Case Title: BONAWITZ v BOURKE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13520 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1977 N O R V A L C. BONAWITZ, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, LOIS BOURKE as Executrix of t h e Estate of PAT BOURKE, Defendant and Third P a r t y P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, RUSSELL FLEHARTY, G E N E MOSSEY, WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, and WILLIAM J. WEBSTER, Third Party-Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable LeRoy L. McKinnon, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Cure and Borer, Great F a l l s , Montana Charles Borer argued, Great F a l l s , Montana P a t t e r s o n and Marsillo, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Robert Johnson Lewistown, Montana Torger Oaas argued, Lewistown, Montana Marra, Wenz & Iwen, Great F a l l s , Montana David Hopkins argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Rapkoch and Knopp, Lewistown, Montana Robert L. Knopp argued, Lewistown, Montana #fl JFLL 1!3L F i l e d * Submitted: A p r i l 19, 1977 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f Norval Bonawitz brought s u i t i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Cascade County, a g a i n s t t h e E s t a t e of Pat Bourke, deceased, t o recover damages f o r i n j u r i e s s u f f e r e d when a s c a f f o l d upon which he was working collapsed. Bourke d i e d a f t e r t h e accident, b u t p r i o r t o commencement of t h i s a c t i o n . The E s t a t e of Bourke ( ~ o u r k e ) f i l e d a t h i r d p a r t y complaint f o r indemnity a g a i n s t t h i r d p a r t y defendants R u s s e l l Fleharty, Gene Mossey, W i l l i a m H. Webster and William J. Webster. After extensive formal d i s - covery by a l l p a r t i e s , t h i r d p a r t y defendants f i l e d motions f o r summary judgment. The c o u r t entered summary judgment i n favor of a l l t h i r d p a r t y defendants. Bourke appeals t h i s r u l i n g . Bonawitz and Bourke were t h e s o l e stockholders of a corporation known a s Bonawitz & Bourke, Inc. Bourke was t h e p r e s i d e n t and owned 75% of i t s s t o c k . Bonawitz was t h e vice- p r e s i d e n t and owned 25% of t h e s t o c k . Bonawitz & Bourke, Inc. owned a ranch south of Lewistown, Montana known a s t h e " ~ e w i s Place". Bourke was l e a s i n g t h i s ranch from t h e corporation pursuant t o an o r a l l e a s e . O n t h e morning of t h e accident, a work p a r t y c o n s i s t i n g of Bourke, Bonawitz, and t h e f o u r t h i r d p a r t y defendants met a t a ranch house l o c a t e d on t h e Lewis Place. The purpose of t h i s g a t h e r i n g was t o r e s h i n g l e t h e roof of t h e ranch house. The work was undertaken a t t h e r e q u e s t of Bourke. There is some question whether Bourke i n d i v i d u a l l y , o r t h e corporation, supplied t h e s h i n g l e s and a t l e a s t a portion of the m a t e r i a l s t o be used i n t h e construction of a s c a f f o l d . A l l labor was on a volunteer b a s i s . The four t h i r d p a r t y defendants a r r i v e d a t t h e Lewis Place first, and commenced b u i l d i n g t h e s c a f f o l d t o be used i n che r e s h i n g l i n g process. The Websters and Mossey had previous experience i n t h e construction of s c a f f o l d s . Neither Bourke rlor Bonawitz p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e a c t u a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o r e r e c t i o n 01' the s c a f f o l d . During t h i s time they were engaged i n hauling the s h i n g l e s from a s t o r a g e shed and various o t h e r d u t i e s i n c i d e n t a l t o t h e s h i n g l i n g operation. When t h e s c a f f o l d i n g was f u l l y e r e c t e d , Bonawitz and t h e thi1.d p a r t y defendants climbed upon it and began removing t h e old s h i n g l e s . They had been working about an hour and were j u s t beginning t o put on t h e new s h i n g l e s when t h e c e n t e r support f o r t h e s c a f f o l d collapsed. A s he f e l l , Bonawitz apparently put h i s arm through t h e g l a s s of a nearby window i n an attempt t o c a t c h himself. Severe and p a r t i a l l y d i s a b l i n g i n j u r i e s r e s u l t e d . P r e t r i a l discoveryindicated t h e cause of t h e s c a f f o l d f a i l u r e was improper construction, r a t h e r than weakness of t h e component p a r t s . Bonawitz's complaint a l l e g e s he was i n t h e employ of Pat Bourke a t t h e time of t h e accident and Bourke, a s t h e employer, had an o b l i g a t i o n t o f u r n i s h p l a i n t i f f with a s a f e place t o work and s a f e appliances and i n s t r u m e n t a l i t i e s w i t h which t o work. After discovery was completed, Bourke f i l e d a t h i r d p a r t y com- p l a i n t f o r indemnity a g a i n s t t h e t h i r d p a r t y defendants a l l e g i n g it was t h e i r a c t i v e and primary negligence i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the s c a f f o l d t h a t caused p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s . Two i s s u e s a r e presented upon appeal: I. Whether t h e d i s t r i c t court e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g summary judgment i n favor of t h i r d p a r t y defendants? 2. Whether Bourke is l i a b l e t o Bonawitz by v i r t u e of t h e Scaffold Act under t h e f a c t s and circumstances of t h i s case? Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ. P., s t a t e s t h a t summary judgment s h a l l be rendered only i f : "* * * the pleadings, depositions, answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and admissions on f i l e show t h a t t h e r e i s no genuine i s s u e as t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h a t t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment as a matter of law." * *" The general purpose underlying Rule 56, M.R.Civ. P., is t o promptly dispose of a c t i o n s which have no genuine i s s u e of f a c t , thereby encouraging j u d i c i a l economy through t h e elimina- t i o n of unnecessary trial, delay and expense. Guthrie v. Dept. of S o c i a l and Rehab. Services, Mont . 9 563 P.2d 555, 34 S t . Rep. 255; Silloway v. Jorgenson, 146 Mont. 307, 406 P.2d 167. Nevertheless, summary judgment is n o t a s u b s t i t u t e f o r a t r i a l . Guthrie, supra; Johnson v. Johnson, Mon t . J 561 P.2d 917, 34 S t . Rep. 162. This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t t h e p a r t y moving f o r summary judgment has t h e burden of showing t h e complete absence of any genuine i s s u e as t o a l l f a c t s which are deemed m a t e r i a l i n l i g h t of those s u b s t a n t i v e p r i n c i p l e s which e n t i t l e d him t o a judgment a s a m a t t e r of l a w . Harland v. Anderson, Mon t , , 548 P.2d 613, 33 St.Rep. 363. This r u l e imposes a s t r i c t standard upon t h e movant and i n Kober &. Kyriss v. B i l l i n g s Deaconess Hosp., 148 Mont. 13.7, 122, 417 P.2d 476, t h i s Court, quoting from 6 Moore's Fed.Prac .2d 956.15[3], held: ""* * *To s a t i s f y h i s burden t h e movant must make a showing t h a t is q u i t e c l e a r what t h e t r u t h is, and t h a t excludes any r e a l doubt as t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of any genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . ' I 1 It is c l e a r t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion w i l l be indulged t o t h e e x t e n t of a l l inferences which may be reasonably drawn from t h e o f f e r e d proof. Harland v. Anderson, supra; Mally v. Asanovich, 149 Mont. 99, 423 P.2d 294; Johnson v. S t . P a t r i c k ' s Hospital, 148 Mont. 125, 417 P.2d 469. Considering t h e f a c t s of t h e i n s t a n t case, we f e e l genuine i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t