Case Title: Commonwealth v. Silva

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12336

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
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SJC-12336 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSHUA SILVA. 
 
 
 
Bristol.     January 11, 2019. - May 15, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Robbery.  Evidence, Inference, Intent, Inflammatory 
evidence, Relevance and materiality.  Jury and Jurors.  
Intent.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Jury and jurors, 
Deliberation of jury, Instructions to jury, Presumptions 
and burden of proof. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on November 21, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Robert J. Kane, J. 
 
 
 
Jeffrey L. Baler for the defendant. 
 
Tara L. Johnston, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  On October 15, 2013, sixty-nine year old Joyce 
Howland was found dead in her home.  After a seven-day trial, a 
Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of armed robbery and 
murder in the first degree in her death, on theories of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty and felony-murder.  At trial, the 
2 
 
 
Commonwealth argued that the defendant had robbed the victim of 
her jewelry, slit her throat, and sold the jewelry to obtain 
money for drugs.  The jury heard testimony from the defendant's 
coworker, over the defendant's objection, that the defendant 
previously had said that if he were to break into a house that 
the two had seen, he would find it necessary to kill its 
occupants.  During deliberation, the jury requested a magnifying 
glass, without stating the purpose for which they intended to 
use it. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial judge erred 
in providing the jury with a magnifying glass during 
deliberation, as a violation of the defendant's rights to due 
process and confrontation.  The defendant argues also that the 
jury instruction on circumstantial evidence and inferences 
unconstitutionally "diminished the Commonwealth's burden of 
proof," and violated his due process rights.  In addition, the 
defendant contends that his statements to his coworker should 
not have been admitted, and that the introduction of those 
statements requires a new trial.  He also asks that we exercise 
our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the verdict 
of murder in the first degree or to order a new trial.  For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the convictions and decline to 
grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
3 
 
 
 
1.  Facts.  We recite facts that the jury could have found, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.  See 
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678 (1979).  We 
reserve some facts for later discussion. 
 
The victim lived alone, and she suffered from lower back 
problems.  At the time of her death in October 2013, she weighed 
under one hundred pounds.  At some point in 2013, the victim 
contracted with a home maintenance and repair contractor to 
insulate her attic.  In October 2013, that contractor hired a 
separate building and supply company to complete the job.  The 
defendant worked for the company that the victim hired to 
insulate her attic.  He had been hired one to two weeks before 
the job was completed, after an acquaintance who worked for the 
company, Paulo Dias, introduced the defendant to the insulation 
department manager. 
 
a.  Events of Friday, October 11, 2013.  On the morning of 
Friday, October 11, 2013, the defendant, Dias, and their 
supervisor arrived at the victim's house to begin the 
installation.  The supervisor left soon thereafter, leaving Dias1 
and the defendant alone with the victim, who was sitting on the 
couch.  Dias and the defendant brought bags of insulation into 
                     
1 Paulo Dias was a key Commonwealth witness at trial. 
4 
 
 
the attic through a small opening in a closet located in the 
victim's bedroom. 
 
Over the course of several hours, as the two men were 
working, Dias noticed several pieces of jewelry on a bureau in 
the victim's bedroom, including a herringbone chain necklace, 
another chain necklace, and some rings.  The defendant and Dias 
discussed the jewelry and noted that it could be worth some 
money.  They talked about possibly taking the jewelry, but 
decided against doing so, because they would be paid that day.  
The defendant explained nonetheless that if he were to attempt 
to take the jewelry, he would leave his tools behind and come 
back later; would knock on the door and be let in because he had 
forgotten his tools; and would hit the jewelry owner over the 
head and kill her.2 
 
In addition to noticing the jewelry, Dias noted that the 
victim had prescription pills in her bathroom.  Dias and the 
defendant determined that the pills were painkillers, and each 
consumed some.  Neither Dias nor the defendant used any other 
drugs that day; Dias testified that the pills helped to ease his 
backache. 
                     
2 The judge allowed Dias to testify to these statements over 
the defendant's objection, as an illustration of the defendant's 
intent.  Dias testified that he thought the defendant was just 
"messing around" when the defendant made the comments. 
5 
 
 
 
The two completed the installation at approximately noon.  
Dias did not have a driver's license, so the defendant drove him 
back to the building company where they worked, in a maroon 
company truck with white lettering.3  The defendant received his 
paycheck and cashed it that afternoon. 
 
b.  Events of Monday and Tuesday, October 14 and 15, 2013.  
On Monday, October 14, 2013, a holiday, Dias and the defendant 
worked on an insulation job for a different customer.  When the 
supervisor drove the defendant to the worksite that morning, the 
defendant asked him for twenty dollars even though the 
supervisor had paid the defendant on Friday. 
 
Over the course of that morning, when Dias and the 
defendant were standing outside the house where they were 
working, they saw the next door neighbors outside with a young 
child.  Dias testified, over defense counsel's objection, that 
"the next-door neighbors were out there with their kid, little 
baby, about two, three years old that I could see, and it came 
up that if -- he was like, if I broke into this house, I'd have 
to kill everybody, and I was -- even the baby.  And I was like, 
why would you have to kill the baby for? . . .  Why would you 
                     
3 At trial, some witnesses referred to the maroon company 
truck as a red truck or as a reddish brown truck. 
6 
 
 
have to kill the baby if he couldn't even identify you, if you 
did something like that, you know?"4 
 
Dias and the defendant completed the insulation job around 
noon or 1 P.M., and the supervisor brought them back to the 
office in the company truck.  The supervisor asked the defendant 
if he would pick up insulation at a warehouse that afternoon.  
The defendant agreed that he would get the insulation and put it 
away, lock the truck and the shed, and telephone the supervisor 
when he was finished.  The defendant took the maroon truck, and 
he dropped Dias off at home on his way to the warehouse.  The 
supervisor received a telephone call from the defendant at 
3:22 P.M., during which the defendant told the supervisor that 
he had locked up around 2 P.M.  Dias watched his children at 
home that afternoon until 4 or 5 P.M. 
 
Sometime before 2 P.M. that day, the victim spoke with a 
longtime friend on the telephone; the victim said that she 
planned to join the friend at a trivia event that evening.  The 
victim spoke with someone else by telephone at approximately 
2 P.M.  When the victim did not appear for the trivia event that 
evening, her friend telephoned but got no answer.  The next 
morning, Tuesday, the friend drove to the victim's house.  She 
                     
4 The judge stopped Dias's testimony at that point.  The 
judge allowed Dias to testify as to the content of the 
conversation as indicative of the defendant's intent. 
7 
 
 
found the front door unlocked, went inside, and discovered the 
victim lying on the floor of her bedroom.  She ran outside and 
telephoned 911. 
 
Paramedics arrived at approximately 11:15 A.M.  One of the 
first responders saw a half-eaten meal on a coffee table.  There 
was also a cigarette that looked like it had burned out.  The 
victim was lying on her left side with a pool of blood 
surrounding her head.  A paramedic determined that the victim 
had died prior to the first responders' arrival.  When the 
victim was rolled over, a large incision was visible across the 
front of her neck.  The victim's blood was found on a candle box 
in her bedroom and on multiple plates in the kitchen sink.  A 
black knife in the sink tested positive for the presence of 
blood, but no confirmatory test determined whether the blood was 
human.5 
 
An autopsy revealed that the cut across the victim's neck 
was seven and one-half inches long, on average one inch deep, 
and comprised at least two distinct cuts.  The victim's veins 
and arteries were severed below the jaw.  She also had numerous 
other cuts, scrapes, and bruises on her arms, face, neck, and 
torso.  Blunt force trauma to one of her vertebrae was 
                     
5 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) from the handle of the knife 
matched the victim's DNA profile, but an expert at trial could 
not determine whether that DNA may have come from skin or a 
different bodily fluid. 
8 
 
 
consistent with her head having been yanked backward, and 
superficial scrapes on her chin were consistent with defensive 
wounds.  A forensic pathologist testified that from the 
beginning of the infliction of the major wound to her neck, the 
victim would have been conscious for ten seconds or more. 
 
Surveillance video footage introduced at trial showed a 
maroon truck with white lettering, identified as the maroon 
company truck, traveling east on Route 6 on October 14, 2013, at 
approximately 2:16 P.M.  The truck was carrying white bundles in 
the back that looked like insulation.  What seemed to be the 
same truck appeared on surveillance video footage traveling in 
the opposite direction nineteen minutes later, at 2:35 P.M.  In 
a recorded interview on Tuesday evening, October 15, 2013, the 
defendant told police that he had gone to the victim's house on 
Monday afternoon to retrieve a tape measure that he had left 
behind.  He said that he was at the victim's house for a maximum 
of five minutes.6  Trial testimony established that if someone 
were driving the maroon truck seen on the surveillance footage 
at 2:16 P.M. to the victim's house, and if the driver only 
stayed at the victim's house for a maximum of five minutes 
                     
6 In his interview with police, the defendant said that 
after he finished work on Monday, he drove to the victim's house 
where he had a conversation that "couldn't have been more than 
. . . three to five minutes, if that," and then the victim 
returned his tape measure.  This portion of the interview was 
played at trial. 
9 
 
 
before returning, the truck should have been visible on the 
surveillance video no more than nine minutes after 2:16 P.M. 
 
