Case Title: Coulter v. City of Rawlins

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5764

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Coulter v. City of Rawlins1983 WY 40662 P.2d 888Case Number: 5764Case Number: 5764Decided: 04/19/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
MILTON L. COULTER, D/B/A 
STAGE COACH APARTMENTS, A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, APPELLANT 
(PLAINTIFF),

v.

THE CITY OF RAWLINS, GLEN 
WOODBURY, MAYOR, DOUG SMITH, PAULINE GONZALES, DEBARI MARTINEZ, JAY GRABOW, 
HARLAN PATCHEN AND DONALD G. COMEAUX, AS MEMBERS OF THE CITY COUNCIL, CITY OF 
RAWLINS, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). No. 5764

Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Robert A. Hill, J.

Edwin H. 
Whitehead of Urbigkit & Whitehead, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

Rebecca H. 
Noecker of Johnson, MacPherson & Noecker, Rawlins, for appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

ROSE, Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal involves 
important questions regarding the power of Wyoming municipalities to charge developers 
fees for connecting their property to water and sewer lines, as well as the 
power to require dedication of land or payments in lieu of dedication for parks 
and recreational purposes. Specifically, we are asked to rule on the validity of 
several ordinances adopted by the City Council of the City of Rawlins requiring 
appellant to pay fees for the privilege of connecting his development to the 
sewer and water system, and one ordinance requiring the appellant to remit to 
the City a sum in lieu of dedicating a portion of his property for the 
establishment of a park.

[¶2.]     An action was brought 
by the appellant challenging the authority of the City to enact and enforce the 
above ordinances. The district court upheld each of the challenged ordinances 
and, pursuant to a contract entered into by the parties, awarded the City such 
attorney's fees as were associated with the defense of the action. In response 
to an adverse ruling, appellant appeals to this court and raises the following 
issues for our review:

"1. Did the Trial Court 
err in finding that the City of Rawlins, in enacting ordinances prescribing 
fees, was acting within power granted it by the Legislature?

"2. Did the Trial Court 
err in finding that the water and sewer connection fees and the money exacted in 
lieu of park-land dedication were constitutional, pursuant to powers expressly 
granted by the Legislature, and proportionate to the burden put upon the 
facilities of the City by Appellant's apartment complex?

"3. Did the Trial Court 
err in finding that Appellant, by signing an agreement wherein he, as owner, 
agreed to reimburse the City for all administrative costs and expenses incurred 
by the City in the acquisition, construction and equipping of a housing project 
for low income persons, had left himself liable for attorney's fees and costs in 
challenging the constitutionality of the fees imposed by the City and paid by 
Appellant under protest?"

[¶3.]     Appellant's position is 
that the City of Rawlins is without statutory or constitutional 
authority to enact the challenged ordinances. This argument is premised upon the 
belief that each of the questioned fees must be characterized as either a tax or 
assessment and, as such, the City is without authority to burden appellant's 
property for taxation or assessment purposes.

[¶4.]     The City of Rawlins responds by 
asserting that the charges levied are not taxes or assessments but are such fees 
or charges as the City may require appellant to pay before developing his 
property. The City also contends that the challenged ordinances were adopted in 
compliance with the authority vested in the City Council by the constitution and 
statutes of the state of Wyoming.

[¶5.]     We agree with the 
position expressed by the City of Rawlins relative to its authority to adopt the 
challenged ordinances, but we find no authority for the award of attorney's 
fees. We will therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.

FACTS

[¶6.]     In 1980, appellant 
Milton Coulter developed a 96-unit low-income housing project in the City of 
Rawlins, Wyoming. This development is known as the 
Stage Coach Apartments, which is also the name of a limited partnership in which 
appellant is the only general partner.

[¶7.]     With the onslaught of 
energy development in Wyoming during the 1970's, the population of 
Rawlins increased substantially and projections indicate that by 1990 the City's 
total number of inhabitants will increase 148% over the 1970 population. In 
response to these projections, the City Council reasoned that the demand for 
City services such as water, sewer and park facilities would also increase and 
that there was a need to offset the projected impact. According to a plan 
developed by the City, it was estimated that approximately $36,000,000 in 
capital improvements would be needed to expand the sewer and water system in 
order to meet the 1990 population estimate.

THE 
ORDINANCES

[¶8.]     On January 21 and 14, 
respectively, the City Council of the City of Rawlins adopted Ordinance No. 
1B-80 requiring water service connection fees and Ordinance No. 1-80 requiring 
fees for tapping into the City's sewer system. Ordinance No. 1B-80 
provides:

"BE IT ORDAINED by the 
City Council of the City of Rawlins, Wyoming:

"Section 1. Sec. 28-13 of 
the Code of Ordinances of the City of Rawlins is hereby repealed and Sec. 28-13 is 
hereby re-enacted to read as follows:

"Sec. 28-13. Water 
Service connection fees.

"a. A service connection 
fee shall be charged for each tap on the City of Rawlins' water system, in 
accordance with the following schedule:

"Service 
Connection                                                                                     
Minimum Service 

Size                                                                                                    
Connection Fee

3/4"                                                                                                                 
$ 1,000 

1 "                                                                                                                   
1,800 

1 1/2"                                                                                                              
4,000 

2 "                                                                                                                   
7,100 

3 "                                                                                                                   
16,000 

4 "                                                                                                                   
28,450

"b. Service connection 
fees for multiple unit residential construction shall be computed at $1,000 for 
each living unit. In no event, shall the service connection fee ever be less 
than the minimum specified herein.

"c. Service connection 
fees for temporary facilities shall be computed at 25 percent of the normal 
minimum service connection fee for each year or portion of a year that the 
temporary facility is expected to be in existence.

"d. All service 
connections larger than three-fourths inch shall be uniform size from the 
service line tap to the building structure or structures. The Building Official 
shall reserve the right to require a larger service connection to any building, 
structure, or development if the water requirements through such service 
connection may, under normal operation, cause a velocity of ten feet per second 
as specified in the Uniform Plumbing Code, through such service 
connection.

"e. Whenever it is 
necessary to install a water service connection in advance of street 
construction and prior to actual need of a water service, the service connection 
fee shall be due and payable at the time the water meter is requested, or a 
building permit is applied for, whichever comes first. The service connection 
fee shall be calculated on the basis of service connection fees in effect as of 
the date of such request for water meter or application for building 
permit.

"f. Wherever, in the 
opinion of the Water Superintendent or his duly designated representative, a 
reduced pressure backflow preventer is required to eliminate contamination of 
the public water supply through a specified service connection, such backflow 
preventer of a type and design approved by the Water Superintendent shall be 
furnished and installed in accordance with the City specifications.

"g. Fees for taps for 
private fire protection facilities shall be charged in accordance with the 
following schedule provided, however, that any water service connections tapped 
to said distribution line extension or private fire protection facility shall be 
charged for at the applicable rates herein specified.

"TAP SIZE                             
MAIN LINE SIZE                                
TAP CHARGE

4" or less                                
6" through 12"                                                
$ 500.00 

4" or less                                
16" through 24"                                             
650.00 

4" or less                                
Over 24"                                             
750.00 

6"                    
                        
6" through 12"                                                
750.00 

6"                                            
16" through 24"                                             
900.00 

6"                                            
Over 24"                                             
1,100.00 

8"                                            
8" through 12"                                                
850.00 

8"                                            
16" through 24"                                             
1,100.00 

8"                                            
Over 24"                                             
1,250.00 

12"                                          
12"                                                      
1,200.00 

12"                                          
16" through 24"                                             
1,400.00 

12"                                          
Over 24"                                             
1,600.00

"h. Construction 
Responsibility: The City shall, at its expense, make the physical tap on the 
water main and furnish and install the water meter, and the applicant for the 
water service connection shall, at his sole expense, provide the trench, service 
line pipe, conduit for remote reader units where required, pressure reducing 
valves where required, backflow preventer where required, and shall install same 
and backfill trench, all in accordance with the specification of the City of 
Rawlins. 

"i. To defray the cost of 
meters and their installations, the following surcharges shall be added to the 
connection fees:

"1. For service with a 
3/4" X 5/8" meter, the sum 125 dollars for the meter and meter yoke plus 125 
dollars for the meter pit and cover if the meter is located in a pit or vault, 
plus 150 dollars for pit excavation and backfill, if not provided by the 
owner.

"2. For service with a 
3/4" meter, the sum of 155 dollars for the meter and meter yoke plus 125 dollars 
for the meter pit and cover if the meter is located in a pit or vault, plus 150 
dollars for pit excavation and backfill if not provided by the 
owner.

"3. For service with a 1" 
meter, the sum of 205 dollars for the meter and meter yoke plus 125 dollars for 
the meter pit and cover if the meter is located in a pit or vault, plus 150 
dollars for pit excavation and backfill, if not provided by the 
owner.

"4. For services with 
meters larger than one inch, the actual cost of labor, materials and 
equipment.

"5. For all meters on 
fire protection lines, the actual cost of labor, materials and 
equipment.

"j. All water service 
connection fees and private fire protection tap fees, upon delivery to the City 
Treasurer, shall be deposited to the credit of a water development fund, to be 
made available for the purpose of paying water development debts service 
only."

Ordinance No. 
1-80 provided:

"BE IT ORDAINED by the 
City Council of the City of Rawlins, Wyoming:

"Section 1. Sec. 28-42 of 
the Code of Ordinances of the City of Rawlins is hereby repealed and Sec. 28-42 is 
hereby reenacted to read as follows:

"Sec. 28-42. Sanitary 
sewer tapping fees.

"Sewer development fees: 
A sanitary sewer development fee for the privilege of tapping or connecting to 
the sanitary sewer system of the City of Rawlins, Wyoming, is hereby established 
and imposed, which shall be paid prior to physical connection or the authorizing 
of construction of any sanitary waste system tying into the City owned sanitary 
sewerage system, which sewer development fee shall be as follows:

"a. On all multiple 
family units, condominiums, townhomes, mobile home parks, or any other multiple 
family dwellings, by whatever description or name, except hotels and motels, 
there shall be charged a sewer development fee of 750 dollars per living 
unit.

"b. On all commercial 
buildings, office buildings, hotels, motels, and business buildings of every 
description, there shall be a sewer development fee of 750 dollars for the first 
toilet or urinal, plus 200 dollars for each additional toilet and/or urinal in 
excess of one. Any structure having as its principal or accessory use a facility 
that would require a high rate of sewage discharge to the sanitary sewer shall 
pay a fee to be negotiated by contract and shall bear a reasonable relationship 
to the size of the water service and the average rate of discharge for a single 
family dwelling.

"c. On all single family 
dwelling units there shall be charged a sanitary sewer development fee of 750 
dollars.

"d. Sewer development 
fees for temporary facilities shall be computed at 25 percent of the normal 
minimum sewer development fee for each year or portion of a year that the 
temporary facility is expected to be in existence.

"e. Whenever it is 
necessary to install a sewer tap in advance of street construction and prior to 
actual need of a sewer service, the sewer development fee shall be due and 
payable at the same time the water service connection fee becomes due or at the 
time a building permit is applied for, whichever comes first. The fee shall be 
calculated on the basis of sewer development fees in effect as of the date such 
fees becomes due.

"f. All sewer development 
fees, upon delivery to the City Treasurer, shall be deposited to the credit of a 
sewer development fund, to be made available for the purpose of paying sewer 
development debts service."

[¶9.]     In July of 1980, the 
City Council enacted Ordinance No. 7-80 providing for dedication of land for 
parks and open spaces in new residential subdivisions, or, at the City's option, 
a money payment in lieu of land. The provisions of this ordinance 
read:

"BE IT RESOLVED BY THE 
GOVERNING BODY OF THE CITY OF RAWLINS:

"§ 1. That § 30-66 of the 
Code of Ordinances, City of Rawlins, is hereby 
repealed and a new § 30-66 of the Code of Ordinances, City of Rawlins, is enacted to 
read as follows:

"§ 30-66 - PARKS, 
RECREATIONAL SITES AND OTHER PUBLIC PLACES.

"a. All residential 
subdivisions shall provide for public parks and recreational sites by dedication 
of land in accordance with these regulations. Subject to the approval of the 
Planning Commission, dedication of such sites and land areas to the City or at 
the option of the City and in lieu thereof, the subdividers may make a payment 
to the City of a sum of money equal to the value of the land which would 
otherwise be dedicated to the City. The value of the land to be dedicated shall 
be determined on the basis of full and fair market value of the raw land. The 
term `raw land' means land without any improvements such as water and sewer 
lines, paving, curb and gutter, etc. Fair market values of the raw land shall be 
determined as of the time of filing the preliminary plat. Any such sums, when 
required, shall be held by the City for the acquisition and improvement of such 
sites and land areas. Provision of land areas for parks and recreational sites 
shall be at the rate of six acres per 1,000 persons in the subdivision. 
Dedication of such sites and land areas shall be made at the time of final 
platting in one or any combination of the following ways:

"1. By dedicating to the 
City of Rawlins 
on the final plat.

"2. By granting the land 
areas in fee simple or general warranty deed to the City.

"b. Suitability of Land. 
Any land to be dedicated as a requirement of this section shall be reasonably 
adaptable for use of active park and recreational purposes and shall be at a 
location convenient to the people to be served. Factors used in evaluating the 
adequacy of the proposed park and recreation areas shall include size and shape, 
topography, geology, tree cover, access, and location.

"c. The number of persons 
that is generated by particular land uses or zone districts within a subdivision 
for purposes of calculating the amount of land area provision for parks and 
recreation areas shall be based on the following calculations:

"TYPE OF USE                                                                     
PERSONS PER 

DWELLING UNIT

Single-Family 
Dwellings                                                                   
4.0

Apartments, 
duplexes and all 

dwelling units 
having two bed-

rooms                                                                                                             
3.2

All dwelling 
units having one 

bedroom, 
including apart-

ments, 
condominiums, etc.                                                              
2.5

Dwelling units 
for the aged,

nursing homes, 
buffet-type 

apartment units 
with no bedrooms, etc.                                                      
1.5

Bunkhouses, 
dormitories, etc., 

per bedroom, 
etc.                                                                             
1.0

Mobile Homes                                                                                               
4.0

"d. Where it is 
determined that a greater amount of land is required for parks and open spaces 
to meet the Master Plan requirements for that area of the City, or where it is 
determined that land is required for any other type of public facilities, the 
subdivider at the time of filing the final plat with the Planning Commission 
must offer to sell at a fair market price to the City, within one year 
immediately following the recording of the final plat, any land required to be 
dedicated in accordance with § 30-36a. If any such proposed public areas have 
not been purchased by the City within one year after the recording of the final 
plat, such areas may be subdivided into lots and blocks in accordance with the 
requirements of this Ordinance.

"e. Whenever cash in lieu 
of land dedication is required for parks and recreation sites, the fair market 
value of the raw land shall be determined by mutual agreement between the 
subdivider and the City Council. In the event of inability of any of the above 
parties to agree on a fair market value of the sites, an independent party being 
a qualified appraiser, shall be selected by mutual agreement of the disagreeing 
parties. Said independent party's findings on fair market value of the site 
shall be final and binding on all parties. A qualified appraiser shall be a 
member of the Appraisal Institute (M.A.I.) or an Accredited Rural Appraisal 
(A.R.A.). The developer shall pay the cost of said appraiser.

"f. Payments made under 
the requirements of this section shall be made payable to the City of Rawlins. The City Council 
shall receive such funds at the time of the final plat approval and deposit them 
with the City Treasurer, who shall in turn deposit such funds in the City 
approved and designated financial institution within the City. Such funds shall 
be deposited to special interest bearing escrow accounts. The status of these 
accounts shall be reported annually to the City Council and shall be made 
available to the Parks and Recreation Board and the general public. Funds may be 
withdrawn from the special escrow accounts by the City Council, for the specific 
purposes of acquiring lands for park and recreation sites respectively and of 
making improvements to the sites."

[¶10.]  These water and sewer ordinances had as 
their purpose the development of special funds for use in reducing the City's 
bonded indebtedness which resulted from capital expenditure for the sewer and 
water system. Ordinance No. 7-80 was designed to create a fund for the expansion 
and maintenance of the City's park land.

[¶11.]  In compliance with these ordinances, the 
appellant remitted to the City, under protest, $240,750 in sewer and water line 
connection fees and $119,660.54 as payment in lieu of park-land 
dedication.

