Case Title: P. v. Prince

Citation: 

Docket Number: S036105

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2007-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 4/30/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S036105 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
   
CLEOPHUS PRINCE, JR., 
) 
 
) 
San Diego County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CR130018 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Defendant Cleophus Prince, Jr., appeals from a judgment of the San Diego 
County Superior Court imposing a sentence of death following his conviction of 
six counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 five counts of 
burglary (§ 459), and one count of rape.  (§ 261.)  The jury found true one rape-
murder special-circumstance allegation and one multiple-murder special-
circumstance allegation.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3) & (17)(C).)  The jury also found 
true the allegations that defendant used a knife in committing each of the murders.  
(§ 12022, subd. (b).)  Defendant also was convicted of six attempted burglaries 
(§§ 459, 664) and nine completed burglaries of homes belonging to persons other 
than the murder victims (§ 459), and perjury.  (§ 119.)  The jury fixed the 
punishment at death.  The court imposed a judgment of death and also sentenced 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated.   
2 
defendant for the noncapital convictions.  Defendant’s appeal is automatic.  
(§ 1239, subd. (b).)   
We affirm the judgment in its entirety.   
I.  FACTS 
 
A.  Guilt Phase Evidence 
 
1.  The prosecution’s case 
We first provide an overview of the evidence.  Defendant and his girlfriend 
Charla Lewis moved into an apartment in the Buena Vista Gardens apartment 
complex in the Clairemont area of San Diego in December 1989.  Defendant was 
employed by Expo Builder Supplies beginning on January 10, 1990, usually 
working from 3:00 p.m. until midnight.  Later in the year he was employed at 
Nacomm Communications.   
Tiffany Schultz was murdered on January 12, 1990; Janene Weinhold was 
murdered on February 16, 1990, and Holly Tarr was murdered on April 3, 1990.  
All three victims were young, attractive White women who resided in or near the 
Buena Vista Gardens apartment complex.  A resident of that apartment complex 
testified that in the interval between the Weinhold and Tarr murders, a man she 
identified as defendant followed her home and stared at her.   
The murders were similar to each other in many respects; circumstantial 
evidence tied defendant to the crimes; DNA and other evidence connected 
defendant to the Weinhold murder, and Tarr’s opal ring was found in Charla 
Lewis’s possession.   
In late April 1990, defendant twice attempted to enter apartments at the 
Torrey Pines Village apartment complex belonging to two young women.  In early 
May 1990 he followed a woman from the beach to the La Jolla Shores beach 
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house she was visiting and tried to force his way into the house, but was foiled 
when the woman pushed him over and fled.   
On May 20, 1990, Elissa Keller was murdered in her apartment on Trojan 
Avenue in San Diego.  The apartment was close to defendant’s new residence at 
the Top of the Hill apartment complex.  The murder was similar to the earlier 
murders; certain circumstantial evidence implicated defendant; he was seen 
wearing Keller’s ring, and various incriminating statements also tied him to the 
crime.   
There was evidence that on August 2, 1990, defendant committed another 
burglary of an apartment located in the Top of the Hill apartment complex.  The 
apartment was occupied by three young women.  There was evidence establishing 
that defendant, at a local Thomas Cook Foreign Exchange office, exchanged the 
lire that were stolen in this burglary.  
On September 13, 1990, Pamela Clark and her daughter Amber Clark were 
murdered in their home in the University City area of San Diego.  The murder was 
similar to the other murders; defendant made incriminating statements, and he was 
seen wearing Pamela’s wedding ring.   
A series of burglaries and attempted burglaries in various areas of San 
Diego was committed between October 1990 and February 1991.  Incriminating 
statements, possession of proceeds of the burglaries, positive identifications of 
defendant and his automobile, and other evidence tied defendant to the crimes, 
many of which involved his following young women from a Family Fitness Center 
on Miramar Drive in San Diego to the women’s homes and attempting to enter the 
women’s residences while the occupant showered or prepared to shower.   
The defense was mistaken identification and alibi.   
A more detailed account of the evidence adduced at trial follows.   
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Count 1 — the murder of Tiffany Schultz 
On January 12, 1990, Tiffany Schultz, a White woman who was 21 years of 
age, was seen sunbathing in the doorway of her second floor Canyon Ridge 
apartment about 10:00 a.m.  The Canyon Ridge complex was located across the 
street from the Buena Vista Gardens apartment complex and shared a recreation 
center, which Schultz’s apartment overlooked.  Schultz spoke to a friend on the 
telephone from 10:00 to 10:30 a.m., but telephone calls placed to her near noon or 
12:30 p.m. went unanswered.   
Dorothy Curtiss, the manager of the Canyon Ridge apartment complex, was 
relatively certain that a stranger who approached her in front of her office at 
approximately 10:30 a.m. on January 12, 1990, was defendant.  The stranger 
requested a hanger so he could unlock his automobile, indicating that the vehicle 
was parked on the street.  When the manager supplied the hanger, the stranger to 
her surprise and concern walked toward the apartments rather than the street.  
Curtiss testified her office abutted the stairs that led to Schultz’s apartment, and 
she had seen Schultz sunbathing, clad only in her bikini, within approximately half 
an hour of encountering defendant.   
Persons occupying the apartment located below Schultz’s reported to the 
police that when they arrived at the apartment between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m. 
on January 12, 1990,  they heard loud sounds coming from Schultz’s apartment.  
The noise sounded as if someone was being beaten.  They also heard running 
water.   
Schultz’s roommate discovered her body in one of the bedrooms in the 
apartment.  It appeared there had been a struggle.  Schultz was clad only in bikini 
briefs.  She lay on her back, her left leg extended under the bed, while her right leg 
lay at a 60- to 70-degree angle.  One leg was smeared with blood, and there was 
blood on her crotch.  There were at least 47 stab wounds, with a cluster of 20 stab 
5 
wounds in the right breast and chest area.  The wounds were deep, some extending 
through to the back.  There was another cluster of stab wounds in the left area of 
the chest, also deep, some passing all the way through the body.  There were 
wounds on the neck and upper-right thigh as well as defensive wounds.  Her 
mouth was bruised, and her face had suffered blunt trauma.  She would have been 
motionless when the fatal knife wounds were inflicted.  The bathtub was wet, and 
there was a damp towel nearby.  There was no evidence of a sexual assault.   
There also was no sign of forced entry.  The interior and exterior doorknobs 
of the door leading to the room where Schultz’s body was discovered bore bloody 
marks in a honeycomb or cross-hatch pattern.  It appeared that the assailant had 
departed by way of the patio, dropping from the second floor balcony to the 
ground.   
Schultz’s live-in boyfriend was arrested for the murder but was released 
after a few days.   
Counts 2, 3, and 4 — the murder and rape of Janene Weinhold and the 
burglary of her residence 
Janene Weinhold, a White woman who was 21 years of age, shared a 
second-story apartment in the Buena Vista Gardens apartment complex with a 
roommate.  Both were students at the University of California, San Diego.  
Weinhold drove her roommate to work at 9:00 a.m. on February 16, 1990, telling 
her she planned to return home to do laundry and homework.  Weinhold was to 
return to pick up her roommate at 2:00 p.m., but failed to do so, an 
uncharacteristic omission.   
Marsha Nelson occupied an apartment below Weinhold’s.  Nelson testified 
that between 11:30 a.m. and noon on February 16, 1990, she observed defendant 
sitting on the stairs leading to Weinhold’s second-story apartment.  He appeared 
sad.  She observed him over a period of 15 minutes.  Subsequently she heard her 
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dog barking, then heard loud sounds coming from Weinhold’s apartment.  When 
Nelson was summoned to a live lineup in June 1991, she identified defendant on a 
card but then crossed out this identification, explaining to the police that the 
incident had occurred too long ago for her to make an identification.  At trial, she 
testified that she crossed out her identification because she did not want to become 
involved.   
On February 16, 1990, telephone calls made to Weinhold’s apartment from 
2:30 p.m. on went unanswered.  Weinhold’s body was discovered when her 
roommate returned home that evening at approximately 8:00 p.m.  The front door 
was locked, and there was no sign of a forced entry.   
A knife belonging to the occupants of the apartment was found in the sink, 
displaying a bent tip and blood.  Weinhold’s body was discovered in her bedroom, 
one leg up against the bedroom door and the other leg spread.  A blouse, trousers, 
and underpants were nearby, the trousers and underwear inside out as if just taken 
off.  The body was clad only in a bra.  There were at least 22 stab wounds, all in 
the upper chest area, with eight clustered in a pattern in the upper-right breast.  
Most were deep, and some had penetrated the breastbone and ribs, a circumstance 
that might cause a knife to bend.  The wounds had been administered with great 
force.  Some of the wounds were defensive in nature.  There was a bloodstain in a 
honeycomb or cross-hatch pattern on a doorjamb.   
Seminal fluid in Weinhold’s vagina was tested, and a genotype match with 
defendant’s blood sample was established to the degree that an expert testified that 
the match would occur in approximately 7 to 8 percent of the general population 
(and a lower percentage of the White population).  Seminal fluid also was 
discovered on a jogging suit, a bedspread, and the carpet next to the body.  
Enzyme testing of the seminal fluid found on the carpet established that defendant, 
who was African-American, was within the 19 to 21 percent of that population 
7 
that could have deposited the fluid.  Further deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing 
of the jogging suit and bedspread disclosed a match with defendant’s blood 
sample, a match that would occur in approximately one in 120,000 persons.   
A number of statements also linked defendant to the murder of Weinhold. 
In April 1990, defendant told his friends Robin and Tony Romo that he had 
gone on a date with a woman, and that when they arrived home he forced himself 
on her.  Defendant related that when he was finished, the victim was weeping, and 
that he went back and “did her” again.   
David Holden was a coworker of defendant’s at Nacomm Communications, 
a cable company, beginning in the autumn of 1990.  Early in 1991, defendant 
mentioned a girl named Janene.  Defendant said he worked out with her at an 
athletic club and went to her home for sexual encounters on one or two occasions.  
Holden also testified defendant commented that the police never would capture the 
Clairemont murderer.  (This was the description commonly used for the 
perpetrator of the charged murders.) 
Raymond Huntley, a jailhouse informant with many prior convictions for 
serious crimes (and an escape charge pending), reported several conversations 
with defendant.  On one occasion defendant allegedly said he “didn’t have nothing 
for no White bitches.”  In another, defendant noted that in his job with the cable 
company, if he found a woman he wanted to “hit,” he could check the name on the 
mailbox to determine whether she lived alone.  The witness assumed that “hit” 
meant burglarize.  The two men discussed assaulting women (Huntley had been 
convicted of such crimes).  Defendant reported that he enjoyed stalking women 
and once he selected one, he enjoyed playing with his victims, letting them believe 
they would escape, and then he would “do them.”  Defendant also reported that he 
enjoyed watching blood drip from a knife onto the victim’s pubic area.   
8 
The Cotalessa-Ritchie incident 
Anna Cotalessa-Ritchie, a young White woman, testified that on March 25, 
1990, during the noon hour, she walked from her second-story apartment in the 
Buena Vista Gardens apartment complex to a local store.  She observed defendant 
at a bus stop on her way to the store, but he was not there when she returned.  As 
she neared her apartment building, she saw defendant coming toward her.  He 
stared at her as they crossed paths.  She was at the door of her apartment, trying to 
insert the key into the lock, when she observed defendant at the bottom of the 
stairs.  Again, he was staring at her.  He bent as if to tie his shoes, although they 
were tied already.  She entered her apartment and locked the door.  After 
defendant’s arrest, Cotalessa-Ritchie positively identified defendant at a video 
lineup as the person who had followed her.  She also identified him at trial.  Prior 
to her participation in the lineup, she once had seen defendant’s image briefly on 
television.   
Counts 5 and 6 — the murder of Holly Tarr and the burglary of her 
residence 
Holly Tarr, who was 18 years of age and White, was a resident of 
Michigan.  In April 1990, she visited her brother Richard at the Buena Vista 
Gardens apartment complex during her high school spring break.  Her friend, 
Tammy Ho, accompanied her.  On April 3 1990, the two girls played tennis and 
then entered the pool area of the complex at 11 a.m.  Ho observed a well-built 
African-American man working out in the adjacent athletic area.  Approximately 
five or 10 minutes before noon, Tarr returned to the apartment alone, intending to 
shower.  Ten minutes later, Ho approached the apartment and thought she heard a 
scream.  To Ho’s surprise, the door of the apartment was locked.  Ho heard  the 
telephone ring, but no one answered it.  She knocked repeatedly and called out 
Tarr’s name.  A neighbor had called the apartment complex maintenance crew, 
9 
and approximately 10 minutes later a maintenance worker, Richard Williams, 
arrived.  The door was chained shut, and he had to break the chain to enter.  Ho 
ran into the apartment and saw a man emerge from a bedroom and run toward her, 
his face covered with a white cloth.  He held a long knife up to his ear.  The man 
wore a red T-shirt and had dark skin.  Ho fell onto a couch as he ran past her 
through the front door.  Ho then discovered Tarr gasping for breath.  Tarr’s opal 
ring was gone.   
The log for the day at the apartment complex weight room showed, in order 
of arrival, Richard Tarr, Holly Tarr, Tammy Ho, and C. Prince.   
Between noon and 1:00 p.m. on April 3, 1990, a bystander heard screaming 
coming from the direction of the Tarr apartment.  When the witness looked in the 
direction of the scream, he saw an African-American man wearing a red shirt and 
black pants and running full speed across the alley, not far from the Tarr 
apartment.  The witness observed the man disappear among the buildings.  While 
in pursuit, the witness encountered another maintenance worker, Juan Rivera 
Rojas, who described the direction of the man’s flight.  Rojas testified at trial that 
he saw an African-American man run by who was approximately 28 to 30 years of 
age, about five feet six inches tall, and wearing a red shirt and black pants.  Rojas 
picked out defendant in a video lineup conducted in July 1991, but testified at trial 
that he had not seen the man’s face and could not identify him.   
Tarr’s body lay on the floor of one of the bedrooms in the apartment, her 
legs spread approximately 45 degrees.  She wore a bra and underpants, and a towel 
was on her chest.  There was no sign of forced entry (other than the chain broken 
by the maintenance worker).  Blood was on the stairwell leading to the apartment 
and in numerous places in the apartment.  A shoe print at the threshold matched 
the size and design of defendant’s Nike Air Jordan athletic shoes.  An impression 
of a knife, in blood, was observed on the apartment doorjamb.  A bloody knife and 
10 
a T-shirt were found near the sidewalk and the parking area; the blood was 
identified as Tarr’s, and the knife was from the Tarr apartment.  Tarr died of a 
single stab wound, seven inches deep, that penetrated her heart.  There was blood 
on her bra and on her underwear in the pubic area.   
On the day of the Tarr murder, defendant’s acquaintances, Robert Romo 
and Timothy Buckingham, observed defendant, wearing a red T-shirt, driving his 
automobile in an alley within the Buena Vista Gardens apartment complex 
between noon and 1:00 p.m.  Defendant wore something white on his head.  When 
Romo entered his own apartment in the Buena Vista Gardens complex, he learned 
from his wife, Robin Romo, that another murder had occurred.  Robert shortly 
thereafter observed defendant drive by again.  Robert had seen defendant wear a 
red T-shirt prior to, but never subsequent to, the Tarr murder.   
When interviewed the day after the murder, defendant informed the police 
that he had been at the pool the prior day until noon, when he returned to his 
apartment and remained there until his departure for work at 1:50 p.m.  He 
declined the police’s request to go to the station for fingerprinting.   
A few days after the Tarr murder, Robin Romo mentioned to defendant that 
there had been another murder.  Defendant responded:  “Yes I remember.  I was at 
the pool.  I saw her leaving.”   
When the police searched the home of defendant’s girlfriend, Charla Lewis, 
they discovered Tarr’s opal ring.  The ring was one of 63 that had been 
manufactured, none of them having been distributed for sale further west than 
Michigan or Wisconsin.  Lewis testified that defendant gave her the ring in 
December 1990.   
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Counts 7 and 8 — the attempted burglary of the residence shared by 
Stephanie Squires and Sarah Canfield 
On April 25, 1990, Stephanie Squires observed defendant follow her to the 
pool in her apartment complex, the Torrey Pines Village apartments.  She 
recognized him, perhaps from her recent prior residence at the Buena Vista 
Gardens apartment complex.  Squires left the pool area around noon and returned 
to her apartment to shower.  A neighbor witnessed an African-American man walk 
up the stairs toward Squires’s apartment.  The neighbor telephoned the apartment 
manager, Jean Smith.  Smith testified that the neighbor told her that she saw the 
man climb the stairs and try the door handle.  At trial, the neighbor testified that 
she merely had seen the man ascend the stairs and then sit down.  She testified she 
did not wish to be involved.   
On April 28, 1990, Squires’s roommate, Sarah Canfield, attired in her 
bathing suit, was in the apartment they shared.  Between 3 and 3:30 in the 
afternoon, she heard a knock at the door and could see the door handle moving.  
She looked out, saw defendant standing at the door, and telephoned the apartment 
manager and the police.  At the time of the video lineup in July 1991, she was 
almost positive the man was defendant, and at trial she was certain of her 
identification.   
At approximately 3:30 p.m. on the same day, April 28, 1990, Jean Smith 
saw an unfamiliar African-American man walk past her office.  She asked her 
husband Glen to follow the man.  Glen Smith testified he observed an African-
American man driving an old, dirty or gray, two-door Chevrolet or Oldsmobile 
exit from the apartment complex parking lot.  The vehicle was noisy, as if it had a 
defective muffler.  A few days later, Glen saw the same vehicle driven by the 
same man in the same parking lot.  Glen relayed the license number to the police, 
who found that the vehicle was registered to defendant.  Glen identified a 
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photograph of defendant’s automobile as the vehicle he had seen on both 
occasions.   
Count 9 — the burglary of Leslie Hughes-Webb’s temporary residence 
On May 2, 1990, between 1:30 p.m. and approximately 2:50 p.m., Leslie 
Hughes-Webb, a young White woman, was sunbathing on the beach near the La 
Jolla Shores beach house she was visiting.  After she walked back to the house, 
she climbed the stairs to the back door and found defendant standing in front of 
the door.  She asked his business, and replying that he had rented the home in the 
past, he walked away.  Hughes-Webb entered the house and saw through the glass 
door that defendant was returning.  She attempted to secure the door, but 
defendant forced it open.  He attacked Hughes-Webb, covering her mouth and 
subsequently grabbing her face and shoulders, and they struggled until she was 
able to push him over into a nightstand.  She fled screaming, and he followed her 
outside and down two steps, then turned, and ran out the gate.  He was due at work 
at 3:00 p.m., but arrived 15 minutes late that day.  At a lineup and at trial, Hughes-
Webb identified defendant as her attacker.   
Counts 10 and 11 — the murder of Elissa Keller and the burglary of her 
residence 
Elissa Keller, 38 years of age and White, lived with her 18-year old 
daughter.  Her home was close to defendant’s new residence at the Top of the Hill 
apartment complex, where he had moved in early May 1990.  Late in the evening 
of May 20, 1990, Keller spoke on the telephone to her daughter, who was away for 
the weekend.  On May 21, 1990, Keller failed to appear at her place of 
employment at 9:00 a.m., which was unusual.  She did not appear at work later 
that day or answer the telephone.  Keller’s daughter arrived at their home at 
approximately 11:30 p.m. on May 21, 1990.  The deadbolt on the front door was 
not locked, which was unusual, and the chain was off the hook.  She went to her 
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bedroom, where she discovered her mother’s body lying on the floor with a 
blanket covering her torso.   
Keller lay on the carpet with her legs out and slightly separated.  She wore 
only a tank top, and her bloody underwear lay inside out and close to the body.  
There were nine tightly clustered, deep stab wounds in her chest, along with some 
defensive wounds.  There was blood smeared on her arms and legs.  It appeared 
that she may have been punched in the face and choked.  According to the 
physician who examined her body at approximately 3:00 a.m. on May 22, 1990, 
Keller had been dead between six and 12 hours, and possibly longer.   
The perpetrator’s point of entry apparently was a partially open window.  
Shoe prints on the sill and on a nearby stereo could have been made by 
defendant’s Nike Air Jordan athletic shoes, and were similar to those found at the 
scene of Tarr’s murder.  A criminalist testified that gloves such as the ones used 
by defendant at his place of employment between January and August 1990, and 
found in the trunk of his vehicle, left the bloody marks found on the bathroom 
counter.  The gloves bore a distinctive honeycomb or cross-hatch pattern.  A pair 
of such gloves also was discovered in the closet of defendant’s girlfriend, Charla 
Lewis.   
Keller’s gold nugget ring was missing, and defendant subsequently was 
seen wearing it.  The ring later was stolen from defendant but ultimately was 
traced to him during the murder investigation.   
Michael Bari was acquainted with defendant when both men resided at the 
Top of the Hill apartments.  Defendant possessed a large quantity of jewelry and 
told Bari he had obtained it “off the girls he had slept with.  They would not be 
needing them anymore.”  Defendant demonstrated for Bari how to break into an 
apartment by using a Blockbuster video store card, remarking that “as long as it 
doesn’t have a deadbolt, I can get into the apartment.”  Another occupant of the 
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Top of the Hill apartments during the period  defendant resided there, John 
Rollins, also was acquainted with defendant.  Rollins brought up the subject of 
Keller’s murder and heard defendant claim responsibility for that murder, but the 
remark was made in the course of preparing for a party, and everyone present 
interpreted it as a joke.   
Count 12 — the burglary of the residence occupied by Anna McComber, 
Maria Saatin, and Nadia Gatti 
Anna McComber resided in the Top of the Hill apartment complex, as did 
defendant.  Two friends from Italy, Maria Saatin and Nadia Gatti, were visiting 
her.  On August 2, 1990, the three young women sunbathed by the apartment 
complex pool, went shopping, and sunbathed again.  When they returned to the 
apartment, they discovered that a large amount of cash in $50 and $100 bills had 
been stolen, along with some Italian lire belonging to the Italian visitors.   
On August 3, 1990, a person who identified himself as Cleophus Prince 
exchanged 94,000 Italian lire for $74.73 at the San Diego Thomas Cook Foreign 
Exchange office.  Defendant also deposited $1,100 in two $50 and ten $100 bills 
into his bank account.  The cash deposit was far greater than any he previously had 
made in the five months he had had the account.   
Counts 13, 14, and 15 — the murders of Amber and Pamela Clark and the 
burglary of their residence 
On July 17, 1990, defendant’s girlfriend Charla Lewis joined the Family 
Fitness Center on Miramar Road.  She listed defendant as a member. The 
membership was cancelled 10 days later.   
At approximately 8:00 a.m. on September 13, 1990, Pamela Clark left her 
home in the University City area of San Diego en route to the Family Fitness 
Center on Miramar Road.  She was wearing a “full body glove” and a bathing suit.  
She was White, 42 years of age, and very fit.  Her husband left their home at 
15 
approximately 8:30 a.m.  Their 18-year-old daughter Amber, who was still asleep, 
was a member of the same fitness center.  At approximately 10:00 a.m., neighbors 
heard Amber speaking or arguing with someone inside the house.  One neighbor 
heard Amber call out as if afraid and also heard a male voice, but the neighbor 
believed nothing serious was occurring.  This witness believed Pamela Clark’s 
automobile had left the residence earlier in the morning but had returned by 
11:00 a.m.  Pamela, who was a massage therapist, did not appear at work for her 
11:00 a.m. appointment, an unusual occurrence.  No one answered the telephone at 
the Clarks’ home.   
A colleague of Pamela Clark’s discovered her body in the entryway of the 
home.  Pamela was nude, lying on her back with her arms spread at 90 degrees to 
her body with her legs together.  She had suffered 11 deep, clustered stab wounds 
to the upper left chest in an area measuring four and one-half by three and one-half 
inches.  There was evidence indicating she had been dragged to that location.  A 
knife that could have inflicted the wounds lay near her head.   
Amber Clark’s body lay on the floor, partly in a hallway and partly in a 
bedroom.  She was clothed, but her garments had been pulled down to expose her 
breasts.  Her legs were spread somewhat apart.  Like her mother, she had suffered 
11 deep, closely clustered stab wounds to her upper chest in an area measuring 
three by three and one-quarter inches.  Blood was smeared on her body.  A knife 
blade lay on the floor in the bathroom.   
Pamela Clark’s purse was found on her bed but, uncharacteristically, 
contained no money.  Her wedding ring was missing.   
Possible points of entry included a partially opened dining room window 
from which a screen had been removed, and a living room sliding glass door.  The 
door handle bore marks of silica and other material consistent with the gypsum 
that defendant used in his employment.  Shoe prints outside led back and forth 
16 
under the dining room window.  Defendant’s Eastland-brand shoes matched shoe 
prints found under the window and in the dining room.  Defendant had called in 
sick to his employer on the day of the Clark murders.   
Two persons who resided with defendant subsequent to these murders 
testified that he had been in possession of Pamela Clark’s wedding ring.   
Ernest Tu’ua, a coworker of defendant’s, testified that defendant told him 
during the summer of 1990 that he was dating a massage therapist and that he was 
“doing the massage therapist and her daughter,” a comment that Tu’ua took to 
refer to sexual relations.  Defendant commented that the massage therapist was an 
older White woman with a good body.  In September 1990, having changed jobs, 
defendant was working at the Nacomm Cable Television Company.  He installed 
underground cable.  He commented to his foreman that he was “going to do a 
mother and a daughter,” a comment the foreman took to refer to sexual relations.  
Defendant offered to sell jewelry to the foreman.  Another coworker reported that 
in September 1990, defendant said he was dating a woman and her daughter, 
adding that the mother, aged 40, had a youthful appearance and the daughter, aged 
17 or 18, was attractive.  Defendant offered to sell the witness jewelry.   
September 1990 — defendant and his cohorts 
In the autumn of 1990, defendant resided at the Top of the Hill apartment 
complex with Shirley Beasley (a male) and Shirley’s younger brother Moheshea 
(Charla Lewis having moved out).  According to Moheshea, Shirley told him that 
defendant and Shirley, in the course of burglarizing the apartment of an older 
couple who resided at the Top of the Hill complex, had stolen some beer.  
Defendant told Moheshea he could break into apartments at the nearby Trojan 
apartment building, because the doors lacked deadbolts.  Defendant committed 
three burglaries with Moheshea, who was 16 years of age at the time.  In 
committing these burglaries, defendant put socks on his hands as he approached 
17 
the front door of the targeted home and then opened the door using a plastic card.  
Defendant told Moheshea that he knew of a residence containing jewelry and a 
safe, and proposed to burglarize it.  Defendant stated that he had been inside the 
home while the female occupant slept, and that if she had awakened, he would 
have cut her throat.  Defendant proposed to return to burglarize this residence.  
Moheshea testified that he and defendant thereafter broke into a Top of the Hill 
apartment and stole foreign currency.  Defendant also told Moheshea that he 
surveilled the homes of women he had met at gyms.   
Count 16 — the burglary of Michelle Tait’s residence 
Michelle Tait resided at the Collwood Pines apartments.  On October 6, 
1990, she sunbathed at the apartment pool beginning in the late morning.  She 
returned to her apartment briefly around 2:00 p.m., finding nothing amiss.  When 
she returned at 3:00 p.m., however, she found that her television and videocassette 
recorder (VCR) had been stolen.   
Tait had had an encounter with defendant during the month preceding the 
burglary.  She was walking up the stairs to her apartment when defendant asked 
repeatedly whether he could help her carry her groceries.  He was pushy and 
aggressive.  They made eye contact for almost a minute.  He stared her down on 
that occasion, and also at the preliminary examination.   
 
Shirley Beasley testified that while he resided with defendant at the Top of 
the Hill apartment complex, they burglarized an apartment at the Collwood Pines 
apartment complex.  Defendant asked Beasley whether he wanted a television and 
a VCR.  Pointing to a woman lying by the Collwood Pines apartment complex’s 
pool, defendant stated it was her apartment they would burglarize.  Defendant put 
socks on his hands and entered the apartment door using a credit card.  Defendant 
went to the kitchen and took a knife, stating that if the occupant returned, Beasley 
should move out of the way and defendant would “handle it.”  They took the 
18 
television and the VCR.  Both were sold or given away but were traced to 
defendant.  Defendant told Beasley he had been watching a home he knew 
contained a safe, intending to burglarize it.  Defendant also told Beasley he had 
stolen foreign currency during a burglary and knew where to exchange it.  Beasley 
testified that defendant kept a large quantity of women’s jewelry in the apartment 
they shared.   
Count 17 — the burglary of Michael Gromme’s residence  
Michael Gromme resided in the Top of the Hill apartment complex and was 
acquainted with defendant. Gromme complained about the noisy muffler on 
defendant’s automobile.  On October 15, 1990, when Gromme returned from work 
at approximately 5:00 p.m., he found that all of his liquor and $100 in cash had 
been stolen from his apartment.  He discussed the burglary with defendant and 
defendant’s roommate shortly after discovering the loss.  Defendant’s roommate 
commiserated, claiming that he and defendant had suffered a recent burglary.  
Gromme’s apartment was located one floor above defendant’s.   
 
