Case Title: CHRISTOPHER LEYO V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
CHRISTOPHER LEYO V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 92116 P.3d 1113Case Number: 04-18Decided: 08/12/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
CHRISTOPHER 
LEYO,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. 
Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Dee Morgan, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, JJ., and SANDERSON, D.J. 

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]           
Christopher 
Leyo appeals his convictions on two counts of delivering a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine)1and one count of 
conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance (methamphetamine).2  
Leyo claims there was insufficient evidence to sustain his 
convictions and prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing argument.  Finding no error, we affirm Leyo's 
convictions.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]           
Leyo 
submits the following issues for this Court's review, with which the State 
generally agrees:

 
 
I.  Whether 
there was sufficient evidence to convict appellant for delivery of a controlled 
substance and conspiracy to deliver a controlled 
substance.

 
 
II.  Whether 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor improperly appealed to 
community outrage in closing argument, and whether the trial court erred in 
failing to rectify this error with a proper curative instruction, denying 
appellant a fair trial.

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]           
In the 
spring of 2002 Amanda Inman began working as a confidential informant for the 
Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI).  
Inman was an intravenous methamphetamine user and a convicted felon.  Inman began working for DCI as an 
informant because she and her boyfriend had been caught delivering 
methamphetamine.  In return for her 
cooperation, the State offered to recommend probation on the delivery charges, 
drop other charges against her, and help her boyfriend.  Pursuant to this deal, Inman provided 
information to DCI on several different criminal matters.  

 
 

[¶4]           
On 
January 27, 2003, Inman learned she was staying in the same motel as an 
acquaintance, Michelle Mastin.  She 
went to Mastin's room.  Inman found 
four people in the room, including Mastin and Leyo.  Leyo informed Inman that he had some 
methamphetamine he needed to sell.  
The next morning, Inman informed an agent with the DCI that she could 
purchase a quarter gram of methamphetamine from Leyo for $35.00.  DCI proceeded to make arrangements for a 
controlled buy and executed the controlled buy the same 
day.

 
 

[¶5]           
DCI 
followed standard operating procedures for a controlled buy.  They had Inman come to the DCI 
office.  After her arrival, a DCI 
agent searched her vehicle.  Inman 
was searched by a female employee of DCI and fitted with a wireless 
transmitter.  Inman was then given 
pre-recorded buy money.  Inman left 
the DCI office with, to the best knowledge of the law enforcement 
representatives present, nothing but the pre-recorded buy money.  Inman drove straight to Mastin's motel, 
at all times followed by law enforcement officers.  Inman drove normally and was not seen 
moving her hands around or reaching for anything.  

 
 

[¶6]           
The 
controlled buy took place in Mastin's motel room.  Inman went alone to the motel room.  DCI maintained surveillance around the 
motel and monitored the transaction by way of the wireless transmitter.  The proceedings as received from the 
wireless transmitter were recorded to audiotape.   Inman returned to her car and 
drove back to the DCI office, under constant surveillance.  Back at the office, Inman was searched 
again, the methamphetamine was recovered, and Inman was questioned about the buy 
(debriefed).  Inman's car was also 
searched.  Inman then left the 
office.

 
 

[¶7]           
The 
second buy took place on February 4, 2003.  
Prior to February 4, Mastin told Inman that, although her source was 
leaving town and she personally could not get more methamphetamine for Inman, 
Leyo could sell Inman some methamphetamine.  Inman informed DCI of her negotiations 
with Mastin.  DCI set up a 
controlled buy and the same procedures were followed.  Inman came to the DCI office, she was 
searched and wired, and she was given pre-recorded buy funds.  

 
 

[¶8]           
Inman's 
driver's license had been suspended so this time a law enforcement officer drove 
Inman to the buy location.  Inman 
was kept under constant surveillance.  
Inman entered the motel room alone and returned to the officer waiting 
for her in the parking lot within six or seven minutes.  The proceedings as received from the 
wireless transmitter were recorded.  
On this occasion, Inman purchased 1.75 grams of methamphetamine from Leyo 
for $130.00.  Inman was driven back 
to the DCI office, the methamphetamine was recovered, Inman was searched and 
debriefed.  The information Inman 
gave to DCI in the debriefing after both buys corresponded to what DCI agents 
were able to hear over the transmitter.  
The audiotapes that recorded the transactions over the transmitter were 
played to the jury and admitted as evidence.

