Case Title: In re Blaylock

Citation: 

Docket Number: S43713

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  April 15, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In Re:

Complaint as to the Conduct of PAUL BLAYLOCK,

	Accused.

(OSB 94-91; SC S43713)

	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board.

	Argued and submitted November 3, 1997.

	Paul Blaylock, Portland, argued the cause and filed the
briefs in propria persona.

	Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause and filed the brief on behalf of the Oregon
State Bar.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.*

	PER CURIAM

	Complaint dismissed.

	*Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Graber, J., resigned
March 31, 1998, and did not participate in the decision of this
case.

		PER CURIAM

		In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) charged the accused with violating Code of
Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-104(A)
(permitting lawyer to initiate personal contact with prospective
client for purposes of obtaining professional employment only
under specified circumstances).  A trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board found that the accused had violated DR 2-104(A) and determined that he should receive a public reprimand. 
The accused sought review.  ORS 9.536(1); Bar Rules of Procedure
(BR) 10.1 and 10.3.  Our review is de novo.  ORS 9.536(3); BR
10.6.  The Bar has the burden of proving misconduct by clear and
convincing evidence.  BR 5.2.  Evidence is clear and convincing
when "the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."  In re
Claussen, 322 Or 466, 468, 909 P2d 862 (1996).

		On de novo review, we conclude that the Bar has failed
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
violated DR 2-104(A).  Accordingly, we dismiss the Bar's
complaint.

		The Bar has proved the following facts by clear and
convincing evidence.  The accused is both a lawyer admitted to
practice law in Oregon and a physician licensed to practice
medicine in Oregon and Washington.  He had been practicing
emergency medicine with privileges at various area hospitals
since 1975 and had been practicing law with a Portland firm since
1984.  The accused's law practice consisted primarily of
defending asbestos claims and representing medical and health
professionals.  

		With respect to the dual nature of the accused's
professional life, the trial panel made the following findings of
fact, which we adopt:

		 "During the accused's ten years of practice he
has accepted approximately 23 cases involving personal
injury claims from motor vehicle accidents.  Most of
those claims were referred to him by personal friends. 
The balance of cases were referred to him by other
members of [his] firm.  The accused has never
represented any of his medical patients in his dual
capacity as a lawyer.  The accused has treated
thousands of persons injured in automobile accidents,
has extensive personal contact with nurses, EMTs,
police, ambulance drivers and other doctors who come
into contact with accident victims, all of whom are in
a position to refer personal injury accident claims to
the accused.  Despite opportunities to do so, the
accused has never solicited cases from those accident
victims, has not requested or sought to represent
personal injury clients with whom he has been in
contact in a hospital setting, and has not received
referrals for personal injury cases from persons at any
hospital where he practices medicine.  When the accused
did receive a referral of a personal injury claim that
[his firm] was willing to accept on a contingent fee
basis, the accused usually referred the matter to
another attorney in the firm to work up the case.  In
an effort to review the profitability of contingent fee
work, the firm determined that none of the cases
brought into the firm by the accused involved patients
at hospitals where the accused also practiced
medicine." 

	We take the following additional facts from the record. 
On June 23, 1991, Sam Nelson was involved in a three-vehicle
automobile accident that killed one of his sisters and injured
another.  Nelson was seriously injured in the crash and was taken
by ambulance to Southwest Washington Medical Center.  Within
several hours of the collision, Nelson's parents learned of the
accident and went to the hospital.  Ultimately, they were joined
there by other family members and friends, including Nelson's
wife.  

	Testimony before the trial panel concerning the timing
and details of the events that occurred at the hospital
conflicted in several respects.  The trial panel concluded that
"[r]esolution of these conflicts on the basis of credibility was
unnecessary to a determination of the essential and material
facts * * *."  We agree.  For purposes of our analysis, there is
one central, undisputed set of facts:  While the Nelson family
was at the hospital awaiting news of Nelson's condition, the
accused, who at that time was working a shift in the hospital's
emergency room, approached the Nelson family, identified himself
as a lawyer, gave them his business card, and informed them that
they could contact him if they needed legal advice.

	Concerning the specific circumstances of that contact,
we adopt the trial panel's findings of fact:

		"On June 24, 1991, the accused received a
telephone call from a woman who he believed was a nurse
at the ICU * * *.  The presumed nurse explained that
there was a man in the ICU who was seriously injured in
an accident and was concerned about how he was going to
feed his children.  He was not told of the facts of the
motor vehicle accident.  She asked the accused if he
would mind speaking with the family about their legal
situation.  The accused did not question the nurse
about her sources of information or ask whether the
family wanted her to contact an attorney on their
behalf.  He did not ask the person to have the family
first contact him.  He simply responded to the request
from a person whom he believed was a nurse acting as a
good samaritan.  This person was not known to the
accused.  The accused was not familiar with the names
of nurses outside the emergency room.  Neither the
accused nor the Bar were unable [sic] to locate any ICU
nurse or other person that actually made this telephone
call to the accused.

		"However at no time did any member of the Nelson
family, including Sam Nelson, [Nelson's surviving
sister] or [Nelson's wife] ask a nurse or other person
to contact a lawyer on their behalf.  At no time during
June 23 or June 24, 1991 did they have any facts or
information to indicate that a lawyer was being
contacted on their behalf.  If they needed to
immediately contact a lawyer, they already knew
[another] attorney * * *.  The person who contacted the
accused, if indeed a nurse, was acting without the
knowledge or consent of any members of the Nelson
family." 

		Before this court, the Bar does not contest the
accused's assertion that, in approaching the Nelson family, he
was responding to a telephone call from a presumed nurse.  The
accused explained his purpose in doing so in the following
testimony, which we credit:

		"You have to understand, I'm still working
downstairs [when the accused met with the Nelson
family], I'm still on duty, so I only had a moment.  I
went up there [to the ICU where the Nelson family was
waiting] to do -- I went up there to do three things. 
I went up there to respond to what I thought was an
invitation.  And I left a busy emergency department and
I only had a few moments.  I went up there to respond
to what I thought was an invitation by a family in
need.  I gave them my business card and told them that
I couldn't talk to them regarding legal advice at the
time, but if they wished to call me that this is how
they could reach me."

		We adopt as well the following additional findings of
the trial panel:

		"At first the Nelson family thought that the
accused was Sam's doctor.  They had not yet heard about
Sam's condition and the accused was dressed in medical
scrubs.  When the accused contacted the Nelson family
he was wearing emergency room garb consisting of a
scrub suit, goggles, jacket and ID badge.  Because of
the accused's attire some members of the Nelson family
mistook the accused as Sam Nelson's surgeon.

		"When the accused went to the waiting room outside
the ICU, he introduced himself as 'Dr. Blaylock.'  He
told the family that he was also a lawyer and that he
had been asked to come up to speak with them.  All
persons present in the waiting room agreed that the
accused gave the Nelson family his business card from
his law practice and informed them that they * * *
could contact him if they needed to do so for legal
advice.  Several members of the Nelson family were
affronted that a lawyer had approached them in the
waiting room about representing them, but said little
to the accused.  Others were impressed that a
professional was dually qualified as a doctor and a
lawyer.  The accused's card was handed to and taken by
a member of the family."  (Footnote omitted.)

	Several days later, as a result of the personal
contact, a family friend met with the accused at the accused's
law office to discuss the accident and Nelson's legal situation. 
Ultimately, Nelson, his wife, and his sister each decided to
retain the accused to represent them concerning the accident.  In
early 1994, the claims were settled.  Nelson, however, was
dissatisfied with the amount of the settlement and, on March 21,
1994, complained to the Bar about the accused's conduct at the
hospital.  The Bar filed a formal complaint that led to the
present proceedings.

	Before the trial panel, the accused denied that he had
violated DR 2-104(A).  He also argued that DR 2-104(A) violates
Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution and the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.(1)  As noted, the
trial panel concluded that the accused violated DR 2-104(A) and
also rejected the accused's constitutional challenges.(2) 

	At the time of the accused's alleged misconduct, DR 2-104 provided:

		"(A)  Subject to the provisions of DR 2-101 [which
are inapplicable here], a lawyer may initiate personal
contact with a prospective client for the purpose of
obtaining professional employment only in the following
circumstances:

			"(1)  If the prospective client is a
close friend, relative, former client, or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client;

			"(2)  Under the auspices of a public or
charitable legal services organization; or

			"(3)  Under the auspices of a bona fide
political, social, civic, fraternal,
employee, or trade organization whose
purposes include but are not limited to
providing or recommending legal services, if
the legal services are related to the
principal purposes of the organization.

		"(B)  For the purpose of DR 2-104, 'personal
contact' means in-person or telephone contact with an
individual or entity.  Direct mail advertising is not
considered 'personal contact' under this rule, but is
otherwise subject to the requirements of DR 2-101."(3)

	None of the circumstances set out in paragraphs (1)
through (3) above is present in this case.  Accordingly, our task
is to determine whether the accused violated the prohibition in
DR 2-104 by "initiating" personal contact with a prospective
client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment.(4)  

		DR 2-104 does not provide a specific definition of the
key term, "initiate," in that rule.  The dictionary definition of
that term is:

	"to begin or get going: make a beginning of: perform or
facilitate the first actions, steps, or stages of * * * to bring about the initial formation of:
ORIGINATE * * *."  Webster's Third New Int'l
Dictionary, 1164 (unabridged ed 1993).

		The definition of the term "initiate" and the nature of
the prohibition embodied in DR 2-104 indicate that a lawyer must
act intentionally to violate that rule.  To act with an
intentional state of mind, an accused must act "with the
conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result."  See In re Allen, 326 Or 107, 122, 949 P2d 710 (1997)
(applying that definition of the state of mind of "intent").  See
also American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing lawyer
Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (same).  In the context of DR 2-104(A), the Bar must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the accused acted with the conscious objective or purpose to
"initiate" personal contact with a prospective client in order to
obtain professional employment.

		As noted, the Bar does not contest the accused's
assertion that he was responding to a nurse's telephone call,
which we have described above.  The Bar also does not contest the
trial panel's finding that the accused acted with a subjective
good faith belief that he was responding to a family invitation
conveyed through the nurse.  The Bar argues, however, that the
intervention here of an intermediary -- the nurse -- between the
accused and the prospective client imposed on the accused, at a
minimum, the duty to direct a series of clarifying questions to
the nurse to ensure that the Nelson family actually desired
contact with the accused.  We acknowledge that asking questions
to clarify the prospective client's state of mind in these
circumstances reflects prudent practice.  However, we can find no
support for compelling that prudent practice as an ethical
requirement under DR 2-104(A).

		The appropriate focus in this case is the intentional
state of mind that the Bar must prove to prevail when charging a
violation of DR 2-104.  In that regard, we conclude that the
Bar's case falls short.  As we have found above, the accused
responded to what he believed in good faith was a family
invitation, conveyed through someone that he believed was a
nurse, for contact with him.  It follows from that finding that
the Bar has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
accused intended to originate the client contact himself. 
Accordingly, we hold that the accused did not violate DR 2-104.

		Complaint dismissed.

1. 	Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution
provides:

		"No law shall be passed restraining the free
expression of opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever;
but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of
this right."

		The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in part:

		"Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the
freedom of speech * * *."

2. 	Because we conclude that the accused did not violate DR
2-104(A), we need not address the accused's constitutional
arguments.

3. 	The court adopted amendments to DR 2-104(B) in 1998. 
Supreme Court Order No. 98-104 (November 5, 1998).  Those
amendments are inapplicable here.

4. 	This court has not construed DR 2-104(A) to date.  In
In re Baer, 298 Or 29, 35, 688 P2d 1324 (1984), the court
summarily held that the Bar had not proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the accused lawyer had violated an
earlier version of DR 2-104(A).