Case Title: In the Matter of Michael Christian Steele

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20S-DI-00474

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 20S-DI-474 
In the Matter of 
Michael C. Steele, 
 Respondent. 
Decided: March 4, 2022 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Hearing Officer James A. Joven 
Per Curiam Opinion 
Chief Justice Rush and Justices David, Massa, and Goff concur. 
Justice Slaughter dissents with separate opinion. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Mar 04 2022, 10:28 am
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Per curiam. 
The old adage, “a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a 
client,” often is invoked to illustrate the perils of self-representation. Less 
frequently have we had occasion to explore the extent to which a self-
represented lawyer functions as both a lawyer and a client. 
Representing himself in a legal dispute, Respondent communicated 
directly with the opposing party about the subject of the representation, 
despite opposing counsel’s explicit instructions not to do so. We agree 
with the hearing officer that Respondent’s conduct violated Indiana 
Professional Conduct Rule 4.2; and for this misconduct, we conclude 
Respondent should be publicly reprimanded. 
Procedural Background and Facts  
This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer we 
appointed to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary 
Commission’s disciplinary complaint filed against Respondent. 
Respondent’s 2005 admission to this State’s bar subjects him to this 
Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction. See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4. 
Sometime around 2018, a dispute arose between Respondent and a 
long-time friend (“Smith”), a Nevada resident, regarding an oral promise 
Smith allegedly had made to pay Respondent’s costs toward an 
educational program. After Respondent emailed a demand letter to Smith 
and Smith’s counsel (“Kealey”) in July 2019, Kealey replied with a 
directive that Respondent “[d]irect your communications to me and cease 
all communications with” Smith. Respondent and Kealey then had a series 
of communications over the next two weeks regarding Respondent’s 
demand and his threatened lawsuit. These communications were not 
fruitful, and Respondent filed a lawsuit against Smith in Marion Superior 
Court. 
One week after that, Respondent sent a profanity-laced email to Smith 
threatening to visit Smith in person and demanding that Smith bypass 
Kealey and discuss the matter with Respondent directly: 
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This is me writing you. I’m tired of talking to that 
douchebag lawyer. Your birthday is in a few hours. I’m out 
west and gonna drive to Vegas. If you don’t want to speak to 
me you’ll have to tell your security people to turn me away. 
. . . 
We aren’t going to hang out again. I get that. But this is 30+ 
years of our life. Let me tell you about the fucking hell I have 
been thru the past year over a despicable lying whore and 
one of the guys that was banging her. I have every intention 
of seeing them both face the multiple felony charges they 
deserve, and I won’t rest a moment in my life until he does 
at least. 
You have a choice. Send this to your dork of a lawyer who 
will try to make more stupid arguments, or have a bit of 
respect for 30 years of friendship and 7 years I have to your 
company and its wild success. 
. . . 
Get the fucking lawyer out of this and talk to me like I’m the 
guy who’s had your back for 32 years (and still counting). 
Respondent did not have Kealey’s consent to communicate directly with 
Smith. Respondent dismissed the lawsuit in February 2020 without ever 
having served Smith. 
The Commission filed a disciplinary complaint against Respondent in 
July 2020 alleging Respondent violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 
4.2, which provides: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate 
about the subject of the representation with a person the 
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer 
or is authorized by law or a court order. 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer issued his final 
report in September 2021, concluding Respondent violated Rule 4.2 as 
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charged and making no recommendation on sanction. The matter has 
been fully briefed and is now ripe for our consideration. 
Discussion and Discipline  
The Commission carries the burden of proof to demonstrate attorney 
misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Admission and 
Discipline Rule 23(14)(g)(1). While our review process in disciplinary 
cases involves a de novo examination of all matters presented to the 
Court, the hearing officer’s findings receive emphasis due to the unique 
opportunity for direct observation of witnesses. See Matter of Wray, 91 
N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. 2018). 
Most of the elements of a Rule 4.2 violation are plainly met here. 
Respondent knew Kealey was representing Smith with respect to 
Respondent’s demand and his subsequent lawsuit. Respondent did not 
have Kealey’s consent to talk with Smith about this subject, and he was 
not authorized by a court order to do so. And we can readily dispense 
with Respondent’s contention that he was not communicating in the email 
“about the subject of the representation” but rather “spoke only of matters 
involving friendship.” (Pet. for Rev. at 3). This contention is belied by the 
language of the email itself, which thrice explicitly requested that Smith 
bypass Kealey, and by the context in which it was sent, after two weeks of 
unsuccessful discussions with Kealey and the filing of a lawsuit.  
Respondent nonetheless argues he was entitled to send the email to 
Smith, for two related reasons. First, in reference to Rule 4.2’s prefatory 
clause, he asserts he was not “representing a client” but rather was 
representing himself; and second, he points to language in the 
commentary to Rule 4.2 recognizing that parties generally may 
communicate with one another. For reasons explained below, we find 
these arguments unavailing. 
Many of our disciplinary precedents have found professional 
misconduct in connection with an attorney’s pro se litigation. See, e.g., 
Matter of Straw, 68 N.E.3d 1070 (Ind. 2017) (pursuit of frivolous action); 
Matter of Yudkin, 61 N.E.3d 1169 (Ind. 2016) (same); Matter of Relphorde, 644 
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N.E.2d 874 (Ind. 1994) (pattern of misconduct in civil case in which 
attorney was a defendant proceeding pro se).1 We also have found 
professional misconduct arising from an attorney’s actions as a 
represented party in a matter. See, e.g., Matter of Powell, 76 N.E.3d 130 (Ind. 
2017) (falsifying evidence that caused counsel to make a false statement to 
a court); Matter of Usher, 987 N.E.2d 1080 (Ind. 2013) (multiple violations); 
Matter of Gaydos, 738 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 2000) (dishonesty in ghostwritten 
appellate filings). These cases, and many others, reflect that an attorney’s 
ethical responsibilities are not limited to the representation of others. 
Notably, several of these cases have involved professional conduct 
rules with language similar to Rule 4.2’s prefatory clause. For example, in 
Matter of Dempsey, 986 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. 2013), and Matter of Richardson, 792 
N.E.2d 871 (Ind. 2003), we found violations of Rule 4.4(a)—which 
provides that “in representing a client” an attorney shall not use means 
that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or 
burden a third person—for conduct committed by the respondent 
attorneys as pro se litigants. Similarly, in Matter of Thomas, 30 N.E.3d 704 
(Ind. 2015), we found a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1) for dishonesty in 
bankruptcy filings by a pro se attorney, even though the commentary to 
that rule indicates it governs the conduct of an attorney “who is 
representing a client[.]”2 These results make eminent sense from a policy 
view; after all, the harms wrought by an attorney’s dishonesty toward 
courts or third parties, or his undue burdening of an opposing party, are 
the same whether the attorney is representing himself, representing 
someone else, or being represented by someone else. These cases also 
implicitly recognize that self-representation is still representation, and an 
 
1 Indeed, Respondent himself was recently disciplined in another case for an unethical email 
sent in connection with separate pro se litigation in which he was engaged. Matter of Steele, 
171 N.E.3d 998 (Ind. 2021). 
2 We similarly found a Rule 3.3(a)(1) violation in Usher for dishonesty in sworn discovery 
provided by a represented attorney and expressly rejected the respondent’s argument that 
actions taken as a litigant were beyond the reach of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 987 
N.E.2d at 1087. 
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attorney who proceeds pro se in a matter functionally occupies the roles of 
both attorney and client.  
We do not think a different result obtains, or should obtain, under Rule 
4.2. The overarching purposes of the rule are “to prevent lawyers from 
taking advantage of laypersons and to preserve the integrity of the 
lawyer-client relationship[.]” Matter of Baker, 758 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ind. 2001). 
More specifically, we have explained that an attorney’s attempt to bypass 
opposing counsel in order to pressure an opposing party to settle on less 
favorable terms “undermines the representative adversarial system.” 
Matter of Syfert, 550 N.E.2d 1306, 1307 (Ind. 1990). This is precisely what 
Respondent did here; and it makes little difference (nor should it) that he 
did so while representing himself and not someone else. 
The commentary to Rule 4.2 reinforces this conclusion, notwithstanding 
Respondent’s reliance on one isolated clause within that commentary. In 
describing the purposes underlying the rule, Comment 1 refers to 
“lawyers who are participating in the matter,” and not merely lawyers 
representing others. Comments 2 and 3 emphasize the broad application 
of the rule in different respects. As Respondent notes, Comment 4 
includes a clause recognizing that there are situations where “[p]arties to a 
matter may communicate directly with each other.” But Respondent’s 
reliance on this clause ignores the remainder of the same sentence and the 
preceding one, delineating what a party’s counsel may or may not do in 
connection with the parties’ own direct communication, when the parties 
are entitled to make that communication. Accord Matter of Anonymous, 819 
N.E.2d 376, 379 n.1 (Ind. 2004) (explaining that Comment 4’s recognition 
that parties may directly communicate with one another “is not intended 
to insulate from scrutiny situations where a party communicates with 
another at the insistence of or in the presence of the party’s counsel and 
while the adverse party’s counsel is absent and unaware of the contact”). 
Put simply, neither the clause Respondent cites out of context nor 
anything else in Comment 4 provides cover for an attorney to engage in 
conduct that violates the rule simply because the attorney is a party 
representing himself.  
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Our holding today accords with those of other jurisdictions addressing 
application of substantially similar versions of Rule 4.2 to self-represented 
attorneys. See Matter of Hodge, 407 P.3d 613, 654-55 (Kan. 2017); Medina 
Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Cameron, 958 N.E.2d 138, 140-41 & n.1 (Ohio 2011); In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Haley, 126 P.3d 1262, 1267 (Wash. 2006); In 
re Discipline of Schaefer, 25 P.3d 191, 199-200 (Nev. 2001), opinion modified on 
denial of reh’g, 31 P.3d 365 (Nev. 2001); Vickery v. Comm’n for Lawyer 
Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 259-60 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1999); 
Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 925 P.2d 1118, 1119-20 (Idaho 1996); Sandstrom 
v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 109 (Wyo. 1994), reh’g denied; In re Segall, 509 
N.E.2d 988, 990 (Ill. 1987).3  
In sum, we agree with the hearing officer and conclude that 
Respondent violated Rule 4.2 as charged. Turning to the question of 
sanction, we have consistently imposed a reprimand in prior cases 
involving standalone violations of Rule 4.2. See Matter of Martin, 166 
N.E.3d 345, 347 (Ind. 2021); Matter of Litz, 894 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ind. 2008); 
Matter of Uttermohlen, 768 N.E.2d 449, 451 (Ind. 2002); Baker, 758 N.E.2d at 
58; Syfert, 550 N.E.2d at 1307. We conclude a reprimand is sufficient 
discipline in this case as well.4 
 
3 Although Pinsky v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 578 A.2d 1075 (Conn. 1990), has been cited 
as contrary authority, we are not convinced it is. The attorney who made the communication 
at issue in Pinsky was not representing himself in the matter but rather was being represented 
by separate counsel. The application of Rule 4.2 to an attorney who occupies solely the role of 
a party presents a different issue, and one we need not address today. 
