Case Title: In re O.P.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 26/19

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2020-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re: O.P. 
No. 26, September Term 2019 
 
 
Civil Procedure – Appeals – Mootness – Issues Capable of Repetition Yet Evading 
Review.  A juvenile court denied a request by a local department of social services to 
continue temporary emergency shelter care of an infant alleged to be a child in need of 
assistance (“CINA”).  The department and counsel for the infant appealed that decision, 
contending that the juvenile court applied an incorrect standard of proof.  The child’s 
mother contested whether there is appellate jurisdiction for such an appeal.  The department 
later decided to refrain from seeking shelter care when the child’s parents agreed that the 
child was a CINA and the juvenile court issued orders governing the parents’ conduct.  
Although an appellate court ordinarily will not decide a moot issue, the issues presented in 
this appeal would be considered under an exception to the mootness doctrine for cases that 
raise an issue “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” 
 
 
Civil Procedure – Appeals – Collateral Order Doctrine.  A juvenile court’s order 
denying continued temporary shelter care during the pendency of a CINA case was 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine because that order (1) conclusively 
determined (2) an important disputed question, (3) that is separate from the merits of the 
CINA case and (4) that would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal awaited final 
judgment in the CINA case.  
 
 
Family Law – Child in Need of Assistance – Shelter Care – Standard of Proof.  To 
decide whether to continue emergency shelter care of a child in a pending CINA case for 
a temporary period of up to 30 days, a juvenile court must find reasonable grounds (1) that 
return of the child to the child’s home is contrary to the safety and welfare of the child and 
(2) either that removal of the child from the child’s home is necessary due to an alleged 
emergency situation and in order to provide for the safety of the child or that reasonable 
efforts were made but unsuccessful in preventing or eliminating the need to remove the 
child from the home.  Any continuation of shelter care beyond 30 days must be based upon 
findings made applying a preponderance of evidence standard at the adjudicatory stage of 
the CINA case. 
Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, §§3-815(d), 3-817. 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
 
Case No. C-02-JV-18-000692 
Argument:  December 6, 2019 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 26 
 
September Term, 2019 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
IN RE: O.P. 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
   
 
Barbera, C.J., 
 
 
 
McDonald 
 
 
 
Watts 
 
 
 
Hotten 
 
 
 
Getty 
 
 
 
Booth 
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr.  
(Senior Judge, Specially 
Assigned), 
 
 
 
 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by McDonald, J. 
 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed: August 14, 2020   
Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal 
Materials Act 
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 
 
 
 
 
 
Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk 
2021-02-11 14:40-05:00
 
Under State law, a local department of social services that has reason to believe that 
a child is a victim of abuse or neglect may initiate an action in a juvenile court to have the 
child declared a “child in need of assistance” – commonly known by the acronym “CINA.”  
If the juvenile court ultimately finds that the child is a CINA, further proceedings ensue to 
provide the necessary assistance to the child. 
 
This appeal relates to the period during which the CINA case is pending.  Upon 
receiving the allegations of abuse or neglect on which the CINA case is based, a local 
department is authorized to place the child in emergency shelter care if it believes certain 
statutory criteria are met.  However, it immediately falls to the juvenile court to hold a 
hearing to assess whether those criteria are satisfied and whether the temporary shelter care 
should continue for up to 30 days while the abuse or neglect allegations are adjudicated in 
the CINA case.  This appeal concerns the standard of proof that the juvenile court is to 
apply in making that temporary shelter care decision.   
 
 In this case, an infant, whom we shall refer to as “O.P.,” was hospitalized with 
serious unexplained brain injuries several days after an incident at home where he stopped 
breathing.  Petitioner Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services (the 
“Department”), alleging that the injuries were the result of abuse or neglect, placed him in 
emergency shelter care and immediately filed a CINA petition with a request for continued 
temporary shelter care pending resolution of the CINA petition.  Pursuant to statute, the 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, sitting as a juvenile court, held a hearing on the 
request for continued temporary shelter care.  Conflicting evidence was presented as to 
whether O.P.’s brain injuries occurred at home or while he was in the neonatal intensive 
2 
 
care unit for seven weeks after his birth.  The juvenile court denied the Department’s 
request for continued shelter care, finding that the Department had failed to establish the 
statutory criteria by a preponderance of the evidence.  O.P. was returned to the custody of 
his parents.   
 
On appeal, the Department and the counsel appointed for O.P. challenged the 
juvenile court’s use of a preponderance standard for determining whether to authorize 
continued shelter care.  The Court of Special Appeals held that the juvenile court used the 
correct standard of proof.  Concluding that the juvenile court’s fact findings were not 
clearly erroneous and that it did not abuse its discretion in denying continued shelter care, 
the intermediate appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s decision.1   
 
The Department and counsel for O.P. pursued a further appeal to this Court.  
However, in the meantime, the parties reached a settlement in the CINA case under which 
O.P. was declared a CINA, but remained with his parents subject to the Department’s 
supervision.  This rendered moot the Department’s request to place him in shelter care.  
Although the issue of shelter care in this particular case is moot, we exercise our discretion 
to decide the legal issues presented by the parties – the appealability of a shelter care 
decision and the appropriate standard of proof to be applied in a shelter care proceeding – 
because these are issues “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”   
We hold that a juvenile court’s decision to deny continued shelter care is appealable 
under the collateral order doctrine.  With respect to the standard of proof to be applied by 
 
1 In re O.P., 240 Md. App. 518 (2019). 
3 
 
the juvenile court in such a proceeding, the court may authorize continued shelter care 
under the relevant statute for up to 30 days if it finds reasonable grounds to conclude that 
(1) return of the child to the child’s home is contrary to the safety and welfare of the child 
and (2) either (i) removal from the home is necessary due to an alleged emergency situation 
and in order to provide for the safety of the child, or (ii) reasonable efforts were made to 
eliminate the need to remove the child from the home, but were unsuccessful.  The juvenile 
court need not make those findings by a preponderance standard, although it must do so to 
extend shelter care beyond 30 days. 
I 
Shelter Care Proceedings in CINA Cases 
The law governing CINA proceedings must accommodate both a vital constitutional 
and human right with the State’s special responsibility for the welfare of children.  The 
liberty interest of parents to raise their children as they see fit without undue interference 
by the State is a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 565 (2003).  However, “the best interests of the 
child may take precedence over the parent’s liberty interest in the course of a custody, 
visitation, or adoption dispute.”  Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 219 (1998).  Moreover, 
“[t]hat which will best promote the child’s welfare becomes particularly consequential 
where the interests of a child are in jeopardy, as is often the case in situations involving 
sexual, physical, or emotional abuse by a parent.”  In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 706 (2001).  
Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the State has an interest, and a responsibility, to 
protect the health, safety, and welfare of children.  In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 569.  In 
4 
 
fashioning the CINA statute, the General Assembly has been cognizant that the law must 
accommodate these sometimes competing interests.2 
The central issue in this appeal concerns the standard of proof that a juvenile court 
is to apply in determining whether to authorize continued shelter care for a child after that 
child has been removed from the home pending the outcome of a CINA proceeding.  To 
place this issue in context, we provide a brief overview of the statutory scheme pertaining 
to CINA cases generally and shelter care proceedings in particular. 
A. 
CINA Cases  
The procedures governing proceedings when a child is alleged to be a CINA are set 
forth in Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJ”), §3-801 et seq.  A 
CINA is a child who requires court assistance because he or she has been abused or 
neglected, or has a developmental or mental disability, and there is no a caretaker to give 
proper attention to the child’s needs.  CJ §3-801(f), (g).  Related provisions concerning 
child abuse and neglect are found in Maryland Code, Family Law Article (“FL”), §5-701 
 
2 The Legislature has identified the purposes of the CINA statute as, among other 
things, “[t]o provide for the care, protection, safety, and mental and physical development 
of any child coming within the provisions [of the CINA statute]” and “[t]o conserve and 
strengthen the child’s family ties and to separate a child from the child’s parents only when 
necessary for the child’s welfare.”  Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, 
§3-802(a)(1), (3). 
5 
 
et seq.3  The Maryland Rules complement these provisions in specifying some of the 
procedures applicable to CINA cases.  See Maryland Rule 11-101 et seq.4 
Petition Alleging Child is a CINA 
If a local department of social services receives a complaint of child abuse or 
neglect, and it concludes that the juvenile court has jurisdiction and that filing a CINA 
petition is in the child’s best interests, the local department must file a petition alleging that 
the child is a CINA and setting forth supporting facts.  CJ §§3-809(a), 3-811(a)(1).  Once 
a petition has been filed, the juvenile court may order the local department to conduct a 
study concerning the child, the child’s family, the child’s environment, and other matters 
relevant to the case.5  CJ §3-816(a).  As a part of a study, the court may order that the child 
or any parent or guardian be examined by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, or other 
professionally qualified person.  CJ §3-816(b).     
The juvenile court proceeding to determine whether the child is a CINA consists of 
two stages – an adjudicatory hearing and a disposition hearing. 
 
