Case Title: State v. Mark H. Tody, Jr.

Citation: 2009 WI 31

Docket Number: 2007AP000400-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 31 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP400-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Mark H. Tody, Jr., 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 312 Wis. 2d 480, 751 N.W.2d 902 
(Ct. App 2008-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 30, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 16, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Ashland   
 
JUDGE: 
Robert E. Eaton   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
 
ZIEGLER, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join the 
concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: GABLEMAN, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Byron 
C. 
Lichstein, 
and 
the 
Frank 
J. 
Remington 
Center, 
University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison, and oral argument 
by Byron C. Lichstein. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by 
William L. Gansner, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 31
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2007AP400-CR 
      
(L.C. No. 
2006CF37) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent   
 
 
v. 
 
Mark H. Tody, Jr.,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
APR 30, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The defendant, Mark H. 
Tody, Jr., seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals affirming a judgment and an order of the Circuit 
Court for Ashland County, Robert E. Eaton, Judge.1  Judge Eaton 
presided over the defendant's jury trial and denied the 
defendant's 
motion 
to 
strike 
Judge 
Eaton's 
mother 
as 
a 
prospective juror.  Judge Eaton's mother sat on the jury.  The 
defendant was convicted of taking and driving a vehicle without 
                                                 
1 State v. Tody, No. 2007AP400-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2008). 
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
2 
 
the owner's consent, as a party to a crime, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 943.23(2) and § 939.05 (2005-06).2   
¶2 
The defendant challenges the jury verdict on a single 
ground, namely that it was error to allow the presiding judge's 
mother to be a juror. 
¶3 
The defendant presents two legal arguments to support 
his position that the judge's mother should be struck for cause: 
(1) he was deprived of his right under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution to be tried by an impartial jury 
independent of the judge; and (2) the circuit court judge should 
have disqualified himself from deciding whether his mother could 
be a fair, impartial juror, citing Wis. Stat. § 757.19 and due 
process concerns.3  These arguments resonate with the court, 
although not in the precise form presented by the defendant.   
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 943.23(2) provides in full that "[e]xcept 
as provided in [Wis. Stat. § 943.23(3m)], whoever intentionally 
takes and drives any vehicle without the consent of the owner is 
guilty of a Class H felony."   
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 939.05(1) 
provides 
in 
full 
that 
"[w]hoever is concerned in the commission of a crime is a 
principal and may be charged with and convicted of the 
commission of the crime although the person did not directly 
commit it and although the person who directly committed it has 
not been convicted or has been convicted of some other degree of 
the crime or of some other crime based on the same act." 
3 Wisconsin's judicial disqualification statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19, provides in relevant part as follows: 
 
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The immediate reaction of the members of the court 
upon hearing the facts of the case was that the presence of the 
circuit court judge's mother on the jury raises red flags of 
danger of juror bias and of a circuit court judge having to rule 
on matters involving a member of his or her family.  
¶5 
For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
defendant was deprived of his right under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution to be tried by an impartial jury and 
accordingly reverse the conviction and order a new trial.  A 
presiding judge's mother serving as a juror is a special 
circumstance so fraught with the possibility of bias that we 
must find objective bias regardless of the particular juror's 
assurances of impartiality.4 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2) Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding when one of 
the following situations occurs: 
. . . . 
(g) When a judge determines that, for any reason, he 
or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in 
an impartial manner. 
4 The defendant also urges this court to exercise its 
discretion under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 to order that a new trial 
be held in the interest of justice or to exercise its 
superintending and administrative authority under Article VII, 
Section 3(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution to direct each 
circuit court judge to prohibit a member of his or her immediate 
family from sitting as a juror in a case in which the judge 
presides.  We need not, and do not, address these issues.    
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
4 
 
¶6 
Justices Prosser, Roggensack, and Ziegler reach the 
same ultimate conclusion that we do, namely that the circuit 
court judge erred in permitting his mother to serve on a jury in 
a case in which the judge presided and that the defendant is 
entitled to a new trial as a result of this error.5  They do not, 
however, identify the authority they rely upon in concluding 
that the circuit court erred or in concluding that the circuit 
court's error warrants a new trial for the defendant.  Their 
concurrence explains that it would have been within the circuit 
court judge's discretion to strike his mother as a prospective 
juror or to recuse himself from the case.6  But their concurrence 
does not explain why the circuit court judge not only was 
permitted but also was required, on pain of reversal by this 
court, to exercise his discretion in this manner.  
¶7 
Indeed, Justice Prosser explicitly argues that this 
court should adopt a results-oriented approach in deciding the 
present case and should avoid reaching any legal conclusions 
                                                 
5 See Justice Ziegler's concurrence, joined by Justices 
Prosser and Roggensack, ¶60 (concurring in the decision to grant 
a new trial; reasoning that the circuit court judge erred in 
failing to strike his mother as a prospective juror or to recuse 
himself from the trial).   
6 See Justice Ziegler's concurrence, joined by Justices 
Prosser and Roggensack, ¶60 (stating that because the circuit 
court has the inherent authority to administer justice, it would 
have been within the circuit court judge's discretion to strike 
his mother as a prospective juror or to recuse himself from the 
case).  See also id., ¶62 ("A circuit court judge possess broad 
inherent powers that provide him or her with the tools to 
fairly, 
efficiency, 
and 
effectively 
administer 
justice.") 
(citation omitted).   
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
5 
 
that might serve as precedent in future cases.7  Justice Prosser 
explains that in his view, any precedent that could emerge from 
this case would be "inappropriate" precedent.   
¶8 
For the reasons set forth, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court 
for a new trial.   
I 
¶9 
The relevant facts are undisputed.  The State charged 
the defendant with taking and driving a vehicle without the 
owner's consent as a party to a crime.  The defendant pled not 
guilty, and the matter was set for trial.   
¶10 During the voir dire, it emerged that the circuit 
court judge's mother was among the pool of prospective jurors.  
The transcript of the voir dire proceeding reveals the following 
exchange disclosing the juror's relationship with the presiding 
circuit court judge: 
[THE COURT]: Is there anyone among you who is a member 
of any police department, sheriff's department, or 
other law enforcement agency?  Any of you have 
relatives 
employed in a law enforcement related 
capacity?  Ms. Eaton, do you have a relative employed 
in the law enforcement related capacity?   
MS. EATON: The judge. 
THE COURT: I like -- I like to consider myself part of 
law enforcement or I may be disowned.  You are related 
to me how?  
                                                 
7 See Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶53 (arguing that we 
should "reach a result that the court deems necessary without 
establishing 
inappropriate 
precedent"); 
id., 
¶57 
(arguing 
against "precedent-setting" opinions).    
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
6 
 
 
MS. EATON: Your mother. 
 
¶11 The prosecutor briefly questioned the judge's mother 
about whether she thought that her relationship with the judge 
would interfere with her duties as a juror: 
[Prosecutor]: Mrs. Eaton, I know you're the judge's 
mother, do you feel comfortable sitting on a trial 
where he's the judge but he's not party in the case?  
MS. EATON: I don't think it makes any difference.  
 
[Prosecutor]: Doesn't make any difference one way or 
the other to you?  You have no opinion about the 
defendant's guilt or innocence? 
 
MRS. EATON: I know nothing about it. 
¶12 Defense counsel also questioned the judge's mother: 
 
[Defense counsel]: Boy, Ms. Eaton, do I have a lot of 
questions for you.  Seriously.  Do you feel you could 
be a fair and impartial juror?  Would you have to 
explain to His Honor Judge Eaton, let's say you voted 
for a verdict of not guilty, would you feel you would 
have to explain or justify why you voted that way?  
MS. EATON: No. 
[Defense counsel]: Would it be fair to say you come in 
here completely with an independent mind and you're 
without being influenced by the fact that His Honor 
Judge Eaton holds a very high office? 
MS. EATON: Well, I feel like the jury makes the 
decision, he isn't part of the decision making.  No.  
[Defense counsel]: That's right and you'll be part of 
the jury, if you're retained as a juror you'll be one 
of twelve of the jury.   
MS. EATON: Right. 
¶13 Defense counsel ultimately moved to have the circuit 
court judge strike his mother for cause from the pool of 
prospective jurors.  Defense counsel argued that "we have a 
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
7 
 