4 We hasten to add, though, that Respondent continues to be his own worst enemy when it 
comes to his electronic communications. He has been disciplined twice now for inappropriate 
emails; and during our consideration of this case he has sent numerous extrajudicial emails 
about his disciplinary matters to the membership and staff of this Court, prompting the 
Commission to file an “Objection to Respondent’s Email Communications and Verified 
Request for Order Prohibiting Further Submissions.” We decline at this time to issue an order 
of prohibition enforceable through contempt, this matter essentially having come to its 
substantive end with this opinion. But our declination should not be viewed by Respondent 
as license to engage in inappropriate communications. 
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Conclusion 
The Court concludes that Respondent violated Indiana Professional 
Conduct Rule 4.2. For Respondent’s professional misconduct, the Court 
imposes a public reprimand. The costs of this proceeding are assessed 
against Respondent, and the hearing officer appointed in this case is 
discharged with the Court’s appreciation. 
Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
Slaughter, J., dissents with separate opinion. 
R E S P ON DE N T  P R O S E  
Michael C. Steele 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
AT T OR N E Y S  FOR  IN DIAN A S UP R E ME  COUR T  
DIS CIP L IN AR Y  COMMIS S ION  
Adrienne L. Meiring, Executive Director 
Charles M. Kidd, Deputy Executive Director 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
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Slaughter, J., dissenting. 
 I respectfully dissent because Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 does not 
clearly apply to pro se lawyers. Rule 4.2, by its terms, applies only to 
lawyers who are “representing a client”. It says:  
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate 
about the subject of the representation with a person the 
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer 
or is authorized by law or a court order. 
Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 4.2.  
Under the Court’s interpretation of this rule, “client” and “lawyer” may 
be one and the same person. But to treat them as the same person would 
twist our understanding of the client-lawyer relationship under our rules 
of professional conduct and stretch the word “client” beyond its plain 
meaning. It might also lead to counterintuitive outcomes. For example, 
Rule 1.15 might be read to require a pro se lawyer to establish a separate 
IOLTA account for himself as a “client”. See Prof. Cond. R. 1.15. Or if the 
lawyer is representing himself gratis, Rule 6.1 might allow him to count 
his pro se hours as pro bono hours and to report them accordingly. See id. 
R. 6.1. If the pro se lawyer is wearing two hats—as both client and 
lawyer—it would be anyone’s guess if (or when) the rules governing the 
client-lawyer relationship would apply. The Rules treat client and lawyer 
as separate persons who may enter a representation relationship, see, e.g., 
id. R. 1, and we should interpret Rule 4.2 consistent with the Rules’ 
framework.  
The commentary to Rule 4.2 makes its application here even less clear. 
Looking at Comment 1, a pro se lawyer may conclude that as a lawyer 
“participating in the matter”, the rule applies. Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 1. But the 
same lawyer may also look to Comment 4 and conclude the rule does not 
apply because “[p]arties to a matter may communicate directly with each 
other”. Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 4. Thus, a pro se lawyer confused about Rule 4.2’s 
application would find no useful guidance in the commentary.     
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On policy grounds, I understand the Court’s desire to protect non-
lawyers represented by counsel from pro se lawyers who may try to take 
advantage of the non-lawyer’s lack of legal education, experience, or 
sophistication. But while this is a desirable policy goal, this issue is one of 
first impression in Indiana, and Rule 4.2 does not clearly apply to pro se 
lawyers.  
If we wish to achieve this policy goal, we should rewrite the rule so it 
actually says what the Court believes it should say: “No lawyer 
representing a client or proceeding on the lawyer’s own behalf in a 
matter shall communicate about the subject of the matter with a person 
the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, 
unless . . . . ” The Restatement editors rewrote Rule 4.2 for a reason, see 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 99(1)(b)—because 
the prior rule did not clearly apply to pro se lawyers.  
*          *          * 
As the Court notes at the outset, Lincoln cautioned that lawyers who 
represent themselves have fools for clients. This timeless advice may still 
be worth heeding. But lawyers who ignore it should not be subject to 
sanction for violating professional rules that do not clearly apply to their 
pro se activities. Because the Court holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.