Case Title: Newman v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 367, 2015

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2016-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MARSAAN NEWMAN, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 367, 2015 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  Cr. ID No. 1202018751 
§   
§   
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: December 23, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
March 8, 2016 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
This 8th  day of March 2016, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court 
that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Marsaan Newman, filed this appeal from a Superior 
Court order denying his first motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court 
Criminal Rule 61.  The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the judgment 
below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Newman’s opening brief that 
his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
The record reflects that, on September 18, 2012, Newman pled guilty 
to Robbery in the First Degree and Assault in the Second Degree in exchange for 
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dismissal of other charges.  The charges arose from Newman’s assault and robbery 
of an elderly man.  The plea agreement reflected that the State intended to seek 
habitual offender sentencing under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) for the Robbery in the 
First Degree charge.  Newman acknowledged that he was subject to sentencing 
under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) based upon on three previous felony convictions.  
Newman was sentenced as a habitual offender to a total of fifty-three years of 
Level V incarceration, suspended after fifty years for decreasing levels of 
supervision.  Newman did not appeal the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(3) 
On September 11, 2013, Newman filed his first motion for 
postconviction relief.  Newman claimed he was entitled to postconviction relief 
because: (i) his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mental health 
issues; (ii) his plea agreement was unfulfilled because he expected to receive a 
sentence of no more than twenty-five years of Level V incarceration; and (iii) the 
sentence was excessive in light of the nature of his crimes.  The Superior Court 
appointed postconviction counsel to represent Newman.   
(4) 
On March 17, 2014, postconviction counsel filed a motion to 
withdraw on the basis that he could not ethically advocate Newman’s arguments 
and had not found any other meritorious grounds for relief.  Newman filed a 
response to the motion to withdraw, arguing that his trial counsel’s failure to 
investigate his mental health meant that he did not pursue a competency or insanity 
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defense and that his trial counsel repeatedly advised him that he would lose at trial 
and to plead guilty.  At the direction of the Superior Court Commissioner, 
Newman’s trial counsel filed an affidavit in response to Newman’s motion for 
postconviction relief. 
(5) 
In an order dated March 10, 2015, the Superior Court Commissioner 
recommended that the Superior Court grant postconviction counsel’s motion to 
withdraw and deny Newman’s motion for postconviction relief.  The Superior 
Court Commissioner concluded that Newman’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
and unfulfilled plea agreement claims were without merit and his excessive 
sentencing claim was outside the scope of Rule 61.  In an order dated June 11, 
2015, the Superior Court accepted the recommendation of the Superior Court 
Commissioner, granted the motion to withdraw, and denied Newman’s motion for 
postconviction relief.  This appeal followed.         
(6) 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction 
relief for abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.1  When reviewing the 
Superior Court’s denial of a motion for postconviction relief, this Court must first 
consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive 
issues.2  On appeal, Newman argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because 
he did not investigate Newman’s mental health issues and he misadvised Newman 
                                                 
1 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
2 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
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to plead guilty.  Newman’s failure to raise his unfulfilled plea agreement and 
excessive sentencing claims in his opening brief constitutes a waiver of those 
claims.3 
(7) 
   We agree with the Superior Court that the procedural bars of Rule 
61(i) did not bar Newman’s timely claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  To 
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel after entry of a guilty plea, 
Newman must demonstrate that his trial counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability that but 
for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on 
proceeding to trial.4   There is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation 
was professionally reasonable.5  Conclusory and unsupported claims of prejudice 
are insufficient to establish ineffective assistance; Newman must make and 
substantiate concrete claims of actual prejudice.6 
(8) 
As to Newman’s mental health, trial counsel stated in his affidavit that 
he arranged for a psycho-forensic evaluator with the Office of Public Defender to 
interview Newman and the psycho-forensic evaluator concluded that Newman was 
clearly competent.  Trial counsel further stated that Newman gave no indication 
that his mental health could constitute a colorable defense.  At the guilty plea 
                                                 
3 Supr. Ct. R. 14(b)(vi)(A)(3) (“The merits of any argument that is not raised in the body of the 
opening brief shall be deemed waived and will not be considered by the Court on appeal.”).  
4 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1985); Allbury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984). 
6 Dawson, 673 A.2d at 1196. 
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colloquy, trial counsel informed the Superior Court that Newman told him he had 
spent time at MeadowWood Hospital in the past year, but that he did not have any 
questions regarding Newman’s competency.  Given trial counsel’s representations 
and Newman’s failure to offer any details concerning the alleged mental health 
issues he claims trial counsel should have discovered, the Superior Court did not 
err in concluding that Newman failed to establish that his counsel’s representation 
was objectively unreasonable or prejudicial. 
(9) 
Newman’s claim that his trial counsel misadvised him to plead guilty 
is similarly without merit because it is again based on Newman’s conclusory and 
unsupported allegations of mental health issues.  To the extent Newman claims his 
guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, this claim is contrary to the 
terms of the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and his guilty plea colloquy 
with the Superior Court.  In the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, Newman 
indicated, among other things, that he was not under the influence of any drugs or 
alcohol, he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty, and he was satisfied with 
his trial counsel’s representation.  During the guilty plea colloquy, Newman told 
the Superior Court, among other things, that he was guilty of Robbery in the First 
Degree and Assault in the Second Degree, he understood that he could face a 
sentence of up to life imprisonment, he was not threatened or forced to plea guilty, 
he was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol, and he was satisfied with 
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trial counsel’s representation.  Absent clear and convincing evidence to the 
contrary, which he has not provided, Newman is bound by these representations.7  
We therefore conclude that the Superior Court did not err in denying Newman’s 
motion for postconviction relief. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
                                                 
7 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).