 
3 FL §5-703(a) provides that “[t]he provisions of this subtitle are in addition to and 
not in substitution for the provisions of Title 3, Subtitle 8 of the Courts and Judicial 
Proceedings Article.” 
4 These rules are currently in the process of being revised to recognize, among other 
things, the statutory separation of CINA proceedings from other juvenile causes.  See Part 
III.C.3 of this opinion.   
5 In addition, FL §5-706 requires that the local department conduct a thorough 
investigation of any report of child abuse or neglect and provides certain parameters for 
investigations. 
6 
 
Adjudicatory Stage   
As a first stage in resolving a CINA petition, the juvenile court is to hold an 
adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the department’s factual allegations in the CINA 
petition are true.  CJ §§3-801(c), 3-817(a); Maryland Rule 11-114.  At the adjudicatory 
hearing, the rules of evidence apply and the allegations in the petition must be proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  CJ §3-817(b)-(c); Maryland Rule 11-114(e).  
Disposition Stage 
If the court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, the court then holds a 
separate disposition hearing to determine whether the child is, in fact, a CINA and, if so, 
the nature of any necessary court intervention.  CJ §§3-801(m), 3-819(a).  Although the 
disposition hearing is “separate” from the adjudicatory hearing, the two hearings are 
ordinarily to be held on the same day.  CJ §3-819(a).  At the disposition stage, it is left to 
the discretion of the juvenile court whether to insist on strict application of the rules of 
evidence.6  Maryland Rule 5-101(c)(6).  The court may find that the child is not a CINA 
and dismiss the case.  CJ §3-819(b)(1)(i).  Alternatively, the court may determine that the 
child is a CINA, in which case it may take one of three actions: (1) decide not to change 
the child’s current custody; (2) commit the child to the custody of a parent, relative, or 
another suitable individual; or (3) commit the child to the custody of the local department 
 
6 A report resulting from any study that the court has directed the local department 
to undertake is admissible as evidence at the disposition hearing, but not at the adjudicatory 
hearing.  CJ §3-816(c).   
7 
 
of social services or the Maryland Department of Health.  CJ §3-819(b)(1)(iii).7  If the child 
is placed out of the home, the court must later hold a permanency planning hearing to 
determine a permanency plan for the child.  CJ §3-823(b).  Those proceedings are not 
pertinent to the issues before us and are beyond the scope of this opinion.    
B. 
Shelter Care Proceedings  
Shelter Care 
Under certain circumstances, the CINA statute authorizes the placement of a child 
alleged to be a CINA in emergency shelter care prior to disposition of the CINA petition.  
CJ §3-815(a).  Shelter care is defined as “a temporary placement of a child outside of the 
home at any time before disposition.”  CJ §3-801(bb).  Shelter care is not a component of 
every CINA case.  Rather, it involves a separate proceeding in which the juvenile court 
decides whether to authorize interim protection for a child who may be at risk in the home 
while the CINA petition is pending.   
Initial Placement of Child in Emergency Shelter Care 
Either before or after the filing of a CINA petition, a local department may place a 
child in emergency shelter care without a court order.8  CJ §3-815(a); Maryland Rule 11-
 
7 The juvenile court has certain other options in the case of a child with a 
developmental disability or mental illness.  CJ §3-819(b)(ii). 
8 Also, a law enforcement officer may remove a child from the home “if the officer 
has reasonable grounds to believe that the child is in immediate danger from the child’s 
surroundings and that the child’s removal is necessary for the child’s protection.”  CJ §3-
814(a)(3).  If a child is taken into custody by law enforcement pursuant to CJ §3-814(a)(3), 
the local department must either place the child in emergency shelter care or release the 
child to the child’s parents.  CJ §3-814(b)(3).  
8 
 
112(a)(1).  The statute establishes the following criteria for placement in emergency shelter 
care: 
(b) A local department may place a child in emergency shelter care 
before a hearing if: 
 
(1) Placement is required to protect the child from serious 
immediate danger; 
 
(2) There is no parent, guardian, custodian, relative, or other person 
able to provide supervision; and 
 
(3) (i) 1. The child’s continued placement in the child’s home is 
contrary to the welfare of the child; and 
 
2. Because of an alleged emergency situation, removal from 
the home is reasonable under the circumstances to provide 
for the safety of the child; or 
 
(ii) 1. Reasonable efforts have been made but have been 
unsuccessful in preventing or eliminating the need for removal 
from the child’s home; and 
 
  2. As appropriate, reasonable efforts are being made to 
return the child to the child’s home. 
 
CJ §3-815(b).   
 
The Family Law Article contains related provisions concerning temporary removal 
of a child from the home.  A representative of a local department conducting an 
investigation into a report of child abuse or neglect may enter a household if he or she “(1) 
previously has been denied the right of entry; and (2) has probable cause to believe that a 
child is in serious, immediate danger.”  FL §5-709(a).  “The representative may remove 
the child temporarily, without prior approval by the juvenile court, if the representative 
believes that the child is in serious, immediate danger.”  FL §5-709(c).  At one time, there 
was consideration of placing all of these related provisions in the Family Law Article.  See 
William H. Adkins, II, Code Revision in Maryland: the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article, 34 Md. L. Rev. 7, 28 n. 109 (1974). 
9 
 
If a child is placed in emergency shelter care, on the next day the juvenile court is 
sitting, the local department must immediately file a petition with the juvenile court to 
authorize continued shelter care.  CJ §3-815(c)(1); Maryland Rule 11-112(a)(2)(ii).9   
In certain circumstances, the local department may file a petition for continued 
shelter care before even filing a CINA petition.  For example, the local department may 
need more time to investigate the allegations to put in the CINA petition, or to decide 
whether filing a CINA petition is even in the child’s best interests.  Other times, as 
happened in the case at hand, the local department may file a petition for continued shelter 
care at the same time that it files the CINA petition.  Either way, the purpose of continuing 
shelter care is to temporarily protect a child who has been removed from the home under 
emergent circumstances until it has been determined whether that child is a CINA.  
Juvenile Court Decision on Continuation of Temporary Shelter Care  
The juvenile court must then hold a shelter care hearing, no later than the next day 
on which court is in session, unless good cause is shown,10 to determine whether temporary 
placement of the child outside the home for up to 30 days is warranted.  CJ §3-815(c)(2).  
The matter may be initially heard by a juvenile court magistrate.11  Reasonable notice of 
 
9 The rule refers to an “intake officer” as filing the petition.  The reference to an 
intake officer – a person assigned to the court by a juvenile services agency to provide 
intake services (see CJ §3-8A-01(r)) – appears to be a remnant related to an earlier version 
of the CINA statute.  See footnote 4 above.   
10 A shelter care hearing may not be postponed for more than eight days from the 
start of a child’s placement in emergency shelter care.  Maryland Rule 11-112(a)(3). 
11 Under Maryland Rule 11-111(a), a magistrate may order emergency shelter care, 
or continued shelter care, in accordance with Maryland Rule 11-112.  However, a 
10 
 
the hearing is to be given to the child’s parents, custodian, or relatives.  CJ §3-815(c)(3).  
The hearing may be adversarial in nature.  However, the rules of evidence do not apply at 
a shelter care hearing.  Maryland Rules 5-101(b)(11), 11-112(d).    
The court may authorize continued shelter care outside the home if it reaches similar 
conclusions to those of the department.  In particular, the statute provides:  
(d) 
A court may continue shelter care beyond emergency shelter care 
 
only if the court finds that: 
 
(1) Return of the child to the child’s home is contrary to the safety and 
welfare of the child; and 
 
(2) (i) Removal of the child from the child’s home is necessary due to 
an alleged emergency situation and in order to provide for the 
safety of the child; or 
 
(ii) Reasonable efforts were made but were unsuccessful in 
preventing or eliminating the need for removal of the child from 
the home.  
 
CJ §3-815(d).  Neither the statute nor the rule specifies a standard of proof for making 
those findings.  
Even if the juvenile court concludes that the criteria in CJ 3-§815(d) are satisfied 
and orders shelter care to continue, that extension is limited.  The court may not order 
shelter care to continue for more than 30 days.  CJ §3-815(c)(4).  Moreover, if the court 
orders shelter care to continue, it must hold the adjudicatory hearing on the CINA petition 
 
magistrate’s order is subject to immediate review by a judge upon the filing of exceptions 
by any party.  Maryland Rule 11-111(c).  An excepting party other than the State may 
request a hearing de novo or a hearing on the record, while the State may only obtain a 
hearing on the record.  Id.  
11 
 
before the expiration of that 30-day period.  Maryland Rule 11-114(b)(2).  If the court does 
not hold the adjudicatory hearing within that 30-day period, the child is to be released from 
shelter care.  Id.  If the adjudicatory hearing is held within that period and the court finds 
at that hearing that continued shelter care is needed to ensure the safety of the child, it may 
extend shelter care for up to an additional 30 days.  CJ §3-815(c)(4).  As noted above, that 
hearing is conducted under the rules of evidence and a preponderance standard applies.  CJ 
§3-817. 
II 
Facts and Procedural History 
The Department no longer seeks shelter care for O.P. in this case.  We provide an 
overview of the underlying facts of this appeal and its procedural history for context.12   
A. 
Emergency Shelter Care and Petition for Continued Shelter Care 
O.P.’s Birth and Placement in Emergency Shelter Care 
O.P. was born seven weeks prematurely on October 7, 2018 to Respondent and 
Cross-Petitioner N.R. (“the mother”) and Respondent S.P. (“the father”).  On November 
23, after a seven-week stay in the neonatal intensive care unit at Johns Hopkins Hospital, 
O.P. was discharged and went home with his parents.  On December 14, the Department 
received a report indicating that O.P. had been admitted to Johns Hopkins Hospital for 
 
12 A more comprehensive account of the evidence and the proceedings in the 
juvenile court is set forth in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals.  In re O.P., 420 
Md. App. 518, 532-45 (2019).  Given that the merits of the shelter care determination is no 
longer at issue, there is no need to reiterate that entire account here.   
12 
 
serious unexplained brain injuries.  O.P. remained at the hospital until December 21, when 
he was discharged and placed in emergency shelter care under the Department’s custody.    
 
