Case Title: Mini Mart, Inc. v. Wordinger

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mini Mart, Inc. v. Wordinger1986 WY 113719 P.2d 206Case Number: 86-19Decided: 05/14/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
MINI MART, INC., 
Appellant (Defendant-Employer),

v.

Lisa Ann WORDINGER, 
Appellee (Plaintiff-Employee), State of Wyoming, ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 
(Defendant).

Appeal from The District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

Catherine W. 
Hansen and Mark W. Gifford of Brown, Drew, Apostolos, Massey & Sullivan, 
Casper, for appellant. 

Gregory C. 
Dyekman and Douglas G. Madison of Dray, Madison & Thomson, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal results 
from the district court's order granting appellee Lisa Ann Wordinger relief from 
all worker's compensation orders and terminating her worker's compensation 
coverage. The case is unique inasmuch as appellee, as employee, sought 
termination of her worker's compensation benefits. Appellant/employer Mini Mart 
contested the termination and brings the present appeal.

[¶2.]     Appellant raises the 
following issues which we will consider together:

"A. Did the lower court 
abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff's motion for relief from worker's 
compensation orders and motion for termination of worker's compensation coverage 
and benefits pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure?

"(1) Do the doctrines of 
Equity and Estoppel prohibit the Appellee from using Rule 60(b)(1), W.R.C.P. to 
contest the Award of Benefits?

"(2) Can Rule 60(b), 
W.R.C.P. be used to avoid a final order entered on a presumed mistake of 
law?

"(3) Was a mistake made 
in the initial determination to award Worker's Compensation 
benefits?"

[¶3.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶4.]     As noted above, the 
facts in the case are unique. Both parties stipulated to a statement of the 
facts. Appellee was employed by Mini Mart in the home office in Casper, Wyoming, as a merchandise accounts payable 
clerk. On October 26, 1984, appellee and a co-employee, Kimberly McDaniels, were 
requested by Kurt Bachand, zone manager for Mini Mart, to travel in Ms. 
McDaniel's car to Parker, Colorado, and work for two days at the grand 
opening of a new Mini Mart store. Mr. Bachand advised appellee that while at the 
grand opening her duties would include popping popcorn, rolling cotton candy, 
warming pizzas, and greeting customers. Apparently Mini Mart felt it would be 
good policy to involve home office employees in grand openings to improve 
relations between store employees and home office 
employees.

[¶5.]     Appellee was seriously 
injured in a car accident en route to the grand opening on October 27, 1984. 
Appellee was asleep in the passenger seat when the car in which she was riding, 
driven by Ms. McDaniels, left the road. The accident occurred approximately 
twenty miles north of Cheyenne on I-25. As a result of the accident 
appellee's injuries were complex, and in addition to other injuries, she is 
paralyzed from the chest down.

[¶6.]     The parties agreed that 
at all times before the accident, appellee was not engaged in an "extrahazardous 
occupation or employment," nor had she ever been reported previously as a 
"covered employee" by Mini Mart for worker's compensation. Larry Veber, 
Personnel director for Mini Mart, testified that home office employees were 
covered by commercial insurance while store employees were covered by worker's 
compensation. Mr. Veber further testified that after the accident, Mini Mart 
management made the decision to report the accident to both the commercial 
insurance carrier and worker's compensation, and to list appellee as a covered 
employee for October, 1984, even though Mini Mart had never listed her 
previously as a covered employee.

[¶7.]     Mr. Veber also informed 
appellee's mother shortly after the accident that accident reports would be 
filed with both the commercial insurance carrier and worker's compensation. On 
November 5, 1984, a document entitled "Employer's Report of Injury or 
Occupational Illness or Disease" signed by Larry Veber, was filed with the 
district court. In the report, appellee's occupation was described as a 
merchandise accounts payable clerk, but the report also indicated that at the 
time of the accident, appellee was "traveling to one of our stores to work as 
sales clerk for store grand opening."

[¶8.]     Worker's compensation 
was awarded to appellee and approximately $85,000 was paid on her behalf. On May 
22, 1985, appellee brought this action against Mini Mart and the worker's 
compensation division to obtain relief from worker's compensation orders and to 
terminate worker's compensation benefits. The district court granted appellee 
relief from the worker's compensation orders, terminated worker's compensation 
benefits and imposed a lien upon appellee to repay the worker's compensation 
benefits. Appellee repaid all the benefits to the worker's compensation division 
February 26, 1986.

[¶9.]     Appellee filed a motion 
for relief based upon Rule 60(b), Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides in pertinent part:

"Mistakes; inadvertence; 
excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. - On motion, and upon 
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; * * * or (6) 
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. * * 
*"

[¶10.]  Appellee also based her claim for relief 
upon § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), which 
provides:

"Where an award of 
compensation has been made in favor of or on behalf of an employee for any 
benefits under this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804], an application may be 
made to the clerk of district court by any party within four (4) years from the 
date of the last award, or at any time during which monthly payments under an 
award are being made, for additional benefits of any type or nature or for a 
modification of the amount of the award on the ground of increase or decrease of 
incapacity due solely to the injury, or upon grounds of mistake or 
fraud."

[¶11.]  The trial court found § 27-12-606 
inapplicable because it provides that an application be made for "additional 
benefits" or for "a modification of the amount of the award." No claim was made 
for additional benefits or for an award modification. Rather, appellee sought 
relief from worker's compensation orders and termination of worker's 
compensation benefits. Since an award of worker's compensation is a "judicial 
determination" pursuant to § 27-12-607, we think the trial court was correct in 
determining that the action was one for relief from a judgment or order and 
should be decided under Rule 60(b), W.R.C.P.

[¶12.]  Motions brought under Rule 60(b) are to 
be decided within the sound discretion of the court and must be supported by 
adequate proof. U.S. Aviation, Inc. v. Wyoming Avionics, Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 121 
(1983). Since such motions are within the sound discretion of the court, the 
decision will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Atkins v. Household 
Finance Corporation of Casper, Wyo., 
581 P.2d 193 (1978). The burden is on the movant to bring himself within the 
scope of the rule. Martellaro v. Sailors, Wyo., 515 P.2d 974 
(1973).

[¶13.]  The essence of appellee's claim under 
Rule 60(b) was that a mistake had been made in the employer's accident report 
resulting in an erroneous award of worker's compensation benefits. Worker's 
compensation benefits were awarded appellee based upon the report and other 
information supplied by Mini Mart. As noted earlier, appellee was advised that 
her duties at the grand opening would include popping popcorn, rolling cotton 
candy, warming pizzas, and greeting customers. Appellee was not told she would 
have to do any of the usual work of a Mini Mart store clerk. Duties of a store 
clerk also involve the sale of gasoline.

[¶14.]  Employees who work at a gasoline filling 
station are covered by worker's compensation since such is considered an 
extrahazardous occupation pursuant to § 27-12-106(a)(ix). But an employee 
engaged in clerical work is not covered by worker's compensation under § 
27-12-102(a)(viii), which states:

"`Employee' means any 
person who has entered into the employment of or works under contract of 
services or apprenticeship with an employer engaged in an extrahazardous 
occupation, except a person whose employment is purely casual and not for the 
purpose of the employer's usual trade or business, or those engaged in clerical work and not 
subject to the hazards of the business. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶15.]  The parties agreed that the following 
Mini Mart personnel policy was in effect at the time of the accident and that 
appellee was a "non-exempt office employee" thereunder:

"1. Applied 
to:

"All nonexempt office 
employees.

"2. 
Definitions:

"2.1 Nonexempt office 
employees: All hourly or fluctuating work week office personnel employed at the 
central office in Casper, the zone office in 
Rapid City, or 
any other Mini Mart office location.

"3. 
General:

"To preclude any problems 
arising from having office personnel working in our stores, the following policy 
is set forth.

"4. Policy: All nonexempt 
office employees are prohibited from performing any store duties in any store 
location. This includes work performed in a normally compensated job and work 
performed as favors for store employees."

