Case Title: Steil v. Smith

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Steil v. Smith1995 WY 134901 P.2d 395Case Number: 94-253Decided: 08/21/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
William G. STEIL and Grace A. Steil,

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

v.

Mary 
Ann SMITH and Mary Ann Smith, Trustee of the Mary Ann 
Smith

 Trust Agreement dated September 22, 
1982,

 Appellees (Defendants).

Lawrence 
A. Yonkee of Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, for appellants.

Dennis 
M. Kirven of Kirven & Kirven, Buffalo, for appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ. 

GOLDEN, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      We consider 
whether the district court erred when it decided an easement granting a right of 
way for "agricultural related purposes" included the right to use the road for 
big game hunting.

[¶2]  We reverse.

[¶3]  Appellants, William and Grace Steil, 
raise these issues:

1. 
Is use as an access for big game hunting within the scope of a recorded easement 
which is limited to agricultural related purposes?

2. 
Is the extent of an easement acquired by grant, unlike an easement arising by 
prescription, fixed by the language contained in the instrument through which it 
was created, instead of by use?

3. 
Was it error to consider use before an easement was granted in determining the 
extent (scope) of the recorded easement?

[¶4]  Appellee, Mary Ann Smith, provides this 
summary of the issue:

Did 
the district court correctly find that the scope of an easement for 
agriculturally related purposes included big game hunting?

[¶5]      Resolution of the 
issue hinges on the words in the easement. Donald and Carol Shively purchased 
land from Smith in August 1985. The sale included an agreement titled "Right of 
Way Grant and Easement," in which the Shivelys granted Smith "a permanent right 
of way over, across and through the lands * * * described for a means of ingress 
and egress to access [Smith's] lands located near or adjacent to the land of 
[Shivelys'] for agricultural related purposes * * *." [emphasis added] 
The Steils purchased the Shivelys' property subject, of course, to that 
easement. After neighborly relations deteriorated into feuding, the Steils sued 
to resolve a variety of disputes between the parties. As a part of its judgment, 
the district court found the easement included a right of Smith to use the road 
for big game hunting access1. That is the issue in this 
appeal.

[¶6]      The applicable 
standard of review is that we derive the meaning of an easement from its 
language, much as we would in the case of a deed or other written agreement. 
Tibbets v. P & M Petroleum Co., 744 P.2d 651, 652-53 (Wyo. 1987); and see 25 
AM.JUR.2d Easements and Licenses § 75 (1966). If the language of the easement is 
not ambiguous and if the intent of the parties can be gathered from its 
language, that should be done as a matter of law. Glover v. Giraldo, 824 P.2d 552, 554 (Wyo. 1992); and see Smith v. Nugget Exploration, Inc., 857 P.2d 320 
(Wyo. 1993); Tibbets, 744 P.2d  at 6532. Where an easement is claimed under 
a grant, the extent of the right depends on its terms. If the terms are 
specific, that is decisive of the limits of the easement. Robertson v. Bertha 
Mineral Co., 128 Va. 93, 104 S.E. 832, 835 (1920) (easement for railway to haul 
coal not an easement for general railway purposes); Parham v. Bradberry, 185 
Miss. 402, 188 So. 298 (1939) (stairway easement to second story office not good 
for access to balcony of adjoining theater); JAMES H. BACKMAN AND DAVID A. 
THOMAS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO DISPUTES BETWEEN ADJOINING LANDOWNERS-EASEMENTS, § 
1.03[1][a] (1989); 25 AM.JUR.2d Easements and Licenses § 74 (1966); and compare 
State v. Homar, 798 P.2d 824, 826 (Wyo. 1990).3

[¶7]      We hold the 
language of the easement is clear and unambiguous and extrinsic evidence need 
not be considered in its construction. The terms "agriculture" and 
"agricultural," its derivative, do not convey to reasonable persons, and their 
definitions do not encompass, "big game hunting." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 43-44 (1986); MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FOOD, 
AGRICULTURE & NUTRITION, "agricultural science (animal)," "agricultural 
science (plant)," "agriculture," 62-75 (DANIEL N. LAPIDES, ED., 1977); and see 
Klutznick v. Thulin, 814 P.2d 1267, 1270 (Wyo. 1991) (words mean what they would 
convey to reasonable persons at the time and place of their use).

[¶8]      We also conclude 
the word "related," as in "agricultural related purpose," does not have the 
effect of expanding the meaning of the word "agriculture" to include big game 
hunting. WEBSTER'S at 1916. In common parlance, big game hunting is not related 
to agriculture.

[¶9]      Further, we hold 
that WYO. STAT. § 23-1-101(a)(i) (1991), when read in combination with WYO. 
STAT. 23-1-901 (1991)4, does not have the effect of 
altering the meaning of the words contained in the easement. That conclusion 
applies as well to WYO. STAT. § 39-6-201 (Supp. 1995)5 and § 40-14-140(a)(iv) (1993)6. Smith cites no authority, and we 
have found none in our own research, to support the proposition that the usual 
meaning of ordinary words, as they are used in the easement at issue, are 
modified by reference to statutes such as those relied upon by 
Smith.

[¶10]   That portion of the district 
court's judgment which found Smith could use the easement at issue for big game 
hunting is reversed, with directions that the judgment be amended to read that 
Smith may not use the easement for big game hunting.

[¶11]  Reversed and 
remanded.

Footnotes

1 
The Judgment provided: "[Smith's] described easement for agricultural related 
purposes includes big game hunting access for [Smith] and [her] 
invitees."

2 
In Tibbets the district court heard extrinsic evidence. That was also true here. 
However, as we noted in Tibbets, the taking of extrinsic evidence does not 
render the easement ambiguous.

3 
A corollary of this general rule, which we commend to adjoining landowners, is 
that the owner of an easement and the owner of land each possess rights and each 
must, as far as possible, respect the other's use. Wallis v. Luman, 625 P.2d 759, 768 (Wyo. 1981); Bard Ranch Co. v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722, 730-31 (Wyo. 1976). 
We note in passing that Smith may fully enjoy hunting on her property without 
resort to use of the easement as it passes by the Steils front door.

4 
Landowners may be paid for damages caused by big game animals if they allow 
hunting on their lands and may redeem hunter coupons issued by the Game & 
Fish Department.

5 
Gasoline tax statute includes within the definition of "agricultural purposes" 
(as used in refund provision) the raising of wildlife for gain, sale or 
profit.

6 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code definition of "agricultural purpose" includes 
reference to raising, production, etc. of wildlife.