cannon, Sheridan, for 
appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and 
LEHMAN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Eleanor 
Adkins appeals from an order which granted a partial summary judgment in favor 
of Appellee Gayle Lawson, the executrix of the estate of Walter Washut (the 
estate). Adkins was seeking compensation for the work and services she had 
performed over a period of several years for Washut.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

Issues

[¶3]      Adkins presents 
four issues:

I.          
Does the requirement of the Dead Man Statute for corroboration of 
evidence come into play in the Summary Judgment stage in a proceeding? 

II.          
Do the facts presented regarding the services performed by the appellant 
at the request of and on behalf of the decedent present a valid quantum meruit 
claim under Wyoming law?

III.         Do 
the facts presented regarding oral promises to leave everything in a will and 
provide for the plaintiff present a valid express contract claim under Wyoming 
law?

IV.        Do the 
facts presented regarding livestock partnership present a valid claim under 
Wyoming law?

Facts

[¶4]      Adkins and Washut 
began dating in 1975. A few months later, Washut asked Adkins to marry him, but 
she refused his proposal. In 1980, after he had suffered a heart attack and had 
become unable to care for himself, Washut asked Adkins to move to his ranch 
located outside of Sheridan. Adkins agreed to do so and moved to the ranch where 
she began living with Washut seven days a week. Several of Adkins's children and 
grandchildren also occasionally lived at the ranch. Even though Adkins lived 
with Washut at the ranch, she kept her house in Sheridan and continued to work 
full time at her jobs in Sheridan.

[¶5]      When Adkins was 
not working at her jobs, she performed various services for Washut. She gave the 
following examples of the services which she performed:

I 
took total care of all stock. I had to feed, water, pull them in from the 
pasture. I did the baling. I drove his tractor. If he had to take a bath, I take 
him and give him a bath. If he shaved, I had to shave him. He chose not to 
unless I did it for him. I cooked the meals. The meals were ready and available 
at times. I set his prescriptions. I set his shots. I took him to the VA; I 
brought him home; went for rides at his request. Essentially, anything that 
needed to be done that he did not feel - or feel up to at that point, I 
did.

Adkins also cleaned Washut's 
house, cleaned up messes which he made because of his lack of control of his 
bladder and his bowels, helped him operate his wild game processing business, 
worked in his garden, painted the trim on his house, and bought and washed his 
clothes. In addition, Adkins's children and grandchildren performed chores at 
the ranch.

[¶6]      Adkins did not 
charge Washut for the services which she performed, and she did not maintain a 
record of the hours she spent working for him at the ranch. She also did not pay 
for utilities at the ranch, and she did not pay rent to Washut. While Adkins 
lived at the ranch, she and Washut slept in separate bedrooms, but they had a 
loving relationship, and they "shared more than most couples that were married." 
According to Adkins, Washut told her on numerous occasions that "everything 
would be taken care of" and that she would never have to leave the ranch. 
Adkins, however, admitted that her motivation for performing the services for 
Washut was that she loved him and cared for him.

[¶7]      Washut died in 
September 1992. His Last Will and Testament contained only one clause which 
pertained to Adkins: "I give, bequeath and devise, to my friend, Elly Adkins, 
ten (10) cows of her choosing from the cattle I own at the time of my 
death."

[¶8]      Adkins filed a 
complaint in which she asserted four claims against the estate: (1) that Washut 
was indebted to Adkins for services which she had rendered for him; (2) that 
Washut had promised to reimburse Adkins for her services through his will and 
that the will failed to provide compensation for her services; (3) that Adkins 
and Washut jointly owned the livestock on Washut's ranch and that Adkins was 
entitled to receive a share of the proceeds from the sale of the livestock; and 
(4) that Adkins had incurred expenses on behalf of Washut after he died. Adkins 
stipulated that she brought her first claim upon the theory of quantum meruit for the services which 
she had performed and that she based her second claim upon Washut's express 
promise to compensate her for her services. Adkins did not claim that the will 
was invalid.

[¶9]      The estate filed 
an answer in which it generally denied the allegations in Adkins's complaint and 
asserted several affirmative defenses. The estate also asserted counterclaims 
for the value of the services which Washut had performed for Adkins and her 
children and grandchildren and for the conversion of property which Adkins had 
removed from the ranch after Washut died.

[¶10]   The estate filed a motion which 
sought a summary judgment on Adkins's first three claims.1 The district court granted the 
estate's motion for a partial summary judgment, and Adkins brought this 
appeal.

Standard 
of Review

[¶11]   "Summary judgment is appropriate 
when no genuine issue of material fact exists and when the prevailing party is 
entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law." Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 884 P.2d 968, 971 (Wyo. 1994). See also W.R.C.P. 56(c).

A 
genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proved, would 
have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of 
action or defense asserted by the parties. The party moving for summary judgment 
bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for a summary 
judgment. If the movant carries this burden, the party opposing the summary 
judgment must come forward with specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine 
issue of material fact does exist.

Thunder Hawk by and through 
Jensen v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 844 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Wyo. 1992) 
(citation omitted). We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable 
to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. Kilmer v. 
Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 860 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Wyo. 1993). We evaluate the 
propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the 
same materials as were employed and used by the lower court. Thunder Hawk by and 
through Jensen, 844 P.2d  at 1047.

Dead Man's 
Statute

[¶12]   In support of its motion for a 
partial summary judgment, the estate claimed that the statements which Adkins 
attributed to Washut as being evidence of his intent to compensate her were 
uncorroborated. The estate argued in part that, under the dead man's statute, 
WYO. STAT. § 1-12-102 (1988), the uncorroborated statements which Adkins 
attributed to Washut could not be used as a basis to deny its motion. The 
district court cited the dead man's statute as being the reason for its decision 
to grant the partial summary judgment. The dead man's statute states in 
part:

In an action or suit . . . against a person who from 
any cause is incapable of testifying, or . . . against a[n] . . . executor . . . 
of the person incapable of testifying, no judgment . . . founded on 
uncorroborated testimony shall be rendered in favor of a party whose interests 
are adverse to the person incapable of testifying or his . . . executor. . . 
.

Section 
1-12-102.

[¶13]   Adkins now claims that the partial 
summary judgment should be reversed because of our recent holding in Drake v. 
Winkler, 838 P.2d 1177 (Wyo. 1992), where we said:

The requirement of corroboration of evidence against 
a party incapable of testifying under the [dead man's] statute should not come 
into play at the summary judgment stage. At this point we debate only the 
existence or nonexistence of material facts surrounding the 
controversy.

838 P.2d  at 1180. Adkins 
argues that the holding in Drake is directly in point and that the partial 
summary judgment should be reversed. We disagree.

[¶14]   The record in this case 
demonstrates that it is not necessary for us to rely upon the dead man's statute 
in upholding the partial summary judgment. We will sustain a summary judgment 
under any legal theory which is properly supported by the record. Equality Bank 
of Evansville, Wyoming v. Suomi, 836 P.2d 325, 328 (Wyo. 1992). The next section 
of this opinion will illustrate that, even without the dead man's statute coming 
into play at the summary judgment stage, Adkins's statements did not create 
material questions of fact which precluded the entry of a summary 
judgment.

Unjust 
Enrichment

[¶15]   Adkins asserts that the partial 
summary judgment should be reversed because the facts which she presented 
supported her cause of action for unjust enrichment.

[¶16]   The doctrine of unjust enrichment 
provides for the recovery of damages on a contract implied in equity. State v. 
BHP Petroleum Company, Inc., 804 P.2d 671, 672 n. 3 (Wyo. 
1991).

"`The phrase "unjust enrichment" is used in law to 
characterize the result or effect of a failure to make restitution of, or for, 
property or benefits received under such circumstances as to give rise to a 
legal or equitable obligation to account therefor. It is a general principle, 
underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, that one person should not be 
permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another, but should be 
required to make restitution of or for property or benefits received, retained, 
or appropriated, where it is just and equitable that such restitution be made, 
and where such action involves no violation or frustration of law or opposition 
to public policy, either directly or indirectly.'"

