Case Title: The People v. Michael J. Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
- 1 -
=================================================================
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
No. 152  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Michael J. Brown,     
            Appellant.
Steven R. Bernhard, for appellant.
William H. Branigan, for respondent.
CIPARICK, J.:
The main issue raised on appeal is whether defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the
introduction of a DNA report processed by a subcontractor
laboratory to the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME)
through the testimony of a forensic biologist from OCME.  Because
- 2 -
No. 152
- 2 -
the report is "nontestimonial," we hold that its admission did
not constitute a Crawford violation (see Crawford v Washington
541 US 36 [2004]; Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts, 557 US _,_, 129
S Ct 2527 [2009]).  
I
The People alleged that on the morning of August 6,
1993, as the nine-year old female victim was walking to her
friend's apartment in Queens, defendant followed her inside the
building to the fifth floor.  Placing his hand over her mouth, he
accosted her and brought her to the rooftop of the building.  He
then used a cigarette lighter to burn a plastic hair clip into
her arm and threatened her if she resisted his sexual advances. 
When she did resist, he picked up a brick and struck her in her
head, temporarily knocking her unconscious.  Upon awakening, she
wore only a t-shirt that was covered in blood, and she had a
footprint on her face from being kicked.  She fled downstairs to
her friend's apartment and was taken to a local hospital.  
Police interviewed the victim at the hospital.  She
told them that she did not know her attacker, nor was she able to
describe him with any specificity, other than he was an African-
American male in his mid-thirties.  A canvas of the area yielded
no additional evidence.    
The hospital prepared a rape kit that was later sent to
- 3 -
No. 152
1  In 1994, the New York State Legislature created a DNA data
bank.  An amendment of the statute provided for retroactive
application.  Thereafter, the New York City Police Department
began a backlog project, and they submitted over 14,000 sexual
assault kits to laboratories for DNA testing. 
- 3 -
OCME.  Due to a substantial backlog,1 OCME was unable to perform
DNA testing on the rape kit at that time.  On August 2, 2002,
almost nine years after the crime, OCME received additional
funding to address the backlog.  It sent the rape kit, along with
225 others, to Bode Technology, one of at least three of its
subcontracting laboratories, for testing.  Bode is a private
laboratory that is fully accredited.  Shortly thereafter, Bode
isolated a male DNA specimen from the rape kit, reflecting a
string of numbers of all thirteen areas of DNA.  Bode further
produced a DNA report containing machine-generated raw data,
graphs and charts of the male specimen's DNA characteristics. 
Subsequently, the DNA characteristics were entered into
the Combined DNA Index System.  By June 2000, defendant's DNA
specimen had been recorded in the national database by Maryland
police, upon his arrest for an unrelated matter.  In February
2003, a routine search of the database registered a "cold hit,"
linking defendant's DNA to the profile found in the victim's rape
kit.  A detective from the Queens Special Victims Squad took a
DNA sample from defendant and delivered it to OCME.  Thereafter,
a forensic biologist/criminalist from OCME compared defendant's
DNA characteristics to the specimen from the victim's rape kit. 
- 4 -
No. 152
- 4 -
Based upon this analysis, she determined that the profiles were a
match occurring in one-out-of one trillion males. 
Defendant was charged with two counts of sodomy in the
first degree, two counts of kidnapping in the second degree,
three counts of assault in the second degree and endangering the
welfare of a child.  Before trial, he moved to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that the statute of limitations had run,
arguing that the People could not rely upon the five-year
extension under CPL 30.10 (4) (a), where the whereabouts of the
defendant are unknown and unascertainable, because police failed
to exercise "reasonable diligence" in locating him.  Supreme
Court denied the motion, holding that the delay was caused by the
child-victim's inability to identify her attacker and that
defendant was arrested based upon DNA evidence found years later. 
 
At trial, the victim provided a more ample description
of her attacker, calling him "muscular."  She also testified that 
he asked her about members of her family, including her "Uncle
Sol."  Defense counsel did not renew the motion to dismiss the
indictment as time-barred based upon this additional evidence
provided at trial by the victim.  
The People called as a witness the forensic
biologist/criminalist from OCME who analyzed defendant's DNA
profile.  She testified that she supervised other criminalists at
OCME, reviewed their reports and findings, and oversaw quality
control management to ensure the laboratory's procedures met
- 5 -
No. 152
- 5 -
appropriate standards.  She stated that she had personally
performed thousands of DNA tests and reviewed many more.  The
court granted the People's application to have her deemed an
expert in DNA testing and forensic biology.  The witness then
testified in depth as to the characteristics of DNA and about the
testing protocols for all accredited crime laboratories in the
United States, including OCME and Bode. 
The People then moved to introduce the DNA report,
containing a profile of the specimen taken from the victim's rape
kit, as a business record.  Defense counsel objected, claiming
that any documents generated by Bode were "testimonial evidence"
that would violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
Confrontation, unless the analyst who performed the test was
present to testify.  Defense counsel further asserted that the
witness was not familiar with Bode's quality assurance and how
this particular test was performed.  The People responded that
the report contained merely raw data and was not testimonial, and
that the witness herself had performed the analysis in comparing
defendant's profile with the profile of the DNA found in the rape
kit.  The People cited to People v Cratsley (86 NY2d 81 [1995])
and People v Kennedy (68 NY2d 569 [1986]), arguing that a
business record can be introduced by a person who is not a
custodian of records, provided that the other criteria for the
business record exception are established.  Initially, the court
denied the application to admit the DNA report.   
- 6 -
No. 152
2  The exhibit contains 72 pages.  The Bode documents are 29
pages and they contain graphs, charts, a description of the
process used to test the DNA and a statement identifying whether
the profile was of a male, female or was inconclusive. 
3  It should be noted that the Appellate Division decision
was entered in April 2008, well over a year before the Supreme
Court of the United States decided Melendez-Diaz. 
- 6 -
The OCME witness then testified that the Bode report
consisted merely of raw data and contained no conclusions other
than noting that there was a male specimen found in the victim's
rape kit.  She stated that she drew her own scientific
conclusions from analyzing the data and defendant's DNA profile. 
She further noted that she was familiar with Bode's procedures
and protocols.  The court then admitted the report into
evidence.2  Subsequently, the jury convicted defendant of first-
degree sodomy, two counts of second-degree assault and
endangering the welfare of a child.  
The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction,
concluding that introduction of the DNA report did not violate
defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right,3 and further
that there was no statute of limitations violation because
defendant was not a suspect until the DNA evidence linked him to
this crime (see 50 AD3d 1154).  A Judge of this Court granted
defendant leave to appeal, and we now affirm.  
     II
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees a defendant the right to be "confronted with the
- 7 -
No. 152
- 7 -
witnesses against him."  This provision bars "admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial
unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant . . . had
a prior opportunity for cross-examination" (Crawford, 541 US at
53-54).  Only statements that are "testimonial" implicate the
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses (see Davis v
Washington, 547 US 813, 821 [2004]).  In Crawford, the Court
explained that "testimony" is "a solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact" (541 US at 51 [internal quotation marks and citations
omitted]).  It includes "ex parte in-court testimony" and
"extrajudicial statements," such as "affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially" (id.).   
In Melendez-Diaz, the United States Supreme Court
recently held that "certificates of analysis" from a state
laboratory concluding two essential elements of the charged
crime, that the seized substance was cocaine and of a certain
weight, without any testimony from the analysts who made such
conclusions, violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses (129 S Ct at 2532).  The certificates were
sworn to by the analysts before a notary public and were created
for the "sole purpose" of being introduced in court during the
prosecution of the case (id.).  Under these circumstances, the
- 8 -
No. 152
- 8 -
Court held that the affidavits were "testimonial statements" and
the analysts were "witnesses" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment
(id.).  The Court stated:
"The documents at issue here, while
denominated by Massachusetts law
certificates, are quite plainly affidavits:
declarations of facts written down and sworn
to by the declarant before an officer
authorized to administer oaths.  They are
incontrovertibly a solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact.  The fact
in question is that the substance found in
the possession of Melendez-Diaz and his
codefendants was, as the prosecution claimed,
cocaine -- the precise testimony the analysts
would be expected to provide if called at
trial.  The certificates are functionally
identical to live, in-court testimony, doing
precisely what a witness does on direct
examination" 
(id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). 
   
In People v Meekins (10 NY3d 136 [2008]), a pre-
Melendez-Diaz case, we held that the introduction of a DNA report
from a private subcontractor laboratory that tested the victim's
rape kit was not a Crawford violation, where the technician who
performed the test did not testify at trial.  We concluded that
the reports were not "testimonial" because the technicians merely
recorded neutral testing procedures and the "graphical DNA test
results, standing alone, shed no light on the guilt of the
accused in the absence of an expert's opinion that the results
genetically match a known sample," and such an expert did testify
at the trial (id. at 159).  In the companion case, People v
Rawlins, however, we held that the introduction of a fingerprint
- 9 -
No. 152
- 9 -
analysis was "testimonial" because it was prepared by police
solely to be entered at the subsequent trial against the
defendant, and it was therefore offered upon a purely accusatory
basis, to establish defendant's identity at trial (see id. at
157).  We have noted several other factors that may be relevant
in considering whether a document is "testimonial" in a Crawford
analysis: (1) whether the agency that produced the record is
independent of law enforcement; (2) whether it reflects objective
facts at the time of their recording; (3) whether the report has
been biased in favor of law enforcement; and (4) whether the
report accuses the defendant by directly linking him or her to
the crime (see People v Freycinet, 11 NY3d 38, 41 [2008]).  
