Case Title: MAZUREK v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-08-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAZUREK v. STATE2000 WY 16610 P.3d 531Case Number: 98-185Decided: 08/16/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming

WILLIAM 
CHARLES MAZUREK, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Plaintiff).

                                  

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County Honorable 
Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

    Representing Appellant:

   Tina N. Hughes, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

    Representing 
Appellee:

   Gay Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Kimberly A. Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General.  
Argument by Ms. Baker.

   Before LEHMAN, 
C.J., and THOMAS, MACY,* GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

   GOLDEN, J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; THOMAS, J., files 
a concurring and dissenting opinion.

  * retired June 2, 2000

   GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]         A jury 
convicted Appellant William Charles Mazurek (Mazurek) of conspiracy to commit 
burglary, burglary, and interference with a peace officer, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-303, 6-3-301, and 6-5-204 (Lexis 1999), respectively.  Mazurek appeals 
from the conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary convictions, complaining 
that admission of inadmissible testimony, ineffective assistance of counsel, and 
prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial.  He also claims that plea bargains with two of 
the State's witnesses against him violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) and Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-5-102(a)(ii), requiring reversal of his conviction.  He does not, 
however, appeal from the conviction for interference with a peace officer.

[¶2]         Contrary to 
Mazurek's contentions, plea agreements do not violate 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) or 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102(a)(ii) (LEXIS 1999).  However, on direct examination, the 
prosecutor elicited inadmissible testimony from the alleged accomplices involved 
in the crime. Although Mazurek did not object to the testimony or the 
prosecutor's improper use of that testimony during the trial and in closing 
arguments, we hold the error committed rises to the level of plain error because 
the prosecutor's conduct effectively denied Mazurek his right to a trial on the 
merits.  
Therefore, we reverse.

             
                       ISSUES

[¶3]         Appellant 
presents the following issues for review:

1. Did the State's offer, and 
the admission of, two witnesses' testimony that they were convicted of offenses 
arising out of the circumstances leading to Appellant's trial, and the State's 
repeated argument concerning those convictions, violate Appellant's right to 
have a trial on its own merits, and did such testimony constitute plain 
error?

2. Did Appellant's trial 
counsel's failure to object to the above testimony and the prosecution's 
repeated references to "accomplices" constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel?

3. Did the prosecution's 
argument concerning the severance of the charge of interference with a police 
officer constitute prosecutorial misconduct, in that the prosecution represented 
to the trial court that it would be offering evidence of incriminating 
statements that could not be separated from the incident of interference, and 
then no such evidence was offered?

4. Did the trial court err in 
admitting testimony of a threat allegedly made by Appellant to a witness outside 
the courtroom?

5. Did the prosecution's 
statements in closing arguments concerning the weight and credibility of the 
testimony and evidence constitute prosecutorial misconduct which resulted in 
plain error?

6. Did the plea bargains and 
subsequent testimony of witnesses Jamie Scheschi and Aaron Morran violate 18 
U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) and W.S. 6-5-102(a)(ii), and result in reversible error?

 Appellee phrases the issues as follows:

I. Whether plea agreements with 
two witnesses who testified against Appellant require reversal of Appellant's 
conviction?

II. Whether plain error was 
committed when two witnesses testified they were convicted of offenses arising 
out of the same circumstances which led to Appellant's trial?

III. Whether statements made by 
the prosecutor deprived Appellant of a fair trial?

                        
IV. Whether Appellant received effective assistance of counsel?

V. Whether the trial court erred 
when it admitted testimony by a witness whom Appellant had threatened outside 
the courtroom?

                                    
FACTS

[¶4]         On July 8, 
1997, Mazurek, Jamie Scheschi and Aaron Morran were at the home of Tammy 
Wade.  After 
spending several hours drinking, the three left Wade's home.  At Mazurek's trial, 
Scheschi and Morran testified that Mazurek accompanied them while they drove 
around town, then returned to Wade's house to store some pallets they had 
retrieved from the Country General store.  After storing the pallets in Wade's garage, 
the three broke into the victim's garage and removed numerous items.  They then drove to 
Scheschi's where they slept for awhile.  Upon awaking, they began to drive to 
Colorado, but Scheschi's truck broke down, preventing further travel. Mazurek 
hitched a ride back to town and borrowed Wade's vehicle.  When he returned to 
where his friends were stranded, they loaded the stolen items into that vehicle 
and drove to Greeley, Colorado.  After stopping to talk to friends in Greeley, 
they drove to Loveland, Colorado, where the three then pawned several of the 
items for about $300. They split the money and returned to Cheyenne.

[¶5]         Several weeks 
later, Detective Greg Way questioned Mazurek at the police station about the 
burglary of the victim's garage.  After the interview, Detective Way told 
Mazurek he was under arrest and handcuffed him. Mazurek asked Detective Way to 
give him another chance, saying, "Ok, I was there, please give me another 
chance." As Detective Way unlocked the car door to transport him to the jail, 
Mazurek fled.  
Detective Way chased and caught Mazurek within a short distance and, 
after subduing him, transported him to the jail.

[¶6]         Mazurek was 
charged with conspiracy to commit burglary, burglary, and interference with a 
peace officer.  
Mazurek's theory of defense was that Scheschi and Morran dropped him off 
before returning to Wade's house.  When he returned to Wade's house the next 
day, the two men asked him to accompany them to Colorado, where Scheschi's truck 
had broken down.  
When the three arrived at the truck, they unloaded what Mazurek believed 
to be Scheschi's property, which Scheschi pawned in Loveland, Colorado.

[¶7]         During 
deliberations, the jury informed the district court that it was deadlocked on 
the counts of conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary.  They were given an 
Allen instruction and continued to deliberate.  The next morning, they found Mazurek guilty 
of all charges. He was sentenced on April 3, 1998, and filed this appeal shortly 
thereafter.

                             
     DISCUSSION

 Testimony of Guilty Plea Solicited by the 
Prosecution

[¶8]         During voir 
dire, examination of witnesses and closing argument, the prosecutor referred to 
the witnesses as "accomplices" and emphasized the witnesses' convictions.  Mazurek contends 
that under our holding in Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wyo. 
1979), the prosecution's solicitation of Scheschi's testimony that he entered a 
plea of guilty to conspiracy and burglary, and Morran's testimony that he 
entered a plea of guilty to burglary, was plain error requiring reversal of his 
conviction.  In 
Kwallek, we held that the admission of the testimony of a co-conspirator, that he had 
entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy, over the objection of counsel, was 
reversible error.  
"[T]he rationale of the rule holding the admission of such evidence to be 
prejudicial error is said to be that it is irrelevant and incompetent because it 
suggests that since the confederate is guilty, the defendant must also be 
guilty, and this inference violates the defendant's right to have his trial on 
its own merits." Kwallek, 596 P.2d  at 1375-76 (citing State v. McCarthy, 567 S.W.2d 722 (Mo.App. 1978)).

[¶9]         At the 
outset, we note that Mazurek raised no objection to these activities.  Therefore, we 
consider these claims under a plain error standard of review. "Plain error 
exists when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there 
was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party 
claiming the error was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced 
him." Yetter v. State, 987 P.2d 666, 668 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Sandy v. State, 870 P.2d 352, 358 (Wyo. 
1994)); see also Mora v. State, 984 P.2d 477, 480 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶10]      We need spend little time on the first 
two prongs of our plain error analysis.  It is clearly shown in the record that at the 
end of his direct examination, the prosecutor asked Scheschi and Morran if they 
had entered guilty pleas to charges arising from the burglary of the victim's 
garage, to which each gave an affirmative response.  It is also clearly 
improper for the prosecutor to elicit such testimony.  See Kwallek, 596 P.2d  at 1375-76, and the cases and annotation cited therein; Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo. 
1996).  We 
presumed Kwallek made it clear, to prosecutors and defense counsel alike, that 
prosecutors are not permitted to elicit this type of testimony on direct 
examination.  
Such testimony is inadmissible evidence because it is irrelevant and 
incompetent evidence which the jury may use improperly.  See id. In Ross, we 
opined:

The State's opening statement 
promised the jury evidence that Ross' wife had previously admitted guilt to a 
misdemeanor charge of failing to protect her son from his father.  When that promise 
was fulfilled, the absence of a timely objection by Ross' trial counsel would 
not appear sufficient to save the State's case from reversal, predicated on the 
rule of Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979).  
Kwallek,  as reaffirmed by Urrutia, [924 P.2d 965 (Wyo. 1996)] 
contemplates situations in which two individuals are prosecuted for different 
offenses arising out of the same circumstance, rendering "the fact that one has 
pleaded guilty * * * inadmissible against the other."  Kwallek, 596 P.2d  
at 1375.

 Ross, 930 P.2d  at 968.

[¶11]      Whether the third prong of our plain 
error test is satisfied requires more in depth analysis, however.  In order to show 
that the error was prejudicial, Mazurek must demonstrate that he was not allowed 
a trial on its own merits.  In Kwallek, we did not find the defendant was 
prejudiced merely because testimony of a guilty plea was presented.  Rather, our holding 
rested on the fact that the circumstances in that case encouraged the jury to 
believe the admissions were valid circumstantial evidence that the accused was 
also guilty.  
Kwallek, 596 P.2d  at 1376.

[¶12]      In Kwallek, the defense filed a motion 
in limine before trial and objected to the testimony during trial.  Id. at 
1375-76.  The 
prosecutor asked Kwallek's confederate if he was charged in the same incident, 
if his case was completed, and what happened in his case.  Id. at 1375.  The witness told 
the jury he pleaded guilty, and questioning by the prosecutor ceased.  Id.  Under those 
circumstances, we held:

Since the court twice refused to 
prevent the disclosure, it is improbable that the Judge would have either 
directed the jury to disregard the testimony or have given a curative 
instruction had they been requested. The probability is, therefore, that the 
jury was left with the impression that, since the total evidence connected the 
defendant with [the witness] in the altercation with [the victim], the court 
must have wanted the jury to understand that, since [the witness] had pleaded 
guilty, it must be that the defendant is also guilty.

 Id. at 1376.  We found the error was prejudicial and 
reversed and remanded for a new trial.  Id.

[¶13]      On appeal, Mazurek complains that the 
prosecutor improperly encouraged the jury to use the guilty pleas as substantive 
evidence of his guilt.  Mazurek did not object at trial, and we will 
only grant a new trial if the prosecutor's actions amounted to plain error.  "Because plain 
error analysis requires us to examine the record as a whole, in ruling on the 
appellant's contentions we necessarily consider the effect of these alleged 
errors on the trial collectively." United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the pertinent portions of the closing 
arguments of both the defense and the prosecution follow. In its closing the 
defense argued:

What 
did they bring you?  
Did they bring you his fingerprints from the shop?  Did they bring you 
hair?  Did they 
bring you anything showing he was ever in the shop?  It's their burden 
to bring you the evidence to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.  1998, you got 
nothing or any type of forensic scientific DNA, any type of evidence.

What they brought you was James 
Scheschi and Aaron Morran, two burglars facing 10, 20 years and awaiting to be 
sentenced, to see what they get.  You have to ask yourself, do you trust 
them?  You saw 
them, you heard them.  
Do you trust them?  If they offered you some great deal on some 
land they had, would you buy it?  If you're not going to make a property 
decision based on what they tell you, can you make a decision beyond a 
reasonable doubt on something that is as serious as this based on what they tell 
you?

[¶14]      The defense then noted the 
inconsistencies in the stories from the two witnesses, and argued that when 
people are lying, they miss the details.  He gave specific examples of lies and 
inconsistencies in their stories, which included:  did they go to Country General and take 
pallets once or twice that night and who kicked in the door to the garage?   He then asked 
the jury to consider why neither one could remember who kicked in the door:

Maybe the one that kicked in the 
door is the one who is going to get the harder sentence.  In their criminal 
minds they're playing some games.  Do I give a little bit of truth, do I give 
lies, throw in a little bit of this?  They play the games.  Why do they do 
it?  The whole 
reason they're here in the first place, they don't - they only care about one 
thing, and that's their sentence.  That's why               
they're here.

That's why they're willing to 
lie.  That's 
why they're refusing to admit who kicked in the door.  They're only here 
for one purpose, not to tell the truth, not to clear up any crime.  They're only here 
because they're 
waiting to be sentenced.  You can't trust that.  If they were 
breaking into your property, and we know that they'll steal your things, they'll 
drive around town drunk, they will lie to you in a second.

Instruction 6-A tells you that 
if you believe a witness has testified falsely about a material fact, has lied 
to you about something important in this case, you can disregard everything they 
say.  Why do we 
have that instruction?  Because we don't convict people on the word 
of liars.  
That's what the law tells you to do.

Will was there, was certainly 
there many parts of all of this.  He wasn't there when they broke in and stole 
these items.  
He certainly was there at different parts.  That's what he said.  He said he was 
there.  He 
didn't say I broke into the shop.

[¶15]      The defense also reminded the jurors of 
the two witnesses who testified for the defense: the paperboy, who saw two men 
by the garage that night; and the victim's daughter, who saw two men at Ms. 
Wade's home the next day.  Their testimony conflicted with the testimony 
from the prosecution's witnesses and confirmed Mazurek's defense.  Mazurek argued that 
the only explanation for what his witnesses saw was that Mazurek wasn't there 
during the burglary, and the victim's daughter saw two men because Mazurek was 
at Wade's house and not with Morran and Scheschi.  Therefore, Morran, not Mazurek, hitched a 
ride into town to get Wade's vehicle.

[¶16]     Finally, the defense asked the jury to 
remember:

During the jury selection, you 
were all seated there, there was only one question that [the prosecutor] asked 
each of you individually. He asked general questions but asked each of you, said 
your name, asked each of you individually only one question during jury 
selection, and that was what do you think about accomplices.  That was because he 
understood that you were going to have to believe these accomplices for him to 
have a case.

That is the case.  That's why that's 
the only question he asked individually to you.  What he didn't tell you was that not only was 
he saying they were accomplices, but what they've shown you is that they're 
liars, they are drunks.  They make stories up that contradict each 
other, that contradict other more credible witnesses, and that they are waiting 
to be sentenced, hoping for probation.

You can't trust them, because 
they're not trustworthy.  You would not in your daily life trust 
them.  You 
cannot trust them here. There was no conspiracy.  There was no understanding.  There was no mutual 
understanding, no agreement.  There was no burglary involving Will.  There was a 
burglary involving two men, Aaron Morran and James Scheschi.

[¶17]      On rebuttal, the prosecutor responded 
by telling the jury that asking for evidence like DNA and fingerprints is trying 
the police department and a waste of time and money.  He argued this is 
especially so because, "You've got two people that came off it and said they did 
it, and they incriminated a third." The prosecutor told the jury, "The hard 
evidence in the case is what [Scheschi] and what [Morran] told you. That is 
uncontradicted in this case coupled with this defendant showing up in the pawn 
shop down in Loveland." He continued:

We know there's three guys in 
the hock shop.  
This defendant is one of them.  That's one of those sides [sic] issues.  When you don't have 
anything else to do you, you've got the insanity defense.  That doesn't work 
most of the time.  
You've got self-defense.  You've got some other dude did it.  That's what this 
one is about.  
Two did it.  
Then they say the third did it, or we try the victim, or we try the 
police department, we try the DA.

Let's divert the real case 
outside into immaterial areas and say well, if the guy lied about the ID card, 
then he's lying about everything. The instruction says that you can disregard 
testimony if you think he lied by necessity or not on material facts, which is 
an important fact, not the collateral facts.  So don't get the smoke and mirrors job going 
in front of your face. Get right down to the hard evidence, the hard, 
uncontradicted evidence.

[¶18]      The prosecutor then asked the jury to 
consider the fact that Mazurek fled from Detective Way after he was handcuffed, 
and to

[c]ouple that with the testimony 
by the accomplices.  
They are accomplices, no question about it.  Accomplices are 
kind of like dealing with - dealing with informants in drug cases, guys working 
off beefs, you know.  
They're great fun on cross-examination, usually former addicts or 
something like that.  
You can have a ball with those people.  Same thing with accomplices.  These guys 
are   fair game, sitting 
duck target up there.

They got up there under oath, 
told you what happened, told you truthfully.  The deals were this, that they would testify 
truthfully; and that's what they did, exactly what they did.  Accomplices and 
informants, great fun.

I think one of the jurors made 
comments about he didn't like finks or narcs or something like that.  Well, that's 
fine.  
Everyone's entitled to their opinion.  You've got to weigh the testimony, look at 
the surrounding facts.  This man lost a lot of stuff out of his 
garage.  Three 
guys involved, three guys down in Denver (sic) trying to hock the stuff.

Jamie and Aaron, they've came 
in, paid their dues, took their medicine; and now they're waiting to see what 
the Court is going to do with them.  They're going to have the snitch jacket the 
rest of their life.  
They're going to wear that, whether they like it or not.

A threat is made right here 
outside in the hallway by this defendant upon Jamie.  Is that evidence of 
a man who is innocent?  Of course not.  It's an attempt to  at retribution.  It's a threat by 
what Jamie said.  
He makes that threat to Jamie, a fellow that he's known since back in 
fifth or sixth grade.  
These guys hope they're going to get probation. That's up to the Court, 
not a sure thing.

                                 
* * *

You have to deal with these 
kinds of people, accomplices; otherwise you just say okay, Mr. Prosecutor, don't 
bring these kinds of things in our Court.  We don't want to mess with these kinds of 
cases, give them a free ride, cut them out, cut them out.  If that's what you 
want to do, you are personally capable of saying I don't believe anybody in this 
case.

But you've go [sic] to look at 
the evidence.  
You've got to look at what these kids said.  Theirs is a done 
deal.  They've 
made their peace with the system a long time ago.  They came in, obviously reluctant, then a 
threat is made on one of them.  Put all of these things together, the 
defendant running from the facts in this case, running from the officer. Put 
that on there, the defendant by stipulation down there in Colorado. The gaps are 
filled in by Aaron, and the gaps are filled in by Aaron and Jamie.  That's what this 
case is about.  
This is not about how intoxicated they were.  Obviously they were 
drinking and drunk.

If I was to ask everyone of you 
persons to start in the back row and tell us about a summer vacation, by the 
time it got to the 13th juror you wouldn't even recognize your trip, and you 
weren't even drunk at the time.  Let's look at the hard core facts in the 
case.  In 
cross-examination, again, these guys are a lot of fun to go after, accomplices 
and informants in drug cases.  If you ever sit in on a drug case, you'll 
watch it there.  
It's a great sport.  They're usually not very intelligent people, 
often made a bad judgment to get themselves involved in this.

There's an old story, when you 
sleep with the dogs, you get fleas. These three guys are together, no question 
about it.  Two 
of them took their medicine, and it's time for you to tell this defendant it is 
time for his. The evidence is there.  The case is there beyond all doubt, not just 
reasonable doubt, but all doubt.

[¶19]      In United States v. Mitchell, the court 
considered several factors when evaluating whether there was prejudicial plain 
error at the trial level.  Those factors included: 1) the degree to 
which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and prejudice 
the accused; 2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; 3) the strength 
of competent proof to establish guilt, absent the remarks; 4) whether the 
comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to 
extraneous matters; 5) the presence or absence of a limiting instruction; 6) 
whether there was a proper purpose for introducing the conviction; 7) whether 
the conviction was improperly emphasized; 8) whether the conviction was used as 
substantive evidence of guilt; 9) whether the error was invited by defense 
counsel; 10) whether the failure to object could have been the result of 
tactical decisions; and 11) whether, in light of all the evidence, the error was 
harmless.1  Mitchell, 1 F.3d  at 241-42 (citing and 
quoting United States v. Harrison, 716 F.2d 1050, 1052 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984)); United States v. Miranda, 593 F.2d 590, 594 (5th Cir. 1979)).

[¶20]       First, we note that the 
prosecution did not appear to have a proper purpose for introducing the 
testimony concerning the guilty pleas, and his comments misled the jury into 
thinking the pleas were substantive evidence of Mazurek's guilt.  Second, the 
prosecutor's remarks were not isolated.  During voir dire and throughout the trial the 
prosecutor referred to Scheschi and Morran as "accomplices," rather than 
witnesses; he elicited testimony that they had already pled guilty to the crime; 
and then in closing argument asked the jurors to use the guilty pleas of those 
accomplices as substantive evidence of Mazurek's guilt.  Third, the 
competent proof to establish Mazurek's guilt was not strong.  The State relied 
heavily on the testimony of Scheschi and Morran.  In addition, the jury found itself at an 
impasse on the burglary counts and was given an Allen instruction before it came 
to a decision.

[¶21]      Fourth, no limiting instruction was 
given.  
Generally, the trial court should instruct the jury that evidence of a 
witness' conviction may be used only for the limited purpose of impeachment and 
not as substantive evidence of guilt.  Mitchell, 1 F.3d  at 242 (citing United States 
v. Davis, 838 F.2d 909, 917 (7th Cir. 1988)).  In this case, the trial court failed to give 
such a limiting instruction, in spite of the fact that Kwallek has been the law 
in Wyoming since 1979.2  As was the situation in Mitchell, so is the 
situation here that the extent of the prosecutor's comments make it difficult 
for this Court to believe that any limiting instruction could have cured the 
prejudicial effect of those improper comments.  Id. at 243.

[¶22]      Fifth, the convictions were emphasized 
and used as substantive evidence of guilt.  The prosecutor used the term "accomplice" 
throughout the trial when referring to Scheschi and Morran.  The prosecutor also 
impermissibly urged the jury, "[t]wo of them took their medicine, and it's time 
for you to tell this defendant it is time for his.  The evidence is 
there." The prosecutor's comments did not go to the credibility of the 
witnesses.  In 
Kwallek, the prosecutor did not seize upon the testimony and use it in his 
argument to the jury, yet we found the testimony was prejudicial and that 
Kwallek had been denied a fair trial.  Kwallek, 596 P.2d  at 1375-76.  The prosecutor's 
conduct in this case is particularly egregious because he encouraged the jury to 
convict Mazurek for an impermissible reason:  because Scheschi and Morran had been 
convicted of participating in the same conspiracy. In the State's closing 
argument, the clear thrust was that the witnesses' convictions should be used a 
substantive evidence of Mazurek's guilt.  This is obviously improper.

[¶23]      Sixth, defense counsel did not invite 
the error.  He 
did not refer to the pleas in opening argument and the testimony was elicited by 
the prosecutor on direct examination.  On cross-examination, defense counsel asked 
questions which expanded on that testimony, asking both witnesses what was 
received in return for their plea and agreement to testify.  Defense counsel's 
questioning was to further the defense theory, presented in opening argument, 
that only two men were present when the victim's garage was entered.  According to the 
defense, Scheschi and Morran were fabricating Mazurek's involvement in order to 
get a more lenient sentence for themselves.  It is important to note at this point that 
the defense is permitted to use guilty pleas to attack witness credibility.  It is not 
permissible, however, for the State to elicit this testimony on direct 
examination or to use it as substantive evidence of guilt.  See Kwallek, 596 
P.2d at 1375-76; Ross, 930 P.2d at 968-69; Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 969-70 (Wyo. 
1996).

[¶24]      Seventh, while we acknowledge that 
defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's improper comments, we are 
not convinced that his failure to object was based on tactical reasons.  "[W]hat tactical 
reason could exist to allow the prosecution to advance improper arguments that 
are likely to result in the conviction of one's client?" See Mitchell, 1 F.3d  at 
243.

[¶25]      Finally, the State's case hinged on the 
testimony of Scheschi and Morran.  Mazurek presented testimony from other 
witnesses which conflicted with the State's version of events.  Mazurek was 
entitled to have the jury consider the conflicting inferences to be drawn from 
that evidence without the impermissible taint of the State's arguments that his 
"accomplices" had taken their medicine, therefore, Mazurek should take his 
too.  Thus, we 
conclude the error was not harmless.

[¶26]      In sum, the factors employed in 
Mitchell weigh in favor of Mazurek.  The only factor in the State's favor is the 
lack of objection by defense counsel.

[I]f one cannot say, with fair 
assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous 
action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the 
error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not 
affected.  The 
inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart 
from the phase affected by the error.  It is rather, even so, whether the error 
itself had substantial influence.  If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the 
conviction cannot stand.

Mitchell, 1 F.3d  at 244 (quoting Kotteakos v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1557 (1946)).

[¶27]      Although we afford wide latitude to 
counsel in making closing arguments, urging the jury to convict a defendant 
because his alleged accomplices have pled guilty crosses the line.  The prosecutor's 
remarks in this case illustrate a clear case of overreaching.  Not content with 
its case against Mazurek, the prosecution used improper testimony and improper 
closing argument to obtain a conviction.  Examining the record as a whole, these errors 
put the fairness of the trial into serious question, requiring reversal and a 
new trial.  See 
Mitchell, 1 F.3d  at 244.

 Plea Agreements

[¶28]      Appellant claims that by reaching plea 
agreements with Scheschi and Morran, the State violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) 
(1994) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102(a)(ii).  He contends that since the two witnesses 
testified against him at trial and received favorable treatment for their 
testimony, his conviction must be reversed.  Whether plea agreements with witnesses who 
testify against a defendant require reversal of a defendant's conviction 
requires an analysis of the pertinent statutes.

Applicable general principles of 
statutory construction include:  if the language is clear and unambiguous, we 
must abide by the plain meaning of the statute; if a statute is ambiguous, we 
may resort to general principles of construction; an ambiguous statute is one 
whose meaning is uncertain and susceptible of more than one meaning; and in a 
criminal statute, an ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.

 Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Wyo. 
1998).  This 
Court construes statutes in pari materia, giving effect to each word, clause, 
and sentence so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous.  McAdams v. State, 
907 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Wyo. 
1995).  We will 
not construe a statute in a manner which renders any portion meaningless or 
produces an absurd result.  Pierson, 956 P.2d  at 1125.

[¶29]      During the course of Mazurek's trial, 
Scheschi and Morran testified as witnesses for the State. Each witness entered 
into a plea agreement with the prosecutor which required him to cooperate with 
the State, including truthful testimony in Mazurek's trial.  Mazurek claims that 
the State's offer of "something of value" for their testimony against him 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1994), which provides in pertinent part:

Whoever * * * directly or 
indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of value to any person, for or 
because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such 
person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court 
* * * authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take 
testimony * * * shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than 
two years, or both.

[¶30]      Mazurek's argument is based on United 
States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), which was decided on July 1, 1998 in the United 
States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.  The 1998 Singleton opinion held that the 
government violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) by entering into a plea agreement that 
promised leniency to a witness in consideration for his trial testimony.  On July 10, 1998, 
however, the opinion was vacated and the matter set for hearing en banc, 
resulting in United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1024 (1999) (Singleton), which was published after Mazurek's brief was filed 
in this case, but two weeks before the State filed its brief in the matter.

[¶31]      Singleton reversed the 1998 opinion 
when a majority of the en banc court held that 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2) does not 
apply to the United States acting in its sovereign capacity and thus does not 
include an assistant United States attorney who is acting as an alter ego of the 
United States in offering an accomplice leniency in exchange for truthful 
testimony.  Id. 
at 1299-1300.  
We agree with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that applying this federal 
statute to a government agent who is functioning within the official scope of 
the office would be absurd. Id. at 1300; and see United States v. Guillaume, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1333 (S.D.Fla. 1998) (the application of § 201(c)(2) to the 
government works an obvious absurdity and threatens to hamper the effectiveness 
of the government in the investigation and prosecution of crime); United States 
v. Eisenhardt, 10 F. Supp. 2d 521 (D.Md. 1998) (calling the 1998 Singleton 
decision "amazingly unsound" and nonsensical").  The practice of using plea agreements is 
long-standing and is a legally sanctioned process.  See, Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470-71, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970).

[¶32]     Mazurek also contends the plea agreements 
violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102(a)(ii) (LEXIS 1999), which provides in 
pertinent part:

            (a) A person 
commits bribery, if:

                         
* * *

(ii) While a public servant, he 
solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any pecuniary benefit, testimonial, 
privilege or personal advantage upon an agreement or understanding that his 
vote, exercise of discretion or other action as a public servant will thereby be 
influenced.

[¶33]      The legislature appears to be concerned 
about public officers benefitting personally from their position as a public 
servant.  Plea 
agreements have long been a sanctioned and useful tool in criminal proceedings, 
and, if the legislature intended to outlaw plea agreements when it enacted Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-5-102(a)(ii), it certainly would have explicitly so 
provided.  
Accordingly, we presume the legislature did not intend to preclude the 
use of plea agreements and hold that the plea agreements in this case did not 
violate Wyoming law.

 Prosecutorial Misconduct

[¶34]      Appellant claims prosecutorial 
misconduct in the State's argument against severing the charges for trial and in 
closing argument.  
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed

by reference to the entire 
record and hinge on whether a defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to 
constitute denial of a fair trial.  Similarly, the propriety of any comment 
within a closing argument is measured in the context of the entire 
argument.  A 
trial court's rulings as to the scope of permissible argument will not be 
disturbed absent a `clear or patent' abuse of discretion.  Even then, reversal 
is not warranted unless a reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the 
appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.

 English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 
1999); Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 
1997) (emphasis omitted)).  However, the defense failed to object during 
the prosecution's closing argument.  Consequently, we review that claim under our 
plain error standard.  
Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 723-24 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶35]      Mazurek filed a motion to sever Count 
III, interference with a peace officer, for trial.  He argued it would 
be prejudicial to try the charges together due to the allegation that he ran 
from the officer while being arrested for the other charges.  The district court 
denied his motion.  
Mazurek claims the prosecutor misled the trial court when he told the 
court the testimony concerning the interference with a peace officer charge was 
necessary to and a part of the evidence in the burglary case, because the 
prosecutor did not use that evidence at trial.  Our review of the record tells us this is not 
so.

[¶36]      During the hearing on the motion to 
sever, the prosecutor told the trial court that Mazurek made an incriminating 
statement and fled from the officer upon being told he was under arrest. During 
the trial, Detective Way testified that, when he told Mazurek he was under 
arrest, Mazurek asked for another chance and said he was there.  Detective Way also 
testified that Mazurek fled from him after he placed Mazurek in hand cuffs.  We cannot say the 
record is clear that the prosecutor misled the trial court. Therefore, we find 
no plain error.

[¶37]      Mazurek also claims the prosecution's 
closing arguments concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence 
constituted prosecutorial misconduct.  We find several instances of improper 
comments in those portions of the prosecution's closing argument quoted earlier 
in this opinion.  
Because we are reversing this case for improper use of witnesses' guilty 
pleas, we decline to perform a plain error analysis here.  However, perhaps we 
must again admonish counsel:

"it is unprofessional conduct 
for the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the 
truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence of the guilt of the defendant." 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.8 
(1980).  
Prosecutors, as well as attorneys in general, acting as counsel in 
particular cases, are prohibited from attesting to facts or asserting as fact 
their personal beliefs relating to matters in issue.  Ross v. State, 8 
Wyo. [351,] at 372, 57 P. 924 [(1899)].  They are not to be witnesses testifying 
through their closing. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S. Ct. 629, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935).

Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 893 (Wyo. 
1982).  In 
addition, it is improper closing argument to ask the jury to convict a defendant 
for any reason other than the evidence before it.  Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 861.

Perhaps we must remind both 
prosecutors and defense counsel, again, about their respective roles with 
respect to this particular issue. See, e.g., Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384-85 (Wyo. 
1992) and Browder v. State, 639 P.2d 889, 893-95 (Wyo. 1982).  I hope they reflect on their solemn 
responsibilities.  
I hope they rededicate themselves to pursuing the ideal of justice, of 
fairness, of due process.  I hope they get the message.  The survival of our 
system of justice depends on it.

Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763, 773 (Wyo. 1995) 
(Golden, C.J., specially concurring, with whom Lehman, J., joins).

 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

[¶38]      Mazurek also contends that he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to the 
prosecution's questions regarding the guilty pleas.  Because we reverse 
and remand for a new trial based on other issues, we decline to address whether 
counsel provided effective assistance of counsel, as required by the United 
States and Wyoming Constitutions.  Engberg v. State, 874 P.2d 890, 892 (Wyo. 
1994) ("The appellate court will not consider questions or errors which are not 
likely to arise on another trial, or questions or errors which will be presented 
in a different manner on another trial.") (quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 
705 at 122 (1993).

[¶39]      Our decision not to consider the issue 
is based on an assumption that both the defense counsel and the prosecutor will 
heed our discussion concerning the use of guilty pleas and prosecutorial 
misconduct, and that this will not occur again on retrial.  See id.  Testimony 
concerning guilty pleas of others associated with the same criminal incident is 
inadmissible, except under limited circumstances.  We exhort prosecutors and defense counsel to 
use care when such testimony is introduced.  We propose notification to the trial court, 
before trial, as well as proper limiting instructions.  In addition, 
prosecutors should not elicit such testimony on direct examination and may not 
use the information improperly if it is introduced by defense counsel.

 Evidence of Threat

[¶40]      Mazurek further claims reversible error 
in the admission of testimony that he threatened a witness in the hallway after 
the witness testified against him.  Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are 
within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. English, 982 P.2d  at 
143.  We will 
not overturn a trial court's discretionary decision unless the court acted in a 
manner exceeding the bounds of reason and could not rationally conclude as it 
did.  Id.

[¶41]      The trial court, over Mazurek's 
objection, allowed Scheschi to return to the witness stand after a break in the 
trial.  
Scheschi testified that Mazurek passed by him in the hallway and said, 
"It's your ass." At trial and on appeal, Mazurek claims the testimony was 
prejudicial and not relevant to the proceeding. W.R.E. 401 defines relevant 
evidence as:

evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.

However, even when evidence is relevant, the trial court 
may exclude relevant evidence

if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

 W.R.E. 403.

[¶42]      The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it determined "if there's threats, we ought to know about it." 
The testimony was relevant to Mazurek's consciousness of guilt.  See e.g., King v. 
State, 780 P.2d 943, 962 (Wyo. 
1989) (jury instruction allowing jury to consider threat made by defendant to a 
witness as evidence of his guilt is "well-settled law"); Opie v. State, 389 P.2d 684, 690 (Wyo. 
1964) (threat against a third person is admissible when circumstances are shown 
which indicate some relation or connection between the crime at issue and the 
third party threatened).

[¶43]      When reviewing evidence for 
admissibility under W.R.E. 403, the trial court must balance the potential for 
unfair prejudice against the probative value of evidence.  Trujillo v. State, 
953 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 
1998) (citing McDermott v. State, 897 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Wyo. 1995)).  The testimony did not distract the jury from 
the question of whether Mazurek committed the charged crime, id., and it was 
neither unduly inflammatory nor introduced solely to inflame the jury.  The trial court did 
not err when it allowed Scheschi to testify concerning the comment Mazurek made to him 
in the hallway. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision to allow the 
testimony at trial.

                                  CONCLUSION

[¶44]      Because the prosecutor improperly used 
evidence of guilty pleas by Scheschi and Morran as substantive evidence of 
Mazurek's guilt, we reverse.  We find no error in the trial court's 
decision concerning the comment Mazurek made to Scheschi in the hallway after 
Scheschi testified.  
Neither federal nor Wyoming law prohibit prosecutors from entering into 
plea agreements with defendants.  We assume counsel will heed our directives 
concerning the other issues raised by Mazurek in the new trial. Reversed and 
remanded for new trial.

  

   THOMAS, 
Justice, concurring and dissenting.

[¶45]      I would affirm Mazurek's 
conviction.  I 
agree with those aspects of the majority opinion that hold that plea agreements 
do not offend either federal or state statutes; there was no prosecutorial 
misconduct in connection with the argument against severing charges for trial; 
and the evidence of the threat was properly admitted.  I have not been 
persuaded to renounce the views set forth in the concurring and dissenting 
opinion I authored in Urrutia v. State, 924 P.2d 965, 971-72 (Wyo. 
1996), and the concurring opinion I authored in Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 972-73 (Wyo. 
1996).  I would 
hold that, in the absence of objection to the evidence, no error occurred in the 
elicitation of guilty pleas from the co-conspirators.  Further, I would 
find no reversible error in any of the other points asserted by Mazurek.

 [¶46]  I would affirm this conviction.

  

FOOTNOTES

  1These factors are not exhaustive, and not all of 
the factors need be shown.  We merely use them as a guideline for review 
of plain error, weighing the factors to determine whether plain error has been 
committed.

  2We take this opportunity to admonish prosecutors 
and defense counsel alike.  If defense counsel wishes to use guilty pleas 
and the deals struck in exchange for those pleas to impeach witnesses, the 
attorneys and the trial court must use care to ensure the jury does not use that 
testimony improperly.