Case Title: Casteel v. News-Record, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Casteel v. News-Record, Inc.1994 WY 58875 P.2d 21Case Number: 93-197Decided: 05/26/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Larry 
Dean CASTEEL,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

The 
NEWS-RECORD, INC., a Wyoming corporation,

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Robert 
J. O'Neil, Legal Clinic of Robert J. O'Neil, Gillette.

Representing 
Appellee:

Charles 
G. Kepler and Chris Edwards, Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, 
Cody.

 

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

Cardine, 
J., filed specially concurring opinion.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, Larry 
Dean Casteel, whose defamation action against appellee, the Gillette 
News-Record, Inc., was dispatched by the district court's entry of summary 
judgment, appeals that summary judgment claiming the existence of at least one 
genuine issue of material fact, as well as a procedural error in the scheduling 
of the summary judgment hearing.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents the following issues for our review: 

I. 
Was the Motion For Summary Judgment of The Defendant, The News-Record, Inc. 
against the Plaintiff, Larry Dean Casteel timely heard?

II. 
Did Wyoming Statute § 1-29-105 apply to the facts of this 
case?

III. 
Did a material issue of fact exist so as to preclude the Court from granting the 
Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendant, The News-Record, Inc. against the 
Plaintiff, Larry Dean Casteel?

[¶4]      Appellee presents 
the issues as:

1. 
Was the Motion for Summary Judgment timely heard?

2. 
Was the article that was printed in the April 3, 1992 edition of The 
News-Record substantially true, and thus a complete defense to any claim of 
libel?

3. 
Was the article that was printed in the April 3, 1992 edition of The 
News-Record a fair and impartial report, and thus privileged according to 
the requirements of Wyoming Statutes Section 1-29-105, which operates as a 
complete defense to any claim of libel?

FACTS

[¶5]      On January 22, 
1992, the state filed a criminal complaint against appellant charging him with 
one count each of first and second-degree sexual assault and one count of taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a child. On April 1, 1992, pursuant 
to a plea agreement, appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere on a deferred 
prosecution to the charge of taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with 
a child.

[¶6]      On April 3, 1992, 
appellee ran the following story in the "Courts" section of its paper, reporting 
the April 1, 1992 hearing:

Larry 
Casteel, 48, pleaded no contest during his arraignment in District Court to a 
felony charge of indecent liberties. In exchange for his plea, felony charges of 
first and second degree sexual assault were dropped. Casteel admitted to 
committing indecent liberties from 1985 to 1991 with a girl who is now 16 years 
old. According to the plea agreement, prosecutors will defer prosecution of the 
indecent liberties charge and Casteel will undergo counseling and be placed on 
unsupervised probation for up to one year.

[¶7]      Following 
publication of the story, appellant's counsel contacted appellee concerning the 
inaccuracy of the portion of the story reporting appellant had "admitted" to the 
charges against him. On April 14, 1992, appellee printed a clarification, in the 
same size type as used in the original article, which 
read:

A 
court item in the April 3 News-Record incorrectly stated that Larry Casteel, 48, 
admitted to committing indecent liberties with a now, 16 year old girl. In fact, 
Casteel pleaded "no contest" to the charge and denied any wrongdoing whatsoever. 
Casteel agreed to seek counseling and was placed on unsupervised probation for 
one year.

[¶8]      On April 2, 1993, 
appellant brought the instant action against appellee for defamation arising 
from the April 3, 1992 news account. On April 26, 1993, the district court 
issued a Case Management Order. Paragraph four of the order 
provided:

At 
least 20 days before the pre-trial conference . . . all Rule 54(b) and 56 
motions must be filed and scheduled so they may be heard at least 5 days before 
the conference[.] Motions not timely filed and heard are 
waived.

[¶9]      On May 19, 1993, 
the district court issued an order scheduling the pre-trial conference for July 
28, 1993. On July 6, 1993, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, to 
which appellant filed a traverse on July 26, 1993. The district court scheduled 
the summary judgment hearing for July 28, 1993, just one hour before the 
pretrial conference. The district court's order granting appellee's motion for 
summary judgment was entered August 17, 1993, and this appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

1. 
Timeliness of Summary Judgment Hearing

[¶10]   Appellant first contends that the 
district court's entry of summary judgment should be reversed because the 
summary judgment hearing was not held within the time set forth by the Case 
Management Order. Appellee responds first that appellant has waived any 
objection to the timing of the summary judgment hearing by his failure to object 
below. Appellee further asserts that adherence to the Case Management Order is 
within the trial court's discretion, no abuse of that discretion has been 
demonstrated, and appellant has failed to prove prejudice resulting from the 
timing of the summary judgment hearing.

[¶11]   A case management order is a type 
of pretrial order. The trial court has discretion in determining the 
requirements of adherence to pretrial orders, and its rulings will not be 
overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Dieringer, 708 P.2d 1, 8 (Wyo. 1985); Ford Motor Co. v. Kuhbacher, 518 P.2d 1255, 1260 
(Wyo. 1974). Additionally, this court cannot reverse except for error which is 
shown to be prejudicial. Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Wyo. 
1983); Caillier v. City of Newcastle, 423 P.2d 653, 656 (Wyo. 
1967).

[¶12]   We need not, however, reach these 
questions of whether the trial court abused its discretion, and if so, whether 
the error was prejudicial, because appellant failed to object below to the 
timing of the summary judgment hearing. "An issue not called to the attention of 
the trial court will not be considered on appeal." Davenport v. Epperly, 
744 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Wyo. 1987) (citing ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 
632 P.2d 925, 942 (Wyo. 1981)). Appellant filed a traverse to appellee's motion 
for summary judgment, but never objected to the timing of the summary judgment 
hearing. Thus, this court will not now consider the issue.

2. 
Propriety of Summary Judgment

[¶13]   "Summary judgment is appropriate 
when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the prevailing party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Lynch v. Norton Construction, 
Inc., 861 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Wyo. 1993) (citing Brown v. Avery, 850 P.2d 612, 614-15 (Wyo. 1993)). "When reviewing the propriety of a grant of 
summary judgment, we review the record in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion, giving that party all favorable inferences that can be 
drawn from the facts." Lynch, 861 P.2d  at 1097 (citing Miller v. 
Campbell County, 854 P.2d 71, 75 (Wyo. 1993)).

[¶14]   Appellant contends that the 
district court erred when it granted appellee's motion for summary judgment 
because it improperly applied WYO. STAT. § 1-29-105 (1988) to the facts of this 
case. Appellant argues that the provision does not apply because the article at 
issue was not a "fair" report, or at the very least a question of fact exists 
whether the article was "fair."

[¶15]   WYO. STAT. § 1-29-105 
provides:

The 
publication of a fair and impartial report of any indictment, the issuing of any 
warrant, the arrest of any person accused of crime, or the filing of any 
pleading or other document in any criminal or civil cause in any court, or of 
the contents thereof, is privileged unless it is proved that the same was 
published maliciously or that the defendant has refused or neglected to publish 
in the same manner in which the publication complained of appeared a reasonable 
written explanation or contradiction thereof by the plaintiff, or that the 
publisher has refused upon plaintiff's request to publish the subsequent 
determination of the suit or action.

[¶16]   This statute is an example of a 
conditional privilege under laws of defamation. A privilege in this context is 
"an exemption from liability for the speaking or publishing of defamatory words 
concerning another, based on the fact that the statement was made in the 
performance of a political, judicial, social, or personal duty." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1077 (5th ed. 1979). An absolute privilege protects the speaker or 
publisher without reference to his motives or the falsity of the statement. 
Id. A conditional privilege is a qualified privilege and typically 
protects the speaker or publisher unless actual malice and knowledge of the 
falsity of the statement is shown. Id. See also Agriss v. Roadway 
Express, Inc., 334 Pa. Super. 295, 483 A.2d 456, 463 (1984) ("Liability for 
publication of defamatory matter may be defeated by a privilege to publish the 
defamation.") (emphasis added); Kurz v. The Evening News Ass'n, 144 Mich. 
App. 205, 375 N.W.2d 391, 394 (1985) ("Where * * * the privilege applies, even 
misstatements of fact are not actionable in a libel suit unless they are made 
with malice.")

[¶17]   "The defense of privilege rests 
upon considerations of public policy." Kurz, 375 N.W.2d  at 394. 
Privileges were created at common law where it was determined that the public 
good and interests of society would be better served by permitting the 
publication of statements than by the vindication of a plaintiff's reputational 
interests. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander §§ 56-57 
(1987).

[¶18]   The initial determination of 
whether a publication is privileged is a question of law for the court. 
Kurz, 375 N.W.2d  at 394; Lence v. Hagadone Inv. Co., 258 Mont. 433, 
853 P.2d 1230, 1237 (1993); Agriss, 483 A.2d  at 463; Crump v. Beckley 
Newspapers, Inc., 173 W. Va. 699, 320 S.E.2d 70, 81 (1983). Here the 
legislature, through its enactment of WYO. STAT. § 1-29-105, has defined when 
the privilege in question applies and how that privilege may be 
lost.

[¶19]   Our initial step in reaching a 
correct interpretation of WYO. STAT. § 1-29-105 and determining when it applies 
is "an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed 
according to their arrangement and connection." Houghton v. Franscell, 
870 P.2d 1050, 1053 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. 
Wyoming Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993)). When 
interpreting a statute, we must determine whether the language of the statute is 
plain and unambiguous. Houghton, at 1053. A statute is plain and 
unambiguous if its wording is such that "reasonable persons are able to agree as 
to its meaning with consistence and predictability." Houghton, at 1053; 
Parker, 845 P.2d  at 1043. If the language of the statute is plain and 
unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning without reference to the numerous rules 
of statutory construction. Houghton, at 1053; W.A.R.M. v. Bonds, 
866 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶20]   The language of WYO. STAT. § 
1-29-105 provides that a publication will be privileged if it is "fair and 
impartial," unless it was published "maliciously" or the publisher "has refused 
or neglected to publish * * * a reasonable written explanation or contradiction 
thereof by the plaintiff." The characteristic challenged in this instance is the 
report's "fairness." Appellant contends that because the information reported 
was inaccurate and untrue, the article could not be fair, and the privilege, 
therefore, does not apply. We disagree.

[¶21]   As noted above, this court will 
assign to the words used in a statute their ordinary and obvious meaning. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines fair as:

Having 
the qualities of impartiality and honesty; free from prejudice, favoritism, and 
self-interest.

BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 535 (5th ed. 1979). WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY clarifies the definition 
of fair by comparing it with similar terms. It 
notes:

FAIR, 
the most general of the terms, implies a disposition in a person or group to 
achieve a fitting and right balance of claims or considerations that is free 
from undue favoritism even to oneself, or implies a quality or result in an 
action befitting such a disposition.

* 
* * * * *

JUST 
stresses, more than FAIR, a disposition to conform with or conformity with the 
standard of what is right, true, or lawful, despite strong, esp. personal, 
influences tending to subvert that conformity * * * (a just statement of 
the facts) * * *.

* 
* * * * *

IMPARTIAL 
stresses an absence of favor or prejudice in judgment.

WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 815 (1971).

[¶22]   The comparison of these terms 
highlights the fact that the term fair does not necessarily contain 
connotations of truth. The term true is defined as:

Conformable 
to fact; correct; exact; actual; genuine; honest.

BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1351 (5th ed. 1979).

[¶23]   We conclude that the ordinary and 
obvious meaning of fair does not require that the report be true or 
accurate. If the legislature had intended such a result, it could have used 
those precise terms. What is required for the privilege to apply is that the 
report have qualities of impartiality and honesty, and be free from prejudice, 
favoritism and self-interest. These parameters on the application of the 
privilege fit with the primary purpose to be served by a privilege. That is, it 
provides immunity from liability where liability might otherwise be imposed. If 
the privilege only applied if the information reported was substantially true, 
it would not serve its primary purpose. Proof that the statement is 
substantially true is all that is generally required to defend against a charge 
of defamation. Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 917 (Wyo. 1992); 
Tschirgi v. Lander Wyoming State Journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Wyo. 
1985). Thus, if the defendant could demonstrate the statement was substantially 
true, the privilege would be unnecessary.

[¶24]   The affidavits of the reporter who 
authored the article and the editor of the newspaper both attested to the 
fairness (as defined above) and impartiality of the article. Appellant did not 
refute or even question the facts attested to in the two affidavits. We thus 
conclude the privilege applies in this instance. Since it is undisputed that 
appellee printed a retraction and explanation upon appellant's request, the only 
remaining question is whether the inaccurate information was printed 
maliciously.

[¶25]   A finding of malice will defeat the 
privilege. When applying a conditional privilege, absence of malice is presumed, 
and the plaintiff must prove malice on the part of the defendant. Williams v. 
Blount, 741 P.2d 595, 596 (Wyo. 1987). With malice means the statement was 
made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not. MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830, 
832 (Wyo. 1980); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 84 S. Ct. 710, 726, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 706, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964).

[¶26]   In his affidavit, the reporter who 
authored the article stated that his mistake was inadvertent and without malice. 
This portion of the affidavit was also uncontroverted by appellant, by either 
the original complaint or a responding affidavit. We thus conclude no genuine 
issue of fact exists concerning whether the statement was published with 
maliciousness, and the privilege applies.

[¶27]   Appellant raises an alternative 
argument that WYO. STAT. § 1-29-105 does not apply because the information 
reported in this instance was learned not from the contents of a document filed 
with a court, but rather from an oral proceeding. We do not address the question 
whether the privilege applies only when the information is obtained from written 
documents filed with the court for two reasons. First, the question is not 
properly before us because, in both the affidavit of the reporter who authored 
the article and in appellant's own traverse to the motion for summary judgment, 
it is stated that appellee obtained its information from the written plea 
agreement. Additionally, appellant did not raise this issue before the trial 
court, and, as we noted earlier, we will not consider on appeal an issue not 
called to the attention of the trial court.

CONCLUSION

[¶28]   Appellant waived his objection to 
the timeliness of the summary judgment hearing by failing to raise the issue 
before the district court, and that court properly determined the statements 
published by appellee were privileged under WYO. STAT. § 
1-29-105.

[¶29]   The decision of the district court 
is affirmed.

CARDINE, 
Justice, specially concurring.

[¶30]   We should not approve the district 
court issuing a case management order and then casually ignoring the same by 
failure to enforce it as to all parties according to its provisions. Without 
enforcement, the order is meaningless and can either be a trap or an advantage 
to a party. It is bad precedent for us to suggest that the court can ignore its 
own order. However, failure to object to the timeliness of the hearing is a 
waiver and dispositive, and for that reason I concur in the disposition of this 
issue and concur otherwise in the opinion of the court.