Case Title: State v. Spencer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 101,077 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
HAROLD DEAN SPENCER, 
Appellee. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
In Jessica's Law and non-Jessica's Law sentencing departure cases: (1) When the 
question is whether the record supported a sentencing judge's particular articulated 
reasons for departure, an appellate court's standard of review is substantial competent 
evidence; (2) when the question is whether a sentencing judge correctly concluded that 
particular mitigating factors constituted substantial and compelling reasons to depart in a 
particular case, including whether those mitigating factors outweighed any aggravating 
factors if such a balance is necessary, the appellate standard of review is abuse of 
discretion; (3) when the question is whether a particular mitigating or aggravating factor 
can ever, as a matter of law, be substantial and compelling in any case, the appellate 
standard of review is de novo; and (4) when the challenge focuses on the extent of a 
durational departure, the appellate standard of review is abuse of discretion, measuring 
whether the departure is consistent with the purposes of the guidelines and proportionate 
to the crime severity and the defendant's criminal history. 
 
2.  
 
In a Jessica's Law case, the sentencing judge need not differentiate between the 
reasons that support a departure from the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment 
 
 
under K.S.A. 21-4643(d) and the reasons that support a dispositional departure from the 
sentencing guidelines to probation.  
 
3. 
 
In a Jessica's Law case, the reasons for a departure from the mandatory minimum 
term of imprisonment must be stated on the record at sentencing. A sentencing judge, 
prior to or in lieu of any appeal, may not later add other reasons to support a granted 
departure to the record of the case. 
 
4. 
 
On the facts of this case, the sentencing judge abused his discretion in departing 
from the mandatory minimum of Jessica's Law. 
 
5. 
 
On the facts of this case, the sentencing judge abused his discretion by granting a 
dispositional departure to probation.  
 
6. 
 
On remand for resentencing, the sentencing judge in a Jessica's Law case may re-
evaluate and/or add to the reasons for departure from the mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment under K.S.A. 21-4643(d) and for dispositional departure to probation and 
decide in his or her discretion to re-grant the departure or departures. He or she also may 
decide whether to grant a durational departure. 
 
7.  
 
Aggravated indecent liberties in violation of K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A) perpetrated 
by a defendant 18 years or older upon a victim younger than 14 is an off-grid crime. If 
the sentencing judge departs from the mandatory minimum of Jessica's Law to a sentence 
pursuant to the sentencing guidelines act, the judge shall go to the grid box associated 
 
 
with the severity level assigned to the crime when it lacks the element of disparity 
between the defendant's and the victim's ages. 
 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; MATTHEW J. DOWD, judge. Opinion filed March 18, 2011. 
Sentences vacated; remanded with directions for resentencing.  
 
Natalie A. Chalmers, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Jamie L. Karasek, assistant 
district attorney, Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were on the brief 
for appellant.  
 
Carl Folsom, III, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
BEIER, J.: This is an appeal taken by the State from the departure sentence given 
defendant Harold Dean Spencer by District Court Judge Matthew J. Dowd. Spencer 
pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child, both off-grid 
felonies punishable under Jessica's Law. One of the victims was his 6-year-old great-
granddaughter; the other was a granddaughter of similar age who was living with Spencer 
and his wife at the time the crimes came to light.  
 
The potential issues before us are:  
 
1. Whether the sentencing judge properly relied on the same findings to support 
both a departure from the mandatory hard 25 sentence under Jessica's Law, K.S.A. 21-
4643(d), to a sentence under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), K.S.A. 21-
4701 et seq., and a dispositional departure from a KSGA prison term under K.S.A. 21-
4716(a) to probation.  
 
 
 
2. Whether the reasons articulated by the sentencing judge for departure from the 
mandatory minimum of Jessica's Law were substantial and compelling. 
 
3. Whether the reasons articulated by the sentencing judge for the dispositional 
departure were substantial and compelling. 
 
4. Whether the sentencing judge abused his discretion in the extent of departure 
granted.  
 
5. In the event the defendant's sentences must be vacated because either or both 
departures were inappropriate, whether a new sentencing judge is permitted on remand to 
re-evaluate his or her reasons and re-grant or deny either or both departures and to 
consider a durational departure. 
 
6. Whether, on a State appeal of a departure sentence for aggravated indecent 
liberties, this court has authority to entertain a defense challenge to the offense severity 
level used by the sentencing judge, and, if so, the correct method and result for a 
departure from Jessica's Law to a sentence "pursuant to the sentencing guidelines act."  
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Spencer was charged with one count of aggravated indecent liberties in violation 
of K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A), perpetrated on a great-granddaughter, and one count of rape 
in violation of K.S.A. 21-3502(a(2), perpetrated on a granddaughter. On arrest, Spencer 
confessed to fondling the girls but not to rape. In exchange for his guilty pleas to two 
counts of aggravated indecent liberties, the State agreed to stand silent at sentencing. 
 
Spencer moved for departure, arguing in his written motion that his waiver of 
preliminary hearing and jury trial had spared the victims emotional harm and that he had 
 
 
accepted responsibility and expressed remorse. He also argued that his lack of prior 
criminal activity and age of 76 justified departure. His counsel also wrote that Spencer 
had "been law-abiding and gainfully employed his entire life," that he had "raised several 
children and grandchildren," that he was "the primary care-giver for his sick and ailing 
wife," that he had "strong support from his family and others in the community," and that 
the "victim's mother favors probation."  
 
At the sentencing hearing, several members of Spencer's family spoke of his vital 
role among their kin and his caretaking of his wife, as well as previous acts of kindness 
and generosity. It appears from the record that certain other members of the family may 
have disagreed, as there were references to the crimes tearing the family apart. A minister 
also spoke on Spencer's behalf. Judge Dowd also had access to victim impact statements, 
one written by the mother of the great-granddaughter, who opposed Spencer's 
imprisonment, and one composed by the granddaughter, who indicated that Spencer 
should go to jail. Judge Dowd also noted numerous letters written by "friends and family 
of the defendant indicating that he is a good citizen, a good person, and a suitable 
candidate for some sort of leniency." When Judge Dowd asked Spencer if he had 
anything to say, Spencer said only, "I just wish I could undo it."  
 
After airing of a disagreement between the parties about the point on the 
sentencing guidelines to which a district judge departing from a hard 25 under Jessica's 
Law should go—with the State arguing for an offense severity level 1 and the defense 
arguing for an offense severity level 3—Judge Dowd ruled:  
 
"Certainly, this is always a serious situation, a serious crime. I am very aware of 
the impact it's had on the defendant's family, on his friends, and on the community. 
There's a kind of a mixed input in regard to the harm that was done to these young ladies. 
It does not appear that the harm was terribly significant. The mom of the children herself 
says that they have dealt with this fairly well. And so I think the victim, the victim impact 
is not as serious as it would be in an ordinary case of this nature." 
 
 
At this point, counsel for the State corrected the judge, saying that there were 
different mothers of the two victims involved in the case. Judge Dowd acknowledged this 
fact. He then continued:  
 
"In any event, I think what I've heard here today would seem to indicate that a departure 
is necessary, appropriate, and there are substantial and compelling reasons to depart. I 
think the age of the defendant, his prior record, and his support from his family and 
friends would lead the Court to believe that this might have been an aberration or a 
momentary lapse in an otherwise good life, so I am going to depart. 
 
"I am going to adopt—since I'm going to also depart durationally, I think it's 
really not terribly significant how many years or months we give, because I am going to 
depart dispositionally. But I will adopt the State's theory and go from life imprisonment 
to a number of years—or pardon me, a number of months as indicated on the guideline 
grid for the severity level 1. So I'm going to impose a 155-month sentence to the 
Secretary of Corrections. The defendant's criminal history is "I" and that's the low range 
on the severity level number 1, 155 months.  
 
"I'm also going to depart dispositionally. I think that it would not, it would not 
serve the end of justice to incarcerate the defendant. I think that a significant amount of 
time in prison would be tantamount to a life sentence for this man in light of his age, and 
age is listed as one of the reasons to depart. Usually we think of that as a young person 
not really aware of his responsibilities, but I think it also can be interpreted as age in the 
sense of an elder person.  
 
"In any event, I'm going to impose the 155 months, 36 months of post-release 
supervision and 36 months supervised probation . . . . 
 
. . . .  
 
". . . And also, we should impose the same sentence on Count 2. And they will 
run concurrent. That will be the order of the Court."  
 