Surveillance video footage from a nearby restaurant showed 
an individual wearing light-colored pants appear to toss 
something into an alleyway at approximately 2:45 P.M. on October 
14, 2013.7  A few days after this video footage was recorded, 
after hearing conversations among his staff about some type of 
incident in the area, the restaurant manager retrieved and 
watched the footage.  He then went into the alley, found a 
prescription bottle label bearing the victim's name, and gave it 
to police. 
 
Sometime on the afternoon of October 14, 2013, an 
individual known as "Mojo" contacted Jonathan Chicoine, and 
asked Chicoine to bring the defendant to a pawn shop because the 
defendant had something he "wanted to get rid of."  Because 
Chicoine did not have government identification documents, and 
because such documents are necessary in order to sell something 
at a pawn shop, Chicoine enlisted the help of a female friend, 
who did have appropriate identification documents.  Chicoine, 
this friend, and another female friend picked up the defendant 
                     
7 The individual shown in the restaurant surveillance 
footage was wearing a red hat and a plaid shirt.  After 
executing search warrants at the defendant's property, police 
discovered a red hat and plaid shirt from the defendant's 
premises. 
10 
 
 
at a restaurant using Mojo's automobile, a white four-door 
sedan.  When the defendant got into the rear passenger seat, he 
was holding a small bag of jewelry, and he said that he wanted 
to pawn the jewelry for at least $400.8 
 
The four drove to a pawn shop.  The defendant handed a 
herringbone chain and another gold chain to the woman with the 
identification documents, who went into the pawn shop 
accompanied by the other woman.  The defendant gave instructions 
not to use his name.  The women returned with the jewelry a few 
minutes later, because the pawn shop would pay only $200; the 
group then drove to a second pawn shop.  The women went inside, 
and Chicoine joined them after ten or fifteen minutes.  The 
three returned to the vehicle with $380 from the sale.  The 
defendant took the money. 
 
Chicoine drove the group to a nearby gasoline station.  The 
defendant got out of the vehicle and used his cellular telephone 
to call someone; he then walked to the side of a building, met 
with a man, and got back into the vehicle.  A short while later, 
in the parking lot of a fast food restaurant, the others found 
out that the defendant was in possession of a clear plastic bag 
of heroin that he had not had earlier.  He gave some to the 
women and put the rest in his pocket.  He told one of the women 
                     
8 One witness testified that the defendant wanted 
potentially as much as $600 for the jewelry. 
11 
 
 
that, regardless of how much she was questioned, she should say 
that she "got the jewelry from some black guy on the street for 
a couple pieces of crack."  The group then drove to a drug store 
and a variety store, where they purchased needles and a glass 
pipe that could be used to consume the heroin and smoke "crack" 
cocaine. 
 
On the drive back, the defendant asked Chicoine if he had 
any clothes that the defendant could wear, because he was dirty 
from work.  The defendant was wearing cream-colored or tan 
pants, which appeared to have blood on them.  Chicoine gave the 
defendant a pair of jogging pants, and watched him put his dirty 
pants into a shopping bag that he put in a trash container in an 
alleyway. 
 
Chicoine later retrieved the plastic bag and gave it to a 
State police trooper.  The pants in the bag had a large, 
reddish-brown stain around the knee, which tested positive for 
human blood.  A deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile from the 
bloodstain matched the victim's DNA profile.9  The defendant's 
                     
9 The expected frequency of the occurrence of the victim's 
particular DNA profile is approximately 1 in 1.97 quintillion 
for the African-American population, 1 in 1.469 sextillion for 
the Asian population, 1 in 245.3 quadrillion for the Caucasian 
population, and 1 in 2.520 quintillion for the Hispanic 
population. 
12 
 
 
DNA profile matched a major profile drawn from the interior back 
portion of the waistband.10 
 
When the defendant went to work on Tuesday, October 15, 
2013, he asked his coworkers if he could borrow a knife because 
he did not know where his was. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The defendant challenges the judge's 
decision, in response to jurors' request, to provide the jury a 
magnifying glass in the jury room.  The defendant contends also 
that the jury instruction on circumstantial evidence and 
inferences improperly lowered the Commonwealth's burden of proof 
and violated his due process rights.  In addition, the defendant 
challenges the judge's decision to allow the introduction of his 
statements regarding the neighbors that he and his coworker saw 
standing outside on Monday afternoon.  The defendant also seeks 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
a.  Magnifying glass.  In his closing argument, defense 
counsel conceded that surveillance video footage showed the 
defendant walking through the alleyway where the prescription 
bottle label was discovered; counsel also conceded that the 
                     
10 DNA from at least two individuals was found on the 
interior of the waistband of the pants.  The statistical 
probability that someone other than the defendant could have 
been the source of the major DNA on the waistband was determined 
to be 1 in 141.3 sextillion for the African-American population; 
1 in 857.6 quintillion for the Asian population; 1 in 8.006 
sextillion for the Caucasian population; and 1 in 586.9 
quintillion for the Hispanic population. 
13 
 
 
defendant could be seen wearing the pants that were introduced 
in evidence.  Counsel encouraged the jurors, however, to study 
the pants as depicted in the surveillance video recording 
closely, on the theory that the pants must have become badly 
bloodstained while being used by someone else.11  The 
Commonwealth argued that the surveillance video recording might 
not be of sufficient quality to permit the kind of scrutiny that 
defense counsel had encouraged.12 
                     
11 Defense counsel argued: 
 
"This is Exhibit Number 68, pretty good shot of those 
pants.  All right?  You'll have that still.  You will 
have the moving video.  You will have the moving video 
. . . in your jury room.  Those are the pants as they 
appeared at 2:46 on the 14th of October 2013.  These 
are the pants as they appear Wednesday night, October 
16th, 2015.  How'd they get so filthy? . . .  Make the 
comparison yourself.  Ask yourself the question, where 
do these pants been going the last two days?  What 
have these pants been doing?  How do they go from this 
to this?  Should that raise some question in your 
mind?  Should that raise reasonable doubt in your 
mind?  I suggest to you that it should.  Third thing 
about the pants, the DNA. . . .  The DNA in those 
pants, [the victim] is on there; we don't contest the 
statistical match provided by the Commonwealth, not at 
all.  We don't contest the statistical . . . 
probabilities provided by the Commonwealth in regard 
to [the defendant], not at all. . . .  There's three 
people wearing those pants.  He's one of them, no 
question about it.  He's one.  Who are the other 
two? . . .  I suggest to you that's the very essence 
of reasonable doubt." 
 
12 The Commonwealth argued: 
 
"When you look at the video and analyze it as the 
defense wants you, keep in mind, what's the clarity of 
14 
 
 
 
During deliberation, the jury requested a magnifying glass, 
without explaining their reasons for the request.  The judge 
surmised that they probably wanted the magnifying glass "to 
examine the [d]efendant's forceful argument about the 
discrepancy between the color or colors of the pants shown on 
[the restaurant surveillance] video and stills and the pants 
that [Chicoine] retrieved and presented to the police."  The 
judge informed jurors that he wanted to defer answering their 
request for a magnifying class until he had conducted some 
research.  After adjourning, the judge researched the science 
underlying digital image coloration.  The parties also agreed to 
conduct research on issues related to the jury's request.  That 
evening, the judge purchased a magnifying glass from an office 
supply store, so that he could review the materials himself 
using a magnifying glass. 
 
The following day, the judge noted on the record that 
digital cameras produce color images by "only record[ing] the 
original color of a portion of the pixels in the image."13  
                     
that video?  Is it crystal clear that you would see 
all those things?  Could that have been affected by 
the glare, the sun?  Look at it all.  I suggest to you 
that a close analysis of the pants . . . doesn't lead 
you to the conclusion that the [d]efendant wants you 
to believe, that those pants were clean when he was 
walking behind [the restaurant]." 
 
13 The judge quoted Witkowski, Can Juries Really Believe 
What They See?  New Foundational Requirements for the 
15 
 
 
Accordingly, he recognized that "[u]se of the magnifying glass 
may focus [jurors'] attention on a digital still that has 
potential distortions."  The judge noted further that no one had 
testified about the accuracy of the depiction of colors in the 
photographs derived from the video recording.  The judge 
explained that he had examined the still image that had been the 
focus of the defendant's closing argument, as well as the 
surveillance video footage, using a magnifying class.  The judge 
determined that using the magnifying glass was "simply just a 
better way to look at" the images. 
 
After hearing the parties' views on the subject, the judge 
decided, over the defendant's objection, to send the jury a 
magnifying glass.  The judge provided jurors with a magnifying 
glass obtained from the registry of deeds, while also 
instructing the jury that "an exhibit that can include . . . a 
still or video, is not . . . assumed to be an accurate 
depiction."  The judge continued, "It is for this jury to look 
at evidence about that particular still or that particular 
video, or a particular document, to find out about . . . its 
creation, its review, and to also consider other evidence that 
is relevant to the question of whether a particular exhibit is 
reliable." 
                     
Authentication of Digital Images, 10 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 267, 
269 n.6 (2002). 
16 
 
 
 
The defendant argues that the judge's provision of the 
magnifying glass to the jury introduced extraneous matters into 
the case, and, as a result, denied the defendant his rights to 
due process and confrontation under the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.  The 
defendant maintains that the magnifying glass "creat[ed] 
evidence that was not introduced at trial," and enabled the jury 
to "consider[] information not in evidence."  We disagree. 
 