remain unresolved. The t h i r d p a r t y defendants a r e t h e r e f o r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o summary judgment as a matter of law. While we f i n d s e v e r a l material i s s u e s of f a c t remain unresolved, we f e e l t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t i s found i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g of f a c t No. 4. This f i n d i n g s t a t e s : "The m a t e r i a l s were furnished by Bourke, o r by t h e Corporation * * *." C e r t a i n l y t h e f a c t of whether Bourke i n d i v i d u a l l y o r t h e corpora- t i o n furnished t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n m a t e r i a l s is of relevance determining f o r whom t h e work was being done. The f a c t of whether Bourke i n d i v i d u a l l y o r the corporation was i n immediate supervision o r c o n t r o l of t h e r e s h i n g l i n g operation i s of g r e a t import i n l i g h t of p l a i n t i f f ' s r e l i a n c e on Montana's S c a f f o l d Act, s e c t i o n 69-1401, e t seq., R,,C.M. 1947. The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n given Montana's Scaffold Act i n regard t o t h e person who owes t h e duty of c a r e t o workers was discussed i n S t a t e e x r e l . Great F a l l s National Bank v. D i s t r i c t Court, 154 Mont. 336, 343, 463 P.2d 326, where t h e Court s t a t e d : ' I * * * a g a i n s t whom i s t h e i n j u r e d workman e n t i t l e d t o recover? Qr s t a t e d another way, who owes t h e b a s i c duty imposed by t h e Scaffold Act? W e must look t o t h e Scaffold Act i t s e l f t o determine t h e answer t o t h i s question. Section 69-1402, R.C.M. 1947, imposes a duty on 'every owner, person, o r corporation who s h a l l have t h e d i r e c t and immediate --- ~ ~ r : m i r \ n h w n ~ m t n n l nf' thn n n n n t - w r r n t i n n nr, supel V I D I V L I V L b V L I bL VI U I V L L G C I V I I U Ub U I V I I remodeling of any b u i l d i n g having more than t h r e e framed f ' - - - - I "- ----- ' 2 - - 4- , , , , , , , , . n - l n " . l . r r A LUUL'Y ' ( r u P L ' U V L U ~ d ~ e ~ i ~ p u ~ ' a ~ - y pLallncu : 'which s h a l l be l a i d t o form a good sub- s t a n t i a l temporary f l o o r f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of employees and a l l persons engaged above o r below, o r on such temporary f l o o r i n such b u i l d i n g . ' ( ~ m p h a s i s supplied. ) " ~ e c t i o n 69-1404, R.C.M. 1947, provides t h a t 'It - s h a l l be t h e duty of a l l owners, c o n t r a c t o r s , b u i l d e r s , o r persons having t h e d i r e c t and immediate c o n t r o l o r supervision of any buildings under c o n s t r u c t i o n t o p r o t e c t stairways, e l e v a t o r openings, f l u e s , and a l l o t h e r openings i n t h e . f l o o r s . ( ~ m p h a s i s supplied. ) I' 154 Mont . 343 See a l s o : Boyer v. Kloepfer, Mont . , , 554 P.2d 1116, This Court has h e l d t h a t t h e f i r m , person o r corporation having d i r e c t and immediate c o n t r o l of t h e work involving t h e use of s c a f f o l d i n g i s t h e one upon whom t h e duty is imposed by t h e S c a f f o l d Act. S t a t e e x r e l . Great F a l l s National Bank v. D i s t r i c t Court, supra. This is a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of dictum contained i n e a r l i e r case l a w which appeared t o impose a non- delegable duty upon t h e landowner. See: Pollard v. Todd, 148 Mont. 171, 418 P.2d 869; J o k i v. McBride, 150 Mont. 378, 463 P. 2d 78. Resolution of a p p e l l a n t ' s first i s s u e makes d i s c u s s i o n of t h e second i s s u e unnecessary. The summary judgment i s vacated and t h e cause remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r f u r t h e r pro- ceedings n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s opinion. W e Concur: @&A~+~~ Chief J u s t i c e