Case Title: Aroian v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12716

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12716 
 
 
 
GABRIEL AROIAN  vs.  COMMONWEALTH. 
 
 
October 31, 2019. 
 
 
Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act.  
Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Gabriel Aroian, filed a petition in the 
county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking review of an 
order of a District Court judge denying his motion for relief 
from the requirement that he register as a sex offender.  A 
single justice of this court denied the petition without a 
hearing.  We affirm. 
 
 
Background.  After an investigation, police traced an 
uploaded child pornography file to a computer at Aroian's home.  
A search warrant issued, and a laptop computer, tablet computer, 
and a computer storage device were seized.  Thirty images of 
child pornography were found on the laptop, consisting of "pre-
pubescent females approximately four through ten years of age in 
various states of nudity with lewd displays of their genitals or 
engaged in sexual activity."  Fifteen images of child 
pornography were found on the storage device.  On June 16, 2016, 
Aroian was charged with possession of child pornography, in 
violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C.  After a plea colloquy, a 
District Court judge accepted his guilty plea on March 26, 2018, 
and sentenced him to eighteen months of probation, with 
conditions. 
 
 
By pleading guilty to possession of child pornography, in 
violation of G. L. c. 272, § 29C, Aroian presumptively was 
required to register as a sex offender.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178C 
(possession of child pornography included within definition of 
2 
 
 
 
"sex offense").  See also Commonwealth v. Ronald R., 450 Mass. 
262, 264 (2007).  Because he was not sentenced to "immediate 
confinement," he was eligible to seek relief from the 
registration requirement.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f) (sex 
offender may be relieved from obligation to register where judge 
determines "the circumstances of the offense in conjunction with 
the offender's criminal history indicate that the sex offender 
does not pose a risk of reoffense or a danger to the public").  
In his motion for relief, Aroian asserted that he presented an 
"extremely low" risk of reoffending, and submitted a mental 
health evaluation by a forensic psychologist.  After a hearing, 
the same District Court judge denied the motion in a ruling 
dated March 28, 2018.  See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 
179 (2014); Ronald R., supra at 269.1  The judge found that the 
weight of the forensic psychologist's report was compromised by 
his failure to obtain a "comprehensive, complete and credible 
history of [Aroian's] background and issues."  He concluded that 
Aroian failed to establish that he should be relieved of the 
requirement that he register as a sex offender.  The judge 
subsequently denied Aroian's motion to stay the registration 
requirement. 
 
 
Nearly ten months later, on January 16, 2019, Aroian filed 
a G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the county court, seeking 
relief from judge's decision not to waive the registration 
requirement.  We review the single justice's decision to deny 
the petition for abuse of discretion or error of law.  See, 
e.g., Adoption of Iris, 427 Mass. 582, 586 (1998).  Finding 
neither, we affirm. 
 
 
Discussion.  We recognize that "[a] sex offender aggrieved 
by a denial of relief from registration under § 178E (f) has 'no 
automatic right of appeal.'"  L.L., 470 Mass. at 173 n.8, 
quoting Ronald R., 450 Mass. at 266-267.  Even where an 
alternative avenue of review is unavailable, however, no party 
"should expect this court to exercise its extraordinary power of 
general superintendence lightly." 2  Commonwealth v. Richardson, 
                                                          
 
 
1 In his brief, Aroian indicates that he subsequently 
registered with the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB), and that 
he was classified as a level one offender. 
 
 
2 Aroian did not file a motion in the District Court seeking 
reconsideration of the judge's § 178E (f) order, specifically 
arguing the points that he now raises in this appeal.  See Hunt 
v. Appeals Court, 441 Mass. 1011, 1012 (2004) (failure to seek 
3 
 
 
 
454 Mass. 1005, 1006 (2009), citing Commonwealth v. Narea, 454 
Mass. 1003, 1004 n.1 (2009).  "A single justice, in his or her 
discretion, may . . . properly decline to employ the court's 
extraordinary power of general superintendence where exceptional 
circumstances are not present."  Narea, supra. 
 
 
In assessing whether exceptional circumstances are present, 
a petitioner's failure promptly to seek the court's 
intervention, pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, may be considered.  
See Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 480 Mass. 683, 696 (2018) (noting that 
there "may be circumstances in which a single justice might deny 
such a petition as untimely"); Commonwealth v. Lucerno, 450 
Mass. 1032, 1033 (2008) (six week lapse "not so lengthy as to 
compel the denial of relief").  Here, as G. L. c. 6, § 178E (f), 
required, the District Court judge acted on Aroian's motion 
within fourteen days of sentencing.  After a hearing, the judge 
also denied Aroian's motion to stay the registration 
requirement.  Aroian nonetheless delayed filing his G. L. 
c. 211, § 3, petition for nearly 300 days after the denial of 
his § 178E (f) motion, until the Sex Offender Registry Board 
(SORB) concluded its registration and classification 
proceedings.  See L.L., 470 Mass. at 173 n.8 (noting 
availability of "statutory review process for decisions of 
[SORB]" under G. L. c. 6, § 178M).  In view of Aroian's failure 
promptly to seek review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, the single 
justice properly could have concluded that the circumstances did 
not require the court's intervention. 
 
 
Conclusion.  The court's extraordinary power of general 
superintendence under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is "to be used 
sparingly" (citation omitted).  Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 
No. 76819 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 480 Mass. 212, 221 n.3 
(2018).  In view of Aroian's failure promptly to seek review 
under G. L. c. 211, § 3, the single justice properly could have 
concluded that there were not exceptional circumstances that 
required the court to exercise its extraordinary power of 
general superintendence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
Edward Crane for the petitioner. 
 
Ellyn H. Lazar, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
                                                          
 
reconsideration among reasons for denial of G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
petition).