Case Title: Kristy Haferman v. St. Clare Healthcare Foundation, Inc.

Citation: 2005 WI 171

Docket Number: 2003AP001307

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 171 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1307 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Kristy Haferman, Toby Haferman, Sr., 
Toby Haferman, Jr., a minor, by his  
Guardian ad Litem, and Richard H. Schulz,  
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
     v. 
St. Clare Healthcare Foundation, Inc.  
d/b/a St. Clare Hospital, Wisconsin  
Hospital Association and Wisconsin  
Patients Compensation Fund,  
          Defendants, 
Donald W. Vangor, M.D., and Physicians  
Insurance Company of Wisconsin,  
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 206 
Reported at:  277 Wis. 2d 156, 689 N.W.2d 636 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 30, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 28, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sauk   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel George   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by Jeremi K. Young and Rasansky Law Firm, Dallas, TX; and 
Richard Schulz and Schulz, Duffey & O’Brien, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Sean Duffey. 
 
For the defendants-appellants there was a brief by David J. 
Pliner and Corneille Law Group, LLC, Madison, and Michael B. Van 
Sicklen, Naikang Tsao and Foley & Lardner LLP, Madison, and oral 
argument by Naikang Tsao. 
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by David E. McFarlane, 
Sheila M. Sullivan and Bell, Gierhart & Moore, S.C., Madison, on 
behalf of Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Mitchell Hagopian, 
Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lynn R. Laufenberg and 
Laufenberg & Hoefle, S.C., Milwaukee, on behalf of The Wisconsin 
Academy of Trial Lawyers, and there was oral argument by Lynn R. 
Laufenberg. 
 
 
2005 WI 171
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1307  
(L.C. No. 
2002CV717) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Kristy Haferman, Toby Haferman, Sr., Toby 
Haferman, Jr. a minor, by his Guardian ad 
Litem, and Richard H. Schulz, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
St. Clare Healthcare Foundation, Inc. d/b/a St. 
Clare Hospital, Wisconsin Hospital Association 
and Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Donald W. Vangor, M.D. and Physicians Insurance 
Company of Wisconsin, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 30, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioners, 
Toby 
Haferman, Jr., and his parents ("the Hafermans"), seek review of 
a published court of appeals decision reversing a circuit court 
order that allowed Toby's medical malpractice action to proceed 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
2 
 
as timely filed.1  The court of appeals concluded that, even 
though Toby was a developmentally disabled child, the general 
three-year 
statute 
of 
limitations 
for 
medical 
malpractice 
actions applied to bar the action as untimely.  It determined 
that other statutes of limitations applicable to children did 
not, 
by 
their 
plain 
language, 
apply 
to 
Toby's 
medical 
malpractice action. 
¶2 
We agree with the court of appeals that the text of 
the other statutes precludes their application.  However, we 
disagree that the general three-year statute of limitations 
applies.  We conclude that the legislature has not provided an 
applicable statute of limitations for a claim against a health 
care provider alleging injury to a developmentally disabled 
child.  Therefore, Toby's action is not time-barred.  We reverse 
the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for further 
proceedings. 
I   
¶3 
The Hafermans filed this action on September 4, 2002, 
against 
several 
defendants, 
including 
Dr. 
Donald 
Vangor, 
Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, St. Clare Hospital, 
and 
Wisconsin 
Hospital 
Association. 
 
According 
to 
the 
allegations in the complaint, Toby was born on February 10, 
1991, making him 11 years old at the time the complaint was 
filed. 
                                                 
1 See Haferman v. St. Clare Healthcare Found., 2004 WI App 
206, 277 Wis. 2d 156, 689 N.W.2d 636 (reversing an order of the 
circuit court for Sauk County, Daniel S. George, Judge). 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The Hafermans alleged that, as a result of the 
defendants' negligence on or about the date of Toby's birth, 
Toby sustained a developmental disability along with other harm.2  
According to the Hafermans, the disability from which Toby 
suffers is cerebral palsy, which occurred because Toby was 
denied oxygen to his brain during critical moments just before 
and after his birth. 
¶5 
St. 
Clare 
Hospital 
and 
the 
Wisconsin 
Hospital 
Association moved for summary judgment, arguing that Toby's 
action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.  
Dr. Vangor and Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin also 
moved for summary judgment and asserted a statute of limitations 
defense. 
¶6 
The circuit court denied the motions, after briefing 
and oral argument.  It recognized that Toby's action potentially 
implicated three statutes of limitations, Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55, 
893.56, and 893.16 (2003-04).3  In order to put both the circuit 
court's decision and the court of appeals decision in context, 
we set forth key portions of each of the statutes. 
                                                 
2 The complaint also alleged a claim by Toby's parents for 
loss of companionship and medical expenses.   
3 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted.  At times, we refer to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55, 893.16, and 893.56 generically as statutes 
of limitations, even though at least some aspects of the 
statutes may be more properly characterized as a statute of 
repose or as a tolling provision.   
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Section 
893.55(1) 
is 
the 
general 
statute 
of 
limitations for actions against health care providers.  It 
includes a three-year limitation period running from the date of 
injury, along with a discovery rule that is limited by a five-
year period of repose: 
Except as provided by [subsections that are not 
relevant here], an action to recover damages for 
injury 
arising 
from 
any 
treatment 
or 
operation 
performed by, or from any omission by, a person who is 
a health care provider, regardless of the theory on 
which the action is based, shall be commenced within 
the later of: 
(a)  Three years from the date of the injury, or 
(b)  One year from the date the injury was 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have been discovered, except that an action may 
not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 
years from the date of the act or omission. 
¶8 
Section 
893.56, 
entitled 
"Health 
care 
providers; 
minors actions," generally provides that children must bring 
claims against health care providers either within the time 
limits prescribed by § 893.55 or by the age of 10 years, 
whichever is later.  However, § 893.56 specifically appears to 
except from its purview those children who are under a 
developmental disability.  It reads as follows: 
Any person under the age of 18, who is not under 
disability 
by 
reason 
of 
insanity, 
developmental 
disability or imprisonment, shall bring an action to 
recover damages for injuries to the person arising 
from any treatment or operation performed by, or for 
any omission by a health care provider within the time 
limitation under s. 893.55 or by the time that person 
reaches the age of 10 years, whichever is later.  That 
action shall be brought by the parent, guardian or 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
5 
 
other person having custody of the minor within the 
time limit set forth in this section. 
¶9 
Section 893.16(1) is a tolling statute that may extend 
a limitation period, including when the person entitled to bring 
an action is a child.  The text of § 893.16(1), however, 
specifically states that its provisions do not apply to a 
child's action against a health care provider: 
Person 
under 
disability.  (1) 
If 
a 
person 
entitled to bring an action is, at the time the cause 
of action accrues, either under the age of 18 years, 
except for actions against health care providers; or 
mentally ill, the action may be commenced within 2 
years after the disability ceases, except that where 
the disability is due to mental illness, the period of 
limitation prescribed in this chapter may not be 
extended for more than 5 years. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶10 The circuit court observed that the interplay of these 
three statutes created a "very difficult conundrum" as applied 
to Toby.  It attempted to look to § 893.56 as the statute which 
the legislature had apparently created to govern actions by 
young children against health care providers, but determined 
that § 893.56 could not apply to Toby because it specifically 
exempts minors with developmental disabilities. 
¶11 Ultimately, the circuit court reasoned, § 893.16 must 
apply to Toby in order to avoid what the court viewed as an 
absurd result if the general three-year statute of limitations 
in § 893.55 were applied: 
 
The rule of statutory construction that I think 
is the most appropriate in this particular situation 
is that we should avoid an interpretation that leads 
to an absurd or illogical result.  And in going from 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
6 
 
the provisions of Section 893.56, if we were to resort 
back to § 893.55, we would achieve just that, an 
absurd and illogical 
result, because 
that 
would 
require a more disabled child to be controlled by a 
more restrictive statute of limitations, and that 
makes absolutely no sense whatsoever. 
¶12 Thus, in order to avoid what it viewed as an absurd 
and illogical result, the circuit court felt compelled to 
rewrite § 893.16. 
 
Specifically, 
the 
court's 
construction 
excised from § 893.16(1) the phrase "except for actions against 
health care providers."  It did so in order to avoid application 
of the general three-year statute of limitations.  As the 
circuit court explained, application of the general statute 
would have resulted in Toby being subject to a shorter statute 
of limitations than would have applied to Toby if he were not 
developmentally disabled.4 
¶13 After Dr. Vangor and Physicians Insurance Company 
successfully sought leave to appeal, the court of appeals 
reversed the circuit court in a split decision.  The court of 
appeals majority, unlike the circuit court, determined that 
§ 893.16(1) could not apply to Toby because the plain language 
of the statute exempted children who sue health care providers 
from the statute's tolling provisions. 
¶14 Rather, the court of appeals majority concluded, the 
general statute of limitations applied to Toby's action, which 
had been filed long past the expiration of the three-year period 
                                                 
4 The circuit court relied on a federal court decision that 
used a similar approach in a case presenting nearly identical 
facts.  See generally Zielke v. Wausau Mem'l Hosp., 529 F. Supp. 
571 (W.D. Wis. 1982).  
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
7 
 
prescribed by § 893.55(1)(a).  The court of appeals majority 
nonetheless recognized that the application of § 893.55 to Toby 
produced a "troubling" result.  Specifically, it noted that 
"[t]he result in this case is troubling given that the 
legislature has, through Wis. Stat. § 893.56, provided more time 
for young children to file medical malpractice suits than the 
three years provided in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(a)."5 
II 
¶15 The 
issue 
we 
must 
decide 
is 
what 
statute 
of 
limitations applies to a claim against a health care provider 
alleging injury to a developmentally disabled child.  This issue 
requires that we seek to interpret and apply §§ 893.16, 893.56, 
and 893.55.  It presents a question of law subject to 
independent appellate review.  Hess v. Fernandez, 2005 WI 19, 
¶36, 278 Wis. 2d 283, 692 N.W.2d 655. 
¶16 We begin our examination of the statutory provisions 
by analyzing the constructions of § 893.16 and § 893.56 that the 
Hafermans and the defendants, respectively, advance.  After 
determining that those constructions cannot be supported by the 
plain language of the statutes, we turn to the history of the 
statutes, which the court has previously discussed in Storm v. 
Legion Insurance Co., 2003 WI 120, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 665 
                                                 
5 The quoted language comes from the final published version 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
decision. 
 
See 
Haferman, 
277 
Wis. 2d 156, ¶13 n.5.  Prior to publication, the court of 
appeals majority had initially gone further, characterizing the 
result as "absurd and illogical." 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
8 
 
N.W.2d 353, and Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 
2000 WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849. 
¶17 Ultimately, we determine that Toby's action is not 
time-barred 
because 
the 
legislature 
has 
not 
provided 
an 
applicable statute of limitations for claims against a health 
care provider alleging injury to a developmentally disabled 
child.  We note, however, that even in the absence of a statute 
of limitations, the common law doctrine of laches may, in 
appropriate cases, be a bar to such claims. 
III 
¶18 There is no dispute that if § 893.56 or § 893.55 
applies 
to 
Toby, 
his 
cause 
of 
action 
is 
time-barred.  
Conversely, there is no dispute that if § 893.16 applies to 
Toby, his cause of action was timely. 
¶19 What is disputed is which of the three statutes of 
limitations applies to Toby.  The Hafermans assert that the 
applicable statute is § 893.16.  In contrast, the defendants 
assert that the applicable statute is § 893.56.  No party 
advances the application of § 893.55 that the court of appeals 
embraced. 
¶20 The fundamental goal of statutory interpretation is to 
discern the intent of the legislature.  Storm, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 
¶15.  In seeking to achieve this goal, we must begin with the 
statutory language.  Hess, 278 Wis. 2d 283, ¶36. 
¶21 We 
examine 
first 
the 
Hafermans' 
assertion 
that 
§ 893.16 applies and test that assertion in light of the plain 
language of the statute.  Section 893.16, which may extend a 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
9 
 
limitation period for a child entitled to bring an action that 
accrues while the child is under the age of 18, provides as 
follows: 
Person 
under 
disability.  (1) 
If 
a 
person 
entitled to bring an action is, at the time the cause 
of action accrues, either under the age of 18 years, 
except for actions against health care providers; or 
mentally ill, the action may be commenced within 2 
years after the disability ceases, except that where 
the disability is due to mental illness, the period of 
limitation prescribed in this chapter may not be 
extended for more than 5 years. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶22 The Hafermans argue that § 893.16 applies to Toby as  
a "person under disability."  They assert that Toby is under two 
disabilities:  (1) the disability of minority, and (2) the 
disability of being developmentally disabled.  Under the plain 
language of § 893.16, the Hafermans assert, Toby may bring his 
claim until two years after "the disability" ceases.  By "the 
disability," the Hafermans apparently mean Toby's developmental 
disability because they say that a child whose only "disability" 
is minority is subject to § 893.56.   
¶23 In reality, however, the Hafermans' construction of 
§ 893.16 is not a plain language construction at all.  Were we 
to 
apply 
§ 893.16 
to 
Toby, 
either 
under 
the 
Hafermans' 
construction or some other construction, we would, at a minimum, 
have to rewrite the statute to do one of two things.  Either we 
would have to write in "developmentally disabled" as an 
additional category of disability that is not presently included 
in the statutory language, or we would have to strike out the 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
10 
 
entire phrase "except for actions against health care providers" 
from § 893.16 so that the statute could apply to Toby based on 
his "disability" of minority.  We would thus be rewriting the 
statute in a manner that appears to directly contravene the 
legislative intent.  The plain language of the statute manifests 
the intent to exclude from its tolling provisions actions 
brought by children against health care providers.6 
¶24 We turn next to the defendants' assertion that 
§ 893.56 is the applicable statute of limitations and examine 
that assertion in light of the statute's plain language.  
Section 
893.56, 
entitled 
"Health 
care 
providers; 
minors 
actions," provides: 
Any person under the age of 18, who is not under 
disability 
by 
reason 
of 
insanity, 
developmental 
disability or imprisonment, shall bring an action to 
recover damages for injuries to the person arising 
from any treatment or operation performed by, or for 
any omission by a health care provider within the time 
limitation under s. 893.55 or by the time that person 
reaches the age of 10 years, whichever is later.  That 
action shall be brought by the parent, guardian or 
                                                 
6 The court of appeals determined that there were no facts 
of record establishing Toby is mentally ill, and the Hafermans 
are not disputing that determination in this court.  We note 
that, for purposes of § 893.16, mental illness is defined as "a 
mental condition that renders a person functionally unable to 
understand or appreciate the situation giving rise to the legal 
claim so that the person can assert legal rights or functionally 
unable to understand legal rights and appreciate the need to 
assert them."  Storm v. Legion Ins. Co., 2003 WI 120, ¶46, 265 
Wis. 2d 169, 665 N.W.2d 353.  The condition of mental illness 
under 
§ 893.16 
may 
overlap 
the 
concept 
of 
developmental 
disability, 
"but 
it 
is 
not 
congruent 
with 
developmental 
disability."  Id., ¶48. 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
11 
 
other person having custody of the minor within the 
time limit set forth in this section. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶25 Section 893.56 plainly and unambiguously excludes 
children 
who 
are 
"under 
disability 
by 
reason 
of . . . developmental disability."  In order to apply § 893.56 
to Toby, we would, at a minimum, have to strike out the words 
"developmental disability" from the statute.  Again, we would be 
rewriting the statute in a manner that appears to directly 
contravene the legislative intent as manifest from the statute's 
plain 
language, 
here 
to 
exclude 
developmentally 
disabled 
children from the statute's reach. 
¶26 Despite our reading of the plain language of § 893.56, 
the defendants maintain that § 893.56 applies to Toby, thereby 
barring Toby's cause of action because it was filed after he 
reached the age of 10.  They argue that § 893.56 can be given an 
"alternative" construction that subjects Toby to the statute but 
avoids any need for the court to rewrite the statute.     
¶27 Specifically, the defendants begin their "alternative" 
construction of § 893.56 with the premise that the legislature 
intended §§ 893.56 and 893.16 to be read in a complementary 
fashion. 
 
Next 
they 
assert 
that, 
under 
§ 893.16(3), 
a 
"disability" (including minority) for purposes of § 893.16 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
12 
 
tolling must predate the accrual of the cause of action.7  
According to the defendants, the court therefore should not ask 
whether Toby had a developmental disability at the time he filed 
suit; instead, they assert, the court must ask whether Toby had 
a developmental disability at the time the cause of action 
accrued.  Because he did not, the defendants argue, the 
exclusionary phrase in § 893.56 "drops out," and the 10-year 
repose period in § 893.56 applies. 
¶28 At oral argument, the defendants further developed 
their "alternative" construction.  They asserted that the phrase 
"who 
is 
not 
under 
disability 
by 
reason 
of 
insanity, 
developmental disability or imprisonment" in § 893.56 was merely 
a 
"placeholder" 
for 
the 
legislature. 
 
According 
to 
the 
defendants, this was the legislature's "inartful" way of showing 
that a minor with some other disability may be able to receive 
additional tolling under § 893.16, but only if the other 
disability predated the accrual of the child's cause of action. 
¶29 The defendants asserted at oral argument that their 
construction "does no violence" to the statutes.  In truth, 
                                                 
7 Section 893.16(3) provides that "[a] disability does not 
exist, for the purposes of this section, unless it existed when 
the cause of action accrues."  The court of appeals has on at 
least one prior occasion given the defendants' interpretation to 
§ 893.16(3).  See Carlson v. Pepin County, 167 Wis. 2d 345, 352, 
481 N.W.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1992).  Here, the court of appeals 
relied on § 893.16(3) as interpreted in Carlson as a secondary 
reason why § 893.16 could not apply to Toby.  We need not reach 
the question of § 893.16(3)'s applicability because we determine 
based on the statute's plain language and legislative history 
that § 893.16(1) cannot apply here regardless of the operation 
of § 893.16(3). 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
13 
 
however, it requires the court to rewrite both § 893.16 and 
§ 893.56. 
¶30 First, 
the 
defendants' 
"alternative" 
construction 
would require the court to write the phrase "at the time his or 
her cause of action accrued" into § 893.56.  Under the 
defendants' construction, 
§ 893.56 
would actually read as 
follows: 
Any person under the age of 18, who is not under 
disability 
by 
reason 
of 
insanity, 
developmental 
disability or imprisonment at the time his or her 
cause of action accrued, shall bring an action to 
recover damages for injuries to the person arising 
from any treatment or operation performed by, or for 
any omission by a health care provider within the time 
limitation under s. 893.55 or by the time that person 
reaches 
the 
age 
of 
10 
years, 
whichever 
is 
later. . . .   
Second, the defendants' construction would require the court to 
write in "developmentally disabled" as a disability that is 
generally eligible for tolling under § 893.16.  According to the 
defendants, § 893.16(1) should actually provide as follows: 
If a person entitled to bring an action is, at 
the time the cause of action accrues, either under the 
age of 18 years, except for actions against health 
care providers; or mentally ill or developmentally 
disabled, the action may be commenced within 2 years 
after the disability ceases, except that where the 
disability is due to mental illness, the period of 
limitation prescribed in this chapter may not be 
extended for more than 5 years. 
¶31 Thus, 
the 
defendants' 
proffered 
"alternative" 
construction of § 893.56 requires us to rewrite not only 
§ 893.56 but also § 893.16.  Just as we have rejected the 
Hafermans' assertion that § 893.16 applies to Toby by its plain 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
14 
 
language, we also reject the defendants' assertion that § 893.56 
can be applied to Toby without rewriting the statutes.  In 
short, neither the Hafermans' construction of § 893.16 nor the 
defendants' construction of § 893.56 passes muster under the 
plain language of the statutes. 
¶32 We recognize, of course, as do the parties, that the 
legislature intended for §§ 893.16 and 893.56 to work together.  
See Storm, 265 Wis. 2d 169, ¶26 ("[l]anguage in § 893.16 and in 
§ 893.56 . . . strongly indicates that they are meant to apply 
in tandem"); id., ¶30 ("the exception for minors in § 893.16(1) 
creates symmetry between these two statutes").   
¶33 Unfortunately, however, reading the statutes together 
does not supply a plain-language answer to the question of 
whether the legislature intended for either § 893.16 or § 893.56 
to apply in a case such as this one.  In Aicher, the court 
previously noted the apparent gap with which we are now faced:  
"Aicher correctly reads Wis. Stat. § 893.56 to exclude the 
developmentally disabled, and she also correctly notes that 
Wis. Stat. § 893.16 
does 
not 
provide 
the 
developmentally 
disabled with an extension for filing medical malpractice 
actions."  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶73. 
¶34 This gap was also recognized in Zielke v. Wausau 
Memorial Hospital, 529 F. Supp. 571 (W.D. Wis. 1982), the case 
on which the circuit court relied.  In Zielke, a federal 
district court observed that "[t]he interplay of these two 
statutes is somewhat abstruse because 'developmental disability' 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
15 
 
is not one of the disabilities covered under [the statute that 
is now § 893.16] . . . ."  Zielke, 529 F. Supp. at 577.    
 
¶35 The problem created by this gap as identified in 
Aicher and Zielke is that the court is left without any clear 
guidance in the language of the statutes as to what the 
legislature intended with regard to the limitation period for 
claims 
against 
health 
care 
providers 
alleging 
injury 
to 
developmentally disabled children.  In an attempt to discern the 
legislative intent, we must delve deeper into the history of the 
statutes as discussed in Storm and Aicher. 
¶36 Before 1977, there was no statute like § 893.56.  
However, 
a 
predecessor 
statute 
to 
§ 893.16(1), 
Wis. Stat. § 893.33, did exist prior to 1977.  It provided 
tolling for all children in most types of actions, including 
actions against health care providers, until the age of majority 
plus one year.8 
                                                 
8 The predecessor statute, Wis. Stat. § 893.33 (1975), read 
as follows: 
893.33 
Persons under disability.  If a person 
entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter, 
except actions for the recovery of a penalty or 
forfeiture or against a sheriff or other officer for 
an escape, or for the recovery of real property or the 
possession thereof be, at the time the cause of action 
accrued, either 
(1) Within the age of 18 years; or 
(2) Insane; or 
(3) Imprisoned . . . , 
the 
time 
of 
such 
disability is not a part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action, except that the period 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
16 
 
¶37 Then, 
in 
1977, 
the 
legislature 
simultaneously 
amended § 893.33 
(now 
§ 893.16(1)) 
and 
created 
Wis. Stat. § 893.235 (now § 893.56).  See ch. 390, Laws of 1977.  
As amended, § 893.33 excluded tolling for actions against health 
care providers brought by children: 
893.33 
Persons under disability.  If a person 
entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter, 
except actions for the recovery of a penalty or 
forfeiture or against a sheriff or other officer for 
an escape, or for the recovery of real property or the 
possession thereof be, at the time the cause of action 
accrued, either 
(1) Within the age of 18 years, except for 
actions against health care providers; or 
(2) Insane; or 
(3) Imprisoned on 
a 
criminal 
charge 
or in 
execution under sentence of a criminal court for a 
term less than his natural life, the time of such 
disability is not a part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action, except that the period 
within which the action must be brought cannot be 
extended more than 5 years by any such disability, 
except infancy; nor can it be so extended in any case 
longer than one year after the disability ceases. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶38 As this court observed in Aicher, the bill that led to 
the creation of § 893.56 (then § 893.235) "tracked precisely" 
the language of § 893.33 in that the bill referred to insanity 
and imprisonment but made no reference to "developmental 
                                                                                                                                                             
within which the action must be brought cannot be 
extended more than 5 years by any such disability, 
except infancy; nor can it be so extended in any case 
longer than one year after the disability ceases. 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
17 
 
disability."  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶73 n.19.  However, the 
Senate inserted a handwritten floor amendment that added the 
phrase "developmental disability" before the final bill was 
enrolled.  See id.; ch. 390, Laws of 1977, Legislative drafting 
file. 
¶39 The act that simultaneously created § 893.56 (then 
§ 893.235) and amended § 893.16(1) (then § 893.33), is a one-
page act.  It was entitled "AN ACT to amend 893.33(1); and to 
create 893.235 of the statutes, relating to time limitations on 
actions against health care providers brought by or on behalf of 
minors." 
¶40 Five legislative findings accompanied the act: 
(a)  The number of suits and claims for damages 
arising from professional patient care has increased 
tremendously in the past several years and the size of 
judgments and settlements in connection therewith has 
increased even more substantially, especially in the 
case of minors. 
(b)  The effect of the increasing frequency of 
judgment and settlements and the increasing size of 
these judgments and settlements, particularly in the 
case of minors, has been to cause the insurance 
industry uniformly and substantially to increase the 
reserves it has established to provide for potential 
liability arising from suits by and on behalf of 
minors. 
(c)  These increased reserves have resulted in 
increased insurance costs which have been passed on to 
health care providers in the form of higher premiums 
and to patients in the form of higher charges for 
health care services and facilities. 
(d)  That the interests of minor children can be 
adequately and fully protected by adopting the same 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
18 
 
time limit for bringing actions as applies to adults, 
except in the case of very young children. 
(e)  That the interests of very young minor 
children can be adequately and fully protected by 
extending the time limits in which actions may be 
brought to age 10. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶41 What is most noteworthy about the act's title and the 
legislative findings is that they do not indicate any intent to 
provide a shorter statute of limitations for children who are 
developmentally 
disabled 
than 
for 
those 
who 
are 
not 
developmentally disabled.  At the same time, the findings 
indicate that the legislature viewed the act as first limiting 
the overall applicable time period for medical malpractice 
actions by children, but then "extending" these newly-created 
time limits for "very young children."  
¶42 This court has previously summarized much of this 
history in Storm: 
The legislature has indicated an express intent 
to curtail the application of § 893.16 to medical 
malpractice actions with respect to minors.  Section 
893.16 excludes children under the age of 18 that are 
bringing actions against health care providers from 
the 
tolling 
provisions 
of 
the 
statute. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1).  The reason for this exclusion 
is that there is a specific statute for medical 
malpractice 
actions 
by 
minors[,] 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.56. . . .  The exception for claims by minors 
against health care providers was added when § 893.56 
[then § 893.235] was created.  See Ch. 390, Laws of 
1977.  
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
19 
 
Storm, 265 Wis. 2d 169, ¶30 (footnotes omitted).9 
¶43 In light of this history, we return to the issue of 
what statute of limitations the legislature intended to apply to 
a claim against a health care provider alleging injury to a 
developmentally disabled child.  As our citations above to 
Aicher and Storm indicate, this court has previously addressed 
the legislative intent behind §§ 893.56 and 893.16. 
¶44 In 
Aicher, 
we 
concluded 
that 
the 
correct 
interpretation of § 893.56 reveals that the developmentally 
disabled are excluded from the statute.  After reviewing the 
text of the statute and tracing the legislative history, the 
Aicher court stated: 
Wisconsin Stat. § 893.56 has remained unchanged 
from July 1, 1980, until the present.  It provides in 
                                                 
9 The dissent focuses on the legislature's insertion of 
"developmental 
disability" 
into 
§ 893.56 
without 
any 
corresponding change to § 893.16.  Describing this as a 
"legislative mistake," the dissent then attempts to "devise a 
response" by staging its own re-enactment of historical events.  
Dissent, ¶¶63, 70-75. 
In the end, the dissent's re-enactment of historical events 
is of little assistance because the statutory analysis it 
employs 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
our 
case 
law 
on 
statutory 
interpretation.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit 
Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶¶45-52, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  
After describing the handwritten floor amendment offered by 
Senator McKenna, the dissent laments:  "We have no direct 
evidence of Senator McKenna's actual intent."  Dissent, ¶75.  
The dissent then explores several possible motivations of the 
senator.  In focusing on the "actual intent" of one member of 
the senate, the dissent answers the wrong question.  The 
question is not:  what was the intent of a single legislator?  
Rather, the question is:  what was intended by the legislature 
as a whole, given the language of the statutes?  
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
20 
 
part that, "Any person under the age of 18, who is not 
under disability by reason of insanity, developmental 
disability 
or 
imprisonment, 
shall 
bring 
an 
action . . . within the time limitations under s. 
893.55 or by the time that person reaches the age of 
10 years, whichever is later."  
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶71 (emphasis in original). 
¶45 Relying on the text of the statute and its legislative 
history, we concluded:  "Aicher correctly reads Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.56 to exclude the developmentally disabled . . . ."  Id., 
¶73 (emphasis added). 
¶46 Shortly after Aicher, we again had an opportunity to 
interpret § 893.56, this time in the context of examining the 
exception for the disability of "insanity" (mental illness).  
Our interpretation remained the same.  We concluded that "the 
statute specifically exempts minors suffering under a disability 
by reason of mental illness . . . ."  Storm, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 
¶32 (emphasis added). 
¶47 Now, 
the 
defendants 
would 
have 
us 
change 
our 
interpretation.  They would have us conclude that we were in 
error in Aicher when we determined that the developmentally 
disabled are excepted from § 893.56.  Likewise, they would have 
us retract our interpretation in Storm where we concluded that 
those suffering from mental illness are exempted from § 893.56. 
¶48 We see no good reason to confess error in Aicher or 
retract our interpretation in Storm.  The plain language of 
§ 893.56, together with its legislative history, dictated our 
interpretation of the statute in Aicher and Storm, and the plain 
language and legislative history dictate the same interpretation 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
21 
 
today.  Those who are disabled by developmental disabilities or 
mental illness are not covered by the limitation set forth in 
§ 893.56 because they are, and were intended to be, specifically 
exempted from that statute. 
¶49 The court also interpreted § 893.16 in both Aicher and 
Storm.  We determined in Aicher that "Wis. Stat. § 893.16 does 
not provide the developmentally disabled with an extension for 
filing medical malpractice actions."  Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 
¶73.  Then, in Storm, we determined as follows: 
 
The legislature has indicated an express intent 
to curtail the application of § 893.16 to medical 
malpractice actions with respect to minors.  Section 
893.16 excludes children under the age of 18 that are 
bringing actions against health care providers from 
the tolling provisions of the statute. 
Storm, 265 Wis. 2d 169 (emphasis added). 
¶50 The Hafermans, however, would now have the court 
change our interpretation of § 893.16.  They would have us 
conclude that we were mistaken in Aicher when we determined that 
§ 893.16 does not apply to the developmentally disabled.  
Further, they would have us overrule our determination in Storm 
that § 893.16 does not apply to children under the age of 18 
bringing actions against health care providers. 
¶51 Just as we see no reason to confess error in Aicher or 
retract our interpretation in Storm with respect to § 893.56, we 
see no reason to think we were mistaken in Aicher or to overrule 
our determination in Storm with respect to § 893.16.  Neither 
those who are under the age of 18 nor the developmentally 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
22 
 
disabled are covered by the tolling provisions set forth in 
§ 893.16. 
¶52 Accordingly, we decline to rewrite either § 893.16 or 
§ 893.56.  We determine that by the plain language of the 
statutes and their legislative history, neither § 893.16 nor 
§ 893.56 applies to a negligence claim alleging injury to a 
developmentally disabled child caused by a health care provider. 
¶53 The court of appeals majority avoided rewriting the 
statutes because it concluded that the general three-year 
statute of limitations, § 893.55, must apply to Toby in the 
absence of another applicable statute of limitations.  We note 
that no party advances this conclusion by the court of appeals 
majority.  Even the court of appeals majority acknowledged that 
its conclusion was "troubling." 
¶54 We disagree with the conclusion of the court of 
appeals majority that § 893.55 is applicable here.  The 
legislature 
could 
not 
have 
intended 
that 
developmentally 
disabled children bringing actions against health care providers 
would be subject to a shorter statute of limitations than would 
other children bringing medical malpractice actions.   
¶55 This court has already observed that the exclusion of 
developmentally 
disabled 
children 
from 
both 
§ 893.16 
and 
§ 893.56 was likely intended to give such children more time 
rather than less time: 
We suspect that this discrepancy is the result of 
oversight rather than purposeful discrimination.  It 
is likely that the legislature's intent was to extend 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
23 
 
the period of filing for persons with developmental 
disabilities, not reduce it. 
Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99, ¶73.10 
¶56 Thus, much like the court of appeals dissent and the 
circuit court, we determine that the application of § 893.55 to 
claims against health care providers alleging injury to a 
developmentally 
disabled 
child 
would 
work 
an 
absurd 
and 
illogical result that the legislature could not have intended.  
We follow the "fundamental rule of statutory construction that 
any result that is absurd or unreasonable must be avoided."  
Lake City Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis. 2d 155, 162, 558 
N.W.2d 100 (1997); accord Hamilton v. Hamilton 2003 WI 50, ¶39, 
261 
Wis. 2d 458, 
661 
N.W.2d 
832; 
State 
v. 
Zielke, 
137 
Wis. 2d 39, 51, 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987). 
¶57 We are compelled to determine, based on this rule, 
that § 893.55 does not apply to claims against health care 
providers alleging injury to a developmentally disabled child.  
Cf. South Milwaukee Sav. Bank v. Barczak, 229 Wis. 2d 521, 535, 
600 N.W.2d 205 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Saunders v. DEC Int'l, 
                                                 
10 The dissent relegates Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients 
Compenation Fund, 2000 WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849, to 
a footnote in an attempt to downplay its significance.  We note 
that our interpretation of the legislative intent as set forth 
in Aicher differs from that advanced by the dissent today.  Five 
years ago, the court in Aicher concluded that the legislative 
intent was to give developmentally disabled children more time 
to 
file 
than 
that 
given 
to 
non-developmentally 
disabled 
children.  Now, in striking out language from § 893.56, the 
dissent concludes that the legislative intent was to give 
developmentally disabled children the same time as other 
children.  See dissent, ¶89. 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
24 
 
Inc., 85 Wis. 2d 70, 74, 270 N.W.2d 176 (1978)) ("Reviewing 
courts must interpret statutes of limitations so that 'no 
person's cause of action will be barred unless clearly mandated 
by the legislature.'").11 
¶58 Accordingly, we further determine that the legislature 
has not provided a statute of limitations for claims against 
health care providers alleging injury to a developmentally 
disabled child.  This determination is the only determination 
the court is able to reach without either rewriting the statutes 
or working an absurd and illogical result. 
¶59 We cannot act in the legislature's stead.  The gap in 
the statutes of limitations was previously brought to the 
attention of the legislature in Zielke, 529 F. Supp 571, and 
again in Aicher.  We once again bring to the attention of the 
legislature this gap in the statutory scheme.12 
                                                 
11 The application of § 893.55 to claims against health care 
providers alleging injury to developmentally disabled children 
may also be foreclosed by the equal protection clauses of the 
federal and state constitutions.  Having determined, however, 
that § 893.55 does not apply here because its application would 
produce an absurd result that must be avoided, we need not 
address this constitutional question. 
12 The 
dissent 
attacks 
our 
conclusion 
as 
lacking 
in 
"judicial restraint."  Dissent, ¶90.  We think this odd under 
the circumstances for at least three reasons. 
First, the dissent reaches out and unnecessarily decides 
constitutional questions.   
Second, it rewrites the statutory scheme. 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
25 
 
¶60 As a final note, we observe that, even in the absence 
of legislative action, the affirmative defense of laches remains 
available in an appropriate case.  The court has stated the 
elements for laches as follows: 
For laches to arise, there must be unreasonable 
delay, lack of knowledge on the part of the party 
asserting the defense that the other party would 
assert the right on which he bases his suit, and 
prejudice to the party asserting the defense in the 
event that the suit is maintained. 
Watkins v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 88 Wis. 2d 411, 
422, 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979).  More recently, the court of appeals 
stated the elements similarly: 
For laches to bar a claim, an unreasonable delay 
must occur, the plaintiff must know the facts and take 
no action, the defendant must not know the plaintiff 
would assert the right on which the suit is based, and 
prejudice to the defendant must occur. 
Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund v. City of Milwaukee, 2001 WI 
App 144, ¶20, 246 Wis. 2d 196, 630 N.W.2d 236 (quoting Jensen v. 
Janesville Sand & Gravel Co., 141 Wis. 2d 521, 529, 415 N.W.2d 
559 (Ct. App. 1987)). 
IV 
¶61 In sum, we conclude that the legislature has not 
provided a statute of limitations for a claim against a health 
                                                                                                                                                             
Third, 
the 
dissent 
makes 
a 
policy 
choice 
in 
the 
legislature's stead while acknowledging that it is unclear 
whether this is the choice the legislature would have made.  
Apparently, the dissent has forgotten its recent admonition that 
the court is not meant to function as a "super-legislature."  
Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 
WI 125, ¶204, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Prosser, J., 
dissenting). 
No. 
2003AP1307   
 
26 
 
care provider alleging injury to a developmentally disabled 
child.  Therefore, Toby's action is not time-barred.  We reverse 
the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
1 
 
 
¶62 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, 
J.   (dissenting). 
 
The 
issue 
presented in this case is what statute of limitations applies to 
a developmentally disabled person under the age of 18 who brings 
an action against a health care provider alleging that the 
provider's acts or omissions caused the person's developmental 
disability.  The majority concludes that the legislature failed 
to set out an applicable statute of limitations for this 
situation.  I conclude that a developmentally disabled person 
must bring his or her action within one of the time limitations 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.55, or by the time the person reaches the 
age of 10 years, whichever period is longer.  Because my 
analysis produces a different result from the majority's 
analysis, I respectfully dissent. 
ANALYSIS 
¶63 This case exposes an obvious legislative mistake, 
which renders the legislature's blueprint for certain litigants 
ambiguous.  Under the circumstances, this court is required to 
devise 
a 
response 
that 
will 
carry 
forward 
legislative 
objectives.13 
¶64 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.55(1) (2003-04)14 provides: 
893.55 Medical malpractice; limitation of actions; 
limitation of damages; itemization of damages. 
                                                 
13 See discussion in ¶75, infra. 
14 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise noted. 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
2 
 
 
(1) Except as provided by subs. (2) and (3), an 
action to recover damages for injury arising from any 
treatment or operation performed by, or from any 
omission by, a person who is a health care provider, 
regardless of the theory on which the action is based, 
shall be commenced within the later of: 
 
(a) Three years from the date of the injury, or 
 
(b) One year from the date the injury was 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have been discovered, except that an action may 
not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 
years from the date of the act or omission. 
¶65 This is the statute of limitations that governs most 
malpractice actions against health care providers.  It embodies 
a three-year limitation period "from the date of the injury," or 
a one-year limitation period "from the date the injury was 
discovered" so long as the discovery date is not "more than 5 
years from the date of the act or omission."  Under this 
statute, a claimant may opt for the more favorable of the two 
limitation periods. 
¶66 The 
legislature 
has 
created 
exceptions 
to 
the 
limitation periods in this medical malpractice statute.  See, 
e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 893.22, 893.55(2) and (3), and 893.56.  It 
has also created statutes that toll these limitation periods.  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 655.44(4) and 893.16(1). 
¶67 This 
case 
involves 
the 
interplay 
among 
Wis. Stat. §§ 893.55, 893.56, and 893.16(1).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 893.56 creates an exception to § 893.55(1) for some medical 
malpractice actions by minors.  It states: 
893.56 Health care providers; minors actions.  
Any person under the age of 18, who is not under 
disability 
by 
reason 
of 
insanity, 
developmental 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
3 
 
disability or imprisonment, shall bring an action to 
recover damages for injuries to the person arising 
from any treatment or operation performed by, or for 
any omission by a health care provider within the time 
limitation under s. 893.55 or by the time that person 
reaches the age of 10 years, whichever is later.  That 
action shall be brought by the parent, guardian or 
other person having custody of the minor within the 
time limit set forth in this section.  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶68 Wisconsin Stat. § 893.16(1), a tolling statute for 
persons under 
a "disability," 
affects 
medical 
malpractice 
actions by persons who are mentally ill.  It reads: 
 
(1) If a person entitled to bring an action is, 
at the time the cause of action accrues, either under 
the age of 18 years, except for actions against health 
care providers; or mentally ill, the action may be 
commenced within 2 years after the disability ceases, 
except that where the disability is due to mental 
illness, the period of limitation prescribed in this 
chapter may not be extended for more than 5 years. 
¶69 The underlined language in § 893.56 would make perfect 
sense 
if 
it 
tracked 
the 
tolling 
provisions 
in § 893.16.  
Unfortunately, it does not.  Section 893.56 uses the term 
"insanity," whereas § 893.16 uses the terms "mentally ill" and 
"mental 
illness." 
 