Shirley Beasley testified that he and defendant burglarized the home of an 
older couple who lived in the Top of the Hill apartment complex and stole all of 
their liquor to have it for a party.  Defendant suggested committing the burglary, 
noting that the apartment was “right upstairs” from his apartment.  During the 
burglary, defendant took a knife from the kitchen and walked around the 
apartment.  Beasley testified that shortly after the burglary he and defendant 
commiserated with the occupants of the burglarized apartment, falsely claiming to 
have suffered a recent burglary themselves.   
Count 18 — the burglary of Bruno Gherardi’s residence 
On November 18, 1990, Bruno Gherardi’s home in Encinitas was 
burglarized.  The screen of his open bedroom window had been cut, and the 
sliding door to his bedroom was open.  His camcorder and its accessory bag were 
19 
missing, along with a knife from a butcher block in the kitchen.  The camcorder 
was traced to defendant.   
Count 19 — the attempted burglary of Patricia Van’s residence 
On December 19, 1990, Patricia Van returned to her home from the 
Miramar Road Family Fitness Center at about 9:30 a.m.  Approximately 20 
minutes later, she heard a soft knocking at the door and saw a man she identified 
at trial as defendant standing there.  She opened the door, and defendant asked for 
a person named Terry, but no one by that name resided there.  Her neighbor, 
Earline Schooner, stood behind defendant, and when she challenged him 
brusquely, he walked away.   
Schooner earlier had seen defendant examining nearby backyards.  After 
ten minutes, she saw him enter a side yard and approach Van’s front door.  
Schooner, having seen defendant exit from a vehicle, provided the police with the 
vehicle license number.  The automobile was registered to defendant, and he was 
stopped by the police at 2:30 p.m. on the same day while driving away from the 
Family Fitness Center on Miramar Road.  The vehicle was a gray Chevrolet 
Cavalier. The police cited defendant for his loud muffler.   
Count 20 — the burglary of Melinda Pinkerton’s residence 
At approximately 11 a.m. on January 8, 1991, Lynn Shudarek returned 
home from her workout at the Family Fitness Center on Miramar Road.  She heard 
someone knocking at the front door and then heard dogs barking.  She saw the 
doorknob moving.  She held the doorknob and looked out, observing an African-
American man who continued for a moment to try to open the door.  He departed 
and went toward Melinda Pinkerton’s residence, two doors away.   
When Pinkerton returned home at approximately 2:30 p.m. the same day, 
the kitchen cabinets had been pulled open and a butcher knife had been placed on 
the kitchen counter.  The sliding door leading to her backyard was open.  Her 
20 
camera was missing, and her lingerie had been moved.  Six rings and a gold chain 
were missing.   
Defendant pawned two of Pinkerton’s rings that same afternoon, using the 
name Rodney Higgs.  After defendant’s arrest, when his automobile was searched, 
the police found Pinkerton’s camera and a wallet containing identification 
belonging to Rodney Higgs.   
Count 21 — perjury 
Defendant used false identification and signed a false name when he 
pawned Melinda Pinkerton’s property. 
Count 22 — the attempted burglary of Karyl Oldenburg’s residence 
Karyl Oldenburg returned home from her workout at the Miramar Road 
Family Fitness Center at approximately 11:30 a.m. on January 22, 1991.  Once 
inside her home, she heard the doorknob on the front door jiggling.  Through the 
peephole she witnessed defendant standing with something in his hands, not 
knocking or ringing the doorbell.  As she went to telephone her husband, she 
observed defendant approaching the back door.  She proceeded to the garage and 
drove away.  When a few months later she saw defendant’s photograph in the 
newspaper, she telephoned the police to report the incident.  She identified 
defendant at a video lineup and at trial.   
Count 23 — the burglary of Patricia Van’s residence 
Approximately one month after the attempted burglary of the Van residence 
(count 19), Patricia Van’s home was burglarized.  On January 21, 1991, Van’s 
husband discovered that the sliding door to the patio had been damaged with a tool 
of some kind.  On January 23, 1991, at approximately 9:20 a.m., Van returned 
from her usual class at the Miramar Road Family Fitness Center.  Once inside her 
home, she discovered that the patio door was open; a window screen was propped 
up in the kitchen, and the kitchen window was broken.  The residence had been 
21 
ransacked.  A butcher knife had been placed on the kitchen counter.  Jewelry had 
been stolen, and that same afternoon defendant drove his acquaintance Mary Ann 
Knight to a pawnshop where she pawned an earring similar to one stolen from 
Van.   
Count 24 — the attempted burglary of Angela and Renata Yates’s 
residence 
On January 24, 1991, an African-American man driving a gray vehicle with 
a loud muffler followed Angela Yates, then 19 years of age, as she drove home 
from the Miramar Road Family Fitness Center.  She became aware that she was 
being followed, and attempted to evade her pursuer.  She arrived home, and while 
she showered, her mother, Renata, observed a shadow moving in the backyard.  
Upon inspecting, Renata discovered defendant, whom she later positively 
identified.  When he moved toward a sliding door, Renata screamed to her 
daughter to call the police and to “grab the gun.”  Their dog ran outside, and 
defendant ran away.  Neighbors witnessed an African-American man jump over 
the Yates’s fence and run to his vehicle.  He appeared agitated as he attempted to 
enter the vehicle, and drove off rapidly.  The muffler of the vehicle was noisy.   
Count 25 — the burglary of Louis Depamphillis’s residence 
Louis Depamphillis returned to his home on Nobel Drive close to midnight 
on February 1, 1991.  He had left his screened front window ajar.  When he 
returned, the screen had been removed.  His camera bag and  jewelry boxes had 
been moved.  When he went to a friend’s apartment to telephone the police, he 
noticed an African-American man driving away in an older model bluish-gray 
vehicle with a loud muffler, possibly matching the photograph of defendant’s 
automobile.  When the police responded to Depamphillis’s call, they noticed an 
adjacent apartment had an open front window from which the screen had been 
removed.  Police left a note for the occupant stating the apartment had been 
22 
burglarized.  When he eventually was arrested, defendant was wearing a ring that 
had been stolen from Depamphillis’s residence during the burglary.   
Count 26 — the burglary of Judy Kinney’s residence 
On February 3, 1991, after a two-day absence, Judy Kinney returned to her 
apartment on Nobel Drive not far from the Miramar Road Family Fitness Center, 
where she was a member.  The screen to a front window had been removed, and 
the apartment had been ransacked.  Her jewelry and lingerie drawers were open, 
and lingerie was draped on the drawers.  Her emerald ring and a gold chain had 
been stolen.  Defendant gave Kinney’s emerald ring to Brittan Lewis and the gold 
chain to Charla Lewis.  Kinney believed she had been followed home from the 
Family Fitness Center on Miramar Road approximately one month prior to the 
burglary.   
Count 27 — the attempted burglary of Geralyn Peters Venvertloh’s 
residence2 
On the morning of February 3, 1991, Geralyn Peters Venvertloh returned 
home to her Scripps Ranch apartment from her usual morning workout at the 
Family Fitness Center on Miramar Road.  She undressed for a shower, then heard 
the knob on the front door rattling.  She looked out and saw an African-American 
man leaning against the door with his hands in the area of the doorknob.  She 
dressed and exited from her apartment through a sliding glass door and proceeded 
to the back of the apartment complex.  She screamed for help.  Her neighbor, 
Jeffrey Pich, responded.  When Venvertloh and Pich walked to the front of her 
apartment, they observed the man still standing at the door, bent over and working 
                                              
2  
This witness had married and changed her surname from Peters to 
Venvertloh by the time of trial.   
23 
at the door with some object.  He wore gloves.  When challenged, the man claimed 
he was looking for his fiancé or a female friend whom he claimed to have seen 
entering Venvertloh’s home.  He walked away calling out a woman’s name.  Pich 
walked down the street looking for the would-be intruder and soon observed the 
man in question driving away in a noisy vehicle at a high rate of speed.  Geralyn 
Peters Venvertloh’s then-fiancé, Mark Venvertloh, arrived home and also 
witnessed an African-American man enter an older silver-colored vehicle and 
drive away noisily at a high rate of speed.  Having examined the intruder closely 
on that occasion, Pich identified defendant as the man he had seen on the front 
step of his neighbor’s residence.   
The next day, Geralyn Venvertloh, who was employed at the same location 
as Charla Lewis, witnessed a man drop off Lewis at work.  The man resembled 
defendant and drove an older model vehicle that had a loud muffler.  Pich 
identified defendant in a photo lineup that same day.  One month later Pich 
identified a photograph of defendant’s automobile, and later confirmed that the 
vehicle sounded like the one he had witnessed when defendant fled from 
Venvertloh’s apartment.   
A police officer took statements from Geralyn Peters Venvertloh, Pich, and 
Mark Venvertloh, and proceeded to the Family Fitness Center on Miramar Road 
with a description of the vehicle and the suspect.  The officer asked fitness center 
employees to inform the police in the event they witnessed either the man or the 
vehicle in the vicinity of the establishment.  The next morning, February 4, 1991, 
the fitness center’s front desk manager informed the police that she had observed a 
silver-colored automobile with a loud muffler driven by an African-American man 
proceed through the fitness center’s parking lot, returning 15 minutes later.  The 
employee observed the vehicle parked 30 feet from her office window and 
watched as the driver moved to the passenger side of the vehicle and slumped 
24 
down.  She was able to observe part of the vehicle license number, which she 
relayed to the police.  Law enforcement officers arrived 15 minutes later and 
confronted defendant, the occupant of the vehicle.   
Defendant informed the officers that he was waiting for his girlfriend, 
Cindy.  A person named Cindy was present at the fitness center at the time, and 
although she was acquainted with defendant, she was not his girlfriend and had no 
plan to meet him that day.  The officers placed defendant under arrest.   
A search of defendant’s vehicle uncovered a pair of black leather gloves in 
the center console and a pair of wool gloves on the driver’s seat.  Under the 
driver’s seat was a knife with an eight-inch blade and a five-inch handle.  On the 
right front floorboard was a folding knife with a two-and-one-half-inch blade and 
a four-inch handle.  Under the front seat were a steak knife and a small folding 
pocket knife.   
Other employees of the fitness center had observed defendant’s vehicle in 
the center’s parking lot on multiple occasions.  They had seen a person who may 
have been defendant seated in the vehicle, slumped in the passenger seat.   
Defendant was questioned and released after providing the  police with a 
blood sample.  Subsequently, on February 23, 1991, an undercover police officer 
witnessed defendant drive into the Miramar Road Family Fitness Center parking 
lot and, slowing as he observed a marked police vehicle parked in the lot, exit the 
center’s parking lot and drive away at a high rate of speed.  The muffler of his 
vehicle made a loud sound.   
Defendant was arrested on March 1, 1991, in Birmingham, Alabama. 
As discussed at greater length post, FBI Special Agent Larry Ankrom 
testified that the six murders bore common marks that led him to believe they all 
were committed by the same person.   
25 
 
2.  The defense case  
Two police officers testified that defendant’s automobile would not start 
without manual manipulation under the hood, and would function only if a metal 
object such as a screwdriver were placed under the hood to make an electrical 
connection.  Officers observed defendant start the vehicle in this manner while 
they had him under surveillance.  Defendant produced evidence indicating that 
jewelry traced to the burglaries of the DePamphilis and Kinney residences and the 
murder of Keller was not custom-made but was available commercially.  Charla 
Lewis testified that during the time she resided with defendant, he never arrived 
home in an agitated state or stained by blood.  Defendant introduced evidence 
establishing  that many companies other than his employer distributed to their 
employees gloves with the distinctive honeycomb or cross-hatch pattern that may 
have been used during the murders.   
Statements of various prosecution witnesses were impeached. 
Marsha Nelson, who was a neighbor of murder victim Janene Weinhold 
and observed defendant seated on the steps leading to Weinhold’s apartment on 
the day of the murder, had told a police interviewer immediately after the crime 
was discovered that the man she saw on the steps had his head in his hands the 
entire time she looked at him and that she was unable to see his face.  Nelson had 
circled defendant’s number at the live lineup, then crossed it out, explaining that 
too much time had elapsed since the crime.  Karyl Oldenburg (count 22) told the 
police at the time of the attempted burglary of her home that she might not be able 
to identify the perpetrator in a lineup.  Oldenburg’s identification of defendant was 
made after she had seen his picture in the newspaper, and although she identified 
defendant in a video lineup and at trial, she testified that unlike defendant, the man 
she saw at her front door did not have facial hair.  Dorothy Curtiss, the apartment 
manager of the complex where Schultz was murdered, failed to make an 
26 
identification at the live lineup even though she identified defendant at trial.  
Rodney Dunn, a maintenance worker at the apartment complex, cast doubt on 
Curtiss’s testimony that it was defendant who approached her seeking assistance 
on the day of Schultz’s murder.  On the day Schultz was murdered, Dunn, who 
was familiar with defendant’s appearance, was approached before noon by an 
African-American man who was not defendant.  The man asked for a screwdriver 
because he had locked himself out of his car.  The witness assisted the man in 
unlocking a vehicle that was not defendant’s.  Richard Williams, the maintenance 
worker who entered murder victim Tarr’s apartment with witness Ho to render 
assistance, had observed the perpetrator running toward him, but described that 
individual as probably Hispanic and selected someone other than defendant at the 
lineup.   
A witness, Carol Dhillon,  testified she had observed an encounter at the 
Buena Vista Gardens apartment complex similar to the incidents attributed to 
defendant, but the perpetrator was not defendant.  On a morning in mid-March 
1990, her 22-year-old daughter was taking a shower when Dhillon observed an 
African-American man looking up at her apartment.  Ten or 15 minutes later, 
when she retrieved the newspaper from her front step, the man pushed open the 
front door and said he was looking for his cousin.  Dhillon closed the door.  The 
visitor was not defendant. She saw the visitor again approximately two hours later, 
sitting on or standing by a parked older model automobile.   
Shirley Beasley, who on direct examination had testified that he had 
burglarized homes with defendant and had attributed incriminating statements to 
defendant, was flown to San Diego, where the police department paid for his 
lodging while he underwent interrogation.  Beasley thereafter was arrested for 
robbery.  He was in custody but had not yet been sentenced when he testified for 
the prosecution at defendant’s preliminary examination.  The prosecution’s 
27 
investigator testified on Beasley’s behalf at his sentencing, explaining that Beasley 
had been of assistance in the present case.  Beasley was sentenced to four years in 
prison, a relatively light sentence.  He was given immunity from prosecution for 
the burglaries he committed with defendant and for any other crimes he admitted 
in the course of his interrogation in the present case.  One of Beasley’s comments 
indicated he was interested in receiving the reward offered for capture of the so-
called Clairemont killer.   
Christine Fagan testified defendant had lunch with her on May 2, 1990, 
until approximately 2:30 p.m. on the day Leslie Hughes-Webb was attacked.  
They met at a location that would have made it extremely difficult for defendant to 
arrive at the beach by the time of the attack.  Fagan observed defendant wearing a 
gold nugget ring similar to the one the prosecution claimed had been stolen during 
the Keller murder, but Fagan’s meeting with defendant occurred prior to that 
murder.  (Under cross-examination by the People, Fagan added that defendant had 
stared intently at her during their lunch and aggressively demanded that she go 
somewhere with him, frightening her.)   
Raymond Huntley, the jailhouse informant, was impeached.  He had been 
convicted of multiple burglaries, robberies, and rapes, had escaped from a Florida 
prison, was facing a sentence of at least 20 years, and was a prison escapee at large 
in San Diego when he was arrested.  He shared a cell only briefly with defendant, 
later being returned to Florida to complete his prison term.  Approximately four 
months after his conversation with defendant, Huntley contacted the prosecution 
from Florida to offer information.  In exchange for his testimony against 
defendant, he received various benefits, including a transfer from a Florida prison 
to one in California and a potential early release date.   
Defendant also presented the testimony of an expert in the phenomenon of 
eyewitness identification.  She explained the many flaws in such identification and 
28 
the factors undermining accuracy, including fear, the lapse of time, the 
reinforcement of opinion that occurs during multiple proceedings, and the effect of 
a threat with a weapon on the accuracy of observation.  She explained that a 
person’s confidence in his or her identification is not indicative of the reliability of 
the identification.   
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented evidence establishing that the murders 
occurring at the Buena Vista Gardens apartment complex ceased after defendant 
moved out in the first week of May 1990.   
The jury found defendant guilty of the charged offenses and found true the 
knife-use and special circumstance allegations. 
 
B.  Penalty Phase Evidence 
 
1.  The prosecution’s case 
The prosecution presented evidence indicating that on December 7, 1991, 
prior to the trial, a search of defendant’s jail cell produced a toothbrush with a 
razor attached — a makeshift weapon typically known as a “shank.”  The object 
was hidden between the mattresses on defendant’s bed.   
The prosecution presented evidence of an additional jailhouse incident 
involving defendant.  Deputy Samuel Sheppard testified that on November 22, 
1991, when he arrived to conduct inmates from a recreation area to their cells, 
defendant told the deputy that he would “kick [his] sweet ass,” directing 
threatening gestures at the deputy while uttering these words.  Defendant 
continued to taunt or threaten the deputy, who grabbed defendant and pushed his 
face against the wall.  Defendant struck Sheppard in the ribs with his elbow and 
tried to trip him.  Sheppard forced defendant to the ground.  Other deputy sheriffs 
assisted in subduing defendant.   
29 
The prosecution also presented the testimony of several family members of 
the murder victims.  The parents of murder victims Schultz, Weinhold, and Tarr 
testified, as did Keller’s daughter.  They described the victims and the impact of 
the murders upon the families.   
The prosecution played an approximately 25-minute videotape of a 
television interview with Tarr that had been prepared by a local television station 
in her hometown a few months prior to her murder.  The program marked the 
accomplishments of certain successful local high school students.  In the 
interview, Tarr described her interests and activities, as well as her plans for 
college and for a potential career as an actress.   
 
2.  The defense case 
The defense presented the testimony of various members of defendant’s 
family and of one of his friends.  These witnesses described defendant’s 
childhood, the circumstance that when he was two years of age his father was 
convicted of murder and subsequently served 11 years in prison, and defendant’s 
formative years spent in a rundown, crime-ridden housing project in Alabama.  
Defendant was extremely short in stature as a child.  These witnesses offered 
evidence of defendant’s good character, including his close relationship with his 
paternal grandmother and faithful visits to her, his visits to his father in prison, his 
industriousness, his protective attitude toward relatives, his compassion, and his 
generosity.  Various relatives and a former girlfriend expressed their love for 
defendant and asked the jury to spare his life.   
A sociologist described the negative attributes of the housing project where 
defendant resided as a child, and offered the opinion that circumstances such as 
family violence, inadequate housing conditions, poor education, drug and alcohol 
abuse, and gang activity were harmful to a child’s development.  A high school 
30 
counselor described defendant’s development into a responsible person, and a 
pastor testified concerning defendant’s church activities.  A former employee of 
the Department of Corrections described the prison conditions experienced by 
persons sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The 
testimony of a fellow inmate suggested that defendant had not been the instigator 
of the conflict with Deputy Sheppard. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A.  Claims Affecting the Guilt Phase of the Trial  
 
1.  Motion for change of venue 
Defendant contends extensive pretrial publicity required a change of venue.  
He claims the trial court’s failure to grant his motions for change of venue 
(§ 1033, subd. (a)) constituted prejudicial error under state law and a violation of 
his right to due process of law and to a fair trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed 
by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  
We disagree. 
a.  Factual background 
The charged offenses occurred between January 1990 and February 1991.  
Defendant was apprehended in March 1991.  The preliminary examination 
commenced on February 24, 1992.  Defendant filed a motion for change of venue 
on September 14, 1992.  In support of his motion for change of venue, the defense 
proffered evidence of the more than 270 newspaper articles that had appeared 
concerning the crimes, the criminal investigation, defendant’s eventual arrest in 
Alabama and extradition, and the preliminary examination.  There was evidence 
suggesting that television coverage was similar in extent, as the parties stipulated.  
It also was stipulated that one television station used defendant’s image in quick 
cuts along with the images of Robert Alton Harris and Craig Peyer, persons who 
31 
had been convicted of murder in San Diego County.  Defendant’s image was on 
the screen for “under a second and a half.”   
As might be expected when a series of six similar murders occurs in a 
community over a period of approximately one year without a culprit being 
quickly identified, the publicity in the present case was pervasive and occasionally 
potentially prejudicial — particularly during the period the crimes remained 
unsolved and the perpetrator remained at large.  Newspaper articles recounted the 
growing fear among residents of the neighborhoods where the crimes occurred; 
articles noted the apparent connection among the crimes, and the eventual 
designation of the murders as “serial killings”; articles recounted the increasing 
police resources devoted to the investigation, which eventually was the most 
extensive in San Diego County history; articles recounted the disproportionate 
impact of the investigation upon African-American men in the affected 
neighborhoods, and assertedly prejudicial articles predicted another attack and 
compared the crimes to those committed by the notorious Jack the Ripper.   
Defendant also proffered articles recounting his arrest in Alabama and the 
relief that ensued among residents of San Diego, especially in neighborhoods in 
which the murders had occurred; his efforts to resist extradition from Alabama; 
and providing negative information concerning his family, including his father’s 
conviction of murder.  In addition, he presented articles in which persons surmised 
they had experienced close brushes with defendant and might have been his next 
victim.  News articles noted that defendant was suspected of having committed 
two additional unsolved murders and mentioned his Navy court-martial for theft.  
An article described defendant’s eviction from the Top of the Hill apartment 
complex for participating in a fight.  The crimes were featured on the television 
program America’s Most Wanted.   
32 
Defendant also presented evidence indicating that the news media had 
reported on damaging evidence that was uncovered during the investigation and 
also at the preliminary examination, including testimony by identification 
witnesses, statements to the press, and preliminary examination testimony 
attributing incriminating statements to defendant, lab results claiming a DNA 
match between  samples taken from defendant and evidence found at the scene of 
the Weinhold murder, and the circumstance that defendant’s girlfriend possessed 
jewelry stolen from the victims.   
The defense also presented the testimony of Paul Strand, an expert who 
conducted a public opinion survey in February 1992, prior to the preliminary 
examination.  According to Strand, approximately 74 percent of the 300 persons 
surveyed were aware of the case despite the circumstance that only two related 
news items had appeared during the previous six months.  Of those aware of the 
case, Strand reported that 25 percent were predisposed to find defendant guilty.  
Strand conducted another survey in September 1992.  Seventy-seven percent of 
the respondents were aware of the case and, of that group, 24 percent were 
predisposed to find defendant guilty.  There had been a burst of publicity around 
the time of the preliminary examination in February and March of 1992, but very 
few news items appeared between April and mid-September of 1992.   
The trial court acknowledged that the crimes had been serious and the 
publicity intense.  The court noted that neither the victims nor the defendant had 
been prominent or notorious other than in connection with the charged crimes.  To 
the extent defendant was an outsider, the court observed that San Diego is a Navy 
town, where many individuals might be considered outsiders.  The court observed 
that Tarr, one of the murder victims, also was an out-of-town visitor, and 
commented that other victims lacked long-standing ties to the community.   
33 
The court also commented that sensational news coverage concerning crime 
permeates our culture in general, and surmised that citizens become inured to such 
coverage or accord it the same weight as entertainment.  The court distinguished 
the present case from another San Diego County prosecution, that of Robert Alton 
Harris (see People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935), concluding that the news 
coverage in the present case lacked the animosity and prejudgment that had been 
conveyed in press reports concerning Harris and, rather, left open the question of 
defendant’s guilt.  Moreover, the investigation continued for a protracted period, 
during which two persons other than defendant were arrested, and residents 
appeared uncertain whether defendant actually was the culprit.  Turning to the 
public opinion surveys, the court commented upon the size and diversity of the 
county’s population and upon the circumstance that the surveys demonstrated that 
a low percentage of potential jurors had formed an opinion concerning defendant’s 
guilt.  Under these circumstances, the court could not conclude it was reasonably 
likely that counsel and the court would be unable to empanel a fair jury.   
The court anticipated that “we’re going to see a lot of people on the panel 
who are familiar with the case,” but also anticipated that even persons who 
casually stated a belief in a defendant’s guilt to a poll taker would find that, as 
jurors, the seriousness of the trial would cause them to set aside their assumptions 
and judge the case based upon the evidence presented in court.   
Further, the court reminded counsel that “it’s going to be one of our tasks in 
jury selection to talk to people who’ve seen the evidence and ask whether they’ve 
come to a conclusion.  And whatever they say, whether it’s ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ that’s 
obviously not going to be conclusive . . . .”   
Defendant moved for reconsideration, supplying previously unavailable 
videotapes of television news coverage of the crimes.  According to defendant’s 
pleadings, San Diego’s channel 39 repeatedly combined defendant’s image with 
34 
the images of three convicted murderers from San Diego and various other 
newsworthy images as part of the brief “spots” promoting one of its news 
programs.  According to defendant, this advertisement appeared 950 times over a 
13-month period ending approximately six months prior to the present trial.   
Speaking in connection with his motion for reconsideration, defense 
counsel stated that he expected to renew the motion for change of venue “once we 
commence jury selection and once the court really sees the nature of publicity, 
how it has affected people.”  Counsel did not renew the motion, however. 
The case was reassigned to another judge for trial.  That judge denied the 
motion for reconsideration, adopting the analysis and conclusion of the court that 
had heard the original motion.  
b.  Analysis 
State law provides that a change of venue must be granted when the 
defendant demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that a fair trial cannot be held in 
the county.  (§ 1033;  People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 278-279.)  “ ‘ “The 
factors to be considered are the nature and gravity of the offense, the nature and 
extent of the news coverage, the size of the community, the status of the defendant 
in the community, and the popularity and prominence of the victim.” ’ ”  (Id. at 
p. 279.) 
On appeal, we conduct de novo review of the evidence presented to the 
superior court to determine whether the court should have granted a change of 
venue.  (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 943.)  In addition, on appeal 
“ ‘ “the defendant must show both that the court erred in denying the change of 
venue motion, i.e., that at the time of the motion it was reasonably likely that a fair 
trial could not be had, and that the error was prejudicial, i.e. that it [is] reasonably 
likely that a fair trial was not in fact had.” ’ ”  (Ibid.) 
35 
We agree with the superior court that the nature of the crimes and the 
intensity of publicity in the present case might weigh in favor of a change of 
venue, but “ ‘the same could be said of most multiple or capital murders.  This 
factor is not dispositive.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 
523.)  San Diego County’s population at the time of the trial was estimated at two 
million persons, and “ ‘[t]he larger the local population, the more likely it is that 
preconceptions about the case have not become imbedded in the public 
consciousness.’  . . .  The key is whether . . . the population is of such a size that it 
‘neutralizes or dilutes the impact of adverse publicity.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. 
Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 363; see also People v. Harris, supra, 28 Cal.3d at 
p. 949.)  We have concluded that even a lower population of 1.4 million (Santa 
Clara County) “suggests that any prejudicial publicity’s effect would be diluted or 
neutralized over time.”  (People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 523.) 
Neither defendant nor the victims were prominent or notorious apart from 
their connection with the present proceedings.  As in other cases, “[a]ny uniquely 
heightened features of the case that gave the victims and defendant any 
prominence in the wake of the crimes, which a change of venue normally attempts 
to alleviate, would inevitably have become apparent no matter where defendant 
was tried.”  (People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 523.)  We acknowledge the 
prejudice that may have attended the circumstances that defendant is African-
American and the victims all were White women, and that the crimes included one 
rape and other crimes having sexual undertones.  (See People v. Williams (1989) 
48 Cal.3d 1112, 1129.)  This element of possible prejudice presumably would 
follow the case to any other venue, however.  (See People v. Dennis, supra, 17 
Cal.4th at p. 523; see also People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 806.)  The 
publicity did not emphasize defendant’s race or employ inflammatory terms to 
kindle racial hatred. 
36 
We also observe that the bulk of the publicity upon which defendant relies 
was disseminated between the time of the second murder in February 1990 and the 
time the preliminary examination took place in February 1992, and that 
approximately one additional year elapsed between that hearing and the 
commencement of jury selection in March 1993.  The television promotional 
material of which defendant complained was withdrawn in July 1992.  The 
passage of time ordinarily blunts the prejudicial impact of widespread publicity.  
(See People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 944; People v. Dennis, supra, 17 
Cal.4th at p. 524; see also People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 623.)  We 
also may presume that potential and seated jurors did not read or watch news 
reports concerning the case against defendant that may have been disseminated 
during jury selection and the ensuing trial, because the jury questionnaire directed 
potential jurors not to expose themselves to news coverage for the duration of their 
service. 
Defendant also fails to establish a reasonable likelihood that pretrial 
publicity in fact deprived him of a fair trial.  Pervasive publicity alone does not 
establish prejudice.  (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 448.)  Jurors who 
have been exposed to publicity still may serve.  “ ‘ “It is sufficient if the juror can 
lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence 
presented in court.” ’ ”  (Ibid.; see also People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 
Cal.4th 1, 45.)  
The superior court’s confidence that, despite the publicity, the venire would 
consist primarily of persons who had not formed an opinion as to defendant’s guilt 
was borne out by subsequent proceedings.  Although a high percentage of the 
prospective jurors and 12 of the 13 jurors who actually served at trial (one juror 
was excused after the guilt phase and an alternate was substituted) had been 
exposed to the publicity, the jurors’ responses to the juror questionnaire and voir 
37 
dire did not disclose any prejudgment or emotional bias.  Rather, for the most part 
they displayed only a vague recollection of past news coverage, a circumstance 
suggesting the absence of prejudice.  (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 
945.)  Significantly, the jurors asserted that the publicity would not prevent them 
from serving as unbiased jurors.  (See People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 448 
[relying upon similar assertions]; People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at p. 46 [same].)  Defendant refers to voir dire answers of three of the 
seated jurors:  Juror H.E., Juror J.G., and Juror A.W.  None of these jurors made 
statements suggesting they had prejudged the case or were biased because of the 
pretrial publicity.  (Juror H.E. — the juror remembered when defendant was 
arrested, but said it was not of great moment to him; Juror J.G. — he knew 
nothing specific, just that there were some killings in a certain neighborhood, and 
he had read nothing about the case since the time defendant was extradited to 
California; Juror A.W. — she read about the case and was frightened.  When 
defendant was arrested, she asked herself “is it him or not?”)   
Defendant insists we cannot believe jurors who are aware of publicity but 
profess not to have formed an opinion concerning guilt or otherwise to have been 
prejudiced by publicity.  Although “such assurances are not conclusive” (People v. 
Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 361), neither do we presume that exposure to 
publicity, by itself, causes jurors to prejudge a defendant’s guilt or otherwise 
become biased.  (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 945.)  “[T]he Supreme 
Court has made clear that we cannot, as a general matter, simply disregard a 
juror’s own assurances of his impartiality based on a cynical view of ‘the human 
propensity for self-justification.’ ”  (DeLisle v. Rivers (6th Cir. 1998) 161 F.3d 
370, 384.)  It was the function of the voir dire examination to expose actual bias or 
prejudice, but the voir dire in this case did not demonstrate a biased or prejudiced 
jury.  Courts must distinguish between “mere familiarity” with the defendant or 
38 
the crime and an “actual predisposition” against the defendant.  (Murphy v. 
Florida (1975) 421 U.S. 794, 800, fn. 4.)  A court may discount a juror’s claim to 
be untouched by publicity when “most veniremen will admit to a disqualifying 
prejudice” (id. at p. 803), but the venire in the present case was not pervaded by 
bias in this manner.  
Moreover defense counsel did not renew the motion for change of venue at 
the conclusion of voir dire and, moreover, did not exhaust his peremptory 
challenges.  Putting aside any question whether counsel’s inaction constituted a 
forfeiture of the issue on appeal, counsel’s conduct supports a reasonable inference 
that the defense did not believe that pretrial publicity had prejudiced the seated 
jurors or rendered them unable to afford defendant a fair trial.  Indeed, “ ‘[t]he 
failure to exhaust peremptories is a strong indication that “the jurors were fair and 
that the defense itself so concluded.” ’ ”  (People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 
524; see also People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 623; People v. Coffman 
and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 46.) 
Defendant urges that no rational inference that counsel was satisfied with 
the jury can be drawn from counsel’s failure to exhaust peremptory challenges.  
He contends that the denial of the motion for change of venue had left defense 
counsel with a venire that was saturated with persons who had been exposed to the 
pretrial publicity and that included a substantial proportion of jurors who must 
have prejudged defendant.  He adds that defense counsel were aware of which 
juror would be called should they exercise a peremptory challenge and may have 
found the next prospective juror even worse than the juror they might have 
excused.3   
                                              
3  
Defendant also claims that “comments made by defense counsel, in seeking 
additional challenges after exhausting all they had for alternate jurors, 
(footnote continued on next page) 
39 
In essence, defendant claims that the publicity was so pervasive and 
inflammatory that, under federal constitutional guarantees, prejudice must be 
presumed.   
In exceptional cases, “ ‘adverse pretrial publicity can create such a 
presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors’ claims that they can be 
impartial should not be believed,’ [citation] . . . .”  (Mu’min v. Virginia (1991) 500 
U.S. 415, 429, italics added.)  “The category of cases where prejudice has been 
presumed in the face of juror attestation to the contrary is extremely narrow.  
Indeed, the few cases in which the [high] Court has presumed prejudice can only 
be termed extraordinary, [citation], and it is well-settled that pretrial publicity 
itself — ‘even pervasive, adverse publicity — does not inevitably lead to an unfair 
trial.’  [Citation.]”  (Delisle v. Rivers, supra, 161 F.3d at p. 382.)  This prejudice is 
presumed only in extraordinary cases ⎯ not in every case in which pervasive 
publicity has reached most members of the venire.  We do not believe the present 
case falls within the limited class of cases in which prejudice would be presumed 
under the United States Constitution.4 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
demonstrated a dissatisfaction with the entire selected jury, not just the alternates.  
Defense counsel stated:  ‘We are in very bad — we didn’t use hardly any, used 
any challenges on the major part.  We are stuck with some very bad jurors.  We 
are very upset with the jurors that we have.’ ”  The quoted comments, however, 
related to the alternates and suggest dissatisfaction with the venire’s attitude 
toward the death penalty, and do not connect counsel’s dissatisfaction with the 
pretrial publicity. 
4  
As in previous cases in which a defendant claimed error in denying a 
change-of-venue motion, “[d]efendant argues he was denied a reliable 
determination of his penalty guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment, citing 
Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 328-329, which held that ‘it is 
constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by 
a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the 
(footnote continued on next page) 
40 
We acknowledge that the high court has held that prejudice may be 
presumed in some limited instances.  The court declared that although jurors who 
are familiar with some facts of the crime may be qualified to serve because they 
can put aside their views and reach a verdict based upon the facts in evidence, 
“[a]t the same time, the juror’s assurance that he is equal to this task cannot be 
dispositive of the accused’s rights, and it remains open to the defendant to 
demonstrate ‘the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as 
will raise the presumption of partiality.’  [Citation.]”  (Murphy v. Florida, supra, 
421 U.S. at p. 800, italics added.)   
The United States Supreme Court decisions that have presumed that pretrial 
publicity was prejudicial involved extreme circumstances, however.  In one case 
in which the high court reversed a judgment, the critical feature was that a local 
television station in a relatively small community on several occasions broadcast 
the entire spectacle of the defendant’s jailhouse confession.  (Rideau v. Louisiana 
(1963) 373 U.S. 723, 727.)  Explaining two other cases in which the high court 
presumed prejudice, the court stated that “[t]he trial in [Estes v. Texas (1965) 381 
U.S. 532] had been conducted in a circus atmosphere, due in large part to the 
intrusions of the press, which was allowed to sit within the bar of the court and to 
overrun it with television equipment.  Similarly, [Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966) 384 
U.S. 333] arose from a trial infected not only by a background of extremely 
inflammatory publicity but also by a courthouse given over to accommodate the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
appropriateness of the defendant’s death lies elsewhere.’  He also cites Woodson v. 
North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, which invalidated a law that provided a 
mandatory penalty of death for all first degree murders.  Defendant fails to explain 
how either of these [principles] has any relevance to the present case.”  (People v. 
Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 436.) 
41 
public appetite for carnival.  The proceedings in these cases were entirely lacking 
in the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that 
subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of a mob.  They cannot 
be made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to information about a 
state defendant’s prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he 
is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process.”  (Murphy 
v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 799.)  The reviewing court instead must look for 
“indications in the totality of the circumstances that [the defendant’s] trial was not 
fundamentally fair.”  (Ibid.) 
Defendant has not demonstrated similarly extreme circumstances.  We 
acknowledge that in the present case there was extensive print and television 
coverage of the crimes, the search for the perpetrator, the fears engendered by the 
nearly year-long series of murders, and defendant’s subsequent arrest and 
extradition.  A further spike in publicity occurring at the time of the preliminary 
examination served to summarize the earlier events and added potentially 
prejudicial information, such as an overstatement of the incriminating value that 
the cautious trial court eventually permitted to be attributed to the DNA evidence, 
defendant’s incriminating statements to a friend, the murder conviction of 
defendant’s father, and the circumstance that some of the victims’ jewelry could 
be traced to defendant.  Some elements of the news coverage could be labeled 
inflammatory or sensational, for example when the perpetrator — then 
unidentified — was compared with Jack the Ripper or a television announcer 
referred to a “reign of terror,” when newspaper and television articles emphasized 
the community fear provoked by the murders, and when the television promotional 
spot repeatedly exhibited defendant’s image along with those of locally well-
known convicted murderers.  As noted, the crimes were of a nature that might 
42 
arouse racial animus, although the news coverage itself did not exploit this 
circumstance.  
On the other hand, the bulk of the newspaper articles and television reports 
merely recounted the facts of the crimes, the course of the investigation, and the 
circumstances of defendant’s arrest.  There were articles and reports concerning 
the arrest and potential prosecution of other persons and, as the trial court 
observed, it appeared from the news reports that the community remained 
uncertain whether it was defendant who actually was the perpetrator.  The great 
bulk of the articles and reports was framed in neutral terms and did not “amount[] 
to an ‘out-of-court campaign to convict,’ reflecting ‘ “inflamed public sentiment 
[citation]” ’ such as when a defendant is persistently labeled in incendiary terms; 
‘a “werewolf,” a “fiend,”a “sex-mad killer,” and the like’ [citations].  As the . . . 
Court observed, coverage that consists of ‘straight news stories rather than 
invidious articles which would tend to arouse ill will and vindictiveness,’ 
[citation], is not so troubling.”  (DeLisle v. Rivers, supra, 161 F.3d at p. 385.)   
In the present case, defendant does not allege that there was a barrage of 
publicity immediately preceding the trial.  “[C]essation of publicity for some 
period prior to trial will go a long way toward undoing the damage of a previous 
media blitz.”  (DeLisle v. Rivers, supra, 161 F.3d at p. 385.)  Defendant’s own 
expert noted the small number of articles and reports that were published between 
the preliminary examination and the hearing on the motion to change venue.  The 
promotional television spot upon which defendant places great weight was 
withdrawn approximately six months prior to trial.  The juror questionnaire 
instructed prospective jurors not to expose themselves to any further media 
coverage.  Defendant does not contend on appeal that the media intruded and 
created a circus atmosphere at trial.  The entire venire contained only a small 
proportion of persons who had formed an opinion as to defendant’s guilt, and 
43 
nothing in the record suggests the panel of seated jurors harbored any opinion 
concerning defendant’s guilt.  Contrary to defendant’s claim, “we cannot, as a 
general matter, simply disregard a juror’s own assurances of his impartiality based 
on a cynical view of ‘the human propensity for self-justification.’  [Citation.]”  (Id. 
at p. 384.)5  On balance, defendant fails to persuade us that his was one of the 
extraordinary cases in which prejudice must be presumed.  We conclude that 
defendant has failed to demonstrate a violation of his federal constitutional right to 
a trial by an impartial jury or to due process of law.  
 
2.  Expert opinion evidence  
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him of 
a fair trial when, on motion of the prosecution, it permitted FBI Special Agent 
Larry Ankrom to testify as an expert that, based on his experience comparing the 
records of hundreds of crime scenes, various common marks among the six 
charged homicides led him to conclude the crimes were committed by the same 
person.  Defendant asserts a violation of his constitutionally guaranteed right to 
the presumption of innocence absent proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  
(U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.)  He also claims a denial of his right to reliable 
factfinding in a capital case  (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Caldwell v. Mississippi, 
                                              
5  
Indeed, “it is beyond question that mere prior knowledge of the existence of 
the case, or familiarity with the issues involved, or even some preexisting opinion 
as to the merits, does not in and of itself raise a presumption of jury taint; such a 
standard would be certainly unsalutary, and likewise impossible to achieve: [¶]  ‘It 
is not required . . . that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues 
involved.  In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of 
communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the 
public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors 
will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case.’ ”  
(DeLisle v. Rivers, supra, 161 F.3d at p. 382.) 
44 
supra, 472 U.S. 320), and what he terms an “arbitrary deprivation of the state-
created protection of Evidence Code section 800” in violation of his right to due 
process of law.  (U. S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.)   
 
The prosecution announced prior to trial that it intended to call FBI Special 
Agent John Douglas to testify as an expert on crime scene analysis and “signature 
crimes,” anticipating Douglas would express his opinion that all six charged 
murders had been committed by the same person.  Evidently the prosecution also 
anticipated that Douglas would testify concerning psychological elements 
involved in serial murders.   
 
Defendant objected to the proposed testimony on multiple grounds, 
including Douglas’s lack of qualifications as an expert on psychological matters 
(Evid. Code, § 720), improper subject matter for expert testimony (Evid. Code, 
§ 801), relevance (Evid. Code, § 210), and the testimony’s prejudicial impact 
outweighing its probative value.  (Evid. Code, § 352.)  Defendant also relied upon 
“the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
analogous provisions of the California Constitution.” 
The court conducted a lengthy pretrial hearing, receiving extensive 
testimony from Douglas and his colleague, FBI Special Agent Ankrom.  The court 
did not believe the witnesses’ training or experience qualified them to express an 
opinion regarding the probable state of mind of the perpetrator, and that aspect of 
the proposed testimony was excluded.  The court concluded the witnesses had 
sufficient training and experience in crime scene investigation, however, and that 
the subject matter of “crime scene analysis and the signature crimes” was beyond 
common experience.  The court ruled the proposed testimony on that limited topic 
was admissible.  The prosecution elected not to call Douglas; only Ankrom 
testified. 
45 
Ankrom’s qualifications as a crime scene expert were significant.  As he 
testified, he was a 13-year veteran special agent for the FBI.  For the five years 
preceding the trial, he had been assigned to the FBI’s National Center for the 
Analysis of Violent Crime (Center), a clearinghouse and pool of experts from 
whom law enforcement agencies throughout the nation sought advice and 
assistance.  In conjunction with his position with the Center, Ankrom received two 
years of intensive training in criminology and other academic topics and, more 
specifically, was trained to review comprehensive information concerning crimes 
and to perform a “criminal investigative analysis” of the case material for various 
purposes, including to develop a profile of the perpetrator, to make 
recommendations on interview strategy, and to give advice regarding “linkage” 
between potential serial crimes. 
Ankrom’s experience was based not only on his training but also on his five 
years as an active agent who had been called upon to review comprehensive 
information regarding hundreds of crimes and to offer expert advice to law 
enforcement agencies whose investigations in these cases faced obstacles or had 
failed to produce results.  Ankrom’s experience included reviewing records related 
to various serial homicide cases and conducting lengthy interviews with eight 
convicted serial killers for the purpose of identifying evidence that would link the 
crimes committed by each perpetrator.  He had reviewed autopsy reports, police 
reports, photographs, and other records for “well over a hundred” female homicide 
victims who had been stabbed to death, and he testified that in his experience the 
multiple deep, clustered stab wounds such as occurred in the present case were 
unusual. 
According to Ankrom, he and other agents at the Center analyze crime 
evidence for “linkage” by looking for common methods of operation among 
groups of crimes — that is, the methods used by the criminals to complete their 
46 
crimes and to achieve the intended murder, rape, or other crime.  In addition to 
identifying common methods among a series of crimes, the agents look for 
signature elements — actions that were not necessarily involved in or necessary 
for completing the crimes, but that served as distinctive common denominators 
among the crimes.   
Ankrom further testified that the San Diego Police Department contacted 
the Center in early 1990 concerning the Schultz and Weinhold murders.  Ankrom 
reviewed autopsy reports, crime scene photographs, autopsy protocols, criminal 
investigative reports, maps, and social histories of the victims.  In April 1990, the 
San Diego Police Department contacted him to report the Tarr murder.  In 
September 1990, that agency reported the Clark murders to him.  At the request of 
the San Diego Police Department, which relied upon his superior expertise in 
crime scene analysis, Ankrom thereafter met personally with members of the San 
Diego Police Department investigative team, reviewed the evidence with them, 
and offered his advice.  The department informed him in February 1991 of the 
Keller murder.   
Ankrom testified that it was his opinion that all six murders were 
committed by the same person.  During his analysis of the crimes, he noted certain 
common features, as follows:  The murders occurred in a small geographical area 
of San Diego, the first three having occurred in adjacent apartment complexes.  
Most occurred between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m., and they occurred in the victims’ 
residences.  There was no mark of forced entry.  The weapon used was a knife, 
and the victims were White females.  Beyond these features exhibiting a common 
modus operandi, the crimes bore certain distinctive marks.  In each murder except 
that of Tarr, where the murder was interrupted, there were numerous stab wounds 
that were tightly clustered in each victim’s chest and were extremely deep, 
sometimes penetrating to the victim’s back.  According to Ankrom, another 
47 
distinctive common denominator was the position of the victims when found.  
They were lying on their backs, nude or in a state of partial undress, and seemed to 
Ankrom to be positioned for display.  The expert’s opinion that all the murders 
were committed by the same person was “very firm.” 
Defendant contends Ankrom’s testimony was inadmissible under state law 
because it concerned matters that were not beyond the common experience of 
jurors.  He points out, for example, that jurors are charged with evaluating whether 
similarities among charged and uncharged crimes suggest the same person 
committed the crimes or that the perpetrator’s intent or motive was the same in 
committing each crime. (Evid. Code, § 1101.)6  On the other hand, he urges, 
expert opinion is restricted to subjects that are “sufficiently beyond common 
experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.”  (Evid. 
Code, § 801, subd. (a), italics added.) 
We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court’s 
decision to admit the testimony of an expert.  (People v. Robinson, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 630.)  The trial court obviously exercised its discretion in the present 
case; it gave very careful attention to the issue, holding an extensive hearing, 
engaging in discussion with counsel, and ultimately excluding any testimony 
concerning the perpetrator’s probable state of mind, motive, or intent.  We 
conclude for a number of reasons that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
the present case.   
First, although ordinarily courts should not admit expert opinion testimony 
on topics so common that persons of “ ‘ordinary education could reach a 
                                              
6  
We summarily reject defendant’s claim that the various charged crimes 
were not sufficiently similar to have been admissible pursuant to Evidence Code 
section 1101.  That statute has no application to charged crimes. 
48 
conclusion as intelligently as the witness’ ” (People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 
351, 367, disapproved on another ground in People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 
896, 914), experts may testify even when jurors are not “wholly ignorant” about 
the subject of the testimony.  (People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 367.)  
“If that [total ignorance] were the test, little expert opinion testimony would ever 
be heard.”  (Ibid.)   
Rather, the pertinent question is whether, even if jurors have some 
knowledge of the subject matter, expert opinion testimony would assist the jury.  
(Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a), People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 367.) 
We acknowledge that ordinarily jurors are equipped to examine crime 
scene photographs and autopsy evidence and to form an opinion, in the context of 
their own perception of the evidence in the particular case, whether the wounds 
depicted are so similar they suggest the wounds were inflicted by the same 
person.7 
Notwithstanding the ability of jurors to review the evidence before them 
and draw commonsense inferences, it may aid them to learn from a person with 
extensive training in crime scene analysis, who has examined not only the 
evidence in the particular case but has in mind his or her experience in analyzing 
hundreds of other cases, whether certain features that appear in all the charged 
crimes are comparatively rare, and therefore suggest in the expert’s opinion that 
                                              
7  
Contrary to the suggestion of defense counsel at oral argument that Ankrom 
simply reviewed the same crime scene photographs reviewed by the jury, Ankrom 
testified he also reviewed, both in the present case and the hundreds of other cases 
he had analyzed, autopsy photographs, protocols from the autopsies, police 
investigative reports (concentrating on the report of the officers who were first on 
the scene), maps, background information concerning the victims, and the history 
of crimes in the pertinent geographic locations. 
49 
the crimes were committed by the same person.  A juror could assume that most 
stabbing victims are found on their backs, or that tightly clustered six-and-a-half-
inch stab wounds to the chest are characteristic of murders by stabbing.  In the 
present case, however, Ankrom was asked whether in his extensive experience 
“the tight clustered wound pattern, the depth of the wounds, in combination with 
the women being found on their backs, is that distinct?”  And he testified in 
response: “It is.  In my opinion it’s something that we would find in our review of 
other cases to be a rare occurrence,” especially in conjunction with the additional 
and consistent similarities in modus operandi he identified among the murders in 
the present case.  He added: “To see that the wound pattern takes place in that 
exact spot repeatedly is something that is a distinct common denominator.”  Under 
these circumstances, we cannot conclude the testimony was of no assistance to 
jurors who previously never had examined crime scene evidence other than the 
evidence before them, nor can we conclude Ankrom’s evidence “ ‘ “would add 
nothing at all to the jury’s common fund of information.” ’ ”  (People v. Farnam 
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 163.) 
Another basis for our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting Ankrom’s testimony is that other courts have permitted 
expert opinion testimony in comparable circumstances.  Experts on the subject of 
crime scene reconstruction, for example, ordinarily may be permitted to give 
opinion testimony concerning such matters as the probable location where the 
crime occurred, notwithstanding the jury’s ability to examine photographs, 
coroner’s reports, and other evidence to form their own common sense 
conclusions regarding the crime scene.  (People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
pp. 162-163.)  
Perhaps even more to the point, courts have held an expert may testify 
concerning criminal modus operandi and may offer the opinion that evidence 
50 
seized by the authorities is of a sort typically used in committing the type of crime 
charged.  An experienced police officer may testify as an expert, for example, that 
tools discovered in a defendant’s automobile are of the type commonly used in 
burglaries.  (People v. Jenkins (1975) 13 Cal.3d 749, 755.)  A police inspector 
may explain that conduct such as that engaged in by the defendant constituted the 
“usual procedure” followed in committing the crime of “till tapping.”  (People v. 
Clay (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 87, 93; see also People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
398, 438 [a detective with relevant training may furnish expert opinion concerning 
the gang-related significance of the defendant’s tattoo]; People v. Gardeley (1996) 
14 Cal.4th 605, 617 [the expert properly testified concerning the culture and habits 
of criminal street gangs, opining on whether certain behavior constituted gang-
related activity];  People v. Martinez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 400, 413-414 [an 
expert properly testified that a gang ordinarily will exact revenge upon a gang 
member who reveals gang confidences]; People v. Gamez (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 
957 965 [based upon his expertise concerning the modus operandi of armed 
robbers, an officer properly testified concerning the probable intent to commit 
robbery exhibited by persons who acted as the defendants did].) 
Federal cases have upheld the admissibility of testimony by a trained police 
officer explaining “that a defendant’s activities were consistent with a common 
criminal modus operandi.”  (U.S. v. Webb (9th Cir. 1997) 115 F.3d 711, 713, and 
cases cited; see also U.S. v. Cross (D.C. Cir. 1991) 928 F.2d 1030, 1050, and cases 
cited; U.S. v. Espinosa (9th Cir 1987) 827 F.2d 604, 612.)  Such modus operandi 
“ ‘evidence helps the jury to understand complex criminal activities and alerts it to 
the possibility that combinations of seemingly innocuous events may indicate 
criminal behavior.’ ”  (U.S. v. Webb, supra, 115 F.3d at p. 714.)  Testimony 
concerning criminal modus operandi may be helpful to the jury even if the modus 
operandi is not particularly complex.  (Ibid.; see also U.S. v. Hankey (9th Cir. 
51 
2000) 203 F.3d 1160, 1168-1169 [explaining the trial court’s duty to evaluate the 
reliability of the evidence].) 
In United States v. Rogers (9th Cir. 1985) 769 F.2d 1418, the court 
determined that it was appropriate for an FBI agent to testify as an expert that of 
the 1,800 robberies that had occurred in Los Angeles, only two were perpetrated in 
a bank vault by a person wearing a bandana.  The evidence was relevant to prove 
that the two charged robberies were committed by the same person.  The court 
commented that it is settled “law enforcement officers may testify concerning the 
techniques and methods used by criminals.”  (Id. at p. 1425.)  The court continued:  
“The testimony as to the frequency of bandana wearing in Los Angeles area bank 
robberies was relevant to the identity of the perpetrator of the robberies.  The fact 
that very few robberies involve this garb make it more likely that the same person 
committed both robberies.”  (Id. at p. 1426.) 
One sister-state decision specifically extends the rule permitting 
experienced officers to testify concerning criminal modus operandi to the topic of 
expert opinion testimony on modus operandi admitted for the purpose of 
establishing linkage among crimes.  The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that 
an FBI agent properly was permitted to testify as an expert regarding serial 
murders, and that he properly could opine that the three charged murders were 
committed by the same person.  (Pennell v. State (Del. 1991) 602 A.2d 48, 55.)  
The court determined that the expert had extensive and specialized experience 
with signature crimes and crime analysis.  (Ibid.)  It added that the expert’s 
testimony could assist the jury in understanding behavior “unknown to the general 
public.”  (Ibid.) 
Respondent has acknowledged and brought to our attention one state court 
decision reaching a different conclusion on so-called linkage evidence.   In that 
case, the defendant was prosecuted for murder and the state introduced evidence 
52 
of an uncharged rape and attempted murder.  The prosecution called upon an 
expert from the FBI to testify that the charged murder, which occurred in New 
Jersey, and the uncharged attempted murder, which occurred in Maine (and during 
which the defendant was apprehended), bore common marks in terms of their 
modus operandi and their “ritualistic” elements, and that the same person 
committed both crimes.  The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that the 
“linkage” evidence was inadmissible, reasoning that the expert’s opinion was 
based upon behavioral science of doubtful and unproven reliability.  (New Jersey 
v. Fortin (N.J. 2000) 745 A.2d 509, 513-514.)  The New Jersey court believed that 
the “linkage” concept had not “attained such a state of the art as to have the 
scientific reliability of DNA testing”  (id. at p. 514), and there was no evidence it 
was accepted in the scientific community or even that it could be tested outside the 
FBI center where the theory had been developed.  (Ibid.) 
To the extent the New Jersey expert was offering testimony similar to 
Ankrom’s, we believe the New Jersey court erred in comparing such testimony to 
DNA evidence.  In our view, that court applied an incorrect standard in searching 
the “scientific community” for “peers to test [the expert’s] theories” and 
“duplicat[e] his results.”  (New Jersey v. Fortin, supra, 745 A.2d at p. 514.)  
Ankrom’s testimony was based upon his extensive experience, not theories that 
normally would be subject to peer review or that would be otherwise comparable 
to DNA testing.  (See U. S. v. Hankey, supra, 203 F.3d at p. 1169 [expert opinion 
on gang culture is not examined for acceptance in the scientific community, nor 
should it be subject to peer review]; see also Pennell v. State, supra, 602 A.2d at p. 
55 [distinguishing FBI agent’s “linkage” testimony on the same basis].)8   
                                              
8  
We do not mean to imply that expert testimony based upon experience 
rather than technical expertise is not subject to scrutiny for reliability.  (See U. S. 
(footnote continued on next page) 
53 
Defendant contends Ankrom’s testimony falls under a different line of 
judicial decisions.  He likens this testimony to “profile” evidence, which defendant 
asserts must be excluded.  A profile ordinarily constitutes a set of 
circumstances — some innocuous — characteristic of certain crimes or criminals, 
said to comprise a typical pattern of behavior.  In profile testimony, the expert 
compares the behavior of the defendant to the pattern or profile and concludes the 
defendant fits the profile.  (See People v. Robbie (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1075, 
1084; see also People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 357, 358.) 
The comparison is unavailing because, unlike profile evidence, Ankrom’s 
testimony did not refer to defendant at all.  We agree with the Delaware Supreme 
Court, which in rejecting a claim that similar linkage testimony constituted 
“profile” evidence, explained “ ‘Profile’ evidence is that which attempts to link the 
general characteristics of serial murderers to specific characteristics of the 
defendant.”  (Pennell v. State, supra, 602 A.2d at p. 55, italics added.)  The 
testimony in that case indicating that three murder scenes bore such common 
marks that, in the opinion of the expert, they suggested the crimes had been 
committed by the same person did not seek to tie characteristics of serial 
murderers to characteristics of the defendant.  (Ibid.) 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
v. Hankey, supra, 203 F.3d at p. 1169 [exhaustively discussing trial court’s 
gatekeeping responsibility]; U. S. v. Vesey (8th Cir. 2003) 338 F.3d 913, 916-917 
[trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a defense expert, a convicted drug 
trafficker, who would have testified concerning the usual practice in drug 
transactions, and explaining scope of court’s discretion in assessing reliability]; 
Kaye, et al., New Wigmore Treatise on Evidence (2004) , Expert Evidence § 9.3.3, 
pp. 323-325 [analyzing reliability requirement in light of Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. 
Carmichael (1999) 526 U.S 137].) 
54 
Significantly, Ankrom’s testimony did not evaluate defendant’s behavior 
against a pattern or profile.  Ankrom did not offer an opinion that he believed 
defendant was the culprit, nor did he relate his findings to defendant at all.  
Instead, he compared documentary evidence of the crime scenes in the present 
case and, based upon his observation of common marks and his experience, 
concluded the crimes had been committed by a single person.  In any event, profile 
evidence does not describe a category of always-excluded evidence; rather, the 
evidence ordinarily is inadmissible “only if it is either irrelevant, lacks a 
foundation, or is more prejudicial than probative.”  (People v. Smith, supra, 35 
Cal.4th at p. 357.)  In sum, “[p]rofile evidence is objectionable when it is 
insufficiently probative because the conduct or matter that fits the profile is as 
consistent with innocence as guilt.”  (Id. at p. 358.)   
Defendant next claims that Ankrom’s testimony that he was confident the 
same person committed all the crimes invaded the province of the jury and 
constituted testimony concerning the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.  Having 
argued the jury was perfectly capable of using common sense to determine 
whether similarities at the crime scenes suggested all the crimes were committed 
by the same person, defendant claims Ankrom’s testimony rendered the jurors 
incapable of making such a determination.  According to defendant, it was solely 
the jury’s obligation to determine whether the asserted similarities among the 
crimes warranted the inference that a single person had committed them.  In 
essence, defendant argues, the expert improperly rendered an opinion on guilt or 
innocence in violation of Evidence Code section 800 and defendant’s right under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution to reliable 
factfinding in a capital case, and the admission of this testimony also constituted 
an arbitrary deprivation of state procedural rights and to due process of law in 
55 
violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal 
Constitution. 
Despite the circumstance that it is the jury’s duty to determine whether the 
prosecution has carried its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, opinion 
testimony may encompass “ultimate issues” within a case.  Evidence Code section 
805 provides that  “[t]estimony in the form of an opinion that is otherwise 
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact.”  (See People v. Valdez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 494, 
597 [a gang expert testified that the defendant was a member of a particular gang 
and that his activities were undertaken on behalf of the gang].)   
Of course an expert’s opinion that a defendant is guilty is both unhelpful to 
the jury — which is equally equipped to reach that conclusion — and too helpful, 
in that the testimony may give the jury the impression that the issue has been 
decided and need not be the subject of deliberation.  But Ankrom did not testify 
that defendant was guilty, nor did Ankrom tell the jury whom to believe or direct 
the jury toward a specific conclusion on any element of the charged crimes.  His 
testimony did not mention defendant at all.  Ankrom’s conclusion, based upon 
special training and experience in evaluating the records of hundreds of crime 
scenes, that he believed all the crimes were committed by the same person, did not 
bind the jury, nor would Ankrom’s testimony be understood as essentially 
directing a verdict.  The court instructed the jury that they were the exclusive 
judges of credibility (CALJIC No. 2.20), and that they were not bound by an 
expert’s opinion, being free to accord the opinion the weight it deserves after 
considering the basis for the opinion (CALJIC No. 2.80). 
Defendant next contends Ankrom’s testimony constituted or closely 
resembled improper “mathematical probability evidence” such as that disapproved 
by this court in People v. Collins (1968) 68 Cal.2d 319.  In that case, an expert 
56 
witness (a mathematics instructor) testified that there was a one in 12 million 
chance that the defendants were not guilty.  (Id. at p. 325.)  An eyewitness had 
observed some characteristics of the perpetrators, such as that they seemed to be a 
White woman with a blonde ponytail accompanied by an African-American man 
with a beard in a yellow automobile, and the expert used these assertedly 
distinctive features to calculate the probability that a couple other than the 
defendants could have met this description.  This court reversed the judgment, 
because the expert’s opinion testimony had no basis in the facts.  For example, one 
of the “factors” relied upon by the expert was the presence of a yellow automobile 
at the scene, but there was no evidentiary basis for the expert’s bold assertion that 
“one out of every ten cars which might have been at the scene of the robbery was 
partly yellow.”  (Id. at p. 327.)  Further, there was no proof that the characteristics 
selected for analysis were mutually independent — a necessary precondition to the 
statistical operation known as the “product rule.”  (Id. at p. 328, see also id. at p. 
325 [the product rule “states that the probability of the joint occurrence of a 
number of mutually independent events is equal to the product of the individual 
probabilities that each of the events will occur” (italics & fn. omitted)]; see also 
People v. Soto (1999) 21 Cal.4th 512, 525.)  We found the error prejudicial, 
because it distracted the jury from its task and encouraged jurors to rely upon “an 
engaging but logically irrelevant expert demonstration.”  (People v. Collins, supra, 
68 Cal.2d at p. 327.) 
The present case is distinguishable, because Ankrom’s testimony was not 
cloaked in scientific garb but was expressed as a matter of professional experience 
gained over a lengthy period of observation.  Moreover, as defendant does not 
deny, the facts relating to the charged crimes analyzed by Ankrom were well 
established, and Ankrom did not employ a mathematical formula to add a specious 
weight to his conclusion. 
57 
People v. Hernandez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 225 is of no assistance to 
defendant.  There a computer was used to search a police database respectively for 
sex crimes committed in a restricted area prior to the defendant’s arrival in the 
neighborhood, and for such crimes committed subsequent to his arrest and 
incarceration.  The search was directed at crimes that bore similarity to those with 
which the defendant was charged.  The prosecution’s argument was that the 
absence of similar crimes in the database when defendant no longer was in the 
neighborhood demonstrated that defendant likely was guilty.  The reviewing court 
reversed for lack of a proper foundation establishing that the data entered into the 
computer was accurate and complete.  (Id. at p. 240.)  
By contrast, Ankrom analyzed multiple sources, including primarily his 
own professional experience, in drawing the conclusion that the same person had 
committed all of the charged murders.  He did not rely upon the absence of 
evidence shown by a system of data collection that might omit pertinent evidence. 
Next defendant contends  the trial court abused its discretion under 
Evidence Code section 352 in permitting Ankrom to testify, asserting that the 
probative value of the evidence was slight and the potential for undue prejudice 
was great.  He argues that the trial court arbitrarily violated the principles 
underlying Evidence Code section 352, thereby denying him various constitutional 
rights, including his right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the federal Constitution, his right to a reliable penalty 
determination pursuant to Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, and his rights 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the presumption of innocence and 
to the requirement that the prosecution meet its burden of proving defendant’s 
guilt of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Defendant claims the evidence had slight probative value, because Ankrom 
failed to recognize salient distinctive features in the various crimes and overstated 
58 
the evidentiary value of the asserted similarities.  These claims go to the weight, 
not the admissibility of the evidence.  It was for defendant to expose the 
weaknesses in the expert’s opinion on cross-examination — and defendant did so.  
Nor do we see the overwhelming prejudicial impact posited by defendant.  We do 
not believe that Ankrom’s stature as an FBI agent employed at the special center 
he described would cause the jury to abandon its function as factfinder, especially 
in light of the guidance offered to the jury by the court’s jury instructions. 
We also reject defendant’s various constitutional claims.  At trial, defendant 
objected to Ankrom’s testimony “based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution and analogous provisions of the California 
Constitution.”  Assuming, without deciding, that the points asserted by defendant 
properly were preserved (see People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434), 
they are without merit for the same reasons that defendant’s state-law claims have 
been rejected.  (See People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 211.)  As we have 
concluded in past cases, “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence generally 
does not impermissibly infringe upon a capital defendant’s constitutional rights.”  
(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035.)  Defendant has not persuaded us 
that his case presents an exception to this rule. 
Finally, defendant contends Ankrom’s testimony that the Center’s work had 
exonerated an innocent person in the past violated defendant’s constitutional 
rights.  Defendant claims: “The jurors would have undoubtedly understood this 
aspect of Agent Ankrom’s testimony as meaning that Ankrom’s unit reviewed 
many thousands of homicide cases, and if they had found any others that were 
similar to the crimes charged against [defendant], they would have surely brought 
that to the attention of the appropriate authorities.  Furthermore, the implication 
was clear that such review would continue in the future, and if they discovered 
after the present trial that somebody else was committing similar crimes, that 
59 
would be brought to the attention of the authorities.  Thus, even if [defendant] 
were wrongly convicted and sentenced to death, he would nonetheless be freed 
before any execution occurred.  [¶] . . .  Thus, the jury was not merely encouraged 
to rely on the Agent’s expertise to overcome their own doubts; in addition, they 
were encouraged to rely on Agent Ankrom’s unit to discover and correct any error 
they might make.”  According to defendant, these circumstances deprived him of 
the reliable factfinding that is required in capital cases under Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320. 
Defendant did not object on this basis during Ankrom’s testimony or 
proffer the constitutional argument he has made in this court, and this aspect of his 
claim therefore is forfeited.  (People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 433-434.)  
In any event, we find no error.  Defendant has not cited any rule of evidence that 
would require the exclusion of such testimony, and his concerns about the effect 
upon the jury of the testimony in question rest solely upon speculation. 
 