CINA Petition with Request for Continued Shelter Care 
On December 26, the first day that the courts were open after the holiday break, the 
Department filed with the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, sitting as a juvenile 
court, a CINA petition with a request for continued shelter care.  The petition alleged that, 
according to the parents, an incident occurred at their home on December 12 in which O.P. 
was choking and seemed to have stopped breathing.  Emergency personnel who responded 
to the incident “determined [O.P.] to be fine.”  However, at a doctor’s visit two days later, 
the doctor was concerned about O.P.’s increased head circumference and immediately sent 
O.P. to the emergency room.  There, medical providers discovered that O.P. had “both 
subdural and subarachnoid hemorrhaging,” and he was admitted for further evaluation and 
treatment.  According to medical providers at Johns Hopkins Hospital, the injuries were 
“consistent with abusive head trauma.”  They recommended that O.P. not be returned to 
his parents’ care, given the lack of plausible explanation for the injuries and the parents’ 
mental health histories.  In particular, the mother had been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder 
and depression, while the father had experienced suicidal ideation and depression in the 
past.  The Department and the parents were unable to agree upon a plan to ensure O.P.’s 
safety without removing him from the home, and no other family members were available 
to care for O.P.  Based on these allegations, the Department asserted that the requirements 
for authorizing continued shelter care set forth in CJ §3-815(d) were satisfied.   
 
13 
 
Shelter Care Hearings in the Juvenile Court 
Petition for Continued Shelter Care 
On December 26, the same day that the Department filed the CINA petition with a 
request for continued shelter care, a juvenile magistrate held a hearing and issued an order 
continuing shelter care of O.P. pending the adjudication of the CINA petition.  The juvenile 
magistrate did not issue written findings, recommendations, or conclusions; instead, the 
order was entered on the docket as part of the Hearing Sheet.    
Juvenile Court Denies Continued Shelter Care Applying Preponderance Standard 
 
The mother requested immediate review of the juvenile magistrate’s order and the 
juvenile court held a de novo shelter care hearing the next day, December 27.  At the 
hearing, the Department presented the testimony of a child protective services worker, as 
well as the hospital’s discharge summary for O.P.13  Counsel for the mother declined to 
present evidence and asked the court to deny the Department’s petition for continued 
shelter care on the basis that, even if the evidence were viewed in the light most favorable 
to the Department, it had not carried its burden to show that O.P. was in need of shelter 
care.   
At the conclusion of the Department’s case, the juvenile court denied the 
Department’s request for continued shelter care, stating on the record that it could not “find 
it more likely than not that abuse or neglect on the part of the parents is indicated here.”  
 
13 A detailed summary of the child protective services worker’s testimony, as well 
as the contents of the hospital discharge summary, is set forth in the opinion of the Court 
of Special Appeals.  240 Md. App. at 534-37.   
14 
 
After the juvenile court denied the petition for continued shelter care, the Department 
requested an order controlling the conduct of the parties, which the court also denied as 
“beyond the purpose” of the hearing.14  The court’s December 27 order denying continued 
shelter care was entered on the docket as part of the Hearing Sheet.  When the Department 
refused to return O.P. to the custody of his parents immediately following the court’s 
ruling, the juvenile court issued an additional order that same day mandating the immediate 
return of O.P. to his parents by that evening.   
Stay of Denial Pending Juvenile Court’s Explanation 
The Department immediately appealed the juvenile court’s denial of continued 
shelter care for O.P. and sought an injunction from the Court of Special Appeals.  On 
December 28, the intermediate appellate court temporarily stayed the termination of shelter 
care and remanded the matter to the juvenile court for an explanation of the basis of its 
December 27 order.  Pending that explanation, the Court of Special Appeals directed that 
the parties return to the pre-December 27 status quo, and O.P. was returned to emergency 
shelter care under the Department’s custody.   
On December 31, 2018, the juvenile court issued a memorandum opinion and order 
explaining its decision to deny the Department’s request for continued shelter care.   
 
14 In a CINA proceeding, the “court, on its own motion or on application of a party, 
may issue an appropriate order directing, restraining, or otherwise controlling the conduct 
of a person properly before the court, if the court finds that the conduct: (1) Is or may be 
detrimental or harmful to a child over whom the court has jurisdiction; (2) Will tend to 
defeat the execution of an order or disposition made or to be made under this subtitle; or 
(3) Will assist in the rehabilitation of or is necessary for the welfare of the child.”  CJ §3-
821; see also Maryland Rule 11-110(e). 
15 
 
Amended CINA Petition and Shelter Care Request 
On January 3, 2019, the Department filed an amended CINA petition with an 
amended request for shelter care stating that it had acquired additional evidence.15  The 
amended petition contained several new allegations, including that the choking incident 
had actually occurred on December 10, not December 12; that the parents had refused the 
paramedics’ recommendation that O.P. be taken to the emergency room; that the 
pediatrician at the December 14 visit noted certain new symptoms not present during O.P.’s 
prior visits, including “sunsetting of his eyes” and “increased head circumference”; that, 
based on O.P.’s birth records, his head was examined at least three times during his stay at 
the NICU and determined to be normal, and there was no indication that he suffered any 
brain-related incidents while at the NICU; and that O.P.’s pediatrician described his head 
as normal during visits on November 27 and December 5.   
The Juvenile Court Again Denies Temporary Shelter Care Based on Preponderance  
Standard 
 
On January 7, a juvenile magistrate held a hearing on the Department’s amended 
shelter care request and granted continued shelter care.  As before, the parents requested 
immediate review by the juvenile court.  The juvenile court held a second de novo shelter 
care hearing on January 8-9, limited to the Department’s new allegations.  The Department 
 
15 One day prior, on January 2, the mother had filed a motion in the Court of Special 
Appeals to lift the stay and injunction and return O.P. to his parents.  On January 4, the 
Court of Special Appeals denied the mother’s motion pending conclusion of the juvenile 
court’s hearing on the Department’s amended shelter care request, but ordered that the stay 
would expire as soon as the juvenile court entered an order resolving the new request.   
16 
 
again presented the child protective services worker as its only witness and introduced 
additional documentary evidence, including EMS records from the paramedics who 
responded to the December incident and medical records from O.P.’s stay in the NICU and 
three pediatric visits.  At the close of the Department’s case, the juvenile court denied the 
parents’ motion to dismiss the petition.  The parents testified on January 9.16   
On January 10, the juvenile court issued a second memorandum opinion and order 
denying the Department’s amended request for continued shelter care.17  Based on its 
findings, the court concluded that the Department had failed to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that O.P.’s injuries were (1) non-accidental; or (2) caused by abuse or 
neglect of the parents while he was in their custody or control.  The court also concluded 
that the Department failed to prove that the parents were guilty of neglect.  As the Court of 
Special Appeals’ stay automatically expired as soon as the juvenile court issued its opinion 
and order, the juvenile court ordered the immediate return of O.P. to the custody of his 
parents.   
Following the juvenile court’s decision, the Department and O.P. noted immediate 
appeals to the Court of Special Appeals and sought a stay of the juvenile court’s order 
 
16 A comprehensive summary of the evidence presented at the second de novo 
shelter care hearing, including the child protective services worker’s testimony, the 
contents of the EMS records and the NICU and pediatric medical records, and the 
testimony of the parents, appears in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals.  240 Md. 
App. at 539-41.   
17 A more complete description of the findings of fact contained in the juvenile 
court’s memorandum opinion and order is set forth in the opinion of the Court of Special 
Appeals.  240 Md. App. at 543-45.  
17 
 
pending appeal.  The intermediate appellate court denied that request and O.P. was returned 
to his parents.   
B. 
The Appeal 
The Court of Special Appeals expedited appeals by the Department and O.P.  On 
March 29, 2019, it affirmed the juvenile court’s judgment.  240 Md. App. 518 (2019).   
The intermediate appellate court first addressed two threshold questions.  It held 
that (1) the juvenile court’s December 27 order denying the Department’s petition for 
continued shelter care was moot because it was superseded by the court’s January 10 order, 
which reached the same result; and (2) the January 10 order denying the Department’s 
petition for continued shelter care was appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  240 
Md. App. at 551-57.   
As to the core issue in the case, the court held that a juvenile court must find the 
factors required by CJ §3-815(d) to continue shelter care by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Id. at 557-73.  The court stated that, while it disagreed with some of the juvenile 
court’s comments and while a reasonable fact finder could have also reached the opposite 
conclusion of the juvenile court under the applicable standard of proof, the juvenile court’s 
fact findings were not clearly erroneous and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion 
in the decision it reached based on those findings.  Id.   
The Department and O.P.’s counsel both petitioned this Court for a writ of 
certiorari.  Those petitions raised two issues:  (1) the appropriate standard of proof to be 
applied by a juvenile court to decide a petition to extend emergency shelter care; and (2) 
whether the juvenile court had abused its discretion in this case.  In response, the mother 
18 
 