Here, unlike Melendez-Diaz, the People called the
forensic biologist who conducted the actual analysis at issue,
linking defendant's DNA to the profile found in the victim's rape
kit.  She testified that she had personally examined the Bode
file; she interpreted the profile of the data represented in the
machine-generated graphs; and she made the critical determination
linking defendant to this crime.  She also stated that she was
familiar with the procedures and protocols used by Bode, and
defendant could have challenged such claim on cross-examination. 
 
The Bode report, furthermore, was not "testimonial"
under such circumstances because it consisted of merely machine-
generated graphs, charts and numerical data.  There were no
conclusions, interpretations or comparisons apparent in the
- 10 -
No. 152
- 10 -
report since the technicians' use of the typing machine would not
have entailed any such subjective analysis.  These technicians
would not have been able to offer any testimony other than how
they performed certain procedures.  As the Court made clear in
Melendez-Diaz, not everyone "whose testimony may be relevant in
establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or
accuracy of the testing device must be called on the
prosecution's case" (129 S Ct at 2532 n 1).  Nor do the
technicians who generated this report fit the definition of an
"analyst" under Meekins, where we held that the DNA
subcontractor's report consisted of merely "raw data . . . in the
form of non-identifying graphical information" (10 NY3d at 159).  
Finally, we see no merit to defendant's contention that
the results of the Bode procedures could have been tainted by a
pro-law enforcement bias to inculpate defendant.  First, Bode's
report was conducted before defendant was ever a suspect in this
case, thereby eliminating any pro-law enforcement benefit to
manipulating the results.  Second, OCME and Bode are not law
enforcement entities; they are scientific laboratories that work
independently from the District Attorney and New York City Police
Department.  Third, the OCME witness testified that technician
incompetence would not have led to defendant being accused.  Any
contamination resulting from mishandling the evidence or an error
in using the equipment would result in blank spots, but would not
otherwise alter the data to form an erroneous DNA profile.  Our
- 11 -
No. 152
- 11 -
holding is thus consistent with Melendez-Diaz, as the Bode report
is "nontestimonial" and the OCME criminalist testified that she
was familiar with Bode's procedures, protocols and accreditation. 
We additionally find that the OCME witness's testimony
provided a sufficient foundation for introducing the Bode
documents under our business records rule, CPLR 4518.  In People
v Cratsley (86 NY2d 81, 89 [1995]), we held that, under limited
circumstances, a witness who is familiar with the practices of a
company that produced the records at issue, and who generally
relies upon such records, may have the requisite knowledge to
meet the CPLR requirements for the admission of a business
record, provided that the witness can also attest that (1) the
record was made in the regular course of business; (2) it was the
regular course of business to make such record; and (3) the
record was made contemporaneously with the relevant event,
thereby assuring its reliability. 
Here, the forensic biologist testified that she relied
on the documents at issue as a matter of practice; she reviewed
them and used them in conducting her own DNA analysis.  OCME
entrusted Bode for a substantial amount of testing, including 225
rape kits.  Further, the witness testified that she was familiar
with the procedures and protocols used by Bode and that such
procedures were up to standard.  She finally testified as to the
reliability of the testing procedures Bode used to generate this
report, and as to Bode's duty to create such records, that it was
- 12 -
No. 152
- 12 -
made contemporaneously, and that the record was made in the
regular course of business.  
Defendant's final claim is that his right to effective
assistance of counsel was violated when his attorney did not
raise the statute of limitations claim again, after the victim
provided a more ample description of her attacker during her
trial testimony.  Because there is no support for the notion that
defendant would have been identified at an earlier date as a
result of this additional information (had the police in fact
known about it) and there was no evidence that police failed to
act with "reasonable diligence" in investigating this crime (see
CPL 30.10 [4] [a]), we conclude that defendant's motion would
have been meritless, and thus his counsel was not ineffective in
failing to restate this claim. 
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be affirmed.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed.  Opinion by Judge Ciparick.  Chief Judge Lippman
and Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided November 19, 2009