Case Title: County of Kenosha v. C & S Management, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1997AP000642

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-0642 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
County of Kenosha,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
C & S Management, Inc., d/b/a Crossroads,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 21, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 10, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce E. Schroeder 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs (in 
the court of appeals) by Stephen M. Glynn, Robert R. Henak and 
Shellow, Shellow & Glynn, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by 
Robert R. Henak. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief 
(in the court of appeals) by Angelina Gabriele, assistant 
district attorney and oral argument by Susan L. Karaskiewicz, 
assistant district attorney. 
 
No.  97-0642 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-0642 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
County of Kenosha,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
C & S Management, Inc., d/b/a Crossroads,  
 
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JAN 22, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County, Bruce E. Schroeder, Judge.  Affirmed.   
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.  This case raises a number of 
issues for review: 
(1) Does Wis. Stat. § 944.21, prohibiting the sale of 
obscene 
material, 
violate 
the 
federal 
and 
Wisconsin 
Constitutions in being too vague and overbroad?  We hold that it 
does not. 
(2)  If the Wisconsin standard of obscenity is that stated 
in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), were jury 
instructions which expanded the Miller "prurient interest" 
standard to material that "appeals generally to a shameful, 
unhealthy, unwholesome, degrading . . . interest in sex" and 
added 
the 
word 
genuinely 
to 
the 
Miller 
"serious 
value" 
definition erroneous? (emphasis added.)  We hold that they were 
not. 
No.  97-0642 
 
2 
(3)  What motion allegations sufficiently support a prima 
facie showing that a hearing is required to resolve issues of 
impermissible discrimination based on selective prosecution in 
constitutionally sensitive prosecutions?  We hold that a prima 
facie showing requires a defendant to provide evidence of a 
discriminatory 
effect 
and 
a 
discriminatory 
purpose 
to 
defendant's prosecution. 
(4) Whether the circuit court erred in excluding a survey, 
expert testimony, and allegedly comparable videotapes available 
in Kenosha County as evidence of prevailing community standards 
with respect to obscenity.  We hold that the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion. 
¶2 
This case is before the court on certification from 
the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 
(1995-96). 
 
Defendant-appellant 
appeals 
decisions 
by 
the 
Honorable Bruce E. Schroeder, Kenosha County Circuit Court. 
I 
¶3 
The relevant facts in this appeal are not disputed by 
the parties.  C & S Management, Inc., operates Crossroads News 
Agency ("Crossroads"), an adult bookstore in Kenosha County 
located along Interstate Highway I-94.  It was charged in four 
cases with a violation of Kenosha County, Wis., Municipal Code § 
No.  97-0642 
 
3 
9.10.21 [hereinafter "Kenosha County Ord. § 9.10.2"] for selling 
videotapes alleged by the county to be obscene.2 
¶4 
Crossroads filed two related motions seeking dismissal 
of the case on the grounds that Kenosha County had engaged in 
selective and discriminatory prosecution.  In its first motion, 
Crossroads argued that the county had impermissibly singled out 
for 
prosecution 
Crossroads 
and 
two 
other 
adult-oriented 
bookstores for the non-obscene sexually explicit nature of their 
inventories and their locations along Interstate 94, while at 
the same time allowing other businesses in the community to sell 
materials virtually identical to those videos for which they 
were being prosecuted.  In a second motion, Crossroads argued 
that the express purpose of the prosecutions was not to 
prosecute obscenity but to close down completely all of the 
adult bookstores in the county. 
                     
1 As the court of appeals noted in its certification of the 
issue to this court, the Kenosha ordinance which is the subject 
of this appeal is identical to Wis. Stats. § 944.21, in all 
respects except that penalty provisions vary and prosecution 
under the statute requires the approval of the attorney general 
while prosecuting under the ordinance does not.  The parties to 
this appeal, explicitly or by implication, have noted that the 
constitutional challenge applies equally to both the Kenosha 
ordinance and § 944.21.  We will refer only to the statute 
because affirming either affirms the other.  From time to time 
as necessary, we do refer to the ordinance.  Our discussion of 
either necessarily implicates the other. 
2 Two other adult-oriented bookstores located along Highway 
I-94 were also each charged in four cases with the violation of 
Kenosha County Ord. § 9.10.2.  These two other bookstores joined 
Crossroads in a number of its motions.  While these other 
bookstores are referred to from time to time, they are not 
parties to this appeal. 
No.  97-0642 
 
4 
¶5 
At a hearing on the motions, the circuit court denied 
Crossroads' 
motions 
without 
providing 
Crossroads 
with 
an 
evidentiary hearing.  The district attorney asked the circuit 
court to accept as true all of the allegations contained in 
Crossroads' motions, and in doing so the circuit court found 
that Crossroads had failed to make a prima facie showing of 
discriminatory prosecution and denied its motions to dismiss the 
charges against Crossroads 
without 
holding 
an 
evidentiary 
hearing.  Crossroads petitioned for leave to appeal the circuit 
court's denial of its motions, which the court of appeals 
denied. 
¶6 
Three of the four cases against Crossroads were 
dismissed on summary judgment.  A fourth case, involving 
Crossroads' sale of the videotape entitled "Anal Vision No. 5," 
proceeded to a jury trial which began January 27 and ended 
January 29, 1997.  At the trial, Crossroads stipulated to the 
fact that the videotape was sold for commercial purposes and 
that it knew the tape was sexually explicit.  The only contested 
issue was whether the tape was "obscene" under Kenosha County 
Ord. § 9.10.2. 
¶7 
The jury returned a non-unanimous verdict of guilty 
and the court imposed a $4,000 fine and costs of the trial.  
Crossroads appealed the verdict on numerous grounds, including 
the four issues stated.  The court of appeals certified the 
first three to this court.  As the parties fully briefed the 
certified issues, as well as the question of whether the circuit 
No.  97-0642 
 
5 
court erred in disallowing Crossroads' evidence of community 
standards, we address all four issues below. 
II 
Standard of Review 
¶8 
The defendant has challenged Kenosha County Ord. § 
9.10.2, and by implication Wis. Stat. § 944.21 (1995-96),3 upon 
                     
3  
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1995-96 version unless otherwise noted. 
944.21 Obscene material or performance. (1) The 
legislature intends that the authority to prosecute 
violations of this section shall be used primarily to 
combat the obscenity industry and shall never be used 
for 
harassment 
or 
censorship 
purposes 
against 
materials or performances having serious artistic, 
literary, political, educational or scientific value. 
The legislature further intends that the enforcement 
of this section shall be consistent with the first 
amendment to the U.S. constitution, article I, section 
3, of the Wisconsin Constitution and the compelling 
state interest in protecting the free flow of ideas.   
  
(2) In this section: 
    (a) "Community" means this state. 
    (b) "Internal 
revenue 
code" 
has the 
meaning 
specified in s. 71.01 (6). 
    (c) "Obscene material" means a writing, picture, 
sound recording or film which: 
    1. 
The 
average 
person, 
applying 
contemporary 
community 
standards, 
would 
find 
appeals 
to 
the 
prurient interest if taken as a whole; 
    2. 
Under 
contemporary 
community 
standards, 
describes or shows sexual conduct in a patently 
offensive way; and 
    3. Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
educational or scientific value, if taken as a whole. 
    (d) "Obscene performance" means a live exhibition 
before an audience which: 
    1. 
The 
average 
person, 
applying 
contemporary 
community 
standards, 
would 
find 
appeals 
to 
the 
prurient interest if taken as a whole; 
    2. 
Under 
contemporary 
community 
standards, 
describes or shows sexual conduct in a patently 
offensive way; and 
No.  97-0642 
 
