Case Title: Madison v. Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County

Citation: 

Docket Number: 170934

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2018-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court Building in the 
City of Richmond on Wednesday the 29th day of August, 2018. 
 
 
PRESENT:  Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, McClanahan, Powell, Kelsey, and McCullough, JJ. 
 
Milari Madison, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner, 
 
 against 
Record No. 170934 
 
Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County, 
 
 
Respondent. 
 
 
Upon a Rule to Show Cause 
 
  
I. Facts and Proceedings 
 
Invoking this Court’s original jurisdiction, on July 14, 2017, Milari Madison (“Madison” 
or “Petitioner”), signed and filed a Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition against the 
Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County (“Loudoun County”).  Loudoun County filed a motion 
to dismiss her petition, and in its motion asked this Court to award sanctions against Madison 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1, arguing that Madison’s petition “is not founded in facts or law, 
lacks merit, is frivolous,” and raised the same arguments that had been resolved against Madison 
in prior litigation.  This Court dismissed Madison’s petition on February 27, 2018.  By separate 
order on the same day, we issued a Rule to Show Cause against Madison, directing her to show 
cause why this Court should not impose sanctions against her pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1. 
 
The underlying case is only the latest in a string of frivolous lawsuits initiated by 
Madison as a pro se litigant.  Madison has filed 22 lawsuits in the Circuit Court of Loudoun 
County against the Board of Supervisors or other divisions or departments of the County.  She 
has also filed four petitions for appeal in this Court and two petitions invoking this Court’s 
original jurisdiction.  Madison’s lawsuits all generally relate to her challenges to Loudoun 
County’s authority over the property of the former Town of Waterford. 
 
In 2013, the General Assembly passed HB 1983 (2013 Acts of Assembly Ch. 753), which 
was enacted “to vest title to real property of the former Town of Waterford to the County of 
Loudoun.”  HB 1983 provided that: 
 
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title to all real property held in the name of the former Town of 
Waterford, whose charter was repealed by Chapter 280 of the Acts 
of Assembly of 1936, vested in the Commonwealth of Virginia 
without any further act or deed as of the date the charter was 
repealed to the extent such title did not otherwise vest in another[.] 
 
The Act further provided that: 
the Department of General Services … is hereby authorized to 
convey by quitclaim deed, without warranty of any kind, to the 
County of Loudoun, all of the Commonwealth’s right, title, and 
interest, if any, in and to, and to release any claim upon, said real 
property held in the name of the former Town of Waterford, less 
and except those lands that now comprise any part of the systems 
of state highways. 
 
The Act also allowed that: 
[t]he Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County shall have and may 
exercise the powers to alter or vacate the streets, alleys, and other 
public rights-of-way as laid out in accordance with the survey and 
plan of the former town made pursuant to Chapter 161 of the Acts 
of Assembly of 1874-75, and to authorize encroachments 
thereon… 
 
Despite this legislation, Madison continues to assert that Waterford is still an incorporated 
municipal entity, and to challenge Loudoun County’s authority over this property. 
 
Madison’s most recent petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition is her second 
materially indistinguishable, unsuccessful attempt to advance this theory by invoking this 
Court’s original jurisdiction.  This is in addition to her recent appeal to this Court from an 
adverse judgment of the Circuit Court of Loudoun County also rejecting this same theory. 
II. Sanctions 
 
Code § 8.01-271.1 provides that: 
[t]he signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by 
him that (i) he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, (ii) to 
the best of his knowledge, information and belief, formed after 
reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and (iii) it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
 
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The statute further states: 
[i]f a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed or made in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed the paper or 
made the motion, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or 
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper or making of the 
motion, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
 
 
Considering the passage of HB 1983, and the multiple times that the factual and legal 
assertions in Madison’s petition have been rejected by the circuit court and by this Court, it is 
clear that Madison’s Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition was not “well grounded in 
fact” or “warranted by existing law.”  Her petition also does not contain “good faith argument[s] 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”  Despite her repeated and failed 
attacks on Loudoun County since the bill’s passage, Madison continues to file actions against the 
County in the circuit court and in this Court with the sole purpose of harassing the County and 
forcing the citizens of Loudoun County to cover the costs of defending against frivolous 
lawsuits. 
 
Code § 8.01-271.1 makes clear if this rule is violated, the court “shall impose” an 
appropriate sanction.  Having found that Madison’s petition was filed in violation of Code 
§ 8.01-271.1, we are therefore required to impose sanctions against her.  See N. Va. Real Estate, 
Inc. v. Martins, 283 Va. 86, 105, 720 S.E.2d 121, 130 (2012).  Such sanctions may include 
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.  Code § 8.01-271.1. 
 
Loudoun County has submitted an affidavit to this Court, setting forth the attorney’s fees 
and costs it has incurred in defending against this action.  The total amount incurred by Loudoun 
County in defending against this petition is $4,377.35. 
 
We find that Madison filed her Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition against 
Loudoun County in violation of Code § 8.01-271.1, and we hold that an appropriate sanction 
against Madison is the costs and attorney’s fees incurred by Loudoun County. 
III.  Pre-filing Injunction 
 
The sanctions issued in this order will reimburse Loudoun County for the expenses 
incurred in defending against this petition.  However, this Court must also protect its jurisdiction 
 
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from repetitious and harassing conduct that abuses the judicial process.  See In re Sindram, 498 
U.S. 177 (1991).  As the United States Supreme Court has noted, “[e]very paper filed with the 
Clerk of this court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the 
institution’s limited resources.  A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these resources 
are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.”  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 
(1989). 
 
In Switzer v. Switzer, 273 Va. 326, 641 S.E.2d 80 (2007), we discussed “various 
restrictive measures [available] in dealing with litigants who have filed repeated frivolous 
appeals.”  We observed the widely-recognized practice in other jurisdictions of a “leave of court” 
requirement in which litigants are required to obtain permission from the court before filing other 
cases or appeals. 
Such “leave of court” requirements have been widely approved on 
appellate review because they do not automatically preclude a 
litigant from filing any type of appeal but merely subject the 
appeal to pre-filing scrutiny to ensure that the appeal is not 
frivolous or filed for the purpose of harassing the opposing party or 
court. 
 
273 Va. at 332-33, 641 S.E.2d at 83-84. 
 
In Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit set forth four factors that courts should consider 
prior to issuing a pre-filing injunction. 
In determining whether a pre-filing injunction is substantively 
warranted, a court must weigh all the relevant circumstances, 
including (1) the party’s history of litigation, in particular whether 
he has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) 
whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation 
or simply intended to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the 
courts and other parties resulting from the party’s filings; and (4) 
the adequacy of alternative sanctions. 
Cromer, 390 F.3d at 818. 
 
Although not binding on this Court, we consider the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning as 
persuasive authority.  Toghill v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 220, 227, 768 S.E.2d 674, 677 (2015).  
Applying the Cromer test to this case, we find that Madison has a history of (1) filing 
duplicative, vexatious lawsuits, (2) without any objective good faith basis, and (3) at the expense 
 
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of the court system and opposing parties.  With respect to the fourth factor, the adequacy of 
alternative sanctions, although we have ordered monetary sanctions pursuant to Code § 8.01-
271.1 in order to compensate Loudoun County for expenses incurred in this case, those sanctions 
will not necessarily prevent Madison from filing future pleadings.  The Court’s objective is to 
protect Loudoun County from the harassment and expense of unfounded litigation, and to 
preserve valuable judicial resources.  For these reasons, imposing a pre-filing injunction appears 
to be an appropriate sanction in addition to the monetary sanctions already ordered. 
 
In Cromer, the court also cautioned that even if the above factors are met and pre-filing 
injunction is merited, the injunction must be narrowly tailored to fit the specific circumstances at 
issue.  Cromer, 390 F.3d at 818.  Because Madison’s history of vexatious litigation appears to 
only target Loudoun County and its various departments, we will limit the pre-filing injunction 
to actions filed by Madison against Loudoun County.  Accordingly, Madison shall be prohibited 
from filing in this Court any petition for appeal, motion, pleading, or other filing against the 
Board of Supervisors of Loudoun County or any of its divisions or departments without (1) 
obtaining the services of a practicing Virginia attorney, whose filings would be subject to Code 
§ 8.01-271.1, or (2) obtaining leave of Court to file any pro se pleading.  The Circuit Court of 
Loudoun County may impose its own pre-filing injunction if it deems it appropriate. 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, judgment is entered for Loudoun County in the amount of 
$4,377.35.  We also instruct the Clerk to comply with this order as it pertains to future filings by 
Madison.  The suspension of the Court’s February 27, 2018 order dismissing the Petition for 
Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition is hereby lifted. 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and certified to the Circuit Court of 
Loudoun County. 
 
 
 
 
 
                A Copy, 
 
 
 
          
                    Teste: 
  
 
 
 
                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk