Case Title: Zeigenbein v. Thornsberry

Citation: 401 S.W.2d 389

Docket Number: 

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 1966-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
401 S.W.2d 389 (1966)
Esta Jane ZEIGENBEIN, a minor, by and through her natural father and next friend, Edward Zeigenbein, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Mary THORNSBERRY, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 51486.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.
April 11, 1966.
*390 Cohn & Lentz, by Arthur B. Cohn, Waynesville, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Allen, Woolsey & Fisher, Harold J. Fisher, Robert C. Fields, Russell G. Clark, Springfield, for defendant-respondent.
DONNELLY, Judge.
This is an action for damages resulting from a vehicular collision in Pulaski County, Missouri, which occurred February 5, 1963. Esta Jane Zeigenbein, a minor, by her next friend, sued in Count I of the Petition for $50,000. Her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Edward Zeigenbein, sued in Count II of the Petition for $25,000. The trial court, at the close of plaintiffs' evidence, sustained defendant's motion for directed verdict. Plaintiffs have perfected an appeal to this Court.
The principal question on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in sustaining the motion for directed verdict on the ground that plaintiffs failed to make a submissible case against defendant. In determining whether or not a submissible case was made for the jury, we must consider the evidence from a viewpoint most favorable to plaintiffs and give plaintiffs "the benefit of every reasonable favorable inference which the evidence tends to support." Berry v. Harmon, Mo.Sup., 329 S.W.2d 784, 789.
The parties agree a collision occurred between a vehicle operated by Lloyd Poulson and a vehicle operated by defendant, Mary Thornsberry, at a point on AA Highway in Pulaski County, near Crocker, Missouri. Esta Jane Zeigenbein was riding in the Poulson car as a passenger in the right front seat. Her sister, Georgia Sharp, was riding in the Poulson car as a passenger in the right rear seat. The collision occurred at about ten o'clock at night. The weather was clear and the highway dry. The highway was blacktop, eighteen feet wide, with shoulders three feet in width. Traveling east at the scene of the collision, there was a slight rise in the highway and a slight curve to the left. The Poulson vehicle was traveling east. The Thornsberry vehicle was traveling west.
*391 Plaintiffs plead and contend here that defendant was negligent in driving her vehicle into the south half of the highway into collision with the Poulson vehicle. We will review the evidence and determine whether it is sufficient to make a submissible case.
We first consider whether the circumstantial evidence of physical facts is sufficient to make a submissible case. Each vehicle was damaged on its left front. After the collision, debris and dirt covered the highway from shoulder to shoulder and extended fifteen feet east and west. Most of it was in the center of the highway. A wheel was found in the north half of the highway near the center. Tire tracks or marks left by metal were located on both the north and south edges of the highway. Tracks from the Thornsberry automobile showed that after the collision it went into a ditch along the north side of the highway, came out of the ditch, crossed the highway, and came to rest west of the debris and on the south side of the highway. The Poulson car came to rest on the south side of the highway and east of the debris. We are of the opinion that this evidence does not "exclude guesswork, conjecture, and speculation as to the existence of the necessary facts." Schoen v. Plaza Express Co., Mo. Sup., 206 S.W.2d 536, 538. The physical facts do not "with compelling force indicate just where on the highway this collision occurred," Berry v. Harmon, Mo.Sup., 323 S.W.2d 691, 696, and are not sufficient to make a submissible case of negligence.
We next consider whether the testimony of plaintiff Esta Jane Zeigenbein is sufficient to make a submissible case. Esta Jane testified on direct examination that just before the accident occurred she saw lights coming and that these lights were located "about the middle of the road." On cross-examination, she testified that when she saw the lights, she "never saw the road" and was "not able to place those lights as being on any particular point or place in the roadway before the accident happened." Obviously, what she said on direct examination was shown on cross-examination to be a mere guess on her part and of no probative value, and is not sufficient to make a submissible case of negligence. Van Bibber v. Swift, 286 Mo. 317, 228 S.W. 69, 76.
Plaintiffs' case must stand or fall on the testimony of Georgia Sharp. Georgia testified on direct examination in part as follows:
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
Georgia testified on cross-examination in part as follows:
*393 "A I started to get a cigarette.
* * * * * *
"THE WITNESS: Yes."
The duty to make their case is upon plaintiffs and they "must remove it from the field of conjecture and establish it by substantial evidence of probative value, or by inferences reasonably to be drawn from the evidence." Vietmeier v. Voss, Mo.Sup., 246 S.W.2d 785, 787; Probst v. Seyer, Mo. Sup., 353 S.W.2d 798.
"Substantial evidence is that evidence which, if true, `has probative force upon the issues * * *,' and from which the trier of fact can reasonably decide the case on the fact issues. Collins v. Division of Welfare, 364 Mo. 1032, 270 S.W.2d 817, cited by petitioner." Cupples-Hesse Corporation v. State Tax Commission, Mo.Sup., 329 S.W.2d 696, 702.
Georgia Sharp testified that just before the collision defendant's vehicle was coming down the road "in our lane." She stated that after she first saw the lights "just a few seconds" elapsed before the collision occurred. She testified on cross-examination that she "didn't have time to think anything." Defendant contends the evidence elicited from Georgia Sharp is insubstantial because she stated "a few seconds" elapsed after she first saw the lights and before the collision occurred. It is true that evidence of one's prior negligence if unconnected with her alleged negligence at collision may be too remote to tend to prove causal negligence at the time of the collision. Shepard v. Harris, Mo.Sup., 329 S.W.2d 1. However, in view of all the evidence, her testimony was substantial evidence showing that defendant's vehicle was on the wrong side of the highway when the collision occurred. Douglas v. Twenter, 364 Mo. 71, 259 S.W.2d 353, 357. Defendant contends that Georgia's testimony that defendant's vehicle was in the wrong lane was rendered a conclusion and not a fact when Georgia said, "because I just knew it." It is true that a case, to be submissible to a jury, depends upon proof of facts and cannot be sustained by mere conclusions of witnesses. Van Bibber v. Swift, supra; Andrews v. Raiber, Mo.App., 270 S.W.2d 529. Also, a witness may qualify her testimony in such a way as to render it of no *394 probative value. Van Bibber v. Swift, supra; Oglesby v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 177 Mo. 272, 296, 76 S.W. 623, 627, 628. In our opinion, when Georgia said, "because I just knew it," she did not render her prior testimony a conclusion. This evidence and the cross-examination inferring that Georgia did not "duck down" but was in fact reaching for a cigarette may have weakened plaintiffs' case. However, it affected only the credibility of plaintiffs' evidence and the weight to be given by a jury. It remained substantial evidence of probative value. Anderson v. Bell, Mo.Sup., 303 S.W.2d 93, 96; Huffman v. Mercer, Mo.Sup., 295 S.W.2d 27, 32; Higgins v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 362 Mo. 264, 274, 241 S.W.2d 380, 384; Swain v. Anders, et al., 349 Mo. 963, 970, 163 S.W.2d 1045, 1049, 1050.
We know that "to make a submissible case there must be substantial evidence not only of negligence, but substantial evidence that such negligence directly caused or contributed to directly cause plaintiff's injuries; and that the usual test as to causal connection is whether the facts show that absent the negligent act, the injuries would not have been sustained." Wood v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 362 Mo. 1103, 1109, 246 S.W.2d 807, 811. Defendant cites King v. Ellis, Mo.Sup., 359 S.W.2d 685; O'Neill v. Claypool, Mo.Sup., 341 S.W.2d 129; Sanders v. Henderson, Mo.Sup., 301 S.W.2d 748; Probst v. Seyer, supra; Andrews v. Raiber, supra; Williams v. Cavender, Mo.Sup., 378 S.W.2d 537; and Mount Olivet Baptist Church v. George, Mo.Sup., 378 S.W.2d 549. These cases are distinguishable on the facts and do not assist us here. As defendant suggests, in all probability no case has been decided in Missouri with facts identical to those in the instant case. Ordinarily, however, proof of the driving of a car onto the wrong side of the highway and into collision makes a submissible case of negligence. Evans v. Colombo, Mo.Sup., 319 S.W.2d 549, 551.
We are of the opinion that the testimony of Georgia Sharp made a submissible case for the jury, based upon facts and not conclusions, and that its probative value was not destroyed on cross-examination. Viewing her testimony from the standpoint most favorable to plaintiffs, the jury could reasonably have found that defendant drove her vehicle onto the wrong side of the highway into collision and that absent such negligence the collision would not have occurred. We hold a submissible case was made for the jury.
Accordingly, the case is reversed and remanded.
All concur.