6 
                                                                  
    3. Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
educational or scientific value, if taken as a whole. 
    (e) "Sexual conduct" means the commission of any 
of 
the 
following: 
sexual 
intercourse, 
sodomy, 
bestiality, 
necrophilia, 
human 
excretion, 
masturbation, sadism, masochism, fellatio, cunnilingus 
or lewd exhibition of human genitals. 
    (f) "Wholesale transfer or distribution of obscene 
material" 
means 
any 
transfer 
for 
a 
valuable 
consideration of obscene material for purposes of 
resale or commercial distribution; or any distribution 
of 
obscene 
material 
for 
commercial 
exhibition. 
"Wholesale 
transfer 
or 
distribution 
of 
obscene 
material" does not require transfer of title to the 
obscene material to the purchaser, distributee or 
exhibitor. 
    (3) Whoever does any of the following with 
knowledge of the character and content of the material 
or performance and for commercial purposes is subject 
to the penalties under sub. (5): 
    (a) Imports, prints, sells, has in his or her 
possession for sale, publishes, exhibits, or transfers 
any obscene material. 
    (b) 
Produces 
or 
performs 
in 
any 
obscene 
performance. 
    (c) Requires, as a condition to the purchase of 
periodicals, that a retailer accept obscene material. 
    (4) Whoever does any of the following with 
knowledge of the character and content of the material 
is subject to the penalties under sub. (5): 
    (a) Transfers or exhibits any obscene material to 
a person under the age of 18 years. 
    (b) Has in his or her possession with intent to 
transfer or exhibit to a person under the age of 18 
years any obscene material. 
    (5) (a) Except as provided under pars. (b) to (e), 
any person violating sub. (3) or (4) is subject to a 
Class A forfeiture. 
    (b) If the person violating sub. (3) or (4) has 
one prior conviction under this section, the person is 
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. 
    (c) If the person violating sub. (3) or (4) has 2 
or more prior convictions under this section, the 
person is guilty of a Class D felony. 
No.  97-0642 
 
7 
                                                                  
    (d) Prior convictions under pars. (b) and (c) 
apply only to offenses occurring on or after June 17, 
1988. 
    (e) Regardless of the number of prior convictions, 
if the violation under sub. (3) or (4) is for a 
wholesale 
transfer 
or 
distribution 
of 
obscene 
material, the person is guilty of a Class D felony. 
    (5m) A contract printer or employe or agent of a 
contract printer is not subject to prosecution for a 
violation of sub. (3) regarding the printing of 
material that is not subject to the contract printer's 
editorial review or control. 
    (6) Each day a violation under sub. (3) or (4) 
continues constitutes a separate violation under this 
section. 
    (7) A district attorney may submit a case for 
review under s. 165.25(3m). No civil or criminal 
proceeding under this section may be commenced against 
any person for a violation of sub. (3) or (4) unless 
the attorney general determines under s. 165.25(3m) 
that the proceeding may be commenced. 
    (8) (a) The legislature finds that the libraries 
and educational institutions under par. (b) carry out 
the essential purpose of making available to all 
citizens a current, balanced collection of books, 
reference materials, periodicals, sound recordings and 
audiovisual 
materials 
that 
reflect 
the 
cultural 
diversity and pluralistic nature of American society. 
The legislature further finds that it is in the 
interest of the state to protect the financial 
resources of libraries and educational institutions 
from being expended in litigation and to permit these 
resources to be used to the greatest extent possible 
for fulfilling the essential purpose of libraries and 
educational institutions. 
    (b) No person who is an employe, a member of the 
board of directors or a trustee of any of the 
following is liable to prosecution for violation of 
this section for acts or omissions while in his or her 
capacity as an employe, a member of the board of 
directors or a trustee: 
    1. A public elementary or secondary school. 
    2. A private school, as defined in s. 115.001 
(3r). 
    3. Any school offering vocational, technical or 
adult education that: 
No.  97-0642 
 
8 
which the ordinance is modeled, as being unconstitutionally 
overbroad and vague under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 1 and 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  The constitutionality of a statute is a 
question of law that this court reviews de novo, without 
deference to the circuit court or the court of appeals.  State 
v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 370, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998).  
Ordinances and statutes normally are the beneficiaries of a 
presumption of constitutionality which the challenger must 
refute.  Lounge Management, Ltd. v. Town of Trenton, 219 Wis. 2d 
13, 20, 580 N.W.2d 156 (1998).  "However, where an ordinance 
regulates the exercise of First Amendment rights, the burden 
shifts to the government to defend the constitutionality of that 
regulation beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. (citations omitted.) 
Overbreadth under the Federal Constitution 
                                                                  
    a. Is a technical college, is a school approved by 
the department of education under s. 38.51 or is a 
school described in s. 38.51 (9) (f), (g) or (h); and 
    b. Is exempt from taxation under section 501 (c) 
(3) of the internal revenue code. 
    4. Any institution of higher education that is 
accredited, as described in s. 39.30(1)(d), and is 
exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the 
internal revenue code. 
    5. A library that receives funding from any unit 
of government. 
    (9) In determining whether material is obscene 
under sub. (2)(c)1. and 3., a judge or jury shall 
examine individual pictures or passages in the context 
of the work in which they appear. 
    (10) The provisions of this section, including the 
provisions of sub. (8), are severable, as provided in 
s. 990.001 (11).  
 
No.  97-0642 
 
9 
¶9 
Crossroads appropriately makes no serious attempt to 
argue that the Kenosha Ordinance is at odds with the protections 
afforded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments under United 
States Supreme Court precedent in the area of state regulation 
of obscenity.  It is clear from Crossroads' brief that it 
fundamentally 
disagrees 
with 
that 
Court's 
obscenity 
jurisprudence, but in the end must (and does) admit that for the 
purposes 
of 
its 
overbreadth 
claim 
under 
the 
federal 
constitution, the Kenosha ordinance must be sustained. 
¶10 The Supreme Court in a line of cases culminating in 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), then declared 
categorically settled "that obscene material is unprotected by 
the First Amendment."  Id. at 23 (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 
U.S. 229 (1972); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354 
(1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)); see 
also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973) 
("This Court has consistently held that obscene material is not 
protected by the First Amendment as a limitation on the state 
police power by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.") 
¶11 Acknowledging 
first 
the 
"inherent 
dangers 
of 
undertaking to regulate any form of expression," the Court 
explicitly provided that states could regulate obscene materials 
so long as their statutes were carefully limited.  Miller, 413 
U.S. at 23-24.  In the Court's view, a carefully limited 
regulation would be sufficiently protective of First Amendment 
values 
applicable 
to 
the 
states 
through 
the 
Fourteenth 
No.  97-0642 
 
10
Amendment.  Id.  Under the tripartite test it then enunciated, a 
state may regulate materials as obscene if:  
 
(a) [] 'the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards' would find that the work, taken 
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Kois v. 
Wisconsin, [408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)], quoting Roth v. 
United States, [354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)]; (b) [] the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive 
way, 
sexual conduct 
specifically 
defined 
by the 
applicable state law; and (c) [] the work, taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value. 
 
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25.   
¶12 This court has adopted Miller in its evaluations of 
state obscenity statutes under the federal constitution, see 
State v. Princess Cinema of Milwaukee, 96 Wis. 2d 646, 292 
N.W.2d 807 (1980) (the Miller standard was used to invalidate, 
for the violation of First Amendment rights, the forerunner to 
the current Wis. Stat. § 944.21, enacted in 1988), and the 
standard was recited by this court with approval as recently as 
1994.  See State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 523, 515 N.W.2d 847 
(1994) (upholding Wis. Stat. § 948.11, Exposing a child to 
harmful material, as a constitutionally valid adaptation of the 
Miller obscenity test). 
¶13 Further, in our assessment of Wis. Stat. § 944.21 
under the federal constitution we are bound by Miller, for 
"[w]hen assessing any First Amendment challenge to a state 
statute, we are bound by the results and interpretations given 
that amendment by the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court."  Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 855, 578 N.W.2d 602 
No.  97-0642 
 
