Case Title: Kingara v. Secure Home Health Care Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13173

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13173 
 
CHARLES KINGARA  vs.  SECURE HOME HEALTH CARE INCORPORATED 
& others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     January 10, 2022.  -  March 28, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Civil, Class action, Death of party, Substitution.  
Death.  Rules of Civil Procedure.  Attorney at Law, Class 
action.  Notice. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
September 30, 2019. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to authorize notice to putative members 
of a class and to extend tracking order deadlines was considered 
by Kenneth W. Salinger, J. 
 
 
An application to prosecute an interlocutory appeal was 
allowed in the Appeals Court by Vickie L. Henry, J., and 
questions of law were reported by her to the Appeals Court.  The 
Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative transferred the 
case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Raven Moeslinger for the plaintiff. 
 
Catherine M. Scott for the defendants. 
 
Kevin W. Buono, for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers 
Association, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
1 Siddharth Parmar and Ankur Rustgi. 
2 
 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  A single justice of the Appeals Court reported 
two questions of law to a full panel of the Appeals Court 
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 64, as amended, 423 Mass. 1410 
(1996), and Rule 1.0 of the Rules of the Appeals Court, as 
appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2020).  Each question 
concerns the authority of counsel or the courts to protect the 
interests of putative class members when the named plaintiff has 
died, no party has been substituted for the named plaintiff, and 
no motion has been made to certify the putative class.  We 
transferred these questions to this court on our own motion.  We 
conclude that in these circumstances, counsel has no authority 
to act on behalf of the deceased plaintiff or the putative 
class, but the courts may act to protect the interests of the 
putative class members when, absent notice, those individuals 
would face significant prejudice.2 
 
Background.  Secure Home Health Care Incorporated (Secure 
Health) employs nurses and home health care aides who travel 
among clients providing in-home care.  Charles Kingara worked 
for Secure Health as a licensed practical nurse for about three 
years.  In September 2019, Kingara filed a five-count complaint 
in the Superior Court against Secure Health, its president 
 
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the 
Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association. 
3 
 
Siddharth Parmar, and its treasurer Ankur Rustgi, alleging both 
class and individual causes of action arising under the wage 
act, the minimum fair wage law, and the overtime law. 
 
In October 2020, while the suit was pending, and before 
plaintiff's counsel had filed for class certification, 
defendants' counsel informed plaintiff's counsel that Kingara 
had died.  Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to (1) 
order notice to putative class members pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 23 (d), as amended, 471 Mass. 1491 (2015) (rule 23 [d]), 
informing them of Kingara's death and inviting them to join the 
action; (2) order the defendants to identify putative class 
members' names and addresses; and (3) extend tracking order 
deadlines to allow substitution of a new class representative 
and completion of discovery.  The defendants opposed the motion, 
arguing that plaintiff's counsel had no authority to act on 
behalf of Kingara or any other member of the putative class.  
After the motion was granted, the defendants filed a petition 
for interlocutory relief pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 118, which 
ultimately resulted in the questions of law before this court. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Standard of review.  We consider questions 
of law de novo.  CP 200 State, LLC v. CIEE, Inc., 488 Mass. 847, 
848 (2022).  The questions here concern class actions under 
Massachusetts law, which are governed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 23.  
"We have noted that rule 23 was written in the light of Fed. R. 
4 
 
Civ. P. 23, hence case law construing the Federal rule is 
analogous and extremely useful" (quotations, citations, and 
alterations omitted).  Chambers v. RDI Logistics, Inc., 476 
Mass. 95, 111 (2016). 
 
2.  Attorney authority.  We first address "[w]hether a 
deceased plaintiff's attorney has the authority to act on the 
deceased plaintiff's behalf prior to class certification, and 
before any motion to certify a class had been filed, and without 
motion by the plaintiff's legal representative to substitute as 
a party to the putative class action."  Our answer is no:  in 
the specific circumstances posited, counsel lacks authority to 
act on behalf of the deceased plaintiff or on behalf of the 
putative class. 
 
A client's death terminates an attorney's authority to act 
on behalf of that client.3  Kelley v. Neilson, 433 Mass. 706, 710 
n.8 (2001) (attorney's authority to act on behalf of client 
"expired on her death").  Thus, the deceased plaintiff's 
attorney may not act on behalf of the deceased, absent a motion 
 
 
3 The defendants are incorrect to rely on Mass. R. Civ. P. 
25 (a), 365 Mass. 771 (1974), as the basis for this proposition; 
that rule merely provides a procedural mechanism by which the 
legal representative of the deceased (e.g., executor) may be 
substituted as a party.  Rule 25 (a) (1), as relevant, states:  
"If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the 
court may order substitution of the proper parties.  The motion 
for substitution may be made by any party or by the 
representative of the deceased party . . . ." 
5 
 
by the deceased's legal representative.  See Federal Ins. Co. v. 
Ronan, 407 Mass. 921, 923 n.6 (1990), quoting Turner v. 
Minasian, 358 Mass. 425, 427 (1970) ("On the death of the client 
there is no legal representative before the court and counsel's 
authority was automatically terminated by his death. . . .  No 
effective action can be taken until a legal representative is 
made a party" [alterations omitted]). 
 
Because "counsel for a class has a continuing obligation to 
each class member," Spence v. Reeder, 382 Mass. 398, 409 (1981), 
it is in keeping with the above proposition that the death of 
the named plaintiff does not necessarily terminate class 
counsel's authority to act on behalf of a certified class, see 
id.; Bartle v. Berry, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 386 (2011), quoting 
Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir. 1982) ("duty 
owed by class counsel is to the entire class and is not 
dependent on the special desires of the named plaintiffs").  
However, it is unclear whether a similar representative 
relationship exists between would-be class counsel and putative 
class members such that counsel would have an obligation and 
concomitant authority to act on behalf of those putative class 
members prior to certification.  Cf. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. 
Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 75 (2013) ("a putative class acquires an 
independent legal status once it is certified under Rule 23").  
We need not determine whether there might be circumstance that 
6 
 
would give rise to such a representative relationship because in 
the circumstances posited here, we conclude that any 
relationship between plaintiff's counsel and the putative class 
would be too attenuated to vest in counsel an obligation or 
authority to act on behalf of the class. 
 
Indeed, the deceased plaintiff's attorney here is in no 
position to act on behalf of anyone whose interests are 
implicated in the putative class action.  The attorney has not 
filed for class certification, has failed to locate the deceased 
plaintiff's personal representative, and has failed to identify 
any other potential members of the putative class who could 
serve as class representative.  And while it is true that 
attorneys sometimes act not as agents of parties but as officers 
of the court, see, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 95-397 (Sep. 18, 1995) 
(duty of candor usually requires attorneys to inform court and 
opposing parties of death of client), to allow the deceased 
plaintiff's attorney to act in such a manner here would allow 
the attorney to utilize the courts as an instrument of client 
solicitation. 
 
3.  Judicial authority.  Given our answer above, we next 
address "whether the Superior Court ha[s] the power to order, 
sua sponte, notice to the putative class members under Mass. R. 
Civ. P. 23 (d)."  We answer this question in the affirmative:  a 
trial judge has the power to order notice to putative class 
7 
 
members pursuant to rule 23 (d) if those putative class members 
would otherwise face significant prejudice. 
 
First, the plain language of rule 23 (d) vests the court 
with the discretionary power to order notice during class 
actions.4  Federal case law interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (d) 
supports this reading.  See, e.g., Navarro-Ayala v. Hernandez-
Colon, 951 F.2d 1325, 1336 (1st Cir. 1991) (under rule 23 [d], 
"notice is not mandatory, but may be required" [emphasis in 
original]); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 
F.2d 826, 878 n.86 (5th Cir. 1975) (rule 23 [d] notice "is not 
mandatory, but rather discretionary with the trial court").  
Second, this discretion may be exercised sua sponte.  While 
other Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure require that the 
court act upon the motion of a party, rule 23 (d) does not refer 
to any necessary request for relief.  Cf. Mass. R. Civ. P. 
15 (d), 365 Mass. 761 (1974) (court may permit supplemental 
pleadings "[u]pon motion of a party").  Finally, this discretion 
 
 
4 Rule 23 (d) provides in relevant part: 
"The court at any stage of an action under this rule may 
require such security and impose such terms as shall fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class in whose 
behalf the action is brought or defended.  It may order 
that notice be given, in such manner as it may direct, of 
the pendency of the action, of a proposed settlement, of 
entry of judgment, or of any other proceedings in the 
action, including notice to the absent persons that they 
may come in and present claims and defenses if they so 
desire." 
8 
 
may be exercised prior to class certification, but only where 
there is a finding of significant prejudice, see infra.5  Cf. 
Wolf v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 367 Mass. 293, 298 (1975) 
(prior to certification, "the judge should have treated the suit 
as a class suit for the purposes of dismissal or compromise"); 
Mass. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) ("A class action shall not be dismissed 
or compromised without the approval of the court.  The court may 
require notice of such proposed dismissal or compromise to be 
given in such manner as the court directs"). 
 
Indeed, it is the finding of significant prejudice, not the 
 
 
5 The defendants discuss a number of Federal cases 
interpreting the courts' authority to issue notice under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23 (d) prior to class certification.  Federal courts 
have seemed to split on the issue, but many of these Federal 
cases, though not all, seem actually to hinge on whether 
putative class members will suffer prejudice, as opposed to 
whether a class has been certified.  Compare, e.g., Marian Bank 
vs. Electronic Payment Servs., Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 95-614-
SLR (D. Del. Mar. 12, 1999) (putative class members not entitled 
to notice due to duty "to keep apprised of the legal 
developments in plaintiff's case"), with Puffer v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 614 F. Supp. 2d 905, 908-915 (N.D. Ill. 2009), quoting 
Culver v. Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2002) (court 
ordered notice to putative class members under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23 [d] in part because of risk of prejudice from "expiration of 
the statute of limitations on the class members' claims without 
their realizing it," in view of publicity concerning suit and 
potential reliance by class members on pendency of suit).  Cf. 
Doe v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 407 F.3d 755, 761-
764 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1094 (2006) (Federal 
District Court erred in not giving putative class members notice 
of settlement because of likelihood of prejudice); Crawford v. 
F. Hoffman–La Roche Ltd., 267 F.3d 760, 764-765 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 [e] applies prior to certification, and 
court must consider possibility of prejudice "in deciding 
whether to allow dismissal or issue notice"). 
9 
 
stage of litigation, that should be meaningful.  Courts must 
exercise their discretion to issue notice pursuant to rule 
23 (d) in keeping with the rule's stated purpose to "fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class in whose behalf 
the action is brought or defended."  Accordingly, we conclude 
that while courts may, in limited circumstances, order notice 
under rule 23 (d) to putative class members prior to class 
certification, it is a clear abuse of discretion to do so 
without finding that putative class members would face 
significant prejudice absent such notice.6 
 
Conclusion.  The answer to the first reported question and 
the related question posed in the single justice's order is 
"no."  The answer to the second reported question is "yes," 
though it is an abuse of discretion for the court to issue 
notice to putative class members without finding that those 
members face significant prejudice.  We remand the case to the 
 
 
6 For example, putative class members may be prejudiced when 
they do not receive notice regarding dismissal, settlement, or 
other circumstances effectively terminating a class action, if 
those putative members relied on the prior pending action and 
therefore did not bring individual claims, because following 
dismissal, the statute of limitations -- which may be tolled 
during the pendency of the class action, see China Agritech, 
Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800, 1806 (2018) -- begins to run 
again and may bar subsequent claims.  Cf. Sikes v. American Tel. 
& Tel. Co., 841 F. Supp. 1572, 1579-1580 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (lack 
of publicity indicates that "class members are not likely to 
have developed a 'reliance interest' in the proposed class 
action," and notice was therefore likely unnecessary). 
10 
 
single justice of the Appeals Court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered.