Case Title: STATE v RUONA

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. a2101 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F MONTANA 19 72 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS - E S K O K. RUONA, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : John L. Adams, Jr. argued, Billings, Montana. For Respondent: Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana. David V. Gliko, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana. Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana. Ernest F. Boschert, Deputy County Attorney, argued, Billings, Montana. Submitted: April 20, 1972 Decided: Jut 2.0 19g ~ i l e d : JUL 2 O 1977 M r . Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of conviction of the crime of criminal possession of dangerous drugs from the d i s t r i c t court of the thirteenth judicial dis- t r i c t , Yellowstone County. On April 1, 1971, a t approximately 5:15 a.m., defendant Esko K. Ruona was arrested for driving the wrong way on a one way s t r e e t i n the c i t y of Billings. After stopping defendant, the patrolman parked directly behind defendant's vehicle, Before the officer could take further action, defendant s l i d over from the driver's side t o the passenger side of h i s vehicle, crawled out of the car on h i s hands and knees, and then proceeded t o walk over t o the police car. Defendant had no driver's license. H e was transported t o the Billings Police Station for booking on the two t r a f f i c offenses. The police station was several blocks from the scene of the arrest. A t the police station during the booking procedure and prior to posting bond, defendant emptied h i s pockets. Among the personal possessiors of defendant there was a small plastic capsule with a hypodermic needle stuck through it, After the defendant posted bond, the arresting officer volunteered to transport defendant t o wherever he wished t o go. Defendant accepted the ride and the officer returned defendant to the general area where h i s car was parked, The officer then returned to the car which defendant had been driving when arrested. While examining the pavement area under the passenger side where defendant made h i s e x i t from the car, he found two objects--a plastic bottle and a plastic bag. Both the bottle and the bag contained drugs, which defendant i s now charged with having i n his possession. The officer took the b o t t l e and bag t o the police station where they were placed i n the evidence locker, along with the needle defendant had l e f t a t the station when booked. On the following day, April 2, 1971, defendant was arrested for posses- sion of dangerous drugs. T r i a l was had on M a y 10, 1971, resulting i n a jury verdict of guilty on M a y 11, 1971, A t t r i a l , it was developed that the car defendant was driving on April 1, 1971, had been borrowed from a friend. Testimony of the arresting officer indicated that although it was a cold morning, the plastic bottle and plastic bag found under- neath the car were free from frost, It was noted a t t r i a l that a fingerprint found on the plastic bottle was not that of de- fendant, but there were other prints that could not be identified. The arresting officer also t e s t i f i e d he had taken defendant t o the vicinity of 805 N. 27th Street i n Billings, a f t e r he made b a i l on the morning of the t r a f f i c a r r e s t ; and although defendant walked i n the general direction of 805 N, 27th Street, he did not actually see him enter the house, The s t a t e made reference t o t h i s house i n i t s opening statement t o the jury t o the effect that drugs had been found a t 805 N. 27th Street, Throughout the t r i a l repeated attempts were made by the s t a t e t o introduce evidence concerning the house, which was characterized as a "hippy pad", Defendant on appeal presents the following issues for t h i s Court's examination: 1, The opening statement and t r i a l reference t o the residence a t 805 N. 27th Street, when no facts connecting de- fendant t o the residence were proven. 2, Introduction of the hypodermic needle into evidence without connecting it t o the crime, 3. Lack of evidence t o convict defendant of the crime of possession. 4. Challenge t o several jury instructions, i.e., the giving of Instructions 14 and 16 and refusal of defendant's offered Instruction 8. W e look f i r s t t o the contention that defendant was pre- judiced by the s t a t e ' s injection of references t o the residence a t 805 N. 27th Street. In reviewing the record, it appears the s t a t e was attempt- ing by r e s gestae or proof of general circumstances t o place defendant a t the residence i n question on the night of h i s t r a f f i c a r r e s t or very near i n time t o the arrest. The house i s i n the same general area where defendant was stopped; and the arresting officer returned defendant t o that area a f t e r the processing a t the police station. This appeared t o be an attempt t o connect defendant t o a known place of drug use, as a general circumstance surrounding the actual possession from which the jury could draw an "inference" a s s e t forth i n State ex r e l . Glantz v. D i s t . Court, 154 Mont. 132, 142, 461 P.2d 193 (1969), more recently discussed and approved i n State v. Anderson, M o n t . 9 29 S t . Rep. In Glantz the Court said: "* * * t h i s Court does not mean t o imply, however, that the s t a t e i s relieved of the burden of showing that defendant knew the vrohibited substance was i n h i s vossession. such knowledge can be proved by evidence of acts, declarations, or conduct of the accused from which - the - inference may be drawn that - .- . he knew of the existence of the prohibited substance a t the place where it was found." (Emphasis supplied) This theory was i n i t i a l l y presented t o the jury i n the s t a t e ' s opening statement. A t that time, the s t a t e intended t o introduce evidence l a t e r i n the case t o support that theory. However, a s the record discloses, such offer was denied. After the i n i t i a l opening statement and up t o the time that the offer was denied, the record discloses numerous references t o the address 805 N . 27th Street, which defense counsel repeatedly objected to, and in most instances was sustained. We note that defense counsel presented nine objections at trial and was sustained on eight of them. We also note that defense on several occasions during cross-examination questioned witnesses in regard to the premises. Reviewing the entire record and the discussions and arguments on the objections, we feel that the court suffi- ciently protected defendant's rights and cautioned the state to submit its offer, which when presented was denied in this language: "Gentlemen, it appears to me that from whatever angle you approach this, from res gestae or proof of a collateral fact or a part of general circum- stances making up circumstantial proof of the State's case, that the decision is largely discre- tionary with the Court, to be made in the light of all circumstances appearing, and after considering the Offer of Proof and the general circumstances appearing in this case, I think that the Court is required as a matter of fairness to the Defendant at this time to deny the Offer of Proof. ' ' I n effect, so far as the State is concerned, this will place some very severe limitations on the use of 805 North 27th Street in further testimony in the case. 11 Immediately following this ruling the state rested its case. As to the opening statement when viewed in light of the course of the trial, we find that there was simply a failure of proof by the state of a relationship between defendant and the named premises. The opening statement itself does not constitute evidence against defendant. It was an expression of the theories which the prosecution would attempt to prove in the evidence to be subsequently produced. We do not condone broad, unproven statements and do not suggest that an opening statement should be free from a test of its prejudicial aspects as was applied by this Court in State v . Zachmeier, 151 Mont. 256, 4 4 1 P.2d 737. Zachmeier held that the damaging opening statements of prosecution were not of the nature that the jury would completely disregard. Too, we are not unmindful of this Court's admonitions 568, in State v. Langan, 151 Mont. 558/ 445 P.2d 565 and cases cited therein. Furthermore, as stated in Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U . S . 85, 8 4 S.Ct. 229, 11 L ed 2d 171, cited in Langan, the test remains: "Is there a reasonable possibility that the inadmissible evidence might have contributed to the conviction?" In the instant case the offered evidence was denied admission by the court after eight of nine objections by the defense counsel were sustained. The opening remarks of this case do not compare to the gravity of the remarks in Zachmeier, which involved a confession of guilt, inadmissible under the Miranda rule. Therefore, we hold that these references in the opening statement and during trial were not of such a nature as to contribute to the defendant's conviction. ~efendant's second issue questions the admission in evidence of the hypodermic needle which defendant left at the police station and argues that such needle was not connected to the crime, thus defendant was prejudiced by its admission. Reviewing the record we find two established facts that defense has not refuted. ( 1 ) Defendant admitted at trial that he had received treatment at the Montana State Hospital at Warm Springs for drug abuse prior to the incidence of his arrest. ( 2 ) He admitted at trial that he had used a similar type needle to shoot drugs at an earlier unspecified time but during the course of events leading up to his first treatment at Warm Springs. The test of relevancy of this evidence to the crime of criminal possession of drugs is stated in McCormick, Law of Evidence (1954), at p . 317: "What i s the standard of relevance or probative quality which evidence must meet i f it i s t o be admitted? W e have said that it must 'tend t o establish' the inference for which it i s offered." Defendant's second issue expands i n t o h i s third issue, which questions whether the evidence shows the defendant was i n possession of dangerous drugs when i n fact the drugs were lying on a public s t r e e t beneath a borrowed automobile he had been driving. Defendant further argues the identifiable fingerprint found on the plastic bottle was not his. However, t h i s ignores the fact that upon analysis by the Billings police department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it was determined that there were s i x latent fingerprints of which only one was identifiable and that one was not that of defendant. In the evidence produced a t t r i a l and offered t o establish defendant's possession of the drugs, we have the arresting officer's testimony that he found the drugs beneach the car defendant had been driving; and that the b o t t l e and plastic bag containing the drugs did not have f r o s t on them, while the surrounding area was covered with frost. From t h i s a jury could reasonably decide the b o t t l e and bag had not been lying on the s t r e e t the e n t i r e night, but had been placed there recently. Evidence linking defendant's constructive possession of the drugs i s found i n the arresting officer's testimony i n regard t o h i s stopping of defendant for the t r a f f i c offense. The officer t e s t i f i e d that defendant a f t e r stopping proceeded t o crawl out of the passenger side of h i s vehicle on h i s hands and knees; that although he was unable t o observe defendant's hands for a brief moment while defendant was crawling out of the car, he was able t o determine that defendant's hands did touch the ground. Further, that upon returning t o the car and finding the drugs beneath the car, i t was h i s observation that h e t i r e s of defendant's vehicle would have run over and crushed the bottle and bag if these objects had been on the street before defendant pulled over to the curb. On the basis of evidence produced at trial and the circum- stances under which the drugs were found, we feel the rationale of Glantz, heretofore discussed, sufficiently answers defendant's second and third issues questioning the admissibility and weight of the evidence. There was sufficient evidence submitted to the jury for it to find constructive possession and we find nothing in defendant's arguments testing the evidence to disturb the verdict. As to defendant's issues pertaining to instructions given or refused, we have examined the record and find no error. Court's Instruction 14 was taken verbatim from section 93-1301-4, R . C . M . 1947, which states: "When an inference arises. An inference must be founded : It 1 . On a fact legally proved; and, "2. On such a deduction from that fact as is warranted by a consideration of the usual propensi- ties or passions of men, the particular propensities or passions of the person whose act is in question, the course of the business, or the course of nature. tt This instruction was cited with approval by this Court in State v. Barick, 143 Mont. 273, 283, 389 P.2d 170. court's Instruction 16 defines constructive possession as: "when a person has the intent to have, and has knowledge that he has capability of control although not in actual physical control but such thing is under his dominion." This instruction is grounded on the decision of this Court in State v . Trowbridge, 157 Mont. 527, 487 P.2d 530. ~efendant's offered Instruction 8 was refused, but defendant argues on appeal that the jury should have been instructed on what constituted abandonment. We find that the facts of this case do not warrant an instruction on abandonment and thus the trial court was not in error in refusing defendant's Instruction 8 . The judgment of the t r i a l court is affirmed, m e concur: / Associate Justices.