[¶12.]  This dispute was initiated and tried upon 
appellant's complaint which sought a declaratory judgment to the effect that the 
ordinances were unlawful in that they had been adopted without authority of the 
laws of the state of Wyoming which pertain to 
the legislative powers of governing bodies of Wyoming municipalities. The trial judge held 
that all of the challenged ordinances were adopted pursuant to and in accordance 
with the powers vested in the City Council of the City of Rawlins by the legislature 
and that all of the fees were reasonable and rationally related to the 
legitimate governmental purpose they were designed to further.

[¶13.]  The issue which we are asked to address 
is whether or not the City of Rawlins was empowered by the Wyoming 
Constitution and various statutes to enact and enforce the three ordinances in 
question.1 We first address the ordinances 
requiring the sewer and water connection fees and will then address the 
park-land dedication ordinance in a separate section.

GENERAL 
CONSIDERATIONS

[¶14.]  Before reviewing and discussing the 
various statutory provisions which we consider applicable to the facts of this 
appeal, it is necessary to review some general principles of law regarding the 
powers of a municipal corporation to legislate.

[¶15.]  It is settled that municipal corporations 
are creatures of the legislature and thereby subject to statutory control. 2 
McQuillin Mun Corp (3d Ed), § 4.03, p. 8; Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Rawlins, 
Wyo., 510 P.2d 301 (1973). Thus, the legislature, except 
as limited by the Wyoming Constitution, may confer on municipal corporations 
such authority as it considers proper, and municipalities can exercise only 
those powers which are expressly or impliedly conferred. 2 McQuillin, supra, §§ 
10.08 and 10.09, p. 755; City of Buffalo v. Joslyn, Wyo., 527 P.2d 1106 (1974); Scarlett v. Town 
Council, Town of Jackson, Teton County, Wyo., 463 P.2d 26 (1969); 
May v. City of Laramie, 58 Wyo. 240, 
131 P.2d 300 (1942); Edwards v. City of 
Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 111, 114 P. 677 (1911). We have recognized in the 
past that the powers of a municipality are not necessarily limited to those 
expressly conferred but that a municipality may also exercise powers fairly and 
necessarily implied from the grant contained in the statute or constitutional 
provision. Whipps v. Town of Greybull, 56 Wyo. 355, 109 P.2d 805, 146 A.L.R. 596 (1941). 
McQuillin discusses these implied or inherent powers as follows:

"* * * [I]t is beyond 
dispute that municipal corporations possess certain implied, sometimes referred 
to as incidental, powers * * *. Such implied powers include, and are generally 
held to be limited to, the following:

"1. Powers necessarily 
arising from those expressly granted, and also those reasonably inferred from 
the powers expressly granted.

"2. Powers essential to give effect to 
powers expressly granted.

"The municipal 
corporation may adopt or employ devices, agencies, instrumentalities, or other 
means for the purpose of carrying out powers expressly conferred on it, although 
the particular means adopted is not expressly authorized. The corporation 
cannot, however, under this rule enlarge or extend the power expressly granted." 
(Footnotes omitted and emphasis added.) 2 McQuillin, supra, § 10.12, p. 
768.

[¶16.]  The parties to this appeal have also 
drawn into question the effect of the home-rule amendment to the Wyoming 
Constitution.2 Appellant argues that such 
amendment has no bearing on this case or the rules of law discussed above, since 
the disputed ordinances provide for fees, charges or taxes - items which are 
still subject to legislative control by the express terms of the amendment, n. 
2, supra. Appellee-City, on the other hand, says that this addition to the 
Wyoming Constitution has the effect of granting the City of Rawlins full control over 
its "local affairs" and therefore the above-discussed rules of law are for the 
most part inapplicable. We are of the opinion that our decision in "Laramie 
Citizens for Good Government" v. City 
of Laramie, Wyo., 
617 P.2d 474 (1980), requires us to decide this secondary issue in favor of 
appellant.

[¶17.]  In the last above-cited opinion we noted 
that, although the home-rule amendment (Art. 13, § 1(b) of the Wyoming 
Constitution) empowered the City of Laramie to control and determine local 
affairs, certain areas of municipal authority remained subject to legislative 
control, including the "levying of taxes, excises, fees, or any other charges." 
617 P.2d  at 483. As in "Laramie Citizens for Good Government" v. City of 
Laramie, supra, we see the home-rule amendment as having minimal impact on the 
resolution of the question of the power of the City of Rawlins to adopt the 
ordinances in issue here. We say this because, under the specific language of 
Art. 13, § 1(b) of the Wyoming Constitution, this case involves an area of 
municipal power that remains subject to express legislative control. See: Art. 
13, § 1(b), supra n. 2. Having arrived at this conclusion, we regard the 
previously discussed general rules of law as applicable in all 
respects.

THE SEWER AND WATER 
CONNECTION FEES

[¶18.]  As we have said, the thrust of 
appellant's argument in this appeal is that the City of Rawlins is without any 
statutory authority to adopt the questioned ordinances because the power of 
Rawlins to levy taxes or assessments does not include the power to require 
hook-up fees. The City responds by urging that the relevant statutory provisions 
pertaining to municipal sewer and water services clearly empower the adoption of 
both Ordinance No. 1-80 and Ordinance No. 1B-80. In order to resolve the 
question, a review of the statutory provisions is necessary.

THE STATUTES3

[¶19.]  In § 15-1-103(a), W.S. 1977 (1980 
Replacement), the following general powers of cities and towns are set 
out:

"(a) The governing bodies 
of all cities and towns may:

* * * * * *

"(ix) Levy and collect 
special assessments against persons or property to the extent allowed by the 
constitution and the law;

* * * * * *

"(xxx) Divide the city 
into suitable districts for establishing a system of drainage, sanitary sewers 
and water mains and:

"(A) Provide and regulate the construction, 
repair and use of sewers and drains;

"(B) Provide penalties 
for violations of regulations;

"(C) Assess against the 
property concerned any penalty or costs and expenses in compliance with 
regulations;

"(xxxi) Take any action to establish, alter and 
regulate as deemed necessary the channels of streams, water courses and any other public water sources or 
supplies within the city; * * *" (Emphasis added.)

[¶20.]  By these statutory provisions, the 
legislature has expressly conferred upon the City Council of the City of Rawlins 
not only the power to levy and collect special assessments, but also the 
separate power to "provide and regulate" for a system of sewers and to take "any 
action to establish, alter and regulate as deemed necessary" a public water 
supply. There is no suggestion in the statute that the powers to provide sewer 
and water systems is conditioned by the power to levy and collect special 
assessments.

[¶21.]  Wyoming municipalities have also been 
vested with powers to enact and enforce zoning regulations, with said 
regulations being designed to:

"(A) Lessen congestion in 
the streets;

"(B) Secure safety from 
fire, panic and other dangers;

"(C) Promote health and 
general welfare;

"(D) Provide adequate 
light and air;

"(E) Prevent the 
overcrowding of land;

"(F) Avoid undue 
concentration of population; and

"(G) Facilitate adequate 
provisions for transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public 
requirements." (Emphasis added.) § 15-1-601(d)(i), W.S. 1977 (1980 
Replacement).

In addition to 
the above provisions, § 15-7-101, W.S. 1977 (1980 Replacement) reiterates the 
comprehensive powers of municipalities to construct, maintain and provide sewer 
and water facilities for their inhabitants. The language of the pertinent 
subdivisions is: 

"(a) In addition to all 
other powers provided by law, any city or town may make public improvements as 
follows for which bonds may be issued to the contractor or be sold as provided 
in this chapter to:

* * * * * *

"(ii) Establish, construct, purchase, extend, 
maintain and regulate a system of water works, for the purpose of supplying 
water for extinguishing fires and for domestic, manufacturing and other 
purposes. To carry out this power, or to prevent pollution or injury to the 
streams, springs or source of supply of its water works, ditches or reservoirs, 
any city or town may go beyond its corporate limits to take, hold and acquire 
property by purchase or otherwise and may take and condemn all necessary land 
and property in the manner provided for the condemnation of real estate by 
railroad companies. Jurisdiction of a city or town shall extend up and along the 
stream or source of supply for the entire distance occupied by such water works, 
ditches or reservoirs. Cities or towns may enact ordinances and make all 
necessary rules and regulations for the government and protection of their water 
works, ditches and reservoirs, and fix water rates and provide for their 
collection. All water rent collected except the amount required to pay the 
expense of maintaining, extending and improving the water works, shall become a 
part of the water bond fund, and be applied only to the payment of the principal 
and interest of the bonds issued for the construction, purchase, maintaining or 
extension of the water works;

"(iii) Take any action necessary to establish, 
purchase, extend, maintain and regulate a water system for supplying water 
to its inhabitants and for any other public purposes, including:

"(A) Condemnation of 
property;

"(B) Prescribing and 
regulating of rates for the use of water; and

"(C) Enacting ordinances 
for their enforcement and collection.