3.  Discovery 
During discovery, the defense received a report prepared by Ankrom 
regarding the investigation he conducted in the present case.  The report expressed 
the opinion the crimes were linked, citing considerable evidence and Ankrom’s 
experience.  The report also mentioned that FBI agents at the center maintained a 
database of the various violent crimes that had been reported to them and that the 
database (called the VICAP database) was designed to track serial killers.  Of the 
5,000 homicides in the database at the time of the present crimes, some involved 
multiple stabbing deaths of female victims in their homes, but none were similar to 
the signature aspects of the crimes charged in this proceeding. 
The defense moved for discovery of the VICAP database, claiming it 
formed one of the bases for Ankrom’s opinion and was critical to adequate cross-
60 
examination.  The prosecution responded that it lacked authority to disclose the 
confidential VICAP database, that the request should be addressed to the FBI, and 
that the prosecution had disclosed to the defense all material relating to the present 
crimes that Ankrom had referred to in his report.  After a hearing, the trial court 
agreed that in the event Ankrom proposed to testify concerning the VICAP 
database and the extent to which it provided a basis for his opinion, the defense 
was entitled to examine the database record of the cases in which female murder 
victims had been stabbed multiple times in their homes.   
Ankrom responded that he would not testify concerning the VICAP 
database and instead would base his trial testimony on his personal experience, 
which the court had established was substantial.  Agent Douglas agreed the 
database results were not essential to support an opinion that the murders in the 
present case were linked. 
The court ruled that Ankrom would not be permitted to testify regarding the 
VICAP database but stated it credited Ankrom’s testimony that his opinion would 
not be based upon the FBI database. 
The defense renewed the discovery request at the conclusion of Ankrom’s 
testimony on direct examination, claiming Ankrom’s conclusion that the clustered 
stabbing pattern in the present case was “in our experience a rare occurrence” 
must have been based on a comparison of the present case with the cases in the 
FBI database, and that discovery of that database was essential to permit adequate 
cross-examination. 
The court denied the motion, stating: “I don’t think it’s necessary for this 
witness, or any other witness for that matter, to bring in each and every prior case 
that one has examined in order to provide a fair opportunity to cross-examine that 
witness.” 
61 
Defense counsel then cross-examined Ankrom, eliciting testimony that he 
never had worked as a homicide investigator and never had been to a homicide 
crime scene, and that he never had examined a map of the entire San Diego 
County area and was not certain of the location of the sites of the murders within 
the area.  Defense counsel vigorously challenged the witness’s view that certain 
elements of the crimes were similar and distinctive, asking him to compare the 
present crimes with others in which the perpetrator left bizarre “signature” marks.  
Under cross-examination, Ankrom conceded that another unsolved stabbing case 
that occurred in San Diego County while defendant was in custody bore certain 
similarities to the charged murders.  Defense counsel himself then elicited the 
information that the witness had consulted a large FBI database, and attempted 
unsuccessfully to bring before the jury the circumstance that the defense had not 
been provided access to that database.  On inquiry by defense counsel, the expert 
again expressed his opinion that the crimes were committed by a single person, but 
that this opinion was not based on the database.   
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his discovery 
motion directed at the FBI database allegedly used by Ankrom (and Douglas) in 
forming the opinion that all the murders charged in the present case were 
committed by the same person.   
Defendant claims the denial of discovery deprived him of fundamental 
fairness because, he claims, it impaired his ability to cross-examine the expert as 
to the basis for his opinion.  Defendant also relies upon Evidence Code section 
721, subdivision (a), which provides that “a witness testifying as an expert may be 
cross-examined to the same extent as any other witness and, in addition, may be 
fully cross-examined as to . . . (3) the matter upon which his or her opinion is 
based and the reasons for his or her opinion.”  Defendant’s argument is premised 
upon the circumstance that an expert’s stated opinion is only as reliable as the 
62 
matter that forms the basis for his or her opinion.  In the view of the defense, it 
was “forced to accept the mere conclusions of the witness, without the materials 
needed to test their strength.” 
“The defendant generally is entitled to discovery of information that will 
assist in his defense or be useful for impeachment or cross-examination of adverse 
witnesses.  [Citation.]  A motion for discovery must describe the information 
sought with some specificity and provide a plausible justification for disclosure.  
[Citation.]  The court’s ruling on a discovery motion is subject to review for abuse 
of discretion.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 953.)  
The defense was not entitled to examine all the written records generated 
during Ankrom’s career in order to be able to cross-examine him concerning his 
own professional experience.  (See People v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th 271, 299 [a 
defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated by the court’s denial of a 
request for discovery of the many sources of the expert’s gang expertise, including 
conversations with inmates and other investigations].)  Nor was the defense 
entitled to challenge the basis for the expert’s opinion by examining him 
concerning a database not relied upon by the expert.   
Defendant disputes that Ankrom could have formed his opinion without 
relying upon the database.  He claims the distinctive marks identified by Ankrom 
as the basis for his opinion were not truly distinctive, so that the only true basis for 
Ankrom’s opinion must have been his mental comparison of the charged crimes 
with all the other crimes in the VICAP database.  We are not persuaded.  At the 
pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the expert’s testimony, the court credited 
the expert’s claim that his opinion was not based upon the database, and Ankrom 
had ample personal experience upon which to base his opinion. 
With respect to defendant’s right of confrontation and cross-examination at 
trial, defendant’s lack of access to the VICAP database did not impair his ability to 
63 
cross-examine the expert concerning the basis for his opinion, nor was it unfair to 
permit the expert to testify without providing such access.  The expert informed 
the court that the database was not the basis for his opinion, and the court credited 
this claim.  Ankrom personally had reviewed records in more than 100 murder 
cases in which a female victim was stabbed to death.  The trial court acted well 
within its discretion in concluding that Ankrom based his opinion upon his 
personal experience in the field of crime analysis, and at trial Ankrom’s testimony 
conformed to this expectation on the part of the trial court.  Defendant cross-
examined the expert regarding his training and the scope of his experience, and 
challenged the expert’s opinion by questioning him on the differences that existed 
among the charged crimes.  In addition, as the trial court noted, the defense could 
have impeached the witness by presenting coroner’s testimony that the stabbing 
wounds in each murder were distinctive. 
Defendant contends that an arbitrary deprivation of state-created discovery 
rights deprived him of due process of law, citing Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 
U.S. 343, but he fails to identify any violation of such rights.9   
                                              
9  
Defendant claims the court at least should have conducted in camera review 
of the FBI database in order to determine whether “due process and fundamental 
fairness required making some of the materials available to the defense.”  In 
support he cites White v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, where 
the appellate department of the superior court concluded the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in ordering an in camera hearing to determine whether the 
defendant’s right to impeach the credibility of a peace officer, who investigated 
allegations that the defendant assaulted a ward in a juvenile facility, should 
overcome the Inspector General’s claim that disclosure would be against the 
public interest.  The appellate department simply determined that the trial court 
had not abused its discretion, and certainly did not hold that an in camera hearing 
should be held whenever a defendant seeks access to materials that he or she 
believes provided a basis for an expert’s opinion.  
64 
Defendant also relies upon People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324 for the 
proposition that a defendant should be given “wide latitude in the cross-
examination of experts to test their credibility.  [Citation]  If a witness frustrates 
cross-examination by declining to answer some or all of the questions, the court 
may strike all or part of the witness’s testimony [and] . . . may decline to admit the 
testimony in the first instance.”  (Id. at p. 421.)  In that case, we concluded the 
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a defense witness 
concerning prison gangs, because the expert was unwilling to identify the persons 
he had interviewed for the study that formed the basis for his opinion.  The court 
was within its discretion in concluding that the expert’s unwillingness to disclose 
would unduly impair cross-examination.  (Ibid.)  But in the present case, the 
database that defendant wished to examine was not the basis for the witness’s 
opinion. 
Defendant contends that withholding access to the FBI database violated 
his constitutional right to effective counsel, thus denying him the right to present a 
meaningful defense, a fair opportunity to be heard, and the constitutional right to 
reliable factfinding in a capital case.  Defendant has not identified a state law or 
constitutional right affording access to the FBI database, so his right to effective 
counsel was not impacted.  There was no denial of a state-created right; as we 
have seen, defendant had the opportunity to present a meaningful defense and had 
a fair opportunity to be heard with respect to the admissibility of the expert 
testimony, and his inability to examine the expert concerning something the expert 
denied considering as a basis for his opinion did not undermine the reliability of 
the factfinding process. 
Defendant invokes his right to compulsory process, claiming his lack of 
access to the FBI database “depriv[ed] [him] of evidence clearly bearing on the 
credibility of key prosecution witnesses.”  In support, he cites Brady v. Maryland 
65 
(1963) 373 U.S. 83, Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, and Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 57-58.  As these cases recognize, the prosecution must 
disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense.  (See also In re Brown 
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 879 [discussing application of this principle to information 
under the control of separate agencies that form part of the prosecution team]; In 
re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-544 [discussing the right to disclosure of 
evidence that would impeach a prosecution witness].)  But the database is not part 
of the record, and the record on appeal does not indicate there exists any material 
or exculpatory evidence in the database.  “As we have done in the past, ‘[b]ecause 
defendant’s claim is dependent upon evidence and matters not reflected in the 
record on appeal, we decline to consider it at this juncture.’ ”  (People v. Jenkins, 
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 952.)10 
Finally, defendant claims that Ankrom’s testimony “encouraged the jury to 
ignore any reasonable doubts” and to rely upon his expertise, while the denial of 
defendant’s discovery request left the defense unable to “test the strength of the 
bases of the witness’s conclusions.”  The consequence, defendant claims, was that 
the court “improperly lightened the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a 
                                              
10  
To the extent defendant’s claim concerns pretrial discovery and is based 
upon the confrontation or compulsory process clauses of the Sixth Amendment, it 
is on a weak footing.  “As we have previously observed, in light of the divided 
views of the justices of the Supreme Court . . . it is not at all clear ‘whether or to 
what extent the confrontation or compulsory process clauses of the Sixth 
Amendment grant pretrial discovery rights to the accused.’  [Citations].”  (People 
v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1126; see also People v. Gurule (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 557, 592 [discussing the limits on a defendant’s constitutional right to 
disclosure prior to trial]; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 577, fn. 11 
[“the high court has never held that the confrontation clause requires more than the 
opportunity to ask the witness questions pertinent to his or her credibility” (italics 
omitted)]; Alvarado v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1121, 1134-1135.)  
66 
reasonable doubt.”  We reject this claim, having determined that Ankrom properly 
was permitted to testify as an expert and that defendant had an adequate 
opportunity to challenge the basis for Ankrom’s opinion. 
 
4.  Admissibility of evidence of defendant’s statements   
Defendant contends  the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the 
testimony of Robin and Robert Romo and Ernest Tu’ua recounting defendant’s 
incriminating statements.   
a.  The Romos’ testimony 
Robin Romo testified she resided in an apartment in the Buena Vista 
Gardens complex with her husband Robert and a roommate, Tony.  Defendant 
visited her home weekly, partly to see her roommate, with whom he worked out in 
the gym on an almost daily basis.  Within one or two days after the murder of 
Holly Tarr, defendant visited her.  Robin Romo informed him of Tarr’s murder, 
and he said “Yes, I remember.  I was at the pool.  I saw her leaving.”  Defendant 
did not explain how he had recognized Tarr prior to the publicity surrounding her 
murder.  One or two days later, defendant visited again while Robin’s husband and 
two other persons were present.  Robin testified that defendant told them “that he 
had gone out on a date with this woman and was taking her home.  He knew that 
she wanted him.  When they got there she had changed her mind and said that he 
was crazy.  And so he forced himself on her.  Then when he was done, got up, 
turned around, she was crying, so he said he went back and did her again, got 
dressed and left.”   
Robert Romo testified that defendant had discussed his relations with 
women and had said something about a girl crying.  Defendant may have 
mentioned “slapp[ing] her around.”  In sum, “he was leaving some girl, she was 
crying and she had said something to him.  He had said that he went back to her, 
67 
did her again.”  According to Robert, defendant was graphic and vulgar in 
describing his relations with women. 
David Holden, who was an acquaintance of defendant’s early in 1991, 
testified that defendant told him he had met a girl named Janene and had worked 
out with her at a club.  Defendant told Holden that he had gone to the woman’s 
home and had sex with her on one or two occasions, but that he could not continue 
the relationship because the woman was married.11   
Prior to trial, defendant objected to the admission of the incriminating 
statements he made to Robin Romo, citing the corpus delicti rule and Evidence 
Code sections 352 and 1101, as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the California 
Constitution.  Defendant’s theory was that the statement admitted the commission 
of another rape (not the rape of Janene Weinhold), that a corpus delicti had not 
been established for the other rape, that the uncharged rape constituted improper 
bad character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, and that this evidence 
should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 as more prejudicial 
than probative.  The superior court (Wellington, J.) determined that circumstantial 
evidence tied defendant to the rape of Weinhold, and that defendant’s admission 
was relevant to prove that defendant had raped Weinhold.  The court declared:  
“By itself, unsupported by the rest of the evidence, it would be pretty unpersuasive 
and perhaps inadmissible; but in context with the rest of it, frankly, it is my 
impression that it is a substantial and significant point.”  In the court’s view, 
                                              
11  
Defendant mentions this evidence, but it is difficult to determine whether 
on appeal he is challenging the admission of Holden’s testimony.  Any claim of 
error is forfeited, because defendant did not object to this testimony at trial.  (Evid. 
Code, § 353; People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 228.) 
68 
defendant’s claim that the connection to the Weinhold murder was too tenuous to 
make this evidence admissible went to the weight of the evidence, not its 
admissibility.  When the case was transferred to the trial court, Judge Hayes 
adopted Judge Wellington’s comments and rulings, adding that the evidence did 
not constitute bad character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, because 
it related to a charged crime. 
At trial (after Robin Romo and David Holden already had testified), 
defendant objected to the admission of Robert Romo’s testimony on the same 
grounds raised with regard to Robin Romo’s testimony, emphasizing that Robert’s 
testimony should be excluded as character evidence barred by Evidence Code 
section 1101, that it was cumulative to Robin’s testimony, and that it was unduly 
prejudicial.  The court thereafter ordered the witness to be examined outside the 
presence of the jury, warning him not to refer to defendant’s statement that he had 
tied up a woman and not to volunteer any information.  Defendant renewed his 
objection under Evidence Code section 352.  The court responded that the 
evidence was relevant and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial 
impact, overruling the objection on the same basis upon which it earlier had ruled 
on the admissibility of Robin Romo’s testimony.   
Defendant contends the statements made by Robin Romo were of slight 
probative value, because they were made some seven weeks after Weinhold’s 
murder, they did not identify the woman to whom defendant referred in his 
admission, there was no evidence defendant had a consensual dating relationship 
with Weinhold, the statement’s reference to a “date” seems inconsistent with a 
midday murder, and the statement was ambiguous.  On the other hand, defendant 
argues, the prejudicial impact of the evidence was great because it suggested 
defendant had a “disposition to sexually assault women” and, he claims, the 
evidence was used in the prosecutor’s closing argument to just that effect. 
69 
We examine the court’s action for abuse of discretion (People v. Rowland 
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 264) and conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying defendant’s Evidence Code section 352 motions to exclude the Romos’ 
testimony.  Contrary to defendant’s claim, this testimony had a “tendency in 
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact” (Evid. Code, § 210), namely that he 
had raped Weinhold in the weeks prior to his conversation with the Romos.  
Defendant was linked to the crime by the DNA evidence, his statement to Holden 
that he had been dating a woman named Janene, and the testimony of Weinhold’s 
neighbor that she had observed defendant sitting on the stairs leading to 
Weinhold’s apartment.  Indeed, as the trial court observed, the statements 
defendant made to the Romos had considerable probative value.  Further, these 
statements were admissible even if they were not “clear and unambiguous” 
admissions, and even though they did not include any admission of the murder.  
(People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1035).  Contrary to defendant’s claim, the 
statements did not constitute evidence of other crimes reflecting negatively on 
defendant’s general character — their reference was to a charged crime.   
Defendant contends the court did not expressly weigh the prejudicial 
impact of the evidence against its assertedly slight probative value.  Although the 
record must “affirmatively show that the trial court weighed prejudice against 
probative value” (People v Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 924, disapproved on 
another point in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 822-823, fn. 1), the 
necessary showing can be inferred from the record despite the absence of an 
express statement by the trial court.  (Ibid.)  The record indicates the court gave 
careful consideration to defendant’s claims at hearings held outside the presence 
of the jury.  The court considered an offer of proof as to the anticipated testimony 
of Robert Romo and excluded certain damaging elements of the witness’s 
statements from evidence.  The court referred to the high probative value of the 
70 
evidence, and we properly may infer that the court determined that the probative 
value outweighed any undue prejudice. 
Defendant contends the trial court also erred in its ruling admitting Robert 
Romo’s testimony for the reason that this testimony was cumulative and added 
highly prejudicial matter through Romo’s volunteered statement that he “didn’t 
know if he slapped her around” and that defendant’s conversation was so “vulgar 
and graphic” that Romo left the room.  The circumstance that defendant may have 
“slapped around” a woman who may have been one of the murder victims was 
relevant to the rape charge, and the defense could cross-examine the witness on 
this point.  The reference to vulgar and graphic conversation simply described the 
tone of the conversation and was of negligible prejudicial impact. 
b.  Tu’ua’s testimony 
In June and July of 1990, Ernest Tu’ua was defendant’s supervisor at Expo 
Stucco Products.  Tu’ua testified that defendant told him he was having sex with a 
mother and her daughter, using the term “doing” to indicate sexual relations.  
Defendant told him the mother was a massage therapist.  Defendant said he was 
able to manipulate the daughter and play “mind games,” disrupting the close 
relationship between the mother and the daughter.  
Defendant objected on the basis of relevance and Evidence Code section 
352, and renews those claims in this court.  We conclude the trial court was within 
its discretion in finding the evidence relevant and determining that its probative 
value was not outweighed by its prejudicial impact.  The evidence tied defendant 
to the subsequent murders of Pamela and Amber Clark.  The two victims were 
mother and daughter, and Pamela was a massage therapist.  In light of the other 
evidence demonstrating defendant’s modus operandi and planning activity, the 
circumstance that the murders occurred some weeks subsequent to the 
71 
conversation does not eliminate the probative value of the conversation.  The 
circumstance that defendant presented evidence that he had patronized another 
massage therapist, Gayle Sovinee, during this period, did not render Tu’ua’s 
testimony irrelevant — it was for the jury to determine whether to believe that the 
massage therapist to whom defendant referred in his conversation with Tu’ua was 
Pamela Clark or Sovinee.  (Sovinee did not have a daughter and testified she 
treated defendant on only one occasion and did not date him.)   
Having contended the Romo and Tu’ua testimony was without probative 
value and was irrelevant, and that its prejudicial impact far outweighed its 
probative value under state law, defendant also claims the admission of the 
testimony constituted an arbitrary deprivation of state-guaranteed rights in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, citing Hicks v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. 343.  He adds that the 
admission of this testimony denied him the right to a reliable verdict under the 
Eighth Amendment and Beck v. Alabama, supra, 447 U.S. 625, 638, footnote 13, 
and Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. 280.   
Application of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not 
impermissibly infringe upon a capital defendant’s constitutional rights.  (People v. 
Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1035-1036.)  The trial court did not err under state 
law, and defendant does not provide any persuasive reason for us to conclude that 
the application of California’s rules of evidence violated his constitutional rights, 
nor does he establish any basis for concluding that the admission of this evidence 
rendered the jury’s death penalty verdict unreliable.  
 
5.  Exclusion of Tiffany Schultz’s statements concerning conflict 
with her boyfriend   
Christopher Burns testified as a prosecution witness.  He was Tiffany 
Schultz’s boyfriend.  The couple shared a two-bedroom apartment with another 
72 
man, Daniel Ganss.  Burns testified that when he left for work on the day of 
Schultz’s murder, she was still in bed.  Burns returned from work at approximately 
5:30 p.m.  He testified that he believed the front door was locked.  Schultz’s towel, 
some suntan oil, and the top of her swimsuit were on a lawn chair located by the 
front door, and the rear screen door and sliding glass door were open.  Ordinarily, 
the sliding door was left open if someone was home, but the screen was kept 
closed.  The door to Ganss’s room was closed.  Burns departed for a 6:15 p.m. 
appointment at a tanning salon.  He returned home after 7:00 p.m., straightened up 
the apartment, and prepared some food.  Ganss returned home and Burns, having 
become worried, asked him if he knew where Schulz was.  When Ganss opened 
his bedroom door, the two men discovered her body.  Law enforcement officers 
arrested Burns for the murder but released him three days later. 
Prior to trial, anticipating that the defense would seek to use certain 
evidence either in cross-examination of Burns or in its case-in-chief, the 
prosecution filed an in limine motion seeking exclusion of police reports of the 
statements of six witnesses who were acquainted with Schultz.  The declarants had 
informed law enforcement officers that Schultz had made statements to them 
asserting that Burns had struck her and threatened her with a knife, that the couple 
had furious arguments over Schultz’s employment as an exotic dancer, and that 
Burns enjoyed pornography.  The prosecutor asserted that during the trial, he 
would not examine Burns concerning his relationship with Schwartz, leaving the 
topic unavailable for cross-examination.  The prosecutor contended that the six 
statements constituted inadmissible hearsay, adding that defendant lacked 
evidence to demonstrate third party culpability that would be admissible pursuant 
to People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 833 (Hall), in which we declared that 
otherwise admissible evidence of third party culpability should be admitted if it is 
“capable of raising a reasonable doubt of [the] defendant’s guilt.”   
73 
 
Defendant, for his part, filed a motion “in support of admissibility of out-
of-court statements made by Tiffany Schultz.”  Specifically, the motion sought an 
order permitting counsel to cross-examine Burns “regarding certain out-of-court 
statements made by Tiffany Schultz shortly before her death.”  The motion relied 
in part upon the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and parallel provisions of the state Constitution.  Defendant claimed 
primarily that he should be permitted to use the statements for the purpose of 
attacking Burns’s credibility, but added that if the court determined the statements 
were being offered for their truth, they then would be admissible as evidence of 
third party culpability.  (Although at times defendant’s position has been unclear, 
the record requires that we reject respondent’s claim that the defense did not seek 
admission of the statements as evidence of third party culpability.)  Defense 
counsel also sought permission to examine Burns concerning his relationship with 
Schultz.  In support of his motion, defendant proffered investigative reports by the 
San Diego Police Department memorializing police interviews with the six 
persons in question.12  
                                              
12  
The police treated Burns as a suspect for a brief period and interviewed 
witnesses in January of 1990.  Defendant proffered written reports of six of these 
interviews.  (1) Ann Cappiello told an officer that she knew Schultz well and also 
knew Burns.  Cappiello informed the officer that Schultz told her she was unable 
to join in a social event “because she was having problems with Chris.  Tiffany 
couldn’t speak with me until Chris went into the shower.  Tiffany said that Chris 
didn’t agree with her working [as an exotic dancer] at Les Girls . . . .”  Cappiello 
informed the officer:  “I found Tiffany to be depressed and in tears due to their 
living arrangements.  They had some argument about some Playboy type books 
that Chris had in the apartment.  The books made Tiffany question herself.  
Tiffany never mentioned any physical violence.”  (2) Kelly Finn testified that 
Schultz informed her on January 10, 1990, that the couple argued over Schultz’s 
employment at Les Girls.  “She told me they had a fight, he was threatening her 
with something, I don’t know with what.  After he threw his temper [tantrum], he 
left the house abruptly and slammed the door.  It was after he left she called me.  
(footnote continued on next page) 
74 
After a hearing at which counsel and the court analyzed the statements both 
with regard to their admissibility in cross-examination and as evidence of third 
party culpability, the court commented: “I don’t see them [the statements] as so 
inherently trustworthy that I ought to make my own exception to the hearsay rule.  
The things people say in the middle of difficult emotional entanglements are, I 
think, historically not the kinds of things that are necessarily reliable.”   
The court also commented that the defense planned to use the statements as 
evidence of third party culpability but that the statements showed only motive.  
The court predicted that defense examination of Burns regarding the statements 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
She was scared and wanted to get out of the apartment.”  Schultz told Finn she 
believed Burns would kill her if she didn’t quit her job.  This was not the first time 
Finn had heard of such arguments.  The witness informed the police of Schultz’s 
statement that she and Burns had a “rough” sex life that included bondage.  Burns 
was a very jealous person, and Schultz told Finn that Burns had struck her about 
three and one-half weeks previously.  Finn herself had seen bruises on Schultz’s 
body that Schultz attributed to Burns’s violence.  Schultz told Finn that Burns had 
told her (Schultz) he would kill her if she did not quit her job, and that he had 
threatened her with a knife.  (3) Susan Franco told the investigating officer that 
Schultz had confided in her on several occasions regarding problems with Burns.  
Burns did not want her to dance at Les Girls and was withholding sex from 
Schultz, who felt ugly and insecure as a consequence.  There was no mention of 
violence.  The conversation occurred on January 11 or 12, 1990.  (4) Daniel 
Ganss, the couple’s roommate, did not report any violence or complaint of 
violence in the home.  Schultz was upset that Burns did not desire her.  Burns 
mentioned some bondage incident, which embarrassed Schultz.  (5) Beth Ann 
Maupin testified that Schultz confided in her during the week preceding her 
murder, stating that she and Burns were having problems, that Burns did not want 
her to work at Les Girls, and that the couple had engaged in some bondage that got 
too rough for Schultz.  The witness did not mention any statements concerning 
other violence.  (6) Peggy Maupin said that Schultz had told her that she and 
Burns were having sexual problems, that Burns did not want her to dance at Les 
Girls, and that he was jealous.   
75 
would create a “side show” without producing evidence of any reasonable 
probative value.  Defense counsel stated that he also wished to use the statements 
for the purpose of impeaching Burns’s credibility, but the court questioned why it 
was even significant for the defense to discredit Burns.  The court asked: “What 
evidence is he giving that you disagree with and need to impeach by showing that 
he’s got a motive to lie?”   
The court (Wellington, J.) issued a written ruling denying the defense 
request on hearsay grounds and also declaring:  “This motion is actually broader 
than its title suggests, and includes requests to cross-examine Schultz’s boyfriend, 
Chris Burns, in an effort to show that he, not defendant killed Schultz.  At 
argument counsel indicated that he is not ready to make an offer of proof 
regarding third party culpability. When he is (before trial) he will bring this matter 
back before us for examination.  [¶]  Finally, should Mr. Burns be called as a 
witness, defendant should at least be entitled to show, on cross-examination, that 
Burns had been a suspect in the Schultz killing.  This, at least arguably, shows a 
motive to see defendant convicted.”   
Immediately prior to the prosecutor’s opening statement to the jury, the trial 
court (Hayes, J.) confirmed Judge Wellington’s order and invited the defense to 
make an offer of proof of nonhearsay evidence that would be admissible to 
establish third party culpability, and the defense answered that it was not ready to 
do so.   
When the guilt phase was nearing its conclusion, the trial court questioned 
defense counsel concerning potential third party culpability evidence, noted that 
the court would adhere to its earlier ruling concerning the admissibility of the 
statements, and declared that “we weren’t going to be hearing testimony on that in 
the absence of some offer of proof” consistent with Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826.  
76 
Defense counsel responded:  “Right now, our witness list, we won’t need to 
address that issue.”  
Defendant did not make any further offer of proof in support of the 
admission of evidence demonstrating third party culpability.   
On appeal, defendant contends fairness demanded that the statements 
recounted by the six acquaintances of Schultz in their interviews with the police be 
admitted as evidence of third party culpability under Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826, 
despite their character as hearsay.  He relies upon Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 
410 U.S. 284 and Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U. S. 95.  He claims a violation of 
his right to present a defense, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against 
him, and to a fundamentally fair trial.  He also claims that without this evidence 
the verdict was unreliable within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.13   
We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.  (People v. 
Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 625.)  We are not persuaded that exclusion of the 
out-of-court statements constituted a violation of the right to present a defense or 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses.  Even if the evidence had not been 
excludable as hearsay, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it, 
because defendant failed, despite several invitations from the court, to make an 
offer of proof that was adequate under Hall, supra, 41 Cal. 3d 826, in support of 
his theory that the defense possessed evidence demonstrating that Burns was the 
person who murdered Schultz.   
                                              
13  
Respondent is mistaken in asserting that defendant failed to make such a 
constitutional claim below.   
77 
“[T]hird party culpability evidence is admissible if it is ‘capable of raising a 
reasonable doubt of [the] defendant’s guilt,’ but . . . ‘[w]e do not require that any 
evidence, however remote, must be admitted to show a third party’s possible 
culpability. . . .  [E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in 
another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a 
defendant’s guilt:  there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third 
person to the actual perpetration of the crime.’ ”  (People v. Robinson, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 625, quoting Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833).)  “[I]n making these 
assessments, ‘courts should simply treat third-party culpability evidence like any 
other evidence: if relevant it is admissible ([Evid. Code,] § 350) unless its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice 
or confusion [citation].’ ” (People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 625, italics 
added, fn. omitted.)   
As the trial court found, contrary to the guidelines we provided in Hall, 
supra, 41 Cal.3d 826, the statements proffered by defense counsel did not directly 
or circumstantially connect Burns to the actual commission of the crimes.  The 
statements demonstrated no more than motive.  (See People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 
Cal.4th 1083, 1137 [noting cases holding “mere evidence of third party’s anger 
toward victim was insufficient,” and “third party’s possible motive alone 
insufficient to raise reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt”].)  Indeed, defense 
counsel himself seemed to recognize he had not made a sufficient offer of proof.  
The trial court also appropriately determined that the probative value of the 
evidence was slight, whereas its potential for delay and confusion of issues was 
great.  Under the circumstances, the court did not err in excluding this evidence.14 
                                              
14  
As noted above, Burns’s testimony at trial merely related Schultz’s 
whereabouts on the morning of her death and described the discovery of her body.  
(footnote continued on next page) 
78 
As we have done in similar cases, “[w]e . . . reject defendant’s various 
claims that the trial court’s exclusion of the proffered evidence violated his federal 
constitutional rights to present a defense, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, 
and to receive a reliable determination on the charged capital offense.  There was 
no error under state law, and we have long observed that, ‘[a]s a general matter, 
the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s 
[state or federal constitutional] right to present a defense.’ ”  (People v. Robinson, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 626-627, quoting People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at 
pp. 833-834 [referring to third party culpability evidence]; see also People v. 
Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 141 [rejecting a claim based upon Chambers v. 
Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 302 in a similar context].) 
Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
suggesting in his closing argument to the jury that there was no evidence of any 
discord between Schultz and Burns.  The prosecutor observed: “Let’s go 
chronologically, if we may, starting off with the murder of Tiffany Schultz.  
You’ve heard evidence about Buena Vista Gardens.  You heard the evidence when 
the defendant moved in.  It was approximately three weeks after he moves in that 
Tiffany Schultz is dead, she has been murdered. [¶]  She’s living there with her 
boyfriend, Christopher Burns.  She was a young student.  There is absolutely no 
evidence prior to her murder that anything was amiss.  In Buena Vista Garden[s] 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
The testimony was of slight importance, because Ganss and the physical evidence 
confirmed what he had to say.  To the extent defendant’s claim is based upon the 
limitations the court placed on his ability to challenge Burns’s credibility, any 
error would be harmless under any standard. 
79 
apartments, you heard some evidence about a burglary, but as soon as Mr. Prince 
moves in, we have a series of murders starting off with Tiffany Schultz.”   
Defendant forfeited his present claim of prosecutorial misconduct by failing 
at trial to object and seek an admonition (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 
753), but in any event, the prosecutor’s argument did not contain the suggestion 
attributed to it.  This is apparent from the context in which the prosecutor’s 
statement was made; his point related to the comparative state of affairs at the 
Buena Vista Gardens apartments before and after defendant moved there.  
Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim on the merits.   
 
