Case Title: Robinson v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 981691

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: All the Justices  
 
LEROY ROBINSON, JR. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 981691 
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO
 
                                    June 11, 1999 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
The defendant, Leroy Robinson, Jr., was convicted in a 
bench trial in the Circuit Court of Henrico County of grand 
larceny for the theft of three sport coats from Hecht’s 
Department Store at Regency Square Shopping Center in 
Henrico County.  After receiving and considering a 
probation report, the trial court sentenced the defendant 
to serve fifteen years in the penitentiary, with ten years 
suspended. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by order, 
and we awarded the defendant this appeal.  In a single 
assignment of error, the defendant contends that “[t]he 
trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony of store 
employees concerning the price listed on store tags to 
prove value.” 
 
Grand larceny consists of the theft, not from the 
person of another, of goods and chattels valued at $200.00 
or more.  Code § 18.2-95(ii).  This statutorily specified 
amount is an essential element of the offense, and the 
burden is upon the Commonwealth to establish that element 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Walls v. Commonwealth, 
248 Va. 480, 481, 450 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1994).  “Proof that 
an article has some value is sufficient to warrant a 
conviction of petit larceny, but where the value of the 
thing stolen determines the grade of the offense, the value 
must be alleged and the Commonwealth must prove the value 
to be the statutory amount.”  Wright v. Commonwealth, 196 
Va. 132, 139, 82 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1954). 
 
The test is market value, and particularly retail 
value.  See People v. Irrizari, 156 N.E.2d 69, 71 (N.Y. 
1959).  “[F]air market value is the price property will 
bring when offered for sale by a seller who desires but is 
not obliged to sell and bought by a buyer under no 
necessity of purchasing.”  Board of Supervisors v. 
Donatelli & Klein, Inc., 228 Va. 620, 628, 325 S.E.2d 342, 
345 (1985).  And the original purchase price of an item is 
admissible as evidence of its current value.  Parker v. 
Commonwealth, 254 Va. 118, 121, 489 S.E.2d 482, 483 (1997);   
Dunn v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 704, 705, 284 S.E.2d 792, 792 
(1981). 
 
At trial in the circuit court, Jonathan K. Cessna, a 
security agent for Hecht’s who witnessed the theft of the 
three sport coats, testified over the defendant’s hearsay 
 
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objection that the value of the coats totaled $499.97.  
Cessna also testified that he knew what the value was 
because “that’s what it is on the price tags” and “that’s 
what they’re sold for.” 
 
Victoria Ann Burton, a regional director of Hecht’s 
who also witnessed the theft, testified over the 
defendant’s hearsay objection that the sport coats were 
valued at $499.97 and that she knew the value from the 
“tickets [that] were attached to the [coats].”  Neither the 
Commonwealth nor the defendant offered any other evidence 
concerning the value of the coats, and, while photographs 
of the coats were introduced into evidence, neither the 
coats themselves nor the price tags were offered into 
evidence. 
 
In overruling the defendant’s hearsay objection to the 
testimony of the store employees, the trial judge observed 
that the price tag affixed to an item “is the evidence of 
the value of the item.”  In affirming, the Court of Appeals 
stated in its order that “the trial court did not err in 
overruling [the defendant’s] hearsay objection.” 
 
On appeal, the defendant points out correctly that 
hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted and that hearsay includes 
testimony given by a witness who relates not what he knows 
 
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personally but what others have told him or what he has 
read.  See Williams v. Morris, 200 Va. 413, 417, 105 S.E.2d 
829, 832 (1958); Cross v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 74, 77 
S.E.2d 447, 453 (1953).  The defendant also points out 
correctly that hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless it 
falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the 
hearsay rule, West v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 906, 909, 
407 S.E.2d 22, 23 (1991), and that the party attempting to 
introduce a hearsay statement has the burden of showing the 
statement falls within one of the exceptions, Doe v. 
Thomas, 227 Va. 466, 472, 318 S.E.2d 382, 386 (1984). 
 
Here, the defendant says, the stolen items and their 
price tags were not offered into evidence, but the store 
employees testified “to what the out-of-court price tags 
said in order to prove the value of the items.”  This, the 
defendant maintains, was “hearsay to prove hearsay” or, in 
other words, “double hearsay” and inadmissible because not 
permitted under any exception to the hearsay rule. 
 
We have not previously considered the question whether 
the amount shown on a price tag affixed to an item by a 
retailer, or, if the tag is not offered into evidence, the 
amount a witness says he observed on the tag, constitutes 
inadmissible hearsay when offered to prove the value of the 
item in a prosecution for its theft.  The Commonwealth 
 
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states, however, that “many courts have found [that] the 
amount on the price tag is a reliable, common-sense source 
of evidence in determining the fair market value of the 
item to which it is affixed.” 
 
The Commonwealth discusses at some length Boone v. 
Stacy, 597 F.Supp. 114 (E.D. Va. 1984), State v. White, 437 
A.2d 145 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981), and Norris v. State, 475 
S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971).  In Boone, a federal 
habeas corpus case applying Virginia law, the petitioner 
attacked his conviction of grand larceny in state court for 
the theft from a department store of five dresses.  In the 
criminal trial, the store’s assistant manager testified 
that the tagged selling price of the five dresses was 
$424.00 and their cost price was $211.00.  597 F.Supp. at 
116.  The petitioner objected to the testimony concerning 
cost on hearsay grounds.  In the habeas case, the 
petitioner asserted that “the tagged selling price of the 
dresses is not the test of market value nor can it be the 
basis for testimony, but rather that fair market value must 
be established in some other fashion.”  Id. at 115. 
 
In dismissing the habeas petition, the district judge 
wrote that “[t]he general rule in a shoplifting case is 
that uncontradicted evidence that merchandise was displayed 
in a retail establishment for regular sale at a marked 
 
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price representing its retail price can serve as sufficient 
circumstantial evidence of fair market value.”  Id. at 117.  
The judge also wrote that “[c]ourts have stated that the 
tagged retail price serves as ‘competent evidence,’” id. 
(quoting Calbert v. State, 670 P.2d 576, 576 (Nev. 1983)), 
“or, alternatively, that, though hearsay, the price tag is 
‘a document prepared or entry made in the regular course of 
business,’” id. at 118 (quoting Lauder v. State, 195 A.2d 
610, 611 (Md. 1963)). 
 
In White, the trial court admitted into evidence over 
a hearsay objection price tags affixed to four items of 
stolen clothing as proof of the items’ value.  Affirming 
this action, the appellate court stated: 
 
The defendant’s arguments against the 
admissibility of these tags are without merit.  We are 
unpersuaded by the argument that such tags are 
technically excludable as hearsay unless qualified 
under the business records exception . . . since the 
inherent unreliability of hearsay is not present in 
this type of evidence.  Rather, the fact that price 
tags generally reflect market value may be judicially 
noted, since this fact is both commonly known and 
capable of ready demonstration. 
 
437 A.2d at 148. 
 
In Norris, the accused was convicted of shoplifting a 
television set valued at more than $100.00.  As in the 
present case, the only proof of the value of the set 
consisted of the testimony of two store security officers 
 
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“to the fact that the set carried a price tag of $109.95, 
and that that was its price (value).”  475 S.W.2d at 555.  
The appellate court affirmed the conviction, stating as 
follows:  “That the television set was displayed for sale 
over a period of time with a certain price tag upon it is 
not hearsay, but fact; and is evidence that the tag 
reflected its retail value.”  Id. at 555-56.  The court 
also indicated that the testimony would be admissible under 
the business records exception to the hearsay rule.  Id. at 
556. 
 
