Case Title: Ali v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 092461

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Hassell, C.J., Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, Goodwyn, and 
Millette, JJ., and Russell, S.J. 
 
WASEEM ALI 
                                         OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 092461  
  SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
 
                                 November 4, 2010 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
This is an appeal from convictions of robbery and grand 
larceny from the person.  It presents three questions:  (1) 
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction 
of robbery, (2) whether the defendant could properly be 
convicted of both crimes when the evidence showed the 
commission of a single act, and (3) whether the “ends of 
justice” exception to Rule 5A:18 should have been invoked to 
permit the defendant to raise question (2) for the first time 
on appeal. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
Applying familiar principles of appellate review, the 
facts will be stated in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.  On May 20, 2007, 
at about 11:30 p.m., a man later identified as Waseem Ali 
entered a convenience store located on Route 1 in Stafford 
County.  When Ali entered, the only others present were the 
store manager, Pauline J. Kessler (Pauline), who was working 
in the back office, Pauline’s 23-year-old daughter, Tara 
Kessler (Tara), who was in the retail part of the store behind 
the counter, near the cash register, and Timothy Gabel and his 
wife, employees who were behind the cooler, stocking it with 
cold drinks. 
 
Ali approached Tara and asked for a cigar that was 
displayed behind the counter.  Tara retrieved the cigar, gave 
it to Ali, and accepted a dollar bill from him in payment.  As 
she opened the cash register to deposit the dollar, Ali 
reached across the counter into the cash register drawer and 
attempted to grab a handful of currency.  Tara tried to 
prevent him from taking the money by holding on to it as best 
she could.  She testified that she was “scared” and “didn’t 
know what was going to happen.  I had never been robbed 
before.”  She held on to the money and the two struggled for 
it.  Tara “screamed” for her mother.  Pauline looked at the 
monitor that was connected to the store’s surveillance camera 
and saw Ali “[p]hysically attacking [Tara].”  Pauline ran out 
into the store.  Ali, seeing her coming, finally “yanked” the 
money away from Tara and ran out of the store with it.  
Photographs recorded by the surveillance camera, showing Ali 
reaching toward the cash drawer and Tara and Ali struggling 
over the money, were admitted in evidence. 
 
Pauline, with Timothy Gabel, who had heard the commotion, 
pursued Ali into the parking lot, where he escaped in a white 
 
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station wagon.  An emergency services (“911”) dispatcher later 
informed Pauline that Ali had wrecked the station wagon within 
minutes after leaving the scene and had been apprehended. 
 
At a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Stafford County, 
Ali was convicted of robbery, grand larceny from the person, 
reckless driving, and driving while license revoked, third or 
subsequent offense.  In accordance with the jury's verdict, he 
was sentenced to 12 years for robbery, five years for grand 
larceny from the person, and 18 months for the two driving 
offenses.  Ali appealed the convictions to the Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court’s judgment by 
memorandum opinion.  Ali v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1650-08-4 
(Nov. 10, 2009).  Ali petitioned this Court for an appeal.  We 
awarded him an appeal limited to his convictions for robbery 
and grand larceny from the person. 
Analysis 
 
Robbery is a common law crime in Virginia.  It is defined 
as “the taking, with intent to steal, of the personal property 
of another, from his person or in his presence, against his 
will, by violence or intimidation.”  Durham v. Commonwealth, 
214 Va. 166, 168, 198 S.E.2d 603, 605 (1973).  The element of 
violence need only be slight.  “[A]nything which calls out 
resistance is sufficient.”  Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 
 
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860, 864, 183 S.E. 452, 454 (1936) (quoting Houston v. 
Commonwealth, 87 Va. 257, 264, 12 S.E. 385, 387 (1890)). 
 
We recently considered the circumstance in which the 
victim engaged in a struggle with a would-be thief to prevent 
a taking or asportation of property.  We explained that 
[w]here the owner of personal property, or another 
having custody or constructive possession of the 
same, interposes himself to prevent a thief from 
taking the property, and the force and violence used 
to overcome the opposition to the taking is 
concurrent or concomitant with the taking, the 
thief's action constitutes robbery. 
 
Commonwealth v. Jones, 267 Va. 284, 289, 591 S.E.2d 68, 71 
(2004). 
In the present case, there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s conclusion that the taking of money was 
accomplished by intimidation as well as by violence.  
Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to 
support the conviction of robbery. 
 
Ali contends that he cannot lawfully be found guilty of 
both robbery and grand larceny from the person because both 
are based upon the same conduct.  Ali concedes that robbery 
and grand larceny from the person are distinct offenses for 
the purposes of analysis under the Blockburger test.  That 
test, expressed in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 
(1932),  provides that when a single act violates two separate 
criminal statutory provisions, convictions for both crimes 
 
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will not offend the constitutional guarantees against double 
jeopardy if each crime requires proof of an element that the 
other does not.  Id. at 304. 
We held in Commonwealth v. Hudgins, 269 Va. 602, 611 
S.E.2d 362 (2005), that the crimes of robbery and grand 
larceny from the person were separate and distinct under the 
Blockburger analysis because an essential element of robbery – 
violence or intimidation – is not an element of grand larceny 
from the person, while an essential element of grand larceny 
from the person – proof of value – is not an element of 
robbery.  Id. at 606, 611 S.E.2d at 365.  For the same reason, 
we held that grand larceny from the person is not a lesser-
included offense of robbery.  Id. at 608, 611 S.E.2d at 366. 
Ali further concedes that under our holding in Phillips 
v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 548, 514 S.E.2d 340 (1999), the 
“statutory double jeopardy" provisions of Code § 19.2-294 do 
not preclude convictions of two crimes for a single act if the 
prosecutions are simultaneous rather than successive.  
Instead, he argues that his convictions for two crimes 
resulting from a single act, under the facts of the present 
case, arise entirely from the adoption by the Commonwealth of 
two mutually inconsistent and contradictory theories:  (A) 
that Ali was guilty of robbery because he took the money by 
force or intimidation and (B) that Ali was also guilty of 
 
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grand larceny from the person because he took the money 
without force or intimidation. 
Ali cites Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187-88 
(2005), for the proposition that reliance by the prosecution 
on an inconsistency “at the core” of the prosecution’s case 
may, if prejudicial to the defendant, violate the defendant’s 
due process guarantees.  There is, of course, no question here 
that Ali was prejudiced by an additional five-year sentence if 
the Commonwealth is shown to have successfully relied on an 
inconsistency at the core of its case. 
In response, the Commonwealth argues that the record, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, showed 
that Ali committed two offenses “seriatim, a larceny from the 
person followed by a robbery.”  The Commonwealth contends that 
when Ali reached into the cash drawer, Tara was surprised and 
did not immediately intervene.  The argument continues that an 
asportation then occurred, completing the crime of grand 
larceny from the person.  Thereafter, the Commonwealth 
contends, Tara attempted to block Ali from taking any more 
money, whereupon he exerted force, thus committing robbery.  
Examining the record in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, we find no evidence that supports the 
Commonwealth’s theory that two successive takings occurred. 
 
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Asportation is an essential element of larceny.  
Severance of the goods from the owner and absolute control of 
the property by the taker, even for an instant, constitutes an 
asportation.  Mason v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 253, 256, 105 
S.E.2d 149, 151 (1958).  Asportation requires some movement of 
the seized goods, however slight, coupled with the intent to 
steal.  Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 575, 667 S.E.2d 
763, 766 (2008).  We find no support in the record for the 
Commonwealth’s contention that Ali removed, or otherwise moved 
any cash from the drawer, or took control of any part of it, 
until after Tara intervened.  The evidence is consistent only 
with the conclusion that Ali obtained all of the stolen money 
by force.  His asportation was complete only when he “yanked” 
the money from Tara’s hands. 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals noted that it was 
“unclear” whether there were two crimes or only one.  A 
concurring opinion stated that it was questionable whether "a 
reasonable fact finder could have concluded that there were 
two separate and independent criminal acts herein.”  Ali, slip 
op. at 9 (Alston, J., concurring).  The Court of Appeals, 
however, noted that the issue had not been raised in the 
circuit court and, refusing to apply the ends of justice 
exception, held that the issue was barred on appeal by Rule 
5A:18.  Id., slip op. at 5-6. 
 
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On appeal to this Court, Ali concedes that the issue 
concerning the Commonwealth’s inconsistent theories was not 
raised in the circuit court, but argues that this case is 
appropriate for application of the ends of justice exception 
and that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to apply it. 
As we view the record, the evidence clearly and 
affirmatively shows that an element of one of the crimes of 
which Ali was convicted did not occur.  Accordingly, there was 
error in the judgment appealed from and application of the 
ends of justice exception is necessary to avoid a grave 
injustice.  See Charles v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 14, 20, 613 
S.E.2d 432, 435 (2005) (holding that the ends of justice 
exception will be applied only if there is error in the 
judgment of the trial court, and only if necessary to avoid a 
grave injustice); Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 
221-22, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272-73 (1997) (holding that the 
exception will not be invoked unless the record affirmatively 
proves that the offense did not occur).  We therefore hold 
that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to apply the ends 
of justice exception of Rule 5A:18 and erred in affirming the 
conviction of grand larceny from the person. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals with respect to the robbery conviction, 
 
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reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the circuit 
court with respect to the conviction of grand larceny from the 
person, vacate that conviction and enter final judgment here. 
      
                             Affirmed in part, 
                                  reversed in part, 
and final judgment. 
 
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