Case Title: In re Thompkins

Citation: 2007-Ohio-5238

Docket Number: 20060286

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re Thompkins, 115 Ohio St.3d 409, 2007-Ohio-5238.] 
 
 
IN RE THOMPKINS. 
[Cite as In re Thompkins, 115 Ohio St.3d 409, 2007-Ohio-5238.] 
Service — Juv.R. 16(A) — When service is attempted by certified mail and the 
certified mail is returned stamped “Attempted—Not Known,” the party 
attempting to make service is not required to attempt ordinary mail 
service before service by publication pursuant to Juv.R. 16(A) is valid. 
(No. 2006-0286 – Submitted January 9, 2007 – Decided October 10, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, 
No. 20489, 2005-Ohio-7073. 
__________________ 
 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} The Montgomery County Children Services Board appeals from a 
decision of the Second District Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court 
order granting the board permanent custody of Shawn Thompkins. 
{¶ 2} The single issue we confront concerns whether the board exercised 
reasonable diligence in attempting to serve Shawn’s father, Iler Crawford, by 
certified mail, which the postal service returned marked “Attempted Not Known,” 
or whether the board had a legal obligation to follow up with ordinary mail, as 
Civ.R. 4.6(D) allows for certified mail returned “Unclaimed,” before service by 
publication would be deemed sufficient.  Stated differently, did the board exercise 
reasonable diligence in attempting to serve Crawford even though the board did 
not attempt service by ordinary mail at an address from which the certified mail 
addressed to Crawford was returned marked “Attempted Not Known”?  The 
answer is yes.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
I 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 3} The parties do not dispute the relevant facts.  A judgment entry of 
paternity established that appellee, Iler Crawford, is the father of the minor child, 
Shawn Thompkins.  The appellant, Montgomery County Children Services Board, 
first sought permanent custody of Thompkins in October 2002.  The board 
discovered two possible addresses for Crawford – one in Columbus and one in 
Dayton.  Crawford’s mother accepted service of process on his behalf at the 
Dayton address.  However, because the trial court did not adjudicate the 
complaint for permanent custody before the 90-day period set forth in R.C. 
2151.35(B)(1) expired, the board filed a new complaint for permanent custody in 
February 2003. 
{¶ 4} The board attempted to personally serve Crawford at the Dayton 
address in March 2003.  That attempt failed, and the process server reported that 
Crawford had not resided at the Dayton address for almost one year.  Pursuant to 
Civ.R. 4.4(A)(1), the board filed an affidavit for service by publication asserting 
that Crawford could not be served by summons because his address was unknown 
to the board and could not be ascertained with reasonable diligence.  Thereafter, a 
notice of the upcoming hearing appeared in the Daily Court Reporter, a 
newspaper of general circulation in Montgomery County. 
{¶ 5} After publication of the notice and before the permanent-custody 
hearing commenced, the board attempted to serve Crawford by certified mail at 
the Columbus address.  The postmaster returned the certified letter to the 
Montgomery County Juvenile Court bearing a stamp listing five possible reasons 
for mail to be returned:  “Attempted Not Known,” “Insufficient Address,” “No 
Such Number/Street,” “Not Deliverable as Addressed – Unable to Forward,” and 
“Other.”  A mark appeared next to “Attempted Not Known.” 
{¶ 6} Counsel appointed to represent Crawford appeared at the hearing 
on the complaint for permanent custody and claimed that the trial court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over Crawford because the board had failed to perfect 
January Term, 2007 
3 
service upon him.  The magistrate ruled that the board had properly served 
Crawford by publication and proceeded with the custody hearing.  In July 2003, 
the magistrate determined that Thompkins was a dependent child and awarded 
permanent custody to the board.  Crawford’s counsel objected to the court’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Crawford.  However, the trial court 
overruled the objection and adopted the magistrate’s decision.  Crawford’s 
counsel appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Second District Court of 
Appeals.  Appellate counsel informed the court that he could not locate his client.  
Crawford’s counsel filed an Anders brief, see Anders v. California (1967), 386 
U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, in which he noted a potential issue 
involving a defect in service and resultant lack of personal jurisdiction but 
concluded that the issue lacked merit.  The appellate court determined that the 
service-of-process issue had sufficient merit to prevent the appeal from being 
wholly frivolous.  Consequently, the court appointed new counsel, who filed a 
brief raising this assignment of error. 
{¶ 7} Reviewing the merits, the court of appeals noted that when a 
children services board seeks to terminate parental rights, Juv.R. 16 requires the 
board to exercise reasonable diligence in its effort to serve the parents with 
process and that reasonable diligence requires attempts to serve the parents in 
accordance with Civ.R. 4(A), (C), and (D), 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, and 4.6 before 
resorting to service by publication. 
{¶ 8} The appellate court then determined that the “Attempted Not 
Known” notation on the certified mail envelope returned to the Montgomery 
County Juvenile Court was the equivalent of an envelope returned “Unclaimed.” 
This triggered the application of Civ.R. 4.6(D), which allows a party to request 
service by ordinary mail.  Because the board did not request service by ordinary 
mail, the appellate court concluded that it did not exercise due diligence in 
attempting to serve Crawford before resorting to service by publication.  
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Therefore, the appellate court held that service by publication was insufficient and 
the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Crawford. 
{¶ 9} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 10} The right of a parent to the custody of his or her child is one of the 
oldest fundamental liberty interests recognized by American courts.  Troxel v. 
Granville (2000), 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49.  See also 
In re Adoption of Walters, 112 Ohio St.3d 315, 2007-Ohio-7, 859 N.E.2d 545, ¶ 
18, citing In re Hayes (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (the right to 
raise one’s child is an essential and basic civil right); In re Adoption of Pushcar, 
110 Ohio St.3d 332, 2006-Ohio-4572, 853 N.E.2d 647, ¶ 11, citing Santosky v. 
Kramer (1982), 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (“natural 
parents have a fundamental right to the care and custody of their children”). 
{¶ 11} Moreover, this court has noted that “ ‘[p]ermanent termination of 
parental rights has been described as ‘the family law equivalent of the death 
penalty in a criminal case.’  * * * Therefore, parents ‘must be afforded every 
procedural and substantive protection the law allows.’ ”  Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d at 
48, 679 N.E.2d 680, quoting In re Smith (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16, 601 
N.E.2d 45. 
{¶ 12} The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provides:   “No person  shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”  But “[f]or all its consequence, ‘due 
process’ has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined. * * * 
Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of ‘fundamental fairness,’ a 
requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty.  Applying 
the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover 
what ‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular situation by first 
considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests 
January Term, 2007 
5 
that are at stake.”  Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., North 
Carolina (1981), 452 U.S. 18, 24-25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640. 
{¶ 13} Our courts have long recognized that due process requires both 
notice and an opportunity to be heard.  See, e.g., Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 
108 (1884), 111 U.S. 701, 708, 4 S.Ct. 663, 28 L.Ed. 569; Caldwell v. Carthage 
(1892), 49 Ohio St. 334, 348, 31 N.E. 602.  In Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865, the United States 
Supreme Court enunciated the standard for determining whether service of 
process comports with due process, holding:  “An elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is 
notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections.”  Id. at 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865. 
{¶ 14} In accordance with this requirement, the government must attempt 
to provide actual notice to interested parties if it seeks to deprive them of a 
protected liberty or property interest.  Dusenbery v. United States (2002), 534 
U.S. 161, 170, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597.  However, due process does not 
require that an interested party receive actual notice.  Id.  Moreover, while “[t]he 
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee 
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it,” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 70 S.Ct. 652, 
94 L.Ed. 865, due process does not require “heroic efforts” to ensure the notice’s 
delivery,  Dusenbery, 534 U.S. at 170, 122 S.Ct. 694, 151 L.Ed.2d 597. 
{¶ 15} Here, we must determine whether the board exercised reasonable 
diligence in attempting to notify Crawford that his parental rights were subject to 
termination, so that its efforts comport with our rules for the service of process 
and with due process requirements.  Crawford did not receive actual notice of the 
termination proceeding; he was not aware of the case that could, and did, 
terminate his constitutionally protected parental rights.  Indeed, it appears that 
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6 
Crawford remains unaware of the lengthy proceedings conducted to preserve his 
parental rights, as even his own court-appointed attorneys have been unable to 
locate him during the pendency of this action. 