The Commonwealth also cites Armstrong v. State, 516 
So.2d 806, 809 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (value of stolen item 
established when box containing stolen item is marked with 
price tag and admitted into evidence); Watson v. State, 415 
So.2d 128, 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (testimony of 
department store employee concerning contents of price tag 
not hearsay); Kowalczk v. State, 394 S.E.2d 594, 595 (Ga. 
App. 1990) (testimony of store manager as to actual retail 
price of stolen merchandise sufficient to establish value); 
People v. Drake, 475 N.E.2d 1018, 1020-22 (Ill. App. 2d. 
1985) (information shown on stickers attached to stolen 
items admissible and competent evidence); Lauder, 195 A.2d 
at 611 (price tags admissible where tag is attached at time 
of arrest and similar tags are attached to other articles 
 
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throughout store); Lacy v. State, 432 So. 2d 1205, 1206 
(Miss. 1983) (adopting judicial notice rationale of State 
v. White, supra, in holding price tags not inadmissible on 
hearsay grounds when tags attached at time of theft, no 
reduced price sale in progress at store, and witness had 
training in pricing); Calbert, 670 P.2d at 576 (price tags 
attached to goods at time of theft competent evidence of 
value); City of Albuquerque v. Martinez, 604 P.2d 842, 843 
(N.M. App. 1979) (price tag proper source from which to 
infer precise value of stolen item); State v. Rainwater, 
876 P.2d 979, 982 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (adopting judicial 
notice rationale of State v. White, supra, in holding price 
tags admissible when case involves retail store commonly 
known to sell goods for non-negotiable price shown on tag). 
 
The defendant cites some of the same cases and, in 
addition, State v. Odom, 393 S.E.2d 146, 151 (N.C. App. 
1990) (security employee’s experience qualified price tags 
as records kept in regular course of business and knowledge 
gained from tags themselves did not bar their admission as 
evidence of value), and State v. Kleist, 895 P.2d 398, 400 
(Wash. 1995) (admission of price tags as evidence 
necessitated foundation testimony which was supplied by 
store’s security guard and sales manager). 
 
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In analyzing these cases, it is interesting to note 
that not one holds that price tags or testimony relating to 
price tags is inadmissible per se.1  All hold price-tag 
evidence admissible, but give varying reasons, or no reason 
at all, for admissibility.  Some say the evidence is 
admissible because what is asserted is not hearsay, others 
because the evidence qualifies under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule, some pursuant to the 
judicial notice rationale, and some when foundation 
testimony is provided. 
 
Apparent throughout, however, is a reluctance on the 
part of the courts involved to say that something is 
hearsay or, if it is, that an exception to the hearsay rule 
should be recognized to make it admissible.  We are of 
opinion that what we are dealing with in this case is 
                     
1 In a case not cited by the parties, the Supreme Court 
of Colorado held that price tags constituted hearsay and 
were inadmissible because no foundation testimony was 
presented to establish the value of the stolen items or to 
show that the price tags were accurate and prepared in the 
ordinary course of business so as to bring them within the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule.  People v. 
Codding, 551 P.2d 192, 193 (Colo. 1976).  The Colorado 
legislature then enacted a statute providing that price 
tags shall be prima facie evidence of value when theft 
occurs from a store and that, in all cases where theft 
occurs, hearsay evidence shall not be excluded in 
determining the value of the thing involved.  Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 18-4-414 (1985). 
 
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hearsay2, that it is not admissible under any presently 
recognized exception to the hearsay rule,3 and that we 
should consider recognizing an exception to the rule to 
permit its admission. 
 
What is involved here is a simple, uncomplicated 
matter.  Shoplifting is something that occurs thousands and 
thousands of times throughout this country every day.  It 
is common knowledge that department and other stores 
regularly affix price tags to items of merchandise and that 
the tagged price is what a purchaser must pay to acquire an 
item, without the opportunity to negotiate a reduced price 
or to question how the tagged price was reached. 
 
Under these circumstances, “the inherent unreliability 
of hearsay is not present.”  State v. White, 437 A.2d at 
148.  Therefore, it would be unreasonable and unnecessary 
to require that in each case a merchant must send to court 
not only a security person but also other personnel to 
                     
2 Cessna’s statement that “that’s what they’re sold 
for,” if based on his personal experience in the store 
rather than a mere reading of the price tags, would not be 
hearsay, but there is nothing in the record indicating that 
the statement was based on such personal experience. 
3 The evidence involved in this case does not fall 
within the business records exception to the hearsay rule 
because no foundation was laid to establish “the regularity 
of . . . [the] preparation” of the price tags or the 
store’s reliance upon them “in the transaction of [its] 
business.”  Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Coley & Petersen, 
Inc., 219 Va. 781, 793, 250 S.E.2d 765, 773 (1979).     
 
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establish the reliability of the information shown on a 
price tag affixed to an item that has been stolen. 
 
Rather, we think the common-sense approach to the 
problem is to recognize an exception to the hearsay rule in 
shoplifting cases permitting the admission into evidence of 
price tags regularly affixed to items of personalty offered 
for sale or, in substitution, testimony concerning the 
amounts shown on such tags when, as in this case, there is 
no objection to such testimony on best evidence grounds.  
While such evidence, when admitted, would suffice to make 
out a prima facie case of an item’s value, the accused 
would retain full opportunity to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses and to present rebutting evidence on the issue of 
value.  See State v. White, 437 A.2d at 148.  For example, 
if a store conducts a sale but computes the reduced price 
at the cash register rather than marking the change on the 
price tag, an accused would be entitled to rely upon the 
reduced price as evidence of the item’s value. 
 
The evidence in the present case falls within the 
exception we now recognize to the hearsay rule.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
 
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JUSTICE KEENAN, with whom JUSTICE HASSELL joins, 
dissenting. 
 
JUSTICE KEENAN, with whom JUSTICE HASSELL joins, 
dissenting. 
 
 
The majority effectively shifts the burden of proving 
the value of the merchandise at issue in a grand larceny 
shoplifting prosecution from the Commonwealth to a criminal 
defendant.  In declaring that the "tagged price" of 
merchandise constitutes prima facie proof of its value, the 
majority essentially requires a criminal defendant to prove 
his innocence by disproving unreliable evidence of value. 
 
The majority apparently has not attended a "red dot" 
sale at Hecht's Department Store, the retail merchant 
involved in this appeal.  It is common knowledge that, at 
these and other comparable sales, price tags often bear 
three or four different price markings.  Under such 
circumstances, price tags are, if anything, an inherently 
untrustworthy form of evidence. 
 
Without acknowledging this problem, the majority 
simply invites a criminal defendant, after hearsay "price 
tag" evidence is admitted, to cross-examine the 
prosecution's witness or to present his own witnesses in an 
attempt to establish the true retail value of the 
merchandise.  The majority also leaves to a defendant the 
burden of proving whether a further reduced price would 
 
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have been computed at the cash register.  A holding that 
places these evidentiary burdens on a criminal defendant 
violates the principle cited by the majority that, in grand 
larceny prosecutions, the Commonwealth bears the burden of 
proving the value of merchandise taken beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Walls v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 480, 481, 450 
S.E.2d 363, 364 (1994); Wright v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 
132, 139, 82 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1954). 
 
Without identifying any necessity for its new 
exception to the hearsay rule, the majority chiefly relies 
on the fact that other jurisdictions have created such an 
exception.  I respectfully submit that such a rationale is 
without substance and should not be the controlling basis 
for any decision of this Court.  The business records 
exception to the hearsay rule is alive and well in 
Virginia.  See, e.g., Kettler & Scott, Inc. v. Earth 
Technology Companies, Inc., 248 Va. 450, 457, 449 S.E.2d 
782, 785-86 (1994); Marefield Meadows, Inc. v. Lorenz, 245 
Va. 255, 264, 427 S.E.2d 363, 368 (1993); Frye v. 
Commonwealth, 231 Va. 370, 387, 345 S.E.2d 267, 279-80 
(1986).  By proper use of that exception, the Commonwealth 
can present evidence of value in grand larceny shoplifting 
cases. 
 
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Thus, I would reject the creation of a new exception 
to the hearsay rule and hold that the hearsay evidence in 
question was improperly admitted.  Since the defendant has 
not assigned error to the sufficiency of the evidence in 
support of his conviction, I would remand the case for a 
new trial on the indictment should the Commonwealth be so 
advised. 
 
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