R.O. Corporation v. John H. Bell Iron Mountain Ranch 
Company, 781 P.2d 910, 912 (Wyo. 1989) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 66 Am.Jur.2d, 
Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3 at 945 (1973)).

804 P.2d  at 672-73. A party 
who is seeking damages on the basis of unjust enrichment must prove four 
elements:

"(1)      Valuable services were 
rendered, or materials furnished,

"(2)      to the party to be 
charged,

"(3)      which services or 
materials were accepted, used and enjoyed by the party, 
and,

"(4)      under such 
circumstances which reasonably notified the party to be charged that the 
plaintiff, in rendering such services or furnishing such materials, expected to 
be paid by the party to be charged. Without such payment, the party would be 
unjustly enriched."

Zitterkopf v. Bradbury, 783 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Wyo. 1989) (quoting Johnson v. Anderson, 768 P.2d 18, 25 (Wyo. 
1989)). See also Bowles v. Sunrise Home Center, Inc., 847 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶17]   The estate and Adkins do not 
dispute whether the first three elements have been proven. The estate claims 
that under the fourth element Adkins cannot recover for unjust enrichment 
because she cared for Washut in a gratuitous family relationship. We 
agree.

[¶18]   In its motion for a partial summary 
judgment, the estate relied in part on Adkins's deposition testimony in which 
the following colloquy transpired between the attorney for the estate and 
Adkins:

Q.        But the 
reason you were there and the reason you didn't pay Walt for room and utilities 
and the reason you helped Walt was because you loved him; isn't that right, Ms. 
Adkins?

A.        That's 
true. And because he - we had the relationship and he wanted the 
help.

Q.        Your 
motivation was because you cared for Walt Washut?

A.        That's 
right.

Adkins also stated in her 
deposition: "I chose [to help Washut] because I loved Walt. And I chose it 
because he requested it. And we had the relationship that we were very close." 
By relying upon Adkins's deposition, the estate clearly established that Adkins 
had performed the services for Washut because she loved him and not because she 
expected to be paid.

[¶19]   Adkins responded to the estate's 
motion for a partial summary judgment by filing an affidavit in which she stated 
in pertinent part:

Walt Washut and I discussed on many, many occasions 
the fact that he intended I would have his ranch property when he died and that 
he would give it to me in consideration of his affection for me and in 
consideration of the fact that I had nursed him and cared for him for the last 
twelve years of his life.

In addition, Adkins cited to 
the part in her deposition where she stated:

I 
[helped Washut] because of our relationship and because of the fact that he 
constantly told me that there would be no problem, nobody would ever want 
anything, and that that was what he wanted me to do.[2]

[¶20]   Adkins's statements did not rise to 
the level of being specific factual evidence which was sufficient to rebut the 
estate's prima facie case for a summary judgment. Adkins's deposition 
demonstrated that Washut had no reason to believe that Adkins expected to be 
paid. The statements in Adkins's affidavits contradicted her deposition. This 
Court has previously adopted a policy against allowing the party who opposes a 
motion for a summary judgment to create questions of fact by presenting 
affidavits which contradict that party's earlier deposition. Hanna v. Cloud 9, 
Inc., 889 P.2d 529, 533-34 (Wyo. 1995); see also Morris v. Smith, 837 P.2d 679, 
684-85 (Wyo. 1992).

Other 
Issues

[¶21]   We will not consider the two 
remaining issues since Adkins does not present any arguments which address them. 
"`It is not the function of this court to frame a party's argument. This court 
has consistently refused to consider positions which are not supported by cogent 
argument or pertinent authority.'" McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 886 P.2d 595, 
597 n. 2 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Campbell v. Department of Family Services, 881 P.2d 1066, 1069 n. 2 (Wyo. 1994) (citations omitted)).

Conclusion

[¶22]   We hold that the district court did 
not err when it granted the partial summary judgment in favor of the 
estate.

[¶23]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1           
The parties ultimately settled Adkins's fourth claim and the estate's 
counterclaims, and the district court entered an order which dismissed those 
claims.

2           
Adkins also submitted an affidavit from Washut's treating physician which 
described the extent of the medical care which Adkins had provided to Washut and 
another affidavit from herself which merely restated the services which she had 
performed for Washut.