filed a conditional cross petition also raising two issues:  (1) whether the juvenile court’s 
order denying continued shelter care was appealable; and, if so, (2) whether the appropriate 
standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence.   
We granted both the Department’s and O.P.’s petitions, as well as the mother’s 
conditional cross petition.   
C. 
 Proceedings in the Juvenile Court After the Court of Special Appeals Decision 
In the meantime, on April 8, 2019, after the Court of Special Appeals had issued its 
decision, the Department filed a third amended CINA petition in the juvenile court.  The 
Department reiterated the circumstances surrounding O.P.’s unexplained brain injury and 
cited concerns about his parents’ inability to keep up with pediatric appointments for O.P. 
and his brother,18 the conditions of the family home, and the parents’ general ability to care 
for O.P. and his brother in light of the parents’ respective histories of mental illness.  The 
Department requested that the court issue an order of shelter care and place O.P. in the 
Department’s custody.   
The juvenile court scheduled a hearing combining the adjudication and disposition 
stages for April 16.  In connection with the hearing, the Department filed a report 
documenting its regular visits to the family’s home since O.P.’s placement with his parents 
on January 10.  The Department reported that O.P. was doing well with his family and no 
longer called for removing O.P. from the home.  Instead, the Department recommended 
 
18 The Department also filed a CINA petition on behalf of O.P.’s brother, containing 
many of the same allegations, but that petition is not at issue in this appeal.  
19 
 
that the parents receive continued support services from the Department pursuant to an 
order of protective supervision, attend a parenting education program, submit to 
psychological evaluations, attend all medical appointments and follow all medical and 
developmental recommendations, and ensure that the home is a safe environment.   
At the adjudication phase of the hearing on April 16, the parents did not admit to 
the Department’s allegations in the third amended CINA petition, but conceded that the 
Department could produce sufficient evidence for the court to find the allegations to be 
true.  The juvenile court agreed.  At the disposition phase of the hearing, the parties reached 
an agreement that O.P. was a CINA based on neglect, but that he should remain with his 
parents.  On April 29, the juvenile court issued an order finding that O.P. was a CINA on 
the basis of neglect, and that the Department had made reasonable efforts to prevent O.P.’s 
placement in care by providing comprehensive services to the family.  The order directed 
that O.P. remain in the care and custody of his parents, but granted an Order of Protective 
Supervision and required that the parents comply with the Department’s recommendations.  
In addition, the court ordered that a Court Appointed Special Advocate be appointed.    
As a result of these developments, O.P has remained in the care of his parents, and 
the Department no longer requests that O.P. be placed in shelter care.    
III 
Discussion 
We granted the Department’s and O.P.’s petitions for certiorari and the mother’s 
conditional cross petition for certiorari to consider the following questions: (1) whether 
there is appellate jurisdiction of an appeal from an order denying a request for shelter care; 
20 
 
(2) what standard of proof a juvenile court is to apply in determining whether to authorize 
continued shelter care under CJ §3-815(d); and (3) whether the juvenile court made clearly 
erroneous findings of fact or abused its discretion in denying the Department’s petition for 
continued shelter care.   
As a preliminary issue, the mother has moved to dismiss this appeal as 
improvidently granted on grounds of mootness.  She argues that the Department’s 
agreement that O.P. remain with his parents, as well as the juvenile court’s order to that 
effect, have rendered this appeal moot.  Accordingly, we first address whether we should 
dismiss this appeal without reaching the merits.   
A. 
Whether this Appeal Should be Dismissed as Moot 
As indicated above, in April 2019, around the time that the Department and the 
mother filed their petitions with this Court, the parties reached a resolution of sorts:  the 
Department abandoned its request for an order of temporary shelter care, the parties agreed 
that O.P. was a CINA based on neglect but that O.P. should remain in the physical custody 
of his parents, and the juvenile court entered an order reflecting these developments.  As a 
result, the issues on which we granted writs of certiorari are, as to this case and these 
parties (at least for the moment), moot.  See Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 
561 (1986) (A case is moot if “there is no longer an existing controversy between the 
parties, so that there is no longer any effective remedy which the court can provide.”).   
21 
 
Although an appellate court typically dismisses a moot appeal without addressing 
its merits,19 there are several exceptions to the mootness doctrine.  Under one exception, 
even if a controversy no longer exists when the case is before the appellate court, the case 
will not be dismissed as moot if the controversy is “capable of repetition, yet evading 
review.”  State v. Parker, 334 Md. 576, 584-85 (1994).  An appellate court may justifiably 
decide an otherwise moot issue “if the public interest clearly will be hurt if the question is 
not immediately decided, if the matter involved is likely to recur frequently, and its 
recurrence will involve a relationship between government and its citizens, or a duty of 
government, and upon any recurrence, the same difficulty which prevented the appeal at 
hand from being heard in time is likely again to prevent a decision.”  Lloyd v. Board of 
Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43 (1954); see also Powell v. Department of Health, 
455 Md. 520, 539-41 (2017).  
The standard of proof used by a juvenile court in deciding whether to grant or deny 
continued shelter care during the pendency of a CINA proceeding is an issue of public 
importance that will undoubtedly recur, perhaps even with the parties to this appeal.  
Application of that standard of proof to the determinations required by CJ §3-815(d) will 
determine whether a juvenile court authorizes the Department to continue to provide shelter 
care outside of the family home to a child alleged to be a victim of abuse or neglect.  It is 
also important that juvenile courts in the State apply the same standard in making such 
 
19 There is, however, no constitutional bar to an appellate court expressing its views 
on a moot issue.  Mercy Hosp., 306 Md. at 562.  
22 
 
determinations.  Given that shelter care proceedings, and related hearings in the CINA case, 
are inevitably on a fast track, an appeal from a denial of shelter care will almost always be 
moot by the time the appellate court would render its decision on a disputed question of 
law.   
Accordingly, we decline to dismiss this appeal on that ground.  We will therefore 
address the issues presented by the parties as to whether a juvenile court’s order denying 
shelter care is appealable and, if so, what standard of proof is to be applied by a juvenile 
court in making that determination.  However, as there is no longer a controversy among 
the parties concerning the placement of O.P. in shelter care at this time, we need not decide 
whether the juvenile court made clearly erroneous findings of fact or abused its discretion 
in denying the Department’s petition for continued shelter care.   
B. 
Whether There is Appellate Jurisdiction  
In her cross-petition for a writ of certiorari, the mother20 raised another threshold 
question:  whether the juvenile court’s January 10 order denying the Department’s petition 
for continued shelter care is appealable.  
As a general rule, a party may appeal only from “a final judgment entered in a civil 
or criminal case by a circuit court.”  CJ §12-301.  There are, however, three exceptions to 
the requirement of a final judgment: (1) appeals from interlocutory orders specifically 
allowed by statute; (2) immediate appeals permitted when a circuit court enters final 
 
20 The father did not join this argument. 
23 
 
judgment under Maryland Rule 2-602(b);21 and (3) appeals from interlocutory rulings 
allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine.  Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 
615 (2005).   
There is no dispute that the juvenile court’s January 10 order denying continued 
shelter care is an interlocutory order in the context of the CINA case.  The order is therefore 
not appealable unless an exception to the final judgment requirement applies.  The 
Department has advanced two arguments for immediate appealability, one based on a 
statute that authorizes an interlocutory appeal of an order denying injunctive relief and the 
other based on the collateral order doctrine.  The Court of Special Appeals concluded that 
an order denying continued shelter care is appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  
240 Md. App. at 552-57.  We agree with the intermediate appellate court’s well-reasoned 
analysis and do not address the Department’s alternative statutory theory. 
 
An interlocutory order may be appealed under the collateral order doctrine if the 
order (1) conclusively determines (2) an important issue (3) separate from the merits of the 
action (4) that would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await entry of a final 
judgment.  Pittsburgh Corning Corp. v. James, 353 Md. 657, 661 (1999).  As the Court of 
Special Appeals observed, the first, second, and fourth elements of the collateral order 
doctrine are easily satisfied in this case. 
 
21 Under Maryland Rule 2-602(b), a circuit court may expressly find that “there is 
no just reason for delay” and may direct entry of a final judgment as to fewer than all of 
the claims or parties.   
24 
 
First, the disputed question at a shelter care hearing – whether continued temporary 
placement of the child outside the home is warranted pending adjudication of the CINA 
petition – is conclusively determined by a juvenile court order denying continued shelter 
care.   
Second, such an order undeniably resolves an important issue as the decision hinges 
on whether there is an emergency situation that requires temporary placement outside the 
home for the safety and welfare of the child.   
Fourth, shelter care is by definition temporary during the pendency of a CINA 
proceeding and intended to deal with a serious risk to the child’s safety and welfare during 
that period.  A decision denying continued shelter care would be effectively unreviewable 
if an appeal had to await a final judgment in the CINA case.   
As the Court of Special Appeals also recognized, the third element of the collateral 
order doctrine – whether the order resolves an issue that is separate from the merits of the 
action – presents the closest question.  The Court of Special Appeals carefully analyzed 
this element in relation to a denial of temporary shelter care.  We can do no better than 
adopt its analysis: 
A request for continuation of shelter care frequently 
accompanies a CINA petition, but it is neither a necessary step in a 
CINA proceeding nor does it constitute part of the CINA determination.  
Although the facts relevant to a determination of whether to authorize 
continued shelter care and whether a child is a CINA may substantially 
overlap, the issues in the two proceedings are fundamentally distinct.  
The core issue in a shelter care proceeding is whether there is an 
impending risk to the health and safety of a child – from whatever 
source and for whatever reason – if the child is returned home before 
the court can complete the disposition phase of a CINA proceeding.  
The resolution of that issue will determine where and with whom the 
25 
 
child will reside prior to the adjudication of the merits of the CINA 
petition.  The core issues in a CINA proceeding, by contrast, are (1) 
whether the child has been abused or neglected and whether his or her 
parents or guardians are unwilling or unable to care for him or her, and 
(2) if so, what plan the court will approve for permanency for the child 
subsequent to the adjudication and disposition of the CINA petition.   
 
The unique nature of shelter care proceedings informs our 
conclusion that an order denying continued shelter is completely 
separate from the merits of a CINA proceeding for purposes of the 
collateral order doctrine.  Because a hearing must be held on a petition 
for continued shelter [care] so soon after a local department places a 
child in emergency shelter care, the Rules of Evidence do not apply at 
the hearing.  As a result, as in this case, much of the evidence that is 
submitted can be based on hearsay that would be inadmissible in any 
subsequent proceeding.  The purpose of a shelter care hearing is thus 
not to gather evidence for either side to prove its ultimate case, nor is 
such a hearing a necessary step on the path to an adjudicatory hearing 
or disposition.  Instead, it is parallel to and separate from the 
proceedings that ultimately lead to the CINA decision.  That 
distinguishes the orders resulting from such proceedings from others 
that our appellate courts have found not to constitute appealable 
collateral orders. 
 
* 
 
* 
 
* 
 
Here, the shelter care determination is not a “step toward the 
final disposition” of a CINA proceeding.  Shelter care runs its course 
not in the path of the CINA adjudication, but collaterally, in its own 
lane, without advancing or hindering the final CINA decision.  That, 
combined with its conclusive resolution of an important issue that is 
effectively unreviewable on direct appeal, renders it among the narrow 
class of orders reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. 
 
240 Md. App. at 554-57 (citations omitted).22 
 
22 The Court of Special Appeals distinguished an order denying continued shelter 
care from other types of orders that this Court has found are not appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine.  See Harris v. State, 420 Md. 300, 320 (2011) (order granting 
discovery request for competency hearing is not appealable under collateral order doctrine 
because a competency hearing, although a distinct phase of a criminal trial, is not entirely 
separate from the trial but rather is a step toward final disposition of a prosecution); In re 
Samone H., 385 Md. 282, 316 n.13 (2005) (order denying a mother’s motion for an 
26 
 
In sum, we hold that the juvenile court’s order denying the Department’s request for 
continued shelter care is reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. 
C. 
The Standard of Proof for Authorizing Continued Shelter Care 
The central issue in this case is the standard of proof that a juvenile court is to apply 
in determining whether to authorize continued temporary shelter care.  The juvenile court 
applied a preponderance of the evidence standard, although it did not analyze the issue.23  
The Court of Special Appeals considered the question in some detail and, relying on this 
Court’s decision in Volodarsky v. Tarachanskaya, 397 Md. 291 (2007), concluded that it 
was appropriate to apply a preponderance standard of proof.  The intermediate appellate 
court indicated that, while the record of this case could have supported a conclusion that 
the Department met that burden, it would defer to the juvenile court’s assessment.   
The Department and O.P. both take the position that the juvenile court erred in 
applying a preponderance standard when it assessed whether the criteria in CJ §3-815(d) 
for continued shelter care were satisfied in this case.  The Department argues that the 
criteria in CJ §3-815(d) are not first-level fact findings to which a fact finder would apply 
a traditional burden of proof (which may be difficult to do based on the limited information 
 
independent evaluation in CINA proceeding is not appealable under collateral order 
doctrine because such evaluations are “not completely separate from the merits of the 
action”).   
23 The juvenile court quoted a passage from In re Priscilla B., 214 Md. App. 600, 
622 (2013), that describes the standard of proof specified by statute for an adjudicatory 
hearing in a CINA case.  That opinion did not discuss the standard of proof applicable at a 
shelter care hearing. 
27 
 
available at the outset of a CINA case) but rather the bases for determining the “best 
interests” of the child – a standard that all presumably agree should determine whether a 
child is placed in emergency shelter care while the CINA case is pending.  Counsel for 
O.P. argues in her brief for a hybrid standard of proof – i.e., that emergency shelter care 
may be continued if the Department proves by a preponderance the possibility of abuse or 
neglect of the child.  At oral argument, counsel rephrased that standard as one in which a 
court would look to whether there are “reasonable grounds” to find that the statutory 
criteria in CJ §3-815(d) for continued shelter care are satisfied.   
O.P.’s parents urge us to affirm the decision of the Court of Special Appeals, 
although the mother argues in the alternative that a higher standard of proof, such as clear 
and convincing evidence, should apply.   
We appreciate the distinction that the Department makes between whether evidence 
supports findings of first-level facts and whether those first-level facts satisfy a legal 
requirement, such as the criteria for continued shelter care.  Yet the question remains:  what 
level of confidence should a juvenile court have, based on the limited information available 
at the outset of a CINA case, to authorize the temporary removal of a child from the home 
due to an alleged emergency that puts the child’s safety and welfare at risk?  In our view, 
it is not inappropriate to express that level of confidence in the familiar language of a 
standard of proof. 
1. 
Statutory Construction 
This issue presents a question of law that we consider without deference to the 
decisions of the juvenile court or of the Court of Special Appeals.  To answer it, we must 
28 
 
construe the shelter care provision of the CINA statute.  As in any question of statutory 
interpretation, the goal is to discern and implement the intent of the Legislature.  That quest 
starts with the text of the particular provision within the context of the statutory scheme of 
which it is part.  Review of the legislative history of the provision may help confirm 
conclusions drawn from the text or resolve its ambiguities.  Prior case law concerning the 
provision or similar statutes, both in Maryland and other jurisdictions, may provide helpful 
guidance.  Finally, consideration of the consequences of alternative interpretations of the 
statute grounds the analysis.  See Blue v. Prince George’s County, 434 Md. 681, 689 (2013) 
(citing Town of Oxford v. Koste, 204 Md. App. 578, 585-86 (2012), aff’d, 431 Md. 14 
(2013)); State v. Thomas, 465 Md. 288, 301 (2019). 
2. 
The Text of the Shelter Care Provision in Context  
As previously indicated, CJ §3-815(d) provides that a juvenile court may authorize 
continued shelter care for a child up to an additional 30 days after the child is removed 
from the home “only if [it] finds” certain criteria: (1) that return of the child to his or her 
home is “contrary to the safety and welfare of the child”; and (2) either that (i) removal 
from the home is “necessary due to an alleged emergency situation and in order to provide 
for the safety of the child,” or that (ii) reasonable efforts were made but were unsuccessful 
to eliminate the need to remove the child from the home.  The text of CJ §3-815(d) does 
not specify a particular standard of proof.24  The pertinent Maryland Rule does not fill in 
 
24 In its analysis of the text of CJ §3-815(d), the Court of Special Appeals reasoned  
that the use of the verb “find” in that subsection implicitly established a preponderance 
standard of proof.  240 Md. App. at 563-65.  However, the verb “find” frequently appears 
in statute or rule in reference to findings made by standards of proof other than a 
29 
 
that gap.  See Maryland Rule 11-112.  Nor do the forms appended to Maryland Rules.  See 
Appendix to Maryland Rules, Form 912-P/CDSC, (“Petition for Continued Shelter Care or 
Detention”); Form 912-O/CDSC (“Order to Continued Shelter Care or Detention”).  
Statutory silence may seem at first frustrating, but in context it may be telling.  
Related provisions of the statute do state standards of proof or levels of confidence.  The 
standard of proof to be applied at a hearing on the temporary continuation of emergency 
shelter care must make sense in that context. 
The statutory provisions that authorize a local department or law enforcement 
officer to remove a child from the home and place the child in emergency shelter care in 
an emergency situation when the child is believed to be in serious, immediate danger use 
phrases such as “probable cause,”25 “reasonable grounds,”26 and “reasonable under the 
circumstances.”27  The CINA statute also specifies a standard of proof when the juvenile 
court holds a more formal hearing on the allegations of the CINA petition, and makes 
 
preponderance.  See, e.g., Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article, §11-110(c) (court 
may order individual to give blood sample if it “finds” probable cause that a particular 
event occurred); Maryland Code, Public Safety Article, §5-604(a)(4) (authorizing referral 
of individual for emergency mental health evaluation if court ”finds” probable cause that 
criteria are satisfied); Maryland Code, Family Law Article, §4-505(a)(1) (court may enter 
temporary protective order, including award of temporary custody of child, if it “finds” 
reasonable grounds to believe that criteria are met).  In our view, the use of the verb “find” 
alone does not necessarily indicate a particular standard of proof.  As explained later in this 
opinion, other language of a particular statute and the context in which the court “finds” 
something determine the standard of proof. 
25 FL §5-709(a). 
26 CJ §3-814(a)(3).  
27 CJ §3-815(b)(3)(i)2.  
30 
 
findings related to any request for continued shelter care beyond 30 days, at the 
adjudicatory hearing.  That standard is preponderance of the evidence.28   
The hearing on the request to continue emergency shelter care is a relatively 
informal hearing that is to take place almost immediately after the child is first removed 
from the home on the basis of an alleged emergency that poses a serious danger to the 
child’s safety.  It relates to the interim period, limited to 30 days, between the emergency 
placement of the child in shelter care and the adjudicatory hearing.  It is an opportunity for 
the parents, or other guardian, to contest the basis for the temporary placement of the child 
in shelter care before a neutral arbiter – the juvenile court – but it is clearly not intended to 
be a premature trial of the allegations in the CINA petition.  It makes little sense to permit 
initial placement of a child in shelter care when it is reasonable under the circumstances 
due to an alleged emergency, and then require proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
the next day or shortly thereafter.  It seems fair to conclude that it should not be governed 
by the same standard of proof as at the later adjudicatory hearing. 
3. 
Legislative History 
 
The Maryland CINA Statute and its Relation to Federal Law 
The legislative history of the statutes governing shelter care proceedings is 
informative, although the legislation creating what is now referred to as a shelter care 
hearing and limiting a shelter care order to 30 days was enacted before the General 
Assembly consistently preserved bill files.   
 
28 CJ §3-817(c).   
31 
 
 
In 1969, the General Assembly enacted a comprehensive revision of the statutes 
relating to juvenile causes, which were then part of former Article 26 of the Maryland 
Code.  Chapter 432, Laws of Maryland 1969.  That law concerned cases involving children 
alleged to be delinquent, neglected, or in need of supervision.  When a child placed in 
detention or shelter care was not immediately released, that law required that a petition be 
filed, to be followed by a prompt hearing on whether the detention or shelter care should 
continue.  Maryland Code, Article 26, §70-13 (1966 Repl. Vol., 1970 Supp.).  With respect 
to adjudicatory hearings, the law specified that, while a delinquency petition required proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, other petitions need be proven only by a preponderance.  
Article 26, §70-18.  The criteria for placing a child in shelter care were similar to, although 
not precisely the same as, those that appear in CJ §3-815 today.29 
 
29 The statute provided: 
A child taken into custody shall not be placed in detention or shelter 
care prior to a hearing on the petition unless: 
(1)  The care is required to protect the person or property of others or 
of the child; 
(2)  The child is likely to leave the jurisdiction of the court; 
(3)  He has no parents, guardian, or custodian or other person able to 
provide supervision and care for him and return him to the court when 
required; or 
(4) an order for detention or shelter care has been made by the court 
pursuant to the provisions of this subtitle. 
Article 26, §70-11 (1966 Repl. Vol., 1970 Supp.). 
32 
 
Court rules adopted to coordinate with the 1969 legislation limited the duration of 
shelter care pending an adjudicatory hearing to 30 days.  Maryland Rule 909 (1971 Repl. 
Vol.).  With respect to the adjudicatory hearing, another rule provided that the rules of 
evidence would apply at that hearing and limited the duration of shelter care after the 
hearing to an additional 30 days.  Maryland Rule 912(c), (d)(2) (1971 Repl. Vol.).  
In 1973, the juvenile causes act was re-codified as Title 3, subtitle 8 of the new 
Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article.  Chapter 2, Extraordinary Special Session, Laws of 
Maryland 1973.  In 1975, that law was revised once again to incorporate another juvenile 
causes statute that had applied only in Montgomery County.  Chapter 554, Laws of 
Maryland 1975.30   
 
The criteria for placing and continuing a child in shelter care that appear in the 
statute today were the product of amendments made to the statute in 1992.  Chapter 173, 
Laws of Maryland 1992.  In that legislation, the General Assembly set forth the criteria 
(that now appear in CJ §3-815(b)) for a local department to place a child alleged to be a 
CINA in emergency shelter care.  That legislation also included a requirement that, when 
authorizing continued temporary shelter care after a hearing, the juvenile court make the 
 
30 A comprehensive 62-page memorandum by Alan M. Wilner, then the Governor’s 
chief legislative officer and later a judge of this Court, appears in the bill file for the cross-
filed Senate Bill related to that legislation and provides a detailed explanation of the various 
provisions of the juvenile causes act.  Unfortunately for our purposes, like the statute at 
that time, it focuses primarily on issues related to delinquency cases and does not discuss 
a standard of proof for a decision on temporary emergency shelter care. 
33 
 
findings that now appear in CJ §3-815(d).31  These amendments were intended to ensure 
that such determinations complied with the requirements of federal law – Title IV-E of the 
Social Security Act – so that the State remained eligible for federal funds related to foster 
care.  See Floor Report of Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee for House Bill 629 
(1992); Fiscal Note for House Bill 629 (February 10, 1992). 
 
In 2001, the Legislature separated CINA proceedings, including those related to 
shelter care, from other juvenile causes – e.g., detention proceedings in delinquency cases.  
Chapter 415, Laws of Maryland 2001; see CJ §3-801 et seq. (statutory provisions related 
to CINA cases); CJ §3-8A-01 et seq. (statutory provisions related to juvenile causes other 
than CINA cases). 
 
Federal Law on Findings for Temporary Shelter Care  
 
As indicated above, the findings required by CJ §3-815(d) for a 30-day continuation 
of emergency shelter care following the child’s initial placement derive in large measure 
from a federal law that sets conditions on payments to states to support foster care.  In 
particular, federal regulations require that, in the first state court ruling pertaining to a 
child’s removal from the home, the court must determine either that remaining in the home 
would be contrary to the child’s welfare or that shelter care placement is in the child’s best 
interest.  45 CFR §1356.21(c).  There must also be a judicial determination, within 60 days 
of the child’s removal, that the state has made “reasonable efforts” to maintain the child in 
 
31 In the 1992 legislation, what are now subsections (b) and (d) of CJ §3-815 
appeared in subsections (c) and (f), respectively.  They were re-codified in their current 
location in 2001.  Chapter 415, Laws of Maryland 2001. 
34 
 
the home and prevent unnecessary removal, although the regulations also specify that, in 
making that determination, “the child’s health and safety must be the paramount concern.”  
45 CFR §1356.21(b). 
While federal law was the driving force for the inclusion of the required findings in 
CJ §3-815(d), it does not require that the findings be made by any particular process or 
standard of proof.  See 65 Fed. Reg. 4022, 4029 (Jan. 25, 2000) (explaining that certain 
requirements for state hearing procedures were eliminated from proposed federal 
regulations).  As a result, states have developed a variety of different procedures for 
deciding whether those criteria are met for emergency shelter care in CINA cases. 
Standards of Proof Applied in Other States 
 
Most states have adopted a “probable cause,” “reasonable cause,” or similar 
standard for the findings needed to maintain a child in temporary shelter care outside the 
home pending adjudication of a CINA petition.32  A minority of states have adopted a 
 
32 See, e.g., Alaska Statutes, §47.10.142 and Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rule 10 
(“probable cause” standard applies at temporary custody hearing to be held within 48 hours 
of initial placement); Arizona Revised Statutes, §8-821 and Juvenile Court Rule 51 
(“probable cause” standard to be applied at juvenile court review hearing to continue 
temporary custody); Delaware Family Court Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 226 (“probable 
cause” standard to be applied to determine temporary custody pending adjudicatory 
hearing); Florida Statutes, §39.402(8)(d) (“probable cause” standard to be applied by court 
to continue shelter care); Georgia Code, §15-11-414(b) (“probable cause” standard for 
continuation of temporary custody); Hawaii Revised Statutes, §587A-26(c)(2) 
(“reasonable cause” standard to be applied to continue temporary foster care); Louisiana 
Children’s Code, Article 626(A) (“reasonable grounds” standard for continuation of child 
in custody pending adjudicatory hearing); Minnesota Statutes, §260C.178(c) (protective 
care of child to be continued if there is “reason to believe” that child’s health or welfare 
would be immediately endangered if returned home); South Carolina Code, §63-7-710(C) 
(“probable cause” standard for emergency protective custody to be applied at probable 
cause hearing); New Hampshire Revised Statutes, §169-C:15 (“reasonable cause” standard 
35 
 
preponderance standard.33  A few states have adopted what appear to be hybrid standards 
that are less than a strict preponderance standard.34   
 
Of course, in construing a Maryland statute we do not simply take a poll of other 
states.  However, the decisions made by lawmakers in other states as to what standard of 
proof to apply for the findings required to continue temporary shelter care is indicative of 
the nature of the decision being made by a Maryland court when it decides whether to 
continue temporary emergency shelter care by making those findings.  And the nature of 
that decision helps inform our interpretation of legislative silence. 
4. 
The Volodarsky Case  
 
In arguing for a preponderance – or higher – standard of proof, the mother relies on 
Volodarsky v. Tarachanskaya, 397 Md. 291 (2007), as did the Court of Special Appeals.  
 
applied at preliminary hearing after child is removed from home); Revised Code of 
Washington, §13.34.065 (“reasonable cause” standard applied at shelter care hearing 
within 72 hours of removal of child from home).   
 
Other states that have adopted similar standards include California, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Tennessee, as well as the District of 
Columbia. 
 
33 See, e.g., Maine Revised Statutes, §4034(2); Utah Code, §§78A-6-306(9), 78A-
6-311(1); 33 Vermont Statutes, §5307(a).   
34 See, e.g., Arkansas Code, §9-27-315 (court may grant continuation of emergency 
custody order at “probable cause hearing” if it finds “by a preponderance of evidence that 
probable cause exists” to protect the child); Kentucky Revised Statutes, §620.080(2) (court 
is to issue order for temporary removal if it finds “by a preponderance of the evidence” that 
“there are reasonable grounds to believe” child would be abused or neglected if returned 
to or left at home). 
36 
 
Volodarsky did not concern a temporary continuation of shelter care, but rather the 
resolution of a custody dispute.   
 
In that case, the parents, who had conceived a child during an extra-marital affair, 
were engaged in a long-running dispute over custody of that child.  The controversy 
involved competing charges of neglect, physical abuse, and sexual abuse of the child that 
resulted in numerous proceedings recounted at some length in this Court’s opinion.  The 
pertinent statute – FL §9-101 – provides that, if a court has “reasonable grounds to believe” 
that a child has been abused or neglected, it is to determine whether the abuse or neglect is 
“likely to continue” if custody or visitation is awarded to the parent accused of that conduct.  
FL §9-101(a).  The statute further provides that “[u]nless the court specifically finds that 
there is no likelihood” of further abuse or neglect, the court is to deny custody or visitation 
to that party.  FL §9-101(b). 
 
Over the six years of the dispute, the circuit court had issued various orders 
governing custody and visitation and dealt with protective orders sought by the parents 
against each other.  The circuit court ultimately conducted a six-day trial and issued a 28-
page opinion to resolve the charges of abuse and neglect.  In that opinion, the circuit court 
stated that it was not persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that the mother’s 
allegations of sexual abuse against the father were true.  397 Md. at 302.  On appeal, the 
Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the Circuit Court had applied too strict a 
standard of proof and that the use of the phrase “reasonable grounds” in FL §9-101 
indicated a lesser standard of proof.  Id. at 303. 
37 
 
 
This Court reversed the decision of the intermediate appellate court.  The Court 
concluded that, despite the use of the phrase “reasonable grounds,” this statute required 
proof of abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the evidence to deny custody and visitation 
to a parent.  The Court looked beyond the isolated phrase “reasonable grounds” to the entire 
text of the statute.35  It noted that a requirement in subsection (b) of the statute that a court 
find “no likelihood of further abuse or neglect” implied that a court’s finding under 
subsection (a) of the statute that there were reasonable grounds to believe that abuse or 
neglect had occurred necessarily was a conclusion that something had “more likely 
occurred than not.”  Id. at 304-6. 
 
In addition, the Court noted that the fact findings of the circuit court in the case 
before it were based on the circuit court’s evaluation in a comprehensive opinion of 
conflicting testimonial evidence of the parties and their experts during the six-day trial.  
The Court contrasted that decision with the sort of “preliminary determination,” often 
 
35 FL §9-101 provided: 
(a) In any custody or visitation proceeding, if the court has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a child has been abused or neglected by a party to the 
proceeding, the court shall determine whether abuse or neglect is likely to 
occur if custody or visitation rights are granted to the party. 
 
(b) Unless the court specifically finds that there is no likelihood of 
further child abuse or neglect by the party, the court shall deny custody or 
visitation rights to that party, except that the court may approve a supervised 
visitation arrangement that assures the safety and the physiological, 
psychological, and emotional well-being of the child. 
The statute is unchanged since the Volodarsky decision. 
 
38 
 
based on hearsay in an ex parte proceeding, made by a magistrate considering whether 
there was probable cause to issue an arrest or search warrant.  Id. at 306-7.  The custody 
decision in Volodarsky was not a temporary or preliminary decision that was adjunct to 
some other proceeding that would settle the rights of the parties – it was the adjudication 
of the right to custody of the child. 
 
In its discussion of the appropriate burden of proof, the Court in Volodarsky looked 
to the Supreme Court’s discussion of standards of proof in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418 (1979).  That case concerned the standard of proof to be applied by a jury in the trial 
of a complaint seeking the involuntary commitment of an individual to a mental health 
facility for an indefinite period.  The issue in Addington did not involve a proceeding to 
make a preliminary or temporary decision pending adjudication of an issue – as in 
Volodarsky, the trial in Addington was the adjudication of the issue.36  Unsurprisingly, the 
Supreme Court discussed only three standards of proof – beyond a reasonable doubt, clear 
and convincing, and preponderance – the standards generally applicable in trials of cases.37  
It noted that the selection of one of those standards related, among other things, to “the 
relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.”  441 U.S. at 423 (emphasis added). 
 
36 The defendant in that case had previously been committed temporarily, at the 
behest of his mother, on seven occasions.  441 U.S. at 420.  The standard of proof for a 
temporary commitment was not at issue in Addington. 
37 The Texas courts, at various levels, had applied all three standards for a trial of 
an indefinite involuntary commitment case, with the Texas Supreme Court ultimately 
opting for a preponderance standard.  See State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563 (1977).  The 
United States Supreme Court held that due process required that the jury apply a higher 
standard of proof, such as clear and convincing.   
39 
 
A few months after the Volodarsky decision, this Court was called upon to construe 
another statute that also employed the phrase “reasonable grounds to believe.”  Motor 
Vehicle Administration v. Shepard, 399 Md. 241 (2007).  In that case, the phrase appeared 
in Maryland Code, Transportation Article (“TR”), §16-105.1, which concerns the 
circumstances under which a police officer may ask a motorist suspected of drunk driving 
to take a blood alcohol test.  Again, the Court did not focus on the phrase in isolation, but 
looked to the context in which it appeared.  Observing that the phrase was used in relation 
to a “preliminary determination based on incomplete and often non-testimonial hearsay 
evidence,” the Court concluded that the phrase – at least in the context of TR §16-105.1 – 
did not equate to a preponderance standard and, indeed, denoted a standard less than 
probable cause.  399 Md. at 258-59.38   
 
In many circumstances, the phrase “reasonable grounds” has been understood to 
refer to a standard somewhere between the preponderance standard articulated in 
Volodarsky and the standard less than probable cause stated in Shepard.  In fact, it has often 
been used essentially as a synonym for probable cause.  See Stevenson v. State, 287 Md. 
504, 516 (1980) (characterizing “reasonable grounds” and “probable cause” as “substantial 
equivalents” in the standard for a lawful arrest); Black’s Law Dictionary, Probable Cause 
 
38 The concurring opinion joined by two judges also rejected the contention that a 
preponderance standard was applicable, but would simply have assessed whether the 
officer’s action was reasonable under the circumstances and found it unnecessary to 
compare it to a probable cause standard.  399 Md. at 266-67 (Eldridge, J., concurring). 
40 
 
(9th ed. 2009) at 1321 (defining “probable cause” as a “reasonable ground” to believe that 
a person has committed a crime). 
The determination made at a hearing to temporarily continue shelter care appears to 
lie somewhere on the continuum between the determination at issue in Volodarsky and the 
determination at issue in Shepard.  The shelter care hearing takes place a day or two after 
the child is placed in shelter care due to an alleged emergency situation in which the child’s 
safety and welfare is alleged to be at risk.  It is a preliminary determination based on 
incomplete and often non-testimonial hearsay evidence.  It is not the adjudication of the 
ultimate decision as in Volodarsky.  On the other hand, it is not simply, as in Shepard, a 
review of a law enforcement officer’s conclusion that “reasonable grounds” existed, but an 
independent judicial determination. 
5. 
The Preliminary and Temporary Shelter Care Decision 
To place the shelter care hearing at its appropriate place along the continuum, it is 
useful to ask:  What are the consequences of the juvenile court’s decision at a shelter care 
hearing?  How does that decision relate to what comes before and after in the CINA 
proceeding?   
At the shelter care hearing, the juvenile court is not determining whether the 
allegations of abuse or neglect in the CINA petition are true; that happens later at the 
adjudicatory hearing in the CINA case.  Rather, the inquiry focuses on whether a return to 
the home is contrary to the child’s immediate safety and whether removal from the home 
is necessary to protect the child because of the alleged emergency.  A shelter care hearing 
conducted under CJ §3-815(d) is, in the general scheme of the statute, an initial preliminary 
41 
 
judicial consideration of the issue.  It might be characterized as the second stage of a three-
stage process.   
In the initial stage, a shelter care proceeding begins when a local department 
determines that a child is in “serious immediate danger,” also finds that the other criteria 
for emergency shelter care exist, and places the child in emergency shelter care.  CJ 3-
815(a)-(b).  The court is not involved at this stage. 
That initial stage is followed, more or less immediately, by a second stage.  The 
local department files a petition seeking to continue emergency shelter care for a period of 
up to 30 days and the juvenile court holds a prompt hearing to determine whether the 
criteria in CJ §3-815(d) – which are similar to the criteria the local department applied at 
the initial stage – are met.  This hearing is ordinarily to be held the day after a child is 
removed from the home.  At this point, the local department likely has not yet had the 
chance to conduct a complete investigation.  As the Court of Special Appeals aptly 
described the situation: “Information is often unavoidably scarce, facts are often 
developing and disconcertingly unclear, [and] the law requires immediate action.”  240 
Md. App. at 532.   
Other than requiring a hearing and specifying that the rules of evidence do not apply, 
the statute and rule do not elaborate on the parameters of the hearing, including a standard 
of proof for any findings.  However, a decision made at that hearing to continue shelter 
care establishes a 30-day deadline for holding the adjudicatory hearing in the CINA case.  
Maryland Rule 11-114(b).   
Shelter care is only meant to provide interim protection for a 
42 
 
child pending further proceedings in the CINA case and is, by definition, temporary.  CJ 
§3-801(bb).   
The third stage of the temporary shelter care process is the adjudicatory hearing in 
the CINA case.  If the local department seeks to extend shelter care beyond an initial 30 
days, it can obtain an extension for an additional 30 days only if the necessary findings are 
made at the adjudication hearing in the CINA case.  Based on its findings at that hearing, 
a juvenile court may commit the child to the custody of someone other than the parent, 
whether that be a relative, the local department, or some other person.  CJ §§3-817(c), 3-
819(b).  This deprivation of parental rights is necessarily of a greater magnitude than the 
temporary deprivation of custody that results from the initial order of shelter care.  At that 
hearing, the rules of evidence do apply, and the juvenile court is required by statute to make 
any findings using a preponderance standard.  CJ §§3-815(c)(4), (d), 3-817.   
The silence in CJ §3-815(d) as to a standard of proof at the second stage contrasts 
with the express statement in CJ §3-817(c) that a preponderance standard applies at the 
third, or adjudication, stage.  Given the relationship of the two proceedings, the implication 
is that the preponderance standard does not apply at the earlier proceeding. 
If the preponderance standard does not apply, what standard of proof should apply? 
It would be illogical to require that the criteria for continued shelter care be demonstrated 
by a clear and convincing standard of proof at the preliminary second stage of shelter care 
proceedings, when a preponderance standard applies at a later stage after the parties have 
had additional time to marshal support for their respective positions and where the hearing 
is conducted under the rules of evidence. 
43 
 
An analogy might be drawn to the arrest and pretrial detention of a defendant in a 
criminal case – which results in a serious deprivation of individual liberty, but one that is 
preliminary and temporary pending fuller adjudication.  Arrest and detention in a criminal 
case can also be envisioned as part of a three-stage process with different, though related, 
determinations made at each stage.  First, an individual may be arrested if there is probable 
cause that the individual committed a crime.  See, e.g., Maryland Code, Criminal 
Procedure, §2-202 (authority of police officer to arrest person if officer has “probable cause 
to believe” that crime is being or has been committed).39 
There is then, almost immediately, a second stage at which the defendant appears 
before a judicial officer who determines whether the defendant is to remain detained.  If 
the defendant was arrested without a warrant, the judicial officer first determines whether 
was there was “probable cause” to support the arrest.  Maryland Rule 4-216.  In 
determining whether the defendant should remain detained, the judicial officer is to assess 
whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” either that the defendant will not appear when 
required or “will be a danger to an alleged victim, another person, or the community.”  
Maryland Rule 4-216.1(b)(1).  That determination is immediately revisited under the same 
standard by a judge at an adversary hearing at which the defendant is represented by 
counsel, but which is not conducted under the rules of evidence.  Maryland Rules 4-216.2, 
 
39 A private citizen has authority under the common law to make an arrest in more 
limited circumstances, but the standard remains “probable cause” or “reasonable grounds” 
to believe that a felony has been committed or that a felony or misdemeanor is being 
committed in the arrester’s presence.  Stevenson v. State, 287 Md. 504, 511-21 (1980). 
44 
 
5-101(b)(6).  There may also follow a preliminary hearing, adversarial in nature although 
not conducted under the rules of evidence, at which the “probable cause” and “reasonable 
likelihood” standards apply.  Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”), §4-103; 
Maryland Rule 4-221.  Like the juvenile court at the second stage of the shelter care 
process, the judge at a detention hearing or preliminary hearing must weigh the serious 
restraint on individual liberty against the risks to the safety and welfare of others 
preliminarily and without a full adjudication of the facts. 
What might be thought of as the third stage of the criminal proceeding is the 
adjudication of whether the defendant in fact committed the crime alleged.  That 
adjudication is conducted under a higher standard of proof – proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt – and the rules of evidence apply.  A defendant who has been detained pretrial will 
only remain in custody if the fact finder determines that the elements of the criminal charge 
are proved by that standard of proof.40  Thus, similar to the requirement that the duration 
of shelter care be limited pending an adjudication hearing at which a higher standard of 
proof applies, the temporary initial detention of a defendant in a criminal case is based on 
a lower standard of proof pending a more formal adjudication with a higher standard of 
proof.41 
 
40 Of course, in a particular case, a defendant may be released from custody and not 
sentenced to imprisonment, even if convicted.  But if the charge is not proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the defendant will no longer be detained. 
41 The criminal process outlined in the text applies, of course, to cases involving 
charges of criminal child abuse or neglect.  A parent charged with criminal child abuse or 
child neglect under Maryland Code, Criminal Law, §§3-601, 3-602.1 could be arrested 
under the “probable cause” standard concerning commission of the offense and detained 
45 
 
Thus, the criminal law contemplates a temporary but serious restraint on individual 
liberty based on a standard of proof not only less than what is required in the adjudicatory 
phase of that proceeding, but also less than a preponderance of evidence. 
6. 
Summary  
As the Court of Special Appeals observed, “this case presents a clash of competing 
interests of the highest order—the State’s parens patriae interest in protecting children 
from harm and the fundamental liberty interest of parents in raising their children.”  240 
Md. App. at 565.  The standard of proof in such a proceeding is but one component in a 
decision that, along with sentencing in criminal cases, is the most difficult that those on the 
front lines of the judiciary must make.  It is no accident that, in illustrating the decision 
making of a wise judge, the scriptures tell the story not of an appellate judge, but of a trial 
judge in a child custody case.42    
An order to continue emergency shelter care as a result of a shelter care hearing is 
preliminary and temporary.  The hearing happens at the very outset of the CINA case, when 
the parties may still be marshalling evidence.  It is conducted informally and immediately 
to deal with a perceived emergency situation.  Any shelter care order resulting from that 
 
under the “reasonable likelihood” standard concerning risk to the child, pending 
adjudication of those charges under the standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
In making this observation, we do not suggest that every CINA case involving 
allegations of parental abuse or neglect of a child is worthy of criminal prosecution.  In 
particular, we are not expressing an opinion on whether such charges would pertain to 
O.P.’s parents. 
42 1 Kings 3:16-28 (Solomon and the two mothers). 
46 
 
hearing lasts for no more than 30 days and may accelerate the timing of an adjudicatory 
hearing.  In similar contexts, the law generally allows for decisions to be based on standards 
such as probable cause, reasonable grounds, or reasonable likelihood.  Such a standard is 
applied for similar preliminary temporary orders in CINA cases in most states that have 
expressed a standard of proof in statute.  It is the adjudicatory hearing, which happens 
within 30 days of the initial shelter care order, that is the full evidentiary hearing in a CINA 
case.  By the time of that hearing, the local department presumably has time to investigate 
the facts more fully, and the parents have time to prepare a defense.  The rules of evidence 
apply, and the juvenile court is expressly tasked with assessing whether the local 
department has met its burden of proving allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.   
We decline to read a requirement of proof by a preponderance of the evidence into 
the text of the shelter care statute.  Based on the strong interest in protecting the child’s 
best interests at the shelter care stage of a CINA case, coupled with the fact that the 
deprivation of parental rights at the shelter care phase is temporary, pending further 
adjudication of the CINA petition, we conclude that reasonable grounds is the appropriate 
standard for a juvenile court to apply.43  Accordingly, a juvenile court may continue 
temporary shelter care for a child alleged to face a serious immediate risk as a result of an 
 
43 At oral argument, the mother asserted that a reasonable grounds standard, or any 
similar standard less than a preponderance, for authorizing temporary continued shelter 
care would be unconstitutional as violative of the due process rights of parents.  It is true 
that such an order implicates a constitutional right of the parents to raise their child, but for 
the reasons explained in the text of this opinion, that right is not unlimited and, in our view, 
a reasonable grounds standard best accommodates the parents’ rights with the need to 
ensure the safety and welfare of a child. 
47 
 
emergency situation if the court has reasonable grounds to find the criteria in CJ §3-815(d) 
are satisfied.  
IV 
Conclusion 
For the reasons explained above, we hold that a juvenile court may continue 
temporary emergency shelter if it has reasonable grounds to find that (1) return of the child 
to the child’s home is contrary to the safety and welfare of the child; and (2) either (i) 
removal from the home is necessary due to an alleged emergency situation and in order to 
provide for the safety of the child, or (ii) reasonable efforts were made but were 
unsuccessful to eliminate the need to remove the child from the home.  Any continuation 
of shelter care beyond 30 days must be based upon findings made applying a 
preponderance of evidence standard at the adjudicatory stage of the CINA case. 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED 
IN PART.  COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS.