Case Title: Wright v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 687, 2011

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
 
§ 
RANDY WRIGHT, 
 
§ 
No. 687, 2011       
 
 
§ 
        
 
Defendant Below, 
§ 
 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court of  
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware, in and for 
              v. 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
§ 
Cr. I.D. Nos. 1101021521 and    
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
1004011471 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
§           
 
 
Appellee. 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted:  August 8, 2012 
 
 
Decided:     September 4, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 4th day of September 2012, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that: 
1. 
Randy Wright, the defendant-below (“Wright”), appeals from his 
convictions of multiple weapons charges and Resisting Arrest, after a Superior 
Court jury trial during which he represented himself.  On appeal, Wright argues 
that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel before trial, 
because the Superior Court’s pre-waiver colloquy with him was legally inadequate.  
We disagree and affirm. 
 
2
2. 
On January 31, 2011, while sitting in the driver’s seat of a car parked 
on Ninth and Monroe Streets in Wilmington, Wright was approached by police 
officers.  The officers searched Wright’s car and found a handgun.  Wright was 
later indicted on the following charges: Possession of a Firearm by a Person 
Prohibited; Possession of a Firearm with a Removed, Obliterated or Altered Serial 
Number; Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited; and Resisting Arrest. 
3. 
On August 16, 2011, the date scheduled for trial, Wright informed his 
court-appointed counsel and the Superior Court that he no longer wanted appointed 
counsel to represent him.  Wright disagreed with counsel’s decision not to call a 
juvenile fact witness who would testify favorably for Wright (by claiming 
ownership of the gun).  Counsel refused to call the witness on ethical grounds.   
4. 
After Wright brought his wishes to the Superior Court’s attention, the 
court and Wright engaged in an extended colloquy about the ramifications of his 
decision.  (At certain points, Wright also conferred with his court-appointed 
counsel.)  The transcript reveals that during that colloquy, Wright inquired, and 
was informed about, the following issues relating to his counsel’s withdrawal: (i) 
the logistics of Wright’s calling witnesses generally, including witnesses who were 
not subpoenaed or present in court that day; (ii) whether Wright would be 
permitted to call the juvenile witness whose testimony Wright’s counsel refused to 
present; (iii) whether Wright’s decision to proceed pro se would affect the State’s 
 
3
ability to introduce his past criminal record as evidence against him; and (iv) 
whether Wright would be afforded time to review the evidence that the State 
planned to present, as well as his case file generally.  After Wright completed the 
Waiver of Counsel form, the Superior Court and Wright then engaged in a more 
formal colloquy.  In that colloquy, the court informed Wright of “the danger and 
disadvantages of self-representation,” and confirmed that Wright understood all of 
them.  
5. 
Wright’s sole claim of error on appeal is that his waiver of the right to 
counsel was not knowing and voluntary and, therefore, violated the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.  Wright relies primarily on our 
decision in Smith v. State1 for the key premise of his claim.  Specifically, Wright 
argues that the Superior Court’s interrogation of the defendant—called for by the 
so-called “Welty”2 factors—was inadequate and caused his waiver to be not 
“knowing and voluntary,” thereby requiring reversal of his conviction.  Our review 
of the validity of a criminal defendant’s waiver of his constitutional right to 
counsel is de novo.3   
                                                 
1 996 A.2d 786 (Del. 2010). 
 
2 Briscoe v. State, 606 A.2d 103, 107 (Del. 1992) (citing U.S. v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 
1982)). 
 
3 Smith, 996 A.2d at 790 (citation omitted). 
 
 
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6. 
Wright’s case is plainly distinguishable from Smith, where: (i) the 
defendant’s answers were “not responsive” to the critical Welty questions posed by 
that trial court, and (ii) the court “never made a [knowing and voluntary waiver] 
determination on the record.”4  Neither circumstance is present here.  Moreover, in 
Smith, this Court recognized that a “knowing and intelligent waiver can occur 
without reviewing each of [the Welty] factors in haec verba.”5  The concern in 
Smith was that “the trial judge did not ascertain enough information to establish a 
basis for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.”6  Here, in 
contrast, the defendant confirmed that he understood the trial court’s questioning, 
and also displayed a sophisticated knowledge of the judicial process.  For example, 
Wright inquired about specific consequences of his counsel’s withdrawal and 
sought time to review the case file and/or locate witnesses.  The record 
demonstrates that Wright made an informed and voluntary choice—because of his 
disagreement with counsel’s advice—to proceed pro se.  His claim of a 
constitutional violation lacks merit. 
                                                 
4 Id. at 791-92. 
 
5 Id. at 792. 
 
6 Id. 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
/s/ Jack B. Jacobs  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        Justice