Case Title: Ex parte Norfolk Southern Railway Company, Norfolk Southern Corporation, and John D. Summers. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Dexter A. Grandison v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company et al.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1060374

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:4/25/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1060374
____________________
Ex parte Norfolk Southern Railway Company, Norfolk Southern
Corporation, and John D. Summers
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Dexter A. Grandison
v.
Norfolk Southern Railway Company et al.)
(Clarke Circuit Court, CV-06-61)
SMITH, Justice.
Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("NSRC"), Norfolk
Southern Corporation ("Norfolk Southern"), and John D. Summers
(collectively "the petitioners") petition for a writ of
mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss, pursuant to
Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-440, the claims asserted against them in
1060374
2
the Clarke Circuit Court by codefendants Rolison Trucking
Company, LLC ("Rolison Trucking"); Gail Rolison; Ronny
Johnson; and Kim Johnson.  We deny the petition.
Facts and Procedural History
In February 2005, a train operated by NSRC and two NSRC
employees--Dexter A. Grandison, a conductor, and Summers, a
locomotive engineer--collided with a truck at a railroad
crossing in Clarke County.  Ronny Johnson was driving the
truck for his employer, Rolison Trucking.
On April 12, 2006, Grandison filed an action in the
Clarke Circuit Court seeking damages for injuries he allegedly
suffered in the accident (hereinafter "the Clarke County
action").  Grandison sought damages from NSRC under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.  He
also alleged state-law claims seeking damages against Rolison
Trucking and Ronny Johnson for negligence and wantonness.
Gail Rolison, the sole member of Rolison Trucking and the
owner of the truck, was later added as a defendant.
On May 9, 2006, NSRC sued Rolison Trucking, Gail Rolison,
and Ronny Johnson in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division, seeking
1060374
3
damages for negligence and wantonness.  Specifically, NSRC
contended that Johnson negligently or wantonly caused the
collision and damaged NSRC's train.
On May 26, 2006, Johnson, Rolison Trucking, and Gail
Rolison all filed separate answers to Grandison's complaint in
the Clarke County action.  Additionally, they asserted what
they called "cross-claims" against NSRC, seeking damages for
negligence, wantonness, and for violation of Ala. Code 1975,
§ 37-2-81.  They further alleged "third-party" claims against
Summers, 
NSRC, 
and 
Norfolk 
Southern 
(NSRC's 
parent
corporation) and asserted counterclaims against Grandison.
Also on that date, Kim Johnson, Ronny Johnson's wife, filed
both a motion to intervene and a complaint, which sought
damages against Grandison, NSRC, Norfolk Southern, and Summers
for loss of consortium.  The trial court later granted Kim
Johnson's motion to intervene.  Ronny Johnson, Kim Johnson,
Rolison Trucking, and Gail Rolison later amended the pleadings
to allege that their claims against Summers, NSRC, and Norfolk
Southern had been erroneously characterized as third-party
claims and were actually cross-claims under Rule 13(h), Ala.
R. Civ. P.
1060374
Summers and Norfolk Southern did not join NSRC's motion
1
to dismiss; instead, they filed a separate motion to dismiss
contending that the "third-party" claims filed against them by
the Johnsons, Rolison, and Rolison Trucking were improper
under Rule 14, Ala. R. Civ. P.
4
Subsequently, NSRC filed a motion in the Clarke County
action contending that Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-440, required the
trial court to dismiss the claims filed against it by the
Johnsons, Rolison, and Rolison Trucking because the federal
court action had been filed before those claims were filed and
thus took precedence over the subsequently filed claims in the
Clarke County action.   NSRC further argued that the claims
1
the Johnsons, Rolison, and Rolison Trucking were attempting to
assert 
as 
"cross-claims" 
were 
actually 
compulsory
counterclaims that must be asserted in the federal court
action. 
In the meantime, Ronny Johnson, Rolison, and Rolison
Trucking moved the federal district court to stay the case
under the abstention doctrine found in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
Under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, a federal court
stays an action when there is an ongoing parallel action in a
state court.  Moorer v. Demopolis Waterworks & Sewer Bd., 374
1060374
5
F.3d 994, 997 (11th Cir. 2004).  In determining whether a stay
is warranted, the court balances its obligation to exercise
jurisdiction over factors counseling against exercising that
jurisdiction.  See Moorer, 374 F.3d at 997-98.  The federal
district court, after weighing various factors, found that the
potential for excessive and inconsistent piecemeal litigation
outweighed the factors in favor of litigating NSRC's federal
court action.  Thus, the federal district court found that the
Colorado River doctrine required that it abstain from
proceeding with the case and entered a stay. 
The Clarke Circuit Court held a hearing on the motion to
dismiss and on November 28, 2006, issued an order denying the
motion.  NSRC, Norfolk Southern, and Summers then petitioned
this Court for mandamus relief.
Standard of Review
A writ of mandamus is appropriate when the petitioner can
demonstrate "(1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2)
an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied
by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate
remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the
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6
court." Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.
2001). 
Discussion
The petitioners contend that the "cross-claims" filed by
the Johnsons, Rolison, and Rolison Trucking in the Clarke
County action must be dismissed pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, §
6-5-440, 
which 
generally 
prohibits 
a 
plaintiff 
from
maintaining duplicate actions:
"No plaintiff is entitled to prosecute two actions
in the courts of this state at the same time for the
same cause and against the same party. In such a
case, the defendant may require the plaintiff to
elect 
which 
he 
will 
prosecute, 
if 
commenced
simultaneously, and the pendency of the former is a
good defense to the latter if commenced at different
times."
This Code section, by its plain language, forbids a party
from prosecuting two actions for the "same cause" and against
the "same party."  This Court has previously held that an
action pending in a federal court falls within the coverage of
this Code section:
"'The phrase "courts of this state," as used in
§ 6-5-440, includes all federal courts located in
Alabama. This Court has consistently refused to
allow a person to prosecute an action in a state
court while another action on the same cause and
against the same parties is pending in a federal
court in this State.'"
1060374
7
Ex parte University of South Alabama Found., 788 So. 2d 161,
164 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Weaver v. Hood, 577 So. 2d 440, 442
(Ala. 1991) (citations in Weaver omitted in University of
South Alabama)).  Additionally, a compulsory counterclaim is
considered an "action" for purposes of § 6-5-440.  Penick v.
Cado Sys. of Cent. Alabama, Inc., 628 So. 2d 598, 599 (Ala.
1993).  As this Court has noted:
"This Court has held that the obligation ... to
assert 
compulsory 
counterclaims, when read in
conjunction with § 6-5-440, Ala. Code 1975, which
prohibits a party from prosecuting two actions for
the same cause and against the same party, is
tantamount to making the defendant with a compulsory
counterclaim in the first action a 'plaintiff' in
that action (for purposes of § 6-5-440) as of the
time of its commencement.  See, e.g., Ex parte
Parsons & Whittemore Alabama Pine Constr. Corp., 658
So. 2d 414 (Ala. 1995); Penick v. Cado Systems of
Cent. Alabama, Inc., 628 So. 2d 598 (Ala. 1993); Ex
parte Canal Ins. Co., 534 So. 2d 582 (Ala. 1988).
Thus, the defendant subject to the counterclaim rule
who commences another action has violated the
prohibition in § 6-5-440 against maintaining two
actions for the same cause." 
Ex parte Breman Lake View Resort, L.P., 729 So. 2d 849, 851
(Ala. 1999).  See also University of South Alabama Found., 788
So. 2d at 165 (holding that a party in an action pending in a
federal court was subject to the counterclaim rule and thus
violated § 6-5-440 by commencing another action in a state
1060374
8
court); Ex parte Parsons & Whittemore Alabama Pine Constr.
Corp., 658 So. 2d 414 (Ala. 1995) (holding that the
prosecution in a subsequent action of claims that had been
compulsory 
counterclaims 
in 
a 
previously 
filed
declaratory-judgment action violated § 6-5-440). 
The petitioners argue that the claims alleged against
NSRC by the Johnsons, Rolison, and Rolison Trucking in the
Clarke County action "are compulsory counterclaims which
should be asserted (if at all) in the federal court lawsuit,"
which was filed over two weeks before the Johnsons, Rolison,
and Rolison Trucking filed their claims in the Clarke County
action.  Under § 6-5-440, the petitioners argue, the Johnsons,
Rolison, and Rolison Trucking can maintain their claims only
in the federal action (where those claims asserted in the
Clarke County action would be compulsory counterclaims), which
was filed first.  We disagree.
Since this petition was filed, NSRC appealed the federal
district court's decision to stay the case to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.  In an order
dated May 22, 2007, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision
of the federal district court, Norfolk Southern Railway v.
1060374
9
Rolison Trucking Co., No. 06-15314 (May 22, 2007, 11th Cir.
2007), and NSRC's petition for a rehearing was denied.  Thus,
the district court's decision to stay the case under the
abstention doctrine of Colorado River remains intact. 
In Terrell v. City of Bessemer, 406 So. 2d 337 (Ala.
1981), this Court recognized an exception to § 6-5-440 that,
by analogy, is applicable in this case.  It discussed that
exception in University of South Alabama Foundation, 788 So.
2d at 165: 
"In Terrell, this Court recognized a limited
exception to the general rule against prosecuting
the same cause of action in two different courts,
noting that where a single wrongful act gives rise
to both a state cause of action and a federal cause
of action, the plaintiff may include his state-law
claim with his federal claim and request the court
to exercise its power of pendent jurisdiction to
hear both claims. Terrell, 406 So. 2d at 339-40. The
plaintiff in Terrell included his state-law claims
with his federal-law claims; however, the federal
district court refused to exercise its discretionary
power of pendent jurisdiction. This Court concluded
that in a situation where the plaintiff has combined
state-law claims with federal claims in an action
filed in a federal court and the federal court
declines to exercise its discretionary power of
pendent jurisdiction over the state-law claims, the
plaintiff 'should be afforded an opportunity to
pursue his alleged common law theories of recovery
in state court.' 406 So. 2d at 339."
In the instant case, the federal district court exercised
its power under Colorado River to stay the action pending in
1060374
The petitioners also allege that, because the claims
2
asserted by the Johnsons, Gail Rolison, and Rolison Trucking
against NSRC are due to be dismissed under § 6-5-440, then
their claims against Norfolk Southern and Summers are also due
to be dismissed.  However, because NSRC's § 6-5-440 argument
is without merit, this allegation is without merit as well.
10
that court.  NSRC attempted, but failed, to have the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals dissolve that stay.  For all
practical purposes, the federal district court has declined to
hear NSRC's claims.  If this Court were to halt the Clarke
County action pursuant to § 6-5-440, then this case would
present the absurd result the Terrell exception was crafted to
prevent: the respondents would have no forum in which to
present their claims.  We thus hold that, when a federal court
abstains from hearing a case under the Colorado River
doctrine, that case is not considered as an action being
prosecuted, for purposes of § 6-5-440.
Because the petitioners have not demonstrated that § 6-5-
440 is applicable in this case and because an exception to the
Code section applies, the petitioners have not demonstrated a
clear legal right to relief they seek.   Therefore, the
2
petition is denied.
PETITION DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Bolin,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.