[¶16.]  Appellee never received any training as a 
store clerk. Furthermore, she was compensated while traveling to the grand 
opening at the same hourly wage she normally received as an accounts payable 
clerk. Mini Mart charged the labor expense for appellee's wages to the 
accounting department and not to the Parker Mini Mart store account. In its 
decision letter, the trial court stated:

"Based upon the evidence 
and testimony presented at the July 12th hearing, as well as upon the record 
before this Court, it is the opinion of the undersigned that, for the following 
reasons, the employee's motion should be granted. The evidence is clear that, 
while in the employ of Mini Mart, Inc., Lisa Ann Wordinger has never been a 
covered employee under the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Act. Further, it is 
clear that neither Lisa Ann Wordinger nor the supervisory personnel anticipated 
that her work at the grand opening of the Parker store would in any way change 
the nature of her employment as a clerk in the home office. The evidence also 
demonstrated that indeed, it would have been contrary to store policy for Lisa 
Ann Wordinger to involve herself in any store duties normally performed by a 
retail store clerk, and that the purpose of Miss Wordinger's trip to the Parker 
grand opening was to promote `relations' between the home office and the 
personnel who worked at the local store. It is consequently the opinion of this 
Court that Miss Wordinger was employed by Mini Mart as a clerical employee of 
the home office on the date of the October 27, 1984, accident rather than as a 
`store clerk' for the Parker, Colorado, store.

"The argument may be 
raised that, although Miss Wordinger was a clerical employee on the date of the 
accident, her anticipated activities would have made her subject to the hazards 
of the business under § 27-12-102(a)(viii). Mini Mart's qualification as an 
extrahazardous occupation for store employees relates to its status as a 
`filling station' under § 27-12-106(a)(ix). The evidence and testimony presented 
at the July 12, 1985, hearing indicated that Miss Wordinger's intended 
activities included popping popcorn, rolling cotton candy, warming pizzas, and 
greeting customers; no mention was made of any activity relating to the sale of 
gasoline. Further, the Agreed Statement of Facts indicates that the self-service 
pumps at the Parker Mini Mart were located approximately 80 to 90 feet from the 
store, and that no fuel was delivered to the store during the grand opening. In 
the opinion of the undersigned, Miss Wordinger's anticipated activities at the 
Parker store would not have subjected her to the hazards of the 
business."

[¶17.]  We think the trial court was correct in 
its determination that appellee's anticipated duties at the grand opening did 
not include those of a store clerk, and therefore she was not subjected to the 
extrahazardous occupation of gasoline filling station work. Her limited assigned 
duties of making popcorn, cotton candy, warming pizzas, and greeting customers 
would not expose her to the hazards of working with gasoline. Therefore, the 
trial court was correct in determining a mistake was made when worker's 
compensation benefits were awarded to appellee.

"The board, commission, 
or court having jurisdiction of the proceeding to secure compensation is usually 
empowered to review or reopen and modify its awards * * *." 82 Am.Jur.2d 
Workmen's Compensation § 590, p. 309 (1976).

"A compensation award may 
be reopened by the commission or board on the ground of fraud or mistake in a 
determination of fact. Mistake or error is ground for exercise by the board or 
commission of its power to modify or change its findings, awards, decisions, or 
orders in the interest of justice, or to reclassify a disability. A board or 
commission may correct an error in a decision that it lacked jurisdiction of a 
case, and a case may be reopened on the ground of a misapprehension of the facts 
as to causation, as to accident or suicide, or as to whether an injury arose out 
of and in the course of employment, and on the ground of mistake of fact as to 
the nature of the injuries for which an award had been made, or as to family 
relationship." 82 Am.Jur.2d Workmen's Compensation § 597, pp. 313-314 
(1976).

[¶18.]  Nevertheless, Mini Mart claims appellee 
should be barred from the requested relief under the doctrines of estoppel and 
laches. In support of this, Mini Mart cites Herring v. Welltech, Inc., Wyo., 660 P.2d 361 (1983), wherein we held that once an employer files its report 
acknowledging the accident occurred in the course of employment, the employer is 
estopped from later taking a contrary position. However, we noted in the case 
that the employer may seek relief under § 27-12-606 to modify the award. We 
further noted that relief is available to the employer under Rule 60(b) if there 
is a mistake as to the issue of scope of employment.

"* * * Once a claim is 
established as having occurred within the course of employment and not due to 
the culpable negligence of the employee - (the latter qualification is not here 
in question), these two factors cannot be challenged in conjunction with other 
claims arising out of the same incident, unless relief is granted under Rule 60(b), 
W.R.C.P., or § 27-12-606, W.S. 1977 * * *." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 
365.

We then allowed 
the petitioner to reopen his case finding the trial court abused its discretion 
in denying the relief sought.

[¶19.]  On the issue of estoppel one authority 
has stated:

"As a general thing not 
only must a party claiming an estoppel have believed and relied upon the words 
or conduct of the other party, but also 
he must have been thereby induced to act, or to refrain from acting, in such a 
manner and to such an extent as to change his position or status from that which 
he would otherwise have occupied. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 28 Am.Jur.2d 
Estoppel and Waiver § 77, pp. 712-713 (1966)

Further, § 60 of 
the same authority provides:

"Ordinarily, no estoppel 
arises from the mere acceptance of benefits by a person in the absence of full 
knowledge of the facts and his rights. Thus, estoppel does not ordinarily arise 
from the acceptance of benefits when such acceptance is induced by excusable 
ignorance or mistake as to the facts involved. * * *" p. 
682.

[¶20.]  In this case we have already found there 
was a mistake made in the employer's accident report regarding appellee's status 
as a "sales clerk." This classification was inaccurate. Furthermore, the 
evidence indicates that Mini Mart management was instrumental in helping 
appellee's mother file the accident report and subsequent claim. Relying upon 
such report, the worker's compensation division awarded benefits to appellee. 
There is no indication that Mini Mart detrimentally relied on any position taken 
by appellee, or was induced to act or misled by appellee's actions. Rather, it 
appears that Mini Mart induced appellee to file for worker's compensation 
benefits since they assisted her mother in filing the requisite 
forms.

[¶21.]  We agree with the trial court's 
conclusion when it stated:

"Consequently, Mini 
Mart's estoppel argument must fail for two reasons. First, Mini Mart has failed 
to carry its burden of proving the requisite elements of reliance, change of 
position, detriment and damage. (See 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver, § 146). 
Second, in the opinion of the undersigned, the instant case falls within the 
limitation explained in 28 Am.Jur.2d § 60 (supra). Likewise, Mini Mart's 
reliance on the doctrine of laches is misplaced as generally, `delay alone is 
not regarded as constituting laches, but only delay which places another at a 
disadvantage.' (28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver, § 2)."

[¶22.]  In the case of Alco of Wyoming v. Baker, 
Wyo., 651 P.2d 266 (1982), two clerical employees were injured in a car accident while driving 
home from a company picnic. Testimony indicated the two employees had run 
various errands for the company in the past. The trial court found the employees 
were covered by worker's compensation. We reversed, finding the employees' 
activities were not sufficient to consider their occupation 
extrahazardous:

"* * * If we accept 
appellees' contention that these activities subjected them to the hazards of the 
business, then any clerical worker who takes a trip in his car to the post 
office or who runs an errand using a car would be entitled to coverage under the 
Worker's Compensation Act, provided the business itself was in some way 
extrahazardous. These statutes are to be given a liberal construction, but not 
so liberal a construction that they extend the intended 
coverage.

"`* * * The courts are 
not free under the guise of construction to extend the beneficent purpose of the 
law to injuries that do not reasonably fall within the reach of the language 
used. * * *' In re Hardison, 
Wyo., 429 P.2d 320, 322 (1967)." 
Id., at 
268.

[¶23.]  In sum, we find no abuse of discretion in 
the court decision granting appellee relief from worker's compensation orders 
and terminating her benefits. We agree that there was a mistake made classifying 
appellee as a "sales clerk." There is no abuse of discretion unless a court acts 
in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason under the circumstances. To decide 
this, we must determine whether the court could conclude as it did, or whether, 
under the circumstances, the court committed an error of law. Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831 
(1980).

[¶24.]  We find no abuse of discretion 
here.

[¶25.]  Affirmed.