{¶ 16} A number of rules and statutes govern the service of process in 
Ohio.  Juv.R. 16(A) states that a “summons shall be served as provided in Civil 
Rules 4(A), (C) and (D), 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5 and 4.6.”  The rule further provides that 
“when the residence of a party is unknown and cannot be ascertained with 
reasonable diligence, service shall be made by publication.” 
{¶ 17} Civ.R. 4.6(D) provides:  “If a certified or express mail envelope is 
returned with an endorsement showing that the envelope was unclaimed, the clerk 
shall forthwith notify, by mail, the attorney of record or, if there is no attorney of 
record, the party at whose instance process was issued.  If the attorney, or serving 
party, after notification by the clerk, files with the clerk a written request for 
ordinary mail service, the clerk shall send by ordinary mail a copy of the 
summons and complaint or other document to be served to the defendant at the 
address set forth in the caption, or at the address set forth in written instructions 
furnished to the clerk.  * * *  Service shall be deemed complete when the fact of 
mailing is entered of record, provided that the ordinary mail envelope is not 
returned by the postal authorities with an endorsement showing failure of 
delivery.  If the ordinary mail envelope is returned undelivered, the clerk shall 
forthwith notify the attorney, or serving party, by mail.” 
{¶ 18} Further, R.C. 2151.29 states: 
{¶ 19} “Service of summons, notices, and subpoenas * * * shall be made 
by delivering a copy to the person summoned, notified, or subpoenaed, or by 
leaving a copy at the person’s usual place of residence.  If the juvenile judge is 
satisfied that such service is impracticable, the juvenile judge may order service 
by registered or certified mail. * * * 
January Term, 2007 
7 
{¶ 20} “Whenever it appears by affidavit that after reasonable effort the 
person to be served with summons cannot be found or the person’s post-office 
address ascertained, * * * the clerk shall publish such summons once in a 
newspaper of general circulation throughout the county.” 
{¶ 21} Pursuant to Civ.R. 4.6(D), when service is attempted by certified 
mail, as it was in this case, and the certified mail “is returned with an endorsement 
showing that the envelope was unclaimed,” the serving party must be notified, 
and may then request that service be attempted by ordinary mail. 
{¶ 22} Here, the postal service returned the certified mail marked 
“Attempted Not Known.”  The United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail 
Manual, Section 507, Exhibit 1.4.1, available at http://pe.usps.gov/text/ 
dmm300/507.htm, provides that the endorsement “Unclaimed” means that the 
reason for nondelivery was that the “[a]ddressee abandoned or failed to call for 
mail,” while the endorsement “Attempted—Not Known” means “[d]elivery 
attempted, addressee not known at place of address.” 
{¶ 23} When a postal return reads “Attempted Not Known,” no purpose 
would be served by a follow-up ordinary mail letter sent to the same address.  The 
“Unclaimed” designation implies that the person may in fact reside or receive 
mail at the designated address but for whatever reason has chosen not to sign for 
the certified mail.  In that situation, a follow-up communication by ordinary mail 
is reasonably calculated to provide the interested party with notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.  Such a communication, not returned, bears a strong 
inference that the intended recipient received the letter.  This is not so, however, 
with ordinary mail following the return of a certified letter with the endorsement 
“Attempted Not Known.”  The inference then is that the intended recipient does 
not reside or receive mail at the designated address and is not known to the 
residents there.  A follow-up letter in these circumstances would not permit a 
similar inference of receipt. 
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8 
{¶ 24} In this case, the board complied with the rules by attempting to 
personally serve Crawford at the Dayton address, by attempting to serve him by 
certified mail at the Columbus address, and by publishing a notice in the Daily 
Court Reporter in Montgomery County.  Neither Civ.R. 4.6(D) nor the Due 
Process Clause required the board to attempt service at the Columbus address by 
ordinary mail.  The returned certified letter, endorsed “Attempted Not Known,” 
clearly demonstrated that Crawford did not reside and was not known at the 
Columbus address.  Therefore, any ordinary mail addressed to him at that address 
could not be reasonably calculated to give him notice and an opportunity to be 
heard at the permanent-custody proceeding. 
{¶ 25} In considering what constitutes reasonable diligence under Civ.R. 
4.4(A), this court has stated:  “Black’s Law Dictionary (5 Ed.1979), at 412, 
defines ‘reasonable diligence’ as ‘[a] fair, proper and due degree of care and 
activity, measured with reference to the particular circumstances; such diligence, 
care or attention as might be expected from a man of ordinary prudence and 
activity.’  As indicated by the above definition, what constitutes reasonable 
diligence will depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”  
Sizemore v. Smith (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 330, 332, 6 OBR 387, 453 N.E.2d 632.  
We declared that “[r]easonable diligence requires taking steps which an individual 
of ordinary prudence would reasonably expect to be successful in locating a 
defendant’s address.”  Id. 
{¶ 26} In Sizemore, we recognized that steps taken in the effort to exercise 
reasonable diligence might include consulting a city directory, examining 
government records, or making inquiries of possible acquaintances of the person 
sought.  Id.  But we cautioned that “[t]hese examples do not constitute a 
mandatory checklist.  Rather, they exemplify that reasonable diligence requires 
[the use of] common and readily available sources” in the search.  Id. 
January Term, 2007 
9 
{¶ 27} In support of its request for service by publication, the board 
submitted a “reasonable diligence” affidavit to the trial court on March 13, 2003.  
That affidavit stated that Crawford’s residence was unknown to the affiant and 
that his last known addresses were in Columbus, where the board later attempted 
certified mail service, and his mother’s address in Dayton. 
{¶ 28} The affidavit stated that the board conducted a “diligent search” by 
(1) checking criminal databases including the CRIS-E Prison Locator, the 
Montgomery County Jail, and the Ohio Defender Database; (2) sending letters to 
the Columbus address, which the postal service later returned; (3) attempting to 
obtain residential service at the Dayton home of Crawford’s mother, which had 
been successful in the prior case; and (4) attempting to contact family members at 
the mother’s address.  The affidavit further stated that the board “knows of no 
other addresses for the legal father,” and concluded that “[t]he residence of the 
legal father cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence and service should be 
made by publication as provided by law.” 
{¶ 29} Because we determine that neither Civ.R. 4.6(D) nor the Due 
Process Clause requires ordinary mail service when the postal authorities return 
certified mail with the endorsement “Attempted Not Known” before a party 
attempts service by publication, and inasmuch as no party has otherwise 
challenged the board’s averment that it exercised reasonable diligence in 
attempting to ascertain Crawford’s address, we conclude that the board exercised 
reasonable diligence in attempting to serve Crawford.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur in part and dissent 
in part. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 30} The overriding issue in this fact-intensive case is whether 
appellant, Montgomery County Children Services (“MCCS”), exercised 
“reasonable diligence” under Juv.R. 16(A) in attempting to serve appellee Iler 
Crawford with notice of a hearing in which his parental rights were at stake.  In 
my view, the majority unjustifiably limits its analysis of that issue by resolving it 
solely within the narrow confines of a discussion of the requirements of Civ.R. 
4.6(D).  But this case also presents this court with an opportunity to clarify the 
standards that should apply to similar situations in the future.  The majority fails 
to take advantage of the opportunity to provide sorely needed guidance on how a 
court should evaluate the validity of service by publication in a parental-rights 
case. 
{¶ 31} For the reasons explained below, I dissent in part.  I would vacate 
the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause to that court to apply 
Sizemore v. Smith (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 330, 6 OBR 387, 453 N.E.2d 632, to all 
the relevant facts and circumstances. 
I 
{¶ 32} In In re Adoption of Walters, 112 Ohio St.3d 315, 2007-Ohio-7, 
859 N.E.2d 545, ¶ 18, this court stressed that the right to raise a child is an 
essential and basic civil right.  Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has 
established that the right of a parent to the custody of his or her child is a 
fundamental liberty interest.  Troxel v. Granville (2000), 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 
S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49.  See also In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 
157, 556 N.E.2d 1169. 
{¶ 33} Because this case implicates a parent’s constitutional right to the 
care and custody of his child, Crawford “ ‘must be afforded every procedural and 
substantive protection the law allows.’ ”  In re Hayes (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 
48, 679 N.E.2d 680, quoting In re Smith (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16, 601 
January Term, 2007 
11 
N.E.2d 45.  I readily acknowledge that Crawford has never exercised his parental 
rights or taken on any responsibilities with regard to Thompkins.  However, 
although Crawford’s failings as a parent were relevant to the trial court’s 
determination whether permanent custody should be granted to MCCS, his 
parental deficiencies are irrelevant to the inquiry whether service of the notice of 
hearing to terminate his parental rights was valid.  To answer that question a 
reviewing court must focus only on the details of the service itself. 
{¶ 34} When a dispute arises as to whether a party exercised reasonable 
diligence preceding resort to service by publication under Juv.R. 16(A), the 
burden is on that party to establish the reasonable diligence of its efforts.  See In 
re Miller (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 224, 226, 515 N.E.2d 635.  Because service by 
publication is a method of last resort, the requirements of Juv.R. 16(A) are to be 
strictly enforced.  See In re Wilson (1984), 21 Ohio App.3d 36, 40, 21 OBR 38, 
486 N.E.2d 152. 
{¶ 35} In perfecting service of notice on a person that a court proceeding 
is to take place and that the proceeding will affect the person’s fundamental rights 
in property or family, the most reliable method of notification is to have a process 
server hand the notice to the person.  That form of service, however, is not always 
possible or practical, nor is it necessarily required by rule or statute. 
{¶ 36} The next best method is to personally serve the notice at the 
residence of the individual by leaving it with a competent adult.  When these 
methods of “personal” and “residence” service fail, the next preferred method is 
to send the notice by certified mail. 
{¶ 37} The return of the receipt card signed by the person or another adult 
at the address signifies (certifies) that the mail was received, and thus, that 
document suffices to show “personal” service of notice of the proceeding. 
{¶ 38} If the certified letter is returned, and the reason given to the sender 
for its failure to be delivered indicates that the letter was unclaimed, ordinary mail 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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service to that same address is then proper.  If a letter sent by ordinary mail 
service is not returned to the sender as undeliverable, then service is deemed to 
have been made upon the person. 
{¶ 39} If, however, a certified letter is returned and indicates that the 
addressee is unknown at that address, it makes no sense to pursue ordinary mail 
service there because the addressee is known not to be at the address.  Civ.R. 
4.6(D) does not require an exercise in futility.  Instead, the Civil Rules authorize 
service of notice by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
county in which the action is pending. 
{¶ 40} The resort to publication service requires the filing of an affidavit 
that avers that the party or his counsel exercised “reasonable diligence” to 
ascertain the address of the person to be served.  Juv.R. 16(A).  See also Civ.R. 
4.4(A)(1).  Service by publication cannot substitute for exercising reasonable 
diligence in ascertaining the current address of the person.  This case must be 
analyzed by focusing on the reasonable diligence expended by MCCS to ascertain 
Crawford’s address. 
{¶ 41} This court previously considered reasonable diligence under Civ.R. 
4.4(A) in Sizemore v. Smith, 6 Ohio St.3d 330, 6 OBR 387, 453 N.E.2d 632. 1  
There, we emphasized that “what constitutes reasonable diligence will depend on 
the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”  Id. at 332, 6 OBR 387, 453 
N.E.2d 632.  We further stated that “[r]easonable diligence requires taking steps 
which an individual of ordinary prudence would reasonably expect to be 
successful in locating a defendant’s address.”  Id. 
{¶ 42} In Sizemore, we gave examples of some steps that could be 
undertaken in the typical exercise of reasonable diligence, but we commented, 
                                                          
 
1.  Sizemore was not an appeal from a juvenile court’s decision, so Juv.R. 16 was not at issue in 
that case.  However, because Juv.R. 16(A)’s relevant provisions on service by publication parallel 
the pertinent provisions of Civ.R. 4.4(A) analyzed in Sizemore, this court’s discussion of 
reasonable diligence in Sizemore is fully applicable here. 
January Term, 2007 
13 
“These examples do not constitute a mandatory checklist.  Rather, they exemplify 
that reasonable diligence requires” the use of “common and readily available 
sources” in the search.  Id. 
{¶ 43} The resolution of this case depends on whether MCCS exercised 
“reasonable diligence” in attempting to serve Crawford.  That inquiry requires a 
consideration of whether MCCS used reasonable diligence in attempting to 
ascertain Crawford’s current address, not simply whether the proper method of 
service was used.  See id., 6 Ohio St.3d at 331, 6 OBR 387, 453 N.E.2d 632.  The 
court of appeals did not focus on whether MCCS exercised reasonable diligence 
in ascertaining Crawford’s address based on a consideration of all relevant facts 
and circumstances as required by Sizemore.  Instead, it limited its inquiry to 
whether service by ordinary mail to the Columbus address was required under 
Civ.R. 4.6(D).  This approach unjustifiably concentrated on one small factor and 
abandoned the larger inquiry. 
{¶ 44} It is apparent that a failed attempt at service indicated by certified 
mail returned marked “Attempted Not Known” is different from a failed attempt 
at service indicated by certified mail returned marked “unclaimed.”  Although 
Civ.R. 4.6(D) specifies the procedures to be followed when “unclaimed” certified 
mail is involved, it is not at all clear that those same procedures come into play 
when certified mail is returned marked “Attempted Not Known.”  In part, this is 
because that phrase is not used within the civil rule and is ambiguous in this 
situation.2  I therefore conclude that Civ.R. 4.6(D) did not necessarily mandate 
                                                          
 
2.  Other courts have encountered the term “attempted not known,” but there does not appear to be 
a consensus on a specific meaning.  See, e.g., Jefferson Cty. Treasurer v. Brown, Jefferson Cty. 
App. No. 04 JE 30, 2005-Ohio-2933, ¶ 30 (suggestion that “attempted not known” means an 
attempted delivery but the named recipient was not present); Adams v. Commr. of Internal 
Revenue (T.C.1994), 1994 WL 397318, *2 (“the notation ‘Returned to Sender, Attempted, Not 
Known’ means that the Postal Service carrier attempted delivery and was told at the point of 
delivery that the addressee did not live there”).  
 
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14 
ordinary mail service in this situation, and so agree with the majority on that 
point.3   
{¶ 45} This case involves the termination of parental rights, and therefore 
a comprehensive consideration of whether MCCS established reasonable 
diligence is especially appropriate here.  Because the court of appeals did not 
conduct such an inquiry, its judgment is incomplete.  The proper course at this 
point is to vacate that judgment and remand the cause to the court of appeals for a 
full consideration of all facts and circumstances in accordance with Sizemore. 
II 
{¶ 46} Although there are a large number of competing concerns that I 
believe should be considered and addressed by the court of appeals, there are 
three critical facts in the record that I believe warrant special attention. 
{¶ 47} First, when service regarding the first hearing, which was 
scheduled to occur on January 15, 2003, was attempted on Crawford at his 
mother’s house in Dayton, his mother accepted service on his behalf on December 
28, 2002.  The summons’s return-of-service form bore the typewritten statement 
that “residential service” was made “upon ____________ by leaving a copy of the 
summons and accompanying document(s) at his/her usual place of residence.”  
On the blank line within the statement, “Iler Crawford” had been printed by hand. 
{¶ 48} Second, after a new complaint was filed and the case was assigned 
a new case number, a hearing was scheduled for April 14, 2003.  Service 
regarding that hearing was attempted on Crawford at the same house in Dayton in 
March 2003.  At the bottom of the identical return-of-service form, the process 
                                                          
 
3.  The attempted service by certified mail on Crawford at the Columbus address was an attempt to 
obtain service after the publication of notice had already occurred in Dayton and thus could be 
viewed as merely an after-the-fact attempt to cure earlier deficient efforts at service.  It is not an 
extremely important fact in the overall efforts to obtain service.  In focusing extensively on a 
possible follow-up attempt at service at the Columbus address by ordinary mail, the court of 
appeals placed undue emphasis on a fact that may not have any import. 
January Term, 2007 
15 
server wrote that he was unable to serve Crawford because Crawford “had not 
lived at [that] address for almost a year.”  (Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 49} Third, the “reasonable diligence” affidavit filed by MCCS on 
March 13, 2003, which was to support the resort to service by publication, 
detailed that Crawford’s residence was unknown and that his last known 
addresses were one in Columbus (the address at which certified mail service was 
later attempted) and his mother’s address in Dayton. 
{¶ 50} The affidavit also stated that MCCS checked criminal databases 
(CRIS-E, Prison Locator; Montgomery County Jail; Ohio Defender Database) in a 
“diligent search”; that letters had been sent to the Columbus address but that they 
had been returned; that service was “made residential” under the case number for 
the first hearing, “as service was accepted by” Crawford’s mother; that after the 
complaint was refiled, service was again attempted at the mother’s address but 
that “[t]he process server was told that the father has not lived at that address in a 
year”; that contact was attempted with family members at the mother’s address 
but that no response was received; and that “MCCS knows of no other addresses 
for the legal father.”  The affidavit concluded, “The residence of the legal father 
cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence and service should be made by 
publication as provided by law.” 
{¶ 51} Despite MCCS’s assertion that reasonable diligence was 
established, an examination of the three facts noted above reveals that that 
fundamental assumption could be erroneous. 
{¶ 52} The note on the March summons’s return of service indicating that 
Crawford had not lived at his mother’s house “for almost a year” directly 
contradicts the language on the December summons’s return of service that 
indicated that his mother’s address was Crawford’s “usual place of residence.”  In 
addition, as clarified by the statement of the process server regarding the March 
service attempt, it appears that the December service attempt had not been 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
“successful” after all.  And if the December service attempt was not successful, 
then there would be no reason to expect success in the March service attempt. 
{¶ 53} Arguably, the contradictions suggested by the service record and 
the reasonable-diligence affidavit should have alerted MCCS of the need to 
conduct a new “diligent search.”  The process server’s notes about the lack of 
success in serving Crawford in Dayton established that that address was not 
correct.  Several letters (apparently by ordinary mail) had been sent to the 
Columbus address and had been returned by the post office.  MCCS attempted to 
achieve service by certified mail at the Columbus address only in an after-the-fact 
effort that commenced after notice by publication in Dayton had occurred.  
Clearly, MCCS did not believe that the Columbus address was a likely one for 
Crawford.  And evidently, MCCS did not find Crawford in any criminal database 
that would have shown him to be in state custody.  Thus, Crawford was at another 
address. 
{¶ 54} It is not for this court to conduct its own consideration of the full 
record to determine whether MCCS acted with reasonable diligence in 
ascertaining Crawford’s address.  That is a review that should be conducted by the 
court of appeals.  The considerations cited are solely to illustrate that the inquiry 
is a fact-intensive one that cannot be resolved simply by addressing one specific 
concern. 
III 
{¶ 55} The majority opinion pays lip service to the due process concerns 
that are implicated in this case by recognizing that parents (even those, such as 
Crawford, who make no attempt to fulfill their parental responsibilities) must be 
afforded a high level of both procedural and substantive protections.  Because 
service by publication is a service method of last resort that frequently fails to 
provide a party actual notice of impending proceedings, heightened scrutiny of 
that service method is especially important in parental-rights cases.  But 
January Term, 2007 
17 
heightened scrutiny can be achieved only if clear standards are set and are applied 
in evaluating the validity of service on a particular person in a particular situation.  
Furthermore, when a reviewing court assesses a trial court’s conclusion that 
service by publication was proper, the reviewing court should apply the same 
standards, and should not defer to the trial court’s conclusion. 
{¶ 56} I would take advantage of the opportunity presented by this case to 
hold that when parental rights are at stake, a reviewing court has a duty to conduct 
a de novo analysis of the validity of service.  I would hold that this analysis 
should be done even when, as here, the service issues are presented to the court of 
appeals in a somewhat limited form and the parent has shown no interest in the 
child. 
{¶ 57} In determining that service by publication was adequate in this 
case, the magistrate and trial court considered some of the factors discussed in 
Sizemore, but neither cited any rules, statutes, or case law as standards to guide 
their considerations.  In reviewing the conclusion that service was proper, the 
court of appeals recognized a heightened duty to thoroughly examine the situation 
in light of the entire record, commenting that “parental rights are fundamental, 
and may not be terminated without due process.” 
{¶ 58} As explained above, I agree with the majority that the court of 
appeals incorrectly reversed the trial court’s judgment on Civ.R. 4.6(D) grounds.  
However, because I believe that the court of appeals truncated its analysis by 
focusing on the specifics of Civ.R. 4.6(D) and then stopping once it determined 
that that rule had not been complied with, I disagree with the majority’s decision 
to simply reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial 
court’s determination that service was proper.  I would remand the cause to the 
court of appeals to complete its analysis. 
{¶ 59} For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the judgment of the court 
of appeals and remand this cause to that court for consideration whether, in light 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
of all the relevant facts and circumstances, MCCS met its burden of establishing 
that it exercised “reasonable diligence” under the standards discussed in Sizemore. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Jennifer B. Frederick, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
D.K. Wehner, for appellee. 
______________________