Case Title: Broadwater v. Dorsey

Citation: 344 Md. 548

Docket Number: 6/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ronald Lee Broadwater, Sr. et al. v. Matilda Woodward Dorsey
et vir.
No. 6, September Term, 1996.
[TORTS--NEGLIGENT 
ENTRUSTMENT--The 
doctrine 
of 
negligent
entrustment is generally limited to those situations in which the
supplier has the right to permit or prohibit use of the chattel at
the time of the accident.
TORTS--NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT--Parents who sell or make a gift of an
automobile to an adult child are not ordinarily responsible for
damages caused by the adult child's negligent use of the automobile
when the parents lack the right to control the adult child or the
automobile at the time of the accident.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 6 
September Term, 1996
___________________________________
RONALD LEE BROADWATER, SR. et al.
v.
MATILDA WOODWARD DORSEY et vir.
___________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
*Murphy, Robert C.,
  (retired, specially assigned)
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
___________________________________
   Filed:  February 14, 1997
This case concerns the tort doctrine of negligent entrustment.
The issue we must decide is whether the parents of an adult child
who sell or who make a gift of an automobile to their adult child,
with knowledge of the child's reckless conduct, may be held
answerable in damages to a third person subsequently injured by the
son's negligent operation of the automobile.  The claim of
liability is predicated upon the principle of legal responsibility
for the negligent entrustment of an automobile to an allegedly
incompetent driver.  Specifically, we must decide whether a parent
who negligently entrusts a chattel to an adult son is responsible
for damages subsequently incurred by a third party when the parent
does not have the power of control over either the automobile or
the son at the time of the accident.  We conclude that parents who
sell or give an automobile to an adult child are not responsible
for damages when they lack the power to control the child or the
automobile.
On October 2, 1992, Ronald L. Broadwater, Jr., then age
twenty-six, drove his automobile across the center line, colliding
head-on into the vehicle driven by Matilda Dorsey and seriously
injuring her.  Along with her husband Dr. James H. Dorsey, she
filed a lawsuit against Ronald, Jr., and Dr. and Mrs. Ronald L.
Broadwater, Sr.  The complaint alleged that Ronald, Jr., the owner
of the automobile, breached his duty to drive his vehicle in a
safe, reasonable and non-negligent manner, and the breach of that
- 2 -
duty resulted in injury to the plaintiff.  The complaint further
alleged that Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater negligently entrusted the
automobile to Ronald, Jr., their adult son, by purchasing the
vehicle and giving it to Ronald, Jr., knowing at the time they gave
the vehicle to Ronald, Jr. it was likely, because of his driving
record and drug abuse problems, that he would drive the vehicle
recklessly and pose an unreasonable risk of physical harm to
others.  
The case proceeded to trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County.  The Broadwaters filed a motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that they had no power to control the use of the vehicle at
the time of the accident, and that they lacked sufficient knowledge
to put them on notice that their son posed an unreasonable risk of
harm to others.  The court denied the motion. The jury found that
Ronald, Jr. negligently operated his motor vehicle on October 2,
1992, and as a result caused injury to Mrs. Dorsey.  The jury also
found that Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater had negligently entrusted the
Mazda RX 7 to Ronald, Jr.  The jury awarded damages to the
plaintiffs, Dr. and Mrs. Dorsey.  
Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals, contending that the trial court had erred in concluding
that they could be liable on a theory of negligent entrustment.
The Court of Special Appeals, by a divided panel, affirmed the
- 3 -
judgment. Broadwater v. Dorsey, 107 Md. App. 58, 666 A.2d 1282
(1995).  This Court granted certiorari. 
The facts were set out in great detail by the intermediate
appellate court as follows:
"In November, 1990, appellants owned or had in their
possession five cars, all insured by State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company--a 1986 Mercedes, a 1988
Toyota, a 1990 Plymouth Laser, a 1956 Ford Thunderbird,
and a 1988 Corvette.  The Ford and the Corvette, they
contended, were not driven.  
"Ronald, Jr. was, to say the least, not a highly
motivated person.  He was born in June, 1965, and thus,
by November, 1990, was 25 years old.  After graduating
high school in 1984 or 1985 (when he was 19 or 20), he
attended three different colleges for varying periods
but, despite five or six years of effort, had not
graduated from any of them and had not even earned
sufficient credits for an A.A. degree.  Except for a
brief period when he lived in an apartment paid for by
his parents while he was attending one of the colleges,
he lived at home or stayed with friends.  Although he
worked part-time for his father for a while (there is
some conflict in the evidence as to whether he was paid
- 4 -
for his services), he never had a steady, permanent job.
He was almost totally supported by his parents.  
"Between August, 1982 and October, 1989, Ronald, Jr.
amassed 10 points on his driving record, for seven
separate incidents of failing to obey traffic signals or
speeding.  Mrs. Broadwater paid a number of fines for her
son and also paid for an attorney to represent him on one
or more occasions.  In 1980, when he was 15, Ronald, Jr.
was involved in a motorcycle accident, as a result of
which, in 1983, Dr. Broadwater was sued for having
negligently entrusted the motorcycle to his son.  The
case was apparently settled.
"Beginning in November, 1990, and continuing through
February, 1991, State Farm informed the Broadwaters that
it would decline to renew the insurance on any of the
five vehicles then owned by them unless Ronald, Jr. was
excluded from the coverage.  Those notices were each
based on three recent violations by Ronald, Jr.--
speeding in April and October, 1989 and failing to obey
a traffic signal in July, 1988 -- and one accident.  In
October, 1990, he ran into a concrete bridge.  Although
the Broadwaters initially protested these notices, they
eventually acceded to State Farm's decision and, in
August, 1991, signed an agreement excluding Ronald, Jr.
from coverage.
- 5 -
"The son's irresponsible conduct may, in part, be
explained by the fact that he was a drug addict.  On
September 20, 1991, the Broadwaters filed a petition with
the District Court for an emergency evaluation of Ronald,
Jr.  Although Dr. Broadwater claimed in his testimony
that the evaluation was "so that he would be forced to
have his bipolar mental problems straightened out," in
the petition he and his wife noted that Ronald, Jr. had
a history of drug abuse dating back to 1980.  During the
most recent period, 1989-1991, they implied that he was
taking cocaine intravenously in both arms.  In response
to the question asking them to document the behavior
leading them to believe that their son had a mental
disorder and was in imminent danger of doing bodily harm
to himself or others, they wrote, in longhand:
"Drug Abuse (Addiction)--1980-83 (Cocaine +
Pot) Leading to seizure--transfer U. of Md.
Shock Trauma--Never would agree to treatment--
1989-91 back on drugs + IV cocaine (needle
tracks both arms) June '91--Again would not
agree to treatment--Last 8 wks behavior
erratic--stole 2 of our cars [unclear] abuse
to his mother could not finish college
[unclear] 
Talks 
irrational. 
 
Has 
been
constantly stealing money from parents. Life
seems to be controlled by need for drugs.  He
is threat to his self mentally + physically +
to the community."
"As a result of this petition, Ronald, Jr. was
committed for evaluation and, according to his mother,
remained hospitalized for four to six weeks.  She was
- 6 -
asked, but claimed that she could not recall, whether, as
a further result of the petition, criminal charges were
filed against Ronald, Jr. for assaulting and battering
Mrs. Broadwater.
"On December 16, 1991, Mrs. Broadwater purchased a
1982 Mazda RX 7 sports car from a friend for $2,750.  On
or about February 2, 1992, Mrs. Broadwater transferred
the car to Ronald, Jr., who had the vehicle retitled in
his name.  Prior to that transfer, Ronald, Jr. received
three additional speeding tickets, one of which had
already resulted in a conviction.
"Although the Broadwaters insist that the transfer
was an arms-length sale, the fact is that the son paid
nothing for the car and the Broadwaters paid the
insurance premium to permit their son to obtain the
minimum required insurance coverage from the Maryland
Automobile Insurance Fund.  In a document dated February
2, 1993, which he captioned as "Agreement of repayment,"
and on which he referenced the Mazda, Ronald, Jr. stated
"I, Ronald L. Broadwater, Jr. noted on this date that I
agree to pay back Eleanor V. and Ronald L. Broadwater Sr.
the sum of $2750.00, for the above automobile when I have
completed my college degree."  As of July, 1994, no
payments had been made on that promise.
- 7 -
"Once the car was turned over to Ronald, Jr., he
apparently used and regarded it as his own.  As noted,
the Broadwaters disclaimed much knowledge about their
son's activities and whereabouts thereafter.  The
accident that led to this lawsuit occurred in October,
1992.  Ronald, Jr. was driving the Mazda that had been
given to him by his mother eight months earlier."
Broadwater, 107 Md. App. at 62-65, 666 A.2d at 1284-85.