6.  Hughes-Webb testimony 
Leslie Hughes-Webb testified that defendant accosted her at the door of the 
home where she was staying and forced his way in.  After a struggle, she knocked 
him over and fled.  She identified defendant at a live lineup and at trial.  At the 
preliminary hearing she testified a woman who had participated in the lineup told 
her she had identified another person and that the other woman’s certainty had 
caused Hughes-Webb to question her own identification somewhat.  During her 
trial testimony, defense counsel cross-examined her concerning this source of 
uncertainty in her identification.  Specifically, after the lineup, Hughes-Webb and 
another woman who had participated in the lineup were given a ride home in a 
patrol car.  The other woman said repeatedly how certain she was of her 
identification, specifying whom she had identified.  Defense counsel asked 
Hughes-Webb whether she was aware that the other woman had identified a 
person other than defendant.  
The prosecutor objected on the ground that the other woman’s statement as 
to which man she had identified was irrelevant and constituted hearsay.  The trial 
court sustained the objection on hearsay grounds, adding that  defense counsel 
80 
could question Hughes-Webb concerning her own state of mind after the live 
lineup, including whether the other woman had said something to give her pause.   
The court directed the jury to disregard the question concerning the other 
woman’s possible identification of another individual.  Under further cross-
examination, Hughes-Webb testified she had been in a police car with the other 
woman, who had talked a great deal and “quite emphatically about her conclusion 
and feelings.”  The other woman’s comments caused Hughes-Webb to hesitate 
about the accuracy of her own identification.  Hughes-Webb “wanted to believe 
that [she] didn’t pick him” and informed the police detective who was driving her 
and the other woman that she felt some “uncertainty and hesitation.”   
Statements made by the out-of-court declarant to whom Hughes-Webb 
referred properly were excluded as hearsay, to the extent they were offered for the 
truth of the declaration.  To the extent they were admissible as describing Hughes-
Webb’s state of mind, the court excluded the statements because it feared the jury 
would be unable to avoid considering them for their truth, despite the absence of 
any evidence establishing the reliability of the identification made by the other 
woman.  Reviewing these evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion (see People v. 
Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 625), we uphold them.  Defendant had an 
adequate opportunity to establish that the declarant said something that caused 
Hughes-Webb to doubt her own identification.  If defendant sought to establish 
that one of the surviving victims or other witnesses positively had identified 
someone other than himself, defendant could have subpoenaed and examined the 
woman as a defense witness.  Even if the court erred in excluding the proffered 
evidence, such error would have been harmless under any standard of review, 
81 
because the court permitted the defense to question the witness to establish that 
she had doubted the accuracy of the identification she had made.15 
Defendant unpersuasively claims the court’s ruling denied him his 
constitutional right to put on a defense, to confront and cross-examine the 
witnesses against him, and to a fundamentally fair trial and reliable determination 
of guilt.  He also asserts that the ruling constituted a denial of due process of law 
by arbitrarily depriving him of crucial evidence.  There was no error under state 
law, and as noted above, “ ‘[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do 
not impermissibly infringe on the accused’s [state or federal constitutional] right 
to present a defense.’  [Citations.]”  (People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 
626-627, fn. omitted.)  Furthermore, as we have noted, even if the evidence should 
have been admitted, its exclusion would have been harmless under any standard.  
 
7.  Evidence of defense counsel’s participation in the lineup 
Defendant contends he was deprived of his federal and state constitutional 
rights to the effective assistance of counsel, to a fair trial, and to reliable 
factfinding when the trial court failed to “protect him” during the course of 
testimony given by Jaime Bordine, the homicide detective who conducted the live 
lineup.  Bordine testified that defense counsel were present at the lineup and 
implied that they had approved the composition of the lineup and selected 
defendant’s placement in it.   
                                              
15  
Defendant notes that Hughes-Webb stated on cross-examination that when 
she informed the officer who was driving the patrol car of her doubts, he said she 
“would know when she saw the evening news.”  Defendant contends this 
statement constituted a suggestive identification procedure, citing Simmons v. 
United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 384.)  Defendant has forfeited this claim 
because he did not raise it below. 
82 
Defendant contends that by introducing testimony that defense counsel 
were present at the lineup and had selected defendant’s placement, the prosecution 
“effectively us[ed] his attorneys as witnesses against him,” thereby violating his 
right to counsel.  He claims that the “effect of [the] testimony was an unmistakable 
implication that counsel were given every opportunity to assure that the lineup was 
fair, and that they approved the conduct of the lineup and the resulting 
identifications.  The resulting prejudice to him was no different than it would have 
been if counsel had been called as witnesses and had testified that they had been 
present, that they had been consulted regarding the adequacy of the other lineup 
participants, and that they had made the decision where their client should be 
placed.”  Defendant blames the prosecutor for asking these questions and the court 
for failing to “protect” him. 
As respondent points out, defendant did not object to Bordine’s testimony 
on any of the bases mentioned in the present claim; indeed, he did not object at all 
during the prosecution’s direct examination.  Accordingly, his claim is forfeited.  
(See People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 824.)  Moreover, it is not improper 
for counsel for either side to inquire into the circumstances surrounding a lineup, 
including the presence or absence of counsel.  (People v. Citrino (1970) 11 
Cal.App.3d 778, 783; see also Cal. Criminal Law:  Procedures and Practice 
(Cont.Ed.Bar 2006) Lineups and Identification, § 22.29, pp. 599-600.) 
Defendant asserts the court had a duty to protect him from what he views as 
an incursion upon his right to counsel, even though counsel failed to object.  He 
cites People v. Rodriguez (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 1018, but that case is of no 
assistance to him.  Rodriguez was charged with robbery, and his defense at trial 
was based on mistaken identity and the asserted suggestiveness of the police 
identification procedures.  Among other subjects, defense counsel cross-examined 
the identifying witnesses and the arresting officer concerning the manner in which 
83 
the lineup was conducted and the appearance of the participants.  On redirect 
examination, the prosecutor asked the officer whether defense counsel, who was 
present at the lineup, had said: “ ‘That was not a bad lineup’ or ‘It’s not bad.’ ”  
(Id. at p. 1020.)  The court sustained a hearsay objection, but the prosecutor called 
defense counsel as a witness, and the court ordered him to testify.  Defense 
counsel ultimately withdrew any objection and testified, confirming that he had 
made the statement attributed to him by the arresting officer. 
Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeal determined that the trial 
court had failed to protect defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel when 
it ordered defense counsel to testify against his client on a question that was 
material to the defense.  Indeed, the court found that the question “completely 
undercut” the misidentification defense, because it “bolstered the eyewitnesses’ 
identifications.”  (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at p. 1021.)  The 
proceedings undermined the attorney’s effectiveness and, the reviewing court 
stated, would cause the jury to be suspicious of his other efforts on defendant’s 
behalf.  “The jury can hardly avoid inferring the defendant’s own attorney does 
not believe in the defense he himself is presenting.  It is fundamentally unfair to a 
criminal defendant to use his own attorney’s testimony to convict him, and such a 
substantial infringement on the right to counsel requires reversal.  [Citations].”  
(Ibid.) 
In the present case, the trial court did not make any incursion on 
defendant’s right to counsel.  It did not order defense counsel to testify.  
Moreover, the defense did not ask the jury to find that the composition of the 
lineup had been suggestive, so the evidence of counsel’s presence at the lineup did 
not undercut defense counsel’s credibility or ability to pursue a defense of 
mistaken identification.  Rather, the defense stressed that numerous witnesses 
were unable to identify defendant at the live lineup, and that the witnesses’ 
84 
subsequent identifications were the result of suggestion, primarily from the media 
coverage that displayed defendant’s picture for the first time subsequent to the live 
lineup.   
Defendant contends we must address his claim despite trial counsel’s 
failure to object, because the court and the prosecutor rendered the trial 
fundamentally unfair in violation of defendant’s federal constitutional right to due 
process of law.  He cites Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168.  There the 
high court determined that a prosecutor’s improper remarks infected the entire trial 
with such unfairness that the resulting conviction constituted a denial of due 
process.  (Id. at p. 181.)  We have responded to similar claims by observing that to 
preserve such an issue on appeal, ordinarily the defendant must object and request 
an admonition.  (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 969.)  In any event, the 
present case is not comparable to Darden v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. 168.  
The prosecutor’s questions did not infect the entire trial with unfairness, just as 
they did not violate defendant’s right to counsel.  Nor has defendant established 
that the court’s failure to “protect” him rendered the verdict unreliable in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment.  
 
8.  Admissibility of knives 
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion under state law and 
violated various of his constitutional rights by admitting into evidence four knives 
that police seized from defendant’s automobile upon his arrest in the Miramar 
Road Family Fitness Center parking lot.  In defendant’s vehicle, police discovered 
a kitchen knife with an eight-inch blade and a five-inch handle, along with a steak 
knife and two small folding knives.  Defendant asserts the knives simply 
constituted bad character evidence and were used to support the prosecutor’s 
85 
argument that defendant was the kind of person who likes to arm himself with 
knives. 
Defense counsel failed to object when the police officer who performed the 
search described the knives in his trial testimony.  When the parties were 
discussing the introduction of exhibits into evidence, defense counsel objected on 
the ground that the admission of the knives would be more prejudicial than 
probative.  (Evid. Code, § 352.)16  The prosecutor countered that the knives might 
have been present in the vehicle for potential use in the various stalking episodes 
and burglaries that followed the commission of the murders. 
The court overruled the objection, observing that a knife had been stolen 
from at least one of the premises defendant had entered and that there was 
evidence indicating defendant used his automobile to stalk young women.  The 
court noted evidence establishing that defendant sometimes removed kitchen 
knives from drawers while committing his crimes and that he used kitchen knives 
“similar to the one taken from the defendant’s vehicle in these homicides.”  The 
court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential 
for prejudice. 
As noted above, defense counsel failed to object to the police officer’s 
testimony recounting the discovery of the knives during the search of the vehicle.  
Accordingly, any error with respect to the admission of the physical evidence must 
be viewed as harmless in light of the officer’s testimony describing the knives. 
                                              
16  
As respondent points out, defense counsel objected to certain numbered 
exhibits, and the numbers represented only the steak knife and the folding knives.  
The transcript of the hearing on the objection, however, makes it clear that the 
court and counsel assumed the objection went to the larger knife as well. 
86 
Even if we were to reach the merits of defendant’s claim, we do not agree 
that the court abused its discretion.  Although none of the knives evidently was 
used as a murder weapon, it is reasonable to conclude that defendant used one or 
more of them during the various charged burglaries and attempted burglaries that 
were committed subsequent to the murders.  There was evidence that at least in the 
Schultz and Keller murders, defendant came armed with his own knife, and the 
subsequently committed burglaries and attempted burglaries bore enough 
similarities to those murders (and the burglaries related to those murders) to enable 
the jury to reasonably conclude he was armed with his own knife (perhaps one of 
the knives discovered in his automobile) when he committed some of the charged 
burglaries and attempted burglaries. 
Defendant’s reliance upon People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566 (overruled 
on another ground in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 648-649) is 
misplaced.  In that case the evidence established that a murder had been 
committed with a Smith and Wesson .38-caliber Special revolver, which never 
was recovered.  We concluded it was error to admit evidence that defendant 
possessed a Colt .38-caliber revolver that could not have been the murder weapon.  
The only purpose of admitting the evidence would be to demonstrate that the 
defendant is “the sort of person who carries deadly weapons.”  (People v. Riser, 
supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 577; see also People v. Archer (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1380, 
1392-1393.) 
The knives seized from defendant’s vehicle apparently were not used to 
inflict the fatal wounds upon the murder victims, but the charge of murder was not 
the only one faced by defendant.  As noted, the knives bore some relevance to the 
weapons shown by the evidence to have been involved in other charged crimes.  
They did not simply constitute bad character evidence.  (See People v. Cox (2003) 
30 Cal.4th 916, 956-957 [“[w]e have also held that when weapons are otherwise 
87 
relevant to the crime’s commission, but are not the actual murder weapon, they 
may still be admissible.  [Citations.]  Thus, in Neely we admitted evidence of a 
rifle located in the defendant’s truck parked near the crime scene even though the 
rifle was not the murder weapon, as it was ‘not irrelevant’ to the charged offenses.  
[Citation.]  In Lane, we upheld the admission of guns found in an ‘abandoned 
truck miles from the scene of the homicide,’ not as relevant to the homicide per se, 
but as weapons ‘of a character which could be used in armed robbery . . . in 
furtherance of the criminal plan.’  [Citation.]”].)   
Defendant unpersuasively contends the court’s ruling denied him his 
constitutional right to put on a defense, to confront and cross-examine the 
witnesses who testified against him, and to a fundamentally fair trial.  He also 
claims the ruling denied him due process of law by arbitrarily depriving him of 
crucial evidence.  We conclude there was no error under state law, and “ ‘[a]s a 
general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the 
accused’s [state or federal constitutional] right to present a defense.’  [Citations.]”  
(People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 626-627, fn. omitted.) 
Defendant next contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct when 
in closing argument he relied upon the knives as evidence of defendant’s bad 
character.  Defendant complains the prosecutor stated that whoever committed the 
crimes obviously liked to use knives, pointing to the exhibits of knives seized from 
defendant’s vehicle and asking why defendant would carry such knives.  
Defendant also characterizes as misconduct the prosecutor’s discussion of 
statements made by defendant concerning knives and the prosecutor’s subsequent 
argument:  “[Defendant] brags about these knives.  He has them in his car.  He is 
that type of person that gets his thrills off of imagining knives and blood dripping 
off those knives.” 
88 
Again, there was no objection on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, nor 
did the defense request that the court admonish the jury.  (See People v. Frye, 
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 969.)  Even assuming that the court’s ruling on defendant’s 
objection to the introduction of the knives into evidence rendered further objection 
futile (see People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 820), defendant’s claim lacks 
merit.  This is not a situation in which the prosecutor asked the jury to draw the 
inference that defendant had a bad character because he possessed a weapon 
unconnected with the charged crimes.  Rather, the prosecutor legitimately referred 
to the knives in connection with the matter of motive.  He argued that the evidence 
from the crime scenes established that whoever committed the crimes liked to use 
knives — implying that employing knives was an aspect of the murderer’s sexual 
perversion and that sexual perversion as expressed by the use of knives was the 
murderer’s motivation.  The prosecutor discussed the similarities among the 
victims, particularly that they were attractive women, most of whom had been 
accosted or attacked while scantily clothed.  He argued that the women had been 
stalked, and that whoever killed the victims was motivated by a sexual perversion.  
“That’s the mold of domination, of sexual perversion — wanting to kill to see 
blood.  Somebody who isn’t quite right.  Somebody who has a desire to dominate, 
to express his sexual perversion by seeing the breasts of women bleed.”  Then the 
prosecutor asked the jury to conclude that defendant was a person who liked to use 
knives, a circumstance that would support the inference that he shared the 
motivation of the murderer.  In support, the prosecutor pointed to the knives 
defendant kept in his car and to statements defendant made to friends.  The 
prosecutor did not ask the jury to conclude that defendant was the murderer 
because other uncharged crimes showed he had a bad character or even because he 
traveled armed — the prosecutor asked them to conclude defendant was the 
89 
murderer because there was circumstantial evidence of his motivation.  This 
argument was permissible. 
Defendant also contends that the evidence of the knives was inadmissible 
because the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting the 
warrantless search of his automobile in which the knives were discovered.  At a 
hearing held prior to trial pursuant to section 1538.5, the court determined that the 
police had probable cause to conduct the search in conjunction with defendant’s 
arrest.  It is unnecessary for us to recite here the events that led to the arrest, the 
seizure of the automobile, and the inventory search conducted the following day, 
because even if the knives were to be viewed as the fruit of a search conducted in 
violation of defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, any error would have 
been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Although we have concluded that the 
knives had some relevance, they were of limited probative value — as defendant 
himself contends.  In light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt of 
the charged crimes, the admission of the knives, if error, would have to be viewed 
as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
9.  Sufficiency of the evidence 
Defendant contends the presentation of the evidence was confusing and that 
the jury may have assumed that if defendant was guilty of one crime, he must be 
guilty of all of the charged crimes.  Defendant does not offer any support for this 
claim.  The jury properly was instructed to decide each count separately (CALJIC 
No. 17.02), and both the prosecution and the defense made the point during 
closing argument that the jury should consider separately its verdict on each 
charge.  Accordingly we reject this claim. 
Defendant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support many of the 
counts charged against him, raising his claims in multiple subparts. 
90 
We “ ‘review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment 
below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence ⎯ that is, evidence 
which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of 
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (People v. 
Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496; see also People v. Berryman (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 1048, 1082-1083 [same standard under the state and federal due process 
clauses].)  We presume “ ‘in support of the judgment the existence of every fact 
the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’  [Citation.]  This standard 
applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved.”  (People v. Catlin 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 139.) 
a.  The murder of Tiffany Schultz (Count 1) 
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to connect him to the 
murder of Tiffany Schultz.  “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . 
with malice aforethought.”  (§ 187, subd. (a).)  “Such malice may be express or 
implied.  It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to 
take away the life of a fellow creature.  It is implied, when no considerable 
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an 
abandoned and malignant heart.”  (§ 188.)  Premeditated murder is murder in the 
first degree.  (§ 189.) 
We reject defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
connecting him to the murder of Tiffany Schultz.  There was sufficient evidence 
from which the jury could infer defendant’s identity as the murderer.  Defendant 
recently had moved into the apartment complex across the street from where 
Schultz was murdered.  The jury could infer that on the morning of the murder, 
defendant was seen, not in his own apartment complex, but near Schultz’s 
apartment, an hour or two prior to the murder, giving a false account for his 
91 
presence and in a position where he could have observed Schultz sunbathing at her 
open doorway.  The jury could have drawn these inferences from the testimony of 
Dorothy Curtiss, the manager of the Canyon Ridge Apartment complex where 
Schultz lived, who testified she saw Schultz sunbathing in a bikini in the doorway 
of her apartment around 10 a.m. on the morning of her murder.  Schultz’s next 
door neighbor saw Schultz sunbathing in the same location at approximately 12:20 
p.m.  Schultz spoke to a friend between 10 and 10:30 a.m., but failed to call the 
friend later in the morning, as the friend had expected.  Telephone calls to her 
placed around 12:30 p.m. went unanswered, and about the same time witnesses 
heard sounds in Schultz’s apartment that were consistent with a violent struggle. 
Curtiss further testified that between 10:30 and 10:45 on the morning of 
Schultz’s murder, she encountered a man in front of her office whom she was 
relatively certain was defendant.  The office abutted the stairs leading to Schultz’s 
second-story apartment.  The man requested a hanger, stating he had locked 
himself out of his automobile.  Curtiss retrieved a hanger from her nearby 
apartment and gave it to the man.  To Curtiss’s surprise, the man proceeded 
toward the back of the complex rather than out to the street, where he had 
indicated his automobile was located.  Curtiss departed on an errand at some time 
between 11 and 11:30 a.m., and did not see anyone working on an automobile on 
the street at that time or upon her return.  
In addition, the jury could infer the identity of Schultz’s murderer from 
evidence establishing substantial similarities among this murder and the other 
murders:  the similarities between Schultz herself and the other murder victims; 
the type of clustered, deep stab wounds inflicted on Schultz and the other murder 
victims; the partially disrobed or nude condition of the bodies in all the murders, 
including that of Schultz; the proximity of the location of the Schultz murder to 
the location of the ensuing similar murders of Weinhold and Tarr; and other 
92 
evidence establishing that defendant was a habitual burglar who preyed primarily 
on young White women whom he followed to their homes.  
In addition, the interior and exterior doorknobs of the door leading into the 
room where Schultz’s body was found were marked with bloody handprints in a 
honeycomb or cross-hatch design consistent with a sock or gloves.  Witness 
Beasley testified that defendant wore socks over his hands when they committed 
burglaries together.  Similar bloody marks were discovered at some of the other 
murder scenes. 
In light of all the evidence, a jury reasonably could conclude defendant was 
guilty of murdering Schultz despite minor distinguishing marks consisting of her 
having been stabbed more times than the other victims and suffering an additional 
cut across her throat, and despite nothing apparently having been stolen from her 
apartment.   
Defendant also contends there was insufficient evidence of premeditation 
and deliberation to support a first degree verdict as to the murder of Schultz.  
“ ‘Generally, there are three categories of evidence that are sufficient to 
sustain a premeditated and deliberate murder: evidence of planning, motive, and 
method.  [Citations.]  When evidence of all three categories is not present, “we 
require either very strong evidence of planning, or some evidence of motive in 
conjunction with planning or a deliberate manner of killing.”  [Citation.]  But 
these categories of evidence, taken from People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 
26-27, “are descriptive, not normative.”  [Citation.]  They are simply an “aid [for] 
reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence is supportive of an inference 
that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of 
considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse.”  [Citation.]’ ”  
(People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 470-471.) 
93 
With regard to planning, there is evidence from which the jury could infer 
defendant noticed Schultz sunbathing in her bikini up to two hours prior to the 
murder, giving him ample time to consider and plan his crime prior to his return to 
the scene.  The jury could infer he possessed criminal intent prior to his 
commission of the crime, because he employed a ruse to explain his presence near 
Schultz’s apartment.  The bloody hand prints in a honeycomb or cross-hatch 
pattern that were discovered at the scene support the inference the perpetrator of 
the murder planned far enough in advance to bring gloves or socks for his hands 
so he would not leave fingerprints.  With regard to motive, evidence of the other 
crimes committed by defendant indicated he harbored animus against young White 
women.  With regard to method, the clustered stab wounds support an inference of 
a deliberate killing.  (See People v. Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 471 [“Three 
potentially lethal knife wounds . . . [and] 80 other stab and slash wounds to her 
body [could have been] construed . . . as intimating a preconceived design to 
kill”].)  The similarities between the Schultz murder and the other murders support 
the inference defendant went to Schultz’s home armed with a knife and with the 
intent to kill.  (See People v. Carter, (2005) 36 Cal.4th 114,. 1184-1185 [the 
circumstances of three similar murders by strangulation occurring in a short period 
of time “strongly indicate” the killings were premeditated, and the record as a 
whole “is inconsistent with any suggestion that the killings were not willful, 
premeditated, and deliberate”]; People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 140-141 
[a common scheme among charged and uncharged murders supplied evidence of 
the defendant’s guilt of murder with malice aforethought].)   
In sum, sufficient evidence supports the verdict of guilty as to the first 
degree premeditated murder of Schultz. 
94 
b.  The murder and rape of Janene Weinhold and the burglary of 
her residence  (Counts 2, 3, and 4) 
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to establish that he was 
responsible for the murder and rape of Janene Weinhold.  It is unclear whether he 
also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the burglary of 
Weinhold’s apartment. 
We disagree with defendant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient as to 
any of the charges involving Weinhold.  As noted, “[m]urder is the unlawful 
killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.”  (§ 187, subd. (a).)  
Murder in the course of certain enumerated felonies, including rape and burglary, 
is murder in the first degree.  (§ 189.)  Forcible rape is “an act of sexual 
intercourse” that is “accomplished against a person’s will by means of force, 
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the 
person of another.”  (§ 261, subd. (a)(2).)  A person who enters a dwelling “with 
intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.”  
(§ 459.)   
There was ample evidence demonstrating that defendant was responsible 
for the murder of Weinhold.  A neighbor observed defendant seated on the steps 
leading to Weinhold’s apartment close to the time of the murder.  The murder fit 
the pattern of the other murders — Weinhold was a young White woman who was 
murdered in her home at the Buena Vista Gardens apartment complex in the 
middle of the day.  Her body lay positioned on the floor wearing only a bra.  She 
had suffered 22 deep stab wounds closely clustered in the chest area and 
administered with force sufficient to penetrate bone.  As in some of the other 
murders, the assailant used a kitchen knife belonging to the victim.  DNA 
evidence strongly connected defendant to the crime.  With respect to the rape 
verdict, the evidence indicated that the victim was not involved in any intimate 
95 
relationships and that defendant was unknown to the victim, circumstances 
supporting an inference that sexual intercourse occurred against her will.  Two 
months after the commission of this crime, defendant told an acquaintance that he 
had gone on a date and forced himself on the woman.  Defendant much later 
remarked to a coworker that he had sexual relations with a woman named Janene.  
Seminal fluid found at the scene indicated a match with defendant’s DNA that 
would occur in one out of 120,000 persons.  It reasonably could be inferred from 
all the evidence that defendant entered the apartment with the intent to commit 
larceny or rape. 
Defendant contends that his statements to his acquaintance were made after 
the crime was committed and did not clearly refer to the victim or to any charged 
offense.  Nonetheless, they supplied a reasonable inference in support of the 
verdicts.  Defendant objects that the DNA evidence demonstrated that there were 
20 other African-American persons in the San Diego area who could have left the 
semen stains at the scene.  But the circumstance that defendant was one of 20 
persons who could have done so, when considered with all the other evidence 
linking him to the crimes, constituted weighty evidence of his guilt. 
Defendant points to various distinctions between the murder of Janene 
Weinhold and the other murders.  According to defendant, the murder of 
Weinhold was the only one in which a sexual assault accompanied the murder, and 
there was no evidence the perpetrator had stolen her property or that she had been 
followed from a swimming pool or a fitness center.   
We disagree that the other murders lacked sexual overtones.  The various 
victims were fully or partially unclothed and their bodies appeared to be displayed, 
sometimes with legs apart.  Although it does not appear that Weinhold was 
followed from a pool or fitness center and there is no proof that defendant stole 
her property, she bore the characteristics of the type of person targeted by 
96 
defendant, namely young, attractive White women who were alone in their homes 
during the middle of the day in a certain neighborhood.  The distinctions among 
the murders did not preclude a jury from reasonably concluding that defendant 
was responsible for the crimes committed against Weinhold.  
c.  Attempted burglaries of the residence of Sarah Canfield and 
Stephanie Squires (counts 7 and 8) 
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to link him to these 
crimes and to establish the element of intent to steal.  As noted, burglary consists 
of entry into a home or certain other structures “with intent to commit grand or 
petit larceny or any felony.”  (§ 459.)  “An attempt to commit a crime consists of 
two elements:  a specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual 
act done toward its commission.”  (§ 21a.) 
We are not persuaded by defendant’s claim that there was insufficient 
evidence of his identity as the perpetrator of the attempted burglaries.  In the first 
incident, Stephanie Squires recognized defendant (perhaps from her having 
previously resided at the Buena Vista Gardens apartment complex) when he 
followed her to the pool at the Torrey Pines Village apartment complex.  On both 
April 25 and April 28, 1990, an African-American man climbed the stairs to 
Squires’s apartment and tried the door handle.  Canfield identified defendant as 
the person who, on April 28, 1990, appeared at her door.  Other evidence 
established that defendant’s vehicle was seen departing from the parking lot soon 
after the second incident.  A jury reasonably could infer, particularly in light of the 
modus operandi involved in many of the other crimes, that the man who tried the 
door on both occasions was defendant.  For the same reason, a jury reasonably 
could determine that his intent was, in part, theft.  (People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 
Cal.4th at pp. 463-464.)  Contrary to defendant’s claim, there was evidence he 
97 
already had stolen from his victims, namely, that he had stolen an opal ring from 
Tarr. 
Defendant claims that Canfield was not completely certain of her 
identification when she viewed the video lineup, and that her identification was 
tainted by her prior observation of defendant’s image on television news.  Canfield 
was quite confident of her identification at trial, however, and even at the video 
lineup she was almost positive.  In addition, the testimony of the apartment 
manager and her husband supported Canfield’s identification.   
d.  Burglary of the residence occupied by Leslie Hughes-Webb 
(Count 9) 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that he 
was responsible for pushing his way into the residence where Leslie Hughes-
Webb was staying, in light of the testimony of another witness who testified 
defendant was at a distant spot in Old Town San Diego until 2:30 p.m. on the day 
of the attack.  The jury was entitled to determine that Hughes-Webb, who 
positively identified defendant as her assailant, was more credible than the other 
witness, Christine Fagan.  Contrary to defendant’s assertion that there was no 
evidence indicating that defendant entered the home with the intent to commit 
theft, the similar crimes he committed in other homes provided a basis for a jury to 
reasonably conclude that his intent was, at least in part, to commit theft. 
e.  Burglary of the residence of Michael Gromme (Count 17) 
 
With respect to the burglary of Michael Gromme’s residence, although the 
question is closer than in other counts, we believe the evidence was sufficient to 
support this conviction.  Shirley Beasley testified that he and defendant 
burglarized an apartment that was “right upstairs” from their own and removed all 
the liquor they found in the home in order to provide supplies for a party.  Beasley 
testified that defendant retrieved a knife from the kitchen and walked through the 
98 
apartment.  Beasley further testified that he and defendant spoke with an older 
couple, the occupants of the apartment, shortly after the burglary and that he 
commiserated over the burglary, falsely claiming the apartment he shared with 
defendant also had been burglarized.  On the other hand, Beasley claimed he and 
defendant committed the burglary of the apartment of an older couple whom he 
saw seated at the apartment complex’s pool as the burglary proceeded, even 
though Gromme resided alone and was at work when the burglary occurred.   
 
When we consider that Gromme’s apartment was indeed “right upstairs” 
from the apartment shared by defendant and Beasley, that Gromme’s account of 
the peculiar burglary (in which the perpetrators removed his entire liquor supply) 
matched Beasley’s account, and that Gromme and Beasley both recalled an 
interaction shortly after the burglary in which Beasley commiserated over the 
burglary and claimed to have suffered one himself, we believe the evidence as a 
whole permitted the jury reasonably to conclude that Beasley was mistaken or lied 
when he stated the apartment belonged to an older couple whom he had seen at the 
pool.  The unusual burglary of Gromme’s residence was sufficiently similar to the 
burglary described by Beasley, and Beasley’s statements to Gromme were so 
similar to the statements described by Beasley, that it would be reasonable for the 
jury to conclude both witnesses were describing the same incident.  Although 
Beasley was an accomplice, his testimony was corroborated by Gromme’s account 
of the target and location of the burglary, the other evidence establishing Beasley’s 
and defendant’s partnership in crime during the relevant period, and Beasley and 
defendant’s presence together shortly after the crime.  (See People v. Gurule, 
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 628.)  
99 
f.  Attempted burglary of the residence of Patricia Van (Count 23) 
Defendant contends the evidence of attempted burglary of the residence of 
Patricia Van on December 19, 1990, consisted of nothing more than an innocent 
knock at the door, accompanied by an inquiry after a friend.  We believe, however, 
that the evidence was sufficient to prove an attempted burglary.  A neighbor saw 
defendant examining the backyards of residences in that vicinity, then witnessed 
him approach the Van residence through the side yard.  Defendant arrived there 
shortly after Van returned from working out at the Family Fitness Center, and the 
evidence strongly suggests he had stalked Van and followed her home.  His 
approach to the front door and request for a person who did not reside there was 
consistent with his approach during the commission of other crimes.  In addition, a 
completed burglary of the home of Patricia Van took place one month after the 
attempt, and one of Van’s stolen earrings was traced to defendant.  There was 
ample evidence that the December 19, 1990 approach to the Van residence also 
constituted an attempted burglary in which defendant’s activities went beyond 
mere preparation but were frustrated by the vigilance of the victim’s neighbor. 
g.  Attempted burglary of the residence of Karyl Oldenburg 
(Count 22) 
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty 
verdict of attempted burglary of Karyl Oldenburg’s residence.  We disagree.  The 
jury reasonably concluded that defendant was stalking Oldenburg and that he 
followed her home from her workout at the Family Fitness Center.  Defendant 
appeared at her front door and, without knocking or ringing the bell, started 
manipulating the doorknob.  There was evidence suggesting he used a credit card 
to unlock doors that were not deadbolted, and his activity on this occasion was 
consistent with such an effort, especially because he seemed to have something in 
his hands as he turned the doorknob.  In addition, Oldenburg witnessed him in her 
100 
backyard, where he had no legitimate business, approaching a sliding glass door 
similar to the ones he had used to gain entry to other residences that he had 
burglarized.  There was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant attempted to 
enter this residence with the intent to steal. 
h.  Attempted burglary of the Yates residence (Count 24) 
Contrary to defendant’s claim, sufficient evidence supported the verdict 
that he was guilty of the attempted burglary of the residence occupied by Angela 
Yates.  There was evidence indicating that defendant followed Yates home from 
the Family Fitness Center, parked at some distance from her residence, then 
entered the backyard of the residence as Angela showered.  He approached a 
sliding glass door at the rear of the residence, but was frightened off when 
Angela’s mother saw him and screamed and the family dog emerged from the 
house.  Defendant was observed jumping over the fence of the Yates property and 
driving off at a high rate of speed.  In light of the evidence connecting defendant 
to similar crimes, there was sufficient evidence to establish that he stalked Angela 
Yates with the intent to enter her residence for the purpose, at least in part, of 
committing theft. 
i.  Burglaries of the residences of Depamphillis and Kinney 
(Counts 25 and 26) 
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence he was responsible for 
the Depamphillis and Kinney burglaries.  He relies upon evidence reflecting that 
these burglaries occurred late at night, unlike the other crimes.  But the burglarized 
apartments were located in the vicinity of the other crimes, and a car similar to that 
used by defendant was observed at the scene.  Moreover, items stolen during these 
burglaries subsequently were traced to defendant. 
101 
j.  Attempted burglary of the residence occupied by Geralyn Peters 
Venvertloh (Count 27) 
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to link him to the 
attempted burglary of Geralyn Venvertloh’s residence, and of his intent to commit 
theft in the course of that incident.  We disagree.  Although Venvertloh was unable 
to make a positive identification at a photo or live lineup, her neighbor Jeffrey 
Pich witnessed defendant attempting to break into Venvertloh’s residence and 
positively identified defendant and his vehicle.  Defendant’s intent to steal was 
established by his attempt to gain surreptitious entry to a residence that did not 
belong to him, and by his having committed numerous other burglaries in the same 
manner with the intent to commit theft. 
k.  Felony-murder theory 
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the burglary 
convictions associated with the murders of Weinhold, Tarr, Keller, and Pamela 
and Amber Clark, and therefore insufficient evidence to support the murder 
verdicts as to these victims if the verdicts were based upon a burglary or rape 
felony-murder theory.  (Defendant was not charged with a burglary in connection 
with the murder of Tiffany Schultz.)   
Murder committed in the perpetration of certain felonies, including 
burglary and rape, constitutes murder in the first degree.  (§ 189.)  “ ‘We have 
required as part of the felony-murder doctrine that the jury find the perpetrator had 
the specific intent to commit one of the enumerated felonies [in section 189] . . . . 
[Citations.]’  [Citation.]  It also is established that the killing need not occur in the 
midst of the commission of the felony, so long as that felony is not merely 
incidental to, or an afterthought to, the killing.”  (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 499, 532.)  In addition, a homicide occurs in the perpetration of an 
enumerated felony for the purpose of the felony-murder rule if both offenses were 
102 
parts of “one continuous transaction.”  (People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 
624.)]  “ ‘There is no requirement of a strict “causal” [citation] or “temporal” 
[citation] relationship between the “felony” and the “murder.” ’ ”  (People v. Hart, 
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 608-609.)  In addition, “[c]ircumstantial evidence may 
provide sufficient support for a felony murder conviction.”  (People v. Elliot, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 469 [“sufficient evidence supported [a] robbery-murder 
conviction based on evidence that [the] victim usually carried several $1 bills, no 
paper currency was found on [the] victim or in his taxi, and defendant had seven 
$1 bills on his person at the time of his arrest,” citing People v. Marks, supra, 31 
Cal.4th at pp. 230-231].) 
Defendant contends the evidence left open the possibility that he was 
invited into each murder victim’s home and did not enter with felonious intent, a 
necessary element for proof of a burglary.  Defendant employs an incorrect test in 
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence.  The test is whether a reasonable juror 
could have believed from all the evidence that defendant entered the homes with 
intent to commit an enumerated felony.  (People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 
p. 496; People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 532.)  There was ample evidence 
establishing that defendant entered each residence with the intent to commit theft, 
considering defendant’s modus operandi and the other similar burglaries he 
committed that clearly were theft related.  In addition, the jury properly was 
instructed that felony murder is not proven unless the intent to commit the felony 
was formed prior to entry into the residence, and that felony murder is not 
established by proof that the defendant entered with the intent to commit murder.  
Defendant reiterates that there was no evidence indicating he entered 
Janene Weinhold’s residence with the intent to steal or rape.  He notes the absence 
of evidence of a forced entry, the absence of evidence that property was missing 
from the residence, and the absence of direct evidence concerning the interaction 
103 
between Weinhold and defendant when he presented himself at her door.  But the 
jury may rely upon circumstantial evidence to find that a felony murder occurred 
(see People v. Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 469, People v. Marks, supra, 31 
Cal.4th at pp. 230-231), and specifically to establish the intent of the defendant.  
The defense’s claim that defendant may have been invited into the apartment 
before he formed the intent to rape Weinhold or steal from the apartment is 
inconsistent with the voluminous evidence of defendant’s stalking behavior, 
including his acts prior to the commission of the Weinhold murder, his statement 
that he had forced himself on a victim, his many similar burglaries, the 
circumstance that he was evidently unknown to Weinhold and that she was not 
interested in dating, and the circumstances that his encounter with her was 
accompanied by loud sounds and that she bore defensive wounds.  The evidence 
suggests that the sexual contact between defendant and his victim was not 
consensual, that Weinhold did not voluntarily admit defendant to her home, and 
that he did not form an intent to commit a theft or rape only after he entered and 
on the spur of the moment, as a purely incidental objective.  A forced entry was 
not necessary to support the burglary verdict.  (See People v. Frye, supra, 18 
Cal.4th at p. 954.)  The jury reasonably could conclude that defendant, well before 
he gained admission to the apartment, intended to force himself upon the victim or 
at least steal from her.   
Defendant also contends there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that 
he formed the intent to steal prior to his entry into the Tarr apartment.  Again, the 
absence of evidence of a forced entry is not determinative.  The evidence of 
defendant’s modus operandi constituted evidence of a common intent to steal that 
was formed prior to entry into the residences of his victims.  As noted, defendant 
did steal an opal ring from Tarr.  The jury reasonably could believe that when he 
104 
entered, defendant already intended to steal rather than forming such intent only 
after the death of his victim. 
The prosecutor suggested that defendant took the ring as a souvenir, and 
defendant contends the evidence supports the view that he stole a single ring from 
Keller merely as a souvenir rather than entering her residence with a preexisting 
intent to steal.  The murder of Keller followed that of Tarr, and the acquisition of a 
second souvenir reasonably could be viewed as one of the objects of defendant’s 
entry into Keller’s home rather than as a reflection of a spontaneous impulse 
experienced following entry into the home. 
With respect to the Clark murders, defendant reiterates there was 
insufficient evidence of an intent to steal prior to entry into the residence because, 
as he views the matter, there was no evidence concerning the circumstances under 
which the perpetrator entered the home, whereas there was evidence indicating 
that defendant was dating persons who met the description of the Clarks.  The jury 
reasonably could conclude defendant was not dating the Clarks, but entered their 
home with intent to commit theft — an intent he carried out in this and many other 
instances. 
Defendant contends that because his convictions were based upon 
insufficient evidence, he was deprived of his federal constitutional “rights to a fair 
jury trial in accordance with due process of law, to be free from conviction of any 
crime absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt [citation], and to reliable fact-
finding underlying capital guilt and penalty phase verdicts.”  The evidence was 
sufficient to support each of the felony-murder verdicts, as we have explained.  
That the evidence in some instances might be reconciled with a contrary finding or 
that a jury reasonably could have determined that each murder was not a felony 
murder is not a basis for reversal of any of defendant’s conviction.  (See People v. 
Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 368.)  
105 
Defendant also contends that because in his view the evidence in support of 
the burglary convictions involving the murder victims was inadequate, it was 
improper for the court to instruct on felony murder.  We disagree, having found 
the evidence of preexisting intent to commit an enumerated felony to be sufficient 
with regard to each of the murders.  
Defendant next claims — still under his general challenge to the sufficiency 
of the evidence — that it was improper for the court to instruct on felony murder, 
because the thefts necessarily were merely incidental afterthoughts to planned 
murders and thus could not support a felony-murder verdict.  (See People v. Green 
(1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 52-54; People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 321-325.)  
This claim is untenable in view of the number of occasions on which defendant 
entered residences with the intent to steal and either pawned the proceeds or used 
them as gifts for friends.   
If defendant’s claim is that, because he committed premeditated killings, he 
could not also have committed burglary for the purpose of the felony-murder rule, 
his assertion is unconvincing.  The felony-murder rule “ ‘do[es] not apply to a 
burglary committed for the sole purpose of assaulting or killing the homicide 
victim.  [Citations.]’ ”  (People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal. 4th at p. 463, quoting 
People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 646.)  On the other hand, “concurrent 
intent to kill and to commit the target felony or felonies does not undermine the 
basis for a felony-murder conviction.”  (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 
p. 1141, italics added; see also People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 183.)   
l.  The murder of Schultz 
Still pursuing his instructional claims under the general heading of the 
sufficiency of the evidence, defendant challenges the first degree murder 
instruction as it applied to the murder of Schultz.  The trial court gave the jury a 
106 
general instruction that first degree murder could be established by proof of 
premeditation and deliberation or by proof that the killing was committed in the 
perpetration of an enumerated felony.  Defendant complains the court did not 
instruct the jury that the felony murder theory would not apply to the charge that 
defendant murdered Schultz.  Defendant contends the jury ⎯ even though a 
burglary was not charged in connection with the Schultz murder — nonetheless 
might have determined that defendant entered Schultz’s home with the intent to 
commit theft, and therefore may have applied the felony-murder theory.  We are 
not persuaded that any error occurred.  The jury may convict on a felony-murder 
theory if the felony is proved beyond a reasonable doubt even if the underlying 
felony has not been charged.  (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 514; see 
also People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1131.)  Moreover, in light of the other 
murders, the evidence taken as a whole was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury 
to conclude that defendant entered Schultz’s home with the intent to commit theft.   
 
10.  Failure to instruct on second degree murder 
The prosecutor requested that the court instruct on second degree murder.  
His concern was to avoid any possibility of an issue on appeal concerning 
instructional error.  Defense counsel agreed the instruction should be given, 
voicing a desire that the jury have something to consider other than an all-or-
nothing choice between first degree murder convictions and acquittal.  At the 
court’s request, defense counsel proposed an evidentiary basis for a second degree 
murder instruction.  Counsel stated:  “I can envision, with respect to the first 
homicide, the defendant being invited inside, there being an argument, something 
brewing in between himself and the perpetrator and Tiffany Schultz, and the state 
of mind of the perpetrator that is not indicative of premeditation, deliberation, 
because of a fight, something being found, some argument, then a struggle there 
107 
and grabbing hold of the knife which was inside the apartment and stabbing, but in 
a semi-heat-of-passion as opposed to during the commission of a rape or during 
the commission of a burglary where he’s been invited inside.  That’s the scenario 
that could quite possibly have happened.  That could be carried through to at least 
one other homicide, maybe the Holly Tarr homicide as well as the Keller 
homicide.” 
The court responded that counsel had provided “at least a plausible 
argument,” explaining:  “Although I’m skeptical, [counsel], you have provided at 
least a scenario that could be based upon this evidence.  That’s as to count one.  
Other counts, the Clark counts, for example, I can’t imagine any scenario . . . that 
would be anything other than first degree.”  The court reflected that to instruct on 
second degree murder as to the Schultz murder alone might cause the jury to 
conclude the court was directing a verdict on the other murder counts, so the court 
concluded it would instruct on second degree murder without limiting the 
instruction to the Schultz murder. 
Although defense counsel favored instruction on second degree murder, 
defendant himself vigorously opposed such instruction.  During extensive 
hearings, the court went to great length to ensure that defendant understood the 
issue and that he knowingly and voluntarily wished to forego instruction on 
second degree murder.  Defense counsel conceded he had no intention of arguing a 
second degree murder theory to the jury but, contrary to his client, believed the 
instruction would serve to give the jury choices.17 
                                              
17  
We note defendant’s statement to the trial court:  “I do not want second 
degree at all.  I’ll use the court’s words, all or nothing.”  The court pressed him on 
his understanding of the issue, and defendant responded, “What you’re trying to 
tell me, your honor, is that if I was to be found guilty and I have to go back to the 
appeal, I can’t say that it was your fault on the error because those are my wishes.   
(footnote continued on next page) 
108 
On the basis of language set forth in People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 
803, the trial court concluded that the ultimate authority as to whether lesser 
included offense instructions should be given was the defendant himself, not his or 
her attorney.  The court took additional steps to ensure that defendant understood 
the choice he was making by opposing instruction on second degree murder, 
including that defendant would not be able to claim error on appeal.  The court 
again asked defense counsel to state the evidentiary basis he believed supported 
the instruction.  Defense counsel maintained that he could “conceive of a state of 
facts where a person was invited in.  That is, there was no burglary, no felony 
burglary which would be the basis of an automatic first degree murder finding 
where the individual inside is confronted by the female, either after having been 
invited in by her for whatever reasons, got that person inside.  There was an 
argument, a discussion.”  Counsel surmised that perhaps “somehow there was a 
struggle, struggle over the knife [obtained from inside the home].  At least one 
blow caused death . . . .  Could have been a killing absent premeditation and 
deliberation.”  Counsel concluded that such a theory would apply to all the killings 
except the Clark murders. 
The court then stated its view that, despite defense counsel’s recitation, the 
evidence was not sufficient to place a sua sponte duty on the court to instruct on 
second degree murder, commenting that all of the evidence supported guilty 
verdicts as to first degree murder, if any.  The court nonetheless undertook further 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
[¶] But I still say [] the same thing.  I do not want second degree.  Because I feel 
that second degree is telling the jury that I [did] something.  I do not want that at 
all.”  Later he said: “I haven’t done anything.  So why should I go any lower to 
second degree.”  
109 
discussion with defendant designed to ensure that defendant’s decision to forego 
instruction on second degree murder (despite defense counsel’s request) was 
knowing and voluntary.  The court asked him whether he would “waive any right 
that you would otherwise have to . . . [¶] [a] second degree [murder] . . . 
instruction being provided to the jury,” and defendant responded in the 
affirmative.  The court determined that it would not instruct on second degree 
murder and announced that its decision stemmed both from its view of the 
evidence and from defendant’s request. 
Defendant now contends, despite his request at trial that the instruction not 
be given, that the court’s failure to instruct on second degree murder constituted 
reversible error, assigning various constitutional bases for his argument. 
“ ‘ “[A] defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury determine 
every material issue presented by the evidence [and] . . . an erroneous failure to 
instruct on a lesser included offense constitutes a denial of that right. . . .”  
[Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 475.) 
The trial court has authority to determine whether to instruct on a lesser 
included offense such as second degree murder, and if the court determines that 
there is sufficient evidence to warrant such an instruction, the court should give 
the instruction.  It is for the court alone to decide whether the evidence supports 
instruction on a lesser included offense.  (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 
196.)  As we have stated, “neither the prosecution nor the defense should be 
allowed, based on their trial strategy, to preclude the jury from considering guilt of 
a lesser offense included in the crime charged.”  (Ibid.)  Indeed, “ ‘ California 
decisions have held for decades that even absent a request, and even over the 
parties’ objections, the trial court must instruct on a lesser offense necessarily 
included in the charged offense if there is substantial evidence the defendant is 
110 
guilty only of the lesser.  [Citations.]’ ”  ( People  v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 
1114, 1184, italics added, italics in Carter.) 
Despite the circumstance that it is the court that is vested with authority to 
determine whether to instruct on a lesser included offense, the doctrine of invited 
error still applies if the court accedes to a defense attorney’s tactical decision to 
request that lesser included offense instructions not be given.  (People v. Barton, 
supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 198; see also People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 
905.)  Such a tactical request presents a bar to consideration of the issue on appeal.  
(Ibid.)  In the present case, however, defense counsel did not make such a tactical 
decision — on the contrary, counsel requested the instruction.  
We need not determine whether this procedural bar to our consideration of 
the issue on appeal applies when defense counsel has requested the instruction but 
the defendant objects.  As we shall explain, we believe that the trial court correctly 
concluded that the evidence adduced at trial was not such that the trial court was 
required to instruct on second degree murder as a lesser included offense.   
Instructions on lesser included offenses “ ‘are required whenever evidence 
that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is “substantial enough to 
merit consideration” by the jury.  [Citations.]  “Substantial evidence” in this 
context is “ ‘evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could  
. . . conclude[]’ ” that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.  
[Citations.]’ ”  (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 366-367, italics omitted.)  
In the present case, the evidence in support of any second degree murder 
conviction was not substantial enough to warrant consideration by the jury.  There 
was no sua sponte duty to instruct, and the court did not err in refusing a request 
for an instruction that was not supported by substantial evidence.  (People v. 
Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685; People v. Ceja (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 78, 
85.)   
111 
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice 
aforethought.”  (§ 187, subd. (a).)  “Such malice may be express or implied.  It is 
express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away 
the life of a fellow creature.  It is implied, when no considerable provocation 
appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and 
malignant heart.”  (§ 188.)  “Murder that is committed with malice but is not 
premeditated is of the second degree.”  (People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
p. 464; § 189.) 
Despite the strong evidence of premeditation discussed above, defendant 
insists the evidence was such that the jury could have concluded that the People 
had failed to prove premeditation and deliberation or felony murder, the two bases 
upon which the first degree murder verdicts rested.  Defendant argues it was 
“entirely possible” that the killings occurred in a quick explosion of violence after 
“the encounters be[gan] in a friendly fashion with the perpetrator invited inside.”  
He urges that there was slight evidence of planning or motive, and that the manner 
of the killings — according to the defense, potentially representing an explosion of 
violence — would suggest malice but not premeditation.  He notes that the 
prosecutor suggested the perpetrator of the murders was mentally disturbed, and 
claims it would be difficult to prove premeditation on the part of a deranged 
person.  Defendant also points to the prosecutor’s argument that the thefts may 
have been afterthoughts, in support of his claim that there was evidence suggesting 
he entered the victims’ homes without criminal intent.   
We disagree.  Defendant was not entitled to have the jury instructed on all 
possible lesser included offenses, but only on those offenses as to which there was 
evidence of substantial weight.  (People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 366-
367.)  In the present case, such evidence of lesser included offenses would have to 
suggest that defendant killed the victims with the general intent to kill or with a 
112 
reckless disregard for human life, but that he did not kill in the course of 
committing a felony or with premeditation and deliberation.  But the evidence 
demonstrating premeditation was overwhelming, and there was no evidence that 
defendant happened upon the victims and rashly decided to kill them.  There was 
no evidence of substantial weight indicating that defendant entered the victims’ 
home at their invitation; defendant relies upon only speculation in making such a 
claim.  Although an unpremeditated explosion of violence may constitute a second 
degree murder, evidence of defendant’s motive and modus operandi supplied 
overwhelming proof that he did not kill on a rash impulse, but according to a 
premeditated design.  As the trial court observed, defense counsel’s request for a 
second degree murder instruction was based upon “speculative scenarios” without 
any evidentiary basis.  Finally, we observe that the defense was alibi and mistaken 
identity, not that defendant intended to kill but did not premeditate.  Defense 
counsel announced the defense had no intention of arguing a second degree 
murder theory to the jury even if the court were to instruct on it.  
We reached a similar conclusion in People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th 
1114.  In that case, within a period of a few days, three women were fatally 
strangled  under closely similar circumstances.  “Not only does the manner in 
which each of these three killings was perpetrated strongly indicate in itself that 
each of the killings was willful, premeditated, and deliberate, but the entire course 
of conduct clearly revealed by the evidence, taken as a whole, is inconsistent with 
any suggestion that the killings were not willful, premeditated, and deliberate.”  
(Id. at pp. 1184-1185; see also People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 116 
[speculation that the victim might have been shot during a struggle did not require 
a second degree murder instruction].)   
Defendant refers to his statements that he was dating the Clarks and a 
woman named Janene, and suggests in this court that this evidence would support 
113 
a claim that he entered the Clark and Weinhold residences without intent to 
commit a felony and without a premeditated intent to kill.  But the jury, having 
convicted defendant of burglary in connection with the Clark and Weinhold 
murders and of rape in connection with the Weinhold murder, specifically rejected 
the theory that he entered the Clark and Weinhold residences without intent to 
commit a felony.  In addition, there is no evidence that defendant entered the 
residences and then suddenly decided to kill the victims in an explosion of 
violence.  All the evidence pointed to premeditation.   
Even if we were to agree with defendant that the court should have 
instructed on second degree murder (and that this issue was not forfeited), any 
error in failing to give such instructions would have been harmless.  “The 
erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense generally is subject to 
harmless error review under the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 
818, at pages 836-837.  Reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable the 
jury would have returned a different verdict absent the error or errors complained 
of.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 867-868, fn. omitted; 
and see id., p. 868, fn. 16 [the footnote describes potential exceptions for certain 
federal constitutional violations]; see also People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
641, 716; People v. Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 621 [a violation of the duty 
imposed by state law to instruct on lesser included offenses is evaluated under the 
Watson standard]; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165 [same]; but 
see People v. Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 475 [characterizing erroneous failure to 
instruct on a lesser included offense as a denial of due process of law to be 
evaluated on appeal under the standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 
386 U.S. 18, 24].)  Having considered “ ‘whether the evidence supporting the 
existing judgment is . . . relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different 
outcome is . . . comparatively weak’ ” (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 
114 
870), we do not believe it is reasonably probable that the absence of a second 
degree murder instruction could have affected the outcome of the jury’s 
deliberations.  Indeed any error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  As we have seen, the evidence in support of second degree murder verdicts 
not only was weak ― it was insubstantial, whereas the evidence relating to the 
manner and circumstances of each crime and the modus operandi and common 
marks among all the crimes overwhelmingly established premeditation. 
Even assuming the existence of some evidence in support of defendant’s 
claim that he killed in a sudden, unpremeditated explosion of violence, we observe 
that the jury also convicted defendant of burglary as to five of the murders — all 
but the Schultz murder, as to which burglary was not charged — thereby 
necessarily determining that, contrary to defendant’s suggestion on appeal, 
defendant did not enter the victims’ residences lacking felonious intent.  The 
verdicts also strongly indicate, in view of the facts underlying the crimes, that the 
jury believed defendant had committed five felony murders.  In addition, the jury 
found true the special circumstance allegation that he killed Janene Weinhold in 
the course of a rape or attempted rape (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), thereby specifically 
establishing that the jury determined that the Weinhold murder was a felony 
murder.  (See People v. Elliot, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 475-476; People v. 
Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 392; see also People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 
839, 883 [the jury necessarily rejected defendant’s sole defense of duress when it 
convicted him of attempted robbery, so that any lack of clarity in the second 
degree murder instructions was harmless].)   
Further, we already have rejected defendant’s claim that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the burglary and rape verdicts involving the 
murder victims, and his renewal of this claim in the context of the present 
argument does not alter our conclusion.  As for the remaining murder count 
115 
involving the murder of Schultz, we do not believe the jury would have convicted 
defendant of second degree murder of Schultz had it been instructed on that 
offense, in light of the jury’s verdicts as to the five other homicide charges. 
Defendant contends that omission of the second degree murder instruction 
constituted federal constitutional error.  Specifically, he asserts that if his state law 
instructional error claim is barred by the invited error doctrine, he still must 
prevail because the court’s failure to instruct on second degree murder constituted 
a violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.  He relies upon Beck v. Alabama, supra, 447 U.S. 625, 
and related cases.18  We have not relied upon the invited error doctrine in rejecting 
defendant’s instructional claim, however.  Defendant adds that his federal 
constitutional argument applies regardless of the cause of the court’s failure to 
instruct, relying upon the same principles.  We also reject this claim.  Beck v. 
Alabama, supra, 447 U.S. 625, and its progeny do not require that a court instruct 
upon a lesser included offense as to which substantial evidence is lacking.  (People 
v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 118 [“Because there was no substantial evidence 
supporting an instruction on second degree murder, the high court’s decision in 
Beck is not implicated”].)  Nor, unlike the situation in the Beck case, does our state 
prohibit the giving of lesser included offense instructions in capital cases.  Nor 
under our state law can the absence of a lesser included offense instruction force 
                                              
18  
“The law at issue in Beck prohibited giving lesser included offense 
instructions in capital cases while they remained available in noncapital cases.  
Additionally, the jury was instructed that if they found the defendant guilty, they 
were mandated to impose the death penalty.  (Beck, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 639, fn. 
15.)  In such a case, the jury was left with only ‘two options: to convict the 
defendant of the capital crime, in which case they were required to impose the 
death penalty, or to acquit.’  (Hopkins v. Reeves (1998) 524 U.S. 88, 95.)”  (People 
v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 118, fn. 23.) 
116 
the jury into a choice between acquittal and a murder conviction that necessarily 
would lead to the death penalty; even after finding true an alleged special 
circumstance, a California jury may elect to sentence the defendant to life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.  (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 
pp. 118-119.)19  
Defendant further contends that the absence of a second degree murder 
instruction violated the federal constitutional principle that the jury, not the court, 
must decide the factual basis for every element of a criminal charge, and 
essentially constituted a directed verdict of first degree murder.  He urges that the 
standard of review for federal constitutional error established in Chapman v. 
California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24, should apply.  
Contrary to defendant’s claim, the court’s failure to instruct on second 
degree murder did not constitute a directed verdict of first degree murder.  
Defendant’s reliance on People v. Figueroa  (1986) 41 Cal.3d 714, is misplaced.  
In that case the trial court instructed the jury on all the elements of the charged 
securities law violation, including the requirement that the item at issue actually be 
a security.  Then the court instructed the jury that the item was a security, thereby 
improperly removing that element from the jury’s consideration.  In the present 
                                              
19  
Because the court must instruct on lesser included offenses for which there 
is evidence of substantial weight without respect to the wishes of the prosecution 
or the defense, we need not reach defendant’s claim that it would constitute a 
denial of equal protection and other constitutional rights to adopt an arbitrary 
system whereby some, but not all, defendants are permitted to control instruction 
of the jury on lesser included offenses, depending upon the policy of the individual 
court in which the defendant happens to appear.  We need not respond to 
defendant’s claim that the court’s failure to instruct on second degree murder 
removed an element of the offense from the jury’s consideration and constituted 
an impermissible directed verdict, because there was no substantial evidence 
suggesting that defendant had committed second degree murder. 
117 
case, however, the court did not instruct the jury that any element of the crime of 
murder had been established.  
Finally, defendant contends that omission of the second degree murder 
instruction caused the jury to fail to fix the degree of the crime as required by 
section 1157, which requires that when a defendant is convicted of a crime that is 
divided into degrees, the fact finder must find the degree of the crime — and that 
failing such action by the fact finder, the crime will be “deemed to be of the lesser 
degree.”  (§ 1157.)  This claim lacks merit.  The question of degree properly was 
not before the jury, and section 1157 had no application.  (See People v. Mendoza, 
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 910.)  That statute does not require the jury to make a 
determination of the degree of the murder when substantial evidence does not exist 
that would warrant the jury’s considering the homicide to be anything less than 
first degree murder.  Defendant fails to provide any authority or persuasive 
argument to the contrary. 
 
11.  Testimony of Anna Cotalessa-Ritchie 
Over defense objection that the evidence was more prejudicial than 
probative and should be excluded pursuant to Evidence Code sections 352 and 
1101, Anna Cotalessa-Ritchie testified as follows.  She resided in the Buena Vista 
Gardens apartment complex.  At approximately noon on March 25, 1990, a few 
days prior to the April 3, 1990 murder of Holly Tarr, the witness walked from her 
residence to a nearby convenience store.  On her way to the store she saw 
defendant, whom she later identified, standing at a bus stop across the street from 
the store.  On her return, at first she did not see defendant, but then observed him 
walking toward her as she walked toward her home.  He stared at her during the 
time it took for her to proceed approximately 50 yards, until they crossed paths.  
Several times she looked away and looked back, and he still was staring at her.  
118 
She passed him and proceeded 20 to 30 yards to the door of her second-story 
apartment.  She fumbled for her keys for a moment, then noticed defendant, now 
standing at the foot of the stairs staring at her.  When she looked at him, he bent 
over as if to tie his shoes, which already were tied, but continued to stare at her.  
She entered the apartment and locked the door.  The incident made her nervous, 
and she informed her husband of it.  She reported the incident to the police the day 
after the Tarr murder.  In June 1991, she identified defendant at a video lineup, 
having been instructed not to view any publicity regarding the case prior to the 
lineup.  In his offer of proof, the prosecutor stated that the witness was a young 
woman in her early 20’s. 
The prosecution offered the foregoing testimony on the issue of identity 
and as evidence of modus operandi, relying upon the asserted similarity between 
the incident and the crimes committed against Tarr and Weinhold.  The court 
overruled defendant’s objection, explaining that the incident occurred close in 
time and place to the Tarr and Weinhold murders, adding its determination that the 
evidence was not more prejudicial than probative.  
Ordinarily, evidence of a person’s character is inadmissible to demonstrate 
his or her conduct on a particular occasion (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a)), except 
that evidence is admissible to establish “that a person committed a crime, civil 
wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .) 
other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.”  (Evid. Code, § 1101, 
subd. (b).)  Evidence going to the issue of identity must share distinctive common 
marks with the charged crime, marks that are sufficient to support an inference 
that the same person was involved in both instances.  (People v. Gray (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 168, 202.)  “ ‘A somewhat lesser degree of similarity is required to show a 
common plan or scheme . . . .’  (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402-403.) 
119 
. . . [W]e review the trial court’s ruling . . . for abuse of discretion.  [Citation.”  
(People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 202.) 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Cotalessa-Ritchie’s testimony 
provided evidence of defendant’s “other act” that was relevant to issues apart from 
his character or disposition, namely identity and common scheme or plan.  There 
was evidence that defendant had followed other victims — including witnesses 
who testified at trial — to their homes during the middle of the day; Tarr and 
Weinhold were murdered in their apartments in the same complex where 
Cotalessa-Ritchie resided and at the same time of day.  The women had been 
murdered within a short time of the Cotalessa-Ritchie incident, and Schultz was 
murdered in an adjacent complex.  There was evidence that murder victims Tarr 
and Schultz both had been followed home by a young African-American man after 
they left their apartments for a brief period, and murder victim Weinhold had gone 
in and out of her apartment while doing laundry.  Schultz, Tarr, and Weinhold had 
been followed up a flight of stairs to their second-story apartments; defendant 
followed Cotalessa-Ritchie to the bottom of the stairway leading to her second-
story apartment.  Finally, Cotalessa-Ritchie was of a similar age and belonged to 
the same race and gender as all the murder victims and most of the other burglary 
or attempted burglary victims.  It was within the trial court’s discretion to 
conclude that the Cotalessa-Ritchie incident was highly similar to the stalking 
activity engaged in by the perpetrator of several of the other charged crimes, 
thereby providing evidence that it was defendant and not some other man who 
committed the charged crimes.  The trial court properly could find that the 
similarity of the incident to the evidence of defendant’s stalking behavior in many 
120 
other instances provided evidence of a common scheme or plan.  Nor was the 
evidence of the incident more prejudicial than probative.20 
 
12.  Exclusion of third party culpability evidence 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding certain third party 
culpability evidence.  Specifically, defendant made an offer of proof that Faie 
Fiorito would testify that a young African-American man watched her as she 
worked out at the Family Fitness Center located on Balboa Avenue in San Diego 
at approximately 6:30 p.m. on April 9, 1990.  When she emerged into the parking 
lot some minutes later, the man was seated behind her automobile and seemed to 
be trying to examine her vehicle license plate and write something down.  She 
watched for two minutes, then drove home and telephoned the police.  She 
participated in the live lineup and would testify that defendant was not the person 
who had watched her on that occasion, although that person met the general 
description of the assailant in the series of murders with which defendant was 
charged. 
The prosecution objected that the offer of proof was inadequate under the 
standard established in Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826.  Specifically, there had been 
nothing linking the Balboa Avenue Family Fitness Center to the crimes, and 
defendant also had failed to provide any evidence concerning the location of 
Fiorito’s residence.  The court excluded the evidence, commenting that it had 
admitted the Dhillon testimony over the prosecution’s objection because it 
                                              
20  
Defendant contends admission of the evidence “arbitrarily deprived him of 
a state entitlement in violation of federal 5th and 14th Amendment due process 
rights . . . and affected the reliability of the guilt verdict that later supported a 
death judgment, violating [defendant’s] federal 8th and 14th Amendment rights.”  
Because we have not found a violation of state law and because the evidence did 
not undermine the reliability of the guilt verdict, we reject this claim. 
121 
described an event bearing many common marks with the charged crimes, in that 
it took place at the same time of day and in the same location as some of the 
charged murders, the same type of victim was targeted, and the same method of 
entry into a home was attempted.  By contrast, the court found no suggestion in 
the evidence that a young African-American man had displayed interest in a 
woman at a location and time different from those involved in the charged 
offenses so as to link that event to the present case. 
Contrary to defendant’s position, there was nothing in the proposed Faie 
Fiorito testimony that would link the person she had seen watching her to the 
charged crimes.  The proposed testimony would not have provided “direct or 
circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the 
crime.”  (Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833.)  Defendant’s attempt to equate the 
Fiorito testimony with the testimony of Cotalessa-Ritchie is unavailing.  As 
explained, the latter testimony described an event that occurred close in time and 
place to two of the charged murders and that shared significant common marks 
with the charged crimes. 
Defendant contends the evidence in question was admissible on an 
additional ground — to rebut the prosecution’s evidence linking defendant to the 
Miramar Road Family Fitness Center.  Defendant’s offer of proof did not pertain 
to any purported impeachment value of the evidence, however, nor did the trial 
court rule upon any such claim.  Accordingly, this claim is forfeited.  (Evid. Code, 
§ 353; People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 428 at pp. 434-435 [stating the general 
rule in the context of an Evidence Code section 352 objection, but permitting the 
defendant to make a narrow due process argument on appeal based upon such a 
statutory objection at trial].)  Nor do we believe this evidence would have had any 
value for impeachment purposes. 
122 
Defendant complains that it was a violation of basic principles of fairness to 
admit testimony by Cotalessa-Ritchie but to exclude Fiorito’s testimony, and that 
the court’s error in this regard violated various of his constitutional rights.21  Even 
if this claim was not forfeited, it is not persuasive.  Cotalessa-Ritchie identified 
defendant and described behavior occurring in the same location, at the same time 
of day, in the same general period, and of a nature similar to the conduct of the 
person who murdered Tarr and Weinhold.  The circumstance that Fiorito observed 
a person do something different at a location different from any involved in the 
present crime and at a different time of day, and that this person was not 
defendant, is not much more probative than recounting the activities of any young 
man of the same racial background as defendant who exhibited interest in a young 
White woman in San Diego at any time of day during the period in which the 
murders were being committed.  The only other point of similarity is that Fiorito 
described an incident that occurred at a Family Fitness Center but, as noted, it was 
a facility different from any connected to any of the crimes underlying the present 
case. 
 
13.  Prosecutorial misconduct 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in his opening 
statement to the jury by assertedly exaggerating the probative value of a DNA 
analysis comparing the semen found at the scene of the Weinhold murder with a 
                                              
21  
We also are unpersuaded by defendant’s claims that the “inconsistent” 
rulings on the Fiorito and Cotalessa-Ritchie testimony constituted an arbitrary and 
fundamentally unfair application of state evidentiary rules (see U.S. Const., 5th & 
14th Amends; Hicks v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. 343, 346) and a deprivation of 
the right to a fair jury trial in accordance with due process of law, to present all 
relevant evidence, to compulsory process, to confrontation, and to reliable 
factfinding (citing U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th, & 14th Amends). 
123 
sample of defendant’s blood.  Defendant asserts the prosecutor committed further, 
similar misconduct in examining the experts he called to explain the evidence and 
in relying upon this evidence in his closing argument to the jury.  Defendant 
argues the prosecutor improperly attributed more weight to the evidence than it 
deserved, by characterizing the scientific analysis that had been employed as 
“conservative.”  He claims that, at the hearing the court conducted pursuant to 
People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 to assess the admissibility of new scientific 
evidence, the prosecutor failed to establish there was general agreement in the 
scientific community that the analysis used was, in fact, conservative. 22 
                                              
22  
The DNA evidence in the present case was subjected to an analysis using 
the so-called modified product rule. 
 
In testing genetic material for forensic purposes, the final part of the 
analysis is a calculation of the statistical probability that a characteristic found in 
the crime scene sample and the defendant’s sample would be represented in 
sample genetic material from a random selection of the population.  A statistical 
operation known as the product rule is employed.  “ ‘The product rule states that 
the probability of two events occurring together is equal to the probability that the 
first event will occur multiplied by the probability that the second event will 
occur.’ ”  (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1250, fn. 5.)  Originally the 
“product rule” was the subject of spirited debate, some population geneticists 
arguing that the relevant random samples were composed without regard to 
“population substructures,” that is without adequately accounting for subgroups 
among various ethnicities.  In response, the product rule was artificially modified 
to produce a conservative result in order to avoid overstating the incriminating 
value of the test result, and this court concluded that the modified rule had been 
accepted in the scientific community and produced evidence admissible under this 
court’s Kelly standard.  (People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 85, 87, 89.)  It 
was the product of this modified statistical operation that the trial court in the 
present case determined was generally accepted in the relevant scientific field.  
The prosecution experts testified accordingly.  This court subsequently recognized 
that additional research had resolved the scientific controversy that led to the 
modified product rule, leaving intact the integrity of the unmodified product rule.  
(People v. Soto, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 538 [“[s]everal developments . . . indicate 
that the controversy over population substructuring and use of the unmodified 
product rule has dissipated”].)  Accordingly, in the present case the experts in fact 
(footnote continued on next page) 
124 
In his opening statement to the jury, the prosecutor stated that the People’s 
DNA experts would inform the jury that “using the most conservative methods, 
that the odds of any person picked off the street matching this banding pattern that 
Cleophus Prince shares with the person that left semen, sperm at the scene [of 
Weinhold’s murder], is 1 out of 124,000.” 
Prosecution witness Dr. Lisa Forman explained the basis for her evaluation 
of the probability of a match between defendant’s blood sample and the sperm 
sample found at the scene.  She described her calculations and her estimate of the 
probability of a match.  The prosecutor inquired, “what number did you come up 
with?”  Dr. Forman replied: “using the most conservative model, the model that 
shows the frequency to be as common as it could be in any population, the 
likelihood that a random person would share those sets of band . . . is 
approximately one in 120,000.”  Later the prosecutor asked the witness whether 
the number she had calculated was “an exceedingly conservative number?” and 
she replied that it was.  When Dr. Glenn Evans testified, the prosecutor asked 
whether Dr. Forman’s “modified ceiling method” of calculating the probability of 
a match was “an extraordinarily conservative estimate?”  Dr. Evans replied that it 
was “in fact much more conservative than many scientists would like to see.  But 
it is the most conservative estimate one can make.  It gives every possible benefit 
of the doubt.” 
In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor made use of the DNA 
evidence.  He reminded the jury that Dr. Forman testified that she applied “the 
most conservative estimate of probabilities, the ones that would give Mr. Prince 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
did use a conservative method compared with the less conservative “unmodified 
product rule.”  (Ibid., see also id. at p. 541.) 
125 
the benefit of the doubt using scientific principles, even those most conservative 
numbers said that it would be one-out-of 120,000 chance” of a random match.  
The prosecutor added that Dr. Evans had confirmed this characterization of the 
evidence “three or four times.  He goes, every benefit is given.  This is a 
conservative number.  Every benefit of the doubt is given ⎯ he repeated that ⎯ 
every step of the way.” 
Defendant contends the references to “conservative” methods in reaching 
the probability estimate, both in the prosecution witnesses’ testimony and during 
the prosecutor’s own statements, constituted misconduct because they invited the 
jury to speculate that a higher probability of a match actually existed.  He suggests 
that the testimony and argument constituted an effort to place before the jury 
evidence that the court had deemed inadmissible at the Kelly hearing.   
Defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct is unpersuasive.  First, 
defendant forfeited this claim because he did not object upon that basis, either 
during testimony or during the prosecutor’s argument, and there is no indication 
an objection would have been futile or that an admonition would not have cured 
any harm.  (See People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 753.)  Nor did he raise 
such an evidentiary objection to the testimony of the experts.  Further, the 
prosecution presented ample evidence at the Kelly hearing that the modified 
product rule was a conservative analytic method created in order to produce a less 
incriminating result than would be produced by the unmodified product rule.  (See 
fn. 24, ante.)  Nor did the prosecutor commit misconduct simply by commenting 
upon admissible evidence.  Defendant’s reference to the constitutional right to due 
process of law and a reliable factfinding proceeding add nothing to his claim.   
126 
 
14.  Closing the proceedings 
A criminal defendant has a right to a public trial that is guaranteed by the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by article 
1, section 15 of the California Constitution.  (Waller v. Georgia (1984) 467 U.S. 
39, 46; People v. Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 382.)  Violation of this right 
requires reversal of the judgment without examination of possible prejudice.  
(People v. Woodward, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 383-384.)  Defendant contends the 
court violated his right to a public trial by closing the courtroom during the brief 
portion of FBI Special Agent Ankrom’s testimony that described a crime scene in 
a murder committed subsequent to defendant’s arrest that remained under 
investigation. 
After considerable litigation, the trial court refused to quash a subpoena 
directed to records of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department concerning the 
circumstances of a murder committed subsequent to defendant’s arrest.  The 
records at issue consisted of an autopsy report and a package of photographs taken 
at the autopsy.  Counsel were prohibited from copying the information and from 
publishing or distributing the evidence or the results of their investigation 
regarding that matter.  The court explained that because the prosecution in the 
present proceedings was relying in part upon evidence indicating that the charged 
murders were “signature crimes” involving a single perpetrator, the defense was 
entitled to explore the circumstances of another murder committed subsequent to 
defendant’s arrest which, the court’s in camera review disclosed, bore certain 
common marks with the charged crime.  The court acknowledged the sheriff’s 
claim that disclosure could impair an ongoing investigation, but concluded that on 
balance the defendant’s interest in a fair trial required disclosure.  The court did 
not rule on the question whether defendant could examine witnesses on the subject 
of the unsolved crime.  The sheriff sought appellate review, but the Court of 
127 
Appeal denied the petition for writ of mandate as premature, noting that the trial 
court had not yet determined whether the evidence was admissible and had 
otherwise demonstrated awareness of the sheriff’s concerns.  The Court of Appeal 
“presume[d] the court will take appropriate precautions should it become 
necessary to admit the material.” 
At trial, defense counsel sought permission to use the materials to cross-
examine the coroner, Dr. Blackbourne.  The court granted permission, limiting 
questioning to the facts of the autopsy.  The name of the victim, the location and 
precise time of the crime, and evidence discovered at the crime scene were not to 
be mentioned.  Defense counsel questioned the coroner briefly as to the nature of 
the stab wounds in the unsolved case, and the prosecution questioned the 
witnesses concerning the dissimilarities between the unsolved crime and the 
murders charged in the present case. 
The issue in question arose again in the context of FBI Special Agent 
Ankrom’s testimony.  As described above, Ankrom testified that a number of 
similarities among the six charged murders justified the conclusion that a single 
person had committed all the crimes.  He referred to the position of the bodies, the 
number and placement of the wounds, and certain other circumstances.  Defendant 
sought permission to examine Ankrom concerning the circumstances of the other 
murder that occurred while defendant was in custody, claiming it bore significant 
similarities to the charged crime and that the evidence supported the inference that 
the perpetrator of the unsolved crime — who could not have been defendant — 
might be responsible for the murders charged against defendant.  The prosecutor 
also requested the court’s permission to examine Ankrom concerning details of the 
crime scene in the unsolved case.  He pointed out Dr. Blackbourne already had 
testified concerning this unsolved crime, and that he needed to examine Ankrom 
128 
to establish that there were important distinctions between the method of killing in 
the other crime and the charged murders.  
The court permitted examination of Ankrom under the same limitations as 
those applied to Dr. Blackbourne.  Defendant elicited testimony that the unsolved 
murder bore certain similarities to the charged murders, in that it involved a White 
woman murdered in her residence who suffered more than 20 stab wounds and 
was discovered in a state of partial undress.  The prosecution elicited testimony 
that Ankrom believed the unsolved murder was not committed by the person who 
committed the charged murders. 
During the prosecutor’s questioning, Ankrom volunteered some details 
concerning the unsolved crime, but the court intervened.  A hearing followed on 
the question whether the details of the unsolved crime could be the subject of 
further examination.  Because of the confidential nature of the information, the 
court suggested it might be required to close the proceedings to the public. 
Counsel for the San Diego County Sheriff objected to any examination that 
would touch on details of the unsolved crime, particularly the crime scene.  The 
objections were based on the theory that public dissemination of such information 
would compromise an ongoing investigation into the unsolved crime.  After 
conducting extensive hearings, the trial court concluded that defendant’s 
constitutional right to present a defense and confront his accusers required that the 
questioning be permitted to go forward, but agreed with counsel for the sheriff that 
the public would be excluded if either counsel examined Ankrom concerning the 
“crime scene facts” underlying the unsolved murder, including certain facts that 
were unknown to the public, such as the nature of the fatal injuries involved in the 
other crime.  Both defendant and the prosecutor objected.  
The trial court acknowledged the right to a public trial, but noted that the 
right may be curtailed as necessary to serve some “higher value,” including, in the 
129 
court’s view, “insuring the integrity of an ongoing murder investigation.”  The 
court explained that the sheriff feared that the disclosure of crime scene 
observations and photographs of the victim would “prevent the sheriff from 
effectively interviewing potential subjects or targets of the investigation, would 
create problems from the standpoint of a confession, if confessions are made.”  
The court acknowledged that a trial must be open absent a compelling contrary 
interest, but concluded after reviewing various options that the potential for 
interference with the apprehension of the murderer constituted such an interest.  “I 
do find that revealing this detailed information concerning the crime scene, 
photographs of the victim live or this autopsy would clearly affect the likelihood 
of the sheriff’s successful investigation of this crime, I think closure is the 
appropriate method of dealing with this issue. [¶] . . . I’ll give this notice to all 
counsel at this point.  Any examination of the witness which does not deal with the 
details of the crime scene should and must be done in open court as a part of the 
public process. [¶] I will order the proceedings closed if and only if the 
examination deals specifically with crime scene facts, description of the crime 
scene in this unsolved case, photographs of the autopsy of the victim in the 
unsolved case showing the nature of the wounds or live photographs of the victim.  
[¶] Any other matter other than that information, that could prevent the sheriff 
from successfully apprehending the perpetrator in this unsolved case will be done 
in open court.”  The court explained that it was referring to “very specific 
information that could only be known to the killer . . . because I want to keep that 
information out of the public record because that is precisely the type of 
information that will prevent the sheriff from apprehending the killer who is at 
large at this point.” 
Thereafter, when the prosecution and the defense questioned Ankrom 
concerning the evidence disclosed at the crime scene in the unsolved murder, the 
130 
courtroom was closed to spectators.  The questions during the closed sessions 
related solely to crime scene evidence and autopsy photographs, as directed by the 
court.  Those portions of the closing arguments that touched upon the sensitive 
crime scene evidence also occurred in closed session.  
The United States Supreme Court “has made clear that the right to an open 
trial may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in inhibiting disclosure 
of sensitive information.  Such circumstances will be rare, however, and the 
balance of interests must be struck with special care.  We stated the applicable 
rules in Press-Enterprise: [¶] ‘The presumption of openness may be overcome 
only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to 
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.  The interest 
is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can 
determine whether the closure order was properly entered.’ ”  (Waller v. Georgia, 
supra, 467 U.S. at p. 45; see also NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV) Inc. v. Superior 
Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1181.) 
Similarly this court has explained that “a public trial ordinarily is one ‘open 
to the general public at all times.’  [Citations.]  The Sixth Amendment public trial 
guarantee creates a ‘presumption of openness’ that can be rebutted only by a 
showing that exclusion of the public was necessary to protect some ‘higher value,’ 
such as the defendant’s right to a fair trial, or the government’s interest in 
preserving the confidentiality of the proceedings.  [Citation]  When such a ‘higher 
value’ is advanced, the trial court must balance the competing interests and allow a 
form of exclusion no broader than needed to protect those interests.  [Citation.]  
Specific written findings are required to enable a reviewing court to determine the 
propriety of the exclusion.’  [Citations.]”  (People v. Woodward, supra, 4 Cal.4th 
at p. 383, relying primarily on Waller v. Georgia, supra, 467 U.S. 39]. ) 
131 
In the present case, the trial court reasonably concluded that the 
governmental and public interest in apprehending a dangerous criminal justified a 
very minor infringement upon defendant’s right to a public trial — but only during 
a limited portion of examination of a single witness and a brief segment of the 
argument to the jury.  The trial court balanced defendant’s right to present a 
defense and his right to a public trial with the “government’s interest in inhibiting 
disclosure of sensitive information.”  (Waller v. Georgia, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 
45, 48.)  Although “[s]uch circumstances will be rare” and “the balance of 
interests must be struck with special care”  (id. at p. 45), we believe that the trial 
court in the present case identified an overriding state interest in keeping secret 
certain limited details concerning an unsolved crime.  These details concerned 
evidence that would be known only to the perpetrator — details that clearly should 
be kept confidential for use in questioning witnesses.  The closure affected only a 
small portion of a single witness’s testimony and of the parties’ argument to the 
jury on that portion of the evidence — the public was not excluded from a 
substantial portion of the trial or pretrial hearings.  (See People v. Woodward, 
supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 384.)23   
                                              
23  
We find support for our conclusion in decisions from other jurisdictions.  In 
U.S. v. Sherlock (9th Cir. 1989) 962 F.2d 1349, for example, the court commented 
that the right to a public trial is not absolute, but on occasion “must give way . . . 
to other interests essential to the fair administration of justice.  [Citations.]  [¶] 
Federal courts have recognized limitations on that right where a judge has 
excluded spectators during a witness’s testimony for a justifiable purpose,” noting 
cases that permit carefully tailored closure to protect witnesses from harassment 
and physical harm.  (Id. at p. 1356.)  Many decisions have approved limited 
closure during the testimony of undercover officers, both in the interest of the 
officer’s personal safety and to prevent disruption of the officer’s ongoing 
investigations.  (Ayala v. Seckard (2d Cir. 1997) 131 F.3d 62, 72 [closure during 
undercover officer’s testimony to maintain effectiveness of undercover 
operations]; United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent (2d Cir. 1975) 520 F.2d 1272, 
(footnote continued on next page) 
132 
In the present case, an ample record demonstrates that the trial court’s 
concern for the ongoing investigation of the unsolved crime justified the very 
limited closure of the courtroom that occurred.  The court carefully weighed the 
competing interests involved and the options available to it, keeping the closure to 
the minimum necessary to serve the state’s interest.  As contemplated by the high 
court in the Waller decision, these brief closures did not infringe upon defendant’s 
right to a public trial.  
 
15.  Cumulative prejudice 
Defendant contends cumulative prejudice requires reversal of the guilt 
verdict, noting that the jury deliberated for portions of 10 days.  He alleges he was 
deprived of a fair trial and reliable guilt determination in violation of state and 
federal constitutional principles. 
We have not identified any significant errors at the guilt phase, nor do we 
believe there was cumulative prejudice. 
Defendant claims that the charges were inflammatory and that the jury 
probably placed the burden of proof upon him, and that the circumstance that the 
jury convicted him of every charge, even those as to which he believes there was 
insufficient evidence, indicates the jury did not deliberate carefully.  Defendant 
contends that even if the trial court did not err in refusing to grant the motion for 
change of venue, the effect of the intense pretrial publicity and the admission of 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
1274, and cases cited [same]; People v. Hinton (N.Y. 1972) 286 N.E.2d 265, 267 
[closure because of the danger to investigative agent’s effectiveness and personal 
safety;] see People v. Gonzalez (N.Y. App.Div. 2000) 716 N.Y.S.2d 23; see also 
Sevencan v. Herbert (2d Cir. 2002) 316 F.3d 76, 84-85 [officer’s safety was 
involved, and the closure served an overriding interest and was no broader than 
necessary].) 
133 
signature-crime evidence undermined the fairness of the trial to his prejudice.  He 
urges that the evidence was insufficient in many respects and that even if we find 
otherwise, it was extremely weak.   
In essence, defendant asks us to reevaluate the evidence, claiming that 
assuming it was sufficient, the evidence was “close” and the eyewitness 
identifications were weak when factors discussed by his identification expert are 
considered.  He contends his possession of jewelry belonging to the victims was 
not conclusive evidence that he was involved in stealing the jewelry.  But all of 
this evidence was for the jury to consider; it is not our function to reevaluate the 
evidence to conclude whether the jury should have reached a different result on 
the theory that the evidence was close.  (See People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 
Cal.4th 547, 578.)  Nor do we agree that serious prosecutorial misconduct 
undermined the identification of defendant as the perpetrator, arising from the 
circumstance that the witnesses and the prosecutor commented, without objection, 
on the presence of defense counsel at the lineup. 
We have not found error as to any of these claims, and we are not 
persuaded by defendant’s suggestion that a number of issues he regards as “close” 
should require reversal on the ground of cumulative prejudice. 
 
B.  Claims affecting the penalty phase of the trial 
 
1.  Motion for a separate penalty phase jury 
After the guilty verdicts had been entered, defendant moved for a new 
penalty phase jury, citing the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.  After hearing argument, the court denied the 
motion.  
Contrary to defendant’s claim on appeal, he was not entitled to a separate 
jury for the penalty phase of the trial.  Section 190.4, subdivision (c) “requires 
134 
that, absent good cause, the same jury decide guilt and penalty at a capital trial.”  
(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 890.)  The statute expresses a long-
standing preference for a single jury to decide guilt and penalty (ibid.), and we 
have rejected claims that this preference in itself constitutes a denial of due 
process of law or violates the defendant’s right to a fair trial and reliable guilt and 
penalty determination.  (People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1094.)   
“Good cause to discharge the guilt phase jury and to impanel a new one 
must be based on facts that appear ‘ “ ‘in the record as a demonstrable reality,’ ” ’ 
showing the jury’s ‘ “ ‘inability to perform’ ” ’ its function.”  (People v. Earp, 
supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 891; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1354, and 
cases cited.)  We review the court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a second jury 
for abuse of discretion.  (People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1353.) 
Defendant contends the court abused its discretion because it would be 
impossible for a jury that had heard the guilt phase evidence to decide upon an 
appropriate penalty.  According to defendant, he was entitled to a new penalty 
phase jury that had not heard at trial the evidence of the eight charged burglaries 
and six charged attempted burglaries — offenses that, defendant asserts, were 
unconnected with the capital crimes.  He claims the burglaries and attempted 
burglaries could not be considered in aggravation pursuant to section 190.2, factor 
(b), because they did not involve force or violence. 
Defendant’s argument fails because, as we explain post, the court 
appropriately determined that the evidence of the noncapital burglaries properly 
could be considered in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b), as evidence of 
prior “criminal activity . . . which involved the use or attempted use of force or 
violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.” 
Defendant contends that even if the burglary and attempted burglary counts 
properly were considered under section 190.3, factor (b), reversible error still 
135 
occurred because the trial court did not instruct the jury how it should determine 
whether or not these crimes involved force or violence within the meaning of 
section 190.3, factor (b).24  Putting aside the tenuous connection between this 
claim and defendant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion for a separate penalty phase jury, the claim fails because, as 
we have held, instruction pursuant to the terms of section 190.3, factor (b) 
suffices, and a clarifying instruction is not required.  (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 
Cal.4th 861, 922.)25   
 
2.  Pitchess motion 
The prosecution informed the defense that it would present in aggravation 
the testimony of San Diego County Deputy Sheriff Samuel Sheppard, who would 
recount an incident in which defendant had assaulted him in the county jail during 
the course of the trial.  After the guilt phase verdict had been entered but before 
commencement of the penalty phase of the trial, defendant filed a motion seeking 
                                              
24  
The court instructed pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b), and pursuant to 
CALJIC No. 14.50 on burglary. 
25  
Defendant claims that the court’s error in denying his motion for a separate 
penalty phase jury violated various constitutional rights.  He claims that when 
good cause for a separate penalty phase jury has been shown, denial of a motion 
for a separate penalty phase jury constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of a state 
entitlement in violation of his right to due process of law.  But he did not 
demonstrate good cause for the empanelment of a separate jury.  We also reject 
defendant’s claims that this purported state law “error” rendered the penalty 
verdict unreliable in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, that the 
“taint” of the “inadmissible” burglary evidence deprived defendant of his right to a 
fair jury trial by an unbiased factfinder in violation of the due process clause of the 
United States Constitution, and that the “error” caused the jury to act without 
adequate guidance in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Nor 
did the unitary jury so “skew” the balancing process that defendant was deprived 
of his right under the Eighth Amendment to have the jury fairly consider his 
evidence in mitigation.   
136 
discovery of documents that recorded complaints against Sheppard for use of 
excessive force on persons in custody.  (See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 
Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).)  In support, defendant supplied defense counsel’s 
declaration recounting the officer’s asserted use of force against defendant and 
also alleging that other individuals had filed complaints against the officer for use 
of excessive force.  Defendant demanded all written records of any instance of the 
officer’s use of force on any person in custody, names, addresses, and telephone 
numbers of all persons who had submitted complaints against the officer, and any 
documents recording disciplinary actions taken or investigations or possible 
disciplinary action to be taken against Sheppard related to the deputy’s treatment 
of persons in custody. 
The San Diego County Sheriff did not oppose defendant’s request for 
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of complaining parties and witnesses 
involved in complaints against Deputy Sheppard during the previous five years, 
but the sheriff opposed release of any other material.  The court evidently 
concluded that defendant had made a showing sufficient to require the court to 
order the sheriff’s department to produce the records for the court’s examination.  
The court conducted an in camera hearing and reviewed the sheriff’s department 
records.  Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel were present at that hearing.   
Subsequently, on the record, the court concluded that “good cause is shown 
to provide counsel with a list of witnesses which will be provided to all parties and 
a protective order will issue as to this list,” but the court ruled good cause did not 
exist to order disclosure of any other material named in defendant’s discovery 
motion. 
On July 19, 1993, a disclosure and protective order was filed.  It directed 
the sheriff’s department to disclose to defendant “the names[] of complainants and 
witnesses regarding allegations of excessive force or violence by Deputy . . . 
137 
Sheppard . . . , for the five-year period immediately preceding the arrest of the 
defendant,” subject to a protective order prohibiting dissemination of the 
information.  
Defendant contends the trial court infringed upon his constitutional rights, 
because he could not examine the sealed record of the in camera hearing in the 
trial court to determine whether the court ruled correctly on his discovery 
motion.26  More specifically, he contends that the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee that he have access to a 
full and accurate record for the purpose of appellate review.  He asserts the silence 
of the record undermines the reliability of the death judgment, and that his Sixth 
Amendment rights to confrontation and to counsel are implicated. 
We are not persuaded by defendant’s constitutional claims.   
“[S]tate law entitles a defendant only to an appellate record ‘adequate to 
permit [him or her] to argue’ the points raised in the appeal.  [Citation.]  Federal 
constitutional requirements are similar.  The due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require the state to furnish an indigent 
defendant with a record sufficient to permit adequate and effective appellate 
review.  [Citations.]  Similarly, the Eighth Amendment requires reversal only 
where the record is so deficient as to create a substantial risk the death penalty is 
being imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner.  [Citation.]  The defendant 
has the burden of showing the record is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate 
review.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 857-858.)  It is 
                                              
26  
On October 17, 2001, we denied defendant’s motion to unseal the transcript 
of the in camera Pitchess hearing. 
138 
also “defendant’s burden to show that deficiencies in the record are prejudicial.”  
(People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1165.) 
Defendant fails to demonstrate that the record is inadequate to permit 
effective review in this court.  The in camera hearing to which defendant alludes 
was transcribed and has been examined by this court.  The appellate record 
available to defendant is not “so deficient as to create a substantial risk the death 
penalty was being inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner” within the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment.  (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
p. 857.)  Moreover, the trial court proceedings properly occurred in camera and 
were sealed, as were the documents that formed the basis for the trial court’s 
ruling.  (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229.)   
Certainly, a defendant’s right to discovery is intended to ensure a fair trial 
and an informed defense based upon “ ‘ “all relevant and reasonably accessible 
information.” ’ ”  (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 960.)  On the other 
hand, defendant’s right to counsel, to put on a defense, and to confrontation were 
not violated simply because the court followed the practice we outlined in Pitchess 
and have endorsed for many years, a practice we have concluded adequately 
balances the defendant’s right to a fair trial with the officer’s right of privacy.  
(See Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531; see also People v. Samuels 
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 109; Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1043; 
City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 14-16; People v. Mooc, 
supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1226-1227, 1229; City of San Jose v. Superior Court 
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 50-53.)   
In the present case, the trial court found good cause to examine the 
evidence concerning possible complaints against the officer.  The proceedings 
conducted by the court were consistent with the standard we have established.  As 
we have stated, the court should “review[] the pertinent documents in chambers 
139 
and disclose[] only that information falling within the statutorily defined standards 
of relevance.  [Citations.]  The trial court may not disclose complaints more than 
five years old, the ‘conclusions of any officer’ who investigates a citizen 
complaint of police misconduct, or facts ‘so remote as to make [their] disclosure 
of little or no practical benefit.’  [Citations.]  Typically, the trial court discloses 
only the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of individuals who have 
witnessed, or have previously filed complaints about, similar misconduct by the 
officer.  [Citation.]”  (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019.)  
The trial court followed precisely the procedure we have outlined.27 
This court routinely independently examines the sealed records of such in-
camera hearings to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying a defendant’s motion for disclosure of police personnel records.  (See 
People v. Lewis & Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 992; People v. Chatman, supra, 
38 Cal.4th at p. 398; People v. Samuels, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 110-111; People 
v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 330 [noting that customarily appellate counsel 
are not permitted to view transcripts of sealed Pitchess motion hearings].)  
The record in the present case is adequate to permit meaningful appellate 
review.  It includes a full transcript of both segments of the in camera hearing and 
the documents that formed the basis for the court’s conclusion that defendant was 
not entitled to the complaints that had been filed against Sheppard.  The court 
directed that the officer’s personnel file not be copied and inserted into the record, 
but the court adequately stated for the record the contents of that file.  (See People 
                                              
27  
Defendant suggests that his trial counsel’s presence at the in camera 
hearing, along with the opportunity to examine witnesses, might have elicited 
exculpatory evidence, otherwise supported his defense in the present case, or 
given rise to unknown constitutional claims of error, but this claim finds no 
support in the record we have reviewed.   
140 
v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1229 [in some circumstances it suffices for the 
court to “state for the record what documents it examined”].)  The court noted that 
there was not a single item indicating that Sheppard ever had suffered discipline 
for any reason.  
We have reviewed the record under seal and independently conclude that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling upon the Pitchess motion.  
(See People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 330 [an abuse-of-discretion 
standard of review applies].)  Moreover, the trial court ordered disclosure of the 
names of complainants and witnesses in the first two incidents (the third being the 
one involving the complaint filed by defendant).  Defendant had access to the 
information needed to explore the possibility that the deputy had been involved in 
the prior use of excessive force.  Defendant offers no explanation why this 
information was inadequate, nor do we find any. 
 
