Case Title: Brown, et al. v. Nagelhout, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC10-868

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
 
_____________ 
 
No. SC10-868 
_____________ 
 
 
WILLIE BROWN, et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
KIM J. NAGELHOUT, et al., 
Respondents. 
 
 
[March 15, 2012] 
 
 
CANADY, C.J. 
 
In this case, we consider the provisions of Florida law governing the 
selection of venue based on the residency of defendants.  Specifically, we address a 
limitation placed on the selection of venue—known as the joint residency rule—
derived from Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1957), which held that the 
selection of venue based on residency was limited to the county of residence 
shared by the individual defendant and the corporate defendant. 
 
 
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We have for review the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in 
Brown v. Nagelhout, 33 So. 3d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), which, based on the joint 
residency rule, affirmed the grant of a motion for a change of venue to the county 
of residence shared by the individual defendant and one corporate defendant where 
there was not a county of residence common to all three defendants.  The Fourth 
District‟s decision expressly and directly conflicts with Aladdin Insurance Agency, 
Inc. v. Jones, 687 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Reliable Electric Distribution 
Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co. of Louisiana, Inc., 382 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1st DCA 
1980); and Doonan v. Poole, 114 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959), in which the 
First, Second, and Third District Courts of Appeal concluded that the joint 
residency rule was inapplicable to cases in which not all of the defendants shared a 
common county of residence.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. 
Const. 
Because Enfinger was predicated on a serious misinterpretation of the 
governing statutes, we resolve the conflict by receding from Enfinger.  We 
conclude that the Florida courts should uniformly apply the plain language of the 
venue statutes enacted by the Legislature, not the judicially created joint residency 
rule.  Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Fourth District. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
 
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In June 2009, Willie and Brenda Brown filed a complaint in Broward 
County, Florida, against Kim Nagelhout, Helena Chemical Co., Inc., and CSX 
Transportation, Inc., alleging multiple causes of action arising from a collision 
between a truck owned by Helena Chemical and operated by Nagelhout and a train 
operated by CSX, on which Willie Brown was riding.  The collision occurred in 
Pasco County, Florida.  Nagelhout and Helena Chemical subsequently filed a 
motion to dismiss or to transfer venue from Broward County to Pasco County, and 
CSX joined in the motion.  The trial court granted the motion to transfer venue.  
Relying on Enfinger, the trial court concluded that because Nagelhout and Helena 
Chemical both reside in Pasco County, Broward County was not a proper venue in 
which to litigate the Browns‟ complaint.  Brown, 33 So. 3d at 84. 
The Browns appealed in the Fourth District, contending that because not all 
of the defendants to this action share a county of residence, the joint residency rule 
from Enfinger does not apply.  The Fourth District rejected the Browns‟ argument.  
The Fourth District interpreted Enfinger to direct that where an individual 
defendant is sued together with a corporate defendant and the corporate defendant 
resides in the same county as the individual defendant, venue lies in the common 
county of residence.  Brown, 33 So. 3d at 84.  Because the trial court found that 
Nagelhout resides in Pasco County and Helena Chemical has a business residence 
in Pasco County, the Fourth District concluded that venue lies in Pasco County.  
 
 
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The Fourth District stated that it found “no merit to any of the other issues raised 
by the Browns” and affirmed the trial court‟s order granting the motion to transfer 
venue from Broward County to Pasco County.  Id. 
 
The Browns petitioned this Court for review, alleging express and direct 
conflict with Enfinger, Aladdin Insurance Agency, 687 So. 2d at 939 (concluding 
that the joint residency rule was not applicable because there was “no county of 
residence which [was] common to all three defendants”); Reliable Electric 
Distribution, 382 So. 2d at 1288 (concluding that where defendants reside in 
multiple counties, plaintiff is entitled to choose venue pursuant to section 47.021, 
Florida Statutes); and Doonan, 114 So. 2d at 506 (concluding that Enfinger did not 
apply where the three defendants did not all share a common county of residence).  
This Court granted review. 
 
In the analysis that follows, after examining the governing statutory 
provisions and explaining the basis for receding from Enfinger, we then turn to the 
case on review and determine that the trial court erred in granting the motion for a 
change of venue. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The determination of venue in Florida is governed by a series of statutory 
provisions set forth in chapter 47, Florida Statutes (2011).  Section 47.011, Florida 
Statutes (2011), provides that “[a]ctions shall be brought only in the county where 
 
 
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the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in 
litigation is located.”  With respect to corporations, section 47.051, Florida Statutes 
(2011), provides: 
 
Actions against domestic corporations shall be brought only in 
the county where such corporation has, or usually keeps, an office for 
transaction of its customary business, where the cause of action 
accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.  Actions against 
foreign corporations doing business in this state shall be brought in a 
county where such corporation has an agent or other representative, 
where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation 
is located. 
Finally, section 47.021, Florida Statutes (2011), provides that “[a]ctions against 
two or more defendants residing in different counties may be brought in any 
county in which any defendant resides.”  Although these provisions were 
previously numbered as sections 46.02 and 46.04, respectively, the substance of 
sections 47.021 and 47.051 has been part of Florida law since 1906.  See §§ 1384, 
1386, Gen. Stat. (1906). 
 
Under this statutory scheme, the plaintiff may select a venue within which to 
litigate a cause of action based on the residency of the defendants.  In the instant 
case, defendant Nagelhout, an individual, resides in Pasco County.  Defendant 
Helena Chemical, a foreign corporation, has a business residence in Pasco County 
and a registered agent in Broward County.  Defendant CSX has its principal place 
of business in Duval County, Florida, and its registered agent in Leon County, 
Florida.  While it is not clear from the record whether CSX is a domestic or foreign 
 
 
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corporation, the defendants do not claim that CSX has “an office for transaction of 
its customary business” or “an agent or other representative” in Pasco County.  § 
47.051, Fla. Stat.  Thus, based on the above statutes, the Browns had the option to 
file suit based on residency in Pasco, Broward, Duval, or Leon counties.  In their 
motion to transfer venue, however, the defendants argued that under Enfinger, 
venue lay only in Pasco County, where Nagelhout and Helena Chemical share a 
common county of residence. 
A defendant wishing to challenge the plaintiff‟s selection has “the burden of 
pleading and proving that the venue is improper.”  Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co. v. McDaniel, 78 So. 2d 100, 102 (Fla. 1955).  “When a trial court is presented 
with a motion to transfer venue based on the impropriety of the plaintiff‟s venue 
selection under section 47.011, the trial court must resolve any relevant factual 
disputes and then make a legal decision whether the plaintiff‟s venue selection is 
legally supportable.”  McDaniel Reserve Realty Holdings, LLC v. B.S.E. 
Consultants, Inc., 39 So. 3d 504, 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (citing 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP v. Cedar Resources, Inc., 761 So. 2d 1131, 1133 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1999)).  “The trial court‟s legal conclusions in this regard are 
reviewed de novo.”  Id. 
In Enfinger, this Court granted a writ of certiorari, quashing a trial court‟s 
denial of a motion to dismiss for improper venue.  Plaintiff Loudoun Baxley, a 
 
 
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resident of Polk County, Florida, filed suit in Duval County against Dan Enfinger 
and Enfinger‟s employer, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.  Enfinger was a 
resident of Polk County, and the railroad company, a foreign corporation, had an 
agent in and did business in both Polk and Duval counties.  At that time, section 
46.02, Florida Statutes (1955), provided that “[s]uits against two or more 
defendants residing in different counties . . . may be brought in any county . . . in 
which any defendant resides,” and section 46.04, Florida Statutes (1955), provided 
that suits against foreign corporations doing business in this state were to be 
“commenced in a county . . . wherein such company may have an agent or other 
representative, or where the cause of action accrued.”  Enfinger, 96 So. 2d at 539-
40 (quoting §§ 46.02, 46.04, Fla. Stat. (1955)).1  This Court concluded that “a 
corporate defendant „resides,‟ within the meaning of Section 46.02, in the county 
or counties specified in Section 46.04,” and thus, Atlantic Coast Line resided in 
Polk and Duval Counties.  Enfinger, 96 So. 2d at 540. 
This Court then concluded that because Enfinger and Atlantic Coast Line 
both resided in Polk County, the individual defendant and the corporate defendant 
                                         
 
1.  Again, section 46.02, Florida Statutes (1955), which provided that an 
action against two or more defendants could be brought in any county in which any 
defendant resided, is substantively equivalent to today‟s section 47.021, and 
section 46.04, Florida Statutes (1955), which defined where a corporation doing 
business in Florida could be sued, is substantively equivalent to today‟s section 
47.051.  See ch. 67-254, § 3, Laws of Fla. (renumbering statutes including sections 
46.02 and 46.04). 
 
 
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should not be considered to reside in different counties within the meaning of 
section 46.02.  This Court explained: 
The applicability of the statute is clear where the venue privileges of 
the defendants are co-equal and not co-existent in the same county.  
Here, however both defendants “reside” in Polk County, even though 
the corporate defendant may also be said to “reside” in Duval County.  
If sued alone, the defendant corporation would have no greater right, 
under Section 46.04, to be sued in Duval County than in Polk County 
since it has an agent in both counties; but the individual defendant if 
sued alone would have the privilege, under Section 46.01, of being 
sued in Polk County.  In this situation, we do not think Section 46.02 
should be applied to give to a plaintiff the right to choose the forum in 
which to bring his suit.  “The right of a plaintiff to have an action tried 
in another county than that in which the defendant has his residence is 
exceptional, and, if the plaintiff would claim such right, he must bring 
himself within the terms of the exception.”  Brady v. Times-Mirror 
Co., 106 Cal. 56, 39 P. 209, 210 [(Cal. 1895)]. 
Enfinger, 96 So. 2d at 540.  This Court‟s holding that where a corporate defendant 
is subject to suit in the county in which the individual defendant resides, “Section 
46.02 cannot be applied to defeat the individual defendant‟s venue privilege,” id. at 
540-41, has become known as the joint residency rule. 
In the instant case, the trial court applied the joint residency rule and 
therefore determined that venue was proper only in Pasco County, where 
Nagelhout and Helena Chemical shared a residence.  Accordingly, the trial court 
granted the defendants‟ motion to change venue. 
 
In Florida, the “presumption in favor of stare decisis is strong.”  N. Fla. 
Women‟s Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 637-38 (Fla. 
 
 
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2003).  Stare decisis “provides stability to the law and to the society governed by 
that law.”  Rotemi Realty, Inc. v. Act Realty Co., 911 So. 2d 1181, 1188 (Fla. 
2005) (quoting State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. 1995)).  “Our adherence to 
stare decisis, however, is not unwavering.  The doctrine of stare decisis bends 
where there has been a significant change in circumstances since the adoption of 
the legal rule or where there has been an error in legal analysis.”  Puryear v. State, 
810 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla. 2002) (citation omitted). 
Stare decisis does not yield based on a conclusion that a precedent is merely 
erroneous.  The gravity of the error and the impact of departing from precedent 
must be carefully assessed.  The United States Supreme Court has succinctly 
summarized the salient relevant factors: 
In deciding whether to depart from a prior decision, one relevant 
consideration is whether the decision is “unsound in principle.”  
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 
546 (1985).  Another is whether it is “unworkable in practice.”  Ibid.  
And, of course, reliance interests are of particular relevance because 
“[a]dherence to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and 
respect for judicial authority.”  Hilton v. South Carolina Public 
Railways Comm‟n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. 
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-266 (1986)). 
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 783 (1992).  We 
have recognized that the circumstance that “the prior decision proved unworkable 
due to reliance on an impractical legal „fiction‟” militates in favor of departing 
from a precedent.  N. Fla. Women‟s Health, 866 So. 2d at 637.  We have also 
 
 
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recognized that the prospect of “serious injustice to those who have relied on” a 
precedent militates against departing from that precedent.  Id. 
Here, the joint residency rule of Enfinger is based on a serious interpretative 
error, which resulted in imposing a meaning on the statute that is “unsound in 
principle.”  Allied-Signal, 504 U.S. at 783 (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546).  
There is no basis in the statutory provisions for treating the venue rights of an 
individual defendant as superior to the plaintiff‟s statutory right to select venue.  
To the contrary, section 47.021—which permits a plaintiff to bring an action “in 
any county in which any defendant resides,” § 47.021, Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis 
added)—does not distinguish between corporate and individual defendants or place 
any other limitation on the plaintiff‟s choice of venue based on residency.  Under 
the reasoning of Enfinger, for purposes of section 47.021 a corporate defendant 
may be deemed to reside in only one county, although under the unequivocal terms 
of section 47.051 the same corporate defendant may have more than one county of 
residence.  Enfinger thus relies on an unwarranted and “impractical legal „fiction.‟”  
N. Fla. Women‟s Health, 866 So. 2d at 637.   
Enfinger is also legally unsound due to its erroneous reliance on the 
Supreme Court of California‟s conclusion in Brady that the “right of a plaintiff to 
have an action tried in another county than that in which the defendant has his 
residence is exceptional.”  Enfinger, 96 So. 2d at 540 (quoting Brady, 39 P. at 
 
 
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210).  The relevant venue statutes are too dissimilar for Brady to constitute 
persuasive authority in Florida. 
In Brady, the plaintiff filed an action in San Diego County, the county in 
which the alleged tort occurred and one—but not all—of the codefendants resided.  
The issue before the court was whether the plaintiff could subject all of the 
defendants to suit in San Diego County.  The California court concluded that—
based on a state statute which granted each defendant “the right to have the action 
tried in the county of his residence”—the defendants‟ motion to transfer venue 
should have been granted.  Brady, 39 P. at 210.  In contrast to the statute in Brady, 
Florida‟s venue provisions did not and do not provide a defendant with a right to 
be sued in his county of residence.  Instead, section 46.02, now section 47.021, 
expressly provides that where codefendants reside in more than one county, the 
plaintiff has the right to select venue in any county in which any defendant to the 
action resides.  The Florida venue provision does not extend any home-county 
venue right to each defendant.  In other words, while the California legislature 
gave priority to a defendant‟s right to venue in his home county over a plaintiff‟s 
right to select venue, Florida‟s legislature gave preference to the plaintiff‟s right to 
select venue.  As a result of these statutory differences, unlike in California, a 
plaintiff‟s right to have an action tried in a county other than the one in which the 
defendant resides is not exceptional in Florida. 
 
 
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Furthermore, whereas in Brady, the California court determined that the 
complaint did not in fact seek relief from the defendant who resided in San Diego 
County, in Enfinger, there was no dispute regarding whether the plaintiff 
sufficiently stated a cause of action against the defendant who resided in Duval 
County.  Given these legal and factual dissimilarities between the cases, this Court 
seriously erred in relying on Brady when deciding Enfinger. 
As evidenced by the instant case and the conflict cases, confusion has arisen 
regarding whether the joint residency rule applies where some—but not all—of the 
defendants to an action share a county of residence.  This Court‟s decision to 
impose a restriction on venue not found in the Florida Statutes has created 
uncertainty and inconsistency.  Receding from the joint residency rule of Enfinger 
will promote stability in the law.  Once the joint residency rule of Enfinger is 
abrogated, venue in the situation of multiple defendants will be governed by the 
application of the plain terms of section 47.021, Florida Statutes, under which 
defendants will be amenable to suit “in any county in which any defendant 
resides.”  § 47.021, Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). 
Receding from Enfinger will not result in any injustice to defendants who 
have relied on the joint residency rule.  There is no basis for concluding that there 
has been any such reliance.  It is not plausible to suggest that defendants have 
organized their affairs or chosen whether and when to commit torts or to breach 
 
 
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contracts on the basis of the Enfinger joint residency rule.  No reliance interests are 
implicated by the joint residency rule. 
Based on the foregoing, we recede from Enfinger‟s restriction on a 
plaintiff‟s right to select a venue based on the defendants‟ residency.  When 
reviewing a plaintiff‟s venue selection, the Florida courts should apply the plain 
language of sections 47.011, 47.021, and 47.051, Florida Statutes.  Where there are 
multiple defendants to an action, a plaintiff may choose as venue any county in 
which any defendant, without consideration of his or her codefendants, may be 
considered a resident. 
 
Here, the Browns were entitled to file their complaint in Broward County 
based on defendant Helena Chemical‟s residency and amenability to suit in that 
county.  We therefore quash the Fourth District‟s decision affirming the grant of 
the motion to transfer venue. 
 
Finally, we decline to address the defendants‟ argument on appeal that the 
change of venue should have been affirmed based on section 47.122, Florida 
Statutes (2009), which provides that “[f]or the convenience of the parties or 
witnesses or in the interest of justice, any court of record may transfer any civil 
action to any other court of record in which it might have been brought.”  “The 
party seeking the transfer [pursuant to section 47.122] bears the burden of showing 
substantial inconvenience or undue expense to establish a basis for the transfer.”  
 
 
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Resor v. Welling, 44 So. 3d 656, 657 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).  The instant record, 
however, does not contain and the trial court did not consider any evidence 
regarding the competing conveniences of the parties, the location, number, or 
availability of the witnesses, or any other factor relevant to the convenience of the 
parties or the interests of justice in this case.  Accordingly, this Court cannot 
evaluate at this time whether a motion to transfer pursuant to section 47.122 would 
have or should have been granted.  See Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 815 
(Fla. 2008) (declining to address on appeal an issue that had “not been addressed in 
this case and [was] outside the scope of the conflict”). 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, we recede from Enfinger because it placed an extrastatutory 
restriction on a plaintiff‟s right to select venue.  We quash the Fourth District‟s 
decision and remand to the Fourth District for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
PARIENTE, J., recused. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
 
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Fourth District - Case No. 4D09-4140 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
Lincoln J. Connolly of Rossman Baumberger, Reboso, Spier and Connolly, PA., 
Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioners 
 
Daniel J. Fleming, Jose A. Gutierrez and Honey Dee Kalkins of Melkus, Fleming 
and Gutierrez, Tampa, Florida; and Richard A. Sherman, Sr. of Richard A. 
Sherman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and David B. Goulfine and Harold Davis 
Lewis, Jr. of Hightower and Partners, Orlando, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondents