Case Title: State v. Crawford

Citation: 169 Vt. 371, 737 A.2d 366

Docket Number: 98-323

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Crawford (98-323); 169 Vt. 371; 737 A.2d 366

[Filed 25-Jun-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of 
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-323

State of Vermont	                           Supreme Court

                                                   On Appeal from
     v.	                                           District Court of Vermont,
                                                   Unit No. 3, Essex Circuit

Vernon Crawford	                                   March Term, 1999

       Shireen Avis Fisher, J.

       Vincent Illuzzi, Essex County State's Attorney, Orleans, and Thomas R.
  Paul, Deputy State's Attorney (On the Brief), St. Johnsbury, for
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Defendant Vernon Crawford appeals from a district
  court judgment  denying his motion to dismiss three counts of criminal
  trespass.  Defendant argues that the State was  barred from prosecuting him
  for trespass after previous charges for burglary based on the same  alleged
  conduct were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the Interstate Agreement
  on Detainers  (IAD).  We affirm, holding that a dismissal with prejudice
  pursuant to the IAD does not prohibit a  subsequent prosecution for conduct
  arising out of the same alleged criminal transaction unless the  newly
  charged crime is a lesser included offense of the charge dismissed with
  prejudice.  

       On October 25, 1995, the Essex County prosecutor charged defendant
  with one count of  sexual assault and thirteen counts of burglary.  At the
  time the charges were filed, defendant was 

 

  serving a prison sentence in New Hampshire.  The Vermont charges were
  lodged as detainers against  defendant, and the State requested temporary
  custody pursuant to the IAD, see 28 V.S.A. §§ 1501-1509.  

       The IAD sets forth procedures for the prompt disposition of criminal
  charges filed in one  state against a prisoner in another state.  A
  prosecutor in the jurisdiction where such untried charges  are pending may
  file the charges as detainers in the "sending state," the state in which
  the prisoner  is incarcerated, and request temporary custody of the
  prisoner for purposes of prosecution.  See id.  § 1504.  A prisoner with
  detainers lodged against him may serve the prosecuting authority a "request 
  for final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or
  complaints" pursuant to § 1503,  which requires the "receiving state," the
  state in which the trial is to be had, to bring the prisoner to  trial
  within 180 days.  See id. § 1503(a).  Once a receiving state has temporary
  custody of a prisoner  pursuant to the IAD, trial must be had on the
  pending charges before the prisoner is returned to the  sending state, or
  the "indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further
  force or effect,  and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same
  with prejudice."  Id. §§ 1503(d), 1504(e).

       On November 30, 1995, defendant filed a request for the final
  disposition of informations  pursuant to § 1503 of the IAD.  Defendant was
  transported to Vermont, arraigned on the charges on  December 5, 1995, and
  returned to the custody of New Hampshire without being tried.  On January 
  29, 1996, citing these prior proceedings, defendant filed a motion to
  dismiss the pending Vermont  charges on grounds that he was returned to New
  Hampshire before trial in violation of 28 V.S.A. §  1504(e).  Defendant's
  motion to dismiss was granted on February 6, 1996, and the sexual assault 
  count and all thirteen counts of burglary were dismissed with prejudice. 
  The State did not appeal  the dismissal.

 

       On February 25, 1997, the Essex County prosecutor filed a new
  fourteen-count information.  Eleven of the new charges were for unlawful
  trespass, one was a charge of burglary which the State  subsequently
  withdrew, and the other two were charges of unlawful mischief.  The new
  charges were  lodged as detainers at the New Hampshire prison where
  defendant was still incarcerated.  Defendant  moved to dismiss the trespass
  charges, arguing that trespass is a lesser included offense of burglary 
  and, therefore, he could not be charged with trespass after the burglary
  charges had been dismissed  with prejudice pursuant to § 1504(e) of the
  IAD.  Defendant also argued that the charges were barred  by the Fifth
  Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy.  
	
       The Essex District Court denied the motion, concluding that dismissal
  with prejudice of the  burglary charges did not preclude prosecution for
  trespass and that jeopardy had not attached in the  prior burglary
  proceeding.  The court granted permission to take an interlocutory appeal,
  which we  denied for having been improvidently granted.  The defense and
  the State then entered into a  conditional guilty plea whereby defendant
  would plead guilty to three counts of unlawful trespass,  the State would
  dismiss the remaining counts and defendant would reserve the right to
  appeal the  denial of his motion to dismiss.  Pursuant to this agreement,
  defendant pleaded guilty and filed a  timely notice of appeal.

       It is instructive to first take note of the arguments defendant is not
  advancing on appeal.   Defendant does not contend, as he did below, that
  the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth  Amendment bars the prosecution of
  the charged crimes because they are lesser included offenses of  the
  charges dismissed with prejudice.  Indeed, defendant concedes that the 1997
  trespass charges  "were almost, but not quite, lesser included offenses of
  the 1995 burglary charges."(FN1)  Nor is 

 

  defendant urging us to apply the doctrine of res judicata or claim
  preclusion to this case, correctly  observing that we have not applied the
  doctrine of claim preclusion to criminal cases.  See State v.  Dann, 167
  Vt. 119, 125, 702 A.2d 105, 109 (1997).  

       Defendant's claim here is best described as an argument for a generous
  interpretation of the  phrase "with prejudice" as it appears in the IAD. 
  To that end, defendant, while conceding that  neither the double jeopardy
  clause nor the doctrine of res judicata are directly applicable to the case 
  before us, urges that we conclude that the drafters of the IAD intended the
  phrase "with prejudice"  to prohibit the refiling not only of previously
  dismissed charges but to bar as well the filing of   charges arising out of
  the "same transaction."

       As applied to the facts, defendant contends that the court's dismissal
  of the 1995 burglary  charges -- unchallenged by the State and required by
  the IAD -- precluded the subsequent filing of  criminal trespass charges
  based on the same alleged conduct. Defendant argues that in our 

 

  examination of other claim preclusion cases, we have looked to the
  Restatement for guidance on  what constitutes identical or substantially
  identical claims.  The Restatement rule bars relitigation  of related
  claims which arise out of "all or any part of the transaction, or series of
  connected  transactions, out of which the action arose."  Restatement
  (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (1982).  Defendant concedes that trespass is
  not a lesser included offense of burglary but argues that the  trespass
  charges arise out of the identical factual circumstances and, therefore,
  the 1997 charges  violate the Restatement rule.

       The State, basing its response primarily on the specific issue raised
  by defendant in the trial  court, argues that because jeopardy did not
  attach to the burglary charges -- the dismissal of those  charges having
  occurred before a jury was empaneled, see Serfass v. United States,