3.  Victim-impact evidence 
After appropriate objections from defendant and hearings held on several 
occasions, the court permitted the prosecution to introduce a videotape of a 25-
minute interview of Holly Tarr that had been taped a few months prior to her 
death.  Defendant contends the tape was inflammatory and went beyond the type 
of so-called victim-impact evidence that may be admitted consistently with 
constitutional principles.  He claims a violation of his right to a fundamentally fair 
trial and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, citing the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  In addition, he claims 
the introduction of the evidence and its probable emotional impact upon the jury 
violated his right to due process of law and a reliable penalty determination, citing 
Evidence Code section 352 and the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
141 
In a capital trial, Eighth Amendment principles ordinarily do not prevent 
the sentencing authority from considering evidence of “the specific harm caused 
by the crime in question.”  (Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825.)  The 
high court has explained that the prosecution has a legitimate interest in rebutting 
the mitigating evidence that the defendant is entitled to introduce by introducing 
aggravating evidence of the harm caused by the crime, “ ‘reminding the sentencer 
that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is 
an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to 
his family.’ ”  (Ibid.)  “[W]e also have found such evidence (and related ‘victim 
character’ evidence) admissible as a ‘circumstance of the crime’ under section 
190.3, factor (a).”  (People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 650, and cases 
cited.)  We have cautioned, however, “that allowing such evidence under factor (a) 
‘does not mean that there are no limits on emotional evidence and argument.’ ” 
(Id. at p. 651, quoting People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 836.)28  “ ‘ “The 
jury must face its obligation soberly and rationally, and should not be given the 
impression that emotion may reign over reason.” ’ ”  (People v. Robinson, supra, 
37 Cal.4th at p. 651.) 
                                              
28  
Defendant contends that this court’s decision in People v. Edwards, supra, 
54 Cal.3d 787, limits victim impact evidence to “evidence that logically shows the 
harm caused by the defendant.”  (Id. at p. 835.)  He suggests that victim impact 
evidence must be such as to portray the victim as he or she was when the 
defendant confronted the victim and that the videotape “showed far more than 
what she was like when her killer saw her, thereby going well beyond showing the 
harm caused by the killer.”  We reject the assertion, as we have rejected similar 
claims in other cases, that our law disallows “evidence of the victim’s 
characteristics that were unknown to his killer at the time of the crime.”  (People 
v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 732, and cases cited, fn. omitted.) 
142 
Defendant contends the tape-recorded interview was emotionally 
inflammatory, thereby creating a danger that the jury would reach a decision based 
purely upon emotion.  He claims that under constitutional principles and in 
accordance with Evidence Code section 352, the prosecution should not have been 
permitted to introduce victim-impact evidence “in which an attractive, articulate, 
and talented young performer with a stage background literally comes back from 
the dead to share her plans and dreams with the jury.”  He characterizes the 
videotape as an “extraordinarily emotional presentation.” 
We have viewed the videotape recording.  It comprises a 25-minute 
interview with the victim, Holly Tarr, conducted at a local television station in the 
community of Okemos, Michigan.  The court also admitted a transcript of the 
interview, which was provided to defense counsel and members of the jury prior to 
the playing of the tape.  The trial court excluded portions of the videotape 
depicting Tarr’s musical performances, because it determined that this evidence 
would be cumulative.  The interviewer devoted nearly the entire interview to 
Tarr’s training and interest in acting and singing, adding a few questions 
concerning Tarr’s ability to balance school and artistic commitments.  The tape 
recording exhibits a young female interviewer and Tarr, seated in chairs in front of 
a plain backdrop.  There is no music and there are no cuts to other images of 
Tarr — the interview is a calm, even static, discussion of Tarr’s accomplishments 
and interests that takes place entirely in a neutral, bland setting.  Under ordinary 
circumstances, the two young women’s discussion would appear unlikely to invite 
empathy or emotional response. 
The jury viewed the videotape near the conclusion of the victim-impact 
testimony, and the tape was both preceded and succeeded by brief testimony from 
Tarr’s mother.  Prior to the playing of the videotape, testimony on the same 
subject was contributed by her natural father, Paul McKean Tarr, Jr., and her 
143 
stepfather, Mark Rubin.  Mr. Tarr spoke at length about his daughter’s love for the 
theatre as well as the drastic effect her murder had had upon his life.  Rubin barely 
spoke his own name before he was reduced to tears, requiring a recess to permit 
him to compose himself.  The jury already had heard testimony from five other 
family members of victims Schultz, Weinhold, and Keller. 
Case law pertaining to the admissibility of videotape recordings of victim 
interviews in capital sentencing hearings provides us with no bright-line rules by 
which to determine when such evidence may or may not be used.  We consider 
pertinent cases in light of a general understanding that the prosecution may present 
evidence for the purpose of “ ‘reminding the sentencer . . . [that] the victim is an 
individual whose death represents a unique loss to society’ ” (Payne v. Tennessee, 
supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825), but that the prosecution may not introduce irrelevant or 
inflammatory material that “ ‘diverts the jury’s attention from its proper role or 
invites an irrational, purely subjective response.’ ”  (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 
Cal.3d at p. 836.) 
In one capital case, the court rejected a relevance challenge to the 
admission of a videotape recording that was used to demonstrate a particular skill 
for which a victim was nationally recognized.  (Whittlesey v. State (Md. 1995) 665 
A.2d 223.)  In Whittlesey, the court approved the admission of a 90-second 
videotape of a murder victim playing the piano.  The court agreed with the trial 
court that the tape could illustrate the victim’s talent better than any photograph.  
(Id. at p. 251.)  In response to defense objections that testimony provided by the 
victim’s parents rendered such evidence cumulative, the court stated that “[i]n 
reviewing objections based on relevance, great deference is afforded the trial judge 
in regulating the conduct of a trial.”  (Ibid.)   
Another court permitted introduction of a videotape recording that had been 
condensed to three minutes, determining that the evidence fell within the accepted 
144 
category of a “ ‘ “ ‘quick glimpse of the life which [the defendant] chose to 
extinguish.’ ” ’ ”  (State v. Allen (N.M. 1999) 994 P.2d 728, 751.)  The court in 
that capital case also noted that a photograph from the same videotaped event had 
been presented to the jury without objection.  (Ibid.; see also State v. Gray (Mo. 
1994) 887 SW2d 369, 389 [videotape of victim’s family at Christmas held 
admissible].) 
On the other hand, two courts were particularly reluctant to allow videotape 
evidence that served as a memorial to the victim, finding that the probative value 
of such evidence was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant.  
(See U.S. v. Sampson (D.Mass. 2004) 335 F.Supp.2d 166; Salazar v. State 
(Tex.Crim.App. 2002) 90 S.W.3d 330.)  In Sampson, the court excluded a 27-
minute videotape that consisted of 200 still photographs depicting the victim at 
various stages of life from birth until death, set to “evocative contemporary 
music.”  (U.S. v. Sampson, supra, 335 F.Supp. at p. 191.)   
Reviewing facts that we characterized as “extreme” (People v. Robinson, 
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 652), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disapproved of 
similar videotape evidence in Salazar v. State, supra, 90 S.W.3d 330, finding that 
in this noncapital case the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting a 17-
minute videotape tribute to a murder victim.  In remanding for an assessment of 
prejudice, the court stated in Salazar that “the punishment phase of a criminal trial 
is not a memorial service for the victim” (id. at pp. 335-336) and that “[w]hat may 
be entirely appropriate eulogies to celebrate the life and accomplishments of a 
unique individual are not necessarily admissible in a criminal trial.”  (Id. at p. 
336.)  The court complained that the trial court had not seen the videotape before it 
was played to the jury and consequently was unable to weigh the probative value 
of the tape against its prejudicial impact.  (Id. at pp. 336-337.)  The reviewing 
145 
court emphasized the risk of unfair prejudice, noting the video contained many 
images from the adult victim’s infancy and childhood.  (Id. at pp. 337-338.) 
Courts must exercise great caution in permitting the prosecution to present 
victim-impact evidence in the form of a lengthy videotaped or filmed tribute to the 
victim.  Particularly if the presentation lasts beyond a few moments, or emphasizes 
the childhood of an adult victim, or is accompanied by stirring music, the medium 
itself may assist in creating an emotional impact upon the jury that goes beyond 
what the jury might experience by viewing still photographs of the victim or 
listening to the victim’s bereaved parents.  The trial court in the present case 
clearly understood the power of this type of evidence, commenting early in the 
proceedings that “I have a great deal of concern about the medium of a videotape 
creating a situation of grave prejudice,” and that “there is a qualitative difference 
between a videotape and a still photograph from an emotional standpoint.”  In 
order to combat this strong possibility, courts must strictly analyze evidence of 
this type and, if such evidence is admitted, courts must monitor the jurors’ 
reactions to ensure that the proceedings do not become injected with a legally 
impermissible level of emotion. 
Although we caution courts against the routine admission of videotapes 
featuring the victim, we do not believe that prejudicial error occurred under the 
circumstances of the present case.  The videotaped evidence did not constitute 
“ ‘irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that divert[ed] the jury’s 
attention from its proper role or invite[ed] an irrational, purely subjective 
response.’ ”  (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 836.)  Unlike the material 
presented in the Sampson and Salazar cases, as we have explained the videotaped 
interview of Holly Tarr did not constitute an emotional memorial tribute to the 
victim.  There was no music, emotional or otherwise.  The tape did not, as the trial 
court in the present case initially feared it might, display the victim in her home or 
146 
with her family, nor were there images of the victim as an infant or young child.  
The setting was a neutral television studio, where an interviewer politely asked 
questions concerning the victim’s accomplishments on the stage and as a musician 
and the difficulty she experienced in balancing her many commitments, touching 
only briefly upon her plan to attend college in the fall and follow the stage as a 
profession.  If not for the circumstances of her subsequent murder, the videotape 
admitted at trial likely would be of modest interest to anyone apart from Tarr and 
her friends and family.  The loss of such a talented and accomplished person is 
poignant even for a stranger to contemplate, but the straightforward, dry interview 
depicted on the videotaped recording was not of the nature to stir strong emotions 
that might overcome the restraints of reason. 
Significantly, the record on appeal also establishes that the trial court not 
only excluded portions of the interview displaying Tarr in performance, it also 
closely observed the jury for signs of emotional distress and made a careful record 
of its observations.  During the numerous hearings on the admissibility of the 
videotaped evidence, the trial court repeatedly commented that it would not be 
allowing the proceedings to be hijacked by “an emotional setting of pathos.”  The 
court scrutinized the jury for evidence of emotional response during the playing of 
the tape, focusing on “not only the jurors but on all members of the spectating 
audience.”  At the completion of the interview, the court allowed only a few more 
minutes of testimony from Tarr’s mother before dismissing the jury for the 
remainder of the day.  When the session resumed the following morning, the court 
entertained further objections by defense counsel to the playing of the videotape.  
The court addressed each of defense counsel’s contentions, ultimately concluding 
that although there was in fact an emotional response from certain members of the 
jury, the court “didn’t see emotion running roughshod over judgment.”  The court 
assured both the prosecution and defense counsel that if it had observed an overly 
147 
emotional response, it would not have hesitated to declare a mistrial, but that such 
a response simply did not occur.  
The trial court concluded that although jurors exhibited sadness, their 
response was no stronger than they had displayed during the testimony given by 
members of the victims’ families.  According to the observations made by the 
court, no one on the jury broke down and cried or appeared overcome by emotion.  
The prosecutor did not exploit the emotional impact of the videotape, but instead 
refrained from any mention of the taped interview in closing argument.  Based 
upon the nature of the evidence and the court’s close observation of the jury, we 
conclude that defendant’s claims are without merit. 
Defendant also contends his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
was violated by the introduction of the videotaped interview.  He argues the 
admission of the videotaped interview “effectively amounted to having the victim 
return from the grave to testify to legally irrelevant matters, with no opportunity 
for the defense to confront and cross-examine this witness.”  
The trial court found no merit in defendant’s argument, reasoning that the 
videotaped interview was not being admitted for the truth of its recorded 
statements.  Rather, it was admitted to demonstrate to the jury Tarr’s “reactions to 
the questions, her demeanor” and, the court further stated, “the content of the tape 
is secondary.”  The court surmised there would be no significant factual 
revelations stemming from the playing of the videotape because much of the 
information pertaining to Tarr’s interests and plans already had been presented to 
the jury via testimony from the victim’s family members. 
We agree with the trial court that the videotape recording was not offered 
primarily for the truth of the statements it contained and that even if it was offered 
in part for the truth of those statements, the information conveyed was cumulative 
to other testimony as to which defendant did have an opportunity for cross-
148 
examination.  In addition, as we have explained, we are confidant that the 
admission of the tape recording was not prejudicial under the circumstances of the 
present case. 
 
4.  Instruction on and jury’s consideration of the burglaries not 
directly related to the murders 
Defendant argued at trial that the jury should not be permitted to consider 
certain guilt phase evidence as a circumstance in aggravation under section 190.3, 
factor (b).  Specifically, he asserted that the jury should not be permitted to 
consider guilt phase evidence concerning the burglaries and attempted burglaries 
that were not directly connected with the capital offenses.  He argued that these 
assertedly unrelated offenses did not come within section 190.3, factor (b), 
because they did not involve force or violence.  
The trial court disagreed with defendant.  The court instructed the jury that 
the burglaries and attempted burglaries may have involved the use of force or 
violence or the express or implied threat of violence, but that it was for the jurors 
to decide whether they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
committed those acts, whether they involved the use or attempted use of force or 
violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence, and whether 
the acts were criminal.  (The court instructed the jury that, as a matter of law, 
perjury (one of the charged offenses) does not involve force or violence and could 
not be considered under section 190.3, factor (b).) 
Defendant contends on appeal that noncapital crimes of which a defendant 
was convicted in the same proceeding never may be considered at the penalty 
phase as evidence in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b), whether the 
crimes are violent or not.  In support he cites People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 
57 (disapproved on another point in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907), in 
which we declared that factor (b) pertains “only to criminal activity other than the 
149 
crimes for which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding.”  (People 
v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 106.)  The quoted language does not carry the 
meaning that defendant attributes to it, because the issue in the Miranda decision 
involved the danger that a jury would double-count evidence under section 190.3, 
factor (a) (circumstances of the crime) and factor (b) (other criminal activity 
involving violence) ― not whether convictions in the same proceeding that were 
unrelated to the capital crimes could be considered under factor (b).  Evidence 
presented at the guilt phase may be considered at the penalty phase of the trial 
(§ 190.4, subd. (d)), and defendant offers no logical reason to support the 
conclusion that evidence that otherwise would be admissible under factor (b) 
would become inadmissible because of a joinder with capital offenses. 
Defendant contends the charged burglaries and attempted burglaries that 
were unconnected temporally with the capital offenses did not all involve violence 
or the threat of violence.  Defendant claims that “thirteen of the fifteen present 
factor (b) burglaries and attempted burglaries did not involve any evidence of 
arming or knife movement [sic] at all.”  He contends the jury instructions on the 
burglary and attempted burglary charges improperly permitted the jury to rely 
upon the offenses as aggravating evidence even though they did not involve the 
use or threat of force or violence, in violation of section 190.3, factor (b). 
We disagree with defendant and agree with the trial court that, under the 
circumstances of the present case, the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational 
trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the burglaries and 
attempted burglaries involved at least an implied threat of violence.  (See People 
v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 672-673 [stating standard].)  We base our 
determination on all the evidence concerning defendant’s use of violence in the 
burglaries that culminated in the capital murders; his possession of knives (either 
his own or those that originated in the home he was burglarizing) in various of the 
150 
capital and noncapital crimes; his stalking behavior in most of the noncapital 
burglaries and attempted burglaries; his repeated attempts to burglarize residences 
knowing that their young female inhabitants were at home and possibly were 
showering; his violence during the Hughes-Webb burglary; his statement to his 
accomplice Moheshea Beasley that if the resident of an apartment had appeared 
unexpectedly during a burglary, he would have slit her throat; and Shirley 
Beasley’s testimony that during one of their joint burglaries, defendant took a 
knife from the kitchen of the burglarized residence and instructed Beasley that if 
the resident returned, Beasley should step aside and defendant would “handle it.”  
Shirley Beasley also testified that defendant told him that if a resident returned to a 
house defendant was burglarizing, defendant would stab the person in the heart or 
the neck.  (See People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 536 [illegal possession 
of weapons along with evidence defendant used those or similar weapons in other 
crimes could be considered under section 190.3, factor (b)]; see also People v. 
Monteil (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 936 [actual or threatened violence in burglary];  
People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 589 [illegal possession of weapon in 
custody constitutes implied threat of violence]; People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at 
pp. 676-677 [evidence that defendant picked up a knife during a burglary “to avoid 
apprehension and make good his escape” could be “an implied threat to use the 
knife against anyone who might interfere”].) 
Defendant contends the court’s instructions were inadequate to inform the 
jury of its responsibilities, and he surmises that the standard instructions on 
section 190.3, factor (b) would permit a juror to conclude that “any residential 
burglary is a crime of violence, even if no force was used in making entry.”29   
                                              
29  
Defendant also complains that the court “never communicated to the jury” 
its view that the burglaries were not “part of an overall scheme that included the 
(footnote continued on next page) 
151 
Defendant’s principal contention seems to be that the court should have 
afforded additional guidance on the meaning of the terms “force” and 
“violence” ― terms he claimed involve “technical legal distinctions not a matter 
of common knowledge.”  We previously have rejected the identical claim, and 
defendant offers no persuasive reason for us to reconsider our holding.  (People v. 
Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 922 [rejecting state law and Eighth Amendment 
claims].)30 
 
5.  Prosecutorial misconduct 
Petitioner contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during his 
questioning of defense expert James Park and during argument to the jury.   
James Park, a former associate warden at San Quentin prison, testified on 
defendant’s behalf.  Park described prison conditions and the daily life 
experienced by persons sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole.  He described the generally “stabilizing” influence of life prisoners upon 
prisoners serving shorter terms.  During cross-examination, the court sustained 
defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s question whether the witness previously 
had “personalized” his testimony.  The prosecutor then asked whether the witness 
was predicting “how he’s [defendant] going to do.”  The witness stated he had not 
testified to that effect.  The prosecutor then asked:  “But in the past, you’ve talked 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
murders.”  The court’s point in making this declaration was to explain why it 
rejected the prosecutor’s argument that all the noncapital burglaries and attempted 
burglaries could be considered under section 190.3, factor (a), the circumstances 
of the crime. 
30  
Having found no error, we also reject defendant’s claim that the asserted 
error denied him various state and federal constitutional rights.  
152 
about a specific defendant doing well in prison?  You predicted that, haven’t 
you?”  The defense successfully objected on relevance grounds. 
According to defendant, the prosecutor’s questions insinuated that the 
witness would not speak of defendant personally because the witness knew there 
was nothing good that could be said about him.  According to defendant, the 
questions undermined important defense evidence in mitigation, and “[n]o 
admonition could have undone the harm caused by this misconduct.”  Defendant 
alleges this purported misconduct rendered the penalty trial fundamentally unfair 
and thereby constituted a denial of the right to due process of law under the United 
States Constitution.  In addition, “once the prosecutor used improper leading 
questions to imply evidence that did not exist and would not have been relevant if 
it did exist, there was no realistic manner in which the defense could have 
‘confronted’ the improper implication.  This deprived [defendant] of his federal 
6th and 14th Amendment rights to confront and cross-examine the witnesses 
against him . . . [and] effectively deprived [defendant] of his right to present 
witnesses in his own behalf.”  Defendant also claims denial of his constitutional 
right to a reliable penalty phase determination and his constitutional right to have 
the jury consider his evidence in mitigation. 
The witness never answered the prosecutor’s questions.  Defendant did not 
seek an admonition to the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s questions, a 
circumstance that ordinarily causes the forfeiture of a claim.  Claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct ordinarily are forfeited for the purpose of appeal unless 
the defendant objects to the asserted misconduct at trial and requests an 
admonition to the jury, or an admonition would not have cured the harm.  (People 
v. Fiereo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 211.) 
Moreover, the jury was instructed that the attorneys’ questions do not 
constitute evidence, and that it should not speculate concerning the answer that 
153 
might have been given to a question or assume the truth of any insinuation 
suggested by a question as to which an objection was sustained.  As a general 
matter, we may presume that the jury followed the instructions it was given 
(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1014), and defendant has failed to 
supply any persuasive reason to suppose the jury instead would have accepted as 
evidence the insinuation allegedly implicit in the prosecutor’s questions.   
Defendant also argues that in closing argument, the prosecutor improperly 
appealed to the passions of the jury and invited the jury to engage in a mechanical 
weighing process, in violation of various constitutional rights.  Defendant points to 
the prosecutor’s argument that the defense was inviting the jury to impose the 
same penalty — life in prison without possibility of parole — that would have 
been the minimum punishment had defendant committed only the offenses against 
Janene Weinhold.  The prosecutor pointed to the additional aggravating factors of 
defendant’s five other murders.  He suggested that defense counsel essentially 
would be arguing that the other five murder victims did not count — that “these 
women are freebies.  Let’s throw these bodies in.  And we are not going to exact 
one more day, one more ounce of punishment against [defendant] for killing six 
than we would the one.” 
Defendant did not object to the argument, nor did he seek an admonition to 
the jury.  Under the circumstances, he forfeited any claim based on the principles 
stated above.  In addition, contrary to defendant’s claim, we do not believe that the 
prosecutor told the jury that all multiple murders automatically warrant the death 
penalty, nor do we believe his argument was an improper appeal to passion or 
invited the jury to engage in a mechanical weighing process.  The circumstances 
of the charged capital crimes are appropriate factors in aggravation, and it is not 
improper to suggest that a defendant who murders six persons is more culpable 
154 
and therefore should receive a more severe sentence than a defendant who murders 
only one victim. 
Defendant cites a decision filed by a majority of the Illinois Supreme Court 
holding that a similar argument constituted reversible error at the penalty phase of 
a capital murder trial.  (People v. Kuntu (Ill. 2001) 752 N.E.2d 380, 403.)  The 
decision held that the prosecutor’s argument was a call to the jury to act on the 
basis of passion and prejudice and also amounted to an argument that all multiple 
murders automatically must be punished by death.  (Ibid.)  The prosecutor’s 
reference to “five free murders,” the majority maintained, was “simply an 
inflammatory statement with no basis in either law or fact; it is tantamount to the 
conclusion that, as a matter of law, a person who kills more than two persons 
should be sentenced to death.”  (Ibid.)  The decision concluded that standard jury 
instructions informing the jury that the prosecutor’s argument does not constitute 
evidence did not, under the particular facts of the case, cure the prosecutor’s 
asserted misconduct.  The court concluded that “[i]n light of the closely balanced 
evidence presented at the penalty phase of the death sentencing hearing, the risk is 
simply too great that the prosecutor’s comments improperly influenced the jury’s 
sentencing decision.”  (Id. at p. 404.) 
We believe that the three dissenting justices in Kuntu took the better view.  
As the dissent pointed out, and as we believe is true in the present case as well, the 
prosecutor “at no time argued that the death penalty should always be imposed 
when more than two persons are killed.  Instead, the State implied, through its 
comments, that the offense was particularly egregious and especially deserving of 
the death penalty.  The State commented, as it has a right to do, that defendant’s 
crime was an atrocious crime that resulted in the senseless death of seven victims 
. . . .  Thus, the State’s comments, although inartful, were not misstatements of the 
155 
death penalty law and should not be construed in such a fashion.”  (People v. 
Kuntu, supra, 752 N.E.2d at p. 409 (dis. opn. of Fitzgerald, J.).)   
 
6.  Failure to exclude evidence of defendant’s possession of a 
weapon while he was in custody 
Defendant contends the trial court erred in determining that it lacked the 
discretion ordinarily afforded by Evidence Code section 352 — which 
acknowledges the court’s discretion to exclude evidence that is more prejudicial 
than probative — to exclude evidence of defendant’s possession of a weapon in 
jail as a factor in aggravation under factor (b). 
In People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1201, we declared that the trial 
court retains its “traditional discretion” to exclude “ ‘particular items of [section 
190.3, factors (a) or (b)] evidence’ ” that are to be used in a “ ‘manner’ that is 
misleading, cumulative, or unduly inflammatory.”  In addition, “factor (b) 
evidence, even if it depicts the moral blameworthiness of the defendant, may 
nonetheless be excludable under Evidence Code section 352 insofar as it unfairly 
persuades jurors to find the defendant guilty of the crime’s commission.”  (Ibid.)  
Even assuming error under Box in the present case, any error could not have been 
prejudicial.  Defendant presents no reason for us to conclude that the evidence in 
question was unduly inflammatory or prejudicial.  He contends the evidence might 
demonstrate that defendant was likely to be dangerous in the future, but such an 
inference was proper.31  
                                              
31  
For the same reason that we rejected defendant’s state law claim, we reject 
his claim that he suffered an arbitrary deprivation of the benefit of state law (Hicks 
v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. 343) and that he was deprived of the right to a 
reliable penalty determination.  (Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. 
280.) 
156 
 
7.  Challenges to the California death penalty scheme 
Defendant raises various constitutional challenges to the California death 
penalty statute, but we reject them as we have done in prior cases.   
a.  Admitting evidence of prior unadjudicated crimes in aggravation does 
not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of fair 
trial, trial by an impartial jury, speedy trial, and reliability, or the prohibition on 
placing persons twice in jeopardy for the same offense.  (People v. Box, supra, 23 
Cal.4th at p. 1217.) 
b.  Failure to require that the jury unanimously find the aggravating 
circumstances true beyond a reasonable doubt, to find unanimously and beyond a 
reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
circumstances, or to require a unanimous finding beyond a reasonable doubt that 
death is the appropriate penalty does not violate the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees of due process and a reliable penalty determination.  
(People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1217.) 
The California death penalty statute is not unconstitutional in failing to 
require the jury to make written findings concerning the aggravating 
circumstances it relied upon, nor does the failure to require written findings 
preclude meaningful appellate review.  (People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 
698, 730-731.)  Neither Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, nor Ring v. 
Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, nor Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 
“affects California death penalty law or otherwise justifies reconsideration of the 
foregoing decisions.”  (People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 731.)  At oral 
argument in the present case, defense counsel filed a letter that added a citation to 
the high court’s recent, related decision in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 
U.S. __ [127 S.Ct. 856].  The Cunningham decision involves merely an extension 
of the Apprendi and Blakely analyses to California’s determinate sentencing law 
157 
and has no apparent application to the state’s capital sentencing scheme.  In 
Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, the high court “found a constitutional requirement 
that any fact, other than a prior conviction, which increases the maximum penalty 
for a crime must be formally charged, submitted to the fact finder, treated as a 
criminal element and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  [Citation.]  But under 
the California death penalty scheme, once the defendant has been convicted of 
first degree murder and one or more special circumstances has been found true 
beyond a reasonable doubt, death is no more than the prescribed statutory 
maximum for the offense; the only alternative is life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.”  (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589-590, fn. 
14.)  Defendant’s failure to supply any discussion or analysis of the Cunningham 
decision leaves us with no basis to conclude that it should cause us to alter our 
views. 
c.  The California death penalty statute does not fail to narrow the class of 
persons eligible for the death penalty as required by the Eighth Amendment and 
article 1, section 17 of the California Constitution.  (People v. Gray, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 237; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1017.) 
d.  Contrary to defendant’s claim, comparative intercase proportionality 
review is not required by the United States Constitution.  (People v. Snow (2003) 
30 Cal.4th 43, 126, 127), but intracase proportionality review is available.  (People 
v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 511.) 
e.  The use of the terms “extreme” or “substantial” does not improperly 
limit the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence in violation of the Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments.  (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
581, 642.) 
158 
f.  “Nor does the prosecutorial discretion to charge special circumstances or 
seek the death penalty under the [California death penalty] statute violate the 
federal Constitution.”  (People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1217.) 
g.  Delay in the appointment of counsel on appeal and in processing the 
appeal does not inflict cruel or unusual punishment within the meaning of the state 
or United States Constitutions.  (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1131.) 
h.  Contrary to defendant’s claim, the statutory sentencing factors are not so 
arbitrary, broad, or contradictory that they provide inadequate guidance to the jury.  
(People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 729. 
i.  There is no constitutional requirement of a presumption in favor of a 
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  (People v. Maury 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 440.) 
j.  Appellate review of death judgments is not impermissibly influenced by 
political considerations in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  (People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th 
at pp. 1140-1141.) 
k.  Defendant contends that the various violations of state and federal law 
he has asserted also constitute a violation of international law, but he “fail[s] to 
establish the premise that his trial involved violations of state and federal 
constitutional law.”  (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1055.)  Further, 
“[t]o the extent defendant alleges violations of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights . . . his claim lacks merit, even assuming he has standing to 
invoke this covenant.”  (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 106; People v. 
Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 404.) 
 
159 
 
8.  Cumulative prejudice 
Defendant contends that guilt phase errors that may have been harmless at 
the guilt phase were prejudicial at the penalty phase.  He cites (1) asserted error in 
admitting evidence of the knives discovered in his automobile at the time of his 
arrest; and (2) admission of “evidence of ambiguous statements made by 
[defendant] which were not sufficiently tied to the present crimes, but which 
nonetheless portrayed [defendant] as having a negative attitude toward females.”  
Defendant contends this assertedly improperly admitted character evidence 
affected the penalty determination and also might have caused the jury to dismiss 
any lingering doubts they had concerning defendant’s guilt.  Defendant also 
contends the prejudicial impact of any guilt phase error on the penalty 
determination is subject to review under the Chapman v. California, supra, 386 
U.S. 18, standard for review of federal constitutional error, rather than the Brown 
(1988) 46 Cal.3d 432 test for state law error at the penalty phase.  But “[w]e have 
explained that ‘Brown’s “reasonable possibility” standard and Chapman’s 
“reasonable doubt” test . . . are the same in substance and effect.’ ” (People v. 
Gonzalez, supra, (38 Cal.4th at p. 961, fn. omitted.)  As we have concluded, the 
admission of the evidence of the knives was harmless under the most exacting 
standard of review (see People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 655), and we 
have rejected defendant’s claim concerning the admission of his statements.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed in its entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
CORRIGAN, J.
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Prince 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S036105 
Date Filed: April 30, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Charles R. Hayes 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Mark E. Cutler, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, William M. Wood, John T. Swan and Quisteen S. 
Shum, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark E. Cutler 
Post Office Box 172 
Cool, CA  95614-0172 
(530) 885-7718 
 
Quisteen S. Shum 
Deputy Attorney General 
110 West “A” Street, Suite 1100 
San Diego, CA  92186-5266 
(619) 645-2211