11
(1998) (citing State ex rel. Holt v. Thompson, 66 Wis. 2d 659, 
663, 225 N.W.2d 678 (1975)); see also State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 
2d 628, 632, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985) ("when this court interprets 
a provision of the federal constitution, this court is bound by 
the interpretations which the United States Supreme Court has 
given that provision").  Miller therefore governs Crossroads' 
overbreadth claim under the federal constitution, and it is 
dispositive. 
¶14 "'A statute is overbroad when its language, given its 
normal meaning, is so sweeping that its sanctions may be applied 
to constitutionally protected conduct which the state is not 
permitted to regulate.'" Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d at 374 (quoting 
Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 411, 407 N.W.2d 533 
(1987)).  We have no doubt that Kenosha County Ordinance § 
9.10.2 and Wis. Stat. § 944.21 are not overbroad under the 
federal constitution, for Miller explicitly permits states to 
regulate sexually explicit material in the manner in which 
Kenosha and Wisconsin have done here. 
¶15 The Miller test has become the basis for many states' 
obscenity laws, including Wis. Stat. § 944.21 upon which Kenosha 
County has modeled ordinance § 9.10.2.  The Supreme Court 
offered the Miller test as an example of an appropriate 
limitation upon a state statute governing obscenity that would 
withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 ("If 
a state law that regulates obscene material is [limited by our 
three-pronged test], the First Amendment values applicable to 
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are adequately 
No.  97-0642 
 
12
protected . . . .").  Both the Wisconsin statute and Kenosha 
ordinance are virtual adaptations of the Miller test. 
¶16 Crossroads has offered no evidence that the Kenosha 
ordinance deviates, unconstitutionally, from the Miller test.  
Indeed, Crossroads explicitly acknowledges in its brief that 
"the three-pronged test for 'obscenity' [is] incorporated into 
the Kenosha ordinance."  Crossroads' point of contention is its 
disagreement with the Supreme Court's categorical exclusion of 
obscene materials from First Amendment protection.  However, it 
also accepts Miller as good law.  Under current obscenity 
statute analysis as found in Miller, the Kenosha County 
ordinance and Wisconsin statute withstand federal constitutional 
scrutiny on Crossroads' overbreadth claim, for as currently 
limited, 
neither 
reaches 
speech 
protected 
by 
the 
First 
Amendment. 
Overbreadth under the Wisconsin Constitution 
¶17 Crossroads is much less concerned with the Kenosha 
County ordinance under the federal constitution than it is with 
the ordinance under the Wisconsin Constitution, and Crossroads 
urges this court to assess the validity of the ordinance under 
the free speech clause of Article I, § 3 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution4.  Necessarily, Crossroads argues that in the area 
                     
4 Section 3. Free Speech libel.  SECTION 3.  Every 
person may freely speak, write and publish his 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the 
abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to 
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the 
press.  In all criminal prosecutions or indictments 
for libel, the truth may be given in evidence, and if 
No.  97-0642 
 
13
of obscenity, the Wisconsin Constitution provides for greater 
protection of speech than does the First Amendment.   
¶18 As noted above, we are bound by Miller under an 
examination of obscenity statutes purportedly affronting the 
protections of the federal constitution as applied to this state 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  However, Miller provides 
Wisconsin 
citizens 
with 
but 
the 
minimum 
constitutional 
protection that must be accorded under the federal constitution. 
 That is, a state statute or county ordinance may not limit 
sexually explicit materials in a manner more restrictive than 
that allowed by Miller.  See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-25.   
¶19 Here, Crossroads would have us find that Wisconsin 
citizens enjoy more expansive freedoms of speech under the state 
constitution than they do under the First Amendment and that 
under the state constitution the state may not limit speech to 
the extent authorized by Miller. 
¶20 We have previously stated that this court "will not be 
bound by the minimums which are imposed by the Supreme Court of 
the United States if it is the judgment of this court that the 
Constitution of Wisconsin and the laws of this state require 
that greater protection of citizens' liberties ought to be 
afforded."  State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 N.W.2d 210 
(1977).  And, in a few limited circumstances, we have found 
                                                                  
it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as 
libelous be true, and was published with good motives 
and 
for 
justifiable 
ends, 
the 
party 
shall 
be 
acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to 
determine the law and the fact.  
No.  97-0642 
 
14
within our state constitution protections that exceeded those 
provided our citizens by comparable clauses under the federal 
constitution.  See e.g., State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 
242, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998) (12-member jury is constitutionally 
required under Wisconsin Constitution, although not under the 
federal constitution); Doe, 78 Wis. 2d at 171-72 (explaining 
that the state has on occasion accorded criminal defendants 
broader right to counsel than mandated by the United States 
Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution). 
¶21 Despite the differences in their language, we have 
heretofore found no differences in the freedom of speech 
guarantees provided by the First Amendment and Article 1, § 3.  
Wisconsin courts consistently have held that Article 1, § 3 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution guarantees the same freedom of speech 
rights as the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
 See Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 274, 70 N.W.2d 
605 (1955); Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 
(1987); State v. Bagley, 164 Wis. 2d 255, 260 n.1, 474 N.W.2d 
761 (Ct. App. 1991). 
¶22 As for the issue before us here, this court has indeed 
considered the breadth of the protection afforded by Article I, 
§ 3 in the context of obscenity and has concluded that no 
greater protection exists under the Wisconsin Constitution than 
under the First Amendment.  See State v. Chobot, 12 Wis. 2d 110, 
106 N.W.2d 289 (1960); see also State ex rel. Gall v. Wittig, 42 
Wis. 2d 595, 605, 167 N.W.2d 577 (1969) (recognition that the 
No.  97-0642 
 
15
sale of obscene matter is a recognized abuse of the right to 
speak freely on all subjects and is not protected by either the 
federal or state constitutions); Princess Cinema, 96 Wis. 2d at 
655 (court considered the constitutionality of the predecessor 
to the current Wis. Stat. § 944.21 under backdrop of both the 
Wisconsin Constitution and the federal constitution making no 
distinction as to the protections they each accord).  
¶23 In 
Chobot, 
this 
court 
expressly 
considered 
the 
constitutionality of the predecessor of the current Wis. Stat. § 
944.21, acknowledging from the outset of that decision that both 
the federal and state constitutional provisions were implicated. 
 Chobot, 12 Wis. 2d at 112.  There, we explicitly stated that 
the constitutional 
provisions 
involved 
in 
determining the 
constitutionality of the obscenity statute at issue were 
"Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, Sec. 3" and "Amendments to 
the United States Constitution."5  Id. 
                     
5 Crossroads 
notes 
in 
its 
brief 
that 
following 
the 
recitation of the state provision, the provision is not again 
addressed.  Contrary to Crossroads' inference, the absence of a 
riveting analysis of the language does not negate the force of 
this opinion: this court has indeed equated the protections of 
the Wisconsin provision no differently than the provision of the 
federal constitution. 
While Crossroads is correct that following our recitation 
of the state constitutional provision we did not specifically 
refer back to its language, we may not ignore the fact that we 
did not distinguish the protections accorded our provision from 
those accorded the federal constitution.  
No.  97-0642 
 
16
¶24 In upholding the constitutionality of the obscenity 
statute, we relied exclusively upon federal decisions, and in 
doing so, did not specifically address the language of either 
the federal or state constitutions.  The unavoidable conclusion 
is that the decision, which relied exclusively upon federal case 
law to decide the constitutional issue, is that for the purposes 
of obscenity statutes, we have interpreted the two provisions in 
an identical manner.   
¶25 Further, roughly a third of the state jurisdictions 
have been asked to interpret their state constitutional free 
                                                                  
Crossroads too quickly dispatched the relevance of the case 
to the issue now before us.  This court is not in the habit of 
setting forth the parameters of its decisions only to fully 
ignore those parameters when deciding its cases.  Crossroads' 
suggestion that Chobot is of no precedential value here requires 
quite the leap of logic.  It is a greater leap of logic to 
consider Chobot as Crossroads would have us do, which is that 
this court, having set forth the issue, ignored or forgot to 
address 
the 
statute's 
constitutionality 
under 
the 
state 
constitution.  Clearly, this court in 1960 accorded the First 
Amendment and Article I, § 3 as providing identical protections, 
and limitations, in the area of obscenity.  That we did have 
clearly 
before 
us 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
is 
further 
supported by the fact that the defendant in the briefs in Chobot 
specifically placed before the court for our consideration the 
relevant provision of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
No.  97-0642 
 
17
speech clauses to protect obscenity.6  Only the Oregon Supreme 
Court has held that its constitution protects obscenity.  State 
v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9 (Or. 1987).  However, the Henry opinion 
reads as a recital of and quarrel with the United States Supreme 
Court's 
obscenity 
opinions, 
basing 
its 
decision 
less 
on 
principled differences between the language of its constitution 
and the federal constitution than on what it believes to be a 
line of poorly-reasoned Supreme Court decisions. 
¶26 We find that obscenity is and has been an abuse of the 
right to 
speak freely 
on 
all subjects under 
the 
state 
constitution.  The court reserves the right to find that in 
other areas the Wisconsin constitution may provide Wisconsin 
citizens 
with 
greater 
protection 
than 
does 
the 
federal 
constitution. 
Vagueness 
¶27 Crossroads also claims that the Kenosha ordinance is 
unconstitutional due to vagueness under both the federal and 
Wisconsin Constitutions.  A statute is "unconstitutionally vague 
                     
6 See State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Minn. 1992); 
People v. Ford, 773 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1989); City of Urbana ex 
rel. Newlin v. Downing, 539 N.E.2d 140, 146 (Ohio 1989); State 
v. Reece, 757 P.2d 947 (Wash. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812 
(1989); City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646 (Me. 1985); 
Com. v. United Books, Inc., 453 N.E.2d 406 (Mass. 1983); People 
v. Neumayer, 275 N.W.2d 230, 237 (Mich. 1979); State v. 
Lesieure, 404 A.2d 457 (R.I. 1979); State v. Manzo, 573 P.2d 
945, 957-58 (Haw. 1977); Bloom v. Municipal Court, 545 P.2d 229 
(Cal. 1976); Taylor v. State ex. rel. Kirkpatrick, 529 S.W.2d 
692 (Tenn. 1975); City of Farmington v. Fawcett, 843 P.2d 839 
(N.M. App. 1992); Com. v. Stock, 499 A.2d 308 (Pa. Super. 1985); 
Porter v. State, 440 N.E.2d 690, 692-93 (Ind. App. 1982); State 
v. Hollins, 533 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. App. 1975).  
No.  97-0642 
 
18
if it fails to afford proper notice of the conduct it seeks to 
proscribe or if it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and 
convictions."  Bachowski, 139 Wis. 2d at 406 (quoting Milwaukee 
v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 2d 11, 16, 291 N.W.2d 452 (1980).  The 
"principles 
underlying 
the 
void 
for 
vagueness 
doctrine 
 . . . stem from concepts of procedural due process."  State v. 
Popanz, 112 Wis. 2d 166, 172, 332 N.W.2d 750 (1983).  "Due 
process requires that the law set forth fair notice of the 
conduct 
prohibited 
or 
required 
and 
proper 
standards 
for 
enforcement of the law and adjudication."  Id.; see also State 
v. Ehlenfeldt, 94 Wis. 2d 347, 355, 288 N.W.2d 786 (1980) 
(constitutional foundation to a vagueness challenge is the 
procedural due process requirement of fair notice).  
 
A vague statute . . . is one which operates to 
hinder free speech through the use of language which 
is so vague as to allow the inclusion of protected 
speech in the prohibition or to leave the individual 
with no clear guidance as to the nature of the acts 
which are subject to punishment. 
Princess Cinema, 96 Wis. 2d at 656.  A statute which is vague 
has the effect of impinging upon three First Amendment values: 
"(1) it does not provide individuals with fair warning of what 
is prohibited; (2) lacking precise or articulated standards, it 
allows for arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement; and (3) it 
causes citizens to 'forsake activity protected by the First 
Amendment for fear it may be prohibited.'"  Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 
at 521, n. 9. 
¶28 As is true of its overbreadth argument under the 
federal constitution, Crossroads here admits that precedent 
No.  97-0642 
 
19
requires that this court be bound by Supreme Court decisions and 
that the Miller test embodied in the ordinance provides 
sufficient notice to those who wish both to exercise fully their 
constitutional rights and to avoid committing a criminal offense 
or ordinance violation. 
¶29 However, Crossroads would have us find that the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides greater procedural due process 
safeguards than does the federal constitution, and that while 
the ordinance does provide sufficient notice under the federal 
standard, it does not do so under the Wisconsin Constitution.  
We 
decline 
to 
distinguish 
the 
procedural 
due 
process 
requirements of the two constitutions.  
¶30 Unlike its claim that the Wisconsin and federal 
constitutions differ as to freedom of speech, here, Crossroads 
makes no such argument and provides no support for its position 
that our analysis under the federal constitution should differ 
from our analysis under the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶31 While the language used in the two constitutions is 
not identical, we have found that the two provide identical 
procedural due process protections.  State v. Hezzie R., 219  
Wis. 2d 849, 892, 580 N.W.2d 675 (1998) (citing Reginald D. v. 
State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 307, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995)).  On more 
than a few occasions we have expressly held that the due process 
and equal protection clauses of our state constitution and the 
United States Constitution are essentially the same: 
Preliminarily, we point out that sec. 1, art. I 
of the Wisconsin Constitution is framed in language of 
No.  97-0642 
 
20
a Declaration of Rights and reminiscent of the 
Declaration of Independence, and many times has been 
held to be substantially equivalent of the due-process 
and 
equal-protection 
clauses 
of 
the 
Fourteenth 
amendment to the United States constitution.  In Black 
v. State (1902), 113 Wis. 205, 89 N.W. 522, the court 
said that the section must mean "equality before the 
law, if it means anything," and, "The idea is 
expressed more happily in the Fourteenth amendment."  
Again in Pauly v. Keebler (1921), 175 Wis. 428, 185 
N.W. 554, it was said in referring to the Fourteenth 
amendment that the first article of the Declaration of 
Rights 
in 
our 
constitution 
was 
a 
substantially 
equivalent limitation of legislative power and "our 
legislature is bound to accord all persons within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."  More 
recently we reaffirmed the concept that sec. 1, art. 
I, is to be equated with the Fourteenth amendment in 
Boden v. Milwaukee (1959), 8 Wis. 2d 318, 99 N.W. 2d 
156; Lathrop v. Donohue (1960), 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 
N.W. 2d 404; and Haase v. Sawicki (1963), 20 Wis. 2d 
308, 121 N.W.2d 876.  Since there is no substantial 
difference between the two constitutions, we will 
henceforth refer only to the Fourteenth amendment of 
the United States constitution. 
State ex rel Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 49-50, 132 
N.W.2d 249 (1965) (footnote omitted). 
¶32 Crossroads argues that Wisconsin recognizes the due 
process clause under the Wisconsin Constitution, a position with 
which we are in full agreement.  However, as we have not 
addressed void for vagueness claims in a manner different from 
the United States Supreme Court, in the absence of a substantive 
difference between the two constitutions, we see no reason to 
interpret a void for vagueness challenge under two separate 
lines of inquiry.  We have historically relied upon the United 
States Supreme Court decisions in the area of void for vagueness 
No.  97-0642 
 
21
challenges, and have done so where a challenge has been made 
under both the constitutions. 
¶33 The Supreme Court, in Miller, held that procedural due 
process safeguards were met with the limitations outlined 
therein.  Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.  As we have held that the 
Kenosha ordinance has largely adopted the Miller standards for 
obscenity, we find that it is not void for vagueness under 
either the federal constitution or the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶34 So long as the Kenosha ordinance and state statute 
meet the specific prerequisites as outlined in Miller, as we 
find that they do, dealers in such materials will have fair 
notice that their "public and commercial activities may bring 
prosecution."  Miller, 413 U.S. at 27. 
III 
¶35 Having decided that Kenosha County Ord. § 9.10.2 does 
not violate either the federal or Wisconsin Constitutions, we 
turn next to the question of whether the circuit court erred in 
modifying the language of the Miller obscenity standard when 
giving instructions to the jury. 
¶36 A trial judge has great discretion in selecting jury 
instructions based on the facts and circumstances of the case.  
State v. Sartin, 200 Wis. 2d 47, 52, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996).  
"This discretion extends to both choice of language and 
emphasis." Id. (citing State v. McCoy, 143 Wis. 2d 274, 289, 421 
N.W.2d 107 (1988)).  "Although the judge is granted such broad 
discretion, the question of whether the circuit court correctly 
instructed the jury is one of law which this court reviews de 
No.  97-0642 
 
22
novo, without deference to the lower courts."  Id. (citing State 
v. Wilson, 149 Wis. 2d 878, 898, 440 N.W.2d 534 (1989)). 
¶37 Crossroads contends that the instruction offered the 
jury departed from constitutional limits first enunciated in 
Miller, 413 U.S. 15, and repeated here: 
 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must 
be: 
(a) 
whether 
'the 
average 
person, 
applying 
contemporary community standards' would find that the 
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest . . . ; (b) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id. at 24.  Crossroads concedes that the circuit court did 
provide the jury with these required elements.  It is in 
defining these elements that Crossroads assigns the circuit 
court with error, arguing that the circuit court's definitions 
of the elements impermissibly expanded the scope of obscenity 
permitting 
the 
conviction 
for 
non-obscene 
and 
therefore 
constitutionally-protected speech. 
¶38 The circuit court provided the jurors with the 
following definition of the first Miller prong: 
 
'Appealing to the prurient interest' does not 
encompass normal healthy sexual desires but means the 
material appeals generally to a shameful, unhealthy, 
unwholesome, degrading or morbid interest in sex, 
nudity, or excretion. 
(emphasis added).  Crossroads objected that this definition 
impermissibly expanded the concept of prurience beyond that 
which is constitutionally permitted.  The court overruled 
No.  97-0642 
 
23
Crossroads' objection that the instruction was constitutionally 
overbroad.   
¶39 Miller, while setting forth the three-pronged test for 
obscenity, did not define "prurience."  Miller simply retained 
without elaborating on, or disagreeing with, the definition of 
"prurient interest" contained in Roth.  Brokett v. Spokane 
Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1985).  The definition of 
"prurient interest" as "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, 
sex, or excretion" stems back at least as far as the Supreme 
Court's decision in Roth in which the definition of obscenity as 
developed in the case law was equated with the definition of 
obscenity in the Model Penal Code: 
 
". . . A thing is obscene if, considered as a 
whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, 
i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or 
excretion, 
and 
if 
it 
goes 
substantially 
beyond 
customary 
limits 
of 
candor 
in 
description 
or 
representation of such matters. . . ." 
Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20 (citing Model Penal Code, § 207.10(2) 
Comment, at 10 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957)).  This definition has 
been accepted in the Court's subsequent decisions.  Brockett, 
472 U.S. at 497-98. 
¶40 Crossroads does not dispute that the Roth-Brockett 
definition of prurience is valid.  Crossroads does dispute the 
circuit 
court's 
addition 
of 
the 
words 
"unhealthy," 
"unwholesome," and "degrading" to the Roth-Brockett formulation 
of prurient, and believes that by adding such words the 
definition was expanded beyond that which is allowed by Miller. 
No.  97-0642 
 
24
¶41 We find that the addition of these words to the jury 
instruction of prurience does not expand the definition to 
encompass 
protected 
speech. 
 
The 
words 
"unhealthy," 
"unwholesome," and "degrading" appropriately define the term 
prurient and do not broaden the subset of materials unprotected 
by the First Amendment under the Miller test.  The United States 
Supreme Court in Miller expressly stated that in providing the 
regime which has become known as the Miller test, it was not 
proposing "regulatory schemes for the States."  Miller, 413 U.S. 
at 25.  We do not accept the position that to meet the 
requirements of Miller, states cannot deviate in the language 
used to regulate obscenity. 
 
The 
Miller 
cases, 
important 
as 
they 
were 
in 
enunciating a constitutional test for obscenity to 
which a majority of the Court subscribed for the first 
time in a number of years, were intended neither as 
legislative drafting handbooks nor as manuals of jury 
instructions. 
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 115 (1974).  States 
simply are not allowed to reach speech beyond that to which 
Miller applies, and we find that the definition of prurience 
supplied by the circuit court does not reach protected speech. 
¶42 The terms "unhealthy" and "unwholesome" do not deviate 
in any significant manner from the term "morbid," which itself 
is a term that the Supreme Court has accepted as properly 
defining prurient.  See Spokane, 472 U.S. at 497-98.  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed., 
1992) defines morbid as follows:  "1.a. Of, relating to, or 
caused by disease; pathological or diseased.  b. Psychologically 
No.  97-0642 
 
25
unhealthy or unwholesome.  2. Characterized by preoccupation 
with unwholesome thoughts or feelings."  (emphasis added.)  
Therefore, we conclude that the addition of these two terms to 
the definition was not an improper statement of the law. 
¶43 Likewise, the term "degrading" does not impermissibly 
expand the definition of prurient.  "Degrading" is merely 
synonymous with "shameful," a term that has been an accepted 
definition of prurient since at least Roth.  "[The verb means] 
to deprive of self-esteem or self-worth.  Degrade implies 
reduction to a state of shame or disgrace."  The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, at 491 (emphasis 
added). 
¶44 Crossroads similarly argues that the circuit court 
impermissibly expanded the ordinance beyond its permissible 
reach by redefining the "value" (third) prong of the Miller 
test.  Miller set the constitutional limit of the government's 
power to regulate materials which were obscene and did not have 
"serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."  
The circuit court instructed the jury that for material to be 
obscene 
it 
must 
not 
have 
"genuinely 
serious 
[] 
value."  
(emphasis added.) 
¶45 Crossroads contends that in so defining the "value" 
prong, the circuit court impermissibly reduced the burden 
Kenosha County bore in prosecuting its case.  We disagree.  We 
do not find that the modification of the word "serious" with the 
word "genuinely" expands the scope of material that the state 
may regulate. The jury instructions presented to the jury were 
No.  97-0642 
 
26
an accurate statement of the law and as such, resulted in an 
accurate conviction by the jury.   
¶46 The circuit court has broad discretion in instructing 
the jury, Fischer v. Ganju, 168 Wis. 2d 834, 849, 485 N.W.2d 10 
(1992), so long as the instructions fully and fairly inform the 
jury of the law.  Jerry M. v. Daniels L.M., 198 Wis. 2d 10, 19, 
542 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted).  The 
instructions were not misleading to the jury.  Taken in light of 
the overall meaning communicated by the instructions, the 
instructions were proper. 
IV 
¶47 Crossroads next argues that the express purpose and 
the effect of the county's prosecution against it was to 
discriminate against Crossroads for the exercise of its right to 
free speech under the First Amendment and Article 1, § 3 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution.  At a minimum, Crossroads believes that 
it was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the matter, and 
preferably, that the charges should have been dismissed because 
the 
county 
engaged 
in 
a 
selective 
and 
discriminatory 
prosecution. 
¶48 A prosecutor has great discretion in deciding whether 
to prosecute in a particular case.  See Sears v. State, 94 Wis. 
2d 128, 133, 287 N.W.2d 785 (1980).  This court has frequently 
stated 
that 
the 
"district 
attorney 
in 
Wisconsin 
is 
a 
constitutional officer and is endowed with a discretion that 
approaches the quasi-judicial."  State v. Johnson, 74 Wis. 2d 
169, 173, 246 N.W.2d 503 (1976) (citing State v. Peterson 195 
No.  97-0642 
 
27
Wis. 351, 359, 218 N.W. 367 (1928)).  In accord with this 
discretion, the prosecutor need not prosecute in all cases where 
there appears to be a violation of the law.  See Id. 
¶49 However, 
prosecutorial 
discretion 
is 
not 
wholly 
unfettered, having, instead, some constitutional limitations.  
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); Locklear v. 
State, 86 
Wis. 2d 603, 
609, 273 N.W.2d 
334 
(1979)(the 
constitution forbids the discriminatory enforcement of laws).  
The decision to prosecute may not be "deliberately based upon an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion," or the exercise 
of protected statutory or constitutional rights.  Wayte, 470 
U.S. at 608 (citations omitted).  Under Wayte, a court may judge 
a discriminatory prosecution claim according to ordinary equal 
protection standards.  Id.  These standards require a petitioner 
to show that the prosecution "had a discriminatory effect and 
 . . . was motivated by a discriminatory purpose."  Id. at 598. 
¶50 Before it is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing, 
Crossroads 
must 
first 
present 
a 
prima 
facie 
showing 
of 
discriminatory prosecution.  See State v. Nowakowski, 67 Wis. 2d 
545, 565-66, 227 N.W.2d 697 (1975);  see also Jarrett v. United 
States, 822 F.2d 1438, 1443 (7th Cir. 1987)(citations omitted); 
United States v. Kerley, 787 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1986).  A prima 
facie showing requires that at a minimum the defendant prove 
that he or she has been singled out for prosecution while others 
similarly 
situated 
have 
not, 
and 
that 
the 
prosecutor's 
discriminatory 
selection 
was 
based 
on 
an 
impermissible 
No.  97-0642 
 
28
consideration such as race, religion or the exercise of 
constitutional rights.  Kerley, 787 F.2d at 1148. 
¶51 We find that Crossroads has failed to make the 
required showing under either prong.  In order to satisfy the 
discriminatory effect prong, a court should look to see if a 
similarly 
situated 
person 
is 
generally 
not 
subject 
to 
prosecution.  See Johnson, 74 Wis. 2d at 173 ("A basic 
consideration to the question of equal protection in the 
enforcement of laws is that 'all persons similarly circumstanced 
shall be treated alike.'"); see also State v. McCollum, 159 Wis. 
2d 184, 197-98, 464 N.W.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1990); United States v. 
Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 705-706 (9th Cir. 1989).   
¶52 The Aguilar court offered a helpful method of applying 
this prong.  Aguilar suggested the use of a control group in 
order to determine whether the pattern of prosecution has 
discriminatory effect.  Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 706.  The proper 
control group will be akin to the defendant in every way except 
for a variable.  Id. 
¶53 As 
the 
Aguilar 
court 
stated, 
the 
purpose 
of 
identifying the appropriate control group is to:  
 
isolate the factor allegedly subject to impermissible 
discrimination.  The similarly situated group is the 
control group.  The control group and defendant are 
the same in all relevant respects, except that 
defendant was, for instance, exercising his first 
amendment rights.  If all other things are equal, the 
prosecution of only those persons exercising their 
constitutional rights gives rise to an inference of 
discrimination.  But where the comparison group has 
less in common with defendant, then factors other than 
No.  97-0642 
 
29
the protected expression may very well play a part in 
the prosecution.  
Id.   
¶54 In this instance, Crossroads has identified the group 
of "similarly situated" as all video stores in Kenosha County 
selling or renting videotapes comparable to those alleged to be 
obscene in this case.  This group includes all three video 
stores initially prosecuted for selling obscene videos as well 
as nine other "mainstream" video stores in the county. 
¶55 In 
alleging 
that 
the 
other 
video 
stores 
have 
comparable 
sexually 
explicit 
videos, 
Crossroads 
implicitly 
admits that the nine "mainstream" video stores are exercising 
the same First Amendment rights to provide sexually explicit 
materials that Crossroads is, albeit they do so with less vigor. 
 However, the quantity or quality of the variable is not the 
touchstone to an equal protection claim, it is the presence of a 
variable in one prosecution and the absence in those not 
prosecuted that is determinative. 
¶56 According to Crossroads, the variable upon which its 
prosecution was based and which gives rise to the inference of 
impermissible 
discrimination 
is 
that 
only 
those 
stores 
specializing in sexually explicit (though perhaps not obscene) 
materials, and advertising on an interstate highway, have been 
prosecuted.  The video stores in the "control group" do not 
specialize in these videos, although they do sell and rent such 
videos.  Crossroads claims that the discrimination is "thus 
squarely based upon the defendant's exercise of its First 
No.  97-0642 
 
30
Amendment rights to sell sexually explicit materials which are, 
after all, 'presumptively protected by the First Amendment.'" 
¶57 Here, Crossroads provided no preliminary showing that 
those similarly situated were not prosecuted because they were 
not exercising their First Amendment rights as was Crossroads.  
Under the circumstances, such a claim would be quite difficult, 
as its allegation implicitly demonstrates that the stores which 
were not prosecuted were indeed exercising the same First 
Amendment rights that Crossroads itself is. 
¶58 A showing 
under 
the 
discriminatory 
effect 
prong 
necessarily requires the presence of some variable which 
demonstrates that a member of a suspect class or individual 
exercising a fundamental right is being prosecuted while those 
not in the suspect class, or not exercising their fundamental 
rights, are not prosecuted.  Only if Crossroads could show that 
it was prosecuted for exercising its right to sell protected 
sexually explicit material while the others did not exercise 
that same right could they have successfully established the 
first prong of their claim.  Here, both the prosecuted and 
unprosecuted are exercising their First Amendment rights to sell 
sexually explicit material. 
¶59 Kenosha County engaged in what is an appropriate use 
of selective prosecution.  Selective prosecution has two 
meanings in the law: 
 
The first is simply failing to prosecute all known 
lawbreakers, whether because of ineptitude or (more 
commonly) because of lack of adequate resources.  The 
resulting pattern of nonenforcement may be random, or 
No.  97-0642 
 
31
an effort may be made to get the most bang for the 
prosecutorial 
buck by 
concentrating on 
the 
most 
newsworthy lawbreakers, but in either case the result 
is that people who are equally guilty of crimes or 
other violations receive unequal treatment, with some 
being punished and others getting off scot-free.  That 
form of selective prosecution, although it involves 
dramatically unequal legal treatment, has no standing 
in equal protection.  (citations omitted).  The second 
form of selective prosecution, and the only one that 
is actionable under the federal Constitution, is where 
the 
decision 
to 
prosecute 
is 
made 
either 
in 
retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional 
right, such as the right to free speech or to the free 
exercise of religion, or because of membership in a 
vulnerable group. 
Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178-79 (7th Cir. 1995).  It is 
this first meaning of selective prosecution that Crossroads has 
objected to, and for which there can be no judicial remedy. 
¶60 We believe the Fourth Circuit correctly identified the 
proper inquiry under the discriminatory effect prong in a case 
such as this:  "defendants are similarly situated when their 
circumstances 
present 
no 
distinguishable 
legitimate 
prosecutorial factors that might justify making prosecutorial 
decisions with respect to them."  United States v. Olvis, 97 
F.3d 739, 744 (4th Cir. 1996). 
¶61 Crossroads' proffer reveals a number of factors which 
must necessarily enter into prosecutorial discretion:  namely, 
the near-exclusive sexually explicit nature of the materials 
sold by Crossroads and Crossroads' prominent location along a 
heavily-traveled 
interstate 
highway. 
 
These 
are 
the 
"distinguishable legitimate prosecutorial factors" we expect a 
No.  97-0642 
 
32
prosecutor to consider in determining his or her priorities in 
charging those who are involved in illegal activity.   
¶62 There is, we may all agree, a fine line between 
sexually explicit material that is within the protection of the 
First Amendment and material which is obscene.  However, a 
prosecutor does not abuse his or her discretion when he or she 
targets those businesses which most publicly present their 
sexually explicit material.   
¶63 It is within Kenosha County's right to regulate 
obscene materials in accordance with Miller.  The county may 
also "crack down" on obscenity, or any other activity which is 
in violation of its county ordinances.  While this court is in 
no position to know what percentage of Crossroads' sexually 
explicit materials are obscene and in violation of the Kenosha 
ordinance, we can find nothing wrong with a prosecutor whose 
first attempts at enforcing a county ordinance focus upon those 
businesses whose inventory is largely made up of such material. 
 If indeed the line between the obscene and the non-obscene is 
finely drawn, prosecutors will undoubtedly find more violations 
of the ordinance at those places where nearly all the materials 
are sexually explicit than they will at mainstream video stores. 
 Further, the advertisement and placement of these businesses on 
the interstate make them highly visible targets, presumably 
unlike the other video stores.  Targeting them can be seen as 
"getting the most bang for the prosecutorial buck."  Esmail, 53 
F.3d at 178.  With these differences, Crossroads has failed to 
No.  97-0642 
 
33
meet 
its 
burden 
in 
making 
a 
prima 
facie 
showing 
of 
discriminatory effect. 
¶64 Nor 
has 
Crossroads 
adequately 
established 
a 
discriminatory purpose behind the prosecutor's decision to 
prosecute it and two others.  It alleges that the prosecutor 
stated that he intended to put the bookstore out of business, 
and offered as evidence of the statement newspaper clippings 
from Kenosha County.  However, in those same clippings, the 
prosecutor states why he intended to put the stores out of 
business: because in his opinion as a prosecutor he believes 
that the bookstores have been in violation of the obscenity 
ordinance since it was first passed.  "Our feeling is that most 
of the inventory probably violates the obscenity ordinance," the 
assistant district attorney was quoted as stating. 
¶65 These 
statements 
do 
not 
indicate 
an 
improper 
prosecutorial motive.  Obscenity is not protected speech and 
prosecutors may rightly target purveyors of obscenity, just as 
they may target those violating other civil and criminal 
statutes.  They may even use the newspapers as a means to notify 
those who are guilty of such violations that they will be 
targeted.  The same newspaper clippings attached to the 
affidavit also make abundantly clear that Kenosha County went 
through a lengthy political process in acquiring an assistant 
district attorney to prosecute violations of the Kenosha County 
obscenity ordinance.  No evidence was provided by Crossroads 
that the district attorney was prosecuting the obscenity 
violation because the district attorney disagreed with the 
No.  97-0642 
 
34
protected, sexually explicit material that Crossroads sold.  
Therefore, no improper motivation may be attributed to the 
assistant district attorney. 
¶66 That the district attorney selected the defendant's 
business because of its prominent location at the entryway to 
the state was a legitimate use of his power.  Further, if the 
district attorney made an incorrect decision, it was a political 
decision, not one to be reviewed by this court. 
V 
¶67 The final issue we address is whether the circuit 
court erred by excluding evidence offered by Crossroads as proof 
of 
community 
standards. 
 
Specifically, 
Crossroads 
sought 
admission 
of 
a 
telephone 
survey 
purporting 
to 
establish 
community standards in Wisconsin with respect to sexually 
explicit materials, the expert testimony of Dr. Joseph Scott, 
and numerous video tapes which Crossroads alleged were materials 
comparable to "Anal Vision No. 5." 
¶68 Upon review of evidentiary issues, this court does not 
consider the issues de novo, but instead must determine whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
properly 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
accordance with accepted legal standards and in accordance with 
the facts of record.  State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 
N.W.2d 498  (1983).  The test is not whether this court agrees 
with the circuit court's ruling, but rather, whether the circuit 
court properly exercised its discretion.  Id.  The circuit court 
does 
not 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion 
where 
its 
determination has a reasonable basis.  Id.  To be upheld, 
No.  97-0642 
 
35
however, a discretionary decision must be supported by "evidence 
in the record that discretion was in fact exercised and the 
basis of that exercise of discretion should be set forth."  Id. 
(quoting State v. Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d 754, 764, 159 N.W.2d 733 
(1968)). 
The Telephone Survey 
¶69 Crossroads made a proffer of a telephone survey as 
evidence of statewide community standards in the area of 
sexually explicit material.  With respect to the survey 
responses which are material to this appeal, survey respondents 
were first read the following passage: 
 
The next few questions deal with adult x-rated videos 
and sexually explicit magazines.  These videos and 
magazines may have little or no plot.  Their contents 
are primarily graphic depictions of nudity and sex, 
showing 
a 
variety 
of 
actual 
sexual 
activities, 
including: vaginal intercourse, ejaculation, bondage, 
oral sex, masturbation, anal sex, use of vibrators, 
lesbian sex, group sex and variations of these by 
adult performers.  No minors are involved, and these 
materials can only be purchased, rented or viewed by 
adults who desire them. 
Respondents were to consider this passage when opining as to the 
following questions: 1) whether Wisconsin standards had changed 
to the extent that nudity and sex in magazines and videos were 
"more or less acceptable today than in recent years;" 2) whether 
the portrayal of sexual conduct in videos and magazines is 
acceptable for adults who want to obtain them; 3) whether it is 
acceptable for "such videos and magazines to be sold or rented 
to adults;" 4) whether, as adults themselves, the respondents 
should be able to legally obtain and view such videos and 
No.  97-0642 
 
36
magazines; 5) whether neighborhood video stores should be 
allowed to rent or sell such videos to adults; 6) whether the 
respondent's viewing of depictions of actual sex acts, including 
close-ups of sexual organs, would appeal to his or her own 
"shameful, morbid, or unhealthy interest in sex;" and 7) whether 
the same would appeal to their best friend's "shameful, morbid, 
or unhealthy interest in sex." 
¶70 Kenosha County objected to the introduction of this 
evidence, and the circuit court, following its thoughtful 
deliberation, refused to admit the evidence on grounds that the 
survey was not relevant to the question of whether "Anal Vision 
No. 5" was obscene and that the admission of the survey would 
tend to confuse the jury.  The circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in reaching these conclusions. 
¶71 Expert 
testimony 
on 
the 
question 
of 
community 
standards is not constitutionally required, Hamling, 418 U.S. at 
104, although we admit that evidence of community standards may 
be helpful to a jury in its deliberation.  As Justice 
Frankfurter stated in his concurring opinion in Smith v. People, 
361 U.S. 147 (1959): 
 
The determination of obscenity no doubt rests with 
judge or jury.  Of course the testimony of experts 
would not displace judge or jury in determining the 
ultimate question whether the particular book is 
obscene, any more than the testimony of experts 
relating to the state of the art in patent suits 
determines the patentability of a controverted device. 
 
There is no external measuring rod for obscenity. 
 Neither, on the other hand, is its ascertainment a 
merely subjective reflection of the taste or moral 
No.  97-0642 
 
37
outlook of individual jurors or individual judges.  
Since the law through its functionaries is 'applying 
contemporary community standards' in determining what 
constitutes obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476, 489,  . . . it surely must be deemed rational, 
and therefore relevant to the issue of obscenity, to 
allow light to be shed on what those 'contemporary 
community standards' are. 
Id. at 165. 
¶72 When properly conducted, a survey may be admitted for 
the purpose of shedding light on community standards.  However, 
telephone surveys which ask respondents to opine about the 
availability and acceptance of "actual depictions of sexual 
activity" in magazines and videos in their communities are not 
relevant to the determination of obscenity in a particular 
instance, particularly where the respondent is to opine about 
sexually explicit material in the abstract. 
¶73 The Seventh Circuit has offered a sensible approach to 
the use of surveys on this question:  "If surveys are to be 
used, they must be taken in the relevant area; they must address 
material clearly akin to the material in dispute, and they must 
be good studies by the usual standards."  United States v. 
Various Articles of Merchandise, 750 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 
1984).  The second of these three prongs, in particular, ensures 
that the survey is relevant with respect to the material for 
which the prosecution began.  See United States v. Pryba, 678 F. 
Supp. 1225, 1229 (E.D. Va. 1988) ("To be admissible, however, a 
public opinion poll must be relevant; it must ask questions 
concerning the materials involved in the case or works that are 
'clearly akin' to the charged materials"). 
No.  97-0642 
 
38
¶74 The requirement states the obvious.  To be admissible, 
evidence must be relevant.  Wis. Stat. § 904.02.  Relevant 
evidence is that which has any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
evidence.  Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  In an obscenity trial, to be 
admissible as relevant, we hold that a survey must bear a strong 
relationship to the type of material that is charged in the case 
or to works that are "clearly akin" to the charged material.  
Various Articles, 750 F.2d 596. 
¶75 In the instant case, as the circuit court determined, 
the innocuous description of the types of activities the survey 
respondent was to consider is too far removed from the graphic 
scenes of sexual activity in "Anal Visions No. 5" to be relevant 
on the question of whether that particular video is obscene. 
¶76 In this survey, the description of sexual activities 
that a survey respondent is to consider, as well as the follow-
up questions, are not materially different from those asked in 
the survey which was the result of the appeal in Pryba, 678 F. 
Supp. 1225.  As that court noted, two problems emerge from the 
survey: 
first, 
the 
surveys 
do 
"not 
question 
respondents 
regarding the materials at issue or similar materials, but 
rather inquire [] into their opinions on the viewing of 'nudity 
and sex,' defined broadly."  Id. at 1229.  Second, the questions 
are not directed at determining whether sexually explicit 
material enjoys community acceptance.  Id. at 1230. 
No.  97-0642 
 
39
¶77 The most serious problem in this survey and other 
"abstract" surveys is that they do not describe with any 
verisimilitude the sexual activities depicted in this video and 
for which the current prosecution is brought.  The bland, 
"descriptive" language of this survey does not adequately 
describe the impact of the visual images provided in "Anal 
Vision No. 5."  See id., at 1229-30.  Here, the circuit court 
believed that the survey language did not adequately convey to 
those responding to the survey the scenes from within this film 
to make the survey relevant to the question of community 
standards on obscenity. 
¶78 Therein 
lies 
the 
inherent 
difficulty 
in 
using 
telephone surveys to assess the prevailing community standards 
on the issue of obscenity.  Survey questions such as the ones 
used in this survey simply do not convey the degree of sexual 
explicitness that the video images of the film in this case do. 
 Here, particularly, truth rings loudly in the oft-used phrase 
"a picture is worth a thousand words."  As the circuit court 
noted, there are no doubt those who will reply in one manner 
when responding to a short survey description containing the 
mechanical 
terms 
"fellatio 
or 
cunnilingus 
or 
sexual 
intercourse," and may have a much different response following 
their review of these activities displayed in a video. 
¶79 Because the survey respondents were not "sufficiently 
apprised of the nature of the charged materials, the responses 
to the poll [are] irrelevant to the issues involved in this 
case."  Pryba, 678 F. Supp. at 1229-30.  The survey is "not 
No.  97-0642 
 
40
probative on whether the charged materials enjoy community 
acceptance." 
 
The survey questions merely inquired as to general 
opinions concerning the depiction of 'nudity and sex,' 
defined as 'exposure of the genitals and sexual 
activity,' 
and 
whether 
adults 
should 
have 
the 
opportunity to obtain such materials. . . . Whether or 
not 76 of 100 persons would say that the change in 
'standards' over recent years in the depiction of 
nudity and sexual activities is 'more acceptable' does 
not show that those same persons would find that the 
[materials] in question depicted sex and nudity in an 
'acceptable' manner.  There was no attempt in the 
survey itself to determine whether the respondents 
were 
of 
the 
opinion 
that 
the 
contents 
of 
the 
[materials at issue] would or would not exceed the 
limits of permissible candor in the depiction of 
'nudity and sex.'  
Id. at 1229 (quoting Flynt v. Georgia, 264 S.E.2d 669, 672 (Ga. 
App. 1980)). 
¶80 The view that we adopt today is shared by numerous 
other state and federal courts, as the failure of a defendant to 
demonstrate how an abstract question regarding the availability 
of sexually explicit materials relates to the material for which 
prosecution is being sought.  See Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 
N.E.2d 1216 (Mass. 1978) (the absence of any connection between 
the willingness, the lack of willingness, or the indifference of 
a group to the sale of sexually explicit magazines of the 
showing of sexually explicit films and whether the particular 
sexual conduct involved in the case was depicted in a patently 
offensive manner made the survey evidence irrelevant); see also 
State v. Roland, 362 S.E.2d 800, 804 (N.C. App. 1987) (evidence 
of survey responses following questions dealing primarily with 
No.  97-0642 
 
41
public tolerance of sexually explicit materials in general, 
rather than with acceptance of the materials under scrutiny, was 
properly disallowed as being irrelevant);  State v. Williams, 
598 N.E.2d 1250, 1257 (Ohio App. 1991) ("On the issue of 
relevance, the poll must be relevant to a determination of both 
community standards in general and the community's acceptance of 
viewing the particular film in question." (emphasis supplied)).  
¶81 We find that a relevant survey must also address 
whether the material at issue depicts sexual acts in a patently 
offensive manner, and whether the material at issue appeals to 
the prurient interest.  See United States v. Pryba, 678 F. Supp. 
at 1229 (citing Various Articles, 750 F.2d at 599); Trainor, 374 
N.E.2d at 1220.  Flynt, 264 S.E.2d 669.   
¶82 The circuit court judge expressed a concern that the 
reference in the survey to "graphic depiction[s]" of various 
sexual acts did not describe the material in question.  He 
further concluded that had the survey respondents been shown 
"Anal Vision No. 5," the survey may have had some value, but 
absent that showing, it did not.  The court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion when it ruled that if the survey were 
admitted, there was a substantial risk of confusing the jury 
thereby precluding its admissibility. 
¶83 Crossroads' survey failed to both seek and elicit 
information regarding the patent offensiveness and the prurient 
appeal of the depiction at issue in this case.  To the contrary, 
the survey sought to elicit an opinion about (1) whether 
consenting adults should have the right to rent or purchase 
No.  97-0642 
 
42
films showing "nudity and sex," (2) whether the customer has a 
prurient interest when and if viewing "nudity and sex," and (3) 
whether nudity and sex in movies has become more or less 
acceptable in recent years.  These three inquiries were 
irrelevant as decided by the court. 
¶84 In actuality, the survey consisted of the "consenting 
adult" defense which the United States Supreme Court rejected in 
Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49.  Here, the circuit court 
judge noted that the survey "dealt with whether [survey 
respondents] 
felt 
[sexually 
explicit 
material] 
should 
be 
available to those who want to look at it, which is a different 
question altogether as to whether this work is obscene . . . ." 
 The fact that materials are distributed to willing, consenting 
adults is no defense to the distribution of obscenity.  See 
Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 57 ("We categorically 
disapprove the theory, apparently adopted by the trial judge, 
that obscene, pornographic films acquire constitutional immunity 
from state regulation simply because they are exhibited for 
consenting adults only"). 
The 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in refusing to admit the 
survey. 
¶85 As for the expert testimony of Dr. Scott, absent the 
community survey, his testimony is not relevant to the question 
of community standards.  In any event, expert testimony 
regarding community standards is not required in an obscenity 
determination.  See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49, 56.   
 
No.  97-0642 
 
43
This 
not 
a 
subject 
that 
lends 
itself 
to 
the 
traditional use of expert testimony.  Such testimony 
is usually admitted for the purpose of explaining to 
lay jurors what they otherwise could not understand. . 
. .  No such assistance is needed by jurors in 
obscenity 
cases; 
indeed, 
the 
"expert 
witness" 
practices employed in these cases have often made a 
mockery out of the otherwise sound concept of expert 
testimony.  
Id. at 56 n.6 (citations omitted). We agree with the Supreme 
Court that obscenity is not a subject that lends itself to the 
traditional use of expert testimony, and that "films, obviously, 
are the best evidence of what they represent."  Id. 
"Comparable" Videos 
¶86 Crossroads also appeals the circuit court's decision 
finding inadmissible evidence of videos Crossroads alleged were 
"comparable" to "Anal Vision No. 5."  Crossroads' proffer 
consisted of two categories of videos: first, two sexually 
explicit videos which in previous litigation involving the 
Kenosha ordinance, the videos were found to be non-obscene by a 
jury.  Second, six sexually explicit videos purchased or rented 
in Kenosha County and which Crossroads alleged were comparable 
to "Anal Vision No. 5." 
¶87 The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its 
discretion in disallowing videotapes from either grouping.  "If 
consistency in jury verdicts as to the obscenity vel non of 
identical materials is not constitutionally required, Miller v. 
California, [], the same is true a fortiori of verdicts as to 
separate materials, regardless of their similarities."  Hamling, 
418 U.S. at 101.  The presentation of the two videos which were 
No.  97-0642 
 
44
found not to be obscene in prior jury trials could only work to 
confuse this jury.   
¶88 Further, as to the six "comparable" videos, it is 
axiomatic that community tolerance or availability does not 
equate with acceptability or non-obscenity. See Pryba, 678 F. 
Supp. at 1230.  The mere availability of the material is not 
indicative of community standards.  All these video tapes could 
be obscene, just as the jury found that "Anal Vision No. 5" was. 
  
¶89 Finally, as the circuit court found, the video tapes 
here which were offered as evidence were not comparable to "Anal 
Vision No. 5."  The video tape itself is the best evidence of 
its obscenity, Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 56, and the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in 
declining to allow the other tapes as evidence of community 
standards. 
By the Court.—The judgment of the Kenosha County Circuit 
Court is affirmed.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  97-0642 
 
45
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1