 
 

[¶9]           
DCI 
hoped to make further purchases from Leyo (and hopefully gather evidence 
regarding Leyo's supplier(s)), but Inman was caught driving with a suspended 
license and sentenced to forty-five days in jail.  Once DCI found out that Inman would be 
in jail and unavailable to conduct any more controlled buys for them, DCI looked 
for Leyo and Mastin, but they had vacated the area.  Thus, DCI was unable to obtain a search 
warrant to find pre-recorded buy funds or other evidence of drug related 
activity. 

 
 

[¶10]       
Leyo was 
eventually arrested on April 22, 2003, and charged with two counts of delivering 
methamphetamine and one count of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine.  The case was tried to a jury in 
September 2003.  Mastin was not 
located in time for her to testify at Leyo's trial.  Thus, although the State called several 
law enforcement officers to testify regarding their respective roles in the 
controlled buys, Inman was the only witness to provide direct testimony of the 
actual transactions.  Specifically, 
Inman was the only witness to testify that Leyo was the person from whom she 
bought the methamphetamine.  At the 
time of trial, Inman was in jail for violation of the terms of her 
probation.  She also had been 
diagnosed with, and was on medication for, schizophrenia.  Leyo moved for a judgment of acquittal 
at the end of the State's case.  The 
motion was denied.  Leyo did not put 
on a defense.  The jury convicted 
Leyo on all three charges.

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
A. 
Sufficiency of the Evidence

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶11]       
On 
appeal, Leyo first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
conviction.  When the issue of 
sufficiency of the evidence is raised on appeal, this Court must respect the 
role of the fact-finder, in this case the jury, to weigh the credibility of the 
respective witnesses.  A jury is 
entitled to weigh and disregard any evidence intended to discredit the witnesses 
for the State.  Broom v. 
State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 1985).  This Court does not second-guess the 
credibility determinations of the jury.  
Estrada-Sanchez v. State, 2003 WY 45, ¶6, 66 P.3d 703, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2003).  To that end, this Court must 
presume that the jury resolved any conflict in the evidence in favor of the 
prosecution.  McFarlane v. 
State, 2001 WY 10, ¶4, 17 P.3d 31, ¶4 (Wyo. 2001).  Ultimately, in order to preserve the 
role of the fact-finder, this Court does not review the record evidence to 
determine if it agrees with the verdict, but rather the critical inquiry of this 
Court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Ekholm v. State, 2004 WY 159, 
¶18, 102 P.3d 201, ¶18 (Wyo. 2004); Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, ¶7, 57 P.3d 1242, ¶7 (Wyo. 2002). 

 
 
 
 
Discussion

 
 

[¶12]       
Initially, 
Leyo questions this Court's standard of review on claims that the evidence 
adduced at trial was insufficient to support a guilty verdict.  In a confusing argument, Leyo seemingly 
contends that this Court has strayed from the standard of review established by 
the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).  
This Court finds Leyo's contention peculiar, particularly in light of the 
fact this Court has repeatedly directly quoted Jackson when explaining our standard of 
review:

 
 
When 
addressing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction 
for a crime, we apply the following standard:

This 
Court assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough 
to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State.  We will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our 
only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury 
actually did.  

Hodges 
v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo.1995) (citation omitted); see also Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo. 2000), cert. 
denied, 532 U.S. 980, 121 S. Ct. 1620, 149 L. Ed. 2d 483 (2001).  This inquiry does not require a court to 
determine whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Broom 
v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 1985).  Rather, the relevant question is 
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Id. This 
standard gives the trier of fact the responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts 
in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the 
facts.  Id. "Once a defendant has been found guilty of the 
crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved 
through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to 
be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.'"  Id. (quoting Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)).

 
 

Willis 
v. State, 2002 
WY 79, ¶8, 46 P.3d 890, ¶8 (Wyo. 2002) (emphasis added). 

 
 

[¶13]       
Leyo 
seems to be under the impression this Court has strayed from Jackson by 
essentially adopting two different standards of review.  Leyo grounds this argument on the fact 
that occasionally this Court states that our review for sufficiency of evidence 
requires us to "accept as true the prosecution's evidence, give to the 
prosecution those inferences which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from that 
evidence, and do not consider the defendant's evidence in conflict with the 
prosecution's evidence and the inferences therefrom."  Brown v. State, 2005 WY 37, ¶18, 
109 P.3d 52, ¶18 (Wyo. 2005).  Leyo 
concludes that when this Court states the standard of review in the above form, 
this Court limits the evidence it reviews to only that introduced by the 
prosecution.  We fail, however, to 
understand the basis for this conclusion, since it would be impossible for this 
Court to determine what evidence conflicts if it does not review all record 
evidence.

 
 

[¶14]       
Leyo 
extends his argument by asserting that, once it is established that this Court 
reviews all record evidence, it naturally follows that this Court should 
consider all evidence when conducting its sufficiency review.  Leyo's ultimate contention is that this 
Court "is not foreclosed from reviewing the entire record, even evidence that 
contradicts or conflicts with the State's theory and evidence" and indeed that 
this Court should not turn "a blind eye' to any and all evidence that happens 
to conflict with the State's evidence."  
In other words, Leyo is asking this Court to adopt a standard of review 
that fails to give deference to the fact-finder.  

 
 

[¶15]       
We 
refuse to accept Leyo's argument that we alter our standard of review to 
essentially conduct a de novo review of the evidence.  This Court has adopted and maintains a 
very consistent review process when reviewing whether sufficient evidence is 
present to sustain a criminal conviction.  
We do not reweigh the evidence.  
It is the province of the fact-finder to weigh credibility and resolve 
conflicts in the evidence.  In order 
to honor the role of the fact-finder, we presume the existence of every fact the 
fact-finder could reasonably deduce from the evidence that supports its 
verdict.  The natural corollary is 
that this Court will disregard any evidence or legally supportable inferences 
that can be drawn from the evidence that conflicts with the verdict.  Once this Court determines the facts the 
jury could have found in support of its verdict, we conclude our review by 
determining whether, based upon those facts, a quorum of reasonable and rational 
individuals could come to the same result as the jury actually did.  

 
 

[¶16]       
This 
Court expressly rejects Leyo's argument that this Court should determine 
"factual sufficiency" by weighing all evidence, including conflicting and 
contradictory evidence.  Such 
argument is inconsistent with our duty to respect the role of the 
fact-finder.  As we recently stated 
in regard to a similar argument: 

 
 

Harlow's 
argument actually turns the legal standard on its head.  The essence of Harlow's argument is that 
the jury should have believed Dowdell's protestations of Harlow's relative 
innocence, and should have resolved any apparent uncertainties in Ramon's 
testimony in favor of Harlow.  But that is not the law.  This Court does not look to see if there 
is evidence that might have supported the defendant's position.  Rather,

"[t]he 
appellate test for sufficiency of evidence is whether a rational trier of fact 
could have been sufficiently armed by the evidence to find the essential 
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  In assessing that issue, we view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the state, affording [it] the benefit of 
all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.  It is not our task, let alone our place, 
to reweigh the evidence or reexamine the credibility of the 
witnesses.'"

Nollen 
v. State, 12 P.3d 682, 684 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 962 P.2d 141, 148 
(Wyo. 1998), and Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 375 (Wyo. 
1995)).

 
 

Harlow 
v. State, 2005 
WY 12, ¶41, 105 P.3d 1049, ¶41 (Wyo. 2005) (alterations in original).  Leyo has presented this Court with no 
compelling reason to turn our established standard of review on its 
head.

 
 

[¶17]       
Our 
accepted standard of review is easily applied to this case.  This Court must review the record 
evidence and determine if there is sufficient evidence by which a quorum of 
rational individuals could have convicted Leyo.  On appeal, Leyo does not seriously 
challenge that two drug buys actually took place.  Instead, Leyo contends that the evidence 
is insufficient to identify him as the person who sold methamphetamine to 
Inman.  In reviewing the evidence in 
this regard, we find that the sole evidence directly identifying Leyo as the 
person involved in the drug transactions comes from the testimony of Inman.  Inman testified at trial that she bought 
methamphetamine from Leyo on two separate occasions.  One buy was arranged directly through 
Leyo and one buy was arranged through Mastin.  Inman specifically testified that on 
both occasions it was Leyo who delivered the methamphetamine.  

 
 

[¶18]       
Leyo 
acknowledges that Inman provided this testimony.  However, Leyo argues that corroborating 
evidence is required before a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  This Court has never adopted 
a bright-line rule regarding the quantum of evidence required before a jury can 
convict a criminal defendant.  There 
simply must be sufficient evidence to legally support a conviction.  Inman's testimony, given from personal, 
first-hand knowledge, provided direct evidence of Leyo's involvement.  This testimony is sufficient, as a 
matter of law, to support Leyo's convictions for drug trafficking.  

 
 

[¶19]       
Leyo 
continues that, because Inman is an "all around bad person," it is irrational 
and unreasonable for the jury to believe anything she said.  Leyo also argues that no rational jury 
would have relied on Inman's testimony because her testimony was internally 
inconsistent.  The jury obviously 
did not agree with Leyo's position.  
Again, it is within the province of the jury to determine the credibility 
of witnesses and resolve conflicts in the evidence.  This Court will not second-guess the 
evidentiary determinations of the jury.  

 
 

[¶20]       
Leyo 
presents similar arguments in his claim that insufficient evidence exists to 
support his conviction of conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine.  Again, the only direct evidence 
regarding the existence of a conspiracy was provided through Inman's 
testimony.  Again, Leyo attacks the 
verdict by arguing that, because there is no evidence corroborating Inman's 
testimony, there is not enough evidence to support his conspiracy 
conviction.  We reiterate that there 
is no bright-line rule regarding the quantum of evidence required before a jury 
can convict a criminal defendant.  
The essential determination is simply if there is evidence supporting a 
finding of the elements of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.  

 
 

[¶21]       
Leyo 
also argues that, even assuming the jury believed Inman, Inman's testimony is 
insufficient to prove an agreement existed between himself and Mastin to deliver 
methamphetamine as a matter of law.  
Under Wyoming law, a conspiracy can be found if 
there is evidence of a tacit agreement between parties to commit a 
crime:

 
 
A 
conspiracy is "commonly . . . defined as an agreement between two or more people 
to commit an unlawful act."  Wehr 
v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 109 (Wyo. 1992).  The elements

of a 
conspiracy involving a controlled substance are: (1) at least a tacit 
understanding between the defendant and a co-conspirator to commit an act 
violative of Wyoming's controlled substances act, and (2) 
intent by the defendant to commit the elements of the offense which was the 
object of the understanding.  Due to 
the covert nature of the crime, circumstantial evidence may be relied upon to 
establish the conspiracy.

Sotolongo-Garcia 
v. State, 2002 
WY 185, ¶14, 60 P.3d 687, 690 (Wyo. 2002).  
We have said that

the 
formal requirements of the criminal agreement are not stringent.  A "meeting of the minds" concept is 
unnecessary; "[a] mere tacit understanding will suffice, and there need not be 
any written statement or even a speaking of words which expressly communicates 
agreement."

Burk v. 
State, 848 P.2d 225, 235 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Burke v. 
State, 746 P.2d 852, 855 (Wyo. 1987)).  More particularly,

[t]he 
agreement that must be shown to support a conviction of a conspiracy to commit a 
crime is not the same as the "meeting of the minds" demanded for a 
contract.  In Bigelow [v. 
State], 768 P.2d [558] at 562 
[(Wyo.1989)], we said:

"One 
might suppose that the agreement necessary for conspiracy is essentially like 
the agreement or meeting of the minds' which is critical to a contract, but 
this is not the case.  Although there continues to exist some 
uncertainty as to the precise meaning of [the] word in the context of 
conspiracy, it is clear that the definition in this setting is somewhat more lax 
than elsewhere.  A mere tacit 
understanding will suffice, and there need not be any written statement or even 
a speaking of words which expressly communicates 
agreement."

Wehr, 841 P.2d  at 109-110 (emphasis in original).  
"Because most conspiracies are clandestine in nature, the prosecution is 
seldom able to present direct evidence of the agreement.  Courts have been sympathetic to this 
problem, and it is thus well established that the prosecution may "rely on 
inferences drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators."'"  Martinez v. State, 943 P.2d 1178, 
1183 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Smith v. 
State, 902 P.2d 1271, 1281-82 (Wyo. 1995)).

 
 

Ekholm, 
¶22.  The jury was instructed 
accordingly.  

 
 

[¶22]       
Despite 
this recent pronouncement regarding the elements of conspiracy, Leyo initially 
suggests that the "tacit" agreement standard should be changed to require proof 
of a "meeting of the minds" before a conspiracy can be found.  However, Leyo retracts from this 
argument by analyzing the facts of this case in the context of the tacit 
agreement standard.  Because Leyo 
has not suggested the outcome would be any different under the "meeting of the 
minds" standard he proposes, we will not address the issue 
further.

 
 

[¶23]       
Looking 
to Inman's testimony, Inman testified that she believed Mastin and Leyo were 
working together.  Inman's testimony 
established that she arranged the first buy directly with Leyo while they were 
in Mastin's motel room, with Mastin present.  Inman returned the next day to Mastin's 
motel room and bought methamphetamine from Leyo, again with Mastin present.  Inman arranged the second 
methamphetamine purchase through Mastin.  
At some point, Inman told Mastin that she wanted to buy 3.5 grams of 
methamphetamine (commonly referred to as an eight ball).  Mastin told Inman that her supplier was 
leaving town so she could not personally sell any methamphetamine to Inman, but 
Leyo had some methamphetamine he would sell to Inman.    

 
 

[¶24]       
Once the 
controlled buy was set up, Inman went to a room at a different motel as Mastin 
had moved out of the original motel.  
Mastin answered the door.  
Leyo was in the room.  Mastin 
explained to Inman that Leyo had not been able to get the eight ball that Inman 
had wanted, but that Leyo had 1.75 grams (commonly referred to as a "teener") he 
would sell to her.  Specifically, 
Inman testified that Mastin told her "[Leyo] couldn't get a hold of an 
eight-ball, so a teener was the only thing they could do."  Inman agreed to purchase the amount of 
methamphetamine Mastin told her was available.  Leyo handed Inman the methamphetamine, 
and Inman placed the DCI purchase money on the bed. 

 
 

[¶25]       
The 
testimony presented is sufficient to support a determination by a rational jury 
that Leyo and Mastin conspired to deliver methamphetamine to Inman.  Direct evidence of an agreement is not 
necessary to a finding that a conspiracy existed.  A jury may make reasonable inferences 
from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators.  In this case, Leyo sold methamphetamine 
out of Mastin's motel room with Mastin's knowledge.  Mastin negotiated for Inman to buy 
methamphetamine from Leyo at least partially with Leyo's knowledge.  Leyo delivered to Inman the quantity of 
methamphetamine agreed to between Inman and Mastin.  From this conduct, it is reasonable to 
infer that Mastin and Leyo agreed to work together to deliver 
methamphetamine.  Leyo actively 
engaged in furthering the conspiracy's common purpose by delivering 
methamphetamine to Inman in fulfillment of the terms of the purchase as 
negotiated by Mastin and Inman.  
Inman's testimony is sufficient to support a finding that Leyo conspired 
with Mastin to deliver methamphetamine.  

                        

B.  Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 
 
Standard 
of Review

 
 

[¶26]       
Leyo 
claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his closing 
argument.  

 
 
Claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct are settled by reference to the entire record and 
hinge on whether the accused's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute the 
denial of a fair trial.  English 
v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 1999) 
(quoting Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 1998); Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 230 
(Wyo. 
1997)).  The propriety of any 
comment within a closing argument is judged "in the context of the prosecutor's 
entire argument, considering the context of the statements and comparing them 
with the evidence produced at the trial."  
Wilks [v. State, 2002 WY 100, 49 P.3d 975 (Wyo. 2002)], at 
¶26 (citing Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶11, 46 P.3d 309, ¶11 (Wyo. 
2002)).  The burden of proving 
prejudicial error rests with the appellant.  Wilks, at ¶26; see also Taylor [v. State, 2001 WY 13, 17 P.3d 715 (Wyo. 2001)], at ¶19; Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339, 346 
(Wyo. 
1990).

 
 

Duke v. 
State, 2004 
WY 99, ¶100, 99 P.3d 928, ¶100 (Wyo. 2004).  Because Leyo failed to make a 
contemporaneous objection to the alleged instance of prosecutorial misconduct, 
we review the closing argument for plain error.  "Plain error exists when 1) the record 
is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a transgression of a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming the error was 
denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced him."  Condra v. State, 2004 WY 131, ¶6, 
100 P.3d 386, ¶6 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶23, 
63 P.3d 875, ¶23 (Wyo. 2003)).

 
 
 
 
Discussion

 
 

[¶27]       
Leyo 
argues that the prosecutor prejudicially appealed to the jurors' passions and 
prejudices by telling them, in the following remarks, about legislative policy 
behind the prohibition against delivery of methamphetamine and why the drug 
culture was bad:

 
 
The law 
says you do not distribute controlled substances.  And I think probably one of the best 
arguments that the legislature might be able to present as to why they came up 
with that law was Amanda Inman, herself.  
You look at that, think about what her life was like.  You can see the destruction that drugs 
have caused in her life.  She's an 
intravenous drug user and has been so for the last three years.  She'll have to be shut 
up.

A week 
ago when she got arrested, she was arrested for more trouble.  She's been in trouble because she's a 
drug user.  And, you know, it would 
be nice if we could go out and get boy scouts or Roman Catholic choir boys to be 
our confidential informants.  But 
unfortunately, they don't run in the circles where drugs are being dealt.  And that's why we have to deal with the 
Amanda Inmans of the world.  And 
that's why we have to do the things that we do.  It's a shame.  It's really a shame this kind of problem 
exists.  And it's a shame that's the 
kind of thing that we have to do to combat it.

But I 
believe it was King Tristanni used to say, "If you are going to tell a story 
about life in hell, you can't be surprised that your witnesses all end up being 
devils."  Unfortunately, that's 
exactly what we've got here.  There 
is a very bad situation going on with drug use.

As I 
say, Amanda Inman is a fairly clear example of the kind of wreckage that drug 
use results in.  She is not a person 
you would want to spend a whole bunch of time with.

 
 
For the 
sake of context, we will continue a little further in the prosecutor's 
statements:

 
 
And I 
think that's what makes this a tough job for police.  The fact of the matter is you are going 
to have to look at Amanda, herself.  
I mean, I know you did; I watched you as she 
testified.

The 
question you've got to resolve in your own mind is do you believe her?  Is she somebody that you can believe? 
And you are going to have to assess her testimony because she basically, as 
everybody has pointed out from the beginning, was the one who was telling what 
happened in this case. . . .

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 
. . . 
But what happened behind those closed doors and drawn curtains at the [two 
motels], you are going to have to rely on what Amanda Inman said. 

 
 

[¶28]       
After 
the prosecutor finished his closing argument, the trial judge requested both 
counsel approach the bench.  The 
trial judge expressed concern about the remarks by the prosecutor referring to 
the public policy behind the legislature's criminalizing drug usage and 
dealing.  The trial judge expressly 
asked the defense counsel for her thoughts on the matter.  The defense counsel replied that she did 
not object because she did not want to draw more attention to the remark.  The defense counsel did not request a 
curative instruction.  Nothing 
further occurred regarding the prosecutor's remarks.  Leyo presents no argument supporting his 
assertion, found only in his phrasing of this issue, that the trial court erred 
in not overriding the tactical decision of the defense counsel and sua sponte 
giving a curative instruction.  This 
Court will not address that issue further.

 
 

[¶29]       
Reviewing 
the record as a whole, we do not find the remarks by the prosecutor to be so 
prejudicial as to deny Leyo a fair trial.  
The remarks at issue were presented in the context of commenting 
specifically about the obvious difficulties of Amanda Inman.  The remarks concerning legislative 
policy were minimal when viewed in the totality of the prosecutor's closing 
remarks.  Even in the remarks 
quoted, the prosecutor emphasized that it was the jury's responsibility to 
determine the credibility of Inman and weigh her testimony.  The credibility of Inman was the 
overriding theme for the attorneys on both sides during their respective closing 
arguments.  The result was that the 
jury was made acutely aware that their verdict would hinge upon its 
determinations regarding the evidence produced at trial.  Additionally, the trial judge instructed 
the jury several times that it must decide the case upon the evidence presented 
at trial.  The trial judge 
specifically instructed the jurors that the statements and arguments of the 
attorneys are not evidence. Given this context, any potential error on the part 
of the prosecutor in closing argument does not rise to the level of plain 
error.

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶30]       
We find 
no trial error.  The evidence was 
sufficient to prove the elements of delivery of a controlled substance and 
conspiracy to do the same.  No plain 
error occurred during closing argument.  
Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 35-7-1031(a) (LexisNexis 2005) provides in pertinent part:  

(a) 
Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, 
deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 
substance.   

 

2Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §  35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 2005) 
provides:  

Any 
person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this article within 
the state of Wyoming or who conspires to commit an act beyond the state of 
Wyoming which if done in this state would be an offense punishable under this 
article, shall be punished by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed 
the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense the commission of which was 
the object of the attempt or conspiracy.