 
 
A month after the sentencing hearing and the State's filing of its notice of appeal, 
when the parties could not agree on the appropriate content of the journal entry, the 
defendant filed a written objection. The objection sought to have the listed reasons for 
departure expanded from the three enumerated in the State's proposed journal entry—the 
age of the defendant, the lack of a criminal record, and family support—to ten—(1) the 
age of the defendant; (2) the defendant's health; (3) "Defendant is the primary caretaker 
for his extremely ill wife"; (4) lack of prior record; (5) support of family and friends; (6) 
expression of remorse and claim of responsibility; (7) "Victim, through mother, asked the 
Court to grant probation"; (8) "Degree of harm associated with this particular crime was 
significantly less than is typical for such offense"; (9) "Defendant did not exercise any 
confrontational rights by way of preliminary hearing or trial and plead [sic] guilty"; and 
(10) "State stood silent thereby offering no opinion as to sentencing."  
 
The State responded in writing to the defense objection, arguing that the court's 
minutes for the sentencing hearing specifically referenced only three departure factors. 
The minutes are not in the record on appeal. The State also quoted a portion of the judge's 
remarks at sentencing, specifically: "'[T]here are substantial and compelling reasons to 
depart. I think the age of the defendant, his prior record, and his support from his 
family and friends would lead the Court to believe that this might have been an 
aberration or a momentary lapse in an otherwise good life, so I am going to depart.'" The 
State continued: "While Defendant may desire to have the addition of seven more 
departure factors, such were clearly not relied upon by the Court as evinced by the record 
and the minutes.'"  
 
Approximately a month after the State filed its response, Judge Dowd held a 
hearing to settle the journal entry. He opened the hearing by stating: 
 
"The issue before the Court is the journal entry and . . . the defense perceived as 
the Court did that the journal entry submitted by the State was rather summary. 
 
 
 
"I would concede at the outset that the quotation of the State in regard to the 
factors listed for departure is accurate. The statutory factors were what the State listed 
and the only issue is whether or not those factors should be expanded, listing several 
other facts that c[a]me to the attention of the defense as well as the Court.  
 
"So I'm seriously considering granting that motion."  
 
Judge Dowd then asked for the State's comments. The prosecutor argued that the 
sentence was final at the time of pronouncement and that the portion of the transcript 
quoted in the State's response to the defense objection was accurate. He also corrected the 
judge, pointing out that the age of the defendant and his prior record were statutory 
departure factors under Jessica's Law, while the appropriateness of family support as a 
mitigator could only be based on case law. The prosecutor concluded: 
 
"So I think it would be fair to say that the Court was not just listing the statutory 
factors but was listing the combination of statutory as well as case law basis.  
 
"What we're left with in the record is what it is and the journal entry reflects the 
record as well as the minutes. I think it would be inappropriate or imprudent at this point 
in time for the Court to add bas[e]s for departure, essentially to enlarge the record.  
 
"It would be the State's position that doing so would ultimately be a—may, in 
fact, result in an illegal sentence and I don't think is—there's a basis—the ability—the 
authority for the Court to do so under law."  
 
Defense counsel agreed that no expansion of the record was appropriate after the 
sentencing hearing but argued that the judge had already considered the additional factors 
sought to be listed in the journal entry. Judge Dowd ruled in favor of the defense, saying:  
 
"Well, I think it's within the Court's discretion to supplement the record. In my 
judgment and my recollection, these factors . . . brought to our attention currently here 
 
 
were part of the motion to depart. They were a significant part of the evidence and I think 
more importantly they were a very significant factor and had a very significant impact on 
me as far as making the decision that I made.  
 
"So I think in the interest of a clearer and comprehensive record, that those 
factors should be added to the record and I will do so over the objection of the State. 
 
"I will sign the journal entry submitted by [the State] and I will also sign the 
order submitted by the defense adding those factors and make a specific finding that 
those were a part of the motion, a part of the evidence and a part of the Court's ruling and 
a part of the Court's decision to depart."  
 
Despite Judge Dowd's last statement, the written court order regarding the journal 
entry, filed the same day as the hearing on the objection, read in pertinent part:  
 
"[T]he Court is not willing to sign the journal entry as proposed by the State. The Court 
would find that the following additional factors were considered by the Court in 
determining a departure was warranted: the degree of harm was significantly less than is 
typical as was evidenced by the mother of [A.S.], who requested leniency; the age, health 
and lack of prior record of the defendant; the support of family and friends; the fact that 
the defendant was and is the primary caretaker of his critically ill wife; and the fact that 
the defendant expressed remorse and claimed responsibility by not exercising his 
confrontational rights. 
 
"In light of the Court's clarification of reasons for departure, the State is hereby 
ordered to prepare a journal entry reflecting the above findings." 
 
No journal entry other than that originally proposed by the State appears in the 
record on appeal. It is signed by Judge Dowd, apparently on the same day as the hearing.  
 
Since the State took its appeal, it has added to the record on appeal the victim 
impact statements and letters Judge Dowd evidently considered at sentencing. There are 
actually three victim impact statements: one written by the mother of the great-
 
 
granddaughter, which denied any lingering effects on the great-granddaughter; one by the 
granddaughter, composed on a form designed for children, in which she described 
experiencing continuing ill effects and favored sending Spencer to prison; and one 
written by the granddaughter's father, who asked that Spencer be given probation. The 
letters to which Judge Dowd made reference during the sentencing hearing are from 
family members and one ex-family member; most question Spencer's guilt rather than 
address appropriate sentence; many emphasize that he is the only family member 
available to care for his seriously ill wife.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Sameness of Findings Supporting Departures 
 
Under the version of Jessica's Law in effect at the time of the 2007 crimes at issue 
here, a defendant who is 18 years old or older at the time he or she commits aggravated 
indecent liberties on a child younger than 14 ordinarily is subject to a Jessica's Law hard 
25 sentence for a first offense. K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1)(C). A sentencing judge may depart 
from that "mandatory minimum term of imprisonment" if the judge "finds substantial and 
compelling reasons, following a review of mitigating circumstances." K.S.A. 21-4643(d). 
The judge 
 
"shall state on the record at the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons 
for the departure. The departure sentence shall be the sentence pursuant to the sentencing 
guidelines act, K.S.A. 21-4701 et seq. . . . , and no sentence of a mandatory minimum 
term of imprisonment shall be imposed hereunder. [A]s used in [K.S.A. 21-4643(d)], 
mitigating circumstances shall include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) 
The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
(2) 
The crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbances. 
(3) 
The victim was an accomplice in the crime committed by another person, 
and the defendant's participation was relatively minor. 
 
 
(4) 
The defendant acted under extreme distress or under the substantial 
domination of another person.  
(5) 
The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the 
defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired. 
(6) 
The age of the defendant at the time of the crime." K.S.A. 21-4643(d).  
 
Once a "sentence becomes a guidelines sentence, the district court is free to depart 
from the sentencing grid if it states on the record findings of fact and reasons justifying a 
departure that are supported by evidence in the record and are substantial and 
compelling." State v. Gracey, 288 Kan. 252, 259, 200 P.3d 1275 (2009). K.S.A. 21-
4716(a) provides that a sentencing judge shall impose the presumptive sentence under the 
sentencing guidelines "unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to 
impose a departure"; if the judge chooses to depart, he or she "shall state on the record at 
the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons for the departure." The 
nonexclusive list of statutory mitigating factors includes "[t]he degree of harm or loss 
attributed to the current crime of conviction was significantly less than typical for such an 
offense." K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1)(E). The factors explicitly listed do not include the age of 
the defendant, his or her lack of a significant criminal history, or family support. K.S.A. 
21-4716(c)(1)(A)-(E).  
 
The State argues that Judge Dowd erred by using the same mitigating 
circumstances to justify both the departure from the Jessica's Law hard 25 to the 
sentencing guidelines and the dispositional departure from what the judge believed to be 
the guidelines' presumptive prison sentence of 155 months to 36 months' probation. This 
issue was specifically left open in the Gracey opinion, decided under the same version of 
Jessica's Law applicable in this case. See Gracey, 288 Kan. at 261. This argument was 
not made to Judge Dowd here, and the State's choice to raise the argument on this appeal 
might be viewed as a violation of its agreement to stand silent at sentencing. However, 
 
 
Spencer does not raise these objections. We therefore will address the merits of the 
State's argument.  
 
The State initially acknowledges that the applicable standard of review is that for 
statutory interpretation, which is de novo. See State v. Jefferson, 287 Kan. 28, 33, 194 
P.3d 557 (2008). But it then proceeds to argue that one reason a sentencing judge should 
be required to differentiate between the mitigators justifying a departure from Jessica's 
Law and those justifying a dispositional departure from the default guidelines sentence is 
that the standard of review applied to one is different from that applied to the other. 
Citing State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, Syl. ¶ 5, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008) (Jessica's 
Law), and State v. Blackmon, 285 Kan. 719, 724, 176 P.3d 160 (2008) (guidelines 
sentence), the State asserts that an appellate court evaluates a district court decision on 
whether mitigators constitute substantial and compelling reasons for departure from 
Jessica's Law under an abuse of discretion standard. In contrast, it argues, appellate 
review of a sentencing judge's performance under K.S.A. 21-4716 requires it to first 
examine the record to discern whether substantial competent evidence supports the 
articulated reasons for the departure. If that hurdle is cleared, it says, the appellate court 
then determines, as a matter of law, whether the reasons are substantial and compelling. 
See K.S.A. 21-4721(d)(1), (2).  
 
