Case Title: The People v. George Davis

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 172  
The People &c.,
            Respondent,
        v.
George Davis,
            Appellant.
Sara Gurwitch, for appellant.
Vincent Rivillese, for respondent.
CIPARICK, J.:
On this appeal, we are asked to determine whether it
was error for Supreme Court to refuse to charge criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree as a
lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled
substance in the third degree when an agency defense was properly
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submitted to the jury.  Applying the test articulated in People v
Glover (57 NY2d 61, 63 [1982]), because it is possible to sell
drugs without concomitantly, by the same conduct, possessing
them, we hold that criminal possession is not a lesser included
offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance and decline to
adopt a different rule for cases where the agency defense is
charged. 
On March 13, 2005, defendant was arrested for selling
drugs to an undercover police officer.  He was indicted for
criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree
(Penal Law § 220.39).  At trial, the officer testified that he
had approached defendant outside a building known for drug sales. 
When defendant asked what he was looking for, the officer
requested two bags of crack and gave defendant $60.  Defendant
then went inside the building, came back outside, and handed the
officer two bags of crack cocaine.  In contrast, defendant
testified that he was approached by the undercover officer at a
donut shop and the officer asked for help purchasing crack.  In
return, the officer promised to "look out for" defendant. 
According to defendant, after helping the officer purchase a
crack pipe, he led the officer to the building, took $40 the
officer gave him, went inside alone, purchased crack, and gave
the crack to the officer, all without receiving payment for his
services.  The officer and defendant then left in opposite
directions and defendant was followed by a second undercover
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officer until he was apprehended by a nearby field team. 
At defendant's request, Supreme Court instructed the
jury on the agency defense, explaining that "a person is not
guilty of selling a controlled substance if he was acting as the
agent of the buyer."  The prosecution never objected to this
instruction, and does not contest its propriety.  Supreme Court,
however, denied the defense's request to charge criminal
possession of a controlled substance as a lesser included offense
of the sale charge.  Defendant was convicted, and the Appellate
Division affirmed the judgment, holding that criminal possession
is not a lesser included offense of the sale charge because "'it
is not necessary to possess a controlled substance in order to
offer or agree to sell it'" (People v Davis, 54 AD3d 575, 575
[1st Dept 2008], quoting People v Cogle, 94 AD2d 154, 159 [3d
Dept 1983]).  As to defendant's argument that cases where an
agency defense is submitted to the jury should be treated
differently, the Appellate Division stated that this "is a matter
best left to the Court of Appeals" (Davis, 54 AD3d at 577).  A
Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal and we now affirm.  
A criminal defendant may request that the jury consider
any "lesser included offense" of a count charged in an indictment
that is reasonably supported by the evidence (CPL 300.50 [1],
[2]).  An offense is "lesser included" if "it is impossible to
commit [the charged] crime without concomitantly committing, by
the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree" (CPL
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1.20 [37]).  In Glover (57 NY2d at 63), we established a two-
pronged test to determine when a defendant is entitled to have a
lesser included offense charged.  First, the proposed lesser
offense must be "an offense of lesser grade or degree" and it
must be "in all circumstances . . . impossible to commit the
greater crime without concomitantly, by the same conduct,
committing the lesser offense” (id. [emphasis added]).  Second,
there must be “a reasonable view of the evidence in the
particular case that would support a finding that [defendant]
committed the lesser offense but not the greater” (id.). 
Although prior to Glover we asked only whether it was
impossible to commit the greater crime without the lesser on the
particular facts of the case, Glover broadened the inquiry to
whether it is possible "in theory" to commit the greater crime
without committing the lesser (Glover, 57 NY2d at 64).
Defendant's reliance on pre-Glover cases is therefore misplaced.
Indeed, we have recently and repeatedly reaffirmed this aspect of
Glover's holding (People v James, 11 NY3d 886, 888 [2008]
[applying the Glover test]; People v Miller, 6 NY3d 295, 302-303
[2006] [clearly stating that "we have no intention of departing
from Glover"]).  Although Glover's theoretical approach
necessarily means that in many cases the proposed lesser crime
was, in fact, committed, this approach has the benefit of
ensuring uniformity in charging lesser included offenses.  Today
we once again affirm that whether it is possible to commit the
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greater offense without committing the lesser must be determined
by “a comparative examination of the statutes defining the two
crimes, in the abstract” (Glover, 57 NY2d at 64). 
Turning to the statutes at issue here, it is possible
to commit the sale crime without committing the possession crime. 
One charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the
third degree is charged with "knowingly and unlawfully sell[ing]
. . . a narcotic drug" (Penal Law § 220.39 [1]); "sell" is
defined broadly as "to sell, exchange, give or dispose of to
another or to offer or agree to do the same" (Penal Law § 220.00
[1]).  Thus, sale does not necessitate possession in the seventh
degree -- "knowingly and unlawfully possess[ing] a controlled
substance" (Penal Law § 220.03) -- since possession requires
"physical possession or . . .  dominion or control over tangible
property" (Penal Law § 10.00 [8]).  One need not have dominion or
control over a drug in order to offer to sell it to someone else.
This analysis is in no way altered by our holding in
People v Mike (92 NY2d 996, 998 [1998]) that a drug sale requires
an “ability to proceed with the sale” (id.).  As we stated in
Mike, ability to sell does not require "proof of possession of
the contraband" (id. at 998-999).  For example, a middleman paid
a commission by a seller may be guilty of sale but not
possession.
Defendant and the dissenting opinion urge us to reach a
different result here because the agency defense was charged,
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permitting the jury to find defendant an agent of the buyer,
rather than a seller, and treat him accordingly.  Nothing about
the agency defense, however, requires a defendant to be charged
with possession, though he may confess to it.  The agency defense
is a well-established "interpretation of the statutory definition
of the term ‘sell’” (People v Andujas, 79 NY2d 113, 117 [1992]). 
Although “[r]eading the statute literally, any passing of drugs
from one person to another would constitute a sale" (People v Lam
Lek Chong, 45 NY2d 64, 72 [1978]), we have held that “one who
acts solely as the agent of the buyer cannot be convicted of the
crime of selling narcotics” (id. at 73).  This assertion of
agency is not a complete defense because it acknowledges
defendant's wrongdoing.  A defendant who asserts the agency
defense acknowledges that he is guilty of a crime, but it is not
necessarily a crime for which he is charged.     
Because the agency defense is a defense, not a separate
crime under the sale statute, it does not alter our analysis
under Glover.  Thus, as the Appellate Division correctly noted
and the dissenting opinion acknowledges, a ruling that drug
possession is a lesser included offense of a drug sale count in
agency defense cases would require an exception to the Glover
test.  We decline to fashion such an exception.  Determining
whether to charge a defendant with possession of a controlled
substance initially is a standard exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.  Supreme Court therefore did not err in refusing to
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submit the charge of criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the seventh degree to the jury as a lesser included
offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third
degree.  
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.  
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People v George Davis
No. 172
JONES, J. (dissenting):
Relying on People v Glover (57 NY2d 61 [1982]), the
majority holds Supreme Court did not err in refusing to charge
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh
degree as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a
controlled substance in the third degree.  I disagree because a
trial judge's failure or refusal to charge seventh degree or
simple possession as a lesser included offense in a drug case
where the agency defense is properly submitted to the jury may
lead to incongruous and deleterious results.  Under the
circumstances of this case, therefore, an exception to Glover is
warranted.  Accordingly, I dissent and would reverse the order of
the Appellate Division.
The first requirement under Glover -- "that it is
theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without at
the same time committing the lesser" (Glover, 57 NY2d at 64; see
CPL 1.20[37]) -- does not consider the realities that typically
attend a drug sale prosecution where the agency defense is
asserted.  Although it is theoretically possible to commit
criminal sale in the third degree without concomitantly, by the
same conduct, possessing the drugs, the likelihood of that
happening is remote.  This is why prosecutors in the real world
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frequently charge defendants in drug sale cases with both
criminal sale and possession.
To be sure, the uniformity that arises from consistent
application of a legal standard is important.  However, blindly
fitting the Glover standard to this type of case flies in the
face of common sense and fundamental fairness.   
The very nature of the agency defense supports the view
that strict application of Glover is inappropriate here.  The
agency defense is unique in that it requires the defendant to
admit he/she criminally possessed drugs as an agent of the buyer. 
We have stated this defense
"is not a complete defense.  The defendant
who has been a party to a drug sale is not
relieved of all criminal responsibility
simply because he was acting for the buyer. 
The agency concept is essentially a means of
determining the extent of the intermediary's
culpability, and thus the nature of his
crime, under a statutory scheme which
reserves the most severe penalties for [drug
sellers].  Evidence that the defendant was
acting solely as an agent of the buyer is
properly employed to determine whether he is
guilty of possession, instead of sale."
(People v Lam Lek Chong, 45 NY2d 64, 74 [1978]).  
To set forth the facts underlying the admitted
wrongdoing the defendant will usually take the stand, bringing
his/her credibility into question.  The jury, therefore, must
determine whether defendant's testimony should be credited and,
ultimately, whether defendant should be held criminally liable as
an agent of the buyer (i.e., to the same extent as the buyer).
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In a drug sale case such as this, not charging simple
possession where the trial court properly submits the agency
defense to the jury undermines the defense.  That is, a jury
weighing a defendant's testimony that he/she was an agent of a
purchaser of drugs, without the lesser charge that the defendant
all but admitted gives less credence to the agency defense. 
Further, submitting the agency defense without simple possession
may have a coercive effect on a jury.  Given only one choice, a
jury which believes the agency defense may acquit a defendant who
admitted to criminal drug possession or, out of a belief that the
defendant should be held criminally liable for the offense
admitted to, convict the defendant of a greater crime than the
one actually committed.
Here, the Appellate Division, after noting that this
Court has recognized an exception to the "impossibility" test,
stated that, "whether another exception . . . should be
recognized on account of the agency defense . . . is a matter
best left to [this Court]" (People v Davis, 54 AD3d 575, 577 [1st
Dept 2008]).  Based on the foregoing and the fact that in the
instant case there was a reasonable view of the evidence from
which the jury could have concluded that defendant committed the
crime of simple possession (Supreme Court saw fit to submit the
agency defense to the jury), this Court should recognize simple
possession as such an exception and view it as a lesser included
offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third
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degree.  This conclusion is consistent with this Court's prior
decisions recognizing exceptions to the statutory definition of
"lesser included offense" (see People v Miller, 6 NY3d 295 [2006]
[held defendants' second degree murder convictions (intentional
and standard felony murder) were lesser included under their
first degree murder convictions (intentional felony murder), even
though it was theoretically possible to commit intentional felony
murder without committing standard felony murder]; People v
Green, 56 NY2d 427 [1982]).  Moreover, charging simple possession
in this sort of case would not amount to reversible error.  Nor
does such a charge aggrieve the People.  If the evidence adduced
at trial makes out criminal possession in the seventh, that is
what defendant will be convicted of.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Ciparick.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Graffeo, Read and Smith concur.  Judge Jones dissents
and votes to reverse in an opinion in which Judge Pigott concurs.
Decided November 24, 2009