Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Zemba

Citation: 2002-Ohio-6725

Docket Number: 20021447

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Zemba, 97 Ohio St.3d 489, 2002-Ohio-6725.] 
 
 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. ZEMBA. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Zemba, 97 Ohio St.3d 489, 2002-Ohio-6725.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — Conviction of 
reckless homicide — Engaging in an unlicensed childcare business that 
required a license. 
(No. 2002-1447 — Submitted October 15, 2002 — Decided December 18, 2002.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 01-94. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
We are asked in this case to determine the sanction for an attorney 
who pleaded guilty to a charge of reckless homicide, a felony of the third degree 
(R.C. 2903.041) and who engaged in an unlicensed childcare business that 
required a license.  The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
found that respondent, Karen K. Zemba of Independence, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0037836, committed these acts and thereby violated DR 1-
102(A)(3) (engaging in conduct involving moral turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) 
(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 1-
102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), 
and 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s 
fitness to practice).  The board recommended that respondent be permanently 
disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio.  In view of the misconduct in this case, 
respondent’s disciplinary record, and the fact that no compelling mitigating 
circumstances warrant a more lenient disposition, we agree that disbarment is 
appropriate. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶2} 
Respondent has engaged in the practice of law on a very limited 
basis since her admission in 1987.  Her practice of law involved no more than the 
handling of a few miscellaneous legal matters for relatives.  Over the past 12 
years, respondent has engaged in childcare services as her primary occupation. 
{¶3} 
On August 24, 2000, respondent was caring for a 17-month-old 
child, under an arrangement with the child’s parents, in her home in 
Independence, Ohio.  That day, respondent was caring for seven other children, 
ranging in age from 4 months to 3 years old, including one of her own children. 
{¶4} 
Respondent does not operate a licensed childcare facility, and on 
the date in question, she was in violation of R.C. 5104.02, which requires a 
license for anyone who cares for more than six children in the home. 
{¶5} 
At approximately 2:30 p.m., respondent placed the 17-month-old 
child in an upstairs playpen for a nap.  At approximately 4:00 p.m., respondent 
checked on the child and found she was not breathing.  The child was pronounced 
dead approximately an hour later.  The coroner’s report declared the cause of 
death to be “[a]sphyxia due to entanglement of bedsheet around neck” and 
declared an “other condition” of “[r]ecent ingestion of diphenhydramine.”  The 
coroner’s verdict characterized the death as “homicidal in nature.” 
{¶6} 
The coroner’s toxicology report indicated that the child had 
diphenhydramine hydrochloride in her system at an adult therapeutic level.  
Diphenhydramine hydrochloride is an ingredient in Benadryl. 
{¶7} 
Respondent was questioned by police about the presence of 
diphenhydramine hydrochloride in the child’s system, but did not volunteer an 
explanation until September 11, 2000.  She then admitted that the child had a 
runny nose at lunch and that she gave the child ½ teaspoon of Benadryl.  Later 
that day, respondent recanted the admission. 
{¶8} 
The grand jury indicted respondent on one count of involuntary 
manslaughter (R.C. 2903.04) and one count of child endangering (R.C. 2929.22).  
January Term, 2002 
3 
On July 31, 2001, respondent pleaded guilty to reckless homicide (R.C. 
2903.041), a third-degree felony.  Respondent was thereafter sentenced to five 
years of community control with conditions including six months of monitored 
house arrest and was ordered not to operate any childcare facility or to provide 
any childcare. 
{¶9} 
Upon inquiry about the felony conviction by the relator, Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel, respondent, in a letter dated October 31, 2001, explained 
the circumstances surrounding her conviction.  Respondent claimed that the 
possibility of years of litigation, including a civil suit, prompted her to plead 
guilty to the lesser included offense of reckless homicide.  Respondent claimed 
that the judge indicated to her defense attorney that he was going to grant her 
motion to suppress evidence due to violations of her constitutional rights by 
police unless the prosecutor negotiated a plea bargain.  Upon inquiry from relator, 
the presiding judge in respondent’s criminal case denied ever telling anyone that 
he would grant the motion to suppress.  The judge also denied respondent’s 
indication that he settled and dismissed the civil action brought against respondent 
by the parents of the deceased child. 
{¶10} This court imposed an interim felony suspension pursuant to 
Gov.Bar R. V(5)(A)(4).  In re Zemba (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 1493, 758 N.E.2d 
1145.  Relator investigated the allegations of respondent’s professional 
misconduct and filed a complaint on November 29, 2001, charging respondent 
with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
{¶11} A hearing was held before a panel of the Board of Commissioners 
on Grievances and Discipline on May 22, 2002, in Cleveland.  Respondent 
appeared pro se and called only her husband, also an attorney, as a witness.  
Respondent stated that she took responsibility for the death of the child under her 
care and continued to deny having given the child Benadryl.  In her deposition, 
respondent claimed that she had not had the money necessary to fully contest the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
criminal charges against her.  However, at the hearing before the panel, she 
claimed that money was not the reason she had pleaded guilty.  Rather, 
respondent asserted that she did not have the emotional strength to go through a 
trial.  Respondent also admitted to making inconsistent statements to police 
during the investigation of the child’s death. 
{¶12} The panel found 
that 
respondent 
“was 
not 
completely 
forthcoming” during the hearing concerning a disciplinary complaint filed against 
her as a result of insurance fraud charges in 1989.  Both the panel and the board 
recommended that respondent be permanently disbarred from the practice of law 
in Ohio. 
{¶13} We agree that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(3), 1-102 (A)(4), 
1-102(A)(5), and 1-102(A)(6).  We also agree that respondent should be 
disbarred.  “[P]ermanent disbarment is an appropriate sanction for conduct that 
violates DR 1-102 and results in a felony conviction.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Gallagher (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 52, 693 N.E.2d 1078.  No mitigating 
circumstance justifies leniency in this case.  Accordingly, respondent is 
permanently disbarred from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to 
respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Gloria J. Sigman, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
__________________