Case Title: Ex Parte Formby

Citation: 750 So. 2d 587

Docket Number: 1972151

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1999-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
750 So. 2d 587 (1999)
Ex parte Stanley FORMBY.
(Re Stanley Formby v. State).
1972151.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 9, 1999.
Opinion Overruling Rehearing August 27, 1999.
*588 Jerry N. Quick, Trussville, for petitioner.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Andy S. Poole, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.
MADDOX, Justice.
The legal issue presented in this case is the same as that presented in Ex parte Parker, 740 So. 2d 432 (Ala.1999). The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded, based on our holding in that case.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and HOUSTON, KENNEDY, COOK, SEE, LYONS, and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur.
BROWN, J., recuses herself.
MADDOX, Justice.
In its application for rehearing the State presents two issues. The State's application is due to be overruled, but we will explain our reasons.
On November 24, 1995, Stanley Formby was stopped by a Riverside police officer and was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. In June 1996, the St. Clair County grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Formby. Before the trial, the defendant moved to require that the State elect which of the two charges it would proceed on, and Judge Robert Austin granted that motion. The State elected to proceed on Count II, which charged:
Formby objected to Count II, arguing that allowing the jury to be informed of his prior DUI convictions in the guilt phase of his trial would be prejudicial and would bias the jury against him. The trial judge overruled that objection. During its case-in-chief, the state admitted evidence of Formby's three prior convictions, and the jury subsequently found him guilty. The trial judge sentenced him to four years in prison.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Formby's conviction and sentence. This Court, on April 9, 1999, reversed on the authority of Ex parte Parker, 740 So. 2d 432 (Ala.1999).
The State's first issue presented in its rehearing application, the answer to which is dispositive, is:
(State's application for rehearing, at 2.) Our review of the State's brief indicates that the state may be laboring under the mistaken inference that in Parker this Court held that a "felony DUI," i.e., a fourth or subsequent DUI conviction, is actually a misdemeanor. The State argues:
(State's brief and argument in support of application for rehearing, at 8.) We accept the State's invitation to clarify Parker.
In Parker, we held:
Ex parte Parker, 740 So. 2d  at 434 (emphasis added). The Code subsection in question provides:
§ 32-5A-191(h), Ala.Code 1975 (emphasis added).
To clarify, then, Parker held that a fourth or subsequent DUI conviction is a felony conviction, rather than a misdemeanor conviction. Parker, thus, is consistent not only with the plain language of § 32-5A-191(h) but also with the general definition of "felony" found in Title 13A, the Criminal Code, which defines a "felony" as "[a]n offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year is authorized by this title." § 13A-1-2(4).
Having explained that Parker does not stand for the proposition that "felony DUI" convictions are really misdemeanor convictions, we now discuss our understanding of the effect of that conclusion. We held in Parker:
Parker, 740 So. 2d  at 435 (emphasis omitted; new emphasis added). The import of that holding is that during the guilt phase of a defendant's DUI trial the jury should not be presented with evidence of the defendant's prior DUI convictions. In so holding, we sought to prevent prejudicial information of a defendant's prior convictions from tainting the jury's determination of guilt in regard to the instant offense. Of course, due-process protections also require that the defendant be on notice of the charges against him, so the indictment should put him on notice that he is being charged with a violation of § 32-5A-191(a)(2), made a felony by § 32-5A-191(h).
We now apply the law, as explained above, to the facts of this present case. In its opinion affirming Formby's conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeals wrote:
Formby v. State, 750 So. 2d 581, 584-85 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). This is the issue of law at the heart of this Court's opinion in Parker. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that while Formby objected in limine to having evidence of his prior DUI convictions admitted into evidence, and while he objected during the trial to the admission of the evidence of his prior convictions, he did not assert, when he objected during the trial, that he was objecting for the same reasons he had objected to the court's reading the indictment to the jury. Nonetheless, as a result of this Court's Parker decision, introducing evidence of prior DUI convictions during the guilt phase of a trial will be deemed prejudicial and reversible error. This Court, accordingly, on original submission, reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Formby, on the authority of Parker.
The State has not convinced us that our holding on original submission was erroneous. In summary, the short answer to the State's first question is that the Legislature's enactment of § 32-5A-191(h) made jurisdiction over a fourth or subsequent DUI charge appropriate in the circuit court, because the offense chargeda fourth or subsequent DUI offenseis a felony. This Court's decision in Parker *591 had no impact on that jurisdictional issue. Prosecutions for felony DUI offenses should have been, and should continue to be, in the circuit court.[2]
The indictment gave Formby appropriate notice of the charges against him. Because the indictment charged him with a felony, it was appropriate for the prosecution to proceed in the circuit court. We reversed because the prosecution was allowed, during the guilt phase of Formby's trial, to present evidence of three prior DUI convictions; under Parker, that was reversible error.
We reiterate that Parker stands for the proposition that a conviction for a fourth or subsequent DUI is a felony conviction. Further, as we held in Parker, it is reversible error for a jury, during the guilt phase of a trial, to be presented with evidence of the defendant's prior DUI convictions. The prior convictions are not to be considered until after the jury has passed on the question of the defendant's guilt.
APPLICATION OVERRULED.
HOOPER, C.J., and HOUSTON, COOK, LYONS, and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur.
BROWN, J., recuses herself.
[1]  The statute has since been amended to remove the requirement that the defendant's three prior DUI convictions be within a five-year period. See Act No. 96-705, Ala. Acts 1996.
[2]  Because the second issue the State raises in its rehearing application is premised on a "yes" answer to the first question, we need not discuss that second question.