Case Title: State v. Donaldson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 109671

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 109,671 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH V. DONALDSON, 
Appellant. 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
Non-sex offenders seeking to avoid retroactive application of provisions of the 
Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) must, in order to satisfy the "effects" prong of 
the test set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 9 
L. Ed. 2d 644 (1963), produce a record that distinguishes—by the "clearest proof"—
KORA's effect on those classes of offenders from the Act's effects on sex offenders as a 
class. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed August 15, 2014. 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; CLARK V. OWENS II, judge. Opinion filed August 11, 2017. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming in part and dismissing in part the judgment of the district 
court, is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
 
Heather Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek 
Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
STEGALL, J.:  The State charged Joseph V. Donaldson with one count each of 
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated battery, and criminal threat. The events leading to 
these charges occurred in June 2011. A jury later convicted him as charged, and after 
finding that Donaldson had a criminal history score of A, the court sentenced him to a 
total controlling 592-month prison sentence. By virtue of his aggravated kidnapping 
conviction, the court imposed lifetime registration pursuant to the Kansas Offender 
Registration Act (KORA), K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq.  
 
Donaldson appealed, alleging several errors, including that his lifetime offender 
registration violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. At the time he committed the crimes, 
Donaldson would have been subject to registration only if the victim of the aggravated 
kidnapping charge was under the age of 18. See K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22-4902(a)(4)(B); 
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22-4906(a). After the State charged Donaldson but prior to trial, our 
legislature amended KORA in such a way that Donaldson is currently subject to lifetime 
registration. See L. 2011, ch. 95, sec. 6; K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 22-4906(d)(10) (providing for 
lifetime registration for any offender who has been convicted of aggravated kidnapping). 
According to Donaldson, because the State did not present any evidence that the victim 
was under the age of 18 and because the pre-2011 version of KORA applied, he should 
not be subject to registration.  
 
The Court of Appeals rejected Donaldson's claim, holding that registration is not 
punishment, so the 2011 amendments could be applied retroactively to him. State v. 
Donaldson, No. 109,671, 2014 WL 4080074, at *11-12 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished 
opinion). The panel further affirmed his conviction and sentence, and we granted review 
solely to address his ex post facto claim. 
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We recently analyzed KORA in this context using the intent-effects test set forth 
by the United States Supreme Court and concluded lifetime sex offender registration does 
not constitute "punishment" for purposes of applying any provision of the federal 
Constitution. State v. Petersen-Beard, 304 Kan. 192, 198-209, 377 P.3d 1127 (2016) 
(relying on the factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 
83 S. Ct. 554, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644 [1963]). We therefore held that the 2011 version of KORA 
could not violate federal prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. See 304 Kan. 
at 208. And not long ago, we "explicitly extend[ed] the holding of Petersen-Beard to 
apply to ex post facto challenges." State v. Reed, 306 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 
110,277, filed August 4, 2017), slip op at 8. 
 
Therefore, to prevail, Donaldson must demonstrate that violent offenders as a class 
are sufficiently distinguishable from the class of sex offenders such that the effects of the 
law become punitive rather than civil when applied to violent offenders. We recently 
confronted a nearly identical question in State v. Meredith, 306 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ 
(No. 110,520, filed August 4, 2017). In that case, we declined to hold that KORA 
registration is punishment where "the record . . . is insufficiently developed for [the 
defendant] to persuasively argue KORA's allegedly punitive effects on drug offenders as 
a class separate and distinct from sex offenders." Meredith, 306 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 6; 
see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 155 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2003) ("Because 
we 'ordinarily defer to the legislature's stated intent,' [citation omitted] '"only the clearest 
proof" will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been 
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,' [citations omitted]."); see also State 
v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 923 P.2d 1024 (1996) (holding that the legislature's intent in 
enacting KORA was to create a nonpunitive civil regulatory scheme); Doe v. Thompson, 
304 Kan. 291, 373 P.3d 750 (2016) (upholding Myers' determination that the legislature 
intended to enact a nonpunitive scheme), overruled on other grounds by Petersen-Beard, 
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304 Kan. 192. We further explained in Meredith that such an inquiry "requires a robust 
record because the effects prong of the applicable legal test obliges an appellate court to 
premise its legal conclusion on at least some fact-intensive questions." Meredith, 306 
Kan. at ____, slip op. at 10.  
 
Donaldson's claim suffers from the same flaw. He is unable to satisfy the "clearest 
proof" standard because the record below has not been sufficiently developed. As a 
result, we cannot—at this time—hold that KORA's registration requirements as applied 
to violent offenders are punishment and subject to the limitations of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. 
 
Affirmed. 
 
*** 
 
BEIER, J., dissenting:  Consistent with my votes in State v. Petersen-Beard, 304 
Kan. 192, 377 P.3d 1127 (2016); State v. Reed, 306 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 
110,277, filed August 4, 2017); and State v. Meredith, 306 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 
110,520, filed August 4, 2017), I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision in this 
case. "Kansas' requirement of offender registration—especially in its modern, maximally 
invasive, maximally pervasive, and infinitely more public incarnation—is punishment, 
certainly in effect if not in intent. It is no less so for a drug offender than for a sex 
offender or a violent offender. It is no less so when the Ex Post Facto Clause is before us 
than when Apprendi or the Eighth Amendment is before us." Meredith, 306 Kan. at ___, 
slip op. at 11-12 (Beier, J., dissenting). 
 
ROSEN and JOHNSON, JJ., join the foregoing dissent.