"Extraneous matter is information, knowledge, or specific 
facts about one of the parties or the matter in litigation that 
did not come from the evidence at trial."  Commonwealth v. 
Greineder, 458 Mass. 207, 246 (2010), vacated on other grounds, 
567 U.S. 948 (2012), S.C., 464 Mass. 580 (2013).  Information is 
not "extraneous" when it is cumulative of evidence introduced at 
trial.  See Commonwealth v. Lally, 473 Mass. 693, 711 (2016); 
Greineder, supra at 247–248.  We conclude that the defendant has 
not established by a preponderance of the evidence that 
delivering a magnifying glass to the jury introduced extraneous 
material into this case.  See Commonwealth v. Miller, 475 Mass. 
212, 221-222 (2016) (defendant bears burden of establishing by 
preponderance of evidence that there was introduction of 
extraneous material). 
17 
 
 
 
The jury's use of a magnifying glass did not introduce 
material beyond the scope of the trial evidence into the jury 
room.  By contrast to other, potentially impermissible, means of 
manipulating evidence, a magnifying glass does not materially 
transform the evidence before the jury.  See United States v. 
Miranda, 986 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 
929 (1993) (distinguishing jury's request for "blow-ups" of 
surveillance photographs introduced as exhibits from jurors' use 
of magnifying glass during deliberations, and deeming latter 
permissible).  Indeed, the judge's own observation of the 
exhibits using a magnifying glass, coupled with his 
determination that the result was "simply just a better way to 
look at" the evidence, indicates that the magnifying glass did 
not impermissibly transform the evidence in such a way so as to 
go beyond "the scope of the evidence presented at trial."  
Greineder, 458 Mass. at 247.  See State v. Griffin, 1993-NMSC-
071, ¶ 30 ("Enhancement of the jury's visual acuity through use 
of a magnifying glass is not [improper] experimentation 
[resulting in the introduction of extraneous information] unless 
there is some indication that the magnification produced 
additional evidence"). 
 
Further, in his closing argument, defense counsel 
encouraged jurors to "look closely" at the surveillance video 
recording and still images that counsel acknowledged depicted 
18 
 
 
the defendant.  There is no indication in the record that the 
jurors requested or used the magnifying glass to do anything 
other than look closely at the evidence, precisely as the 
defendant requested they do.  See United States v. Young, 814 
F.2d 392, 396 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 838 (1987) (not 
error to provide jury with magnifying glass where foreperson did 
not explain intended use and trial judge did not inquire as to 
intended use, but jury request was read in presence of both 
parties and there was "no evidence in the record, nor [did] the 
defendant contend, that the jury understood the magnifying glass 
to have any bearing as evidence in the case or that the jury 
would use it improperly"); State v. Everson, 166 Wash. 534, 536–
537 (1932) ("if [an] experiment [during jury deliberations] 
involves merely a more critical examination of an exhibit than 
had been made of it in the court, there is no ground of 
objection. . . .  [T]he jury merely more critically examined 
[evidence] by the aid of a magnifying glass.  This did not put 
them in possession of material facts which were not already in 
evidence"). 
 
"Rather, by providing the jury with a magnifying glass, the 
[judge] permitted the jury to make a more critical examination 
of the exhibits introduced at trial."  Young, 814 F.2d at 396, 
citing United States v. Beach, 296 F.2d 153, 158–159 (4th Cir. 
1961).  See United States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841, 843 (9th 
19 
 
 
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831 (1986) ("We are unable to see 
how the use of the magnifying glass to view photographs differs 
from the use of corrective eyeglasses by jurors"); People v. 
Turner, 22 Cal. App. 3d 174, 183 (1971) ("At most, the use of 
the magnifying glass involved an extension of the jury's sense 
of sight"); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 220 (K.S. Broun ed., 7th 
ed. 2016) (noting distinction between experiments constituting 
closer scrutiny of trial exhibit and experiments that go beyond 
evidence introduced in court). 
 
The defendant's argument that "more than common knowledge 
was required" to analyze or compare video footage and still 
images is belied by the absence of any expert testimony about 
digital image coloration at trial, and counsel's own request 
that the jury closely scrutinize the surveillance video 
recording and still images.  To the extent that digital image 
coloration processes may not comport with a lay viewer's 
understanding of what digital images depict, the judge accounted 
for this possibility and addressed it adequately by giving an 
instruction related to use of the magnifying glass at the time 
he gave the magnifying glass to the jury.  The judge explained 
that no exhibit should be assumed to be an accurate depiction.  
Moreover, the jury in this case were not presented with images 
of fingerprints or handwriting samples, the comparison of which 
may be commonly understood to require scientific or technical 
20 
 
 
knowledge.14  See People v. Moody, 195 A.D.2d 1016, 1016-1017 
(N.Y. 1993) (no error in granting jurors' request for magnifying 
glass during deliberations because magnifying glass enhances 
clarity of photographs similarly to reading glasses, and no 
fingerprint or handwriting comparisons were at issue).  Compare 
United States v. George, 56 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 937 (1995) (concluding that "[n]o 'new 
evidence' resulted from the jurors' use of a magnifying glass to 
examine . . . fingerprint cards and [a] gun"), with People v. 
Rhoden, 101 Ill. App. 3d 223, 226 (1981) (noting that "the 
refusal to permit examination of fingerprint exhibits under 
magnification does not result in error," because "[t]he 
classification and method of comparison of fingerprints is a 
science requiring specialized study not common to most"). 
 
Additionally, the fact that the judge appears to have 
tested the magnifying glass he provided the jury refutes the 
argument that "there is nothing known about the power or quality 
of the magnifying glass" provided.  As the judge explained: 
"The Court, last night, purchased, personally, a . . . 
2M magnifying glass, thereby possibly removing the 
equipment deficiency.  The Court then called someone 
at the Registry of Deeds, thinking that that system 
                     
14 The jury heard testimony that the defendant's 
fingerprints were compared with fingerprints taken from various 
objects in the victim's house, but no images of fingerprints 
were introduced at trial.  Regardless, expert testimony 
established that none of the fingerprints recovered from the 
victim's house matched the defendant's fingerprints. 
21 
 
 
would have a magnifying glass.  It did, and it has 
loaned us the magnifying glass, which appears to have 
somewhat similar resolution, but easier to manipulate 
than the one that I purchased." 
 
 
Overall, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in allowing the jurors' request for a magnifying 
glass, following consultation with the parties; in conducting 
independent investigation of the use and effects of a magnifying 
glass on specific trial exhibits; or in providing instructions 
to the jury designed to account for the possibility that digital 
images might contain distortions.  See Evans v. United States, 
883 A.2d 146, 151 (D.C. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 870 
(2006), quoting Boland v. Dolan, 140 N.J. 174, 182 (1995) 
("where, as here, the jury make[] a formal request for a 
magnification device, which the trial court grants, 'the use of 
a magnifying glass by jurors for exhibits properly introduced at 
trial is within the trial court's discretion'").  See also Dixon 
v. A.J. Cunningham Co., 257 Mass. 63, 71 (1926); Commonwealth v. 
Pixley, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 927, 928 (1997). 
 
b.  Instruction on circumstantial evidence.  The defendant 
contends that the judge's instructions on circumstantial 
evidence impermissibly lessened the burden of proof and violated 
his due process rights.  Of course, the Commonwealth bears the 
burden of proving a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
See Commonwealth v. Pinckney, 419 Mass. 341, 342 (1995), citing 
22 
 
 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  The judge properly 
instructed the jury in language that hewed very closely, indeed 
was nearly verbatim, to the instruction on reasonable doubt that 
we presented as authoritative in Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 
Mass. 464, 477-478 (2015).  Separately, the judge instructed on 
circumstantial evidence and inferences that could be drawn 
therefrom; he noted that circumstantial evidence was 
particularly important in this case because there was "no direct 
evidence of who committed the killing and how it occurred." 
 
The judge illustrated the concepts of circumstantial 
evidence and inferences using the example of a firefighter who 
responds to a burning building, makes several observations, and 
comes to a reasoned inference that the owner of the building 
intentionally set the fire.  In the example, a firefighter who 
responds to a fire sees the owner of a burning building lurking 
in the vicinity of the building as it burns; determines after 
professional investigation that the fire was caused by flammable 
material consistent with material that the owner recently 
purchased; determines that the fire was intentionally set; 
learns that the building was in tax foreclosure; learns that the 
owner had an insurance policy in case of fire; and infers that 
the fire was intentionally set by the building's owner. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge's use of the arson 
example to explain circumstantial evidence and inferences 
23 
 
 
"trivialized the [Commonwealth's] burden of proof by 
demonstrating that a chain of inferences satisfied the burden 
and therefore diminished it below the constitutional standard of 
due process secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . 
and [art.] 12."  The defendant contends that the arson example 
"went improperly far beyond the simple example" presented in 
Instruction 3.100 of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for 
Use in the District Court (2009), which provides an example of a 
mailbox owner who does not observe a mail carrier deliver mail, 
but is able to infer that a mail carrier arrived from the fact 
that the mailbox was empty in the morning but filled with mail 
at night.  Overall, the defendant maintains, the judge in this 
case "gave the jury the impression that a chain of inferences 
from circumstantial evidence was sufficient, leaving the jury 
with a diminished burden of proof." 
 
Because the defendant did not object, we review to 
determine whether the instructions created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 392, 392 n.1 (1998), S.C., 431 Mass. 360 
(2000).15  We conclude that there was no error in the 
                     
15 In addition, before providing the jury with the arson 
example, the judge explained to both parties:  "I do have a 
section [on inferences] that I have developed.  I think both of 
you have heard it.  It uses an illustration from an arson case, 
and I think it's a good illustration.  I think it works."  The 
record indicates that there was no objection. 
24 
 
 
instructions, and therefore no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.16 
 
"In considering whether a [jury] charge lowers the criminal 
standard of proof, we consider the charge, taken as a whole, and 
assess the possible impact of [an] alleged error on the 
deliberations of a reasonable juror, i.e., whether a reasonable 
juror could have used the instruction incorrectly."17  
Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 27 (1996).  This inquiry is 
not purely speculative but, rather, must be supported by some 
evidence in the record.  See Commonwealth v. O'Brian, 445 Mass. 
720, 732, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 898 (2006) (in assessing 
reasonable doubt instruction, finding "no evidence that the jury 
did not understand the high degree of certainty required to find 
the defendant guilty"); Rosa, supra at 29 ("The jury in this 
case were quite discerning . . . .  [T]hey . . . distinguished 
between theories . . . of murder.  It is at best purely 
                     
16 Accordingly, we reject the defendant's argument that 
counsel was ineffective due to his failure to object to these 
instructions. 
 
 
17 Federal law inquires "not whether the instruction 'could 
have' been applied in an unconstitutional manner, but whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it."  
See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6 (1994), citing Estelle v. 
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 & n.4 (1991).  Massachusetts law on 
jury instructions "is more favorable to a criminal defendant 
than the Federal standard."  Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 
27 n.10 (1996). 
25 
 
 
speculative to think that the jury were misled as to their 
responsibility to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
 
A review of the record in this case reveals no evidence 
that the jury could have failed to understand the "awesome duty 
of the jury to determine whether the defendant's guilt was 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 
373 Mass. 116, 129 (1977).  First, the fact that this jury did 
not convict the defendant on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation indicates that they understood the high degree of 
certainty required to find the defendant guilty.  See O'Brian, 
445 Mass. at 732 (that "the jury did not convict the defendant 
of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation" illustrated jury's understanding of burden of 
proof).  See also Rosa, 422 Mass. at 29. 
 
Second, this case differs from Commonwealth v. Pomerleau, 
10 Mass. App. Ct. 208 (1980), on which the defendant relies.  In 
Pomerleau, supra at 213, the judge "attempted to convert [an] 
example [explaining circumstantial evidence and inferences] to 
one illustrating how doubt might be formed in the minds of the 
jurors," thereby leading to likely confusion over the 
relationship between successive inferences and reasonable doubt.  
See id. at 214.  Here, in contrast, the judge provided jurors 
with an unambiguous and adequate instruction on reasonable 
doubt, see Russell, 470 Mass. at 477-478, as well as separate 
26 
 
 
and distinct instructions on circumstantial evidence and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
 
Third, the record makes clear that the jurors "were not 
left free to premise their verdict[s] on speculative 
inferences."  Commonwealth v. Dostie, 425 Mass. 372, 377 (1997).  
The instructions on circumstantial evidence, of which the arson 
example formed one part, underscored that the practice of 
drawing inferences was "not guesswork."  Moreover, the judge 
appropriately clarified that several "rules" constrain the 
practice of inference making.  He explained that inferences must 
be drawn from the evidence, that each inference must be 
reasonable and not a guess, and that any inference constituting 
an element of an offense must be established beyond a reasonable 
doubt."18  The judge also properly emphasized that the drawing of 
inferences could favor the defendant.  Finally, the judge 
instructed the jurors to consider evidence favoring an inference 
in conjunction with evidence standing against it, including the 
                     
18 The judge's instructions present concepts encapsulated by 
model jury instructions routinely used in the courts of the 
Commonwealth.  See, e.g., Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal 
Practice Jury Instructions § 1.5 (3d ed. 2018) ("You may draw an 
inference even if it is not necessary or inescapable, so long as 
it is reasonable and warranted by the evidence, but you may not 
indulge in conjecture or guesswork in drawing inferences.  In 
order to convict the defendant, you must find that all of the 
evidence and the reasonable inferences that you have drawn, 
taken together, prove that [he/she] is guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  If it does not, you must acquit [him/her]"). 
27 
 
 
lack of evidence, in determining whether that evidence satisfied 
the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
To be sure, as we have explained in assessing questions of 
evidentiary insufficiency, "[t]here must be more than slight 
evidence to support each essential element [of a criminal 
conviction;] a conviction may not rest upon the piling of 
inference upon inference or conjecture and speculation" 
(quotation and citations omitted).  Commonwealth v. Reaves, 434 
Mass. 383, 390 (2001).  Our review of the judge's instructions, 
however, persuades us that the instructions would not have 
suggested to a reasonable juror that the act of making 
successive inferences itself might erase reasonable doubt.  
Contrast Pomerleau, 10 Mass. App. Ct. at 213-214.  Indeed, "we 
have permitted . . . a jury to make an inference based on an 
inference to come to a conclusion of guilt or innocence . . . 
[b]ut we require that each inference must be a reasonable and 
logical conclusion from the prior inference; we have made clear 
that a jury may not use conjecture or guesswork to choose 
between alternative inferences."  Dostie, 425 Mass. at 376. 
 
Taken as a whole, the judge's instructions on 
circumstantial evidence and inferences "correctly stated the 
relevant principles and essentially cautioned the jury to be 
sure of the strength and logic of any inferences they drew."  
See Commonwealth v. Schand, 420 Mass. 783, 795 (1995).  The jury 
28 
 
 
are presumed to follow all instructions they are given.  Rosa, 
422 Mass. at 29, citing Commonwealth v. Albert, 391 Mass. 853, 
859 (1984).  Accordingly, we do not agree with the defendant's 
contention that, "[i]n light of [the judge's] instructions, the 
jury [were] likely to believe that merely because circumstantial 
evidence built up, any doubt that they had was unreasonable."  
We underscore that, moving forward, while in general "[t]he use 
of an illustration to explain an inference in connection with 
the concept of circumstantial evidence is permissible," 
Commonwealth v. Shea, 398 Mass. 264, 271 (1986), it is better 
practice to avoid examples in which hypothetical individuals 
commit crimes. 
 
c.  Defendant's statement to his coworker.  The defendant 
argues that the judge erred in permitting Dias to testify to the 
defendant's statement on Monday, October 14, 2013, that, if he 
were to break into the neighbors' house, he would kill the 
neighbors, including their young child.  The defendant asserts 
that any potential probative value in this statement was 
outweighed by the potential for prejudice, and that, as a 
result, the decision to allow the statement to be introduced 
denied the defendant his right to due process rights under the 
Federal and State Constitutions.  Because the defendant objected 
at trial, we review for prejudicial error.  See Commonwealth v. 
Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 744 (2008). 
29 
 
 
 
We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in 
allowing Dias to testify about the defendant's prior statement, 
particularly in light of the limiting instruction that the judge 
provided immediately before Dias's testimony, and the clarifying 
instruction he provided immediately afterward.  Accordingly, the 
admission of the statement did not violate the defendant's 
constitutional rights. 
 
Before Dias testified about the defendant's statement, the 
judge instructed that the statement's "only purpose, I 
emphasize, is to, if it does, shed any light on any intent [the 
defendant] may have had with respect to [the victim] insofar as 
anything occurring on [the] date of [the killing]."  The judge 
also instructed the jurors that they should ask themselves a 
threshold question, "[D]id the [d]efendant say that? . . .  If 
you don't believe he made [the statement], you don't pay any 
regard to it."  Immediately after Dias testified about the 
defendant's out-of-court statement, the judge reminded jurors 
that they were to be "concerned [only] with [the defendant's] 
words, not with [Dias's] words, unless they give meaning to what 
the [d]efendant said.  That's the limited purpose of his words." 
 
"The trial judge is afforded substantial discretion in 
deciding whether, and for what purposes, evidence is relevant, 
and a trial judge's rulings on these questions are reversible 
only for an abuse of discretion" (citation omitted).  
30 
 
 
Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 485 (2010).  Evidence 
that may be inadmissible for the purpose of demonstrating a 
defendant's character or propensity to commit the charged crime 
"may be admissible, if relevant, for other purposes, including 
proof of motive," Commonwealth v. Mendes, 441 Mass. 459, 464 
(2004), or intent.  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) (2019). 
 
Here, we cannot say that the judge abused his discretion in 
determining that the defendant's statement shed further light on 
his intent, i.e., to rob and to kill in connection with a 
robbery; nor can we say that the judge abused his discretion in 
determining that the probative value of the statement outweighed 
any risk of unfair prejudice.  That Dias already had testified 
about the defendant's separate statement regarding killing and 
robbing the victim does not, as the defendant suggests, make his 
statement about the neighbors irrelevant to proving his intent.  
The statement at issue was made on the day the victim was 
killed, days after the defendant's earlier statement about the 
victim; it reasonably may have tended to show that the defendant 
had been serious in his stated intent to rob and kill in 
connection with a robbery, and that he was not, as Dias assumed, 
merely "messing around" when he said it.  The potential for 
undue prejudice was mitigated in some part by Dias's testimony 
about the defendant's earlier statement concerning robbing and 
killing the victim.  In addition, the limiting instructions 
31 
 
 
alleviated the risk that the jury would rely on the statement 
for an improper purpose.  See Rosa, 422 Mass. at 29 (jury are 
presumed to follow judge's instructions). 
 
d.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have 
reviewed the record, in accordance with our statutory duty under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and identify no basis upon which to order a 
new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.