Section 
893.56 
includes 
the 
terms 
"developmental disability" and "imprisonment" but these terms do 
not appear in § 893.16. 
¶70 The historical record explains the inconsistency.15  In 
1977 Representative Tom Hanson introduced 1977 Assembly Bill 705 
at the request of "The Malpractice Committee."  The bill sought 
to create a new section, 893.235, that would read: 
                                                 
15 1997 Wisconsin Act 133 amended Wis. Stat. § 893.16(1) by 
changing "insane" and "insanity" to "mentally ill" and "mental 
illness" and striking the words "imprisoned" and "imprisonment." 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
4 
 
 
893.235 Health Care Providers; Minors Actions.  
Any person under the age of 18, who is not under 
disability by reason of insanity or imprisonment, 
shall bring an action to recover damages for injuries 
to the person arising from any treatment or operation 
performed by, or for any omission by, a person who is 
licensed, 
certified, 
registered 
or 
authorized 
to 
practice as a health care provider under state law 
within the time limitation under s. 893.295(1) or by 
the time that person reaches the age of 8 years, 
whichever is later.  That action shall be brought by 
the parent, guardian or other person having custody of 
the minor within the time limit set forth in this 
section. 
This proposed section was to become the predecessor of § 893.56.   
¶71 1977 Assembly Bill 705 also amended an existing 
section, § 893.33, which would thereafter read in part: 
 
893.33 Persons under disability.  If a person 
entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter, 
except actions for the recovery of a penalty or 
forfeiture or against a sheriff or other officer for 
an escape, or for the recovery of real property or the 
possession thereof be, at the time the cause of action 
accrued, either 
 
(1) Within the age of 18 years, except for 
actions against health care providers; or 
 
(2) Insane; or 
 
(3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge . . . the 
time of such disability is not a part of the time 
limited for the commencement of the action, except 
that the period within which the action must be 
brought cannot be extended more than 5 years by any 
such disability, except infancy; nor can it be so 
extended in any case longer than one year after the 
disability ceases. 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
5 
 
Wis. Stat. § 893.33 
(1977-78) 
(emphasis 
added 
showing 
new 
language).16  This section was the predecessor of § 893.16.  If 
Assembly Bill 705 had passed exactly as introduced, the 
predecessors to §§ 893.16 and 893.56 would have tracked each 
other perfectly to create a coherent system of limitations and 
tolling periods. 
 
¶72 The 
intended 
symmetry 
was 
short-lived, 
however, 
because of a legislative mistake that occurred on March 2, 1978.  
1977 Assembly Bill 705 was introduced on April 27, 1977.  It was 
debated and passed the Assembly on September 14, 1977, with one 
amendment.  The Senate debated the bill on March 2, 1978.  As in 
the Assembly, there was a heated dispute in the Senate over the 
age limitation in what is now § 893.56.  Should it be 8, as in 
the original bill?  Should it be 13, as provided in the 
amendment adopted by the Assembly?  Or, should it be 10, as 
proposed in Senate Amendment 1?  The controversy was so spirited 
in the Senate that a motion to refer the bill back to committee 
lost on a tie vote.   
 
¶73 Immediately after the Senate adopted Senate Amendment 
1, 
Senator 
Dale 
McKenna 
offered 
Senate 
Amendment 
2, 
an 
unrelated, 
handwritten 
amendment 
adding 
"developmental 
disability" as a "disability" in proposed § 893.235 (now 
§ 893.56).  The amendment was adopted on a voice vote.  Senator 
                                                 
16 Subsections (2) and (3) of the section are printed above 
to show the new language in context.  Because these two 
subsections had been enacted previously, they did not appear in 
1977 Assembly Bill 705.  This helps to explain the legislative 
"mistake" described in ¶73, infra. 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
6 
 
McKenna never attempted to amend then-existing § 893.33 (now 
§ 893.16), so that the newly created section (§ 893.235) and the 
old statute (§ 893.33) would track each other and work together.  
His amendment destroyed any symmetry in the law. 
¶74 The 
Assembly 
subsequently 
battled 
over 
Senate 
Amendment 1, ultimately concurring in it; but the Assembly 
either did not notice or did not act to fix the problem created 
by Senator McKenna's Senate Amendment 2. 
¶75 We have no direct evidence of Senator McKenna's actual 
intent. 
 
He 
presumably 
intended 
that 
all 
minors 
with 
developmental disabilities have additional time to file their 
actions against health care providers.  If this were his intent, 
he failed to effect that intent by also amending the tolling 
statute (§ 893.33).17  He could have intended simply to recognize 
"developmental 
disability" 
as 
a 
legal 
disability 
without 
thinking through the implications of his action.18  He could have 
intended to create a defect in the bill that would, when 
                                                 
17 In 2000 in Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation 
Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶73, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849, the court 
stated: "We suspect that this discrepancy is the result of 
oversight rather than purposeful discrimination.  It is likely 
that the legislature's intent was to extend the period of filing 
for persons with developmental disabilities, not reduce it."  If 
these speculative comments were correct, the McKenna amendment 
would represent a classic example of good intentions not being 
sufficient to overcome contradictory statutory language. 
18 The Chapter 51 mental health statutes were revised in 
1976, during Senator McKenna's senate term.  This legislation 
included the first definition of "developmental disability."  
See § 11, ch. 430, Laws of 1975; Wis. Stat. § 51.01(5).  In 1978 
the legislature was still in the process of working the term 
"developmental disability" into the statutes. 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
7 
 
discovered, jeopardize its passage by requiring the bill to 
return to the Senate.19  He could have intended to legislate a 
shorter 
limitation 
period 
for 
minors 
with 
developmental 
disabilities than for other minors.  Although this last 
motivation for the amendment is unlikely, the effect of the 
McKenna amendment was to treat part of the class of minors with 
developmental disabilities less favorably than all other classes 
of children. 
¶76 This brings us to the issue at hand.  The court of 
appeals concluded that the applicable statute in this case is 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(a).  Haferman v. St. Clare Healthcare 
Found., 2004 WI App 206, ¶¶1, 13, 272 Wis. 2d 156, 689 
N.W.2d 636.  It noted that, "The result in this case is 
troubling 
given 
that 
the 
legislature 
has, 
through 
Wis. Stat. § 893.56, provided more time for young children to 
file medical malpractice suits than the three years provided in 
Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(a)."  Id., ¶13, n.5.  The dissenting 
judge, Charles Dykman, declared this result "absurd."  Id., ¶15 
(Dykman, J., dissenting).   
¶77 The present majority provides a sound analysis until 
it reaches § 893.55: 
                                                 
19 This possibility is not implausible.  Senator McKenna 
voted to reject Senate Amendment 1 (meaning that he favored age 
13 over age 10 in proposed Wis. Stat. § 893.235); he voted to 
refer the bill back to the Committee on Judiciary and Consumer 
Affairs; and he voted to non-concur in 1977 Assembly Bill 705, 
meaning that he voted to defeat the bill.  See Wis. S. Journal 
1873-74 (Mar. 2, 1978). 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
8 
 
The court of appeals majority avoided rewriting 
the statutes because it concluded that the general 
three-year statute of limitations, § 893.55, must 
apply to Toby [Haferman] in the absence of another 
applicable statute of limitations. . . .  
 
We disagree with the conclusion of the court of 
appeals majority that § 893.55 is applicable here.  
The 
legislature 
could 
not 
have 
intended 
that 
developmentally disabled children bringing actions 
against health care providers would be subject to a 
shorter statute of 
limitations than would 
other 
children bringing medical malpractice actions. 
Majority op., ¶¶53-54. 
¶78 "We are compelled to determine . . . " the majority 
continues, "that § 893.55 does not apply to claims against 
health care providers alleging injury to a developmentally 
disabled child."  Id., ¶57.  "Accordingly, we further determine 
that the legislature has not provided a statute of limitations 
for claims against health care providers alleging injury to a 
developmentally disabled child."  Id., ¶58. 
¶79 The majority's resolution of the issue is unpersuasive 
and creates new problems.   
¶80 First, it is a mistake to reject § 893.55 so quickly.  
Applying § 893.55(1)(a) or (b) to a developmentally disabled 
child for an alleged injury from medical malpractice that occurs 
on or after the child's seventh birthday is not discriminatory 
because the child will be treated exactly the same as all other 
minors who are not "insane."  Moreover, § 893.55(2) and (3) will 
assist any minor in specific circumstances. 
¶81 The only time a problem arises under § 893.55(1)(a) is 
when the statute is applied to a developmentally disabled child 
for an alleged injury from medical malpractice before the 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
9 
 
child's 
seventh 
birthday. 
 
In 
that 
situation, 
the 
developmentally disabled child is given less time to file suit 
than almost all other children of the same age.  This result is 
indisputably discriminatory. 
¶82 The statutory language that creates the "as applied" 
problem for young children is the phrase "developmentally 
disabled" 
in § 893.56 
because 
that 
phrase 
excludes 
young 
developmentally disabled children from the benefits of the 
statute.  The presumed good intentions behind the phrase cannot 
save it from its irrational and discriminatory effect in cases 
of developmentally disabled children under age seven.  As 
applied to these children, the phrase is unconstitutional as a 
denial of equal protection of the law. 
¶83 Second, the majority creates a new problem not because 
it wants to treat some developmentally disabled children the 
same as other children but because it decides to treat all 
developmentally disabled children more favorably than other 
children.   
¶84 If a health care provider's negligence caused a child 
to become developmentally disabled at birth and the child 
brought suit eight years later, the members of this court would 
have no difficulty striking down the "developmentally disabled" 
exclusion in § 893.56 because the disparate treatment of 
developmentally 
disabled 
children 
would 
be 
obvious 
and 
correctable.  We would employ the same equal protection analysis 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
10 
 
that Amy Aicher attempted to use to challenge § 893.56, although 
she was not developmentally disabled.20   
¶85 The majority resolves the issue here by giving Toby 
Haferman more time to file suit than we gave Amy Aicher.  
Indeed, the majority opinion gives all developmentally disabled 
children more favorable treatment than other children.  To 
illustrate, when a 12-year-old is injured through medical 
malpractice, the child is governed by the provisions of 
§ 893.55.  When a 12-year-old developmentally disabled child is 
injured through medical malpractice, the child now has no 
statute of limitations at all. 
¶86 In 
contrast, 
if 
we 
were 
to 
strike 
the 
phrase 
"developmentally 
disabled" 
in 
§ 893.56, 
we 
would 
put 
developmentally disabled children on the same footing as other 
children.  The legislature could grant these children more 
generous treatment if it enacted legislation to do so. 
¶87 Third, 
by 
creating 
a 
special 
category 
for 
developmentally disabled persons under the age of 18, the court 
disregards the legislative finding that "the interests of very 
young minor children can be adequately and fully protected by 
extending the time limits in which actions may be brought to age 
10."  See Majority op., ¶40 (quoting 1977 A.B. 705, § 1).  The 
court 
also 
creates 
a 
potential 
problem 
in 
relation 
to 
"imprisoned" minors who are injured from malpractice, inasmuch 
as these minors now have the same status as developmentally 
                                                 
20 See Aicher, 237 Wis. 2d 99. 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
11 
 
disabled children; that is, they are excepted from § 893.56 but 
are not covered in § 893.16. 
¶88 Although it relies on the ambiguity of the statutes to 
reach its decision, the majority fails to provide any policy 
rationale 
why 
developmentally 
disabled 
children 
should be 
treated more favorably than other children.  A developmentally 
disabled child is not expected to file suit personally.  Rather, 
an action in behalf of such a child will be brought by the 
parent, guardian, or other person having custody of the child, 
as provided in § 893.56.  The majority provides no explanation 
of why the parent, guardian, or other person having custody of a 
developmentally disabled child should not be bound by a statute 
of limitations in filing a medical malpractice suit.   
¶89 Application of § 893.55 to developmentally disabled 
children under 7 violates equal protection of the law.  But 
§ 893.55 applies only because § 893.56 excepts minors with 
developmental disabilities from its purview.  Therefore, the 
exception in § 893.56 is unconstitutional as applied.  Striking 
this exception would eliminate the constitutional infirmity of 
these statutes and sidestep the bizarre conclusion that no 
statute of limitations applies to minors with developmental 
disabilities. 
¶90 The majority authorizes suit in this case more than 11 
1/2 years after the child's alleged injury and boasts in doing 
so that it has avoided rewriting the statute.  Majority op., 
¶58.  This is not judicial restraint.  It is not judicial 
restraint because it disregards completely the purpose of 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
12 
 
statutes 
of 
limitation 
in 
medical 
malpractice 
actions.21  
Excising unconstitutional language from an obviously defective 
statute is the common sense solution and is no more problematic 
than removing a ruptured appendix from an otherwise healthy 
body. 
¶91 I therefore respectfully dissent. 
¶92 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 The 
majority 
opinion 
correctly 
recounts 
the 
five 
legislative findings that accompanied ch. 390, Laws of 1977.  
Majority op., ¶40.  Although the majority notes the legislative 
intent to limit actions by minors against health care providers, 
it finds "noteworthy" that these legislative findings do not 
"provide a shorter statute of limitations for children who are 
developmentally disabled[.]"  Id., ¶42.  Equally noteworthy, 
however, is that the findings do not provide a longer statute of 
limitations for developmentally disabled children.  By focusing 
on a finding that does not exist, the majority lays the 
foundation upon which it disregards the overriding legislative 
intent at work in the late 1970s: limiting the time period in 
which all persons could bring medical malpractice actions. 
No.  2003AP1307.dtp 
 
 
 
 
1