Case Title: Bricker v. Bricker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Bricker v. Bricker1994 WY 71877 P.2d 747Case Number: 93-200Decided: 07/13/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
James 
L. BRICKER,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Carol 
J. BRICKER,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Washakie County, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

John 
W. Davis of Davis, Donnell, Worrall & Bancroft, P.C., 
Worland.

Representing 
Appellee:

Kent 
A. Richins, Worland, for appellee.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY,** and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

* 
Retired July 5, 1994.

** 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this appeal 
from a divorce and property settlement proceeding, the former husband seeks to 
reverse the property distribution made by the district court. The former husband 
contends that the district court abused its discretion by distributing property 
which no longer exists. The former husband also contends that the district court 
improperly based its judgment upon speculation.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant states 
two issues:

I. 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when, after distributing the 
existing property of the parties, it distributed property which no longer 
existed?

II. 
The district court committed reversible error by producing a property 
distribution based upon speculation.

[¶4]      Appellee restates 
the issues and brings before this court a third 
contention:

1. 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in its distribution of property to 
the parties?

2. 
Did the district court distribute property based upon speculation, and if so, 
did the district court commit reversible error?

3. 
Was there reasonable cause for the defendant/appellant to file an appeal in this 
case, and if not, should costs and penalties be awarded to the 
plaintiff/appellee pursuant to Rule 10.05, W.R.A.P.?

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      Appellant, James 
L. Bricker (James), and appellee, Carol J. Bricker (Carol), were married on 
February 24, 1978. After a contested proceeding, a Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce was entered on July 21, 1993. At issue in the property distribution 
phase of the proceeding was the parties' numerous real property acquisitions, 
renovations and transfers prior to and during the 
marriage.

[¶6]      Carol and James 
met in Pennsylvania in 1970. James moved to Wyoming in 1971. In November, 1975, 
Carol and her three daughters came to Wyoming to join James and to help him run 
his newly acquired lodge which was located six miles east of Ten Sleep, Wyoming. 
Together, Carol and James renovated the property known as Canyon 
Lodge.

[¶7]      Canyon Lodge, 
which included a restaurant and eight motel units, opened for business in April, 
1976. For over a year, Carol's duties at Canyon Lodge included cooking, cleaning 
and performing various maintenance functions. Before Carol and James sold Canyon 
Lodge, Carol had moved to the community of Ten Sleep and found another job in 
nearby Worland. The warranty deed transferring the property identified the 
grantors as James L. Bricker and Carol Bricker, husband and 
wife.

[¶8]      In August, 1977, 
James bought the Beckett property, a house situated on two lots in Ten Sleep. 
Carol and James spent evenings and weekends improving the Beckett property. 
After Carol and James were married, they rented a home in Ten Sleep and 
continued to make improvements on the Beckett property. The Beckett property was 
sold in November, 1980. 

[¶9]      In April, 1980, 
James purchased the Daniels Ranch, located twenty-two miles south of Ten Sleep. 
The warranty deed transferring the property identified the grantee as James L. 
Bricker without indication that the property would be held as his separate 
property. Carol and James moved from Ten Sleep to the Daniels Ranch in August, 
1980. James continued to work for Washakie County and at a contracting business. 
Carol quit her job in Worland and spent her days at the 
ranch.

[¶10]   After nearly four years of living 
at the ranch, Carol and her daughters left and moved back to Ten Sleep. James 
remained at the ranch until the ranch home and all its contents were destroyed 
by a 1985 fire. The fire loss was partially indemnified by insurance except for 
an unclaimable amount because James chose not to replace the ranch home. After 
the fire, James joined Carol in Ten Sleep. The Daniels Ranch was sold in 1986. 
The warranty deed transferring the property identified the grantors as James 
Bricker and Carol Bricker, husband and wife.

[¶11]   In September, 1983, James bought 
the Mills property where he operated his contracting business. The warranty deed 
transferring the property identified the grantee as James L. Bricker without 
indication that the property would be held as his separate property. This 
property was the only real property James owned at the time of the divorce 
proceeding. The parties stipulated that the Mills property, including the shop 
building, was valued at $55,000.00. James had numerous tools and equipment, some 
of which he brought into the marriage and others which he acquired during the 
marriage. Carol's sole participation in James' contracting business was to 
annually post all profits, losses and expenditures.

[¶12]   In 1967, before she met James, 
Carol and her two brothers purchased a sixty-five acre farm in Pennsylvania for 
$23,000.00. The farm property remained intact until 1992, when one acre was sold 
to Carol's nephew for $7,500.00. Carol received one third, or $2,500.00, of the 
proceeds from that sale. During the divorce proceeding, Carol's brother, who 
lives near the farm, testified that he thought the property was worth 
approximately $65,000.00. The only current income from the farm is $300.00 per 
month rent for a house located on the farm. James visited the Pennsylvania 
property once before he moved to Wyoming and had no further involvement with any 
aspect of the farm.

[¶13]   After hearing testimony at the 
divorce proceeding regarding the parties' real and personal property, the 
district court made the following findings of fact pertinent to the distribution 
of property:

4. 
That the Plaintiff brought into the marriage the Pennsylvania property which has 
appreciated substantially.

5. 
That the value of the Defendant's tools and equipment which he brought into the 
marriage was $7,600.00.

6. 
That the value of the Defendant's tools, equipment and machinery is 
$35,000.00.

7. 
That the profit from the sale of the Canyon Lodge was 
$14,879.00.

8. 
That the profit on the sale of the Beckett house was 
$20,000.00.

9. 
That the profit from the sale of the Daniel's place, including the insurance, 
was $26,000.00.

10. 
That the value of the guns acquired by the Defendant during the course of the 
marriage is $2,200.00.

11. 
That the Plaintiff worked alongside with and improved many of the properties 
acquired by the Defendant during the course of the 
marriage.

The 
district court concluded:

[T]he 
Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $42,600.00 which shall include 
$5,000.00 for the gain on the Canyon Lodge property, the sum of $10,000.00 
profit on the Beckett property, the sum of $10,000.00 profit on the Daniels 
Ranch property, the sum of $15,000 on the Defendant's shop building, $1,100.00 
on the guns and $1,500.00 on the sale of the Ford pickup.

It 
is from this judgment and decree that James appeals.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶14]   Upon dissolution of a marriage in 
Wyoming, the district court must provide for a just and equitable division of 
the property of the parties. Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (1987). Property settlements 
present complex problems. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 456 P.2d 243, 247 (Wyo. 
1964). The district court must assess the respective merits and needs of the 
parties and, therefore, a property distribution ruling will not be disturbed on 
appeal except on clear grounds of abuse of discretion. Neuman v. Neuman, 
842 P.2d 575, 578 (Wyo. 1992); Paul v. Paul, 616 P.2d 707, 714 (Wyo. 
1980). "Abuse of discretion occurs when a court exceeds the bounds of reason or 
commits an error of law." Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶15]   Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 governs 
distribution of rights, obligations and property in divorce 
proceedings:

In 
granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the property of the 
parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits 
of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the 
party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the 
property for the benefit of either party and children.

[¶16]   James asks this court to review the 
district court's distribution of "profits" from the sale of three properties he 
owned during the course of the marriage to Carol. The three properties are the 
Canyon Lodge, the Beckett property, and the Daniels ranch. James contends that 
while the properties were sold during the marriage, the "profits" from those 
sales no longer exist.

[¶17]   James maintains that the district 
court cannot distribute properties which no longer exist, and points to our 
decision in Storm v. Storm, 470 P.2d 367 (Wyo. 1970) to back his 
assertion. In Storm, we held that it was improper for a trial judge to 
award a spouse a mere expectancy of property; in that case, an unrealized 
inheritance. Id. at 370-71. Unlike Storm, the issue here does not 
involve distribution of an unrealized inheritance or any type of future 
interest. Rather, the district court made a finding of fact of the monetary 
value of the profit or gain from the sale of three specific properties; 
properties sold during the marriage and to properties which Carol contributed a 
great deal of her time and energy in improving.

[¶18]   Property distribution depends upon 
the circumstances of each case. Biggerstaff v. Biggerstaff, 443 P.2d 524, 
526 (Wyo. 1968). As a part of this property distribution, the district court 
ordered James to pay Carol $42,600.00, which included Carol's share of the 
realized profits from the sale of marital property. We hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding these profits attributable to the 
sale of specific properties which Carol helped improve.

[¶19]   James also argues that the district 
court erred by basing the property distribution upon speculation or theoretical 
estimates of value. James claims that Carol not only failed to establish a value 
for the improvements she made on any of the Wyoming properties, she also failed 
to show any link between her efforts and the ultimate profits gleaned from the 
sale of those properties.

[¶20]   In Karns v. Karns, 511 P.2d 955, 957 (Wyo. 1973), this court affirmed a monetary award to the wife based on 
her involvement with the operation of a motel her husband owned prior to the 
marriage. In Karns, no showing was made of the value of the motel at the 
time of the marriage. Id. at 956-57. We recognized that the "wife, 
through her energy, made a substantial and direct contribution to the 
accumulation of the wealth of the parties." Id. at 
957.

[¶21]   The district court made specific 
findings of fact of the amount of profit earned from the sale of the Canyon 
Lodge, the Beckett property and the Daniels Ranch. The evidence presented 
clearly disclosed that Carol made a "substantial and direct contribution" to the 
improvements in each of these properties that occurred during the course of the 
marriage. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not speculate in 
establishing the realized profits from these sales.

[¶22]   James then argues that Carol failed 
to establish an actual value for the Pennsylvania farm. Therefore, he contends 
the district court's distribution of property must be reversed. 

[¶23]   There is a need for sufficient 
evidence to support a district court's distribution of property. See Klatt v. 
Klatt, 654 P.2d 733, 737 (Wyo. 1982); Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 583 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Wyo. 1978); and Barbour v. Barbour, 518 P.2d 12, 15 
(Wyo. 1974). We noted in Klatt, where the value of the parties' business 
property was questioned, that even though an appraisal "may" have been helpful, 
it was not absolutely necessary. Klatt, 654 P.2d  at 737. A district court 
may distribute certain marital property without ascertaining its value if, 
within the context of the entire estate, such an award is not an abuse of 
discretion. See 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation § 937 (1983). 
A property settlement "`needs to be judged on an overall basis and not 
necessarily on the basis of separate parts.'" Klatt, 654 P.2d  at 735 
(quoting Paul, 616 P.2d at 712). See also Piper v. Piper, 487 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 1971).

[¶24]   The district court did not abuse 
its discretion in determining that the Pennsylvania farm was Carol's separate 
property. The record discloses that James made absolutely no contribution, by 
way of capital or effort, to the appreciation of that property. Carol did not 
invest any of her marital time or energies to increasing the value of the 
Pennsylvania farm. See Biggerstaff, 443 P.2d  at 527 and Crawford v. 
Crawford, 63 Wyo. 1, 176 P.2d 792, 795 (1947). The district court heard 
sufficient testimony with an aggressive cross-examination regarding the 
potential value of the farm. The district court found that the property had 
appreciated in value; however, the district court ruled that the Pennsylvania 
farm was Carol's sole and separate property.

[¶25]   Carol has asked this court to 
certify, pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05, that there was no reasonable cause for 
James' appeal and to consequently tax him a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs of this case.

[¶26]   W.R.A.P. 10.05, in pertinent part, 
states:

If 
the judgment or appealable order is affirmed in a civil case, appellee shall 
recover the cost for publication of the brief with the cost to be computed at 
the rate allowed by law for making the transcript of the evidence. If the court 
certifies there was no reasonable cause for the appeal, a reasonable fee to be 
fixed by the appellate court shall also be taxed as part of the costs in the 
case.

[¶27]   Carol asserts that since, in her 
opinion, the district court did not abuse its discretion, there was no 
reasonable cause for James to file his appeal. We agree that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion distributing the property of the parties, but 
"`[e]ven reasonable minds differ on relative matters.'" Bacon v. Carey 
Co., 669 P.2d 533, 536 (Wyo. 1983) (quoting Reno Livestock Corp. v. Sun 
Oil Co. (Delaware), 638 P.2d 147, 155-56 (Wyo. 1981)). Abuse of discretion 
questions arise in innumerable situations; thus, "standards for review of 
discretionary exercise cannot readily be reduced to black-letter principles." 
Bacon, 669 P.2d  at 536. See also Matter of Adoption of GSD, 716 P.2d 984, 990 (Wyo. 1986) and James S. Jackson Co., Inc. v. Meyer, 677 P.2d 835, 839 (Wyo. 1984).

[¶28]   We hold that James had reasonable 
cause for his appeal and, therefore, deny Carol's request for 
costs.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶29]   A district court's exercise of 
discretion inherently leads to a variance in settlements. Neither statute nor 
precedent in marriage dissolution cases requires an equal division of property. 
This court has noted many times that "a just and equitable division is as likely 
as not to be unequal." Piper, 487 P.2d  at 1064 (citing Young v. 
Young, 472 P.2d 784, 785 (Wyo. 1970) and Lovejoy v. Lovejoy, 36 Wyo. 
379, 256 P. 76, 79 (1927)). There was no abuse of discretion by the district 
court in its distribution of the property of the parties.

[¶30]   Affirmed.