Case Title: CALVIN WEST V JIM REEVES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 121003

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 22, 2003  
CALVIN WEST and MARGO ANN WEST, 
Jointly and Severally, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees 
and Cross-Appellants, 
v 
No. 121003  
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, RANDY 
KOYAL, KEVIN SPARKS and JOHN TATE, 
Jointly and Severally, 
Defendants-Appellants 
and Cross-Appellees, 
and  
JIM REEVES, 
Defendant.  
PER CURIAM  
The circuit court granted defendant General Motors’  
motion for summary disposition and dismissed plaintiff’s1  
complaint, which alleged a count under the Whistleblowers’  
Protection Act, MCL 15.361 et seq., and counts of assault and  
1 Plaintiff Margo Ann West’s derivative claim is for loss 
of consortium.  For ease of reference, in this opinion we 
refer to plaintiff in the singular.  
 
battery, wrongful discharge, race discrimination, retaliation  
for reporting acts of discrimination, and loss of consortium.  
The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s  
whistleblower count and affirmed the remainder of the circuit  
court’s ruling.  
Defendant2 seeks to appeal the part of the Court of  
Appeals decision reinstating plaintiff’s whistleblower count,  
while plaintiff seeks to cross-appeal the part of the Court of  
Appeals decision that affirmed the dismissal of the balance of  
his complaint.  Because plaintiff failed to come forward with  
evidence supporting the causation element of his whistleblower  
claim, we reverse that aspect of the Court of Appeals decision  
and reinstate the circuit court’s order of summary disposition  
in favor of defendant.  We have also considered plaintiff’s  
application for leave to cross-appeal, and that application is  
denied because we find no merit in the issues raised by  
plaintiff.  
I  
Plaintiff Calvin West worked as a maintenance supervisor  
for defendant General Motors.  He was a salaried employee and  
was responsible for completing his own time sheet.  Plaintiff  
was warned several times in 1996 and in February 1997 about  
2 Defendant General Motors is the only defendant involved 
in this appeal.  
2  
 
  
misrepresenting the time he actually worked.  Nevertheless,  
plaintiff reported four extra hours of overtime on his time  
sheet for May 22, 1997.  His supervisors learned of this  
overstatement and, after an investigation, plaintiff was  
disciplined on June 4, 1997.  Plaintiff was prohibited from  
working any overtime, and he was required to use the salaried­
employee entrance and to “swipe” his identification badge at  
the entrance each time he entered or left the plant.  In  
addition, plaintiff was advised, orally and in writing, that  
reporting time that was not actually worked constituted  
fraudulent conduct and could result in termination of his  
employment.  
Effective August 11, 1997, plaintiff was transferred from  
the morning shift to the afternoon shift.3 
Plaintiff  
accordingly worked for different supervisors.  In September  
1997 plaintiff was again allowed to work overtime.  On October  
16, 1997, plaintiff reported two hours of overtime that he did  
not work.  An investigation of this incident led to the  
termination of plaintiff’s employment on January 8, 1998,  
because of plaintiff’s repeated violations of the employer’s  
3  According to defendant, plaintiff was transferred to 
the afternoon shift because the morning shift required a 
maintenance supervisor who could work overtime.  
3  
 
 
 
policies for reporting time worked.4  
While plaintiff was still working on the morning shift,  
an incident occurred on May 4, 1997, involving a union  
committee person named Jim Reeves.  Plaintiff entered a room  
where Reeves and others were in conference.  When plaintiff  
did not leave the room as Reeves ordered, there was physical  
contact between plaintiff and Reeves.  Plaintiff claims that  
he was shoved by Reeves; Reeves claims that when he stood up  
from his desk his stomach brushed plaintiff.  
Plaintiff reported to plant security that Reeves had  
assaulted him.  In addition, plaintiff claims he telephoned  
the Romulus police and reported the assault.5  Plaintiff also  
asserts that he advised his immediate supervisor, Randall  
Koyal, and his area supervisor, John Tate, that he had  
reported the assault to the police.  Plaintiff characterized  
Koyal’s response to being told about the report to the police  
4 Plaintiff initially acknowledged that he had not worked 
the overtime on October 16, but said he had worked it the next 
day.  Later, he asserted that he actually worked the overtime 
hours that he reported on October 16 on that date. However, 
his supervisor stated that plaintiff left after completing an 
eight hour shift and did not return.  In addition, no one else 
saw plaintiff during the two hours at issue.  
5  According to plaintiff, the police told him to file a 
written complaint.  Plaintiff never filed such a complaint, 
nor did he otherwise follow up with the police.  
4  
 