"(iv) Establish, construct, purchase, extend, 
maintain and regulate a system of sewerage;" (Emphasis added.)

Similar powers 
are again expressed in § 15-7-502(a)(i), W.S. 1977 (1980 
Replacement):

"(a) Any city or town 
may:

"(i) Construct, 
reconstruct, improve and extend, or acquire, improve, extend and operate a 
sewerage system, within or without its corporate limits and may apply for and 
accept loans or grants or any other aid from the United States of America or any 
agency or instrumentality thereof under any federal law to aid in the prevention 
and abatement of water pollution, or may borrow money from any other 
source;"

With respect to 
revenues derived from operation of a sewerage system the legislature goes on to 
provide:

"(a) All revenues derived 
from the operation of the sewerage system shall be set aside as collected and 
deposited in a special fund to be used only for:

"(i) Paying the cost of 
operating and maintaining the system;

"(ii) Providing an 
adequate depreciation fund; and

"(iii) Paying the 
principal and interest on the bonds issued under this article." § 15-7-507(a), 
W.S. 1977 (1980 Replacement).

[¶22.]  Municipalities are also empowered to 
charge rates for services rendered by the provisions of § 15-7-508, W.S. 1977 
(1980 Replacement):

"(a) Any city or town 
borrowing money or receiving grants and improving, constructing or acquiring and 
improving a sewerage system, shall collect a charge from the users of the system 
at a rate sufficient to:

"(i) Pay the cost of 
operating and maintaining the system;

"(ii) Provide an adequate 
depreciation fund;

"(iii) Pay the principal 
and interest on the bonds issued; and

"(iv) Repay grants. 

"(b) Any city or town 
owning and operating a sewerage system constructed or acquired under the 
provisions of any law may provide by ordinance that the users of the system pay 
a service rate sufficient to pay the cost of operating and maintaining the 
system and to provide an adequate depreciation fund.

"(c) Any city or town may 
fix special rates as provided in W.S. 15-7-407."

One of the 
limitations placed on the power to collect rents or charges for the use of a 
City's water system is found in § 15-3-305(c), W.S. 1977 (1980 Replacement), 
which provides:

"(c) All water rents 
collected, except the amount required to pay the expenses of maintaining, 
extending and improving the water system of the city, shall be applied only to 
the payment of the principal and interest of the outstanding water bonds until 
full payment thereof."

[¶23.]  When we read the above statutory 
provisions together, we are convinced that the legislature has chosen to empower 
municipalities with full authority and control over public water and sewerage 
systems. The City of Rawlins is therefore not only charged with providing 
appellant sewer and water services, but it must also "construct, purchase, 
extend, maintain and regulate" those systems for the benefit of its residents. 
Section 15-7-101(a)(ii), (iii), and (iv), supra. In carrying out this municipal 
responsibility, the City of Rawlins has been empowered to take "any action 
necessary." Section 15-7-101(a)(iii), supra. Not only is the City of Rawlins 
required to provide appellant and other inhabitants of its incorporated area 
with sewer and water services, but the City must also charge the users of those 
systems in order to pay the costs associated with maintaining, operating and 
expanding them. Sections 15-7-507 and 15-7-508, supra.

[¶24.]  Notwithstanding the above-quoted 
statutory provisions, the appellant contends that the City of Rawlins is not 
empowered to charge him for connecting to the sewer and water lines, but is only 
empowered to assess against his property the costs associated with extending the 
lines to facilitate the apartment project. In arguing this point, appellant 
points to the provisions of § 15-7-512, W.S. 1977 (1980 
Replacement):

"(a) Any city or town may 
make special assessments for the construction of sewers and water mains. The 
assessments shall be made on all lots and pieces of ground to the center of the 
block, or if the sewers or water mains are constructed in an alley, then on all 
lots and pieces of ground to the nearest street or avenue on each side of the 
alley, extending along the street, avenue or alley, the distance of the 
improvement, according to the area of the lots or pieces of ground without 
regard to the buildings or improvements. The amount to be paid by each property 
holder shall be determined by dividing the expenses of the construction of the 
proposed sewer or water main among all the property holders for the benefit of 
whose property the sewer or water main is to be constructed. In the case of 
unplatted acreage within the city limits, the city or town shall consider that 
only the first seventy-five (75) feet in each direction from the sewer or water 
main is benefited and so assessed. However, if any property in an unplatted area 
is later connected to or receives service from the sewer or water main, that 
property shall be assessed its proportionate share. The amount to be assessed 
against each property holder shall be in proportion to the number of square feet 
each owns to the entire number of square feet assessed for the expense of the 
construction.

"(b) The city or town may 
adopt ordinances providing for the manner of sale, redemption and conveyance of 
lands sold for nonpayment of the special assessments."

In short, 
appellant argues that the only way for the City of Rawlins to charge him for 
sewer and water services is for the City to levy a special assessment pursuant 
to the provisions of § 15-7-512(a), supra, and that in no statute has the 
legislature expressly given the City the power to charge connection fees. In 
other words, it is appellant's position that the City of Rawlins can only fund 
the expansion of its system through the levying of special assessments and it is 
without authority to establish funds for this purpose through the collection of 
connection fees. We disagree.

[¶25.]  The question of the power of 
municipalities to levy sewer and water service connection fees, although one of 
first impression for us, has been exhaustively developed in the case law. An 
identical question was addressed in Rocky 
Hill Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Metropolitan District, 160 Conn. 446, 
280 A.2d 344, 348 (1971), and in holding for the municipality the court 
concluded:

"* * * By its charter the 
legislature made the defendant a municipal corporation, with powers to sue and 
be sued, to hold and convey any estate real or personal, and generally to do all 
acts necessary and convenient for the building, creation, and maintenance of 
sewers, sanitary systems and plants for the disposal of sewage, and the control 
and maintenance of such systems in the public highways and elsewhere throughout 
the district. Incident to the performance of these duties was the right and 
power to do those things `necessary or convenient' to accomplish these 
purposes."

The Florida 
Supreme Court has also, on several occasions, looked into the authority of a 
municipality to require payment of connection fees. In Cooksey v. Utilities Commission, Fla., 
261 So. 2d 129, 130 (1972), the court stated:

"* * * Implicit in the 
power to provide municipal services is the power to construct, maintain and 
operate the necessary facilities. The fixing of fair and reasonable rates for 
utilities services provided is an incident of the authority given by the 
Constitution and statutes to provide and maintain those services."

The Cooksey decision, supra, was followed in 
Contractors and Builders Association of 
Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, Fla., 329 So. 2d 314, cert. denied 444 U.S. 867, 100 S. Ct. 140, 62 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), although the challenged ordinance 
was struck down for the reason that it placed the burden of providing all new 
capital improvements on new users of the system. The court did, however, 
recognize the power of the City to impose connection charges on a new 
user:

"* * * In principle, 
however, we see nothing wrong with transferring to the new user of a municipally 
owned water or sewer system a fair share of the costs new use of the system 
involves." 329 So. 2d  at 317.

Connection fees, 
such as those involved in the present dispute, have been upheld by numerous 
other decisions. See: Rupp v. Grantsville 
City, Utah, 610 P.2d 338 (1980); Heinrich v. City of Moline, 59 Ill. 
App.3d 278, 16 Ill.Dec. 699, 375 N.E.2d 572 (1978); Homebuilders Association of Greater Salt 
Lake v. Provo City, 28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P.2d 451 (1972); Hayes v. City of Albany, 7 Or. App. 277, 
490 P.2d 1018 (1971); Associated 
Homebuilders of the Great East Bay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 56 Cal. 2d 847, 17 Cal. Rptr. 5, 366 P.2d 448 (1961); Western Heights Land Corporation v. City of 
Fort Collins, 146 Colo. 464, 362 P.2d 155 (1961);

[¶26.]  The same decisions that have upheld sewer 
or water connection charges have also thoroughly discussed appellant's claim 
that such charges are taxes or assessments which a City cannot validly impose. 
In Contractors and Builders Association 
of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, supra, 329 So. 2d  at 318-319, the 
court, in holding that the connection charges were not taxes, noted that the 
revenues derived were not placed in the general fund but rather they were 
earmarked for a special fund designed to develop and expand the system. The 
court also cited from Hartman v. Aurora Sanitary District, 23 Ill. 2d 109, 177 N.E.2d 214 (1961), where the Illinois Supreme Court observed that such 
connection fees had been uniformly sustained as service charges rather than a 
tax. In Rocky Hill Convalescent Hospital, 
Inc. v. Metropolitan District, supra, 280 A.2d  at 348, the court held that 
the connection fees were not assessments. The court in Hartman v. Aurora Sanitary District, 
supra, summed up the problem as follows: 

"* * * It is patent that 
the rapid expansion of our municipalities has rendered inadequate prior 
facilities developed for the health and welfare of the community. It is only 
proper that all citizens of the community should share equally in the cost of 
maintaining a sanitary plant which benefits the health and welfare of the entire 
community by the proper disposal of sewage.

* * * * * *

"We have found that such 
reasonable charges have been uniformly sustained as a service charge rather than 
a tax. [Citations.] It is our conclusion that the present statute creates a 
legitimate method of financing needed extensions of sanitary systems by means of 
a service or connection charge rather than a general tax." 177 N.E.2d  at 
218-219.

For other cases 
on this issue see: Montgomery Brothers Construction, Inc. v. City of Corvallis, 
34 Or. App. 785, 580 P.2d 190 (1964); Montgomery Brothers Construction, Inc. v. 
City of Corvallis, 34 Or. App. 785, 580 P.2d 190 (1978).4

[¶27.]  Given the above authorities, we come to 
the conclusion that the Wyoming statutory provisions previously cited grant to 
the City of Rawlins the power to levy the sewer and water connection charges 
provided by Ordinance No. 1-80 and Ordinance No. 1B-80. Although no cited 
statute specifically provides that cities and towns are authorized to charge new 
users a certain specified fee for connecting or hooking up with the sewer and 
water systems, we conclude that the authority for such ordinances as those 
enacted by the City of Rawlins, in this case, can be fairly and necessarily 
implied from the powers expressly granted in the statutes. We reject both of 
appellant's contentions, and hold that Ordinance No. 1-80 and Ordinance No. 
1B-80, adopted by the City Council of the City of Rawlins, are permissible means 
through which the City can carry out its duty to regulate, maintain, construct, 
and operate a unified water and sewer system. Such charges are earmarked for the 
specific purpose of assisting Rawlins in the payment of Rawlins' bonded 
indebtedness which has been in response to a continuing need to update its water 
and sewerage disposal system. Water and sewer line connection charges are a fair 
and reasonable means for the City to offset the impact placed on its system by 
the influx of new users. Hayes v. City of 
Albany, supra. As we noted in Antlers 
Hotel, Inc. v. Town of City of Newcastle, 80 Wyo. 294, 341 P.2d 951, 953 
(1959):

"* * * [E]very owner of 
property in a city or town is interested for sanitary purposes that a sewer 
system should be established throughout the community, and a distinct benefit 
accrues to every property owner if that is done."

The City of 
Rawlins acted within the scope of its delegated powers in adopting Ordinance No. 
1-80 and Ordinance No. 1B-80, and the charges collected from appellant 
thereunder were justifiable in all respects.

THE PARK-DEDICATION 
ORDINANCE

[¶28.]  The appellant also challenges Ordinance 
No. 7-80 providing for the dedication of park land by subdividers or, at the 
City's option, a payment of money in lieu thereof. The appellant challenges this 
ordinance on substantially the same grounds as he challenged Ordinance No. 1-80 
and Ordinance No. 1B-80. We therefore will deal with the contentions in a 
similar manner.

The Statutes

[¶29.]  As with the power to develop sewer and 
water services, the legislature in § 15-1-103(a), W.S. 1977 (1980 Replacement), 
has indicated the power of Wyoming municipalities to acquire and hold property 
for public parks. The pertinent subdivisions read:

"(xii) Sell, convey and transfer any property 
acquired or held for park purposes if the city or town has held title to the 
property for more than ten (10) years and no substantial use has been made 
thereof for park purposes provided:

* * * * * *

"(xxii) Establish and regulate parks, zoological 
gardens and recreation areas within the city limits and upon land owned, leased 
or controlled outside of the city limits provided:

"(A) The police court of 
the city or town has jurisdiction to punish any violator of the ordinances of 
the city or town governing those areas;

"(B) The state game and 
fish commission is authorized to furnish to any city or town any game or animals 
requested, and the city or town shall pay the necessary expenses;" (Emphasis 
added.)

In general 
terms, the above-quoted statute expressly provides for the power of all cities 
and towns to acquire and hold property for use as public parks with the added 
authority to "regulate" the same. This general power is reiterated in § 
15-7-101(a)(ix), W.S. 1977 (1980 Replacement), where it is stated:

"(ix) Contract for, 
purchase and hold lands and water rights and erect thereon amusement halls and 
buildings to be used for public parks and grounds for the use, benefit and 
enjoyment of the public; and

"(A) Enact ordinances, and make all necessary 
rules and regulations for the protection, maintenance and beautification of any 
park located within or without the limits of the city or town;

"(B) Establish, purchase 
and hold parks on lands outside the corporate limits, if the lands are within 
thirty (30) miles of the city or town limits;" (Emphasis added.)

[¶30.]  The legislature has also authorized 
municipalities to establish planning commissions for the purpose of formulating 
master plans for the development of the city's or town's limited land areas. 
Section 15-1-502, W.S. 1977 (1980 Replacement). This commission is then charged 
with the duty of generating a master plan and regulations which can recommend 
for instance the "development * * * character and extent * * of * * * parks." 
Section 15-1-503(a)(i), W.S. 1977 (1980 Replacement). Also, as we noted earlier, 
municipalities are vested with broad powers to enact zoning ordinances which can 
be designed to facilitate "adequate provisions for * * * parks and other public 
requirements." Section 15-1-601(d)(i)(G), supra.

[¶31.]  The appellant correctly points out that 
there is no statute upon which the City of Rawlins can rely which serves as 
express authority for the enactment of a park-land dedication ordinance, which 
also contemplates a plan for the payment of money in lieu of dedication. 
However, the statutory provisions previously set out clearly and unqualifiedly 
empower the City of Rawlins to hold and acquire property for the purpose of 
establishing parks and recreational facilities thereon. With regard to this and 
the City's power to plan, zone and regulate property development, counsel for 
the City argues that the power to adopt Ordinance No. 7-80 can be fairly and 
necessarily implied. We agree.

[¶32.]  Courts in other jurisdictions have 
struggled with park-land dedication ordinances, and the holdings in these 
decisions are far from consistent. It is fair to say, however, that a majority 
of the decisions have upheld the power of municipalities to require park-land 
dedication. Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 862. In Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 
Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), the court upheld an ordinance requiring 
park-land dedication or a fee in lieu thereof. It was reasoned that the statutes 
authorizing the formation of a planning commission were designed to facilitate 
the development of parks and therefore the power to require subdividers to 
dedicate certain portions of property for park purposes was a reasonable method 
of offsetting the burden created by the new development on existing facilities. 
The court also decided that the fee which could be charged in lieu of actual 
raw-land dedication was not a tax but rather a charge imposed on the transaction 
having to do with obtaining plat approval. This holding was followed in Brookhill Development Ltd. v. City of 
Waukesha, 99 Wis.2d 485, 299 N.W.2d 610 (1980), where the court upheld an 
ordinance requiring dedication or a fee in lieu of dedicating land for school 
purposes. Similar conclusions were reached in Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 
107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970), where a regulation requiring park-land 
dedication was upheld. The court, in that case, reasoned that the natural result 
of subdividing or new development was increasing pressure on existing facilities 
coupled with the need for new facilities, so the municipality could properly 
require a developer to offset these effects by requiring dedication of land. 264 A.2d  at 913.

[¶33.]  Some courts, however, have expressed 
concern over the ability of the municipality to require a payment in lieu of the 
dedication. This hesitation stems from the fear that courts have felt that while 
the dedication of raw land directly benefits the subdivision, the benefit 
derived as a result of a payment in lieu of dedication may be somewhat 
attenuated. As was said in Aunt Hack 
Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission of the City of Danbury, 160 Conn. 
109, 273 A.2d 880, 885 (1970):

"The test which has been 
generally applied in determining whether a requirement that a developer set 
aside land for parks and playgrounds as a prerequisite to the approval of a 
subdivision plan is whether the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically 
and uniquely attributable to his own activity. Where the requirement is uniquely 
attributable to the subdivider's activity, it has been held to be a permissible 
exercise of the police power. Billings 
Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182; Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673; Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 
Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442.

"The cases just cited 
hold that a requirement that the developer dedicate open space to the public is 
valid on the ground that the burden imposed on him is uniquely attributable to 
his own activity because the increase in population in the area which will 
result from that activity is productive of the need for open space. It is to be 
noted that in both the Jenad and Jordan cases the court also sustained a 
requirement that the developer pay a sum of money to the municipality as an 
alternative to providing open space. Other jurisdictions have frowned upon a 
requirement that a subdivider make a cash payment in lieu of providing land for 
parks or open space. In Haugen v. 
Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 359 P.2d 108, the basis of the decision was that the 
required fee was not limited to the direct benefit of the particular 
subdivision. Still other cases have held the requirement imposed by the 
regulation to be invalid on the ground that it was beyond the scope of the 
enabling statute. Coronado Development 
Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51; Gordon v. Village of Wayne, 370 Mich. 
329, 121 N.W.2d 823. All of the cases from other jurisdictions to which we have 
alluded are clearly distinguishable from both the statute and the regulation 
with which we are concerned. Neither the statute nor the regulation here 
involved goes as far as those involved in any of the cases referred to, because 
they do no more than provide that a developer may be required to set aside a 
park or playground area in his proposed subdivision."

As the quoted 
portion notes, the courts, in the previously cited Jordan case and in Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 
N Y2d 78, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966), upheld ordinances providing 
for dedication of land or payments in lieu thereof. The California Supreme Court 
reached the same conclusions in Associated Home Builders of the Greater East 
Bay, Incorporated v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 
484 P.2d 606 (1971). There the court, in citing its decision in Ayres v. City Council of City of Los 
Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1, 11 A.L.R.2d 503 (1949), noted that it was 
not imperative that the dedication requirement benefit the new development 
alone, and it was acceptable if the benefit were to be received by the 
municipality as a whole. In Associated 
Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Incorporated v. City of Walnut Creek, 
supra, however, the court was concerned with a statute which required that 
payment in lieu of land be utilized for park or recreational facilities for the 
particular subdivision, but in a footnote the court discussed the rationale 
behind not requiring any direct benefit to be recovered by the actual parcel of 
land:

"Amicus curiae Sierra 
Club urges that the requirement of dedication or the payment of a fee may be 
justified under the state's police power even if the recreational facilities 
provided by the subdivider's contribution are not used for the specific benefit 
of the future residents of the subdivision but are employed for facilities used 
by the general public. Ordinarily if land within the subdivision is dedicated 
for a park it may be assumed that those who will reside in the subdivision will 
make primary use of the park. The problem of connecting the facilities with the 
use made of them by the subdivision residents arises when a fee in lieu of 
dedication is required. In view of the provisions of section 11546, we need not 
decide in the present case whether a subdivider may be compelled to make a 
contribution to a park which is, for example, not conveniently located to the 
subdivision. Parenthetically, however, we perceive merit in the position of 
amicus curiae. It is difficult to see why, in the light of the need for 
recreational facilities described above and the increasing mobility of our 
population, a subdivider's fee in lieu of dedication may not be used to purchase 
or develop land some distance from the subdivision but which would also be 
available for use by subdivision residents. If, for example, the governing body 
of a city has determined, as has the city in the present case, that a specific 
amount of park land is required for a stated number of inhabitants, if this 
determination is reasonable, and there is a park already developed close to the 
subdivision to meet the needs of its residents, it seems reasonable to employ 
the fee to purchase land in another area of the city for park purposes to 
maintain the proper balance between the number of persons in the community and 
the amount of park land available. The subdivider who deliberately or 
fortuitously develops land close to an already completed park diminishes the 
supply of open land and adds residents who require park space within the city as 
a whole. A similar rationale was employed in Southern Pac. Co. v. City of Los Angeles 
(1966) 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197, to uphold an ordinance requiring 
dedication of property for street widening as a condition of obtaining a 
building permit. (See also Bringle v. 
Board of Supervisors (1960) 54 Cal. 2d 86, 4 Cal. Rptr. 493, 351 P.2d 765; Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale 
(1966), 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957-958, 218 N.E.2d 673.)" 94 Cal. Rptr. 
at 636, n. 6, 484 P.2d  at 612, n. 6.

[¶34.]  We are aware of the fact that several of 
the above-cited cases involved construction of statutes; even so, we are of the 
opinion that the lack of a specific statutory provision in this case is not 
determinative. We have previously concluded that the broad powers delegated by 
the legislature can fairly encompass the power to adopt the challenged park-land 
dedication ordinance. We agree with the rationale expressed in the cases cited 
that the City of Rawlins could require the appellant to pay a sum in lieu of 
park-land dedication in order to lessen the impact and pressure on park 
facilities that result from the influx of inhabitants caused by the development. 
The limitation on this power is the requirement that any fees collected in lieu 
of raw-land dedication must be earmarked to accounts for the purpose of 
acquiring needed park land and maintenance of existing park facilities. Here, 
the ordinance in question specifies that the funds collected are only to be used 
for park-land acquisition by the City Council. With this limitation, the problem 
of "direct benefit" to the particular subdivision is overcome. Open space is a 
rare commodity in increasingly impacted Wyoming municipalities and the governing 
bodies of the various towns and cities can fairly impose requirements, such as 
those found in Ordinance No. 7-80, to assist them in meeting current and future 
demands for park land. We hold that Ordinance No. 7-80 was adopted and applied 
to appellant pursuant to express powers delegated by the legislature and those 
fairly implied therefrom.

ATTORNEY'S 
FEES

[¶35.]  In his judgment, the trial judge awarded 
the City of Rawlins attorney's fees because he found that a contract entered 
into between appellant and the City required the same. The appellant also 
challenges this aspect of the judgment and we agree with his 
position.

[¶36.]  The contract entered into between the 
parties provided:

"WHEREAS, the Owner has 
requested that the City participate in the acquisition, construction and 
equipping of a housing project for low income persons pursuant to Section 8 of 
the United States Housing Act of 1937 as amended and hereinafter referred to as 
the `Project', and * * *

"NOW, THEREFORE, for and 
in consideration of the City's participation with the Owner in the acquisition, 
construction and equipping of a housing project for low income persons, and 
further in consideration of the covenants herein contained, it is agreed as 
follows:

"1. The Owner agrees to 
reimburse the City, upon appropriate documentation provided by the City, for all administrative costs and expenses 
incurred by the City in participating with the Owner in the acquisition, 
construction and equipping of a housing project for low income persons, and 
for which the City is not otherwise compensated for. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

The City claimed 
that the above emphasized language requiring appellant to reimburse the City for 
"all administrative costs and expenses" was intended to cover attorney's fees 
incurred in the present action. The appellant argued that it was never intended 
that attorney's fees be included.

[¶37.]  In reviewing the matter, we look to the 
rule that holds that attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable except where 
provided by statute or a contract. Werner 
v. American Surety Company of New York, Wyo., 423 P.2d 86 (1967); Yellowstone Sheep Co. v. Ellis, 55 Wyo. 
63, 96 P.2d 895 (1939). Here, when we read the plain language of the contract, 
we are unable to find any reference to recovery of "attorney's fees." In order 
to recover attorney's fees under a contract, the agreement must unequivocally 
provide for such recovery. Here, we cannot conclude that the term "all 
administrative costs and expenses" covered recovery of attorney's fees 
considering the fact that the language "all administrative costs and expenses" 
refers to expenses incurred in the acquisition, construction and equipping of 
the housing project. If the parties had intended attorney's fees to be paid by 
appellant, they should have said so. We, therefore, reverse that portion of the 
judgment awarding the City of Rawlins attorney's fees.

CONCLUSION

[¶38.]  We are satisfied that this opinion 
settles all of the issues raised by appellant in his brief. Any corollary issue 
not addressed was deemed by us to be fairly resolved by the conclusions reached. 
In summary, each of the challenged ordinances is upheld and the district court's 
order is affirmed in that regard. The City of Rawlins acted within its statutory 
authority.

FOOTNOTES

1 The briefs and the 
positions expressed at oral argument reflect that appellant is not challenging 
the reasonableness of the amount of the charges and is only concerned with the 
power of the City of Rawlins to adopt them.

2 Article 13, § 1(b), of 
the Wyoming Constitution provides:

"(b) All cities and towns 
are hereby empowered to determine their local affairs and government as 
established by ordinance passed by the governing body, subject to referendum 
when prescribed by the legislature, and 
further subject only to statutes uniformly applicable to all cities and towns, 
and to statutes prescribing limits of indebtedness. The levying of taxes, 
excises, fees, or any other charges shall be prescribed by the legislature. 
The legislature may not establish more than four (4) classes of cities and 
towns. Each city and town shall be governed by all other statutes, except as it 
may exempt itself by charter ordinance as hereinafter provided." (Emphasis 
added.)

3 In this opinion we will 
refer to the statutory numbers as they appear in the revised Title 15 of the 
Wyoming statutes even though the questioned ordinances were adopted in 1980 and 
the revised act was made to be effective January 1, 1981. (Chapter 38, S.L. of 
Wyoming 1980.) We will do this, not only because the parties have relied upon 
the revised numbers in their briefs, but because a comparison of the old title 
and the revised version has shown the applicable statutory provisions to be in 
all respects substantially similar to the former sections.

4 See also 11 McQuillin 
Mun Corp (3d Ed), § 31.30(a), p. 230, where it is stated as a general rule 
that:

"The municipality may fix 
fees, rents, charges, and rates for making connections with and for using its 
sewers and drains, outside the municipal limits, as well as within, and may, by 
law, have a lien upon the property therefore. Sewer charges are usually 
established by ordinances, the validity of which is presumed.

"Sewer charges and fees 
are not taxes or special assessments (although occasionally they are so 
regarded), but are in the nature of tolls or rents paid for services furnished 
or available." (Footnotes omitted.)

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[¶39.]  I concur with that part of the majority 
opinion relating to the award of attorney's fees and that part relating to the 
inapplicability of the home-rule constitutional amendment to this matter. 

[¶40.]  I disagree with the majority opinion in 
its conclusion that the water and sewer connection fees and the fees in lieu of 
parklands dedication were proper.

WATER AND SEWER 
CONNECTION FEES

[¶41.]  From a common-sense or practical 
stand-point there must be something wrong with a situation in which the people1 in an area being annexed to the 
city can be made to pay all, or a disproportionate part, of the capital cost of 
a water and sewer system for the city. The majority opinion creates this 
situation since there is absolutely nothing in the record to reflect the 
relationship of the amount of such fees with any aspect of the annexed area. The 
sewer connection fee for single-family dwellings, multiple-family units, 
condominiums, etc., is set at $750.00 "per living unit." The water connection 
fee for standard three-quarter-inch pipe is set at $1,000.00 "for each living 
unit." The $750.00 and $1,000.00 figures seem to have been plucked out of thin 
air. There was no evidence to reflect the manner in which these figures came 
into existence. There was no evidence to support the reasonableness of them. 
They could just as easily have been $7,500.00 per living unit for a sewer 
connection and $10,000.00 for each living unit for a water connection - or 
$75,000.00 for sewer and $100,000.00 for water. Under the majority opinion, such 
would be proper. As said, common sense and practicality would dictate that such 
is not proper.

[¶42.]  Somewhere in the scheme of this 
situation, we must set guidelines of reasonableness, or fairness, or uniformity. 
We cannot say that once a charge is called a "fee," it will have no perimeters, 
or fairness, or uniformity. The legal restrictions on charges called "rates" or 
"assessments" are a result of the necessity for uniformity, fairness and 
practicality. This brings the conclusion that (1) the reasonableness and 
uniformity of the charge must be addressed in considering the issue, and (2) the 
extent and nature of the authority to levy the charge - be it called a "fee," an 
"assessment," or a "rate" - must also be addressed for the same 
purpose.

[¶43.]  The majority opinion purports to not 
address the reasonableness of the charge, stating in footnote 1 
that:

"The briefs and the 
positions expressed at oral argument reflect that appellant is not challenging 
the reasonableness of the amount of the charges and is only concerned with the 
power of the City of Rawlins to adopt them."

There are two 
things wrong with this statement: One, it is only partially accurate, and two, 
it is internally inconsistent.

[¶44.]  Although it is true that appellant said 
in oral argument that he was not contesting the reasonableness of the charge, 
the argument itself did do so. And his brief argued the lack of uniformity and 
reasonableness of the charges at length. Appellant worded the second issue on 
appeal in part:2

"2. Did the Trial Court 
err in finding that the water and sewer connection fees * * * were * * * proportionate to the burden put upon the 
facilities of the City by Appellant's apartment complex?" (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶45.]  The complaint sought a declaration, among 
other things, that the charges were "not proportionate to the benefits received 
by" appellant. This fact was recited in appellant's brief. He further noted in 
his brief that the fees were protested by his agent, Mrs. Bricker, on the 
grounds:

"* * * First, that the 
tap fees were excessive and unrelated to the costs actually incurred by the City 
of Rawlins; and second, that no recognition was given and no commensurate 
reduction in the tap fees charged was afforded as a result of the fact that 
Appellant's project as a multi-unit complex, requiring but one actual tap for 
each 24 units and that other communities have conducted studies that have 
revealed that apartments burden the water and sewer systems but a fraction of 
the amount that single family units burden those facilities. As a result of such 
readily available statistical information, Ms. Bricker noted that other 
communities, such as Cheyenne and Gllette [sic], charge a lesser tap fee or 
development fee for water and sewer fee extension for each apartment than for 
each single family housing unit."

In arguing the 
nature of the fee, appellant continually refers in his brief to the necessity 
for proportionate application of the money to be received. He points to the 
statutory recognition of the propriety of proportionate assessment in § 
15-7-512(a):

"Any city or town may make special 
assessments for the construction of sewers and water mains. The assessments 
shall be made on all lots and pieces of ground to the center of the block, or if 
the sewers or water mains are constructed in an alley, then on all lots and 
pieces of ground to the nearest street or avenue on each side of the alley, 
extending along the street, avenue or alley, the distance of the improvement, 
according to the area of the lots or pieces of ground without regard to the 
buildings or improvements. The amount to 
be paid by each property owner [holder] shall be determined by dividing the 
expenses of the construction of the proposed sewer or water main among all of 
the property holders for the benefit of whose property the sewer or water main 
is to be constructed. . . . The amount to be assessed against each property 
holder shall be in proportion to the number of square feet [* * *] assessed for 
the expenses of the construction. (Emphasis added.)"

Appellant also 
noted in his brief that he did not make claims on the City for refund of the 
entire amount paid under protest for water and sewer connection charges and 
that:

"* * * He had, in the 
past in other communities, paid more modest tap fees without protest. Those tap 
fees, connection fees or development fees were not only less than incurred in 
Rawlins, but were also graduated in such a way that multi-family housing units 
were charged a declining rate, recognizing that multi-family units put a lesser 
burden upon the city's facilities than do single family residences. The City did 
not respond to Appellant's claim for partial refund and the lawsuit resulted. * 
* *"

[¶46.]  It cannot be said that appellant is not 
challenging the reasonableness of the charge.

[¶47.]  The evidence in this case relative to the 
foundation for the amount charged for water and sewer connection fees reflected 
that the water and sewer system in Rawlins in 1977 was not only inadequate but 
was of great age and little worth; that plans were made to reconstitute the 
system; that a great portion of the plans have been brought to accomplishment; 
that the financing (approximately $32 million for water system and $17 1/2 
million for sewer system - not including grants) was through bond issues and 
loans; that a per-person cost was obtained by dividing a present population 
figure of 12,000 for money already expended together with a future population 
figure of 20,000 for future expenditures into the cost figures; that the 
capacity of the development was 306.24 persons; and that 306.24 multiplied by 
the per-person cost amounts to between $500,000.00 and $700,000.00 as 
appellant's share.

[¶48.]  After presenting the foregoing (60 to 65 
percent of the entire trial testimony), it was never tied in in any manner with 
the ordinance charge of $1,000.00 for water and $750.00 for sewer. These latter 
charges totaled about $178,000.00 for the development. The foundation for the 
figures was never evidenced.

[¶49.]  Of course, effort to allocate costs per 
person pursuant to the extensive testimony contains many flaws: Speculation as 
to future population; allowance for cost of money; failure to recognize 
depreciation and appreciation of plant; failure to recognize proportionate use 
of the system; failure to restrict amount of debt attributable to connection 
charges to that not to be paid for by all users in the future, etc., e.g. if the 
system would become operative the day before the development went on it, a 
connection charge of approximately $178,000.00 would be unreasonable as compared 
to no charge at all if it became operative the day after the development went on 
it. Both the development and the other City units would receive equal benefits 
and should bear equal costs. Likewise if the system collapsed from use the day 
after the development went on it, the connection charge would be unreasonable. 
The reasonable charge on population basis must be computed by considering the 
factors of depreciation, etc., as noted.

[¶50.]  Furthermore, the 1977 bond issue is 
subject to payment from general revenue, and the other bond issues are subject 
to payment from user charges and connection fees.

[¶51.]  Most of the cases cited in the majority 
opinion and from which quotations are taken refer to the necessity for 
connection charges to be fair and reasonable.3 "Fair" is 
"non-discriminatory."

"Fair. Having the qualities of 
impartiality and honesty; free from prejudice, favoritism and self-interest. 
Just; equitable; even-handed; equal, as between conflicting interests." Black's 
Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979), p. 535.

[¶52.]  The testimony and computations presented 
at trial were never tied into the allocation of $1,000.00 and $750.00 charges 
"per living unit."4 To allow such to be done does 
extend the powers of municipal corporations far beyond the intention as 
expressed in the constitution and statutes. It seems incongruous that 
municipalities be restricted by law with regard to "taxes," "assessments" and 
"rates," only to be given a free reign to impose connection charges in any 
amount without consideration of the reasonableness, fairness or discriminatory 
nature of them.

"* * * [A]n assessment 
according to legal intendment is `A valuation made by authorized persons 
according to their discretion. It is a valuation of the property of those who 
are to pay the tax, for the purpose of fixing the proportion which each man must 
pay.' * * *" Union Pacific Railway v. 
Donnellan, 2 Wyo. 478, 488 (1882).

"(a) The board shall fix 
the rates for water, sanitary sewer services * * *. The rates shall secure an 
income sufficient to:

"(i) Pay the interest 
charges and principal payments on all bonds issued to pay the purchase price, 
construction cost, extensions and enlargements of the respective systems as they 
are due." Section 15-7-407(a), W.S. 1977.

"* * * A public utility 
is entitled to charge and receive for its product or service such rates, and 
such only, as are just and reasonable.

"The term `rate' as used 
in connection with public utilities signifies a charge to the public for a 
service open to all and on the same 
terms; * * * measured by a specified unit or standard. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.) 73 C.J.S. Public Utilities, § 13, p. 1008.

"`It is a principle 
universally declared and admitted that municipal corporations can levy no taxes, 
general or special, upon the inhabitants or their property, unless the power be 
plainly and unmistakably conferred. * * *'" Town Council of Hudson v. Board of 
Commissioners Fremont County, 37 Wyo. 160, 164, 259 P. 1051, 1052 (1927), 
quoting from 4 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 1377.

And see § 
15-7-512(a), W.S. 1977, supra.

[¶53.]  Called by whatever name it be, a tax, 
assessment, rate, fee, or charge, it cannot be proper unless it is fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory. It must be based on some formula designed to 
these ends. On their faces, the $1,000.00 water connection charge and the 
$750.00 sewer connection charge do not meet these requirements.

PARKLANDS DEDICATION 
FEE

[¶54.]  I have no quarrel with the general 
philosophy expressed in the majority opinion relative to the desirability for a 
city to insure proper dedication by a developer for park-lands area within a 
development. It may even be desirable to provide for a cash payment to a 
parklands-use fund in lieu of such dedication where the parklands area is 
already sufficient without the dedication. However, I do not find express or 
implied powers for a Wyoming city to mandate a cash payment in lieu of parklands 
dedication in connection with approval of a subdivision plat.

[¶55.]  It must be recognized that my concern is 
not addressed to annexation, or zoning, or planning requirements.5 These factors are not in this case. 
The land for the development has already been annexed and rezoned without any 
parklands requirement. It was only when the City directed it to be subdivided 
that the parklands requirement was introduced.

[¶56.]  Section 15-1-415, W.S. 1977, 
provides:

"(a) The owner of any 
land within or contiguous to any city 
or town may subdivide the land into lots, blocks, streets, avenues and alleys 
and other grounds under the name of . . . . addition to the city (town) of. . . 
. An accurate map or plat shall be made designating the subdivided land and 
particularly describing the lots, blocks, streets, avenues and alleys and other 
grounds of the addition. The lots must be designated by numbers, and the 
streets, avenues and other grounds by name or numbers.

"(b) The plat 
shall:

"(i) Be acknowledged 
before some officer authorized to acknowledge deeds;

"(ii) Have appended a 
survey made by some competent surveyor with a certificate that he has accurately 
surveyed the addition, and that the parts thereof are accurately staked off and 
marked.

"(c) When the map or plat 
is made out, acknowledged, certified and approved by the governing body, it 
shall be filed and recorded in the office of the county clerk. When filed it is 
equivalent to a deed in fee simple to the city or town from the owner, of all 
streets, avenues, alleys, public squares, parks and commons and of that portion of 
the land set apart for public and city use, or dedicated to charitable, 
religious or educational purposes. All additions thus laid out are a part of the 
city or town for all purposes, and the inhabitants of the addition are entitled 
to all the rights and privileges and subject to all the laws, ordinances, rules 
and regulations of the city or town.

"(d) The governing body, 
by ordinance, may compel the owner of any addition to lay out streets, avenues 
and alleys to correspond in width and direction and be continuations of the 
streets, ways and alleys in the city or town or other additions thereto. No 
addition is valid unless the terms and conditions of the ordinance are complied 
with and the plat submitted and approved by the governing body." (Emphasis 
added.)

[¶57.]  Certainly, this section gives to a city 
the implied power to require reasonable dedication of parklands in connection 
with subdividing, but it would be stretching reason to find authorization in it 
to extract a cash payment in lieu of dedication. See quotation in majority 
opinion from Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, 
Inc. v. Planning Commission of City of Danbury, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880, 
885 (1970). The majority opinion notes that other cases cited therein are 
premised on construction of statutes, but the opinion comments "we are of the 
opinion that the lack of a specific statutory provision in this case is not 
determinative." I do not agree. I believe it is determinative, and that it 
becomes judicial legislation to stretch general language authorizing regulation 
and operation of parklands to include authority to extract a cash fee in lieu of 
dedication in a subdivision 
plat.

FOOTNOTES

1 The developer is charged 
with paying the fee, but, of course, economic facts of life result in the cost 
being passed on to the people who will occupy the development.

2 The issue as worded by 
appellant is quoted in full in the majority opinion.

3 In all but one of these 
cases, the connection charges amounted to only a few hundred dollars. They 
usually reflected the approximate amount to be paid for labor and materials 
necessary to make the connection.

4 A "living unit" could 
have one person, two persons, three persons, four persons, etc. "Population" 
does not correlate with "living units."

5 In their brief, 
appellees point to § 15-1-501 et seq., W.S. 1977, to indicate legislative 
authorization for the action here taken by them. Such sections concern 
establishment of a planning commission and resulting procedures. Appellees 
specifically point to § 15-1-510, W.S. 1977, to support their contention. That 
section provides for establishment of a master street plan and for regulations 
governing subdivisions of land, which regulations the governing body "may adopt 
* * * after a public hearing thereon." There is nothing in the record to reflect 
use by appellees of the powers granted by these sections.