The doctrine of negligent entrustment as stated in the Second
Restatement of Torts § 390 and adopted in Maryland provides: 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a
chattel for use of another whom the supplier knows or has
reason to know to be likely because of his youth,
inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner
involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself
and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or
be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for
physical harm resulting to them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965); see, e.g., Neale v. Wright,
322 Md. 8, 13-14, 585 A.2d 196, 198-99 (1991); Kahlenberg v.
Goldstein, 290 Md. 477, 488-89, 290, 431 A.2d 76, 83 (1981);
Morrell v. Williams, 279 Md. 497, 503, 366 A.2d 1040, 1043 (1976);
Curley v. General Valet Service, 270 Md. 248, 255, 311 A.2d 231,
235 (1973); Snowhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 311,
221 A.2d 342, 353-54 (1966); Rounds v. Phillips (Rounds I), 166 Md.
151, 160-61, 170 A. 532, 535 (1934).   
The issue at the heart of this case is whether the parents of
an adult child, who with knowledge of their child's incompetence,
- 8 -
give or sell that child an automobile are to be considered
"suppliers" for purposes of § 390 of the Restatement.  Because a
"supplier," in terms of the Restatement, must have the right to
control the chattel, we must determine whether the supplier's
control over the chattel should be measured at the time of the
"entrustment" or at the time of the negligent act of the
"entrustee" resulting in injury.  
In its review of this case, the Court of Special Appeals held
that "[t]he right to permit and the power to prohibit must be
considered as of the time of the entrustment."  Id. at 68, 666 A.2d
at 1287.  The court concluded that the continuing ability to
control the chattel is not required for a prima facie case of
negligent entrustment; control need only exist at the time of the
entrustment.  The court noted:
The tort is founded upon an entrustment--the supply
of a chattel by the defendant to another person.  That
necessarily presumes that the defendant had a choice
whether to supply the chattel or not.  Control has to be
viewed in that context.  The tort does not rest on any
vicarious liability--on imputing to the supplier the
negligence of the entrustee--but rather on the direct
negligence of the supplier in supplying the chattel in
the first place.  That negligence must, of necessity, be
viewed as of the time of the entrustment, not as of the
time the entrustee improperly uses the entrusted chattel.
Id. at 67, 666 A.2d at 1287.  The court further reasoned that a
person cannot escape liability by deliberately and negligently
placing a chattel in the hands of another under circumstances set
out in Restatement § 390 and thereby 
- 9 -
effectively relinquish[] all practical ability thereafter
to prohibit or limit the use of the chattel by the
entrustee.  It would be wholly inconsistent with the
public policy underlying the tort to regard such an act
as providing a greater advantage to the supplier than if
he retained the power of control but declined to exercise
it.  
Id. at 69, 666 A.2d at 1287-88.  The intermediate appellate court
held that Petitioners had control at the time of entrustment, that
they knew of Ronald, Jr.'s reckless propensities, and that the
negligent entrustment of the vehicle was the proximate cause of
Respondents' injuries.  Id. at 67-72, 666 A.2d at 1286-89.  
Judge Cathell dissented.  He agreed with the majority's view
of the facts, the character of Ronald, Jr., and the Broadwaters'
knowledge of their son's behavior.  He parted company with the
majority on the scope and application of the doctrine of negligent
entrustment.  Recognizing that the "position of the majority is one
that is logically supportable under an expansive (virtually all
inclusive) interpretation of the applicability of the tort," the
dissent suggested that the better position for this Court to adopt
would be a more limited application of the doctrine which would,
"in a sales context, require the transferor to retain the legal
right to control the instrumentality or have a legal responsibility
to control the buyer."  Id. at 75, 666 A.2d at 1291 (Cathell, J.,
dissenting).
The dissent further suggested that in order to limit the
application of negligent entrustment appropriately, the entrustor
- 10 -
must retain a legal right of control over either the chattel or its
user.  The dissent noted:
If (1) the power to control the vehicle or (2) the power
to control its operator--or both--exists and the
"entrustor" has knowledge of dangerous propensities of
the driver, it is clear that the requirements of the tort
are met.
Id. at 83, 666 A.2d at 1295.  Otherwise, the dissent reasoned,
liability for negligent entrustment would be too expansive and
would subject all vendors to liability long after the vendor had
relinquished control over the chattel.  
Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater contend that the relevant time period
is the time of the recipient's subsequent negligent use of the
chattel.  If the defendant has the right to permit or the power to
prohibit the use of the chattel entrusted at that time, then the
defendant may be liable.  The Broadwaters maintain that the power
to permit or prohibit use of the chattel is inherent in an
entrustment, as opposed to a mere transfer, because that power to
control imposes a duty upon the entrustor to guard against
negligent use of the property.  A transferor without the power to
control would have no such duty.  
Respondents argue that the significant point in time is the
time of the entrustment and that there need only be negligence at
the time of entrustment, not a continuing right to control.  If the
entrustment was negligent when made, and that negligence was a
proximate cause of the foreseeable injury complained of, the
- 11 -
entrustor will be liable to the injured party.  Respondents
recognize that an entrustment can be, but need not be, a continuing
event.  As such, they argue, an entrustment can occur even if the
entrustor was not the owner of the chattel, if the entrustor has
the ability to control use of the chattel.  Respondents rely on §
390 of the Second Restatement of Torts and Kahlenberg v. Goldstein,
290 Md. 477, 431 A.2d 76 (1981), for the proposition that Maryland
law does not require continuing control of the chattel.
Alternatively, they suggest that even if continuing control is
required to impose liability under the doctrine of negligent
entrustment, the evidence at trial established that Dr. and Mrs.
Broadwater in fact had the power to control Ronald, Jr.
The doctrine of negligent entrustment has been part of the law
of Maryland since 1934.  In Rounds v. Phillips (Rounds I), 166 Md.
151, 170 A. 532 (1934), the first case in this State recognizing
the doctrine of negligent entrustment, this Court quoted with
approval § 260 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts, the
precursor of § 390 in the Second Restatement.  The Court noted:
We are of [the] opinion . . . that the principle
contained in the quotation from the Restatement is a fair
and accurate statement of the rule, deduced from opinions
representing the great weight of authority in this
country.  Of course, there are, and must be, limitations
upon the application of the rule . . . .
Rounds I, 166 Md. at 166-67, 170 A. at 538 (emphasis added).  
Section 390 of the Second Restatement of Torts, Chattel for
Use by Person Known to be Incompetent, is a "special application"
- 12 -
of § 308,  Permitting Improper Persons to Use Things or Engage in
Activities.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, § 390 cmt. b; see
also Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352, 357 (Colo. 1992).  Section
308 provides that
[i]t is negligence to permit a third person to use a
thing or to engage in an activity which is under the
control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know
that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or
to conduct himself in the activity in such a manner as to
create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, § 308 (emphasis added).  Sections
390 and 308 are in pari materia, and must be read together.  Cf.
State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 93, 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990) (statutes
that are in pari materia should be harmonized as much as possible).
Thus, § 308's reference to a "thing or . . . activity which is
under the control of the actor" limits § 390's broad reference to
"one who supplies . . . a chattel for the use of another."  The
comments to § 308 elaborate on this limitation:
The words "under the control of the actor" are used to
indicate that the third person is entitled to possess or
use the thing or engage in the activity only by the
consent of the actor, and that the actor has reason to
believe that by withholding consent he can prevent the
third person from using the thing or engaging in the
activity.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, § 308 cmt. a.  Reading § 308 and
§ 390 together, we hold that the doctrine of negligent entrustment
is generally limited to those situations in which the chattel is
under the control of the supplier at the time of the accident.
Ordinarily, without the right to permit or prohibit use of the
- 13 -
chattel at the time of the accident, an individual cannot be liable
for negligent entrustment. 
In Rounds v. Phillips (Rounds I), 166 Md. 151, 170 A. 532
(1934), this Court held that parents of a minor child, known to the
parents to be a reckless driver, were responsible for damages to a
third party resulting from the son's negligent use of an automobile
owned by the mother.  Id. at 167, 170 A. at 538.  The Court
explained that 
the theory upon which the [plaintiff's] declaration is
drawn . . . rests solely upon the primary negligence of
the [parents] themselves in permitting their son, alleged
to have been habitually reckless, negligent, and
incompetent in the operation of automobiles, to be in
possession of and operate the Buick . . . at the time of
the accident . . . .
Id. at 160, 170 A. at 535 (emphasis added).  We established in
Rounds I that the basis for liability under the doctrine of
negligent entrustment is the power to permit and prohibit the use
of the entrusted chattel.  The father in the Rounds case, although
he did not own the car, was nonetheless responsible for the damages
caused by his son because he "had the authority and power to permit
the use by the son of the mother's automobile, or to prohibit it."
Rounds v. Phillips (Rounds II), 168 Md. 120, 124, 177 A. 174, 175
(1935).
In Neale v. Wright, 332 Md. 8, 585 A.2d 196 (1991), our most
recent case to consider negligent entrustment, this Court held that
a co-owner of an automobile lacks the right to control the use of
- 14 -
the co-owned property and may not be held liable on a theory of
negligent entrustment for damages resulting from the other co-
owner's negligent use of the car.  Mr. and Mrs. Neale co-owned an
automobile.  The husband had a poor driving record and injured the
plaintiff while driving the jointly owned car.  The plaintiff sued
Mrs. Neale on a theory that Mrs. Neale had negligently entrusted
the co-owned automobile to her husband.  The Court concluded: 
[I]n order for Mrs. Neale to have "supplied" the car to
Mr. Neale at the time of the accident, and thus be liable
under a negligent entrustment theory, she had to have the
power to permit or prohibit Mr. Neale from using the
vehicle.  That power could emanate from a superior right
to control the operation of the car, or from a special
relationship between the "entrustor" and the driver, such
as a parent-child relationship . . . .  
Id. at 19, 585 A.2d at 201 (citations omitted); see also Snowhite
v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 314, 221 A.2d 342, 355
(1966) (limiting negligent entrustment liability to those suppliers
who have the right to permit as well as power to prohibit).
Respondents rely on Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 290 Md. 477, 431
A.2d 76 (1981), for the proposition that control at the time of the
accident is not a prerequisite for liability under the doctrine of
negligent entrustment.  In Kahlenberg, a father provided funds for
his son to purchase an automobile and shortly thereafter the son
was involved in a single car accident, injuring the plaintiff, a
passenger in his car. Kahlenberg, 290 Md. at 484, 431 A.2d at 81.
Despite the father's protest that he did not have the right to
permit and prohibit the son's use of the car, we held that the
- 15 -
father was liable for the damages caused by the son's accident
because he gave his son the car knowing his reckless propensities.
Id. at 491, 431 A.2d at 84.  The Court noted:
The holding in this case goes no further than to
recognize that the principle expressed in § 390 applies
where a gift of an automobile is made to a member of the
donor's immediate family.
Id. at 489, 431 A.2d at 83.
Kahlenberg is distinguishable from the case before us because
Kahlenberg involved a minor child.  Id. at 479 n.1, 431 A.2d at 78
n.1.  The father in Kahlenberg, like the father in Rounds, had the
right to control his minor son's use of the car, even if he did not
have the right to control the car directly.  In Neale, 322 Md. at
18, 585 A.2d at 201, we noted:
 
"[I]n Kahlenberg . . . there existed a parent-child
relationship between the defendants and the entrustees.
Mr. Kahlenberg's son was living at home with his parents
and was still a minor.
We intended to limit the application of Kahlenberg to those cases
involving a parent/minor-child relationship.  Id. at 18-19, 585
A.2d at 201.          
We agree with our sister states that have concluded that  "the
paramount requirement for liability under a theory of negligent
entrustment is whether or not the defendant had a right to control
the vehicle."  Lopez v. Langer, 761 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Idaho 1988);
see Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352, 359 (Colo. 1992); Alioto v.
Marnell, 520 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (Mass. 1988); Mills v. Continental
- 16 -
       In a footnote, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that
1
(continued...)
Parking Corp., 475 P.2d 673, 674 (Nev. 1970); see also  1 S. SPEISER
ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 4:10, at 594 (1983) ("The gist of
the negligent entrustment is the right of control of the entrustor
over the vehicle or instrumentality entrusted."); cf. Mejia v.
Erwin, 726 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).  Among the states
that have decided cases involving a parent's sale or gift of an
automobile to an adult child, nearly all reach the same conclusion
as we do today.  See Shipp v. Davis, 141 So. 366, 367 (Ala. Ct.
App. 1932); Peterson v. Halsted, 829 P.2d 373, 379 (Colo. 1992);
Estes v. Gibson, 257 S.W.2d 604, 607-08 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953); Lopez,
761 P.2d at 1228; Zedella v. Gibson, 650 N.E.2d 1000, 1004 (Ill.
1995); Tosh v. Scott, 472 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984);
Fischer v. Lunt, 557 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (App. Div. 1990); Rosenfeld
v. Tisi, 542 N.Y.S. 762, 763 (App. Div. 1989); Brown v. Harkleroad,
287 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955).  For example, in Peterson
v. Halsted, 829 P.2d 373, the Petersons helped their twenty-five
year old daughter purchase an automobile, knowing that she had a
history of excessive alcohol consumption.  While intoxicated, she
drove her car into the plaintiff's vehicle, injuring the plaintiff.
The court concluded that the Petersons could not be liable for
negligent entrustment because they had no control over the driving
activities of their adult daughter.   Peterson, 829 P.2d at 379.
1
- 17 -
(...continued)
although there was evidence that the Petersons had once taken away
their daughter's keys and kept them overnight, the parents had no
right to do so.  Peterson v. Halsted, 892 P.2d 373, 379 n. 9 (Colo.
1992).
Similarly, in 1989, when Ronald, Jr. was twenty-three years
old, Mrs. Broadwater told Ronald, Jr. that he must remove his name
from the title to a Corvette that was titled jointly in Ronald,
Jr.'s and Dr. Broadwater's names.  Ronald, Jr. complied and removed
his name from the title.  
Although this incident may illustrate Mrs. Broadwater's
influence, she apparently had no legal right to force Ronald, Jr.
to remove his name from the title.
In summary, we agree with the description of the doctrine expressed
by the Kentucky intermediate appellate court in Estes v. Gibson,
257 S.W.2d at 607-08:  "The doctrine ought not to be extended where
the party sought to be charged had no control over the machine and
the other party actually committing the injurious wrong was the
owner, sui juris." 
We found only one case holding parents liable for damages
caused by an adult child's negligent use of an automobile that the
parents had provided.  In Golembe v. Blumberg, 27 N.Y.S.2d 692, 692
(App. Div. 1941), the appellate division of the Supreme Court held
parents liable for having purchased a car for their adult,
epileptic son who then had an epileptic seizure while driving the
car, injuring the passengers.  We find this case unpersuasive.  See
Brown v. Harkleroad, 287 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956)
(rejecting Golembe).  Two subsequent New York cases reach an
opposite conclusion and undermine the authority of this holding.
- 18 -
Fischer, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 221 ("[Father] cannot be liable to third
parties under a theory of negligent entrustment of a dangerous
instrumentality in the hands of his adult son."); Rosenfeld v.
Tisi, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 763 (holding that mother who "neither owned
vehicle in question nor had control over her daughter" could not be
liable, as a matter of law, for damages caused by daughter's
negligent driving).  
We turn now to the facts of the case before us.  Undoubtedly,
Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater significantly influenced their adult son.
Except for a brief period when he lived in an apartment paid for by
his parents, Ronald, Jr. has lived with Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater his
entire life.  Petitioners have always provided the financial
support for Ronald, Jr.  They gave him spending money, included him
on their automobile insurance policy, paid traffic fines, and hired
counsel to represent him in traffic proceedings.  To the limited
extent Ronald, Jr. has been employed, his father has been his only
employer.       
We must, however, focus on Petitioners' rights as the parents
of an adult child, not their influence on Ronald, Jr.  Generally,
when a child reaches the age of majority, the parent's legal
responsibility ends and, concomitantly, the parent's legal right to
control the actions of the child also ends.  
Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater had no legal right to control Ronald,
Jr. at the time of the accident because he was an adult.  Their
- 19 -
       This is not to suggest that title is always dispositive of
2
the legal right to control chattel.  This Court has acknowledged
that the legal right to control can exist independent of title,
such as when a bailee permits an intoxicated person to drive a car
that is in the bailee's possession.  See Smith v. Branscome, 251
Md. 582, 600-01, 248 A.2d 455, 466-67 (1968).  In Branscome, this
Court wrote:  "Milton as the bailee of the owner, Green, had the
right to control the Green automobile.  He was given the power to
exercise this right by the delivery by Green of the automobile keys
to Milton."  Id. at 601, 248 A.2d at 467; see Rounds v. Phillips
(Rounds I), 166 Md. 151, 167, 170 A. 532, 538 (1934).  
In the present case, however, the car was retitled in Ronald,
Jr.'s name, indicating that Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater did not intend
a bailment or any other arrangement in which they would maintain
legal control over the automobile.     
continuing financial support of their son does not confer on them
any legally cognizable right to control his actions.  Nor did
Petitioners have any right of control over the Mazda involved in
the accident.  Regardless of whether Dr. and Mrs. Broadwater sold
Ronald, Jr., the car or gave it to him as a gift, under the
circumstances of this case, their ability to exercise control over
the car ended when they relinquished title.   Accordingly, we
2
reverse.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO CIRCUIT
COURT 
FOR 
BALTIMORE
COUNTY TO ENTER JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS.
COSTS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY
RESPONDENTS.