 
 
as “nonchalant.”6  Plaintiff said that he could not discern  
Tate’s response upon learning that plaintiff had contacted the  
police, but Tate seemed to be upset that the incident between  
plaintiff and Reeves had occurred.7  
In his complaint, plaintiff claimed that his rights under  
the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act were violated because he  
was retaliated against and discriminated against for reporting  
the Reeves assault to the police.  Plaintiff’s complaint  
alleged that after the report, both Tate and Koyal treated him  
differently and retaliated by, among other things, unfairly  
accusing him of time-sheet violations, transferring him to a  
different shift, and terminating his employment.  The circuit  
court granted defendant summary disposition regarding this  
count, reasoning that plaintiff did not establish a prima  
facie case because he failed to present evidence of a causal  
connection between his report to the Romulus police and any  
adverse employment action.8  The circuit court also concluded  
6 Koyal testified at his deposition that he did not learn 
that plaintiff called the police until he received notice of 
this lawsuit.  
7 At his deposition, Tate recalled plaintiff being upset 
about the incident with Reeves, but Tate was not asked about 
whether plaintiff said anything about making a report to the 
police.  
8  The adverse employment actions specifically discussed 
by the circuit court were (1) the “overtime restriction” 
imposed in June 1997, (2) the transfer to the afternoon shift, 
and (3) the decision to terminate employment.  
5  
  
that, even if plaintiff had established a prima facie case,  
the employer had shown a legitimate reason for its actions.  
The Court of Appeals found that a factual issue existed  
regarding whether there was a causal connection between  
plaintiff’s telephone call to the Romulus police and the  
subsequent adverse employment actions.  The Court accordingly  
reversed the summary-disposition order and remanded the case  
for further proceedings on plaintiff’s whistleblower count.  
The Court of Appeals did not address the circuit court’s  
finding that there were legitimate reasons for the employment  
actions.  
II  
Defendants’ summary-disposition motion regarding the  
whistleblower claim was brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no  
genuine issue of material fact).  Appellate review of the  
grant or denial of a summary-disposition motion is de novo,  
and  the court views the evidence in the light most favorable  
to the party opposing the motion. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich  
109, 118, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Summary disposition is  
appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine  
issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is  
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  A genuine issue of  
material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of  
reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue  
6  
 
 
 
 
 
upon which reasonable minds might differ. Shallal v Catholic  
Social Services of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 609; 566 NW2d 571  
(1997); Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 369; 547  
NW2d 314 (1996).  
III  
Plaintiff’s whistleblower claim is brought under MCL  
15.362, which states:  
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or 
otherwise 
discriminate 
against 
an 
employee 
regarding 
the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, 
location, or privileges of employment because the 
employee, or a person acting on behalf of the 
employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or 
in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of 
a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to 
law of this state, a political subdivision of this 
state, or the United States to a public body, unless 
the employee knows that the report is false, or 
because an employee is requested by a public body to 
participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry 
held by that public body, or a court action.  
To establish a prima facie case under this statute, a  
plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff was engaged in  
protected activity as defined by the act,9 (2) the plaintiff  
was discharged or discriminated against, and (3) a causal  
connection exists between the protected activity and the  
discharge or adverse employment action.  Chandler v Dowell  
Schlumberger, Inc, 456 Mich 395, 399; 572 NW2d 210 (1998);  
9  For the purpose of this opinion, we assume without 
deciding that plaintiff called the Romulus police, and that 
doing so is a protected activity.  See Dudewicz v Norris  
Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68; 503 NW2d 645 (1993).  
7  
Shallal, supra at 610.  
Plaintiff claims that, because of his report to the  
police, he was disciplined when he was barred from overtime,  
required to swipe his identification badge, transferred to the  
afternoon shift, and discharged.  However, our review of the  
record reveals no evidentiary support from which a reasonable  
jury could find a causal connection between plaintiff’s report  
to the police and these employment actions.  
Plaintiff’s case rests on the factual point that he  
advised supervisors Koyal and Tate that he had reported the  
assault to the police.  That assertion, by itself, is not  
enough to raise a reasonable inference that plaintiff was  
retaliated against or discriminated against on the basis of  
the report.  It does nothing to establish a causal nexus  
between plaintiff’s contacts with his supervisors and any  
subsequent employment action.  
Summary disposition for the defendant is appropriate when  
a plaintiff cannot factually demonstrate a causal link between  
the protected activity and the adverse employment action.  For  
example, in Shallal, the plaintiff failed to establish the  
necessary causal connection because she knew her discharge was  
imminent before the protected activity on which she based her  
whistleblower claim, and in Roberson v Occupational Health  
Centers of America, Inc, 220 Mich App 322; 559 NW2d 86 (1996),  
8  
 
 
 
 
 
the plaintiff failed to show a causal connection because the  
evidence did not show that the employer knew about the  
plaintiff’s filing of a complaint with the Occupational Safety  
and Health Administration until after she was discharged.  
The most that plaintiff demonstrates here is that he was  
disciplined, and eventually discharged, after he reported to  
the police that Reeves had assaulted him.  To prevail,  
plaintiff had to show that his employer took adverse  
employment action because of plaintiff’s protected activity,  
but plaintiff has merely shown that his employer disciplined  
him after the protected activity occurred.  Plaintiff had to  
demonstrate that the adverse employment action was in some  
manner influenced by the protected activity, but has failed to  
make such a demonstration.  The evidence does not show that  
either of the supervisors, whom plaintiff allegedly informed  
about the call to the police, viewed the call as a matter of  
any consequence.  Nor was either supervisor involved in the  
decision to discharge plaintiff.10  There is no evidence that  
Koyal or Tate gave even a second thought to plaintiff’s report  
to the police.  Plaintiff did not recall Tate saying anything  
when he learned about the police report, although he did seem  
10  After he was transferred, and at the time he reported 
the unworked overtime leading to his discharge, plaintiff was 
working under a different supervisor.  Thus, it cannot be 
assumed that Koyal and Tate were involved in the decision to 
terminate plaintiff’s employment.  
9  
 
 
  
 
upset that the incident with Reeves occurred, and plaintiff  
testified that Koyal’s reaction was “nonchalant.”  
Although the employment actions about which plaintiff  
complains occurred after his report to the police, such a  
temporal relationship, standing alone, does not demonstrate a  
causal connection between the protected activity and any  
adverse employment action.  Something more than a temporal  
connection between protected conduct and an adverse employment  
action is required to show causation where discrimination­
based retaliation is claimed.11 
Nguyen v City of Cleveland,  
229 F3d 559 (CA 6, 2000) (retaliation for claim of  
discrimination based on national origin); Scroggins v Univ of  
Minnesota, 221 F3d 1042 (CA 8, 2000) (retaliation for race­
discrimination claim); Cooper v North Olmsted, 795 F2d 1265  
(CA 6, 1986) (retaliation for race- and sex-discrimination  
claims); Taylor v Modern Engineering, Inc, 252 Mich App 655,  
662; 
653 
NW2d 
625 
(2002) 
(retaliation 
for 
alleged  
whistleblower activity).  Plaintiff must show something more  
than merely a coincidence in time between protected activity  
and adverse employment action.12  
Plaintiff’s whistleblower claim is analogous to an 
antiretaliation claim based on other prohibited kinds of 
employment discrimination. Shallal, supra at 617.  
12 Relying merely on a temporal relationship is a form of 
engaging in “the logical fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc 
(after this, therefore in consequence of this)” reasoning.  
10  
11 
 
 
 
A case in which a close temporal relationship supported  
the plaintiff’s claim is Henry v Detroit, 234 Mich App 405;  
594 NW2d 107 (1999).  But unlike plaintiff, the plaintiff in  
Henry also presented evidence that his superior expressed  
clear displeasure with the protected activity engaged in by  
the plaintiff. In contrast to Henry, plaintiff has not shown  
any reaction or conduct on the part of his supervisors that  
reasonably suggests that they were upset by the fact that  
plaintiff reported an assault to the police.  Moreover,  
contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, the evidence  
does not show that plaintiff’s record was “impeccable” or  
“unblemished” before the Reeves incident or that the  
discipline imposed was seemingly undeserved as it was in  
Henry.13  The fact that a plaintiff engages in a “protected  
activity” under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act does not  
immunize him from an otherwise legitimate, or unrelated,  
adverse job action.  
The only evidence plaintiff has shown other than the  
temporal sequence of events is that one of the two supervisors  
he notified was nonchalant.  This does not amount to evidence  
Rogers v Detroit, 457 Mich 125, 168; 579 NW2d 840 (1998) 
(TAYLOR, J., dissenting), majority opinion overruled by 
Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000).  
13 Unpublished 
opinion 
per 
curiam, 
issued 
January 
25, 
2002 
(Docket No. 224408), pp 1, 4.  
11  
 
 
 
 
 
from which a reasonable juror could conclude that any adverse  
employment action directed at plaintiff was related to the  
police report lodged by plaintiff.  
With regard to the employment-discharge decision in  
particular, plaintiff has presented no evidence connecting his  
discharge to his report to the police. There is no evidence  
that the persons conducting the investigation that led to  
plaintiff’s discharge or the persons who made the discharge  
decision were even aware that plaintiff called the police.  
The supervisors (Koyal and Tate), whom plaintiff claims he  
told about the police report, were not involved in the  
discharge decision.  
The Court of Appeals erred in finding that contested  
facts and permissible inferences present a factual issue for  
a jury in this case.14
 There is nothing more than pure  
conjecture and speculation to link plaintiff’s call to the  
police to any subsequent adverse employment action.15  
14  As the preceding analysis makes clear, under the 
applicable standard, which requires us to view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff has failed to 
establish a prima facie claim because he has not demonstrated 
a causal connection—an essential element of a claim under the  
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act—between the protected activity 
and the adverse employment action.  
15  To the extent that the Court of Appeals rested its 
decision 
on 
its 
interpretation of the principle that “remedial 
statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the persons 
intended to be benefitted,” we simply note that our obligation 
is to accurately construe a statute according to its terms and  
12  
 
 
IV  
Plaintiff did not present evidence that would allow a  
reasonable juror to find a causal connection between the  
police report made by plaintiff and the subsequent employment  
decisions affecting plaintiff.  Plaintiff therefore failed to  
establish a prima facie case under the Whistleblowers’  
Protection Act.  We reverse in part the judgment of the Court  
of Appeals and reinstate the circuit court order granting  
defendant summary disposition on plaintiff’s whistleblower  
claim.  In all other respects the Court of Appeals decision is  
affirmed. MCR 7.302(F)(1).  
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman  
that “liberally construing” a statute does not transform mere 
speculation into a genuine issue of material fact.  
13  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
CALVIN WEST and MARGO ANN WEST, 
jointly and severally,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
Cross-Appellants,  
No. 121003  
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, RANDY 
KOYAL, KEVIN SPARKS, and JOHN TATE, 
jointly and severally,  
Defendants-Appellants, 
Cross Appellees,  
and  
JIM REEVES,  
Defendant.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
The majority holds that plaintiff presented insufficient  
evidence to support his claim under the Whistleblowers’  
Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.362.  In my view, quite the  
contrary is true.  Plaintiff presented entirely sufficient  
evidence to reach the jury on this claim.  Therefore, I  
dissent.  
I  
When reviewing a ruling on a defendant's motion for  
  
summary disposition, we must view the evidence in the light  
most favorable to the plaintiff, the nonmoving party.  Maiden  
v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). The majority  
articulates, but neglects to follow, this mandate in ruling  
for defendant.  
To satisfy the elements of his claim, plaintiff must  
present evidence that (1) he was engaged in protected activity  
as defined by the act, (2) he was discharged or discriminated  
against, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected  
activity and the discharge or adverse employment action.  The  
majority concedes that plaintiff established the first two  
elements, but holds that he has not established the third,  
causation. Ante at 8.  
One method of determining whether an element has been  
established is to ask if a party has raised a material  
question of fact about it.  The majority acknowledges that  
"[a] genuine issue of material fact exists when the record,  
giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party,  
leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might  
differ." Ante at 6, citing Shallal v Catholic Social Services  
of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604, 609; 566 NW2d 571 (1997); Quinto v  
Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 369; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).  
In this case, the record reveals several allegations from  
which, if they were to be proven, a factfinder could infer  
2  
 
causation.  First, defendant did not discharge plaintiff until  
after he "blew the whistle" by reporting the shoving incident  
to the police.  Defendant premised plaintiff's termination of  
employment on his time sheet problems.  Plaintiff had a nearly  
perfect thirty-year employment history with defendant.  
However, during the year preceding the whistleblowing,  
defendant had grown concerned about plaintiff's time sheet  
errors.
 Nonetheless it took no action. 
Then, after the  
whistleblowing, for the first time, defendant acted against  
plaintiff allegedly because of the time sheet problems.  The  
lack of action preceding the police report supports an  
inference that the report caused the adverse employment  
actions taken afterward.  
Second, plaintiff denied that the time sheet that led to  
his firing contained overtime that he did not work.  If the  
trier of fact should find that plaintiff did work the two  
hours in question, it follows that plaintiff was wrongfully  
discharged.  It could be validly inferred that the wrongful  
discharge constituted retaliatory action against plaintiff for  
his whistleblowing.  Also, a wrongful discharge shows that  
there was not the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for  
firing plaintiff that defendant asserts existed.  
II  
The majority sidesteps the evidence that constitutes the  
3  
 
issues of fact by construing the facts in the light most  
favorable to defendant. 
Construing them correctly, in  
plaintiff's favor, it becomes evident that a question of fact  
about causation exists in this case.  Accordingly, I would  
affirm the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals to  
reverse the summary disposition on the whistleblower count and  
remand the case to the trial court.  
Marilyn Kelly 
Michael F. Cavanagh  
4