Case Title: State v. Reiner

Citation: 2000-Ohio-190

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-07-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Reiner, 89 Ohio St.3d 342, 2000-Ohio-190.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. REINER, APPELLEE AND 
CROSS-APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Reiner (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 342.] 
Evidence — Prohibitions in Evid.R. 606(B) against receiving evidence from a 
juror apply to alternate jurors — Evidence received from alternate juror, 
without other outside evidence, is insufficient aliunde evidence under 
Evid.R. 606(B) upon which a court may rely in order to conduct inquiry of 
other jurors into validity of a verdict. 
1. 
The prohibitions against receiving evidence from a juror in Evid.R. 606(B) 
apply to alternate jurors. 
2. 
Evidence received from an alternate juror, without other outside evidence, is 
insufficient aliunde evidence under Evid.R. 606(B) upon which a court may 
rely in order to conduct an inquiry of other jurors into the validity of a 
verdict. 
(Nos. 99-239 and 99-427 — Submitted January 11, 2000 — Decided July 26, 
2000.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lucas 
County, No. L-97-1002. 
 
 
2
 
Appellee and cross-appellant, Matthew Reiner, was convicted by a jury of 
involuntary manslaughter for the death of his two-month-old infant son, Alex 
Reiner.  Alex died as a result of “shaken baby syndrome.” 
 
On June 15, 1995, Deborah S. Reiner gave birth to twin boys named Alex 
and Derek.  Both boys were premature at birth but otherwise healthy.  The Reiners 
also had a two-year-old daughter named Amy.  Following the birth of the twins, 
both parents took time off from work to care for them.  Matthew Reiner took leave 
from his job as an engineer from June 15 to July 25, 1995.  Deborah Reiner, a 
dentist, did not return to work until August 14, 1995. 
 
The Reiners hired a full-time babysitter, Susan Batt, age twenty-four, to care 
for their three children.  Susan Batt began working on July 25, 1995, under 
Deborah Reiner’s supervision while Susan Batt became acclimated to the family.  
During the first week of Susan Batt’s employment, Deborah Reiner spent most of 
her time at home.  In the final two weeks before Deborah Reiner returned to work, 
she left the home on several occasions with Amy, leaving Susan Batt alone with 
the twins.  Susan Batt became the full-time exclusive childcare provider on August 
14, 1995. 
 
Over a period of two weeks, the following events occurred. Alex became ill 
the weekend of August 12, 1995. He appeared to be achy and vomited several 
times.  Deborah Reiner called the pediatrician and then took Alex to an outpatient 
 
 
3
clinic on Sunday, August 13.  The clinic doctor diagnosed stomach flu and 
recommended that Deborah Reiner give Alex Pedialyte. 
 
By Wednesday, August 16, 1995, Alex had improved and appeared to have 
recovered.  The twins’ pediatrician performed a well-care examination of both 
boys that day.  The results were unremarkable. 
 
Deborah Reiner stayed home with the children on Wednesday, August 23, 
1995, her regular day off.  Alex seemed achy that day but had no fever. On 
Thursday, August 24, 1995, Susan Batt telephoned Matthew Reiner at work and 
reported that Alex had vomited in the morning.  He told her to give Alex some 
Pedialyte.  On Friday, August 25, Susan Batt telephoned Deborah Reiner at work 
to report that Alex had vomited.  Deborah Reiner’s mother came over Friday 
afternoon to help care for the children.  Alex remained ill and vomiting over the 
weekend, still with no fever. 
 
On Monday, August 28, 1995, when Deborah Reiner returned home after 
work, Susan Batt reported that Alex had eaten well and taken two five-hour naps 
that day.  He appeared achy but did not have a fever, and Susan Batt had given him 
Tylenol.  Susan Batt left the Reiners that evening between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m.  
Later that evening, Deborah Reiner’s parents stopped by to drop off Amy, who had 
spent the day with them.  They stayed and visited until 7:30 p.m. when Matthew 
Reiner arrived home. 
 
 
4
 
Alex vomited again that evening at 9:00 p.m.  The couple put the twins to 
bed at approximately 10:30 that night.  Later, they heard Alex whimpering.  
Matthew Reiner took Alex downstairs.  He claimed that he laid Alex on his 
(Matthew’s) chest to try to get the baby comfortable and to fall asleep.  Within a 
half hour, Alex’s breathing became labored and he became unresponsive. Matthew 
Reiner took Alex to his bedroom to awaken his wife.  She could not get Alex to 
respond, so Matthew Reiner called 911. 
 
When emergency personnel arrived, Alex had no pulse and was not 
breathing.  His skin was blue.  They transported Alex to a nearby hospital, where 
he was placed on a respirator.  Two days later, on August 30, 1995, Alex was 
removed from life support and died. 
 
Dr. James Patrick, Lucas County Coroner, performed an autopsy.  He 
concluded that Alex had died from “shaken baby syndrome.”  Dr. Patrick 
estimated that the time of injury was the evening of Monday, August 28, 1995, 
most likely within minutes of the onset of respiratory arrest when Matthew Reiner 
had been alone with Alex, but at most, within two to three hours of the onset. 
 
A grand jury indicted Matthew Reiner for involuntary manslaughter.  The 
case proceeded to trial.  The key issue at trial was the timing of the fatal trauma to 
Alex.  The defense theory was that Susan Batt, not Matthew Reiner, was the 
culpable party.  The defense presented evidence that all three Reiner children had 
 
 
5
been healthy from birth until the weekend of August 11, 1995, after Susan Batt 
became employed.  Deborah Reiner testified that her children had no medical 
problems from the time of Alex’s death until the trial, after Susan Batt left the 
Reiners’ employ.  Deborah Reiner also testified that no other family members had 
contracted a stomach virus or suffered symptoms similar to Alex’s during the last 
two weeks of August despite their close proximity to Alex, in particular his twin, 
Derek, who slept in the same crib.  There also was evidence of additional injuries 
to Alex and injuries to Derek.  A hospital radiologist testified that x-ray films of 
Alex taken at the hospital on August 29, 1995, indicated a broken rib and broken 
leg.  Subsequent x-rays of Derek indicated that he suffered from three broken ribs. 
 
