Case Title: State ex rel. Vaughn Industries, L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce

Citation: 2006-Ohio-2994

Docket Number: 20051921

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Vaughn Industries, L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 109 Ohio St.3d 
482, 2006-Ohio-2994.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. VAUGHN INDUSTRIES, L.L.C., APPELLANT, v. OHIO 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Vaughn Industries, L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 
 109 Ohio St.3d 482, 2006-Ohio-2994.] 
Prevailing-wage law — Investigation by Director of Commerce — Mandamus to 
compel Director of Commerce to abide by settlement agreement denied. 
(No. 2005-1921 — Submitted May 10, 2006 — Decided June 28, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 05AP-168, 2005-Ohio-5093. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for a writ 
of mandamus to compel a state agency and its director to comply with the terms 
of a settlement agreement concerning complaints filed with the agency alleging 
violations of the Ohio Prevailing-Wage Law. 
{¶ 2} Appellant, Vaughn Industries, L.L.C. (“Vaughn”), is an electrical 
and mechanical contractor that performs construction work on public 
improvements.  According to Vaughn’s complaint, in 1995, the Department of 
Industrial Relations, which then enforced the prevailing-wage law, investigated 
Vaughn to determine whether it was complying with R.C. 4115.03 through 
4115.16.  Vaughn filed suit, and the department counterclaimed, in a dispute over 
credits for payments made by Vaughn to a voluntary employees’ beneficiary 
association (“VEBA”).  In December 1997, the Wyandot County Court of 
Common Pleas accepted the voluntary dismissal of the parties’ claims without 
prejudice based upon a settlement agreement between Vaughn and the 
Administrator of the Bureau of Employment Services, to whom the duties of 
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enforcement of the prevailing-wage law had been transferred.  According to 
Vaughn, the settlement agreement provided that Vaughn’s contributions to the 
VEBA could be credited against its payment of the required wages.  Vaughn 
claimed that it has since relied upon the settlement agreement when it bids to 
perform construction work on public-improvement projects. 
{¶ 3} On December 23, 2004, the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, Local No. 8, filed six complaints with appellee the Department of 
Commerce, which now enforces the prevailing-wage law, alleging that Vaughn 
had violated the law by crediting its contributions to the VEBA.  The department 
began an investigation of the union’s complaints, requesting information from 
Vaughn about benefits paid out by the VEBA. 
{¶ 4} In February 2005, Vaughn filed a petition in the Court of Appeals 
for Franklin County for a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, the department 
and its director, to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement specifying that 
Vaughn’s contributions to the VEBA be credited towards its prevailing-wage 
obligation.  In addition, Vaughn requested a writ of mandamus to order the 
department and its director to limit their investigation so as not to contradict the 
settlement agreement. 
{¶ 5} Appellees moved to dismiss Vaughn’s mandamus complaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  In support of the motion, 
the appellees asserted that in March 2005, after 60 days had passed without any 
ruling by the director on the union’s complaints, the union filed six complaints, 
which alleged that Vaughn had violated the prevailing-wage law, in the Wood 
County, Sandusky County, and Hancock County courts of common pleas.  
Appellees should have established these assertions by affidavit and then moved 
for summary judgment, not dismissal for failure to state a claim.  But because 
Vaughn accepted the assertions as true and relied on them in its argument on 
mootness, we will accept them as true, as did the court of appeals. 
January Term, 2006 
3 
{¶ 6} Appellees contended that under the controlling statute, Vaughn 
was not entitled to the writ because appellees had no duty to act once the union 
filed the complaints in court, and Vaughn had an adequate remedy at law in those 
common pleas court cases. 
{¶ 7} On September 29, 2005, the court of appeals granted appellees’ 
motion and dismissed the cause. 
{¶ 8} In its appeal as of right, Vaughn asserts that the court of appeals 
erred in dismissing its mandamus claim.  Dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is 
appropriate if, after all factual allegations are presumed true and all reasonable 
inferences are made in Vaughn’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that it could 
prove no set of facts warranting the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus.  
State ex rel. Talwar v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 104 Ohio St.3d 290, 2004-Ohio-
6410, 819 N.E.2d 654, ¶ 5. 
{¶ 9} In order to establish its entitlement to the requested writ of 
mandamus, Vaughn had to prove a clear legal right to the department’s adherence 
to the settlement agreement by crediting Vaughn’s contributions to the VEBA 
towards its prevailing-wage obligation and limiting the department’s investigation 
accordingly, a clear legal duty on the part of the department to so abide by the 
settlement agreement, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course 
of law.  State ex rel. Asti v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 107 Ohio St.3d 262, 2005-
Ohio-6432, 838 N.E.2d 658, ¶ 17. 
{¶ 10} Vaughn’s claim is governed by R.C. 4115.16, which provides: 
{¶ 11} “(A) An interested party may file a complaint with the director of 
commerce alleging a violation of sections 4115.03 to 4115.16 of the Revised 
Code.  The director, upon receipt of a complaint, shall investigate pursuant to 
section 4115.13 of the Revised Code.  If the director determines that no violation 
has occurred or that the violation was not intentional, the interested party may 
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appeal the decision to the court of common pleas of the county where the 
violation is alleged to have occurred. 
{¶ 12} “(B) If the director has not ruled on the merits of the complaint 
within sixty days after its filing, the interested party may file a complaint in the 
court of common pleas of the county in which the violation is alleged to have 
occurred.  The complaint may make the contracting public authority a party to the 
action, but not the director.  Contemporaneous with service of the complaint, the 
interested party shall deliver a copy of the complaint to the director.  Upon receipt 
thereof, the director shall cease investigating or otherwise acting upon the 
complaint filed pursuant to division (A) of this section.  The court in which the 
complaint is filed pursuant to this division shall hear and decide the case, and 
upon finding that a violation has occurred, shall make such orders as will prevent 
further violation and afford to injured persons the relief specified under sections 
4115.03 to 4115.16 of the Revised Code.  The court’s finding that a violation has 
occurred shall have the same consequences as a like determination by the director.  
The court may order the director to take such action as will prevent further 
violation and afford to injured persons the remedies specified under sections 
4115.03 to 4115.16 of the Revised Code.  Upon receipt of any order of the court 
pursuant to this section, the director shall undertake enforcement action without 
further investigation or hearings.” 
{¶ 13} Vaughn cannot establish a legal duty on the part of the department 
or its director to act on the union’s complaints.  Because the director did not make 
a ruling on the merits of the union’s complaints within 60 days after the 
complaints were filed with him, and the union then filed complaints in common 
pleas courts alleging prevailing-wage violations by Vaughn, the director had a 
duty under R.C. 4115.16(B) to “cease investigating or otherwise acting upon the 
complaint[s].” 
January Term, 2006 
5 
{¶ 14} Moreover, Vaughn’s claimed legal right to compel the department 
and its director to abide by the settlement agreement and limit its investigation of 
the union’s complaints is premised upon R.C. 4115.131, which provides: 
{¶ 15} “In the event of a specific contract dispute concerning a prevailing 
wage determination, a proper wage classification, or a novel or unusual situation 
pertaining to sections 4115.03 to 4115.16 of the Revised Code, the director of 
commerce may, upon request by a public authority or by a person having a 
contract with a public authority, cause to be made such investigation and hearing 
as the director deems necessary and render a decision embodying the director’s 
findings and conclusions.  Unless finally reversed on appeal to the courts, the 
decision of the director shall form the basis for decision of any complaint on the 
same facts filed pursuant to sections 4115.03 to 4115.16 of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 16} The law at the time of the 1997 settlement was the same, except 
that it gave enforcement duties to the Administrator of the Bureau of Employment 
Services.  1995 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 162, 146 Ohio Laws, Part V, 9639-9640. 
{¶ 17} As the court of appeals correctly ruled, the settlement agreement 
entered into in 1997 that led to the dismissal without prejudice of litigation 
involving Vaughn did not constitute a decision of the director (then, the 
Administrator of the Bureau of Employment Services) that “shall form the basis 
for decision of any complaint on the same facts” filed pursuant to the prevailing-
wage law. 
{¶ 18} Finally, R.C. 4115.16(B) provides an adequate remedy in the 
ordinary course of law for Vaughn to raise its settlement-agreement claim through 
the pending common pleas court cases.  “Mandamus will not issue if there is a 
plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”  State ex rel. Mackey v. 
Blackwell, 106 Ohio St.3d 261, 2005-Ohio-4789, 834 N.E.2d 346, ¶ 21; R.C. 
2731.05.  “The alternative must be complete, beneficial, and speedy in order to 
constitute an adequate remedy at law.”  State ex rel. Ullmann v. Hayes, 103 Ohio 
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St.3d 405, 2004-Ohio-5469, 816 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 8.  R.C. 4115.16(B) provides a 
complete, beneficial, and speedy remedy for Vaughn.  It can raise its claim as a 
defense in the common pleas cases, and should any court find against it, it can 
raise the claim on appeal.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio 
Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 183, 699 
N.E.2d 64 (“Insofar as appellants challenge the [administrator’s] determinations 
that no violations of the prevailing wage law have occurred, that the violations 
were not intentional, or that the administrator has not ruled on the merits of the 
interested parties’ complaints, the court of appeals correctly held that R.C. 
4115.16 provides an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law precluding 
extraordinary relief in mandamus”). 
{¶ 19} Based on the foregoing, it appears beyond doubt that Vaughn 
would not be able to establish any of the requirements warranting the issuance of 
an extraordinary writ of mandamus.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals dismissing Vaughn’s mandamus petition.1 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Ross, Brittain & Schonberg Co., L.P.A., David T. Andrews, and Nick A. 
Nykulak, for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Michael D. Allen, Principal Assistant 
Attorney General, and Megan H. Boiarsky, Assistant Attorney General, for 
appellees. 
______________________ 
                                                 
1.   We deny Vaughn’s request for oral argument.