Ceaser's [sic] wife situation here where even the very fact of 
the close relationship I think, it's per se a prejudicial 
matter."  Defense counsel was particularly worried that the 
other jurors might give undue weight to the opinion of the 
judge's mother due to "her personal relationship with the 
Court."   
¶14 Defense counsel seemed concerned that the circuit 
court judge would misinterpret defense counsel's motion as 
implying criticism of the judge's mother.  Defense counsel asked 
that the judge's mother be excused for cause from the jury pool 
"with all due respect" and stated that he "certainly [was] not 
in any way implying that [the judge's mother] cannot be a fair 
and impartial juror . . . ."  Defense counsel also stated that 
the situation regarding the judge's mother was a "[v]ery 
sensitive matter."   
¶15 The prosecutor opposed defense counsel's motion.  The 
prosecutor opined that the judge's mother had "raised an 
individual who looks at facts and tries to find the truth" and 
that the judge's mother presumably would do the same as a juror.  
¶16 The circuit court judge suggested a preference for 
granting defense counsel's motion.  He stated that he was "not 
necessarily excited about having [his mother] on the panel."  
The judge also acknowledged that he "[could] see the possibility 
of questions arising" and particularly worried that he might "be 
called into a position where I would have to rule on some type 
of juror misconduct involving my mother[.]"   
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
8 
 
¶17 Nevertheless, the circuit court judge declared that 
"I'm going to perhaps reluctantly deny" the defendant's motion 
to strike the judge's mother as a juror for cause.  The circuit 
court judge apparently concluded that he had no choice in the 
matter.  Three times, the circuit court judge stated words to 
this effect: "I don't think I have any legal basis for excusing 
her."   
¶18 Neither 
the 
State 
nor 
defense 
counsel 
used 
a 
peremptory challenge to remove the judge's mother from the jury. 
The judge's mother sat as a juror in the defendant's trial.  
¶19 In his instructions to the jury, the circuit court 
judge described the separate roles of the judge and jury and the 
jury's duty to decide the case based solely on the evidence 
presented at trial.  The circuit court judge instructed the jury 
in relevant part as follows: 
It is your duty to follow all of these instructions.  
Regardless of any opinion you may have about what the 
law is or ought to be, you must base your verdict on 
the law I give you in these instructions.  Apply that 
law to the facts in the case which have been properly 
proven by the evidence.  Consider only the evidence 
received during this trial and the law as given to you 
by these instructions and from these alone, guided by 
your soundest reason and best judgment, reach your 
verdict.  If any member of the jury has an impression 
of my opinion as to whether the defendant is guilty or 
not guilty, disregard that impression entirely and 
decide the issues of fact solely as you view the 
evidence.  You, the jury, are the sole judges of the 
facts, and the court is the judge of the law only. 
¶20 The defendant's trial lasted one day.  The jury found 
the defendant guilty of the crime charged.  The circuit court 
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
9 
 
withheld sentence and placed the defendant on probation for 
three years.   
II 
¶21 When the circuit court denies an accused's motion to 
excuse a juror for cause on the ground of bias, the accused 
often will have the opportunity to exercise a peremptory 
challenge to remove the juror.  In the present case the 
defendant did not exercise a peremptory challenge to strike the 
circuit judge's mother as a juror.  A defendant's failure to 
exercise a peremptory challenge does not result in a waiver of 
the defendant's right to raise on appeal the issue whether the 
juror's inclusion violated the defendant's constitutional right 
to be tried by an impartial jury.8 
¶22 A criminal defendant's right to a fair trial by a 
panel of impartial jurors is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.9   
 
¶23 The Sixth Amendment provides in full as follows:   
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
                                                 
8 State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶117, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 
N.W.2d 223 (citing State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 671, 482 
N.W.2d 99 (1992)). 
9 State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 715, 596 N.W.2d 770 
(1999). 
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
10 
 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense.  (Emphasis added.) 
 
¶24 The 
Sixth 
Amendment 
right 
to 
a 
jury 
trial 
is 
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.10 
 
¶25 Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
this state's analogue to the Sixth Amendment, provides in full 
as follows:  
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law.  (Emphasis added.) 
¶26 This court recognizes three categories of bias that 
may render a person's presence on the jury inconsistent with the 
guarantee of fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors: 
"statutory bias," "subjective bias," and "objective bias."11   
                                                 
10 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) ("[W]e 
hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury 
trial in all criminal cases which——were they to be tried in a 
federal 
court——would 
come 
within 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment's 
guarantee." (footnote omitted)). 
11 Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 706.  
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
11 
 
¶27 "Statutory bias" and "subjective bias" are not at 
issue in the present case and need not be discussed.12  The 
defendant contends that the circuit court judge's mother was 
objectively biased.   
¶28 This court ordinarily "give[s] weight to a circuit 
court's conclusion that a prospective juror is or is not 
objectively biased" and will reverse the circuit court's 
determination "only if as a matter of law a reasonable judge 
could not have reached such a conclusion."13   
¶29 We 
generally 
defer 
to 
the 
circuit 
court's 
determination because "a circuit court's conclusion on objective 
bias is intertwined with factual findings supporting that 
conclusion."14  Here, for two reasons, we depart from our usual 
practice of deferring to the circuit court's determination of 
objective bias. 
¶30 First, appellate deference appears almost ludicrous 
when the appellate court is going to rely upon the circuit court 
judge's determination that a member of his or her immediate 
family is objectively impartial.  The appearance of fairness and 
propriety clearly is lost when the critical determination 
                                                 
12 "Statutory bias" simply refers to categories of per se 
bias set forth at Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1).  See Faucher, 227 
Wis. 2d at 717.  "[S]ubjective bias refers to the bias that is 
revealed by the prospective juror on voir dire: it refers to the 
prospective juror's state of mind."  Id.   
13 Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 721.   
14 Id. at 720.  
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
12 
 
whether a prospective juror should be excluded as a juror on the 
ground of bias is entrusted to a circuit court judge who is a 
member of the juror's immediate family and is not subject to 
independent appellate review.    
¶31 Second, the circuit court judge in the present case 
erred as a matter of law in stating that he lacked any legal 
basis to grant the defendant's motion.  The circuit court judge 
commented on his lack of authority as follows: "So, again, I'm 
not necessarily excited about having her on the panel because I 
can see the possibilities of questions arising like you [the 
defense counsel] raised but I don't have any basis for kicking 
her off so at this point your motion is denied."   
¶32 The circuit court judge erroneously concluded that 
although there were practical reasons for striking his mother 
from the jury, he had no legal basis for doing so.  The correct 
principle of law that should have guided the circuit court judge 
is that a circuit court judge should err on the side of 
dismissing a challenged juror when the challenged juror's 
presence may create bias or an appearance of bias.15  The reason 
for this principle of law is that a circuit court's striking a 
                                                 
15 See Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶49 ("[W]e caution and 
encourage the circuit courts to strike prospective jurors for 
cause when the circuit courts 'reasonably suspect' that juror 
bias exists." (quoting State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 495-96, 
579 N.W.2d 654 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted))); 
Kanzenbach v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 627, 79 
N.W.2d 249 (1956) (holding that a circuit court judge should 
strike a juror for cause "whenever he may reasonably suspect 
that circumstances outside the evidence may create bias or an 
appearance of bias on the part of the challenged juror"). 
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
13 
 
prospective juror who raises issues of bias saves judicial time 
and resources in the long run.16   
¶33 This court has acknowledged that cases concerning 
juror bias present difficult legal questions for this court and 
the court of appeals.17  The circuit court's best course of 
action is to obviate the need for appellate review of these 
questions by erring on the side of caution in the first instance 
by striking the juror.   
¶34 The circuit court judge in the present case failed to 
acknowledge or to exercise his authority to strike a prospective 
juror for cause when the circuit court reasonably suspected that 
juror bias or an appearance of juror bias existed.  Although the 
circuit court judge seemed to express a preference for granting 
the defendant's motion, he repeatedly and erroneously stated 
that he lacked any legal basis for granting the defendant's 
motion.  The circuit court judge did have a legal basis.   
¶35 Accordingly, in the present case we review the circuit 
court judge's determination of juror bias independently of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals, although benefiting from 
their analyses.   
                                                 
16 Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶49 (stating that by "err[ing] 
on the side of striking prospective jurors who appear to be 
biased," the circuit courts may "avoid the appearance of bias, 
and may save judicial time and resources in the long run" 
(quoting State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 503, 579 N.W.2d 654 
(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
17 Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶31. 
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
14 
 
¶36 A juror is objectively biased when a reasonable person 
in the juror's position could not be impartial.18  "To be 
impartial, a juror must be indifferent and capable of basing his 
or her verdict upon the evidence developed at trial."19  A juror 
therefore should be viewed as objectively biased if a reasonable 
person in the juror's position could not avoid basing his or her 
verdict upon considerations extraneous to evidence put before 
the jury at trial.  
¶37 Ordinarily it is a juror's "relationship to either 
side [of a dispute] which leaves doubt about [the juror's] 
impartiality."20  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.08(1), for example, 
states that a juror must be excused if "the juror is related by 
blood, marriage or adoption to any party or to any attorney 
appearing in the case . . . ."21  The judge's mother does not fit 
into the traditional mold of a juror who has a relationship with 
a party or someone involved with a party.  
                                                 
18 Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718.   
"[T]he focus of the inquiry into 'objective bias' is not 
upon the individual prospective juror's state of mind . . . ."  
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718.  A juror's subjective state of 
mind, however, is relevant to the determination of objective 
bias.  Id. at 720.  
19 Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 715 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 
U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). 
20 Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶49 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
21 See 
also 
Gesch, 
167 
Wis. 2d at 
662 
(holding 
that 
"prospective jurors who are related to a state witness by blood 
or marriage to the third degree . . . must be struck from the 
jury panel"). 
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
15 
 
¶38 Nevertheless, we conclude that the circuit court 
judge's mother was objectively biased under the standards set 
forth in our case law.  The judge's mother has an interest in 
the case, namely her familial relationship with the judge, that 
is extraneous to the evidence on which the jury is to base its 
decision.  A reasonable person in the position of the judge's 
mother would not have been able to set aside her relationship to 
the presiding judge when discharging her duties as a juror.22   
¶39 Furthermore, 
the 
mother's 
presence 
may 
have 
a 
potential impact on the trial proceedings or the jury's 
deliberations.  Counsel may be reluctant to challenge the 
circuit court's adverse rulings with ordinary zeal if one of the 
jurors whom counsel needs to persuade happens to be an immediate 
family member of the presiding judge.  The other jurors may tend 
                                                 
22 In arguing that the judge's mother was objectively biased 
in the State's favor, the defendant also points out that the 
judge's mother identified her son, a neutral party, as a member 
of law enforcement and further that the judge responded by 
suggesting that he "may be disowned"——presumably by his mother——
if he did not consider himself a member of law enforcement as 
well.  We do not find this argument persuasive.   
Neither the judge nor the judge's mother made comments 
demonstrating more than a generalized admiration for law 
enforcement.  Neither person disparaged criminal defendants or 
criminal defense attorneys.  Indeed, when defense counsel asked 
the prospective jurors whether they disagreed with his view that 
an acquittal can be "just as much law enforcement . . . as a 
conviction," the judge's mother kept silent with the rest of the 
jurors in the pool. 
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
16 
 
to give the deference to the judge's mother that they are 
presumed to give to the judge.23  
¶40 Finally, a close and familial link between the judge 
and a juror is not congruent with one of the basic purposes 
underlying the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial 
jury.  The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the 
federal constitution, as well as the constitutions of the many 
states, provides for trial by jury in criminal cases in large 
part to protect against the abuses of judges.24  The presence of 
a member of the judge's immediate family on the jury seems 
conspicuously inconsistent with the jury's function as, in part, 
a check upon the power of the judge. 
¶41 In these circumstances, a circuit court need not 
search for evidence of bias to protect a defendant's right to a 
fair trial.25  A presiding judge's mother as a juror is a special 
circumstance so fraught with the possibility of bias that 
                                                 
23 See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933) 
("The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily 
and properly of great weight and his lightest word or intimation 
is 
received 
with 
deference, 
and 
may 
prove 
controlling." 
(quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
24 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("Those who 
wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it 
was necessary to protect against . . . judges too responsive to 
the voice of higher authority. . . . [T]he right to be tried by 
a jury of his peers [gives the accused] an inestimable safeguard 
against . . . the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.").   
25 Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 723. 
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
17 
 
objective bias must be found regardless of the particular 
juror's assurances of impartiality.26 
¶42 We conclude that as a matter of law a reasonable judge 
could not reach any other conclusion under the circumstances of 
the present case than to excuse his mother from sitting on the 
jury.   
¶43 The parties have given scant attention to the question 
whether the "harmless error" doctrine applies to the circuit 
court judge's erroneous inclusion of his mother on the jury, in 
violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial by an 
impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
and 
Article 
I, 
Section 
7 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The defendant briefly states that "harmless error 
does not apply to impartial jury issues."27  Although the State 
devotes several pages to describing the evidence against the 
defendant and appears to view this evidence as overwhelming,28 
the State sets forth no position regarding the harmless error 
doctrine. 
¶44  When concluding in our previous cases that a juror 
was biased and was erroneously impaneled, the court has reversed 
the defendant's conviction and ordered a new trial without 
                                                 
26 Id. at 724. 
27 Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner Mark H. 
Tody, Jr. at 1. 
28 See Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent State of Wisconsin at 
12-17.   
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
18 
 
inquiry into harmless error.29  These cases reflect the rule that 
juror bias taints the entire proceeding and requires automatic 
reversal.  Juror bias is a defect affecting the framework within 
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the 
trial process itself.  Juror bias seriously affects the 
fairness, 
integrity, 
or 
public 
reputation 
of 
judicial 
proceedings and is per se prejudicial.   
¶45 Although there is a dearth of authority regarding the 
question whether a member of the presiding judge's immediate 
family may serve as a juror, our decision in the present case is 
consistent with and is supported by two cases from other 
jurisdictions: Elmore v. State, 144 S.W.3d 278 (Ark. 2004); and 
People v. Hartson, 553 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. App. 1990).  The 
presiding judge's wife sat as a juror in each of these cases.30  
The Arkansas Supreme Court (in Elmore) and the New York 
appellate court (in Hartson) each held that allowing the judge's 
wife to serve as a juror was error and reversed the defendant's 
conviction.   
¶46 Although the courts in Elmore and Hartson did not 
clearly identify the constitutional or statutory basis of their 
decisions, each court employed reasoning substantially similar 
to ours in the present case.  The Arkansas Supreme Court 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 596 
N.W.2d 770 (1999); State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 
N.W.2d 1 (1999); State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 
(1992).   
30 See Elmore v. State, 144 S.W.3d 278, 279 (Ark. 2004); 
People v. Hartson, 553 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (N.Y. App. 1990).  
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
19 
 
stressed the necessity of avoiding "even the appearance of 
impropriety, 
bias, 
or 
prejudice" 
when 
selecting 
jurors 
consistent with the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair 
trial before an impartial jury.31  The New York appellate court 
stated that "a defendant has a fundamental right to an impartial 
jury" and that "where the impartiality of a juror is open to 
serious question, disqualification is the better practice."32  
¶47 As we do here, the Elmore and Hartson courts both 
ordered new trials without inquiring into questions of prejudice 
or harmless error.  The Hartson court explained that "the right 
to the fact and appearance of a fair jury is so fundamental that 
the service of the spouse of the Trial Judge as a trial juror 
requires 
reversal 
of 
[the] 
defendant's 
conviction" 
and 
additionally that proof of any prejudice to the defendant "is 
likely to be out of [the] defendant's reach."33  The Elmore court 
ordered a new trial with minimal explanation.34 
¶48 The obligation to avoid a biased juror lies not only 
with defense counsel and the circuit court, but also, as we have 
stated, with the prosecutor.  We repeat the admonitions we gave 
to prosecutors in State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶118, 245 
Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223: Prosecutors have an interest in 
seeing that biased jurors do not sit.  The State should be alert 
                                                 
31 Elmore, 144 S.W.3d at 280.   
32 Hartson, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 538.   
33 Id.   
34 See Elmore, 144 S.W.3d at 280. 
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
20 
 
and sensitive to a defendant's challenge for cause.  We have 
urged the State to anticipate a defendant's possible strategy in 
unsuccessfully challenging a juror for cause and have outlined 
three courses of action for the State in this eventuality: the 
State can join the defendant in asking the circuit court to 
remove the juror for cause; the State can exercise a peremptory 
strike to remove a juror who has been challenged for cause; or 
the State can do nothing and risk a new trial if an appellate 
court concludes that a biased juror was on the jury.35  The State 
took the third course of action in the instant case.  As a 
result a new trial is ordered.   
¶49 For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
defendant was deprived of his right under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution to be tried by an impartial jury 
independent of the judge.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment 
of conviction and remand the cause for a new trial.  
* * * * 
¶50 For the reasons set forth we conclude that the 
defendant was deprived of his right under the Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution to be tried by an impartial jury and 
accordingly reverse the conviction and order a new trial.  A 
presiding judge's mother serving as a juror is a special 
circumstance so fraught with the possibility of bias that we 
                                                 
35 Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶118. 
No. 
2007AP400-CR   
 
21 
 
must find objective bias regardless of the particular juror's 
assurances of impartiality.36   
¶51 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for a new 
trial.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded.    
¶52 MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J., did not participate.   
 
                                                 
36 See Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 724. 
No.  2007AP400-CR.dtp 
 
1 
 
¶53 DAVID 
T. 
PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  This case 
presents the jurisprudential question of how to reach a result 
that 
the 
court 
deems 
necessary 
without 
establishing 
inappropriate precedent.  I join the concurring opinion of 
Justice 
Annette 
Kingsland 
Ziegler 
because 
her 
opinion 
understands the problem and attempts to resolve it as narrowly 
as possible.   
¶54 The lead opinion takes a different approach.  It 
recognizes the circuit court's error in underestimating and 
misstating its authority to address the situation at hand.  Lead 
op., ¶¶29-32.  It lays out sound policy reasons why the circuit 
court should have exercised its authority in this case.  Id., 
¶¶4, 39-40.  But then it concludes that the presence of the 
judge's mother on the jury panel violated the defendant's right 
to an impartial jury under both the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, id., ¶¶5, 49, and it implies that the 
judge created structural error by failing to remove his mother 
from the jury panel, id., ¶¶41-47. 
¶55 I cannot join an opinion that seeks to transform a 
questionable example of "objective bias" into a per se violation 
of the Sixth Amendment. 
¶56 The presence of the judge's mother on the jury after 
the defendant asked the judge to remove her was not appropriate.  
The judge had the power to address the situation and avoid any 
problems in fact or appearance.  In my view, he erred in not 
exercising that power.   
No.  2007AP400-CR.dtp 
 
2 
 
¶57 For this court, there has to be a reasonable middle 
ground between a precedent-setting opinion that would approve, 
over the objection of the defendant, a judge's family member 
sitting on a criminal jury in a trial in which the judge 
presides, and a precedent-setting opinion that would categorize 
every future case of objective bias a constitutional violation 
requiring a new trial.  Justice Ziegler's concurrence represents 
that middle ground. 
¶58 For the reasons stated, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
No.  2007AP400-CR.akz   
 
1 
 
¶59 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (concurring).  I write 
separately because this is not a case that involves juror bias.  
Standing apart, neither the judge nor the juror was biased.  
However, the combination of having the judge preside over a case 
in which he may be called upon to rule on a matter involving his 
mother as a juror is a problem waiting to happen.  The judge 
here was first confronted with this issue when he was called 
upon to decide whether his mother should be stricken for cause.   
¶60 Judges face tough calls in the courtroom each day.  
Judges are charged with administering justice and have a 
concurrent goal of avoiding unnecessary appellate issues.  To 
avoid these appellate issues the judge could have either removed 
himself from the case or replaced the juror.  However, the 
circuit court judge stated that he did not think there was "any 
legal basis for excusing" his mother from the panel.  I disagree 
because the circuit court judge has broad inherent authority and 
thus the discretion and authority to administer justice.  Under 
his inherent authority, the judge should have either stricken 
his mother from the jury or recused himself from the case.  The 
juror, however, could sit on another case so long as her son was 
not the presiding judge.  Consequently, it is unnecessary for 
this court to manipulate this case to fit the law of objective 
bias.  Because I do not agree that this case involves juror 
bias, I respectfully concur in the lead opinion's decision to 
grant a new trial.  
No.  2007AP400-CR.akz   
 
2 
 
 
I 
¶61 I disagree with the lead opinion's determination that 
this juror was objectively biased.  The lead opinion weaves an 
analysis in order to obtain a result.  I do not join in that 
confusion of case law involving juror bias.  Instead, I would 
call upon judges to use their sound discretion and inherent 
authority to avoid such situations where the recipe for disaster 
is right before their eyes.  The judge could not rule on a 
motion which directly involved his mother as a juror.  He did, 
however, rule on a motion that concerned striking her as a 
juror.  If this were a matter where his mother was a witness, he 
would not preside over that hearing.  See SCR 60.04(4)(e)4.  
Judges have broad discretion and employ a wide variety of 
methods when selecting a jury.  Instead of calling upon judges 
to do what they do every day in running efficient and fair 
courtrooms 
and 
employing procedures to effectively select 
juries, the lead opinion instead attempts to label this as a 
case of objective bias.  In so doing, the lead opinion unravels 
the concept of objective bias.  
¶62 A circuit court judge possesses broad inherent powers 
that provide him or her with the tools to fairly, efficiently, 
and effectively administer justice.  See City of Sun Prairie v. 
Davis, 226 Wis. 2d 738, 749-50, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999) (citing to 
a number of cases and stating "the court exercises inherent 
authority i[n] ensuring that the court functions efficiently and 
effectively to provide the fair administration of justice"); 
No.  2007AP400-CR.akz   
 
3 
 
State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 44, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982) 
(discussing inherent powers, which are "'those powers which must 
necessarily be used by the various departments of government in 
order that they may efficiently perform the functions imposed 
upon them by the people'"). 
¶63 "This court has been very clear about the circuit 
court's role in jury selection."  State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, 
¶109, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223.  "The appearance of bias 
should be avoided."  Id. (citations omitted).  "Circuit courts 
are advised to err on the side of striking jurors who appear to 
be biased" because "'[s]uch action will avoid the appearance of 
bias, and may save judicial time and resources in the long 
run.'"  Id. (citations omitted).  Even if the judge did not 
think his mother appeared to be biased, our directives are not 
so inflexible as to prevent a judge from eliminating the obvious 
problems that could occur in having his mother sit on the jury.  
This judge could have been called to rule upon an issue 
involving the jury wherein his mother could have been a witness 
or the subject of inquiry.  See SCR 60.04(4)(e)4.  The judge 
recognized that he could not sit on such matters, but he 
believed he lacked authority to remove his mother from the 
panel.  
¶64 In Lindell, "[w]e recognize[d] that circuit judges 
must deal with a diverse group of prospective jurors, some of 
whom are eager to serve even when they should not, others of 
whom will offer any excuse to escape from their civic duty."  
Id., ¶98.  We should acknowledge that a circuit court judge has 
No.  2007AP400-CR.akz   
 
4 
 
the discretion to employ any number of tools to address the 
unexpected situations that may arise during selection of a jury 
and subsequent trial.  A judge should make every attempt to 
avoid foreseeable problems. 
¶65 Instead of recognizing that a judge possesses the 
authority to avoid appellate issues, the lead opinion attempts 
to fit this into the body of case law that involves objective 
bias of a juror. 
¶66 However, the combination of these two people and the 
concern it produces does not square with objective juror bias as 
the lead opinion would have us believe.  There is no reason to 
believe that a reasonable person in the juror's position was 
partial and unable to base her decision on the evidence 
presented and the law as instructed.  It is counterproductive to 
pigeonhole this case into the category of objective bias, and it 
certainly makes no sense that we forever alter and further 
confuse the law of objective bias.  This juror exhibited no bias 
or prejudice so as to disqualify her on the basis of bias.  In 
point of fact, the objective bias cases relied on by the lead 
opinion involve situations that directly impact a juror's 
ability to be fair and impartial.  For example, in the cases 
cited by the lead opinion, the prospective juror's brother was 
to testify for the State in State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 
667-68, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992); the prospective juror had a "close 
personal 
relationship 
with 
the 
victim" 
in 
Lindell, 
245 
Wis. 2d 689, ¶42; and the prospective juror was a neighbor to 
one 
of the State's witnesses in State v. Faucher, 227 
No.  2007AP400-CR.akz   
 
5 
 
Wis. 2d 700, 732-33, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999).  However, none of 
those concerns are present here.  No objective bias exists here. 
II 
¶67 I concur because I believe the judge should have 
either stricken his mother from the jury or recused himself from 
the case.  I recognize that recusal may be time-consuming and 
inefficient, and as a result striking the juror was more likely 
the practical result.  Nonetheless, I would continue to call 
upon judges to do what they do every day when administering 
justice in courtrooms around this state.  Here, selecting a jury 
that was fair and also appeared fair was critical.  I would 
recognize that the front-line judges have the ability to use 
their discretion to dispense with a juror since allowing the 
juror to remain on the case would quite obviously create these 
types of issues.  Within their inherent authority, I would 
merely call upon our judges to select a fair and impartial jury 
and avoid such foreseeable appellate issues.  
¶68 For the foregoing reasons I respectfully concur. 
¶69 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this concurrence. 
No.  2007AP400-CR.akz   
 
1