Dr. Patrick testified on behalf of the prosecution.  He explained that, based 
upon his findings from the autopsy and the lack of any evidence of a blow to the 
head or other significant trauma, Alex had died of shaken baby syndrome.  Dr. 
Patrick testified that the brain had been injured when it was “subjected to forces 
operating in different directions” that caused the blood vessels to tear.  He 
described these forces as “shearing forces” that rapidly disrupted the electrical 
circuitry of the brain and caused loss of consciousness.  Dr. Patrick testified that 
when this occurs, the brain is profoundly disrupted and no longer capable of 
responding to stimuli.  Although there was evidence of brain swelling, Dr. Patrick 
testified that swelling is merely an indication that there has been an injury. 
 
 
6
 
After the autopsy, Dr. Patrick prepared slides of brain tissue in order to 
examine microscopically the various injuries inside the brain.  He testified that the 
slides confirmed the presence of blood and the brain injury. 
 
During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Dr. Patrick about the 
significance of the swelling of the brain, or edema.  Dr. Patrick stated that although 
edema was present and played a role, the principal problem was the mechanical 
disruption to the circuits of the brain.  Defense counsel then asked Dr. Patrick 
about his testimony to the grand jury in which he attributed Alex’s loss of 
consciousness and lack of breathing to swelling of the brain within a confined 
space.  When confronted with statements taken from his testimony given to the 
grand jury in this case, Dr. Patrick reviewed the page from the grand jury transcript 
and admitted that he had made the statements. 
 
The trial court refused to admit into evidence only one page from the 
transcript of Dr. Patrick’s grand jury testimony because one page taken out of 
context would not have fairly and accurately represented his grand jury testimony.  
Defense counsel, however, would not agree to the admission of the entire 
statement.  Defendant then moved to strike Dr. Patrick’s opinion as unreliable 
under Evid.R. 702(C).  The court overruled the motion. 
 
Dr. Elizabeth K. Balraj, the Cuyahoga County Coroner and a professional 
acquaintance of Dr. Patrick, also testified on behalf of the prosecution.  She 
 
 
7
testified that the Lucas County Coroner’s Office sent her information about this 
case, including the autopsy report, Alex’s medical records, and photographs and 
slides taken at the time of the autopsy.  Dr. Balraj also testified that Alex died as a 
result of shaken baby syndrome.  In response to a lengthy hypothetical question 
that asked Dr. Balraj for her opinion “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty” 
as to when the injury was inflicted upon Alex in relation to his collapse, Dr. Balraj 
responded that “the type of injuries and the information that you have given me is 
consistent with the child sustaining the injury sometime between 10:30 p.m. and 
11:00 p.m.” 
 
Susan Batt was subpoenaed by the prosecution and the defense.  She 
invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to 
testify.  She had also invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege while testifying in 
the juvenile court proceeding. The prosecution requested that the court grant Susan 
Batt transactional immunity pursuant to R.C. 2945.44 and compel her to testify.  
The prosecution told the court that it did not presently intend to prosecute Susan 
Batt for this crime.  The court granted her transactional immunity. 
 
Having been granted transactional immunity, Susan Batt subsequently 
testified.  She explained to the jury that she had refused to answer questions 
without a grant of immunity upon the advice of counsel although she had done 
nothing wrong.  She testified that she had attended a nanny and governess school 
 
 
8
in Cleveland.  She previously worked for three years as a live-in nanny for another 
family with three children.  She learned of the position with the Reiner family 
through a newspaper ad.  She began working limited hours for the Reiners on July 
25, 1995, while she became acquainted with the children and their routines.  When 
Deborah Reiner returned to work on August 14, 1995, Susan Batt worked from 
7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays. 
 
Susan Batt testified that she had never shaken the children while she was 
alone with them.  She specifically denied shaking Alex on August 28, 1995.  She 
testified that she did nothing to harm any of the Reiner children.  She also testified 
that she was not aware that Alex had a broken leg or that Derek had some broken 
ribs.  She denied that she had anything to do with the broken bones. 
 
Susan Batt testified that she last worked for the Reiners on Tuesday, August 
29, 1995, the day after Alex had been taken to the hospital.  She learned of Alex’s 
death through the news.  She had no further contact with Reiners. 
 
On September 23, 1996, a jury convicted Matthew Reiner of involuntary 
manslaughter.  Two weeks later, the defense filed a motion for acquittal or, in the 
alternative, for a new trial.  The defense claimed that the verdict was not supported 
by the evidence.  The defense also alleged legal errors and procedural irregularities 
with regard to the grant of immunity to Susan Batt, jury instructions related to 
Batt’s testimony and her implied admission of guilt, and the court’s refusal to 
 
 
9
permit defense counsel to ask Susan Batt about other injuries to the Reiner 
children. 
 
The defense motion alleged prosecutorial misconduct in failing to disclose 
that Dr. Patrick was allegedly changing his testimony or theory of the case.  The 
defense also claimed that the trial court should have admitted Dr. Patrick’s grand 
jury testimony as a prior inconsistent statement, and that the court should have 
stricken as unreliable the opinions of the coroners who testified for the prosecution.  
Finally, the defense alleged juror misconduct and attached the affidavit of Rolf R. 
Sandberg, an alternate juror.  In his affidavit, Rolf Sandberg admitted that during 
the trial, he had discussions with several other jurors about the case, including 
assessments and characterizations of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and 
his opinion about the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
 
The trial court conducted an in camera inspection of Rolf Sandberg on 
October 31, 1996.  The court then subpoenaed each juror to appear and testify 
about the alleged misconduct.  Thereafter, the trial court denied the motion for new 
trial.  The court determined that Rolf Sandberg’s affidavit did not constitute 
competent non-juror evidence under Evid.R. 606(B), because he was an alternate 
juror.  Furthermore, even assuming that Rolf Sandberg’s affidavit was competent 
evidence, the court concluded that he was not a credible witness. The court said it 
should not have conducted the hearing and specifically was not considering any 
 
 
10
statement by the jurors.  The court found no prejudice to the defendant as a result 
of any jury conduct, and even if misconduct occurred that was presumed to be 
prejudicial, the state had rebutted the presumed prejudice beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
 
Matthew Reiner appealed his conviction to the Lucas County Court of 
Appeals.  The appellate court reversed the trial court solely on the issue of juror 
misconduct.  The appellate court considered Rolf Sandberg’s affidavit as outside 
evidence of extraneous prejudicial information that had been improperly brought to 
the jury’s attention.  The appellate court concluded that there had been juror 
misconduct that was prejudicial to the defendant.  The appellate court also 
considered as misconduct the failure of the other jurors to abide by the trial court’s 
instruction not to discuss the case with anyone including each other until 
deliberations began.  The court considered this fact to be evidence that Rolf 
Sandberg’s conduct tainted the jury panel. 
 
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of transactional immunity 
to Susan Batt.  The court held that, at the time immunity was granted, it did not 
appear to Susan Batt that she lacked culpability because she knew the defense was 
going to try to blame her for Alex’s death.  When it granted her immunity, the trial 
court did not know if the defense had any evidence that would implicate Susan 
 
 
11
Batt.  Therefore, at the time, the trial court would not have known that Susan Batt’s 
assertion of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was a mistake. 
 
The appellate court also affirmed the trial court’s refusal to strike Dr. 
Patrick’s testimony as to the cause of Alex’s death.  The court reasoned that the 
defense’s objection that Dr. Patrick did not have the appropriate tissue slides to 
support his conclusion about the cause of death went to the weight of the evidence 
rather than to its admissibility.  The appellate court also upheld the trial court’s 
decision not to admit Dr. Patrick’s grand jury testimony as a prior inconsistent 
statement.  The appellate court concluded that Dr. Patrick admitted he had made 
the alleged inconsistent statements to the grand jury; thus, the trial court did not 
have to admit the prior testimony. 
 
As to the legal sufficiency of the opinion given by Dr. Balraj concerning the 
timing of Alex’s collapse, the appellate court concluded that Dr. Balraj’s use of the 
word “consistent” instead of “probable,” when giving her opinion as to the timing 
of the injury, was not a fatal error.  In addition, the court determined that Dr. 
Balraj’s testimony was cumulative.  The appellate court also found that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on implied 
admission of guilt. 
 
Thereafter, the court of appeals determined that its judgment that Evid.R. 
606(B) bars any inquiry of a juror as to the effect of extraneous information or 
 
 
12
improper outside influence upon his or her decision-making process was in conflict 
with State v. Thomas (July 26, 1995), Athens App. No. 94CA1608, unreported, 
1995 WL 468183.  The appellate court entered an order certifying a conflict. 
 
The state appealed and the defendant filed a cross-appeal. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon our determination that a conflict 
exists (case No. 99-427), and pursuant to the allowance of a discretionary appeal 
and cross-appeal (case No. 99-239). 
__________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, John J. Weglian and J. 
Christopher Anderson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant and cross-
appellee. 
 
Fritz Byers, Robert Z. Kaplan and Samuel Z. Kaplan; Cooper, Walinski & 
Cramer and Richard S. Walinski, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.  The Lucas County Court of Appeals stated the 
certified conflict as “whether Evid.R. 606(B) permits, under any circumstances, 
inquiry of a juror as to the effect of extraneous information or improper outside 
influence upon his or her decision making process.”  The dissenting judge framed 
the same issue as follows: “[I]n a case of jury misconduct (statements, 
conversations or remarks made to a juror), once evidence aliunde of jury 
 
 
13
misconduct is provided, whether a court may inquire of a juror as to whether or not 
the juror remained uninfluenced by the misconduct (i.e., impartial) so that the 
defendant was not denied his substantial rights.”   Because this latter statement 
more succinctly states the issue, we shall consider the certified conflict in the terms 
articulated by the dissenting judge. 
 
The state’s discretionary appeal involves the related issues of burden of 
proof when there are allegations of juror misconduct in a criminal case, and 
whether an affidavit from an alternate juror constitutes outside evidence sufficient 
to trigger the application of Evid.R. 606(B), otherwise known as the aliunde rule. 
 
The defendant’s cross-appeal challenges the validity of the transactional 
immunity granted to Susan Batt, the reliability of the opinions rendered by the 
state’s medical witnesses, the trial court’s failure to admit Dr. Patrick’s grand jury 
testimony for impeachment purposes, and Dr. Balraj’s expression of her medical 
opinion on causation. 
 
For the reasons more fully set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals as to juror misconduct and the grant of transactional immunity to 
Susan Batt, and we affirm the remainder of the court’s judgment. 
JUROR MISCONDUCT 
 
Because the certified conflict presumes the existence of aliunde evidence, 
before we may address this issue, we must decide the threshold question of 
 
 
14
whether Evid.R. 606(B), also known as the aliunde rule, applies to alternate jurors.  
For the reasons more fully set forth below, we hold that the prohibitions against 
receiving evidence from a juror in Evid.R. 606(B) apply to alternate jurors.  
Therefore, evidence received from an alternate juror, without other outside 
evidence, is insufficient aliunde evidence under Evid.R. 606(B) upon which a 
court may rely in order to conduct an inquiry of other jurors into the validity of a 
verdict. 
 
It is a longstanding rule that “the verdict of a jury may not be impeached by 
the evidence of a member of the jury unless foundation for the introduction of such 
evidence is first laid by competent evidence aliunde, i.e., by evidence from some 
other source.”  State v. Adams (1943), 141 Ohio St. 423, 427, 25 O.O. 570, 572, 48 
N.E.2d 861, 863.  Ohio has adopted this rule in Evid.R. 606(B), which states: 
 
“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not 
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s 
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or 
emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment 
or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith.  A juror may testify on 
the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to 
the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to 
bear on any juror, only after some outside evidence of that act or event has been 
 
 
15
presented. However a juror may testify without the presentation of any outside 
evidence concerning any threat, any bribe, any attempted threat or bribe, or any 
improprieties of any officer of the court.  His affidavit or evidence of any statement 
by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying will 
not be received for these purposes.”   (Emphasis added.) 
 
The rule is intended to preserve the integrity of the jury process and the 
privacy of deliberations, to protect the finality of the verdict, and to insulate jurors 
from harassment by dissatisfied or defeated parties by prohibiting a court from 
questioning a juror about what occurred during deliberations, or about anything 
else that may have affected the juror’s mind or emotions in the deliberations 
process once a final verdict is rendered.  State v. Schiebel (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 
71, 75, 564 N.E.2d 54, 61;  State v. Adams, 141 Ohio St. at 427, 25 O.O. at 572, 48 
N.E.2d at 863.  However, if there is a foundation of outside evidence of extraneous 
prejudicial information, or of any threat, bribe, or improper conduct by an officer 
of the court, the rule permits a court to ask a juror about that outside evidence. 
 
The trial court determined that Rolf Sandberg’s affidavit was not competent 
evidence to attack the jury’s verdict under Evid.R. 606(B).  The court reasoned that 
the intent of Evid.R. 606(B), to prevent an attack by a disgruntled juror, should 
likewise apply to an alternate juror. 
 
 
16
 
The court of appeals reversed on the basis of State v. Rudge (1993), 89 Ohio 
App.3d 429, 624 N.E.2d 1069.  The Rudge court considered an alternate juror to be 
outside the regular jury panel because an alternate does not participate in 
deliberations or in reaching the final verdict.  Id., 89 Ohio App.3d at 437, 624 
N.E.2d at 1074.  In Rudge, after the trial was over, an alternate juror informed the 
bailiff that on two occasions he had overheard other jurors make statements about 
the defendant prior to opening statements and during the trial.  The trial court 
conducted an in camera examination of the alternate juror, followed by an 
examination of the remaining jurors.  The court granted a mistrial on the basis that 
one of the statements was prejudicial.  The court of appeals noted that, as a 
nondeliberating juror, an alternate may not be viewed as a member of the jury, so 
that the alternate’s testimony may constitute aliunde evidence for purposes of 
Evid.R. 606(B).  However, the Rudge court concluded that Evid.R. 606(B) was not 
applicable, because the trial court’s inquiry did not threaten or reveal discussion 
during deliberations.  The Rudge court considered it proper to inquire into the 
partiality of jurors to determine if the defendant had received a fair trial before an 
impartial jury, but not to inquire into deliberations.  Id., 89 Ohio App.3d at 439, 
624 N.E.2d at 1076.  Based upon Rudge, the court of appeals held that Rolf 
Sandberg’s affidavit was sufficient outside evidence for the court to have inquired 
of the jurors about the alleged misconduct that occurred during the trial. 
 
 
17
 
It is apparent from the language of Evid.R. 606(B) that the rule becomes 
applicable only when the validity of a verdict is questioned.  Although Evid.R. 
606(B) protects the deliberations process, the language of the rule does not limit its 
application to the examination of improper conduct or communications only during 
deliberations.  The rule also prohibits inquiry into “the effect of anything upon his 
or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent 
from the verdict * * * or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith.”  
This may involve inquiry into improper conduct that occurred throughout the trial, 
during the presentation of evidence, or among jurors during the course of the trial 
that may influence a juror’s mind, emotions, or mental processes during 
deliberations.  Events that occur during the trial may also have an effect upon the 
jurors’ deliberations. 
 
Alternate jurors are selected at the same time and in the same manner as the 
entire jury panel.  An alternate juror participates as a regular member of the jury 
panel and is subject to the same jury admonitions and rules until discharged.  The 
alternate juror sees and hears the entire trial and is prepared to deliberate.  An 
alternate juror may become a member of the deliberating panel.  State v. Hutton 
(1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 36, 45, 559 N.E.2d 432, 443. 
 
Here, Rolf Sandberg was an alternate juror who claimed that he violated jury 
rules during the trial.  However, he waited until after the verdict before notifying 
 
 
18
defense counsel about his conduct in an effort to challenge the finality of the 
verdict.  When questioned by the trial judge, Rolf Sandberg admitted that he was 
frustrated that he had not been able to deliberate and that he was upset with the 
guilty verdict.  Although the defense claimed that Rolf Sandberg’s misconduct 
affected the deliberations process and tainted the verdict, the defendant presented 
no outside evidence of the improper conduct.  This is precisely the situation that 
the aliunde rule was intended to prevent—a disgruntled juror attacking the verdict. 
 
Had the trial judge been notified of this conduct during the trial, the judge 
would have had an opportunity to inquire of the jurors about any misconduct or 
violation of the jury rules because the aliunde rule was not yet applicable.  See 
State v. Taylor (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 827, 598 N.E.2d 818.  Although Rolf 
Sandberg did not deliberate, he was privy to the jury process up to the actual 
deliberations.  His alleged misconduct during the trial had nothing to do with his 
status as an alternate juror and could just as likely have been committed by a 
regular juror.  The defense sought to attack the final verdict based upon Rolf 
Sandberg’s conduct during the trial prior to his discharge.  Therefore, for purposes 
of the aliunde rule, one’s status as an alternate juror should not preclude 
application of the rule.  Therefore, we disapprove of the decision in State v. Rudge 
to the extent that it holds otherwise. 
 
 
19
 
When the defendant moved for acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial, 
based solely on the alleged juror misconduct in Rolf Sandberg’s affidavit, the trial 
court properly concluded that it was prohibited by Evid.R. 606(B) from 
considering Rolf Sandberg’s affidavit or testimony for purposes of attacking the 
jury verdict.  The court correctly disregarded the testimony of other jurors.  
Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the 
judgment of the trial court with respect to the issue of juror misconduct. 
 
Having determined that the affidavit from the alternate juror was not 
competent evidence aliunde to challenge the jury’s verdict, our resolution of this 
case effectively removes any conflict that may have existed with State v. Thomas, 
supra, because that case involved a juror’s contact with a non-juror. 
IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION 
 
Defendant’s cross-appeal challenges the validity of the trial court’s grant of 
immunity to Susan Batt.  The defendant alleges that the grant of transactional 
immunity pursuant to R.C. 2945.44 was unlawful because Susan Batt did not have 
a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination upon which to base 
the immunity.  Defendant claims that, as a consequence, his rights were prejudiced.  
We agree. 
 
The Fifth Amendment declares that “[n]o person * * * shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself * * * .”  This right, or privilege, 
 
 
20
ensures that a person is not compelled to produce evidence that may tend to 
incriminate him.  The privilege, however, is not unlimited.  A person may decline 
to answer specific questions “only when the danger of incrimination is real and 
appreciable, rather than imaginary and insubstantial,” or when the answer could 
reasonably “[furnish] a link in the chain of evidence” against him.  State v. Jenkins 
(1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 228, 15 OBR 311, 366, 473 N.E.2d 264, 318.  See 
United States v. Apfelbaum (1980), 445 U.S. 115, 100 S.Ct. 948, 63 L.Ed.2d 250; 
Hoffman v. United States (1951), 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 
1118, 1124. 
 
When a witness asserts a privilege against self-incrimination, a court may 
not rely upon the witness’s claim alone.  State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 
107, 120, 559 N.E.2d 710, 726.  The court has a duty to determine if the witness’s 
refusal to answer is justified.  Id.  If the court determines that a witness is mistaken 
about the danger of incrimination, then the court must require the witness to 
answer the question.  Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. at 486, 71 S.Ct. at 818, 
95 L.Ed. at 1124. 
 
However, when the court is satisfied that the witness’s refusal to answer is 
justified, a court may either excuse the witness from testifying or, upon the written 
request of the prosecuting attorney, may compel the witness to answer by granting 
that person immunity from prosecution for any criminal act about which the person 
 
 
21
may testify.  R.C. 2945.44;  State v. Kirk (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 564, 651 N.E.2d 
981;  State ex rel. Leis v. Outcalt (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 147, 1 OBR 181, 438 
N.E.2d 443. 
 
In this case, the trial court relied upon R.C. 2945.44.  It states: 
 
“(A) In any criminal proceeding in this state * * *, if a witness refuses to 
answer or produce information on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, the court of common pleas of the county in which the proceeding is 
being held, unless it finds that to do so would not further the administration of 
justice, shall compel the witness to answer or produce the information, if both of 
the following apply: 
 
“(1) The prosecuting attorney of the county in which the proceedings are 
being held makes a written request to the court of common pleas to order the 
witness to answer or produce the information, notwithstanding his claim of 
privilege; 
 
“(2) The court of common pleas informs the witness that by answering, or 
producing the information he will receive immunity under division (B) of this 
section. 
 
“(B) If, but for this section, the witness would have been privileged to 
withhold an answer or any information given in any criminal proceeding, and he 
complies with an order under division (A) of this section compelling him to give 
 
 
22
an answer or produce any information, he shall not be prosecuted or subjected to 
any criminal penalty in the courts of this state for or on account of any transaction 
or matter concerning which, in compliance with the order, he gave an answer or 
produced any information.” 
 
Transactional immunity is a prosecutorial tool to enable the government to 
obtain necessary testimony.  Leis, 1 Ohio St.3d at 149, 1 OBR at 183, 438 N.E.2d 
at 446.  The practical effect of a grant of immunity is that a witness is compelled to 
give information that the witness would otherwise be privileged to withhold in 
order to assist the prosecution.  Often the witness who is compelled to testify is a 
co-defendant or is facing other charges related to the defendant’s charges.  The 
prosecution is willing to forgo possible prosecution of the witness by granting the 
witness immunity in exchange for useful testimony that will assist in convicting 
the defendant. 
 
There is no need for a grant of immunity where the witness denies all 
culpability.  In situations where an admission of guilt by one person would 
completely exonerate any possible guilt of another person, as is the case here, a 
grant of immunity is unnecessary and improper.  An assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege by Susan Batt would lead one to believe that she possessed 
self-incriminating knowledge regarding her own culpability.  Had Susan Batt been 
granted immunity and testified that she had shaken Alex and caused his death, the 
 
 
23
prosecution would have no further grounds to prosecute Matthew Reiner.  To grant 
immunity in such a situation may have allowed the guilty party to go free and 
would not “further the administration of justice.” 
 
Susan Batt’s counsel informed the court in advance of her testifying that she 
intended to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege and would refuse to answer 
questions.  All counsel present knew that she had likewise asserted this privilege in 
a related juvenile court proceeding and did not answer any questions.  Susan Batt’s 
counsel explained that, although Susan Batt was not the focus of a criminal 
investigation, she had been with the victim within the potential time frame of the 
fatal trauma, she was the focus of the defense, and she did not know the identity of 
defense witnesses who may be called to inculpate her.  Susan Batt would testify 
only if granted “complete and absolute immunity.” 
 
The prosecution initially seemed perplexed as to why Susan Batt would 
refuse to testify.  The prosecution said that Susan Batt had told the Children’s 
Services Board that she had nothing to do with the victim’s injuries, and her 
counsel had not indicated that her testimony would incriminate her.  The 
prosecution informed the court that it had no intention of prosecuting Susan Batt.  
She was not being investigated and there was insufficient evidence to take to the 
grand jury. The prosecution even told the court, “I don’t know how in the interest 
of justice I can request immunity for this witness because it doesn’t seem to me 
 
 
24
that she in any way has anything to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege to protect 
herself, or I’m unaware of anything.”    However, when it became apparent that 
Susan Batt did not intend to testify, the prosecution reluctantly agreed to consider a 
request that the court grant Susan Batt transactional immunity, rather than request 
that the court use its contempt powers to force a reluctant witness to testify. 
 
When Susan Batt took the witness stand at trial and invoked her Fifth 
Amendment privilege, the prosecution submitted a written request asking the court 
to grant her immunity pursuant to R.C. 2945.44.  The court conducted a hearing on 
whether the grant of immunity would “further the administration of justice.”  R.C. 
2945.44.  However, the court did not address the prosecution’s earlier concerns 
that Susan Batt had no apparent reason, other than her fear of Matthew Reiner’s 
defense, to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege.  Nevertheless, the court decided 
that it would be in the “interests of justice” to compel Susan Batt to testify.  The 
court granted her transactional immunity. 
 
Based on the prosecutors’ statements alone, the trial judge had a duty to 
question Susan Batt’s assertion of the privilege and whether her testimony would, 
as she claimed, be self-incriminating.  State v. Landrum, supra.  Instead, the trial 
judge merely relied upon Susan Batt’s claim of privilege and disregarded the 
questions and concerns expressed by prosecutors.  Susan Batt’s testimony did not 
 
 
25
incriminate her, because she denied any involvement in the abuse.  Thus, she did 
not have a valid Fifth Amendment privilege. 
 
A court may resort to R.C. 2945.44 only after reaching the threshold 
determination that the witness’s testimony would be self-incriminating.  This is 
apparent from the language of subsection (B) of the statute, which states that “[i]f, 
but for this section, the witness would have been privileged to withhold an answer 
or any information given in any criminal proceeding * * *.”  (Emphasis added.)  
We agree with the defendant that before a court may exercise its authority to grant 
a person transactional immunity, it is implicit that the person has validly asserted 
the privilege against self-incrimination.  Once the issue of immunity under R.C. 
2945.44 arises, it is inherent that the court has already determined that the witness 
has a valid privilege against self-incrimination in order to invoke immunity.  Here 
the trial court failed to make that determination. 
 
The court of appeals below likewise recognized this threshold determination 
when it stated that “the language of R.C. 2945.44 implies that a trial court make 
some determination of the validity of the privilege against self-incrimination 
antecedent to a grant of statutory immunity.”  Nevertheless, the appellate court 
focused on circumstances that would have led the trial court to believe that Susan 
Batt was not mistaken in asserting her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, i.e., she knew that the defense blamed her for the baby’s death and 
 
 
26
she did not know what evidence, if any, the defense may have had that would 
implicate her in the fatal trauma.  Again, these are merely Susan Batt’s assertions.  
A defense theory is not a ground for a grant of immunity when the witness 
continues to deny any self-incriminating conduct.  The appellate court did not 
consider the prosecutors’ statements or the fact that Susan Batt had denied any 
involvement in the abuse to Alex when questioned by Children’s Services Board.  
These are factors that could and should have been considered by the trial court in 
determining whether Susan Batt’s fear of self-incrimination was real or imaginary. 
 
In addition, the wrongful grant of immunity resulted in serious prejudice to 
the defendant.  The essence of Matthew Reiner’s defense was that Susan Batt was 
responsible for Alex’s death.  When the court granted her immunity, the court in 
effect was telling the jury that Susan Batt did not cause Alex’s injuries.  To 
“further the administration of justice,” the jury should have been able to hear and 
evaluate all the evidence to decide whether someone other than Matthew Reiner 
was responsible for Alex’s death.  A grant of immunity to Susan Batt under these 
circumstances seriously affected the fairness of the trial and resulted in prejudice to 
the defendant. 
 
The state argues that a defendant lacks standing to challenge a grant of 
immunity.  State v. Bika (Oct. 19, 1978), Marion App. No. 9-78-6, unreported;  
State v. Steverson (Sept. 15, 1998), Franklin App. No. 97APA11-1466, unreported, 
 
 
27
1998 WL 634949.  This argument assumes that the grant of immunity met the 
statutory threshold of a valid privilege against self-incrimination.  Because Susan 
Batt lacked a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the 
grant of immunity was unlawful, the state’s standing argument lacks merit. 
 
The state also contends that the defendant failed to preserve any error for 
appeal by failing to object to the grant of immunity.  We do not agree.  Defense 
counsel sufficiently objected to the grant of immunity when the court conducted a 
hearing on whether the grant of immunity would further the administration of 
justice. 
 
Therefore, we find that a court has no judicial discretion to grant or deny 
immunity until and unless the statutory requirements for immunity are met.  This 
includes a valid assertion of one’s Fifth Amendment privilege.  Leis, 1 Ohio St.3d 
at 149, 1 OBR at 183, 438 N.E.2d at 446.  Because Susan Batt did not have a valid 
Fifth Amendment privilege, the trial court’s grant of immunity was erroneous and 
unlawful. 
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
 
The defense contends that Dr. Patrick’s theory of the cause of death was not 
based upon objectively verifiable facts as required by Evid.R. 702(C)(1).  
Therefore, it was not reliable evidence and Dr. Patrick’s testimony should have 
been stricken.  The defense relies upon the testimony of its expert witnesses who 
 
 
28
opined that the tissue slides taken by Dr. Patrick did not show the damage about 
which he testified. 
 
A decision to admit the testimony of an expert, once qualified, is generally 
within the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a 
showing of an abuse of discretion. See State v. Williams (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 
576, 660 N.E.2d 724, 732;  State v. Mack (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 502, 511, 653 
N.E.2d 329, 337.  An abuse of discretion requires more than an error of law or 
judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
unconscionable.  State v. Clark (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 466, 470, 644 N.E.2d 331, 
335;  State v. Moreland (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 58, 61, 552 N.E.2d 894, 898; State 
v. Adams (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 16 O.O.3d 169, 173, 404 N.E.2d 144, 
149. 
 
Here, the appellate court concluded that defense challenges to the reliability 
of the brain tissue slides concerned the weight of the evidence, not its 
admissibility.  We agree.  This decision was within the broad discretion of the trial 
court and the court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the reliability of 
expert evidence within the confines of Evid.R. 702(C). 
 
The defense also contends that Dr. Balraj failed to express her opinion as to 
the cause of death in terms of probability.  When asked her opinion “to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty as to when the injury was inflicted in 
 
 
29
relationship to the collapse,” Dr. Balraj stated that “the type of injuries * * * [are] 
consistent with the child sustaining the injury between 10:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.”  
The appellate court determined that the use of the word “consistent” was not fatal 
to Dr. Balraj’s overall testimony because she was answering a hypothetical 
question predicated upon the appropriate standard of medical certainty.  In 
addition, her testimony was cumulative.  Looking at the overall context of her 
testimony, we agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused 
to strike the testimony of Dr. Balraj for failure to include the word “probable” in 
her opinion. 
 
The defense claims that the trial court should have admitted the grand jury 
testimony of Dr. Patrick as a prior inconsistent statement under Evid.R. 613(B).  
The defense contended that the opinion offered by Dr. Patrick before the grand 
jury as to the cause of death was different from the opinion that he rendered at trial.  
The trial court permitted the defense to cross-examine Dr. Patrick about a 
particular statement he had made to the grand jury.  Dr. Patrick initially disagreed 
with statement but, after reviewing his grand jury transcript, he subsequently said 
that he recalled making the statement, although he attempted to qualify his answer 
and put it into context with the remainder of his grand jury testimony.  The 
statement alone could appear to be inconsistent. 
 
 
30
 
The defense moved to introduce into evidence the one page from the 
transcript of Dr. Patrick’s grand jury testimony that contained the alleged 
inconsistent statement.  The court said it would admit the entire transcript from the 
grand jury in order to put the alleged inconsistency into context; however, the 
defense would not agree.  Therefore, the court excluded the one-page exhibit. 
 
Evid.R. 613(B)(1) states, in part, that extrinsic evidence of a prior 
inconsistent statement is admissible “[i]f the statement is offered solely for the 
purpose of impeaching the witness, the witness is afforded a prior opportunity to 
explain or deny the statement and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to 
interrogate the witness on the statement or the interests of justice otherwise 
require.” 
 
Although the defense fulfilled the requirements of Evid.R. 613(B) , we agree 
with the reasoning of the trial court that it would have been improper to admit only 
one page of Dr. Patrick’s grand jury testimony because it would not fairly and 
accurately represent his testimony to the grand jury.  The trial court acted within its 
discretion to exclude the exhibit when defense counsel would not agree to 
admission of the entire transcript.  Evid.R. 106. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals 
with respect to the juror misconduct and the grant of immunity to Susan Batt, and 
 
 
31
we affirm the remainder of the court’s judgment.  This cause is remanded to the 
trial court for a new trial consistent with this opinion. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
and cause remanded. 
 
WOLFF, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs separately. 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissents. 
 
COOK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
 
WILLIAM H. WOLFF, JR., J., of the Second Appellate District, sitting for 
RESNICK, J. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.  I concur with the ultimate judgment of the 
majority in remanding this cause to the trial court for a new trial.  I write separately 
to specifically concur in the majority’s opinion with regard to the immunity issue 
and the discussion of the issue found in the “Immunity From Prosecution” section 
of the opinion.  I also write because I agree, with regard to the juror misconduct 
issue, with the analysis found in Chief Justice Moyer’s dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
 
 
32
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  I concur in the decision of the majority with 
respect to the grant of immunity to Susan Batt, and the evidentiary issues presented 
by the defense.  However, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority 
holding that evidence received from an alternate juror who did not participate in 
deliberations is insufficient aliunde evidence under Evid. R. 606(B) to inquire into 
the validity of the verdict.  While I recognize that allowing a party to question a 
jury verdict based on evidence presented by an alternate juror may have some 
detrimental consequences, I believe that the integrity of the jury process would be 
better preserved by allowing such inquiries. 
 
Evid.R. 606(B) provides: 
 
“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not 
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s 
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or 
emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment 
or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith.  A juror may testify * 
* * only after some outside evidence of that act or event has been presented.”  
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The majority correctly observes that Evid.R. 606(B) is intended to preserve 
the integrity of the jury process and the privacy of deliberations.  Significantly, the 
rule prohibits testimony about events and statements occurring during the course of 
 
 
33
deliberations, absent some outside evidence of such occurrences.  The rule does go 
further to prohibit inquiry into “the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s 
mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict * * * 
or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith.”  The majority relies 
on this additional language to conclude that testimony of an alternate juror is 
insufficient outside evidence to inquire into the validity of a jury verdict.  
However, the inclusion of the words “during the course of deliberations” in the 
first sentence of the rule indicates that Evid.R. 606(B) is meant to protect the 
deliberation process.  Therefore, it follows that an alternate juror, who did not 
participate in deliberations, could properly supply the evidence necessary to 
inquire into the validity of the verdict reached by the jury. 
 
The majority also concluded that the aliunde rule is not applicable during the 
trial.  Instead, the rule applies only after the jury decides on a verdict.  This fact 
further supports allowing an alternate juror, who did not participate in 
deliberations, to supply the evidence necessary to challenge a jury verdict pursuant 
to Evid.R. 606(B). 
 
While I share the concern of the majority that allowing an alternate juror to 
provide the evidence needed to inquire into a jury’s verdict could easily allow a 
single disgruntled alternate juror to attack a jury verdict, I believe that this risk is 
outweighed by the right of the parties to a jury free of misconduct.  Section 5, 
 
 
34
Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees the right to a trial by jury, and this 
right carries with it by necessary implication the right to a trial by a jury of 
unbiased and unprejudiced jurors.  Lingafelter v. Moore (1917), 95 Ohio St. 384, 
117 N.E. 16. 
 
Here, the appellate court found that there had been juror misconduct during 
the trial and that such misconduct was prejudicial to the defendant.  I agree with 
the court of appeals that Evid.R. 606(B) should be interpreted to allow testimony 
of an alternate juror as sufficient aliunde evidence to inquire into the validity of a 
jury verdict. 
 
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals with 
respect to the issue of juror misconduct. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
I.  Aliunde Evidence/Juror Misconduct 
 
The majority’s syllabus suggests that an alternate juror’s testimony can 
never be sufficient “outside evidence” under Evid.R. 606(B) to permit jurors to 
testify regarding extraneous prejudicial information.  Like Chief Justice Moyer, I 
am not convinced that a discharged alternate juror’s status—the status of having 
once served as an alternate juror—should in every case preclude the trial court 
 
 
35
from relying on that individual’s testimony to trigger an inquiry into the validity of 
a verdict. 
 
Under Civ.R. 47(C), “[a]n alternate juror who does not replace a regular 
juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict.”  A discharged 
alternate juror thus no longer possesses “the same functions, powers, facilities, and 
privileges as the regular jurors.”  Id.  A discharged alternate juror is thus no longer 
a “juror” for purposes of the Civil Rules.  And I see no compelling reason to treat a 
discharged alternate juror as a “juror” under the aliunde rule either, since this 
evidentiary rule is designed to protect the sanctity of the deliberative process—a 
process in which the discharged alternate juror did not participate.  Accord State v. 
Rudge (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 429, 437, 624 N.E.2d 1069, 1074 (“[A]lternate 
jurors who are not present during deliberations and do not participate in rendering 
the verdict are not members of the trial jury for purposes of the aliunde rule”). 
 
Though the trial court in this case ultimately rejected Rudge and concluded 
that it could not use the alternate’s affidavit as the basis to examine the jurors, the 
trial court also determined that even if the alternate’s affidavit satisfied the aliunde 
rule, the juror examination revealed that Reiner suffered no prejudice.  We review 
the trial court’s decision denying Reiner’s motion for a new trial on an abuse-of-
discretion standard.  State v. Schiebel (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 564 N.E.2d 54, 
paragraph one of the syllabus.  Without mentioning this deferential standard of 
 
 
36
review, the majority of the court of appeals concluded that what occurred was “by 
definition * * * prejudicial” to Reiner.  The dissenting judge on the appellate panel 
noted that Reiner bore the burden of proving that any unauthorized 
communications with jurors resulted in actual juror partiality, and concluded that 
Reiner failed to meet his burden.  I agree.  As the trial judge stated, all of the jurors 
“uniformly denied” that any improper communication with the alternate juror 
affected their verdict. 
 
Accordingly, like the majority, I would reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court denying Reiner’s motion for a 
new trial on the basis of juror misconduct.  However, I do not join the majority’s 
syllabus, because I share Chief Justice Moyer’s view that the testimony of a 
discharged alternate juror is not categorically insufficient aliunde evidence for 
purposes of Evid.R. 606(B). 
II.  The Grant of Immunity to Susan Batt 
 
I dissent from the majority’s resolution of the immunity issue.  The majority 
concludes that the trial court’s grant of immunity to Susan Batt was unlawful for 
two reasons.  First, the majority concludes that Batt did not have a valid Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Second, the majority decides that 
the grant of immunity that followed from this apparently invalid privilege resulted 
in “serious prejudice” to Reiner.  I respectfully disagree on both counts. 
 
 
37
A.  Batt’s Entitlement to the Fifth Amendment Privilege 
 
I agree with the majority that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is “confined to instances where the witness has reasonable cause to 
apprehend danger from a direct answer.”  (Emphasis added.)  Hoffman v. United 
States (1951), 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118, 1124.  But the 
majority applies an inapposite test for “reasonable cause,” deciding that “Susan 
Batt’s testimony did not incriminate her because she denied any involvement in the 
abuse.” 
 
A witness’s denial of culpability regarding an offense should not 
preclude the witness from asserting the privilege against self-incrimination.  “The 
privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a 
conviction * * * but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the 
chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant * * * .”  Id.  There are many 
situations in which a witness could deny guilt but could nonetheless furnish a self-
incriminating “link in the chain” if compelled to answer a particular question in 
court.  Witnesses who deny ultimate culpability for the defendant’s alleged offense 
should not be categorically denied access to the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
 
The Hoffman case cited by the majority reinforces my view that the 
“reasonable cause” standard for asserting the privilege is not as the majority 
opinion suggests.  In Hoffman, the United States Supreme Court noted that, “if the 
 
 
38
witness, upon interposing his claim [of privilege], were required to prove the 
hazard [of incrimination] in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be 
established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which 
the privilege is designed to guarantee.  To sustain the privilege, it need only be 
evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, 
that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be 
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.  The trial 
judge in appraising the claim ‘must be governed as much by his personal 
perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence.’ “  
(Emphasis added.) Id., 341 U.S. at 486-487, 71 S.Ct. at 818, 95 L.Ed. at 1124, 
quoting Ex parte Irvine (S.D.Ohio 1896), 74 F. 954, 960. 
 
In the case at bar, Batt had “reasonable cause” to assert the privilege against 
self-incrimination.  Defense counsel’s announced theory of the case was that Batt, 
not Reiner, was responsible not only for the alleged crime against Alex, but also 
for the uncharged injuries suffered by Alex’s sibling. Given this, and given the 
statements by defense counsel warning the trial court that a grant of immunity 
would preclude a later trial against Batt for Alex’s death, I agree with the trial 
court and the court of appeals that Batt’s assertion of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege was amply supported by the “reasonable cause” Hoffman requires. 
B.  The Trial Court’s Grant of Immunity 
 
 
39
 
Having rejected Batt’s entitlement to the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the majority also concludes that “the wrongful grant of immunity resulted in 
serious prejudice to the defendant.”  To support this conclusion, the majority 
claims that, “when the court granted her immunity, the court in effect was telling 
the jury that Susan Batt did not cause Alex’s injuries.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Since the trial court’s decision to grant or deny immunity under R.C. 
2945.44 is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion, State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus 
(1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 118, 119, 515 N.E.2d 914, 916, I would not reverse that 
decision on such speculative grounds.  The majority claims that the grant of 
immunity “told” the jury that Batt was faultless.  It is equally possible—if not more 
likely—that the jury would regard Batt as less credible, and a more likely source of 
Alex’s injuries, after the trial court’s grant of immunity.  After all, a grant of 
immunity compels testimony from a witness who has something potentially self-
incriminating to say.  R.C. 2945.44(A).  Regardless, I would not substitute this 
court’s judgment for the trial court’s on the basis of such speculation. 
 
The majority also decides that, to further the administration of justice, “the 
jury should have been able to hear and evaluate all the evidence to decide whether 
someone other than Matthew Reiner was responsible for Alex’s death.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  I agree, but I fail to see how the trial court’s grant of immunity to Batt 
here did anything to restrict the trial evidence.  The jury heard Batt’s immunized 
 
 
40
testimony.  The trial court’s grant of immunity did not immunize Batt from 
testifying—it “compel[led] the witness to answer.”  R.C. 2945.44(A). 
 
Batt had reasonable cause to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege.  The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion or prejudice Reiner in deciding to grant Batt 
transactional immunity in compliance with R.C. 2945.44.  Accordingly, I dissent 
from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s grant of immunity was 
erroneous, and would affirm the court of appeals’ decision on this issue.