Case Title: State v. Tyler T.

Citation: 2012 WI 52

Docket Number: 2010AP000784

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 WI 52 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2010AP784 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
In the interest of Tyler T., a person under the 
age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Tyler T., 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 331 Wis. 2d 489, 795 N.W. 2d 64 
(Ct. App. 2011 – Unpublished)  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 22, 2012   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 12, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
James L. Carlson  
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (Opinion filed).  
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins dissent.    
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: PROSSER, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Susan E. Alesia, assistant state public 
defender.  
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by Zeke 
Wiedenfeld, assistant district attorney, Phillip A. Koss, 
district 
attorney, 
Elkhorn, 
and 
oral 
argument 
by 
Zeke 
Wiedenfeld. 
 
 
2012 WI 52
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2010AP784 
(L.C. No. 
2009JV59) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the interest of Tyler T., a person under the 
age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Tyler T., 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 22, 2012 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed an 
order by the Walworth County Circuit Court2 waiving juvenile 
court jurisdiction over Tyler T. (Tyler).   
                                                 
1 State v. Tyler T., No. 2010AP784, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2010).  The decision of the court of 
appeals was decided by one judge pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 752.31(2)(e), (3) (2009-10).   
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The Honorable James L. Carlson presided. 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Tyler argues that the circuit court erred as a matter 
of law in denying his request to strike a waiver investigation 
report prepared by the Walworth County Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS).  The DHHS prepared its report after 
conducting a staffing meeting in which the Walworth County 
Assistant District Attorney, who filed the petition alleging 
Tyler's delinquency, participated.  Neither Tyler nor his 
defense counsel was invited to attend the staffing meeting.  
Comparing a waiver investigation report to a presentence 
investigation (PSI) report, Tyler contends that the assistant 
district 
attorney's 
participation in the staffing meeting 
constituted improper ex parte3 communication that compromised the 
objectivity of the waiver investigation report.  As such, Tyler 
requests that we vacate the circuit court's order waiving 
juvenile court jurisdiction, order the preparation of a new 
waiver investigation report, and order the circuit court to 
conduct a new waiver hearing before a different judge. 
¶3 
We decline Tyler's request and therefore affirm. 
¶4 
We conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
denying Tyler's request to strike the waiver investigation 
report prepared by the DHHS.  While we have reservations about 
the DHHS's decision to invite only the assistant district 
attorney to its final staffing meeting, we decline to create a 
                                                 
3 "Ex parte," Latin for "from the part," is defined as "[o]n 
or from one party only, usu[ally] without notice to or argument 
from the adverse party."  Black's Law Dictionary 597 (7th ed. 
1999). 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
3 
 
bright-line rule precluding the DHHS from communicating directly 
with either party, be it the State or the juvenile, for purposes 
of preparing a waiver investigation report.  Rather, consistent 
with 
the 
DHHS's 
role 
in 
delinquency 
proceedings 
and 
in 
furtherance of the express objectives of Wis. Stat. ch. 938, we 
conclude that the DHHS is free to compile information for a 
waiver investigation report in the manner it deems most 
beneficial to the circuit court. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶5 
On July 21, 2009, the State, through Walworth County 
Assistant District Attorney Zeke Wiedenfeld (ADA Wiedenfeld), 
filed a petition in the Walworth County Circuit Court alleging 
that Tyler, then 15 years old, was delinquent.  In support of 
its petition, the State alleged that on June 19, 2009, Tyler was 
a party to an armed robbery in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 939.054 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.05, "Parties to crime," states, in 
relevant part:  
(1) Whoever is concerned in the commission of a 
crime is a principal and may be charged with and 
convicted of the commission of the crime although the 
person did not directly commit it and although the 
person 
who 
directly 
committed 
it 
has 
not 
been 
convicted or has been convicted of some other degree 
of the crime or of some other crime based on the same 
act.  
(2) A person is concerned in the commission of 
the crime if the person:  
(a) Directly commits the crime; or  
(b) Intentionally aids and abets the commission 
of it . . . . 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
4 
 
and 943.32(2).5  More specifically, the State alleged that Tyler 
and an adult male named Terrance Walker (Walker), both in gray 
hooded sweatshirts and wearing bandanas over their faces, held 
up a gas station in Elkhorn, Wisconsin by displaying black 
airsoft guns that resembled semi-automatic handguns.  The gas 
station attendant, working alone at the time, reported that 
Tyler and Walker pointed their guns at him and demanded money.  
Tyler and Walker allegedly left the gas station with just under 
$1,000. 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.32, "Robbery," provides:  
(1) Whoever, with intent to steal, takes property 
from the person or presence of the owner by either of 
the following means is guilty of a Class E felony:  
(a) By using force against the person of the 
owner with intent thereby to overcome his or her 
physical resistance or physical power of resistance to 
the taking or carrying away of the property; or  
(b) By threatening the imminent use of force 
against the person of the owner or of another who is 
present with intent thereby to compel the owner to 
acquiesce in the taking or carrying away of the 
property.  
(2) Whoever violates sub. (1) by use or threat of 
use of a dangerous weapon, a device or container 
described under s. 941.26(4)(a) or any article used or 
fashioned in a manner to lead the victim reasonably to 
believe that it is a dangerous weapon or such a device 
or container is guilty of a Class C felony.  
(3) In this section "owner" means a person in 
possession of property whether the person's possession 
is lawful or unlawful. 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
5 
 
¶6 
According to the petition, Tyler advised a detective 
from the Elkhorn Police Department that he and Walker were 
dropped off at the gas station by an adult male named Michael 
Boyle (Boyle) and that Tyler had been involved in "about 6 
different robberies since April or May" of 2009. 
¶7 
In addition to its delinquency petition, the State, 
again through ADA Wiedenfeld, filed a petition for waiver of 
juvenile court jurisdiction over Tyler pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.18.6  In support of its petition for waiver, the State 
asserted that juvenile court jurisdiction would be contrary to 
the best interests of both Tyler and the public.  The State 
noted that Tyler was charged with committing a serious crime 
that involved the threat of force with a weapon and which would 
constitute a felony if committed by an adult.  Moreover, the 
State maintained, Tyler committed the crime with two adult 
conspirators 
under 
circumstances 
demonstrating 
aggression, 
premeditation, and willfulness.  Finally, the State alleged that 
this crime was only one of several robberies committed by Tyler 
and that, in the event of his conviction, the remedies available 
to the criminal court would be more effective than those 
available to the juvenile court. 
¶8 
Pursuant 
to 
its 
authority 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.18(2m), the circuit court requested the DHHS to prepare a 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18 provides, in relevant part, that 
the district attorney, the juvenile, or the court may petition 
for waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction if "[t]he juvenile is 
alleged to have violated any state criminal law on or after the 
juvenile's 15th birthday."  See § 938.18(1)(c), (2). 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
6 
 
waiver investigation report analyzing the criteria for waiver 
with respect to Tyler.  According to testimony derived from the 
waiver hearing, roughly ten members of the DHHS participated in 
a staffing meeting to determine the agency's recommendation as 
to whether the juvenile court should or should not waive 
jurisdiction over Tyler.  At the invitation of the DHHS, ADA 
Wiedenfeld also participated in the staffing meeting, advocating 
in favor of waiver.  Neither Tyler nor his defense counsel, 
Attorney Mary Burns (Attorney Burns), was invited to attend the 
staffing meeting.  Still, in preparation for the staffing 
meeting, Erin Bradley (Bradley), a juvenile court intake worker 
who ultimately drafted the waiver investigation report on behalf 
of the DHHS, gathered information from both Tyler and Attorney 
Burns, as well as from Tyler's parents.  In the end, the members 
of the DHHS failed to reach a consensus at the staffing meeting 
and consequently opted not to offer any formal recommendation as 
to waiver. 
¶9 
The DHHS filed its waiver investigation report on 
February 17, 2010.  In its report, the DHHS explained that while 
Tyler had no prior criminal history in Walworth County, he had a 
fairly extensive record in Kenosha County.  In 2007, when Tyler 
was 13 years old, he was referred to Kenosha County's Juvenile 
Intake Services on charges of criminal damage to property and 
disorderly conduct.  That referral resulted in a deferred 
prosecution agreement, which terminated successfully in 2008.  
In addition, the DHHS noted that Tyler had a delinquency 
petition then pending in Kenosha County for a separate charge of 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
7 
 
armed robbery, party to a crime.  In that case, the Kenosha 
County Circuit Court denied the district attorney's petition for 
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction.  Finally, the DHHS 
advised that in 2009, Tyler was subject to two petitions for 
adjudication of wardship in Lake County, Illinois, both stemming 
from charges of armed robbery, aggravated robbery, and burglary.  
On January 13, 2010, Lake County's Nineteenth Judicial Circuit 
Court placed Tyler on five years of juvenile court supervision 
and ordered him to participate in the county's "FACE-IT" 
residential treatment program for juvenile probationers.7 
¶10 Concerning Tyler's personal and social history, the 
waiver investigation report provided that Tyler has a ninth 
grade 
education, 
suffers 
from 
no 
mental 
illnesses 
or 
developmental disabilities, and "presents in a pleasant and 
respectful manner."  The DHHS further reported that Tyler 
maintains a positive and supportive relationship with his 
biological parents, his sister, and his grandparents.  In 
addition, personnel from both the Illinois and Wisconsin 
detention centers indicated that Tyler is "very respectful to 
staff and follows directions without incident."  Still, pursuant 
to its assessment, the DHHS advised that Tyler presents a 
"moderate risk" of delinquency.  
                                                 
7 On January 14, 2010, Tyler returned to Kenosha County on a 
court-ordered capias, see Wis. Stat. § 938.19(1), at which time 
he was placed in secure custody at the Washington County 
Juvenile Detention Center pending disposition in Kenosha County. 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
8 
 
¶11 Relevant 
to 
Tyler's 
underlying 
charge 
of 
armed 
robbery, the DHHS's waiver investigation report described Boyle, 
the adult male who allegedly dropped Tyler and Walker off at the 
gas station, as "a step-father figure to Tyler."  Boyle 
reportedly dated Tyler's mother for a period of eight years, 
beginning when Tyler was 15 months old.  After Tyler's mother 
ended the relationship, Tyler continued to visit Boyle on a 
regular basis.  Tyler acknowledged that he assisted Boyle with 
several robberies and that Boyle regularly provided him with 
alcohol and other drugs.  When asked why he agreed to assist in 
the robberies, Tyler explained that Boyle needed money in order 
to hire an attorney to get his roommate's two daughters out of 
foster care.  According to Tyler, most of the money obtained 
from the robberies "went to the attorney fund and he kept little 
for himself." 
¶12 The 
waiver 
investigation 
report 
confirmed 
the 
seriousness of Tyler's offense, describing the robbery as 
planned, aggressive, and potentially violent.  The DHHS further 
acknowledged that Tyler willfully participated "at his own 
discretion on multiple occasions over multiple dates." 
¶13 Finally, as to the adequacy of facilities, services, 
and procedures available to Tyler within the juvenile justice 
system, the DHHS explained that Tyler's offense met the criteria 
for the five-year Serious Juvenile Offender (SJO) Program 
operated by the Department of Corrections (DOC).  If placed in 
the SJO Program, Tyler would serve a maximum of three years in a 
secure juvenile correctional institution. 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
9 
 
¶14 As previously mentioned, the DHHS declined to offer a 
formal recommendation as to waiver, citing "the complexity of 
the matter." 
¶15 On February 19, 2010, in response to the DHHS's waiver 
investigation report, the State filed a memorandum arguing in 
favor of waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction over Tyler.  The 
State contended that waiver was appropriate given Tyler's record 
of committing serious and violent crimes, his association with 
negative peers and adults, his history of substance abuse, and 
his high risk to reoffend.  The State further maintained that 
Tyler's behavior warranted rehabilitation and confinement beyond 
what the juvenile court, including the SJO Program, could 
provide.  In addition, the State stressed the desirability of 
prosecuting Tyler, Walker, and Boyle in the same court of 
criminal jurisdiction. 
¶16 On March 9, 2010, Tyler filed a response to the 
State's memorandum and an objection to the DHHS's waiver 
investigation report.  Tyler requested the juvenile court to 
retain jurisdiction, arguing that his offense, while serious, 
was committed at the behest of Boyle and that he has 
demonstrated his potential to respond favorably to juvenile 
court supervision.  Tyler further requested the court to strike 
the waiver investigation report on the grounds that ADA 
Wiedenfeld's ex parte participation in the DHHS's staffing 
meeting unduly influenced what was supposed to be an objective 
report prepared by an independent body.  Absent ADA Wiedenfeld's 
participation in the staffing meeting, Tyler posited, the DHHS 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
10 
 
would 
have 
recommended 
that 
the 
juvenile 
court 
retain 
jurisdiction over Tyler, in accordance with the decision of the 
Kenosha County Circuit Court. 
¶17 The circuit court held a two-day waiver hearing on 
March 10 and 12, 2010.  At the hearing, both ADA Wiedenfeld and 
Attorney Burns questioned Bradley extensively regarding the 
DHHS's staffing meeting and the preparation of the waiver 
investigation report.  Bradley confirmed that she spoke about 
Tyler's case with both ADA Wiedenfeld and Attorney Burns prior 
to 
drafting 
the 
waiver 
investigation 
report. 
 
While 
acknowledging that her conversations with Attorney Burns were 
"basically short hallway conversations," Bradley testified that 
ADA Wiedenfeld was not present for those conversations and that 
she relayed at the staffing meeting the information she gathered 
from Attorney Burns.  Bradley further testified that even with 
ADA Wiedenfeld's participation in the staffing meeting, the 
meeting remained "well balanced" in terms of DHHS members in 
favor of waiver and those against waiver.  When asked how common 
it is for the DHHS not to offer a recommendation as to waiver, 
Bradley responded, "I would say that's probably not very 
common."   
¶18 Bradley's testimony was largely echoed by Dr. David 
Thompson (Dr. Thompson), the Deputy Director of the DHHS who was 
also present at the staffing meeting.  Dr. Thompson testified 
that the DHHS chose not to offer a recommendation as to waiver 
because the members "simply couldn't reach a consensus on what 
the recommendation should be."  Dr. Thompson recounted that 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
11 
 
"[t]here were strong feelings in [the DHHS] staffing that Tyler 
should be waived into adult court, and there were also strong 
feelings that he was a suitable candidate for remaining in the 
juvenile justice system."  Moreover, Dr. Thompson volunteered 
that some members of the DHHS exhibited "fairly strong feelings 
for waiver" even prior to ADA Wiedenfeld's presence at the 
staffing meeting. 
¶19 At the close of the hearing on March 12, 2010, the 
circuit court announced its decision to waive juvenile court 
jurisdiction over Tyler.  The court was satisfied that the State 
had proven by clear and convincing evidence that juvenile court 
jurisdiction would be contrary to the best interests of both 
Tyler and the public.  The court acknowledged that Tyler had 
behaved well in secure detention but expressed concern over his 
alcohol and drug abuse and his moderate to high risk of 
reoffending.  Given the dangerous and serial nature of Tyler's 
offenses, the court found that juvenile court jurisdiction 
"would be a serious disservice to the public."  The court 
further noted that Tyler's rehabilitative needs could still be 
served through the facilities and services afforded by the 
Kenosha County and Lake County juvenile courts. 
¶20 The circuit court made clear that its decision to 
waive juvenile court jurisdiction over Tyler was based upon the 
court's 
"own 
feelings" 
and 
not 
upon 
the 
DHHS's 
waiver 
investigation report.  While remarking that it was "not a good 
idea" for the DHHS to invite only ADA Wiedenfeld to its staffing 
meeting, the court was satisfied that his presence was not 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
12 
 
coercive and that positions both in favor of waiver and against 
waiver were represented.  The court therefore denied Tyler's 
request to strike the waiver investigation report. 
¶21 Three days later, on March 15, 2010, the circuit court 
entered its order granting the State's petition to waive 
juvenile court jurisdiction over Tyler. 
¶22 Tyler appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.  
State v. Tyler T., No. 2010AP784, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. Dec. 29, 2010).  Concluding that a waiver investigation 
report is distinct from a PSI report, id., ¶10, the court of 
appeals 
found 
no 
support 
for 
Tyler's 
argument 
that 
ADA 
Wiedenfeld was precluded from participating in the DHHS's 
staffing meeting, id., ¶14.  In any event, the court of appeals 
determined that the circuit court's decision to waive juvenile 
court jurisdiction over Tyler was made independent of the waiver 
investigation report.  Id., ¶15. 
¶23 Tyler petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on September 13, 2011. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 The decision to waive juvenile court jurisdiction 
under Wis. Stat. § 938.18 is committed to the sound discretion 
of the juvenile court.  J.A.L. v. State, 162 Wis. 2d 940, 960, 
471 N.W.2d 493 (1991) (applying Wis. Stat. § 48.18 (1989-90))8; 
                                                 
8 Effective July 1, 1996, as part of its creation of Wis. 
Stat. ch. 938, the Juvenile Justice Code, the legislature 
repealed Wis. Stat. § 48.18 (1993-94) and replaced it with Wis. 
Stat. § 938.18.  1995 Wis. Act 77, §§ 87-99, 629, 9400; see also 
State 
v. 
Kleser, 
2010 WI 88, ¶42, 328 Wis. 2d 42, 786 
N.W.2d 144.   
No. 
2010AP784   
 
13 
 
D.H. v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 286, 304-05, 251 N.W.2d 196 (1977) 
(applying Wis. Stat. § 48.18 (1975-76)).  We will reverse the 
juvenile court's decision to waive jurisdiction only if the 
court erroneously exercised its discretion.  J.A.L., 162 
Wis. 2d at 960.  A juvenile court erroneously exercises its 
discretion if it fails to carefully delineate the relevant facts 
or reasons motivating its decision or if it renders a decision 
not reasonably supported by the facts of record.  Id. at 961; 
D.H., 76 Wis. 2d at 305.  In reviewing the juvenile court's 
discretionary decision to waive jurisdiction, we look for 
reasons to sustain the court's decision.  J.A.L., 162 Wis. 2d at 
961. 
¶25 At 
the 
same 
time, 
whether 
ADA 
Wiedenfeld's 
participation in the DHHS's staffing meeting entitles Tyler to a 
new waiver investigation report and a new waiver hearing before 
a different judge presents a question of law that we review 
without deference to the juvenile court. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶26 In this case, Tyler does not argue that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion when it waived 
juvenile court jurisdiction over Tyler.  Rather, Tyler argues 
that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in denying his 
request to strike the DHHS's waiver investigation report.  
Comparing a waiver investigation report to a PSI report under 
Wis. Stat. § 972.15, Tyler contends that ADA Wiedenfeld's 
participation 
in 
the 
DHHS's 
staffing 
meeting 
constituted 
improper ex parte communication that compromised the objectivity 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
14 
 
of the waiver investigation report.  As such, Tyler requests 
that we vacate the circuit court's order waiving juvenile court 
jurisdiction, 
order 
the 
preparation 
of 
a 
new 
waiver 
investigation report, and order the circuit court to conduct a 
new waiver hearing before a different judge.  In support of his 
position, Tyler relies almost exclusively upon a series of cases 
in which the court of appeals concluded that the integrity of 
the sentencing process requires that a PSI report be objective.  
We therefore begin our analysis by discussing those cases.   
¶27 In 
State 
v. 
Knapp, 
111 
Wis. 2d 380, 
385, 
330 
N.W.2d 242 (Ct. App. 1983), the court of appeals held that a 
defendant's Sixth Amendment9 right to the assistance of counsel 
does not entitle the defendant to have counsel present at a PSI 
interview.  The court of appeals explained that a PSI report 
assists the sentencing court in selecting an appropriate 
                                                 
9 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, 
¶20 n.8, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40 (citing Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 
2d 194, 202, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997)). 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
15 
 
sentence for the defendant by gathering information concerning 
the defendant's personality, social circumstances, and pattern 
of behavior.  Id. at 384, 386.  Because the sentencing court is 
equally responsible to both the convicted defendant and the 
public, the court of appeals determined that access to "the 
fullest information possible" is "[h]ighly relevant, if not 
essential" to the sentencing court's decision.  Id. at 384-85.  
The court of appeals concluded that defense counsel's presence 
at the PSI interview could "seriously impede" the sentencing 
court's ability to obtain and consider all relevant facts that 
might aid the court in forming an intelligent sentencing 
decision.  Id. at 385. 
¶28 Nearly ten years later, in State v. Perez, 170 
Wis. 2d 130, 142, 487 N.W.2d 630 (Ct. App. 1992), the court of 
appeals cited the same concerns in rejecting the defendant's 
argument that due process requires the presence of counsel at a 
PSI interview.  The court of appeals reiterated that a PSI 
report serves as the sentencing court's information base, id. at 
140, adding that the author of the PSI report acts exclusively 
on behalf of the independent judiciary, id. at 141.  In order to 
safeguard the reliability and accuracy of the PSI report, the 
court of appeals ruled that "the probation and parole agent 
preparing the report must be neutral and independent of either 
the prosecution or the defense."  Id. at 140.  Otherwise, the 
court 
of 
appeals 
reasoned, 
the 
PSI 
interview 
would 
be 
transformed from an unbiased, information-gathering proceeding 
into an adversarial proceeding.  Id. at 141.  In sum, "[t]he 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
16 
 
active involvement of an advocate——defense counsel or, for that 
matter, the prosecution——in the information-gathering process 
could cause a serious degradation in the reliability and 
impartiality of the sentencing court's information base."  Id. 
¶29 Drawing 
upon 
Perez, 
in 
State 
v. 
Suchocki, 
208 
Wis. 2d 509, 520, 561 N.W.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1997), overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶2, 291 
Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1,10 the court of appeals concluded that 
the circuit court erred in denying the defendant's motion to 
strike the PSI report, reasoning that the marital relationship 
between the prosecutor and the author of the PSI report was 
itself sufficient to draw into question the objectivity of the 
PSI report.  In that case, the PSI report was prepared by an 
agent of the Division of Corrections11 who was married to the 
district attorney who prosecuted the defendant.  Suchocki, 208 
                                                 
10 In Blum v. 1st Auto & Casualty Insurance Co., 2010 WI 78, 
¶46, 326 Wis. 2d 729, 786 N.W.2d 78, this court held that unless 
we "explicitly state[] otherwise, a court of appeals opinion 
overruled by this court no longer retain[s] any precedential 
value."  In the instant case, neither Tyler nor the State 
discusses whether Suchocki retains any precedential value in 
light of our holding in Blum.  In fact, neither party even 
acknowledges that Suchocki has been overruled in part.  In any 
event, because we conclude that Suchocki is inapplicable to the 
instant case, see infra ¶37, we need not decide today whether 
Suchocki retains any precedential value. 
11 Prior to the creation of the DOC in 1990, see 1989 Wis. 
Act 31, §§ 2569, 3203(23)(a), the Division of Corrections was 
contained within the Department of Health and Social Services.  
See Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Special Reports: A 
Brief History of the Department of Corrections, http://www.wi-
doc.com/DOC_History.htm (last visited May 2, 2012). 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
17 
 
Wis. 2d at 513.  The defendant moved to strike the PSI report, 
arguing that the marital relationship between the prosecutor and 
the author of the PSI report compromised the objectivity of the 
report and thereby tainted the sentencing process.  Id. at 514.  
The circuit court denied the motion but permitted the defendant 
to file an alternative PSI report.  Id.  The court then 
considered both PSI reports at sentencing.  Id. 
¶30 On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the 
circuit court erred in denying the defendant's motion to strike 
the PSI report.  Id. at 520.  Citing Perez, 170 Wis. 2d at 140-
41, the court of appeals observed that the Division of 
Corrections, in fulfilling its role of gathering information for 
a PSI report, functions as an agent of the sentencing court.  
Suchocki, 208 Wis. 2d at 518.  Because the integrity of the 
sentencing process demands that the PSI report be objective, the 
court of appeals reaffirmed that the author of the PSI report 
must be "neutral and independent from either the prosecution or 
the defense."  Id.  When a marital relationship exists between 
the prosecutor and the author of the PSI report, the court of 
appeals remarked, the author may be subconsciously influenced in 
forming her impressions of the defendant and in making a 
recommendation to the sentencing court.  Id. at 519.  Thus, the 
court of appeals held that the marital relationship alone was 
sufficient to draw into question the objectivity of the PSI 
report, regardless of whether or not the author was biased in 
fact.  Id. at 520. 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
18 
 
¶31 Still, the Suchocki court denied the defendant's 
request for resentencing, concluding that the defendant failed 
to show that the tainted PSI report prejudiced the sentencing 
process.  Id. at 521.  The court of appeals explained that the 
circuit court was conscious of the defendant's objection to the 
PSI report and expressly based its sentence on the defendant's 
uncontroverted 
conduct 
rather 
than 
on 
the 
recommendation 
contained in the PSI report.  Id. at 521-22. 
¶32 Finally, in State v. Howland, 2003 WI App 104, ¶37, 
264 Wis. 2d 279, 663 N.W.2d 340, the court of appeals held that 
the prosecutor's contacts with the Division of Community 
Corrections (DCC),12 in which he expressed his dissatisfaction 
with the recommendation contained in the PSI report, constituted 
a material and substantial breach of the plea agreement.  In 
that case, the defendant was charged with second-degree sexual 
assault of a child and misdemeanor bail jumping.  Id., ¶2.  In 
exchange for the defendant's plea of no contest, the State 
agreed, inter alia, to dismiss the charge of bail jumping and to 
not make a specific sentence recommendation.  Id.  In spite of 
that agreement, on at least three occasions, the prosecutor 
contacted the DCC to complain about the PSI report's sentence 
recommendation of probation.  See id., ¶29.  Subsequent to these 
contacts, the author of the PSI report amended the report by 
changing the recommendation from probation to five to seven 
                                                 
12 The DCC is a division of the DOC that oversees the 
supervision of individuals on probation, parole, or extended 
supervision. 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
19 
 
years of incarceration.  Id.  The circuit court ultimately 
sentenced the defendant to 20 years imprisonment, comprised of 
nine years of initial confinement and 11 years on extended 
supervision.  Id., ¶16. 
¶33 The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause 
to the circuit court for resentencing conducted by a different 
judge.  Id., ¶¶37, 38.  The court of appeals concluded that the 
State effectively procured a sentence recommendation through the 
DCC by expressing its concerns with the PSI report, thereby 
committing an "end run" around the plea agreement.  Id., ¶31.  
In 
addition 
to 
holding 
that 
the 
State 
materially 
and 
substantially breached the plea agreement, id., ¶37, the court 
of appeals made a point to note that the prosecutor's contacts 
with the DCC "border[ed] on ex parte communications," id., ¶32.  
Citing Suchocki, 208 Wis. 2d at 518, the court of appeals 
explained that the issue was not the mere existence of contact 
between the prosecutor and the DCC but rather whether the 
contacts subconsciously influenced the author of the PSI report.  
Howland, 264 Wis. 2d 279, ¶35.  Again stating that a PSI report 
must be "accurate, reliable and, above all, objective," the 
court 
of 
appeals 
advised 
that 
a 
cooperative 
and 
open 
relationship between the defendant and the author of the PSI 
report "would be impossible" if the defendant perceived the 
latter "to be a mere puppet of the district attorney's office."  
Id., ¶36.  Accordingly, in order "to avoid any further taint," 
the court of appeals ordered a new PSI report to be prepared by 
a department from a different county.  Id., ¶38. 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
20 
 
¶34 Turning back to the instant case, Tyler urges us to 
apply the above series of cases to waiver investigation reports 
under Wis. Stat. § 938.18(2m).  Tyler suggests that a PSI report 
is comparable to a waiver investigation report because both 
reports serve as the court's information base and because the 
author of both reports acts exclusively on behalf of the 
independent judiciary.  It follows, according to Tyler, that 
because we require a PSI report to be objective, we must equally 
require a waiver investigation report to be objective.  In the 
instant case, relying on Suchocki and Howland, Tyler contends 
that ADA Wiedenfeld's participation in the DHHS's staffing 
meeting could have subconsciously influenced the DHHS in forming 
its impressions of Tyler and in choosing not to offer any formal 
recommendation as to waiver, thus drawing into question the 
objectivity of the waiver investigation report as a matter of 
law.  As a result, similar to the remedy afforded in Howland, 
Tyler contends that he is entitled to the preparation of a new 
waiver investigation report and to a new waiver hearing before a 
different judge. 
¶35 We disagree.  We conclude that the circuit court did 
not err in denying Tyler's request to strike the waiver 
investigation report prepared by the DHHS.  While we, like the 
circuit court, have reservations about the DHHS's decision to 
invite only ADA Wiedenfeld to its final staffing meeting, we 
decline to create a bright-line rule precluding the DHHS from 
communicating directly with either party, be it the State or the 
juvenile, for purposes of preparing a waiver investigation 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
21 
 
report.  Rather, consistent with the DHHS's role in delinquency 
proceedings and in furtherance of the express objectives of Wis. 
Stat. ch. 938, we conclude that the DHHS is free to compile 
information for a waiver investigation report in the manner it 
deems most beneficial to the circuit court. 
¶36 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18(2m) grants the circuit court 
discretionary authority to "designate an agency, as defined in 
s. 938.38(1)(a), to submit a report analyzing the criteria [for 
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction] specified in sub. (5)."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 938.38(1)(a) defines "agency" as the DOC, a 
county department (like the DHHS in this case), or a licensed 
child welfare agency.  Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18(2m) further 
provides that "[t]he court may rely on facts stated in the 
report in making its findings with respect to the criteria under 
sub. (5)."  Pursuant to § 938.18(5), the criteria for waiver of 
juvenile court jurisdiction include the personality of the 
juvenile; the prior record of the juvenile; the type and 
seriousness 
of 
the 
juvenile's 
offense; 
the 
adequacy 
and 
suitability of facilities, services, and procedures available 
for treatment of the juvenile and protection of the public 
within the juvenile justice system; and, if the juvenile was 
allegedly associated in the offense with persons who will be 
charged in the court of criminal jurisdiction, the desirability 
of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court. 
¶37 To be sure, as Tyler notes, a waiver investigation 
report under Wis. Stat. § 938.18(2m) bears some similarities to 
a PSI report under Wis. Stat. § 972.15.  For example, both 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
22 
 
reports may be ordered and relied upon at the circuit court's 
discretion, compare Wis. Stat. § 938.18(2m), with Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.15(1) 
("After 
a 
conviction 
the 
court 
may 
order 
a 
presentence 
investigation . . . ."), 
and 
both 
reports 
are 
designed to assist the circuit court in making an informed 
decision 
by compiling information concerning the specific 
defendant, compare Wis. Stat. § 938.18(2m), (5), with Knapp, 111 
Wis. 2d at 386 ("[P]resentence reports are designed to gather 
information 
concerning 
a 
defendant's 
personality, 
social 
circumstances and general pattern of behavior, so that the judge 
can make an informed sentencing decision.").  Cf. J.A.L., 162 
Wis. 2d at 973 (comparing a waiver hearing to a sentencing 
hearing).  Still, it does not follow, as Tyler suggests, that we 
must apply to waiver investigation reports the same objectivity 
requirements that we demand of PSI reports.  In other respects, 
a waiver investigation report is fundamentally different than a 
PSI report.   
¶38 A PSI report is prepared post-conviction by an 
employee of the DOC.  See Wis. Stat. § 972.15(1).  The DOC is "a 
neutral and independent participant in the sentencing process."  
State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 131, 452 N.W.2d 377 (1990); 
cf. Farrar v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 651, 657, 191 N.W.2d 214 (1971) 
("In Wisconsin, the entire sentencing process is to be a search 
for the truth and an evaluation of alternatives.  Any advance 
understanding between prosecutor and defendant must not involve 
the trial judge——or any persons conducting a presentence 
investigation for such trial judge or court.").  Thus, in 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
23 
 
preparing a PSI report, "[i]t necessarily follows that a parole 
or 
probation 
officer 
acts 
on 
behalf 
of 
an 
independent 
judiciary," not as an agent of either the State or the defense.  
McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d at 131; see also State v. Washington, 2009 
WI App 148, ¶9, 321 Wis. 2d 508, 775 N.W.2d 535 ("The DOC does 
not function as an agent of either the State or the defense in 
fulfilling its PSI role but as an agent of the court in 
gathering information relating to a specific defendant.").  In 
this respect, a waiver investigation report is distinct from a 
PSI report.  Unlike the author of a PSI report who, in order to 
protect the integrity of the sentencing process, must remain 
neutral and independent from both the prosecution and the 
defense, see Howland, 264 Wis. 2d 279, ¶36; Suchocki, 208 
Wis. 2d at 518; Perez, 170 Wis. 2d at 140, the author of a 
waiver investigation report, here, DHHS, is necessarily involved 
with both the juvenile and the State from the start of the 
delinquency process.  The DHHS is responsible for providing "24 
hours a day, 7 days a week" intake services for the purpose of 
screening 
juveniles 
taken 
into 
custody. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.067(1).  Intake services "shall" include, inter alia, 
interviewing the juvenile, § 938.067(2), determining whether and 
where the juvenile should be held in custody, § 938.067(3), (4), 
providing crisis counseling to the juvenile, § 938.067(5), 
requesting that a delinquency petition be filed or entering into 
a deferred prosecution agreement, § 938.067(6), and taking 
juveniles into custody, § 938.067(8m).  Likewise, when a 
juvenile is not taken into custody, delinquency proceedings 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
24 
 
begin with a referral by law enforcement to an intake worker.  
See Wis. Stat. § 938.24(1).  The intake worker must then 
"conduct an intake inquiry on behalf of the court to determine 
whether the available facts establish prima facie jurisdiction 
and to determine the best interests of the juvenile and of the 
public with regard to any action to be taken."  § 938.24(1).  
Within 40 days of receiving the referral, the intake worker must 
determine whether to (1) request that the district attorney file 
a delinquency petition under Wis. Stat. § 938.25; (2) enter into 
a deferred prosecution agreement; or (3) close the case.  Wis. 
Stat. § 938.24(3)-(5).  Once the district attorney receives an 
intake worker's request, the district attorney has 20 days to 
"file the petition, close the case, or refer the case back to 
intake or, with notice to intake, the law enforcement agency 
investigating the case."  § 938.25(2).  As these statutes 
demonstrate, unlike the sentencing process, which requires the 
DOC to remain neutral and independent from both the prosecution 
and the defense, the delinquency process requires immediate 
contact between the DHHS and both the juvenile and the State.  
¶39 Given the DHHS's role in delinquency proceedings as 
outlined in Wis. Stat. ch. 938, we do not think that the DHHS's 
contact with the juvenile and the State must necessarily cease 
at the preparation of a waiver investigation report.  Indeed, in 
light of the criteria under Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5) that the DHHS 
is directed to analyze, a waiver investigation report may not be 
complete unless the DHHS continues to communicate with the 
juvenile and the State.  As previously mentioned, the criteria 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
25 
 
for waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction include, inter alia, 
"[t]he personality of the juvenile" and "[t]he adequacy and 
suitability of facilities, services and procedures available for 
treatment of the juvenile and protection of the public within 
the juvenile justice system."  § 938.18(5).  In delinquency 
proceedings, 
the 
district 
attorney 
"shall" 
represent 
the 
interests of the public.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.09(1).  It 
follows that the DHHS must necessarily communicate with the 
juvenile in order to analyze the juvenile's personality and must 
necessarily communicate with the district attorney in order to 
analyze 
whether 
the 
facilities, 
services, 
and 
procedures 
available within the juvenile justice system are sufficiently 
adequate to protect the public from the juvenile.  
¶40 Moreover, permitting the DHHS to contact both the 
juvenile and the State for purposes of preparing a waiver 
investigation report effectuates the express objectives of Wis. 
Stat. ch. 938.  By enacting Chapter 938, the legislature 
intended to "promote a juvenile justice system capable of 
dealing with the problem of juvenile delinquency, a system which 
will protect the community, impose accountability for violations 
of law and equip juvenile offenders with competencies to live 
responsibly and productively."  Wis. Stat. § 938.01(2).  To that 
end, one of Chapter 938's express objectives is "[t]o respond to 
a juvenile offender's needs for care and treatment, consistent 
with the prevention of delinquency, each juvenile's best 
interest and protection of the public, by allowing the court to 
utilize 
the 
most 
effective 
dispositional 
option."  
No. 
2010AP784   
 
26 
 
§ 938.01(2)(f).  In the context of waiving juvenile court 
jurisdiction, our courts have recognized that the juvenile 
court's dual responsibility to protect both the juvenile and the 
public is "best served when the court has access to the fullest 
information possible."  S.N. v. State, 139 Wis. 2d 270, 275, 407 
N.W.2d 562 (Ct. App. 1987);13 see also D.H., 76 Wis. 2d at 303.  
Permitting the DHHS to contact both the juvenile and the State 
for purposes of preparing a waiver investigation report ensures 
that the court has access to a wider range of information.  
Indeed, the application of rigid rules to a waiver proceeding is 
more likely to impair the court's ability to make an informed 
                                                 
13 Advancing that S.N. v. State, 139 Wis. 2d 270, 407 
N.W.2d 562 (Ct. App. 1987), is the decisive authority on the 
instant case, the dissent concludes that the distinctions 
between a PSI report and a waiver investigation report "are 
without a difference" and that both reports must be held to an 
identical standard of objectivity.  See dissent, ¶¶56-61.  The 
dissent overstates the impact of S.N.  In S.N., a decision that 
spans just over seven pages, the court of appeals held that the 
then-existing Children's Code, Wis. Stat. ch. 48 (1985-86), did 
not prohibit the juvenile court from considering a waiver 
investigation report prepared by the county department of social 
services, even though the report went beyond the facts contained 
in the waiver petition.  139 Wis. 2d at 274-75.  The court 
reasoned that § 48.18(5) (1985-86) "does not provide that such 
additional evidence may be only presented by the juvenile," and 
in fact, the juvenile court's dual function of protecting the 
juvenile and the public through its decision on waiver is "best 
served when the court has access to the fullest information 
possible."  Id. at 275.  As the dissent correctly points out, 
see dissent, ¶60, the S.N. court's determination that a juvenile 
court may consider a waiver investigation report prepared by a 
county department of social services is now codified at Wis. 
Stat. § 938.18(2m).  Contrary to the dissent's insinuations, 
however, the S.N. decision is void of any discussion pertaining 
to the manner in which the county department must compile 
information for its waiver investigation report. 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
27 
 
and intelligent decision than to lead to a just result.  D.H., 
76 Wis. 2d at 303.  Accordingly, we decline to create a bright-
line rule precluding the DHHS from communicating directly with 
either party, be it the State or the juvenile, for purposes of 
preparing a waiver investigation report.  Rather, we conclude 
that the DHHS is free to compile information for a waiver 
investigation report in the manner it deems most beneficial to 
the circuit court. 
¶41 That being said, in the instant case, we share the 
circuit court's reservations about the DHHS's decision to invite 
only ADA Wiedenfeld to its final staffing meeting.  Inviting 
only one party to a final staffing meeting creates a perception 
of imbalanced information, a perception which——like in the 
instant case——may prove inaccurate.  Here, any perceived 
imbalance caused by ADA Wiedenfeld's participation in the 
staffing 
meeting 
was 
refuted 
by 
the 
circuit 
court's 
uncontroverted findings that ADA Wiedenfeld's presence was not 
coercive and that positions both in favor of waiver and against 
waiver were represented.  In addition, the circuit court 
expressly stated that its decision to waive juvenile court 
jurisdiction over Tyler was based upon the court's "own 
feelings" and not upon the DHHS's waiver investigation report.  
In the future, however, it may be a better practice for the DHHS 
to invite both parties, or neither party, to its final staffing 
meeting.  We will leave that decision to the DHHS. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
No. 
2010AP784   
 
28 
 
¶42 We conclude that the circuit court did not err in 
denying Tyler's request to strike the waiver investigation 
report prepared by the DHHS.  While we have reservations about 
the DHHS's decision to invite only the assistant district 
attorney to its final staffing meeting, we decline to create a 
bright-line rule precluding the DHHS from communicating directly 
with either party, be it the State or the juvenile, for purposes 
of preparing a waiver investigation report.  Rather, consistent 
with 
the 
DHHS's 
role 
in 
delinquency 
proceedings 
and 
in 
furtherance of the express objectives of Wis. Stat. ch. 938, we 
conclude that the DHHS is free to compile information for a 
waiver investigation report in the manner it deems most 
beneficial to the circuit court. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶43 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  10ap784.awb 
 
1 
 
¶44 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  In this case, 
the juvenile court asked the Walworth County Department of 
Health and Human Services to prepare a waiver investigation 
report.  Under the authority of Wis. Stat. § 938.18(2m), the 
Department's role is to serve as an independent agent gathering 
information to aid the court's determination about whether Tyler 
T. should be tried in juvenile or adult court.  It held a 
meeting to formulate its recommendation to the court.    
¶45 We are asked to determine whether the prosecuting 
attorney's ex parte advocacy at the Department's meeting 
constituted improper involvement in what should have been a 
neutral and independent decision-making process.  The answer to 
this question should be a resounding "yes."   
¶46 Instead, 
the 
majority 
equivocates. 
 
Expressing 
reservation about the Department's procedure, it acknowledges 
that such a procedure creates a perception of imbalanced 
information.  Ultimately, however, it answers the question with 
a halfhearted "no."   
¶47 The majority reaches this halfhearted conclusion by 
setting up a fallacy of false choice instead of squarely 
addressing the question presented and by selective analysis 
instead of applying the most relevant case law.  Because I 
conclude that the prosecuting attorney's ex parte advocacy at 
the Department's decision-making meeting was improper, and 
because I cannot determine that Tyler suffered no prejudice as a 
result, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
No.  10ap784.awb 
 
2 
 
¶48 The majority acknowledges that a waiver investigation 
report "bears some similarities to a PSI report," and that PSI 
reports are required to be independent.  Majority op., ¶¶37, 38.  
It also acknowledges that the presence of an advocate risks 
transforming a meeting "from an unbiased, information-gathering 
proceeding into an adversarial proceeding" and could "cause a 
serious degradation in the reliability and impartiality of the 
[] court's information base."  Id., ¶28.  Nevertheless, after 
cataloging the similarities and differences between PSIs and 
waiver investigation reports, id., ¶¶37-39, the majority asserts 
that "it does not follow . . . that we must apply to waiver 
investigation reports the same objectivity requirements that we 
demand of PSI reports," id., ¶37. 
¶49 Ultimately, the majority "decline[s] to create a 
bright-line rule" because it "do[es] not think that the DHHS's 
contact with the juvenile and the State must necessarily cease 
at the preparation of a waiver investigation report."  Id., 
¶¶35, 39.  Although it expresses "reservations about the DHHS's 
decision to invite only [the prosecuting attorney] to its final 
staffing meeting," the majority concludes: "[T]he DHHS is free 
to compile information for a waiver investigation report in the 
manner it deems most beneficial to the circuit court."  Id., 
¶¶41, 40.     
¶50 The majority reaches this dubious conclusion as a 
result of two errors.  The first is an error of logic, and the 
second is one of selective analysis.   
A 
No.  10ap784.awb 
 
3 
 
¶51 The first error in the majority opinion is that it 
relies on a fallacy of false choice——an error of logic.  Tyler 
asserts that the prosecuting attorney's ex parte advocacy at the 
Department's decision-making meeting was improper.  He does not 
argue that all direct contact between the Department and the 
parties is prohibited.   
¶52 Despite the narrow scope of Tyler's argument, the 
majority frames the issue much more broadly and therefore 
overshoots the issue on review.  Its broad framing of the issue 
allows it to skirt an otherwise obvious result.   
¶53 The implicit rationale is as follows: if it is 
improper for the Department to invite the prosecuting attorney's 
advocacy at its decision-making meeting, then it must likewise 
be improper for the Department to have any contact with the 
State or the juvenile at all for the purpose of gathering 
information relevant to the waiver decision.1  Once examined, 
however, this false choice falls apart.  To conclude that there 
was procedural error here, the court need not "create a bright-
line rule" or require all contact between the Department and the 
parties to "necessarily cease."  Rather, it need only answer the 
question presented. 
                                                 
1 See majority op., ¶39 ("[W]e do not think that the DHHS's 
contact with the juvenile and the State must necessarily cease 
at the preparation of a waiver investigation report."); id., ¶40 
("[P]ermitting the DHHS to contact both the juvenile and the 
State for purposes of preparing a waiver investigation report 
ensures that the court has access to a wider range of 
information."); id. ("[W]e decline to create a bright-line rule 
precluding the DHHS from communicating directly with either 
party . . . for the purposes of preparing a waiver investigation 
report.").  
No.  10ap784.awb 
 
4 
 
¶54 There is a difference between soliciting information 
and soliciting advocacy.  I agree with the majority that the 
Department has a great deal of discretion in how it would like 
to prepare the report and that it is required to have some 
interaction with both the parties to fulfill its information-
gathering function.  However, consistent with the juvenile court 
in this case,2 I conclude that the Department compromises its 
role as an independent agent of the court when it solicits the 
ex parte advocacy of one party at the meeting in which it makes 
crucial decisions about its waiver recommendation and the 
contents of its report.   
B 
¶55 The majority's error in framing the question is 
compounded because it focuses its analysis on the wrong cases 
and overlooks the important principles derived from the most 
relevant case.  It asserts that there are differences between 
PSIs and waiver investigation reports, and I agree.  Yet, with 
no clear explanation of how the distinctions it identifies make 
                                                 
2 After being apprised of the Department's proceedings, the 
court explained: "[A]pparently the District Attorney was invited 
and the defense was not.  I tend to think that that is not a 
good idea, myself."   
No.  10ap784.awb 
 
5 
 
any difference,3 the majority somehow concludes that, as a result 
of these distinctions, waiver investigation reports are held to 
a lower standard of objectivity.  See majority op., ¶37.      
¶56 Even though the majority asserts that PSIs and waiver 
investigation reports are significantly different, it focuses 
its analysis on the case law dealing with PSIs.  It barely 
pauses to mention S.N. v. State, a case that is specific to 
waiver investigation reports.   
¶57 The use of waiver investigation reports was first 
discussed in S.N. v. State, 139 Wis. 2d 270, 407 N.W.2d 562 (Ct. 
App. 1987) (hereinafter, In re S.N.).  That case contemplates 
that the preparer of a waiver investigation report is not an 
ally of the prosecution or the defense, but rather, an 
independent agent of the court.   
¶58 The facts of In re S.N. are straightforward.  The 
State filed a petition to waive a juvenile into adult court, and 
a social worker at the Department of Social Services prepared a 
waiver investigation report for the court.  Id. at 272-73.  At 
                                                 
3 Majority op., ¶¶38-40.  Incidentally, I do not believe 
that the differences between waiver investigation reports and 
PSIs are as pointed as the majority suggests.  For example, the 
majority contends that "a waiver investigation report may not be 
complete unless the DHHS continues to communicate with the 
juvenile and the State," and "permitting [this communication] 
for 
purposes 
of 
preparing 
a 
waiver 
investigation 
report 
effectuates the express objectives of Wis. Stat. ch. 938."  Id., 
¶¶39, 40.  In this respect, I see no difference between a waiver 
investigation report and a PSI.  A PSI also serves an 
information-gathering function, and its author is required to 
attempt to interview the criminal defendant, Wis. Admin. Code 
DOC § 328.29(4), and to obtain information about the crime and 
the 
defendant's 
criminal 
history 
from 
the 
State, 
id., 
§ 328.27(3).   
No.  10ap784.awb 
 
6 
 
the time, there was no statutory authority for the court to 
request a waiver investigation report.  Over the juvenile's 
objection, the court admitted the social worker's report into 
evidence.     
¶59 In determining that the juvenile court did not err by 
admitting the report, the court of appeals stressed the 
independent nature of a waiver investigation report and the fact 
that the report was prepared for the benefit of the court.  It 
emphasized the "juvenile court's duty to independently determine 
whether waiver is appropriate, rather than deferring to the 
state's or the juvenile's request for waiver or to either 
party's acquiescence in the other party's request."  Id. at 275 
(emphasis added).  It explained that the statutes do not 
prohibit the juvenile court "from using independent information 
relevant to waiver, such as the county department of social 
services' waiver investigation report admitted in the present 
case."  Id. (emphasis added).   
¶60 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 938.18(2m) 
reveals that this statute was specifically created to codify the 
procedure set forth by In re S.N.4  Accordingly, the apparent 
                                                 
4 The text of sub. (2m) was proposed in a 1996 letter by 
Randall Schneider, an ADA for Racine County. Among other 
recommendations, Attorney Schneider's letter suggested that the 
In re S.N. procedure be codified:   
Add a sub-section after sec. 938.18(2r) to read: "The 
court may designate an agency as defined in sec. 
938.38(1)(a) to prepare and submit a report analyzing 
the waiver criteria as defined in sub. (5) as applied 
to the juvenile.  The report shall be given to all 
parties at least 3 days prior to the waiver hearing.  
The court, in its discretion, may rely on facts 
No.  10ap784.awb 
 
7 
 
purpose of sub. (2m) is to provide a procedure for court 
appointment of an independent agent of the court charged with 
gathering the fullest possible information.   
¶61 Because the majority ignores the principles of the 
founding case of In re S.N., it erroneously concludes that 
waiver reports are held to a lower standard of objectivity.  To 
the contrary, my review of In re S.N. suggests that the 
distinctions between PSIs and waiver investigation reports 
identified by the majority are without a difference, and that 
both types of reports must be prepared by an independent agent 
of the court.   
¶62 The waiver investigation report is supposed to be a 
means of gathering information, not a means of funneling 
advocacy to the juvenile court.  The presence of advocates at 
the Department's meeting "could cause a serious degradation in 
the reliability and impartiality of the [] court's information 
base" and could transform (or, at the very least, risk 
transforming) 
the 
meeting "from an unbiased, information-
gathering proceeding into an adversarial proceeding."  See 
majority op., ¶28 (discussing State v. Perez, 170 Wis. 2d 130, 
                                                                                                                                                             
contained within the waiver study in making its 
finding under sub. (5)."  This codifies In the 
interest of S.N., 139 Wis. 2d 270, 407 N.W.2d 562 (Ct. 
App. 1987). 
Letter from Randall Schneider to the Juvenile Justice Study 
Committee (Feb. 13, 1996) (on file with the Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin) (emphasis added).  This 
proposed 
language 
was 
modified 
slightly 
and 
was 
then 
incorporated, as modified, as an amendment to 1995 SB 624.  
Ultimately, it was passed and signed into law.  1995 Wis. Act 
352. 
No.  10ap784.awb 
 
8 
 
487 N.W.2d 630 (Ct. App. 1992)).  In this case, the risk to the 
court's information base was compounded because only one side 
was invited to advocate for its desired result.  I conclude that 
the Department's procedure was in error.  
II 
¶63 Although the juvenile court recognized the problem 
with the Department's procedure, it concluded that it was 
unnecessary to order a new report.  In making its decision on 
waiver, the court attempted to isolate the effect of the tainted 
report.  It explained: "I'm satisfied with the thorough input 
from both parties as to the situation, and I believe I've made 
my decision which is ultimately the Court's responsibility and 
not the Department's."  It assured the parties that its waiver 
decision was made based upon its "own feelings," and not the 
Department's.      
¶64 I appreciate the juvenile court's attempts to separate 
its waiver decision from the tainted report.  Nevertheless, I 
cannot conclude that Tyler suffered no prejudice as a result of 
the improper procedure before the Department.   
¶65 Although the court took great pains to disentangle the 
information in the report from its own conclusion, facts from 
the tainted report crept into the court's analysis of the waiver 
criteria.5  The report's influence on the juvenile court is 
                                                 
5 For example, when discussing the criteria, the juvenile 
court observed that Tyler came "from a family where there [were] 
multiple relationships and family members [involved with] drugs 
and alcohol," and that in school, there were periods where 
"there was a total lapse of doing his homework and getting poor 
grades."  These facts come directly from the Department's 
report.  
No.  10ap784.awb 
 
9 
 
evinced by the court's reliance on the facts it adduced from the 
report.  
¶66 It is impossible to know what would have happened if 
the 
prosecuting 
attorney 
had 
not 
been 
present 
at 
the 
Department's meeting.  There were many mitigating facts that 
could support a decision to retain Tyler in juvenile court, and 
there 
was 
significant 
sentiment 
against 
waiver 
in 
the 
Department.  In fact, the assigned case worker volunteered, "I 
certainly felt there were reasons and information provided that 
a recommendation could be made to——to retain [Tyler] in juvenile 
court."  Who knows what the recommendation would have been if 
the ex parte advocacy of the prosecuting attorney had not been 
infused into the discussion?   
¶67 If the report had ultimately recommended against 
waiver, no one can know the impact that such a recommendation 
would have had on the juvenile court's determination.  Judges 
often give great value to the on-the-ground determinations and 
recommendations of the Department.   
¶68 The problem here is that we just don't know.  We 
cannot unring the bell.    
¶69 Accordingly, because I cannot conclude that Tyler 
suffered no prejudice, I respectfully dissent.    
¶70 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
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