In Ortega-Cadelan, the defendant challenged the sentencing judge's denial of a 
motion to depart from a Jessica's Law hard 25 for a rape of a child. Justice Luckert, 
writing for a unanimous court, rejected a defense argument that each of the mitigators 
listed in Jessica's Law constituted a per se substantial and compelling reason for a 
departure, likening the procedure to 
 
"that mandated by K.S.A. 21-4716( c)(1), the general departure provision in the 
[sentencing guidelines] . . . .  
 
 
 
"[U]nder both the [sentencing guidelines] provision and [Jessica's Law], the 
district court must consider whether a mitigating circumstance is a substantial and 
compelling reason for departure under the facts of the case. There is no formula for this 
determination, and the list of nonexclusive mitigating circumstances merely serves as a 
guide for analysis." Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 165. 
 
The sentencing judge's determination that the mitigating circumstances in a 
particular case constitute substantial and compelling reasons to depart was then evaluated 
under an abuse of discretion standard. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 165-66. It is 
worthwhile to note that the Gracey opinion followed Ortega-Cadelan in stating that a 
decision to depart is within the discretion of the sentencing court. Gracey, 288 Kan. at 
260; see State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 164, 199 P.3d 1265 (2009). Many others among 
our now-numerous Jessica's Law cases have done likewise. See State v. Plotner, 290 
Kan. 774, 780-81, 235 P.3d 417 (2010); State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666, 689-90, 234 P.3d 
761 (2010); State v. Trevino, 290 Kan. 317, 322-23, 227 P.3d 951 (2010); State v. 
Marler, 290 Kan. 119, 127, 223 P.3d 804 (2010) State v. Robison, 290 Kan. 51, 56-57, 
222 P.3d 500 (2010); State v. Mondragon, 289 Kan. 1158, 1162, 220 P.3d 369 (2009); 
State v. Ballard, 289 Kan. 1000, 1009-10, 218 P.3d 432 (2009); State v. Seward, 289 
Kan. 715, 721-22, 217 P.3d 443 (2009); State v. Spotts, 288 Kan. 650, 654-56, 206 P.3d 
510 (2009); State v. Gilliland, 2010 WL 1379182, at *3, unpublished opinion filed (April 
2, 2010). Further, we have specifically held that the exercise of discretion by a sentencing 
judge deciding a departure motion does not violate a defendant's right to procedural due 
process. See State v. Garza, 290 Kan. 1021, 1035, 236 P.3d 501 (2010).  
 
Justice Luckert also wrote the second decision cited by the State on this issue, 
State v. Blackmon, 285 Kan. 719, a non-Jessica's Law case. Blackmon also differed 
fundamentally from Ortega-Cadelon, because the issue the court examined was not 
whether the record supported the existence of a departure factor or whether, on the facts 
of the case, any cited factor qualified as substantial and compelling. Rather, the issue was 
whether, as a matter of law, a sentencing judge could ever rely on his or her disagreement 
 
 
with a jury's verdict on the level of recklessness involved in a crime to support a 
downward departure under K.S.A. 21-4716. The answer was no. See Blackmon, 285 Kan. 
at 728 (sentencing judge cannot be permitted to become "super juror"); see also State v. 
Martin, 279 Kan. 623, 627-28, 112 P.3d 192 (2005) (issue whether defendant's status as 
ringleader could ever support upward departure reviewed as a question of law; statutory 
interpretation required). Gracey echoed Blackmon, although it did not cite to it, relying 
on the de novo standard applicable to statutory construction questions to decide whether a 
dispositional departure was ever authorized after a departure from Jessica's Law. See 
Gracey, 288 Kan. at 257 (citing State v. Ruiz-Reyes, 285 Kan. 650, 653, 175 P.3d 849 
[2008]).  
 
Another recent non-Jessica's Law case that bears revisiting on the nature of our 
standard of review is State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 735, 175 P.3d 832 (2008), which was 
written by now Chief Justice Nuss and filed 9 months before Ortega-Cadelan. It involved 
an upward dispositional departure from presumptive probation; the Court of Appeals had 
held that the factors on which the sentencing judge relied were not valid departure 
factors. On the State's petition for review, we upheld the departure sentence, ruling that 
the defendant mother violated a special fiduciary relationship and her unique position of 
trust when she handed her 16-year-old son a gun and exhorted him to shoot into an 
occupied house. Martin, 285 Kan. at 742-43, 745-46. Chief Justice Nuss wrote:  
 
"There is no dispute in the instant case about whether the evidence in the record 
supports the reasons given by the sentencing court for the departure. Rather, the dispute is 
whether these reasons are substantial and compelling for departure. Analysis of the 
present dispute consists of two parts: First, are the reasons given by the sentencing court 
valid departure factors and, second, 'are the reasons, as a whole, substantial and 
compelling reasons for departure in a given case?' State v. McKay, 271 Kan. 725, 729, 26 
P.3d 58 (2001). This determination is a matter of law which we review de novo. 271 Kan. 
at 728." Martin, 285 Kan. at 739. 
 
 
 
In State v. Favela, 259 Kan. 215, 911 P.2d 792 (1996), we also dealt with the 
appropriate standard of review on the extent of non-Jessica's Law durational sentencing 
departures. Such a question is subject to an abuse of discretion standard, which is defined 
as consistent with the "'enacted purposes and principles of [the] sentencing guidelines'" 
and "'proportionate to the severity of the crime of conviction and the offender's criminal 
history.'" Favela, 259 Kan. at 219 (quoting K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-4719[b][1]).  
 
In short, as sometimes happens, this case exposes some "failure to communicate" 
in our previous general statements of the standards of review governing Jessica's Law and 
non-Jessica's Law sentencing departure cases. It appears, however, that the following 
synthesis is workable and true to the majority of our relevant precedent: (1) When the 
question is whether the record supported a sentencing judge's particular articulated 
reasons for departure, an appellate court's standard of review is substantial competent 
evidence; (2) when the question is whether a sentencing judge correctly concluded that 
particular mitigating factors constituted substantial and compelling reasons to depart in a 
particular case, including whether those mitigating factors outweighed any aggravating 
factors if such a balance was necessary, the appellate standard of review is abuse of 
discretion; (3) when the question is whether a particular mitigating or aggravating factor 
can ever, as a matter of law, be substantial and compelling in any case, the appellate 
standard of review is de novo; and (4) when the challenge focuses on the extent of a 
durational departure, the appellate standard of review is abuse of discretion, measuring 
whether the departure is consistent with the purposes of the guidelines and proportionate 
to the crime severity and the defendant's criminal history.  
 
Given this synthesis, the State's argument that varying standards of review 
command differentiation in the mitigating factors supporting a departure from Jessica's 
Law and those supporting a dispositional departure from the default guidelines prison 
sentence dissolves. 
 
 
 
The State also argues that both the character of the mitigators listed in Jessica's 
Law and the structure it imposes upon a judge's procedure support its view that Judge 
Dowd erred when he failed to distinguish two sets of mitigating factors.  
 
Regarding the character of the Jessica's Law mitigators, the State relies on the 
noscitur a sociis canon of statutory construction. Literally "it is known from its 
associates," the canon requires a court to conduct a comparison of the elements of a list to 
determine meaning of any one item. The State posits that each of the statutory mitigators 
in Jessica's Law focuses on the culpability of the particular defendant, rather than a 
broader class of concepts relevant to a reduced need for punishment. Read in this light, 
the Jessica's Law mitigators are not equivalent and interchangeable with the mitigators 
listed or not listed in K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1). 
 
Regarding structure, the State sees significance in the requirement under Jessica's 
Law that a sentencing judge evaluate only mitigators before departing. It points out that 
K.S.A. 21-4716, again, is broader in scope, permitting a sentencing judge to evaluate 
both mitigators and aggravators before a decision to depart. The State also cites the 
requirement of a balance of aggravators and mitigators by a jury considering the death 
penalty and a judge considering imposition of a hard 40 or 50 life sentence, see K.S.A. 
21-4624(e) (death penalty); K.S.A. 21-4635(b) - (d) (hard 40, 50), to demonstrate that the 
sole focus on mitigators in Jessica's Law is unique.  
 
These character and structure arguments by the State are unpersuasive.  
 
There is no need to resort to a statutory canon of construction, because the plain 
language of the statutes tells us what we need to know about the legislature's intentions. 
On character, each statute explicitly provides that its list of mitigating factors is 
nonexclusive. See K.S.A. 21-4643(d); K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1). This means that the courts 
are free to develop additional mitigating factors on a case-by-case basis. In addition, not 
 
 
all of the Jessica's Law factors focus exclusively on a particular defendant's level of 
culpability, as the State insists. The third listed factor expressly mentions the role of the 
victim, as well as the defendant, in the crime. See K.S.A. 21-4643(d)(3). In comparison, 
the mitigating factors listed in K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1)(A) through (D) include factors 
focused on the level of the defendant's culpability, e.g., role in the crime, duress, 
compulsion, physical or mental impairment, as well as other types of factors, e.g., 
victim's aggression, lesser degree of harm or loss.  
 
On structure, no balance between mitigators and aggravators such as that implied 
in K.S.A. 21-4716 or explicitly provided for in K.S.A. 21-4624(e) or K.S.A. 21-4635(b)-
(d) is necessary when Jessica's Law is the starting point. The only way for Jessica's Law 
to operate is to intensify, if not lengthen, a sentence. It makes 25 years a mandatory 
minimum, unless certain mitigators justify a departure. Simply put, there is nowhere to go 
but to a less-intense place. Under K.S.A. 21-4716, in contrast, departure either upward or 
downward is possible. Likewise, when a jury is asked to deliberate on a life sentence 
versus a death sentence, it is sensible and appropriate for both mitigators and aggravators 
to play a role in the choice between a show of mercy and the ultimate penalty; neither is 
the otherwise automatic sentence. The same can be said when a judge weighs mitigators 
and aggravators to determine whether a hard 40 or 50 sentence should be imposed.  
 
The State's final argument in favor of requiring a sentencing judge to distinguish 
between the mitigators that justify a departure from Jessica's Law and then a dispositional 
departure from the default guidelines prison sentence is an analogy to K.S.A. 21-
4719(c)(2). As Spencer's brief points out, this citation actually supports defendant's 
position more than the State's. K.S.A. 21-4719(c)(2) deals with the situation in which the 
sentencing judge imposes a prison term as an upward dispositional departure. It 
specifically provides that, if the judge chooses to then impose a term longer than that 
specified in the applicable guidelines grid box, the additional prison time "shall constitute 
an additional departure and shall require substantial and compelling reasons independent 
 
 
of the reasons given for the dispositional departure." K.S.A. 21-4719(c)(2). This language 
demonstrates that the legislature knew exactly how to provide for the procedure 
advocated by the State for the stacked intensity-lessening departures at issue here. It 
could have clearly provided that a sentencing judge must rely on separate mitigators to 
depart, first, from Jessica's Law and, second, dispositionally from the default guidelines 
sentence. It did not.  
 
In view of all of the foregoing, this court endorses the district court's 
undifferentiated approach to the two departures in this case. Under the statutes at issue, as 
a matter of law, Judge Dowd was free to use the same mitigating factors to justify both a 
departure from the mandatory minimum of Jessica's Law and a dispositional departure 
from the default guidelines prison sentence to probation.  
 
Existence of Substantial and Compelling Reasons for Departure from Jessica's Law 
 
The parties agree that the standard of review governing this issue is abuse of 
discretion, which is consistent with the synthesis above. 
 
Again, the State did not make this argument before the district court. It had agreed, 
in exchange for Spencer's guilty pleas, to stand silent at sentencing. Again, because 
Spencer has not objected, we address the merits. 
 
The parties first contest a threshold question of law, i.e., the significance, if any, of 
the seven mitigating circumstances not included in the State's original proposal for the 
journal entry. These seven mitigating circumstances were listed in the defense objection 
to the journal entry, which Judge Dowd attempted to endorse explicitly and add to the 
record supporting his decision by way of the hearing on the objection and, apparently, his 
signatures on both an order drafted by the defense and the State's journal entry. The 
transcript of sentencing includes the judge's mention of the three factors originally listed 
 
 
by the State, i.e., Spencer's age, his lack of a criminal record, and the support of his 
family and friends, and a factor listed under K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1)(E), i.e., "[t]he degree 
of harm or loss attributed to the current crime of conviction was significantly less than 
typical for such an offense."  
 
"The court's comments at the time of sentencing, not the written journal entry, 
govern as to the reasons for departure." State v. Murphy, 270 Kan. 804, 806, 19 P.3d 80 
(2001) (citing State v. Jackson, 262 Kan. 119, 135, 936 P.2d 761 [1997]). In addition, 
Jessica's Law explicitly requires the downward departure factors upon which a judge 
relies to be articulated by the judge "on the record at the time of sentencing." K.S.A. 21-
4643(d). 
 
The defense cites Blackmon to support Judge Dowd's ability to supplement the 
record by way of the hearing to settle the journal entry and his dueling signatures. 
Blackmon permitted a remand so that a sentencing court could clarify its reasoning, 
rejected on appeal, to justify a downward departure. See Blackmon, 285 Kan. at 730-32. 
The opinion included the following language:  
 
"This analysis raises the question of whether upon remand it is appropriate for 
the sentencing court to clarify the reasons for departure or whether the initial failure 
dooms Blackmon's departure motion. Kansas precedent shows that remand for 
clarification of departure reasons has been allowed with respect to upward departures.  
 
. . . .  
 
". . . We can discern no reason why the same policy would not apply to 
downward departures. Consequently, when a sentencing court fails to state substantial 
and compelling reasons for a downward departure from a presumptive sentence on the 
record at an initial sentencing hearing and as a result the sentence is vacated on appeal, 
upon remand the sentencing court may cite appropriate reasons justifying the imposition 
 
 
of a downward departure sentence and may impose such a sentence subject to the usual 
review process. 
 
"In the case at hand, the limited record available on appeal indicates the 
sentencing court may have had additional reasons for departure but did not clearly state 
those reasons on the record at the sentencing hearing. Consequently, rather than reverse 
the sentence as did the Court of Appeals panel, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the 
sentence. On remand, if the sentencing court determines there are reasons for departure 
other than the court's disagreement with the jury's determination that the State established 
an element of the crime of conviction, the sentencing court may impose a departure 
sentence, which then would be subject to appeal under K.S.A. 21-4721." Blackmon, 285 
Kan. at 730-32.  
 
In short, this court must decide whether Spencer could receive the essence of the 
same benefit bestowed on the defendant in Blackmon—a second bite at the departure 
justification apple.  
 
On the surface, it seems at least as fair here, from a procedural perspective, to 
allow some post-sentencing supplementation of Judge Dowd's reasoning, because 
Spencer lodged an objection in the district court to what he viewed as omissions from the 
State's proposed journal entry. This was the case, even though he had received everything 
he could have hoped for in terms of leniency. 
 
But a close review of the timing of events reveals that Spencer's objection 
probably was not merely an altruistic move to complete the court's file. The sentencing 
was held on June 27, 2008, and the State filed its notice of appeal of the departure 
sentence immediately. It served its proposed journal entry a few days later, and Spencer 
did not file his objection until July 29, 2008. The hearing to settle the journal entry was 
held September 10, 2008, and the order filed the same day. The original proposed journal 
entry also was signed by the judge on September 10 and filed on September 12, 2008. 
The State filed a motion to docket its appeal out of time on September 15, 2008, and the 
 
 
motion was granted and the docketing statement filed on September 29, 2008, finally 
depriving the district court of jurisdiction. In other words, long before Spencer filed his 
objection with his list of not 3 or 4 but 10 substantial reasons the judge (mostly silently) 
harbored for granting the two departures, Spencer knew that those reasons would be 
scrutinized by the Court of Appeals or by this court. For that matter, it is highly likely 
Judge Dowd also was aware of the filing of the State's appeal. 
 
We hold that the aspect of the Blackmon ruling on which Spencer now seeks to 
rely should be limited to like situations, i.e., those in which a Jessica's Law sentence has 
been vacated by an appellate court and the case remanded for resentencing. See 
Blackmon, 285 Kan. at 730-32. Blackmon was not a case in which the content of the 
record may have been manipulated. It also cannot excuse the express Jessica’s Law 
requirement that departure factors be stated by the judge on the record at sentencing. We 
therefore limit our evaluation at this time of whether the mitigators cited in arriving at 
Spencer's departure from Jessica's Law are substantial and compelling to the four factors 
Judge Dowd originally referenced at sentencing. 
 
Under the standard of review synthesis outlined above, we review these mitigating 
factors to determine whether Judge Dowd abused his discretion in deciding that they 
constituted substantial and compelling reasons to depart from Jessica's Law. The State 
does not question whether the record on appeal contains substantial competent evidence 
to support these mitigators.  
 
Age of defendant. The State makes a compelling argument that Judge Dowd's 
reference to Spencer's age of 76 had nothing to do with Spencer's judgment or lack 
thereof at the time of the crimes, which is the traditional significance of an age mitigator. 
See Murphy, 270 Kan. at 807; Favela, 259 Kan. at 235. The statute expressly states that it 
is the age of the defendant at the time of the crime that matters. See K.S.A. 21-
4643(d)(6). But Judge Dowd appears to have considered Spencer's age as significant only 
 
 
because of the likelihood that a Jessica's Law hard 25 would actually mean life behind 
bars. In essence, the State argues that the length of a sentence in relation to the 
defendant's probable lifespan cannot be a substantial and compelling reason for departure 
in this case. The defense offers little in the way of counterargument, pointing out only 
that the age of the defendant is a listed mitigator in the statute. 
 
We hold that the State is correct on this mitigator. No reasonable person would 
rely on the age of the defendant in the way Judge Dowd did as a substantial and 
compelling reason to grant a departure from Jessica's Law in this case.  
 
Lack of criminal record. The State concedes that this is a listed mitigating factor 
under Jessica's Law, but it nevertheless argues that it was insufficient on its own to 
constitute a substantial and compelling reason for Spencer's departure from Jessica's Law. 
It mentions, in particular, that Spencer's sexual abuse of his granddaughter had continued 
for years by the time the allegations came to light. Again, the defense makes little 
response, except to emphasize that the absence of a prior record is a statutory mitigator. 
 
Despite the lack of a criminal record being a listed Jessica's Law mitigator, the 
State makes an accurate and sensible assessment of this factor. The only evidence before 
the court, which would not include the several family members who disbelieved 
Spencer's confession, was that Spencer had engaged in lewd fondling of his 
granddaughter for years. No reasonable person would regard the fact that he had never 
been caught and prosecuted before as a substantial and compelling reason to grant him a 
departure from Jessica's Law. 
 
Support of Family and Friends. The State attempts to undercut the repeated praise 
of Spencer by (almost exclusively) family members by emphasizing that these persons 
also expressed disbelief in his guilt. The State takes the aggressive position that such 
disbelief would actually be harmful, making Spencer likely to reoffend while on 
 
 
probation. The defense response to this argument is to regurgitate those parts of support 
statements that do not assert Spencer's innocence.  
 
Although we agree with the State that the protestations of Spencer's innocence 
have a tendency to weaken the support statements in the sentencing transcript and in the 
letters reviewed by Judge Dowd, as do repeated, desperate references to the need for 
someone to care for Spencer's wife, our abuse of discretion standard limits our exercise of 
skepticism. Even though the record makes clear that such support was not the uniform 
response of Spencer's family, including at least one of his young victims, we reluctantly 
concede that a reasonable person could decide that the support of family and friends was 
a substantial and compelling reason to grant Spencer's departure from Jessica's Law. 
 
Degree of Harm. On this factor, the State argues that this should not be a 
permissible mitigator under Jessica's Law, given legislative testimony about the lifelong 
consequences from sexual victimization of children. (The State evidently fails to grasp 
that this is a legal argument, rather than an abuse of discretion argument.) It also argues 
that Judge Dowd failed to acknowledge anything beyond the great-granddaughter's 
mother's statement that no one talks about the crimes, while the record also included the 
other victim's personal statement that she still suffers from the trauma caused by her 
grandfather's abuse. The defense brief overstates its record support, asserting that the 
parents of the victims, i.e., plural, said that the victims were not hurt by Spencer's actions.  
 
This factor again favors the State, even if one ignores its legal argument and 
concentrates only on its argument regarding Judge Dowd's incomplete review or 
comprehension of the victim impact statements under the forgiving abuse of discretion 
standard of review. No reasonable person would extrapolate from one victim's mother's 
lukewarm statement that the crimes are never discussed and thus her daughter is back to 
her old self to a "degree of harm . . . significantly less than typical for such an offense." 
K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1)(E). There was a second victim, at a similar vulnerable age to the 
 
 
first victim, who had the misfortune of living with the defendant and therefore being 
handy for repeated molestation. Judge Dowd did not account for the harm done to her. 
 
Conclusion. We have previously said that "[a]s long as one factor relied upon by 
the sentencing court is substantial and compelling, the departure sentence should be 
upheld," State v. Blackmon, 285 Kan. 719, 725, 176 P.3d 160 (2008), and that each 
mitigating factor standing alone need not be sufficient to justify a departure, if the 
reasons taken collectively constitute a substantial and compelling basis for departure, see 
Blackmon, 285 Kan. at 724-25; State v. Minor, 268 Kan. 292, 311, 997 P.2d 648 (2000). 
Here, the collective does nothing to strengthen the only individual factor of support of 
family and friends. Moreover, to the extent support of Spencer's family and friends can 
reasonably be characterized as a substantial and compelling reason to depart, the record 
on appeal demonstrates that it is far from an unalloyed good. A significant faction of 
Spencer's family, including the victim most affected by his crimes, wanted him in prison. 
Although an abuse of discretion standard is always difficult for any appellant to meet, 
Judge Dowd's overall performance at this sentencing was inadequate. He disregarded 
undisputed evidence. He failed to conduct an appropriate weighing of competing 
information. His belated, defense-scripted effort to improve upon his performance only 
served to emphasize its original deficiencies. We therefore hold, under the circumstances 
of this case, that Judge Dowd abused his discretion in granting the departure from 
Jessica's Law. As a result, Spencer's sentences must be vacated and the case remanded for 
resentencing. A different judge will conduct the resentencing, as Judge Dowd is now 
retired.  
 
Existence of Substantial and Compelling Reasons for Dispositional Departure from 
Guidelines 
 
The dispositional departure from a guidelines prison sentence to probation would 
not have been possible had Judge Dowd not first granted the departure from Jessica's 
 
 
Law. Because we decide, as discussed below, that the new sentencing judge on remand 
may re-evaluate the evidence and decide anew whether to depart from Jessica's Law and 
dispositionally, we proceed to analysis of this issue because of the possibility it may arise 
again.  
 
Before Judge Dowd, in view of its agreement to stand silent at sentencing, the 
State did not raise the argument that any mitigators supporting the dispositional departure 
were not substantial and compelling. Because Spencer does not object, we nevertheless 
reach the merits. Our analysis is again limited to the four mitigators mentioned initially 
by Judge Dowd; again, he did not differentiate between the mitigators that supported the 
departure from Jessica's Law and those that supported the dispositional departure. 
 
The State's first argument is that nonstatutory mitigators should be reviewed with 
stricter scrutiny than statutory mitigators. The defense points out correctly that we no 
longer give analytical weight to such a distinction. See State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 735, 
747, 175 P.3d 832 (2008). It does not appear, however, that Martin eradicated the 
customary corollary that nonstatutory factors must be consistent with the intent and 
purposes of the sentencing guidelines. See State v. Tiffany, 267 Kan. 495, 506, 986 P.2d 
1064 (1999).  
 
Age of defendant. On this issue, the State argues that only immaturity can be 
considered by a sentencing court, not maturity. It cites the Court of Appeals decisions in 
State v. Haney, 34 Kan. App. 2d 232, 241-42, 116 P.3d 747, rev. denied 280 Kan. 987 
(2005), and State v. Ussery, 34 Kan. App. 2d 250, 258-59, 116 P.3d 735, rev. denied 280 
Kan. 991 (2005). Both of these opinions, nearly word-for-word identical, involved adult 
male codefendants who perpetrated sex crimes against an intoxicated 13-year-old girl in 
Lawrence. The defense argued that the age of these young adult codefendants should 
have exerted downward pressure on sentence length, because a juvenile male codefendant 
was punished less severely, despite his role as an instigator. This argument left the panel 
 
 
cold. See, e.g., Ussery, 34 Kan. App. 2d at 257-58. Yet neither case stands for the 
proposition that advanced age can never be considered as a mitigating factor; indeed, they 
imply that any age can be a factor when it is demonstrated to have affected a defendant's 
judgment.  
 
The defense brief has no response on this issue other than to state Spencer's age.  
 
As on the departure from Jessica's Law, the State's argument on this factor is far 
more persuasive. There is no evidence in the record that Spencer's age of 76 had any 
negative effect on his judgment, which is the logical point of any age mitigator. No 
reasonable person would have relied upon Spencer's age without such evidence to 
support the dispositional departure.  
 
Lack of criminal record. The State cites our opinion in Murphy, 270 Kan. at 807, 
for the proposition that a lack of criminal history, by itself, is not sufficient to justify a 
departure from a guideline sentence but can be considered "in the overall picture." This 
seems to be an argument attuned to an abuse of discretion standard of review. The State 
also cites the Court of Appeals opinion in State v. Richardson, 20 Kan. App. 2d 932, Syl. 
¶ 2, 901 P.2d 1 (1995), for the idea that a defendant's criminal history is (implicitly) never 
a proper departure factor, because the sentencing guidelines have already taken criminal 
history into account in setting presumptive sentence ranges. This is a legal argument 
appropriate for our de novo review. 
 
The defense response to these arguments is virtually nonexistent.  
 
We agree with the State that no reasonable person would have used Spencer's lack 
of a criminal record to support a dispositional departure from a guidelines sentence to 
probation. As noted above, the only evidence in the record is that his molestation of one 
of the victims was a longstanding practice; the fact that his crimes had never previously 
 
 
come to light is not a point in his favor. In this case, we need not go the extra step to rule 
on whether the absence of criminal history is ever a proper mitigator to reduce a 
guidelines sentence. 
 
Support of Family and Friends. The parties' arguments on this factor for the 
dispositional departure do not differ meaningfully from their arguments on this factor for 
the departure from Jessica's Law. Our response is therefore identical. Under an abuse of 
discretion standard, there is at least limited room to approve Judge Dowd's reliance on 
this factor as a substantial and compelling reason for the dispositional departure. 
However, the full record's exposure of the family divide over Spencer's conduct amply 
supports the opposite outcome.  
 
Degree of Harm. The State expands beyond its previous Jessica's Law departure 
argument on this factor, and it brings our substantial competent evidence standard of 
review into play. The State asserts that this mitigator, despite its listing in K.S.A. 21-
4716(c)(1)(E), was an improper basis for Judge Dowd's dispositional departure in this 
case, because there was no proof of how much harm would be typical for the type of 
offense and no showing of how the facts in the case made the harm less significant.  
 
Again, the defense does not make a particularized counterargument.  
 
In our opinion in Minor, 268 Kan. 292, Justice Edward Larson noted that nothing 
in the record showed that the degree of harm or loss attributed to the current crime was 
significantly less than what would be typical: "We have no statements or evidence as to 
what is 'typical for such an offense' and no showing as to how the facts in this case make 
the 'degree of harm or loss . . . significantly less.' To the extent this factor was relied upon 
by the trial court, it is specifically disapproved." Minor, 268 Kan. at 312. The Court of 
Appeals relied on Minor in the Haney and Ussery cases. See Haney, 34 Kan. App. 2d at 
243; Ussery, 34 Kan. App. 2d at 260-61.  
 
 
 
In the record on appeal before us, the only proof that the degree of harm caused by 
Spencer's offense could have been less than might ordinarily be expected is the victim 
impact statement from his granddaughter, speaking for her daughter, his great-
granddaughter. It indicated that the great-granddaughter was back to her old self, as no 
one talked about the crimes. This ultraslim reed cannot support the substantial competent 
evidence label that it must.  
 
Conclusion. Our overall assessment of the four factors Judge Dowd originally 
articulated for the dispositional departure, whether considered individually or as a group, 
is the same as our assessment of the four factors when used as support for the departure 
from Jessica's Law. Under the circumstances before us, Judge Dowd abused his 
discretion in granting the dispositional departure.  
 
Extent of Departure 
 
The last issue raised by the State questions the extent of the departure granted by 
Judge Dowd. We need not reach this issue, given our decision to vacate Spencer's 
sentences and remand.  
 
Permissible Actions on Remand 
 
We must also discuss the appropriate scope of the new sentencing judge's 
authority on remand. This question appears to have been decided by Blackmon, although 
Blackmon was not a Jessica's Law case. See Blackmon, 285 Kan. at 730-32. Under that 
case, if a Jessica's Law sentence is vacated and a remand ordered for resentencing, the 
judge may re-evaluate the factors bearing on sentencing, including adding to them, and 
re-grant or deny a departure from Jessica's Law and a dispositional departure from the 
default guidelines sentence to probation, as well as a durational departure. This vacate-
 
 
and-remand situation matches that before us in Blackmon; as discussed above, the 
situation in which Judge Dowd found himself between Spencer's sentencing and the 
hearing on the motion regarding the journal entry did not.  
 
Defense Challenge to Offense Severity Level  
 
As mentioned above, the parties disagreed at sentencing about the appropriate 
sentencing guidelines nondrug grid box to which Judge Dowd should be permitted to 
depart from a Jessica's Law hard 25. The State took the position that the appropriate box 
was that for an offender with a criminal history of I and an offense severity level 1. The 
defense took the position that the appropriate box was that for an offender with a criminal 
history of I and an offense severity level 3. 
 
Although Spencer did not file a prophylactic cross-appeal of Judge Dowd's ruling 
in favor of the State on this point, and he has not filed a motion to correct an illegal 
sentence, he now seeks to have the issue decided in his favor by invoking K.S.A. 21-
4721(e)(3), which reads:  "In any appeal, the appellate court may review a claim that:  . . . 
the sentencing court erred in ranking the crime severity level of the current crime . . . ." 
The State did not file a reply brief, and we thus have no response from it regarding the 
authority of the court to decide this issue.  
 
In Gracey, 288 Kan. 252, 200 P.3d 1275 (2009), the appeal was the defendant's; 
he challenged the State's failure to allege his age of 18 or more in the complaint and the 
sentencing court's refusal to consider a dispositional departure after departing from a 
Jessica's Law hard 25. After deciding those issues, Justice Rosen then wrote:  "[T]he 
State contends that the district court imposed a sentence lower than the guidelines 
sentence and that the imposition of such a sentence was illegal." He then observed that 
such an allegation raised a question of law over which an appellate court's review was 
 
 
unlimited, and quoted from K.S.A. 22-3504(1), which allows a court to correct an illegal 
sentence at any time. Gracey, 288 Kan. at 260-61.  
 
Gracey's structure and content thus implicitly permit a party that did not take an 
appeal or file a motion to correct illegal sentence to mount a challenge to a sentence's 
illegality during the other party's appeal. Consistent with Gracey, this court has authority 
to entertain Spencer's challenge to Judge Dowd's use of an offense severity level 1. This 
has a certain practical allure as well. A ruling on the merits of this issue will provide 
guidance on remand to the judge who replaces Judge Dowd. 
 
 
Settlement of the parties' argument over which offense severity level governs an 
aggravated indecent liberties conviction after a departure from Jessica's Law requires 
statutory interpretation or construction, over which this court has de novo review. See 
State v. Arnett, 290 Kan. 41, 47, 223 P.3d 780 (2010). The fundamental rule 
 
"governing our interpretation is that ‘the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can 
be ascertained. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the 
language of the statutory scheme it enacted.' State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 
355, 378, 22 P.3d 124 (2001). For this reason, when the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, courts 'need not resort to statutory construction.' In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 
53, 79, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007). Instead, '[w]hen the language is plain and unambiguous 
an appellate court is bound to implement the expressed intent.' State v. Manbeck, 277 
Kan. 224, Syl. ¶ 3, 83 P.3d 190 (2004). 
 
"Where a statute's language is subject to multiple interpretations, however, a 
reviewing court 'may look to the historical background of the enactment, the 
circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the 
statute may have under the various constuctions suggested. [Citation omitted.]' Robinett 
v. The Haskell Co., 270 Kan. 95, 100-01, 12 P.3d 411 (2000). Generally, courts should 
construe statutes to avoid unreasonable results and should presume that the legislature 
does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. Hawley v. Kansas Dept. of 
 
 
Agriculture, 281 Kan. 603, 631, 132 P.3d 870 (2006). We ascertain the legislature's intent 
behind a particular statutory provision 'from a general consideration of the entire act. 
Effect must be given, if possible, to the entire act and every part thereof. To this end, it is 
the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to 
make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. [Citation omitted.]' In re Marriage of 
Ross, 245 Kan. 591, 594, 783 P.2d 331 (1989); see also State ex rel. Morrison v. Oshman 
Sporting Goods Co. Kansas, 275 Kan. 763, Syl. ¶ 2, 69 P.3d 1087 (2003). Thus, in cases 
that require statutory construction, 'courts are not permitted to consider only a certain 
isolated part or parts of an act but are required to consider and construe together all parts 
thereof in pari materia.' Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Howard, 218 Kan. 248, 
Syl. ¶ 2, 544, P.2d 791 (1975)." Board of Sumner County Comm'rs v. Bremby, 286 Kan. 
745, 754-55, 189 P.3d 494 (2008).  
 
On the merits, the defense cites only to Gracey, asserting that it held a departure 
from the hard 25 sentence of Jessica's Law to a severity level 3 under the sentencing 
guidelines "not illegal." This is true; but the mirror image procedural posture of Gracey, 
i.e., the State challenging the legality of a severity level 3 assignment on the defendant's 
appeal rather than the defense challenging the legality of a severity level 1 assignment on 
the State's appeal, means that Gracey does not directly control the outcome here. A 
holding that a severity level 3-based sentence is "not illegal" is not the same thing as a 
holding that a severity level 1-based sentence is illegal. Moreover, the Gracey parties' 
disagreement was limited to whether the sentencing judge had used the appropriate 
criminal history classification, not the appropriate offense severity level, in choosing the 
applicable grid box under the guidelines. In other words, in Gracey we never were asked 
to examine or rule upon whether a departure from a hard 25 under Jessica's Law to a 
sentence "pursuant to the sentencing guidelines act" under K.S.A. 21-4643(d) necessarily 
meant a grid sentence and, if so, which offense severity level was appropriate for an 
aggravated indecent liberties conviction.  
 
The same has been true in several other Jessica's Law cases, where mention has 
been made of a departure from Jessica's Law to a grid sentence or a particular severity 
 
 
level, but no appellate ruling on the propriety of that course of action has been sought or 
pronounced. See State v. Stone, 291 Kan. 13, 17, 237 P.3d 1229 (2010) (mentions district 
judge departed from Jessica's Law to 61 months); State v. Oehlert, 290 Kan. 189, 190-91, 
224 P.3d 561 (2010) (mentions district judge departed from Jessica's Law to 60 months); 
State v. Ballard, 289 Kan. 1000, 1003, 218 P.3d 432 (2009) (district judge had granted 
joint recommendation from Jessica's Law to severity level 3); State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 
715, 716, 217 P.3d 443 (2009) (mentions defendant sought departure from Jessica's Law 
to grid); State v. Easterling, 289 Kan. 470, 471, 213 P.3d 418 (2009) (suggestion that 
Jessica's Law departure would go to 118 months); Gracey, 288 Kan. at 254 (departure 
from Jessica's Law apparently to 3H before application of durational, dispositional 
departures); State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 158-59, 199 P.3d 1265 (2009) (departure 
from Jessica's Law would have led to 59 months under a severity level 3); State v. Frost, 
2010 WL 1379112, at *2, unpublished opinion filed April 2, 2010 (S. Ct.) (defendant had 
received departure from Jessica's Law to 72 months).  
 
Unfortunately, Jessica's Law and the sentencing guidelines act to which it refers a 
district judge when he or she departs from the hard 25 under K.S.A. 21-4643(d) are 
nothing if not ambiguous. Indeed, they set up an endless feedback loop with no plain or 
obvious resolution.  
 
Taking the crime at issue in this case as an example, aggravated indecent liberties 
with a child is defined in K.S.A. 21-3504. Specifically, Spencer pleaded guilty to two 
charges under K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3)(A). K.S.A. 21-3504(c) states:  "Except as provided 
further, aggravated indecent liberties with a child as described in subsection[] . . . (a)(3) is 
a severity level 3, person felony. . . . When the offender is 18 years of age or older, 
aggravated indecent liberties with a child as described in subsection (a)(3) is an off-grid 
person felony." 
 
 
 
Jessica's Law, in K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1)(C), makes Spencer's crime punishable by 
life with no possibility of parole for 25 years. But, once the district judge decides to 
depart from the mandatory minimum provision, Jessica's Law's departure provision, 
K.S.A. 21-4643(d), states that a "departure sentence shall be the sentence pursuant to the 
sentencing guidelines act, K.S.A. 21-4701 et seq. . . . and no sentence of a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment shall be imposed hereunder." The only "sentencing 
guidelines act" provision for aggravated indecent liberties and the other Jessica's Law 
crimes when the defendant is 18 or older and the victim is younger than 14 is K.S.A. 21-
4706(d), which reads in pertinent part:  " [S]uch violations are off-grid crimes for the 
purposes of sentencing. . . . [T]he sentence shall be imprisonment for life pursuant to 
K.S.A. 21-4643, and amendments thereto." The feedback loop for departures from 
Jessica's Law is thus complete: Jessica's Law sends the district judge to the sentencing 
guidelines act, which sends the district judge to Jessica's Law, which sends the district 
court to the sentencing guidelines act, and so on.  
 
How should the loop be broken?  
 
The legislative intent that a defendant in Spencer's shoes generally be punished 
with, and incapacitated by, a lengthy prison term seems clear. The legislative history on 
this point emphasizes this impression. See House J. 2006, p. 1323 (Speaker of the House, 
Michael O'Neal's explanation of vote: "I vote 'YES' on HB 2576. Between protecting the 
rights of those committing crimes against children and protecting children from heinous 
acts, I’ll err in favor of protecting children EVERY time. I’ll leave it to others to fret over 
whether we are being too tough. I make no apology. This is about protecting children. I 
hope the message we send to the sick criminal minds out there works, but if not and they 
break our laws, I want to know where they'll be the rest of their lives and if it's an added 
prison bed, sign me up.") Yet the inclusion of a departure option to remove the 
mandatory minimum term is express. K.S.A. 21-4643. It is regrettable that similar 
drafting precision to define a Jessica's Law departure's effect on the underlying life 
 
 
sentence was not employed and that the legislative history is silent on the solution to the 
statutory circularity.  
 
Florida was the first state to pass Jessica's Law, and Kansas looked to Florida 
when it passed Jessica's Law here. Forty-three states have passed some form of Jessica's 
Law, and of those states, nine have sentencing grid schemes similar to Kansas. But the 
interpretations of Jessica's Law-type statutes in our sister states also does not help us. The 
primary difference between Kansas and our sister states is that none of those states with a 
similar sentencing scheme to Kansas statutorily permit the trial court to depart from the 
mandatory minimum sentences. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103 (2009) (offender 
convicted of Jessica's Law-type offense sentenced to minimum 25-year term; no 
indeterminate sentences; no statutory reference to departure from mandatory sentence); 
Fla. Stat. §§ 794.011 (2010), 775.08 (2010), 921.0022 (2010) (mandatory 25-year 
minimum for dangerous sexual felony offenders, sexual battery of a child under the age 
of 12, and lewd or lascivious molestation of a child under the age of 12; statutory scheme 
assigns criminal severity ranking of 10 for Jessica's Law-type offenses; no statutory 
reference to departure from mandatory sentence); La. Rev. Stat. §§ 14:42, 14:43, 15-
537(B) (2011) (mandatory life sentence or mandatory 20 years for Jessica's Law-type 
offenses with child under the age of 13 at hard labor without parole, probation, or 
suspension of sentence; no statutory reference to departure from mandatory sentence); 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b (2010) (mandatory 25-year term if victim under the age 
of 13 and offender is 17 years of age or older; assigns felony level of Class A; no 
statutory reference to departure from mandatory sentence); Minn. Stat. § 609.3455 (2010) 
(mandatory life sentence for egregious first-time and repeat offenders; guidelines 
presumptive sentence does not apply to offenders under § 609.3455; no statutory 
reference to departure from mandatory life sentence); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655 (Law. 
Co-op 2010) (up to 30-year term for offender convicted of criminal sexual conduct in 
first degree when offender is over 18 and victim is under 11 years of age; no statutory 
reference to departure from mandatory sentence); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-522, 40-35-
 
 
211 (2010) (rape of a child is a Class A felony; mandatory 25-year term; no 
indeterminate sentences; no statutory reference to departure from mandatory sentence); 
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.507 (2011) (legislature limits court's authority to depart for 
Jessica's Law offenses; mandatory 25-year term or more).  
 
In the absence of other guidance, we turn to subsequent legislative action, a canon 
of statutory construction, and the assumptions underlying our earlier Jessica's Law cases, 
remembering Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' admonition that the life of the law is not 
logic, but experience.  
 
The subsequent legislative action with some instructive power is the 2008 
amendment to K.S.A. 21-4719, which governs departures from grid sentences. See 
K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 21-4719(a). It qualifies as "subsequent" in this case because Spencer's 
crimes of conviction were committed in 2007. Subsection (a) of that statute was altered, 
effective July 1, 2008, to include language limiting durational and dispositional 
departures in those Jessica's Law cases involving "crimes of extreme sexual violence," 
which includes rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and aggravated indecent liberties 
perpetrated on children younger than 14. See K.S.A. 21-4716 (defining "crime of extreme 
sexual violence"). After amendment, 21-4719(a) reads in pertinent part:  "The sentencing 
judge shall not impose a downward dispositional departure sentence for any crime of 
extreme sexual violence . . . . The sentencing judge shall not impose a downward 
durational departure sentence for any crime of extreme sexual violence, . . . to less than 
50 percent of the center of the range of the sentence for such crime."  
 
Because we presume that legislation happens for a reason and that amendments 
usually work a change in existing law, see Hawley v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 281 
Kan. 603, 631, 132 P.3d 870 (2006) (presumption against meaningless legislation), and 
Ft. Hays St. Univ. v. University Ch., Am. Ass'n of Univ. Profs., 290 Kan. 446, 464, 228 
P.3d 403 (2010) (presumption that statutory amendment modifies prior law), it appears 
 
 
that the legislature believed the statutory scheme as it existed before the 2008 amendment 
permitted both durational and dispositional departures in Jessica's Law cases. If this were 
not the case, it would not have taken the trouble in 2008 to disallow dispositional 
departures altogether and limit the extent of durational departures. In addition, because it 
placed the amendment in the sentencing guidelines act provision on departures from grid 
sentences, it also implied that the place to which a sentencing judge went when he or she 
departed from the mandatory minimum of Jessica's Law was not only a "sentence 
pursuant to the sentencing guidelines act," but a sentence pursuant to a sentencing 
guidelines grid. Finally, the limit it enacted for durational departures plainly clearly uses 
the grid as a starting place, keying the maximum reduction in prison time to 50 percent of 
the middle number in the assigned grid box. We deduce from all of these after-acquired 
clues that the legislature always intended a sentencing judge who departed from the 
mandatory minimum of Jessica's Law under K.S.A. 21-4643(d) to go to the applicable 
grid box to determine the departure sentence. 
 
The statutory canon of construction known as the rule of lenity compels the 
answer to the next question:  What is the applicable grid box? 
 
As referenced above, both the definitional statutes for Jessica's Law crimes—see 
K.S.A. 21-3447 (aggravated trafficking); K.S.A. 21-3502 (rape); K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(3) 
(aggravated indecent liberties); K.S.A. 21-3506(a)(1) and (a)(2) (aggravated criminal 
sodomy); K.S.A. 21-3513 (promoting prostitution); K.S.A. 21-3516(a)(5) and (a)(6) 
(sexual exploitation)—and K.S.A. 21-4706(d), for sentencing of such crimes, identify 
them as off-grid crimes. And a defendant convicted of a Jessica's Law crime who 
receives a departure from the mandatory minimum under K.S.A. 21-4643, remains 
convicted of an off-grid offense. See Ballard, 289 Kan. at 1012. Nevertheless, if the 
appropriate sentence for a defendant who receives a Jessica's Law departure must be 
found not only in the sentencing guidelines act but on a sentencing guidelines grid, the 
defendant must have an offense severity level assigned to the crime of conviction. See 
 
 
K.S.A. 21-4704(d) (grid box determined by intersection of offense severity level rating 
for the current crime and criminal history score).  
 
The State, as it did in this case, has been known to argue that every Jessica's Law 
case not sentenced to the mandatory minimum cannot go below a severity level 1 once it 
moves to the sentencing guidelines grid. The defense bar, on the other hand, has argued 
that every Jessica's Law case not sentenced to the mandatory minimum must be 
sentenced dependent on the severity level assigned to the crime when it lacks the element 
of disparity between the defendant's and the victim's ages, i.e., defendant 18 or older and 
victim younger than 14.  
 
There is precious little statutory language to vindicate either position, so we fall 
back on the rule of lenity, see Horn, 288 Kan. at 693-94 (invoking rule of lenity to assign 
severity level to attempt of Jessica's Law offense), and accept the defense argument. A 
sentencing judge who departs from the mandatory minimum of Jessica's Law should look 
to the severity level assigned to the crime when it lacks the element of disparity between 
the defendant's and the victim's ages. In other words, the offense severity level for a 
violation of K.S.A. 21-3447 (aggravated trafficking), K.S.A. 21-3502 (rape), and K.S.A. 
21-3504(a)(1) and (a)(2) (aggravated criminal sodomy) is 1; for a violation of K.S.A. 21-
3504(a)(3)(A) (aggravated indecent liberties) is 3; for a violation of K.S.A. 21-3513 
(promoting prostitution) is 6; and for a violation of K.S.A. 21-3516(a)(5) and (a)(6) 
(sexual exploitation of a child) is 5.  
 
Finally, experience. The holdings set forth above appear to be consistent with the 
patterns adopted by various district court judges in the Jessica's Law cases that have so 
far reached this court. See, e.g., Ballard, 289 Kan. at 1003; Gracey, 288 Kan. at 253; 
Thomas, 288 Kan. at 159. When departing from the mandatory minimum under K.S.A. 
21-4643(d), these judges have gone to the grid at the severity level dictated by the crime-
defining statute less the element of the defendant's and victim's age disparity. This is a 
 
 
situation, perhaps emblematic of common-law development as a whole, in which all of us 
are learning by doing. Certainly, if the legislature believes we have misconstrued its 
intention, it will waste no time in letting us know. 
 
We pause to make a closing point, an explicit correction of the label this court has 
previously used for departures from the mandatory minimum of Jessica's Law. Although 
several of our cases have referred to such a departure as a "durational departure" or a 
"downward departure" or a "downward durational departure"—see State v. Huerta-
Alvarez, 291 Kan. 247, 251-52, 243 P.3d 326 (2010) ("downward departure" from 
Jessica's Law sought); State v. Garza, 290 Kan. 1021, 1023, 236 P.3d 501 (2010) 
(downward departure); State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, 861, 235 P.3d 1203 (2010) 
("durational departure" denied by district judge); State v. Plotner, 290 Kan. 774, 780-81, 
235 P.3d 417 (2010) (two-step process for considering "downward durational 
departure"); State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666, 689-90, 234 P.3d 761 (2010) (no abuse of 
discretion in denying motion seeking "durational departure"); State v. Trevino, 290 Kan. 
317, 318, 227 P.3d 951 (2010) (State agreed to recommend "durational departure"); State 
v. Oehlert, 290 Kan. 189, 190-91, 224 P.3d 561 (2010) (district judge granted defendant's 
downward "durational departure"); State v. Marler, 290 Kan. 119, 127, 223 P.3d 804 
(2010) (no abuse of discretion to deny downward "durational departure"); State v. 
Robison, 290 Kan. 51, 56-57, 222 P.3d 500 (2010) (same); State v. Mondragon, 289 Kan. 
1158, 1162, 220 P.3d 369 (2010) (same); Ballard, 289 Kan. 1006 (jurisdiction to review 
"downward durational departure"); State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715, 721-22, 217 P.3d 443 
(2009) (no abuse of discretion to deny "downward durational departure"); State v. 
Gonzalez, 289 Kan. 351, 356, 212 P.3d 215 (2009) (defendant sought downward 
durational departure); State v. Spotts, 288 Kan. 650, 655-56, 206 P.3d 510 (2009) (no 
abuse of discretion to deny downward durational departure); Gracey, 288 Kan. at 254 
("downward durational departure" from low-end presumptive sentencing range for 
severity level 3, criminal history H nondrug felony); State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 164, 
199 P.3d 1256 (2009) (no abuse of discretion to deny motion for "downward durational 
 
 
departure"); State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 164-66, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008) 
(defense argument for "downward durational departure" rejected); State v. Frost, 2010 
WL 1379112, at *2 unpublished opinion filed April 2, 2010 (S. Ct.) (defendant received 
"downward durational departure"); State v. Gilliland, 2010 WL 1379182, at *1 
unpublished opinion filed April 2, 2010 (S. Ct.) (motion for "downward durational 
departure" denied)—these actually are confusing misnomers.  
 
The sentence under Jessica's Law is life imprisonment. It is true that a departure to 
the grid for a determinate sentence displays at least numerical indicia of release from 
prison before either the expiration of the defendant's natural life or the Parole Board's 
dispensation of grace. Yet it is best to refrain from calling a departure from the 
mandatory minimum of Jessica's Law to the sentencing guidelines grid a "durational 
departure" or a "downward departure" or, the alliterative trifecta, a "downward durational 
departure." These terms are best reserved for the last of the three types of departures 
available from a Jessica's Law sentence, the one Judge Dowd did not try to grant Spencer, 
i.e., a departure from the grid box sentence dictated by the intersection of severity level 
and criminal history to a shorter determinate prison sentence. See Gracey, 288 Kan. at 
253 (after departure from mandatory 25 years to 3H, durational departure to 3I range; 
then dispositional departure considered); see also Ballard, 289 Kan. at 1008-09 (once 
sentenced on grid, judge free to depart). That option, like the two departures granted by 
Judge Dowd, also will be in play on remand in this case.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In view of all of the foregoing discussion, under the version of Jessica's Law in 
effect before amendment in 2008, a sentencing judge need not differentiate between the 
mitigators that constitute substantial and compelling reasons for a departure from the 
mandatory minimum of Jessica's Law and those that support an additional dispositional 
departure from the default prison sentence pursuant to the sentencing guidelines act. On 
 
 
the record before us in this case, the district judge abused his discretion in granting the 
defendant a departure from the hard 25 of Jessica's Law. He also abused his discretion in 
granting the defendant a dispositional departure from the sentencing grid. We therefore 
vacate Spencer's sentences and remand for resentencing. Given the sentencing judge's 
intervening retirement, the district judge who replaces him on remand may re-evaluate 
the factors bearing on Spencer's sentencing, including adding to them, and re-grant or 
deny a departure from Jessica's Law and impose a durational and/or dispositional 
departure. The appropriate grid sentence for an off-grid Jessica's Law crime, once a judge 
has decided to depart from the mandatory minimum of Jessica's Law, is that dictated by 
the severity level assigned to the crime when it lacks the element of disparity between the 
defendant's and the victim's ages.  
 
Sentences vacated and case remanded for resentencing.