Case Title: Parker v. Ashford

Citation: 661 So. 2d 213

Docket Number: 1931296

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1995-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
661 So. 2d 213 (1995)
William H. PARKER
v.
Leon ASHFORD, et al.
1931296.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 31, 1995.
Rehearing Denied May 5, 1995.
*214 Paul Roger Ellis of Baxley, Dillard, Dauphin & McKnight, Birmingham, for appellant.
J. Rushton McClees of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Birmingham, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
The defendant appeals from an order granting a permanent injunction against an anticipated nuisance, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-125. That order "permanently enjoined and restrained [William H.] Parker from any acts or actions in furtherance of constructing and operating a dirt racing track or any similar facility at the existing excavated location ... on the parcel of land [made the] subject of this action." We affirm, although not on the rationale stated by the trial court.
William H. Parker had resided on a 15-acre tract of land for more than 20 years. On January 4, 1994, he purchased an adjoining 20 acres of land with the intention of building a dirt racetrack. The plaintiffs are 31 individuals who own property located within 1.5 miles of the proposed racetrack. The proposed track adjoins the property of plaintiffs Jody and Robert Porter and Susan and Arnold Moore, on which those plaintiffs *215 maintain residences. These parcels of land are located in an unzoned area of Shelby County that is primarily rural. The plaintiffs sued to enjoin Parker from constructing and operating the proposed racetrack, with the principal allegation being that the noise and the lights from the racetrack would constitute a nuisance.
After hearing ore terms evidence and after personally inspecting the racetrack site, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order, making the following findings of fact (which it later adopted in its final order granting the permanent injunction):
"The Court finds as follows:
"The court finds the audiologist's testimony credible.
Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing on the requests for preliminary and permanent injunctions and entered the following "FINAL ORDER OF INJUNCTION":
(Emphasis added.)
A nuisance is "anything that works hurt, inconvenience or damage to another.... The inconvenience complained of must not be fanciful or such as would affect only one of fastidious taste, but it should be such as would affect an ordinary reasonable man." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-120. If it is impossible, before the construction of a project has been completed and the project is operating, for a court to ascertain whether it will or will not constitute a nuisance, or if reasonable doubt exists as to the probable effect of the proposed project, then a court will not intervene until the project is completed and can be tested by actual use. That is, if from the facts it appears that the injury or harm alleged by the persons seeking an injunction is uncertain or speculative; that the use of the project is only possibly productive of injury; or that the public benefit to be served by the project may outweigh the inconvenience caused to the plaintiffs, then the court must refuse the injunction and await *218 the completion and operation of the project to determine whether the project is a nuisance. See, e.g., Jackson v. Downey, 252 Ala. 649, 42 So. 2d 246 (1949).
However, "[w]here the consequences of a nuisance about to be erected or commenced will be irreparable in damages and such consequences are not merely possible but to a reasonable degree certain, a court may interfere to arrest a nuisance before it is completed." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-125; see Rouse & Smith v. Martin & Flowers, 75 Ala. 510, 51 Am.Rep. 463 (1883). For the court not to interfere would be "`to ignore the location [of the proposed project] and the court's common knowledge of the inevitable consequences to follow upon the conduct of the business which [the] defendant proposes to carry on, however well conducted.' " Jackson v. Downey, supra, 252 Ala. at 652, 42 So. 2d  at 248, quoting Bloch v. McCown, 219 Ala. 656, 658, 123 So. 213, 215 (1929). An activity that is lawful in its nature and that is not a nuisance in one locality may be or become a nuisance when erected and maintained in certain other localities, depending on the particular location of the activity and the way it is managed or operated. See Nevins v. McGavock, 214 Ala. 93, 106 So. 597 (1925). In determining whether an activity is or has become a nuisance, a court must consider its effect upon an ordinary reasonable personi.e., a person of ordinary sensibilities; it is not sufficient that it would be considered harmful or inconvenient by a person of fastidious tastes or sensibilities. See, e.g., First Avenue Coal & Lumber Co. v. Johnston, 171 Ala. 470, 54 So. 598 (1911).
We recognize that Parker seeks to operate a lawful business on his property. However, the rights of the plaintiffs residing in the immediate vicinity cannot be unreasonably interfered with by the intrusion of a business or activity that by its nature would cause an unreasonable and continuous or recurring annoyance to the plaintiffs, would prevent the enjoyment of their property, and would disturb the quietude and pleasure otherwise to be found in their homes.
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that the Porters and the Moores have demonstrated that it is not reasonably possible for the proposed racetrack to be constructed and operated in a manner that would not create a nuisance. That is, considering the location of the proposed racetrack and the effect the noise and the lights from the racetrack would have on the Porters and the Moores, the trial court could find it to a "reasonable degree certain" that the proposed racetrack would cause them irreparable damage. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's injunctive order. See Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-125.
We note that in other cases this Court has interpreted § 6-5-125 to require that for an activity or project to be enjoined before it is "erected or commenced" the activity or project must be shown to be a nuisance per se. See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Monroeville, 384 So. 2d 1080 (Ala.1980); McCord v. Green, 555 So. 2d 743 (Ala.1989); and R & D Trucking Co. v. Carter, 592 So. 2d 1040 (Ala.1992). That interpretation of § 6-5-125 is overruled.
The trial court's finding that the proposed racetrack would be a nuisance per se was erroneous and unnecessary. Nevertheless, based on the evidence presented, we conclude that the court correctly enjoined the racetrack pursuant to § 6-5-125.
AFFIRMED.
KENNEDY, INGRAM, COOK, and BUTTS, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
I believe that the learned trial judge erred in permanently enjoining and restraining the landowner, William H. Parker, from any actions in furtherance of constructing and operating a dirt racing track or any similar facility on his property. I think the trial judge misapplied the provisions of Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-125, relating to an anticipated nuisance.
I recognize that the decision to grant or to deny injunctive relief rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and that the trial *219 court's ruling will not be set aside unless the court has abused that discretion. Acker v. Protective Life Insurance Co., 353 So. 2d 1150 (Ala.1977). Nevertheless, I do not believe that the plaintiffs proved a clear, specific, legal right that required protection, that an injunction was necessary to prevent irreparable injury, and that they had no adequate remedy at law. See, Gulf House Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Gulf Shores, 484 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Ala.1985), and the cases cited therein.[1]
I also recognize that
Morgan County Concrete Co. v. Tanner, 374 So. 2d 1344 (Ala.1979), citing Baldwin v. McClendon, 292 Ala. 43, 288 So. 2d 761 (1974), and Coleman v. Estes, 281 Ala. 234, 201 So. 2d 391 (1967).
I recognize that the Legislature, by adopting Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-125, has authorized courts to enjoin an anticipated nuisance, but this Court has, within the past 15 years, interpreted that statute to require that the nuisance to be enjoined be a nuisance per se. Gilmore v. City of Monroeville, 384 So. 2d 1080 (Ala.1980); McCord v. Green, 555 So. 2d 743 (Ala.1989); and R & D Trucking Co. v. Carter, 592 So. 2d 1040 (Ala.1992). Today, many of the Justices who joined in those opinions believe that the principle of law stated in those opinions is wrong, and that those cases should be overruled, something the Court refused to do the last time this Court had an occasion to consider this question. In R & D Trucking Co. v. Carter, 592 So. 2d  at 1041, the question of a trial court's authority to enjoin an anticipated nuisance pursuant to § 6-5-125 was squarely and specifically presented, and this Court stated:
I am not a believer in a slavish adherence to a precedent that is wrong, but when this Court squarely and forthrightly addresses a question, as it did in R & D Trucking Co. v. Carter, and refuses to change the law, it would seem that persons would have a right *220 to rely on that law unless it was changed by the Legislature. Consequently, I would apply the definition of "nuisance per se" in those prior cases to the facts in this case, not only because I think that interpretation is correct, but because I believe that the law, especially the law relating to property rights, should be stable.
Applying the principles of law in those prior cases, one cannot rationally argue that a racetrack is a nuisance at all times and in all places. See, Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Automobile Racetrack or Drag Strip as Nuisance, 41 A.L.R.3d 1273 (1972).[2] Because I believe that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the racetrack would be a nuisance per se, I believe the trial court erred in enjoining its completion.
There is another reason why I believe that the injunction should not have been issued in this case. A person's right to use and enjoy his or her property is extensively regulated by zoning laws, especially in incorporated municipalities. Increasingly, legislative bodies, at all levels of government, have extended zoning and use laws and regulations to encompass properties located in unincorporated areas and have extended the scope of those laws and regulations to deal with the public's concern for the environment. For example, the subject property is located in Shelby County, outside any incorporated area, and insofar as I am aware, the racetrack that was enjoined is not prohibited by any zoning regulation, law, or ordinance[3]
The judicial branch of government traditionally has been given the power to enjoin nuisances. This is a power courts can use to protect property rights, and in appropriate cases it should be used; but it would appear to me that property owners, such as the plaintiffs in the present case, could best protect their rights by appearing before zoning boards or other authorities vested with the power to control the use and enjoyment of property, to assure its more orderly and planned development. Zoning laws and regulations generally exist for the protection of the public and the property owners in the free use and enjoyment of their property.
Because properties outside incorporated areas are increasingly becoming the subject of zoning laws and regulations, the court's use of the power granted to it by § 6-5-125 would appear less and less important, especially since courts are rarely equipped to decide land use problems.
I recognize that courts have the power to enjoin a nuisance. I realize that this Court's case law states that a nuisance may exist notwithstanding the fact that the defendant's conduct is lawful and is performed in a proper manner.[4] I am also aware that the Legislature has provided that "[t]he fact that the act done may otherwise be lawful does not keep it from being a nuisance."[5] Nevertheless, I believe that this Court's comparatively recent decisions interpreting the provisions of § 6-5-125 are sound. I also believe that these plaintiffs were aware of all zoning laws and regulations affecting their property and adjoining properties, or the lack of such laws or regulations, and, if they were dissatisfied with the zoning of adjacent properties, could have sought, and may have obtained, favorable zoning regulations to protect their interests. *221 Based on the foregoing, I must respectfully dissent.
[1]  Teleprompter of Mobile, Inc. v. Bayou Cable TV, 428 So. 2d 17 (Ala.1983); State ex rel. Abernathy v. City of Sheffield, 428 So. 2d 5 (Ala.1982); First National Bank of Oxford v. Whitmore, 339 So. 2d 1010 (Ala.1976); Nininger v. Norwood, 72 Ala. 277 (1882).
[2]  The following cases support the general view that an automobile racetrack or drag strip is not a nuisance per se, although it may under particular circumstances become a nuisance per accidens: Hooks v. International Speedways, Inc., 263 N.C. 686, 140 S.E.2d 387 (1965); Jones v. Queen City Speedways, Inc., 276 N.C. 231, 172 S.E.2d 42 (1970) (the operation of a motor vehicle speedway is a lawful enterprise, and its operation is not a nuisance per se, but under varying circumstances, the operation of a speedway could be a private nuisance in fact); Smilie v. Taft Stadium Board of Control, 201 Okla. 303, 205 P.2d 301 (1949); Bedminster Tp. v. Vargo Dragway, Inc., 434 Pa. 100, 253 A.2d 659 (1969).
[3]  See Bailey v. Shelby County, 507 So. 2d 438 (Ala.1987), which challenged the constitutionality of local acts and delegation of zoning power to the Shelby County Planning Commission (Act No. 82-771, Ala.Acts 1982, created the Shelby County Planning Commission).
[4]  See, e.g., Coleman v. Estes, 281 Ala. 234, 239, 201 So. 2d 391, 395 (1967); Alabama Power Co. v. Stringfellow, 228 Ala. 422, 425, 153 So. 629, 631 (1934); City of Selma v. Jones, 202 Ala. 82, 79 So. 476 (1918)
[5]  Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-120