Case Title: Smith v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 271, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
WALTER L. SMITH, SR., 
 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
Appellee. 
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No. 271, 2002 
 
Court Below: Superior Court of 
the State of Delaware in and for 
Sussex County. 
 
Cr. A. Nos. IS01-05-0751 
 
 
IS01-05-0753 
 
 
IS01-05-0754 
 
 
IS01-05-0755 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: November 26, 2002  
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
December 23, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and BERGER, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
This 23rd day of December 2002, upon consideration of the briefs of the 
parties, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
This is the direct appeal of Walter L. Smith, Sr., defendant-appellant, 
from his conviction in Superior Court of Attempted Rape in the First Degree, 
Burglary in the First Degree, and Wearing a Disguise during the Commission of a 
Felony.  Smith has two arguments on appeal.  First he contends that the trial judge 
committed reversible error by striking the testimony of Police Officer Harold 
Barber.  Smith argues that the testimony was properly offered under the 
evidentiary doctrine of “Opening the Door.”  The second argument is that the trial 
judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses.  We find 
 
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Smith’s arguments to be without merit.  Accordingly, this Court affirms the 
judgment of the Superior Court. 
(2) 
Smith conspired with two other men to burglarize the apartment of 
Pedro and Yoselyn Soto.  On May 22, 2001, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Yoselyn 
Soto was awakened by a noise in her bedroom and saw an intruder wearing a black 
coat, black gloves and a cream-colored mask.  The intruder, later identified as 
Smith, turned off the light and put a pillow over Soto’s face.  Next, Smith grabbed 
her and threw her to the floor.  When Soto asked him if he wanted money, he 
repeatedly hit her head against the floor.  Smith then wrapped a sheet around Soto 
and continued to hit her.  Soto pretended to be dead several times in an attempt to 
stop the beating. 
(3) 
During one of the times when Soto pretended to be dead, Smith 
removed her pajama pants and underwear, grabbed her breasts and tried to insert 
his hand into her vagina.  When Soto attempted to cover herself, Smith turned her 
over and inserted his hand between her buttocks until she began to feel a burning 
sensation, as if he had penetrated her with his fingers.  Finally, Smith left the 
bedroom and went into the kitchen where Soto heard him opening drawers.  She 
was then able to dial 911.  Smith was later arrested and charged with Attempted 
Rape in the First Degree, Assault in the First Degree, Burglary in the First Degree, 
Wearing a Disguise during the Commission of a Felony, and Possession of 
 
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Burglar’s Tools.  He was convicted of Attempted Rape in the First Degree, 
Burglary in the First Degree, and Wearing a Disguise during the Commission of a 
Felony.  Smith now appeals. 
(4) 
Smith’s first argument is that the Superior Court committed reversible 
error by striking Officer Barber’s testimony regarding his police report of the 
incident.  This Court reviews the Superior Court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of 
discretion.1 
(5) 
At trial, Smith’s defense counsel questioned Officer Barber about his 
police report of the incident, specifically asking why he concluded and wrote in his 
report that Soto had been penetrated or penetration was attempted when Officer 
Barber did not interview Soto.  The State did not object to this line of questioning 
and also questioned Officer Barber regarding the report on redirect.  When defense 
counsel on re-cross again asked Officer Barber about the report, the trial judge sua 
sponte interrupted the questioning finding the testimony prejudicial and 
conclusionary. 
(6) 
Delaware Rule of Evidence 403 provides that the trial judge must 
make a threshold determination whether to admit evidence.  The purpose is to 
strike a balance between relevant evidence and potential prejudice.  The policy 
                                          
 
1 Longfellow v. State, 688 A.2d 1370, 1372 (Del. 1997) (citing Tice v. State, 624 A.2d 399, 401 (Del. 1993)). 
 
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behind this rule is to provide the jury with an “adequate factual base and breadth of 
understanding that it needs to render a fair verdict consistent with the truth.”2 
(7) 
An examination of the record reveals no abuse of discretion.  It is 
within the trial judge’s discretion to stop a prejudicial line of questioning. 
Accordingly, the trial judge’s decision to strike the testimony and instruct the jury 
to disregard the testimony of Officer Barber in rendering their verdict did not 
constitute an abuse of discretion. 
(8) 
Smith’s second argument is that the trial judge should have instructed 
the jury on the lesser included offenses of Second and Third Degree Assault,3 and 
Second Degree Burglary.4  The standard of review in determining whether the trial 
judge erred by not instructing the jury on lesser included offenses is de novo.5 
(9) 
Under Delaware law, the trial court “is not obligated to charge the 
jury with respect to a lesser included offense unless there is a rational basis in the 
evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting the defendant of the included offense.”6  Also, failure to instruct the 
jury on lesser included offenses is not per se reversible error.7 
                                          
 
2 Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 586 (Del. 2001). 
 
3 11 Del. C. §§ 612, 611. 
 
4 11 Del. C. § 825. 
 
5 Henry v. State, 805 A.2d 860 (Del. 2002). 
6 11 Del. C. § 206(c). 
 
7 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1062 (Del. 1994). 
 
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(10) On the evidence presented at trial, the trial court rightfully rejected the 
Second Degree Burglary charge of Section 825(2)(b) because that statute pertains 
to a burglary taking place in a building as opposed to a dwelling, as is the case 
here.  Likewise, the trial court rightfully rejected the Second Degree Burglary 
charge under Section 825(1)8 because it was undisputed that the attack took place 
at night, which is an element of First Degree Burglary under Section 8269 and not 
Second Degree Burglary.   
(11) On the lesser included offenses of Assault in the Second and Third 
Degree, Smith contends that his testimony demonstrates that he did not inflict 
serious bodily injury upon Soto to justify the First Degree Assault charge.  At 
                                                                                                                                        
 
8 “A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when the person knowingly enters or remains unlawfully:  
(1) In a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein…” 
 
9 “A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when the person knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a 
dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein…” 
 
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trial, Smith testified that he only acted as a lookout and came upon one of the other 
co-conspirators in Soto’s bedroom and only hit her in the torso a few times to keep 
her from moving.  Given his testimony, Smith argues that the seriousness of Soto’s 
injuries should have been given to the jury for determination by instructing them 
on the lesser included charges.  This argument lacks merit.  While it is within the 
province of the jury to determine credibility, the trial judge did not take away the 
jury’s role in deciding the seriousness of Soto’s injuries. The trial judge properly 
instructed the jury to find him not guilty if they did not find that Soto suffered from 
“physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious 
and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss or 
impairment of any bodily organ.”10  At trial, Soto testified she suffered from 
extensive bruising and swelling around the eyes, face, neck, arms, rib cage area, 
knees and thighs and from multiple hematomas on her head.   
(12) Given the evidence presented at the trial, the jury’s total rejection of 
Smith’s theory of the case supports the fact that there was no rational basis to 
acquit Smith of the greater charges and convict him of the lesser included charges. 
The jury verdict reflects its factual determination that Smith caused serious 
physical injury to Soto by beating her during the commission of a burglary and 
rejecting Smith’s testimony that he was only acting as a lookout.  We therefore 
                                          
 
10 See 11 Del. C. § 613. 
 
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conclude that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses 
did not constitute reversible error. 
 
 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ E. Norman Veasey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice