Case Title: Pike v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.

Citation: 81 So. 2d 254

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1955-03-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
81 So. 2d 254 (1955)
May PIKE
v.
SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
6 Div. 470.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 24, 1955.
Rehearing Denied May 19, 1955.
Further Rehearing Denied June 23, 1955.
Gibson, Hewitt & Gibson, Birmingham, for appellant.
Edw. W. Smith and John A. Boykin, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., and Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, for appellee.
Copeland & Copeland, Gadsden, Jas. H. Willis, Birmingham, amici curiae.
MAYFIELD, Justice.
A statement of this case appears in the dissenting opinion. The primary question here for consideration is whether or not the appellee Telephone Company was justified in removing the appellant's telephone. The appellee's asserted justification of this act was that it had received notification from Eugene "Bull" Connor, Commissioner of Public Safety of the City of Birmingham, that this telephone was being used for "illegal purposes".
It is clear that the Telephone Company, like any other public utility, which is granted a monopoly, has a duty to serve the general public impartially, and without arbitrary discrimination. This right of service extends to every individual who complies with the reasonable rules of the Company. The subscriber is entitled to equal service and equal facilities, under equal conditions. 86 C.J.S., Tel. & Tel., Radio & Television, § 71, p. 83; City of Birmingham v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 234 Ala. 526, 176 So. 301.
*255 It is equally clear that the Telephone Company may properly refuse to furnish its service for a purpose or business which is patently illegal or a public nuisance. But, mere suspicion that such service is desired for purposes contrary to the public interest will not justify refusal. 86 C.J.S., Tel. & Tel., Radio & Television, § 65, p. 80; Western Union Telegraph Company v. Ferguson, 57 Ind. 495.
In Andrews v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., D.C., 83 F. Supp. 966, 968, 969, the defendant Telephone Company received a letter from the United States Attorney stating that the plaintiff (subscriber) was using his telephone in violation of the gambling statutes and requested that the telephone be discontinued. When the Telephone Company complied with the request of the United States Attorney, the subscriber brought a petition for injunctive relief. There the court said:
In the above cause, the tariff of the Telephone Company contained a provision that service could be discontinued if any law enforcement agency advised that it was being used, or will be used, in violation of law. Speaking of this tariff provision and the letter of the United States Attorney, the court said:
In the instant case, as far as the record reveals, there was not even a "tariff" of the telephone company to justify their discontinuance of this appellant's telephone service. We do not think this point controlling, however, and agree with the reasoning of the above case that the Telephone Company could not have adopted a valid tariff in this particular. Such a "tariff" would have been a denial of due process of law.
In that portion of the opinion in People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 29, 30, 120 *256 P.2d 946, 954; dealing with whether receipt by the Telephone Company of a letter from the State Attorney General stating that Brophy was using his telephone in bookmaking and requesting its removal would constitute a defense in a suit by Brophy against the Telephone Company for removal of the telephone, the court said:
In Giordullo v. Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Telephone Co., Ohio Com.Pl., 71 N.E.2d 858, 859, 860, the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for the withdrawal of telephone service from the plaintiff's premises and to compel defendant to restore plaintiff's service. In its answer the telephone company alleged that the Chief of Police had requested that plaintiff's telephone be removed claiming that he was using his telephone for bookmaking. On demurrer by plaintiff, the court said:
In Shillitani v. Valentine, 184 Misc. 77, 53 N.Y.S.2d 127, 131, 132, the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the restoration of telephone service. Petitioner's telephone had been removed by the police at the time of his arrest for bookmaking. On his acquittal of the charge, petitioner applied to the telephone company to have telephone service restored. The police department did not approve the restoration of his telephone and for that reason the company refused to restore it.
The holding of the court in granting the writ was, in part, as follows:
The appellate division modified the order of the trial court so as to direct a dismissal of the petition upon a finding that the petitioner was, in fact, using his telephone for criminal activities. 269 App.Div. 568, 56 N.Y.S.2d 210. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the holding of the appellate division was affirmed, 296 N.Y. 161, 71 N.E.2d 450, 451. The court said in part:
Shillitani v. Valentine, supra, was followed in Whyte v. New York Telephone Co., Sup., 73 N.Y.S.2d 138, and in Dees Cigarette & Automatic Music Co., Inc., v. New York Telephone Co., 184 Misc. 269, 53 N.Y.S. 651, wherein the respondent Telephone Company was ordered to reinstall petitioners' telephones. In both cases, the Company had refused service on the request of the police department. We are aware that the courts of several jurisdictions have taken a contrary view; nevertheless, we are convinced that the rule enunciated in the foregoing cases is sound and should be followed by the courts of Alabama. The cases supporting the contrary view are ably collected in the dissenting opinion and require no further comment.
Upon its factual situation, the instant case is even weaker than the cases which we have heretofore reviewed. A contrary holding would be particularly disturbing when we consider the questions which are left unanswered by the Company's plea. This plea does not even allege that the appellant's telephone was, in fact, being used in a manner which would justify its removal. The allegation is merely that the appellee received notice from Eugene "Bull" Connor, Commissioner of Public Safety, and was thereby ordered to remove the telephone. The letter from Commissioner *258 Connor, which the company claims clothes them with immunity, merely states that the telephone is being used for "illegal purposes."
Attached to the letter to the Company from the Commissioner was a list which included remarks concerning one Louis Pikepresumably the husband of appellant. It was stated that Louis Pike "is a well-known lottery operator in the city." As was stated in the foregoing cases, the questionable character of the telephone subscriber is not justification for a Company, which holds a monopoly, to discontinue the service. Obviously, this principle is doubly applicable where both the character and the occupation of the person assailed is someone other than the subscriber.
"Criminal" and "illegal" are not interchangeable terms. While it is argued by the appellee that the "illegal" use referred to concerned bookmaking operations, such does not appear in the notice received by the Telephone Company. Stripped to its bare essentials, Commissioner Connor's letter makes two allegations against Louis Pike. First, that he "operates a negro beer joint". Regardless of whether such activity be laudable, it is not criminal or even "illegal". Secondly, that Pike operates the Joe Louis Lottery House and has at least three cases pending in the various courts. The "pendency" of a criminal case cannot be used as a predicate for punitive action under the American system. The present tendency and drift towards the Police State gives all free Americans pause. The unconstitutional and extra-judicial enlargement of coercive governmental power is a frightening and cancerous growth on our body politic. Once we assumed as axiomatic that a citizen was presumed innocent until proved guilty. The tendency of governments to shift the burden of proof to citizens to prove their innocence is indefensible and intolerable.
We are not able to glean from the bare conclusions set up in the letter of the Commissioner, whether it is claimed that the "illegal" use of the telephone was by the appellant, her husband, or a total stranger. From aught that was alleged in the plea, except for the conclusion of the Commissioner, no "illegal" use of any type was made of this telephone by any one.
The notice alleged to have been received by the Telephone Company was couched in the terms of a direct order from the Commissioner of Public Safety. What is the source of Mr. Connor's authority to issue such an order? We know of none. And we hold that none exists.
If we took a contrary view, it would naturally flow and follow that the telephone company would be justified in acting on the notice of any over-zealous law enforcement official who, without evidence, and on mere suspicion, is impressed with the bad character or occupation of a particular telephone subscriber. The letter from Commissioner Connor set up in the plea is no defense. It is the Telephone Company's burden to show that the use being made of the telephone did, in fact, justify its removal.
These depredations of a subscriber's legal right to telephone service constitute a denial of due process guaranteed by the Constitution of 1901, art. 1, § 6. The gratuitous and arbitrary action of a police official is no justification for an abridgement of this right. To hold that the Telephone Company is justified in discontinuing service by "order" of a police official would require judicial recognition of a police power which does not exist. The bald assertion of an executive officer, be he the Attorney General of the United States or a constable of some remote beat, cannot be accepted as a substitute for proof in the judicial process. No presumption arises as to the sufficiency of evidence based on a law enforcement officer's conclusions.
Appellee's plea No. 2 alleged no defense to the cause of action and the nisi prius court erred in overruling the challenging demurrer.
Reversed and remanded.
SIMPSON and STAKELY, JJ., concur.
*259 LAWSON, J., concurs in the result.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and GOODWYN and Merrill, JJ., dissent.
GOODWYN, Justice (dissenting).
Appellant, plaintiff below, brought action at law against appellee claiming damages for cutting off or discontinuing her telephone service. As last amended, the complaint consisted of three counts. Count 1 charged appellee with "negligently" cutting off telephone service; count 2, with "wantonly" cutting off such service; and count 3, with "willfully, wantonly, maliciously, intentionally, and wrongfully" cutting off such service. Appellee's demurrer to the complaint, as last amended, was overruled. Thereupon appellee entered two pleas. The first was a plea of the general issue. Plea 2 was as follows:
"`April 2, 1951
"`Mr. C. L. Lott, District Manager,
"`Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company,
"`Birmingham 3, Alabama
"`Dear Mr. Lott:
"`Sincerely yours,
"`/s/ C. L. Lott
"`District Manager.'
The appellant demurred to plea 2, assigning thirty-eight separate and several grounds. The demurrer being overruled, appellant moved for a non-suit, which was granted. This appeal presents for review the propriety of the action of the court in overruling the demurrer to plea 2.
As I see it, the question presented for decision is whether, under the facts averred in plea 2, appellee was justified in discontinuing appellant's telephone service. Specifically, the question is whether appellee, in removing appellant's telephone pursuant to the instructions from the Commissioner of Public Safety of the City of Birmingham, was justified in accepting the order of said Commissioner as reasonable cause to believe that the telephone was being used for an illegal purpose. Appellant's insistence is that appellee, as a public utility, must serve the public without discrimination and that she has been unjustly discriminated against by the discontinuance of her telephone service; that plea 2 does not show that either she or her husband personally used the telephone for illegal purposes nor that they had any notice or knowledge that it was being used for illegal purposes or that they permitted any one to use said telephone for illegal purposes. It is further contended that the discontinuance of service deprived her of her property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
The position taken by the Telephone Company is that the instructions from the Commissioner of Public Safety for removal of appellant's telephone because of its use, as stated in said instructions, for illegal purposes, constituted reasonable cause for the Company to believe the telephone was being illegally used, thus justifying its removal.
It does not appear that this question has heretofore been before this court. However, it has been dealt with in other jurisdictions, but not with unanimity in the decisions.
My research discloses that when the question has been considered in other jurisdictions, there has usually been involved the reasonableness of a statute, a rule of a state or federal regulatory body, or a rule of the public utility. It is apparent that our problem, as presented by the pleadings, is somewhat different. Here, no statute or rule is involved. The question, then, simply stated, is whether the Telephone Company, in the absence of a statute or rule on the subject, is justified in discontinuing service when requested to do so by a responsible law enforcement officer who represents to the Company that such service is being used for illegal purposes. (As I see it, the principle applicable here would likewise be applicable if a statute or rule were involved.) My view is that the Telephone Company is justified in relying on the representations of such law enforcement officer as to the illegal use of the service and, accordingly, should not be liable for damages when service is discontinued at the request of such officer.
It is generally held that a public utility, by reason of the very nature of its business, is obligated to furnish "its service or commodity to the general public, or that part of the public which it has undertaken to serve, without arbitrary discrimination." 73 C.J.S., Public Utilities, § 7 b, p. 999. But it cannot be required to furnish service, for illegal purposes. *261 52 Am.Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, § 93, p. 123; Nichols, Public Utility Service and Discrimination, Chap. VII, § 9, p. 196. As thus stated in 52 Am.Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, Cum.Supp. § 84.1:
In the light of these principles, is it not a reasonable and practicable rule of law which says that a utility is justified in discontinuing service when a responsible law enforcement officer notifies the utility that such service is being used for illegal purposes and requests that the service be discontinued because of such illegal use? I think so; and this conclusion finds support in the following cases, among others: McBride v. Western Union Tel. Co., 9 Cir., 1948, 171 F.2d 1, 3, 4; King v. Seamon, Fla., 1952, 59 So. 2d 859, 861; Dade County News Dealers Supply Co. v. Florida Railroad & Public Utilities Commission and Dade County News Dealers Supply Co. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., Fla., 1950, 48 So. 2d 89, 90; Hagerty v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 1940, 145 Fla. 51, 199 So. 570; Dente v. New York Telephone Co., Sup., 1944, Westchester County, 55 N.Y.S.2d 688, 690, 691, 692; Application of Manfredonio, 1944, Westchester County, 183 Misc. 770, 52 N.Y.S.2d 392, 393; People ex rel. Restmeyer v. New York Telephone Co., 1916, 173 App.Div. 132, 159 N.Y.S. 369, 370.
In the case of McBride v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra [171 F.2d 3], appellant sought to compel the telegraph company to restore wire service to him. The company based its refusal to restore service on Federal Communication's Tariff Regulation 219(8) which provided as follows:
The court there said:
In Hagerty v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, the Attorney General of the United States advised the telephone company that Hagerty was using the company's facilities to promote lottery schemes in Florida and elsewhere and demanded that the service be discontinued on pain of being held to account for aiding and conspiring in the violation of the Federal anti-lottery laws. The Attorney General of Florida also advised the telephone company that Hagerty "was using its telephone facilities to aid in the maintenance of gambling houses or in the promotion of gambling" contrary to the laws of Florida, and requested that the service be discontinued. In response to these demands, the telephone company notified Hagerty that service would be discontinued. Hagerty thereupon filed his bill in equity and secured a temporary restraining order directed to the company prohibiting it from discontinuing the service. The company filed its answer interposing as a defense its right to discontinue service because of the alleged violation of state and federal laws and the demand made on it by the state and federal prosecuting officers. The trial court upheld the answer of the telephone company. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court has this to say [145 Fla. 51, 199 So. 571]:
In the later Florida cases of Dade County News Dealers Supply Co. v. Florida Railroad & Public Utilities Commission and Dade County News Dealers Supply Co. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, the Supreme Court of that state held that the telephone company was warranted in discontinuing service to the News Dealers Supply Co. when notified to do so by the Florida Attorney General because such service was being used for unlawful purposes. There under consideration was Rule 1592 of the Commission which became effective on April 1, 1950. Said rule contained the following:
Pursuant to this rule, the telephone company notified the News Dealers Supply Co. that the Attorney General of Florida had demanded that all facilities furnished by the telephone company to said Supply Company be discontinued, and that, therefore, all such services would be terminated. A bill was filed and a temporary restraining order was issued to prevent the telephone company from interfering with the telephone service then being furnished. *263 On hearing in the trial court said restraining order was dissolved and the bill dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida said [48 So.2d 90]:
The opinion in King v. Seamon, supra, discloses that Rule 1592, considered in the Dade County News Dealers Supply Co. Cases, supra, was subsequently enacted into law. In construing such enactment, the court cited with approval the construction of the rule as announced in the Dade County News Dealers Supply Co. Cases, supra.
In Application of Manfredonio, supra, the petitioner's telephone service was discontinued and the telephone removed by the telephone company, acting upon request of the Mt. Vernon Police Department which informed the telephone company that the telephone was being used by petitioner for gambling and bookmaking. Petitioner brought suit for restoration of telephone service. The court said:
In the later case of Dente v. New York Telephone Co., supra [55 N.Y.S.2d 689], telephone service was discontinued by the telephone company "after it had received a letter from the Chief Inspector of the Mount Vernon Police Department, the purport of which was, that he had received information from the New York Police Department, with other information, which led him to believe that the telephone in question was being used for an unlawful purpose, to wit, bookmaking, and requested the respondent [telephone company] to forthwith discontinue the service, and not to reinstate the same without the approval of the Police Department." The court said:
In People ex rel. Restmeyer v. New York Telephone Co., supra, the proceeding was to require the telephone company to furnish telephone service to the relator. The telephone company had removed the telephone from relator's saloon upon complaint of the police authorities that the premises and telephone were being used by the relator in conducting a pool room for receiving and registering bets on horse racing. On the question of whether service should be restored, the court said as follows [173 App.Div. 132, 159 N.Y.S. 370]:
Although there is authority to the contrary, Andrews v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 1949, D.C.D.C., 83 F. Supp. 966, 968, 969; Giordullo v. Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Telephone Co., Ohio Com. Pl., 1946, 71 N.E.2d 858, 859; People v. Brophy, 1942, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 120 P.2d 946; Whyte v. New York Telephone Co., Sup., 1947, New York County, 73 N.Y.S.2d 138, 139; Shillitani v. Valentine, 1945, New York County, 184 Misc. 77, 53 N.Y.S.2d 127, 130, 131, 132, 134. I am persuaded that the principle approved in the line of cases hereinbefore discussed is fair, reasonable and practicable and, being in aid of law enforcement, accords with sound public policy. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority holding. It is to be noted that appellant is not without recourse to have her right to telephone service judicially heard and determined. Code 1940, Tit. 48, §§ 57, 63, 79.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and MERRILL, J., concur in the foregoing opinion.
On Rehearing.
MAYFIELD, Justice.
Counsel for the appellee insist with great vigor that Section 6 of the Constitution of Alabama 1901 affords no protection against an abuse of "due process of law" except in criminal cases. In support of this position they cite the holding of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in Sepe v. Daneker, 76 R.I. 160, 68 A.2d 101, and Taglianetti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., R.I., 1954, 103 A.2d 67, construing a provision of the Rhode Island Constitution similar to art. 1, § 6 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Regardless of what position the Supreme Court of Rhode Island may have taken in the interpretation of their own Constitution, the Supreme Court of Alabama has consistently and repeatedly required due process of law in civil, as well as criminal cases. In the civil case of Almon v. Morgan County, 245 Ala. 241, 246, 16 So. 2d 511, 515, it was said:
In State ex rel. Steele v. Board of Education of Fairfield, 252 Ala. 254, 260, 40 So. 2d 689, 695, which was a petition for mandamus, this court, in speaking of an administrative hearing, said:
*266 In the case of Zeigler v. South & North Ala. R. R. Company, 58 Ala. 594, 598, 599, Justice Stone said:
The cases of Wise v. Miller, 215 Ala. 660, 111 So. 913; Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Womack, 228 Ala. 70, 151 So. 880; Byars v. Town of Boaz, 229 Ala. 22, 155 So. 383; Ridge v. State ex rel. Tate, 206 Ala. 349, 89 So. 742, are all civil cases. In each of these cases, in discussing whether there was or was not a denial of due process, the court assumed as axiomatic that due process of law in civil cases is constitutionally guaranteed in Alabama. In our most recent pronouncement on this subject, in the case of Phillips v. Hinkle, Ala., 78 So. 2d 800, 804, decided March 10, 1955, this court quoted the language in Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84, 173 So. 864, 867, as follows:
While it is true, as argued by appellee's counsel, that art. 1, § 6, Constitution of Alabama 1901, begins "That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused * * *", it must be remembered that in the instant case the supposed justification for removing appellant's telephone was that the appellant was accused of using the telephone for criminal purposes. Art. 1, § 6, supra, continues "nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law; * * *." [Emphasis supplied.]
In addition to the protection afforded appellant by the law of Alabama, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal constitution prohibits any State of depriving any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Even Rhode Island admits this provision of the Federal Constitution is applicable to civil cases. Notice and hearing, which were denied the appellant before her telephone was summarily removed, are the backbone of due process. The Supreme Court of the United States in the Alabama case of Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 21 S. Ct. 836, 45 L. Ed. 1165, said:
Eminent counsel for the appellee next argue that due process was not violated *267 because the scope of Title 48, Sections 57, 63 and 79, Code of Alabama 1940, are broad enough to countenance an appeal by the appellant, to the Public Service Commission to have her telephone service restored. By the same token, if the police commissioner's request was based on fact rather than mere suspicion, he had a right to apply to the Public Service Commission for an order directed to the telephone company to discontinue the subscriber's telephone; and thereby afforded the appellant notice and hearing as required by due process in advance of his summary action.
Distinguished counsel for the City of Birmingham says, in his brief amicus curiae:
The same argument might be made on behalf of wire tapping, involuntary confessions, unreasonable search and seizure, and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. However, it is the experience of the English-speaking people that due process and the other fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights are the cornerstone of individual liberty, and that these basic rights can neither be disregarded nor eroded away by the winds of an ever-strengthening executive branch of the government.
The application for rehearing is denied.
SIMPSON and STAKELY, JJ., concur.
LAWSON, J., concurs in the result.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and GOODWYN and MERRILL, JJ., dissent.